The Christian Metaphysics of St Maximus the Confessor: Creation, World-Order, and Redemption (Instrumenta Patristica Et Mediaevalia - Subsidia Maximiana, 90) [1 ed.] 2503600859, 9782503600857

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THE CHRISTIAN METAPHYSICS OF ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

I N S T R V M E N TA PAT R I S T I C A E T M E D I A E VA L I A

Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity

90 S v b si di a

m a x i m i a na

2

THE CHRISTIAN METAPHYSICS OF ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR CREATION, WORLD-ORDER, AND REDEMPTION

Torstein Theodor Tollefsen

2023

I N S T R V M E N TA PAT R I S T I C A E T M E D I A E VA L I A Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity

Founded by Dom Eligius Dekkers († 1998)

Svbsidia

maximiana

Editorial responsibility

Alexis Léonas (Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary) & Vladimir Cvetkovic (Belgrade University, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory) Publishing manager

Bart Janssens Editorial board

Paul Blowers (Emmanuel Christian Seminary), Anthony Dupont (KU Leuven), Bronwen Neil (Macquarie University), Bram Roosen (KU Leuven), Torstein Tollefsen (University of Oslo), Peter Van Deun (KU Leuven)

D/2023/0095/18 ISBN 978-2-503-60085-7 E-ISBN 978-2-503-60086-4 DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.130169 ISSN 1379-9878 E-ISSN 2294-8457 © 2023, Brepols Publishers n. v./s.a., Turnhout, Belgium. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Printed in the EU on acid-free paper.

Table of Contents Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Byzantine Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Christian Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Clarity, Consistency, Coherency . . . . . . . . . 18 Context and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A Terminological Note . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1. Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Revelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The Fall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Virtue and Contemplation . . . . . . . . . . . 35 The Ancient Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Knowledge of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Maximus’ Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 2. Knowledge of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Statements of Cataphatic and Apophatic Knowledge . . 57 Cataphatic Knowledge of the Trinity . . . . . . . 61 Being and Subsistence . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Essence as Immanent Power of Being . . . . . . . 66 Monad and Triad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Trinity: 1+1+1=3? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Father, Son, and Holy Sprit . . . . . . . . . . 75 Divine Concealment: Apophaticism . . . . . . . . 82 Divine Concealment: Transcendence . . . . . . . . 89 3. Maximus’ Doctrine of Creation in Context . . . . . . 93 Fourth Century Prelude . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Attack and Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 John Philoponus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Maximus on Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Divine Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

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4. The Logos and the Logoi . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 The Platonic Legacy . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Metaphysics of Prepositions . . . . . . . . . . 125 The Johannine Logos . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 What God Knows . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Logoi and difference . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Principles of Knowledge, Principles of Making . . . 131 Infinitely Many Logoi? . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 The Maximian Logoi and the Porphyrian Tree . . . . 136 One Logos, Many Logoi . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Procession and Conversion . . . . . . . . . . 141 Maximus’ Doctrine of the Logoi . . . . . . . . . 144 5. Logoi and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 The Meaning of ἐνέργεια in the Philosophical Tradition 146 Internal and External Activity . . . . . . . . . 149 Divine Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Unity and Plurality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Activities and Logoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 6. Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 The Universal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 Philosophical Background . . . . . . . . . . . 175 The Porphyrian Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Holomerism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 7. Incarnation and Deification . . . . . . . . . . . 203 The Incarnation, Some Historical Notes . . . . . . 204 St Maximus on the Incarnation . . . . . . . . . 209 The Hypostatic Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Essence and Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 Deification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 8. Corollaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 General Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Preface Several years after the publication of my first book on Maximus and after several years of reading, discussing with collegaues, and reflection, I have now completed the writing of my second book on Maximus the Confessor. After having read the pages published here again and again, I do not feel completely satisfied with the final result. There is still a lot that remains unclear to me, and many details are still in need of renewed philosophical reflection. However, I hope the present book, with all its shortcomings, may stimulate further discussion of Maximus’ writings. Throughout my work, I have profited a lot from discussions with my colleagues in “The International Byzantine Philosophy Reading Group”. I am grateful to all of them: Vladimir Cvetkovic, Sebastian Mateiescu, Dionysios Skliris, and Sotiris Mitralexis. I will also warmely thank Dimitrios Vasilakis and Ralph Vaags who have been so kind as to comment on earlier drafts of the first chapters. Their remarks helped a great deal in my further work. I am also grateful to fr. Andrew Louth who commented on a draft for the section on deification (Chapter 7). I warmely thank Panagiotis Pavlos for having read through the manuscript critically and for having checked the Greek quotations and translations. Alexis Léonas read through the whole manuscript as well and gave valuable comments. I am very grateful for this. Lal Dingluaia has meticulously constructed the Indices from my rather helpless list of entries. He did a job for which I am very grateful. Finally, I thank the series editors Alexis Léonas and Vladimir Cvetkovic for their encouragement and support. The responsibility for all flaws and mistakes rest solely with me. I am grateful for a grant from the Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas at the University of Oslo, that financed proofreading and the professional working out of the index. Torstein Theodor Tollefsen

List of Abbreviations Works by Maximus For the text of Amb.Ioh. I use Constas’ slightly revised edition (which uses PG pagination) Amb.Ioh., Ambigua ad Iohannem Amb.Thom., Ambigua ad Thomam Car., Capita de caritate D.P., Disputatio cum Pyrrho E.O.D., Expositio orationis dominicae L.A., Liber asceticus Myst., Mystagogia Op., Opuscula theologica et polemica Q.D., Quaestiones et dubia Q.Thal., Quaestiones ad Thalassium Th.Oec., Capita theologica et oeconomica

Other texts ACA, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle CAG, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca CCT, Corpus Christianorum in Translation CCSG, Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca Contra Proclum, Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum GCS, Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte DN, Dionysius the Areopagite, De Divinis Nominibus GNO, Gregorii Nysseni Opera LCL, The Loeb Classical Library MT, Dionysius the Areopagite, De Mystica Theologia NPNF, Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church PG, Patrologia Graeca

Introduction As is seen in the title, the topic of this book is the metaphysics of St Maximus the Confessor. In several places below, I use the formula “Maximus’ doctrine of”. This needs an explanation. In the context of what a Christian denomination teaches, in the history of Christian dogma and controversy, the term “doctrine” means something like formulas of Christian beliefs (fides quae creditur). There are in fact such dogmatic beliefs at the basis of Maximus thought. However, the formula “Maximus’ doctrine of” does not have this “confessional” character but should be understood philosophically, similar to formulas like “Aristotle's doctrine of”. As such it denotes the typical Maximian philosophy that meditates philosophically with the dogmas as referential horizon. What we call metaphysics, Aristotle called “first philosophy” and “theology”. In the first book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle says: For the most divine science is also most honourable; and this science alone must be, in two ways, most divine. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for (1) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better.1

This description of metaphysics fits what we find in Maximus’ writings. The highest science or the highest kind of knowledge is knowledge of the divine or of God. For this reason, this book opens with two chapters on knowledge, knowledge of the world (Chapter 1) and knowledge of God (Chapter 2). Maximus claims that to reach true knowledge of the universe we need to develop virtues, since a vicious or passionate relationship with our sur1  Metaphysics Α, 2, 983a5–11. Ross’ translation from Aristotle, Metaphysics, Translated by W. D. Ross, Stilwell, 2006 (Digireads.com Book), p. 5.

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roundings blocks us from proper and true understanding of the essence of beings. When it comes to knowledge of God, Maximus tries to find a delicate balance between two kinds of approach, namely the so-called apophatic and cataphatic discourse, answering respectively to the transcendent and the revealed being of God. When Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, discusses the features of first philosophy, he says that philosophy starts with wonder and advances gradually from the lesser to the higher matters before it ends by asking about the origin of the universe (τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως).2 The third chapter of the present book, reasonably, discusses Maximus’ doctrine of creation. In the background we have the tension between Neoplatonist and Christian approaches to the issue of creation in the first part of the sixth century. Aristotle says “this science” treats of “divine objects” or “the divine” (τὰ θεία). In chapters 4–6 below, I treat of divine matters like the principles behind the world order (Chapter 4), the activity of God in His dealings with His creation (Chapter 5), and the divinely instituted order of nature itself (Chapter 6). The principles behind the world-order are certain Forms (logoi, see below) eternally conceived in the divine intellect. When God establishes the world-order through His activity, He acts in accordance with these Forms. The order God institutes is a part-whole system in accordance with which all beings are ontologically interconnected and related. In the last chapter, I discuss Maximus’ doctrine of the Incarnation of the second person of the Holy Trinity, a subject that does not immediately sound very “metaphysical” or “philosophical”. However, as will be explained below (in Chapter 7), even this topic can be treated philosophically. The book ends with what I have called “Corollaries”. This is not just a recapitulation of what has been said throughout the chapters, but a try to show how the late ancient metaphysics described may have an important lesson to teach us concerning our attitudes towards and treatment of the environment. In short, I shall argue that Maximus’ metaphysics has relevance even today. Maximus is a Byzantine and a Christian. He is an important figure in the history of theology; I treat him as a philosopher. Even if I already have pointed out why I consider him such, I 2 

Metaphysics Α, 2, 982b12–17.

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believe we need to shed some light on two relevant classificatory categories, namely “Byzantine philosophy” and “Christian philosophy”. Byzantine Philosophy I see no need to enter into the general discussion of what Byzantine philosophy is and therefore restrict myself to consider why I reckon Maximus a philosopher. 3 Gutas and Siniossoglou say the following in a rather polemical chapter in The Cambridge Intellectual History of Byzantium: It can be stated that philosophical discourse aims at arriving at a mutual understanding or rational consensus among interlocutors through an open-ended process, that is, without the interference of externally imposed restrictions.4

The problem, as these two authors see it, is that the “philosophizing” of a Byzantine intellectual, for instance Maximus the Confessor, is restricted by the dogmas of Christian Orthodoxy. They continue to say that Greek-speaking Orthodox Christianity “had to define itself for its very essence as the correction, transformation, or simply negation of Hellenism as a worldview”.5 I see some problems with this opinion. First, Gutas and Siniossoglou seem to have a curious notion of what “Orthodoxy” is. What they write creates the impression that Orthodoxy or dogma defines some kind of total (totalitarian?) doctrine of how to live and what to think of the universe. For anyone acquainted with the history of the dogmatic controversies and the definition of dogma, this sounds rather strange. There is no comprehensive dogmatic worldview. Secondly, Gutas and Siniossoglou seem to portray the Byzantine Christian thinker, even if he belongs to the comparatively early period, as a person 3  For discussions of Byzantine philosophy, cf. K. Ierodiakonou, Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, Oxford, 2006, pp.  1–13 and B.  Bydén, K.  Ierodiakonou, The many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy, Athens, 2012, pp.  1–21, D.  Gutas, N. Siniossoglou, “Philosophy and ‘Byzantine Philosophy’”, in A. Kaldellis, N. Siniossoglou, The Cambridge Intellectual History of Byzantium, Cambridge, 2017, pp.  271–95. 4  Gutas, Siniossoglou, “Philosophy”, p. 277. 5  Gutas, Siniossoglou, “Philosophy”, p. 279.

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constrained to have certain beliefs, not as someone who is a Christian by conviction. In the late Roman or early Byzantine world there were still many people, especially among those belonging to philosophical schools, that were pagan. Objectively speaking, you did not have to be Christian if your convictions did not accord with Christianity. On the other hand, the possibilities of living a pagan life were gradually restricted. The Symbol of faith (the Nicene Creed) defined dogma in early Byzantium. The Symbol of faith states that God is the creator of the world, that the Son of God fulfilled the divine Economy, that the Holy Spirit should be worshipped together with the Father and the Son, and that there is one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church. What I consider Maximus’ metaphysics or philosophy touches upon these points rather slightly. Of course, “God” for him is the Trinity, and I have devoted Chapter 2 to a discussion of how to know and name God as such. As far as that is concerned, I cannot see that Maximus does not reason “philosophically” about it. (If Plotinus’ three primary hypostases belong to philosophy, why not the Christian Trinity? If St Augustine’s De Trintate is Philosophy, why is not Maximus’ mediations on how we may know God?) Chapter 7 below is on the Incarnation, and this chapter, likewise, follows Maximus into a philosophical analysis of that subject. The remaining chapters below (chapters 3–6) are on metaphysical topics that are not at all restricted by dogmatic concerns. As I shall show in Chapter 3, the divine creation of the world was an issue between Neoplatonist and Christian thinkers. There was some common ground between them but they disagreed in certain respects. Maximus’ philosophy of the creation has some aspects that are rather surprising, aspects that other Christian thinkers maybe would not accept. However, his opinions are not dictated by any “Orthodoxy”. Maximus’ doctrine of the principles of cosmic order and of the features of this order is an original contribution that is definitely not dictated by “externally imposed restrictions”. It is correct that Maximus generally seems fit to oppose the “Hellenic” worldview argumentatively but I really cannot see how this in any way disqualifies his thought as being philosophy. Philosophers disagree with one another. That is common knowledge. To claim that Maximus’ particular disagreement with the “Hel-

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lenes” is because he is constrained to be a Byzantine Christian with predefined opinions, falls on its own unreasonableness. There are instances in which he explicitly accepts the wisdom of those outside of the church. There are a lot more instances in which he philosophizes the way he does because of his acquaintance with pagan Neoplatonism. It seems to me that Gutas’ and Siniossoglou’s conception of what philosophy is, amounts to some kind of perennial scepticism.6 Even if a critical attitude is part and parcel of being a philosopher, scepticism does not have to be. Several major philosophers have fought scepticism. Maximus is a Byzantine philosopher because he lived in a particular historical epoch and, I should add, because he lived in an evolving culture marked by Christian convictions. He therefore used his intellectual resources to philosophize as a Christian within this culture. Christian Philosophy The words Maximus’ metaphysics and philosophy should be qualified by the word “Christian”, it is a Christian philosophy. Plantinga published an inspiring paper in 1992, called “Augustinian Christian Philosophy”.7 In this paper he distinguishes between four elements of this kind of philosophy. The first of these is philosophical theology, which is “a matter of thinking about the central doctrines of the Christian faith from a philosophical perspective”.8 The second and third are apologetics and Christian philosophical criticism.9 All three approaches describe and prescribe important philosophical engagements. The fourth element Plantinga calls “positive Christian philosophy” and he describes it thus:10 “a fourth crucial element of Christian philosophy is thinking about the sorts of questions philosophers ask and answer from an explicitly Christian point of view”. He continues: 6 

Gutas, Siniossoglou, “Philosophy”, pp. 276–77. “Augustinian Christian Philosophy”, The Monist, vol. 75 (1992), pp. 291–320. 8  Plantinga, “Augustinian Christian Philosophy”, pp. 291–92. 9  Plantinga, “Augustinian Christian Philosophy”, pp.  292–95 and pp.  295–308. 10  Plantinga, “Augustinian Christian Philosophy”, p. 308. 7 A. Plantinga,

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introduction For most of these questions, what is really crucial is theism — the proposition that there is an almighty, all-knowing wholly good and loving person who has created the world and created human beings in his image — rather than specifically Christian doctrine; so we could call this fourth element ‘theistic philosophy’. Whatever we call it, the project in question is that of thinking about philosophical questions, taking for granted or starting from theism.11

Both from the Aristotelian point of view as well as from Plantingas’ point of view, what Maximus does would count as metaphysics and Christian philosophy. Typical Aristotelian questions are, as we saw above and as we can gather from his writings, “what is the origin of the universe?”, “what are the basic causes and principles at work in all beings?”, “how is the universe structured?”. These are questions addressed by Maximus as well, from a theistic point of view or, more precisely, from a Christian point of view. In this Maximian endeavour, we also find treatments of the Christian God as the holy Trinity and of the Incarnation. The first, which I treat in Chapter 2, is really an investigation of how we may apply language when we talk of a divinity that is beyond comprehension. The second, which I treat in Chapter 7, is an investigation of how ontological categories may be applied when we talk of an event that in its core is a mystery. Both of these are philosophical approaches to mysteries whether these approaches are philosophical theology or theistic philosophy. I accept Plantinga’s description of Christian philosophy and find it, as said above, inspiring and, I would add, very useful. Maximus’ thought definitely answers to Plantinga’s descriptions both as a belonging to the history of ancient philosophy and, I claim, as a contribution to the enrichment of contemporary theistic philosophy.12 However, the present book is mainly a contribution to the history of philosophy and it is only in the last section, called “Corollaries”, where I try to sketch how we may situate Maximian metaphysics contemporarily. 11 

Plantinga, “Augustinian Christian Philosophy”, pp. 308–09. Gerson ed., The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Cambridge, 2010, contains a chapter on Maximus by D. Bradshaw, “Maximus the Confessor”, pp. 813–28. 12  L. P.

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What is written above shows that I treat St Maximus the Confessor’s cosmological thought as a metaphysical or philosophical doctrine in the tradition of Aristotelian first philosophy or theology. Even so, his philosophy is not Aristotelianism or Platonism in the sense that it eclectically fits together elements from one or both of these traditions into a kind of Christian system. His philosophy is his own. That means: I claim he has a rather original approach. It is quite clear, on the other hand, that Maximus adopts and adapts elements from these traditions into his own system. However, the Aristotelianism of his philosophy is the Aristotelianism of late ancient Neoplatonism. His logic, ontology, and metaphysics apply categories and concepts that Christian controversies and schools of Neoplatonism have already used and developed. Some scholars want to label Maximus’ thought “Christian Platonism”. I myself have written a paper in which I treated Maximus under this heading.13 The term may be useful since it places Maximus in a tradition with some common features, namely the acceptance of a certain vocabulary, of a certain logic, of certain metaphysical ideas and structures. The vocabulary is the same as is found in almost any Christian writer in late antiquity. It includes well-known terms like οὐσία, ἐνέργεια, δύναμις, εἶδος, γένος, ὑπόστασις,  etc. In the sphere of logic, we find traditions of the Porphyrian treatment of Aristotelian categories in Ammonius (c.  445 –517/26) and his followers. When it comes to forms of argumentation, they are probably inherited both from Aristotelian and Stoic tradition. Among metaphysical ideas and structures, we find for instance the notion of Ideas in the mind of God and of the procession and conversion (πρόοδος καὶ ἐπιστροφή) of all being in relation to the divine source. On the other hand, there is also a Christian philosophical criticism of Neoplatonist cosmology, for instance of the eternity of the universe. A Christian philosopher like Maximus is primarily a Christian and not a Platonist, even if it is safe to place him in a tradition of Platonism. On this background, I see no harm in labelling Maximus’ thought “Christian Platonism”. 13  T. T. Tollefsen, “Christian Platonism in Byzantium”, in A. J. B. Hampton, J. P. Kenney ed., Christian Platonism, Cambridge, 2021, pp. 207–26.

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Clarity, Consistency, Coherency I claim, as can be seen from the above, that Maximus is a Christian philosopher and that he has a metaphysics. What should we expect from his doctrine in order for it to be philosophical? We should expect intelligent, rational, and systematic treatment that is consistent, coherent, and clear. Everyone acquainted with Maximus’ writings would probably agree that they witness to a person of a formidable intellect. Some of them are hard to digest, partly because of his long and intricate sentences and partly because his ideas are expressed in a rather dense style. However, he is not at all alone among the great minds in the history of philosophy in whom we turn up against this problem. One may think of Aristotle (whose comparatively short sentences does not make understanding any easier), Kant, or Heidegger. Even so, does he express his ideas in a clear manner? The term “clear” does not mean “simple”. It means that his application of key-terminology is according to definitions so that the reader does not get confused with an ambiguous use of terms. When it comes to what I hold to be key-terminology, I think we may say that the usage is clear to a sufficient degree. Maximus’ mind is trained in the Christological controversy and all readers who have tried to understand this late ancient discussion knows the importance of precision, a virtue that often is lacking. Maximus, however, is very keen on terminology and at least in my view, his application of terms is generally clear. In many of his shorter works (Opuscula theologica et polemica, PG 91,  9–285) he tries to clarify relevant terminology. His thought is also, as far as I can see, consistent. There may be inconsistencies, something one may detect in almost any thinker, but there seems to be no striking or major inconsistencies (contradictions) in his doctrines. Further, does he think coherently or are there parts of what he says that are opposed to other parts? Even if a philosophical reader studies his subject systematically and seldom is disturbed by historical issues like “development”, in casu the development of Maximus’ thought, he may admit that certain incoherencies, if they really are that, may be the sign of development. It is a wellknown case that Maximus changed his view on whether Christ had what one often calls a “gnomic” will. If such a concept is central to a prolonged argument, and if the modern interpreter does not consider that it may be explained by “development”, it may give

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the impression of incoherency. However, alleged incoherencies may often turn out not to be that. However that may be, it seems to me that there are no major incoherencies in Maximus’ metaphysics. When I say that Maximus metaphysics is Maximian, I claim, to put it short, that it has originality. His metaphysics in particular has a richness that is not found in any Christian thinker before him, not even in Dionysius the Areopagite, and which we do not find again until Eriugena (c. 800-c. 877). Many of the elements of his thought may be located separately in philosophers and theologians before him, but nobody has brought them together into a comprehensive system like his. That is not all. The elements are not simply brought together, they are thought together, thought together systematically into a unified structure. In this unity they are not just pieces of knowledge fitted together like building blocks. The elements are amplified, developed, dynamically woven into one another so that they result in a doctrine of a pattern of exquisite fabric that is the universe in its relatedness to the divine source. There is nothing similar to this in Christian thought in late antiquity. The different aspects of this system will be treated systematically in the chapters that follow. Context and Contributions Maximus is remembered in the history of Christian theology for the defence of the doctrines of two wills in Christ, a divine and a human. For this reason, his writings are usually read in the context of early doctrinal controversies. He is also much studied because of his anthropology and spirituality. My approach, however, is not very common. I investigate Maximus’ thought as a Christian metaphysics or philosophy on the multifaceted background of ancient and late ancient philosophy and mainstream Christian thought, especially as far as it is relevant for cosmological matters. In modern research, there are relevant pages in three of the pioneers of twentieth century Maximus-studies, namely von Balthasar, Sherwood, and Thunberg.14 In 2008 I published 14 H. Urs

von Balthasar’s Kosmische Liturgie (1941 and 1961) has been translated into English: Cosmic Liturgy, The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, San Francisco, 2003; P. Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor, Rome, 1955; L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, Chicago and La Salle, 1995 (first published in Sweden in 1965).

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my book The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor and the topic, “Christocentric cosmology”, was seven years later (2015) still considered by Allen and Neil among the “new areas of research” in their introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor.15 It seems by now that scholars acknowledge the idea of the Christocentricity of Maximus’ thought in general, as well as of his cosmology in particular. However, when it comes to ground breaking studies in the field of metaphysics the situation seems to be the following: almost everyone who publishes on Maximus at some point refers to metaphysical doctrines, mainly to the doctrine of the logoi. One generally repeats the same relatively simple patterns (already learnt from scholars like von Balthasar, Sherwood, and Thunberg) without asking critical questions and without investigating the different aspects of the doctrines systematically. In short: one uses and refers to metaphysical topics but they are seldom investigated as such. There are, of course, exceptions. In the footnotes and bibliography below, I refer to some interesting contributions that I am aware of and there may, of course, be others that I am not aware of yet. For a student of Maximian metaphysics there is a lot of material to be recommended that may highlight his historical and intellectual context, namely the ever-growing output of translated sources of late ancient Neoplatonist thinkers and of the tradition of the Aristotelian commentators on Aristotle.16 One might also mention the secondary literature on late ancient philosophical and cultural debates to the degree these shed light on the relations and tensions between pagan and Christian thought.17 To what degree does the present book contribute anything new to the field of Maximus’ metaphysics, compared with von Balthasar, Sherwood, Thunberg, and, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor? The present book investigates topics that are not of primary concern for the three pioneers, except 15 T. T.

Tollefsen, “Christocentric Cosmology”, in P. Allen, B. Neil, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2015, pp. 307–21. 16 Cf. especially the series of Ancient Commentators on Aristotle with R.  Sorabji as general editor. 17  For instance M. W. Champion, Explaining the Cosmos, Creation and Cultural Interaction in Late-Antique Gaza, Oxford, 2014 and E. J. Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria, Berkeley, 2008.

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probably for von Balthasar. It further identifies and treats new aspects of Maximus’ thought that have not caught the attention of scholars before. Through years of renewed reflection on the sources and through many discussions with colleagues, especially in “The Byzantine Philosophy Reading Group”, my perception of Maximus’ contribution has, I believe, deepened and developed. I discuss many of the same topics over again but with new and sharpened attention to the contents of the texts. I have also discovered features of Maximus’ system that I mainly missed in my initial work, especially his views of the universal and the “holomeristic” structure of the created world as he considers it (cf. Chapter 6 below). I can only hope that the present book may stimulate further philosophical investigation into Maximus’ thought. I hope for constructive critique that may inspire further research, since I do not believe that last word is said. I recall a conversation in Oxford many years ago. In a break at a small Maximus-conference in the House of St Gregory and St Macrina, I talked with Lars Thunberg and his wife Anne Marie. Anne Marie remarked: “Now there cannot be much more to be said about this guy?” Lars just had a furtive smile. For my own part, I can only say that when I read through the chapters that follow below, it strikes me that each could be developed into a book on its own. A Terminological Note Before we start on the journey through Maximus’ rather intricate and difficult thought, there is one terminological point that I should explain. In the following chapters the terms Logos, logos, and logoi (plural of logos) are used extensively. One should keep in mind the opening verse of the Gospel of John: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” “Word” here is Logos in Greek. Following other scholars, I frequently use the transliterated Greek term. There is a particular reason for this choice. Maximus uses the terminology of logos and logoi extensively. These terms have several senses in his writings (and they could therefore be translated in different ways depending on context) but there is one sense that is especially important for the present investigation. In connection with this sense it is important to keep in mind the connection between the logos/ logoi and the divine Logos (“Word”) of the opening of John’s Gos-

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pel. The Logos contains the logoi. They are His thoughts, Ideas, or internal and external “expressions”, and as such they are the divine principles that encapsulate and are creative of the essences of beings. Whatever way one chooses to translate logos, some of its rich conceptual content will be lost. In order to keep the semantics as clear (and as open) as possible, I have chosen, like most other scholars, to keep the transliterated Logos, logos, and logoi.

1. Epistemology The term epistemology sounds remarkably modern. It has connotations that makes one think of Descartes, Hume, Kant, Husserl, etc., thinkers who were interested in how we may gain true, scientific knowledge of the world. St Maximus epistemology naturally differs from this approach. He is not concerned with the problems of how to get scientific knowledge in the modern sense, but with how we may know the divine economy. The divine economy comprises God’s activities in creation, constitution, and regeneration of created beings. As I said in the Introduction, Maximus’ philosophy is a Christian philosophy and as such takes its basic or first principles from revelation. The term “revelation” suggests that there is a supernatural as opposed to a “natural” source of information. However, this is not exactly the case. As we shall see, neither is the revelation limited to “supernatural” events nor does it comprise what is found in Holy Scripture only. God has left traces of His activities in the created world as well. In order to grasp revelation one in any case needs the natural powers of the soul: the powers of sensation and thinking, and especially the power of contemplative thinking, are vital. However, human nature also needs some kind of reform or change for these powers to function properly because human nature is “fallen”. We return below to this notion of a “fall”. Maximus’ epistemology has certain similarities with other pre-modern approaches to the question of how we may achieve true knowledge, knowledge of ourselves, of our societies, and of the natural world. Pre-modern thought has some typical features. In many philosophical systems the knower does not stand in a oneto-one relationship with the object of knowledge. There are higher principles in the hierarchy of being that facilitate the knower’s access to the object of knowledge. We may think of Plato’s allegory of the sun, according to which the Form of the Good is the principle that facilitates the intellect’s access to the intelligible objects of knowledge.1 We may also think of the Augustinian idea 1 Plato,

Republic 508a-e.

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of illumination, according to which the intellect may grasp the truth in an incorporeal light provided by God.2 Maximus nurtures a similar idea. Another similarity with pre-modern thought is the experience of living in a cosmos, a well-ordered world, a world based on divine principles. Further, in ancient and medieval thought one often finds the idea that true knowledge of the object of knowledge presupposes the possession of virtues. We find all these features in the philosophy of Maximus. In this chapter, I investigate how Maximus’ epistemology is based on the idea of divine revelation. Human beings search for knowledge but our minds are in a particular condition of being “clouded”. This is a consequence of the “fall”. We shall consider the nature of this consequence and see how it affects human understanding of the created world. We shall also see that the development of virtues and contemplation are essential for a true grasp of the meaning of being. In a preliminary sketch, we shall also see how Maximus thinks we may have knowledge of God. Revelation For Maximus and his theological and philosophical tradition, God is completely incomprehensible and hidden beyond everything that possesses being. Even so, God is believed to be the maker of the cosmos and therefore humans have some kind of access to Him. In order for human beings to know God and to know the meaning of His creation by using the powers of the soul, God has to reveal Himself. In Ambiguum 33 Maximus talks about a threefold divine embodiment or presence in the world, and this amounts to a threefold revelation. Interpreters often take this to mean a threefold incarnation. 3 Maximus comments on a saying from St Gregory the Theologian, which says that the Logos “becomes thick”.4 The Logos “becomes thick” (παχύνεται) in (1) His incarnate presence 2 

De Trinitate 12.15.24. For interpretation, cf. R. H. Nash, “Illumination, Divine”, in Augustine through the Ages, ed. by A. D. Fitzgerald, Grand Rapids, Cambridge, 1999, pp.  438–40. 3 Cf. L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, Chicago and La Salle, 1995, p. 77. 4 Gregory the Theologian, Oratio 38, cf. Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 38–41, ed. C. Moreschini, P. Gallay, Paris, 1990 (SC 358), p. 106.

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as well as in (2) the logoi of beings and in (3) the letters, syllables, and sounds of Scripture.5 The primary instance of revelation is the historical Incarnation of the Logos Himself (1). We shall see how this event furnishes the key to perceive and grasp the revelatory traces in beings (2) and in the Scriptures (3). According to the Gospel of John, the Logos “became flesh” (σὰρξ ἐγένετο) and the apostles “beheld His glory” (John 1:14). In Ambiguum 10 Maximus develops this further and offers a contemplation (θεωρία) of the transfiguration of Christ, an event in which the apostles definitely beheld Christ’s glory.6 Matthew describes the transfiguration in the following words (17:1–8): Now after six days Jesus took Peter, James, and John his brother, led them up a high mountain by themselves; and He was transfigured before them. His face shone like the sun, and His clothes became as white as the light. And, behold, Moses and Elijah appeared to them, talking with Him. Then Peter answered and said to Jesus, ‘Lord, it is good for us to be here; if You wish, let us make here three tabernacles; one for You, one for Moses, and one for Elijah.’ While he was speaking, behold, a bright cloud overshadowed them; and suddenly a voice came out of the cloud, saying, ‘This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. Hear Him!’ And when the disciples heard it, they fell on their faces and were greatly afraid. But Jesus came and touched them and said, ‘Arise, and do not be afraid.’ When they had lifted up their eyes, they saw no one but Jesus only.

As said above, Maximus’ interpretation points to the incarnate Logos as the primary event and vehicle of revelation. Matthew says, “His face shone like the sun”. According to Maximus, what shines forth in Christ is of an ambiguous nature. In daily experience we see things in the sun’s light but if we look directly at the sun, it is hidden behind its dazzling rays. Maximus plays on this ordinary experience and points to the shift between what is revealed and what is concealed. On the one hand, the apostles perceive the transfiguring light because their powers of sensation are changed by the activity of the Spirit. This is possible since, Maximus says, the “veils of the passions” are removed from their 5 

Amb.Ioh. 33, PG 91, 1285c–1288a. Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1125d–1128d. Cf. 1128d–1133a as well. For the Biblical event of Christ’ transfiguration, cf. Matt. 17:1–8, Mark 9:2–8, Luke 9:28–36. 6 

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intellect so that they may grasp the light as a symbol of Christ’s divinity. (As we shall see below, the passions obstruct the ability to grasp the truth, therefore the “veils of the passions” have to be removed from the apostles.) On the other hand, the dazzling light also conceals Christ. In the depth of the light, as if hidden behind what is shown, is the unapproachable nature of the divinity. There is then a cataphatic as well as an apophatic dimension in the transfiguration. However, both dimensions are kept together in the one incarnate Christ. The cataphatic splendour is conceived as a symbol, and the event clearly illustrates the meaning of “symbol” as such: it does not stand as a separate sign for something completely other or different. It partakes of that of which it is a symbol. One cannot separate the sun and its light, and one can likewise not separate the manifestation of the divinity and the divinity itself. However, the divine light perceived by the apostles conceals the transcendent nature behind. Maximus turns to the meditation of the white clothes of Christ. They are the symbol of two things. First, they symbolize the words of Scripture. These words become at that moment “bright, clear, and transparent” to the apostles, “grasped by the intellect without any dark riddles or symbolic shadows”. Secondly, the white clothes may be conceived as a symbol of creation. However, it can only function as a symbol of creation when the latter is contemplated by an unsullied mind, or, as Maximus indicates, it will be a symbol of creation when the “filthy assumption” of those deceived by sensation is removed. Then nature will appear in the wise variety of different forms “declaring the power of the creative Logos in a manner analogous with that of a garment declaring the dignity of the one who wears it”.7 Maximus’ conviction is, as we shall see, that in a purely utilitarian relationship with the created world, based on a knowledge of the simple usefulness of entities, one is deceived as to the true nature of beings. Their true nature is not to satisfy our desires. Their true meaning is not grasped in instrumental knowledge. The acknowledgement of the incarnate Logos is the key to understand the created world properly. He is the decisive event of divine intervention in time and space. Christ becomes the divine 7 

Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1128b-c.

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lens through which one is enabled to “read” the true senses or logoi of Scripture and nature. For Maximus, true knowledge of beings therefore requires that one lives as a Christian and follows a path of purification of both senses and intellect. The “veils of the passions” were lifted from the apostles, and the symbolism of the clothes of Christ were contemplated clearly. This path of purification begins with Christ and one should move in accordance with what Maximus calls practical and contemplative philosophy, ending finally in theological philosophy. Maximus expresses the importance of the Incarnation as revelatory act in a rather striking way in the Capita theologica et oeconomica: The mystery of the embodiment of the Logos holds the power (δύναμιν) of all the riddles and types of Scripture, and also gives us knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) of creatures phenomenal and intelligible. The one who has come to know the mystery of the cross and the tomb, knows the logoi of these creatures; and the one who has been initiated into the ineffable power of the resurrection comes to know the purpose for which God first established all things. 8 Τὸ τῆς ἐνσωματώσεως τοῦ Λόγου μυστήριον, πάντων ἔχει τῶν τε κατὰ Γραφὴν αἰνιγμάτων καὶ τύπων τῆν δύναμιν, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ νοουμένων κτισμάτων τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Καὶ ὁ μὲν γνοὺς σταυροῦ καὶ ταφῆς τὸ μυστήριον, ἔγνω τῶν προειρημένων τοὺς λόγους· ὁ δὲ τῆς ἀναστάσεως μυηθεὶς τὴν ἀπόῤῥητον δύναμιν, ἔγνω τὸν ἐφ’ ᾧ τὰ πάντα προηγουμένως ὁ Θεὸς ὑπεστήσατο σκοπόν.

We need first to interpret the term power (δύναμις), which seems a bit enigmatic. Origen, in his commentary on the Gospel of John, uses it in the rare sense of “meaning”:9 “Now the bosom of Moses has two meanings (δύο δυνάμεις ἔχει).” That would fit Maximus’ words here. Maybe we could say that the Incarnation “holds” the potential key to the meaning of the “riddles and types” of the Scriptures. The Scriptures, consequently, should be interpreted in the light of this primary act of divine intervention. However, it is not just the Scriptures that should be disclosed in light of the Incarnation. The latter is also the key to the meaning of created 8 

Th.Oec. 1.66, PG 90, 1108a-b. Commentaria in evangelium Joannis, PG 14, 800d.

9 Origen,

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beings, sensible as well as intelligible. Even more specifically the mystery of the cross, the burial, and the resurrection furnishes the key both to understand creatures from the point of view of their logoi in God, and to grasp the final purpose of all being. How should we understand this? The simple answer is that the divine economy or whole cosmic drama of original creation and final transformation has the Logos or Christ as the meaningful center of it all. Christ is the universal key to the meaning of beings, their origin and destiny. Maximus’ metaphysics is a Christocentric cosmology. We return to Ambiguum 33.10 Maximus says the Logos “becomes thick” in the sense that He “concealed” (ἐγκρύψας) Himself in the logoi of beings. Creatures are intelligible because they are constituted by these divine logoi. They are intellectually understandable like letters that when read signify the Creator. In this way the logoi are conceived as the semantic element in creatures. When creatures are “read” in that way, we find the Logos present as a whole in each creature, remaining undifferentiated even in differentiated beings, Maximus says. We shall investigate this dialectic of being undifferentiated and differentiated in later chapters. How shall we understand the concealment? We see here the paradoxical notion of a dialectical shift between revelation and concealment. God reveals Himself in the Scriptures and in created beings, but at the same time He conceals Himself in these things. In the next section we shall see that human beings brought about concealment by the wrong actions in the fall. The Incarnation of the Logos is for Maximus the key to disclose these concealed sources of revelation. Only in this way do we have access to the real nature of created beings. Maximus’ meditation on the transfiguration is followed by a meditation on the natural law (ὁ φυσικὸς νόμος) and the written law (ὁ γραπτὸς νόμος).11 The natural law has something analogous with the letters, syllables, and words that one finds in Scripture, in its intricate though harmonious web of forms and impulses steering the physical phenomena of the universe. A precondition for grasping these “semantic” elements in the visible world, and for 10  11 

Amb.Ioh. 33, PG 91, 1285d. Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91,  1128d–1133a.

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understanding the world properly, is to acknowledge Christ and to achieve a properly trained mind, that is, a mind purified and suited to contemplation. On the other hand, one gains knowledge of the written law through study. The written law is like “another cosmos”, “having its own heaven, earth, and what is between them”. Maximus interprets the latter division as ethical, natural, and theological philosophy, thereby identifying three stages of spiritual development.12 At this point several intricate notions run together and it seems necessary to combine these dense sayings with other texts in which Maximus develops such ideas. The two triads “heaven, earth and what is between them” and the stages of spiritual development of “ethical, natural, and theological philosophy”, direct us to Maximus’ Mystagogia. This work treats the symbolism of the church (chapters 1–7) and the liturgy (chapters 8–24). In this rather intricate meditation, we find that human life is destined to be lived ecclesially, i.e. in the church. The faithful participate in this ecclesial life and are then introduced to the above mentioned stages of development. In this way, the church and the liturgy establish the faithful in a movement that has the final transformation as end. In this transformation, beings are destined to achieve a divine mode of being beyond their created capacity (cf. Chapter 7 below). Maximus describes, in Mystagogia’s first chapter, how the church is an image and a representation of God.13 In a sweeping but interesting sketch, he shows how God, with the logoi as principles, is the gathering and interconnecting power in the manifold of cosmic beings: all entities are unified in Him. Likewise, the church gathers, interconnects, and unifies human beings of different age and sex, different social standing, ethnicity, language, occupation, customs, and pursuits, giving them one single formation of being Christians. Maximus connects this gathering function of the church with the image of the body and its members:14 “For it [Scripture] says that the heart and soul of all was one, as a body is composed of different members but is and is seen to be one; and the body is actually worthy of Christ himself, who is our true head.” In Mystagogia’s first chap12 

Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1129a. Myst. 1, CCSG 69, pp. 10–14. 14  Myst. 1, CCSG 69, p. 13. 13 

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ter, God is described as the interconnecting agent in the cosmos. The church is an image of God since it gathers and interconnects its members into a body with Christ as head. Maximus amplifies the motif further in the fifth chapter: On the one hand, it [the decad] draws me back to Him — Jesus, my God and Saviour, the one who is fulfilled through me (the one who is being saved) and yet one who is always full and always overflowing and never able to exhaust Himself. On the other hand, it [the decad] marvellously restores me, the human being, to myself, or rather to God, from whom I received and now possess being and to whom I am driven from afar, longing also to receive well-being.15 Ἰησοῦν μὲν τὸν ἐμὸν θεὸν καὶ σωτῆρα συμπληρωθέντα δι’ ἐμοῦ σωζομένου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπανάγει, τὸν ἀεὶ πληρέστατόν τε καὶ ὑπερπληρέστατον καὶ μηδέποτε ἑαυτοῦ ἐκστῆναι δυνάμενον, ἐμὲ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐμαυτῷ θαυμαστῶς ἀποκαθίστησιν, μᾶλλον δὲ θεῷ, παρ’ οὗ τὸ εἶναι λαβὼν ἔχω, καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἐπείγομαι πόρρωθεν, τὸ εὖ εἶναι προσλαβεῖν ἐφιέμενος·

This picture is very rich in content. There is reference to the “decad”, mentioned earlier in Mystagogia, which is explained as the ten commandments or the ten virtues that Maximus comments on. Practicing the commandments draws the human being to Christ. Christ is fulfilled (συμπληρωθέντα) through those who are being saved, which probably means that they become members (or organs) that complete or fill in His body. This body is the church, the mystical body of Christ. The incorporation into the church, with Christ as interconnecting head, is a restoration through the virtues “to myself”, as Maximus says, and at the same time it completes the body of Christ/the church. This restoration “to myself” obviously means that in the fallen or sinful condition, the human being is estranged from itself. It lives, so to say, an eccentric life, a life that is outside its natural center, which is God. To be brought back to oneself is to be brought back to the consciousness of the true source of life or to one’s logos in God. Self-knowledge is knowledge of oneself as reflecting God. One accomplishes the way back to oneself through the church. The fourth chapter of the Mystagogia develops a supplementary image. Maximus applies a threefold division of the church into nave, sanctuary, and holy table as an image of body, soul, and 15 

Myst. 5, CCSG 69, pp. 23–4.

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intellect. He then connects the three divisions of the church and the three components of human beings with the stages of spiritual development: with the nave, that is an image of the body, the human being is lead to ethical philosophy. With the sanctuary, that is an image of the soul, one is lead to natural contemplation. With the holy table, that is an image of the intellect, one is lead to mystical theology. The human being moves or develops ecclesially from being (the nave/body) to well-being (the sanctuary/soul) to eternal well-being (the holy table/intellect), from being made in the image of God to the reception of the likeness with God. Along this way, both Scripture and the universe are disclosed as sources of revelation. It seems reasonable to interpret this complex imagery as describing a cosmic movement as well. If we connect what is said above with the sketch of the unifying activity of the incarnate Logos in Ambiguum 41 this becomes clear. In Ambiguum 41, Maximus sketches certain cosmic divisions that constitute the total framework comprising the many beings in the world. In this system, human nature is created as a cosmic bond (since it comprises features from all created beings) destined to interconnect everything and connect it all to God.16 Because of the fall, Christ fulfils the human task and when we fill in the body of Christ, as described in the Mystagogia, we partake of the universal regenerative activity of Christ in the church. I believe Maximus’ epistemology culminates in this: it is not just a question of achieving a proper stance or vantage-point from which to contemplate the cosmos truly or precisely, but to know is to participate in a process. To “know” has practical implications as well. This process is the regenerative process initiated and fulfilled by Christ and executed through His body that is the church. The primary event of revelation is the Incarnation of the Logos. This furnishes the key to understand Scripture and nature as revelatory sources. We gain access to these sources through the church, the liturgy, and the spiritual life in the church. To know is not only to understand, it is also to participate actively in the regenerative process established by Christ. We must next investigate the condition in which human beings live and from which we

16 

Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1305b.

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must be saved if we are to gain access to true knowledge and take part in the regenerative process. The Fall This brings us to the fall. The biblical story is well known. The human being was created in the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1:26). Like many other late antique Christian thinkers, Maximus holds that there is a distinction between these. For Maximus, the human being, even if created in the image of God, was at first not “mature” but was destined to achieve the likeness of God through a proper development. This development failed when Adam and Eve ate of the forbidden tree (Gen. 3:1–7). In Quaestiones ad Thalassium Maximus conjectures that the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is an image of the visible creation.17 When the human being ate of this forbidden tree, it sought knowledge, a dangerous and, at that particular moment, a forbidden knowledge. This brought the soul’s attention away from God. The fall resulted in ignorance of one’s proper object of knowledge: So, the first man, falling short of the movement towards the end of the activity of his natural powers, fell sick with ignorance of his own Cause, and, following the council of the serpent, thought that God was the very thing of which the divine word had forbidden him to have.18 Τῆς οὖν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐνεργείας τῶν κατὰ φύσιν δυνάμεων ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐλλείψας τὴν κίνησιν, τὴν τῆς οἰκείας αἰτίας ἐνόσησεν ἄγνοιαν, ἐκεῖνο νομίσας εἶναι θεὸν διὰ τῆς συμβουλῆς τοῦ ὄφεως, ὅσπερ ἔχειν ἀπώμοτον ὁ τῆς θείας ἐντολῆς διετάξατο λόγος.

Humans turned their attention from God and became preoccupied with the knowledge of sensible things. Thereby they forgot their creator: Thus, the more that the human being was preoccupied with the knowledge of visible things solely according to sensation, the more he bound himself to the ignorance of God; and the more he tight17  Q.Thal. Introductio, CCSG 7, p. 37. On “conjecture” in Maximus, cf. P. Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy in Maximus the Confessor, Notre Dame, 1991 (Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 7), p. 187. 18  Q.Thal. Introductio, CCSG 7, p. 31.

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ened the bond of ignorance, the more he attached himself to the experience of the sensation of material objects of knowledge in which he was indulging; and the more he took his fill of this, the more he inflamed the desire of self-love.19 Ὅσον οὖν κατὰ μόνην τὴν αἴσθησιν τῆς τῶν ὁρωμένων ἐπεμελεῖτο γνώσεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τοσοῦτον ἐπέσφιγγεν ἑαυτῷ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἄγνοιαν· ὅσον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀγνοίας συνέσφιγγε τὸν δεσμόν, τοσοῦτον τῆς πείρας ἀντείχετο τῆς τῶν γνωσθέντων ὑλικῶν αἰσθητικῆς ἀπολαύσεως· ὅσον δὲ ταύτης ἐνεφορεῖτο, τοσοῦτον τῆς ἐκ ταύτης γεννωμένης φιλαυτίας ἐξῆπτε τὸν ἔρωτα·

The dynamism of this epistemic condition of fallen humanity lies in the fact that the human being searches for knowledge driven by self-love to desire enjoyment or pleasure. None of these notions should be understood too narrowly or simply in the vulgar sense of licentiousness. They comprise licentiousness of course, but have much wider connotations. In my opinion, they include all human efforts to secure the totality of life solely from exploiting sensible possibilities and resources. The human being directs its intellectual attention through sensation to material things. This results in ignorance of God, an ignorance that increases the more the attention is focussed on these sensible things. The cosmos is transformed epistemologically and ontologically into a world that is a collection of resources. The transformation is epistemological since one comes to know the world for the sake of providing pleasure, and it is ontological since the result of the fall is the introduction of corruptibility and death. The human being brings itself into the tragic dialectic of pleasure and pain. All pleasure is inevitably followed by pain and the more one strives for the former one is bound to experience the latter.20 For Maximus this is a description of the plight of humanity. It characterizes the whole history of humans after the fall, individually and socially. Human beings came to live their lives in mutual competition:21 “Thus the one human nature was cut up into myriad parts, and we who are of one and the same nature devour each other like wild beasts.” 19 

Q.Thal. Intoductio, CCSG 7, p. 31. Maximus draws a similar picture in Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91,  1156c–1157a. 20  Q.Thal. Introductio, CCSG 7, pp. 31–35. 21  Q.Thal. Introductio, CCSG 7, p. 33.

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When the self-loving human being enters the dialectic of pleasure and pain, this gives rise to a series of bad attitudes or vices. Since the experience of pleasure intensifies self-love and gives it free reins, this results in gluttony, pride, vainglory, grandiosity, avarice, conceit, etc.22 If self-love is distressed by pain, this results in anger, envy, hate, enmity, remembrance of past injuries, etc. This may remind one of the state of nature imagined by Hobbes, in which violence was the only law and life was “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short”.23 In Maximus, however, a political organism or the State cannot remedy this situation. Maximus thinks it is crucial for the spiritual health or wellbeing of the human being to achieve a correct epistemic stance. This cannot be achieved when the motive force behind the search for knowledge is human passion. He says that the intelligibles are the kindred objects of the intellect.24 (We return to what these are below.) The intellect has no direct access to these intelligible things and has to go via sensation. Sensation is naturally kindred to sensible things and it transports its information to the intellect. The intellect is in this way receptive of what is sensually perceived. It is at this critical point that danger originates. Maximus repeatedly says that the intellect is ensnared by the “surface appearances of visible things” (ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις τῶν ὁρατῶν). The passion we have for sensible things is only fascinated with the surface of these. This kind of terminology is frequent in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium.25 What is meant by this “surface”? As we may understand from the context and from what is said above, the “surface” is whatever aspect of a created entity that is sought as useful since it promotes human pleasure or sensible enjoyment 22 In Q.Thal. Introductio, CCSG 7, pp.  33–5, Maximus lists 27 vices that originate when pleasure gives heed to self-love. He again lists 24 vices that are due to self-love distressed by pain. When self-love and pain are mixed together this again gives birth to at least six more vices. He does not investigate the rationale of each vice, but the text is very interesting. For a translation, see St Maximos the Confessor, On Difficulties in Sacred Scripture: the Responses to Thalassius, transl. by N. Constas, Washington, DC, 2018 (The Fathers of the Church Volume 136), p. 85. 23 Hobbes, Leviathan, New York, 1979, p. 65. 24  Q.Thal. 58, CCSG 22, p. 33. 25  Cf. for instance Q.Thal. 49, CCSG 7, pp. 357, 361, 369; Q.Thal. 55, p. 501; Q.Thal. 58, CCSG 22, p. 35, Q.Thal. 59, p. 45.

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or perhaps even a happiness without God. Maximus makes a clear distinction between the usefulness of entities and their basic ontological constitution and meaning. The latter is only available in light of God, the Logos. Virtue and Contemplation Many scholars present and discuss Maximus’ doctrine of spiritual development. Thunberg gives the most comprehensive treatment and his presentation is, in my opinion, still unsurpassed.26 This doctrine is central to Maximus’ epistemology. As we have seen above, there are three stages of spiritual development: the practical, contemplative, and theological stage. These stages are based on a monastic tradition in which Evagrius Ponticus (345–399) plays a formative role. Evagrius states in the first chapter of his Praktikos:27 “Christianity is the dogma of Christ our Savior. It is composed of praktike, of the contemplation of the physical world and the contemplation of God.” The next two chapters specify the two kinds of contemplation: (2) “The Kingdom of Heaven is apatheia of the soul along with true knowledge of existing things.” (3) “The Kingdom of God is knowledge of the Holy Trinity co-extensive with the capacity of the intelligence and giving it a surpassing incorruptibility.” Evagrius, as we can see, distinguishes between the Kingdom of Heaven and the Kingdom of God. The first or lowest of these is of some interest for us in the present context. The apatheia of the soul is probably a certain dispassion or detachment from the desire for sensible things. In apatheia one knows creatures truly, not as existing for the satisfaction of our appetites, but as belonging to God. Even if Maximus takes over the Evagrian doctrine of three stages, he adjusts it to his own theological framework. Maximus’ terminology varies. For example in Mystagogia chapter 4, he speaks of ethical philosophy (ἠθικὴ φιλοσοφία), natural contemplation (φυσικὴ θεωρία), and mystical theology (μυστικὴ θεολογία).28 In Ambiguum 10 he uses the ter26 L. Thunberg,

Microcosm and Mediator. translation from Evagrius Ponticus, The Praktikos and Chapters On Prayer, transl. by J. E. Bamberger, Collegeville, Minnesota, 1972 (Cistercian Studies Series: Number four), p. 15. 28  Myst. 4, CCSG 69, p. 18. The teaching on three stages turns up in a lot of places in Maximus’ works and is a very important aspect of his thinking. Q.Thal. 27 Bamberger’s

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minology of ethical, natural, and theological philosophy.29 In Capita de caritate Maximus says that the Christian philosophizes in the commandments, the dogmas, and the faith:30 “The commandments separate the intellect from the passions, the dogmas lead to the knowledge of beings, and faith to the contemplation (τὴν θεωρίαν) of the Holy Trinity.” The formulation of the last stage is directly reminiscent of Evagrius’ formula above. We return to this notion of “contemplation of the Holy Trinity” later. There is a clear connection between what Maximus says about the stages of spiritual development and Christian philosophizing. The purpose of ethical philosophy as adjusting oneself to the commandments is in effect to separate the intellect from the passions. The separation of the intellect clears the room for contemplation. But what does it mean that the dogmas lead to the knowledge of beings? What are these dogmas and what relevance do they have for contemplation and knowledge of beings? The dogmas are probably the doctrine of the divine economy which comprises creation, Incarnation, and transformation. In this doctrine, the knowledge of being or nature and its potential transformations plays a major role. As we saw above, the incarnate Logos offers the key to proper understanding of nature. In a sequence in Ambiguum 10 Maximus comments on “the five modes of contemplation” which concern essence (or being), movement, difference, mixture, and position. 31 These are ontological categories in the system of nature. Unfortunately, Maximus’ reflections are (as often) dense, but we shall not investigate these points in detail, just sketch what they suggest. These modes of contemplation lead (1) to the vision and acknowledgement of God as the cause of the cosmos or as the cause of essence. They further lead (2) to a vision of a cosmos in which one sees beings providentially ordered in their movement and (3) as fitted together in the divine preservation of differences. Each essence is marked out by a so-called difference (or distinguishing/identifying mark). Each entity has, for this reason, a particular kind of movement to perform in the cosmos. Natural 25 is another example of a text in which Maximus elaborates on this topic. 29  Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1129a. 30  Car. 4.47, PG 90, 1057c. 31  Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91,  1133a–1136b.

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contemplation is, consequently, to understand the order in which entities are set. One further contemplates (4–5) the distribution of beings according to natural potentialities, in their mixtures and positions. All of this is rather obscure but once again tells us that natural contemplation is to understand the ontological features that make the totality into a divinely ordered cosmos. One also contemplates how human inclinations, when virtuously adjusted, are transformed into a “divinely-fitting” cosmos, a well-ordered state of the human person that is to be seen as a microcosm in harmony with the structure of the macrocosm. God is the Maker of a world that is a cosmos. His work is a well-ordered, well-moving system. In Chapter 6 we shall investigate this order further, as what I shall call a holomeristic system: parts and wholes are contemplated as fitted together and as facilitating in that way the divine purpose for the created world. Within this system, fallen humanity shall be reintegrated and as such fulfil its task of unifying what sin and corruption have disintegrated. 32 The first stage of spiritual development is ethical philosophy and this is fundamental for contemplation. Ethical philosophy is concerned with bringing forth virtues. It is no coincidence that I said “bringing forth virtues”. It is well known that Maximus according to the Disputatio cum Pyrrho claims that virtue is natural. 33 The exchange between the two interlocutors, Maximus and the former patriarch Pyrrhus, runs as follows: Pyrrhus asks if virtues are natural and Maximus answers positively: they are natural. Pyrrhus then asks why not virtues exist in all human beings equally, since we are of the same nature. To this Maximus answers that the reason is that we do not all practice what is natural in an equal degree. Virtues are not introduced in us from the outside, but are inherent in us from our making. At this point Maximus seems to resound of what St Gregory of Nyssa said in his De hominis opificio. 34 Gregory states that human nature, in its character as a living image of God, is clothed in virtue. From Maximus’ point of view, in the fall, the deceptive covering of the passions defiles this virtuous character of the divine image. Asceticism, in 32 See

Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, chapter 5: Establishing the Microcosm. 33  D.P., PG 91, 309b-c. 34  Cf. St Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio 5.1, PG 44, 137a.

