Studies in Maximus the Confessor's Opuscula Theologica Et Polemica: Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3-4 ... Et Mediaevalia - Subsidia Maximiana, 89) 9782503600833, 2503600832

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STUDIES IN MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR’S OPUSCULA THEOLOGICA ET POLEMICA

I N S T R V M E N TA PAT R I S T I C A E T M E D I A E VA L I A

Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity

89 S v b si di a M a x i m i a na 1

STUDIES IN MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR’S OPUSCULA THEOLOGICA ET POLEMICA PAPERS COLLECTED ON THE OCCASION OF THE BELGRADE COLLOQUIUM ON SAINT MAXIMUS, 3–4 FEBRUARY 2020

Edited by Vladimir C vetković & Alexis L éonas With the collaboration of E. B rown D ewhurst

2022

I N S T R V M E N TA PAT R I S T I C A E T M E D I A E VA L I A

Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity

Founded by Dom Eligius Dekkers (†1998)

S v b si di a M a x i m i a na

Editorial responsibility

Alexis Léonas (Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary) & Vladimir Cvetković (Belgrade University, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory) Publishing manager

Bart Janssens Editorial board

Paul Blowers (Emmanuel Christian Seminary), Anthony Dupont (KU Leuven), Bronwen Neil (Macquarie University), Bram Roosen (KU Leuven), Torstein Tollefsen (University of Oslo), Peter Van Deun (KU Leuven)

D/2022/0095/187 ISBN 978-2-503-60083-3 E-ISBN 978-2-503-60084-0 DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.130168 ISSN 1379-9878 E-ISSN 2294-8457 © 2022, Brepols Publishers n. v./s.a., Turnhout, Belgium. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Printed in the EU on acid-free paper

Contents Abbreviations Used in this Volume for Maximus’ Works and Maximiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Reference Works: Series, Books and Journals . Introduction .

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Christian Boudignon, What Are the Opuscula theologica et polemica? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Bram Roosen, Maximian ἀπορίαι against the Monothelites

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Bronwen Neil and Ryan W. Strickler, Letters of Maximus in the Collectanea of Anastasius Bibliothecarius . . . 65 Aleksandar Djakovac, Maximus’ Relational Ontology .

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Kevin M. Clarke, Maximus the Confessor’s Anti-Severan Polemics in the Opuscula . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Sebastian Mateiescu, Arguing with the Properties of Christ . 127 Romilo Aleksandar Knežević, Maximus’ Opuscula and the Concept of the Hypostatic Union . . . . . . . . 161 Miklós Vassányi, The Problem of Identity in St Maximus’ Opusculum 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Dionysios Skliris, The Ambiguity of the Gnomic Will as Basis for a Theory of Human Individuality in the Thought of Saint Maximus the Confessor . . . . . 215 Indices Index of Maximus Citations . . . . . . Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . Index of Theological and Philosophical Terms List of Contributors . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . 241 . . . . . . 243 . . . . . 2 45 . . . . . 251

Abbreviations Used in this Volume for Maximus’ Works and Maximiana Add. Amb.Ioh. Amb.Thom. Anim. Cap.alia Cap.X Cap.XV Car. Comp. Contra Const. D.B.

Additamenta e variis codicibus [CPG 7707] Ambigua ad Iohannem [CPG 7705.2] Ambigua ad Thomam [CPG 7705.1] Opusculum de anima [CPG 7717] Capita alia [CPG 7716] Capita X [CPG 7694a] Capita XV [CPG 7695] Capita de caritate [CPG 7693] Computus ecclesiasticus [CPG 7706] Contra Constantinopolitanos [CPG 7740] Disputatio Bizyae sive Acta in primo exsilio seu dialogus Maximi cum Theodosio episcopo Caesareae in Bithynia [CPG 7735] Diversa capita ad theologiam et oeconomiam spectanDiv.Cap. tia deque virtute et vitio [CPG 7715] Disputatio cum Pyrrho [CPG 7698] D.P. E.O.D. Expositio orationis dominicae [CPG 7691] Expositio in Psalmum LIX [CPG 7690] E.ps.59 Epistulae XLV [CPG 7699] Ep. Epistula ad Anastasium monachum discipuEp.Max. lum [CPG 7701] L.A. Liber asceticus [CPG 7692] Myst. Mystagogia [CPG 7704] Op. Opuscula theologica et polemica [CPG 7697] Q.D. Quaestiones et dubia [CPG 7689] Q.Thal. Quaestiones ad Thalassium [CPG 7688] Q.Theop. Quaestiones ad Theopemptum [CPG 7696] R.M. Relatio Motionis inter Maximum et principes  [CPG 7736] Th.Oec. Capita theologica et oeconomica [CPG 7694] T.S. Testimonia et syllogismi [CPG 1916]

Reference Works: Series, Books and Journals AB Analecta Bollandiana Allen & Neil, OHMC   P. Allen and B. Neil (eds), The Oxford Handbook on Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2015. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca CAG Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca CCSG Corpus Christianorum Series Latina CCSL Clavis Patrum Graecorum CPG Clavis Patrum Graecorum Supplementum CPG Supp. Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium CSCO Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library DOML Early Christian Studies ECS Gregorii Nysseni Opera, Leiden GNO Loeb Classical Library LCL Louth, Maximus  A.  Louth, Maximus the Confessor (The Early Church Fathers), London – New York, 1996 Oxford Early Chrsitian Texts OECT J.-P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae cursus completus. PG Series Graeca, 161 vols (Paris, 1857–1866) J.-P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae cursus completus. PL Series Latina, 221 vols (Paris, 1844–1865) The Prosopography of the Late Roman Empire PLRE Studia Antiqua Australiensia SAA Studies in Byzantine History and Civilization SBHC Sources Chrétiennes SC Studia Patristica SP Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. by H. F. A. von SVF Arnim, 4 vols Leipzig, 1903–1905 Travaux et Mémoires TM C.-G. Conticello (– V. Conticello) (eds), La TB théologie byzantine et sa tradition, 2 vols, Turnhout, 2002-2016.

Introduction Vladimir Cvetković and Alexis Léonas (Belgrade and Budapest)* More than a century after the pioneering works of the Russian patristic scholar, Sergey Epifanovič, modern studies on Saint Maximus the Confessor have experienced a sudden and massive expansion, evident in the production of articles, monographs, theses, as well as in the organization of major international conferences. Together with Augustine, Maximus has become one of the most studied ancient Christian authors in the third millennium. The first modern studies dedicated to Saint Maximus were produced in Russia in the nineteen-tens by Sergey Epifanovič.1 A few decades later, Swiss theologian and future cardinal of the Catholic Church, Hans Urs von Balthasar, who was not familiar with the works of the Russian scholar, published his own study in 1941: Kosmische Liturgie. Maximus der Bekenner: Höhe und Krise des griechischen Weltbilds.2 This study has been followed by the works of the Benedictine monk and professor of theology Polycarp Sherwood, who provided not only the translations and a date-list of Maximus’ works, but also an alternative perspective on Saint

* This article was completed with the support of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, according to the Agreement on the realisation and financing of scientific research. 1  S.  L.

Epifanovič,  Prepodobnyj Maksim Ispovednik i Vizantijskoe bogoslovie, Kiev, 1915; S.  L. Epifanovič, Prepodobnyj Maksim Ispovednik, ego žiznʹ i tvorenija, Kiev, 1917. 2  H.  U.  von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie. Maximus der Bekenner, Höhe und Krise des griechischen Weltbilds, Freiburg i. Br., 1941. Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 9–22.

 



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Maximus’ relationship to Origenism. 3 In the light of Sherwood’s discoveries, Balthasar republished his work in 1961, radically revising his view on Maximus’ Origenism.4 In 1964, the Swedish Lutheran theologian Lars Thunberg published his monograph entitled Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor,5 one of the best introductions to Maximus’ thought available today. In 1985, he published a smaller book as an introduction to Maximus’ cosmic vision.6 Walther Völker’s excellent monograph Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens,7 published in 1965, unfortunately remained in the shadow of Thunberg’s work published a year earlier. Interest in Maximus the Confessor in the francophone world during the 1970s and 1980s far exceeded that of anglophone academia. The French school in Maximian scholarship was the legacy of the students of the Dominican monk Marie-Joseph Le Guillou,8 whose students included Alain Riou,9 Jean-Miguel Garrigues,10

3  P. Sherwood, The earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism, Roma, 1955; P. Sherwood, St Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life – The Four Centuries on Charity, Westminster, 1955. 4  H.  U.  von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie. Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners, Einsiedeln 1961. Translated into English by Brian E. Daley as: H. U. von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy. The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, San Francisco, 2003. 5  L.  Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois, 21995. 6  L.  Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos. The Vision of St Maximus the Confessor, Crestwood, NY, 1985. 7  W. Völker, Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens, Wiesbaden, 1961. 8  M.-J.  Le Guillou, Le Christ et l’Église. Théologie du mystère, Paris, 1963; M.-J. Le Guillou, L’expérience de l’Esprit saint en Orient et en Occident, SaintMaur, Les Plans-sur-Bex, 2001. 9  A.  Riou, Le monde et l’Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur, Paris, 1973 (Théologie historique, 22). 10  J.  M. Garrigues, Maxime le Confesseur. La charité, avenir divin de l’homme, Paris, 1976 (Théologie historique 38).

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François-Marie Lethel,11 Pier Piret,12 and Irénée Henri Dalmais.13 Increased theological interest in Maximus’ works also led to a philological focus on his corpus, which was previously only available in Migne’s Patrologia Graeca (vols 90 and 91). The first critical editions of Maximus’ works appeared in Brepols’ Corpus Christianorum: Seria Graeca (CCSG) as the works of Carl Laga and Carlos Steel on the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, José Declerck on the Quaestiones et dubia, and Peter Van Deun on the Expositio in Psalmum LIX, the Expositio orationis dominicae, and the Liber Asceticus. Several important theological works on Maximus were produced during the nineties: Paul M. Blowers’s Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy in Maximus the Confessor focused on Quaestiones ad Thalassium,14 Nikolaos Loudovikos’s Eucharistic Ontology (in Greek),15 Vasilios Karayiannis’s Maxime le confesseur. Essence et énergies de Dieu,16 Jean-Claude Larchet’s La divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur; 17 and Andrew Louth’s Maximus the Confessor.18 These studies were written by scholars with a certain aim in mind: Loudovikos tried to demonstrate that the Eucha11  F.-M.  Léthel,  Théologie

de l’agonie du Christ. La liberté humaine du Fils de Dieu et son importance sotériologique mises en lumière par saint Maxime le Confesseur, Paris, 1979 (Théologie historique 52). 12  P.  Piret, Le Christ et la Trinité selon Maxime le Confesseur, Paris, 1983 (Théologie historique 69). 13  I.-H. Dalmais, Théologie de l’église et mystère liturgique dans la Mystagogie de saint Maxime le Confesseur, Berlin, 1975. 14  P.  M. Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy in Maximus the Confessor: An Investigation of the Quaestiones Ad Thalassium, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1991. 15  N.  Loudovikos, Ἡ εὐχαριστιακὴ ὀντολογία: τὰ εὐχαριστιακὰ θεμέλια τοῦ εἶναι ὡς ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γίγνεσθα, στὴν ἐσχατολογικὴ ὀντολογία τοῦ ἁγίου Μαξίμου τοῦ Ὁμολογητῆ, Athens, 1992. Translated by Elisabeth Theokritoff as: N.  Loudovikos, A  Eucharistic Ontology: Maximus the Confessor’s Eschatological Ontology of Being as Dialogical Reciprocity, Brookline, 2010. 16  V. Karayiannis, Maxime le confesseur. Essence et énergies de Dieu, Paris, 1993 (Théologie historique, 93). 17  J.-C.  Larchet, La Divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur, Paris, 1996; Maxime le Confesseur, médiateur entre l’Orient et l’Occident, Paris, 1998; J.-C.  Larchet, Saint Maxime le Confesseur, Paris, 2003. 18  Louth, Maximus.

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ristic ecclesiology propagated by his mentor John Zizioulas was also Maximus’ legacy, but he later disagreed with Zizioulas about Maximus’ view on person-nature relationship; Vasilios Karayiannis attempted to show that the distinction between substance and activities in the Trinity is evident in Maximus, like in Palamas; Larchet criticised the tendency of Dominican scholars such as Riou and Garrigues to consider Maximus as a proto-Thomist; and Andrew Louth provided a short but informative introduction to Maximus the Confessor as well as an English translation of key passages from the Ambigua, boosting further Maximian studies in the English speaking world. Louth also served as mentor and/ or as editor for several important works on Maximus: Demetrios Bathrellos’ The Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of St Maximus the Confessor (2004), Adam Cooper’s The Body in St Maximus the Confessor: Holy Flesh, Wholly Deified (2005), Melchisedec Törönen’s Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor (2007), Torstein Tollefsen’s, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor (2008) and Cyril Hovorun’s Will, Action and Freedom. Christological Controversies in the Seventh Century (2008). Historical studies in Maximus have followed theological interest in his works. Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil have published the letters of Maximus and his closest associates in Greek and Latin, as well as in the English translation,19 the third recension of The Life of Maximus the Confessor,20 and The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor.21 Probably the greatest breakthrough in the academic studies of Maximus the Confessor was achieved in the field of philosophy. Maximus the philosopher was discovered first by Eric Perl, who in his thesis Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus the Confessor (Yale University, 1991) investigated Maximus’ ideas within Platonic conceptual framework. He has been followed in the exploration of Maximus’ philosophical vision by several generations of philosophers, such as Torstein Tollefsen, Grigory Benevich, Georgi Kapriev, David Bradshaw, Valery V. 19  CCSG

39; OECT 2002. 6. 21  Allen & Neil, OHMC . 20  ECS

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Petroff, Pascal Mueller-Jourdan, Michael Harrington, Christophe Erismann, Sotiris Mitralexis, Nevena Dimitrova, Filip Ivanović, Bogna Kosmulska, and Dionysios Skliris. There was only one major conference on Maximus in the twentieth century,22 organized in Fribourg in 1980. In stark contrast, in the first two decades of the twenty-first century alone several major international conferences on Maximus were organized in Athens, Belgrade, Helsinki, Berlin, and Budapest.23 Since 2007 there have been workshops on Maximus at the Oxford Patristics Conferences24 and at the International Congress of Byzantine Studies,25 as well as smaller scale conferences in Georgia (Tbilisi and Tsageri, where Maximus’ relics were discovered in 2011).26

22  F.  Heinzer

& C.  Schönborn (eds), Maximus Confessor, Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2–5 sept. 1980, Fribourg, 1982. 23  “Neoplatonism and St Maximus the Confessor”, Norwegian Institute at Athens, University of Liverpool & Academy of Finland. Athens: 11–13 December 2008; “International Symposium on Saint Maximus the Confessor”, University of Belgrade & Fordham University, Belgrade: 18–21 October 2012; “International Conference on St Maximus the Confessor: The Architecture of the Cosmos”, University of Helsinki and Studium Catholicum, Helsinki: 2–4 September 2013; “Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher”, Freie Universität Berlin and University of Athens, Berlin, September 26–28, 2014; “Opuscula theologica et polemica of Maximus the Confessor” University of Belgrade and Károli Gáspár University of the Hungarian Reformed Church, Belgrade 3–4 February 2020; “Ambiguum 10 of Maximus the Confessor”, Károli Gáspár University of the Hungarian Reformed Church and University of Belgrade, Budapest (online), 3–4 February 2021. 24  “Ambiguum 7 of St Maximus the Confessor”, XV International Conference of Patristic Studies, University of Oxford, 2007; “A Saint for East and West: The Thought of Maximus Confessor in Eastern & Western Christian Theology”, XVI International Conference on Patristic Studies, University of Oxford, 2011; “The Fountain and the Flood: Maximos the Confessor and Philosophical Enquiry”, XVII International Conference on Patristic Studies, University of Oxford, 2015; “Exploring Nuances in Maximos the Confessor’s Thought”, XVIII International Conference on Patristic Studies, University of Oxford, 2019. 25  Byzantine Philosophy and Maximus the Confessor, 23rd International Congress of Byzantine Studies, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade: 22–27 August 2016. 26  The International Theological Scientific Conference dedicated to St Maximus the Confessor”, St Maximus the Confessor’s International Theo-

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Major critical editions and translations of Maximus’ works have been produced in the twenty-first century. For example, Brepols’ Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca, the Liber Asceticus edited by Peter Van Deun published in 2000; the Ambigua ad Tomam edited by Bart Janssens published in 2002, and the Mystagogia edited by Christian Boudignon published in 2011. A critical edition of Ambigua ad Ioannem was published together with its English translation by Nicholas (Maximos) Constas with Harvard University Press in 2014.27 Despina Prassas translated Maximus’ Quaestiones et dubia in 2010 and Constas also published the English translation of Quaestiones ad Thalassium28 in 2018.29 Already in his survey of the research on Maximus the Confessor from 1997, Andrew Louth dedicated equal space to the theological and philosophical readings of Maximus, specifically in the works of Paul Blowers and Isabel de Andia. 30 Less than two decades later, the most significant question for Joshua Lollar, in his overview on Maximus’ modern reception, has been the difference in reading Maximus as a theologian and philosopher. 31 In addition to this disparity, one may encounter various, even opposing readings of Maximus in the camps of theologians and philosophers. It is possible to discern a long tradition of reading Maximus through confessional lenses, either as a proto-Thomist by the French Catholic school of Maximian studies, a trend that continues into the twenty-first century, as the work of Antoine Lévy demonstrates, 32 or as a proto-Palamist which is also evident logical Scientific Centre, Tbilisi. So far, seven conferences were organized between 2007 and 2019. 27  N. Constas (trans.), Maximos the Confessor, The Ambigua, 2 vols, Cambridge MA, 2014 (DOML 28–29). 28  Maximus the Confessor, On Difficulties in Sacred Scripture: The Responses to Thalassios, trans. by M.  Constas, Washington, DC, 2018. 29  St Maximus the Confessor, Questions and Doubts, trans. by D.  Prassas, De Kalb, Illinois, 2010. 30  A.  Louth, “Recent Research on St Maximus the Confessor: A Survey”, St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 42/1 (1998), pp. 67–84. 31  J.  Lollar, “Reception of Maximian Thought in the Modern Era”, in OHMC, pp. 564–80: 577. 32  A.  Lévy, Le créé et l’incréé: Maxime le Confesseur et Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 2006.

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in the reading of some orthodox scholars, such as Torstein Tollefsen33 and David Bradshaw. 34 Some American Catholic theologians read Maximus through the lens of von Balthasar’s pioneering studies on Maximus. In a similar vein, some Orthodox Maximian scholars read Maximus through the prism of Epifanovič’s work and focus on bringing Maximus’ works to contemporary theological debates about the relationship between hypostasis and nature. Since Thunberg’s studies on Maximus, there have also been a number of protestant theologians focusing on Maximus’ exegesis of biblical texts as the most important feature of his corpus. All these differences in the theological readings of Maximus surely reflect the richness of different confessional traditions, but they should not detract us from trying to attain a unified vision. In the readings of Maximus as a philosopher, one encounters two main approaches. The first considers Maximus as a Neoplatonic philosopher, due to the similarity of his philosophical language to the language of Neoplatonists. The danger of this tendency is to read Maximus like any other non-Christian Neoplatonist, without paying much attention to his Christian commitment. The second approach is to admit the superficial resemblance of his philosophical vocabulary with that of the Neoplatonists, but to insist on Maximus’ overall originality in dealing with the existing philosophical material. The result of this is an overemphasis on Maximus’ novelty in dealing with Neoplatonic philosophy and a failure to acknowledge that the Neoplatonic philosophical software was the common property of both educated Christians and pagans in Maximus’ times. Moreover, there is still a hesitation to use Maximus’ ideas in modern philosophical debates in the same way as Augustine’s and Thomas Aquinas’ ideas are put forth. In spite of the fact that Augustine and Aquinas are categorized as “religious thinkers”, they are not exiled to the hermetically sealed domain of theology, 33  T.  Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2008, pp. 139–48. See also P. Allen, “Review of Torstein Tollefsen’s The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor”, Journal of Religious History, 35/3 (2011), pp. 426–27. 34  D. Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West, Cambridge, 2004.

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as it is still the case for Maximus. Instead, their contribution to classical philosophical problems is deemed relevant. Finally, because philosophical ideas do not become irrelevant just on the basis of old age, one can look at ancient philosophies in a decontextualised manner. However, there exists a danger that one may overlook the social, political, or theological circumstances that influenced the conception of these ideas. This is applicable to Maximus also because an achronological approach to his ideas may neglect the socio-political aspects of his time, as Pauline Allen has pointed out. 35 For a full appreciation of Maximus’ genius, it is equally important to approach his works from a historical and philological perspective. Historians, no less than philosophers, confront various challenges while approaching Maximus’ works. Attempts have been made recently to solve the long-lasting question of Maximus’ origins by advocating for the hypothesis of Maximus’s Syriac origin. 36 The Syriac Life of Saint Maximus is a psogos or anti-Vita written by Maximus’ adversary, who claims that Maximus was born in the village of Hesfin on the Golan in Palestine, as an illegitimate child of a Samaritan father and a Persian mother, and that he grew up in neighboring Palestinian monastery. 37 In spite of the new evidence for Maximus’ Syriac origin, scholars 38 have pointed out the problem of reconciling the assertions of the Syriac

35  Allen, “Review of Torstein Tollefsen’s The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor”, 427. 36  P.  Booth, Crisis of Empire: Doctrine and Dissent at the End of Late Antiquity, Berkeley, 2014, pp. 144–55; P. Allen, “Life and Times of Maximus the Confessor”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, pp. 3–18. 37  V.  Bolotov, Lectsii po istorii drevnej Tserkvi [Lectures on the History of the Ancient Church], Petrograd, 1917, vol. iv, pp. 477–82; AB 91, pp. 299–346; B. Neil and P. Allen (eds. and trans.), The Life of Maximus the Confessor Recension 3, Strathfield, 2003 (ecs 6). Full biographical dossier on Maximus had been assembled by B. Roosen, “Maximi Confessoris Vitae et Passiones Graecae: The Development of a Hagiographic Dossier”, Byzantion 80 (2010), pp. 408–60. Roosen’s conclusions have been recently confirmed by H. Ohme, “Die griechische Vita Papst Martins (BHG 2259), Maximus Confessor und das Concilium Quinisextum (691/2)”, Byzantion 86 (2016), pp. 317–36. 38  S.  Mitralexis, “Review of The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor”, Vigiliae Christianae, 70/4 (2016), pp. 467–71: 470–71.

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life of Maximus with his own words that he is not familiar with the places and customs in Syria and Palestine, the region in which he was allegedly born. 39 Furthermore, there is evidence that Maximus had extensive knowledge of and contacts within the imperial court, details which are more consonant with the claim in the Greek life that Maximus held a position as head of the imperial chancellery.40 Philological research on Maximus’ work is important not only in regard to the production of critical editions of his voluminous opus, but also in regard to the reception of his works. The last four decades have seen the publication of critical editions of Maximus’ most important works (mostly in the Brepols’ Corpus Christianorum series). As well as this, there are also continuous studies investigating the reception of Maximus in different traditions, including Late Antique and Medieval Greek and Latin, Georgian, Paleo-Slavonic and Medieval Russian. A critical edition of Cerbanus’ Latin translation of the Chapters on Charity was recently undertaken by Péter Bara for the Corpus Christianorum and is a step in this direction. In the same vein, the Georgian versions have been recently studied by a whole group of scholars.41 The subseries Subsidia Maximiana of the Brepols’ series Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia (IPM) is the next logical step in the development of Maximian studies — it follows the recent explosion of interest in this Late Antique author. Its aim is to provide a way to deal with the existing challenges in the contemporary Maximus research. Cooperation with Brepols makes it possible to coordinate the development of Maximian studies with the publication of the critical editions of Saint Maximus’ texts within the Corpus Christianorum series. The editorial board of Subsidia Maximiana is composed of Maximian scholars from different disciplines with the aim of avoiding 39  QD

163; II,8, cf. J. Declerck (ed.), Quaestiones et dubia, Turnhout, 1982, p. 113 & pp. 166–67 (CCSG 10). 40  In his study favouring the Greek life, Louth draws attention to Lackner’s argument that there is direct evidence in Maximus’ own works that he had once been in the service of the emperor (Ep. 12, PG 91, 505B). Cf. Louth, Maximus, p. 199, n. 6. 41  Cf.  Maximus the Confessor and Georgia, ed. by T. Mgaloblishvili & L.  Khoperia, London, 2009 (Iberica Caucasica, 3).

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divisive approaches to Maximian studies. Rather than prioritising traditional theological readings of Maximus, or taking a solely philosophical approach, it is the intention of this series to provide a space for a more interdisciplinary approach to Maximus’ work. An important purpose of the series, besides coordinating and channeling widespread academic interest in Maximus, is to afford equal recognition and valuation to different regional approaches to Maximus’ works. The language of the series is English, with the possibility of publishing research also in French and German. It is important to make the results of different national or regional traditions in Maximian research known to a wider community of scholars. This kind of exchange will ensure not only proper representation of different national or regional scholarship, but will establish a relationship between the different registers of Maximus’ thought on which certain national and regional schools of Maximian studies are focused. The present volume of the Subsidia Maximiana contains the materials from the International Colloquium on Saint Maximus the Confessor held in Belgrade on 3–4 February 2020, as well as contributions collected in its aftermath. Since these proceedings happened to be the origin of the Subsidia Maximiana series, it makes sense to say a few words about the initial project. Our original plan was to organise St Maximus’ workshops alternately in Belgrade (the University of Belgrade) and in Budapest (at the Károli Gáspár University of the Hungarian Reformed Church), thus bringing together the unbroken chain of the Orthodox Patristic learning in Serbia and the traditionally high standard of Classical and Biblical Studies in Hungary. Our conferences were conceived as workshops focused on narrowly defined topics from the field of Maximian studies, as in this case on Opuscula theologica et polemica. This approach was obviously putting a restraint on the number of interested participants but at the same time it allowed us to achieve more concentrated and interesting results. While conferences on Maximus would normally be focused on largescale aspects of Maximus’ works, such as his Neoplatonism, the intention of the Belgrade-Budapest workshops was to focus each time on one single work of Maximus, or even on individual chapters within his works. Thus, one could

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hope that the analysis of a given work will combine different perspectives — theology, philosophy, philology and history. As the topic of our first symposium, we chose Opuscula theologica et polemica — one of the most scholarly neglected of Saint Maximus’ works. Opuscula theologica et polemica or “Minor Theological and Polemical Writings” of the Confessor are a collection of letters and shorter works largely written between ad 633 and 657. The collection itself, its composition and origin have never received concentrated scholarly attention so far, although some Opuscula were at the centre of a recent debate on nature and hypostasis in Maximus between John Zizioulas and Nikolaos Loudovikos.42 A critical edition is lacking, although Basile Markesinis (Leuven) has been working on one, keeping Maximian scholars in eager expectation of a speedy publication. Therefore, the present volume purports to be the first of its kind, offering a panorama of modern approaches to a little-studied work of Maximus. It can thus just as well be regarded as a kind of an elementary introduction to the study of the Opuscula Theologica et Polemica. The timing of the Opuscula workshop was purposefully chosen to fall on 3 February, this being the date of the Feast of St Maximus according to the Julian Calendar still in use with the Serbian Orthodox Church (21 January by the new style). The colloquium on 3 February 2020 had the privilege to unfold under the patronage of the late Patriarch Irenaeus of Serbia, who participated in our first session and gave it his blessing, which was surely responsible for the lasting success of our enterprise. Among the papers in this volume, the contributions of Miklós Vassányi, Dionysios Skliris, Aleksandar Djakovac and Romilo Knežević were presented then and there. Already the first workshop showed that the potential of the conference is much greater than expected, as the interest it aroused surpassed our countries’ borders. Many Maximian scholars from around the world — whom we would not have been able to invite given our stretched means 42  J.  Zizioulas,

“Person and Nature in the Theology of St Maximus the Confessor”, in: Knowing the Purpose of Creation through the Resurrection, ed. by M.  Vasiljević, Alhambra, CA, 2013, pp. 85–113. For a critique see N.  Loudovikos, “Dialogical Nature, Enousion Person, and Non-ecstatic Will in St Maximus the Confessor: The Conclusion of a Long Debate”, Analogia, 2/1 (2017), pp. 79–110.

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— responded enthusiastically to the call for papers. The idea of having the contributions published by Brepols inspired the project to create a stable platform for Maximian studies: the Subsidia Maximiana. Thus, reflecting our quest for a multidisciplinary approach, this volume combines theological, philosophical, philological, and historical studies on Saint Maximus. Its contributors are philosophers (Sebastian Mateiescu, Dionysios Skliris and Miklós Vassányi), theologians (Aleksandar Djakovac, Kevin M. Clarke and Romilo Knežević), philologists and historians (Bronwen Neil, Ryan Strickler, Christian Boudignon and Bram Roosen). The first group of studies in the volume is focused on textual issues. Opuscula Theologica et Polemica is an assemblage of heterogeneous materials. Christian Boudignon analyses the structure of the Opuscula and suggests several classifications of its materials, according to date, to genre and to content. Boudignon maintains that although the compiler of Opuscula, François Combefis, in 1675 aimed to create a collection of texts related to Maximus’ dispute with the Monothelites, the collection itself is not unified either around theme, or around the date of writing, nor around genre, and therefore it is difficult to justify its split from the Letters’ corpus. Bram Roosen in his article also confirms the arbitrary character of Combefis’ collection and points out two important Maximian texts on will omitted by Combefis. New texts can thus be added to the collection. Roosen presents his critical edition and translation of one of these texts on the two wills in Christ to be included among the Opuscula. An important milestone in the transmission of the Maximian legacy to the West (and ultimately in the making of the Opuscula series) is the ninth century Collectanea of Anastasius Bibliothecarius studied by Bronwen Neil and Ryan Strickler. Anastasius’ collection contains Latin translations of Opuscula 10, 12, and 20 — texts dealing with the anti-monothelete polemic, the Filioque question and the supremacy of Rome. In his attempts to demonstrate that even an eminent Greek as Maximus could come close to the Western understanding of these issues, Anastasius saved from oblivion the important pieces of Maximus’ writing.

introduction

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From textual analysis, we move on to the questions of theology and philosophy. Few thinkers of Late Antiquity were as well-versed in the Classical Greek philosophy as Maximus. Proof of this can be found in the study by Aleksandar Djakovac, who explores the distinction between the Aristotelian category of πρός τι and the notion of σχέσις, both employed by Maximian to indicate relation. After a careful overview of the relational concepts in Neoplatonic and in patristic philosophy, Djakovac highlights the background and the meaning of Maximus’ distinctive use of πρός τι and σχέσις. According to Djakovac, Saint Maximus uses the term πρός τι to denote a wide range of relations, from created beings to uncreated entities like the persons of the Trinity, while he reserves the term σχέσις for hypostatic relations only. Another aspect of Maximus’ background is analysed in Kevin Clarke’s study. What is the reason of Maximus’ frequent polemics against Severus of Antioch (456–538) in the Opuscula? As Clarke convincingly shows, by using Severus as a whipping boy, Maximus could avoid naming his actual opponents and advance his ideas in the way that offered common ground for understanding to his contenders. Clarke demonstrates that, for Maximus, it is only possible to apply the notion of a composite hypostasis to Christ. Thus, Christ could will and work in both natures while being the hypostasis of each nature, whereas the Severan application of composite will and operation to Christ would lead to the Holy Trinity becoming quaternity. Anti-Severan polemics are also very much present in the study of Sebastian Mateiescu, who scrutinises a case of a theologically over-charged formula. Coined by Cyril of Alexandria (c. 376–444) in his polemic against Eunomians, “difference as to natural quality” — διαφορὰ ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ — came to mean different things to different people. Mateiescu presents the antecedents and focuses on Saint Maximus’ handling of the problem, which reveal, apart from the Confessor’s typical lucidity, his indebtedness to philosophical traditions, especially to that of Neoplatonism. The ontological premises of Maximus’ teaching on hypostatic union are further questioned in the contribution of Romilo Knežević. Knežević considers radical personalism and the works of Maximus, arguing that Maximus’ works contain a number of speculative pitfalls going all the way to the idea of person’s un-crea-

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tedness. These difficulties are carefully presented and analysed by Knežević who proceeds to resolve them with a Zizioulian acumen. Plunging further into metaphysical depths, we next turn to Miklós Vassányi’s reflections on the issue of identity in Saint Maximus’ theology. Vassányi begins by pointing out an interesting chiastic structure in Opusculum 13: human beings have a personal identity combined with difference of the essences (i.e., soul and body), whereas in the Holy Trinity, identity is that of the essence, and difference is that of the persons. This reverse analogy introduces a conceptual build-up, which allows Maximus to develop a theology operating in strictly rational terms, where Christology appears as a foundation — a cross-beam — bearing out both theology and anthropology. Despite the essential difference between divine and human natures, their hypostatic unity in Christ is, for Vassányi, a bedrock on which infinite and finite attributes may subsist in a human being. The doctrine of the gnomic will is undisputedly one of Saint Maximus’ most important contributions to Christian thought. In his article, Dionysios Skliris demonstrates how this concept is determinant for the whole of Maximian anthropology. Exploring a theology of the gnomic will allowed Maximus to significantly deepen the entire dimension of anthropology. Despite — or maybe owing to — its complexity, Maximus’ prosopological stance appears today strangely modern, comparable and compatible with the ideas of the twentieth century thinkers as Sartre, Berdyaev or Heidegger. Having presented this short overview of the volume’s contents, the editors have the pleasant task to express gratitude to Bram Roosen (KU Leuven) for so many useful commentaries and corrections and to Diána Enesey (Károli Gáspár University, Budapest) for help with editing. We would also like to thank Brepols and particularly Bart Janssens for helping to make this volume happen. It is hoped that this collection of studies contributes to knowledge of Saint Maximus and will be useful to scholars and friends of the Confessor. The editors would like to dedicate this volume to the blessed memory of the Patriarch Irenaeus of Serbia.

What Are the Opuscula theologica et polemica? A Philological Question Christian Boudignon (Aix-Marseille) The Opuscula theologica et polemica1 or Opuscula are a collection of twenty-seven texts on monophysism, monoenergism and monotheletism, written by the famous monk and theologian Maximus the Confessor between ad c. 633 and 657. It was first edited by François Combefis in 16752 and reprinted by Jacques-Paul Migne in 1860. 3 So, what does this group of texts consist of? Although there is an apparent thematic unity in this collection, addressing the theological issues of nature, action and will in Christ, the philological unity of this group of texts is very problematic considering the extant manuscripts. Our main scope will be to evaluate the validity of the Opuscula’s standing as a cohesive collection. Most scholars are not aware of this problem. This point has not yet been studied extensively. Recently, Peter Van Deun in a paper on “Maximus the Confessor’s Use of Literary Genres” does not consider the texts of this collection as a whole but classifies them in questions and answers, chapter collections, collections of defini-

1  That

is CPG 7697. Basile Markesinis has announced he will publish the critical edition of the Op. 1–11 and 20 (see P. Van Deun, P. Mueller-Jourdan & B. Markesinis, “Maxime le Confesseur”, in La théologie byzantine et sa tradition, I/1, ed. by C. G. Conticello, Turnhout, 2015, p. 412). 2  F. Combefis ed., S. Maximi Confessoris, Graecorum theologi eximiique philosophi, operum tomus primus (secundus)… eruta, nova Versione subacta, Notis illustrata, Paris, 1675. 3  PG 90, 91. Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 23–36.

 



10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.131015

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tions or theological treatises 4. Marek Jankowiak and Phil Booth both independently insist on the ambiguity of these texts that are principally letters but are not classified among Maximus’ Letters:5 The edition of Combefis imposed a division of the corpus of Maximus’ short works into Letters and Opuscula and established a provisional (but now canonical) order of works within each of these two groups. Neither of these corresponds to the shape in which these texts have been transmitted in the manuscripts. Many of the Opuscula are in reality letters, and they are not transmitted as a distinct body of text; they seem, however, as a rule, to be later than Letters, which end c. 641/2. The sequence of the Letters and Opuscula in the manuscripts 6 does not suggest any original arrangement of Maximus’ short works.

The compilation process and history will be the focus of this paper. A Medieval Short Compilation We would like to begin with a medieval compilation of eight or ten Opuscula. It is the core of Combefis’ twenty-seven Opuscula. The first state of the Opuscula is found in the Constantinopolitan Corpus, a medieval collection of approximately forty Maximian texts. The Constantinopolitan Corpus has been studied by Peter Van Deun,7 and Raf Bracke 8 has situated this compilation in the tenth century since the first manuscript of it, the lost Taurinensis 4  P. 

Van Deun, “Maximus the Confessor’s Use of Literary Genres”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, pp. 274–86. 5  M.  Jankowiak & Ph.  Booth, “A new Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, p. 23. 6  See e.g. P. Van Deun (ed.), Opuscula exegetica duo, Turnhout, 1991 (CCSG 23), pp. lii–lv & cviii–cxi. 7  Van Deun, Opuscula exegetica duo…, p. l: “La plupart de ces manuscrits renferment en fait une vaste collection d’à peu près quarante textes maximiens tels qu’ils ont été rassemblés dans le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée”. 8  R.  Bracke, “Some Aspects of the Manuscript Tradition of the Ambigua of Maximus the Confessor”, in Maximus Confessor, Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2–5 septembre 1980, ed. by F.  Heinzer – C. Schönborn, Fribourg, 1982, pp. 102–06.

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C. III. 3, has been copied by Theophanes in the Athonite monastery of Iviron between 1004 and 1023. Recently, Basile Markesinis has offered a status quaestionis and a dating of the corpus before the end of the joint reign of Constantine VII and Romanus I Lekapenus (December 921 or December 944).9 Two πίνακες or “summaries”, retaining probably the ancient form of the Constantinopolitan Corpus, are kept in the manuscripts A (Romanus Angelicus graecus 120) and M (Monacensis graecus 363). Here is the πίναξ of A (slightly different from the texts really written in A) which might reflect the oldest order: Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Letters 6, 7, 11, Expositio orationis dominicae, Letters 4, 8, 9, 1, 19, 12, 13, 15, Ambigua ad Thomam, Ambigua ad Iohannem, Disputatio cum Pyrrho, Opuscula 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, Mystagogia, Expositio in psalmum 59, Liber Asceticus, Capita de caritate, Capita theologica et oeconomica, Capita XV, Computus Ecclesiae, Dialogi de sancta Trinitate 1, 2.

In this collection, if we consider the Expositio orationis dominicae (that is the Short Explanation on the Lord’s Prayer) as a letter (it is a letter, indeed, addressed to an unknown Sergius magistros), we notice two series, one of Letters 6, 7, 11, (+ Expositio orationis dominicae) 4, 8, 9, 1, 19, 12, 13, 15, and the other of the so-called Opuscula 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9. Here is the πίναξ of M (different from the texts really written in M). In bold characters we write the difference of the πίναξ in M with the πίναξ in A: Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Ambigua ad Thomam, Ambigua ad Iohannem, Opusculum 13, Letters 6, 7, 11, Expositio orationis dominicae, Disputatio cum Pyrrho, Opuscula 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 6, 14, 8, 9, Letters 4, 8, 9, 1, 19, 12,10 13, 15, Mystagogia, Expositio in psalmum 59, Dialogi de sancta Trinitate 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, Opusculum de anima, Computus Ecclesiae, Liber Asceticus, Capita de caritate, Capita theologica et oeconomica, Diversa Capita.

9  B.  Markesinis, “La date de la composition du Corpus de S. Maxime le Confesseur: nouvelles données”, in The Literary Legacy of Byzantium. Editions, Translations, and Studies in Honour of Joseph A. Munitiz SJ, ed. by B. Roosen & P. Van Deun, Turnhout, 2019 (Byzantioς. SBHC 15), pp. 255–87.. 10  This item is written twice.

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To the list of the πίναξ of A the πίναξ of M added three Opuscula: 13 (isolated), 6 and 14 (inserted between Opuscula 7 and 8). This new list of ten Opuscula as described in the πίναξ of M is the real order of texts found in almost every manuscript of the Constantinopolitan Corpus.11 What Is the Unity of the Medieval Compilation of Eight or Ten Opuscula? a. The Probably Original Series of Eight Opuscula So, if we return to the probably original series of eight Opuscula (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9), what was the link between these texts that caused the first compiler to make a collection of them? We should give an analysis of them in order to see their unity. Opusculum 1 is addressed to the priest Marinus. It covers fourteen and a half columns in Migne’s Patrologia. It was chosen as an introduction to the question of will in Christ, principally because of the definitions of important words requested by Marinus (PG 91, col. 12B):12 1. θέλημα, 2. βούλησις, 3. βουλή, 4. προαίρεσις, 5. γνώμη, 6. ἐξουσία, 7. δόξα, 8. φρόνησις (PG 91, cols 12C–21C).

Opuscula 2 and 3 are two chapters (50 and 51) excerpted from a lost Treatise on operations and wills (ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἐνεργειῶν καὶ θελημάτων πραγματείας). The Corpus Constantinopolitanum does not mention to whom this treatise was addressed, and Combefis wrongly thought that it was to Marinus, whereas the priest Thalassius was the real dedicatee.13 These two chapters give the Miaphysite background of the dispute about the one or two wills

11  That

is in the four main codices (the Romanus Angelicus graecus 120, the lost Taurinensis C. III. 3, the Vaticanus graecus 1502 and the Parisinus, Coislinianus 90), and in their copies. 12  The second part concerns the idea that God and the saints have one will (τοῦ τε θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁγίων ἓν θέλημα γενήσεσθαι) and expresses a retractation of two awkward expressions in Maximus’ earlier works, the Q.Thal 42 and Amb.Ioh. 3, PG 91, 21D–37A. 13  See S.  L. Epifanovič, Матеріалы къ изученію жизни и твореній преп. Максима Исповѣдника, Kiev, 1917, p. 75, l. 6.

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in Christ. In the second one, Maximus quotes Discourse 30, 12 of Gregory of Nazianzus: Τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνου θέλειν οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον θεῷ, θεωθὲν ὅλον “For the willing of Christ is in no way against God, because it is all divinized” about the Agony in the garden of Gethsemane (Mt 26, 39: “Father, if it be possible, let the cup pass from me”). It is a surprise to find these two chapters 50 and 51 in the Constantinopolitan Corpus. They are contrary to the spirit of the Constantinopolitan Corpus, which aimed at gathering complete texts rather than excerpts: so, either the compiler found it already excerpted in his model or this compilation is prior to the Constantinopolitan Corpus’ collection and the loss of the Treatise on operations and wills. Opusculum 4 is a letter to the priest George on the mystery of Christ. It covers three columns in Migne’s edition. It is not properly on the will in Christ but Maximus (PG 91, col. 61A-B) quotes here also, albeit in a longer way, Discourse 30 (ch. 12) of Gregory of Nazianzus: Εἴπαμεν ἂν ὡς παρὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τυποῦσθαι τὸν λόγον· οὐ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Σωτῆρα νοουμένου (τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνου θέλειν, οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον θεῷ θεωθὲν ὅλον) ἀλλὰ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς· ὡς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου θελήματος, οὐ πάντως ἑπομένου τῷ θείῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντιπίπτοντος ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀντιπαλαίοντος. We would have said that the Verb is formed in the shape of the man, not the man thought as the Savior (for the willing of Christ is in no way against God, because it is all divinized) but the man as we are, since the human will does not always follow the divine but often resists it and wrestles against it.

This unique patristic reference seems to echo the former quotation in Opusculum 3. Opusculum 5 is a series of three excerpts of Maximian texts of unknown origin. It deals with operation or activity (ἐνέργεια); in Christ, there is no prevalent divine activity acting upon the human, nor does Christ use his human activity as a tool for his divine one, as there is no composite activity in Christ. This piece is a kind of little Maximian florilegium as are the Opuscula 2–3. Opusculum 7 is called Dogmatic Tome and was sent to Marinus, while he was still a deacon. The word τόμος in the title here means ‘treatise’. Nevertheless, Maximus seems to refer to this text in the

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Opusculum 9 under the title of letter: πρὸς Μαρῖνον ἐπιστολή (PG 91, col. 129B). If we judge by the length of ten columns in Migne’s Patrologia, it is approximately the length of the Opusculum 1 (fourteen columns and half) and it does not exceed the volume of a letter. Then, the title Dogmatic Tome may concern rather the thought than the length of the text. It refers sarcastically to the novel Ekthesis of Heraclius (PG 91, col. 76D–77A) and more seriously to several fathers of the Church, - especially in the context of the Agony in the garden of Gethsemane to Gregory’s same Discourse 30,  12: Τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνου θέλειν οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον θεῷ, θεωθὲν ὅλον (PG 91, col. 81C), - to the expression: θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια “humano-divine activity” of Pseudo-Dionysius’ Letter to Gaius (PG 91, col. 84D) - and to the statement of Cyril of Alexandria in his Commentary on the Gospel of John, IV, 2: ἡ συγγενὴς δὲ καὶ δι᾽ ἀμφοῖν ἐπιδεδειγμένη μία ἐνέργεια “the one activity [of Christ], homogenous and shown through both [human and divine?]” (PG 91, col. 85C).

The letter or tomos ends with the request that Marinus correct this text (διόρθωσίν μοι χαρίσασθαι PG 91, col. 89A). The compiler of this collection had no interest in chronological order, since he preferred to put first the Opusculum addressed to Marinus as a priest and in the middle, this Opusculum addressed to the same Marinus as a deacon. Opusculum 8 is an ἴσον ἐπιστολῆς,14 that is a Copy of a letter, sent to the unknown bishop Nicander. It covers eleven columns in Migne’s Patrologia and focuses on the double activity of Christ and on the same pseudo-Dionysian θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια and, much longer, on the Cyrillian expression ἡ συγγενὴς δὲ καὶ δι᾽ἀμφοῖν ἐπιδεδειγμένη μία ἐνέργεια (PG 91, col. 100B). It ends with a request of correction addressed to the bishop (φιλάγαθον ποιήσασθαι τὴν διόρθωσιν PG 91, col. 112B). The last Opusculum, the ninth, is an ἀπολογία (PG 91, 132C), a “speech in defence” sent to the monks and lay people of Sicily. It covers ten columns of Migne’s Patrologia. Maximus defends himself against the accusation of introducing three wills in Christ

14  As

is Op. 10 in Combefis’ collection.

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and then explains in a new way the formula of Cyril in his Commentary on the Gospel of John, IV, 2: Καὶ γοῦν, ὅτε τοῦ ἀρχισυναγώγου τὸ κόριον διανίστη, λέγων· Ἡ παῖς, ἐγείρου· ἐκράτησε τῆς χειρὸς αὐτῆς, καθὼς γέγραπται· ζωοποιῶν μὲν ὡς θεὸς τῷ παντουργῷ προστάγματι, ζωοποιῶν δ᾽αὖ πάλιν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς τῆς ἰδίας αὐτοῦ σαρκός· μίαν τε καὶ συγγενῆ δι᾽ἀμφοῖν ἐπιδεικνὺς τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Well, then when he resurrected the daughter of the Synagogue master, with these words: ‘Child, wake up’ (Lc 8, 54), he took her hand, as it was written. He was giving her life by his almighty order as a god, but he was also giving her life through the touch of his own flesh, showing through both one homogenous activity. (PG 91, col. 124C-D)

The letter ends with the defence of two letters of Maximus, the first to Marinus (probably Opusculum 7) and the second to Pyrrhus (probably Letter 19). What are the results of our research? This collection of eight Opuscula is made of five letters15 and of excerpts of lost works.16 There seems no reason to separate the letters from the rest of the epistles present in the Constantinopolitan Corpus17 neither on a literary ground nor on a theological one. There is a pedagogical order in these eight texts. This collection begins with an introduction to the definitions of will and a discussion of the background to the dispute between Miaphysites and Chalcedonians: it ends with an accurate analysis of the questions of operation and will. The quotations of Gregory’s Discourse 30,12 and of Cyril’s Commentary on the Gospel of John IV, 2 appear to be the link between Opuscula 3, 4 and 7 and between Opuscula 7, 8 and 9, respectively. This first collection of Opuscula aimed at giving a kind of memento of the Monothelite dispute centred on the patristic tradition.18 15  They

are Op. 1 to Marinus priest, Op. 4 to the priest George, Op. 7 to Marinus deacon, Op. 8 to the bishop Nicander, Op. 9 to the monks and lay people of Sicily. 16  They are Op. 2, 3 and 5. 17  They are the Ep. 6, 7, 11 and 4, 8, 9, 1, 19, 12, 13, 15. 18  Would it be absurd to hypothesize that, if this collection was to be prior to the Constantinopolitan corpus (tenth century), such texts might have been copied together for the third council of Constantinople (680–681), which consecrated Maximus’ thought? But we have no proof of this hypothesis.

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b. The Probably Secondary Series of Ten Opuscula A later development that happened to this group of texts may highlight that they are united by a patristic quotation. In the πίναξ of the manuscript M and in nearly all manuscripts of the Constantinopolitan Corpus, two texts (Opuscula 6 and 14) have been added to this collection, strangely in the middle of it, that is between Opuscula 1, 2–3, 4, 5, 7 and Opuscula 8, 9. Opusculum 6 is an excerpt of either a letter or a chapter of a treatise, since it refers to an anonymous Monothelite at the beginning (εἰ … λάμβανεις “if you understand”). It is still based on Gregory’s same quotation (Discourse 30, 12).19 This unites this new text with Opuscula 3, 4 and 7 and explains the place of this insert. However, there is no apparent reason for the addition of the Opusculum 14. This Opusculum is just a group of definitions and therefore presents no new content worth creating a new opusculum out of. It is centred on the “substance” (οὐσία), the “subsistence” (ὑπόστασις), and the “property” (ἴδιον). The end of the text (PG 91, col.  143 A-B), gives four definitions of δύναμις, θέλημα (φυσικόν / γνωμικόν), διαφορά and ταυτότης.20 Perhaps the scribe that added Opuscula 6 and 14 found them joined in his model? This strange addition allowed Torres’ and Combefis to expand to include other groups of definitions as Opuscula 13, 17 and 18. Combefis himself found the addition of Opusculum 14 here unnecessary and appended it to Opusculum 13 (Capita de duabus Christi natura). Torres’ Collection of Opuscula The third state of the Opuscula, named Contra monothelitas et acephalos21 opuscula, appeared in a Latin translation: Sancti Maximi Confessoris, Contra monothelitas et acephalos, opuscula tridecim, Ingolstadt, 1605, prepared by the Jesuit Francisco Torres (c. 1509–1584) and published after his death by Antonio Possevino 19  Οὐ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Σωτῆρα νοουμένου· τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνου θέλειν, οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον θεῷ θεωθὲν ὅλον· ἀλλὰ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς· ὡς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου θελήματος, οὐ πάντως ἑπομένου τῷ θείῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντιπίπτοντος ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀντιπαλαίοντος (PG 91, 65B). 20  This end is absent from Epifanovič’s Add. 21. 21  The Acephali are the Severan Miaphysites.

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(1533–1611), also a Jesuit. There are only thirteen Opuscula. Here is the index 22 (in brackets is Combefis’ equivalent order): I.  II. III. IV.

Epistola ad Marinum Presbyterum. (=  Opusculum 1) De operationibus et voluntatibus caput L. (=  Opusculum 2) Ex eodem tractatu caput LI. (=  Opusculum 3) Epistola ad Georgium Presbyterium et Abbatem de mysterio Christi. (=  Opusculum 4) V.  Contra eos qui dicunt oportere dicere unam Christi operationem secundum exsuperantiam, etc. (=  Opusculum 5) VI. Tomus dogmaticum ad Marinum Diaconum. (=  Opusculum 7) VII. De illo: Pater, si possibile est, transeat a me calix. (= Opusculum 6) VIII. Definitiones variae. (=  Opusculum 14) IX. Epistola ad Nicandrum Episcopum, de duabus in Christo operationibus. (=  Opusculum 8) X.  Epistola ad Praepositos, Monachos etc. Siciliae etc. (=  Opusculum 9) XI. Gnomae demonstrativae duarum in Christo voluntatum. (= Opusculum 25) XII. Distinctio multiplicis unionis. (= Opusculum 18) XIII. De duabus naturis Christi. (= Opusculum 13)

This collection of Opuscula seems to be composed of two parts. For the first ten Opuscula, Torres used a codex from the Corpus Constantinopolitanum with Opuscula 1–5, 7, 6, 14, 8–9. For what seems to be a second part (Opuscula 18, 25 and 13), three options exist: 1) 2)

Torres used most probably for Opusculum 25 the Vaticanus graecus 1778 as suggested by Peter Van Deun, 23 for the Opusculum 18, Torres followed an unknown manuscript as noted by the same scholar, 24

22  F. Torres (tr.), Sancti Maximi Confessoris, Contra monothelitas et acephalos, opuscula tridecim, Ingolstadt, 1605, p. 6. 23  P. Van Deun, “Les Capita X de duplici uoluntate Domini (CPG 7697, 25)”, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 60/1–4 (2008), pp. 195–213: p. 206. 24  P.  Van Deun, “L’Unionum definitiones (CPG 7697 Op, 18) attribué à Maxime le Confesseur, Études et édition”, Revue des études byzantines, 58 (2000), pp. 123–47, p. 137, no. 71. It may be a combination of two manuscripts, the Vindobonensis theologicus graecus 40 (that omitted the l. 1/2 ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποστάσεων … ἕνωσις) and of the Monacensis graecus 225 (that omitted καὶ τῶν τοιούτων in the line 10).

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christian boudignon 3)

for the last Opusculum, the Opusculum 13, the source is unknown. 25

Those thirteen Opuscula seem then to be composed of the mediaeval collection (Opuscula 1–5, 7, 6, 14, 8–9) and of three texts (Opuscula 18, 25, 13) added from various manuscripts. So, this gathering of texts is an invention of Torres: those thirteen Opuscula form no real collection in manuscript. Even if we find them all in two manuscripts (the Vaticanus graecus 504 and the Vaticanus graecus 507), they are not together and not in this order but scattered among other works of Maximus. Combefis’ First Edition of the Opuscula François Combefis in his Parisian edition of 167526 published a collection of Opuscula based on several manuscripts, principally Parisian and Vatican codices. It is the last state of the Opuscula. Since Combefis knew Torres’ edition and since he had written an Historia haeresis monothelitarum…, Paris, 1648, 27 he probably aimed at an historical organisation of all the works pertaining to the theological conflict with the Monothelites28 and, therefore, named them Opuscula theologica et polemica. In doing so, he created a collection of twenty-seven Opuscula that previously were disparate

25  K.  Levrie,

Maximi Confessoris Capita de duabus Christi naturis…, Turnhout, 2017 (CCSG 89), p. 176*, wrote: “Il n’est pas possible de déterminer le manuscrit source de Torres, bien qu’il semble exister surtout une proximité avec Ah [scil. the Monacensis graecus 225] et Aj [its copy, the Monacensis graecus 10]”. In reality, it is not the Monacensis graecus 225, because there is no hint of the omission of ἢ ταυτότης οὐσιῶν οἷον (β´ l.  2 of Levrie’s edition) in the translation. It may be rather the Vaticanus graecus 740 (or less probably the Athous, Iviron 190) with omission of ἢ (β´ l.  2) and of μὴ (ζ´ l.  4) that we found also in the translation. 26  F. Combefis ed., S. Maximi Confessoris …, operum tomus primus (secundus). 27  F.  Combefis, Historia haeresis monothelitarum sanctaeque in eam sextae synodi actorum vindiciae. Diversorum item antiqua, ac medii aevi, tum historiae sacrae, tum dogmatica, graeca opuscula…, Paris, 1648. 28  The theological debates between Miaphysites and Orthodoxes take a new turn in 636 (after the imperial edict called Ekthesis) about the question of one or two wills in Christ. Against the imperial theology, Maximus defended the idea of two wills in Christ according to the two natures in him.

what are the opuscula theologica et polemica?

33

writings and not intended as a collection. Yet, all scholars making a collection do so, and he was not the first, as we saw. Combefis’ collection shows no unity. Let us take an example. Jankowiak and Booth29 listed a series of work addressed to Marinus: Letter 20 and the Opuscula 7, 20, 10, 1, 2 (?), and 19 (in chronological order). Why did Combefis not include the Letter 20 in the Opuscula? He may have thought that it was not a doctrinal letter but a moral one. Yet, nowadays, the absence of this letter in the series addressed to Marinus is perceived as a problem30. The difficulty of Combefis’ collection of polemical and theological short texts is also that it contains more than the polemics against the Monothelites. As noted by Peter Van Deun:31 La plupart des Opuscula inventoriés dans CPGA 7697 sont dirigés contre des monophysites (par ex. n° 13), contre des monoénergistes (par ex. n° 5, 8) ou contre des monothélètes, tels l’Ad Marinum presbyterum (n° 1), l’important De eo quo scriptum est: Pater si fieri potest transeat a me calix (n° 6), texte fondamental du débat monothélète, le De duabus unius Christi nostri voluntatibus (n° 16), le Tomus dogmaticus ad Marinum presbyterum (n° 20).

We find indeed the old polemics against the Severians and the Nestorians illustrated for instance by the Opusculum 13 on the double nature of Christ. Acording to Katrien Levrie, 32 this work is probably a text of Maximus and not of Leontius of Byzantium, although three manuscripts give Leontius as the author of this 29  Jankowiak

& Booth, “A new Date-List”, p. 26. we read it, we find that it apparently contains no theological discussion but the praise of the silence that Maximus decided to keep on the “divine discourses that exceed his ability” (τῶν ὑπὲρ ἐμὲ θείων λόγων). As Jankowiak & Booth wrote, “A new Date-List”, p. 46: “it is tempting to connect the letter with the conflict between Arcadius and Sophronius and the Council of Cyprus in c. 636. The source which describes that council, the Syriac Life (8–15), states that Maximus’ doctrine (of dyenergism) was condemned there — although he himself did not attend — and that in the aftermath Maximus withdrew from the doctrinal scene. In this case, Letter 20 appears as the auto-critique of Maximus after his condemnation”. Ignoring the Syriac Life, Combefis could not understand that this Letter 20 is probably part of the whole series about dyenergism and dytheletism. 31  Van Deun, Mueller-Jourdan & Markesinis, “Maxime le Confesseur”, 412. 32  Levrie, Maximi Confessoris Capita…, p 35*. 30  If

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text and Leontius wrote three books Adversus Nestorianos et Eutychianos (CPG 6813). And if the Opuscula are not only polemical texts against the Monothelites, but also against the Severians, why did Combefis not include the Letter 13 to Peter the Illustris, Short exposé of the dogmas of Severus? How Should We Classify Combefis’ Opuscula? This collection seems to have no theological unity: some texts are deficient whilst others are superfluous. Can we find some kind of unity by using another type of classification? a. Historical Classification A first attempt at classification may be that of Marek Jankowiak and Phil Booth. They divide this whole collection into different series according to the chronology. In this case, the Opuscula are split in 7 different groups:33 Minor Early Texts (c. 628–634) Opuscula 13, 14 (+ Additamentum 21), both dated perhaps before 633/34, Opuscula 18 (and maybe 21) Letters to Marinus + From Monoenergism to Monothelitism (c. 636–643) Opuscula 7, 20, 10, 1, 19 + 4, 6, 8, 2–3 Mature Anti-Monothelite Texts (c. 643 onwards) Opuscula 25, 16, 12, 5, 9 and (if not dated earlier) 21 Towards the Lateran Council (c. 647–649) Opuscula 15, 24, 26b (+ Additamentum 24), 27 (+ Additamentum 25), 11 Maximus in Exile (655–662) Opusculum 26a (+ Additamenta 20 and 38) dated maybe of c. 656/5734 Opuscula 17, 22, both of an indeterminate date

33  Jankowiak

& Booth, “A new Date-List”, pp. 31–71. Op. 23 is spurious and, therefore, not dated. 34  A critical edition of these texts is published by B. Roosen in B. Roosen, “What Theodosius of Gangra wanted to Know from Maximus the Confessor”, in B. Demulder & P. Van Deun (eds.), Questioning the World. Greek Patristic and Byzantine Question and Answer Literature, Turnhout: Brepols, 2021 (Lectio 11), 229–67.

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35

We can see that there is no real chronological unity in the Opuscula. b. Classification According to Literary Genre A second idea of classification may be that of Peter Van Deun35 according to the genre of the text: Questions and Answers Opusculum 19 (and we add 26a (+ Additamenta 20 and 38) Chapter Collections Opuscula 25, 13 Collections of Definitions Opuscula 14, 17, 18 Theological Treatises Opuscula 1, 2–3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 (and we add 15, 36 16, 20, 21)

And we may add to this classification

Fragments of Letter Opuscula 5, 10, 11, 12, 22 and maybe 24, 37 Florilegium Opuscula 26b (+ Additamentum 24), 27 (+ Additamentum 25) 38

Clearly, the collection of Opuscula also has no literary unity. That is why we attempted to propose a kind of archeological unity — the fruit of the work of scholars from the tenth to the seventeenth 35  Van

Deun, “Maximus the Confessor’ Use of Literary Genres”, 274–86. 15 has recently been edited by B. Roosen, “A dyothelite Florilegium in the Run-up to the Lateran Council (a. 649). Maximus the Confessor’s tomos to Stephen of Dor against the Ekthesis (CPG 7697, Op.15)”, in The Literary Legacy of Byzantium: Editions, Translations, and Studies in Honour of Joseph A. Munitiz SJ ed. by B. Roosen & P. Van Deun, Turnhout, 2019 (SBHC 15), pp. 415–533. 37  According to Bram Roosen, the manuscripts of Op. 24 do not provide any indication about the nature of this text: part of a letter? Part of a treatise? 38  Concerning Op. 23a (+ Add. 22), 23b and 23c, they are spurious. We thank Bram Roosen who kindly told us that “the first (23a + Add. 22) is wrongly attributed to Maximus. The second (23b) is either attributed to Eulogius of Alexandria or is transmitted anonymously” (see the edition of this text by B.  Roosen, “Eulogii Alexandrini quae supersunt. Old and new fragments from Eulogius of Alexandria’s oeuvre [CPG 6971-6979]”, Medioevo greco, 15 (2015), pp. 201–40). The third (23c) is a very small collection of definitions that has no link whatsoever to Maximus.” 36  Op.

