The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada 9781442631762

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THE AR T O F TH E POSSIBL E

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THE ART

OF THE POSSIBLE

Government and

Foreign Polic y in Canada

UNIVERSITY O F TORONTO PRES S

James Eayrs

© Universit y of Toronto Press 1961 Reprinted 1966 , 1971, in the U.S.A. ISBN 0-8020-1164-0 (clothboun d edition) ISBN 0-8020-6054-4 (paperboun d edition )

Acknowledgments

This stud y o f ho w institutions , agencie s an d servant s o f governmen t conduct Canada' s externa l affair s i s part o f a projec t o f th e Schoo l of International Servic e of American University, Washington, D.C., which , under a gran t fro m th e Rockefelle r Foundation , i s sponsorin g a n investigation o f th e wa y foreig n policy i s mad e i n variou s countries . I am gratefu l t o Dr . Kennet h Thompson o f the Foundatio n fo r suggestin g me as a possible author, an d to Dean Ernest S. Griffith o f the Schoo l fo r inviting me to take part. I recall with pleasure the lively weekl y meeting s of th e semina r of staf f an d student s a t th e Schoo l directe d b y Professo r Charles O . Lerche , Jr. , i n whic h I wa s a s regula r a participan t a s th e vagaries o f commutin g between Toront o an d Washingto n durin g th e Fall an d Winte r o f 1959-6 0 woul d permit . I a m gratefu l t o th e authorities a t the Universit y of Toront o fo r permissio n to absen t mysel f for tw o or three days a week for this purpose, an d I shoul d lik e to offe r belated thank s to m y student s o f tha t tim e fo r thei r forbearanc e whil e I wa s living too much "the airpor t existence. " In writing the book I have been greatl y assiste d b y those who gener ously allowe d m e t o mak e us e o f thei r ow n unpublishe d work : Pro fessor J . R . Mallor y of McGill University, who made availabl e chapter s of hi s work in progres s o n th e governmen t of Canada ; th e Hon . J . W . Pickersgill, wh o enable d m e to consul t the firs t volum e of hi s infinitely valuable Mackenzie King Record in proof form ; General Mauric e Pope, who allowe d m e t o quot e passage s fro m th e manuscrip t o f hi s auto biography, whic h is happily to be published a t a later date ; Mr. Mitchel l Sharp, fo r allowin g m e t o us e hi s speech , "Reflection s o f a Forme r Civil Servant"; Mr . Keit h Spicer, who provided me with an unpublishe d paper o n th e administratio n o f Canadia n foreig n aid an d place d a t m y disposal hi s first-han d knowledg e of thi s subject . I a m indebte d t o m y colleague, Professo r Pau l Fox , fo r allowin g m e t o mak e us e o f th e records o f his extensiv e interviews wit h member s of Parliament . I wa s also fortunat e in bein g abl e t o rea d th e unpublishe d doctora l thesi s of Professor R . Barr y Farrel l o f Northwestern University, o n "Th e Plan ning and Conduct o f Foreign Polic y i n Canada, " representing , s o far a s I know , the only research done on the subjec t o f my own book. Among the man y collections o f papers which I hav e used, none has bee n mor e

VI ACKNOWLEDGMENT

S

valuable than the papers of the late W. L. Mackenzi e King . I a m grate ful t o hi s literary executors , Dr . W . Kaye Lamb, Mr . F . A . McGregor , the Hon. J . W . Pickersgill, an d Mr. Norma n Robertson , fo r permissio n to quote from thi s immense source; for permission t o quote from certai n documents draw n fro m th e perio d 1924-3 9 I a m indebte d a s wel l t o Dr. Blai r Neatby , wh o i s writin g the officia l biograph y fo r thes e years . I wan t particularl y t o pa y tribut e t o th e patien t an d alway s helpfu l services o f th e staf f o f th e Publi c Archive s o f Canada , especiall y Mis s Jacqueline Cot e (no w Mrs . Blai r Neatby ) an d he r assistant s whos e long an d carefu l labour s hav e transformed some two million document s of th e Kin g Paper s int o a n incomparabl e instrumen t fo r th e stud y of Canadian politics an d society . I a m gratefu l a s wel l t o thos e wh o hav e se t asid e mor e importan t business to read and comment upo n m y manuscript. Mr. Joh n Holmes, President o f the Canadia n Institute of International Affair s an d formerly Assistant Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , rea d mos t o f it an d offered , ou t o f hi s grea t experience , man y helpfu l suggestions . Colonel C . P . Stacey , Directo r o f th e Historica l Sectio n o f th e Genera l Staff an d no w Professo r o f Histor y a t th e Universit y o f Toronto , rea d the chapte r o n "Th e Militar y Establishment" ; his unrivalled knowledg e of thi s subject , generousl y shared , prevente d a numbe r o f error s o f fact an d judgmen t large an d small . A goo d frien d o f man y years rea d the entir e manuscrip t a t ver y shor t notice , an d m y gratitud e t o hi m i s in n o wa y diminishe d b y th e fac t that , bein g i n governmen t service , he prefers no t t o b e mentione d by name . The quatrai n on page 16 7 is from Pagett, M.P., b y Rudyard Kipling, and i s reproduced wit h th e kin d permissio n of Mrs. George Bambridge, the Macmilla n Co . o f Canada, Methue n an d Co. , Ltd. , an d Doubleda y & Co., Inc . My fina l pleasan t dut y i s t o expres s m y thank s t o th e member s o f the Universit y o f Toront o Pres s fo r thei r helpfu l co-operatio n a t ever y stage o f th e productio n o f m y book ; an d especiall y t o Mis s Jea n Jamieson, o f its Editorial Staff , fo r s o much friendly encouragemen t an d skilful aid . J.E. University o f Toront o July 196 1

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS / v I/THE POLITICA L EXECUTIVE/ 3

The Prim e Minister ; Prim e Ministe r an d Cabinet ; Prim e Minister and Foreign Minister ; Prim e Minister an d Governo r General

II/THE BUREAUCRAC Y / 32

The Senio r Civi l Servant ; Th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs ; Th e Hea d o f Mission ; Th e Foreig n Ser vice Officer ; Th e Attache ; Th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs

III/THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMENT/7 0

The Civil-Military Tradition; Soldier s and Governments: Th e Years between the Wars; Th e Secon d World War: The Principle o f Civilia n Supremacy ; Civil-Militar y Relation s i n th e Nuclear Ag e

IV / TH E LEGISLATURE / 10 3

Foreign Policy , Legislative-Executive Relations, and the Parliamentary System ; "Parliamen t Wil l Decide" ; Th e Cabinet , the Hous e o f Commons , an d Discussio n o f Foreig n Affairs ; The Member of Parliament and Foreign Policy; Parliamentar y Committees

V/INTELLIGENCE/124

The Origin s an d Developmen t o f Intelligenc e Facilities ; In telligence an d Foreig n Policy : Th e Year s betwee n th e Wars ; Intelligence an d Foreign Policy: The Second World War; Th e Contemporary Intelligenc e Community

VI / PLANNING/T 51 Plan o r No Plan?; Foreig n Polic y Plannin g an d th e Nationa l Style; Machiner y fo r Foreig n Polic y Plannin g VII / NEGOTIATIO N / 160 The Negotiato r an d Hi s Changin g World ; Th e Developmen t of Negotiatin g Machinery; Policy-makin g an d Negotiation: A t

Vlll CONTENT

S

Home and Abroad; Policy-makin g and Negotiation: Abov e and Below ; Policy-makin g an d Negotiation : Ope n an d Closed Vlll / PROPAGAND A / 18 2

Propaganda versus "Publicity" ; Earl y Propagand a fo r Immi gration and Trade; Wartim e Propaganda in the United States; Propaganda an d Foreig n Polic y sinc e 1945

REFERENCES / 203 INDEX/217

THE AR T O F TH E POSSIBL E

To E.K.W. in gratitude

ChapterOne TH

E POLITICA L

EXECUTIVE

THE PRIM E MINISTE R

Politics i n Canad a hav e produce d government s of extraordinar y longe vity. The y hav e als o produce d smal l an d feebl e oppositions , t o th e debility o f Parliamen t an d th e aggrandizemen t o f th e Executive . Th e Cabinet stand s supreme, an d withi n hi s Cabine t (his , for h e make s i t and ma y brea k it ) th e Prim e Ministe r enjoy s a pre-eminenc e othe r parliamentary system s seldom provide . The greate r prestig e o f hi s offic e an d th e greate r powe r o f hi s perso n are most obviously accounted for by the lesser lustr e o f his colleagues in Cabinet, an d thi s i n tur n b y a conventio n o f cabinet-makin g wherei n the political Executiv e becomes a miniature of the Canadian community . Regions, provinces , race s an d creed s ar e represente d i n th e Ministr y with as exact fidelity to the origina l a s may be allowe d b y the sometime s competing consideration s o f securin g tolerable efficienc y i n administra tion an d havin g t o rewar d friend s an d punis h foes . N o wonde r tha t cabinets o f al l th e talent s ar e rar e i n Canadia n politica l life : wha t i s more remarkabl e i s tha t powerfu l an d abl e ministrie s occasionall y emerge. Bu t th e genera l resul t i s th e elevatio n o f th e Prim e Ministe r over al l th e othe r ministers . Thos e whos e claim s t o offic e deriv e principally fro m th e accident s o f geograph y or th e imperative s o f part y stand o n a lowe r leve l o f competence ; whil e hi s equal s i n politica l sagacity an d administrativ e abilit y ca n neve r forge t tha t i t i s t o th e Prime Ministe r the y ow e thei r portfolio s an d a t hi s pleasur e continu e to hold them . The usual description o f the Prime Minister' s relationshi p to hi s ministeria l colleague s a s primus inter pares is eve n les s accurat e in Canadia n than i n Britis h parliamentary practice. "H e canno t b e first among his equals for the very excellent reason tha t he has no equals." 1 All thi s applie s wit h ver y specia l forc e t o foreig n affairs . Th e Prim e Minister bear s inevitabl y a uniqu e responsibilit y fo r hi s country' s ex ternal polic y eve n i f b y tast e an d temperamen t h e ha s littl e interes t i n it; an d circumstance s mak e it likely tha t h e will have to o muc h interest

4 TH

E ART OF THE POSSIBLE

rather tha n to o little . Importan t official s concerne d wit h th e formula tion an d executio n o f foreign policy ar e appointe d o n his recommenda tion; ambassadors , general s an d deput y minister s ar e alik e beholde n t o him for thei r positions . T o hi m ar e normall y addresse d importan t com munications fro m th e politica l head s o f foreig n governments , an d wit h the technicall y non-foreign government s of th e Commonwealt h o f Na tions consultatio n proceed s conventionall y o n a Prim e Minister-to Prime Minister basis. To him are referred important foreig n policy com munications receive d i n th e Department s o f Externa l Affairs , Nationa l Defence, Trad e an d Commerce an d others . Visitin g dignitaries , wishin g to exchang e impressions of th e internationa l scene, wil l want t o confe r with th e Prim e Ministe r rathe r tha n wit h an y o f hi s colleagues . Good will tour s i n foreig n land s ad d furthe r t o hi s rang e o f influentia l con tacts, providin g sources o f privat e informatio n long afte r th e journey' s end, a s do excursions into the increasingly fashionable realm of "summi t diplomacy." I t i s the Prim e Minister' s tas k t o shap e th e recommenda tions o f hi s foreig n polic y technician s (amon g who m th e Secretar y o f State fo r External Affair s ma y or may not b e numbered) t o the require ments of domestic politics an d to impar t to them the correctives deeme d necessary fo r partisa n advantage . And i n time s o f crisis , whe n th e na tion i s rouse d fro m it s accustome d privat e preoccupation s t o appre hensive awarenes s o f externa l danger , i t i s th e Prim e Ministe r wh o through pres s an d radi o an d televisio n must play the fathe r figure , pro viding reassurance and guidance and hope. Foreign polic y is his prerogative; the range and intimacy of his concern ar e rarely matche d b y an y of his colleagues , eve n b y hi s foreig n secretary . PRIME MINISTE R AN D CABINE T

The exten t t o whic h th e Prim e Ministe r allow s member s o f hi s Cabi net t o shar e i n th e mysterie s o f foreig n polic y i s a s muc h a matte r o f individual temperamen t an d styl e as it is a matter o f constitutiona l law , perhaps a goo d dea l more . A Prim e Minister ma y resemble i n thi s th e Duke o f Plazo Toro , leading "hi s regimen t from behind" ; anothe r ma y prefer th e vanguard. Some have been possessive , eve n secretive, i n thei r conduct o f foreig n affairs ; other s hav e take n thei r colleague s int o thei r confidence an d looke d t o the m for counsel . T o stat e wit h an y precisio n the natur e o f a Prim e Minister' s relation s wit h hi s Cabine t i n matter s of foreig n policy o r an y othe r kin d o f polic y i s no t easy ; a stric t con vention prescribe s tha t Cabine t proceeding s are secre t an d mus t remain

THE POLITICA L EXECUTIV E 5

secret.* Bu t fro m availabl e privat e paper s an d certai n othe r evidenc e (which cannot , however , includ e Cabine t minutes) , som e impressio n may b e gaine d o f ho w variou s prim e minister s hav e gon e abou t thei r foreign polic y busines s i n relatio n t o thei r Cabine t colleagues . WDfrid Laurier' s manne r o f conductin g Cabine t busines s ha s bee n the subjec t o f conflictin g opinion. Accordin g t o hi s officia l biographer , "he believe d i n givin g ever y ministe r wid e latitude an d larg e responsi bility. . . . I n cabine t council s h e never playe d th e dictator." 2 Agains t this may b e se t the testimon y o f Si r Clifford Sifton , a powerfu l membe r of hi s Government : " I wa s no t Si r Wilfri d Laurier' s colleagu e fo r eight year s withou t findin g ou t tha t h e is , despit e hi s courtes y an d gracious charm , a masterful ma n set on having his own way, and equall y resolute tha t hi s colleagues shal l no t hav e thei r wa y unless thi s i s quit e agreeable t o him." 3 Laurie r himsel f rarel y wrot e o n th e matte r an d when he did , a s to a friend durin g the earl y year s of his administration , not ver y helpfully : "Ho w littl e peopl e reall y kno w o f wha t i s reall y going on in a Cabinet." 4 In foreig n affair s Laurie r wa s readie r tha n mos t o f hi s successor s t o allow th e participatio n o f hi s Cabine t colleagues . Suc h a dispositio n owed muc h to hi s serenit y of spiri t an d a temperament t o whic h secret iveness an d paranoi a wer e wholl y alien . I t wa s als o a consequenc e o f strong an d ofte n conflictin g view s hel d b y hi s colleague s abou t th e major issues : reciprocit y (whic h brough t abou t Sifton' s resignatio n i n 1905), imperia l preference , th e Boe r War , th e contributio n t o Empir e defence, orienta l immigration . I n addition , lac k o f diplomati c repre sentatives abroa d mean t tha t negotiation s wer e frequentl y entrusted t o ministers o f department s principall y concerne d (se e below , chapte r vn). Suc h functiona l divisio n o f labou r i n externa l affair s naturall y imparted a collegial character to consideratio n o f foreign policy matters. It als o tende d t o dela y thei r settlement . "I t ha s bee n impossibl e t o ge t anything out o f you r Ministers," th e Britis h ambassado r a t Washingto n complained t o th e Governo r Genera l i n 1910 : I ha d take n u p th e Behrin g Se a Sea l Treat y wit h th e U.S . an d the y wer e very compliant , apparentl y dispose d t o mee t al l Canada' s objections . Bu t since I reporte d this , no w som e thre e week s ago , no t a wor d i n repl y ca n be got , eve n thoug h I hav e writte n bot h t o Laurie r an d t o you r Adminis trator. Perhap s thi s i s du e t o th e scatterin g o f Ministers , an d t o th e habi t *As a n illustratio n o f th e severit y o f thi s conventio n on e ma y not e tha t a resigning Ministe r i s no t allowe d t o disclos e th e difference s wit h hi s colleague s that have led to his resignation without the authorizatio n o f th e Prim e Ministe r as the custodia n of Cabine t secrets .

6 TH

E ART OF TH E POSSIBL E

of embodyin g al l decision s i n a Minut e o f th e Priv y Council . Tha t i s a pla n which i s really quit e unfitte d for negotiation s wit h anothe r power . I t make s every ste p i n progres s depen d o n th e possibilit y o f gettin g Minister s to gether fo r a Council. . . .5

All thi s di d no t mean , o f course , tha t th e Prim e Ministe r migh t no t embark o n negotiation s withou t th e knowledg e or consen t o f hi s Cabi net; a s R . L . Borde n pu t i t h i 1909 , whe n Leader o f th e Opposition , "matters o f a confidential character, some of which possibly could not b e disclosed eve n t o th e Cabine t a s a whole , shoul d com e i n th e firs t in stance to the Prime Minister." 6 Thus, Laurier' s attempt i n 191 0 t o enlist the suppor t o f the Vatica n t o overcom e clerica l oppositio n t o hi s nava l policy remaine d a secret betwee n himself and his confidential envoy, the Chief Justic e o f Canada ; an d Borde n kep t hi s ow n counse l whil e cor responding wit h Winsto n Churchil l i n 1912-1 4 o n th e natur e o f th e emergency created b y the Germa n naval programme. But i n these earl y years of the centur y the usua l practice wa s to plac e foreig n policy mat ters befor e the Cabine t a s they arose . Few problem s o f externa l policy , nava l polic y apart , trouble d th e Government o f R . L . Borde n betwee n 191 1 an d th e outbrea k o f war , and eve n wa r lef t Canad a relativel y fre e fro m foreig n polic y decision s until 191 7 whe n th e creatio n o f th e Imperia l Wa r Cabine t provide d machinery for the Dominions to obtain wha t was ambiguously described in a famou s constitutiona l documen t a s "a n adequat e voic e i n foreig n policy an d i n foreig n relations. " I t wa s a t th e meeting s of th e Imperia l War Cabine t tha t Si r Rober t Borde n (a s h e ha d the n become ) firs t expressed a Canadia n viewpoin t on suc h question s a s peac e terms , th e post-war settlement , an d gran d strategy . I t migh t b e though t tha t th e Prime Minister' s participatio n a t suc h exalted gathering s left littl e scop e for th e judgmen t of colleagues i n foreign and imperia l decision-making . But s o fa r fro m tryin g t o exploi t hi s privilege d position , Borde n wa s anxious tha t othe r member s of hi s Governmen t accompan y hi m t o th e United Kingdom , an d hi s importan t intervention s i n th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet were usually preceded b y consultation wit h them. Indeed, i t was at Borden' s insistenc e tha t N . W . Rowell , th e leadin g Libera l i n th e coalition Unio n Government an d whos e interests i n internationa l affair s were n o les s tha n hi s own , attende d meeting s o f th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet i n 1918 . Such solicitude migh t owe something to th e difficultie s of runnin g a coalitio n administratio n (th e hea d o f whic h i s mor e tha n ordinarily beholde n t o minister s not o f hi s ow n party), bu t i t wa s als o entirely i n keepin g wit h Borden' s manne r o f leadership . Borde n pos sessed many of the characteristic s o f his distinguishe d predecessor. Lik e

THE POLITICA L EXECUTIVE 7

Laurier he wa s prepared an d o n occasion anxiou s t o delegat e responsi bility; hi s diar y expresse s irritation whe n colleague s pestere d unduly. * He allowe d tw o member s o f his Cabine t t o remai n i n Londo n through out mos t o f th e wa r (Si r Georg e Perle y a s Actin g Hig h Commissione r and A . E . Kem p a s Oversea s Ministe r o f Militia) , wherea s Mackenzi e King wa s late r sternl y determine d t o preven t th e Hig h Commissione r from sharin g i n the makin g of policy an d strongl y disapprove d o f over seas ministers . Alon e o f th e Dominio n prim e minister s a t th e Pari s Peace Conference , Borde n brough t n o fewe r tha n thre e member s o f his Cabine t (Si r Georg e Foster , A . L . Sifto n an d C . J . Doherty ) an d all wer e assigne d majo r responsibilities . Borden' s method s o f reachin g decisions i n foreig n polic y ar e wel l illustrate d b y th e followin g extract s from telegram s exchange d betwee n Borde n i n Pari s an d th e Actin g Prime Minister , Si r Thomas White, i n Ottawa , concernin g the despatc h of Canadia n troops to Siberia at the en d o f the war : White t o Borden (November 22 , 1918): Man y member s o f Counci l strongly oppose d t o ou r sendin g troops no w ready t o Siberi a an d continuin g expedition. Mewbur n [Ministe r o f Militi a an d Defence ] ha s delaye d shi p sailing o n Monday. . . . Borden t o White (November 24 , 1918): Telegra m received . I n m y judgment w e shal l stan d i n a n unfortunat e situatio n unles s w e procee d wit h Siberia expedition . W e made definit e arrangements with British Governmen t on whic h the y hav e relied . The y coul d reasonabl y hol d u s responsibl e fo r great inevitabl e dela y i n makin g othe r arrangements . Canada' s presen t position an d prestig e would be singularl y impaired b y deliberat e withdrawal from definit e arrangement s under thes e conditions . . . . However I leave the matter t o judgmen t of Counci l wit h the stron g feelin g that withdrawa l fro m our deliberat e engagemen t wil l hav e extremel y unfortunat e effect . Foster , Sifton, Dohert y concur . White t o Borden (November 25 , 1918): Ver y stron g feelin g i n Counci l against continuanc e Siberia n Expedition , Ballantyne , Crerar , Calde r an d Reid mos t strongl y opposed . Crera r ha s writte n m e lette r o f protest . S o far a s I ca n judg e publi c opinio n wil l no t suppor t furthe r actio n o n an y large scal e i f a t all . . . . M y ow n view afte r hearin g man y discussion s i n Council i s tha t Canad a should , no w tha t th e wa r i s ove r an d n o necessit y exists fo r th e re-establishmen t o f th e Easter n front , discontinu e furthe r participation an d expense. . . . Borden t o White (November 28 , 1918): You r telegra m . . . respectin g Siberian expedition . I f feelin g bot h i n Cabine t an d amon g publi c i s s o strongly oppose d we leave question t o your ow n determination. . . . *"Rowell bega n t o bombar d m e with letter s about variou s subject s . . ." (Jun e 9, 1918) ; "Rowell still bombarding me with letters . . ." (Jun e 15 , 1918); "Rowell left thi s mornin g an d shortl y afte r a showe r o f letter s . . . " (Jul y 27 , 1918) ; "Telegrams fro m Whit e thic k a s autum n leave s i n Vallambros a . . ." (Nov . 27, 1918).

8 TH

E ART OF TH E POSSIBLE

White t o Harden (November 28 , 1918): W e hav e decide d t o procee d with Siberia n expeditio n a s originall y planned . . . . Yo u ma y regar d th e matter as closed. . . .7 Arthur Meighen , wh o succeede d Borde n a s Prun e Ministe r i n th e Union Governmen t h i July 1920 , displaye d durin g the yea r an d a hal f before th e defea t of his administration a style of leadership ver y differen t from hi s predecessor's . "Hi s intellectua l arrogance, " a n unfriendl y critic ha s observed, "le d hi m to trust too much to his own judgment and he showe d a tendency to disregar d th e advic e o f colleague s who , whil e not hi s equa l i n som e respects , possesse d muc h mor e politica l experi ence and sagacity.... His confidence in the product of his own judgment was s o profoun d an d hi s advocac y s o determine d tha t th e polic y wa s open to little or no discussion, stil l less could it be recast or toned down hi any way to meet the demands or soothe the feelings of dissenting groups or interests."8 Th e majo r foreig n polic y decisio n o f hi s brie f Ministr y o f 1920-1 wa s hi s oppositio n t o th e renewa l o f th e Anglo-Japanes e alli ance. Th e proposal s whic h Arthu r Meighe n pu t before th e Imperia l Conference i n Jun e 192 1 ha d bee n worke d ou t b y himsel f an d Loring Christie of the Department of External Affair s a s early as March, but n o member s o f hi s Cabine t ha d bee n consulte d abou t the m or , a s one Ministe r note d o n Jun e 5 , abou t "an y o f th e possibl e matter s tha t may come up" i n London before he set out. 9 He took non e of his ministerial colleague s wit h him , an d seem s t o hav e consulte d non e whil e there, s o that th e firs t knowledg e of wha t had transpire d wa s conveyed to the m b y th e Prim e Ministe r a t a Cabine t meetin g afte r hi s return . "He appear s t o hav e playe d hi s par t well, " Si r Georg e Foste r wrot e after th e meeting , "— a little too advance d on the Jap. Tr . matte r i n my opinion."10 No Canadia n Prim e Ministe r ha s s o openl y dominate d hi s Cabine t colleagues as R. B. Bennett, the Conservative Prun e Minister fro m 193 0 to 1935 . Th e stor y i s ofte n tol d o f hi s walkin g alone , los t i n thought , when spoke n t o b y a citize n o f Ottawa . "Pleas e d o no t interrup t me, " Bennett replied. "Ca n yo u not see I a m engaged i n a Cabinet meeting? " This (doubtless ) apochrypha l vignett e is altogethe r justifie d b y wha t i s known o f Bennett's conduc t o f governmen t policy a t th e Imperia l Eco nomic Conference of 1932 . "Severa l othe r Canadia n Ministers took par t in th e proceedings, " a Ne w Zealan d delegat e recalled , "bu t i t wa s obvious that non e o f them could agre e to an y decision withou t the prio r consent o f Mr . Bennett." 11 A Canadia n observe r wrot e soo n afte r th e Conference opened : "Bennet t ha s on e qualit y whic h differentiate s hi m from [Mackenzie ] King : i t i s bot h a n asse t an d a liability . Thi s i s hi s

THE POLITICA L EXECUTIV E 9

active min d an d hi s readiness t o plunge." 12 Ther e i s evidence that unti l the fina l day s befor e th e Conferenc e (i t ma y b e th e fina l hours ) th e Prime Ministe r wa s uncertai n whethe r h e woul d "plunge " fo r hig h tariffs o r for low, and that his "active mind," marvellousl y untroubled by what hi s colleague s migh t think , wa s stil l grapplin g wit h th e drasti c alternatives o f protection an d preference. 13 Tha t o n s o crucia l a n issue , ordinarily productiv e o f hour s o f acrimoniou s bargainin g insid e th e Cabinet betwee n it s protectionis t an d free-tradin g wings, 14 th e Prim e Minister shoul d hav e fel t fre e t o swin g fro m on e extrem e t o th e othe r without fearin g ministeria l resignations , i s indicativ e a t onc e o f hi s unusually stron g positio n a s leade r an d o f hi s determinatio n t o exploi t it. (I t als o illustrate s th e rarit y o f resignation s fro m Canadia n cabinet s on matter s o f principle.) As th e month s an d year s o f hi s administratio n passed , th e countr y slipping deepe r int o depression , Bennett' s autocrati c method s becam e if anythin g more pronounced . Lik e th e "Ne w Deal " type o f programme on whic h h e fough t (an d lost ) th e electio n o f 1935 , hi s view s o n th e Italo-Ethiopian War , (whic h brok e ou t i n th e las t month s o f hi s ad ministration) wer e formulated o n th e spu r o f the moment . He intende d to tak e a stron g stan d agains t Italy , h e tol d hi s Unde r Secretar y o f State for External Affairs , O . D. Skelton , over the telephon e on Octobe r 10, 1935, an d he was " 'not going to wriggle out of it if it meant I didn' t get on e vote'." 15 I t wa s perhap s unfortunat e tha t th e voter s o f Canad a were not prepare d t o allow him the opportunity of converting convictio n into policy . Bennett wa s evidently sensitive t o criticis m tha t hi s ha d bee n a one man governmen t for , onc e bac k i n opposition , h e too k th e firs t oppor tunity t o den y th e charge . Contrastin g th e 96 7 Counci l meeting s ove r which h e had preside d wit h the 51 6 meeting s which had bee n hel d dur ing a n equa l perio d o f th e precedin g Libera l administration , h e added : "So fa r a s th e conduc t o f department s wa s concerne d ther e neve r wa s a tim e i n thi s countr y whe n ther e wa s greate r freedo m o n th e par t of those conductin g departments, o r a time when men enjoye d greate r lati tude or greater opportunit y to make their view s prevail."16 On that scor e opinions wer e boun d t o differ , an d th e matte r wil l remain i n th e real m of opinio n unti l th e privat e paper s o f Bennet t an d hi s colleague s ar e available fo r examination. * With th e exceptio n o f th e five years o f th e Bennet t Governmen t an d a fe w day s i n 1926 , Mackenzi e Kin g wa s Prim e Ministe r o f Canad a *The Bennet t Papers , whic h ar e th e persona l propert y o f Lor d Beaverbrook , have bee n deposite d a t th e Librar y o f th e Universit y o f Ne w Brunswick .

