The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada 9781442631762

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Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
Chapter One. THE POLITICAL EXECUTIVE
Chapter Two. THE BUREAUCRACY
Chapter Three. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
Chapter Four. THE LEGISLATURE
Chapter Five. INTELLIGENCE
Chapter Six. PLANNING
Chapter Seven. NEGOTIATION
Chapter Eight. PROPAGANDA
References
Index
Recommend Papers

The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada
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THE AR T O F TH E POSSIBL E

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THE ART

OF THE POSSIBLE

Government and

Foreign Polic y in Canada

UNIVERSITY O F TORONTO PRES S

James Eayrs

© Universit y of Toronto Press 1961 Reprinted 1966 , 1971, in the U.S.A. ISBN 0-8020-1164-0 (clothboun d edition) ISBN 0-8020-6054-4 (paperboun d edition )

Acknowledgments

This stud y o f ho w institutions , agencie s an d servant s o f governmen t conduct Canada' s externa l affair s i s part o f a projec t o f th e Schoo l of International Servic e of American University, Washington, D.C., which , under a gran t fro m th e Rockefelle r Foundation , i s sponsorin g a n investigation o f th e wa y foreig n policy i s mad e i n variou s countries . I am gratefu l t o Dr . Kennet h Thompson o f the Foundatio n fo r suggestin g me as a possible author, an d to Dean Ernest S. Griffith o f the Schoo l fo r inviting me to take part. I recall with pleasure the lively weekl y meeting s of th e semina r of staf f an d student s a t th e Schoo l directe d b y Professo r Charles O . Lerche , Jr. , i n whic h I wa s a s regula r a participan t a s th e vagaries o f commutin g between Toront o an d Washingto n durin g th e Fall an d Winte r o f 1959-6 0 woul d permit . I a m gratefu l t o th e authorities a t the Universit y of Toront o fo r permissio n to absen t mysel f for tw o or three days a week for this purpose, an d I shoul d lik e to offe r belated thank s to m y student s o f tha t tim e fo r thei r forbearanc e whil e I wa s living too much "the airpor t existence. " In writing the book I have been greatl y assiste d b y those who gener ously allowe d m e t o mak e us e o f thei r ow n unpublishe d work : Pro fessor J . R . Mallor y of McGill University, who made availabl e chapter s of hi s work in progres s o n th e governmen t of Canada ; th e Hon . J . W . Pickersgill, wh o enable d m e to consul t the firs t volum e of hi s infinitely valuable Mackenzie King Record in proof form ; General Mauric e Pope, who allowe d m e t o quot e passage s fro m th e manuscrip t o f hi s auto biography, whic h is happily to be published a t a later date ; Mr. Mitchel l Sharp, fo r allowin g m e t o us e hi s speech , "Reflection s o f a Forme r Civil Servant"; Mr . Keit h Spicer, who provided me with an unpublishe d paper o n th e administratio n o f Canadia n foreig n aid an d place d a t m y disposal hi s first-han d knowledg e of thi s subject . I a m indebte d t o m y colleague, Professo r Pau l Fox , fo r allowin g m e t o mak e us e o f th e records o f his extensiv e interviews wit h member s of Parliament . I wa s also fortunat e in bein g abl e t o rea d th e unpublishe d doctora l thesi s of Professor R . Barr y Farrel l o f Northwestern University, o n "Th e Plan ning and Conduct o f Foreign Polic y i n Canada, " representing , s o far a s I know , the only research done on the subjec t o f my own book. Among the man y collections o f papers which I hav e used, none has bee n mor e

VI ACKNOWLEDGMENT

S

valuable than the papers of the late W. L. Mackenzi e King . I a m grate ful t o hi s literary executors , Dr . W . Kaye Lamb, Mr . F . A . McGregor , the Hon. J . W . Pickersgill, an d Mr. Norma n Robertson , fo r permissio n to quote from thi s immense source; for permission t o quote from certai n documents draw n fro m th e perio d 1924-3 9 I a m indebte d a s wel l t o Dr. Blai r Neatby , wh o i s writin g the officia l biograph y fo r thes e years . I wan t particularl y t o pa y tribut e t o th e patien t an d alway s helpfu l services o f th e staf f o f th e Publi c Archive s o f Canada , especiall y Mis s Jacqueline Cot e (no w Mrs . Blai r Neatby ) an d he r assistant s whos e long an d carefu l labour s hav e transformed some two million document s of th e Kin g Paper s int o a n incomparabl e instrumen t fo r th e stud y of Canadian politics an d society . I a m gratefu l a s wel l t o thos e wh o hav e se t asid e mor e importan t business to read and comment upo n m y manuscript. Mr. Joh n Holmes, President o f the Canadia n Institute of International Affair s an d formerly Assistant Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , rea d mos t o f it an d offered , ou t o f hi s grea t experience , man y helpfu l suggestions . Colonel C . P . Stacey , Directo r o f th e Historica l Sectio n o f th e Genera l Staff an d no w Professo r o f Histor y a t th e Universit y o f Toronto , rea d the chapte r o n "Th e Militar y Establishment" ; his unrivalled knowledg e of thi s subject , generousl y shared , prevente d a numbe r o f error s o f fact an d judgmen t large an d small . A goo d frien d o f man y years rea d the entir e manuscrip t a t ver y shor t notice , an d m y gratitud e t o hi m i s in n o wa y diminishe d b y th e fac t that , bein g i n governmen t service , he prefers no t t o b e mentione d by name . The quatrai n on page 16 7 is from Pagett, M.P., b y Rudyard Kipling, and i s reproduced wit h th e kin d permissio n of Mrs. George Bambridge, the Macmilla n Co . o f Canada, Methue n an d Co. , Ltd. , an d Doubleda y & Co., Inc . My fina l pleasan t dut y i s t o expres s m y thank s t o th e member s o f the Universit y o f Toront o Pres s fo r thei r helpfu l co-operatio n a t ever y stage o f th e productio n o f m y book ; an d especiall y t o Mis s Jea n Jamieson, o f its Editorial Staff , fo r s o much friendly encouragemen t an d skilful aid . J.E. University o f Toront o July 196 1

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS / v I/THE POLITICA L EXECUTIVE/ 3

The Prim e Minister ; Prim e Ministe r an d Cabinet ; Prim e Minister and Foreign Minister ; Prim e Minister an d Governo r General

II/THE BUREAUCRAC Y / 32

The Senio r Civi l Servant ; Th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs ; Th e Hea d o f Mission ; Th e Foreig n Ser vice Officer ; Th e Attache ; Th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs

III/THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMENT/7 0

The Civil-Military Tradition; Soldier s and Governments: Th e Years between the Wars; Th e Secon d World War: The Principle o f Civilia n Supremacy ; Civil-Militar y Relation s i n th e Nuclear Ag e

IV / TH E LEGISLATURE / 10 3

Foreign Policy , Legislative-Executive Relations, and the Parliamentary System ; "Parliamen t Wil l Decide" ; Th e Cabinet , the Hous e o f Commons , an d Discussio n o f Foreig n Affairs ; The Member of Parliament and Foreign Policy; Parliamentar y Committees

V/INTELLIGENCE/124

The Origin s an d Developmen t o f Intelligenc e Facilities ; In telligence an d Foreig n Policy : Th e Year s betwee n th e Wars ; Intelligence an d Foreign Policy: The Second World War; Th e Contemporary Intelligenc e Community

VI / PLANNING/T 51 Plan o r No Plan?; Foreig n Polic y Plannin g an d th e Nationa l Style; Machiner y fo r Foreig n Polic y Plannin g VII / NEGOTIATIO N / 160 The Negotiato r an d Hi s Changin g World ; Th e Developmen t of Negotiatin g Machinery; Policy-makin g an d Negotiation: A t

Vlll CONTENT

S

Home and Abroad; Policy-makin g and Negotiation: Abov e and Below ; Policy-makin g an d Negotiation : Ope n an d Closed Vlll / PROPAGAND A / 18 2

Propaganda versus "Publicity" ; Earl y Propagand a fo r Immi gration and Trade; Wartim e Propaganda in the United States; Propaganda an d Foreig n Polic y sinc e 1945

REFERENCES / 203 INDEX/217

THE AR T O F TH E POSSIBL E

To E.K.W. in gratitude

ChapterOne TH

E POLITICA L

EXECUTIVE

THE PRIM E MINISTE R

Politics i n Canad a hav e produce d government s of extraordinar y longe vity. The y hav e als o produce d smal l an d feebl e oppositions , t o th e debility o f Parliamen t an d th e aggrandizemen t o f th e Executive . Th e Cabinet stand s supreme, an d withi n hi s Cabine t (his , for h e make s i t and ma y brea k it ) th e Prim e Ministe r enjoy s a pre-eminenc e othe r parliamentary system s seldom provide . The greate r prestig e o f hi s offic e an d th e greate r powe r o f hi s perso n are most obviously accounted for by the lesser lustr e o f his colleagues in Cabinet, an d thi s i n tur n b y a conventio n o f cabinet-makin g wherei n the political Executiv e becomes a miniature of the Canadian community . Regions, provinces , race s an d creed s ar e represente d i n th e Ministr y with as exact fidelity to the origina l a s may be allowe d b y the sometime s competing consideration s o f securin g tolerable efficienc y i n administra tion an d havin g t o rewar d friend s an d punis h foes . N o wonde r tha t cabinets o f al l th e talent s ar e rar e i n Canadia n politica l life : wha t i s more remarkabl e i s tha t powerfu l an d abl e ministrie s occasionall y emerge. Bu t th e genera l resul t i s th e elevatio n o f th e Prim e Ministe r over al l th e othe r ministers . Thos e whos e claim s t o offic e deriv e principally fro m th e accident s o f geograph y or th e imperative s o f part y stand o n a lowe r leve l o f competence ; whil e hi s equal s i n politica l sagacity an d administrativ e abilit y ca n neve r forge t tha t i t i s t o th e Prime Ministe r the y ow e thei r portfolio s an d a t hi s pleasur e continu e to hold them . The usual description o f the Prime Minister' s relationshi p to hi s ministeria l colleague s a s primus inter pares is eve n les s accurat e in Canadia n than i n Britis h parliamentary practice. "H e canno t b e first among his equals for the very excellent reason tha t he has no equals." 1 All thi s applie s wit h ver y specia l forc e t o foreig n affairs . Th e Prim e Minister bear s inevitabl y a uniqu e responsibilit y fo r hi s country' s ex ternal polic y eve n i f b y tast e an d temperamen t h e ha s littl e interes t i n it; an d circumstance s mak e it likely tha t h e will have to o muc h interest

4 TH

E ART OF THE POSSIBLE

rather tha n to o little . Importan t official s concerne d wit h th e formula tion an d executio n o f foreign policy ar e appointe d o n his recommenda tion; ambassadors , general s an d deput y minister s ar e alik e beholde n t o him for thei r positions . T o hi m ar e normall y addresse d importan t com munications fro m th e politica l head s o f foreig n governments , an d wit h the technicall y non-foreign government s of th e Commonwealt h o f Na tions consultatio n proceed s conventionall y o n a Prim e Minister-to Prime Minister basis. To him are referred important foreig n policy com munications receive d i n th e Department s o f Externa l Affairs , Nationa l Defence, Trad e an d Commerce an d others . Visitin g dignitaries , wishin g to exchang e impressions of th e internationa l scene, wil l want t o confe r with th e Prim e Ministe r rathe r tha n wit h an y o f hi s colleagues . Good will tour s i n foreig n land s ad d furthe r t o hi s rang e o f influentia l con tacts, providin g sources o f privat e informatio n long afte r th e journey' s end, a s do excursions into the increasingly fashionable realm of "summi t diplomacy." I t i s the Prim e Minister' s tas k t o shap e th e recommenda tions o f hi s foreig n polic y technician s (amon g who m th e Secretar y o f State fo r External Affair s ma y or may not b e numbered) t o the require ments of domestic politics an d to impar t to them the correctives deeme d necessary fo r partisa n advantage . And i n time s o f crisis , whe n th e na tion i s rouse d fro m it s accustome d privat e preoccupation s t o appre hensive awarenes s o f externa l danger , i t i s th e Prim e Ministe r wh o through pres s an d radi o an d televisio n must play the fathe r figure , pro viding reassurance and guidance and hope. Foreign polic y is his prerogative; the range and intimacy of his concern ar e rarely matche d b y an y of his colleagues , eve n b y hi s foreig n secretary . PRIME MINISTE R AN D CABINE T

The exten t t o whic h th e Prim e Ministe r allow s member s o f hi s Cabi net t o shar e i n th e mysterie s o f foreig n polic y i s a s muc h a matte r o f individual temperamen t an d styl e as it is a matter o f constitutiona l law , perhaps a goo d dea l more . A Prim e Minister ma y resemble i n thi s th e Duke o f Plazo Toro , leading "hi s regimen t from behind" ; anothe r ma y prefer th e vanguard. Some have been possessive , eve n secretive, i n thei r conduct o f foreig n affairs ; other s hav e take n thei r colleague s int o thei r confidence an d looke d t o the m for counsel . T o stat e wit h an y precisio n the natur e o f a Prim e Minister' s relation s wit h hi s Cabine t i n matter s of foreig n policy o r an y othe r kin d o f polic y i s no t easy ; a stric t con vention prescribe s tha t Cabine t proceeding s are secre t an d mus t remain

THE POLITICA L EXECUTIV E 5

secret.* Bu t fro m availabl e privat e paper s an d certai n othe r evidenc e (which cannot , however , includ e Cabine t minutes) , som e impressio n may b e gaine d o f ho w variou s prim e minister s hav e gon e abou t thei r foreign polic y busines s i n relatio n t o thei r Cabine t colleagues . WDfrid Laurier' s manne r o f conductin g Cabine t busines s ha s bee n the subjec t o f conflictin g opinion. Accordin g t o hi s officia l biographer , "he believe d i n givin g ever y ministe r wid e latitude an d larg e responsi bility. . . . I n cabine t council s h e never playe d th e dictator." 2 Agains t this may b e se t the testimon y o f Si r Clifford Sifton , a powerfu l membe r of hi s Government : " I wa s no t Si r Wilfri d Laurier' s colleagu e fo r eight year s withou t findin g ou t tha t h e is , despit e hi s courtes y an d gracious charm , a masterful ma n set on having his own way, and equall y resolute tha t hi s colleagues shal l no t hav e thei r wa y unless thi s i s quit e agreeable t o him." 3 Laurie r himsel f rarel y wrot e o n th e matte r an d when he did , a s to a friend durin g the earl y year s of his administration , not ver y helpfully : "Ho w littl e peopl e reall y kno w o f wha t i s reall y going on in a Cabinet." 4 In foreig n affair s Laurie r wa s readie r tha n mos t o f hi s successor s t o allow th e participatio n o f hi s Cabine t colleagues . Suc h a dispositio n owed muc h to hi s serenit y of spiri t an d a temperament t o whic h secret iveness an d paranoi a wer e wholl y alien . I t wa s als o a consequenc e o f strong an d ofte n conflictin g view s hel d b y hi s colleague s abou t th e major issues : reciprocit y (whic h brough t abou t Sifton' s resignatio n i n 1905), imperia l preference , th e Boe r War , th e contributio n t o Empir e defence, orienta l immigration . I n addition , lac k o f diplomati c repre sentatives abroa d mean t tha t negotiation s wer e frequentl y entrusted t o ministers o f department s principall y concerne d (se e below , chapte r vn). Suc h functiona l divisio n o f labou r i n externa l affair s naturall y imparted a collegial character to consideratio n o f foreign policy matters. It als o tende d t o dela y thei r settlement . "I t ha s bee n impossibl e t o ge t anything out o f you r Ministers," th e Britis h ambassado r a t Washingto n complained t o th e Governo r Genera l i n 1910 : I ha d take n u p th e Behrin g Se a Sea l Treat y wit h th e U.S . an d the y wer e very compliant , apparentl y dispose d t o mee t al l Canada' s objections . Bu t since I reporte d this , no w som e thre e week s ago , no t a wor d i n repl y ca n be got , eve n thoug h I hav e writte n bot h t o Laurie r an d t o you r Adminis trator. Perhap s thi s i s du e t o th e scatterin g o f Ministers , an d t o th e habi t *As a n illustratio n o f th e severit y o f thi s conventio n on e ma y not e tha t a resigning Ministe r i s no t allowe d t o disclos e th e difference s wit h hi s colleague s that have led to his resignation without the authorizatio n o f th e Prim e Ministe r as the custodia n of Cabine t secrets .

6 TH

E ART OF TH E POSSIBL E

of embodyin g al l decision s i n a Minut e o f th e Priv y Council . Tha t i s a pla n which i s really quit e unfitte d for negotiation s wit h anothe r power . I t make s every ste p i n progres s depen d o n th e possibilit y o f gettin g Minister s to gether fo r a Council. . . .5

All thi s di d no t mean , o f course , tha t th e Prim e Ministe r migh t no t embark o n negotiation s withou t th e knowledg e or consen t o f hi s Cabi net; a s R . L . Borde n pu t i t h i 1909 , whe n Leader o f th e Opposition , "matters o f a confidential character, some of which possibly could not b e disclosed eve n t o th e Cabine t a s a whole , shoul d com e i n th e firs t in stance to the Prime Minister." 6 Thus, Laurier' s attempt i n 191 0 t o enlist the suppor t o f the Vatica n t o overcom e clerica l oppositio n t o hi s nava l policy remaine d a secret betwee n himself and his confidential envoy, the Chief Justic e o f Canada ; an d Borde n kep t hi s ow n counse l whil e cor responding wit h Winsto n Churchil l i n 1912-1 4 o n th e natur e o f th e emergency created b y the Germa n naval programme. But i n these earl y years of the centur y the usua l practice wa s to plac e foreig n policy mat ters befor e the Cabine t a s they arose . Few problem s o f externa l policy , nava l polic y apart , trouble d th e Government o f R . L . Borde n betwee n 191 1 an d th e outbrea k o f war , and eve n wa r lef t Canad a relativel y fre e fro m foreig n polic y decision s until 191 7 whe n th e creatio n o f th e Imperia l Wa r Cabine t provide d machinery for the Dominions to obtain wha t was ambiguously described in a famou s constitutiona l documen t a s "a n adequat e voic e i n foreig n policy an d i n foreig n relations. " I t wa s a t th e meeting s of th e Imperia l War Cabine t tha t Si r Rober t Borde n (a s h e ha d the n become ) firs t expressed a Canadia n viewpoin t on suc h question s a s peac e terms , th e post-war settlement , an d gran d strategy . I t migh t b e though t tha t th e Prime Minister' s participatio n a t suc h exalted gathering s left littl e scop e for th e judgmen t of colleagues i n foreign and imperia l decision-making . But s o fa r fro m tryin g t o exploi t hi s privilege d position , Borde n wa s anxious tha t othe r member s of hi s Governmen t accompan y hi m t o th e United Kingdom , an d hi s importan t intervention s i n th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet were usually preceded b y consultation wit h them. Indeed, i t was at Borden' s insistenc e tha t N . W . Rowell , th e leadin g Libera l i n th e coalition Unio n Government an d whos e interests i n internationa l affair s were n o les s tha n hi s own , attende d meeting s o f th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet i n 1918 . Such solicitude migh t owe something to th e difficultie s of runnin g a coalitio n administratio n (th e hea d o f whic h i s mor e tha n ordinarily beholde n t o minister s not o f hi s ow n party), bu t i t wa s als o entirely i n keepin g wit h Borden' s manne r o f leadership . Borde n pos sessed many of the characteristic s o f his distinguishe d predecessor. Lik e

THE POLITICA L EXECUTIVE 7

Laurier he wa s prepared an d o n occasion anxiou s t o delegat e responsi bility; hi s diar y expresse s irritation whe n colleague s pestere d unduly. * He allowe d tw o member s o f his Cabine t t o remai n i n Londo n through out mos t o f th e wa r (Si r Georg e Perle y a s Actin g Hig h Commissione r and A . E . Kem p a s Oversea s Ministe r o f Militia) , wherea s Mackenzi e King wa s late r sternl y determine d t o preven t th e Hig h Commissione r from sharin g i n the makin g of policy an d strongl y disapprove d o f over seas ministers . Alon e o f th e Dominio n prim e minister s a t th e Pari s Peace Conference , Borde n brough t n o fewe r tha n thre e member s o f his Cabine t (Si r Georg e Foster , A . L . Sifto n an d C . J . Doherty ) an d all wer e assigne d majo r responsibilities . Borden' s method s o f reachin g decisions i n foreig n polic y ar e wel l illustrate d b y th e followin g extract s from telegram s exchange d betwee n Borde n i n Pari s an d th e Actin g Prime Minister , Si r Thomas White, i n Ottawa , concernin g the despatc h of Canadia n troops to Siberia at the en d o f the war : White t o Borden (November 22 , 1918): Man y member s o f Counci l strongly oppose d t o ou r sendin g troops no w ready t o Siberi a an d continuin g expedition. Mewbur n [Ministe r o f Militi a an d Defence ] ha s delaye d shi p sailing o n Monday. . . . Borden t o White (November 24 , 1918): Telegra m received . I n m y judgment w e shal l stan d i n a n unfortunat e situatio n unles s w e procee d wit h Siberia expedition . W e made definit e arrangements with British Governmen t on whic h the y hav e relied . The y coul d reasonabl y hol d u s responsibl e fo r great inevitabl e dela y i n makin g othe r arrangements . Canada' s presen t position an d prestig e would be singularl y impaired b y deliberat e withdrawal from definit e arrangement s under thes e conditions . . . . However I leave the matter t o judgmen t of Counci l wit h the stron g feelin g that withdrawa l fro m our deliberat e engagemen t wil l hav e extremel y unfortunat e effect . Foster , Sifton, Dohert y concur . White t o Borden (November 25 , 1918): Ver y stron g feelin g i n Counci l against continuanc e Siberia n Expedition , Ballantyne , Crerar , Calde r an d Reid mos t strongl y opposed . Crera r ha s writte n m e lette r o f protest . S o far a s I ca n judg e publi c opinio n wil l no t suppor t furthe r actio n o n an y large scal e i f a t all . . . . M y ow n view afte r hearin g man y discussion s i n Council i s tha t Canad a should , no w tha t th e wa r i s ove r an d n o necessit y exists fo r th e re-establishmen t o f th e Easter n front , discontinu e furthe r participation an d expense. . . . Borden t o White (November 28 , 1918): You r telegra m . . . respectin g Siberian expedition . I f feelin g bot h i n Cabine t an d amon g publi c i s s o strongly oppose d we leave question t o your ow n determination. . . . *"Rowell bega n t o bombar d m e with letter s about variou s subject s . . ." (Jun e 9, 1918) ; "Rowell still bombarding me with letters . . ." (Jun e 15 , 1918); "Rowell left thi s mornin g an d shortl y afte r a showe r o f letter s . . . " (Jul y 27 , 1918) ; "Telegrams fro m Whit e thic k a s autum n leave s i n Vallambros a . . ." (Nov . 27, 1918).

8 TH

E ART OF TH E POSSIBLE

White t o Harden (November 28 , 1918): W e hav e decide d t o procee d with Siberia n expeditio n a s originall y planned . . . . Yo u ma y regar d th e matter as closed. . . .7 Arthur Meighen , wh o succeede d Borde n a s Prun e Ministe r i n th e Union Governmen t h i July 1920 , displaye d durin g the yea r an d a hal f before th e defea t of his administration a style of leadership ver y differen t from hi s predecessor's . "Hi s intellectua l arrogance, " a n unfriendl y critic ha s observed, "le d hi m to trust too much to his own judgment and he showe d a tendency to disregar d th e advic e o f colleague s who , whil e not hi s equa l i n som e respects , possesse d muc h mor e politica l experi ence and sagacity.... His confidence in the product of his own judgment was s o profoun d an d hi s advocac y s o determine d tha t th e polic y wa s open to little or no discussion, stil l less could it be recast or toned down hi any way to meet the demands or soothe the feelings of dissenting groups or interests."8 Th e majo r foreig n polic y decisio n o f hi s brie f Ministr y o f 1920-1 wa s hi s oppositio n t o th e renewa l o f th e Anglo-Japanes e alli ance. Th e proposal s whic h Arthu r Meighe n pu t before th e Imperia l Conference i n Jun e 192 1 ha d bee n worke d ou t b y himsel f an d Loring Christie of the Department of External Affair s a s early as March, but n o member s o f hi s Cabine t ha d bee n consulte d abou t the m or , a s one Ministe r note d o n Jun e 5 , abou t "an y o f th e possibl e matter s tha t may come up" i n London before he set out. 9 He took non e of his ministerial colleague s wit h him , an d seem s t o hav e consulte d non e whil e there, s o that th e firs t knowledg e of wha t had transpire d wa s conveyed to the m b y th e Prim e Ministe r a t a Cabine t meetin g afte r hi s return . "He appear s t o hav e playe d hi s par t well, " Si r Georg e Foste r wrot e after th e meeting , "— a little too advance d on the Jap. Tr . matte r i n my opinion."10 No Canadia n Prim e Ministe r ha s s o openl y dominate d hi s Cabine t colleagues as R. B. Bennett, the Conservative Prun e Minister fro m 193 0 to 1935 . Th e stor y i s ofte n tol d o f hi s walkin g alone , los t i n thought , when spoke n t o b y a citize n o f Ottawa . "Pleas e d o no t interrup t me, " Bennett replied. "Ca n yo u not see I a m engaged i n a Cabinet meeting? " This (doubtless ) apochrypha l vignett e is altogethe r justifie d b y wha t i s known o f Bennett's conduc t o f governmen t policy a t th e Imperia l Eco nomic Conference of 1932 . "Severa l othe r Canadia n Ministers took par t in th e proceedings, " a Ne w Zealan d delegat e recalled , "bu t i t wa s obvious that non e o f them could agre e to an y decision withou t the prio r consent o f Mr . Bennett." 11 A Canadia n observe r wrot e soo n afte r th e Conference opened : "Bennet t ha s on e qualit y whic h differentiate s hi m from [Mackenzie ] King : i t i s bot h a n asse t an d a liability . Thi s i s hi s

THE POLITICA L EXECUTIV E 9

active min d an d hi s readiness t o plunge." 12 Ther e i s evidence that unti l the fina l day s befor e th e Conferenc e (i t ma y b e th e fina l hours ) th e Prime Ministe r wa s uncertai n whethe r h e woul d "plunge " fo r hig h tariffs o r for low, and that his "active mind," marvellousl y untroubled by what hi s colleague s migh t think , wa s stil l grapplin g wit h th e drasti c alternatives o f protection an d preference. 13 Tha t o n s o crucia l a n issue , ordinarily productiv e o f hour s o f acrimoniou s bargainin g insid e th e Cabinet betwee n it s protectionis t an d free-tradin g wings, 14 th e Prim e Minister shoul d hav e fel t fre e t o swin g fro m on e extrem e t o th e othe r without fearin g ministeria l resignations , i s indicativ e a t onc e o f hi s unusually stron g positio n a s leade r an d o f hi s determinatio n t o exploi t it. (I t als o illustrate s th e rarit y o f resignation s fro m Canadia n cabinet s on matter s o f principle.) As th e month s an d year s o f hi s administratio n passed , th e countr y slipping deepe r int o depression , Bennett' s autocrati c method s becam e if anythin g more pronounced . Lik e th e "Ne w Deal " type o f programme on whic h h e fough t (an d lost ) th e electio n o f 1935 , hi s view s o n th e Italo-Ethiopian War , (whic h brok e ou t i n th e las t month s o f hi s ad ministration) wer e formulated o n th e spu r o f the moment . He intende d to tak e a stron g stan d agains t Italy , h e tol d hi s Unde r Secretar y o f State for External Affairs , O . D. Skelton , over the telephon e on Octobe r 10, 1935, an d he was " 'not going to wriggle out of it if it meant I didn' t get on e vote'." 15 I t wa s perhap s unfortunat e tha t th e voter s o f Canad a were not prepare d t o allow him the opportunity of converting convictio n into policy . Bennett wa s evidently sensitive t o criticis m tha t hi s ha d bee n a one man governmen t for , onc e bac k i n opposition , h e too k th e firs t oppor tunity t o den y th e charge . Contrastin g th e 96 7 Counci l meeting s ove r which h e had preside d wit h the 51 6 meeting s which had bee n hel d dur ing a n equa l perio d o f th e precedin g Libera l administration , h e added : "So fa r a s th e conduc t o f department s wa s concerne d ther e neve r wa s a tim e i n thi s countr y whe n ther e wa s greate r freedo m o n th e par t of those conductin g departments, o r a time when men enjoye d greate r lati tude or greater opportunit y to make their view s prevail."16 On that scor e opinions wer e boun d t o differ , an d th e matte r wil l remain i n th e real m of opinio n unti l th e privat e paper s o f Bennet t an d hi s colleague s ar e available fo r examination. * With th e exceptio n o f th e five years o f th e Bennet t Governmen t an d a fe w day s i n 1926 , Mackenzi e Kin g wa s Prim e Ministe r o f Canad a *The Bennet t Papers , whic h ar e th e persona l propert y o f Lor d Beaverbrook , have bee n deposite d a t th e Librar y o f th e Universit y o f Ne w Brunswick .

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from Decembe r 192 1 t o Novembe r 1948 . Ove r thi s lon g perio d o f political leadership , a t it s clos e unequalle d i n th e histor y o f parlia mentary democrac y an d sinc e onl y onc e surpassed , th e natur e o f hi s relations wit h Cabinet colleague s naturall y underwen t som e change . A t first, his relativ e youth , hi s positio n a s hea d o f a minorit y government , and th e presenc e i n hi s firs t administratio n (1921-5 ) o f a numbe r o f colleagues o f greate r experienc e an d prestig e than himself , combine d t o make Mackenzi e Kin g eager to defe r t o his ministers o n most importan t matters, foreig n as wel l as domestic . Whe n informe d (by a newspape r reporter) o f th e appea l o f th e Britis h Governmen t fo r Canadia n hel p to stem the Turkish advanc e upon Chanak in 1922 , hi s first words were : "That will require the deliberation o f the Cabinet before an y pronounce ment can be made." Asked whethe r the Governmen t would sen d troops, he replied: " I woul d not mak e an y statement without a conference wit h my colleagues, " and , presse d fo r hi s ow n views , onl y remarked : " I haven't any , apar t fro m thos e o f th e Cabinet." 17 A t th e en d o f th e second da y o f the crisi s he wrot e in hi s diary : " I shal l no t commi t my self on e wa y o r th e other , bu t kee p th e responsibilit y fo r prlt.—th e executive regardin g itsel f a s th e committe e o f prlt." 18 O n Septembe r 18, th e followin g day , no fewe r tha n thre e Cabine t meeting s wer e held , to whic h th e Prim e Ministe r referre d incomin g despatche s fro m th e British Governmen t an d aske d thos e presen t t o draf t a reply . "W e de bated lon g ove r questio n o f givin g 'mora l support ' & approvin g at titude," Mackenzi e Kin g wrot e afterwards . " I fel t tha t involve d whol e question o f participation in European war s and held bac k o n it. Cabine t agreed i n this." 19 Earlier h e had sen t a telegram t o Ernest Lapoint e an d W. S . Fielding, th e tw o member s o f the Governmen t absen t i n Genev a for th e Leagu e o f Nation s Assembly , askin g fo r thei r views . Th e repl y of hi s Ministe r o f Financ e mus t hav e bee n disconcerting : "W e heartil y approve attitud e British Governmen t respectin g Constantinople." 20 Bu t Lapointe's messag e a day later suggeste d that Fieldin g ha d spoke n onl y for himself : "B e governed b y Canadian opinion . . . . Would advis e delaying answe r an d bein g non-committal." 21 Thi s wa s preachin g t o th e converted. The presenc e withi n hi s Governmen t o f Laurier' s designate d suc cessor (wh o had been Laurier's Financ e Ministe r and was now his), was a facto r o f som e consequence t o Mackenzi e King in developin g foreig n and imperia l polic y durin g hi s firs t administration . Supporte d b y th e majority i f no t th e remainde r o f hi s Cabinet , th e Prim e Ministe r fel t able t o withhol d suppor t fro m th e Britis h Governmen t ove r Chanak when Fielding wante d to offe r it ; and he proceeded h i spite of Fielding's

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misgivings to allo w Ernes t Lapoint e t o becom e th e first Canadian Min ister t o sig n a political treat y withou t th e coverin g signature of a Britis h plenipotentiary. Whe n i t cam e t o exercisin g th e righ t o f legation , how ever, Fielding' s determine d oppositio n wa s a n importan t (althoug h no t the only ) reaso n fo r th e prolonge d dela y i n appointin g a Canadia n Minister t o Washington. 22 B y 192 6 thi s restraint , an d others, ha d bee n removed. Fieldin g ha d resigne d i n 1925 , an d th e followin g yea r Mac kenzie Kin g ha d wo n a resoundin g electora l victor y o f whic h h e wa s very muc h sol e architect . N o longe r wa s he hea d o f a minorit y govern ment. He was both mor e experienced an d more confident, an d with good reason. Hencefort h h e wa s t o b e th e unchallenge d maste r o f hi s ad ministration unti l trj e conscriptio n crisi s o f 1944 ; an d fro m tha t chal lenge h e emerge d mor e powerfu l tha n ever . The characteristi c styl e o f Mackenzi e King' s handlin g o f foreig n policy matter s first became apparen t durin g th e administratio n returne d to offic e i n 1935 , fo r no t unti l the n di d majo r issue s o f externa l polic y begin to impinge upon Canadia n event s and a Canadian Prim e Ministe r begin t o exercis e important , i f carefull y concealed , initiative s i n regar d to them . "Unde r a Libera l regim e th e Prim e Ministe r state s th e foreig n policy an d th e Cabine t Minister s stat e th e polic y fo r interna l affair s without consultatio n wit h an y o f th e members, " a disgruntle d Libera l backbencher wrot e privatel y a t th e time, 23 an d th e acutenes s o f hi s analysis wa s t o becom e eviden t durin g th e nex t fe w years. N o Cabine t colleagues accompanie d Mackenzi e Kin g o n hi s visi t t o Hitle r i n th e summer o f 1937 , an d non e coul d therefor e challeng e wit h a n authorit y based o n comparabl e experienc e th e grievousl y inappropriat e notion s of Naz i policy an d leadership tha t thei r Prim e Ministe r acquire d o n thi s mission. Durin g the Munic h crisi s the secrec y wit h whic h Mackenzi e King ha d b y thi s tim e com e t o cloa k th e conduc t o f externa l polic y assumed almos t paranoi c proportions . "Lai d u p a t Kingsmer e wit h sciatica, h e watche d th e clima x o f appeasement, " write s Mr . Bruc e Hutchison. He watche d i t s o secretl y that , a s h e tol d thi s writer , h e di d no t dar e t o le t his Cabine t colleague s . . . rea d th e code d cable s fro m London . . . . Suc h was King' s contro l o f governmen t an d nation , suc h th e numbe d stat e o f his colleagues , tha t h e coul d tak e foreig n polic y int o hi s ow n hand s an d direct i t as he pleased. . . . It ca n b e sai d o n the authorit y o f Minister s wh o attended th e Cabine t i n thes e hour s tha t i t neve r discusse d th e Europea n crisis. Tw o minister s raise d th e questio n i n council . N o answe r cam e fro m Kingsmere. Government , whe n the natio n quivere d on the knif e edg e of war, ha d move d fro m th e Eas t Bloc k t o King' s bedroo m i n th e country. 24

The onse t o f wa r mad e necessar y a considerabl e devolutio n o f

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responsibility in the conduc t of external policy, less through the persona l inclination o f th e Prim e Ministe r tha n throug h th e pressur e o f event s compelling a divisio n of labour. I n th e earl y month s o f th e conflict , n o fewer tha n five differen t Cabine t minister s set ou t successivel y for Eng land o n a variet y o f mission s relate d t o th e wa r effort . Whe n Mr . Churchill wishe d to reviv e the Imperia l War Cabine t o f the Firs t Worl d War, Mackenzie Kin g defende d hi s oppositio n t o th e proposa l o n th e grounds tha t "importan t decision s should no t b e mad e by on e ma n bu t by a governmen t as a whole." 25 I n fact , however , not th e "governmen t as a whole " bu t th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabine t becam e th e effective policy-makin g body fo r th e duration . The origi n o f Cabine t committee s i n Canad a is . to b e foun d i n th e suggestion raise d b y Unite d Kingdo m authoritie s a t th e Imperia l De fence Conferenc e o f 190 9 tha t the self-governin g Dominions follo w th e example o f th e Britis h Governmen t b y creatin g defenc e committee s within thei r variou s ministries . Nothin g immediatel y cam e o f thi s pro posal i n Canada , no r o f th e recommendation s o f Si r Georg e Murra y in 191 2 tha t th e burde n o f individua l members i n th e Canadia n Gov ernment b e relieve d b y allowin g a quoru m o f Cabine t minister s t o dispose of routine business. It was not until October 191 7 that the Unio n Government unde r Si r Rober t Borde n divide d itsel f int o a Wa r Com mittee an d a Committe e on Reconstructio n an d Development , eac h o f ten members . These Cabine t committees did no t lon g outlast th e en d of the war , an d non e reappeare d unti l 193 6 whe n a Defenc e Committe e was constitute d compose d o f th e Prim e Minister , th e Ministe r o f National Defence , an d th e Minister s o f Justic e an d Finance . I t me t o n only two occasions prior to the outbreak of war, on November 14 , 1938 , and o n Septembe r 5 , 193 9 (th e Canadia n declaratio n o f war , it wil l be recalled, cam e a week afte r tha t o f th e Unite d Kingdom , o n Septembe r 10), fo r th e purpos e o f discussin g with th e Chief s o f Staf f propose d defence estimates . The Defenc e Committe e was replace d followin g Canada' s entr y int o the war by the Emergency Council (sometime s called the Committe e o n General Policy) , on e o f si x "sub-committees o f council " create d b y a n order-in-council (P.C . 2747 ) o n Augus t 30 , 1939 . I t me t si x time s before i n its turn being replaced by the Wa r Committee and , like it, was responsible fo r polic y relatin g t o th e over-al l wa r effort . A furthe r re organization o f th e Cabine t committe e syste m too k plac e i n Decembe r 1939, an d on e o f th e nin e committee s thu s create d wa s the Wa r Com mittee of the Cabinet . The War Committee me t for the first time on December 8 , 1939 , an d

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over th e nex t five and a hal f year s wa s t o mee t o n 34 3 occasions . Its membership throughou t thi s period varie d accordin g to th e composition of th e Ministr y an d fo r othe r reasons , bu t alway s include d th e Prim e Minister (wh o was als o Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs) , th e service ministers , th e Ministe r o f Finance , and , afte r th e creatio n of the portfolio , th e Ministe r o f Munition s an d Supply . "Th e result, " th e former secretar y of the War Committee has commented, "was that, while the Wa r Committe e like other Cabinet Committee s was never an executive bod y bu t was , in fac t a s i n form , purel y advisor y i n character , it s prestige wa s suc h tha t it s decision s wer e fo r practica l purpose s th e decisions o f th e government." 28 I n additio n t o th e regula r ministeria l members, adviser s fro m th e service s an d fro m governmen t department s were frequen t participants . Th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs attende d regularly and , whe n militar y matters were unde r discussion (a s they usually were), the Chiefs of Staff wer e normally present. After 194 3 th e chairma n o f th e Canadia n sectio n o f th e Permanen t Joint Board on Defence periodicall y attended its meetings. As the war continued, a number of measures were introduced to make the wor k o f th e Wa r Committe e mor e orderly an d efficient . Th e mos t important o f thes e wa s th e creatio n o f th e pos t o f secretar y o f th e Wa r Committee in April 1940 , to which Mr. A.D.P. Heeney was appointed.* From tha t date t o th e Committee' s dissolution i n Jun e 194 5 minute s were kep t o f it s deliberations . I n Septembe r 1941 , followin g th e Prim e Minister's first-han d observatio n o f the workin g of th e Unite d Kingdom *The project o f som e for m o f Cabine t secretaria t ha d bee n i n Mackenzi e King' s mind a s earl y a s 1923 . I n tha t yea r h e tol d Si r Mauric e Hankey , secretar y t o th e United Kingdo m Cabinet , "tha t h e woul d lik e t o hav e a Secretar y t o Canadia n Cabinet, an d tha t h e woul d hav e on e 'i n hi s time' , bu t tha t a t presen t i t wouldn' t do. Hi s Cabine t woul d no t stan d fo r it , an d h e stresse d th e wa y hi s Cabine t ha d to b e representativ e i n characte r an d ho w h e didn' t hav e th e sam e freedo m a s the Britis h Prime Ministe r to choose . A secretar y woul d caus e al l kind s of trouble . . . . Hankey suggeste d tha t thi s kin d of a Cabine t neede d som e organizatio n mor e than th e British , but Kin g would no t hav e i t then . . . . " R . MacGrego r Dawson , "Memorandum o f intervie w wit h Lor d Hankey, " 1951 . Since 194 5 i t ha s bee n th e practic e o f Canadia n government s t o kee p a ful l but impersona l recor d o f Cabine t deliberations , evidentl y no t withou t justifyin g Mackenzie King' s earlie r misgivings . "Ministers ar e conservativ e beings , to who m the intrusio n o f a Secretary takin g notes o f thei r discussion s was difficul t t o accept . Even afte r th e War , ther e wa s usuall y on e Cabine t a wee k durin g th e sessio n and certai n other s wher e th e Secretar y wa s absen t an d o f whic h n o minute s wer e kept. O n thes e occasion s th e Cabine t wa s discussin g 'political ' (i.e . party ) questions o r th e Secretar y o r hi s Department wer e unde r discussion . A s tim e wen t on, thes e becam e les s frequen t an d i t wa s ver y rare , i n fact , fo r ther e t o b e a n entire meetin g withou t th e Secretary . A t presen t . . . al l meeting s o f th e Cabine t and it s committee s ar e attende d b y a membe r o f th e Secretariat , an d minute s are kept. " J . R . Mallory , unpublishe d manuscript .

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War Cabinet , severa l procedure s designe d t o facilitat e it s busines s wer e adopted. Amon g these were the preparatio n o f proper agend a circulate d to member s i n advanc e o f meetings , togethe r wit h paper s an d memor anda relate d t o item s o n th e agenda ; regula r meeting s o n Wednesda y of eac h week , i n additio n t o meeting s calle d a t th e discretio n o f th e Prime Minister ; regula r attendanc e b y th e thre e servic e Chief s o f Staff a t th e first meeting in eac h mont h an d thei r submissio n of militar y appreciations regularl y ever y month ; attendanc e b y minister s no t mem bers o f th e Wa r Committee , a t th e Prim e Minister' s discretion , whe n matters directl y affectin g thei r department s wer e unde r consideration. * The en d o f th e Secon d Worl d Wa r di d no t brin g abou t th e disap pearance o f Cabine t committee s a s a t th e en d o f th e First . Instead , th e wartime committees were replaced b y others designe d to mee t the need s of post-wa r policy . Cabine t committee s hav e no w becom e a norma l feature o f parliamentary government i n Canada. Despit e thi s fact , how ever, it is impossible t o offe r a n exact descriptio n o f their operation, fo r no detaile d informatio n ha s bee n disclose d an d th e governmen t i s ap parently constitutionall y unabl e t o disclos e it. t Cabine t committee s function therefor e i n som e obscurity . W e ar e tol d o n th e authorit y o f the Registra r o f th e Cabine t tha t mos t o f it s committee s no w ar e o f a n ad ho c variety , "se t u p t o dea l wit h specia l problem s a s thes e aris e o r acquire prominence or urgency, and report bu t to the Cabinet. Thei r lif e is usuall y brie f an d the y di e naturall y whe n the y hav e reported . The y represent purel y interna l arrangement s made b y th e Cabine t an d ar e usually no t well known t o the public , althoug h reference has bee n mad e *This las t measur e di d no t guarante e tha t minister s no t member s o f th e Wa r Committee woul d kno w wha t wen t o n i n th e charme d circle . I n Februar y 194 2 the Ministe r o f Pension s an d Nationa l Health , Ia n Mackenzie , wh o a s th e Britis h Columbia representativ e i n th e Cabine t bor e th e brun t o f stron g pressur e fro m that province to strengthen Pacifi c defences , wrot e to the Prime Minister : ". . . not being a membe r o f th e Wa r Committee , I a m no t exactl y sufficientl y conversan t with wha t i s transpiring , althoug h th e Minister s separatel y hav e bee n ver y cour teous i n givin g m e th e necessar y information. " Ia n Mackenzi e t o Mackenzi e King , Feb. 14 , 1942 ; quote d i n Col . C . P . Stacey , Si x Years o f War: Th e Army i n Canada, Britain and th e Pacific (Ottawa , 1955) , p. 170 . Mackenzie' s lac k o f infor mation i s th e mor e surprisin g i n tha t prio r t o 193 9 h e ha d bee n Ministe r o f National Defence , an d enjoye d wit h th e Prim e Ministe r " a degre e o f persona l intimacy whic h woul d not hav e bee n tolerate d in anothe r colleagu e afte r 194 1 [when Lapoint e died]. " J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 19391944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 7 . fin 195 7 th e Speake r o f th e Hous e o f Common s rule d tha t "a n inquir y int o the metho d b y whic h th e governmen t arrive s a t it s decisio n i n Cabine t i s ou t o f order. . .. A s I understan d th e situation , th e decisio n o f th e governmen t i s one and indivisible . Inquir y int o ho w i t i s arrive d at , particularl y inquir y int o th e Cabinet process , i s no t permitte d i n th e House. " Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Nov . 6 , 1957 , p . 813 .

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on occasion s i n Parliament t o thei r work." 27 Thus , i n June 196 0 refer ence was made in the Hous e o f Commons to th e existenc e of a Cabine t Committee o n Emergenc y Plans , consistin g o f th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence (chairman ) an d th e Minister s o f Finance , Trad e an d Com merce, Nationa l Healt h an d Welfare , Defenc e Production , an d Justice , the Associat e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , an d th e Ministe r withou t Portfolio, whos e functio n wa s t o develo p governmenta l policie s t o b e put int o effec t i n th e even t o f surpris e atomi c attac k upo n th e Nort h American continent. 28 Perhaps th e mos t importan t o f contemporar y Cabine t committee s is the Cabine t Defenc e Committee, create d i n Augus t 194 5 t o conside r and advise upon post-war defence problems . Its chairma n was originally the Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , a provisio n designe d t o gai n th e support an d co-operatio n o f th e thre e services , bu t subsequentl y it s chairmanship passe d t o th e Prim e Minister , th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence actin g a s vice-chairman . It s meeting s ar e normall y attende d by the Unde r Secretary of State for Externa l Affair s an d th e permanen t chairman o f th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , togethe r wit h th e thre e Chiefs o f Staff , i n additio n t o th e ministeria l head s o f othe r importan t departments suc h a s Finance , Trad e an d Commerce , an d Externa l Affairs. A meetin g o f th e Defenc e Committe e was attende d b y Jame s Forrestal, then United States Secretary o f Defense, on August 16 , 1948 . "One o f the deep impressions that I had a s a result o f this meeting, " h e recorded afterward s i n hi s diary , was th e contras t t o th e functionin g o f ou r ow n government . I n thi s grou p there wer e th e incomin g Chie f o f Stat e [sic], Mr . L . S . St . Laurent , wh o will succee d Mackenzi e Kin g a s Prim e Minister ; th e Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affairs , Mr . L . B . Pearson , wh o wil l succee d t o St . Laurent's job a s chief o f that Department ; Ministe r o f Trade an d Commerc e C. D . Howe ; Ministe r o f Defenc e Brook e Claxton , an d th e thre e chief s of staff . . . . This grou p no t merel y wa s the Defenc e Committe e o f the Cabine t . . . but the y represente d th e contro l o f th e Canadia n Parliament , becaus e the y are th e chose n Minister s o f th e Libera l Party , whic h i s th e part y no w pre vailing i n power , a s wel l a s th e chief s o f thei r respectiv e governmen t agencies. Therefor e expression s o f polic y a t thi s meetin g ar e th e statement s of a responsible government . . . , 29

The singl e exceptio n t o th e rul e tha t committee s of the Cabine t hav e their origi n an d foundatio n i n th e conventiona l workin g of th e parlia mentary syste m i s th e Treasur y Board , a committe e o f th e Cabine t created b y legislation (se e Revised Statutes of Canada, s. 71) an d differ ing a s well from othe r Cabine t committee s in it s permanence an d i n it s

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staff o f expert s engage d i n it s wor k o f scrutinizin g departmenta l esti mates. The chairma n o f the Treasur y Board i s the Ministe r o f Finance; with him serve five other Cabinet ministers of whom th e Secretary of State for External Affairs is not one. The fact that its members are Cabinet ministers is sufficient safeguar d agains t the Treasury Board too ofte n thwart ing governmen t polic y b y implacabl e oppositio n t o extravaganc e an d waste (a s i t i s charged th e Unite d State s Bureau o f the Budge t i s prone to do). But it offers t o the Prime Minister and his Minister of Finance an incomparable instrumen t wit h whic h t o par e awa y a t costl y depart mental projects . A forme r Financ e Ministe r ha s describe d th e process : The staf f o f th e Treasur y Board , withou t referenc e t o th e Ministe r i n th e first place , g o a t thos e estimate s an d tr y t o hav e them reduced . The y ar e successful t o a considerabl e exten t i n havin g the m reduced . Bu t variou s departments demur , an d som e g o eve n farthe r tha n tha t an d vigorousl y and violentl y protest agains t th e propose d cuts . Th e matte r i s the n take n up b y myself wit h the variou s Ministers , an d afte r a considerabl e amoun t o f argument th e estimate s ar e stil l furthe r reduce d unti l the y reac h th e for m in whic h the y appea r befor e th e Hous e o f Commons . . . . At time s I fee l a s though I a m agains t the whol e worl d whe n I tr y t o kee p a lo t o f thes e expenditure s down . W e jus t d o th e bes t w e can , tha t i s all , and keep them down. 30 The impac t o f th e Treasur y Boar d i s felt , naturall y enough , i n thos e aspects o f foreig n polic y tha t requir e larg e outlay s o f publi c money s such a s defence an d foreig n aid ; bu t i t make s it s mark o n less expensiv e matters: Mr. Martin (Essex East): I s ther e an y likelihoo d o f an y missio n bein g established i n Baghdad . . . ? Mr. Green (Secretary o f State fo r External Affairs): Thi s i s a missio n I woul d lik e ver y muc h t o hav e established , an d ther e ar e other s to o I would lik e t o hav e established , bu t i n gettin g thes e wishe s carrie d out , I always ru n fou l o f th e Treasur y Board . I d o no t doub t th e leade r o f th e Opposition ha d tha t sam e proble m whe n h e wa s minister . I woul d lik e to hav e a missio n in Baghdad right now , bu t s o far I hav e no t bee n abl e t o make muc h progress . . . . Mr. Pearson (Leader o f th e Opposition): I appreciat e th e Minister' s diffi culties wit h th e Treasur y Board . I woul d hav e though t tha t perhap s h e would b e mor e skilfu l tha n I eve r wa s i n overcomin g them , bu t I a m sur e the Ministe r doe s no t nee d anyon e t o tel l hi m tha t whil e fund s fo r capita l construction abroa d d o ad d t o th e budge t an d th e budgetar y difficultie s o f the Ministe r o f Finance, ove r the long run they ar e economical. . . . Mr. Green: Tha t i s exactl y th e argumen t I hav e bee n makin g wit h th e Minister o f Finance . No w tha t I hav e som e suppor t fro m th e Leade r o f th e Opposition, perhap s it will be easier t o convince him . . . .31 The fact , mentione d above , tha t th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs i s not amon g the si x Cabinet minister s wh o ar e member s o f th e

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Treasury Boar d doe s no t plac e hi s Departmen t a t to o muc h o f a dis advantage in keeping its estimates intact; more importan t is the persona l relationship o f th e foreig n ministe r wit h th e Minister o f Financ e an d with th e Prim e Minister . (Befor e 1946 , whe n th e Prim e Ministe r an d the foreign minister were one and the same person, th e modest demand s of th e Departmen t wer e me t withou t to o muc h protest , although , depending on hi s interests an d hi s temperament, th e incumben t o f bot h posts migh t favou r on e a t th e expens e o f th e other. ) No r t o b e over looked ar e th e persona l relationship s betwee n th e civi l servic e staf f o f the Treasur y Boar d an d th e foreig n servic e officers o f th e Departmen t of Externa l Affairs . Thes e hav e sometime s bee n strained , t o th e dis advantage o f th e Department . "Muc h o f th e succes s o f ou r ai d pro grammes and muc h of the succes s of our organizatio n a s a department," one o f it s member s ha s writte n privately , "depen d o n bette r relation s with Financ e an d Treasury Board." 32 Two othe r Cabine t groupings , no t ordinaril y though t o f a s Cabine t committees but havin g the sam e purpose o f bringing matters o f externa l policy befor e th e minister s directl y concerned , ar e th e Canadia n mem bers o f th e Join t Unite d States-Canadia n Committe e o n Trad e an d Economic Affair s an d o f th e Canada-Unite d State s Ministeria l Com mittee o n Join t Defence . Th e forme r wa s create d b y a n exchang e o f notes betwee n th e Canadia n an d America n government s i n Novembe r 1953 statin g tha t th e Committe e shoul d mee t "onc e a year , o r mor e often, a s may be considered necessary." It consiste d of those members of the Canadia n an d America n cabinet s principally involve d i n economi c affairs, an d wa s thu s a n attemp t t o combin e i n a singl e piec e o f inter governmental machiner y tw o distinct an d perhap s incompatibl e govern mental systems , with th e dange r (a s wa s observe d a t th e time ) "tha t people ma y b e le d t o expec t result s fro m me n wh o ar e i n n o positio n to effec t them." 33 On th e Canadian sid e the representatives usuall y con sisted o f th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , an d th e Minister s of Trad e an d Commerce , Finance , an d Agriculture . A secon d an d similar Committe e wa s establishe d i n 195 8 "t o consul t periodicall y o n all matter s affectin g th e join t defence o f Canad a an d th e Unite d State s ..., not only military questions but also the political and economic aspects of join t defence problems." Th e Canadia n member s o f thi s Committe e were ordinaril y th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s an d th e Ministers o f Nationa l Defence , Defenc e Production , an d Finance , attended b y exper t adviser s fro m thei r respectiv e departments . "Ther e was no lon g table at whic h we sat dow n with minutes and pape r befor e us," th e Minister o f Nationa l Defenc e reporte d afte r th e Committee' s meeting at Cam p David in the fal l o f 1959 . "However , we sat aroun d i n

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an informa l grou p an d w e ha d th e mos t intimat e discussio n o n al l defence matters." 34 The proliferatio n o f Cabine t committee s an d grouping s i n recen t years ha s ha d it s effec t upo n th e relationshi p o f th e Prim e Ministe r to hi s Cabine t colleague s i n th e formulatio n o f externa l policy . T o th e extent tha t suc h committee s an d grouping s impos e orde r an d routin e and settle d procedures , an d ensur e tha t differen t facet s o f polic y com e as a matte r o f cours e befor e th e minister s nominall y responsibl e fo r them, i t become s tha t muc h mor e difficul t fo r a Prim e Ministe r t o gather th e rein s tightl y i n hi s ow n hands . Th e member s o f th e Wa r Committee o f th e Cabinet , Mackenzi e Kin g remarke d i n 1943 , wer e "immediately concerned wit h matters relating to externa l affairs , s o tha t they ar e i n a positio n t o assis t me , a s i n fac t the y do . The y carr y much o f th e responsibilit y tha t I hav e t o assum e i n tha t particula r position [Secretar y o f State for Externa l Affairs]." 35 Som e months afte r the war had ende d h e spoke appreciativel y onc e agai n o f the devolutio n that ha d take n place : Thank God , I hav e around m e Ministers who are taking more o f [th e load ] from m y shoulders da y by day . . . . I hav e t o tak e responsibilit y fo r wha t is sai d an d done , bu t i f hon . member s wil l notic e ho w matter s relatin g t o external affair s hav e bee n deal t wit h i n considerabl e par t b y on e ministe r after another , they wil l realize that the burden of the Departmen t of External Affairs i s no t wholl y o n th e shoulder s o f an y on e man , bu t i s share d b y a very larg e par t o f th e Ministry. *

In th e larger gatherin g of the full Cabine t th e Prim e Ministe r ma y mor e easily hav e hi s wa y o r mor e easil y kee p matter s t o himself ; i n th e smaller an d mor e specialize d committe e o f th e Cabine t suc h evasion , while not impossible , i s less likel y t o g o unremarked an d unchallenged . Indeed, i t ma y b e fo r jus t thi s reaso n tha t ther e i s no t no w no r ha s there eve r bee n a Cabine t Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , a fac t sug gestive o f the unwillingnes s of Prime Minister s t o allo w i t t o dispos e of *Canada, H . o f C . Debates, Apri l 2 , 1946 , p . 492 . I t i s possible , an d eve n probable, tha t b y thu s citin g the collegia l natur e o f Cabine t decision-makin g in external affairs , the Prim e Ministe r was attemptin g to forestal l suggestion s tha t he devolv e th e Externa l Affair s portfoli o upo n anothe r membe r o f th e Cabinet . Mackenzie King' s rea l feeling s on th e subjec t o f sharin g wit h hi s colleague s th e process o f decision-makin g in matter s which , lik e externa l affairs , la y clos e t o hi s own interests , may hav e been expresse d i n a n entr y i n hi s dair y a fe w day s afte r the sudde n deat h o f O . D . Skelto n earl y i n 1941 . "Ther e mus t b e a purpose, " he wrot e characteristically of thi s tragi c event, "and, a s I se e it, i t ma y b e mean t to caus e m e t o rel y mor e completel y o n m y ow n judgmen t i n makin g decisions , and t o acquain t mysel f mor e meticulousl y wit h al l tha t i s happenin g so a s t o be abl e t o mee t eac h deman d a s i t i s occasioned. " Quote d i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 166 .

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what Mackenzi e Kin g onc e referre d t o a s "th e politica l sid e o f publi c affairs i n the large sense of the word." 36 Another potentia l check upo n prim e ministerial control , als o o f fairl y recent origin , i s th e practic e o f resortin g t o settle d procedure s fo r disposing o f certai n type s o f foreig n polic y decisions . I n 1956 , fo r example, th e the n Secretar y of Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s describe d th e manner i n which decisions were mad e with regard t o th e expor t o f wa r materiel. Certain lines of policy had bee n laid down : no arm s shipments of an y kin d t o th e Sino-Sovie t bloc , n o restriction s o n arm s shipment s to NAT O allie s an d mos t Commonwealth nations . Scop e fo r discretio n existed wit h respec t t o "area s o f tensio n o r strife o r wha t w e cal l sensitive areas " o f which ther e wer e a t tha t tim e thirty-four thu s desig nated. T o thes e sensitiv e area s ther e coul d no t b e exporte d "arm s o f such a characte r tha t the y migh t increas e an y temptatio n t o commi t an aggressio n or begi n a preventive war. " I n n o cas e coul d an y kin d of shipment o f wa r materie l b e mad e t o suc h area s withou t th e agree ment o f th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , th e Ministe r o f Trad e an d Commerce an d th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs . I n addition , "if th e applicatio n i s a particularl y significan t one , eithe r i n quantit y or becaus e o f th e politica l circumstance s surroundin g it , an d eve n though th e thre e minister s ma y hav e agree d t o th e [export] permit , the matte r i s referre d t o th e whol e Cabinet." 37 Anothe r exampl e o f settled procedure s i s th e manne r o f decidin g upo n project s fo r capita l assistance unde r th e Colomb o Plan . A n interdepartmenta l committe e submits recommendation s t o th e Cabinet . "I f th e Cabine t approve s them," the Administrato r o f the Internationa l Economi c an d Technica l Co-operation Divisio n o f th e Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerc e (then Mr. R. G . Nik Cavell) informe d the House o f Commons Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affair s i n 1956 , "w e go ahead. " T o tha t date , he added , th e Cabine t ha d approve d al l th e recommendation s o f th e Committee.38 A thir d illustratio n i s to b e foun d i n the manne r o f decid ing upo n whethe r an d wher e t o ope n u p ne w diplomati c missions , described i n 195 2 b y the Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs : An attemp t i s made withi n th e Departmen t [o f Externa l Affairs ] i n th e firs t instance t o asses s tha t nee d agains t expenditur e i n term s o f men—becaus e we ar e shor t o f qualifie d men—a s wel l a s i n term s o f money . Tha t assess ment the n come s u p through th e Unde r Secretar y t o the Ministe r o f External Affairs himself . H e examine s th e proposa l i n relatio n t o othe r requirement s and demand s . . . an d h e come s t o a decisio n a s to wha t recommendatio n to make . H e the n take s i t to the Cabinet an d th e Cabine t decide s whethe r o r not pos t "A " o r pos t "B " o r pos t "C " o r al l thre e requir e t o b e opened . According t o thei r decisio n submission s ar e mad e t o Treasur y Boar d fo r

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the appropriate establishment s and then amount s appear i n the estimates. Th e process throug h whic h w e g o i n thi s fiel d o f activity , I ca n assur e th e Committee, i s a ver y carefu l one. 39

As the range and complexity of foreign polic y decision s increase , they have become more and more the result of settled procedure s designed t o bring t o bea r upo n the m th e judgmen t of minister s an d official s fro m other department s o f governmen t i n additio n t o th e judgmen t o f th e Prime Minister . I n th e las t analysi s th e firml y hel d vie w o f th e Prim e Minister wil l prevail , bu t onl y th e mos t paranoi c o f prim e minister s would wish to disregard too ofte n o r too obviously the recommendations of colleague s an d officials . I n thi s sens e the tren d t o settle d procedure s of decision-makin g ma y b e sai d t o limi t th e potentia l scop e o f prim e ministerial discretio n i n th e matter s fo r whic h the y ar e employed . Th e procedure fo r openin g ne w diplomati c missions , describe d above , i s in strikin g contras t t o th e earlie r practic e whe n th e decisio n t o ope n legations i n Toky o an d Pari s reflecte d Mackenzi e King' s persona l an d somewhat eccentri c opinion s abou t th e configuratio n o f worl d power . Even as late as 1942 the decisions were wholly his. "Robertson and Pearson alway s wanted t o g o a littl e to o fast, " th e America n Ministe r i n Ottawa record s him as saying. "For instance , the y were pressing him t o establish Canadian Legations al l over the place. He was inclined t o think that a Legation woul d soon be opened i n Moscow, an d I suggeste d that Mexico migh t have som e merits . H e sai d yes , bu t h e ha d n o intentio n of spreadin g too fast." 40 PRIME MINISTE R AN D FOREIG N MINISTER

The authorit y of th e Prim e Ministe r i n foreig n affair s ha s bee n poten tially circumscribe d b y th e assumptio n in recen t year s o f th e Externa l Affairs portfoli o by a member of his Cabinet othe r tha n himself. When the Departmen t of External Affair s wa s created i n 190 9 i t wa s the expectatio n o f it s firs t Unde r Secretary , Josep h Pope , tha t th e new portfoli o shoul d b e hel d b y th e Prim e Minister ; and , a s th e indi vidual mor e tha n an y othe r responsibl e fo r it s creation , h e wa s vexe d when th e Departmen t wa s placed instea d unde r th e Secretar y o f State . This, h e wrot e a t th e time , wa s " a great mistake . I t shoul d b e unde r the Prim e Minister." 41 Despit e th e assignmen t o f responsibilit y t o th e Secretary o f Stat e b y th e Ac t o f 190 9 bringin g th e Departmen t int o being, i t wa s Sir Wilfrid Laurie r a s Prime Ministe r rathe r tha n Charle s Murphy a s Secretar y o f Stat e wh o assume d effectiv e contro l o f th e

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Department o f Externa l Affairs . I n 191 2 legislatio n o f th e Borde n Government correcte d thi s anomaly by bringin g the Departmen t legall y as wel l a s practicall y withi n the Prim e Minister' s authority : 2. Ther e shal l b e a Departmen t o f th e Governmen t o f Canad a t o b e called th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , ove r whic h th e Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affair s shal l preside . 3. Th e Membe r o f th e King' s Priv y Counci l fo r Canad a holdin g th e recognized positio n o f Firs t Ministe r shal l b e th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs. 42

After tw o year s o f wartim e leadership , Si r Rober t Borde n foun d himself increasingl y unable t o d o justic e t o bot h positions . Hi s remedy was no t t o dives t himself of the Externa l Affair s portfoli o bu t t o creat e the ne w pos t o f Parliamentar y Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs. Th e Order-in-Counci l b y whic h thi s wa s accomplishe d (P.C . 1719 o f July 15 , 1916 ) recite d th e followin g "order s an d regulations " in connection with the position : 2. Th e Parliamentar y Unde r Secretar y shall , wit h respec t t o th e Depart ment o f Externa l Affairs , perfor m suc h parliamentar y dutie s a s ma y fro m time t o tim e b e assigne d t o hi m b y the Governo r h i Council . 3. Th e Parliamentar y Unde r Secretar y shall , subjec t t o suc h instruction s as may fro m tim e to tim e be issue d b y competent authorit y assis t th e Prim e Minister i n administerin g th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , an d may , subject to the approval o f the Prim e Minister, conduct suc h officia l communi cations betwee n th e Governmen t o f Canad a an d th e Governmen t o f an y other countr y in connection wit h the externa l affair s o f Canada, an d perfor m such othe r dutie s i n th e sai d Departmen t a s fro m tim e t o tim e ma y b e directed. 4. I n th e absenc e o f th e Prim e Minister , th e Parliamentar y Unde r Secre tary shall , subject to the directio n an d approva l o f the Acting Prim e Ministe r for th e tim e being , preside ove r an d administe r th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs; an d i n suc h cas e h e shal l hav e authorit y t o repor t t o an d mak e recommendations t o th e Governo r i n Counci l throug h th e Actin g Prim e Minister.43

The term s o f th e Order-in-Counci l permitte d the Parliamentar y Under Secretary o f Stat e for Externa l Affair s t o assum e considerable responsi bility. Th e firs t occupan t o f th e position , Colone l Hug h Clark , who m Borden appointe d i n Octobe r 1916 , di d littl e more , however , tha n answer question s in th e Hous e o f Commons , and Franci s Keefer , wh o took over from Clar k in 1918 , di d no t enlarg e its scope . Th e offic e ha d been authorize d onl y "durin g th e continuanc e o f th e war, " an d wa s soon afterwar d allowe d to lapse . In 194 3 th e positio n o f Parliamentar y Assistant t o th e Presiden t o f the Priv y Counci l wa s created . Brook e Claxto n wa s th e firs t t o hol d

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the post . Th e Parliamentar y Assistan t wa s responsibl e t o Parliamen t for th e activitie s o f a numbe r of wartim e governmenta l agencie s which had originall y bee n place d unde r Mackenzi e Kin g i n on e o r othe r o f his thre e positions , Prim e Minister , Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, an d Presiden t o f th e Priv y Council; amon g these agencie s were the Wartime Information Board an d the Economic Advisory Committee charged wit h post-wa r plannin g an d reconstruction . Th e Parliamentar y Assistant t o th e Presiden t o f the Priv y Council wa s thus i n fac t thoug h not ye t i n nam e a Parliamentar y Assistan t t o th e Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affairs . I n late r year s th e latte r positio n replace d th e former, and , undergoin g on e mor e chang e i n title , emerge d a s tha t of Parliamentary Secretar y t o th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , today a normal fixtur e o f the Ministry . In 191 8 Si r Rober t Borde n seem s t o hav e bee n read y t o offe r th e External Affair s portfoli o t o Si r George Foster, the n Ministe r o f Trad e and Commerce . "Sen t fo r Foster, " Borde n note d i n hi s diar y o n November 1 . "H e agree d t o accompan y me t o Englan d an d t o accep t External Affairs. " Thi s invitatio n i s apparentl y confirme d b y Foster' s diary entry for the sam e date: My ow n positio n wil l b e radicall y changed . I shal l hat e t o leav e m y wor k in T . an d C . just a s I a m gettin g it int o shap e fo r goo d work . O n th e othe r hand ther e i s a vas t mas s o f detai l i n i t an d I a m 7 1 year s old . I d o no t now ge t a n hou r fre e fro m har d grin d an d I canno t stan d i t long . S o vale. The othe r wil l brin g m e int o clos e contac t wit h Empir e an d internationa l relations an d adjustment s which will be congenial. I shall b e free fro m detai l worries. Th e nex t fe w month s i n Europ e wil l b e ver y interesting .

For som e reaso n remainin g obscur e th e chang e di d no t tak e plac e a t this time or, indeed, until very much later. R. B. Bennett upon becoming Prime Minister in 193 0 had , accordin g to Mackenzie King, "entertaine d the vie w tha t i t woul d b e desirabl e t o separat e th e tw o offices " bu t changed hi s min d soon afterwards. 44 Ther e i s n o evidenc e fo r th e con tention of Dr. W. A. Riddell that in 193 5 Mackenzie Kin g was prepared to offe r th e Externa l Affair s portfoli o to Ernes t Lapointe , the n Ministe r of Justice , an d wa s only dissuaded b y his dissatisfaction with Lapointe' s handling o f th e "Riddel l incident"; 45 Mackenzi e Kin g himsel f late r stated tha t " I shoul d hav e foun d i t perilou s an d indee d impossibl e t o have separate d thes e tw o position s a t tha t particula r time." 46 O n a t least tw o occasion s durin g th e Secon d Worl d War , however , h e con sidered (ho w seriousl y i s anyone' s guess ) th e possibilit y o f himsel f holding the External Affair s portfoli o in the event of some other member of th e Governmen t becoming Prime Minister. * I n 194 3 h e offere d th e

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the Hous e o f Commons a n explanatio n o f "why , to pu t i t i n a direc t way, I mysel f hav e retained th e positio n o f Minister o f External Affair s while holdin g th e offic e o f Prim e Ministe r a t thi s tim e o f th e war. " It wa s not , h e insisted , "throug h an y desir e o n m y par t t o carr y th e extra portfolio . I woul d poin t ou t tha t i n tim e o f wa r nine-tenth s o f the Prim e Minister's work is related t o externa l affairs , an d i t would b e making hi s tas k i n som e way s mor e difficul t wer e h e t o tr y t o assum e the offic e o f Prim e Ministe r withou t bein g responsibl e a s wel l fo r External Affairs." 47 In 194 6 Canada acquire d fo r th e firs t tim e a Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s wh o wa s not als o Prim e Minister . Thi s wa s Mr. L . S . St. Laurent , wh o fo r a fe w month s afte r hi s appointment continue d t o hold th e Justic e portfoli o a s wel l a s Externa l Affairs. f Sinc e the n i t has been the rule rather than the exception for the External Affairs port folio t o b e th e sol e responsibilit y o f a membe r o f th e Cabine t othe r than the Prime Minister. Mr. St. Laurent held it until 9 September 1948, combining i t fo r th e las t nin e week s o f hi s tenur e wit h Justic e (whic h he retaine d unti l becomin g Prim e Ministe r o n 1 5 Novembe r 1948) . His successo r a s Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s wa s Mr . Lester Pearson , wh o remaine d i n tha t capacit y unti l th e defea t o f th e *"I sai d [t o th e Cabinet ] I woul d b e quit e prepare d t o sta y o n unde r Ralston , and accep t an y pos t h e woul d lik e t o giv e me , particularl y i f h e though t wel l o f giving m e Externa l Affairs . I woul d fee l happie r i n devotin g m y entir e tim e t o it." Kin g Diary , entr y fo r Ma y 29 , 1940 , quote d i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 83 . O n Jul y 8 , 1942 , Mackenzi e King tol d Ralsto n tha t "quit e frankly, wha t I woul d like , abov e everythin g else , woul d b e t o le t someon e els e take th e offic e o f Prim e Minister . Le t m e continu e a s Ministe r o f Externa l Af fairs, an d giv e t o th e Prim e Ministe r al l th e hel p I could. " Quote d i n ibid., p . 399. There i s som e inconsistenc y betwee n thes e comment s an d Mackenzi e King' s public statement s tha t a s Prim e Ministe r i t woul d b e necessar y fo r hi m t o re tain Externa l Affairs ; i f h e a s Prim e Ministe r could no t relinquis h it , wh y shoul d some othe r Prim e Ministe r b e abl e to ? Perhap s th e answe r i s tha t Mackenzi e King neve r seriousl y contemplate d givin g u p th e prim e ministershi p t o becom e foreign secretar y o r hea d o f an y othe r department , bu t use d th e threa t o f resig nation a s a mean s o f quietin g opposition i n hi s Cabinet . fMr. St . Lauren t wa s apparentl y no t th e firs t ministe r t o b e approache d b y Mackenzie Kin g t o accep t th e Externa l Affair s portfolio . Whil e i n Pari s fo r th e Peace Conferenc e o f 1946 , Kin g ha d offere d i t t o th e the n Ministe r o f Nationa l Health an d Welfare , Brook e Claxton . Accordin g t o th e obituar y notic e appearin g in th e Toront o Globe an d Mail th e da y afte r Brook e Claxton' s deat h o n Jun e 13 , 1960, "Mr . Claxto n wishe d nothin g bette r [tha n t o becom e Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affairs ] bu t h e reminde d Mr . Kin g tha t Loui s St . Laurent , th e Min ister o f Justice , ha d decide d t o g o bac k t o hi s la w practice . I t wa s importan t t o the part y tha t h e remain i n public life. Mr . Claxton suggested tha t Mr . St . Lauren t be offere d Externa l Affairs . Mr . Kin g sai d i t woul d b e fruitless , tha t Mr . St . Laurent was determined to retire, but agreed t o try. Mr . St. Laurent accepted . . . ."

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Liberal Governmen t i n Jun e 1957 . Th e ne w Prime Minister , Mr . Joh n Diefenbaker, wa s his ow n foreign ministe r unti l i n Septembe r 195 7 h e brought Sidne y Smit h int o hi s administratio n an d hande d th e Externa l Affairs portfoli o ove r t o him . Whe n Sidne y Smith' s ne w caree r wa s tragically ende d b y his deat h i n Marc h 1959 , th e Prim e Ministe r agai n assumed responsibility for the External Affair s Department , relinquishin g it in July of that year to the then Minister o f Public Works , Mr. Howar d Green. Fo r a tim e Mr . Gree n retained , whil e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , no t onl y hi s ol d portfoli o bu t als o hi s positio n a s House Leader ; ther e wa s som e criticis m i n th e Hous e o f Common s at this pilin g on o f responsibilities, an d withi n a few months Mr . Gree n was left fre e t o devot e al l his tim e an d energ y t o foreig n affairs . The relationshi p betwee n a Prim e Ministe r an d hi s foreig n minister , "the mos t fateful . . . of all imposed by the machinery of government," 48 is seldom free fro m difficult y an d may easily become tensely competitive . Where a Prime Minister is wise enough and generous enough to allow an able colleagu e sufficien t scop e fo r judgmen t an d initiative , o r wher e a foreign ministe r i s conten t wit h a technician' s role , a harmoniou s an d productive partnershi p ma y result. Bu t thi s rarel y happens . "Th e rela tions o f subordinatio n tha t bin d the m together, " a n authorit y ha s written, "th e car e take n b y th e ministe r o f foreig n affair s i n orde r t o keep his own autonomy, the fear o f the prime minister tha t thi s collabo rator ma y carr y hi m to o fa r toward s a polic y o f whic h th e parliamen t disapproves . . . , the general tendenc y t o hold numerou s internationa l meetings a t th e highes t level , al l thi s create s betwee n thes e tw o men , even whe n the y belon g t o th e sam e politica l party , a fata l competi tion."49 Whethe r the y contriv e a mutuall y profitabl e division o f labour , or whethe r thei r energie s ar e dissipate d i n rivalry , wil l depen d mainl y upon thei r temperaments ; especially wil l i t depen d upo n th e tempera ment of the Prim e Minister . Mackenzie Kin g combine d th e position s o f Prim e Ministe r an d foreign ministe r fo r al l bu t th e las t tw o year s o f hi s lon g sojour n i n power. H e di d s o not becaus e h e fel t foreig n affair s t o b e insufficientl y important t o warrant anothe r Cabine t ministe r holdin g the portfolio bu t precisely becaus e he fel t foreig n polic y t o b e too seriou s a matter t o b e left t o foreig n ministers . His attitud e resemble d tha t o f the Abb e Sieye s towards a secon d chamber : i f i t agree d i t wa s superfluous ; i f not , mis chievous. Whe n i n 194 6 h e finall y relinquishe d th e External Affair s portfolio, i t wa s withou t an y intentio n o f yieldin g contro l o f importan t foreign polic y matters; on the contrary , i t wa s in orde r t o devot e mor e attention t o them , an d t o sloug h of f upo n th e ne w Secretar y o f Stat e

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for Externa l Affair s suc h mundan e matter s a s th e acquisitio n o f ne w properties abroa d fo r Canadia n diplomati c missions then bein g opene d up. Th e necessar y amendmen t o f th e Ac t o f 191 2 wa s passe d i n Apri l 1946, bu t i t wa s no t unti l Septembe r tha t Mr . St . Lauren t too k over . To justif y hi s refusal t o she d the portfoli o a t the earlie r date , Mackenzi e King referred t o hi s ow n long experienc e o f foreig n policy : This Hous e know s tha t th e problem s w e have i n al l thes e internationa l rela tionships hav e no t grow n u p i n th e las t fe w day s o r week s o r years ; the y have com e int o bein g ove r th e years , an d with respec t t o them , wid e knowl edge an d informatio n i s a ver y grea t asse t i n reachin g highl y importan t de cisions. Th e movemen t o f internationa l affair s i s s o rapid i n thes e day s tha t unless on e ha s som e o f th e direc t knowledg e o f th e backgroun d ou t o f which thes e situation s hav e sprun g i t woul d b e nex t t o impossibl e . . . t o make wit h an y sens e o f securit y th e decision s whic h ar e essentia l i f th e proper step s ar e to be taken. . .. It is not for me to say whether or not a new minister o f externa l affair s comin g int o offic e tomorro w woul d b e able , in th e critica l situation s whic h hav e t o b e deal t wit h a t som e o f th e inter national gathering s whic h ar e t o tak e place thi s year, t o render , perhaps , th e same servic e t o Canad a a s one who has known a t first hand th e internationa l situation a s it has grow n u p ove r th e years. 50

It seemed likely, therefore, that the new Secretary of State for External Affairs woul d not b e allowe d much leeway in those larger affair s o f stat e that th e Prim e Ministe r clearl y intende d t o dea l wit h himself ; an d thi s proved t o b e th e case . Two incidents during the short period whe n Mackenzie King and Mr . St. Laurent worke d together a s Prime Ministe r an d foreig n ministe r ar e suggestive of their difficul t an d unsatisfactor y relationship . The firs t took place soo n afte r Mr . St . Laurent acquire d his new portfolio. A telegra m from th e Prim e Ministe r o f th e Unite d Kingdom , relatin g tha t Indi a was soo n t o achiev e independence o n suc h generou s terms tha t i t wa s expected to remai n in the Commonwealth , was received in Ottaw a dur ing Mackenzi e King' s absence . Mr . Leste r Pearson , the n Unde r Secre tary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , prepare d a n answe r (t o th e effec t that Canad a welcome d th e new s i n Mr . Attlee' s message ) whic h Mr . St. Lauren t signed , delayin g it s despatc h fo r th e Prim e Minister' s ap proval o n hi s return . Whe n presente d t o hi m i n Cabinet , Mackenzi e King "wa s furious . H e remarke d tha t Attlee' s cable ha d bee n addresse d to th e Prim e Minister o f Canad a an d h e assume d that h e an d n o othe r was stil l Prime Minister. Sinc e he alon e wa s entitled t o answe r his ow n correspondence, h e too k th e draf t repl y rudel y ou t o f St . Laurent' s hands an d said he would dea l wit h it himself. . .. St. Laurent receive d this outrageous rebuke i n silence." 51

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A simila r and more seriou s episode occurre d a few months later. Mr . J. L. Ilsley, then Minister o f Finance, leadin g the Canadian delegatio n a t the Unite d Nation s Genera l Assembly , signifie d Canada' s acceptanc e of membershi p o n th e U.N . Temporar y Commissio n o n Korea , an d Mr. St . Laurent, a s Acting Prim e Ministe r i n King' s absenc e fro m Ot tawa, approve d Mr . Ilsley' s decision . O n learnin g o f thi s developmen t on his return, Mackenzi e Kin g was so incensed tha t h e despatche d Mr . Lester Pearso n t o Washingto n t o obtai n Presiden t Truman' s approva l of Canada' s withdrawa l from th e Commission. (I t ha d bee n i n respons e to a request from th e United States that the Canadian representativ e ha d agreed t o accep t membership. ) Whe n Mr . Pearso n reporte d tha t h e had been unable to secure Mr. Truman's agreemen t to a Canadian withdrawal, th e Canadia n Prim e Ministe r determine d t o withdra w i n an y case. Thereupo n a numbe r o f Cabine t members , includin g Mr . St . Laurent an d Mr . Ilsley , threatene d t o resign . Confronte d wit h on e of the rar e occasion s in Canadia n political lif e whe n ministers have threat ened resignation over an issu e of foreign policy, Mackenzi e King backed down, an d settle d for a compromise by which Canada remained a member o f th e Commissio n o n th e understandin g that i t woul d pla y a s in conspicuous a role a s possible. Soon afte r thi s incident, Mackenzi e King invited Mr . St . Laurent t o hi s Laurie r Hous e hom e an d there , "i n hi s most charmin g manner, remarked tha t h e ha d no t realize d ho w keenl y his colleague s fel t abou t th e Korea n matter . St . Lauren t replie d tha t naturally h e mus t resign i f Kin g repealed hi s policy . Resignation , Kin g protested, wa s unthinkable. If St . Laurent . . . believe d i n th e wisdom of hi s action, the n ther e wa s nothing more t o b e said . . . . Thi s affai r marked a watershed in the politica l live s of King and St . Laurent. Kin g was n o longe r th e dominant power in the Government . . . ," 62 If Mackenzi e Kin g and Loui s St . Lauren t provide d a mode l o f ho w a Prim e Ministe r an d a foreig n ministe r ough t no t t o wor k together , Mr. St . Lauren t a s Prim e Ministe r an d Mr . Leste r Pearso n a s foreig n minister offere d a mode l o f ho w the y should . A s on e wh o ha d himsel f held th e positio n o f Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s unde r th e difficult circumstance s jus t described , Mr . St . Lauren t ha d a soun d appreciation o f it s importanc e whil e conten t t o leav e a larg e are a o f discretion t o hi s younge r colleague . Mr. Pearso n ha s himsel f disclose d that durin g the Sue z crisis i n November 195 6 h e was given a fre e han d at the United Nations. "Mr . St . Laurent was more than a prime minister to me , h e wa s alway s a ver y clos e friend . 'Don' t worry' , h e tol d me . 'Do wha t i s best. Do the righ t thing , an d I'l l bac k you'." 63 Thi s happ y

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understanding appear s t o hav e bee n th e basi s o f a n exceptionall y har monious an d fruitfu l collaboratio n throughou t eigh t eventfu l years , fo r which th e Prim e Minister , a s th e senio r partner , deserve s ful l credit . Mr. St . Laurent' s relationshi p wit h Mr . Pearso n i s wel l describe d b y words onc e applie d t o Mr. Churchill' s relationshi p wit h Anthon y Eden : "[It] wa s s o fran k an d sagacious , an d hi s ow n temperamen t s o littl e inclined t o backstair s methods , tha t ther e wa s never an y question abou t what migh t be calle d a 'doubl e foreig n policy'." 54 The presen t Prim e Ministe r ha s s o far displaye d i n thi s matter a les s sure touch . Mr . Joh n Diefenbaker' s spectacula r electora l triumph s o f June 195 7 an d Marc h 195 8 wer e du e mor e tha n t o anythin g els e t o his ow n personal appeal , evokin g such "hysterica l adoration, " a corres pondent note d i n wonder, "that a t places lik e Fredericton , N.B., wome n were holdin g u p thei r childre n t o touc h th e he m o f hi s garment." 55 H e was thu s les s tha n usuall y solicitou s o f colleague s durin g th e normall y sordid busines s o f cabinet-making ; an d a s h e wa s widel y regarde d a s an authorit y o n internationa l affairs—h e ha d bee n sinc e th e deat h o f Gordon Graydo n in 195 3 the officia l Opposition' s foreig n policy spokes man—no on e wa s greatly astonishe d a t hi s decisio n t o becom e hi s ow n foreign minister , a t leas t fo r th e tim e being . In Septembe r 195 7 Mr . Diefenbake r announce d tha t Sidne y Smit h would ente r th e Cabine t a s Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs . Sidney Smit h was then th e respecte d an d widel y known Presiden t o f th e University o f Toronto , wit h a reputatio n fo r vigorou s an d witt y speec h in th e caus e o f highe r education , ofte n rumoure d a s a possibl e leade r of th e Conservativ e part y o f whose membership h e ha d mad e n o secret . All expecte d hi m quickly to mak e his mark a s a Canadia n foreig n min ister. I n thi s al l were to b e disappointed . Sidney Smith was not a t hom e in hi s ne w job , an d whil e h e ha d show n som e sign s o f masterin g i t shortly befor e hi s deat h i n office , h e neve r displaye d th e consistentl y professional flai r o f hi s Nobe l prize-winnin g predecessor . I t canno t b e said tha t th e Prim e Ministe r mad e hi s foreig n minister' s apprenticeshi p any easier . Sidne y Smith's earliest public utterance a s Secretar y of Stat e for External Affair s wa s delivered a few moments after bein g sworn int o the Cabinet , Mr . Diefenbake r standin g watchfull y a t hi s side . H e wa s asked b y newspape r reporter s fo r hi s opinio n o f Canadia n polic y a t the tim e o f th e Sue z crisis . Embarke d o n a n hones t i f maladroi t repl y to th e effec t tha t h e wa s i n genera l agreemen t wit h th e St . Laurent Pearson position , h e wa s interrupted , "rathe r tartly , i t seeme d t o som e listeners,"56 by the Prime Ministe r wh o proceeded t o offe r hi s own, ver y

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different, versio n of what the Secretar y o f State for Externa l Affair s ha d meant to say. This initial reprimand se t the ton e o f their relationshi p fo r its tragicall y short duration . In Mr . Howar d Green , wh o becam e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs o n Jun e 4 , 1959 , thre e month s afte r Sidne y Smith' s death , th e Prime Minister had a wholly different kin d of colleague. An experience d parliamentarian wh o ha d entere d th e Hous e o f Common s i n 1935 , Mr. Gree n was note d fo r a n obsessiv e concer n tha t Canad a joi n som e kind o f Pacifi c counterpar t of NATO , fo r a rancorou s attac k o n th e Government at the time of the Suez crisis, and for a record, surel y unique for a foreign minister , of unbroken domicile in his own country since his return fro m th e Wester n front i n 1918 . I t wa s widel y noticed , a t leas t during th e firs t yea r an d a hal f o f thei r ne w relationship , tha t Mr . Diefenbaker seeme d reluctan t t o allo w Mr . Gree n th e latitud e Mr . St. Lauren t ha d permitte d Mr . Pearson , tha t h e reserve d fo r himsel f important pronouncement s on worl d affairs , an d o n occasio n mad e things mor e difficul t fo r hi s foreig n secretar y t o sui t hi s ow n politica l advantage. Lik e Lor d Curzo n fort y year s before him , Mr . Gree n wa s "to discove r th e persona l embarrassmen t t o whic h a Foreig n Secretar y might b e subjecte d b y a Prim e Ministe r . . . wh o took a n activ e an d sometimes independen t par t i n th e foreig n policy o f hi s country." 57 PRIME MINISTE R AN D GOVERNOR GENERA L

Half a century ago, whe n the conduc t o f Canadia n externa l polic y wa s both theoretically and practically the concern of the British Government , the Governo r General a s its representative played a s great a part i n th e external affair s o f th e Dominio n a s hi s ow n temperamen t an d tha t o f his Prim e Ministe r woul d allow ; an d the y coul d allo w a grea t deal . Lord Mint o has lef t a revealing account of what he conceive d to b e hi s constitutional rol e durin g hi s governo r generalshi p (1898-1904) : I think what I should like to make most clea r [h e wrote to his Canadian friend George R . Parki n i n 1904 ] i s the positio n I hav e take n u p wit h "m y min isters" o n matter s o f publi c importance..viz . alway s t o expres s m y view s a s openly an d a s decidedl y a s I coul d o n al l matter s upo n whic h I hav e bee n consulted—and thoug h i t ma y soun d conceite d I hav e bee n consulte d abou t everything o f an y moment , an d I a m sur e yo u wil l understan d th e pleasur e it i s to m e that th e longe r I hav e bee n here , th e greate r weigh t I hav e bee n able t o bear.. I hav e howeve r alway s assume d th e position , i n matter s o f importance, tha t ther e wer e tw o classe s int o whic h question s place d befor e

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me resolve d themselves...viz . Imperia l questions , an d purel y Canadia n questions—as regard s th e forme r I hav e alway s claime d m y righ t t o asser t myself, i.e . t o pu t m y foo t down , i f I suspecte d anythin g detrimenta l t o Imperial interests , whils t a s t o Canadia n question s howeve r important , I have onl y expresse d m y opinion a s strongly a s I could, simply a s my opinion, for wha t i t wa s worth , tellin g th e ministe r intereste d tha t suc h wa s m y opinion an d tha t h e coul d tak e i t o r no t a s h e liked. *

Lord Grey , Governo r Genera l fro m 190 4 t o 1911 , foun d th e are a in whic h h e coul d "pu t m y foo t down " somewha t smalle r tha n tha t available t o hi s predecessor , bu t di d no t hesitat e t o pu t i t dow n whe n he sa w fit, as when he wrot e to th e Britis h ambassado r i n Washington , "with th e vie w o f preventin g th e offic e o f Governo r Genera l driftin g into a subordinat e an d undignifie d position, " to reques t tha t h e b e sen t "copies o f an y privat e communication s yo u ma y sen d t o th e Secretar y of th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs." 58 I n th e main , however , Gre y relied, a s his successors ha d necessaril y t o rely , o n influence rather tha n on constitutional authority . His restless an d energetic intelligence lappe d into every cranny of Canadian life, suffusin g hi s minister s with schemes, goading the m int o actio n an d frequentl y int o irritation . "O n on e oc casion (1909 ) whe n Grey's enthusias m for proportiona l representatio n threatened t o becom e embarrassing , Laurie r 'wishe d Ear l Gre y woul d mind hi s own business', an d Kin g in hi s diary added : 'Th e trut h i s Hi s Ex. i s getting into to o man y things'."59 Bu t Bryce , i n Washington , was more appreciative . "Whe n I loo k bac k ove r thes e las t thre e years, " h e wrote to Gre y i n 1910 , " I doub t i f an y decision s woul d eve r hav e bee n got ou t o f Canada bu t fo r you r action." 60 Under Gre y th e influenc e o f Governor s Genera l upo n Canadia n external polic y reached a hig h water mark fro m whic h i t wa s to reced e for man y years. The pressure s of wa r ha d b y 191 9 create d th e practic e of direc t communicatio n betwee n prim e ministers , an d althoug h th e channel formall y ran throug h th e Governo r General' s offic e i n Ottawa , the hold-u p o f th e Britis h Government' s telegra m a t th e tim e o f th e Chanak crisi s o f 192 2 (receive d i n th e Governo r General' s offic e a t 1 0 on th e evenin g of Friday, Septembe r 15 , deciphere d ther e th e followin g morning an d delivere d t o th e Prim e Minister' s offic e a t 3 P.M . on Sep tember 16 , tw o hour s afte r th e new s ha d appeare d i n th e Canadia n press61) helpe d t o mak e inevitabl e th e change s i n th e positio n o f th e Governor Genera l throughou t th e Dominion s agree d upo n a t th e Im *Lord Mint o t o Georg e R . Parkin , Sept . 26 , 1904 , quote d i n Fran k H . Under bill, "Lor d Mint o o n hi s Governor Generalship, " Canadian Historical Review, vol . XL, no . 2 , Jun e 1959 , p . 124 . Professo r Underbil l draw s attentio n t o Minto' s curious "syste m o f punctuatio n b y mean s o f dot s an d dashes. "

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perial Conference of 1926.* Henceforth the Governor General no longer functioned a s th e representativ e o f th e Britis h Government ; h e wa s to b e no mor e (i f n o less ) tha n th e representativ e o f th e Sovereign . I n that capacity he might continue to exercise influence o n policy by means of th e prerogative s o f constitutiona l monarch y classicall y denne d b y Bagehot as "the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn." Warning an d encouragement , however , were only useful, indee d the y were onl y practical , o n th e assumptio n o f adequat e consultation . Thi s the Imperia l Conferenc e of 192 6 recognize d an d sough t t o promot e b y stating i n it s repor t tha t " a Governo r Genera l shoul d b e supplie d wit h copies o f al l document s o f importanc e an d i n genera l shoul d b e kep t as fully informe d a s is His Majest y th e Kin g in Grea t Britai n of Cabine t business an d publi c affairs. " Whethe r i n fac t h e woul d b e s o informe d of cours e depende d no t upo n constitutiona l document s draw n u p i n London bu t upo n th e inclination o f his Prim e Minister . I n Canada , th e Prime Ministe r wa s no t s o inclined . Whil e Canadia n practic e di d no t so obviousl y follo w tha t o f th e Iris h Fre e Stat e i n seekin g t o degrad e the Governo r General' s offic e fo r politica l advantage , ther e wa s cer tainly n o grea t effor t b y Mackenzie Kin g to dra w the Governo r closel y into his confidence o r to see k the benefit o f his advice . Lord Willingdon , Governor Genera l fro m 192 6 t o 1930 , complaine d tha t "fe w chief s o f a Stat e hav e suc h littl e knowledg e o f th e wor k tha t i s bein g don e b y his administrator s a s ha s th e presen t Governor-Genera l o f Canada"; 62 Lord Tweedsmuir , Governo r Genera l fro m 193 5 t o 1940 , althoug h on much closer persona l term s with his Prime Minister tha n Willingdon had been , ha d hardl y mor e influenc e o n policy . Th e Governor s o f Mackenzie King' s las t year s i n offic e wer e ceremonia l cyphers . I n 1944 Kin g George VI inquire d o f his Canadian Prime Minister , then i n the Unite d Kingdom , "ho w hi s uncl e wa s gettin g on. I spok e o f bein g exceedingly please d wit h Lord Athlone . . . . He aske d m e how often I saw him . I sai d sometime s quit e a littl e perio d wen t by , sometimes , some weeks would go by. I t wa s then tha t h e spok e o f seein g Churchil l *The wisdo m o f on e o f thes e changes , tha t prescribin g tha t th e Governo r General wa s n o longe r t o ac t a s th e channe l o f communicatio n betwee n a Do minion governmen t an d tha t o f anothe r membe r o f th e Britis h Commonwealth , was forcibl y suggeste d b y th e late r experienc e o f Ne w Zealan d whic h alon e o f the Dominion s clun g i n thi s respec t t o th e ol d syste m unti l 1941 ; man y seriou s delays i n th e transmissio n o f message s betwee n Londo n an d Wellingto n occurre d as a consequence . O n on e occasio n "a n importan t Londo n cabl e o f 1 9 Ma r 3 7 reached Governmen t Hous e o n th e 20t h bu t th e Prim e Minister' s Departmen t not unti l th e 23rd. " F . L . W . Wood , Th e Ne w Zealand People a t War: Political and External Affairs (Wellington , 1958) , p . 63 .