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century. Let us say it in a provocative way: the collection of Opuscula theologica et polemica is a reflection of the seventeenth-century scholarship of Combefis. Conclusion Our thesis is that the twenty-seven Opuscula theologica et polemica, as a cohesive collection, are a creation of François Combefis in 1675. Combefis intended to make a collection of texts related principally to the dispute with the Monothelites. Yet, those Opuscula have no real unity, neither of thought, nor of date, nor of genre. It is difficult to see what distinguishes them from the forty-five Letters edited by the same Combefis. The Opuscula are based on a group of thirteen texts translated by Francisco Torres and published in 1605. The core of it is made up of eight or ten texts found together in the manuscripts of the Constantinopolitan Corpus. The likely original form of the eight texts (Opuscula 1,  2–3,  4,  5,  7,  8,  9) is presented in the πίναξ of the codex Angelicus graecus 120. This collection has a logical and theological unity. In a second step, in the πίναξ of the manuscript M, Opusculum 6 has been added after Opusculum 7, together with a collection of definitions in Opusculum 14. This new group of ten texts was copied in most manuscripts of the Constantinopolitan Corpus and paved the way for the collection of Francisco Torres and François Combefis. So, the unity of the twenty-seven Opuscula is the result of a long-term development of a collection, present in the Constantinopolitan Corpus and further expanded in the seventeenth century. We should then reconsider the classification opposing the Letters, the Opuscula and the Additamenta39 (made by Epifanovič), because there is no clear distinction between these short texts.

39  We

speak of the genuine part of it, that is to say Add. 9, 14, 18, 19, 20,  21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 34 and 38 according to Jankowiak & Booth, “A new Date-List”, passim, based on B.  Roosen, Epifanovitch revisited (Pseudo-) Maximi Confessoris Opuscula varia: A critical edition with extensive notes on manuscript tradition and authenticity, PhD diss., Leuven, 2001.

Maximian ἀπορίαι against the Monothelites1 Bram Roosen (Leuven) In December 1660, when François Combefis unveiled his plans for an edition of the works of Maximus the Confessor,2 he included a description of f. 146ra-146vb of the famous Vaticanus graecus 504: Capitula XV. Dubitationum, de naturalibus voluntatibus & operationibus. Reg. Cod. extat. & Vat. DIV, ex quo capitula alia XIII. de iisdem, Ὅτι οὐσία μὲν. αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος: cum subjunctis definitionibus Clementis Alexandrini, & Eulogii Patriarchae Alexandrini, capitula VII. Tum aliae XI. definitiones.

I have discussed this paragraph in detail in my article on Eulogius of Alexandria. 3 For the present purpose it is noteworthy that for reasons unknown the first two texts did not make it to Combefis’ edition: they are the Capita X de voluntatibus et energiis [CPG 1  This

is an adapted, corrected and bibliographically updated version of an edition that was part of my doctoral dissertation Epifanovič Revisited. (Pseudo-) Maximi Confessoris Opuscula varia: a critical edition with extensive notes on manuscript tradition and authenticity, Leuven, 2001. 2  Combefis published his Elenchus operum sancti Maximi 15 years before his edition. The text can be found in B.  de  Montfaucon, Bibliotheca Coisliniana, olim Segueriana; sive manuscriptorum omnium Graecorum, quae in ea continentur, accurata descriptio, ubi operum singulorum notitia datur, aetas cuiusque Manuscripta indicatur, vetustiorum specimina exhibentur, aliaque multa annotantur, quae ad Palaeographiam Graecam pertinent, Parisiis, 1715, p. 309. See also B.  Janssens, “François Combefis and the Edition of Maximus the Confessor’s Complete Works (Paris, 1675/1679)”, AB, 119 (2001), pp. 357–62. 3  Cf. B. Roosen, “Eulogii Alexandrini quae supersunt. Old and new fragments from Eulogius of Alexandria's oeuvre (CPG 6971–6979)”, Medioevo Greco 15 (2015), pp. 218–19. Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 37–64.

 



10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.131016

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7707.19, henceforth Add. 19] and the Capita XIII de voluntatibus [CPG 7707.18, henceforth Add. 18] respectively. The consequence of what may have been a mere oversight is that even to this day both texts remain virtually absent from scholarly research. The authority of Combefis’ edition, reprinted in the Patrologia Graeca as volumes 90 and 91, was and is such that the texts it contains are readily attributed to Maximus, while texts outside his edition elicit doubts as regard their authenticity. Two editions were made but the situation hardly changed. The 1917 edition by S.  L. Epifanovič is quite rare and until the rise of the internet very hard to come by,4 and my own doctoral dissertation, defended back in 2001, is getting published less quickly than planned and hoped. In other words, it is high time these texts are given the attention they deserve. In this article I start with Add. 18. Add. 19, which has quite a substantial manuscript tradition, will be the subject of a future article. Text and author Before we turn to the literary genre of the text and its authorship, a closer look at the chapter numbers will also clarify the subject of the text. In three of the four independent manuscripts, i.e., in Ga and Ac Ui,5 Add. 18 is divided into 13 chapters numbered α´ to ιγ´. In Ug the chapters are not numbered, but the marginal tildes, indicating the beginning of each new chapter, suggest that the situation envisaged by its scribe was very similar to that in the other manuscripts.6 This division into chapters and numbering, however, poses several problems. The first chapter is quite different from the rest. It is an introduction, a table of contents of sorts. It asks the monothelites, who are addressed in the second person plural, how they want to 4  Cf.  S.  L. Epifanovič, Матеріалы къ изученію жизни и твореній преп. Максима Исповѣдника, Kiev, 1917, pp. 64–65. 5  Please refer to the chapter on the traditio textus for the explanation of these manuscript sigla. 6  In any case, Epifanovič’s remark (cf. Матеріалы, p. ix) that in Ug there is a division into 15 chapters is not correct.

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call the one will they profess in Christ. The ten possible answers the chapter lists are ordered in five mutually contradictive pairs: divine or human — natural or hypostatic — simple or composite — free or moved by God — the result of a conquest or of a favour? Chapters [β´] to [ι´] 1/5 scrupulously follow this program. However, there is no chapter on the possibility of that one will being called γνωμικόν. This is almost certainly a secondary evolution as it destroys the duality with θεοκίνητον. The chapter numbering in the manuscripts, however, continues as if nothing happened: [β´] θεῖον

↔

[γ´] ἀνθρώπινον

[δ´] φυσικόν

↔

[ε´] ὑποστατικόν

[ϛ´] ἁπλοῦν

↔

[ζ´] σύνθετον

γνωμικόν

↔

[η´] θεοκίνητον

[θ´] κατ’ἐκνίκησιν ↔

[ι´] 1/5 κατὰ μετάδοσιν

The rest of the text, rather than discussing possible designations of the one will in Christ, highlights the logical difficulties that arise from the monothelite stand. The first one ([ι´] 5/8) rejects the possibility that there is one will in Christ as a result of the union, because that would mean that before the union the Word had no will. The second one ([ια´] 1/3) syllogistically proves that the ultimate consequence of the assumption of one will in Christ is that the Father and the flesh have one will. The third additional chapter ([ια´] 3/6) discusses Lc. 22,  42, one of the most controversial and most discussed Bible passages of the monothelite crisis. The fourth ([ιβ´]) zooms in on another oft-cited Bible passage, Mc.  7,  24, while the last one ([ιγ´]) asserts the perfectness of Christ’s human nature for soteriological reasons. Especially for these final capita the numbering is problematic. The first one, introduced with the words Καὶ αὖθις περὶ τούτου, is attached to the chapter with number ι´. The second and the third ἐπαπόρημα, the latter introduced with Καὶ πάλιν, are joined under the number ια´. The fourth is given a number of its own (ιβ´), much like the last one (ιγ´), which starts with the words Καὶ αὖθις. However, there is no apparent reason for this situation, and this further contributes to the impression that the numbers as found in the manuscripts do not go back to the author of the text.

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If originally the chapters were numbered, the situation was probably that Add. 18 started with an unnumbered introductory chapter, now numbered α´, which was then followed by the ten chapters announced in those opening lines and by five additional chapters. This totals fifteen chapters. We have kept the numbering of the manuscripts in our edition between square brackets but used the reconstructed numbering in our translation. A superscript number in the edition refers to the numbering of the translation. Now, let us turn to the question of the authorship of the text. Or, to put it differently, is there reason to doubt the manuscripts, all of which attribute the text to Maximus the Confessor?7 Add. 18 belongs to the literary genre of ἀπορίαι or ἐπαπορήματα, the polemical subgenre of the capita or κεφάλαια literature that appeared in the early sixth century.8 It is hardly a surprise that Maximus was quite familiar with this kind of texts. Most closely related with Add. 18 as concerns both the form and the subject matter are certainly Op. 25, made of 10 chapters on the two wills of Christ addressed to the orthodox,9 and Add. 19, made of 10 chapters dealing with the perfectness of both the human and the divine nature in Christ. But Maximus made use of the genre also on other occasions. In his letter to John the sophist, for example, Maximus discusses the statement ὅτι ἀσώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή in the form of several such ἀπορίαι.10 And in general, Maximus’ writings bear witness to his frequent use of syllogisms and syllogistic lines of reasoning. In many cases these can quite easily be separated from the surrounding text and, as such, they would hardly

7  Only Ug mentions Maximus’ name in the title. The other manuscripts only have τοῦ αὐτοῦ: in Ga, Add. 18 follows Maximus’ Op. 25. In Ug Ac Ui the text follows Maximus’ Add. 19. 8  On this genre see the remarks and the bibliography in Roosen, “Eulogii Alexandrini quae supersunt…”, pp. 203–05. 9  See the edition of this text by P.  Van Deun, “Les Capita X de duplici uoluntate Domini (CPG 7697, 25)”, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 60/1–4 (2008), pp. 195–213. 10  This is Maximus’ letter 6 (CPG 7699.6; PG 91, 424–33). On the addressees of Maximus’ letters, see the table and overview by P. Van Deun (in collaboration with B. Markesinis) in TB, I/1, pp. 399–403, especially at p. 399 and footnote 132.

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differ from ἀπορίαι or ἐπαπορήματα in the strict sense. The following example from Op. 1 will suffice:11 Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν θεοῦ τὸ θέλημα φύσει σωστικὸν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει σωζόμενον, ταυτὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτὲ τὸ φύσει σῶζον, καὶ τὸ φύσει σωζόμενον, κἂν εἷς ἀμφοτέρων σκοπὸς, ἡ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων καθέστηκεν, ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ προβεβλημένη, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἁγίων προῃρημένη. If by nature God’s will has the power to grant salvation, while the human will by nature is saved, then that which by nature provides salvation and that which by nature receives it could never be the same, even if their goal is one and the same, i.e. the salvation of everything, as provided by God, and chosen by the saints.

The same is true for the subject matter of Add. 18, which places the text firmly in the monothelite controversy. In other words, the text postdates 638 (or 636?), the year in which the Ekthesis was promulgated by Emperor Heraclius.12 This decree tried to end the monenergist crisis by prohibiting discussions about the number of energies in Christ, but at the same time started the discussions about the number of wills in Christ. Moreover, the fact that the monothelites are repeatedly and emphatically addressed in the second person plural, suggests that the text was written during the controversy and, thus, may very well date back to the last 11  Cf.  Op.

1, PG 91, 25 B6–12. See e.g. also Op. 1, PG 91, 25 C1–8; Op. 19, PG 91, 220 A3–8; 225 B6–13; etc. Also, the fact that the Disputatio cum Pyrrho contains a considerable number of ἀπορίαι (see e.g. PG 91, 300 C11 – D2; 301, C3–12; 304 B12 – D5), probably indicates that this was a characteristic way of reasoning and writing for Maximus. On the date and the authorship of the Disputatio cum Pyrrho, see J.  Noret, “La redaction de la Disputatio cum Pyrrho (CPG 7698) de Saint Maxime le Confesseur serait-elle postérieure à 655?”, AB, 117 (1999), pp. 291–96. 12  In his doctoral dissertation Marek Jankowiak questions the traditional date of the Ekthesis, instead identifying it with the document resulting from the 636 council of Cyprus (Essai d’histoire politique du monothélisme, Paris – Warsaw, 2009). I have not been able to get a hold of the dissertation but see the remarks on pp. 10–11 of the introduction by R. Price, Ph. Booth and C. Cubitt to R.  Price, The Acts of the Lateran Synod of 649, Liverpool, 2014 (Translated Texts for Historians, 61). For the council, see § 15–16 of the Syriac life of Maximus the Confessor, edited by Sebastian Brock in AB, 91 (1973), pp. 299–346 (reprinted as article XII in id., Syriac Perspectives on Late Antiquity, London, 1984).

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phase of Maximus’ life, which was marked by his fierce resistance against the monothelite doctrine. To conclude, while there are no external elements that confirm Maximus’ authorship, style, genre, date, or content of the text all fit Maximus like a glove. We are convinced, therefore, that Add. 18 can safely be considered as one of Maximus the Confessor’s opera minora. Traditio Textus The manuscript tradition is fairly limited, with four manuscripts of a well-defined family containing the full text and two manuscripts containing the same fragmentary text. Ac Atheniensis, Bibliothecae Nationalis 225 (s. xv), f. 179–180 v Ga Genavensis, Bibliothecae Publicae et Universitatis, graecus 33 (s. xvi), f. 65v–66 (fragm.) Pt Parisinus, Supplementi graeci 199 (s. xvii), pp. 138–139 (fragm.) Ug Vaticanus graecus 504 (a. 1105), f. 146r-v Uh Vaticanus graecus 507 (a. 1344), f. 127v–128 Ui Vaticanus graecus 508 (s. xii–xiii), f. 200 v–201v

For the close-knit family Ac Ug Uh Ui, there is no need to repeat what I have written in earlier articles,13 especially since the text of Add. 18 does not provide enough faults and variants to build a stemma. Ac and Ui do not add any corruptions to the text. Ug is characterized by the hardly decisive readings νοεῖτε for νοεῖται ([ζ´]  1) and ἄλλω for ἄλλο ([ια´]  5), and by the omission of the article ἡ ([ι´]  3 [coincidentally also in Ga]). And in Uh the number ιγ´ is added after Κεφάλαια in the title and the particle δὴ is omitted in chapter [ϛ´] (l.  4). 13  Cf.  B. Roosen, “Precepts for a Tranquil Life. A new edition of the Ad neophytos de patientia [CPG 7707.32]”, JÖB, 64 (2014), pp. 254–60 and id., “Eulogii Alexandrini quae supersunt”, pp. 209–10. More recently, I have used these manuscripts for the edition of the remains of the answers Maximus seems to have given to some questions asked by Theodosius of Gangra [CPG 7697.26a–7707.20 & CPG 7707.38] (cf. B.  Roosen, “What Theodosius of Gangra wanted to know from Maximus the Confessor”, in Questioning the World. Greek Patristic and Byzantine Question-and-Answer Literature, ed. by B.  Demulder, P. Van Deun, Turnhout, 2021 (Lectio, 11), pp. 229–67, especially p. 235).

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For the hypothetical manuscript ε, i.e., the common ancestor of Ac and Ui, one can refer to the position of ἔχων after θέλημα ([β´]  2) and to the readings γενέσθαι for γενέσθω ([ια´]  5) and ὃ for ὅπερ ([ια´]  6). And finally, the hypothetical manuscript ϛ is, also in the case of Add. 18, responsible for a good number of changes to the text: omission of φύσεως ([γ´]  2) and τὴν ἰδιότητα for τὰ ἰδιώματα ([γ´]  3), omission of γὰρ ([ε´] 2), the position of δώσετε after Σαβέλλιον and the omission of τὸν ([ε´] 4) and of ἐπινοεῖτε τοῦτο, τὴν δὲ ἐκνίκησιν ([θ´]  1). Two other readings are hardly decisive (14). Their relationship is as follows: 15 ϛ

x

ε

x

x

Ui

Ug

Ac

Uh

The remaining two manuscripts and their relationship are also quite well known in the research into the Maximian manuscript tradition. The oldest of the two is Ga, a manuscript now in Geneva.16 It is made of 405 paper folios which based on the quires can be divided 14  I

refer to the readings δίδοτε for δίδοται ([η´]  1) and μεταδιδοῦν for μεταδιδὸν ([ι´] 1). 15  The hypothetical manuscripts “x” are there because of what is known about the manuscript tradition of other texts in this family of manuscripts. They are irrelevant for the present edition. 16  Chartaceus; 310 × 220 mm; 1 col.; 20–22 l.; 405 f. in three parts: I = 7 quaterions + 1 ternion (f. 1–62 v); II = 3 quaternions + 1 bifolium (f. 63–88v); III = 39 quaternions + 5 folios (f. 89–405v). The all too concise catalogue description by H.  Omont (cf. “Catalogue des manuscrits des bibliothèques de Suisse”, Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen, 3 [1886], p. 435) can be supple-

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into three parts. Parts I and II were written by the same hand, which Mr Markesinis has been able to identify with that of the famous Nicolaus Choniates or one of his collaborators. Date and place of origin can therefore be identified with late sixteenth-century Venice. The palaeographic and codicological characteristics of part III suggest the same origin. Add. 18 is found in part II (f. 65v–66) and is preceded by chapters 5–10 of Add. 19 (f. 63r-v) and by Op. 25 (f. 63v–65v). Unfortunately, the text of Add. 18 is preserved only partially and ends in the middle of chapter [ι´]. Moreover, the text Ga presents is characterized by the systematic change of the second person plural into the third person. The result of this clearly intentional intervention is that the text gives a more detached impression, as if the monothelite crisis is something from the past. Pt postdates Ga only by a couple of years.17 If it was copied at the end of the sixteenth century, as Astruc assumes, this may have happened in Venice. If, however, it was copied in the seventeenth century, as Riedinger — to our opinion, correctly — states, then also Geneva becomes a possible place of origin, since two of its mented with useful information provided by C. Laga & C. Steel (eds), Quaestiones ad Thalassium I, Quaestiones I–LV, una cum latina interpretatione loannis Scotti Eriugenae, Turnhout – Leuven, 1980 (CCSG, 7), pp. xxvii–xxix and pp. lxiii–lxiv; by P. Allen & B. Neil (eds), Scripta Saeculi VII vitam Maximi Confessoris illustrantia cum Latina interpretatione Anastasii Bibliothecarii iuxtaposita Turnhout – Leuven, 1999 (CCSG, 39), p. 153; and by P.  Van Deun, “Les Capita X de duplici voluntate domini attribués à Maxime le Confesseur (CPG 7679.25), Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 60.1-4 (2008), pp. 200–01. The latter description and the description in the present article are indebted to an unpublished description B. Markesinis made for his edition of some of Maximus’ Opuscula. 17  Chartaceus; 370 × 270 mm; 1 col.; variable number of lines, normally between 25 and 30 l. per page; 182 p. (+ 77bis, 78bis, 101bis, 102bis, 105bis and 106bis). In the past, descriptions of this manuscript were made by H. Omont, Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothèque nationale et des autres bibliothèques de Paris et des départements, III, Paris, 1888, p. 230; R.  Riedinger, Pseudo-Kaisarios. Überlieferungsgeschichte und Verfassersfrage, München, 1969 (BA, 12), p. 98; Ch. Astruc in P.  Lemerle, “L’histoire des Pauliciens d’Asie Mineure d’après les sources grecques”, TM, 5 (1973), p. 32, footnote 32. The only detailed description is due to B. Markesinis. Unfortunately, it is still awaiting publication. The descriptions by Allen and Neil (cf. Scripta saeculi VII, p. 153) and by Van Deun (cf. “Les Capita X”, p. 201) are based on it, as is the present one.

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ancestors, viz. Ga and Genavensis, Bibliothecae Publicae et Universitatis, graecus 34, arrived in Geneva before 1620.18 On 31 May 1826 someone in Paris added a note to the manuscript dealing with the number of pages.19 Can the dependency of Pt on Ga also be proved for the present text? A look at the contents of both manuscripts reveals that pp. 135–68 of Pt is identical to f. 63–87v of Ga with the same partial texts of Add. 19 and Add. 18. Furthermore, Pt adds several mistakes to the already quite characteristic text of Add. 18 in Ga: omission of καὶ ([β´] 1); omission of φύσις ([δ´] 3), very likely triggered by the problems with that word in Ga; addition of εἶναι after σύνθετον ([ζ´] 1); and the addition ante correctionem of καὶ τὴν θέωσιν ἐπὶ ἑνώσει after ἐκνίκησιν ([θ´] 3). Now, for the top of the stemma. Although Ga is considerably younger than the other manuscripts, it has none of the faults or variants that characterize ϛ. In other words, it probably goes back to a phase in the textual tradition that predates ϛ. This is confirmed by the edition of Op. 25 by Peter Van Deun and by my own collations of Add. 19. For both texts the manuscript tradition is considerably larger and makes it possible to identify a hypothetical common ancestor ζ, which Van Deun calls hyparchétype 2.20

18  This

can be concluded from the catalogue of the Genevan library which was drawn up in 1620 (ed. B.  Gagnebin, “Le cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de Genève”, Genava, N.S. II, 2 [1954], pp. 105–09). Ga is mentioned on p. 108, Genavensis, Bibliothecae Publicae et Universitatis, graecus 34 on p. 109. 19  See p. 174: Le présent manuscript contient cent soixante et quatorze ou plutôt cent quatre-vingt pages, à cause des trois feuillets cottés 78, 102 et 106 qui avaient été oubliés. Paris le 31 mai 1826. 20  See Van Deun, “Les Capita X”, especially p. 205.

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The final stemma, therefore, looks like this: ζ ϛ

Ga

x

Pt

ε

x

x

Ui

Ug

Ac

Uh

The Edition by Epifanovič For his edition Epifanovič picked arguably the worst manuscript he could have picked, the fourteenth-century Uh, the direct descendant of Ui.  Fortunately, the text in this manuscript is almost identical to that in Ui.  As usual the silent interventions by Epifanovič, consciously made or not, are far worse: [α´] 1 printing error ὁποίαν for ὁποῖον and the change of βούλεσθε into βούλησθε [γ´] 2/3 the sentence ὁ μὴ — ἰδιώματα, which in Uh is found as ὁ μὴ τῆς θείας αὐτοῦ φέρων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἰδιότητα, is silently changed into ὁ μήτε θείαν αὐτοῦ φέρων ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἰδιότητα [ε´] 3 θελόντα [sic] for θελήματα [ϛ´] 3 ἁπλοῦν for ἁπλοῦς [ζ´] 3 ἄλλο for ἄλλος because of the misinterpretation of ἄλλο [η´] 3 δείκνυτε for δείκνυται, which is either a conscious correction or the misinterpretation of the compendium in Uh [ιβ´] 3 and 4 ὑπάρχον for ὑπάρχειν and ἀγαγὸν for ἀγαγεῖν, both probably misinterpretations of the compendia used in Uh [ιγ´] 3 om. of ταῖς

Moreover, of the three faults Epifanovič did indicate in the critical apparatus, two are not found in Uh, but are misreadings by Epifanovič: he read τελίας ([β´] 3) and βούλευσθαι ([ϛ´] 1), while

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Uh has the correct readings. The third entry is the correction he proposed of νοεῖται into νοεῖτε (cf.  [ζ´] 1) Ratio Edendi The present edition follows the same principles as my earlier editions and those of the Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca.21 This means that changes to the manuscripts are only made if these changes are necessary for the intelligibility of the text. This is especially important with regard to the punctuation of the text and to the accentuation of enclitics, which in many editions tend to be adapted to the rules in the editor’s native language and to the rules in school grammars respectively. In short, every punctuation mark in my edition corresponds to a punctuation in the majority of the manuscripts, not the other way round, however; the accentuation of enclitics and hyphenation mirror the situation in the manuscript as closely as possible; no space is added after an apostrophe; and a iota subscriptum is written only if necessary for the intelligibility of the text. And, finally, quotes from the Bible are identified by means of italics.

21  I only mention some points of interest here. For more details and bibliography, see my “A Dyothelite Florilegium in the Run-up to the Lateran Council (a. 649). Maximus the Confessor’s tomos to Stephen of Dor against the Ekthesis (CPG 7697.15)”, in The Literary Legacy of Byzantium. Editions, Translations, and Studies in Honour of Joseph A. Munitiz SJ, ed. by B. Roosen & P. Van Deun, Turnhout, 2019 (Byzantioς. Studies in Byzantine History and Civilization, 15), pp. 434–35.

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Edition Κεφάλαια περὶ θελημάτων, ἤγουν κατὰ τῶν λεγόντων ἓν θέλημα ἐπὶ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ [α´] Ἀξιοῦμεν παρ’ὑμῶν μαθεῖν, ὁποῖον ἄρα βούλεσθε λέγειν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑμῶν θέλημα· θεῖον ἢ ἀνθρώπινον; φυσικὸν ἢ ὑποστατικόν; ἁπλοῦν ἢ σύνθετον; γνωμικὸν ἢ θεοκίνητον; κατ’ἐκνίκησιν ἢ κατὰ μετάδοσιν; [β´] 1Εἰ μὲν οὖν θεῖον αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν θέλημα λέγετε, θεὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ μόνον ὁ Χριστὸς, ὁ θεῖον ἔχων καὶ τὸ θέλημα, καὶ οὐ γέγονε κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπος. Ποῦ γὰρ τὸ τέλειον τῆς τελείας αὐτοῦ δώσετε ἀνθρωπότητος; [γ´] 2 Εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον αὐτὸ καὶ μόνον φάσκετε, ἄνθρωπός ἐστι μόνον ψιλὸς καὶ οὐχὶ θεὸς, ὁ μὴ τῆς θείας αὐτοῦ φύσεως φέρων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ἰδιώματα.

[α´.] 1/2 Cf. Max. Conf., Op. 2–3, cap. 51 (PG 91, 53 C2–4); id., Op. 8 (PG 91, 100 A2–6 et 109 B10–11); id. Op. 24 (PG 91, 268 C11 – D5) [β´.] (θεῖον) Mac.  Ant., Serm. III, fragm. (p.  508, l.  6–7 [de voluntate]); id., Conf. fid. (p. 224, l. 7–11 [de operatione]) – Refutatio: cf. Max. Conf., Op. 8 (PG 91, 100 A8–14); Max. Conf. in (Max. Conf.), D.P. (PG 91, 313 A4–5 et 329 C8–11). Vide et Max. Conf., Op. 2–3, cap. 51 (PG 91, 53 C12–14) 3/4 (Ποῦ – ἀνθρωπότητος) Max. Conf., Op. 16 (PG 91, 189 C4–5) [γ´.] (ἀνθρώπινον) Apud haereticos hanc opinionem non invenimus. – Refutatio: cf. Max. Conf. Op. 8 (PG 91, 100 A14–15); Max. Conf. in (Max. Conf.), D.P. (PG 91, 313 A7–8). Vide et Max. Conf., Op. 2–3, cap. 51 (PG 91, 53 C14 – D2) Ga Ug Ac Ui Indicatio auctoris τοῦ αὐτοῦ μαξίμου Ug; τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ga Ac Ui Tit. 1/2 Κεφάλαια – Χριστοῦ] om. Ga 2 τοῦ] s. lin. add. Ui [α´.] 1 α´] seclusi; om. Ug παρ’ὑμῶν] τοίνυν περὶ τῶν λεγόντων ἓν θέλημα, Ga ὑμῶν] om. Ga θεῖον] fenestram βούλεσθε] βούλονται Ga 2 τὸ] τὸν Gaa. corr. habet Ga 4 κατ’ἐκνίκησιν] fenestram habet Ga [β´.] 1 β´] seclusi; om. Ug λέγετε] λέγουσι Ga καὶ] om. Ga 2 θεῖον ἔχων] θεὸς εἷς Ga ἔχων] p. θέλημα trps. Ac Ui 4 δώσετε] δώσουσιν Ga [γ´.] 1 γ´] seclusi; om. Ug φάσκετε] φάσκουσιν Ga ἄνθρωπός ἐστι] ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ Ga 2 φύσεως] om. Ug Ac Ui 3 τὰ ἰδιώματα] τὴν ἰδιότητα Ug Ac Ui

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Translation Chapters about the wills, or against those who say that our Lord, God and saviour Jesus Christ has one will We want to learn from you, how you want to call that will you are talking about. Do you want to call it divine or human? Natural or hypostatic? Simple or composite? Is it a will of choice (γνωμικόν) or one moved by God (θεοκίνητον)? Is it the result of a conquest (κατ’ἐκνίκησιν) or of a favour (κατὰ μετάδοσιν)? 1. Now, if you call that one will divine, Christ would be solely God, since also his will is divine, and he would not in truth have become man. For where will you situate the perfection of his perfect humanity? 2. If, however, you call his will only human, he is but a mere man and not God, as he does not carry in himself the characteristics of his divine nature.

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[δ´] 3Εἰ δὲ φυσικὸν λέγετε τοῦτο, μίαν καὶ μόνην ἐν αὐτῷ φύσιν δοξάζετε· ἀνωτέρω γὰρ οἱ πατέρες ὡρίσαντο, ὅτι Ὅπου μία θέλησις καὶ ἐνέργεια, μία ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ φύσις. [ε´] 4 Εἰ δὲ ὑποστατικὸν αὐτὸ φάσκετε, τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον δώσετε· ἢ γὰρ διὰ τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις τῆς ἁγίας θεότητος, τρία καὶ θελήματα λέξετε ἐν αὐτῇ κατὰ τὸν Ἄρειον, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἓν θέλημα, μίαν καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν δώσετε κατὰ τὸν Σαβέλλιον.

[δ´.] (φυσικόν) Ps. Martin. papa, Ep. Ad Heraclium imp., quam meminit Anast. Sin., Hom. III de creat. 1, 44–48 (p. 57) – Refutatio, cf. Max. Conf., Op. 24 (PG 91, 269 A7–10); id., Op. 1 (PG 91, 28 B8–12); id. Op. 8 (PG 91, 108 C4 – D3); id., Op. 25, 4 (p. 208, no. 81) et 8 (p. 210); Martin. papa in Conc. Later., Act. III (p. 148, l. 20–22) 2/3  (Ὅπου – φύσις) De operatione, e.g. Ps.  Bas. Caes., Adv. Eun. IV (PG 29, 676 A2); Bas. Caes., Hom. s. Psalm. I (PG 29, 217 A3–4); Greg. Nyss., Or. dom. III (p. 41, l. 8–10); Cyrill. Alex., Thes. 10 (PG 75, 137 A12 – B1). De voluntate, cf. e.g. Amph. Icon., In illud: Non potest…, l. 101 (p. 178); Cyrill. Alex., In Ioh. X (p. 493, l. 16–17); hic locus a Max. Conf. laudatus est in Op. 7 [PG 91, 81 A11–13: κατὰ τὸν σοφώτατον Κύριλλον], in Op. 25, 7 [p. 210 et no. 115: κατὰ τὸν μέγαν Κύριλλον], et in [Max. Conf.], D.P. [PG 91, 313 D4 – 316 A1: κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας]) [ε´.] (ὑποστατικόν) Theodos. Caes. in (Max.  Conf.), D.B., l.  343–44 (p.  105); Mac. Ant. in Conc. CP III, Act. VIII (p. 216, l. 24–25) – Refutatio, cf. Max. Conf., Op. 2–3, cap. 51 (PG 91, 53 C8–12); id., Op. 8 (PG 91, 100 B1–4 [de voluntate] et 108 D3 – 109 A2 [de operatione]); id., Op. 25, 4 (pp. 208–09 et no. 86), 6 (p. 210 et no. 111) et 9 (p. 211); id. in (Max. Conf.), D.P. (PG 91, 313 C3–6 et 329 C14 – D2); Martin. Papa in Conc. Later., Act. III (p. 148, l. 23) Ga Ug Ac Ui [δ´.] 1  δ´] seclusi; om. Ug λέγετε] λέγουσι Ga 2  δοξάζετε] δοξάζουσιν Ga ἀνωτέρω] ἀνωτέρῳ Ga 3 φύσις] φϊλᾱνία [sic] Ga [ε´.] 1 ε´] seclusi; om. Ug αὐτὸ] αὐτὸν Ga φάσκετε] φάσκουσι Ga δώσετε] δώσουσιν Ga 2 γὰρ] om. Ug Ac Ui ἁγίας θεότητος] ἀθεότητος Ga 3 λέξετε] λέξουσιν Ga 4  δώσετε] δώσουσι Ga; p. Σαβέλλιον trps. Ug Ac Ui τὸν] om. Ug Ac Ui

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3. If you call his will natural, you imagine that in him there is only one nature. Indeed, in the past the fathers determined that where there is one will and energy, there is also one nature. 4. If, however, you call it hypostatic, you do one of two things: either you say like Arius, that because the divinity has three hypostaseis, it also has three wills, or you assign one hypostasis to the divinity because of the one will, just like Sabellius does.

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[ϛ´] 5Εἰ δὲ ἁπλοῦν αὐτὸ εἶναι βούλεσθε, τὰ δὲ ἁπλᾶ, καὶ ἀμιγῆ καὶ ἀσύνθετά εἰσιν, οὐκοῦν οὐ συνετέθη ἐκ μερῶν ὁ Χριστὸς, οὐδὲ ἔστι κατ’οὐσίαν διπλοῦς, ἀλλ’ὥσπερ τῷ θελήματι ἁπλοῦς ἐστιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τῇ φύσει τὴν ἁπλότητα κέκτηται. [ζ´] 6Εἰ δὲ πάλιν σύνθετον νοεῖται, καὶ οὕτω καθ’ὑμᾶς χωρίζεται τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός· εἰ γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς σύνθετον θέλημα ἔχει, ὁ δὲ πατὴρ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀσύνθετον, ἄλλος ὁ υἱὸς τῷ θελήματι παρὰ τὸν πατέρα ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰσήχθη δι’ὑμῶν καὶ νῦν ἡ Ἀρείου δυσσέβεια. ‹…›7 [η´] 8Ἀλλὰ θεοκίνητον αὐτὸ φάσκετε; Οὐκοῦν ἕτερον δίδοται ἐνταῦθα θέλημα κινούμενον ὑπὸ θεοῦ, τὸ θεοκίνητον, καὶ ἕτερον ὑπὸ ἑτέρου κινούμενον δείκνυται.|

[ζ´.] (σύνθετον) De energia iam praedicatum est a Sev.  Ant. in Ep. 3 ad Ioh. abb., fragm. 1 (p. 309, l. 17 – 310, l. 7) et fragm. 2 (p. 310, l. 8–12). Ad θέλημα σύνθετον, cf.  Pyrrh. CP in (Max.  Conf.), D.P. (PG 91, 296 A7–9) – Refutatio, cf. Max. Conf., Op. 2–3, cap. 51 (PG 91, 56 A1–5); id., Op. 7 (PG 91, 76 A1–8); id., Op. 24 (PG 91, 269 A6–7); id. in (Max. Conf.), D.P. (PG 91, 296 C9–12); Martin. Papa in Conc. Later., Act. III (p. 148, l. 18–20). Vide et Eulog. Alex., Dubitationes (α´) 3–4 et (θ´) 1–2 (et app. fontium et loc. par. ad loc.). [η´.] (θεοκίνητον) Serg. CP, Ep. ad Hon. (p. 544, l. 1–3; = Mac. Ant., Conf. fid. [p. 224, l. 17–19]); Paul. II CP, Ep. Ad Theodor. (p. 200, l. 32–34) – Refutatio: cf. Max. Conf., Add. 37. De hoc vocabulo, vide P.  Parente, “Uso e significato del termine Θεοκίνητος nella controversia monotelitica”, REB, 11 (1953), pp. 241–51; F.  Carcione, “Enérgheia, Thélema et Theokínetos nella lettera di Sergio, patriarca di Costantinopoli, a papa Onorio Primo”, OCP, 51 (1985), pp. 263–76 Ga Ug Ac Ui [ϛ´.] 1 ϛ´] seclusi; om. Ug βούλεσθε] βούλονται Ga 2 ἀσύνθετά εἰσιν] ἀσύνθετα εἰσὶν Ga οὐκοῦν] οὐκ οὖν Ga Ac Ui 3 ἔστι] ἐστὶ Ga ἐστιν] ἐστὶν Ga 4 δὴ] δὲ Ga [ζ´.] 1 ζ´] seclusi; om. Ug νοεῖται] νοεῖτε Ug; νοοῦσι Ga καθ’ὑμᾶς] κατ’αὐτοὺς Ga 4 ὑμῶν] αὐτῶν Ga Caput de θέλημα γνωμικόν (cf. [α´] 2) perditum esse videtur. [η´.] 1 η´] seclusi; om. Ug φάσκετε] φάσκουσιν Ga Οὐκοῦν] οὐκ οὖν Ga Ug Ui δίδοται] δίδοτε Ug Ac Ui

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5. If you want his will to be simple, and if simple things are also unmixed and uncomposed, then Christ is not composed from parts, nor is he double with regard to his essence, but just like he is simple with regard to his will, in the same way he also possesses simplicity by his nature. 6. If, on the other hand, his will is thought to be composite, then also in this way, according to you, the son is separated from the father. For, if the son has a composite will, the father, however, a simple will, not composite that is, then the son is different from the father with regard to his will, and again you introduce the heresy of Arius. ‹7.› 8. You call his will moved by God? Then he is given one will that is moved by God, the divinely moved one, while another will is shown to be moved by someone else.

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[θ´] 9Εἰ δὲ κατ’ἐκνίκησιν ἐπινοεῖτε τὴν θέωσιν ἐπὶ ἑνώσει οἱ πατέρες λέγετε ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ γενέσθαι τὸ σύγχυσιν καὶ ἀφανισμὸν ἐν Χριστῷ 5

τοῦτο, τὴν δὲ ἐκνίκησιν καὶ λαμβάνουσι, ταύτῃ δὲ ὑμεῖς θέλημα, ἄρα τὴν ἐκνίκησιν, τῶν συνελθόντων λέγετε.

[ι´] 10Εἰ δὲ κατὰ μετάδοσιν αὐτὸ φάσκετε, τὸ δὲ μεταδιδὸν ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ ἕτερον πάλιν τὸ μεταλαμβάνον — ἢ ἡ θεία φύσις ποτὲ μετεδίδου τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ τὸ οἰκεῖον θέλημα, ἢ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη τῇ θεότητι τὸ ἴδιον προσέφερε –, καὶ ἦν λοιπὸν καιρὸς καθ’ὑμᾶς, ὅτε τούτων θάτερον θατέρου ἐχήρευε. 11Καὶ αὖθις περὶ τούτου· εἰ διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἓν θέλημα λέγετε ἐν Χριστῷ, ἄρα πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως, οὐδὲ θέλημα εἶχεν ὁ λόγος. Τοῦτο γὰρ καθ’ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει γέγονε. Καὶ τίς θέλων ἐκ μὴ ὄντων τὰ ὄντα παρήγαγεν;

[θ´.] (κατ’ἐκνίκησιν) refert ad Greg. Naz., Or. 29, 19, 8–9 (p. 218). Vide et id., Ep. 101, 45 (p. 54) – ad interpretationem monophys., cf. Colluth., Apol., fragm. 5 (p. 332, l. 3–5) – ad interpretationem vocis ἐκνίκησις apud Max. Conf., cf. Amb. Thom. III, 27–34 (p. 11) 1/2 (τὴν δὲ – λαμβάνουσι) cf. Ps. Dion. Areop., Eccl. Hier. I, 3 (p. 66, l. 12–13) [ι´.] 5/8 (διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἓν θέλημα) cf.  Pyrrhum CP in (Max.  Conf.), D.P. (PG 91, 296 B1–2 [de voluntate]; PG 91, 340 D1–4 [de operatione]); Theodos. Caes. in (Max. Conf.), D.B., l. 490–92 (p. 119) – Refutatio: cf. Max. Conf. in (Max. Conf.), D.P. (PG 91, 340 D5–7 [de operatione]); Max. Conf. in (Max. Conf.), D.B., l. 506–08 (pp. 119–21) et l. 511–15 (p. 121) Ga(usque ad ἀνθρωπίνη [ι´, l. 3]) Ug Ac Ui [θ´.] 1 θ´] seclusi; om. Ug ἐπινοεῖτε τοῦτο, τὴν δὲ ἐκνίκησιν] scripsi, ἐπινοοῦσι τοῦτο τὴν δὲ ἐκνίκησιν Ga; om. Ug Ac Ui 2/3 ὑμεῖς λέγετε] καὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν 4 λέγετε] λέγουσι Ga Ga 3 θέλημα] σου add. Gaa. corr. [ι´.] 1 ι´] seclusi; om. Ug φάσκετε] φασὶ Ga μεταδιδὸν] μεταδιδοῦν Ug Ac Ui 1/2 ἕτερόν ἐστι] ἕτερον ἐστὶ Ga 2 ποτὲ] τὲ Ga 3 μετεδίδου] ἐπεδίδου Ga ἡ] om. Ga Ug

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9. If you consider that one will to be the result of a conquest, if the Fathers take the conquest and the divinization to be the goal of the union, and if you claim that the (one) will in the lord comes about in that way, then you claim that the conquest is a confusion and a disappearance in Christ of the parts that come together. 10. If you state that the one will is the result of a favour, and the part that gives is different from the part that receives — either the divine nature once gave to the human nature its own will, or the human nature gave to the divinity its own will — then there was a time according to you, when one of them was without the other. 11. And again about that: if you say that there is one will in Christ as a result of the union, then before the union the Word did not have a will. For, according to you, that will has come about in the union. And whose will has created existence out of nonexistence?

56

5

bram roosen

[ια´] 12 Εἰ ἓν θέλημα δίδοτε τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ, ἓν δὲ θέλημα ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ λόγου, ἄρα ἓν θέλημα ἔσται τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς σαρκός. 13Καὶ πάλιν· εἰ προσευχόμενος ὁ κύριος εἴρηκε, Μὴ τὸ ἐμὸν θέλημα γένηται, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν, οὐκ εἶχε δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα, ἄρα ἄλλο τῷ υἱῷ δώσετε θέλημα, ὅπερ ἔλεγε, Μὴ γενέσθω, καὶ ἄλλο τῷ πατρὶ, ὅπερ προσηύχετο γενέσθαι. [ιβ´] 14 Εἰ ἐν τῷ θείῳ θελήματι ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τελείωσις κατὰ τοὺς ἁγίους ἡμῶν πατέρας, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ θεῖον καὶ μόνον ἐν Χριστῷ λέγετε ὑπάρχειν, περιγραπτὸν ἄρα τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντη εἰς πέρας ἀγαγεῖν τὰ θελήματα, τὴν θείαν λέξετε δύναμιν. Φησὶ γὰρ τὰ θεῖα λόγια· Ἀναστὰς ἦλθεν εἰς τὰ μεθόρια Τύρου καὶ Σιδῶνος. Καὶ εἰσελθὼν εἰς οἰκίαν, οὐδένα ἤθελε γνῶναι καὶ οὐκ ἠδυνήθη λαθεῖν. [ιγ´.] 15Καὶ αὖθις· εἰ θελήσας ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ αἰσχρῷ ὑπήκουσε, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ θέλημα ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἀνέλαβεν, οὐδαμῶς καθ’ὑμᾶς τῆς κατάρας ἐρρύσθημεν, καὶ ἔτι ἐσμὲν ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἡμῶν.

[ια´.] 1/3 (Εἰ – σαρκός) Vide Eulog. Alex., Dubitationes (ε´) 1–2 (et app. fontium et loc. parallel. ad loc.); cf. Max. Conf., Op. 25, 5 (p. 209 et no. 98) 3/6 (εἰ – γενέσθαι) cf.  Max.  Conf., Op. 7 (PG 91, 80 D12 – 81 A9) 3/4 Lc. 22, 41–42. Persaepe laudatur e.g. a Max. Conf. (Op. 2–3, cap. 51 [PG 91, 48 C5–6]; Op. 6 [PG 91, 65 B8–9; 68 A3–4 et C12–13]; Op. 7 [PG 91, 80 D7–8; 81 A4–5]; etc.) et ab Agath., Ep. ad Constant. IV imp. (p. 68, l. 27; p. 70, l. 10 et l. 14–15, etc.). Ad usum apud monothel., cf. Paul. II CP, Ep. ad Theodor. (p. 202, l. 4) 5 (Μὴ γενέσθω) Lc. 22, 42 6 (προσηύχετο γενέσθαι) Lc. 22, 41–42 [ιβ´.] 1 (ἐν – τελείωσις) fontem non invenimus 5/6 Mc. 7, 24 [ιγ´.] 1/4 cf. Greg. Naz., Or. 30, 6, 9–10 (p. 236). Adfertur a Max. Conf., Op. 9 (PG 91, 128 D1–2); Amb.Thom. IV, 36–37 (p. 14); et Add. 19, (α´) 1–5 (p. 66, l. 4–8) Ug Ac Ui [ια´.] 1  ια´] seclusi; om. Ug 6 ὅπερ] ὃ Ac Ui [ιβ´.] 1 ιβ´] seclusi; om. Ug [ιγ´.] 1 ιγ´] seclusi; om. Ug

5  ἄλλο] ἄλλω Ug

γενέσθω] γενέσθαι Ac Ui

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12. If you assign one will to the Word and to the flesh, and if the father and the Word have one will, then the father and the flesh will have one will. 13. And again: if the lord said in prayer: “Not my will, but yours be done” without having also a human will, then you give one will to the son (the one, he said, should not be done) and another will to the father (the one, he prayed, that would be done). 14. If the divine will is directed towards perfection according to our divine fathers, and you say that that divine will is the only one in Christ, as a consequence you will state that that will is limited and that the divine power does not bring its wills fully to completion. Indeed, the divine scripture says: Jesus left that place and went to the vicinity of Tyre. He entered a house and did not want anyone to know it; yet he could not keep his presence secret. 15. And again: if man willingly obeyed the devil, and the word did not accept man’s will, then there is no way according to you we could have escaped the curse, and we remain in our sins.

58

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Index fontium et locorum parallelorum Mc. 7,  24

[ιβ´]  5/6

Lc. 22,  41–42

[ια´]  3/4,  6

Lc. 22,  42

[ια´]  5

Agath., Ep. ad Constant. IV imp. Agatho Romanus, Epistula ad Constantinum IV imperatorem, ed. R. Riedinger, ACO, Ser. II, 2, 1, Berlin, 1990, pp. 52, 12 – 122, 4 [CPG 9417; 9423.1] p.  68, l.  27

[ια´]  3/4

p.  70, l.  10 et 14–15

[ια´]  3/4

Amph. Icon., In illud: Non potest… Amphilochius Iconiensis, In illud: Non potest filius a se facere quidquam (Ioh. 5, 19), ed. C. Datema, Amphilochii Iconiensis Opera. Orationes, pluraque alia quae supersunt, nonnulla etiam spuria, Turnhout – Leuven, 1978 (CCSG, 3), pp. 173–79 [CPG 3249] l.  101 (p.  178)

[δ´]  2/3

Anast. Sin., Hom. III de creat. Anastasius Sinaita, Homilia III de creatione hominis, ed. K.-H.  Uthemann, Anastasii Sinaitae Sermones duo in constitutionem hominis secundum imaginem Dei necnon Opuscula adversus monotheletas, Turnhout – Leuven, 1985 (CCSG, 12), pp. 55–83 et 51–52 [CPG 7749] 1,  44–48 (p.  57)

[δ´]

Bas. Caes., Hom. s. Psalm. Basilius Caesariensis, Homiliae super Psalmos, PG 29, 209–494 [CPG 2836] I (217 A3–4)

[δ´] 2/3

Ps. Bas. Caes., Adv. Eun. Ps. Basilius Caesariensis, Contra Eunomium IV–V, PG 29, 497–768 [CPG 2837a] IV (676 A2)

[δ´] 2/3

Colluth., Apol. Colluthus, Apologia pro Theodosio, fragmenta in Concilio Lateranensi, ed. R.  Riedinger, ACO, Ser. II, 1, Berlin, 1984, pp. 330, l. 16 – 332, l. 5 [CPG 7298] fragm. 5 (p.  332, l.  3–5)

[θ´]

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59

Cyrill. Alex., In Ioh. Cyrillus Alexandrinus, Commentarius in Iohannem, ed. P. E. Pusey, S.P.N. Cyrilli Alexandrini in D. Joannis evangelium, vol. i–iii, Oxonii, 1972 (Bruxelles, 19652) [CPG 5208] X (p.  493, l.  16–17)

[δ´]  2/3

Cyrill. Alex., Thes. Cyrillus Alexandrinus, Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali trinitate, PG 75, 9–656 [CPG 5215] 10 (137 A12 – B1)

[δ´]  2/3

Ps. Dion. Areop., Eccl. Hier. Ps. Dionysius Areopagita, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, ed. G. Heil – A.  M. Ritter, Corpus Dionysiacum, II. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De coelesti hierarchia, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, De mystica theologia, Epistulae, Berlin – New York, 1946 (PTS, 36), pp. 63–132 [CPG 6601] I, 3 (p.  66, l.  12–13)

[θ´] 1/2

Eulog. Alex., Dubitationes Eulogius Alexandrinus, Dubitationes orthodoxi, ed. Roosen, “Eulogii Alexandrini quae supersunt”, pp. 221–27 [CPG 6971 et 7697.23b] (α´) 3–4 (ε´) 1–2 (θ´) 1–2

[ζ´] [ια´]  1/3 [ζ´]

Greg. Naz., Ep. 101 Gregorius Nazianzenus, Epistula 101, ed. P. Gallay – M. Jourjon, Grégoire de Nazianze. Lettres théologiques, Paris, 1974 (SC, 208), pp. 36–38 [CPG 3032.101] 45 (p.  54)

[θ´]

Greg. Naz., Or. 29 Gregorius Nazianzenus, Oratio 29 (Theologica III), ed. P.  Gallay – M. Jourjon, Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 27–31 (Discours théologiques), Paris, 1978 (SC, 250), pp. 176–224 [CPG 3010.29] 19,  8–9 (p.  218)

[θ´]

Greg. Naz., Or. 30 Gregorius Nazianzenus, Oratio 30 (Theologica IV), ed. ibid., pp. 226–74 [CPG 3010.30] 6,  9–10 (p.  236)

[ιγ´]  1/4

60

bram roosen Greg. Nyss., Or. dom. Gregorius Nyssenus, De oratione dominica orationes V, ed. J. F. Callahan, GNO, VII, 2, Leiden – New York – Köln, 1992, pp. 5–74 [CPG 3160] III (p.  41, l.  8–10)

[δ´] 2/3

Mac.  Ant., Conf. fid. Macarius Antiochenus, Confessio fidei, ed. R.  Riedinger, ACO, Ser. II, 2, 1, Berlin, 1990, pp. 218, l. 7 – 230, l. 26 [CPG 7625] p.  224, l.  7–11 p.  224, l.  17–19

[β´] [η´]

Mac. Ant., Serm. III, fragm. Macarius Antiochenus, Sermo  III, fragmenta in Concilio Constantinopolitano III, ed. R.  Riedinger, ACO, Ser. II, 2, 1, Berlin, 1990, p. 508, l. 1–4 et 6–7 [CPG 7626.1] p.  508, l.  6–7

[β´]

Mac. Ant. in Conc. CP III Macarius Antiochenus prout loquitur in actionibus Concilii Constantinopolitani III, ed. R.  Riedinger, ACO, Ser. II, 2, 1–2, Berlin, 1990–1992 [CPG 9420–9437] Act. VIII (p.  216, l.  24–25)

[ε´]

Martin. papa in Conc. Later. Martinus papa prout loquitur in actionibus Concilii Lateranensis, ed. R.  Riedinger, ACO, Ser. II, 1, Berlin, 1984 [CPG 9398–9402] Act. III (p.  148, l.  18–20)

[ζ´]

Act. III (p.  148, l.  20–22)

[δ´]

Act. III (p.  148, l.  23)

[ε´]

Ps. Martin. papa, Ep. Ad Heraclium imp. Ps. Martinus papa, Epistula ad Heraclium imperatorem. Vide apud Anast. Sin., Hom. III de creat. Max. Conf., Add. 19 Capita X de voluntatibus et energiis, ed. Epifanovič, Матеріалы, pp. 66–67 [CPG 7707.19] (α´) 1–5 (p.  66, l.  4–8) Max. Conf., Add. 37

[ιγ´]  1/4

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61

Additamentum 37. Syllogisticum, ineditum (editio paratur a B. Markesinis) [CPG 7707.37]

[η´]

Max. Conf., Amb. Thom. Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Thomam, ed. B.  Janssens, Ambigua ad Thomam una cum Epistula secunda ad eundem, Turnhout – Leuven (CCSG, 48), 2002, pp. 3–34 [CPG 7705.1] III, 27–34 (p.  11)

[θ´]

IV, 36–37 (p.  14)

[ιγ´]  1/4

Max. Conf., Op. 1 Opusculum 1. Ad Marinum presbyterum, PG 91, 9–37 [CPG 7697.1] 28 B8–12

[δ´]

Max. Conf., Op. 2–3 Opusculum 2–3. Capita 8, 50 et 51 ex tractatu ad Thalassium de operationibus et voluntatibus, PG 91, 40–56 [CPG 7697.2–3] cap.  51 (48 C5–6)

[ια´]  3/4

cap.  51 (53 C2–4)

[α´]  1/2

cap.  51 (53 C8–12)

[ε´]

cap.  51 (53 C12–14)

[β´]

cap.  51 (53 C14 – D2)

[γ´]

cap.  51 (56 A1–5)

[ζ´]

Max. Conf., Op. 6 Maximus Confessor, Opusculum 6. De eo quod scriptum est: Pater si fieri potest transeat a me calix (Matth. 26, 39), PG 91, 65–69 [CPG 7697.6] 65 B8–9

[ια´]  3/4

68 A3–4

[ια´]  3/4

68 C12–13

[ια´]  3/4

Max. Conf., Op. 7 Maximus Confessor, Opusculum 7. Tomus dogmaticus ad Marinum diaconum, PG 91, 69–89 [CPG 7697.7] 76 A1–8

[ζ´]

80 D7–8

[ια´]  3/4

80 D12 – 81 A9

[ια´]  3/6

81 A4–5

[ια´]  3/4

62

bram roosen 81 A11–13

[δ´]  2/3

Max. Conf., Op. 8 Maximus Confessor, Opusculum 8. Exemplum epistulae ad episcopum Nicandrum, PG 91, 89–112 [CPG 7697.8] 100 A2–6

[α´]  1/2

100 A8–14

[β´]

100 A14–15

[γ´]

100 B1–4

[ε´]

108 C4 – D3

[δ´]

108 D3 – 109 A2

[ε´]

109 B10–11

[α´]  1/2

Max. Conf., Op. 9 Opusculum 9. Ad catholicos per Siciliam constitutos, PG 91, 112–32 [CPG 7697.9] 128 D1–2

[ιγ´]  1/4

Max. Conf., Op. 16 Opusculum 16. De duabus unius Christi nostri voluntatibus, PG 91, 184–212 [CPG 7697.16] 189 C4–5

[β´]  3/4

Max. Conf., Op. 24 Opusculum 24. De duabus Christi dei nostri voluntatibus, PG 91, 268–69 [CPG 7697.24] 268 C11 – D5

[α´]  1/2

269 A7–10

[δ´]

269 A6–7

[ζ´]

Max. Conf., Op. 25 Capita X de duplici voluntate domini, ed. Van Deun, “Les Capita X”, pp. 195–213 [CPG 7697.25] 4 (p.  208, no.  81)

[δ´]

4 (pp.  208–09 et no.  86)

[ε´]

5 (p.  209 et no.  98)

[ια´]  1/3

6 (p.  210 et no.  111)

[ε´]

7 (p.  210 et no.  115)

[δ´]  2/3

8 (p.  210)

[δ´]

9 (p.  211)

[ε´]

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63

Max. Conf. in (Max. Conf.), D.B. Maximus Confessor prout loquitur in (Ps.?) Maximi Confessoris Disputatione Bizyae vel Actis in primo exsilio seu dialogo Maximi cum Theodosio episcopo Caesariae in Bithynia, ed. Allen – Neil, Scripta saeculi VII, pp. 73–151 [CPG 7735] l.  506–08 (pp.  119–21)

[ι´] 5/8

l.  511–15 (p.  121)

[ι´] 5/8

Max. Conf. in (Max. Conf.), D.P. Maximus Confessor prout loquitur in (Ps.?) Maximi Confessoris Disputatione cum Pyrrho, PG 91, 288–353 [CPG 7698] 296 C9–12

[ζ´]

313 A4–5

[β´]

313 A7–8

[γ´]

313 C3–6

[ε´]

313 D4 – 316 A1

[δ´]  2/3

329 C8–11

[β´]

329 C14 – D2

[ε´]

340 D5–7

[ι´] 5/8

Paul II CP, Ep. ad Theodor. Paulus II Constantinopolitanus, Epistula ad Theodorum papam, ed. R.  Riedinger, ACO, Ser. II, 1, Berlin, 1984, pp. 196, l. 18 – 204, l. 8 [CPG 7620] p.  200, l.  32–34

[η´]

p.  202, l.  4

[ια´]  3/4

Pyrrh. CP in (Max. Conf.), D.P. Pyrrhus Constantinopolitanus prout loquitur in (Ps.?) Maximi Confessoris Disputatione cum Pyrrho, PG 91, 288–353 [CPG 7698] 296 A7–9

[ζ´]

296 B1–2

[ι´] 5/8

340 D1–4

[ι´] 5/8

Serg. CP, Ep. Ad Hon. Sergius Constantinopolitanus, Epistula ad Honorium papam, ed. R.  Riedinger, ACO, Ser. II, 2, 2, Berlin, 1992, pp. 534–46 [CPG 7606] p.  544, l.  1–3 Sev. Ant., Ep. 3 ad Ioh. abb.

[η´]

64

bram roosen Severus Antiochenus, Epistula 3 ad Iohannem abbatem, fragmenta in DPatr 41, XXIV et XXV, ed. F.  Diekamp – B.  Phanourgakis – E.  Chrysos, Doctrina Patrum de incarnatione Verbi. Ein griechisches Florilegium aus der Wende des 7. und 8. Jahrhunderts, Münster, 19812 fragm. 1 (p.  309, l.  17 – 310, l.  7)

[ζ´]

fragm. 2 (p.  310, l.  8–12)

[ζ´]

Theodos. Caes. in (Max. Conf.), D.B. Theodosius episcopus Caesariae Bithyniae prout loquitur in (Ps.?) Maximi Confessoris Disputatione Bizyae vel Actis in primo exsilio seu dialogo Maximi cum Theodosio episcopo Caesariae in Bithynia, ed. Allen – Neil, Scripta saeculi VII, pp. 73–151 [CPG 7735] l.  343–44 (p.  105)

[ε´]

l.  490–92 (p.  119)

[ι´]

Letters of Maximus in the Collectanea of Anastasius Bibliothecarius Opuscula 10, 12, and 20 Bronwen Neil and Ryan W. Strickler (Sydney – Newcastle) The monothelite dossier known as the Collectanea was produced soon after 874 by Anastasius Bibliothecarius (c. 810–c. 878), former papal secretary and librarian, briefly anti-pope, and later self-styled papal legate. It contains his Latin translations of eleven Greek letters or extracts thereof, from various participants in the seventh-century Christological disputes over the number of energies and wills in Christ. Their authors include Pope John IV (640– 642), Pope Theodore (642–649),1 Pope Martin I (649–654), 2 and the Greek monk, Maximus the Confessor (590–662). The latter’s four letters survive only in excerpts. The first, not treated here because it is not regarded as an opusculum, is the Letter from Maximus the Confessor to the Abbot Thalassius. 3 It commends the behaviour of papal legates at Constantinople for remaining firm against imperial pressure when they were asked to support the

1  For a general introduction to Maximus’s life see P.  Allen, “Life and Times of Maximus the Confessor”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, pp. 3–18. 2  Martin’s trial in Constantinople and exile to Cherson, where he died in 654 is commemorated in Narrationes de exilio sancti papae Martini, in SAA 2, pp. 166–233. 3  Known as Letter  A. See M.  Jankowiak & P.  Booth, “A New Date-list of the Works of Maximus the Confessor”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, 19–83 at 56–60.

Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 65–84.

 



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imperial Ekthesis, to which Pope John IV was opposed.4 The Ekthesis (CPG 7607 Supplementum) was issued by Patriarch Sergius in the name of Heraclius in 638. It aimed to suppress any talk of either one or two activities (energeiai) or two wills in Jesus Christ but at the same time affirmed one will. The other three excerpted letters are known as Opuscula 10, 12, and 20. The three opuscula are community letters, directed to the minority of Greek bishops, monks, and civil servants who were prepared to resist imperial policy on certain matters of doctrine. The focus of Opusc. 10 and 12 is the ongoing monothelite dispute. These documents were later used by protagonists in both halves of the empire to defend their own resistance against imperial power. The main issue under discussion in the third letter, to Marinus of Cyprus, is the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, the controversial filioque clause, which had been added to the creed in the West in the sixth century, and which Maximus tentatively defended against imperial condemnation. Community Letters The concept of “community letters”, or letters which were circulated among a community, addressing questions particular to it, and whose authors or purported authors were known to that community, has recently entered the scholarly conversation on both the Pauline letters of the New Testament and late-antique and medieval letters, especially those written by bishops of Rome.5 From the fourth century up to the end of Gregory the Great’s papacy (604), papal letters functioned as community documents 4  Ekthesis in Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-Century Heresy. The Synodical Letter and Other Documents, trans. by P.  Allen, Oxford, 2009 (Oxford Early Christian Texts), pp. 213–15. 5  For the application of the term “community documents” to the letters of Paul and the deutero-Pauline letters, see I. J. Elmer, “The Pauline Letters as Community Documents”, in Collecting Early Christian Letters from the Apostle Paul to Late Antiquity, ed. by B. Neil & P. Allen, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 37–53 and B. Edsall, “Community Letters”, in The Brill Encyclopedia of Early Christianity Online, ed. by D. Hunter, P. J. J. Van Geest & B. J. Lietaert Peerbolte. Leiden, 2018. Consulted online 25 March 2020 .