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from Decembe r 192 1 t o Novembe r 1948 . Ove r thi s lon g perio d o f political leadership , a t it s clos e unequalle d i n th e histor y o f parlia mentary democrac y an d sinc e onl y onc e surpassed , th e natur e o f hi s relations wit h Cabinet colleague s naturall y underwen t som e change . A t first, his relativ e youth , hi s positio n a s hea d o f a minorit y government , and th e presenc e i n hi s firs t administratio n (1921-5 ) o f a numbe r o f colleagues o f greate r experienc e an d prestig e than himself , combine d t o make Mackenzi e Kin g eager to defe r t o his ministers o n most importan t matters, foreig n as wel l as domestic . Whe n informe d (by a newspape r reporter) o f th e appea l o f th e Britis h Governmen t fo r Canadia n hel p to stem the Turkish advanc e upon Chanak in 1922 , hi s first words were : "That will require the deliberation o f the Cabinet before an y pronounce ment can be made." Asked whethe r the Governmen t would sen d troops, he replied: " I woul d not mak e an y statement without a conference wit h my colleagues, " and , presse d fo r hi s ow n views , onl y remarked : " I haven't any , apar t fro m thos e o f th e Cabinet." 17 A t th e en d o f th e second da y o f the crisi s he wrot e in hi s diary : " I shal l no t commi t my self on e wa y o r th e other , bu t kee p th e responsibilit y fo r prlt.—th e executive regardin g itsel f a s th e committe e o f prlt." 18 O n Septembe r 18, th e followin g day , no fewe r tha n thre e Cabine t meeting s wer e held , to whic h th e Prim e Ministe r referre d incomin g despatche s fro m th e British Governmen t an d aske d thos e presen t t o draf t a reply . "W e de bated lon g ove r questio n o f givin g 'mora l support ' & approvin g at titude," Mackenzi e Kin g wrot e afterwards . " I fel t tha t involve d whol e question o f participation in European war s and held bac k o n it. Cabine t agreed i n this." 19 Earlier h e had sen t a telegram t o Ernest Lapoint e an d W. S . Fielding, th e tw o member s o f the Governmen t absen t i n Genev a for th e Leagu e o f Nation s Assembly , askin g fo r thei r views . Th e repl y of hi s Ministe r o f Financ e mus t hav e bee n disconcerting : "W e heartil y approve attitud e British Governmen t respectin g Constantinople." 20 Bu t Lapointe's messag e a day later suggeste d that Fieldin g ha d spoke n onl y for himself : "B e governed b y Canadian opinion . . . . Would advis e delaying answe r an d bein g non-committal." 21 Thi s wa s preachin g t o th e converted. The presenc e withi n hi s Governmen t o f Laurier' s designate d suc cessor (wh o had been Laurier's Financ e Ministe r and was now his), was a facto r o f som e consequence t o Mackenzi e King in developin g foreig n and imperia l polic y durin g hi s firs t administration . Supporte d b y th e majority i f no t th e remainde r o f hi s Cabinet , th e Prim e Ministe r fel t able t o withhol d suppor t fro m th e Britis h Governmen t ove r Chanak when Fielding wante d to offe r it ; and he proceeded h i spite of Fielding's

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misgivings to allo w Ernes t Lapoint e t o becom e th e first Canadian Min ister t o sig n a political treat y withou t th e coverin g signature of a Britis h plenipotentiary. Whe n i t cam e t o exercisin g th e righ t o f legation , how ever, Fielding' s determine d oppositio n wa s a n importan t (althoug h no t the only ) reaso n fo r th e prolonge d dela y i n appointin g a Canadia n Minister t o Washington. 22 B y 192 6 thi s restraint , an d others, ha d bee n removed. Fieldin g ha d resigne d i n 1925 , an d th e followin g yea r Mac kenzie Kin g ha d wo n a resoundin g electora l victor y o f whic h h e wa s very muc h sol e architect . N o longe r wa s he hea d o f a minorit y govern ment. He was both mor e experienced an d more confident, an d with good reason. Hencefort h h e wa s t o b e th e unchallenge d maste r o f hi s ad ministration unti l trj e conscriptio n crisi s o f 1944 ; an d fro m tha t chal lenge h e emerge d mor e powerfu l tha n ever . The characteristi c styl e o f Mackenzi e King' s handlin g o f foreig n policy matter s first became apparen t durin g th e administratio n returne d to offic e i n 1935 , fo r no t unti l the n di d majo r issue s o f externa l polic y begin to impinge upon Canadia n event s and a Canadian Prim e Ministe r begin t o exercis e important , i f carefull y concealed , initiative s i n regar d to them . "Unde r a Libera l regim e th e Prim e Ministe r state s th e foreig n policy an d th e Cabine t Minister s stat e th e polic y fo r interna l affair s without consultatio n wit h an y o f th e members, " a disgruntle d Libera l backbencher wrot e privatel y a t th e time, 23 an d th e acutenes s o f hi s analysis wa s t o becom e eviden t durin g th e nex t fe w years. N o Cabine t colleagues accompanie d Mackenzi e Kin g o n hi s visi t t o Hitle r i n th e summer o f 1937 , an d non e coul d therefor e challeng e wit h a n authorit y based o n comparabl e experienc e th e grievousl y inappropriat e notion s of Naz i policy an d leadership tha t thei r Prim e Ministe r acquire d o n thi s mission. Durin g the Munic h crisi s the secrec y wit h whic h Mackenzi e King ha d b y thi s tim e com e t o cloa k th e conduc t o f externa l polic y assumed almos t paranoi c proportions . "Lai d u p a t Kingsmer e wit h sciatica, h e watche d th e clima x o f appeasement, " write s Mr . Bruc e Hutchison. He watche d i t s o secretl y that , a s h e tol d thi s writer , h e di d no t dar e t o le t his Cabine t colleague s . . . rea d th e code d cable s fro m London . . . . Suc h was King' s contro l o f governmen t an d nation , suc h th e numbe d stat e o f his colleagues , tha t h e coul d tak e foreig n polic y int o hi s ow n hand s an d direct i t as he pleased. . . . It ca n b e sai d o n the authorit y o f Minister s wh o attended th e Cabine t i n thes e hour s tha t i t neve r discusse d th e Europea n crisis. Tw o minister s raise d th e questio n i n council . N o answe r cam e fro m Kingsmere. Government , whe n the natio n quivere d on the knif e edg e of war, ha d move d fro m th e Eas t Bloc k t o King' s bedroo m i n th e country. 24

The onse t o f wa r mad e necessar y a considerabl e devolutio n o f

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responsibility in the conduc t of external policy, less through the persona l inclination o f th e Prim e Ministe r tha n throug h th e pressur e o f event s compelling a divisio n of labour. I n th e earl y month s o f th e conflict , n o fewer tha n five differen t Cabine t minister s set ou t successivel y for Eng land o n a variet y o f mission s relate d t o th e wa r effort . Whe n Mr . Churchill wishe d to reviv e the Imperia l War Cabine t o f the Firs t Worl d War, Mackenzie Kin g defende d hi s oppositio n t o th e proposa l o n th e grounds tha t "importan t decision s should no t b e mad e by on e ma n bu t by a governmen t as a whole." 25 I n fact , however , not th e "governmen t as a whole " bu t th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabine t becam e th e effective policy-makin g body fo r th e duration . The origi n o f Cabine t committee s i n Canad a is . to b e foun d i n th e suggestion raise d b y Unite d Kingdo m authoritie s a t th e Imperia l De fence Conferenc e o f 190 9 tha t the self-governin g Dominions follo w th e example o f th e Britis h Governmen t b y creatin g defenc e committee s within thei r variou s ministries . Nothin g immediatel y cam e o f thi s pro posal i n Canada , no r o f th e recommendation s o f Si r Georg e Murra y in 191 2 tha t th e burde n o f individua l members i n th e Canadia n Gov ernment b e relieve d b y allowin g a quoru m o f Cabine t minister s t o dispose of routine business. It was not until October 191 7 that the Unio n Government unde r Si r Rober t Borde n divide d itsel f int o a Wa r Com mittee an d a Committe e on Reconstructio n an d Development , eac h o f ten members . These Cabine t committees did no t lon g outlast th e en d of the war , an d non e reappeare d unti l 193 6 whe n a Defenc e Committe e was constitute d compose d o f th e Prim e Minister , th e Ministe r o f National Defence , an d th e Minister s o f Justic e an d Finance . I t me t o n only two occasions prior to the outbreak of war, on November 14 , 1938 , and o n Septembe r 5 , 193 9 (th e Canadia n declaratio n o f war , it wil l be recalled, cam e a week afte r tha t o f th e Unite d Kingdom , o n Septembe r 10), fo r th e purpos e o f discussin g with th e Chief s o f Staf f propose d defence estimates . The Defenc e Committe e was replace d followin g Canada' s entr y int o the war by the Emergency Council (sometime s called the Committe e o n General Policy) , on e o f si x "sub-committees o f council " create d b y a n order-in-council (P.C . 2747 ) o n Augus t 30 , 1939 . I t me t si x time s before i n its turn being replaced by the Wa r Committee and , like it, was responsible fo r polic y relatin g t o th e over-al l wa r effort . A furthe r re organization o f th e Cabine t committe e syste m too k plac e i n Decembe r 1939, an d on e o f th e nin e committee s thu s create d wa s the Wa r Com mittee of the Cabinet . The War Committee me t for the first time on December 8 , 1939 , an d

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over th e nex t five and a hal f year s wa s t o mee t o n 34 3 occasions . Its membership throughou t thi s period varie d accordin g to th e composition of th e Ministr y an d fo r othe r reasons , bu t alway s include d th e Prim e Minister (wh o was als o Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs) , th e service ministers , th e Ministe r o f Finance , and , afte r th e creatio n of the portfolio , th e Ministe r o f Munition s an d Supply . "Th e result, " th e former secretar y of the War Committee has commented, "was that, while the Wa r Committe e like other Cabinet Committee s was never an executive bod y bu t was , in fac t a s i n form , purel y advisor y i n character , it s prestige wa s suc h tha t it s decision s wer e fo r practica l purpose s th e decisions o f th e government." 28 I n additio n t o th e regula r ministeria l members, adviser s fro m th e service s an d fro m governmen t department s were frequen t participants . Th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs attende d regularly and , whe n militar y matters were unde r discussion (a s they usually were), the Chiefs of Staff wer e normally present. After 194 3 th e chairma n o f th e Canadia n sectio n o f th e Permanen t Joint Board on Defence periodicall y attended its meetings. As the war continued, a number of measures were introduced to make the wor k o f th e Wa r Committe e mor e orderly an d efficient . Th e mos t important o f thes e wa s th e creatio n o f th e pos t o f secretar y o f th e Wa r Committee in April 1940 , to which Mr. A.D.P. Heeney was appointed.* From tha t date t o th e Committee' s dissolution i n Jun e 194 5 minute s were kep t o f it s deliberations . I n Septembe r 1941 , followin g th e Prim e Minister's first-han d observatio n o f the workin g of th e Unite d Kingdom *The project o f som e for m o f Cabine t secretaria t ha d bee n i n Mackenzi e King' s mind a s earl y a s 1923 . I n tha t yea r h e tol d Si r Mauric e Hankey , secretar y t o th e United Kingdo m Cabinet , "tha t h e woul d lik e t o hav e a Secretar y t o Canadia n Cabinet, an d tha t h e woul d hav e on e 'i n hi s time' , bu t tha t a t presen t i t wouldn' t do. Hi s Cabine t woul d no t stan d fo r it , an d h e stresse d th e wa y hi s Cabine t ha d to b e representativ e i n characte r an d ho w h e didn' t hav e th e sam e freedo m a s the Britis h Prime Ministe r to choose . A secretar y woul d caus e al l kind s of trouble . . . . Hankey suggeste d tha t thi s kin d of a Cabine t neede d som e organizatio n mor e than th e British , but Kin g would no t hav e i t then . . . . " R . MacGrego r Dawson , "Memorandum o f intervie w wit h Lor d Hankey, " 1951 . Since 194 5 i t ha s bee n th e practic e o f Canadia n government s t o kee p a ful l but impersona l recor d o f Cabine t deliberations , evidentl y no t withou t justifyin g Mackenzie King' s earlie r misgivings . "Ministers ar e conservativ e beings , to who m the intrusio n o f a Secretary takin g notes o f thei r discussion s was difficul t t o accept . Even afte r th e War , ther e wa s usuall y on e Cabine t a wee k durin g th e sessio n and certai n other s wher e th e Secretar y wa s absen t an d o f whic h n o minute s wer e kept. O n thes e occasion s th e Cabine t wa s discussin g 'political ' (i.e . party ) questions o r th e Secretar y o r hi s Department wer e unde r discussion . A s tim e wen t on, thes e becam e les s frequen t an d i t wa s ver y rare , i n fact , fo r ther e t o b e a n entire meetin g withou t th e Secretary . A t presen t . . . al l meeting s o f th e Cabine t and it s committee s ar e attende d b y a membe r o f th e Secretariat , an d minute s are kept. " J . R . Mallory , unpublishe d manuscript .

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War Cabinet , severa l procedure s designe d t o facilitat e it s busines s wer e adopted. Amon g these were the preparatio n o f proper agend a circulate d to member s i n advanc e o f meetings , togethe r wit h paper s an d memor anda relate d t o item s o n th e agenda ; regula r meeting s o n Wednesda y of eac h week , i n additio n t o meeting s calle d a t th e discretio n o f th e Prime Minister ; regula r attendanc e b y th e thre e servic e Chief s o f Staff a t th e first meeting in eac h mont h an d thei r submissio n of militar y appreciations regularl y ever y month ; attendanc e b y minister s no t mem bers o f th e Wa r Committee , a t th e Prim e Minister' s discretion , whe n matters directl y affectin g thei r department s wer e unde r consideration. * The en d o f th e Secon d Worl d Wa r di d no t brin g abou t th e disap pearance o f Cabine t committee s a s a t th e en d o f th e First . Instead , th e wartime committees were replaced b y others designe d to mee t the need s of post-wa r policy . Cabine t committee s hav e no w becom e a norma l feature o f parliamentary government i n Canada. Despit e thi s fact , how ever, it is impossible t o offe r a n exact descriptio n o f their operation, fo r no detaile d informatio n ha s bee n disclose d an d th e governmen t i s ap parently constitutionall y unabl e t o disclos e it. t Cabine t committee s function therefor e i n som e obscurity . W e ar e tol d o n th e authorit y o f the Registra r o f th e Cabine t tha t mos t o f it s committee s no w ar e o f a n ad ho c variety , "se t u p t o dea l wit h specia l problem s a s thes e aris e o r acquire prominence or urgency, and report bu t to the Cabinet. Thei r lif e is usuall y brie f an d the y di e naturall y whe n the y hav e reported . The y represent purel y interna l arrangement s made b y th e Cabine t an d ar e usually no t well known t o the public , althoug h reference has bee n mad e *This las t measur e di d no t guarante e tha t minister s no t member s o f th e Wa r Committee woul d kno w wha t wen t o n i n th e charme d circle . I n Februar y 194 2 the Ministe r o f Pension s an d Nationa l Health , Ia n Mackenzie , wh o a s th e Britis h Columbia representativ e i n th e Cabine t bor e th e brun t o f stron g pressur e fro m that province to strengthen Pacifi c defences , wrot e to the Prime Minister : ". . . not being a membe r o f th e Wa r Committee , I a m no t exactl y sufficientl y conversan t with wha t i s transpiring , althoug h th e Minister s separatel y hav e bee n ver y cour teous i n givin g m e th e necessar y information. " Ia n Mackenzi e t o Mackenzi e King , Feb. 14 , 1942 ; quote d i n Col . C . P . Stacey , Si x Years o f War: Th e Army i n Canada, Britain and th e Pacific (Ottawa , 1955) , p. 170 . Mackenzie' s lac k o f infor mation i s th e mor e surprisin g i n tha t prio r t o 193 9 h e ha d bee n Ministe r o f National Defence , an d enjoye d wit h th e Prim e Ministe r " a degre e o f persona l intimacy whic h woul d not hav e bee n tolerate d in anothe r colleagu e afte r 194 1 [when Lapoint e died]. " J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 19391944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 7 . fin 195 7 th e Speake r o f th e Hous e o f Common s rule d tha t "a n inquir y int o the metho d b y whic h th e governmen t arrive s a t it s decisio n i n Cabine t i s ou t o f order. . .. A s I understan d th e situation , th e decisio n o f th e governmen t i s one and indivisible . Inquir y int o ho w i t i s arrive d at , particularl y inquir y int o th e Cabinet process , i s no t permitte d i n th e House. " Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Nov . 6 , 1957 , p . 813 .

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on occasion s i n Parliament t o thei r work." 27 Thus , i n June 196 0 refer ence was made in the Hous e o f Commons to th e existenc e of a Cabine t Committee o n Emergenc y Plans , consistin g o f th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence (chairman ) an d th e Minister s o f Finance , Trad e an d Com merce, Nationa l Healt h an d Welfare , Defenc e Production , an d Justice , the Associat e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , an d th e Ministe r withou t Portfolio, whos e functio n wa s t o develo p governmenta l policie s t o b e put int o effec t i n th e even t o f surpris e atomi c attac k upo n th e Nort h American continent. 28 Perhaps th e mos t importan t o f contemporar y Cabine t committee s is the Cabine t Defenc e Committee, create d i n Augus t 194 5 t o conside r and advise upon post-war defence problems . Its chairma n was originally the Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , a provisio n designe d t o gai n th e support an d co-operatio n o f th e thre e services , bu t subsequentl y it s chairmanship passe d t o th e Prim e Minister , th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence actin g a s vice-chairman . It s meeting s ar e normall y attende d by the Unde r Secretary of State for Externa l Affair s an d th e permanen t chairman o f th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , togethe r wit h th e thre e Chiefs o f Staff , i n additio n t o th e ministeria l head s o f othe r importan t departments suc h a s Finance , Trad e an d Commerce , an d Externa l Affairs. A meetin g o f th e Defenc e Committe e was attende d b y Jame s Forrestal, then United States Secretary o f Defense, on August 16 , 1948 . "One o f the deep impressions that I had a s a result o f this meeting, " h e recorded afterward s i n hi s diary , was th e contras t t o th e functionin g o f ou r ow n government . I n thi s grou p there wer e th e incomin g Chie f o f Stat e [sic], Mr . L . S . St . Laurent , wh o will succee d Mackenzi e Kin g a s Prim e Minister ; th e Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affairs , Mr . L . B . Pearson , wh o wil l succee d t o St . Laurent's job a s chief o f that Department ; Ministe r o f Trade an d Commerc e C. D . Howe ; Ministe r o f Defenc e Brook e Claxton , an d th e thre e chief s of staff . . . . This grou p no t merel y wa s the Defenc e Committe e o f the Cabine t . . . but the y represente d th e contro l o f th e Canadia n Parliament , becaus e the y are th e chose n Minister s o f th e Libera l Party , whic h i s th e part y no w pre vailing i n power , a s wel l a s th e chief s o f thei r respectiv e governmen t agencies. Therefor e expression s o f polic y a t thi s meetin g ar e th e statement s of a responsible government . . . , 29

The singl e exceptio n t o th e rul e tha t committee s of the Cabine t hav e their origi n an d foundatio n i n th e conventiona l workin g of th e parlia mentary syste m i s th e Treasur y Board , a committe e o f th e Cabine t created b y legislation (se e Revised Statutes of Canada, s. 71) an d differ ing a s well from othe r Cabine t committee s in it s permanence an d i n it s

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staff o f expert s engage d i n it s wor k o f scrutinizin g departmenta l esti mates. The chairma n o f the Treasur y Board i s the Ministe r o f Finance; with him serve five other Cabinet ministers of whom th e Secretary of State for External Affairs is not one. The fact that its members are Cabinet ministers is sufficient safeguar d agains t the Treasury Board too ofte n thwart ing governmen t polic y b y implacabl e oppositio n t o extravaganc e an d waste (a s i t i s charged th e Unite d State s Bureau o f the Budge t i s prone to do). But it offers t o the Prime Minister and his Minister of Finance an incomparable instrumen t wit h whic h t o par e awa y a t costl y depart mental projects . A forme r Financ e Ministe r ha s describe d th e process : The staf f o f th e Treasur y Board , withou t referenc e t o th e Ministe r i n th e first place , g o a t thos e estimate s an d tr y t o hav e them reduced . The y ar e successful t o a considerabl e exten t i n havin g the m reduced . Bu t variou s departments demur , an d som e g o eve n farthe r tha n tha t an d vigorousl y and violentl y protest agains t th e propose d cuts . Th e matte r i s the n take n up b y myself wit h the variou s Ministers , an d afte r a considerabl e amoun t o f argument th e estimate s ar e stil l furthe r reduce d unti l the y reac h th e for m in whic h the y appea r befor e th e Hous e o f Commons . . . . At time s I fee l a s though I a m agains t the whol e worl d whe n I tr y t o kee p a lo t o f thes e expenditure s down . W e jus t d o th e bes t w e can , tha t i s all , and keep them down. 30 The impac t o f th e Treasur y Boar d i s felt , naturall y enough , i n thos e aspects o f foreig n polic y tha t requir e larg e outlay s o f publi c money s such a s defence an d foreig n aid ; bu t i t make s it s mark o n less expensiv e matters: Mr. Martin (Essex East): I s ther e an y likelihoo d o f an y missio n bein g established i n Baghdad . . . ? Mr. Green (Secretary o f State fo r External Affairs): Thi s i s a missio n I woul d lik e ver y muc h t o hav e established , an d ther e ar e other s to o I would lik e t o hav e established , bu t i n gettin g thes e wishe s carrie d out , I always ru n fou l o f th e Treasur y Board . I d o no t doub t th e leade r o f th e Opposition ha d tha t sam e proble m whe n h e wa s minister . I woul d lik e to hav e a missio n in Baghdad right now , bu t s o far I hav e no t bee n abl e t o make muc h progress . . . . Mr. Pearson (Leader o f th e Opposition): I appreciat e th e Minister' s diffi culties wit h th e Treasur y Board . I woul d hav e though t tha t perhap s h e would b e mor e skilfu l tha n I eve r wa s i n overcomin g them , bu t I a m sur e the Ministe r doe s no t nee d anyon e t o tel l hi m tha t whil e fund s fo r capita l construction abroa d d o ad d t o th e budge t an d th e budgetar y difficultie s o f the Ministe r o f Finance, ove r the long run they ar e economical. . . . Mr. Green: Tha t i s exactl y th e argumen t I hav e bee n makin g wit h th e Minister o f Finance . No w tha t I hav e som e suppor t fro m th e Leade r o f th e Opposition, perhap s it will be easier t o convince him . . . .31 The fact , mentione d above , tha t th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs i s not amon g the si x Cabinet minister s wh o ar e member s o f th e

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Treasury Boar d doe s no t plac e hi s Departmen t a t to o muc h o f a dis advantage in keeping its estimates intact; more importan t is the persona l relationship o f th e foreig n ministe r wit h th e Minister o f Financ e an d with th e Prim e Minister . (Befor e 1946 , whe n th e Prim e Ministe r an d the foreign minister were one and the same person, th e modest demand s of th e Departmen t wer e me t withou t to o muc h protest , although , depending on hi s interests an d hi s temperament, th e incumben t o f bot h posts migh t favou r on e a t th e expens e o f th e other. ) No r t o b e over looked ar e th e persona l relationship s betwee n th e civi l servic e staf f o f the Treasur y Boar d an d th e foreig n servic e officers o f th e Departmen t of Externa l Affairs . Thes e hav e sometime s bee n strained , t o th e dis advantage o f th e Department . "Muc h o f th e succes s o f ou r ai d pro grammes and muc h of the succes s of our organizatio n a s a department," one o f it s member s ha s writte n privately , "depen d o n bette r relation s with Financ e an d Treasury Board." 32 Two othe r Cabine t groupings , no t ordinaril y though t o f a s Cabine t committees but havin g the sam e purpose o f bringing matters o f externa l policy befor e th e minister s directl y concerned , ar e th e Canadia n mem bers o f th e Join t Unite d States-Canadia n Committe e o n Trad e an d Economic Affair s an d o f th e Canada-Unite d State s Ministeria l Com mittee o n Join t Defence . Th e forme r wa s create d b y a n exchang e o f notes betwee n th e Canadia n an d America n government s i n Novembe r 1953 statin g tha t th e Committe e shoul d mee t "onc e a year , o r mor e often, a s may be considered necessary." It consiste d of those members of the Canadia n an d America n cabinet s principally involve d i n economi c affairs, an d wa s thu s a n attemp t t o combin e i n a singl e piec e o f inter governmental machiner y tw o distinct an d perhap s incompatibl e govern mental systems , with th e dange r (a s wa s observe d a t th e time ) "tha t people ma y b e le d t o expec t result s fro m me n wh o ar e i n n o positio n to effec t them." 33 On th e Canadian sid e the representatives usuall y con sisted o f th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , an d th e Minister s of Trad e an d Commerce , Finance , an d Agriculture . A secon d an d similar Committe e wa s establishe d i n 195 8 "t o consul t periodicall y o n all matter s affectin g th e join t defence o f Canad a an d th e Unite d State s ..., not only military questions but also the political and economic aspects of join t defence problems." Th e Canadia n member s o f thi s Committe e were ordinaril y th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s an d th e Ministers o f Nationa l Defence , Defenc e Production , an d Finance , attended b y exper t adviser s fro m thei r respectiv e departments . "Ther e was no lon g table at whic h we sat dow n with minutes and pape r befor e us," th e Minister o f Nationa l Defenc e reporte d afte r th e Committee' s meeting at Cam p David in the fal l o f 1959 . "However , we sat aroun d i n

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an informa l grou p an d w e ha d th e mos t intimat e discussio n o n al l defence matters." 34 The proliferatio n o f Cabine t committee s an d grouping s i n recen t years ha s ha d it s effec t upo n th e relationshi p o f th e Prim e Ministe r to hi s Cabine t colleague s i n th e formulatio n o f externa l policy . T o th e extent tha t suc h committee s an d grouping s impos e orde r an d routin e and settle d procedures , an d ensur e tha t differen t facet s o f polic y com e as a matte r o f cours e befor e th e minister s nominall y responsibl e fo r them, i t become s tha t muc h mor e difficul t fo r a Prim e Ministe r t o gather th e rein s tightl y i n hi s ow n hands . Th e member s o f th e Wa r Committee o f th e Cabinet , Mackenzi e Kin g remarke d i n 1943 , wer e "immediately concerned wit h matters relating to externa l affairs , s o tha t they ar e i n a positio n t o assis t me , a s i n fac t the y do . The y carr y much o f th e responsibilit y tha t I hav e t o assum e i n tha t particula r position [Secretar y o f State for Externa l Affairs]." 35 Som e months afte r the war had ende d h e spoke appreciativel y onc e agai n o f the devolutio n that ha d take n place : Thank God , I hav e around m e Ministers who are taking more o f [th e load ] from m y shoulders da y by day . . . . I hav e t o tak e responsibilit y fo r wha t is sai d an d done , bu t i f hon . member s wil l notic e ho w matter s relatin g t o external affair s hav e bee n deal t wit h i n considerabl e par t b y on e ministe r after another , they wil l realize that the burden of the Departmen t of External Affairs i s no t wholl y o n th e shoulder s o f an y on e man , bu t i s share d b y a very larg e par t o f th e Ministry. *

In th e larger gatherin g of the full Cabine t th e Prim e Ministe r ma y mor e easily hav e hi s wa y o r mor e easil y kee p matter s t o himself ; i n th e smaller an d mor e specialize d committe e o f th e Cabine t suc h evasion , while not impossible , i s less likel y t o g o unremarked an d unchallenged . Indeed, i t ma y b e fo r jus t thi s reaso n tha t ther e i s no t no w no r ha s there eve r bee n a Cabine t Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , a fac t sug gestive o f the unwillingnes s of Prime Minister s t o allo w i t t o dispos e of *Canada, H . o f C . Debates, Apri l 2 , 1946 , p . 492 . I t i s possible , an d eve n probable, tha t b y thu s citin g the collegia l natur e o f Cabine t decision-makin g in external affairs , the Prim e Ministe r was attemptin g to forestal l suggestion s tha t he devolv e th e Externa l Affair s portfoli o upo n anothe r membe r o f th e Cabinet . Mackenzie King' s rea l feeling s on th e subjec t o f sharin g wit h hi s colleague s th e process o f decision-makin g in matter s which , lik e externa l affairs , la y clos e t o hi s own interests , may hav e been expresse d i n a n entr y i n hi s dair y a fe w day s afte r the sudde n deat h o f O . D . Skelto n earl y i n 1941 . "Ther e mus t b e a purpose, " he wrot e characteristically of thi s tragi c event, "and, a s I se e it, i t ma y b e mean t to caus e m e t o rel y mor e completel y o n m y ow n judgmen t i n makin g decisions , and t o acquain t mysel f mor e meticulousl y wit h al l tha t i s happenin g so a s t o be abl e t o mee t eac h deman d a s i t i s occasioned. " Quote d i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 166 .