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1

once a week. . . . "* Wit h Lord Alexander , Athlone' s successor , Mac kenzie Kin g wa s o n friendl y term s bu t agai n "di d no t mak e a practic e of consultin g th e famou s soldier , presumabl y becaus e h e wa s confident that Alexander' s advic e o n Canadia n politic s woul d b e quit e worth less."63 Lor d Alexander , i t wil l b e recalled , lef t hi s vice-rega l pos t t o become Minister o f Defence in the Governmen t of the Unite d Kingdom . The appointmen t o f Mr . Vincen t Masse y i n 195 2 an d tha t o f hi s successor, Majo r Genera l George s Vanier , i n 195 9 hav e t o a consider able exten t rehabilitate d th e office . Bot h ha d wid e experienc e o f Canadian affair s (Mr . Masse y indee d havin g bee n a membe r o f a Canadian Government ) an d i n particula r o f Canadia n diplomacy , s o that thei r Prim e Minister s coul d no t wit h muc h plausibilit y hol d aloo f on th e groun d that thei r Governors ' knowledg e an d judgmen t of event s were too sligh t to make their counse l wort h acquiring. No r woul d a n increasing numbe r o f informe d Canadian s hav e bee n conten t wit h a cypher's role . Th e prestig e o f th e Governo r General' s offic e has , fo r the firs t tim e i n thirt y years , bee n noticeabl y enhanced . Th e appoint ment o f Canadian s ha s contribute d t o thi s result , an d eve n mor e th e rare distinctio n wit h whic h th e firs t Canadia n appointee , Mr . Vincen t Massey, wen t abou t hi s duties . S o has th e increase d popularit y o f th e monarchy itsel f an d it s domesticatio n int o th e Canadia n constitutio n with more frequent (an d les s stuffy ) roya l visits . * Quoted i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 694 . Th e weekl y meetings wit h Mr . Churchill , Kin g Georg e added , wer e sometime s alone , some times wit h th e Chief s o f Staff , sometime s wit h member s o f th e Wa r Cabinet . Mackenzie Kin g "aske d hi m i f hi s presenc e cause d th e me n t o discus s matter s less freely . H e sai d no t a t all . The y spok e quit e freel y bac k an d forth . H e foun d it ver y helpful. " Ibid., p . 694 .

ChapterTwo

TH

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BUREAUCRAC Y

THE SENIO R CIVI L SERVAN T

It i s a parado x o f bureaucratic histor y tha t no soone r ha d th e principl e of a n official , permanen t an d neutra l publi c servic e bee n firml y estab lished i n the constitution s o f Western democracie s tha n th e line betwee n political and administrativ e activity began to be so smudged an d blurre d that toda y i t i s doubtfu l whethe r a frontie r exists , le t alon e whethe r the boundar y ma y b e precisel y delimited . N o sophisticate d studen t of politics i s an y longer shocke d b y this, no r doe s h e hanke r fo r a golde n age o f administratio n fro m whic h patronag e an d politic s hav e bee n forever banished . Th e da y o f "th e administrativ e eunuc h wit h neithe r policies nor politics" 1 is over, i f it ha d eve r dawned ; th e administratio n of things , i n splendi d defianc e o f th e Marxia n prediction , ha s com e t o mean th e governmen t o f men . Th e civi l servant , mor e especiall y th e senior civi l servant , ha s bee n draw n eve r mor e intimatel y t o th e centr e of th e politica l process . Th e rang e an d complexit y o f technologie s modern government s must master , th e want s o f citizen s grow n accus tomed t o thei r welfar e state , th e tren d toward s mobilize d i f no t garri soned communitie s in a n er a tha t i s neithe r wa r no r peace , al l hav e increased hi s influence upo n affairs . In Canada, the senior civil servant's involvement in the policy proces s has been a s close and continuous as anywhere in the world. The longev ity o f government s has brough t hi m int o prolonge d an d ofte n familia r contact wit h political superiors . Th e state' s uninhibite d participatio n h i taming an d harnessin g the resource s o f th e mor e forbiddin g hal f o f th e continent ha s place d a premiu m upo n hi s manageria l talents . Th e stil l more specialize d problem s o f defenc e i n th e missil e age have cast doub t upon th e validit y o f th e classica l formul a "layma n o n top , exper t o n tap" t o the exten t that the political layma n is concerned abou t national , as distinc t fro m hi s own , survival . Such ar e th e circumstances offerin g the senio r Canadia n administrato r a positio n o f powe r an d influenc e greater, perhaps , tha n tha t o f hi s counterpar t i n othe r democrati c bureaucracies. Student s of the politica l proces s in Canada ar e al l agreed upon his importance, if they are just beginning to penetrate the mysteries of decision-makin g i n whic h he i s s o cruciall y involved . It migh t b e thought , recallin g th e wanin g influenc e o f th e caree r

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diplomatist (se e below, chapter vn), that the senior Canadian administra tor exert s hi s authorit y onl y i n question s o f interna l policy . Thi s woul d be a majo r misinterpretatio n o f hi s role . For a t th e summi t of th e civi l service th e division s betwee n foreig n an d domesti c affair s al l bu t disappear. A t thi s exalte d leve l th e gaz e o f th e civi l servan t sweep s across th e whol e horizo n o f publi c policy . Thu s th e senio r member s of the Departmen t o f External Affairs , wit h their commandin g positio n o n interdepartmental committee s an d thei r uniqu e relationshi p wit h th e Prime Minister's offic e (se e above, chapter i), are assured of opportunit y to influenc e decision s i n area s fa r mor e extensiv e than a recita l o f their nominal responsibilitie s migh t suggest . I n th e sam e way , ke y member s from othe r department s an d agencie s o f governmen t brin g thei r experi ence t o bea r upo n problem s o f externa l polic y whic h i n a mor e rigi d division o f labou r woul d b e th e sol e prerogativ e o f foreig n offices . Th e mutuality o f thes e intrusion s help s t o alla y th e resentmen t the y migh t otherwise arouse . The grou p whos e member s stra y s o frequentl y int o eac h other' s jurisdictions i s no t an d coul d no t b e a larg e one . It s number s hav e varied ove r th e years : perhap s a doze n o r s o i n 1945 , perhap s tripl e that today . I t i s a grou p withou t fixe d composition , jus t a s i t i s a group withou t define d duties . Withi n i t ar e usuall y t o b e foun d th e deputy minister s an d o n occasio n th e associat e an d assistan t deput y ministers o f certai n importan t departments—Externa l Affairs , Finance , National Defence , Trad e an d Commerce , Transport—togethe r wit h th e senior official s o f th e Ban k o f Canada , th e secretar y o f th e Cabinet , perhaps th e principa l privat e secretar y o f th e Prim e Minister . It s mem bers hav e been describe d a s an "unde r Cabinet." 2 I t i s a n ap t term , fo r this i s th e grou p t o whic h responsibl e minister s o f th e Crow n turn , individually an d collectively , fo r continuou s advic e an d guidanc e o n matters o f high policy. I t thu s comprise s a kind of civil service ministry , and t o it s member s migh t wel l b e applie d Si r Jame s Stephen' s descrip tion o f higher publi c servant s i n Englan d a centur y ago , "statesme n i n disguise." Below the "unde r Cabinet " may b e foun d a large r grou p o f officials , usually o f th e ran k o f assistan t deput y ministe r o r hea d o f a majo r branch o r division , likewis e engage d i n genera l administratio n an d properly describe d a s members of the senio r civi l service. Th e numbe r of such official s ha s greatl y increase d ove r th e years—indee d th e whol e group i s largel y a produc t o f th e perio d sinc e th e en d o f th e Secon d World War—bu t it is still a smal l an d selec t secto r o f the publi c servic e as a whole . It s presen t membershi p ha s bee n estimate d variousl y a s

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between 15 0 and 250. * I t ma y be best describe d a s "th e bureaucrati c elite." T o identif y it s member s wit h th e "unde r Cabinet " woul d b e t o exaggerate thei r responsibilities , bu t i t i s fro m th e bureaucrati c elit e that "unde r Cabinets " o f the futur e ar e recruited . Where departmenta l division s ar e barrier s rathe r tha n aid s t o action , the "unde r Cabinet " an d th e bureaucrati c elit e usefull y dissolv e them . This ma y b e don e b y th e interdepartmenta l committee , meetin g a t th e level o f deput y minister s o r head s o f division , habitua l resor t t o whic h is s o distinctiv e a featur e o f publi c administratio n i n Canad a (se e below, chapte r vi) . Bu t th e interdepartmenta l committe e a s suc h can not b e expected t o secur e tha t broa d comprehensio n o f national interes t which i s its ostensibl e purpos e an d whic h i t ma y achiev e a t it s best . A t its worst , however , i t i s a foru m fo r departmenta l lobbying , fo r post ponement an d procrastination , fo r pitchin g discussio n an d decisio n a t the lowes t commo n denominato r o f understandin g an d agreement . A valuabl e ai d to interdepartmenta l liaiso n o f a mor e helpfu l kin d i s the practic e o f postin g ke y official s t o othe r department s an d receivin g in retur n ke y official s fro m them . "W e fee l tha t i n man y case s thes e officials ar e interchangeable, " Mr . L . S . St . Lauren t remarked soo n after becomin g Prim e Minister , "an d ca n b e moved t o ne w posts eithe r in othe r department s o r wit h specia l governmen t agencies." 3 Th e prac tice seem s t o hav e bee n inaugurate d durin g th e Secon d Worl d Wa r among actual or prospective member s of the "unde r Cabinet, " and sinc e then tw o o r thre e ver y senio r civi l servant s indee d hav e rotate d ever y three o r fou r year s amon g th e mos t importan t administrativ e posts — the unde r secretaryshi p o f stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , clerkshi p o f th e Privy Council , chairmanshi p o f th e Civi l Servic e Commission . I t ha s also bee n encourage d withi n th e rank s o f th e les s senio r bureaucrati c elite, particularl y amon g th e Department s o f Externa l Affairs , Trad e and Commerce , an d Finance . Bu t civi l servant s who find usefu l experi ence i n departments other tha n their own are still the exception, an d th e characteristic complain t continue s t o b e th e classica l complain t tha t the public servic e offer s rathe r les s tha n privat e enterpris e th e oppor *Keith B . Callard , Advanced Administrative Training i n th e Public Service (Toronto, 1958) , p. 22, cites a figure of "possibly . . . 150" ; Joh n Porter , "Highe r Public Servant s an d th e Bureaucrati c Elit e i n Canada, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol . XXIV , no . 4 , Nov . 1958 , pp . 497-501 , offers a large r estimat e mor e carefull y computed . Takin g a s hi s bureaucrati c universe "twenty-on e deput y ministers , an d twent y other s a t th e deput y ministe r level; twenty-nin e associat e an d assistan t deputies , an d sixt y other s a t tha t level ; seventy-seven belo w thes e rank s . . . a t th e directo r leve l . . . ; an d senio r executives o f Crow n Corporations, " Professo r Porte r arrive s a t a figur e o f 243 . Of thes e 20 2 offere d fairl y unifor m biographica l data , an d thes e official s for m hi s "bureacratic elite."

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5

tunity t o mak e th e mos t o f one' s talent s i n whateve r branc h the y ar e most urgentl y neede d o r bes t rewarded . Canad a ha s develope d mor e hesitantly tha n Unite d State s busines s th e interchangeabl e executiv e along wit h th e interchangeabl e part , movin g imperturbabl y an d effec tively fro m on e enterpris e t o th e next ; th e interchangeabl e civi l servan t is a s ye t a n idea l an d i n som e quarter s h e i s no t ye t that . "I t seem s to m e tha t th e Canadia n servic e i s muc h to o highl y fragmented, " a former membe r of the "unde r Cabinet " commented i n 1957 . "Ther e ar e far to o man y pigeon hole s an d blin d alleys . . . . Too muc h talen t get s lost an d frustrated within these narro w confines . . .. I expec t someon e will say , 'Loo k a t yourself . Yo u see m t o hav e go t around. ' Tha t i s true, bu t I hav e resigne d thre e times." 4 Perhaps th e chie f catalys t o f co-ordinatio n a t th e highe r level s o f the civi l servic e i s th e wa y it s member s spen d tim e togethe r outsid e their offices , "havin g lunch at the Chateau, o r on a Saturday a t Madam e Burger's."* A forme r membe r o f th e "unde r Cabinet " has stresse d th e importance o f thi s extra-bureaucrati c environment : In informa l gathering s a t lunch , a t dinner , a t receptions , a t evenin g partie s and a t the fishing club, th e leadin g adviser s o f th e Governmen t . . . mak e a practic e o f consultation . . . . I t i s taken fo r grante d a t mos t Ottaw a socia l gatherings tha t th e wive s gravitat e t o on e en d o f th e roo m whil e thei r husbands collec t a t th e othe r fo r tha t infinitel y fascinatin g occupatio n o f "talking shop" . Fro m observatio n an d fro m conversatio n wit h civi l servant s in othe r countries , I hav e com e t o th e conclusio n tha t thi s clos e contac t and constan t exchang e o f view s amon g leadin g civi l servant s i n Ottaw a i s in man y respect s unique . I n Washingto n interdepartmenta l consultatio n hardly exist s excep t i n formall y constitute d committees . I n Londo n ther e is greate r informalit y durin g workin g hour s tha n i n Washington , bu t afte r hours civi l servant s depar t fo r thei r home s i n widel y separate d suburb s o f the cit y an d hav e relativel y fe w socia l contacts. 5

The syste m work s effectivel y enoug h t o cur e th e usua l bureaucrati c malaise o f dissipatin g rivalry an d competition , bu t i n doin g s o i t ma y produce undesirabl e side-effects . Th e senio r civi l servan t ma y vie w such a vas t panoram a o f governmen t busines s tha t h e become s incap able of that close scrutin y of detail or that specialized knowledge withou t *Callard, Advanced Administrative Training i n th e Public Service, p . 1 . "Th e Chateau" i s the Chatea u Laurie r Hotel , "Madam e Burger's " a restauran t i n Hull , Quebec, a few minutes ' driv e acros s the Ottaw a River . A typica l meeting of thi s kind was describe d in 194 2 by the America n Ministe r in Ottaw a who havin g attemped withou t success to trac k dow n some members of th e "bureaucrati c elite " at th e Ridea u Club o n th e previou s day, "trie d m y luc k at th e [Chatea u Laurier ] cafeteria toda y and lunche d with Jac k Pickersgil l (Privat e Secretary t o th e Prim e Minister), Ji m Coyn e (Assistan t to Donal d Gordo n i n Pric e Control) , Sau l Ra e and Escot t Rei d of th e Departmen t of Externa l Affairs." Nanc y Harvison Hooker , ed., Th e Moffat Papers (Cambridge , Mass., 1956) , p . 382 . The luncheo n yielded more politica l informatio n fo r th e Ministe r tha n half-a-doze n forma l interviews.

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which n o enterprise , publi c o r private , ca n full y succeed . A membe r of Parliament ha s describe d senio r publi c servant s i n Canad a a s " a bunc h of mandarin s who , b y bein g all-aroun d gentlemen , sor t o f crosswor d puzzle experts , hav e neve r go t aroun d t o havin g enoug h exper t knowl edge i n an y on e secto r t o develo p o r elaborat e policy." 6 Th e descrip tion i s doubtles s overdrawn , bu t i t suggest s a tendenc y o f whic h th e "mandarins" themselve s are not unaware. Another hazar d is that debat e between spokesme n o f differen t department s may b e sappe d b y famili arity o r inhibition . Professo r Whear e ha s writte n convincingl y o f th e need i n effectiv e committe e wor k fo r th e talent s "o f bein g unabl e t o see th e sens e i n wha t i s bein g done , o f questionin g th e whol e basi s of organization , o f brushin g difficultie s aside , o f ignorin g logica l argu ment, an d of pressing a point beyon d what most me n consider a reasonable limit." 7 Thes e ar e no t th e ordinar y bureaucrati c virtues , an d the y are likely to be in acutely short supply in a bureaucracy whose member s (to adap t th e famou s phras e o f Jinnah ) occasionall y intermarr y an d habitually interdine . Th e exten t t o whic h clos e persona l associatio n of th e member s o f th e senio r civi l servic e make s fo r a dangerousl y monolithic approac h t o publi c polic y i s har d t o determine . On e o f th e members o f th e grou p has recalle d afte r leavin g i t tha t "o n man y mat ters i t wa s considere d undesirabl e t o tr y t o reac h commo n view s fo r presentation t o th e Ministers. . . . T o hav e attempted t o d o s o might have give n a quit e unjustifie d authorit y t o th e resultin g piec e o f pape r or hav e glosse d ove r difference s o f interpretatio n tha t Minister s . . . should b e awar e of." 8 Agains t thi s encouragin g testimon y ma y b e se t the disturbin g evidence of the forme r Chie f o f the Genera l Staf f tha t th e Committee ha d bee n " 'packed' t o protec t th e governmen t agains t th e receipt o f unpalatabl e advice , rathe r tha n presen t th e militar y cas e objectively an d fearlessly o n its merits."9 Related t o thi s dange r i s anothe r which might be called , howeve r in elegantly, th e "politicization " o f the senio r civi l servant . I t i s o f cours e a commonplac e tha t th e senio r civi l servan t ca n n o mor e avoi d politic s that h e ca n avoi d policy ; no r i s i t desirabl e 'that h e should . "I n th e formulation o f policy," writes Professor Wheare, "a Highe r Civi l Servant is advisin g an d assistin g a Ministe r no t onl y t o carr y throug h a polic y which i s the polic y o f a majorit y part y i n th e Hous e o f Commons , bu t also to defen d that polic y agains t the criticism s an d attack s of th e part y or partie s i n opposition . H e work s i n th e mids t o f part y politics . H e must b e awar e of party politics; indee d h e ignore s i t a t his peril. A first requirement of a Higher Civil Servant is a political sense." 10 Yet no aspect of his work requires more discretio n or carrie s greater risk . An obsessiv e

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concern wit h part y politic s displaye d unde r a singl e governmen t ove r a lon g perio d o f tim e ma y temp t hi m t o plac e th e part y befor e th e public interest ; or i f he i s not s o tempted a ne w se t o f politica l master s may regar d hi m notwithstandin g as to o closel y associate d wit h th e ol d to be of much use to them. "Th e on e thing that I don't like," Mackenzie King wrote i n his diary o n the occasio n o f appointin g Genera l A . G . L . McNaughton a s commande r o f th e Canadia n Arm y i n 1939 , "i s th e school fro m whic h h e comes , whic h wa s th e schoo l o f MacBrien , o f Bennett, an d Herridge. . .. No better evidenc e could be given of our dis interested actio n tha n i n givin g this comman d t o on e who comes . . . from tha t particula r group." 11 The quasi-political natur e of the services rendered b y senior Canadia n administrators to the politician s se t in authority over the m is recognized by the specia l manne r of their appointment . Unlike other civi l servants, who ar e appointe d b y th e Civi l Servic e Commission , deput y minister s are calle d t o thei r exalte d position s b y th e Governor-in-Counci l o n th e advice o f th e Prim e Minister . A n incomin g administratio n i s thu s no t only abl e bu t t o som e exten t expecte d t o reapprais e it s predecessor' s "under Cabinet " in the ligh t of its own intended policies , an d t o replac e any obviou s misfit s b y official s enjoyin g it s confidenc e an d eage r t o d o its bidding . I t woul d be altogethe r imprope r t o regar d thi s procedure a s a throwbac k t o th e patronag e syste m o f Laurier' s da y an d a majo r exception t o th e principle s o f civi l servic e neutralit y an d permanence . If i t result s i n change s o f personnel , thos e change s ar e expecte d t o b e few an d obvious . Bu t followin g th e Genera l Electio n o f 195 7 whic h returned th e Conservativ e part y t o powe r afte r twenty-tw o year s i n opposition, th e belie f wa s widesprea d tha t th e "unde r Cabinet " whic h had serve d Libera l master s fo r s o lon g an d s o wel l (no t leas t o f it s services bein g t o contribut e fro m it s rank s th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s an d th e Ministe r o f Citizenshi p an d Immigration* ) would prove unacceptable t o the new Government. Distinguishe d heads , it wa s confidentl y predicted , woul d soo n roll ; indeed , i n som e quarter s the cr y wa s tha t the y shoul d b e mad e t o roll , th e Globe an d Mail o f *Respectively, Mr . Leste r Pearso n (wh o ha d bee n Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affair s at the tim e of his entering politics), and Mr. J. W. Pickersgil l (previously Cler k o f th e Priv y Council) . I n 1948 , i n announcin g Mr . Pearson' s Cabinet appointment , th e Prim e Ministe r remarke d tha t th e civi l servic e shoul d be regarde d a s "th e steppin g ston e t o th e Ministry, " a doctrin e immediatel y stigmatized b y a leadin g constitutiona l authorit y a s assertin g " a constitutiona l principle a s nove l a s i t i s subversiv e o f parliamentar y government " and , later , as "untrue , vicious , and unnecessary. " Eugen e Forsey , "Mr . Kin g and Parliament ary Government, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol . XVII, no . 4 , Nov . 1951 , p . 454 .

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Toronto arguin g after th e impressiv e Diefenbaker victor y o f 195 8 tha t the tim e ha d com e fo r "th e dismantlement o f wha t ha s com e t o b e called, in Ottawa, th e 'Establishment'." 12 But whil e som e senio r official s left th e publi c servic e afte r th e ne w administratio n too k over , ther e is n o evidenc e tha t an y wer e actuall y dismissed . Th e transition , i n retrospect, too k plac e wit h far les s frictio n an d recriminatio n than ha d been expected , an d suc h desir e a s ther e ma y hav e bee n t o replac e members o f th e "Establishment " foun d a n outle t i n th e hirin g o f ne w personnel rathe r tha n in th e firing of the old. 13 THE UNDE R SECRETAR Y O F STAT E FOR EXTERNA L AFFAIR S

Senior official s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s hav e o n th e whole bee n mor e secur e i n thei r position s throughou t change s o f government tha n hav e thei r colleague s i n suc h department s a s Trad e and Commerce , perhap s becaus e foreig n polic y ha s bee n les s contro versial tha n commercia l policy . Bu t tranquillit y ha s no t alway s bee n their lot. Durin g the early 1920's , when the nature o f Canada's positio n within th e Britis h Commonwealt h o f Nation s wa s stil l unsettle d an d what i s no w o f largel y antiquaria n interes t wa s capabl e o f stirrin g th e Dominion, a chang e i n governmen t produce d th e resignatio n o f th e most abl e membe r o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . Whe n Mackenzie King assumed his dutie s a s Prime Ministe r an d Secretar y of State for External Affair s i n December 1921 , h e foun d tha t Departmen t to consis t o f thre e administrativ e (non-clerical ) officers : Si r Josep h Pope, it s Unde r Secretary ; W . H . Walker , Assistan t Unde r Secretary ; and Lorin g C . Christie , Lega l Adviser . Pop e an d Walke r ha d bee n i n the Departmen t sinc e it s creatio n i n 190 9 an d i n th e publi c servic e since 187 8 an d 188 7 respectively ; the y wer e elderl y men , n o longe r able t o kee p full y abreas t o f affairs . Th e majo r burden s o f th e Depart ment ha d devolve d upo n Christie , a n exceptionall y abl e officia l whos e formal titl e o f Lega l Advise r conveye d mos t imperfectl y the scop e o f his actua l responsibilities . Th e tw o prim e minister s who m h e ha d previously serve d relie d o n hi m fo r advic e an d assistanc e i n polic y formulation a t th e highes t level : Si r Rober t Borden' s repor t o n th e Washington Disarmament Conferenc e was largely Christie's work , while the policie s argue d b y Arthu r Meighe n a t th e Imperia l Conferenc e in 1921 ha d thei r origi n i n hi s memoranda . "O n matter s o f externa l affairs," Meighe n wrot e t o Christi e som e year s afterwards , " I valu e your view s mor e highl y tha n an y othe r I know." 14 I t wa s n o doub t

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because o f th e hig h estee m i n whic h Christi e wa s hel d b y Conservativ e leaders bot h i n Canad a an d i n th e Unite d Kingdo m tha t Mackenzi e King a t the outse t o f his administratio n regarde d hi m wit h considerabl e mistrust, remarking in his diary in 192 2 that th e Department o f Externa l Affairs wa s " a Tor y hive. " Shortl y afte r becomin g Prim e Minister , Christie late r recalled , Mackenzi e Kin g called o n m e t o sa y a t grea t lengt h tha t m y relation s & work wit h hi m would b e exactl y th e sam e a s wit h yo u [Borden ] an d Mr . Meighen . . . . [But] durin g th e year that followe d I sa w him o n busines s possibl y a doze n times, includin g meeting s i n th e corridor , & scarcely eve r mor e tha n a fe w minutes. . . . I ha d ver y littl e t o do—an d thu s thoug h i t wa s decided tha t I shoul d no t g o to th e Geno a Conferenc e o r t o Genev a o n th e groun d tha t there wa s importan t wor k a t home , th e importan t wor k neve r turne d up , and al l I di d throughou t th e yea r migh t hav e bee n don e i n thre e weeks . Long afterwar d I recalle d that a t ou r origina l intervie w h e had talke d abou t his politica l cree d a t grea t length , contrastin g i t wit h Mr . Meighen' s & so on, an d tha t a t on e o r tw o appropriate pause s I ha d eithe r bee n silen t o r sought t o talk abou t th e Department. . . ,15

If b y tactic s o f enforce d inactivit y Mackenzi e Kin g ha d i n fac t sought t o compe l Lorin g Christi e t o resig n fro m th e Departmen t o f External Affairs , h e wa s altogethe r successful , fo r earl y i n 192 3 th e Legal Advise r tendere d hi s resignatio n whic h wa s accepted. * Fo r th e next yea r Mackenzi e Kin g laboure d wit h foreig n an d imperia l affair s without an y exper t assistanc e fro m th e Department . H e turne d fro m time t o time to O . D. Skelton , the n Dea n of Arts a t Queen' s University , Kingston, Ontario , an d wel l know n a s th e biographe r o f Laurier , an d in 192 3 too k him to London a s his advise r for th e Imperia l Conference . King ha d bee n anxiou s a s earl y a s 192 2 t o brin g Skelto n int o th e *In 193 5 Christi e wa s brough t bac k int o th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s by R. B. Bennett after consultatio n with Mackenzi e King to ensure that his position would no t b e jeopardize d b y a Libera l administration . I n 193 9 Mackenzi e Kin g appointed hi m Ministe r to th e United States. Th e Financial Post of Toront o (Sept . 23, 1939) , commentin g on thi s appointment , recalle d tha t whe n Mackenzi e King had com e t o powe r i n 1921 , "Mr . Christie' s advic e wa s n o longe r sought ; h e found himsel f sidetracke d i n hi s offic e i n th e Eas t Block . . . . Mr . Christie— a lifelong Conservative—wa s no t deeme d th e bes t Counsello r i n foreig n polic y for a Libera l Administration. " Upo n readin g thi s articl e Christi e wrot e privatel y to th e associat e edito r statin g that relation s betwee n himsel f an d th e Prim e Min ister ha d neve r bee n othe r tha n friendly , an d tha t hi s resignatio n i n 192 3 ha d been du e wholl y t o persona l reason s (Lorin g Christi e t o K . R . Wilson , Oct . 4 , 1939, Christi e Papers) . Thi s versio n i s clearl y a t odd s wit h Christie' s lette r t o Borden quote d i n th e text ; bu t i t i s surel y th e earlie r version , writte n thirtee n years close r t o th e event , which i s to b e believed . It woul d no t hav e bee n helpfu l as Ministe r t o th e Unite d State s t o hav e i n circulatio n rumour s tha t h e wa s a t one tim e forced ou t o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs b y hi s Prim e Minister . Christie's untimel y death too k plac e i n Washingto n i n 1941 .

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Department;* o n July 10 , 1924 , he wa s officiall y appointe d Counsellor; and i n 1925 , on the retiremen t of Sir Joseph Pope, he wa s made Under Secretary of State for Externa l Affairs, a position occupied continuously by him to his death in 1941 . In O . D . Skelton , Mackenzie King had foun d a deput y ministe r i n whom h e coul d repos e a s muc h trus t an d confidenc e a s hi s natur e could allow . Skelton's influence upo n th e formatio n of externa l policy was ver y great . Durin g th e earl y 1920's , no t ye t a membe r o f th e Department o f Externa l Affairs , Skelto n "strengthene d an d refined " King's view s o n inter-imperia l affairs; 16 durin g th e late r 1930' s hi s great experienc e was thrown , althoug h not i n th e en d decisively , into an attemp t to protec t Canada fro m involvemen t in a Europea n war. f The intimac y of thei r associatio n might be though t to hav e diminished Skelton's usefulnes s t o a succeedin g government , just a s Christie' s rol e *On Januar y 21 , 1922 , Mackenzi e Kin g wrot e i n hi s diary : "A n excellen t address [b y Skelton]—pointin g ou t tha t foreig n polic y wa s a n extensio n o f domestic polic y & tha t a s w e ha d gaine d contro l o f th e on e s o w e mus t gai n control o f th e other . . . . Skelton' s addres s woul d mak e a n excellen t foundatio n for Canadia n polic y o n Externa l Affairs , an d Skelto n himsel f woul d mak e a n excellent ma n fo r tha t Department . . . . I tol d hi m tha t h e migh t b e wante d there som e day . . .. H e certainl y ha s th e knowledg e & the righ t poin t o f view. " Quoted i n R . MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, I , 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p . 454 . fDuring th e wee k betwee n th e Britis h an d Canadia n declaration s o f wa r o n Germany i n Septembe r 1939 , "Kin g wa s engage d i n anothe r struggl e wit h neu trality unde r th e mos t wrenchin g persona l strain s o f hi s career . Skelton , hi s trusted advise r o n foreig n affair s fro m th e beginning , insiste d wit h al l th e powe r of hi s experienc e an d integrit y tha t Canad a mus t remai n neutral . . . . Skelto n argued tha t th e surrender s an d hypocris y o f appeasement , fro m Ethiopi a onward , had undermine d al l th e mora l purpos e fo r whic h th e wa r ostensibl y wa s t o b e fought. Sinc e n o mora l questio n wa s involved , Canada , lik e Ireland , shoul d kee p out. Bein g a Nort h America n nation , i t migh t exercis e som e mediatio n i n th e course o f a conflic t morall y chaotic . . . . Kin g tol d Skelto n bluntl y tha t hi s counsel, whateve r els e migh t b e sai d o f it , wa s impossible. " Bruc e Hutchison , The Incredible Canadian (Toronto , 1952) , p . 250 . Lorin g Christie , wh o ha d re-entered th e Departmen t i n 193 5 t o become , nex t t o Skelton , it s mos t importan t official, als o argue d i n thi s vein , althoug h advocatin g passiv e belligerenc y rathe r than neutrality . "Wha t i s th e safes t attitud e o f governmen t i n Canad a a t th e moment whe n th e blin d Europea n preventiv e wa r plung e ha s bee n take n an d Canada i s instantaneousl y precipitate d int o th e lega l statu s o f war? " h e inquire d in a memorandu m writte n soo n befor e Munich . "T o preserv e th e greates t cautio n and slowness , realizin g ther e i s fo r Canad a n o strategi c necessit y fo r rapi d mobilizations o r other action . To giv e n o lead t o take th e people int o Europe . . . . To mak e i t clea r tha t Canad a i s no t a participan t i n th e sam e sens e o r o n th e same kin d o f unlimite d scal e a s th e Europea n allies , bu t i s onl y wha t fo r short ma y b e calle d a n 'associate'— a Nort h America n associat e . . . " ("Note s on th e Canadia n Positio n i n th e Even t o f a German-Czec h Conflic t Involvin g Great Britain, " Sept . 8 , 1938 , Christi e Papers) . Th e influenc e o f Skelto n an d Christie di d no t g o unremarked a t th e time . Se e H. D . Hal l t o J . W . Dafoe , Jul y 1, 1936 ; Dafo e t o P . J . Noel-Baker , Ma y 29 , 1937 , Dafo e Papers .

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1

as polic y advise r t o Borde n an d Meighe n mad e hi m suspec t i n th e eyes of Mackenzie King . I n thi s regard, however , R. B . Bennet t wa s t o display a larger spiri t tha n hi s predecessor. Skelto n di d no t shar e many of th e ideal s o f hi s ne w chief , bu t Bennett , afte r a n initia l an d wholl y natural period o f reserve, cam e to recogniz e th e qualit y of his judgment and advice . O. D . Skelto n wa s th e las t Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs t o hol d thi s importan t pos t fo r s o lon g a continuou s period . With th e successio n o f Mr . Norma n Robertso n t o th e unde r secretary ship in 194 1 followin g Skelton' s death , th e practic e was begun o f rotating three o r fou r senio r member s o f the Departmen t betwee n the unde r secretaryship an d tw o o r thre e othe r importan t diplomati c posts—th e mission i n Washington , th e offic e o f Hig h Commissione r i n Londo n and, afte r 1952 , th e positio n o f permanen t ambassado r t o th e Nort h Atlantic Council . Th e sam e officials , i n keepin g wit h th e prevailin g philosophy o f publi c administration , migh t serv e als o i n ke y govern ment post s outsid e th e Department , perhap s a s Cler k o f th e Priv y Council o r chairma n o f th e Civi l Servic e Commission . Th e revolvin g under secretaryshi p ha s certai n obviou s advantage s th e mos t importan t of which , i n th e contex t o f th e presen t discussion , i s t o reduc e t o th e minimum the temptation for the Under Secretary to become a party politician i n disguis e rather tha n a statesma n in disguise . For th e Ministe r it prevents the excessive dependence or personal animosity which prolonged association with a single deputy may develop. For th e Under Secretary it provides th e stimulu s o f a ne w bu t no t a n unfamilia r assignment . Fo r the Departmen t i t offer s periodicall y fres h directio n an d minimize s th e danger o f interna l rivalrie s an d cliques . I f th e devic e i s t o wor k wel l (and ther e i s genera l agreemen t tha t s o fa r i t ha s worke d well ) muc h depends upo n th e compatibilit y o f th e senio r official s wh o tak e turn s at the top. Th e positio n of a relative newcome r to the "unde r Cabinet, " doing a n initia l tou r a s Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , could becom e difficul t i f no t untenabl e i f forme r unde r secretarie s i n ambassadorial post s wer e unread y t o defe r t o hi s judgmen t o r abid e by his decisions . It may be for thi s reaso n tha t the deput y ministe r in most foreig n office s i s a long-term appointment , i n the Unite d Kingdo m his relativ e administrativ e longevit y bein g emphasize d i n hi s title , Permanent Under-Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Foreig n Affairs. * *The autho r o f th e volum e o n th e Foreig n Offic e i n th e Ne w Whitehal l series , himself a forme r Permanen t Under-Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Foreig n Affairs , ha s pointed ou t tha t "th e officia l us e o f th e wor d 'permanent ' i n thi s connexio n i s perhaps somewha t misleading , wit h it s suggestio n o f hoar y an d impregnabl e bureaucracy. Ther e i s o f cours e nothin g permanent about th e tenur e o f th e offic e so fa r a s the individua l incumbent i s concerned—he rarel y holds i t fo r mor e tha n

42 TH

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Heads o f diplomati c mission s compris e anothe r categor y o f senio r public servant s appointe d b y th e governmen t o f th e da y rathe r tha n by th e Civi l Servic e Commission . Lik e deput y an d associat e deput y ministers, the y mus t comman d th e confidenc e o f thei r politica l chief s if the y ar e t o perfor m usefu l service , an d ther e i s genera l agreemen t that a ne w government , shoul d i t b e seriousl y dissatisfie d wit h th e diplomatic appointment s o f it s predecessor , ough t t o b e abl e t o replac e them wit h it s own . I t i s equall y understood , however , tha t frequen t resort t o suc h a practic e i s prejudicia l t o th e publi c interest , an d tha t an effectiv e safeguar d agains t abus e i s t o selec t head s o f diplomati c missions fro m th e rank s o f th e senio r civi l service , onl y occasionall y handing ou t ambassadorship s a s politica l rewards . Two o f thre e earl y diplomati c appointment s wer e offere d i n par t a s political consolatio n prizes . Mr. Vincen t Massey , who went to Washing ton a s Canada's firs t Ministe r t o th e Unite d States , ha d bee n a membe r of Mackenzi e King's Cabine t unabl e t o secur e a sea t i n th e Hous e o f Commons; Herber t Marler , wh o becam e Canada' s firs t Ministe r t o Japan, ha d bee n i n precisely the sam e predicament. O n th e othe r hand , Canada's firs t Ministe r t o France , Philipp e Roy , ha d sinc e 191 1 per formed quasi-diplomati c dut y a s Canadia n Commissione r i n Pari s an d might o n tha t accoun t b e regarde d a s a caree r appointment . Th e tren d since thes e earl y day s ha s bee n steadil y i n th e directio n o f developin g a caree r diplomati c servic e i n whic h th e mos t abl e member s o f th e Department o f External Affair s coul d look forwar d wit h som e assurance to becoming heads of missions. "I canno t conceiv e o f any training better adapted t o qualif y a ma n [fo r a n ambassadorship], " Mackenzi e Kin g remarked i n 1942 , "tha n tha t whic h h e ma y receiv e a s a permanen t official i n the Department o f External Affairs." 17 A t th e sam e time ther e has bee n a consciou s effor t t o mak e outsid e appointment s a t th e head s of mission s level both t o take advantag e of the talent s o f gifte d outsider s and t o reduc e th e danger s o f inbreeding . "Yo u canno t d o muc h bette r than th e inspire d amateur, " Mr . Leste r Pearso n remarke d whe n Unde r Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs ; bu t h e concede d tha t "al l amateurs ar e no t inspired." 18 four o r fiv e year s a t th e en d o f hi s career. " Lor d Strang , Th e Foreign Office (London, 1955) , p . 153 , n . 1 . Even thi s qualifie d description , however , sufficientl y distinguishes th e offic e fro m it s Canadia n counterpart , fo r i t i s no t th e practic e i n Ottawa t o reserv e th e pos t fo r th e las t fe w year s o f th e incumbent' s career . Th e present (1961 ) Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , Mr . Norma n Robertson, hel d th e sam e position a s long ag o a s 1941 , serving , i n th e interim , in mos t o f th e othe r ke y bureaucrati c positions .

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The genera l principle s the n an d sinc e governin g appointment s o f heads o f diplomati c mission s wer e state d i n 194 7 b y th e Unde r Secretary o f the Department : In th e Unite d State s diplomati c servic e th e ver y to p post s hav e rarely , if ever , been hel d b y caree r men . That I thin k i s no t goo d fo r th e moral e of th e Foreig n Service . O n th e othe r hand , th e Britis h diplomati c service is sometime s criticized a s to o muc h o f a close d corporatio n o f official s recruited fro m a limite d clas s o f persons . I thin k th e Canadia n service ha s given evidence that i t will avoi d these extremes. This will mea n rejecting th e view o n the on e han d that a ma n wh o ha s successfull y manufacture d safet y pins ca n b e equall y successfu l i n conductin g delicat e an d complicate d negotiations betwee n governments , and , o n th e other , avoidin g th e equall y dangerous delusio n tha t becaus e a ma n ha s no t passe d a Foreig n Service Examination an d learne d how t o sig n hi s lette r " I hav e the honou r to be , Sir, wit h al l Trut h an d Respect , You r Lordship' s Humbl e an d Obedien t Servant", h e ha s no t therefor e qualifie d t o manag e an embassy. 19 This vie w wa s reaffirme d i n 195 4 b y th e Actin g Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affair s wh o remarked , i n respons e t o a questio n whether i t wa s th e Department' s polic y t o dra w al l head s o f mission s from it s own personnel: "I t ma y be desirabl e t o hav e a fe w exceptions . There ar e som e post s wher e perhap s i t i s most desirabl e t o hav e a ma n with a broa d experienc e i n business." 20 I n recen t year s th e exception s have bee n few ; in 1956 , o f forty-fou r appointee s the n head s o f diplo matic missions , thirty-tw o ha d com e u p throug h th e Departmen t o f External Affairs ; eigh t ha d bee n appointe d fro m othe r governmen t departments; onl y fou r ha d bee n draw n fro m outsid e governmen t service.21 Th e numbe r o f outsid e appointee s i s to o smal l t o justif y conclusions abou t favoure d occupations . Som e hav e bee n friend s o f the administration ; som e hav e bee n busines s men ; a ver y few , distin guished me n o f th e arts . Appointment s fro m th e militar y ar e no t unusual; as Mr. Leste r Pearso n observe d i n 1949 , "i n certai n countrie s the use of a military title does not do one any harm."22 Most military men appointed t o diplomati c post s hav e ha d considerabl e experienc e i n public administration , an d i t woul d b e wholl y prope r t o describ e a s career appointment s thos e o f Genera l A . G . L . McNaughto n (perma nent representativ e o n th e Unite d Nation s Securit y Counci l an d late r chairman o f th e Canadia n sectio n o f th e Internationa l Join t Commis sion), Genera l Mauric e Pop e (hea d o f th e Canadia n Missio n i n Germany an d later ambassado r to Spain) , an d Genera l E . L . M . Burn s (representative t o th e ten-natio n disarmamen t conferenc e a t Genev a in 1960) . Th e appointmen t o f Brigadie r Genera l Victo r Odiu m a s High Commissione r i n Australi a i n 194 2 wa s not , however , a caree r appointment i n this sense , an d h e found the transitio n t o diplomati c lif e

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somewhat difficult . " I hav e not ye t learned t o dea l wit h delicate matter s on pape r i n a correc t diplomati c language, " h e wrot e t o hi s Prim e Minister soo n afte r arrivin g in Canberra . "M y whol e trainin g has bee n to kee p silen t o n a subjec t o r t o approac h i t openl y an d directly . . . . I hav e a roote d objectio n t o dealin g wit h certai n religiou s an d racia l questions o n paper . . . . Whe n me n o f grea t eminenc e tal k t o m e in confidence I d o no t kno w how to giv e you th e pictur e without breaking that confidence . . . ," 23 Members o f th e C.C.F . (Socialist ) part y hav e bee n concerne d wit h the dange r o f developin g a n ambassado r corp s base d o n clas s an d social position , it s leader, Mr . M . J . Coldwell , remarkin g i n 194 2 tha t "we have had enoug h of diplomacy by well-to-do aristocrats." 24 Govern ment spokesme n hav e agreed , whil e denyin g tha t th e conditio n exists . "Striped pant s ar e no t a garmen t bu t a stat e o f mind, " Mr . Leste r Pearson observe d i n 1954 . "Tha t stat e o f mind , I hop e an d believe , does no t exis t i n th e Canadia n Externa l Affair s Departmen t o r i n it s Foreign Service." 25 There has been some tendency in Parliament t o refe r to th e nee d t o diversif y th e professiona l an d occupationa l backgroun d of Canada' s head s o f missions ; th e Conservativ e foreig n polic y critic , the lat e Gordo n Graydon , wa s pron e t o spea k a t lengt h o n th e nee d to appoin t " a distinguishe d membe r o f th e agricultura l vocation." 26 An exceptio n t o th e generall y accepte d principl e o f th e desirabilit y of drawin g heads o f mission s fro m caree r personne l i s th e positio n o f High Commissione r i n th e Unite d Kingdom . Th e Hig h Commissione r has sometime s bee n regarde d b y th e governmen t o f th e da y a s bein g in a categor y differen t fro m tha t o f othe r head s o f diplomati c missions . When th e Conservativ e Government came t o powe r on Augus t 7, 1930 , it foun d tha t i t ha d inherite d a s it s Hig h Commissione r i n Londo n th e appointee o f th e defeate d administration , Mr. Vincen t Massey , a s th e result o f a n order-in-counci l passe d onl y a few days earlier o n Jul y 24 . Although th e Prim e Ministe r wa s late r t o insis t tha t h e ha d accepte d Mr. Massey' s resignation, not compelle d it , th e accoun t give n by R . B . Bennett himsel f o f hi s intervie w wit h Mr . Masse y o n Augus t 1 3 sug gests tha t a n elemen t o f compulsio n wa s no t lacking : I pu t t o Mr . Masse y [Bennet t tol d th e Hous e o f Commons ] th e circum stances i n connectio n wit h th e dut y o n agricultura l implement s an d hi s expressions o f opinion concerning th e then Prime Ministe r [Arthu r Meighen ] and th e governmen t of th e da y [1926] . I pu t hi s statement s t o hi m fairly ; I pu t t o hi m th e communication s whic h h e ha d ha d wit h th e the n leade r of th e oppositio n [Mackenzi e King] . I pu t th e fac t t o hi m tha t withi n a few month s late r h e accepte d offic e unde r th e ma n who m h e ha d thu s described. . . . Then I turne d t o hi m an d said , a s I no w say to hi s spokes man i n th e House : "Ca n yo u possibl y represen t th e administratio n o f thi s

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day, anywhere , a t an y time , i n an y place? " D o hon . members thin k h e could? Woul d an y ma n giv e suc h a ma n a powe r o f attorne y t o ac t a s hi s representative, i n vie w o f thos e facts ? . . . Ho w coul d I carr y on ? How could an y Prime Ministe r carr y o n busines s i n Londo n wit h tha t ma n a s his representative? . . . How could on e open his heart to him? 27

On th e da y followin g the intervie w Mr . Masse y submitte d hi s lette r of resignation; soo n afterwar d th e Prim e Ministe r appointe d a s Hig h Commissioner i n Londo n th e forme r Conservativ e Premie r o f Ontario , Howard Ferguson . In th e extensiv e parliamentar y discussio n whic h followed , R . B . Bennett an d Mackenzi e Kin g sough t respectivel y t o justif y an d con demn wha t had bee n don e b y advancin g conflictin g theorie s concernin g the natur e o f th e office . Accordin g t o Bennett , th e Hig h Commissone r in London wa s "not a diplomatic office r i n the sens e i n whic h that ter m is use d wit h respec t t o externa l affairs . Hi s positio n wit h respec t t o the governmen t i s on e o f th e mos t confidentia l characte r an d i n m y judgment th e Hig h Commissione r fo r Canad a shoul d b e i n touc h wit h the governmen t o f th e da y i n Ottaw a i n suc h a wa y a s t o indicat e that i t ha s hi s confidenc e an d h e ha s th e confidenc e o f th e govern ment."28 According t o Mackenzi e King , th e hig h commissionershi p wa s "the highes t o f al l diplomati c office s whic h ca n b e hel d b y anyon e belonging to this country" bu t i n no other wa y distinguishable from thos e of "ou r minister s at Washington, Tokyo an d Paris. . . . All the qualifica tions o f character , ability , tac t an d judgment , whic h ar e essentia l i n a minister o r a n ambassado r abroad , ar e equall y essential , i f indee d no t more necessary , i n a representativ e o f Canada i n Grea t Britain . . . . I cannot se e ho w m y righ t hon . frien d ca n dra w a n essentia l distinctio n between th e tw o classes of positions." 29 Mackenzie Kin g did no t hav e to put hi s doctrin e t o th e aci d tes t o f retainin g a s Hig h Commissione r an individua l for who m h e ha d littl e affectio n o r respect , fo r whe n th e results o f the Genera l Electio n o f 193 5 becam e known , Howar d Fergu son submitte d hi s resignatio n directl y t o th e outgoin g Prim e Minister , leaving Mackenzi e Kin g fre e t o appoin t Mr . Vincen t Massey . Mr . Massey hel d th e hig h commissionershi p unti l th e en d o f th e Secon d World War , whe n i t became , alon g wit h th e embassie s i n Washingto n and Paris , on e o f thos e importan t diplomati c post s amon g whic h th e three o r fou r senio r official s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s circulated ever y fe w years . I n 1957 , however , whe n a Conservativ e Government cam e t o power i n Ottawa fo r the first time sinc e 1930 , th e incoming Prim e Ministe r reverte d to the earlie r quasi-politica l concep tion o f th e offic e o f Hig h Commissione r i n Londo n b y appointin g a leading membe r o f his party and th e forme r Leade r o f the Opposition .

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It remain s to be see n whethe r upo n Mr . Georg e Drew' s eventua l retire ment th e hig h commissionershi p wil l onc e agai n b e hel d b y a caree r official. THE FOREIG N SERVIC E OFFICE R

If th e head s o f Canada' s diplomati c mission s hav e bee n recruite d in creasingly fro m th e rank s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , thei r qualities ar e boun d t o b e thos e sough t an d develope d b y th e foreig n service itself , thu s reflectin g th e Department' s policie s o f recruitment , training an d promotion . Although Josep h Pope' s memorandu m o f 190 7 advocatin g th e crea tion o f a Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s wa s acte d o n i n 1909 , no t until man y year s afterward s wa s effec t give n t o on e o f it s principa l recommendations, tha t ther e shoul d b e recruite d fo r th e Departmen t "a smal l staf f o f youn g men , wel l educate d an d carefull y selected. " Even b y 192 5 th e Departmen t coul d muste r n o mor e tha n thre e ad ministrative officer s i n Ottawa , an d th e shortag e wa s s o acut e tha t th e Prime Ministe r an d Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , Mackenzi e King, complaine d tha t h e ha d n o on e t o assis t hi m i n preparin g des patches an d accordingl y ha d t o bea r th e burde n o f thei r compositio n himself.30 It was at this time that N. W. Rowell, a former Liberal member of Borden' s Unio n Governmen t who m Mackenzi e Kin g wa s the n un successfully tryin g to brin g into his own, wrote to hi m o n th e subjec t of the Department' s personne l problems . " I canno t se e how i t i s possibl e for Canad a t o dea l intelligentl y wit h larg e question s o f Imperia l an d international policy, " Rowel l observed , "withou t havin g a rea l Depart ment of External Affairs , an d havin g in that Departmen t competen t an d trained me n wh o woul d b e familia r wit h th e problem s requirin g con sideration an d decisio n b y th e Government . I d o no t undervalu e wha t we have, but in my view it is inadequate to mee t the present situation." 31 O. D. Skelton, who had himself joined the Department onl y a few months previously, remarked , o n bein g show n Rowell' s lette r b y th e Prim e Minister, tha t i t was "essentially righ t . .. as to th e inadequate staffin g of th e Department . With onl y Mr . Walker , Mr . Des y an d mysel f (cor responding t o Mr . Walker , Mr . Christi e an d Si r Josep h [Pope ] form erly) t o dea l wit h wide r questions , an d wit h th e pressur e o f corres pondence, interviews , an d administration , i t i s absolutel y impossible , even wit h 7-da y week s an d 16-hou r days , t o secur e th e independen t and exac t knowledg e o f externa l affair s whic h ha s no w becom e de sirable. However , w e shoul d no t see k t o expan d to o rapidly." 32 I n re plying t o Rowell , Mackenzi e Kin g wrote tha t h e wa s

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heartily i n agreemen t wit h you r vie w that i t i s not possibl e t o carr y o n th e work adequatel y withou t a n increase d staff , an d a consequen t measur e o f departmentalization. W e hav e no t don e a s muc h i n thi s fiel d a s I shoul d myself hav e liked . M y former deput y [Pope] , while a very distinguishe d an d competent publi c servant , naturally , wit h fift y years ' servic e behin d him , looked somewha t askanc e upo n extensiv e plan s o f reorganization . Further , the insisten t deman d fo r econom y i n publi c expenditure , whic h ha s com e from s o many peopl e wh o d o not lik e t o pay the pipe r fo r th e railwa y tune s and th e wa r tune s the y called , ha s mad e expansio n i n an y Department , an d not leas t i n th e Prim e Minister' s Department , o r Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, a matte r requirin g specia l consideration . A distinc t beginnin g has been made , however. W e have recentl y appointe d a ver y promisin g counsellor , Mr . Jea n Desy , a graduat e o f th e bes t diplo matic schoo l i n Europe , 1'Ecol e de s Science s Politiques , an d latterl y Pro fessor o f International La w at the Universit y o f Montreal , an d I hop e t o add a promisin g youn g Universit y graduat e ever y yea r o r tw o a s th e wor k o f the Departmen t grows. 33

The "promisin g youn g University graduates" thu s recruited i n th e late r 1920's—it wa s th e onl y significan t intak e unti l th e late r 1930's—mor e than mad e u p i n qualit y for thei r ver y smal l number , fo r i t wa s a t thi s time tha t th e Departmen t gaine d the service s o f Leste r Pearson , H . L . Keenleyside and Hume Wrong. "Dr. Skelton' s young men," a s they were known, cam e in tim e t o exer t a remarkabl e an d beneficia l influenc e o n the fortune s of thei r country , an d indee d o f th e world . A secon d rippl e o f recruitmen t too k plac e i n th e perio d 1935-9 , staffing th e ne w legation s openin g u p i n Wester n Europ e an d furthe r augmenting th e embattle d fe w in th e Eas t Bloc k a t Ottawa ; by 193 9 i t brought th e tota l numbe r o f foreig n servic e officer s i n th e Departmen t to thirty-three . Thes e ne w recruits , lik e th e distinguishe d entrant s of a decade earlier , cam e t o th e Departmen t by th e difficul t roa d o f a civi l service examination. There was at this time of depression an d unemployment no shortag e of candidates; in on e year there wer e "200 applicant s and onl y 2 0 qualifie d an d onl y 4 o f th e 2 0 wer e calle d in." 34 Durin g the wa r th e acut e shortag e o f personne l wa s t o som e exten t alleviate d by thos e wh o cam e forward fro m civilia n lif e fo r temporar y servic e i n the Department ; for suc h special assistant s the requirement s of th e civi l service examinatio n were waived. It wa s als o decide d t o dispens e with the regula r pre-wa r examinatio n procedure durin g the firs t yea r o r tw o of post-wa r recruitment . "It seeme d quite unfair," the Associat e Under Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s explaine d to th e Hous e o f Com mons Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , to as k peopl e wh o ha d bee n i n th e arme d force s perhap s fo r fiv e year s t o pass a fairl y sever e examinatio n o f academi c standards . W e substitute d fo r it a simpl e examinatio n designe d t o sho w whethe r th e candidat e ha d an y

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capacity fo r thinkin g fo r himsel f an d expressin g wha t h e thought , an d ver y little more . . . . The mai n tes t wa s to as k the applicant s t o writ e a n essa y on a choic e o f abou t te n differen t subject s o n widel y selecte d scientific , literary, historica l an d militar y subjects . . . . The y ar e writte n i n Englis h or i n French , an d the y hav e t o writ e th e examinatio n i n .. . thre e hours . That i s the simpl e test, an d i t i s surprisingl y effective . . . . O n that basi s we were abl e t o decid e tha t a larg e numbe r o f candidates wer e obviousl y un suited, an d w e droppe d them . Th e remainde r ar e brough t u p fo r intervie w by th e Boar d whic h th e Civi l Servic e Commissio n an d ourselve s jointl y co-operate on. 35

During th e yea r whe n thi s temporar y syste m wa s i n effec t (1945-6) , 1,000 applicant s wrot e the foreig n servic e office r examination , o f whom a fe w mor e tha n fort y wer e accepted . Aske d whethe r th e Departmen t intended t o revert to th e pre-war syste m "of having the variou s examin ations s o stif f tha t even th e foreig n secretar y o f man y nations coul d no t qualify," th e Associat e Unde r Secretar y replied : " I shoul d no t sa y tha t we would revert exactl y to the pre-war system . I shoul d hop e not . Tha t would be rather a n urge to adher e to past practices i n a changing world; but w e wil l n o doub t stiffe n th e examination s a s w e ge t furthe r awa y from th e particula r proble m o f no t imposin g a handica p o n thos e wh o have bee n i n th e arme d service s an d ar e a lon g wa y fro m schoo l an d university. . . ,"36 This predictio n prove d wholl y correc t fo r a time. Durin g th e decad e 1946-56 th e tw o hundre d o r s o universit y graduat e o r graduatin g students ordinaril y applyin g fo r admissio n eac h yea r wer e reduce d t o a hard core of about fifteen succesful candidate s by a three-stage proces s of selection , th e firs t stag e o f whic h wa s a writte n examinatio n whos e formidability ma y bes t b e judge d b y th e reader : FOREIGN SERVIC E OFFICER , GRAD E I DEPARTMENT O F EXTERNA L AFFAIR S

Written Examination , 195 2 PAPER I . TIME : 3 HOUR S The purpos e o f thi s pape r i s to tes t you r capacit y t o analyz e a theoretica l problem lucidly . Th e examiner s wil l bas e thei r judgmen t o n th e manne r i n which yo u presen t you r view s an d o n th e cogenc y o f th e view s themselves. Discuss on e o f th e following : 1. Wha t i s the bes t balanc e of wor k an d leisure ; ho w shoul d th e questio n of leisur e tim e b e approache d i n moder n society ? 2. "Th e for m o f governmen t o f an y countr y i s determine d b y tradition , physical environmen t an d th e stag e o f it s economi c development" . 3. " A Nation , i n it s influenc e upo n civilization , i s no t a n aggregat e o f its livin g people , fo r the y ar e bu t par t o f th e whol e continuin g an d histori c people. No r i s it a State , fo r th e Stat e i s artificial . A Natio n i s a n Idea" .

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4. "Withou t justice , wha t i s politica l rul e bu t brigandag e an d rapine? " ("Remota justitia, quid sun t regna nis i magna latrocina?") 5. "Th e firs t requiremen t o f a soun d bod y o f la w i s that i t shoul d corres pond wit h actua l feeling s an d demand s o f th e community , whethe r righ t or wrong" . 6. "Ther e i s n o suc h thin g a s a scienc e o f economics ; ever y syste m o f economic though t i s i n larg e measur e subjectiv e i n tha t i t i s posite d o n desired socia l goals" . PAPER II . TIME : 3 & HOUR S The purpos e o f Part s A an d B of thi s pape r i s to tes t you r interes t in , an d understanding of , som e o f th e followin g problem s an d you r abilit y t o dis cuss the m clearl y an d i n logica l fashion . In part s A an d B candidate s mus t d o thre e question s wit h a t leas t on e from eac h part . Par t C , whic h i s designe d t o tes t th e candidate' s abilit y t o comprehend th e meanin g o f writte n material , i s compulsor y fo r al l candi dates. Part A. Questions on Canada 1. Discus s th e feasibilit y o f Canadia n membershi p i n th e Sterlin g Area . 2. Discus s som e o f th e implication s o f recen t trend s o f domesti c an d foreign investmen t i n Canada . 3. Discus s th e contributio n t o politica l though t an d actio n i n Canad a o f one o f th e following : Henr i Bourassa , J . S . Woodsworth , Goldwy n [sic] Smith, J. S . Ewart. 4. Discus s th e relationshi p o f Canadia n trad e union s t o th e politica l life o f Canada . 5. Discus s th e rol e o f th e Federa l Governmen t i n fosterin g cultura l activities. 6. Discus s Canada' s rol e i n th e evolutio n fro m "Britis h Empire " t o "Commonwealth o f Nations" . 7. T o wha t exten t d o yo u thin k th e Britis h Nort h Americ a Ac t re stricts th e Governmen t o f Canad a i n th e conduc t o f it s externa l affairs ? Part B. Questions on International Affairs 8. Ho w d o yo u accoun t fo r th e appearanc e o f Titois m i n Yugoslavia ? What ar e th e chance s o f simila r development s i n th e Europea n Satellite s and China ? 9. Discus s th e movemen t towar d Europea n integration , an d asses s it s prospects. 10. Discus s th e rol e o f Christia n Democrac y i n Europ e today . 11. I n you r opinion , i n th e presen t internationa l situatio n d o "neutralist " or "n o foreig n entanglements " policie s contribut e t o worl d peace ? Discuss , using example s drawn fro m foreig n policie s o f government s in bot h Europ e and Asia . 12. "Stali n ha s non e o f Hitler' s compulsio n t o g o t o war ; indeed , th e compulsion i s al l th e othe r way , takin g int o consideratio n hi s ow n nature , the categorie s o f Marxis t thinking , Sovie t geograph y an d resources , th e nature o f th e Russia n people , an d th e miserabl e an d unreliabl e stat e o f th e Soviet Unio n today" . Comment .

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13. Asses s th e rol e o f eithe r th e Unite d Nation s o r NAT O i n preservin g international peac e an d security . 14. D o yo u thin k i t i s desirabl e t o establis h a t th e presen t tim e a n Inter national Cour t of Criminal Jurisdiction ? 15. Discus s tw o representativ e author s fro m an y on e o f th e followin g countries: France , Germany , U.S.A. , U.S.S.R. , Unite d Kingdom , Canada , and indicat e wh y yo u conside r them representative . Part C . Rea d th e passage contained i n Appendix A [a n extrac t fro m Arnol d Toynbee, A Study o f History, vol . I , pp. 299-301] an d answe r th e followin g questions whic h ar e base d o n it . 1. Summariz e i n on e paragrap h o f no t mor e tha n on e pag e i n lengt h th e theory presente d i n thi s passage . 2. Th e autho r suggest s tha t i n th e historica l proces s ther e i s on e vita l unknown element . Define , an d i f you agre e o r disagre e wit h hi s theory, giv e your reasons . 3. Fro m th e abov e passage , what doe s th e phrase "Uniformity o f Nature" mean t o th e autho r an d t o wha t exten t doe s i t satisf y th e author' s vie w o f the origi n o f a civilization ? 4. Relat e th e ide a o f "Integratio n o f Custom " t o "Differentiatio n o f Civilization". 5. I n you r opinio n i s the autho r subscribin g t o a deterministi c theor y of history? I n a shor t paragraph , defen d you r answer. 37

An examinatio n of this kin d favoured , and wa s no doub t intende d t o favour, universit y graduate s in suc h course s a s history, political scienc e and economics , an d law ; and , moreover , universit y graduate s fro m the stronge r universities . I n th e Hous e o f Common s Standin g Com mittee on Externa l Affairs, wher e officers o f th e Departmen t were ques tioned o n th e theor y an d practic e o f it s recruitmen t programme , ther e was som e disposition to expres s the kin d o f views foun d i n th e Wristo n Report o n the United State s Foreig n Service. 38 " I d o think w e ought t o have peopl e i n ou r diplomati c servic e beside s thos e wh o ar e post graduates o f universities acros s Canada, " th e Oppositio n foreig n polic y critic, Mr. Gordo n Graydon , remarked in 1953 . " I woul d like to se e the Department o f External Affair s a little better balance d u p with practical , sound, commo n sens e people." 39 Perhap s becaus e o f a fea r tha t th e departmental examinatio n displayed a donnis h preciosity o n th e par t of the departmenta l examiners, perhaps becaus e a wide r basis fo r recruit ment was fel t t o b e desirable , certainly because o f a growin g scarcity of good candidates , th e writte n examinatio n underwen t a n importan t change in 1956 . I n tha t yea r the so-calle d "objective-type " examinatio n was introduced : "th e Civi l Servic e Commissio n think s [it ] i s useful, " a spokesman of the Department explained, thus allowing the implication that hi s own Department was less certain o f its utility. At th e sam e time the writte n examinatio n wa s itsel f shortene d an d simplified :

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FOREIGN SERVIC E OFFICER , GRAD E I DEPARTMENT O F EXTERNA L AFFAIR S 1957. TIME : 2%. HOUR S Answer an y tw o questions 1. "I t i s not th e term s o f th e Charte r tha t bloc k th e developmen t o f th e United Nation s int o a peace-enforcin g authority , bu t th e fact s o f interna tional lif e i n ou r age" . Discuss . 2. A Canadia n statesma n recentl y declare d tha t a Canadian foreig n policy i s no t necessaril y "th e sam e a s a n independent policy" . Discus s thi s statement i n relatio n t o Canada' s membershi p i n th e Commonwealth , th e United Nation s an d NATO. 3. "Th e proble m o f disarmamen t i s th e proble m o f security" . I s thi s dictum o f th e 1930' s stil l valid ? 4. Wha t woul d b e som e o f th e result s o f th e applicatio n t o th e con temporary worl d o f th e principle s o f Ada m Smith ? 5. Th e guidin g principl e o f Sovie t foreig n polic y ha s sometime s bee n described a s "al l mischie f shor t o f war" . Ho w characteristi c in you r opinio n is thi s o f th e polic y o f th e U.S.S.R . today ? 6. Wha t feature s o f Canadia n lif e shoul d a government-sponsore d in formation an d cultura l programm e try t o projec t abroad ? 7. Discus s "colonialism " a s a facto r influencin g th e policie s o f countrie s of Eas t an d South-eas t Asia . 8. D o yo u believ e tha t th e policie s pursue d b y Wester n democracie s since th e Secon d Worl d Wa r bea r ou t th e statemen t mad e b y Walte r Lipp mann tha t "face d wit h these [interdependent ] choice s betwee n th e har d an d the soft , th e norma l propensit y o f democrati c government s i s t o pleas e th e largest numbe r o f voters . Th e pressur e o f th e electorat e i s normall y fo r the sof t sid e o f th e equations" ? 9. Wha t woul d b e th e view s o n th e ide a o f th e integratio n o f Wester n Europe o f an y three o f th e following : Machiavelli , th e Du e d e Sully , Napoleon, Bismarck , Woodro w Wilson ? 10. I s Canada a "welfar e state" ? Shoul d i t be? 11. Sugges t mean s b y whic h internationa l la w coul d effectivel y mak e fo r a mor e orderl y world . 12. Discus s som e o f th e implication s o f industrializatio n o f either th e Province o f Quebe c o r th e fou r wester n provinces. 40 Candidates successful in the written examinatio n ar e called for a n oral examination convened in the main cities of Canada and , i f sufficient num bers warrant, in some of the larger cities of the Unite d States, the United Kingdom an d Wester n Europe . Th e examinin g boar d normall y consist s of fiv e members , tw o examiner s fro m th e Departmen t o f Externa l Af fairs, tw o outsid e examiner s representin g th e busines s an d universit y communities, an d a representative o f the Civi l Service Commissio n wh o acts a s chairman . A n effor t i s mad e t o secur e continuit y o f represent ation o n th e boar d o f examiners , th e Civi l Servic e Commissio n repre sentative an d on e departmenta l examine r ordinaril y attendin g al l ora l examinations i n a give n year . Th e examiner' s tas k i s th e difficul t on e

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common to most oral examination s of this kind, to tr y t o assess , o n th e basis o f a n intervie w usually lasting n o mor e tha n a n hour , th e candi date's "intellectua l capacity, integrity, initiative, personality an d appear ance."41 Th e opinion s o f on e o f th e Department' s mos t experience d examiners, se t dow n in 194 7 a s a guid e for prospectiv e applicants , dis close somethin g of its assumption s and criteria : Quand i l s'agi t d e jeune s qu i sorten t d e 1'universite , 1'experienc e es t pluto t courte e t n'offr e guer e 1'occasio n d e pose r beaucou p d e questions . Auss i le s membres d u jur y trouvent-il s de s question s generate s pou r fair e parle r l e candidat. I I import e d e savoi r s'i l pens e vit e o u lentement , s'i l pens e just e ou non , s'i l s'exprim e bien , s'i l s e tir e ave c ingeniosit e d e situation s impre vues. Tou t a u cour s d e s a carriere , i l s e trouver a dan s de s situation s semblables. Au x conference s internationales , i l n'aura pa s toujours la repons e exacte au x probleme s qu i s e posent . I I devr a improviser . Parfoi s i l devr a temporiser e t toujour s s e tirer d'un e pass e difficil e ave c elegance . L'exame n oral perme t d e decouvri r certain s trait s profond s d u caracter e d u candidat . Certains candidat s se presentenl avec 1'idee bien arretee et bientot evident e de n e pa s s e compromettre . U s n e reponden t qu e pa r monosyllable s au x questions qu i leur son t posees . O u bien il s repondent e n Normand. D'autres , au contraire , savan t tout , o n repons e a tout . Parfois il s n e semblen t pa s s e rendre compt e le moins du monde du but d e I'examen oral e t de la portee de s questions. U n jour , u n membr e d u jur y posai t a u n candida t l a questio n suivante: "Si , domain , u n gouvernemen t mondia l etai l elabli , qu i serai t l e meilleur premie r ministre : u n avocat , u n homm e d e science , u n theologie n ou u n diplomate" . I I s'agissait d e savoi r quell e etai t 1'echell e de s valeur s d u candidat, quel s etaien l le s facteur s qui , a so n avis , avaien t l e plu s d'im portance dan s l e gouvernemen t de s hommes. L e candida t fu t completemen t desempare. I I refus a d e repondr e e n disan t qu'i l s'agissai t l a d'un e questio n purement theorique . I I sugger a mem e pa r so n attitud e qu'i l trouvai t l a question saugrenu e e t ridicule . Les candidat s feraien t parfoi s meilleur e figur e s'il s s e souvenaien t qu e I'examen a pou r bu t d e fair e voi r leu r tournur e d'esprit . Il s feraien t bonn e impression e n etan t sinceres , e n s e montran t tel s qu'il s sont . S'il s pensen t lentement, il s auraien t tor t d e vouloi r fair e croir e qu'il s son t rapides ; il s s e peut qu e leu r lenteu r soi l compense e pa r plu s d e precision , plu s d e profon deur. U n membr e du jur y avai l pos e un e questio n asse z difficil e a u n candi dat. Celui-ci, au lieu de se lancer dans de vagues considerations, repondit qu'il n'avait jamai s serieusement reflechi a la question mai s que s i Ton voulait bien lui donne r deu x minute s pour reflechi r i l essaierai t d e donne r un e opinio n qui vaudrait mieux que les banalites qui lui viendraient peut-etre tout d'abor d a 1'esprit . Mem e s i ce qu'il avai l a dir e plu s tar d n e fu t pa s tre s brillianl , i l avail merit e un e bonn e nol e pou r so n bo n sens , s a prudence . E n un e autr e occasion, u n membr e d u jur y demand a a u n candida t d e lu i resume r l a question d e Palestine . Celui-c e repondi t qu'i l achevai t se s etudes d e droit, si je n e m e Irompe , qu'i l avai l a pein e e u l e temp s d e lir e l e journa l a 1'oc casion e l que se s notions su r la questio n etaienl Irop vagues pour lu i permel Ire d e donne r un e opinio n valable . Cett e sincerit e etai t encore , dan s le s circonslances, l a meilleur e polilique . U n secretair e qu i reconnai l so n

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ignorance dan s un e matier e donne e aur a tou t probablemen t l e courag e d e I'etudier s i cel a es t necessair e et , apre s quelque s jours , i l ser a plu s util e qu e celui qui s e contente d e notions vague s et s'illusionn e volontier s su r I'etendu e de se s connaissances. 42

A candidate wh o impresses his board favourabl y during the oral examination i s then rate d o n th e basi s o f hi s military , busines s o r professiona l experience, i f any, an d i f he obtain s a sufficientl y hig h fina l mar k o n al l three phase s o f the competitio n i s graded accordin g t o ran k an d place d upon a n eligibl e lis t fro m whic h appointment s t o th e Departmen t ar e made a s vacancies arise . The kin d o f junio r foreig n servic e office r tha t thi s winnowin g is de signed t o selec t i s typicall y a graduatin g studen t fro m a universit y honours cours e in the humanities or social sciences . H e cannot ordinaril y be olde r tha n thirt y years o f age , no r ma y h e b e younge r tha n twenty three. H e i s therefore withou t much outside experience, an d certainl y is unlikely to bring to the Departmen t a great deal o f specialist knowledge. The rol e o f specialist s withi n th e Departmen t ha s bee n th e subjec t o f much discussion , an d properl y so . Th e guidin g principl e o f personne l policy, unimpaire d sinc e th e day s o f O . D . Skelton , i s tha t th e idea l foreign servic e office r i s someon e o f all-roun d ability , capabl e o f per forming widel y differin g assignment s at short notice , rather tha n a highly skilled specialis t payin g little attentio n t o matter s lyin g outsid e his field. To thi s principl e th e senio r administrator s o f th e Departmen t hav e dis played wha t a t time s ha s seeme d a n almos t pervers e attachment , a n observer remarkin g in 195 2 tha t "th e ma n wh o studie d publi c opinio n and wrot e a book wit h George Gallup , Mr . Sau l Rae, wa s moved fro m the Head o f the Information Division . . ., the personnel expert T. W. L. MacDermott was transferred from Hea d o f the Personnel Division , . . . and on e officia l . . . remarke d rathe r proudl y . . . tha t mos t o f the members of the Departmen t wh o can spea k Russia n ar e no t workin g on the Sovie t Union." 43 (Th e deleteriou s consequence s o f th e generalis t approach, whic h has undergon e significan t modificatio n i n recen t years , are note d i n chapter v. ) Their devotio n to th e generalis t idea l ha s cause d th e senio r adminis trators o f th e Departmen t t o loo k wit h som e suspicio n upo n th e de vice of lateral entry , that is, the recruitmen t o f specialists at intermediat e or senio r level s o f advancement . A n exceptio n t o th e rul e too k plac e in 195 6 whe n th e Departmen t aske d th e Civi l Servic e Commissio n t o conduct examination s fo r a smal l numbe r o f specialist s i n Slavonic , Arabic an d Chines e language s an d affairs , an d i n internationa l la w an d economics. "Ther e wer e a lo t o f applicants, " a departmenta l officia l commented o n thi s experiment ,

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but a goo d man y o f the m di d no t appea r t o hav e th e qualification s which people i n ou r servic e alread y possessed . . . . O n th e whol e w e find it bes t to recrui t a t the bottom—at grad e on e level—and t o promot e peopl e a s their ability develop s an d a s the y acquir e experience . . . . I f w e ar e lookin g for , say, a Foreign Servic e Office r Grad e 4 I think yo u woul d probabl y ge t better results fro m a ma n wh o ha d com e i n a s a Grad e On e office r an d worke d his way up , spendin g a numbe r o f tour s o f dut y abroa d an d i n thi s countr y and gainin g a certai n amoun t of expertis e an d knowledg e during that period . I thin k suc h a ma n would hav e mor e t o offer , a s a genera l rule , tha n a ma n who cam e i n becaus e h e was , le t u s say , a goo d economis t o r a n exper t o n Slavonic languages .

He concede d tha t "ther e i s a dange r o f havin g a close d corporation . I think we are awar e of that an d tryin g to mee t it." 44 The recruitin g policy of the Departmen t o f External Affairs i s usually defended o n th e groun d of the superiorit y of th e generalis t concept , bu t there ar e two practical considerations by which it could a s well or bette r be justified . T o a muc h greate r exten t i n Canad a tha n i n th e Unite d States o r th e Unite d Kingdo m there i s a shortage o f qualifie d specialist s in variou s aspect s o f internationa l affair s fro m who m recruit s a t mor e senior level s migh t be drawn . Secondly, th e opportunitie s for advance ment of specialists within the Department are necessaril y more restricted than i n th e fa r large r Stat e Departmen t o r Foreig n Office . Bot h thes e handicaps t o specialis t recruitmen t wil l becom e les s sever e wit h th e passing o f time . Since entry to the foreign servic e is restricted by inclination and neces sity t o youn g an d inexperience d applicants , th e qualit y o f th e senio r officers o f the Departmen t of External Affair s depend s t o a greate r tha n ordinary degre e upo n th e qualit y o f in-servic e trainin g and soun d pro motion policies . Provisio n for trainin g foreign service officers withi n th e Department i s not elaborate , an d i s confined mainl y to th e earl y proba tionary period of their careers. "We have classes in French fo r candidate s who come in without adequate knowledg e of French," the Actin g Under Secretary o f State fo r External Affair s informe d the Hous e o f Commons Standing Committe e i n 1954 . "W e do , also , i n th e cas e of incomin g of ficers for th e first year, put the m through a sort of course of training. We send the m to differen t division s o f the departmen t fo r shor t periods . We provide course s o f lectures. W e bring in peopl e fro m othe r department s to lecture t o them—a s wel l a s people fro m ou r ow n Department. Othe r than that w e do not provide special classe s o r facilities for junior officer s to ge t ahead . W e expec t the m reall y t o lear n o n th e job." 45 Officer s failing t o measur e u p t o expectation s durin g this initia l trainin g perio d may b e release d fro m th e Departmen t a t thi s time ; thi s doe s no t ofte n

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happen, bu t i t does happen. "I t i s an ad hoc way to look a t the proble m of training, " the Unde r Secretar y admitte d i n 1958 , "but , o n the whole , bearing i n min d tha t ther e [are ] seldo m i f eve r mor e tha n 2 0 ne w Foreign Servic e Officer s i n an y given year, w e do no t thin k i t woul d b e appropriate t o se t up to o elaborat e a school." 46 There i s som e opportunit y fo r th e foreig n servic e office r t o receiv e specialized training later i n his career, particularl y training in more diffi cult languages. A promising officer ma y be sen t for a year t o the Middle East Centr e fo r Arabi c Studie s ru n b y th e Unite d Kingdo m Foreig n Office i n th e Lebanon , t o th e Schoo l o f Orienta l an d Africa n Studie s i n the Universit y o f London , o r th e Departmen t o f Slavoni c Studie s a t Cambridge University . Ther e ha s bee n som e discussio n o f regula r sab batical leav e for stud y and research , bu t neithe r senio r no r junio r mem bers o f th e Departmen t see m t o hav e followe d u p th e suggestio n ver y energetically. Th e Departmen t annuall y appoint s on e o r tw o member s to th e National Defenc e Colleg e a t Kingston , Ontario, th e Imperia l De fence Colleg e i n London an d th e NATO Defence Colleg e h i Paris. Finally, promotion . D o th e bes t me n (an d women ) ge t t o th e top ? Do they get there soo n enough? A former publi c servant , speakin g fro m long an d intimat e experience , though t i t a legitimat e criticis m o f th e Canadian civi l servic e generall y tha t "ther e i s to o muc h o f wha t th e Germans cal l Gleichschaltung —too muc h holdin g bac k t o th e pac e o f the average . . . . Our present procedure s ar e based o n th e assumptio n that th e messenger boy might become th e deput y minister. By al l means let tha t b e so , but i f h e ha s th e capacity , d o no t requir e hi m t o mov e consecutively fro m grade s on e t o te n a t ever y stage . I f h e survive s that weary process, th e chances are that he will no longer make a good deputy minister."47 Foreig n servic e officer s hav e suffere d rathe r les s i n thi s respect tha n othe r member s o f th e publi c service . Durin g th e Secon d World War , an d immediatel y afterwards , th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs had too few able personnel to fill the rapidly growing number of key positions openin g u p abroa d an d a t home ; individual s o f prove n per formance an d greate r promise wer e moved int o post s o f grea t responsi bility a t a comparativel y earl y age , risin g i n thei r fortie s to becom e as sistant, associat e an d deput y ministers, an d head s o f missions. Bu t wit h the paus e i n th e Department' s expansion , incomin g recruit s coul d loo k with les s assuranc e tha n th e hopefu l entrant s o f 1946- 9 fo r rapi d ele vation t o policy-makin g positions . I t becam e harde r i n a Departmen t of thre e hundre d foreig n servic e officer s tha n i n a Departmen t o f thirt y to kee p sigh t efficientl y o f younge r people o f ability , an d a n elemen t of luck entere d inevitabl y into postin g an d promotion. I t woul d b e wron g

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to suggest that morale has suffered o n this account alone, fo r the discon tent of which tangible evidence may be found i n resignations at al l levels in recen t year s must be relate d t o othe r factors—th e improve d salarie s offered b y Canadia n universities, the diminishe d prestige of th e foreig n service followin g Mr . Leste r Pearson' s resignatio n a s Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affair s i n 1957 , th e strai n o f working with politicians wh o have for twent y years been unuse d to office , an d th e tol l o n healt h an d spirit o f frequen t posting s t o politicall y an d climaticall y uncomfortable environments.* Yet th e shortag e of room a t the to p ha s mad e for som e malaise. Fo r th e firs t tim e i n it s histor y th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs experience d difficult y i n securin g its norma l quot a o f candidate s for th e foreig n servic e office r competitio n i n 1960 . THE ATTACH E

Not leas t amon g the pressures assailin g the professional diplomatist ha s been the gradual usurpation of his investigative and reportorial function s by specialists inside his embassy and outside, enjoying o r claiming diplomatic status, stuffing th e pouche s with their reports , frequentl y by-pass ing altogethe r th e norma l channel s o f diplomati c communication , f Jostled an d hemme d in b y specialists , the traditiona l foreign servic e of ficer may wel l wonder what is left fo r hi m t o sa y onc e th e commercial , *"I regre t tha t ou r ba g o f Jul y 1 2 [1960 ] containe d n o politica l reports, " a foreign servic e office r wrot e t o hi s regiona l des k office r i n th e Eas t Bloc k fro m his missio n i n Southeas t Asia . "Thi s wa s primaril y du e t o th e absenc e o f th e Ambassador [o n hom e leave ] an d t o th e pressur e o f administration , Colomb o Plan matters , etc. , whic h ha d falle n t o m e fo r abou t thre e weeks , i n additio n t o my norma l duties . Durin g tha t time , poo r X wa s ou t wit h a combine d attac k of amoebi c dysentery , tapewor m an d roundworm . Bu t X i s no w better , and , al though h e ha s ye t to recove r fro m residua l anaemia , h e i s back a t work . Y i s now suffering fro m bacillar y dysenter y bu t seem s t o b e abl e t o pu t i n a norma l day. " As member s o f th e publi c servic e foreig n servic e officer s ma y participat e i n a health insuranc e plan a t favourabl e rates , bu t th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s is unabl e t o assum e financia l responsibilit y fo r treatmen t o f illnesse s incurre d a s the resul t o f servin g i n unhealth y environments . Militar y attaches , o n th e othe r hand, receiv e th e protectio n t o whic h the y ar e entitle d a s member s o f th e arme d forces, a circumstanc e no t improvin g moral e amon g thei r diplomati c colleague s undergoing comparabl e hardships . tThe dislik e shown b y caree r diplomatist s fo r attache s fro m outsid e th e foreign service i s nothing new. "Three attaches , m y dea r Palmerston, " wrot e Si r Frederic k Lamb fro m Vienn a i n 1838 , "ar e a s muc h a s thi s plac e ca n bear ; mor e woul d b e like keepin g a pensio n fo r grown-u p pupils. " Fro m Lisbo n Lor d Willia m Russel l sent a similar protest : " When the y are so numerous th e Chancery become s a sor t of Coffe e Hous e wher e th e dispatche s ar e rea d an d criticize d lik e newspapers. " Quoted i n Si r Charle s Webster , Th e Foreign Policy o f Palmerston, 1830-1841, I (London, 1951) , p . 70 .

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military, press , labour , finance , agricultural , science , an d technica l as sistance attache s hav e ha d thei r say ; or , i f somethin g i n hi s ow n des patches ha s escape d thei r notice , whethe r his political superio r ca n pos sibly find time to rea d it . Th e Canadia n diplomatis t ha s enjoye d i n thi s regard a n experienc e happier , o n th e whole , tha n tha t o f his colleague s in governmen t service elsewhere . Th e rang e an d numbe r o f specialists , while expanding , ar e no t oppressive , an d leav e hi m ampl e scop e fo r significant activity . The machiner y fo r co-ordinatin g hi s wor k wit h tha t of functiona l diplomatists, while not ye t perfect , has worke d effectively , both i n th e embass y and a t Ottawa , to preven t th e kin d o f inter-agenc y rivalry tha t elsewher e reduce s th e statu s an d moral e o f th e regula r foreign service . The commercial attache is at once the oldes t an d most importan t type of functiona l diplomatis t i n th e Canadia n publi c service . I n relatio n t o him, indeed , th e foreig n servic e office r o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs i s somethin g o f a n interloper , fo r commercia l representatio n overseas precede d b y severa l decade s th e exercis e o f th e righ t o f lega tion. That relation s betwee n commercia l an d diplomati c representative s have been largely devoid of personal rivalr y and jurisdictiona l squabbles owes much to the traditio n of interdepartmental co-operation an d inter change o f personnel. " A ma n ca n transfe r entirel y fro m th e trad e com missioner servic e to Externa l Affairs, " remarke d the Under Secretar y in 1948. "W e hav e made a trad e commissione r an ambassador . W e have made one a consul-general. W e have transferred a trade commissioner to an embassy as first secretary. We have transferred a trade commissioner to be a second ma n a t Canada House." 48 I t wil l be noted tha t thes e ar e examples o f one-wa y traffi c fro m Trad e an d Commerc e t o Externa l Affairs; ther e ha s bee n less , i f any, flow from Externa l Affair s t o Trad e and Commerce , a fac t reflectin g th e greate r prestig e o f diplomac y a s against commercia l representation , an d als o th e pressur e exerte d b y C. D . Howe , whe n Ministe r o f Trad e an d Commerce , t o fin d suitabl e employment fo r a backlo g o f senio r official s o f hi s Department . The oversea s representative s o f th e Departmen t o f Trad e an d Com merce ar e mor e widel y dispersed tha n thos e o f th e Departmen t o f Ex ternal Affairs . I n thos e countrie s wher e ther e i s a trad e commissione r but n o diplomati c representative , th e trad e commissioner' s wor k ma y reach int o th e politica l sphere , mos t usefully , perhaps , b y providin g diplomatic intelligence . Wher e there i s diplomatic as well as commercial representation, th e trad e commissione r an d hi s staf f wor k closel y wit h the embassy or legation, without being wholly subservient to it. "I t i s not

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true tha t trad e commissioner s an d diplomati c mission s repor t onl y through o r to the Department o f External Affairs, " th e Unde r Secretar y explained i n 1952 . We do not see k t o channel thei r report s to o rigidl y through th e hea d o f mis sion, althoug h th e head o f missio n would b e aware o f what i s being reported . I woul d pu t i t thi s way : i f th e commercia l secretar y i n Havan a wer e t o b e writing upo n th e genera l commercia l polic y o f th e governmen t o f Cuba , a despatch o f that characte r I should think shoul d mor e properl y b e sent by the Ambassador—sent forwar d t o th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d the n distributed t o department s o f th e governmen t includin g Trad e an d Com merce wh o ar e intereste d i n matter s o f policy . If , o n th e othe r hand , th e commercial ma n wer e reportin g o n some detai l regardin g sugar, for instance , I thin k th e appropriat e cours e woul d b e fo r hi m t o addres s hi s despatc h or report to the deput y minister o f Trade an d Commerc e an d sen d a copy of it t o th e hea d o f mission . I thin k tha t satisfie s bot h th e proprietie s an d the practicalities .