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other words ethical philosophy, is for the sake of separating us (διαχωρίσαι) from the deception (ἀπάτη) established in the soul through sensation. Maximus seems to come rather close to what Aristotle says about ethical virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics: “Hence virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature; but by our nature we can receive them and perfect them by habituation.”35 First, when Maximus says virtues are natural he obviously, as we have seen, does not claim that we are virtuous without any effort. We need to practice what is natural to us. In that case, the virtues already belong to us potentially. Is this position any different from Aristotle’s position? Aristotle has, of course, no doctrine of human beings created in the image of God and of a fall. Even if Maximus in many aspects of his philosophy comes close to Aristotelian positions, his concept of human nature includes more than it does for Aristotle. Maximus would agree with Aristotle and Aristotelian tradition that being human is to be a rational and political animal or, more fully, “a human being is a rational animal, mortal, receptive of intellect and scientific knowledge”, 36 but his understanding of the human being includes more. Maximus adheres to the tradition that intellect and reason (νοῦς and λόγος) are divinely formed, divine powers in human beings. 37 However, there is more. In Capita de caritate he says that rational and intelligent creatures participate in God in three ways, namely by their being, by their aptitude (ἐπιτηδειότης) for well-being, that is for the reception of goodness and wisdom, and by the gracious gift of ever-being or eternal being (ἀεὶ εἶναι). 38 Maximus explains this further when he says that God communicated four divine properties to intelligent creatures: being, ever-being, goo35 

Nicomachean Ethics, book 2, chapter 1, 1103a23–26. text in M. Roueché, “Byzantine Philosophical Texts of the Seventh Century”, Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik, 23 (1974), pp.  70–71, translation in T.  T. Tollefsen, “St Maximus the Confessor and Alexandrian Logic – some Observations”, in Knezevic, M., ed., Philosophos – Philotheos – Philoponos, Belgrade, 2021, p. 302. 37 Cf. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1077b, where Maximus quotes Gregory the Theologian’s Oratio 28, cf. Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 27–31, ed. P. Gallay, M.  Jourjon, Paris, 2008 (SC 250), pp. 134–36. 38  Car. 3.24–25, PG 90, 1024a-c. 36 Greek

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dness, and wisdom. It is worth noticing that these four items are not primary features of creatures, they do not belong per se to the essence, but additional properties (ἰδιώματα). Being and ever-being are properties given to the essence, while goodness and wisdom are given to the volitive capacity (τῇ γνωμικῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι). From this there seems to be two kinds of aptitude, namely the natural and the habitual. This obviously means that being and ever-being are “natural” in the sense that they are gifts given to all intelligent creatures. Goodness and wisdom, on the other hand, depend (in part) on how we adjust our lives in relation to God. Ever-being, however, a property given to the essence, is explicitly said to be by grace. This suggests that for Maximus being created is to receive a gift by grace. It seems to follow that ever-being as a gracious gift is given as an original property of the created intelligent substance. Maximus continues: [The human being is made] according to the image [of God], as being from [God’s] being, and as eternal being (ἀεὶ ὂν) from [God’s] eternal being, and even if not without origin, it is nevertheless without end. [He is also made] according to the likeness [of God], as good from [God’s] goodness, and as wise from [God’s] wisdom; the one is according to nature, the other is according to grace. Every rational nature is from God, but only those are by likeness who are good and wise. 39 Καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα μὲν, ὡς ὂν, ὄντος· καὶ ὡς ἀεὶ ὂν, ἀεὶ ὄντος· εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀνάρχως, ἀλλ’ ἀτελευτήτως· καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν δὲ, ὡς ἀγαθὸς, ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ ὡς σοφὸς, σοφοῦ· τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, ὁ κατὰ χάριν. Καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα μὲν, πᾶσα φύσις λογική ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ· καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν δὲ, μόνοι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σοφοί.

We have here the distinction between image and likeness that often occurs in Greek patristic authors. The divine image in human beings is given at the making of man, while the likeness is a feature to be achieved. Being and eternal being (or ever-being) are given as properties of the image (essence). Goodness and 39  Car. 3.25, PG 90, 1024c. Maximus’ formulas are scanty and leaves a lot to the interpreter. The three already existing translations choose slightly different ways out, but seem to coincide when it comes to the sense. Cf. St Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, translated by P. Sherwood, New York, 1955, p. 177; The Philokalia, Volume II, translated by G. E. H. Palmer, Ph. Sherrard, K. Ware, London, 1981, p. 87; Maximus Confessor, Selected Writings, trans. G. C. Berthold, New York, 1985, p. 64.

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wisdom have, however, to be achieved and are graciously given as properties characterizing the condition of likeness. From all this it seems to follow that intelligent creatures possess grace in at least two ways, namely (1) as originally created with the gift of ever-being, which belongs to the nature of the image (natural aptitude), and (2) when they use their volitive capacity correctly in order to achieve an aptitude for well-being (habitual aptitude). If they live in accordance with the divine purpose, they become apt to receive the gracious gifts of goodness and wisdom by following the steps of spiritual development, and in that condition they enter the state of likeness with God. We return now to the topic of the virtues. What could it mean that virtue is natural? Ontologically speaking, virtue is potentially situated in those essential features in which humans are endowed with the divine image. Virtues are then developed and manifested when the volitive capacity is used correctly and humans move into the sphere where they participate in the additional grace of goodness and wisdom. The achievement of the latter two properties presupposes that the human being adjusts itself to its divine paradigm. The life of well-being consists in the progress from being in the image of God to achieving the likeness of God. This life is not something external or completely strange to the human being. It is in a sense natural. In Maximus “the natural” is what is in accordance with the divine purpose. Humans were created for the purpose of living naturally in the sense of activating virtue. This becomes completely clear in a definition of evil that Maximus gives in his introduction to the Quaestiones ad Thalassium:40 “evil is nothing other than the deficiency of the activity of innate natural powers with respect to their goal” (τὸ κακὸν τῆς πρὸς τὸ τέλος τῶν ἐγκειμένων τῇ φύσει δυνάμεων ἐνεργείας ἐστὶν ἔλλειψις). If we turn it around, virtue must be the proper activity of innate natural powers with respect to the goal. We find the same idea in Capita de caritate:41 “A passion is blameworthy when it is a movement of the soul contrary to nature.” As we have seen above, the human being has to use its volitive capacity correctly, that is naturally, in order to participate in goodness by grace. In Capita 40  41 

Q.Thal. Introductio, CCSG 7, p. 29. Car. 1.35, PG 90, 968a.

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theologica et oeconomica Maximus says that the gracious participation in goodness is the achievement of virtue as well, since virtue is comprised by goodness.42 Participation in goodness and virtue is to receive an infused power (δύναμις ἔμφυτος) and this power manifests itself as a divine activity working in the human being. However, the divine activity operates in conjunction with human activity. We should note the particular sense of the term “natural” in this context: how can the virtuous life as reception of an infused power be “natural”? The point is that Maximus always sees the creature in its total dependence on the Creator. The creature has no purpose nor has its life any meaning independently of its relation to God. The complete ontological makeup of any creature involves the divine presence. To live naturally or according to nature, is to live in accordance with the divine purpose of being. We return to this in Chapter 5 on the logoi and the divine activities. Knowledge of sensible things is not something bad in itself. It is bad when the pursuit of knowledge is driven by the passions and is forgetful of God. There is, consequently, a bad and a good knowledge of nature. The pursuit of knowledge is good when it is executed as natural contemplation within the framework of the virtues. In Capita de caritate Maximus describes a natural sequence of the development of virtues: faith in God, fear of God, self-control, patience and forbearance, hope in God, dispassion or detachment (ἀπάθεια), and love: The one who believes in the Lord fears punishment, the one who fears punishment controls the passions. The one who controls the passions endures affliction patiently, the one who endures afflictions patiently acquires hope in God. Hope in God separates the intellect from every worldly attachment, and when the intellect is separated from this it has love for God.43 Ὁ πιστεύων τῷ Κυρίῳ, φοβεῖται τὴν κόλασιν· ὁ δὲ φοβούμενος τὴν κόλασιν, ἐγκρατεύεται ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν· ὁ δὲ ἐγκρατευόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν, ὑπομένει τὰ θλιβερά, ἔχει εἰς Θεὸν ἐλπίδα· ἡ δὲ εἰς Θεὸν ἐλπὶς, χωρίζει πάσης γηΐνης προσπαθείας τὸν νοῦν· ταύτης δὲ ὁ νοῦς χωρισθεὶς, ἔξει τὴν εἰς Θεὸν ἀγάπην. 42 

Th.Oec. 1.47–50, PG 90,  1100b–1101b. 1.3, cf. 1.1–4, PG 90, 961a-c.

43 Cf. Car.

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We find something similar in Evagrius.44 His sequence is faith, fear, asceticism (that is keeping the commandments), detachment, and love. There is a natural or even logical development from the first to the last item in Maximus’ list of virtues above. The last two steps, those of dispassion or detachment and love, are crucial and need to be highlighted. One might wonder what kind of epistemic state the soul arrives at when “Hope in God separates the intellect from every worldly attachment” and one achieves the virtue of dispassion or detachment. One would normally associate the term apatheia with Stoicism. However, Bamberger argues that in Evagrius apatheia is located “in a specifically Christian and biblical context”.45 It is akin to the Christian notion of fear of God and it is not simply taken over from the Stoics: “Still more significantly, it is the parent to love, to agape.” Bamberger further states that the Christians took over the term early and Clement of Alexandria brought it into his ascetical theology. Bamberger thinks Clement is probably one of Evagrius’ sources. According to Maximus, the peak of the virtuous development is love:46 “The one who loves God values knowledge of Him more than anything created by Him, and by desire devotes himself ceaselessly to it.” One may easily get the impression from this that the virtuous person, when he arrives in detachment and love, leaves the created world behind and, following the steps of spiritual development, one ends up with no interest in creatures at all. Such a conclusion is, I shall argue, a misunderstanding of Maximus. Because there is the possibility to be ensnared by the passions, it is important to follow the way of virtue until one reaches dispassion or detachment. The highest virtue is love, and Maximus says, as we have just seen, that the person who loves God values knowledge of God more than anything created by God. He also says that when the intellect intensely loves God, “the intellect goes out of itself” and “has no sense of itself or of any beings”.47 Should we not again think that creatures lose their value and are of no rele44 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, The Praktikos and Chapters On Prayer, Bamberger, p. 36. 45  Bamberger’s introduction to Evagrius Ponticus, The Praktikos and Chapters On Prayer, pp. lxxxii–lxxxiii. 46  Car. 1.4, PG 90, 961c. 47  Car. 1.10, PG 90, 964a.

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vance for humans at this stage? Again, I do not think this is the case. The point is that in detachment one is freed from the passionate attitude and relationship towards sensible entities and in this state one becomes free to love God. At the stage of detachment the intellect’s reception of sensible experience is transformed into natural contemplation of the intelligibles. These intelligibles are the logoi of creatures, and the logoi are, as suggested above, the divine paradigms according to which beings were created. Detachment, love, and knowledge of God, why do they not sever our ties with the created world? It can be argued from several texts that they do not. In Capita de caritate, Maximus stresses that the one who loves God cannot help loving every human being as himself.48 The principle is that to achieve detachment and love is to be focussed on the divine source of all being. God contains the logoi of creatures in Himself. Creatures are brought forth in love and there is nothing superfluous in the created world. The problem is just what kind of relationship humans have with creatures, whether it is passionate or in accordance with divine intentions. As we shall soon see, Maximus speaks of examining creatures “with God”. Maximus sheds some interesting light on the state of detachment in the introduction to the Quaestiones ad Thalassium.49 As we saw above, he interprets the tree of knowledge of good and evil as the visible creation. The reason why it is called the tree of good and evil is that it may be contemplated in a good way, which is in spiritual contemplation, or it may be received in a corporeal way, and then it carries the knowledge of evil. In the latter case it becomes the teacher of passions and makes human beings oblivious of God. The visible creation “holds” (ἔχει) spiritual logoi that nourish the intellect and Maximus conjectures that God for a time forbade the participation in knowledge of these since humans should first have obtained deification through grace in order to be mature. As we saw above, the Logos “concealed” (ἐγκρύψας) Himself in the logoi of beings, probably until the human being was in the proper state to have them revealed. 50 When in the 48 Cf. Car.

1.13–17, PG 90, 964b-d. Q.Thal. Introductio, CCSG 7, p. 37. 50 Cf. Amb.Ioh. 33, PG 91, 1285c–1288a. 49 

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proper state, the deified human could examine creatures without fear of harm with God (μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ). He would then get knowledge of them, not as human but as God:51 “having by grace the very same wise and informed knowledge of beings that God has, on account of the divinizing transformation of his intellect and powers of perception”. In the Capita de caritate Maximus says that God knows Himself through knowing His blessed essence and He knows His creatures through knowing His wisdom.52 It seems that Maximus thinks that one achieves the highest form of contemplation as a participation in what God knows about creatures internally. It also seems that the highest form of contemplation is a step into the deified condition. From this we may probably learn that the stages of spiritual development are not separate steps on a ladder, ascending which one climbs higher and higher, leaving the former steps behind. Rather they are a continuous movement towards the goal, each step carrying with it and strengthening the former. In words strongly reminiscent of Plato’s allegory of the sun, Maximus says: The knowledge of all that has come to be by Him is naturally made properly known together with Him. For just as with the rising of the sensible sun all bodies are clearly made to appear, so it is with God, the intelligible sun of righteousness, rising in the intellect: although He is known to be separate from creation, He wishes the true logoi of everything, whether intelligible or sensible, to be manifested together with Himself. […] For as the eye cannot grasp sensible things without light, nor can the intellect, apart from the knowledge of God, receive spiritual contemplation. For there light gives to sight the reception of visible things, and here the science of God grants the intellect knowledge of things intelligible. 53 Αὐτῷ γὰρ πέφυκε συνεκφαίνεσθαι κυρίως ἡ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων γνῶσις. Ὡς γὰρ τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἡλίῳ ἀνατέλλοντι πάντα καθαρῶς συνεκφαίνονται τὰ σώματα, οὕτω καὶ Θεὸς ὁ νοητὸς τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἥλιος ἀνατέλλων τῷ νῷ, καθὼς χωρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς κτίσεως οἶδεν αὐτός, πάντων ἑαυτῷ νοητῶν τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν τοὺς ἀληθεῖς βούλεται συνεκφανίζεσθαι λόγους. […] Οὔτε γὰρ δίχα φωτὸς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὀφθαλμὸς 51 

Q.Thal. Introductio, CCSG 7, p. 37. Car. 3.22, PG 90, 1024a. 53  Amb.Io. 10, PG 91, 1156a-b. Cf. Car. 1.95, PG 90: 981c. 52 

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ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δύναται, οὔτε νοῦς χωρὶς γνώσεως Θεοῦ θεωρίαν δέξασθαι πνευματικήν. Ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ τῇ ὄψει τὸ φῶς τῶν ὁρατῶν τὴν ἀντίληψιν δίδωσι, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τῷ νῷ τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν νοητῶν ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπιστήμη χαρίζεται.

In their primitive condition human beings had not yet achieved the full aptitude for the correct contemplation of beings. The incarnate Logos, Christ, provides the possibility of gaining the proper aptitude. Practical philosophy reaches its peak in detachment and love, a love that seeks to know God to the degree God is available to us. In this condition of detachment and love the world that was earlier veiled or covered up and seen in the fallen state as a collection of corruptible, useful, and pleasurable entities without any higher purpose, is now discovered in accordance with the “science” of God in its splendour as a theophany. The world emerges as a cosmos that is contemplated in light of God and the logoi. If the world is contemplated in this way, it emerges not as something indifferent, not as a simple resource for exploitation, but rather as divinely given and instituted. Our relationship with the world should no longer be directed by appetite, neither privately nor collectively, that is in our economic systems. This obviously means that we are not allowed to use the things that are at hand indiscriminately. However, this is a very general or global claim and the question is if it can be made more explicit. How should we act when it comes to minerals, plants, and animals? How should we act when it comes to particular situations and details? It is a well-known critique of virtue-ethics that it offers little concrete guidance when it comes to real challenges. There is no space to address this problem at any length in this particular context, but I shall only point to some features that characterize what we may call, for convenience, Maximian virtue-ethics: it does not just consist in the learning of certain habitual practises. For Maximus, who thinks virtues are natural, the conditions for such habitual practises are already present in human nature but they need to be awakened and developed. The awakening and development of virtues culminate in natural contemplation. This contemplation, as far as I can understand, must partly consist in a certain spiritual prudence.54 This prudence teaches us how to behave in rela54 Cf. Myst.

5, CCSG 69, pp. 25–6.

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tion to beings in our environment. The contemplative knows the world as a cosmos with a definite purpose. A human being in this condition will therefore strive to cooperate with God in the cosmic movement towards peace and harmony. Negatively speaking, acts of cruelty, inflicting of pain, the spread of fear, the destruction of natural phenomena are to be avoided and transcended in order to achieve the opposite. We saw above that Maximus lists a series of vices that originate within the dialectic of pleasure and pain. Along the road of spiritual development such bad habits should be transcended and give way to the virtues that naturally belong to human nature. We return to the implications this doctrine may have in the Corollaries at the end of this book. According to Maximus, as long as the human attitude to the surroundings is directed by passions, the true nature of creatures remains concealed. This nature is grasped when creatures are interpreted in accordance with the divine principles of the logoi of beings. One cannot achieve true knowledge of beings except from a divine vantage point: natural contemplation is a stage of spiritual development in which one “sees” the system of creatures intellectually in light of the logoi. One does not search for true knowledge for the sake of exploiting natural entities but for the sake of grasping God’s purpose for creation: a regenerated and glorified cosmic system in communion with the Creator. Maximus epistemology is, therefore, very different from early modern epistemology. While the latter searches for true knowledge in order to establish sciences that make it possible to exploit the natural world technically as a “resource”, Maximus searches for true knowledge in order to live according to the divine purpose for the world: its transformation. The Ancient Framework At the beginning of this chapter I claimed that Maximus’ epistemology is similar to some other ancient ideas of how we attain true knowledge of the world. In some prominent ancient epistemologies the knower does not stand in a one-to-one relationship with the object of thought. According to Plato as well as to Aristotle there is a third factor in this picture, namely a higher level of being that facilitates the knower’s access to true knowledge. In Plato this level consists of the Forms, with the Form of the Good

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transcending and supporting the rest. The Forms provide measures for virtues in the polis, paradigms for mathematical entities and operations, and archetypes of sensible entities. According to the allegory of the sun, the Form of the Good provides the epistemic openness between the soul’s intellect and the intelligibles.55 We saw above that Maximus uses the sun and its light, which facilitates sensible perception, to illustrate how the intellect, illuminated by God, may grasp the intelligible logoi. In Aristotle the picture is different. There is no Form of the Good, but a divinity secures the orderly movement of the universe.56 For him knowledge of God is the highest metaphysical knowledge, since it gives us the key to the universal conception of a well-structured reality.57 In Neoplatonism, true knowledge of oneself, of society, and of nature is pivotal in the intellectual soul’s journey from here below to its true home in the intelligible world. 58 When the soul gets lost in intricate relationships with the material world and strives after pleasure, it has forgotten its true nature and its true home up “there”. None of these thinkers believes that the soul is in its proper condition when it strives for knowledge of material things just in order to gain a pleasant life. Ancient thinkers (except the atomists) usually believed that in its true reality the world is not a chaotic manifold of material entities some of which are detrimental, some useful, some pleasurable, some irrelevant, moving at random in a vast space. The world is a well-ordered system, a cosmos that in its beauty witnesses to the intelligible principles and divine causes of order. It is important to see the world as such a system and to adjust one’s life in accordance with the divinely instituted and providential order that exists in it. The only possibility to know the world as a cosmos and to adjust one’s life to the providential order is to develop virtues, ethical virtues and intellectual virtues. Only a virtuous mind may achieve true knowledge. The goal of supreme knowledge is therefore not to master the world but to develop a well-balanced and 55 Plato,

Republic 508a-e. Metaphysics Λ, chapter 8. 57  Metaphysics Α, chapter 2, 982b28–983a11. 58 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads I.3 in Enneads vol.  i, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1966 (LCL 440). 56  Cf. Aristotle,

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harmonious character that makes one able to achieve the highest purpose of human life: happiness, whatever way the different schools understood this term. However, in order to appreciate Maximus’ epistemology, we need to make one additional distinction, namely between the doctrine of happiness in the pagan schools and his Christian understanding of happiness. Happiness or, to use a more adequate term, blessedness, is not achieved simply by acting virtuously and knowing the divinely instituted cosmic order, but by being unified with God. On the other hand, is not this the goal for a Neoplatonist as well? It definitely is, but there are differences. We see one important difference in the scale of virtues. While different kinds of contemplative virtues are at the top of the scale in pagan systems, the virtue of love is the apex in Christianity. Love in Christianity is first and foremost the love of God for His creatures, especially God’s philanthropy, the love for human beings. Divine love is the motif behind the creation of the world and this love is not only directed to the general order of the cosmic system, but to all particulars in it, especially to human beings. 59 The motif behind creation is, in Neoplatonism as in Christianity, divine goodness, but according to Christianity this goodness is specified as a love that brought the divine being itself down to the world in specific acts, acts of creation and acts of reconciliation. At “the fullness of the times” (Eph. 1:10) the divinity itself, the Logos of God the Father, entered the historical scene and became a human being. While particulars “down here” are astray from their proper purpose in both pagan and Christian systems, in Christianity the divinity itself moves “down” in order to save human beings from their plight and through human nature the incarnate God redirects the whole worldly order and transforms it into a new order of being. To know the world is therefore not simply to understand the world but to participate in a movement of transformation.

59 For a sketch of late ancient discussions of providence, see R. Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, volume 2, London, 2004, pp. 79–110.

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Knowledge of God According to Maximus, the second stage of spiritual development unveils the true nature of the cosmos. In the third stage, that of mystical theology, one is led to the contemplation of God, the Holy Trinity. However, at this stage the term “contemplation” (θεωρία) needs some qualifications. Maximus says that beings are intelligible (νοούμενα) but God is not intelligible (οὐ νοούμενος).60 He says in Capita theologica et oeconomica that God is neither an apprehending intellect nor an intelligible object.61 If that is the case, it follows that there can be no contemplation of God. What is not intelligible and is not even an intellect cannot be grasped intellectually. On the other hand, there are places where Maximus speaks of God as intellect, but strictly speaking, he adds that God transcends such essential characteristics.62 The terms “knowledge of God” and “contemplation of God” therefore obviously have more than one sense. We return to discuss different ways in which we may know God in the next chapter. In the present section my purpose is to give a sketch of the stage that follows natural contemplation, that of mystical theology. On the background of what we saw in an earlier paragraph, we may note that the three stages of spiritual development are not completely separated from one another. We saw that detachment and love provide the fertile ground in which contemplation thrives. We also saw that natural contemplation transcends the simple use of human epistemic capacities and culminates in a participation in the divinity that carries into the sphere of deification. In Quaestiones ad Thalassium Maximus distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge (γνῶσις) of God: The Word [of Scripture] knows two kinds of knowledge of divine realities. The one is relative (σχετικήν), based only on reasoning and concepts, not possessing the actual perception (αἴσθησιν) of what is known through experience (διὰ πείρας), and by this we make interpretations in this present life. The other is authoritatively true, gained only by actual experience — without reasoning and concepts — and provides, by grace through participation, 60 

Th.Oec. 1.8, PG 90, 1085c. Th.Oec. 2.2, PG 90, 1125c. 62  Q.Thal. 25, CCSG 7, pp. 161–63. 61 

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epistemology a whole perception of the One who is known. By this latter we attain, in the future rest, the deification beyond nature that is actualized unceasingly.63 Διττὴν γὰρ οἶδε τὴν τῶν θείων γνῶσιν ὁ λόγος· τὴν μὲν σχετικὴν, ὡς ἐν λόγῳ μόνῳ κειμένην καὶ νοήμασιν, καὶ τὴν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν τοῦ γνωσθέντος διὰ πείρας οὐκ ἔχουσαν αἴσθησιν, δι’ ἧς κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωὴν οἰκονομούμεθα, τὴν δὲ κυρίως ἀληθινὴν ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πείρᾳ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν δίχα λόγου καὶ νοημάτων ὅλην τοῦ γνωσθέντος κατὰ χάριν μεθέξει παρεχομένην τῆν αἴσθησιν, δι’ ἧς κατὰ τὴν μέλλουσαν λῆξιν τὴν ὑπὲρ φύσιν ὑποδεχόμεθα θέωσιν ἀπαύστως ἐνεργουμένην.

It seems again obvious that the three stages of spiritual development are not very sharply distinguished. They overlap one another. One may wonder if the two kinds of knowledge of the divine belongs respectively to natural contemplation and mystical theology or if they are a lower and higher kind of mystical theology. Whichever way that may be, we shall now sketch the properties of both. As we see in the quotation, the first kind of knowledge of the divine is “relative” and based on reasoning and concepts. It lacks in direct perception and experience of its object. Then we come to the interpretation of the phrase δι’ ἧς κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωὴν οἰκονομούμεθα. Constas translates it “it is this knowledge that we use to order our affairs in this present life”.64 The verb οἰκονομέω means to govern, administer, order, etc. However, according to Lampe, in theology it may have the special sense of “interpret doctrine”.65 In my view, this sense fits the interpretation I consider the most reasonable of the above quotation. This kind of knowledge is based on the sources of revelation provided by the incarnate Logos who is witnessed in Holy Scripture and who sheds illuminative light on both Scripture and nature. Scriptural language is read literally as well as spiritually. The Scriptures conceal and reveal their meaning and only the recognition of the incarnate 63 

Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, p. 77. the whole paragraph, cf. Maximos the Confessor, On Difficulties in in Sacred Scripture: The Responses to Thalassios, transl. by Fr. M. Constas, Washington, DC, 2018 (The Fathers of the Church Volume 136), pp. 429–30. 65  G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford, 1989, p. 940. 64 For

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Logos offers the key to proper understanding. I therefore interpret this first knowledge as the kind of theological insight that provides the foundation for liturgical language and theological discourse about God, using imagery, metaphors, and philosophical concepts, and operating within the limits between apophatic and cataphatic discourse. That this kind of theological knowledge is relative must mean that it is a gradual approximation to divine realities, using analogy, as Maximus says in the text. In the next chapter, we shall investigate this approximative theology closer. I use the term relative knowledge to denote it. The second kind of knowledge of God is experiental. Maximus uses the terminology of ordinary epistemic events, like sensation and experience (αἴσθησις and πεῖρα). This is, obviously, a kind of meeting with God, an experienced disclosure of the depths of divinity, and a kind of unification with divine realities. In this event, God no longer emerges as an object of thought or a subject of discourse. The knower transcends the dual epistemic state of a subject searching for knowledge of an object of thought. The lover does not any longer have its beloved as an external object but is unified with it. One moves beyond reasoning, conceptualization, and talk, for these cannot exist in the mind that experiences “the good things that transcend nature”. Sensation is a kind of participation in the thing known when the latter communicates itself to the recipient. Experience is “knowledge based on active engagement” with what is experienced. When does a human being achieve this? The quotation says that by this (δι’ ἧς) knowledge we attain deification in the future rest. It does not say, however, that this knowledge is exclusively achieved in this future rest. Maybe Maximus would claim that there are ascetics in the present life that have achieved some foretaste of the final bliss. What is at least clear is that the term knowledge does not have its ordinary sense here. We should search the background for this Maximian notion in Dionysius the Areopagite, for instance when he hymns God in the first chapter of his Mystica Theologia. I use the term experiential knowledge for this kind of theology. It is tempting now to minimize the importance of the relative knowledge of the divine, but we should not do that. This kind of knowledge is extremely important. It is important for believers

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since it gives them notions of how to think of God. It is contained in the Scriptures and is important for liturgical language and for an accurate and correct definition of orthodox teaching. That there is a particular kind of experiental knowledge beyond relative theological knowledge does not diminish the importance of the latter. Maximus also says the relative knowledge is a motivation for search for the higher. This distinction between two kinds of knowledge of God poses some challenges. Does the notion of the experiental knowledge imply, for instance, that some privileged few have access to an esoteric insight that may correct common opinions and the accurate definition of the orthodox faith in the church? The answer is clearly negative. For Maximus, the correct or orthodox faith is received from the Holy Scriptures, the Holy Councils, and the Holy Fathers. The general point seems to be that the councils and the fathers have understood the mind of the Scriptures correctly. In the Record of the Trial Maximus refers to “the four holy synods” and in Opuscula theologica et polemica 11 he mentions the six councils.66 The four synods are probably Nicaea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451). The two additional councils are Constantinople II (553) and Rome (649). Maximus participated in the latter council which condemned monothelitism. His examiners during the Dispute at Bizya did not recognize the council of Rome:67 “The synod at Rome was not ratified, because it was held without the order of the emperor.” Maximus rejects this kind of reasoning, since that would imply that imperially called synods that were later condemned as heretical, should be acknowledged. As a rule, an imperial decree does not ratify dogma. Maximus’ appeal to the councils is in accordance with a tradition that is witnessed in the acts of Ephesus, Chalcedon, and Constantinople II.68 The holy fathers are the major theologians of former 66 P. Allen,

B. Neil, ed. and trans., Maximus the Confessor and his Companions, Oxford, 2004), p. 61; Op. 11, PG 91, 137d. 67  Allen, Neil, Maximus the Confessor and his Companions, p. 89. 68 Cf. R. Price, M. Gaddis, trans., The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon: Volume 1, Liverpool, 2007 (Translated Text for Historians, volume 45) and R.  Price, trans., The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553, Liverpool, 2012 (Translated Texts for Historians, volume 51).

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times whose theologies were acknowledged in these councils. This appeal to the councils and fathers is an appeal to revelation and to those major thinkers who are recognized to have had proper and acknowledged insight into the truth. Maximus would probably hold that their insight went beyond the level of relative knowledge of God and touched the higher kind of knowledge. However, this appeal to an acknowledged and common tradition precludes for Maximus that any contemporary individual can pop up as an authority with esoteric knowledge. Maximus’ Epistemology In many influential ancient epistemologies the human being has to go through an ethical development in order to achieve the correct stance for understanding or contemplating the world and the purpose of human life in it. This is typical for Platonism and Stoicism. The acknowledgement of the Christian revelation is crucial for Maximus. He looks at the human condition from the point of view of the fall. Human beings directed their attention to the visible creation before they achieved maturity and therefore became sensually fascinated. The intellect became infected with sensual imaginations that triggered desire and humans got stuck in the detrimental and tragic dialectic of pleasure and pain. In this state human beings sought to know creation, but not in the proper way. They directed themselves in desire to the “surface appearances” of beings, since this was useful to promote pleasure. The Incarnation of God the Logos re-established the conditions for communion with God, and on the way back humans should develop spiritually along the three stages of ethical, contemplative, and theological philosophy. The development of virtues, culminating in detachment and love, makes a change in human attitude to the world. In natural contemplation one discovers and recovers beings in accordance with their logoi and thereby achieves a divine perspective on the created world. The world is no longer seen as a collection of desirable and useful things, but as a divinely instituted cosmos that is destined for transformation by participating in divine gifts. Beyond this knowledge of God and His creation is the “knowledge” of God in Himself. This “beyond-knowledge”

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is achieved in mystical experience and belongs primarily to the future deification. What I call Maximus’ metaphysics is the contemplative knowledge of the world as cosmos with the Logos as its beginning and end. It culminates, of course, in theological knowledge. All true knowledge has for Maximus a theological aspect. God is the beginning and end of all his philosophizing. In the next chapter, we turn to Maximus’ concept of a relative knowledge of God, before we move on to cosmological matters proper in later chapters.

2. Knowledge of God We saw in the previous chapter that there is a relative and an experiential knowledge of God. The relative knowledge is based on the sources of revelation and uses reasoning, concepts, and analogy. St Maximus probably has in mind the knowledge of God that lies behind all theological terminology and language that is highly important for the definition of dogma, for preaching, liturgy, and theological discourse. This relative knowledge is achieved in the delicate balance between cataphatic and apophatic theology since the sources of revelation, as we have seen in the previous chapter, both reveal and conceal their truth. It is important to keep in mind that Maximus receives the knowledge provided by these sources as the tradition of the Fathers and the Councils. In this chapter I intend to investigate what Maximus thinks we may know of God when we search to understand Him from the point of view of this tradition. We need a preliminary account of two things before we proceed. First, I define provisionally the terms cataphatic and apophatic theology.1 Secondly, we should take notice of a distinction that I shall discuss and try to clarify in later chapters: the distinction between God in His essence (οὐσία) and God in His activity (ἐνέργεια). Aristotle introduces the terms κατάφασις and ἀπόφασις in De interpretatione:2 “An affirmation is a statement affirming something of something, a negation is a statement denying something of something.” Affirmative and negative statements about God have a long history in Christianity, even if a systematization of these theological procedures had to wait for the appearance of the Dionysian corpus at the beginning of the sixth century. In cataphatic theology one makes affirmative statements of God and applies predicates of Him. In apophatic theology one makes statements that negate predicates. We could say, for instance, “God is a mighty 1 For negative theology, see the by now classical study by D. Carabine, The Unknown God, Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena, Eugene, Oregon, 2015 (previously published by Peeters Press, 1995). 2 Aristotle, De interpretatione 17a25–26.

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fortress” and we could in another context say “God is not a mighty fortress”. The first statement reveals something about God, namely about His strength. On the other hand, it conceals something: God is literally not a fortress. This will suffice for now. The distinction between God’s essence or being and His activity is frequent in Maximus’ works and the terminology varies. In Chapter 5 below, I come back to a detailed discussion of this topic. In the present context we should just be aware of the fact that the distinction is important if one is to make sense of cataphatic and apophatic predication or theology in Maximus. Let us say that Maximus’ axiom is that God is simply incomprehensible. On the other hand, God has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ and in Scripture and nature. Cataphatic theology makes statements of God in accordance with these activities of revelation in Incarnation, Scripture, and nature. However, as we have seen above, God is revealed and concealed: revealed in His activities and concealed in His essence. We may classify theological statements in three groups: (1) Cataphatic statements, (2) apophatic statements, and (3) statements of transcendence. The second kind of statements are often alpha-privatives, like ἀγέννητος, “unbegotten”. The last kind are usually prefixed with the preposition ὑπέρ, “above” or “beyond”. We shall discuss all three groups below. On Christian ground, Dionysius the Areopagite gave the classical formulation of the two ways of speaking theologically about God. Cataphatic theology makes predications of God because God has created the world and thereby revealed Himself in it. Apophatic theology denies such predicates for the essential being of God. The two theological methods look so to say in different directions. Cataphatic theology looks “downwards” from God considered as creator while apophatic theology looks “upwards” towards God in Himself. In the De Divinis nominibus, Dionysius meditates on several positive predicates while he at the same time stresses the need to negate them if the focus is God as such and not God as cause of the world. In his Mystica Theologia, he even states that God transcends both positive and negative predications. 3 3  Cf. Dionysius, De Mystica Theologia chapter 5, Corpus Dionysiacum II, herausgegeben von G. Heil, A. M. Ritter, Berlin, New York, 1991, pp. 149–50.

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It would be wrong, however, to think that apophatic theology, even if more proper to God, belongs to the experiential kind of knowledge of God. The higher knowledge is, as we saw in Chapter 1, mystical experience, and this experience transcends all conceptualization. It is interesting that St Gregory Palamas, centuries later, sees this clearly and says that the hesychast experience of God is beyond apophaticism.4 Statements of Cataphatic and Apophatic Knowledge Cataphatic statements are based on divine revelation. Revelation is an aspect of the divine activities of creating, preserving, communicating, condescending (becoming incarnate), and perfecting what is created. Revelation is the “making known” or “disclosure” of divine truth through such activities. Revelation is, therefore, an event, not a “thing”. The starting-point for recognizing these activities is the Incarnation. It is important to remember, as we saw in the first chapter, that divine truth, even if somehow disclosed, is not available without spiritual development. The Incarnation discloses both Scripture and nature as sources of potential knowledge of God. Within this disclosed knowledge there is a variety of “names”, terms, or predicates that may be understood and applied to God. In Maximus’ writings one finds discourse that is symbolical, metaphorical, allegorical, analogical, and philosophical. Below I discuss some important terms from a couple of these categories. In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 28, Maximus says: “We discover that Holy Scripture fashions God in terms relative to the underlying disposition of those under His providential care” (Πρὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην τῶν προνοουμένων διάθεσιν εὑρίσκομεν τὴν ἁγίαν γραφὴν τὸν θεὸν διαπλάττουσαν).5 The ineffable and secret councils of God are fashioned in corporeal images for the sake of human beings. However, to those of a more purified mind, like Abraham, God revealed Himself in more proper figures. Maximus refers to God’s revelation to Abraham in Mambre:6 “Now God appeared to 4 Grégoire Palamas, Défense des saints hésychastes 1.3.4, ed. J. Meyendorff, Leuven, 1959, pp. 113–15. 5  Q.Thal. 28, CCSG 7, p. 203. 6  Gen 18:1–2, quoted from A New English Translation of the Septuagint, ed. A.  Pietersma, B. G. Wright, New York and Oxford, 2007.

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him near the oak of Mambre, while he was sitting at the door of his tent at midday. And looking up with his eyes he saw, and see, three men stood over him.” Maximus comments: “God appeared to him as three and spoke to him as one”, thus revealing the mystery of the Trinity.7 I have used the comparative mode more proper figures, since we are now talking of relative knowledge. Theological discourse cannot be so presumptuous as to claim adequate knowledge of the divine being since, according to Maximus, God in Himself is an unknowable Intellect, an unutterable Logos, and an incomprehensible Life. A couple of places in Capita de caritate show how Maximus distinguishes between the unknowable essence and the knowable activities as sources of knowledge: Once [the intellect] coming to be in God, inflamed with desire it seeks first of all the logoi about His essence (τοὺς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ […] λόγους), but finds no satisfaction in those [that are] in accordance with Him (τῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν), for that is impossible and forbidden to every created nature alike. But it receives encouragement from those [that are] around Him (τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν), that is, from His eternity, infinity, and indefiniteness, as well as from His goodness, wisdom, and power that creates, preserves, and judges beings. And this alone is thoroughly understandable of Him, infinity; and the very fact of knowing nothing is to know beyond the [capacity of the] intellect, as the theologians Gregory and Dionysius have said somewhere. 8 Ἐν δὲ Θεῷ γενόμενος, τοὺς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ πρῶτον λόγους, ζητεὶ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ πόθου φλεγόμενος, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν δὲ τὴν παραμυθίαν εὑρίσκει· ἀμήχανον γὰρ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀνένδεκτον πάσῃ γενητῇ φύσει ἐξ ἴσου· ἐκ δὲ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν παραμυθεῖται· λέγω δὴ, τῶν περὶ ἀϊδιότητος, ἀπειρίας τε, καὶ ἀοριστίας· ἀγαθότητός τε καὶ σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως, δημιουργικῆς τε καὶ προνοητικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς τῶν ὄντων. Καὶ τοῦτο πάντη καταληπτὸν αὐτοῦ μόνον, ἡ ἀπειρία, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μηδὲν γινώσκειν, ὑπὲρ νοῦν γινώσκειν, ὥς που οἱ θεολόγοι ἄνδρες εἰρήκασι. Γρηγόριός τε καὶ Διονύσιος.

7  Q.Thal. 28, CCSG 7, p. 205. It is possible that Maximus is “correcting” a text from Philo here, cf. Philo, De Abrahamo, chapter xxiv in Philo, vol. vi, transl. F. H. Colson, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 1935 (LCL 289). 8  Car. 1.100, PG 90, 981d–984b.

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When you are about to speak theologically, do not seek the logoi in accordance with Him (for the human intellect cannot discover this, nor can any other of those after God), but [search] as far as possible those [that are] about Him, such as those about eternity, infinity, and indefiniteness, as well as about goodness, wisdom, and power that creates, preserves, and judges beings. For this one is a great theologian among men who discovers these logoi, however so little.9 Θεολογεῖν μέλλων, μὴ τοὺς κατ’ αὐτὸν ζητήσῃς λόγους (οὐ μὴ γὰρ εὕρῃ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν μετὰ Θεὸν), ἀλλὰ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν, ὡς οἷόν τε, διασκόπει. Οἷος τοὺς περὶ ἀϊδιότητος, ἀπειρίας τε καὶ ἀοριστίας, ἀγαθότητός τε καὶ σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως, δημιουργικῆς τε καὶ προνοητικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς τῶν ὄντων. Οὗτος γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγας θεολόγος, ὁ τούτων τοὺς λόγους κἂν ποσῶς ἐξευρίσκων.

Both texts are about the theological level of spiritual development. He talks of the intellect when it has “come to be in God” (ἐν Θεῷ γενόμενος). Being in God, the intellect seeks to know the logoi about God’s essence (τοὺς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας […] λόγους). I take logos here in the sense of “meaning”. Further, I believe that these two terms, περὶ τῆς οὐσίας and περὶ αὐτοῦ, should be distinguished from the term περὶ αὐτόν, as well as from κατ’ αὐτόν. As seen in the translations above, I suggest that the first two should be translated “about His essence” and “about Him”. How could we understand this? It seems that for Maximus, the human intellect may achieve meaningful notions (logoi) of properties manifested in the divinity’s external actualization. I believe these external manifestations are what he denotes by the term περὶ αὐτόν. The meaningful notions may be predicated apophatically (namely terms like ἀπειρία, ἀοριστία) as well as cataphatically (terms like ἀϊδιότης, ἀγαθότης, σοφία, δύναμις) about or of God. The fourth term, however, the κατ’ αὐτόν, means something else. I suggest that it should be translated “in accordance with” or “according to”. Meaningful notions (logoi) about what accords with the divine being, that is about what belongs to its essence as such, are not available for any created intellect. We may only know or understand the manifestations (the περὶ αὐτὸν) of His essence. The general point is that when the intellect is in a certain condition we 9 

Car. 2.27, PG 90, 992c-d.

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may know that God is eternal, infinite, indefinite, good, wise, and powerful (περὶ αὐτόν) and we nurture notions of these and predicate them (περὶ αὐτοῦ) about God. But what is hidden beyond these (the κατ’ αὐτόν), we do not know. What does it mean to know or understand these attributes? It seems obvious that the believer acknowledges that God is good, wise, and powerful before he arrives at the theological stage of spiritual development. One should think this is acknowledged at an early stage of living a Christian life. However, it seems reasonable to hold that there are degrees of such knowledge. One may acknowledge these predicates without much reflection and one may gain deeper knowledge of what they mean through intellectual or spiritual development. It seems more of a challenge to know and understand the attributes of eternity, infinity, and indefiniteness. I suppose the last term is easier to grasp than the first two if to understand indefiniteness is to understand that God cannot be defined. We return to this in the section on apophatic theology below. Eternity and infinity pose more challenges. Maximus even says that only infinity may be fully grasped.10 This is indeed a strange claim. He refers to St Gregory the Theologian who says: “The divine nature is infinite (ἄπειρον) and hard to understand; and all that we can comprehend of Him is His infinity (ἀπειρία) […].”11 Gregory says it is hard to grasp infinity, but it is not impossible. He connects this claim with the simplicity of God and says that simplicity is not the nature of God just as composition is not the nature of compound beings. He points to the fact that the infinite is beyond beginning and end. It is as if the intellect is confronted with a boundless depth that surrounds the source of all being. The divine nature is unknowable, being beyond all limits, hidden in a surrounding infinity. It is indeed difficult to understand this infinity as it presupposes a widening of the human intellect when it by the grace of God transcends its creaturely limits. However, what is grasped in that elevated condition is still not the divine essence but only a striking manifestation of God.

10 

Car. 1.100, PG 90, 984d. Oratio 38.7 in Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 38–41, ed. C. Moreschini, P. Gallay, Paris, 1990 (SC 358), pp. 117–21. 11  Cf. St Gregory,

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Cataphatic Knowledge of the Trinity I referred in the preceding section to God’s revelation as three and one to Abraham. In this section I shall mainly focus on cataphatic knowledge of the Trinity. In the history of Christian theology, theologians have predicated many terms of God and one wonders what has become of divine simplicity. Maximus introduces a meditation on the Trinity in Capita theologica et oeconomica with the following words: There is one God because one Godhead, alone, without beginning and simple and superessential, and without parts and undivided; the same [is] monad and triad; the same [is] entirely monad and triad; the same [is] wholly monad as to essence, and the same [is] wholly triad as to hypostases.12 Εἷς Θεὸς, ὅτι μία θεότης· μονὰς ἄναρχος καὶ ἁπλῆ καὶ ὑπερούσιος· καὶ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος· ἡ αὐτὴ μονὰς καὶ Τριάς· ὅλη μονὰς ἡ αὐτὴ, καὶ ὅλη Τριὰς ἡ αὐτή· μονὰς ὅλη κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἡ αὐτὴ, καὶ Τριὰς ὅλη κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις ἡ αὐτή.

The chapter is quite long — to occur in a writing in this genre — and ends with the words: “For there is one and the same essence, power, and activity of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and no one of them can exist or be conceived without the others.”13 According to Maximus, God is simple, without parts, and undivided (ἁπλῆ […] ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος). There is, then, an emphasis on divine simplicity. On the other hand, this same God is also a triad. The same entity is at the same moment both monad and triad, even if not in the same respect: the divinity is monad according to essence and triad according to hypostases. One may therefore state the predicates of unity and trinity of God. The triad of hypostases does not imply that the divinity is divided or has parts. The three hypostases are not three parts of God. Rather God is conceived of as simple. The simplicity, the “without parts”, and the undivided character of God are all based on the one essence. There is a tendency in some modern orthodox theologians to subordinate the concept of essence (or substance) to

12  13 

Th.Oec. 2.1, PG 90,  1124d–1125a. Th.Oec. 2.1, PG 90,  1124d–1125a.

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the concept of hypostasis (or person). Zizioulas says:14 “Among the Greek Fathers the unity of God, the one God, and the ontological ‘principle’ or ‘cause’ of the being and life of God does not consist in the one substance of God but in the hypostasis, that is, the person of the Father.” In view of what Maximus says in the Capita theologica et oeconomica referred to above, this is not his teaching. Even if St Gregory of Nyssa says the Father is the cause of the Son (and the Spirit), it is the Father as essentially God that is this cause.15 If that was not the case, there would be no ontological basis for consubstantiality. A human being may be the father of another human being qua hypostasis, but it is because of the biological nature of his hypostasis that he is able to be a father. There seems to be a strange tendency in some modern theology to divide essence and hypostasis as if they were two different “things”. However, that seems quite unreasonable. Essence and hypostasis are not two “things”. What exists is a substance and such a substance is an hypostasized essence. However, when it comes to God, things are somehow different, since the three hypostases of the Trinity are not three individual substances, i.e. three gods. The Trinitarian meditation in the Capita theologica et oeconomica is, as can be expected, rather intricate. The divinity is said to be the three hypostases, and it is also in the three. However, it is not in the three in such a way that part of it is in each, rather “The same [divinity] is wholly in the whole Father and the whole Father is in the whole of it” (Ὅλη ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Πατρὶ ἡ αὐτή· καὶ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ αὐτῇ ὁ Πατήρ). This goes for every one of the three hypostases: the whole is in the whole of each and each is in the whole of it. He further says: “The whole [divinity] is the Father and in the whole Father; and the whole Father is in the whole of it, and the whole Father is the whole of it” (Ὅλη Πατὴρ, καὶ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Πατρί· καὶ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῃ ὁ Πατὴρ, καὶ ὅλη ὅλος ὁ Πατήρ). This goes for every one of the three hypostases as well: the whole divinity is each of the three, the whole divinity is in each of the three, 14 J. Zizioulas,

Being as Communion, Crestwood, New York, 1985, p. 40. Whatever value Zizioulas’ modern contribution might have in itself there is no patristic foundation for this that I know of. 15  See the treatment of St Gregory’s Trinitarian doctrine in T. T. Tollefsen, Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought, Oxford, 2012, pp. 47–66.

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and each of the three is the whole of it. Maximus excels in these kinds of aphoristic-like, dense sentences that are a challenge to his interpreter. We shall find more of this below. If we break these sayings down, we have the following propositions: (1) (2) (3) (4)

The whole divinity is in each of the three hypostases. The whole divinity is each of the three hypostases. Each of the three hypostases is in the whole divinity. Each of the three hypostases is the whole divinity.

We learn explicitly at the end of the chapter that each of the persons inheres in each of the others and we may therefore speak of mutual inherence or co-inherence. It is immediately tempting to drop any further comment and state that Trinitarian co-inherence as sketched by Maximus is a mystery we cannot highlight by philosophical means. However, we shall not leave it off that quick. It is worth noting that the Greek text itself does not admit any conception of part into the picture. When I use the term each above, it is simply due to translation. Strictly speaking, the text gives the impression that there are three (hypostatic) wholes (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) that are identical with the same (essential) whole (the divinity), and this last whole is not a fourth entity. We may illustrate it with three concentric and congruent circles. We might ask if they then are one or three. Is it at all meaningful to distinguish three hypostases when they all seem to collapse into one and only three names remain? Are the three names enough to distinguish three alleged hypostases? One may wonder if it is not three different names that denote one and the same thing, and that the picture we are left with is what one in the history of Christian doctrine calls “Sabellianism”. However, the picture is more complex than that: the three wholes (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) that are identical with the same whole (the divinity) are identical because of the mutual and complete co-inherence of all three in each other due to sameness in essence or divinity. As long as there is complete co-inherence of three (different) entities in each other, the three do not necessarily collapse into just one identical entity. On the other hand, that depends on whether there are any conceivable reasons to distinguish the three as three hypostases.

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Being and Subsistence In the Expositio orationis dominicae, we find some interesting ideas that supplement what we have just discussed.16 Maximus starts commenting on St Paul’s words that in Christ there is neither Greek nor Jew (cf. Gal 3:28). He then points out what he thinks is the “Jewish” and the “Greek” (that is the pagan) concepts of divinity. Maximus objects both to what he considers the Jewish “contraction” of divinity into a single person and the Greek “expansion” of divinity into polytheism. However, he thinks that Jewish doctrine could admit the Logos and the Spirit as qualifications of the one hypostasis, but denies that the persons or hypostases are qualities or accidents according to the true (i.e. Christian) teaching. What is Maximus’ source for saying that Jewish religion could accept the Logos and the Spirit as qualifications of the Fatherly hypostasis? I suppose he is inspired by something St Gregory of Nyssa says in his Oratio catechetica: But should it be a Jew who gainsays these arguments [for the Trinitarian nature of God], our discussion with him will no longer present equal difficulty [as with the Greek], since the truth will be made manifest out of those doctrines on which he has been brought up. For that there is a Logos of God, and a Spirit of God, powers essentially subsisting (οὐσιωδῶς ὑφεστώσας δυνάμεις), both creative of whatever has come into being, and comprehensive of things that exist, is shown in the clearest light out of the divinely-inspired Scriptures.17

It is most interesting that Maximus denies the reduction of the hypostases to qualities or accidents. If they had been qualities or accidents, one could think of a single entity (probably a hypostasis) subject of non-essential predications like being Father, Son, and Spirit. This would probably count as Sabellianism in Maximus’ days. However, Maximus emphasises again in his Expositio orationis dominicae the Christian doctrine according to which God is a single, uncaused intellect that subsists essentially (οὐσιωδῶς

16 

E.O.D., CCSG 23, pp. 51–54. Nysseni, Oratio catechetica, edidit E. Mülenberg, Leiden, New York, Köln, 1996 (GNO III.IV), p. 14. Translation in NPNF, Second Series Volume 5, pp. 477–78. 17  Gregorii

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ὑφεστῶτα) as Father18 and is the begetter of a single, essentially subsisting (οὐσιωδῶς ὑφεστώς) and unoriginate Logos, and the source of a single, eternal life, essentially subsisting (οὐσιωδῶς […] ὑφεστῶσα) as Holy Spirit.19 The terminology of “essentially subsisting” is interesting.20 Terms derived from the verb εἰμί (“I am”) are used for the essential aspect of the divinity, while terms derived from the verb ὑφίστημι (“I subsist”) are used for the hypostatic character of God. The term essentially subsisting points to the axiom that there is no essence or nature (φύσις) without hypostasis. This axiom played a role in the contemporary Christological controversies. To be essentially subsisting tells us that essence or being (οὐσία) is always instantiated hypostatically and a hypostasis is always essential or, in other words, has always an essence. In Expositio orationis dominicae Maximus further denies a whole series of claims that might be made about the divinity: (1) The Triad is not an accident in a monadic substance. (2) The Monad cannot be separate from the Triad as if they were different natures (i.e. the two are “not one thing and another thing”). (3) The Monad is not the cause of a Triad lower in the scale of power — as if they again were two things, the one being the cause of the other. (4) The Monad is not a common and generic term conceived theoretically from particulars — as if the hypostases were concretely existing and the essence an abstract universal. This last claim is of particular interest. Maximus concludes cataphatically that the Monad is a self-subsisting essence and a truly self-consolidating power (οὐσία κυρίως αὐθύπαρκτος οὖσα καὶ δύναμις ὄντως αὐτοσθενής).21 This is obviously not the way to designate “godhead” or “divinity” or “divine nature” as if it was simply an abstract universal predicated on three entities. Let me try to make this clearer. If we consider some entities like Peter, John, 18 

E.O.D., CCSG 23, p. 53. E.O.D., CCSG 23, pp. 41 and 53. Mark Gregory’s and Maximus’ terminology for “essentially subsisting”. It suggests that Maximus had the Oratio catechetica in mind when he wrote this. 20 See V. V. Petroff’s interesting analyses in “Υπάρχω and ὑφίστημι in Maximus the Confessor’s Ambigua”, in A. Levy, P. Annala, O. Hallamaa, T. Lankila, eds, The Architecture of the Cosmos, Helsinki, 2015, pp. 93–122. 21  E.O.D., CCSG 23, 53–4. 19 

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and Jacob, we may intellectually abstract a universal concept and apply “human being” to each of them. “Peter is a human being”, and so on. Taken together they are three human beings. On the other hand, if we proceed in the same manner concerning God, we can for instance say that “The Father is God”, but we cannot say that there are three gods. Divine essence is not an abstract universal but rather an immanent power of being: a self-subsisting essence and a truly self-consolidating power. Essence as Immanent Power of Being We shall dwell a bit further on this important point. The doctrine of the Trinity is the basic Christian dogma but difficult to grasp in a precise way. As we saw above, Maximus says there is one God because there is one θεότης, Godhead, obviously meaning “what it is to be God”. One way to solve the problem of the one and the three, would be to say that “Godhead” is an abstract universal and the Trinity is a social “gathering”. From a Maximian point of view, this would be a backing down in front of intellectual challenges, confusing Scriptural cataphaticism with exact philosophical doctrine. The Godhead is a mystery and can neither be adequately analysed into philosophical propositions nor put down in simplified cataphatic imagery. Even when Maximus uses terms like “self-subsisting essence” and “self-consolidating power” they have value for us, in our thinking, but they do not convey us a precise grasp of “das Ding an sich”. I shall meditate a bit further on the key-terms. The terms “self-subsisting essence” and “self-consolidating power” are from the translation of the Philokalia by Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware.22 Berthold translates it as “an essence which exists properly by itself” and “a force which is absolutely mighty”.23 For the first term I prefer the translation “self-subsisting essence” (which is conceptually equivalent with Berthold’s translation). The second term, αὐτοσθενής, indicates something like “being strong in itself”, probably with the power to consolidate itself. This word is rare. A search in the TLG indicates that it is not found in Pro22  On the Lord’s Prayer in The Philokalia, vol.  ii, transl. by G. E. H. Palmer, Ph. Sherrard, K. Ware, London, 1984, p. 296. 23 Maximus the Confessor, Selected Writings, transl. by George C. Berthold, New York, 1985, p. 111.