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what Mackenzi e Kin g onc e referre d t o a s "th e politica l sid e o f publi c affairs i n the large sense of the word." 36 Another potentia l check upo n prim e ministerial control , als o o f fairl y recent origin , i s th e practic e o f resortin g t o settle d procedure s fo r disposing o f certai n type s o f foreig n polic y decisions . I n 1956 , fo r example, th e the n Secretar y of Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s describe d th e manner i n which decisions were mad e with regard t o th e expor t o f wa r materiel. Certain lines of policy had bee n laid down : no arm s shipments of an y kin d t o th e Sino-Sovie t bloc , n o restriction s o n arm s shipment s to NAT O allie s an d mos t Commonwealth nations . Scop e fo r discretio n existed wit h respec t t o "area s o f tensio n o r strife o r wha t w e cal l sensitive areas " o f which ther e wer e a t tha t tim e thirty-four thu s desig nated. T o thes e sensitiv e area s ther e coul d no t b e exporte d "arm s o f such a characte r tha t the y migh t increas e an y temptatio n t o commi t an aggressio n or begi n a preventive war. " I n n o cas e coul d an y kin d of shipment o f wa r materie l b e mad e t o suc h area s withou t th e agree ment o f th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , th e Ministe r o f Trad e an d Commerce an d th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs . I n addition , "if th e applicatio n i s a particularl y significan t one , eithe r i n quantit y or becaus e o f th e politica l circumstance s surroundin g it , an d eve n though th e thre e minister s ma y hav e agree d t o th e [export] permit , the matte r i s referre d t o th e whol e Cabinet." 37 Anothe r exampl e o f settled procedure s i s th e manne r o f decidin g upo n project s fo r capita l assistance unde r th e Colomb o Plan . A n interdepartmenta l committe e submits recommendation s t o th e Cabinet . "I f th e Cabine t approve s them," the Administrato r o f the Internationa l Economi c an d Technica l Co-operation Divisio n o f th e Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerc e (then Mr. R. G . Nik Cavell) informe d the House o f Commons Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affair s i n 1956 , "w e go ahead. " T o tha t date , he added , th e Cabine t ha d approve d al l th e recommendation s o f th e Committee.38 A thir d illustratio n i s to b e foun d i n the manne r o f decid ing upo n whethe r an d wher e t o ope n u p ne w diplomati c missions , described i n 195 2 b y the Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs : An attemp t i s made withi n th e Departmen t [o f Externa l Affairs ] i n th e firs t instance t o asses s tha t nee d agains t expenditur e i n term s o f men—becaus e we ar e shor t o f qualifie d men—a s wel l a s i n term s o f money . Tha t assess ment the n come s u p through th e Unde r Secretar y t o the Ministe r o f External Affairs himself . H e examine s th e proposa l i n relatio n t o othe r requirement s and demand s . . . an d h e come s t o a decisio n a s to wha t recommendatio n to make . H e the n take s i t to the Cabinet an d th e Cabine t decide s whethe r o r not pos t "A " o r pos t "B " o r pos t "C " o r al l thre e requir e t o b e opened . According t o thei r decisio n submission s ar e mad e t o Treasur y Boar d fo r

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the appropriate establishment s and then amount s appear i n the estimates. Th e process throug h whic h w e g o i n thi s fiel d o f activity , I ca n assur e th e Committee, i s a ver y carefu l one. 39

As the range and complexity of foreign polic y decision s increase , they have become more and more the result of settled procedure s designed t o bring t o bea r upo n the m th e judgmen t of minister s an d official s fro m other department s o f governmen t i n additio n t o th e judgmen t o f th e Prime Minister . I n th e las t analysi s th e firml y hel d vie w o f th e Prim e Minister wil l prevail , bu t onl y th e mos t paranoi c o f prim e minister s would wish to disregard too ofte n o r too obviously the recommendations of colleague s an d officials . I n thi s sens e the tren d t o settle d procedure s of decision-makin g ma y b e sai d t o limi t th e potentia l scop e o f prim e ministerial discretio n i n th e matter s fo r whic h the y ar e employed . Th e procedure fo r openin g ne w diplomati c missions , describe d above , i s in strikin g contras t t o th e earlie r practic e whe n th e decisio n t o ope n legations i n Toky o an d Pari s reflecte d Mackenzi e King' s persona l an d somewhat eccentri c opinion s abou t th e configuratio n o f worl d power . Even as late as 1942 the decisions were wholly his. "Robertson and Pearson alway s wanted t o g o a littl e to o fast, " th e America n Ministe r i n Ottawa record s him as saying. "For instance , the y were pressing him t o establish Canadian Legations al l over the place. He was inclined t o think that a Legation woul d soon be opened i n Moscow, an d I suggeste d that Mexico migh t have som e merits . H e sai d yes , bu t h e ha d n o intentio n of spreadin g too fast." 40 PRIME MINISTE R AN D FOREIG N MINISTER

The authorit y of th e Prim e Ministe r i n foreig n affair s ha s bee n poten tially circumscribe d b y th e assumptio n in recen t year s o f th e Externa l Affairs portfoli o by a member of his Cabinet othe r tha n himself. When the Departmen t of External Affair s wa s created i n 190 9 i t wa s the expectatio n o f it s firs t Unde r Secretary , Josep h Pope , tha t th e new portfoli o shoul d b e hel d b y th e Prim e Minister ; and , a s th e indi vidual mor e tha n an y othe r responsibl e fo r it s creation , h e wa s vexe d when th e Departmen t wa s placed instea d unde r th e Secretar y o f State . This, h e wrot e a t th e time , wa s " a great mistake . I t shoul d b e unde r the Prim e Minister." 41 Despit e th e assignmen t o f responsibilit y t o th e Secretary o f Stat e b y th e Ac t o f 190 9 bringin g th e Departmen t int o being, i t wa s Sir Wilfrid Laurie r a s Prime Ministe r rathe r tha n Charle s Murphy a s Secretar y o f Stat e wh o assume d effectiv e contro l o f th e

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Department o f Externa l Affairs . I n 191 2 legislatio n o f th e Borde n Government correcte d thi s anomaly by bringin g the Departmen t legall y as wel l a s practicall y withi n the Prim e Minister' s authority : 2. Ther e shal l b e a Departmen t o f th e Governmen t o f Canad a t o b e called th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , ove r whic h th e Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affair s shal l preside . 3. Th e Membe r o f th e King' s Priv y Counci l fo r Canad a holdin g th e recognized positio n o f Firs t Ministe r shal l b e th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs. 42

After tw o year s o f wartim e leadership , Si r Rober t Borde n foun d himself increasingl y unable t o d o justic e t o bot h positions . Hi s remedy was no t t o dives t himself of the Externa l Affair s portfoli o bu t t o creat e the ne w pos t o f Parliamentar y Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs. Th e Order-in-Counci l b y whic h thi s wa s accomplishe d (P.C . 1719 o f July 15 , 1916 ) recite d th e followin g "order s an d regulations " in connection with the position : 2. Th e Parliamentar y Unde r Secretar y shall , wit h respec t t o th e Depart ment o f Externa l Affairs , perfor m suc h parliamentar y dutie s a s ma y fro m time t o tim e b e assigne d t o hi m b y the Governo r h i Council . 3. Th e Parliamentar y Unde r Secretar y shall , subjec t t o suc h instruction s as may fro m tim e to tim e be issue d b y competent authorit y assis t th e Prim e Minister i n administerin g th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , an d may , subject to the approval o f the Prim e Minister, conduct suc h officia l communi cations betwee n th e Governmen t o f Canad a an d th e Governmen t o f an y other countr y in connection wit h the externa l affair s o f Canada, an d perfor m such othe r dutie s i n th e sai d Departmen t a s fro m tim e t o tim e ma y b e directed. 4. I n th e absenc e o f th e Prim e Minister , th e Parliamentar y Unde r Secre tary shall , subject to the directio n an d approva l o f the Acting Prim e Ministe r for th e tim e being , preside ove r an d administe r th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs; an d i n suc h cas e h e shal l hav e authorit y t o repor t t o an d mak e recommendations t o th e Governo r i n Counci l throug h th e Actin g Prim e Minister.43

The term s o f th e Order-in-Counci l permitte d the Parliamentar y Under Secretary o f Stat e for Externa l Affair s t o assum e considerable responsi bility. Th e firs t occupan t o f th e position , Colone l Hug h Clark , who m Borden appointe d i n Octobe r 1916 , di d littl e more , however , tha n answer question s in th e Hous e o f Commons , and Franci s Keefer , wh o took over from Clar k in 1918 , di d no t enlarg e its scope . Th e offic e ha d been authorize d onl y "durin g th e continuanc e o f th e war, " an d wa s soon afterwar d allowe d to lapse . In 194 3 th e positio n o f Parliamentar y Assistant t o th e Presiden t o f the Priv y Counci l wa s created . Brook e Claxto n wa s th e firs t t o hol d

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the post . Th e Parliamentar y Assistan t wa s responsibl e t o Parliamen t for th e activitie s o f a numbe r of wartim e governmenta l agencie s which had originall y bee n place d unde r Mackenzi e Kin g i n on e o r othe r o f his thre e positions , Prim e Minister , Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, an d Presiden t o f th e Priv y Council; amon g these agencie s were the Wartime Information Board an d the Economic Advisory Committee charged wit h post-wa r plannin g an d reconstruction . Th e Parliamentar y Assistant t o th e Presiden t o f the Priv y Council wa s thus i n fac t thoug h not ye t i n nam e a Parliamentar y Assistan t t o th e Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affairs . I n late r year s th e latte r positio n replace d th e former, and , undergoin g on e mor e chang e i n title , emerge d a s tha t of Parliamentary Secretar y t o th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , today a normal fixtur e o f the Ministry . In 191 8 Si r Rober t Borde n seem s t o hav e bee n read y t o offe r th e External Affair s portfoli o t o Si r George Foster, the n Ministe r o f Trad e and Commerce . "Sen t fo r Foster, " Borde n note d i n hi s diar y o n November 1 . "H e agree d t o accompan y me t o Englan d an d t o accep t External Affairs. " Thi s invitatio n i s apparentl y confirme d b y Foster' s diary entry for the sam e date: My ow n positio n wil l b e radicall y changed . I shal l hat e t o leav e m y wor k in T . an d C . just a s I a m gettin g it int o shap e fo r goo d work . O n th e othe r hand ther e i s a vas t mas s o f detai l i n i t an d I a m 7 1 year s old . I d o no t now ge t a n hou r fre e fro m har d grin d an d I canno t stan d i t long . S o vale. The othe r wil l brin g m e int o clos e contac t wit h Empir e an d internationa l relations an d adjustment s which will be congenial. I shall b e free fro m detai l worries. Th e nex t fe w month s i n Europ e wil l b e ver y interesting .

For som e reaso n remainin g obscur e th e chang e di d no t tak e plac e a t this time or, indeed, until very much later. R. B. Bennett upon becoming Prime Minister in 193 0 had , accordin g to Mackenzie King, "entertaine d the vie w tha t i t woul d b e desirabl e t o separat e th e tw o offices " bu t changed hi s min d soon afterwards. 44 Ther e i s n o evidenc e fo r th e con tention of Dr. W. A. Riddell that in 193 5 Mackenzie Kin g was prepared to offe r th e Externa l Affair s portfoli o to Ernes t Lapointe , the n Ministe r of Justice , an d wa s only dissuaded b y his dissatisfaction with Lapointe' s handling o f th e "Riddel l incident"; 45 Mackenzi e Kin g himsel f late r stated tha t " I shoul d hav e foun d i t perilou s an d indee d impossibl e t o have separate d thes e tw o position s a t tha t particula r time." 46 O n a t least tw o occasion s durin g th e Secon d Worl d War , however , h e con sidered (ho w seriousl y i s anyone' s guess ) th e possibilit y o f himsel f holding the External Affair s portfoli o in the event of some other member of th e Governmen t becoming Prime Minister. * I n 194 3 h e offere d th e

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the Hous e o f Commons a n explanatio n o f "why , to pu t i t i n a direc t way, I mysel f hav e retained th e positio n o f Minister o f External Affair s while holdin g th e offic e o f Prim e Ministe r a t thi s tim e o f th e war. " It wa s not , h e insisted , "throug h an y desir e o n m y par t t o carr y th e extra portfolio . I woul d poin t ou t tha t i n tim e o f wa r nine-tenth s o f the Prim e Minister's work is related t o externa l affairs , an d i t would b e making hi s tas k i n som e way s mor e difficul t wer e h e t o tr y t o assum e the offic e o f Prim e Ministe r withou t bein g responsibl e a s wel l fo r External Affairs." 47 In 194 6 Canada acquire d fo r th e firs t tim e a Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s wh o wa s not als o Prim e Minister . Thi s wa s Mr. L . S . St. Laurent , wh o fo r a fe w month s afte r hi s appointment continue d t o hold th e Justic e portfoli o a s wel l a s Externa l Affairs. f Sinc e the n i t has been the rule rather than the exception for the External Affairs port folio t o b e th e sol e responsibilit y o f a membe r o f th e Cabine t othe r than the Prime Minister. Mr. St. Laurent held it until 9 September 1948, combining i t fo r th e las t nin e week s o f hi s tenur e wit h Justic e (whic h he retaine d unti l becomin g Prim e Ministe r o n 1 5 Novembe r 1948) . His successo r a s Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s wa s Mr . Lester Pearson , wh o remaine d i n tha t capacit y unti l th e defea t o f th e *"I sai d [t o th e Cabinet ] I woul d b e quit e prepare d t o sta y o n unde r Ralston , and accep t an y pos t h e woul d lik e t o giv e me , particularl y i f h e though t wel l o f giving m e Externa l Affairs . I woul d fee l happie r i n devotin g m y entir e tim e t o it." Kin g Diary , entr y fo r Ma y 29 , 1940 , quote d i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 83 . O n Jul y 8 , 1942 , Mackenzi e King tol d Ralsto n tha t "quit e frankly, wha t I woul d like , abov e everythin g else , woul d b e t o le t someon e els e take th e offic e o f Prim e Minister . Le t m e continu e a s Ministe r o f Externa l Af fairs, an d giv e t o th e Prim e Ministe r al l th e hel p I could. " Quote d i n ibid., p . 399. There i s som e inconsistenc y betwee n thes e comment s an d Mackenzi e King' s public statement s tha t a s Prim e Ministe r i t woul d b e necessar y fo r hi m t o re tain Externa l Affairs ; i f h e a s Prim e Ministe r could no t relinquis h it , wh y shoul d some othe r Prim e Ministe r b e abl e to ? Perhap s th e answe r i s tha t Mackenzi e King neve r seriousl y contemplate d givin g u p th e prim e ministershi p t o becom e foreign secretar y o r hea d o f an y othe r department , bu t use d th e threa t o f resig nation a s a mean s o f quietin g opposition i n hi s Cabinet . fMr. St . Lauren t wa s apparentl y no t th e firs t ministe r t o b e approache d b y Mackenzie Kin g t o accep t th e Externa l Affair s portfolio . Whil e i n Pari s fo r th e Peace Conferenc e o f 1946 , Kin g ha d offere d i t t o th e the n Ministe r o f Nationa l Health an d Welfare , Brook e Claxton . Accordin g t o th e obituar y notic e appearin g in th e Toront o Globe an d Mail th e da y afte r Brook e Claxton' s deat h o n Jun e 13 , 1960, "Mr . Claxto n wishe d nothin g bette r [tha n t o becom e Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affairs ] bu t h e reminde d Mr . Kin g tha t Loui s St . Laurent , th e Min ister o f Justice , ha d decide d t o g o bac k t o hi s la w practice . I t wa s importan t t o the part y tha t h e remain i n public life. Mr . Claxton suggested tha t Mr . St . Lauren t be offere d Externa l Affairs . Mr . Kin g sai d i t woul d b e fruitless , tha t Mr . St . Laurent was determined to retire, but agreed t o try. Mr . St. Laurent accepted . . . ."

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Liberal Governmen t i n Jun e 1957 . Th e ne w Prime Minister , Mr . Joh n Diefenbaker, wa s his ow n foreign ministe r unti l i n Septembe r 195 7 h e brought Sidne y Smit h int o hi s administratio n an d hande d th e Externa l Affairs portfoli o ove r t o him . Whe n Sidne y Smith' s ne w caree r wa s tragically ende d b y his deat h i n Marc h 1959 , th e Prim e Ministe r agai n assumed responsibility for the External Affair s Department , relinquishin g it in July of that year to the then Minister o f Public Works , Mr. Howar d Green. Fo r a tim e Mr . Gree n retained , whil e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , no t onl y hi s ol d portfoli o bu t als o hi s positio n a s House Leader ; ther e wa s som e criticis m i n th e Hous e o f Common s at this pilin g on o f responsibilities, an d withi n a few months Mr . Gree n was left fre e t o devot e al l his tim e an d energ y t o foreig n affairs . The relationshi p betwee n a Prim e Ministe r an d hi s foreig n minister , "the mos t fateful . . . of all imposed by the machinery of government," 48 is seldom free fro m difficult y an d may easily become tensely competitive . Where a Prime Minister is wise enough and generous enough to allow an able colleagu e sufficien t scop e fo r judgmen t an d initiative , o r wher e a foreign ministe r i s conten t wit h a technician' s role , a harmoniou s an d productive partnershi p ma y result. Bu t thi s rarel y happens . "Th e rela tions o f subordinatio n tha t bin d the m together, " a n authorit y ha s written, "th e car e take n b y th e ministe r o f foreig n affair s i n orde r t o keep his own autonomy, the fear o f the prime minister tha t thi s collabo rator ma y carr y hi m to o fa r toward s a polic y o f whic h th e parliamen t disapproves . . . , the general tendenc y t o hold numerou s internationa l meetings a t th e highes t level , al l thi s create s betwee n thes e tw o men , even whe n the y belon g t o th e sam e politica l party , a fata l competi tion."49 Whethe r the y contriv e a mutuall y profitabl e division o f labour , or whethe r thei r energie s ar e dissipate d i n rivalry , wil l depen d mainl y upon thei r temperaments ; especially wil l i t depen d upo n th e tempera ment of the Prim e Minister . Mackenzie Kin g combine d th e position s o f Prim e Ministe r an d foreign ministe r fo r al l bu t th e las t tw o year s o f hi s lon g sojour n i n power. H e di d s o not becaus e h e fel t foreig n affair s t o b e insufficientl y important t o warrant anothe r Cabine t ministe r holdin g the portfolio bu t precisely becaus e he fel t foreig n polic y t o b e too seriou s a matter t o b e left t o foreig n ministers . His attitud e resemble d tha t o f the Abb e Sieye s towards a secon d chamber : i f i t agree d i t wa s superfluous ; i f not , mis chievous. Whe n i n 194 6 h e finall y relinquishe d th e External Affair s portfolio, i t wa s withou t an y intentio n o f yieldin g contro l o f importan t foreign polic y matters; on the contrary , i t wa s in orde r t o devot e mor e attention t o them , an d t o sloug h of f upo n th e ne w Secretar y o f Stat e

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for Externa l Affair s suc h mundan e matter s a s th e acquisitio n o f ne w properties abroa d fo r Canadia n diplomati c missions then bein g opene d up. Th e necessar y amendmen t o f th e Ac t o f 191 2 wa s passe d i n Apri l 1946, bu t i t wa s no t unti l Septembe r tha t Mr . St . Lauren t too k over . To justif y hi s refusal t o she d the portfoli o a t the earlie r date , Mackenzi e King referred t o hi s ow n long experienc e o f foreig n policy : This Hous e know s tha t th e problem s w e have i n al l thes e internationa l rela tionships hav e no t grow n u p i n th e las t fe w day s o r week s o r years ; the y have com e int o bein g ove r th e years , an d with respec t t o them , wid e knowl edge an d informatio n i s a ver y grea t asse t i n reachin g highl y importan t de cisions. Th e movemen t o f internationa l affair s i s s o rapid i n thes e day s tha t unless on e ha s som e o f th e direc t knowledg e o f th e backgroun d ou t o f which thes e situation s hav e sprun g i t woul d b e nex t t o impossibl e . . . t o make wit h an y sens e o f securit y th e decision s whic h ar e essentia l i f th e proper step s ar e to be taken. . .. It is not for me to say whether or not a new minister o f externa l affair s comin g int o offic e tomorro w woul d b e able , in th e critica l situation s whic h hav e t o b e deal t wit h a t som e o f th e inter national gathering s whic h ar e t o tak e place thi s year, t o render , perhaps , th e same servic e t o Canad a a s one who has known a t first hand th e internationa l situation a s it has grow n u p ove r th e years. 50

It seemed likely, therefore, that the new Secretary of State for External Affairs woul d not b e allowe d much leeway in those larger affair s o f stat e that th e Prim e Ministe r clearl y intende d t o dea l wit h himself ; an d thi s proved t o b e th e case . Two incidents during the short period whe n Mackenzie King and Mr . St. Laurent worke d together a s Prime Ministe r an d foreig n ministe r ar e suggestive of their difficul t an d unsatisfactor y relationship . The firs t took place soo n afte r Mr . St . Laurent acquire d his new portfolio. A telegra m from th e Prim e Ministe r o f th e Unite d Kingdom , relatin g tha t Indi a was soo n t o achiev e independence o n suc h generou s terms tha t i t wa s expected to remai n in the Commonwealth , was received in Ottaw a dur ing Mackenzi e King' s absence . Mr . Leste r Pearson , the n Unde r Secre tary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , prepare d a n answe r (t o th e effec t that Canad a welcome d th e new s i n Mr . Attlee' s message ) whic h Mr . St. Lauren t signed , delayin g it s despatc h fo r th e Prim e Minister' s ap proval o n hi s return . Whe n presente d t o hi m i n Cabinet , Mackenzi e King "wa s furious . H e remarke d tha t Attlee' s cable ha d bee n addresse d to th e Prim e Minister o f Canad a an d h e assume d that h e an d n o othe r was stil l Prime Minister. Sinc e he alon e wa s entitled t o answe r his ow n correspondence, h e too k th e draf t repl y rudel y ou t o f St . Laurent' s hands an d said he would dea l wit h it himself. . .. St. Laurent receive d this outrageous rebuke i n silence." 51

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A simila r and more seriou s episode occurre d a few months later. Mr . J. L. Ilsley, then Minister o f Finance, leadin g the Canadian delegatio n a t the Unite d Nation s Genera l Assembly , signifie d Canada' s acceptanc e of membershi p o n th e U.N . Temporar y Commissio n o n Korea , an d Mr. St . Laurent, a s Acting Prim e Ministe r i n King' s absenc e fro m Ot tawa, approve d Mr . Ilsley' s decision . O n learnin g o f thi s developmen t on his return, Mackenzi e Kin g was so incensed tha t h e despatche d Mr . Lester Pearso n t o Washingto n t o obtai n Presiden t Truman' s approva l of Canada' s withdrawa l from th e Commission. (I t ha d bee n i n respons e to a request from th e United States that the Canadian representativ e ha d agreed t o accep t membership. ) Whe n Mr . Pearso n reporte d tha t h e had been unable to secure Mr. Truman's agreemen t to a Canadian withdrawal, th e Canadia n Prim e Ministe r determine d t o withdra w i n an y case. Thereupo n a numbe r o f Cabine t members , includin g Mr . St . Laurent an d Mr . Ilsley , threatene d t o resign . Confronte d wit h on e of the rar e occasion s in Canadia n political lif e whe n ministers have threat ened resignation over an issu e of foreign policy, Mackenzi e King backed down, an d settle d for a compromise by which Canada remained a member o f th e Commissio n o n th e understandin g that i t woul d pla y a s in conspicuous a role a s possible. Soon afte r thi s incident, Mackenzi e King invited Mr . St . Laurent t o hi s Laurie r Hous e hom e an d there , "i n hi s most charmin g manner, remarked tha t h e ha d no t realize d ho w keenl y his colleague s fel t abou t th e Korea n matter . St . Lauren t replie d tha t naturally h e mus t resign i f Kin g repealed hi s policy . Resignation , Kin g protested, wa s unthinkable. If St . Laurent . . . believe d i n th e wisdom of hi s action, the n ther e wa s nothing more t o b e said . . . . Thi s affai r marked a watershed in the politica l live s of King and St . Laurent. Kin g was n o longe r th e dominant power in the Government . . . ," 62 If Mackenzi e Kin g and Loui s St . Lauren t provide d a mode l o f ho w a Prim e Ministe r an d a foreig n ministe r ough t no t t o wor k together , Mr. St . Lauren t a s Prim e Ministe r an d Mr . Leste r Pearso n a s foreig n minister offere d a mode l o f ho w the y should . A s on e wh o ha d himsel f held th e positio n o f Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s unde r th e difficult circumstance s jus t described , Mr . St . Lauren t ha d a soun d appreciation o f it s importanc e whil e conten t t o leav e a larg e are a o f discretion t o hi s younge r colleague . Mr. Pearso n ha s himsel f disclose d that durin g the Sue z crisis i n November 195 6 h e was given a fre e han d at the United Nations. "Mr . St . Laurent was more than a prime minister to me , h e wa s alway s a ver y clos e friend . 'Don' t worry' , h e tol d me . 'Do wha t i s best. Do the righ t thing , an d I'l l bac k you'." 63 Thi s happ y

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understanding appear s t o hav e bee n th e basi s o f a n exceptionall y har monious an d fruitfu l collaboratio n throughou t eigh t eventfu l years , fo r which th e Prim e Minister , a s th e senio r partner , deserve s ful l credit . Mr. St . Laurent' s relationshi p wit h Mr . Pearso n i s wel l describe d b y words onc e applie d t o Mr. Churchill' s relationshi p wit h Anthon y Eden : "[It] wa s s o fran k an d sagacious , an d hi s ow n temperamen t s o littl e inclined t o backstair s methods , tha t ther e wa s never an y question abou t what migh t be calle d a 'doubl e foreig n policy'." 54 The presen t Prim e Ministe r ha s s o far displaye d i n thi s matter a les s sure touch . Mr . Joh n Diefenbaker' s spectacula r electora l triumph s o f June 195 7 an d Marc h 195 8 wer e du e mor e tha n t o anythin g els e t o his ow n personal appeal , evokin g such "hysterica l adoration, " a corres pondent note d i n wonder, "that a t places lik e Fredericton , N.B., wome n were holdin g u p thei r childre n t o touc h th e he m o f hi s garment." 55 H e was thu s les s tha n usuall y solicitou s o f colleague s durin g th e normall y sordid busines s o f cabinet-making ; an d a s h e wa s widel y regarde d a s an authorit y o n internationa l affairs—h e ha d bee n sinc e th e deat h o f Gordon Graydo n in 195 3 the officia l Opposition' s foreig n policy spokes man—no on e wa s greatly astonishe d a t hi s decisio n t o becom e hi s ow n foreign minister , a t leas t fo r th e tim e being . In Septembe r 195 7 Mr . Diefenbake r announce d tha t Sidne y Smit h would ente r th e Cabine t a s Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs . Sidney Smit h was then th e respecte d an d widel y known Presiden t o f th e University o f Toronto , wit h a reputatio n fo r vigorou s an d witt y speec h in th e caus e o f highe r education , ofte n rumoure d a s a possibl e leade r of th e Conservativ e part y o f whose membership h e ha d mad e n o secret . All expecte d hi m quickly to mak e his mark a s a Canadia n foreig n min ister. I n thi s al l were to b e disappointed . Sidney Smith was not a t hom e in hi s ne w job , an d whil e h e ha d show n som e sign s o f masterin g i t shortly befor e hi s deat h i n office , h e neve r displaye d th e consistentl y professional flai r o f hi s Nobe l prize-winnin g predecessor . I t canno t b e said tha t th e Prim e Ministe r mad e hi s foreig n minister' s apprenticeshi p any easier . Sidne y Smith's earliest public utterance a s Secretar y of Stat e for External Affair s wa s delivered a few moments after bein g sworn int o the Cabinet , Mr . Diefenbake r standin g watchfull y a t hi s side . H e wa s asked b y newspape r reporter s fo r hi s opinio n o f Canadia n polic y a t the tim e o f th e Sue z crisis . Embarke d o n a n hones t i f maladroi t repl y to th e effec t tha t h e wa s i n genera l agreemen t wit h th e St . Laurent Pearson position , h e wa s interrupted , "rathe r tartly , i t seeme d t o som e listeners,"56 by the Prime Ministe r wh o proceeded t o offe r hi s own, ver y

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different, versio n of what the Secretar y o f State for Externa l Affair s ha d meant to say. This initial reprimand se t the ton e o f their relationshi p fo r its tragicall y short duration . In Mr . Howar d Green , wh o becam e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs o n Jun e 4 , 1959 , thre e month s afte r Sidne y Smith' s death , th e Prime Minister had a wholly different kin d of colleague. An experience d parliamentarian wh o ha d entere d th e Hous e o f Common s i n 1935 , Mr. Gree n was note d fo r a n obsessiv e concer n tha t Canad a joi n som e kind o f Pacifi c counterpar t of NATO , fo r a rancorou s attac k o n th e Government at the time of the Suez crisis, and for a record, surel y unique for a foreign minister , of unbroken domicile in his own country since his return fro m th e Wester n front i n 1918 . I t wa s widel y noticed , a t leas t during th e firs t yea r an d a hal f o f thei r ne w relationship , tha t Mr . Diefenbaker seeme d reluctan t t o allo w Mr . Gree n th e latitud e Mr . St. Lauren t ha d permitte d Mr . Pearson , tha t h e reserve d fo r himsel f important pronouncement s on worl d affairs , an d o n occasio n mad e things mor e difficul t fo r hi s foreig n secretar y t o sui t hi s ow n politica l advantage. Lik e Lor d Curzo n fort y year s before him , Mr . Gree n wa s "to discove r th e persona l embarrassmen t t o whic h a Foreig n Secretar y might b e subjecte d b y a Prim e Ministe r . . . wh o took a n activ e an d sometimes independen t par t i n th e foreig n policy o f hi s country." 57 PRIME MINISTE R AN D GOVERNOR GENERA L

Half a century ago, whe n the conduc t o f Canadia n externa l polic y wa s both theoretically and practically the concern of the British Government , the Governo r General a s its representative played a s great a part i n th e external affair s o f th e Dominio n a s hi s ow n temperamen t an d tha t o f his Prim e Ministe r woul d allow ; an d the y coul d allo w a grea t deal . Lord Mint o has lef t a revealing account of what he conceive d to b e hi s constitutional rol e durin g hi s governo r generalshi p (1898-1904) : I think what I should like to make most clea r [h e wrote to his Canadian friend George R . Parki n i n 1904 ] i s the positio n I hav e take n u p wit h "m y min isters" o n matter s o f publi c importance..viz . alway s t o expres s m y view s a s openly an d a s decidedl y a s I coul d o n al l matter s upo n whic h I hav e bee n consulted—and thoug h i t ma y soun d conceite d I hav e bee n consulte d abou t everything o f an y moment , an d I a m sur e yo u wil l understan d th e pleasur e it i s to m e that th e longe r I hav e bee n here , th e greate r weigh t I hav e bee n able t o bear.. I hav e howeve r alway s assume d th e position , i n matter s o f importance, tha t ther e wer e tw o classe s int o whic h question s place d befor e

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me resolve d themselves...viz . Imperia l questions , an d purel y Canadia n questions—as regard s th e forme r I hav e alway s claime d m y righ t t o asser t myself, i.e . t o pu t m y foo t down , i f I suspecte d anythin g detrimenta l t o Imperial interests , whils t a s t o Canadia n question s howeve r important , I have onl y expresse d m y opinion a s strongly a s I could, simply a s my opinion, for wha t i t wa s worth , tellin g th e ministe r intereste d tha t suc h wa s m y opinion an d tha t h e coul d tak e i t o r no t a s h e liked. *

Lord Grey , Governo r Genera l fro m 190 4 t o 1911 , foun d th e are a in whic h h e coul d "pu t m y foo t down " somewha t smalle r tha n tha t available t o hi s predecessor , bu t di d no t hesitat e t o pu t i t dow n whe n he sa w fit, as when he wrot e to th e Britis h ambassado r i n Washington , "with th e vie w o f preventin g th e offic e o f Governo r Genera l driftin g into a subordinat e an d undignifie d position, " to reques t tha t h e b e sen t "copies o f an y privat e communication s yo u ma y sen d t o th e Secretar y of th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs." 58 I n th e main , however , Gre y relied, a s his successors ha d necessaril y t o rely , o n influence rather tha n on constitutional authority . His restless an d energetic intelligence lappe d into every cranny of Canadian life, suffusin g hi s minister s with schemes, goading the m int o actio n an d frequentl y int o irritation . "O n on e oc casion (1909 ) whe n Grey's enthusias m for proportiona l representatio n threatened t o becom e embarrassing , Laurie r 'wishe d Ear l Gre y woul d mind hi s own business', an d Kin g in hi s diary added : 'Th e trut h i s Hi s Ex. i s getting into to o man y things'."59 Bu t Bryce , i n Washington , was more appreciative . "Whe n I loo k bac k ove r thes e las t thre e years, " h e wrote to Gre y i n 1910 , " I doub t i f an y decision s woul d eve r hav e bee n got ou t o f Canada bu t fo r you r action." 60 Under Gre y th e influenc e o f Governor s Genera l upo n Canadia n external polic y reached a hig h water mark fro m whic h i t wa s to reced e for man y years. The pressure s of wa r ha d b y 191 9 create d th e practic e of direc t communicatio n betwee n prim e ministers , an d althoug h th e channel formall y ran throug h th e Governo r General' s offic e i n Ottawa , the hold-u p o f th e Britis h Government' s telegra m a t th e tim e o f th e Chanak crisi s o f 192 2 (receive d i n th e Governo r General' s offic e a t 1 0 on th e evenin g of Friday, Septembe r 15 , deciphere d ther e th e followin g morning an d delivere d t o th e Prim e Minister' s offic e a t 3 P.M . on Sep tember 16 , tw o hour s afte r th e new s ha d appeare d i n th e Canadia n press61) helpe d t o mak e inevitabl e th e change s i n th e positio n o f th e Governor Genera l throughou t th e Dominion s agree d upo n a t th e Im *Lord Mint o t o Georg e R . Parkin , Sept . 26 , 1904 , quote d i n Fran k H . Under bill, "Lor d Mint o o n hi s Governor Generalship, " Canadian Historical Review, vol . XL, no . 2 , Jun e 1959 , p . 124 . Professo r Underbil l draw s attentio n t o Minto' s curious "syste m o f punctuatio n b y mean s o f dot s an d dashes. "

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perial Conference of 1926.* Henceforth the Governor General no longer functioned a s th e representativ e o f th e Britis h Government ; h e wa s to b e no mor e (i f n o less ) tha n th e representativ e o f th e Sovereign . I n that capacity he might continue to exercise influence o n policy by means of th e prerogative s o f constitutiona l monarch y classicall y denne d b y Bagehot as "the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn." Warning an d encouragement , however , were only useful, indee d the y were onl y practical , o n th e assumptio n o f adequat e consultation . Thi s the Imperia l Conferenc e of 192 6 recognize d an d sough t t o promot e b y stating i n it s repor t tha t " a Governo r Genera l shoul d b e supplie d wit h copies o f al l document s o f importanc e an d i n genera l shoul d b e kep t as fully informe d a s is His Majest y th e Kin g in Grea t Britai n of Cabine t business an d publi c affairs. " Whethe r i n fac t h e woul d b e s o informe d of cours e depende d no t upo n constitutiona l document s draw n u p i n London bu t upo n th e inclination o f his Prim e Minister . I n Canada , th e Prime Ministe r wa s no t s o inclined . Whil e Canadia n practic e di d no t so obviousl y follo w tha t o f th e Iris h Fre e Stat e i n seekin g t o degrad e the Governo r General' s offic e fo r politica l advantage , ther e wa s cer tainly n o grea t effor t b y Mackenzie Kin g to dra w the Governo r closel y into his confidence o r to see k the benefit o f his advice . Lord Willingdon , Governor Genera l fro m 192 6 t o 1930 , complaine d tha t "fe w chief s o f a Stat e hav e suc h littl e knowledg e o f th e wor k tha t i s bein g don e b y his administrator s a s ha s th e presen t Governor-Genera l o f Canada"; 62 Lord Tweedsmuir , Governo r Genera l fro m 193 5 t o 1940 , althoug h on much closer persona l term s with his Prime Minister tha n Willingdon had been , ha d hardl y mor e influenc e o n policy . Th e Governor s o f Mackenzie King' s las t year s i n offic e wer e ceremonia l cyphers . I n 1944 Kin g George VI inquire d o f his Canadian Prime Minister , then i n the Unite d Kingdom , "ho w hi s uncl e wa s gettin g on. I spok e o f bein g exceedingly please d wit h Lord Athlone . . . . He aske d m e how often I saw him . I sai d sometime s quit e a littl e perio d wen t by , sometimes , some weeks would go by. I t wa s then tha t h e spok e o f seein g Churchil l *The wisdo m o f on e o f thes e changes , tha t prescribin g tha t th e Governo r General wa s n o longe r t o ac t a s th e channe l o f communicatio n betwee n a Do minion governmen t an d tha t o f anothe r membe r o f th e Britis h Commonwealth , was forcibl y suggeste d b y th e late r experienc e o f Ne w Zealan d whic h alon e o f the Dominion s clun g i n thi s respec t t o th e ol d syste m unti l 1941 ; man y seriou s delays i n th e transmissio n o f message s betwee n Londo n an d Wellingto n occurre d as a consequence . O n on e occasio n "a n importan t Londo n cabl e o f 1 9 Ma r 3 7 reached Governmen t Hous e o n th e 20t h bu t th e Prim e Minister' s Departmen t not unti l th e 23rd. " F . L . W . Wood , Th e Ne w Zealand People a t War: Political and External Affairs (Wellington , 1958) , p . 63 .