Asked whethe r he considere d "th e tim e ha s arrive d whe n Externa l Af fairs shoul d take over the trade commissioners and includ e them in their department fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f policy , administration , an d gen erally speakin g for th e goo d o f the countr y an d economy, " Mr . Arnol d Heeney replied: "Tha t suggestion has been canvasse d from tim e to time both fro m withi n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d th e Depart ment o f Trad e an d Commerce . . . . I a m afrai d tha t t o answe r th e question woul d requir e a degre e o f diplomati c skil l o f whic h I a m no t capable."49 Whateve r the merit s o f thi s proposal, i t woul d hav e ha d a t least th e effec t o f removin g one sourc e o f irritatio n an d grievance—th e uncertainty about whether in the absence of the head of mission a foreign service office r o f th e Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerc e o r o f th e Department o f Externa l Affair s shoul d assum e th e responsibilitie s o f charge d'affaires . A fa r mor e importan t proble m o f jurisdictio n i s whic h o f th e tw o departments, if either, should be responsible for foreig n ai d programmes. Canada firs t entere d th e field of externa l assistanc e t o under-develope d countries i n 194 9 throug h th e Unite d Nation s programm e o f technica l assistance, an d fo r thi s reaso n administratio n of foreig n ai d becam e a t the outse t th e responsibilit y of th e Unite d Nation s divisio n o f th e De partment o f Externa l Affairs . Th e inauguratio n o f th e Colomb o Pla n a yea r later place d the Department' s facilitie s unde r considerabl e strain , and i t wa s a t thi s junctur e that th e powerfu l an d energeti c Ministe r o f Trade an d Commerce , C . D . Howe , expresse d th e readines s o f his De partment t o tak e ove r th e administratio n o f Canadia n participatio n i n the Colomb o Pla n an d al l othe r foreig n ai d programmes . Th e Depart ment o f Externa l Affair s rightl y sense d tha t thi s interes t ha d bee n

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aroused b y th e commercia l an d tradin g possibilitie s o f th e venture , bu t its misgivings, if such there were , vanished a t th e prospec t o f relief fro m administrative burden s rapidl y becomin g intolerable . Membershi p o n an interdepartmenta l committee * would , it hoped , enabl e i t t o kee p a watchful ey e o n th e administratio n o f th e programme s an d t o se e tha t foreign polic y aspect s were kept well to the fore. Under th e capabl e directio n o f th e firs t Administrato r o f th e Inter national Economi c an d Technica l Co-operatio n Divisio n o f th e Depart ment o f Trad e an d Commerce , Mr. R . G . Ni k Cavel l (wh o wa s chair man o f th e interdepartmenta l committee), thi s syste m worke d mor e o r less satisfactorily for severa l years. But th e proces s of clearing proposal s with thre e department s (Externa l Affairs , Trad e an d Commerce , an d Finance), tw o Crow n corporation s (Defenc e Construction , Ltd. , an d the Canadia n Commercia l Corporation ) an d Treasur y Boar d becam e increasingly irksome . Co-ordinatio n betwee n official s a t hom e an d i n the fiel d lef t muc h t o b e desired , largely becaus e o f th e inabilit y o f th e cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus at Ottawa to delegat e sufficien t dis cretionary authorit y t o th e me n o n th e spot , wit h th e resul t tha t de cisions wer e undul y delaye d an d opportunitie s fo r constructiv e actio n needlessly lost. f Finally , the Asia n beneficiaries wer e beginning to com plain privatel y tha t commercia l advantag e rathe r tha n disintereste d philanthropy seeme d too ofte n t o motivate the donor . The resignation of C. D. Howe as Minister o f Trade an d Commerce i n June 1957 , followe d no t lon g afterward s b y tha t o f Mr . Cavel l a s Ad ministrator, offere d th e ne w Governmen t an opportunit y t o re-examin e the administratio n of foreign aid programmes . Three choice s la y before it. On e wa s t o d o wha t might be don e t o improv e th e existin g system, without altering its main administrative features. A second wa s to creat e a ne w Departmen t o f Foreig n Aid , distinc t fro m th e Department s o f 'Composed o f th e hea d o f th e Economi c Division , Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs; Director , Trad e Commissione r Service , Departmen t o f Trad e an d Com merce; Deput y Governo r o f th e Ban k o f Canada ; Assistan t Deput y Ministe r o f Finance; an d Administrato r o f th e Internationa l Economi c an d Technica l Co operation Division , Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerce . f'Most capita l an d especiall y technica l assistanc e administratio n ca n b e carried o n a t highes t efficienc y i n th e countrie s t o whic h th e ai d i s directed rathe r than a t desks , howeve r intelligentl y manned , te n o r fiftee n thousan d mile s away . . . . A n indefensibl e amoun t o f tim e i s now spent i n length y an d tediou s corres pondence betwee n fiel d technicians , Canadia n mission s abroad , an d th e thre e Ministries . . . o n point s o f appallin g triviality. " Keit h Spicer , "Som e Remark s concerning Canadia n Assistanc e unde r th e Colomb o Plan " (unpublishe d manu script); an d "Th e Administratio n o f Canadia n Colomb o Pla n Aid, " International Journal, vol . XVI , no . 2 , Sprin g 1961 , pp . 169-82 . I a m gratefu l t o Mr . Spicer , who conducte d extensiv e fiel d researc h fo r hi s doctora l thesi s o n Canad a an d th e Colombo Plan, fo r placin g hi s paper a t m y disposal .

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Trade an d Commerc e an d Externa l Affairs , wit h it s ow n autonomou s corps of career officers . S o radical a reorganization might b e undertake n in th e hop e o f allayin g suspicion s o f recipient s o f ai d administere d b y departments primaril y intereste d i n trad e o r diplomacy , improvin g th e morale an d effectivenes s o f fiel d officer s b y makin g foreig n ai d thei r sole responsibility, * an d providin g better facilitie s fo r creativ e exchang e of idea s betwee n th e Ottaw a planner s an d th e oversea s experts . The reorganization actually undertaken was far less radical. Responsibility for foreig n ai d was restored to th e Department of External Affairs , just as , fiv e year s earlier , th e Unite d State s foreig n ai d agency , th e Foreign Operation s Administratio n (whic h ha d replace d th e Mutua l Security Administratio n i n 1953) , ha d bee n abolishe d an d replace d by th e Internationa l Cooperatio n Administratio n unde r th e directio n of th e Secretar y o f State . A statemen t issue d b y th e Prim e Ministe r on Augus t 25 , 1960 , explaine d th e ne w arrangement s i n th e followin g terms: In recen t year s th e responsibilitie s fo r Canada' s economi c assistanc e hav e been divide d between th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d th e Depart ment o f Trad e an d Commerce , wit h co-operatio n b y th e Departmen t o f Finance. Recently th e ide a o f economi c assistanc e t o underdevelope d countrie s has acquire d a ne w significanc e an d attractio n fo r a lengthenin g lis t o f prospective recipient s an d potentia l donors . It ha s bee n decide d tha t th e administratio n an d operatio n o f ai d pro grammes, i n th e interest s o f efficien t an d expeditiou s administratio n an d to assur e a soun d an d productiv e us e o f th e ai d programmes , shoul d b e placed unde r on e head . A n externa l ai d offic e wil l b e establishe d i n charg e of a n office r t o b e know n a s Director-Genera l o f Externa l Ai d Programmes . Under the directio n of the Secretar y of State for Externa l Affairs , hi s respon sibilities wil l b e a s follows : (a) Th e operatio n an d administratio n o f Canada' s assistanc e programme s covered b y th e genera l ai d vote s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs ; (b) To keep these programmes unde r constan t revie w and, a s appropriate , to prepar e recommendation s o n the m an d relate d matter s t o Cabinet ; t o prepare submission s t o Treasur y Boar d o n financia l question s relatin g t o economic assistance ; (c) T o ensur e co-ordinatio n i n th e operation s o f othe r Department s and agencie s o f governmen t concerne d wit h variou s aspect s o f economi c assistance programmes ; (d) T o consul t an d co-operat e a s appropriate wit h international organiza tions an d agencies ; *"Although presen t Canadia n ai d administrator s abroa d ar e generall y o f th e highest individua l calibre , fe w . .. ar e enthusiasti c abou t th e ai d aspec t o f thei r work, an d som e o f the m frankl y conside r i t a n annoyin g impedimen t t o th e pursuit o f thei r principa l career. " Spicer , "Som e Remark s concernin g Canadia n Assistance under the Colomb o Plan."

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(e) T o consul t an d co-operat e a s appropriat e wit h Canadia n voluntar y agencies activ e i n underdeveloped countries ; (/) T o co-ordinat e Canadia n effort s t o provid e emergenc y assistanc e i n the cas e o f disasters abroad ; fo r thi s purpos e t o achiev e th e necessar y liaiso n with th e Canadia n Re d Cros s Societ y an d othe r appropriat e Canadia n organizations; (g) T o b e responsibl e fo r th e interna l administratio n o f th e Externa l Aid Office ; an d (h) T o perfor m suc h othe r dutie s a s ma y b e require d i n relatio n t o Canada's externa l assistanc e programme . It ha s bee n decide d t o appoin t Mr . H . O . Moran , recentl y Hig h Com missioner t o Pakistan , a s Director-Genera l i n th e Externa l Ai d Office , with effec t fro m Septembe r 1st .

Unlike his commercial counterpart, th e militar y attache i s a compara tive newcome r t o Canadia n mission s abroad . I n 192 7 th e Canadia n Government unanimousl y decide d agains t appointin g militar y officer s to th e Hig h Commissioner' s offic e i n Londo n o r t o th e newl y opene d legation i n Washington. 50 I t wa s no t unti l Colone l G . P . Loggi e wa s assigned t o Canad a Hous e i n 193 7 a s ordnanc e representativ e o f th e Department o f National Defence that an y of Canada's mission s acquired an officia l remotel y resemblin g a servic e attache . Th e creatio n i n September 193 9 o f th e Canadia n Militar y Headquarter s i n Londo n was though t t o mak e unnecessar y th e appointmen t o f militar y officer s to th e Hig h Commissioner' s office , an d thi s di d no t tak e plac e unti l the disbandin g of C.M.H.Q . a t th e en d o f th e war . Canada an d th e Unite d States , havin g no t ye t appointe d servic e attaches t o thei r mission s in Washingto n an d Ottawa , carrie d o n thei r pre-war militar y conversation s largel y throug h Canadia n staf f officer s who travelle d t o Washingto n for th e purpose . Th e missio n of th e Chie f of th e Genera l Staf f (Majo r Genera l E . C . Ashton ) an d th e Chie f of the Nava l Staf f (Commodor e P . W . Nelles ) too k plac e i n Januar y 1938 unde r condition s o f great secrecy , Genera l Ashto n leavin g Ottawa one day , Commodor e Nelles th e next . Travellin g separately , i n civilia n dress, the y arrive d a t th e Canadia n legation , thei r identit y unknow n (or a t leas t undisclosed ) t o an y o f it s staf f sav e th e Ministe r himself. 51 They proceede d t o discus s wit h thei r America n counterparts , Genera l Malin Crai g an d Admira l Willia m D . Leahy , plan s fo r th e defenc e of North Americ a in th e even t of wa r wit h Japan . I n Apri l 193 8 Colone l N. O . Car r o f th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e discusse d wit h various Unite d State s technica l an d suppl y officer s i n Washingto n th e materiel whic h a belligeren t Canad a migh t acquir e fro m th e Unite d States i n th e even t o f dela y i n o r failur e o f deliver y fro m th e Unite d Kingdom, an d i n Novembe r o f th e sam e yea r a thir d discussio n o n

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military matter s too k plac e betwee n Majo r Genera l T . V . Anderso n of th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e an d America n officers . Shortly afte r Canada' s declaratio n o f war , ther e wa s discussio n i n the Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s o f appointin g a nava l attach e t o the Washington legation. (Th e Navy may have been chose n a s the senio r service, o r becaus e nava l problem s wer e mos t pressin g a t th e time. ) It was , however , a n R.C.A.F . officer , Ai r Commodor e W . R . Kenny , who becam e th e firs t Canadia n servic e attach e i n Washington , takin g up hi s dutie s h i Februar y 1940 . Ai r Commodor e Kenny was instructe d to dea l wit h al l servic e matters , bu t th e burde n o f dealin g wit h arm y and navy , a s wel l a s ai r force , affair s wa s fro m th e star t a heav y one . The ai r attache , reporte d th e Canadia n Ministe r i n July , "ca n perhap s at th e momen t handl e th e specifi c request s fo r informatio n an d actio n which reac h him , bu t h e canno t unde r suc h condition s fin d th e tim e or opportunit y fo r contact s an d studie s an d report s o f a genera l natur e which ar e s o useful. " H e recommende d tha t th e Government appoin t a nava l attach e t o th e legation , inasmuc h as the Unite d State s adminis tration wa s considerin g sendin g a nava l attach e t o Ottawa. 52 Th e following mont h a nava l an d a n arm y attach e wer e poste d t o Washington. Even thoug h al l thre e service s no w ha d thei r representative s i n th e United States , th e Canadia n Governmen t fel t i t stil l lacke d acces s t o the inne r council s o f th e Gran d Alliance . Accordingl y i t presse d fo r the creatio n o f a Canadia n join t staf f missio n a t Washington , simila r to the British. Thi s reques t was opposed by the Unite d State s War and Navy Department s "o n th e ground s tha t representatio n throug h th e Permanent Join t Boar d o n Defens e an d th e Britis h Join t Staf f Missio n met al l th e Canadia n need s fo r liaison , an d tha t a n undesirabl e prece dent woul d b e establishe d fo r simila r request s b y othe r dominion s an d the America n republics." 53 Thi s explanatio n di d no t giv e muc h satis faction i n Ottawa , an d o n Augus t 1 8 th e Prim e Ministe r tol d th e American Ministe r "tha t th e prolonge d refusa l o f Washingto n t o approve a militar y mission wa s th e onl y aspec t o f U.S.-Canadia n rela tionships tha t seriousl y trouble d him." 54 Th e Minister , Pierrepon t Moffat, mad e a n earnes t bu t unsuccessfu l attemp t t o impres s hi s mili tary colleague s wit h th e advers e politica l effect s o f thei r position , bu t both th e Unite d State s Chief o f Staf f an d th e Secretar y of Wa r fel t "tha t foreign politica l consideration s inimica l t o ou r militar y interests shoul d not b e allowe d t o determin e the attitud e o f the War Department." 55 The entr y of the United State s into th e war spurre d a renewed Cana dian effor t t o wi n acceptanc e b y th e Unite d State s o f a join t militar y mission a t Washington , whic h i n th e Canadia n vie w th e creatio n i n

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December 194 1 o f th e U.S.-U.K . Combine d Chief s o f Staf f mad e al l the more imperative. Mackenzie King took advantag e of Mr. Churchill' s presence i n th e Canadia n capita l t o rais e th e matte r wit h him: Said quit e openl y to him th e proble m w e faced wa s that whil e w e had bee n in [th e war ] durin g two an d a quarte r years , thing s woul d b e s o arrange d that th e U.S . an d Britai n woul d settl e everythin g betwee n themselves , an d that ou r services , Chief s o f Staff , etc . woul d no t hav e an y sa y i n wha t wa s to b e done . Tha t i n th e las t war , ther e ha d bee n a Militar y Missio n a t Washington. Peopl e thought , i n Canada , ther e shoul d b e a Militar y Missio n there now , watchin g Canada's interests. That h e woul d understan d ou r poli tical proble m i n tha t regard . I go t the Chief s o f Staf f late r t o explai n th e position . H e sai d h e though t we shoul d b e entitle d t o hav e representatio n there , bu t expresse d th e hop e that w e would tak e a larg e vie w o f th e relationship s o f th e larg e countries , to avoi d anythin g in th e wa y o f antagonisms. 58

A fortnigh t late r h e tol d th e America n Ministe r tha t h e "wa s ver y critical o f th e attitud e o f man y o f ou r technicians , particularl y i n th e Army an d Navy, for trying to settl e i n two-way discussions matter s that directly affecte d Canad a an d shoul d b e carrie d o n i n a three-wa y dis cussion."57 These persisten t complaint s eventuall y were rewarded. In Jul y 1942 , after a recor d o f negotiation s describe d b y a n officia l historia n o f th e United States Army as "one o f the least happy aspects of the U.S.-Canadian Worl d Wa r I I relationship," 58 a Canadia n Join t Militar y Mission , with self-containe d naval , arm y an d ai r forc e staffs , wa s create d i n Washington. (Th e exten t t o whic h i t succeede d i n pryin g strategi c secrets ou t o f th e Combine d Chief s o f Staf f i s discusse d belo w i n chapter v. ) The chairma n o f th e Canadia n Join t Militar y Missio n wa s Majo r General Mauric e Pope , wh o in additio n to bein g a militar y representa tive o n th e Permanen t Join t Boar d o n Defence , had sinc e March 194 2 been th e representativ e i n Washingto n o f th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabinet "fo r th e purpos e o f maintainin g continuous contac t wit h th e U.K.-U.S. Combine d Staff s an d th e Combine d Plannin g Committees , and t o represen t th e Wa r Committee before the Combine d Staff s whe n questions affectin g Canad a wer e unde r consideration." 69 Th e origina l intention ha d bee n to appoin t Genera l Pope a s the representativ e o f the Chiefs o f Staf f Committe e rather tha n a s th e representativ e of th e Wa r Committee but , accordin g t o Genera l Pope' s ow n account , "th e Nav y and Ai r Forc e woul d have non e o f this " sinc e i t appeare d t o offe r th e Army a privilege d channe l o f communication. 60 Bu t t o hav e offere d equal statu s t o al l thre e service s woul d hav e encountere d America n opposition. Aske d "whethe r h e though t i t woul d have bee n possibl e t o

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secure recognitio n fo r thre e Canadia n Servic e representative s i n Washington a t th e sam e leve l an d wit h th e sam e statu s tha t ha d bee n accorded Genera l Pope, " th e America n Ministe r i n Ottaw a "sai d em phatically that , i n hi s judgment , it woul d no t hav e bee n possible , an d that i f [th e Canadia n Government ] ha d endeavoure d t o insis t o n separate to p leve l representatio n fo r th e thre e Defenc e Departments , none o f thes e Washingto n representative s coul d hav e enjoye d th e position vi s a vi s th e Combine d Chief s o f Staf f whic h h e expect s General Pop e t o fill." 61 The numbe r o f servic e attache s poste d t o Canadia n diplomati c mis sions wa s greatl y increased followin g the Secon d Worl d War . B y 194 8 the Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e wa s represente d i n Belgium , Czechoslovakia, Denmark , France , German y (Bon n an d Berlin) , Italy , Japan, th e Netherlands , Sweden , Turkey , th e Unite d Kingdom , th e United States , th e U.S.S.R . an d Yugoslavia , althoug h i n som e case s the representativ e was responsible fo r mor e tha n on e o f thes e countries . The manne r of appointing service attaches was described h i 194 8 b y the Under Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs : If th e defenc e service s fee l tha t i t woul d b e desirabl e fro m thei r poin t o f view t o hav e a servic e attach e a t a diplomati c missio n the y approac h th e Department o f Externa l Affair s t o ge t ou r genera l view s o n th e desirabilit y or otherwise . W e normall y say , i f the y wis h t o sen d a servic e attache , tha t is al l righ t wit h us . .. . Ther e hav e bee n on e o r tw o occasion s wher e w e thought o n certai n ground s i t wa s undesirabl e t o hav e a servic e office r a t a diplomati c post, * bu t normall y w e d o no t object . Th e fina l appointmen t is mad e b y th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s afte r agreemen t i n th e appointment ha s bee n reache d wit h th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defence. 62

The servic e attache , onc e poste d t o a diplomati c mission , i s unde r th e authority o f th e hea d o f missio n an d subjec t t o remova l fro m th e pos t at th e discretio n o f th e hea d o f mission. 63 Lik e th e commercia l attache , he has a dual responsibility, to the head of mission (an d throug h him to the Departmen t o f External Affairs ) an d t o th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defence. H e i s required to sen d report s o f general interest t o th e Cana dian governmen t throug h th e hea d o f missio n t o th e Departmen t o f External Affairs , furnishin g copie s o f suc h reports t o Nationa l Defenc e Headquarters; onl y report s o f othe r tha n genera l interes t ar e sen t directly t o hi s ow n Department . O n on e occasio n durin g th e Secon d World Wa r th e servic e representative s i n Washingto n faile d t o follo w *One suc h occasio n aros e i n 1947 , whe n th e R.C.A.F . wante d t o appoin t a n air attach e t o th e Hig h Commissioner' s offic e i n Ne w Delhi . Th e "certai n othe r grounds" o n whic h thi s proposa l wa s though t undesirabl e presumabl y include d the prospect , i f i t wer e adopted , o f makin g a simila r appointmen t i n Karachi .

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this procedure . A t a meetin g o f th e Wa r Committee o f th e Cabine t on Ma y 14 , 1943 , Mackenzi e Kin g "spoke out ver y strongl y agains t som e of th e official s o f the Defenc e Department no t forwardin g t o me , a s Prim e Ministe r [an d Secretary o f Stat e fo r External Affairs] , importan t document s whic h cam e fro m ou r militar y staf f at Washington. . .. I sai d tha t no document i n the publi c servic e shoul d be concealed fro m th e Prime Minister . . .. I mad e it clear tha t a directio n was to g o fro m th e Wa r Committe e t o th e Chief s o f Staf f an d state d . . . that I wa s t o hav e fo r m y persona l possession , thes e differen t communications , that I migh t b e i n a positio n a t an y tim e t o tak e ful l responsibilit y fo r wha t I ha d done. . . ," 64 The servic e attache , i n a word , i s i n ever y wa y impresse d b y th e prin ciple o f civilia n supremac y tha t distinguishe s th e relatio n betwee n soldiers an d governments in Canada (se e below , chapte r HI) . The Canadia n governmen t ha s responde d t o th e increasin g speciali zation of modern diplomati c activity by appointing t o it s major mission s attaches wh o perfor m othe r tha n commercia l o r militar y duties . Pres s attaches hav e bee n a norma l par t o f th e personne l o f th e Washingto n embassy and o f Canada House, London, since 1941 , and the subsequent appointment o f labour , agricultural , financial , scientifi c an d othe r specialists ha s turne d thes e mission s int o miniatur e replica s o f th e federal governmen t a t Ottawa . Ther e ha s not , however , bee n tha t extreme proliferatio n o f oversea s representatio n whic h characterize d the conduc t o f Unite d State s foreig n polic y durin g th e 1950's , whe n as man y a s fift y differen t agencie s o f th e administratio n maintaine d their own functiona l diplomatist s abroad , ofte n wit h onl y the mos t tenuous connectio n wit h th e hea d o f mission. 65 THE DEPARTMEN T O F EXTERNA L AFFAIRS

One o f Joseph Pope' s firs t officia l act s upo n becomin g Unde r Secretar y of th e ne w Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s h e ha d don e s o muc h t o bring int o bein g wa s t o cas t abou t fo r som e principle s o f departmenta l organization. A stud y o f th e Australia n Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s (created i n 1901 ) di d no t prov e helpful . "Thei r Departmen t seem s t o have a muc h wide r spher e o f activit y tha n i s contemplate d fo r th e Canadian one, " wa s th e commen t o f W . H . Walker , th e senio r o f tw o "chief clerks " wit h whic h th e Departmen t ha d bee n provided , "an d while th e informatio n supplie d [b y th e Australia n Government ] i s interesting s o far a s it goes it doe s no t see m t o m e very helpful toward s

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establishing a n organizatio n o r procedur e fo r th e ne w Dep*." 66 Som e years earlie r th e Prim e Ministe r whil e i n Londo n ha d take n "pain s t o learn ho w thes e things wer e deal t wit h there," 67 an d i t wa s accordingl y to Londo n tha t Si r Wilfri d Laurie r decide d t o sen d Pop e i n 191 0 "t o look int o the Foreign Offic e syste m and to collec t bac k records." 68 Pope was chiefl y intereste d i n th e latte r par t o f th e assignmen t an d spen t several happy weeks at Whitehall busil y copying documents. There wa s indeed littl e to be done at this stag e abou t the organizatio n o f a Depart ment consistin g o f a Deput y Minister , tw o clerk s an d a secretary , a budget (fo r 1909-10 ) o f $14,950 , an d a n offic e ove r a barbe r shop . An importan t an d far-reachin g step wa s taken i n 1913 , probabl y with out realizatio n o f it s beneficia l consequences , whe n th e offic e o f th e Canadian Commissione r i n Pari s wa s brough t unde r th e jurisdictio n of th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . A preceden t wa s thu s create d which, followe d i n 192 1 b y th e mergin g of th e Hig h Commissioner' s office i n Londo n wit h th e Departmen t an d late r o f th e mission s i n Washington, Pari s an d Tokyo , forestalle d the developmen t o f a foreig n service separat e fro m th e foreig n offic e a s i n th e Unite d State s unti l 1954. No furthe r though t appear s t o hav e bee n give n t o departmenta l organization unti l 192 0 whe n Lorin g Christi e (wh o ha d entere d th e Department durin g the Firs t Worl d Wa r an d quickl y occupie d it s new post o f Lega l Advise r create d i n 1913 ) wa s sen t t o Londo n "t o investigate th e organizatio n o f th e Britis h foreig n offic e . . . fo r th e purpose o f gathering information which would help . .. in a reorganiza tion o f [the ] Departmen t of Externa l Affairs." 69 Nothin g cam e o f thi s investigation, perhap s because , a s Mackenzi e Kin g wrot e afterwards , the Unde r Secretar y of the Department , "with fifty years' servic e behind him, looked somewha t askance upon extensive plans o f reorganization. " Sir Josep h Pope' s successor , O . D . Skelton , whil e no t avers e t o suc h projects, wa s no t incline d t o rus h int o them , no r di d th e siz e o f th e Department (whic h in 192 5 containe d no mor e than th e three adminis trative position s wit h whic h i t ha d starte d ou t fiftee n year s earlier ) require them . A stud y was undertake n o f procedure s employe d i n th e foreign service s of the United Kingdom , the Unite d States , France , Aus tralia an d th e Iris h Fre e State . I n respons e t o a suggestio n tha t th e Department o f External Affairs , lik e th e Britis h Foreig n Offic e an d the America n Stat e Department , shoul d b e organize d alon g regiona l lines, Mackenzi e Kin g wrote a s follows : A regiona l basi s . . . work s adequatel y onl y whe n th e staf f i s sufficientl y large t o ensur e i n eac h o f thes e regiona l division s a numbe r o f me n wh o have specialize d i n the differen t subject s and topics tha t arise . Th e alternativ e

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procedure, namely , divisio n accordin g t o subjec t rathe r tha n b y region , ha s a goo d dea l t o b e sai d fo r it . Probabl y i n th e earl y year s o f th e expansio n of th e Departmen t w e shoul d hav e t o tr y t o combin e bot h methods . A t th e present time , fo r example , th e Assistan t Unde r Secretary , Mr . Walker , deals with all consular an d passpor t matter s an d confidential prints, whil e th e Counsellor, Mr . Desy , i s takin g charg e o f Leagu e o f Nation s matter s an d will probabl y b e give n specia l responsibilit y fo r th e shar e i n th e negotiation s of commercia l treatie s whic h i t i s m y intentio n tha t th e Departmen t o f External Affair s shoul d tak e i n future. 70

This fusion o f regional and functiona l responsibilit y wa s accordingly pu t into effect. Th e result was described in 193 0 b y the Under Secretary : The wor k i n th e Department , s o fa r a s ou r limite d staf f wil l permit , i s divided partl y b y subject s and partl y b y countries . Fo r example , on e office r looks afte r passports ; anothe r look s afte r consula r relations ; another , th e legal aspec t o f affairs . . . . We also attemp t t o divid e according t o countries . One [officer ] mus t specializ e i n Britis h Empir e relations ; anothe r mus t b e familiar wit h th e Leagu e o f Nation s an d continenta l affairs ; anothe r i s familiar wit h condition s i n th e Unite d States , an d s o on . Ou r staf f i s no t large enoug h t o permi t a s grea t a degre e o f specializatio n a s w e woul d like, bu t w e hop e tha t i t wil l gradually be mad e mor e adequate. 71

While a gradua l mov e i n th e directio n o f increase d specializatio n has take n plac e a s th e Departmen t ha s grow n t o on e hundre d time s the numbe r of its original personnel, the basi c principles of departmental organization hav e undergone little change. The fusio n o f responsibilities for polic y an d administration , originally th e produc t o f necessity , ha s been though t a virtu e i n it s ow n righ t servin g t o brea k dow n depart mental barriers and to offse t th e developmen t of an inner circl e of politi cal officer s untrouble d b y th e menia l chore s o f keepin g house . Thu s one o f four assistan t unde r secretaries wa s until recentl y responsibl e fo r the consular , information, lega l an d America n affair s divisions ; another , for th e Commonwealth , the Unite d Nations , th e Fa r Easter n an d th e historical divisions ; a thir d fo r th e tw o economi c an d th e tw o defenc e liaison divisions . There i s continuou s tinkering wit h th e organizationa l structure. "W e allocat e ou r function s an d chang e aroun d ou r division s perhaps onc e ever y si x month s t o correspon d wit h th e wor k i n hand , which change s in characte r al l the time, " th e Associat e Unde r Secretar y explained i n 1945 , an d changes , h e migh t hav e added , t o accor d wit h the interest s an d capacitie s o f th e senio r official s wh o happe n t o b e a t home rathe r tha n h i th e field. He wen t o n t o describ e th e organizatio n of th e Departmen t a s i t existe d a t tha t time : To star t a t the top, ther e i s Mr. Robertson , Unde r Secretary , whil e I [Hum e Wrong] a m th e Associat e Unde r Secretary . I hav e th e specia l responsibilit y of supervisin g th e politica l division s o f th e Departmen t whil e Mr . Robert son, i n additio n t o hi s lega l responsibilitie s a s deput y minister , supervise s

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the othe r division s o f th e Departmen t directly . The n th e nex t tw o senio r members o f th e staf f ar e Mr . Read , Lega l Adviser , an d Mr . Beaudry , Assis tant Unde r Secretary . Ther e ar e thre e division s dealin g wit h politica l questions. . . . The first of the three division s deal s wit h question s o f inter national organizatio n an d genera l matter s affectin g th e peac e settlement . The othe r tw o ar e geographical . The y dea l wit h politica l affair s i n certai n areas. On e takes in Europe an d th e Commonwealth . I t i s a large assignment. The other , th e America n continent s an d th e Fa r East , o n th e politica l side . Then w e hav e a lega l divisio n whic h i s agai n extremel y activ e a t th e present tim e an d rathe r har d pressed . I t look s afte r th e function s yo u would expec t a lega l divisio n t o do , includin g th e draftin g o f internationa l instruments. . . . The n ther e i s a n economi c divisio n whic h ha s t o wor k very closel y wit h th e othe r divisions . . . . I t handle s th e curren t economi c business passin g throug h th e Departmen t an d i s responsibl e fo r conductin g a goo d dea l o f liaiso n busines s with th e othe r Department s a t Ottawa . The n there i s th e diplomati c divisio n whic h deal s wit h th e diplomati c corp s i n Ottawa an d it s problems , an d ha s genera l responsibilit y fo r certai n othe r questions suc h a s passport s an d question s o f immigration . . . . W e hav e recently establishe d a n informatio n division . . . , 72

Within a year a new treaty division was added, as well as a new adminis trative division ; b y 194 8 th e Department' s organizationa l char t bor e little similarit y t o tha t i n us e i n 1945 . Th e firs t politica l division , formerly dealin g wit h internationa l organization , ha d becom e th e United Nation s division ; the secon d politica l division , formerl y dealin g with bot h Commonwealt h an d Europea n affairs , ha d give n wa y t o a European divisio n and a British Commonwealth division; the diplomati c division ha d issue d in a protocol divisio n an d a consular division ; while to deal with the Department' s rapidl y growing staff an d th e problem s of its postin g overseas a ne w personnel divisio n ha d bee n added . Finally , the Associate Unde r Secretary had bee n replaced b y two assistant unde r secretaries. "Th e genera l schem e of organization, " th e Unde r Secretar y explained in 1948, "i s that the three geographica l divisions . . . are under the direc t supervision of the assistan t Under Secretary of State i n charge of th e politica l sid e o f th e Department . Certai n othe r divisions , th e United Nations , th e consular , the legal , th e economi c an d th e informa tion division s repor t directl y t o me . Th e personne l divisio n an d th e administrative divisio n ar e unde r th e charg e o f th e assistan t Unde r Secretary o f Stat e i n charg e o f administration." 73 I n 1949 , th e yea r of the Atlanti c Pact , th e defence liaiso n divisio n wa s created , "havin g t o do," th e Under Secretary stated, "with matters in which we are interested jointly with the Departmen t o f National Defence." 74 During th e nex t decad e eigh t mor e boxe s wer e adde d t o th e depart mental organizatio n chart , bringin g the tota l numbe r o f division s fro m twelve t o twenty ; a pres s office , a n inspectio n service , an d a politica l

THE BUREAUCRAC Y 6

9

co-ordination sectio n wer e als o acquired . O n th e geo-politica l sid e th e number o f division s rose fro m thre e t o five, Far Easter n an d America n affairs finall y acquirin g division s o f thei r own , whil e i n 195 7 a ne w Middle Easter n division was "entrusted wit h the seriou s problems whic h have o f late brough t eas t an d wes t fac e t o fac e i n tha t trouble d area, " and charge d wit h providin g "advic e . . . o n th e politica l aspect s o f Canadian participatio n i n th e Unite d Nation s Emergenc y Force." 75 I n 1960 a Latin-American divisio n came into being, an d consideration wa s being give n to th e formatio n o f a n Africa n divisio n t o en d th e existin g anomaly o f dealin g wit h Afric a sout h o f th e Sahara , s o muc h o f i t lying outsid e the Commonwealth , through th e Commonwealt h division . The despatc h i n Augus t 196 0 o f som e fiv e hundre d Canadia n troop s as par t o f th e Unite d Nation s presenc e i n th e Cong o Republi c coul d be expecte d t o produc e greate r attentio n t o Africa n affair s withi n th e Department, whos e firs t Africa n des k office r wa s appointe d onl y i n 1957. To secur e th e optimu m liaison amon g the differen t division s o f thei r Department, it s senio r officer s hav e resorte d t o a variet y o f forma l devices. Th e practic e o f weekl y meeting s o f divisio n head s wa s dis continued som e year s ago , an d th e principa l metho d o f co-ordinatio n is no w th e regula r mornin g conferenc e betwee n th e Unde r Secretar y and th e assistan t unde r secretaries . Bu t th e mos t importan t catalys t of communicatio n continues to b e supplie d b y th e tradition s an d esprit of th e foreig n service officer s themselves . Th e Departmen t i s stil l smal l by th e standard s o f Washington o r London , an d a s less tha n hal f o f it s members serv e a t an y give n tim e i n Ottaw a i t i s possibl e t o ge t t o know al l one' s colleague s slightl y an d som e o f the m well . Bu t i n th e last analysi s muc h depend s upo n th e receptivit y o f thos e a t th e to p to th e idea s o f thos e furthe r down . Generalizatio n i s hazardous , bu t i t is true to sa y that senio r official s o f the Departmen t profes s their readi ness to entertain suggestion s of their juniors, and that—a more revealing test—most o f th e junior s appea r satisfie d tha t acces s t o th e highe r echelons i s as easy a s might reasonably b e hoped for . A differen t aspec t o f communicatio n i s tha t betwee n member s o f the Departmen t an d their politica l masters. All members o f the Depart ment coul d find in Mr. Leste r Pearso n (wh o had bee n on e o f the m fo r twenty years ) a n accessibl e an d receptiv e audience . Perhap s i n thi s respect hi s successor s wer e boun d t o suffe r b y comparison . Bu t ther e was som e feeling i n the Departmen t that , b y 1961 , makin g every allow ance for th e differen t backgroun d and personalit y o f their ne w Minister, its resources were not being exploited a s fully a s these deserved.

Chapter Three

TH

E

MILITAR Y

ESTABLISHMENT

THE CIVIL-MILITAR Y TRADITIO N

That th e influenc e o f th e militar y establishmen t upo n nationa l polic y has increased , i s increasing , an d ough t t o b e diminished , most liberal minded peopl e fin d i t eas y to agree . Th e widesprea d acceptance o f thi s proposition i n Canada must not however be thought to ste m solel y fro m a commitmen t t o libera l democracy ; it s greates t suppor t i s found , o r used t o b e found , i n th e authoritarian , anti-libera l settin g o f rura l Quebec. Rather , i t i s th e resul t o f a variet y o f historica l circumstance s placing th e militar y profession i n low estate. For mor e than one-third o f the Canadian people, suspicion of the mili tary min d an d o f th e militar y virtues derive s directl y fro m th e centra l circumstance o f thei r history . French-speakin g Canadian s ar e a conquered people , conquere d b y British arms . That the cr y of battle o n th e Plains of Abraham has bee n hushe d fo r tw o centurie s has no t deprive d la conquete o f th e qualit y o f a Sorelia n myth , a myt h whic h i n th e hands o f ultra-nationalis t leader s remain s a poten t i f wanin g force fo r national disruption . Cu t of f fro m hi s motherlan d b y distanc e an d b y his distast e fo r th e republica n institution s an d manner s o f moder n France, th e Frenc h Canadia n wa s stil l les s capabl e o f respondin g sympathetically t o th e imperialis m agitatin g th e Britis h Isle s a t th e turn of the century. "The new Britain of Mr. Chamberlain, " wrot e Henr i Bourassa i n 1901 , "is i n sor e nee d o f soldier s an d sailor s t o pro p th e fabric raise d b y he r franti c ambition . Bein g actuall y denuded o f troops at home, sh e turns in distress to her colonies. . . . Under miscellaneou s names an d variagate d uniforms—Roya l Rifles , Mounte d Infantry , Strathcona Horse , Yeomanry—the y extor t fro m u s whateve r the y ma y get i n th e shap e o f huma n materia l fo r thei r army . . . " l Bourassa' s interpretation capture d accuratel y enoug h th e moo d o f hi s compatriots . The Prime Ministe r himsel f took u p the cry, expressing the feelings of a great man y more tha n thos e whos e mother tongu e wa s French. "Ther e is a schoo l abroad , ther e i s a schoo l i n Englan d an d i n Canada , a school which is perhaps represented o n th e floo r o f this parliament," Si r Wilfrid Laurie r declaime d i n the House o f Commons in 1902 , "a schoo l

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 71

which want s t o brin g Canad a int o th e vorte x o f militaris m whic h i s the curs e and blight o f Europe. I a m not prepare d t o endors e an y suc h policy."2 I t wa s no wonde r that successiv e officer s o f the Britis h Army , sent fro m Londo n t o tak e charg e o f th e Canadia n militia , cam e int o conflict with the Canadian Government and were eventually recalled at its request. The most celebrated of these episodes were those involving Major General E . T . H . Hutto n an d Majo r Genera l Th e Ear l o f Dundonald ; the former was recalled i n 1900 , th e latter in 1904 . I n neithe r cas e was the motiv e o f th e Canadia n Governmen t pitche d a t th e highes t leve l of principle , fo r th e mos t irritatin g aspec t o f th e Genera l Office r Com manding was his propensity to reduc e its powers of patronage in militia affairs. Bu t th e Hutto n an d Dundonal d incident s establishe d a t th e outset o f the Dominion's moder n history the principl e of civilian control over th e militar y establishment . Les s happil y the y reinforce d civilia n prejudices agains t th e militar y mind . Bot h tradition s wer e t o persis t strongly dow n the years. The Firs t Worl d Wa r di d a s littl e i n Canad a a s elsewher e fo r th e reputation o f th e military . Mor e tha n hal f a millio n Canadian s fough t in Franc e an d Belgium ; mor e tha n fift y thousan d die d there . "I t wa s European policy , Europea n statesmanship , Europea n ambition , tha t drenched thi s worl d i n blood, " th e Canadia n delegat e tol d th e Firs t Assembly o f th e Leagu e o f Nations, 3 an d h e migh t wit h mor e justic e have include d Europea n generals . "Th e narrownes s o f hi s trainin g i n the regular arm y and his lack of adaptability to ne w conditions militated against hi s usefulness, " Canada' s wartim e Prim e Minister , Si r Rober t Borden, wrot e afterward s o f th e Britis h commande r o f Canadia n forces in France until May 1916; 4 an d wha t he sa w and learne d o f stil l higher levels o f comman d disturbe d hi m eve n more. N o attemp t wa s mad e by the Britis h Prime Ministe r t o concea l fro m hi m th e "constan t mistake s [of the generals], thei r failure t o fulfil expectations , an d th e unnecessar y losses whic h thei r lac k o f foresigh t ha d occasioned. " Borde n aske d Lloyd Georg e "wh y he had not dismissed those responsibl e . . . ; and he replied that he had endeavoure d to do so but did not succeed in carrying the Cabinet ; the hig h comman d had thei r affiliation s and root s every where; an d i t wa s fo r th e purpos e o f strengthenin g his han d i n dealin g with th e situatio n tha t h e ha d summone d th e Dominio n Minister s t o the Imperia l Cabinet. " I f suc h wa s Lloyd George' s purpose , th e Cana dian Prime Minister, fo r one , di d not le t him down . O n Jun e 13 , 1918 , Borden spok e t o th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet . "Gav e illustration s o f in competence, lac k o f system , disorganization , lac k o f foresight , etc. " As th e Canadia n Prim e Ministe r bega n speaking , th e Chie f o f th e

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Imperial Genera l Staf f attempte d t o leav e th e roo m bu t Lloy d Georg e directed hi m to retur n an d t o listen . "Si r Henr y Wilson, " Borden note d laconically i n hi s memoirs , "wa s handicappe d b y hi s intens e vanit y an d by his love of intrigue." 5 Official dissatisfactio n with the Hig h Comman d was mor e tha n equalle d b y th e feeling s o f th e Canadia n people , wel l summed u p i n a lette r t o F . S . Olive r fro m hi s brothe r i n Britis h Columbia: " . . . the British general s one and all are the most incompe tent lo t o f blood y fool s tha t hav e eve r bee n collecte d togethe r fo r th e purpose o f sacrificing armies . . . ." 6 No Canadia n genera l ros e hig h enoug h i n th e hierarch y o f comman d to bear direc t responsibility for th e strategi c conduct o f the war, but thi s did no t protec t th e commande r o f th e Canadia n Corp s i n 1917-18 , Sir Arthur Currie , fro m th e slur s an d accusation s whic h wer e t o houn d him later i n public life. 7 Th e onl y British genera l to becom e a Canadia n hero, Genera l J . H . G . Byng , Viscoun t Byn g o f Vimy , o n assumin g the governo r generalshi p o f th e Dominio n i n 192 1 encountere d con siderable hostilit y precisel y becaus e o f hi s militar y career . Finally, th e mas s o f French-speakin g Canadians , rallyin g wit h sur prising enthusias m t o th e cal l t o arm s i n 1914 , wer e quickl y alienate d by th e tactlessnes s an d stupidit y o f th e Canadia n Governmen t i n rele gating French-speakin g officer s t o mino r positions , assignin g French speaking soldier s t o English-speakin g regiments , usin g in rura l Quebe c methods o f recruitmen t appropriat e t o urba n Ontario . Enthusias m soured int o sulle n resentmen t an d then , i n 1917 , threatene d civi l wa r when th e Governmen t decide d t o impos e conscriptio n fo r oversea s military service. 8 Th e crisi s o f Quebe c durin g the Firs t Worl d Wa r cas t a lon g an d sombr e shado w upo n th e relation s o f soldier s an d govern ments in years to follow. SOLDIERS AN D GOVERNMENTS : THE YEAR S BETWEE N TH E WAR S

In 191 9 Sir Arthur Currie was appointed Inspecto r General and Militar y Counsellor t o th e militi a force s o f the Dominion , hi s firs t dut y bein g t o develop plan s fo r th e reorganizatio n o f the Canadia n militia . H e offere d three principa l recommendations . Th e existin g Departmen t o f Militi a and Defenc e shoul d becom e a Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e fo r th e three militar y services , Nav y (hithert o th e responsibilit y o f th e Depart ment o f Marine an d Nava l Services), Arm y an d th e nascen t Ai r Force . Second, th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , togethe r wit h th e Prim e Minister an d Ministe r o f Finance , i n consultatio n wit h th e Chief s o f

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 7 3

Staff, shoul d for m a Committe e o f Stat e t o stud y al l aspect s o f nationa l security policy. Third , ther e shoul d b e create d a Defenc e Committe e of twenty-five member s of the Hous e o f Commons, empowered to summo n before i t a s witnesses the senio r officer s o f the thre e services . Of thes e thre e recommendations , th e thir d ha s yet t o b e implemente d in it s origina l form , althoug h specia l defenc e committee s o f th e Hous e of Common s have bee n create d fro m tim e t o tim e (se e below , chapte r iv). The secon d wa s put int o effec t onl y i n 1936 , "a t th e earnes t solici tation o f th e Canadia n Genera l Staff." 9 Th e firs t proposal , a singl e ministry for the three services , was not new; it had been first put forwar d in 190 9 b y Si r Frederic k Borden , Ministe r o f Militi a an d Defenc e i n the Laurie r Government . Whe n i t wa s finall y acte d o n i n 1922 , th e chief incentiv e wa s economy rather tha n efficiency . "Wha t I d o wan t t o accomplish, i f I possibl y can, " th e Minister o f Militia an d Defenc e pro posing the necessar y legislation frankly concede d to the Hous e of Com mons, "i s t o hav e a wel l organized , snapp y defenc e forc e tha t wil l b e a credit to Canada without being too expensive." 10 Machinery fo r nationa l securit y polic y wa s develope d eve n mor e slowly at higher servic e levels. From June 192 7 th e Chief s of Staf f coul d meet formall y i n their ow n committee (know n a s the "Join t Staf f Com mittee" unti l Januar y 193 9 when , followin g the appointmen t o f on e o f its members, the Senio r Air Officer , a s Chief o f the Ai r Staff , i t acquire d its presen t titl e o f "Chief s o f Staf f Committee") . Bu t i t wa s no t unti l March 193 8 tha t a grou p o f sub-committee s and a secretariat , simila r to thos e functionin g i n th e Unite d Kingdo m unde r th e Committe e o f Imperial Defence , wer e create d unde r th e Defenc e Committe e o f th e Cabinet t o pla n fo r variou s defenc e measure s i n th e even t o f war . "The centra l organizatio n fo r th e coordinatio n o f defence, " th e officia l historian o f the Canadia n Army remarked , "wa s thu s graduall y improving."11 But th e operativ e wor d i s "gradually." Such pre-wa r preparatio n fo r defenc e a s ha d bee n accomplishe d b y September 193 9 ha d bee n du e almos t entirel y t o th e insisten t pressur e of th e militar y establishmen t upo n government s reluctan t t o commi t resources t o wha t they regarde d a s a steril e an d unnecessar y enterprise . Although th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e privatel y describe d th e condition o f th e Dominion' s defence s i n 193 6 a s "mos t astonishin g an d atrocious,"12 th e Governmen t o f Mackenzi e Kin g di d littl e t o improv e them. Politicians , takin g thei r cu e fro m publi c sentimen t a s politician s must, coul d perceiv e neithe r prestig e no r necessit y i n policie s designe d to defen d th e realm . For th e real m seeme d unassailable . Th e worl d was still wide . T o th e ocean s an d th e Roya l Nav y migh t no w b e adde d a s

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purveyor o f securit y th e grea t an d friendl y guardia n t o th e south . Canada wa s a "fire-proo f house , fa r fro m inflammabl e materials"; 13 its fortunat e inhabitants peere d disapprovingl y a t th e distan t conti nent fro m whic h invasio n seeme d s o improbable , an d rejoice d a t the mora l virtue s o f thei r Nort h America n civilization . "W e thin k i n terms o f peace, " th e Canadia n delegat e ha d informe d th e Leagu e o f Nations Assembl y i n 1924 , "whil e Europe , a n arme d camp, think s i n terms o f war."14 Canada an d the United States , Mackenzi e Kin g told th e same long-sufferin g bod y a fe w year s later , ha d cease d "t o rel y o n Force, w e have looke d t o Reaso n a s th e metho d o f solvin g ou r differ ences."15 Soldiers , whos e sens e o f dut y an d professiona l instinc t alik e impelled the m to bring the forces at their disposal to a peak o f efficienc y and strength , coul d hardl y accep t suc h assumptions . Thei r dut y wa s t o defend the realm ; and if thei r plannin g for a tim e disclose d a curiou s conception o f whom it was necessary t o defen d i t agains t (fo r a s late as 1926 "Defenc e Schem e No. 1 " fo r us e i n th e even t o f arme d attac k b y the Unite d State s wa s circulatin g unde r to p secre t classificatio n amon g Canadian militar y districts 16), thei r assumption s prove d i n th e even t t o be more relevant than those of their civilia n masters . The differin g perspective s i n whic h th e Canadia n Chief s o f Staff , o n the on e hand , an d th e member s o f th e Governmen t togethe r wit h ke y officials i n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , o n th e other , sa w th e worsening crises in Europe an d the Far Eas t produced a certain tensio n between th e tw o groups , simila r t o tha t prevailin g betwee n militar y and civilia n authoritie s i n nearl y al l th e democracie s durin g th e year s between th e wars. 17 Th e servic e chief s though t thei r politica l master s altogether to o optimisti c abou t th e prospect s fo r Canada' s remainin g outside a Europea n wa r and , i n th e even t o f th e Dominion' s involve ment, altogethe r to o crave n concernin g th e exten t o f it s participation . The Governmen t though t th e militar y undul y impresse d b y th e dange r of war , regardin g it s estimate s o f Canadia n defenc e need s a s bot h greatly inflate d an d politicall y unrealistic . I t wa s als o concerne d les t pre-war plannin g and militar y liaison wit h th e United Kingdo m plac e i n jeopardy Canada' s righ t to decid e th e natur e an d exten t o f participatio n in an y futur e war . A n illustratio n o f thi s concer n i s offere d b y th e decision o f th e Cabine t earl y i n 193 7 t o hav e th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence examin e wha t wer e know n a s th e "liaiso n letters " wit h a view t o determinin g whethe r th e practic e wa s harmfu l an d ough t t o be ended. Th e liaison letter s consisted o f correspondence betwee n senio r staff officer s o f th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e an d thei r counter parts i n th e Unite d Kingdom ; it date d fro m 1910 , bu t i t wa s o f cours e

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 7

5

the more recent correspondenc e i n which the Canadian Governmen t was interested. Th e Minister, Ian Mackenzie, duly went through th e material. In hi s repor t t o th e Cabine t h e concede d tha t muc h usefu l informatio n had bee n exchange d i n thi s way , bu t noted , wit h eviden t concern , a tendency o n the par t o f certain senio r Canadia n arm y officer s t o assum e that i n th e even t o f wa r a n expeditionar y forc e woul d b e despatche d from th e Dominion . H e though t tha t discussio n o f hig h polic y i n th e liaison letter s wa s a dangerou s practice , an d recommende d tha t an y correspondence betwee n th e Genera l Staff s i n Ottaw a an d Londo n pas s in futur e throug h th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , s o a s t o b e sub ject t o politica l surveillance . Thi s hencefort h becam e establishe d pro cedure, doubtles s to the irritation an d possibl y to the disadvantage of the officers concerned . THE SECON D WORL D WAR : THE PRINCIPL E O F CIVILIA N SUPREMACY

The outbrea k o f the Second World War naturall y increased th e influenc e of th e militar y establishmen t upo n nationa l policy , i f onl y becaus e th e military establishmen t wa s enlarge d twenty-fold . An d ye t th e distin guishing characteristi c o f civil-militar y relation s i n Canad a fro m 193 9 to 194 5 wa s th e exten t t o which , wit h on e threatene d exceptio n t o b e discussed below , th e civilia n authoritie s remaine d firml y i n contro l o f the country' s wa r effort . Canadia n experienc e i n thi s respec t differe d markedly fro m tha t o f th e Unite d State s where , accordin g t o on e authority, "s o fa r a s majo r decision s i n polic y an d strateg y wer e con cerned, th e military ran th e war." 18 The officia l historia n o f th e Canadia n Arm y i n th e Secon d Worl d War ha s remarke d tha t th e Prim e Ministe r "di d no t ofte n expres s a direct opinio n o n a purel y militar y question." 19 Bu t th e crucia l poin t i s that ther e wa s ver y littl e connecte d wit h th e Canadia n wa r effor t tha t Mackenzie Kin g wa s dispose d t o vie w a s " a purel y militar y question " and therefor e beyond th e rang e of his own knowledge an d judgment . I n part thi s was a reflectio n of his temperamen t and styl e of leadership — his fussin g ove r detail , hi s reluctanc e t o delegat e responsibility—bu t i n the mai n i t wa s becaus e ove r ever y major militar y decisio n o f th e war , particularly thos e decision s concernin g th e dispositio n o f troop s fo r battle, there loome d insistentl y and obsessivel y the questio n of conscrip tion. Mackenzi e King' s firs t majo r polic y statemen t o f th e wa r ha d

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been t o assur e Parliament an d the nation tha t "th e presen t Governmen t believe that conscriptio n o f men for oversea s servic e will not b e a necessary o r a n effectiv e step . N o suc h measur e wil l b e introduce d b y th e present Administration." 20 This wa s not a policy of which, all else bein g equal, commander s o f Canada' s arme d force s coul d i n thei r heart s approve; fiv e year s later , whe n i t seeme d t o presag e militar y disaster , they wer e t o us e drasti c mean s t o chang e it , i n th e even t successfully . But i n th e interva l th e commitmen t t o voluntar y enlistment conditione d every decisio n o f wartim e policy , leadin g th e Canadia n Governmen t to scrutiniz e th e politica l implication s o f militar y operation s mor e closely, perhaps, than any of the Allies . Unlike th e Unite d States , Canad a di d no t ente r th e wa r a s th e result o f treacherou s an d costl y attac k o n it s ow n territory , renderin g it ready to make any sacrifice neede d fo r revenge an d retribution . "I a m taking th e wor d o f th e Genera l Staff, " a membe r o f th e Unite d State s House o f Representative s ha d remarke d a t th e tim e o f Pear l Harbor . "If the y tel l m e thi s i s wha t the y nee d fo r th e successfu l prosecutio n of thi s war an d fo r ultimat e victory, I a m for it." 21 No suc h Ludendorf f philosophy wa s t o b e foun d i n th e Canadia n Hous e o f Commons i n September 1939 , or , fo r tha t matter , i n th e Canadia n Cabinet . A t it s meeting o f Septembe r 5 th e Cabine t Defenc e Committe e instructe d th e Chiefs o f Staff, abou t to prepare thei r estimate s fo r militar y expenditure , to hold them " to very moderate levels"; 22 when estimates to the amount of $50 0 millio n wer e accordingl y submitted , th e Cabine t promptl y cu t the su m in two , an d tol d th e Chief s to wor k t o th e reduce d figure . Th e appropriation o f $25 0 millio n wa s judge d sufficien t t o raise , equip , train an d despatc h t o th e Unite d Kingdo m a n arm y division , an d t o begin intensiv e ai r trainin g i n Canada . A star t o n thi s programm e having bee n made , th e Governmen t wa s dismaye d t o receiv e fro m th e United Kingdo m a proposa l tha t th e Dominio n shoul d becom e th e centre fo r trainin g Australian, Ne w Zealan d an d Britis h airme n a s well . "There was general regret, " Mackenzie Kin g wrote in hi s diary , "tha t it had no t been mad e a t the outse t s o that our wa r effor t woul d hav e bee n framed o n thes e line s instea d o f having to hea d s o strongl y int o expedi tionary forces at the start." But he was quick to perceive a related advan tage fo r th e longe r term : "Wit h concentratio n o f Canadia n energie s on ai r trainin g an d ai r powe r an d therefor e les s pressur e fo r a large r army, ther e woul d als o b e les s ris k o f agitatio n fo r conscription." 23 Accepted i n principl e b y th e Cabinet , th e Britis h Commonwealt h Ai r Training Plan , afte r long an d acrimoniou s negotiatio n wit h th e Britis h authorities, wa s t o mak e it s grea t contributio n t o Allie d victory ; th e

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original expectatio n o f th e Canadia n Governmen t tha t participatio n i n the pla n woul d suffice a s Canada's par t i n th e wa r effor t di d no t outlas t the en d of the "twiligh t war" b y man y weeks . By Februar y 194 0 som e 23,00 0 Canadia n troop s ha d bee n dis embarked in the Unite d Kingdom. The Commande r o f the 1s t Canadia n Division wa s Major Genera l A . G . L . McNaughton. Hi s nominatio n by the Prim e Ministe r wa s a n ac t o f th e highes t politica l importance , an d Mackenzie Kin g so regarded it. As a n office r wit h th e Canadia n Expeditionary Forc e durin g th e Firs t Worl d War , Genera l McNaughto n ha d been haunte d b y th e needles s slaughte r o f hi s troops ; a s presiden t o f the Nationa l Researc h Counci l h e ha d becom e convince d tha t scienc e and technology, presse d int o militar y service, coul d preven t a repetitio n of th e carnag e in an y futur e conflict . N o strategi c doctrin e coul d bette r suit th e requirement s o f a manpowe r policy base d o n voluntar y enlist ment, an d Mackenzi e King was immediately attracted b y th e suggestio n put forwar d b y Norma n Rogers , hi s Ministe r o f Labour , o n Septembe r 22, 1939 , tha t McNaughto n shoul d comman d th e firs t expeditionar y force o f the Second World War . In a n interview with the Prime Ministe r on Octobe r 6 , McNaughton expounded his views on how th e wa r ough t to be fought: th e main commitment should be "along the lines o f [indus trial] production , an d . . . every effort shoul d be made to arm and equip the troop s t o spar e human lives." Thi s conceptio n wa s wholly gratifyin g to Mackenzi e King , an d McNaughton' s comman d wa s announce d late r in th e day . "Ther e coul d b e n o question abou t McNaughto n bein g th e best equipped ma n for the purpose," Mackenzi e Kin g wrote in his diary . "I hav e don e m y best wit h m y colleague s t o remov e prejudic e whic h I know there ha s been agains t hi m on accoun t of his tendency to organiz e matters to the maximum with respect t o possible conflict . . . ,"24 Shortl y before proceedin g overseas , "Andy " McNaughto n wa s quote d i n a newspaper despatc h a s saying : "I f I a m know n fo r anythin g i t i s fo r the urgen t insistenc e o n usin g gun s rathe r tha n th e live s o f ou r troop s and for a proper co-ordinatio n o f all arms." 25 Under such a n officer , th e Prime Ministe r felt , th e proble m o f reinforcement s was unlikel y t o be come acute , an d th e pledg e no t t o conscrip t fo r oversea s servic e an d the unit y o f the natio n i n wartime could bot h b e maintained . The confidenc e repose d b y Mackenzi e Kin g i n hi s commande r di d not, however , go so far a s to allo w him complet e discretionar y authorit y to commit his soldiers to battle. This General McNaughton discovere d t o his chagri n when , face d wit h th e nee d fo r troop s t o forestal l enem y action i n Norway , th e Britis h Wa r Offic e turne d t o th e G.O.C . 1s t Canadian Divisio n o n Apri l 16 , 1940 . I n les s dir e circumstance s th e

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British Governmen t ought more properly to hav e communicated directly with th e Canadia n Governmen t i n suc h a matter , bu t i n vie w o f th e stress o f th e moment , th e nee d fo r secrecy , an d abov e al l th e nee d fo r speed, it s overtur e t o Genera l McNaughto n i s wholl y understandable . Having ascertaine d fro m Canadia n Militar y Headquarter s i n Londo n that i t la y within hi s legal competence , Genera l McNaughto n agree d t o commit Canadian force s t o the Norwegian theatre befor e consulting wit h Ottawa. Thirt y hour s elapse d betwee n thi s commitmen t an d th e receip t at th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e o f a telegra m fro m th e Cana dian commander stating that he had designate d som e thirteen hundre d of his men to proceed a s part of a British forc e to attack Trondheim . I n th e absence fro m th e countr y o f th e Prim e Minister , th e matte r wa s deal t with b y th e Actin g Prim e Ministe r an d Ministe r o f Finance , Colone l J. L . Ralston. On the evenin g o f April 17 , he, th e Postmaste r Genera l (Mr. C . G . Power ) an d th e Chie f o f th e Genera l Staf f considere d McNaughton's message . The y agree d tha t ther e wa s n o alternativ e t o approval o f Canadian participation , bu t strongl y objected t o the manne r in whic h th e decisio n t o commi t troops ha d bee n taken . O n Ralston' s instructions a telegra m wa s sen t ("durin g m y absence, " Mackenzi e King later minuted , "withou t knowledg e o r authority" 26) approvin g th e expedition bu t observin g "tha t suc h a commitmen t shoul d no t hav e been entered withou t prior referenc e t o Nationa l Defenc e an d approva l of Canadia n Government." 27 A mor e detaile d observatio n wa s sen t t o the Hig h Commissione r in London: We woul d hav e expecte d tha t Canadia n Governmen t woul d hav e bee n informed b y Unite d Kingdo m Governmen t immediatel y participatio n re ferred t o wa s required . . . . W e fee l tha t whe n consultatio n commence d intimation shoul d hav e a t onc e bee n give n b y yoursel f o r G.O.C . t o affor d Canadian Governmen t reasonabl e opportunit y pas s o n a dispositio n o f suc h importance t o Canadia n peopl e a s diversio n o f a portio n personne l o f present formatio n t o a specia l Missio n o f thi s kin d whic h i s a radica l departure pre-considere d polic y an d plan. 28

When, late r i n the sam e year, i t wa s rumoured tha t ther e wa s a pro posal t o sen d Canadia n troops fro m th e Unite d Kingdo m t o figh t th e Italians i n Nort h Afric a s o a s t o gai n battl e experience , th e matte r was referre d t o th e Canadia n Government . Th e Prim e Minister wa s much oppose d t o th e idea . " I strongl y state d m y vie w [t o th e Wa r Committee of the Cabinet], " Mackenzi e King' s diar y for Decembe r 4, 1940, read s in part , that w e owed i t to ou r men to see k t o protec t thei r lives . . .. I though t th e logical thin g wa s t o hav e Canadian s continu e t o defen d Britai n . . . an d not t o begi n t o pla y th e rol e o f thos e wh o wan t Empir e war . Clearly , th e Army peopl e wis h this , an d Power , I a m afraid , ha s com e aroun d t o thei r

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point o f view an d ha s rather sanctione d i t wit h them . . . . [I ] insiste d o n a message bein g sen t t o Ralsto n tha t n o fina l dispositio n o f troop s wa s t o b e made unti l ou r Wa r Committe e ha d ha d a chanc e o f gettin g bot h sides . Also lettin g hi m know , a s matter s stood , w e wer e oppose d t o ou r peopl e being sent to the Suez. . . ,29

It wa s later known that ther e ha d bee n n o intentio n o f sending them. In th e sprin g o f 1941 , the Ministe r o f National Defenc e stated i n th e House o f Common s tha t th e decisio n t o commi t troop s outsid e th e United Kingdo m wa s a decisio n t o b e take n b y th e Governmen t o f Canada, not by the General Office r Commanding . General McNaughton , who had fel t keenl y the implied rebuke in the cable s from Ottaw a abou t the Norwegia n operatio n th e previou s April , too k n o mor e kindl y t o this statement , an d whe n th e Prim e Ministe r visite d Englan d i n th e summer of 194 1 used the occasion to raise wit h him the whole question of hi s authorit y to dispos e o f the troop s unde r hi s command. "Questio n of restrictio n o n us e o f troops, " hi s memorandu m of thei r conversatio n reads. "Ralston' s statemen t i n Common s whic h w e fel t ha d tie d ou r hands. His attitude in the Norway affair. . . . Warning that I woul d not accept censure , an d tha t h e shoul d b e ver y certai n tha t h e wa s righ t before h e gav e it." 30 Th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabine t discusse d th e matter o n Septembe r 10 , an d i t wa s there remarke d tha t "whil e troop s could not be sent out of the United Kingdom on the sole authority of th e Corps Commande r unde r th e la w a s i t stood , i t migh t b e desirabl e t o extend hi s authorit y t o includ e operations based o n th e Britis h Isles." 31 In October , th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e ha d furthe r discussion s in Englan d wit h Genera l McNaughton , resultin g i n Ralston' s cablin g Ottawa tha t i t wa s desirabl e t o wide n th e discretionar y authorit y o f the Corp s commande r (a s McNaughto n ha d b y thi s tim e become ) "t o cover futur e minor projects o f ... temporar y nature. . . . Extreme nee d secrecy argue s agains t prio r submissio n eac h cas e o f suc h plan s t o Governmental authority . Recommen d Wa r Committe e o f Cabine t no w forward McNaughto n genera l authorit y t o ac t i n suc h case s subjec t to hi s ow n judgment. He wil l notif y Ministe r b y mos t secre t mean s i n general term s prio r t o even t wher e practicabl e [italic s added]." 32 To thi s procedure th e Wa r Committe e agree d o n Octobe r 29 , 1941 . But th e first occasion fo r th e exercis e o f the ne w authorit y of the Corp s commander was the projecte d raid o n Dieppe, a n operatio n eve n in th e planning stage not properly described as a "minor project." Accordingly , when Genera l Montgomer y first broached th e proposa l t o hi m o n Apri l 30, 1942 , Genera l McNaughto n though t i t wis e t o consul t wit h th e Canadian Government . "Plan s ar e now being made," he cabled , "whic h involve operation s o f typ e indicate d bu t o n a scal e whic h canno t

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properly b e classe d a s 'minor', " an d requeste d tha t th e wor d "minor " be delete d from th e phras e "minor project s of a temporary nature " then setting th e limi t beyon d whic h hi s discretio n wa s no t t o b e exercised . The Wa r Committe e considere d thi s reques t o n Ma y 1 , an d agree d t o authorize Genera l McNaughto n t o procee d wit h th e Diepp e operatio n on th e understandin g that bot h h e an d th e Unite d Kingdo m authoritie s approved o f th e plan . McNaughton' s affirmativ e decisio n wa s relaye d to th e Governmen t on Ma y 15 , an d th e destin y of th e ill-fate d venture was sealed. 33 The fir m contro l exercise d b y th e Canadia n Governmen t ove r th e commitment o f it s troop s t o militar y operation s ma y b e illustrate d further b y th e procedure s followe d prio r t o th e dispositio n o f force s to th e Fa r East , th e Mediterranean , th e Northeas t Pacifi c an d North west European theatres of war. The reques t fo r "on e o r tw o Canadia n battalion s fro m Canada " t o reinforce th e Britis h garriso n i n Hon g Kon g wa s telegraphe d t o th e Canadian Government by the Dominions Office o n September 19 , 1941 , following approva l o f th e overtur e b y th e Britis h Prim e Ministe r wh o had i n turn accepted the advic e of his Chief s of Staff . Th e proposa l wa s considered b y the Wa r Committe e of the Canadia n Cabine t o n Septem ber 23, but decision was deferred pending consultation wit h the Ministe r of Nationa l Defence (then absent in the United States) an d examination by the Canadia n General Staff . "O n 2 Octobe r th e Ministe r o f National Defence reporte d t o th e Cabine t Wa r Committee that the Unite d King dom Government' s suggestio n had bee n referre d to hi m an d approved , after examinatio n by th e Genera l Staff . Th e Committe e confirme d th e approval fo r th e dispatc h o f th e tw o battalions , notin g tha t th e actua l units woul d b e selecte d b y th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e i n consul tation wit h th e Genera l Staff." 34 (Th e lac k o f adequat e intelligenc e facilities leading to this disastrous decisio n is noted below , in chapter V.) The commitmen t of Canadian troop s t o th e campaig n i n Ital y wa s a more complicate d decision , fo r certai n difference s o f opinio n appeare d between th e Governmen t an d th e arm y command . Th e forme r wa s b y the summe r o f 194 2 becomin g increasingl y responsiv e t o publi c pres sure favouring a more active military role fo r Canadian troops overseas . Two ver y differen t motive s mus t b e distinguished . Th e argumen t tha t at least som e Canadian forces ough t to have large-scale battle experienc e before exposur e o f th e whol e Arm y t o th e ordeal s o f th e projecte d bu t frequently postpone d cross-channe l invasio n wa s a militar y argument , and on the face of it sound. But there was also a political argumen t to th e effect tha t continue d inactivit y o f Canadia n troop s wa s damagin g t o

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the prestig e o f th e Dominio n an d migh t adversel y affec t it s influenc e o n the shapin g of post-war policy . Th e Government , while appreciating th e first, di d no t overloo k th e second . Whe n th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence me t wit h the Britis h Prim e Ministe r i n the Unite d Kingdo m i n October 1942 , Ralsto n sought to impress Mr. Churchill wit h the urgency of it s reques t tha t Canadia n soldier s b e use d i n battl e a t th e earlies t opportunity. Month s o f inactivit y passed . I n Marc h 194 3 th e Canadia n Prime Ministe r cable d t o Mr . Churchil l t o expres s hi s Government' s regret a t th e decisio n no t t o emplo y Canadia n troop s i n th e comin g Mediterranean campaign , an d urge d it s "earnes t re-examination." 35 Bu t the Canadia n commander , anxiou s to preserv e hi s Arm y intact , viewed with displeasur e an y project tha t threatened t o divid e it, an d shared no t a bi t hi s Government' s concer n wit h th e politica l implication s o f th e decision. " I d o no t recommen d tha t w e shoul d pres s fo r employmen t merely t o satisf y a desir e fo r activit y o r fo r representatio n i n particula r theatres," Genera l McNaughto n signalle d o n Marc h 20 . Thi s recom mendation th e Governmen t fel t oblige d t o disregard . Stron g diplomati c pressure wa s brough t t o bea r upo n Mr . Ede n an d Mr . Churchill , resulting i n a directiv e fro m th e latte r t o th e Chie f o f th e Imperia l Staff t o includ e th e Canadian s i n hi s next operation . This prove d t o b e th e Sicilia n campaign . Genera l McNaughton , acquiescing i n th e diversio n o f hi s forces , Insiste d o n hi s righ t t o pas s upon th e feasibilit y o f th e operatio n fro m a militar y standpoint ; afte r three intensiv e day s o f stud y an d consultatio n h e reporte d t o Ottaw a that h e regarde d Operatio n Husk y a s " a practica l operatio n o f war." On receivin g thi s assurance , th e Canadia n Governmen t authorize d th e participation o f th e 1s t Canadia n Division , whic h embarke d a t th e end o f June , an d lande d o n th e beache s o f souther n Sicil y on Jul y 10 . The Allie d conquest wa s achieved in thirty-eight days . In th e urgency of th e nee d t o follo w u p th e successe s i n Sicil y wit h a strik e acros s th e Straits o f Messina t o th e Italia n mainland , th e precis e rol e o f the Cana dian force s ha d bee n neglected . Woul d they , havin g gaine d battl e experience i n th e campaig n jus t concluded , b e returne d t o th e Unite d Kingdom t o reunit e th e Arm y an d shar e wit h those wh o ha d remaine d the lesson s learne d i n combat ? O r woul d th e 1s t Divisio n pres s o n t o Italy, an d perhap s b e joine d ther e b y mor e Canadia n force s fro m th e United Kingdom ? Aske d o n Jul y 2 9 fo r hi s recommendatio n t o th e War Committee , Genera l McNaughto n state d t o th e Ministe r o f National Defenc e that "the importan t thin g for Canada a t the en d of the war wa s to hav e he r Arm y togethe r unde r th e contro l o f a Canadian, " and tha t h e "was oppose d t o the dispersion o f the Canadian Army . . . .

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If th e Canadia n Governmen t decide d upo n dispersion , the n . . . i t would b e wis e t o pu t someon e i n contro l wh o believe d i n it." 36 Thi s development wa s not , indeed , fa r off . The Wa r Committe e favoure d increased Canadia n participatio n i n th e Italia n campaign . O n Augus t 16 Mackenzi e Kin g discusse d th e matte r wit h Mr . Churchil l a t th e Quebec Conference . The Britis h Prim e Ministe r tol d hi m that th e questio n ha d bee n raise d b y McNaughton , I gathered , a s to whethe r our me n goin g to Ital y wa s to b e regarde d a s part o f th e on e operation . H e asked m e i f I coul d sa y that i t was. I tol d hi m I ha d alway s understoo d tha t Sicily wa s simpl y a ste p t o invadin g Italy , an d t o th e invasio n o f Europ e from th e South . I would , however , lik e t o confe r wit h th e Ministe r o f Defence befor e givin g a definit e word. H e sai d t o m e the y ma y b e landin g there a t an y moment . The y ar e probabl y alread y almos t there . I sai d I would hav e th e matte r checke d up , bu t I fel t quit e sure tha t th e Govern ment ha d alway s regarde d th e whol e operatio n a s one . Apparentl y McNaughton ha s questione d this. 37

Mackenzie Kin g consulte d Ralston , wh o informe d hi m tha t afte r examining th e recor d h e wa s satisfie d tha t Canadia n troop s ha d bee n committed fo r th e Italia n a s wel l a s fo r th e Sicilia n campaign. Genera l McNaughton wa s advise d o f thi s interpretation . O n Octobe r 12 , 1943 , the Wa r Committe e formall y endorse d Operatio n Timberwolf, involvin g the build-u p o f th e 1s t Divisio n t o corp s strengt h b y divertin g t o Ital y troops fro m th e Unite d Kingdom . This endorsatio n wa s no t withou t it s effect i n bringin g about, befor e th e year' s end , Genera l McNaughton' s relinquishment of his command. The decisio n t o us e Canadia n troop s i n th e campaig n t o expe l Japanese forces from the Aleutian Islands in the Northeast Pacific was one in which the militar y played a n importan t an d wha t th e Prim e Ministe r regarded a s an improper part . Th e matte r wa s first raised whe n Genera l John L . DeWitt , Commandin g Genera l o f th e Unite d State s Wester n Defence Comman d (includin g th e Alask a Defenc e Command) , visite d Major Genera l G . R . Pearkes , th e Canadia n G.O.C . Pacifi c Command , at Vancouve r o n Apri l 19 , 1943 . Th e tw o officer s discusse d th e possi bility o f a combine d Canadian-America n assaul t upo n th e Japanes e garrison o n Kiska ; General Pearkes ' repor t o f thi s discussion , however, made n o mentio n o f proposed Canadia n participation. 38 O n Ma y 8 , th e chairman o f th e Canadia n Join t Staf f Missio n i n Washington , Majo r General Maurice Pope (wh o also was a member of the Canadian sectio n of th e Permanen t Join t Boar d o n Defenc e an d acte d a s th e Wa r Com mittee's representativ e t o th e Combine d Chief s o f Staff) , discusse d th e project wit h th e Secretar y o f th e Unite d State s sectio n o f th e P.J.B.D. , Mr. J . D . Hickerson o f the Stat e Department :

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Hickerson . . . sai d h e propose d tellin g m e o f somethin g tha t ha d bee n o n his min d fo r som e time . I n doin g so , however , h e wishe d m e t o under stand tha t h e ha d n o knowledg e whateve r o f th e plan s o f th e U.S . Join t Chiefs o f Staff . I t wa s obvious , however , tha t soone r o r late r th e genera l position woul d b e suc h a s to enabl e the m t o moun t a n operatio n t o driv e th e Japanese ou t o f Kisk a an d Attu . Whe n tha t tim e came , Canadia n troops , i n his view , shoul d participate . . . . H e ha d n o ide a o f th e force s tha t woul d be involve d an d fro m hi s ow n poin t o f vie w a mer e toke n forc e woul d b e adequate. I n an y even t h e propose d t o tak e suc h actio n a s wa s i n hi s powe r to se e that a n invitatio n b e extende d t o th e Canadia n authorities. 39

General Pop e observe d tha t "shoul d th e ide a commen d itsel f t o th e Canadian Government , i t woul d appea r t o b e mor e appropriat e fo r u s to intimat e t o th e U.S . Join t Chief s o f Staf f tha t w e wer e desirou s o f associating ourselve s in suc h a project rathe r tha n t o si t quietly awaiting an invitatio n t o d o so." 40 This conversatio n Genera l Pop e dul y reporte d t o th e Chie f o f th e General Staf f i n Ottawa , Lieutenant-Genera l K . Stuart , an d o n Ma y 1 2 General Stuar t authorize d Genera l Pop e t o rais e th e matte r wit h th e Chief o f Staf f o f th e Unite d State s Army , Genera l Georg e C . Marshall . But thi s authorizatio n ha d bee n give n withou t previou s consultatio n with th e Canadia n Government . "I n Stuart' s message, " Genera l Pop e recalled afterwards , there wa s a phras e whic h ra n generall y "tha t h e ha d no t ye t consulte d th e Minister i n thi s respect" . I n th e ligh t o f thi s governin g phrase , th e "heresy " of hi s instructions struck in my min d wit h the clarit y o f th e clic k o f a pebbl e thrown agains t a rock . . . . For , mor e or les s in the word s of an Externa l Affairs telegra m tha t onc e cam e t o m y notice , "th e righ t t o dispos e o f it s fighting forces i s one tha t th e Governmen t especiall y reserve s t o itself". 41

Despite hi s misgivings about how the matter was being handled, Genera l Pope calle d o n Genera l Marshall . "Whil e h e undertoo k n o commitmen t of an y kind , [Marshall's ] manne r seeme d t o indicat e agreemen t i n principle" t o Canadian participatio n i n the Kiska operation; o n May 24 , General Pop e wa s informe d by Marshal l tha t th e Unite d State s officer s commanding in Alask a wer e "delighte d a t th e prospec t o f havin g units of th e Canadia n force s associate d wit h . . . presen t an d futur e opera tions i n th e Aleutia n area. " Marshal l ha d authorize d th e America n commander, Genera l DeWitt , t o confe r immediatel y wit h Genera l Pearkes t o wor k ou t arrangements. 42 It wa s only afte r thi s conference betwee n the Canadia n an d American commanders ha d take n plac e tha t th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabine t learned, a t it s meetin g o n Ma y 26 , o f an y plan s t o emplo y Canadia n troops i n the Alaskan theatre. "Personally, " Mackenzie Kin g commented

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after th e meeting , " I thin k th e Ministe r o f Defenc e shoul d hav e bee n the on e t o b e taking , i f anythin g o f th e kin d wer e contemplated , th e initial ste p i n discussio n wit h the Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabinet, " an d the edito r o f hi s diar y remark s tha t hi s "initia l irritation tha t thi s Canadian participatio n i n th e expeditio n ha d bee n suggeste d t o th e Americans b y th e militar y authoritie s coloure d hi s whol e subsequen t attitude t o th e Kisk a expedition." 43 A t th e Wa r Committe e meetin g the next day (Ma y 27), Mackenzi e King objected strongl y t o ou r Chief s of Staf f an d other s o f th e Hig h Comman d i n Canada negotiatin g wit h correspondin g number s i n th e U.S . befor e th e Minister ha d a ful l knowledg e o f wha t wa s proposed , th e Wa r Committe e included, and , mos t o f all , mysel f a s th e Prim e Minister . I t wa s full y apparent tha t Stuar t ha d gon e ahea d wit h hi s ow n officer s an d Pearkes , o n the Pacifi c Coast , an d tha t he , Pearkes , ha d gon e furthe r wit h hi s corres ponding numbe r in the States , in agreein g to a course of actio n whic h woul d involve ou r troop s bein g engage d activel y wit h U.S . troop s agains t th e Aleutian Islands . I di d no t objec t t o th e projec t a s such , bu t pointe d ou t that th e procedur e wa s entirel y wrong ; tha t th e Governmen t woul d b e i n an indefensibl e positio n i f i t wer e allowe d t o g o furthe r withou t bein g wholly regularized . . . . It wa s finally agreed tha t th e communication woul d have t o com e fro m eithe r th e Presiden t t o myself , o r Stimso n t o Ralston , to ge t matter s o n Ministeria l leve l an d ou t simpl y o f th e militar y level ; indeed thi s whol e thin g ha s worke d fro m th e botto m u p instea d o f fro m the top down. . . ,44

Neither th e Prim e Ministe r no r th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e were mollified b y th e news , reaching them o n Ma y 28 , tha t Canadia n force s were actuall y e n route t o Attu . Eve n thoug h i t develope d tha t th e forces concerne d consiste d onl y o f eigh t officer s proceedin g t o th e Aleutians a s observers , th e Prim e Ministe r continue d t o fee l "incense d that ou r force s shoul d hav e bee n draw n int o thi s business , withou t knowledge o n th e par t o f o r reques t fro m th e Join t Chief s o f Staf f a t Washington. I would have insisted on a cancellation of the whol e thing, were it not that . .. to have cut it off would have raised a serious situation r e relatio n t o U.S . an d Canadia n armie s o n th e Pacific , an d probably involv e Stuart's resignation." 45 Mackenzie King' s instruction s that an y proposa l t o associat e Cana dian force s wit h a n America n expedition agains t Kisk a woul d hav e t o come fro m eithe r th e Presiden t o r th e Secretar y o f Wa r wer e easie r t o issue tha n t o implement . Th e tas k fel l t o Genera l Pop e i n Washington , and h e ha s recorde d tha t h e learne d o f hi s assignmen t "wit h mixe d feelings," an d advise d General Stuar t "tha t th e U.S . Arm y might prov e tough t o mov e in this matter." When Genera l Pop e informe d his frien d and colleagu e o n th e P.J.B.D. , Mr . J . D . Hickerson , "tha t Canad a

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wanted a Stimso n t o Ralsto n invitatio n t o collaborate , h e laughingl y told m e t o forge t whateve r Calvinisti c tendencie s ther e migh t b e i n my syste m an d no t t o se t ou t i n a n attemp t t o refor m U.S . Arm y pro cedure." Th e Unite d State s Deput y Chie f o f Staff , visite d b y Genera l Pope a t th e Pentago n i n th e absenc e o f Genera l Marshall , wa s a t firs t hostile t o th e reques t bu t eventuall y agree d wit h anothe r America n officer presen t tha t ther e wa s "n o reaso n wh y Mr. Stimso n shoul d no t address a genera l invitatio n t o Mr . Ralsto n provide d al l detail s wer e settled throug h th e militar y channel" ; h e als o tol d Genera l Pop e tha t "he di d no t wan t thi s approac h t o Canad a t o g o anywher e nea r th e State Department." 46 Th e episod e illuminate s th e differin g conception s of civil-militar y relation s prevailin g durin g th e Secon d Worl d Wa r a t Ottawa an d a t Washington . The desire d lette r fro m Secretar y Stimso n wa s dul y despatched , an d after considerin g i t o n Ma y 31 , th e Wa r Committee approve d i n prin ciple th e participatio n o f a brigad e grou p i n th e Kisk a campaign . I t instructed th e Canadia n commande r tha t "th e operationa l contro l exer cized b y th e Unite d State s Commande r shal l b e observe d i n lette r an d spirit as fully a s if he were a Canadian officer, " bu t als o empowere d hi m to withdra w hi s troops a t hi s discretio n an d t o resor t directl y t o th e Canadian Government . I t wa s onl y a t th e ver y las t moment , th e da y before th e invadin g forc e se t ou t fro m th e American-hel d islan d o f Adak, tha t th e Wa r Committee , havin g jus t receive d a n appreciatio n from it s militar y adviser , th e Vice-Chie f o f th e Genera l Staff , tha t th e proposed expeditio n represente d i n hi s vie w " a practica l operatio n o f war," finall y authorize d th e Canadia n force s t o proceed. 47 On landin g a t Kisk a on Augus t 15 , th e invader s foun d n o Japanes e whatever i n occupation , an d succeede d onl y i n inflictin g a fe w casual ties upo n thei r ow n side . Thirty-fou r thousan d me n ha d attacke d a n empty island . Bu t i f i n th e ligh t o f thi s anti-clima x th e cautio n o f th e Canadian Governmen t appear s excessive , i t wa s no t withou t reason . It wa s determined no t t o repea t th e disaste r a t Hon g Kong; an d a large number of the fou r thousan d Canadian s takin g par t wer e conscripte d men. The Canadia n Governmen t wa s particularl y anxiou s tha t th e pro cedure whereb y th e Canadia n commande r submitte d directl y t o i t his independen t appreciatio n o f an y operatio n i n whic h th e us e o f Canadian troop s wa s proposed , s o a s t o allo w th e Wa r Committe e t o approve o r rejec t participatio n a s i t sa w fit , shoul d b e followe d i n th e plans fo r th e cross-channe l invasio n definitely projecte d fo r th e summe r of 1944 . O n Februar y 2 1 o f that yea r th e Ministe r o f National Defenc e

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cabled a reques t fo r suc h a n appreciatio n t o Canadia n Militar y Headquarters i n London. "Th e reaso n fo r it, " h e explained , "is th e necessit y for bein g i n a positio n t o assur e Canadia n home s tha t Canadia n staf f and commanders are assured of timely opportunity to get all the informa tion the y nee d s o a s t o b e i n a positio n t o exercis e thei r judgmen t fo r the benefi t o f th e Canadia n troop s fo r who m the y ar e responsibl e t o Canada."48 Genera l McNaughton' s successo r a s commande r o f th e 1s t Canadian Army , t o who m this request wa s referred, was o f the opinio n that th e Canadia n Government' s assen t t o th e forthcomin g operatio n was implici t i n it s decisio n i n Januar y 194 4 t o plac e th e 1s t Canadia n Army "i n combinatio n with " th e 21s t Arm y Group , th e Allie d invasio n force le d b y Genera l Montgomery . Thi s vie w th e Wa r Committe e de clined t o accept . "Th e Canadia n Government, " Ralsto n wrot e t o General H. D. G. Crerar on April 27, "has responsibilitie s to the people of Canad a an d befor e troops ar e embarke d o n th e propose d operatio n the Canadia n Governmen t woul d expec t a repor t b y th e Arm y Com mander advisin g whether or no t h e is satisfied tha t the task s allotte d ar e feasible operation s o f wa r an d whethe r in hi s opinio n th e plan s formu lated fo r Canadia n formations with the resource s which are t o b e mad e available ca n be carrie d ou t wit h reasonabl e prospect s o f success . . . . This i s wholly a matte r betwee n th e Arm y Commande r an d th e Cana dian Government." 49 Genera l Crera r accordingl y expresse d hi s satisfac tion wit h the battl e plans assigne d to th e Canadia n forces . O n Ma y 2 4 a directiv e approve d b y th e Wa r Committe e wa s despatche d t o th e Commander o f th e 1s t Canadia n Army . Thre e o f it s provision s ar e o f particular interest : 8. Yo u an d th e Com d o f an y Canadia n forc e no t operatin g unde r you r command . . . continu e t o enjo y th e righ t t o refe r t o th e Governmen t o f Canada i n respec t t o an y matte r i n whic h th e sai d Canadia n Force s are , or ar e likel y t o be , involve d o r committe d o r i n respec t o f an y questio n o f their administration . . . . 9. I n decidin g whether t o exercise th e authorit y t o withdraw th e Canadia n Force [fro m th e 21s t Arm y Group ] . . . yo u wil l conside r al l th e circum stances including , bu t no t i n any way to b e restricted to , th e following : (a) Whethe r i n you r opinio n th e order s an d instruction s issue d t o yo u by th e Commande r Combine d Force s represen t i n th e circumstance s a tas k for th e Canadia n Force s whic h i s a practicabl e operatio n o f war ; (b) Whethe r i n you r opinio n suc h tas k wit h th e resource s availabl e i s capable o f bein g carrie d ou t wit h reasonabl e prospect s o f success ; (c) Whethe r i n you r opinio n suc h orders , instruction s o r tas k ar e a t variance wit h th e polic y o f th e Canadia n Government ; (d) You r appraisa l o f th e exten t o f prospectiv e losse s t o th e Canadia n Force i n relatio n t o th e importanc e o f th e result s prospectivel y t o b e achieved;

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(e) Th e effec t o f suc h withdrawa l i n preventin g th e succes s o f th e opera tion as a whole; (/) Al l othe r factor s whic h yo u may conside r relevant . Th e authorit y t o withdraw shoul d normall y b e exercise d b y yo u onl y afte r referenc e t o th e Canadian Government , but , wher e th e exigencie s o f th e momen t d o no t permit suc h a reference , yo u have , i n decidin g whethe r o r no t t o exercis e this authority , ful l discretio n t o tak e suc h actio n a s yo u conside r advis able. . . . 13. Yo u wil l kee p th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e constantl y in 0 formed 5

It di d no t prov e necessar y i n th e even t t o exercis e eithe r th e righ t o f reference o r th e righ t o f withdrawal ; but th e Canadia n Government' s insistence o n thei r explici t formulatio n an d acceptanc e b y th e Britis h military authoritie s a t this critica l junctur e of th e wa r i s evidenc e of th e extent to which political consideration s were constantly kep t t o th e fore . The machiner y fo r th e politica l directio n o f militar y affair s wit h which Canad a entere d th e Secon d Worl d Wa r wa s the resul t o f legisla tion datin g fro m 192 2 fo r which , a s w e hav e seen , th e inspiratio n ha d been mor e tha t o f econom y tha n o f efficiency . Th e centralizatio n o f authority unde r a singl e Ministe r o f National Defenc e responsibl e fo r all thre e servic e arm s quickl y prove d unde r th e pressure s o f wa r to o great t o be borne b y any one man, especiall y afte r th e comple x arrange ments involve d i n th e Britis h Commonwealt h Ai r Trainin g Pla n wer e added t o th e load . O n Marc h 30 , 1940 , Mackenzi e Kin g urge d hi s Minister o f Nationa l Defence , Norma n Rogers , t o conside r devolvin g some o f hi s duties . " I favoure d keepin g th e thre e branche s o f th e Defence Departmen t unde r on e Minister, " Mackenzi e Kin g recorde d i n his diary , "bu t matter s woul d hav e t o b e s o arrange d a s to reliev e hi m [Rogers] o f al l detai l r e ai r development. " H e aske d Roger s whethe r he fel t tha t Mr . C . G . Power , the n Postmaste r General , woul d wor k well wit h him . (Mr . Powe r ha d bee n Mackenzi e King' s firs t choic e a s Minister fo r Nationa l Defenc e a t th e outse t o f th e war , but wa s passe d over i n favou r o f Rogers whe n Power himsel f pointe d ou t tha t i t migh t be unwis e to hav e the Ministe r o f National Defenc e fro m Quebe c sinc e this woul d b e sur e t o rais e th e conscriptio n issu e righ t away. ) Roger s suggested tha t Mr . Powe r "shoul d b e mad e a n Assistan t Ministe r o f Defence, t o handl e th e ai r wor k an d t o b e abl e t o answe r question s i n Parliament."51 Hi s suggestio n wa s adopte d i n a slightl y differen t form ; on May 2 2 roya l assen t wa s given to a n amendmen t o f th e Departmen t of Nationa l Defenc e Ac t (1922 ) providin g fo r th e appointmen t o f a Minister o f Nationa l Defenc e fo r Air . Mr . Powe r assume d th e ne w portfolio o n th e followin g day .