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clus or in Dionysius. Of the few instances that are noted, most of them are quotations from Maximus’ text. Maximus uses the terms about the divine essence. What do they tell us? The essence is “self-subsisting”. It is obviously understood as the internal power of existing as God in each hypostasis. This internal power is numerically the same, i.e. identical, in all three. Since there is no bodily being, no distance of place and time in the divinity then, qua Godhead, nothing separates or distinguishes the three. Further, God, being self-subsisting by nature, is in need of nothing beyond Himself to exist. God is free, independent, and self-determining. It is in light of this we also must view the doctrine of creation: eternally there is only God, and without constraint (we return to discuss this in the next chapter) He creates out of nothing. The self-subsisting essence functions as a kind of immanent universal holding the three instantiations in unity. The second term is particularly interesting. If we are correct in understanding δύναμις ὄντως αὐτοσθενής as “self-consolidating power” the term seems to indicate a kind of activity. This fits the metaphysics of some first principles in, for instance, Proclus. Proclus says that the self-constituted (τὸ αὐθυπόστατον) is self-sufficient with regard to essence (αὔταρκες πρὸς οὐσίαν).24 To be selfconstituted and self-sufficient should be conceptually the same as being αὐτοσθενής, “self-consolidating”. It is, however, interesting to notice that the One or Good in Proclus’ system is beyond being self-constituted. Being self-constituted would compromise its unity: that which produces itself is subject to the duality of producing and being produced. Self-constituted substances are therefore secondary to the first principle. However, the first principle of Maximus’ system is the Christian God, the Trinity. In this Trinity there is no subordination, nothing higher and lower. In late antique Platonist systems the “effect” is ontologically weaker and lower in the intelligible hierarchy than the cause.25 According to Christian theology there is no subordination in the Triad. The term self-consolidating power could very well designate the divinity 24 Proclus, Elements of Theology, ed. E. R. Dodds, Oxford, 2004, proposition 40. 25 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads V.5.13, in Plotinus, in Enneads vol.  v, transl. by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1984 (LCL 444) and Proclus, Elements of Theology, proposition 7.

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structuring and consolidating its essential being hypostatically as a Triad. The source or principle of this structuring is the essence of the hypostasis of the Father. However, this “causal” activity of the Father has to be qualified more precisely. (We return to this in the next paragraph, in connection with some sayings in the Expositio orationis dominicae.) Is there any particular advantage in Maximus’ doctrine of God as Trinity? On the one hand, it is not a question of “advantage” as if this doctrine was a human invention. It is received and believed as the tradition of the church. On the other hand, the doctrine of a self-consolidated triune Godhead adds to a particular and important aspect of a God that is different from the Neoplatonist One. God is love, and this is a divine property much stressed in Maximus’ cosmology. (We return to this as well in the next paragraph.) The Neoplatonist One, focussed without distraction on itself, does not strike one as by nature a loving divinity. Of course, the One, without knowing it, is distributive of good effects, but does not direct its love to creatures at lower levels in the chain of being. The Trinity, on the other hand, is a perfect image of love: three consubstantial hypostases internally consolidated in mutual love, is a reassuring image Monad and Triad When Maximus says God the Father is the begetter of the Son and source of the Spirit, he obviously acknowledges the Cappadocian notion that the Father is the source of the Triad.26 However, as we have seen and as we shall see below, he denies any ontological subordination of the Son and the Spirit. We saw above that the divine essence is not an abstract universal. It is not a mind-dependent universal that could be predicated like the term human being on a group of particulars. This would reasonably lead to three-theism. The one essence communicates ontologically into a triadic pattern in a way that we do not find among creatures. The essence is a unified ontological reality hypostasized as Triad. This sounds rather paradoxical, and we will see more of this below. God is beyond the grasp of intelligent creatures but even so He may be talked about and held to be an object of knowledge. We find 26  E.O.D., CCSG 23, p. 41 and p. 53. Cf. L. Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, Oxford, 2009, pp. 206–07 and p. 248.

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some interesting sayings about this in Ambiguum 1. Maximus comments on a couple of sayings from St Gregory the Theologian’s orations. The first is from Oration 29 and the second is from Oration 23: Therefore the monad from the beginning moved towards the dyad and came to a halt at the triad. The monad is moved because of its abundance and the dyad is surpassed, for beyond matter and form, out of which bodies are made, the triad is defined on account of its perfection.27

Maximus interprets these sayings as Trinitarian, but adds: This is not, however, a causal explanation of the cause of beings, which is itself beyond all being, but a demonstration of a pious opinion about it, since the Godhead is a Monad (but not a Dyad), and a Trinity (but not a multitude), for it is without beginning, bodily form, or internal strife.28 Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν αἰτιολογία τοῦτο τῆς ὑπερουσίου τῶν ὄντων αἰτίας, ἀλλ’ εὐσεβοῦς περὶ αὐτῆς δόξης ἀπόδειξις, εἴπερ μονὰς, ἀλλ’ οὐ δυὰς, καὶ τριὰς, ἀλλ’ οὐ πλῆθος ἡ θεότης, ὡς ἄναρχος, ἀσώματός τε καὶ ἀστασίαστος.

To my knowledge there are three translations of this text into English, namely by Louth, Lollar, and Constas. 29 The translation quoted above is by Constas. He and Lollar have chosen to translate one important clause in a different way than Louth, namely εὐσεβοῦς περὶ αὐτῆς δόξης ἀπόδειξις. Louth translates it as “a demonstration of the reverent glory that surrounds it”, Lollar as “a demonstration of how one is piously to think about it”, and Constas as “the demonstration of a pious opinion about it”. The translations differ primarily on the interpretation of the word δόξα. All three gives sense, but while Louth takes it to mean “glory”, the two others think it has to do with thinking or opinion. Louth’s translation suggests that it is used of the glory 27 Cf. Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 27–31, ed. P. Gallay, M. Jourjon, Paris, 2008 (SC 250), p. 180 and Discours 20–23, ed. J. Mossay, G. Lafontaine, Paris, 1980 (SC 270), p. 298. 28  Amb.Thom. 1, CCSG 48, p. 7. 29 A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor, London, 1996, pp.  169–70; Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua to Thomas, transl. by J. Lollar, Turnhout, 2009 (CCT 2), pp.  50–51; Maximos the Confessor, On Difficulties in the Church Fathers, volume 1, transl. by N. Constas, Cambridge Massachusetts, 2014, pp.  7–11.

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that surrounds God, while the other two suggest that it has to do with our pious thoughts about God. All three indicate at least what seems to be Maximus’ essential meaning: Gregory’s words are not an αἰτιολογία of the superessential cause of beings, i.e. a causal description of what in fact goes on inside the divinity in its Trinitarian structuration. Gregory’s words are about something secondary, something within our grasp, something that is shown to human beings either in a manifestation of God’s glory “outside of” His essence (Louth) or that occurs in pious opinions (Lollar and Constas) we may have gathered by sound theological method. In both cases the result is a kind of knowledge we have achieved about God. How should we understand this knowledge? It is of course obvious that divine revelation, mainly as statements found in Scripture, is the starting point of theologically sound “opinions”. Such statements, however, should be pondered by a properly trained intellect in divine light. In this regard the tradition of the Fathers and Councils of the Church, of those who are recognized to have pondered the truth properly, are normative. When it comes to the phenomenology of a properly trained intellect, Maximus’ further interpretation of Gregory’s sayings maybe has its inspiration from two important figures, namely St Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius. In Homily 5 on the Song of Songs the former says: How after all is it possible for a beautiful image to appear in a mirror unless the mirror has received the impression of a lovely form? Hence the mirror that is human nature does not become beautiful until it has drawn close to the Beautiful and been formed by the image of the divine Beauty. […] it is shaped in accordance with that which it looks upon — and what it looks upon is the archetypal Beauty. 30

According to Bamberger’s interpretation of Evagrius, “the soul itself becomes the locus visionis, the place of vision, not of God as he is in himself, but as he makes his presence known. He shines in the soul as in a mirror”.31 The metaphor of shining accords well with Louth’s 30  Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies of the Song of Songs, transl. by R. A. Norris Jr., Atlanta, 2012, p. 163; cf. Gregorii Nysseni, In canticum canticorum, edidit H.  Langerbeck, Leiden, 1986 (GNO VI), p. 150. 31 Cf. the introduction to Evagrius Ponticus, The Praktikos and Chapters On Prayer, translated by J. E. Bamberger, Collegeville, Minnestota, 1972

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translation of δόξα as “glory”, but I think it is reasonable to suppose that Maximus plays on the ambiguity of the term as glory and opinion. The point made by Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius is that the divinity is formed in the soul like an imprinted image. According to Maximus, it is such an image the theologians reflect upon when they form pious opinions of God. The implication is probably mystical: it has to do with experience. When a theological thinker in Maximus’ days looked to the past, this is probably what he would hold of the Fathers: they knew the truth divinely. This background at least sheds some light on what Maximus says next in the first Ambiguum. In the last part of the text, Maximus makes it clear that the movement Gregory the Theologian talks about is not in God but in us. It is in our way of thinking about God:32 “Thus the ‘movement’ of the Godhead is the knowledge — through illumination — both of its being and of how it subsists (τε τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὴν καὶ τοῦ πῶς αὐτὴν ὑφεστάναι), manifested to those who are able to receive it.” The terms being and subsistence connote respectively the essential and the hypostatic character of God. The term movement means probably the pious and illuminated reasoning process that takes place in the mind when it contemplates what God is (essentially) and how God is (hypostatically). How should pious opinion think about God then? I should like to say in advance that Maximus’ sayings are not very easy to follow, but we shall try to get a clearest possible view of it. He puts forward four assertions all of which are true at the same time:33 (1) The (2) The (3) The (4) The

Monad is truly Monad. Triad is truly Triad. Triad is truly Monad. Monad is truly Triad.

These propositions have a certain rhetorical and even poetical ring about them. Monad and Triad obviously have different connotations, but they have the same denotation. The two terms mean different things, but both of them point to the same sub(Cistercian Studies Series: Number Four), p. xci. 32  Amb.Thom. 1, CCSG 48, p. 7. 33  Amb.Thom. 1, CCSG 48, p. 7.

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ject. What is interesting here is that all statements are claimed to be true and none of them can be set aside. It is equally correct to predicate true oneness as well as true threeness of this same entity. We should investigate, however if the propositions contain contradictions. It seems that (1) and (4) contradict one another, and likewise (2) and (3). The propositions seem to be contradictions but even if the same entity is claimed to receive its predicates at the same time it does not have them in the same respect: the Triad is Monad essentially and the Monad is Triad hypostatically. I believe this interpretation is confirmed by Maximus’ next assertions: (1) The Monad is the hypostatic being of the co-essential Triad (ἐνυπόστατος ὀντότης ὁμοουσίου τριάδος). (2) The Triad is the essential subsistence of the tri-hypostatic Monad (ἐνούσιος ὕπαρξις τρισυποστάτου μονάδος).

It is quite demanding to keep all of this together in a coherent picture. Firstly, Maximus connects hypostasis with subsistence (2) and essence with being (1). Secondly, he relates hypostasis to being (1) and essence to subsistence (2). This gives us that the hypostatic mode of threeness qua co-essential is the oneness (or being), i.e. the Monad. Further, the essential mode of oneness qua tri-hypostatic is the threeness, i.e. the Triad. In other words: the Monad is the one being that is hypostasized into a Triad that, because of this one being, is co-essential, while the Triad is the tri-hypostatic subsistence of the one being of the Monad. Even if these sayings are dense, they demonstrate clearly that for Maximus essence is an ontological category (as I claimed in the former paragraph) and not a semantic category only. In this picture there are a couple of ways of thinking that should be avoided. The first way is taken from a sentence that the three translators (Constas, Lollar, and Louth) seem to have struggled a bit with how to translate. I quote from Constas who gives the most illuminating translation:34 “For the Monad is truly Monad: it is not the origin of the things that come after it, as if it had expanded after a state of contraction, like something naturally poured out and proliferating into a multitude” (Μονὰς 34 

Amb.Thom. 1, CCSG 48, p. 7.

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γὰρ ἀληθῶς ἡ μονάς. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν μετ’ αὐτὴν κατὰ διαστολῆς συστολὴν, ἵνα χεθῇ φυσικῶς εἰς πλῆθος ὁδεύουσα…) In this Maximus probably criticises an interpretation of Gregory the Theologian’s words that someone might have set forth. If Constas’ translation is sound, Maximus may simply deny that we should think of the Trinity like some kind of physically expanding entity from Monad to Triad. For instance, I may have a rosebush in the garden and I may trim it in such a way that I allow three branches to sprout and develop. Another possibility is that Maximus has in mind that Neoplatonist first principles are sources of the emanation of hierarchically lower entities on the scale of being. If this interpretation is correct, Maximus maybe wants to say that Gregory shall not be held to teach that the divinity expands almost organically or intelligibly from monad via dyad to triad. This is not a proper way to think about the divinity. Trinity: 1+1+1=3? The second way of thinking that one should avoid is more interesting: the “three” are not to be thought of as three discretely numbered entities added together. The Triad is truly a Triad, but not a sum like 1+1+1=3. In that case, each hypostasis would be a part of a whole sum. If we think this way, how should we avoid tritheism? To my knowledge, even if Maximus now and then dives into numerical speculation, there is not much to be found in him on numbers as such. However, in Ambiguum 67 there are a few notions that may at least supplement what we find in Ambiguum 1. Maximus says the three is the Monad. 35 He further even says that the decad is a monad. All this might suggest that at least one of Maximus’ ideas of number is that each whole number is a unity or a monad. Three is not only three units counted together; ten is not only ten units counted together: three as well as ten are in addition units in their own right. In other words, we should distinguish between (at least) two kinds of number. We find a similar line of thought in Evagrius’ Gnostic Chapters. He says: The arithmetic triad is followed by a tetrad. The Holy Trinity, on the contrary, is not followed by a tetrad. Therefore, it is not an arithmetic triad. 35 

Amb.Ioh. 67, PG 91, 1397c.

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knowledge of god The arithmetic triad is formed by addition of unity to unity without substance. The blessed Trinity, on the contrary, is not formed by addition of unities like those. Therefore, it is not a triad that is in numbers. 36

Maybe this becomes clearer if we make a distinction between numbers and numbering. The number 3 — taken in abstraction from all numbering of entities in the world — is a monad. Maximus probably holds the Triad or Trinity to be a Monad this way. But if 3 is taken as that by which we number or count something, then to say that something is 3 is to say that we have collected together three entities that exist as discrete beings, physically or intelligibly. There are, for instance, three apples on the table, 1+1+1=3. Maximus’ view of number in this connection is probably of Platonic provenance and we cannot exclude the possibility of Evagrian influence as well. According to a Platonist doctrine of number, there are numbers on different levels of reality. 37 There are (1) the numbers that we use to count objects in the physical world, (2) the numbers we do mathematics with, and (3) Form numbers. We use the first kind when we count things or persons: “There are one, two, three persons over there.” This is true if and only if there are three persons over there. The second kind is when we count mathematically or make mathematical judgements like 1+1+1=3. The latter is true in abstraction from facts about entities in the world. It is an arithmetical statement and it is true when we use numbers to do mathematics. The third kind of number is the most interesting in the present context. A Form number, for instance the number 3, is unique, simple, and indivisible. Even if this number is a compound of three units, the units are, according to Julia Annas, “not to be thought of as independently characterizable as so many units into which the number might be divided”38 Three is therefore a unit in its own right, a monad. Whatever permanent fruitfulness there is in this theory, it gives sense. Maxi-

36 Evagrius’s Kephalaia Gnostica, transl. by I. Ramelli, Atlanta, 2015, pp. 322–23. 37  Cf. the introduction to Aristotle’s Metaphysics Books Μ and Ν, transl. by J. Annas, Oxford, 1988, pp. 13–21. 38 Cf. Annas’s introduction to Aristotle’s Metaphysics Books Μ and Ν, p. 18.

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mus is, consequently, something of a Platonist when it comes to numerology or mathematics. Father, Son, and Holy Sprit What, then, is the positive outcome of Maximus’ complex meditation on the Trinity except for highly dense sayings? The language is mainly philosophical or more specifically metaphysical in character. However, despite the philosophical keenness and, we should add, the density, these meditations have not brought us any glimpse into the very being of God. That would have been, as we have seen above, beyond our intellectual capacity and therefore impossible. We are in the field of pious even if learned opinion, in the field of relative knowledge and analogy. The members of the Triad are still not coming forward as clearly recognizable figures. In the Expositio orationis dominicae Maximus moves a bit beyond the unified metaphysical perspective we have dealt with above. A sequence in the commentary on the first part of the prayer, namely “Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name; thy kingdom come”, is especially interesting. 39 These words, according to Maximus, are an introduction to the mode of existence (ἡ πῶς ὕπαρξις) of the creative cause of all beings. This cause is by essence the cause of beings. We return to these sayings about the creative cause in the next chapter. Now, in the present sequence the term ὕπαρξις connotes hypostatic existence. Further, the verb ὑφίστημι is also used for subsisting or existing hypostatically. We also find the term συνυφίστημι that connotes co-subsisting or co-existing hypostatically. However, it is important to note that there is talk of subsisting essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) and of co-existing essentially. As we have seen above, the verbal derivatives of “to be” are used for the essential being of God, while the verb “to subsist” is used hypostatically. We have also seen that Maximus combines these verbs and the coordinated terminology of essence/essential and hypostasis/hypostatical in intricate clauses. Maximus investigates the relations in the Trinity. The present sequence ends with a rather important saying: “For relation has acquired the power of joint indication, by which it is and is said 39 

E.O.D., CCSG 23, pp. 40–42.

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to be a relationship, to be contemplated without admitting the terms as coming one after another” (ἡ γὰρ σχέσις συνενδείξεως κέκτηται δύναμιν, τὰ ὧν ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται σχέσις, μετ᾽ ἄλληλα θεωρεῖσθαι μὴ συγχωροῦσα). What Maximus says gives good sense on the background of Aristotle’s Categories. Normally two relata are simultaneous (ἅμα) and given one of them the other follows necessarily. Maximus has probably the following in mind: if there is a father then there must be a son, and if there is a son then there must be a father. Further, if there is a king, then there is a kingdom. In these two sets the terms indicate one another “jointly” or mutually and there can be no temporal sequence separating them. (One could ponder, of course, if one is still a father when one’s child is dead.) What Maximus tries to introduce here is an analogy and this would, I think, be an obvious example of pious opinion. The analogy, however, is not perfect. (Well, they probably seldom are.) Terms like father and son, king and kingdom are applied within the order of created beings to indicate relationships. These relationships are transferred to the divine sphere. Here we meet with a challenge, since God the Father and God the Son are obviously not within an earthly or biological relationship. Gregory of Nyssa comments on something similar in his Contra Eunomium: since divine realties transcend human thought we need the aid of analogies in order to get some glimpse of the divinity. It is, however, important that we exclude the corporeal sense attached to the words we apply.40 The second set is easier to comprehend: if there is a king, then there is a kingdom and if there is a kingdom, then there is a king. Maximus dwells on four central notions in the paragraph from Expositio orationis dominicae: Father and the Father’s name, King and the Father’s kingdom. The first set is interpreted respectively as the Father and the only-begotten Son. The next set is interpreted as the Father-King and the Holy Spirit. (If there is a king, then there is a kingdom and if there is a kingdom, then there is a king.) These two sets exist by “joint indication” (internal in each set) to one another analogously with the earthly sets of relata. The only-begotten Son and the Holy Spirit subsist essentially and 40  Cf. Gregorii Nysseni, Contra Eunomium libri, pars altera, edidit W. Jaeger, Leiden, 1960 (GNO II), pp.  196–200 and pp.  348–52. T.  T. Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, pp.  54–57.

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co-subsist essentially with the Father. The Son and the Spirit are from the Father (ἐξ αὐτοῦ) and in the Father (ἐν αὐτῷ), beyond cause and understanding. They are not after Him (οὐ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν) as if they had come to be subsequent (ὕστερον) to Him as by a cause. Maximus tries to avoid causal terminology as far as he can. It is, of course, well known to him that the Cappadocians applied such terminology, but Maximus probably tries to avoid the subordinationist connotations causal terminology might create. However, he obviously thinks, like the Cappadocians, that the Father is the source of the Trinity: the Son and the Spirit are, as said above, from the Father, which somehow expresses a kind of causal connection, and the Son is called the Father’s name while the Spirit is the Father’s kingdom. One set of relata is somehow similar to another set of relata. The question is, of course, how we should understand this “somehow similar”. Already the Symbol of faith contains metaphorical terms like generation (of the Son) and procession (of the Spirit). These terms are, of course, in Maximus’ background knowledge even if not applied in the sequence we discuss now. Maximus’ terminology is more abstract as when he writes of “from Him”, i.e. from the Father. This “from Him” suggests a kind of generation, and we can probably not reach any deeper knowledge of the exact process that takes place between Father and Son than just to take it as “somehow similar” and then abstract all corporeal connotations from our understanding. To sum up: there are two sets of earthly relata, father/son and king/kingdom, analogous with two transcendent, Trinitarian relata, Father/Son and King/Kingdom. It seems to me that this sequence from the Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer at least lets the three hypostases evolve in a slightly clearer light than in the texts we have discussed earlier. Hypostatic being is expressed in the terminology of subsistence and co-subsistence. The Father having the Son as the Father’s Name and having the Spirit as the Father’s Kingdom suggest that each of the hypostases have a function or activity to execute in a particular way through the subsistence of each. I shall not devote space here to investigate the use of the “Name” of God (and of Christ) in the Old and New Testament. We may safely say that the Name has several dimensions and indicates something that calls on our reverence since it is fearful,

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powerful, but also revelatory of a mystery. In the Gospel of John it partly reveals the mystery of the Trinitarian Father-Son relationship. The Son, as the Father’s Name, executes this “mystery of Christ” in the acts of salvation history. The Holy Spirit as the Father’s Kingdom is, among other things, connected with the economy of the church. However, we should keep in mind that there is one essence, power, and activity of the Triad. Maximus seems to suggest that this one activity is modified through each of the hypostatic subsistences. This does not mean that the one is split up into three activities. It can just mean that one and the same activity is executed in the modality of three hypostases. We shall have to investigate this a bit further. Some contours of the Trinity qua Trinity emerges within the horizon of revelation, the so-called Economy. The divinity itself established a point of contact when the ontological otherness emerged in the acts of creation and preservation. The divine activities at the beginning, middle, and end (in the sense of purpose) of this otherness are coloured by their contact with what emerges. The three-fold activity of revelation that was presented above is the proper locus for investigating and discussing divine interaction with what is other than God. We shall once more turn to the commentary on the Lord’s Prayer.41 According to Maximus, God has granted to humankind through Christ seven mysteries the first of which is theology:42 “The incarnate Logos of God teaches theology, since He shows in Himself the Father and the Holy Spirit.” Maximus then once again uses the term essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) when he says that the whole of the Father and the whole of the Spirit were present essentially in the whole of the incarnate Son. Even so, the Father and the Spirit — qua hypostases — did not become incarnate. At this point there emerges a distinction between the hypostasis of the Son and the hypostases of the Father and the Spirit. One of the Holy Trinity and one only, became incarnate. One of the Trinity condescended and was “invested” by flesh. The invisible and perfect divinity became visible in and through flesh. This condescension occurs somehow as similar with a Neoplatonic procession (except 41  42 

E.O.D., CCSG 23, pp. 30–33. E.O.D., CCSG 23, p. 31.

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for the consequent subordination): the second hypostasis is distinguished from the first. Maximus then distributes different activities to the three divine hypostases in connection with the Incarnation — or maybe we now should say different modes of the one activity, since the final purpose is the same:43 “the one [the Father] approved, other [the Spirit] co-operated when the Son by Himself effected the Incarnation.” One finds the same idea in Quaestiones ad Thalassium 60 when Maximus talks about the mystery of Christ:44 “This mystery was solely foreknown by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit before all the ages. By the first [the Father, it was known] by approval (κατ᾽ εὐδοκίαν), by the second [the Son, it was known] by His self-execution (κατ᾽ αὐτουργίαν), and by third [the Holy Spirit, it was known] by His cooperation (κατὰ συνεργίαν).” Does approving, executing, and co-operating make the hypostatic character of a triune God conceptually or imaginatively visible? These rather abstract terms fit quite well in with the Biblical story. The Father sends the Son into the world and the Son executes the work of salvation. The Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son to fulfil what the Son did. The three hypostases get rather clear hypostatic identifications through the Evangelical history. It is important to note that the Son is also conceived as the Creator of the cosmos or the divine Mediator of creation, since the Economy includes the two steps of creation and salvation. The three emerge as three distinct agents and not as three masks for one and the same basic principle. They even emerge as three individual entities. Even so, the Biblical narrative points in the direction of a mystery: the three agents or three individuals are ontologically somehow one and the same, Monad as Triad and Triad as Monad. There are similarities and dissimilarities between Maximus’ Christian God and the highest God of Neoplatonist systems. It could be claimed that the most obvious difference is that the Christian God is a person while the Neoplatonist first principle is not. However, this might be rather difficult to demonstrate. Frede calls it a prejudice to reckon the first God in late ancient thought

43  44 

E.O.D., CCSG 23, p. 32. Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, p. 79.

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more as an abstract principle than as a concrete person:45 “There is nothing impersonal about Aristotle’s God, or the God of the Stoics, or the God of Numenius or Plotinus.” However, the term person could be defined in different ways and it is of course obvious that all modern, personalist concepts of personhood should be kept out. I think it is better all in all to speak of hypostasis than of person since the former is not laden with so many modern connotations. I think, however, that there is a possibility of saying something interesting about the difference between the two kinds of divinities from another angle. Both Christian and Neoplatonist thought hold that the reason behind the creation of the cosmic system is divine goodness. This idea stems from their different “sacred” writings, from the Christian Scriptures and from Plato’s Timaeus. As far as I can see there are important differences between the two conceptions of goodness. The goodness of the Neoplatonist first God is a goodness that is manifested almost unconsciously and by a kind of natural necessity. We should expect that an act of creation, whether it results in a temporally limited or an everlasting cosmos, presupposed some kind of activity of the divine principle. The One of Plotinus, however, is inactive when it comes to thinking and it is not even conscious of itself.46 In one way this is not very surprising since the One transcends the Intellect and then obviously the thinking processes that goes on on that level as well. On the other hand, Plotinus admits a kind of activity in the One, and in one place calls it ὑπερνόησις.47 This “beyond-intellection” cannot in any way be related to cosmic creation even if it is the ontological foundation of it. Because of the One’s internal activity the Intellect is constituted and because of the internal activity of the Intellect the Soul is constituted. To put it metaphorically, the 45 M. Frede, “Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy in Later Antiquity” in P. Athanassiadi, M. Frede ed., Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, Oxford, 2008, p. 48. 46 Plotinus, Enneads V.6.6 and Enneads III.9.9, in Enneads vol.  iii, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1967 (LCL 442). My immediate reaction to this is that the One cannot be a person (contra Frede), since we at least should expect a person to be self-conscious and if that is the case, a duality sneaks into the notion. However, the idea of self-consciousness is modern and should probably not be pressed into an ancient framework where it plays a much more restricted role. 47 Plotinus, Enneads V.1.6.

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Soul carries what is contemplated in the Intellect into the lowest level of Nature and the material cosmos. This timeless process of constitution starts with the One and ends with the sensible world. Whatever occurs on the levels below the One is somehow conditioned by the One. The goodness of the One releases its outward activity. It is on this background that I above used the terms “unconsciously” and by “natural necessity” to qualify creative activity. I think Maximus’ Christian God could not at all be said to create in this way. I shall not develop or modify these considerations further in the present section since the topic will be offered due consideration in the next chapter. However, one might ask the question if the Christian God is much different from the Neoplatonist God. The Christian God is held to be good by nature and in that case divine goodness is manifested from God almost unconsciously — since God does not need to consider being good — and by natural necessity — since God’s nature is what it is and manifests itself naturally. If this is the case, where is the difference between the concepts of God in Christianity and Neoplatonism? For the moment we can at least identify one particular point that makes a big difference. In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 60 Maximus claims that the purpose behind the making of the cosmos was to achieve the hypostatic union between divine and human nature in Christ, and consequently to institute an economy of salvation for all beings: This is the great and hidden mystery. This is the blessed end because of which all things are put together. This is the divine purpose conceived before the beginning of beings, which, defining it we would say is the preconceived goal for the sake of which everything exists, itself, however, for the sake of nothing.48 Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα καὶ ἀπόκρυφον μυστήριον. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μακάριον, δι’ ὃν τὰ πάντα συνέστησαν, τέλος. Τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων προεπινοούμενος θεῖος σκοπός, ὃν ὁρίζοντες εἶναί φαμεν προεπινοούμενον τέλος, οὗ ἕνεκεν μὲν τὰ πάντα, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκεν […].

What is strange here, from a Neoplatonist point of view, is the idea of the Incarnation, namely that the purpose of creation is to bring about a union between divine and human nature. This kind 48 

Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, p. 75.

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of divine purpose would be blasphemous and incomprehensible for a Neoplatonist. As a conclusion I shall sum up the main points of the above analysis. Because God is executing certain activities of creation, preservation, and incarnation, we may know aspects of Him and therefore make propositions in which we predicate several terms of Him. God is Monad and Triad, a self-subsisting and self-consolidating power. He is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The hypostases of the Son and the Spirit are subject to generation and procession. In the divinity there is approval, carrying out, and cooperation in the Economy. Maximus treats and considers a lot of other terms we may predicate of God. Above I have focussed on central metaphors like Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and a set of philosophical terms. We shall return to terms like goodness, being, etc. in Chapter 5 below, when I discuss the logoi and the activities. It is only important to remember that all positive or cataphatic knowledge and predication is possible because of divine revelation. We should also remember that in the acts of revelation God not only reveals Himself, He also conceals Himself. In the next section we investigate this divine concealment a bit further. Divine Concealment: Apophaticism In the former section I investigated some of the things we may know about God because He has made Himself manifest in revelation. I focussed on Trinitarian discourse since the doctrine of the Trinity is basic for Christianity and therefore for the philosophy of Maximus. It is also philosophically challenging and interesting. If we now turn our attention to God in Himself and not to God as related to the world in His manifestations, our discourse must be modified. We shall investigate Maximus’ understanding of God in Himself as an object of thought. Here we immediately turn up against challenges. In order to understand something we need to make distinctions and be able to identify it as an object of thought. In Capita theologica et oeconomica Maximus presents a problem. He says that all thinking (νόησις) occurs within the relation of those who think to what is thought.49 A human 49 

Th.Oec. 2. 2, PG 90, 1125c.

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knower stands as a subject in relation to an object and both entities are delimited in this relation to one another. The knower is one thing and the known object is another. Somehow the subject and object must be accommodated to one another if thinking is to take place. This accommodation is within certain limits possible when it comes to the knowledge human beings have of creatures. I say “within certain limits” since, as we saw in Chapter 1, a more proper knowledge of creatures is only possible when creatures are disclosed from the point of view of their logoi. When it comes to the knowledge of God, however, there is no natural bond or possible accommodation between the human knower and the divine object. God cannot be a simple object of knowledge for a created mind as He is not even an apprehending intellect nor an intelligible object of thought. Maximus says God transcends these distinctions. If God is a thinker standing in relationship to Himself as what is thought, there would occur a duality in His simple being. God would be one thinking “thing” standing over against another “thing” that is thought. This somehow implies a divinity that has certain similarities with the Aristotelian God, a God that is self-thinking thought. In this way, however, one induces a duality into God’s very being and strictly speaking, God transcends this. God is not a thing or a being, neither for Himself nor for any other intellect. It is obvious that when God is not an intelligible being for Himself he cannot be an intelligible being for a created intellect. It may sound strange that God is not an intellect grasping Himself as intelligible, but Maximus’ point is here, as already mentioned above, that God, when considered in Himself, is beyond such characteristics. God of course knows Himself but not in the dual fashion of subject and object of thought. When we try to understand the divine being as such, we need to put aside all these properties. When it comes to God’s knowledge of what is other than God, He does not know creatures as external objects. He knows them in Himself as His own acts of will.50 We return to this in Chapter 4.

50 Cf. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1085b. We will return to this below when we turn to creation.

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Before we comment on Maximus’ idea of divine transcendence, we shall turn to his apophatic theology. In Ambiguum 16 and 17 Maximus comments on sayings from St Gregory the Theologian’s Oration 28, directed against Eunomius. This is one of Gregory’s celebrated “theological orations”. Maximus’ comments are illuminating when it comes to apophatic theology. According to the fourth century heretic Eunomius, certain names (ὀνόματα) are natural in the sense that they belong to what they are said of in an essential way. They therefore reveal the nature of something and make it intelligible.51 The Eunomians’ favorite and privileged term is ἀγέννητον, “unbegotten”. Eunomius and his adherents held that this predicate makes the essence of God comprehensible. St John Chrysostom says they claim to know God as God knows Himself.52 This claim strikes one as rather surprising and strange. Let me try to make it clearer. An essential property is a property that a being cannot lack while still continuing to be the same entity. Eunomius holds that “unbegotten” is an essential property that makes up the entire essence of God. If we understand what “unbegotten” means, then we understand the essence of God. It is also important to note that according to Eunomius the divine nature is simple. For this reason there can be one and only one essential property. The argument is directed against the full divinity of the Son. God the Father is, as is commonly acknowledged, unbegotten, while the Son is begotten. For the Eunomians this implies that the Son is essentially dissimilar to the Father. We have seen above that, according to Maximus, we may know the logoi, the reasons, or senses that are “about God” or “regarding God” (cf.  περὶ τῆς οὐσίας/περὶ αὐτοῦ). In other words, we may grasp the meanings of what we predicate of God (even if some of these meanings are hard to grasp). What we cannot know is what is “according to Him” (κατ’ αὐτόν). The properties that are according to Him or that accord with Him are (according to 51 Cf. Eunomius, Extant Works, Liber apologeticus, ed. R. P. Vaggione, Oxford, 1987, pp. 41–43. 52 Jean Chrysostome, Sur l’incompréhensibilité de Dieu (Homélies I–V), par Jean Daniélou, Anne-Marie Malingrey, Robert Flacelière, Paris, 2000 (SC 28), p. 154. Cf. Socrates Scholasticus, Historia ecclesiastica, 4.7, PG 67, 473b. Vaggione accepts the fragment in Socrates as genuine, cf. his comments in his edition of Eunomius’ Extant Works, ed. Vaggione, pp.  168–70.

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my above interpretation) those that are about His essence as such. No property we would like to predicate can therefore be essential in the sense that it reveals God’s essence. Maximus claims that even the “unbegotten” somehow belongs to the latter category. I say “somehow” since “unbegotten” is a negation and the question is what kind of role such a negation can play. In his interpretation of Gregory, Maximus says that if the Eunomians continue to insist that the “unbegotten” is the essence of God, they will be completely constrained to maintain that other negative terms as well denote and reveal the divine essence, terms like incorporeal, without beginning, immortal, immutable, and incorruptible.53 Maximus claims that if they are to be consistent with their own principles, they in fact introduce many essences of God, and they risk falling into polytheism. What exactly is the force of Maximus’ argument? We need to answer two questions: (1) Why are the Eunomians constrained to accept the other negative terms? (2) Why do they introduce many essences and in fact end in polytheism when they abide by their own principles? Maximus holds, in accordance with Gregory, that among the several negative terms that could be reasonably predicated of God none is more privileged than any other. If one of these terms, in casu unbegotten, denotes the divine essence, then one could claim that the other terms denote this as well. If we study Eunomius’ argument in his Liber apologeticus, it is not easy to see why the particular term “unbegotten” should have a privileged status philosophically. There is of course one reason, since Eunomius’ argument is directed polemically against the orthodox doctrine of the ὁμοούσιος (“of the same essence”): if the Father is unbegotten and the Son is begotten, how can they be of the same essence? His argument is mainly focused on the Father as cause. In that capacity He is, we may reasonably say, before all things. Maximus point would be that compared with all that is not the Father it would seem obvious to say that while all generated things have a beginning, He is “without beginning” (ἄναρχον). So why is not the “without beginning” the essence of God? Probably one can make as good a case for several other negations as can be given for the unbegotten. There seems to be no good reason to make a priority 53  Cf. the

whole argument in Amb.Ioh. 16, PG 91, 1212c–1224a.

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of one term from among many possible negations. This, as far as I can see, is why Maximus claims that the Eunomians are constrained to accept other negative terms. But why does this acceptance introduce many essences and end up in polytheism? Maximus’ reasoning seems to be that if the many predicates are on the same footing, if each of these terms denotes God, if in denoting God they denote an essence, and if the divine essence is perfectly simple, then there seems to be many divine essences. Further, these essences cannot be different “parts” of God, since the simplicity of God entails, Eunomius claims, to be without parts.54 According to Maximus, the consequence is that there must be several gods. This follows from Eunomius’ principles and seems to be a sound inference. This answers the second question. Eunomius denies that to know God as unbegotten is to know Him by way of a privation.55 He thinks that privations are “with respect to [the] natural characteristics” (τῶν κατὰ φύσιν) of something. If “unbegotten” should be a privation, generation would have been an inherent property of God which one then denies, therefore “unbegotten” cannot be a privation. This reasoning is strange. There should be no reason to hold that negations deprive things of inherent properties. If I say that the stone is not heavy, I make an assertion in which I deny that it has a certain property (“heaviness”) but I do not deprive it of anything ontologically. According to Eunomius, however, “the unbegotten” has a positive or affirmative force. It reveals the reality of what God is essentially. Maximus, on the other hand, claims that negations are not in any way denoting the essence. This is a crucial move. According to him, negations are assertions that signify what things are not (τὸ τί οὐκ ἔστιν), and not what they are (τὸ τί ἐστιν).56 They cannot therefore count as definitions of something because definitions are not of what things are not, but of what they are.57 At this point we need to interpret the use of the terms περὶ θεοῦ and περὶ θεόν in the present context. We saw above that Maximus uses the first term in the sense “about God”. The second term 54 Eunomius,

Extant Works, Liber asceticus 8, ed. Vaggione, pp.  42–43. Extant Works, Liber asceticus 8, ed. Vaggione, pp. 42–43. 56  Amb.Ioh. 16, PG 91, 1221d. 57  Amb.Ioh. 16, PG 91, 1224a. 55 Eunomius,

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have the sense of “around God”. These terms and their cognates play an important role in the arguments of Ambiguum 16 and 17. A definition (ὅρος), Maximus says, “unfolds the concise grasping of things, namely of their name.”58 Therefore, a definition of the term predicated of anything should signify concisely “the what” (τὸ τί ἐστιν) of that thing. On the other hand, the statements of alpha-privative negations, referred to as τὰ στερητικά and τὰ ἀναιρετικά (privations and negations), deny certain properties of God. 59 The unbegotten denies that God is generated, the incorporeal denies that God is a body, the without beginning denies that God began His existence at some point in the past, the immortal denies that God is subject to death, the immutable denies that God can change, and the incorruptible denies that God is subject to corruption. Suchlike terms are said negatively “about God” (περὶ θεοῦ), “God is not so and so”, and they are negating properties that are “around God” (περὶ θεόν). The logical implication is that these properties “around God” are properties belonging to created entities, properties like generation, bodily being, time, mortality, change, and corruptibility.60 To make this clearer: Maximus’ point is that when we apply negative statements about God, we in effect deny that God has properties that belong to creatures that are around Him. According to Maximus, God is not a subject of definition. We can only make statements that deny certain properties about God. We deny properties that belong to creatures around God. But what about the alpha-privatives, could they still have a positive function? Maybe the alpha-privatives taken together could suggest a kind of “description” (ὑπογραφή) of God? One distinguishes between definition and description in the tradition of Porphyrian logic. Since Ammonius is one of the main

58  Amb.Ioh. 16, PG 91, 1224a. This is essentially the same description of a definition that we find in Addidamentum 34: “A definition is a concise formula that declares the nature of the subject matter” See translation in T. T. Tollefsen, “St Maximus the Confessor and Alexandrian Logic”, in M. Knezevic, ed., Philosophos-Philotheos-Philoponos, Belgrade, 2021, p. 302. 59  Amb.Ioh. 16, PG 91, 1221d. 60 According to Aristotelian-Porphyrian logic, all the characteristics that are mentioned here are properties, except “body” which is a genus.

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sources for the commentators that probably influenced Maximus (David, Elias, Stephanus),61 we may quote him: This, then, is how definition differs from description: i.e. by the fact that the definition indicates realities on the basis of substance, but the description [does so] on the basis of accidents. It is called a description (hypographê) as if it were a kind of sketch (skiagraphia), for among painters the sketch indicates an imitation of the image, but not in any articulated way, so a description also somehow indicates the reality, but not in an articulated way.62

Could the sum of alpha-privatives be said to give a sketch that indicates a reality? If we say that something is without generation, without a body, without beginning, without mortality, without change, and without corruption (and we may add a lot of other privatives), does this indicate this “something” in a way that we may grasp? An entity characterized thus seems rather to disappear as something we may not identify. Outside of the present theological and philosophical context, we would have said that an entity characterized thus simply does not exist. However, the negations tell us that God is not an entity we may know through the attributes of creatures. On the other hand, we may use such properties provisionally. In this way apophatic theology balances cataphatic theology. We should learn that God reveals Himself in figures but at the same time transcends these. We cannot identify the reality behind the figures with the figures, nor can we lock God up in them, as if He was a being among other beings. We have also seen in the section on cataphatic and apophatic theology above that we may predicate several positive properties of God. Maximus says we may know what is “around Him” (περὶ αὐτόν), and in this text the “around Him” does not mean creatures, but divine properties like eternity, infinity, indefiniteness, goodness, wisdom, and power (ἀϊδιότης, ἀπειρία, ἀοριστία, ἀγαθότης, σοφία, δύναμις).63 Even if these properties are not 61 Cf. Tollefsen,

“St Maximus the Confessor and Alexandrian Logic”, pp. 296–304. 62 Ammonius, Interpretation of Porphyry’s Introduction to Aristotle’s Five Terms, transl. M. Chase, London, 2020, p. 59; Greek text in Ammonius, In Porphyrii Isagogen sive v voces, edidit A. Busse, Berlin, 1891 (CAG IV.III), pp. 54–55. 63  Car. 1.100, PG 90, 984b.

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the essence as such, they emanate, if I may use that term provisionally, from the essence and therefore seem to sketch (as in a description) what the essence of God is. Affirmations and negations balance each other, but there is still more to say. In the next section we turn to Maximus’ radical apophaticism or to his views of God’s absolute transcendence. Divine Concealment: Transcendence Cataphatic and apophatic theology normally affirms and denies properties of God from a particular perspective. The perspective is God as He has revealed Himself in certain acts of creating and providing for the cosmos. In these activities, God both reveals and conceals Himself. He is said to be this and that and at the same time not to have the features of created beings. However, God is Himself and if we want to talk of Him as such, our conceptual tools are in principle strained to the uttermost. The late ancient thinkers use a certain terminology but that terminology seems designed to let the divinity free from our grip in order to let it be itself alone. This strategy is of course not completely successful, since human beings are always in the grip of language and its semantic content. This kind of discourse is common to Platonic and Christian traditions. Plato’s words in the Republic, that the Good is ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, beyond being or essence, became a basic dogma for Platonic philosophers in late antiquity.64 God is not anything of what is created. God cannot in Himself be characterized by what comes “after” Him or what He is not. If we know the properties of being, goodness, etc. solely from worldly experience, such terms and concepts do not grasp what God is. We should need another kind of language, one that is not of this world, but we do not possess such a language. God is not a being, not goodness, not God, not even a “this”. Late ancient thinkers saw the challenge and held it crucial that the source of all being and of all additional perfections (which are “after” God) in itself is acknowledged as beyond everything we may know. One perspicuous linguistic tool they apply is exactly this beyond (ὑπέρ, above, over, beyond) terminology. Dionysius the Areopagite is a source of inspiration for Maximus in this regard. One of the ways 64 Plato,

Republic 509b.

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in which Dionysius emphasises divine “beyondness” is by applying “beyond-terminology”, like the terms ὑπερκόσμιος, ὑπερουράνιος, ὑπερούσιος, and ὑπεράγαθος (beyond-cosmos, beyond-heaven, beyond-essence/being, beyond-goodness).65 We find this kind of linguistic expressions in several places in Maximus’ works but I shall only mention a couple of texts. In Ambiguum 17 Maximus argues that we have no knowledge of God in His essence. God is “the nature beyond essence (or being)” (τὴν ὑπερούσιον […] φύσιν).66 Here we have the Dionysian term ὑπερούσιος. Maximus says we shall not dare to form a universal concept of God from beings that are secondary and distant from God: that is from creatures.67 In general, we cannot know any essence by the epistemic capacity possessed by humans. We may have some knowledge of what an entity is but in our fallen condition we do not grasp the basic subject that is instituted by God through His logoi. When it comes to God, however, we cannot have any knowledge of His essence in principle. The divinity remains beyond our epistemic powers in the present as well as in the future age. It is obvious that what transcends οὐσία at the same time transcends knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term. How could we “know” what has no intelligible or essential content, what has no “whatness”? It is simply beyond any possible act of knowing. One place where Maximus shows his radical apophaticism is in the introduction to Mystagogia. He says we should not group God together with any being and He is called non-being (τὸ μὴ εἶναι) because of τὸ ὑπερεῖναι, “beyond-being”.68 He continues: “For it is necessary, if we are to know truly the difference between God and creatures, that we must know that the affirmation of beyond-being (τοῦ ὑπερόντος) is the negation of beings, and the affirmation of beings is the negation of beyond-being.” Maximus further states that, on the one hand, both being and non-being (τὸ εἶναι […] καὶ

65 Cf., DN 1.6; DN 1.1; DN 2.3, in Corpus Dionysiacum I, ed. B. R. Suchla, Berlin, 1990, p. 119, p. 108, p. 125; MT 1.1, in Dionysiacum II, ed. Heil, Ritter, pp.  141–42. 66  Amb.Ioh. 17, PG 91, 1224b. 67  Amb.Ioh. 17, PG 91, 1224d. 68  Myst., CCSG 69, pp. 9–10.

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τὸ μὴ εἶναι) may be applied to God, but, on the other hand, none of them are properly applied. We shall discuss this further. Maximus says we may predicate being of God as cause of beings but when God is considered in Himself, we say He is non-being. The last term does not mean that God does not exist, it means that His inherent properties (which is a word with no force in this connection) are just “outside” of any cosmic property. If we should use the strategy of affirming “being” of God in any sense of the term, even in the sense of “beyond-being”, then creatures cannot be qualified as “being”. If God is being, then creatures are not being. On the other hand, if “being” is a predicate of creatures, then the term cannot be applied to God in any sense, not even in the sense of “beyond-being”. One interesting and important question here is what Maximus actually understands by terms like τὸ ὑπερεῖναι and ὑπερούσιος. Does he claim that God is beyond finite being or being in any possible sense of the term? It seems quite clear from what I commented on above that he claims God to be beyond being in any sense. In Ambiguum 10, Maximus says that if we say that God “is” we do not predicate being of Him; for even if being comes from Him He is not being.69 In the same vein, probably inspired by Maximus, St Gregory Palamas says the following in his Capita 150:70 “If God is nature, otherness is not nature, and if each of the other things is nature, He is not nature; just as He is not being, if others are beings, and if He is being, the others are not beings.” Obviously, the believer cannot speak of God except as existing, but the property of being, or more precisely (as we shall see in a later chapter) the activity of being, is not a characteristic of the essence of God. We return to being as activity in Chapter 5 below. Apophatic theology or transcendence theology, when driven to the extreme, puts God beyond all categories and concepts. It seems metaphysically sound that this should be the case, but it poses a question: why should God be of any concern to us when we simply cannot know Him? If God wants us to know Him, we need some kind of access to Him. The answer is that revelation 69 

Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1180d. Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, ed. R. E. Sinkewicz, Toronto, 1988 (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Studies and Texts 83), § 78, pp. 172–73. 70 Saint

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provides this access. The available knowledge is relative and analogous, conceived in images and concepts. Whether our formulas are poetical, liturgical, or philosophical, they are all within the field of tension between apophatic and cataphatic theology. In the next chapter, we turn to God’s act of creation which is the first in the sequence of activities that make Him known to human beings.

3. Maximus’ Doctrine of Creation in Context The development of the Christian doctrine of creation is a rather long history. It is not necessary to enter into that history for the purpose of the present chapter.1 We shall just notice that the final steps of this development were taken in the fourth century with thinkers like Athanasius, Basil the Great, Ambrose, and Augustine. The main points of this doctrine are: (1) God made the world with a certain purpose because He willed so. (2) The world was made according to a divine plan. (3) It was not created out of pre-existent matter — it was rather made ex nihilo. (4) The world was made with a temporal beginning. The doctrine got its classical formulation in the fourth century but was seriously challenged by Neoplatonist philosophers of Athens and Alexandria from the middle of the fifth century. This called for further developments. In the present chapter I shall investigate St Maximus’ doctrine of creation on the background of the achievements of the fourth century, the attack on the Christian doctrine in the fifth century, and its defence at the end of the fifth and the beginning of the sixth century. Fourth Century Prelude Most thinkers, pagan and Christian, agreed that the world was created by God. They disagreed, however, on the nature of this God and where the Creator is placed in the intelligible hierarchy. Pagans and Christians also disagreed on certain particularities of the doctrine of creation. One of the important issues was the question of the temporal beginning of the world. St Basil made it sufficiently clear that the world should be considered to have a temporal beginning in his In hexaemeron:2 1  For the early development of the Christian doctrine of creation, cf. P. M. Blowers, “Doctrine of Creation”, in S. A. Harvey, D. G. Hunter eds, The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, Oxford, 2010, chapter 44. 2 J. F. Callahan, “Basil of Caesarea a New Source for St. Augustine’s Theory of Time”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 63 (1958), pp.  437–54, makes an interesting case for the influence of Basil on Augustine’s theory of time in general.

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maximus’ doctrine of creation in context It is even possible for you to learn when the formation of this world began, if only going back from the present to the past you will strive to discover the first day of the generation of the world. You will in this way find from what moment the first movement in time came; then too that the heavens and the earth were laid down, first, like foundation stones and the groundwork […]. 3

It is clear from this that for Basil there is a temporal starting-point from which the world began. He says further that visible things are not without a beginning and those who claim this are simply deceived by observing how circular movements in the heavens return upon themselves. Even if we are not able to discern the beginning and end of such movements it would be wrong to suppose that they are without a beginning. Basil also claims that the world is perishable or transitory, because what begins with time shall end in time:4 a whole whose parts are subject to corruption and change must itself submit of necessity to the fate of its parts. Diogenes Laertius refers to this as a Stoic doctrine: They hold the cosmos to be perishable, inasmuch as it was generated, on the analogy of those things that are understood by the senses. And that of which the parts are perishable is perishable as a whole. Now the parts of the world are perishable, seeing that they are transformed into one another. Therefore the world itself is doomed to perish. 5

Whatever the provenance of this argument, it recurs, as we shall see below, as an important point both in John Philoponus and Maximus. In making these statements, Basil is on collision course with developments in the Platonic schools. The philosophical issues came to be concentrated on the interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus. 3 Basil de Césarée, Homélies sur l’hexaéméron, texte grec, introduction et traduction de Stanislas Giet, Paris, 1968 (SC 26), pp.  110–11; translated in Saint Basil, Exegetic Homilies, transl. by A. C. Way, Washington, DC, 1981, pp. 10–11. 4 Cf. Basil, Homélies sur l’hexaéméron, pp.  96–101; Saint Basil, Exegetic Homilies, p. 7. 5  Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. ii, transl. by R. D. Hicks, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1979 (LCL 185), book 7, § 141, p. 245.

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The dialogue presents a creation-story of the visible cosmos but the problem was how this should be understood. Plato seems to describe a sequence of events starting from pre-existent matter in disordered movement and ending with a beautiful cosmos. There were so-called Middle Platonists that accepted a doctrine of creation of this cosmos in time. One should note that this is not the Christian doctrine that taught creation with time. Proclus remarks on it in his commentary on the Timaeus: Those around Plutarch of Chaeronea and Atticus cling tenaciously to these words in the belief that they witness on their behalf to the generation of the cosmos from a [point of] time. And what is more, they say that unordered matter pre-existed prior to this creation, and, further, that there pre-existed maleficent soul moving this discordant [mass]. For where did the movement come from, [they ask,] if not from soul? And if the movement was unordered, [it must have derived] from unordered soul.6

The term “from a [point of] time” should reasonably be interpreted as “from a [point of] time within time”. Plutarch of Chaeroneia (c. 45-c.  ad 125) and Atticus (second century ad) among others, namely Christians, may have been the targets of Proclus in his book against those who teach that the world has a beginning.7 We shall return to Proclus, his arguments, and John Philoponus’ critique of them below. St  Athanasius of Alexandria (295–373) betrays some knowledge of Platonic sources in his De incarnatione: Others take the view expressed by Plato, that giant among the Greeks. He said that God had made all things out of pre-existent and uncreated matter, just as the carpenter makes things only out of wood that already exists. But those who hold this view do not realise that to deny that God is Himself the Cause of matter is to impute limitation to Him, just as it is undoubtedly a limitation on the part of the carpenter that he can make nothing unless he has wood. How could God be called Maker and Artificer if His ability to make depends on some other cause, namely on matter 6 Proclus,

In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, vol. i, ed. E. Diehl, Leipzig, 1903, book 2, pp.  381–82, translation in Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, vol.  ii, ed. and transl. by D. T. Runia, M. Share, Cambridge, 2008, p. 249. 7  On these two philosophers, see J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, London, 1977, pp. 184–230 and pp. 247–58.

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maximus’ doctrine of creation in context itself? If He only worked up existing matter and did not Himself bring matter into being, He would be not the Creator but only a craftsman. 8

Similar ideas are reflected in Basil’s In hexaemeron.9 The words of Athanasius do not prove that he actually knew the Timaeus first hand even if that is a possibility that probably cannot be ruled out. He at least knew Platonic sources that described some features of what is taught in that dialogue. The sources may probably be sought in Alexandria, in thinkers like Philo and those Christians that studied him. Whatever Plutarch and Atticus had taught, Athanasius is not satisfied with a doctrine of creation accepting that matter pre-exists the making of the cosmos. The reason is clearly enough given in the quotation: to accept pre-existent matter would be to delimit the power of God. Basil presents us with a view of Platonism similar to the one found in Athanasius. It is, however, more elaborate and probably betrays acquaintance with more elaborate sources than those studied by Athanasius. In his second homily of the In hexaemeron Basil comments on the words that “the earth was invisible and unformed” (ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος).10 He says that those who falsify the truth claim that these words point to matter. This means matter without quality and separated from form and shape. But who are “they” that falsify the truth? Does he have Christians in mind or pagans? Probably he is thinking of pagans who, according to the apostle Paul, should have used their wisdom to know God, but who were led astray (cf. Rom 1:18–22). In that case Basil may be thinking of pagans that in his opinion distort the words of Moses to suit their Platonic bias. (According to the pious legacy, Plato learnt philosophy from Moses’ writings.)