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for the church of Rome, but also gained an expanded reach to all the western churches. Due to the nature of medieval canon law collections and the rationale behind their compilation, that of providing authorities on questions of clerical discipline and doctrinal error, the content of papal letters that survive is remarkably homogeneous. Almost all letters by bishops of Rome from Innocent I (401/2–417) to Pelagius II (579–590) are preserved only in medieval letter collections, or in collections of their correspondents, such as Augustine and Jerome in the case of Innocent I.6 Common themes in these collections are increasing pressure on the legal system, disputed episcopal succession, matters of clerical discipline, and ecclesiastical territory disputes. Records were kept of the deposition of clergy and disputes between bishops and judgements on appeals brought to Rome. The conceptual framework for the use of letters to illustrate social and religious history, along with the methodological problems they present, have been laid out elsewhere.7 These problems become especially acute when letters survive only in excerpts, as do these three opuscula, and not in their original language of composition. The partial Latin translations of Anastasius Bibliothecarius are all that remains of these three important witnesses to anti-imperial resistance in the 640s. The key to understanding their preservation lies in the common purpose they share with the other eight letters in Anastasius’s Collectanea. 6  F. Maassen,

Geschichte der Quellen und der Literatur des canonischen Rechts im Abendlande, bis zum Ausgange des Mittelalters, 2 vols Graz, 1870. On the seventh-century papal letter collections and their textual transmission, see B. Neil & P. Allen, Conflict and Negotiation in the Early Church. Letters translated from the Latin, Syriac and Greek (500–700 ce), Washington DC, 2020, pp. 162–240. 7  P.  Hatlie, “Redeeming Byzantine Epistolography”, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 20 (1996), pp. 213–48; P. Allen, “Rationales for Episcopal Letter-collections in Late Antiquity”, in Collecting Early Christian Letters: From the Apostle Paul to Late Antiquity, ed. by B.  Neil & P.  Allen, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 18–34; C. Sogno, B. Storin & E. Watts, “Introduction: Greek and Latin Epistolography and Epistolary Collections in Late Antiquity”, in Late Antique Letter Collections. An Introduction and Reference Guide, ed. by C. Sogno, B. Storin & E. Watts. Los Angeles, 2017, pp. 1–10; A. Riehle ed., A Companion to Byzantine Epistolography, Leiden, 2020 (Brill’s Companions to the Byzantine World, 7).

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The Letters of the Collectanea Each letter in the Collectanea has a bearing on the contested authority of the bishop of Rome over the patriarch of Constantinople. It has been argued elsewhere that Anastasius Bibliothecarius, as a virulent supporter of papal primacy under Pope Nicholas I (858– 867), was interested in any material that cast Constantinople in a bad light, vis-à-vis Rome. This is clear in his early hagiographic translations, made while papal secretary for Nicholas in the 860s. Under Pope Hadrian II (867–872), he continued to translate the Acts of councils which condemned heretical patriarchs of Constantinople, including the Acts of the Ecumenical Council of Constantinople III (680–681) and the Acts of the Ecumenical Council of Nicaea II (787). However, when the new pope John VIII (872–882) adopted a pro-Byzantine stance out of political necessity, with Muslim invasions of the southern Italian coast looming, Anastasius had to change his tune somewhat, and appeared to engage with the new approach to the East.8 It was during this last phase of his career in the curia that Anastasius translated the Collectanea, intended to be included in a new church history for John VIII. In what form Anastasius acquired these letters — whether in full or excerpted, singly or already put together in a dossier — and what he hoped to gain by presenting them as a collection to the court of John VIII, are the questions investigated here. We posit that the Filioque debate, which had recently been revived by Photius9 at the time of Anastasius’s visit to Constantinople in 869/70, was behind his continued desire to discredit the easterners’ record in the history of doctrinal debates with Rome, in this work of the mid-870s. The main interest of these letters lies first in their gathering as a collection, and who made that collec8  G.  Arnaldi,

“Anastasio Bibliotecario”, in Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, 3, Rome, 1961, pp. 25–37; C. Leonardi, “Anastasio Bibliotecario e le traduzioni dal Greco nella Roma altomedievale”, in The Sacred Nectar of the Greeks, ed. by M. W. Herren & S. Brown, London, 1988, pp. 277–96; Narrationes de exilio sancti papae Martini, in B. Neil (ed. and trans.), Seventh-Century Popes and Martyrs: The Political Hagiography of Anastasius Bibliothecarius (Studia Antiqua Australiensia 2), Turnhout – Sydney, 2006, pp. 3–10, 35–42, and on the Collectanea in SAA 2, pp. 71–79. 9  Patriarch of Constantinople (858–867 and 877–886).

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tion, and second in how they have been excerpted according to the agenda of Anastasius Bibliothecarius. The collocation of these letters has influenced their dating and interpretation by modern scholars. Why Compile a Dossier of Anti-Monothelite Letters? Anastasius Bibliothecarius undertook the composition of the Collectanea at the request of John the Deacon (also known as John Immonides), court historiographer for John VIII.10 In the early 870s, Anastasius published part of it — his translation of the Narrationes de exilio sancti papae Martini.11 His preface to that part, dedicated to Martin of Narni in 874, and a preface to his translation of the whole Collectanea, addressed to John Immonides, are two more letters associated with this collection.12 Anastasius’s decision to translate this collection of documents related to their role in Rome’s ongoing struggle for recognition by, and independence from, Constantinople in the seventh century.13 Although the Collectanea, including these letters, purports to be a documentary record rather than hagiography, there is an obvious bias towards the Roman point of view in the controversy over the number of wills in Christ and the Filioque clause. What Leonardi wrote concerning the saints’ lives translated by Anastasius14 therefore applies particularly to the Collectanea:15 ‘A subtle political and ideological line appears in these saints’ lives, a line that tries to bring into relief … the heresies of the eastern Christians and the abuses of Byzantine political power, in order to affirm by contrast the orthodoxy and freedom of Rome.’ 10  G.  Arnaldi,

“Giovanni Immonide e la cultura a Roma al tempo di Giovanni II”, Bullettino dell’Istituto storico per il medio evo, 68 (1956), pp. 33–89; Neil, Seventh-Century Popes.., pp. 64–66. 11  Neil, Seventh-Century Popes…, pp. 166–233. 12  Neil, Seventh-Century Popes…, pp. 148–65. 13  Neil, Seventh-Century Popes…, pp. 1–10. 14  Neil, Seventh-Century Popes…, pp. 42–66. 15  C.  Leonardi, “L’agiografia romana del secolo IX”, in Hagiographie, cultures et sociétés, IVe –XIIe siècles, Actes du colloque organisé à Nanterre et à Paris (2–5 May 1979), ed. by E. Patlagean & P. Riché, Paris, 1981, pp. 471–89: 479; see also Leonardi, “Anastasio Bibliotecario”, pp. 286–87.

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The dossier concerning the lives of Maximus the Confessor, Pope Martin and other martyrs of the monothelite controversy provided evidence of Greek-speaking support for papal positions, and was well suited to the policies of the newly elected pope John VIII, who was a known supporter of Greek theology. Therefore, Anastasius was required to take excerpts of several letters: an extract from a second letter of apology for Honorius by Maximus the Confessor to Marinus, priest of Cyprus;16 extracts from a letter of Maximus to Peter the illustris concerning Pyrrhus of Constantinople, Sophronius of Jerusalem, and Pope Honorius;17 and an extract from a letter of Maximus to the same Marinus, defending the current pope’s acceptance of the Filioque in his synodical letter.18 The four letters of Maximus in Latin translation are well known,19 A fifth letter of Maximus surviving in a Latin version by Anastasius Bibliothecarius but also in the original Greek, is Letter C (CPG 7701) to his disciple Anastasius the monk.20 Three papal letters from John IV and Theodore included in the Collectanea have only recently received their first English translations.21 In addition to those three papal letters, the Collectanea preserves four increasingly desperate letters from Pope Martin to his supporters in Rome, Africa, and Constantinople. Each of these protagonists had some connection with Maximus the Confessor. Pope Theodore was a vocal opponent of the imperial theological policy, as was Martin, even before he became bishop of Rome 16  Op.

20. See Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, pp. 48–49. 12. PG 91, 141A–146A; J.-C. Larchet & E. Ponsoye, Maxime le Confesseur: Lettres, Paris, 1998 (Sagesses chrétiennes), p. 73. 18  Op. 10; PG 91, 133A–137C; Larchet & Ponsoye, Maxime le Confesseur, p. 76. 19  P.  Allen and B.  Neil (eds), Scripta Saeculi VII vitam Maximi Confessoris illustrantia cum Latina interpretatione Anastasii Bibliothecarii iuxtaposita, Turnhout – Leuven, 1999 (CCSG 39), pp. 160–63; P. Allen & B. Neil (eds and trans.), Maximus the Confessor and his Companions: Documents from Exile, OECT, Oxford, 2002, pp. 120–23. The editio princeps of the Collectanea (Anastasii Bibliothecarii sedis apostolicae Collectanea) was made from the single Latin manuscript, Par. Lat. 5095 (Sirmond 1620) and remains the only one to date. 20  Allen & Neil, Scripta Saeculi VII vitam Maximi Confessoris illustrantia…, pp. 160–63. 21  All three are translated in Neil and Allen, Conflict and Negotiation in the Early Church, pp. 186–98. 17  Op.

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in 649. As an apocrisiarius in Constantinople for Theodore, Martin opposed both monoenergism and monothelitism. This seems to have resulted in his expulsion from the capital c. 648. Upon his appointment as Theodore’s successor, Martin took up the cause in Rome, convening in October 649 the Lateran Synod planned by Theodore to challenge monoenergism and monothelitism. The Acts of its fifth session condemned Patriarchs Sergius and Pyrrhus, as well as the imperial decrees which enshrined these doctrines, though they were careful to attribute the decrees to Sergius and Pyrrhus to avoid condemning the emperors directly:22 and those who held or hold or will hold till death, without repenting, opinions like theirs, that is, one will or one operation of the Godhead and manhood of Christ, and [382] in addition to them [do not reject and anathematise] the most impious Ekthesis issued against the orthodox faith by the emperor Heraclius at the prompting of the same Sergius, which lays down the upholding of one will and (through fabrication) one operation of Christ God, and all their impious writings and proceedings in its support, and those who accept it or any of the writings and proceedings in its support, and again together with them the most impious Typos recently issued against the catholic church by the now serenely reigning emperor Constantine at the instigation of the same Paul, which declares that the two natural wills and operations, divine and human, in Christ true God and our Saviour piously proclaimed by the holy fathers are to be denied and relegated to silence together with the one will and one operation in him impiously advocated by the heretics.

The Lateran Synod’s findings resulted in Pope Martin’s arrest in Rome and trial in Constantinople in 653/54. He was subsequently exiled to Cherson, on the northern coast of the Black Sea, at the southern tip of the Crimean Peninsula, where he died in September 655. His status as a martyr was not incontestable, since he died in exile: his supporters usually refer to him as a “confessor and martyr for the truth”.

22  “Acts

of the Lateran Synod”, in Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum: Concilium Lateranense a. 649 celebratum, ed. by R. Riedinger, Berlin, 1984 (ACO series secunda, volumen 1), pp. 380, 382; The Acts of the Lateran Synod of 649, transl. by R. Price, P. Booth & C. Cubitt, Liverpool, 2014 (Translated Texts for Historians, 61), pp. 381–82.

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On the opposing side we have the emperor Heraclius (d. 641) and his grandson Constans II (d. 668). The Greek patriarchs involved in epistolary exchanges with Rome on monoenergism and/or monothelitism in the late 630s to early 640s included Sergius I (610–638) and Pyrrhus (638–641, 654). Their letters are included in the Acts of the Lateran Synod (649), 23 and in the Acts of the Council of Constantinople III (680–681). Later Constantinopolitan patriarchs who wrote letters on this subject were Paul II (641–653), Peter (654–666), Thomas II (667–669), John V (669–675), Constantine I (675–677), and Theodore (677–679). The initial issue that united Maximus, the priest Marinus, Peter the Illustris, and Thalassius in opposition to the imperial court of Heraclius and his successor Constans II was the question over the number of wills in Jesus Christ. Did he have one or two? Proponents of monotheletism sought to maintain the Chalcedonian definition of Christ’s divine and human natures, while arguing that Christ had a composite theandric will; opponents argued that anything less than separate divine and human were a violation of Chalcedon. The doctrinal debate was carried out over the course of two decades via an exchange of letters. Let us look at three opuscula in detail, and in chronological order. Dogmatic Tome to Marinus (Opusculum 20) Maximus’s dogmatic tome to the priest Marinus is in part a defence of Honorius’s first letter to Sergius of Constantinople on the validity of the doctrine of monoenergism.24 That first letter had given Honorius the unfortunate distinction of being the first to launch monothelitism per se, 25 as it contained the original and infamous formulation of “one will in Christ”. In brief, Honorius’s reasoning was as follows: Christ, while being a person of a single Godhead, 23  The

Acts of the Lateran Synod, trans. by Price, Booth & Cubitt, pp. 389–99. 24  PG 91, 237C–245A. For a comparison with two other extant defences of Honorius attributed to Maximus — that in Disputatio cum Pyrrho and Opusc. 12 — see “A Dispute in Dispute: Revisiting the Disputatio cum Pyrrho Attributed to Maximus the Confessor (CPG 7698)”, transl. by R. W. Strickler, Sacris erudiri, 56 (2017), pp. 243–72 at pp. 257–58. 25  His reply to Sergius of Constantinople in 634 or 635 (CPG Suppl. 7606), in Allen, Sophronius of Jerusalem..., pp. 183–95.

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was also fully human and divine. Because the Godhead is one, we can say that God’s divinity was crucified and suffered, and that God’s divinity was united with humanity in Jesus. Therefore, “it follows too that we confess one will of the Lord Jesus Christ, since manifestly our nature was assumed by the Godhead, there being no sin in it”.26 It was this letter to Sergius, preserved in the Acts of the Council of Constantinople III (680/81), that eventually led to the condemnation of Pope Honorius himself by that council.27 Now regarded as the Sixth Ecumenical Council by the Catholic and Orthodox churches, it was convened by Emperor Constantine IV (d. 685) in 680/81 and was presided over by George I of Constantinople. The assembled bishops condemned monoenergism and monothelitism as heretical and upheld the orthodoxy of the dyenergist and dyothelite definitions of Jesus Christ, that is, his having two energies and two wills (divine and human). In Honorius’s reply, Sergius saw an opportunity to replace the contentious notion of monoenergism and find unity under the doctrine of monotheletism, with its apparent papal endorsement.28 However, imperial critics were not satisfied and, as we will see, accused Sergius of manipulating and purposefully misinterpreting Honorius’s letter. In Rome, meanwhile, the late Pope Honorius was accused by the Byzantines of hoarding wealth in the vestry of the Lateran palace (Episcopium) and of withholding imperial stipends intended for the army.29 The Lateran palace was plundered by Byzantine troops led by Maurice the chartularius and Isaac the exarch of Ravenna, who sent a portion of the spoils to Emperor Heraclius. Only after this imperial tribute was obtained was Honorius’s successor Severinus ordained, at the end of May 641. Already an old man, Severinus died two months later, making way for the ordination of John IV in 642. 26  Allen,

Sophronius of Jerusalem..., pp. 197–99. Conciliorum Oecumenicorum: Concilium universale Constantinopolitanum tertium, ed. by R. Riedinger, Berlin, 1990–1992 (ACO series secunda, volumen 2, 2 parts) pp. 548–58 and 620–24. 28  Fragments are preserved in Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, ed. by Riedinger, vol. 2, pp. 620–25; Ekthesis in Allen, Sophronius of Jerusalem…, pp. 205–09. 29  Le Liber Pontificalis, 3 vols, 2nd edn., ed. by L. Duchesne & C. Vogel, Paris, 1955–1957, vol. 1, p. 328, lines 4–7. 27  Acta

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Dating to c. 641, but after Opusc. 7, 30 Maximus addressed this letter-treatise to his friend the priest Marinus in Constantia, the capital city of Cyprus. Jankowiak notes that Maximus’s entire correspondence with Marinus (Opusc. 1, 7, 10, 19, 20 and perhaps 2) should be read as part of a wider effort to unite the Cypriot archbishops to the dyothelite cause. 31 Maximus’s defence of Honorius’s letter to Sergius finds a parallel in the Apology of John IV, sent to the son of Heraclius in spring 641 (Letter 1). 32 Marinus had asked Maximus to comment on three texts which the monoenergists and monothelites were citing in support of their position. Of particular concern was the monothelites’ use of Pope Honorius to support one will, a claim that the deceased pope could not refute, and one which, if true, lent significant credibility to the monothelite position. Maximus and fellow dyotheletes, including Honorius’s successors, were vigorous in their efforts to vindicate Honorius from association with monotheletism. The third of Maximus’s responses to Marinus is what Anastasius excerpted in the Collectanea: Maximus’s reply concerning the first Letter of Honorius to Sergius, with its infamous reference to “one will” in Christ. 33 Jankowiak and Booth are worth quoting on the logical gymnastics performed by Maximus: The defence of Pope Honorius’ monothelite formula is tortuous: Maximus first argues that Honorius’ ‘one will’ referred to the divine will and did not preclude the human, but then implies that Honorius has never spoken of ‘one’ will. 34

They then attempted to shift the blame from Honorius in another way: on a recent trip to Rome, Maximus’s disciple the monk Anastasius (not the Bibliothecarius) had pestered the late Honorius’s supporters into projecting the responsibility of the formula 30  Op.

7 is an earlier letter to Marinus (c. 640–641?) where he is addressed as a deacon. See Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, pp. 47–48. 31  Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, p. 26; M. Jankowiak, “Essai d’histoire politique du monothélisme à partir de la correspondance entre les empereurs byzantins, les patriarches de Constantinople et les papes de Rome”, PhD diss. Paris and Warsaw, 2009, pp. 198–99. 32  Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, p. 48 (nr. 42). 33  PG 91, 237C–245A. 34  Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, p. 48.

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onto the Greek translator of the letter. 35 The translator was the abbot John, known as John the Councillor. A similar argument was used to defend Honorius in the Disputatio cum Pyrrho (CPG 7698), which purports to be a verbatim record of a debate between Maximus and the former patriarch Pyrrhus in Carthage in July 645, over the questions of the energies and wills of Christ. 36 We return to the Disputatio below. Excerpts from the letter of Maximus to Peter the Illustris (Opusculum 12) Composed during the early part of the papacy of Pope Theodore (642–649), Opusc. 12 is the last of three letters addressed to Peter the Illustris, strategos of Numidia. 37 Most of our information about Peter’s career comes from the correspondence between Peter and Maximus on the topic of theological controversies. In Letter 13 from 633–634, Maximus gave Peter a short exposé of the heretical teachings of Severus of Antioch. 38 The Dogmatic Letter to Peter the Illustris (Ep. 14), also from 633 or 634, was carried by Cosmas, a deacon of the Alexandrian church. 39 It concludes with a greeting to “the blessed child sir Nonnos”, who was probably Peter’s son.40 Peter was also the recipient of Maximus’s Computus ecclesiasticus.41 Peter’s period of office as Pe[t]ro patriciho [h]ac Africana probincia is attested independently in an inscription dated to 636 from Telegma in Numidia.42 His name was also raised in the record of Maximus’s trial in Constantinople, as the general of Numidia who reported that Maximus had advised him by letter in 633 not to 35  PG 91, 244C–245A. For further discussion, see P. Booth, Crisis of Empire. Doctrine and Dissent in the Roman Empire, Los Angeles, 2013, pp. 267–68. 36  D.P., PG 91, 288–353 (CPG 7698). 37  On Peter the patrikios/illustris, see PLRE 3: 1013 “Petrus 70”, Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, pp. 24–25, do not unequivocally support the usual identification of Peter the Illustris with the patrician Peter. 38  Ep. CPG 7699.13; Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, pp. 33–34. 39  Ep. CPG 7699.14; Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, pp. 44–45. 40  PG 91, 543C; Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, pp. 45. 41  On Computus ecclesiasticus (CPG 7606), see Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, p. 39. 42  Petrus 70, PLRE 3: 1013. See Y. Duval, “Le Patrice Pierre, exarque d’Afrique?”, Antiquités africaines, 5  (1971), pp. 211–12.

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lead a Roman army against the Saracens in Egypt, since God did not support the Roman empire’s cause under Heraclius’s rule.43 Although this slur was reported by the gossips of Peter’s army, no written testimony of such a letter exchange between Maximus and Peter could be adduced in court to support this claim, to Maximus’s satisfaction.44 However, Letter 14 to Peter does lend itself to such a treasonous interpretation, where Maximus suggests that the invasion of the desert people is a manifestation of collective sin and indicates that the Antichrist’s rule is imminent.45 This literary evidence from a letter (ep. 14) composed around the same year as Peter was alleged to have received the treasonous letter from Maximus, has not been adduced before in support of the identification of Peter the Illustris with Peter the patrician, but adds certainty to the assumption of Yvette Duval and Constantin Zuckerman that the two Peters were one and the same man.46 Opusc. 12 presented a defence of Pope Honorius and the late patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronius, along with a condemnation of Pyrrhus of Constantinople, who was patriarch of Constantinople twice, being deposed in 641 for his support of Martina, Heraclius’s second wife and niece, but recalled again in 654 for six months until his death. The letter contains a strong anti-Muslim statement in response to the recent Arab devastation of Egypt; and an invective against the Jews for supporting the Arab invaders. Scholars have rightly associated Opusc. 12 with a public debate which took place in Carthage between Pyrrhus and Maximus in July 645, in which Pyrrhus allegedly conceded defeat and sought permission to travel to Rome to seek absolution from the pope. There has been a question as to whether the letter preceded the Dispute with Pyrrhus (Disputatio cum Pyrrho), as Polycarp Sherwood 43  R.M.

1 (CPG 7736), in Allen & Neil, Maximus the Confessor and his Companions…, pp. 48–51. 44  R.M. 1, in Allen & Neil, Maximus the Confessor and his Companions…, pp. 50–51. 45  PG 91, 540AB, 541B. 46  Duval 1971 investigates whether Peter the Patricius of the Telegma inscription and the exarch of Africa before Gregory were also one and the same; C. Zuckerman, “La haute hiérarchie militaire en Afrique byzantine.” Antiquité tardive, 10 (2003), pp. 173–74.

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argued,47 or is subsequent to July 645. According to Boudignon, the letter was written while Pyrrhus was in transit to Rome after the dispute with Pyrrhus, as the letter makes absolution from the pope a prerequisite for the restoration of honours.48 Most scholars have attributed the Disputatio cum Pyrrho to Maximus himself, or an impartial scribe, accepting the text as a transcript of the historical disputation which took place in 645. Jacques Noret opened the possibility of an author other than Maximus by pushing the date forward to between 655, the date of Maximus’ trial in Constantinople, and 667, the year of his disciple Anastasius’s death.49 With an examination of the language and arguments used, apparent textual seams, and the historical context of the Sixth Ecumenical Council in 680–681, Ryan Strickler argues that the Disputatio may be a compilation of two documents: a primary composition following Noret’s dating, and a later redaction.50 Even if, as Noret and Strickler argue, the Disputatio cum Pyrrho was composed well after the historical disputation took place in July 645, and after Pyrrhus’s condemnation at the Lateran Synod of 649, there is no reason to doubt the outcome and Pyrrhus’s initial recantation, to which the record of Maximus’s trial attests.51 Considering Maximus’s sharp tone towards Pyrrhus in Opusc. 12, the uncertainty concerning Pyrrhus’s status, and the lack of any sense of Pyrrhus’s repentance, we believe that Opusc. 12 was most likely composed prior to the historical disputation of July 645, with a date close to Pyrrhus’s arrival in North Africa after his expulsion from Constantinople.

47  P. Sherwood,

An Annotated Date-list of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, Rome, 1952 (Studia Anselmiana, 30), p. 52. 48  C. Boudignon, “Le Pouvoir de l’anathème ou Maxime le Confesseur et les moines palestiniens du VIIe siècle”, in Foundations of Power and Conflicts of Authority in Late-Antique Monasticism, ed. by A. Camplani & G. Filoramo, Leuven, 2007 (Orientalia Lovanensia Analecta, 157), pp. 256–57. 49  J. Noret, “La Rédaction de la Disputatio cum Pyrrho de S. Maxime le Confesseur (CPG 7698) serait-elle postérieure à 655?”, Analecta Bollandiana, 117 (1999), pp. 291–96. 50  Strickler, “A Dispute in Dispute”, pp. 271–72. 51  Allen & Neil, Scripta Saeculi VII vitam Maximi Confessoris illustrantia…, pp. 237–44, (R.M. lines).

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At the beginning of Opusc. 12, Maximus outlined the purpose of the letter. He explained that he was writing in reply to Peter’s question about the proper protocol for addressing the exiled patriarch Pyrrhus during his sojourn in North Africa. Peter had enquired whether Pyrrhus should be afforded the traditional titles due to a patriarch. Maximus encouraged Peter to not use these titles, and to discourage their use by his subordinates until such a time as Pyrrhus renounced his position and made a formal reconciliation with Rome. In his response, Maximus refers to several important figures of the period, including recent popes and their attitudes towards monothelitism. Maximus asserts that Pope Severinus, Honorius’s successor who died two months after attaining office, spoke in opposition to the doctrine, thus providing the only evidence of his position since no documents from his hand survive. He also confirms the better-attested opposition of Popes John IV and Theodore, whose letters are included in the Collectanea with Maximus’s letter to Peter. Maximus repeats his opinion that Honorius’s use of the phrase “one will” had not only been misunderstood, but deliberately manipulated by Sergius and Pyrrhus.52 In addition to his apologia on behalf of Honorius, Maximus goes to great lengths to defend Sophronius of Jerusalem (d. 638), another member of the dyenergist circle, from charges of heresy. In the course of his defence, Maximus provides an account of Sophronius’s presence in Alexandria, suggesting that he not only expressed his opposition to the Nine Chapters in writing, but begged Cyrus to retract them in person, prostrating himself before the then patriarch of Alexandria. This is the only claim for such an action and must be taken with a grain of salt. However, it does confirm Sophronius’s strong opposition to the Pact of Union, which he also expressed at length in his Synodical Letter of 634.53 In Opusc. 12, Maximus refers to “robber councils and gatherings of bishops”, convened under duress to confirm imperial doctrine. This phrase, echoing Leo I’s disparaging description of the second council of Ephesus in 449, is intriguing, as history has not 52  Cf. Op.

20 above and D.P., PG 91, cols 288–353. Epistula Synodica of Sophronius is in Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-Century Heresy, trans. by Allen, pp. 66–157. 53  The

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recorded any attempts to confirm the doctrine of monothelitism through an ecumenical council. We do know that Sergius and Pyrrhus convened synods in Constantinople in 638–639, although only their encyclical letters survive. Likewise, in Disputatio cum Pyrrho Pyrrhus protests that condemning the memory of Sergius would negate the “councils” over which they presided, to which Maximus responds that the proper protocols for convening a council had not been observed.54 The authority and acta of the Constantinopolitan synods of 638–639 were abandoned in the wake of the Sixth Ecumenical Council of 680–681. The central problem facing Peter the Illustris as general of Numidia in North Africa was Pyrrhus’s canonical status as an exiled patriarch, and whether he should be afforded patriarchal honours. Pyrrhus’s canonical position vis-à-vis Constantinople remains unclear.55 He seems to have been exiled to North Africa on political grounds, and the nature of his deposition from the patriarchate remains opaque. We know he was replaced by Paul II while in exile, and we have no record as to whether he formally resigned, abandoned his post, or was canonically deposed.56 This was a moot point for Maximus, as Pyrrhus had been condemned by Pope Theodore, along with Sergius of Constantinople, because of his responsibility for endorsing monoenergism and monothelitism. Unfortunately, this does little to resolve the question of his status in Constantinople as it is unlikely that the court would have accepted his condemnation on theological grounds, given that Constans II had enshrined monothelitism in imperial law. Maximus’s striking pro-Roman stance and his understanding of the authority of the Holy See has led some to question the 54  D.P., PG 91, 352C–353A8. See Strickler, “A Dispute in Dispute”, pp. 259–61. 55  “Pyrrhos”, PmbZ 6386/corr in PmbZ. ed. by R.-J. Lilie, C. Ludwig, T. Pratsch, B. Zielke et al. Prosopographie der mittelbyzantinischen Zeit Online. Berlin: Berlin – Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, updated version (accessed 24 February 2020 at http://pom.bbaw.de/pmbz/ index.html); J. L. Van Dieten, Geschichte der Patriarchen von Sergios I. bis Johannes VI. (610–715), Enzyklopädie der griechischen Patriarchen von Konstantinopel, part 4. Amsterdam, pp. 57–75; P. Booth, Crisis of Empire. Doctrine and Dissent in the Roman Empire. Los Angeles, 2013, 252–53. 56  “Paulos”, in PmbZ 5763/corr. PmbZ. ed. by Lilie, Ludwig, Pratsch, Zielke et al.

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letter’s authenticity. However, it fully conforms with Maximus’s pro-Roman stance throughout his corpus, and his crucial role in the convening of the Lateran Synod of 649. 57 From Maximus’s perspective, the apostolic see was the final authority in matters of doctrine, and the manipulation of its bishops was among the most grievous offences of Sergius and Pyrrhus. Maximus underlines that Roman primacy is based on apostolic orthodoxy when he writes in the second excerpt of Opusc. 12: “But I feared lest I be thought to act outside of the sacred laws, or contrary to the will of the Most Holy See of apostolic men, who properly lead the universal fullness of the catholic Church, and who act in an orderly way according to divine law.”58 Most importantly for Pyrrhus’s canonical status, and in response to Peter’s inquiry, the apostolic see is the source of Pyrrhus’s condemnation and loss of honours and stands as the only point of recourse for Pyrrhus if he desires absolution. Maximus makes reconciliation with the See of Rome the sine qua non for Pyrrhus to restore his status, and any attempts to reconcile with any other authority are in vain. Maximus urged Peter not to address Pyrrhus as “most holy (sanctissimus)”, for sacred law did not allow him to be called such a thing. Rather, he tells Peter to “urge him to make a suitable answer to the most holy Roman pope”. Pyrrhus did confess his error before Theodore in Rome in 646 but promptly recanted when he returned to Constantinople. He was briefly reinstated as patriarch in 654, though he survived less than six months in office before his death on 1 June of the same year.59 Maximus’s Letter to the Priest Marinus of Cyprus (Opusculum 10) 60 Dated by most scholars to the period c. 643–646, this letter to Marinus also exists only in the fragment translated in Latin by Anastasius Bibliothecarius.61 As in Opusculum 20, Marinus is now 57  Booth, Crisis of Empire, pp. 269–76; Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, ed. by Riedinger, pp. 517–34. 58  PL 129, 573B. 59  Strickler, “A Dispute in Dispute”, 262. 60  PG 91, 133A–137C. 61  PL 129, 577A–578B; CPG 7697.10.

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a priest, placing our text after Letter 20 (636?) and Opusculum 7 (c. 640–641?) where he is called monk and deacon respectively.62 Writing from Carthage, and thus before his departure for Rome in 645/6,63 Maximus defends “the present pope” in the face of theological detractors from Constantinople, who contested the pope’s doctrine of the Filioque and of the freedom of Christ from original sin, both contained in his synodical letter.64 Ἀμέλει τοι γοῦν τῶν τοῦ νῦν ἁγιοτάτου, Πάπα συνοδικῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοσoύτοις, ὅσoις γεγράφατε, κεφαλαίοις, οἱ τῆς βασιλίδος τῶν πόλεων ἐπελάβοντο· δυσὶ δὲ μόνοις, ὧν, τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχει περὶ θεολογίας, ὅτι τε φησὶν εἶπεν, “Ἐκπορεύεσθαι κἀκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον·” … Καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, συμφώνους παρήγαγον χρήσεις τῶν ‘Ρωμαίων Πατέρων· ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, ἐκ τῆς πονηθείσης αὐτῷ εἰς τὸν εὐαγγελιστὴν ἅγιον Ἰωάννην ἱερᾶς πραγματείας· ἐξ ὧν, οὐκ αἰτίαν τὸν Υἱὸν ποιοῦντας τοῦ Πνεύματος, σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀπέδειξαν· μίαν γὰρ ἴσασιν Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος τὸν Πατέρα αἰτίαν· τοῦ μὲν κατὰ τὴν γέννησιν· τοῦ δὲ, κατὰ τὴν ἐκπόρευσιν· ἀλλ’ ἵνα τὸ δι’ αὐτοῦ προϊέναι δηλώσωσι· καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ συναφὲς τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἀπαράλλακτον παραστήσωσι. [T]he men of the Queen of cities [sc. Constantinople] have attacked the synodal letter of the present most holy pope, not in all the chapters you [sc. Marinus] have written about, but only two of them. One [chapter] relates to [his] theology and makes the statement that, ‘The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son’ … In the first place they [sc. the Romans] produced the unanimous evidence of the Roman Fathers, and also of Cyril of Alexandria, from the study he made of the gospel of St John. From this they showed that they themselves do not make the Son the cause of the Spirit for they know that the Father is the one cause of the Son and the Spirit, the one by begetting and the other by procession, but they show the progression through him and thus the unity of the essence.

The second chapter to be criticised contained a statement that Christ was without sin. Our understanding of Maximus’s defence of the Filioque clause, which had been added to the Western creed in the sixth century, is hampered by uncertainty as to who exactly 62  Jankowiak

& Booth, “A New Date-list”, pp. 46–47. 91, 137B. 64  PG 91, 133D–136A. 63  PG

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is accused of saying that “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son”. Siecienski posits that “the present most holy pope” mentioned in this letter, for which he accepts Sherwood’s dating of 645/6, was Theodore (642–648).65 Jankowiak and Booth also conclude that the “current pope” was probably Theodore, but (as they recognise) Theodore’s synodical letter, sent to Constantinople probably in early 643,66 does not refer to the Filioque or to Christ’s sinlessness. We may also note that Theodore’s synodical letter is preserved entire in the Collectanea, not in fragments, so there is no chance that the two offending chapters singled out by Maximus, including a mention of the filioque, have been expurgated.67 On the other hand, in Maximus’s first letter to Marinus in the Collectanea (Opusc. 20), the monk mentions that the Greeks criticised Honorius for his views on the Holy Spirit.68 It therefore seems more likely to us that the “current pope” is Honorius, who died in 638, not Theodore. If this surmise is correct, it would suggest we have to date this letter of Maximus at least five years earlier than Jankowiak’s and Booth’s suggestion of mid-643.69 The text mentions the Ekthesis as having been published after the Council of Cyprus in 636,70 giving us a terminus post quem for Opusc. 10. This dating, however, would leave us with the problem of Marinus’s designation as priest in this opusculum, when he was still deacon in Opusc. 7, dated to 640–641. Is it possible that “the present most holy pope” means the one who was pope at the time of the events described, rather than at the time of writing Opusc. 10? Given the later importance of the filioque in East-West 65  A. E. Siecienski, “Maximus the Confessor and Ecumenism”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, p. 549. “The Letter to Marinus (645/6), written after the monothelites in Constantinople allegedly attacked the orthodoxy of Pope Theodore for his use of the filioque in his synodal letter contains one of the earliest references to the debate”. Sherwood, An Annotated Date-list, pp. 53–55 (no. 79), also dated it to “645–646”. 66  M. Jankowiak, “Essai d’histoire politique du monothélisme”, pp. 208–15. Theodore’s Synodical Letter is Ep. 2 in the Collectanea, PL 129, 577C–582B. 67  Op. 10, PG 91, 136. 68  Op. 20, extract in PL 129, 568A; PG 91, 228B. 69  Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-list”, p. 80. 70  M. Jankowiak, “Essai d’histoire politique du monothélisme”, p. 159; P. Allen, “Life and Times of Maximus the Confessor”, in Allen &  Neil, OHMC, pp. 5–6.

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relations, some have doubted the authenticity of these excerpts as well as those in Opusc. 12.71 Conclusion The three opuscula studied above illustrate the perceived and actual power of “community letters” as tools in doctrinal controversy and the importance of those who had the skills to translate them, from Greek into Latin and vice versa. Maximus’s letter to Thalassius of 640 (CPG 7702) defended the Roman envoys’ prolonged refusal to endorse the imperial condemnation of monoenergism in favour of monotheletism in the Ekthesis. His letter to Peter the Illustris (CPG 7697.12) of c. 645 concerns the issue of the recidivist patriarch Pyrrhus, who got caught up in the monothelite dispute in 638, and whose involvement lasted until his death in 654. In the course of answering Peter’s inquiry, Maximus mentioned many of the major historical figures of the period, including the recent popes, as well as the Patriarchs Sophronius of Jerusalem and Cyrus of Alexandria. In this Opusculum and his letter to the priest Marinus (CPG 7697.20), Maximus also discussed the matter of the letter of Honorius to Sergius which, as mentioned above, initiated the monothelite controversy, as well as Cyrus’s Nine Chapters, including Sophronius’s presence at their reading in Alexandria. This short letter contains a wealth of information regarding the early stages of the development of the monoenergist and monothelite controversies. The condemnation of Honorius, a bishop of Rome, at the sixth ecumenical council of 680–681 was a fact which medieval and post-Reformation theologians made good use of during subsequent debates about papal fallibility. The other letter to Marinus considered here (CPG 7697.10), concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, was also a defence of the Roman position in the face of imperial condemnation. These letters were community

71  A. E. Siecienski, “The Authenticity of Maximus the Confessor’s Letter to Marinus: The Argument from Theological Consistency”, Vigiliae Christianae, 61 (2007), pp. 217–27 argues for their authenticity; see also P. Booth, Crisis of Empire, p. 270, no. 177.

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documents and were used by protagonists in both halves of the empire to defend their own resistance against imperial power. Anastasius Bibliothecarius’s retrieval of the three Greek opuscula included in the anti-monothelite dossier provided lasting fuel for the fire of the Filioque controversy, which continued to dog eastern church relations with the West until the twentieth century. Maximus’s assertions about the Filioque have been adduced in more recent doctrinal debates between Catholic and Orthodox theologians, although now directed towards the aim of finding common ground.72 The conjunction of papal and Greek letters in this dossier shows the hand of someone with a strong interest in defending Roman interests. The revival of the Filioque dispute under Photius provided a context for Anastasius to show that even some Greeks, namely, Maximus the Confessor, disagreed with the Orthodox stance against the inclusion of the phrase “and from the Son” in the creed. Although Anastasius’s attempted intervention in this dispute was doomed to fail, his translation of the antimonothelite material in the Collectanea at least preserved three opuscula of Maximus that would otherwise have been lost to us.

72  Siecienski, “The Authenticity of Maximus the Confessor’s Letter to Marinus,” p. 226.

Maximus’ Relational Ontology πρός τι and σχέσις Aleksandar Djakovac (Belgrade) Saint Maximus the Confessor belongs to the time when patristic theological thought reached its creative peak. His interest — as with most of the Church Fathers — was primarily theological, more precisely soteriological. Although he was not interested in philosophical speculations per se, he knew, used and creatively synthesized philosophical heritage.1 During the Trinitarian disputes that shook the Church, the Cappadocian Fathers developed a specific personalistic theology, which has not been fully understood to this day.2 St Maximus applied achievements of his predeces-

1  Among the Church Fathers, Maximus occupies a special place when it comes to logic. As Erismann observes: “Maximus is an important milestone in the history of logic in early Byzantine philosophy, both because of his own work and because many collections of definitions and compendia of logic came to circulate under his name and authority”. Cf. C. Erismann, “A Logician for East and West: Maximus the Confessor on Universals”, in A Saint for East and West: Maximus the Confessor’s Contribution to Eastern and Western Christian Theology ed. by D. Haynes, Eugene, OR, 2019, pp. 50–65. 2  On the meaning of the term person in theology and especially in the Cappadocians and St Maximus, there has been an interesting debate for a long time, which I will not deal with on this occasion. I just point to an important paper that resolves many doubts: J. Zizioulas, “Person and Nature in the Theology of St Maximus the Confessor”, in Knowing the Purpose of Creation through the Resurrection: Proceedings of the Symposium on St Maximus the Confessor, Belgrade, October 18–21, 2012, ed. by M. Vasiljević, Belgrade, 2013, pp. 85–113.

Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 85–104.

 



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sors to Christology, in order to defend the Church’s faith in the reality of incarnation. In the theology of the Cappadocians, as in St Maximus the Confessor, the notion of relation has a fundamental ontological meaning. 3 In this paper, I will — through the analysis of the Aristotelian category πρός τι and the notion of σχέσις — try to examine in what way St Maximus used philosophical and theological heritage. A brief overview of the understanding of this problem in the first part of this paper is certainly not exhaustive. It serves only as a presentation of the foundation on which Maximus builds his theological structure. Although Maximus deals with this issue in several places in his works, the contribution he makes in his Opuscula theologica et polemica, which are therefore at the center of our research, is especially significant. St  Maximus uses the terms πρός τι and σχέσις in many places, the first of which is particularly related to Aristotle’s Categories. This paper is based on an attempt to develop the idea that Maximus uses πρός τι when he wants to point out the relation between different entities, while he uses σχέσις when he takes into account hypostatic relations. In the theology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, relation plays a significant role. It is implied in many important terms such as participation (μέθεξις) and communion (κοινωνία), and especially mode of existence (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως). The Philosophical Background In Aristotle Categories, Category πρός τι means “relative”, or things toward something. Typical examples are large, half, master, double. In Metaphysics Δ15,  1021b6–8, we find: “In addition, everything in virtue of which those that have it are called πρός τι 3  Maspero successfully summarizes the significance of the ontological relation for defining Christian metaphysics: “Thus, the transition to this new ontology can be identified in the formulation of a new thought not solely based on a logos ut ratio, that is a logos understood as a necessary causal link, but as a thought is born out of the logos ut relatio, that is, from the thought of the Son whose being is a purely ontological relation with the Father”. (G. Maspero, “Life as Relatio: Classical Metaphysics and Trinitarian Ontology”, Theological Research The Journal of Systematic Theology, 2/1 (2014), pp. 31–52 at 38).

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[is also a πρός τι]. For example, equality [is a πρός τι] because the equal [is called πρός τι in virtue of it], and similarity [is a πρός τι] because the similar [is called πρός τι in virtue of it]”.4 Aristotle’s use of πρός τι is not entirely clear. As Studtmann observes, it is wrong to think that this term in Aristotle means “relations”. He emphasizes that “for Aristotle things are toward something else insofar as a relational predicate applies to them”, and gives short definitions: “though he certainly thought that objects in the world are related to other objects, he did not accept relations as a genuine type of entity. So, Aristotle’s category of relatives is a kind of halfway house between the linguistic side of relations, namely relational predicates, and the ontological side, namely relations themselves”.5 Of course, I will not go into detail here about Aristotle, since he has been studied extensively. I will only mention that Aristotle based his consideration of πρός τι on Plato’s insights, which is important to our subject. Once again we return to Aristotle’s Categories: “All relatives have their correlatives. ‘Slave’ means the slave of a master, and ‘master’, in turn, implies ‘slave’” — Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου λέγεται δοῦλος καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης λέγεται (Cat. 6b28–30). According to Aristotle “Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature” — Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι (Cat. 7. 15–16), but this “does not seem to be true of all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature. For the knowable seems to be prior to knowledge”. According to Matthew Duncombe, the distinction between extensional and intensional aspects of πρός τι is particularly important for understanding Plato and Aristotle’s view.6 The extensional account of relatives does not necessarily 4  Alternative

translation: Further, there are the properties in virtue of which the things which possess them are called relative; e.g., “equality” is relative because “the equal” is relative, and “similarity” because “the similar” is relative. Cf. H. Tredennick, Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I, Books 1–9 Harvard, 1933 (LCL 271). 5  P. Studtmann, “Aristotle’s Categories”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), ed. by E. N. Zalta, URL = . 6  M. Duncombe, “Aristotle’s Categories 7 Adopts Plato’s View of Relativity”, in Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, ed. by J. Bryan,

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include a specific other. The extensional account “allows a relative multiple relations.”7 Duncombe suggests that the extensional account contrasts with the intensional in cases of named individuals. “For example, human can be a relative, since a human can relate to things. […]  On [the] intensional account, however, a human is not a relative, since bearing a relation to something is not part of what it is to be a human. A human can be a rational animal even alone in the universe”.8 Maybe that’s the reason why Aristotle consistently speaks of πρός τι, but not of σχέσις, which is a term he rarely uses. As Emery notes, “Aristotle’s main focus was not on relations, but rather on relatives or relative predicates”.9 But some relatives must have reciprocating correlatives, for example: love or fatherhood. These are the examples found in Plato’s Symposium (199d1–199e8). Love must be love for something, and father must be someone’s father. In that sense, Anna Marmodoro suggests that

R. Wardy & J. Warren, Cambridge, 2018, pp. 120–38 at 123. 7  Duncombe provides examples that illustrate these aspects. For extensional view: “Achilles is a relative simply in virtue of being faster than Hector. Achilles is faster than Hector; so, Achilles relates to Hector; so, Achilles relates to something. So, Achilles is a relative”. For intensional view: “Take a relative like a brother. Relating in some way to something does not suffice for being a brother. A brother must be a brother of something. Being a brother depends on bearing the ‘… is a brother of …’ relation to something. A named individual brother, Hector, does bear the ‘… is a brother of …’ relation to someone, Paris. But being a brother of Paris is not what it is to be a brother: Agamemnon is a brother, but not a brother of Paris. To avoid such counter-examples, we might specify that we are interested in being a brother as such, rather than some named brother”. (Duncombe, Aristotle’s Categories 7 Adopts Plato’s View of Relativity, p. 123). 8  Duncombe,

Aristotle’s Categories 7 Adopts Plato’s View of Relativity, p. 124. “Ad aliquid: Relation in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas”, in Theology Needs Philosophy: Acting Against Reason is Contrary to the Nature of God ed. by M.L Lamb, Washington, DC, 2016, pp. 175–201 at 176. According to Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: “Le terme grec qui est souvent traduit par le terme ‘relation’ est le mot σχέσις, e la famille de ἔχειν, qui désigne un ‘état’ ou une ‘condition’ aussi bien qu’une ‘relation’, et est employé tout autant pour désigner une relation entre deux êtres que l’état ou la disposition d’un être”. J.-B. Gourinat, “Relations et relatifs: les stoïciens contre Aristote”, Quaestio, 13 (2013), pp. 17–38 at 17. 9  G. Emery,

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“The relation between the reciprocating correlatives is not a linguistic or a semantic relation. It is an ontological interdependence”.10 Plato and Aristotle’s understanding of relation underwent certain changes on its way to St Maximus. According to Simplicius, the Stoics determine two kinds of relatives, the πρός τι and the πρός τι πῶς ἔχον.11 DelCogliano suggests that phrase πρός τί πως ἔχον could be translated “relatively disposed to something” and can be found in several places in Aristotle.12 As Limone notes “the former consists of those things whose being is determined by their different properties, e.g. sweet and bitter; the latter consists of those things whose being is determined by their relation, e.g. father and son”.13 According to Aristotle and his successors, such 10  A. Marmodoro,

Aristotle on Perceiving Objects, Oxford, 2014, pp. 28–29. To put what I am saying more clearly, they [the Stoics] call ‘relative’ all things which are conditioned according to an intrinsic character but are directed towards something else; and ‘relatively disposed’ all those whose nature it is to become and cease to be a property of something without any internal change or qualitative alteration, as well as to look towards what lies outside. Thus when something in a differentiated condition is directed towards something else, it will only be relative: for example tenor, knowledge, sense-perception. But when it is thought of not according to its inherent differentiation but merely according to its disposition relative to something else, it will be relatively disposed. (2) For son, and the man on the right, in order to be there, need certain external things. Hence without any internal change a father could cease to be a father on the death of his son, and the man on the right could cease to be the man on the right if his neighbour changed position. But sweet and bitter could not alter qualitatively if their internal power did not change too. (3) If, then, despite being unaffected in themselves they change because of something else’s disposition relative to them, it is clear that relatively disposed things have their existence in their disposition alone and not through any differentiation”. Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 166, 15–29 (SVF 2, 403, part) in A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary, Cambridge, 1987, p. 176. 12  Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (=  EN) 1101b10–27 (LCL 73), Physica (=  Phys.) 246b3–20 (LCL 228), Topica (=  Top.) 142a.26–31 and 146a36-b4. (LCL 391). M. DelCogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names. Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy, Leiden/Boston, 2010, p. 226. 13  Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium (=  in. cat) 6a.36 ed. by C. Kalbfleisch. Berlin, 1907, CAG 8, 165.32–166.29 = SVF 2, 132.21–133.9. V.  Limone, “Origen’s Explicit References to Aristotle and the Peripateticians”, Vigiliae Christianae. 72 (2018), pp. 390–404: 399–400. 11  “1)

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as Alexander of Aphrodisias, “the substance has priority over the relation” as Liman observes.14 So they subsume πρός τι πῶς ἔχον under the πρός τι genre, showing that a being cannot have relation as its ontological basis. On that note, we cannot be surprised by the fact that some statements indicate that, in Middle Platonism, Aristotle’s Categories was considered to be merely a linguistic tool.15 In that sense, in post-Aristotelian times, the category πρός τι was considered to be “a non-authentic and somewhat ‘parasitic’ category”, as Christos Evangeliou writes.16 When Porphyry discusses the right place that the category πρός τι should occupy, he considers it to come third, after the categories of “quantity” and “solids”, which represents three-dimensional entities is first considered.17 Porphyry explains that “relatives are not absolute (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόλυτα τὰ πρός τι), but exist in a relation of one thing to another (ἐν σχέσει τινὸς πρὸς ἄλλο τι)”.18 The terms σχέσις and πρός τι are brought here together, but σχέσις serves to explain the πρός τι. In any case, Porphyry believes that relation does not belong to the key ontological definition of being. The Theological Heritage Clement of Alexandria understands the category πρός τι, in the order of the material world, along with time and space, as in Paedagogus (2.1.14.3.4): Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ τρόπος καὶ τὸ πρὸς τί… (the occasion and the time, the manner and the motive).19 A more detailed series can be found in Stromata 14  EN

1096a.21–22. Limone, Origen’s Explicit References, p. 400. Limone, Origen’s Explicit References, 396. Limone specifically mentions Lucius and Nicostratus, quoted by Simplicius: Nicostratus ap. Simpl., in cat. 1a.1 (CAG 8, 24.6–9); see also: Porphyry, in cat. 1a.1–2 (CAG 4/1 61.13– 16); Dexipus, in cat. 1a.1–2 (CAG 4/2, 17–30-18.2); Lucius ap. Simpl., in cat. 1b.25 (CAG 8 64.18–19). 16  C.  Evangeliou, Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry, Leiden, 1988, pp. 79–80. 17  Evangeliou, Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry, pp. 79–80. 18  DelCogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names, p. 224. 19  English translation: S. P. Wood, C.P. Clement of Alexandria, Christ the Educator, Washington, DC, 1953, p. 106. 15  See

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(8.6.20.2.3) — ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν ἤτοι οὐσία ἐστὶν (ὥσπερ ὅταν λέγωμεν· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα) ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ πότε ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. “And of things stated in connection, some point out ‘essence’, some ‘quality’, some ‘quantity’, some ‘relation’, some ‘where’, some ‘when’, some ‘position’, some ‘possession’, some ‘action’, some ‘suffering’, which we call the elements of material things after the first principles”.20 Origen was aware of the distinction between πρός τί πως ἔχον and πρός τι.21 In Contra Celsum, Origen addressed this issue in a very specific context, regarding the peripatetic understanding of providence. The Peripatetics argued that providence refers only to species and genera and not to individuals, which is attested by Atticus and Nemesius.22 This is where the general Aristotelian view arose that essence has priority over the individual.23 However, when Origen tried to apply Aristotle’s categories to Christian theology, things got more complicated. Due to the need for God’s providence to always have a subject with whom it is related, Origen postulated a kind of eternity of the world. So in the Peri Archon we read: “God cannot be called almighty if there are none over whom he can exercise his might”.24 Origen appears to have shifted the same argument directly to the field of Triadology: “How can anyone, think or believe that God was ever Father, even for a moment, apart from the begetting of Wisdom?” 25 DelCogliano concludes that “Origen does not employ technical Aristotelian

20  English translation of W. Wilson in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2, ed. by A. Roberts, J. Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, Buffalo, NY, 1885. 21  On the possible influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias on Origen, see I. Ramelli, “Alexander of Aphrodisias: a source of Origen’s philosophy?”, Philosophie antique, 14 (2014), pp. 237–89. 22  Atticus, in Praeparatio evangelica XV 5, 12 (SC 338, 262); Nemesius, De Natura Hominis 43. See Limone, Origen’s Explicit References, 399. 23  More about Origen’s reception of Categories see R. M. Berchman, “Origen on The Categories: A Study in Later Platonic First Principles”, Origeniana Quinta (1992), pp. 231–52; I.  Vigorelli, “ΣΧΕΣΙΣ in Origen”, Origeniana Undecima (2016), pp. 885–900. 24  Origen, De principiis 1.2 [10], 307–10, ed. by H. Crouzel – M.  Simonetti, SC 252, p. 132. 25  Origen, De principiis 1.2 [2], 31–34, SC 252, p. 112.

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language in making this argument, but his endorsement of the ontological entailment of relatives in the case of the Father and Son is clear”.26 As is well known, Maximus largely adopted the results of the philosophical and theological efforts of the Cappadocians.27 As one may see, this is significantly true of the problem we are dealing with. In order to simultaneously avoid subordinationism and tritheism, and to establish the sameness of essence (homoousia) of the Trinity, the Cappadocian Fathers had to adapt the concept of relation to theological use. The term σχέσις in the Cappadocian Fathers plays a significant and important role in constituting their triadological position. I will now briefly outline some points demonstrating this. Gregory of Nyssa considers that God cannot be known by his very essence. According to Gregory “the definition of being is one thing, the definition of the manner of being (πως εἶναι), another”.28 Maspero concludes that “In this sense, πως εἶναι is identified with πρός τι, i.e., with relation (σχέσις)”.29 I’m not sure this conclusion is quite true. It seems to me that such a conclusion would be possible only if it were found that Gregory neglects the philosophical use of πρός τι. It is clear that Gregory here use third Stoic genus πως ἔχον, although the Cappadocian term is not identical with the Stoic, as Papagopulos has shown. 30 This difference 26  M. DelCogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names, p. 229. 27  G. C. Berthold, “The Cappadocian Roots of Maximus the Confessor”, in Maximus Confessor, Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, 2–5 septembre 1980, ed. by F. Heinzer and Chr. von Schönborn, Fribourg, 1982, pp. 51–59. 28  Contra Eunomium III, 8.39.6–40.1, ed. by W. Jaeger, GNO II, pp. 253, 12–15. 29  G. Maspero, “Life from Life: The Procession of the Son and the Divine Attributes in Book VIII of Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium”, in Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium III. An English Translation with Commentary and Supporting Studies: Proceedings of the 12th International Colloquium On Gregory of Nyssa (Leuven, 14–17 September 2010) ed. by J. Leemans & M.  Cassin, Leiden, 2014, pp. 401–28: 417. 30  G. D. Panagopoulos, “Die Vermittlung des Sohnes beim ewigen Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes aus dem Vater nach Gregor von Nyssas Ad Ablabium (GNO III/1, 55, 21–56, 10 Müller)”, in Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Trea-

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relates precisely to the specific role of the term σχέσις in Cappadocian Trinitarian theology, which is one of their most significant contributions to the Christian theology. Gregory of Nazianzus clearly states that the name Father “designates neither the substance nor the activity, but the relationship, the manner of being, which holds good between the Father and the Son”. 31 Sutherland concludes correctly that, for Gregory, “the divine persons are the relations, and the relations are the divine persons. Which is to say that both the Father and Son share the same substance but the names themselves refer to their mutual relations”. 32 When talking about human fathers and sons, Gregory seems to be closer to understanding this relationship in terms of Aristotelian πρός τι (Or. 29.5). However, when it comes to the divine relationship (σχέσις), which is not susceptible to decay, that relation — or mutual relationship (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις) — eternally exists in reality. In fact, this mode of existence is the only reality of divine existence. 33 In the controversy with Eunomius, St Basil points out that unbegotteness is not a question of what something is (τὸ τί ἐστιν) but of how it is (τὸ ὅπως ἐστιν). These terms are obviously Aristotelian, 34 but Basil uses them in a modified sense. Basil distinguishes between the material substrate (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὐποκείμενον) and the mode of existence (τρόπος τῆς ὑποστάσεως), so that for him mode of existence and hypostasis become synonymous. Vigorelli correctly points out that “In Basil, the theological inquiry surrounding the ontological status of the ‘Son’ is thus already configured through the development of the relationality in God”. 35 tises on Trinitarian Theology and Apollinarism, ed. by V. Henning Drecoll and M. Berghaus, Leiden, 2011, pp. 383–98 at 386. 31  Or. 29, 16, ed. par P. Gallay et M. Jourjon, SC 250, p.  210: ὄνομα ὁ Πατήρ … σχέσεως δὲ καὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν ὁ Πατήρ, ἢ ὁ Υἱὸς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα. 32  G. M. Sutherland, The Unity and Equality of the Divine Relations in Gregory of Nazianzus’s Trinitarian Theology, PhD Thesis, McMaster University, 2019, pp. 52–53. 33  Or. 31.9, SC 250, p. 290. 34  For τὸ τί ἐστιν see Met. Z, 4. Latin translation of this Aristotelian expression is essentia. For “τὸ ὅπως ἐστιν” see for example Met. Α. 992b 14. 35  I. Vigorelli, “The σχέσις of the Father and of the Son in the Contra Eunomium”, in Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium I. An English Translation

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The definitions of Gregory of Laodicea may be useful here. “The names ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ each signify a relation to something (ἡ πρός τι σχέσις). Hence even if we use the name ‘Father’ alone, we have the notion of the Son implied in the name ‘Father’ (for ‘father’ is said of a father of a son). Even if we use the name ‘Son’ alone, we have the notion of the Father because ‘son’ is said of a son of a father. For each pertains to the other and the relation is not sundered. Instead, even when the one is mentioned alone, it introduces the notion of the other, and not only the name, but the affinity of nature along with the name”. 36 A Digression on Plotinus This phrase ἡ πρός τι σχέσις can be translated as “the state of being in a relation”. Sometimes it seems that the Neoplatonic positions coincide with the conclusions reached by Saint Maximus. 37 According to Plotinus “If then one is going to consider the state belonging to relation (τοῦ πρός τι σχέσιν) generically as a form εἶδος -, it will be one genus and substantial reality”. Εἰ μὲν οὖν [ὡς εἶδος] γενικῶς τὴν τοῦ πρός τι σχέσιν ὡς εἶδός τις θήσεται, γένος ἓν καὶ ὑπόστασις ὡς λόγος τις πανταχοῦ·38 Filler correctly suggests that “The One/Many problem, because there can be no relation between the One and the Many, and the problem of Subject/Object dualism because the subject, as primarily existing independently, cannot come into relation with other entities, and with Supporting Studies, ed. by M. Brugarolas, Leiden, 2018, pp. 538–56 at 544. 36  Epiphanius, Panarion 73.19.3–4 in Epiphanius III: Panarion haer. 65-80, De fide, ed. by K.Holl, J. Dummer (GCS 37), 1985, Berlin, p. 292. Cf. DelCogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names, p. 247. 37  The question of philosophical influences on St Maximus is very complex. Despite different assessments of the type and degree of influence of Neoplatonism on his thought, the fact is that he lived in a time “in which theology and philosophy are intricately intertwined in a complex and far-reaching Christian metaphysics”, as Batrelos notes. D. Bathrellos, “Neoplatonism and Maximus the Confessor on the Knowledge of God”, SP, 58 (2013), pp. 117–26 at p. 117. 38  Enn. VI.1.9.26–31. English translation A. H. Armstrong, Enneads VI. 1–5, LCL 445, p. 41.