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On Jun e 10 , 1940 , th e Ministe r of National Defence was killed i n a n air crash. Rogers ' successo r wa s J. L . Ralston , an d it was Ralston wh o suggested tha t Mr . Powe r combin e his portfolio of Minister o f Nationa l Defence fo r Ai r wit h a ne w portfolio , tha t o f Associat e Ministe r o f National Defence . This pos t wa s created b y a further amendmen t to th e Department o f Nationa l Defenc e Ac t (1922 ) o n Jul y 12 , an d Mr . Power wa s assigne d to it , retainin g his othe r portfolio . Th e amendmen t specified tha t th e Associat e Ministe r wa s "entitle d t o exercis e al l th e powers o f th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence. " A t th e sam e tim e th e post o f Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e fo r Nava l Service s wa s created , and assume d by Mr . Angu s L . Macdonald . A furthe r provisio n o f th e amendment wa s tha t i n th e absenc e o f on e o f th e servic e minister s his power s wer e t o b e exercise d b y another : "i f th e Ministe r o f National Defenc e an d Associat e Ministe r wer e absent , th e Nava l Minister woul d administe r th e whol e Department , an d i f h e to o was absen t thi s authorit y passe d t o th e Ai r Minister . Thu s th e minis ters becam e familia r wit h thei r colleagues ' function s an d duties , wit h resultant advantage s t o th e publi c service." 52 I t i s eviden t tha t th e system could work well only if the individuals concerned wer e personall y on th e bes t o f terms , an d o n thi s poin t on e o f them , Mr . Power , has sinc e written : "Th e thre e wer e boun d togethe r b y tie s o f intimat e friendship. . . . Macdonal d an d Power . . . had suc h admiratio n an d respect fo r Col . Ralsto n tha t the y had n o difficult y whatsoeve r in grant ing hi m th e primac y ove r both , an d b y consen t i f no t b y la w h e wa s looked upo n b y al l as the senio r Minister." 53 This highl y effective tea m remained intac t unti l Novembe r 1944 , whe n Ralsto n an d Powe r re signed, fo r opposit e reasons , ove r conscription . Co-ordination o f th e arme d service s o n matter s o f hig h polic y wa s the functio n o f the Wa r Committe e o f the Cabinet . Wher e service issue s were mainly concerned, the instrument of co-ordination wa s the Defenc e Council which, as re-organized o n September 13 , 1940 , consiste d o f th e Minister o f Nationa l Defenc e (chairman) , th e Associat e Ministe r an d the Ministers fo r Naval Services and Air (vice-chairmen) , an d the thre e Chiefs o f Staf f an d th e deput y ministers fo r th e thre e services . Accord ing to th e officia l historia n o f the Canadia n Arm y i n the Secon d Worl d War, thi s institutio n "wa s a n effectiv e orga n o f interservic e coordina tion."54 Additional apparatu s fo r strategi c plannin g an d co-ordinatio n wa s provided afte r it s creatio n i n Augus t 194 0 b y th e Permanen t Join t Board o n Defence . Although i t wa s confine d t o tenderin g advic e t o th e Canadian an d Unite d State s government s on defenc e problem s pertain -

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ing t o th e Nort h America n continent, * al l bu t tw o o r thre e o f it s thirty-three wartim e recommendations , man y o f crucia l significance , were accepted . Th e Canadia n section, like the American, was composed of fou r servic e personnel an d tw o civilians , bu t i t woul d be misleadin g to suppos e tha t th e large r servic e representatio n le d t o greate r servic e influence. On e o f the tw o civilians in eac h sectio n acte d a s its chairman —the Canadian , O . M . Biggar , the American , th e redoubtabl e Fiorell o LaGuardia; th e other , a senio r foreig n servic e office r enjoyin g th e confidence o f his government , acted a s secretary—th e Canadian , H . L . Keenleyside o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , th e American , J. D . Hickerso n of the Departmen t of State. Th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Canadian Cabine t decide d o n Jun e 5 , 1943 , t o allo w th e chairma n of the Canadia n sectio n t o appea r a t it s meeting s whe n th e Committe e thought his attendance desirable, an d this procedure furthe r strengthene d civilian influence o n the Board. During the early period o f its history, th e wartime secretar y o f th e Canadia n sectio n ha s recalled , ther e wa s a certain tensio n o n th e Board , no t (a s migh t b e expected ) betwee n th e two nationa l sections , bu t betwee n th e militar y member s o f bot h sec tions, o n the on e hand, an d the civilia n members, o n th e other . "Ther e was a noticeabl e tendenc y amon g th e servic e member s t o loo k o n th e civilians a s ignoran t o f militar y affair s and , i n consequence , a s some thing of a burden to the Board. The civilians for their par t fel t tha t some of the service representatives were handicapped by a too stric t adherenc e to conventiona l servic e procedure s an d t o traditiona l line s o f thought . . . . Thes e mutua l hesitation s an d reservations amon g the member s of the Board rapidl y disappeared." 55 More difficul t problem s o f political-military relation s wer e created b y dispersal o f the variou s authorities concerne d wit h th e Canadia n Army . No fewe r tha n thre e separate d centre s o f comman d wer e involved : National Defenc e Headquarter s i n Ottawa ; th e Canadia n Militar y Headquarters i n London , England ; an d th e senio r Canadia n Fiel d Headquarters which , thoug h intende d t o follo w th e fighting in Europe , was throughou t th e greate r par t o f th e wa r locate d chee k b y jow l wit h C.M.H.Q. Betwee n th e defence establishmen t i n th e Canadia n capita l *On on e occasion , whe n i t appeare d tha t th e Boar d ha d exceede d it s advisor y function, th e Canadia n Prim e Ministe r wa s highl y critical , tellin g th e Wa r Com mittee o f th e Cabine t o n Ma y 27 , 1943 , tha t i t "ha d n o righ t t o tak e an y ste p which entere d th e fiel d o f strateg y an d operations . Tha t th e American s wer e t o report t o thei r Governmen t o n matter s o f defence , an d Canadian s t o ou r Government bu t i t wa s fo r th e Government s to conside r thei r recommendations , and t o decid e o n operations , etc. " Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I, 1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 515 .

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and th e oversea s Arm y som e differenc e i n perspectiv e wa s inevitable . Men clos e to , i f no t actuall y engage d in , comba t traditionall y entertai n strategic concept s othe r tha n thos e o f th e me n i n governmen t offices . "Even o n th e administrativ e side, " th e Army' s officia l historia n ha s noted, "despit e th e benefit s o f cabl e an d telephone , th e effor t t o bridg e 3,000 mile s o f ocea n wa s fraugh t wit h difficulties . Geographi c remote ness helped t o produc e differen t type s of thinkin g on militar y problem s and Canada' s militar y leaders becam e increasingl y awar e o f th e neces sity o f close r liaiso n betwee n th e staff s 'o n th e spot ' an d thos e i n Ottawa."58 On e relativel y mino r inciden t illustrate s th e problem . I n January 194 4 th e Chie f o f Staf f a t C.M.H.Q. , London , Genera l K . Stuart, signalle d th e Genera l Office r Commanding , 1s t Canadia n Army i n Italy , concernin g th e replacemen t o f on e o f th e senio r com manders. Hi s recommendatio n differe d fro m tha t o f th e Ministe r o f National Defence , previousl y expressed b y Ralsto n t o Genera l Stuart ; and th e Ministe r naturall y fel t h e shoul d a t leas t hav e bee n consulte d before Stuar t sen t hi s message . H e thereupo n wrot e privatel y t o him : . . . Speaking generally , I would lik e it , particularly i n matters o n these hig h levels wher e question s ar e boun d t o b e a mixtur e o f polic y an d militar y considerations, i f we coul d hav e a n exchang e o f view s an d comment s befor e the matte r become s "set " i n a definit e recommendation . . . . I a m sur e you woul d b e th e first to sa y yourself tha t i t i s just goo d team work anyway , quit e apar t fro m th e "drill" , fo r u s her e [i n Ottawa ] t o b e kept up-to-date an d eve n ahea d o f time i f possible wit h informatio n i n whic h we would be interested. . . . . . . O f this you can b e sure , tha t yo u ca n neve r er r o n th e sid e o f givin g us too muc h o r to o earl y information. 57

As plannin g fo r "Overlord " reache d it s fina l stages , th e oversea s Headquarters becam e steadil y mor e apprehensiv e ove r th e manpowe r situation. A shar p conflic t o f opinio n develope d betwee n senio r officer s at C.M.H.Q . an d Fiel d Headquarter s an d th e staf f officer s a t N.D.H.Q . in Ottawa , wh o wer e attemptin g t o reconcil e a s bes t the y coul d th e military requirement s o f th e forthcomin g operation wit h th e Govern ment's determinatio n no t t o resor t t o conscriptio n fo r oversea s service . "I a m afrai d tha t th e telegram s tha t hav e passe d withi n th e las t wee k or two," th e Ministe r o f National Defence wrote to th e Chie f o f Staf f i n London on March 26, 1944 , "hav e appeare d mor e like thos e emanating from partisan s o n opposit e side s tha n fro m co-worker s i n a commo n cause."58 Genera l Stuart , caugh t i n th e cross-fir e betwee n th e civilia n and staf f planner s i n Ottaw a an d th e officer s overseas , sa w the proble m with commendabl e clarity . O n Apri l 1 h e wrot e t o th e Chie f o f th e General Staf f i n Ottawa :

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In th e past , CMH Q ha s no t understoo d an d ha s no t bee n sufficientl y sym pathetic t o th e broa d problem s an d repercussion s othe r tha n militar y tha t face NDHQ . . . . NDHQ o n the other han d ha s I thin k tende d to emphasiz e the broade r aspect s o f th e proble m a t issue . Bot h o f thes e ar e perfectl y natural development s an d bot h ar e perhap s aggravate d b y th e fac t tha t th e two part s o f NDH Q ar e 300 0 mile s apart . Th e proble m i s no t onl y t o reconcile th e figure s involve d [i.e. , th e differen t estimate s o f reinforcement s required an d o f number s likel y t o b e mad e availabl e unde r th e existin g system o f voluntar y enlistment ] bu t o f greate r importanc e t o reconcil e th e two point s o f view . Representative s o f NDH Q ar e no w her e [i n London ] and ar e engage d i n the proces s o f reconcilin g th e figure s involve d an d I a m in th e proces s o f attemptin g t o broade n th e viewpoin t o f CMH Q i n orde r to brin g i t a s clos e a s possibl e t o tha t o f NDHQ . I a m confiden t of succes s at thi s en d provide d ther e i s som e giv e an d tak e a t bot h ends . CMH Q ha s at time s bee n unnecessaril y alarmin g i n it s presentatio n o f allege d fact s and I sugges t tha t NDH Q ha s perhap s bee n unnecessaril y violen t [in ] it s unexpressed bu t implie d reactions. 59

Some week s late r Genera l Stuar t reporte d t o th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence tha t h e fel t considerabl e progres s wa s bein g mad e i n over coming "th e CMH Q viewpoint " an d it s "tendenc y t o writ e alarmis t cables."60 The difficult y o f maintainin g productive an d harmoniou s relation s between defenc e planner s a t hom e and militar y authorities abroad wa s immeasurably increase d by th e emergenc e of a fundamenta l differenc e of outloo k between the politica l an d militar y branche s o f th e defenc e establishment i n Ottawa . S o lon g a s th e Genera l Staf f a t N.D.H.Q . remained sympatheti c and responsiv e t o th e politica l directive s o f th e Government, an y tensio n betwee n Ottaw a an d th e oversea s Head quarters coul d b e containe d withi n th e bound s o f nationa l safety . Bu t once difference s develope d withi n th e defenc e establishmen t a t home , the prospec t o f a crisis of immens e gravity presented itself. As earl y a s 1941 ther e i s evidenc e o f acut e disagreemen t betwee n th e Prim e Minister an d hi s militar y advisers . On Jun e 10 , afte r a meetin g of th e War Committe e of the Cabinet , Mackenzie King requested the Minister of National Defence and the Minister for Naval Services to remain afterwards. When alone , I sai d t o the m tha t I though t on e or th e othe r shoul d b e pre pared t o tak e o n th e busines s of government . That I fel t thing s wer e getting now wher e i t was almost impossibl e fo r m e to hop e t o lea d th e Administra tion longer . Tha t I though t ther e wa s suc h a differenc e growin g u p betwee n the Defenc e Departmen t an d th e Civi l Governmen t i n matter s o f polic y generally tha t I coul d n o longe r hol d th e tw o together . Tha t I coul d se e there wa s a growin g pressur e fo r conscription . Tha t I woul d b e please d t o be ou t o f th e figh t altogethe r befor e tha t battl e came ; als o tha t I coul d no t

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countenance thi s countr y bein g committe d t o projects i t wa s incapabl e o f carrying out , an d assume responsibilit y fo r anythin g o f the kind. . . .61

Towards th e en d o f th e yea r Mackenzi e Kin g privatel y expresse d th e opinion tha t "bac k o f al l else , I a m positive , i s th e Army' s desir e t o maintain a foremos t position , a certai n jealous y o f th e Ai r Forc e an d Naval Services. " Ralston , h e note d a few days later, "i s becomin g ver y rigid an d I fin d i t difficult , excep t becaus e o f commitment s h e ha s already mad e t o som e i n th e Departmen t [o f Nationa l Defence] , t o understand his attitude. . . . However, w e have reache d th e end of thi s year o f m y lif e wit h th e Governmen t stil l intact." 62 The conscriptio n crisis , which had neve r been fa r fro m th e surfac e of events sinc e th e outbrea k o f war, burs t upo n th e natio n i n th e autum n of 1944 . Despit e earlie r assurance s fro m th e militar y planner s tha t the voluntar y syste m o f recruitmen t woul d b e sufficien t t o sustai n th e troops fighting in Wester n Europe , i t wa s becoming tragicall y apparen t at th e scen e o f comba t tha t i t woul d not . Thi s intelligenc e reache d the Canadia n public whe n a widel y known sport s promote r o f pre-wa r days, home wounded from th e front , tol d a press conferenc e on Septem ber 1 8 that reinforcement s joining Canadian fighting units wer e "green, inexperienced an d poorl y trained, " an d tha t casualtie s a s a resul t ha d been unnecessaril y high . Th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , Colone l Ralston, immediately set out for Europe to see for himself. From officers in the field he learned tha t th e situatio n wa s as desperate a s rumour main tained, an d h e returne d t o repor t hi s shockin g new s t o th e Wa r Com mittee o n Octobe r 19 , togethe r wit h hi s fir m recommendatio n tha t th e Government immediatel y pu t int o effec t a polic y o f conscriptin g me n for oversea s servic e i n orde r t o bolste r th e flo w o f reinforcements . There followed a Cabinet crisi s of unprecedented severit y in Canadia n political life . Wha t is relevant t o the present discussio n is the part playe d in the ultimate decision b y the senior officers servin g at National Defenc e Headquarters. Eve n whe n face d wit h th e oppositio n o f hal f a doze n of hi s mos t influentia l minister s an d th e possibilit y tha t the y woul d resign, Mackenzie Kin g remaine d confiden t tha t th e militar y situatio n could b e successfull y deal t wit h b y voluntar y enlistment . Wha t shat tered tha t confidenc e wa s th e threa t no t o f ministeria l bu t o f militar y resignations. Th e Arm y Hig h Comman d ha d worke d loyall y i f reluct antly wit h Genera l McNaughto n (brough t int o th e Cabine t t o replac e Ralston) i n hi s unsuccessfu l effor t t o induc e large-scal e voluntar y enlistment. B y th e middl e o f November , senio r officer s o f th e Arm y had becom e convince d that , whateve r exertion s migh t b e made , th e effort woul d no t succeed . The y state d a s muc h t o thei r ne w Ministe r

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at a meetin g wit h hi m i n Ottaw a o n Novembe r 14 . Althoug h the y agreed t o d o thei r bes t t o secur e th e 15,00 0 me n require d b y th e en d of th e year , "i t wa s clea r tha t emotionall y mos t o f the m preferre d t o see th e appea l fai l s o tha t a n adequat e suppl y o f me n coul d b e mad e available throug h conscription." 63 The da y befor e thi s meeting , Genera l McNaughton ha d tol d Mackenzi e Kin g tha t h e though t som e o f hi s senior officer s wer e "plotting" conscription. 64 I n spit e o f this misgiving , and i n th e fac e o f th e unmistakabl e oppositio n o f th e senio r officer s t o continuing th e voluntar y system , th e Ministe r sa w fi t t o issu e a pres s statement declarin g tha t "th e informatio n give n m e b y th e O.C. s con firmed m y belie f mor e tha n eve r tha t continuatio n o f th e voluntar y policy wil l provid e th e reinforcements." 65 Fou r o f th e officer s presen t at th e meetin g promptl y telegraphe d t o McNaughto n t o protes t tha t nothing tha t ha d bee n sai d coul d hav e properl y encourage d hi m i n this belief . One o f the protestin g officers wa s General G . R . Pearkes , a Victori a Cross winne r o f th e Firs t Worl d War , th e G.O.C . Pacifi c Comman d in charg e o f th e 6t h Divisio n o f drafte d troops . (Thirtee n year s late r he wa s himself t o becom e Ministe r of National Defence. ) O n returnin g from th e Ottaw a consultation , h e calle d hi s officer s t o a meetin g i n Vancouver, wher e they proceede d t o giv e interview s to newspaperme n telling o f thei r failur e t o persuad e substantia l number s o f thei r me n to voluntee r fo r oversea s servic e an d o f thei r doub t whethe r th e Government's polic y coul d eve r succeed . Thi s devic e wa s clearly inten ded t o brin g pressur e o n th e Governmen t fro m a publi c b y no w thoroughly arouse d an d alarmed . Learnin g o f the interviews , th e Prim e Minister wrot e i n hi s diary : "I t i s quit e apparen t tha t ther e i s a conspiracy. . . . On e afte r th e othe r ha s bee n comin g ou t an d saying that th e N.R.M.A . me n wer e jus t waitin g fo r th e Governmen t t o d o its dut y an d sen d the m overseas . Tha t look s like th e Arm y defyin g th e civil power . Thes e me n i n unifor m hav e n o righ t t o spea k i n way s which wil l tur n th e peopl e agains t th e civi l power." 66 A muc h grave r even t soo n followed . O n th e mornin g o f Novembe r 22, th e da y Parliament opened , th e Chie f o f the Genera l Staff , Lieuten ant-General J . C . Murchie , an d othe r senio r officer s me t wit h thei r former commander , no w their ne w Minister, a t National Defenc e Head quarters. T o Genera l McNaughto n th e C.G.S . presented , o n behal f of th e militar y members o f the Army Council , a brief memorandum . It s key provisio n rea d a s follows: "Afte r a carefu l revie w of al l the factor s including th e lates t expressio n o f thei r view s b y th e Distric t Officer s Commanding, I mus t now advise yo u that i n my considered opinio n th e

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voluntary syste m o f recruitin g throug h Arm y channel s canno t mee t the immediate problem." 67 Was thi s prosai c documen t a n ultimatum ? Th e officer s presentin g i t regarded i t a s such . "Whil e ther e wa s n o explici t agreemen t amon g them tha t the y woul d resig n i f thei r advic e wa s no t followed , a t leas t one o r tw o o f them understoo d tha t i f th e Ministe r remaine d adamant , resignation woul d b e th e nex t step." * Th e recipien t certainl y believe d he had bee n serve d with an ultimatum. As soo n a s the officers withdrew , General McNaughto n telephone d th e Prim e Minister : He sai d h e ha d quit e seriou s new s tha t th e Headquarter s Staf f her e ha d al l advised hi m tha t th e voluntar y syste m woul d no t ge t th e men . H e ha d emphasized i t was the mos t seriou s advic e tha t coul d b e tendered . . . . He expressed th e opinio n tha t i t wa s lik e a blo w i n th e stomach . H e als o sai d that h e ha d th e resignatio n o f th e Commande r i n Winnipeg. Tha t i f th e Commanders, on e afte r th e other , bega n t o resign , th e whol e militar y machine woul d ru n down , begi n t o disintegrate , an d ther e woul d b e n o controlling th e situation . Instantly ther e cam e to m y min d th e statemen t I ha d mad e t o Parliamen t in Jun e a s to th e actio n th e Governmen t woul d necessaril y tak e i f w e wer e agreed tha t th e tim e ha d com e whe n conscriptio n wa s necessary . I t i s apparent t o m e tha t t o whateve r ba d managemen t thi s ma y hav e bee n due , we ar e face d wit h a rea l situatio n whic h ha s t o b e met an d no w ther e i s n o longer though t a s to th e natur e o f th e militar y advic e tendered , particularl y by Gen . McNaughton . An d i f s o tendere d b y Gen . McNaughto n wh o ha s come int o th e governmen t t o tr y t o sav e th e situation , i t wil l b e m y clea r duty t o agre e t o th e passin g o f th e Orde r i n Counci l an d g o t o Parliamen t and as k for a vote of confidence. . . .es

In thi s wa y ther e wa s formed i n th e min d o f th e Prim e Minister , i n a matter o f minutes , th e mos t importan t decisio n o f th e Canadia n wa r effort. Confronted b y wha t th e Prim e Ministe r som e day s afterwar d obliquely describe d a s a threa t o f "anarchy, " th e anti-conscriptionis t members o f th e Cabine t (wit h th e exceptio n o f Mr . C . G . Powe r wh o resigned) supporte d Mackenzie King' s dramati c volte-face. An order in-council providin g fo r th e immediat e draftin g o f 16,00 0 N.R.M.A . men fo r oversea s servic e wa s approve d o n Novembe r 23 . Ther e wa s *R. MacGrego r Dawson , "Th e Revol t o f th e Generals, " Weekend Magazine, vol. X , no . 44 , 1960 . Mr . Bruc e Hutchison , whos e investigation s firs t brough t the stor y ou t int o th e open , ha s written : "Th e fina l threa t [o f resignation ] was no t pu t i n writin g alon g wit h th e officers ' memorandu m and , i n tha t tense hurrie d interview , n o on e seem s t o remembe r exactl y wha t wa s sai d o r who sai d it . Ther e ca n b e absolutel y no question , however , from th e information given m e quit e voluntaril y fro m militar y sources , tha t th e resignation s woul d have bee n wid e sprea d an d distinguishe d enoug h t o produc e disastrou s conse quences." Bruc e Hutchison , "Mackenzi e Kin g an d th e 'Revolt ' o f th e Army, " Maclean's Magazine, Ma y 15 , 1953 .

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still Parliamen t t o face , an d th e prospec t tha t French-Canadia n Libera l members migh t refus e t o accep t th e ne w policy . Th e Prim e Minister' s motion of confidence wa s carried o n December 7 by a vote of 14 3 to 70 , 34 French-speakin g Liberal s votin g agains t i t les s ou t o f a sens e o f betrayal tha n becaus e o f specifi c pledge s agains t conscriptio n give n earlier t o thei r constituents . Th e threa t o f civi l wa r ha d passed , an d the member s o f th e Arm y Hig h Comman d wer e spare d th e ordea l o f having to decid e whether t o carr y out th e desperat e strateg y o f resigna tion i n wartime. Some 12,00 0 conscrip t soldier s wer e sen t overseas , o f who m som e 10,000 reache d Europ e an d som e 2,50 0 sa w action . Tha t winte r th e general reinforcemen t situatio n improved , an d th e wa r i n Europ e ended befor e further crise s could appear . Bu t th e "revol t o r the Army " was to hav e it s effec t upo n civil-militar y relation s i n Canad a fo r many years afte r th e Germa n surrende r o n Ma y 5 , 1945 . CIVIL-MILITARY RELATION S I N THE NUCLEA R AG E

In 191 8 the Armistice was widely believed to presage a n era o f peace, if not fo r turbulen t Europe a t leas t fo r Nort h America . A moo d o f isola tionism se t in ; tw o decade s passe d befor e i t wa s finall y dispelled . Th e mood o f Canadian s a t th e en d o f th e secon d o f thei r tw o worl d war s was ver y different . Th e hop e tha t internationa l politics migh t i n futur e see tha t unit y o f grea t power s assume d i n th e Charte r o f th e Unite d Nations they knew, as soon a s any people, t o be pitiably slim. Disclosure late i n 194 5 o f Sovie t espionag e i n th e Canadia n capita l revealed , a t least t o member s o f th e Government , th e reckles s perfid y o f Marsha l Stalin's politics ; i f public disillusionmen t di d no t com e unti l th e extinc tion o f liberal democrac y in Czechoslovaki a i n Februar y 1948 , i t cam e then wit h soberin g clarity . "I t i s a n appallin g thought, " th e Ministe r of Nationa l Defenc e reflecte d i n th e Hous e o f Common s i n Jun e o f that year , that althoug h hardl y thre e year s hav e gon e b y sinc e V- E Day . . . man y nations shoul d no w be engaged i n spendin g mone y o n armament s o n a scal e never befor e know n i n th e histor y o f th e worl d i n peacetime . . . . Th e Soviet Unio n ha s floute d [its ] war-wo n friendships , obstinatel y obstructe d every mov e to arrive a t understanding, an d promoted chao s an d disorde r an d the darknes s o f the iron curtain . . . . It has produced a n attitud e i n Canad a towards defenc e whic h i s quit e differen t fro m an y tha t w e eve r ha d befor e in peacetime . O f on e thin g I a m sure , an d tha t i s th e determinatio n o f th e Canadian peopl e to defend ou r country agains t an y attack. . . ,69

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Nor wa s thi s a partisa n view . "Thos e wh o wer e aslee p fro m 193 5 t o 1939," declare d a n Oppositio n spokesma n i n th e sam e debate , "ar e asleep n o longer . W e kno w th e issues." 70 To thei r militar y advisers , th e Chief s o f Staf f an d senio r officer s of th e thre e services , th e Canadia n Governmen t an d peopl e turne d fo r advice an d guidanc e about wha t to d o t o protec t themselve s fro m thei r new enemy . A t th e disposa l o f tha t enem y wa s a n arsena l o f weapon s ranging fro m short-wav e radio transmitter s t o (afte r 1949 ) th e atomi c bomb an d (afte r 1954 ) th e hydroge n bomb ; weaponr y an d strateg y had becom e intricately interwoven, the lin e betwee n militar y an d politi cal decisions blurred beyond recognition. Th e result , i n Canada a s in al l Western nations, wa s to compe l senior military officer s t o exercis e judgment i n area s lying far beyon d thei r traditiona l competence . They hav e becom e increasingl y concerne d wit h internationa l affairs , tha t i s to say , wit h the premise s o f military policy , wit h th e purpose s fo r whic h an d the term s o n whic h militar y force s wil l b e deployed . The y hav e move d upstream towar d th e fountai n spring s o f nationa l policy . Second , thei r support functions—supply , finance , researc h an d development , publi c rela tions, manpowe r management , an d th e like—hav e grow n mor e numerous , difficult an d important . The y hav e move d downstrea m t o a poin t wher e th e river widen s into a bay far broader tha n any they have ever travelle d before. 71

A militar y establishmen t strugglin g wit h thes e unfamilia r responsi bilities coul d coun t itsel f fortunat e to enjo y th e suppor t an d sympath y of th e civilia n community for who m it stoo d o n guard . The professiona l soldier neve r ranked high among the heroe s o f a country no t noticeabl y disposed t o hero-worship , but a t an y rat e h e emerge d fro m th e Secon d World Wa r i n greate r publi c estee m tha n h e ha d a generatio n earlier . "The ol d attitud e ther e use d t o b e toward s sailor s an d soldier s i s a thing of the past," remarked th e Ministe r o f National Defenc e in 1950 . "Our sailors , soldier s an d airme n hav e attaine d an d earne d th e respec t of th e community." 72 I n particular , the y ha d earne d th e respec t o f th e French-speaking community . Nothing in the traditional values of Frenc h Canada conflicte d wit h th e traditiona l value s o f militar y life ; indeed , its severity , its regularity, its discipline and dedicatio n accorde d remark ably wel l wit h th e kin d o f societ y extolle d b y th e defender s o f th e established orde r i n Quebec . Bu t th e commitmen t o f French-speakin g Canada t o th e defenc e o f th e real m wa s boun d t o b e somethin g les s than tota l s o long as the enem y contrived to envelo p its sinister purpos e in th e mantl e of a n ideolog y no t withou t its ow n attractions ; a s Musso lini's Ital y an d Petain' s Franc e fo r a tim e an d t o a n exten t manage d to do . Once , however , th e enem y wa s identifie d a s internationa l com -

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munism, the French-speakin g Canadia n demonstrate d as muc h capacit y for sacrific e a s hi s compatrio t i n Toront o o r Vancouver . O f 10,58 7 men enlistin g in th e specia l voluntee r forc e for servic e i n Korea , 3,13 4 were fro m th e provinc e o f Quebec , a proportio n slightl y highe r tha n that of the populatio n o f Quebec to the population o f the whol e country ; moreover, th e proportio n o f French-speaking Canadian s i n th e specia l force wa s almost exactly the sam e as that o f French-speaking Canadian s to th e tota l population. 73 If , therefore , Canad a continue d t o shar e wit h Iceland th e doubtfu l distinctio n of bein g th e onl y membe r o f th e Nort h Atlantic allianc e no t t o hav e introduce d compulsor y militar y service , i t reflected no t s o muc h th e unwillingnes s o f Canadian s t o sacrific e fo r freedom a s th e unwillingnes s o f thei r Governmen t t o ris k openin g th e old wound s o f th e conscriptio n issue . O n th e wisdo m o f it s diffidenc e opinions differ , an d wil l diffe r fo r a lon g time ; bu t ther e ca n b e n o question that conditions were more favourable for the experiment during the administratio n o f Mr . L . S . St . Laurent , a Canadia n o f Frenc h descent, tha n durin g tha t o f hi s successor . All thes e circumstance s assure d th e militar y establishmen t o f greate r influence o n national polic y than i t had previousl y enjoyed in peacetime . The proposa l t o invit e Europea n force s fro m NAT O countrie s t o tak e up operationa l dutie s alon g th e norther n rada r warnin g lines, favoure d by th e Departmen t o f External Affair s a s improving the cohesivenes s of the allianc e an d offsettin g Unite d State s influenc e i n Canada , wa s objected t o b y th e Chief s o f Staf f an d o n tha t accoun t discarded . Th e decision t o create a North American Air Defence Command (NORAD ) owed muc h t o th e chairma n o f th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , Genera l Charles Foulkes , turnin g hi s power s o f persuasio n upo n inexperience d ministers immediatel y afte r th e chang e o f governmen t i n 1957 . Th e proposal t o acquir e tactica l atomi c weapon s fo r continenta l defence and for Canada's force s in Western Europe indicate d th e influenc e o f the Department o f Nationa l Defenc e a s agains t tha t o f th e Departmen t of Externa l Affair s whos e Minister , Mr . Howar d Green , mad e n o secret o f hi s distat e fo r nuclea r armament s o f an y kind . Th e precis e manner an d exten t t o whic h militar y influenc e shape d thes e an d othe r crucial measure s canno t ye t b e ascertained , bu t ther e ca n b e n o doub t that i t was decisive o n severa l occasions . But despit e th e ne w importanc e o f th e militar y establishmen t i n th e making o f nationa l policy , th e traditiona l idea l o f civilia n supremac y was in no way impaired. O n th e contrary , firm civilian control appeare d all the mor e essentia l in a n er a whe n even the mos t distan t paramilitary skirmish ra n th e ris k o f thermonuclea r catastrophe . "Th e professiona l

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soldier i s answerable to th e government, " th e Leade r o f the Oppositio n declared t o a n approvin g Hous e o f Common s i n 1953 . "Th e profes sional soldie r mus t tak e hi s directio n fro m th e government ; h e mus t carry ou t policie s establishe d b y th e government . I t i s no t fo r hi m t o tell the governmen t what it will do; it i s for the governmen t to sa y what the staf f officer s wil l do. .. . Tha t ha s been th e policy of the supervisio n of ou r defenc e force s eve r sinc e w e hav e ha d defenc e forces." 74 Th e Prime Minister di d no more than express the general will of his country men whe n he expresse d disma y at th e "voca l rocke t rattling " o f "thos e in position s o f militar y authority," addin g tha t h e coul d "thin k o f n o more sterile or irresponsible use . .. of office tha n a tendency to brandis h the symbol s of militar y power." 75 Tha t i n thi s matte r th e Governmen t was prepare d t o practis e wha t i t preache d wa s eviden t h i th e swiftnes s with whic h officia l rebuk e descende d upo n thos e member s o f th e military who from tim e to time ventured to express opinion s a t varianc e with policy . The principl e o f civilia n supremac y continued t o b e buil t firml y int o the institutions b y whic h defenc e polic y wa s made . Th e Cabinet , th e ultimate foru m fo r decision , experimente d wit h th e wartim e devic e of a n Associat e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e ( a portfoli o allowe d to laps e wit h the comin g of peace) whe n in 195 3 Mr . Ralp h Campne y was appointe d t o tha t post . Hi s divisio n o f labou r wit h th e Ministe r of Nationa l Defence , Brook e Claxton , i n keepin g wit h th e post-wa r ideal o f servic e unification , wa s alon g functiona l rathe r tha n servic e lines, th e Associat e Ministe r attendin g mainl y t o administrativ e matter s throughout th e militar y establishmen t a s a whole , leavin g hi s senio r colleague free r t o grappl e wit h increasingl y intractabl e problem s o f policy. Th e lin e betwee n polic y an d administratio n i s notoriousl y diffi cult t o draw , an d thi s functiona l separatio n o f responsibilitie s coul d only succeed , a s the Prime Minister concede d whe n proposing it , o n th e basis o f "a n exceptiona l degre e o f harmon y betwee n th e Ministe r an d the Associat e Minister , an d a n eve n greate r degre e o f franknes s an d understanding tha n i s necessar y between tw o minister s o f th e govern ment havin g quit e separat e departments." 76 Th e tea m o f Campne y an d Claxton worke d togethe r harmoniousl y enough , bu t whe n th e latte r retired in 1954 , an d Mr. Campney became Minister o f National Defence, no Associat e Ministe r wa s appointed . Th e positio n remaine d unfille d until 1957 , whe n Mr . Pau l Hellye r assume d it , onl y t o los e i t i n th e General Electio n som e weeks later. The incomin g Diefenbaker adminis tration di d no t choos e t o appoin t a n Associat e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence unti l 1959 . It s appointee , Mr . Pierr e Sevigny , strengthene d

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 9

9

French Canada' s representatio n i n th e Cabine t withou t noticeabl y eas ing th e heav y burdens fallin g upo n Genera l G . R . Pearkes , Ministe r o f National Defenc e from Jun e 195 7 t o his resignation i n October 1960 . While th e Defenc e Committe e o f th e Cabine t (describe d abov e i n chapter i ) i s normally attende d b y th e Chief s of Staf f an d th e chairma n of th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , it s personne l an d traditio n ar e suc h that th e dominan t voic e i s th e voic e o f th e civilian . Th e principa l military adviser s o f th e governmen t ar e member s o f th e Chief s o f Staff Committee , bu t eve n thi s committee , contrar y t o wha t it s nam e may suggest , i s no t a wholl y militar y group . I t includes , i n additio n t o the Chie f o f Staf f o f eac h o f th e thre e services , th e chairma n o f th e Defence Researc h Board , wh o i s a civilian, * an d (sinc e 1951 ) a permanent chairma n who , whil e a distinguishe d office r o f th e highes t rank (Genera l Charle s Foulke s wa s th e firs t incumbent , succeede d in 195 9 b y Ai r Marsha l F . R . Miller , formerl y Deput y Ministe r o f the Departmen t o f Nationa l Defence) , wa s clearl y intende d t o infus e the Committe e wit h a supra-servic e poin t o f view . Additiona l civilia n chaperonage i s provide d b y th e regula r attendanc e a t it s meeting s o f the Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s an d th e Deput y Minister o f Nationa l Defence , whe n othe r tha n purel y militar y matter s are under discussion—as, indeed, they usually are. Th e presence of these influential non-militar y figure s i n th e Chief s o f Staf f Committe e ha s given ris e t o th e charg e b y a forme r Chie f o f th e Genera l Staf f (note d above in chapter 11) tha t it is " 'packed' to protect the government against the receip t o f unpalatabl e advice . . . ." 77 Whethe r vali d o r not , thi s grave accusatio n i s a s applicabl e t o th e tw o ke y committee s tha t serv e the Chief s o f Staf f Committee , fo r th e Join t Intelligenc e Committe e and th e Join t Plannin g Committe e ar e als o customaril y attende d b y officials fro m on e o f th e defenc e liaison division s o f th e Departmen t o f External Affairs . The restrainin g han d o f th e civilia n bureaucrac y i s foun d a s wel l upon the Permanent Join t Board on Defence which, while less importan t than durin g the Second Worl d War, retains som e responsibility for plan ning fo r continenta l defence . T o a t leas t on e highl y place d militar y observer thi s arrangemen t ha s appeare d les s tha n advantageous . "Th e Permanent Join t Boar d on Defence," Lieutenant-Genera l G . G. Simonds *Whether th e Defenc e Researc h Boar d wa s t o b e unde r militar y o r civilia n control wa s strenuousl y debate d a t th e tim e o f it s creatio n i n 1945-6 , bu t th e principle o f civilia n supremac y i n matter s o f defenc e researc h prevaile d ove r the view s o f th e Arm y ordnanc e an d th e R.C.A.F . A n unusuall y informativ e account o f thi s debat e i s t o b e foun d i n Capt . D . J . Goodspeed , A History o f th e Defence Research Board o f Canada (Ottawa , 1958) , pp . 28-44 .

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has written , "act s a s a barrie r t o direc t contac t betwee n th e Canadia n and U.S . Chief s o f Staf f excep t o n a person-to-perso n basi s withi n individual services . Th e predilectio n o f Canadia n member s o f thi s joint boar d t o experimen t i n th e fiel d o f gadgetr y ha s engineere d decisions o f doubtfu l militar y value , bu t ver y expensiv e i n money." 78 A furthe r exampl e o f ho w th e soldie r i s overshadowe d b y th e civilian i n plannin g fo r nationa l securit y i s provide d b y th e Pane l o n Economic Aspect s o f Defence . Create d i n 1948- 9 t o conside r th e problems o f Canadia n militar y an d economi c assistanc e programme s in relatio n t o th e Marshal l Pla n an d Mutua l Aid , i t ha d becom e b y 1955 th e ke y interdepartmenta l committe e o n al l aspect s o f defenc e policy. It s onl y regular military participant, however, wa s the chairma n of th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , wh o migh t o r migh t no t invit e othe r military member s o f hi s ow n committe e t o attend . It s othe r regula r members wer e al l fro m th e civilia n bureaucracy , an d include d th e secretary o f th e Cabinet , wh o acte d a s chairman , tw o o r thre e officer s of th e Departmen t o f External Affairs , th e deput y minister s o f Defenc e and Defenc e Production , an d representative s o f th e Departmen t o f Finance an d th e Ban k o f Canada . The classica l libera l doctrin e fo r regulatin g relation s betwee n soldiers an d government s is offere d i n Lor d Salisbury' s famou s aphor ism: "I f yo u believ e th e doctors , nothin g i s wholesome ; i f yo u believ e the theologians , nothin g i s innocent; i f you believ e th e soldiers , nothin g is safe. They al l require to have their stron g wine diluted b y a very large admixture o f insipi d commo n sense." 79 Ther e ar e tw o assumption s here: first , tha t th e correctiv e o f commo n sens e i s supplie d b y th e civilian politicia n o r publi c servant ; second , tha t defenc e polic y shoul d properly b e th e resul t o f a dialectica l interpla y o f th e civilia n an d th e military mind , th e latte r untrouble d b y politica l implications . Th e making of national security policy in nearly all of the liberal democracie s since the Second World War has, however, tended t o neglec t the second , and corollary , assumption . Th e traditiona l proces s whereb y objectiv e military advic e is tempered b y civilians mindful o f the politica l environ ment has been replace d b y one in which the militar y mind, no w traine d to recogniz e non-militar y aspect s o f strategy , tender s advic e whic h ha s already take n the m int o account . I n it s America n settin g th e ne w process quickl y acquire d doctrina l legitimatio n a s "th e theor y o f politi cal-military fusion" ; i t ha s bee n lucidl y describe d b y Professo r Huntingdon: This theor y starte d fro m th e undeniabl e fac t tha t militar y polic y an d political polic y wer e muc h mor e closel y inter-relate d i n th e postwa r worl d

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 10 1

than the y ha d bee n previously . I t wen t on , however , t o asser t tha t i t ha d become impossibl e t o maintai n th e distinctio n a t the highes t leve l o f govern ment. . . . I t wa s argue d tha t ne w development s ha d rendere d th e ol d categories o f "political " an d "military " sterile , obsolet e an d meaningless . . . . I n par t i t reflecte d th e inherent constitutional difficultie s o f maintainin g a clearcu t delimitatio n o f militar y responsibilities , an d i n par t i t derive d from th e feelin g tha t becaus e wa r ha d becom e total , s o als o ha d th e spher e of militar y affairs . T o a greate r extent , however , i t simpl y reflecte d libera l fear tha t th e increase d powe r o f militar y leadershi p woul d mea n increase d acceptance o f the professiona l militar y viewpoint. Consequently , i t attempte d to weake n an d subordinat e the professiona l military approac h an d t o recon cile increase d militar y powe r wit h libera l value s b y positin g th e inevitabl e transmutation o f militar y leadership . I n effect , th e fusionis t theor y attempt s to solv e th e post-wa r proble m o f civil-militar y relation s b y denyin g it s existence.80 In Canad a n o les s tha n th e Unite d State s thi s fusionis t conceptio n has displace d sinc e 194 5 th e traditional relationship between the civilia n and militar y servant s o f government . I f ther e i s an y differenc e betwee n Canadian an d America n experienc e i n thi s regard , i t ha s bee n i n the greate r emphasi s give n i n Canad a t o achievin g fusio n b y bringin g the civilia n bureaucrac y int o mor e intimat e contac t wit h militar y prob lems, rathe r tha n b y extendin g th e domai n o f servic e officer s t o includ e political matters . Bu t th e latte r developmen t ha s bee n b y n o mean s unknown. I t ma y b e discerne d i n th e creatio n o f th e permanen t chair man o f th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , i n th e typ e o f office r promote d to senio r rank , and , abov e all , i n th e attentio n pai d t o th e non-militar y side o f senio r office r training . In 194 8 th e National Defence Colleg e offere d th e first of a continuin g series of annua l courses for wha t its handbook fo r participants describe s as the trainin g o f senio r officer s o f th e Arme d Service s an d civi l departmen t of governmen t i n th e principle s o f highe r governmenta l administratio n an d staff work , bot h i n peac e an d war , s o tha t the y ma y b e thoroughl y verse d in inter-servic e an d inter-departmenta l planning , includin g the politica l an d economic aspect s an d th e organizatio n fo r th e centra l directio n o f wa r an d the syste m o f higher command , an d s o become qualifie d t o tak e thei r place s on th e staf f an d inter-departmenta l committee s whic h ar e a n essentia l par t of th e machiner y for plannin g an d directin g the nationa l effort . The thirt y o r s o officer s an d civilian s enrolle d wer e accordingl y instructed i n "(a ) historical , economic , socia l an d politica l factor s affecting Canadia n defence ; (b ) internationa l affair s an d Canada' s foreign policy ; (c ) influenc e o f scientifi c developmen t o n war ; (d ) relationship o f arme d service s wit h on e anothe r an d othe r department s

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of government ; (e ) principle s o f highe r comman d an d o f join t servic e planning on th e strategi c level." Many, if not th e majority , of influential staff officer s o f th e thre e service s ha d b y 196 1 bee n expose d t o thi s training. I t is of some interest tha t the first commandant o f the Nationa l Defence Colleg e becam e afte r hi s retiremen t fro m activ e servic e th e most outspoken criti c of the fusionis t philosoph y of which its curriculum was s o clea r a manifestation . "O n th e subjec t o f defense, " Lt.-Gen . Simonds ha s written , "th e proble m i s no t on e o f attemptin g t o devis e ways o f enablin g th e militar y t o encroac h upo n politica l prerogatives , but o f getting politicians t o fac e th e unpleasan t dut y of making realisti c decisions."81

ChapterFour

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FOREIGN POLICY , LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE RELATIONS , AN D TH E PARLIAMENTARY SYSTE M

Control o f foreign polic y i n a parliamentary syste m i s the responsibilit y of th e Executive . Thi s i s no t merel y a corollary o f th e familia r parado x that parliamentar y government , i n whic h th e Cabine t i s theoreticall y responsible t o th e Hous e o f Commons , ha s i n practic e undergon e " a strange an d alarmin g inversion " s o tha t "th e Common s ha s becom e instead responsibl e t o the Cabinet." 1 Law and convention both prescrib e that crucia l step s i n th e foreig n polic y proces s ar e t o b e take n onl y b y ministers o f th e Crown . Collectivel y thos e minister s se t th e cours e o f external affairs . A foreig n polic y decisio n i s a Cabine t decision . I f a treaty i s needed, Parliamen t ma y be summoned ; but i t doe s no t hav e to be summoned , for ratificatio n ma y b e accomplishe d withou t it s aid . I f money o r legislatio n ar e neede d t o giv e effec t t o a foreig n polic y deci sion, Parliamen t mus t approve ; bu t th e Government' s majorit y i n th e House o f Common s ensure s that approva l i s rarely i f ever withheld . If Parliamen t i s t o se t it s mar k upo n foreig n policy , i t mus t there fore d o s o b y influence . It s method s ar e interrogatio n an d discussion . How effectivel y thes e ar e use d depend s partl y upo n th e abilit y an d drive o f th e Opposition , bu t jus t a s muc h upo n th e readines s o f th e Government t o allo w th e Oppositio n t o pla y it s dialectica l rol e a s th e parliamentary syste m requires. A membe r ma y as k questions ; a minis ter nee d no t answer . Th e Oppositio n ma y deman d discussion ; th e Government ma y refus e tim e fo r debate . Safeguards agains t Cabine t dictatorshi p i n external , a s i n other , affairs ar e o f two kinds . Too flagran t disregar d of parliamentary opinion may disaffec t a Government' s followin g i n th e Hous e t o th e poin t o f threatening it s defeat . I n practic e thi s sanctio n i s no t severe . Th e member, no t th e Prim e Minister , ordinaril y fear s th e cos t an d bothe r of seekin g re-election , an d i n fac t th e weapo n o f dissolutio n i s on e way a Governmen t ma y kee p it s majorit y fro m becomin g maverick . The other , an d mor e important , safeguar d lies outsid e Parliament . To o flagrant disregar d o f publi c opinio n ma y disaffec t a n electorat e t o th e

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point wher e it votes th e Oppositio n int o power . A Governmen t mistak ing voters ' silenc e fo r indifferenc e ma y discove r a t th e nex t genera l election tha t i t i s th e Governmen t n o longer . Thi s sanctio n naturall y operates mor e effectivel y toward s th e en d o f a n administratio n tha n at th e beginning . But t o discus s parliamentar y governmen t i n term s o f sanction s an d safeguards i s to disregar d its centra l assumption . Th e system , if i t i s t o work well , presuppose s a degre e o f politica l maturit y an d restrain t o n the par t o f thos e wh o wor k i t tha t i s somewha t a t varianc e wit h Lor d Acton's dictu m abou t th e tendenc y o f powe r t o corrupt . I t assume s that both Government and Opposition ar e so convinced of its advantages and s o attache d t o it s tradition s a s t o refrai n fro m abuse s whic h ma y irreparably damag e th e system . To determin e legislativ e influenc e o n foreig n polic y withi n a give n parliamentary system, it therefore becomes necessary to inquire into two facets o f politica l behaviour . On e i s th e exten t t o whic h th e Cabine t allows legislator s tim e an d opportunit y fo r constructiv e criticism . Th e other i s th e qualit y o f suc h parliamentar y discussio n a s ma y result . "PARLIAMENT WIL L DECIDE "

On Augus t 14 , 1914 , th e Canadia n Governmen t announce d tha t th e Dominion wa s a t wa r wit h Germany . Member s o f th e Hous e o f Com mons an d th e Senate , meetin g tw o week s late r t o vot e fund s fo r th e prosecution o f th e wa r effort , too k n o par t i n th e mos t momentou s decision o f externa l polic y sinc e Confederation . I n 191 9 Parliament , which ha d no t bee n consulte d abou t goin g t o war , wa s summone d t o approve th e term s o f peace. It s ne w associatio n wit h th e foreig n polic y process wa s du e partl y t o th e Prim e Minister' s emphasi s o n nationa l status; bu t thi s wa s no t Si r Rober t Borden' s onl y motive . I n Canada , as i n Grea t Britain , publi c opinio n blame d "secre t diplomacy " fo r th e calamities o f th e pas t fiv e years , an d looke d t o parliamentar y scrutin y of th e Executiv e a s th e principa l mean s o f preventing thei r recurrence . The Canadia n Governmen t ha d not , o f course , initiate d an y o f th e clandestine diplomati c arrangement s of the pre-wa r year s o r durin g th e war itself , no r wa s i t widel y understoo d tha t a t th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet i t had becom e awar e o f thei r existence . Th e public' s desir e fo r increased parliamentar y influenc e wa s du e mainl y t o it s fea r tha t a Canadian government, at some future imperial gathering or at the Leagu e of Nations , might commit the natio n to war , or to som e course o f actio n leading t o war , withou t it s knowledg e o r approval . The outcr y i n th e Unite d Kingdo m agains t secre t diplomac y wa s

THE LEGISLATUR E 10

5

heard mostl y o n th e politica l left , suc h movement s a s th e Unio n fo r Democratic Contro l drawin g suppor t principall y amon g th e Labou r party. I n Canad a th e lef t wa s preachin g t o th e converted . No t tha t th e Government value d parliamentar y contro l ove r foreig n polic y fo r it s own sake ; later on , in the 1930' s Mackenzie Kin g was to shiel d externa l affairs fro m legislativ e scrutiny a s n o othe r Prim e Ministe r befor e o r since. Bu t th e politica l situatio n o f th e earl y 1920' s le d hi m t o profes s attachment to th e principle . Upo n it , an d i t alone , hi s minority Govern ment foun d som e measur e o f agreemen t wit h th e sixty-fiv e member s of th e Progressiv e part y on whos e support i t depende d fo r continuatio n in office . These wer e th e circumstance s givin g ris e t o th e famou s formul a "Parliament wil l decide. " I t wa s firs t presse d int o servic e durin g th e Chanak crisi s o f 1922 . Withi n hour s o f receivin g th e Britis h Govern ment's "invitation " t o sen d troops t o hel p hol d th e lin e a t th e Neutra l Zone, Mackenzi e Kin g wa s overwhelme d wit h advic e no t t o commi t any Canadia n force s unti l Parliamen t ha d authorize d him t o d o so , an d he accordingl y informe d Lloy d Georg e o n Septembe r 1 7 tha t "publi c opinion i n Canad a woul d deman d authorizatio n o n th e par t o f Parlia ment a s a necessary preliminar y to th e despatc h o f a contingent." 2 Th e Progressives rallie d wit h gratifying enthusias m t o thi s position ; over th e tariff, ove r freigh t rates , ther e migh t b e disagreemen t an d eve n conflic t between them and the Liberal Cabinet , bu t o n the issue of parliamentary control o f foreig n polic y a distinct harmony of interest wa s disclose d fo r the firs t time . " I believ e w e hav e foun d th e basis, " Mackenzi e Kin g wrote soo n afterwards , "o n whic h the Progressive s o f Wester n Canad a may b e brough t int o rea l accor d wit h th e Liberal s o f th e Provinc e o f Quebec an d othe r part s o f th e Dominion." 3 I n hi s statemen t t o th e House o f Commons , th e expedien t becam e a principle : "I t i s fo r Parliament t o decide, " the Prim e Ministe r state d o n Februar y 1 , 1923 , "whether or not we shoul d participat e in war s in differen t part s of the world, an d i t i s neither righ t no r prope r fo r an y individua l nor fo r an y groups o f individual s to tak e an y ste p whic h i n an y wa y migh t limi t the right s o f Parliamen t i n a matte r whic h i s o f suc h grea t concer n t o all the peopl e o f ou r country." 4 A fe w month s later , Mackenzi e Kin g carrie d thi s doctrin e t o th e Imperial Conference . "The decisio n o f Canad a o n an y importan t issue , domestic or foreign, we believe should be made by the people of Canada," he tol d hi s fello w prim e ministers , "thei r representative s i n Parliament , and th e Governmen t responsibl e t o tha t Parliament." 5 Afte r muc h per sistent effort , i t wa s accepte d b y th e Conferenc e and foun d it s wa y int o its publishe d report , whic h include d th e statemen t tha t "i t i s fo r eac h

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government t o decid e whethe r parliamentar y approva l o r legislatio n is required befor e desir e for , o r concurrenc e in , ratificatio n [o f imperia l treaties] i s intimate d b y tha t government." * I n 192 6 Mackenzi e Kin g placed before a receptiv e Hous e o f Common s a resolutio n askin g i t t o approve th e procedur e agree d upo n a t Londo n i n 1923 , explainin g tha t the Governmen t woul d i n futur e submi t fo r parliamentar y approval , prior to , an d a s a condition of , ratification by the Executive , "importan t treaties suc h a s involv e militar y an d economi c sanctions." 6 Thes e categories wer e furthe r broadene d i n 1928 . "Th e da y ha s passed, " Mackenzie Kin g the n tol d th e Hous e o f Commons , when an y government o r executiv e should fee l tha t they should take it upo n themselves, withou t th e approva l o f Parliament , t o commi t a countr y t o obligations involvin g an y considerabl e financia l outlay s o r activ e under takings. In al l case s where obligation s o f suc h a characte r ar e bein g assume d internationally, Parliamen t itself shoul d b e assure d of havin g th e ful l righ t o f approving wha t i s done before bindin g commitment s ar e made . I woul d not confine parliamentar y approva l only t o thos e matter s whic h involv e militar y sanctions an d th e like . I fee l parliamentar y approva l shoul d appl y wher e there ar e involve d matter s o f larg e expenditur e o r politica l considerations of a far-reaching character. 7 In 1950 , a n amendmen t o f th e Nationa l Defenc e Ac t require d tha t whenever th e Governor-in-Counci l place s Canadia n force s o n activ e service, Parliamen t shal l mee t withi n te n day s i f i t i s no t alread y i n session. It i s on e thin g t o mak e provision, b y resolutio n o r b y law , fo r legis lative control ; i t i s anothe r t o pu t i t int o effect . Som e reluctanc e o n th e •"Imperial Conferenc e (1923) , Summary o f Proceedings, p . 14 . While attendin g th e Imperia l Conferenc e o f 1923 , Mackenzie Kin g me t E . D . Morel, th e leadin g spiri t o f th e Unio n fo r Democrati c Control . I n a lette r t o J. S . Woodsworth, th e leade r o f th e Canadia n Labou r party , More l describe d hi s interview wit h th e Canadia n Prim e Minister : " I ha d a privat e an d confidentia l talk wit h Mackenzi e Kin g abou t th e Europea n situation , an d als o abou t ou r circular lette r abou t foreig n polic y control , whic h h e a t th e tim e acknowledge d very courteously . Withou t i n an y wa y committin g himsel f a t all , o r eve n committing myself , I ma y sa y that I gathere d fro m ou r conversatio n tha t h e wa s no t unfavourable t o th e idea , an d I don' t se e wh y yo u o r other s shoul d no t consul t together t o se e whethe r yo u canno t introduc e int o th e Canadia n Hous e a t th e earliest possibl e moment , a resolutio n muc h o n th e line s o f th e Anne x attache d to the letter. . . . "A speec h whic h I hear d Mackenzi e Kin g giv e wit h regar d t o Dominio n participation i n foreig n polic y a t th e Hous e o f Common s dinne r t o th e Prim e Ministers th e othe r day , wa s ver y muc h alon g th e line s tha t I hav e alway s advocated, namely , tha t w e mus t avoi d th e Imperia l Foreig n Offic e ide a an d ensure tha t decision s on foreig n polic y ar e reall y democratic . Tha t w e ca n onl y do by securing full parliamentar y control. . . ." (E . D. Morel t o J. S. Woodsworth, Nov. 16 , 1923 , Woodswort h Papers. )

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part o f Mackenzi e Kin g t o abid e b y bot h lette r an d spiri t o f th e formula tha t "Parliamen t wil l decide " wa s displaye d a s earl y a s 1929 , when a n important decisio n o n th e St . Lawrence Waterwa y projec t wa s taken b y order-in-counci l withou t prio r parliamentar y approval . Whe n criticized for thi s procedure, th e Prim e Ministe r firs t too k refug e i n th e argument tha t Parliamen t wa s no t competen t t o dea l wit h th e kin d of decisio n involved : "I n negotiatin g a n agreemen t wit h respec t t o water-power, water rights , an d navigation , where the consideration s ar e so largely technica l i n thei r nature , Parliamen t i s scarcel y i n a positio n to discus s suc h matter s i n detail ; i t i s fo r expert s t o wor k ou t thes e matters." H e adde d tha t th e principl e o f parliamentar y contro l wa s i n this cas e safeguarde d by a provisio n enablin g Parliamen t t o annu l th e Order-in-Council i f it wishe d to d o so . Thi s explanatio n di d no t satisf y E. J. Garland, a Progressive member from Alberta : I a m afrai d m y righ t hon . frien d i s on th e horn s o f a dilemm a i n thi s case . If becaus e o f a lac k o f technica l knowledg e Parliamen t i s incapabl e o f arriving a t a n intelligen t decisio n i n th e firs t place , lackin g tha t technica l knowledge ho w i s Parliament t o arriv e a t a n intelligen t decisio n wit h regar d to the annulmen t o f an order in council later ?

The Prim e Ministe r then resorte d t o what was later t o becam e a favourite and familia r device , pleading the undesirabl e consequences o f parlia mentary discussio n upo n internationa l negotiation s i n progress . "Th e present moment, " h e declared , "i s perhap s a critica l on e a t whic h t o discuss a n internationa l matte r whic h affect s ou r relation s wit h ou r neighbour t o th e south . I d o no t wis h t o discourag e discussio n i n an y way . . . but i n debatin g thi s matte r I hop e hon . gentleme n wil l bea r in min d th e fac t tha t whateve r i s sai d i n thi s Parliamen t a t thi s tim e may hav e a very far-reachin g effect upo n som e decision s which ma y b e reached i n the very near futur e wit h regard to matter s whic h are o f real concern t o both countries . . . ." 8 The lette r o f th e "Parliamen t wil l decide " formul a wa s observed i n September 1939 , bu t whethe r it s spiri t wa s wholl y i n evidenc e som e authorities ar e incline d t o doubt . "I n th e wee k fro m Septembe r 2 t o September 10, " Professo r K . W . McNaught ha s observed , despite King' s telephon e denia l o f Canada' s belligeren t statu s t o Presiden t Roosevelt, th e Government' s action s coul d b e defende d onl y o n th e assump tion tha t Canad a wa s a t war . Th e enem y wa s defined , al l arme d service s were pu t o n a ful l wa r basis , enem y national s wer e arrested , an d tradin g with th e enem y wa s prohibite d b y order-in-council . O n Septembe r 7 , th e Governor General' s speec h referre d t o "th e stat e o f wa r whic h no w exists" . . . . By the time Parliamen t me t there wa s nothing lef t fo r i t to decide . . . . The Common s wa s bein g aske d t o endors e a polic y alread y implemente d and to give the Governmen t a blank chequ e fo r th e future." 9

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Wars ar e seldo m beneficia l to legislatures . Durin g th e year s 1939-4 5 the influenc e of the Canadia n Parliamen t upo n polic y necessaril y diminished, bu t it s prestig e suffere d perhap s unnecessaril y becaus e o f the Government' s addictio n t o orders-in-counci l a s a metho d fo r takin g decisions. "An y criticis m base d o n th e shee r numbe r o f th e Orders-in Council," on e o f it s critic s acknowledges , would b e bot h sill y an d unfair . . . . Abou t 9 5 pe r cen t o f them wer e fo r approval o f contract s an d routin e administrativ e purposes . Onl y abou t 4 o r 5 pe r cen t wer e "o f a legislativ e character," an d man y o f thes e wer e unex ceptionable. . . . Mr . King' s offence , constitutionall y speaking , i s no t tha t he legislate d b y Order-in-Council , bu t tha t h e di d s o t o a n altogethe r un necessary an d eve n dangerou s degree ; an d th e offenc e i s particularly heinou s because h e had himsel f s o often denounce d it . H e sinne d agains t th e light. 10 THE CABINET , TH E HOUS E O F COMMONS, AN D DISCUSSIO N OF FOREIG N AFFAIR S

The formul a "Parliamen t wil l decide " implie d tha t "Parliamen t wil l discuss"; sensibl e decisio n coul d onl y follo w ful l deliberatio n o f foreig n policy matters . Thi s wa s ver y different , however , fro m wha t th e inven tor o f the formul a was prepared t o allow , fo r i n Mackenzi e King' s vie w the les s th e legislator s discusse d externa l affair s th e better . I t earl y became hi s custo m t o discourag e discussio n b y pleadin g th e nee d t o avoid upsettin g delicat e negotiations . Suc h a ple a ma y b e wholl y legiti mate becaus e wholl y genuine ; every foreig n secretar y ha s ha d occasio n to resor t t o it . Bu t fo r Mackenzi e Kin g it s purpos e wa s les s t o furthe r the settlemen t o f internationa l dispute s tha n t o preven t th e expressio n of politicall y embarrassin g point s o f view . T o suppos e tha t discussio n of internationa l affair s i n th e Canadia n Hous e o f Common s migh t adversely affec t th e cours e o f event s i n Europ e wa s nothin g i f no t absurd, bu t th e absurdit y o f th e argumen t di d no t preven t th e Prim e Minister fro m makin g frequen t us e o f it . I n 1926 , fo r example , whe n J. S . Woodsworth sough t t o plac e befor e th e Hous e o f Common s a motion tha t "Canad a shoul d refus e t o accep t an y responsibilit y fo r complications arisin g fro m th e foreig n polic y o f the Unite d Kingdom, " Mackenzie Kin g promptly sough t to stav e off discussio n on the groun d that "remark s mad e i n th e cours e o f debat e woul d almos t certainl y be cable d t o Europ e wher e thei r bearin g migh t no t b e understood ; i t would b e inadvisabl e t o incu r a ris k o f th e kin d whil e th e Leagu e o f Nations i n it s assembl y a t Genev a i s considerin g matter s o f Britis h

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foreign polic y an d o f great international import."11 I t mus t be adde d i n fairness tha t R . B . Bennet t displaye d a s Prime Ministe r durin g 1930- 5 a simila r antipathy to parliamentar y discussion of foreign policy . Aske d by J . S . Woodswort h i n Novembe r 193 2 t o stat e "what , i f any , i s th e policy o f Hi s Majesty' s Governmen t i n Canad a i n regar d t o th e situa tion i n th e Fa r Eas t an d t o th e Lytto n Report, " th e Prim e Ministe r replied: "I t i s no t though t desirabl e t o ente r int o a discussio n a t thi s time wit h respect t o a matte r o f thi s kind , fo r i t no t onl y canno t serv e the publi c interes t bu t woul d be anticipatin g action tha t migh t be taken , and therefor e i s t o b e deprecated." 12 Bu t i t shoul d als o b e note d tha t Mackenzie Kin g a s Leade r o f th e Oppositio n accepte d thi s evasio n without protest; indeed , a year later, whe n a statemen t o f the Canadia n delegate a t th e Leagu e o f Nation s o n th e Manchuria n crisi s wa s unde r scrutiny i n th e Hous e o f Commons , h e declare d tha t h e woul d no t be responsible fo r provoking parliamentary discussion by commenting on the statement. 13 Afte r 1935 , Prim e Ministe r onc e more , Mackenzi e King steadfastl y refuse d t o b e draw n int o debat e i n Parliamen t o n suc h issues a s the Government' s attitud e to sanctions , collectiv e securit y an d the Leagu e o f Nations. At th e tim e of the Rhinelan d crisis, for example , he me t a reques t fo r a statemen t o f th e Government' s attitud e b y observing: I questio n i f ther e i s anythin g w e o f thi s Hous e coul d ad d whic h woul d b e helpful t o thos e wh o a t th e momen t ar e involve d i n very critical an d delicat e negotiations o n a matte r o f suprem e concer n t o mankind . . . . I thin k i t would b e i n ever y wa y preferable , havin g regar d t o th e extremel y critica l nature o f th e negotiation s an d th e fac t tha t th e situatio n keep s changin g no t only fro m da y t o da y bu t sometime s fro m hou r t o hour , fo r hon . member s of thi s House to forbear , i f the y ca n se e their wa y t o d o so , from preferrin g any reques t whic h migh t provok e discussio n i n ou r countr y a t thi s time. 14

When J . S . Woodswort h responde d t o thi s extraordinar y repl y b y remarking tha t "w e canno t g o indefinitel y withou t havin g som e indica tion fro m th e Governmen t a s t o wha t th e attitud e o f Canad a is, " th e Prime Ministe r answered : May I say to my hon. frien d that, i n a word, th e attitud e o f the Governmen t of Canad a is to do nothing itself an d i f possible t o prevent anythin g occurrin g which wil l precipitat e on e additiona l facto r int o th e all-importan t discus sions whic h ar e now taking plac e i n Europe. . . ,15

This exaggerate d reticenc e di d no t g o uncriticized a t th e time . Saturday Night, acknowledgin g that "Canad a ha s bu t a mino r par t i n th e chorus o f th e oper a no w bein g presente d o n th e internationa l stage, " expressed it s opinion tha t i t woul d nevertheless "b e interestin g to kno w

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what par t w e ar e goin g t o sin g whe n w e d o sing" ; an d th e Winnipeg Tribune inquire d mor e bluntly: "Ho w ca n we uphold th e hands of thos e who ar e endeavourin g t o maintai n the peac e o f th e worl d i f w e simpl y sit lik e a bump o n a lo g an d hav e nothin g t o say?" 16 I t wa s doubtles s owing t o suc h criticis m tha t th e Prim e Ministe r decide d t o brea k hi s long silenc e i n orde r t o mak e a ful l foreig n polic y statemen t i n th e House o f Commons . H e delivere d i t o n Jun e 18 , 1936 ; an d a s hi s remarks were the first he had devote d to the international situatio n sinc e December 6 , 1935 , h e prefaced them with a justification for th e absenc e of previou s statements : It ha s been contende d tha t th e Governmen t ha s not mad e clea r it s policy o n the importan t problems , immediat e an d future , whic h hav e bee n raise d b y the outbrea k an d progres s o f th e Italian-Ethiopia n conflict . I t i s tru e tha t the Governmen t ha s decline d t o mak e a statemen t a t som e critica l stage s when a statemen t woul d b e premature , an d woul d complicat e rathe r tha n advance a solution . I believ e i t wil l b e generall y concede d tha t th e cours e of event s i n Europ e ha s mor e tha n justifie d th e Government' s attitude . It i s undoubtedl y essentia l tha t i n Parliamen t an d outsid e o f i t ther e should b e ful l an d responsibl e discussio n o f th e vita l question s o f Canada' s relations t o othe r states . Ther e ha s not bee n sufficien t discussio n i n th e past . That ha s bee n du e t o ou r slo w emergenc e fro m th e colonia l attitud e o f mind; ou r relativ e immunit y fro m an y seriou s dange r o f wa r o n ou r ow n account; th e rea l difficultie s inheren t i n ou r preoccupatio n wit h th e tremen dous, absorbin g an d paramoun t task s o f achievin g economi c developmen t and nationa l unity , whic h with u s tak e th e plac e o f th e preoccupatio n wit h the fea r o f attac k an d th e dream s o f glor y whic h bese t olde r an d mor e crowded countries ; an d th e unparalleled complexit y o f ou r positio n a s a member o f th e Britis h Commonwealt h o f Nation s an d on e o f th e nation s of th e America n continent. 17

An hones t reckonin g woul d hav e adde d tha t insufficien t discussio n o f foreign polic y i n Parliamen t had als o bee n du e t o th e Prim e Minister' s determination t o kee p Parliamen t fro m discussin g foreign policy; only a few week s earlier, Mackenzi e King had writte n privately that h e wanted "as littl e discussio n a s possibl e . . . i n ou r Hous e o f Common s wit h respect t o the presen t Europea n situation. " If thes e remark s stirre d an y hope s tha t fo r th e futur e th e Govern ment stoo d read y t o embar k upo n a fres h experimen t i n publi c educa tion b y encouragin g discussio n o f internationa l affair s i n Parliament , they wer e soo n disappointed . Parliamen t migh t decide ; bu t i t mus t no t be allowe d t o kno w what i t wa s deciding . I t wa s a curiou s an d unedi fying chapte r i n th e histor y o f Canadia n democrac y when , a s a criti c remarked afte r th e war, "at the time of one of the great worl d crises . . . twenty-seven minute s wer e devote d t o externa l affair s i n th e Hous e o f Commons an d over eight hours to a tariff o n asparagus." 18

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During th e wa r years , Parliament' s influenc e throug h discussio n and debat e suffere d alon g with its decision-makin g powers. "Ideas an d policies no longer travelled upward from Parliamen t but downward from officials t o th e Cabine t an d the n t o th e Hous e o f Common s for cursory approval. Parliamen t i n wartim e held littl e mor e tha n a watchin g brief with a righ t o f criticis m an d th e fina l prerogativ e o f deat h sentenc e against th e Government , an d tha t i t di d no t inten d t o us e excep t i n a suprem e crisis." 19 Th e nadi r o f neglec t wa s reache d o n Januar y 25 , 1940, when , summone d by th e Prim e Minister , Parliamen t listene d t o him announc e its dissolution. Of this occasion a n authorit y has written : The Speec h fro m th e Thron e usuall y ends : "I n invitin g your consideratio n to th e importan t matter s whic h wil l engag e you r attention , I pra y tha t Divine Providenc e may guide an d bles s your deliberations, " o r word s t o tha t effect. Tha t woul d no t d o thi s time ; ther e wer e n o "importan t matters" ; there wer e t o b e n o "deliberations. " Parliamen t ha d bee n summone d onl y to liste n an d leave . So the Speec h thi s time woun d up : "I n al l tha t pertain s to th e discharg e of you r responsibl e duties , ma y Divin e Providenc e b e you r strength an d guide. " Divin e Providenc e neve r ha d a n easier job . Ther e wer e no "responsibl e duties. " Member s ha d bee n summone d onl y t o hea r tha t their dutie s were a t an end . N o othe r Prim e Ministe r i n an y Britis h country , before o r since, eve r dare d t o offe r suc h a n affron t t o Parliament. . . .20

On severa l occasion s durin g th e war , Mackenzi e Kin g warde d off discussion o f foreig n polic y i n th e Hous e o f Common s b y statin g that discussion o f such matters in wartime was not i n th e publi c interest. As late a s 1943 , h e decline d t o mak e any statemen t abou t post-wa r policy on th e groun d that "th e mor e publi c discussio n is diverted to questions about wha t is going to b e th e attitud e of thi s country and tha t country at th e peac e tabl e an d i n th e postwa r period , th e les s th e countr y will be impresse d wit h th e fac t tha t thi s wa r itsel f i s no t ye t won." 21 Mr . Winston Churchill , b y contrast , was under no suc h inhibition; two days later h e outline d t o th e Hous e o f Common s a t Westminste r a Fou r Year Pla n fo r post-wa r Britain . The wanin g authority of th e Canadia n Parliament durin g the Second World War was recalled in later years by a member o f the Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabinet : Members wer e rarel y consulte d eithe r abou t polic y o r otherwise— a fa r cr y indeed fro m th e ol d prewa r day s [i n th e 1920's ] whe n th e sam e Prim e Minister, the n leadin g th e Hous e o f Common s a s a minorit y government , had strenuousl y uphel d th e doctrin e tha t th e Cabine t wa s onl y a committe e of th e Hous e o f Common s an d coul d hav e n o powe r withou t th e prio r decision o f th e member s o f tha t House . I n fact , member s learne d o f deci sions fro m their seat s i n the House , i n man y instance s lon g afte r actio n ha d been taken . I f the y objected , the y wer e tol d tha t ther e wa s a wa r on . Eve n their well-mean t advocac y o f wa r measure s o r decision s wa s discourage d by the ministers concerne d who , rightl y or wrongly, fel t competen t t o handl e

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their ow n busines s i n th e Hous e an d wer e anxiou s t o ge t throug h wit h i t i n order to dea l with pressing problem s in the Department . Even th e mos t abl e and mos t eage r M.P . was boun d t o fee l a sens e o f hi s own impotence . Departmenta l officers , eve n o f th e mos t junio r order , sense d this an d th e prestig e o f Parliamen t decrease d accordingly . Th e publi c bega n to loo k t o th e Prim e Ministe r an d th e member s o f th e Cabinet , they—an d they alone—cam e t o b e regarde d a s responsibl e fo r everythin g concerne d with th e war . Thi s increase d th e prestig e o f th e Cabine t an d Governmen t enormously, an d correspondingl y decrease d tha t o f Parliament . Th e trut h of th e matte r i s Parliament ha s no t ye t [1957 ] recovere d it s position. 22

During th e post-wa r years , discussion of foreig n affair s b y th e Hous e of Common s becam e mor e frequent , bu t improvemen t wa s neithe r spectacular no r rapid . I n 194 7 onl y 45 0 o f nearl y 7,00 0 page s o f recorded debat e were concerned wit h internationa l problems, compare d to 15 0 out o f 5,000 in 1935 . Bu t a t least thi s situatio n coul d n o longe r justly be blamed upon th e Government . Mr . Leste r Pearson , o n becom ing Secretary of State for External Affair s i n 1949 , determine d fro m th e first t o us e hi s hig h offic e a s a n instrumen t o f publi c educatio n an d the Hous e o f Commons a s a mean s o f reachin g th e public . I f hi s efforts wer e no t wholl y successful , th e faul t la y wit h thos e member s of th e Hous e wh o continue d t o b e apatheti c durin g foreig n polic y debates. "S o fa r a s discussion s i n th e Hous e o f Common s ar e con cerned," Mr . Pearso n remarke d i n Ma y 1950 , " I woul d lik e t o se e all the discussio n w e ca n hav e o n externa l affairs . Onc e o r twic e I hav e pleaded fo r more interest in external affair s i n the House o f Commons to empty benche s an d empt y pres s galler y seats , an d th e debate s hav e tailed off . Onc e th e debat e ende d s o suddenl y tha t I foun d mysel f winding u p a discussio n whe n I though t i t ha d jus t begun . Possibl y w e ourselves, i n th e Hous e o f Commons , ar e somewha t t o blam e fo r th e lack o f interest." 23 THE MEMBE R O F PARLIAMEN T AND FOREIG N POLIC Y

If ther e is such a person a s an average member of Parliament, i t may b e said o f hi m tha t ove r th e year s h e ha s no t displaye d muc h interes t i n or knowledg e of foreign affairs . Suc h indifference flow s naturall y enough from th e prevalen t conceptio n o f representativ e democrac y i n Canada . "In ninety-nin e case s ou t o f on e hundred , th e membe r goe s t o Ottaw a to speak for his own constituency and no other. That i s what the member thinks h e i s sen t t o Ottaw a t o do ; tha t i s wha t th e elector s thin k h e i s sent t o do." 24 A s a consequenc e th e membe r devote s n o mor e tim e

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to foreig n polic y tha n h e believe s hi s constituent s woul d wis h hi m to , which i n practic e i s ver y littl e tim e indeed . "Le t u s conciliat e Quebe c and Ontario, " remarked a member o f the Hous e o f Common s i n 1923 , "before w e star t conciliatin g Roumani a an d Ukrainia," 25 an d thi s general orde r o f priorit y ha s no t radicall y altere d ove r th e years . N o one though t i t inappropriat e whe n the Leade r o f the Opposition , R . B . Hanson, remarke d i n th e cours e o f his speech o n th e Addres s i n 1940 : "I di d intend t o say something about the St. Lawrence Waterway , bu t I do not think I should trespass muc h longer o n the time of the House. . . . I cannot , however , refrai n fro m sayin g somethin g abou t th e positio n of truck transportatio n i n Princ e Edwar d Island." 26 If on e look s t o th e Uppe r House , whos e member s hav e n o constitu ents requirin g the m t o fi x thei r attentio n exclusivel y upo n th e hom e front, fo r mor e informe d discussio n o n internationa l affairs , on e look s in vain. O f the American Senate , Joh n Ha y remarke d tha t treaties ente r it a s bull s th e arena , neve r t o leav e alive ; i n th e Canadia n Senat e thi s is no t tru e o f treatie s bu t i t i s o f senators . The y ar e appointe d b y th e government of the day for life, bu t durin g the years to come—an d ther e may b e man y year s t o com e fo r some—rarel y affec t th e cours e o f external policy . Suc h feebl e influenc e i s du e partl y t o th e Senate' s waning power s i n th e constitution ; no t sinc e 1913 , whe n th e Libera l majority i n th e Senat e defeate d Si r Rober t Borden' s nava l bill , ha s the Uppe r Hous e lef t it s mar k upo n nationa l policy , an d ther e i s general agreemen t tha t an y Senate rash enough to repeat th e experimen t would brin g a long-simmering movement fo r it s abolitio n t o th e boilin g point. I t i s du e a s wel l t o th e qualit y o f senatoria l appointments . Wit h a fe w conspicuou s exceptions , thes e ten d t o b e part y workhorse s pas t their prim e fo r who m th e Senat e become s a kin d o f politica l pastur e where ol d ag e may be spen t in tranquil but no t unfamilia r surroundings . One migh t suppos e tha t th e leisurel y temp o o f th e senatoria l life , it s opportunities fo r researc h an d reflection , th e attenuatio n o f part y ties , create unusua l opportunit y fo r elde r statesmanship , particularl y i n internal affairs , i f onl y fo r th e fe w abl e an d willin g t o tak e advantag e of it . Eve n here , however , the talent s o f the aler t senato r ar e consumed by th e extraneou s function s whic h by conventio n th e Uppe r Hous e ha s come t o perform . O f thes e it s rol e a s a divorc e cour t i s b y fa r th e most distracting . "Al l o f th e evidenc e ha s t o b e take n dow n b y th e stenographic staff, " a senato r recentl y complained , "an d i t i s simpl y impossible t o ru n th e Senat e an y mor e tha n thre e day s a wee k an d carry o n a successfu l divorc e cour t proceedings . . . . The result . . . is yo u ca n barel y ge t tim e t o dea l wit h th e specifi c legislatio n tha t

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comes throug h [fro m the Hous e of Commons], " let alon e get tim e for significant contributio n to th e makin g of foreig n policy. 27 Even i n th e Lowe r House , lac k o f opportunit y t o influenc e foreig n policy ha s a dampenin g effec t upo n th e interes t o f individua l member s in internationa l problems . I n th e Unite d State s Senate , whos e member s may no t merel y influenc e polic y but determin e it , it was not s o long ag o that a newl y electe d colleagu e receive d advic e "t o avoi d servic e o n a fancy committe e lik e tha t o f foreig n affair s i f h e wishe d t o retai n hi s hold upo n hi s constituent s becaus e the y care d nothin g abou t inter national questions." 28 Canadia n constituent s car e littl e more , bu t th e member of the House o f Commons ha s not eve n the consolation o f bein g able t o thwar t the Governmen t o n a foreig n polic y matte r t o whic h h e is opposed . Opportunitie s i n Oppositio n ar e restricte d b y th e Govern ment's readines s to allo w time fo r interrogatio n an d debate , and , a s ha s been shown , this until recently was very little time. I t is naive to suppos e that th e Governmen t is eager t o accep t usefu l suggestion s fro m Opposi tion members . " A fe w of these th e Cabine t ma y b e abl e t o accep t wit h dignity; bu t le t thi s becom e frequent , an d th e electorat e wil l naturall y conclude th e simple r solutio n woul d b e t o plac e i n powe r th e part y which i s s o fertil e i n valuabl e idea s rathe r tha n acquir e the m i n thi s circuitous fashion." 29 Fertilit y i n valuabl e ideas ha s not , however , bee n the conspicuou s characteristi c o f parliamentar y oppositions , especiall y in th e fiel d o f foreig n policy . It i s almos t a s rare , perhap s eve n mor e rare , amon g th e ran k an d file supporter s o f th e Government . To o man y brillian t suggestion s from th e bac k benche s ma y caus e th e fron t benche s t o loo k foolis h b y comparison, an d ar e therefor e discouraged . Light s mus t shin e unde r bushels, i f the y ar e t o illuminat e anythin g a t all . Mor e exactly , the y must shin e i n th e parliamentar y party caucus . What influenc e member s may have in this private* gatherin g depend s mainly o n th e inclinatio n o f thei r leade r t o le t the m hav e thei r say . Mackenzie Kin g ha s bee n describe d a s " a grea t believe r i n th e valu e of discussio n in th e part y caucus, though h e neve r permitte d th e caucu s to determin e policy . H e deliberatel y encourage d th e privat e member s to ai r thei r grievance s an d eve n t o attac k th e Minister s and , a t times , was able in this way to get departmental attitudes and procedures change d without direct interventio n o n his ow n part." 30 Th e vitalit y o f the part y *Or nominall y private . A membe r o f th e C.C.F . part y ha s stated : " I kno w inside o f a n hou r wha t ha s take n plac e i n th e Libera l an d Conservativ e caucuse s and I' m not supposed t o know. . .. All the newspapermen know . . . ." Interview for th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation (hereafte r cite d a s C.B.C . interview) .

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caucus tend s t o fluctuat e wit h th e siz e o f th e parliamentar y following, particularly i n th e Governmen t ranks . I f a majorit y i s small , an d there fore precarious , th e caucu s ca n b e extremel y important ; i f i t i s large , and therefore secure, the tendency is for it to degenerat e into a meaning less ritual . On e membe r o f the exceptionall y larg e (20 5 seats ) Conser vative majorit y whic h b y 196 1 ha d bee n i n powe r fo r thre e year s com plained tha t "W e spen d mos t o f ou r tim e i n caucu s talkin g abou t secretarial servic e o r parkin g space . W e ar e neve r consulte d abou t policy, an d hardl y eve r ge t a chanc e t o discus s i t a t all." * Member s of th e Senat e atten d meeting s o f th e parliamentar y caucu s o f thei r party where , accordin g t o on e senator , the y ar e no t alway s welcom e guests: "The y tal k to o muc h i n caucus . Tha t i s th e complain t o f th e M.P.'s. The y ar e alway s givin g the m th e experienc e tha t the y had , and I thin k th e M.P.'s resen t i t a little."31 If the ordinary member, whether on the Government o r the Opposition side of the House of Commons finds himself without influence upon foreign policy decisions, he has increasing opportunity t o gain some experience of external affairs . H e ma y becom e a membe r o f th e Hous e o f Commons Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs . H e ma y atten d meeting s o f the NAT O Parliamentar y Associatio n o r th e Commonwealt h Parlia mentary Association , an d fraterniz e wit h his congressiona l counterpart s in th e Canada-Unite d State s Interparliamentar y Group . H e ma y b e taken o n guide d tours o f America n defenc e installations. He ma y eve n go to Europ e or the Middl e East , althoug h parliamentar y "junketing " is discourage d an d infrequent . Members o f Parliament , mainl y bu t no t exclusively supporter s o f th e Government , ar e normall y include d i n the Canadian delegatio n t o the General Assembl y o f the United Nations . Such assignment s d o no t brin g th e membe r muc h close r t o th e centres o f decision , bu t the y enabl e hi m t o indulg e i n agreeabl e fashion his interes t i n foreig n affairs , the y flatte r hi s sens e o f self-importance , and the y may contribut e something to hi s knowledge and understanding of worl d problems . It canno t b e said, however, that they have dramatic ally improve d th e qualit y of foreig n polic y debate , eithe r i n th e Hous e of Common s o r i n the Senate . Ther e i s a tendency t o describ e a t lengt h *Quoted i n Blai r Fraser , "Backstag e a t Ottawa, " Maclean's Magazine, Marc h 12, 1960 , p . 2 . Othe r member s o f th e sam e part y disagree , on e remarking : "Caucus [is ] a les s courteou s plac e [than ] th e Hous e o f Commons , a mor e raucous place . . . . Fewe r hold s ar e barre d an d fewe r restraint s ar e place d o n the expression o f a n opinion . . . . The storm s tha t blo w i n caucu s fro m tim e t o tim e are prodigious. " Anothe r describe d th e caucu s a s "completel y unfettered, " an d added: "Ther e hav e bee n Governmen t policie s altere d a s a resul t o f th e expres sion o f opinio n i n caucus. " C.B.C . interview .

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the kin d o f world th e speake r woul d like t o liv e in, an d fo r suc h rever y to pas s fo r seriou s analysis . Ther e i s a tendenc y t o appea l t o th e authority o f the written word, without much regard fo r whose word i t is. Finding a pres s clippin g bearin g upo n the topi c unde r discussion , a member wil l quot e it , wav e i t triumphantl y aloft , an d ru n n o greate r risk tha n t o b e aske d t o cit e th e dat e o f th e newspape r fro m whic h i t is taken o r challenge d t o read th e quotatio n i n it s entirety.* Apar t fro m the foreign policy spokesmen of the various parties, few members troubl e to kee p themselve s really wel l informe d o n specia l problem s o f externa l policy; fe w i f an y ar e capabl e o f contributin g muc h o f originalit y an d value to such subjects as defence o r foreign aid , although there i s a limitless fun d o f expertis e o n fores t management , gol d mining , freigh t rate s and th e Grea t Lake s lamprey . Whatever th e reason s fo r this , i t i s no t fo r wan t o f tim e fo r study—not, a t an y rate , i n th e cas e o f member s o f th e part y i n power . So far fro m bein g overworked, the chie f proble m o f th e ordinar y back bencher i n a larg e majorit y ha s bee n t o fin d enoug h significan t activit y to keep his self-respect. The member for the important Toront o constitu ency o f Yor k Centr e wa s quote d a s havin g said soo n afte r hi s electio n in 1957 : "Wha t a m I suppose d t o do ? Every mornin g I g o to m y offic e at nin e o'clock , sam e a s I d o a t home . B y ten, I' m al l through. . . . How d o I spen d th e res t o f the day? " Tw o years later h e tol d a corres pondent tha t h e coul d "stil l handl e al l his constituenc y business , chec k Hansard, answe r his mail, write five additional letter s eac h da y t o tota l strangers i n his riding to invite their view s on public question s . . . and finish before th e mornin g coffee break , wit h nothing to d o excep t listen . . . . H e think s thi s i s equall y tru e fo r al l private MP s wh o represen t urban riding s on th e governmen t side, an d h e say s most o f the m dislik e it a s muc h a s he does." 32 Evidenc e fro m othe r member s tend s t o bea r out hi s experience . On e Governmen t supporte r tol d a n interviewer : The averag e youn g member i s not bus y an d ther e isn' t sufficien t wor k t o do . That i s a sa d stat e o f affair s i n m y opinion , an d becaus e o f i t you'r e goin g to ge t a differen t typ e o f member . . . . I f yo u called a n electio n soon , I fee l that a lo t o f th e younge r member s woul d no t b e back , becaus e there's no t *"Mr. Pearson: . . . A Washingto n repor t o f las t Saturda y quote s a n officia l o f the Boein g aircraf t compan y a s sayin g tha t th e reduce d fund s fo r al l thes e missiles mad e b y th e Boein g aircraf t compan y wil l permi t n o majo r productio n at all , bu t wil l b e use d onl y t o continu e research . Mr . Diefenbaker: Fro m wha t is th e hon . gentlema n reading ? Mr . Pearson: Fro m a pres s statemen t fro m Washington attributin g a repor t t o a hig h officia l o f th e Boein g aircraf t company . Mr. Diefenbaker: Wha t i s th e newspaper ? Mr . Pearson: I hav e no t go t i t befor e me—Mr. Diefenbaker: Ah. " (Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Marc h 28 , 1960, p . 2502.)

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enough t o do . ... Woul d I com e back ? It' s a lon g wa y from home , let' s put it tha t way . We'r e talkin g her e o n a Saturda y morning , an d I haven' t go t very muc h t o d o fro m Frida y nigh t til l Monda y mornin g o r Monda y after noon at 2.30 . That' s a lon g tim e t o wait. . .. I thin k u p things t o do . Man y things. . . . I'v e jus t com e bac k fro m Squa w Valle y an d now I'm tryin g t o entertain th e ide a o f havin g Canad a hos t th e nex t Olympic s i n 1968 . . . . It's somethin g I'v e dreame d ou t o f m y ow n min d t o kee p m e occupie d an d busy. . . .3S

Members o f the Opposition , however , particularl y o f a smal l Opposi tion, ma y wit h ever y justificatio n plea d th e excus e o f overwork , an d i f they ar e overworke d the y ar e als o understaffed . " I coul d kee p a staf f of a t leas t tw o o r thre e goin g ful l tim e on researc h alone, " th e Opposi tion foreig n polic y criti c wa s quote d a s sayin g in Marc h I960, 34 an d i t is primaril y wit h thos e lik e hi m i n min d tha t variou s suggestion s fo r improving members ' facilitie s fo r researc h hav e bee n pu t forward . On e of thes e i s tha t ther e shoul d b e create d fo r th e Canadia n Parliamen t something simila r t o th e Legislativ e Referenc e Servic e o f th e Librar y of Congress . Parliamen t ha s it s ow n library , bu t n o provisio n i s mad e for assistanc e i n preparin g materia l fo r us e i n speeches , an d i t i s ofte n suggested tha t ther e shoul d b e suc h provision . I t i s jus t a s ofte n over looked, however , tha t th e Legislativ e Referenc e Servic e i s peculiarl y the produc t o f a legislatur e no t onl y independen t o f bu t frequentl y a t loggerheads wit h the executiv e branch o f the Unite d State s government ; to expec t i t t o functio n wit h simila r effectivenes s i n th e parliamentar y system ma y be to expec t to o much . A librar y of Parliament equippe d t o carry ou t researc h fo r oppositio n partie s migh t becom e s o effectiv e a s a sourc e o f criticis m o f governmen t policy a s t o temp t th e Governmen t to withhol d fund s an d cram p it s facilities . I t i s tru e tha t it s facilitie s would b e equall y availabl e t o member s o n th e Governmen t side , an d just a s true tha t the y ma y nee d them; * but , a s alread y pointe d out , th e Cabinet ma y hav e understandabl e i f ignobl e motive s fo r dimmin g th e brilliance o f it s ow n parliamentar y supporters . Fo r thes e reason s th e appropriate sponso r o f legislators' researc h withi n a parliamentar y sys tem o f governmen t is the politica l part y rathe r tha n th e bureaucracy. 35 The mos t effectiv e metho d s o fa r devise d fo r improvin g th e qualit y of parliamentar y discussio n of foreig n polic y i s the us e o f parliamentary committees. Thes e ar e discusse d i n th e followin g sectio n o f thi s chapter. *"I ha d a Governmen t Membe r yesterda y tel l m e tha t . . . h e neve r clip s anything. Th e onl y files he ha s i n hi s drawer s ar e correspondenc e files . Well , thi s is fantasti c . . . bu t point s u p th e nee d fo r research , guidanc e an d advice. " C.B.C. interview.