8 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. and transl. by R. W. Thomson, Oxford, 1971, p. 139. 9 Basil, Homélies sur l’hexaéméron, pp.  142–49; Saint Basil, Exegetic Homilies, pp.  22–24. 10 Basil, Homélies sur l’hexaéméron, pp. 140–41 and pp. 142–49; Saint Basil, Exegetic Homilies, p. 21 and pp. 22–24.

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What can we say of Basil’s sources? Quite early in the section he says that the craftsman (τεχνίτης) took over (παραλαβών) matter and formed it by his own wisdom. Plato also says the creator took over (παραλαβών) the material stuff, but this stuff was visible (ὁρατόν) while Basil refers to those that say it was invisible (ἀόρατος).11 When he continues and uses their own words — so he claims — for what matter is like, it is said to be without quality, formless, utter formlessness, unshaped ugliness (τὴν ἄποιον, τὴν ἀνείδεον, τὴν ἐσχάτην ἀμορφίαν, τὸ ἀδιατύπωτον αἶσχος). He says this in a polemical context and he probably has the Gnostics in mind.12 The terms do not stem from the Timaeus, they more probably have a later provenance. Philo says that matter is without quality (ἄποιος), formless (ἀνείδεος), and shapeless (ἄμορφος).13 Plotinus says matter is invisible, without quality, formless, and unshaped.14 It is not easy to say what Basil’s source might be. It is also interesting that Basil claims that matter, if uncreated, should be held in equal honour with God, which he of course considers absurd. Neither Plato nor any Neoplatonist would ever have conceded this and it is probably a corollary drawn polemically by a Christian. Basil further points to the pagan idea of the deficiency of matter that delimits divine control over creation since the divinity could not reach His purposes perfectly because of the unmanageable character of the original stuff. For Basil, of course, this would count as an argument for creation out of nothing, 11  Cf. Plato,

Timaeus 30a. seems to suggest that compared with God, matter is like this. 13  Cf. Philo, De Opificio Mundi 5.22, in Philo, vol.  i, transl. by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 1981 (LCL 226); Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 27.140, in Philo, vol.  iv, transl. by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 1939 (LCL 261); Philo, De mutatione Nominem 23.135, De Somnis 2.6.45, in Philo, vol. v, transl. by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 1934 (LCL 275); Philo, De Specialibus Legibus 1.60.32, in Phil, vol. vii, transl. by F. H. Colson, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2006 (LCL 320). 14 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads II.4.12 (invisible), II.4.10, II.4.13, IV.7.3 (without quality), I.8.3; I.8.8 (formless), I.8.8; I.8.9 (shapeless). Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, vol. i, 1978 (LCL 440), vol. ii, 1966 (LCL 441), and vol. iv, 1984 (LCL 443), transl. by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England. 12  He

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since the Christian God could not be imagined to have incomplete mastery of any of the elements of the created world. Plotinus teaches that matter originates from Soul and is, in its complete lack of perfection, not even able to receive form in any full sense.15 The next part of Basil’s criticism is especially interesting. He seems to be acquainted with a picture of creation similar to the way the Timaeus-story is utilized by Philo in De opificio mundi. Basil claims that the false doctrine of creation distinguishes between the subject (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) or matter (ἡ ὕλη) of the cosmos, the form (τὸ εἶδος) or shape of the cosmos (τὸ […] σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου), and the artful combination of these in the final product.16 These distinctions between matter and form are basically Aristotelian. The shape of the cosmos was fitted together (ἐπῆχθαι) by the wisdom of the Maker but matter was appropriated from outside as if pre-existent. Philo’s description in De opificio mundi is quite similar to this.17 Now, if Philo’s teaching is Basil’s source and the latter knew that source first hand, he obviously did not consider Philo an “orthodox” witness to the truth. However, I suppose we cannot know for sure that Basil knew this, but there are definitely similarities between Philo and what Basil criticises. Some information must have reached him that reported such a view, whether in Philo or in someone else. Runia says Basil “uses Philo relatively little”.18 In an excursus Runia shows that creation out of nothing and the origin of matter is an issue in Philonic studies on which there is no consensus.19 It seems that we cannot reach any sure conclusion as to who Basil’s target is. However this may be, it is quite clear that according to Basil there is no pre-existent matter and the cosmos is created out of nothing, with a temporal beginning, and a definite number of time-units ago. 15 Cf. the

introduction to Proclus, On the Existence of Evils, transl. by J. Opsomer, C. Steel, London, 2013, pp. 12–15. 16 Basil, Homélies sur l’hexaéméron, pp.  146–47; Saint Basil, Exegetic Homilies, p. 23. 17 Philo, De Opificio Mundi 5.20–22. 18 Philo, On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses, Introduction, Translation and Commentary by Runia, Leiden, 2001 (Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, Number 1), p. 37. 19  D. T. Runia, On the Creation of the Cosmos, pp. 152–55.

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Attack and Defence In 430 the young Proclus (412–485) came to Athens and became a student first of the aging Plutarch (c.  350–431/2) and then of Syrianus (c. 375-c. 437). In Athens Proclus got a student from Alexandria, namely Ammonius, who later returned to his native city and taught there. In Alexandria Ammonius became the teacher of famous thinkers like Simplicius and Philoponus. He also taught a certain Zacharias, later bishop of Mytilene and the author of the polemical dialogue Ammonius in which he attacked the philosopher and his Neoplatonist doctrine of creation. Proclus produced a work with eighteen arguments against those who teach creation of the cosmos with a temporal beginning. It is no surprise that the influential figure of Proclus had great impact on the intellectual climate between Christians and pagans. The dominating Neoplatonist view was that the cosmos had an everlasting existence side by side with the eternal divine principles. Here we meet a somehow confusing terminological issue. The Neoplatonists held that the world is “eternal” in the sense of everlasting, but not that it has the kind of eternity that belongs to entities transcending time. In his introduction to the first volume of the translation of Philoponus’ Against Proclus, Share says he found it important “to distinguish clearly between aiônios (‘eternal’), aïdios (‘everlasting’) and aei (‘always’, ‘forever’, etc.) in the translation”.20 Share points out that Proclus always reserves aiônios for entities that are outside of time, but uses aïdios or aei either for those divine entities or for temporal things that exist forever. The Christian Philoponus, who criticises Proclus, observes his distinctions when commenting on his text, but uses the terms interchangeably in other paragraphs. In the opening of the fourth part of the Capita de caritate, Maximus uses the term ἐξ ἀϊδίου three times:21 God subsists ἐξ ἀϊδίου as creator, His knowledge of creatures exists in Him ἐξ ἀϊδίου, and some say, Maximus claims, that creatures exist ἐξ ἀϊδίου with God. Maximus obviously means from eternity or outside of time: God is Creator from eternity; God manifested His knowledge of creatures that was in Him from eter20 See

M. Share’s introduction p. 7 in Philoponus, Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 1–5, transl. by M. Share, London, 2004. 21  Car 4.3, 4, and 6, PG 90, 1048c-d and 1049a.

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nity; and the pagans claim that creatures existed with God from eternity. It will probably not be easy to remain consistent when translating these terms, but it is at least important to note that, in general, beings that transcend time and belong to the divine sphere are “eternal” in another sense than everlasting creatures might be. Well-argued Neoplatonist cosmology called forth responses from Christian authors associated with the rhetorical schools of Gaza in the last part of the fifth century. Aeneas of Gaza and Zacharias of Mytilene wrote dialogues in which they argued against the Neoplatonist position. 22 However, the strength and quality of their arguments leave something to be desired and one might say about the Christians, in Sorabji’s words, that they were “waiting for Philoponus”. 23 It is interesting to note that not all Christian intellectuals were orthodox in all regards when compared with the legacy of the fourth century. It seems, for instance, that the person that wrote under the pseudonym of “Dionysius the Areopagite” (at the beginning of the sixth century) nurtured the notion of an everlasting cosmos. 24 Given the influence of Proclus on aspects of Dionysius’ thought this is perhaps not so strange. It witnesses to the strong impact Proclus’ arguments had at that time. However, it might also suggest that the legacy of the fourth century was not yet received as dogmatically binding by all Christians. On the other hand, even if the Neoplatonist attack was confined within the circle of the philosophical schools, it probably had the bad effect on the intellectuals that reason was held to be on the side of the pagans and not on the side of Christian barbarism. 25

22  For these two figures, cf. M. W. Champion, Explaining the Cosmos, Creation and Cultural Interaction in Late-Antique Gaza, Oxford, 2014. Cf. Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus, transl. by J. Dillon, D. Russell with Zacharias of Mytilene, Ammonius, transl. by S. Gertz, London, 2012). 23  Cf. R. Sorabji’s Preface to Aeneas, Theophrastus with Zacharias, Ammonius, London, 2012. 24 T. T. Tollefsen, Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought, Oxford, 2012, pp. 110–13. 25  See E. J. Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria, Berkeley, 2008, for a vivid and interesting description of the intellectual climate of fourth to fifth century Athens and Alexandria.

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John Philoponus John Philoponus of Alexandria gave a detailed and systematic critique of Proclus’ book against a temporal beginning in his Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World that was published in 529. Later (in the 530s) Philoponus wrote a second polemical work, Against Aristotle On the Eternity of the World. The first work is preserved almost in its entirety while the second one is lost, but fragments are preserved in Simplicius’ commentaries on Aristotle’s De caelo and Physics book 8.26 We shall not dive into all details of these arguments, but we shall bring forward a couple of points made by Philoponus as they are particularly relevant for our discussion below. Proclus’ second argument states that if the pattern of the world is eternal and it belongs to it essentially to be a pattern, then the world must exist forever (ἀεί) as well.27 This argument is based on the power of the relation. Image and pattern are relatives and as such they exist together or are destroyed together: when there is a pattern, there is an image, and when there is an image, there must be a pattern. Philoponus argues against this that it does not belong to the Platonic Forms to be patterns essentially. Such Forms, be they substances or creative logoi in the divine mind, have essentially their being in being a kind of substance or logos separate from a qualified function as patterns. It is therefore not necessary that if there is a pattern that is not a pattern essentially, there must be an image of it. Proclus’ third and fourth arguments can be seen together. He first claims that the Creator is always a Creator in actuality and therefore things will always undergo creation.28 If the Creator is not always Creator in actuality, He will sometimes be a potential Creator that, according to an Aristotelian principle, has to be actualized by another actualized entity. This may go on indefinitely, presupposing one entity before another that actualizes the 26  For

details, see Philoponus, Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, transl. by C. Wildberg, London, 1987, pp. 24–26. 27  See the argument in Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, ed. H.  Rabe, Leipzig, 1899 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana), pp.  24–41, translated in Philoponus, Against Proclus 1–5, pp. 32–42. 28 For the whole argument, see Philoponus, Contra Proclum, pp.  42–55; translated in Philoponus, Against Proclus 1–5, pp. 42–50.

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one next to it. We should acknowledge for these reasons that God is an actual Creator in the first place. Proclus’ fourth argument states that if God enters from not creating into creating He undergoes a change and change takes time.29 But we cannot hold that God changes or acts temporally. From these arguments it follows that the world is always being created. Philoponus’ objections to the third argument apply the Aristotelian distinctions between first and second actuality, first and second potentiality, that are alluded to for instance in De anima book 2, chapter 1. An example of first potentiality is an entity’s possession of a natural aptitude (ἐπιτηδειότης) to become something because its nature has receptivity for it, like when a child has the aptitude to become a grammarian. When this potential is realized, the child has achieved first actuality: the child has learnt the principles of grammar. However, the child may at the moment not be exercising his knowledge since he sleeps or is occupied with something else. The first actuality is therefore a kind of second potentiality. This potentiality is a ἕξις, a capacity that may be executed in a second actuality when the child again practises his knowledge. There is, of course, no first potentiality in God. If God is eternally a creator in actuality, this actuality should be understood as a first actuality that is not (always) executed, but is a second potentiality that is qualified as a capacity: God is eternally a creator in capacity. When God enters second actuality or activity from first actuality or capacity, at that moment creation takes place. Philoponus claims further, when it comes to Proclus’ fourth argument, that the transition from first to second actuality is no temporal transition. This claim is important for Philoponus: the execution of an actuality (i.e. second actuality) out of a capacity is instantaneous (ἄχρονος). In order to illustrate his point, he gives the example of a person who stops not writing and starts writing in one and the same moment. The same will be true if God stops not creating. According to Philoponus, God’s act of creation is neither a movement nor takes time since He creates all things by His will alone (μόνῳ τῷ θέλειν). This last phrase is probably intended to be in direct opposition to Proclus’ claim in his 29 For the whole argument, see Philoponus, Contra Proclum, pp.  55–102, translated in Philoponus, Against Proclus 1–5, pp. 50–78.

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commentary on Plato’s Parmenides where he says that God “creates by his very being” (αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ εἶναι δημιουργεῖ). 30 It touches on an important point in the whole issue: Proclus held that the Creator, being good, eternally contemplated and at the same time eternally willed the cosmos to exist. It is in this regard that Dionysius the Areopagite seems to be following Proclus rather than the Christian legacy from the fourth century. In De Divinis Nominibus he implies that the world has no temporal beginning and is everlasting since it results from the being of the Creator and not from any particular act of divine choice: For even as our sun without calculating or choosing but by its very being (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι) enlightens all things that in accordance with their logos are able to participate of its light, so too the Good, which as archetype transcends the obscure image of the sun, by its existence alone (αὐτῇ τῇ ὑπάρξει), sends to all beings proportionally the rays of its whole Goodness. 31

The terms “by its very being” and “by its existence alone” probably reflect Proclus usage that we saw above. The concept of divine will obviously makes an important difference between the Neoplatonist and the orthodox Christian view. From Philoponus’ arguments against Proclus there emerges an important distinction between the creative logoi in God as principles of knowledge and principles of making. This becomes clear from the following quotation from his fourth refutation: And so, as has been shown, the creative logoi in God always possess actuality and perfection but God brings each thing into existence and gives it being when He so wishes, bringing all things into existence by just willing them; and He so wishes at the time when coming into existence is good for the things that come into

30 Procli, In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria tomus I, ed. C. Steel, Oxonii, 2007, p. 762, cf. p. 786 (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν), p. 791 (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι). 31  DN 4.1, in Corpus Dionysiacum I, ed. B. R. Suchla, Berlin, 1990, p. 144. For a fuller argument for this interpretation, cf. T. T. Tollefsen, “The Doctrine of Creation according to Dionysius the Areopagite”, in Grapta poikila II, Saints and Heroes, Helsinki: Papers and Monographs of the Finnish Institute at Athens, vol. 14, 2008, pp. 75–89.

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maximus’ doctrine of creation in context existence; and what is in accordance with nature is in every way good, as was shown in chapter one. 32

One may wonder, does this mean that God exists in a kind of temporal everlastingness and that He acts temporally? Philoponus tries to avoid this impression. In his sixteenth argument he says that even if God always had the will that the ordered state should exist, it does not mean that He willed it to exist always. 33 God, according to Philoponus, both knew and willed eternally in His logoi that the cosmos should be made (first actuality). Therefore the logoi are principles of knowledge, but beings are not brought into being simply because God knew and willed them eternally. When God so willed and, according to His wisdom, it was good for beings to emerge, He acted in accordance with His logoi and then they became principles of making (second actuality). However, there is a probable source of confusion here. The way the transition from the logoi as principles of knowledge to principles of making was just described, seems to suggest a temporal sequence. However, it is not the case that God first knew something and subsequently willed it. Philoponus does not think that there is a temporal sequence. There are two aspects of God’s conception of the logoi: they are what God eternally knows and they are what God eternally wills. His willing them eternally means that He wills the logoi executed in accordance with the instantiation of a temporal otherness that conditions the existence of creatures, but that does not involve God’s action in a temporal sequence. As we saw above, even if God always had the will that the ordered state should exist, it does not mean that He willed it to exist always. 34 It is reasonable to interpret this to mean that God both knew and willed eternally, but that His will is an eternal will to manifest beings, as Philoponus says, “when coming into existence is good for the things that come into existence”. The argument is not completely transparent but this is at least what he claims. 32 Philoponus,

Contra Proclum, p. 79; translated in Philoponus, Against Proclus 1–5, p. 64. 33 Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 566; Philoponus, Against Proclus’ On the Eternity of the World 12–18, transl. by J. Wilberding, Ithaca, New York, 2006, p. 70. 34 Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 566; Philoponus, Against Proclus 12–18, p. 70.

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Why is this distinction between principles of knowledge and principles of making important? It is important as part of Philoponus’ argumentative strategy against Proclus’ doctrine of an everlasting world. It is obvious that God always, that is eternally, knew beings in the plans of His own mind. To think otherwise would be to impute change into the being of God: He would change from not thinking of any principles of the world into thinking of such principles. If the divine intellect is eternal and infinite there cannot be any “moment” when there was something God did not know. Philoponus’ distinction between the logoi as principles of knowledge and principles of making makes room for a conception of divine will that differs from Neoplatonism. According to Philoponus’ Christian convictions God acted for the sake of His creatures and not because the fullness of His own being made creation inevitable. God knew eternally what He wanted to create and He acted instantaneously by His will alone, for the sake of His creatures. We could of course ask if God could have decided not to create the world. A discussion of this question will show that there are definitely some philosophical challenges connected with the Christian position as well. However, we shall postpone such a discussion until the end of this chapter. We might wonder if Philoponus succeeds with his defence of the Christian position. There are, clearly, some Philoponean arguments that are effective against the Neoplatonic position on the eternity of the world. These are the famous arguments from the concept of infinity. We are not going to investigate this line of thought since there seems to be only slight traces in St Maximus of that kind of reasoning. The arguments we have gone through have some interesting points. The question is whether the Aristotelian conceptual tools of potentiality and actuality are sufficient to clarify the transition from the eternal (a-temporal) actuality as creator to the instantaneous temporal execution of what God wills eternally. Eternity in the Maximian sense is radically different from temporal otherness. Eternity and temporality are neither commensurate nor do they have any tertium comparationis. John Philoponus wrote his famous treatises against the doctrine of an everlasting (or eternal) world in the sixth century. This was the century of the emperor Justinian who closed the Neoplato-

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nic school in Athens the same year that Philoponus published his Against Proclus, i.e. in 529. It is difficult to determine the exact influence Philoponus’ writings had on Christian thinkers outside of Alexandria in the years that followed. For mainstream Christian thinkers outside of Alexandria Philoponus’ theological orthodoxy itself was questionable. Being loyal to his local church he was held by his opponents as a “monophysite”, something that may have influenced the orthodox with a general bias against his philosophical work as well. When we now turn to Maximus, an acknowledged representative of orthodoxy, even if not so much in his own life-time,35 we cannot expect explicit references to the Alexandrian philosopher, and we are not in the position to claim with certainty any direct influence of the latter on the former. Even if this is the case, there are some striking similarities between the two thinkers in their doctrines of creation. As we shall see, we find in Maximus the distinction between the logoi as principles of knowledge and principles of making. Maximus further enhances the importance of the divine will. He claims that the world has a temporal beginning and, which is most striking considering Philoponus’ words on the same, he thinks that beings are made at the time when it is good for them to come into being. Maximus on Creation A quotation from Capita de caritate furnish us with an interesting starting-point for the treatment of St Maximus’ doctrine of creation: God subsists eternally as Creator, and He creates when He wills, in His infinite goodness, through His co-essential Logos and Spirit. Do not say: What is the reason that He did create now since He was always good? For I reply that the unsearchable wisdom of the infinite essence does not fall under human knowledge. 36 Ἐξ ἀϊδίου δημιουργὸς ὑπάρχων ὁ Θεὸς, ὅτε βούλεται δημιουργεῖ λόγῳ ὁμοουσίῳ καὶ πνεύματι δι’ ἄπειρον ἀγαθότητα. Καὶ μὴ εἴπῃς, Τίνι τῷ λόγῳ νῦν ἐδημιούργησεν ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸς ὑπάρχων; 35 Maximus was an important defender of the doctrine of Christ’s two wills, a doctrine that was much discussed and contested in the seventh century and that was declared orthodox after his death (662) at the ecumenical council of 680–681. 36  Car. 4.3, PG 90, 1048c.

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Ἐπεὶ, κἀγώ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ἡ τῆς ἀπείρου οὐσίας ἀνεξιχνίαστος σοφία, τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ οὐχ ὑποπίπτει γνώσιν.

This short quote alludes to several interesting and important points or issues. Let me just list them: (1) God is Creator from eternity (ἐξ ἀϊδίου). (2) The motif for creation is divine goodness. (3) He creates “when He wills” (ὅτε βούλεται). (4) Creation takes place “now” (νῦν), even if one could have expected it to take place from eternity because of God’s goodness. (5) The reason for recent creation is hidden in God.

We may add to this picture that the world was created in accordance with God’s eternal knowledge. 37 This implies a divine plan as the basis for creation. Further, the world was not created out of pre-existent matter. 38 With all these points in mind, we may say that Maximus’ doctrine of creation is in accordance with the four points listed at the beginning of this chapter. Most of what is listed in 1–5 above has to do with topics that had been a matter of controversy between Christians and Platonists before Maximus’ time. I shall refer to these points below. They touch upon problems that Philoponus also treats and, as we shall see, Maximus’ opinions are in almost all cases similar to his. It is a basic idea for Proclus (and before him for Plotinus for that matter) that God is Creator from eternity (cf. (1) above). The reason for this is divine goodness that is eternally distributive of effects. This doctrine is an interpretation of Plato’s saying in the Timaeus that the motif for creation is the goodness of the Maker. 39 Goodness is not a property that God has acquired. It rather belongs essentially to Him. Therefore, the creative activity is executed eternally so that there is an everlasting coming to be of the cosmos.

37 Cf. Car.

4.4, PG 90, 1048c-d. the arguments in Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1184b–1085b. 39 Plato, Timaeus, 29d-e. 38  See

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We find the idea that God is Creator from all eternity already in Athanasius of Alexandria.40 It turns up in his polemics against the Arians, in which we are not entering into the details. Athanasius claims that God is an eternal Creator even if He does not create eternally. Athanasius argues by analogy that even if a man may be and be called a maker, for instance a carpenter, his works may for that matter not yet exist: for the time being he may be sleeping or planning his next project. This anticipates of one of Philoponus’ arguments against Proclus. As we have seen, Philoponus applies the Aristotelian distinction between first and second actuality, first and second potentiality. The example used above illustrates the case: first actuality is when a human being has learnt the principles carpentry. This knowledge may not be executed for the moment. It may be executed subsequently as a second actuality in actual work. Philoponus argues as we have seen that God is eternally a Creator in capacity, but this does not mean that He creates eternally. A similar way of thinking is obviously present in Maximus as well. The quotation above tells us that God is Creator from eternity, but does not create eternally even if He is eternally good. Here we find the distinction between the logoi as principles of knowledge and principles of making. We shall develop this a bit further by turning to Maximus’ Ambiguum 7. In Ambiguum 7 Maximus distinguishes between God’s knowing all things in His logoi before (πρίν) they came to be, and God’s making of each being in accordance with the logoi at the appropriate time (τῷ ἐπιτηδείῳ καιρῷ).41 This distinction is also sketched in Capita de caritate, namely between God’s eternal knowledge of beings and God’s making of such beings in accordance with His knowledge.42 Here we should remember what Philoponus says: always willing something to exist does not imply willing something to exist always. The logoi are divine thoughts in accordance with which God creates at the appropriate time. In Ambiguum 7 Maximus even applies the terminology of potentiality 40 Cf. Orationes contra Arianos 1.8.29, in Athanasius Werke 1.1, ed. K. Savvidis, Berlin and New York, 1998, pp.  138–39. Translated in NPNF, Second Series, vol. 4, pp. 323–24. 41  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081a. 42  Car. 4.4, PG 90, 1048d.

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and actuality, but not in exactly the same way as Philoponus, at least not explicitly. Maximus says that God eternally is Maker according to actuality, but creatures exist first in potentiality and not yet (οὐκ ἔτι) in actuality.43 This gives sense if God’s eternal actuality as Creator is what Philoponus calls first actuality=second potentiality=capacity. Further, that creatures first exist potentially and are actualized later seems to suggest such an interpretation. God eternally knew beings and qua known, these beings exist potentially, that is in God’s capacity. It is when God actually creates beings that they become actualized. Does this indicate that Maximus knew of Philoponus’ defence of the Christian doctrine of creation? It certainly does not prove such dependence, but I think we cannot completely preclude it either. Why? Many decades before Maximus was born the conflict between Christians and Neoplatonists was rather acute. Not in the sense that it was an ecumenical crisis, something ordinary people would know much about, but in the sense that it was a controversy among several intellectuals. It caused unrest in Alexandria. Learned people in Maximus’ own time would probably still know something about this conflict and influential writings or at least arguments extracted from them were, maybe, taught in centres of learning. This is at least not improbable. Maximus presupposes a distinction between first/second actuality and first/ second potentiality in addition to a distinction between the logoi as principles of knowledge and principles of making. In most likelihood there is an Aristotelian source for this and Philoponus’ philosophy is not a bad guess. God makes beings “when He wills” (ὅτε βούλεται) (cf.  (2) above). Maximus refers to Dionysius and calls the creative logoi, on the one hand, predeterminations (προορισμοί) and, on the other hand, wills or acts of will (θεῖα θελήματα).44 I think this is once more the distinction between logoi as principles of knowledge and principles of making. Maximus probably holds, as does Philoponus, that the transition from the one to the other is instantaneous. Maybe this is confirmed when he says that creation takes place “now” (νῦν) (cf.  (3) above). We may interpret this “now” as an 43  44 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081a-b. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1085a.

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instantaneous (ἄχρονος) or a timeless event. There is an additional aspect to this. The reason for recent creation is hidden in God (cf. (4) above). The above quotation from Capita de caritate (4.3) refers to God’s “unsearchable wisdom” that “does not come within the compass of human knowledge”. Maximus continues: Seek the cause for why (δι᾽ ἣν) God created; for that is knowledge. Seek not how (πῶς) or why (διὰ τί) He created recently (προσφάτως); for that is not within the compass of your intellect.45 Δι’ ἣν μὲν αἰτίαν ὁ θεὸς ἐδημιούργησε, ζήτει· ἐστὶ γὰρ γνῶσις. Τὸ δὲ πῶς, καὶ διὰ τί προσφάτως, μὴ ζήτει· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ τῷ σῷ ὑποπίπτουσα νῷ.

It is not immediately clear how we should distinguish between δι᾽ ἣν and διὰ τί. Both terms (διά with accusative) means “because of which/what?” The difference probably emerges because the second term is connected with the adverb “recently”. We may, therefore, ask why God created the cosmos but not why He did so recently. This notion of recent creation may have two aspects, namely (1) the recent creation of the whole cosmos and (2) the recent creation of particulars according to a scheme of temporal succession within the totality. For the latter we may turn to something said in Ambiguum 7: […] all things — things that are and things to come — were not called into being simultaneously with their logoi or with being known by God, but each of these things, according to the wisdom of the Creator, were created at the appropriate time (τῷ ἐπιτηδείῳ καιρῷ), in accordance with their logoi, and thus they received by themselves actual being.46 […] τὰ πάντα, τὰ τε ὄντα καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα οὐχ ἅμα τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις ἢ τῷ γνωσθῆναι ὑπὸ Θεοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρήχθησαν, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστα τῷ ἐπιτηδείῳ καιρῷ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ σοφίαν πρεπόντως κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν λόγους δημιουργούμενα καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ τὸ εἶναι τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ λαμβάνῃ.

This reasoning is very similar to what Philoponus says in his fourth refutation of Proclus. Philoponus says that God brings beings into existence by just willing them: “and He so wishes at the time when coming into existence is good for the things that 45  46 

Car. 4.5, PG 90, 1048d. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081a.

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come into existence”.47 I suggest that the “mystery” that Maximus says we should not inquire into is God’s providence. In Ambiguum 10 Maximus has a substantial paragraph on providence that relies heavily on Nemesius of Emesa’s On the nature of Man.48 Maximus sketches how beings emerge and act or move within the complex matrix of the cosmos. In fact, the complexity of the matrix within which irrational but in particular rational beings live is inconceivable and requires that infinite resources are available for providence in order to address all details. Therefore, providence is something into which we shall not pry, Maximus says, and we should believe “that whatever happens is for the best of reasons, even if these reasons are beyond our ability to comprehend”.49 If the above interpretation is correct, we may sum up Maximus’ position as follows: God is Creator from eternity and there is no necessity to hold that created beings need to exist everlastingly because of God’s goodness since the logoi are principles of knowledge as well as principles of making. Further, Maximus claims like Philoponus that to make creatures at the appropriate time is to make them at the moment it is good for them to be made, in accordance with divine wisdom. The reason for particular beings to be created and to live in particular places and at particular times, however, is not something into which we shall pry. A saying attributed to St Anthony the Great may illustrate the point: When the same abba Anthony thought about the depth of the judgements of God, he asked, ‘Lord, how is it that some die when they are young, while others drag on to extreme old age? Why are there those who are poor and those who are rich? Why do wicked men prosper and why are the just in need?’ He heard a voice answering him, ‘Anthony, keep your attention on yourself;

47 Philoponus,

Contra Proclum, p. 79; Philoponus, Against Proclus 1–5, p. 64. 48  Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1188c–1193c. See the notes in Constas’ translation for references to Nemesius, Maximos the Confesssor, On Difficulties in the Church Fathers, The Ambigua, vol. i, transl. by N. Constas, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 2014 (Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 28). 49  Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1193b.

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maximus’ doctrine of creation in context these things are according to the judgement of God, and it is not to your advantage to know anything about them’. 50

One should not, as we have seen, inquire into why the cosmos was created recently, neither in whole nor in part. On the other hand, we may inquire into why the cosmos was created. I suppose this means that we could ask for the motif, the reason why God made the world. Maximus’ short answer to this question would be divine goodness. 51 In his Ad Thalassium 60 he gives a more specific answer: the cosmos was created for the sake of the “mystery of Christ” or for the hypostatic union. Maximus is interpreting some words in St Peter’s first epistle (1 Pet 1:20) about Christ being “foreknown before the foundation of the cosmos”, and says: For it is not natural to contemplate any change in God, in whom we cannot conceive of any movement whatsoever, because of which [movement] change subsists in things that move. This is the great and hidden mystery. This is the blessed end because of which all things were brought into existence. This is the divine purpose conceived before the beginning of beings, and defining it we would say that it is the preconceived end for the sake of which everything exists, itself though exists for the sake of nothing, and it was with a view to this end that God created the essence of beings. 52 Θεῷ γὰρ οὐ πέφυκεν ἐνθεωρεῖσθαι τροπή, ᾧ μηδεμία καθάπαξ κίνησις ἐπινοεῖται, περὶ ἣν ὑπάρχει τοῖς κινουμένοις τό τρέπεσθαι. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα καὶ ἀπόκρυφον μυστήριον. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μακάριον, δι’ ὃ τὰ πάντα συνέστησαν, τέλος. Τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων προεπινοούμενος θεῖος σκοπός, ὃν ὁρίζοντες εἶναί φαμεν προεπινοούμενον τέλος, οὗ ἕνεκα μὲν τὰ πάντα, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκεν· πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ τέλος ἀφορῶν τὰς τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεὸς παρήγαγεν οὐσίας.

“The blessed end” Maximus has in mind here is the divine purpose of deifying or glorifying created beings. The hypostatic union is said to be the end or purpose since it is through the hypo-

50 From

The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, The Alphabetical Collection, transl. by B. Ward, London and Oxford, 1981, p. 2. 51 Cf. Car. 4.3, PG 90, 1048c. 52  Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, p. 75.

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static union that this is achieved.53 The unity between divinity and humanity in the one hypostasis of Christ is the model for the achievement of deification by created beings, and this divine purpose is said to exist for the sake of nothing, which probably means that there are no reasons for such a purpose besides God Himself. The last saying deserves, however, more attention. It is clear that the motif for the making and for the providential ordering of the world rests solely in God Himself. But in that case we are confronted with a major challenge that might be the basic scandal of Christianity: Maximus’ God not only created the world according to a plan, He was also willing, eternally, to enter into communion with the world through the Incarnation. God was willing, therefore, to suffer and die for the world He made. This willingness definitely witnesses to a divinity that cares purposely for creatures. God does not create simply because of the ontological overflow of His goodness. Each creature has, as we shall see in the chapter on the logoi, its principle in God and is willed by God. The historical Incarnation initiates, so to say, the phase of fulfilment of the original divine purpose. With this in mind, Maximus says the Incarnation “was proper” (ἔπρεπε) to the Maker of the cosmos. It is, however, rather a challenge to figure out exactly how this should be understood. It follows from Maximian principles that God knew eternally the metaphysical order of the cosmos and the ontological constitution of universal and particular beings in it. It also follows that God knew the historical drama that unfolds within this divinely instituted cosmos. It was never a secret for God that sin would enter the historical scene. The divine purpose could not be achieved if God had not intervened. But the will to intervene did not originate temporally or historically. It was always, that is eternally, intended in God’s original purpose. The Ad Thalassium 60 makes this obvious. It is important to notice that the eternal purpose was not conditioned by sin, but by the divine will to communicate blessedness, glorification, or deification to creatures. Even so, this divine project includes a most striking fact that is a real mystery: God knew eternally that sin and suffering would take place historically, and He knew eternally that the historical Incarnation would entail sufferings for the impassible God. This 53  Cf. the

whole Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, pp. 73–81.

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has some striking implications: God must know that the divine gifts promised to created otherness are goods so great that they compensate fully for all suffering, divine and human. The truth of this idea is confirmed by the fact that the eternally blessed God eternally accepted suffering in order to bring these gifts to beings that are not God. This is a strong claim, and a challenge to the philosophy of religion. I suppose the real scandal of Christianity lies with these ideas. Divine Will As we have seen above, Maximus teaches that the world was created according to a divine plan. It was created out of non-being and with a temporal beginning. It was the result of a divine act of will. I have already alluded to but not quoted the following words: “When He willed it (ὅτε ἐβουλήθη), the Creator gave being to and manifested His eternally pre-existing knowledge of beings. It is of course absurd to doubt that an omnipotent God can give being to something when He wills (ὅτε βούλεται).”54 In the introduction to this chapter, I said that God made the world freely. It has been pointed out that Neoplatonism and Christianity differ especially over the understanding of the freedom of the divine will.55 However, Emilsson claims that the contrast between Plotinus and Thomas Aquinas regarding necessity and freedom in the act of creation is “a false contrast”.56 If this contrast is false with regard to Plotinus and Thomas, it is probably false with regard to any mainstream Christian philosopher. We shall investigate this further. We start with a sketch of Plotinus’ account of how the One acts in connection with creation. Plotinus says that all things, as long as they remain (μένει) in being, necessarily (ἀναγκαίαν) produce from their own essences.57 He often describes this production in metaphorical terms as a kind of emanation: “fire produces the heat which comes from it; snow does not keep its cold inside it.” 54 

Car. 4.4 (cf. 4.3), PG 90, 1048d. Rist, Plotinus, Cambridge, 1980, p. 83. 56  E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus, London and New York, 2017, pp. 93–94. 57  Enneads V.1.6, in Enneads, vol.  v, transl. by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1984 (LCL 444). 55  Cf. J. M.

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The philosophical doctrine behind these metaphors is usually called the doctrine of double activity.58 In Ennead V, he describes it thus: In each and every thing there is an activity that belongs to essence and one which goes out from essence; and that which belongs to essence is the activity of each thing, and the other activity inevitably derives from the first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself […]. 59 And all things when they come to perfection produce; and the One is always perfect and therefore produces everlastingly; and its product is less than itself.60

There are several things to investigate here: Plotinus claims that production is inevitable and Rist understands this to mean by necessity. What does that imply? Rist interprets this necessity in connection with the question of why the One is as it is.61 The answer to this question is that the One is as it is because it wills to be so. This willing is contemporaneous with its products, i.e. with its activity out of its essence. The necessity, therefore, arises from this willing which is accompanied with its act of making. When the One wills itself, external activity necessarily occurs. However, the One has no intention to create, no wish to do so. It directs its intention, if we may talk about such a thing in the One, solely to willing itself as one and good. For this reason, despite the necessity, the One produces accidentally, since it did not have the effects in view.62 The effects occurred simply because the One remained focussed on its own will to be itself. On this background, Rist thinks we may say that the One has a kind of free will. It is important to notice, however, that this will is not the ability to make choices as we understand it. Further, the One is under no constraint externally or internally. There is nothing higher than it that could force it to be as it is, and when it wills itself, there is 58 Cf.  Rist, Plotinus, pp.  70–71; Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, pp. 21–31; Emilsson, Plotinus, pp. 48–57. 59  Enneads V.4.2. 60  Enneads V.1.6. 61  Rist, Plotinus, pp. 70–83. 62 Cf. Enneads VI.1.22, in Enneads, vol.  vi, transl. by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1988 (LCL 445); cf. Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, p. 26.

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no duality within it of one aspect forcing another aspect to be as it is. It is simply this act of willing. If the universe is the result of the activity of a divinity, if nothing constrains this divinity to act, and if it itself is the act constituting itself by willing, then I suppose one could claim this divinity to be free. To deny that this same divinity has the ability to choose between options is not to deny any perfection of it. Choice occurs when different options arise, and no options arise in the simplicity of the first principle. What then about the Christian God? Lossky says the following: There is, in fact, nothing in the divine nature which could be the necessary cause of the production of creatures: creation might just as well not exist. God could equally well not have created; creation is a free act of His will, and this free act is the sole foundation of the existence of all beings.63

Romanides says: God’s love is not a necessity of the divine nature. Thus, God does not have relations with the world in His essence but only in His energy and will and with no alteration in His essence. The dogma of creation ex nihilo is the bulwark against the erroneous teaching that the world is an emanation or reflection of the essence of the One, or the result of some other principle. It is also the most secure guarantee that God is the Creator neither by necessity nor by essence but by energy and will.64

Both Lossky and Romanides claim to build what they write on the church fathers. However, what they state is, unfortunately, not as simple as they think. It seems rather clear to me that these words are at least not consistent with Maximus’ doctrine. In his Expositio orationis dominicae, Maximus says that God, the Father, “is by essence the cause of all beings” (κατ’ οὐσίαν τῶν ὄντων αἴτιος ὤν).65 He further says in Quaestiones ad Thalassium that God, by the impulse of His will alone, instituted (ὑποστήσας) the generation of all beings, visible and invisible, before the ages (πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων).66 There was, as we see, 63 V. Lossky,

The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, Cambridge and London, 1973, p. 93. 64  J. S. Romanides, The Ancestral Sin, Ridgewood, 2008, p. 47 and p. 53. 65  E.O.D., CCSG 23, 41. 66  Q.Thal. 22, CCSG 7, 137.

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an eternally conceived divine plan for the cosmos, something Romanides emphatically denounces as a western delusion.67 The whole of Ad Thalassium 22 is interesting, since it witnesses to the fact that the divine economy is God’s eternal plan. According to Capita de caritate, God, when He willed, manifested His eternally pre-existing knowledge of beings.68 Maximus also says that God is eternally Maker according to actuality, but creatures exist first potentially and not yet actually.69 Finally we may take into consideration that Maximus says that God “always and in all” (ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν) has the will to embody Himself.70 We should sum up what Maximus teaches: God is essentially the cause of the cosmos. He is eternally the Maker of the cosmos and He creates according to an eternally conceived plan for creatures. It is very difficult, on the background of these sayings, to claim, like Lossky, that “God could equally well not have created” or that there is “nothing in the divine nature which could be the necessary cause of the production of creatures”. God is, according to Maximus, the necessary as well as the sufficient cause of creatures. However, this does not immediately mean that creation follows because of some internal constraint in God’s nature. It rather means that there could not exist any cosmos without a divine cause. It is in that sense that God is the necessary and sufficient cause. Even if that is the case, it is still an open question whether “God could equally well not have created”. We shall return to this below. In Romanides’ picture we get a rather strange division between a completely transcendent God and His “energies”. The “energies” and even the divine will emerge as if they even were a kind of lower divinity, something that acts in distinction from God Himself. I consider this notion unsound and a misunderstanding of the patristic and Maximian doctrine of divine ἐνέργεια.71 I investigate this concept closer in Chapter 5 below. It is important to be aware of the following point: there is no doubt about the fact that according to Maximus, God, by His will, 67 

Romanides, The Ancestral Sin, pp.  35–36. Car. 4.4, PG 90, 1048d. 69  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081a-b. 70  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1084c-d. 71  For this topic, cf. Tollefsen, Activity and Participation. 68 

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created the world with a temporal beginning. However, this act of creation is founded on an eternal plan to create and a will to fulfil the divine economy. I think it is true, as Lossky says, that there cannot be necessity involved in the sense that God is constrained by Himself or by anything else. The latter is not possible since there is nothing “before” or “beside” God. In the Disputatio cum Pyrrho Maximus says:72 “Not only does His divine and uncreated nature have any natural compulsion, nor does His intellectual and created [nature].” Consequently, Maximus does not think that God, even if He is the essential cause of the cosmos and the necessary cause of the cosmos, creates by necessity. Even so, we should ask if God could have decided not to create the world. When Maximus says God is eternally Creator and that His knowledge of beings is eternal, this implies that God eternally contemplated in Himself the created world as something good. Is it reasonable to say that God would decide not to make such a good thing? I suggest that the term should not be “could not decide to”, but rather “would not decide to”. If God is not constrained, then it cannot be a question of what He could or could not. God, being omnipotent, could do whatever He wants to. It is, then, a matter of will. On the other hand, it seems rather clear that it is not a question of simple choice either: should I or should I not? The most reasonable explanation is that the will of God is a will to be true to Himself and therefore a will to make what He eternally contemplated as good. One might hypothetically ask if God, eternally knowing creation and salvation as good, could have decided not to act in accordance with this good. One might even ask if this would not imply that God would not be true to Himself. These possibilities seem absurd: God could not have decided not to create and would not have decided not to be true to Himself. God, therefore, did not choose to make the world as one of a great many things He could do, but rather willed to make this world because He eternally knew and willed what is good. One might say with Emilsson then that the contrast between Platonism and Christianity regarding necessity and freedom in the act of creation is “a false contrast”. There is, even so, an important contrast, namely that the Christian understanding of God’s will in 72 

D.P., PG 91, 293b.

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the end is different from the Neoplatonist view. The Neoplatonist One had the will to be itself but no intention of instituting created otherness. For the sake of the argument one might object that when willing itself it willed itself as good, and when willing itself as good it willed itself as distributive of effects. Therefore, the contrast does not exist after all. However, one might counter that there is still a difference, since the Christian God creates for the sake of His creatures, and I do not believe that the One could be said to have such intentions. The Christian God is even said to create because of philanthropy, something that would be completely strange for the One. There is one further difference here. We saw above that Maximus’ God “always and in all” (ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν) has the will to embody Himself in the created world. I think there is no such will in the Neoplatonist One. This willing “always and in all”, belongs to God’s eternal plan, and is therefore no coincidence. That God incarnates Himself in the logoi, the plans for creatures, could probably be absorbed properly in a Platonic system, but that this eternal will is the will that a divine hypostasis shall incarnate itself historically in flesh and blood, is, I would claim, totally foreign to Neoplatonism. For Maximus, the will to create, to reveal Himself, and to become incarnate, is one and the same eternal will of God. With these remarks, we leave the topic of creation and turn to further details of Maximus’ cosmology. We have seen above that God “always and in all” wants to embody Himself in the created realm. The next topic we shall investigate is, therefore, Maximus’ doctrine of the Logos and the logoi, the divine principles for creatures.

4. The Logos and the Logoi In the previous chapter, I investigated St Maximus’ doctrine of creation. One of the things that I emphasized was his claim that God created the world according to an eternal plan. In this chapter, we shall discuss this plan and its execution. The world appears, at least superficially, as an ordered system, as a cosmos, and not as an accidental collection of entities moving at random. According to Maximus, the principles that institute the nature of substances, their potentialities, and their activities in this cosmos, are the divine logoi. These are the principles behind the orderly rhythm we observe. The logoi pre-exist eternally in the divine mind, and God makes creatures in accordance with them. The doctrine of logoi is, therefore, a version of the doctrine of Ideas or Forms in the divine Mind, alluded to by pagan and Christian thinkers in the Greek tradition before Maximus, like Clement, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Dionysius.1 Maximus’ doctrine of the logoi is an original piece of theory resulting from a creative appropriation of several sources. Doctrines of divine Ideas as we know them from pagan and Christian thinkers often have a rather static aspect. They reckon with eternal Ideas of Forms in the divine mind reflected in substances because of an act of creation. Creatures statically mirror the eternal patterns. We find this function in Maximus as well, but we find something more, namely a dynamic aspect according to which the Idea gets the triadic structure of logos of being, logos of wellbeing, and logos of eternal well-being. The Idea therefore not only specifies the essential contents of an entity. In addition it prescribes a pattern of development from an initial to a final condition through which the first immanent potential of an entity is finally actualized into the gracious state of incorruptibility and glorifica1  Cf. for instance Clemens Alexandrinus, Zweiter Band, Stromata I–VI, ed. O. Stählin, Leipzig, 1906 (GCS 15), book V.3, p. 336 and book V.14, pp. 387– 88; Origenes, De principiis I.2.2, ed. H. Görgemanns, H. Karpp, Darmstadt, 1976, pp. 123–27; Gregory of Nyssa, De perfectione, in Gregorii Nysseni, Opera ascetica, edidit W. Jaeger, J. P. Cavarnos, V. W. Callahan, Leiden, 1986 (GNO VIII.I), p. 182; Dionysius, DN 5.8, in Corpus Dionysiacum I, ed. B. R. Suchla, Berlin 1990, p. 188.

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tion.2 In this development, the essence of an entity is not changed into something else. What happens is an actualization of an already given potential. We shall treat all of this in the present and the next chapter. One question that turns up is whether there is a single logos that specifies being and prescribes the developmental patterns of well-being and eternal well-being, or if there is in each case an original triad of logoi. It seems to me that Maximus is not sufficiently clear on this issue. On the other hand, I cannot see that it makes any important philosophical difference whichever way it should be since both solutions suggest a triadic structure. There are at least three sources for Maximus’ doctrine of the logoi. He does not take over these sources eclectically. I believe he saw the three elements that I analyse below as original parts parts of one and the same picture. However that may be, the resulting doctrine is highly original. The three sources are (1) the doctrine of Ideas in the divine intellect as we find it in Platonic tradition, (2) a Pauline “metaphysics of prepositions”, and (3) the Johannine notion from the New Testament of the Logos of God. I shall treat these elements in that order. The Platonic Legacy The term logos is established as denoting divine Ideas before Maximus’ time. The theological motivation for Maximus’ usage is of course Christian tradition. The immediate philosophical background for the development of his doctrine is, however, to be sought in Neoplatonism. In Plotinus the terms logos and the plural logoi does not denote divine Ideas as such, but certain activities in the intelligible sphere. Among these are activities that transpose the thoughts (νοήματα) or the Ideas proper in the Intellect down to the lower regions of the cosmic hierarchy. This transposition is a causal event and is explained within the Plotinian scheme of “double activity”. 3 In short: an internal activity is accompanied by an external activity. These two activities are also respectively 2  See D. Skliris, On the Road to Being, St Maximus the Confessor’s Synodical Ontology, Alhambra, California, 2018. 3  For “double activity”, see E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus on Intellect, Oxford, 2007, chapter 1 and T. T. Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, Oxford, 2012, pp.  21–31.

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called the “activity of the essence” and the “activity out of the essence”.4 An example from the sensible world is that fire, because of its internal activity of glowing, emits the external activity of heat. Ice, being internally frozen, emits cold. If we can say that the internal essence of frozenness is accompanied with this external activity of coldness, then the latter is a logos of frozenness. This concept of double activity is the causal mechanism in Plotinus’ system and the doctrine behind the metaphors of emanation. How does Plotinus’ logoi fit into his hierarchically structured causality? The Plotinian system, in all its complexity, has a relatively simple structure compared with Proclus. There are three primary hypostases, the One, the Intellect, and the Soul. When the Intellect is internally active, an external activity is manifested and becomes constitutive for the level of the Soul. In this way the Soul is a logos of the Intellect, and the latter is a logos of the One.5 Emilsson comments on this: “the logos of something is a rationally arranged intelligible structure which is a more manifold, inferior expression of a higher, more unified entity.” In this scheme a logos, as I said above, transposes a more unified intelligible structure on the higher level into a more expanded intelligible structure on the lower level. What is unified above becomes pluralized below. Emilsson points out that the Plotinian concept of logos owes much to Stoicism: “The Stoics believed that the world’s rational behaviour is determined by immanent logoi (plural of logos) which are part of God, God carrying out his plans for the world, in fact.”6 The doctrine of the logos as a rational principle has a cosmological function. This function is further developed in later Neoplatonism and Christian thought. John Philoponus, for example, uses the terminology of logos/logoi for the creative principles in God’s intellect.7 4  See for instance Plotinus, Enneads V.4.2 in Enneads vol. v, transl. by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1984 (LCL 444). 5  See E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus, London and New York, 2017, pp. 45–47. 6  Emilsson, Plotinus, p. 32. 7 Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig, 1899 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana), pp.  36–37 and p.  79; Philoponus, Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 1–5, transl. by M. Share, London, 2004 (ACA), p. 39 and p. 64; see T. T. Tollefsen, “Proclus, Philoponus, and Maximus: the paradigm of the world and temporal beginning”, in P. G. Pavlos, L. F. Janby, E. K. Emilsson, T. T. Tollefsen, Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity, London and New York, 2019, pp. 102–07.

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It is vital to notice that the doctrine of logoi as creative principles in God’s intellect becomes synthesized with logical ideas from Plotinus’ student Porphyry. Porphyry is an important figure in the history of logic in late antiquity. In the present context we shall bring the so-called Porphyrian tree into the discussion. He sketches it thus: What is meant will be clear from the following. In each category there are the highest genera, the lowest species, and some that are between the highest and the lowest. There is a highest genus beyond which there can be no other superior genus; there is a lowest species after which there can be no subordinate species; and between the highest genus and the lowest species there are some classes that are genera and species at the same time, since they are comprehended in relation now to one thing and now to another.8

The following diagram may be helpful: essence

corporeal essence

incorporeal essence

animate corporeal essence

inanimate corporeal essence

sensitive animate corporeal insensitive animate corporeal essence=animal essence=plant

rational animal

irrational animal

8 Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, edidit A.  Busse, Berlin 1887 (CAG IV.I), p. 4. See Barnes’ comments on the Porphyrian tree in Porphyry, Introduction, trans. by J. Barnes, Oxford, 2008, pp.  108–12.

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In this figure essence is the highest genus and rational animal and irrational animal are the lowest species. Between these there are species (like corporeal essence) that are genera for the species under them (like animate corporeal essence and inanimate corporeal essence), and these again are genera for the level of species below, etc. The figure illustrates that the highest genus is divided by the two differences of corporeal and incorporeal. On a higher level, a difference divides a given genus and is called a διαφορὰ διαιρετική. Essence may be divided into essences that are corporeal or incorporeal; corporeal essence may be divided into essences that are animate or inanimate. These divisive differences fulfil a second function of constituting the species as well. Therefore each such difference functions as a διαφορὰ συστατική on the lower level. The differences, when added to the genus, give rise to the species under the genus. We return to this below. In Neoplatonic thought the doctrine of universal genera and species is combined with the doctrine of logoi in the demiurgic intellect, and, therefore, what God thinks or contemplates eternally is a world-system that is arranged hierarchically according to logoi for genera, species, and particulars. As we shall see later, this is what Maximus teaches as well. Metaphysics of Prepositions The Christian belief that a good God created the world connects easily with the philosophical conviction that the world contains intelligible and well-structured aspects implanted by a superior Mind. The world is causally dependent on this Mind. Such a belief is already reflected in St Paul and this brings us to the second source for Maximus’ doctrine of the logoi. There are some places in Paul’s letters where he uses prepositional constructions for cosmological matters, like “from Him and through Him and to Him are all things” (ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, Romans 11:36). He also says about Christ that “in Him (ἐν αὐτῷ) all things were created” and that “all things were created by Him and for Him (δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν)” and that “in Him (ἐν αὐτῷ) all things hold together” (Colossians 1:16–17). Paul’s application of prepositions reminds one of what Dillon once called the “meta-

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physics of prepositions”.9 Dillon lists the five traditional “Platonic” causes as to ex hou (i.e. matter), to hyph’ hou (i.e. agent), to en hoi (i.e. immanent form), to eph’ ho (i.e. paradigm), and to hou heneka (i.e. final cause). I shall not speculate in any detail if or how Paul’s prepositional constructions may be adjusted to all these causes. Nor should we draw the implications too far. We do not know if Paul knew of such a doctrine of prepositions from any philosophical source or if what he says is just a matter of coincidence in that particular regard. Whatever the background, Paul definitively sketches a metaphysics of prepositions and his views came to have far-reaching consequences for Christian thought on creation. The world is made and ordered in such a way that it depends causally on God. Paul specifies the creative agent as Christ. Without being too speculative we may discern three of Dillon’s Platonic causes in Paul’s prepositional constructions: the paradigm, the agent, and finality. Beings are created paradigmatically “in” Christ, they are created “by” Him, and are created “to” Him as their goal. In Ambiguum 7, Maximus explicitly refers to St Paul’s prepositional constructions in his explanations of the doctrine of the logoi.10 The Johannine Logos The third of the elements appropriated by Maximus into his doctrine of the logoi of creatures has its origin in the opening verses of the Gospel of John. These verses are well known (1:1–3): “In the beginning was the Word (Logos), and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made that was made.” The term logos is here used for Christ, the Logos of God the Father, in Christian tradition the second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. For Maximus this connects naturally with the two other elements and what results is the doctrine that the one Logos “contains” or “is” the many logoi or divine Ideas according to which creatures are made.11 This has the implication that creatures mirror God the Logos Himself in their ontological 9 J. Dillon,

The Middle Platonists, London, 1977, pp. 138–39. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1077c–1080a. 11 Cf. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91,  1077c–1080a. 10 

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makeup. They visibly and invisibly reflect aspects of their Creator and carry, therefore, vestiges of Christ. As we saw in Chapter 1 above, this notion connects with Maximus’ concept of natural contemplation as an important step in spiritual development. What God Knows Now we come to the doctrine of the logoi itself. Maximus says in Ambiguum 7:12 “From all eternity, He was holding (ἔχων) the pre-existing logoi of created things.” The logoi, then, pre-exist in the Logos as Gods’ plans for the making of the world. They are not some kind of ideal entities in the Logos, as if the world of Platonic Forms are put into the Demiurge. As I have suggested above, Maximus has a much more dynamic understanding of them. The logoi are what God knows, they are the knowledge of the divine intellect. In his Capita de caritate Maximus says:13 “When He willed it, the Creator gave substance to and manifested His eternally pre-existing knowledge of beings.” When God created the world out of nothing He did it on the basis of these logoi. In Ambiguum 7, this pre-existing knowledge is qualified as God’s own wills or acts of will (θελήματα) by which He knows beings.14 The logoi, as God’s knowledge of beings, are eternally embraced in His will to create. This knowledge is in a special way contained in the Logos Himself. Here there emerges a problem: if the logoi as God’s plans for creatures are embraced in the divine will, why is the cosmos not without a beginning and everlasting? I touched upon this challenge in the chapter on creation above, and I shall return to it in a section below in this chapter. The notion of divine will has to be differentiated. What God wills is eternal and therefore He eternally willed the creation of the world-system. However, this eternal will must be a willing that what is thought (the logoi) shall emerge as created entities within a temporal scheme of beginning and end. It is not the will that the temporal order shall exist eternally or everlastingly. The logoi are the divine knowledge of beings and the divine plans for the creation of them. However, we shall have to qualify 12 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1080a. Car. 4.4, PG 90, 1048d. 14  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1085b. 13 

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this conclusion below since, as we shall see, God knows more than the logoi, which for the moment may sound strange. It is talk about God’s knowledge of “beings” here. What should we understand with this term, what exactly is the extension of the term “beings”? Maximus says God created and continues to create all things (τὰ πάντα), and this “all things” includes universals and particulars. Each being is created at the appropriate time.15 This saying has several implications. First, created things do not only comprise particulars. Universals, genera and species, are created as well. We come to the status of the universals in Chapter 6. Secondly, it is obvious that the divine knowledge Maximus speaks of is not limited to the knowledge of human beings only, but is a knowledge of all kinds of creatures. What else would be the point of τὰ πάντα and of universals in the plural? Consequently, there are logoi of all particulars and of all natural kinds of beings. Thirdly, we may wonder what exactly this knowledge of particulars and universals comprises. Does it circumscribe the details of the life span of each creature? But are we not in that case plunged into the disturbing problematic of determinism or predestination? Whatever Maximus thinks of divine foreknowledge, that is not what he talks about here. The point he makes seems to be limited to the ontological contents of a creature: the divine knowledge of universals and particulars is a knowledge of the principles, the logoi, of what they are essentially. This knowledge includes, of course, a knowledge of the limits of creaturely capabilities, but as far as I can see, there is no hint at any divine hand steering the details of the history of an individual. However, as I mentioned above, there is one modification to this picture: we shall see in Chapter 5 how the doctrine of logoi is expanded into a triad comprising the logos of being, the logos of well-being, and the logos of eternal well-being. This triad includes not only the logos of essential being, but includes logoi for how creatures “move” in their lives. In my earlier research I described Maximus’ system as “Christocentric cosmology”.16 That means that his doctrine of the whole 15 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1080a. was the title of my doctoral thesis as well as of my first book on Maximus, published by Oxford University Press in 2008. 16 This

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economy (“world-order”) of creation and redemption in a special way has its centre in Christ the Logos. Maximus views the whole economy as a series of incarnations (or embodiments) of the Logos. We have seen that he speaks of three incarnations: (1) in the logoi of beings, (2) in the letters, syllables, and sounds of the Scriptures, and (3) as the historical person of Jesus Christ.17 The Logos, as the one through whom “all things were made”, “concealed” (ἐγκρύψας) Himself, Maximus says, in the logoi of beings. We touched upon this concealment in Chapter 1, on Maximus’ general epistemology.