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so becomes trapped in itself”. 39 However, I’m not sure that relationality in Plotinus can really be understood as grounding being, as Filer himself admits. It is my opinion that this will happen precisely within the framework of Christian theology. It is precisely the equation of divine personalities with the hypostases that enables the constitution of a truly relational ontology. The Contribution of Saint Maximus After this brief review, it is time to turn to St Maximus.40 In Op. 1, 25D–28A,41 Maximus addresses the question of whether the saints after the resurrection have one will with God. Maximus claims that this is not possible because human nature seeks to be saved and the deity wants to save the human race. Although the goal is the same — the salvation of the human race — the difference is significant and obvious. For this reason, the will (θέλημα) must belong to the genus πρός τι, otherwise it would have nothing towards which it can relate/conform (οὐκ ἔχον κατηγορούμενον). If that were the case, then the will would represent quality (ποιότης), not in itself but in relation to something else. If the will is understood with respect to something else, then it is an accident (συμβεβηκός). If will is an accident, then it is a characteristic of either substance or hypostasis. In that case, the saints would have with God either one essence or one hypostasis.42 39  J. Filler,

“Relationality as the Ground of Being: The One as Pure Relation in Plotinus”, The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition, 13/1 (2019), pp. 1–23 at p. 22. 40  For detailed overview of the reception of Plato and Aristotle in St, Maximus, see M.  Portaru, “Classical Philosophical Influences: Aristotle and Platonism”, in: Allen & Neil, OHMC, pp. 127–48. A slightly different approach, with a stronger emphasis on the eschatological aspect can be found in: E. Brown Dewhurst, Revolution in the Microcosm: Love and Virtue in the Cosmological Ethics of St Maximus the Confessor, PhD Thesis, Durham University, 2017, pp. 63–92. 41  English translation of Opuscula is by Kevin Clarke, still unpublished. 42  Op. 1, PG 91,  25D–28A: Εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι θέλημα, ὁπωσοῦν νοούμενον ἣ λεγόμενον ἄσχετον, καὶ τὸ πρός τι γένος οὐκ ἔχον κατηγορούμενον· ποιότης ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῶν καθ᾿ αὐτά, ὡς ἐν ἑτέρῳ δηλαδὴ θεωρούμενον. Εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ἑτέρῳ θεωρουμένων ἐστί τὸ θέλημα, συμβεβηκὸς πάντως ἐστίν· εἰ δέ συμβεβηκός, ἢ οὐσίας, ἢ ὑποστάσεως ἔσται χαρακτηριστικόν (τούτων

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We can see that genus πρός τι is closely related to earlier philosophical traditions.43 Salvation involves the reciprocity of different entities. Human “nature seeks to be saved and the deity wants to save the human race”, as Maximus points out. But, πρός τι still signifies the relationship of concrete entities that first exist and only later enter into the relationship. Genus πρός τι is closely related to the diastemic mode of existence, that is, to creation. In agreement with this, in Q.Thal. 43, Maximus claims that good and evil are determined by one another. Γνῶτε ὅτι τὸ ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον κακὸν οὐ πάντως κακόν, ἀλλὰ πρός τι μὲν κακόν, πρός τι δὲ οὐ κακόν· ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον καλὸν οὐ πάντως καλόν, ἀλλὰ πρός τι μὲν καλόν, πρός τι δὲ οὐ καλόν· You should know that what is simply (ἁπλῶς) said to be evil is not absolutely evil but is evil in relation to something else (ἀλλὰ πρός τι), just as what is simply said to be good is not absolutely good but is good in relation (ἀλλὰ πρός τι) to something else.44

Without going into the details of Maximus’ understanding of evil, I just want to point out that good and evil are mutually defined as two different entities. Here Maximus obviously adheres to Aristotle’s and Plotinus’ understanding of πρός τι.45 Something first is, and then it enters into a relationship that determines it. Good γὰρ οὐδὲν μέσον ἐστὶ καθ᾿ αὐτὸ θεωρούμενον, ἤτοι μηδετέρων μετέχον, ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον)· καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐσίας, μίαν τοῦ τε Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁγίων φύσιν κατηγορήσουσι· πάντων διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς θελήματος, τήν εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν παθόντων συναίρεσιν. Τὸ γὰρ γενικῶς τινων ἐπίσης κατηγορούμενον, οὐσίας, ὑφ᾿ ἣν τελοῦσιν, ὑπάρχει δηλωτικόν. Εἰ δὲ ὑποστάσεως, μία πάντων ἔσται τοῦ τε Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁγίων ὑπόστασις, πάντων ἀλλήλοις εἰς ταυτὸν συγχωνευθέντων. Τὸ γὰρ ἰδικῶς τινι καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν ἐμπεφυκός, ἄλλοις ἀπαραλλάκτως ἐνθεωρούμενον, πάντας ἀλλήλοις συγχεῖ· καὶ τὸν ἑκάστου τοῦ, πῶς εἶναι λόγον, ποιεῖ παντελῶς ἀδιάγνωστον. 43  See A. Guiu, “Christological and Philosophical Culture in Maximus the Confessor’s Ambiguum 41”, Studia Patristica, 48 (2010), pp. 111–16. 44  Q.Thal. 43.6, cf. C.  Laga & C.  Steel (eds), Quaestiones ad Thalassium I, Quaestiones I–LV, una cum latina interpretatione loannis Scotti Eriugenae (CCSG 7), Turnhout, 1980, p. 297. (English translation: Maximus the Confessor, On Difficulties in Sacred Scripture: The Responses to Thalassios [Quaestiones ad Thalassium], trans. by M. Constas, Washington, DC, 2018 (FC 136), p. 248. 45  Cf. Metaphysics Δ15,  1021b6–8 (LCL 271).

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(thing) is good in relation to evil, and evil (thing) is evil in relation to good. That is why he uses πρός τι to define their existence, thus avoiding to ontologically establish evil. Maximus understands genus πρός τι, in the context of the “diastemic gulf between infinite God and finite creatures”.46 Such relation is possible only in the way of existence of created nature which is not yet deified. In this way, Maximus connects πρός τι with movement. Τῆς δὲ τῶν γεγενηµένων φυσικῆς γενέσεως τέλος ἡ στάσις ἐστίν, ἣν ποιεῖ πάντως µετὰ τὴν διάβασιν τῶν πεπερασµένων ἡ ἀπειρία, ἐν ᾗ διὰ τὸ µὴ εἶναι διάστηµα πᾶσα παύεται κίνησις τῶν φυσικῶς κινουµένων, οὐκ ἔχουσα λοιπὸν ὅποι τε καὶ πῶς καὶ πρός τι κινηθῆναι. The end of the natural motion of whatever has been originated is rest (στάσις), which, after the passage beyond finite things, is produced completely by infinity for in the absence of any spatial or temporal interval, every motion of whatever is naturally moved ceases, henceforth having nowhere, and no means whereby, and nothing to which (καὶ πρός τί) it could be moved.47

In the eschatological reality, when the στάσις of created being occurs, it will no longer have “nothing to which (καὶ πρός τί) it could be moved”. This means that the genus πρός τι for Maximus necessarily belongs to the realm of creation. In the eschatological mode of existence, there will be nothing towards which created beings direct (πρός τι) their movement. The difference between the present and the eschatological state is precisely in the existence or non-existence of the genus πρός τι. In this sense, πρός τι represents the definition of a diastema. In Theological and Economical Chapters (Th.Oec. 1, 68), we find a definition, which reads: Τῶν πρός τι, καὶ οἱ αἰῶνές εἰσι, καὶ οἱ χρόνοι, καὶ οἱ τόποι· ὧν ἄνευ οὐδὲν τῶν συνεπινοουµένων τούτοις ἐστίν. Ὁ δὲ Θεός, οὐ 46  P. M.

Blowers, “Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of ‘Perpetual Progress’”, Vigiliae Christianae, 46/2 (1992), pp. 151–71 at p. 152. 47  Amb.Ioh. 15, PG 91, 1217C; N.  Constas (trans.), Maximos the Confessor, The Ambigua (DOML 28), 2 vols., Cambridge MA, 2014, vol. 1, p. 368.

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aleksandar djakovac τῶν πρός τι ἐστίν· οὐ γάρ ἔχει τι καθόλου συνεπινοούµενον. Εἴπερ οὖν ἄρα κληρονοµία τῶν ἀξίων αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, ὑπέρ πάντας αἰῶνας καί χρόνους καί τόπους ὁ ταύτης ἀξιούµενος τῆς χάριτος ἔσται, τόπον ἔχων αὐτὸν τὸν Θεόν, κατὰ τό γεγραµµένον· Γενοῦ µοι εἰς Θεὸν ὑπερασπιστήν, καὶ εἰς τόπον ὀχυρόν, τοῦ σῶσαί µε. Age, time, and place belong in the category of the relative (τῶν πρός τι). Without them nothing of what is included in them exists. God is not of the category of the relative (Ὁ δὲ Θεός, οὐ τῶν πρός τι ἐστίν) because he does not have anything at all included in him. If, then, the inheritance of those who are worthy is God himself, the one who is rendered worthy of this grace will be above age, time, and place. He will have God himself as a place, according to what is written, ‘Be for me a protecting God, a strong place which saves me’.48

Part of the sentence reads: “he does not have anything at all included in him” — οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τι καθόλου συνεπινοούµενον. The English translation seems unclear. St Maximus says here that there is nothing to think of as being simultaneous with God. The future relationship of the saints with God will not fall within the genus πρός τι, since “they will have God Himself as a place” — τόπον ἔχων αὐτὸν τὸν Θεόν. Place (τόπον) signifies here a special, different kind of relationship with God — the hypostatic one. According to the definition given by St  Maximus, πρός τι cannot be used to describe the relationship of divine Hypostases. But it seems that in Op. 3, 48A we find a slightly different approach. Maximus explains here why it is necessary for Christ to have two wills. In the relation of two wills, the human will is the one which is deified and the divine will is one which deifies. He then continues: Εἴπερ τῶν πρός τι, τό τε θεοῦν, καὶ τὸ θεούμενον· τὰ δὲ πρός τι, πάντως ἀλλήλοις συνεισάγεσθαι πέφυκε, καὶ θατέρῳ συνεπινοεῖσθαι θάτερον. What deifies and what is deified are then related (τῶν πρός τι), and if they are related (τὰ δὲ πρός τι), they are certainly

48  Th.Oec. 1.68, PG 90,  1108С. English translation: Maximus Confessor. Selected Writings, ed. by G. C. Berthold, New York, 1985. See S. Mitralexis, “The Temporality of Deification: Maximus the Confessor’s Ever-Moving Repose”, Teologikon, 4/1 (2015), pp. 40–59 at p. 52.

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brought together, the one to the other, naturally, and each is thought of together with the other.49

We may ask ourselves, what is it that “brought together” two different natural wills? In my opinion, this is exactly the mode of existence (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως), which will be briefly discussed later.50 Confirmation of this assumption can be found a bit further in the same Opuscula. Εἴπερ ἡ σάρκωσις, ἐναργής ἐστι φύσεως καὶ οἰκονομίας ἀπόδειξις· τοῦ τε φυσικοῦ λέγω τῶν ἡνωμένων λόγου, καὶ τοῦ καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν τῆς ἑνώσεως τρόπου τοῦ μὲν πιστουμένου, τοῦ δὲ καινοτομοῦντος τὰς φύσεις, δίχα τροπῆς καὶ συγχύσεως. For the Incarnation is an effective demonstration of both nature and the economy, I mean of the natural logos of what has been united, confirming the mode of the hypostatic union, and ‘instituting afresh the natures’, without any change or confusion.

In the present age, those who are in the process of deification, refer to God in the mode πρός τι. However, the incarnation confirms “the mode of the hypostatic union” — καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν τῆς ἑνώσεως τρόπου. The genus πρός τι is used here precisely because it relates to nature. It is necessary for both natures to be complete. Otherwise, as Maximus points out “a personal division would appear” — προσωπικὴ θεωρεῖται διαίρεσις, [49A] and “the Word Incarnate would not fulfill the hypostatic union with flesh”.51 49  English

translation: Louth, Maximus, p. 192. the meaning of this expression in St Maximus, see: A. Djakovac, “Τρόπος ὑπάρξεως bei den Kappadokischen Vätern und bei St  Maximus Confessor”, in Durch den Denken glauben: Aufsätze aus der serbischen Teologie heute. ed. by B. Šijaković, Belgrade, 2017, pp. 119–27. 51  The whole passage reads: Οὐκοῦν ψιλῇ μορφώσει σαρκὸς τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐφάντασεν· ἀλλ᾿ οὐ φύσει σαρκός, νοερῶς τε καὶ λογικῶς ἐψυχωμένης καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν σαρκωθεὶς ὁ Λόγος πεπλήρωκε, θέλημα φυσικὸν κατὰ Σευῆρον οὐκ ἔχων ὡς ἄνθρωπος· εἰ γὰρ φυσικῷ θελήματι κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἦν ἐλλιπής, τέλειος κατ’ ἀλήθειαν οὐ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, οὐδ᾿ ὅλως ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν. Τίς γὰρ ἀτελοῦς φύσεως ὕπαρξις, ἧς οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστί; “Therefore the economy would be a mere fantasy, if he merely had the shape of flesh. But if, as Severus said, he did not have, as man, a natural will, the Word Incarnate would not fulfil the hypostatic union with flesh, endowed by nature with a rational soul and intellect. For if he was truly, as man, lacking a natural will, he would not truly have become perfect man. And if he did not truly 50  On

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Maximus here seems to use πρός τι in the sense of the entities constituting the hypostasis. If so, then in Maximus we can distinguish between different levels of use of πρός τι. When he talks about the things of this world, he uses the genus πρός τι in classical philosophical terms, mostly like Porphyry. However, we see here that he uses πρός τι to explain Christ’s hypostatic unity. This is because he wants to emphasize the reality of both wills in Christ (and therefore both natures), that is, their real and objective existence. Although the use of πρός τι in connection with the hypostatic mode of existence may be misleading, Maximus usage of πρός τι is actually consistent. We must not forget that he is talking about natural wills here. Precisely because they are natural, they fall under the genus πρός τι. In this sense, the relation of human and divine will in the mode of πρός τι does not constitute the basis of constitution of the hypostasis but is the consequence of the hypostatic unity. For this reason, human natural will does not imply the existence of a proper Person. In this sense, Maximus uses the genus πρός τι to describe the mutual relation of two wills, but not the relation of will to Person. (Recall that Maximus insists that the will is by no means hypostatic). Criticizing Severus, Maximus argues that in this case (ie. if the will belongs to the hypostasis), every Person of the Holy Trinity would have their own will, which would result in tritheism.52 In Maximus words: Εἰ γὰρ κατ᾿ αὐτόν, ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἕπεσθαι τὰ θελήματα πέφυκε τοῖς δὲ θελήμασιν εἰσάγεσθαι πρόσωπα, καθάπερ αἰτίοις αἰτιατά· … καὶ παντὶ προσώπῳ δηλονότι, κατ’ αὐτόν, θέλημα· καὶ τούτῳ πάντως ἐνέργεια συνεισαχθήσεται πρόσφορος. Ὁ γὰρ τὸν πρός τι,

become perfect man, he did not become man at all. For what kind of existence does an imperfect nature have, since the principle of its existence no longer exists?” 52  See P. M. Blowers, Maximus the Confessor: Jesus Christ and the Transfiguration of the World, Oxford, 2016, p. 47. It is possible that Maximus arguments here are directed against John Philoponus. See V. Cvetkovic, “The Oneness of God as Unity of Persons in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor”, in Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher ed. by S. Mitralexis, G. Steiris & M. Podbielski, Eugene OR, 2017, pp. 304–15 at 306; A. Djakovac, “Person and Nature, Hypostasis and Substance: The Philosophical Basis of the Theology of John Philoponus”, Philotheos, 16 (2016), pp. 73–84.

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λόγος, ἄλυτον ἔχων τὴν σχέσιν, ἴσην ποιεῖται τὴν τῶν σχετῶν ἀκολούθως ἀντιστροφήν. For if, according to him [Severus], the wills naturally follow the energies, and persons are naturally introduced by the wills, as effect follows cause … then clearly according to him there is a will for every person, and with this certainly a suitable energy is introduced. For from the principle of preserving relationships intact, it follows that there is equal reciprocity between those that are related. 53

It is important to emphasize that according to Maximus’ understanding, wills or actions cannot be united according to the genus πρός τι. He uses πρός τι merely to point out that the divine and human wills in Christ are naturally complete. However, if their unity were based on the relation πρός τι, one would have to be dominant, which “introduce opposing distinctions in them”. In Op. 5.64A we read: Πρῶτον μὲν δύο ἐνεργείας καὶ ὑμεῖς ὁμολογεῖτε· μίαν ἐπικρατοῦσαν· τὴν θείαν φημί· καὶ μίαν κρατουμένην· τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δηλονότι· ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν Πρός τι. Τὰ δὲ Πρός τι, πάντως συνεισάγουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἀντιδιαιρούμενα. First of all, you yourselves confess two operations, one predominating, I mean, the divine, and one being overpowered, plainly the human, which are in reciprocal relation. And the things in reciprocal relation completely introduce opposing distinctions in them.

Maximus uses the example of soul and body to explain two natures in Christ. Therefore, a description of the relationship between body and soul can be helpful. In Amb.Ioh. 7 he says: Οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς λέγεται “σῶμα” μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλ᾿ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα, καὶ τοῦ τινος ἀνθρώπου σῶμα, κἄν εἰ φθείρεται καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν ἀναλύεσθαι στοιχεῖα πέφυκεν. Ἔχει γὰρ καὶ οὕτως ὡς εἶδος τὸ ὅλον αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν ὡς μέρους κατηγορούμενον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. For the body after its separation from the soul, is not simply called ‘body’, even though it will decompose and be dissolved into the elements from which it was constituted, but the body of a man, indeed of a particular man (τοῦ τινος ἀνθρώπου). 53  Op.

3, PG 91, 53A.

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aleksandar djakovac For like the soul it possesses the form of the whole (εἶδος τò ὅλον) human being predicated of it, by virtue of its relation (κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν) as a part to the whole. 54

This εἶδος τò ὅλον is a particular man (“τοῦ τινος ἀνθρώπου”) or person. When referring to body and soul as parts of a person, Maximus uses the term σχέσις to describe that relation that forms the whole. The relation described by the term σχέσις corresponds to the particular mode of existence of soul and body as a human Person. Following the Cappadocian Fathers, Maximus equates the mode of being with Person. When he uses the phrase τρόπος ὑπάρξεως to denote the hypostatic mode of existence, he employs σχέσις rather than πρός τι. In the Mystagogy, Maximus gives us a good explanation from a triadological perspective. ἑαυτῇ ταὐτὴν καὶ μονάδα καὶ τριάδα ἀσύγχυτόν τε καὶ ἀσυγχύτως τὴν ἕνωσιν ἔχουσαν καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν ἀδιαίρετόν τε καὶ ἀμέριστον· μονάδα μὲν κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ἤτοι τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἢ συναίρεσιν ἢ τὴν οἱανοῦν σύγχυσιν, τριάδα δὲ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πῶς ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὑφεστάναι λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀλλοτρίωσιν ἢ τὸν οἱονοῦν μερισμόν. The same unity and trinity has a unity without composition or confusion and a distinction without separation or division. It is unity by reason of essence or of being (μονάδα μὲν κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας), but not by any composition or joining together (οὐ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἢ συναίρεσιν) or confusion; it is trinity by reason of its mode of existence (κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πῶς ὑπάρχειν) and subsistence, but not by any separation or diversity or division. 55

Genus πρός τι explains the relationship between entities, and therefore can be applied when it comes to substance or energy. God is a monad in essence. There is no division in the divine essence and so there is no genus πρός τι. Of course, in God’s essence there is also no relation (σχέσις), since the relation concerns the mode of existence. So in Q.Thal. 8, we read:

54  Amb.Ioh.

7, PG 91, 1101B; N. Constas (trans.), The Ambigua.., vol. 1, pp. 140–41. 55  Myst. 23, PG 91, 700D–701A; cf. C.  Boudignon (ed.), Mystagogia, Turnhout, 2011 (CCSG 69), p. 840. (English translation in Maximus Confessor. Selected Writings, ed. by G. C. Berthold, New York, 1985).

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῍Η μᾶλλον, φῶς ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ Πατὴρ ἐν φωτί, δηλαδὴ τῷ Υἱῷ καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, οὐκ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο φῶς ὑπάρχων, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό, κατὰ τὸν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπον τρισσοφαές. God the Father is light in light; that is, He is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, not that He exists as three separate lights, but He is one and the same light according to essence, which, according to its mode of existence is threefold light (κατὰ τὸν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπον τρισσοφαές). 56

In conclusion, St  Maximus uses the genus πρός τι when he wants to point to real and concrete entities. Although πρός τι is more suited to describing the relationship between created and material entities, Maximus always uses it when he wants to point to individual realities, no matter whether they are divine or human. However, when referring to the hypostatic relationship or mode of existence, he prefers to use the term σχέσις, in accordance with the Cappadocian heritage.

56  Q.Thal. 8, cf. Laga & Steel, Quaestiones ad Thalassium…, p. 77. (English translation by M. Constas in Maximus the Confessor, On Difficulties in Sacred Scripture, p. 113).

Maximus the Confessor’s Anti-Severan Polemics in the Opuscula Kevin M. Clarke (Detroit, Michigan) Introduction The Opuscula, which bear the title of the Small Theological and Polemical Works, are clearly theological, but they are polemical in quite unexpected ways. Maximus shows himself as a complex and subtle polemicist.1 One of the more fascinating strategies of the polemical approach is that Maximus does not target his contemporaries with his polemics nearly as often as he does their theological predecessors. In other words, the tameness of the polemics leaves the reader wondering if he missed the bloodbath. We know a good deal about Maximus’s historical context, yet in the Opuscula he seems locked into the past. In my view, there are a couple of reasons for this. One is that Maximus may feel constrained from anathematizing the imperial court, however foolhardy he suspects 1  This essay is an expansion and development of a chapter from my doctoral dissertation, “Nature’s Innovation and Preservation in Christ: Maximus the Confessor’s Exegesis at Christology’s Crossroads”, Ph.D. diss. (Ave Maria University, 2018). All translations of the Opuscula and other works of Maximus in this essay are my own, unless otherwise noted. I am particularly grateful to the editors of this volume for their gracious invitation to contribute and for the reviewers’ helpful edits and suggestions. I dedicate this essay to Fr. Daniel Donohoo, the former rector of St Patrick’s Seminary and University in California with great gratitude for his encouragement, mentorship, and spiritual fatherhood. “Wisdom is radiant and unfading, and she is easily perceived by those who love her, and she is found by those who seek her” (Wis 6:12).

Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 105–126.

 



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them to be. The other has to do with the recipients of his opuscula. He recognizes that all in the empire are negotiating difficult terrain. If he can simply persuade them that the question over the will and operation in Christ has already been settled, then the lion’s share of the work is already done. This is why Severus of Antioch, who had been dead for roughly a century, becomes one of Maximus’s primary theological opponents. Not only does Maximus view the dispute over one or two natures to be established doctrine, the most consequential authorities in the empire — the emperor’s ecclesiastical court — also viewed it so, as evidenced by the seventh century monenergist dossier. Therefore, strategically, both Maximus’s theological allies and his foes could at least agree that Severus was heretical even if they could not agree on the number of wills. If Maximus could simply prove monotheletism was a logical consequence of Severan monophysitism, then perhaps his interlocutors would agree. But Maximus, true to form, would go many steps further, proving connections with Nestorius and other heretical forerunners. It does not seem that this strategy is unique to Maximus. This rhetorical pattern of identifying antithetical heretics standing athwart the golden mean of orthodoxy is well established in one of Severus’s own contemporaries. Brian Daley observes something similar in the sixth century writer Leontius of Byzantium (d. 544?), most obviously in his work Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, which is not so much a work against Nestorius or Eutyches, both long deceased, but rather “the real opponents he has in mind are the Severan ‘monophysites’”.2 Daley rightly apprehends the surprising “breadth” of the rhetorical strategy, but what Leontius is aiming to address is “a common danger in both an exaggeratedly unitive Christology and an exaggeratedly divisive one”. 3 “Leontius’s method of attack, however, is to present his own form of strictly Chalcedonian diphysism as a middle position between two extremes that rest ultimately on the same error: a somewhat contrived line of argument, perhaps,

2  Leontius of Byzantium, Completed Works, ed. by B. E. Daley, SJ., Oxford, 2017 (Oxford Early Christian Texts), p. 31. 3  Leontius of Byzantium, Completed Works, p. 27.

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but dialectically an effective one”.4 This is the same rhetorical and theological strategy we find in Maximus’ Opuscula. Considering the historical circumstances, Severus seems to be a logical target for Maximus’s polemics. As this essay will show, the imperial monenergist documents had already taken an antiSeveran tone in the 630s, and so when Maximus is writing his anti-Severan Opuscula in the 640s, the position of Constantinople would have already been known to him. The real brilliance lies in the polemical implication that his contemporaries are the theological heirs to Severus. The first section of the essay will introduce Severus of Antioch and his theological concerns. The second section will consider Maximus the anti-Severan, especially as manifested in the Opuscula. Severus of Antioch (456–538) — A Brief Sketch In devotion to Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444), Severus of Antioch fiercely opposed both Leo the Great’s (d. 461) tome to Flavian against Eutyches and the Council of Chalcedon. Pope Leo had intervened ahead of the infamous latrocinium, or robber synod at Ephesus in 449 with his tome that would later be received at the Council of Chalcedon two years later.5 Severus is remembered as “the greatest theologian of the one-nature christology”.6 Some contemporary scholars, such as Joseph Lebon, have sought to rehabilitate his reputation. Lebon especially argued that the Christology of Severus was “nothing other than Cyrillian Chris-

4  Leontius

of Byzantium, Completed Works, p. 32. approach to preservation in distinction is very similar to that of Maximus. Leo wrote in his tome that “the proper character of both natures was maintained and came together in a single person” (Salva igitur proprietate utriusquae naturae et in unam coeunte personam…) and that “there is nothing unreal about this oneness, since both the lowliness of the man and the grandeur of the divinity are in mutual relation” (nullum est in hac unitate mendacium, dum in invicem sunt et humilitas hominis et altitude deitatis). Translation from N. P. Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. i: Nicaea 1 to Lateran 5, London – Washington, DC, 1990, pp. 78–79. 6  P. Allen & C. T. R. Hayward, “Severus of Antioch”, in Early Church Fathers, ed. by C. Harrison, London, 2004, p. 30. 5  Leo’s

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tology”.7 Allen and Hayward explain that the monophysitism of the anti-Chalcedonians was merely “verbal”, stressing “the unity of the two natures, rather than the two-nature formula of the definition of Chalcedon”.8 For this reason, it is important not to see Severus and Eutyches as one and the same. Severus himself resisted the charge of Eutychianism. On the other hand, because φύσις (nature), ὑπόστασις (hypostasis), and προσώπον (person) all were synonymous for Severus, it was unthinkable to speak of two φύσεις after the union, for that would be tantamount to Nestorianism, in his view.9 An illustration may be found in his dogmatic and polemical works, wherein he writes, But you can say that the Synod of Chalcedon understood the union as hypostatic, for it says in its definition that there is to be acknowledged ‘one and the same Christ and Son and Lord and only-begotten in two natures without confusion, without change, without separation, and without division; the difference of the natures being in no way taken away on account of the union, but rather the distinctive characteristic of each being preserved from two natures concurring together into one person (prosopon) and one hypostasis’. But it is plain to all those who are even moderately educated and learned in the dogmas of orthodoxy that it is in the nature of a contradiction to say concerning the one Christ that on the one hand there are two natures, but on the other one hypostasis. For the person who speaks of ‘one hypostasis’ necessarily affirms one nature as well.10

By this rationale, another nature would force an introduction of another person. In this regard, Severus also attacks Leo with passion. For example, Severus writes in his second letter to Sergius the Grammarian, But how do you say ‘one particularity’, and not remember our saying that the Tome of Leo says: ‘Each one of the natures retains its particularity without diminishment’, so that we should think and say that these (natures and properties) adhere (to each other) in a division? For where (on the one hand) Christ is divided in a duality of natures after the union, each one of the natures proceeds

7  Quoted

in Allen & Hayward, “Severus of Antioch”, p. 33. & Hayward, “Severus of Antioch”, p. 33. 9  Allen & Hayward, “Severus of Antioch”, p. 34. 10  Allen & Hayward, “Severus of Antioch”, p. 63. 8  Allen

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without diminishment in those (properties) which are its own. But on the other hand, where the one nature of God the Word incarnate is professed — because he is Emmanuel, according to the word of holy Cyril — to be gloriously composed (so as to become) some one thing from two, it allowed the flesh — as is proper for the economy — sometimes also to suffer what belongs to it.11

For Severus, the union of the natures is composite, a “one from two”. In his view, after the Incarnation there can be no speaking of “two” anymore. He is very dependent on the famous μία φύσις formula passed down from Apollinarian sources (unknowingly) through Cyril, “one incarnate nature of God the Word”.12 In some way, each of the natures are preserved without a mixture of the human and divine. Yet, Aloys Grillmeier points out that for Severus the unity was still a unity of natures, but Severus insists that there is no tertium quid in Christ. Thus, for him, composition (σύνθετος) functions to help identify that in the Incarnation it is not a matter of the two becoming a simple nature.13 But is Severus guilty of an overly literalistic reading of Cyril that fails to take into context the subtleties of Nestorianism? Grillmeier rightly points out that Cyril was not per se opposed to δύο φύσεις, but only opposed to what δύο φύσεις meant for Nestorius, namely, two persons. It was only natural, indeed, necessary, for Cyril to assert the μία φύσις language, Grillmeier says.14 Grillmeier also previously observed that Cyril himself avoided Apollinarianism in his interpretation of this formula in his Second Letter to Succensus by asserting that “Christ’s human nature also is αὐτοκίνητον, a self-moving principle, a physis”.15 Unwittingly, as he accuses the Chalcedonians of Nestorianism, Severus strikes an identical note with Nestorius: for both Severus and Nestorius, 11  Translation in I. R. Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon: Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite, Norwich, 1988, p. 183. 12  A.  Grillmeier with T. Hainthaler, Christ in Christian Tradition: The Church of Constantinople in the Sixth Century, vol. ii, part ii, trans. by P. Allen and J. Cawte, Louisville, 1995, p. 153. 13  Grillmeier with Hainthaler, Christ in Christian Tradition, pp. 158– 59. 14  A.  Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), vol. i, trans. by J. Bowden, Atlanta, 21975, pp. 478–79. 15  Grillmeier, From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), pp. 474–75.

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nature introduces a person. Cyril, on the other hand, is able to make a distinction between the two natures without dividing the one Christ. Cyril Hovorun argues that Severus’s monenergism was not original to him, but “was preceded by others that were cultivated within traditions linked to Apollinarius of Laodicea and Theodore of Mopsuestia”.16 Both of those figures were also previously condemned at ecumenical councils: Apollinarius at First Constantinople (381) for denying Christ’s human soul and Theodore for writings that were influential among Nestorians at Second Constantinople (553). For example, Apollinarius had written, It (= the flesh) was adopted by him (= the heavenly ruler) according to its passibility (κατὰ τὸ παθητικόν) and received the divine (Logos), who indwelled in it, according to the activity (κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργητικόν). Therefore, he was a single living being composed of what is moved and what moves (ἐκ κινουμένου καὶ κινητικοῦ), but not two (beings), neither (was he composed) of two perfect and self-moving (entities).17

These are monenergisms of a different stripe, of course, because Severus approaches the operation of Christ vis-à-vis the union, which he is content to shroud in ineffable silence, whereas Apollinarius considers there to be a divine operation alone through a kind of soulless “adoptionism”. Why the Strange Fixation upon Severus of Antioch in Maximus’s Polemics? In July 645, at the end of Maximus’s public dispute in Carthage with the deposed patriarch Pyrrhus of Constantinople, Pyrrhus shows himself to be quite concerned for the reputations of his episcopal predecessor, Sergius, and for those who attended the synod that produced the Ekthesis in 638. The question comes up 16  C. Hovorun,

Will, Action, and Freedom: Christological Controversies in the Seventh Century, Boston, Leiden, 2008, p. 3. See also C. Lange, Mia Energeia: Untersuchungen zur Einigungspolitik des Kaisers Heraclius und des Patriarchen Sergius von Constantinopel, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 66, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012. 17  Quoted in Hovorun, Will, Action, and Freedom, p. 7.

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whether one may pass over in silence those who stand in need of anathematization. Maximus emphatically denies that this is possible. Throughout the Carthage dispute, a written record of which was likely recorded shortly after the public debate, Maximus deals with real polemical concerns against living — or recently living — figures of his day. In that regard, his polemical tactic seems somewhat different from what one finds in the Opuscula, with a few exceptions.18 In scouring the Opuscula for Maximus’s thoughts about the troublemakers of his own day, there is frustratingly little concerning his contemporary opponents. Instead, Maximus appears to be waging theological battles against the dead. Did Maximus not have bigger fish to fry in his own day? In evaluating his primary targets, the logic of his polemics becomes more lucid. So why would Maximus focus so much of his energies on the figure of Severus 18  Ryan Strickler argues that the dispute was essentially fabricated by the disciples of Maximus after his trial, a literary genre meant to elevate the dyothelete cause. Strickler further divides the dispute into two parts, an original composition written after Maximus’s trial in 655 and a later redaction reflecting more Roman interests. Strickler’s arguments though fascinating are highly speculative and inconclusive. Strickler has built an imaginative and enticing thesis, but he is unable to deliver on the weighty burden of proof (see R. W. Strickler, “A Dispute in Dispute: Revisiting the Disputatio cum Pyrrho Attributed to Maximus the Confessor [CPG 7698]”, Sacris Erudiri, 56 (2017), pp. 243–72). A close reading of the Dispute with Pyrrhus text will reveal that there is simply too much evidence that favors the dispute’s authenticity and its dating proximate to the debate itself. In my view, the smoking gun is not the failure to mention the existence of a dispute text in the Relatio Motionis (as Strickler argues, among other evidence he considers), but the fact that this text does not really meet what one would expect by a later fabrication. There is no knowledge in the dispute of the demands of the Typos document, of Maximus’s fate, of the significance or fate of his two disciples each named Anastasius (also not mentioned in the dispute text), or of anything subsequent to Pyrrhus’s renunciation of monotheletism in Rome. Strickler also proposes that the debate text ended before the topic of the operations and that a later emendation was added by an editor. The problem with this aspect of Strickler’s theory is that the Ekthesis, the most significant document published before the debate takes place, similarly tries to dispense with the question of the operations. Pyrrhus follows this very recent pattern in the debate itself. It is thus quite certain, pace Strickler, that this document was composed between 645 and 649, in accordance with the longstanding scholarly opinion (see P. Sherwood, An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, Rome, 1952 (Studia Anselmiana 30), p. 53.

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of Antioch, the controversial sixth-century anti-Chalcedonian who died in 538? Severus only comes up twice in the Carthage dispute, where Nestorius is more the focal point, so why is he so much the focal point of the polemics in the Opuscula? It is not that the dead do not put up a fight, but rather that they have already been judged, and this is particularly the case with Severus and may help to explain why Maximus focuses on him rather than Eutyches as the face of one nature Christology. The documents in the monenergist dossier betray an anti-Severan program in the empire. For example, Sergius in his letter to Pope Honorius speaks of those in Alexandria who were “sick with the beliefs, hateful to God, of Eutyches and Dioscorus, Severus and Julian”.19 The more recent error is the most treacherous. Thus, Maximus identifies a number of infamous heretics in his Opuscula, but “Severus the senseless sophist” (Σεβῆρος ὁ παράφρων σοφιστής) stands out in particular.20 The polemical agenda of the Opuscula could even be characterized as anti-Severan. Maximus mentions Severus twenty-seven times in the Opuscula, second only to Nestorius’s twenty-eight.21 As is common with anti-Severan polemics, when Nestorian thought comes up, it is in a Severan context.22 Perhaps it was his encounter with the 19  Sergius

of Constantinople, First Letter to Honorius, in P. Allen, Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh Century Heresy: The Synodical Letter and Other Documents, Oxford, 2009 (Oxford Early Christian Texts), p. 185. 20  Op. 21, PG 91, 252A. Similarly, Maximus composes his twelfth letter with a twofold purpose: “concerning the right dogmas of the Church of God, and against Severus the heretic”. 21  By my count, Maximus mentions the following heretics in the Opuscula, listed by order of frequency: Nestorius (28), Severus (27), Apollinarius (16), Arius (13), Eutyches (11), Mani (6), Sabellius (5), Eunomius (4), Paul of Samosata (3), Marcion (2), Macedonius (2), among others. The same appears to be true in Maximus’s epistles as well with Nestorius (21), Severus (17), and Apollinarius (12), among others. 22  See Op. 2, PG 91, 40: “And just as Nestorius saying mere union introduced a real division so also Severus saying mere difference of natures made real the mixture”; Op. 3, PG 91,  56: “Then one purpose exists in both Nestorius and Severus concerning their impiety, even though the mode is different. For the one because of mixture flees the hypostatic union and makes a personal division the essential difference. And the other refusing to say ‘difference’ on account of the essential division concocts a natural mixture of the hypostatic union”; and Op. 16, PG 91, 204D.

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Severan bishops on the island of Crete, when they denounced the Tome of Leo to him, that led Maximus to realize the strength of this connection between Severan monophysitism and Constantinopolitan monenergism and monotheletism.23 In any case, this seems to be something of a later development in Maximus’s polemics, if the date lists of Polycarp Sherwood and Marek Jankowiak and Phil Booth are accurate.24 Maximus mentions Severus by name in opuscula 2, 3, 15, 16, 19, 21, and 24, each of which the date lists fairly consistently place in the 640s. The only exception may be opusculum 21, which has a proposed dating of either 633 or 645–646.25 Thus, all of the opuscula that name Severus could plausibly be dated to the 640s. Further, three of Maximus’s dogmatic epistles — 12, 13, and 15 — likewise take a strongly anti-Severan tone, two of which the date lists place in the 630s. Whether Maximus was writing in the 630s or 640s, Severus had been dead for about a century. But Maximus finds him living in his theological heirs in the seventh century. In this regard, Maximus had adopted the mentality of his contemporary and mentor Sophronius of Jerusalem, who in his Synodical Letter released shortly after his episcopal elevation in 634 expressed some choice words for Severus. Sophronius begins his heresiology with Simon Magus, naming one heretic after another in quick succession. Sophronius then, in something of an anti-doxology, copiously heaps contempt upon the memory of Severus, saying: “With all these, and before all and after all and according to all and on behalf of all, let Severus be anathema, their thoroughly mad disciple, who of all the Headless Ones, new and old, is called a most cruel tyrant and a most hostile enemy of the holy catholic church, and a most lawless adulterer of the most holy church of Antioch, and a most disgusting seducer.”26 When Sophronius wrote his Synodical Letter, he 23  Op.

3, PG 91, 49C–56D. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, Studia Anselmiana 30, (Rome, 1952); M. Jankowiak & P. Booth, “A New Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, pp. 19–83. 25  I share Sherwood’s reservations about this being the first of Maximus’s opuscula. See Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, pp. 36–37. 26  Sophronius of Jerusalem, Synodical Letter, 2.6.1, in Allen, Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh Century Heresy, p. 141. One cannot help but notice the 24  P. Sherwood,

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recognized that the monenergism being promoted in his own day was theologically and philosophically Severan. As Pauline Allen points out, Sophronius effectively identified monenergism with the one-nature Christology of the anti-Chalcedonians.27 Sophronius calls the monenergists “children of the headless ones”, since composite operation (ἐνέργεια) is the same thing as composite nature because of operation’s flowing forth from nature.28 Maximus as a result finds himself with unfinished business in Severus’s intellectual heirs. Like Sophronius, therefore, Maximus similarly considers Severus one of the great heresiarchs. When it comes to union, we read in Opusculum 2, Severus understands it along the same lines as Mani, Apollinarius, and Eutyches. When it comes to division, he understands it along the same lines as Ebion, Paul of Samosata, and Nestorius.29 Truly if one understands as Severus does, Maximus argues, the theology and the economy disintegrate together because the conflation of natures, and along with them wills and operations, into one mixed divine-human nature, operation, and will, estranges Christ from both his divine and his human nature. 30 In Opusculum 3, Maximus unpacks a series of consequences for the monophysite view. He begins in no uncertain terms, “The view then of Severus and of those around him, through some complete removal of nature, casts out the nature assumed according to the ineffable union in order to sanction the defilement of Mani’s fantasy, Apollinarius’s confusion, and Eutyches’s essence-mixing”. 31 Wills are either natural or gnomic, that is, the “modified will in

antithesis with Ephesians 4:6 that Sophronius builds with the repetition of πάντες with various prepositions. 27  Allen, Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh Century Heresy, p. 39. 28  Sophronius of Jerusalem, Synodical Letter, 2.3.10. 29  Cf. Op. 2, PG 91, 40. 30  See also K. M. Clarke, “Preserving the Whole Theological System: Maximus the Confessor’s Dyothelitism as a Bulwark for Trinitarian Theology, Christology, and Soteriology”, Vox Patrum 37/68 (2017), pp. 479–500. 31  Op. 3, PG 91, 49. This opusculum was originally thought by Sherwood to be one of the latest works of Maximus, though Jankowiak and Booth date this between 636 and 642 (Jankowiak & Booth, “A New Date-List”, p. 61).

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the insecure post-lapsarian situation”, according to Tollefsen. 32 So either way one takes the will, Severus does violence to the Trinity, according to Maximus. If wills are natural, Severus brings about a triad of natures in the Trinity and obliterates the unity of the divinity. On the other hand, if the wills are gnomic, then Severus makes the divine persons rivals of one another. The third alternative in the Severan logic is that there is one will in the Trinity because it is not a Trinity, but a single-personed monad. With respect to Christ, the outlook is no better. The unintelligibility of the Severan account, for Maximus, introduces innumerable wills (ἀπειρόβουλος) and persons (ἀπειροπρόσωπος) in Christ while simultaneously destroying the will and the person. At the same time, Severus renders Christ without essence (ἀνούσιος) and without hypostasis (ἀνυπόστατος). Maximus concludes, Οὐκοῦν κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀντιστροφὴν τῆς Σευήρου προτάσεως, ὁ τῆς θεολογίας αὐτῷ διαπέπτωκε λόγος, Ἀρειανὴν πολυθεΐαν, καὶ Σαβελλιανὴν ἀθεΐαν, καὶ μαχομένην ἑλληνικῶς ἑαυτῇ φύσιν θεότητος εἰσηγουμένῳ· κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρότασιν, σαφῶς ὁ τῆς οἰκονομίας αὐτῷ νενόθευται λόγος, τὸν ἕνα Χριστὸν ἀνούσιον, ἄβουλον, ἀνυπόστατον· καὶ πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπειρόβουλόν τε πρεσβεύοντι καὶ ἀπειροπρόσωπον· οὗ τί δυσσεβέστερον; Surely, the account of theology collapses according to the inversion of the Severan premise, since he introduces an Arian polytheism, a Sabellian atheism, and a divinity fighting himself like the Greek gods. And according to the premise, the account of the economy is clearly corrupted by him: the one Christ becomes unsubsistent, without counsel, nonexistent, and again it puts him forward both with an infinitude of counsels and an infinitude of persons. What could be more impious?33

On the surface, this may seem like raw hyperbole, but at this point in Maximus’s life, having explored the full consequences

32  T. T.

Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2008 (Oxford Early Christian Studies),p. 133. See also Paul Blowers’s discussion on Maximus’s shift in his approach to gnomic will, P. M. Blowers, “Maximus the Confessor: Jesus Christ and the Transfiguration of the World”, in Christian Theology in Context, ed. by T. Gorringe, S. Jones, and G. Ward, Oxford, 2016, pp. 234–46. 33  Op. 3, PG 91, 53B.

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of a dissolution of natural will and operation, he knows what is at stake theologically. At the core of this view is for Maximus the most crucial problem of all: “For every account such as this shows that it does not have the truth as its invincible foundation”. 34 Christ would then stand in the world without Father or mother, powerless to accomplish the economy for which he became one of us. But Maximus has not been entertaining tangents in his antimonophysite polemics. He returns to the question of the will in the opusculum, when he writes, “But, as it seems, Severus removes the natural will of the humanity of Christ, not seeing that both the more fixed and first property of every especially rational nature is the movement according to desire. The Fathers saw this and brilliantly confessed a difference not of gnomic wills of Christ but of natural wills”. 35 Monenergism and monotheletism are both forms of Severan monophysitism expressed in different terms. Maximus demonstrates that monotheletism and monenergism each destroy communion with God in the same way that Severan monophysitism does. Each makes of Christ a tertium quid, neither God nor man. Severan monophysitism is the cause of monotheletism. So what becomes of this one will in Christ that Severus has bequeathed to posterity? There are three possibilities. If the will is only divine, then his hunger and thirst reveal a God subject to the passions. If his will is human alone, then the miracles of Christ become some sort of monstrosity (τερατώδης). The third alternative is no better, namely, that of a composite will. Such an account of the will enters into mythopoeia, because the consequence of the Severan account introduces polytheism, according to Maximus, when it makes of Christ something other than who he is. Similarly, elsewhere, Maximus had written: Εἴτε γὰρ ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὅλον τι, τὰ τε οὐσιώδη δύο θελήματα καὶ τὰς ἰσαρίθμους φυσικάς ἐνεργείας κατὰ σύνθεσιν εἰς ἓν θέλημα καὶ μίαν ἐνέργειαν ἐκτήξομεν τυχὸν καὶ χωνεύσομεν, μυθικὸν τὸ 34  Op.

3, PG 91, 53C. ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ φυσικὸν θέλημα τῆς κατὰ Χριστὸν ἀνθρωπότητος Σευῆρος ἀνεῖλεν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτι κυριώτερον τε καὶ πρῶτον ἰδίωμα πάσης μάλιστα φύσεως λογικῆς, ἡ κατ᾿ ἔφεσιν αὐτῆς καθέστηκε κίνησις· ἣν οἱ Πατέρες σκοπήσαντες, φυσικῶν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ γνωμικῶν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ θελημάτων διαφοράν λαμπρῶς ὡμολόγησαν. Op. 3, PG 91, 56AB. 35  Ἀλλ᾿,

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τοιοῦτον, καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα καὶ ἡμᾶς ξένον τε πάντη καὶ ἀλλότριον δειχθήσεται κοινωνίας· ὡς οὐ σύνθετον ἐκείνου κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντος θέλημα, ἢ ἐνέργειαν· οὐδὲ πάλιν ἡμῶν. For if, like some whole from the parts, we melt down the two essential wills and the same number of natural operations and smelt the resulting composition into one will and one operation, the result is mythical, and He will even be shown to be a complete foreigner and stranger to the communion with the Father and us, as the Father does not have a composite will or operation according to nature, and again, nor do we. 36

Here, Maximus is employing two-nature Christology in the theology of the two wills. Just as a mixed nature makes a “third thing”, so also a mixed will makes a “third thing”. Under such a dispensation, the disciples of Christ then would not be Christians, but polytheists; consequently, sin would remain in humanity. Against the notion of a mythological Christ, Maximus retorts, “Again, you alienated him from the Father, designating his composite hypostasis alone by a composite will”.37 Ironically, a fear of opposition between two natural wills leads the Severan position to a difference of gnomic wills in Christ. But in Maximus’s view this position is what would lead to vacillation in a Christ with multiple personalities, who would be “fighting with himself in a storm of thoughts”.38 No, it is precisely the twoness of the wills in the one composite hypostasis that leads to harmony. But the position of Severus would do much more than nullify the harmony. The tertium quid theory, a consequence of the composite will position that Constantinopolitan monotheletism ultimately adopted, results in the estrangement of Christ from God and from man. Severus the anti-Chalcedonian has inspired the mixture (σύγχυσις) and division (διαίρεσις) of the two natures Maximus faces in his own day.39 Similarly, with respect to the divinity, Severus transfers the three-in-oneness of God into a four-in-twoness. Epistle 15 to Cosmas the deacon of Alexandria is especially worthy of our attention

36  Op.

7, PG 91, 76A. 3, PG 91, 56A. 38  Op. 3, PG 91, 56B. 39  Cf. Op. 2, PG 91, 40. 37  Op.

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here.40 Maximus writes in the letter, “By saying nature and hypostasis are the same, Severus makes the union a mixture and makes the difference a division, according to which it is proven that he is splitting the account of the Trinity into a tetrad of persons, dissecting the mystery of the Monad into a dyad of gods, and blasphemously casting Christ out of every essential existence”.41 Later in the same letter, he explains why two separate natures cannot be consubstantial with one another. Εἰ δὲ μίαν φύσιν λέγων Χριστοῦ μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν σύνθετον, τὴν ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ δοκεῖ προσρίπτειν αὐτῇ διαφοράν· πρῶτον μὲν καθὸ φύσις σύνθετος, οὐδενὶ τῶν ὄντων ἔσται παντελῶς ὁ Χριστὸς ὁμοούσιος· εἴπερ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν καὶ φύσιν εἷς καὶ μόνος ἐστίν ὁ Χριστός. Φύσις γὰρ φύσει, καθὼς εἴρηται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτ᾿ ἂν παντελῶς ὁμοούσιος. Τινί δὲ τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ὢν ὁμοούσιος, οὔτε Θεὸς ἔσται παντελῶς ὁ αὐτός, οὔτε μὴν ἄνθρωπος· ἢ εἴπερ Θεός, ἔσται πολύθεος ὁ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὡς ἀσυνθέτου μὲν φύσεως ὡς ἁπλῆς λέγων Θεὸν τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον· συνθέτου δὲ φύσεως ὡς οὐχ ἁπλῆς λέγων Θεὸν τὸν Χριστόν, καὶ δύο θεότητας καταγγέλλων δειχθήσεται· μίαν ἁπλῆν, καὶ μίαν σύνθετον. And if he [Severus] says one composite nature of Christ after the union, the difference seems to be added to the natural quality itself. First of all, as a composite nature, Christ would not be completely consubstantial with any being since Christ would be only one according to essence and nature. For a nature as was said cannot be completely consubstantial with another nature. And if he is not consubstantial with any being, he would neither be completely God nor completely man; or if he is a god, the one decreeing this would be a polytheist, by saying, on the one hand, God the Father and the Holy Spirit are of an incomposite, that is, simple, nature, and, on the other, the God Christ is of a composite nature, that is, not simple. And he will be shown to be proclaiming two divinities, one simple and one composite.42

40  Among Maximus’s letters, epistles 12, 13, and 15 have a particularly anti-Severan tone. 41  Ep. 15, PG 91, 568C. 42  Ep. 15, PG 91, 569BC.

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In Maximus’s view, Severan monophysitism necessitates nothing less than dyadic dualism. This is the same path the monothelete innovators were walking, and so Maximus felt a strong sense of urgency. Since this is a matter of salvation, Maximus is willing to wager it all on the dyothelete position. At the end of this letter, Maximus defends himself against the accusations of the Severans. He then unambiguously invokes a curse upon himself if he should be wrong. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα πρὸς σέ κατ᾿ ἐπιτομὴν περὶ ὧν ἠρώτησας διεξῆλθον, δοῦλε Θεοῦ, τῆς σῆς χάριν πληροφορίας· οὐκ ἄλλως μὲν ἔχων κατὰ ψυχήν, ὥς τινες τῶν Σευήρῳ χαιρόντων διαθρυλλοῦσιν· ἄλλως δὲ λαλῶν τοῖς παρατυγχάνουσι· μὴ τοῦτο νομίσῃς, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐδιδάχθην καὶ φρονῶ καὶ πιστεύω, καὶ παρὰ τῶν Πατέρων παρέλαβον, λαλῶ. καὶ τὸ δὲ κυριώτερον εἰπεῖν, αὐτὴν μου τὴν διάνοιαν προφέρω σωματουμένην τοῖς ῥήμασιν. Εἰ δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ λόγος, μὴ τύχω τῆς ἐκεῖθεν μακαριότητος· ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπηγγελμένων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ἀλλοτρίωσιν ὡς ψεύδους καρπὸν ἀπενέγκωμαι. Σὺ δὲ τῆς εὐπειθείας ἕνεκεν τῆς ἐμῆς, ἀμείψασθαί με ταῖς εὐχαῖς καταξίωσον· ὅπως Χριστὸς ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ἡ σωτηρία τῶν φοβουμένων αὐτόν, ἰάσηταί μου τὰ τραύματα τῆς ψυχῆς τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ μυστηρίου τῶν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτοῦ ζωοποιῶν παθημάτων· Therefore, I have briefly gone through these things you asked about, O  servant of God, with the grace of your confidence. I do not think in one way but speak differently to bystanders, as some of those who take pleasure in Severus falsely spread abroad. Do not think this. But I speak as I was taught, as I understand, as I believe, as I received from the Fathers. And to speak more precisely, I bear forth my very thought embodied in these utterances. But if the account is false, may I not attain the blessedness from that place but may I bring back estrangement from the promised good things as the fruit of falsehood. But you, hold me worthy to give me your prayers for the sake of my ready obedience, so that Christ our God, the salvation of those who fear him, should heal my soul’s wounds by the power of the mystery of his life-giving sufferings for us.43

Maximus wagers his reading of the Tradition is the right one, and so he is ready to cast lots for his own soul. If his Christology 43  Ep.

15, PG 91, 576AB.

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should be off in the least, then beatitude is beyond him. He recognizes the high stakes, but his fidelity to the Fathers attains to real certitude, if there should be any doubt for the Constantinopolitan deacon Cosmas. As things would turn out, Maximus was not only betting his soul; he was also betting his life. Severus’s mixture presented an enduring threat to the unity of the empire’s shared faith on the eve of the rise of the Muslim empire. In the 650s and 660s, the perceived threat that Maximus and other dyotheletes presented would no longer be welcome. Thus, we can perceive some of the polemical brilliance of Maximus in his keeping the focal point on Severus. Maximus is not really only writing against the anti-Chalcedonian Severans. He is writing against Constantinopolitan ecclesio-political machinery pushing an innovative new doctrine. Thus, it is very curious not to see blame being laid at the feet of “Sergius”, “Pyrrhus”, “Cyrus”, or even “Heraclius”. After all, in the Carthage dispute, Maximus had said, “It is not fitting, on the one hand, that the persons be passed over in silence, and such teachings as these, on the other, to be anathematized”.44 Why, then, does Maximus seem to pass over the others in silence in favor of censuring the deceased “Severus”? Severus is a cautionary metonymy, signifying all monophysite-monenergist-monothelete thought. While it is true that the same principles are at work in Severan monophysitism as there are in monothelete thought, this trope serves Maximus’s rhetorical purpose as a well-concocted appellation since Severus himself was not at all held in esteem by leading monotheletes. “If only Constantinople could see how Severan they were”, Maximus must have thought. After all, Sergius’s Ekthesis of 638 had anathematized Severus. There had also been a thread of anti-Severan polemics in Sergius’s own work, as in his first letter to Cyrus and in his first letter to Pope Honorius.45 There would have also been a great challenge in rebuffing the theological program of Constantinople, in that Maximus was not only doing battle with the Constantinopolitan patriarchs, but also with the Emperor Heraclius (d. 641), who had placed his name 44  Cf. D.P.,

PG 91, 352C. letters are translated by Allen, Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh Century Heresy, pp. 165–66 and 185. 45  Both

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upon the Ekthesis, which was the most recent monothelete work (even though the Ekthesis had been written by Sergius, the patriarch at the time). The Typos of Constans II would not be released until 649, after most of the Opuscula had been written.46 How did Maximus view Heraclius? It is possible that Maximus’s position shifted over time. During his trial in 655, Maximus reports that the late Heraclius “of pious memory” disavowed the Ekthesis before his death.47 He also states that Heraclius sent this communication to Pope John. Now it may have been that Maximus discovered Heraclius’s disavowal of the Ekthesis while he was in Rome, after his dispute with Pyrrhus in Carthage. It would have been important to mention Heraclius’s disavowal during the dispute with Pyrrhus, so it seems that this matter was either a strange omission or not yet known to Maximus at the time of the Carthage debate. Even well before his trial, Maximus accuses Pyrrhus and Sergius of exploiting Heraclius’s authority illegitimately.48 Maximus clearly suspected treachery at the hand of Pyrrhus’s predecessor Sergius. This position is consistent with what he had written in his opening to Opusculum 15, where Maximus states in passing that the Ekthesis of Heraclius is “from the dissimulation (ἐξ ὑποστολῆς) of Sergius the primate of Constantinople”.49 Con46  According

to Sherwood, 25 or 26 of the opuscula had been written before 649; according to Jankowiak and Booth, 22 or 23 of the opuscula had been written before 649 (they regard Op. 23 as spurious). 47  R.M. 9, in P. Allen & B. Neil, (eds and trans.), Maximus the Confessor and his Companions: Documents from Exile, Oxford Early Christian Text (Oxford, 2002), p. 67. Maximus states that Heraclius wrote, “The Ekthesis is not mine, for I neither dictated it nor ordered its composition. But the patriarch Sergius, who composed it five years before my return from the East, requested me on my return to that all-fortunate city that it be published in my name and with my signature. And I acceded to his demand. Now, however, knowing that some people are in dispute over it, I am making clear to everyone that it is not mine”. 48  D.P., PG 91, 289CD. 49  Op. 15, PG 91, 153C. “A spiritual and dogmatic tome demonstrating that the innovation occurring because of the alien Ekthesis of Heraclius the emperor, from the dissimulation of Sergius primate of Constantinople, is out of tune with both the sacred passages and the patristic ones while being in harmony with the unholy heretics who make a mixture and a division at the

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sequently, the anti-Severan polemics seem to indicate a position Maximus holds before the release of the Typos. At the same time, “Severus” was not merely a trope. Because nature, operation, and will run together, Severus really is the paradigmatic proponent of monotheletism. Should Constantinople have continued to follow after Severus, they would have nullified all Trinitarian and Christological developments from the beginning of the faith, everything present in the Scriptures and in the Councils. Severus’s Christ, for Maximus, was powerless before sin, death, and the disorders from which humanity stands in need of redemption. And so it is no surprise that, although he does not feature prominently in the dispute, Severus comes up once more when Maximus is on trial for his life. Ὑμεῖς οὐ δέχεσθε, ἀλλ’ ἐκβάλλεσθε πάντας τοὺς διδασκάλους, τοὺς μετὰ τὴν ἁγίαν ἐν Χαλκηδόνι σύνοδον, τοὺς ἀγωνισαμένους κατὰ τῆς τοῦ Σεβήρου μιαρίας· κἀγὼ ἔχω δέξασθαι τὸν λίβελλον Μηνᾶ, τοῦ γενομένου μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον; δι’ οὓ συνηγορεῖ προφανῶς Σεβήρῳ, καὶ Ἀπολιναρίῳ καὶ Μακεδονίῳ καὶ Ἀρείῳ καὶ πάσῃ αἱρέσει, καὶ κατηγορεῖ τῆς συνόδου· μᾶλλον δὲ τελείως ἐκβάλλει, δι’ ὧν ἐδογμάτισε. You do not accept, but reject, all teachers after the holy synod at Chalcedon who struggled against the abominable heresy of Severus, and do I have to accept the document of Menas, who lived after the synod, by which he obviously supports Severus and Apollinaris and Macedonius and Arius and every heresy, and accuses the synod — I should say, he rejects it completely — by what he has propounded. 50

The other heresiarch who figures most prominently throughout the Opuscula is Nestorius. Severus’s pairing with Nestorius, oftentimes

same time, telling absurd tales about the mystery of Christ our God”. For a critical edition and English translation of Op. 15, see B. Roosen, “A dyothelite Florilegium in the Run-up to the Lateran Council (a. 649). Maximus the Confessor’s tomos to Stephen of Dor against the Ekthesis (CPG 7697.15)”, in The Literary Legacy of Byzantium. Editions, Translations, and Studies in Honour of Joseph A. Munitiz SJ, ed. by B. Roosen & P. Van Deun, Turnhout, 2019 (Byzantios. Studies in Byzantine History and Civilization 15), 415–533. 50  D.B. 4 in: Allen and Neil, Maximus the Confessor and his Companions, 90–91. Menas was the patriarch of Constantinople who had written to Pope Vigilius.

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in the same breath,51 is theologically ironic, for Severus threw off Leo and Chalcedon in devotion to Cyril, Nestorius’s opponent. However, as Maximus has shown throughout the Opuscula, Severan monophysitism and Nestorianism bring about the same result, albeit from different vistas. Maximus’s opponents truly believed they were being faithful to Cyril of Alexandria concerning the union of Christ, and so Cyril has a particular place of importance in Maximus’s thought, not just in the Opuscula but in the Carthage debate. Pyrrhus brings up a particularly troublesome quote from Cyril that seems to support monenergism. He asks, “Then why did Cyril, the light of the Church, teach the opposite of the pious conception which is now evident from the debate, when he clearly said, ‘one operation shown to have kinship through both’ regarding Christ?”52 This is problematic if taken in a certain way, because “one operation” would oppose Maximus’s notion of operation as a power inhering in nature. So, if according to Cyril there is “one operation” in Christ, there must either be one nature, or the definition is incorrect. Maximus responds at length, saying, Οὐ μάχεται ὅλως ἡ παροῦσα χρῆσις ταῖς δύο ἐνεργείαις· τουναντίον δὲ καὶ συνίστησιν. Οὐ γὰρ μίαν φυσικὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς θεότητος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἔφη, καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωπότητος· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀλλαχοῦ ἔλεγεν, ὅτι “Ποιητοῦ καὶ ποιήματος μίαν ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἄν τις δοίη σωφρονῶν” ἀλλὰ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, μίαν τῆς θεότητος οὖσαν τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ἄνευ σαρκὸς καὶ μετὰ σαρκός. The present usage is not at all in conflict with two operations. On the contrary, it even supports it. For he did not say one natural operation of the divinity of Christ and of his humanity, since he would not have said elsewhere, ‘no one of

51  Op. 2, PG 91, 40B: “And just as Nestorius, by saying mere union, introduced a real division, so also Severus, by saying mere difference of natures, made the mixture real”. Op. 3, PG 91, 56CD: “One purpose, therefore, exists in both Nestorius and Severus concerning their impiety, even though the mode is different”. See also Op. 16, PG 91, 204CD and Op. 21, PG 91, 253AB. 52  Τί οὖν ἐναντία τῆς νῦν ἐκ τῆς ζητήσεως ἀναφανείσης εὐσεβοῦς ἐννοίας, ὁ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας φωστήρ Κύριλλος ἐδογμάτισε, “μίαν συγγενῆς δι᾿ ἀμφοῖν ἐπιδεδειγμένον ἐνέργειαν”, τὸν Χριστὸν δηλαδὴ, φήσας; D.P., PG 91, 344A– B. Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on John, 4.2 (PG 73, 577C–D).

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kevin m. clarke sound mind would grant one operation of the Maker and of the made’, but he intended to show one essential operation of the divinity, both without the flesh and with the flesh. 53

So, in Maximus’s interpretation, the oneness of operation in Cyril’s work can be interpreted as referring to the oneness of the divine operation, unchanged by the Incarnation, but it certainly excludes the idea of a composite operation. In this same passage from the dispute, Maximus brings up the example of fire that burns both materially and immaterially. He argues that Cyril is doing something similar with Christ. Maximus is a devoted student of Cyril, and too careful a reader of Cyril to be tripped up by a problematic quote stripped from its context. Maximus more than his interlocutors seems to understand the following characteristic of Cyril, which John McGuckin makes so perspicaciously: Cyril’s Christology is “simply not so much formulaic as discursive”.54 As Pyrrhus and others demonstrate by their fumbling Cyrillian quotes here and there, it is better to read Cyril as Maximus does, taking the aporiai in conversation with the rest of his work. Maximus does just that in various places. He treats this quote from Cyril extensively in three of the Opuscula (7–9). 55 Maximus has a means of reading Cyril and Chalcedon harmoniously. Maximus’s interpretative strategy through his logos-tropos distinction is one that he carefully preserves in harmony with Cyrillian Christology. Maximus teaches that innovation can take what is according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν) from itself to what is above nature (ὑπὲρ φύσιν), but it cannot move in a way contrary to nature (παρὰ φύσιν). Christ is like us in all things except for sin, which also, for Maximus, includes sin’s effects upon us. In Jesus Christ, the innovation primarily occurs on the level of the hypostasis, his mode of existence (τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως), a phrase Maximus often uses in reference to the one hypostasis while the principle of nature (λόγος τῆς φύσεως) refers to the unchanging essences. This careful distinction then is applied to a reading of 53  D.P.,

PG 91, 344B. McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christology Controversy: Its History, Theology, and Texts, Crestwood, NY, 2004, p. 194. 55  Cf.  Op. 7, PG 91, 84D–88B; Op. 8,  PG 91, 100B–104D; Op. 9,  PG 91, 124D–125B. 54  J. A.