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PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE S

Suggestions t o creat e fo r th e Canadia n Parliamen t som e counterpar t of th e Foreig n Relation s an d Foreig n Affair s Committee s o f th e Unite d States Congres s wer e firs t mad e a t th e en d o f th e Firs t Worl d Wa r a s part o f th e genera l sentimen t fo r a mor e "democratic " foreig n policy . "There shoul d b e a Foreig n Affair s Committe e o f th e Hous e her e a t Ottawa," wrote a membe r o f th e Pres s Galler y i n 1920 , "whic h shoul d insist a s the American Senate does o n seein g ever y document tha t binds the Britis h Commonwealth . I t migh t no t d o muc h goo d bu t i t woul d put a crim p i n secre t diplomacy." 36 I n Marc h 192 4 a Governmen t motion t o creat e a Standin g Committee o n Industria l an d Internationa l Relations wa s adopte d b y th e Hous e o f Common s withou t debate , an d thirty-three member s wer e appointe d t o it . " I thin k th e combinatio n of industria l an d internationa l problems woul d b e a ver y prope r one, " the Prime Minister remarked . "Internationa l question s deal in very large part wit h industria l matters , an d certainl y ou r industria l problem s ar e becoming mor e an d mor e international i n character."* A mor e specific , though unstated , reason fo r th e od d combinatio n wa s the Government' s intention t o us e th e ne w Committe e t o dea l wit h thos e convention s o f the Internationa l Labou r Organisatio n givin g ris e t o problem s o f juris diction betwee n federa l an d provincia l governments , althoug h th e sol e reference durin g it s firs t fe w year s wa s th e I.L.O . Draf t Conventio n on th e Limitatio n o f Hour s o f Wor k i n Industria l Undertakings . I n later year s onl y tw o matter s o f externa l polic y wer e discusse d b y th e Committee: a plan to promote peac e by university scholarships (referre d to th e Committee i n 1931) ; an d th e questio n o f employin g orienta l seamen o n ship s o f Canadia n registr y (referre d i n 1935) . Afte r 193 6 the Committe e hel d n o furthe r meetings . In Septembe r 1945 , th e Prim e Minister , i n respons e t o suggestion s from member s o f th e Opposition , create d a ne w Hous e o f Commons Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs . It s thirty-fiv e member s (te n constituting a quorum ) ar e appointe d t o reflec t part y standin g i n th e House o f Commons, s o that th e Committe e i s in respec t o f membershi p the Hous e o f Commons i n miniature . Ther e is , however , a goo d dea l less partisan feelin g and repartee. No t onl y have Opposition member s of the Committe e generall y refraine d fro m usin g it a s a forum fo r politica l attacks upo n th e Government ; a numbe r o f Governmen t supporters i n •"Canada, H . o f C . Debates, Marc h 24 , 1924 , p . 617 . Thi s sectio n throughou t owes muc h t o Ole g Ale c Chistoff , "Th e Hous e o f Common s Standin g Committe e on Externa l Aifairs : A n Aspec t o f Parliamentar y Contro l o f Foreig n Polic y i n Canada" (unpublishe d M.A . dissertation , Universit y o f Toronto , 1955) .

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the Committe e hav e criticize d Governmen t polic y t o a degre e unthink able i n th e Hous e o f Commons . A t th e outse t th e Committe e wa s pre vented b y th e rule s o f th e Hous e fro m investigatin g matters othe r tha n those referre d t o i t by the House ; thi s s o restricted th e usefulnes s of th e Committee tha t i n 194 6 th e Prim e Ministe r accepte d a n Oppositio n suggestion tha t th e estimate s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s b e submitted t o th e Committe e fo r scrutiny . Thi s procedure , th e Prim e Minister explained , woul d "giv e th e Committe e a n opportunit y t o dis cuss anythin g that relate s t o externa l affairs . . . . I d o no t believ e it s members wil l b e abl e t o thin k o f anythin g relatin g t o externa l affair s which i t will not b e possibl e t o brin g up b y reference to som e particular appropriation."37 Sinc e 194 6 thi s practic e ha s bee n consistentl y fol lowed, givin g t o th e Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affair s scop e enjoyed b y n o othe r committe e o f Parliament . The mos t importan t function s performe d b y th e Committe e durin g the year s sinc e it s inceptio n are : (i ) expeditin g th e busines s o f th e House o f Commons ; (ii ) extractin g information fro m th e Ministe r an d officials o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs ; (iii ) assistin g th e Government in the formulatio n of policy throug h discussio n unimpaired by part y rancour ; (iv ) examinin g proposed legislatio n o n internationa l affairs t o improv e its quality. It migh t be expecte d tha t th e Governmen t would emphasiz e th e expeditin g an d legislative-scrutinizin g function s of the Committee , whil e th e Oppositio n woul d stres s it s investigativ e an d policy-making roles ; an d durin g th e formativ e year s thes e preference s were clearl y i n evidence. Whil e the Governmen t di d not attemp t t o con fine th e Committee's discussion s t o administratio n a s opposed t o policy , it trie d a t first to restrain an y tendency toward s free-wheeling investiga tion o f foreig n polic y i n th e broades t sense . " I d o no t thin k tha t an y members o f th e Committee, " remarke d th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s i n 1946 , want t o mak e an y determinatio n o f wha t futur e externa l polic y i s t o b e because . . . that i s subject to almos t hourl y change s i n view o f the develop ments takin g place. Probably th e Committe e woul d wis h t o hav e som e infor mation abou t wha t ha s bee n takin g plac e an d wha t ha s bee n th e attitud e taken b y Canad a i n internationa l discussion s s o a s t o for m it s ow n opinio n as t o whethe r tha t wa s prope r o r not , an d wha t i t seem s t o indicat e a s a general trend. 38

After Mr . Leste r Pearso n becam e Secretar y of State fo r Externa l Affair s in 1949 , th e Government' s earl y unfriendlines s t o uninhibite d discus sion o f foreig n polic y b y th e Committe e gav e way t o activ e encourage ment o f suc h discussion . I t i s the practic e fo r th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r

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External Affair s t o appea r befor e th e Committe e a t th e outse t o f it s deliberations t o delive r a genera l polic y statement , an d t o respon d t o questions an d comment s arisin g ou t o f hi s statement , befor e official s of th e Departmen t of Externa l Affair s ar e summone d for interrogatio n on administrativ e matters. " I wil l b e happ y t o b e a s ful l an d fran k a s possible whe n dealin g with question s of policy, " Mr . Pearso n tol d th e Committee i n 1951; 39 an d h e wa s a s goo d a s his word . Whether the Committee may properly assume a policy-formulating role, recommending course s o f actio n t o th e Government , i s a questio n frequently arisin g durin g its work. Th e Governmen t ha s take n th e vie w that it may not formulate policy. "Here we come to a pretty fundamenta l principle," remarke d th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e i n 1950 . "I t i s . . . tha t th e hon . membe r fo r Yor k Wes t wa s no t electe d b y th e people o f Canad a t o mak e suc h decisions." 40 Th e Governmen t ha s occasionally departe d fro m thi s principle , perhap s mos t notabl y i n 1947, whe n th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s attempted t o seek th e Committee' s "fran k opinio n a s t o wha t i t i s advisable , unde r all circumstances, to recommend a t this time" wit h respect t o a proposa l to purchas e housin g fo r th e Canadia n embass y in Washington . Mr . St . Laurent sough t to explai n hi s curiou s initiativ e i n thes e words : As long a s I a m Minister, I d o not mind takin g the responsibilit y fo r matter s which I reall y conside r vital , bu t whe n i t come s t o matter s whic h ar e no t really vital , I shoul d no t lik e t o hav e a controvers y ove r th e manne r i n which w e ar e conductin g th e externa l affairs . Smal l controversie s ca n hav e disastrous effect s o n the large r issues . Therefore , w e want t o avoid , a s muc h as possible , havin g an y smal l controversie s an d reserv e ou r positio n s o that when w e d o hav e a dispute , i t wil l b e abou t somethin g whic h i s reall y vital. . . .41

It i s greatl y t o th e Committee' s credit tha t i t refuse d t o accep t thi s doctrine wit h it s untenabl e distinction s betwee n vita l an d "no t reall y vital" matters , betwee n smal l an d larg e controversies . Th e Oppositio n foreign polic y critic , Gordo n Graydon , expresse d th e sens e o f th e Committee whe n h e remarke d i n reply : The responsibilit y fo r thi s rest s entirel y upo n th e Governmen t an d no t o n this Committee . I thin k th e Committe e must , i n al l fairness , discus s th e question s o the Governmen t wil l the n hav e th e variou s point s o f vie w whic h are brought out . I n this way, the Government may , possibly, arrive a t a mor e sensible, more appropriat e decision . I do not think i t is up to th e Committee . I d o not thin k we should se t a precedent. . . . Such thing s ar e reall y withi n the provinc e o f th e Governmen t rathe r tha n o f Parliament. 42

This vie w wa s later reaffirme d an d ha s prevailed . In 194 9 th e questio n arose whether the Committe e ought to summo n the Canadia n ambassa -

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dor t o China , Mr . T . C . Davis , t o questio n hi m abou t th e wisdo m of recognizing th e Communis t regime . "Nothin g w e ca n fin d ou t fro m Mr. Davis, " a membe r o f th e Committe e remarke d o n tha t occasion , "would b e of any assistanc e in a decision of policy because we have no t got to make that decision." 43 In 195 4 th e Committe e discusse d whethe r the Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s ough t t o infor m i t abou t plan s fo r opening diplomati c missions : Mr. Howard Green: Ar e yo u i n a positio n ye t t o tel l u s wher e th e ne w posts are going to be? Witness (Mr. R . A . MacKay, Department o f External Affairs): I regret , Sir, I a m not . Negotiation s ar e no t complete d i n this matte r an d I thin k i t would b e inappropriate t o make an y public statement . Mr. Green: Th e Departmen t i s stil l takin g th e positio n tha t the y won' t tell us until after th e event . Witness: Well, Sir , I think tha t is a decision fo r the Government. . . . Mr. Green: Tha t mean s tha t th e Committe e ca n hav e n o voic e i n th e decision a s to whether o r no t certai n ne w posts ough t t o b e opened . The Chairman (Mr. L.-P. Picard): Well , I thin k w e ar e a committe e o f the legislativ e branc h an d thes e decision s belon g t o th e executiv e branc h of th e government. 44

The mos t usefu l contributio n o f th e Committe e ha s bee n t o elici t information fro m th e Ministe r an d official s o f th e Departmen t o f External Affair s concernin g both externa l policy an d th e administratio n of externa l policy . I n th e opinio n o f it s ow n members , such succes s a s the Committe e has ha d a s a n investigatin g committee ha s bee n du e t o its ability to question official s directly , thus circumventing the procedur e in the House of Commons where only the Secretar y of State for Externa l Affairs, togethe r wit h th e Prim e Ministe r an d th e Parliamentar y Secre tary, i s availabl e fo r questioning . Th e Committe e ha s bee n carefu l no t to abus e this privilege. Witnesses are treate d wit h courtesy an d respect ; they are no t presse d further i f they plead tha t answer s come better fro m the Ministe r tha n fro m themselves , nor ar e the y cajole d o r bullie d int o disclosing informatio n if the y stat e disclosur e no t t o b e i n th e publi c interest. Thus , h i 1949 , whe n th e Committee considere d whethe r i t should interrogat e th e Canadia n ambassado r t o China , a membe r ex pressed th e sens e of the meetin g when he remarked : " I a m oppose d t o this t o th e las t ditch . I d o no t thin k w e should creat e a preceden t an d call a n ambassado r an d pu t hi m o n th e grille. " Anothe r membe r aske d rhetorically: "D o yo u thin k i t woul d b e prope r fo r thi s Committe e t o look int o th e diplomati c valis e o f an y o f ou r ambassadors ? I t i s stil l worse to as k an ambassado r t o com e here."45 Not al l committees of th e House o f Common s hav e show n suc h consideratio n fo r thei r witnesse s

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and some , indeed , hav e show n a marke d dispositio n toward s "hatche t forays o n civi l servants." 46 Witnesse s appearin g before th e Externa l Affairs Committe e ar e appropriatel y grateful , an d displa y their gratitud e by respondin g t o th e bes t o f thei r abilit y t o questioning . "Fe w Com mittees," remarke d th e Oppositio n foreig n polic y criti c i n 1951 , "hav e found hon . member s mor e satisfie d wit h thei r wor k and the way in which i t i s carried on." 47 In a number o f the other committee s o f the House o f Commons, bot h standing an d a d hoc, foreig n polic y matter s frequentl y come u p fo r dis cussion. For example , during the proceedings o f the Standing Committe e on Mines, Forests and Water in 1959 , consideratio n wa s given to "trad e with Re d China , th e inadequac y o f expor t credi t facilities , th e threa t o f Russian entry into world paper markets, the competition o f cheap labou r in th e Southern U.S.A." 48 The Standin g Committee o n Estimates , whe n reviewing th e propose d expenditure s o f suc h department s a s Nationa l Defence o r Citizenshi p an d Immigration , unavoidabl y move s int o th e realm o f externa l policy . However , thei r practice , unlik e tha t o f th e Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs , almos t invariabl y i s to refrai n from questionin g the broad outline s of government polic y an d t o confin e interrogation t o th e detail s o f departmenta l administration . The succes s o f th e Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affair s i n examining polic y i n it s broades t aspect s ha s le d t o th e suggestio n tha t a simila r Standin g Committe e o n Nationa l Defenc e shoul d b e created . There i s muc h logi c i n th e suggestion . I n fe w othe r area s o f nationa l policy ar e administrativ e decision s relatin g t o expenditur e mor e inti mately connecte d wit h politica l decision s relatin g t o strategy . I n recen t years, enormou s sum s o f mone y hav e bee n devote d t o th e acquisitio n of weapon s whos e strategi c usefulnes s ha s vanishe d eve n befor e the y came int o service , o r whos e strategi c usefulnes s wa s challenge d b y offi cials onc e associate d wit h thei r development , speakin g u p onl y afte r retirement. Th e feelin g wa s widesprea d tha t th e country' s fortun e wa s being squandere d t o n o purpose , an d tha t insufficien t informatio n wa s being mad e availabl e t o Parliamen t an d throug h Parliamen t t o th e public t o permi t a n intelligen t evaluatio n o f wha t ha d bee n don e an d of wha t was proposed. "W e ge t mos t o f ou r informatio n o n continenta l defence, abou t change s i n defenc e concept s an d strategy , fro m th e reports o f [Congressional ] committee s an d no t throug h anythin g w e get fro m th e Governmen t o f Canada, " Mr . Leste r Pearso n complaine d in 1960 . "Al l w e hav e i s a fo g o f silenc e penetrate d occasionall y b y a ministerial platitude." 49 In Marc h 196 0 th e Governmen t responde d t o publi c demand s b y

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creating a special fifteen-membe r Committe e o f the House o f Commons , along th e line s o f a simila r Special Committe e o n Defenc e Expenditure which functione d durin g th e fift h sessio n o f th e twenty-firs t Parliamen t in 1951-2 . I t wa s t o examin e "al l expenditur e o f publi c money s fo r national defence an d al l commitment s fo r expenditur e fo r nationa l defence sinc e Apri l 1 , 1958 , a s reporte d i n publi c accounts , an d t o report fro m tim e t o tim e thei r observation s an d opinion s thereon , an d in particular what , if any, economies consistent wit h the executio n o f th e policy decide d b y th e Governmen t may b e effecte d therein , wit h power to sen d fo r persons , paper s an d records , an d t o examin e witnesses." 50 These term s o f referenc e wer e criticize d b y th e Opposition . The y limited, i t wa s pointe d out , discussio n o f defenc e expenditur e t o wha t had bee n decide d befor e the las t availabl e repor t o f the publi c accounts , and a s this documen t bor e th e date Marc h 31 , 1959 , th e Specia l Com mittee coul d no t tak e up , consisten t wit h it s term s o f reference , th e most recen t an d controversia l o f th e Government' s defenc e decisions — the decisio n t o procee d wit h th e Bomarc-SAG E weapon s system . Th e terms of reference also specificall y confine d th e Committe e t o discussio n within th e framewor k o f establishe d policy . "W e visualiz e a ver y different committee, " declare d th e Leade r o f th e Oppositio n o n Marc h 17, 1960 , one tha t woul d discus s defenc e policy , on e tha t woul d mak e recommenda tions on defence policy . . . . We visualize a committee whic h woul d questio n the Ministe r o n defenc e polic y matters , a committe e whic h whe n necessar y for securit y reasons—an d i t would no t b e necessary ver y often—woul d mee t in camera ; a committe e whic h woul d no t examin e servin g officer s becaus e that i s contrary t o ou r parliamentar y tradition s an d I d o no t thin k i t woul d be wis e . . . , but a committe e whic h coul d examin e expert s i n the field of defence i n this countr y an d outside thi s country an d get their views . . . .51

Such a committe e di d no t materialize . Th e Specia l Committee , i n defi ance o f it s term s o f referenc e an d despit e th e attemp t o f it s chairma n to sto p it , consume d muc h of its time debatin g th e wisdo m of the limit s the Governmen t had place d o n it s freedom of inquiry. A proposal b y its Opposition member s that it should call witnesses other tha n Governmen t officials* wa s defeate d b y a vot e o f th e Committee ( 7 t o 5 ) o n th e grounds that i t "would b e a real departur e fro m ou r practic e i n Canad a to hav e polic y discussion s by thos e wh o hav e n o responsibility." 52 *The Libera l defenc e critic , Mr . Pau l Hellyer , announce d hi s intention , i f th e Committee allowed , t o cal l a s witnes s Dr . Omon d Solandt , forme r chairma n o f the Defenc e Researc h Board ; Genera l Howar d Graham , forme r Chie f o f th e General Staff ; an d Dr . Roge r Hilsman , professo r a t th e John s Hopkin s University .

ChapterFive I N T E L L I G E N C

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THE ORIGIN S AN D DEVELOPMEN T OF INTELLIGENC E FACILITIES

The ter m "intelligence " i s use d throughou t thi s chapte r t o mea n "th e kind o f knowledg e a stat e mus t posses s regardin g othe r state s i n orde r to assur e itsel f tha t it s caus e wil l no t suffe r no r it s understanding s fai l because it s statesme n an d soldier s pla n an d ac t i n ignorance." * I t wa s only slowl y that Canadia n government s cam e to appreciat e th e intimat e connection o f intelligenc e i n thi s sens e an d th e qualit y o f thei r externa l affairs. On e o f th e earlies t occasion s o n whic h th e lesso n wa s drive n home wa s whe n Si r Wilfri d Laurie r summone d Josep h Pop e t o hi s office o n June 22 , 1899 , an d gav e him " a job whic h is nothing else tha n to prepar e th e cas e o f th e Canadia n Govt . i n th e matte r o f th e Alask a boundary."1 Th e searc h thu s begu n fo r material s t o suppor t th e Cana dian contentio n a s t o wher e th e frontie r shoul d ru n revealed , perhap s for th e first time, th e lac k o f eve n th e mos t basi c dat a b y whic h Cana dian vital interests might be safeguarded. It did not take Pope many days to realiz e tha t th e informatio n availabl e i n Canad a wa s wholl y insuffi cient for his purpose, an d on July 1 0 he wrote to a friend in the Colonia l Office fo r assistance : It i s a cas e o f makin g brick s withou t straw . I fin d th e greates t difficult y i n collecting th e paper s necessar y t o a prope r understandin g o f th e case . Ar e there an y blu e book s publishe d abou t 188 8 a t hom e containin g th e corres pondence o f tha t period ? I f ther e ar e I wis h yo u woul d sen d m e a se t o f them—of al l the correspondenc e that ha s bee n publishe d sinc e 1886 . I hav e nothing betwee n th e Russia n Ukas e o f 182 5 & Lord Herschell' s letter s bu t fragmentary despatche s and a few Yankee "E x docs". . . . I dar e sa y you ma y b e surprise d a t m y request s fo r wha t ar e elementar y papers, bu t yo u mus t remembe r m y offic e ha s onl y t o d o wit h th e interna l affairs withi n th e Dominion . Alask a matter s hav e alway s bee n referre d t o the Ministe r o f th e Interior , an d thoug h I sa y i t wit h bate d breath , neve r properly deal t with . . . . We sadly lac k syste m here. 2 *Sherman Kent , Strategic Intelligence (Princeton , 1949) , p . 3 . Othe r studie s relating intelligenc e to foreig n polic y ar e Roge r Hilsman , Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions (Glencoe , 111. , 1956) , an d Harr y How e Ransom , Central Intelligence an d National Security (Cambridge , Mass. , 1958) .

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The materia l wa s dul y supplie d bu t when , a fe w month s later , Pope , his appetit e whetted , wrot e fo r more—"i t i s ver y desirabl e tha t w e should hav e a recor d o f thi s correspondence , an d th e Premie r rathe r looks to me to keep it up" 3—the reply, delaye d for tw o years, indicated that th e British authoritie s coul d not b e counted o n hi future a s regula r purveyors o f confidentia l materials: The P.O . [Foreig n Office] , afte r muc h searchin g o f heart , hav e agree d t o let yo u hav e th e accompanyin g volume s o f th e Alask a Prin t fo r you r personal use , an d o n conditio n tha t whe n yo u ceas e t o b e officiall y seize d of tha t questio n yo u wil l retur n them an d no t pas s them o n t o you r suc cessor. They kno w you but the y ar e scarcel y likel y t o hav e th e acquaintanc e of anyon e wh o succeed s you , a t an y rat e t o suc h a n exten t a s the y dee m requisite for the purpose.4

The searc h fo r informatio n o n Alask a boundar y le d Josep h Pop e t o Washington an d th e Stat e Departmen t i n 1903 , an d there , wit h con siderable reluctanc e o n th e par t o f th e officia l wit h who m h e wa s i n contact (wh o late r becam e apprehensiv e tha t hi s conduc t migh t b e treasonable), h e wa s allowed to photograp h it s collectio n o f documents concerning Russia n occupation of Alaska. 5 The inadequac y o f material s availabl e t o Canadia n government s fo r conducting thei r external relations wa s demonstrate d again a fe w years later whe n the Ministe r o f Labour , Rodolph e Lemieux , wen t t o Japa n to tr y t o negotiat e a treaty limiting th e numbe r o f Japanese wh o would be allowe d t o procee d t o Canad a a s immigrants . Allowe d b y th e British ambassador , Si r Claud e Macdonald , t o rea d Foreig n Offic e papers i n th e embass y library, Lemieu x learned mor e i n Toky o abou t the backgroun d o f th e proble m tha n h e ha d bee n abl e t o fin d ou t h i Ottawa. Je n'a i p u obteni r a Ottaw a [h e wrot e fro m Japan ] qu e de s bribe s d e documents e t d e correspondances, qu i rapportent a c e traite. I I fau t voir e a u contraire le s comm e records d u F.O . a Londre s son t parfait s e t comm e l a genese d u trait e e n es t complete. J'a i p u mettr e l a mai n su r ce s records (1 2 vols. semblable s au x factum s d e l a Cou r d'Appel) . "Forewarned i s forearmed." C'es t en consultant tou t cel a qu e j'ai cause, tou t e n evitant d'aborde r ceux qu i nou s etaien t defavorables . I I faudr a qu e Si r W . [Laurier ] reorga nise dan s l e servic e publi c tou t c e qu i a trai t a l a correspondanc e officielle . II n e fau t plu s qu'ell e soi t reparti e entr e le s different s ministeres. 6

On returnin g to Canada , Lemieu x wrot e t o th e Britis h Foreig n Secre tary to se e if a copy of the serie s coul d be sen t to Ottaw a for th e futur e use o f th e Canadia n Government ; h e emphasize d ho w valuabl e thi s material ha d bee n t o him during his recent negotiation s with the Japan ese authorities , an d promise d tha t it s confidentia l character woul d b e

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respected. Si r Edwar d Gre y replie d tha t i t woul d "no t b e possibl e t o issue complete d volume s of th e serie s owin g to th e stric t rule s w e ar e obliged to observ e with regard to thei r distributio n and t o th e principl e involved i n thes e rules ; but i f yo u wil l specif y wha t specia l documents you ma y wish to have , I wil l gladly do m y best t o mee t your wishes." 7 Lemieux sen t thi s lette r t o Josep h Pop e fo r hi s comments . " I retur n Sir E. Grey' s letter," Pope replied , which I thin k call s fo r n o answer . No t merel y ever y volume , bu t accordin g to m y recollection s nearl y ever y pag e o f th e Confidentia l Prints , contain s some referenc e t o Canada . Th e serie s i s a whole , an d portion s o f i t woul d be of n o use . Wha t a commentar y thi s afford s o n ou r lac k o f system ! I f m y suggestion ha d bee n listene d t o year s ago , w e shoul d no t hav e t o as k anybody fo r thes e paper s today , fo r w e should hav e ha d them ourselves. 8

The growin g need fo r orderl y an d complet e source s o f information to guid e th e Governmen t throug h increasingl y complicate d problem s of externa l policy was a principa l factor leadin g to th e creatio n o f th e Department o f Externa l Affairs . "W e ar e muc h handicappe d here, " Lord Grey , th e Governo r General , had writte n in 1907 , "b y th e wan t of an y organize d Department for th e co-ordinatio n an d reproductio n of information bearin g o n th e relation s betwee n Canad a an d th e U.S." 9 In hi s memorandum of the sam e year to th e Civi l Servic e Commission, Joseph Pop e cite d th e nation' s deficienc y h i wha t a late r generatio n of intelligenc e expert s hav e terme d "basi c descriptiv e intelligence" — "the groundwor k which give s meanin g t o day-to-da y chang e an d th e groundwork withou t whic h speculatio n into th e futur e i s likel y t o b e meaningless"10—as requiring the attention of a special branch of government. This material , he wrote, has bee n s o scattered , an d passe d throug h s o man y hand s tha t ther e i s n o approach t o continuit y i n an y o f th e departmenta l files . Suc h knowledg e concerning the m as is available is, for th e mos t part , lodged i n the memorie s of a fe w officials . . . . A s th e Dominio n grow s thi s stat e o f thing s mus t always b e gettin g worse. I f som e refor m i s no t soo n effecte d i t wil l b e to o late. Eve n now , I a m o f opinio n tha t i t woul d b e a n extremel y difficul t tas k to construc t fro m ou r officia l file s anythin g approachin g t o a complet e record o f an y o f th e internationa l question s i n whic h Canad a ha s bee n con cerned durin g the past fifty years. . . . My suggestio n is , tha t al l despatche s relatin g t o externa l affair s shoul d be referre d by the Priv y Counci l to one department , whos e staf f shoul d contain me n traine d i n th e stud y o f thes e questions . . . . Thes e official s should b e i n close touc h wit h the othe r departments , fro m whic h the y coul d draw al l necessar y information , the ra w material , a s i t were , o f thei r work ; but the digesting of this information, an d its presentation i n diplomati c form , should res t with them. 11

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The creatio n o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s i n 190 9 di d no t and coul d no t o f itsel f brin g int o bein g a stockpil e o f intelligenc e dat a of sufficien t scop e an d qualit y a s t o wor k immediat e improvemen t i n the conduc t o f externa l policy . Tha t ha d t o awai t th e exercis e o f th e right o f legatio n (thu s ensurin g source s o f informatio n independen t of th e Foreig n Office) , and , eve n mor e fundamentally , th e desir e t o strike ou t o n a distinctivel y Canadia n cours e i n foreig n affairs . Bu t i t was a step, however hesitant, i n that direction . During th e year s immediatel y precedin g th e Firs t Worl d War , th e Canadian Governmen t suffered , perhap s fo r th e firs t tim e bu t certainl y not fo r th e last , from a scarcit y of intelligenc e dat a o f th e "speculative evaluative" variety (th e ter m late r assigne d b y professiona l intelligence officers t o th e kin d o f informatio n require d fo r reliabl e predictio n o f probable course s o f actio n o f othe r states 12). Canadia n statesme n during th e year s 1909-1 4 urgentl y neede d som e suc h strategi c assess ment of the intentions o f Germany under the Kaise r in orde r t o respon d appropriately t o Britain' s reques t fo r emergenc y nava l assistance . Th e assumption underlyin g Laurier' s nava l polic y wa s tha t ther e wa s n o emergency. Tha t assumptio n could no t b e s o confidentl y hel d i n 1911 , when th e Borde n Governmen t assume d office , an d th e ne w Prim e Minister di d wha t h e coul d t o obtai n a realisti c appraisa l o f th e likel y danger t o worl d peac e o f th e Flottenpolitik the n i n progress . I n th e absence o f othe r authority , Borde n turne d t o th e Firs t Lor d o f th e Admiralty, Mr . Winsto n Churchill , an d i t wa s fro m thi s eloquen t i f not exactl y impartia l sourc e tha t th e Canadia n Governmen t receive d the informatio n causin g i t t o abando n Laurier' s polic y i n favou r o f a n emergency cas h contributio n t o th e Imperia l Government. 13 The comin g o f the Firs t Worl d Wa r greatl y sharpene d th e anxiet y of the Canadia n Governmen t concernin g th e reliabilit y o f th e intelligenc e sources a t its disposal an d the exten t t o which these wer e being properly exploited. Withi n a year nearl y a quarte r o f a millio n soldier s ha d bee n sent fro m Canada t o th e Western front . Thei r casualtie s were both fear ful an d unexpected , an d a visi t b y th e Prim e Ministe r t o Englan d an d France i n 191 5 lef t hi m i n n o doub t tha t muc h o f th e slaughte r wa s due t o blunder s an d mismanagemen t i n th e strategi c directio n o f th e war. O n hi s retur n t o Canada Borde n cable d t o th e Actin g Hig h Commissioner i n London, Si r George Perley : Please infor m Bona r La w tha t w e woul d appreciat e fulle r an d mor e exac t information fro m tim e t o tim e respectin g conduc t o f Wa r an d propose d military operation s a s t o whic h littl e o r n o informatio n vouchsafed . W e thoroughly realiz e necessit y centra l contro l o f Empir e armie s bu t Govern -

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ments o f oversea s Dominion s hav e larg e responsibilitie s t o thei r peopl e fo r conduct o f War , an d w e dee m ourselve s entitle d t o fulle r informatio n an d to consultatio n respectin g genera l polic y i n Wa r operations . Th e grea t difficulty o f obtainin g information during my recen t visi t t o Londo n seeme d partially occasione d b y lack o f prope r co-ordinatio n betwee n severa l depart ments responsibl e fo r conduc t o f War . Perhap s ne w Counci l o r Committe e can arrang e fo r informatio n an d consultation. 14 As a forme r Canadian , Bona r La w migh t hav e bee n expecte d t o b e sympathetic t o thi s request , an d a s Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Wa r i n a position t o d o somethin g abou t it ; bu t hi s reply t o Borden , transmitte d through th e Actin g High Commissioner , wa s disappointing: We full y realize , I nee d no t say , th e grea t par t whic h you r Governmen t i s playing i n thi s wa r an d a s Si r Rober t Borde n foun d whe n h e wa s her e w e were onl y to o delighte d t o pu t hi m int o possessio n o f al l th e informatio n which wa s availabl e t o th e Cabinet . I t i s o f cours e muc h mor e difficul t t o keep him in touch no w but it is our desir e to give him the fulles t informatio n and i f ther e i s an y wa y whic h occur s t o hi m o r t o yoursel f i n whic h thi s can b e don e I shal l b e delighte d t o carr y i t out . . . . A t th e sam e tim e I should like you to repeat t o him what I hav e sai d to you—tha t i f no schem e is practicable the n i t is very undesirable that th e questio n shoul d b e raised. 16 "Mr. Bona r Law' s lette r i s no t especiall y illuminating, " wa s Borden' s comment, "an d leave s th e matte r exactl y wher e i t wa s before m y letter was sent." He despatched a strongly worded reply: During th e pas t fou r month s sinc e m y retur n fro m Grea t Britain , th e Canadian Government (excep t fo r a n occasional telegra m from yo u [Perley ] or Si r Max Aitken ) hav e had jus t wha t informatio n coul d b e gleane d fro m the dail y Pres s an d n o more . A s t o consultation , plan s o f campaig n hav e been mad e an d unmade, measure s adopte d an d apparentl y abandone d an d generally speakin g step s o f th e mos t importan t an d eve n vita l characte r have bee n taken , postpone d o r rejecte d withou t th e slightes t consultatio n with the authoritie s of this Dominion . It ca n hardl y b e expecte d tha t w e shal l pu t 400,00 0 o r 500,00 0 me n i n the fiel d an d willingl y accep t th e positio n o f havin g n o mor e voic e an d receiving n o mor e consideratio n tha n i f w e were to y automata . An y perso n cherishing suc h a n expectation harbour s a n unfortunat e an d eve n dangerou s delusion.16 This remonstranc e produce d " a numbe r o f th e mos t importan t docu ments whic h hav e bee n circulate d t o th e Wa r Council, " sen t t o th e Canadian Prim e Ministe r wit h instruction s tha t the y b e show n t o no on e els e an d burne d afte r perusal . "The y came, " Borde n late r recalled, "i n a stron g canva s ba g loade d heavil y wit h lead . O n th e voyage, thi s ba g wa s kep t o n th e bridg e unde r direction s t o thro w it overboard in case the ship shoul d be subject t o capture." 17 It als o pro duced a promise by Bonar Law that he would "continu e to se t aside the most importan t [documents ] an d forwar d the m t o yo u later." A t leas t

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one furthe r consignmen t o f thi s characte r reache d Borden , fo r i n Jul y 1916 Si r Georg e Perle y himsel f arrive d i n Ottaw a wit h a bundl e con taining, amon g other items , "fiv e appreciation s o f th e Genera l Staff." 18 Lloyd George' s replacemen t o f Asquit h a s Prim e Ministe r an d hi s creation o f th e Wa r Cabine t i n 191 6 brough t som e improvement i n th e flow of information . The Colonia l Secretar y i n the ne w Government was instructed t o sen d t o th e Canadia n Governo r Genera l " a weekl y lette r for th e personal an d confidentia l informatio n o f [th e Governo r an d his ] Prime Minister." 19 B y Apri l 191 7 thi s ha d give n wa y t o a fortnightl y telegram o f diplomatic intelligence. Th e Canadia n Governmen t was stil l unsatisfied b y these arrangements . In Ma y 191 8 th e Actin g Hig h Com missioner wrote to Si r Robert Borden : You an d I hav e talke d ove r severa l time s th e possibilit y o f obtainin g mor e regularly fo r yo u confidentia l informatio n an d reports . I talke d thi s ove r with th e Colonia l Secretar y mor e tha n onc e bu t n o systemati c arrangemen t was ever put into force. Sinc e Lord Beaverbrook ha s been appointe d Ministe r of Information , I hav e discusse d th e questio n wit h him , an d a coupl e o f months ago he wrote me that he was anxious to furnis h the Prim e Minister s of th e Dominions , throug h th e Hig h Commissioners , wit h th e fulles t con fidential informatio n i n hi s power . H e furthe r wen t o n t o sa y tha t h e wa s willing t o sen d m e confidentiall y for despatc h t o yo u periodi c summarie s of the whole situatio n i n the field and i n political affairs . O f course , I wa s very happy to accept this suggestion an d make an arrangement o f this kind. I t has , however, take n a considerabl e tim e t o pu t i t int o force, an d las t mont h the y wrote m e fro m th e Departmen t sayin g tha t the y foun d i t rathe r a busines s getting things in order and that thei r intelligenc e staf f woul d no t b e complet e for som e weeks . However , everythin g seem s t o be now nearly i n order. . . . I hope , therefore , tha t th e firs t o f thes e report s wil l b e read y i n a fe w day s and tha t thereafte r the y ma y b e forthcomin g regularly. 20

More importan t tha n telegraphe d o r writte n despatche s fro m White hall a s a mean s of keepin g th e Canadia n Government informe d abou t the strategi c directio n o f th e wa r wa s it s membershi p i n th e Imperia l War Cabinet . Th e invitatio n t o Borde n t o atten d " a serie s o f specia l and continuou s meeting s o f th e Wa r Cabine t i n orde r t o conside r urgent question s affectin g prosecutio n o f War , th e possibl e condition s on which in agreement with our Allies we could assent to its termination, and th e problem s whic h wil l the n immediatel y arise " wa s receive d i n Ottawa o n Christma s Day , 1916. 21 Borde n attende d meeting s o f th e Imperial Wa r Cabine t i n February an d March 1917 ; i n June , Jul y an d August 1918 ; an d fro m Novembe r 191 8 throug h Ma y 1919 , meetin g first i n Londo n an d then , a s th e Britis h Empir e Delegatio n t o th e Peace Conference , i n Paris . O f th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet , Lorin g Christie, who , a s Borden's "fide s Achates , ide a man , confidential envo y and genera l righ t han d ma n fo r externa l affairs," 22 sa w muc h o f it s

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deliberations a t first hand, wrote afterwards : "I t brough t th e responsibl e political head s o f th e differen t state s o f th e Empir e fac e t o fac e . . . and i t supplie d them in th e mos t convenient wa y with th e bes t informa tion going . . . . All the commitments o f the Allies, secre t an d otherwise , were lai d befor e them a t th e outse t i n March , 1917 , s o far a s the y ha d not bee n disclose d before . Al l th e card s wer e pu t o n th e table." 23 Ye t even i n thi s bod y ther e wer e th e longueurs inseparable fro m an y com mittee howeve r exalted , an d i n hi s diar y Borde n o n mor e tha n on e occasion vente d hi s impatience . "The n t o Wa r Cabine t wher e som e futile discussio n too k place . As bad a s our Cabinet" (Marc h 29 , 1917) . "Imperial Wa r Cabine t a t 11:3 0 unti l 2 an d long discussio n a s t o channels o f communication . . . . Fool tal k prevaile d i n som e quarters . It i s absur d tha t thi s resul t shoul d hav e take n tw o day s to accomplish " (July 25 , 1918) . An d i t wa s i n th e Imperia l Wa r Cabine t tha t th e Canadian Prim e Ministe r receive d misleadin g estimates o f the economi c advantage t o result fro m participatin g i n the Siberian intervention ; thes e estimates, reinforce d b y equall y misleadin g intelligenc e fro m official s of hi s ow n Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerce, 24 brough t abou t th e Dominion's ill-time d involvemen t i n Russia n affair s i n 1918-19 , fro m which extricatio n wa s t o prov e s o difficult . INTELLIGENCE AN D FOREIG N POLICY: TH E YEAR S BETWEE N THE WAR S

The hop e an d expectatio n o f Si r Rober t Borde n ha d bee n tha t th e Imperial Wa r Cabine t woul d provid e th e basi s fo r a ne w imperia l partnership i n tim e o f peace . A t th e Imperia l Conferenc e o f 192 1 th e prime minister s cas t abou t fo r th e firs t (an d a s i t wa s t o prov e th e final) tim e fo r som e wa y o f implementin g th e protea n Resolutio n IX , which i n 191 7 ha d promise d the m "a n adequat e voic e i n foreign policy and i n foreig n relations, " a n ambiguou s formul a designe d t o satisf y equally thos e whos e eyes wer e fixe d upon th e promise d lan d o f uncon ditional autonom y an d thos e t o who m perfectio n i n imperia l affair s meant a singl e Empir e polic y formulate d i n Downin g Street . Bu t th e Imperial Conferenc e di d no t giv e it s blessin g t o a n Imperia l Peac e Cabinet. Publicly it gave its blessing to very little. Bu t behin d the scene s it wa s though t tha t th e problem s o f empir e coul d b e solve d b y th e panacea o f improve d communications . "Wha t yo u want, " th e Britis h Foreign Secretar y tol d th e member s o f th e Imperia l Conference ,

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is greate r knowledg e an d greate r influenc e o n matter s whic h concer n yo u as parts o f the Empire , an d i n which yo u yourselves , you r Parliaments , you r troops, ma y be involved. Now, ho w can w e bring tha t about ? The suggestio n I mad e t o th e Prim e Ministe r [Lloy d George ] wa s this : yo u want , befor e you ar e involve d i n action , t o kno w wha t ha s happened , t o kno w wha t i s happening fro m da y to day . I think , s o far a s I ca n ascertain , you r presen t knowledge i s inadequate . Wha t d o yo u ge t now ? Onc e a week , I believe , there i s sen t ou t t o yo u . .. a pape r calle d "Th e Britis h Empir e Report" , and anothe r calle d "Th e Foreig n Countrie s Report" , whic h contain s a con densed summar y o f th e information , telegraphi c an d otherwise , o f th e pre ceding week . No w loo k a t th e contras t betwee n tha t an d wha t happen s when yo u com e here . A s lon g a s you ar e i n Londo n yo u ge t th e telegram s from da y t o day , yo u ge t a selectio n o f despatche s an d paper s sen t t o yo u by m e o n importan t matters , an d yo u ge t . . . th e paper s recordin g th e interviews o f th e Foreig n Ministe r wit h various Ambassador s an d Ministers , and th e paper s h e supplie s t o th e Cabinet . Canno t w e brin g you r positio n when yo u ar e awa y fro m her e int o close r conformit y wit h tha t whic h exist s when yo u are here? . . . The suggestion I mad e t o the Prim e Ministe r was this: tha t w e might send out to you, to the Prime Minister s o f the Dominions , once a month , or , i f necessary , onc e a week , a selectio n o f thos e extremel y confidential Foreig n Offic e Paper s whic h ar e no w see n onl y b y th e Cabine t and circulate d t o ou r representative s i n ou r Embassie s an d Legation s abroad.

At thi s junctur e th e Foreig n Secretar y wa s interrupte d b y th e Prim e Minister o f Australia . "Yo u ar e speaking, " sai d Willia m Hughes , "o f sending it by post." "Yes, " Curzon answered, "and a great crisis leading up t o wa r doe s no t develo p i n a wee k o r two . A wa r o r an y grea t affair i n whic h yo u ar e concerne d i s th e resul t o f a proces s tha t ha s been going on for severa l weeks or months." 25 The firs t "grea t affair " i n whic h Canad a wa s subsequentl y involved brought th e countr y to th e brin k o f wa r no t durin g "severa l week s o r months," a s Curzon had predicted, but i n a matter of hours. This was the Chanak crisis . A s i t happene d th e Canadia n Prim e Ministe r learne d of Mustaf a Kemal' s threat t o th e Neutra l Zon e no t throug h a despatc h from th e Unite d Kingdo m Governmen t bu t fro m a loca l newspaper . So muc h migh t have bee n forgiven , eve n thoug h ha d Mackenzi e Kin g been i n Ottaw a rather tha n i n Newcastle , Ontario , h e woul d stil l have been notifie d o f th e crisi s throug h th e pres s rathe r tha n throug h th e regular channe l o f th e Governo r General' s office . Les s easil y par doned wa s th e inadequac y o f Britis h intelligenc e report s durin g th e preceding weeks . N o cable d despatche s fro m an y departmen t o f th e United Kingdo m Governmen t ha d bee n receive d i n Ottaw a prio r t o Winston Churchill's "invitation " t o th e Dominion s t o sen d troops . Foreign Offic e report s o n Turke y an d th e Nea r East , travellin g by se a

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bag, ha d bee n arrivin g a t irregula r intervals . Bu t i n n o cas e wa s a report receive d unde r thre e week s fro m th e tim e o f it s despatch ; i n most case s well over a month elapsed betwee n transmissio n an d receipt; on a singl e da y (Augus t 28 , 1922 ) n o fewe r tha n eigh t reports arrive d at once , thei r date s o f origi n varying from Jul y 1 7 to Augus t 5 ; and n o reports a t al l wer e receive d durin g the te n day s (Septembe r 7 t o 16 ) immediately precedin g th e crisis . Moreover , th e informatio n containe d in suc h Foreig n Offic e materia l tha t di d arriv e lef t muc h t o b e desired . The repor t o f Jul y 2 5 (receive d o n Augus t 28 ) suggeste d tha t th e Greek Arm y was "never i n a more healthy or efficien t state. " The repor t of Augus t 1 5 (receive d o n Septembe r 6 an d th e las t t o reac h Ottaw a before th e Churchil l "invitation" ) consiste d o f a cop y o f a memoran dum fro m th e Italia n ambassado r i n Londo n containin g th e assuranc e that "th e Turk s ar e beginning to conside r wit h increase d inclinatio n th e necessity o f terminatin g the war." 26 I n th e ligh t o f thes e fact s a late r accusation b y Th e Times tha t th e reaso n th e Dominion s remaine d i n ignorance o f th e crisi s unti l i t burs t upo n the m wa s tha t thei r govern ments faile d t o rea d th e despatche s sen t t o the m b y th e Foreig n Offic e was rendere d mor e gallin g b y it s furthe r observatio n tha t readin g despatches "i s n o doub t a laboriou s task , an d i f ther e i s n o excus e for Minister s shirkin g it i n London , i t i s clearly harde r fo r Minister s i n Ottawa o r Pretoria to giv e their time to matters which lie so far away." 27 Had th e Canadia n Governmen t o f that da y bee n anxiou s t o develo p its own effective foreig n policy, th e onl y logical respons e t o the failure of the Britis h Governmen t t o provid e i t wit h som e advanc e notic e o f th e likelihood o f war i n the Middl e East was to pres s strongl y for improve d methods of communication, and t o exercis e th e righ t of legation grante d to Canad a i n 1920 . N o effor t wa s mad e t o mov e i n eithe r o f thes e directions. A n active and independent rol e in world affair s wa s about the last thin g th e Canadia n peopl e wante d a t thi s time . "Ther e i s a curiou s tiredness ove r 'foreig n affairs', " th e edito r o f a Toront o newspape r wrote privatel y i n 1920 . "W e hav e hear d s o muc h o f Wa r Cabinet s and League s o f Nation s an d Ambassador s t o Washingto n . . . tha t many peopl e begi n t o as k i f w e hav e an y question s o f ou r ow n an d whether o r no t ou r statesme n hav e an y interes t i n th e problem s o f Canada."28 The Canadian Prim e Ministe r wa s quick t o sens e thi s moo d and eage r t o cate r t o it . T o improv e th e qualit y o f informatio n migh t sharpen th e obligatio n t o tak e initiatives , an d t o avoi d thi s unpalatabl e situation Mackenzi e King deliberately shielde d himself and his colleague s from intelligenc e whic h migh t mak e isolatio n les s defensible . Thu s h e

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repeatedly turne d dow n suggestion s tha t hi s Hig h Commissione r i n London shoul d meet regularly wit h th e Secretar y of State for Dominion Affairs o r wit h th e Foreig n Secretary , in th e compan y of hi s Dominion colleagues, t o b e furnishe d wit h backgroun d information.* No r wa s h e in a hurr y t o creat e a diplomati c missio n a t Washington . While hi s delay was partl y due to the oppositio n of his Ministe r of Financ e and to th e difficult y o f findin g a suitabl e appointee, the desir e t o improv e his Government's information abou t American affairs wa s not a strongly countervailing factor . Indee d whe n Merchan t Mahoney , th e agen t of th e Departmen t of Externa l Affairs wh o looke d afte r suc h Canadian interests a s th e Britis h embassy i n Washingto n lef t unattended , offere d to sen d t o Ottaw a a dail y summar y o f th e activitie s o f th e Congres s when i n session , the Prim e Minister's office replie d that a dail y bulletin was too much and a weekly woul d be better. 29 A good deal of the infor mation reachin g th e Canadia n Governmen t o n Unite d State s affair s bearing upon Dominion interests cam e neithe r fro m th e Britis h embass y nor fro m th e Department' s agent i n Washingto n but fro m a Canadian newspaperman, To m King , who m th e Cabine t authorize d in 192 2 "t o *As Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Dominio n Affair s a t th e time , Leopol d Amer y late r wrote, "i t wa s lef t t o m e t o kee p i n touc h wit h th e Hig h Commissioner s a s bes t I could . I n th e pres s o f wor k thi s wa s no t easy , unles s som e particula r matte r o f special importanc e calle d fo r a n interview . S o I readil y too k u p a suggestio n o f Mr. Pete r Larkin's , th e Canadia n Hig h Commissioner , tha t I shoul d b e 'a t home ' one mornin g every week for al l th e Hig h Commissioners . Thi s worke d admirably , giving m e a n opportunit y o f tellin g the m collectivel y o f wha t wa s goin g o n i n 'high polities' , a s wel l a s i n economi c o r othe r affair s i n whic h the y wer e generally interested . . . . Unfortunately , whe n Mackenzi e Kin g hear d o f thi s a t the tim e o f th e Imperia l Conferenc e [o f 1926] , h e a t onc e suspecte d a siniste r design on my par t of graduall y workin g toward s som e sor t of Imperia l polic y council situate d i n London—th e grea t bugbea r whic h h e alway s dreaded . S o poor Larki n ha d t o com e an d tel l me , ver y apologetically , tha t h e wa s no t allowed t o se e me except b y himself." L . S . Amery, M y Political Life, I I (London , 1953), p . 377 . Th e Foreig n Secretar y commente d privatel y a t th e tim e o f th e disadvantage t o hi m o f havin g "n o agen t o f th e Canadia n Governmen t her e wit h whom I a m authorize d b y tha t Governmen t t o discus s confidentiall y thes e problems. . . . Wha t I shoul d lik e t o se e i s a bod y o f Hig h Commissioner s possessing th e politica l confidenc e o f thei r Governments , chose n fo r thei r political ( I d o no t mea n party ) qualifications , an d authorize d t o mee t m e regularly a s a body to discus s the urgen t question s o f the da y an d th e developmen t of event s a s they occur . . .. If thes e me n kne w the mind s o f thei r Governments , 'devilled' th e Foreig n Offic e paper s fo r them , an d wer e i n clos e touc h wit h them , they woul d a t leas t kno w wha t point s in ou r polic y mos t affecte d thei r respectiv e Dominions, woul d cal l th e attentio n o f thei r Government s t o whateve r migh t particularly concer n them , an d coul d elici t an y furthe r explanation s o r informa tion whic h the y wer e instructe d b y thei r Government s t o seek. " Si r Auste n Chamberlain t o Si r Robert Borden , Feb . 27 , 1926 , Christi e Papers .

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furnish u s wit h confidentia l report s from tim e to time." * Fo r th e nex t few year s To m Kin g wrot e hi s "despatches " i n th e for m o f persona l letters to th e Prim e Minister ; they wer e read , an d frequentl y answered , and th e qualit y o f thei r informatio n wa s suc h tha t Mackenzi e King continued t o us e thi s unusua l sourc e eve n afte r th e openin g o f th e Canadian legation in 1927 . Of th e thre e world capital s wher e aggression s leadin g t o th e Second World Wa r wer e spawne d an d hatched , only on e b y 193 9 was th e sit e of a Canadian diplomatic mission. The legatio n at Toky o neither fore warned the Governmen t of the dange r of Japanese militarism no r offere d wise counse l whe n th e dange r becam e obvious . Canada' s first minister to Japan , appointe d i n 192 8 and remainin g throughout th e Manchuria n crisis, wa s Herbert Marler . Lik e th e Ministe r t o th e Unite d States , Mr . Vincent Massey , Marle r had bee n a membe r o f th e Mackenzi e Kin g administration whos e diplomati c postin g followe d soo n afte r th e dis appointment o f bein g unabl e to secur e electio n to th e Hous e of Commons. Hi s backgroun d i n busines s an d finance , togethe r wit h th e diplomatist's traditiona l sympathy fo r th e countr y o f hi s mission , predisposed hi m t o th e caus e o f Japa n an d rendere d hi m susceptibl e t o *The Prim e Ministe r officiall y recommende d thi s appointmen t i n a lette r t o th e Governor-in-Council date d Octobe r 25 , 1922 : "Th e undersigne d ha s th e honou r to represen t tha t You r Excellency' s adviser s hav e fo r som e tim e pas t bee n im pressed wit h th e desirabilit y o f havin g a residen t corresponden t connecte d wit h the pres s a t Washington , wh o woul d b e i n a positio n t o ascertai n an d repor t confidentially fro m tim e t o tim e wha t i t migh t b e o f interes t fo r th e Canadia n Government t o kno w touchin g legislative , administrativ e an d judicia l proceeding s in that capital . "The undersigne d understand s tha t foreig n government s ver y generall y emplo y in suc h capacit y America n newspapermen , wh o ca n tal k wit h Senators , Con gressmen, an d executiv e official s wit h th e objec t o f findin g ou t an d reportin g what i t ma y b e usefu l fo r thei r principal s t o know . Man y thing s ar e happenin g i n Washington fro m da y t o da y o f importanc e t o th e Canadia n Government . Durin g the comin g sessio n ther e wil l n o doub t com e u p fo r consideration question s o f special interes t t o th e Dominion , such , fo r example , a s th e regulatio n o f nava l strength o n th e Grea t Lakes ; th e re-writin g o f th e Transportatio n Act , especiall y those section s dealin g wit h labou r an d labou r disputes; th e Bora h Bill , whic h ha s already passe d th e Senate , exemptin g American coasta l vessel s fro m th e paymen t of toll s o n th e Panam a Canal ; tarif f legislation ; th e Shi p Subsid y Bill , an d others . The mos t importan t wor k i n connectio n wit h thes e subject s wil l b e don e i n committee, th e proceeding s o f which ar e ofte n no t reporte d a t all . I t i s particularly desirable, havin g regar d t o thes e an d othe r questions , tha t w e shoul d hav e a trustworthy agen t o n th e spo t closel y t o watc h thi s committe e wor k an d t o furnish u s wit h confidentia l reports fro m tim e t o time . "The undersigne d accordingl y recommend s tha t he be authorize d to engag e in that capacit y th e service s o f Mr . T . W . King , formerl y connecte d wit h th e Canadian Press , Limited , an d no w doin g journalisti c wor k a t Washington , an d to pa y hi m therefor , ou t o f th e Vot e fo r Canadia n representatio n i n th e Unite d States. . . ."

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propaganda tha t it s soldier s wer e bringin g la w an d orde r t o a dis ordered China . Hi s despatche s t o th e Bennet t Governmen t doubtles s reflected th e pro-Japanese bia s to be found i n his private correspondenc e of th e perio d wit h th e Leade r o f th e Opposition, 30 althoug h hi s Prim e Minister's declaratio n a t th e heigh t o f th e crisi s tha t h e wa s unabl e t o offer a n opinion o n event s in the Fa r Eas t becaus e o f "th e sligh t knowl edge tha t we possess"31 suggests that th e intelligenc e the y containe d wa s neither extensiv e no r important . The lac k o f a legatio n a t Rom e ma y hav e deprive d th e Canadia n Government o f informatio n withou t placin g it s policie s a t a disadvan tage, fo r th e mor e tha t wa s know n abou t fascis m i n it s Mediterranea n setting th e bette r dispose d a significan t grou p o f Canadian s becam e towards it . Th e loft y sentiment s o f doctrin e elaborate d b y Mussolini' s publicists, wit h thei r apotheosi s o f order , discipline , family , nation , their pseudo-syndicalis t remedie s fo r industria l unrest , thei r shril l assault upo n th e liberal values, gaine d powerfu l suppor t amon g the elit e of Frenc h Canad a whic h a Canadia n governmen t disregarde d a t it s peril. National Socialis m wa s somethin g els e again . Bu t diagnosi s of th e Nazi movemen t wa s hindere d b y th e severit y o f economi c depressio n at hom e an d b y th e isolationis t tradition. * Event s i n German y wer e consistently misconstrue d a s a nationalis t reviva l of the traditiona l type , distinguished, perhaps , b y th e od d fanaticis m o f it s leaders , b y th e strut an d swagge r of its rank an d file, but fo r al l that a movement whic h might b e comprehende d i n traditiona l terms , appease d an d containe d by traditiona l methods . Th e intelligenc e whic h migh t hav e pu t t o fligh t such wishfu l thought s wa s lacking . Th e Canadia n Government , havin g no missio n a t Berlin , necessaril y relie d o n whateve r Whitehal l migh t select fo r it s instructio n fro m th e despatche s o f Si r Nevil e Henderson , and thes e conveye d a sadl y erroneous interpretatio n o f Naz i polic y an d motives, f Thi s unhelpfu l sourc e was supplemente d b y th e assessmen t of the Canadia n Ministe r i n Paris , Philipp e Roy , wh o informe d hi s Government o n Septembe r 9 , 1938 , tha t Hitler , bein g "a n intelligen t man," woul d no t "tak e th e ris k o f spoilin g hi s wonderfu l achievement s in Germany. " Ther e remaine d tha t o f th e Hig h Commissione r i n Lon don. Mr . Vincen t Massey , whos e mos t endurin g wor k i n a lifetim e of *This vie w i s elaborate d i n m y essa y "' A Lo w Dishones t Decade' : Aspect s o f Canadian Externa l Policy , 1931-1939 " i n H . L . Keenleysid e e t at., Th e Growth of Canadian Policies i n External Affairs (Durham , N.C. , 1960) , pp . 59-80 . f During th e Munic h crisi s Henderso n wrot e o f "Hitler' s ow n lov e fo r peace , dislike o f dea d German s an d hesitatio n o f riskin g hi s regim e o n a gambler' s throw." Quote d i n Feli x Gilbert , "Tw o Britis h Ambassadors : Pert h an d Henderson" i n Gordo n A . Crai g an d Feli x Gilbert , eds. , Th e Diplomats: 19191939 (Princeton , 1953) , p . 543 .

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public servic e stil l la y ahead , wa s the n a gifte d an d experience d diplo matist; bu t hi s closes t associate s i n Britai n wer e o f th e grou p whic h moved wit h disastrou s effec t betwee n Cliveden , Printin g Hous e Squar e and Downin g Street, an d nothin g he learne d fro m the m seem s likel y t o have provide d a usefu l correctiv e t o th e misleadin g despatche s passe d on b y the Dominion s Office. 32 The mos t misleadin g information was derive d a t firs t hand . I n 193 7 Mackenzie Kin g decide d t o g o fro m th e Imperia l Conferenc e t o Germany. Ther e h e me t an d talke d wit h Hitle r an d othe r leadin g per sonalities o f the Third Reich . Lik e s o many others, th e Canadia n Prim e Minister fel l victi m to th e Fiihrer's remarkable capacit y fo r mesmerizing his visitors . "Ther e i s n o doub t tha t Hitle r ha d a powe r o f fascinating men," Mr . Churchil l wrot e in his memoirs ; an d adde d th e sag e advice : "Unless th e term s ar e equal , i t i s bette r t o kee p away." 33 A s betwee n the Prim e Ministe r o f Canad a an d th e perpetrato r o f the Naz i Schrechlichkeit the term s were far fro m equal , an d th e exten t o f Hitler's advan tage ma y b e measure d i n th e opinion s wit h whic h Mackenzi e Kin g returned t o Canada an d which he shared with its public over the nationa l radio: "O f thi s I a m certain . . . . Neithe r th e government s no r th e peoples o f an y countrie s I hav e visite d desir e war , o r vie w th e possi bility o f wa r betwee n eac h other , a s othe r tha n likel y t o en d i n self destruction, an d th e destructio n o f Europea n civilizatio n itself." 34 That th e destructio n o f Europea n civilizatio n wa s precisel y th e Naz i objective wa s "speculative-evaluativ e intelligence " whic h th e Canadia n Prime Ministe r di d not have at his disposal; for , as was remarked o f him in a differen t connection , "Mr . Kin g neve r quit e go t i t int o hi s hea d during hi s economi c studie s a t Toront o an d Harvar d tha t ou r civiliza tion i s dominated b y carnivorous animals." 35 INTELLIGENCE AN D FOREIG N POLICY: TH E SECON D WORLD WA R

The Second Worl d War helped t o dispel some (but not all) o f that "antiDowning Stree t complex " fro m whic h Mackenzi e Kin g ha d suffere d in th e 1930' s an d o f whic h th e Britis h Commonwealt h o f Nation s wa s so nearl y th e victim. * On e inhibitio n soo n t o disappea r wa s th e edic t against meeting s o f th e Canadia n Hig h Commissione r i n th e compan y *A justificatio n of thi s statemen t i s contained i n m y essay , " 'A Lo w Dishones t Decade,'" pp. 72-5 .

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of hi s Dominio n colleague s wit h th e Foreig n Secretar y o r th e Secretar y of Stat e fo r Dominio n Affair s t o receiv e background information supple menting th e dail y despatches . Thi s ster n prohibitio n wa s i n forc e a s late a s 1939 , an d was relaxed onl y when the High Commissioner pleade d that th e pressur e o f busines s o n member s o f th e Britis h Governmen t was making it difficul t fo r hi m continuall y to b e requestin g special audi ences. Onl y afte r th e wa r bega n di d meeting s tak e plac e o n a regula r rather tha n o n a sporadi c basis . "Thei r immediat e practica l purpose, " an authorit y ha s noted , "wa s th e conveyin g o f up-to-dat e an d accurat e information abou t wartim e development s t o th e Dominio n representa tives fo r transmissio n whe n the y deeme d i t desirabl e t o thei r govern ments, bu t the y serve d equall y a s a channe l b y whic h th e view s o r the representation s o f dominio n government s coul d b e conveye d b y their Hig h Commissioner s t o th e Secretar y o f Stat e o r t o th e Foreig n Secretary."36 The wa r gav e grea t impetu s a s wel l t o th e flo w o f informatio n i n the despatche s whic h dail y wen t ou t fro m Londo n t o th e Dominio n capitals—"sheaves of telegrams," as the Secretar y o f State fo r Dominio n Affairs describe d them , "o n al l an d ever y subjec t o f mutua l interest — foreign affairs , economi c development , militar y co-operation , eve n domestic issue s her e whic h ar e likel y t o interes t ou r partners . W e tell the m everythin g w e can." 37 I n th e vie w o f Mr . Winsto n Churchil l too muc h wa s communicate d t o th e Dominio n government s i n thi s fashion; i n Decembe r 194 0 h e enjoine d th e Dominion s Offic e "no t t o scatter s o much deadly and secret information over this very large circle" or t o "ge t int o th e habi t o f runnin g a kin d o f newspape r ful l o f deadl y secrets."38 Of greate r significanc e tha n th e quantit y o f materia l thu s receive d was it s quality ; i t i s a t leas t arguabl e tha t th e Dominio n government s would hav e bee n serve d bette r ha d the y receive d nothin g a t al l rathe r than the distorted view s relayed t o them i n the later 1930's . The qualit y of informatio n sen t ou t b y th e Churchil l Government , however , wa s of a different , an d better , grade , th e mor e valuabl e fo r bein g truste d by it s recipients . (Marsha l Stalin , i t wil l b e recalled , pai d n o hee d t o the warnin g of Mr. Churchil l i n February 194 1 tha t Britis h intelligenc e sources had informatio n leading them to believ e that a German invasio n of Russi a woul d tak e plac e som e tim e i n Jun e o f that year. ) "Th e coo l and carefu l appreciatio n o f the militar y situatio n prepared b y the Chief s of Staf f an d sen t ou t o n 4 May 1940, " writes Professor Mansergh , "wa s a model o f its kind." 39 Hardly a model (fo r it wil l stand alone) , bu t n o less valuable , wa s th e documen t compose d b y Mr . Churchil l himsel f

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on Jun e 16 , 1940 , to lessen the shock of the fal l o f France fo r th e prim e ministers an d peoples of the Dominions. "I n i t he explained tha t Britain's resolve t o continu e the struggl e alon e wa s 'not base d upo n mer e obstin acy or desperation ' bu t upo n a n assessmen t o f 'th e rea l strengt h o f ou r position', whic h h e the n proceede d t o examin e i n som e detail. " A s h e observed later , "al l came true." 40 Lapses wer e inevitable . O n Septembe r 19 , 1941 , ther e wen t ou t from th e Dominion s Offic e a woefully inadequat e appraisa l o f th e situa tion i n the Fa r East , detectin g "sign s o f a certai n weakenin g i n attitud e of Japa n toward s Unite d State s an d ourselves, " reportin g a n improve ment i n th e defence s o f Malaya , urgin g th e reinforcemen t o f th e garrison a t Hon g Kong , an d requestin g Canadia n troop s fo r tha t pur pose.* There wer e als o errors o f omission. Th e offe r o f union to Franc e in Jun e 1940 , the ultimatu m to th e Frenc h flee t an d it s bombardmen t at Oran , th e tex t o f th e Atlanti c Charter , th e unconditiona l surrende r formula—these wer e som e o f th e matter s o f momen t t o th e Canadia n Government abou t whic h i t wa s not consulte d an d whic h consequentl y provoked in Mackenzie King reactions ranging from irritatio n to outrage . But notwithstandin g th e occasiona l breakdown , th e Canadia n Prim e Minister wa s highl y satisfie d bot h wit h th e machiner y fo r transmittin g intelligence between members of the Commonwealth and with the qualit y of th e informatio n thus transmitted. Mackenzi e King's fervent defenc e of the syste m delivere d t o th e Canadia n Hous e o f Commons o n Februar y 17, 1941 , an d late r tha t yea r i n Londo n i s i n strikin g contras t t o Sir Rober t Borden' s dissatisfactio n a t a comparabl e stag e o f th e pre ceding war. One o f the consideration s i n his rejection o f the proposa l t o reconsti tute th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet , mentione d i n hi s speeche s o n th e subject i n 194 1 bu t no t ther e give n th e prominenc e i t assume d i n *The tex t o f thi s fatefu l telegra m i s give n i n ful l i n Col . C. P . Stacey , Si x Years o f War: The Army i n Canada, Britain an d th e Pacific (Ottawa , 1955) , pp. 440-1. The Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e a t th e tim e late r admitte d tha t "th e considerations se t ou t i n th e telegra m wer e ver y largel y th e factor s whic h influenced me " i n recommendin g t o th e Canadia n Governmen t tha t troop s b e sent to Hong Kong. (Quote d i n ibid., p. 442). Canada wa s no t th e onl y Dominio n t o suffe r a s th e resul t o f poo r intelligenc e from th e Unite d Kingdo m Government . I n it s despatche s t o Australi a an d Ne w Zealand urgin g the us e o f thei r troop s i n Greec e i n 1941 , "the hope tha t Turke y and Yugoslavi a migh t act wa s mentioned afte r Ede n an d other s ha d sai d explicitl y that n o suc h hop e wa s reasonable . . . . Moreover , on e o f Eden' s las t cable s [to London ] wa s no t repeate d t o Ne w Zealand . I t reported , amon g othe r things , that Longmore , fo r th e Ai r Force , wa s no t confiden t tha t h e coul d giv e adequat e air suppor t t o th e operations . . . ." F. L . W. Wood, Th e New Zealand People a t War: Political an d External Affairs (Wellington , 1958) , pp . 183-4 .

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his ow n mind , wa s th e nee d fo r th e Prim e Ministe r o f Canad a t o sta y within clos e cal l o f th e Presiden t o f th e Unite d States . Th e associatio n of Frankli n Roosevel t an d Mackenzi e Kin g ha d no t begu n i n studen t days a t Harvar d Universit y (King' s graduat e wor k ther e wa s don e i n 1897-9, wherea s Roosevel t entere d Harvar d a s a n undergraduat e i n 1900), bu t tha t Mackenzi e Kin g allowe d a popular belie f t o th e contrary t o persis t suggest s the infinit e satisfactio n he derive d fro m a rela tionship h e wa s later won t t o describ e i n somewha t extravagan t terms . Their meeting s a s Presiden t an d Prim e Ministe r ha d begu n i n Marc h 1937; the y reache d th e summi t o f achievemen t i n th e rendezvou s a t Ogdensburg i n August 1940 . Such meeting s wer e o f valu e chiefl y fo r th e polic y decision s whic h were thei r outcome , bu t thei r importanc e a s a sourc e o f informatio n is not t o b e overlooked . Indee d th e cable s sen t b y th e Prim e Ministe r of Canada t o th e Prim e Minister o f the Unite d Kingdo m in th e summe r of 1940 conveye d th e content s o f th e President' s min d wit h mor e fidelit y than di d those reaching Mr. Churchil l fro m Lor d Lothian , hi s ambassador i n Washington ; for a fe w fleeting weeks th e Canadia n Governmen t fully justifie d it s subsequently inflated reputatio n a s the Anglo-America n "interpreter." Thereafter , a s Mr . Churchil l an d Frankli n Roosevel t forged thei r ow n friendship , an d a s Anglo-America n co-operatio n grew mor e intimat e i n ever y aspec t o f th e commo n cause , th e Unite d Kingdom an d the Unite d State s ha d steadil y less need of an interpreter' s services. Th e Canadia n Government, n o longe r sol e confidan t o f each , became increasingl y preoccupied with the vexin g task o f tryin g to kee p itself informe d o f wha t th e strategist s of th e Gran d Allianc e wer e u p to. I n Novembe r 1941 , th e Unite d State s governmen t consulte d repre sentatives of the United Kingdom , China, the Netherlands an d Australi a concerning negotiation s tha t ha d bee n i n progres s betwee n America n and Japanes e official s sinc e September ; bu t despit e wha t a n America n historian ha s describe d a s "the clear Canadia n interes t i n th e politica l and securit y problem s o f th e Pacific, " th e Canadia n Governmen t wa s at n o tim e consulte d or informed. * Thi s wa s only th e firs t o f a numbe r of simila r episode s i n th e month s t o follow . The appointmen t i n 194 2 o f Majo r Genera l Mauric e Pop e a s th e War Committee' s representative i n Washington, an d th e creatio n durin g *CoI. Stanle y W . Dziuban , Military Relations between th e United States an d Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington , D.C. , 1959), p . 70 . "Th e failure t o includ e Canada amon g th e power s invite d t o discus s th e Pacifi c problem s i n lat e November," Sumne r Welle s note d afte r a conversatio n wit h th e Canadia n charge d'affaire s i n Washington , "continued , despit e al l explanations , t o rankle. " lbid.,p.7l.

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the sam e yea r o f th e Canadia n Join t Staf f Missio n (se e above , chapte r n), adde d tw o potentiall y usefu l channel s o f communication . Intelli gence, however , continue d t o mov e sluggishl y an d intermittently . "Looking bac k o n those days, " Genera l Pop e ha s written, my recollectio n i s tha t whil e ou r Britis h friend s tol d u s al l the y fel t the y reasonably could , th e attitud e o f th e American s wa s as mut e a s that o f thei r highly-prized little-nec k clams . Eve n so , i f w e wer e preclude d fro m askin g direct questions , wha t wit h a wor d her e an d a phras e there , adde d t o a n eloquent reticenc e o n anothe r occasion , no t onl y coul d a fai r pictur e o f th e situation a t th e momen t b e assembled , bu t als o a n intelligen t forecas t coul d be mad e of thing s that wer e to come . I thin k it is fai r to say tha t not onl y was th e C.J.S.M . abl e t o kee p Ottaw a abreas t o f C.C.O.S . thinking , bu t also t o indicat e th e strategi c tren d fo r th e nex t month s t o come. 41

In additio n t o Commonwealt h an d America n sources , th e Canadia n Government ha d it s ow n listening posts abroad . Th e importanc e o f it s French legatio n wa s muc h enhance d afte r th e fal l o f Franc e b y th e decision no t t o break off diplomatic relations wit h the Vich y regime but to allo w its representative in Canada t o continu e hi s dutie s in exchange for wha t Mr . Churchil l wa s t o describ e a s " a windo w throug h whic h they coul d loo k a t wha t wa s happenin g i n France." 42 A membe r o f the Departmen t o f External Affairs , Mr . Pierr e Dupuy , charge d'affaire s at th e missio n which , afte r th e fal l o f France , ha d move d t o London , made thre e visit s t o unoccupie d Franc e i n 194 0 an d 1941 , ostensibl y to discuss the interests of Canadians in that area with the Vichy authori ties, actuall y to gathe r political information . The considerabl e sympathy in Frenc h Canad a fo r Marsha l Petai n woul d i n an y cas e hav e mad e i t difficult fo r th e Canadia n Governmen t t o hav e broke n of f relation s during th e firs t fe w month s o f hi s regime , bu t durin g 194 1 an d 1942 , and particularl y afte r th e Diepp e rai d i n Augus t 194 2 (whe n Petai n sent a message of congratulation to th e Germa n defender s for inflictin g great losse s o n th e Canadia n forces ) nothin g coul d hav e bee n mor e popular tha n severance , an d i t wa s only becaus e Mr . Churchil l insiste d on th e valu e o f Mr . Dupuy' s contact s tha t diplomati c relation s wer e preserved unti l November 1942. * Two other potentially important observation posts were created by the Canadian Government during the Second World War. As Minister to the *From Londo n i n Augus t 194 1 Mackenzi e Kin g ha d cable d a n explanatio n t o Ernest Lapointe : "I n conversatio n toda y Mr . Churchil l wa s quit e emphati c i n his desir e t o hav e Dupu y continu e a s charg e d'affaires . H e sai d tha t Dupu y wa s the onl y mean s o f contac t tha t he , Churchill , ha d wit h Vichy , an d tha t whil e Dupuy migh t b e optimisti c himsel f i n reportin g thing s tol d hi m whic h hav e t o be verified , nevertheles s h e gav e muc h informatio n whic h i s mos t helpful. "

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Soviet Union , Mr . Dan a Wilgress went to the wartime capital a t Kuiby shev. Mr. Wilgres s was at th e time of this appointmen t Deput y Ministe r of Trad e an d Commerce ; h e ha d lon g experienc e o f Russia n affairs , having bee n a membe r o f th e Canadia n Economi c Missio n t o Siberi a in 1918-1 9 an d returnin g t o th e Sovie t Unio n o n a numbe r o f late r occasions; h e spok e th e Russia n language , enjoyin g in thi s respec t a n advantage ove r hi s America n colleagues . Major Genera l Victo r Odiu m who went to open Canada's legatio n at Chungking had no special knowl edge o f Fa r Easter n affair s an d spok e n o Chinese , bu t hi s despatches , in so far a s they may be presumed to have furnished hi s Prime Minister' s knowledge of th e country , migh t conceivably have shape d th e cours e of post-war policy . A t th e Quebe c Conferenc e o f 1943 , when Frankli n Roosevelt an d Mr . Churchil l disagree d abou t th e plac e o f Chin a i n future internationa l organization , Mackenzi e Kin g expresse d th e vie w that "th e new generatio n o f Chines e wer e quit e differen t fro m th e old. There wa s a new China, a youthful Chin a tha t ha d t o b e reckone d wit h and mus t not b e underestimated." 43 THE CONTEMPORAR Y INTELLIGENCE COMMUNIT Y

By "th e contemporary intelligenc e community " i s mean t th e resource s now a t th e disposa l o f th e Canadia n Governmen t fo r collectin g an d evaluating informatio n usefu l i n shapin g it s externa l policies . The y include th e following: (1 ) Canadia n representatio n abroad ; (2 ) repre sentatives of other Commonwealt h countries; (3 ) agencie s o f the Unite d States government ; (4 ) certai n undefine d "intelligenc e exchanges" ; (5 ) the repositor y o f informatio n an d experienc e o f governmen t personne l at home . (1) I n 195 3 the then Secretar y o f State fo r External Affairs , Mr . Leste r Pearson, addresse d th e followin g remark s t o th e Hous e o f Common s Standing Committe e o n Externa l Affairs : In ou r concentratio n of interest s ove r ne w method s o f consultation , over new internationa l agencies to b e se t up , w e sometime s forge t tha t w e have an ol d an d trie d metho d o f consultatio n through th e regula r diplomati c services. . .. Our best sources of information ar e usually the messages which we get from ou r representatives abroad. . . . I d o not , for instance , have to rel y onl y o n thi s weekl y [international] committee in Washington to find out wha t i s likely to happe n in Korea. We have ou r Canadia n Ambassador [to th e Unite d States ] i n touc h wit h th e State Departmen t every day. . . . Similarly fro m ou r European missions we

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knew withi n a matte r o f hour s wha t Mr . Dulle s wa s talkin g abou t o n hi s recent visit s t o Paris , Bon n an d London . W e di d no t hav e t o appl y t o an y central agency. Mr. Davi s for instanc e is a pretty activ e person a t Bon n an d he foun d ou t wha t wa s sai d ther e an d th e report s wer e o n m y des k almos t within twenty-fou r hours ; an d th e sam e i s tru e i n respec t o f ou r head s o f mission i n Paris an d London. 44

The qualit y o f th e informatio n receive d i n thi s wa y depends , first , o n the strategi c locatio n o f Canadia n mission s abroa d and , second , o n th e abilities o f the member s of those missions . By 196 1 Canad a ha d it s ow n diplomati c representatio n i n roughl y fifty countries i n al l the majo r region s o f th e globe , a s wel l a s represen tation throug h permanen t delegation s i n th e Unite d Nations , th e Nort h Atlantic Council , th e Organizatio n fo r Europea n Economi c Co-opera tion, an d commissioner s o n th e internationa l supervisor y commis sions fo r Cambodi a an d Vietnam. * Thi s wa s a far-flun g networ k b y any standard , especiall y whe n fortifie d b y th e wide r commercia l con tacts o f th e Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerce . It s expansio n ha d been exceedingl y rapi d sinc e 1939 , o r eve n sinc e 194 5 whe n Canad a was represented i n less than a quarter of the countrie s i n which mission s had bee n establishe d fifteen years later . Even so , ther e wer e deficiencies . Th e hea d o f missio n i n mor e tha n one ke y capita l divide d hi s tim e an d energ y betwee n hi s missio n ther e and anothe r i n som e othe r country . A s recentl y a s 196 1 th e Hig h Commissioner i n Malaya wa s als o responsibl e fo r Canadia n representa tion i n Burma ; th e ambassado r t o Norwa y wa s als o ambassado r t o Iceland; th e ambassado r t o Belgiu m wa s als o ambassado r t o Luxem bourg; th e ambassador t o Costa Ric a ha d to find time for ambassadoria l duties i n Managua , Tegucigalp a an d Panam a City . The n ther e wer e a number o f countrie s wher e Canad a ha d n o diplomati c representatio n of an y kind , includin g (i n 1961 ) Afghanistan , th e Republi c o f China , the Republic o f Korea, Hungary , Iraq, an d Jordan . It s absence , i t is fai r *Canadian embassies wer e locate d i n Argentina , Austria , Belgium , Brazil , Burma, Chile , Colombia , Cost a Rica , Cuba , Denmark , th e Dominica n Republic , Ecuador, Finland , France , the Federa l Republi c of Germany , Greece , Haiti , Honduras, Iceland , Indonesia , Ireland , Israel , Italy , Japan , th e Lebanon , Luxem bourg, Mexico , th e Netherlands , Nicaragua , Norway , Panama , Peru , Poland , Portugal, Spain , Sweden , Switzerland , Turkey , th e Unio n o f Sovie t Socialis t Republics, th e Unite d Ara b Republic , th e Unite d State s o f America , Uruguay , Venezuela, an d Yugoslavia ; high commissioners' offices i n Australia , Ceylon , Ghana, India , Malaya , Ne w Zealand , Nigeria , Pakistan , th e Union o f Sout h Africa, and the Unite d Kingdom ; legations in Czechoslovaki a and Iran . A com missioner's offic e ha d bee n opene d i n th e Federatio n o f th e Wes t Indies , no t ye t a Commonwealt h member ; consula r office s i n th e Philippines ; an d ther e wa s a military missio n i n Berlin .

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to add , wa s ofte n a s much du e t o th e Departmen t o f Financ e a s to th e Department o f Externa l Affair s (se e chapte r i) ; i n th e cas e o f th e People's Republi c o f Chin a i t wa s du e t o a continuin g polic y o f non recognition, denyin g to Canad a a s to th e Unite d State s a listenin g pos t however hampere d b y inhospitabl e authorities . In 194 8 th e Departmen t o f External Affair s a t Ottaw a receive d fro m its mission s oversea s n o fewe r tha n 22,50 0 despatche s an d letters , an d 22,000 telegram s an d teletyp e messages , figure s whic h i n th e absenc e of mor e recen t dat a mus t b e presume d t o b e ver y muc h exceede d b y those o f the presen t day . The qualit y of these intelligence source s is less easily estimated . B y 196 1 th e grea t embassie s i n London , Pari s an d Washington, an d th e Permanen t Missio n t o th e Unite d Nation s i n New York, eac h th e siz e o f a smal l foreig n office , wer e operatin g a t pea k efficiency unde r the directio n o f member s of tha t selec t grou p o f senio r officials a t th e summi t of th e publi c service . Informatio n receive d fro m such sources may be presumed to be as full an d a s accurate a s any in th e world, an d n o les s perceptivel y interpreted . Removed t o mor e exoti c posts , however , th e Canadia n diplomatis t operates with less assurance as a purveyor of intelligence. H e wil l be less experienced tha n th e senio r an d exceptionall y gifte d publi c servant s presiding over the historic embassies ; a Heeney, a Robertson o r a Leger could no t b e spare d fo r Djakart a o r Beiru t (thoug h i t shoul d b e note d that Mr. Escott Rei d was spared for New Delhi). That is neither unusual nor decisiv e for, a s ha s bee n wisel y remarked , "n o governmen t servic e can b e mad e u p entirel y o f first-class men; . . . efficienc y i s finally determined no t b y th e star s bu t b y th e averag e secon d class." 45 Appraisal o f th e averag e secon d clas s i n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs come s best, perhaps , from outsid e observers ; a n Australian find s its member s "articulate , worldly-wis e yet earnest , seekin g fe w favour s but determine d t o b e active." 46 I f the y ar e handicappe d h i th e intelli gence aspec t of their work (a s opposed t o it s negotiating and propagan dist aspects) , it is less by their persona l qualitie s than by the long-stand ing (i f diminishing ) departmenta l prejudic e agains t specialization , an d the assumptio n that i t i s no t onl y possibl e bu t desirabl e fo r a n officia l to serv e jus t a s effectivel y unde r pal m a s unde r pine . Th e practi cal consequenc e o f thi s generalis t approac h i s th e shiftin g o f personne l every tw o o r thre e year s betwee n missio n an d missio n an d betwee n home an d abroad ; an d a s th e mos t intelligen t o r ambitiou s o f foreig n service officer s ca n hardl y acquir e rea l expertis e durin g s o shor t a sojourn, ther e i s accordingl y a shortag e o f expert s an d a n impairmen t of th e qualit y o f intelligence . I t shoul d b e stresse d tha t thi s defec t i s

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being overcom e b y longer posting s (especiall y o n countr y an d regiona l desks i n th e Departmen t a t Ottawa ) an d b y a mor e rationa l allocatio n of postings ; a n Arabic-speakin g office r wil l rarel y an y longe r fin d hi s special knowledg e diminishing through disus e in som e Latin-America n capital, an d are a specialist s ar e no w retained a t th e Eas t Bloc k fo r five years or eve n longer. (2) Supplementing , an d i n som e area s substitutin g for , Canadia n sources o f informatio n ar e thos e o f othe r Commonwealt h nations . Before th e emergenc e o f th e Commonwealt h i n Afro-Asia , th e Unite d Kingdom wa s by far th e mos t importan t source . "Throug h ou r missio n in London, Canad a House, as well a s through ou r embass y i n Washing ton an d at other posts where we are both established," th e Unde r Secre tary o f State fo r Externa l Affair s commente d in 1952 , "w e d o hav e th e advantage o f a grea t dea l o f informatio n whic h come s t o th e Unite d Kingdom throug h thei r muc h wide r networ k o f posts." 47 Bu t eve n b y 1952 othe r Commonwealt h capital s wer e assumin g greater importanc e along the communications system. New Delhi had alread y demonstrate d its importance durin g the Korea n War, its embassy in Peking furnishing the Canadian Government with valuable dat a abou t the People's Repub lic of China. Whereas much of the informatio n received from th e Unite d Kingdom cam e fro m th e Commonwealt h Relation s Office , informa tion fro m India n source s was usually conveyed i n conversatio n wit h th e High Commissione r i n Ne w Delhi , a mar k o f th e especia l confidenc e reposed i n Mr . Escot t Rei d a s Canada' s representative , an d passe d o n in hi s despatches. * *Since som e Canadian s ten d t o exaggerat e th e valu e an d significanc e o f th e "Ottawa-New Delh i axis, " opinion s o f qualifie d India n observer s o n thi s matte r are o f particula r interest . On e India n schola r comments : "Wit h Canada , fo r various reasons , Indi a cam e t o hav e a n unusuall y war m friendshi p whic h wa s next onl y t o tha t wit h th e Unite d Kingdom ; indeed , i t woul d b e n o exaggeratio n to sa y tha t a t th e en d o f 1956 , Indi a an d Canad a wer e close r t o eac h othe r i n some respect s tha n wa s Indi a eve n wit h th e Unite d Kingdom. " M . S . Rajan , "India an d th e Commonwealth , 1954-56, " India Quarterly, vol . XVI , no . 1 , Jan.-March, 1960 , p . 31 . Th e India n contributo r t o th e Round Table's lubile e issue remarks : "Til l Indi a becam e independent , Canad a wa s t o mos t Indian s n o more tha n a nam e o n a map . Al l interes t i n Americ a wa s directe d toward s th e United States . Onc e freedo m wa s attained , however , relation s wit h Canad a ex panded rapidly . Th e considerabl e economi c assistanc e received , an d th e fac t that th e tw o countrie s sa w ey e t o ey e o n man y issue s o f foreig n policy , helpe d greatly i n this . Bu t th e primar y caus e wa s tha t Indi a foun d Mr . St . Laurent , Mr. Pearso n an d Mr . Diefenbake r (al l o f who m hav e visite d th e country ) sympathetic personalities . Part y politic s i n Canad a hav e ha d n o influenc e o n Indo-Canadian relations. " "A n India n View, " Round Table, no . 200 , Sept . 1960 , p. 373 .

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A potentiall y importan t sourc e o f political informatio n wa s the prim e ministers' meeting , wher e th e leader s o f a n expandin g Commonwealt h more o r les s trienniall y indulge d i n wha t thei r spars e communique s described a s "fran k an d friendl y exchange s o f views. " A numbe r o f member governments , however , including Canada's , wer e disinclined t o use this forum t o ventilate intra-Commonwealt h grievances, thu s striking off thei r agend a (althoug h no t of f the agend a o f bilatera l discussio n t o which a number o f delegates reverte d when in London) suc h importan t matters a s th e Kashmi r dispute , th e neutralis t respons e t o communis t aggression, and the political implications of apartheid.* Whethe r any rea l unburdening o f min d an d hear t coul d tak e plac e unde r suc h circum stances migh t well be doubted. A furthe r barrie r t o communicatio n was concern ove r security . Olde r member s coul d no t hel p bu t fee l som e misgiving a t sharin g sensitiv e informatio n wit h ne w an d untrie d col leagues of such exotic politica l complexio n that the assassinatio n i n 195 9 of the trotskyite Prime Minister of Ceylon, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, was thought t o hav e deprive d th e Commonwealt h o f on e o f it s truste d senior statesmen . I t ha s thus come about that no t muc h of interest flows indiscriminately throughou t th e entir e Commonwealt h communication s network, eac h membe r instea d decidin g fo r itsel f which , i f any , o f th e others ar e t o b e favoure d recipient s o f politica l secrets . I f thi s works , as i t must , t o th e disadvantage o f th e "secon d clas s members, " i t doe s preserve th e qualit y o f informatio n for th e favoure d few. f (3) I n payin g tribut e t o th e valu e o f Unite d Kingdo m intelligenc e sources fo r Canadia n foreig n policy , th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s observe d i n 195 2 tha t "w e ar e als o indebte d t o th e United State s i n muc h the sam e wa y for th e informatio n and assistanc e that w e get from Washingto n . . . whic h i t woul d b e ver y difficul t t o do without." 48 Fro m th e variou s part s o f th e Unite d State s polic y machine, informatio n o f al l kind s pour s int o th e Canadia n capital , im pelled mainl y b y fea r o f surpris e attac k upo n th e commo n continent . *Even a t th e prim e ministers' meetin g o f Marc h 1961 , whic h resulte d i n Sout h Africa withdrawin g its application t o remai n i n th e Commonwealt h a s a republic , discussion o f apartheid too k plac e onl y wit h th e permissio n o f th e Sout h African Prim e Minister ; ha d Dr . Verwoer d refuse d t o giv e permission , th e issu e could no t wit h propriet y hav e bee n discussed . Se e Canada , H . o f C . Debates, March 17 , 1961, p. 3085 . fSuch a practice , howeve r subversiv e t o Commonwealt h ideals , i s no t new . At th e Imperia l Conferenc e o f 192 3 "ver y confidentia l matter s wer e discusse d not at the Conferenc e but at a meetin g of 'Prim e Ministers, ' a devic e to exclud e the Iris h Fre e Stat e an d India." R. MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, I , 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p . 46 1 n .