Logoi and difference The logoi of beings are responsible for the identification and differentiation of creatures. In Ambiguum 7 Maximus says that if one directs the contemplative power of the soul to the infinite natural difference and variety of beings (τῇ φυσικῇ τῶν ὄντων ἀπείρῳ διαφορᾷ τε καὶ ποικιλίᾳ), one should be able to distinguish in thought the logos in accordance with which each is created.18 The term “infinite” is, of course, an enthusiastic exaggeration. In Ambiguum 22, Maximus says that it is because of the logoi, by which beings exist essentially, that different things differ.19 This usage of the terminology of difference (διαφορά) and the way it functions in the constitution of essences, betrays, which is to be expected, familiarity with general features of the tradition of Porphyrian logic. I shall develop this a bit further. To contemplate beings in accordance with their differences means that one is able to separate them according to essential features that divide the one from the other and again to gather those that have identical features (specifically or generically, see below) into groups. One is, for example, able respectively to identify and distinguish humans and gorillas, lions and tigers, salmons and cods, bluebells and roses.20 Identification and differentiation are essential to the philosophical and scientific understanding of the world. They are also essential in Maximus’ theological vision. 17 

Amb.Ioh. 33, PG 91, 1285c–1288a. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1077c–1080b. 19  Amb.Ioh. 22, PG 91, 1256d. 20  Cf. the sequence in Amb.Ioh. 22, PG 91, 1256d–1257a. 18 

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We find in this a basic feature of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. When Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, investigates the “kinds” of being and unity it is not just a mapping of ways of perceiving or contemplating.21 He claims to investigate the attributes of being as being. We perceive the world within the dialectic of unity and plurality because beings are present to us in unified as well as pluralized way. Unity and plurality (τὸ ἕν and τὸ πλῆθος) are basic “principles” of being and knowledge. Under unity we have the more specific kinds of identity (essential unity), similarity (qualitative unity), and equality (quantitative unity), and under plurality we have otherness, dissimilarity, and inequality. UNITY

PLURALITY

identity similarity equality

otherness dissimilarity inequality

Beings are identical if they have their essential features in common, and suffer otherness if they do not have these in common. We disclose identity and otherness at different levels of universality: a human being is specifically identical with another human being, but specifically other than for instance a gorilla. On the other hand, human being and gorilla have generic identity while they are generically other than the species horse. The world is not experienced as an unlimited plurality in which no identification is possible: otherness is not total. The logic of this Platonic and Aristotelian world-view forms the background for the further developments of the techniques of classification that we encounter in Porphyrian logic, the Aristotelian commentators, and in the intellectual culture of late antiquity. Porphyry makes a distinction that we touched upon in an earlier paragraph of this chapter, a distinction that is of particular importance for the understanding of central ideas in Maximus. This is the distinction between διαφορὰ διαιρετική and διαφορὰ συστατική, divisive and constitutive difference. 22 The divisive differences

21 Cf. Metaphysics,

book Γ, chapter 2. Isagoge, ed. A. Busse, (CAG IV.I), p. 10. Barnes’ translation in Porphyry, Introduction, p. 10. 22  Cf. Porphyrii,

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divide the genus while they at the level below constitute the (new) species: For animal is split by the difference of rational and non-rational, and again by the difference of mortal and immortal; and the differences of rational and mortal are found to be constitutive of man, those of rational and immortal of god, and those of non-rational and mortal of the non-rational animals. As we saw above, Maximus says that different things differ. Beings are different from one another and since they differ they also suffer some kind of identity by which they differ. In other words, differences functions both as divisive and constitutive in the same way as in Porphyry. We shall investigate aspects of this logic closer in Chapter 6, on the universal. I just like to add one more observation. In Opuscula theologica et polemica 14, Maximus defines διαφορὰ οὐσιώδης, “essential difference”, in a way that seems to be equivalent with Porphyry’s constitutive difference:23 “a logos by which the essence, that is to say nature, remains both undiminished and unchanged, unmixed and unconfused” (λόγος καθ’ ὃν ἡ οὐσία, ἤγουν φύσις, ἀμείωτός τε καὶ ἄτρεπτος, ἄφυρτος ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀσύγχυτος διαμένει). This definition is clearly Christological, but I think we may safely claim that it has a general ontological relevance. An essential difference like a constitutive difference preserves the essential identity and integrity of something. It is important for the topic of the present chapter that the logoi are the principles behind these essentially defining differences. As we saw above, observation of difference and variety among beings directs the mind to the logos in accordance with which each being is created. Maximus also says, as we saw, that beings exist essentially and differ from one another by the logoi.24 The logos of a creature is in any case the rational principle causative of the essential features of each being that instantiate the identities and differences we observe. Principles of Knowledge, Principles of Making We have already treated this topic in chapter 3 above. The divine knowledge of logoi is knowledge of the essences of beings. Max23  24 

Op. 14, PG 91, 149d. Amb.Ioh. 22, PG 91, 1256d.

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imus adds, referring to Dionysius the Areopagite, that the logoi are predeterminations and divine wills, or should we say acts of divine will (προορισμοί and θεῖα θελήματα).25 I argued in chapter 3 that these two terms indicate the important distinction between logoi as principles of knowledge and principles of making. God knew things prior to the decision to create them, to put it in a rather awkward way (since God is not subject to time). John Philoponus anticipates this distinction and it turns up later in Thomas Aquinas.26 I interpret the predeterminations as connoting the logoi as principles of knowledge and the acts of divine will as connoting the logoi as principles of making. However, as we have just seen, Maximus says God knows beings as His own wills. This saying seems to comprise all logoi without differentiation. They are all in an undifferentiated sense God’s wills. Does not this suggest that there is no such distinction? I think not. If we recall what was said in the chapter on creation, I think we shall have to distinguish between will as first activity or capacity and will as second activity or execution. This is completely clear when Maximus says that things present and things to come were not created simultaneously with their being known by God. Therefore, God knows beings as His wills eternally, i.e. as His principles of knowledge, and He makes creatures “when He wills” when they are executed according to His principles of making. Maximus says:27 “Instead, in the wisdom of the Creator, individual things were created at the appropriate moment, in a manner consistent with their logoi, and thus received in themselves actual existence as beings.” Something similar is said in Ambiguum 42:28 “The logoi of all beings that exist essentially — whether they are or will be, whether they have come to be or will come to be, or have appeared or will appear — pre-exist and are immovably fixed in God […].” I think we may conclude that Maximus is of the same opinion as Philoponus: always to will the ordered state to exist does not mean willing it to exist always. Beings are made at the appropriate moment (τῷ

25 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1085a. The reference to Dionysius is to DN 5.8, Corpus Dionysiacum I, ed. Sucha, p. 188. 26  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, question 15, article 3. 27 Cf. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1085b and 1081a. 28  Amb.Ioh. 42, PG 91, 1329a.

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ἐπιτηδείῳ καιρῷ) or, as Philoponus says, “when coming into existence is good for the things that come into existence”.29 Infinitely Many Logoi? The logoi comprise all creatures, particulars as well as universals, “whether they are or will be, whether they have come to be or will come to be, or have appeared or will appear”. Here two questions come up, namely: (1) Does Maximus think that particulars constituting a new species may emerge at some point in time? (2) Does he think that there are infinitely many logoi? We shall address the second question first. The divine being and therefore the divine mind is infinite or even beyond infinity (as Maximus claims on occasions). It follows that its capacity to think is infinite. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that there must be an infinity of logoi. If that should be the case, would it not imply that God had to select from this infinite number of principles of knowledge a finite number in accordance with His will actually to create (by the logoi as principles of making)? If this should be the case, Maximus’ thought would have some striking resemblances with Leibniz’ philosophy. 30 One might object that Maximus never mentions an infinite number of logoi and therefore there are no reasons to think that such a number exists. Such an objection would, however, be naïve and unphilosophical. One cannot simply solve the issue by authority. If we wish to approach Maximus philosophically, the problem needs to be addressed. Do the principles of Maximus’ own system allow for an infinity of logoi or not? It is interesting to see how an earlier thinker, St Basil the Great, venture to go beyond the limitations of the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine of one and only one cosmic system because of his Christian notion of God’s immense power:

29 Maximus, Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081a; Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, edidit Hugo Rabe, Leipzig, 1899 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana) p. 566; Philoponus, Against Proclus’ On the Eternity of the World 12–18, transl. by J. Wilberding, Ithaca, New York, 2006 (ACA), p. 70. 30  Cf. G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Liberty of Man and the Origin of Evil, Part I, transl. by E. M. Huggard, London, 1951, §§ 7–15, §§ 19–26.

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Then he added the word, “created”, that it might be shown that what was made required a very small part of the power of the Maker. In fact, as the potter, although he has formed innumerable vessels by the same art, has exhausted neither his art not his power, so also the Maker of the universe, possessing creative power not commensurate with one cosmos but infinitely greater, by the impulse of His will alone brought the mighty works of things invisible into being. 31

Basil obviously presuppose the infinite capacity of the divine intellect to think possible creatures and therefore implies that God in His power could make more worlds. This is remarkable, since the notion of a plurality of (possible) worlds belonged to Epicurean atomism while mainstream Christian thought adhered to the Platonic-Aristotelian paradigm. Fortunately, Maximus touches upon the question of the number of logoi in one place, even if he is not addressing my question explicitly. We shall analyse this text below. At face value it seems to deny an infinite number of logoi, but, on the other hand, it also seems to imply that God knows all, that is infinitely many possible (and impossible) creatures eternally, which, I believe, would be philosophically sound if God’s intellect is of infinite capacity. The text I am referring to is found in Ambiguum 42. In the relevant paragraph Maximus argues against those that claim that souls pre-exist bodies. 32 He addresses an Origenist opinion that bodies were created later in order to punish souls that had previously (in a disembodied state) fallen into sin. But such an opinion would entail, Maximus thinks, that God would be forced to make something He originally did not intend to create (namely bodies), and that would entail the existence of logoi for essences that it were beside His purpose (παρὰ πρόθεσιν) to make. Maximus considers this an absurd idea. The saying, however, definitely requires some clarification. The text clearly implies that there are no logoi for what God does not intend to create. However, that is not the whole picture. It of course also implies that He knows what He does not intend to make. There can be no doubt as to the fact that God eternally 31 Basile

de Césarée, Homélies sur L’Hexaéméron, ed. S. Giet, Paris, 1968 (SC 26), pp. 94–96. 32  Amb.Ioh. 42, PG 91, 1325d–1332d.

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and infinitely knows all possibilities. The point is that He does not want to make all. This brings us back to what I said above, namely that the logoi cannot simply be identified with God’s knowledge of beings, since, as we see now, God knows more than what is comprised in the logoi. The natural question to ask is what exactly Maximus has in mind when using the term logoi. It cannot simply exhaust the concept of “God’s thoughts” because knowledge of what He does not want to create is a thought as well. The way the term is used by Maximus seems to indicate that it denotes, as we saw above, what is comprised in God’s purpose, namely a definite and delimited divine plan, the plan that is comprised in the economy of the Logos. Consequently, God has of course knowledge of infinite possibilities, but the term logoi denotes the set of thoughts that He eternally willed to execute at the appropriate time in accordance with the mystery of Christ. In that case there is a finite number of logoi. We return to the mystery of Christ below. 33 If this interpretation is sound, we avoid imputing a philosophical blunder on Maximus. It is obvious that since the divine intellect is infinite, its capacity for thinking is infinite, and no possibility among infinite possibilities is hidden from God. The logoi, on the other hand, is not just a term for divine thoughts in general, but denote the providential set of divine thoughts. An implication of this is, of course, that God eternally selected the set He wanted to create from the infinite possibilities at His disposal. 34 The logoi as “the providential set of divine thoughts” are definitely bound to the divine economy or the “mystery of Christ”, eternally contemplated by God. 35 According to this view, the cosmos did not originate from a divinity that creates “just by being”, a divinity that creates without any definite will or purpose to care providentially for its creatures. In this regard, Maximus’ cosmology is definitely different from pagan Neoplatonism. Maximus’ divinity is, paradoxical though it sounds, eternally contemplating the execution of a plan for graciously giving creatures a share in its own blessed life. This is the essence of his Christocentric cosmology. 33 I

think one finds this confirmed if one reads the whole sequence of the argument in Amb.Ioh. 42, PG 91, 1325d–1332d. 34  In this respect some similarity with Leibniz remains. 35 Cf. Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, pp. 73–83.

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We should reflect a bit on the first question posed above. Throughout natural history, particulars constituting new species turn up within the kingdom of living beings, among plants and animals. Is there any hint in Maximus that allows for a new species to enter the scene of nature? There is of course no reason to expect an ancient or late ancient thinker to have notions of evolution. However, since we approach Maximus metaphysically we should ask if his metaphysics excludes the possibility of evolution in principle. We should ask for reasonable interpretations of the words quoted above: 36 “The logoi of all beings that exist essentially — whether they are or will be, whether they have come to be or will come to be, or have appeared or will appear — pre-exist and are immovably fixed in God […].” I suppose that what Maximus has in mind is the coming to be of particulars within the already existing and familiar species. On the other hand, the saying does not at all exclude that the divine mind contains logoi for new arrivals throughout the long history of nature. We saw in the chapter on creation that Maximus claims the cosmos to be created “recently”. “Recently”, however, does not necessarily mean a few thousand years ago, even if Maximus himself believed that. Compared with the infinity of God, 13.7 billon years also count as “recent”. The main point of the doctrine of creation in this regard is that the universe did not exist eternally with God and that God is the almighty origin of all being. I cannot see that Maximus’ metaphysics in principle excludes the possibility of a long cosmic history and a process of evolution. It does exclude, however, the notion of “blind” processes. Natural processes have to be conceived, on the metaphysical level at least, as teleological in some way. The Maximian Logoi and the Porphyrian Tree I claimed in the first paragraph of the present chapter that Maximus’ doctrine of logoi relates to the Porphyrian tree as a system of genera, species, and particulars. In Ambiguum 7 Maximus tells us that God, in His logoi, knows all things before their creation, and in knowing them we have seen that God knows universals and 36 

Amb.Ioh. 42, PG 91, 1329a.

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particulars. 37 A section from Ambiguum 41 may help us develop this topic further: […] the logoi of everything that is divided and particular are contained, as they say, by the logoi of what is universal and generic, and the more generic and universal logoi are held together by wisdom, and those of the particulars, held fast in various ways by the generic [logoi] are contained by prudence […] For the wisdom and prudence of God the Father is the Lord Jesus Christ, who holds together the universals of beings by the power of wisdom, and embraces their complementary parts by the prudence of understanding, since by nature He is the maker and provider of all, and through Himself draws into one what is divided, and abolishes war between beings, and binds everything into peaceful friendship and undivided harmony, both what is in the heavens and what is on earth (Col. 1:20), as the divine Apostle says. 38 […] πάντων τῶν διῃρημένων καὶ μερικῶν οἱ λόγοι τοῖς τῶν καθόλου καὶ γενικῶν, ὥς φασι, περιέχονται λόγοις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν τῶν γενικωτέρων καὶ καθολικωτέρων λόγους ὑπὸ τῆς σοφίας συνέχεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ μερικῶν ποικίλως τοῖς τῶν γενικῶν ἐνισχημένους ὑπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως περιέχεσθαι […] Σοφία δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστιν ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, ὁ καὶ τὰ καθόλου τῶν ὄντων συνέχων τῇ δυνάμει τῆς σοφίας, καὶ τὰ συμπληρωτικὰ τούτων μέρη τῇ φρονήσει τῆς συνέσεως ὡς πάντων φύσει δημιουργὸς καὶ προνοητής, καῖ εἰς ἓν ἄγων τὰ διεστῶτα δι’ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι καταλύων πόλεμον, καὶ πρὸς εἰρηνικὴν φιλίαν τὰ πάντα καὶ ἀδιαίρετον συνδέων ὁμόνοιαν, τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, καθώς φησιν ὁ θεῖος ἀπόστολος.

In my doctoral thesis I discussed the relation between the logoi and the Porphyrian tree. 39 In a very stimulating book, Törönen criticised the claims I made:40 “I do not find any grounds in Maximus to connect the Logos-logoi theme with the Porphyrian Tree, which, I think is simply a different issue.” I have difficulty 37 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081a. Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1313a-b. See also 1312c–1312d that gives the same picture. 39 T. T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor – a Study of his Metaphysical Principles, Oslo, 2000 (Acta Humaniora 72), pp.  104–18. 40 M. Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2007, p. 138, note 39. 38 

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with understanding how Törönen can fail to see the connection, given texts like the one quoted above. I admit that it may be a challenge to understand the exact way the two structures are accommodated by Maximus, but I cannot see that the issues are different. The influence of Porphyrian logic and the Porphyrian tree is present in a lot of late antique thinkers, pagans as well as Christians. What is sketched in the above quotation is a hierarchy of logoi of genera, species, and particulars.41 These logoi are held together by wisdom and prudence and this wisdom and prudence of God the Father is Christ who holds together the universals of beings. The Logos, then, holds in His eternal knowledge together or embraces conceptually a Porphyrian tree or a taxonomy of logoi. In Ambiguum 7 Maximus says that “the one Logos is many logoi and the many are one”.42 The One is many in the creative and sustaining procession, that is in the act of creation, while the many are One in the “revertive, inductive, and providential return”, that is in the final consummation of all things. Described this way, the logoi are the transcendent principles of world-order, a whole contemplated in God and contained in the Logos. Maximus considers the logoi as the principles of a cosmic arrangement that emerges like a Porphyrian tree. One Logos, Many Logoi Maximus says that the one Logos is many logoi and the many are one (πολλοὶ λόγοι ὁ εἷς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ εἷς οἱ πολλοί).43 What exactly does this mean? He elaborates further on the same claim in the following words: [We also believe] that the same one is manifesting and multiplying (δεικνύμενόν τε καὶ πληθυνόμενον) Himself in all the things that come from Him, in a manner appropriate to each, as befits His goodness, and He is recapitulating all things (τὰ πάντα ἀνακεφαλαιούμενον) in Himself, for it is owing to Him that things have being and remaining, and generated things qua gener-

41 Cf. also

Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1177b-c. I shall try to highlight the topic further in the chapter on the universal. 42  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081b-c. 43  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081b-c, cf. 1077c.

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ated came from Him, and for His sake, and remaining and moving they participate in God.44 [πιστεύομεν] καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν πᾶσι ἐξ αὐτου κατὰ τὴν ἑκάστου ἀναλογίαν ἀγαθοπρεπῶς δεικνύμενόν τε καὶ πληθυνόμενον καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὰ πάντα ἀνακεφαλαιούμενον, καθ’ ὃν τό τε εἶναι καὶ τὸ διαμένειν καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ γεγονότα ὡς γέγονε καὶ ἐφ’ ᾧ γέγονε καὶ μένοντα καὶ κινούμενα μετέχει θεοῦ.

There are several things to take into consideration in this quotation. Maximus says that the one Logos is many logoi in His manifesting and multiplying Himself in creatures. The Logos manifests Himself or brings Himself to light, or shows Himself, that is reveals Himself in creatures. In an earlier section of this chapter (What God knows) I mentioned the three “incarnations” of the Logos and this is one of them:45 “He ineffably concealed Himself in the logoi of beings, obliquely signified in proportion to each visible thing, as if through certain letters […].” We should ask, what does this manifestation or revelation mean? On the one hand, it has epistemological implications. We investigated this in Chapter 1 above. The Logos concealed Himself in creatures and could only be discovered or disclosed by a created intellect when the latter is in a proper, virtuous condition. On the other hand, Maximus obviously implies that there is a certain metaphysical or ontological relationship between the logoi of the one Logos and created beings. Creatures are somehow imitations or images of the logoi and, basically, of the Logos Himself. It is for this reason Maximus says that the Logos concealed Himself and, for a properly trained intellect, manifested Himself in creatures. The one Logos not only manifested Himself, but also multiplied Himself in creatures. The Logos does not consist of parts that are split up, divided, and distributed. How, then, is the one Logos multiplied in creatures? Maximus says the one Logos is “indivisibly distinguished amid the differences of created things”.46 This again suggests that there is a paradigm/image-relationship at work. Every logos is an expression of the Logos and every natural creature is an expression of its logos. Therefore, every creature expres44 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1080a-b. 33, PG 91, 1285c–1288a. 46  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1077c. 45 Cf. Amb.Ioh.

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ses an aspect of the one God the Logos. The logoi are reflected in “otherness” when beings are called forth from non-being, and in this way, He is “indivisibly distinguished in the differences of created things”. He remains indivisible but is “distinguished” as imitated in manifold creaturely differences. We can apply the analogy of a mirror. Several mirrors may reflect one and the same entity from different angles. In this way the logoi are divine paradigms or patterns that are reflected in the created realm: “the one is manifested and multiplied in all the things that come from Him, in a manner appropriate to each” (κατὰ τὴν ἑκάστου ἀναλογίαν). Each creature originates as it receives a particular imprint of God and it is made to reflect God in a particular way. Creatures not only receive such an imprint, they are called to adjust themselves in accordance with it. We return to this topic in Chapter 5. There is also another way in which we may highlight how the One Logos becomes many logoi. The Logos remains a unity even if He expresses many thoughts. We should remember that the logoi are a specific kind of divine thoughts, namely those divine thoughts that constitute the divine knowledge of the economy of creation and salvation. The unity of the logoi rests in the Logos Himself. They are one for the reason that they are His thoughts and manifest His perfections. Maximus says in Ambiguum 22 that God is present in the logos of each being by itself, and in all the logoi together, but He is truly none of beings, He is all of them, and beyond them.47 We may interpret this to mean that God is all beings by the fact that He contains or comprises the logoi of all creatures as His thoughts. He is the logoi of creatures. This obviously does not mean that God could be identified with creatures. Maximus is not a pantheist. He says further that God is none of creatures and transcends them. Being God (i.e. being God as He is in Himself) does not mean to be Creator even if God eternally wills to be so.48 This doctrine has important implications for how creatures are related to God and for how they are ordained to behave metaphysically in relation to Him. It also has moral implications that we shall investigate further in the last section of this book, the Corollaries. 47 

Amb.Ioh. 22, PG 91, 1257a. discussion at the end of the chapter on creation above.

48  Cf. the

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Procession and Conversion We should recall St Paul’s saying, referred to above, that “from Him and through Him and to Him are all things” (ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, Romans 11:36). Maximus refers explicitly to these words.49 Paul’s saying suggests the picture of a circular movement. On this Biblical background Maximus develops a metaphysics of πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή, procession and conversion of creatures via their logoi in relation to their divine source: the Logos is, on the one hand, manifested and multiplied when creatures proceed from Him, and on the other hand, He recapitulates all things in Himself when creatures convert to Him.50 However, there is more at work than this Biblical background here. It is quite clear that Maximus works out his elaborate system of procession and conversion by adopting and adapting a Neoplatonist procession and conversion scheme according to Christian criteria. To be more precise, the Neoplatonist scheme consists of three moments: remaining, proceeding, and converting (or reverting). We find all three in Maximus. Let us first turn to the Neoplatonist background. We find the structure remaining-proceeding-converting in Plotinus.51 The general features of his doctrine are that a higher hypostasis “remains” in itself, meaning that it rests in some kind of self-sufficient internal activity. From this internal activity there results an external activity that separates from the hypostasis. This separation is the procession. In order that a new hypostasis shall emerge, the proceeding activity converts and is constituted as a new entity on the level below its cause. In the fifth century Proclus develops this triadic scheme systematically. The following words are well known:52 “Every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and reverts upon it” (Πᾶν τὸ αἰτιατὸν καὶ μένει ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ αἰτίᾳ καὶ πρόεισιν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς 49 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1077d–1080a. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1080a-b. 51 For the following, see Emilsson, Plotinus, pp.  57–59, pp.  94–96; Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, pp.  21–31. Cf.  Plotinus, Enneads I.7.1, in Enneads, vol. i, ed. Armstrong, 1978 (LCL 440); Ennead V.1.6 and V.4.2, in Enneads, vol.  v, ed. Armstrong, 1984 (LCL 444). 52 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. and transl. by E. R. Dodds, Oxford, 2004, pp. 38–39. 50 

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αὐτήν). The “remaining” means that the essential features that characterize the effects are present in the cause in a perfect mode. The procession accounts for the distinction between cause and effect: the effect separates itself as something inferior and imperfect compared with the cause. The conversion accounts for the moment at which the effect “looks back” or “turns around” and becomes constituted by the reception of its essential features from the cause. (For that to occur, the effect must possess some contemplative power.) That the effect proceeds does not mean that it empties the cause. Its perfect “self” remains there as a paradigm to be desired in the conversion. These words are from Proclus’ proposition 35, and the text has several resemblances with Maximus’ thought even if Maximus’ metaphysics is very different from Proclus’ metaphysics. According to Maximus, the effect has an original remaining in the cause because the logoi as predeterminations pre-exist in God. He says that we are “portions of God” because the logos of our being is in God.53 The terminology of being a “portion of God” has its background in Maximus’ polemic against Origenists that, in his opinion, abused a saying by St Gregory the Theologian. Gregory had spoken of man as being a “portion of God”, and Maximus gives what he considers an orthodox interpretation of this obscure saying.54 The Maximian sense of being a portion of God suggests an original remaining in God. This becomes even clearer in the following quotation: The logoi of all things are securely fixed (βεβαίως…πεπήγασι) with Him, and because of these He is said to know all things before their generation, since all things are in Him and with Him who is the truth [of all things], even though all things — things present and things to come — were not brought into being simultaneously with their logoi or with their being known by God […]. 55 Παρ’ ᾧ βεβαίως πάντων οἱ λόγοι πεπήγασι, καθ’ οὓς καὶ γινώσκειν τὰ πάντα πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν λέγεται, ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ παρ’ αὐτῷ ὄντων αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῶν πάντων, κἂν εἰ αὐτὰ τὰ πάντα, τὰ τε ὄντα καὶ τὰ ἐσόματα οὐχ ἅμα ἑαυτῶν λόγοις ἢ τῷ γνωσθῆναι ὑπὸ θεοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρήχθησαν […].

53 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1084b-c. Theologii Oratio XIV.7, PG 35, 865c. The whole of Maximus’ Ambiguum 7 is a reply to the Origenist interpretation. 55  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081a. 54  Cf. Gregori

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This securely fixed condition of the logoi in the Logos is a Maximian version of Proclus’ remaining. The logoi, as principles of knowledge, constitute the necessary condition for the existence of creatures, even if they are not a sufficient reason for their existence. The logoi as principles of making constitute the necessary and sufficient reason for creatures. The procession takes place when creatures are brought from non-being to being by God’s will, and the conversion is when creatures move correctly in accordance with their logoi and suffer transformation from corruptibility to incorruptibility in the eschatological consummation; in St Paul’s terminology (Eph. 1:10): all things are recapitulated in Christ. We need to comment a bit further on this. Maximus calls the procession τὴν ἀγαθοπρεπῆ εἰς τὰ ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς ποιητικήν τε καὶ συνεκτικὴν πρόοδον, “the creative and together-keeping procession of the One to beings, which is befitting goodness”.56 In this process the one Logos is many logoi. The term together-keeping procession suggests a world-system that God the Logos holds together in a rather special way. We shall investigate the structure of this system further in Chapter 6 below. He calls conversion τὴν εἰς τὸν ἕνα τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστρεπτικήν τε καὶ χειραγωγικὴν ἀναφοράν τε καὶ πρόνοιαν, “the converting and hand-leading ascent and providence of the many to the One”. In this movement the many becomes One. We may compare this with something said in Ambiguum 10 with reference to a Pauline saying in Dionysius the Areopagite:57 all things are brought into being from non-being, are held together in Him (ἐν αὐτῷ συνεστηκέναι τὰ πάντα), and all things are converted to Him (εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα ἐπιστρέφεσθαι). The similarities with Proclus’ scheme of procession and conversion are clear, and so are the differences. As we have seen in the chapter on creation, Maximus does not think creation is the result of God “just being”. It results from a purpose and will to communicate graciously with His creatures. The conversion is also different: it is not just the metaphysical moment of constitution, but rather the temporal return or adjustment of creatures to the 56 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081c. Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1188b-c. Cf. Dionysius, DN 4.4, in Corpus Dionysiacum I, ed. Suchla, p. 148. 57 

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divine purpose from a fallen and corruptible existence. The main differences are obviously connected with particular Christian ideas of God’s love, will, and providence. Maximus’ Doctrine of the Logoi According to Maximus, the logoi are eternally contained in or “fixed” in God the Logos as His thoughts, being predeterminations and good acts of will instituting creatures, particulars and universals “when God wills” in accordance with a temporal scheme. They establish the differences that make the cosmos a taxonomic system internally characterized by differentiation and identification. In this way they define creatures essentially. However, this is only the metaphysical aspect of their function. They also serve a soteriological purpose. When this purpose is brought into the picture, one particular logos shows itself to constitute a triadic pattern. This triadic scheme is also connected with Maximus’ doctrine of the divine ἐνέργεια, actuality or activity. We shall investigate this intricate topic further in the next chapter.

5. Logoi and Activities The topic of the previous chapter was St Maximus’ doctrine of the logoi. However, there is still something missing. As we have seen, Maximus does not only talk of a logos of being, which was the topic of Chapter 4. He presents us with a triad of logoi: the logos of being, the logos of well-being, and the logos of eternal well-being. I interpret this triad in the final paragraph of the present chapter. The triadic pattern should be brought into contact with another major topic in Maximus’ thought: the doctrine of divine ἐνέργεια, “activity”. The subject of the present chapter is therefore Maximus’ doctrine of the logoi and the activities. According to my interpretation, logoi and activities are different metaphysical moments.1 A logos is a divine thought, while an activity is something God essentially is and manifests. There is, then, a double aspect to this activity: it is internal and external. One might object that a logos as a thought is obviously an activity as well, which of course is generally correct. However, as we have seen already, the logoi belong to what God knows and wills, while the activity is natural and belongs to God’s essence. I shall explain what this means below. The topics I deal with in this chapter are the following: First, I discuss the translation of the term ἐνέργεια. The term will also be situated within the philosophical tradition. Secondly, I introduce the terminology of internal and external activity, which we already have met in earlier chapters as a particular Plotinian or Neoplatonic concept. However, as we shall see, it is found in Maximus as well and it is helpful in interpreting his texts. Thirdly, we shall investigate Maximus doctrine of divine activity. Fourthly, I treat the question whether there is one or several divine activities. Many scholars speak of “energies” in the plural (and this has also entered common parlance) but I wonder if not this plural manife1  An

interesting treatment of these topics is found in an unpublished paper by Marius Portaru, which he has kindly shared with me. In this article he also criticises claims I made in my first book on Maximus (2008): Marius Portaru, “A Reconsideration of the Relationship between Logoi and Divine Activities in Maximus the Confessor”, 2015.

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station is basically a unity. Fifthly, I shall investigate the distinction and relation between logoi and activities. Last but not least: the topics of this chapter turn on a very central idea in Maximus: the event of participation. This notion will therefore follow us in the paragraphs below. The Meaning of ἐνέργεια in the Philosophical Tradition In books and articles on patristic topics ἐνέργεια is often translated as energy. I avoid this translation. 2 I follow the example of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic scholars and the translators of the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series, who translate ἐνέργεια as activity and actuality, depending on the context. If we translate the term as “energy” we make a strange split between the ancient and late ancient philosophical legacy on the one hand, and Christian thought on the other; for whatever is “energy”? The term suggests something exotic and reminds one of the modern “alternative spirituality” and neo-religious movement. But is it ontologically something different from the activity/actuality spoken of among the philosophers? As we shall see below, it definitely is not. The only difference is its usage in a system of Christian thought. Aristotle is the first philosopher who uses the term ἐνέργεια in a technical sense. First, we should remember, as I said above, that ἐνέργεια is translated as activity and actuality depending on the context. However, one may get the feeling that activity and actuality denote two slightly different phenomena. For us activity often denotes different kinds of (what we would call) movement while actuality denotes an accomplished state. For Aristotle (and those who apply his terminology) the term ἐνέργεια carries both senses. However, the difference is not necessarily a major one. If I walk, I can be said to execute an activity, but it would be equally correct to say that I am in the actuality of walking. On the other hand, Aristotle would not consider walking an ἐνέργεια in the proper sense. At best, it is an incomplete activity. Aristotle includes both aspects of activity and actuality when he distinguishes ἐνέργεια from potentiality the following way: 2  I have given some reasons for this in T. T. Tollefsen, Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought, Oxford, 2012, pp. 4–5.

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What we want to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, and one should not look for a definition of everything but should also take in what is analogical, because as what builds is to what can build, and what is awake to what is asleep, and what is seeing to what has closed eyes but has sight, [and so] what has been separated off from matter to the matter, and what has been finished off to what is unwrought. 3

These examples may be divided into two groups. First we have the following: ἐνέργεια

δύναμις

What builds What is awake What is seeing

What can build What is asleep What has closed eyes but has sight

These examples of the activity-potentiality scheme in fact illustrate the distinction between entities possessing certain capacities (on the right had of the scheme) and entities executing these same capacities (on the left hand). The next two examples illustrate a different relation: What has been separated off from matter What has been finished off

The matter What is unwrought

These examples illustrate the matter (right side) and substance (left side) relation.4 We may easily think of building, waking, and seeing as activities and of a finished artefact as an actuality. In my opinion, however, to build (as activity) is the same as to be in the actuality of building so there is no need to distinguish conceptually between activity and actuality. Maybe it is more of a challenge to grasp that the finished artefact or the object that has achieved its form (as actuality) is in the condition of activity. It is, however, an accomplished activity, an activity as it has achieved its goal. I think the problem we are faced with is our tendency immediately to associate ἐνέργεια, activity, with 3  Metaphysics Θ, 6, 1048a35-b4. Makin’s translation in Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Θ, transl. by S. Makin, Oxford, 2006 (Clarendon Aristotle Series). 4  Makin gives a detailed discussion of these examples in his translation of Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Θ, pp. 137–40.

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movement. That is probably not precise. The term rather means that something is “in work”, i.e. that it is functioning. The term signalizes that something displays its reality when it manifests its work or function. In Metaphysics Θ, chapter 6 Aristotle make a distinction between activity and movement. 5 A movement is an incomplete kind of change, and he gives as examples processes of thinning, learning, walking, and building. All of these are processes or movements on the way to final states that are not yet achieved. An activity, on the other hand, is a process that is complete in that it includes it goal. Aristotle says that “at the same time one is seeing [and has seen], and is understanding [and has understood], is thinking and has thought”.6 However, it does not seem to me that this fine-grained distinction has much bearing on our interpretation of Maximus, at least not terminologically. Let us turn to what Aristotle says about God in Metaphysics Λ. The first mover, Aristotle says, is both essence and activity (οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα).7 But God does not move even if He exists actually (ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν).8 Therefore, movement and activity in the strict sense shall be kept apart. Chapter 9 in Metaphysics Λ is on the nature of intellect (νοῦς). Its conclusion is clearly that the essence of God is the activity of thinking. This activity, which is not a movement, is exactly “being in work”, “functioning”. The divinity manifests its reality in this complete activity. In the next paragraph I shall show that Maximus thinks the essence (οὐσία) of something consists in its activity (ἐνέργεια). But this makes it all the more necessary to distinguish between the internal and external activity of an entity. In the introduction to the present chapter I said that activity is something God essentially is and executes. Let me specify this to mean that it is something God is internally and executes externally. The distinction is obviously present in Maximus and he applies it in order to highlight some very important aspects of the divine activity. I 5 This is a much discussed distinction that does not seem to be of importance for our concerns here, but see Makin’s discussion in Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Θ, pp. 128–54. 6  Metaphysics Θ, 6, 1048b23–4. 7  Metaphysics Λ, 7, 1072a25. 8  Metaphysics Λ, 7, 1072b7–8.

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further think that the Aristotelian distinction applied by Philoponus in his arguments for the Christian doctrine of creation is relevant for Maximus, namely between first and second potentiality, first and second activity. Internal and External Activity We should remember what was said in Chapter 2 above. Theological reasoning belongs to the “lower” level of theology, is relative, and uses analogies. In this paragraph, therefore, much space will be devoted to an ontological discussion of created being in order to identify certain categories that we may apply relatively or analogously in philosophical theology. It is for the sake of the latter that I dwell on the former. Interpreters of Greek patristic thought often refer to the distinction between God’s essence and “energies”. As I indicated above, I rather prefer to differentiate between God’s essence and activities. I can specify my claim even more: the distinction is between God’s internal and external activity. We return to this below in the present paragraph. Meyendorff claims the distinction between essence and “energies” to be “real”: The distinction — a real distinction — between divine ‘essence’ and divine ‘energy’ is made unavoidable in the context of the doctrine of ‘deification’, which implies a ‘participation’ of created man in the uncreated life of God, whose essence remains transcendent and totally unparticipable.9

To my knowledge, Meyendorff never defines what he means by a real distinction. Any attempt to interpret his term will therefore be arbitrary. I fear, however, that his separation between the two moments is too drastic. From the point of view of Plotinus, the internal activity of the essence results in an outward manifestation: All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from their own substances, in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was pro-

9 J. Meyendorff,

Byzantine Theology, New York, 1987, p. 186.

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duced: fire produces the heat which comes from it; snow does not keep its cold inside itself.10

From this it appears to be a necessary connection between essence and external activity: whenever an entity is actualized or fulfilled as itself, it produces, like fire producing heat. Further, one may admit that heat is not the same as fire nor is cold the same as snow. One should also add that, according to Plotinus, production is accidental:11 “Or [we may say that] the making is incidental and the activity […] is incidental, because he did have this in view” The seeming contradiction between the necessary and accidental aspects of making is solved the following way: whenever an essence is internally active, it necessarily produces, but it does not have any external result in view. The latter, therefore, originates accidentally from the internal activity. The last consequence, however, is not acceptable in a Christian system. The Christian God definitely had creation in view and did not make the world by accident. In both cases, however, since God is internally active, an external activity results. For Plotinus, the external manifestation is necessary since it results from God being what God is. However, even if it is necessitated by the internal activity, it is not the same as it. As mentioned above, fire is not the same as heat. At this point it seems to me fruitful to turn to a couple of patristic sources that may shed some light on what we are dealing with here. Both thinkers are later than Maximus and influenced by him. These later receptions may offer a slight confirmation (even if not a strong one) on my interpretation of Maximus himself. First, I quote St John of Damascus: Activity is the efficient and essential movement (κίνησις) of nature. The nature from which the activity proceeds possesses the capacity for being active (ἐνεργητικὸν). The result of the activity is that which is effected by the activity. And the agent of the activity is the hypostasis that is active.12 10 Plotinus, Enneads V.1.6, in Enneads, vol. v, transl. by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1984 (LCL 444). 11 Plotinus, Enneads VI.1.22, in Enneads, vol.  vi, transl. by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1988 (LCL 445). 12 Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, Expositio fidei, ed. B. Kotter, Berlin, New York, 1973, section 59, lines 7–9, p. 144.

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It seems reasonable to apply the distinction between internal and external activity as an interpretative tool here. In addition, we may bring in the distinction between first/second activity and potentiality. John’s words suggest the following picture: the “efficient and essential movement of nature” is the internal and first activity of an entity. It is what an entity is as an accomplished being of some sort. This accomplished state comprises as well a (second) potentiality or a capacity, namely the “capacity of being active”. Because of these conditions, an entity (or agent) executes a second and external activity that culminates in a result. I supplement these remarks with some words from St Gregory Palamas, several centuries later. He says that the activity is not separate, but still differs from the essence of God, since it is from this essence (ἵνα τὴν μὴ χωριζομένην, διαφέρουσαν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργειαν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνης οὖσαν).13 If Palamas advocates a “real” distinction, this distinction means that the activity is not separate from the essence since it comes from it. Maybe we should avoid the word “real”. The essence is the necessary and sufficient condition of God’s external manifestation. There is a continuity between the internal and external sphere here, as it is between fire and heat. However, to repeat myself, to be heated is not the same as to be fire. Likewise, to be deified is not the same as to be God, but Maximus explicitly says human beings shall be gods by grace.14 We return to this in Chapter 7. Ambiguum 5 will play a major role in our investigation of Maximus’ ideas of internal and external activity. The text is an ontological exposition of the hypostatic union between divine and human nature or essence in Christ and has some relevance for the topic of deification as well. We shall start with a crucial saying: The sole, true demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) of this [that is, for the presence of an essence] is its natural constitutive potentiality (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῆς συστατικὴ δύναμις), and one would not err from the truth in calling this a natural activity (φυσικὴ ἐνέργεια) properly and primarily characteristic of it, being a form-making, most generic movement (ὡς εἰδποιὸν ὑπάρχουσαν κίνησιν γενικωτάτην) that contains every property that is naturally added to it, apart 13 Saint

Gregory Palamas, The one hundred and fifty Chapters, transl. by R. E. Sinkewicz, Toronto, 1988, § 126, pp. 232–33. 14 Cf. Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1308b.

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from which there is only non-being, since, according to the great teacher [Dionysius], only that which in no way has being is without movement or existence.15 ἧς μόνη τὲ καὶ ἀληθής ὲστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῆς συστατικὴ δύναμις· ἣν οὐκ ἄν τις ἁμάρτοι τῆς ἀληθείας, φυσικὴν φήσας ἐνέργειαν, κυρίως τὲ καὶ πρώτως χαρακτηριστικὴν αὐτῆς, ὡς εἰδοποιὸν ὑπάρχουσαν κίνησιν γενικωτάτην, πάσης τῆς φυσικῶς αὐτῇ προσούσης περιεκτικὴν ἰδιότητος, ἧς χωρὶς μόνον ἐστι τὸ μὴ ὂν, ὡς μόνου τοῦ μηδαμῶς ὄντος κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν μέγαν διδάσκαλον, οὔτε κίνησιν οὔτε ὕπαρξιν ἔχοντος.

It seems reasonable to me to interpret “the natural constitutive potentiality” (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῆς συστατικὴ δύναμις) and the “natural activity” (φυσικὴ ἐνέργεια) as two aspects of one and the same “state” of a substance. This state is the actuality of the substance as a particular kind of entity, in this case a human being. An entity, in casu a human being, is a finished result that comes out of the unwrought condition of first potentiality. This human being is, therefore, in the condition of its first natural activity that has given it form as what it is. As giving it form, it constitutes it with the “generic movement” that contains all natural properties and this amounts to be its “natural constitutive potentiality”. This state of the same substance is therefore its first activity, which for the moment may not be actualized in particular movements. The first activity is therefore the same as its second potentiality that is a capacity for entering into second activity as actual particular movements. Even if this is an interpretation applying a set of already given terms to the Maximian saying, I believe it gives good sense. It also furnishes us with keys to bring our interpretation further. We can compare this interpretation with something Maximus says in Capita theologica et oeconomica: Every essence, which implies in itself its own limit, is naturally an origin of movement conceived in potentiality in it. Every natural movement towards activity, conceptualized after essence and before activity, is a middle insofar as it naturally lies between both as a mediation between them. And every activity, circumscribed

15 

Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, pp. 19–20.

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naturally according to its own logos, is the end of the essential movement conceptually prior to it.16 Πᾶσα οὐσία τὸν ἑαυτῆς ὅρον ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγουσα, ἀρχὴ πέφυκεν εἶναι, τῆς ἐπιθεωρουμένης αὐτῇ κατὰ δύναμιν κινήσεως. Πᾶσα δὲ φυσικὴ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν κίνηεσις, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας μετεπινοουμένη· προεπινοουμένη δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας, μεςότης ἐστὶν, ὡς ἀμφοῖν κατὰ τὸ μέσον φυσικῶς διειλημμένη· καὶ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια τῷ κατ’ αὐτὴν λόγῳ φυσικῶς περιγραφομένη, τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν οὐσιώδους κινήσεως.

The text is dense, but here we have the three principles of essence, potentiality, and activity. We may summarize the main points of this text in the following scheme:17 ἀρχή, beginning, origin οὐσία, essence ἦν, was

μεσότης, middle δύναμις, potentiality ἐστι, is

τέλος, end ἐνέργεια, activity ἔσται, shall be

The last line in the figure is not taken directly from the text but is added by me. However, what Maximus says legitimizes this temporal interpretation.18 The triad beginning-middle-end is connected with time, “which has measured movement”, as the basic διάστασις, “extension”, “interval”, characteristic of temporal beings. The tenses was, is and shall be are therefore appropriate, I believe. Essence, as ontological beginning or origin of an entity, is an actualized condition, or a realized or first activity. This condition contains a lot of possibilities that may be actualized temporally. We have therefore the condition of first actuality containing powers or faculties that are potentially present as diverse capacities for different acts. This is the “middle” stage or the second potentiality. The last stage, the “end”, is the second activity. An essence, Maximus says (in the above quotation), is delimited in itself, and this delimitation is due to the logos of this particular entity. The starting point is, therefore, an actualized essence or an essence in “activity”. We have an actualized essence, let us say a 16 

Th.Oec. 1.3, PG 90, 1084a-b. Th.Oec. 1.1–5, PG 90, 1084a–1085a. 18 Cf. Th.Oec. 1.5, PG 90, 1085a. 17 

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human being. This human being possesses essentially a potentiality for movement. I suppose “movement” here covers all kinds of natural activities. A human being has, for instance, potentiality for thinking, sensing, desiring, and acting in diverse ways, etc. When the text characterizes this potentiality as a “natural movement towards activity”, it looks like a capacity that may be actualized in a second activity, which is the execution of what the entity is capable of: thinking, sensing, desiring, and acting. Interpreted this way the text agrees with what Maximus says in Ambiguum 5. The interpretation is at least reasonable and probable. The “natural activity” in Ambiguum 5 is what Plotinus would call the activity of the essence or the internal activity of an entity which makes it what it is. This seems to be what Maximus has in mind when he says:19 “the definition of every nature is constituted by the logos of its essential activity”. This logos is the divine principle by which God defines an entity, namely its logos of being. In the quotation from Capita theologica et oeconomica above, an activity, and this is an external activity, the last item in the scheme, is circumscribed according to its logos. I suppose that the logos again is the divine logos of being. This logos, qua defining the nature or essence, delimits the range of possible activities that an entity may execute because it has the capacity for it. Some other passages contribute to the same picture. Maximus talks of “the constitutive activity of the essence He [i.e. Christ] assumed” (τὴν συστατικὴν τῆς προσληφθείσης οὐσίας ἐνέργειαν).20 The term constitutive is important, and I comment on that below. What Maximus says here is, obviously, that the essence is constituted by a particular kind of activity. We need to clarify the term constitutive. As we have seen above, in the tradition of Porphyrian logic the difference (διαφορά) function in two ways, namely as divisive and constitutive (διαιρετική and συστατική). 21 The divisive differences divide a genus such as for instance animal by splitting it up by adding differences like rational and irrational. On the level of the species the differences function as constitutive: we get rational animal and irra19 

Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, p. 31. Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, p. 24. 21 Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1887 (CAG IV.I), p. 10. 20 

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tional animal. If we interpret Maximus’ sayings above in accordance with this tradition, the constitutive activity should be that which makes it possible to characterize an essence (a nature) or, at least, describe the functioning or manifestation of the essence (or nature). However, as we have seen in Chapter 2, the essence as such is not something of which we have direct knowledge. We may only know the external activities and try to grasp an essence from these. In the case of God, however, we cannot know His essence. This interpretation is strengthened when Maximus, in the above quotation, says that the natural constitutive potentiality or natural activity “subsists as specifying the most generic motion, and contains every property that is naturally added to it, apart from which there is only non-being”. The saying is, however, dense, and needs to be unpacked. The constitutive difference (διαφορὰ συστατική) makes a species, such as the essence of human being. This constituted first activity, which is also a second potentiality, therefore, specifies the most generic motion “and contains every property that is naturally added to it”. The human being is a species of animal and therefore contains the generic property of animals in a specified form (i.e. made into a species) on the level of humanity. All levels of generic properties are naturally contained in this species. Human beings are bodily, living, moving, sensitive, rational animals. The series of differences constitute different generic levels above the species and are collected in the species. Movement (κίνησις) is a generic difference of animal and when specified (i.e. made into a species) in the human being it is a second potentiality or capacity inclusive of all those possible second activities that are characteristic of the species. The second activities are, according to this interpretation, external activities. In the quotation above, Maximus says that apart from the properties contained in the species, “there is only non-being, since, according to the great teacher [Dionysius], only that which in no way has being is without movement or existence”. In my opinion, the point is simply that the properties manifested in activity are the only witnesses to the being of something. Without activity there is nothing, non-being. This interpretation is confirmed by what Maximus says further in Ambiguum 5:

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For the Word beyond being who once assumed essence, humanly possessed undiminished, as His own, the movement of the essence that characterizes Him generically as a human being, naturally specified in everything He performs (ἐνήργει) as such. Since He has truly become a human being, He breathes, speaks, walks, moves His hands, uses His senses naturally in the perception of things sensible, is hungry, thirsty, eats, sleeps, is tired, weeps, is distressed, and possesses every other independent capacity (δύναμις) and, in every other respect in the mode of a soul that with its own activity moves the body that forms one nature that He has truly become and is called His own […].22 Ἅπαξ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικῶς οὐσιωθεὶς ὁ ὑπερούσιος Λόγος, μετὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης οὐσίας ἀμείωτον εἶχεν ὡς ἰδίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν γενικῶς αὐτὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπον χαρακτηρίζουσαν τῆς οὐσίας κίνησιν, πᾶσιν οἷς ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐνήργει φυσικῶς εἰδοποιουμένην, εἴπερ ἀληθῶς γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, ἀναπνέων, λαλῶν, βαδίζων, χεῖρας κινῶν, προσφυῶς ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενος εἰς ἀντίληψιν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, πεινῶν, διψῶν, ἐσθίων, ὑπνῶν, κοπιῶν, δακρύων, ἀγωνιῶν, καίτοι δύναμις ὢν αὐθυπόστατος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς αὐτουργικῶς ψυχῆς δίκην φυσικῶς τὸ συμφυὲς σῶμα κινούσης, τὴν προσληφθεῖσαν φύσιν κινῶν, ὡς αὐτοῦ καὶ γενομένην ἀληθῶς καὶ λεγομένην […].

I think this quotation illustrates how internal activity (cf. “the movement of the essence that characterizes Him generically as a human being”) becomes manifest in external activities like breathing, speaking, etc. We shall now turn to the divine activities as such. Divine Activity Above I described the general principles of internal and external activity. However, what is important in the present context is how we may apply this to God. We turn first to a text in Capita de caritate.23 Maximus says that when the human intellect comes to be in God, which probably means when one reaches the third level of spiritual development (mystical theology), it seeks the logoi of His essence, but it is impossible to grasp them. The term logoi may 22  23 

Amb. Thom. 5, CCSG 48, pp. 23–24. Car. 1.100, PG 90, 981d–984a.

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here mean conceptions or definitions of the divinity that of course are inaccessible for created intellects. What the intellect may grasp, however, is the attributes that are “around Him” (περὶ αὐτόν): Eternity Infinity Indefiniteness (ἀοριστία) Wisdom Power, by which He creates, preserves, and judges beings

It is important to notice that the grasping of these attributes is not to achieve a definition of God, who is characterized by ἀοριστία. Maximus concludes the text with saying that we know nothing about God and this, paradoxically, is to know God beyond (ὑπέρ) the intellect. We shall not discuss that kind of mystical knowledge in the present context. Maximus also says, rather surprisingly, that what is wholly graspable about God is His infinity (ἀπειρία). As said above (in Chapter 2), I should think that infinity would be among the most difficult things to grasp. Many interpreters would claim that these attributes are so-called “energies”, what I would call activities. I suggest they should be understood as external activities since they are “around Him”. They are therefore manifested actualities of the divine essence. At this point the notorious question of the unity and plurality of the divine activity turns up. I shall return to that in the next section below. Here I will just claim that the items of the above list of attributes, qua barely knowable activities or actualities of the unknowable divine essence, are to be understood as manifested from the internal complete activity of the Godhead. In Capita theologica et oeconomica 1. 48 Maximus uses the term “works of God” (ἔργα Θεοῦ) and distinguishes between two kinds of them: works that He did not begin to create (τὰ ἔργα ὧν οὐκ ἤρξατο ποιῆσαι) and works that He began to create (τὰ ἔργα ὧν ἤρξατο ποιῆσαι).24 The terminology is strange, since we should expect the term “works of God” simply to means creatures. However, the term “works that He did not begin to create” cannot mean creatures. This will be more obvious when we come to

24 

Th.Oec. 1.48, PG 90, 1100c-d.