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1

once a week. . . . "* Wit h Lord Alexander , Athlone' s successor , Mac kenzie Kin g wa s o n friendl y term s bu t agai n "di d no t mak e a practic e of consultin g th e famou s soldier , presumabl y becaus e h e wa s confident that Alexander' s advic e o n Canadia n politic s woul d b e quit e worth less."63 Lor d Alexander , i t wil l b e recalled , lef t hi s vice-rega l pos t t o become Minister o f Defence in the Governmen t of the Unite d Kingdom . The appointmen t o f Mr . Vincen t Masse y i n 195 2 an d tha t o f hi s successor, Majo r Genera l George s Vanier , i n 195 9 hav e t o a consider able exten t rehabilitate d th e office . Bot h ha d wid e experienc e o f Canadian affair s (Mr . Masse y indee d havin g bee n a membe r o f a Canadian Government ) an d i n particula r o f Canadia n diplomacy , s o that thei r Prim e Minister s coul d no t wit h muc h plausibilit y hol d aloo f on th e groun d that thei r Governors ' knowledg e an d judgmen t of event s were too sligh t to make their counse l wort h acquiring. No r woul d a n increasing numbe r o f informe d Canadian s hav e bee n conten t wit h a cypher's role . Th e prestig e o f th e Governo r General' s offic e has , fo r the firs t tim e i n thirt y years , bee n noticeabl y enhanced . Th e appoint ment o f Canadian s ha s contribute d t o thi s result , an d eve n mor e th e rare distinctio n wit h whic h th e firs t Canadia n appointee , Mr . Vincen t Massey, wen t abou t hi s duties . S o has th e increase d popularit y o f th e monarchy itsel f an d it s domesticatio n int o th e Canadia n constitutio n with more frequent (an d les s stuffy ) roya l visits . * Quoted i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 694 . Th e weekl y meetings wit h Mr . Churchill , Kin g Georg e added , wer e sometime s alone , some times wit h th e Chief s o f Staff , sometime s wit h member s o f th e Wa r Cabinet . Mackenzie Kin g "aske d hi m i f hi s presenc e cause d th e me n t o discus s matter s less freely . H e sai d no t a t all . The y spok e quit e freel y bac k an d forth . H e foun d it ver y helpful. " Ibid., p . 694 .

ChapterTwo

TH

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BUREAUCRAC Y

THE SENIO R CIVI L SERVAN T

It i s a parado x o f bureaucratic histor y tha t no soone r ha d th e principl e of a n official , permanen t an d neutra l publi c servic e bee n firml y estab lished i n the constitution s o f Western democracie s tha n th e line betwee n political and administrativ e activity began to be so smudged an d blurre d that toda y i t i s doubtfu l whethe r a frontie r exists , le t alon e whethe r the boundar y ma y b e precisel y delimited . N o sophisticate d studen t of politics i s an y longer shocke d b y this, no r doe s h e hanke r fo r a golde n age o f administratio n fro m whic h patronag e an d politic s hav e bee n forever banished . Th e da y o f "th e administrativ e eunuc h wit h neithe r policies nor politics" 1 is over, i f it ha d eve r dawned ; th e administratio n of things , i n splendi d defianc e o f th e Marxia n prediction , ha s com e t o mean th e governmen t o f men . Th e civi l servant , mor e especiall y th e senior civi l servant , ha s bee n draw n eve r mor e intimatel y t o th e centr e of th e politica l process . Th e rang e an d complexit y o f technologie s modern government s must master , th e want s o f citizen s grow n accus tomed t o thei r welfar e state , th e tren d toward s mobilize d i f no t garri soned communitie s in a n er a tha t i s neithe r wa r no r peace , al l hav e increased hi s influence upo n affairs . In Canada, the senior civil servant's involvement in the policy proces s has been a s close and continuous as anywhere in the world. The longev ity o f government s has brough t hi m int o prolonge d an d ofte n familia r contact wit h political superiors . Th e state' s uninhibite d participatio n h i taming an d harnessin g the resource s o f th e mor e forbiddin g hal f o f th e continent ha s place d a premiu m upo n hi s manageria l talents . Th e stil l more specialize d problem s o f defenc e i n th e missil e age have cast doub t upon th e validit y o f th e classica l formul a "layma n o n top , exper t o n tap" t o the exten t that the political layma n is concerned abou t national , as distinc t fro m hi s own , survival . Such ar e th e circumstances offerin g the senio r Canadia n administrato r a positio n o f powe r an d influenc e greater, perhaps , tha n tha t o f hi s counterpar t i n othe r democrati c bureaucracies. Student s of the politica l proces s in Canada ar e al l agreed upon his importance, if they are just beginning to penetrate the mysteries of decision-makin g i n whic h he i s s o cruciall y involved . It migh t b e thought , recallin g th e wanin g influenc e o f th e caree r

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diplomatist (se e below, chapter vn), that the senior Canadian administra tor exert s hi s authorit y onl y i n question s o f interna l policy . Thi s woul d be a majo r misinterpretatio n o f hi s role . For a t th e summi t of th e civi l service th e division s betwee n foreig n an d domesti c affair s al l bu t disappear. A t thi s exalte d leve l th e gaz e o f th e civi l servan t sweep s across th e whol e horizo n o f publi c policy . Thu s th e senio r member s of the Departmen t o f External Affairs , wit h their commandin g positio n o n interdepartmental committee s an d thei r uniqu e relationshi p wit h th e Prime Minister's offic e (se e above, chapter i), are assured of opportunit y to influenc e decision s i n area s fa r mor e extensiv e than a recita l o f their nominal responsibilitie s migh t suggest . I n th e sam e way , ke y member s from othe r department s an d agencie s o f governmen t brin g thei r experi ence t o bea r upo n problem s o f externa l polic y whic h i n a mor e rigi d division o f labou r woul d b e th e sol e prerogativ e o f foreig n offices . Th e mutuality o f thes e intrusion s help s t o alla y th e resentmen t the y migh t otherwise arouse . The grou p whos e member s stra y s o frequentl y int o eac h other' s jurisdictions i s no t an d coul d no t b e a larg e one . It s number s hav e varied ove r th e years : perhap s a doze n o r s o i n 1945 , perhap s tripl e that today . I t i s a grou p withou t fixe d composition , jus t a s i t i s a group withou t define d duties . Withi n i t ar e usuall y t o b e foun d th e deputy minister s an d o n occasio n th e associat e an d assistan t deput y ministers o f certai n importan t departments—Externa l Affairs , Finance , National Defence , Trad e an d Commerce , Transport—togethe r wit h th e senior official s o f th e Ban k o f Canada , th e secretar y o f th e Cabinet , perhaps th e principa l privat e secretar y o f th e Prim e Minister . It s mem bers hav e been describe d a s an "unde r Cabinet." 2 I t i s a n ap t term , fo r this i s th e grou p t o whic h responsibl e minister s o f th e Crow n turn , individually an d collectively , fo r continuou s advic e an d guidanc e o n matters o f high policy. I t thu s comprise s a kind of civil service ministry , and t o it s member s migh t wel l b e applie d Si r Jame s Stephen' s descrip tion o f higher publi c servant s i n Englan d a centur y ago , "statesme n i n disguise." Below the "unde r Cabinet " may b e foun d a large r grou p o f officials , usually o f th e ran k o f assistan t deput y ministe r o r hea d o f a majo r branch o r division , likewis e engage d i n genera l administratio n an d properly describe d a s members of the senio r civi l service. Th e numbe r of such official s ha s greatl y increase d ove r th e years—indee d th e whol e group i s largel y a produc t o f th e perio d sinc e th e en d o f th e Secon d World War—bu t it is still a smal l an d selec t secto r o f the publi c servic e as a whole . It s presen t membershi p ha s bee n estimate d variousl y a s

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between 15 0 and 250. * I t ma y be best describe d a s "th e bureaucrati c elite." T o identif y it s member s wit h th e "unde r Cabinet " woul d b e t o exaggerate thei r responsibilities , bu t i t i s fro m th e bureaucrati c elit e that "unde r Cabinets " o f the futur e ar e recruited . Where departmenta l division s ar e barrier s rathe r tha n aid s t o action , the "unde r Cabinet " an d th e bureaucrati c elit e usefull y dissolv e them . This ma y b e don e b y th e interdepartmenta l committee , meetin g a t th e level o f deput y minister s o r head s o f division , habitua l resor t t o whic h is s o distinctiv e a featur e o f publi c administratio n i n Canad a (se e below, chapte r vi) . Bu t th e interdepartmenta l committe e a s suc h can not b e expected t o secur e tha t broa d comprehensio n o f national interes t which i s its ostensibl e purpos e an d whic h i t ma y achiev e a t it s best . A t its worst , however , i t i s a foru m fo r departmenta l lobbying , fo r post ponement an d procrastination , fo r pitchin g discussio n an d decisio n a t the lowes t commo n denominato r o f understandin g an d agreement . A valuabl e ai d to interdepartmenta l liaiso n o f a mor e helpfu l kin d i s the practic e o f postin g ke y official s t o othe r department s an d receivin g in retur n ke y official s fro m them . "W e fee l tha t i n man y case s thes e officials ar e interchangeable, " Mr . L . S . St . Lauren t remarked soo n after becomin g Prim e Minister , "an d ca n b e moved t o ne w posts eithe r in othe r department s o r wit h specia l governmen t agencies." 3 Th e prac tice seem s t o hav e bee n inaugurate d durin g th e Secon d Worl d Wa r among actual or prospective member s of the "unde r Cabinet, " and sinc e then tw o o r thre e ver y senio r civi l servant s indee d hav e rotate d ever y three o r fou r year s amon g th e mos t importan t administrativ e posts — the unde r secretaryshi p o f stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , clerkshi p o f th e Privy Council , chairmanshi p o f th e Civi l Servic e Commission . I t ha s also bee n encourage d withi n th e rank s o f th e les s senio r bureaucrati c elite, particularl y amon g th e Department s o f Externa l Affairs , Trad e and Commerce , an d Finance . Bu t civi l servant s who find usefu l experi ence i n departments other tha n their own are still the exception, an d th e characteristic complain t continue s t o b e th e classica l complain t tha t the public servic e offer s rathe r les s tha n privat e enterpris e th e oppor *Keith B . Callard , Advanced Administrative Training i n th e Public Service (Toronto, 1958) , p. 22, cites a figure of "possibly . . . 150" ; Joh n Porter , "Highe r Public Servant s an d th e Bureaucrati c Elit e i n Canada, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol . XXIV , no . 4 , Nov . 1958 , pp . 497-501 , offers a large r estimat e mor e carefull y computed . Takin g a s hi s bureaucrati c universe "twenty-on e deput y ministers , an d twent y other s a t th e deput y ministe r level; twenty-nin e associat e an d assistan t deputies , an d sixt y other s a t tha t level ; seventy-seven belo w thes e rank s . . . a t th e directo r leve l . . . ; an d senio r executives o f Crow n Corporations, " Professo r Porte r arrive s a t a figur e o f 243 . Of thes e 20 2 offere d fairl y unifor m biographica l data , an d thes e official s for m hi s "bureacratic elite."

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5

tunity t o mak e th e mos t o f one' s talent s i n whateve r branc h the y ar e most urgentl y neede d o r bes t rewarded . Canad a ha s develope d mor e hesitantly tha n Unite d State s busines s th e interchangeabl e executiv e along wit h th e interchangeabl e part , movin g imperturbabl y an d effec tively fro m on e enterpris e t o th e next ; th e interchangeabl e civi l servan t is a s ye t a n idea l an d i n som e quarter s h e i s no t ye t that . "I t seem s to m e tha t th e Canadia n servic e i s muc h to o highl y fragmented, " a former membe r of the "unde r Cabinet " commented i n 1957 . "Ther e ar e far to o man y pigeon hole s an d blin d alleys . . . . Too muc h talen t get s lost an d frustrated within these narro w confines . . .. I expec t someon e will say , 'Loo k a t yourself . Yo u see m t o hav e go t around. ' Tha t i s true, bu t I hav e resigne d thre e times." 4 Perhaps th e chie f catalys t o f co-ordinatio n a t th e highe r level s o f the civi l servic e i s th e wa y it s member s spen d tim e togethe r outsid e their offices , "havin g lunch at the Chateau, o r on a Saturday a t Madam e Burger's."* A forme r membe r o f th e "unde r Cabinet " has stresse d th e importance o f thi s extra-bureaucrati c environment : In informa l gathering s a t lunch , a t dinner , a t receptions , a t evenin g partie s and a t the fishing club, th e leadin g adviser s o f th e Governmen t . . . mak e a practic e o f consultation . . . . I t i s taken fo r grante d a t mos t Ottaw a socia l gatherings tha t th e wive s gravitat e t o on e en d o f th e roo m whil e thei r husbands collec t a t th e othe r fo r tha t infinitel y fascinatin g occupatio n o f "talking shop" . Fro m observatio n an d fro m conversatio n wit h civi l servant s in othe r countries , I hav e com e t o th e conclusio n tha t thi s clos e contac t and constan t exchang e o f view s amon g leadin g civi l servant s i n Ottaw a i s in man y respect s unique . I n Washingto n interdepartmenta l consultatio n hardly exist s excep t i n formall y constitute d committees . I n Londo n ther e is greate r informalit y durin g workin g hour s tha n i n Washington , bu t afte r hours civi l servant s depar t fo r thei r home s i n widel y separate d suburb s o f the cit y an d hav e relativel y fe w socia l contacts. 5

The syste m work s effectivel y enoug h t o cur e th e usua l bureaucrati c malaise o f dissipatin g rivalry an d competition , bu t i n doin g s o i t ma y produce undesirabl e side-effects . Th e senio r civi l servan t ma y vie w such a vas t panoram a o f governmen t busines s tha t h e become s incap able of that close scrutin y of detail or that specialized knowledge withou t *Callard, Advanced Administrative Training i n th e Public Service, p . 1 . "Th e Chateau" i s the Chatea u Laurie r Hotel , "Madam e Burger's " a restauran t i n Hull , Quebec, a few minutes ' driv e acros s the Ottaw a River . A typica l meeting of thi s kind was describe d in 194 2 by the America n Ministe r in Ottaw a who havin g attemped withou t success to trac k dow n some members of th e "bureaucrati c elite " at th e Ridea u Club o n th e previou s day, "trie d m y luc k at th e [Chatea u Laurier ] cafeteria toda y and lunche d with Jac k Pickersgil l (Privat e Secretary t o th e Prim e Minister), Ji m Coyn e (Assistan t to Donal d Gordo n i n Pric e Control) , Sau l Ra e and Escot t Rei d of th e Departmen t of Externa l Affairs." Nanc y Harvison Hooker , ed., Th e Moffat Papers (Cambridge , Mass., 1956) , p . 382 . The luncheo n yielded more politica l informatio n fo r th e Ministe r tha n half-a-doze n forma l interviews.

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which n o enterprise , publi c o r private , ca n full y succeed . A membe r of Parliament ha s describe d senio r publi c servant s i n Canad a a s " a bunc h of mandarin s who , b y bein g all-aroun d gentlemen , sor t o f crosswor d puzzle experts , hav e neve r go t aroun d t o havin g enoug h exper t knowl edge i n an y on e secto r t o develo p o r elaborat e policy." 6 Th e descrip tion i s doubtles s overdrawn , bu t i t suggest s a tendenc y o f whic h th e "mandarins" themselve s are not unaware. Another hazar d is that debat e between spokesme n o f differen t department s may b e sappe d b y famili arity o r inhibition . Professo r Whear e ha s writte n convincingl y o f th e need i n effectiv e committe e wor k fo r th e talent s "o f bein g unabl e t o see th e sens e i n wha t i s bein g done , o f questionin g th e whol e basi s of organization , o f brushin g difficultie s aside , o f ignorin g logica l argu ment, an d of pressing a point beyon d what most me n consider a reasonable limit." 7 Thes e ar e no t th e ordinar y bureaucrati c virtues , an d the y are likely to be in acutely short supply in a bureaucracy whose member s (to adap t th e famou s phras e o f Jinnah ) occasionall y intermarr y an d habitually interdine . Th e exten t t o whic h clos e persona l associatio n of th e member s o f th e senio r civi l servic e make s fo r a dangerousl y monolithic approac h t o publi c polic y i s har d t o determine . On e o f th e members o f th e grou p has recalle d afte r leavin g i t tha t "o n man y mat ters i t wa s considere d undesirabl e t o tr y t o reac h commo n view s fo r presentation t o th e Ministers. . . . T o hav e attempted t o d o s o might have give n a quit e unjustifie d authorit y t o th e resultin g piec e o f pape r or hav e glosse d ove r difference s o f interpretatio n tha t Minister s . . . should b e awar e of." 8 Agains t thi s encouragin g testimon y ma y b e se t the disturbin g evidence of the forme r Chie f o f the Genera l Staf f tha t th e Committee ha d bee n " 'packed' t o protec t th e governmen t agains t th e receipt o f unpalatabl e advice , rathe r tha n presen t th e militar y cas e objectively an d fearlessly o n its merits."9 Related t o thi s dange r i s anothe r which might be called , howeve r in elegantly, th e "politicization " o f the senio r civi l servant . I t i s o f cours e a commonplac e tha t th e senio r civi l servan t ca n n o mor e avoi d politic s that h e ca n avoi d policy ; no r i s i t desirabl e 'that h e should . "I n th e formulation o f policy," writes Professor Wheare, "a Highe r Civi l Servant is advisin g an d assistin g a Ministe r no t onl y t o carr y throug h a polic y which i s the polic y o f a majorit y part y i n th e Hous e o f Commons , bu t also to defen d that polic y agains t the criticism s an d attack s of th e part y or partie s i n opposition . H e work s i n th e mids t o f part y politics . H e must b e awar e of party politics; indee d h e ignore s i t a t his peril. A first requirement of a Higher Civil Servant is a political sense." 10 Yet no aspect of his work requires more discretio n or carrie s greater risk . An obsessiv e

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concern wit h part y politic s displaye d unde r a singl e governmen t ove r a lon g perio d o f tim e ma y temp t hi m t o plac e th e part y befor e th e public interest ; or i f he i s not s o tempted a ne w se t o f politica l master s may regar d hi m notwithstandin g as to o closel y associate d wit h th e ol d to be of much use to them. "Th e on e thing that I don't like," Mackenzie King wrote i n his diary o n the occasio n o f appointin g Genera l A . G . L . McNaughton a s commande r o f th e Canadia n Arm y i n 1939 , "i s th e school fro m whic h h e comes , whic h wa s th e schoo l o f MacBrien , o f Bennett, an d Herridge. . .. No better evidenc e could be given of our dis interested actio n tha n i n givin g this comman d t o on e who comes . . . from tha t particula r group." 11 The quasi-political natur e of the services rendered b y senior Canadia n administrators to the politician s se t in authority over the m is recognized by the specia l manne r of their appointment . Unlike other civi l servants, who ar e appointe d b y th e Civi l Servic e Commission , deput y minister s are calle d t o thei r exalte d position s b y th e Governor-in-Counci l o n th e advice o f th e Prim e Minister . A n incomin g administratio n i s thu s no t only abl e bu t t o som e exten t expecte d t o reapprais e it s predecessor' s "under Cabinet " in the ligh t of its own intended policies , an d t o replac e any obviou s misfit s b y official s enjoyin g it s confidenc e an d eage r t o d o its bidding . I t woul d be altogethe r imprope r t o regar d thi s procedure a s a throwbac k t o th e patronag e syste m o f Laurier' s da y an d a majo r exception t o th e principle s o f civi l servic e neutralit y an d permanence . If i t result s i n change s o f personnel , thos e change s ar e expecte d t o b e few an d obvious . Bu t followin g th e Genera l Electio n o f 195 7 whic h returned th e Conservativ e part y t o powe r afte r twenty-tw o year s i n opposition, th e belie f wa s widesprea d tha t th e "unde r Cabinet " whic h had serve d Libera l master s fo r s o lon g an d s o wel l (no t leas t o f it s services bein g t o contribut e fro m it s rank s th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s an d th e Ministe r o f Citizenshi p an d Immigration* ) would prove unacceptable t o the new Government. Distinguishe d heads , it wa s confidentl y predicted , woul d soo n roll ; indeed , i n som e quarter s the cr y wa s tha t the y shoul d b e mad e t o roll , th e Globe an d Mail o f *Respectively, Mr . Leste r Pearso n (wh o ha d bee n Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affair s at the tim e of his entering politics), and Mr. J. W. Pickersgil l (previously Cler k o f th e Priv y Council) . I n 1948 , i n announcin g Mr . Pearson' s Cabinet appointment , th e Prim e Ministe r remarke d tha t th e civi l servic e shoul d be regarde d a s "th e steppin g ston e t o th e Ministry, " a doctrin e immediatel y stigmatized b y a leadin g constitutiona l authorit y a s assertin g " a constitutiona l principle a s nove l a s i t i s subversiv e o f parliamentar y government " and , later , as "untrue , vicious , and unnecessary. " Eugen e Forsey , "Mr . Kin g and Parliament ary Government, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol . XVII, no . 4 , Nov . 1951 , p . 454 .

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Toronto arguin g after th e impressiv e Diefenbaker victor y o f 195 8 tha t the tim e ha d com e fo r "th e dismantlement o f wha t ha s com e t o b e called, in Ottawa, th e 'Establishment'." 12 But whil e som e senio r official s left th e publi c servic e afte r th e ne w administratio n too k over , ther e is n o evidenc e tha t an y wer e actuall y dismissed . Th e transition , i n retrospect, too k plac e wit h far les s frictio n an d recriminatio n than ha d been expected , an d suc h desir e a s ther e ma y hav e bee n t o replac e members o f th e "Establishment " foun d a n outle t i n th e hirin g o f ne w personnel rathe r tha n in th e firing of the old. 13 THE UNDE R SECRETAR Y O F STAT E FOR EXTERNA L AFFAIR S

Senior official s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s hav e o n th e whole bee n mor e secur e i n thei r position s throughou t change s o f government tha n hav e thei r colleague s i n suc h department s a s Trad e and Commerce , perhap s becaus e foreig n polic y ha s bee n les s contro versial tha n commercia l policy . Bu t tranquillit y ha s no t alway s bee n their lot. Durin g the early 1920's , when the nature o f Canada's positio n within th e Britis h Commonwealt h o f Nation s wa s stil l unsettle d an d what i s no w o f largel y antiquaria n interes t wa s capabl e o f stirrin g th e Dominion, a chang e i n governmen t produce d th e resignatio n o f th e most abl e membe r o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . Whe n Mackenzie King assumed his dutie s a s Prime Ministe r an d Secretar y of State for External Affair s i n December 1921 , h e foun d tha t Departmen t to consis t o f thre e administrativ e (non-clerical ) officers : Si r Josep h Pope, it s Unde r Secretary ; W . H . Walker , Assistan t Unde r Secretary ; and Lorin g C . Christie , Lega l Adviser . Pop e an d Walke r ha d bee n i n the Departmen t sinc e it s creatio n i n 190 9 an d i n th e publi c servic e since 187 8 an d 188 7 respectively ; the y wer e elderl y men , n o longe r able t o kee p full y abreas t o f affairs . Th e majo r burden s o f th e Depart ment ha d devolve d upo n Christie , a n exceptionall y abl e officia l whos e formal titl e o f Lega l Advise r conveye d mos t imperfectl y the scop e o f his actua l responsibilities . Th e tw o prim e minister s who m h e ha d previously serve d relie d o n hi m fo r advic e an d assistanc e i n polic y formulation a t th e highes t level : Si r Rober t Borden' s repor t o n th e Washington Disarmament Conferenc e was largely Christie's work , while the policie s argue d b y Arthu r Meighe n a t th e Imperia l Conferenc e in 1921 ha d thei r origi n i n hi s memoranda . "O n matter s o f externa l affairs," Meighe n wrot e t o Christi e som e year s afterwards , " I valu e your view s mor e highl y tha n an y othe r I know." 14 I t wa s n o doub t

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because o f th e hig h estee m i n whic h Christi e wa s hel d b y Conservativ e leaders bot h i n Canad a an d i n th e Unite d Kingdo m tha t Mackenzi e King a t the outse t o f his administratio n regarde d hi m wit h considerabl e mistrust, remarking in his diary in 192 2 that th e Department o f Externa l Affairs wa s " a Tor y hive. " Shortl y afte r becomin g Prim e Minister , Christie late r recalled , Mackenzi e Kin g called o n m e t o sa y a t grea t lengt h tha t m y relation s & work wit h hi m would b e exactl y th e sam e a s wit h yo u [Borden ] an d Mr . Meighen . . . . [But] durin g th e year that followe d I sa w him o n busines s possibl y a doze n times, includin g meeting s i n th e corridor , & scarcely eve r mor e tha n a fe w minutes. . . . I ha d ver y littl e t o do—an d thu s thoug h i t wa s decided tha t I shoul d no t g o to th e Geno a Conferenc e o r t o Genev a o n th e groun d tha t there wa s importan t wor k a t home , th e importan t wor k neve r turne d up , and al l I di d throughou t th e yea r migh t hav e bee n don e i n thre e weeks . Long afterwar d I recalle d that a t ou r origina l intervie w h e had talke d abou t his politica l cree d a t grea t length , contrastin g i t wit h Mr . Meighen' s & so on, an d tha t a t on e o r tw o appropriate pause s I ha d eithe r bee n silen t o r sought t o talk abou t th e Department. . . ,15

If b y tactic s o f enforce d inactivit y Mackenzi e Kin g ha d i n fac t sought t o compe l Lorin g Christi e t o resig n fro m th e Departmen t o f External Affairs , h e wa s altogethe r successful , fo r earl y i n 192 3 th e Legal Advise r tendere d hi s resignatio n whic h wa s accepted. * Fo r th e next yea r Mackenzi e Kin g laboure d wit h foreig n an d imperia l affair s without an y exper t assistanc e fro m th e Department . H e turne d fro m time t o time to O . D. Skelton , the n Dea n of Arts a t Queen' s University , Kingston, Ontario , an d wel l know n a s th e biographe r o f Laurier , an d in 192 3 too k him to London a s his advise r for th e Imperia l Conference . King ha d bee n anxiou s a s earl y a s 192 2 t o brin g Skelto n int o th e *In 193 5 Christi e wa s brough t bac k int o th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s by R. B. Bennett after consultatio n with Mackenzi e King to ensure that his position would no t b e jeopardize d b y a Libera l administration . I n 193 9 Mackenzi e Kin g appointed hi m Ministe r to th e United States. Th e Financial Post of Toront o (Sept . 23, 1939) , commentin g on thi s appointment , recalle d tha t whe n Mackenzi e King had com e t o powe r i n 1921 , "Mr . Christie' s advic e wa s n o longe r sought ; h e found himsel f sidetracke d i n hi s offic e i n th e Eas t Block . . . . Mr . Christie— a lifelong Conservative—wa s no t deeme d th e bes t Counsello r i n foreig n polic y for a Libera l Administration. " Upo n readin g thi s articl e Christi e wrot e privatel y to th e associat e edito r statin g that relation s betwee n himsel f an d th e Prim e Min ister ha d neve r bee n othe r tha n friendly , an d tha t hi s resignatio n i n 192 3 ha d been du e wholl y t o persona l reason s (Lorin g Christi e t o K . R . Wilson , Oct . 4 , 1939, Christi e Papers) . Thi s versio n i s clearl y a t odd s wit h Christie' s lette r t o Borden quote d i n th e text ; bu t i t i s surel y th e earlie r version , writte n thirtee n years close r t o th e event , which i s to b e believed . It woul d no t hav e bee n helpfu l as Ministe r t o th e Unite d State s t o hav e i n circulatio n rumour s tha t h e wa s a t one tim e forced ou t o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs b y hi s Prim e Minister . Christie's untimel y death too k plac e i n Washingto n i n 1941 .