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Political personages shuttl e bac k an d forth , sometime s alone , sometime s in committee . Th e tw o embassie s continuousl y engag e i n transmittin g political intelligence . Militar y intelligenc e i s gathere d principall y b y th e Canadian Join t Staf f a t Washington , wit h it s contact s a t th e Defens e Department an d th e Offic e o f International Securit y Affairs , whil e "some 60 Canadian officers o f the army, the navy and the ai r force" (th e Minis ter o f National Defenc e disclose d i n Marc h 1960) , "sittin g i n dail y o n various committee s a t th e Pentagon, " kee p "th e Chief s o f Staf f her e i n Ottawa advise d b y letter , telegra m an d telephone." 49 Scientifi c an d technological intelligence , relatin g mainl y t o weapon s development , i s the responsibilit y o f th e Defenc e Researc h Board , an d gathere d a t it s liaison post s a t th e Unite d State s Ai r Researc h an d Developmen t Com mand a t Baltimore , an d a t th e Unite d State s Ai r Forc e Cambridg e (Mass.) Researc h Cente r an d Lincol n Laboratory ; th e historia n o f th e Board ha s writte n tha t i t probabl y "obtaine d a relativel y bette r retur n for th e mone y whic h i t ha s spen t o n liaiso n tha n fo r an y othe r typ e of expenditure." 50 Intelligenc e o n subversiv e activit y i s exchange d b y the Roya l Canadia n Mounted Police and the Federa l Burea u of Investi gation, a n arrangemen t tha t becam e widel y know n i n 195 7 whe n th e Canadian Governmen t threatened t o en d it to preven t the imprope r us e of informatio n by Unite d State s authoritie s beyon d th e contro l o f th e administration.51 The proximit y o f th e Unite d State s ha s on e othe r importan t i f over looked advantag e fo r th e Canadia n intelligenc e community . Th e Ne w York Times, a n intelligence source not to be despised for being unclassi fied,* ma y b e rea d i n Ottaw a twelv e hour s afte r publicatio n a t a cos t of $1 6 a year . (4) Governmen t official s hav e mad e ver y occasiona l an d ver y guarde d references t o "th e intelligenc e exchanges. " Fro m thei r crypti c comments it i s impossible t o tel l whethe r thes e constitut e specia l source s o f infor mation, o r specia l kind s o f information . "Th e intelligenc e exchanges, " *"The trut h is, " wrot e Phili p Ker r whe n privat e secretar y t o Lloy d Georg e i n 1917, "tha t on e derive s fa r mor e new s fro m th e pres s tha n fro m an y othe r source, an d ever y da y i n th e clu b [Th e Travellers ] on e see s lon g row s o f hig h Foreign Offic e officials , includin g Balfour , goin g eagerl y t o th e notic e boar d t o find ou t wha t i s reall y happening. " Quote d i n J . R . M . Butler , Lord Lothian (London, 1960) , p . 66 . Fort y year s late r a forme r Canadian foreig n secretar y expressed th e vie w tha t "ther e ar e foreig n correspondent s o f newspaper s whos e despatches ca n b e a s full , shrewd , an d usefu l a s an y diplomat's . Sometime s the y are base d o n a n eve n greater knowledg e an d broade r experienc e o f th e countr y —and it s people—abou t whic h the y ar e bot h writing. " Leste r B . Pearson , Diplomacy i n th e Nuclear Ag e (Toronto , 1959) , p . 16 .

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remarked th e Unde r Secretar y of Stat e for Externa l Affair s t o member s of th e Senate Standin g Committee in 1958 , "hav e t o remain secret . . . . This i s a field in whic h I hop e yo u wil l no t pres s me." 52 An d n o on e did. Government s d o no t ordinaril y disclos e th e existence , le t alon e the details , of an y espionage or clandestin e intelligence activit y in which they ma y b e engaged , an d th e Canadia n Governmen t i s n o exception . Having som e if not complet e acces s to th e produc t o f the Anglo-Ameri can espionag e systems , i t ha s littl e incentiv e t o embar k itsel f o n suc h a dangerou s an d disreputabl e enterprise . Ther e ha s bee n n o publi c discussion o f th e propriet y o f Canadia n participatio n i n clandestin e intelligence work , bu t mos t officials , i f aske d fo r thei r opinion , woul d probably subscrib e to the view expressed in 194 6 b y the Royal Commis sion investigatin g Sovie t espionag e i n Canada : "Th e transplantin g of a conspiratorial technique , whic h wa s firs t develope d i n les s fortunat e countries to promot e an undergroun d struggl e agains t tyranny , to a democratic societ y . . . i s singularly inappropriate." 53 (5) Th e mos t importan t secto r o f an y intelligenc e communit y i s t o b e found a t hom e rather tha n abroad , fo r th e mos t accurat e an d elaborat e information ca n have little beneficial effect upo n foreign polic y i f ignored by it s recipient . Th e proble m o f th e responsivenes s o f politica l leaders to information supplie d b y expert s has bee n discusse d briefl y i n chapte r ii. The problem t o be considered her e is that of collating, evaluating and transmitting t o th e maker s o f nationa l polic y th e informatio n receive d from governmenta l contacts throughou t the world . The mos t strikin g feature of the machiner y by whic h thes e task s are performed i s the absenc e o f anything resembling the Centra l Intelligenc e Agency o f th e Unite d State s government . Th e muc h smalle r scal e o f intelligence operation s i n Canada , togethe r wit h mor e efficien t proce dures fo r sharin g an d co-ordinatin g information—procedure s resultin g both fro m th e parliamentar y syste m an d th e intimac y o f th e Ottaw a environment—make a n autonomou s intelligenc e secto r les s urgen t i f not altogethe r unneccessary . The centr e o f foreig n polic y intelligenc e i s withi n the Departmen t o f External Affairs , wher e thre e aspect s o f intelligenc e wor k ma y b e dis tinguished. Ther e is , firs t o f all , th e importan t functio n o f bringin g information t o the attentio n o f those responsibl e fo r foreig n policy deci sions. Thi s presuppose s a goo d dea l o f knowledg e an d indee d o f wisdom. The volume of incoming despatches is so great that only a select few ca n b e brough t befor e th e senio r official s o f th e Department , an d fewer still before the Secretary o f State for External Affairs. Mr . Howar d

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Green, commentin g i n 195 9 o n "th e numbe r an d th e qualit y o f th e dispatches whic h com e i n t o th e ministe r o f th e Departmen t ever y da y from al l over th e world, " confesse d tha t he di d "no t thin k tha t perhap s more than 1 0 per cen t of the total volume woul d b e passe d on t o me." 84 In 194 6 th e procedur e fo r disposin g o f incomin g despatche s wa s des cribed b y th e Associat e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs . Asked b y a membe r o f th e Hous e o f Common s Standin g Committee , "How doe s th e informatio n ge t t o th e to p polic y me n i n th e Depart ment?," Hume Wrong replied: It depend s on the natur e an d urgenc y of th e subjec t ho w a n incomin g docu ment i s treate d i n th e Department . Routin e communication s g o t o th e division concerne d wit h th e matte r i n th e Departmen t an d the y ca n dispos e of them . Matter s affectin g polic y g o straigh t t o th e to p an d ma y the n g o down, an d the y ma y b e brough t u p b y th e Unde r Secretar y t o th e Prim e Minister. Yo u canno t la y dow n a genera l rul e fo r dealin g wit h busines s of that sort . W e hav e varyin g correspondenc e coverin g a larg e rang e o f subjects. Q. I t come s dow n t o th e ol d sourc e o f th e mai l an d t o who m i t i s directed; whethe r i t i s marke d privat e an d confidentia l o r jus t confidential . A. No , i t is not nearly a s automatic a s that. I wis h sometime s i t coul d b e made automatic , bu t i t i s impossibl e t o d o it . A larg e elemen t o f huma n discretion an d intelligenc e must b e allowe d for . Q. A s lon g as the strea m o f communicatio n i s smal l an d th e Departmen t is smal l i t ca n ac t i n on e way , bu t afte r a whil e a s volume grow s yo u hav e to hav e a system? A. Yo u hav e t o hav e a system , an d i t i s no t somethin g yo u ca n reduc e to a simpl e formul a becaus e ther e mus t b e a residua l elemen t o f judgment as t o wha t treatmen t thi s deserve s i f i t i s obviousl y a n importan t question . Usually i t wil l g o t o th e chie f o f th e divisio n concerne d an d h e wil l tak e i t up wit h th e Unde r Secretar y o r mysel f who , i f th e matte r require s it , wil l see that i t i s brought t o th e attentio n o f th e Prim e Ministe r [an d Secretar y of Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs] . O n th e othe r hand , sometime s i t migh t b e obviously a matte r whic h nee d no t b e brough t t o th e Prim e Minister' s attention o r require th e persona l attentio n o f th e Unde r Secretar y o r myself . I d o no t kno w an y larg e organizatio n excep t possibl y a mai l orde r hous e which can reduce t o an absolut e formula ho w to trea t incomin g communica tions.55 By the early 1950' s the increased volume o f incoming communication s had le d to the formation withi n th e Department of a Political Co-ordination Sectio n havin g amon g it s dutie s "providin g a numbe r o f politica l information service s fo r Cabine t Ministers " an d preparin g regula r reports "o n th e backgroun d an d curren t aspect s o f majo r internationa l developments" fo r th e genera l us e o f member s o f th e Department. 56 (In a late r reorganizatio n th e Politica l Co-ordinatio n Section , strippe d of th e secon d o f these functions , wa s rename d the Liaiso n Service. ) A n

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officer o f the Department visits the Prime Minister eac h da y to brin g t o his attention important informatio n received during the previous twentyfour hours . Th e foreig n servic e office r performin g thi s tas k fo r th e administration heade d b y Mr. Joh n Diefenbake r is, unlike hi s predecessors, a senio r membe r o f th e Department , an d hi s ran k i s a measur e of hi s importanc e i n th e polic y proces s whe n relation s betwee n th e professional foreig n servic e an d it s politica l master s ar e les s ultimat e than in the past. A secon d functio n of intelligence wor k performed within th e Depart ment o f Externa l Affair s i s tha t o f collatin g th e return s o f th e variou s agencies o f government, such as the Defenc e Research Boar d an d eac h of th e thre e services , whic h maintai n thei r ow n system s fo r gatherin g information. Th e integratio n o f political , scientifi c an d militar y intelli gence i s th e primar y task o f on e o f th e tw o defenc e liaison division s of the Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . Th e Departmen t als o provide s the chairma n of the Join t Intelligenc e Committe e which , with its representatives fro m th e thre e services , brings intelligenc e dat a t o th e atten tion of the Chief s o f Staf f Committe e and othe r senio r interdepartmenta l bodies concerne d wit h problems o f national defence . Finally, th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s ma y itsel f contribut e to intelligenc e source s b y bringin g it s ow n experienc e an d judgmen t to bea r upo n information received. This function, passing imperceptibly into th e real m o f polic y plannin g (discusse d i n chapte r vi) , consist s primarily o f forecasting foreign policy , anticipatin g political an d strate gic contingencie s an d attemptin g to devis e ways and mean s fo r copin g with them . Onl y i n recen t year s ha s th e intelligenc e communit y i n Canada consciousl y addresse d itsel f t o thi s importan t aspec t o f it s work; durin g th e Secon d Worl d War , th e historia n o f th e Canadia n Army ha s observed, the country had "no intelligence organizatio n . . . capable o f makin g a full y adequat e estimat e o f th e situatio n i n th e Far East." 57 Toda y th e Join t Plannin g Committee , compose d o f repre sentatives o f th e thre e service s an d officer s o f th e tw o defenc e liaiso n divisions o f th e Departmen t of External Affairs , "co-operat e [s] closel y with th e intelligenc e an d plannin g agencies of th e arme d force s i n th e preparation o f paper s fo r consideratio n b y th e Chief s o f Staff." 58 For a small (or, i f it be preferred, a middle) power , Canada is unusually an d perhap s uniquel y wel l endowe d wit h diversifie d source s o f foreign polic y intelligence . It s ow n fact-gatherin g apparatu s i s no w located i n ove r fift y countries ; i t ha s acces s t o muc h o f th e produc t of th e immens e intelligence community of th e Unite d States ; an d a s a senior membe r o f th e Commonwealt h o f Nation s i t occupie s a centra l

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position i n th e far-flun g communication s networ k linkin g thirtee n countries togethe r i n on e o f the mos t remarkable if unpublicized intelli gence system s i n th e world . If , therefore , i n spit e o f thes e tremendou s assets, th e foreig n policy decision s o f a Canadia n governmen t see m ill suited t o their objectives , responsibilit y rest s t o a n unusual degre e upo n those minister s wh o fail t o exploi t th e exceptiona l intelligenc e facilitie s at their disposal .

Chapter Six PLANNIN

G

PLAN O R N O PLAN ?

"There is no suc h thing as originality in foreign policy, " Mussolin i onc e remarked i n a moment of clarity. Th e possibility , le t alon e the wisdom, of plannin g for a future a s inscrutable a s that awaitin g a member of th e modern state s system remains in doubt. Geograph y set s a hard i f not a n iron la w fo r foreig n minister s o f al l nations , an d i t i s remarkabl e ho w even the mos t powerfu l dictatorships , free r tha n mos t to manoeuvr e an d sacrifice wit h a minimum regard fo r lif e an d happiness , stray s o slightly from th e ol d establishe d ways . Governments o f open societies , planning for foreig n polic y i n th e sens e o f mappin g a detaile d cours e fo r th e longer run , have been restrained b y more than the inertia an d fickleness of thei r electorates . The y hav e encountere d an d t o som e exten t share d a libera l democrati c traditio n tha t i s hostil e t o polic y plannin g o n th e grand scale . I f (paraphrasin g Dicey) al l wer e planners fift y years ago , planning as a panacea later los t muc h of its allure . "I n politica l activit y men sai l a boundles s an d bottomles s sea, " Harol d Laski' s successo r at th e Londo n Schoo l o f Economic s affirme d i n a famou s lecture : "There i s neither harbou r no r shelte r no r floo r fo r anchorage , neithe r starting plac e no r appointe d destination." 1 Thi s reactio n wa s mor e than a philosophica l movement ; it wa s the outcom e of har d an d tragi c experience. Planner s allowe d t o indulge thei r fearfu l logi c ha d led much of mankin d not t o Utopi a bu t throug h the valle y of a totalitaria n ordea l to th e unspeakabl e horror s o f "the fina l solution. " But a s th e survivin g liberal democracie s move d defensivel y int o th e second hal f o f the twentieth century, planning for nationa l policie s began to appea r i n a ne w and seductiv e guise . Fo r thi s th e externa l challeng e of Sovie t (an d increasingl y o f Chinese ) communis m wa s mor e tha n anything responsible. Tha t challeng e wa s not new . Since 191 7 (perhap s earlier) Wester n liberalis m ha d bee n startle d b y a riva l clai m t o inter pret th e democrati c tradition , an d th e interpretatio n provide d b y Lenin was a s different fro m tha t o f liberal democrac y a s State and Revolution from Mill' s O n Liberty. Bu t b y 195 0 a mor e threatenin g aspec t wa s apparent. Communis m was n o longe r a riva l theory ; i t ha d becom e a rival example , offerin g glitterin g prize s o f productivit y an d prestig e t o those lookin g t o Mosco w for model s an d methods . Plannin g i n its mos t

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doctrinaire for m wa s hel d t o b e th e ke y t o thes e triumphs . "Th e hig h vocation o f Sovie t diplomacy, " write s a Bolshevi k cour t historian , "i s made easie r by the fact tha t i t wields a weapon possessed b y none o f its rivals o r opponents . Sovie t diplomac y i s fortifie d wit h th e scientifi c theory o f Marxism-Leninism . . . [whic h gives ] i t a specia l positio n i n international lif e an d explain s it s outstanding successes." 2 Couched i n thes e terms , it migh t appea r t o it s Afro-Asia n audience s that thi s greates t o f al l "grea t debates " wa s n o mor e (i f n o less ) tha n the ol d argumen t abou t "pla n o r n o plan. " Bu t t o th e exten t tha t thi s interpretation prevailed , the case of liberal democracies alread y identifie d in Afro-Asia n mind s a s th e unreconstructe d exemplar s o f planlessnes s was bound t o be lost by default. I t therefor e becam e urgentl y necessar y to recast it s terms, to make clear beyond doubt that its protagonists were not planners on the one hand an d non-planners o n the other, but totali tarian planner s o n th e on e han d an d libertaria n planner s o n th e other . The rehabilitatio n o f th e polic y planne r ha d begun , eve n i f hi s appea l stemmed no t fro m inne r conviction , o r no t yet , bu t fro m externa l necessity. What mad e hi s triump h certai n wa s th e growin g convictio n o f Western public s tha t th e achievement s o f Sovie t technolog y ha d re sulted in spit e of—perhaps eve n because of—th e rigour s o f Soviet plan ning. Durin g th e month s followin g th e launchin g o f th e sputnik — the firs t o f man y subsequen t Russia n intrusion s int o space—les s an d less was heard of the doctrinal incubus supposedly hindering communis t technological breakthroughs . The fashionable contrast was now between the aimlessnes s an d drif t o f libera l democracie s an d th e ster n an d purposive mission of Soviet society. With mounting frequency an d bluntnes s the poin t wa s mad e tha t i t woul d be necesar y fo r th e Wes t t o emulat e the Sovie t exampl e to survive . The democracie s (s o a growin g numbe r of thei r leadin g citizen s wer e saying ) neede d somethin g o f th e sens e of missio n and directio n o f the communis t world, som e doctrinal under pinning fo r decision s hithert o pragmatic , t o challeng e a s muc h a s t o respond, and, above all, foreign policie s continuousl y relatin g t o a longterm assessmen t o f nationa l goal s an d o f th e method s b y whic h thes e might be attained . The planne r wa s back o n his throne . FOREIGN POLIC Y PLANNIN G AND TH E NATIONA L STYL E

Of al l th e libera l democracies , th e Unite d State s ha s mos t ardentl y reassessed planning as a technique and indee d a s a condition of national

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survival. Suc h was the natura l respons e of the leade r o f the nation s tha t were standin g togethe r i n consciou s oppositio n t o th e sprea d o f com munist influence. Bu t it was also a response wholly in keeping with what W. W . Rosto w ha s calle d "th e America n nationa l style, " discerne d a century o r mor e ag o by de Tocqueville : "American s hav e a grea t dea l of curiosit y an d littl e leisure ; thei r lif e i s s o practical , s o confused , s o excited, s o active, tha t bu t little time remains to the m for thought . Suc h men ar e pron e t o genera l idea s becaus e the y ar e thereb y spare d th e trouble o f studyin g particulars." 3 Thu s emerge d th e parado x o f " a nation o f individualistic empiricist s . . . powerfully drawn to a particula r use o f highl y abstrac t concepts," 4 a n attractio n a t onc e a caus e an d a condition o f th e plannin g approac h t o foreig n a s t o othe r nationa l affairs. Fo r th e assumptio n of the foreign policy planner mus t necessarily be that there is order an d rhyth m in the movemen t o f events , a pattern, even a gran d design , whic h wis e reflectio n wil l disclos e an d carefu l analysis exploit t o th e nation's advantage . For i f history wer e otherwise, one crisi s succeedin g another a t random , devoi d o f reaso n an d regular ity, impervious to understanding and s o incapable of prediction, wherei n lay the planner's task ? Did he have a task a t all? The American nationa l style discourages such questions, just as the British style , empirical , pragmatic, expediential , shyin g awa y fro m abstrac t principle , distrustfu l of doctrine, assume s thei r answer s t o b e negative . "A n eminen t Britis h economist," a Canadia n colleagu e onc e recalled , "wh o wa s i n th e public servic e use d t o sa y tha t h e rejoice d whe n som e civi l servan t o r minister referre d t o hi m a s academic . H e the n kne w tha t h e ha d bee n guilty o f thinkin g as much a s si x months ahead." 5 The Canadian style , despite the influence of the French-Canadian tradition (itsel f ver y differen t fro m th e rationalist , Cartesia n traditio n o f modern France) , resemble s th e Britis h i n it s inhospitalit y t o basi c assumptions abou t planning fo r foreig n policy. Ther e is a stron g dispo sition t o dea l wit h externa l affair s i n a workada y manner , eschewin g doctrine an d th e lon g view , taking one thin g a t a tim e an d bein g pre pared t o take much time ove r that on e thing. Cautious, patient , compro mising, flexible , ar e th e word s b y whic h Canadia n foreig n minister s of recen t year s have describe d thei r endeavours ; such words , whil e no t unknown t o th e vocabular y o f planning , ar e ther e use d mor e ofte n a s pejoratives tha n a s praise. * For thi s attitud e a numbe r o f circumstance s hav e bee n responsible . Perhaps mos t basi c hav e bee n th e circumstance s o f Canadia n histor y *Professor Harr y Johnso n call s the m "weasel-adjectives. " Se e hi s "Canada' s Foreign Trad e Problems, " International Journal, vol . XV , no . 3 , Summe r 1960 , p. 235.

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and th e absenc e fro m tha t histor y o f a revolutionar y tradition compar able t o that i n the Unite d States. * I f revolution s breed philosopher s an d heroes they also beget doctrinaires, and that ster n sense of self-righteous ness which , i f i t sustain s th e weak , i s no t a n unmixe d blessin g fo r th e strong. Fro m th e America n revolutionar y traditio n derive s tha t charac teristically America n belie f tha t som e swif t an d spectacula r strok e ma y permanently solv e problems whic h in their natur e admi t onl y o f amelio ration. Th e Canadia n style knows no comparabl e addiction t o th e "one shot solution, " t o the "crash program, " t o "doctrines" whether the y bea r the nam e o f Monro e o r Stimson , Truma n o r Eisenhower . Ther e ha s been littl e i n Canadia n experienc e t o encourag e th e expectatio n tha t injuries t o societ y ma y b e heale d i n th e sam e fashio n an d wit h th e same hope o f success as a machine is repaired o r a n appendi x removed . It i s th e Canadia n styl e t o tr y t o garde n i n th e fiel d o f politics , no t to da m o r dredge . The pragmatic approach t o foreign policy is natural in a country which, like Canada , ha s fe w i f an y opportunitie s fo r exercisin g importan t an d sustained assault s upo n majo r internationa l problems . Lackin g bot h resources an d occasions fo r bol d an d independent approaches , it s initia tives ar e limited to thos e rar e occasion s whe n (a s durin g the Sue z crisi s in Novembe r 1956 ) a n inspire d mediatio n ma y sav e th e grea t power s from thei r ow n miscalculations . It s polic y mus t nearl y alway s b e on e of respons e t o th e move s of others . This , t o some , ha s seeme d t o mea n that Canada ca n hav e n o foreig n polic y o f it s own , implyin g tha t a policy o f respons e i s no t a foreig n polic y a t all . "A s i f th e Canadia n Government could have a foreign or external policy lik e the government s of othe r countries, " wrot e a membe r o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs i n 1938 . "T o asser t tha t you r governmen t ca n for m a polic y is t o asser t tha t i t ha s a choic e o f actio n an d a capacit y t o giv e th e choice effect." 6 "Ove r th e years, " a senio r Canadia n diplomatist , no w retired, has written , I hav e heard a numbe r o f earnes t soul s (som e o f who m wer e noticeably long-haired), glibl y talk of Canadian foreign policy , and thi s to m y no littl e puzzlement. An d afte r a spel l of ove r a decad e in posts abroad my min d i s still unreceptive in this regard. That, over the centuries, the Unite d Kingdom should hav e strive n to preven t a first-class European power from occupyin g the Low Countries; that, as long as she was able to d o so, she did everythin g in he r power to ensure the securit y of the Sue z Canal ; that neither Germany nor Russi a shoul d succee d i n establishin g themselves on th e norther n shores of th e India n Ocean; that Franc e ha s eve r bee n watchfu l ove r he r north *I hav e draw n her e fro m m y essay , "Fro m Canada " i n Fran z M . Joseph , ed. , As Others Se e Us : Th e United States i n Foreign Eyes (Princeton , 1959) , pp . 280-1.

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eastern frontier ; an d tha t th e Italians , sinc e th e earlies t times , hav e resiste d the southwar d thrus t o f th e Teutoni c races—thes e ar e object s o f foreig n policy that I find it easy enough to understand. Bu t when I tur n m y mind t o our s o fortunately placed country , I a m at a loss to kno w i f it i s possible fo r us rationall y t o asser t tha t ther e i s suc h a thin g a s a Canadia n foreig n policy.7

However thi s ma y be , i t i s tru e tha t th e incentiv e t o pla n policie s i n external affair s i s greatl y reduce d b y th e comparativ e unimportance of Canada in the genera l configuration o f power politics. A forme r Cabine t Minister, experienced i n diplomacy, has mad e this plain: It would , o f course , b e idl e t o preten d tha t Canada , lik e othe r countrie s i n the free world, ha s succeede d i n constantly keepin g the initiativ e i n planning much o f it s foreig n polic y durin g thes e disturbin g year s sinc e th e Secon d World Wa r ended. . . . We have, a s you know, rarel y bee n i n a position t o take th e initiative , an d w e have , throughou t thes e years , bee n ver y largel y on the defensive . I n consequence , ou r foreig n polic y ha s bee n wha t I migh t call responsive ; jus t a s when , i n playin g hockey , wit h tw o o r thre e o f th e Canadian tea m i n the penalt y box—a phenomenon whic h does , o n occasion , arise—we ar e constraine d t o pla y a purel y defensiv e rol e rathe r tha n a n aggressive on e i n which we can us e our ful l force s o f strengt h an d initiative . . . . This makes it difficul t t o discus s accurately an d realistically th e manne r in whic h ou r foreig n policie s ar e planne d sinc e s o frequentl y the y hav e been shape d t o dea l wit h aggressio n o r th e menac e o f i t agains t ourselve s and ou r friends. 8

Another facto r accountin g fo r th e pragmati c approac h t o foreig n affairs ha s bee n th e manne r an d metho d o f th e Prim e Ministe r an d Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s throughou t muc h o f th e forma tive period o f Canadian foreign policy . "Upo n man y matters of external policy," a clos e associat e ha s writte n o f Mackenzi e King , "h e too k decisions a s al l i n th e day' s work ; tha t is , excep t fo r th e advic e an d knowledgeability o f hi s principa l adviser s i n th e publi c service , the y were decision s base d no t upo n profoun d persona l stud y o f issues , bu t upon the apparen t needs of the moment." 9 It i s unlikely that th e subject of thi s appraisa l would have taken seriou s issu e wit h it, an d mor e tha n once h e confide d t o hi s diary , a s o n Apri l 20 , 194 1 (th e "gran d Sunday" o n whic h h e an d Frankli n Roosevel t worke d ou t th e Hyd e Park Agreemen t together) : " I recal l wha t Lor d Morle y sai d abou t not plannin g to o fa r ahea d i n politics . Tha t event s determin e wha t i s possible."10 Such a styl e might no t b e expecte d t o surviv e a chang e i n govern ment an d minister , bu t onl y i f i t i s no t deepl y ingraine d i n th e bureaucracy a s well. In Februar y 196 0 th e Secretar y o f State fo r Exter nal Affairs , Mr . Howar d Green , suggeste d i n hi s firs t majo r revie w of

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foreign affair s i n th e Hous e o f Common s tha t th e tim e ha d com e "t o drop th e ide a tha t Canada' s rol e i n worl d affair s i s t o b e a n 'hones t broker' between th e nations. We must decid e instea d tha t ou r rol e i s t o be t o determin e th e righ t stan d t o tak e o n problems , keepin g i n min d the Canadian background and, above all, using Canadian common sense . In effect , th e tim e ha s com e t o tak e a n independen t approach." 11 Thi s statement wa s o n th e whol e wel l receive d throughou t th e country , wit h one curiou s exception . Member s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s were disturbe d at the implication s of their Minister' s remarks , and eve n relatively junio r foreig n servic e officer s (wh o on e woul d hav e though t might respon d enthusiasticall y t o suc h a cal l t o greatness ) privatel y expressed misgiving s abou t hi s "magnificen t obsession " an d hi s "politique de grandeur."* So cautiou s a respons e reflected , o f course , th e traditiona l bia s o f their calling . Th e attitud e o f th e professiona l diplomatis t t o foreig n policy plannin g i s essentiall y negative , scornfu l o f th e bol d initiative , distrustful o f th e gran d design . Mr . Georg e Kenna n ha s wel l describe d "the wear y skepticis m that characterize s th e mor e experience d range s of th e diplomatic profession . . . . The professional . . . sees th e task of diplomacy a s essentiall y a menia l one , consistin g o f hoverin g aroun d the fringe s o f a proces s on e i s powerles s t o control , tidyin g u p th e messes other peopl e hav e made, attempting to keep smal l disaster s fro m turning int o bi g ones , moderatin g th e passion s o f government s an d o f opinionated individuals. . . ,"12 It would be hard to describe more exactly the Weltanschauung of th e Departmen t o f External Affairs . Reinforcing i t i s th e operationa l cod e o f th e foreig n servic e officer , traditionally hostil e t o blueprint s an d th e forwar d look . A senio r official o f the Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s onc e remarke d t o a smal l group o f academic social scientist s that in his view foreign polic y "i s th e result o f a continuin g serie s o f ad ho c decisions , whic h frequentl y hav e to be made with inadequate stud y and inadequate data . . .. It is always a cas e o f realizin g a s full y a s yo u ca n th e implication s o f wha t yo u propose t o do , an d o f doin g i t accordin g t o th e bes t judgmen t yo u ca n make i n a singl e circumstanc e a t th e momen t o f time."* I n thi s classi c *One suc h officer , free d fro m reticenc e b y recen t resignatio n fro m th e Department, gathere d togethe r i n a widel y circulate d magazin e articl e severa l of hi s forme r Minister' s utterances i n thi s vein , describin g the m a s hi s collectio n of "Greenery. " "To b e influential with modest means, " the articl e concluded , "on e needs t o b e modes t i n demeanour. " Peyto n V . Lyon , "Canad a I s Becomin g a Mouse Tha t Roars," Maclean's Magazine, Jun e 18 , 1960 .

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statement o f th e pragmati c approac h t o foreig n politic s a measur e o f rationalization ma y b e detected . Fo r i f a n aversio n t o plannin g i s th e occupational prejudic e o f th e foreig n servic e officer , th e ple a o f over work, o f the stead y unrelenting stream o f detail an d crisi s sai d t o mak e reflection difficul t i f no t impossible , i s hi s occupationa l disease , espe cially i n th e senio r ranks . Doe s h e exaggerate , doe s h e welcome , th e pressures an d th e dail y strai n a s a n escap e fro m th e planner' s har d creative tasks ? T o suc h a questio n it woul d b e presumptuous t o retur n a final answer; but on e may recall, i n leaving it , Walte r Bagehot' s vie w that i f the hea d o f a large enterpris e spend s hi s lif e a t hi s desk , there i s likely somethin g wrong with th e organization. 13 MACHINERY FO R FOREIG N POLICY PLANNIN G

The genera l scepticis m i n whic h th e plannin g o f Canadia n foreig n policy ha s bee n hel d b y government s and bureaucrac y alike is reflecte d in th e deart h o f specia l machinery . Ther e ha s neve r bee n withi n th e Department o f Externa l Affair s th e equivalen t o f th e Stat e Depart ment's Polic y Plannin g Staf f establishe d i n 1947 , o r th e Permanen t Under-Secretary's Committe e o f th e Unite d Kingdo m Foreig n Offic e established i n 1949; f an d n o Ministe r o r senio r officia l ha s publicl y suggested it would be desirabl e to have one. Specia l planning bodies ar e perhaps les s essentia l i n th e parliamentar y system , wher e th e Cabine t is responsible for policy decisions, than in the presidential. But consciou s *Quoted i n B . S . Keirstead , Canada i n World Affairs: September 1951 t o October 1953 (Toronto , 1956) , p . 37 . Th e U.S . Stat e Departmen t ha s a simila r operational preferenc e fo r "makin g polic y o n th e cables. " "Despit e uncounte d high-level directive s stressin g th e nee d fo r previsio n an d a n adequat e operationa l plan," write s a n America n authority , "th e Departmen t retain s muc h o f it s pre 1941 disinclinatio n t o pla n i n advance . Agencie s exis t withi n th e Departmen t whose functio n i t i s t o plan , actin g unde r th e genera l directio n o f th e Assistan t Secretary fo r Polic y Planning ; muc h effor t i s expende d i n devisin g blueprint s for th e future . Th e objectiv e observer , however , i s stil l impressed b y th e exten t to whic h th e usua l des k office r refuse s t o 'dea l wit h hypothetica l questions ' an d seems t o ge t considerabl e satisfactio n ou t o f makin g th e 'brus h fire ' approac h a normal operatin g procedure. " Charle s O. Lerche , Jr. , Foreign Policy of the American People (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J. , 1958) , p . 43 . fThe wor k o f th e Polic y Plannin g Staf f i s wel l known ; tha t o f th e Permanen t Under-Secretary's Committe e muc h les s so , fo r it s existenc e ha s onl y recentl y been disclose d b y it s sometim e chairman , Lor d Strang : "Th e dut y o f thi s com mittee wa s t o tr y t o identif y th e longe r ter m trend s i n internationa l affair s an d to prepar e studie s o n th e possibl e bearing s o f thes e trend s upo n th e futur e formulation o f Britis h policy. " Lor d Strang , "Insid e th e Foreig n Office, " International Relations, vol . XI , no . 1 , Apri l 1960 , pp . 19-20 .

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aversion t o plannin g may be detecte d i n the fac t tha t ther e i s not now , nor ha s ther e eve r been , a n Externa l Affair s committe e o f th e Cabinet , matching it s committee s o n defenc e an d economi c policy , wher e th e minds o f fou r o r fiv e minister s togethe r wit h thos e o f senio r civi l servants an d hig h militar y officer s migh t grappl e collectivel y wit h questions of foreign policy in a more reflectiv e fashio n tha n th e day-to day operation s o f a busy foreign offic e allow . If an y institution s concer n themselve s mainl y wit h foreig n polic y planning, thes e ar e th e interdepartmenta l committee s o f senio r civi l servants drawn from variou s departments o f government. O n suc h com mittees th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s traditionall y occupie s a commanding position , frequentl y supplyin g thei r chairmen . Thei r us e for th e consideratio n o f foreig n polic y problem s date s fro m th e firs t Mackenzie Kin g administratio n o f 1921-5 . Whe n th e Prim e Ministe r of tha t da y wa s urge d t o expan d th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , he replied t o th e suggestion: We are no t confined , so far a s permanent official s ar e concerned , to th e staf f of th e Department , i n th e consideratio n o f foreig n affairs . I a m a stron g believer i n th e polic y o f inter-departmenta l co-ordination , an d th e presen t government, I think , ha s mad e a distinc t progres s i n applyin g thi s policy . The waterway s question s outstandin g wit h th e Unite d States , whic h i n m y opinion constitut e th e mos t difficul t an d mos t momentou s issu e o f Canadia n foreign policy , hav e bee n studie d fo r tw o year s b y a stron g inter-depart mental committee , whic h i s makin g a mor e thoroug h analysi s o f th e situa tion tha n t o m y knowledge ha s eve r bee n mad e b y a Canadia n government . When th e Genev a Protoco l wa s unde r consideration , a simila r committe e was appointed , an d a t th e presen t tim e question s o f Orienta l Immigratio n are bein g considere d jointl y b y th e Immigratio n an d Externa l Affair s Departments. *

During th e late r 1930' s th e devic e fel l int o disuse , bu t cam e bac k into it s ow n durin g th e Secon d Worl d War , particularl y durin g th e last tw o year s whe n post-wa r problem s bega n t o b e systematicall y considered. On e o f th e mor e importan t interdepartmenta l committee s thus constitute d wa s th e Post-Hostilitie s Plannin g Committe e create d in Februar y 1943 , dealing , amon g othe r matters , wit h possibl e Cana *Mackenzie Kin g t o N . W . Rowell , Dec . 7 , 1925 , Rowel l Papers . Th e inter departmental committe e examinin g th e Genev a Protoco l wa s compose d o f th e following: O . D . Skelto n an d W . H . Walke r o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs; L . C . Moye r an d R . O . Campne y o f th e Prim e Minister' s office ; Majo r General J . H . MacBrie n an d Commodor e W . Hos e o f th e Departmen t o f National Defence ; W . S . Edward s o f th e Departmen t o f Justice ; Thoma s Mulve y of th e Departmen t o f th e Secretar y o f State ; O . M . Biggar , Chie f Electora l Officer; an d R . H . Coats , Dominio n Statistician .

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dian approache s t o internationa l organizatio n fo r th e comin g peace . In 194 3 the War Committee of the Cabinet create d a n interdepartmental committee t o conside r internationa l monetar y problems , an d i n Jun e of tha t yea r th e Interdepartmenta l Committe e o n Internationa l Civi l Aviation (replacin g the Interdepartmenta l Committee on Air Transpor t Policy se t up i n May 1942) . O n thes e an d othe r suc h committees, per haps te n o r twelv e i n all , were t o b e foun d th e sam e ke y member s of the bureaucratic elite to whom the Government was learning to turn with increasing frequency and confidenc e for guidanc e on a broadening rang e of domesti c an d foreign policy problem s (se e above , chapte r n) . Man y of thes e ke y officials , thei r rank s deplete d b y th e deat h o f som e an d the entr y int o non-governmenta l occupation s o f others , hav e continue d since 194 5 t o exercis e thei r importan t influenc e o n polic y plannin g through such committees as the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trad e Polic y an d th e Pane l o n th e Economi c Aspect s o f Defenc e Policy.

Chapter Seven N E G O T I A T I O

N

THE NEGOTIATO R AN D HI S CHANGING WORL D

Much ha s bee n mad e i n recen t year s o f th e deca y o f th e metho d o f conducting foreig n polic y b y negotiation . Th e lamen t proceed s charac teristically fro m negotiator s themselves , usually , indeed , fro m retire d negotiators. Their memoir s deplor e th e passin g o f "the old diplomacy, " the diplomac y of which they had th e goo d fortun e to b e th e las t expon ents, diplomac y i n it s rightfu l sens e an d prope r meaning . Lor d Vansittart wrot e of "The Decline o f Diplomacy"; Sir Victor Wellesle y of "Diplomacy i n Fetters. " Si r Nevil e Blan d note s " a growin g tendenc y . . . to substitut e fo r th e discree t exchang e o f note s tendentiou s pres s conferences an d abus e ove r th e air, " and resolutel y refuse s t o sull y hi s edition o f Satow' s Guide t o Diplomatic Practice b y offerin g neophyte s hints for thei r effectiv e exploitation . "Wha t w e have com e t o cal l diplo macy i n th e cours e o f th e pas t twent y years," observe d Hug h Gibson , "has faile d t o achiev e result s an d ha s le d int o al l sorts o f disasters. Bu t it wasn' t reall y diplomacy . I t wa s th e usurpation o f diplomati c func tions b y politicians an d inept amateurs." 1 The eclipse of the negotiator i n foreign policy ha s bee n caused , para doxically enough, by a n expansion o f his functions. No longe r i s it suffi cient fo r hi m t o explai n hi s government' s policy , o r a versio n o f tha t policy, t o th e governmen t t o whic h h e i s accredited ; h e ha s t o a n increasing exten t t o explai n i t t o it s people . H e has , that i s t o say , a propagandist function , an d mor e tha n eve r th e effectivenes s o f th e modern diplomatis t depend s upo n th e shrewdnes s an d imaginatio n h e brings t o it s performance . Wherea s th e negotiatin g functio n stand s a t the origi n o f hi s art , the propagandis t functio n i s comparativel y new, generated b y spectacula r improvement s i n th e technolog y o f communi cations. Million s o f peopl e previousl y isolate d fro m worl d event s might no w b e appeale d to , an d th e negotiato r ha s accordingl y ha d thrust upo n hi m th e unaccustome d rol e o f publi c persuader . H e mus t address himsel f no t onl y t o official s bu t t o mas s public s bot h a t home and abroad . So far , then, fro m contracting , th e univers e o f moder n diplomac y has bee n infinitel y expanding . Bu t thi s expansio n ha s rarel y bee n

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regarded wit h muc h favour . Mor e ofte n tha n no t th e negotiato r ha s looked upo n the propagandist aspec t o f his work a s a threat t o his posi tion rathe r tha n a mean s t o furthe r triumphs . Temperamen t ha s bee n in par t responsibl e fo r thi s fearfu l response . Th e old-styl e diplomatists , Mr. George Kenna n has observed , tended everywher e t o vie w propagand a wit h distast e an d skepticism . Th e profession o f diplomac y induce d a weary detachment , foreig n t o al l politica l enthusiasms an d e x parte pleas . Propagand a smacke d o f over t interferenc e in th e domesti c affair s o f othe r countries—somethin g tha t wen t strongl y against th e grai n o f diplomati c tradition . Mos t diplomatist s wer e instinctivel y convinced tha t government wa s everywhere i n some degre e a conspiracy an d that, whateve r th e outwar d trapping s o f democracy , i t wa s alway s mor e important t o influenc e a fe w selec t individual s tha n t o appea l t o th e broa d electorate. Th e professiona l diplomatis t thu s tende d t o sh y off , tempera mentally, fro m th e ver y though t o f distributin g propaganda . An d h e wa s generally held , the n a s now , b y th e enthusiast s o f th e propagandisti c approach, t o b e quit e unqualifie d for thi s sor t o f work. 2

In on e respec t thes e enthusiasts , th e ne w apostle s o f mas s enlighten ment an d mass bewilderment , wer e absolutel y correct , fo r th e profes esional diplomatis t di d lac k on e o f th e mos t importan t qualification s of th e successfu l publi c persuader . H e was , a s a rule , unknow n t o th e public. And , bein g unknown , h e ha d littl e influenc e wit h it . I t wa s easier, it was surely safer (s o i t was argued) fo r government s to entrus t the propagandis t functio n t o a celebrity . Th e hea d o f governmen t or , if unavailable , th e foreig n minister , bein g th e mos t celebrated , wer e best equippe d fo r th e job . Failin g thes e potentates , i t coul d b e give n t o generals an d admirals , t o pres s lords , t o captain s o f industry , even t o stars fro m th e firmamen t o f entertainmen t (fo r wh o shon e mor e brightly tha n they?)—t o almos t anyone , i t mus t have seeme d t o thos e who mad e diplomacy their career , bu t themselves . The professiona l negotiato r migh t hav e born e thes e intruder s wit h more composur e had the y concerned themselve s solely wit h tha t aspec t of diplomac y fo r whic h their reputations wer e though t t o qualif y them . Such hopes were quickly dashed. "The ar t o f diplomacy," Harold Nicol son ha s observed , "a s tha t o f watercolours , ha s suffere d muc h fro m the fascinatio n whic h i t exercise s upo n th e amateur." 3 Fe w o f thos e imported t o hel p wit h diplomati c publi c relation s hav e bee n conten t with tha t alone . Nearl y al l hav e yielde d t o th e temptatio n o f believin g themselves, precisel y becaus e o f thei r extra-diplomati c status , bette r qualified tha n th e professiona l t o perfor m hi s traditiona l assignments . Sometimes th e belie f wa s justified ; mor e ofte n not ; bu t alway s i t reduced hi s effectiveness . Fe w caree r negotiator s ca n rea d withou t sympathy th e cr i d e caeur o f th e Unite d State s ambassado r i n Londo n

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in 1941 , Joh n G . Winant : "Th e increasin g numbe r o f peopl e wh o negotiate wit h the British Government, ofte n withou t definite assignmen t to th e Embassy . . . seriously interfer e wit h th e work o f the Embassy . I wan t ver y muc h t o hav e ou r relation s wit h th e Britis h bot h friendl y and orderl y s o tha t w e ca n buil d confidenc e tha t permit s continuin g trust an d co-operation . Pleas e hel p me." 4 Bu t no help came . Th e pligh t of hi s colleagu e i n Mosco w wa s n o les s pitiable . "Fo r lon g months, " writes Admira l Willia m H . Standle y i n hi s memoirs , " I sa w Specia l Representative afte r Bi g Dignator y com e t o Russia , leapfro g ove r m y top-hatted head . . .. I als o watche d the situation deteriorate." 5 The mor e grandios e ambition s of th e amateu r diplomatis t hav e bee n sustained b y a variety of forces, no t leas t b y a prejudiced publi c which , when things go wrong, so quickly makes a scapegoat o f the professional : Some diplomat n o doubt Will launc h a heedless word , And lurking war leap out .

But thi s hostility , powerfu l a s i t wa s an d is , coul d no t o f itsel f hav e propelled th e interloper s t o thei r presen t dizz y height s o f powe r an d influence. Technolog y ha s been mor e than anythin g responsible fo r that. An ambassado r i n foreig n part s use d t o b e ver y muc h o n hi s own . He woul d hav e instructions , o f course , bu t thes e wer e necessaril y phrased i n genera l terms , leavin g hi m fre e t o fil l i n importan t details , frequently t o mak e policy i n his ow n right. I n 189 8 Si r Julian Paunce fote, th e Britis h ambassado r a t Washington , urge d upo n th e Foreig n Office tha t certai n concession s b e grante d t o Spai n i n negotiation s the n proceeding i n th e America n capital . "I f Pauncefot e ha d no t associate d himself wit h thi s policy, " th e Actin g Foreig n Secretar y minuted , " I confess I shoul d have rejecte d it a t once; but h e knows our views , he is on th e spot , an d h e is a man o f solid judgment . It seem s a stron g orde r to rejec t hi s advice." 6 Today , nothin g i s mor e easily , o r readily , done. Autonomy t o th e moder n negotiato r i s almos t unknown . Hi s dis cretionary power s hav e bee n steadil y weakene d b y th e telegraph , th e telephone, an d the four-engine aircraft . Whatever natio n h e represents , whateve r for m o f governmen t h e serves, th e diplomatis t experience s a predicamen t commo n t o hi s pro fession. Ye t diplomatist s o f differen t countrie s ar e confronte d wit h special problems , an d thei r commo n predicamen t i s presente d i n different ways . The Canadia n negotiato r i s no exception . Hi s experienc e illustrates a t onc e th e pressure s an d tension s t o whic h th e diplomatis t of ever y natio n i s prey , an d th e peculia r historica l environmen t fro m which, a s a Canadia n diplomatist , h e come s an d attempt s t o defend .

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THE DEVELOPMEN T O F NEGOTIATING MACHINER Y

Much th e greate r par t o f Canada' s negotiation s wit h othe r countrie s has been , a s it remains, wit h the Unite d States . Befor e the appointmen t of a Canadia n Ministe r t o Washingto n i n 1926-7 , th e Dominion' s interests wer e formall y th e responsibilit y o f th e Britis h ambassado r t o the United States. The developmen t of distinctively Canadian negotiatin g machinery wa s largely a response t o a well-founded feeling on th e par t of successiv e government s a t Ottaw a tha t thes e interest s coul d no t b e adequately cared fo r i n this way. Criticism attache d partly , an d by no mean s improperly , t o th e repre sentatives o f th e Britis h Governmen t themselves . Thu s i n th e after math o f th e negotiation s a t Washingto n i n 187 1 ther e wa s widesprea d and advers e comment i n Canadian newspaper s upon th e less than help ful attitud e o f Si r Edwar d Thornto n (who m wit h hi s wif e eve n th e Secretary of the British delegation ha d describe d a s "a dreadfull y drear y pair, lookin g as i f the lif e ha d fade d ou t o f the m i n Sout h Americ a an d the spiri t wa s evaporatin g in Washington" 7). Thornton' s successor , Si r Lionel Sackville-West, was recalled i n th e memor y of a n aid e of Josep h Chamberlain a s "a ma n o f extremely reticent nature , who seldo m spok e unless someon e spok e t o him . S o retiring , indeed , wa s he , that , i f I remember aright , hi s onl y ora l contributio n t o th e 3 0 meeting s o f th e Conference [dealin g wit h a fisherie s disput e o f grea t importanc e t o Canada] wa s th e expressio n o f a wis h tha t a certai n windo w might b e closed."8 I t wa s Sackville-Wes t (bes t know n for th e naiv e interventio n in a n America n presidenta l campaig n resultin g i n hi s recall ) wh o i n 1888 faile d t o transmi t to th e Unite d State s authoritie s th e term s o f a Canadian protes t agains t American occupatio n o f par t o f th e dispute d territory alon g th e Alask a frontier ; when , a decad e later , th e Canadia n Government cam e to prepar e it s case , ther e wa s nothing in th e record , as Joseph Pop e wrote in some disgust to Laurier, "to indicat e what part of H.M . Dominion s wa s bein g encroache d on , an d consequentl y th e protest, a s such , i s worthless . Thi s i s th e mor e aggravatin g when w e consider tha t Canada' s caus e was all that i t shoul d be. W e were specifi c . . . but old West botche d it." 9 But th e mor e fundamenta l grievanc e was not tha t Canadia n interest s suffered fro m bein g "botched" by British negotiators . I t wa s rather tha t on man y matter s th e interest s o f Britai n an d Canad a wer e no t onl y different bu t diametricall y opposed , s o tha t a Britis h ambassador , charged with responsibility fo r both, could uphold one only by sacrificing the other. I t became the settled and , once again, well-founded conviction

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of successiv e Canadia n government s that, face d wit h thi s dilemma , th e British ambassado r woul d pursu e hi s imperia l mandat e a t th e expens e of th e Canadian . T o hav e Canad a negotiat e wit h th e Unite d State s authorities wher e Canadia n interest s wer e involve d seeme d essentia l i f sacrifices wer e not to becom e a ritual. The remed y too k tw o mai n forms . Fo r th e occasiona l bu t (fro m the Canadia n standpoint ) crucia l conference s i n whic h Britis h an d American representative s met , sometime s fo r month s o n end , i n a n effort t o clea n th e slate , nothin g les s tha n th e persona l interventio n o f the Prim e Ministe r himsel f wa s though t sufficien t protection . Thu s Sir John A . Macdonald too k par t a s a member o f the Britis h delegatio n at th e Hig h Commissio n i n Washingto n i n 1870-1, * whil e Si r Wilfri d Laurier, hi s positio n a s Canada' s representativ e mor e clearl y define d than Macdonald's , similarl y negotiate d fo r th e Dominio n a t th e Join t High Commissio n o f 1898-9 . On th e mor e frequen t occasion s whe n specifi c topic s wer e unde r negotiation, th e Canadian Governmen t woul d send its own negotiator t o Washington to se e that the Dominion's point of view was receiving suffi cient attention . This practice implie d a lack o f confidence in the capacit y of th e Britis h ambassador , a s wel l a s erodin g (th e imperial authoritie s often charged ) th e the n sacre d principl e o f th e diplomati c unit y o f th e Empire; i t wa s therefore neithe r highl y publicized no r ver y ofte n used . But i t wa s indispensabl e o n occasion . I n 1907 , George C . Gibbons , a civil servic e membe r o f th e Canadia n sectio n o f th e Internationa l Waterways Commission , wen t a t Laurier' s behes t t o Washingto n t o see how the British ambassador was making out in negotiations intende d to result in a permanent Boundary Waters Commission betwee n Canad a and th e Unite d States . "M y visi t t o Washingto n wa s no t satisfactory, " he reporte d t o th e Prim e Minister . " I go t little fro m Mr . Bryc e excep t talk, nine-tenths o f it quit e outsid e th e issue . His courtes y an d persona l kindness mak e it awkwar d to tel l th e truth , bu t I hav e ha d a n oppor tunity a s I hav e neve r ha d before o f sizin g th e situatio n u p an d th e truth demand s tha t I shoul d tel l yo u that Mr . Bryc e i s of no assistanc e but, in my opinion, a n obstruction t o obtaining wha t ought to be insiste d upon, a permanent Commission." 10 A few days later Gibbon s wrote: " I think i f yo u woul d mak e i t clea r t o Mr . Bryc e tha t yo u wan t m e t o join i n th e negotiation s a t Washingto n wit h Mr . Roo t an d th e Ameri can authorities , w e wil l hav e a chanc e o f accomplishin g something . I do not se e how they can refuse ou r proposals, i f properly presented . Th e * Macdonald's negotiation s ar e brilliantl y describe d i n Donal d Creighton , John Ai Macdonald: The Ol d Chieftain (Toronto , 1955) , pp . 82-102 .

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matter will fiddle along , month after month , if left t o th e Britis h Ambassador, an d I very much doubt eve n then of his being abl e to accomplis h anything. I a m no t a t al l clea r tha t I can , but , i f I fail , i t wil l no t b e for wan t of effort." 11 Laurie r accepte d thi s suggestio n and Bryce , to hi s credit, di d no t object . No r di d Gibbon s fail . Tw o year s late r th e Governor Genera l o f Canad a wrot e to th e Colonia l Secretary : I hav e despatche d a cabl e t o you , wit h th e greates t satisfaction , beggin g you i n th e nam e o f th e Dominio n Govt . t o instruc t Bryc e t o sig n th e Gibbons Draf t Treat y r e Internationa l Waters . Thi s Treat y i s a grea t triumph fo r Gibbons , Si r Wilfri d Laurie r an d Canadia n diplomacy . I n saying thi s I d o no t wis h t o impl y an y disparagemen t o f Bryce , wh o ha s i n many respect s prove d a n admirabl e Britis h Ambassado r t o th e U.S. , bu t it i s impossibl e t o den y tha t th e direct , outspoke n an d rathe r choleri c manner o f ou r Canadia n Amateu r Diplomatis t ha s bee n mor e successfu l than th e deferentia l attitud e toward s Roo t o f th e Britis h Ambassador. 12

This wa s not th e onl y occasio n o n whic h Canadian negotiator s wer e to fin d faul t wit h Jame s Bryc e a s a protecto r o f Dominio n interests . Even on e s o devoted to the Britis h connection a s Joseph Pope privately expressed disma y a t Bryce' s readines s to tur n agains t Canad a fo r th e sake o f Britis h foreig n policy . I n 1911 , sen t t o Washingto n to hel p i n the negotiations ove r pelagic sealing, Pope note d i n his diary: Called upo n Mr . Bryce . Fea r w e ar e goin g t o hav e troubl e t o ge t hi m t o sustain ou r view , i.e. , tha t w e shoul d receiv e compensatio n fro m Russi a and Japan , i n retur n fo r abstainin g fro m Pelagi c Sealin g i n th e Wester n half o f the Pacifi c Ocea n . . . [Ma y 10] . . . . Mr. Bryc e mad e me sta y behind , and spok e to me at lengt h sayin g the U.S . conside r ou r positio n quoad Russi a an d Japa n a s a piec e o f shar p practice. Tha t w e wer e partner s an d shoul d wor k together . Th e charg e o f sharp practic e brough t b y the author s o f th e schem e t o ta x ou r cas e i s rich. Mr. Bryc e wh o seem s wholl y o n thei r sid e i n thi s busines s urge d m e t o withdraw my statement whic h I can't d o ... [Ma y 19] .

A yea r later , dealin g the n wit h fis h rathe r tha n wit h seals , Pope' s impression wa s unchanged . "Mr . Bryce, " h e wrote , "i s o f cours e al l for yieldin g to the U.S. . . . It's a shame." 13 Repeated incident s o f this kind mad e th e eventua l creatio n o f a separat e Canadia n missio n i n Washington inevitable, although it was no t unti l si x years after th e righ t of legatio n ha d bee n establishe d i n 192 0 tha t Mr . Vincen t Masse y received hi s credential s a s Canada' s firs t Ministe r t o Washington . The ne w legatio n wa s soo n immerse d in th e minutia e of negotiatio n which for m a norma l an d necessar y featur e o f Canadian-America n diplomacy. In les s than th e first year o f its existenc e it despatche d ove r

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a thousan d message s to th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s a t Ottaw a and ove r thre e hundre d message s t o th e Unite d State s Secretar y o f State, i n additio n t o countles s othe r les s forma l communication s wit h various agencie s of the America n government, dealing with suc h matter s as boundar y waters , immigration , allocatio n o f radi o broadcastin g channels, suppressio n o f smuggling , extradition, fisheries . Thu s eve n a t this earl y stag e ther e wa s littl e t o justif y th e charg e o f W . S . Fielding , the Ministe r o f Financ e whos e oppositio n delaye d th e creatio n o f th e mission fo r severa l years , tha t " a Canadia n representativ e a t Washington . . . would have an almost entirely ornamental position" as "there is really n o diplomati c work he could do." 14 The Canadia n legatio n (whic h i n 194 3 becam e th e Canadia n embassy) i n Washingto n wa s th e norma l bu t no t th e onl y mean s o f negotiating wit h th e Unite d States . Th e missio n o f Georg e Gibbon s resulted i n 190 9 i n th e creatio n o f th e Internationa l Join t Commission , a standin g tribuna l o f si x commissioner s in eac h o f it s Canadia n an d American sections , authorize d b y th e Treat y bringin g i t int o bein g t o settle dispute s submitte d b y th e tw o government s ove r th e system s of waterways whic h follo w an d travers e th e frontier . To observ e tha t th e celebrated Articl e I X o f thi s Treaty , providin g fo r referra l o f "an y other matter s of difference arisin g . . . along the common frontier," has yet t o b e invoke d i s no t t o sugges t tha t b y confinin g itsel f t o dispute s over waterway s th e Commissio n ha s devote d itsel f t o trivia : wher e water i s scarce , the welfar e o f peopl e an d th e rat e o f economi c growt h are at stake, and there can be no more vital national interests than these . The Commissio n has faile d t o produc e a mutually satisfyin g solutio n i n only one of the thirty odd cases of which it has bee n seized; it eventually resolved, despit e man y setback s an d uncertainties , th e futur e o f th e immense hydro-electri c resource s o f th e Columbi a Rive r system . There ha s bee n som e tendenc y fo r Canadia n leader s mistakenl y t o attribute thi s recor d o f achievemen t t o th e natur e o f th e institution , rather tha n t o th e exceptiona l relation s o f th e tw o Nort h America n neighbours which alone have made it possible; an d therefore to urg e th e institution upo n othe r countries . " I a m convinced, " Mackenzi e Kin g wrote i n 1923 , "tha t [th e Internationa l Join t Commission ] contain s th e new world answer to old world querie s a s to th e mos t effectiv e method s of adjustin g internationa l difference s an d avoidin g th e war s t o whic h they giv e rise";15 i n 194 2 h e expresse d t o Presiden t Roosevel t th e vie w that it might serve as the basis fo r post-war internationa l organization. 16 But a s a prescriptio n fo r th e ill s o f others, thi s ne w worl d remed y wa s wholly inappropriate , arisin g a s it di d fro m a wholly differen t situation :

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The toad beneath th e harrow know s Exactly wher e eac h tooth-poin t goes . The butterfly upo n the roa d Preaches contentment t o that toad.

The butterfly i s wiser now. But more than once in recent year s Canadian spokesmen hav e commende d th e Internationa l Join t Commissio n t o audiences i n Asia, a s thirty years previously they had don e to audience s in Europe . I t ma y b e presume d tha t th e Asians , i f mor e polit e i n thei r response, hav e bee n n o les s sceptica l o f th e suggestion . The Permanen t Join t Boar d o n Defence , lik e th e Internationa l Join t Commission a foru m fo r functiona l negotiatio n wit h th e Unite d States , is discussed abov e i n chapte r in . Canadian interest s in the United Kingdom were attended t o by a High Commissioner man y year s befor e hi s diplomati c statu s wa s formall y signified. (Th e specia l natur e o f th e offic e o f Hig h Commissione r i n London i s referred t o abov e in chapter n. ) I n 192 8 th e British Govern ment fo r th e firs t tim e sen t it s ow n Hig h Commissione r t o Ottawa . Thereafter tw o instruments fo r negotiatio n wit h the Britis h Governmen t were availabl e t o Canadia n ministers . Mackenzi e Kin g preferre d t o negotiate throug h th e Britis h Hig h Commissione r i n Ottaw a rathe r tha n through th e Canadia n Hig h Commissione r i n Londo n becaus e h e could then conduct negotiations himself. "To se e from m y office windo w on an adjoining sid e of Parliament Square a building which I know to be that o f th e representativ e o f th e Governmen t o f th e Unite d Kingdom, " he remarked i n 1928 , "wit h whom , a t a moment' s notic e I ca n confer , or who, at a moment's notic e ca n confe r wit h m e . .. is, I assur e you, deeply comfortin g t o on e in m y position." 17 Canadian interest s i n countrie s othe r tha n th e Unite d State s an d th e United Kingdo m were fewer , an d th e nee d fo r negotiatio n les s urgent . In Franc e a n agen t o f th e Dominio n governmen t ha d i n fac t i f no t i n law represente d Canad a sinc e 188 2 whe n Hecto r Fabre , originall y appointed b y th e governmen t o f th e provinc e o f Quebec , wa s com misioned by Ottawa to follo w instruction s from the Hig h Commissione r in Londo n s o a s t o improv e relation s betwee n th e tw o countries ; i n 1911 h e wa s succeede d b y Philipp e Roy , wh o assume d th e ne w titl e of Commissione r Genera l o f Canad a i n Franc e and , althoug h withou t official recognitio n o r diplomati c standing , attende d t o a variet y o f diplomatic dutie s befor e hi s appointmen t i n 192 8 a s Canada' s firs t Minister t o France. The presenc e i n Ottaw a o f a numbe r o f consula r representative s o f foreign countrie s provided th e governmen t with a method o f negotiatio n

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prior t o th e openin g u p o f Canadian diplomati c mission s abroad ; these , while lackin g diplomati c accreditatio n an d formall y responsibl e onl y for commercia l affairs , wer e resorte d t o o n occasio n a s i f member s of a regula r corps diplomatique. At th e tur n o f the century , Laurier, wishing t o soun d th e Frenc h Governmen t o n th e questio n o f th e compen sation i t migh t b e prepare d t o accep t i n exchang e fo r relinquishin g fishing an d other rights on a section o f the Newfoundland shore , entere d into negotiatio n wit h the Frenc h consu l genera l i n Montreal, A . Klecz kowski, notwithstandin g the doubt s o f th e Colonia l Secretar y whethe r "the Frenc h consu l woul d b e i n an y cas e abl e t o spea k fo r hi s govern ment or ... d o anything more than express his own personal opinions."* Similar approache s wer e made to th e Japanes e consu l i n Vancouver, S . Shimizu, an d th e consu l genera l i n Ottawa , Tatsgor o Nosse , o n th e subject o f Japanes e immigratio n durin g the perio d 1899-1909 . But th e mor e usua l metho d o f negotiatin g with foreig n government s before th e creatio n o f Canadia n mission s abroa d wa s t o exploi t th e facilities o f the Britis h government. The conflic t o f interest s confronting a Britis h ambassado r charge d wit h the protectio n o f Canadia n interest s in som e foreig n country was usuall y not s o acut e a s i n th e cas e o f th e British ambassado r i n Washington, but o n occasio n i t coul d be ; an d a s in matters of trade and commerce his knowledge of Canadian condition s and requirement s wa s likel y t o b e sligh t an d hi s interes t i n drivin g a hard Canadia n bargai n even slighter , the practic e develope d o f sendin g to th e ambassador' s sid e a Canadia n negotiator , usuall y o f Cabine t rank, t o fortif y th e Dominion's case . The fledgling Canadian diplomatis t was ofte n tempte d o n suc h occasion s t o dispens e entirel y wit h th e ambassador's services . But there usually supervened the recollection that the credential s o f a Canadia n negotiato r wer e likely t o b e greete d wit h suspicion b y a foreig n government , i f recognize d a t all ; th e presenc e of th e ambassador , i f onl y t o hove r ceremoniousl y i n th e background , was therefor e essential . Sometime s hi s expertis e wa s a s helpfu l a s hi s status, an d a visitin g Canadian mission , workin g i n clos e co-operatio n with th e residen t Britis h authority , coul d achiev e result s no t possibl e if either worke d withou t th e other . I n 190 7 Rodolph e Lemieu x wa s abl e * Joseph Chamberlai n t o th e Ear l o f Minto , Jan . 18 , 1899 , Laurie r Papers . Chamberlain wa s i n error , fo r th e negotiation s continue d fo r ove r tw o years . I n 1901 Laurie r informe d th e Governo r Genera l tha t h e ha d recentl y see n Kleczkowski i n Montrea l an d tha t th e latte r ha d "advise d hi s Minister—M . Delcasse—to thro w u p th e claim s o f th e Frenc h i n Newfoundlan d entirely . H e considered the y were of littl e us e to Franc e an d tha t th e Ministe r woul d probabl y be incline d to com e t o term s excep t fo r th e stron g anti-Englis h feelin g i n Franc e which ha d bee n stirre d u p b y th e Fashod a question. " Memorandu m o f intervie w with Laurier , Jan . 19 , 1901, Mint o Papers .

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to persuad e th e Japanes e governmen t t o undertak e t o limi t futur e emigration t o Canad a largel y becaus e o f th e assistanc e o f th e Britis h ambassador i n Tokyo , whic h th e Canadia n generousl y acknowledged . "Whatever ma y b e th e outcom e o f th e negotiations, " Lemieu x wrot e from Japan , "Canad a owe s a debt o f gratitud e t o th e Britis h Ambassa dor. Afte r havin g presente d m y credential s t o th e Foreig n Offic e i n Tokio, he took, from th e beginning, a deep interes t i n the question itself . He no t onl y obtaine d fo r Canad a th e ful l suppor t o f Hi s Majesty' s Government—but h e personall y attende d eac h an d ever y meetin g a t the Foreig n Office . H e thu s gav e Canad a th e prestig e o f Grea t Britai n . . . an d besides , w e ha d th e benefi t o f hi s vas t experienc e a s a diplomat."18 The relationshi p betwee n Canadia n an d Britis h authoritie s i n suc h a situatio n wa s no t alway s s o untroubled . Israe l Tarte , Ministe r o f Public Work s i n th e Laurie r Government , whil e i n Europ e i n 190 0 t o arrange fo r Canadia n participatio n i n a n internationa l exhibition , suc ceeded i n irritatin g th e Colonia l Secretary . " I hav e see n somethin g of Mr. Tarte' s manner s & temper sinc e h e ha s bee n ove r here, " Josep h Chamberlain wrot e t o th e Governo r Genera l o f Canada , "an d I a m sorry tha t h e ha s s o much influenc e i n th e Dominio n Government . Hi s idea evidentl y i s that Canad a shoul d practicall y b e regarde d i n Franc e as almos t a n independen t Frenc h Republic . H e ha s bee n ver y fuss y and irritable , an d th e Commissioner s o f th e Exhibitio n hav e foun d i t almost impossibl e t o satisf y hi s requirements." 19 Som e years later, whe n W. S . Fielding , th e Ministe r o f Finance , wen t t o Berli n t o negotiat e a trad e agreemen t wit h th e Germa n government , simila r tensio n arose . "I d o no t doub t hi s sincerit y i n wishin g to maintai n an d i n a genera l way strengthe n th e Imperia l tie, " wrot e a membe r o f th e editoria l staff o f Th e Times t o it s Toront o correspondent , "bu t [Fielding ] seem s to m e t o hav e acquire d a tast e fo r larg e negotiation s an d th e sens e of wielding plenipotentiar y powers , an d I thin k h e ma y indulg e tha t passion fro m day to day withou t quit e realizin g how far it is carryin g him. Th e wa y i n whic h negotiation s wer e undertake n i n Berli n ha s caused som e regre t here." 20 Thes e isolate d incident s becam e les s an d less frequent a s the British Empir e transforme d itself int o th e Common wealth o f Nation s an d a s th e doctrin e o f diplomati c unit y wa s replace d by th e concep t o f a like-minde d communit y o f independen t states . The relianc e o f successiv e Canadian government s upo n Britis h negotia tion o f thei r day-to-da y interest s i n foreig n countrie s wa s howeve r t o continue fo r som e time ; apar t fro m legation s a t Washington , Pari s an d Tokyo n o more mission s were opened unti l the eve of the Secon d Worl d

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War. Eve n today , wit h mor e tha n fift y diplomati c establishment s o f its own , the Canadia n Governmen t relie s i n som e countrie s upo n th e British embassy for negotiating with their government s on its behalf. POLICY-MAKING AN D NEGOTIATION: AT HOM E AN D ABROA D

The discretionar y power s o f Canadia n negotiators , a s thos e o f othe r countries, wer e from a n earl y date severel y curtaile d b y improvement s in communicatio n which made home governments reluctant t o delegat e authority t o thei r representative s abroad . Rodolph e Lemieux , Ministe r of Labou r an d Postmaste r Genera l i n th e Laurie r Government , wa s one o f th e firs t t o experienc e their effect . Afte r week s of intensiv e an d difficult negotiatio n wit h th e Japanes e authoritie s h i Toky o o n th e question o f limitin g furthe r emigratio n t o Canada , Lemieu x fel t h e had reache d a satisfactor y agreemen t an d o n Decembe r 5 , 1907 , h e cabled t o Laurie r a synopsi s of th e proposal s an d advise d thei r accep tance. "Enfin, " h e wrot e elatedl y but , as i t wa s to prove , prematurely , "tout ser a fini lundi a 3 p.m. le 9 decembre . Le s negotiations, grac e a Sir Claude Macdonald, ont pu terminer plut tot qu e je ne crois. Bien que le trait e rest e c e qu'i l es t dan s so n integralite , i l s e trouv e desormai s profondement modifi e pa r I'accor d conclu." 21 Thi s moo d o f triump h was rudel y jarre d fou r day s late r b y th e arriva l o f a telegra m fro m Laurier statin g tha t th e term s o f th e arrangemen t wer e unacceptabl e to th e Canadia n Government . I n som e exasperatio n Lemieu x wrot e t o Sir Louis Jette, the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec and a relative having some influenc e wit h the Prim e Minister , in a n attemp t to clea r u p wha t he regarded t o b e no mor e tha n a misunderstanding: II es t impossibl e a cett e distance , d'explique r pa r cablegramm e tou s le s details d e I'accor d qu e j e sui s e n mesur e d e conclur e si—comm e j e I'esper e —je recoi s me s instruction s dan s c e sens . J e comprend s l e desi r d e Si r Wilfrid d'obteni r tou t c e qu e Noss e a promis , mai s si , indirectement e t e n fait, j'arrive au meme resultat, il n'y a pas a hesiter. Dix minute s d e conver sation ave c Si r Wilfri d mettraien t le s chose s a point , mai s j e sui s a 1'autr e bout d u monde! 22

To Laurie r Lemieu x wrote a length y letter o f explanation , concludin g with th e remar k tha t he , Josep h Pop e an d th e Britis h ambassado r ha d "spent man y hour s an d man y day s to reac h thi s stag e o f th e negotia tions" an d tha t al l fel t tha t "althoug h no t perfect , th e arrangemen t

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under presen t circumstance s i s the bes t obtainable." 23 But thi s entreaty , and other s (includin g a ple a fro m th e Britis h ambassado r t o th e Governor General) , wer e o f n o avail . Lemieu x wa s instructe d no t t o conclude any agreemen t wit h the Japanes e governmen t and to retur n to Ottaw a t o explai n hi s proposal s t o th e Cabinet . Thi s confrontatio n took plac e o n January 11 , 1908 . My explanatio n o f th e whol e schem e [Lemieu x wrote ] an d th e recita l o f negotiations occupie d th e whol e day . Th e propose d arrangemen t i s no t onl y accepted, bu t everyon e admit s tha t I hav e obtaine d mor e tha n coul d hav e been expected . Th e reasons wh y settlemen t wa s deferre d ar e (1 ) becaus e they di d no t full y understan d th e term s o f th e proposals . (2 ) Becaus e th e British Columbi a member s wante d t o se e m e befor e an y acceptanc e coul d be made . (3 ) Becaus e thi s bein g th e grea t issu e durin g th e presen t session , they fel t a littl e nervou s abou t sayin g "yes " fro m suc h a distance . M y explanations, however , hav e bee n full y accepted , an d afte r I ha d rea d m y report (7 0 pages) , everybod y congratulate d m e ver y warmly. 24

An eve n les s happ y outcom e awaite d anothe r Canadia n negotiato r in later year s who attempte d t o exercis e discretionar y authority withou t precise instruction s fro m hi s hom e Government . Thi s wa s Dr . W . A . Riddell, th e Canadia n Permanen t Advisor y Office r a t th e Leagu e o f Nations, whos e repudiatio n b y th e Canadia n Governmen t a t th e tim e of th e controvers y over oi l sanctions against Ital y provide s a n importan t footnote t o th e diplomati c histor y o f th e 1930's . During th e las t day s o f th e Bennet t administration , th e Canadia n delegation a t Geneva, acting with the suppor t of the Prime Minister, ha d taken certai n initiative s concernin g sanction s agains t th e Mussolin i regime, whic h ha d begu n t o wi n favourabl e respons e fro m th e advo cates o f collectiv e security . The chang e o f Governmen t a t th e Genera l Election o n Octobe r 14 , 1935 , lef t Dr . Riddell , no w i n charg e o f th e delegation, i n som e uncertaint y abou t ho w t o proceed . Presse d b y events an d lacking replies to hi s cabled request s for specifi c instructions , he fatefull y decide d t o spea k i n favou r o f imposin g oi l sanctions . "I t seemed a moment," he wrot e afterwards , "whe n a n immediat e decisio n had t o b e take n i f sanction s wer e t o becom e reall y effectiv e an d i f I were t o safeguar d Canada' s interests." 25 Histor y ha s confirme d thi s verdict, i f not th e propriet y o f a caree r diplomatis t settin g hi s country' s policy on a cours e its governmen t was not prepare d to follow . Dr. Riddell's initiativ e wa s dogge d b y il l fortun e for , barel y a n hou r afte r his request s fo r instruction s arrived a t Ottawa , replie s wer e sen t tellin g him specificall y t o avoi d th e actio n h e ha d alread y take n b y th e tim e they reache d him . Wor d o f wha t h e ha d don e brough t a n immediat e and shar p repriman d t o th e effec t tha t request s fo r instruction s shoul d

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arrive sufficientl y i n advance to permit full consideratio n of th e situation by the Canadia n Government , and that h e was on n o accoun t t o ac t in an importan t matte r i n th e absenc e o f instructions . Dr . Riddell' s tele graphed repl y t o thi s messag e pleade d "th e difficult y o f m y position : with meagr e instructions and n o basi c statemen t o f polic y to co-operat e fully t o secure effectiv e applicatio n o f economi c sanction s whil e safe guarding Canada' s interests . I regre t exceedingl y if I hav e cause d th e Government an y embarrassment." 26 Th e Prim e Ministe r remaine d unmoved, an d cable d coldl y tha t th e positio n take n b y Dr. Riddel l was neither soun d policy nor withi n the scop e o f hi s authority . The Cabine t considered carefully whethe r t o repudiat e immediatel y th e statemen t o f the Permanent Advisor y Officer , bu t onl y whe n mounting publicity ha d drawn world-wid e attentio n t o "th e Canadia n proposal " di d i t d o so . A pres s statemen t wa s issue d o n Novembe r 29 , th e fina l paragrap h of whic h was a s follows: The suggestio n whic h ha s appeare d i n th e pres s fro m tim e t o time , tha t th e Canadian Governmen t ha s take n th e initiativ e i n th e extensio n o f th e embargo upo n exportatio n o f ke y commoditie s t o Italy , an d particularl y i n the placin g o f a ban upo n shipment s o f coal, oil , iro n an d steel , i s due t o a misunderstanding. The Canadia n Governmen t ha s no t an d doe s no t propos e to take the initiative in any such action; an d the opinio n whic h wa s expresse d by th e Canadia n membe r o f th e Committee—an d whic h ha s le d t o th e reference t o th e proposa l a s a Canadia n proposal—represente d onl y hi s personal opinion , an d hi s views as a member o f th e Committee , an d no t th e views of th e Canadia n Government. 27

It remaine d Dr . Riddell' s belie f tha t hi s repudiatio n wa s du e t o th e circumstance tha t th e Prim e Ministe r an d th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affair s wer e both ou t o f th e countr y a t th e tim e th e pres s statement wa s give n ou t an d th e Departmen t lef t i n charg e o f "tw o French Canadians, " Ernes t Lapointe , a s Actin g Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , an d Lauren t Beaudry , a s Acting Unde r Secretary. 28 I n this h e wa s i n error . A n exchang e o f telegram s betwee n Skelto n an d Beaudry on November 28 and November 29 makes clear the proposal t o disavow Dr. Riddell originated not in Ottawa but at Sea Island, Georgia , where th e Prim e Ministe r an d hi s Unde r Secretar y ha d withdraw n fo r a brie f bu t i n th e even t unattainabl e respite fro m th e pressur e o f worl d events. Ha d Dr . Riddel l followe d mor e closel y th e cours e o f th e elec tion campaig n h e woul d hav e ha d som e forewarnin g of th e probabl e response o f th e futur e Prim e Ministe r t o an y untowar d initiatives fro m permanent diplomati c officials; i n a speec h a t St. John, Ne w Brunswick, Mackenzie Kin g ha d criticize d th e Bennet t administratio n fo r leavin g

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the conduc t o f Canadia n polic y durin g th e Ethiopia n crisi s "i n th e hands o f thre e wh o hav e neve r bee n returne d t o responsibl e position s in th e institution s of the country." 29 The "Riddel l incident " ha s com e t o exer t a n important , i f unremarked, influenc e upo n th e foreig n polic y proces s i n Canada . I t engraved indelibl y upo n th e mind s o f hi s colleague s (mos t o f who m later ros e t o hig h position s i n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs ) th e unwisdom o f exercising important diplomati c initiatives withou t explicit political directio n fro m th e Eas t Block . I n 195 9 th e Unde r Secretar y of Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s wa s aske d b y a membe r o f th e Hous e o f Commons Standin g Committee to commen t on th e degre e o f discretio n customarily allowe d a Canadia n representativ e abroad . Th e repl y suggests that Dr . Riddell' s experience cas t a long shadow : I woul d sa y tha t consultatio n o n an y questio n o f polic y betwee n a repre sentative abroa d an d th e governmen t a t hom e woul d b e complet e an d continuous. . . . Nowadays wit h communication s a s promp t an d secur e a s the y are , an y representative abroa d . . . ca n get in touc h wit h Ottaw a withi n a da y and consult, o r ge t instruction s a s t o th e actio n h e shoul d take . Tha t i s on e result—and I thin k tha t i s tru e o f al l th e diplomati c services—o f th e enormous speedin g up , no t onl y o f telegraphi c bu t telephoni c communica tions, [and ] o f th e provisio n fo r automati c cypherin g whic h the y hav e between a goo d man y o f the importan t offices . A situatio n i n whic h th e representativ e i s isolate d fo r a whil e an d ha s t o use hi s ow n judgmen t withou t bein g abl e t o infor m hi s governmen t doe s not happe n ver y muc h now ; i t i s very rare. 30

The rol e o f th e Canadia n representativ e a t th e Unite d Nation s pro vides even less opportunity for independen t initiatives, for th e proximity of Ne w York City to Ottawa allows virtually continuous consultation. I n periods o f crisis the foreig n minister himself may , at shor t notice, arriv e to tak e charg e o f negotiations , a s Mr . Leste r Pearso n di d a t th e tim e of th e Sue z crisi s i n Novembe r 1956 . Instruction s prepare d b y th e Cabinet fo r Security Council delegates in 194 8 enjoine d them specifically to see k authority from th e Governmen t before makin g any commitment, or, i f time did no t permit , to abstai n from voting. 31 Delegates t o th e Genera l Assembl y hav e bee n allowe d eve n les s room fo r manoeuvre , and th e frequenc y wit h whic h a s a consequenc e they hav e resorte d t o withholdin g thei r vot e ha s cause d the m t o b e known t o th e pundit s of the delegates ' loung e a s "th e tota l abstainers. " While a numbe r o f abstention s hav e bee n du e t o governmen t polic y rather tha n t o th e lac k of it , th e testimon y of a parliamentar y member

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of th e delegatio n (th e mor e impressiv e a s comin g fro m a supporte r of th e Government ) i s that Ottaw a keep s a clos e an d almos t distrustful watch upo n it s activitie s a t al l times . Mr . Arthu r Smit h complaine d to th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s i n 196 0 tha t th e delegation foun d itsel f "consistentl y i n a positio n o f havin g t o refe r t o your offic e an d you , in turn, t o your advisers, on question s o f procedur e and policy, " an d h e wondered whethe r i t wa s no t leavin g itsel f "some what inflexibl e realizing ho w quickl y event s tak e place. " Mr . Norma n Robertson replied : Basically, i t i s very importan t t o se e that an y statement s mad e i n th e nam e of Canad a ar e consistent , tha t the y ar e i n lin e wit h Cabine t policy ; an d whenever yo u can , yo u wan t t o chec k an d confir m befor e a decisio n i s taken. A goo d man y quic k decision s hav e t o b e take n i n th e cours e o f th e Assembly, bu t som e o f the m hav e quit e importan t consequences . No w tha t we hav e a prett y goo d an d ver y fas t syste m o f communicatio n wit h ou r office, I think there is a great dea l t o be said fo r encouragin g [th e delegation ] to consul t frequentl y an d quickl y wit h th e Governmen t i n Ottawa , whe n they can . Bu t there ar e situation s whe n a sna p decisio n ha s t o b e mad e an d the ma n i n charg e ha s t o us e hi s bes t judgment , whic h ma y no t alway s coincide wit h th e judgmen t here . I d o no t thin k an y Governmen t ca n delegate responsibilit y to , le t u s say , a delegatio n a t a conference , o r mor e particularly th e Unite d Nations .

This wa s especiall y th e case , h e added , wit h socia l an d economi c questions, fo r thes e require d mor e extensiv e interdepartmenta l consul tation i n Ottaw a tha n purel y politica l questions. 32 Hi s repl y di d no t altogether satisf y Mr . Arthu r Smith , wh o observe d tha t i f th e Unde r Secretary's argumen t were carried to its logical extreme , "i t would mean there woul d b e little poin t i n havin g the delegatio n ther e a t all—rathe r just a spokesma n wh o i s responsible fo r repeatin g view s that ma y hav e come out o f th e offic e o f a civil servan t in Ottawa. " A s i t was , h e con cluded, "befor e yo u g o t o hav e a cu p o f coffe e yo u hav e t o receiv e instructions."* The styl e of Canadia n negotiation ha s thu s come t o b e characterize d by a reluctanc e o n th e par t o f professiona l diplomatist s t o commi t their government s i n th e absenc e o f instructions , b y a n exaggerate d *Canada, H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes o f Proceedings an d Evidence, no . 12 , Apri l 6 , 1960 , pp . 302-3 . Th e testimon y o f an America n congressiona l member o f th e Unite d State s delegatio n during th e same Assembl y offer s a n instructiv e comparison . "Onc e th e broa d limit s o f national polic y wer e establishe d on an y issue, " Mr . Harol d Riegelma n recalled , "there remaine d a wid e are a fo r negotiatio n within whic h th e delegat e i n charg e had a ver y rea l an d challengin g discretion." Lette r t o Ne w York Times, Marc h 14, 1960.

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circumspection i n makin g publi c statements, * an d b y a readiness , no t shared b y th e professio n a t large , t o acquiesc e withou t complain t i n that genera l demotio n o f thei r plac e i n th e schem e o f governmen t brought abou t b y twentieth-century politics an d technology . Suc h a styl e is no t withou t it s advantages . "Quie t diplomacy " ha s com e int o favou r as th e resul t o f repeate d indiscretion s b y les s inhibite d representatives . And ye t i t ha s it s price, exacte d chiefl y i n th e for m o f opportunitie s fo r constructive intervention s misse d o r neglecte d b y diplomatist s abroa d for fea r o f the consequence s t o com e fro m home . POLICY-MAKING AN D NEGOTIATION: ABOVE AN D BELO W

Among th e force s assailin g the traditiona l positio n o f th e professiona l diplomatist i s the growin g popularity o f what has com e t o b e know n a s "summit diplomacy, " a proces s o f negotiatio n wherei n b y a kin d o f inverted Gresham' s la w senio r statesme n driv e ou t junior , an d politi cians, preferabl y head s o f government , tak e ove r direc t responsibilit y for wha t wa s onc e th e ordinar y wor k o f caree r ambassadors . Thi s trend wa s particularly strikin g in th e Unite d Kingdo m durin g th e year s between th e tw o worl d war s whe n a n unusuall y brillian t corp s o f professional diplomatist s foun d itsel f increasingl y displace d b y " a succession o f politician-diplomat s wit h suc h strikin g an d memorabl e characteristics as plus-fours , Scot s brogues , shagg y coiffures , whit e linen neckties , underslun g pipes , an d variou s kind s o f umbrellas." 33 The eclips e o f diplomatist s b y politician s ha s bee n les s obviou s i n Canada, partl y becaus e prio r t o 194 5 fe w caree r ambassador s serve d as alternativ e channels for negotiation ; bu t i t ha s take n place . Negotiating a t th e summi t has alway s been t o Canadia n governments a natura l wa y o f dealin g wit h dispute s wit h th e Unite d States , fo r th e Prime Ministe r an d othe r member s of his Cabinet wer e never more tha n a day' s journe y fro m Washingto n t o whic h the y coul d an d ofte n di d *In 194 6 th e Associat e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s remarke d in repl y to a questio n whethe r an America n Stat e Departmen t practic e of the time requiring oversea s representative s t o clea r publi c statement s wit h Washingto n before deliver y wa s followe d i n Canada : "W e trus t t o th e goo d sens e o f ou r representatives abroa d no t t o sa y thing s whic h ar e embarrassing , an d i f the y d o we reserv e th e righ t t o criticize , whic h w e exerciz e withou t stin t i n th e cas e o f a lapse. " Canada , Hous e o f Common s Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes o f Proceedings an d Evidence, no . 4 , Jun e 4 , 1946 , p . 67 .

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directly repai r t o take up matters with the Presiden t an d his administra tion. I t thrive d a s neve r before o r sinc e durin g th e earl y month s o f the Secon d Worl d Wa r whe n Mackenzi e Kin g an d Frankli n Roosevel t met severa l time s t o dispos e o f issue s larg e an d small . Th e rol e o f th e Canadian legatio n wa s necessaril y diminishe d by thi s practice . O n on e occasion, whe n th e Canadia n Minister , Lorin g Christie , wa s present a t their discussion , th e Presiden t "turne d t o Christi e an d said : 'Yo u wil l not min d i f [i n future ] I g o over you r head an d tal k straigh t acros s th e phone to Mr. King' . Christie sai d no; o n the contrar y h e woul d be very much relieved." 34 I n 194 3 th e Hous e o f Common s wa s informe d tha t in regar d t o certai n negotiation s ordinaril y th e concer n o f th e legatio n the Canadia n Ministe r (the n Leighto n McCarthy ) had playe d no part whatsoever , whic h dre w fro m a n oppositio n criti c th e comment : "If agreement s o f thi s sort , involvin g Canad a an d th e Unite d States , are not matters for discussion by our legation a t Washington, wha t is the legation for?" 35 Th e answe r t o thi s criticism , whic h th e Prim e Ministe r did not give at that time, was that so long as matters might more expedi tiously be taken u p b y the tw o heads o f governmen t there wa s no poin t in involvin g th e legation . "I t i s indee d fortunate, " Mackenzi e Kin g wrote o n the ev e of one o f his visits to Frankli n Roosevelt , "tha t w e so completely shar e eac h other' s confidenc e an d sympathies . Ther e i s absolutely nothing that we do not feel abl e to discus s with each other." 36 No Canadia n Prim e Ministe r an d America n Presiden t hav e sinc e come close t o approximatin g this camaraderie , whic h owed much to th e extraordinary circumstance s o f war . Presiden t Truman' s relation s with bot h Mackenzi e Kin g and Mr . St . Laurent , whil e cordia l enough , seemed someho w lackin g i n warmth ; th e presidenc y o f Genera l Eisenhower brough t a temporar y reviva l o f persona l diplomac y i n Canadian-American relations . I n Decembe r 1956 , Mr . St . Laurent wa s easily persuade d t o joi n th e Presiden t i n hi s favourit e pastime . " I wa s very happy," the Prime Ministe r tol d the House of Commons soo n after wards, when, toward s th e en d o f m y shor t holida y i n Florida , I receive d a telephone cal l fro m th e Whit e Hous e tha t th e Presiden t woul d b e gla d i f I would dro p of f a t Augusta , Georgia , o n m y wa y back , hav e lunc h wit h him an d hav e a gam e o f golf . Wel l I foun d i n fact , yo u know , tha t a gam e of gol f wit h on e o f thos e electri c go-cart s wa s abou t th e bes t wa y t o hav e an internationa l conferenc e becaus e yo u ar e gettin g of f th e go-car t quit e frequently fo r onl y a coupl e o f minute s bu t fo r tim e enoug h t o reflec t o n what ha s bee n sai d u p t o th e the n presen t momen t an d t o reflec t o n wha t is goin g t o b e sai d whe n yo u ge t bac k o n th e sea t o f th e go-cart . . . . I came awa y wit h th e impressio n tha t th e gol f gam e ha d bee n ver y enjoyabl e

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but tha t ther e ha d bee n othe r aspect s o n th e hal f da y I spen t wit h hi m that wer e quit e mor e importan t tha n th e gol f score. 37

Thirty year s previousl y Lloy d Georg e ha d discovere d th e danger s o f doing diplomati c business on the gol f links, 38 while half a century previously Si r Wilfri d Laurie r ha d reacted , a littl e to o violentl y perhaps , against th e flatter y o f Londo n duchesses . Mr . St . Laurent' s excursio n into go-car t diplomacy , however gratifying t o Canadia n self-esteem , ra n the doubl e ris k o f misunderstandin g an d neglec t whe n th e moo d o f mateship passed . Canada's introductio n t o summit diplomacy o n the larger worl d scen e may perhap s b e date d fro m th e Colonia l Conferenc e a t th e en d o f th e nineteenth century ; it s distinctivel y twentieth-centur y qualit y wa s firs t savoured whe n Mackenzi e Kin g allowe d himsel f t o b e bundle d int o a Liberator bombe r an d flow n t o Londo n i n 194 1 fo r conference s wit h Mr. Churchil l an d other Britis h war leaders. I n recen t year s Canadians , while professin g scor n for the airborn e diplomac y tha t Joh n Foste r Dulles carrie d t o suc h remarkabl e length s an d heights , hav e bee n profoundly satisfie d t o watc h thei r ow n leader s circl e an d re-circl e the glob e i n a swif t successio n o f good-wil l tours . These , i t shoul d b e added, hav e ordinaril y ceremonia l rathe r tha n politica l significance ; the Canadian diplomatis t abroad has rather less often tha n his American colleague suffere d th e mortificatio n of havin g his foreig n ministe r dro p from th e sk y to assum e personal charg e o f negotiations becomin g reall y interesting fo r th e firs t tim e i n year s o f painfu l preparation . Mr . Leste r Pearson, whe n Canadia n foreig n minister , wen t s o fa r a s t o counse l against thi s method . "W e migh t well be advise d to leav e more o f diplo macy to the diplomats," h e wrote. "They ar e trained fo r the job and they are usuall y happ y t o conduc t a negotiatio n withou t broadcastin g th e score afte r eac h inning . . . . But when foreign ministers, or, eve n more , when head s o f governmen t meet , wit h thei r inevitabl e retinu e o f press , radio, an d television companions , with experts, advisers, and adviser s to advisers, wit h clever me n t o wor k behin d th e scene s an d eve n clevere r men t o suppl y th e scene s behin d whic h t o work , the n thing s ten d t o become difficult." * Wel l awar e of the temptation , Mr . Pearso n wa s no t *Lester B . Pearson, Democracy i n World Politics (Toronto , 1955) , p . 62 . Thi s view o f negotiation, it has been pointed out , "tha t one should pic k goo d negotiator s to represen t hi m an d the n giv e the m complet e flexibilit y an d authority— a principle commonl y voice d b y negotiator s themselves—i s b y n o mean s a s self evident a s it s proponent s suggest ; th e powe r o f a negotiato r ofte n rest s o n a manifest inabilit y t o mak e concession s an d t o mee t demands. " Thoma s C . Schelling, Th e Strategy o f Conflict (Cambridge , Mass. , 1960) , p . 19 . Sovie t negotiators hav e demonstrate d thi s mor e obviousl y tha n most ; se e Phili p E . Mosely, ed. , Negotiating with th e Russians (Boston , 1947) , passim.