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Cyril.56 For example, he does not shy away but repeatedly comes back to Cyril’s “one nature of God the Word Incarnate” formula (μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένην). This enables Maximus on the one hand to preserve the two natures Christology of Chalcedon entire and without confusion (ἀσυγχύτως) and on the other hand to be faithful to Cyril’s theology. Conclusion Beneath the polemical strategy of aligning monotheletism with Severan monophysitism, Maximus develops a robust theology of the will, operation, and nature. Maximus carefully articulates a brilliant vision of the assumption of the human willing faculty within the human nature of Jesus Christ. Maximus manages the subtleties of what willing would have meant for the eternal Logos in his composite hypostasis, but without impersonally dissolving the human psychology into the agency of the Logos. He also does this without doing something far worse, namely, proclaiming a non-existent (ἀνυπόστατος) humanity. As the Gethsemane agony demonstrates very well, the temptation of Christ is no mere charade. Maximus avoids what we might call a practical Apollinarism that professes Christ’s possession of a human soul while denying that soul any real human activity. He is very careful to construct his account of the will of Christ in full conformity with the established assumption doctrine. Christ wills in a fully human way in accordance (κατὰ φύσιν) with the assumed human λόγος. At the same time, assuming the will in its totality does not mean assuming those things that are contrary to the right operation of the will within the nature, in other words, the consequences of the fall bringing about the disordering of nature that make it act contrary to itself (παρὰ φύσιν). On the other end of the spectrum, the monenergists and monotheletes cannot escape making a tertium quid of a synthetic Christ and his supposedly composite will and operation and thus making 56  I explored the consequences of the logos-tropos distinction in greater depth in my doctoral thesis, “Nature’s Innovation and Preservation in Christ: Maximus the Confessor’s Exegesis at Christology’s Crossroads”, Ph.D. diss. (Ave Maria University, 2018).

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a quaternity of the Holy Trinity in the same way that Severus did. Maximus shows that only the notion of a composite hypostasis accounts for the manner in which Christ could will and work in both natures while being the hypostasis of each nature. Moreover, his fixation on Severus in his anti-monothelete polemics was a matter of giving credit where credit was due. This was a very calculated choice, since Maximus wished to prove that Severus was the ideological father of the Constantinopolitan innovation and because the monotheletes would have found such an association repugnant. In sum, Maximus’s struggle for a clear account of the wills and operations of Christ is not mere quibbling over insignificant distinctions but has everything to do with theology and the economy of redemption itself. To err in this matter would be to obliterate virtually all conciliar Trinitarian and Christological developments. To affirm a single will or a single operation — or one that is both one and two — would be to follow a tradition, to be sure, the tradition of those innovators whose teachings have opposed the esteemed saints and the councils. Severus was a name that carried that kind of infamy both for Maximus and for his opponents, and it gave Maximus a way to avoid bringing shame upon the head of a beloved emperor in Heraclius. Perhaps the manner of Maximus’s trial and death suggests that his strategy failed, at least practically speaking, since Constantinople would not only silence him but make a spectacle of him. 57 But as to the truth of his account, Maximus was willing to wager life and eternity.

57  See especially R.M. and D.B., in Allen & Neil, Maximus the Confessor and his Companions.

Arguing with the Properties of Christ The Case of “Difference as in Natural Quality” and its Critical Reception by Maximus the Confessor1 Sebastian Mateiescu (Leiden) Introduction Christological debates between Chalcedonians and anti-Chalcedonians are commonly portrayed as relying on a clash of contradictory interpretations of hypostasis and physis, two core terms of Christology. The non-Chalcedonians are traditionally seen as making no clear-cut distinction between the two notions, and as often relying on Cyril of Alexandria (376–444) in professing their synonymy. The defenders of the Council of Chalcedon (451) claim to have saved the possibility of distinguishing the divine and human natures in Christ by professing their unity in the one single hypostasis of Christ. Yet, this common portrayal does not pay attention to other crucial terms involved in the debates, such as the idea of the properties of Christ. For it is by means of posing

1  This

paper has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 843839. The paper reflects exclusively the author’s view and the European Union’s Research Executive Agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained herein. I am indebted to Frans de Haas for a series of observations and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper and to Dirk Krausmüller, Sebastian Moldovan and two anonymous reviewers for their comments. I am also thankful to Hans van Loon who has kindly accepted to offer his critical remarks on a last version of this article. Any errors remaining are solely mine. Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 127–160.

 



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a peculiar difference in the properties of Christ that Severus, the famous Patriarch of Antioch (512–518) and the champion of non-Chalcedonian theology, constructs a mitigated form of dualism in Christ. Faced with the extreme forms of monophysitism posited by some of his colleagues, Severus makes a concession to dyophysite language by talking about the difference as in natural quality (διαφορὰ ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ) between the divinity and humanity in Christ. However, by denying that the properties of Christ should be ascribed to two natures in actuality after incarnation, this sort of Severan dualism soon proves to be a subtle enemy of the pro-Chalcedonian view which is committed to a duality of both the natures and their properties in Christ. In consequence, Severus’ theory provoked a strong reaction from the Chalcedonian side which was also echoed in the work of Maximus the Confessor (c. 580–662). The aim of this paper is to uncover some of the details of this intricate debate and to analyze the way in which Maximus constructed a critical rejoinder to Severus’ theory in his Opuscula. I will begin by identifying Cyril of Alexandria’s anti-Eunomian theory of names, which argues that they are based on common conceptualizations, as the key background for the interpretation of “difference as in natural quality”. It will turn out that the original meaning of natural quality was neither that of specific or constitutive difference nor the proprium. Rather, it designated a set of common characteristics on the basis of which common conceptualizations about the divine and human natures might be built, in a similar manner to the Stoic idea of common notions. My argument will further explore Severus’ commitment to this Cyrilian idea which the Patriarch of Antioch adopted ingeniously in his Christology. In the second part of this paper, Maximus the Confessor’s critical response to Severus’ idea of difference as in natural quality will be carefully investigated. As a point of comparison, I shall analyze Maximus’ positive attitude towards the anti-Eunomian theory of names which he inherits from Gregory of Nazianzus. However, it will be shown that Maximus finds significant limits to this theory when it freely transgresses from theology to Christology. The paper will show that in response to this, Maximus provides important metaphysical arguments for the building of an essentialist ontology according to which

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human nature must be defined in terms of its essence and constitutive properties, and not only in accordance with general properties representable through common notions. Maximus’ critical reception of the argument for difference as in natural quality in the Opuscula is consequently shown to have been conducted in the light of Maximus’ ontology, which requires the affirmation of the constitutive difference of the humanity of Christ instead of its common traits. Setting the Scene The famous Council of Chalcedon (451), which was supposed to clarify and settle the tumultuous theological debates of its time by aligning them in agreement with the tradition of the Church, ended up in the provocation of a long-standing split in the Church and the erecting of two antagonistic theologies. 2 Already before but also during the Council, Cyril, Archbishop of Alexandria (412–444), was celebrated as an unparalleled theological authority. The extraordinary emphasis he put on the unity of Christ often became the standard against which the soundness of theology was measured. This had a considerable impact upon the reception of the Christological dualism professed by the Antiochene and Western theologies, whose credo could eventually find no room in the Chalcedonian Creed except in a Cyrilian language. 3 Yet, the final draft of the Creed contains a tiny fragment which in content and form looks like an insertion made under pressure from the Chalcedonian dyophysites: “the difference of the natures being in no way destroyed by the union, but 2  For a recent account of some of the subtleties posed by the theological debates issuing from Chalcedon, see the recent contributions in S. Mateiescu & G. F. Călian, “Lost for Words: Theological and Philosophical Vocabulary in the Aftermath of Chalcedon”, Review of Ecumenical Studies (RES), 11 (2019), pp. 333–520, The Institute for Ecumenical Research, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, available online at https://sciendo.com/issue/RESS/11/3. 3  For such an interpretation, see R. Price, “Introduction”, in The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon. Volume One, trans. by R. Price and M. Gaddis (Liverpool, 2005), pp. 56–75. The analysis below of the Cyrilian influence on the Creed is indebted to this work. For other details, see also A.  Grillmeier & T. Hainthaler, Christ in Christian Tradition. vol. 2, part. 2 , London, 2005.

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rather the distinctive character of each nature being preserved”.4 However, it is not easy to establish whether the dyophysite emphasis of this passage lies mostly in the need to discriminate the natures according to their properties or in the declaration of their integrity, as saved in the preservation of their corresponding properties in Christ. We shall see that Maximus will devote considerable attention to arguing for the latter, in support of which he will devise a sophisticated ontology of essences and properties. But to the Miaphysites, a strict ontological dualism in Christ was to conjure the spectre of Nestorius, whose theology had been repudiated by Cyril precisely because its dualism would amount to a division of Christ. 5 This is why it is reasonable to say that in order to make all this acceptable to the strict Cyrilians, the addition was dressed up in Cyrilian language, as the phrase “the difference of the natures being in no way destroyed by the union” seems to be following closely Cyril of Alexandria’s Second Letter to Nestorius.6 Furthermore, by suggesting that the natures must come together in one person and one hypostasis, the phrase ends in a similarly Cyrilian picture that seems to profess the subordination of the natures and their properties to Christ as their subject.7 While this blend of duality and single-subject language may speak of the concessions made by the Cyrilian, respectively the Western part in the Council, it has nevertheless provoked further debates and controversies after the Council that were never resolved. Among other repercussions, it worked to shift the problem into a debate on Cyril’s dualism concerning 4  The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Volume Two, trans. by R.  Price & M.  Gaddis, p. 204. 5  I use the term “Miaphysite” in contrast with “Monophysite” to denote the anti-Chalcedonian theology that did not profess solely a “one nature Christology” without qualification with respect to any duality in Christ. I believe Severus’ idea of a duality of properties is the refined expression of this nuanced Miaphysitism which tries to avoid a confusion or blending together of the natures of Christ. 6  “Not implying that the difference between the natures was abolished through their union”, in Cyril of Alexandria, “Second letter to Nestorius” 3, 5–10, in Cyril of Alexandria, Select letters, ed. and trans. by L. R. Wickham, Oxford, 1983, p. 7. 7  “It is one Christ and Son coming from them”, in Cyril, Select letters, 3, 5–10, p. 7.

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the properties of Christ. In the hands of Severus, a very dedicated and close reader of Cyril, this all became an opportunity to concoct an ingenious combination of the basic Cyrilian idea of one Christ with a duality of properties applicable to his divinity and humanity. The intended goal of this middle path between strict Christological dualism and Monophysitism was a minimalist Christology with regard to the ontology of the natures of Christ by grounding duality in the properties themselves and unity in the one nature/hypostasis of Christ. Acknowledging the Difference as in Natural Quality As documented in the now classic studies of Joseph Lebon, the newly forming Miaphysite theology after Chalcedon does not reject the duality of natures, divine and human, from which (ek) the union was made, but it does obstinately insist on the absolute unity of Jesus Christ after the Incarnation.8 In the light of this, to assent to any duality after union was to become identical with a dividing of Christ in two, and thus to become an heir to Nestorianism. Severus shows a strong commitment to this view, which nevertheless he starts to qualify as he advances in theological authority. One such remarkable example is found in Severus’ exchange with a certain Sergius, a little-known theologian who was attracted to an extreme form of monophysitism.9 As a strict anti-Chalcedonian monophysite, Sergius is concerned to deny not only the possibility of differentiating between the two natures after incarnation, but also the possibility of differentiating between their properties.10 However, this idea was qualified by a local synod which converted Sergius’ refusal to talk about two properties into an interdiction on speaking of two divided properties after the Incarnation. Sergius complains to Severus about his difficulty in understanding 8  See

J. Lebon, “La Christologie du monophysisme Syrien”, in Konzil von Chalkedon, 3 vols, ed. by A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht, Würzburg, 1951, pp. 425–580. 9  I. R. Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon: Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite, Norwich, 1988. 10  See, for more details, Torrance’s introduction, in Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon, p. 7 and passim.

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the amendment, which nevertheless looks to him like a concession made to the Chalcedonian enemies. Sergius then passes the question on to Severus for further clarification. As a philosophically minded person, Sergius nevertheless includes a philosophical argument against the idea of accepting two properties in Christ: “But every property belongs to an underlying nature, and if we speak of two properties, we are obliged also to speak of two natures”.11 Severus does not give a proper reply to this argument which will later also become essential to Maximus’ thought. Rather, Severus’ strategy is repeatedly to refer to Cyril’s particular understanding of the notion of property, which is, according to Severus, “that which (lies) in difference of natural quality  […] and not that (which lies) in (independent) parts”.12 What appears evident from this and many other similar passages in Severus is that “difference as in natural quality” (διαφορὰ ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ) is in stark opposition to the Chalcedonians’ idea of ascribing an actual duality of properties and natures in Christ after the Incarnation. Severus’ professed synonymy between difference and division and his resistance to it is made plain in the following passage from his exchange with Sergius: For we do not refuse to confess the difference, God forbid, but we flee from this, that we should divide the one Christ in a duality of natures after the union. For if he is divided, the properties of each one of the natures are divided at the same time with him, and what is its own will cling to each of them.13

“Difference as in natural quality” is thus meant to respond directly to the idea of two actual substantial properties of Christ after the union which, on Severus’ reading, would amount to a cutting of Christ into two (natures). However, Severus wants at the same time to avoid the other extreme of a strict one-nature Christology without qualification. He thus feels compelled to rebuke those like Sergius who in their anti-dyophysite zeal uphold the idea of a synthetic nature of Christ, a mixed divine-human nature that 11  Sergius’ first letter to Severus in Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon, p. 144. 12  Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon, p. 152. 13  Severus’ first letter to Sergius in Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon, pp. 150–51.

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would have just one (synthetic) natural property applicable to it.14 Severus is plain that this would lead to a tertium quid of the incarnation which would destroy the two natures in Christ. It is towards this goal of conserving the properties of Christ that he introduces the idea of difference as in natural quality in the first place. The picture thus completed by Severus would result in a unitary Christ, of whom the only acceptable distinction would be that of difference as in natural quality. Hence, it is important to understand the meaning of this special type of qualitative difference in order to grasp why and how a distinction according to its terms would save the unity of Christ and be free of any divisive duality. The notion of difference as in natural quality (διαφορὰ ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ) received close attention from Joseph Lebon in section two of his extended article on the Syrian Christology.15 Here, Lebon considers the Miaphysite view regarding the conservation or destruction of the properties of Christ, and makes a good case for singling out Severus among his fellow theologians as a champion of the conservation of properties according to the difference as in natural quality. Lebon finds a perfect match between Severus’ idea of natural quality and Cyril of Alexandria’s notion of natural property (ἰδιότης φυσική) or property according to the nature (ἰδιότης ἡ κατὰ φύσιν), on the basis of which Cyril allows for talk about “otherness” in Christ.16 This further leads Lebon to the conclusion that Severus’ concept of difference as in natural quality represents the inheritance of Cyril’s idea of the diversity (ἑτερότης) of the natural property in Christ.17 However, by noticing the scarcity of Cyril’s use of the formula “natural quality (ποιότης φυσική)” itself and the existence of other concurrent expressions by which Cyril conceptualizes the difference of the natures, Hans van Loon has recently concluded that Lebon has

14  “Therefore, do not ascribe to the folly of the Synousiasts”, in Severus’ first letter to Sergius in Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon, p. 149. 15  Lebon, La Christologie, pp. 534–52. 16  Lebon, La Christologie, pp. 537–39. 17  Lebon, La Christologie, pp. 539.

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simply projected Severus’ own arguments onto Cyril himself.18 Yet, for our purposes here it is important to note that, for instance, in the Letter to Acacius of Melitene, Cyril shows familiarity with the idea that “Godhead and manhood are not the same thing as in quality of nature” (ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ).19 By this phrase, Cyril wishes to clarify what in the previous line appears as “the difference (ἡ διαφορά) between the natures or subjects”. A  few lines later, Cyril uses exactly the same phrase construction with the same meaning, clearly intending to turn the Antiochene discourse about the difference between the natures of Christ into an orthodox one.20 Both occurrences of the phrase are thus intended by Cyril to be used as a technical tool for speaking about the duality of Christ. Cyril considers this terminology to be a sufficient way of talking about duality in Christ, correcting a non-orthodox view that over-emphasises the unity of the Son. This clarification was also Severus’ original intention. For example, in his first letter to Sergius, Severus names and faithfully cites a long passage from Cyril’s Second Letter to Succensus, in which Cyril argues against “mingling” the elements of Christ.21 Cyril emphasizes that the nature of the Word could not have passed into that of the flesh or inversely and that each is remaining “in the property according to nature” (ἐν ἰδιότητι τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκατέρου μένοντος).22 Cyril further exemplifies this by another union which avoids conflation, namely the union of soul and body in human nature, in which the two elements continue to maintain their difference according to nature (τὸ διάφορον κατὰ φύσιν).23 And Severus proves himself a close follower of Cyril both in letter and in spirit. He too proposes the arguments taken from Cyril against those who mingle

18  H. Van

Loon, The dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria, Leiden & Boston, 1983, pp. 538–39. 19  Cyril of Alexandria, “Letter to Accacius of Melitene”, in Wickham, Select letters, p.  50: οὐ γάρ τοι ταὐτὸν ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ θεότης τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότης. In his translation, Wickham (p. 51) omits to render the “ὡς”. 20  Cyril of Alexandria, “Letter to Accacius of Melitene”, in Wickham, Select letters, p. 52, lines 1–5. 21  Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon, pp. 147–48. 22  Cyril of Alexandria, Select Letters, p. 89 (modified). 23  Cyril of Alexandria, Select Letters, p. 89.

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the natures of Christ and further conjoins the diversity in natural property with difference as in natural quality: It is therefore already made known  […] from these things that natural property [ἰδιότης] (implies) the otherness of natures of those things which have come together to union, and the difference (lies) in natural quality.24

Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Lebon had good reasons to associate Severus’ notion of difference as in natural quality with Cyril’s rationale for the difference in Christ through the otherness of the natural properties.25 However, where Lebon seems to go too far is in the interpretation he offers for this qualitative difference. The Louvain scholar identifies another correlative of it in Cyril who, according to Severus’ notation too, associates the notion with the logos of the how of being (ὁ λόγος τοῦ πῶς εἶναι).26 Lebon takes this logos to refer to the essence or species in Cyril, which may seem to imply that the properties differentiated are nothing other than the (constitutive) differentiae between the human species and God.27 Hans van Loon has charged Lebon with inconsistency in this matter too as the Belgian scholar also showed that the Miaphysites shared the opposite picture of a physis that is a concrete entity and not an abstract essence.28 This would render the specific difference less relevant for Cyril and the Miaphysites. Hans van Loon’ alternative to this is that in as much as we can accept that natural quality in Cyril does not mean something “added” but rather something that gets “attached by nature or substanti-

24  Torrance,

Christology after Chalcedon, p.  148. Torrance renders ἰδιότης as “particularity” instead of “natural property” to highlight Severus’ intent to keep it different from a divisive property. This, however, may bring in too much of an interpretation into the translation. 25  As we shall see below, Maximus himself does not raise any doubts about the formula itself, but only about its interpretation. 26  Lebon, La Christologie, p. 539. 27  Lebon, La Christologie, p.  539: “Ce λόγος τοῦ πῶς εἶναι, qui est la qualité naturelle, correspond évidemment ce qu’en notre langage, nous exprimons par l’essence spécifique”. 28  Van Loon, The dyophysite, pp. 227–28, 542–43.

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ally” to God’s being,29 then it can safely said that it represents a whole set of natural properties, 30 which can include the “differentiae, the propria and the inseparable attributes.”31 This looks like a safe proposition to hold, but it is still too minimalistic for our demands. We are looking for an interpretation of Cyril’s idea of difference in Christ, something that initiated a fierce debate after Chalcedon and that contains more nuance than van Loon’s suggestion allows for. We shall see below that, even if it might be tempting to associate the item in question with the proprium, this is not a straightforward move because the characteristics used to differentiate the two natures in Christ are very general and common, rather than specific for one single nature. This all shows once again how difficult it is to interpret Cyril’s idea of property and thence Severus’ concept of difference as in natural quality. I propose that in order to come to a solution, particular attention must be paid to the examples of properties provided by the two authors. Thus, we might eventually ascertain whether their intention is to associate natural quality with any of the three categories mentioned above, or to the set of all, as suggested by H. van Loon, or to something different from either. The Hidden Background: Cyril’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names During the first of his Dialogues on the Trinity, 32 Cyril discusses the form of unity between the Father and the Son which he believes is based on the generation of the latter from the former’s substance. Yet, he considers this also to be beyond (ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς) our sort of commonality in the human species as every human individual is bound by a spatial separation with respect to others 29  Van Loon, The dyophysite, pp. 131–32. I am thankful to Prof. van Loon for clarifying this detail of his interpretation in a private correspondence with me. 30  Van Loon, The dyophysite, pp. 228 and 543. 31  Van Loon, The dyophysite, p. 202. 32  Deux dialogues christologiques [Dial. Trin.] ed. by G. M. de Durand, Paris, 1964 (SC 97) [which also contains On the Incarnation [DI] and On the unity of Christ [DUC]].

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“according to the law of bodies” (408b19), while in God there is no separation. As noted by van Loon already, it is in this context that Cyril introduces the traditional philosophical definition of man as “rational, mortal living being” and the question we should ask ourselves is whether it is this philosophical notion of humanity that is used by Cyril to describe the human side of Christ in Christological contexts. 33 Let us take Cyril’s work On the Incarnation, a Christological dialogue dated around 428, before the Nestorian crisis. According to van Loon’s analysis of the work, Cyril mostly refers to human nature as “flesh” or “humanity”. 34 How does Cyril describe this humanity? It is often depicted as something (τι) “visible” and “tangible” (680d–682d), “unstable”, “changeable”, “alterable”, “transformable” (683bc), etc., and that is always in contrast with the peculiarities of the divine nature (ἡ Θεοῦ φύσις), which is “immutable” (684a), “stable” (690cd), “invisible” etc. 35 The context in which these different properties are described is the conservation without confusion of the divine and humanity in the incarnated Christ (683de). Cyril’s argument is in opposition to a teaching that would defend the alteration of each of the two natures during their union in Christ. In this sense, it bears a striking similarity to the context of saving the difference as in natural quality, except that here we get a list of several properties and not just one quality. However, if we turn to Cyril’s treatise on the Holy Trinity, we find the idea that the properties of the divine nature are many and expressible through many names because none of these alone could encapsulate (ἐγκατακλείω) the divine nature itself. 36 For Cyril, as for his Christian predecessors, the plurality of these names is the solution that counters the Eunomian, unlawful identification of the divine with one single name, the “unbegotten” which would render the “begotten” Son

33  See

Van Loon, The dyophysite, pp. 102–03 and 126. Loon, The dyophysite, p. 272. H. van Loon also identifies in Cyril the very rare expression “man by nature”. 35  See also, DI, 691d. 36  Cyril, Dial. Trin. V 558cd. For a subtle analysis of Cyril’s arguments and methodology, see M.-O. Boulnois, Le paradoxe trinitaire chez Cyrille d’Alexandrie. Herméneutique, analyses philosophiques et argumentation théologique, Paris, 1994, pp. 91–102 at 98. 34  Van

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into a non-divine item. 37 The strategy of avoiding the confusion of the multiple biblical names with the essence is rooted in Origen, who was the first to consider the names of Christ such as “light”, “life”, “truth”, etc. as “conceptualizations” (epinoiai) applicable to Him by the human mind. 38 The relegation of these names to the conceptual activity of the human mind may sound too deflationary a move but it is likely that Origen did not see the concepts of the human mind as bare notions bereft of any reality. 39 Basil of Caesarea too considered these names as “conceptualizations” that are not simple imaginations (φαντασιῶν) of the mind but bear on empirical experience: “After an initial concept (νόημα) has arisen for us from sense perception (ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως), the more subtle and precise reflection on what we have conceived is called conceptualization (ἐπίνοια)”.40 It is, Basil argues, on the basis of different conceptualizations that many and different names can be applied to Christ. This detail of a plurality of names applicable to one and the same entity is crucial for Basil’s anti-Eunomian argument that the substance of God, being absolutely simple, cannot be equated with the collection of the properties named by these different nouns. Cyril’s method is very close to the one above: he describes the whole process as taking its root in repeated “contemplations” (ἐκ πλείστων ὅσων θεωρημάτων) which the mind collects from the Bible by means of further “refined representations of conceptions” (κατερρινημέναις φαντασίαις ἐννοιῶν).41 Cyril gives very simi37  See,

for details, Boulnois, Le paradoxe, pp. 174–77. Origen, Comm. on John I, IX, p. 53. For a history of this tradition starting from Origen and echoing later in both Theology and Christology, see T.  Kobusch, Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache, Leiden, 1987, pp. 48–64. 39  Origen devised his theory of epinoia as a reaction against the Sabelians’ pure conceptual or modalist interpretation of the divine hypostases as different “masks” of the same single divine entity. See, for details, Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, pp. 49–51, who argues that a kind of conceptual realism was practised by Origen. 40  Basil of Caesarea, Contra Eunomium, I,6, 524b in St Basil of Caesarea. Against Eunomius, trans. by M. DelCogliano & A. Radde-Gallwitz, Washington DC, 2011, p. 98. 41  Cyril, Dial. Trin V, 558ab. For Cyril’s theory of collection (ἐρανίζομαι), see Boulnois, Le paradoxe, pp. 98–99. 38  See

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lar examples of conceptualizations regarding Christ as “light”, “life” etc. and insists that they contribute to a unitary and informative picture about the divine nature. Hence, Cyril and Basil too convey that despite the transcendence of the divine essence, human language can still represent some of its properties in analogy with how similar general traits can be identifiable for the human nature. As we shall shortly see, this conjunction of nonessential properties is hardly embeddable in a philosophical traditional scheme of substance and non-substance entities. As we shall suggest, these properties are neither substantial, nor accidental or the so called propria of an entity and this asks for an alternative interpretation of them.42 The Natural Qualities and the Conceptual Difference of the Natures We have so far seen that the properties described by Cyril look like the general characteristics of entities that get deciphered through conceptualization. The human properties discussed by Cyril seem to confirm his intention of talking about humanity in general terms, rather than by using a definition of humanity or even its proprium. If for God we do not have a definition, for man we do have. However, Cyril does not seem interested to use this definition when he talks about the difference between the two natures in Christ. Rather, as described above, he employs many conceptual representations of the two natures in the same way as he reasons about God. Though perfectly aware of the notion of the proprium, he does not use it in those contexts in which he often portrays humanity by means of properties it has in common with other animals such as “visible or ‘mortal”, in contrast with its proprium which he denotes by “risibility”.43 As a matter of fact, 42  Note

that Cyril does not present this process in terms of abstraction since the divine properties cannot be abstracted from various divine items as if they would inhere in a multitude of divinities. Nor are they called for through the Platonic mechanism of recollection. 43  For examples and details about the philosophical tradition regarding the proprium that seems to be implied in here, see Barnes’ comments in Porphyry, Introduction, trans. by J. Barnes (Oxford, 2003), pp. 208–13. For more on Cyril’s use of the proprium, see Van Loon, The dyophysite, pp. 102 and 131.

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he attributes the association of the “(un)begotteness” with the proprium as pertaining to the Eunomians and proposes a stark rebuttal of this on the basis that there are many unbegotten entities yet and also there are a multitude of beings that are born.44 Therefore, he concludes, “(un)begotten” could not be deemed as a proprium of God.45 Interestingly, the treatise On Incarnation abounds in the use of the word “humanity” (ἀνθρωπότης) instead of phrases like “human nature” (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις) or its equivalents, as is also the case with “divinity” (θεότης) instead of the divine nature (ἡ θεία φύσις). Different sets of properties seem thus to concur in the building of a common notion of “divinity” and “humanity”. These two concepts being further refined and wisely put together, it can be further said with Cyril that “Godhead and manhood have given us the one Lord, Christ and Son by their mysterious and inexpressible unification”.46 If Cyril’s method indeed leads to the construction of polished notions of divinity and humanity out of very general or common impressions, then the “natural quality” by which he distinguishes the two natures must be nothing than what results from these common representations that the mind makes about each nature. A conjunction of properties obtainable through repeated conceptualizations which nonetheless cannot be equated with any of the classic distinction between substantial or non-substantial properties we may be accustomed from Aristotle onwards. Hence, how should one interpret it? I would tentatively suggest that these properties approximate well the generic features of objects that the Stoics take as starting point for the construction of concepts. For example, according to Diogenes Laertius, the Stoics construct common notions by the means of “a natural conception of the

44  Cyril,

Dial. Trin. II, 420, 15–20. Dial. Trin. II, 420, 26–27. 46  Cyril of Alexandria, “Second Letter to Nestorius”: ἀποτελεσασῶν δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν τὸν ἕνα κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν καὶ υἱὸν θεότητός τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος διὰ τῆς ἀφράστου καὶ ἀπορρήτου πρὸς ἑνότητα συνδρομῆς, in Wickham, Select letters, p. 7. I am thankful to Prof. van Loon for pointing out to me the right reference to this passage in Cyril. 45  Cyril,

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general characteristics of a thing (ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου)”.47 According to this view, for instance, by getting repeated sensory impressions of white things, we gradually put them together by building into the notion of “white”. Similarly, Diogenes (DL, VII, 61) explains how the generic notion of Animal gets formed in this Stoic account by the conjunction of different conceptualizations abut different sorts of animals. This subtle link between conjunction and conceptualization as based on general traits of beings has further lead the Stoics to the idea of “common notions” as being contents naturally shareable by all rational beings that can have natural sensorial experiences.48 It seems to me the same correlation between multiple features described by the many names of Christ and their joining together to the same entity as if they would compose a “common notion” of divinity was identified earlier in the anti-Eunomian arguments.49 And this same link between the capacity of the mind to construct concepts out of generic features of entities is confirmed by Cyril’s general idea that the difference between divinity and humanity “in quality of nature” would be subject only to the mind’s contemplative work (ἂν νοηθείη).50 In other words, the same mind which builds up the two notions can discern them accordingly. Cyril plainly asserts that the duality of Christ resides in the notions we have about him (ὡς ἐν ἐννοίαις 47  Diogenes

Laertius [DL], Lives of the Eminent Philosophers VII, 54, trans. in F. H. Sandbach, “Ennoia and prolepsis in the Stoic theory of Knowledge”, in Problems in Stoicism, ed. by A. A. Long, London, 1971, p. 25. 48  See, for details, C. Brittain, “Common sense: concepts, definition and meaning in and out of the Stoa”, in Language and learning. Philosophy of language in the Hellenistic Age, ed. by D. Frede & B. Inwood, Cambridge, 2005, p. 177, and H. Dyson, Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa, Berlin, 2009. 49  One important tracing of the Christian theory of conceptualization to Stoic roots, though not made on exactly the same grounds as those presented here, has been also suggested by T. Kobusch, Sein un Sprache, pp. 48–59, and T. Kobusch, “Die Epinoia – Das menschliche Bewusstsein in der antiken Philosophie”, in Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II. An English version with supporting studies. Proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Olomouc, September 15–18, 2004), ed. by L. Karfikova, S. Douglass & J. Zachhuber, with the assistance of V. Husek & L. Chvatal, Leiden, 2007, pp. 3–21. 50  Cyril of Alexandria, “Letter to Accacius”, in Wickham, Select letters, p. 51.

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δεχόμενοι),51 and there is nothing special about this intellectual process defined by him as “theoria” because it is equally applicable to the difference between soul and body in a human being.52 The parallelism between the two models is perfect “for purely mental consideration by the mind’s eye”,53 so any other kind of difference would turn both man and Christ into two separate entities. Division must thus mean something purely extra-mental, something similar to a concrete cutting into two that leads eventually to a “spatial” separation, such as that between corporeal beings. However, this does not mean that for Cyril differentiation by the mind is simply a psychological process. It is true that Cyril sometimes talks as though this were the case, as for example when he considers the difference between the natures as a difference between the terms that designate them (φωνῶν δὲ διαφοράν).54 However, if his method has something in common with the Stoic view of concept formation, as we have suggested, then all these names must rely on a causal mechanism, i.e. they must be produced by that reality which falls under the produced concept. This should mean, among other consequences, that they are not pure constructions of the mind deprived of any reality but rather a different kind of conceptual reality to which we may not be accustomed.55 According to the Stoics, the mind would put together the multiple representations insofar as it believes that they all arise from the same cause. Similarly, I believe it is only by accepting the multiple appellations of God as all coming from God as “author” of the Bible that the mind can put them all together in a unitary

51  Ibid.

frag. 12, p. 48. See also, Cyril’s first letter to Succensus, in Wickham, Select letters, p. 77. 52  Cyril of Alexandria, “Letter to Eulogius”, in Wickham, Select letters, pp. 63–64. Cyril’s (Stoic) constructivism about universals is visible in this passage as he freely says that “we unite them [the soul and body] and get one nature of man” (p. 65). 53  Cyril of Alexandria, “Letter to Succensus”, in Wickham, Select letters, p. 77. 54  Cyril of Alexandria, “Letter to Accacius”, in Wickham, Select letters, p. 51. 55  On the Stoic conceptual realism, see V. Caston, “Something and nothing: the Stoics on concepts and universals”, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 17, ed. by D.  Sadley, Oxford, 1999, pp. 145–213.

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notion of the divine. In light of this, one might say that the mind must be affected by the same cause in order to agree that all conceptual representations refer to the same entity. And when there is a name that is not explicitly stated in the Bible, Cyril seems to imply that the mind could add further names that contribute to a better precision and congruence under the same notion. We know that the Stoics complemented in a similar fashion their common notion of god “conceived of, and grasped by prolepsis to be, not only immortal and blessed, but also humane, protective, and beneficent”.56 Severus on Natural Quality and Common Notions That common notions of humanity and divinity made of various cumulative characteristics are implied in Severus’ thought can be easily seen from his reaction against the Chalcedonian dictum that speaks of two properties (and two activities). Severus points out that there are many properties that characterize every nature and not just two: ‘For example, of his humanity there is perceptibility, and visibility, and mortality, and being subject to hunger and to thirst and to other things like it. And there are many properties of the divine nature: invisibility, intangibility, being before the ages, being unlimited.’57

Again, we face here a multitude of properties in which none is a differentia or the proprium of human being. They are arguably general properties taught by the Bible as applicable to divinity and humanity and it is likely that they featured as common notions for the Christian mind. By the end of the same first letter to Sergius, Severus points out, following Cyril’s account in the Commentary to John, that these properties must be considered in analogy with the more materialistic natural qualities of a body, “as for example the quality of being solid, or of taste, or of density, or of weight, or of thickness or transparency”. 58 These are

56  Dyson,

Prolepsis, p. 7. Christology after Chalcedon, p. 155. 58  Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon, p. 160. 57  Torrance,

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obviously very general traits of bodies and do not single out any propria of a certain group of bodies. Rather, they seem to add up together to form the notion of a natural body. In that same passage, Severus points out that according to Cyril we must reason about divinity in a similar manner to thinking about bodies while being aware of the materialistic limits of our language. This chimes well with the previous suggestion that we interpret Cyril’s account in line with Stoicism, as the Stoic mechanism of causation is based on the causal activity of the physical bodies. Severus’ suggestion thus seems to be that we reason about natural quality in Christology in analogy with the natural qualities of a body. This should therefore mean that we extrapolate the causal mechanism to non-material entities such as divinity but keep the rest in a good analogy with that. It is, I surmise, this very concrete or materialistic picture that drives the two authors to regard the Chalcedonian duality about Christ as a splitting of Christ “in independent parts”, i.e. as a mutilation of him as though he were a body cut into two spatially separated pieces: we confess the particularities of the natures from which Emanuel is, that is (particularities) that (lie) in natural quality, and not such that the natures should be cut off independently and separated from each other. For whoever does not confess it, arrives at the opinion of those who confuse ousiai. 59

In this fragment Severus also suggests that natural quality is only the set of all the general characteristics 60 used to describe one nature. For our purposes, however, it is less important whether natural quality means here the whole set or might refer to each of those traits taken in isolation. What is crucial, rather, is to establish whether they resemble the propria of the nature in question. However, Severus is openly against this idea of the properties approximating the proprium when he describes in detail the features of the human nature in which the Logos gets incarnated: when we make terms about the inhomination, we say that it is the propriety of the humanity to hunger, or to thirst, or to be weary, but we do not say this in any precise way, for this is not the propriety only of man, but also of the other living creatures, which 59  Torrance, 60  Torrance

Christology after Chalcedon, p. 214. renders these properties by “particularities”.

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by nature breathe the air, and live lives subject to the senses and are nourished. Because a propriety, expressed precisely, is that thing which belongs to something alone, and without sharing with another. But because to hunger and to thirst or to be tired are not properties of the bodiless God, because of this, in a comparison in relation to him, we call these ‘properties of humanity.61

Hence Severus, like Cyril before him, is aware of the notion of the proprium as a property applicable to a limited category of beings as though it “belongs” to them solely. And he even provides the example of “risibility” for men and “neighing” for horses in that very same context.62 However, he is explicit that it is not the proprium that he has in mind when he describes the natural quality of humanity but rather a conjunction of general notions that are equally applicable to other beings and not to humans exclusively. These are, as suggested earlier, general characteristics that the mind adds up together in order to build up the concept of humanity as different to that of divinity. Of course, this does not mean that God incarnated himself in the notion of humanity or finally that humanity is nothing but what man has in common with other animals. On the contrary, both Severus and Cyril time and again stress the rational part of the individual human nature which Christ put upon himself, only they appear to see no compelling necessity for including this in their account of the difference in natural quality. In the light of this, the difference between the two natures means only a form of formal distinction which is able to show “how they are” one in respect to the other and not “what they are”: It is clearly established … that natural quality is the principle of how (a thing) is, for the Doctor [Cyril] said: with respect to how they are, these things which are named are seen to be different and are unlike each other in anything. And so we confess the difference and the particularity and the otherness of the natures from which Christ is, for we do not quarrel about names, but (we confess) the particularity which (lies) in natural quality and not that which will be set in parts, each one existing independently.63

61  Torrance,

Christology after Chalcedon, p. 194. Christology after Chalcedon, p. 223. 63  Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon, p. 150. 62  Torrance,

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Echoing Cyril’s view that a proper comparison of two entities is conditioned by their being co-specific/generic, Severus thus implies in this passage that there is a specialized way of marking the otherness of those entities and that heterogeneity is not arbitrarily stipulated. Rather, it represents a true principle that shows how entities are in general and Severus does not shy away from emphasizing that it stays “firm and unchangeable”.64 It is on the basis of this difference that Severus might equally complement his theory with the Alexandrian’s idea that this difference in Christ is subject to the mind’s power of discernment, in opposition to any other sort of difference that might endanger the absolute unity of Christ.65 We shall now proceed to show that although this theory was meant to save the duality in Christ, the whole approach was to be critically interpreted as the denial of a real duality in the Savior. Maximus’ Idea of Common Concepts Maximus’ Christological arguments, presented in his Epistles and Opuscula, address with great interest the problem of the difference as in natural quality. However, Maximus’ arguments are already foreshadowed by his general view of the relationship between nature and its properties, which he elaborated long before in his Ambigua to John.66 And by way of comparison, it would also be useful to start with some passages that reflect Maximus’ concern with Eunomian arguments too. Of course, Maximus’ engagement with Eunomius’ theology can be explained by the fact that Ambigua is a commentary on Gregory the Theologian, and Maximus could not have missed the Theologian’s attack on Eunomius’ heresy. Chapters 16 and 17 of Ambigua indeed consist of Maximus’ interpretation of Gregory the Theologian’s anti-Eunomian arguments in his Oratio 28. Maximus takes up the task of explaining 64  Torrance,

Christology after Chalcedon, p. 183. Lebon, La Christologie, pp. 526–27, no. 198–99. 66  All references to Ambigua and translations are taken from N.  Constas (ed. and trans.), Maximos the Confessor, The Ambigua, Cambridge, MA, 2014 (Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 28, 2 vols). 65  See

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Gregory’s view about the properties said to be “around” (περί) God such as “beginningless”, “immutability”, and “incorruptibility”, the properties of divinity we have encountered above in Cyril and Severus. Gregory’s argument, as shown by Maximus, aims to oppose the Eunomian impulse to equate God’s essence with the property of being “unbegotten” for several general reasons: 1) because to profess a general equivalence between the property and the divine essence would imply “the introducing of many essences of God” as there are many such properties said about God;67 2) definitions of a thing’s essence are based on positive terms, referring to a thing’s existence and not to what the thing is not, that is, on privative properties, which show what the thing is not;68 3) definition is a complex formula which does not contain only a single term but “items which expand and explain the summary designation of a thing, which is its name”.69 Maximus draws the obvious conclusion that none of those properties invoked by the Eunomians “can ever be the essence of God”.70

Maximus goes on to describe Gregory’s preference for negative terms in his discourse on God as an intentional move taken to counterbalance the Eunomian trust in the human capacity to know God’s essence. Maximus thereafter responds positively to Gregory’s answer to his adversaries’ accusation that his claims obstruct the very comprehension of the fact that God exists. Since Gregory argues that all we know about God is not his essence, how then, the Eunomians would ask, can we be sure on this premise that He actually exists? Gregory characterizes this move as a “treacherous twist” unjustly intended to make him appear like an atheist and proposes that despite our limits we can still know important things about God through his properties. It is important to notice in this context how Maximus describes Gregory’s move. The Confessor sees it as an attempt to “make clear and intelligible, on the basis of prevailing common concepts (οὕτως τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν κεκρατηκυιῶν), that the Divine is infinite”.71 He further adduces that “the same common concepts demonstrate 67  Amb.Ioh.

16, PG 91, 1221CD; Constas, The Ambigua, vol, 1, p. 379. 16, PG 91, 1224A; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 379. 69  Amb.Ioh. 16, PG 91, 1224A; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 379. 70  Amb.Ioh. 16, PG 91, 1224A; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 379. 71  Amb.Ioh. 17, PG 91, 1229D; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 395. 68  Amb.Ioh.

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or introduce (εἰσαγουσῶν) that God is ‘indeterminate’ or ‘formless’ or ‘completely without parts’”.72 In a commentary on a different passage from Gregory’s Oratio 30, Maximus agrees that not only the attributes of the divine nature (omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, justice, etc.) but also those of human nature (servitude, obedience, circumscription, existence ex nihilo,  etc.) are deemed proper to the two natures by the “common concepts” (κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις) that we have of them.73 Therefore, these are good examples to help us conclude that Maximus shows himself equally favourable to the idea, as discussed earlier, found in Cyril and Severus that one could describe divinity and respectively humanity through common notions. After all, this should not come as a surprise if one recalls that Gregory is also an important source for Cyril, and implicitly for Severus, with regard to the same anti-Eunomian teaching. Maximus would thus seem well prepared to accept what follows from distinguishing the divine and human nature according to common notions, but is he content with that? I will argue that he is not, for indeed Maximus’ reception of this argument does not yet imply that he agrees that the only acceptable difference between humanity and divinity is a difference in natural quality. The reasons for his reluctance to accept this idea are already present in his commentary on Gregory. Let us first notice that both Gregory and Maximus accept there can be a meaningful discourse about the essence of things, that is, at least prima facie they are not agnostic that there is such an essence but want to establish our limited apprehension of it. The question, however, remains as to how we might understand this narrowness — is it an ontological given or rather a restriction forced on us by the Fall? This question is too complex to be addressed fully and lies beyond the scope of this paper, but I would like to suggest that despite Maximus’ general commitment to the limited capacities for knowledge by human nature as incurred by the Fall, he nevertheless proves to be more positive with respect to our capacity to understand the created world and make predications of it.

72  Amb.Ioh. 73  Amb.Ioh.

17, PG 91, 1232AB; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 395–96. 28, PG 91, 1272C; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 2, p. 33.

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Knowledge through Universals Is Necessary One suggestion of this capacity for knowledge of the world is found in Maximus’ nuanced contrast between the two types of properties applicable to bodies that correspond to “accidental” and, respectively, “essential or constitutive properties”. Following Gregory, Maximus indeed accepts that a complete knowledge (τελείαν κατάληψιν) through natural predicates such as “being a body” or “suffering corruption”, which can be applied to a particular compound (στοιχεῖόν τι) such as “man”, “ox” or “horse”, is limited. The reason for this would lie in the need to place the subject of these attributes together with them, “for it is the subject (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) which is born, suffers corruption, and is marked by qualities (πεποίωται)”.74 Maximus’ interest, thus, is in distinguishing the “collection of properties”, which shows “how” something is, from “what” a thing is, that is, from the essence of a thing, and he assumes we have only a limited means for accessing that essence. However, in drawing the comparison between the subject and its properties, in his examples “being born” and “suffering corruption”, Maximus contrasts these particularized properties with general terms such as “man”, “ox” or “horse”, which according to him would give us further knowledge about the body in question. What sort of knowledge would that be? Maximus suggests that, for instance, these general terms would convey that the topic is about “living beings” (περὶ τὰ ζῶα, that is, in terms of ancient logic, with which Maximus seems to be quite familiar, they would include their superior species. Maximus further explains his thought in terms of ancient rules for predication by associating the general terms (species and genera) with the universals that are predicated of the particular and not vice versa, “for particulars are never predicated of universals, nor species of genera”.75 Therefore, the knowledge of the universals seems to be the key element for grasping the object in question “completely and without remainder” (τελείως καὶ ἀπαραλείπτως).76 However, as is well known from the history of 74  Amb.Ioh.

17, PG 91, 1225A; Constas The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 383. The obvious Peripatetic context of Maximus’ argument is confirmed by his immediate appeal to the rule of the priority of “subject” in terms of predication. 75  Amb.Ioh. 17, PG 91, 1225BC; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 385. 76  Amb.Ioh. 17, PG 91, 1225C; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 387.

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philosophy, whenever the matter at hand turns towards universals, it cannot be easily settled. In Maximus’ case the difficulty emerges from a double concern. Firstly, he seeks to explain the nature of things by means of participation in the logoi, or intelligible principles of reality pre-existent in God’s mind from eternity, a theory which would place him in the proximity of a Platonic theory of “exemplarism” concerning universals.77 And secondly, the problem arises from his opposition to a pure ante rem conception of universals, which is clear from his explicitly stated view that universals actually consist in particulars.78 These two opposing sides of Maximus’ theory of universals have triggered the recent portrayal of Maximus as a defender of “immanent realism”.79 I believe this type of realism, which presents the universal as wholly and fully existent in each individual, receives its impetus from Maximus’ analysis of God as the cause of creation and from his subsequent portrayal of the properties of created beings in terms of their springing from a common generic motion caused by God.80 By this, Maximus implies that the properties of each individual are metaphysically grounded in a unifying and commonly generic capacity or power to move which originates in God as their Cause. That active power complements substance and accommodates itself to all genera and species accordingly, without losing its generic unifying character ultimately

77  See, for details, T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2008. 78  “For if the universals subsist (ὑφέστηκεν) in the particulars, and do not in any way possess their principle of being and existence by themselves, then it is quite clear that, if the particulars were to disappear, the corresponding universals would cease to exist”, Amb.Ioh. 10,   PG 91, 1189CD; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 313. 79  See C. Erismann, “Maximus the Confessor on the logical dimension of the structure of reality”, in The Architecture of the Cosmos: St Maximus the Confessor. New Perspectives, ed. by A. Lévy, P. Annala, O. Hallamaa & T. Lankila, with the collaboration of D. Kaley, Helsinki, 2015, pp. 51–70, and T. Tollefsen, “The Concept of the Universal in the Philosophy of St Maximus”, in The Architecture of the Cosmos, ed. by A. Lévy et alii, pp. 70–93. 80  See S. Mateiescu, “The doctrine of immanent realism in Maximus the Confessor”, in Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity, ed. by E. Emilsson, F. Janby, P. Pavlos & T. Tollefsen , London & New York, 2021, pp. 201–20.

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based on God as its single and actual originator and preserver.81 Maximus claims that all these things represent a good deal of the knowledge that the saints have access to, despite the general human limitations they share in common with human beings as created entities. For example, they are able to comprehend the generic motion of beings as representing “the unvarying essential identity of beings in their particular species”, through which God as source of beings guarantees that they “possess an inviolable and unchanging equilibrium in their natural identity”.82 And by contemplating the same motion as representing the “natural power commensurate with the substrate” of every being, the contemplator gains access to another name of God such as that of a “judge” of creation that is the one assuring “the salutary and differentiated distribution of beings”.83 Maximus’ strict engagement with this differentiation of beings is profoundly based on his dynamic ontology and to that end he even describes substance itself as undergoing motion from the most generic genus to the most particular species.84 As is clear from these examples, these names of God reflect his activity as the creator and preserver of creation. Maximus does not consider them only from the perspective of theology but also from the perspective of ontology. In this respect, Maximus seems to be projecting onto ontology the consequences of seeing God as the actual producer of the world, to the extent that the species and genera are differentiated by true and “constitutive” powerproperties which supply a metaphysical grounding to predication itself. We shall now see how Maximus imports this ontological view into Christology itself and further uses it in a critical reception of the notion of “difference as in natural quality”. 81  Amb.Thom.

5, PG 91, 1048ab, cf. Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 33: “The most generic motion [is] constitutive of species and contains every property that naturally belongs to the essence”. 82  Amb.Ioh. 10.19, PG 91, 1133D; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 205. 83  Amb.Ioh. 10.19, PG 91, 1133CD; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, pp. 205–07. See, for further details, S. Mateiescu, “Providence as Judgment in Maximus the Confessor. Some Christological Implications”, in Pronoia. The Providence of God. Die Vorsehung Gottes, ed. by T. Hainthaler, F. Mali, G.  Emmenegger & M.  L. Ostermann, Innsbruck & Wien, 2019, pp. 351–65. 84  Amb.Ioh. 10.37, Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p.  289: “For it [οὐσία] is moved from the most generic genus through the more generic genera to particular species”

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Christ Is Fully Man. The Argument from Ontology Opusculum 16 is a dense Christological piece in which Maximus is asked to comment on another monk’s definition of will as a power.85 Here, Maximus again draws on Gregory of Nazianzus, this time to distinguish the will (θέλησις) from the willed thing (θελητόν). Maximus intends to secure the idea that will is a natural capacity of every rational being (God including) and hence that there are two wills in Christ, corresponding to his two natures, despite the fact that Christ activates them, and thus wills, unitarily. Maximus supports his argument with the idea that will is “connatural” (ἔμφυτος) and “constitutive” (συστατικός) of the being in which it exists. And in this regard, he wonders how Christ might be considered “full man” (τέλειος ἄνθρωπος), beyond the recognition of the will inherent to his humanity and which the incarnation could not have destroyed. What is striking in this particular argument is the switch from talking about two wills to the discussion of one will, namely that pertaining to the humanity of Christ. Maximus agrees that defining the will as natural is but a strategy to secure the fullness of the humanity of Christ, but he repeats the same strategy when he considers the natural energy of the humanity of Christ, this time revealing that both rely on his ontology of essences and constitutive powers: Πᾶν γὰρ εἴ τι τῶν ὄντων, συστατικὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν, τὴν ἔμφυτον κίνησιν τῷ γένει συμπαραλαμβανομένην, καὶ ποιοῦσαν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τὸν ὁρισμὸν, δι’ οὗ ὅτι ἐστὶ καὶ τί ἐστι κυρίως γνωρίζεται, πρός τε τὰ ὁμοειδῆ τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον ἔχον, καὶ τὸ διάφορον αὖθις πρὸς τὰ ἑτεροειδῆ· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πῶς δυνατὸν φυσικ­ῇ δυνάμει ἀμοιροῦντα κατὰ σάρκα, τὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα Λόγον ἄνθρωπον τέλειον, ἢ ὅλως ἄνθρωπον χρηματίζειν. Every being has the inborn motion that grows together with the genus and produces the definition of the subject as constitutive difference, through which it is properly known that something is and what it is, having, in turn, both the sameness with beings of the same species and the difference from 85  This Opusculum (PG 91, 184C–212A; CPG 7697.16) bearing the full title “On the two wills of one Christ, our God, to Theodore the Deacon”, has been recently dated after c. 641 by M. Jankowiak and P. Booth, “A new date-list of the works of Maximus the Confessor” in Allen & Neil, OHMC, pp. 62–63.

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those heterospecific. And if so, how it is possible to call the incarnated Word deprived of the natural power according to the flesh, complete or whole man. 86

In this fragment, one can easily recognize Maximus’ approach in the Ambigua, as discussed earlier, which proposed that we know the subject of beings through their constitutive properties and not through their particularized properties. Here, Maximus again indicates a strong association between the generic motion and the constitutive differentia, thus granting the latter, otherwise a logical concept, a metaphysical causal power. Ever since Porphyry, philosophers had been accustomed to the idea that a differentiating property can “produce” a species when it attaches itself to the right genus.87 But Maximus goes beyond this by grounding it in a metaphysical account that derives from his analysis of God as creator and preserver of the world. The paradoxical placement of differentia into the genus of motion is meant to ensure its constitutive force of the species and hence to back up the commonality of the specific nature beyond a purely conceptual level.88 The argument closely resembles one that is found in Ambiguum 5, in which this constitutive difference is taken as a “proof” of the humanity of Christ, thus showing that Maximus reasons about Him, as about every other item in ontology. By placing these ideas at the heart of his Christological arguments, Maximus meant to champion the fullness of the humanity of Christ, his will and natural energy, and he thus reveals how deeply his Christology is dependent on his ontology. Notably, whenever he speaks about the two wills and also when he proceeds to the topic of the two energies of Christ, Maximus has almost nothing to say about the divine will or energy. His argument addresses only the human side of Christ as if that would be sufficient to prove the duality of Christ in those respects. As we shall soon see, Maximus is fully aware that the divine lacks any constitutive property because it is without composition. But it seems that precisely on this account, when building in the difference bet86  Op.

16, PG 91, 200BC. Isagoge, CAG 4, 8.15–10.3. 88  See, for details, Mateiescu, “The doctrine of immanent realism”, pp. 214–15. 87  Porphyry,

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ween the two sides of Christ he puts more weight on the human part and its constitutive qualities. The same strategy is visible in Opusculum 3, in which Maximus simply accuses Severus and his followers of stripping Christ of his human nature, against which he wants to establish that Christ is fully man (τέλειος ἄνθρωπος).89 In support of his argument for the complete humanity of Christ, Maximus again provides a close definition of the human will of Christ in terms of the nature’s essential power. He also calls it a vital power (ζωτικὴν δύναμιν) and sees it as constitutive of human nature in general, including that of Christ.90 In this regard, he concludes that the failure to reason about the will of Christ from an ontological perspective results in depriving Christ of a real human will, as Severus did.91 The existential input of the human nature of Christ being thus ensured, it is against this “realist” background that Maximus would deem the properties of Christ portrayed by Severus to be “simple” or “conceptual”. Maximus’ Critique of “difference as in natural quality” In Opusculum 2, addressed to the priest Marinus, the Confessor launches a pointed attack on Severus’ misrepresentation of the Chalcedonian notion of difference as division. He accuses the Patriarch of exactly the same confusion made possible, according to Maximus, by the Miaphysite identification of physis with hypostasis. Maximus’ tone is of course very polemical,92 and this is amplified in this Opusculum by the observation that Severus’ argu89  Op.

3, PG 91, 49B. Dated between c. 640–643, Opuscula 2 (chapter 50) and 3 (chapter 51) (PG 91, 40A–56D; CPG 7697.2–3) have recently been referred to as parts of a single work by Maximus called “On the operations and the wills, to the priest Thalassius”. See, for details, M. Jankowiak and P. Booth, “A new date-list of the works of Maximus the Confessor”, p. 61. 90  Op. 3, PG 91, 49B. It is precisely the lack of this ontological perspective that Maximus imputes to Severus, who would not know that the primary and most proper property of rational beings is motion. 91  Op. 3, PG 91,  49B: Θέλημα φυσικὸν κατὰ Σευῆρον οὑκ ἔχων ὡς ἄνθρωπος. 92  Emmanuel Ponsoye, the translator of Maximus’ Opuscula into French, seems to buy into this polemical tone of Maximus when he (ironically, it seems!) adds the following note to qualify Severus’ argument: “Je laisse à plus savant que moi le soin de la réflexion profonde exigée ici!” in Saint Maxime le

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ment for “difference as in natural quality” was actually meant by Severus to mask his real intention of professing a real difference between the human and divine natures in Christ. It is crucial to observe here that while Maximus is very exact in his wording of Severus’ notion of difference as in natural quality, he also adds the awkward epithet of “ψιλή” to portray it pejoratively as a “simple difference in natural quality” (τὴν ψιλὴν ἐν ποιότητι φυσικ­ῇ ).93 Maximus readily explains that this view amounts only to posing a formal or conceptual differentiation of the natures which in his opinion would “produce their actual confusion” (πραγματικὴν ποιεῖται τὴν σύγχυσιν).94 He openly contrasts this simple difference of qualities with the real or constitutive difference of nature and gives his verdict that Severus openly makes use of falsehood (τὸ ψεῦδος) in saying that “the difference in natural quality is the same thing as the real and natural difference” (τὴν ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ διαφοράν, τῇ πραγματικῇ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν).95 This contrast between difference as in natural quality and constitutive difference thus mimics the opposition of the conceptual versus the real. Obviously, Maximus’ notion of “real” and “natural” quality is the same as the concept of “constitutive difference” for which, as noted already, Maximus does not reserve a place in predication solely but buttresses it with his specific ontology. It is only by reasoning within such a background ontology that one could state that posing only a simple or formal difference (μόνη ψιλή) between the natures of Christ renders them distinct in conceptualization (κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν) only, as opposed to being so “in reality”.96 Maximus is thus right to see the correlation between difference in natural quality and conceptualization in Severus, but he cannot see any justification for it as he is very strict in equating the latter with non-being. Maximus also ventures an explanation for Severus’ deceitful mingling of simple or formal difference and constitutive diffe-

Confesseur, Opuscules Théologiques et Polémiques, Introduction par Jean-Claude Larchet, transl. and ed. by E. Ponsoye, Paris, 1998, p. 127. 93  Op. 2, PG 91, 40AB. 94  Op. 2, PG 91, 40AB. 95  Op. 2, PG 91, 40B. 96  Op. 2, PG 91, 41B.

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rence. He explains that the two could be easily conjoined because all quality is after all natural (φυσικὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν ποιότητα), but warns that posing a difference as (ὡς) in simple quality still does not lead to posing a difference between the natures in Christ themselves.97 On the contrary, Maximus holds, by solely requiring a simple or conceptual difference (ψιλῇ διαφορᾷ), Severus obscures the fact that he actually turns the natures of Christ into nonexistent (ἀνυπαρξίαν) entities.98 It is hardly credible that Severus intended to deny the existence of the natures of Christ. But what seems decisive in Maximus’ twisting of his words in that way is Severus’ avoidance of any reference to the constitutive difference of beings and its ontological import, a notion to which Maximus is strictly committed. Therefore, Maximus’ opposition between the “real” and “conceptual” properties is a direct consequence of his ontology which he also projects onto his analysis of Christ. Difference as in Natural Quality versus Mixed Quality Opusculum 21 contains another harsh critique of Severus’ employment of the difference in natural quality.99 The piece is mainly dedicated to the notions of quality (ποιότης), property (ἰδιότης), and difference (διαφορά), which Maximus explains in a clear proximity to the tradition of the Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories.100 Prior to this explanation, however, the Opusculum starts first by opposing the Fathers’ “brief and condensed” 97  Op.

2, PG 91, 40B. 2, PG 91, 41A. 99  The dating of this Opusculum with the title “On Quality, Property, and Difference, to Theodore, Priest in Mazara” (PG 91, 245D–257A; CPG 7697.21) remains unsettled yet, but see the arguments for placing it between c. 633– 645/6 in M. Jankowiak and P. Booth, “A new date-list of the works of Maximus the Confessor”, pp. 70–71. 100  The same topic though phrased in a more closer language to the Neoplatonic authors Elias and David appears in Maximus the Confessor, “In isagogen Porphyrii et in categorias Aristotelis” in M. Roueché, Byzantine philosophical texts of the seventh century, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik 23 (1974): 70-71 and, B. Roosen, Epifanovich Revisited. (Pseudo-) Maximi Confessoris Opuscula varia: A critical edition with extensive notes on manuscript tradition and authenticity, PhD diss., Leuven, 2001, pp. 901-2. 98  Op.