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Department;* o n July 10 , 1924 , he wa s officiall y appointe d Counsellor; and i n 1925 , on the retiremen t of Sir Joseph Pope, he wa s made Under Secretary of State for Externa l Affairs, a position occupied continuously by him to his death in 1941 . In O . D . Skelton , Mackenzie King had foun d a deput y ministe r i n whom h e coul d repos e a s muc h trus t an d confidenc e a s hi s natur e could allow . Skelton's influence upo n th e formatio n of externa l policy was ver y great . Durin g th e earl y 1920's , no t ye t a membe r o f th e Department o f Externa l Affairs , Skelto n "strengthene d an d refined " King's view s o n inter-imperia l affairs; 16 durin g th e late r 1930' s hi s great experienc e was thrown , althoug h not i n th e en d decisively , into an attemp t to protec t Canada fro m involvemen t in a Europea n war. f The intimac y of thei r associatio n might be though t to hav e diminished Skelton's usefulnes s t o a succeedin g government , just a s Christie' s rol e *On Januar y 21 , 1922 , Mackenzi e Kin g wrot e i n hi s diary : "A n excellen t address [b y Skelton]—pointin g ou t tha t foreig n polic y wa s a n extensio n o f domestic polic y & tha t a s w e ha d gaine d contro l o f th e on e s o w e mus t gai n control o f th e other . . . . Skelton' s addres s woul d mak e a n excellen t foundatio n for Canadia n polic y o n Externa l Affairs , an d Skelto n himsel f woul d mak e a n excellent ma n fo r tha t Department . . . . I tol d hi m tha t h e migh t b e wante d there som e day . . .. H e certainl y ha s th e knowledg e & the righ t poin t o f view. " Quoted i n R . MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, I , 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p . 454 . fDuring th e wee k betwee n th e Britis h an d Canadia n declaration s o f wa r o n Germany i n Septembe r 1939 , "Kin g wa s engage d i n anothe r struggl e wit h neu trality unde r th e mos t wrenchin g persona l strain s o f hi s career . Skelton , hi s trusted advise r o n foreig n affair s fro m th e beginning , insiste d wit h al l th e powe r of hi s experienc e an d integrit y tha t Canad a mus t remai n neutral . . . . Skelto n argued tha t th e surrender s an d hypocris y o f appeasement , fro m Ethiopi a onward , had undermine d al l th e mora l purpos e fo r whic h th e wa r ostensibl y wa s t o b e fought. Sinc e n o mora l questio n wa s involved , Canada , lik e Ireland , shoul d kee p out. Bein g a Nort h America n nation , i t migh t exercis e som e mediatio n i n th e course o f a conflic t morall y chaotic . . . . Kin g tol d Skelto n bluntl y tha t hi s counsel, whateve r els e migh t b e sai d o f it , wa s impossible. " Bruc e Hutchison , The Incredible Canadian (Toronto , 1952) , p . 250 . Lorin g Christie , wh o ha d re-entered th e Departmen t i n 193 5 t o become , nex t t o Skelton , it s mos t importan t official, als o argue d i n thi s vein , althoug h advocatin g passiv e belligerenc y rathe r than neutrality . "Wha t i s th e safes t attitud e o f governmen t i n Canad a a t th e moment whe n th e blin d Europea n preventiv e wa r plung e ha s bee n take n an d Canada i s instantaneousl y precipitate d int o th e lega l statu s o f war? " h e inquire d in a memorandu m writte n soo n befor e Munich . "T o preserv e th e greates t cautio n and slowness , realizin g ther e i s fo r Canad a n o strategi c necessit y fo r rapi d mobilizations o r other action . To giv e n o lead t o take th e people int o Europe . . . . To mak e i t clea r tha t Canad a i s no t a participan t i n th e sam e sens e o r o n th e same kin d o f unlimite d scal e a s th e Europea n allies , bu t i s onl y wha t fo r short ma y b e calle d a n 'associate'— a Nort h America n associat e . . . " ("Note s on th e Canadia n Positio n i n th e Even t o f a German-Czec h Conflic t Involvin g Great Britain, " Sept . 8 , 1938 , Christi e Papers) . Th e influenc e o f Skelto n an d Christie di d no t g o unremarked a t th e time . Se e H. D . Hal l t o J . W . Dafoe , Jul y 1, 1936 ; Dafo e t o P . J . Noel-Baker , Ma y 29 , 1937 , Dafo e Papers .

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1

as polic y advise r t o Borde n an d Meighe n mad e hi m suspec t i n th e eyes of Mackenzie King . I n thi s regard, however , R. B . Bennet t wa s t o display a larger spiri t tha n hi s predecessor. Skelto n di d no t shar e many of th e ideal s o f hi s ne w chief , bu t Bennett , afte r a n initia l an d wholl y natural period o f reserve, cam e to recogniz e th e qualit y of his judgment and advice . O. D . Skelto n wa s th e las t Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs t o hol d thi s importan t pos t fo r s o lon g a continuou s period . With th e successio n o f Mr . Norma n Robertso n t o th e unde r secretary ship in 194 1 followin g Skelton' s death , th e practic e was begun o f rotating three o r fou r senio r member s o f the Departmen t betwee n the unde r secretaryship an d tw o o r thre e othe r importan t diplomati c posts—th e mission i n Washington , th e offic e o f Hig h Commissione r i n Londo n and, afte r 1952 , th e positio n o f permanen t ambassado r t o th e Nort h Atlantic Council . Th e sam e officials , i n keepin g wit h th e prevailin g philosophy o f publi c administration , migh t serv e als o i n ke y govern ment post s outsid e th e Department , perhap s a s Cler k o f th e Priv y Council o r chairma n o f th e Civi l Servic e Commission . Th e revolvin g under secretaryshi p ha s certai n obviou s advantage s th e mos t importan t of which , i n th e contex t o f th e presen t discussion , i s t o reduc e t o th e minimum the temptation for the Under Secretary to become a party politician i n disguis e rather tha n a statesma n in disguise . For th e Ministe r it prevents the excessive dependence or personal animosity which prolonged association with a single deputy may develop. For th e Under Secretary it provides th e stimulu s o f a ne w bu t no t a n unfamilia r assignment . Fo r the Departmen t i t offer s periodicall y fres h directio n an d minimize s th e danger o f interna l rivalrie s an d cliques . I f th e devic e i s t o wor k wel l (and ther e i s genera l agreemen t tha t s o fa r i t ha s worke d well ) muc h depends upo n th e compatibilit y o f th e senio r official s wh o tak e turn s at the top. Th e positio n of a relative newcome r to the "unde r Cabinet, " doing a n initia l tou r a s Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , could becom e difficul t i f no t untenabl e i f forme r unde r secretarie s i n ambassadorial post s wer e unread y t o defe r t o hi s judgmen t o r abid e by his decisions . It may be for thi s reaso n tha t the deput y ministe r in most foreig n office s i s a long-term appointment , i n the Unite d Kingdo m his relativ e administrativ e longevit y bein g emphasize d i n hi s title , Permanent Under-Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Foreig n Affairs. * *The autho r o f th e volum e o n th e Foreig n Offic e i n th e Ne w Whitehal l series , himself a forme r Permanen t Under-Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Foreig n Affairs , ha s pointed ou t tha t "th e officia l us e o f th e wor d 'permanent ' i n thi s connexio n i s perhaps somewha t misleading , wit h it s suggestio n o f hoar y an d impregnabl e bureaucracy. Ther e i s o f cours e nothin g permanent about th e tenur e o f th e offic e so fa r a s the individua l incumbent i s concerned—he rarel y holds i t fo r mor e tha n

42 TH

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Heads o f diplomati c mission s compris e anothe r categor y o f senio r public servant s appointe d b y th e governmen t o f th e da y rathe r tha n by th e Civi l Servic e Commission . Lik e deput y an d associat e deput y ministers, the y mus t comman d th e confidenc e o f thei r politica l chief s if the y ar e t o perfor m usefu l service , an d ther e i s genera l agreemen t that a ne w government , shoul d i t b e seriousl y dissatisfie d wit h th e diplomatic appointment s o f it s predecessor , ough t t o b e abl e t o replac e them wit h it s own . I t i s equall y understood , however , tha t frequen t resort t o suc h a practic e i s prejudicia l t o th e publi c interest , an d tha t an effectiv e safeguar d agains t abus e i s t o selec t head s o f diplomati c missions fro m th e rank s o f th e senio r civi l service , onl y occasionall y handing ou t ambassadorship s a s politica l rewards . Two o f thre e earl y diplomati c appointment s wer e offere d i n par t a s political consolatio n prizes . Mr. Vincen t Massey , who went to Washing ton a s Canada's firs t Ministe r t o th e Unite d States , ha d bee n a membe r of Mackenzi e King's Cabine t unabl e t o secur e a sea t i n th e Hous e o f Commons; Herber t Marler , wh o becam e Canada' s firs t Ministe r t o Japan, ha d bee n i n precisely the sam e predicament. O n th e othe r hand , Canada's firs t Ministe r t o France , Philipp e Roy , ha d sinc e 191 1 per formed quasi-diplomati c dut y a s Canadia n Commissione r i n Pari s an d might o n tha t accoun t b e regarde d a s a caree r appointment . Th e tren d since thes e earl y day s ha s bee n steadil y i n th e directio n o f developin g a caree r diplomati c servic e i n whic h th e mos t abl e member s o f th e Department o f External Affair s coul d look forwar d wit h som e assurance to becoming heads of missions. "I canno t conceiv e o f any training better adapted t o qualif y a ma n [fo r a n ambassadorship], " Mackenzi e Kin g remarked i n 1942 , "tha n tha t whic h h e ma y receiv e a s a permanen t official i n the Department o f External Affairs." 17 A t th e sam e time ther e has bee n a consciou s effor t t o mak e outsid e appointment s a t th e head s of mission s level both t o take advantag e of the talent s o f gifte d outsider s and t o reduc e th e danger s o f inbreeding . "Yo u canno t d o muc h bette r than th e inspire d amateur, " Mr . Leste r Pearso n remarke d whe n Unde r Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs ; bu t h e concede d tha t "al l amateurs ar e no t inspired." 18 four o r fiv e year s a t th e en d o f hi s career. " Lor d Strang , Th e Foreign Office (London, 1955) , p . 153 , n . 1 . Even thi s qualifie d description , however , sufficientl y distinguishes th e offic e fro m it s Canadia n counterpart , fo r i t i s no t th e practic e i n Ottawa t o reserv e th e pos t fo r th e las t fe w year s o f th e incumbent' s career . Th e present (1961 ) Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , Mr . Norma n Robertson, hel d th e sam e position a s long ag o a s 1941 , serving , i n th e interim , in mos t o f th e othe r ke y bureaucrati c positions .

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The genera l principle s the n an d sinc e governin g appointment s o f heads o f diplomati c mission s wer e state d i n 194 7 b y th e Unde r Secretary o f the Department : In th e Unite d State s diplomati c servic e th e ver y to p post s hav e rarely , if ever , been hel d b y caree r men . That I thin k i s no t goo d fo r th e moral e of th e Foreig n Service . O n th e othe r hand , th e Britis h diplomati c service is sometime s criticized a s to o muc h o f a close d corporatio n o f official s recruited fro m a limite d clas s o f persons . I thin k th e Canadia n service ha s given evidence that i t will avoi d these extremes. This will mea n rejecting th e view o n the on e han d that a ma n wh o ha s successfull y manufacture d safet y pins ca n b e equall y successfu l i n conductin g delicat e an d complicate d negotiations betwee n governments , and , o n th e other , avoidin g th e equall y dangerous delusio n tha t becaus e a ma n ha s no t passe d a Foreig n Service Examination an d learne d how t o sig n hi s lette r " I hav e the honou r to be , Sir, wit h al l Trut h an d Respect , You r Lordship' s Humbl e an d Obedien t Servant", h e ha s no t therefor e qualifie d t o manag e an embassy. 19 This vie w wa s reaffirme d i n 195 4 b y th e Actin g Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affair s wh o remarked , i n respons e t o a questio n whether i t wa s th e Department' s polic y t o dra w al l head s o f mission s from it s own personnel: "I t ma y be desirabl e t o hav e a fe w exceptions . There ar e som e post s wher e perhap s i t i s most desirabl e t o hav e a ma n with a broa d experienc e i n business." 20 I n recen t year s th e exception s have bee n few ; in 1956 , o f forty-fou r appointee s the n head s o f diplo matic missions , thirty-tw o ha d com e u p throug h th e Departmen t o f External Affairs ; eigh t ha d bee n appointe d fro m othe r governmen t departments; onl y fou r ha d bee n draw n fro m outsid e governmen t service.21 Th e numbe r o f outsid e appointee s i s to o smal l t o justif y conclusions abou t favoure d occupations . Som e hav e bee n friend s o f the administration ; som e hav e bee n busines s men ; a ver y few , distin guished me n o f th e arts . Appointment s fro m th e militar y ar e no t unusual; as Mr. Leste r Pearso n observe d i n 1949 , "i n certai n countrie s the use of a military title does not do one any harm."22 Most military men appointed t o diplomati c post s hav e ha d considerabl e experienc e i n public administration , an d i t woul d b e wholl y prope r t o describ e a s career appointment s thos e o f Genera l A . G . L . McNaughto n (perma nent representativ e o n th e Unite d Nation s Securit y Counci l an d late r chairman o f th e Canadia n sectio n o f th e Internationa l Join t Commis sion), Genera l Mauric e Pop e (hea d o f th e Canadia n Missio n i n Germany an d later ambassado r to Spain) , an d Genera l E . L . M . Burn s (representative t o th e ten-natio n disarmamen t conferenc e a t Genev a in 1960) . Th e appointmen t o f Brigadie r Genera l Victo r Odiu m a s High Commissione r i n Australi a i n 194 2 wa s not , however , a caree r appointment i n this sense , an d h e found the transitio n t o diplomati c lif e

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somewhat difficult . " I hav e not ye t learned t o dea l wit h delicate matter s on pape r i n a correc t diplomati c language, " h e wrot e t o hi s Prim e Minister soo n afte r arrivin g in Canberra . "M y whol e trainin g has bee n to kee p silen t o n a subjec t o r t o approac h i t openl y an d directly . . . . I hav e a roote d objectio n t o dealin g wit h certai n religiou s an d racia l questions o n paper . . . . Whe n me n o f grea t eminenc e tal k t o m e in confidence I d o no t kno w how to giv e you th e pictur e without breaking that confidence . . . ," 23 Members o f th e C.C.F . (Socialist ) part y hav e bee n concerne d wit h the dange r o f developin g a n ambassado r corp s base d o n clas s an d social position , it s leader, Mr . M . J . Coldwell , remarkin g i n 194 2 tha t "we have had enoug h of diplomacy by well-to-do aristocrats." 24 Govern ment spokesme n hav e agreed , whil e denyin g tha t th e conditio n exists . "Striped pant s ar e no t a garmen t bu t a stat e o f mind, " Mr . Leste r Pearson observe d i n 1954 . "Tha t stat e o f mind , I hop e an d believe , does no t exis t i n th e Canadia n Externa l Affair s Departmen t o r i n it s Foreign Service." 25 There has been some tendency in Parliament t o refe r to th e nee d t o diversif y th e professiona l an d occupationa l backgroun d of Canada' s head s o f missions ; th e Conservativ e foreig n polic y critic , the lat e Gordo n Graydon , wa s pron e t o spea k a t lengt h o n th e nee d to appoin t " a distinguishe d membe r o f th e agricultura l vocation." 26 An exceptio n t o th e generall y accepte d principl e o f th e desirabilit y of drawin g heads o f mission s fro m caree r personne l i s th e positio n o f High Commissione r i n th e Unite d Kingdom . Th e Hig h Commissione r has sometime s bee n regarde d b y th e governmen t o f th e da y a s bein g in a categor y differen t fro m tha t o f othe r head s o f diplomati c missions . When th e Conservativ e Government came t o powe r on Augus t 7, 1930 , it foun d tha t i t ha d inherite d a s it s Hig h Commissione r i n Londo n th e appointee o f th e defeate d administration , Mr. Vincen t Massey , a s th e result o f a n order-in-counci l passe d onl y a few days earlier o n Jul y 24 . Although th e Prim e Ministe r wa s late r t o insis t tha t h e ha d accepte d Mr. Massey' s resignation, not compelle d it , th e accoun t give n by R . B . Bennett himsel f o f hi s intervie w wit h Mr . Masse y o n Augus t 1 3 sug gests tha t a n elemen t o f compulsio n wa s no t lacking : I pu t t o Mr . Masse y [Bennet t tol d th e Hous e o f Commons ] th e circum stances i n connectio n wit h th e dut y o n agricultura l implement s an d hi s expressions o f opinion concerning th e then Prime Ministe r [Arthu r Meighen ] and th e governmen t of th e da y [1926] . I pu t hi s statement s t o hi m fairly ; I pu t t o hi m th e communication s whic h h e ha d ha d wit h th e the n leade r of th e oppositio n [Mackenzi e King] . I pu t th e fac t t o hi m tha t withi n a few month s late r h e accepte d offic e unde r th e ma n who m h e ha d thu s described. . . . Then I turne d t o hi m an d said , a s I no w say to hi s spokes man i n th e House : "Ca n yo u possibl y represen t th e administratio n o f thi s

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day, anywhere , a t an y time , i n an y place? " D o hon . members thin k h e could? Woul d an y ma n giv e suc h a ma n a powe r o f attorne y t o ac t a s hi s representative, i n vie w o f thos e facts ? . . . Ho w coul d I carr y on ? How could an y Prime Ministe r carr y o n busines s i n Londo n wit h tha t ma n a s his representative? . . . How could on e open his heart to him? 27

On th e da y followin g the intervie w Mr . Masse y submitte d hi s lette r of resignation; soo n afterwar d th e Prim e Ministe r appointe d a s Hig h Commissioner i n Londo n th e forme r Conservativ e Premie r o f Ontario , Howard Ferguson . In th e extensiv e parliamentar y discussio n whic h followed , R . B . Bennett an d Mackenzi e Kin g sough t respectivel y t o justif y an d con demn wha t had bee n don e b y advancin g conflictin g theorie s concernin g the natur e o f th e office . Accordin g t o Bennett , th e Hig h Commissone r in London wa s "not a diplomatic office r i n the sens e i n whic h that ter m is use d wit h respec t t o externa l affairs . Hi s positio n wit h respec t t o the governmen t i s on e o f th e mos t confidentia l characte r an d i n m y judgment th e Hig h Commissione r fo r Canad a shoul d b e i n touc h wit h the governmen t o f th e da y i n Ottaw a i n suc h a wa y a s t o indicat e that i t ha s hi s confidenc e an d h e ha s th e confidenc e o f th e govern ment."28 According t o Mackenzi e King , th e hig h commissionershi p wa s "the highes t o f al l diplomati c office s whic h ca n b e hel d b y anyon e belonging to this country" bu t i n no other wa y distinguishable from thos e of "ou r minister s at Washington, Tokyo an d Paris. . . . All the qualifica tions o f character , ability , tac t an d judgment , whic h ar e essentia l i n a minister o r a n ambassado r abroad , ar e equall y essential , i f indee d no t more necessary , i n a representativ e o f Canada i n Grea t Britain . . . . I cannot se e ho w m y righ t hon . frien d ca n dra w a n essentia l distinctio n between th e tw o classes of positions." 29 Mackenzie Kin g did no t hav e to put hi s doctrin e t o th e aci d tes t o f retainin g a s Hig h Commissione r an individua l for who m h e ha d littl e affectio n o r respect , fo r whe n th e results o f the Genera l Electio n o f 193 5 becam e known , Howar d Fergu son submitte d hi s resignatio n directl y t o th e outgoin g Prim e Minister , leaving Mackenzi e Kin g fre e t o appoin t Mr . Vincen t Massey . Mr . Massey hel d th e hig h commissionershi p unti l th e en d o f th e Secon d World War , whe n i t became , alon g wit h th e embassie s i n Washingto n and Paris , on e o f thos e importan t diplomati c post s amon g whic h th e three o r fou r senio r official s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s circulated ever y fe w years . I n 1957 , however , whe n a Conservativ e Government cam e t o power i n Ottawa fo r the first time sinc e 1930 , th e incoming Prim e Ministe r reverte d to the earlie r quasi-politica l concep tion o f th e offic e o f Hig h Commissione r i n Londo n b y appointin g a leading membe r o f his party and th e forme r Leade r o f the Opposition .

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It remain s to be see n whethe r upo n Mr . Georg e Drew' s eventua l retire ment th e hig h commissionershi p wil l onc e agai n b e hel d b y a caree r official. THE FOREIG N SERVIC E OFFICE R

If th e head s o f Canada' s diplomati c mission s hav e bee n recruite d in creasingly fro m th e rank s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , thei r qualities ar e boun d t o b e thos e sough t an d develope d b y th e foreig n service itself , thu s reflectin g th e Department' s policie s o f recruitment , training an d promotion . Although Josep h Pope' s memorandu m o f 190 7 advocatin g th e crea tion o f a Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s wa s acte d o n i n 1909 , no t until man y year s afterward s wa s effec t give n t o on e o f it s principa l recommendations, tha t ther e shoul d b e recruite d fo r th e Departmen t "a smal l staf f o f youn g men , wel l educate d an d carefull y selected. " Even b y 192 5 th e Departmen t coul d muste r n o mor e tha n thre e ad ministrative officer s i n Ottawa , an d th e shortag e wa s s o acut e tha t th e Prime Ministe r an d Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , Mackenzi e King, complaine d tha t h e ha d n o on e t o assis t hi m i n preparin g des patches an d accordingl y ha d t o bea r th e burde n o f thei r compositio n himself.30 It was at this time that N. W. Rowell, a former Liberal member of Borden' s Unio n Governmen t who m Mackenzi e Kin g wa s the n un successfully tryin g to brin g into his own, wrote to hi m o n th e subjec t of the Department' s personne l problems . " I canno t se e how i t i s possibl e for Canad a t o dea l intelligentl y wit h larg e question s o f Imperia l an d international policy, " Rowel l observed , "withou t havin g a rea l Depart ment of External Affairs , an d havin g in that Departmen t competen t an d trained me n wh o woul d b e familia r wit h th e problem s requirin g con sideration an d decisio n b y th e Government . I d o no t undervalu e wha t we have, but in my view it is inadequate to mee t the present situation." 31 O. D. Skelton, who had himself joined the Department onl y a few months previously, remarked , o n bein g show n Rowell' s lette r b y th e Prim e Minister, tha t i t was "essentially righ t . .. as to th e inadequate staffin g of th e Department . With onl y Mr . Walker , Mr . Des y an d mysel f (cor responding t o Mr . Walker , Mr . Christi e an d Si r Josep h [Pope ] form erly) t o dea l wit h wide r questions , an d wit h th e pressur e o f corres pondence, interviews , an d administration , i t i s absolutel y impossible , even wit h 7-da y week s an d 16-hou r days , t o secur e th e independen t and exac t knowledg e o f externa l affair s whic h ha s no w becom e de sirable. However , w e shoul d no t see k t o expan d to o rapidly." 32 I n re plying t o Rowell , Mackenzi e Kin g wrote tha t h e wa s

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heartily i n agreemen t wit h you r vie w that i t i s not possibl e t o carr y o n th e work adequatel y withou t a n increase d staff , an d a consequen t measur e o f departmentalization. W e hav e no t don e a s muc h i n thi s fiel d a s I shoul d myself hav e liked . M y former deput y [Pope] , while a very distinguishe d an d competent publi c servant , naturally , wit h fift y years ' servic e behin d him , looked somewha t askanc e upo n extensiv e plan s o f reorganization . Further , the insisten t deman d fo r econom y i n publi c expenditure , whic h ha s com e from s o many peopl e wh o d o not lik e t o pay the pipe r fo r th e railwa y tune s and th e wa r tune s the y called , ha s mad e expansio n i n an y Department , an d not leas t i n th e Prim e Minister' s Department , o r Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, a matte r requirin g specia l consideration . A distinc t beginnin g has been made , however. W e have recentl y appointe d a ver y promisin g counsellor , Mr . Jea n Desy , a graduat e o f th e bes t diplo matic schoo l i n Europe , 1'Ecol e de s Science s Politiques , an d latterl y Pro fessor o f International La w at the Universit y o f Montreal , an d I hop e t o add a promisin g youn g Universit y graduat e ever y yea r o r tw o a s th e wor k o f the Departmen t grows. 33

The "promisin g youn g University graduates" thu s recruited i n th e late r 1920's—it wa s th e onl y significan t intak e unti l th e late r 1930's—mor e than mad e u p i n qualit y for thei r ver y smal l number , fo r i t wa s a t thi s time tha t th e Departmen t gaine d the service s o f Leste r Pearson , H . L . Keenleyside and Hume Wrong. "Dr. Skelton' s young men," a s they were known, cam e in tim e t o exer t a remarkabl e an d beneficia l influenc e o n the fortune s of thei r country , an d indee d o f th e world . A secon d rippl e o f recruitmen t too k plac e i n th e perio d 1935-9 , staffing th e ne w legation s openin g u p i n Wester n Europ e an d furthe r augmenting th e embattle d fe w in th e Eas t Bloc k a t Ottawa ; by 193 9 i t brought th e tota l numbe r o f foreig n servic e officer s i n th e Departmen t to thirty-three . Thes e ne w recruits , lik e th e distinguishe d entrant s of a decade earlier , cam e t o th e Departmen t by th e difficul t roa d o f a civi l service examination. There was at this time of depression an d unemployment no shortag e of candidates; in on e year there wer e "200 applicant s and onl y 2 0 qualifie d an d onl y 4 o f th e 2 0 wer e calle d in." 34 Durin g the wa r th e acut e shortag e o f personne l wa s t o som e exten t alleviate d by thos e wh o cam e forward fro m civilia n lif e fo r temporar y servic e i n the Department ; for suc h special assistant s the requirement s of th e civi l service examinatio n were waived. It wa s als o decide d t o dispens e with the regula r pre-wa r examinatio n procedure durin g the firs t yea r o r tw o of post-wa r recruitment . "It seeme d quite unfair," the Associat e Under Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s explaine d to th e Hous e o f Com mons Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , to as k peopl e wh o ha d bee n i n th e arme d force s perhap s fo r fiv e year s t o pass a fairl y sever e examinatio n o f academi c standards . W e substitute d fo r it a simpl e examinatio n designe d t o sho w whethe r th e candidat e ha d an y

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capacity fo r thinkin g fo r himsel f an d expressin g wha t h e thought , an d ver y little more . . . . The mai n tes t wa s to as k the applicant s t o writ e a n essa y on a choic e o f abou t te n differen t subject s o n widel y selecte d scientific , literary, historica l an d militar y subjects . . . . The y ar e writte n i n Englis h or i n French , an d the y hav e t o writ e th e examinatio n i n .. . thre e hours . That i s the simpl e test, an d i t i s surprisingl y effective . . . . O n that basi s we were abl e t o decid e tha t a larg e numbe r o f candidates wer e obviousl y un suited, an d w e droppe d them . Th e remainde r ar e brough t u p fo r intervie w by th e Boar d whic h th e Civi l Servic e Commissio n an d ourselve s jointl y co-operate on. 35

During th e yea r whe n thi s temporar y syste m wa s i n effec t (1945-6) , 1,000 applicant s wrot e the foreig n servic e office r examination , o f whom a fe w mor e tha n fort y wer e accepted . Aske d whethe r th e Departmen t intended t o revert to th e pre-war syste m "of having the variou s examin ations s o stif f tha t even th e foreig n secretar y o f man y nations coul d no t qualify," th e Associat e Unde r Secretar y replied : " I shoul d no t sa y tha t we would revert exactl y to the pre-war system . I shoul d hop e not . Tha t would be rather a n urge to adher e to past practices i n a changing world; but w e wil l n o doub t stiffe n th e examination s a s w e ge t furthe r awa y from th e particula r proble m o f no t imposin g a handica p o n thos e wh o have bee n i n th e arme d service s an d ar e a lon g wa y fro m schoo l an d university. . . ,"36 This predictio n prove d wholl y correc t fo r a time. Durin g th e decad e 1946-56 th e tw o hundre d o r s o universit y graduat e o r graduatin g students ordinaril y applyin g fo r admissio n eac h yea r wer e reduce d t o a hard core of about fifteen succesful candidate s by a three-stage proces s of selection , th e firs t stag e o f whic h wa s a writte n examinatio n whos e formidability ma y bes t b e judge d b y th e reader : FOREIGN SERVIC E OFFICER , GRAD E I DEPARTMENT O F EXTERNA L AFFAIR S

Written Examination , 195 2 PAPER I . TIME : 3 HOUR S The purpos e o f thi s pape r i s to tes t you r capacit y t o analyz e a theoretica l problem lucidly . Th e examiner s wil l bas e thei r judgmen t o n th e manne r i n which yo u presen t you r view s an d o n th e cogenc y o f th e view s themselves. Discuss on e o f th e following : 1. Wha t i s the bes t balanc e of wor k an d leisure ; ho w shoul d th e questio n of leisur e tim e b e approache d i n moder n society ? 2. "Th e for m o f governmen t o f an y countr y i s determine d b y tradition , physical environmen t an d th e stag e o f it s economi c development" . 3. " A Nation , i n it s influenc e upo n civilization , i s no t a n aggregat e o f its livin g people , fo r the y ar e bu t par t o f th e whol e continuin g an d histori c people. No r i s it a State , fo r th e Stat e i s artificial . A Natio n i s a n Idea" .