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always abl e t o resist ; his successors , lackin g his backgroun d i n profes sional diplomacy , were a t times eager t o succumb . POLICY-MAKING AN D NEGOTIATION: OPEN AN D CLOSE D

In Canada , a s elsewhere, the tragedy of the First World War was widely attributed t o th e evi l machination s o f diplomatist s allowe d t o hatc h nefarious plot s hidde n fro m a watchfu l public . Close d diplomac y had been th e virus , ope n diplomac y wa s t o b e th e cure . Ther e wa s n o surer wa y o f discreditin g externa l polic y tha n t o shou t "secrecy " a t those responsible . Mackenzi e King as Leader o f the Opposition , lackin g argument to attack the Government fo r announcing in 192 0 th e negotia tion with the British Government o f the right of legation a t Washington, took u p th e familiar cry : "Well , Sir, al l I ca n sa y is, it i s a might y bad beginning i n a ne w departure i f our foreig n polic y . .. i s to b e boun d up wit h a secrec y fro m th e start . W e ar e drivin g righ t int o th e ver y vortex tha t create d th e whol e situatio n i n Europe , goin g agains t th e very thing which the allied nations have been urging so strongly, namely, that diplomac y shoul d no t b e secre t bu t tha t i t shoul d b e ope n an d above board." 39 Afte r becomin g Prime Minister , Mackenzie Kin g paid lip-service t o th e principl e o f ope n diplomacy , not leas t becaus e o f it s strong appeal t o thos e sixty-fiv e representative s o f the Progressiv e part y on whos e continuing parliamentary suppor t th e lif e o f hi s Governmen t depended. It wa s also usefu l i n imperial relations. Throughou t th e firs t Macken zie King administration a series o f crise s large an d smal l aros e between Ottawa an d Whitehall , an d a stead y strea m o f agitate d telegram s passed between the two. It was then Mackenzie King's aim to loosen the hold which the British Government sough t to retai n ove r the conduc t of the Dominion' s externa l affairs , an d fo r thi s purpos e i t wa s frequently expedient t o mak e publi c hi s correspondenc e wit h tha t Government . Much o f it , however , in accordanc e wit h a no w firmly established con vention o f intra-Commonwealt h consultation , wa s secre t correspon dence, an d t o brin g dow n th e text s o f secre t despatche s require d th e approval o f th e Britis h Governmen t a s autho r o r recipien t (an d als o of an y o f th e Dominio n government s affecte d b y thei r disclosure) . I n effect, therefore , th e Unite d Kingdo m authoritie s possesse d a powe r of veto ove r th e publicatio n o f thei r correspondenc e wit h th e Dominio n

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Government merel y b y markin g i t "private " o r "confidential" ; an d even in the case of communications not s o marked it was the contentio n of old-fashione d constitutiona l authoritie s that, addresse d a s the y wer e (until 1926 ) t o th e Governo r General , suc h message s require d th e Governor's approva l befor e disclosure—approva l no t likel y t o b e forthcoming i f the Britis h Government, whom the Governo r a s yet stil l represented, directe d otherwise . The disput e laten t i n thes e circumstance s aros e i n 192 3 whe n th e Canadian Governmen t wishe d t o brin g dow n it s correspondenc e wit h the Unite d Kingdo m Governmen t t o clarif y Canada' s constitutiona l position i n regar d t o th e Treat y o f Lausanne . T o suppor t hi s case— a strong one—Mackenzi e Kin g agai n invoke d popula r sentimen t against secret diplomacy . In a letter to the Governor General's secretar y (afford ing, incidentally , a fai r exampl e of his literary style i n it s characteristic , though not it s best, form), h e wrote: With respec t t o correspondenc e betwee n th e Governmen t o f Canad a an d the Governmen t o f Grea t Britai n o n matter s originatin g wit h th e Canadia n Government, an d with respec t t o which th e fulles t publicit y i s desired, . . . unless—when th e retur n o f suc h correspondenc e i s aske d fo r b y th e Hous e of Commons—th e Governmen t i s fre e t o exercis e th e sam e judgmen t an d discretion wit h respec t t o th e promp t presentatio n t o Parliamen t o f th e correspondence requeste d a s i s exercise d wit h respec t t o al l othe r return s of correspondence , documents , etc. , i t wil l b e increasingl y difficul t t o avoi d the charg e tha t th e Administratio n i s lendin g itsel f t o a specie s o f secre t diplomacy with respect t o public busines s whic h i s in no way warranted, an d which, wer e th e impressio n permitte d t o b e fostered , woul d b e mos t un fortunate fo r ou r inter-imperial an d internationa l relations. 40

In hi s repl y th e Governor' s secretar y argue d tha t correspondenc e addressed to the Governor General was in fact a s in form th e Governor General's Correspondenc e and, as such, his to disclose or withhold as he saw fit . Thi s sanctit y of officia l correspondence , h e insisted , "doe s no t imply secre t diplomacy " bu t wa s "intende d t o provid e a saf e mean s whereby matter s o f publi c concer n ma y b e discusse d i n private." 41 Mackenzie King's eventua l response wa s to rais e th e whol e question a t the Imperia l Conferenc e later i n th e yea r where , after muc h argument, a resolution , largel y drafte d b y him , settle d i t alon g th e principle s h e desired. It s mos t important paragraph s wer e these : The Conferenc e gav e it s attentio n t o th e desir e o f th e Parliament s o f th e various part s o f th e Empir e t o b e afforde d th e fulles t informatio n possibl e on al l matter s o n whic h negotiation s wer e goin g on , o r discussion s takin g place, betwee n tw o o r mor e Governments . The Conferenc e recognize d that , i f consultation , t o whic h i t attache d great importance , wa s to be carried ou t effectively , thi s mus t involv e a fran k

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and confidentia l exchange o f views in written o r telegraphi c communications , and tha t man y o f the communication s exchange d betwee n th e Governments , particularly i n connectio n wit h foreig n polic y an d defence , coul d no t b e made public . A t th e sam e tim e th e feelin g o f th e Conferenc e wa s tha t a s many communication s a s possibl e ough t t o b e mad e availabl e fo r th e us e of th e Parliaments , an d i t was thought desirabl e t o discus s th e circumstance s in whic h officia l communication s betwee n th e Government s coul d an d could no t b e made public . It wa s generall y agree d tha t an y officia l communicatio n no t marke d "confidential" o r "secret" or not clearl y intende d t o b e treated a s such migh t be regarde d a s availabl e fo r publicatio n wtihou t referenc e t o an y othe r government. It wa s understoo d that , s o fa r a s eac h Governmen t wa s concerned , an d subject t o th e nee d fo r mutua l consen t i n certai n cases , th e responsibilit y a s to publicatio n o f correspondenc e wit h othe r Government s reste d wit h th e Ministers o f th e Crow n i n th e Dominion s a s i n Grea t Britain. 42

Mackenzie King' s disenchantmen t wit h "ope n covenants , openl y arrived at " coincided , surel y no t b y accident , wit h th e strengthenin g of hi s parliamentary position in 1926 , an d with a lengthening experience of diplomati c negotiations fortifyin g a tast e fo r secrec y acquire d a s early a s 190 8 whe n he undertoo k a missio n t o Englan d a t th e reques t of Presiden t Theodor e Roosevel t th e rea l purpos e o f whic h ha d bee n deliberately conceale d fro m th e public. * I n 192 9 th e Britis h Prim e Minister, Ramsa y MacDonald, pai d a visi t to Ottawa . Mackenzie King invited hi m ou t t o hi s countr y retrea t i n th e Gatinea u Hills , an d the y "had a delightful tramp together through the woods and over the moors, and tea togethe r i n my little cottag e by the lake. Tha t particula r experience ha s convince d m e mor e tha n eve r o f th e wisdo m of wha t I hav e done a t Kingsmere . I believ e tha t mor e an d more , muc h o f ou r publi c life i s going to b e carrie d o n i n th e open , an d tha t partl y as a mean s of self-preservation fro m th e stress , strai n an d pressure s o f th e highl y intensified an d comple x lif e o f ou r day , me n wh o hav e reall y grea t problems t o conside r ar e goin g to mee t i n th e quie t retreat s o f Natur e and thres h out thei r problem s there." 43 Henceforth , thi s belie f in the value o f intimat e negotiatio n wit h leader s o f government , untrouble d by th e mischievou s scrutiny of th e publi c an d th e press , influence d t o an increasin g exten t Mackenzi e King' s conduc t o f externa l policy . I t was manifeste d in a distrus t o f multilatera l conferences—"th e mor e I *"The Canadia n Cabine t coul d no t possibl y announc e tha t Kin g wa s goin g t o England a t Roosevelt' s request , an d a n ostensibl e reaso n fo r th e tri p ha d t o b e found. . . . [Thi s was ] tha t . .. he was being sen t t o Englan d t o discus s variou s aspects o f [immigration ] wit h th e Governmen t o f th e Unite d Kingdom. " R . MacGregor Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, I , 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p. 160 .

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1

see o f conference s th e les s patienc e I a m comin g t o hav e wit h them, " he exclaime d i n a n unusuall y fran k outburs t i n th e Hous e o f Common s hi 1937—and , mor e positively , i n a decide d preferenc e fo r "quie t diplomacy." Hi s reactio n t o th e "Atlanti c Charter " meetin g betwee n Roosevelt an d Churchil l i n th e summe r o f 194 1 wa s revealin g i n thi s respect. "To me , i t is the apotheosi s of the craze for publicity and show," he wrot e in his diary . "Ther e i s no nee d fo r an y meetin g of th e kind." 4* Mr. Leste r Pearso n brough t t o hi s offic e a s Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s fro m 194 9 t o 195 7 th e trainin g an d th e outloo k o f twenty year s i n professiona l diplomacy . I t i s no t surprising , therefore , that h e share d t o th e full , an d helpe d i n considerabl e degre e t o formu late, th e reactio n agains t negotiatin g i n th e limeligh t s o dominan t i n recent years . "Th e purpos e o f negotiation, " h e ha s written , is th e reconciliatio n o f interests , th e explorin g o f a situatio n i n a n effor t t o find som e commo n ground , som e possibilit y o f compromise , th e seekin g o f agreement throug h mutua l adjustments . Suc h adjustment s ar e no t mad e easier, an d ma y well be made impossible , when th e negotiator s fea r tha t an y concession o r compromis e wil l withi n th e hou r b e printed , pictured , o r broadcast bac k hom e a s a capitulation. . . . There ar e situations—an d the y ar e sometime s th e mos t difficul t an d important ones—wher e . . . highl y publicize d meeting s offe r th e leas t promising o f al l method s o f negotiating . A n atmospher e o f dram a i s inevit ably generate d whe n th e spotlight s o f th e worl d ar e focusse d o n a singl e "parley a t th e summit" . Suc h a n atmospher e ma y wel l b e a publi c relation s officer's dream , bu t a negotiator's doom . . . .4B Negotiations conducte d i n public, in fact, b y political personages , ar e simpl y not permitte d t o fail—a t leas t fo r som e time . Thi s i s on e reaso n tha t diplo matic negotiation s should normall y b e conducted i n private. . . . Full publicity for objective s and policie s an d result s doe s no t mean , o r a t least shoul d no t mean , tha t negotiatio n mus t alway s b e conducted , ste p b y step, i n public . Certainl y n o privat e activity , no t eve n a publi c relation s business, coul d b e operate d b y suc h methods . An d governmen t i s toda y th e most importan t an d delicat e activit y of all . Negotiatio n i n a n agitate d gold fish bowl, then, is often a serious obstacle t o the reaching of agreement. . . ,46 These reflection s ma y appea r t o embod y n o mor e than th e conventiona l wisdom o f thei r subject , bu t reflectio n o f an y kin d i s rar e enoug h i n politicians, an d o f thi s kind rare r still .

Chapter Eight P

R O P AG AN D A

PROPAGANDA VERSU S "PUBLICITY"

In commo n wit h leaders o f liberal democracie s everywhere , the maker s of Canadia n foreig n polic y have been reluctant to develo p a s part o f th e ordinary machiner y of governmen t th e instrument s o f wha t i s variousl y described a s information, propaganda, psychological or political warfare . Ready enoug h t o exploit suc h devices in war, the Canadia n governmen t has regarde d the m a s inappropriat e fo r peacetim e use . I t wa s onl y gradually, an d wit h eviden t distaste , tha t th e legitimac y o f propa ganda a s a mean s o f implementin g foreign polic y i n norma l time s wa s established, a s it becam e apparen t tha t th e ol d dichotomie s o f "peace " and "war " wer e no longer relevan t to the internationa l scene . An d eve n then th e mos t experience d an d knowledgabl e official s wer e incline d t o approach i t wit h great caution . "I t i s a very tricky business, " remarke d Mr. Leste r Pearso n i n 1953 , "t o conduc t psychologica l warfar e i n a time o f col d wa r an d throug h th e agenc y of coalitio n o f fre e states." 1 Notwithstanding thes e inhibition s agains t usin g propagand a t o influence th e foreign policies o f other states , Canadians hav e been quit e ready to accep t i t for anothe r and , as they conceive it, a more innocuous purpose, creatin g a climat e o f opinio n abroa d i n whic h Canadia n interests coul d blosso m an d prosper . Provide d n o attemp t wa s mad e directly t o interven e i n matter s o f hig h policy , provide d effort s wer e confined t o wha t late r becam e know n a s "projectin g a favourabl e image o f th e Canadia n community, " n o seriou s objectio n wa s raised . In thi s dilute d version , ofte n describe d a s "publicity " s o a s t o avoi d a more offensiv e i f mor e accurat e connotation , propagand a ha s becom e an accepted for m o f governmental activity. Indeed, i t has bee n suggested that suc h activit y i s mor e importan t t o th e Canadia n governmen t tha n to most others. "W e are a comparatively new arrival on the internationa l scene," Mr . Vincen t Masse y ha s written , "an d les s i s know n abou t Canadian lif e than would be the case if we had been a grown-up membe r of th e family o f nations for a longer time . . . . The paradox o f enjoying at th e sam e tim e th e complet e independenc e an d th e privileg e o f membership i n the Britis h Commonwealt h is confusing to th e foreigner . This impose s a specia l obligatio n o n u s t o enlighte n other s a s t o ho w

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we carr y o n ou r affairs." 2 Th e enlightenmen t o f foreigner s ha s bee n in fac t a continuin g if incidental par t o f th e wor k o f Canadia n officials , from W . T. R . Presto n wh o in 1900 wished to destro y al l lantern slide s depicting Indians , ic e palace s an d sno w slides, 3 t o Mr . Leste r Pearso n who in 195 4 remarked t o a n America n audienc e tha t Canad a wa s afte r all "fa r more tha n a n enormou s col d spo t o n th e map , inhabited b y Mounties, Eskimo , trappers , quintuplet s an d Ros e Marie." 4 An d i f th e need has lessened, i t has not yet passed. EARLY PROPAGAND A FO R IMMIGRATION AN D TRAD E

Propaganda wa s firs t employe d i n ai d o f externa l polic y t o brin g more peopl e t o th e country . "Ou r immigration policy, " remarke d th e Minister responsibl e fo r i t i n 1911 , "i s i n th e firs t instanc e simpl y a n advertising policy—a means of placing the advantage s of Canada before such peopl e i n othe r countrie s a s w e desir e t o com e t o Canada." 5 Enlisted i n thi s caus e wer e a variet y o f propagandis t techniques , em ployed th e mor e vigorously , i f crudely , b y Dominio n agent s unre strained b y th e nicetie s o f norma l diplomati c practice . The y soo n ra n into trouble . Europea n countries , i f the y di d not , like Russia , forbi d emigration altogether , wer e no t anxiou s to los e thei r labou r forces , an d they prohibite d wit h varyin g degree s o f severit y an d effectivenes s emigration propaganda b y foreign agents. Canadia n propaganda becam e the subjec t o f officia l complaint t o th e imperia l authoritie s b y th e German ambassado r i n London; th e Hamburger Nachrichten deplore d "th e arrogance o f th e Canadia n [Hig h Commissioner ] Lor d Strathcona , and th e utter disrespec t show n b y him . .. i n publicl y conductin g his emigration propagand a o n German soil . . . . Apart fro m th e weakening of th e Fatherlan d whic h th e succes s o f suc h propagand a entails , th e attempt to lure our fellow-countrymen to this desolate , sub-arcti c regio n is, upo n human e ground s alone , t o b e denounce d a s criminal." 6 I n the Unite d Kingdom , however , th e Hig h Commissione r an d th e agent s of th e provincia l government s coul d an d di d giv e free r reig n t o then ingenuity. Newspape r advertisements , letter s t o editors , pamphlets , lec tures abette d b y the magi c lantern, sough t t o depic t th e Dominio n a s a land o f opportunit y i f no t o f mil k an d honey . "I n late r year s tw o exhibit wagon s wer e o n th e mov e i n Irelan d an d Scotland , an d tw o motor car s travelle d throug h Englan d . . . , stopping whereve r a crowd could b e collecte d an d a n opportunit y fo r speakin g an d givin g ou t pamphlets coul d b e found." 7

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Propaganda wa s similarl y presse d int o th e servic e o f commercia l policy. Agent s alread y engage d i n drummin g u p immigrant s turne d their attentio n t o good s an d capital . Joh n Dyk e i n Liverpoo l wa s instructed i n 188 5 t o "furnis h informatio n o n .. . question s o f trad e . . . between Canada an d Europe," and henceforth depicting the fortunes awaiting trader s an d investor s i n th e ne w Dominio n becam e a n increasingly important aspec t of the wor k of Canadian agent s and , later , of trad e commissioners . Member s o f th e Canadia n Economi c Commis sion whic h visite d Russi a i n 191 8 wer e keenl y awar e o f th e valu e o f propaganda i n pursuing its objectives : Before leavin g Siberi a you r Commissio n urge d tha t a n illustrate d pamphle t describing Canada an d he r resource s shoul d b e prepared an d translate d int o Russian fo r distributio n throughou t Siberia . No t havin g ha d tim e t o ac complish this durin g thei r sta y i n Vladivostock , a smal l leafle t wa s prepare d for distributio n throug h th e mediu m o f th e Trad e Commissioner . You r Commission, however , fee l tha t th e origina l proposa l shoul d b e carrie d out , and a carefull y prepare d pamphlet in Russian issue d fo r wid e distribution . It wa s arrange d befor e th e Commissio n lef t fo r Siberi a tha t certai n moving picture films illustrating Canadian nationa l lif e an d industrie s shoul d be prepare d an d forwarde d fo r us e throughou t th e country . The y failed , however, t o com e t o hand , an d you r Commissio n no w recommen d tha t a series o f suc h film s b e prepare d wit h th e prope r Russia n title s an d mad e available fo r us e b y th e Trad e Commissione r i n carryin g o n a n illustrate d propaganda throug h th e mediu m o f th e co-operativ e societies , th e zemstvos , the school s an d othe r suitabl e organizations , wh o woul d b e gla d t o arrang e for th e exhibit of these films. 8 WARTIME PROPAGAND A I N THE UNITE D STATE S

The Canadia n Governmen t di d no t ventur e in th e compan y o f it s mor e powerful Allie s int o th e excitin g experiment s conducte d a t Crew e House an d late r b y Georg e Creel' s Committe e o n Publi c Informatio n (although Canadian s serve d unde r Lor d Beaverbroo k i n th e Britis h Government's Ministr y o f Informatio n create d i n Februar y 1918*) . Lacking bot h appetit e an d mean s fo r psychologica l warfar e o n suc h a scale, th e Canadia n Governmen t resorte d fo r th e firs t tun e t o propa ganda fo r th e purpos e o f achievin g a politica l objectiv e o f externa l * Beaverbrook, accordin g t o on e critic , relie d o n Canadian s "whos e experienc e of foreig n affair s an d whos e knowledge of foreig n language s was a s limite d a s hi s own." Laurence Lyon, Th e Pomp o f Power (London , 1922) , quote d i n Harol d D . Lasswell, "Th e Organizatio n of Psychologica l Warfar e Agencie s in Worl d Wa r I " in Willia m E . Daughert y an d M . Janowitz , eds. , A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore , 1958) , p. 12 3 n.

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5

policy a s distinc t fro m commercia l advantage . Th e objectiv e wa s t o enlist America n sympath y fo r th e Allie d cause . Th e metho d coul d hardly hav e bee n mor e discreet . I n Januar y 191 7 th e Canadia n Prim e Minister, Si r Rober t Borden , aske d Majo r Charle s W . Gordon , a Canadian autho r bette r know n as Ralph Connor , i f he would exploit hi s considerable reputatio n i n th e Unite d State s t o spea k ther e o n th e subject o f th e Allied , an d particularl y o f th e Canadia n wa r effort . "I t occurred to me," Borde n wrot e to the Colonial Secretary , that h e migh t g o informall y t o som e o f th e citie s i n th e Unite d State s an d deliver addresse s descriptiv e o f condition s a t th e front , wher e h e ha d a n experience o f man y months , an d o f th e wor k an d achievement s o f th e British forces , an d mor e especiall y o f th e Canadia n Arm y Corps , t o whic h he wa s attache d a s a chaplain . I t wa s suggeste d tha t incidentall y h e coul d set fort h i n thes e addresse s th e cause s whic h ha d compelle d Canad a t o throw hersel f hear t an d sou l int o the struggl e an d that i n this way he migh t awaken i n hi s audience s a fulle r appreciatio n o f th e purpos e o f th e Allie d nations an d o f th e magnitud e o f th e issu e a s i t concern s th e whol e world. 9

No soone r ha d Gordo n arrive d i n Washingto n tha n th e Unite d State s broke of f diplomatic relation s wit h Germany , an d a fe w week s late r i t was a t war . H e wa s advise d b y th e Britis h ambassado r t o confin e hi s efforts "t o a campaig n devoi d o f an y grea t publicity," 10 an d event s i n any case soo n made mor e ambitiou s effort s unnecessary . Th e Canadia n Government throughou t 191 8 too k th e view , wel l expresse d b y a prominent Toront o busines s ma n a t th e time , tha t "t o fin d th e Unite d States ou r associat e i n foreig n policy , eve n t o th e fightin g point , i s s o much beyon d ou r wildes t hope s o f thre e year s ag o tha t w e fee l tha t what America n sentimen t need s fo r th e momen t i s a certain amoun t of letting alone." 11 The proble m aros e agai n betwee n Septembe r 193 9 an d Decembe r 1941. Whe n i n th e sprin g an d summe r o f 194 0 th e twiligh t wa r deepened int o th e blac k nigh t o f battle and disaster , th e voice s o f many influential Canadian s wer e raise d t o deman d tha t thei r Government appeal t o America n opinio n t o pres s th e Roosevel t administratio n int o closer co-operatio n wit h th e Unite d Kingdom . Mackenzi e King , lik e Borden befor e him, was greatly averse to propaganda o f this kind. While he di d no t shrin k fro m placin g privatel y befor e th e Presiden t an d hi s officials request s fo r materie l an d othe r form s o f assistance , h e wa s intensely sympatheti c t o th e President' s difficultie s i n copin g wit h isolationist opinio n i n a n electio n yea r an d mos t anxiou s t o avoi d any thing i n th e natur e o f a publi c appeal , o r th e kin d o f privat e appea l which migh t becom e public . Thu s h e viewe d wit h grea t displeasur e a speech mad e b y th e Attorne y Genera l o f Ontari o o n April 3 , 1940 , urging tha t Canad a "brin g abou t th e activ e participatio n o f th e Unite d

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States i n suppor t o f th e Allie d cause." 12 Th e speec h wa s widel y an d adversely commente d upon i n th e America n press , an d dre w fro m th e Secretary o f Stat e th e extraordinaril y shar p publi c rebuk e tha t "n o nondescript utterance s o f minor official s o r individual s abroad . . . have anything remotely t o d o with the polic y o f this Governmen t a t hom e o r in it s international relations." 13 The Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Exter nal Affair s describe d th e spec h a s "th e mos t stupi d an d harmfu l . . . made b y an y Canadia n i n years, " th e Canadia n Ministe r telephone d from Washingto n t o repor t tha t i t ha d greatl y strengthene d th e han d of th e isolationists , an d th e Prim e Minister though t i t advisabl e t o issu e a statemen t declarin g tha t "th e Canadia n Governmen t particularl y ha s no though t o f attemptin g t o intervene , directl y o r indirectly , i n th e affairs o r policies o f the United States." 14 But feelin g persiste d tha t i t should . Th e forme r Minister t o th e United States, W. D. Herridge, sought support fo r a mission to Washington o f eminen t statesme n an d soldier s o f th e Allie s t o infor m th e American public and governmen t of the urgenc y of th e situatio n an d o f the nee d fo r massiv e an d immediat e assistance ; h e propose d tha t th e Canadian Governmen t shoul d initiat e thi s project , firs t b y seekin g th e President's approval , an d the n b y taking i t u p wit h th e government s of France an d th e Unite d Kingdom . Althoug h th e Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affair s privatel y describe d the proposa l a s "cockeyed and dangerous " (a n opinio n full y share d b y hi s Prim e Minister) , th e Canadian legatio n i n Washington was instructed t o broac h i t informally with th e Secretar y o f Stat e who , a s expected , sternl y disapproved . Mackenzie Kin g wa s als o instrumenta l i n deflectin g a proposa l o f th e Prime Ministe r o f Australi a tha t th e Unite d Kingdo m an d th e Domin ions shoul d simultaneousl y appea l t o th e Presiden t and , throug h him , American opinion , fo r immediat e aid . "An y chang e o f polic y i n th e United States, " he cabled t o Mr. Churchil l o n May 24, 1940 , "wil l hav e to resul t fro m convictio n tha t a chang e i s necessar y i n their ow n interest. I fee l strongl y that a t the present momen t an y public appea l b y out side government s woul d arres t rathe r tha n assis t th e formatio n o f public an d Congressiona l opinio n favourabl e t o action." 15 Eve n t o such modes t proposal s a s publi c lecture s b y pro-Allie d speaker s h e was distinctl y cool . "Wit h respec t t o wha t yo u hav e i n min d a s t o lecturing in the United States," he wrote to a correspondent offerin g he r services a s a publi c speake r t o America n audiences , " I mus t tel l yo u that from th e beginning of the war ou r Governmen t has rigidl y refrained from identifyin g itsel f i n an y wa y wit h propagand a in tha t country . W e have not eve n sough t to divid e responsibility wit h th e Unite d Kingdom.

PROPAGANDA 18

7

We hav e ha d t o infor m th e Britis h Governmen t tha t it s ministr y mus t use its own judgment and take responsibility for suc h work i n the nature of propagand a i n th e Unite d State s a s i t deem s advisable." 16 Ther e can be no doub t tha t thi s polic y of restrain t was the righ t policy , and wholly justifie d b y events . Late r i n th e wa r th e Prim e Ministe r referre d to th e matte r i n the Hous e of Commons: There wa s i n th e Unite d State s a stron g feelin g agains t an y attemp t o n th e part o f Canad a t o influenc e th e peopl e i n a wa y whic h migh t b e hel d t o b e political, namely , to mak e fro m Canad a b y way o f propagand a a n effor t t o bring th e Unite d State s int o th e war . I t wa s hel d th e reaction s migh t b e serious. I a m justifie d i n sayin g that I wa s aske d b y the highes t authorit y i n the Unite d State s t o se e tha t grea t car e wa s take n t o avoi d makin g an y move b y whic h i t coul d b e sai d tha t th e governmen t o f Canad a wa s tryin g to influenc e publi c opinion i n th e Unite d State s wit h a vie w t o havin g th e United State s brough t int o th e wa r agains t it s will. 17 By 194 1 th e cas e fo r restrain t ha d les s t o commen d it . Frankli n Roosevelt ha d bee n triumphantl y returne d fo r a thir d term , isolationis t sentiment wa s o n th e wane , Anglo-America n co-operatio n wa s assum ing th e mor e tangibl e for m o f a n easterl y flo w o f munition s an d suppl y if only , a s yet , fo r "cas h o n th e barrel-head. " Thi s rus h o f event s ha d tended t o obscur e th e natur e an d exten t o f Canada' s ow n contributio n to the war effort, an d Mackenzie King becam e increasingl y responsive to the great pressure on the Government to step up its informational activi ties i n th e Unite d States . B y Ma y 1941 , eve n th e Washingto n legatio n urged thi s course: We . . . respectfull y sugges t tha t yo u shoul d a t a n earl y dat e delive r a speech somewher e in th e Unite d State s to b e carrie d o n a nationa l hook-up , publicizing th e war-effor t o f Canada , an d urgin g th e America n natio n an d government to se e that th e tools which they ar e s o splendidly manufacturing, and asked for by Mr. Churchill , reach th e sourc e wher e they ar e desperatel y required an d no t sun k i n th e Atlanti c Ocean . Further, w e respectfull y sugges t tha t Ernes t Lapoint e [th e Ministe r o f Justice] shoul d a t th e earlies t possibl e moment delive r a simila r speec h i n the Unite d State s which shoul d b e broadcas t throughou t th e country , reply ing to the articl e i n Life whereb y the Provinc e o f Quebe c i s classed a s "Fift h Columnist", a s wel l a s urgin g deliver y o f th e tool s unde r protectio n whic h will preven t their bein g sunk. 18 While thes e suggestion s wer e no t acte d upon , i t i s clea r tha t th e Prime Minister' s thought s wer e movin g i n th e sam e direction . A fe w weeks earlie r h e ha d himsel f spoke n wit h Cordel l Hul l abou t th e inade quacy o f informatio n abou t Canada in th e Unite d States . " I tol d hi m of my havin g wante d t o avoi d an y interferenc e whe n th e Lend-Leas e Bil l was on . Sai d I ha d bee n askin g mysel f whethe r i t migh t no t b e wel l

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to giv e a radio broadcas t t o th e U.S . settin g forth Canada' s position." 19 By mid-summer he was considering new machinery fo r a sustaine d pro gramme o f informatio n i n th e Unite d States . "Ther e is , a s yo u know, " he wrot e t o th e Ministe r i n Washingto n i n September , a ver y stron g feelin g throughou t th e country , an d mor e particularl y o n th e part o f th e Press , tha t Canad a shoul d have , i n Ne w York , a n offic e some what simila r t o tha t ove r whic h Si r Geral d Campbel l preside s [th e Unite d Kingdom Informatio n Office] . I doub t i f thos e wh o hav e t o d o wit h th e creating o f publi c opinio n an d public prejudice i n Canad a wil l eve r b e satisfied tha t th e Governmen t i s doin g it s dut y unles s som e additiona l agency o f th e kin d i s established . I migh t sa y I thin k th e sam e woul d b e more o r les s true o f the Member s o f Parliament . As matter s no w stand , th e Legatio n i s coming i n fo r wholl y unwarrante d as wel l a s unnecessar y criticis m o n th e scor e o f inadequat e publicit y bein g given i n th e Unite d State s t o Canada' s wa r effort . Indee d th e criticis m is , as you will know, aime d no t less at myself tha n th e Legation. . . . I a m sur e tha t somethin g ca n b e worke d ou t whic h wil l preven t an y conflict o f jurisdiction s or o f services. 20 The Minister , no t unnaturally , wa s less sure , an d too k unkindl y t o th e creation i n th e neighbourin g America n cit y o f a n agenc y boun d t o become t o som e exten t a riva l o f hi s own . "Ther e i s nee d fo r u s t o continue an d expan d the quiet work that is being don e i n this country," he conceded in a letter to the Prime Minister. "There is need perhaps for a mor e dramatic presentation from Ottaw a of our wa r effort . Bu t thi s is not th e momen t t o establish , wit h th e attendan t publicit y require d t o meet th e Canadia n criticism s to whic h yo u refer , a registere d burea u i n the Unite d States , whic h woul d naturally hav e to justif y it s existence b y attracting an d retainin g th e publi c eye." 21 Fo r th e momen t thi s vie w prevailed. Bu t Pear l Harbo r dispose d o f an y remainin g objections , an d in 194 2 th e Wartim e Informatio n Boar d cam e int o being . The consideration s leadin g th e Governmen t t o tak e thi s importan t step were describe d by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons on July 13 , 1943 : The succes s o f th e combine d effort s o f th e allie d power s depend s largel y upon mutua l good-will . Good-wil l i n tur n demand s accurate , ful l an d con stant information . I t i s the acknowledge d ai m o f the enemy' s propagand a t o sow discor d amon g th e Unite d Nation s b y spreadin g lie s an d half-truth s i n each o f th e allie d nation s abou t it s partners . S o importan t d o th e Nazi s consider thi s warfare of words, o r political warfare , that the y hav e spen t an d continue t o spen d staggerin g sum s o n propaganda . Th e germ s o f fals e pro paganda ca n onl y d o their evi l work i n th e darknes s o f ignorance . The y ca n be destroye d onl y wit h th e ligh t o f truth . Bu t i t i s stil l mor e satisfactor y i f accurate informatio n ca n b e supplie d befor e th e fals e propagand a i s spread abroad. Tha t i s why ever y fre e countr y a t wa r ha s give n s o muc h attentio n to disseminatin g informatio n outsid e it s ow n borders .

PROPAGANDA 18

9

Before th e presen t war , Canad a ha d littl e o r n o experienc e o f thi s important sid e o f wartim e activity . Th e governmen t approache d i t wit h caution an d hesitation . Fo r obviou s reasons , i t wa s mor e importan t fo r Canada t o se e that accurat e informatio n wa s availabl e i n th e Unite d State s than in any other country. Before th e Unite d States entered th e wa r that was a matte r o f extreme delicacy . Afte r th e entr y o f th e Unite d States , th e technical difficultie s wer e no t s o great , bu t th e America n peopl e becam e increasingly absorbe d i n thei r ow n wa r effort , an d consequentl y relativel y less intereste d i n th e activitie s o f anothe r country . Thi s situatio n increase d the dange r o f misunderstandings . Ther e wa s a growin g concer n i n Canad a to find some means of preventing possible misunderstandin g b y the provisio n of accurat e informatio n t o th e Unite d States . Severa l hon . member s gav e expression t o tha t concern . Th e concer n wa s full y share d b y th e Govern ment, an d i t wa s ou t o f tha t concer n tha t th e Wartim e Informatio n Boar d was established. 22

The Wartim e Informatio n Boar d (W.I.B. ) wa s fro m it s inceptio n placed unde r th e ministeria l directio n o f th e Presiden t o f th e Priv y Council ( a portfoli o the n an d normall y hel d b y th e Prim e Minister ) "in order, " a s Mackenzie Kin g later explained , "tha t interdepartmenta l co-operation migh t be mor e effectivel y obtained . Thi s wa s no t likel y t o be th e cas e t o th e sam e degre e i f th e Boar d remaine d unde r an y on e other particula r minister." * It s firs t chairma n wa s Charle s Vining , a public relation s counsello r no t previousl y i n governmen t service , wh o had prepared fo r the Government a report o n the need for informationa l activity an d o n th e machiner y b y whic h i t migh t b e provided . On e recommendation o f th e Vinin g Repor t wa s tha t externa l an d domesti c information service s shoul d b e combine d unde r a singl e administration , and accordingl y th e ne w W.I.B . too k ove r th e wor k an d personne l o f the smal l Burea u o f Publi c Informatio n whic h sinc e Jul y 1940 , unde r the Departmen t o f Nationa l Wa r Services , ha d concerne d itsel f solel y with informatio n o n th e hom e front . Whe n Charle s Vinin g resigne d for reason s o f health , th e W.I.B . chairmanshi p wa s mad e a n advisor y rather tha n administrativ e positio n an d a ne w post , tha t o f genera l manager, created . T o i t was appointe d Mr . Joh n Grierson , th e directo r of th e Nationa l Fil m Board . Mr . Grierso n full y agree d wit h th e recommendation i n the Vinin g Report tha t "ther e shoul d b e nothin g in the natur e o f a publicity campaign , that ther e shoul d b e a minimu m of commotion, tha t th e office s o f th e Boar d shoul d b e smal l an d efficient , *This sam e consideratio n had le d t o a numbe r o f othe r wartim e agencie s an d functions bein g placed unde r th e Presiden t o f th e Priv y Council , wit h th e resul t that th e Prim e Ministe r wa s greatl y overburdened . T o mee t thi s situation , th e post o f Parliamentar y Assistan t t o th e Presiden t o f th e Priv y Counci l wa s created i n 1943 , and firs t occupie d b y Brook e Claxton . Upo n hi m devolve d th e duty o f administerin g and dealin g i n th e Hous e o f Common s wit h th e Wartim e Information Board .

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that the y shoul d largel y wor k throug h th e pres s an d othe r instruments , and no t i n an y way see k to tak e th e plac e o f th e press." 23 Earl y i n th e war h e ha d writte n t o member s o f th e Prim e Minister' s staf f abou t th e dangers of too large and to o nois y propagand a machinery: I mus t say , I don' t lik e the idea o f a bi g Ministry o f Informatio n wit h larg e personnel, o n th e line s o f th e Englis h one . I t became , a s yo u know , a disaster o f heavy-weight officialdom. . . . The alternativ e method—an d on e whic h I thin k woul d admirabl y sui t Canadian condition s . . . —is to have a Bureau o f Information whic h travel s as ligh t a s possible. . . . All you requir e i s a smal l group o f liaiso n officer s or secretarie s o f information—on e fo r eac h mediu m whic h th e Governmen t wishes t o use—wit h a principa l Secretar y o f Informatio n wh o woul d repor t directly to the Prime Minister an d convey policy decisivel y to the others. . . . Your informatio n servic e woul d therefor e b e somethin g i n th e natur e o f a flying squad, proceeding fro m specifi c jo b t o specifi c jo b an d co-operatin g with peopl e onl y i n respec t o f specifi c jobs ; but doin g s o with th e authorit y of th e P.M . i n the backgroun d an d a considere d an d singl e polic y regardin g the variou s problem s involved , e.g. , nationa l unity , presentation o f Canadia n views t o th e Unite d States , advisin g th e Britis h Informatio n Servic e o n Canadian realities , etc . . .. One of the principa l problems wil l be to kee p the lunatic s i n leash. I hav e already hear d the m talk o f working the peopl e u p t o feve r pitch , forcin g th e U.S. int o the war by preventive tactics. . . ,24 There i s considerabl e dange r fo r Canad a i f i t i s exploite d a s a bas e fo r th e cruder form s o f propaganda . . . . There i s no questio n bu t tha t America n opinion i s super-sensitive t o exploitatio n by the crude r form s of propaganda , and tha t ill-wil l ma y be create d b y it. .. . I n othe r words , whil e th e voic e of Canad a mus t inevitably develop grea t importanc e in the Unite d State s at the presen t time , i t ma y b e wis e to determin e wit h grea t car e an d foresigh t the nature o f that voice . I have advised the [British ] Embassy a t Washingto n to concentrat e fo r th e tim e bein g o n a n intensiv e developmen t o f cultura l relations betwee n Englan d an d the Unite d States . . . . Th e sam e polic y might b e adopte d b y Canad a wit h a judiciou s introductio n o f informatio n concerning Canada' s wa r activities , it s view s o n th e war , and , particularly , its nationa l interpretatio n o f th e democrati c issue s a t stake. 25 These view s coul d no t hav e mor e exactl y coincide d wit h th e Prim e Minister's ow n opinions, an d the y wer e n o doub t recalle d b y hi m whe n he appointe d thei r author a s genera l manage r o f th e W.I.B . A t th e same tim e the y wer e easie r t o expres s tha n t o carr y int o effect . Th e W.I.B. was frequently an d heatedl y criticized , partly o n th e groun d tha t it ha d becom e a n instrumen t fo r politica l part y propaganda , bu t also , and perhap s mor e fairly , tha t i t ha d no t remaine d a s modes t i n siz e and i n demeanou r a s i t se t ou t t o be . Thes e charge s wer e naturall y rejected b y th e Government . "I t i s modest , i t i s no t aggressiv e i n an y

PROPAGANDA 19

1

improper sense, it has an admirable personnel, an d is doing a good job, " declared Brook e Claxton to th e Hous e o f Common s in 1943 . H e des cribed it s work in these words: The me n i n charg e o f th e Washingto n an d Ne w Yor k office s receiv e a n advance upo n a stor y comin g throug h ove r th e Canadia n Pres s o r th e British Unite d Pres s fro m Canada . The y a t onc e ge t int o contac t wit h th e heads o f th e America n service s an d th e editor s o f th e leadin g America n papers, pointin g out tha t thi s story is of the typ e which would interes t them . . . . The members o f the Boar d hav e assiste d i n th e preparation o f articles , have provide d facilitie s an d material s fo r writer s an d fo r journalist s havin g to do with the war effort. . . . The Board replie s t o inquiries—and the y ar e pouring i n al l th e time—an d i t furnishe s stil l photograph s an d othe r materials. . . . The Boar d ha s co-operate d i n th e closes t possibl e wa y and has th e friendlies t relation s wit h bot h th e Britis h Ministr y o f Informatio n officials i n th e Unite d State s an d th e Offic e o f Wa r Informatio n o f th e United States . Th e latte r organizatio n ha s helpe d i n th e disseminatio n o f Canadian new s al l ove r th e worl d becaus e o f arrangement s mad e b y th e Wartime Information Board .

He wa s asked why, in the cours e of his exposition , he ha d implie d that the W.I.B . was not a propagand a organization : Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury): . . . I s not the whole thin g propaganda , t o make the people o f the Unite d State s understand wha t Canad a i s doing? Mr. Claxton: If m y hon. frien d uses the wor d "propaganda " in tha t sense , which i s it s tru e litera l sense , I agre e wit h him . Bu t propagand a ha s i n addition certai n unfavourabl e connotations , an d I d o no t us e th e wor d fo r that reason. 26 PROPAGANDA AN D FOREIG N POLICY SINC E 194 5

In 1943 , answerin g a question whether the Wartime Information Boar d would b e continue d a s a peacetim e instrument of government , Brooke Claxton replied fo r th e Prime Minister that "i t i s absolutely certain that [its] wor k will not g o on afte r th e wa r in its presen t form . . . . If th e work now done by the Boar d is carried on, i t wil l b e totall y changed in character an d certainl y change d i n nam e an d form." 27 Th e futur e o f W.I.B., and, more generally, of post-war government information policy, were considere d by th e Mackenzi e King administration soon afte r th e end of hostilities against Japan. A memorandum prepared by the general manager o f the Board in August 1945 argue d strongly for th e continuation o f it s externa l activitie s wit h th e objec t o f conveyin g factua l information abou t Canadia n life t o th e peopl e o f othe r countries , par ticularly i n th e Unite d States . Fo r thi s purpos e a ne w agenc y wa s

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proposed outsid e th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s thoug h workin g closely wit h that Department , havin g its ow n informatio n officer s who , like th e officer s o f th e Department s o f Trad e an d Commerc e an d National Defence , woul d b e unde r th e genera l supervisio n o f head s o f diplomatic mission s whil e reportin g independentl y t o th e agency' s Ottawa headquarters . These recommendation s wer e largely accepted. I n September 194 5 th e W.I.B . wa s disbanded. I n it s place emerge d a new Canadian Informatio n Servic e (C.I.S.) , unde r th e guidanc e o f a n inter departmental committe e o n whic h wer e represente d thos e department s and agencie s havin g a n interes t i n externa l informationa l activity — External Affairs , Trad e an d Commerce , th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation an d the National Fil m Board . The chairman of this guiding committee wa s th e Cler k o f th e Priv y Council , the n Mr . A . D . P . Heeney. The C.I.S. had its own director, Mr. Geoffre y C . Andrew, who , prior t o this appointment, had been assistant director o f the W.I.B. (Th e director o f W.I.B . a t th e en d o f th e war , Mr . A . D . Dunton , becam e chairman o f th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation. ) Operating wit h som e o f th e staf f an d a muc h smalle r par t o f th e budget o f the W.I.B., th e C.I.S . was neither charge d wit h no r equippe d for th e majo r responsibilit y of conducting political warfar e o n an y scale . It confine d itsel f t o th e tas k o f providin g more o r les s factua l informa tion abou t Canad a for overseas governments and publics. I n thi s modest function, performe d on a modest scale, it acted i n close conjunction with the Departmen t o f External Affairs . I n additio n t o th e Unde r Secretar y of th e Department , wh o represente d it o n th e guidin g committee, a less senior officia l wa s a member of the C.I.S . working committee which me t once o r twic e a wee k t o revie w an d direc t operations . Dail y contac t between th e personne l o f C.I.S . an d o f th e Departmen t wa s assure d if only becaus e th e tw o wer e house d i n th e sam e building . It s oversea s officers i n London, Pari s an d Canberra (th e C.I.S . had succeede d t o the W.I.B. office s i n thos e capitals ) wer e member s o f th e Canadia n diplo matic mission s there an d responsibl e t o thei r heads , while in New Yor k City an d Washingto n they worke d ver y closel y wit h th e consu l genera l and th e ambassador . Liaiso n betwee n th e tw o wa s i n fac t s o intimat e and thei r function s s o simila r tha t i t quickl y becam e eviden t tha t ther e was littl e poin t i n maintainin g the C.I.S . a s a separat e institution . B y order-in-council, th e C.I.S . o n Februar y 5 , 1947 , wa s integrate d int o the Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . Since 194 6 th e Departmen t o f External Affair s ha d bee n experiment ing with a small information division of its own. Its name , the Associat e Under Secretar y o f th e Departmen t conceded , wa s "possibl y a littl e

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misleading. W e debate d fo r som e time befor e the nam e was agree d on . The nam e use d fo r correspondin g activitie s i n th e Departmen t o f Stat e at Washingto n i s th e Cultura l Relation s Division , whic h strike s m e a s being rather high-soundin g and no t a particularl y significan t title . S o we adopted perhap s th e mos t nondescrip t titl e t o indicat e th e portio n o f the Departmen t whic h wa s concerne d wit h a collectio n o f dutie s con nected wit h providin g data an d answerin g queries."28 Whe n th e C.I.S . was disbanded in 1947 , it s director became the head of the Department' s information division , and mos t of its staff wa s taken into the Departmen t to augmen t th e personne l o f th e division . Th e proces s o f integration , reported th e Department's chie f administrativ e officer i n 1947 , "wa s no t an eas y jo b a t first." 29 H e di d no t elaborat e thi s crypti c statement , perhaps implying a more than routine administrative difficult y i n absorbing additiona l personne l fro m a disbande d agency . Th e establishe d foreign servic e officer s looke d upo n th e ne w arrival s with somethin g of the diplomatist' s traditiona l contemp t fo r th e manipulator s o f mas s media, whil e th e ex-informatio n officers , sensin g thei r inferio r status , sought t o leav e i t behin d b y strivin g afte r appointmen t t o politica l divisions of the Department. It was a marriage of convenience bu t i t was not a happ y marriage , an d th e forme r directo r o f th e C.I.S . lef t th e Department soo n afterwards . The informatio n division had reall y ver y little t o d o with propaganda as a n instrumen t o f foreig n policy . I t acte d a s th e Department' s pres s office, furnishin g text s of officia l statement s to th e diplomati c corps an d the Parliamentar y Pres s Gallery . I t share d wit h othe r division s th e jo b of circulatin g withi n the Departmen t informatio n derive d fro m incom ing despatches , an d o f preparin g "genera l report s fo r th e backgroun d information o f mission s o n economi c an d politica l development s i n th e various countrie s i n whic h ou r missions ar e located , o r o n trend s o f thought an d polic y i n the Department." 30 I t prepare d th e Department' s publications an d referenc e materials. In short , i t wa s doin g what it was supposed t o d o i f i t poole d informatio n amon g th e member s o f th e Department, conveye d t o th e hom e publi c somethin g o f th e directio n and detai l o f Canadia n foreig n policy, an d projecte d t o people s abroa d a favourabl e impression o f Canadia n life . Ther e wa s littl e i f an y con scious attemp t t o influenc e th e policie s o f othe r governments . This mor e frankl y propagandis t tas k wa s th e responsibilit y o f th e International Servic e o f th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation . The creatio n o f a government-owned short-wave broadcasting station had bee n urge d b y th e C.B.C . a s earl y a s 1937 , althoug h withou t an y suggestion tha t i t shoul d b e use d fo r transmittin g propaganda . Indeed ,

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when the United Kingdo m Ministry of Information revived the proposa l in 1941 , on e o f th e opposin g arguments brought forwar d b y a n officia l of th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s wa s "th e danger o f indulgin g i n 'propaganda' abroad." 31 The term was evidently not thought t o embrac e the mor e innocuou s i f n o les s constructiv e functio n o f projectin g "th e major issue s a t stak e i n th e presen t war , which woul d b e a positiv e factor i n strengthenin g th e resistanc e withi n th e occupie d countrie s o f Europe, . . . exchanging views an d information with othe r part s o f the Commonwealth, an d . . . reaching the countries o f South America, " for these wer e cite d a s favourabl e consequence s o f th e proposal . O n September 27 , 1941 , the Prime Minister minuted: " I favou r th e shor t wave station & intended t o recommen d it s establishmen t a t las t meetin g o f War Committe e ha d principa l member s bee n present. " Thre e year s were to pass, however, before th e short-wav e facilities were used by th e Government fo r th e transmissio n o f propaganda . Durin g th e interval , the Wartim e Informatio n Boar d use d th e transmitter s o f th e Britis h Ministry o f Informatio n an d Unite d State s Offic e o f Wa r Informatio n to carr y som e o f it s materia l abroad . Bu t th e exten t t o whic h thes e facilities coul d b e exploite d wa s limited, fo r th e principa l them e o f th e W.I.B. propagand a wa s th e distinc t an d o n occasio n th e superio r achievement o f th e Canadia n wa r effor t vis-a-vi s thos e o f th e Unite d States an d th e Unite d Kingdom . Suc h a messag e wa s mor e fittingl y carried ove r Canadian tha n Anglo-American facilities , an d in 1944 , the year o f th e invasion , th e Cabine t authorize d th e creatio n o f th e Inter national Servic e o f th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation . It s trans mitter wa s located a t Sackville, New Brunswick, an d its operatin g head quarters, mainl y fo r technica l reasons , i n Montreal , th e neares t larg e city. C.B.C.-I.S. bega n it s broadcast s i n Februar y 1945 . These consiste d principally o f short-wav e transmissio n o f programme s to th e people s of Germany an d o f occupie d Europe , an d thei r objective s wer e t o disrup t the Axi s caus e an d t o sustai n th e moral e an d vigou r o f th e resistance . But th e comin g of peace brough t a sudde n end t o thi s wor k s o recentl y begun; i n Ottaw a (a s i n al l othe r Allie d capital s sav e Moscow ) ther e was no disposition t o continue propaganda a s a conventional instrumen t of foreig n policy . Foreig n languag e broadcastin g wa s continued , an d indeed expanded, but the emphasis was solely upon projecting "a pictur e of Canadia n life wit h special reference to social , cultural , an d economi c development."32 The communis t seizur e o f powe r i n Czechoslovaki a radicall y altere d the character o f C.B.C.-I.S. broadcasting. Prio r to 194 8 there had bee n

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built up in Czechoslovakia wha t the directo r o f the Internationa l Servic e later describe d a s "on e o f ou r larges t an d mos t responsiv e Europea n audiences."33 Rather than abandon i t to the raucous monopoly of Radi o Prague an d Radio Moscow , th e Canadian Governmen t fatefull y decide d to continu e t o broadcas t programme s in Czec h an d Slova k bu t t o alte r their conten t s o a s t o achiev e tw o wholl y ne w purposes : "(1 ) t o expound an d develo p th e aim s an d policie s o f th e Wester n democrati c powers an d particularl y of Canada; (2 ) t o comba t communis t ideolog y and Sovie t imperialism." 34 Othe r area s o f Easter n Europ e wer e soo n added a s target s o f transmission . Short-wav e broadcastin g i n Russia n to th e Sovie t Unio n wa s begu n i n Februar y 1951 , an d a Ukrainia n service, als o directed a t the Sovie t Union, was inaugurated i n July 1952 . Transmission i n Polish t o Poland wa s started in 195 3 and, following the revolution i n Hungar y i n 1956 , programme s i n Magya r wer e beame d to th e peopl e o f that unhapp y land . The valu e o f thes e effort s wa s atteste d t o b y th e assiduit y o f Sovie t jamming, although (s o smal l was the proportion o f programming reach ing its intended audience ) i t might be, an d was, asked whether the game was worth the candle . T o thi s questio n the directo r o f the Internationa l Service i n 195 3 returne d the followin g answer : The mai n argument s i n favou r o f maintainin g thes e programme s [t o Eastern Europe ] ar e reason s o f prestige , sinc e i t woul d appea r t o b e indis pensable t o stres s i n people's mind s the independenc e o f Canad a a s a n entit y distinct fro m Grea t Britai n an d th e Unite d States , an d reason s o f strategy , since i t i s importan t t o secur e channel s o f communicatio n whic h ma y become usefu l i n tim e o f emergency . I n th e cours e o f conversation s wit h senior official s o f th e Voic e o f Americ a an d th e B.B.C. , I wa s tol d tha t th e Voice o f Canad a i s renderin g a goo d servic e t o bot h thes e broadcastin g organizations b y keepin g a middl e cours e betwee n th e aggressiv e Voic e o f America an d th e dispassionat e Voic e o f Britain. 35

No forma l apparatu s o f liaiso n kep t th e Internationa l Servic e i n touc h with th e politica l broadcastin g instrumentalitie s o f Canada' s allies , notably th e Voic e o f America an d th e B.B.C., but th e Servic e was kept closely informe d o f bot h long-rang e policie s an d day-to-da y program ming. "Ther e i s a constan t flo w o f information , o f material, " th e Service's directo r remarke d i n 1953 . "I t i s a sor t o f Niagar a o f teletypes."36 The proces s b y whic h propaganda , s o obviousl y a n instrumen t o f foreign polic y an d a s suc h the prerogativ e o f foreig n offices , becam e i n Canada a s in the United Kingdom (and later on as in the United States ) the responsibilit y o f a separat e instrumen t outsid e th e Departmen t o f External Affairs , di d no t reflec t settle d conviction s abou t th e inabilit y

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of diplomatist s t o becom e propagandists . Ther e wer e n o inhibition s o n that score in Ottawa. "Ever y Canadian officia l i s an information officer, " commented th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s i n 1947 , "or should be." 37 It was due, rather, to a tradition o f public broadcasting over a state-owne d radi o system , an d t o th e locatio n o f th e system' s short-wave facilitie s in Montreal, ove r a hundred miles fro m th e capital . To hav e move d thos e facilitie s to Ottaw a woul d no t hav e bee n impos sible bu t it would have been costly. So , for better o r worse , the decisio n was taken t o entrus t th e preparatio n a s well a s the transmissio n of pro paganda t o th e Internationa l Servic e in Montreal . I t ma y b e assume d that i t wa s take n wit h som e awarenes s o f th e difficultie s tha t migh t follow a s a consequence, fo r by that time there wa s available the experi ence o f th e Britis h Governmen t whic h ha d attempte d wit h indifferen t results t o divid e th e propagand a functio n betwee n th e B.B.C . an d th e Foreign Office.* With the inauguration of broadcasting to Eastern Europe three year s later , th e Internationa l Servic e embarke d o n a mor e obviously propagandis t tack , an d th e increasingl y importan t proble m of effective liaiso n betwee n th e Servic e an d th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs becam e th e subjec t o f searchin g inquir y b y th e Hous e o f Commons Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs . The earlies t statemen t o f arrangement s fo r liaiso n wa s give n b y th e Secretary o f Stat e fo r External Affair s t o th e Standin g Committe e i n May 1951 . Mr . Leste r Pearso n concede d tha t "i n th e earlie r day s of the Servic e . . . consultatio n wa s not a s effectiv e a s migh t hav e bee n desired." T o improv e it , a foreig n servic e office r wa s appointe d fo r liaison duties with the International Service , an d th e Department under took t o suppl y it with "policy guidanc e memoranda which are supposed to gover n th e polic y sid e o f thei r broadcastin g t o foreig n countries. " *"When wa r broke ou t . .. the B.B.C., whils t maintainin g their independence , entered int o a gentlemen' s agreemen t wit h th e Governmen t t o accep t officia l guidance i n thei r treatmen t o f publi c affairs . Tha t i s t o sa y the y undertoo k t o conform t o officia l policy , whils t reservin g th e righ t t o execut e i t i n thei r ow n way b y th e fre e selectio n o f speakers , arrangemen t o f programmes , an d s o forth . The Ministr y responsibl e fo r givin g guidance was t o b e th e Ministr y of Information. . .. I t i s perhaps no t surprisin g tha t thi s arrangemen t di d no t wor k well . In th e firs t place , th e B.B.C . ha d n o acces s t o secre t informatio n regardin g th e conduct o f th e war , a circumstanc e whic h le d t o a numbe r o f discreditabl e mishaps. Secondly , to o man y people i n th e Ministr y o f Informatio n an d i n othe r Government department s trie d t o influenc e an d guid e the B.B.C . i n thei r day-to day handling o f affairs . Sinc e interest s o f Governmen t department s o r eve n sections o f th e Ministr y o f Informatio n wer e ap t t o conflict , guidanc e fro m different officia l source s wa s ofte n contradictory . Th e resul t wa s friction , resent ment o n bot h side s an d a mountin g sens e o f unmerite d dissatisfactio n wit h th e performance o f th e B.B.C. " Th e Inner Circle: Memoirs o f Ivone Kirkpatrick (London, 1959) , p. 156 .

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But, Mr. Pearson insisted , "w e do not . . . tell the m how they will carr y out tha t policy . W e do not write their scripts , an d I thin k I a m right i n saying tha t w e d o no t censo r thei r scripts , bu t w e examin e al l thei r scripts afterward s and if, in our opinion , the y depart fro m th e policy laid down, w e brin g i t t o thei r attention." 38 Tw o year s late r h e reported : "Every mont h I ge t a grea t stac k o f text s o f broadcast s t o countrie s behind th e iron curtai n . . . and I try to see the line being followed and to satisf y mysel f i t i s the righ t line." 39 Th e text s wer e also furnishe d t o the Canadia n diplomati c mission s in th e targe t countrie s fo r thei r com ments an d criticisms. 40 In 195 2 a n attempt wa s made to secur e a still close r relatio n betwee n the Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d th e Internationa l Servic e b y appointing t o th e Servic e a s it s directo r genera l a senio r Canadia n diplomatist, th e lat e Jea n Desy , a t tha t tim e ambassado r t o Italy . Des y did not resig n fro m th e Departmen t t o tak e o n his new position, an d a s a continuing member of it he enjoyed what his predecessors an d succes sors coul d no t enjoy—th e righ t o f acces s t o al l departmenta l files . H e informed th e Standin g Committe e i n 195 3 o f thi s privileg e an d it s consequences: " I a m entitle d t o rea d al l th e secre t memoranda , secre t telegrams, secre t document s coming fro m al l ove r th e world , fro m ou r missions, an d these documents enable m e to for m a n opinion a s to what is goo d [propaganda ] an d wha t i s bad." 41 I n practice , however , th e director's resor t t o departmenta l file s appear s t o hav e bee n limite d t o what th e Department' s official s themselve s decide d t o sen d fo r hi s guidance. A foreign servic e officer, Mr . Yvo n Beaulne (wh o had serve d under Des y in Rome), travelled once or twice a week between Montrea l and Ottawa to acquire confidential documents for the Director's perusal . Within th e Departmen t itsel f a politica l co-ordinatio n sectio n wa s created o n Marc h 1 , 1953 , primaril y fo r th e purpos e o f "keepin g th e C.B.C. informe d o f development s whic h shoul d b e reflecte d i n thei r broadcasts,"42 and it was to this section that Mr. Beaulne (o r Des y when in Ottawa) turne d fo r informatio n an d directio n o n policy . Further alteration s i n th e liaiso n apparatu s occure d betwee n 195 3 and 1959 . With the appointment late in 195 3 of an International Servic e official (Mr . Charle s Delafield ) a s Desy' s successor , th e Departmen t of Externa l Affair s withdre w Mr. Beauln e fro m hi s courie r duties . It s political co-ordinatio n sectio n continue d t o ac t a s a channel o f commu nication t o th e Internationa l Service , bu t th e Servic e itsel f assume d greater responsibilit y fo r keepin g i n touc h wit h Ottawa . I t ha d fo r thi s purpose it s ow n polic y co-ordinatin g unit , whos e hea d wa s responsibl e for liaiso n wit h th e Departmen t bot h b y dail y telephon e conversation s

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and b y persona l visit s to Ottawa . Th e hea d o f th e polic y co-ordinatin g unit als o transmitte d th e Department' s view s on polic y t o th e chief s o f the variou s language sections withi n the Service . Such machiner y migh t work well enough whe n there wa s agreemen t all round o n th e purpos e an d conten t of politica l broadcastin g abroad. But enoug h wa s alread y know n o f wha t ha d happene d elsewher e t o suggest th e wisdo m of anticipatin g a certai n tension betwee n a separat e propaganda agenc y an d th e regula r foreig n office , an d o f doin g what could b e don e t o ensur e that wha t might ideally b e a health y blending of experienc e did not degenerat e int o a crippling rivalry . To som e critics an obviou s weakness lay i n the physica l separation of th e two . "Why in the world, " demande d th e Oppositio n foreig n polic y critic , Gordo n Graydon, i n 1953 , should w e separat e th e CB C Internationa l Servic e b y puttin g Jea n Des y i n Montreal an d the n havin g a commuter servic e wher e a ma n commute s bac k and fort h onc e or twice a week t o tel l hi m wha t th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs want s beame d t o othe r countries ? . .. I thin k wha t w e shoul d hav e is a CB C Internationa l Servic e righ t her e i n Ottawa , an d Jea n Des y o r whoever i s responsibl e fo r th e materia l tha t goe s ou t shoul d b e righ t her e on th e spo t wher e consultation s ca n continuall y g o o n instea d o f a .. . remote control o f policy.43

Following this blunt criticism, Jean Des y wa s aske d whethe r "h e would think advisable , a s wa s suggested , that bein g th e bi g boss . . . o f th e CBC-I.S., h e shoul d statio n himsel f i n Ottaw a instea d o f Montreal. " He replied : " I d o believ e tha t i t i s mor e usefu l fo r m e t o b e nea r m y personnel i n Montreal , t o wor k i n clos e co-ordinatio n wit h them , than to b e in Ottawa." 44 Th e sam e opinion wa s offered b y his successor , Mr . Delafield, i n 1959. 45 Some member s o f th e Hous e o f Commons Standin g Committee o n External Affair s displaye d a commendabl e curiosit y abou t wha t migh t happen i n the even t of a fundamental disagreement over policy between the Internationa l Servic e an d th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . " I think the divisio n of authority, the divisio n of direction, an d th e division of approva l wit h respec t t o thes e internationa l broadcast s leav e ver y much t o b e desired, " Gordo n Graydo n declare d i n 1953 . " I thin k th e government ought to giv e consideration right away to makin g sur e there is one boss an d on e final person who is responsible fo r th e Internationa l Service broadcasts . A s i t i s no w i t i s certainl y ver y confused." 46 Jea n Desy attempte d t o dispel the confusion . "I a m not servin g two masters, " he insisted . "Wherea s th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Revenu e [th e Minister through who m the C.B.C. reported t o Parliament ] ma y be compare d t o

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my Father Superior , a s they sa y in clerical circles, the Secretar y of Stat e for Externa l Affair s i s mor e lik e a 'directeu r d e conscience' , a spiritua l director. I a m at liberty to follow the advic e of my spiritual director, bu t should I commit any sin I have to turn to my Father Superior , eithe r for absolution o r reprimand." 47 Desy did not mak e it appear a s if the advic e of hi s "spiritua l director " was much of a forc e t o b e reckone d with : " I receive no definit e instruction s fro m th e Departmen t of External Affairs , I receiv e information , an d i t i s fo r m e t o decid e a s t o whethe r I a m going to sa y this o r t o sa y that. I f I mak e mistakes , the y ar e m y own, because I a m actin g unde r n o precis e instruction . The y rel y o n m y judgment, an d i f my judgmen t should fail , the n I a m responsible." 48 If it shoul d fai l s o drasticall y a s t o warran t th e director' s removal , th e power to remov e was that of the Ministe r of National Revenue, not tha t of th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs. 49 I n th e les s improbabl e event of disagreement over the tone or content of broadcasting, however, the line s o f responsibilit y appeare d blurred , an d i t wa s no t unti l th e following yea r (1954 ) tha t th e Standin g Committee received a direc t if reluctant answe r fro m Desy' s successor : Q. (by Mr . Starr): Doe s th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s influenc e th e content o f th e Internationa l Servic e broadcasts ? A. (b y Mr. Delafield): W e are always guided by their advice . Q. (b y Mr . MacNaughton): Wh o ha s th e fina l veto ? A. I d o not thin k th e questio n ha s actually arisen , s o I woul d no t know . Q. Bu t in a cas e wher e i t di d arise, wh o would hav e th e final say? . . . Is it the CBC or the Departmen t o f External Affairs ? . . . A. I thin k tha t perhap s Externa l Affair s migh t mak e som e commen t o n that point . . . . A. (b y Mr . R . M . Macdonnell, Assistant Under Secretary): I woul d certainly endors e what Mr . Delafiel d ha s sai d abou t ther e bein g n o dispute s of thi s sor t havin g arisen , an d I thin k i t i s ver y unlikel y tha t the y woul d arise. However , w e feel quit e confident tha t th e CB C would giv e du e weigh t to suggestion s mad e i n the political field. . . . Q. I t woul d almos t b e a cas e o f "whe n i n doubt , leav e i t out. " A. Tha t might possibly be so. Q. Wher e would the final responsibility lie ? A. (b y Mr. Delafield): I t rest s wit h th e CBC . Q. Yo u say: "I t rests with the CBC. " A. Yes . Th e CB C i s th e agen t chose n b y th e governmen t fo r th e esta blishment an d presentation o f the International Service. 50

The assuranc e that n o importan t conflict ove r policy ha d take n plac e between th e Internationa l Servic e an d th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, conveye d t o th e Hous e o f Common s Standin g Committe e i n 1954 an d reaffirme d i n 1959 , wa s o f cours e n o guarante e tha t thei r future relation s woul d continu e untroubled . The principa l potentia l

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source o f difficult y wa s Easter n Europe . A s th e monolithi c blo c o f Stalin's da y gav e wa y t o th e mor e puzzlin g challeng e o f a communis t "commonwealth," disagreemen t ove r th e rol e o f politica l broadcastin g in th e foreig n polic y proces s wa s not onl y likel y bu t inevitable . An d i n countries wher e the propaganda functio n wa s vested i n a n agenc y sepa rate fro m th e foreig n office , suc h disagreemen t coul d hardl y tak e plac e without dispute s betwee n th e two . I n th e Unite d Kingdo m i t ha s bee n charged withou t convincing refutation that th e B.B.C.' s Russian Servic e displayed " a to o pro-Sovie t attitud e fo r th e jo b i n hand " an d ha d followed a lin e o f "mora l compromis e an d appeasement"; th e sam e grave accusation wa s later levelle d a t its Yugoslav Service. 51 While there is n o direc t evidenc e o f Foreig n Offic e dissatisfactio n wit h broadcast s from Bus h House , intellectual s i n universit y an d othe r circle s fre e t o express thei r view s were critical o f the dispassionat e an d restraine d ton e of B.B.C . comment o n communis t affairs . I n th e Unite d States , o n th e other hand , th e separatio n o f propagandis t agencie s fro m th e Depart ment o f Stat e (wher e the y ha d originall y reposed ) wa s designe d t o permit a mor e vigorou s prosecutio n o f col d wa r activities , implici t i n the promis e t o "liberate " th e Easter n Europea n satellites , tha n i t wa s felt th e Foreig n Servic e woul d approv e o r allow . Th e enthusias m wit h which th e Voic e o f Americ a an d othe r instrument s o f th e Informatio n Agency too k u p thi s mandat e brough t upo n the m th e ver y differen t charge that thei r operation s lent t o American foreign polic y a shril l an d strident ai r th e administratio n neithe r intende d no r favoured . A stud y prepared fo r the Senate Foreig n Relation s Committe e has recommende d that th e propagand a functio n b e brough t bac k unde r Foreig n Servic e control, s o a s to guar d "agains t th e tendenc y o f th e informatio n activi ties, unde r th e pres s o f particular event s o r current s o f opinion a t hom e or abroad , t o generat e a separat e foreig n polic y an d t o expres s i t with out referenc e t o broade r polic y considerations." 52 In Canad a thi s tendency is minimized by the parliamentar y syste m of government, whic h mor e effectivel y tha n th e presidentia l co-ordinate s the instrument s o f nationa l polic y an d protect s the m fro m captur e b y special interests . No r ha s ther e bee n an y stron g desir e t o influenc e foreign polic y i n thi s way , fo r th e member s o f intereste d partie s ar e scattered an d few , and th e effor t involve d i n bringin g pressur e t o bea r upon th e governmen t o f a smal l an d relativel y unimportan t powe r ha s hardly seeme d wort h while . Some , however , hav e persiste d notwith standing thes e handicaps , particularl y thos e whos e ancestor s o r wh o themselves ha d mad e thei r wa y fro m th e nation s o f Easter n Europ e fallen t o communis t rule . Th e mos t importan t grou p amon g the m

PROPAGANDA 20

1

politically ar e th e 500,00 0 Canadian s o f Ukrainia n origin ; thei r in fluence was demonstrated b y the decision to inaugurate Ukrainian broad casts t o th e Sovie t Union , a polic y whic h o n th e fac e o f i t appear s subversive o f the non-provocativ e approac h to Eastern Europea n affair s clearly favoure d i n the Department o f External Affairs . Thei r spokesme n have expresse d thei r desir e fo r a stil l mor e strongl y anti-Sovie t line . I n 1959 th e directo r o f th e Internationa l Servic e wa s interrogate d b y a member o f Parliamen t o f Ukrainia n descen t amon g whose constituent s were man y with relatives in Eastern Europe : Q. (by Dr . Kucherepa): Hav e yo u receive d an y complaint s o r representa tions fro m Canadia n individual s o r organization s relativ e t o you r pro gramming [t o Eastern Europe]? A. (by Mr. Delafield): . . . It i s true tha t w e do receive a certai n amoun t of commen t an d suggestion s a s to th e typ e of thin g we should do . Q. D o you follow any of these suggestions ? A. W e assess the m and , depending on the guidanc e an d advice w e receive , we adjust ourselve s accordingly . . . . Q. Hav e yo u i n recen t year s bee n requeste d b y anyon e t o chang e you r policy relativ e t o th e degree , shal l w e say , o f you r psychologica l warfare , which yo u may be carrying o n i n your politica l broadcastin g t o thi s area ? A. A s yo u know , ther e i s a variet y o f Canadia n opinio n o n thi s subject . Q. Ma y I assum e tha t mos t o f you r broadcast s behin d th e iro n curtai n are designe d t o counterac t communis t propagand a whic h i s bein g dissemi nated i n that area ? A. Yes , bu t w e d o i t no t b y givin g wide r publicit y t o tha t propagand a than i s necessar y i n replying ; also , w e ten d t o tak e a positiv e approac h i n this field, that is , by ... presentin g a Canadia n vie w o f Canada' s position , the wester n position , an d th e virtue s o f th e wester n stan d o n a particula r issue.63

From this , an d other , testimon y i t i s eviden t tha t th e Internationa l Service ha s displaye d remarkably few of the characteristics usuall y associated wit h a propagand a agenc y lyin g beyon d direc t foreig n offic e control. I t ha s no t struc k ou t o n it s ow n line o f policy, i t ha s refraine d from experimentin g with ne w techniques an d methods , i t ha s appeare d wholly conten t t o accep t th e guidanc e o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs o n ever y aspec t o f it s operations . Suc h deferenc e i s s o differen t from th e behaviou r o f propagandist s elsewher e tha t on e look s fo r explanation. It i s to be found partl y in the centripeta l an d co-ordinating action o f th e Cabinet , partl y i n th e traditio n o f interdepartmenta l co operation, partl y in th e administratio n o f th e Service . Bu t perhap s th e most poten t inducemen t t o complianc e i s t o b e foun d i n th e circum stance tha t th e whol e propaganda establishmen t ha s increasingl y com e

202 TH

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to be viewed as a marginal concern, th e funds fo r which could be applied to the solutio n of more urgent problems without public protes t an d with no damag e t o th e nationa l interest . An y majo r contretemp s i n whic h the Internationa l Servic e becam e involve d woul d quickl y brin g thi s argument int o th e open, an d s o it has preferre d the quie t lif e t o th e ris k of n o lif e a t all . Early i n 1960 , a n interdepartmenta l committe e wa s forme d t o con sider the future rol e of the Internationa l Service . I t wa s put t o i t that b y the simpl e expedien t o f turnin g th e Sackvill e transmitte r i n a differen t direction, a n audienc e in the Canadian nort h coul d b e served , and mor e usefully served , tha n audience s i n foreig n countries . Thi s us e o f short wave a s a n ai d t o Prim e Minister Diefenbaker' s celebrate d "vision " of northern developmen t provided a tempting alternative to the increasingly controversial policy of transmission to Europe, but th e polic y eventually agreed upo n prove d rathe r different . Th e Cabine t ordere d a cu t o f $500,000 fro m th e $1,900,00 0 sough t b y th e Internationa l Servic e fo r its 196 1 operations . T o achiev e thi s econom y withou t to o drasti c a reduction o f it s propagandis t role , i t wa s decide d tha t foreig n languag e broadcasting t o Italy , th e Netherlands , Norway , Sweden an d Denmark , which ha d continue d withou t interruptio n sinc e 1945 , shoul d b e dis continued, an d replace d b y transmission s i n Englis h an d i n Frenc h t o Africa sout h of the Sahara, with special emphasi s on the Commonwealt h audience i n Ghan a an d Nigeria . N o alteratio n wa s contemplate d i n broadcasts to Eastern Europe. The new operation bega n o n January 29 , 1961.

References

CHAPTER ONE : THE POLITICA L EXECUTIV E

1. R . MacGrego r Dawson , Th e Government o f Canada (Toronto , 1949), p. 22. 2. O . D . Skelton , Life an d Letters o f Si r Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto , 1921), II , p. 163. 3. Quote d i n J . W . Dafoe , Clifford Sifton i n Relation t o Hi s Times (Toronto, 1931) , p. 333. 4. Wilfri d Laurie r t o J. S. Willison, Oct. 14, 1899 , Willison Papers. 5. Jame s Bryce to Lord Grey, July 4, 1910, Grey Papers . 6. Quote d i n Henr y Borden , ed. , Robert Laird Borden: Hi s Memoirs (2 vols. , Toronto, 1938) , I, p. 245. 7. Borde n Papers . Se e als o Gaddi s Smith , "Canad a an d th e Siberia n Intervention, 1918-1919, " American Historical Review, vol . XLIV, no . 4 , July 1959 , pp. 866-77. 8. R . MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, I , 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , pp. 341, 417 . 9. Diar y of Sir George Foster, June 5, 1921, Foster Papers . 10. Ibid., Aug. 13, 1921. 11. W . Downi e Stewart , "Viscoun t Bennett : Som e Persona l Reminis cences." (Fro m a newspaper , th e titl e an d dat e o f whic h ar e unavailable. ) 12. J . W . Dafo e t o Vincen t Massey , July 22 , 1932 , Dafoe Papers . 13. Harr y Sifto n t o J . W . Dafoe , Jul y 10 , 1932 , Dafoe Papers . 14. Se e Dawson, Mackenzie King, I, pp. 443-6. 15. Memorandu m by O. D. Skelto n o f telephon e conversatio n wit h R . B . Bennett, Oct . 10 , 1935 , Department o f Externa l Affairs , Ottawa . 16. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Feb. 10 , 1936 , pp. 67-8 . 17. Toront o Star, Sept. 16 , 1922 . 18. Quote d in Dawson, Mackenzie King, I, p. 409. 19. Quote d in ibid., p. 410. 20. W . S. Fielding to Mackenzie King, Sept. 18 , 1922 , King Papers. 21. Ernes t Lapoint e t o Mackenzi e King , Sept . 19 , 1922 , King Papers . 22. W . S . Fielding , "Memorandu m o n Canadia n Representatio n i n th e United States, " Apri l 24 , 1923 , Fielding Papers . Se e also Joh n S . Galbraith, The Establishment o f Canadian Diplomatic Status a t Washington (Berkele y and Los Angeles, 1951) , p. 86. 23. Quote d i n K . W . McNaught , "Canadia n Foreig n Polic y an d th e Whig Interpretation , 1936-1939, " Report o f th e Canadian Historical Association, 1957 , p. 48. 24. Bruc e Hutchison , Th e Incredible Canadian (Toronto , 1952) , pp . 236-7.

204 REFERENCES

, PAGE S 12-2 9

25. Th e Times, Aug. 22, 1941. 26. A . D . P . Heeney , "Cabine t Governmen t i n Canada : Som e Recen t Developments i n the Machinery of the Centra l Executive, " Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. XII, no. 3 , Aug. 1946, p. 289. 27. W . E . D . Halliday , "Th e Executive of th e Governmen t o f Canada, " Canadian Public Administration, vol . II, no . 4 , Dec . 1959, p. 240. 28. Canada , H . o f C . Specia l Committe e o n Defenc e Expenditures , Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, no . 11 , Jun e 10 , 1960 , p. 266. 29. Walte r Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951) , p . 474. 30. Canada , H. of C . Debates, Dec. 18, 1945, pp. 3734-5. 31. Ibid., July 15 , 1960, pp. 6377-8. 32. Lette r to the author, Aug. 6, 1960. 33. "Canadian-America n Meeting, " Th e Economist (London) , Sept . 10 , 1955. 34. Canada , H. of C . Debates, March 28, 1960 , p. 2509. 35. Ibid., July 12 , 1943, pp. 4670-1. 36. Ibid., p. 4670. 37. Ibid., Jan. 24, 1956, pp. 463-5. 38. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6 , May 3 , 1956, p. 154. 39. Ibid., no. 1 , April 4, 1952, pp. 19-20 . 40. Nanc y Harviso n Hooker , ed. , Th e Mofjat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Papers o f Ja y Pierrepont Mofjat (Cambridge , Mass. , 1956) , p. 373. 41. Diar y of Sir Joseph Pope, March 4, 1909, Pope Papers. 42. 2 George V, c. 22. 43. Borde n Papers. 44. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, April 2, 1946, p. 490. 45. W . A . Riddell , World Security b y Conference (Toronto , 1949) , pp . 140-1. 46. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, April 2, 1946, p. 490. 47. Ibid., July 12, 1943, p. 4670. 48. Kennet h W . Thompson , Political Realism an d th e Crisis o f World Politics (Princeton , 1960) , p. 106. 49. Jacque s d e Bourbon-Busset , "Decision-Making in Foreig n Policy " i n Stephen D . Kertes z an d M . A . Fitzsimmons , eds. , Diplomacy i n a Changing World (Notr e Dame, 1959) , pp . 79-80 . 50. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, April 2, 1946, pp. 491-2 . 51. Hutchison , The Incredible Canadian, p. 424. 52. Ibid., pp. 433^. 53. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , March 18 , 1958. 54. Th e Listener, Jan. 10, 1957, p. 69. 55. Round Table, vol. XLVIH, 1957-8 , p. 291. 56. Blai r Fraser , "Th e Ma n Who'l l Spea k fo r Canada, " Maclean's Magazine, Nov. 9 , 1957. 57. Th e Ear l o f Ronaldshay , Th e Life o f Lord Curzon, II I (London , 1928), p. 149. 58. Lor d Grey to James Bryce, June 2, 1909, Grey Papers . 59. Dawson , Mackenzie King, I, pp. 174-5 .

REFERENCES, PAGE S 29-4 3 20

5

60. Jame s Bryce to Lord Grey, July 4, 1910 , Grey Papers . 61. W . F. Slade n to Mackenzie King, Jan. 24, 1923 , King Papers . 62. Lor d Willingdon to Mackenzie King, May 2, 1928 , Kin g Papers . 63. Dawson , Th e Government o f Canada, p. 188 . CHAPTER TWO : THE BUREAUCRAC Y

1. J . E . Hodgetts , "Th e Civi l Servic e an d Polic y Formation, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol. XXIII , no . 4 , Nov . 1957 , p. 471. 2. R . Barr y Farrell , "Th e Plannin g an d Conduc t o f Foreig n Polic y i n Canada" (unpublishe d doctora l thesis , Harvar d University , 1952) , p . 68 . 3. Ottawa Journal, July 21, 1949 . 4. J . J . Deutsch , "Som e Thought s o n th e Publi c Service, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol . XXIII , no . 1 , Feb . 1957 , pp. 85-6 . 5. M . W . Sharp , "Reflection s o f a Forme r Civi l Servant, " typescrip t o f speech delivere d on Nov. 14 , 1958 . 6. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Ma y 24 , 1960 , p . 4184 . Th e speaker wa s Mr. Dougla s Fisher. 7. K . C. Wheare, Government b y Committee (Oxford , 1955) , pp. 23-4 . 8. Sharp , "Reflection s of a Forme r Civi l Servant. " 9. Lt.-Gen . G . G . Simonds , "Wher e We'v e Gon e Wron g o n Defense, " Maclean's Magazine, June 23, 1956 . 10. K . C. Wheare, Th e Civil Service in th e Constitution (London , 1954) , pp. 27-8 . 11. Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 19391944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 38. 12. Globe an d Mail, Apri l 9 , 1958 , "Th e Governmen t an d th e 'Esta blishment.' " 13. Financial Post, Jan . 9 , 1960 , "Namin g o f Deput y Ministe r Trick y Political Question. " 14. Arthu r Meighe n to Lorin g Christie, Jan. 13 , 1926 , Christi e Papers . 15. Lorin g Christi e t o Si r Rober t Borden , Marc h 15 , 1926 , Christi e Papers. 16. R . MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1, 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p . 454. 17. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, July 25, 1942 , p. 4712. 18. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , May 17 , 1948 , p. 18 . 19. Leste r B . Pearson , "Canadia n Diplomacy, " addres s give n t o th e Alumni Federation , th e Universit y o f Toronto , Jan . 11 , 1947 . Quote d i n Farrell, "Th e Plannin g and Conduc t o f Foreig n Polic y i n Canada, " p . 157 . 20. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee on Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6 , May 6 , 1954 , p. 148 . 21. Ibid., no. 11 , May 24, 1956 , p. 274 . 22. Ibid., no. 1 , Nov. 18 , 1949, p. 24.

206 REFERENCES

, PAGES 44-63

23. Victo r Odiu m to Mackenzie King, May 20, 1942, King Papers. 24. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, Aug. 1, 1942 , p. 5151. 25. Leste r B . Pearson, "Internationa l Publi c Relations, " addres s give n t o the Canadia n Publi c Relation s Society , Montreal , Jan . 5, 1954 . Dept. o f External Affairs , Statements and Speeches (Ottawa , 1954) , no. 2. 26. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , April 4, 1952 , p. 24 . 27. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, May 15 , 1931, p. 1651 . 28. Ibid., p. 1647. 29. Ibid., pp. 1647, 1649 . 30. Mackenzi e King to P. C. Larkin, April 23, 1924, King Papers. 31. N . W. Rowell to Mackenzie King, Nov. 30, 1925, Rowell Papers. 32. O . D. Skelton to Mackenzie King, Dec. 9, 1925, King Papers. 33. Mackenzi e King to N. W. Rowell, Dec. 7, 1925, Rowell Papers . 34. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 4, June 4, 1946, p. 63 . 35. Ibid., p. 61. 36. Ibid., p. 63. 37. External Affairs, vol . V, no. 7, July 1953, pp. 220-1. 38. Towards a Stronger Foreign Service: Report o f th e Secretary o f State's Public Committee o n Personnel, June, 1954 (Washington , D.C. , 1954). 39. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , Feb. 23, 1953 , p. 36 . 40. "Th e Foreign Servic e Office r Competition, " External Affairs, vol . X, no. 9, Sept. 1958 , p. 229. 41. Ibid., p. 228. 42. Marce l Cadieux , L e Ministere de s affaires exterieures (Montreal , 1949), pp. 75-7. 43. Farrell , "Th e Planning an d Conduc t o f Foreig n Polic y i n Canada, " p. 127. 44. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 9, May 17 , 1956, pp. 240-1. 45. Ibid., no. 6, May 6, 1954, pp. 149-50 . 46. Ibid., no. 4, Aug. 6, 1958, p. 163. 47. Deutsch , "Som e Thoughts on the Public Service," p. 86. 48. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , May 17 , 1948 , p. 16 . 49. Ibid., no. 2, April 8, 1952, p. 34. 50. Mackenzi e King to J. L. Ralston, Sept. 28, 1927, King Papers. 51. Col . C. P . Stacey , "Th e Canadian-American Permanen t Join t Boar d on Defence , 1940-45, " International Journal, vol . IX, no . 2 , Sprin g 1954, pp. 108-9 . 52. Lorin g Christi e t o O . D . Skelton , Jul y 26 , 1940 , King Papers . 53. Col . Stanle y W . Dziuban , Military Relations between th e United States and Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington , D.C., 1959), p. 73. 54. Ibid., p. 73. 55. Ibid., p. 74. 56. Diar y entr y o f Dec . 29, 1941 . Quoted i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I, p. 326.

REFERENCES, PAGES 63-72 20

7

57. Nanc y Harviso n Hooker , ed. , Th e Moffat Papers: Selections from th e Diplomatic Papers o f Ja y Pierrepont Moffat (Cambridge , Mass. , 1956) , p . 374. 58. Dziuban , Military Relations between th e United States an d Canada, p. 75. 59. Memorandu m of th e Ministe r of Nationa l Defence , Marc h 11 , 1942. Quoted i n Maurice Pope, unpublished manuscript. 60. Ibid. 61. "Memorandu m fo r th e Prim e Minister, " Apri l 13 , 1942, King Papers . 62. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 4, May 26, 1948 , pp. 97-8 . 63. Ibid., p. 98. 64. Diar y entr y fo r Ma y 14 , 1943. Quoted i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p. 501. 65. Th e Brooking s Institution , Th e Administration o f Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations (Washington , D.C. , 1951), p. 244. 66. W . H . Walke r t o Josep h Pope , Ma y 13 , 1909 , Under Secretar y o f State: Semi-Officia l Correspondence . 67. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 4, 1909 , col. 1983. 68. Pop e diary , Jan. 16, 1910. 69. N . W . Rowel l t o Mackenzi e King , Nov. 30, 1925 , Rowell Papers . 70. Mackenzi e Kin g t o Rowell , Dec . 7 , 1925 , Rowell Papers . 71. Canada , H . o f C . Selec t Standin g Committe e o n Industria l an d International Relations , Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, no . 1 , Marc h 25, 1930 , p. 11 . 72. Canada , H. o f C . Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes o f Proceedings an d Evidence, no . 1 , Oct. 25, 1945 , pp. 7-8 . 73. Ibid., no. 3, May 30, 1946 , p. 51. 74. Ibid., no. 2, Nov. 22, 1949 , p. 54. 75. Ibid., no. 3, Dec. 6, 1957, p. 94. CHAPTER THREE : THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T

1. Henr i Bourassa , Great Britain an d Empire (Montreal , 1902) , p . 4 . 2. Quote d i n O . D . Skelton , Life an d Letters o f Si r Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto, 1921) , II, p. 293. 3. Leagu e o f Nations , Records o f th e First Assembly (1920) , p . 379. 4. Henr y Borden , ed. , Robert Laird Borden: Hi s Memoirs ( 2 vols. , Toronto, 1938) , II, p. 606. 5. Ibid., pp. 827, 817 . 6. Quote d i n Gaddi s Smith , "Canadia n Externa l Affair s durin g Worl d War I " i n Hug h L . Keenleysid e et al., Th e Growth o f Canadian Policies i n External Affairs (Durham , N.C., 1960), p. 46. 7. H . M . Urquhart , Arthur Currie: The Biography o f a Great Canadian (Toronto, 1950) , pp . 274-81, 318-21. 8. Elizabet h Armstrong , Th e Crisis o f Quebec, 1914-18 (Ne w York , 1937).

208 REFERENCES

, PAGES 73-86

9. Georg e F . G . Stanley , Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1960: Th e Military History o f a n Unmilitary People (Toronto , 1960) , p. 347. 10. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Apri l 4 , 1922 , p. 669. 11. Col . C. P . Stacey , Si x Years o f War: The Army i n Canada, Britain and th e Pacific (Ottawa , 1955) , p . 9 . 12. Quote d in ibid., p. 8. 13. Leagu e of Nations, Records of th e Fifth Assembly (1924) , p. 222. 14. Ibid., p. 221. 15. Ibid., Records of th e Ninth Assembly (1928) , p . 61. 16. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 30 . 17. See , fo r evidenc e o f suc h tensio n i n th e Unite d States , Mar k S . Watson, Chief o f Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C. , 1950). 18. Samue l P . Huntington , Th e Soldier and th e State (Cambridge , Mass. , 1959), p. 315. 19. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 321. 20. Canada , H. of C . Debates, Sept. 8 , 1939, p. 36. 21. Quote d in Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 317. 22. Quote d in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 47 . 23. Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , pp. 40-1. 24. Quote d in ibid., p. 38 . 25. Montrea l Star, Nov. 20, 1939. 26. Margina l not e o n Norma n Rogers ' diar y o f hi s visi t t o th e Unite d Kingdom, entr y for Apri l 20 , 1940 , Kin g Papers . 27. Quote d in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 261. 28. Quote d in ibid., p. 261. 29. Quote d in Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, I, p. 156. 30. Quote d in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 263. 31. Quote d in ibid., p. 263. 32. Quote d in ibid., p. 308. 33. Ibid., p. 333. 34. Ibid., p. 442. 35. Lt.-Col . G . W . L . Nicholson , Th e Canadians i n Italy, 1943-1945 (Ottawa, 1956) , p. 24. 36. Quote d in ibid., pp. 343-4. 37. Quote d in Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, I , p. 545. 38. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 497. 39. Quote d in Maurice Pope, unpublishe d manuscript. 40. Quote d in ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Quote d in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 498. 43. Pickersgill , The Mackenzie King Record, I, p. 515. 44. Quote d in ibid., pp. 515-16. 45. Quote d in ibid., p. 517. 46. Mauric e Pope, unpublishe d manuscript. 47. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 500. 48. Quote d in Col. C. P . Stacey , Th e Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945 (Ottawa , 1960) , p . 42 . 49. Quote d in ibid., pp. 42-3 .