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(συνεχής τε καὶ σύντομος) account with that of those outside the Church tradition (παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω) that is, the philosophers who employ more distinctions.101 According to the Fathers, quality would have two subspecies, being split into general or substantial (οὐσιώδη) and particular or hypostatic (ὑποστατικὴν). The example the text provides for the former, i.e. “rationality” for humanity and “neighing” for horses betray a possible confusion between rationality as a common instance of a constitutive difference and neighing as a proprium for horses.102 However, the hypostatic qualities such as an aquiline nose, or being dappled or chestnut in colour for a horse, seem to approximate better the particular properties of the philosophical tradition.103 The text, however, does not give further details about this bipartite manner of defining quality and how it is possible to establish its equivalence with the subsequently inserted tripartite classification of quality in “general” (ποιότης καθολικώτερα), “proper” (ἰδιότης μερική) and “constitutive” (συστατικός) qualities, which itself is also derived from the philosophical tradition.104 Given Maximus’ acquaintance with the third technical meaning of quality as “constitutive” of beings, one may reasonably think that in the absence of other similar examples from Maximus, the first part of the text is perhaps an interpolation. However, Opusculum 16 abounds in arguments for the necessary distinction between will as a natural property and the “gnomic” will as the property of the willing person. This suggests that Maximus does not only work in parallel with these two schemes of the classification of quality. Rather, he also takes them as equivalent and often attempts to translate one into the other, as seems to be the case in Opusculum 16’s successive definition of the will as both constitutive and proper (τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τῇ φύσει πρωτίστην οὖσαν φυσικῶν ἰδιωμάτων) to the human species.105 By continuing to exemplify the bipartite traditional account of quality through the general and particular pro101  Op.

21, PG 91, 248B. Isagoge, CAG 12, 17–22. 103  More on the philosophical intricacies about the proprium in Barnes’ comments in Porphyry, Introduction, transl. with a commentary by J. Barnes, Oxford, 2003, pp. 208–13. 104  Op. 21, PG 91, 249C. See, Porphyry, Isagoge, CAG 9. 105  Op. 16, PG 91, 193D–196A. 102  Porphyry,

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perties of God, Maximus implicitly reveals that the tradition inherited by him refers to the top-down theological discourse on God, whose being is not composed and hence lacks any constitutive property. It is likely that this same tradition is shared by Severus of Antioch and Cyril of Alexandria, who emphasize in their approach the simplicity or the non-compositionality of God and thus refrain from submitting the divine to an ontological analysis proper to created beings. Maximus must therefore acknowledge the limits of his ontological approach when it comes to analyzing the divine part of Christ and its properties. However, that would not lead him to the same minimalist account of divinity based on common notions which Severus and Cyril seem to share in common when they talk about the difference as in natural quality in Christ. Maximus indeed first declares that one does not speak properly (κυρίως) about the quality (ποιότης) of God, simply because divinity does not consist of substance and accidents as created beings do. We rather do that “abusively” (καταχρηστικῶς) and only according to our limited power to represent what is beyond us.106 Accordingly, we use the various names of God such as “all holy”, “all-powerful”, “all-perfect”, etc., as if each represented a natural quality (φυσικὴ μὲν ποιότης) of God, and Maximus explains that that is possible because each is applicable to God solely and superessentially (μόνον συμπρέπον ὡς ὑπερούσιον).107 Maximus thus seems to be reasoning that these divine names represent the propria of the divine substance. This helps him to devise his central argument against Severus in this Opusculum that every property must belong to an underlying nature, and thus to distinguish the natural qualities in Christ must result in an affirmation of their underlying natures. But what would be the substitute for that? Maximus shows that Severus’ reasoning, if followed consistently, must lead to a composed quality (μίαν σύνθετον ποιότητα) in Christ which would correspond to a composed nature in Him after incarnation (μίαν σύνθετον φύσιν) that would render Him foreign to the simple and non-synthetic nature of Father.108 But recall that one very similar argument had been composed by Sergius 106  Op.

21, PG 91, 249A. 21, PG 91, 249A. 108  Op. 21, PG 91, 252A-C. 107  Op.

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the Monophysite, who advocated a synthetic yet unique nature of Christ. But we saw Severus deploying many arguments against that view, at the head of which he placed the theory of difference as in natural quality as the best remedy for the “synousiasts”, as he called the supporters of a mixed nature in Christ. Maximus thus appears to be forcing a view on Severus that the patriarch explicitly had rejected. And by making that bold move, Maximus does not seem to be aware that he is implicitly translating Severus’ own argument into a logic of propria that may not be appropriate for the former’s intention with respect to the properties of Christ. Conclusions This paper has investigated the notion of “difference as in natural quality” and its critical reception by Maximus the Confessor in his Opsucula. The argument was devised in two parts: the first part identified a possible conceptual background for this expression in the anti-Eunomian theory of names shared in common by Cyril of Alexandria with Basil of Caesarea. In particular, I have suggested a Stoic rationale underlines these anti-Eunomian arguments and in light of this, the natural quality that both Cyril and later Severus talk about resembles the generic features of objects that get conceptualized by the Stoics by the means of common notions. One important reason for this interpretation consisted in the fact that according to Cyril, the properties of God and humanity devised through conceptualizations do not match with a classic Aristotelian-like division of them into substantial and accidental features of objects. And in like manner with the Stoics, Cyril talks about the difference between natural qualities as obtainable at the level of conceptualization, and not prima facie at the level of beings themselves. I further argued this view was later developed by Severus of Antioch with the explicit anti-Chalcedonian goal to allow for differentiation of generic or common features in Christ and thus avoid any division thereof by placing the differentiated natural qualities at the level of conceptualization. In the second part, Maximus the Confessor’s charge against this Severan idea has been presented within the context of Maximus’ essentialist ontology. I have first identified a parallel positive reception in Maximus of the idea of common notions stemming

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from Gregory of Nazianzus’ treatment of the divine names. However, I argued that the Confessor also identifies the limits of this tool when it comes to the analysis of the human nature per se, which he ascribes to an approach based on universals. Maximus’ metaphysics of motion as based on his remarkable philosophical analysis of the idea of creation was further adduced as an integral part of his theory. It has been shown that in light of this metaphysical advancement Maximus can claim that the universal constitutive properties that define the nature of every species and individuals partaking in it are all composing an ontology covering the whole natural properties of being and from which the human nature of Christ cannot make exception. It has thus been argued that Maximus’ Christology is highly dependent on his ontology and when projected by Maximus against this essentialist metaphysics of properties, Severus’ notion of “difference as in natural quality” becomes deployed of any reality. Several passages from different Opuscula by Maximus highlight Maximus’ interpretation of Severus along a simply conceptual and non-realist approach to the properties of Christ which was probably not intended as such by Severus. This proves once again that still more work is needed to understand the difference in the natural quality of these antagonistic theologies.

Maximus’ Opuscula and the Concept of the Hypostatic Union A Critical Interrogation of the Ontology of Absolute Non-Being Romilo Aleksandar Knežević (Belgrade) God and man are greater than God alone. N. Berdyaev

The scope of this paper is to examine whether the concept of the hypostatic union as developed by Maximus the Confessor is built upon an adequate ontological foundation. As we know, the notion of the hypostatic union is crucial for Maximus’ defence of the integrity of human nature. This is because, as the Church Fathers asserted, nature exists only as enhypostacised, i.e., only in a particular person. This means that the unconfused union of the two natures in Christ is possible only if it is a personal or hypostatic union. So it seems logical that every interrogation into the so-called “integrity” of human nature and hypostatic union ought to start from the concept of person and its presumed ontological basis. A defence of the integrity of human nature in Christ was probably one of Maximus’ most important contributions to theology. Maximus’ Christology was shaped as a critical response to the theology that suggested one will (Monothelitism) and one activity (Monoenergism) in Christ, as a way of making a bridge to the Monophysites.1 Maximus is, furthermore, known as a “Con1  A.

Louth, Maximus the Confessor, London, 1996, p. 48.

Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 161–200.

 



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fessor” because he defended the Orthodox teaching on the Person of Christ, in whom both natures, divine and human, are perfectly preserved.2 In other words, he became a “Confessor” because, by defending the doctrine of the Person of Christ, he safeguarded the integrity of human nature. 3 But before we advance with our interrogation, I need to clarify what I imply by the “ontological foundation” of the hypostatic union. Speaking of creation, as we know, the classical Christian doctrine uses the phrase creatio ex nihilo. So, Paul Tillich concludes that “the first task of theology is an interpretation of these words”.4 To illuminate the nature of the created we need to look into its origin. What exactly is the ontological status of the “nihil” from which God creates the world and the human person? We should be careful not to automatically discard this question as a “frivolous ephemera”.5 It has been suggested that the question of the “nihil” has become pivotal for our time, shaping our contemporary thought.6 Creatio ex nihilo, it is also argued, is a foundational teaching in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It 2  Louth,

Maximus, p. 48. is well known, Maximus was primarily named the “Confessor” because he underwent extreme physical torture in Constantinople in 662. It is suspected that the tongues and the right hands of the condemned (i.e., Maximus and his disciples) were probably amputated and they were sent to Lazica on the southeast shore of the Black Sea, where Maximus died on the 13 August of the same year (662). L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor, Chicago and La Salle, IL, 21995, p. 7. 4  P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, London, 1968, p. 281. Emphasis mine. 5  G. Hyman, “Augustine on the ‘Nihil’: An Interrogation”, Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory, 9/1 (2008), pp. 35–49. 6  I shall mention only a few of the most relevant contemporary works on the issue of the nihil: V.  Burrus, “Nothing is Not One: Revisiting the Ex Nihilo”, Modern Theology 29/2 (2013), pp. 33–48; P. Copan and W. L. Craig, Creation out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration, (Grand Rapids, MI, 2004); C. Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London, 2003); P. Gavrilyuk, “Creation In Early Christian Polemical Literature: Irenaeus Against the Gnostics and Athanasius Against the Arians”, Modern Theology, 29/2 (2013), pp. 22–32; D. O’Brien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter: An Exercise in the Interpretation of the Enneads, Naples, 1991; Creation and the God of Abraham, ed. by D. B. Burell, C. Cogliati, J. M. Soskice, and W. R. Stoeger, Cambridge, 2010; J. Sallis, Chorology: On Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus, Bloomington IN, 1999. 3  As

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states that God created the world out of nothing — from no preexistent matter, no space or time. This teaching is the cornerstone for classical interpretations of divine action, free will, grace, theodicy — in short, the underpinning for any understanding of a scriptural God who is present in history and yet remains the transcendent Creator.7 The issue, however, is not distinctively postmodern, as one may think, since it obviously troubled likewise the pre-modern thinkers.8 Furthermore, the problem of the ontological status of the nihil is momentous because the nature of the nihil is essentially interweaved with the question of God.9 Our view of God, somewhat surprisingly, depends on our understanding of the “nothing”. Gavin Hyman detects this issue in Augustine: For all his insistence on the unfettered priority of God, I suggest that one can discern in his texts a much more postmodern and differential relationship between God and the ‘nihil’. In other words, we shall be led to ask: is the ‘nihil’ possible without God and is God possible without the ‘nihil’?10

It should probably be clear by now that I intend to approach Maximus’ view of the hypostatic union from a contemporary angle. I shall argue that Maximus’ justification of the integrity of human nature, and in particular his view of that nature’s capability to penetrate the divine,11 requires an ontological paradigm shift. The ontological model we are looking for, I will suggest, is closest to the one we find in the work of the twentieth century Russian religious philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev. As for my elucidation of Maximus’ concept of hypostasis, apart from Berdyaev, I also intend to use the work of the noted Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas. I shall argue that both Berdyaev 7  C. Cogliati,

Introduction, in Creation and the God of Abraham, ed. by D. B. Burell et alii, p. 1. 8  “Pre-modern theologians were more mindful of the nihil than their modern successors who, on the whole (and in the interests of the whole), tended to repress it. Augustine, in particular, spent a great deal of his intellectual life wrestling with the idea of the ‘nihil’ and probing its multitudinous ramifications”. G. Hyman, “Augustine on the ‘Nihil’”, p. 35. 9  Hyman, “Augustine on the ‘Nihil’”, p. 35. 10  Hyman, “Augustine on the ‘Nihil’”, p. 35. 11  Louth, Maximus, pp. 189. As we see, Louth translates the term simfyias not as “mutual adhesion” but as “mutual coming together”. Emphasis mine.

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and Zizioulas are drawing, each in his own way, logical conclusions from the teaching of the Confessor. While Berdyaev’s contribution is visible both regarding the issue of ontology and person, Zizioulas input concerns only the latter concept.12 Zizioulas’ development of the concept of person and the notion of freedom as “absolute ontological otherness”13 is momentous, but it is built, just like Maximus’ concept of hypostasis, on an inadequate ontology. In other words, Zizioulas’ ontology remains within the patristic horizon. I will, therefore, argue that both the patristic theology, represented here in Maximus, and the “Neo-patristic synthesis”, exemplified in the work of John Zizioulas, need a new type of ontology to sustain their concept of hypostasis and hypostatic union. It is also important to clarify that what Maximus manages to provide is, in my opinion, a doctrinal “defence” of human nature, but not a theological one. What do I exactly have in mind when I make the distinction between doctrinal and theological? Tackling the question of Christology, Sergius Bulgakov writes that in the Chalcedonian dogma of the duality of the two natures in Christ we find only a dogmatic, not a theological, synthesis.14 “Until the present day”, contends Bulgakov, “a theological synthesis is still being sought by theological thought … despite the labours of St  Maximus the Confessor… The desired theological synthesis in the doctrine of Christ remains something for the future — and in particular of our epoch — to achieve”.15 What Bulgakov implies by the distinction doctrinal/theological is that by arguing that the two natures are united in Christ incon12  In several essays, Zizioulas has been accused of projecting contemporary ideas into the work of the Church Fathers. It is not, of course, within the scope of this essay to engage with this controversy. Nevertheless, my position is unequivocal: both thinkers, in my view, manage to grasp the essence of Maximus’ message and to make inevitable deductions from its premises. Their assumptions, I believe, should be appreciated as the creative development of patristic theology. 13  I assume that Zizioulas’ interpretation of the Maximian concept of freedom as “absolute ontological otherness”, even though the Confessor does not use this exact phrase, is correct. 14  S. Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, Grand Rapids MI – Cambridge, 2008, p. 443. 15  Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, p. 443.

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fusably, unchangeably, indivisibly, and inseparably the Chalcedonian formula expresses a dogmatic position. The four adverbs are underscoring the union, but only from the negative side. In other words, the expressions proclaim that human nature remains inconfused but they fail to offer a theological clarification as to which of this nature’s properties enables its ontological distinctness. We know the Chalcedonian “no” — the natures are not confused, but we don’t know the “yes”16 — what are the qualities of human nature that help her not only to remain distinct but also able to penetrate the divine nature? 17 So, I shall seek to isolate the positive ontological quality of human nature, avoiding identifying it with the lack of being or nothingness. Based on which of its assets is human nature different from its divine counterpart and able to maintain their mutual interpenetration (perichoresis)? What is it precisely that we mean when we talk about the capacity of human nature to penetrate the divine? We can always try to circumvent this problem by taking refuge in the classical view that the otherness of human nature rests precisely in its createdness. But this explanation is vague because we would still need to clarify what is the essence of createdness. Again, we need to acknowledge that our answer depends on our view of the “nihil” as the origin of the world. One of the principal problems Christian theology endeavours to solve is how to avoid the view of every becoming and differentiation as the corruption of the original being.18 Berdyaev believed that this problem — which is essentially the problem of the one and the many — remains unexplained in our epoch and that it torments contemporary philosophy as much as it tormented Greek thought. ‘The problem of the one and the many tormented Greek thought. How is the transition from the one to the many to be made? How

16  Bulgakov,

The Lamb of God, p. 445. about the theological dispute between the school of Alexandria and the school of Antioch, Bulgakov contends that the imaginary character of the problems discussed was exposed by the Church in the Definition of Chalcedon. However, the Definition did not solve them but simply “annulled and abolished them” — for the dogma, but not yet for theology. Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, p. 36. 18  J. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, Crestwood NY, 1997, p. 29. 17  Writing

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These are some of the “theological” questions we need to ask if we hope to achieve the “desired theological synthesis”. But let us return to our initial question. What do I imply by the ontological justification of the “integrity” of human nature and how is this issue related to the problem of the “nihil”, which is the origin of the world? Ontology and Becoming From a Biblical and Christian point of view, the creation of the world should be regarded not as a descent or degradation, but rather as ascension. For Greek metaphysics, as well as for its modern descendants represented in Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel, creation is regarded as a “fall”. The world is a “deduction” or “alienation” that will be eventually abolished in eternal unity. The Judeo-Christian concept of creation as an ascent is supposed to make a radical departure from the Greek metaphysics that is essentially monistic and its implications are of immense importance.20 According to Parmenides, 21 it is in the very nature of being that what shares or participates in it is, while that which does not share, is not. So if all that which is, is being, being must be qualified with unity. Therefore, the cause of its existence is unimaginable because, to cause it, the cause would first need to be. For that reason, the being has no cause and consequently no beginning — it is eternal, foreign to change, and immutable. Any transformation of its structure would entail that something that was not, is now becoming or beginning to be, which is incompatible with the unoriginated character of being as well as the principle of unity.22 In its unity, the being, therefore, is one, but the world of sense we are inhabiting appears to us as many. Not only that in this 19  N. Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom, trans. By R. M. French, San Rafael CA, 2009, pp. 49–50. Emphasis mine. 20  C. Tresmontant, Essai sur la pensée hébraïque, Paris, 1962, pp. 13–14. 21  E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, Toronto, 1952, p. 7. 22  Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 7.

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world there are a variety of elements, not only that these elements are different, but some of them are opposites: light and darkness is a good example. Thus, if we credit the world of sense with being, it will follow that being is neither one, nor homogenous, nor simple, which is by definition impossible. Moreover, particular things are prone to ceaseless appearing and disappearing, to decay and coming to an end, they are characterised by plurality, diversity, mutability, caducity, qualities that are irreconcilable with the definition of being. It follows that, if only that which warrants the title of being is, we have to conclude that the world of multiple must be said not to be.23 Now if with existence we identify the ultimate mode of being that belongs to our ever-changing world, it becomes obvious that there is an unsurpassable difference between to be and to exist. As Plato asks in Timaeus, “which is the being that is eternal and is never born, and which is the being that is always being born but never is?”24 In other words, that which exists is not, just as that which does not exist. Thus, in the very foundation of Western thought, we encounter a premise that, if being truly is, nothing should exist, which is what the modern existentialists labelled as a “disease” of being.25 Again, the creation is regarded as alienation from the original perfection. We recall Berdyaev’s concern: indeed, is there an other that exists for the one? Just like unity, sameness cannot be identical with being, simply because being could no longer be ascribed to two different things: things would either have not to be or not to be different. “In a doctrine where to be is to be the same”, asserts Gilson, “otherness is the very negation of being”.26 If we look at this problem from a slightly different viewpoint, it turns out, somewhat ironically, that otherness is necessary for sameness. Because what does it mean to be the same as itself, than to be different from all the rest? Thus, sameness of necessity entails otherness. And since sameness is identified with being

23  Gilson, 24  Plato,

Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 6–8. Timaeus, 87 d, in Plato Selections, ed. by R.  Demos, New York,

1927. 25  Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 10. 26  Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 11.

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whereas otherness is identical with non-being, we are entitled to say that sameness entails otherness as much as to claim that being presupposes non-being. The unexpected conclusion is that nothing can be that which it is, without being that which is not.27 It is a prevalent conviction that this kind of dialectical and binary ontology — a coincidentia oppositorum — was inconceivable in Platonism and Neoplatonism simply because unity and sameness — a radical opposition to multiplicity — always remain coessential with being. But there is a reasonably different reading of Plato and in particular of his concept of khôra or the pre-existent substratum from which Demiurge is crafting the world. According to this interpretation, khôra is precisely this otherness without which sameness could not exist or the non-being without which being could not be. In other words, khôra appears to be the true origin of being. By being simultaneously independent of the Creator while forming dialectical binarity with Him, khôra breaks the chain of causation, the ontological necessity of unity and sameness, allowing “non-being” to be as much as the being. This is how I understand Jacques Derrida’s words that “what Plato in Timaeus designates by the name of khôra (χώρα) seems to defy that ‘logic of noncontradiction of the philosophers’ … ‘that logic of binarity, of yes or no’. Hence it might perhaps derive from that ‘logic other than the logic of the logos’. The khôra is neither ‘sensible’ nor ‘intelligible’, it belongs to a ‘third genus’ (τρίτον γένος).28 One cannot even say of it that it is neither this nor that or that it is both this and that. The difficulty declared by Timaeus is shown differently: at times khôra appears to be neither this nor that, at times both this and that”.29 27  Gilson,

Being and Some Philosophers, p. 19. Timaeus, Plato distinguishes between being, which is the first kind, becoming, which is the second kind, and the receptacle of generation or khôra, which is the third kind. “Now the third is other than the other two, and indeed one of the things that will prove difficult and obscure is precisely this otherness of the third; almost nothing will prove more difficult than saying the otherness of this obscure third … for one will have to say also that it is a kind of kind beyond kind, a kind of kind outside of kind”. Sallis, Chorology, pp. 98–99. 29  J. Derrida, On the Name, trans. by T.  Dutoit, Stanford CA, 1995, pp. 89. For Derrida, the “logic of binarity” sometimes entails the “logic of exclusion” of the opposites: a thing could be this or that. However, khôra 28  In

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We need to remember Derrida’s interpretation of Plato for our ensuing interrogation. But let us now briefly look at how the question of one and the many develops in Neoplatonism. Trying to escape from the maze of ontological monism, Plato intuited what was much later to be introduced by Plotinus — a principle superior to being. For Plotinus, being finally ceases to be the first principle and its place is taken by the One. The One cannot be a particular thing that shares in unity, but it is not the unity. If the One were but “a certain one, it would not be the One itself; for indeed the One itself comes before what is but a certain one”. 30 Since the One is not a thing, and it can never be a particular thing, we are entitled to say that it is nothing. However, the fact that we call the One “nothing” and the temporal world “something” does not make out of this “something” a positive ontological qualification. On the contrary. As Gilson avers, “the One is nothing because it is too good to be something”. 31 The One is furthermore nothing because, to give something, a cause must be above what it gives. For, if it had that which it causes, it could not cause it because it would be it. The question that Gilson, however, fails to ask here is how the One can cause that which it is not? It is obvious that the One must be different from what it causes to avoid being similar to the effect of its causation. But if the One is different from its effect, what it could communicate is only its otherness, which is nothing but its self-identity. We see time and again that identity entails otherness. In its structure, the One must have what it does not have — its otherness. Its khôra in the Derridian sense. Unless the One in itself possesses otherness, what it could cause is only sameness. It follows that the most important metaphysical problem we need to tackle is, how can the One have that which it does not have? “The question no longer is”, notes Gilson, “to be or not to be, but, rather, to be and not to be. Nothing can be that which it is without, at the same time, not being that which it is not”. 32 could also represent the “logic of participation”: a thing could be both this and that. The way I use the term “binarity” or “dialectical binarity” supports precisely the latter — or the coincidentia oppositorum — interpretation. 30  Plotinus, Enn. V, 3, 12. 31  Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 22. Emphasis mine. 32  E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 19. Gilson interprets the posi-

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The proposition to be and not to be displays the inadequacy of the ontology of unity and sameness. The One needs to have in itself a potency from which it begets otherness. Potency, on the other hand, is always a trace of non-being within being. 33 It seems not only that the potency should be identified with the “nihil”, but also that the idea of creatio ex nihilo springs from a primal intuition about the binary character of the Absolute. Similarly to Gilson’s idea that “in the doctrine where to be is to be the same otherness is the very negation of being”, 34 Berdyaev states: “The one, as absolute, would seem not to permit the existence of an other”. 35 And he proclaims that the “slavery to being is, indeed, the primary slavery of man”. 36 Surely, Plotinus believes that beings are better off if they are not individuated and separated from their source. He fears that in becoming one’s true self one might lose one’s individuality. Those who seek their own identity by forgetting their father end up losing their self. 37 Plotinus writes, Τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχὰς πατρὸς θεοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι, καὶ μοίρας ἐκεῖθεν οὔσας καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου ἀγνοῆσαι καὶ ἑαυτὰς καὶ ἐκεῖνον; Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν αὐταῖς τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ τόλμα καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἑτερότης καὶ τὸ βουληθῆναι δὲ ἑαυτῶν εἶναι. Τῶι δὴ αὐτεξουσίωι ἐπειδήπερ ἐφάνησαν ἡσθεῖσαι, πολλῶι τῶι κινεῖσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν κεχρημέναι, τὴν ἐναντίαν δραμοῦσαι καὶ πλείστην ἀπόστασιν πεποιημέναι, ἠγνόησαν καὶ ἑαυτὰς ἐκεῖθεν εἶναι· ὥσπερ παῖδες εὐθὺς ἀποσπασθέντες ἀπὸ πατέρων καὶ πολὺν χρόνον πόρρω τραφέντες ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πατέρας.  Οὔτ᾽ οὖν ἔτι ἐκεῖνον οὔτε ἑαυτὰς ὁρῶσαι, ἀτιμάσασαι ἑαυτὰς ἀγνοίαι τοῦ γένους, τιμήσασαι τἆλλα καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ἑαυτὰς θαυμάσασαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκπλαγεῖσαι καὶ ἀγασθεῖσαι tion of Dionysius the Areopagite in a similar vein: “Dionysius maintains that God must not be what He gives, in order precisely that He may give it”. Ibid. Gilson is indeed aware of this paradox, which does not mean that he produces an adequate ontology that would support it. It seems that, in the final analysis, he is satisfied with the doctrine of analogia entis. 33  G. Pattison, God and Being, Oxford, 2011, p. 295. 34  Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 10. 35  Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom, pp. 49–50. 36  Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom, p. 78. 37  R. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death, Oxford, 2006, pp. 118–19.

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καὶ ἐξηρτημέναι τούτων, ἀπέρρηξαν ὡς οἷόν τε ἑαυτὰς ὧν ἀπεστράφησαν ἀτιμάσασαι· ὥστε συμβαίνει τῆς παντελοῦς ἀγνοίας ἐκείνου ἡ τῶνδε τιμὴ καὶ ἡ ἑαυτῶν ἀτιμία εἶναι αἰτία. What is it, then, that has made souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are apportioned (μοίρας) from there and wholly belong to him? The starting point of their evil was their arrogance (τόλμα), their birth, the beginning of their differentiation (ἑτερότης), and their willing (βουληθῆναι) to belong to themselves (ἑαυτῶν εἶναι). When they made their appearance here, revelling in this self-determination (αὐτεξουσίωι) and enjoying this self-movement (κινεῖσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν), going against the flow and having greatly distanced (ἀπόστασιν) themselves, they lost sight of the fact that they came from that world (…) So our souls no longer see either their father God or themselves (ἑαυτοὺς); they disregard (ἀτιμάσασαι) themselves and regard everything else more highly than themselves through ignorance of their origin  (…) As a result, their regard for all this and their disregard for themselves (ἑαυτῶν) has become the cause of their utter ignorance of him [God]. 38

However, although he shows a preference for the view of remaining merged with one’s source, Plotinus simultaneously feels attracted to retaining a distinct identity. Firstly, he is keen to answer the question of what makes us distinct from each other. He explicitly argues that our souls are distinct from each other despite being housed in different bodies. These differences in our souls might stem from different principles (logoi), which were present in our parents when we were conceived. Even if our bodies change in the heavens, we could still exhibit our characters (ἔθη) and distinctive behaviour (ἰδιότης τῶν τρόπων). 39 In Ennead 4.4 [28] 5 (11–31) Plotinus writes, Καὶ εἰ τὰ σχήματα δὲ ἀλλάξαιντο σφαιροειδῆ ποιησάμεναι, ἆρα διὰ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν τρόπων ἰδιότητος γνωρίζοιεν; Οὐ γὰρ ἄτοπον. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη ἔστωσαν ἀποθέμεναι, τὰ δ᾽ ἤθη οὐ κωλύεται μένειν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δύναιντο, καὶ οὕτως ἂν γνωρίζοιεν. 38  Plotinus,

Enneads 5.1 [10] 1 (1–17), trans. by B.  Fleet & R.  Sorabjy in R. Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 ad: A Sourcebook, vol. 3, London and Ithaca N.Y. 2004. 39  Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights, pp. 120–21.

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romilo aleksandar knežević Even if they [our souls] changed the shapes of their bodies to spheres, would they not recognize each other by their characters and the particular nature of their behaviour? Although they may have put away their accidental properties, there is nothing to prevent their characters from persisting. Also, if they were able to converse (διαλέγεσθαι) they would recognize each other.40

It is much more difficult to say what differentiates us if we rise to the intelligible world of Platonic Forms. Since this world is outside of time, it contains no memory of the previous life and therefore no ground for the continuity of the self. And yet, Plotinus insists that by shedding our lower concerns we do not lose ourselves but even increase ourselves (σεαυτόν). Still, this does not explain how we remain distinct from each other in the intelligible world. Plotinus has endorsed Forms of individual human souls, but this does not help since he also believes in reincarnation. So the souls, according to Plotinus, retain some individuality even when they shed everything corporeal, but how does this fit with his claim that Socrates might be the reincarnation of Pythagoras (5.7 [18] 1 (1–11)? Are we to understand that Pythagoras is still a different individual than Socrates? And if he is, what then is Socrates’ identity? This, of course, is not the place to discuss Plotinus’ view of individuality in detail.41 I am simply trying to demonstrate that Plotinus, just like Plato before him, was acutely aware of the problem of the ontological integrity of the differentiated individual. But if the Absolute does not permit the existence of an other, how are we to account for the Platonic view of the unoriginated matter? Is it not evident that the pre-existing matter is the Absolute’s other? If the primordial substratum is unoriginated, does this not make Two out of the One? As we know, the idea of the pre-existing and independently existing darkness (which is usually a synonym for the matter), is a part of the Gnostic belief that Plotinus tried hard to eliminate 40  Trans. by B. Fleet and R. Sorabji, in Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators. 41  For an extensive elucidation of Plotinus’ theory of the individual, see R. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights. See also E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus on Intellect, Oxford, 2007.

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from the minds of his followers. Plotinus’ argument is designed to extract from his opponents the admission that the soul “has made matter”, or that matter “follows as a necessary consequence” from principles prior to matter.42 In the treatise On the daimon who has taken charge of us, Plotinus explains that the soul that comes from Intellect generates an “image” of herself, and this image is “absolute indefiniteness”, that “what is not”. To grasp what Plotinus means by “what is not” we need to recall that Plato identifies otherness with non-being. Thus, the matter is “other” than being.43 How should we understand Plato’s view of matter as otherness or as that which is “other” than being? Can we interpret it along the Derridean lines suggesting that khôra is a potent non-being? Perhaps we should accept Plato’s classification of matter as “absolute non-being” or that “what is not in any way at all” — the “contrary to being”? It is argued that non-being also means “not being anything special”, that which embraces everything and means being everything?44 This dilemma pertains to the nuances of the Greek language. The Greek language provided a possibility of distinguishing between two kinds of non-being: first is the dialectical non-being or μὴ ὄν while the second is the non-dialectical οὐκ ὄν.45 Now the important thing is that the οὐκ ὄν is the “nothing” that has no relation to being while μὴ ὄν is the “nothing” with a dialectical relation to being. Plato and his followers identified μὴ ὄν with potential being, with that which does not yet have being but could come into being if it is joint with ideas. But the mystery of non-being remains, for despite its “nothingness” μὴ ὄν has the power to resist union with ideas. Ex nihilo As we remember, the “ontological” question I have in mind pertains to Maximus’ understanding of the doctrine of creatio ex 42  D. O’brien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter; An Exercise in the Interpretation of the Enneads (Napoli, 1991), p. 20. 43  O’brien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter, p. 17. 44  O’brien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter, p. 18. 45  Tillich, Systematic Theology, pp. 208–10.

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nihilo. What exactly, according to Maximus, is the ontological status of the “nihil” from which God creates the world and human person? Christianity established as unquestionable the truth that everything is created not from some formless and bottomless something but from nothing: An omnipotent God could have created the world only ex nihilo.46

God created us ex nihilo and this “nihil” is our origin. What is the “nihil” we are created from and in what kind of relationship does it stand with God? Is it a pre-existing matter or a relative nonbeing (μὴ ὄν), or perhaps an absolute non-being (οὐκ ὄν)? But if the “nihil” implies absolute nothingness, why do we bother to mention it in the first place? How are we to conceptualise something which, precisely because it is nothing, eludes conceptualisation?47 Why would God need absolute nothingness for his creation if this nothing does not exist? On the other hand, if it meant the absolute negation of being, it could not be the origin of the world.48 Perhaps it would be more appropriate to declare that God creates not out of nothing, but out of himself (ἐκ Θεοῦ)? This is what Maximus did when he equated with much nuance ex nihilo and ex Deo, and this is also the case with Irenaeus (a semetipso), Gregory of Nyssa, and Dionysius the Areopagite.49 Furthermore, if we insist that the “nihil” is absolute nothing, does this confirm God’s unrestricted all-mightiness? How do we define omnipotence? Does God’s omnipotency stem from the fact that the structure of the divine being is monolithic, i.e., that in God’s being there is no room for a dialectical relation with a non46  Keller,

Face of the Deep, p. xvi. “Augustine on the ‘Nihil’”, p. 41. 48  Tillich, Systematic Theology, p. 281. 49  P. Blowers, From Nonbeing to Eternal Well-being: Creation ex nihilo in the Cosmology and Soteriology of Maximus the Confessor, in Light on Creation: Ancient Commentators in Dialogue and Debate on the Origin of the World, ed. by G. Roskam & J. Verheyden, Tübingen, 2017, p. 175. See also A. Papanikolaou, “Created for Communion: Vladimir Lossky on Creation and the Divine Ideas”, in Legacy of Achievement, Metropolitan Methodios of Boston, Festal Volume on the 25th Anniversary of his Consecration to the Episcopate, ed. G. D. Dragas (Palmira, VA, 2008), pp. 650–69; J. Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, London, 2008, pp. 89–91. 47  Hyman,

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being? More precisely, is God omnipotent because in Him the fullness of being is pre-eternally realised and there is nothing “out” of Him that still awaits to be actualised?50 Or, is He omnipotent precisely because a kind of non-being is a dialectical part of his being, a non-being that is an infinite potency — omnipotency — from which God continues to create otherness? Indeed, God who creates out of an absolute non-being is not restrained by what already exists, and in that sense, He is free. But this is only a negative aspect of freedom: God is free from using the pre-existent matter, but He is not free to create His absolute ontological other. This is because in Him everything that could ever subsist — already exists. Can we say that God is free if His creature is not ontologically free? So, it is not entirely surprising that this theological move towards obliterating God’s other meets stern criticism. As Keller observes, But Christian theology, I argue, created this ex nihilo at the cost of its own depth. It systematically and symbolically sought to erase the chaos of creation… The author of Genesis, like virtually the entire ancient world, assumed that the universe was created from a primal chaos: something uncreated, something Other, something that a creator could mould, form, or call to order. But Christian theology that early came to dominate the Church could not tolerate this constraint upon God’s power: for why should ‘He’ have had to reckon with an Other  (…) Classical theism created itself in the space of the erased chaos. 51

One could share Keller’s main concern, which stresses that unless an Other is posited alongside God, God could not create His ontological other. On the other hand, it is difficult not to appreciate Christian theology and its motives for erasing the pre-existent chaos and introducing the concept of absolute non-being. Given the need to separate the true God from the Platonistic and gnostic divinities, it is no doubt logical that the emphasis is exclusively on God and his undisputed transcendence and superiority vis-à-vis 50  As Gilson explains, beings always strive more or less to realise themselves, while Being is already fully realised (i.e., Being is actus purus). E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, Notre Dame, IL, 1991, p. 103. Emphasis mine. 51  Keller, Face of the Deep, p. xvi.

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the world. There could be nothing pre-eternally existing together with God because this would be a bifurcation in being — this would create a second God. Is it, however, possible to find a third ontological solution, one that would introduce a “nihil” which is the source of the integrity of human nature without threatening God’s omnipotence; a “nihil”, which is not created by God but is still a part of His being? If the “nothing” were created, this would mean that it is domesticated by God and it could not be God’s Other; it would cease to be the source of otherness. Furthermore, the “nihil” must not be defined in a platonic sense as that which is completed, because it is not its pre-existence that limits God’s freedom, but the fact that by being predetermined it obstructs the creation of an absolute novum. Thus, this “nihil” should be both uncreated and infinite or, if we prefer Berdyaev’s vocabulary — bottomless. Without this third kind of nothing — nothing that is both uncreated and infinite — it is difficult to imagine how we could evade a totalitarian ontology and monism. The nature of the “nihil”, I would suggest, could have been interpreted with more balance, to underpin the idea that in philosophising we need to start neither from God nor from man, but from the theanthropic principle of God-Man. 52 After all, why would we, humans, be more concerned about God’s freedom than with ours? Is this not a subtle symptom of a concealed tendency towards monophysitism? Can a theodicy be genuine if it does not imply an ontological anthropodicy?53 What we have here is two models of radically different structures of God’s being: first, the monistic structure of the fully realised actus purus, which is closely related to the ontology of absolute non-being. Second, the binary posse/esse structure, the

52  I

have coined elsewhere the term “theanthropic” to describe this new hermeneutic method, which as its starting position takes the notion of GodMan. See R. A. Knežević, “A Theanthropic Scrutiny of Nietzsche’s concept of Chaos and Berdyaev’s notion of the Ungrund”, Analogia, The Pemptousia Journal for theological studies, 8 (2020), p. 78. 53  “[Nikolai Berdyaev] suggests that perhaps the only way to write a convincing theodicy is by way of an anthropodicy”. M. Spinka, Nicolas Berdyaev: The Captive of Freedom, Philadelphia, 1946, p. 145.

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dialectical union of not-yet realised and already-realised, which rest upon the ontology of uncreated freedom.54 The question is, whether we can build an ontological justification of the world upon the concept of actus purus, which entails that by creating the world God did not add anything new to Himself, nor would He lose anything by its annihilation?55 Gilson is making a subtle distinction between creation as an effect, to which has been accidentally added a certain similarity with its cause, and creation as analogue, which, in his opinion, is “much more than an effect”.56 Creation is an analogue precisely because it receives its existence and substantiality from its Creator. The creature’s existence and substantiality stem from participation and similitude, but Christian theology endowed these concepts with “much more profound meaning than did the Platonism whence it borrowed them”.57 So what is the difference between Platonism and Christianity regarding these concepts? As Gilson explains, while the matter of Timaeus is simply informed by the Ideas in which it participates, the matter of the Christian theology receives its existence from God. The analogue, therefore, is different from the effect because it receives its existence and substantiality from its Creator.58 However, Gilson is aware of the problems that the concept of the analogue creates. The idea of participation seems unacceptable for logical thinking because it assumes that the participator both is, and is not, that in which it participates.59 But Berdyaev maintains that the idea of God surpasses those antinomies related to the idea of the relationship between the world and God: “For both antinomic theses are equally true: the world in God and the world outside of God”60 Put differently, communion exists only where there is otherness. Every communion or participation — every relationship —

54  See

more about it in Knežević, “A Theanthropic Scrutiny”, pp. 77–87. The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 96. 56  Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 96. 57  Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 96. 58  Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 96. 59  Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 96. 60  N. Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act, trans. D.  A. Lowrie and ed. by B.  Jakim, San Raphael CA, 2009, p. 132. Emphasis mine. 55  Gilson,

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demands two entities. If by creating the world God did not add anything to His being, nor would He lose anything should His creature ceases to exist, can this creature be called God’s true ontological other? What, then, is this creature’s ontological status? If in the act of creation nothing new is added to God’s being, does this imply the identification of differentiation with deterioration and corruption? How can we conceive of a positive concept of creation unless we postulate that to create means to yield more being than there was before? Thus, God and His creature ought to be more than God alone. Berdyaev argues: This is the mystery of Christianity, the mystery of Christ, which is unknown to Hindu mystics, to Plotinus or any of the abstract-monistic mystics. God and man are greater than God alone. The substantial multinomial being revealed in One is greater than a One undifferentiated.61

It seems that only based on a binary ontology are we able to conceive of creation not as God’s temporal analogue but as amplification of Being. This is because, as Berdyaev stresses: The creative act does not create out of nature 62 of the creator … but out of nothing… Every creative act, in essence, is creation out of nothing: the production of new forces rather than the changing or re-arrangement of the old. In every creative act there is absolute gain, something added.63

If in creation nothing radically unprecedented is brought into Being, it seems to be legitimate to question the fundamental difference between creation and emanation. If God’s creativity is not an augmentation of Being, what is it? If it’s not amplification, perhaps it should be interpreted as a preservation of the status quo? But creation does generate an effect: us, humans who are asking these questions. So if that which comes out of God does not make Him larger, and the status quo is ruled out, that which is created could only make Him smaller. Either creation is defined as expansion, or the distinction between creation and emanation is obliterated. 61  Berdyaev,

The Meaning of the Creative Act, p. 130. take that here by “create out of nature” Berdyaev implies “to create out of God”. 63  Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act, p. 128. 62  I

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‘The doctrine of emanation does not know the creative act in God, and hence it does not know the creative act at all — only an outflow. For an emanational consciousness of God and the world, power flows out and is variously dispensed but does not increase. God flows out in His emanation into the world. In Plotinus Divinity is not diminished in its power by the fact that its rays emanate into the world. But a consistent doctrine of emanation must lead to a doctrine of the diminution of Divine power… Divinity is powerless to create a world, but it may become a world. And the divine power emanating into the world must necessarily be diminished and decrease.’64

The Early Christian Doctrine of creatio ex nihilo Let us now return to Maximus and his view of the creatio ex nihilo as it was shaped in the framework of early Christian teaching. After highlighting the views of the most prominent contributors, Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, Irenaeus, and Athanasius of Alexandria, I shall seek to establish Maximus’ either explicit or implicit view of the ontological status of the “nothing”. Then I will proceed with clarifying his view of the hypostatic union and the related notion of hypostasis, inquiring whether his understanding of the “nihil” provides an adequate ontological ground for these concepts. The first attempts to articulate in philosophical conceptions the belief in God who created the world were assumed in the framework of the Hellenistic-Christian mission preaching.65 Early Christians were not equally conscious of the complications of Greek thought which were contained in the Old Testament view of God and creation. It was not before the middle of the second century that the dispute with philosophy was recognised as the pivotal task of Christian thinking. The question arises as to how to reconcile the idea of the God who creates freely and unconditionally with the system of Greek metaphysics. It was within the context of this debate, which started in the second century, that the doctrine of

64  Berdyaev,

The Meaning of the Creative Act, p. 131. Emphasis mine. Creatio ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in early Christian Thought, trans. by A. S. Worrall, London, 1994, p. 1. 65  G. May,

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creatio ex nihilo developed.66 However, it seems possible that some of the early Church Fathers, Irenaeus for example, were not so much interested in developing the philosophical aspect of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. So, in the definitive study of the historical emergence of the creatio ex nihilo,67 Gerhard May notes that “the philosophical arguments with which Irenaeus criticises the gnostic mythology do not arise from a general ontological conception, but are merely directed ad hoc against the heretical doctrines”.68 In its full and correct sense, as an ontological declaration, the thesis of creatio ex nihilo only surfaced in opposition to the idea of world-formation from pre-existing matter. The main purpose of the doctrine was to stress the omnipotence, freedom and uniqueness of God, which inevitably demanded the suggestion that matter also is created by God. This assumption was endorsed almost at the same time by Tatian and Theophilus of Antioch, and soon afterwards with Irenaeus the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo acquired its permanent shape.69 According to Tatian, the creation of the world ensued in two stages: first, God produces the material substratum, which is then by Logos shaped into the cosmos. Thus, Tatian became the first Christian thinker who explicitly supported the view that matter was created by God.70 Theophilus of Antioch rejected the idea of unoriginated matter on the same grounds as Tatian, but his argumentation is more elaborate. Three main arguments are distinguishable. Firstly, if 66  May, Creatio ex Nihilo, p. 2. As I am here focusing primarily on the ontological status of the “nihil”, I shall not go into the details of the historical development of the creatio ex nihilo doctrine. For a detailed historical overview, see May, Creatio ex Nihilo. 67  Keller, Face of the Deep, pp. 15. 68  May, Creatio ex Nihilo, p. 177. Emphasis mine. May continues: “The Platonising proposition that God produced the pattern, the forms and the substance of things out of himself, is simply formed as an antithesis to the Valentinian views about the demiurge’s creation; in itself, Irenaeus’s statement is of no philosophical use”. 69  May, Creatio ex Nihilo 1994, pp. xii, 148. 70  May, Creatio ex Nihilo, pp. 149–50. Tatian’s concept of the matter created by God, however, was still partly ambiguous since for the act of creation he uses the term provalesthe which Valentinians employed to denote the process of emanation.

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the matter is unoriginated, then God cannot be considered as the creator of everything and the divine monarchy is compromised. Secondly, God is unoriginate and therefore immutable. If the matter were unoriginate, it would be also immutable and in a sense godlike. Thirdly, if God created the world out of pre-existent matter this would not be a special achievement since there would be no difference between Him and a human craftsman who uses the given material for his creation. God’s power lies exactly in that He creates out of nothing. Thus, the idea about the creation out of nothing is targeting Plato’s world-formation concept and challenges Parmenides and his axiom “Ex nihilo nihil fit”.71 Irenaeus repeats some of the main ideas from Theophilus, but he stresses additionally God’s unconditional creative ability and sets it against the gnostic as well as the Platonist doctrine of the origin of the world. Probably the best example of his thoughts on the creation of the world comes from the fourth book of the “Refutation and Repudiation”. God has “through himself” created the cosmos and mankind. There were no subordinate powers that acted like demiurges, but God created everything through “his hands”, Word, and Wisdom, which means through the Son and the Spirit.72 Finally, in his On the Incarnation of the Word of God, Athanasius of Alexandria argues against the Epicurean claim that “everything” has had its beginning from itself and independently of purpose, as well as against the Platonic teaching that “God has made the world out of matter previously existing and without beginning”. Athanasius maintains: For if he is not the cause of the matter but simply makes things from pre-existent matter, then he is weak, since he cannot fashion any of the things which exist without matter — just as the weakness of the carpenter consists in his inability to fashion any necessary object without wood. For, according to the argument, unless matter existed God would not have made anything. But how then could he be called Maker and Creator if his creative ability had come from something else, I mean from matter?73 71  May,

Creatio ex Nihilo, pp. 160–61, 163. Creatio ex Nihilo 1994, pp. 168. 73  Athanasius, De Incarnatione 2 in Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. and trans. by R.  W. Thomson, Oxford, 1971, pp. 138–39. On the 72  May,

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Athanasius is also repudiating the assertion that “the creator of the universe” is different from the Father of Jesus Christ.74 He explicitly states that God the Father creates the world through His Son: We also by the grace of God made a few remarks concerning the divinity of the Word of the Father and his providence for and power in the universe: that the good Father disposes all things through him, and the universe is moved by him and is given life.75

Athanasius insists that “out of what was not (ἐκ οὐκ ὄντων) God brought into being the world, which was by no means and in no way existing”.76 By his hyperbolic negations of the origin of the world (which was created “out of what was not”, and out of “by no means and in no way existing”), Athanasius proves that instability and frailty of creation remain axiomatic for him.77 A hypothetical withdrawing of God’s sustaining power would imply an inevitable return of creation to non-existence, and this is all due to the downright negative character of the “nihil”. As we remember, Christian theology introduces the new concept of non-being not only to secure God’s unlimited freedom but also to avoid the view of differentiation as corruption. If the goal, therefore, is to find the right balance between the One and the many, then we should probably agree with those who criticise Athanasius’ picture of the all-powerful God who is boasting “that only weaklings use pre-existent matter” while he can “barely keep his handiwork from unravelling”?78 Indeed, this kind of nothing (οὐκ ὄν) is many, as much as it is the One.79 Or, in other words, the One is many as much as it is the nothing. Maximus’ view of creatio ex nihilo is in no respect different from the patristic tradition. Maximus is also concerned to emphaIncarnation, trans. A Religious of C.S.M.V, Crestwood NY, 1953, p. 27. 74  Athanasius, De Incarnatione 2 (Thomson, pp. 138–39). See also Burrus, “Nothing is not One”, p. 41. 75  Athanasius, De Incarnatione 1 (Thomson, pp. 134–35). 76  Cited in Burrus, “Nothing is not One”, p. 41. 77  Burrus, “Nothing is not One”, p. 42. 78  V. Burrus, Begotten, not Made: Conceiving Manhood in Late Antiquity, Stanford, CA, 2000, (Figurae: Reading Medieval Culture), p. 44. 79  V. Burrus, “Nothing is not One”, p. 48.

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sise God’s superiority over the world, repeating that the Creator does not need any unoriginate material to create.80 The Confessor mentions several times the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Firstly, in Centuries on Charity Maximus tributes God for bringing the existing from nothing,81 and in Ambigua 7 he states that “what exists was brought out of non-being into being by God”. 82 Maximus also underscores that “by his gracious will he created all things visible and invisible out of non-being”.83 Later in the same work, Maximus states that the end or goal of all creatures is God alone, emphasizing the absolute superiority of God to all else. “He is the beginning and cause of all things in whom all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible”. 84 This creates an absolute distance between God and his creature, which is of the utmost importance for his cosmology.85 We have seen how Maximus equated ex nihilo and ex Deo (ἐκ Θεοῦ): “He is the beginning and cause of all things in whom all things were created … all things were created from him and through him and for him”.86 In creation, God places over against himself a creature that is radically distinct and which he wants to bring into union with himself, but in such a way that it does not obliterate the difference. As Lars Thunberg explains, “a sharp distinction and a positive relationship between earthly creation and its creator must go together”, because this is “a double prerequisite” both for Maximus’ Christology as well as for cosmology.87 However, since God creates “out of himself”, it is difficult to say what is the origin of the world’s otherness and its “integrity” and how can the creature be “utterly different” from its Creator. What we don’t find in Maximus’ work, therefore, is a theological 80  Thunberg,

Microcosmos and Mediator, p. 50. Confessore, Car., Critical edition, with Italian translation, introduction and notes by A. Ceresa-Gastaldo (Rome, 1963), p. 194. 82  Maximus the Confessor, Amb.Ioh 7, PG 91: 1077C, cf. N. Constas (trans.), Maximos the Confessor, The Ambigua, Cambridge MA, 2014, 2 vols (DOML 28), vol. 1, p. 94. 83  Amb.Ioh 7, PG 91, 1077C; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 94. 84  Amb.Ioh 7, PG 91, 1077 C; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 94. 85  Thunberg, Microcosmos and Mediator, p. 55. 86  Amb.Ioh 7, PG 91, 1077C; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 94. 87  Thunberg, Microcosmos and Mediator, p. 51. 81  Massimo

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(as opposed to doctrinal) elucidation of the “biblical evaluation of creation in its multiplicity as essentially good”.88 One could argue, nonetheless, that the doctrine of deification developed by the Church Fathers envisions a glorious prospect for the human being, which is certainly true. But what this doctrine does not demonstrate is the role and the purpose of the deified and glorified human nature in Christ and the Trinity. According to Maximus, one of the three concepts that characterise the new state of the rational beings is their passivity in receiving God: Ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ὄντες, ὡς ποιοῦντες εἰς αἰώνων τέλη καταντῶμεν, πέρας λαμβανούσης ἡμῶν κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν τῆς δυνάμεώς τε καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς αἰῶσι τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις, πάσχοντες τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεοῦσθαι χάριτι μεταποίησιν, οὐ ποιοῦμεν ἀλλὰ πάσχομεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ λήγομεν θεουργούμενοι. Existing here and now, we arrive at the end of the ages as active agents and reach the end of the exertion of our power and activity. But in the ages to come we shall undergo by grace the transformation unto deification and no longer be active but passive; and for this reason, we shall not cease to be deified. 89

We may therefore conclude that the doctrine of deification, just like the concept of the hypostatic union, is satisfying from a doctrinal point of view, but what we need to develop is a theological elucidation. As Berdyaev notes, The teachers of the Church had a doctrine of the theosis of man, but in this theosis, there is no man at all. The very problem of man is not even put. But man is godlike not only because he is capable of suppressing his nature and thus freeing a place for divinity. There is godlikeness in human nature itself, in the very human voice of that nature. Silencing the world and the passions liberates man. God desires that not only God should exist, but man as well.90 88  Thunberg,

Microcosmos and Mediator, p. 51. 22, C.  Laga and C.  Steel (eds), Quaestiones ad Thalassium I, Quaestiones I–LV, una cum latina interpretatione loannis Scotti Eriugenae, Turnhout, 1980 (CCSG 7), p. 141. English translation in St Maximus the Confessor, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, p. 117. 90  Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act, p. 84 [the Russian version] Smysl tvorchestva: Opyt opravdaniia cheloveka, Paris, 1991, p. 114. 89  Q.Thal.

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Maximus’ Concept of Hypostasis We need to turn our attention now to Maximus’ concept of hypostasis. Even from Maximus’ early writings, it is clear that for him “synthesis” and not “confusion” is the first structural principle of all creation.91 This is why the question of Christ’s human nature is not only an anthropological issue but also cosmological and ontological because it touches upon the meaning and destiny of God’s entire creation.92 I speak about ontological freedom or freedom to be “other in an absolute ontological sense”.93 Indeed, Maximus himself does not define freedom simply as freedom of will. On the contrary, for him, freedom of will is “autexousion” or the power of absolute self-determination. Maximus maintains: Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τῆς μακαρίας καὶ ὑπερουσίου Θεότητος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γεγένηται· αὐτεξούσιος δὲ φύσει ἡ θεία φύσις· ἄρα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς αὐτῆς ὄντως εἰκών, αὐτεξούσιος τυγχάνει φύσει· εἰ δὲ αὐτεξούσιος φύσει, θελητικὸς ἄρα φύσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος· εἴρηται γὰρ ἤδη, ὡς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον θέλησιν ὡρίσαντο οἱ Πατέρες. And again, if the man was made after the image of the blessed godhead which is beyond being, and since the divine nature is self-determined, then he is by nature endowed with free will. For it has been stated already that the Fathers defined ‘will’ as self-determination (αὐτεξούσιον).94

Maximus builds his ontology and his view of the person upon the foundation laid by the Cappadocians. What was “revolutionary” in the writings of the Cappadocians regarding the concept of hypostasis? The reason why platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy struggled to create an ontology of human individuality, as we have seen, is deeply rooted in its basic principle that being constitutes unity des91  Louth,

Maximus, p. 207. Maximus, p. 207: “Everyone recognizes that his ontology and cosmology are extensions of his Christology, in that the synthesis of Christ’s concrete person is not only God’s final thought for the world but also his original plan”. 93  Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church, New York, 2006, p. 11. 94  D.P., PG 91: 304CD. The translation according to Joseph P. Farell, The Disputation with Pyrrhus of Our Father among the Saints Maximus the Confessor, South Canaan, PA, 1990, pp. 24–25. 92  Louth,

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pite the multiplicity of beings. Every differentiation or individuation, every becoming, is regarded as a deterioration of the being.95 To have a person in the ancient Greek context means to have something accidental to one’s being or one’s true hypostasis. The ultimate ontological category is still “hypostasis” with a meaning of “substance” or “nature”.96 Even in the fifth century, the difference between the terms “hypostasis” and “nature” (φύσις) is not clear. Hypostasis was a metaphysical term and it was considered to have the same two meanings as “ousia” (essence) had, which is 1) “an individual thing” (similar to Aristotle’s first substance), and 2) “that which is common to a group of particulars” (corresponding to Aristotle’s second substance). The Alexandrians used it with the first meaning, and it is in this sense that Cyril speaks of “hypostatic union”. The Antiochenes, however, believed that hypostasis implies the second meaning, i.e., “that which underlies” or “that which is common”. Nature (φύσις) could also embody two meanings that were given to ousia and hypostasis. It was used by Apollinarius, the later Alexandrians and by all the Greek Fathers to mean “an individual” or the “person himself”, while the Antiochenes used it only in the generic sense.97 Hans Urs von Balthasar also stresses the significance of the hypostatic union: A solution to the problem was impossible as long as one was unable to recognize any other dimension of being than that of ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ — the dimension considered by ancient Greek philosophy. For the result of this one-dimensionality was the conclusion that all ‘essence’ (ousia, physis) possessed reality in itself, or was at least the key element, the structure, the law of some really existing thing.98 

Since nature exists only as enhypostacised,99 we need to transfer our investigation from the natural to the personal or hypos95  Zizioulas,

Being as Communion, p. 29. Being as Communion, p. 33. 97  M. E. Butler, The Dyothelite Christology of St Maximus the Confessor, New York, 1994, pp. 40–41. 98  Tunberg, Microcosmos and Mediator, p. 210. 99  V. Cvetkovic, “The Oneness of God as Unity of Persons in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor”, in Maximus the Confessor as a European Phi96  Zizioulas,

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tatic level. This is what Maximus does himself when he speaks about “hypostatic difference”. In Opuscula 13, Maximus writes, “we anathematize Sabellius not for proclaiming the natural unity in the Holy Trinity, but for not declaring the hypostatic difference”.100 We also need to note that the Chalcedonian definition of the mutual indwelling of the two natures in Christ, although mentioning the term person, does not give any further explanation as to how to understand this concept. If Christ is the most significant of all divine mysteries,101 as Maximus claims, it is because he is a Person, a Person that hypostatically unites the two natures. If God is a Triune God, a God who is three Persons, then every theological investigation ought to start by investigating what is meant by the notion of person; that is, to start by trying to solve the “world’s most significant and central mystery”.102 Both the words “person” (πρόσωπον), and “subsistent being” (ὑπόστασις), which the Chalcedonian Definition uses to express the unity of Christ, had already been employed in a Trinitarian context to stress the distinctness of the three members of the Trinity. This is the case especially in the works of the Cappadocian Fathers. Maximus is inspired by the Cappadocians to use one of their ways of elucidating the difference between subsistent being (ὑπόστασις) and nature (φύσις) in the Trinitarian context, but he employs it in such a way that it becomes for him an essential metaphysical distinction. To explain what it is that is distinctive about the hypostasis of the Trinity, the Cappadocian Fathers use the term “mode of existence” (τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως). Maximus, therefore, claims that at the level of being, natures are defined by their principles, meanings or definitions (all of which are denoted by the term logos), but at the level of person we find “modes of existence”. At the level of nature, therefore, ousia, physis, and logos belong together. On the level of the person, on the other hand, hyparxis, hypostasis, and tropos belong together. In further losopher, ed. by S.  Mitralexis, G.  Steiris & M.  Podbielski, Eugene OR, 2017, pp. 304–15 at 312. 100  Op. 13.1, PG 91, 145A. 101  Amb.Ioh 42, PG 91, 1332C; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 2, p. 154. 102  H. U. von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe according to Maximus the Confessor, San Francisco, CA, 2003, p. 212.

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clarifying what he implies by “hypostasis” Maximus is using his “Chalcedonian logic”, distinguishing between the natural level and the personal level. 103 The person is contrasted to nature because it is about the way we are (the mode or τρόπος), and not what we are (principle or λόγος). Maximus expresses this distinction by differentiating between existence (ὕπαρξις) or subsisting (ὑφιστάναι) and being (οὐσία or εἶναι). In other words, persons exist, natures are. What we share with other people is our nature or what we are, but what we do not share and what belongs to our person is how we are.104 Hence, the distinction between the natural and the personal becomes one of the most prominent features of Maximus’ metaphysics, especially significant for his exposition of the doctrine of Christ.105 In a Trinitarian framework, nevertheless, Maximus employs these distinctions with some caution. Thus, trying to elucidate the movement in the Trinity, he writes: Μονὰς γὰρ ἀληθῶς ἡ Τριάς, ὅτι οὕτως ἐστί, καὶ Τριάς ἀληθῶς ἡ μονάς, ὅτι οὕτως ὑφέστηκεν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ μία θεότης οὖσά τε μοναδικῶς, καὶ ὑφισταμένη τριαδικῶς. Εἰ δὲ κίνησιν ἀκούσας ἐθαύμασας πῶς ὑπεράπειρος κινεῖται θεότης, ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἐκείνης τὸ πάθος, πρῶτον τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον αὐτῆς ἐλλαμπομένων, καὶ οὕτω τὸν τοῦ πῶς αὐτὴν ὑφεστάναι τρόπον φωτιζομένων, εἴπερ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ πῶς εἶναι πάντως προεπινοεῖται. Κίνησις οὖν θεότητος ἡ δι᾿ ἐκφάνσεως γινομένη περί τε τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὴν καὶ τοῦ πῶς αὐτὴν ὑφεστάναι τοῖς αὐτῆς δεκτικοῖς καθέστηκε γνῶσις. For the triad is truly monad, because thus it is, and the monad truly triad because thus it subsists. Thus, there is one Godhead that is as monad and subsists as triad. If, hearing of movement, you wonder how the Godhead that is beyond infinity is moved, understand that what happens is happening in us, and not to the Godhead. For first we are illuminated with the reason [logos] for its being, then we are enlightened about the mode in which it subsists, for we understand that something is before we understand how it is. Therefore, movement in the Godhead is constituted by the knowledge about

103  Louth,

Maximus, p. 57. Maximus, p. 59. 105  Louth, Maximus, pp. 50–51. 104  Louth,

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that it is and how it subsists that comes about through revelation to those who receive it.106

Obviously, for Maximus nature exists only as enhypostacised (there is no nature in “naked”),107 and hypostasis or person seems to have ontological primacy over nature. In Christ, the general exists only in the particular and this is why the particular acquire ontological primacy. The being of the hypostasis, it is suggested, is to be viewed in the tension between the logos of nature and the mode of existence. The term mode of existence denotes a variety of different concretizations of nature.108 In Christ, the two natures provide their qualities to the person without making the person dependent on these qualities. The natural qualities are not something external to the person, but by being enhypostacised they become dependent on the hypostasis. The conclusion is that the cause of the being is particular, and not the general.109 However, this does not abolish the dialectical relationship between nature and person since as much as nature is preconditioned by hypostasis so is hypostasis by nature. In Opusculum 16 Maximus writes: κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἁγίων παράδοσιν καθ᾿ ἣν τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ποιεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἐνυπόστατον· ἵνα μὴ ὡς συμβεβηκός, ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ λαμβάνηται, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς εἶδος πραγματικῶς θεωρῆται. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνούσιον, οὐκ οὐσίαν ποιεῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐνούσιον παριστᾷ, ἵνα μὴ ψιλòν ἰδίωμα ταύτην, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἰδίωμα κυρίως γνωρίζωμεν. in accordance with the tradition of the holy fathers, according to which the fact that no nature is without hypostasis does not make it into a hypostasis but rather into something hypostatized (ἐνυπόστατον), so that it should not be conceived simply as a property that can only be distinguished [from the hypostasis] in thought, but rather is recognized as a form (εἶδος) in fact (πραγματικῶς). In the same way, also the fact that a 106  Amb.Thom. 1, PG 91, 1036C. English translation in Louth, Maximus, p. 168 and Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 8. 107  “no nature exists as a ‘naked’ nature, but always in a particular ‘mode’ or tropos”. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, p. 25. 108  T. T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2008, p. 131. 109  Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, p. 109.