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4. "Withou t justice , wha t i s politica l rul e bu t brigandag e an d rapine? " ("Remota justitia, quid sun t regna nis i magna latrocina?") 5. "Th e firs t requiremen t o f a soun d bod y o f la w i s that i t shoul d corres pond wit h actua l feeling s an d demand s o f th e community , whethe r righ t or wrong" . 6. "Ther e i s n o suc h thin g a s a scienc e o f economics ; ever y syste m o f economic though t i s i n larg e measur e subjectiv e i n tha t i t i s posite d o n desired socia l goals" . PAPER II . TIME : 3 & HOUR S The purpos e o f Part s A an d B of thi s pape r i s to tes t you r interes t in , an d understanding of , som e o f th e followin g problem s an d you r abilit y t o dis cuss the m clearl y an d i n logica l fashion . In part s A an d B candidate s mus t d o thre e question s wit h a t leas t on e from eac h part . Par t C , whic h i s designe d t o tes t th e candidate' s abilit y t o comprehend th e meanin g o f writte n material , i s compulsor y fo r al l candi dates. Part A. Questions on Canada 1. Discus s th e feasibilit y o f Canadia n membershi p i n th e Sterlin g Area . 2. Discus s som e o f th e implication s o f recen t trend s o f domesti c an d foreign investmen t i n Canada . 3. Discus s th e contributio n t o politica l though t an d actio n i n Canad a o f one o f th e following : Henr i Bourassa , J . S . Woodsworth , Goldwy n [sic] Smith, J. S . Ewart. 4. Discus s th e relationshi p o f Canadia n trad e union s t o th e politica l life o f Canada . 5. Discus s th e rol e o f th e Federa l Governmen t i n fosterin g cultura l activities. 6. Discus s Canada' s rol e i n th e evolutio n fro m "Britis h Empire " t o "Commonwealth o f Nations" . 7. T o wha t exten t d o yo u thin k th e Britis h Nort h Americ a Ac t re stricts th e Governmen t o f Canad a i n th e conduc t o f it s externa l affairs ? Part B. Questions on International Affairs 8. Ho w d o yo u accoun t fo r th e appearanc e o f Titois m i n Yugoslavia ? What ar e th e chance s o f simila r development s i n th e Europea n Satellite s and China ? 9. Discus s th e movemen t towar d Europea n integration , an d asses s it s prospects. 10. Discus s th e rol e o f Christia n Democrac y i n Europ e today . 11. I n you r opinion , i n th e presen t internationa l situatio n d o "neutralist " or "n o foreig n entanglements " policie s contribut e t o worl d peace ? Discuss , using example s drawn fro m foreig n policie s o f government s in bot h Europ e and Asia . 12. "Stali n ha s non e o f Hitler' s compulsio n t o g o t o war ; indeed , th e compulsion i s al l th e othe r way , takin g int o consideratio n hi s ow n nature , the categorie s o f Marxis t thinking , Sovie t geograph y an d resources , th e nature o f th e Russia n people , an d th e miserabl e an d unreliabl e stat e o f th e Soviet Unio n today" . Comment .

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13. Asses s th e rol e o f eithe r th e Unite d Nation s o r NAT O i n preservin g international peac e an d security . 14. D o yo u thin k i t i s desirabl e t o establis h a t th e presen t tim e a n Inter national Cour t of Criminal Jurisdiction ? 15. Discus s tw o representativ e author s fro m an y on e o f th e followin g countries: France , Germany , U.S.A. , U.S.S.R. , Unite d Kingdom , Canada , and indicat e wh y yo u conside r them representative . Part C . Rea d th e passage contained i n Appendix A [a n extrac t fro m Arnol d Toynbee, A Study o f History, vol . I , pp. 299-301] an d answe r th e followin g questions whic h ar e base d o n it . 1. Summariz e i n on e paragrap h o f no t mor e tha n on e pag e i n lengt h th e theory presente d i n thi s passage . 2. Th e autho r suggest s tha t i n th e historica l proces s ther e i s on e vita l unknown element . Define , an d i f you agre e o r disagre e wit h hi s theory, giv e your reasons . 3. Fro m th e abov e passage , what doe s th e phrase "Uniformity o f Nature" mean t o th e autho r an d t o wha t exten t doe s i t satisf y th e author' s vie w o f the origi n o f a civilization ? 4. Relat e th e ide a o f "Integratio n o f Custom " t o "Differentiatio n o f Civilization". 5. I n you r opinio n i s the autho r subscribin g t o a deterministi c theor y of history? I n a shor t paragraph , defen d you r answer. 37

An examinatio n of this kin d favoured , and wa s no doub t intende d t o favour, universit y graduate s in suc h course s a s history, political scienc e and economics , an d law ; and , moreover , universit y graduate s fro m the stronge r universities . I n th e Hous e o f Common s Standin g Com mittee on Externa l Affairs, wher e officers o f th e Departmen t were ques tioned o n th e theor y an d practic e o f it s recruitmen t programme , ther e was som e disposition to expres s the kin d o f views foun d i n th e Wristo n Report o n the United State s Foreig n Service. 38 " I d o think w e ought t o have peopl e i n ou r diplomati c servic e beside s thos e wh o ar e post graduates o f universities acros s Canada, " th e Oppositio n foreig n polic y critic, Mr. Gordo n Graydon , remarked in 1953 . " I woul d like to se e the Department o f External Affair s a little better balance d u p with practical , sound, commo n sens e people." 39 Perhap s becaus e o f a fea r tha t th e departmental examinatio n displayed a donnis h preciosity o n th e par t of the departmenta l examiners, perhaps becaus e a wide r basis fo r recruit ment was fel t t o b e desirable , certainly because o f a growin g scarcity of good candidates , th e writte n examinatio n underwen t a n importan t change in 1956 . I n tha t yea r the so-calle d "objective-type " examinatio n was introduced : "th e Civi l Servic e Commissio n think s [it ] i s useful, " a spokesman of the Department explained, thus allowing the implication that hi s own Department was less certain o f its utility. At th e sam e time the writte n examinatio n wa s itsel f shortene d an d simplified :

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FOREIGN SERVIC E OFFICER , GRAD E I DEPARTMENT O F EXTERNA L AFFAIR S 1957. TIME : 2%. HOUR S Answer an y tw o questions 1. "I t i s not th e term s o f th e Charte r tha t bloc k th e developmen t o f th e United Nation s int o a peace-enforcin g authority , bu t th e fact s o f interna tional lif e i n ou r age" . Discuss . 2. A Canadia n statesma n recentl y declare d tha t a Canadian foreig n policy i s no t necessaril y "th e sam e a s a n independent policy" . Discus s thi s statement i n relatio n t o Canada' s membershi p i n th e Commonwealth , th e United Nation s an d NATO. 3. "Th e proble m o f disarmamen t i s th e proble m o f security" . I s thi s dictum o f th e 1930' s stil l valid ? 4. Wha t woul d b e som e o f th e result s o f th e applicatio n t o th e con temporary worl d o f th e principle s o f Ada m Smith ? 5. Th e guidin g principl e o f Sovie t foreig n polic y ha s sometime s bee n described a s "al l mischie f shor t o f war" . Ho w characteristi c in you r opinio n is thi s o f th e polic y o f th e U.S.S.R . today ? 6. Wha t feature s o f Canadia n lif e shoul d a government-sponsore d in formation an d cultura l programm e try t o projec t abroad ? 7. Discus s "colonialism " a s a facto r influencin g th e policie s o f countrie s of Eas t an d South-eas t Asia . 8. D o yo u believ e tha t th e policie s pursue d b y Wester n democracie s since th e Secon d Worl d Wa r bea r ou t th e statemen t mad e b y Walte r Lipp mann tha t "face d wit h these [interdependent ] choice s betwee n th e har d an d the soft , th e norma l propensit y o f democrati c government s i s t o pleas e th e largest numbe r o f voters . Th e pressur e o f th e electorat e i s normall y fo r the sof t sid e o f th e equations" ? 9. Wha t woul d b e th e view s o n th e ide a o f th e integratio n o f Wester n Europe o f an y three o f th e following : Machiavelli , th e Du e d e Sully , Napoleon, Bismarck , Woodro w Wilson ? 10. I s Canada a "welfar e state" ? Shoul d i t be? 11. Sugges t mean s b y whic h internationa l la w coul d effectivel y mak e fo r a mor e orderl y world . 12. Discus s som e o f th e implication s o f industrializatio n o f either th e Province o f Quebe c o r th e fou r wester n provinces. 40 Candidates successful in the written examinatio n ar e called for a n oral examination convened in the main cities of Canada and , i f sufficient num bers warrant, in some of the larger cities of the Unite d States, the United Kingdom an d Wester n Europe . Th e examinin g boar d normall y consist s of fiv e members , tw o examiner s fro m th e Departmen t o f Externa l Af fairs, tw o outsid e examiner s representin g th e busines s an d universit y communities, an d a representative o f the Civi l Service Commissio n wh o acts a s chairman . A n effor t i s mad e t o secur e continuit y o f represent ation o n th e boar d o f examiners , th e Civi l Servic e Commissio n repre sentative an d on e departmenta l examine r ordinaril y attendin g al l ora l examinations i n a give n year . Th e examiner' s tas k i s th e difficul t on e

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common to most oral examination s of this kind, to tr y t o assess , o n th e basis o f a n intervie w usually lasting n o mor e tha n a n hour , th e candi date's "intellectua l capacity, integrity, initiative, personality an d appear ance."41 Th e opinion s o f on e o f th e Department' s mos t experience d examiners, se t dow n in 194 7 a s a guid e for prospectiv e applicants , dis close somethin g of its assumption s and criteria : Quand i l s'agi t d e jeune s qu i sorten t d e 1'universite , 1'experienc e es t pluto t courte e t n'offr e guer e 1'occasio n d e pose r beaucou p d e questions . Auss i le s membres d u jur y trouvent-il s de s question s generate s pou r fair e parle r l e candidat. I I import e d e savoi r s'i l pens e vit e o u lentement , s'i l pens e just e ou non , s'i l s'exprim e bien , s'i l s e tir e ave c ingeniosit e d e situation s impre vues. Tou t a u cour s d e s a carriere , i l s e trouver a dan s de s situation s semblables. Au x conference s internationales , i l n'aura pa s toujours la repons e exacte au x probleme s qu i s e posent . I I devr a improviser . Parfoi s i l devr a temporiser e t toujour s s e tirer d'un e pass e difficil e ave c elegance . L'exame n oral perme t d e decouvri r certain s trait s profond s d u caracter e d u candidat . Certains candidat s se presentenl avec 1'idee bien arretee et bientot evident e de n e pa s s e compromettre . U s n e reponden t qu e pa r monosyllable s au x questions qu i leur son t posees . O u bien il s repondent e n Normand. D'autres , au contraire , savan t tout , o n repons e a tout . Parfois il s n e semblen t pa s s e rendre compt e le moins du monde du but d e I'examen oral e t de la portee de s questions. U n jour , u n membr e d u jur y posai t a u n candida t l a questio n suivante: "Si , domain , u n gouvernemen t mondia l etai l elabli , qu i serai t l e meilleur premie r ministre : u n avocat , u n homm e d e science , u n theologie n ou u n diplomate" . I I s'agissait d e savoi r quell e etai t 1'echell e de s valeur s d u candidat, quel s etaien l le s facteur s qui , a so n avis , avaien t l e plu s d'im portance dan s l e gouvernemen t de s hommes. L e candida t fu t completemen t desempare. I I refus a d e repondr e e n disan t qu'i l s'agissai t l a d'un e questio n purement theorique . I I sugger a mem e pa r so n attitud e qu'i l trouvai t l a question saugrenu e e t ridicule . Les candidat s feraien t parfoi s meilleur e figur e s'il s s e souvenaien t qu e I'examen a pou r bu t d e fair e voi r leu r tournur e d'esprit . Il s feraien t bonn e impression e n etan t sinceres , e n s e montran t tel s qu'il s sont . S'il s pensen t lentement, il s auraien t tor t d e vouloi r fair e croir e qu'il s son t rapides ; il s s e peut qu e leu r lenteu r soi l compense e pa r plu s d e precision , plu s d e profon deur. U n membr e du jur y avai l pos e un e questio n asse z difficil e a u n candi dat. Celui-ci, au lieu de se lancer dans de vagues considerations, repondit qu'il n'avait jamai s serieusement reflechi a la question mai s que s i Ton voulait bien lui donne r deu x minute s pour reflechi r i l essaierai t d e donne r un e opinio n qui vaudrait mieux que les banalites qui lui viendraient peut-etre tout d'abor d a 1'esprit . Mem e s i ce qu'il avai l a dir e plu s tar d n e fu t pa s tre s brillianl , i l avail merit e un e bonn e nol e pou r so n bo n sens , s a prudence . E n un e autr e occasion, u n membr e d u jur y demand a a u n candida t d e lu i resume r l a question d e Palestine . Celui-c e repondi t qu'i l achevai t se s etudes d e droit, si je n e m e Irompe , qu'i l avai l a pein e e u l e temp s d e lir e l e journa l a 1'oc casion e l que se s notions su r la questio n etaienl Irop vagues pour lu i permel Ire d e donne r un e opinio n valable . Cett e sincerit e etai t encore , dan s le s circonslances, l a meilleur e polilique . U n secretair e qu i reconnai l so n

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ignorance dan s un e matier e donne e aur a tou t probablemen t l e courag e d e I'etudier s i cel a es t necessair e et , apre s quelque s jours , i l ser a plu s util e qu e celui qui s e contente d e notions vague s et s'illusionn e volontier s su r I'etendu e de se s connaissances. 42

A candidate wh o impresses his board favourabl y during the oral examination i s then rate d o n th e basi s o f hi s military , busines s o r professiona l experience, i f any, an d i f he obtain s a sufficientl y hig h fina l mar k o n al l three phase s o f the competitio n i s graded accordin g t o ran k an d place d upon a n eligibl e lis t fro m whic h appointment s t o th e Departmen t ar e made a s vacancies arise . The kin d o f junio r foreig n servic e office r tha t thi s winnowin g is de signed t o selec t i s typicall y a graduatin g studen t fro m a universit y honours cours e in the humanities or social sciences . H e cannot ordinaril y be olde r tha n thirt y years o f age , no r ma y h e b e younge r tha n twenty three. H e i s therefore withou t much outside experience, an d certainl y is unlikely to bring to the Departmen t a great deal o f specialist knowledge. The rol e o f specialist s withi n th e Departmen t ha s bee n th e subjec t o f much discussion , an d properl y so . Th e guidin g principl e o f personne l policy, unimpaire d sinc e th e day s o f O . D . Skelton , i s tha t th e idea l foreign servic e office r i s someon e o f all-roun d ability , capabl e o f per forming widel y differin g assignment s at short notice , rather tha n a highly skilled specialis t payin g little attentio n t o matter s lyin g outsid e his field. To thi s principl e th e senio r administrator s o f th e Departmen t hav e dis played wha t a t time s ha s seeme d a n almos t pervers e attachment , a n observer remarkin g in 195 2 tha t "th e ma n wh o studie d publi c opinio n and wrot e a book wit h George Gallup , Mr . Sau l Rae, wa s moved fro m the Head o f the Information Division . . ., the personnel expert T. W. L. MacDermott was transferred from Hea d o f the Personnel Division , . . . and on e officia l . . . remarke d rathe r proudl y . . . tha t mos t o f the members of the Departmen t wh o can spea k Russia n ar e no t workin g on the Sovie t Union." 43 (Th e deleteriou s consequence s o f th e generalis t approach, whic h has undergon e significan t modificatio n i n recen t years , are note d i n chapter v. ) Their devotio n to th e generalis t idea l ha s cause d th e senio r adminis trators o f th e Departmen t t o loo k wit h som e suspicio n upo n th e de vice of lateral entry , that is, the recruitmen t o f specialists at intermediat e or senio r level s o f advancement . A n exceptio n t o th e rul e too k plac e in 195 6 whe n th e Departmen t aske d th e Civi l Servic e Commissio n t o conduct examination s fo r a smal l numbe r o f specialist s i n Slavonic , Arabic an d Chines e language s an d affairs , an d i n internationa l la w an d economics. "Ther e wer e a lo t o f applicants, " a departmenta l officia l commented o n thi s experiment ,

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but a goo d man y o f the m di d no t appea r t o hav e th e qualification s which people i n ou r servic e alread y possessed . . . . O n th e whol e w e find it bes t to recrui t a t the bottom—at grad e on e level—and t o promot e peopl e a s their ability develop s an d a s the y acquir e experience . . . . I f w e ar e lookin g for , say, a Foreign Servic e Office r Grad e 4 I think yo u woul d probabl y ge t better results fro m a ma n wh o ha d com e i n a s a Grad e On e office r an d worke d his way up , spendin g a numbe r o f tour s o f dut y abroa d an d i n thi s countr y and gainin g a certai n amoun t of expertis e an d knowledg e during that period . I thin k suc h a ma n would hav e mor e t o offer , a s a genera l rule , tha n a ma n who cam e i n becaus e h e was , le t u s say , a goo d economis t o r a n exper t o n Slavonic languages .

He concede d tha t "ther e i s a dange r o f havin g a close d corporation . I think we are awar e of that an d tryin g to mee t it." 44 The recruitin g policy of the Departmen t o f External Affairs i s usually defended o n th e groun d of the superiorit y of th e generalis t concept , bu t there ar e two practical considerations by which it could a s well or bette r be justified . T o a muc h greate r exten t i n Canad a tha n i n th e Unite d States o r th e Unite d Kingdo m there i s a shortage o f qualifie d specialist s in variou s aspect s o f internationa l affair s fro m who m recruit s a t mor e senior level s migh t be drawn . Secondly, th e opportunitie s for advance ment of specialists within the Department are necessaril y more restricted than i n th e fa r large r Stat e Departmen t o r Foreig n Office . Bot h thes e handicaps t o specialis t recruitmen t wil l becom e les s sever e wit h th e passing o f time . Since entry to the foreign servic e is restricted by inclination and neces sity t o youn g an d inexperience d applicants , th e qualit y o f th e senio r officers o f the Departmen t of External Affair s depend s t o a greate r tha n ordinary degre e upo n th e qualit y o f in-servic e trainin g and soun d pro motion policies . Provisio n for trainin g foreign service officers withi n th e Department i s not elaborate , an d i s confined mainl y to th e earl y proba tionary period of their careers. "We have classes in French fo r candidate s who come in without adequate knowledg e of French," the Actin g Under Secretary o f State fo r External Affair s informe d the Hous e o f Commons Standing Committe e i n 1954 . "W e do , also , i n th e cas e of incomin g of ficers for th e first year, put the m through a sort of course of training. We send the m to differen t division s o f the departmen t fo r shor t periods . We provide course s o f lectures. W e bring in peopl e fro m othe r department s to lecture t o them—a s wel l a s people fro m ou r ow n Department. Othe r than that w e do not provide special classe s o r facilities for junior officer s to ge t ahead . W e expec t the m reall y t o lear n o n th e job." 45 Officer s failing t o measur e u p t o expectation s durin g this initia l trainin g perio d may b e release d fro m th e Departmen t a t thi s time ; thi s doe s no t ofte n

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happen, bu t i t does happen. "I t i s an ad hoc way to look a t the proble m of training, " the Unde r Secretar y admitte d i n 1958 , "but , o n the whole , bearing i n min d tha t ther e [are ] seldo m i f eve r mor e tha n 2 0 ne w Foreign Servic e Officer s i n an y given year, w e do no t thin k i t woul d b e appropriate t o se t up to o elaborat e a school." 46 There i s som e opportunit y fo r th e foreig n servic e office r t o receiv e specialized training later i n his career, particularl y training in more diffi cult languages. A promising officer ma y be sen t for a year t o the Middle East Centr e fo r Arabi c Studie s ru n b y th e Unite d Kingdo m Foreig n Office i n th e Lebanon , t o th e Schoo l o f Orienta l an d Africa n Studie s i n the Universit y o f London , o r th e Departmen t o f Slavoni c Studie s a t Cambridge University . Ther e ha s bee n som e discussio n o f regula r sab batical leav e for stud y and research , bu t neithe r senio r no r junio r mem bers o f th e Departmen t see m t o hav e followe d u p th e suggestio n ver y energetically. Th e Departmen t annuall y appoint s on e o r tw o member s to th e National Defenc e Colleg e a t Kingston , Ontario, th e Imperia l De fence Colleg e i n London an d th e NATO Defence Colleg e h i Paris. Finally, promotion . D o th e bes t me n (an d women ) ge t t o th e top ? Do they get there soo n enough? A former publi c servant , speakin g fro m long an d intimat e experience , though t i t a legitimat e criticis m o f th e Canadian civi l servic e generall y tha t "ther e i s to o muc h o f wha t th e Germans cal l Gleichschaltung —too muc h holdin g bac k t o th e pac e o f the average . . . . Our present procedure s ar e based o n th e assumptio n that th e messenger boy might become th e deput y minister. By al l means let tha t b e so , but i f h e ha s th e capacity , d o no t requir e hi m t o mov e consecutively fro m grade s on e t o te n a t ever y stage . I f h e survive s that weary process, th e chances are that he will no longer make a good deputy minister."47 Foreig n servic e officer s hav e suffere d rathe r les s i n thi s respect tha n othe r member s o f th e publi c service . Durin g th e Secon d World War , an d immediatel y afterwards , th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs had too few able personnel to fill the rapidly growing number of key positions openin g u p abroa d an d a t home ; individual s o f prove n per formance an d greate r promise wer e moved int o post s o f grea t responsi bility a t a comparativel y earl y age , risin g i n thei r fortie s to becom e as sistant, associat e an d deput y ministers, an d head s o f missions. Bu t wit h the paus e i n th e Department' s expansion , incomin g recruit s coul d loo k with les s assuranc e tha n th e hopefu l entrant s o f 1946- 9 fo r rapi d ele vation t o policy-makin g positions . I t becam e harde r i n a Departmen t of thre e hundre d foreig n servic e officer s tha n i n a Departmen t o f thirt y to kee p sigh t efficientl y o f younge r people o f ability , an d a n elemen t of luck entere d inevitabl y into postin g an d promotion. I t woul d b e wron g

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to suggest that morale has suffered o n this account alone, fo r the discon tent of which tangible evidence may be found i n resignations at al l levels in recen t year s must be relate d t o othe r factors—th e improve d salarie s offered b y Canadia n universities, the diminishe d prestige of th e foreig n service followin g Mr . Leste r Pearson' s resignatio n a s Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affair s i n 1957 , th e strai n o f working with politicians wh o have for twent y years been unuse d to office , an d th e tol l o n healt h an d spirit o f frequen t posting s t o politicall y an d climaticall y uncomfortable environments.* Yet th e shortag e of room a t the to p ha s mad e for som e malaise. Fo r th e firs t tim e i n it s histor y th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs experience d difficult y i n securin g its norma l quot a o f candidate s for th e foreig n servic e office r competitio n i n 1960 . THE ATTACH E

Not leas t amon g the pressures assailin g the professional diplomatist ha s been the gradual usurpation of his investigative and reportorial function s by specialists inside his embassy and outside, enjoying o r claiming diplomatic status, stuffing th e pouche s with their reports , frequentl y by-pass ing altogethe r th e norma l channel s o f diplomati c communication , f Jostled an d hemme d in b y specialists , the traditiona l foreign servic e of ficer may wel l wonder what is left fo r hi m t o sa y onc e th e commercial , *"I regre t tha t ou r ba g o f Jul y 1 2 [1960 ] containe d n o politica l reports, " a foreign servic e office r wrot e t o hi s regiona l des k office r i n th e Eas t Bloc k fro m his missio n i n Southeas t Asia . "Thi s wa s primaril y du e t o th e absenc e o f th e Ambassador [o n hom e leave ] an d t o th e pressur e o f administration , Colomb o Plan matters , etc. , whic h ha d falle n t o m e fo r abou t thre e weeks , i n additio n t o my norma l duties . Durin g tha t time , poo r X wa s ou t wit h a combine d attac k of amoebi c dysentery , tapewor m an d roundworm . Bu t X i s no w better , and , al though h e ha s ye t to recove r fro m residua l anaemia , h e i s back a t work . Y i s now suffering fro m bacillar y dysenter y bu t seem s t o b e abl e t o pu t i n a norma l day. " As member s o f th e publi c servic e foreig n servic e officer s ma y participat e i n a health insuranc e plan a t favourabl e rates , bu t th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s is unabl e t o assum e financia l responsibilit y fo r treatmen t o f illnesse s incurre d a s the resul t o f servin g i n unhealth y environments . Militar y attaches , o n th e othe r hand, receiv e th e protectio n t o whic h the y ar e entitle d a s member s o f th e arme d forces, a circumstanc e no t improvin g moral e amon g thei r diplomati c colleague s undergoing comparabl e hardships . tThe dislik e shown b y caree r diplomatist s fo r attache s fro m outsid e th e foreign service i s nothing new. "Three attaches , m y dea r Palmerston, " wrot e Si r Frederic k Lamb fro m Vienn a i n 1838 , "ar e a s muc h a s thi s plac e ca n bear ; mor e woul d b e like keepin g a pensio n fo r grown-u p pupils. " Fro m Lisbo n Lor d Willia m Russel l sent a similar protest : " When the y are so numerous th e Chancery become s a sor t of Coffe e Hous e wher e th e dispatche s ar e rea d an d criticize d lik e newspapers. " Quoted i n Si r Charle s Webster , Th e Foreign Policy o f Palmerston, 1830-1841, I (London, 1951) , p . 70 .

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military, press , labour , finance , agricultural , science , an d technica l as sistance attache s hav e ha d thei r say ; or , i f somethin g i n hi s ow n des patches ha s escape d thei r notice , whethe r his political superio r ca n pos sibly find time to rea d it . Th e Canadia n diplomatis t ha s enjoye d i n thi s regard a n experienc e happier , o n th e whole , tha n tha t o f his colleague s in governmen t service elsewhere . Th e rang e an d numbe r o f specialists , while expanding , ar e no t oppressive , an d leav e hi m ampl e scop e fo r significant activity . The machiner y fo r co-ordinatin g hi s wor k wit h tha t of functiona l diplomatists, while not ye t perfect , has worke d effectively , both i n th e embass y and a t Ottawa , to preven t th e kin d o f inter-agenc y rivalry tha t elsewher e reduce s th e statu s an d moral e o f th e regula r foreign service . The commercial attache is at once the oldes t an d most importan t type of functiona l diplomatis t i n th e Canadia n publi c service . I n relatio n t o him, indeed , th e foreig n servic e office r o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs i s somethin g o f a n interloper , fo r commercia l representatio n overseas precede d b y severa l decade s th e exercis e o f th e righ t o f lega tion. That relation s betwee n commercia l an d diplomati c representative s have been largely devoid of personal rivalr y and jurisdictiona l squabbles owes much to the traditio n of interdepartmental co-operation an d inter change o f personnel. " A ma n ca n transfe r entirel y fro m th e trad e com missioner servic e to Externa l Affairs, " remarke d the Under Secretar y in 1948. "W e hav e made a trad e commissione r an ambassador . W e have made one a consul-general. W e have transferred a trade commissioner to an embassy as first secretary. We have transferred a trade commissioner to be a second ma n a t Canada House." 48 I t wil l be noted tha t thes e ar e examples o f one-wa y traffi c fro m Trad e an d Commerc e t o Externa l Affairs; ther e ha s bee n less , i f any, flow from Externa l Affair s t o Trad e and Commerce , a fac t reflectin g th e greate r prestig e o f diplomac y a s against commercia l representation , an d als o th e pressur e exerte d b y C. D . Howe , whe n Ministe r o f Trad e an d Commerce , t o fin d suitabl e employment fo r a backlo g o f senio r official s o f hi s Department . The oversea s representative s o f th e Departmen t o f Trad e an d Com merce ar e mor e widel y dispersed tha n thos e o f th e Departmen t o f Ex ternal Affairs . I n thos e countrie s wher e ther e i s a trad e commissione r but n o diplomati c representative , th e trad e commissioner' s wor k ma y reach int o th e politica l sphere , mos t usefully , perhaps , b y providin g diplomatic intelligence . Wher e there i s diplomatic as well as commercial representation, th e trad e commissione r an d hi s staf f wor k closel y wit h the embassy or legation, without being wholly subservient to it. "I t i s not

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true tha t trad e commissioner s an d diplomati c mission s repor t onl y through o r to the Department o f External Affairs, " th e Unde r Secretar y explained i n 1952 . We do not see k t o channel thei r report s to o rigidl y through th e hea d o f mis sion, althoug h th e head o f missio n would b e aware o f what i s being reported . I woul d pu t i t thi s way : i f th e commercia l secretar y i n Havan a wer e t o b e writing upo n th e genera l commercia l polic y o f th e governmen t o f Cuba , a despatch o f that characte r I should think shoul d mor e properl y b e sent by the Ambassador—sent forwar d t o th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d the n distributed t o department s o f th e governmen t includin g Trad e an d Com merce wh o ar e intereste d i n matter s o f policy . If , o n th e othe r hand , th e commercial ma n wer e reportin g o n some detai l regardin g sugar, for instance , I thin k th e appropriat e cours e woul d b e fo r hi m t o addres s hi s despatc h or report to the deput y minister o f Trade an d Commerc e an d sen d a copy of it t o th e hea d o f mission . I thin k tha t satisfie s bot h th e proprietie s an d the practicalities .