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the items included under this term below.25 The Greek word ἔργον is ambiguous. It may have the dynamic sense of being at work or executing a deed. It may also mean the result of a work or a deed. In its first sense, it is reasonable to claim that it means the same as ἐνέργεια, activity. As said above (in connection with the text from Capita de caritate), these “works” are external manifestations of God’s internally fulfilled activity, and therefore something accomplished. On the other hand, these accomplished works should be understood dynamically as activities. The term “works that He began to create” denotes beings that have a temporal beginning (χρονικῶς ἠργμένα). These beings are creatures. Since they are creatures, they are “participating beings” (ὄντα μετέχοντα), qualified by Maximus as the different essences of beings. These were brought from non-being into being. The “works He did not begin to create”, on the other hand, have no temporal beginning. Maximus says that while God rested from the works He began to make (cf. Gen 2:3), He did not rest from those He did not begin to make. On the one hand, the latter “works” are important for keeping participating beings in being. On the other hand, it is obvious that these works, being without any beginning and therefore issuing from God’s eternal essence, are not simply manifested for the making of creatures. We return to this below. The divine works without beginning are “participated beings” (ὄντα μεθεκτά) and participating beings participate in these according to grace (κατὰ χάριν). Since the talk thus far has been on creation, one may conclude that “being created” is an expression of grace. Maximus’ doctrine is clear: created essences have 25  There

is an interesting saying in Ecclesiasticus (16:26 LXX) that maybe suggested this terminology to Maximus, even if he applies it a bit differently. It is said that the works of the Lord (τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ) were in His council from the beginning (ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς), and in the act of creation He divided their parts, which could mean that he ordered the world according to His plan. Here the works of God are definitely not creatures, rather they are divine conceptions before the act of creation. The saying from Ecclesiasticus would fit well as a scriptural confirmation of Maximus’ doctrine of logoi, but all I want to draw from this citing is a terminological lesson. The ambiguity of the term may also be observed in Pseudo-Aristotle, De mundo, in Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, On Coming-to-be and Passing-away, On the Cosmos, transl. by E. S. Foster, D. J. Furley, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1978 (LCL 400), chapter 6, 399b.

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their being qua participating in the divine works without beginning. It seems obvious to me that we should distinguish between an essence as such and what it participates in. I discussed this topic of participation in my first Maximus-book as well, and then I gave a rather complex definition of participation. In my book Activity and Participation I changed my view because I was convinced that the event of participation was much simpler (structurally) that I originally believed.26 I still have that conviction. We will return to this topic as well below. We turn now to the list of participated beings: goodness and all that goodness encompasses, all life, immortality, simplicity, immutability, and infinity. I suggest, comparing Capita theologica et oeconomica 1.47 with 1.48, that all these “works” are comprised in the “divine activity” mentioned in the former text.27 Somehow this could suggest that the list of divine works contains specifications of something unified: the one divine activity. However, this argument is not sufficient to establish such a unity and we have to return to this in the next section. Let us just for the moment say that the term divine activity denotes the list of works presented above. We should mention other lists of attributes that are relevant in this connection. In Capita theologica et oeconomica 1.49, Maximus says that the participated beings are implanted by grace in creatures like a δύναμις ἔμφυτος.28 I suggest that the term should be translated and understood as an inborn power, since, it is said, this δύναμις “clearly proclaims God’s presence in all beings”. (I suppose the background for this saying is St Paul, Rom. 1:20.) This power is specified in the next paragraph (1.50) in relation to the participants.29 In the figure below it is put in the left column: Participated beings:

Participating beings:

Immortality itself Life itself

All immortal beings All living beings

26 Cf. T. T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2008, chapter 5 and Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, 2012. 27  Th.Oec. 1.47–48, PG 90,  1100b–1101a. 28  Th.Oec. 1.49, PG 90, 1101a. 29  Th.Oec. 1.50, PG 90, 1101a-b.

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Holiness itself Virtue itself Goodness itself Being itself

and activities All holy beings All virtuous beings All good beings All beings

Now the picture becomes more complex, but I postpone my comments until I have presented one more list. In Capita de caritate (3.25) we find a list of divine ἰδιώματα, properties:30 Being (τὸ ὄν) Eternal being (τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν) Goodness (ἡ ἀγαθότης) Wisdom (ἡ σοφία)

Why are they called properties? In the tradition of Porphyrian logic properties are distinguished from essence, but it is at the same time obvious that the properties of some entity are not attributes that are foreign to its essence. 31 For instance, members of the species human being have properties that are possible because of the whole generic series of essential determinations culminating in it. Porphyry mentions for example the ability to laugh as a human property and I suppose this is based on the rational essence of human beings. I suggest that Maximus’ usage here fits the fourth Porphyrian sense: a property is a characteristic that holds of something alone and always. The four properties are essentially divine in the sense that only God could manifest them, and if creatures have them, it is strictly by participation. There is one more thing to take notice of in this text from Capita de caritate. Maximus says that two of these properties are given to the essence, namely Being and Eternal being, while two are given to what he calls “the gnomic aptitude” (τῇ γνωμικῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι), namely Goodness and Wisdom. As we shall see below, this saying may seem to involve Maximus in an inconsistency. We shall now try to bring the loose ends together. There are some overlapping in these lists and all of them seem to deal with 30 

Car. 3.25, PG 90, 1024b-c. Isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias, p. 12.

31 Porphyrii,

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the same phenomena under different terms: what is around God, works without beginning, properties, and divine activity. It might be fruitful to compare with Dionysius the Areopagite who is a source of inspiration Maximus knows well. The fifth chapter of De Divinis Nominibus is particularly relevant here. 32 Dionysius says the divine name of the Good makes known the whole of the divine processions and extends to beings and non-beings but is also beyond (ὑπέρ) them. The name of Being extends to beings but is beyond beings, the name of Life extends to living things but is beyond living things, and the name of Wisdom extends to intellectual, rational, and sensitive things and is beyond them. We should note that the Good comprises all creative processions and therefore collects them into some kind of unity. The different processions are, one may suppose, specified aspects of the one Goodness. We should also note that the processions have two aspects, namely one transcendent (signalized by the term “beyond”, ὑπέρ) and one that extends into the created world. The divine essence is, of course, beyond the processions, but the question is if this means that it is beyond both kinds of processions or just those through which God proceeds to creatures. In my opinion, the divine essence seems to transcend both kinds: Dionysius says that his treatise is meant to hymn God’s providence which means that it does not reveal the very “hyperessential” goodness, essence, life, and wisdom. What is “hymned”, to use a Dionysian term, is the essence-making, life-making, and wise-making cause. 33 Then follows a most interesting saying: Dionysius does not claim that the Good is one thing, Being another, and Life and Wisdom are still other. The causes are not many and we should not reckon them as different deities that are productive of different effects. The whole of the Good processions are from one God. This shows that there are certain internal processions in the Godhead and that these transcend the external processions or 32 

DN 5. 1–2, in Corpus Dionysiacum I, herausgegeben von B. R. Suchla, Berlin, New York, 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien, band 33), pp. 180–81. 33  For “hymn” as a Dionysian term, see P. G. Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite”, in P. G. Pavlos, L. F. Janby, E. K. Emilsson, T. T. Tollefsen, Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity, London and New York, 2019, pp. 162–64.

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activities of God. It is also quite clear that the divinity as such transcends even the internal processions or activities. 34 One more thing is to be noted, the so-called processions are not independently existing Platonic Forms or Neoplatonist divinities that exist “between” God and creatures. The processions are of the one God. The unity of the processions is therefore based on the divine essence and all the processional aspects are unified in the basic divine providence or Goodness. There is no realm of entities bridging the gap between God and creatures. God Himself bridges the gap by His activities. There are certain similarities between Maximus and Dionysius. Maximus’ terminological usage “divine works without beginning” may seem to suggest some kind of entities or Platonic Forms between God and creatures. This impression is strengthened by his terminology of Being itself (αὐτὴ ἡ ὀντότης), Goodness itself (αὐτὴ ἡ ἀγαθότης),  etc. 35 But there are no reasons to believe that Maximus any more than Dionysius considers there to be any entities “between” God and the created world. Another similarity is that Maximus also thinks that the divine activity constitutes some kind of whole, since there is talk of Goodness and all that Goodness encompasses (ἐμπεριέχεται), which must mean that there are further items comprised by Goodness. The latter are, probably, specifications or aspects of it. 36 It is possible that Maximus thinks that what is listed in the sequence are such items that are encompassed by Goodness: Life, Immortality, Simplicity, Immutability, and Infinity. If that is the case, then this list may be further synthesized with the list of participated beings or the so-called divine works without beginning, since Goodness is one of the items in this list. The list of participated beings is a whole as well, since all items in it are participated beings. This list will consequently include Being itself, Goodness itself with Life, Immortality, Simplicity, Immutability, Infinity, and the additional items, probably also included in Goodness: Virtue and Holiness. At this 34 If this interpretation is correct, it seems that Dionysius is in disagreement with Plotinus, for whom the internal activity of the One is the essence of the One, even if we strictly speaking cannot know any internal activity at this level. 35  Th.Oec. 1. 50, PG 90, 1101b. 36  Th.Oec. 1. 48, PG 90, 1100d.

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point there emerges a difference between Maximus and Dionysius. While Dionysius definitely holds Goodness to be the all-encompassing divine procession expressive of God’s providence, Maximus holds Being to be basic. Every divine activity is, therefore, a kind of “being” or “being-making” activity. At this point we are close to raise the question of whether there is one or many divine activities, but that is our topic in the next paragraph. We should note the differences in terminology: some items are said to be “around Him”, others are “divine works”, divine activity or power, participated beings, or, finally, properties. Some of the lists overlap, some do not. Even so, it seems to me that we have to do with the same metaphysical phenomenon. Eternity, infinity, indefiniteness, wisdom, and power (creative, providing, judging) are like veils (to use a commonly known Dionysian metaphor) for the hidden divine majesty. These are features manifested from God and are understood “around Him”. They are a manifest divine activity and they are even items that creatures may participate in. The “works without beginning” should, of course, also be understood as “around Him”, even if it is not explicitly said. The logic of the matter demands it. These works are likewise manifested from God as an external activity that is explicitly said to be participated in. The same is the case when the terminology of “properties” is used. There is one question that needs to be answered: what is the exact relation of these divine manifestations to created beings? What is the order according to which participation takes place? I discuss this in the last paragraph of this chapter. Unity and Plurality I mentioned above that several scholars speak of divine “energies” and seem to think that there is a plurality of these. In my first book on Maximus, I tried to argue that the divine activity is a unity. I think now that my arguments then were far from decisive. 37 However, I believe the question needs some further attention. Above I pointed to something Dionysius says in his De Divinis Nominibus, namely that Goodness, Being, Life, and Wis37  This is one of the points discussed by M. Portaru, “A Reconsideration”. He criticizes my arguments and I consider him correct.

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dom are not separate “entities”. He claims “that the whole of the good processions and the names of God, hymned by us, are of one God; and that it reveals the complete providence of the one God, but that the others [show] His more whole and more partial [providences]”. 38 From this it seems clear that the principle of unity among the processions is God Himself. They all stem from the one divine being. However, there is more: the processions are unified in God’s Providence as well and the proper name for them all is Goodness. Providence as Goodness comprises all more general and particular providences. Created beings participate in an exact amount in accordance with some pre-defining principles. However, I shall not investigate this topic more in Dionysius, but return to Maximus. As we saw in the former section, Maximus follows Dionysius in the idea that several particular activities are comprised in Goodness. Here we should note one difference between the two thinkers: while Goodness is the basic procession or activity in Dionysius, Being is the basic and most comprehensive activity in Maximus. The list of “participated beings” is a list of items comprised by Being itself. If we sum up the items mentioned in the last section, we get a picture like the following: Being comprises Goodness, which again comprises Virtue, Holiness, Life, Immortality, Simplicity, Immutability, and Infinity. While the principle of unity is the divine essence, the picture also suggests that the external activity of God is a unity in Being. In Capita theologica et oeconomica Maximus states: “For there is one and the same essence, power, and activity of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and no one of them can be or be conceived without the others.”39 How shall we understand this? The first thing we can say is that the statement is traditional.40 The most important question is, of course, what kind of activity Maximus is dealing with here. It seems obvious that this one activity is the internal activity, the activity of the essence. This activity of the 38 Dionysius,

DN 5.2, in Corpus Dionysiacum I, ed. Suchla (1990), p. 181. Th.Oec. 2.1, PG 90, 1125c. Cf. Amb.Ioh. 23, PG 91, 1261a. 40 Cf. Pope Vigilius’ “Third encyclical letter” in Richard Price, ed., The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 553, Liverpool, 2012 (Translated Texts for Historians Volume 51), p. 176. 39 

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essence is what God is, and therefore it transcends the capacity of any created intellect.41 As such, it is “one and the same”. The activities comprised by Being above, are the activities out of the essence. These are founded on the one, internal activity, and, in line with what I argued above, I still believe these activities to be a unified whole. It does not seem to me that Maximus has left us with any definite explanation of exactly how this unified whole shall be understood. We may therefore try to offer an interpretation based on Maximian principles. Since Being is a divine attribute (not essence of course), a property manifested, it contains all possible perfections (or activities) in its single nature. Whenever an entity is created, it is divinely designed to receive Being to the degree God has preordained. One may ask if this makes the plural nature of the basic activity dependent on creatures. I claim that it does not. Divine Being is all-perfect and contains all possible modes of being (Goodness, Virtue, Holiness, Life, Immortality, etc.) eternally. This is the way I would interpret Maximus. It remains now to investigate how this comes about. That is, to find out on what principles Maximus thinks this distribution occurs. Activities and Logoi In this paragraph we come to the topic of participation. I start with an important saying from Ambiguum 7: For all things, in that they came to be from God, participate proportionally in God, whether by intellect, by reason, by sensation, by vital movement, or by essential and habitual aptitude (οὐσιώδη καὶ ἑκτικὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα), according to the great theologian Dionysius the Areopagite.42 Πάντα γὰρ μετέχει διὰ τὸ ἐκ Θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι, ἀναλόγως Θεοῦ, ἢ κατὰ νοῦν ἢ λόγον ἢ αἴσθησιν ἢ κίνησιν ζωτικὴν 41 At this point Portaru, “A Reconsideration” has a strange objection to my claim: “if this eternal divine manifestation ad intra were [was, I suppose] one in number, God would seem to be devoid of dialogical freedom, to say the least”. First, I do not think Maximian principles allow us to know anything at all about God’s internal life or “dialogical freedom” (whatever that means). Secondly, since the internal activity is what God is essentially, it seems rather daring to suggest that this is a plural activity. 42  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1080b.

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ἢ οὐσιώδη καὶ ἑκτικὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα, ὡς τῷ μεγάλῳ καὶ θεοφάντορι Διονυσίῳ δοκεῖ τῷ Ἀρεοπαγίτῃ.

I claim that the key-terms here are essential aptitude and habitual aptitude. With the terms intellect, reason, sense-perception, and vital motion, Maximus provides a list of essential features that make a creature apt for participation. The essential definition of a creature is given in the eternal advance. The essence is defined or conceived in the eternally contemplated logos of the creature in the Wisdom of God, i.e. in the Logos, Christ. According to the quotation above, the creature, when brought into being, participates in God in accordance with this pre-defined, creaturely content. It is, therefore, the logos of being that delimits the receptive capacity of an entity. What it receives is God or, more precisely, the divine activity or, to use terminology from the sections above: the divine works without beginning, the participated beings, or the properties of God, i.e. the external activity of the Godhead. Creatures receive to the degree their respective capacity is predetermined to receive. This brings us to the triadic structure of the logoi. Maximus talks of the logos of being, the logos of well-being, and the logos of eternal (well-) being. In the 7th Ambiguum, Maximus says of man: […] and he is a ‘portion of God’, then, as being, because of the logos of being that is in God; and [he is a ‘portion of God’] as good, because of the logos of well-being that is in God; and [he is a ‘portion of God’] as God, because of the logos of his eternal being that is in God […].43 […] καὶ ἔστι “μοῖρα Θεοῦ”, ὡς ὤν, διὰ τὸν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτοῦ λόγον, καὶ ὡς ἀγαθός, διὰ τὸν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι αὐτοῦ λόγον, καὶ ὡς Θεός, διὰ τὸν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι αὐτοῦ λόγον […]

According to Maximus, to be a portion of God means that there are logoi in God that are basic for the being and movement of creatures. I interpret the above quotation to indicate that the triad of logoi concerns the being, movement, and consummation of beings. Participation according to the habitual aptitude, mentioned

43 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1084b-c.

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above, is to participate according to the logos of well-being and the logos of eternal (well-) being. We shall investigate this further. Firstly, a human being, a rational creature, or any being made with an essential aptitude is a “portion of God” in the sense that there is a logos of its being in God. This logos, as we have seen, both defines the creature essentially and delimits its share of Being as a divine activity. This logos, therefore, defines and institutes the creature as a natural entity in the world-system. Secondly, a human being is a “portion of God” in the sense that it receives the activity of divine Goodness because of the logos of well-being in God. This reception of Goodness is conditioned by a certain self-activity executed by the creature. In Ambiguum 7 Maximus says that rational creatures are subject to motion, since they are moved from a natural beginning in Being towards a “voluntary” (κατὰ γνώμην) end in well-being.44 Here we should introduce a set of technical terms that Maximus applies, namely the terminology of according to nature/logos (κατὰ φύσιν/λόγον) and discordant with nature/logos (παρὰ φύσιν/λόγον).45 In Opuscula theologica et polemica 10, Maximus says: It is by being something (τι), not as being someone (τις), that each of us principally is active as man; but by being someone, e.g. Peter or Paul, he gives form to the mode of activity (τὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας σχηματίζει τρόπον) — more or less intensively, determining it this way or that according to his gnomic will (κατὰ γνώμην). Hence, in the mode (ἐν μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ) the changeability of persons is known in their activity, in the logos (ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ) in the inalterability of natural activity (ἐνεργείας).46 Ὡς γάρ τι ὢν προηγουμένως, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὥς τις ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐνεργεῖ· τουτέστιν, ὡς ἄνθρωπος· ὡς δέ τις, οἷον Παῦλος ἢ Πέτρος, τὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας σχηματίζει τρόπον, ἐνδόσει τυχὸν ἢ ἐπιδόσει, οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατὰ γνώμην τυπούμενος. Ὅθεν ἐν μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον τῶν προσώπων κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν γνωρίζεται· ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ, τὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀπαράλλακτον ἐνεργείας. 44 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1073c. this distinction, see S. Mitralexis, “Maximus’ Theory of Motion: Motion κατὰ φύσιν, Returning Motion, Motion παρὰ φύσιν”, in S.  Mitralexis, G. Steiris, M. Podbielski, S. Lalla, eds, Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher, Eugene, Oregon, 2017, pp. 73–91. 46  Op. 10, PG 91, 137a. 45 For

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Man has, because of his human nature, a natural capacity for being active. Mental and physical (practical) activities are natural for humans. The mode in which this natural activity is executed is, however, given personal form in each individual according to its so-called gnomic will. Maximus’ concept of the gnomic will is a large topic that we shall not enter into here.47 Let us just say that this is a modified version of the natural will. The natural will is stable in its drive towards the good but after the fall this natural drive is under the spell of sensible desires and therefore confused. Part of the way back to union with God, is to accommodate this confused will to the natural drive. We have already met with the term “gnomic will” above, in connection with the four divine properties mentioned in Capita de caritate.48 I mentioned there that Maximus seems to involve himself in an inconsistency. The problem is the following: In Capita theologica et oeconomica, Maximus states that Virtue and Goodness (among other items) are implanted by grace in creatures like a δύναμις ἔμφυτος.49 (We have seen above that divine Goodness comprises Virtue as one of its aspects.) Since we translate this term as an “inborn power”, it suggests that goodness and virtue in creatures are an inborn or natural participation in divine Virtue and Goodness. This is in accordance with what Maximus says in the Disputatio cum Pyrrho, where he claims that virtues are natural.50 But how can this be reconciled with what he says in Capita de caritate, where it is stated that Being and Eternal being is given to the essence of the creature, while Goodness and Wisdom are given to what he calls “the gnomic aptitude” (τῇ γνωμικῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι)?51 The latter saying suggests that Goodness, which, as we have seen, comprises Virtue, is something we need to achieve through effort as human goodness and virtue, and not something that is already possessed. Is there an inconsistency here? Maximus offers an explanation to this (in my opinion) apparent inconsistency. In Disputatio cum Pyrrho, he claims that not all 47  Many

have written on the “gnomic will”; see for instance the classical treatment by L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, Chicago, 1995, pp. 211–30. 48  Car. 3.25, PG 90, 1024b-c. 49  Th.Oec. 1.49, PG 90, 1101a. 50  D.P. PG 91, 309b. 51  Car. 3.25, PG 90, 1024b-c.

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human beings practice what is natural, but if they did, we would be able to see one virtue in all.52 This suggests that the divine activities of Goodness and Virtue are a naturally implanted power but that it is up to us to execute this power practically. This may explain that Goodness and Wisdom are given to the “gnomic aptitude”. If human beings adjust their lives in accordance with their logoi of being and well-being, then they become apt to manifest internally and externally the natural endowment of Goodness. Living discordant with the will of God obstructs the possibility of manifesting this particular divine gift. However, even if the power is “natural” it is not a property that is essentially participated. The two properties of Being and Eternal Being, on the other hand, are given to the created essence.53 This must mean that they cannot be lost whether one lives in accordance with or discordant with the divine logoi. The divine activity as Being and Eternal Being is always present. The divine activity as Goodness (comprising Virtue) is also always present, but in this case it depends on the human being whether this activity shall have any scope for manifestation internally and externally. There remains for us to comment on a couple of issues that emerged above. (1) How exactly does Maximus think of participation? (2) The divine works without beginning issue from God’s essence and are not manifested only for the making of creatures. Even so, does not this imply that the created world is eternal? Ad (1): In Plato’s Parmenides, Parmenides, the main interlocutor, examines the problem of participation in conversation with the young Socrates. The problem is whether several entities may participate in a unitary Form without the Form losing its unity. The discussion reaches the conclusion that a Form is split up if participated in by many things:54 “Then, said he [Parmenides], the Forms themselves, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each Form.” One could suggest that Plato solves the problem in 52 

D.P. PG 91, 309b. Car. 3.25, PG 90, 1024b-c. 54  For this problem, cf. the whole sequence in Plato, Parmenides 130e–131c. The problem is explained in Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology, p. 194. 53 

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his Timaeus, when he lets his Creator-God (or lower divinities) create cosmic order and cosmic beings by making them from a paradigm. 55 The point is that a demiurgic divinity acts as efficient cause and creates images of an eternal paradigm. It will be like an artisan that produces a series of material items from a preconceived pattern in his mind. In a Christian context, this particular problem of participation is solved in a similar way. Maximus’ God contemplates the equivalents of the Forms, namely His own eternal logoi of creatures. As we saw in Chapter 4 above, creatures are made as images of these divine logoi. As far as I can see, Maximus nowhere states that created beings participate in the logoi as such. Participation is in the divine activity, and, I claim, this does not make a new problem of participation. 56 The divine power of “creating, preserving, and judging creatures”, is an activity that is executed in creatures and that is present in them. 57 This active divine presence keeps beings in being. By analogy, an artist creates (in a sense) a work of art, but the analogy breaks down since he may die but the work may still exist. Not so in the case of the created cosmos. Creation cannot exist without the continuous presence of God’s activity. If that is taken away, the world collapses into nothing. One could say, therefore, that there is no created being (or existence), by which beings are. Beings are beings because of the continuous presence of the divine activity of Being with all its manifold content. Ad (2): If there is an internal divine activity that is the essence of God, and if this internal activity is eternally manifest as an external activity, why are creatures not eternal? We touched upon this problem at the end of Chapter 3 above as well. There seems to be a couple of challenges here. The first has to do with the meaning of the internal/external concepts and the second is about the recent creation of the world. Maximus does not use the terminology of internal/external activity, but the concepts are definitely present, as shown in this chapter. There is no possibility to avoid putting the problem in 55 

Timaeus 29e–30d, cf. 41a-d. is an aspect of my argument in Tollefsen, Activity and Participation. 57  Car. 1.100, PG 90, 984a. 56  This

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awkward words: before the creation there is only God. There is no “surrounding” otherness. There is God and nothing else. However, I cannot see that what is “around” God, His properties, or works without beginning, create any major problem. Even if there is only God, God’s essence is eternally manifest in properties that are essential yet not essence. On the other hand, since the divine power of “creating, preserving, and judging creatures” is eternally “around” God, how can Maximus claim that creation is “recent”?58 As we saw in the chapter on creation, Maximus seeks the solution in the divine will. God is Creator from all eternity but creatures are brought into being recently, when God wills, at the appropriate time for them to be created.59 Even if these words (“recently”, “at the appropriate time”) ascribe temporal properties to God, the nature of the case is different. How shall we state it? Maybe we could say that God wanted eternally that something other than God should originate with a temporal beginning of existence. This saying is, maybe, not completely satisfactory and it shows how difficult it is to describe the transition from eternal being to temporal acts. Besides, I should like to mention that even if Maximus claims a recent creation, this does not answer the challenge I discussed in the last part of Chapter 3, whether God could have decided not to make the world.

58 Cf. Car.

4.5, PG 90, 1048d. 7, PG 91, 1081a and Car. 4.4, PG 90, 1048d.

59 Cf. Amb.Ioh.

6. Universals Few people have investigated St Maximus doctrine of the universal.1 I claim that this is an essential part of his metaphysics or Christocentric cosmology. We have seen above how God institutes the universe as a cosmos founded on the divine logoi. We have also seen how God distributes His external activity in accordance with these logoi. My topic below is to investigate the intricate yet essential structure that results from God’s creative activity. Even if we cannot identify many of Maximus’ philosophical sources, it is obvious that there is a philosophical background for what he says about the universal, and it is interesting to compare his thought with the theories of others, since we then should be able to situate him within the context of late ancient philosophy. This brings us into some quite technical matters philosophically. In Maximus the Confessor the divine logoi are the primary set of principles behind the founding of the cosmos. There is, however, another set of structures that answers to the logoi, namely the cosmic arrangement into wholes and parts. The logoi are the divine acts of will by which God makes this whole/part-arrangement. These wholes and parts are genera, species and particulars that we find in the cosmic building. I call the doctrine of such a cosmic arrangement holomerism, from the Greek words for whole

1 I

have published the following papers on this topic, “The Concept of the Universal in the Philosophy of St Maximus the Confessor”, in A. Lévy, P. Annala, O. Hallamaa, T. Lankila, eds, The Architecture of the Cosmos, St Maximus the Confessor, New Perspectives, Helsinki, 2015, “A Metaphysics of Holomerism”, in S. Mitralexis, G. Steiris, N. Podbielski, S. Lalla, eds, Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher, Eugene, Oregon, 2017. There is also a section about this topic in my “Christocentric Cosmology”, in P. Allen, B. Neil, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2015, pp.  316–19. There are few other studies of this concept, but cf. S. Mateiescu, “The doctrine of immanent realism in Maximus the Confessor”, in P. G. Pavlos, L. F. Janby, E. K. Emilsson, T. T. Tollefsen Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity, London and New York, 2019, pp.  201–19.

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and part, ὅλος and μέρος.2 My claim is that according to Maximus, the cosmos is made metaphysically and ontologically as a whole-part system or structure. When we move into the texts, we find that he is acquainted with a certain late antique reception and interpretation of the Aristotelian Categories. It is obvious to me that Maximus not only knew — something most learned persons did at that time — but applied the basics of the Porphyrian logic of the Isagoge. We shall highlight this below. The Universal The term universal brings to mind the notion of a concept that is somehow gathered through experience of several particulars and made into a kind of rule for the application or predication of a general term, for instance “the human being is a rational animal”. If any being in the world answers to the criteria of animality and rationality, then we may predicate the term human being of it. Conceived thus, universals are dependent on human thought, since they are gathered from entities through a process of sensation and abstraction. However, this is not how Maximus (primarily) thinks of the universal. In the history of philosophy universals have been understood in many different ways. One naturally thinks of the problem of universals in Western medieval thought with different positions (as modern scholars classify them) like ultra-realism, moderate realism, conceptualism, nominalism, etc. The topic brings immediately with it the topic of (universal) genera and species, and this again brings with it the topic of wholes and parts — particulars being parts of a species, species being parts of a genus. What are the late antique doctrines of the universal? According to Sorabji, the history of the subject after Plato “is for a long time a history of ‘deflation’ of the status of the universals”. 3 I suppose this verdict depends on how one reads the material. On Sorabji’s view, this history of deflation begins with Platonic Forms and moves on to Aristotle’s concept of “what is of a nature 2 This term, not the exact content, is borrowed from my old teacher in philosophy, professor emeritus E. A. Wyller, Enhet og Annethet, Oslo, 1981, p. 229, who uses it in his interpretations of Platonism. 3 R. Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, volume 3, London, 2004, p. 129.

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to be predicated of several things”.4 In the Metaphysics Aristotle says the universal is a kind of whole and is called universal since it contains many things (πολλὰ περιέχον) and is predicated of each them.5 The notion develops into a lot of different positions in Hellenistic and late antique philosophy. In some of these the universal is simply held to be mind-dependent and in others it still retains the status of being “something”, similar to a Platonic Form, in the intelligible or sensible realm. We shall not go through the history of the concept in all its details, since that would require (at least) a book of its own, and is not much relevant here. However, we shall sketch some aspects of this history that seem to be of relevance for our present topic, and we shall compare Maximus’ thinking on the universal with some material from the philosophical tradition. Philosophical Background An important development starts with Porphyry. It is therefore natural to quote from his famous Isagoge, where he says he will avoid deeper questions and focus on what is simpler: For example, about genera and species — whether they subsist, whether they actually depend on bare thought alone, whether if they actually subsist they are bodies or incorporeal and whether they are separable or are in perceptible items and subsist about them — these matters I shall decline to discuss, such a subject being very deep and demanding another and larger investigation. 6

Here there are listed no less than five possible different views on the universal: concepts depending on thought, subsisting bodies, subsisting incorporeal entities, separable entities, and items immanent in things.7 We have seen in Chapter 4 that the so-called Porphyrian tree is important in Maximus’ cosmology. The Porphyrian 4 

De interpretatione chapter 7, 17a 39–40. Metaphysics book Δ, chapter 26, 1023b29–32. 6 Porphyry, Introduction, transl. by J. Barnes, Oxford, 2008, p. 3; cf. Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, edidit A. Busse, Berlin 1887 (CAG IV.I), p. 1. 7  Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, volume 3, pp. 133–35, thinks he can identify seven different kinds of universal in ancient thought. 5 

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tree classifies what is said of things ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, i.e. what is said essentially of beings. According to Porphyry, Aristotle’s Categories is not about things but about the words that are used to signify things (περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν τῶν πραγμάτων).8 However, in Maximus’ case it seems obvious that genera and species are not just “what is said of something” but belong to the world of beings. This is clearly present in Ambiguum 7, when he speaks of creation. Maximus says God made all things visible and invisible, and he goes on:9 “By His word (logos) and His wisdom (sophia) He created and continues to create all things (τὰ πάντα) — universals as well as particulars (τὰ καθόλου τε καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον) — at the appropriate time.” It is important to notice that both universals and particulars are creatures. This juxtaposition would be rather strange if he here was talking of universals as terms and concepts in the human mind. One might also wonder if Maximus’ division of creatures into visible and invisible indicates that particulars belong to the former while universals belong to the latter. On the other hand, invisible creatures might just be angels. Ammonius’ student Simplicius (c.  480–560) holds a view that is quite representative for late antique Neoplatonism. In his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories he says: Perhaps one should take ‘common item’ (koinon) in three ways, the first transcending the individuals and being the cause of the common item in them in virtue of its single nature, as it is also the cause of the difference in virtue of its pre-encompassing many species. For example, in virtue of the single nature of animal the first animal, i.e. Animal-Itself, endows all animals with the common item they share, and in virtue of its pre-encompassing the different species it establishes the different species of animals. The second common item is the one that the different species are endowed with by their common cause and which resides in them, like the one in each animal. The third is the common feature established in our thought by means of abstraction, which is later-born and most of all admits of the notion of the non-differentiated and common feature.10 8 Porphyrii

Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, p. 57. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1080a. 10 Simplicius, On Aristotle Categories 5–6, transl. by F. De Haas, B. Fleet, London, 2013, p. 24; Simplicii In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, edidit C.  Kalbfleisch, Berlin, 1907 (CAG VIII), pp. 82–3. 9 

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There are at least four things of interest here: first, we have the existence of intelligible genera like Animal-Itself comprising different intelligible and sensible species. Animal-Itself probably belongs to the even higher genus of Essence (οὐσία). Secondly, this Animal-Itself is not only an item in the intelligible world; it is the cause of the common nature of the particulars. We should also note that this cause is causative of the difference between different species of animals. I cannot see that this first item represents any deflation of the universal. Thirdly, there is talk of a common item caused by the intelligible genera and shared by the particulars. This item resides in the particulars as a unity in each animal and may therefore probably be identified as an enmattered Form or an immanent universal. Fourthly, there is the kind of universal that is abstracted from the particulars and exists in the mind of the knower. Now, the description of universal genera comprising species seems to suggest an intelligible Porphyrian tree. Since this is causative of sensible nature one might wonder if the internal reality of cosmic becoming is not a Porphyrian tree as well, that is a created one. It seems reasonable to conclude from what Simplicius says that the intelligible Animal-Itself is the paradigm of sensible genera and species of animals, and that its arrangement is reflected in the created world. However, one should very much have liked to know exactly how the higher genera may act as causes for sensible things. Already Porphyry says that if the genus or the difference is destroyed the things under them are destroyed as well; something that suggests particulars to be causally dependent on what is intelligible.11 However, Porphyry does not elaborate on this point. According to Dexippus (early fourth century), probably of Iamblichus’ school, there are three levels of substance or essence (οὐσία), namely (1) the single genus of essence in the intelligible realm that is the source of being both to (2) incorporeal Forms and to (3) Forms in matter.12 Once again there is a causal dependence of the lower on the higher. In the end all being depends on the first originating principle, the One.13 In that case, the problem of causality is 11 Porphyrii

Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, p. 15. In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, edidit A. Busse, Berlin, 1888 (CAG IV.II), pp. 40–41. 13 Dexippi In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, p. 41. 12 Dexippi

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pushed even further into the highest realm of the Neoplatonic hierarchy. Ammonius, Proclus’ student, is a key figure teaching the Alexandrian generation of Simplicius and Philoponus. Verrycken tries to reconstruct Ammonius’ metaphysics from other ancient sources and states that the Demiurge “produces the sensible world on the basis of logoi, universal ideas, which flow from the henad”.14 If Verrycken’s reconstruction is correct, the universal logoi that are the conditions for the existence of a sensible cosmos stem from the highest principle, but are received in the demiurgic Intellect that is the cause of the sensible world. These universal logoi would then be equivalent to Platonic Forms as creative logoi in the divine mind. It is, however, still not easy to find out how the causal mechanism functions. Maybe some light may be shed on the causal mechanism if we turn to Ammonius’ teacher, Proclus (411–485). There is a lot to be found in Proclus’ writings on the relations between the levels of reality, but it is not easy to find out exactly how causes work in the institution of the sensible realm. This can be made more precise: in Plotinus one finds the causal mechanism behind “emanation” in the doctrine of double activity. In the intelligible hierarchy we find that, for instance, the Intellect has an essential internal activity that is the source of an external activity. Even if this doctrine is quite difficult to grasp, it intuitively gives some sense. One finds something similar in Proclus’ Elements of Theology. In proposition 35 we have the famous saying that “Every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and reverts upon it”.15 The remaining of a higher entity seems to indicate a certain fullness of being that proceeds towards the making of what is below it in the scale of being. Proclus talks of a certain completeness that is productive (παρακτικόν) according to its nature.16 He also adds that “every productive cause produces its consequents while itself remaining steadfast”.17 Does this shed some light on how Proclus thinks causality works? If we can accept the idea 14 K. Verrycken, “The metaphysics of Ammonius son of Hermeias”, in R. Sorabji, ed., Aristotle transformed, London, 1990, pp. 208–09. 15 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. by E. R. Dodds, Oxford, 2004, pp.  38–39. 16 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, pp. 28–29 (proposition 25). 17 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, pp.  30–31 (proposition 26).

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that the completeness of the cause consists in a kind of goodness, then it seems that Proclus thinks something like Plotinus’ internal activity goes on “inside” it. This activity, that is a kind of remaining in itself, manifests itself in an external activity that culminates in the constitution of the next level. An image could illustrate this: the internal activity (process) of fire has heating as a surrounding external activity. I admit the result of this short exposition is rather meagre. What is brought forth is mainly that a kind of natural process goes on without any willed external result on behalf of the cause. The exact role of divine will is a quite obscure topic in late antique philosophy, but we know that the will of the One plays an important role according to Plotinus, and we should think Proclus as well would see the will of the creator God as playing a role in his system. As we have seen in the chapter on creation above, the highest Neoplatonist divinities are not held to be the direct causes of a world with a temporal beginning. In Maximus’ Christian metaphysics this is quite different: God as efficient cause is held to create a cosmos that came into being a definite number of time-units ago. Created beings do not depend causally on universal species and genera simply as such for their existence, but they depend on the divine logoi as acts of divine will. At least this particular causal claim, even if it contains difficulties, is clearer than the above. Maximus admits the divinity’s eternal contemplation of what would be an ordered system of genera and species. The Porphyrian Tree The logoi, as we saw in Chapters 3 and 4 above, have two aspects, namely they are both principles of knowledge and principles of making. As principles of knowledge they are what God knows eternally and it would be very strange if God did not contemplate the whole of created being in an orderly fashion eternally. As principles of making the logoi become acts of will, by which creatures are brought forth from non-being. Creatures therefore depend causally on the divine mind that acts in accordance with itself. There exists, therefore, something answering to Simplicius’ first notion of “common item” even if it has a dual nature, namely what God contemplates and what God wills. It is, however, important to distinguish between this double functioning of the logoi. As we saw

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in the chapter on creation, nothing follows causally from God just contemplating His own mind. God made an ordered cosmos. There is, in Maximus, something that corresponds with the second common item according to Simplicius as well, namely that which resides in creatures, “like the one in each animal”. Simplicius thinks of something like an Aristotelian enmattered Form, and it seems that Maximus nurtured such a doctrine as well. In Ambiguum 10 he speaks of God giving Form to creatures and in Capita de caritate he says that sensible beings consist of matter and Form.18 There cannot be any doubt if one reads the below quotation from Ambiguum 10 that the world of creatures is ordered in a way that suggests a Porphyrian tree like the one we find in Simplicius. But neither of these are ordinary Porphyrian trees, at least not if the Porphyrian tree is a classification of “things said” and a systematic way to make definitions. However, the following passage from Ambiguum 10 strongly suggests both something like a Porphyrian tree and that this tree is the basic feature of the created world: But that which is simply called essence (οὐσία) itself is not only [the essence] of those things subject to generation and corruption, moved in accordance with generation and corruption, but also [the essence] of all beings whatever that have been moved and are moved in accordance with the logos and mode of expansion and contraction. For it is moved from the most generic genus through the more generic genera to the species, by which and in which it is naturally divided, proceeding down to the most specific species, by [a process of] expansion, circumscribing its being towards what is below, and again it is gathered together from the most specific species, moving back through the more generic genera, up to the most generic genus, by [a process of] contraction, defining its being towards what is above. Thus it is circumscribed either way, either from above or from below, and is shown as possessing both beginning and end, not at all capable being defined by infinity.19 Ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἁπλῶς λεγομένη “οὐσία”, οὐ μόνον ἡ τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ κατὰ γένεσιν κινεῖται καὶ φθοράν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων καὶ κεκίνηται καὶ κινεῖται τῷ κατὰ διαστολὴν καὶ συστολὴν λογῷ τε καὶ τρόπῳ. Κινεῖται γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ γενικωτάτου γένους διὰ τῶν γενικωτέρων γενῶν εἰς τὰ 18  19 

Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1184a and Car. 3. 30, PG 90,  1025d–1028a. Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1177b-c.

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εἴδη, δι’ ὧν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖσθαι πέφυκε, προϊοῦσα μέχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων εἰδῶν οἷς περατοῦται ἡ κατ’ αὐτὴν διαστολή, τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς πρὸς τὰ κάτω περιγράφουσα, καὶ συνάγεται πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων εἰδῶν διὰ τῶν γενικωτέρων ἀναποδίζουσα μέχρι τοῦ γενικωτάτου γένους, ᾧ περατοῦται ἡ κατ’ αὐτὴν συστολὴ, πρὸς τὸ ἄνω τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς ὁρίζουσα, καὶ λοιπὸν διχόθεν περιγραφομένη, ἄνωθέν τε λέγω καὶ κάτωθεν, ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἔχουσα δείκνυται, τὸν τῆς ἀπειρίας οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐπιδέξασθαι δυναμένη λόγον.

There are three important terms here: οὐσία, διαστολή, and συστολή. It is reasonable to translate οὐσία as essence in this context; and this essence should be understood in a hierarchical way, from most universal to the most specific kind. It is interesting to note the terminology of “above and below” (ἄνωθέν τε λέγω καὶ κάτωθεν) which definitely suggests a diagram similar to a Porphyrian tree. Essence is taken as the essence of beings that are subject to generation and corruption, and in general as essence that is subject to a particular kind of movement, namely the “movement” of cosmic expansion through a system of levels of generic and specific being. There can be no doubt about it: these universal genera and species belong to the world of creatures, and we saw above that God makes universals as well as particulars.20 However, it is interesting to see that in the present text there is no mention of particulars. Actually the expansive process stops at the level of the most specific species (τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος) that, according to Porphyry, is the lowest species “after which there will be no other subordinate species”.21 It is rather surprising that the expansion stops at the lowest level of universality and not at the level of the particulars. We may wonder why that is so. One possibility is that since he describes the expansion and contraction of essence, the lowest level of essence is the specific species, which is the essence of all particulars that it contains. An implication of this is that there is no essence of the particular being or the individual as such. Even if that may sound ontologically reasonable, we have to return to it below.

20 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1080a. Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, p. 4; translation in Porphyry, Introduction, p. 5. 21 Porphyrii

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There is one thing that should strike one as rather strange in this quotation, namely what is meant by “movement” here? Why describe expansion and contraction of essence as movement? It is very unlikely that essence is subject to a kind of process of emanation, as if a higher genus generated its species. I suggest that what is intended is to design a metaphysical “map” of the cosmos as a kind of distribution or expansion and contraction of essence. Movement is, therefore, just another term for the expansive and contractive activity instituted by God. God has “moved” the system into its proper order. Maximus prefers to talk of expansion and contraction (διαστολή and συστολή) since what he focuses on is the movements (and not the classification) of created beings. The kind of movement that is emphasized here cannot be any kind of movement, but the basic cosmic dynamics of pluralisation and unification, which answers to a certain duality in the unified divine purpose for the cosmos, namely (1) the creation of a manifold realm of beings and (2) the salvation of this same realm. Creation and salvation are not two separate or unrelated divine acts but constitute rather one original divine purpose with a dual aspect for all of being: they are created in a certain “natural” state from which they shall “move” into transformation. What Maximus describes is not a traditional division but rather how the created cosmos is ordered hierarchically with a view to unity and plurality, not in the static sense, but dynamically. Below we shall have to turn to other texts, however, to show more clearly how this works. It seems a reasonable interpretation that what Simplicius called the “one” (see above) in creatures is the immanent or enmattered Form that makes an entity what it is and places it within a taxonomy. In Maximus’ cosmic model the Form or essence clearly situates each being within a taxonomy. We should focus a bit more on the topic of the immanent form or immanent universal.22 The terminology of form and matter does not seem to be very prominent in patristic authors. The reason is 22  For the important concept of immanent realism, see S. Mateiescu, “The doctrine of immanent realism in Maximus the Confessor”, in P. G. Pavlos, L. F. Janby, E. K. Emilsson, T. T. Tollefsen, eds, Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity, London and New York, 2019, pp. 201–19.

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probably that their ontological vocabulary is mainly developed in connection with theological and Christological controversies that made room for a different terminology, namely of essence, nature, and hypostasis. The concepts of essence and hypostasis are quite close to the concept of form. Form and matter belong to the tradition of metaphysics and in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 7 the form is the primary ousia of an entity. In De anima book 2 we find that form is substance as the ἐντελέχεια.23 This primary ousia is what makes the entity be what it is and it comes thus quite close to ousia as essence in Christological debates. However, there are maybe some differences. In Aristotelian scholarship there has been a disagreement as to whether the enmattered form is particular or universal. When the form or eidos is considered in separation from matter it is conceived as a universal and one usually translates the term as species. When the form is enmattered there are many scholars claiming that it is particular.24 I must admit, though, that I find it hard to believe that the form is particular as such. The texts are not extremely clear on this and in the end I suppose the reading of the sources depends on what one thinks the purpose of the form-matter conception is. I am tempted to stick to the traditional doctrine that the form is the constitutive principle of an entity and is as such universal, but when enmattered the total entity, not the form as such, is particularized because of matter. If this is the case, then one comes rather close to the Cappadocian concept of an entity as an essence with properties. It is not very clear what role matter plays in the Cappadocian model, but what is clear is that an entity becomes particularized by the addition of so-called idiomata. This means that the essence is constitutive of an entity that because of the sum total of added properties is an hypostasis. The essence as such is thereafter only available through intellectual vision or contemplation. We may quote St Basil as a witness to this idea:25 “For this reason, in 23 

De anima book 2, chapter 1, 412a6–11. Witt, Substance and Essence in Aristotle, Ithaca, New York, 1989, pp.  175–79. 25 St Basil of Cesarea, Against Eunomius, transl. by M. DelCogliano, A.  Radde-Gallwitz, Washington, DC, 2011 (The Fathers of the Church Volume 122), p. 134. Greek text in Basil de Césarée, Contre Eunome II, ed. B. Sesboüé, G.-M. de Durand, L. Doutreleau, Paris, 1982 (SC 299), p. 18. 24  Cf. C.

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most respects we are the same as one another, but it is only due to the distinguishing marks considered in connection with each one of us that we are different, each from the other” (Διόπερ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐσμέν· τοῖς δὲ ἰδιώμασι μόνοις τοῖς ἕκαστον θεωρουμένοις ἕτερος ἑτέρου διενηνόχαμεν). There is a tendency in some modern theological works to write as if hypostasis is some additional “thing” over above the essence, which I find a bit absurd. The essence is basically what something is and hypostasis is nothing but the situated being of the essence. If this interpretation of the philosophical tradition is correct, the terminology of essence or nature takes the place of the terminology of (Aristotelian) form as constitutive for a being as an entity in time and place. The enmattered form or the essence of an hypostasis is then an instantiation of a specific kind of essential being and this species belongs again to a genus and so on. Then the question arises about what status these species and genera have ontologically. We have now seen that according to Maximus there is (1) divine knowledge of creatures in the logoi and, answering to these, (2) the essential structure of created beings. What about universal species and genera? I claim that they belong to the second point, namely the sphere of creatures, but how? According to Maximus, God created and creates both particulars and universals.26 The “created and creates” points to the fact that God did not just make the cosmos in the past, but the Godhead continues to create beings in accordance with the logoi. The most important thing to notice now is that universals are created beings. We shall now return to the passage that was quoted above from the tenth Ambiguum.27 The hierarchical order Maximus describes suggests the following scheme: Essence itself, namely the most generic genus The more generic genera The species The most specific species

The text does not explicitly say that essence is the most generic genus, but it seems quite reasonable (and logical) that this is the 26  27 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1080a. Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1177b-c.

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case. The more generic genera are, to use Porphyrian terminology, species that themselves are genera, namely in the sense that they are the species of higher genera and the genera for species below them. When it comes to the two lowest levels in the hierarchy one wonders, are they different or identical? A species at this level is generally a class that is not a genus, which means that it is the class that contains particulars. Porphyry defines the most specific species as the lowest species “after which there will be no other subordinate species”.28 There is nothing in the text of Ambiguum 10 that suggests the most specific species to be anything else, for instance particulars, and Maximus does not give us any hint as to how it should be either different from or identical with the species that are mentioned before it. If we interpret the Maximian text according to the customs of the philosophical schools, I suppose they should be taken as identical. However, the later St John of Damascus gives an interesting classification of division into division, redivision, and subdivision.29 Subdivision is presented as a further division of a species: if animal (genus) is divided into rational (animal) and irrational (animal) that will be the species, rational may be divided into mortal (rational animal) and immortal (rational animal). These latter will result from a subdivision and are, maybe, most specific species. We do not know if Maximus could have had such things in mind, but it strikes me as not impossible. It is rather dissatisfactory not to be able to solve this riddle. Maximus says the distribution of being in the system of cosmic taxonomy has two limitations, namely towards what is below (κάτωθεν) and towards what is above (ἄνωθεν). Of course, the terminology of above and below is metaphorical for something that belongs to the inner structure of being. Beyond the limit below there is nothing at all and beyond the limit above there is only God. The realm of being is “between” these two limits bound to 28 Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, p. 4; translation in Porphyry, Introduction, p. 5. 29  Dialectica in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos I, Institutio elementaris, Capita philosophica (Dialectica), besorgt von Bonifatius Kotter, Berlin, 1969 (Patristische Texte und Studien Band 7), p. 64; translation in Saint John of Damascus, Writings, transl. F. H. Chase, Washington, DC, 1970 (first published in 1958) (The Fathers of the Church Volume 37), p. 20.

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the dynamic system of cosmic expansion and contraction. Maximus says that the scale of being, when it is circumscribed thus from above and below, “plainly has a beginning and an end” and cannot be defined by infinity (ἀπειρία). 30 What is the beginning and end (ἀρχή and τέλος) he talks of here and what does he have in mind when he denies infinity? Clearly, what has beginning and end cannot be infinite. 31 However, do beginning and end refer to the time of the world, to the number of beings in it, or to its quantitative extension? If the terms are to be understood temporally, the denial of infinitude must mean that the world-system has a temporal beginning and a temporal end and that the number of time-units in between is measurable and limited. In a temporally limited cosmos, i.e. in a cosmos with a temporal beginning and end, infinitely many creatures are impossible. A denial of temporal infinity could imply a denial of an infinite number of things. As we saw in the chapter on creation, Maximus holds that the cosmos has a temporal beginning and is finite by nature. As such it has no room for an infinite number of beings. It is also quite clear that between beginning and end there could only be a limited quantitative extension. Maximus denies, like most antique and late antique thinkers, the existence of an infinite cosmos. The discussion of this central passage from Ambiguum 10 has initially sketched the outlines of the framework of cosmic being or the system of the metaphysical structure of the world. The cosmos is made a unity-in-plurality. We shall investigate some additional texts where Maximus talks generally of the relationship between God and creatures before we investigate the holomeristic character of the created world. In Mystagogia chapter 1 we see clearly the providential character of the cosmic fabric and how its metaphysical structure is basically instituted with a view to the salvation and transformation of all being. The Mystagogia contains a contemplation of the church and the liturgy. The first chapter tells that the church is an image and figure of God. What is striking is that about half the chapter is purely cosmological while the last part is eccle30 

Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1177c. in Aristotelian and Neoplatonic physics one may claim that a material thing, like a brick, may in principle be infinitely divisible, but this kind of infinitude is most probably not what is denied above. 31  However,

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siological and soteriological without dropping the cosmological aspect completely. The church, Maximus says, has the same activity (ἐνέργεια) as God. In the infinite power of the divinity God contains all creatures, gathers (i.e. brings together), and circumscribes (συνέχει καὶ συνάγει καὶ περιγράφει) them, binding both intelligible and sensible beings providentially to Himself and to one another. The church on its part effects unity among human beings that differ in a lot of respects. In this unifying activity the church is an image of God and serves the divine purpose of creation and salvation. This statement contains a lot of information. (1) How does God contain all things? Probably God contains the All in the sense that the Godhead possesses all the principles or logoi of beings in eternal contemplation. 32 (2) How does God gather all beings? The Godhead gathers all beings into unity in the ἐπιστροφή. Procession (πρόοδος) and conversion (ἐπιστροφή) are two terms used by the Neoplatonists to describe certain causal connections in their system. I discussed these in Chapter 4. In Maximus they denote the two processes of creation and salvation. 33 It seems reasonable to interpret conversion as a release of the inherent potential of the natural world so that the contraction discussed above may be actualized. The contractive character of the cosmic manifold, its “movement” towards unity, is realized in the movement of conversion of all beings to God. (3) How does God circumscribe all creatures? Since Maximus is not very specific in the text, we again have more than one possibility: (a) does he talk of the circumscription or limitation of the totality of cosmic beings or (b) about the limitation and structuring of each creature? If he talks of the totality of beings, then he probably claims that God controls this totality ontologically: there is nothing that does not have God as its Maker and Provider. The totality is circumscribed providentially. If he talks of particular creatures he probably indicates that these are by divine will ontologically structured in such a way that a definite course is prescribed for them. (However, even if that is so, rational creatures may disobey the natural course.) In the beginning

32 Cf. Amb.Ioh. 33 

22, PG 91, 1257a. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081b-c.

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there was only God, and God as Creator brought into being a delimited (i.e. circumscribed) otherness. In the divine containment and gathering of or in the circumscription of creatures, God binds (ἐνδιασφίγγει) intelligible and sensible creatures to one another and to Himself. This “binding” is interesting, what exactly does it mean? There is one more question: what is meant with “intelligible beings”? We shall address the last question first. Maximus distinguishes between τὰ νοητά and τὰ αἰσθητά. The sense of the latter term is obvious: it denotes all sensible beings, substances, qualities, quantities, etc. The former term probably denotes intelligible entities, in casu angelic beings. We turn to the first question: what, then, does it mean that God binds intelligible and sensible beings to one another and to Himself? The words that follow in Mystagogia’s first chapter sheds some more light on these relationships: […] steering around Himself as cause, principle, and end all things which are by nature distant from one another, as principle He makes them converge in each other by the power of their relationship [to Him]. Through this [power] He leads all things to an identity of movement and subsistence [that is] incorrupt and unconfused, no one being originally in revolt against any other or separated by a difference of nature and movement, but all things combine with all others in an unconfused way by the singular indissoluble relation to and protection of the single principle and cause […]. 34 […] καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸν ὡς αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχήν καὶ τέλος πάντα περικρατῶν, τὰ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα κατὰ μίαν τὴν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς ἀρχήν, σχέσεως δύναμιν ἀλλήλοις συννενευκότα ποῖει· καθ’ ἣν εἰς ταυτότητα κινήσεως τε καὶ ὑπάρξεως ἀδιάφορόν τε καὶ ἀσύγχυτον ἄγεται τὰ πάντα, πρὸς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς τῶν ὄντων προηγουμένως κατὰ φύσεως διαφορὰν ἢ κινήσεως στασιάζοντός τε καὶ διαιρουμένου, πάντων πᾶσι κατὰ τήν μίαν τῆς μόνης ἀρχῆς καὶ αἰτίας ἀδιάλυτον σχέσιν τε καὶ φρουρὰν ἀφύρτως συμπεφυκότων […].