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romilo aleksandar knežević hypostasis is not without its essence does not make the hypostasis into an essence but shows it to be essential (ἐνούσιον); in order that we would truly know that the hypostasis is not a mere quality, but that it exists together with that in which the quality is (grounded).110

What was necessary for the radical change in our understanding of the world and the being of the human so that they both would be justified ontologically? According to John Zizioulas, the most important amendment was the identification of the person with the ontological and eschatological identity of the human being. It was the Cappadocians in their wrestling with the problem of Trinitarian theology who provided this prerequisite.111 The full scope of the philosophical “revolution” is perceived only when we know that the term ὑπόστασις was never connected to the term “person” in Greek philosophy. For the Greeks, ὑπόστασις would have any other connotation but that of the essence of the human being, and it was eventually identified with the concept of “substance” or οὐσία. Zizioulas gives a brief account of the “revolution” and its deeper significance that involves a twofold thesis: (a) the person is not something added to a particular being with an already established ontological hypostasis; the person is itself the hypostasis of the being, that is, there is no being unless the substance or ousia is hypostasized. (b) Thus, being ceases to be a fundamental ontological category and the source of other entities; it is replaced now by the person who becomes the constitutive element of beings.112 This radical break in Greek ontology was prepared by what Zizioulas names as the two basic “leavenings” in patristic theology. The first concerned the deconstruction of the absolute cosmological necessity by the introduction of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, which means that the world was no longer considered as co-eternal with God thus limiting divine freedom; God’s free decision is now the source of the world, and the world is a product of freedom.113 110  Op.

16, PG 91, 205A-B. Italics are mine. Being as Communion, p. 35. 112  Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 39. 113  Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 39. 111  Zizioulas,

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The second “leavening” represented even further reappraisal of the monistic ontology. It was not enough to argue that the being of the world is traced back to freedom, but that the being of God was a result of a free person, the Father. Since the source of the divine being is the Father’s person, the unity of God was no longer in the one substance of God, but in the free person of the Father.114 Maximus proposes to reconcile participation in the divine life and freedom of creation through the Logos as a personal principle. Key to Maximus’ ontology is his idea of the logoi of beings according to which every being has its logos or particular identity.115 Without its particular logos, the being would cease to exist. However, Maximus distinguishes between difference (διαφορὰ) and division (διαίρεσις), which means that difference does not necessarily lead to division. How can communion and otherness coincide in an ontology according to Maximus? In Maximus’ view, the Logos is not conceived as an impersonal nous, but as the Son, the second Person of the Trinity. This means that the gap between God and creation is bridged in a personal or hypostatic manner, that is, in the hypostatic union of the divine and human nature. The idea of “hypostatic union” requires, furthermore, an ontology that is based not on the nature of beings (on what the beings are), but on the “way of beings” (on how they are). For this purpose, Maximus makes the distinction between logos and tropos. In other words, in every being there is a permanent aspect and an adjustable one. In the framework of the Incarnation, thus, the logos physeos or the logos of nature remains fixed whereas the tropos hyparxeos or the mode of being is adjusted to allow for unity and freedom. Zizioulas explains that this amounts to a “tropic identity” or to an ontology of tropos, of how things are. 114  Zizioulas,

Being as Communion, pp. 40–41. doctrine of the logoi is one of the most intriguing aspects of Greek patristic thought. The logoi are the “inner essences of things”. The origin of this doctrine lies at the confluence of the two strands of Greek thought: Plato’s Timaeus and Philo’s On the Making of the World. See more about it in D.  Bradshaw, “The Logoi of Beings in Greek Patristic Thought”, in Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature, and Creation, ed. by B.  V. Foltz & J.  Chryssavgis, New York, 2013, pp. 9–22. 115  The

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romilo aleksandar knežević We are dealing here with two kinds of identity. The first one implies natural otherness, and in itself and by itself, that is, as substance or nature per se, allows for no possibility of communion. The second one concerns not nature per se, its logos, but the way it relates, its tropos, and it is this that makes communion possible… It is because of and through their tropos that the divine and the creaturely natures can unite since it is the tropos that is capable of adjustment. The substance is relational not in itself but in and through and because of the ‘mode of being’ it possesses.116

Maximian ontology is not only an ontology of logos but also an ontology of tropos: God and the world are united while preserving their otherness only in the person of the divine Logos. As we shall see shortly, according to Maximus, “it is a person that makes this possible because it is only a person that can express communion and otherness simultaneously”117 This point is of crucial importance and requires special attention. We are focusing on the question, which particular quality of person makes possible simultaneous expression of communion and otherness? What does it mean that the person is capable of adjusting its mode of being, preserving unity and particularity? Maximus asserts that each being has different hypostasis by the logos of personal otherness. πάντες δὲ τὸν ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπιδέχονται τῆς οὐσίας ὅρον τε καὶ λόγον. Ἑτεροϋπόστατα δέ, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς αὐτὰ διακρινούσης προσωπικῆς ἑτερότητος, καθ᾿ ὃν ἄλλος ἄλλου διακέκριται, μὴ συμβαίνοντες ἀλλήλοις τοῖς καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασιν· ἀλλ᾿ ἕκαστος τῷ κατ’ αὐτὸν ἀθροισμῷ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων ἰδικώτατον τῆς οἰκείας καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν ἐπιφέρεται λόγον· καθ᾿ ὃν τὴν πρὸς τὰ ὁμοφυῆ καί ὁμοούσια κοινωνίαν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται. Although some beings share the same essence and are consubstantial by the logos of the essential community, on the other hand, they are of different hypostases (ἑτεροϋπόστατα) by virtue of the logos of personal otherness, which distinguishes one from another. The hypostases do not coincide in their characteristic distinguishing marks, but each one by virtue of the sum of its characteristic properties bears most particular logos of its own hypostasis, and in accordance with this logos

116  Zizioulas, 117  Zizioulas,

Being as Communion, p. 25. Being as Communion, p. 29.

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it admits of no community with those that are connatural and consubstantial with it.118

It is the most particular logos of hypostasis that distinguishes one being from another. Without the logos of personal otherness, the being would not live in communion, because communion entails otherness. There would be no synthesis in the relationship between beings but only confusion. It follows that a hypostasis, if it is “absolutely other in an ontological sense”, also needs to have a radically unique expression and actualisation of one’s otherness. Living according to one’s most particular logos means adjusting one’s mode of being and preserving one’s otherness. One’s otherness is one’s unique identity or logos in the state of potentiality. Otherness has to be manifested because the self needs to be relational.119 As manifested, the uniqueness of the self appears as a radical newness, if we wish to be consistent — even for God. Maximus’ claim that the Logos is many logoi and the many logoi are one Logos overcomes monistic ontology on the doctrinal level, but on the level of theology, it remains monistic. If we wanted to overcome monism theologically, we would need to argue that the uniqueness of each created logos (which I identify with the self), as manifested represents an absolute novum in being — a newness even for the Logos. To act according to one’s radically inimitable logos means to offer to the other something new and incomparable, to enrich and amplify him. Divine and human nature cannot remain in a synthesis, unconfused, unless the hypostasis, in which nature is enhypostasised, possesses, and lives according to, one’s most personal logos.120 In Opusculum 7 Maximus writes: 118  Ep. 15, PG 91, 552B-C. Cited in M.  Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2007, p. 61. 119  “When I say, not that I am, but that I exist… I glimpse more or less obscurely the fact that my being is not only present to my own awareness but that it is a manifest being. It might be better, indeed, instead of saying, ‘I exist’, to say, ‘I am manifest’. The Latin prefix ex — meaning out, outwards, out from — in ‘exist’ has the greatest importance”. G.  Marcel, Mystery of Being, Chicago IL, 1960, pp. 111–12. 120  About Maximus’ view of the logoi, see A. Louth, “St Maximos’ Doctrine of the logoi of Creation”, SP 48 (2010), pp. 77–84. Also, V. Cvetković, “‘All in All’ (1 Cor 15:28): Aspects of the Unity Between God and Creation

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romilo aleksandar knežević Εἶτα, ὡς ἔδειξε τὰς φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συγκειμένου Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, σωζομένας τελείως· τὴν τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ, διὰ τοῦ παντουργοῦ προστάγματος, τὴν δὲ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτοῦ, διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς· παρέστησε ταύτας ἡνωμένας διόλου τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλας συμφυΐᾳ καὶ περιχωρήσει. Then, as he showed that the natural energies of Christ the God, who is composed of both, are perfectly preserved, that of his Godhead through the almighty command, and that of his humanity through the touch, he proves them to be thoroughly united by their mutual coming together and interpenetration.121

If we read this paragraph on a personal level, it follows that by being absolutely other in an ontological sense, the human hypostasis is capable of penetrating the divine hypostases. Being penetrated by the human person, the divine hypostases receive something fundamentally new, something radically other, by which they are enlarged and augmented. This, however, would imply that the person cannot be created ek theou since God can give only what He possesses. God cannot give what He does not have — something that does not exist in his Being — so if He creates out of Himself, he is unable to create an ontological other. The logoi, according to Maximus, are a part of God’s mind. Παρ᾿ ᾧ βεβαίως πάντων οἱ λόγοι πεπήγασι καθ᾿ οὕς καὶ γινώσκειν τὰ πάντα πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν λέγεται, ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ παρ᾿ αὐτῷ ὄντων, αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῶν πάντων. Κἂν εἰ αὐτὰ τὰ πάντα, τά τε ὄντα καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα, οὐχ ἅμα τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις, ἢ τῷ γνωσθῆναι ὑπὸ Θεοῦ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρήχθησαν, ἀλλ᾿ ἕκαστα τῷ ἐπιτηδείῳ καιρῷ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ σοφίαν πρεπόντως κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν λόγους δημιουργούμενα καὶ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ λαμβάνῃ. The logoi of all things known by God before their creation are securely fixed in God. They are in him who is the truth of all things. Yet all these things and things to come, have not been brought into being contemporaneously with their being According to St Maximus the Confessor”, Analogia. The Pemptousia Journal for Theological Studies, 2/1 (2017), pp. 13–28. 121  Op. 7, PG 91, 85C–88A. English translation in Louth, Maximus, p. 189. As we see, Louth translates the term συμφυΐᾳ not as “mutual adhesion” but as “mutual coming together”. Emphasis mine.

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known to God; rather, each was created in an appropriate way according to its logos at the proper time according to the wisdom of the maker, and each acquired concrete actual existence in itself.122

But if the logoi are known by God before their creation and if they are “securely fixed” in His mind, they cannot be the source of otherness. If God creates using the logoi as models, He can only repeat Himself in the created realm. However, Maximus believes that to be created according to the Logos of God means something exactly opposite to being a mere repetition; it means to be created according to one’s own particular logos. 123 Again, it is obvious that Maximus’ claim is doctrinal, and not a theological one. For, how can the created logos be “particular” and unique if it is known, i.e., determined by God before its creation? There is, nonetheless, another, equally important aporia. Maximus affirms the priority of the logoi to that of which they are the logoi.124 God “held together in himself the logoi before they came to be”,125 which means that the logoi of all things are created in accordance with the eternal logoi. But he immediately adds that “by his gracious will he created all things visible and invisible out of non-being”.126 Perhaps for Maximus, the phrase “out of non-being” is simply a rhetorical figure meant to entail “out of Himself” or “out of the logoi”? But, as Louth notes, this raises an acute question as to the status of these logoi. Because “if they are not created, they must be ‘uncreated’. Must they, therefore, be identical with God?”.127 Although unlike Platonic Forms the logoi are “in” God’s mind they are still “uncreated” and as such seem to be entities independent of God. If they are “uncreated”, however, how can we avoid the conclusion that they are limiting God’s absolute freedom? Certainly, they are. So, the creatio ex nihilo was inaugurated to liberate God from the external pre-existing substratum, but there is something in God that is also eternally co122  Amb.Ioh

7, PG 91, 1081A; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 98. “St Maximos’ Doctrine of the logoi”, p. 82. 124  Louth, “St Maximos’ Doctrine of the logoi”, p. 82. 125  Amb.Ioh 7, PG 91, 1080A; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 94. 126  Amb.Ioh 7, PG 91, 1080A; Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, p. 94. 127  Louth, “St Maximos’ Doctrine of the logoi”, p. 82. 123  Louth,

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existing, i.e., something not created by God — the logoi. Even if we understand them as an integral part of God’s mind — that which is not external to God — is God free to create without using the logoi? He is not, because God always creates out of Himself, and when He does this, He has to use the logoi. It seems that struggling to eradicate the external limitations of unoriginate matter and embracing the notion of absolute non-being, patristic ontology becomes captive of its freedom. So, the logoi are “uncreated” in the sense that they are a part of God’s mind. But since they are identical with God (we cannot assume that Maximus would have thought them not to be identical), they are not “uncreated” in the sense that they possess absolute ontological otherness, which means that they could not be regarded as God’s other. And if they are not God’s other, it follows that when God creates using the logoi He repeats Himself in creation. But, as we know, this is in stark contrast with the “terrifying ontological ultimacy” of the person. Zizioulas arrives at an unavoidable assumption that the person, “in its terrifying ontological ultimacy”,128 must be “uncreated”, that is, unbounded by any “necessity, including its own existence”.129 Only theology can treat of the genuine person, because the authentic person, as absolute ontological freedom, must be ‘uncreated’, that is, unbounded by any ‘necessity, including its own existence.’130

Nonetheless, since the human person is not “uncreated”, the concept of the hypostasis as absolute ontological otherness proves to be implausible. We could argue, nevertheless, that the person is “uncreated” if by “uncreatedness” we imply that despite being created the person is not ontologically determined. Each person would need to have something that no other person, including the Creator, does not possess. This is conceivable only if we assume that God does not create “out of Himself” (that is, out of the logoi). God needs to create out of something that is “outside” of Him. Can we conceive of the third kind of non-being — a non128  Zizioulas,

Communion and Otherness, p. 235. Being as Communion, p. 43. Italics added. 130  Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 143. 129  Zizioulas,

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being that while being “outside” of God is still in a sense “in” God? A non-being that would allow us to see the person as simultaneously created and uncreated (non-determined)? The integrity of the world, as seen, is incumbent upon the ontological status of the “nihil”, which is the world’s origin. Platonic “nihil” or the unoriginate matter is only informed by Ideas, which implies that the world, which is formed out of this matter, can never be transformed in its fullness: it is only a reflection of the “real” world of Ideas. The Christian world, on the other hand, is not simply informed by that which is “real” — God — but it receives its existence from God. This is possible because the “nihil” or the matter from which the world is created does not resist God’s transformative act. Christian “nihil” cannot be something extraneous to God for the simple fact that it does not exist. Because it is only informed by Ideas, the Platonic world is an effect to which only an accidental similarity to the cause is added. The Christian world, allegedly, is “much more” than an effect because similarity with the cause is substantial: the analogue receives its existence from the cause. Now we may or may not agree with this subtle argumentation of Gilson’s, but what seems to be indisputable is that in this ontological equation God remains the all-determining cause, similar to the Absolute that does not seem to permit the existence of an other. Hence, since it does not allow of otherness, in all its varied forms the ontology of the absolute non-being permits only repetition. For example, speaking about the creation of the world Sergius Bulgakov is bound to use the verb “repeat”: “God repeated Himself in Creation, so to speak”.131 Bulgakov then adds another verb, which implies that creation was an act of duplication and repetition: “He reflected Himself in nonbeing”.132 Being unable to support theologically the uncreatedness of the human person, Zizioulas realises that he is bound to deny his initial position and to revoke the person’s absolute ontological freedom. He tries to avoid this, but he uses in my opinion an unsustainable argument. He argues that the unique and undetermined human person exists because the uncreated, Christ’s person exist. 131  Bulgakov, 132  Bulgakov,

The Lamb of God, p. 126. The Lamb of God, p. 126. Emphasis mine.

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romilo aleksandar knežević the authentic person, as absolute ontological freedom, must be ‘uncreated’, that is, unbounded by any ‘necessity, including its own existence’. If such a person does not exist in reality, the concept of the person is a presumptuous daydream. If God does not exist, the person does not exist.133

It is not clear how Christ as an uncreated person could bestow the quality of uncreatedness and ontological uniqueness to a particular human person. In other words, how could Christ possibly give something he does not possess — the other person’s uniqueness? To be ontologically unique of necessity implies a possession of a personal logos that belongs solely to that particular person, making her distinct from all other persons. Zizioulas could overcome this contradiction only by making a radical shift from the classical patristic and Maximian view of the divine omnipotence. This would result in an ontology that permits absolute ontological otherness of the human person — the person would be conceived as possessing something of her “own”, something that, although it is given to her is not created and determined by the Creator. Zizioulas does not seem to be prepared to make this major paradigm shift and is forced to admit eventually that the human person cannot escape the “tragic paradox of presence-inabsence”.134 In other words, human freedom is a potency that can never be actualised in history because this world, just like its Creator, is complete and nothing new could be added to its being.135 Conclusion Probably the most important difference between the Platonic Creator and the Christian God pertains to the question of divine freedom. Plato’s Creator is more of a Maker who is shaping the pre-existent substratum using eternally co-existent Forms. His freedom is limited by primordial matter and Ideas. So, we need to 133  134  Zizioulas,

Communion and Otherness, p. 229. have to notice here an interesting similarity between the Platonic and the Christian world. Although both worlds are finite, i.e., limited in time and space, there is no assumed unlimited void outside and there are no any materials left over. See F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, London, 1935, p. 42. 135  We

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note that divine freedom is identified with freedom of creativity. Christian theology claims that God is free because He can create ex nihilo or out of absolute non-being. In other words, God is free because He is free from external constraints. But it would make little sense to claim that God’s freedom is exhausted in this freedom from. Indeed, we understand that God is free from having to use unoriginate matter, but He is free from to be free for creating something. Freedom is not complete without its positive aspect or freedom for. What is God’s freedom for or what is the positive goal of the divine creation? What should be the outcome of God’s creativity so that we can say that God is a free Being? Is God sovereign because He can repeat Himself in the creation? He is certainly not, because the fact that He repeats Himself indicates that He is unable to overcome the necessity of His nature. God’s inner necessity are uncreated logoi of all things according to which He creates. While the Forms were external to Platonic deity, the logoi are in God’s mind. But being uncreated, the logoi seem to be independent entities from God, limiting His freedom just like if they were outside of Him. To ask if God can create without using the logoi seems equally pointless as to ask if He can create otherwise but from Himself. Where else would He create from? The positive result of God’s creativity has to be something opposite to God’s repeating Himself in the world. Opposite to repetition is the creation of an absolute novum in being. In “its terrifying ontological ultimacy”, the person needs to be “uncreated” or unbounded by any form of necessity, including God. The uniqueness of the person is the ultimate proof of God’s freedom not to repeat Himself in creation. God is free only if His creature is also free. God can create something that He is not — His absolute ontological other — if He creates out of uncreated freedom. Uncreated freedom is God’s nature or the bottomless nihil. Being uncreated, divine nature is “outside” of God in the sense that its infinite potency can never be exhausted or domesticated by God. When we talk about God we talk about nature and hypostases. So, we admit a binary structure of God’s being. But then, as if frightened not to compromise God’s omnipotency,136 we eradicate 136  Keller detects a “tehomophobia” (a term coined from the Biblical t ehom — “abyss”, Genesis 1.2) in the mainstream theology of creation. She argues

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the very source of this potency — nature itself — by stressing that it does not contain any “material” left that is not already used by God. And since in God there is no “before” and “after”, we need to admit that the content of nature was “always”, that is, pre-eternally exhausted. Thus, God’s all-mightiness seems to be unable to accept any other power, including the power of its nature. If, however, we assume that nature is the bottomless source of God’s potency, we could accept that nature is also “in” God. God does create out of something external, but this external reality, since it does not limit Him, is at the same time dialectically “internal”, enabling Him to be the Creator or the One who never repeats Himself

that the tehomophobic imaginary does not entail but prepares the way for the creatio ex nihilo. Cf. Keller, Face of the Deep, p. 26.

The Problem of Identity in St Maximus’ Opusculum 14 A Philosophical Analysis Miklós Vassányi (Budapest) In this paper I am intent on canvassing and interpreting the several modes of human and divine identity in some of the theological ‒ more specifically Christological ‒ opuscles of the great Byzantine mystic, Confessor and Church Father, St Maximus († 662). First off, my query regards the logical terms by which Maximus conceives of the unification of the divine and the human natures in the person of the Christ. Second, I want to look into how the personal (hypostatic) union compares to the unity of the Holy Trinity, as defined by the Confessor. This quest promises to provide deeper insight into Maximus’ concept of God and into the relationship he establishes between God and man. Since this issue has a bearing on Maximus’ theology of redemption at large, I shall be trying to chart his soteriological presuppositions and intuitions as a final upshot. 1. Sources In terms of sources, we are chiefly concerned with five texts of the Opuscula theologica et polemica. These are, arranged in a plausible chronological order of composition,1 Op. 13: On the Two Natures 1  Datation

on the basis of M. Jankowiak & P. Booth, “A New Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC,  pp. 19‒83; especially pp. 34‒35, 60, and 64. For an earlier, classic reconstruction, see also P. Sherwood, An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor. Romae, 1952. (Studia Anselmiana, fasciculus 30). Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 201–214.

 



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of Christ (“date indeterminable, but perhaps before 633/4”); Op. 14: Various Definitions (“probably before 633/4”);2 Op. 18: Definitions of Unions (“date after 633/4”); Op. 6: On “Father, if it be Possible, Let this Cup Pass from Me” (“c.  640–641?”); and Op. 5: Three Answers to those who Profess One Operation in Christ (“probably post-645”). It is known that via these treatises, pamphlets and lists of definitions, Maximus contributed to different phases of the theological struggle against monoenergism and monothelitism. Though distant from each other in time, these pieces mostly belong into the first part of Maximus’ life, that is, to the period preceding the dispute with the ex-Patriarch of Constantinople, Pyrrhus (July 645) and the Lateran Synod (649). But a stronger link among them is Maximus’ intention to logically disentangle some crucial concepts in Christology and theological anthropology. They especially want to pinpoint the areas, species and degrees of Identity and Difference in three domains: 1. Trinitarian theology; 2. Christology; and 3. the human nature. 2. Conceptual Hubs of the Opuscula In the course of the discussion, Maximus takes the utmost care to establish clear-cut logical distinctions between relevant concepts and keep the discussion within the boundaries of Chalcedonian orthodoxy. In doing so, he is pushing forward into a literally infinite horizon. Identity and difference within the Trinity are endless queries once summarily settled in the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creeds, then discussed at length, centuries before the Confessor, by the Cappadocian Fathers as well as by St Denys the Areopagite, to name only some of the most evident examples. It is enough to point to St Gregory of Nyssa’s Great Catechism and his treatise addressed To the Greeks on Common Notions; to St Gregory of Nazianzus’ 30th and 31st Orations (that is, the 4th and 5th Theological Orations), and the first two parts of St Denys’ On the Divine Names. Other than that, the grand topic of Identity and Difference, examined in a fundamental ontological horizon, had already been part and parcel of Plato’s thought, as expounded especially in the Parmenides and The 2  A longer version of this Opusculum is found in S. L. Epifanovič, Materialy k izučeniyu žiznyi i tvoreniy prep. Maksima Ispovednika. Kiev, 1917,  pp. 68‒70.

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Sophist. Book 5 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics does not fail to treat of Sameness and Otherness either (1018 A‒B) but more importantly, Identity and Difference take a lead role in Proclus’ Platonic Theology (Book 2, Chapter 1 differentiating between the One and the Many) and his Elements of Theology (first fundamental ontological theses expounding the identity of the One with the Good, etc.). Back to Maximus, tackling Identity and Difference (ταυτότης – ἑτερότης) in Trinitology and Christology naturally implies the discussion of the concept pairs Essence versus Person (οὐσία – ὑπόστασις), and Union versus Differentia (ἕνωσις – διαφορά). 3 Relying on these oppositions, Maximus is actually able to positively define orthodoxy and to characterize all possible sorts of heterodoxy. Hereby, he is ultimately up to constructing a coherent terminological network that turns around the notion of redemption and grounds an homogeneous overarching metaphysical theory encompassing God and man alike. 3. Initial Pitfalls Especially illuminating in this respect is his classification of some of the major heresies ‒ Arianism, Sabellianism, Macedonianism, Nestorianism ‒ by virtue of the terms Same, Other, One, Different; and the way he contrasts the divine nature with the human nature as it were by a reverse analogy in Opusculum 13: Πῶς ἡ ἄκρα ἕνωσις καὶ ταυτότητα ἔχει, καὶ ἑτερότητα; [Ἦ ταυτότητα οὐσιῶν]. Οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος, ταυτότης μέν ἐστιν οὐσίας· ἑτερότης δὲ προσώπων· μίαν γὰρ οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦμεν· τρεῖς δὲ ὑποστάσεις. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταυτότης μέν ἐστι προσώπου· ἑτερότης δὲ οὐσιῶν· ἑνὸς γὰρ ὄντος ἀνθρώπου, ἄλλης οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ ἄλλης ἡ σάρξ.4 How is it that the most perfect union possesses identity as well as difference? That is, the identity of the essences, and the difference of the persons, and vice versa. Like, in the Holy 3  For a general discussion of the concepts of Nature, Essence, Unity, and Distinction in Maximus’ Christology, see D.  Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford, 2004, (especially Chapter 3.2). 4  Op. 13, II, 1–7, K.  Levrie, Maximi Confessoris Capita de duabus Christi naturis, Turnhout, 2017 (CCSG 89), p. 7.

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miklós vassányi Trinity, identity is of the essence, whilst difference is of the persons; because we confess one essence but three persons. As far as the human being is concerned, however, identity is of the person, while difference is of the essences, since although the human being is a unity, soul is of one essence and flesh is of another. 5

This statement is to the effect that the differentia realis between the Infinite Being and the finite rational being is that the latter is structurally the logical inverse of the former. By specifying the difference, however, Maximus also points us to a (logical) relation: Here we behold two ontological extremes that can be described with the same categories, even if in a reverse pattern. This reverse analogy also suggests that if one person can relate to two essences (or natures) in the human being then, vice versa, one essence can relate to more persons in God. This helps us prefigure how different the same things (attributes) are in God, despite the identity of the terms with which God and man are circumscribed. This passage is also a token that core concepts of the Opuscula ‒ especially ousia and hypostasis ‒ are intended to mark out a comprehensive notional and dialectical framework for a fullscale discussion of the entire problematique. For the same reason, however, these key terms are also oriented in slightly different ways when applied to God than when applied to the human being (see also Op. 14). If they are to bridge the divide between theology and anthropology then it is no wonder they are overstretched or overexpanded, as they overarch the gap between the infinite and the finite extremes of the theology of deification. This is done in an effort to encompass God and man in one consistent and preferably rational conceptual system. This difficulty comes to sight on account of the elemental concept of homoousios in the list of definitions that makes up Opusculum 14: Ὁμοούσιόν ἐστι τὸ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἄλλῳ τυγχάνον, διάφορον δὲ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὄν· ὡς ἐπί τε ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει εἰδῶν. Εἴ τι οὖν ἄλλῳ ταυτὸν ὑπάρχει κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, οὐ ταυτὸν ὑπάρχει τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν· καὶ εἴ τι ἓν καὶ ἡνωμένον ἄλλῳ τυγχάνει κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, οὐχ ἓν οὔτε ἡνωμένον τῷ αὐτῷ τυγχάνει καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν· καὶ

5  All

translations by the author of this paper.

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εἴ τι διαφορὰν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τοῦτο ἕνωσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. (PG 91,  149 C 7‒D 2) Of the same essence is that which is possessed of the same essence as another thing but is nevertheless different than that thing in respect of the hypostasis; like this is the case with man and the other species. If, then, something is identical with another thing in respect of the essence, it is not identical with that thing in respect of the hypostasis too; and if a thing is one and unified with another in terms of the essence, it is not one with the other, nor is it unified with the other, in respect of the hypostasis; and if a thing differs from another in respect of the hypostasis then it is unified with the same thing in respect of the essence.

The first sentence of this passage evidences that the basic notions ousia and homoousios are utilized by Maximus also in an anthropological sense: The species “human being” consists of an indefinite number of individuals who are particular persons endowed with the same human essence. In the second sentence, then, the Confessor just may have the Trinity in mind, where identity of essence goes along with a difference between the persons.6 In other words, the terms ousia and homoousios are designed to build a bridge. Another pair of concepts laden with such dialectical tension is that of union (ἔνωσίς) and difference (διαφορά), whose definitions Maximus now orients towards Trinitology on the one hand and Christology on the other, still in the same Op. 14: Οὐσιώδης οὖν ἔνωσίς ἐστιν ἡ τὰς διαφόρους κατ’ἀριθμὸν καὶ πολλὰς ὑποστάσεις εἰς μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν συνάγουσα. Οὐσιώδης δὲ διαφορὰ τυγχάνει λόγος καθ’ὃν ἡ οὐσία, ἤγουν φύσις, ἀμείωτός τε καὶ ἄτρεπτος, ἄφυρτος ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀσύγχυτος διαμένει, καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἄλλο κατ’εἶδος ἕτερον εἰς μίαν ὑπόστασιν ποιουμένη σύνοδον, οὐδ’ὅλως τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἰδίας ἐξίσταται φύσεως. (PG 91,  149 D 3‒10) Union is essential if it unifies numerous and numerically different persons into one and the same essence. Essential 6  A

detailed discussion of Maximus’ usage of ousia in Trinitarian theology is found in A. Louth, “St  Maximos’ Distinction between λόγος and τρόπος and the Ontology of the Person”, in Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher, ed. by S. Mitralexis et al., Eugene OR, 2017, pp. 157–66. Louth’s analysis concerns especially the earlier Amb.Ioh., and revolves around the important concept pair logos – tropos.

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miklós vassányi difference is an arrangement where the essence ‒ that is, the nature ‒ undergoes no diminishing or change or mingling or fusion; and where it does not abandon at all its own specific nature as it constitutes one person with another thing that is different in respect of genus.

In a single passage, we find here two foundational concepts (“union of essence” and “difference of essence”) of Trinitology and Christology, set in an opposition. A union of essence (along with a difference between persons) characterizes the Trinity; whilst a difference of essences (along with a unity of the person) are perceived in the Christ. Hence the two definitions (“essential union” versus “essential difference”) are, in a logical respect, each other’s inverse. As the Confessor describes in these inverse terms the Trinity and the Christ, he clearly implies that the unity of the Trinity is different from that of the two essences in the person of the Christ. One is inclined to believe that this indicates that for Maximus, the unity of the Trinity, deriving from the essence, may be of a more pervasive kind than the union of the two fundamentally different and disparate essences (one infinite, the other finite) in the person of the Saviour. For him, a hypostatic — that is, personal — union is apparently not of the same kind as an essential union. Following upon this, Maximus proposes an identification of the terms hypostasis (“person”) and prosōpon in the same Op. 14: Ὑπόστασις καὶ πρόσωπον, ταυτόν· ἄμφω γὰρ μερικόν τε καὶ ἴδιον, ὡς ἐφ’ἑαυτῶν τὴν περιγραφὴν, ἀλλ’οὐκ ἐν πλείοσι τὴν κατηγορίαν φυσικῶς κεκτημένα. (PG 91,  152 A 1‒4) Hypostasis and prosōpon are the same thing; because both are particular and individual, insofar as they are circumscribed in themselves but according to their nature, are not predicated of several things.

The passages we have produced and examined so far invite a deeper analysis of the Confessor’s concepts of essence and person, and raise broader ontological and metaphysical issues regarding the concept of being and the principle of identity in general. 4. The Identity of Essence versus the Identity of Person: A Discussion We have seen so far how ousia as a general metaphysical term may be predicated of several hypostases or “personal realities” at

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the same time, both with reference to the Creator and the created rational beings, though in different modalities. This difference in the modes of application is to be emphasized since the absolutely unique and unitary divine substance as it were bears up with being ideally partitioned into the persons of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit ‒ that is, God’s essence is able to sustain several persons without splitting up into ontologically individual persons. Contrary to this, the human ousia is obliged to multiply in function of the number of human individuals ‒ that is, it will not be a unitary carrier of several persons but breaks down into a multitude of individual subjects. Which invites the conclusion that the unity of the divine ousia is a more enduring and more perfect one. Hence at the end of the day, ousia does not operate in the same manner with regard to, and may not be applied in the same sense to, God and man, respectively. This in turn means that the divine essence is easily differentiated in dialectical terms from the human essence (as it does not bear up to being multiplied) whilst it is also tacitly implied that the divine essence still may link up with the human essence (as it does in the person of Christ). Comparing this outcome with how Proclus fashions the process of emanation (ἐκροή) in the opening paragraphs of The Elements of Theology, the difference is immediately noticeable that for the Diadochos, it is ultimately the divine essence itself that plēthynetai kai pollaplasiazetai, is multiplied and proliferates, while for Maximus, the divine essence itself will never proliferate. Only created species may do that as a token of their inferiority. In consequence, ousia (or the synonymous physis) is revealed here as the normative centerpiece of the Confessor’s theology as it designates, within the bounds of Trinitology, an indissoluble ironclad unity and hence, self-existent identity.7 As the divine essence so conceived descends ‒ or better, condescends ‒ into a personal (hypostatic) union with the finite rational essence, It (for want of a better word) trespasses upon its own strict principle of unity in an act of redeeming grace. God in the person of the Christ voluntarily enters a different kind of union whereby He, so to say, transcends His own transcendence. While Maximus specifies that this personal 7  For

a discussion of the concept of nature (physis) in Maximus, see B.  De Angelis, Natura, persona, libertà. L’antropologia di Massimo il Confessore. Rome, 2002 (Quaderni dell’Assunzione), especially Chapter 7.3.

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union, hypostatikē henōsis is also adihairetos, indissoluble, it is still certain that this indissolubility or indivisibility derives not from an original unity of essence but from mercy — gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit (Aquinas, STh p. 1, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2). In this manner, the divine nature in one person of the Trinity tolerates the human nature. But in fact, this is far more than a case of simple toleration ‒ it cannot be less than an explicit act of love as God somehow allows the human essence to enter one of His persons, which is allowing man to enter God Himself. While this may not be motivated by anything other than a philanthropy flowing from the essence of God, Maximus takes care to delimit this graceful union of divine and human nature from the essential unity of the Trinity, as he defines the concept of homohypostaton still in Op. 14 as follows:8 Ὁμοϋπόστατόν ἐστι τὸ εἰς μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόστασιν ἄλλῳ συντεθειμένον· διάφορον δὲ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ κατ’οὐσίαν τυγχάνον· ὡς ἐπί τε ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φύσεως ἑτερότητι διαφέροντα καθ’ὑπόστασιν ἥνωται. Εἴ τι οὖν ἄλλῳ καθ’ἕνωσιν συντεθὲν ταυτὸν ὑπάρχει κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τουτέστιν, ὑπόστασις μετ’αὐτοῦ γέγονε μία, ἕτερον τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστί. Καὶ εἴ τι ἓν καὶ ἡνωμένον ἄλλῳ τυγχάνει κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τοῦτο οὐχ ἓν οὔτε ὁμόγενές ἐστι τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. Καὶ εἴ τι συντεθειμένον ἄλλῳ διαφορὰν ἔχει κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, τοῦτο ἕνωσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν. (PG 91,  152 A 9‒B 6) ‘Unified in one hypostasis’ is that which is joined with another thing into one and the same hypostasis but is at the same time different than the other thing in respect of essence; like this is the case with the soul and the body, and with whatever is unified in terms of hypostasis while different in respect of essence. Hence, if something, joined to another thing by virtue of a unification, is identical with that thing in terms of hypostasis ‒ that is, if it has become one hypostasis with that thing ‒ then it is different from the other thing in respect of essence. And if something is one with and unified with another thing in terms 8  On this issue, consider also Vladimir Cvetković’s analysis of Maximus’ understanding of physis and hypostasis in Op. 16, 21, and 26, in V. Cvetković, “The Oneness of God as Unity of Persons in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor”, in Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher, ed. by S.  Mitralexis et  al., pp.  304–16. Cvetković extends his discussion to relevant parts of the Amb., the Ep., the Car. and Q.Thal., concluding that the consubstantiality of mankind is analogous to that of the Holy Trinity.

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of hypostasis, then it is not one with, and is not homogenous with that thing even in respect of essence. And if something, joined to another thing, is different from that in its essence, then this one is in a hypostatic union with that one.

Here, Maximus is indoctrinating the mutual exclusion or alternation of the two kinds of union (essential versus personal). In the given dogmatic context, this doctrine practically entails that it is unthinkable ‒ or better, logically excluded ‒ that the respectively divine and humane essences could ever unite. On account of the above-described strict identity (or principle of unity) of the divine ousia, the two kinds of essence rule out a possibility of unification in the sense that they may never fuse or merge or produce a third, new genus (as Maximus explicitly denies this also in Amb.Ioh. 5). Instead, in the course of the hypostatic union, the receiving party ‒ that is, the divine nature ‒ maintains its status of receiver and the received party ‒ that is, the human nature ‒ preserves its status of being received. The efficient cause of the hypostatic union will not lose its causal power, the ground may not lose its character of being the ground, the archetype remains the archetype forever, while the ectypon just stays an ectypon. Which is to say that in a first approach, the hypostatic union would seem more an alliance (berith), a less strict unification than the original unity of the divine nature. To put this first interpretation into Leibnizian metaphysical terms, the original unity of the Holy Trinity is unconditional or metaphysically necessary (necessitas metaphysica) whereas the union of the divine nature with the human nature in the person of Christ is originally not a priori metaphysically necessary because a separate voluntary salvific decision on the part of God was needed for it to happen. So in a first approach, this results in a necessitas hypothetica for the hypostatic union. On these grounds, we may qualify the difference between the persons of the Trinity in Cartesian terms as a differentia idealis; while that between the divine nature and the human nature in the person of the Christ continues to be a differentia realis. Still continuing in our first approach, we should point out that the two natures in the Christ, from a metaphysical point of view, are in a distributive unity.9 9  The intra-divine relations in the Holy Trinity are also discussed by Nicholas Loudovikos with reference to Maximus the Confessor, Augustine,

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And yet, in a second approach, all that changes as Maximus adds on the qualification adihairetos to the hypostatic union. This implies backpedaling the distributivity of that union on the grounds that God’s alliance proposed to man is final and irrevocable, turning the personal union indissoluble, adihairetos. This qualification renders an originally non-essential union in outcome almost like an essential unity. Though it remains a personal union it is realized in a modality whereby in outcome it is also indissoluble. The difference, then, between the two kinds of union is God’s free decision to save man, because that is the ratio essendi of the personal union; whereas the original unity of the divine nature is no result of a choice on the part of God but an original attribute of the divine nature, because that is by itself, as we have seen, self-identical, tauton (whereby God is also the most real being). For this opposition between an essential and a personal union to prevail in the Confessor’s theology, the concept of “essence” must imply a higher degree of unity and perfection and thereby, also more reality whilst the concept of “person” clearly refers to a lesser grade of unification and perfection. Hence in Maximus’ trinitology, the principle of identity (and thereby also the main principle of reality and existence) is the absolutely indivisible divine essence rather than the persons. In his anthropology, however, we face a reversed situation. From an ontological point of view, then, the Christ has an utterly extraordinary constitution in that in so far as He is God, He is a facet of the individual God by virtue of His essence whereas, as far as He is human, He is an individual by virtue of His personhood ‒ which is to say that in Him, two principles of identity subsist at the same time. To put this in strict ontological terms, He is not an independent individual as a divine person, but He certainly is that in so far as He is the Saviour. It is perhaps not wrong to say that in His person, the human principand Thomas Aquinas, in N. Loudovikos, “Consubstantiality Beyond Perichoresis: Personal Threeness, Intra-divine Relations, and Personal Consubstantiality in Augustine’s, Thomas Aquinas’ and Maximus the Confessor’s Trinitarian Theologies”, SP 89 (2017), pp. 33–46. However, although the title of this paper promises an analysis also of Maximus’ thought concerning consubstantiality, there is, in fact, only one textual reference to a work partially attributed to Maximus, the Scholia in Dionysium Areopagitam while the author dedicates most of his attention to St Athanasius, St Basil, Augustine and Thomas.

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ium individuationis is admitted into and meets up with the divine principle of identity. The bottom line is that in trinitology, Maximus attributes a lower ontological rank to personhood whilst he conceives of “essence” and “nature” as a kind of foundation that carries the persons. This entails that for him, the divine οὐσία is, in a final analysis and despite the identity of the term, different than the human οὐσία in its essential attributes. On top of that, the divine οὐσία no doubt preserves its specific difference even as, in the person of the Christ, it enters into communion with man. Hence at this point we may want to give an outline of the Confessor’s soteriology, that is, his understanding of how God relates to man. 5. A Soteriological Perspective The fact that God freely decided to save man reveals that the radically different divine nature is intensely interested in the human nature. This is, I think, a point where Maximus differs from his master, Denys the Areopagite, who for his part does not emphasize to this extent God’s salvific interest in man. For the Confessor, however, there is this essential link between the center of fundamental theology and that of anthropology, which ultimately rests on God’s being Creator as well as Saviour. This bond between God and man is even regarded by him as natural, that is, as flowing naturally from the divine nature. He goes so far as to qualify it as a kind of inseparable union, a συμφυΐα ‒ as Op. 6 affirms of salvation, “this is what God wants by virtue of His nature” (τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτῷ φύσει καθέστηκε θελητόν).10 Since this philanthropy is rooted in the divine nature, it is logical ‒ so Maximus argues ‒ that it should be quasi-infinite, or in other words, that it should go to the utmost that is still compatible with God’s transcendence. This yields the paradoxical idea of a pervasive union, which, on the one hand envisages the condescension of God into man in the act of the πρόσληψις σαρκός, while, on the other, allows for man to be raised up unto God. This idea is a paradox insofar as it connects an infinite thing with a finite one, that is, establishes a real relation between what is infinite and 10  Op.

6, PG 91, 68B 12–13.

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what is finite. And this union is pervasive insofar as it extends, in principle, to the entire (infinite) divine essence and to the entire human essence ‒ as Maximus puts it: “the full Logos has taken on the full human nature, and has also rendered it fully divine [θεώσαντος] by putting on the essence [οὐσιώσει]”.11 Maximian soteriology closes ‒ or perhaps only begins? ‒ with the opening up of the endless perspective produced by the pervasive union. This soteriology undoubtedly aims at elevating man to an ontological height that is just reachable for man consistently with the rest of theology. The same idea of the pervasive union also surfaces in the fourth canon of the 649 Lateran synod, which highlights the importance of the Christ’s full humanity: ut toto homine eodemque et Deo totus homo reformaretur, qui sub peccato cecidit.12 6. Conclusion At this point, we may want to turn to Op. 18 for a background classification of the several conceivable types of union in general.13 Out of the ten modalities of unification this pithy list enumerates, three cases are relevant for trinitology, Christology and anthropology. Arranged in an order of intensity of union, these are the essential union (κατ’ οὐσίαν ἕνωσις), the personal union (καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις) and the relative union (κατὰ σχέσιν ἕνωσις), characteristic of the cooperation of the two wills in the Christ. In opposition to these theologically significant modes of union, Op. 18 excludes seven further modalities, which are patterns of union between material things or things analogical to matter. (Here, Maximus is apparently keen on formulating a full induction of all possible forms of unions between different states of matter, in order to deny them of the Christ.) Among the seven cases to be

11  Op.

6, PG 91, 68C 9–10. & A. Schönmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum. Editio XXXVI, Barcelona - Fribourg - Rome, 1976, p. 172 (№ 504). 13  For an examination of the authenticity of Opusculum 18, and for a critically established text, see P. Van Deun, “L’Unionum definitiones (CPG 7697, 18) attribué à Maxime le Confesseur: étude et édition du traité”, Revue des études byzantines, 58 (2000), pp. 123–47. 12  H. Denzinger

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negated of the Savior, κατὰ σύγχυσιν ἕνωσις ‒ that is, a substantial merger of two essences ‒ stands out for its historical significance insofar as it may not exemplify the bond of the divine and the human natures in the Christ. This is because for Maximus, God is, on the one hand, radically different from the human being while, on the other, He is also connected to man by an inseparable link rooted in His nature. Could this perhaps entail that the divine and the human natures are homogenous? Maximus gives us a nuanced response: While God and man are essentially different in kind, yet they display a very high degree of affinity, which implies that God is different in a manner that He as a ground is ready and able to admit the radically different human being into Himself. Hence although God and man are not kindred natures, still they are affined and by virtue of God’s explicit decision, they belong irrevocably together. At the end of the day, the hypostatic union realized in the Christ, and rationally discussed in logical terms by the Confessor, invariably implies the predication of infinite and finite attributes of one and the same subject (or person). As such, it will ultimately demand that we abandon the groundwork of all rationality and rise above the principle of contradiction, by means of religious faith. Maximus is here not denying but implying that the person of the Christ and salvation in general is a borderline case of thinkability and logical analyzability. Even as he points us to the theory of perichōrēsis as a Christological argument in Amb.Ioh. 5,14 he affirms that salvation and its groundwork, Incarnation are things we can only grasp with religious faith. In other words, the rational confession of the Confessor walks us to the brink of rationality and there points us to faith. I want to dedicate a last consideration to this double act of rational analysis and argument on the one hand, and the progress beyond the bounds of rationality on the other, in Maximus. The Confessor’s dialectical efforts regarding the way the divine and the human natures are isolated and yet indissoluble from each other in the Christ ultimately rely on the general and implicit presupposition that God’s essence is at least in a first approach not 14  See Bart Janssens’s critical edition in B.  Janssens (ed.), Ambigua ad Thomam una cum Epistula secunda ad eundem, Turnhout, 2002 (CCSG 48).

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inimical to reason and rational insight. This rational insight into the divine nature is, according to the scheme laid out in the Mystagogy,15 preliminary and natural knowledge, scientia antecedens naturalis concerning the divine nature. To believe the Confessor, this anticipatory intuition is of a logically articulable character: by virtue of an ontologically grounded logic, man as a rational being gets a glimpse into the divine essence even in this visible world of ours, in statu viatoris. Hence Maximus’ mystagogy and Christology are a logically articulable initiation into the mystery of God, which yields real insight. God is not completely unknowable. This fundamental conviction of Maximus’ may be called a Leibnizio-Aristotelian theological principle, whereby God and man somehow have in common the feature that they are rational beings. But Maximus makes it also unmistakeably clear that at a certain point (namely, in the Christ), divine rationality crosses over into a supra-rationality that is no longer intuitable for man. So in a final analysis, for our Father Maximus, the divine essence is, on the one hand, pure and perfect rationality and, on the other hand, a surpassing of that perfect rationality ‒ that is, an infinite riddle. It is, then, from the rational side that the human being may approach and be admitted into God where, in salvation, she or he may face God as an infinite riddle.

15  See Christian Boudignon’s critical edition in C. Boudignon (ed.), Maximi Confessoris Mystagogia, Turnhout, 2011 (CCSG 69).

The Ambiguity of the Gnomic Will as Basis for a Theory of Human Individuality in the Thought of Saint Maximus the Confessor Dionysios Skliris (Athens) he notion of the gnomic will is present throughout the whole Maximian corpus; it is however particularly developed in a technical sense in the Confessor’s Opuscula, since the latter constitute treatises with polemical character against Monothelitism, as well as Monoenergism and Monophysitism.1 They thus contain elaborate definitions of great clarity, something that was not always called for in his previous spiritual and ascetical writings. In this respect, it is crucial to examine Saint Maximus’ First Opusculum, which is addressed to Marinus, the “most holy priest and oikonomos of the most holy Metropolis of Constantia of the island of Cyprus”, and is thus related to the Second, Third and Tenth Opuscula, which have the same addressee.2 According to Polycarp Sherwood and Jean-Claude Larchet, the First Opusculum was probably written in 645–646 in Carthage at the peak of the Monothelete controversy, 3 just before Saint Maximus’ trip to Rome.4 M. Jankowiak

1  J.-C. Larchet,

Saint Maxime le Confesseur (580–662), Paris, 2003, p. 70. “Introduction”, in Saint Maxime le Confesseur. Opuscules Théologiques et Polémiques, trans. by E. Ponsoye, Paris, 1998, p. 86. 3  P. Sherwood, An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, Rome, 1952; Larchet, “Introduction”, p. 86. 4  See the tentative timeline of the life of Maximus the Confessor in: P. Allen, “Life and Times of Maximus the Confessor”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, p. 14. 2  J.-C. Larchet,

Studies in Maximus the Confessor’s Opuscula Theologica et Polemica Papers Collected on the Occasion of the Belgrade Colloquium on Saint Maximus, 3–4 February 2020, ed. by Vladimir Cvetković & Alexis Léonas, IPM, 89 (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 215–240.

 



10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.131023

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and P. Booth date it in the period 643–646,5 including it in the mature anti-Monothelete texts. What was at stake, particularly in the First Opusculum, is the way we understand the notion of the will both in Christology and in anthropology. It is to be noted that Saint Maximus clearly distinguished between the two. Of course, Christ offers the salvation of humanity and is a model for human persons. But since Christ is a divine, uncreated hypostasis, or, alternatively put, a divine, uncreated subject that assumes a human nature, there are differences from the “ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος”, i.e. from being a merely human, created hypostasis. For Saint Maximus, it is indispensable to note the differences before articulating the soteriological vision of salvation. What had to be clarified was the way the will is related to nature and personhood. Saint Maximus’ contribution was that the will is a natural faculty and capacity of the soul, or even of the whole psycho-corporeal fabric, and it is only the mode of the will (πῶς θέλειν) that is determined by the person. The doctrine that Christ has two wills is thus a necessary presupposition for the salvation of the human will as an indispensable, (i.e. natural) feature of humanity. The difference between Christ and the human person is that in Christ the mode of willing is determined by an uncreated, divine hypostasis, that of the Son, according to an asymmetrical neo-Chalcedonian Christology, whereas in the simple man (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος) it is formed by a created hypostasis. It is here that the famous Maximian distinction between the logos and the tropos enters the picture.6 The logos of the nature of human will is the same in Christ and in humanity. It is only the mode (tropos) of willing that changes between an uncreated and a created hypostasis. This difference is articulated through the assertion in the Seventh Opusculum that Christ does not possess a gnomic will.7 This declaration could have been misunderstood as introducing a chasm between Christ and the rest of humanity. Saint Maximus 5  Μ. Jankowiak & P. Booth, “A new date-list of the works of Maximus the Confessor”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, p. 49. 6  I have developed this subject in greater detail in D. Skliris, Logos – mode – end. A Study in the Thought of Saint Maximus the Confessor, Alhambra, CA and Athens, 2018 [title in Greek: Λόγος – Τρόπος – Τέλος. Σπουδή στη σκέψη του Αγίου Μαξίμου του Ομολογητού]. 7  Op. 7, PG 91, 81C–85C.

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had to defend his position from such critique. He had to show that authentic salvation has two poles: on the one hand, everything that is indispensable for human nature must be included in salvation. This is the meaning of the logos of nature. On the other hand, salvation must come from the outside. This is the meaning of the novel mode of existence of human nature in Christ. In one of his stories, Baron Munchausen narrates that he was saved from quicksand by pulling himself up by his own hair. Such a paradoxical type of (non-)salvation was precisely what Saint Maximus wanted to avoid in Christology. Salvation can only arise from a person that is not part of lapsarian humanity or even of created humanity as such. The Christian notion of salvation includes two moments: i) partaking in the entirety of (what is indispensable in the) life of the subject to be saved and ii) coming from the outside in order to save them, not being part of their problems and sin. This double character of salvation is articulated through the dogmatic notion that Christ is not a created hypostasis (as in Nestorianism), but he assumes a full created human nature including human will. The latter is, however, determined and formed by a novel mode of divine existence. The first Opusculum was written in order to explain this rationale through offering concise definitions of the different moments of volition. The goal of Saint Maximus is to observe all different aspects of volition that one finds in anthropology and then discuss which of them are indispensable for the salvation of humanity, i.e. which of them forms part of the real human nature that is eschatologically conceived of as the “logos” of nature, and which are not. One of the terms discussed is the gnomic will. The gnomic will is excluded from eschatological salvation in Christ, even though it is considered to play a crucial role within the present human life, especially ascetic struggle. As I will argue, for Saint Maximus the human gnomic will is not identical to the “lapsarian” one. It is more accurate to say that the gnomic will would have existed even if the Fall had not taken place, as a mere disposition (διάθεσις) of the created person toward both the uncreated God and the created world. After the Fall, however, this gnomic disposition acquires a novel divisive character (διάστασις) that is a concomitant of the fragmentation of human nature, i.e. of its failure to be universal. The mystery of Christ could be defined in Maximian terms also as an achievement of human universality

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and, consequently, as a call to human persons to concede their gnomic will to God, but only after having previously used it. It is to be noted that the lack of gnomic will in Christ is related to the fact that Christ achieves the universality of human nature by overcoming its fragmentation after the Fall. But this does not mean that γνώμη is just a synonym of division: the ontological ground of the lack of gnomic will in Christ is rather the fact that He is an uncreated person instead of a created one, i.e. not just the overcoming of the results of the Fall. In order to understand these very subtle distinctions in Maximian thought, one needs first to examine in detail the definitions of the different aspects of human will, which are given in the First Opusculum. After this clarification of the different dimensions and stages of human volition, I  will locate the notion of γνώμη in its specific place inside the process of willing. We shall then be able to observe the ambiguous character of the gnomic will, which could be very valuable to human ascetic struggle, even though it is ultimately offered to God as a eucharistic gift. After discussing this ambiguity, we shall be able to understand better the complexity of both the assertion that Christ lacks a gnomic will and the claim that gnomic will is rather connected to created personhood, not being lapsarian per se. In other words, the gnomic will is neither lapsarian nor eschatological: it is rather a disposition of created human persons within history that is eventually affected by the fall, thus turning it into a divisive element. The fact that the lasparian “version” of the gnomic will contributes to the perpetuation of division does not entail a radical depreciation of gnomic will in itself. On the contrary, Saint Maximus has the tendency to observe the positive dynamic of gnomic will even after the fall, following Patristic ascetic tradition. Such considerations will lead us to some more general conclusions about the meaning of individuality in Saint Maximus toward the end of the chapter. The Importance of the Definitions Given in the First Opusculum for a Theory of Human Will In the first Opusculum, the gnomic will is defined in the context of a very elaborate analysis of the event of willing, which contains

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many aspects 8 that are thoroughly described in the Maximian elaboration of Nemesius of Emesa.9 It is important to observe these definitions in order to understand the gnomic will as the final outcome of a particular human mode of willing. The “appetite” or “appetency” (ὄρεξις) is defined as the universal genus of willing in the same way that animality is the genus of any animal species, be it a fish, a serpent, a bird, or a mammal. In the same way, for Saint Maximus, any manifestation of will is but a species of appetite. The importance attributed to appetite in Maximian anthropology is so crucial that Saint Maximus could be considered as a “philosopher of appetency” in the same sense that Arthur Schopenhauer is regarded as the philosopher of the will or Friedrich Nietzsche the philosopher of the “will to power”. Appetency is linked to the deficiency and finitude of creaturehood that is experienced as universal “thirst” for achieving a higher existential completion. All events of willing are particular actualisations of this primordial nature of man as an appetitive animal. Even though the importance of appetency is usually stressed in a great part of the later Aristotelian tradition, the particularity of Maximian thought lies in the fact that Saint Maximus links appetency to his theological notion of the human natural will, the latter being defined as a desire and inclination for the fullest possible completion of being. Appetency is thus turned into both the profound ontological ground and the conceptual encapsulation of volition. But in order to understand this relation between will and appetency, it is crucial to distinguish between natural will (θέλησις) and the will as a personally determined (βούλησις). The terms θέλησις, θέλημα and φυσικὸν θέλημα denote the natural grounding of will.10 This natural will could be considered hypostatic in the sense that it subsists through personal hypostasis and is determined by it. At the same time, it is crucial for Saint Maximus to affirm that the θέλημα is natural as such. Only the mode of the

8  Op.

1, PG 91, 9A–37D. Maximus’ use and transformation of Nemesius, see R.-A. Gauthier, “Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l’acte humain”, Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 21 (1954), pp. 51–100. 10  Op. 1, PG 91, 12C–13A. 9  For

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natural will is determined by the person11 or, as it would be put in the context of contemporary post-Structuralism, its “negotiation”. By this, I mean that the natural will has content and orientation. It does not constitute an ontological void and it is not indifferent. In this aspect, the theory of will expounded in the First Opusculum is the opposite of Late Medieval and Early Modern Nominalism, the latter being connected to a theory of will as void and arbitrary. The content of the natural will is the completion of nature in the future. In this sense, temporality and, most of all, anticipation of the future, is inherent in the definition of the natural will. It is also to be noted that, even though the natural will is linked to the primordial notion of appetency, this does not mean that it is restricted to the “lower” carnal or instinctual urges. On the contrary, the natural will accompanies all instances of the human psycho-corporeal life from intellection and reason,12 to sensation, movement and other expressions of animality. The natural will is a δύναμις. This Maximian term has a polysemy. It means that θέλημα is a potentiality that awaits its actualisation. It is thus dynamic and not static. But it is also a power of the soul, a fundamental faculty that accompanies all spiritual life. In other words, it is not an exterior object (θελητόν) as in other philosophical treatments of volition. This consideration of natural will as an indispensable power and faculty of the soul could mean that, according to J. D. Madden’s expression, “Maximus is the father of the technical concept of the will (θέλησις)”.13 Will, as an anthropological category that is distinct from cognition and emotion, was absent from ancient Greek thought,14 whilst the Greek

11  J.-M. Garrigues,

Maxime le Confesseur. La charité, avenir divin de l’homme, Paris, 1976, p. 146. 12  Op. 1, PG 91, 97B. 13  J. D. Madden, “The authenticity of early definitions of will (thelêsis)”, in Maximus Confessor. Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur. Fribourg, 2–5 septembre 1980, ed. by F. Heinzer & C. Schönborn, Fribourg, 1982, p. 62. See also J. J. Prado, Voluntad y naturaleza: La antropología filosófica de Máximo el Confesor, Rio Cuarto, 1974. 14  I. Mcfarland, “The Theology of the Will”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, p. 518.

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Fathers before Saint Maximus were not consistent in the use of the terminology of volition.15 There is an intrinsic relation between the human natural will and the logoi of beings. It is to be reminded that the latter are considered by Saint Maximus to be uncreated wills16 of God for the future of created nature. In Saint Maximus, the logoi are not just protological, i.e., principles to be investigated in the origin of creation, but eschatologically oriented, i.e., leading nature to its eschatological fulfillment through a historical itinerary. The logos of nature is thus not identified with nature as such. It is also to be noted that the logos of nature is not to be identified with some concept of created “pre-lapsarian” nature, since the logos is rather a divine uncreated will for the future of created nature. But this does not mean that the Fall is somehow required or anticipated. Nature is grounded in its logos since it is created in order to partake in a future fulfillment. In its temporal origin, created nature is not already perfect in the beginning; it is rather immature and anticipating its perfection in the future without implying the need for Fall in the context of a dialectic that would necessarily include evil. The passage from potentiality to actualisation could ideally have happened without the intervention of evil, even though this is not our historical experience and Saint Maximus is not keen on “what if” hypotheses. According to the expression of George Charles Berthold, “because of its constant reference to Christ as axis through the 15  See:

A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Berkeley, CA, 1982. 16  Saint Maximus identifies the logoi with divine wills in Ad Thalassium (see C. Laga & C. Steel (eds), Quaestiones ad Thalassium I, Quaestiones I–LV, una cum latina interpretatione loannis Scotti Eriugenae, Turnhout, 1980 (CCSG 7), p. 95, 8; PG 90, 296A), and in the Ambigua (see N. Constas (trans.), Maximos the Confessor, The Ambigua (DOML 28), 2 vols, Cambridge MA, 2014, vol. I, pp. 106–08; PG 91, 1085A). In the latter, Saint Maximus cites his source as the Areopagitic writings and “the disciples of Pantainos, the teacher of the great Clement, who wrote the Stromateis”. In what concerns ps.-Dionysius, see De Divinis Nominibus, 5,  8, in В. Suchla (ed.), Corpus Dionysiacum 1: Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De divinis nominibus, PTS 33 (Berlin – New York, 1990), p. 188, 6–10 (PG 3, 824C). For the reference to Pantainos, see P. Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and His Refutation of Origenism, Rome, 1955, pp. 175–76.

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doctrine of the logoi, the notion of φύσις avoids the twin perils of a closed nature in a closed universe and that of an insubstantial reality floating about unanchored in any positive identity”.17 In other words, nature per se is finite and mortal, while at the same time having an existential thirst for immortality. It is here that the relation between the natural will and the logos of nature can best be observed. The logos of nature is a divine will that invites the created will of nature toward achieving fuller existence and completion in the future. It is in this sense that the natural will is a form of appetency (ὄρεξις), i.e., the appetite of a fuller self in the future. One could say that the divine logos of nature constitutes nature as a will for a fuller version of itself in the future of its existential itinerary, started in history and continued in the eschaton. The logos of nature mobilises the created nature to will all the actualisations that make it integral in the eschaton. Richard Sorabji has compared this Maximian notion of natural will to the Stoic concept of οἰκείωσις, namely “that attachment that is felt by new-born infants and animals to their own physical constitution (systasis), and which the adult human can later extend to his entire rational constitution”.18 But the eschatological character of the natural will is a transformed or even inverse form of Platonism or Stoicism. One should also note that, in Opusculum 16, θέλημα is distinguished from θέλησις.19 Whereas the former is a natural capacity, the latter is defined as an actual relation. For Saint Maximus, it is absolutely crucial to assert that Christ assumed the natural appetite and will (ὄρεξις, θέλημα, θέλησις) of the human nature. Of course, in Christ, the goal of nature, i.e., its complete and full existence, is achieved from the begin-

17  G. C. Berthold, Freedom and Liberation in the Theology of Maximus the Confessor, PhD thesis, Institut Catholique de Paris, Paris, 1975, p. 189. 18  R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford, 2000, p. 338. For a critique of Sorabji’s minimisation of Maximus’ importance, see D. Bradshaw, “St Maximus the Confessor on the Will”, in Knowing the Purpose of Creation through the Resurrection. Proceedings of the Symposium on St Maximus the Confessor, Belgrade, October 18–12, 2012, ed. by M. Vasiljević, Alhambra, CA, 2013, pp. 151–52. One could add the importance attributed by Maximus to the eschatological orientation of the natural will to the future. 19  Op. 16, PG 91, 188B-C.