Asked whethe r he considere d "th e tim e ha s arrive d whe n Externa l Af fairs shoul d take over the trade commissioners and includ e them in their department fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f policy , administration , an d gen erally speakin g for th e goo d o f the countr y an d economy, " Mr . Arnol d Heeney replied: "Tha t suggestion has been canvasse d from tim e to time both fro m withi n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d th e Depart ment o f Trad e an d Commerce . . . . I a m afrai d tha t t o answe r th e question woul d requir e a degre e o f diplomati c skil l o f whic h I a m no t capable."49 Whateve r the merit s o f thi s proposal, i t woul d hav e ha d a t least th e effec t o f removin g one sourc e o f irritatio n an d grievance—th e uncertainty about whether in the absence of the head of mission a foreign service office r o f th e Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerc e o r o f th e Department o f Externa l Affair s shoul d assum e th e responsibilitie s o f charge d'affaires . A fa r mor e importan t proble m o f jurisdictio n i s whic h o f th e tw o departments, if either, should be responsible for foreig n ai d programmes. Canada firs t entere d th e field of externa l assistanc e t o under-develope d countries i n 194 9 throug h th e Unite d Nation s programm e o f technica l assistance, an d fo r thi s reaso n administratio n of foreig n ai d becam e a t the outse t th e responsibilit y of th e Unite d Nation s divisio n o f th e De partment o f Externa l Affairs . Th e inauguratio n o f th e Colomb o Pla n a yea r later place d the Department' s facilitie s unde r considerabl e strain , and i t wa s a t thi s junctur e that th e powerfu l an d energeti c Ministe r o f Trade an d Commerce , C . D . Howe , expresse d th e readines s o f his De partment t o tak e ove r th e administratio n o f Canadia n participatio n i n the Colomb o Pla n an d al l othe r foreig n ai d programmes . Th e Depart ment o f Externa l Affair s rightl y sense d tha t thi s interes t ha d bee n

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aroused b y th e commercia l an d tradin g possibilitie s o f th e venture , bu t its misgivings, if such there were , vanished a t th e prospec t o f relief fro m administrative burden s rapidl y becomin g intolerable . Membershi p o n an interdepartmenta l committee * would , it hoped , enabl e i t t o kee p a watchful ey e o n th e administratio n o f th e programme s an d t o se e tha t foreign polic y aspect s were kept well to the fore. Under th e capabl e directio n o f th e firs t Administrato r o f th e Inter national Economi c an d Technica l Co-operatio n Divisio n o f th e Depart ment o f Trad e an d Commerce , Mr. R . G . Ni k Cavel l (wh o wa s chair man o f th e interdepartmenta l committee), thi s syste m worke d mor e o r less satisfactorily for severa l years. But th e proces s of clearing proposal s with thre e department s (Externa l Affairs , Trad e an d Commerce , an d Finance), tw o Crow n corporation s (Defenc e Construction , Ltd. , an d the Canadia n Commercia l Corporation ) an d Treasur y Boar d becam e increasingly irksome . Co-ordinatio n betwee n official s a t hom e an d i n the fiel d lef t muc h t o b e desired , largely becaus e o f th e inabilit y o f th e cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus at Ottawa to delegat e sufficien t dis cretionary authorit y t o th e me n o n th e spot , wit h th e resul t tha t de cisions wer e undul y delaye d an d opportunitie s fo r constructiv e actio n needlessly lost. f Finally , the Asia n beneficiaries wer e beginning to com plain privatel y tha t commercia l advantag e rathe r tha n disintereste d philanthropy seeme d too ofte n t o motivate the donor . The resignation of C. D. Howe as Minister o f Trade an d Commerce i n June 1957 , followe d no t lon g afterward s b y tha t o f Mr . Cavel l a s Ad ministrator, offere d th e ne w Governmen t an opportunit y t o re-examin e the administratio n of foreign aid programmes . Three choice s la y before it. On e wa s t o d o wha t might be don e t o improv e th e existin g system, without altering its main administrative features. A second wa s to creat e a ne w Departmen t o f Foreig n Aid , distinc t fro m th e Department s o f 'Composed o f th e hea d o f th e Economi c Division , Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs; Director , Trad e Commissione r Service , Departmen t o f Trad e an d Com merce; Deput y Governo r o f th e Ban k o f Canada ; Assistan t Deput y Ministe r o f Finance; an d Administrato r o f th e Internationa l Economi c an d Technica l Co operation Division , Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerce . f'Most capita l an d especiall y technica l assistanc e administratio n ca n b e carried o n a t highes t efficienc y i n th e countrie s t o whic h th e ai d i s directed rathe r than a t desks , howeve r intelligentl y manned , te n o r fiftee n thousan d mile s away . . . . A n indefensibl e amoun t o f tim e i s now spent i n length y an d tediou s corres pondence betwee n fiel d technicians , Canadia n mission s abroad , an d th e thre e Ministries . . . o n point s o f appallin g triviality. " Keit h Spicer , "Som e Remark s concerning Canadia n Assistanc e unde r th e Colomb o Plan " (unpublishe d manu script); an d "Th e Administratio n o f Canadia n Colomb o Pla n Aid, " International Journal, vol . XVI , no . 2 , Sprin g 1961 , pp . 169-82 . I a m gratefu l t o Mr . Spicer , who conducte d extensiv e fiel d researc h fo r hi s doctora l thesi s o n Canad a an d th e Colombo Plan, fo r placin g hi s paper a t m y disposal .

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Trade an d Commerc e an d Externa l Affairs , wit h it s ow n autonomou s corps of career officers . S o radical a reorganization might b e undertake n in th e hop e o f allayin g suspicion s o f recipient s o f ai d administere d b y departments primaril y intereste d i n trad e o r diplomacy , improvin g th e morale an d effectivenes s o f fiel d officer s b y makin g foreig n ai d thei r sole responsibility, * an d providin g better facilitie s fo r creativ e exchang e of idea s betwee n th e Ottaw a planner s an d th e oversea s experts . The reorganization actually undertaken was far less radical. Responsibility for foreig n ai d was restored to th e Department of External Affairs , just as , fiv e year s earlier , th e Unite d State s foreig n ai d agency , th e Foreign Operation s Administratio n (whic h ha d replace d th e Mutua l Security Administratio n i n 1953) , ha d bee n abolishe d an d replace d by th e Internationa l Cooperatio n Administratio n unde r th e directio n of th e Secretar y o f State . A statemen t issue d b y th e Prim e Ministe r on Augus t 25 , 1960 , explaine d th e ne w arrangement s i n th e followin g terms: In recen t year s th e responsibilitie s fo r Canada' s economi c assistanc e hav e been divide d between th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d th e Depart ment o f Trad e an d Commerce , wit h co-operatio n b y th e Departmen t o f Finance. Recently th e ide a o f economi c assistanc e t o underdevelope d countrie s has acquire d a ne w significanc e an d attractio n fo r a lengthenin g lis t o f prospective recipient s an d potentia l donors . It ha s bee n decide d tha t th e administratio n an d operatio n o f ai d pro grammes, i n th e interest s o f efficien t an d expeditiou s administratio n an d to assur e a soun d an d productiv e us e o f th e ai d programmes , shoul d b e placed unde r on e head . A n externa l ai d offic e wil l b e establishe d i n charg e of a n office r t o b e know n a s Director-Genera l o f Externa l Ai d Programmes . Under the directio n of the Secretar y of State for Externa l Affairs , hi s respon sibilities wil l b e a s follows : (a) Th e operatio n an d administratio n o f Canada' s assistanc e programme s covered b y th e genera l ai d vote s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs ; (b) To keep these programmes unde r constan t revie w and, a s appropriate , to prepar e recommendation s o n the m an d relate d matter s t o Cabinet ; t o prepare submission s t o Treasur y Boar d o n financia l question s relatin g t o economic assistance ; (c) T o ensur e co-ordinatio n i n th e operation s o f othe r Department s and agencie s o f governmen t concerne d wit h variou s aspect s o f economi c assistance programmes ; (d) T o consul t an d co-operat e a s appropriate wit h international organiza tions an d agencies ; *"Although presen t Canadia n ai d administrator s abroa d ar e generall y o f th e highest individua l calibre , fe w . .. ar e enthusiasti c abou t th e ai d aspec t o f thei r work, an d som e o f the m frankl y conside r i t a n annoyin g impedimen t t o th e pursuit o f thei r principa l career. " Spicer , "Som e Remark s concernin g Canadia n Assistance under the Colomb o Plan."

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(e) T o consul t an d co-operat e a s appropriat e wit h Canadia n voluntar y agencies activ e i n underdeveloped countries ; (/) T o co-ordinat e Canadia n effort s t o provid e emergenc y assistanc e i n the cas e o f disasters abroad ; fo r thi s purpos e t o achiev e th e necessar y liaiso n with th e Canadia n Re d Cros s Societ y an d othe r appropriat e Canadia n organizations; (g) T o b e responsibl e fo r th e interna l administratio n o f th e Externa l Aid Office ; an d (h) T o perfor m suc h othe r dutie s a s ma y b e require d i n relatio n t o Canada's externa l assistanc e programme . It ha s bee n decide d t o appoin t Mr . H . O . Moran , recentl y Hig h Com missioner t o Pakistan , a s Director-Genera l i n th e Externa l Ai d Office , with effec t fro m Septembe r 1st .

Unlike his commercial counterpart, th e militar y attache i s a compara tive newcome r t o Canadia n mission s abroad . I n 192 7 th e Canadia n Government unanimousl y decide d agains t appointin g militar y officer s to th e Hig h Commissioner' s offic e i n Londo n o r t o th e newl y opene d legation i n Washington. 50 I t wa s no t unti l Colone l G . P . Loggi e wa s assigned t o Canad a Hous e i n 193 7 a s ordnanc e representativ e o f th e Department o f National Defence that an y of Canada's mission s acquired an officia l remotel y resemblin g a servic e attache . Th e creatio n i n September 193 9 o f th e Canadia n Militar y Headquarter s i n Londo n was though t t o mak e unnecessar y th e appointmen t o f militar y officer s to th e Hig h Commissioner' s office , an d thi s di d no t tak e plac e unti l the disbandin g of C.M.H.Q . a t th e en d o f th e war . Canada an d th e Unite d States , havin g no t ye t appointe d servic e attaches t o thei r mission s in Washingto n an d Ottawa , carrie d o n thei r pre-war militar y conversation s largel y throug h Canadia n staf f officer s who travelle d t o Washingto n for th e purpose . Th e missio n of th e Chie f of th e Genera l Staf f (Majo r Genera l E . C . Ashton ) an d th e Chie f of the Nava l Staf f (Commodor e P . W . Nelles ) too k plac e i n Januar y 1938 unde r condition s o f great secrecy , Genera l Ashto n leavin g Ottawa one day , Commodor e Nelles th e next . Travellin g separately , i n civilia n dress, the y arrive d a t th e Canadia n legation , thei r identit y unknow n (or a t leas t undisclosed ) t o an y o f it s staf f sav e th e Ministe r himself. 51 They proceede d t o discus s wit h thei r America n counterparts , Genera l Malin Crai g an d Admira l Willia m D . Leahy , plan s fo r th e defenc e of North Americ a in th e even t of wa r wit h Japan . I n Apri l 193 8 Colone l N. O . Car r o f th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e discusse d wit h various Unite d State s technica l an d suppl y officer s i n Washingto n th e materiel whic h a belligeren t Canad a migh t acquir e fro m th e Unite d States i n th e even t o f dela y i n o r failur e o f deliver y fro m th e Unite d Kingdom, an d i n Novembe r o f th e sam e yea r a thir d discussio n o n

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military matter s too k plac e betwee n Majo r Genera l T . V . Anderso n of th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e an d America n officers . Shortly afte r Canada' s declaratio n o f war , ther e wa s discussio n i n the Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s o f appointin g a nava l attach e t o the Washington legation. (Th e Navy may have been chose n a s the senio r service, o r becaus e nava l problem s wer e mos t pressin g a t th e time. ) It was , however , a n R.C.A.F . officer , Ai r Commodor e W . R . Kenny , who becam e th e firs t Canadia n servic e attach e i n Washington , takin g up hi s dutie s h i Februar y 1940 . Ai r Commodor e Kenny was instructe d to dea l wit h al l servic e matters , bu t th e burde n o f dealin g wit h arm y and navy , a s wel l a s ai r force , affair s wa s fro m th e star t a heav y one . The ai r attache , reporte d th e Canadia n Ministe r i n July , "ca n perhap s at th e momen t handl e th e specifi c request s fo r informatio n an d actio n which reac h him , bu t h e canno t unde r suc h condition s fin d th e tim e or opportunit y fo r contact s an d studie s an d report s o f a genera l natur e which ar e s o useful. " H e recommende d tha t th e Government appoin t a nava l attach e t o th e legation , inasmuc h as the Unite d State s adminis tration wa s considerin g sendin g a nava l attach e t o Ottawa. 52 Th e following mont h a nava l an d a n arm y attach e wer e poste d t o Washington. Even thoug h al l thre e service s no w ha d thei r representative s i n th e United States , th e Canadia n Governmen t fel t i t stil l lacke d acces s t o the inne r council s o f th e Gran d Alliance . Accordingl y i t presse d fo r the creatio n o f a Canadia n join t staf f missio n a t Washington , simila r to the British. Thi s reques t was opposed by the Unite d State s War and Navy Department s "o n th e ground s tha t representatio n throug h th e Permanent Join t Boar d o n Defens e an d th e Britis h Join t Staf f Missio n met al l th e Canadia n need s fo r liaison , an d tha t a n undesirabl e prece dent woul d b e establishe d fo r simila r request s b y othe r dominion s an d the America n republics." 53 Thi s explanatio n di d no t giv e muc h satis faction i n Ottawa , an d o n Augus t 1 8 th e Prim e Ministe r tol d th e American Ministe r "tha t th e prolonge d refusa l o f Washingto n t o approve a militar y mission wa s th e onl y aspec t o f U.S.-Canadia n rela tionships tha t seriousl y trouble d him." 54 Th e Minister , Pierrepon t Moffat, mad e a n earnes t bu t unsuccessfu l attemp t t o impres s hi s mili tary colleague s wit h th e advers e politica l effect s o f thei r position , bu t both th e Unite d State s Chief o f Staf f an d th e Secretar y of Wa r fel t "tha t foreign politica l consideration s inimica l t o ou r militar y interests shoul d not b e allowe d t o determin e the attitud e o f the War Department." 55 The entr y of the United State s into th e war spurre d a renewed Cana dian effor t t o wi n acceptanc e b y th e Unite d State s o f a join t militar y mission a t Washington , whic h i n th e Canadia n vie w th e creatio n i n

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December 194 1 o f th e U.S.-U.K . Combine d Chief s o f Staf f mad e al l the more imperative. Mackenzie King took advantag e of Mr. Churchill' s presence i n th e Canadia n capita l t o rais e th e matte r wit h him: Said quit e openl y to him th e proble m w e faced wa s that whil e w e had bee n in [th e war ] durin g two an d a quarte r years , thing s woul d b e s o arrange d that th e U.S . an d Britai n woul d settl e everythin g betwee n themselves , an d that ou r services , Chief s o f Staff , etc . woul d no t hav e an y sa y i n wha t wa s to b e done . Tha t i n th e las t war , ther e ha d bee n a Militar y Missio n a t Washington. Peopl e thought , i n Canada , ther e shoul d b e a Militar y Missio n there now , watchin g Canada's interests. That h e woul d understan d ou r poli tical proble m i n tha t regard . I go t the Chief s o f Staf f late r t o explai n th e position . H e sai d h e though t we shoul d b e entitle d t o hav e representatio n there , bu t expresse d th e hop e that w e would tak e a larg e vie w o f th e relationship s o f th e larg e countries , to avoi d anythin g in th e wa y o f antagonisms. 58

A fortnigh t late r h e tol d th e America n Ministe r tha t h e "wa s ver y critical o f th e attitud e o f man y o f ou r technicians , particularl y i n th e Army an d Navy, for trying to settl e i n two-way discussions matter s that directly affecte d Canad a an d shoul d b e carrie d o n i n a three-wa y dis cussion."57 These persisten t complaint s eventuall y were rewarded. In Jul y 1942 , after a recor d o f negotiation s describe d b y a n officia l historia n o f th e United States Army as "one o f the least happy aspects of the U.S.-Canadian Worl d Wa r I I relationship," 58 a Canadia n Join t Militar y Mission , with self-containe d naval , arm y an d ai r forc e staffs , wa s create d i n Washington. (Th e exten t t o whic h i t succeede d i n pryin g strategi c secrets ou t o f th e Combine d Chief s o f Staf f i s discusse d belo w i n chapter v. ) The chairma n o f th e Canadia n Join t Militar y Missio n wa s Majo r General Mauric e Pope , wh o in additio n to bein g a militar y representa tive o n th e Permanen t Join t Boar d o n Defence , had sinc e March 194 2 been th e representativ e i n Washingto n o f th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabinet "fo r th e purpos e o f maintainin g continuous contac t wit h th e U.K.-U.S. Combine d Staff s an d th e Combine d Plannin g Committees , and t o represen t th e Wa r Committee before the Combine d Staff s whe n questions affectin g Canad a wer e unde r consideration." 69 Th e origina l intention ha d bee n to appoin t Genera l Pope a s the representativ e o f the Chiefs o f Staf f Committe e rather tha n a s th e representativ e of th e Wa r Committee but , accordin g t o Genera l Pope' s ow n account , "th e Nav y and Ai r Forc e woul d have non e o f this " sinc e i t appeare d t o offe r th e Army a privilege d channe l o f communication. 60 Bu t t o hav e offere d equal statu s t o al l thre e service s woul d hav e encountere d America n opposition. Aske d "whethe r h e though t i t woul d have bee n possibl e t o

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secure recognitio n fo r thre e Canadia n Servic e representative s i n Washington a t th e sam e leve l an d wit h th e sam e statu s tha t ha d bee n accorded Genera l Pope, " th e America n Ministe r i n Ottaw a "sai d em phatically that , i n hi s judgment , it woul d no t hav e bee n possible , an d that i f [th e Canadia n Government ] ha d endeavoure d t o insis t o n separate to p leve l representatio n fo r th e thre e Defenc e Departments , none o f thes e Washingto n representative s coul d hav e enjoye d th e position vi s a vi s th e Combine d Chief s o f Staf f whic h h e expect s General Pop e t o fill." 61 The numbe r o f servic e attache s poste d t o Canadia n diplomati c mis sions wa s greatl y increased followin g the Secon d Worl d War . B y 194 8 the Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e wa s represente d i n Belgium , Czechoslovakia, Denmark , France , German y (Bon n an d Berlin) , Italy , Japan, th e Netherlands , Sweden , Turkey , th e Unite d Kingdom , th e United States , th e U.S.S.R . an d Yugoslavia , althoug h i n som e case s the representativ e was responsible fo r mor e tha n on e o f thes e countries . The manne r of appointing service attaches was described h i 194 8 b y the Under Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs : If th e defenc e service s fee l tha t i t woul d b e desirabl e fro m thei r poin t o f view t o hav e a servic e attach e a t a diplomati c missio n the y approac h th e Department o f Externa l Affair s t o ge t ou r genera l view s o n th e desirabilit y or otherwise . W e normall y say , i f the y wis h t o sen d a servic e attache , tha t is al l righ t wit h us . .. . Ther e hav e bee n on e o r tw o occasion s wher e w e thought o n certai n ground s i t wa s undesirabl e t o hav e a servic e office r a t a diplomati c post, * bu t normall y w e d o no t object . Th e fina l appointmen t is mad e b y th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s afte r agreemen t i n th e appointment ha s bee n reache d wit h th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defence. 62

The servic e attache , onc e poste d t o a diplomati c mission , i s unde r th e authority o f th e hea d o f missio n an d subjec t t o remova l fro m th e pos t at th e discretio n o f th e hea d o f mission. 63 Lik e th e commercia l attache , he has a dual responsibility, to the head of mission (an d throug h him to the Departmen t o f External Affairs ) an d t o th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defence. H e i s required to sen d report s o f general interest t o th e Cana dian governmen t throug h th e hea d o f missio n t o th e Departmen t o f External Affairs , furnishin g copie s o f suc h reports t o Nationa l Defenc e Headquarters; onl y report s o f othe r tha n genera l interes t ar e sen t directly t o hi s ow n Department . O n on e occasio n durin g th e Secon d World Wa r th e servic e representative s i n Washingto n faile d t o follo w *One suc h occasio n aros e i n 1947 , whe n th e R.C.A.F . wante d t o appoin t a n air attach e t o th e Hig h Commissioner' s offic e i n Ne w Delhi . Th e "certai n othe r grounds" o n whic h thi s proposa l wa s though t undesirabl e presumabl y include d the prospect , i f i t wer e adopted , o f makin g a simila r appointmen t i n Karachi .

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this procedure . A t a meetin g o f th e Wa r Committee o f th e Cabine t on Ma y 14 , 1943 , Mackenzi e Kin g "spoke out ver y strongl y agains t som e of th e official s o f the Defenc e Department no t forwardin g t o me , a s Prim e Ministe r [an d Secretary o f Stat e fo r External Affairs] , importan t document s whic h cam e fro m ou r militar y staf f at Washington. . .. I sai d tha t no document i n the publi c servic e shoul d be concealed fro m th e Prime Minister . . .. I mad e it clear tha t a directio n was to g o fro m th e Wa r Committe e t o th e Chief s o f Staf f an d state d . . . that I wa s t o hav e fo r m y persona l possession , thes e differen t communications , that I migh t b e i n a positio n a t an y tim e t o tak e ful l responsibilit y fo r wha t I ha d done. . . ," 64 The servic e attache , i n a word , i s i n ever y wa y impresse d b y th e prin ciple o f civilia n supremac y tha t distinguishe s th e relatio n betwee n soldiers an d governments in Canada (se e below , chapte r HI) . The Canadia n governmen t ha s responde d t o th e increasin g speciali zation of modern diplomati c activity by appointing t o it s major mission s attaches wh o perfor m othe r tha n commercia l o r militar y duties . Pres s attaches hav e bee n a norma l par t o f th e personne l o f th e Washingto n embassy and o f Canada House, London, since 1941 , and the subsequent appointment o f labour , agricultural , financial , scientifi c an d othe r specialists ha s turne d thes e mission s int o miniatur e replica s o f th e federal governmen t a t Ottawa . Ther e ha s not , however , bee n tha t extreme proliferatio n o f oversea s representatio n whic h characterize d the conduc t o f Unite d State s foreig n polic y durin g th e 1950's , whe n as man y a s fift y differen t agencie s o f th e administratio n maintaine d their own functiona l diplomatist s abroad , ofte n wit h onl y the mos t tenuous connectio n wit h th e hea d o f mission. 65 THE DEPARTMEN T O F EXTERNA L AFFAIRS

One o f Joseph Pope' s firs t officia l act s upo n becomin g Unde r Secretar y of th e ne w Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s h e ha d don e s o muc h t o bring int o bein g wa s t o cas t abou t fo r som e principle s o f departmenta l organization. A stud y o f th e Australia n Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s (created i n 1901 ) di d no t prov e helpful . "Thei r Departmen t seem s t o have a muc h wide r spher e o f activit y tha n i s contemplate d fo r th e Canadian one, " wa s th e commen t o f W . H . Walker , th e senio r o f tw o "chief clerks " wit h whic h th e Departmen t ha d bee n provided , "an d while th e informatio n supplie d [b y th e Australia n Government ] i s interesting s o far a s it goes it doe s no t see m t o m e very helpful toward s

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establishing a n organizatio n o r procedur e fo r th e ne w Dep*." 66 Som e years earlie r th e Prim e Ministe r whil e i n Londo n ha d take n "pain s t o learn ho w thes e things wer e deal t wit h there," 67 an d i t wa s accordingl y to Londo n tha t Si r Wilfri d Laurie r decide d t o sen d Pop e i n 191 0 "t o look int o the Foreign Offic e syste m and to collec t bac k records." 68 Pope was chiefl y intereste d i n th e latte r par t o f th e assignmen t an d spen t several happy weeks at Whitehall busil y copying documents. There wa s indeed littl e to be done at this stag e abou t the organizatio n o f a Depart ment consistin g o f a Deput y Minister , tw o clerk s an d a secretary , a budget (fo r 1909-10 ) o f $14,950 , an d a n offic e ove r a barbe r shop . An importan t an d far-reachin g step wa s taken i n 1913 , probabl y with out realizatio n o f it s beneficia l consequences , whe n th e offic e o f th e Canadian Commissione r i n Pari s wa s brough t unde r th e jurisdictio n of th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . A preceden t wa s thu s create d which, followe d i n 192 1 b y th e mergin g of th e Hig h Commissioner' s office i n Londo n wit h th e Departmen t an d late r o f th e mission s i n Washington, Pari s an d Tokyo , forestalle d the developmen t o f a foreig n service separat e fro m th e foreig n offic e a s i n th e Unite d State s unti l 1954. No furthe r though t appear s t o hav e bee n give n t o departmenta l organization unti l 192 0 whe n Lorin g Christi e (wh o ha d entere d th e Department durin g the Firs t Worl d Wa r an d quickl y occupie d it s new post o f Lega l Advise r create d i n 1913 ) wa s sen t t o Londo n "t o investigate th e organizatio n o f th e Britis h foreig n offic e . . . fo r th e purpose o f gathering information which would help . .. in a reorganiza tion o f [the ] Departmen t of Externa l Affairs." 69 Nothin g cam e o f thi s investigation, perhap s because , a s Mackenzi e Kin g wrot e afterwards , the Unde r Secretar y of the Department , "with fifty years' servic e behind him, looked somewha t askance upon extensive plans o f reorganization. " Sir Josep h Pope' s successor , O . D . Skelton , whil e no t avers e t o suc h projects, wa s no t incline d t o rus h int o them , no r di d th e siz e o f th e Department (whic h in 192 5 containe d no mor e than th e three adminis trative position s wit h whic h i t ha d starte d ou t fiftee n year s earlier ) require them . A stud y was undertake n o f procedure s employe d i n th e foreign service s of the United Kingdom , the Unite d States , France , Aus tralia an d th e Iris h Fre e State . I n respons e t o a suggestio n tha t th e Department o f External Affairs , lik e th e Britis h Foreig n Offic e an d the America n Stat e Department , shoul d b e organize d alon g regiona l lines, Mackenzi e Kin g wrote a s follows : A regiona l basi s . . . work s adequatel y onl y whe n th e staf f i s sufficientl y large t o ensur e i n eac h o f thes e regiona l division s a numbe r o f me n wh o have specialize d i n the differen t subject s and topics tha t arise . Th e alternativ e

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procedure, namely , divisio n accordin g t o subjec t rathe r tha n b y region , ha s a goo d dea l t o b e sai d fo r it . Probabl y i n th e earl y year s o f th e expansio n of th e Departmen t w e shoul d hav e t o tr y t o combin e bot h methods . A t th e present time , fo r example , th e Assistan t Unde r Secretary , Mr . Walker , deals with all consular an d passpor t matter s an d confidential prints, whil e th e Counsellor, Mr . Desy , i s takin g charg e o f Leagu e o f Nation s matter s an d will probabl y b e give n specia l responsibilit y fo r th e shar e i n th e negotiation s of commercia l treatie s whic h i t i s m y intentio n tha t th e Departmen t o f External Affair s shoul d tak e i n future. 70

This fusion o f regional and functiona l responsibilit y wa s accordingly pu t into effect. Th e result was described in 193 0 b y the Under Secretary : The wor k i n th e Department , s o fa r a s ou r limite d staf f wil l permit , i s divided partl y b y subject s and partl y b y countries . Fo r example , on e office r looks afte r passports ; anothe r look s afte r consula r relations ; another , th e legal aspec t o f affairs . . . . We also attemp t t o divid e according t o countries . One [officer ] mus t specializ e i n Britis h Empir e relations ; anothe r mus t b e familiar wit h th e Leagu e o f Nation s an d continenta l affairs ; anothe r i s familiar wit h condition s i n th e Unite d States , an d s o on . Ou r staf f i s no t large enoug h t o permi t a s grea t a degre e o f specializatio n a s w e woul d like, bu t w e hop e tha t i t wil l gradually be mad e mor e adequate. 71

While a gradua l mov e i n th e directio n o f increase d specializatio n has take n plac e a s th e Departmen t ha s grow n t o on e hundre d time s the numbe r of its original personnel, the basi c principles of departmental organization hav e undergone little change. The fusio n o f responsibilities for polic y an d administration , originally th e produc t o f necessity , ha s been though t a virtu e i n it s ow n righ t servin g t o brea k dow n depart mental barriers and to offse t th e developmen t of an inner circl e of politi cal officer s untrouble d b y th e menia l chore s o f keepin g house . Thu s one o f four assistan t unde r secretaries wa s until recentl y responsibl e fo r the consular , information, lega l an d America n affair s divisions ; another , for th e Commonwealth , the Unite d Nations , th e Fa r Easter n an d th e historical divisions ; a thir d fo r th e tw o economi c an d th e tw o defenc e liaison divisions . There i s continuou s tinkering wit h th e organizationa l structure. "W e allocat e ou r function s an d chang e aroun d ou r division s perhaps onc e ever y si x month s t o correspon d wit h th e wor k i n hand , which change s in characte r al l the time, " th e Associat e Unde r Secretar y explained i n 1945 , an d changes , h e migh t hav e added , t o accor d wit h the interest s an d capacitie s o f th e senio r official s wh o happe n t o b e a t home rathe r tha n h i th e field. He wen t o n t o describ e th e organizatio n of th e Departmen t a s i t existe d a t tha t time : To star t a t the top, ther e i s Mr. Robertson , Unde r Secretary , whil e I [Hum e Wrong] a m th e Associat e Unde r Secretary . I hav e th e specia l responsibilit y of supervisin g th e politica l division s o f th e Departmen t whil e Mr . Robert son, i n additio n t o hi s lega l responsibilitie s a s deput y minister , supervise s

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the othe r division s o f th e Departmen t directly . The n th e nex t tw o senio r members o f th e staf f ar e Mr . Read , Lega l Adviser , an d Mr . Beaudry , Assis tant Unde r Secretary . Ther e ar e thre e division s dealin g wit h politica l questions. . . . The first of the three division s deal s wit h question s o f inter national organizatio n an d genera l matter s affectin g th e peac e settlement . The othe r tw o ar e geographical . The y dea l wit h politica l affair s i n certai n areas. On e takes in Europe an d th e Commonwealth . I t i s a large assignment. The other , th e America n continent s an d th e Fa r East , o n th e politica l side . Then w e hav e a lega l divisio n whic h i s agai n extremel y activ e a t th e present tim e an d rathe r har d pressed . I t look s afte r th e function s yo u would expec t a lega l divisio n t o do , includin g th e draftin g o f internationa l instruments. . . . The n ther e i s a n economi c divisio n whic h ha s t o wor k very closel y wit h th e othe r divisions . . . . I t handle s th e curren t economi c business passin g throug h th e Departmen t an d i s responsibl e fo r conductin g a goo d dea l o f liaiso n busines s with th e othe r Department s a t Ottawa . The n there i s th e diplomati c divisio n whic h deal s wit h th e diplomati c corp s i n Ottawa an d it s problems , an d ha s genera l responsibilit y fo r certai n othe r questions suc h a s passport s an d question s o f immigration . . . . W e hav e recently establishe d a n informatio n division . . . , 72

Within a year a new treaty division was added, as well as a new adminis trative division ; b y 194 8 th e Department' s organizationa l char t bor e little similarit y t o tha t i n us e i n 1945 . Th e firs t politica l division , formerly dealin g wit h internationa l organization , ha d becom e th e United Nation s division ; the secon d politica l division , formerl y dealin g with bot h Commonwealt h an d Europea n affairs , ha d give n wa y t o a European divisio n and a British Commonwealth division; the diplomati c division ha d issue d in a protocol divisio n an d a consular division ; while to deal with the Department' s rapidl y growing staff an d th e problem s of its postin g overseas a ne w personnel divisio n ha d bee n added . Finally , the Associate Unde r Secretary had bee n replaced b y two assistant unde r secretaries. "Th e genera l schem e of organization, " th e Unde r Secretar y explained in 1948, "i s that the three geographica l divisions . . . are under the direc t supervision of the assistan t Under Secretary of State i n charge of th e politica l sid e o f th e Department . Certai n othe r divisions , th e United Nations , th e consular , the legal , th e economi c an d th e informa tion division s repor t directl y t o me . Th e personne l divisio n an d th e administrative divisio n ar e unde r th e charg e o f th e assistan t Unde r Secretary o f Stat e i n charg e o f administration." 73 I n 1949 , th e yea r of the Atlanti c Pact , th e defence liaiso n divisio n wa s created , "havin g t o do," th e Under Secretary stated, "with matters in which we are interested jointly with the Departmen t o f National Defence." 74 During th e nex t decad e eigh t mor e boxe s wer e adde d t o th e depart mental organizatio n chart , bringin g the tota l numbe r o f division s fro m twelve t o twenty ; a pres s office , a n inspectio n service , an d a politica l

THE BUREAUCRAC Y 6

9

co-ordination sectio n wer e als o acquired . O n th e geo-politica l sid e th e number o f division s rose fro m thre e t o five, Far Easter n an d America n affairs finall y acquirin g division s o f thei r own , whil e i n 195 7 a ne w Middle Easter n division was "entrusted wit h the seriou s problems whic h have o f late brough t eas t an d wes t fac e t o fac e i n tha t trouble d area, " and charge d wit h providin g "advic e . . . o n th e politica l aspect s o f Canadian participatio n i n th e Unite d Nation s Emergenc y Force." 75 I n 1960 a Latin-American divisio n came into being, an d consideration wa s being give n to th e formatio n o f a n Africa n divisio n t o en d th e existin g anomaly o f dealin g wit h Afric a sout h o f th e Sahara , s o muc h o f i t lying outsid e the Commonwealth , through th e Commonwealt h division . The despatc h i n Augus t 196 0 o f som e fiv e hundre d Canadia n troop s as par t o f th e Unite d Nation s presenc e i n th e Cong o Republi c coul d be expecte d t o produc e greate r attentio n t o Africa n affair s withi n th e Department, whos e firs t Africa n des k office r wa s appointe d onl y i n 1957. To secur e th e optimu m liaison amon g the differen t division s o f thei r Department, it s senio r officer s hav e resorte d t o a variet y o f forma l devices. Th e practic e o f weekl y meeting s o f divisio n head s wa s dis continued som e year s ago , an d th e principa l metho d o f co-ordinatio n is no w th e regula r mornin g conferenc e betwee n th e Unde r Secretar y and th e assistan t unde r secretaries . Bu t th e mos t importan t catalys t of communicatio n continues to b e supplie d b y th e tradition s an d esprit of th e foreig n service officer s themselves . Th e Departmen t i s stil l smal l by th e standard s o f Washington o r London , an d a s less tha n hal f o f it s members serv e a t an y give n tim e i n Ottaw a i t i s possibl e t o ge t t o know al l one' s colleague s slightl y an d som e o f the m well . Bu t i n th e last analysi s muc h depend s upo n th e receptivit y o f thos e a t th e to p to th e idea s o f thos e furthe r down . Generalizatio n i s hazardous , bu t i t is true to sa y that senio r official s o f the Departmen t profes s their readi ness to entertain suggestion s of their juniors, and that—a more revealing test—most o f th e junior s appea r satisfie d tha t acces s t o th e highe r echelons i s as easy a s might reasonably b e hoped for . A differen t aspec t o f communicatio n i s tha t betwee n member s o f the Departmen t an d their politica l masters. All members o f the Depart ment coul d find in Mr. Leste r Pearso n (wh o had bee n on e o f the m fo r twenty years ) a n accessibl e an d receptiv e audience . Perhap s i n thi s respect hi s successor s wer e boun d t o suffe r b y comparison . Bu t ther e was som e feeling i n the Departmen t that , b y 1961 , makin g every allow ance for th e differen t backgroun d and personalit y o f their ne w Minister, its resources were not being exploited a s fully a s these deserved.