We shall make our comments point by point: Maximus says that beings that are distant from one another by nature are made to 34 

Myst., CCSG 69, p. 11.

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converge in each other by their relationship to God. This probably refers to the grand cosmic scheme that we are acquainted with from above, namely the “movements” of contraction and conversion. We have also suggested that this grand scheme has two aspects, namely (1) a cosmological and (2) a soteriological one. These two aspects cannot be separated. The cosmological aspect shows all beings as established in a system that preserves their essential integrity. The divine logoi of beings secure this. As preserved in their integrity beings are distant or different from one another. On the other hand — and here we meet what I shall call the “holomeristic” structure of creation below — beings converge in each other. Cosmologically this should be taken in the sense that the contractive “movement” is manifested in practice: the potentiality of different creatures that are naturally related to each other is actualized. But the “identity” they finally achieve in this process of contractive movement is unconfused: in this identity of movement and subsistence each creature remains what it is essentially — even when it is granted the gift of glorification or deification. We shall return to this notion of “identity of movement and subsistence” below. We shall also investigate the ontology of deification in Chapter 7, on Incarnation and deification. Human beings may not be able to map the inventory of the world in a Porphyrian tree (or a taxonomic system), but God eternally contemplates the whole system and how beings are interrelated. The chapter from Mystagogia offers a brief sketch of the cosmic order as unity-in-plurality. The other aspect of this is that the cosmic arrangement has soteriological implications: beings are made as different, but the divine purpose behind this arrangement is that they should achieve a unification that would culminate in the glorification or deification of all creatures. The divine power, invested in the cosmic relations of all creatures to God, facilitates the soteriological conversion of creatures. Beings in the cosmic fabric depend on God for their being, well-being, and eternal well-being. Beings are not separated from God. Everything they achieve is because of the “indissoluble relation to and protection of the single principle and cause”. Even if beings are made for the purpose of conversion and rational creatures are meant to cooperate with God, creatures do not possess of themselves any power to move towards God. The cosmic conversion and contraction depend

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on the ontological and metaphysical structure of the cosmos and cannot be achieved without it. Outside of this structure there is nothing at all, no essence, power, or activity. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the desired end-product is not achieved without human effort: free human activity has to be in accordance with the cosmic “logic” if the transformation of the individual human being is to be reached in the church, the body of Christ. We read that “all things combine with all others in an unconfused way by the singular indissoluble relation to and protection of the single principle and cause”. How exactly do all things combine with all others? In Ambiguum 41 Maximus describes one additional hierarchical scheme. 35 He says that all beings, according to their true logos, “fall together with one another”. 36 Then follows a sequence in which he sketches the whole and part dynamics. (I quote this sequence in the next section below.) Maximus describes the Logos Himself as the basic collective principle of the cosmos. He describes a hierarchy of genera as well as of logoi: the logoi of what is particular are contained by the logoi of what is universal and generic, and the more generic and universal logoi are held together by wisdom, while the logoi of particulars — that are contained in higher genera — are encompassed by prudence. Maximus eventually transfers both terms, prudence and wisdom, to Christ, since He is “the Wisdom and Prudence of God the Father”. 37 We should take notice of the talk of logoi of particulars, species, and genera. The logoi on the lower level are contained (περιέχονται) by the logoi on 35 

Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1312c–1313b. Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1312b. A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor, London, 1996 (The Early Church Fathers), translates ἀλλήλοις συνεμπίπτει with “have something in common with one another”, while Constas, in Maximos the Confessor, On Difficulties in the Church Fathers, The Ambigua, I–II, edited and translated by N. Constas, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 2014 (Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 28–29), translates “coincide with all the others”. I prefer “fall together with one another”. 37  E. D. Perl, Methexis, Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus the Confessor, Yale University, 1993 (dissertation), p. 169, claims that Christ is therefore the highest universal, but I disagree: I do not think this is what Maximus suggests. Rather he suggests that Christ is the highest personal source of all being. 36 

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the higher level and all is united in Christ. In Chapter 4, we saw that the logoi are contained in the Logos, and to call this a “containment” must be a way to say that these logoi are the thoughts of the Logos. What is suggested here, in Ambiguum 41, is that logoi of particulars are contained in logoi of species that again are contained by logoi of genera. And the logoi of genera are contained in the highest logoi that eventually are “in” the Logos. God has conceived or contemplated the whole plan of the cosmos. It is reasonable to think that what God contemplates is a systematically worked out pattern or a paradigm of the world. In that case, God contains in His divine contemplation a whole taxonomy of cosmic principles. Holomerism Here follows the text from Ambiguum 41 that I had in mind in the above interpretation. The quotation is rather extensive and it contains dense points that, hopefully, will bring us further into our topic: For all things that are distinguished from each other by virtue of their proper differences are generically united by their universal and common identities, and are drawn together to one and the same by a certain generic logos of nature, like genera that are united with each other according to essence, and possess one and the same and indivisible. For nothing that is universal and containing and generic, can be divided in any way into what is partial and contained and particular. For that which does not draw together things that are naturally separated is no longer able to be generic, but rather divided up together with them and so departs from its own individual unity. For everything generic, according to its proper logos, is wholly present, indivisibly and in the mode of unity, in the whole of those subordinate to it, and the particular is contemplated as a whole in the genus. Species, according to their genus, being released from variations grounded in difference, likewise admit of identity with each other. The individuals, finding agreement with each other according to their species, become completely one and the same with each other, since by virtue of their common origin and nature they are indistinguishable and free of all difference. Accidents, finally, possess unity because of the subject, where they are in no way scattered. 38 38 

Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1312c–1312d.

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universals Πάντα γὰρ τὰ ταῖς οἰκείαις ἰδίως διαφοραῖς ἀλλήλων διακεκριμένα ταῖς καθόλου καὶ κοιναῖς γενικῶς ταὐτότησιν ἥνωνται, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀλλήλοις γενικῷ τινι λόγῳ φύσεως συνωθοῦνται, οἷον τὰ μὲν γένη κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλήλοις ἑνούμενα τὸ ἓν ἔχει καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον. Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν καθόλου καὶ περιεχόντων καὶ γενικῶν τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ περιεχομένοις καὶ ἰδικοῖς παντελῶς συνδιαιρεῖται. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι γενικὸν εἶναι δύναται τὸ μὴ συνάγον τὰ διῃρημένα φυσικῶς, ἀλλὰ συνδιαιρούμενον αὐτοῖς, καὶ τῆς οἰκείας μοναδικῆς ἑνότητος ἐξιστάμενον. Πᾶν γὰρ γενικὸν κατὰ τὸν οἰκεῖον λόγον ὅλον ὅλοις ἀδιαιρέτως τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτὸ ἑνικῶς ἐνυπάρχει πραγματειωδῶς, καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον ὅλον ἐνθεωρεῖται γενικῶς. Τὰ δὲ ἔιδη κατὰ τὸ γένος ὡσαύτως τῆς ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ ποικιλίας ἀπολυθέντα τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα ταὐτότητα δέχεται. Τὰ ἄτομα δέ, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα δεχόμενα σύμβασιν, ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀλλήλοις πάντη καθέστηκε, τῇ ὁμοφυΐᾳ τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον ἔχοντα καὶ διαφορᾶς πάσης ἐλεύτερον. Τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀλλήλοις συγκριθέντα τὸ ἑνιαῖον ἔχει, τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ παντελῶς μὴ σκεδαννύμενον.

We may illustrate this section from the following way: Logos logoi genera species particulars It is clear that this text does not describe a map of definitions contained in the mind of the human observer, but rather it describes the created world as it is based on certain metaphysical structures and principles. It further does not describe the created world only as a piece of natural philosophy or metaphysics, but

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rather with a view to the practical, divine end of salvation. The context shows this clearly. However, it is wrong to separate the theoretical and the practical in Maximus’ philosophy. The cosmos as it is described in this quotation is an intricate system that challenges us to employ the technical vocabulary of philosophical and theological traditions to highlight it. We may summarize some of the main ideas in the following points: (1) There is a distinction between the logoi as principles of beings on the one hand, and beings that are instituted by them, namely genera, species, and particulars, on the other. (2) All created beings, on whatever level, have differences that distinguish them from one another horizontally. (3) Even if differentiated, created beings are collected together vertically in accordance with a system of species and genera. This system reaches its unification in a highest genus and everything is finally collected together in the one source of all differentiation and unification, i.e. Christ, the Logos. (4) Even if differentiated, no genus can be split up into the particulars it contains. This goes for all classes. (5) Even if differentiated, all beings (particulars as well as universals) have their essential unity, identity, and undivided character in the species (for particulars) or genus (for species) “above” them. (6) Every higher class exists as a whole, indivisibly and really, in the whole of those things subordinate to it.

A genus is a whole containing species and a species is a whole containing particulars. But it is also the other way around: the particular is a part containing the species as a whole and the species is a part containing the genus as a whole. The whole-part arrangement described here is of an essential nature. Maximus uses the terminology of difference, and in actual fact he makes use both of Porphyry’s διαφορὰ διαιρετική and of his διαφορὰ συστατική, i.e. the divisive difference and the constitutive difference. The highest genus is divided by divisive differences and the immediately emerging species are constituted on their level by these self-same differences. This means that each difference plays a double role, namely it divides the genus at the higher level and constitutes the species on the lower level.

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In short, God wills the world as a plurality of differentiated but interconnected beings. Even if beings exist as different, they are not separate from one another in an unlimited differentiation. Maximus obviously thinks that a class is not an abstraction that we use conveniently to group together entities that more or less are coincidentally similar to one another. A class is a created something that is not divided or split up. It exists as a complete whole. The whole species is instantiated in each particular, as the whole genus is instantiated in each species. A class exists as a whole in the whole of each item it contains. I claim this to be a doctrine of immanent universals. We should note the distinctive ontological vocabulary Maximus uses in this connection. Particulars or species have an essential unity, identity, and undivided character in the class they belong to: “The individuals, finding agreement with each other according to their species, become completely one and the same with each other, since by virtue of their common origin and nature they are indistinguishable and free of all difference.” If we just think of human beings, we can say that each individual human is one and the same as each other human individual because both are human beings. No human individual is divided from any other human individual, and no class is divided by its differentiations. Each class is preserved as a whole. I should perhaps try to make what we have found up to now even clearer: two human individuals like Peter and Paul are completely identical essentially, i.e. in the species, while they differ in a lot of non-essential characteristics. Two species like human being and gorilla are likewise completely identical in the genus common to both species while they differ according to certain differentia. It is, however, important to notice that when a particular individual instantiates a species and is of a certain essence or nature, this specific essence or nature includes or comprises hierarchically every universal level by turns up to the primary genus of essence itself. In this way beings are not only interconnected specifically but the whole realm of being is interconnected. Particulars exist in their species and genera. Their species and genera exist in particulars. There lurks a problem in a system like the one we try to grasp now, namely the problem of the so-cal-

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led generic poverty. It is said of the orthodox Aristotelian view of universals that the higher up in the system of genera, the emptier the concepts become. A concept like “human being” is rich in content when we add all the differences together, but genera are gradually emptied of specific content the higher they are located on the scale and the fewer differences they contain. The highest genus or, more properly, category, is the emptiest when it comes to conceptual content. However, in the Platonic tradition things are different. If Aristotelian “orthodoxy” is the opinion that what is treated in the Categories is “things said” or terms, then the result will be generic poverty, but if what is treated are features of reality or beings, then the real content of the increasingly higher genera become gradually enriched. Cornford has an appropriate remark on this: In Plato’s view the Highest Form, whether it be called ‘Being’ or ‘the One’ or ‘the Good’, must be not the poorest, but the richest, a universe of real being, a whole containing all that is real in a single order, a One Being that is also many. Such a Form is as far as possible from resembling an Aristotelian category; for the categories are precisely the barest of abstractions, at the furthest remove from substantial reality. 39

Maximus’ species and genera are not universal and transcendent Forms, but even so have something in common with such Forms since they are immanent essential structures or immanent universals. These contain potentially all the lower specifications. The metaphysical interpretation of created being serves a practical and soteriological end as well: since rational beings are ontologically interconnected, they are ontologically in communion with each other, and since they are in communion ontologically, they have the innate potential of correct moral interaction and of communion with God. Essence is the source of communion, and when it comes to beings with intelligence, essence or nature is the source of genuine moral and religious freedom. It is also important to take notice of what we found in the Mystagogia. God executes His providential power and draws beings together by means of the logoi. This is possible because the immanent universal is the 39 F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, London, 1979 (first published 1935), p. 270.

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source of communion. In the quotation from Ambiguum 41 above, we saw that beings “are drawn together to one and the same by means of a certain generic logos of nature”40 The first chapter of the Mystagogia tells us that it is the divine power invested in the relation of creatures to God that facilitates the conversion of creatures to God. God steers all things around Himself and makes them converge in each other by the power of their relationship to Him. This is one aspect of holomerism, namely that particulars are unified ontologically each by instantiating the essentials of the whole specific/generic hierarchy. The whole species is in the particular and fills the whole particular. But there are more aspects to this and we shall turn to some passages in Ambiguum 10 to fill in the picture. In Ambiguum 10 there is a long sequence on providence.41 From this text we are able to gather some additional aspects of Maximus’ whole/part thinking. It confirms that universals belong as an ontological feature to the created world:42 God’s providence reaches to all beings and includes universals as well as particulars. Quoting Nemesius, Maximus also says “universals naturally consist of particulars”. From this saying it is easy to jump to the conclusion that particulars are the basic ontological entities. However, as we shall see soon, the situation is a lot more complex. There are in particular two paragraphs from this sequence that are important for us: For if universals subsist in the particulars, and do not in any way possess their logos of being and subsistence by themselves, then it is quite clear that if the particulars were to perish, the universals would cease to exist. For the parts exist and subsist in the wholes, and the wholes in the parts.43 Εἰ γὰρ τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ὑφέστηκεν, οὐδαμῶς τὸ παράπαν τὸν τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὰ εἶναι τε καὶ ὑφεστάναι λόγον ἐπιδεχόμενα τῶν κατὰ μέρος διαφθειρομένων παντί που δῆλόν ἐστιν ὡς οὐδὲ τὰ καθόλου στήσεται. Τὰ μέρη γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὁλότησι καὶ αἱ ὁλότητες ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι εἰσὶ καὶ ὑφεστήκασι. 40 

Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1312c. Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91,  1188c–1193a. 42  Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1189c. 43  Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1189c-d. 41 

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For these [universals and particulars] are brought in with one another, because of the natural, indissoluble relation they have to one another, so that each achieves remaining with the other, and the one cannot be foreign to the protection of the other, and again, if they admit the protection of the remaining of the one, the other should consequently be granted the same.44 Συνεισάγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα διὰ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάλυτον πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν, καὶ θατέτου πρὸς διαμονὴν συντηρουμένου, μηδὲ τὸ ἕτερον ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φυλακῆς ἀλλότριον, καὶ ἑνὸς πάλιν τῆς πρὸς διαμονὴν φυλακῆς διαπίπτοντες μηδὲ τὸ ἄλλο ταύτης τυγχάνειν λέγει ἀκόλουθον.

The first quotation is ambiguous. What does Maximus mean when he says “if” (εἰ) universals subsist in the particulars? The view he comments on has the further consequence that they then do not possess their logos of being and existence by themselves and therefore cease to exist with the particulars. This might be a view he implicitly rejects since it has the corollary that universals are not creatures but mind-dependent abstractions. On the other hand, the context seems to suggest another interpretation: the “if” should probably be read more like a “since”. In that case, what is stated is the mutual dependence of the one on the other, of particulars on universals and of universals of particulars. When he further says it is a consequence of this view that universals “do not in any way possess their logos of being and existence by themselves”, this means that there are no logoi that establish species and genera as self-subsistent entities in their own right. In short, in Maximus’ Christian system there are no hierarchical levels of being “between” God and particular creatures. Immediately before the last quotation, Maximus says the remaining (or permanence) and subsistence or hypostasis (διαμονὴ καὶ ὑπόστασις) of universals consist in the particulars.45 From this one might be tempted to jump to the conclusion that universals have no real existence, but rather depend on something else, namely a particular entity. However, this is not what he says. The text rather says universals are hypostasized which must definitely mean they exist even if they exist as such 44  45 

Amb. Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1192a. Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1192a.

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in the particular. There is a further aspect to this: universals and particulars have an indissoluble natural relationship with each other. The second quotation says that universals and particulars achieve permanence through each other: there is no particular being without universal being and there is no universal being without particular being. The last sentence in the first quotation seems to confirm what is just said: it is not only the whole (i.e. the genus or the species) that exists and subsists in the parts (i.e. the species or the particulars), but the parts exist and subsist in the whole. Even if the texts may create a first impression that particulars are ontologically primary beings, Maximus makes a balance in which he clearly insists on a mutual relationship between whole and part, universal and particular which is, in a strong term, indissoluble. Universals belong as an essential aspect to the created order and even if they disappear with the particulars, there could be no particulars existing in the world if there were no universals. Since universals do not exist by themselves, but have their being in the internal, essential reality of particular beings, they possess their logoi not as logoi for self-subsistence but as logoi for specific and generic being immanent in the particulars. The parts subsist in the wholes: each particular belongs to and achieves its identification, its existence and subsistence in its specific essence. In that way the universal collects together a plurality of parts into itself and is manifest as a collective whole. But there is another side to this, namely that the whole subsists in the parts. This means that the specific essence is an immanent universal and is as such present in an indissoluble way in each individual. Take away this aspect of an entity and it can no longer be identified as a being in the world. We shall return to the quotation from Ambiguum 41 at the start of this section since it presents some claims that are easily missed. In this text Maximus comments on four ontological aspects of the created order: (1) the genus in relation to the species, (2) the species in relation to the genus, (3) the individual in relation to the species, and (4) the individual as such.46

46 Cf. Amb.Ioh.

41, PG 91, 1312c–1313b. For the four points, see 1312c-d.

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(1) He says that everything generic (according to its own logos) is wholly present, indivisibly and in a unitary mode, to subordinate wholes. In other words, each genus is present as a whole in each of its species. The whole of what it is to be the genus fills the whole of what it means to be each species that is subordinate to it, even if each species is distinguished by the essential manifestation of a constitutive difference. That means that in the essence of the human species the whole of its proximate genus is present and again in this genus the whole of every superior (generic) essence is comprised. This may be illustrated thus: in human being the whole of what it is to be a primate is present, and in the primate the whole of what it is to be a mammal is present, and in a mammal the whole of what it is to be an animal is present, etc. In this way there is an ontological interrelatedness between all creatures in the world. (2) The species, when considered in relation to the genus, are somehow “released from variations grounded in difference” (τῆς ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ ποικιλίας ἀπολυθέντα) and “find identity with one another” (τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα ταὐτότητα δέχεται) in the genus immediately prior to them. When the species are established, they are of course differentiated by the introduction of differences that divide the genus and constitute the species. However, this differentiation does not prevail so as to separate each species from each other species and thereby split up the genus. When one considers the species with a view to the genus one looks beyond the differentiating characteristics and sees the species as identical with one another because the same generic essence unifies them all. (3) When the individuals (τὰ ἄτομα) are considered in relation to their species they find agreement with one another (πρὸς ἄλληλα δεχόμενα σύμβασιν) and are constituted as one and identical with one another (ἕν καὶ ταὐτόν). They have an unchangeable sameness of nature and are free from any difference (τῇ ὁμοφυΐᾳ τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον ἔχοντα καὶ διαφορᾶς πάσης ἐλεύθερον). For instance, if we consider two human beings like Peter and Paul specifically, then we find ontological agreement, they are one and identical, have an unchangeable sameness of nature, and are free from any difference because both are human beings. (4) Then there follows the last statement on accidents (συμβεβηκότα) that are unified in their subject (τὸ ὑποκείμενον).

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This point is a bit confusing since one would expect the division to end with the point before this, namely with individuals related to their species. However, the point might be that Maximus includes in his division the level on which individuals become genuine individuals. The former point was about how individuals are related to their species in which they are the same, while the present point is about how these specifically identical particulars are differentiated or individualized by the collection of characteristics inherent in the present subject. It seems relevant to point to St Basil once more: “For this reason, in most respects we are the same as one another, but it is only due to the distinguishing marks considered in connection with each one of us that we are different, each from the other”.47 Even if the subtleties of Maximus’ holomerism are his own invention, in the present connection we see clearly the Cappadocian influence on his mind and not only the Porphyrian legacy. This Cappadocian influence can be seen in Maximus’ Opuscula theologica et polemica 26 as well. He presents two definitions that are relevant: An ‘individual’ is, according to the philosophers, a collection of properties, and this bundle cannot be contemplated in another; according to the Fathers, such are Peter and Paul or someone else, each of whom is distinct from other human beings by virtue of their own, personal properties.48 Ἄτομόν ἐστιν, κατὰ μὲν φιλοσόφους ἰδιωμάτων συναγωγή, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου θεωρεῖσθαι οὐ δύναται· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Πατέρας, οἷον Πέτρος ἢ Παῦλος, ἢ τις ἕτερος τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἰδίοις προσωπικοῖς ἰδιώμασι τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζόμενος. An ‘hypostasis’ is, according to the philosophers, an essence with properties; according to the Fathers, it is the particular human being who as a person is distinct from other human beings.49 Ὑπόστασις δέ ἐστιν, κατὰ μὲν φιλοσόφους, οὐσία μετὰ ἰδιωμάτων· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Πατέρας, ὃ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄνθρωπος, 47 St Basil

of Cesarea, Against Eunomius, p. 134. Greek text in Basil de Césarée, Contre Eunome II, p. 18. 48  Op. 26, PG 91, 276a-b. 49  Op. 26, PG 91, 276a-b.

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προσωπικῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζόμενος.

Who are the philosophers? The concept of a simple bundle of properties reminds one of a well-known paragraph in Porphyry’s Isagoge: Socrates is said to be an individual, and so are this white thing, and this person approaching, and the son of Sophroniscus (should Socrates be his only son). Such items are called individuals because each is constituted of proper features the assemblage (ἄθροισμα) of which will never be found the same in anything else — the proper features of Socrates will never be found in any other of the particulars. 50

However, I do not read Maximus’ text as a depreciation of the definition of “the philosophers”, since Maximus of course knows that this bundle-theory, as it is called, is found in St Gregory of Nyssa. When the latter sketches his understanding of matter it seems to be in terms of such a way of thinking, but more relevant for the present topic is the definition he in one place gives of an hypostasis as “the concourse of the peculiar characteristics of each [person]” (τὴν συνδρομὴν τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον ἰδιωμάτων).51 The definitions according to the philosophers and according to the Fathers are possible alternatives and not necessarily opposite one another. Even so, there is a difference. One of the definitions, namely the first one, states that an individual is just a collection of properties. The rest indicates that an individual or an hypostasis is a collection of properties in a subject. In Ambiguum 41 Maximus’ definitely thinks in terms of a subject with properties, and the definitions in Opusculum 26 seems mainly to point in that direction as well.

50 Porphyry, Introduction, p. 8, the Greek term is inserted by me; Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, p. 7. 51 For Gregory’s concept of matter, cf. Gregori Nysseni, De anima et resurrectione, Opera dogmatica minora, edidit A. Spirea, Leiden, Boston, 2014 (GNO III.III), p. 94; Gregorii Nysseni, Opera exegetica in Genesim, edidit H. R. Drobner, Leiden, Boston, 2009 (GNO IV.I), p. 15; De hominis opificio 24, PG 44, 212d–213b. For hypostasis, see (Pseudo-)Basil, Letter 38, To his brother Peter, On the Difference between Ousia and Hypostasis, in Basil, The Letters, volume I, transl. by R. J. Deferrari, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1972 (first published 1926) (LCL 190).

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The individual entity, the particular being, primarily the individual or particular human being, is a basic ontological unit in Maximus’ grand metaphysical and cosmological system of holomerism. According to the sketch in Ambiguum 41, human nature, as instantiated in the particular human being, was originally designed as the cosmic bond uniting all being horizontally as well as vertically. The human being was destined to unite all and connect all with the divine source of the cosmos, a task that failed in the fall from grace. However, human nature was designed to become the locus of God’s salvific action. According to Quaestiones as Thalassium 60, the “Mystery of Christ”, the coming together of the created nature of the human being and the uncreated nature of God in the hypostatic union, was the eternal purpose behind the making of created otherness.52 This means that God eternally decided that the Incarnation should take place. God created the cosmos because in His goodness He wanted to deify or glorify all being, acting through Himself as a human being. Our investigation of the metaphysical system of St Maximus the Confessor, of his Christocentric cosmology, therefore directs us to investigate his understanding of the Incarnation and deification.

52 

Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, 73–81.

7. Incarnation and Deification The doctrines of an infinite, transcendent, all-perfect divine being, of creation and cosmology, are metaphysical topics. However, claiming this God to have become a human being seems very different, almost as if a kind of myth. Still, this is basic Christian doctrine and the backbone of St Maximus’ philosophy. Even if peculiar, the claim does not involve an impossibility. It does not involve any contradiction. There are of course aspects of this doctrine that seem difficult if not impossible to grasp or explain philosophically but this does still not make it impossible. Whether it is credible or not is another matter. In this chapter, I analyse the metaphysical and ontological aspects of Maximus’ doctrines of Incarnation and deification. He repeatedly refers to the divine economy of the Incarnation as a mystery.1 Even if that is the case, he applies all the philosophical tools and terms used in the writings of earlier theologians in his analyses of the event. There is an intense search for conceptual clarity and precise distinctions and definitions, and this almost creates the impression of a philosophical discipline. On the one hand, the doctrine of the Incarnation, even if a revealed truth, is approached rationally as if one pursued an ontological quest. However, in the middle of complex ontological expositions, it is obvious that the case one tries to describe cannot be sufficiently diagnosed or precisely understood in its depth. One may approach it philosophically but eventually one discovers that there is something slipping away from the keenest application of conceptual tools. It is necessary to confess Christ as uniting two natures (or essences) in one hypostasis. The two natures united are His divinity and humanity, what is uncreated and beyond being and what is created and belonging to the realm of being. This is a description that can be made even more philosophically sophisticated, but it still does not bring us insight into the ontological 1 See below. This terminology of “mystery” or “mystery of Christ” has a Pauline background, cf.  Rom. 16:25–6, 1 Cor. 2:7, 4:1, Eph. 1:9, 3:3, 5:19, Col. 1:26, 4:3.

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event of the union itself. Precisely how this union takes place, the structure of its actualization, remains beyond intellectual grasp. Maximus stresses in paradoxical language that Christ, even in His manifestation, remains hidden.2 There is an enormous amount of literature on the Christological controversy, on the disputants, the councils, and the social and political contexts. 3 Fascinating and relevant though this history is, it is beyond the scope of the present book to enter into any comprehensive description of it. However, I shall sketch a few points of particular relevance for Maximus’ position. As I shall show below, for Maximus, the doctrine and the ontology of the Incarnation are of special importance for the understanding of deification. The Incarnation, Some Historical Notes The clash between the two archbishops Nestorius of Constantinople (bishop 428–431) and St  Cyril of Alexandria (bishop 412–444) gives the long history of the controversy its tenor. Cyril’s Christology and its interpretations in late antiquity made him one of the most influential theologians in the history of the Christian church. Whatever Nestorius actually taught, his view of Christ, of how the two natures of divinity and humanity were unified in the one Christ, became for many the abhorrent dualistic model of two essences and even two persons that never actually became one. Against this view, Cyril argued for a “hypostatic union” according to which the eternal Logos of God came down, became 2 

Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, 22. of textbooks, I should like to recommend the following translations with their introductions: R. Price, M. Gaddis, eds, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon: Volume 1–3, translated with an introduction and notes, Liverpool, 2007 (Translated Texts for Historians volume 45); R. Price, ed., The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 553: Volume I-2, translated with an introduction and notes, Liverpool, 2012 (Translated Texts for Historians volume 51); R. Price with contributions by P. Booth, C. Cubitt, eds, The Acts of the Lateran Synod of 649, translated with notes, Liverpool, 2016 (Translated Texts for Historians volume 61). The introductions, which of course represent the point of view of these scholars, are informative. The translated texts are fascinating and interesting. A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, Volume 2, Part 3, edited by T. Hainthaler, Oxford, 2013, contains a lot of relevant material. 3 Instead

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a human being, and assumed a created humanity from the Virgin Mary into His own divine hypostasis. The controversy over the Marian title of Θεοτόκος (God-bearer, Mother of God), was in reality a controversy over how the oneness of Christ should be understood. The Cyrilline council of Ephesus in 431, received later as the Third ecumenical council, stated that Mary is Theotokos and opted for Cyril’s concept of an “hypostatic union”. Despite the intense theological work of Cyril both before and after Ephesus, this concept did not receive sufficient philosophical clarification.4 The controversy erupted again in 448 when the home synod in Constantinople (at the instigation of Eusebius of Dorylaeum) tried the venerable archimandrite Eutyches for “confusing” the two natures of Christ. At the home synod, Eutyches confessed:5 “I acknowledge that our Lord came into being from two natures before the union; but after the union I acknowledge one nature.” Cyril had adopted the pseudo-Athanasian saying “one incarnate nature of God the Logos”, therefore, a “one nature”-Christology was important to come to terms with for all his adherents.6 There is no reason to believe that he acknowledged this formula because he denied that Christ was consubstantial with human beings. It can be put in McGuckins words:7 “Thus, Jesus is no less than God enfleshed (Theos sesarkomenos) and so the virgin is the Mother of God.” “Enfleshed” means to have assumed human nature or, better, to have become a human being. Together with the one nature formula the terms “from two” and “in two” natures became part of Christological terminology. They became catchwords for the controversy until Maximus’ days and beyond. It is important to understand the sense of the prepositional terms “from two” and “in two”. Cyril had said, in his letter to the monks of Egypt (429), that Christ is from (ἐξ) two unlike 4 See the collection of Cyril’s texts in translation in J. McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy, Crestwood, New York, 2004. 5  Price, Gaddis, eds, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, vol.  i, p. 222. Eutyches also appeals to the “holy fathers”, particularly to St Athanasius and St Cyril, cf. p. 224. 6 Cf. McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, p. 207. This term plays an important role in almost all literature on the controversy. 7  McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, p. 211.

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principles:8 “Accordingly, the Emmanuel is from two entities [ἐκ δυοῖν μὲν πραγμάτων, from two ‘things’], that is Godhead and manhood.” At the same time, he had warned about those who cut in two (εἰς δύο τέμνοντες) the one Lord Jesus Christ. “From” (ἐκ) does not mean that two complete entities subsisted before the Incarnation and that they subsequently were joined into one. It means that logically and abstractly we may distinguish two different realities coming together in the one Christ. The “before” is to be taken in this logical or ontological sense, not in a chronological sense. The term “in” (ἐν) implied the existence of two natures in Christ after the Incarnation. Some of Cyril’s adherents considered this usage suspect since it tasted of Nestorianism.9 Price remarks that the draft of the definition of the council of Chalcedon (451) “did not contain an unambiguous statement of the existence in Christ of two distinct natures, divine and human”.10 It had the term “from two natures”, but during the discussion it was asked for a statement to the effect that two natures were acknowledged in Christ “after” the union. The final formula deleted the ἐκ and approved the ἐν instead: […] one and the same (ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν) Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, acknowledged in (ἐν) two natures which undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no separation; at no point was the difference between the natures taken away through the union, but rather the property of both natures is preserved and comes together into a single person and a single subsistent being (ὑπόστασιν) […].11

The formula “the property of both natures is preserved and comes together into a single person and a single subsistent being” seems to me logically to preserve the “from two natures”. The task of the council of Chalcedon was to counter Eutyches’ radical Cyrillian Christology that many saw as an extremist view. On the 8  For

this, see PG 77, 21d, 24a, 28d. instance Price, Gaddis, eds, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, vol. 1, pp. 159–60. 10  Price, Gaddis, eds, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, vol. 2, p. 186 and pp.  198–200. 11  Quoted from N. P. Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Volume One, London and Washington, DC, 1990, p. 86. Greek terms inserted by me. 9  Cf. for

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other hand, one had to formulate the common stand in such a way that one gave no concession to the accursed Nestorius. Whether they succeeded or not has been a matter of controversy in modern scholarship. If one reads the acts, it is clear that the major authority for large groups of the gathered bishops was the deceased Cyril of Alexandria, for many now one of the Fathers. Even though the so-called Tome of Pope Leo was read out and received with acclamation, it was accepted since it could be interpreted as in accordance with Cyril’s Christology.12 However, conciliar formulas are not philosophical expositions and despite some terminological refinements and appeals to authorities (Cyril and Leo), the Definition leaves the reader with enough of ambiguous statements to make schism a possible outcome. The Chalcedonian definition frequently uses the term “one and the same” or simply “the same” in order to stress the one subject for all attributes that could be predicated of Christ. There is a single “hypostasis” (translated in the quotation above as “subsistent being”) that is the subsistent ontological reality for all predicates. This one hypostasis preserved the two natures or the properties of the two natures with no confusion, no change, no division, and no separation (ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως). All four adverbs are statements of negation. “No confusion” means that the unified natures are not mixed in such a way that a third “something” results, in which the component parts can no longer be separated. “No change” means that the one nature is not altered or changed into the other. The Definition applies both these adverbs in order to state the preservation of the difference between the natures of Christ. The natures are not completely mixed and the one is not transformed into the other. The conciliar fathers then try to balance this preservation of difference with the statements that the natures cannot be divided or separated from one another. One cannot say that these statements represent a philosophical clarification of the doctrine they “define”. The negations are rather statements of negative theology: they do not explain the fact of the Incarnation but rather point to what it is not. In that way they not only try to let the mystery be a mystery, they even leave the door open to further speculation. In addition to 12 

McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, pp.  233–40.

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these terms, we have the phrase “in two natures”. For those who already felt slightly uncomfortable, this may smell too much of a Nestorian attitude. It could seem that the council, in its correction of Eutyches’ errors, gave too many concessions to the opposite view. For our purposes there is no need to enter into detailed descriptions of the complex and chaotic developments until the age of Justinian. There was one relevant letter by Cyril that Chalcedon did not include in its Definition and did not refer to, namely the third letter he wrote to Nestorius (in 430) that contained twelve anathemas, called the Twelve Chapters.13 This letter had caused considerable opposition at the council of Ephesus (431) and in the years that followed. The sixth century, however, received this letter as a witness to the orthodox faith. The letter became of vital importance at the council of Constantinople in 553, gathered under Justinian. The canons of the council sketch a Cyrillian position that is usually referred to as neo-Chalcedonianism. Some of Cyril’s main ideas, put forward in these canons, are of relevance as a background for Maximus’ Christology. Price points out that there are two Christological models at work in the early Christological controversy.14 The one starts with the two natures and seek to understand how they are unified, while the second starts with the Johannine statement that the Logos or Word “became flesh” (John 1:14, σὰρξ ἐγένετο). The former easily ends up with the almost unsurmountable problem of how these two can unite to be one. The second turn out to be more successful and is also in accordance with the Nicene Symbol of faith. The one subject of the several predicates is the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father: He came down, was made flesh and a human being, He suffered and rose again on the third day, etc. Cyril stresses this both in his second and third letter to Nestorius.15 In his Twelve Chapters, Cyril also emphasises that the sayings and works of Christ in the Gospels shall not be distributed respectively on His humanity and divinity, and that it is the Logos of God who suffered, was crucified, and tasted death 13  See

the translation in McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, pp. 266–75. Price, ed., The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 553: vol. I, pp. 62–63. 15  PG 77, 44–50 and 105–22; translated in McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, pp. 262–75. 14 

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in the flesh. The canons from Constantinople 553 emphasise the same ideas.16 The canons also acknowledge the two prepositional terms “in two natures” and “from two natures” under certain conditions. The first is accepted if one recognizes the one Lord “theoretically” or “contemplatively” in Godhead and manhood.17 The second is acknowledged if one recognizes the hypostatic union without confusing the two natures. I mentioned above that the Christological position promulgated at the sixth century council is usually known in the history of doctrine as neo-Chalcedonianism. One may wonder what is new. Neo-Chalcedonianism carries the mark of Cyril’s thought. McGuckin’s seems to claim that the council of Chalcedon as well was strictly Cyrillian in essence. I shall not discuss this at length, but accept Price’s view: My own interpretation, however, shared by most Eastern Orthodox scholars and some western ones, is that the Chalcedonian Definition, despite its non-Cyrillian assertion of two natures after the union, expresses an essentially Cyrillian Christology; I therefore see the unambiguously Cyrillian Christology of neo-Chalcedonianism as a valid clarification of Chalcedon, involving a certain shift of emphasis but with no change of meaning.18

However, if this is true, how is it that the council gave rise to so many divisions among the churches? The above sketch provides us with a sufficient background for the treatment of Maximus’ doctrine of the Incarnation. St Maximus on the Incarnation Most treatments of Maximus’ doctrine of the Incarnation discuss him in the context of the Christological controversies of monoen-

16 Cf. Price, ed., The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 553: vol. II, pp. 120–26. 17  Price, ed., The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 553: vol. II, p. 122, translates the τῇ θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ as “in perception alone”. I think this translation may cause confusion. As pointed out later, the perception of Christ as an agent is one but two aspects may be contemplated. It is better to reserve “perception” for what may be actually experienced. 18  Price, ed., The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 553: vol. I, pp. 73–74, cf. pp.  59–75.

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ergism and monotheletism.19 However, I am not going to investigate and discuss his thought with regard to this. I am not going to say much on one or two activities or wills as an issue in a controversy. Rather my purpose is to describe his understanding of the Incarnation as the backbone of the metaphysics and cosmology presented in the previous chapters. The first thing we should note is that according to Maximus, the Incarnation did not pop up in God’s mind as a divine rescuing action when something went wrong in place and time. Maximus clearly states that God conceived both creation and Incarnation eternally as plans He would execute. This is obvious in Quaestiones ad Thalassium 60, where Maximus comments on the term “mystery of Christ”. 20 He states very clearly that the Incarnation is the mystery for the sake of which the creation of the world took place. 21 Everything created exists for the sake of bringing about the Incarnation, but why should God want to become incarnate? Maximus answers: “for the sake of nothing”. How do we interpret this? Maybe we could say that the activities of creation and Incarnation are not for the sake of any divine need. God does not need creatures, neither as things made nor as conditions to bring about an Incarnation. Even if God eternally conceived to become incarnate, He did not need to, but if God eternally both conceived and decided, it is another matter. 22 However that may be, God does not need anything beyond Himself. There is no internal or external constraint on His actions except for His own goodness and will. Can we still ask why God acted even if He did not act because of any need? Maximus seems to suggest an answer to these challenges, when he says that the Logos “revealed Himself as the innermost depth of the Father’s goodness while also displaying in Himself the very goal for which creatures plainly received the beginning of 19  Once

again, I will recommend a publication by Price: Price with contributions by Booth, Cubitt, eds, The Acts of the Lateran Synod of 649, contains a general introduction giving an overview of the controversy in addition to a translation of the acts of the synod. The introduction discusses Maximus importance in the controversy. 20  Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, 73–81. 21  Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, 73–75. 22  Cf. my discussion of divine will at the end of Chapter 3.

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their being”. 23 If we take this as an answer, it tells us that the motif is divine goodness. This goodness motivates actions without any sidelong glance to internal needs or external value. This should be further elaborated. The motif for creation and Incarnation is hidden, I think we could say, in the depths of divine goodness. It seems to me that with the idea of an eternal plan and decision behind these acts, we are confronted with the real scandalon and mystery in Christianity. Why should God want to create a world in which sin, suffering, and corruptibility are realities, and why should God Himself eternally want to unite with such a world and even suffer for it? If God eternally wanted to communicate goodness to creatures and if He eternally wanted intelligent creatures to respond freely to His goodness, the risk of bad choices would necessarily be present. There is no space for further discussion of this important topic within the limits of the present book. Maximus, however, definitely thought that freedom is a gift to be used in accordance with divine purposes,24 and the mystery of suffering and of divine suffering “in the flesh”, is obviously for him for the sake of the greater good of deification. God eternally decided both creation and Incarnation.25 In the first chapter above, I pointed out that, according to Maximus, there is a threefold Incarnation, two of which are of interest in the present context.26 The Logos made Himself present in the logoi of beings and as the historical person of Jesus Christ. The Logos made Himself present in beings in the act of creation. He is cosmologically present in the whole system from the beginning of the world. According to Maximus, the Logos is therefore the centre of created plurality. We may illustrate this by a circle: the centre represents the Logos, the radii are the logoi of created beings that stretch forth until they are circumscribed by the circumference which is the outermost limit of expansion where all things are kept within divine providence.27 Maximus applies this 23 

Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, 75. treatment in Chapter 1 above. 25 Maximus’ doctrine is a contemplation over a Pauline notion, cf. Rom. 16:25–6, 1 Cor. 2:6–7, Eph. 1:3–12, 3:1–12, Col.  1:24–7, 2 Tim. 1:8–11, Titus 1:1–3. 26 Cf. Amb.Ioh. 33, PG 91, 1285c–1288a. 27  For expansion, see Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1177b-c. 24  Cf. the

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circle-image in Ambiguum 7, where he shows us how the one Logos is the centre from which the many logoi proceed into the creation of beings and then convert in directing creatures back to Himself as divine source.28 The Logos is concealed within all created beings only to be detected through a virtuous life and in natural contemplation. When the divine presence is revealed, the sacred dimension of nature is regained.29 When the eternal Logos of God becomes historically incarnate, the Creator Himself becomes flesh. The One who from the beginning of creation is the creative principles (logoi) instituting the essences of beings, enters nature and history and becomes a human being. All substances in the system of the world are, to use an image, connected with Him as if tied with strings to the one centre of all. His acts, therefore, affect the whole system. The regenerative acts of Christ throughout His ministry, culminating in His suffering and resurrection, stretch beyond their significance for historically existing human beings and make a change in the ontological constitution of beings generally. Maximus says this beautifully in his Capita theologica et oeconomica: The mystery of the Incarnation of the Logos holds the power of all the riddles and types of Scripture, as well as the science of visible and intelligible creatures. And the one who has come to know the mystery of the cross and tomb, comes to know the logoi of these creatures, and the one who has been initiated into the ineffable power of the resurrection comes to know the purpose for which God initially established all things. 30 Τὸ τῆς ἐνσωματώσεως τοῦ Λόγου μυστήριον, πάντων ἔχει τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν Γραφὴν αἰνιγμάτων καὶ τύπων τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ νοουμένων κτισμάτων τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Καὶ ὁ μὲν γνοὺς σταυροῦ καὶ ταφῆς τὸ μυστήριον, ἔγνω τῶν προειρημένων τοὺς λόγους· ὁ δὲ τῆς ἀναστάσεως μυηθεὶς τὴν ἀπόῤῥητον δύναμιν, ἔγνω τὸν ἐφ’ ᾧ τὰ πάντα προηγουμένως ὁ Θεὸς ὑπεστήσατο σκοπόν.

28 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081b-c. Cf. Myst. Chapter 1, CCSG 69, p. 13 and Th.Oec. 2.4, PG 90,  1125d–1128a. 29  I treated this in the first chapter above. 30  Th.Oec. 1.66, PG 90, 1108a-b.

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Maximus obviously does not divide Christian theology into academic disciplines of a doctrine of God, a doctrine of the Trinity, a doctrine of Christ, a doctrine of creation, a doctrine of salvation, etc. The whole of Christian theology in all its aspects is encapsulated in one divine act: Incarnation. All “riddles and types” of Scripture are to be read and understood in light of the mystery of the Incarnation. The Incarnation is the secret key to achieve the proper science of creatures, visible as well as intelligible. Knowledge of the mystery of the Incarnation reveals something essential about these creatures. We may wonder what exactly this knowledge consists in. What is it that we come to know about creatures? What is this essential knowledge? Maximus goes on with saying that if one knows the mystery of the cross and tomb, one comes to know the logoi of creatures. If one is initiated into the power of the resurrection one knows the purpose of created things. For Maximus, the meaning of being and the key to understand creatures, is found in the cross, the tomb, and the power of the resurrection. As we saw above, God created the world for the sake of the Incarnation and for the sake of those benefits that befall creatures because of the Incarnation. What do we learn about creatures from this divine viewpoint? In Chapter 5 above, I discussed the triad of logoi that, according to Maximus, prescribes the history of the development of creatures if they move correctly. 31 What we come to know about creatures in light of salvation history is that all beings, designed by God with their natural essences and capacities, are designed to transcend their present state by the gracious power of divine activity, which creatures let into themselves when they move in accordance with the logoi of well-being and the logoi of eternal well-being. We learn or gain the science that the present conditions of weakness, plainness, and corruptibility hide the fact that even the most inconspicuous of creatures is destined to transcend its present state and expand gloriously into the transformed state of deification. The quotation from Capita theologica et oeconomica above refers to the idea of an original divine plan stemming from a hidden motive in God Himself. For us this can obviously only be grasped as the mystery of divine goodness. God created the world with a 31  Cf. Chapter

5, the section “Activities and logoi”.

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view to the Incarnation of the Logos. The Creator became the Saviour or Healer through His becoming flesh and through the cross, the tomb, and the resurrection. Is it not a logical implication of this that everything created should have been transformed immediately when Christ fulfilled His mission? Since this did not happen, I think we may assume that according to Maximus, the work of Christ has established the conditions for the transformation. These conditions need to be made effective in the movements of created beings in relation to one another and to God. Maximus sketches the dynamism of such movements in Ambiguum 41, where he identifies the human being as the microcosm in which all kinds of cosmic being are present. The unification and transformation of the totality of created beings shall start from the correct activity of this microcosmic nature. However, the human being did not fulfil this task and the Son of God Himself became incarnate. In Maximus scheme, God made the human nature initially as a preparation for the act of the Incarnation. The Incarnate Logos fulfilled the work of reconciliation ontologically and thus laid the foundation for a gradual process practically. Maximus’ Mystagogia sheds light on how he considers this process to take place “ecclesially”, that is, with the church as dynamic factor. Maximus clearly places the agent of creation and salvation, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Logos (Word) of God, within the divine sphere, as one of the Holy Trinity. 32 This conception of Christ is according to the Symbol of faith, which states that the Lord Jesus Christ is “the only-begotten Son of God, who was begotten from the Father before all ages, true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things came into being”. In the words that follow, the eternal hypostasis of the Son and Logos becomes, as I said above, the subject of several “incarnational” predicates: He came down, was made flesh and a human being. Maximus expresses it the following way in his Ambiguum 41: “in a paradoxical way beyond nature that which is completely unmoved by nature is moved immovably around that which by nature is moved, and God becomes a human being, in order to 32  Cf. the

Trinitarian meditation in Th.Oec. 2.1, PG 90, 1124d–1125c.

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save lost humanity”. 33 The words “God becomes a human being” (θεὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται) resound of the Johannine “the Word became flesh” (John 1:14: ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο). In this quotation, Maximus applies the model of the eternal Logos becoming a human being. The Hypostatic Union Maximus holds on to the so-called neo-Chalcedonianism of the sixth century. There is one and the same divine agent, Christ, the Logos, who was begotten of the Father, by whom the world was made, and who came down and was incarnate. In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 60, Maximus identifies the “mystery of Christ” as the “ineffable and incomprehensible hypostatic union of divinity and humanity”.34 We have seen above that in his Twelve Chapters, Cyril emphasises that because of the one agent, the sayings and works of Christ in the Gospels are not to be distributed respectively on His humanity and divinity.35 The Logos of God is the subject of the exalted as well as the lowlier sayings and actions. In Ambiguum 2, Maximus interprets an obscure saying from St Gregory the Theologian: the more exalted things should be attributed to the divinity, to the nature which is superior to sufferings, and what is more lowly should be attributed to the compound (τῷ συνθέτῳ), “to Him who because of you was emptied and became flesh”.36 This saying could of course lend itself to a Nestorian interpretation. Maximus, however, offers an orthodox interpretation. The Logos is on the one hand wholly divine by essence. 37 As the Logos or Son, He is an hypostasis, one of the three hypostases of the Trinity. Maximus says that the Logos “emptied Himself” in the incarnational act, a favourite theme of Cyril, and became compounded through His conception by the Theotokos. 38 He also says 33 

Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1308c-d. Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, p. 73. 35 Cyril, Third Letter to Nestorius (Letter 17 in PG), fourth anathema, PG 77, 120c-d; translation in McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, p. 274. 36  Amb.Thom. 2, CCSG 48, p. 18. The quotation is from Gregory, Homily 29.18. 37  For what follows, cf. Amb.Thom. 2, CCSG 48, pp. 8–9. 38  For “kenosis” in Cyril, cf. McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, p. 186. The concept comes from St Paul, cf.  Phil. 2:6–11. 34 

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that in the “emptying” the Logos “became the seed of His own flesh”. 39 This suggests that the generative power in the conception, the moving force, is the Logos who makes for Himself a humanity from His mother. Entering composition, the Logos, eternally divine, became wholly a human being. He accepted all the natural logoi of the nature He assumed. We should probably understand these “natural logoi” as all the natural differences that belong to being human within the holomeristic system described in Chapter 6 above. Maximus does not think Gregory believes that there is a split in the one Christ when he says that the exalted things should be attributed to the divine nature. It simply means that the exalted things are possible because of that nature. Likewise, when the lowly is attributed to the compound, this means that it is possible because of the humanity compounded with the hypostasis of the Logos. There is one and the same agent or subject for both kinds of works. As we can see, Maximus strives to come to terms with the legacy he acknowledges as orthodox. However, his attempt to accommodate the two natures in one hypostasis leaves something to be desired. He tries to formulate the mystery in strict formulas but maybe the philosophical vocabulary becomes insufficient at a certain point. One might sense that the traditional Porphyrian logic of late ancient and early Byzantine thinkers ends in dichotomy and is never able to unify the thesis and antithesis in a synthetic “Aufhebung”, with the result that the ontology of the Incarnation never gets philosophically transparent. We return to this problem later in the present chapter. Essence and Activity It is interesting to see how Maximus elaborates on the topic of how Christ executed both kinds of works. With this we come to the subject of essence and activity (οὐσία, ἐνέργεια) which plays an important role in the Christological controversies of Maximus’ days. He touches upon it towards the end of Ambiguum 2 and returns to it in Ambiguum 4 and 5. An essence cannot be directly observed, it is only perceived because it is active, that is, executes activity. This is a legacy from the Cappadocians in late antique theology. St Basil, for instance, in his Letter 234, treats the dis39 

Amb.Thom. 2, CCSG 48, p. 8.

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tinction between essence and activity. He opens with the rhetorical question from an Eunomian opponent: “Do you worship what you know or what you do not know?” The Eunomians taught that it is possible to know the divine essence completely, something denied by the Cappadocians. The question has a scriptural background, namely Christ’s meeting with the Samaritan woman. Jesus says (John 4:22): “You worship what you do not know; we know what we worship, for salvation is of the Jews.” On this background, Basil cannot simply say that he worships what he does not know nor can he say that he simply knows (like the Eunomians) what he worships. His answer to the challenge is that we may know God’s attributes because we have access to God’s activities. The activities (documented in Holy Scripture) witness to the fact that God exists and to what God is. This claim is sound enough and in Maximus days it is commonplace that only that which has an activity or movement can be real.40 Maximus says it is necessary to confess that Christ is the hypostasis of the two natures together with the natural activities of these same natures.41 He further stresses that Christ is the true union of these natures and He acts by Himself naturally, monadically, and uniformly (προσφυῶς, μοναδικῶς, ὁμοειδῶς).42 These adverbs emphasise the unity of the agent. Christ acts naturally, as one single agent, and in a uniform, not split up way, when He acts. It is obvious that every reader of the Gospels would get that impression: one perceives one agent, not a duality of agents. Maximus adds (with a Chalcedonian adverb) that Christ in all He does manifests the activities of His own flesh inseparably (ἀχωρίστως) with the divine power. Christ is from two natures, in two natures, and He is the two natures. This claim is confirmed if the natural activities of these natures are manifest in what He actually undergoes and does as one agent. We see that Maximus applies the terms from which (ἐξ ὧν) and in which (ἐν οἷς) that I commented on above. In this way he balances Cyrillian and Chalcedo40 Cf. Amb.Thom.

5, CCSG 48, p. 20. Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, p. 25. 42  προσφυῶς is a tricky term to translate. It means something like “naturally attached to”. I follow Lollar’s translation in Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua to Thomas, Second Letter to Thomas, introduction, translation and notes by J. Lollar, Turnhout, 2009, p. 67. 41 

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nian terminology. In Ambiguum 5, Maximus adduces a case from the Scriptures to illustrate the union of the two natural activities, namely Christ’s walking on water.43 Christ executed a simple human activity by the act of walking. Inseparably from this act, in a natural, single and uniform way, Christ instituted anew the nature of the elements with His divine power when He walked on water. An observer, we can imagine, would have seen one single event, but one single event that was both human and “superhuman” at the same time. In Ambiguum 4, Maximus speaks of an exchange (ἐπαλλαγή) between the natures of divinity and humanity.44 Christ, as the hypostasis of both natures, manifests the essential activities or movements of these natures (τὰς αὐτῶν οὐσιώδεις ἐνεργείας ἤγουν κινήσεις). The exchange effects that Christ does the works of a slave in the manner of a master (τὰ μὲν δουλικὰ δεσποτικῶς) and the works of God in the manner of the flesh (τὰ σαρκικὰ θεϊκῶς). Pointing to the natures and (probably) the activities, Maximus further says Christ was the “unconfused union” of these. Since He was the hypostasis of these natures and activities, He acted “monadically” (μοναδικῶς) or “uniformly” (ἑνοειδῶς) whenever He acted. As we saw above, this is stressed in Ambiguum 5 as well.45 We shall not leave the subject of nature or essence and activity yet. In Ambiguum 5 as well we find an ontological analysis of the hypostatic union. Maximus comments on one of Dionysius the Areopagite’s letters to Gaius (Letter 4), containing the controverted term “a new theandric activity”.46 In his commentary, Maximus stresses that the hypostatic subject of the union is clearly none other than the eternal Logos who came down and became human. I treated some passages from this text in Chapter 5 above. In the former context I had a general ontological point in view and avoided entering into all the Christological implications that I treat here. Maximus says, quoting Dionysius, that Christ 43  Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, p. 23. See Lollar’s treatment of this in Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua to Thomas, pp.  119–20. 44  Amb.Thom. 4, CCSG 48, p. 16. 45  Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, p. 25. 46 On this, see below and see A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor, London, 1996 (The Early Church Fathers), pp. 54–56.