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ning thanks to the hypostatic union with Divinity. However, it is important to stress that Christ’s human nature includes appetency and will. The fact that Christ has a perfected human nature does not annul the inclusion of appetency and will in it, since the latter constitutes an indispensable element of what it is to be human.20 A similar important term is that of “inclination” (ἔφεσις),21 which refers to an equally universal, volitional event as ὄρεξις, but concerns mainly the intellectual and the reasonable part of the soul, that aims at God as the “ultimate object of desire”. It seems that for Saint Maximus this utmost desire is reserved only for God. For example, in the third Letter he writes that “we are tied to God through the loving inclination of our desire (ἔφεσις), while we are linked to each other through loving compassion”.22 I translate “ἔφεσις” as “inclination” in order to reserve the word “desire” for “ἐπιθυμία”, the latter being distinct in Maximian thought from ἔφεσις, since it is a particular capacity of the soul next to the reasonable and the irascible part. However, the best translation for “ἔφεσις” would arguably be “reasonable desire” or “intellectual desire”, since ἔφεσις constitutes a deep urge that is rooted in man’s intellectual and reasonable nature. Christ does of course assume the ἔφεσις in His human nature, since this urge is the most fundamental movement of the soul toward the divinisation that He achieves. The cornerstone of the particularly Maximian theory of volition is the distinction between θέλησις and βούλησις, which are often confounded by many historians of philosophy. Bούλησις is sometimes translated as “wish”, 23 but its most accurate meaning is a “personal will in view of an end”. According to its very clear

20  For

the relation between Christ and the process of human willing, see J. Farrell, Free Choice in Saint Maximus the Confessor (South Canan, PA, 1989), pp. 115–30. 21  See, for example, Op. 1, PG 91, 12C-D. 22  Ep. 3, PG 91, 409A. 23  See, for example, Bradshaw, “St Maximus the Confessor on the Will”, p.  145. Bradshaw follows the choice of R.-A.  Gauthier to translate βούλησις by the French word “souhait” in R.-A. Gauthier, “Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l’acte humain”, Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 21 (1954), pp. 51–100.

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definition in the First Opusculum, 24 while the elements that constitute the natural will (θέλησις) are potentiality (δύναμις), essence (οὐσία), and reason (λόγος), the relative elements for βούλησις are imagination (φαντασία), discursive reason (διάνοια), and finality (τέλος). Whereas θέλησις is provoked by the logos of nature, βούλησις is mobilised by the setting of a specific goal (τέλος). This end is approached through imagination and discursive reasoning. In other words, one reaches the goal through a kind of reasoning that is capable of imaginary projections. For Saint Maximus, this means that βούλησις is a hypostatic/personal modification of θέλησις (ποῖα φυσικὴ θέλησις), a personally determined natural will. To put it another way, whereas θέλησις is universal and indeterminate in its potentiality, βούλησις constitutes a personal determination of will in view of a specific end. This means that βούλησις constitutes the first emergence of personal modality in the act of willing. It also means that one can find in Saint Maximus a dialectic of logos, mode and end, in which the logos mobilises the natural will, whereas the person modifies it by posing a particular goal.25 By “modification” (τρόπος) I  mean a determination by the person that is contrasted to the indeterminate and infinite character of natural will as such. Of course, θέλησις and βούλησις coexist in reality and can be distinguished only through conceptual abstraction, since it seems that in re one cannot exist without the other. They denote however two different dimensions of will. The importance of this distinction lies in its Christological aspect: Christ assumes the human βουλητικόν but with the crucial difference that His personal modification of the natural will is due to His divine uncreated hypostasis being tantamount to the only true ontological goal, namely theosis. Saint Maximus’ originality and crucial position in the history of philosophy, due to the clarity of this distinction between θέλησις and βούλησις, is demonstrated in a very profound manner 24  Op.

1, PG 91, 13B–16Α. the contribution of personhood in the subsistence and act of natural willing, see J. P. Manoussakis, “The Dialectic of Communion and Otherness in St Maximus’ Understanding of the Will”, in Knowing the Purpose of Creation through the Resurrection. Proceedings of the Symposium on St Maximus the Confessor, Belgrade, October 18–12, 2012, ed. by M. Vasiljević, Alhambra, CA, 2013, pp. 159–80. 25  For

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by R.-A. Gauthier: “Thelēsis is no longer a desire that is rational by accident, but a desire rational by nature, a faculty (δύναμις) moved by its own proper vitality, prior to any intervention of knowledge, toward the same universal natural good that is the function of reason to know. This faculty belongs to human nature, and it is natural too that there arises in it, whenever a simple representation occurs, independently of any deliberation, the act of wish [βούλησις], thus elevated for the first time to the dignity of the will”.26 It is to be noted that this transformation was relative to a dogmatic necessity. If Christ had two natural operations (Dyoenergism as opposed to the heresy of Monoenergism), He should also have two powers/faculties, i.e. both a divine and a human one, according to the Aristotelian principle, which had been inherited by Galen, Iamblichus and Nemesius of Emesa, that energeia springs from the dynamis.27 Dyodynamism is thus the other side of Dyoenergism, being in any case a theological doctrine that had a decisive impact on the significance attributed to will in European thought. What is more, Saint Maximus had the scriptural preoccupation to apply in Christology the term θέλημα that one also encounters in the Gospels (Lc. 22:42; Io. 6:38).28 According to Saint Maximus, in contrast to the natural will (θέλησις), βούλησις as a will that is conditioned by personhood is linked to imagination (φαντασία). Depending on its definition in the First Opusculum, 29 βούλησις is valorised as a possible way to transcend one’s power (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐξουσία) by posing even impossible goals. This cannot but be viewed in a positive light by Saint Maximus, if one considers that the ontological goal of human nature is something that transcends its power, namely deification. It is to be noted that in many cases in the Opuscula, 30 imagination is portrayed in a negative manner in the context of Saint Maximus’ effort to combat Docetism — a sort of heretical Chris26  R.-A. Gauthier

& J.-Y.  Jolif, Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque, vol. i, Second Edition, Louvain, 1970, pp. 263–64. 27  See David Bradshaw’s brilliant analysis in D. Bradshaw, “St Maximus the Confessor on the Will”, p. 152. 28  D. Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, Oxford, 2004, p. 118. 29  Op. 1, PG 91, 13B–16A. 30  Op. 3 PG 91, 48Β; Op. 4 PG 91, 61C; Op. 7 PG 91, 80A-C; 84A; Op. 15 PG 91, 157Β; Op. 16 PG 91, 193A; 197A; Op. 19 PG 91, 221D.

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tology according to which Christ’s passion was only an impression of human imagination. Saint Maximus is determined to show the real and non-imaginary character of salvation in Christ. Any human endeavor to make fictitious projections upon Christ should thus be regarded with reservation, even if it is not always possible to avoid it. However, when he offers a specific definition in the First Opusculum, Saint Maximus does affirm the positive dimension of human imagination. What is more, imagination is included in the human nature assumed by Christ, since it is a part of βούλησις that is not excluded from Him.  Of course, in Christ, the imagination of βούλησις is determined by the divine person. Whereas in human persons imagination contrasts power, in Christ, imagination coincides with power according to, one would say, a fortunate theological version of the May 1968 slogan “all power to the imagination”. What for the human nature of Christ is a transcendence of power, becomes a reality thanks to the personal union with the divine nature. The inclusion of imagination as a possibility to transcend human power (ἐξουσία) in Christology is the most radical valorisation of imagination one could have in Late Antiquity. Saint Maximus could thus also be regarded as a philosopher that has stressed the transcending, positive and creative character of imagination, a forerunner of modern philosophers of imagination such as Jean-Paul Sartre or Cornelius Castoriadis. After, βούλησις starts a process of volition that is related to the discursive investigation of the right means toward the chosen ends. This whole process is termed προαίρεσις. 31 The distinction between βούλησις and προαίρεσις is Aristotelian and reached Saint Maximus through Nemesius of Emesa. 32 But προαίρεσις can also be regarded as the final decisive moment, the decision, properly speaking. 33 In the context of the First Opusculum, προαίρεσις could be translated as “choice” in the sense that the term “choice” 31  Op.

1, PG 91, 16B–29C. “Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l’acte humain”, pp. 71–72; L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, Second Edition, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois, 1995, pp. 219–25; D.  Bradshaw, “St Maximus the Confessor on the Will”, p. 145. 33  J.-C. Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme selon Saint Maxime le Confesseur, Paris, 1996, p. 140. 32  R.-A. Gauthier,

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can describe both the entire process of election and its final moment. The first moment of this process is “deliberation” (βουλή or βούλευσις), an analytical, rational choice about the best way to achieve what is set as a goal. It is true that βούλευσις is not deprived of an appetitive element. But this is rather an “appetency for investigation” (ὄρεξις ζητητική). 34 Bούλευσις is a sort of deliberation, that comprehends investigation (ζήτησις) and rational thinking (σκέψις), being concluded at the moment of judgement (κρίσις), after which comes προαίρεσις as a kind of “casting a vote” (ψῆφος). 35 Concerning the latter, Saint Maximus’ choice of words has interesting political connotations that are arguably derived from the civil life of Late Antiquity. It is, however, to be noted that this whole process of προαίρεσις which is considered as the discursive aspect of the gnomic will36 is excluded from Christ according to Saint Maximus. It seems that for Saint Maximus the process of ambiguity and doubt that is necessarily linked to deliberative choice, is judged as unfit for a human nature that has already achieved its goal thanks to the hypostatic union with God. In Ian McFarland’s words: “For Maximus the Confessor, the act of choosing was a mark of the imperfection rather than the fulfillment of human freedom. To be truly free, for Saint Maximus, is not to be able to choose, but to have transcended the circumstances that make the exercise of choice necessary. Even as God does not choose the good, but wills it naturally, so the human existence is to be united to God that by grace we, too, will the good without any deliberation”. 37 Whereas imagination and discursive reason as such can be sinless, personal modifications of the natural will, deliberation might entail dilemmas that involve a choice between good and evil, something that would lead to a Nestorian Christology. The Neo-Chalcedonian and Anti-Nestorian priority of Saint Maximus’ Christology points to a Christ who does not always make the right choice, as in Nestorianism, but transcends choice and deliberation altogether. Saint Maximus would wish to avoid a Christology according to which 34  Op.

1, PG 91, 16B. 1, PG 91, 29A. 36  Op. 1, PG 91, 17C. 37  McFarand, “The Theology of the Will”, p. 517. 35  Op.

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Christ would not be a priori impassible but would have to master His passions gradually through the right moral choices. 38 For our modern mentality, lack of choice might be considered tantamount to a lack of freedom. But for Saint Maximus, true ontological freedom (αὐτεξούσιον) seems to be be considered more important than freedom of choice, since it implies a conscious participation in the soul’s movement towards the good, without the need to consider the choice between good and evil. Christ does possess the human αὐτεξούσιον, which constitutes the logos of human will, 39 however he does not have the mode (τρόπος) of the gnomic will, which is that of the “simple man” (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος), His logos of the αὐτεξούσιον being modified by the Divine Person of the Son that transcends will as choice. To be more precise, προαίρεσις is the cognitive aspect of the gnomic will. In the First Opusculum the relation between γνώμη and προαίρεσις is defined in a very explicit way.40 The gnomic will (γνώμη) is an appetitive disposition (διάθεσις) and a habitus (ἕξις). It is disposed toward the results of deliberative judgment. It is thus distinct from the more rational aspect of deliberative choice (προαίρεσις). Such remarks manifest a deep experience of the spiritual life. One might have made a choice after deliberation, but the true spiritual value lies rather in their disposition toward the objects of deliberation. Two different persons might perform exactly the same act, following the same line of reasoning, but at the same time have a different attitude toward this same decision. For example, almsgiving might be accompanied by an attitude of pride, unease, humbleness, or enthusiasm, etc. The same decision to abstain from food in the period of fasting might be a result of coercion, or of ascetic joy and gratitude. The importance attributed to the gnomic will by Saint Maximus shows the limits of rationalism in spiritual life. It is also important to note that for Saint Maximus the relation between γνώμη and προαίρεσις is one between habitus (ἕξις) and activity (ἐνέργεια). Γνώμη thus has

38  Larchet,

“Introduction”, p. 89. de l’Agonie du Christ. La Liberté Humaine du Fils de Dieu et Son Importance Sotériologique Mises en Lumière par Saint Maxime le Confesseur, Paris, 1979, p. 129. 40  Op. 1, PG 91, 17C. 39  F.-M. Léthel, Théologie

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the connotation of an attitude that precedes choice, but it also has the meaning of a stable disposition that is formed due to anterior moral choices and constitutes a person’s general moral character.41 If one were to put it in terms of Sartrean existentialism, γνώμη is the facticité of human volition, i.e. the result of previous choices that makes us have a certain disposition toward future decisions. The Ambiguity of Gnomic Will in the Entire Corpus of the Opuscula In order to fully understand why the gnomic will is excluded from Christ, one has to combine the definitions in the First Opusculum with declarations in the other Opuscula. Saint Maximus is determined to refute Nestorian Christology, as is evident in the Second Opusculum.42 Nestorianism considered the unity of Christ as a gnomic unity between different hypostatic centres. Saint Maximus replied by stressing the hypostatic unity of Christ and, at the same time, radically excluding the gnomic will both from Trinitarian theology and from Christology. What Saint Maximus feared was that a Christological unity based on the “consensus” of the gnomic wills would be too weak and would not do justice to the mystery of salvation. At the same time, a view of the Trinity as a communion of three different agents of gnomic will would lead to tritheism and would again fail to render the mystery of the Trinity’s loving unity. On the other hand, Saint Maximus does not have a negative view of gnomic will in anthropology. On the contrary, he stresses the importance of the gnomic will for ethical fulfillment. The notion of γνώμη is not restricted to lapsarian division and fragmentation. It can also mean that a particular created person has a certain situatedness that can be confirmed as an ethical force. In other words, trying to deny the existence of human gnomic will a priori would entail a false or even hypocritical notion of automatic initial universality of human nature. On the contrary, an ethical person affirms their situatedness, since particular moral traits are better than sheer abstraction, the latter being tantamount to anthropological Docetism. One should not merely deny 41  Larchet, 42  Op.

La divinisation, p. 140. 2, PG 91, 41D.

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their personal and collective history but should rather entrust it to God for redemption from its evil aspects. In this context, the gnomic will could also mean an ethical decisiveness and courage to overcome concrete obstacles (coming both from the past and the future). The latter is arguably an element that Saint Maximus inherits mostly from the Antiochian tradition; however, this does not entail a sort of “heroism” of the gnomic will, since the Maximian attitude is mostly one of humility, as well as of readiness to concede the gnomic will to God, but only after having affirmed it in the first place. The result of the Maximian theory of the gnomic will is thus a constant tension between the gnomic and the natural will in anthropology, which can be solved only in a Christological, ecclesiological and eschatological way. If the definitions of the First Opusculum are read together with the analysis in the other Opuscula, one can reach the following conclusions: According to the Third Opusculum, there can be no gnomic will in the Trinity, because this would mean an internal division that would lead to “Arian polytheism”43 or, even more, to “Greek theomachy”.44 By the latter, Saint Maximus could mean either the Ancient Greek myths about gods struggling with one another or with Titans, giants, etc., or even the Neoplatonic philosophical systems in which the different divine hypostases correspond to diverse ontological levels reminiscent of the Arian heresy. When excluding the gnomic will from the Trinity, Saint Maximus gives one more concise definition of it: it is “distinctive of the person”45 and “characterises the hypostasis”.46 But since the latter is not the case in the Trinity, it is restricted to humanity. In the Trinity, Saint Maximus envisages a complete combination of natural catholicity and personhood, according to which each person “comprises” the entirety of the supra-substantial substance, while also completely sharing it with the other two persons. The same is true for the divine natural will. In the 25th Opusculum,47 43  Op.

3, PG 91, 52B-C. 3, PG 91, 53B. 45  Op. 3, PG 91, 53C. 46  Op. 3, PG 91, 53C. 47  Op. 25, PG 91, 269D–273. See P.  Van Deun, “Les Capita X de Duplici Voluntate Domini attribués à Maxime le Confesseur (CPG 7697, 25)”, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 60 (2008), pp. 195–213. 44  Op.

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Saint Maximus remarks that Christ cannot have a will that is linked to deliberative choice (προαιρετικὸν θέλημα), since the latter would entail a gnomic division from the Father as well as from the Son. The divine will is conceived of as belonging to the Father, while at the same time being completely shared between the Three Persons, without any kind of separation due to the gnomic will. In the 7th Opusculum written around 640–641, the gnomic will is explicitly excluded from the human nature of Christ. The human will of Christ is only the natural one and “it is always determined and moved by the Divinity in order to complete the divine economy”.48 Whereas in trinitarian theology, the “enemy” is Arianism, in Christology, it is “Nestorianism”. The existence of gnomic will in the human nature of Christ would mean a separate human person. However, this trinitarian ontology of will is also a model for eschatological anthropology with the crucial difference that humans act with their gnomic will within history, in order to offer it to God in the eschaton. This is expressed in a much earlier work, namely the Ambigua, through the notion of the “offering of the gnomic will” (ἐκχώρησις γνωμική) to God.49 God would thus be the source of both human being and human movement. It is to be noted that eschatological anthropology cannot reach the level of unity that is to be found in the Trinity, because humanity is characterised by the gnomic will during its initial historical itinerary, before conceding it to God. For this reason, at many instances in the Opuscula,50 the human gnomic will is regarded as something positive that has to be assumed. The human ascetic struggle rather concerns a “coordination” (ὁμογνωμοσύνη) of different gnomic wills that is achieved through the “relational charitable disposition” (φιλικὴ ἐν σχέσει διάθεσις) and “consensus” (σύννευσις).51 The correct relation to our gnomic will is one of self-transcendence, that is, to transcend it from within only after having first subjectively assumed it. It is to be noted of course, that history and the eschata are not two independent compartments: the offering of our gnomic will (ἐκχώρησις γνωμική) can also happen within history 48  Op.

7, PG 91, 81D. 7, PG 91, 1076B. Constas, The Ambigua, I, 88–90. 50  Op. 4, PG 91, 57A-Β; Op. 16, PG 91, 185A; 193Β-C. 51  Op. 16, PG 91, 193B-C. 49  Amb.Ioh.

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through ascesis, but the latter rather means an anticipation of the eschatological condition through divine grace. Saint Maximus is trying to do justice to two different aspects of Christian spiritual life, namely on the one hand the concrete and realistic character of ascetic struggle within history, contrary to what I would term “anthropological Docetism” (namely, an extremely abstract and imaginary notion of human nature) and, on the other, the anticipation of the eschatological condition in the ecclesial life. The crucial question is whether the gnomic will is due to the created character of human person or to the Fall. In order to answer this difficult question one has first to notice that while in the First Opusculum the gnomic will is simply defined as “disposition” (διάθεσις) in the Third Opusculum it is also defined as “division” (διαίρεσις προσωπική).52 This definition has to be observed in combination with the Third Letter to John Cubicularius on love, in which the gnomic will is regarded as one of the three dimensions of the Fall, the other two being egoism (φιλαυτία) and pleasure (ἡδονή).53 However, Saint Maximus does not present the gnomic will as something introduced by the Fall. The gnomic will is not named as one of the causes or the results of the Fall in the Nominative case. On the contrary, Saint Maximus uses the phrase “according to the gnomic will” (κατὰ τὴν γνώμην) putting the word γνώμη in the Accusative case. This arguably means that the gnomic will pre-exists54 the Fall as a sort of a disposition toward God, and the Fall results in this “disposition” (διά-θεσις) being turned into a “division” (διά-στασις). It is rather egoism (φιλαυτία) that is the cause of the Fall: cutting off man’s orientation towards God and turning it towards oneself, thus provoking the division of nature. 55 Then, pleasure (ἡδονή) arises as a corruption of the intellectual desire for God that is then turned to the world, bringing with it the two vicious circles, one of pleasure and pain (ἡδονή - ὀδύνη), and the other of birth and death through 52  Op.

3, PG 91, 49A. 3, PG 91, 408–12. 54  The term “pre-exists” should not be conceived of in a strictly temporal sense, since for Saint Maximus the Fall of humanity happened simultaneously with its creation. 55  I. Hausherr, Philautie. De la tendresse pour soi à la charité selon Saint Maxime le Confesseur, Rome, 1952, pp. 88–90. 53  Ep.

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sexual reproduction (γέννησις – θάνατος). The latter means that human nature cannot achieve universality, but is “broken by egoism into many pieces”.56 Egoism is presented as the cause, while the gnomic will is considered only as a means through which man’s egoism is turned against man’s own nature.57 In the 16th Opusculum (around 643) one finds a similar view, that sin is a faux pas (ὀλίσθημα) of the gnomic will when nature is moved against its own reason and law.58 Here also, the reason for the Fall is attributed to a movement of nature against itself which is only followed by the gnomic will. This means that the gnomic will is not to be identified with the lapsarian will, even though the two might coincide in the fallen mode of existence. As Ian McFarland puts it: “Yet as much as it is true that human sin is bound up with gnomic willing, it would be a serious mistake to view the former as the inevitable result of the latter, as though the gnomic will were equivalent to the fallen will. Such an equation of gnomic and sinful willing would imply that the Fall was inevitable for creatures living under the conditions of time and space — a position that would impugn the goodness of nature in a way completely at odds with Saint Maximus’ theology of Creation”.59 Gnomic willing as such is therefore characteristic of created human hypostases and not of the lapsarian condition.60 At the same time, it is to be noted that the gnomic willing is not a natural power, faculty or capacity,61 such as the natural willing, but a created mode of the latter. By “created” I mean that human personhood is faced with the givenness of the pre-existent God as well as of a pre-existent world. Thusly, created personhood is necessarily “disposed” 56  Ep.

3, PG 91, 408D–409A. 3, PG 91, 408D–409A. 58  Ep. 3, PG 91, 192A. 59  McFarland, “Theology of the Will”, p. 522. 60  “Gnomic willing is a characteristic of human hypostases living in time and space and thus lacking an immediate perception of the good. Christ does not have a gnomic will because his hypostasis is the divine Word”. See McFarland, “Theology of the Will”, p. 526. It is to be noted that Maximus does not touch on the question of whether angels (and demons) have gnomic willing, a subject that would be philosophically very interesting regarding the question of the catholicity of the angelic nature. 61  Bradshaw, “St Maximus the Confessor on the Will”, p. 146. 57  Ep.

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(διάθεσις) toward an exteriority, namely both toward God, who has an unfathomable natural difference with created humanity, and toward the world which also preexists man. The human gnomic will would thus mean either a dilemma of orientation (being fundamentally oriented towards God or towards the world) or a dilemma between affirming or denying (affirming and returning God’s love would eventually entail an affirmation of His will for the future of the world, whereas denying God’s love would entail a “lapsarian” sticking to the world that brings death and division). I will not discuss here the question of the created personhood of angels since it needs a very lengthy discussion, which is not to be found in the Maximian corpus. To the best of my knowledge the question of whether angels have a gnomic will was not discussed explicitly by Saint Maximus, who prefered to stick to questions that have concrete soteriological implications for humanity. The personhood of angels is rather connected to their bearing a name and having an intellectual nature without an explicit discussion of the question of whether they have a gnomic will. It is to be noted that pre-lapsarian humanity does not absolutely coincide with the humanity that Christ assumes in the incarnation. In the First Opusculum, many of the characteristics that are attributed to humanity, such as investigation (ζήτησις) and deliberation (προαίρεσις),62 are excluded from Christ. After all, Adam is a created personal hypostasis, while Christ achieved the deification and catholicity of his human nature from the very beginning, due to the hypostatic union between the created and the uncreated.63 “Pre-lapsarian” humanity was, on the contrary, invited to a historical itinerary toward deification and catholicity. The difference lies more in the fact that, before the Fall, the gnomic will was rather a sort of availability of disposition toward God (διάθεσις), while, after the Fall, it is really concomitant with the division of lapsarian human nature and its loss of catholicity (διάστασις, μερισμός, ἀφορισμός). The lapsarian gnomic will 62  Op.

1, PG 91, 24A. the relation between catholicity and the hypostatic union, see J. Zizioulas, “Person and Nature in the Theology of St Maximus the Confessor”, in Knowing the Purpose of Creation through the Resurrection. Proceedings of the Symposium on St Maximus the Confessor, Belgrade, October 18–12, 2012, ed. by M. Vasiljević, Alhambra, California and Belgrade, 2013, pp. 85–113. 63  For

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means that each human being has a fragmented “piece” of human nature and thus has their own point of view and what one might call an “opinion” (this is, by the way, the prevailing meaning of the word “γνώμη” in Modern Greek). In Saint Maximus’ soteriology, especially in his Second Letter,64 love is called to convince the gnomic will, that is to say respecting it and trying to transform it from within. In the 7th Opusculum, the goal of coordination between the divided gnomic wills of different human persons is described as “consensus” (σύννευσις).65 In the definitions of the 14th Opusculum that are traditionally incorporated in the Maximian corpus, the coordination of the gnomic wills is characterized as “posterior consensus” (ἐπίνευσις), “charitable common disposition” (φιλικὴ συνδιάθεσις) and “relation” (σχέσις).66 Some of these terms, such as the term “relation” (σχέσις) are avoided when discussing Christ and the Trinity, because they have Nestorian undertones and are substituted by the term συμφυία, which denotes a deeper ontological unity. The “relational union” (σχετικὴ ἕνωσις) is defined as a will that brings the different gnomic wills together.67 Even though these definitions have an anti-Nestorian aim of denoting the relational union as weaker than a hypostatic or essential one, the union of the gnomic wills is depicted in a totally positive manner in the context of human nature. In fact, the only way that humanity can achieve universality through the ascetic struggle, is by imitating Christ’s example. This cannot be fully implemented within history due to the fact that Christ is an uncreated hypostasis. Toward a Definition of the Gnomic Will If one returns to the analysis of volition in the First Opusculum one can note that, after the expression of the gnomic will, comes urge (ὁρμή) and use (χρῆσις). Ὁρμὴ means a movement toward things in order to use them (χρῆσις).68 In the 26th Opusculum the 64  Ep.

2, PG 91, 396C-D. 7, PG 91, 80A. 66  Op. 14, PG 91, 152C. 67  Op. 14, PG 91, 152C. 68  Op. 1, PG 91, 21D. 65  Op.

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ὁρμή is related to the lower parts of the soul that humans share with animals or even with plants, such as sensation and growth. Thus, in the 26th Opusculum, ὁρμή seems to be considered as an element of human nature. However, in the 14th Opusculum69 ὁρμή is considered to be part of the gnomic will when it reaches out for the use of things. It thus seems that the more technical uses of the term ὁρμή connect it to the mode of the gnomic will instead of the natural one. The term “use” (χρῆσις) is also considered to be part of the definition of the gnomic will and to be a mode either of natural capacities70 or of moral objects71 determined by the person. This use is also defined as a sort of power (ἐξουσία) over moral objects.72 The notion of ἐξουσία is linked to human freedom as αὐτεξούσιον, which means to have power over one’s self and the ability to act morally. The αὐτεξούσιον as such is a natural capacity, but the particular uses of objects that depend on our power rather constitute personal modifications. To sum up the definition of the gnomic will: i) It is first of all a disposition (διάθεσις). In a narrow sense it is a disposition toward the object of deliberation. ii) It is also a habitus (ἕξις) that precedes the moral act. iii) In anthropology, the gnomic will distinguishes one person from another (ἀφοριστικόν). This is, however, not the case with divine personhood both in terms of the Trinity and in Christ. iv) There is an existential meaning of the gnomic will in the drama of Fall and salvation. Egoism (φιλαυτία) takes root in the (non-lapsarian) gnomic will as disposition (διάθεσις) and leads to the lapsarian fragmentation of nature. The postlapsarian gnomic will is concomitant with division (διαίρεσις, μερισμός) and fragmentation (κατάτμησις) of nature or even revolt (στάσις, μάχη) toward its universal and teleological character. In this sense, the gnomic will is tantamount to a partial opinion (δόξα), due to one having a fragmentary and subjective point of view. v) In soteriology, however, the gnomic will can have a positive meaning, since God is calling humanity to partake in the transfiguration of gnomic will through love, to a coordination 69  Op.

14, PG 91, 153B. 1, PG 91, 24B-C. 71  Op. 1, PG 91, 28D–29A. 72  Op. 1, PG 91, 17D. 70  Op.

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of our gnomic wills (ὁμογνωμοσύνη) and to reach a relational consensus (σύννευσις, φιλική συνδιάθεσις, σχετικὴ ἕνωσις). Despite the link between the gnomic will and the lapsarian mode of existence, Saint Maximus also has an optimistic view, according to which there can be “genuine progress towards blessedness in this life”73 through ascetic discipline of the gnomic will in cooperation with divine grace. vi) In anthropology, the gnomic will also has a cognitive meaning as partial knowledge (μερικὴ γνῶσις). vii) The gnomic will is also defined as a personal mode of use (τρόπος χρήσεως) both of interior natural capacities and of exterior moral objects (πρακτά). This entails power (ἐξουσία) over them and a certain urge (ὁρμή) toward them. viii) The eschatological depth of the soteriology of the gnomic will is in the final offering of human gnomic will to God (γνωμικὴ ἐκχώρησις). ix) In Trinitarian theology, the term preferred is συμφυία which denotes a deeper unity than exterior relation (σχέσις), as well as the absolute divine simplicity (ἁπλότης) of the supra-substantial substance. The will of the Father is absolutely shared by the other two Persons. There are thus not three gnomic wills that coincide in the Trinity, but one single, simple, natural will that expresses the simplicity and union of the ὁμοούσιον. x) In Christology, the term συμφυία is also preferred, in order to express the hypostatic union of the wills that is deeper and stronger than a simple relational union. Toward a Theory of Individuality Based on the Maximian Notion of the Gnomic Will It is to be noted that the Maximian definition of the gnomic will, in all its complexity, carries some characteristics of the modern individuality, such as the breaking of ties with community and natural surroundings or even self-reference. Of course, the gnomic will, as defined by Saint Maximus, does not contain all the panoply of self-reflection, self-consciousness and moral autonomy that are characteristic of modern individualism. But it does express a certain existential solitude that is distinctive of the modern individual. By comparison, the term ἄτομον denotes a neutral, logical, and metaphysical notion that does not contain the overtones 73  Mcfarland,

“Theology of the Will”, p. 522.

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of modern opposition between individuality and personhood.74 For Saint Saint Maximus, a non-lapsarian path toward ontological perfection would be a communal one, i.e., an ontological itinerary traversed by the entirety of humanity. After Christ, this is in a sense the ontological mission of the Church, namely that of a “synod”, in its etymological meaning as a “common way”. Saint Maximus inherits the Aristotelian notion of an ontological trajectory from potentiality to full actualization that is necessary for the teleological flourishing of beings. The tragic element of the gnomic will is that, in the lapsarian mode, this ontological trajectory is a lonely one. When the Church invites us to a coordination of our gnomic wills through ascetic struggle, this means a novel ontology, in which the universality of humanity can be achieved. There is however no easy short-cut to the Trinitarian model of universality. The simple human (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος) is called to a transformation of their gnomic will through love. In the First Opusculum, Saint Maximus describes in great detail the entire process of volition, balancing the cognitive, rational and affective elements as a very experienced psychologist. One could say that Saint Maximus follows a virtue ethics that is complemented by elements of consequentialism, though his main focus is pointing to a deeper human ontology. Saint Maximus wants to avoid false universalism on an anthropological level. The catholicity and universality of humanity is attained through a difficult struggle to subdue our instinctive egoism. At the same time, this goal of the universality of humanity is already achieved in the hypostatic union of Christ, according to a theology that today would be termed “inaugurated eschatology”, since the eschaton of human catholicity is already established in history thanks to Christ, but is also a goal for human beings. What one could retain from these Maximian notions in a modern or even late modern/post-modern context, is the fruitful ambiguity of the notion of the gnomic will. On the one hand, it is a tragic division of nature; on the other hand, it is a break and a finitude that humanity is invited to assume in order to reach catholicity through first being a finite, 74  For

a thorough comparison between the notions of πρόσωπον and ἄτομον, see J.-C.  Larchet, “Hypostase, Personne et Individu selon Saint Maxime le Confesseur”, Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique, 109 (2014), pp. 35–63.

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or even “broken” being. Between assumption and transcendence lies the adventure of human history. Jean-Claude Larchet remarks on this ambiguity of the gnomic will by comparing Saint Maximus with Saint Augustine of Hippo. Even though in Saint Maximus the gnomic will is linked to a lapsarian mode of the division of nature, which is also related to the results of ancestral sin (such as death and the sexual reproduction), the gnomic will is not always depicted in a pessimistic way. The gnomic will is weakened by the Fall, but it is not altogether evil, powerless and corrupted.75 At times, Saint Maximus’ view contains some of Saint Augustine’s pessimistic traits, but in its totality, it has an optimistic stance. Edward Siecienski has also convincingly shown that the Maximian theory of will demonstrates a possible rapprochement between different philosophical understandings of volition.76 For example, the Maximian endeavour is to conceive of human will as transcending the dilemma between libertarian freedom and deterministic compulsion.77 One can evoke the example of resistance during foreign occupation. The “choice” to resist is not a choice between two equal options: it is in fact viewed as the only option one has in order to save one’s dignity and freedom as such. It is a choice between freedom and unfreedom and thus not a “free” choice in the libertarian sense, nor of course a deterministic lack of agency. Saint Maximus emphasises the spontaneity of natural willing that could be received as a rejection of Late Medieval and Early Modern nominalistic voluntarism avant la lettre.78 In this sense, the ambiguity in the theory of the gnomic will helps Saint Maximus articulate a notion of the individual that is 75  J.-C. Larchet, Maxime le Confesseur Médiateur entre l’Orient et l’Occident, Paris, 1998, pp. 91–93. 76  E. Siecienski, “Maximus the Confessor and Ecumenism”, in Allen & Neil, OHMC, p. 561. 77  Mcfarland, “Theology of the Will”, p. 529. 78  See Bradshaw, “St Maximus the Confessor on the Will”, p. 153; D. Bathrellos, “St Maximus the Confessor’s Contribution(s) to the Notion of Freedom”, in Knowing the Purpose of Creation through the Resurrection. Proceedings of the Symposium on St Maximus the Confessor, Belgrade, October 18–12, 2012, ed. by M. Vasiljević, Alhambra, California and Belgrade, 2013, pp. 129–42.

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not a modern one, but nevertheless presents some interest for its own sake. The gnomic will means some initial disposition (διάθεσις) toward God that can characterize the human person. When the human philautia entails an orientation of humanity toward the world instead of God, the gnomic will coincides with a lapsarian mode of fragmentation. This notion of the gnomic will presents features, such as the break with natural or even human communitarian surroundings and a sort of traumatic scission in nature that recalls the emergence of the Western individual in times of acute historical crisis. After all, Saint Maximus’ own thoughts about fragmentation arguably reflect his experience of the fragmentation of the Graeco-Roman oecumene due to the Arab invasions that he had himself experienced wondering through a great part of the Mediterranean. In Saint Maximus, the gnomic will is not a centre of self-reflection; however, it is a centre of a fragmented approach to reality. The positive character of the gnomic will that we find especially in Saint Maximus’ ascetical writings means that ascetic struggle takes place through the assumption of the fragmented character of humanity without recourse to an easy, imagined catholicity. However, the ontological depth of the Maximian theory of the will is the eschatological surrender of the gnomic will to God, in order for human beings to find their catholicity within the hypostatic union in Christ. Saint Maximus’ theory of will is thus a denunciation of the false dilemma between, on the one hand, the arbitrariness of libertarian will that takes place in an ontological void, and, on the other, naturalistic determinism. The human gnomic will in Saint Maximus takes place within an eschatological horizon. In the eschaton, human gnomic will will lose its divisive character as διάστασις and will again be a mere διάθεσις. This διάθεσις however will be an ontological disposition toward the fact that God will have resurrected human nature in its universality. Whereas “damned” persons will have a disposition of external knowledge toward this event of the resurrection without participating lovingly in the novel universality of human nature, “saved” persons will have a desiring disposition of ever-lasting movement toward the Trinitarian God who offers this universality. It is in this sense that, in the eschaton, the personal mode will shall be one of mere disposition and not one of division.

INDICES INDEX OF MAXIMUS CITATIONS1 Additamenta e variis codicibus (CPG 7707) 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48-57 Ambigua ad Iohannem (CPG 7705.2) 7 (PG 91, 1076B; Constas, The Ambigua, I, 88-90) . . . 231 (PG 91, 1081A; Constas, The Ambigua, I, 98) . . . . . . 195 (PG 91, 1101B; Constas, The Ambigua, I, 140-141) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101-102 10.19

(PG 91, 1133D; Constas, The Ambigua, I, 205) . . . . . 151

15

(PG 91, 1217C; Constas, The Ambigua, I, 368) . . . . . . 97

16 17

(PG 91, 1221CD; Constas, The Ambigua, I, 379) . . . . 147 (PG 91, 1224A; Constas, The Ambigua, I, 379) . . . . . 147 (PG 91, 1229D; Constas, The Ambigua, I, 395) . . . . . 147

Ambigua ad Thomam (CPG 7705.1) (PG 91, 1036C; Constas, The Ambigua, I, 8) . . . . . . . 189 1 Capita theologica et oeconomica (CPG 7694) (PG 90, 1108C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97-98 1.68 Disputatio Bizyae sive Acta in primo exsilio seu dialogus Maximi cum Theodosio episcopo Caesareae in Bithynia (CPG 7735) (Allen & Neil 2002, 90-91) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 4 Disputatio cum Pyrrho (CPG 7698) (PG 91, 304CD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (PG 91, 344AB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (PG 91, 344B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (PG 91, 352C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

185 123 124 120

Epistulae XLV (CPG 7699) 3 (PG 91, 408D-409A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 15 1

(PG 91, 568C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Maximus’ works are arranged alphabetically.

242

indices (PG 91, 569BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 (PG 91, 576AB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Mystagogia (CPG 7704) 23 (PG 91, 700D-701A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Opuscula theologica et polemica (CPG 7697) (PG 91, 12BC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 1 (PG 91, 13B-16A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 (PG 91, 25B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 2

(PG 91, 40AB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123, 155

3

(PG (PG (PG (PG (PG (PG

6

(PG 91, 68B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 (PG 91, 68C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

7

(PG 91, 76A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 (PG 91, 81D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 (PG 91, 85C-88A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

9

(PG 91, 124CD). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

91, 91, 91, 91, 91, 91,

48AB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98-99 49). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99, 114 53A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 53B). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 56AB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116, 117 56CD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

13, 2:1-7 (CCSG 89, 7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203-204 14

(PG 91, 146CD). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204-205 (PG 91, 149D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205-206 (PG 91, 152AB). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206, 208-209

15

(PG 91, 153C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121-122

16

(PG (PG (PG (PG

20

(PG 91, 133D-136A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

91, 91, 91, 91,

193BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 193D-196A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 200BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152-153 205AB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189-190

Quaestiones ad Thalassium (CPG 7688) (CCSG 7, 77) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 8 (CCSG 7, 297) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 43,6 Relatio Motionis inter Maximum et principes (CPG 7736) (Allen & Neil 2002, 67) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 9

indices

243

INDEX OF NAMES 2 Acacius of Melitene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Alexander of Aphrodisias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Anastasius Bibliothecarius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 67-70, 80, 84 Apollinarius of Laodicea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 Aristotle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86-91, 96, 140, 156, 186, 203 Arius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Athanasius of Alexandria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179, 181-182, 184 Atticus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Augustine of Hippo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Balthazar, Hans Urs von. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Basil of Caesarea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138, 159 Berdyaev, Nikolai Alexandrovich.161,163-165, 167, 170, 176-178, 184 Berthold, George Charles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Bulgakov, Sergei Nikolaevich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164, 197 Castoriadis, Cornelius. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 Clement of Alexandria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Cyril of Alexandria .21, 28, 81, 107, 123, 127-128, 130, 133, 158-159 Cyrus of Alexandria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83, 120 Derrida, Jacques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168-169 Diogenes Laertius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140-141 Dionysius (Denis) the Areopagite (pseudo-). . . . . . . . . . 174, 202, 211 Epicurus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Eulogius of Alexandria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 59 Eunomius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93, 146 Eutyches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106-108, 112, 114 Galen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Gauthier, René-Antoine OP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Gilson, Étienne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167, 169-170, 177, 197 Gregory of Laodicea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Gregory of Nazianzus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 93, 128, 152, 160, 202 Gregory of Nyssa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92, 174, 202 Grillmeier, Aloys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Heraclius (emperor) . . . . . . . 28, 41, 66, 71-74, 76, 110, 120-121, 126 Honorius (pope) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70, 72-76, 78, 82-83, 112, 120 Hyman, Gavin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Iamblichus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Irenaeus of Lyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174, 180-181 John Cubicularius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 John IV (pope) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65-66, 70, 73-74, 78 2 Only names occuring in the main text (with the exclusion of the Introduction) have been listed.

244

indices

John Philoponus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 John the Councillor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 John the Evangelist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28-29 Larchet, Jean-Claude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215, 239 Lebon, Joseph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107, 131, 133, 135 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166, 209, 214 Leo (pope) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78, 107-108, 113, 123 Leontius of Byzantium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33-34, 106 Macarius of Antioch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Macedonius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Madden JohnD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 Mani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Marcion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Marinus of Cyprus (deacon, later priest) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66, 80 Martin I (pope) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 May, Gerhard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Menas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Nemesius of Emesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91, 219, 225-226 Nestorius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106, 109-110, 112, 114, 122-123, 130 Origen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91, 138 Parmenides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166, 181, 202 Paul of Samosata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Peter the Illustris (strategos of Numidia) . 34, 70, 72, 75-76, 79, 83 Plato. . . . . . . . . . . . . 87, 89, 167-169, 172-173, 181, 195, 197-198, 202 Plotinus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94-96, 169-173, 178-179 Porphyry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90, 100, 153 Proclus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203, 207 Pyrrhus of Constantinople . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70, 76, 110 Pythagoras. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Sartre, Jean-Paul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226, 229 Sergius of Constantinople . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-73, 79 Sergius the Grammarian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108, 121, 132 Severus of Antioch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75, 106-107, 110, 112, 158-159 Sherwood, Polycarp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76, 82, 113, 215 Simplicius. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Socrates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Sophronius of Jerusalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70, 78, 83, 113 Spinoza, Benedictus de. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Tatian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179-180 Thalassius (abbot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 65, 72, 83 Theodore (pope) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 70, 71-72, 75, 80 Theodore of Mopsuestia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 Theodosius of Caesarea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Theodosius of Gangra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Theophilus of Antioch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179-181

245

indices

Thomas Aquinas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208, 210 Zizioulas, John . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85, 163-164, 190-191, 196-198 INDEX OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL TERMS Accident (συμβεβηκός) 225

95, 158,

Activities / operations / actuality (ἐνέργεια) 11, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 66, 71, 93, 101, 106, 110, 111, 114, 117, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 138, 143, 144, 161, 225, 228 Anthropology 10, 22, 185, 202, 204, 205, 210, 211, 212, 216, 217, 219, 220, 229, 230, 231, 232, 236, 237, 238 Antinomy/antinomic

177

Appetite / appetency (ὄρεξις) 219, 220, 222, 223, 227, 228 Arianism

203, 231

Aristotelianism / Aristotelian tradition 20, 86, 90, 91, 93, 150, 214, 219, 225, 226, 238 Body (σῶμα) 21, 101, 102, 134, 142, 144, 149, 208

Communion (κοινωνία) 86, 116, 117, 177, 191, 192, 193, 211, 229 Composite / composition (σύνθετον) 18, 21, 27, 39, 49, 53, 67, 69, 72, 77, 102, 109, 114, 116, 117, 118, 124, 125, 126, 153, 201 Constitutive / constitution (σύστασις) 95, 100, 128, 129, 135, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 190, 210, 222 Consubstantial / Consubstantiality (ὁμοούσιον) 118, 192, 193, 208, 210; see also Homoousios Confusion (σύγχυσις) 55, 99, 102, 108, 114, 125, 130, 137, 138, 154, 155, 157, 185, 193; see also Mixture Creation (γένεσις) 151, 160, 162, 175, 176, 177, 181, 182, 183, 191, 194, 195, 221, 232, 233

96, 97, 166, 167, 178, 179, 184, 185, 196, 197,

150, 174, 180, 190, 199,

Christology 12, 22, 86, 106, 107, 112, 114, 117, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 133, 144, 151, 160, 161, 183, 202, 203, 205, 206, 214, 216, 217, 225, 226, 229, 231, 237

105, 119, 132, 164, 212, 227,

Coincidentia oppositorum 169

168,

Deification / divinization (θέωσις) 55, 99, 184, 204, 225, 234

Common (κοινός) 15, 21, 43, 45, 67, 106, 128, 140, 141, 143, 146, 148, 150, 153, 158, 159, 186, 202

Deliberation (βουλή / βούλευσις) 225, 227, 228, 234, 236

Cosmos / Universe 180, 181

(κόσμος)

246

indices

Deliberative choice (προαίρεσις) 227, 228, 231 Dialectics/dialectical 107, 168, 169, 173, 174, 175, 177, 189, 200 Disposition (διάθεσις) 88, 89, 217, 218, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234, 235, 236, 240 Distinction / difference (διαφορά / ἑτερότης) 21, 25,72, 87, 91, 95, 101, 102, 107, 108, 110, 112, 118, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 142, 145, 146, 148, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 164, 171, 178, 183, 186, 187, 188, 191, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 216, 218, 223, 224, 226, 234 Divine / Divinity (θεότης) 22, 27, 28, 33, 39, 40, 49, 51, 55, 57, 71, 72, 73, 80, 93, 95, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 123, 124, 127, 128, 131, 132, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 153, 155, 158, 160, 162, 163, 165, 174, 179, 181, 184, 185, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 230, 231, 232, 236, 237 Division (διαίρεσις) 99, 108, 112, 117, 118, 123, 132, 142, 154, 159, 191, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 236, 238, 239 Eschaton (ἔσχατον) 238, 240

102, 130, 218, 234,

222, 231,

Essence – Substance (οὐσία) 11, 21, 30, 53, 81, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 102, 103, 118, 124, 129, 130, 135, 136, 138, 139, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 158, 165, 178, 186, 190, 191, 192, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 224, 230, 237 Essential 112, 140, 168, 208, 235

/ Substantial 22, 94, 117, 118, 124, 132, 139, 149, 151, 154, 157, 159, 178, 190, 192, 205, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213,

Existentialism

229

Faculty see Power 220, 225, 233

125, 216,

Fall / lapsarian 115, 125, 148, 166, 217, 218, 221, 229, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240 Filioque 20, 66, 68, 69, 70, 81, 82, 84 Flesh (σάρξ) 29, 39, 57, 99, 109, 110, 124, 134, 137, 153, 204 Freedom (αὐτεξούσιον) 69, 81, 164, 175, 176, 177, 180, 182, 185, 190, 191, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 227, 228, 236, 239 Genus / genera (γένος) 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 150, 151, 152, 153, 168, 206, 209, 219 Gnomic will / Choice 22, 115, 117, 215, 218, 219, 227, 228, 231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240 Habitus (ἕξις)

(γνώμη) 216, 217, 229, 230, 235, 236,

228, 236

247

indices Homoousios (ὁμοούσιος) 204, 205; see also Consubstantial Human / humanity (ἄνθρωπος / ἀνθρωπότης) 22, 27, 28, 39, 40, 41, 49, 55, 57, 71, 72, 73, 74, 88, 93, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 109, 110, 114, 116, 117, 122, 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 172, 174, 176, 184, 185, 190, 191, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240 Hypostasis / subsistence (ὑπόστασις) 15, 19, 21, 51, 93, 95, 100, 108, 115, 117, 118, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 154, 163, 164, 179, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 196, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 216, 217, 219, 224, 230, 233, 234, 235 Hypostatized 189 Inclination (ἐφεσίς)

(ἐνυπόστατος) 219, 223

Identity (ταὐτότης) 21, 151, 169, 170, 171, 190, 191, 192, 193, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 222 Imagination (φαντασία) 224, 225, 226, 227

138,

Interpenetration (περιχώρησις) 46, 54, 69, 76, 109, 124, 127, 128, 135, 136, 139, 146, 159, 160, 162, 163, 168 Lapsarian see Fall Logic 85, 111, 115, 159, 168, 169 Logos / logoi (λόγος / λόγοι) 99, 125, 135, 144, 180, 189, 191, 192, 193, 195, 205, 212, 216, 217, 221, 224, 228 Macedonianism

86, 187, 198, 222,

203

Matter (ὕλη) 162n., 163, 172175, 177, 180-182, 196-199, 212 Metaphysics / metaphysical 86, 94, 129, 151, 153, 160, 166, 169, 179, 186, 187, 188, 203, 206, 209, 237 Mind / intellect (νοῦς) 124, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 150, 173, 195, 196 Mixture (σύγχυσις) 109, 113, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123; see also Confusion Mode of existence (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως) 86, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 124, 187, 189, 217, 233, 237 Monism/monistic 178, 191, 193

166, 169, 176,

Monoenergism 23, 33, 34, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 83, 161, 202, 215, 225 Monophysite / Monophysitism 23, 33, 54, 106, 108, 113, 114, 116, 119, 120, 123, 125,

248

indices 128, 130, 131, 159, 161, 176, 215

Monothelete / Monthelitism 20, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 82, 83, 84, 161, 202, 215 Movement (κίνησις) 97, 116, 171, 188, 220, 223, 228, 231, 233, 235, 240 Mythology

117, 180

Nature (φύσις) 19, 39, 40, 41, 55, 67, 73, 79, 85, 89, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 124, 125, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 140, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 150, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 166, 172, 176, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 199, 200, 203, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 240 Neoplatonism / neoplatonic 15, 18, 20, 21, 94, 156, 168, 169, 185, 230 Nestorianism / Nestorian 33, 106, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 122, 123, 130, 131, 137, 203, 217, 227, 229, 231, 235 Ontology / ontological 21, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 97, 129, 130, 131, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191,

192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 203, 204, 206, 207, 210, 211, 212, 214, 218, 219, 220, 224, 225, 228, 230, 231, 235, 238, 240 Orthodoxy / orthodox 15, 18, 19, 40, 69, 71, 73, 80, 82, 84, 106, 108, 134, 162, 163, 202, 203 Ousia see Essence Participation (μέθεξις) 177, 191

86, 150,

Perfection (τελειότης) 49, 57, 167, 210, 221, 227, 228 Person (πρόσωπον) 72, 85, 100, 108, 130, 161, 162, 164, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 216, 217, 218, 224, 228, 229, 232 Platonism

90, 168, 177, 222

Power / potentiality / faculty (δύναμις) 41, 57, 66, 69, 83, 84, 89, 119, 123, 146, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 158, 173, 175, 179, 181, 182, 183, 185, 200, 209, 219, 220, 225, 226, 233, 236, 237 Principle of nature (λόγος τῆς φύσεος) 124 Property 119, 145, 158,

(ἰδιότης) 89n., 116, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 147, 153, 154, 156, 157, 189

Quality (ποιότης) 21, 95, 118, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 143, 144, 145, 146, 151, 155, 156, 157,

249

indices 158, 159, 160, 165, 190, 192, 198 Reason (διάνοια)

102, 224, 227

Relationship (σχέσις) 98, 101, 103, 201 Rest (στάσις)

97

Sabellianism

203

93, 96,

Simple / simplicity (ἁπλός / ἁπλότης) 49, 53, 109, 118, 138, 154, 158, 237 Soteriology 237

211, 212, 235, 236,

Soul (ψυχή) 101, 102, 110, 119, 120, 125, 134, 142, 142, 171, 172, 173, 204, 208, 216, 220, 223, 228, 236 Species / form (εἶδος) 91, 135, 136, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 157, 160, 202, 205, 207, 219

210, 211, 212, 229, 231, 237, 238, 240 Union (ἕνωσις) 21, 39, 55, 57, 99, 108, 109, 110, 114, 118, 123, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137, 161, 162, 163, 165, 173, 177, 179, 184, 186, 191, 192, 201, 203, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 223, 226, 227, 229, 234, 235, 237, 238, 240 Universals

142, 149, 150, 160

Universe see Cosmos Volition (θέλησις / βούλησις / προαίρεσις) 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 226, 229, 235, 238, 239 Whole (ὅλον)

102, 117, 153, 163

Transcendence 139, 175, 207, 211, 226, 231, 239

Will (θέλημα) 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 39, 40, 41, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 106, 107, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 125, 126, 128, 132, 152, 153, 154, 157, 163, 183, 185, 195, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240

Trinitology / Trinitarian 85, 93, 122, 126, 187, 188, 190, 202,

Wisdom (σοφία) 181, 195

Substrate / subject (ὑποκείμενον) 91, 93, 94, 116, 134, 143, 145, 149, 151, 152, 153, 213, 216 syllogism/syllogistic Tehomophobia

39, 40

199, 200

91, 105, 148,

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Christian Boudignon is Associate Professor of classics at Aix-Marseille University (France). He is working in Greek patristics, and especially on Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and Origen. He has published Maximi Confessoris Mystagogia in the Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca (n° 69), Turnhout, Brepols, 2011, and with Matthieu Cassin Grégoire de Nysse, Homélies sur le Notre Père in the Sources chrétiennes (n° 596), Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 2018. Currently he is preparing a new critical edition of Origen’s De oratione. E. Brown Dewhurst is an independent researcher in early Greek Christian theology, based in Glasgow (Scotland). They recently completed a post-doctorate at LMU Munich funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement (‘The Absence of Sex and Gender in Early Byzantine Theology’). Brown Dewhurst holds a PhD in Theology from Durham University (‘Revolution in the Microcosm: Love and Virtue in the Cosmological Ethics of St Maximus the Confessor’), a Master of Theology by Research Ecclesiastical History, and an MA with Honours Divinity and History both from the University of Edinburgh. Their research interests are Maximus the Confessor and Gregory of Nyssa and their theological relevance for contemporary ethical topics. Recent articles include ‘Beyond the Borders of Society: Sex and Gender as Tropos in Maximus the Confessor’s Theology and Its Relevance to Contemporary Ethics’, Theology & Sexuality (2022) and ‘On the Soul and the Cyberpunk Future: St Macrina, St Gregory of Nyssa, and Contemporary Mind/Body Dualism’, Studies in Christian Ethics (2020). Kevin M. Clarke is the Dean of the Institute for Lay Ministry and Associate Professor at Sacred Heart Major Seminary (Detroit, U.S.A.). His research interests include patristic Biblical interpretation, especially the Church Fathers’ spiritual exegesis. He co-edited  Patristic Spirituality: Classical Perspectives on Ascent in the Journey to God, in the Studies in Theology and Religion series (Brill,

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list of contributors

2022). He also edited and introduced The Sayings of the Fathers of the Church: The Seven Deadly Sins (CUA, 2018). He is presently translating Maximus’s Opuscula and Dispute with Pyrrhus for CUA’s Fathers of the Church Series. He has published in the Irish Theological Quarterly, Nova et Vetera, Scrinium, Logos, Heythrop, the Angelicum Journal,  Vox Patrum, the Review of Biblical Literature, and the  Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception. He is a member of numerous academic societies, including the International Association of Patristic Studies, where he is the national correspondent for the United States.  Vladimir Cvetković is a research associate professor at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade (Serbia). His research interests include Patristics, Ancient and Byzantine Philosophy, and Modern Orthodox Theology. He is co-editor (together with Alex Leonas) of the Subsidia Maximiana, a subseries dedicated to studies of the work of Maximus the Confessor as part of the Instrumenta Patristica et Medievalia series (IPM), published by Brepols. His recent books include: Justin Popović: Synthesis of Tradition and Innovation (2021, in Serbian); Thought and Mission of St Justin Popović (2019, edited together with Bogdan Lubardić in Serbian), and From “Merciful Angel” to “Fortress Europe”: The Perception of Europe and the West in Contemporary Serbian Orthodoxy (University of Erfurt, 2015). Aleksandar Djakovac is an Associate Professor at the Orthodox Theological Faculty of the University of Belgrade and teaches at the Department of Systematic Theology. He researches in the areas of dogmatic theology, patristics, ethics, and the social role of the Church. His recent books include: The Same Yesterday and Today and Forever (2020, in Serbian); Spoken and Unspeakable: Discursiveness of Asmatic Ontology in the Aporetics of St. Maximus the Confessor (2018, in Serbian); Heavenly Jerusalem and the Secular Kingdom: Essays on the Church and Secularism (2018, in Serbian). Romilo Aleksandar Knežević (Dphil, Oxon) is a research associate professor at the Innovation Center of the University of Niš (Serbia) and also adjunct professor at the Department of Comparative Literature and Literary Theory of the University of Belgrade. His research focuses on the question of ontological freedom and personality, especially as expounded in the work of

list of contributors

253

Nikolai Berdyaev, the noted Russian religious philosopher. His other research interest includes patristics, German Idealism, Jacob Boehme, contemporary Orthodox theology, as well as Martin Heidegger and C. G. Jung. His recent books include: Time and Cognition: A Theological Reading of Marcel Proust (Belgrade, Orthodox Faculty of Theology, 2011, in Serbian), and Homo Theurgos: Freedom According to John Zizioulas and Nikolai Berdyaev (Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 2020, in English). Alex Leonas is associate professor at the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary. He holds an M.Phil from the University of Oxford and a PhD from the Sorbonne (University of Paris-IV). He has written and published on history of religion and French literature: Recherches sur le langage de la Septante (OBO 211, Fribourg-Göttingen, 2005); L'Aube des Traducteurs (Paris, Cerf, 2007); Les petites fleurs de sainte Marguerite de Hongrie (Paris, Cerf, 2013); Muse étrangère. Petite anthologie poétique de l’Europe française (Kiel/Bastia, Solivagus, 2015); together with Marianne Sághy, he edited Pierre Dubois, De la reconquête de la Terre Sainte… (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2019). Sebastian Mateiescu is currently an EU Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at the Institute for Philosophy, Leiden University (Netherlands), working on the project “The interpretation of the differentia during late antique and early Christian thought” which investigates the reception of the notion of difference, a key term in Aristotelian and Neo-platonic logic into the Byzantine Christological debates. He has previously held research positions in the fields of History of philosophy, Patristics and Byzantine studies at the University of Bucharest, University of Lausanne and Institute for Ecumenical Research, Sibiu (IÖFH). His broad interests include the history of Christian thought, the history of philosophy and science, while his recent work lies at the intersection of late antiquity and Christianity, with a focus on the philosophical tools shaping Greek patristic thought. Bronwen Neil is Professor of Ancient History in the Department of History and Archaeology at Macquarie University (Sydney). Her research focuses on Byzantine cultural history from the fourth to tenth centuries, with an emphasis on east-west church relations, letters, gender and hagiography. She is an elected fel-

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low of the Australian Academy of Humanities. She has recently published  Dreams and Divination from Byzantium to Baghdad (400-1000 CE) (Oxford, 2021), and with Pauline Allen, Greek and Latin Letters in Late Antiquity: The Christianisation of a Literary Form  (Cambridge, 2020), and Conflict and Negotiation in the Early Church  (Washington DC, 2020). She is currently co-editing The Cambridge Companion to the Byzantine Church with Andrew Mellas.  Bram Roosen is research associate at the KU Leuven (Belgium). His research is mostly philological and focused on the oeuvre of Maximus the Confessor. He is coordinator of the online Clavis Clavium (https://clavis.brepols.net/clacla/) and director of the editorial board of the Claves subseries of the Corpus Christianorum (Brepols). Dionysios Skliris holds a PhD from the University of Paris IV-Sorbonne (‘The term tropos (mode) in the thought of Maximus the Confessor’). He also holds a Masters in Late Antique and Byzantine Studies from the University of London (‘The theory of evil in Proclus: Proclus’ Theodicy as a completion of Plotinus monism’), a Masters II in Byzantine Literature from the University of Paris IV- Sorbonne, a BA in Classics, and a BA in Theology from the University of Athens. He is currently a Teaching Fellow at the Hellenic Open University. His works include On the Road to Being: Saint Maximus the Confessor’s Synodical Ontology (Alhambra CA, Sebastian Press, 2018), and Logos – Mode – Telos: A study in the thought of Saint Maximus the Confessor (Athens, Indiktos – Alhambra CA, Sebastian Press, 2018, in Greek). He is also the editor of the volume Slavoj Žižek and Christianity (Routledge, 2018). Ryan W. Strickler is Lecturer in Ancient History at the University of Newcastle (New South Wales). His interests include authority, identity, and crisis management in Byzantine and Late-Roman imperial history and literature. He recently edited  Dissidence and Persecution in Byzantium: From Constantine to Michael Psellos (Brill, 2021) with Danijel Džino. Miklós Vassányi holds a PhD in philosophy from the KU Leuven (Anima mundi. The Rise of the World Soul Theory in Modern German Philosophy, published by Springer, 2011) and a PhD in

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history from Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest (The Theology of St Maximus the Confessor, published in Hungarian, 2017). He has been working at Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary as an associate professor of philosophy and religious studies. His research interests include early Byzantine theology, Scholasticism, and recently, the early Syriac Church Fathers.