REFERENCES, PAGES 87-105 20

9

50. Quote d i n ibid., pp . 648-9 . Th e directiv e i s printed i n it s entiret y a s App. "A," pp. 647-9. 51. Quote d in Pickersgill, Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 75 . 52. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 81. 53. Quote d in ibid., p. 81. 54. Ibid., p. 82. 55. H . L . Keenleyside , "Th e Canada-Unite d State s Permanen t Join t Board o n Defence , 1940-1945, " International Journal, vol . XVI, no . 1 , Winter 1960-1 , p. 55. 56. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 215. 57. Quote d in ibid., pp. 223-4. 58. Quote d in ibid., p. 224. 59. Quote d in ibid., pp. 224-5. 60. Quote d in ibid., p. 225. 61. Quote d in Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, I, p. 221. 62. Quote d i n ibid., pp . 303-4 , 313. 63. R . MacGrego r Dawson , "Th e Revol t o f th e Generals, " Weekend Magazine, vol. X, no. 44, 1960. 64. Ibid. 65. Quote d in ibid. 66. Quote d in ibid. 67. Quote d in ibid. 68. Quote d in ibid. 69. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, June 24, 1948 , p. 5779 . 70. Ibid., p. 5810. 71. Joh n W . Maslan d an d Laurenc e I . Radway , Soldiers an d Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton , 1957) , p. 3. 72. Canada , H. of C . Debates, Aug. 31, 1950, p. 105. 73. Ibid., May 8, 1951, p. 2801. 74. Ibid., Feb. 2, 1953, p. 1532. 75. Speec h a t Depau w University , Jun e 9 , 1960 . 76. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, Feb. 2, 1953 , p. 1527. 77. Lt.-Gen . G . G . Simonds , "Wher e We'v e Gon e Wron g o n Defense, " Maclean's Magazine, June 23, 1956. 78. Ibid. 79. Quote d i n Lad y G . Cecil , Life o f Robert, Marquis o f Salisbury, I I (London, 1921), p. 153. 80. Huntington , The Soldier and the State, p. 351. 81. Simonds , "Where We've Gone Wrong on Defense. " CHAPTER FOUR : THE LEGISLATUR E

1. R . MacGrego r Dawson , Th e Government o f Canada (Toronto , 1949), p. 434. 2. Quote d i n R . MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1,1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p . 411. 3. Mackenzi e King to J. R. Boyle , Oct. 3, 1922 . Quoted i n ibid., p. 413.

210 REFERENCES

, PAGE S 105-11 9

4. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Feb . 1 , 1923 , p . 33 . 5. Quote d in Dawson, Mackenzie King, p. 465 . 6. Canada , H. of C . Debates, June 21, 1926 , p. 4762 . 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., Feb. 25 , 1929 , pp. 422-3. 9. K . W . McNaught , "Canadia n Foreig n Polic y an d th e Whi g Inter pretation, 1936-1939, " Report o f th e Canadian Historical Association, 1957, pp. 51-3 . 10. Eugen e Forsey, "Mr. Kin g and Parliamentary Government," Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol. XVII, no . 4 , Nov . 1951 , p . 458. 11. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 15 , 1926, p. 1561 . 12. Ibid., Nov. 18 , 1932, p. 1368 . 13. Ibid., May 16 , 1933, p. 5067. 14. Ibid., March 23, 1936 , p. 1332 . 15. Ibid. 16. Saturday Night, Dec . 14 , 1935; Winnipeg Tribune, May 14 , 1936 . 17. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, June 18 , 1936, p. 3862. 18. Ibid., July 4, 1947 , p. 5198 . 19. Bruc e Hutchison, Th e Incredible Canadian (Toronto, 1952) , p. 267 . 20. Forsey , "Mr . Kin g and Parliamentary Government," p. 463 . 21. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 19 , 1943 . 22. C . G . Power , "Caree r Politicians : Th e Changin g Role o f th e M.P., " Queen's Quarterly, vol. LXII , no . 4 , Winte r 1957 , pp . 488-9 . 23. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 3 , May 1 , 1950, p . 77 . 24. Quote d i n Norma n Ward , Th e Canadian House o f Commons: Representation (Toronto , 1950) , p . 10. 25. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, June 15, 1923, p. 4001 . 26. Ibid., Nov. 12 , 1940, p. 33. 27. Intervie w fo r th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporatio n (hereafte r cited as C.B.C. interview). 28. Quote d in H . A . Innis , Great Britain, th e United States an d Canada (Nottingham, 1948) , p. 5. 29. Dawson , Th e Government o f Canada, p. 452 . 30. J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto, 1960) , p. 9. 31. C.B.C . interview. 32. Blai r Fraser, "Backstag e a t Ottawa, " Maclean's Magazine, Marc h 12 , 1960, p . 2. 33. C.B.C . interview. 34. Le e Beland , "Paul Martin : Architec t wit h a Needle, " Toronto Star, March 29 , 1960 . 35. Se e Donald Eldon , "Towar d a Wel l Informe d Parliament : Th e Use s of Research, " Queen's Quarterly, vol. XLIII , no . 4 , Winte r 1957 , p . 524 . 36. J . A . Stevenso n t o J . W . Dafoe , Jan . 23 , 1920 , Dafo e Papers . 37. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, May 10 , 1946, p. 1395 . 38. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , May 21 , 1946 , p. 4 .

REFERENCES, PAGES 120-129 21 1

39. Ibid., no. 1 , May 22, 1951 , p. 8. 40. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, Sept. 5, 1950, p. 296. 41. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 5 , Ma y 20 , 1947 , p. 128. 42. Ibid., p. 139. 43. Ibid., no. 4, Nov. 24 , 1949 , p. 123. 44. Ibid., no. 9, May 18 , 1954, p. 249. 45. Ibid., no. 4, Nov. 24 , 1949 , pp. 122 , 125 . 46. D . M . Fisher , "Parliamentar y Committee s i n th e 24t h Parliament, " Waterloo Review, vol. II, no . 1 , 1960, p. 78. 47. Canada , H. ofC. Debates, May 7, 1951, p. 2756. 48. Fisher , "Parliamentar y Committee s i n th e 24t h Parliament, " pp . 69-70. 49. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 17 , 1960, p. 2192. 50. Ibid., p. 2178. 51. Ibid., pp. 2189-90. 52. Canada , H . o f C . Specia l Committe e o n Defenc e Expenditures , Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, no . 8 , Jun e 1 , 1960 , p. 192. CHAPTER FIVE : INTELLIGENCE

1. Pop e diary, June 22, 1899. 2. Josep h Pope to John Anderson, July 10 , 1899, Pop e Papers. 3. Pop e to Anderson, Jan. 27, 1900, Pope Papers. 4. Anderso n to Pope, Feb. 19, 1902, Pope Papers. 5. Josep h Pope to Cliffor d Sifton , Jul y 8, 1903, Pope Papers. 6. Rodolph e Lemieux to Sir Louis Jette, Dec. 4, 1907 , Lemieux Papers. 7. Rodolph e Lemieu x t o Si r Edwar d Grey , Dec . 13 , 1907 ; Grey t o Lemieux, Feb. 11, 1908 . Lemieu x Papers. 8. Josep h Pope to Rodolphe Lemieux, Feb. 24, 1908, Lemieux Papers. 9. Lor d Grey to Lord Elgin, Jan. 14, 1907, Grey Papers. 10. Sherma n Kent, Strategic Intelligence (Princeton, 1949) , p. 11. 11. "Memorandu m fo r Consideratio n of th e Civi l Service Commissioners , May 25 , 1907. " Civi l Servic e Commissio n 1908 : Minutes o f Evidence , I , pp. 48-50 , Sessional Papers o f Canada, vol. XLII, no . 15 , 1907-8 . 12. Kent , Strategic Intelligence, p. 39. 13. "Admiralt y Memorandu m on th e Genera l Nava l Situation, " Sept . 20 , 1912, Borde n Papers. 14. Henr y Borden , ed. , Robert Laird Borden: Hi s Memoirs ( 2 vols. , Toronto, 1938) , II , p . 62 1 (hereafte r cite d a s Borden Memoirs'). 15. Bona r La w t o Si r Georg e Perley , Nov . 3, 1915 . Quoted i n ibid., p . 621. 16. Si r Rober t Borde n t o Si r Georg e Perley , Jan . 4, 1916 . Quoted i n ibid., p. 622. 17. Ibid., p. 623. 18. Bona r Law to Sir Robert Borden, July 6, 1916, Borden Papers.

212 REFERENCES , PAGES 129-143

19. Secretar y o f Stat e fo r th e Colonie s t o th e Governo r Genera l o f Canada. Quote d in Borden Memoirs, II, p. 625. 20. Si r Georg e Perle y t o Si r Rober t Borden , Ma y 31 , 1918 , Borden Papers. 21. Borden Memoirs, II, pp. 625-6. 22. Gaddi s Smith , "Canadia n Externa l Relation s durin g Worl d Wa r I " in H . L . Keenleysid e e t al., Th e Growth o f Canadian Policies in External Affairs (Durham , N.C., 1960) , p. 47. 23. Lorin g Christie to George Wrong, Dec. 30 , 1919, Wrong Papers . 24. Report o f th e Canadian Economic Commission (Siberia) (Ottawa , 1919). 25. "Note s o f Meeting s o f Representative s o f th e Unite d Kingdom , th e Dominions, an d India , hel d i n Londo n i n Jun e an d July , 1921, " Kin g Papers. 26. "Memorandu m for th e Prim e Minister, " Dec . 16, 1922, King Papers . 27. Th e Times, Feb. 8, 1923 . 28. Si r Joh n Williso n t o Si r Campbel l Stuart , Dec . 7, 1920 , Willison Papers. 29. F . A. McGregor to Merchant Mahoney, Feb. 2, 1924 , King Papers. 30. E.g. , Herber t Marle r t o Mackenzi e King , Dec . 28 , 1931 , King Papers. 31. Canada , House of Commons Debates, April 7 , 1932 , p. 1825. 32. Se e Thoma s Jones , A Diary with Letters (London , 1954) , pp . 179-81, 218 ; The History o f "The Times": Th e 150th Anniversary an d Beyond, 1912-1948, Par t II , 1921-1948 (London , 1952) , p . 938 ; John Evelyn Wrench , Geoffrey Dawson and Ou r Times (London , 1955) , p . 369; Vincent Massey , O n Being Canadian (Toronto , 1948) , pp . 76-7 . 33. W . S . Churchill , Th e Second World War, I, Th e Gathering Storm (London, 1949) , p. 250. 34. Speec h give n over the nationa l network of the Canadia n Broadcasting Corporation, Jul y 19, 1937 . 35. Fran k H . Underbill , "Th e Close o f a n Era : Twenty-Fiv e Year s o f Mr. Mackenzie King," Canadian Forum, Sept. 1944. 36. Nichola s Mansergh , Survey o f British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change, 1939-1952 (London, 1958) , p. 402. 37. Speec h of Lord Cranbourne, Feb. 19, 1945, quoted i n ibid., p. 401. 38. Quote d in ibid., p. 46. 39. Ibid.,p.4l. 40. Ibid., p. 42. 41. Mauric e Pope, unpublished manuscript. 42. Quote d i n J . H . Cranston , Ink o n M y Fingers (Toronto , 1951) , p. 180. 43. Kin g Diary , Aug . 21 , 1943 , quoted i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, 1,1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 553. 44. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 1 , Feb. 19, 1953 , pp . 18-19 . 45. E . L. Woodward, "The British Foreign Service " i n J. E . McLean , ed., The Public Service and University Education (Princeton , 1949) , p . 175. 46. J . D. B. Miller, in Canadian Forum, Aug. 1959 .

REFERENCES, PAGE S 144-156 21

3

47. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 2 , Apri l 8 , 1952 , p. 35 . 48. Ibid. 49. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 28 , 1960, p. 2508. 50. D . J . Goodspeed , A History o f th e Defence Research Board o f Canada (Ottawa , 1959) , p. 84. 51. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, April 10 , 1957, pp. 3358-9. 52. Th e Senat e o f Canada , Proceedings o f th e Standing Committee o n External Relations, June 25, 1958, p. 23. 53. Th e Report o f th e Royal Commission . . . t o Investigate th e Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information t o Agents o f a Foreign Power (Ottawa , 1946) , p . 83 . 54. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, July 9, 1959 , p. 5741. 55. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 4 , Jun e 4 , 1946 , p. 71 . 56. "Th e Department o f Externa l Affairs, " Referenc e Paper no . 6 9 of th e Information Divisio n o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s (Ottawa , 1959, mimeo.), p. 9. 57. Col . C. P. Stacey , Six Years o f War: The Army i n Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa , 1955) , p. 441. 58. "Th e Department o f External Affairs," p . 7. CHAPTER SIX : PLANNING

1. Michae l Oakeshott, Political Education (Cambridge , 1951) , p. 22 . 2. E . V . Tarle , Istoria Diplomatii, III , pp . 763-4 . Quote d i n Ma x Beloff, Th e Foreign Policy o f Soviet Russia, II, 1926-1941 (London , 1949) , p. 394. 3. Quote d i n W . W. Rostow, "Th e American Nationa l Style, " Daedalus: Proceedings o f th e American Academy o f Arts an d Sciences, vol . LXXXVII, no . 2, 1958 , p. 118 . 4. Ibid. 5. W . A . Mackintosh , "Governmen t Economi c Policy : Scop e an d Principles," Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol. XVI , no. 3 , Aug. 1950, p. 325. 6. Lorin g Christie, "Note on Munich," Nov. 1, 1938, Christie Papers . 7. Lette r t o th e author , Jun e 13 , 1959. 8. Addres s b y th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Healt h an d Welfare , Mr . Pau l Martin, Sept . 1 , 1955 . Dept. o f Externa l Affairs , Statements an d Speeches (Ottawa, 1955 , mimeo.), no. 29. 9. Jame s A . Gibson , "Mr . Mackenzi e Kin g an d Canadia n Autonomy , 1921-1946" i n Canadia n Historica l Association , Annual Report, 1951 , p. 20. 10. Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 201. 11. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Feb . 10 , 1960 , p. 930.

214 REFERENCES , PAGES 156-172

12. Georg e F . Kennan , "Histor y an d Diplomac y a s Viewe d b y a Diplo matist" i n Stephen D . Kertes z an d M . A. Fitzsimmons, eds., Diplomacy i n a Changing World (Notr e Dame , 1959) , pp . 107-8. 13. Se e J . E . Hodgetts , "Th e Civi l Servic e an d Polic y Formation, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol . XXIII, no . 4 , Nov. 1957 , p. 478. CHAPTER SEVEN : NEGOTIATION

1. Hug h Gibson , Th e Road t o Foreign Policy (Ne w York, 1944) , p . 63 . 2. Georg e F . Kennan , A History o f Soviet-American Relations, II , Th e Decision to Intervene (Princeton , 1958) , p . 191. 3. Harol d Nicolson , Curzon: Th e Last Phase, 1919-1925 (Ne w York, 1939), p. 54. 4. Foreign Relations o f th e United States, 1941, III, Th e British Commonwealth, th e Near East an d Africa (Washington , D.C., 1959) , p . 27 . 5. Willia m H. Standle y an d Arthu r A . Ageton , Admiral Ambassador t o Russia (Chicago , 1955) , pp . 195-6 . 6. Quote d i n Charle s S . Campbell , Jr. , Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 (Baltimore , 1957), p. 35. 7. Quote d i n Jame s Phinne y Baxte r III , "Th e Britis h Hig h Commis sioners a t Washington in 1871, " Proceedings of th e Massachusetts Historical Society, June 1934. 8. Si r Willoughby Maycock, With Mr. Chamberlain in th e United States and Canada, 1887-1888 (Toronto , 1914), p. 34. 9. Josep h Pop e to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Oct. 4 , 1899 , Laurier Papers . 10. Georg e C . Gibbon s t o Si r Wilfri d Laurier , Dec . 16 , 1907 , Laurier Papers. 11. Gibbon s to Laurier, Dec. 21, 1907, Laurier Papers . 12. Lor d Gre y to Lord Crewe , Jan. 11, 1909, Grey Papers . 13. Diary , entry for Feb. 20, 1912 , Pope Papers . 14. "Canadia n Representatio n i n th e Unite d States, " memorandu m b y W. S. Fielding, April 24, 1923 , King Papers, Fielding Papers . 15. Mackenzi e King to Charles McGrath , Jul y 21, 1923 , King Papers . 16. J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto, 1960) , p. 433. 17. "Som e Recent Developments in Canada's Externa l Relations, " addres s by Mackenzi e King befor e Toront o Boar d o f Trade , Nov. 22, 1928. 18. Rodolph e Lemieux to Lor d Grey , Dec . 13, 1907, Lemieu x Papers . 19. Josep h Chamberlai n t o th e Ear l o f Minto , Ma y 31 , 1900 , Minto Papers. 20. G . W. M. Grigg to J. S. Willison, April 22, 1910 , Willison Papers . 21. Rodolph e Lemieux to Sir Louis Jette, Dec. 5, 1907 , Lemieux Papers . 22. Lemieu x to Jette , Dec . 10, 1907 , Lemieux Papers . 23. Lemieu x to Sir Wilfrid Laurier , Dec. 10, 1907, Lemieux Papers . 24. Lemieu x to W. T. R. Preston, Jan. 14, 1908, Lemieux Papers. 25. W . A . Riddell, World Security b y Conference (Toronto , 1947) , p . 124. 26. Ibid., p. 130.

REFERENCES, PAGES 172-185 21 5

27. Documents Relating t o th e Italo-Ethiopian Crisis (Ottawa , 1935) , p. 172 . 28. Riddell , World Security by Conference, p. 129 . 29. St . John Telegraph Journal, Sept. 4, 1935 . 30. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 3 , March 12 , 1959, pp. 48-9 . 31. Kin g Papers. 32. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 12 , April 6 , I960 , pp . 302-3 . 33. Gordo n A . Craig , "Th e Professiona l Diploma t an d Hi s Problems , 1919-1939," World Politics, vol. IV , no. 2, Jan. 1952 , pp . 147-8 . 34. Quote d i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 115 . 35. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Jul y 9 , 1943 , p . 4567 . 36. Mackenzi e King to O . F. Brothers , Apri l 14 , 1941 , Kin g Papers . 37. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, Jan. 9, 1957 , pp . 31-2. 38. Se e Lor d Riddell , A n Intimate Diary o f th e Peace Conference an d After (London , 1933) , p. 225 . 39. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, May 17 , 1920, p. 2532 . 40. Mackenzi e King to A. F. Sladen , March 17 , 1923, King Papers. 41. Slade n to Mackenzie King, April 12 , 1923, King Papers . 42. Unpublishe d text, King Papers. 43. Mackenzi e King to P. C. Larkin, Nov. 30, 1929 , King Papers . 44. Quote d in Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, I , p. 233. 45. Leste r B . Pearson , Democracy i n World Politics (Toronto , 1955) , pp. 57 , 62 . 46. Leste r B . Pearson , Diplomacy i n th e Nuclear Ag e (Toronto , 1959) , pp. 35 , 44. CHAPTER EIGHT : PROPAGANDA

1. Canada , House o f Commons Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, no . 1 , Feb . 19 , 1953 , p . 13 . 2. Vincen t Massey , O n Being Canadian (Toronto , 1948) , p . 159 . 3. Canada , House o f Commons Journals, 1900 , App . I , p . 490 . 4. Addres s b y Mr . L . B . Pearso n a t Rollin s College , Florida , Feb . 21 , 1954, i n Dept . o f Externa l Affairs , Statements an d Speeches (Ottawa , 1954 , mimeo.), no. 9. 5. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Marc h 13 , 1911 , p . 5168 . 6. Quote d i n Beckle s Willson , Th e Life o f Lord Strathcona & Mount Royal (London , 1915) , p. 496. 7. H . Gordo n Skilling , Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy (Toronto , 1945) , p . 18 . 8. Report o f th e Canadian Economic Commission (Siberia) (Ottawa , 1919), p . 17. 9. Si r Robert Borde n t o Walter Long , Apri l 12 , 1917 , Borde n Papers . 10. Charle s W. Gordon (Ralp h Connor) t o Sir George Foster , Marc h 28 , 1917, Borde n Papers . 11. Si r Edmun d Walke r t o Rober t Donald , Ma y 18 , 1917 , Walke r Papers.

216 REFERENCES , PAGES 185-201

12. Ottawa Citizen, April 4, 1940. 13. Ne w York Times, April 5 , 1940. 14. Pres s statement by the Prime Minister, April 11 , 1940. 15. Mackenzi e King to Winston Churchill, May 24, 1940 , King Papers. 16. Mackenzi e Kin g t o Mrs . George d e Grippenberg , Oct . 25 , 1940 , King Papers . 17. Canada , H. of C . Debates, July 13 , 1943, pp. 4728-9. 18. Leighto n McCarthy to Mackenzie King, May 7, 1941, King Papers. 19. Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 190. 20. Mackenzi e King to Leighton McCarthy, Sept . 24 , 1941 , King Papers. 21. Leighto n McCarthy to Mackenzie King, Sept. 27, 1941 , King Papers. 22. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, July 13, 1943, p. 4705. 23. Quote d in ibid., p. 4709 . 24. Joh n Grierso n t o W. J. Turnbull, Nov. 2, 1939, King Papers. 25. Joh n Grierso n t o A. D. P. Heeney, Nov. 2, 1939, King Papers. 26. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, July 13 , 1943, pp. 4709-11, 4713. 27. Ibid., p. 47'12. 28. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6 , June 9, 1948 , p. 146. 29. Ibid., no. 7, May 27, 1947, p. 206. 30. Ibid., no. 6, June 9, 1948 , p. 147. 31. Memorandu m for th e Prim e Minister , Sept . 18 , 1941 , King Papers . 32. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6 , March 12 , 1953, p. 142. 33. Ibid., p. 142. 34. Ibid., p. 142. 35. Ibid., pp. 140-1 . 36. Ibid., p. 170. 37. Ibid., no. 7, May 27, 1947 , p. 209. 38. Ibid., no. 1 , May 17 , 1951, p. 17 . 39. Ibid., no. 1 , Feb. 19, p. 14 . 40. Ibid., p. 14. 41. Ibid., no. 6, March 12 , 1953, pp. 170-1 . 42. Ibid., p. 171. 43. Ibid., no. 2, Feb. 26, 1953 , p. 46. 44. Ibid., p. 48. 45. I n an interview with the author, Dec. 31, 1959. 46. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 2, Feb. 26, 1953 , p. 51. 47. Ibid., no. 6, March 12 , 1953, p. 138. 48. Ibid., p. 170. 49. Ibid., no. 2, Feb. 26, 1953 , p. 53. 50. Ibid., no. 12 , June 10 , 1954, pp. 400-1. 51. Pete r Wiles , "Repor t o n th e Russia n Service, " Th e Spectator (London), Jan . 3, 1958 . See also ibid., correspondenc e column s fro m Jun e 21, 1957 , to Sept. 6, 1957 , and in Dec. 1959 . 52. Th e Formulation an d Administration o f United States Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 78. 53. Canada , H . o f C . Specia l Committe e o n Broadcasting , Minutes o f Proceedings an d Evidence, no . 12 , June 16 , 1959 , pp. 429-30 , 434.

Index

ACTON, LORD , 10 4 Adak, 8 5 Admiralty, First Lor d o f (U.K.) , 12 7 Afghanistan, 14 2 Africa sout h o f th e Sahara , 69 ; broad casting to , 20 2 Afro-Asian nations : an d planning , 15 2 Agriculture, Ministe r of , 1 7 Air Forc e Cambridg e Researc h Cente r (U.S.), 14 6 Air Researc h an d Developmen t Com mand (U.S.) , 14 6 Aitken, Si r Max , 128 . Se e also Beaver brook, Lor d Alaska Boundary , 163 ; documents , 124-5 Aleutian campaign : Canadia n Arm y in , 82-5 Alexander, Fiel d Marshal , Ear l o f Tunis: an d W . L. Mackenzi e King, 30 ambassadors: t o Nort h Atlanti c Treat y Organization (NATO) , 41 ; t o Spain, 43; to China , 121 ; to Unite d States, 141 , 192 ; t o Italy , 19 7 ambassadors, Germany : t o Unite d Kingdom, 18 3 ambassadors, Unite d Kingdom : t o United States , 5 , 29 , 162 , 168 , 185; a s negotiator s fo r Canada , 163-5, 168-7 0 Amery, L . S. , 133 n Anderson, Majo r Genera l T . V. , 6 2 Andrew, Geoffre y C., 192 Anglo- Japanese alliance : propose d re newal, 8 apartheid, 145 , 145 n appeasement, 1 1 Armistice (1918) , 9 5 Army, British , 7 1 Army, Canadian , 72 , 77 , 81 , 82 , 86 , 99n; i n Siberia , 7 , 130 ; officia l historian, 63 , 73 , 75 , 149 ; Norwe gian campaign , 77-8 , 79 ; Nort h Africa, 78-9 ; Diepp e Raid , 79-80 ; and government , 80-1 ; Italy , 80-2 ; Hong Kong , 80 , 138 , 138n ; an d post-war policy , 81 ; Aleutian cam -

paign, 82-5 ; Wester n Europe , 85-7, 90-5 ; an d Nationa l Defence Headquarters (N.D.H.Q.) , 89-91 ; and Canadia n Militar y Head quarters (C.M.H.Q.) , 89-91 ; man power situation , 90-5 ; i n Firs t World War , 18 5 Army Council , 93 Ashton, Majo r Genera l E . C. , 6 1 Asquith, H . A. , 12 9 Athlone, Ear l of : an d W . L . Macken zie King , 3 0 Atlantic Charter , 138 , 18 1 atomic attack , 1 5 attaches: diplomatists ' dislik e of , 56 , 56n; agricultural , 57 , 65 ; air , 62 ; commercial, 57-8 ; financial , 57 , 65; labour , 57 , 65 ; military , 56n , 57, 61-5 ; naval , 62 ; press , 57 , 65 ; scientific, 57 , 65 ; technica l assis tance, 5 7 Attlee, Clement , 2 5 Attu, 8 3 Augusta, Georgia , 17 6 Australia, 139 , 142n , 192 ; Prime Minis ter of , 131 , 138n , 18 6 Austria, 14 2 Axis powers , 19 4

BAGEHOT, WALTER , 30 , 15 7 Balfour, A . J. , 146 n Ballantyne, C . C. , 7 Baltimore, Maryland , 14 6 Bandaranaike, S . W. R . D. , 14 5 Bank o f Canada , 33 , 100 ; Deput y Governor of , 59 n Beaudry, Laurent , 68 ; an d "Riddel l incident," 17 2 Beaulne, Yvon , 197 Beaverbrook, Lord , 184 , 184n ; Minister of Informatio n (U.K.) , 129 . Se e also Aitken, Si r Ma x Behring Sea Seal Treaty , 5 Beirut, Lebanon , 14 3 Belgium, 64 , 142 , 142n . Se e also Lo w Countries

218

INDEX

Bennett, R . B. , 37 , 39n ; an d Cabinet , 8-9; privat e papers , 9 , 9n ; an d External Affair s portfolio , 22 ; an d O. D . Skelton , 41 ; an d Vincen t Massey, 44-5 ; o n Hig h Commis sioner fo r Canad a i n Unite d King dom, 44-5 ; o n Fa r Easter n crisis , 109; an d parliamentar y discussion of foreig n affairs , 109 ; Govern ment of , 135 ; an d Italo-Ethiopia n War, 171 , 17 3 Berlin, Germany , 64 , 135 , 142 n Biggar, O . M. , 89 , 158 n Bland, Si r Nevile , 16 0 Boer War , 5 Bomarc-SAGE, 12 3 Bonn, Wes t Germany , 6 4 Borah Bil l (U.S.) , 134 n Borden, Si r Frederick , 7 3 Borden, Si r Robert , 12 , 21 , 22 , 104 , 138; an d foreig n policy , 6-8 ; an d Cabinet, 6-8 ; an d Siberia n expedition, 7-8 ; Governmen t of , 21 ; and Imperial Wa r Cabinet , 71-2 , 129-30; an d Firs t Worl d War , 71-2; nava l policy , 113 , 127 ; wartime propagand a i n U.S. , 18 5 Boundary Water s Commission : pro posed, 16 4 Bourassa, Henri : anti-militaris m of , 7 0 Brazil, 142 n British Broadcastin g Corporatio n (B.B.C.), 195 , 196 , 196n , 20 0 British Columbia , 14 n British Commonwealth . Se e Common wealth o f Nation s British Commonwealt h Ai r Trainin g Plan, 76-7 , 8 7 British Empir e Delegation , 12 9 "British Empir e Report, " 13 1 British Unite d Press , 19 1 Bryce, James , 5 , 29 , 164- 5 Bureau o f th e Budge t (U.S.) , 1 6 Bureau o f Publi c Information , 18 9 "bureaucratic elite, " 34- 8 passim; 34 n Burma, 142 , 142 n Burns, Majo r Genera l E . L . M. , 4 3 Bush House , 20 0 Byng, Genera l J . H . G. , Viscoun t Byng of Vimy , 7 2 CABINET, 98 , 171 ; representation , 1-2 , 99; an d foreig n policy , 4-20 , 103 ;

secrecy, 5n , 14 , 14n ; resignations , 9, 26 ; minutes , 13n ; Registrar , 14 ; secretary, 100 ; dictatorship , 103-4 ; in Secon d Worl d War , 111-1 2 committees: war , 12-14 , 18 , 63 , 65 , 76, 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83-4 , 85 , 88 , 89, 89n , 92 , 111 , 139-40 , 159 , 194; Genera l Policy , 12 ; Recon struction an d Development , 12 ; Emergency Plans , 15 ; Defence, 73 , 76, 99 ; Externa l Affairs , 15 8 Cadieux, Marcel : o n F.S.O . examina tions, 52- 3 Calder, J . A. , 7 Cambodia, Internationa l Truc e Super visory Commission : representatio n on, 14 2 Cambridge University , Departmen t o f Slavonic Studies , 5 5 Camp David , 1 7 Campbell, Si r Gerald , 18 8 Campney, Ralp h O. , 98 , 158 n Canada: a s "fire-proo f house, " 74 ; a s "interpreter," 139 ; a s "middl e power," 149 ; an d "nationa l style, " 153-4 Canada House , 57 , 61 , 65 Canada-United State s Interparliamen tary Group , 11 5 Canada—United State s Ministeria l Committee o n Join t Defence , 17-1 8 Canada-United State s Ministeria l Com mittee o n Trad e an d Economi c Affairs, 1 7 Canada-United State s relations : pela gic sealing , 165 ; fisheries , 165-6 ; boundary waters , 166 ; immigra tion, 166 ; broadcastin g channels , 166; smuggling , 166 ; extradition , 166 Canadian Broadcastin g Corporatio n (C.B.C.): an d propaganda , 192 , 193-202; Internationa l Service , 193-202 Canadian Commercia l Corporation , 5 9 Canadian Commissione r i n Paris , 6 6 Canadian Fiel d Headquarters , 8 9 Canadian Informatio n Servic e (C.I.S.) , 192-3 Canadian Militar y Headquarter s (C.M . H.Q.), 61 , 78 , 86 , 89-9 1 Canadian Press , 134n , 19 1 Canberra, Australia , 19 2 Carr, Colone l N. O. , 61

INDEX

caucus, parliamentar y party : discus sion in , 114-15 , 114n , 115 n Cavell, R . G . Nik , 19 , 59 Central Intelligenc e Agenc y (U.S.) , 147 Ceylon, 142n , 14 5 Chamberlain, Si r Austen , 133 n Chamberlain, Joseph , 163 , 168 , 168 n Chanak crisis , 10 , 29 , 105 , 131- 2 Chateau Laurier , 35 , 35 n Chief Electora l Officer , 158 n Chief o f th e Genera l Staff , 8 3 Chief o f Nava l Staff , 6 1 Chief o f Staff , U.S . Army , 61 , 83 , 100 ; Deputy, 8 5 Chiefs o f Staff , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 65 , 72-3 , 76, 84 , 96 , 100 , 146 ; an d Depart ment o f Externa l Affairs , 74- 5 Chiefs o f Staf f (U.K.) , 137 . Se e also Imperial Genera l Staf f Chiefs o f Staf f Committee , 15 , 36 , 73 , 149; Chairman , 97 , 99 , 100 , 101 ; civilian influenc e in , 99 ; criticize d by Genera l Simonds , 9 9 Chile, 142 n China, 135 , 139 , 141 , 142 ; Sino-Sovie t bloc, 19 ; People' s Republic , 121 , 143, 144 , 151 ; Minister to, 14 1 143, 144 Chistoff, Ole g Alec , 118 n Christie, Lorin g C. , 8 , 38-40 , 40n , 46 ; and R . L . Borden , 38-9 ; an d Arthur Meighen , 38-9 ; an d W . L . Mackenzie King , 39 , 39n , 41 , 42 ; influence o n policy , 40n , 41 ; view s on Europea n crisis , 40n ; missio n to Londo n (1920) , 66 ; on Imperia l War Cabinet , 129-30 ; o n Cana dian foreig n policy , 154 ; Ministe r to U.S. , 17 6 Chungking, China : legatio n at , 14 1 Churchill, Winston , 30-1 30-1, ,31n 3 In,, 63 , 81 , 82, 111 , 139 , 141 , 177 , 181 , 186 ; and Imperia l Wa r Cabinet , 12 ; and Anthon y Eden , 27 ; nava l policy, 127 ; an d Chana k crisis , 131; o n Hitler , 136 ; an d Domin ions Office , 137 ; o n Canada' Canada' s policy toward s Vichy , 140 , 141 1 4 In n Citizenship an d Immigration : Depart ment of , 122 ; Minister , 3 7 civil servants , higher : an d polic y pro cess, 32-8 ; interchangeabilit y of , 34; socia l contact s among , 35, 35n 35n,, 36; a s "mandarins, " 35-6 ; an d

219

politics, 36-8 ; an d "steppin g stones t o Ministry, " 37 n Civil Servic e Commission , 37 , 41 , 43 , 48, 49 , 126 ; chairman , 3 4 civilian supremacy , 65 , 97-10 2 Clark, Colone l Hugh , 2 1 Claxton, Brooke , 15 , 21-2 , 23 n 9 8 189n, 19 1 Clerk o f th e Priv y Council , 41 , 19 2 Cliveden, 13 6 Coats, R . H. , 158 n Coldwell, M . J. , 4 4 collective security , 10 9 Colombia, 142 n Colombo Plan , 19 , 56n . 58 , 59 n Colonial Conference , 17 7 Colonial Office , 12 4 Colonial Secretar y (U.K.) , 129 , 18 5 Columbia River , 16 6 Combined Chief s o f Staf f (U.K.-U.S.) , 62, 63 , 64 , 82 , 14 0 Combined Plannin g Committe e (U.K. U.S.), 6 3 commercial policy : an d propaganda , 184 Commissioner Genera l o f Canad a i n France, 16 7 Committee o f Imperia l Defence , 7 3 Committee o f State : proposed , 7 3 committees, interdepartmental , 34-5 , 59, 59n , 202 ; an d foreig n polic y planning, 158 ; an d Departmen t o f External Affairs , 158-9 ; informa tional activity , 19 2 Panel o n th e Economi c Aspect s o f Defence Policy , 100 , 159 ; Post Hostilities Planning , 158-9 ; Ai r Transport Policy , 159 ; Externa l Trade Policy , 159 ; Internationa l Civil Aviation , 159 ; Internationa l Service, C.B.C. , 20 2 Commonwealth o f Nations , 4 , 19 , 25 , 30n, 38 , 69 , 136 , 169 , 202 ; an d consultation, 138-9 , 139n , 178-80 ; as intelligenc e source , 141 , 144-5 , 149; i n Afro-Asia , 144 ; "secon d class members, " 145 , 145 n Commonwealth Parliamentar y Associa tion, 11 5 Commonwealth Relation s Offic e (U.K.), 14 4 communism, Soviet , 151 . Se e also Marxism-Leninism Congo Republic , 6 9

220

INDEX

Congress (U.S.) , 118 , 133 ; Librar y of , 117; opinio n in , 18 6 conscription, 76 , 77 ; crisi s of 1917 , 72 ; crisis o f 1944 , 90- 5 Conservative party , 27 , 37 ; foreig n policy spokesma n for , 44 , 50 ; par ty, 27 , 37 ; foreig n polic y spokes man for , 44 , 50 ; parliamentar y caucus of , 114n , 11 5 Consul general : i n Ne w Yor k City , 19 2 consuls, foreign : a s channel s fo r nego tiation, 167-8 ; French , 168 ; Japanese, 16 8 Co-operative Commonwealt h Federa tion (C.C.F.) , 44 , 114 n Costa Rica , 142 , 142 n Coyne, James , 35 n Craig, Genera l Malin , 6 1 Creel, George , 18 4 Crerar, Genera l H . D . G. , 8 6 Crerar, T . A. , 7 Crewe House , 18 4 Cuba, 142 n Currie, Si r Arthur , 7 2 Curzon, Lord , 28 , 130- 1 Czechoslovakia, 64 , 95 , 142n ; broad casting to, 195- 6 DAFOE, J. W. : o n R . B . Bennett, 8- 9 Davis, T . C. , 121 , 14 2 Dawson, R . MacGregor : o n Arthu r Meighen, 8 defence: imperial , 5 ; Nort h American , 61; post-194 5 attitudes , 95- 8 Defence, Ministe r o f (U.K.) , 3 1 Defence Committee , Cabinet , 12 , 1 5 Defence Construction , Ltd. , 5 9 Defence Council , 8 8 Defence Production , Ministe r of , 15 , 17 Defence Researc h Board , 123n , 146 , 149; civilia n directio n of , 99 , 99 n "Defence Schem e No . 1, " 7 4 Defense, Departmen t o f (U.S.) , 146 ; Secretary, 1 5 Delafield, Charles , 197 , 198 , 19 9 Delcassé, Théophile , 168 n Denmark, 64 , 142n ; broadcastin g to , 202 Department o f Nationa l Defenc e Ac t (1922): amended , 87 , 8 8 despatches: dispositio n of , 147-8 , 19 3 Désy, Jean , 46 , 47, 67 ; and C.B.C.-I.S., 195, 197- 8 DeWitt, Genera l Joh n L. , 82 , 8 3

Dicev, A . V. , 15 1 Diefenbaker, Joh n G. , 24 , 38 , 116n , 144n; an d Externa l Affair s port folio, 27 ; an d Sidne y Smith , 27-8 ; and Howar d Green , 28 ; an d Hig h Commissioner fo r Canad a i n U.K., 45 ; o n civilia n supremacy , 98; an d Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, 149 ; "vision " o f norther n development, 20 2 Dieppe Raid , 140 ; Canadian Army and , 79-80 diplomacy: "summit, " 4 , 175 ; secret , 104-5, 118 , 178-81 ; Soviet , 152 ; "old," 160 ; an d propaganda , 160-1; "quiet, " 175 ; airborne , 17 7 diplomatic unity , doctrin e of , 164 , 16 9 diplomatists: functional , 57 , 65 ; an d politicians, 17 5 Director General , Externa l Ai d Pro grammes, 60- 1 Djakarta, Indonesia , 14 3 doctrines: Eisenhower , 154 ; Monroe , 154; Stimson , 154 ; Truman , 15 4 Doherty, C . J. , 7 Dominican Republic , 142 n Dominion Affairs , Secretar y o f Stat e for (U.K.) , 133 , 133n , 13 7 Dominion Statistician , 158 n Dominions Offic e (U.K.) , 80 , 137- 8 Downing Street , 130 , 13 6 Draft Conventio n (I.L.O. ) o n th e Limitation o f Hour s o f Wor k i n Industrial Undertakings , 11 8 Drew, George: Hig h Commissione r fo r Canada i n U.K. , 4 6 Dulles, Joh n Foster , 142 , 17 7 Dundonald, Majo r Genera l Th e Ear l of, 7 1 Dunton, A . D., 19 2 Dupuy, Pierre : missio n t o Vichy , 140 , 140n Dyke, John , 18 4 EAST BLOCK , 11 , 39n , 47, 56n , 144 , 173 . See also Externa l Affairs , Depart ment o f Economic Advisor y Committee , 2 2 Ecuador, 142 n Eden, Anthony , 81, 138n ; an d Winsto n Churchill, 2 7 Edwards, W . S. , 158 n Eisenhower, Dwigh t D. , 154 , 17 6

INDEX

Emergency Council , 1 2 Empire, diplomati c unit y of , 164 , 169 espionage, Soviet , 9 5 "Establishment," the , 3 8 Europe, 74 ; Western , 92 , 97 ; occupied , 194; broadcastin g to , 195-7 , 200-1, 20 2 External Affairs , Departmen t of , 4 , 8 , 15, 17 , 18 , 24 , 25 , 29 , 33 , 34 , 38 69 passim, 97 , 100 , 120, 121, 133, 166, 173 ; origins, 20-1 , 46 , 126-7 ; legal adviser , 39 , 66 , 68 ; counsel lor, 40 ; an d Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affairs , 41 ; re cruitment o f ambassador s from , 42-3; "stripe d pants " attitud e of , 44; in-servic e training , 46 , 54-5 ; recruitment, 46-54 ; examinations , 47-53; generalis t concept , 53 , 143-4; specialist s in , 53-1 , 143-4; "lateral entry, " 53—4 ; promotions , 55-6; diminishe d prestig e of , 56 ; and Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerce, 57-61 ; an d adminis tration o f foreig n ai d programmes , 58-61; an d militar y attaches , 64 , 64n; an d Departmen t o f Nationa l Defence, 64 , 64n, 74-5, 97 ; organization, 65-9 ; an d Hig h Commis sioner fo r Canad a i n U.K. , 66 ; press office , 68 ; inspectio n service , 68; politica l co-ordinatio n section , 68-9, 148 , 197; African des k offi cer, 69 ; interna l liaison , 69 ; rela tions wit h Minister , 69 ; size , 69 ; as intelligenc e centre , 147-9 ; liai son service , 148 ; Weltanschauung, 156; plannin g in , 157-9 ; an d propaganda, 192- 3 divisions: administrative , 68; African (proposed), 69 ; American , 67 , 68 ; Commonwealth, 67 , 68 ; consular , 67, 68 ; defenc e liaison , 67 , 99 , 149; diplomatic , 68 ; economic , 59n, 67 , 68 ; European , 68 ; Fa r Eastern, 67 , 68 ; historical , 67 ; information, 53 , 67 , 68 , 192-3 ; Latin American , 69 ; legal , 67 , 68 ; Middle Eastern , 69 ; personnel , 53 , 68; protocol, 68 ; treaty, 68 ; United Nations, 58 , 6 7 External Affairs , Departmen t o f (Australian), 65- 6 External Affairs , Secretar y o f Stat e for,

221

4, 13 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 24 , 26 , 28 , 37, 41 , 97 , 119 , 121 , 147 , 148 , 155, 181 , 196; and Prim e Minister, 17, 24-8 ; Parliamentar y Unde r Secretary to , 21 ; Parliamentar y Assistant to , 22 ; Parliamentar y Secretary to , 22 , 121 ; and Unde r Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 38-41 , 39n , 40n; and De partment o f Externa l Affairs , 6 9 External Affairs , Unde r Secretar y of State for , 9 , 13 , 15 , 19 , 34 , 37 , 38-41, 42 , 43 , 57 , 58 , 64 , 65 , 67 , 99, 144 , 145, 147, 148 , 173, 174, 186, 196 ; an d Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affairs , 38-41 , 39n , 40n; Associate , 47 , 67 , 68 , 148 , 175n, 192 ; Acting, 5 4 External Ai d Office , 60- 1

FABRE, HECTOR , 16 7 Far East , 74 , 13 8 fascism: attitude s towards , 135- 6 Fashoda, 168 n Federal Burea u of Investigatio n (U.S.) , 146 Ferguson, Howard : High Commissione r for Canad a i n U.K. , 45 Fielding, W . S. : an d Chana k crisis , 10 ; and righ t o f legation , 11 ; resigna tion, 11 ; opposes representatio n i n U.S., 133 , 166; mission t o Berlin , 169 Finance, Departmen t of , 15 , 33, 34 , 59 , 100; Minister , 10 , 12 , 13 , 15 , 16 , 17, 26 , 72 , 78 , 133 ; Assistan t Deputy Minister , 59n ; and repre sentation abroad , 14 3 Financial Post, the , 39n Finland, 142n "fireproof house, " Canad a as , 7 4 First Worl d War . See Worl d Wa r I Flottenpolitik, 12 7 Foreign Affair s Committe e (U.S.) , 11 8 foreign aid , administration of, 58-6 1 "Foreign Countrie s Report, " 13 1 Foreign Offic e (U.K.) , 54 , 55 , 66 , 125, 127, 131 , 162 ; an d B.B.C. , 196 , 196n, 20 0 Foreign Operation s Administratio n (U.S.), 6 0 Foreign Relation s Committe e (U.S.) , 118

222

INDEX

Foreign Secretar y (U.K.) , 125 , 130-1 , 133, 133n , 137; acting, 16 2 foreign service : Australian , 66 ; French, 66; Unite d States , 66 ; Iris h Fre e State, 6 6 foreign servic e officers : recruitment , 46-54; in-servic e training , 46 , 54-5; examinations , 47-53 ; quali fications, 53-4 ; promotion , 55-6 ; shortage of , 56 ; sicknes s benefits , 56n; hardship s of , 56n ; as purvey ors o f intelligence , 143-4 ; opera tional cod e of , 156-7 . Se e also External Affairs , Departmen t o f forest management , 11 6 Forrestal, Jame s V. : o n Cabine t De fence Committee , 1 5 Forsey, Eugene : o n W . L . Mackenzi e King an d constitutiona l govern ment, 37n, 108 Foster, Si r George , 7 , 8 ; offere d Exter nal Affair s portfolio , 2 2 Foulkes, Genera l Charles , 97 , 9 9 France, 64 , 96 , 138 , 140 , 142 , 142n, 143, 153 , 154 , 167 , 168n , 169 , 186, 19 2 Fredericton, N.B. , 27 freight rates , 105 , 116 French Canada : an d militar y establish ment, 70-2 , 96-7 ; an d conscrip tion, 95 , 97 ; an d Korea n War , 97; representation i n Cabinet , 99 ; an d fascism, 135 ; and Vichy , 140 ; and "national style, " 153 ; and Secon d World War , 187 "fusion": concep t o f civil-militar y rela tions, 100 , 102

Germany, Federa l Republi c of , 142n Ghana: Hig h Commissione r fo r Can ada in , 142n ; broadcasting to , 20 2 Gibbons, Georg e C. , 164- 5 Gibson, Hugh , 16 0 Globe an d Mail, the , 37-8 gold mining , 11 6 Gordon, Majo r Charle s W . (Ralp h Connor), 18 5 Gordon, Donald , 35 n Governor General , 107 , 129, 131, 165, 168n, 169 , 171; and Prim e Minis ter, 28-31 ; an d Unite d Kingdo m government, 179-8 0 Governor i n Council , 2 1 Graham, Lt.-Gen . Howard , 123n Grand Alliance , 62 , 13 9 Graydon, Gordon , 27 , 44 , 50 , 120 , 198 Great Lakes : lamprey , 116 ; nava l strength on , 134n Greece, 138n , 142 n Green, Howard , 16 , 121 , 147-8 ; be comes Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , 24 , 28 ; an d John Diefenbaker , 28 ; an d De partment o f Externa l Affairs , 69 ; opposes nuclea r weapons , 97 ; o n Canadian foreig n policy , 155- 6 Grey, A . H . G. , 4t h Ear l Grey : a s Governor General , 29 , 126 , 165 Grey, Si r Edward , 1s t Viscoun t Gre y of Fallodon , 125- 6 Grierson, John : o n wartim e propa ganda, 189-90

HAITI, 142n Hamburger Nachrichten, 18 3 Hankey, Sir Maurice, 13n GALLUP, GEORGE , 5 3 Hanson, R . B. , 113 , 191 Harvard University , 136 , 139 Garland, E . J. , 10 7 general elections : (1935) , 45 , 171 ; Havana, Cuba , 5 8 (1957), 24 , 27, 37, 45, 98 ; (1958) , Hay, John : o n U.S. Senate, 113 27, 3 8 Health an d Welfare , Ministe r of, 1 5 General Staff , 73 , 80 ; Chie f of , 61 , 78 , Heeney, A . D. P., 58 , 143 , 192; on Wa r 90, 93 , 99 , 123n ; Vice-Chie f of, 8 5 Committee o f Cabinet , 1 3 "generalists," 53-4 , 143- 4 Hellyer, Paul , 98 , 123n Geneva, 39 , 43 . Se e also Leagu e o f Henderson, Si r Nevile , 135 , 135 n Herridge, W . D. , 37 , 18 6 Nations Geneva Protocol , 15 8 Herschell, Lord , 12 4 Genoa Conferenc e (1922) , 3 9 Hickerson, J. D., 82 , 83, 84-5, 89 George VI , King , 30 , 31n High Commissio n a t Washingto n Germany, 64 , 154 , 183 , 185 , 194 ; (1870-1), 163 , 164 declaration o f wa r o n (1914) , High Commissione r fo r th e Unite d 104; intelligenc e concerning , 12 7 Kingdom: i n Canada, 16 7

INDEX High Commissioner s fo r Canada : I n Australia, 142n ; i n Ceylon , 142n ; in Ghana , 142n ; i n India , 64n , 142n, 143 ; i n Malaya , 142n ; i n New Zealand , 142n ; i n Nigeria, 142n; i n Pakistan , 61 , 142n ; i n Union o f Sout h Africa , 142n ; i n United Kingdom , 44-6 , 61 , 66 , 127, 128 , 129 , 133 , 133n , 135-6 , 136-7, 142n , 144 , 167 , 18 3 High Commissioners , Dominion : meet ings of, 133 , 133n , 136- 7 Hilsman Roger , 123 n Hitler, 135 , 135n ; visite d b y W . L . Mackenzie King , 11 , 136 Honduras, 142 n Hong Kong , 85 ; Arm y at , 80 , 138 , 138n; intelligenc e concerning , 138 , 138n Hose, Commodore Walter , 158 n House o f Commons , 14n , 15 , 23 , 24 , 26, 42 , 76 , 95 , 98 , 103-2 3 passim, 134, 138 , 187 , 191 ; Speaker , 14n ; Leader of , 24 ; an d discussio n o f foreign affairs , 108-13 , 115-1 7 committees: Standin g Committe e o n External Affairs , 19 , 47 , 50 , 54 , 115, 118-23 , 141 , 147 , 173 , 196 202 passim; propose d Standin g Committee o n Defence, 73 , 122-3 ; Standing Committe e o n Industria l and Internationa l Relations , 118 ; Standing Committe e o n Estimates , 122; Standin g Committe e o n Mines, Forest s an d Water , 122 , 123; Specia l Committe e o n De fence Expenditure , 12 3 House o f Common s (U.K.) , 11 1 House o f Representative s (U.S.) , 7 6 Howe, C . D. , 15 , 57, 58 , 59 Hughes, William , 13 1 Hull, Cordell , 187- 8 Hungary, 142 ; revolutio n (1956) , 195 ; broadcasting to , 19 5 Huntington, Samue l P. : o n civil-mili tary relations , 100- 1 Husky, Operation , 81- 2 Hutchison, Bruce : o n W . L. Mackenzi e King, 11 ; o n conscriptio n crisi s (1944), 94 n Hutton, Majo r Genera l E . T. H. , 7 1 Hyde Par k Agreement , 15 5 ICELAND, 97 , 142 , 142 n Ilsley, J . L. : o n Treasur y Board , 16 ;

223

threatens resignation , 2 6 Immigration, 68 , 180n , 183 ; oriental, 5 , 158, 168 , 170- 1 Immigration, Departmen t of , 15 8 Imperial Conferences : (1921) , 8 , 38 , 130; (1923) , 39 , 105-6 , 106n , 179-80; (1926) , 30 , 133 n Imperial Defence , 5 Imperial Defenc e College , 5 5 Imperial Defenc e Conferenc e (1909) , 12 Imperial Economi c Conferenc e (1932) , 8-9 Imperial Genera l Staff , 129 ; Chie f of , 71-2, 8 1 imperial preference, 5 Imperial Wa r Cabinet , 6 , 71-2 , 104 , 129-30; propose d reconstitution , 12, 138- 9 India, 142n , 143 , 144 , 144 n Indian Ocean , 15 4 Indonesia, 142n , 14 3 Information, Ministr y o f (U.K.) , 129 , 184, 184n , 190 , 191 , 194 , 196 n Information Agenc y (U.S.) , 200 Information Offic e (U.K.) , 18 8 intelligence: an d trad e commissioners , 57-8; Join t Intelligenc e Commit tee, 99 , 149 ; "basi c descriptive, " 126; "speculative-evaluative, " 127 , 136; i n Firs t Worl d War , 127-30 ; "British Empir e report, " 131 ; "foreign countrie s report, " 131 ; and Chana k crisis , 131-2 ; an d W. L . Mackenzi e King , 133-4 ; o n United States , 133-4 ; an d Fa r Eastern crisis , 134-5 ; an d Naz i Germany, 135-6 ; supplie d b y United Kingdo m Governmen t dur ing Secon d Worl d War , 137-9 ; exchanges, 141 ; an d foreig n servic e officers, 143-4 ; Commonwealt h o f Nations a s sourc e of , 144-5 , 149 ; United State s a s sourc e of , 145-7 , 149; subversiv e activity , 146 ; mili tary, 146 , 149 ; scientific , 146 , 149 ; and Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, 147- 9 Interior, Ministe r of the , 12 4 International Cooperatio n Administra tion (U.S.) , 6 0 International Joint Commission, 43, 166 International Labou r Organisation , 11 8 International Waterway s Commission , 164

224

INDEX

interpreter, Canad a as , 13 9 Iran, 142 n Iraq, 14 2 Ireland, 142n , 18 3 Irish Fre e State , 30 , 6 6 Israel, 142 n Italo-Ethiopian War , 9 , 110 , 171- 3 passim Italy, 64 , 96 , 135 , 142n , 197 ; Arm y in , 80-2; propose d sanction s against , 171-3; broadcasting to, 202

and L . S . St . Laurent , 25-6 ; an d governors general , 29-31 ; an d General A . G . L . McNaughton , 37, 77 ; o n civi l service , 37n ; an d Department o f Externa l Affairs , 38-41, 46-7 , 66-7 ; an d Unde r Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 38-41 ; an d Lorin g C . Christie, 39 , 39n , 42 ; an d O . D . Skelton, 39-41 , 40n ; an d Join t Staff Missio n at Washington , 62-3 ; and Departmen t o f Nationa l De fence, 65 , 87 , 91-2 ; o n Canadian JAPAN, 64 , 134 , 138 , 142n , 165 , 169 , American relations , 74 ; an d mili 191; Minister to, 134 ; U.S. negotia tary affairs , 75-6 ; an d C . G . tions with, 139 Power, 78 ; an d Arm y durin g Jetté, Si r Louis , 17 0 Second Worl d War , 78-9 , 81 , 82 , Jinnah, M . A. , 3 6 83-4; visi t t o Unite d Kingdo m Johns Hopkin s University, 123 n (1941), 79 , 177 ; an d Permanen t Johnson, Harr y G. , 153 n Joint Boar d o n Defence , 89n ; an d Joint Chiefs of Staf f (U.S.) , 8 3 conscription, 91-5 ; an d Parliament , Joint Intelligenc e Committee, 99 , 14 9 105, 106 , 106n , 107 , 108-10 , 111 Joint Plannin g Committee, 9 9 12; an d Progressiv e party , 105 ; a t Joint Staf f Committee , 7 3 Imperial Conferenc e (1923) , 105 Joint Staf f Missio n a t Washington , 62 6; an d orders-in-council , 108 ; o n 4, 140 , 146 ; United Kingdom, 62 Manchurian crisi s (1933) , 109 ; o n Jordan, 14 2 Rhineland crisi s (1936) , 109 ; an d Justice, Departmen t of , 158n ; Minister , parliamentary part y caucus , 114 ; 12, 1 5 "Downing Stree t complex, " 133n , 136-7; an d Commonwealt h con sultation, 138 ; and Franklin Roose KARACHI, Pakistan , 64 n velt, 139 , 176 ; polic y toward s Kashmir dispute , 14 5 Vichy, 140n ; view s o n post-wa r Keefer, Francis , 2 1 China, 141 ; an d decision-making , Keenleyside, Hug h L. , 47 , 8 9 155; o n interdepartmenta l commit Kemal, Mustafa, 13 1 tees, 158 ; an d Internationa l Join t Kemp, A. E. , 7 Commission, 166 ; an d "Riddel l Kennan, George : o n diplomac y an d incident," 172-3 ; an d Harr y S . propaganda, 16 1 Truman, 176 ; and negotiation , 176 , Kenny, Ai r Commodor e W . R., 6 2 178-81; an d Ramsa y MacDonald , Kerr, Philip , 146n . Se e also Lothian , 180; missio n t o U.K . (1908) , 180 , Lord 180n; Atlanti c Charter , 181 ; an d King, W . L . Mackenzie , 8 , 15 , 22 , 29 , wartime propagand a t o U.S. , 185 78, 118 , 191 ; an d Hig h Commis 8; an d W.I.B. , 188-9 ; an d C.B.C.sioner fo r Canad a i n U.K. , 7 , 45 , I.S., 19 4 132-3, 133n , 167 ; an d Cabinet, . administrations: 1s t (1921-5) , 10 , 9-12; an d Chana k crisis , 10 , 105 , 42, 178-9 ; 4t h (1935-40) , 73- 4 131-2; an d W . S. Fielding, 10-11 ; King, Tom, 133-4 , 134n and Munic h crisis , 11 ; and Hitler , Kingsmere, 11 , 18 0 11, 136 ; an d Imperia l Wa r Cabi - Kiska, 82- 5 passim. Se e also Aleutia n net, 12 , 138-9 ; an d Cabine t secre campaign tariat, 13-14 , 13n ; conduc t o f Kleczkowski, A. , 168 , 168 n external affairs , 18-19 , 18n , 24 ; Korea, Republic of, 14 2 and Externa l Affair s portfolio , 23 , Korea, Unite d Nation s Temporar y 25; and J. L . Ralston, 23n , 79 , 92; Commission on , 2 6

INDEX

Korean War , 141 , 144 ; Frenc h Canad a and, 9 7 Kucherepa, J . W., 201 Kuibyshev, U.S.S.R., 14 1 LABOUR, MINISTE R OF , 77, 125 , 17 0 Labour party , Canadian , 106 n Labour part y (U.K.) , 105 LaGuardia, Fiorello , 8 9 Lamb, Si r Frederick , 56 n Lapointe, Ernest , 10 , 11 , 14n , 22 , 140n , 187; an d "Riddel l incident, " 17 2 Larkin, P . C. , 133 n Laski, Harold , 15 1 "lateral entry" : an d Departmen t o f External Affairs , 53- 4 Laurier, Si r Wilfrid , 7 , 10 , 20 , 37 , 39 , 66, 124 ; relation s wit h Cabinet , 5-6; an d Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, 20-1 ; "vorte x o f mili tarism," 70-1 ; Governmen t of , 73 , 169, 170 ; nava l policy , 127 ; Join t High Commission , 164 ; Newfoundland Shore , 168 , 168 n Laurier House , 2 6 Lausanne, Treat y of , 17 9 Law, Bonar , 127 , 12 8 League o f Nations , 10 , 67, 71 , 74 , 104 , 108, 109 , 132 ; Permanent Advisor y Officer at , 171 . Se e also Genev a Leahy, Admira l Willia m D. , 6 1 Lebanon, 55 , 142n , 14 3 legation, righ t of , 11 , 132 , 165 , 17 8 legations: Paris , 169 ; Tokyo , 169 ; Washington, 62 , 165 , 166 , 169 , 176, 186 , 187 , 188 . Se e also: missions, diplomatic ; representa tion abroa d Léger, Jules , 14 3 Lemieux, Rodolphe : missio n t o Japan , 125-6, 168-9 , 170 . lend-lease, 18 7 Lenin: State an d Revolution, 151 "liaison letters, " 74- 5 Liberal party , 15 ; in Quebec , 105 ; par liamentary caucus , 114 n liberalism, Western : an d planning, 151 2 Library o f Congress (U.S. ) : Legislativ e Reference Service , 11 7 Life, 18 7 Lincoln Laborator y (U.S.) , 14 6 Liverpool, Eng. , 18 4 Lloyd George , David , 105 , 129 , 131 , 177; an d Si r Rober t Borden , 71- 2

225

Loggie, Colone l G . P. , 6 1 London, Eng. , 69 , 138 , 143 London Schoo l o f Economics , 15 1 Longmore, Ai r Chie f Marsha l Si r A. , 138n Lothian, Lord , 139 . Se e also Kerr , Philip Low Countries , 15 4 "Ludendorff philosophy, " 7 6 Luxembourg, 142 , 142n . Se e also Lo w Countries Lyon, Peyto n V. : o n "Greenery, " 156 n Lytton Report , 10 9 MACBRIEN, MAJO R GENERA L J . H. , 37 , 158n McCarthy, Leighton , 17 6 MacDermott, T . W . L., 53 Macdonald, Angu s L., 8 8 Macdonald, Si r Claude , 125 , 17 0 Macdonald, Si r Joh n A. : an d Hig h Commission a t Washington (1870 1), 164 , 164n MacDonald, Ramsay , 18 0 Macdonnell, R . M. , 19 9 MacKay, R . A. , 12 1 Mackenzie, Ian , 14n , 74- 5 McNaught, K . W. : o n "Parliamen t wil l decide," 107 McNaughton, Genera l A . G . L. , 86 ; appointed Arm y Commander , 37 , 77; representativ e a t Securit y Council, 43 ; chairman , Canadian section, Internationa l Join t Com mission, 43 ; an d W . L . Mackenzi e King, 77 ; authorit y fo r us e o f troops, 77-82 ; an d J . L . Ralston , 79; relinquishe s Arm y command , 82; an d conscriptio n crisi s (1944) , 92-5; Ministe r o f Nationa l De fence, 92- 5 MacNaughton, Alan , 19 9 Madame Burger's , 35 , 35 n Mahoney, Merchant , 13 3 Malaya, 138 , 142 , 142 n Mallory, J . R. : o n Cabine t secretariat , 13n Managua, Nicaragua , 14 2 Manitoba, 10 7 manpower situation : i n Army , 90-5 . See also conscriptio n crisi s (1944 ) Mansergh, Nicholas : o n Britis h intel ligence, 13 7 Marine an d Naval Services , Departmen t of, 7 2

226

INDEX

Marler, Si r Herbert: Ministe r t o Japan , 42, 134- 5 Marshall, Genera l Georg e C. , 83 , 85 Marshall Plan , 10 0 Martin, Paul , 16 ; on Canadia n foreig n policy, 15 5 Marxism-Leninism, 152 . See also Soviet communism Massey, Vincent : a s Governor General , 31; Ministe r t o Washington , 42 , 134, 165 ; Hig h Commissione r fo r Canada i n U.K. , 44-5 , 135-6 ; o n propaganda, 182- 3 materiel, war : expor t of , 1 9 Meighen, Arthur , 38 , 39 ; an d relation s with Cabinet , 8 Messina, Strait s of , 8 1 Mewburn, Genera l S . C., 7 Mexico, 142 n Middle Eas t Centr e fo r Arabi c Studies , Foreign Office , 5 5 military establishment : attitude s to wards, 70-2 , 96-7 ; civila n contro l of, 71 , 97-102 ; increasin g respon sibilities, 96 ; influenc e o n policy , 97; trainin g o f senio r officers , 101-2 militia: reorganizatio n of, 11 , 72- 3 Militia an d Defence : Oversea s Minister , 7; Departmen t of , 72 ; Minister , 73 Mill, J . S. : O n Liberty, 15 1 Miller, Ai r Marsha l F . R. , 99 ministers, deputy : appointmen t of, 3 7 ministers, diplomatic : t o Unite d States , 11, 39n , 42, 61 , 62 , 163 , 186 , 188 ; to France , 42 , 135 ; t o Japan , 42 . See also: missions , diplomatic ; representation abroa d ministers, diplomati c (U.S. ) : t o Can ada, 6 4 Minto, G . J . Elliott , 4t h Ear l of : o n governor generalship , 28-9 , 29 n missions, diplomatic : openin g of , 19 20; head s of , 42-6 ; i n France , 20 , 42, 45 , 66 ; i n Germany , 43 ; i n Japan, 20 , 42 , 45 , 66 ; i n Mexico , 20; i n Spain , 43 ; i n U.S.S.R. , 20 ; in Unite d States , 41 , 42 , 45 , 61 , 66. See also: ministers , diplomatic ; representation abroa d Moffat, Ja y Pierrepont , 20 , 35n , 62 , 6 3 Montgomery, Genera l Bernard , 79 , 8 6 Montreal, Que. , 168 , 194 , 196 , 197 , 19 8 Moran, H . O. , 61 Morel, E . D. , 106 n

Morley, Lord , 15 5 Moscow, U.S.S.R. , 151 , 19 4 Moyer, L . C. , 158 n Mulvey, Thomas , 158 n Munich crisis , 11 , 40n Munitions an d Supply , Minister of, 1 3 Murchie, Lt.-Gen . J . C . : an d conscrip tion crisi s (1944) , 93- 4 Murphy, Charles , 2 1 Murray, Si r George , 1 2 Mussolini, 96 , 135 ; o n foreig n policy , 151 Mutual Ai d Progra m (U.S.) , 10 0 Mutual Securit y Administration (U.S.) , 60

NATIONAL DEFENCE , DEPARTMEN T OF , 4, 33 , 68 , 74 , 78 , 122 , 158n , 192 ; representation abroad , 61-2 , 64 ; and Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, 64 , 64n, 74-5, 97 ; organiz ation, 87-8 ; an d conscriptio n crisi s (1944), 91- 5 National Defence , Ministe r of , 12 , 14n , 15, 17 , 19 , 72 , 73 , 74-5 , 80 , 81 , 82, 85-6 , 87 , 88 , 95 , 96 , 98 , 120 , 135n, 146 ; Associate , 15 , 88 , 98 ; for Air , 87 , 88; for Nava l Services , 88, 91 ; Deputy , 9 9 National Defenc e Act : amende d (1950), 10 6 National Defenc e College , 15 ; curricu lum, 101- 2 National Defenc e Headquarter s (N.D.H.Q.): an d C.M.H.Q. , 89 91; an d conscriptio n crisi s (1944) , 92-5 National Fil m Board , 189 , 19 2 National Researc h Council , 7 7 National Reserv e Mobilizatio n Ac t (N.R.M.A.), 93 , 9 4 National Revenue , Ministe r of, 198- 9 National Socialism : attitude s towards , 135-6 National Wa r Services , Departmen t of , 189 naval policy , 113 , 12 7 Navy Departmen t (U.S.) : oppose d t o Joint Staf f Missio n a t Washington , 62-3 negotiation: an d diplomatists , 160-2 ; and technology , 162 , 170, 174 ; with U.S., 163-8 ; an d Britis h ambassa -

INDEX

dors, 168-70 ; discretionar y autho rity allowe d in , 173-5 ; style , 174 5; Soviet , 177 n Nelles, Commodor e P . W., 61 Netherlands, 64 , 139 , 142n ; broadcast ing to, 202 . See also Low Countrie s New Delhi , India , 143 , 144 , 144 n New Yor k City , U.S.A. , 14 3 New York Times: a s sourc e o f intelli gence, 14 6 New Zealand , 3 On, 142n; and Common wealth consultation , 138n Newfoundland Shore , 168 , 168 n Nicaragua, 142 , 142 n Nicolson, Harold , 16 1 Nigeria, 142n ; broadcasting to, 20 2 North America , defenc e of , 89 , 14 5 North America n Ai r Defenc e Com mand (NORAD) , 9 7 North Atlanti c Treat y Organizatio n (NATO), 19 , 28 , 68 , 97 ; ambas sador to , 41 , 142 ; Defence College , 55; Parliamentar y Association , 11 5 Norway, 142 , 142n ; broadcastin g to , 202 Nosse, Tatsgoro , 16 8 nuclear weapons , 96 , 9 7 OAKESHOTT, MICHAEL , 15 1 Odium, Brig.-Gen . Victor : Hig h Com missioner fo r Canad a i n Australia , 43-4; Ministe r t o China , 14 1 Office o f Internationa l Securit y Affair s (U.S.), 14 6 Office o f Wa r Informatio n (U.S.) , 191 , 194 Oliver, F . S. , 72 Ontario, 113 ; Attorne y Genera l for , 185-6 opposition parties , 96 , 104 , 114 , 123 ; feebleness of , 3 ; leade r of , 16 , 98 ; foreign polic y spokesmen , 27 , 117 , 120, 122 , 198 ; member s o f Parlia ment, 117-1 9 Oran: bombardmen t o f Frenc h flee t at , 138 order-in-council, 44 , 107 , 108 ; P.C . 1719 (Jul y 15 , 1916) , 2 1 Organization fo r Europea n Economi c Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) : repre sentation in , 14 2 Ottawa, 69 , 125 , 132 , 166 , 194 , 196 , 197, 198 ; U.S . servic e attache s at , 61-2; U.S . Ministe r at , 64 ; an d New Delh i "axis, " 144 n

227

Overlord, Operation , 9 0 Overseas Ministe r of Militia , 7 PACIFIC: securit y problem s of , 139 , 139n Pakistan, Hig h Commissione r fo r Canada in , 61 , 142 n Palmerston, Lord , 56 n Panama, 142 , 142 n Panama Cana l tolls , 134 n Panama City , Panama , 14 2 Panel o n Economi c Aspect s o f Defenc e Policy, 100 , 15 9 Paris, Canadia n Commissione r in , 6 6 Paris, France , 14 3 Parkin, Georg e R. , 28 , 29n Parliament, 76 , 93 , 95 ; dissolutio n of , 103; an d foreig n policy , 103-2 3 passim; Speec h fro m th e Throne , 111; Librar y of, 11 7 Parliament, member s of , 188 ; French speaking Liberals , 95 ; i n Secon d World War , 111-12 ; an d foreig n policy, 112-17 ; Britis h Columbia , 171 parliamentary assistants : t o Presiden t of th e Priv y Council , 21-2 , 189n ; to th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , 2 2 parliamentary committees, 118-23 . Se e also: Hous e o f Commons , commit tees Parliamentary Pres s Gallery , 118 , 19 3 parliamentary secretaries : t o th e Secre tary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , 22, 12 1 parliamentary unde r secretaries : t o th e Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 2 1 parties, political : Liberal , 15 , 105 , 114n; Conservative , 27 , 37 ; C.C.F., 44 , 114n ; Progressive , 107 , 178; an d researc h facilities , 11 7 Pauncefote, Si r Julian , 16 2 Peace Conference , Pari s (1919) , 7 , 129 Pearkes, Majo r Genera l G . R. : an d Aleutian campaign , 82-4 ; an d con scription crisi s (1944) , 93 ; Minis ter o f Nationa l Defence , 9 9 Pearl Harbor , Hawaii , 76 , 188 Pearson, Leste r B. , 15 , 16 , 20 , 23 , 25 , 26, 27 , 37n , 42 , 43 , 44 , 116n , 122 , 144n, 183 , 196 , 197 ; resign s a s Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 23-4 , 56 ; an d L . S . St .

228

INDEX

Laurent, 26-7 ; o n "striped-pants " state o f mind , 44; an d Departmen t of Externa l Affairs , 47 , 69 ; an d parliamentary discussion o f foreign affairs, 112 , 119-20 ; o n Specia l Committee o n Defenc e Expendi ture, 123 ; o n source s o f informa tion, 141-2 , 146n ; an d Sue z crisi s (1956), 173 ; o n negotiation , 177 8, 181 ; o n psychologica l warfare , 182 Peking, People's Republi c of China, 14 4 Pensions an d Nationa l Health , Ministe r of, 14 n Pentagon, 85 , 14 6 Perley, Si r George , 127 , 128 , 12 9 Permanent Advisor y Officer , Leagu e o f Nations, 17 1 Permanent Join t Boar d o n Defenc e (P.J.B.D.), 13 , 62 , 63 , 82 , 88-9 , 89n, 16 7 Permanent Under-Secretar y o f Stat e for Foreig n Affair s (U.K.) , 41 , 41n; Committe e of , 157 , 157 n Peru, 142 n Petain, Marsha l Henri , 96 , 14 0 Philippines, 142 n Picard, L.-P. , 12 1 Pickersgill, J. W., 35n , 37n planning: an d foreig n policy , 149 ; an d U.S.S.R., 151-2 ; an d Wester n liberalism, 151-2 ; an d Afro-Asia n nations, 152 ; an d U.S. , 152-3 ; an d U.K., 15 3 Poland, 142n ; broadcasting to, 19 5 Policy Plannin g Staff , U.S . Stat e De partment, 157 , 157 n Pope, Si r Joseph, 20 , 38 , 40, 46 , 47, 66 , 124, 125 , 126 , 162 , 165 , 170 ; memorandum o f 1907 , 46 , 126 ; Under Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Ex ternal Affairs , 65-6 ; creatio n o f Department o f Externa l Affairs , 126 Pope, Lt.-Gen . Maurice , 43 ; chairman , Canadian Join t Staf f Missio n a t Washington, 63-4 ; an d Aleutia n campaign, 82-5 ; representativ e o f War Committe e o f Cabine t a t Washington, 139-40 ; o n intelli gence i n Secon d Worl d War , 14 0 Portfolio, Ministe r without , 1 4 Portugal, 142 n Postmaster General , 78 , 87 , 17 0 Power, C . G. , 78 ; an d J . L . Ralston ,

88; Associat e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence, 88 ; Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence fo r Air , 88 ; an d conscrip tion crisi s (1944) , 94 ; o n Parlia ment i n Secon d Worl d War , 111 12 President o f th e Priv y Council , 22, 189 , 189n; Parliamentar y Assistant , 21 2, 189 n press, 188 ; i n U.S.A. , 134n , 186 ; a s source o f intelligence , 146 , 146n ; Lester B . Pearson on , 146 n Press Gallery , Parliamentary , 118 , 19 3 pressure groups : an d foreig n policy , 200-1 Preston, W . T . R. , 18 3 Pretoria, Unio n o f Sout h Africa , 13 2 Prime Minister , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 33 , 66 , 121, 145 , 155 , 170 ; primacy of , 3-4; an d foreig n policy , 3-4 , 18 20; an d Cabinet , 4-20 ; an d Secre tary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , 17, 24-8 ; an d Departmen t o f Ex ternal Affairs , 20-1 ; an d Gover nors General , 28-31 ; principa l private secretar y to , 33 ; a s nego tiator, 164 , 175- 6 Prime Ministers ' Meetings , Common wealth: a s source s o f intelligence , 145, 145n ; March 1961 , 145 n Prince Edwar d Island , 11 3 Printing Hous e Square , 136 . Se e als o Times, The Privy Council , 126 ; Presiden t of , 22 , 189, 189n ; Clerk of , 34 , 37 n Progressive party , 107 , 17 8 propaganda: an d diplomacy , 160-1 ; and "publicity, " 182-3 ; an d immi gration, 183 ; an d commercia l policy, 184 ; i n U.S.A. , 184-9 1 Public Information , Committe e o n (U.S.), 184 public opinion , 103-4 , 186-8 ; o n con duct o f Firs t Worl d War , 72 ; an d conscription, 92 ; an d post-194 5 defence policy , 95-8 ; an d "secre t diplomacy," 104 ; an d Chana k crisis, 105 ; indifferenc e t o foreig n affairs, 13 2 Public Works, Ministe r of 24 , 16 9 QUEBEC, provinc e of, 96 , 113 , 167 , 187 ; Lieutenant-Governor, 17 0 Quebec Conferenc e (1943) , 141 Queen's University , 3 9

INDEX RADAR EARL Y WARNIN G SYSTEMS , 9 7

Radio Moscow , 19 5 Radio Prague, 19 5 Rae, Saul , 35n , 53 Ralston, J . L. , 23n. , 78, 79 , 82 ; an d conscription crisis , 90- 2 Read, John , 6 8 reciprocity, 5 Red Cros s Society , Canadian , 6 1 Reid, Escott, 35n , 143, 144 Reid, J. D. , 7 representation abroad , diplomatic , 121 , 141, 142-4 ; Afghanistan , 142 ; Australia, 142n , 192; Austria, 142; Belgium, 142 , 142n; Berlin, 142n; Brazil, 142n ; Burma , 142 , 142n; Cambodia, 142 ; Ceylon , 142n ; Chile, 142n ; China, People' s Re public of , 143 ; China, Republi c of , 141, 142 ; Colombia, 142n ; Costa Rica, 142 , 142n ; Cuba , 142n ; Czechoslovakia, 142n ; Denmark , 142n; Dominica n Republic , 142n ; Ecuador, 142n ; Finland , 142n ; France, 142 , 142n, 143, 167, 169, 192; Germany , Federa l Republi c of, 142n ; Ghana , 142n ; Greece , 142n; Haiti , 142n ; Honduras, 142n; Hungary, 142 ; Iceland, 142 , 142n; India, 142n , 143, 144 ; Indonesia , 142n, 143 ; Iran, 142n ; Iraq, 142 ; Ireland, 142n ; Israel, 142n ; Italy, 135, 142n ; Japan, 134 , 142n, 169; Jordan, 142 ; Korea, Republi c of , 142; Lebanon , 142n , 143; Luxembourg, 142 , 142n ; Malaya , 142 , 142n; Mexico , 142n ; Netherlands, 142n; Ne w Zealand , 142n ; Nica ragua, 142 , 142n ; Nigeria, 142n ; North Atlanti c Treat y Organiza tion, 142 ; Norway , 142 , 142n ; Organization fo r Europea n Eco nomic Co-operation , 142 ; Pakistan, 142n; Panama , 142 , 142n ; Peru , 142n; Philippines , 142n ; Poland , 142n; Portugal , 142n ; Spain , 142n; Sweden, 142n ; Turkey , 142n ; Union o f Sout h Africa , 142n ; Union o f Sovie t Socialis t Repub lics, 141 , 142n ; United Ara b Re public, 142n ; Unite d Kingdom , 142n, 143 , 144, 146, 163, 165, 169, 192; Unite d State s o f America , 120, 133-4 , 142n , 143 , 144 , 146 , 163, 165 , 169, 192; Uruguay, 142n;

229

Venezuela, 142n ; Vichy, 140 , 140n; Vietnam, 142 ; Wes t Indies , The , 142n; Yugoslavia , 142n . See also: ambassadors; Hig h Commissioner s for Canada ; ministers , diplomatic ; missions, diplomati c Resolution IX , 13 0 Riddell, W . A. , 22 , 171- 3 passim; "Riddell incident, " 22 , 171- 3 Riegelman, Harold , 174 n Robertson, Norman , 20 , 41 , 42n , 67 , 143, 17 4 Rogers, Norman , 77 , 87 , 8 8 Rome, Italy , 19 7 Roosevelt, Franklin , 84 , 107 , 141, 155, 166, 176 , 181, 185, 187; and W . L . Mackenzie King , 139 , 176 Roosevelt, Theodore , 18 0 Root, Elihu , 164 , 165 Rostow, W . W. , 15 3 Roumania, 11 3 Rowell, N . W. , 6 , 7n , 71 ; o n Depart ment o f Externa l Affairs , 4 6 Roy, Philippe : Commissione r i n Paris , 42; Ministe r t o France , 42 , 167 ; on Hitler , 135 ; Commissione r General o f Canad a i n France , 16 7 Royal Canadia n Ai r Force, 62, 63, 64n, 72, 92 , 99n Royal Canadia n Mounte d Police , 14 6 Royal Canadia n Navy, 62, 63 , 72, 9 2 Royal Commissio n o n Espionage , 14 7 Royal Navy , 7 3 Royal New Zealand Air Force, 138n Russell, Lor d William , 56 n Russia, 154 , 165, 184. See also U.S.S.R. SACKVILLE, N.B., 194, 202 Sackville-West, Si r Lionel , 16 3 St. John , N.B. , 172 St. Laurent , L . S. , 15 , 27 , 120 , 144n; Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 23 , 23n , 25; Governmen t of, 23-4 ; an d W . L . Mackenzi e King, 25-6; and Leste r B . Pearson , 26-7; an d conscription , 97 ; an d Harry S . Truman, 176 ; and Dwigh t D. Eisenhower , 176- 7 St. Lawrenc e Waterway , 107 , 113, 158 Salisbury, Lord , 10 0 sanctions, 109 ; oil, 171-3 passim Satow, Ernest : Guide t o Diplomatic Practice, 16 0 Saturday Night, 109-1 0

230

INDEX

Scotland, 18 3 Sea Island , Georgia , 17 2 Second Worl d War . Se e Worl d Wa r I I Senate, 104 ; Libera l majorit y in , 113 ; and foreig n policy , 113-17 ; an d parliamentary part y caucus , 11 5 Senate (U.S.) , 114 , 118 , 134n ; Foreig n Relations Committee , 20 0 Sevigny, Pierre , 98- 9 Shimizu, S. , 16 8 Ship Subsid y Bill (U.S.) , 134 n Siberia: Arm y in , 7 , 130 ; Economi c Mission to ; 141 , 184 Sicily, Arm y in , 81- 2 Sieyes, Abbe , 2 4 Sifton, A . L. , 7 Sifton, Si r Clifford , 5 ; o n immigration , 183 Simonds, Lt.-Gen . Guy : o n Chief s o f Staff Committee , 36 , 99 ; o n P.J.B.D., 99-100 ; firs t comman dant, Nationa l Defenc e College , 102; on civil-militar y relations, 102 Sino-Soviet bloc , 1 9 Skelton, O . D. , 9 , 18n , 66 , 158n ; an d W. L . Mackenzi e King , 18n , 39 41; influenc e o n policy , 40 , 40n ; and R . B . Bennett , 41; o n Depart ment o f Externa l Affairs , 46 ; "young men, " 47 ; an d generalis t ideal, 53 ; an d "Riddel l incident, " 172 Smith, Arthur, 17 4 Smith, Sidney : Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , 24 , 27-8 ; an d John Diefenbaker , 27- 8 Solandt, Omond , 123n South Africa , Unio n of . Se e Unio n o f South Afric a South America , 19 4 Spain, 142n , 16 2 specialists, 56 ; and "generalists, " 53- 4 Spicer, Keith : o n administratio n o f foreign ai d programmes, 59n , 60 n Stalin, 95 , 137 , 20 0 Standing Committe e o n Externa l Affairs, Hous e o f Commons . Se e House o f Commons , committee s Standley, Admira l Willia m H. , 16 2 Starr, Michael , 19 9 State, Secretar y of , 20 ; Department , 158n State, Secretar y o f (U.S.) , 60 , 166 , 18 6 State Department (U.S.) , 54, 82, 85, 89, 125, 141 , 157n , 175n ; Cultura l

Relations Division , 193 ; propa ganda, 200 Stephen, Si r James , 3 3 Stimson, Henry , 84 , 8 5 Strang, Lord , 157 n Strathcona, Lord , 18 3 Stuart, Lt.-Gen . Kenneth , 83 , 84 , 90- 1 Suez Canal , 15 4 Suez crisi s (1956) , 26 , 27 , 28 , 17 3 Sweden, 64 , 142n ; broadcasting to , 20 2 Switzerland, 142 n TARIFF, 105 ; legislatio n (U.S.) , 134 n Tarte, Israel , 16 9 technical assistance : Unite d Nations , 5 8 technology: Soviet , 152 ; an d negotia tion, 162 , 170 , 17 4 Tegucigalpa, Honduras , 14 2 Thornton, Si r Edward , 16 3 Timberwolf, Operation , 8 2 Times, The, 132 , 169 . See also Printin g House Squar e Tocqueville, Alexis de, 15 3 Tokyo, Japan , 12 5 Toronto, Ont., 9 7 Trade an d Commerce , Departmen t of , 4, 15 , 19 , 22 , 33 , 34 , 38 , 192 ; International Economi c an d Tech nical Co-operatio n Division , 19 , 59, 59n ; an d Departmen t o f Ex ternal Affairs , 57-61 ; an d foreig n aid, 58-61 ; Trad e Commissione r Service, 59n ; an d intelligence , 130 ; representation abroad , 14 2 Trade an d Commerce , Ministe r of , 15 , 17, 19 , 57 ; Deputy , 14 1 trade commissioners , 57- 8 Transport, Departmen t of , 3 3 Transportation Ac t (U.S.) , 134 n Treasury Board , 15-17 , 19 , 59 Treaties: Behrin g Se a Seal , 5 Trondheim, Norway , 7 8 Truman, Harr y S. , 26 , 17 6 Turkey, 64 , 18n , 142 n Tweedsmuir, Lord : an d W. L. Macken zie King , 3 0 "twilight war, " 7 7 UKRAINE, SOVIET , 113 ; broadcastin g to , 195-201 Ukrainian-Canadians: an d foreig n policy, 200- 1 unconditional surrender , 13 8 "under Cabinet, " 33- 8 passim

INDEX Union fo r Democrati c Control , 105 , 106n Union Government , 6 , 8 , 1 2 Union o f Sout h Africa , 142n ; with draws applicatio n t o remai n i n Commonwealth a s republic , 145 n Union o f Sovie t Socialis t Republic s (U.S.S.R.), 53 , 64 ; Sino-Sovie t bloc, 19 ; invasio n o f b y German y predicted, 137 ; representatio n in , 141, 142n ; an d planning , 151-2 ; diplomacy of , 152 ; propagand a of , 194; broadcastin g to , 19 5 United Ara b Republic , 142 n United Kingdom , 54 , 73 , 76 , 139 , 154 , 175, 183 , 186 , 195 ; foreig n service , 43, 66 ; Canadia n representatio n in, 142n , 143 , 144 , 146 , 163 , 165, 169, 192 ; a s sourc e o f intelligence , 145; plannin g and nationa l "style, " 153 United Nations , 26 , 18 8 Charter, 9 5 Emergency Force , 6 9 General Assembly : delegatio n to , 26 , 115, 173-4 , 174n ; U.S . delegatio n to, 174 n Permanent Missio n o f Canad a to , 142-3 Security Council , 43 ; Canadia n representative, 17 3 United State s o f America , 64 , 138 , 158 , 195; foreig n servic e of , 43 ; civil military relation s in , 76 ; influenc e in Canada , 97 ; representatio n in , 120, 133-4 , 142n , 143 , 144 , 146 , 163, 165 , 169 , 192 ; governmen t agencies, 141 ; a s sourc e o f intelli gence, 145-7 , 149 ; embass y a t Ottawa, 146 ; planning and nationa l "style," 152-3 ; machiner y fo r ne gotiating with , 163-8 ; negotiation s with, 175-6 ; inadequatel y in formed abou t Canada , 183 , 187- 8 University o f London : Schoo l o f Oriental an d Africa n Studies , 5 5 University o f Montreal , 4 6 University o f Toronto , 27 , 13 6 Uruguay, 142 n VANCOUVER, B.C. , 97 , 16 8 Vanier, Majo r Genera l Georges : a s Governor General , 3 1 Vansittart, Lord , 16 0 Venezuela, 142 n

231

Verwoerd, Hendrik , 145 n Vichy, 140 , 140 n Vietnam, Internationa l Truc e Super visory Commissio n for , 14 2 Vining, Charles , 18 9 Vladivostok, 18 4 Voice o f America , 195 , 20 0 WALKER, SI R EDMUND : o n wartim e propaganda t o U.S. , 18 5 Walker, W . H. , 38 , 46 , 65 , 67 , 158 n War Cabine t (U.K.) , 129 , 13 2 War Committee , Cabinet . Se e Cabinet , committees War Committee , Unio n Government , 12 War Counci l (U.K.) , 12 8 War Departmen t (U.S.) : oppose s Canadian Join t Staf f Missio n a t Washington, 62- 3 War Offic e (U.K.) , 7 7 War, Secretar y o f (U.S.) , 62 , 8 4 War, Secretar y of Stat e for (U.K.) , 128 Wartime Informatio n Boar d (W.I.B.) , 22, 194 ; origins , 188-9 ; criticism s of, 190-1 ; post-wa r role , 191- 2 Washington, D.C. , 69 , 125 , 132 , 139 , 143, 145 , 17 5 Washington Disarmamen t Conferenc e (1921-2), 3 8 "weasel-adjectives," 15 3 Welles, Sumner , 139 n Wellesley, Si r Victor , 16 0 West Indies , the , 142 n Wheare, K . C . : o n committees , 36 ; on civil servant s an d politics , 3 6 White, Si r Thomas , 7 White House , 17 6 Wilgress, Dana : Ministe r t o U.S.S.R. , 140-1; Economi c Missio n t o Sibe ria, 14 1 Willingdon, Lord : an d W . L . Macken zie King , 3 0 Wilson, Si r Henry , 7 2 Winant, Joh n G. , 16 2 Winnipeg Tribune, 11 0 Woodsworth, J . S. , 106n , 108 , 10 9 World Wa r I , 14 , 66, 77 , 93 ; an d mili tary establishment , 71-2 ; an d intelligence, 127-8 ; "secre t diplo macy," 17 8 World Wa r II , 14 , 22 , 33 , 34 , 55 , 6 4 75-96 passim, 99 , 100 , 136 , 155 , 169, 176 ; an d Cabinet , 11-12 ;

232 INDE

X

and militar y establishment , 75-6 ; Wrong , Hume , 47 , 67 , 14 8 prestige o f Parliamen t during , 108 , 111-12; an d intelligence , 149 ; an d YOR K CENTRE , membe r for , 11 6 interdepartmental committees , Yor k West , membe r for , 12 0 158-9 Yugoslavia , 64, 138 , 142n ; broadcasting Wriston Repor t (U.S.) , 5 0 t o B.B.C.) , 200

CANADIAN UNIVERSIT Y PAPERBOOK S Other titles in the serie s 9 Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System C. B. Macpherson 14 Th e Life an d Times of Confederation P. B. Waite 17 A Prophet in Politics Kenneth McNaugh t 18 Democratic Government i n Canada Robert MacGrego r Dawso n 23 Towards a World o f Plenty? Barbara War d 38 Th e Union Nationale Herbert F . Quinn 41 Th e Future of Canadian Federalism Paul-André Crépeau an d C . B. Macpherso n 54 Th e Progressive Party i n Canada W. L. Morton 58 Th e Protective Tariff i n Canada's Development J. H. Dales 67 In Defence o f Canada, Volume I : From th e Great Wa r t o the Depression James Eayr s 74 I n Defence o f Canada, Volume II : Appeasement an d Rearmament James Eayrs 78 Th e Social Credit Movement i n Alberta John A. Irving 83 Pollution, Property, an d Prices J. H. Dales 84 Agenda 1970: Proposals fo r a Creative Politics edited by Trevor Lloy d an d Jack McLeo d 95 Th e Politics of Survival: Th e Conservative Party o f Canada, 1939-45 J. L. Granatstei n 97 Close the 49th parallel etc: The Americanization o f Canada edited b y Ian Lumsde n