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is human “as that which according to the whole of its essence is truly a human being”.47 God the Logos becomes a human being to the same degree that we are human beings but there is no human hypostasis in Christ. Maximus says there occurs an ineffable assumption (πρόληψις) of human nature and with this assumption the Logos became the constitution or constitutive principle (σύστασις) of His humanity.48 Assumption means that the Logos united Himself hypostatically to flesh endowed with an intellectual soul. The Logos became the constitutive principle of His humanity, consisting of flesh and intellectual soul, united to Him hypostatically. Maximus says the demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) of the presence of human essence is “the natural constitutive potentiality” (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῆς συστατικὴ δύναμις) that is a “natural activity” (φυσικὴ ἐνέργεια).49 One may wonder with what degree of strictness Maximus applies the term demonstration (ἀπόδειξις). In philosophical literature (for instance in Aristotle) the term often means a strict demonstration or proof achieved by a scientific syllogism. On the other hand, the term is also used in a more loose way and may simply mean that something is shown or exhibited. Maximus does not have something as formal as a technical syllogism in mind when he uses the term, but even so I think he has in mind that the reality of the manhood (as well as the Godhead) of Christ is clearly shown or even demonstrated by the Scriptural witness he appeals to in Ambiguum 5. This is Christ’s walking on water. In the following interpretation I apply the philosophical tools of first/second activity and potentiality that I appealed to in Chapter 5 above. The Logos as constitutive principle of the humanity of Christ has assumed this humanity as a natural activity (first activity). This is the actualized state of being human. This (first) natural activity is established as “a form-making, most generic movement” (εἰδοποιὸν ὑπάρχουσαν κίνησιν γενικωτάτην), and this establishes itself as a natural constitutive potentiality (second potentiality). How can we understand this? I suggest it means that the Logos assumed being human as first activity. This “being human” is form-making since it establishes the totality of gene47 

Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, p. 19. Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, p. 21. 49  Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 5, pp. 19–20. 48 

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ric possibilities inherent in this nature. I repeat a quotation from Chapter 5 above since it specifies the possible human activities: For the Word beyond being who once assumed essence humanly possessed undiminished, as His own, the movement of the essence that characterizes Him generically as a human being, naturally specified in everything He performs (ἐνήργει) as such. Since He has truly become a human being, He breathes, speaks, walks, moves His hands, uses His senses naturally in the perception of things sensible, is hungry, thirsty, eats, sleeps, is tired, weeps, is distressed, and possesses every other independent capacity (δύναμις) and, in every other respect in the mode of a soul that with its own activity moves the body that forms one nature that He has truly become and is called His own […]. 50

The basic constitution of “being human” contains (second) potentiality as a capacity to be active in all the ways characteristic for humans. The term generic, used in two quotations above, means that all the characteristics (differences of all kinds) that may be added together in a comprehensive definition of the human being, are included in instantiations of human nature, as in the humanity of Christ.51 Maybe the following schematization is helpful: 2) First activity: the Logos has actualized the first potentiality and has become a human being.

4) Second activity: Christ executes the generic activities mentioned in the quotation above, plus all other activities witnessed in Scripture in a “theandric” way (see below).

1) First potentiality: the created elements that the Logos assumes from the Holy Virgin, these may be developed into a complete humanity.

3) First activity=second potentiality: the Incarnate Logos has at His disposal all essential differences that are included generically in humanity. These differences are available as a capacity that the Incarnate Logos may actualize in communion with His divine power when He wills.

50 

Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, pp. 23–24. should be compared with what is said of “holomerism” in Chapter 6.

51  This

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It is the Logos of God who acts (is active) in human ways. He did not change the constitutive activity of the assumed nature. He acts in accordance with His own divinity and humanity. Maximus’ Ambiguum 5 is a commentary on Dionysius the Areopagites’ fourth letter, which tells that Christ exercised for us “a new theandric activity” (καινήν τινα τὴν θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν). 52 “Theandric” means divine-human. The monoenergists had quoted this term differently: “one theandric activity”. According to Louth, there are reasons to believe that the original had “new” but we cannot completely rule out “one”. 53 St Cyril formulated the idea of Christ’s activity as a single one out of two activities in his Commentary on John. He uses the raising of Jairus’ daughter (Luke 8:41–56, especially verse 54) as an example. Christ gives His command and touches her with the hand, “demonstrating from both that the activity was single and cognate” (μίαν τε καὶ συγγενῆ δι’ ἀμφοῖν ἐπιδείκνυσι τὴν ἐνέργειαν). 54 Grillmeier remarks that the human contribution is simple:55 “The sarx, too, has nothing to contribute except the stretching out to touch.” I agree that it may seem so but I am not so sure that this is what Cyril intends. He stresses that Christ insisted to use His holy flesh as co-worker and that it does not act by divine command alone. Grillmeier suggests that the Cyrillian formula lies behind Dionysius’ “new theandric activity”. The question is, however, to which of Christ’s acts or doings the term can be predicated. 56 Should it be predicated of the miraculous acts only or of all that Christ does? Grillmeier concludes that if the divine-human activity, which by implication is the unity of two natural activities, is understood to be executed by the hypostasis of Christ, then it may be applied even “for the purely natural actions of Christ, such as eating and drinking, and so on, because they belong, exclusively but

52 Cf. Corpus Dionysiacum II, herausgegeben von G. Heil, A. M. Ritter, Berlin, New York, 1991 (Patristische Texte und Studien Band 36), p. 161. 53  Louth, Maximus the Confessor, pp.  54–56. 54  Commentarium in Evangelis Joannis, book 4, PG 73, 577c. 55  Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, Volume 2, Part 3, p. 333. 56 See Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, Volume 2, Part 3, pp.  333–36 for a discussion of this.

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concretely, to a divine subject”. 57 This is obviously what Maximus thinks when he says (as we saw above) that: He has truly become a human being, He breathes, speaks, walks, moves His hands, uses His senses naturally in the perception of things sensible, is hungry, thirsty, eats, sleeps, is tired, weeps, is distressed, and possesses every other independent capacity (δύναμις) and, in every other respect in the mode of a soul that with its own activity moves the body that forms one nature that He has truly become and is called His own […]. 58

Christ exercises the divine and human activity in the same act.59 It is a reasonable interpretation that Cyril’s “single” activity in fact is two-sided or includes two aspects, the divine and the human. Of course, the term “two” triggers sensitivities. Such a two-sidedness is definitely present in Maximus’ understanding of the term “theandric” but he would protest that it in fact denotes any separation. There is no confusion, no change, no division, and no separation. It seems to me that it is very difficult to grasp or make a clear notion of the incarnational unity without confusion philosophically. Philosophical terminology delimits the event negatively (apophatically) but does not explain the thing in itself. We are in the realm I introduced in Chapter 1 above, the realm of relative knowledge, where we use reasoning and concepts, that, in Maximus’ words, are “not possessing the actual perception (αἴσθησιν) of what is known through experience (διὰ πείρας), and by this we make interpretations in the present life”.60 Maximus actually turns to a metaphor at the end of Ambiguum 5, the metaphor of a sword plunged in fire: For it is just as when a sword has been heated: what is able to cut becomes able to burn, and what is able to burn becomes able to cut (for just as fire was united to iron, thus also the burning of fire was united to the cutting of the iron). The iron has become able to burn by a union with the fire, and the fire becomes able to cut by a union with the iron. Neither thing has undergone a change with respect to mode in the exchange with the other in union, but each has remained, in the identity of what was composed in 57 

Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, Volume 2, Part 3, p. 336. Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, pp. 23–24. 59  Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, p. 30. 60  Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, p. 77. 58 

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the union, without falling from what belonged to it according to nature.61 Ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῦ πυρακτωθέντος ξίφους τὸ τμητικὸν γέγονε καυστικὸν, καὶ τὸ καυστικὸν τμητικόν (ἡνώθη γὰρ ὥσπερ τῷ σιδήρῳ τὸ πῦρ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ τοῦ σιδήρου τμητικῷ τὸ τοῦ πυρὸς καυστικόν), καὶ γέγονε μὲν καυστικὸς ὁ σίδηρος, ἑνώσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, καὶ τμητικὸν τὸ πῦρ, ἑνώσει τῇ πρὸς τὸν σίδηρον, οὐδέτερον δὲ τροπὴν τῇ καθ’ ἕνωσιν ἀντιδόσει πρὸς θάτερον πέπονθεν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάτερον κἀν τῇ τοῦ συγκειμένου καθ’ ἕνωσιν ἰδιότητι μεμένηκε τῆς κατὰ φύσιν οἰκείας ἀνέκπτωτον […].

Conceptual diagnosis is necessary but can never exhaust the actual case. It seems that a metaphor like the above may bring us closer to the actual mystery. There are definitely two substances, iron and fire. There are definitely two activities, cutting and burning. The unified entity is from both and in that entity they can only be conceptually distinguished. For anyone that has seen a piece of iron heated in fire, the image is striking: the iron is penetrated by an almost whitish-red glow, a frightening phenomenon. For perception the two sides of the phenomenon are indistinguishable even if conceptually or theoretically two. In this case, the metaphor seems successful. However, even if that is the case, there are limitations. The hypostasis of the entity is the sword but the sword is an image of the human element. The metaphor therefore illustrates the workings of the natural activities better than it illustrates the hypostatic union. It needs obviously to be supplemented conceptually since its interpretation is not completely obvious. According to Maximus’ point of view, is should be highlighted by the orthodox truth of the councils and the holy fathers. Deification We have come to the topic of the deification of creatures.62 As was said above, the Logos “revealed Himself as the innermost depth of the Father’s goodness while also displaying in Himself the very 61  Amb.Thom. 5, CCSG 48, p. 33. Lollar’s translation in Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua to Thomas, pp. 72–73. 62 For deification in general, see the now classical book by N. Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, Oxford, 2009 (first published in 2004).

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goal for which creatures plainly received the beginning of their being”.63 The goal or purpose of the Incarnation is the salvation of creatures and salvation consists in their deification. It is helpful to keep in mind the metaphor of the glowing sword which illustrates how fire completely penetrates the coarser material of iron. We should keep in mind that the deification of Christ’s human nature serves as a model for the deification of human beings in particular and for all beings generally. “Deification” is a strong term and “becoming God” is striking. Maximus’ writings contain at least four kinds of sayings that we should consider with regard to our topic. (1) First we have the texts in which Maximus says that the human being “becomes God” or receives the predicate “God”. Here we could refer to, for instance, Ambiguum 7, where he says that a creature which has completed his course “becomes God, receiving from God to be God” (γίνεται Θεός, ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ Θεὸς εἶναι λαμβάνων).64 In the backgound for this γίνεται Θεός, we probably have the Johannine Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο (John 1:14). In the same context Maximus comments on St Gregory the Theologian’s term “portion of God”. Maximus says a human being becomes a portion of God (in the final consummation of all being) as being God (ὡς Θεός), because of the logos of eternal being that is in God.65 In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 22, we find that Christ became a human being without alteration of what He originally was.66 The result of the Incarnation is that the divine activity makes the human being God. This text has a scolion, not by Maximus, which states that the Incarnation “is making the human being God, just as much as [God] Himself became a human being” (θεὸν ποιοῦσα τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅσαν αὐτὸς γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος).67 This leads to the next point which we can place under the heading of “just as much as” or tantum quantum. (2) There are texts in which Maximus speaks of this “just as much as” or “to the extent that”, like in Ambiguum 7. He refers to a “beautiful exchange” (καλὴν ἀντιστροφήν) in which God is 63 

Q.Thal. 60, CCSG 22, p. 75. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1084a. 65  Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1084b-c. 66  Q.Thal. 22, CCSG 7, p. 137. 67  Q.Thal. 22, CCSG 7, 145. 64 

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“humanized” and the human being is “deified”.68 In Ambiguum 60, Maximus says the human being becomes God to the extent that God became human (γενόμενος τοσοῦτον Θεὸς ὅσον ἐκεῖνος ἄνθρωπος).69 We find this in Expositio orationis dominicae as well.70 By emptying himself of the passions, the human being is deified to the extent that (ὅσον) Christ emptied Himself of His glory and became humanized. With this “just as much as” or “to the extent that”, Maximus points to the depth of God’s love for His creation. God is willing to step “down” in order to lift His creation “up”, like a loving Father. I do not think we should turn these sayings into a strict logical pattern. (3) There are texts that tell us that the deified human being receives divine attributes. Maximus says in Ambiguum 10 that the human being “becomes without beginning and end” (γέγονε καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος), since it possesses the eternal life of the Logos that dwells in it.71 This sounds rather paradoxical. To be ἄναρχος is a divine attribute and all creatures have a temporal beginning. Maybe we could say that to become God is to achieve existence in the logos of eternal well-being. In this condition one suffers the reception of qualities that have no beginning or end. Therefore, to have a beginning and not to have a beginning is unified, so to say, in the same human hypostasis. It definitely seems to be a paradoxical existence. However, it is not contradictory. The created hypostasis does not possess the opposed characteristics in the same respect: it possesses beginning as creature and beginninglessnes as a gift. (4) I shall only refer to one example of the last kind of statement. In Ambiguum 41, Maximus says that the whole creature is wholly interpenetrated by God, “becoming all whatever God is, without identity according to essence” (γενόμενος πᾶν εἴ τί πέρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, χωρὶς τῆς κατ’ οὐσίαν ταὐτότητος).72 If we reflect on the first three kinds of statements and follow the logic of the sayings at face value, we may end up with a 68 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1084c. 60, PG 91, 1385b-c. 70  E.O.D., CCSG 23, pp. 32–33. 71  Amb.Ioh. 10, PG 91, 1144c. 72  Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1308b. 69 Cf. Amb.Ioh.

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picture of the deified creature that is rather strange. The Logos moves “down” and becomes man and the creature moves “up” and becomes God, in a way that is equivalent with the σὰρξ ἐγένετο of the Logos. In that case, the created hypostasis would be the hypostasis of both a created and an uncreated nature. Even if the semantics of the “became flesh” and the “becoming God” suggest that we have to do with ontologically equivalent events they do not have an identical structure. The Logos assumed human nature but the creature does not assume divine nature. In the first section of this chapter, I discussed aspects of Maximus’ doctrine of the Incarnation. We saw that the Logos “emptied Himself” and “compounded” human nature with His divine nature in His one hypostasis. The Logos became a human being. The divine hypostasis of Christ acted in a “theandric” way, naturally, monadically, and uniformly. That is, in the acts of Christ the activities of both natures come together. However, nothing of this gives us a glimpse into exactly how the two natures or the two activities of the natures merge. On this background, it seems clear that all Christ’s acts have somehow a dual character. The terms “doing the works of a slave in the manner of a master” and “doing the works of God in the manner of flesh”, create this impression. Are there not in the end two substances here, coming together in parallel existence? However, Maximus is eager to emphasise the unity of Christ and His actions. The terms “monadically” and “uniformly” weigh against the impression of duality. However, there is no confusion between the two spheres, but even so, Maximus stresses that there is nothing more unified than Christ.73 If we are going to accept Maximus’ words for it, we have to acknowledge the shortcomings of philosophical terminology. In the first section of the present chapter, I commented on Price’s sketch of two Christological models. The one starts with two natures, seeking to understand how they are unified. The second starts with the Johannine σὰρξ ἐγένετο. It is difficult to grasp how the two could become one so the second model is probably the most fruitful. However, the problem of how the two became one seems to intrude itself into the consideration of different aspects of the doctines of Incarnation as well as of deification. One sees clearly 73 

Amb.Thom. 4, CCSG 48, p. 16.

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why it is necessary all along to stress their mysterious character. In the former section we ended up with the metaphor of the sword heated in fire and maybe we have to turn to metaphors in order to get some glimpse into the mystery of deification as well.74 What exactly does deification consist in? The texts referred to above in the present paragraph talk of human nature becoming God and being God, receiving to be God from God. Further, they also talk of receiving divine attributes. The becoming God seems to imply an ontological transformation in which humanity not only borrows certain properties cast around it like some cloak. This is confirmed in the words from Ambiguum 41, quoted above, where Maximus says the creature by grace becomes wholly interpenetrated by God, becoming all whatever God is, without identity according to essence.75 This brings us to the concept of περιχώρησις.76 In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59, Maximus says:77 “The ineffable περιχώρησις of the object of faith proportionate with the faith of each [person] is the true revelation of the object of faith. The ascent (ἐπάνοδος) to the beginning according to the goal (τέλος) of the faithful is established (καθέστηκεν) as the περιχώρησις of the object of faith.” It is easier to grasp what Maximus says if we turn the sayings around: the true revelation of the object of faith, this object being Christ, is the ineffable περιχώρησις of the object of faith. The περιχώρησις of the object of faith, Christ, is the ascent to the beginning, God, which is the goal of the journey of the creature. We need to decide on the translation of περιχώρησις. The word may mean rotation, circular movement, reciprocity, or interpenetration. It seems to me sound to translate it “penetration” or “interpenetration” depending on context. This translation fits the above quotation and fits 74  See the comments in T. T. Tollefsen, “Like a Glowing Sword: St Maximus on Deification”, in M. Edwards, E. E. D-Vasilescu, eds, Visions of God and Ideas on Deification in Patristic Thought, London and New York, 2017, pp. 158–70. 75  Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1308b. 76 See the discussion in L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, Chicago and La Salle, 1995, pp.  21–36; H.  A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1976, pp.  418–28. Cf.  also Tollefsen, “Like a Glowing Sword”, pp. 158–70. 77  Q.Thal. 59, CCSG 22, p. 53.

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Maximus sayings in Ambiguum 7, about the beautiful exchange.78 The object of faith must obviously be Christ. Christ displayed or revealed in Himself the divine purpose when He deified His own humanity. Proportionate to the faith of the believer, the latter suffers this penetration of Christ into himself. In this experience, the believer receives the true revelation of Christ, a revelation that is not a piece of knowledge but an experience of divine transformative activity. Maximus says in Ambiguum 10 that the saints (who pursue natural contemplation) finally are united wholly with the Logos according to their capacity to receive, and are receptive of His qualities.79 They become like mirrors that reflect the “form of the Logos” who is manifested by His divine characteristics, but they lack none of their natural human characteristics. There are several things to take notice of here. Participation in the divine is delimited by the believer’s natural capacity (τῆς […] φυσικῆς δυνάμεως) to receive. Since what is given is divine and limitless, we may wonder how this natural capacity is apt for such a reception? In Ambiguum 7, Maximus says that God gives the creature its simple ability to move, probably as instituted naturally in the act of creation: only what can move or act is real.80 This ability is in its basic sense “natural”. However, God also institutes an additional ability: the particular ability of “the how” (τὸ πῶς) to move. The latter “how to move” is probably what made the original nature apt to receive the addition of God’s transforming gifts. Another passage from Ambiguum 7 shed some further light on this. “The how” is a mode (τρόπος) originally and graciously given by God so that we may reach the blessed end we are destined for.81 This mode is obviously given as a condition that should enable us to use our natural powers in good ways. However, humans voluntarily rejected this mode in abusing their natural powers. Therefore, God introduced another mode “more marvellous and befitting God than the first”. While the first mode was according to nature, the new mode is “above 78 

Amb.Ioh. Amb.Ioh. 80  Amb.Ioh. 81  Amb.Ioh. 79 

7, PG 91, 1084c-d. 10, PG 91, 1137b-c. 7, PG 91, 1073c. 7, PG 91, 1097c.

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nature” (ὑπὲρ φύσιν). The new mode is a condition provided by the Incarnation of the Logos and salvation history. We need to bring in some additional material before we can make a reasonable interpretation of these ideas. In Chapter 5 above, I discussed an important saying from Ambiguum 7, and I repeat the quotation here: For all things, in that they came to be from God, participate proportionally in God, whether by intellect, by reason, by sensation, by vital movement, or by essential and habitual aptitude (οὐσιώδη καὶ ἑκτικὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα), according to the great theologian Dionysius the Areopagite. 82

The key-terms here are essential aptitude and habitual aptitude. When Maximus mentions intellect, reason, sense-perception, and vital motion, this is a list of essential features that make creatures apt for participation in the natural way. God has eternally established the essential definition of an entity. The creature participates in God in accordance with this pre-definition. This means that the logos of being sets the limits to the receptive capacity of an entity. It receives God or, more precisely, it receives the divine activity, that is, the external activity of the Godhead. The Logos Himself, however, is not participated in by any being in any manner at all.83 The point is that God’s essential being is beyond participation and intellectual grasp. The essential aptitude or capacity to receive the divine presence is one thing. It is quite another thing to participate according to habit. In Chapter 1 I treated Maximus’ doctrine of spiritual development. When we take the above into consideration, he seems to think that if creatures move according to nature, they make themselves apt to receive the divine activity into themselves to a certain degree. This movement expands the habitual aptitude (ἡ ἑκτικὴ ἐπιτηδειότης). There seems to be, however, a limit that the creature cannot move beyond, and this limit is the borderline between the creaturely capacity, even if expanded, and the gift of deification itself. As I pointed out above, Christ introduced a

82  83 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1080b. Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1081b-c, cf. Q.D., question 173, CCSG 10, p. 120.

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new and marvellous mode. Maximus’ comments in Ambiguum 20 are highly relevant for this subject.84 Maximus first says we may comprehend the predication of terms (names) under three heads. Names may be predicated (1) according to essence, (2) according to condition, and (3) according to grace or perdition (τὰ μὲν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὰ δὲ σχέσεως, τὰ δὲ χάριτος ἢ ἀπωλείας). From his examples we may construct three kinds of predicative propositions: (1) “x is a human being” (2) “x is good, holy, or wise or wicked, foolish, or impure” (3) “x is God”

Maximus says that the Scriptures call the human being “God” (Ps 82 (81 LXX):6, cf.  John 10:34) but that is neither κατὰ φύσιν nor κατὰ σχέσιν (i.e. neither (1) nor (2)). It is not according to nature or essence, since a creature cannot become God by nature, nor is it according to σχέσις. What does that mean? It seems to me that Maximus is making an important qualification of what deification means. An example of σχέσις is when we say a “good human being”. This is a qualified condition and according to Liddell and Scott, σχέσις may even mean a temporary, passing condition. In the Porphyrian scheme, this will be a kind of accidental predication. Being good depends upon the choice of the agent and is a qualification that could be lost. According to Maximus, being God or being deified, is not of this kind: it is not a qualified condition dependent solely on the agent. Being deified is a transformation that depends on God. He says the human being becomes and is called (γενόμενός τε καὶ ὀνομαζόμενος) God κατὰ θέσιν καὶ χάριν. How shall we understand this? The term θέσις may be translated “placing” or “deposit”. It may also mean “adoption”. What is θέσει may also indicate something opposite of φύσει. What is the point of using the term in this context? The three kinds of predication Maximus sketches are obviously not just semantic categories. They are semantic categories with strong ontological implications. It looks as if he tries to find an ontological description of deification that is as exact as possible. When we say a human being is deified or is God, this cannot mean that it is divine or God by nature (φύσει), nor can it mean that 84 

Amb.Ioh. 20, PG 91, 1236d–1237c.

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the agent has achieved a particular condition by its own powers. To be divine or to be God by is to be “placed” in the condition of divinity or to be adopted into such a condition. Maximus elaborates on the condition further when he says that “the grace of deification” (ἡ χάρις τῆς θεώσεως) is completely unconditioned and works without any receptive faculty in the participant. A natural potentiality is completed in actuality. Such an actuality does not transcend the limits of nature. In deification, on the other hand, the human being transcends itself or goes out of itself (ἐξίστησιν ἑαυτοῦ).85 Maximus’ Ambiguum 20 is a meditation on a saying from St Gregory the Theologian on St Paul’s experience of “the third heaven” (2. Cor. 12:2), where Gregory uses the terms progress, ascent, and assumption (πρόοδος, ἀνάβασις, ἀνάληψις). Maximus adjusts these to his scheme of threefold spiritual development. “Progress” denotes the ascetical stage, “ascent” the stage of contemplation, and “assumption” the stage in which the apostle passively experiences the deified condition as a gift. What is passively received, however, is the activity (ἐνέργεια) of God that is assumed into the human nature of Paul. As we have just seen, deification does not consist in the predication of an accident like holiness or wisdom. The predication according to grace denote something that penetrates deeper into the creature. The humanization of God and the deification of the human being is neither according to essence nor according to accident. If we consider Maximus’ three kinds of predication above, it seems that predication according to grace (or perdition) is the predication of a property, a property given by someone else. The humanization of God, is the reception into God of essentially human properties and activities. The deification of the human being, is the reception into human nature of essentially divine properties and activities. By “essentially”, I do not mean that there is a reception of human or divine nature into respectively the divine or the human being, resulting in another, a third kind of nature. All I mean is that some properties are essentially divine and some are essentially creaturely in the sense that they are manifested from the two different kinds of nature. 85 Cf. Amb.Ioh.

20, PG 91, 1237b–1240c.

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What can we gain from all this? As originally created the human being was equipped with a condition, a mode, that would have helped it in its steady advance towards its divine goal. This mode was lost due to the fall as was described in the first chapter above. In one sense, the human being was left in the claws of its own passions, but not without carrying the divine image. This means that there was still some gracious vestige in humans. The salvation instantiated by the incarnate Logos, did not re-establish the original condition but instituted a new and “marvellous” mode “above nature”. It is clear that Maximus did not think the natural capacity of humans, even if renewed, would be sufficient for the reception of the gift of deification. Even so, he must at least have reckoned that the full actualization of the human potential in cooperation with God would so to say make a condition in which the new gracious mode of deified being could be given. The full actualization of the human potential is therefore the creaturely condition that is apt for the reception of that grace which makes it possible for the divine activity to enter into the human constitution, transforming it into a divine mode of being. Here we should remember the metaphor of the glowing sword. But to be heated or glowing is not to be fire and to be deified is not to be God by nature. Humans will become gods by grace. Most theologians throughout history have focussed exclusively, or at least mainly, on human salvation. This is obviously not the case with Maximus. The general tenor of his metaphysics shows us the grand vision of a created totality that comes from God and converts to God. Ambiguum 41 sketches how the incarnate Logos unifies all levels of being. Other texts that are interpreted in the above chapters show the same picture: all particulars, species, and genera that are parts of the whole of the cosmic order with its beginning and end in God, are originally destined to deification. The metaphysics of St Maximus the Confessor describes the basic principles and structures behind the drama of nature and history. The movement of the cosmos from initial potentiality to deified actuality is what God eternally conceived in His goodness.

8. Corollaries It happens that students of ancient intellectual history are met with the attitude that this subject matter may be interesting as a pastime but has no relevance for contemporary issues. One also now and then meets the attitude that there are opinions and outlooks that “we” no longer have or can have. I hold this attitude to be simplistic and ahistorical. The study of the past is the study of what has been historically formative for later generations and therefore for our own age. There are, of course, elements of the past (convictions, opinions, beliefs, superstitions, prejudices) that we no longer believe or hold on to. That does not mean that they are irrelevant for understanding later epochs of history or even our own times. In the history of Christian dogma, St Maximus is recognized for his contribution to formulate an essential aspect of Christology (the two wills of Christ). For the churches, this piece of ancient thought is not redundant. What then about his metaphysics? Is it by now outdated despite its influence on later thinkers? There is no easy answer to this question. A negative answer, which it is definitely possible to give, has to make some distinctions that will place this kind of thinking in relation to other fields of knowldge, namely modern science. This is a big challenge, which deserves a book of its own, but I shall try to sketch below how I see it, to the provocation of some and, hopefully, to the challenge and inspiration of others. The purpose of the present section, called Corollaries, is not simply to give a short version of what I have said above, but to point to some implications, also practical ones, of the metaphysical structures that I have discussed. In the chapters of this book I have discussed and described Maximus’ metaphysical structures of the world as I understand them. We have seen that God eternally contemplated creation in His logoi. On the one hand, we may describe these logoi as divine Ideas or Forms similar to what we find in Platonic tradition. On the other hand, even if Maximus’ logoi are predeterminations defining the essences or natures of creatures, they are not static patterns for “what is”. Each logos is

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developed into a triadic system of logos of being, of well-being, and of eternal well-being. The texts do not state clearly how this triad should be understood. We may, however, speculate and suggest that Maximus thinks of the logoi analogously with the Trinity. The term “logos” is a unitary designation for a triad and the whole complex will then serve as an image of the divinity: one essence and three hypostases. I believe this is a reasonable interpretation given that Maximus’ whole system is conceived as a “mechanism” (not the best word for a world-view that looks more organic than mechanistic) describing how creatures are brought forth from God and shall convert to God. Since the goal for creatures is transformation into a glorified state in which they participate in the dynamic powers of the triune God, it would not be surprising that the principles promoting this final purpose are sets of divine and triadic logoi. These triads prescribe development.1 Maximus’ divine “Ideas” are prescriptions for development or movement from an initial ontological condition of potentiality for change, into an actualized condition apt for the reception of gifts that transform creatures beyond what they are essentially capable of. There is another aspect of the doctrine of logoi that is obscured if we indiscriminately apply the terminology of “divine Ideas”. The term “logos” corresponds to the verb λέγω, a basic sense of which is “speak”, “say”. (There is a long and complex history of development of logos into a lot of senses, like word, thought, reason, statement, argument, principle, proportion, etc.) It is likely that Christ is called the Logos as the consubstantial Word, spoken or expressed by the Father. It seems also likely that the logoi are the “words” spoken by the Logos in the act of creation, like in Genesis 1 the repeated “God said” occurs when each step in the making of the world takes place. The logoi encapsulate therefore several aspects: they are God’s definitions of beings, the words spoken in the act of creation, and principles prescribing creaturely development. I cannot see that any other early Christian thinker has such an elaborate doctrine of divine and creative principles for the making of creatures. 1 D. Skliris, On the Road to Being. St Maximus the Confessor’s Synodical Ontology, Alhambra, California, 2018, offers a beautiful description of the dynamic character of Maximus’ thought.

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The Logos conceives the logoi as a system of principles for a cosmos created as a taxonomic system. God created particulars and universals, which suggests a kind of philosophical realism: particulars are basic ontological entities and the universal species and genera are instituted with them and in them in order to interconnect all created things. Maximus’ “holomeristic” system of the cosmos is designed to achieve a final outcome: universal salvation and transformation of everything created. “Universal salvation or transformation” means here that salvation is not only for human beings. This becomes clear from several places in Maximus’ writings. In Ambiguum 7 he describes how the one Logos becomes many logoi in the creation of differentiated beings and how the many become one in the conversion of the many to their divine source.2 There are logoi for all beings that have received their being from God. In Ambiguum 41 we find that the whole Porphyrian arrangement of the cosmos is diversified and unified by the Logos. 3 It is clearly stated that this whole system is destined to be deified in the proper and unifying movement of human nature.4 The latter point is important: Maximus thinks the final goal is achieved because the human being is created as a natural bond, interconnecting all levels of being: human nature is a microcosm and a potential mediator between all creatures. The term “universal salvation” provokes a controversial point: does it even imply the salvation of all intellectual creatures? I have not investigated this issue in detail and I am not entering into it here either. Let me just point out that Maximus suggests an idea of eschatological punishment in some places, and I am not in the position to rule out that he had a notion of eternal damnation in mind.5 However, my impression is that the system as a whole makes no room for such a notion. Studying his metaphysics and cosmology gives the impression that all creatures are destined to transformation into the glorified state. However, if that is the case, of which I am in no way sure, Maximus’ ascetic psychology shows the need of thorough self-knowledge and repentance in order 2 

Amb.Ioh. 7, PG 91, 1077c–1080b. Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1312b–1313b. 4  Amb.Ioh. 41, PG 91, 1304d–1308c. 5  Amb.Ioh. 42, PG 91, 1329a-b. Cf. Q.Thal. 11, CCSG 7, pp.  88–91 on the judgement of angels. 3 

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to enter into the great transformative movement. In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 11, he says about the wicked angels that only the Just Judge knows what will happen to them at the terrible day of judgement. It is clear that, according to Maximus, the creation of human nature is the first step towards the fulfilment of the divine purpose. However, human nature had to become the human nature of the incarnate Logos in order to be the effective microcosm and mediator that God intended. The divine purpose, therefore, is achieved in Christ. Since human nature plays such an important role in the cosmic drama, Maximus finds it natural that human individuals still have their part to play. In the Mystagogia he describes how human beings play this part by incorporation into the church. The church is an image of God since it, mirroring His gathering of all beings into unity, gathers people of all kinds into unity with Christ through baptism (cf. Mystagogia, chapter 1). In the church human beings are called to live an “ecclesial” existence in accordance with the three stages of spiritual development that I commented on in Chapter 1 above (cf. Mystagogia, chapter 4). This brings us to the point I wanted to emphasize in this last section of the present book: the proper relation of human beings towards their natural surroundings. Maximus’ metaphysics is a late ancient system of thought. Ancient thinkers do not work out any environmental ethics, maybe because they lack an environmental crisis. In itself this unmasks the anthropocentric origin of this kind of modern ethics. It had to be invented because of human concerns. One reason for this is that nature, from the onset of early modern thought, science, and technology, has become desacralized and exposed to unrestricted human exploitation.6 In early modern thought humans were separated from nature and placed outside of it. When the consequences became gradually intolerable for human well-being (in the modern sense), one invented (among other strategies) environmental ethics. However, the desacralization has destroyed so much of the sense of nature as saturated with numinous presence and meaning that appeals to human consciousness does not exactly seem to have 6 See the interesting analyses and discussions in E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, Mineola, New York, 2003 and Arne Johan Vetlesen, The Denial of Nature, London and New York, 2015.

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much success. The theory of evolution, for instance, acknowledged almost by everybody, has to a large degree contributed to this. A radical evolutionary outlook on nature finds nothing mysterious or beautiful, it just sees deadly competition, pain and death, survival of the fittest. Even if a David Attenborough can talk charmingly and with enthusiasm about nature in TV programs, the approach touches probably only our surface sentiments. I am not criticizing Attenborough who does a great job and these words shall not be read as a denial of a modern scientific theory in principle, but as a warning against “reading” everything that goes on in nature in the way of deadly competition. I do not claim that Maximus has “an environmental ethics”. What I do claim is that he seems to stand out among ancient and late ancient authors, Christians as well as non-Christians, in what he says about nature and in what he thinks is our task in relation to nature. One could of course object that Maximus’ concern with the natural surroundings is purely for the sake of human beings, but I think the foregoing chapters should have demonstrated that this would be to jump to conclusions. Of course, human salvation is the main point for him but he does not seem to think there is any disruptive tension between nature and human beings as if the former was a simple scene on which humans wandered on their journey to a promised eternal bliss beyond everything else. Much Christian theology has been of the latter kind, Maximus’ thought is not. There is no waste in Maximus’ cosmos. His God is a gracious creator that bounteously grants being to a large interconnected system of entities that make up the world. This is because his God expresses Himself and makes a beautiful and complex image of Himself to be disclosed by rational creatures searching for cosmic meaning. But the world is not just given to show the way to the divine source. If that were the case, it could finally be dispensed with after all. That, however, is not the case. The cosmos is destined for transformation, which clearly shows that it was not created for the sake of humans only but because of God’s ungrudging joy of giving. (This motif, even if slightly, reminds one of Plato’s words about the Demiurge in the Timaeus.7 ) Contrary to early modern thought there is no separation or split between humans 7 

Timaeus 29d–30a.

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and the rest of the cosmic structure. The human task of uniting all creatures in peace and harmony is for the sake both of the human being itself and for the sake of all other entities in the natural surroundings. This brings us to the topic I investigated in the first chapter of this book, Maximus’ epistemology with special emphasis on the fall and spiritual development. According to Maximus, the fall brought about a change in our relations with the natural surroundings. Humans became preoccupied with the knowledge of sensible things in the desire to base their existence on the exploitation of the surroundings. This led into the tragic dialectic of pleasure and pain and gave room for the development of numerous vices in accordance with which humans entered a state of competition and enmity with one another. According to Maximus, we are in the present condition allowed to make some use of sensible things, virtuously and correctly.8 His doctrine of ethical philosophy was meant to correct vicious behaviour so that one might see the world from another vantage point in detachment and love. In natural contemplation one should learn to see the world as a complex image of God and thereby achieve knowledge of the final purpose of human beings with the cosmos in the final transformation. We could say that this has to do with recovering the sacred dimension of nature as a work of divine art. There is no environmental ethics in Maximus as a separate topic, but we find that our behaviour in relation to our surroundings is bound up with the whole of what we are intended to be and how we should live. This means that we have the duty to adjust our lives to nature since we are responsible as co-workers with God. Human existence is an ecclesial as well as a cosmic existence that should be lived in harmony with all God’s creatures. How could any of this be of any value for us today? If I claim that it has value, I suppose (and know) there will be many objections. One primary objection will probably be that we cannot transpose this ancient piece of metaphysics into our own times. It represents a world-view we do not have any longer. I wonder, what is the world-view “we” do not have, and who are “we” that cannot have such a world-view? Then there is this term 8 See

L.A., CCSG 40, pp. 15–19.

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“world-view”, which might have more than one sense, some of which are irrelevant. What is in question here is a metaphysical doctrine. Metaphysics is concerned with what is μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, what is “after” the physical constitution of the world. No scientific practice and no scientific world-view (which I consider two different things) is without a metaphysical framework. There is a basic conception about the nature of being that to a large degree prescribes what science is concerned with, what possible methodologies are available, and what kind of propositions count as valid results. Maximian metaphysics would constitute a different framework (“paradigm”) than the metaphysics of modern science. However, that does not necessarily mean that scientific theories and scientific results would be largely affected by Maximian metaphysics. It would not, for instance, exclude the Platonic and Pythagorean insight of reality as mathematically structured. I believe that the modern view of the science of nature as basically mathematical would not be in conflict with this metaphysics. There might be another matter with biology, at least to the degree it is tied to the theory of evolution. Evolution is blind, we hear, there is no purpose involved in biological processes. (Even if popular science often appeals to the audience’s superficial (?) sense of teleological explanations.) In this case Maximian metaphysics is of another opinion: there are definitely divine purposes steering biological processes. It is, on the other hand, quite clear that an observer accepting this kind of basic view would not see anything else than what an ordinary biologist would see (all things equal) when an event takes place or a phenomenon is studied. The event or the phenomenon would probably (in the best cases) be explained in the same way. But there are layers of explanation. A theistic world-view would add a richer explanation than a naturalistic world-view (that is also metaphysical). The difference lies in the fact that the Maximian view will offer an ultimate or a metaphysical explanation of another kind. This would definitely make a difference. The same would probably be the case with physical investigation: physics investigates and explains certain phenomena of experience, but that does not exclude that an ultimate, theistic or metaphysical explanation would add further insights. Who are “we” that do not have or that cannot have such a basic metaphysical conception any more? I do not believe that this “we”

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exists, at least not with a mentality as clearly naturalist as some people imagine. Many groups would claim that “we” hold this or that view as true to the exclusion of other views. I do not believe in the superficial claim that anything goes and that every conviction is a result of determined propaganda: the best story wins. The concept of truth is bound up with a Christian (as well as with a sound philosophical) conviction and there is all the need to apply criteria to separate truth from falsehood. I consequently hold that a naturalistic world-view is basically false and that a theistic or even Maximian world-view is true. Claiming that implies of course a readiness to enter the arena of philosophical discussion. My aim in these corollaries was both to claim that Maximian metaphysics is still defendable, and to extract a practical lesson from all the theories discussed in this book. The practical lesson is this: we live in a cosmos in which there is an interconnectedness between all beings, with humans having a crucial task. Our task is not to secure our lives by exploiting the natural surroundings but rather to be virtuously concerned with the well-being of all entities, since they all, according to St Maximus the Confessor, are destined to achieve a transformed fulfilment in the eschatological Kingdom of God.

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Indices Index of Names General Index

Index of Names 1. Ancient Authors Aeneas of Gaza 100 Ambrose 93 Ammonius 17, 87–88, 99, 176, 178 Anthony the Great 111–12 Aristotle 11–12, 18, 20, 38, 46–47, 55, 76, 80, 101, 130, 146–48, 158, 174– 76, 183, 219 Athanasius 93, 95–96, 108, 205 Atticus 95–96 Augustine 14, 23–24, 93 Basil the Great 93–94, 96–98, 133–34, 183–84, 200–01, 216–17 Clement of Alexandria 42, 121 Cyril of Alexandria 204–09, 215, 217– 18, 221–22 Dexippus 177 Diogenes Laertius 94 Dionysius the Areopagite 19, 51, 55–56, 58, 67, 89–90, 100, 103, 109, 121, 132, 143, 152, 155, 161–65, 218, 221, 229 Eriugena 19 Eunomius 84–86 Eusebius of Dorylaeum 205 Eutyches 205–06, 208 Evagrius Ponticus 35–36, 42, 70–71, 73–74 Gregory of Nyssa 24, 37–38, 58, 60, 62, 64–65, 69–71, 73, 76, 84–85, 121, 142, 201, 215–16, 224, 231

Gregory Palamas 57, 91, 151 Iamblichus 177 John Chrysostom 84 John of Damascus 150–51, 185 John Philoponus 94–95, 99–111, 123, 132–33, 149, 178 Justinian 105, 208 Nemesius of Emesa 111, 196 Nestorius of Constantinople 204, 207–08 Numenius 80 Origen 27, 121 Philo 58, 96–98 Plutarch of Chaeroneia 95–96, 99 Pope Leo 207 Plato 23, 44, 46–47, 80, 89, 94–97, 103, 107, 169–70, 174, 195, 237 Plotinus 14, 47, 67, 80, 97–98, 107, 114–15, 122–24, 141, 149–50, 154, 162, 178–79 Porphyry 124, 130–01, 160, 175–77, 181, 185, 193, 201 Proclus 67, 95, 98–108, 110–11, 123, 141–43, 178–79 Pyrrhus 37 Simplicius 99, 101, 176–80, 182 Socrates 169, 201 Socrates Scholasticus 84 Syrianus 99 Thomas Aquinas 114, 132 Zacharias of Mytilene 99–100

2. Modern Authors Annas, J. 74 Ayres, L. 68 Bamberger, J.E. 35, 42, 70 Barnes, J. 124, 130, 175 Blowers, P. 32, 93 Bradshaw, D. 16

Burtt, E.A. 236 Bydén, B. 13 Callahan, J. F. 93 Carabine, D. 55 Champion, M. W. 20, 100 Constas, N. 50, 69–70, 72–73, 111, 190

256

indices

Cornford, F. M. 195 Dillon, J. 95, 125–26 Descartes, R. 23 Emilsson, E. K. 114–15, 118, 122– 23, 141 Frede, M. 79–80 Gaddis, M. 52, 204–06 Grillmeier, A. 204, 221–22 Gutas, D. 13, 15 Heidegger, M. 18 Hobbes, T. 34 Hume, D. 23 Husserl, E. 23 Ierodiakonou, K. 13 Kant, E. 18, 23 Lampe, G.W.H. 50 Leibniz, G.W. 133, 135 Lollar, J. 69–70, 72, 217–18, 223 Lossky, V. 116–18 Louth, A. 69–70, 72, 190, 218, 221 McGuckin, J. 205, 207–09, 215 Mateiescu, S. 173, 182 Meyendorff, J. 149 Mitralexis, S. 167 Nash, R. H. 24 Pavlos, P. G. 161 Perl, E. D. 190 Petroff, V. V. 65

Plantinga, A. 15–16 Portaru, M. 145, 163, 165 Price, R. 52, 164, 204–06, 208–10, 226 Rist, J.M. 114–15 Romanides, J. S. 116–17 Roueché, M. 38 Runia, D.T. 98 Share, M. 99 Sherwood, P. 19–20 Siniossoglou, N. 13, 15 Skliris, D. 122, 234 Sorabji, R. 20, 48, 100, 174–75 Tanner, N. P. 206 Thunberg, L. 19–21, 24, 35, 37, 168, 227 Tollefsen, T.T. 17, 20, 38, 62, 76, 87– 88, 100, 103, 115, 117, 122–23, 137, 141, 146, 159, 169–70, 173, 227 Törönen, M. 137–38 Vaggione, R.P. 84 Verrycken, K. 178 Vetlesen, A. J. 236 von Balthasar, H.U. 19–21 Watts, E. J. 20, 100 Witt, C. 183 Wolfson, H. A. 227 Wyller, E. A. 174 Zizioulas, J. 62

indices

257

General Index accident(s) 64–65, 88, 191, 199, 230–31 according to nature/ logos, discordant with nature/ logos 39, 41, 167, 223, 228–30 activity/ actuality (ἐνέργεια/ ἐνέργειαι)/ activities 12, 17, 23, 25, 31–32 40– 41, 55–56, 61, 67, 68, 77–81, 91, 115–16, 144–48, 151–52, 156, 158– 59, 161–64, 167–70, 173, 182, 187, 190, 213–14, 216–19, 221–22, 224, 228–29, 231–32 activity of the essence/activity out of the essence 123, 149, 154, 164 activity–potentiality 147 ; see also potentiality acts of will 83, 109, 116, 127, 144, 173, 179 actuality/ activity, first and second 102, 108, 149, 152–54, 219–20 constitutive activity 154–55, 221 double activity 115, 122–23, 145, 178 internal and external activity 80, 81, 115, 122–23, 141, 145, 149–51, 156– 57, 163–66, 170, 178–79 affirmation/ negation 55, 89–90 analogy 51, 55, 75–76, 94, 108, 140, 170 apatheia (dispassion/ detachment) 35, 41–43, 45, 49, 53 ; see also contemplation apophatic and cataphatic discourse/ statements/ theology 12, 26, 51, 55– 57, 59–60, 65–66, 82, 84, 88–92 ; see also affirmation/ negation ; revelation apt/ aptitude 38–40, 45, 102, 165–67, 229 “gnomic” will/ “gnomic aptitude” 18, 160, 167–69 asceticism 37–38, 42 αὐτοσθενής (“strong in itself”) 65–67, 82 ; see also self–consolidating being and subsistence 64, 71, 196

being, well-being, eternal well-being 31, 38–40, 121–22, 128, 145, 166– 67, 169, 189, 213, 234 beginning, middle, end 78, 153 beyond terminology/ being/ intellection (ὑπέρ/ beyondness) 16, 24, 51, 53–54, 56–58, 60, 68–69, 75, 77, 80, 89–91, 156–57, 161, 203–04, 220, 229 ; see also apophatic and cataphatic discourse bundle of properties/ bundle-theory 200–01 categories 13, 16–17, 36, 57, 91, 149, 195, 230 cause(s) 11, 16, 32, 36, 47, 56, 62, 65, 67, 69–70, 75, 77, 85, 91, 95, 110, 116–18, 126, 141–42, 161, 170, 176– 79, 188–90 Christocentric cosmology 20, 28, 128, 135, 173, 202 conceal, concealment 20, 25–26, 28, 43, 46, 50, 55–56, 82, 89, 129, 139, 212 ; see also revelation constitutive principle 183, 219 contemplation/ contemplative 23–25, 27, 29, 31, 35–37, 41, 43–46, 48–50, 53–54, 127, 129, 142, 179, 183, 186–87, 191, 212, 228, 231, 238 ; see also spiritual development contraction/ expansion 64, 72, 180– 82, 185, 211 cosmic bond/ divisions 31, 202 deceive/ deception 26, 38, 94 deified, deification 43–44, 49–51, 54, 113, 149, 151, 189, 202–32 definition(s) 13, 18, 40, 52, 55, 86–88, 131, 147, 154, 157, 166, 180, 192, 200–01, 203, 206–09, 220, 229, 234 definition/ description 87–89 differences(s) (constitutive, divisive, essential) 36, 125, 129–31, 139–40,

258

indices

143–44, 154–55, 188, 191, 193–94, 199, 206–07, 220 embody, embodiment 24, 27, 117, 119, 129 ; see also incarnation “energy”/ “energies” 116–17, 145–46, 149, 157, 163 ; see also activity, actuality ethical, natural, and theological philosophy 29, 35–36, 53 ; see also spiritual development essence (οὐσία) 17, 36, 39, 44, 55–56, 58–63, 65–68, 72, 75, 78, 84–86, 89–91, 106–07, 112, 114–16, 124–25, 129, 131, 145, 148–49, 151–58, 160– 62, 164–66, 169–71, 177, 180–84, 191–92, 194–95, 200, 203–04, 212– 13, 215–20, 225, 227, 230–31, 233– 34 ; see also hypostasis ; substance forbidden knowledge/ forbidden tree 32, 43 freedom and necessity 114–16, 118 genera, species, particulars 124–25, 128, 136, 138, 173–77, 179–81, 184– 85, 190–95, 197, 232, 235 goodness 38–41, 48, 58–59, 80–82, 88–89, 106–07, 111–13, 138, 143, 159–65, 167–69, 179, 202, 210–11, 213, 223, 232 ; see also wisdom grace 39–40, 43–44, 49, 60, 151, 158– 59, 168, 202, 227, 230–32 hierarchy 23, 67, 93, 122, 138, 178, 185, 190, 196 holomerism/ holomeristic 21, 37, 173– 74, 186, 189, 191, 196, 200, 202, 216, 220, 235 ὕπαρξις (existence) 72, 75, 103–04, 110–12, 116, 132–34, 143–44, 152, 155, 170–71, 206 hypostasis/ hypostases 14, 61–65, 67– 68, 71–73, 75, 77–80, 82, 113, 119, 123, 126, 141, 150, 183–84, 197, 200–01, 203, 205, 207, 214–19, 221, 223, 225–26, 234 ; see also Triad ; Trinity hypostatic union 81, 112, 151, 202, 204–05, 209, 215, 218, 223 ; see also mystery of Christ

immanent universal 67, 177, 182, 194–95, 198 image, image and likeness 16, 29–32, 37–40, 68, 70–71, 139, 149, 170, 186–87, 232, 234, 236–38 ; see also being ; goodness ; wisdom Incarnate, incarnation(s) 12, 14, 16, 24–28, 31, 36, 45, 48, 50, 53, 56–57, 78–79, 81–82, 113, 119, 129, 139, 189, 202–32 ; see also deification ; embodiment ; revelation infused power 41 inherence/ co-inherence 63 instantaneous (ἄχρονος) 102, 104–05, 109–10 intelligible(s) 23, 27–28, 34, 43–44, 47, 49, 67, 83–84, 90, 93, 122–23, 125, 175, 177–78, 187–88, 212–13 “just as much as” 224–25 κατ’ αὐτόν 59–60, 84 likeness 31–32, 39–40 ; see also image logoi as predeterminations and acts of will/ divine wills 93, 109, 132, 142, 144, 233 logoi as principles of cosmic arrangement 45–48, 53, 121, 123, 138, 173, 189 ; see also holomerism ; Porphyrian tree logoi as principles of knowledge and principles of making 103–06, 108– 11, 131–33, 143, 179 logoi as providential set of divine thoughts 43, 127, 135, 140 logos of being, logos of well-being, logos of eternal well-being 121–22, 128, 145, 154, 166–67, 196–97, 224– 25, 229, 234 ; see also being, well– being, eternal well–being mediator 79, 235–36 metaphysics of prepositions 122, 125–26 microcosm/ macrocosm 37, 214, 235– 36 most specific species 180–81, 184–85 movement/ motion 29, 31–32, 36, 40, 44, 46–48, 71, 94–95, 102, 112, 141, 143, 146–48, 150–56, 165–67, 181– 82, 187–89, 214, 217–20, 229, 232,

indices 234–36 ; see also activity ; passion ; procession and conversion  ; transformation mystery of Christ 78–79, 112, 135, 202–03, 210, 215 ; see also hypostatic union neo-Chalcedonianism 208–09, 215 new theandric activity 218, 221 no confusion, no change, no division, no separation 206–07, 222 paradigm 40, 43, 47, 126, 134, 139– 40, 142, 170, 177, 191, 239 participate/ participation 29, 31, 38, 40–41, 43–44, 48–49, 51, 53, 103, 139, 146, 149, 158–60, 163–70, 228– 29, 234 participated beings 158–59, 162–64, 166 ; see also goodness ; wisdom participating beings 158–59, 164, 166 passion(s) 25–27, 34, 36–37, 40–43, 46, 225, 232 penetration/ interpenetration (περιχώρησις) 227–28 ; see also Trinity περὶ αὐτόν/ περὶ αὐτου 59–60, 84, 88, 157 ; see also κατ’ αὐτόν pleasure/ pain 33–34, 46, 53, 238 Porphyrian/ Porphyrian tree/ Porphyrian logic 17, 87, 124, 129–30, 136–38, 154, 160, 174–77, 179–81, 185, 189, 200, 216, 230, 235 “portions/ portion of God” 142, 166– 67, 224 potential/ potentially/ potentiality 37–38, 40, 57, 101–02, 105, 108–09, 117, 121–22, 146–47, 149, 151–55, 187, 189, 195, 219–20, 231–32, 234– 35 ; see also activity, actuality ; energy ; power power (δύναμις) 17, 27, 41, 59, 64–65, 67, 88, 147, 151–53, 156, 159, 168, 219–20, 222 practical, contemplative, theological philosophy 27, 35 ; see also spiritual development procession/ conversion (πρόοδος/ ἐπιστροφή) 17, 141–43, 187

259

property/ properties (ίδιώματα) 38– 40, 59, 68, 83–89, 91, 107, 160, 163, 165–66, 168–69, 171, 183, 200–01, 227, 231 ; see also being, well-being, eternal well-being ; image and likeness  ; participated/ participating beings providence 48, 111, 143–44, 161–64, 196, 211 quality/ qualities ; see accident “recently” (προσφάτως) 110, 112, 136, 171 receptive/ receptivity 34, 38, 102, 166, 228–29, 231 relative knowledge/ experiental knowledge 49–55, 57–58, 75, 222 remaining, proceeding and converting 141 ; see also procession/ conversion revelation 23–25, 27–28, 31, 50, 53, 55–57, 61, 70, 78, 82, 91–92, 139, 227–28 ; see also conceal, concealment ; incarnation self-consolidating 65–68, 82 ; see also αὐτοσθενής ; power self-constituted 67 self-love/ loving 19, 33–34 ; see also pleasure/ pain self-subsisting/ subsistence 64–67, 82, 197–98 self-sufficient 67, 141 ; see also activity sensible 28, 32–35, 41, 43–44, 47, 81, 123, 156, 168, 175, 177–78, 180, 187–88, 220, 222, 238 ; see also intelligible spiritual development 29, 31, 35–37, 40, 42, 44, 46, 49–50, 53, 57, 59–60, 127, 156, 229, 231, 236, 238 substance(s) 39, 61–62, 65, 67, 74, 88, 101, 121, 127, 147, 149, 152, 177, 183, 188, 212, 223, 226 ; see also essence surface appearances 34, 53 taxonomy/ taxonomic system 138, 144, 182, 185, 189, 191, 235temporal beginning 93–94, 98–99, 101,

260

indices

103, 106, 114, 118, 158, 171, 179, 186, 225 the One, the Intellect, and the Soul 80–81, 123 transfiguration 25–26, 28 transformation 28–29, 33, 36, 44, 46, 48, 53, 143, 182, 186, 190, 214, 227, 230, 234–35, 237–38 ; see also deification Triad 61, 65, 67–69, 71–75, 78–79, 82, 122 Trinity 12, 14, 16, 35–36, 49, 58, 61– 63, 65–70, 73–75, 77–79, 82, 126, 213–15, 234 universal(s) and particular(s) 67–68, 113, 128, 133, 136–38, 144, 173– 202, 235 ; see also whole/part vice(s) 34, 46, 238 ; see also pleasure/ pain

virtue(s) 11, 24, 30, 35, 37–38, 40–42, 45–48, 53, 162, 164–65, 168–69 ; see also contemplation ; spiritual development whole(s)/ part(s) 12, 37, 94, 112, 173– 74, 190, 193–96, 198–99 ; see also genera, species, particulars ; holomerism ; universal and particular wills/ acts of will, 109, 127 ; see also activity, actuality without beginning (ἄναρχον) 61, 69, 85, 87–88, 158–59, 161–63, 166, 169, 171, 225 wisdom 38–40, 58–59, 88, 160–61, 168–19 see also gnomic aptitude ; goodness works of God 157–58, 218, 226 ; see also activity