Chapter Three

TH

E

MILITAR Y

ESTABLISHMENT

THE CIVIL-MILITAR Y TRADITIO N

That th e influenc e o f th e militar y establishmen t upo n nationa l polic y has increased , i s increasing , an d ough t t o b e diminished , most liberal minded peopl e fin d i t eas y to agree . Th e widesprea d acceptance o f thi s proposition i n Canada must not however be thought to ste m solel y fro m a commitmen t t o libera l democracy ; it s greates t suppor t i s found , o r used t o b e found , i n th e authoritarian , anti-libera l settin g o f rura l Quebec. Rather , i t i s th e resul t o f a variet y o f historica l circumstance s placing th e militar y profession i n low estate. For mor e than one-third o f the Canadian people, suspicion of the mili tary min d an d o f th e militar y virtues derive s directl y fro m th e centra l circumstance o f thei r history . French-speakin g Canadian s ar e a conquered people , conquere d b y British arms . That the cr y of battle o n th e Plains of Abraham has bee n hushe d fo r tw o centurie s has no t deprive d la conquete o f th e qualit y o f a Sorelia n myth , a myt h whic h i n th e hands o f ultra-nationalis t leader s remain s a poten t i f wanin g force fo r national disruption . Cu t of f fro m hi s motherlan d b y distanc e an d b y his distast e fo r th e republica n institution s an d manner s o f moder n France, th e Frenc h Canadia n wa s stil l les s capabl e o f respondin g sympathetically t o th e imperialis m agitatin g th e Britis h Isle s a t th e turn of the century. "The new Britain of Mr. Chamberlain, " wrot e Henr i Bourassa i n 1901 , "is i n sor e nee d o f soldier s an d sailor s t o pro p th e fabric raise d b y he r franti c ambition . Bein g actuall y denuded o f troops at home, sh e turns in distress to her colonies. . . . Under miscellaneou s names an d variagate d uniforms—Roya l Rifles , Mounte d Infantry , Strathcona Horse , Yeomanry—the y extor t fro m u s whateve r the y ma y get i n th e shap e o f huma n materia l fo r thei r army . . . " l Bourassa' s interpretation capture d accuratel y enoug h th e moo d o f hi s compatriots . The Prime Ministe r himsel f took u p the cry, expressing the feelings of a great man y more tha n thos e whos e mother tongu e wa s French. "Ther e is a schoo l abroad , ther e i s a schoo l i n Englan d an d i n Canada , a school which is perhaps represented o n th e floo r o f this parliament," Si r Wilfrid Laurie r declaime d i n the House o f Commons in 1902 , "a schoo l

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 71

which want s t o brin g Canad a int o th e vorte x o f militaris m whic h i s the curs e and blight o f Europe. I a m not prepare d t o endors e an y suc h policy."2 I t wa s no wonde r that successiv e officer s o f the Britis h Army , sent fro m Londo n t o tak e charg e o f th e Canadia n militia , cam e int o conflict with the Canadian Government and were eventually recalled at its request. The most celebrated of these episodes were those involving Major General E . T . H . Hutto n an d Majo r Genera l Th e Ear l o f Dundonald ; the former was recalled i n 1900 , th e latter in 1904 . I n neithe r cas e was the motiv e o f th e Canadia n Governmen t pitche d a t th e highes t leve l of principle , fo r th e mos t irritatin g aspec t o f th e Genera l Office r Com manding was his propensity to reduc e its powers of patronage in militia affairs. Bu t th e Hutto n an d Dundonal d incident s establishe d a t th e outset o f the Dominion's moder n history the principl e of civilian control over th e militar y establishment . Les s happil y the y reinforce d civilia n prejudices agains t th e militar y mind . Bot h tradition s wer e t o persis t strongly dow n the years. The Firs t Worl d Wa r di d a s littl e i n Canad a a s elsewher e fo r th e reputation o f th e military . Mor e tha n hal f a millio n Canadian s fough t in Franc e an d Belgium ; mor e tha n fift y thousan d die d there . "I t wa s European policy , Europea n statesmanship , Europea n ambition , tha t drenched thi s worl d i n blood, " th e Canadia n delegat e tol d th e Firs t Assembly o f th e Leagu e o f Nations, 3 an d h e migh t wit h mor e justic e have include d Europea n generals . "Th e narrownes s o f hi s trainin g i n the regular arm y and his lack of adaptability to ne w conditions militated against hi s usefulness, " Canada' s wartim e Prim e Minister , Si r Rober t Borden, wrot e afterward s o f th e Britis h commande r o f Canadia n forces in France until May 1916; 4 an d wha t he sa w and learne d o f stil l higher levels o f comman d disturbe d hi m eve n more. N o attemp t wa s mad e by the Britis h Prime Ministe r t o concea l fro m hi m th e "constan t mistake s [of the generals], thei r failure t o fulfil expectations , an d th e unnecessar y losses whic h thei r lac k o f foresigh t ha d occasioned. " Borde n aske d Lloyd Georg e "wh y he had not dismissed those responsibl e . . . ; and he replied that he had endeavoure d to do so but did not succeed in carrying the Cabinet ; the hig h comman d had thei r affiliation s and root s every where; an d i t wa s fo r th e purpos e o f strengthenin g his han d i n dealin g with th e situatio n tha t h e ha d summone d th e Dominio n Minister s t o the Imperia l Cabinet. " I f suc h wa s Lloyd George' s purpose , th e Cana dian Prime Minister, fo r one , di d not le t him down . O n Jun e 13 , 1918 , Borden spok e t o th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet . "Gav e illustration s o f in competence, lac k o f system , disorganization , lac k o f foresight , etc. " As th e Canadia n Prim e Ministe r bega n speaking , th e Chie f o f th e

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Imperial Genera l Staf f attempte d t o leav e th e roo m bu t Lloy d Georg e directed hi m to retur n an d t o listen . "Si r Henr y Wilson, " Borden note d laconically i n hi s memoirs , "wa s handicappe d b y hi s intens e vanit y an d by his love of intrigue." 5 Official dissatisfactio n with the Hig h Comman d was mor e tha n equalle d b y th e feeling s o f th e Canadia n people , wel l summed u p i n a lette r t o F . S . Olive r fro m hi s brothe r i n Britis h Columbia: " . . . the British general s one and all are the most incompe tent lo t o f blood y fool s tha t hav e eve r bee n collecte d togethe r fo r th e purpose o f sacrificing armies . . . ." 6 No Canadia n genera l ros e hig h enoug h i n th e hierarch y o f comman d to bear direc t responsibility for th e strategi c conduct o f the war, but thi s did no t protec t th e commande r o f th e Canadia n Corp s i n 1917-18 , Sir Arthur Currie , fro m th e slur s an d accusation s whic h wer e t o houn d him later i n public life. 7 Th e onl y British genera l to becom e a Canadia n hero, Genera l J . H . G . Byng , Viscoun t Byn g o f Vimy , o n assumin g the governo r generalshi p o f th e Dominio n i n 192 1 encountere d con siderable hostilit y precisel y becaus e o f hi s militar y career . Finally, th e mas s o f French-speakin g Canadians , rallyin g wit h sur prising enthusias m t o th e cal l t o arm s i n 1914 , wer e quickl y alienate d by th e tactlessnes s an d stupidit y o f th e Canadia n Governmen t i n rele gating French-speakin g officer s t o mino r positions , assignin g French speaking soldier s t o English-speakin g regiments , usin g in rura l Quebe c methods o f recruitmen t appropriat e t o urba n Ontario . Enthusias m soured int o sulle n resentmen t an d then , i n 1917 , threatene d civi l wa r when th e Governmen t decide d t o impos e conscriptio n fo r oversea s military service. 8 Th e crisi s o f Quebe c durin g the Firs t Worl d Wa r cas t a lon g an d sombr e shado w upo n th e relation s o f soldier s an d govern ments in years to follow. SOLDIERS AN D GOVERNMENTS : THE YEAR S BETWEE N TH E WAR S

In 191 9 Sir Arthur Currie was appointed Inspecto r General and Militar y Counsellor t o th e militi a force s o f the Dominion , hi s firs t dut y bein g t o develop plan s fo r th e reorganizatio n o f the Canadia n militia . H e offere d three principa l recommendations . Th e existin g Departmen t o f Militi a and Defenc e shoul d becom e a Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e fo r th e three militar y services , Nav y (hithert o th e responsibilit y o f th e Depart ment o f Marine an d Nava l Services), Arm y an d th e nascen t Ai r Force . Second, th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , togethe r wit h th e Prim e Minister an d Ministe r o f Finance , i n consultatio n wit h th e Chief s o f

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 7 3

Staff, shoul d for m a Committe e o f Stat e t o stud y al l aspect s o f nationa l security policy. Third , ther e shoul d b e create d a Defenc e Committe e of twenty-five member s of the Hous e o f Commons, empowered to summo n before i t a s witnesses the senio r officer s o f the thre e services . Of thes e thre e recommendations , th e thir d ha s yet t o b e implemente d in it s origina l form , althoug h specia l defenc e committee s o f th e Hous e of Common s have bee n create d fro m tim e t o tim e (se e below , chapte r iv). The secon d wa s put int o effec t onl y i n 1936 , "a t th e earnes t solici tation o f th e Canadia n Genera l Staff." 9 Th e firs t proposal , a singl e ministry for the three services , was not new; it had been first put forwar d in 190 9 b y Si r Frederic k Borden , Ministe r o f Militi a an d Defenc e i n the Laurie r Government . Whe n i t wa s finall y acte d o n i n 1922 , th e chief incentiv e wa s economy rather tha n efficiency . "Wha t I d o wan t t o accomplish, i f I possibl y can, " th e Minister o f Militia an d Defenc e pro posing the necessar y legislation frankly concede d to the Hous e of Com mons, "i s t o hav e a wel l organized , snapp y defenc e forc e tha t wil l b e a credit to Canada without being too expensive." 10 Machinery fo r nationa l securit y polic y wa s develope d eve n mor e slowly at higher servic e levels. From June 192 7 th e Chief s of Staf f coul d meet formall y i n their ow n committee (know n a s the "Join t Staf f Com mittee" unti l Januar y 193 9 when , followin g the appointmen t o f on e o f its members, the Senio r Air Officer , a s Chief o f the Ai r Staff , i t acquire d its presen t titl e o f "Chief s o f Staf f Committee") . Bu t i t wa s no t unti l March 193 8 tha t a grou p o f sub-committee s and a secretariat , simila r to thos e functionin g i n th e Unite d Kingdo m unde r th e Committe e o f Imperial Defence , wer e create d unde r th e Defenc e Committe e o f th e Cabinet t o pla n fo r variou s defenc e measure s i n th e even t o f war . "The centra l organizatio n fo r th e coordinatio n o f defence, " th e officia l historian o f the Canadia n Army remarked , "wa s thu s graduall y improving."11 But th e operativ e wor d i s "gradually." Such pre-wa r preparatio n fo r defenc e a s ha d bee n accomplishe d b y September 193 9 ha d bee n du e almos t entirel y t o th e insisten t pressur e of th e militar y establishmen t upo n government s reluctan t t o commi t resources t o wha t they regarde d a s a steril e an d unnecessar y enterprise . Although th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e privatel y describe d th e condition o f th e Dominion' s defence s i n 193 6 a s "mos t astonishin g an d atrocious,"12 th e Governmen t o f Mackenzi e Kin g di d littl e t o improv e them. Politicians , takin g thei r cu e fro m publi c sentimen t a s politician s must, coul d perceiv e neithe r prestig e no r necessit y i n policie s designe d to defen d th e realm . For th e real m seeme d unassailable . Th e worl d was still wide . T o th e ocean s an d th e Roya l Nav y migh t no w b e adde d a s

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purveyor o f securit y th e grea t an d friendl y guardia n t o th e south . Canada wa s a "fire-proo f house , fa r fro m inflammabl e materials"; 13 its fortunat e inhabitants peere d disapprovingl y a t th e distan t conti nent fro m whic h invasio n seeme d s o improbable , an d rejoice d a t the mora l virtue s o f thei r Nort h America n civilization . "W e thin k i n terms o f peace, " th e Canadia n delegat e ha d informe d th e Leagu e o f Nations Assembl y i n 1924 , "whil e Europe , a n arme d camp, think s i n terms o f war."14 Canada an d the United States , Mackenzi e Kin g told th e same long-sufferin g bod y a fe w year s later , ha d cease d "t o rel y o n Force, w e have looke d t o Reaso n a s th e metho d o f solvin g ou r differ ences."15 Soldiers , whos e sens e o f dut y an d professiona l instinc t alik e impelled the m to bring the forces at their disposal to a peak o f efficienc y and strength , coul d hardl y accep t suc h assumptions . Thei r dut y wa s t o defend the realm ; and if thei r plannin g for a tim e disclose d a curiou s conception o f whom it was necessary t o defen d i t agains t (fo r a s late as 1926 "Defenc e Schem e No. 1 " fo r us e i n th e even t o f arme d attac k b y the Unite d State s wa s circulatin g unde r to p secre t classificatio n amon g Canadian militar y districts 16), thei r assumption s prove d i n th e even t t o be more relevant than those of their civilia n masters . The differin g perspective s i n whic h th e Canadia n Chief s o f Staff , o n the on e hand , an d th e member s o f th e Governmen t togethe r wit h ke y officials i n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , o n th e other , sa w th e worsening crises in Europe an d the Far Eas t produced a certain tensio n between th e tw o groups , simila r t o tha t prevailin g betwee n militar y and civilia n authoritie s i n nearl y al l th e democracie s durin g th e year s between th e wars. 17 Th e servic e chief s though t thei r politica l master s altogether to o optimisti c abou t th e prospect s fo r Canada' s remainin g outside a Europea n wa r and , i n th e even t o f th e Dominion' s involve ment, altogethe r to o crave n concernin g th e exten t o f it s participation . The Governmen t though t th e militar y undul y impresse d b y th e dange r of war , regardin g it s estimate s o f Canadia n defenc e need s a s bot h greatly inflate d an d politicall y unrealistic . I t wa s als o concerne d les t pre-war plannin g and militar y liaison wit h th e United Kingdo m plac e i n jeopardy Canada' s righ t to decid e th e natur e an d exten t o f participatio n in an y futur e war . A n illustratio n o f thi s concer n i s offere d b y th e decision o f th e Cabine t earl y i n 193 7 t o hav e th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence examin e wha t wer e know n a s th e "liaiso n letters " wit h a view t o determinin g whethe r th e practic e wa s harmfu l an d ough t t o be ended. Th e liaison letter s consisted o f correspondence betwee n senio r staff officer s o f th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e an d thei r counter parts i n th e Unite d Kingdom ; it date d fro m 1910 , bu t i t wa s o f cours e

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 7

5

the more recent correspondenc e i n which the Canadian Governmen t was interested. Th e Minister, Ian Mackenzie, duly went through th e material. In hi s repor t t o th e Cabine t h e concede d tha t muc h usefu l informatio n had bee n exchange d i n thi s way , bu t noted , wit h eviden t concern , a tendency o n the par t o f certain senio r Canadia n arm y officer s t o assum e that i n th e even t o f wa r a n expeditionar y forc e woul d b e despatche d from th e Dominion . H e though t tha t discussio n o f hig h polic y i n th e liaison letter s wa s a dangerou s practice , an d recommende d tha t an y correspondence betwee n th e Genera l Staff s i n Ottaw a an d Londo n pas s in futur e throug h th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , s o a s t o b e sub ject t o politica l surveillance . Thi s hencefort h becam e establishe d pro cedure, doubtles s to the irritation an d possibl y to the disadvantage of the officers concerned . THE SECON D WORL D WAR : THE PRINCIPL E O F CIVILIA N SUPREMACY

The outbrea k o f the Second World War naturall y increased th e influenc e of th e militar y establishmen t upo n nationa l policy , i f onl y becaus e th e military establishmen t wa s enlarge d twenty-fold . An d ye t th e distin guishing characteristi c o f civil-militar y relation s i n Canad a fro m 193 9 to 194 5 wa s th e exten t t o which , wit h on e threatene d exceptio n t o b e discussed below , th e civilia n authoritie s remaine d firml y i n contro l o f the country' s wa r effort . Canadia n experienc e i n thi s respec t differe d markedly fro m tha t o f th e Unite d State s where , accordin g t o on e authority, "s o fa r a s majo r decision s i n polic y an d strateg y wer e con cerned, th e military ran th e war." 18 The officia l historia n o f th e Canadia n Arm y i n th e Secon d Worl d War ha s remarke d tha t th e Prim e Ministe r "di d no t ofte n expres s a direct opinio n o n a purel y militar y question." 19 Bu t th e crucia l poin t i s that ther e wa s ver y littl e connecte d wit h th e Canadia n wa r effor t tha t Mackenzie Kin g wa s dispose d t o vie w a s " a purel y militar y question " and therefor e beyond th e rang e of his own knowledge an d judgment . I n part thi s was a reflectio n of his temperamen t and styl e of leadership — his fussin g ove r detail , hi s reluctanc e t o delegat e responsibility—bu t i n the mai n i t wa s becaus e ove r ever y major militar y decisio n o f th e war , particularly thos e decision s concernin g th e dispositio n o f troop s fo r battle, there loome d insistentl y and obsessivel y the questio n of conscrip tion. Mackenzi e King' s firs t majo r polic y statemen t o f th e wa r ha d

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been t o assur e Parliament an d the nation tha t "th e presen t Governmen t believe that conscriptio n o f men for oversea s servic e will not b e a necessary o r a n effectiv e step . N o suc h measur e wil l b e introduce d b y th e present Administration." 20 This wa s not a policy of which, all else bein g equal, commander s o f Canada' s arme d force s coul d i n thei r heart s approve; fiv e year s later , whe n i t seeme d t o presag e militar y disaster , they wer e t o us e drasti c mean s t o chang e it , i n th e even t successfully . But i n th e interva l th e commitmen t t o voluntar y enlistment conditione d every decisio n o f wartim e policy , leadin g th e Canadia n Governmen t to scrutiniz e th e politica l implication s o f militar y operation s mor e closely, perhaps, than any of the Allies . Unlike th e Unite d States , Canad a di d no t ente r th e wa r a s th e result o f treacherou s an d costl y attac k o n it s ow n territory , renderin g it ready to make any sacrifice neede d fo r revenge an d retribution . "I a m taking th e wor d o f th e Genera l Staff, " a membe r o f th e Unite d State s House o f Representative s ha d remarke d a t th e tim e o f Pear l Harbor . "If the y tel l m e thi s i s wha t the y nee d fo r th e successfu l prosecutio n of thi s war an d fo r ultimat e victory, I a m for it." 21 No suc h Ludendorf f philosophy wa s t o b e foun d i n th e Canadia n Hous e o f Commons i n September 1939 , or , fo r tha t matter , i n th e Canadia n Cabinet . A t it s meeting o f Septembe r 5 th e Cabine t Defenc e Committe e instructe d th e Chiefs o f Staff, abou t to prepare thei r estimate s fo r militar y expenditure , to hold them " to very moderate levels"; 22 when estimates to the amount of $50 0 millio n wer e accordingl y submitted , th e Cabine t promptl y cu t the su m in two , an d tol d th e Chief s to wor k t o th e reduce d figure . Th e appropriation o f $25 0 millio n wa s judge d sufficien t t o raise , equip , train an d despatc h t o th e Unite d Kingdo m a n arm y division , an d t o begin intensiv e ai r trainin g i n Canada . A star t o n thi s programm e having bee n made , th e Governmen t wa s dismaye d t o receiv e fro m th e United Kingdo m a proposa l tha t th e Dominio n shoul d becom e th e centre fo r trainin g Australian, Ne w Zealan d an d Britis h airme n a s well . "There was general regret, " Mackenzie Kin g wrote in hi s diary , "tha t it had no t been mad e a t the outse t s o that our wa r effor t woul d hav e bee n framed o n thes e line s instea d o f having to hea d s o strongl y int o expedi tionary forces at the start." But he was quick to perceive a related advan tage fo r th e longe r term : "Wit h concentratio n o f Canadia n energie s on ai r trainin g an d ai r powe r an d therefor e les s pressur e fo r a large r army, ther e woul d als o b e les s ris k o f agitatio n fo r conscription." 23 Accepted i n principl e b y th e Cabinet , th e Britis h Commonwealt h Ai r Training Plan , afte r long an d acrimoniou s negotiatio n wit h th e Britis h authorities, wa s t o mak e it s grea t contributio n t o Allie d victory ; th e

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original expectatio n o f th e Canadia n Governmen t tha t participatio n i n the pla n woul d suffice a s Canada's par t i n th e wa r effor t di d no t outlas t the en d of the "twiligh t war" b y man y weeks . By Februar y 194 0 som e 23,00 0 Canadia n troop s ha d bee n dis embarked in the Unite d Kingdom. The Commande r o f the 1s t Canadia n Division wa s Major Genera l A . G . L . McNaughton. Hi s nominatio n by the Prim e Ministe r wa s a n ac t o f th e highes t politica l importance , an d Mackenzie Kin g so regarded it. As a n office r wit h th e Canadia n Expeditionary Forc e durin g th e Firs t Worl d War , Genera l McNaughto n ha d been haunte d b y th e needles s slaughte r o f hi s troops ; a s presiden t o f the Nationa l Researc h Counci l h e ha d becom e convince d tha t scienc e and technology, presse d int o militar y service, coul d preven t a repetitio n of th e carnag e in an y futur e conflict . N o strategi c doctrin e coul d bette r suit th e requirement s o f a manpowe r policy base d o n voluntar y enlist ment, an d Mackenzi e King was immediately attracted b y th e suggestio n put forwar d b y Norma n Rogers , hi s Ministe r o f Labour , o n Septembe r 22, 1939 , tha t McNaughto n shoul d comman d th e firs t expeditionar y force o f the Second World War . In a n interview with the Prime Ministe r on Octobe r 6 , McNaughton expounded his views on how th e wa r ough t to be fought: th e main commitment should be "along the lines o f [indus trial] production , an d . . . every effort shoul d be made to arm and equip the troop s t o spar e human lives." Thi s conceptio n wa s wholly gratifyin g to Mackenzi e King , an d McNaughton' s comman d wa s announce d late r in th e day . "Ther e coul d b e n o question abou t McNaughto n bein g th e best equipped ma n for the purpose," Mackenzi e Kin g wrote in his diary . "I hav e don e m y best wit h m y colleague s t o remov e prejudic e whic h I know there ha s been agains t hi m on accoun t of his tendency to organiz e matters to the maximum with respect t o possible conflict . . . ,"24 Shortl y before proceedin g overseas , "Andy " McNaughto n wa s quote d i n a newspaper despatc h a s saying : "I f I a m know n fo r anythin g i t i s fo r the urgen t insistenc e o n usin g gun s rathe r tha n th e live s o f ou r troop s and for a proper co-ordinatio n o f all arms." 25 Under such a n officer , th e Prime Ministe r felt , th e proble m o f reinforcement s was unlikel y t o be come acute , an d th e pledg e no t t o conscrip t fo r oversea s servic e an d the unit y o f the natio n i n wartime could bot h b e maintained . The confidenc e repose d b y Mackenzi e Kin g i n hi s commande r di d not, however , go so far a s to allo w him complet e discretionar y authorit y to commit his soldiers to battle. This General McNaughton discovere d t o his chagri n when , face d wit h th e nee d fo r troop s t o forestal l enem y action i n Norway , th e Britis h Wa r Offic e turne d t o th e G.O.C . 1s t Canadian Divisio n o n Apri l 16 , 1940 . I n les s dir e circumstance s th e

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British Governmen t ought more properly to hav e communicated directly with th e Canadia n Governmen t i n suc h a matter , bu t i n vie w o f th e stress o f th e moment , th e nee d fo r secrecy , an d abov e al l th e nee d fo r speed, it s overtur e t o Genera l McNaughto n i s wholl y understandable . Having ascertaine d fro m Canadia n Militar y Headquarter s i n Londo n that i t la y within hi s legal competence , Genera l McNaughto n agree d t o commit Canadian force s t o the Norwegian theatre befor e consulting wit h Ottawa. Thirt y hour s elapse d betwee n thi s commitmen t an d th e receip t at th e Departmen t o f Nationa l Defenc e o f a telegra m fro m th e Cana dian commander stating that he had designate d som e thirteen hundre d of his men to proceed a s part of a British forc e to attack Trondheim . I n th e absence fro m th e countr y o f th e Prim e Minister , th e matte r wa s deal t with b y th e Actin g Prim e Ministe r an d Ministe r o f Finance , Colone l J. L . Ralston. On the evenin g o f April 17 , he, th e Postmaste r Genera l (Mr. C . G . Power ) an d th e Chie f o f th e Genera l Staf f considere d McNaughton's message . The y agree d tha t ther e wa s n o alternativ e t o approval o f Canadian participation , bu t strongl y objected t o the manne r in whic h th e decisio n t o commi t troops ha d bee n taken . O n Ralston' s instructions a telegra m wa s sen t ("durin g m y absence, " Mackenzi e King later minuted , "withou t knowledg e o r authority" 26) approvin g th e expedition bu t observin g "tha t suc h a commitmen t shoul d no t hav e been entered withou t prior referenc e t o Nationa l Defenc e an d approva l of Canadia n Government." 27 A mor e detaile d observatio n wa s sen t t o the Hig h Commissione r in London: We woul d hav e expecte d tha t Canadia n Governmen t woul d hav e bee n informed b y Unite d Kingdo m Governmen t immediatel y participatio n re ferred t o wa s required . . . . W e fee l tha t whe n consultatio n commence d intimation shoul d hav e a t onc e bee n give n b y yoursel f o r G.O.C . t o affor d Canadian Governmen t reasonabl e opportunit y pas s o n a dispositio n o f suc h importance t o Canadia n peopl e a s diversio n o f a portio n personne l o f present formatio n t o a specia l Missio n o f thi s kin d whic h i s a radica l departure pre-considere d polic y an d plan. 28

When, late r i n the sam e year, i t wa s rumoured tha t ther e wa s a pro posal t o sen d Canadia n troops fro m th e Unite d Kingdo m t o figh t th e Italians i n Nort h Afric a s o a s t o gai n battl e experience , th e matte r was referre d t o th e Canadia n Government . Th e Prim e Minister wa s much oppose d t o th e idea . " I strongl y state d m y vie w [t o th e Wa r Committee of the Cabinet], " Mackenzi e King' s diar y for Decembe r 4, 1940, read s in part , that w e owed i t to ou r men to see k t o protec t thei r lives . . .. I though t th e logical thin g wa s t o hav e Canadian s continu e t o defen d Britai n . . . an d not t o begi n t o pla y th e rol e o f thos e wh o wan t Empir e war . Clearly , th e Army peopl e wis h this , an d Power , I a m afraid , ha s com e aroun d t o thei r

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point o f view an d ha s rather sanctione d i t wit h them . . . . [I ] insiste d o n a message bein g sen t t o Ralsto n tha t n o fina l dispositio n o f troop s wa s t o b e made unti l ou r Wa r Committe e ha d ha d a chanc e o f gettin g bot h sides . Also lettin g hi m know , a s matter s stood , w e wer e oppose d t o ou r peopl e being sent to the Suez. . . ,29

It wa s later known that ther e ha d bee n n o intentio n o f sending them. In th e sprin g o f 1941 , the Ministe r o f National Defenc e stated i n th e House o f Common s tha t th e decisio n t o commi t troop s outsid e th e United Kingdo m wa s a decisio n t o b e take n b y th e Governmen t o f Canada, not by the General Office r Commanding . General McNaughton , who had fel t keenl y the implied rebuke in the cable s from Ottaw a abou t the Norwegia n operatio n th e previou s April , too k n o mor e kindl y t o this statement , an d whe n th e Prim e Ministe r visite d Englan d i n th e summer of 194 1 used the occasion to raise wit h him the whole question of hi s authorit y to dispos e o f the troop s unde r hi s command. "Questio n of restrictio n o n us e o f troops, " hi s memorandu m of thei r conversatio n reads. "Ralston' s statemen t i n Common s whic h w e fel t ha d tie d ou r hands. His attitude in the Norway affair. . . . Warning that I woul d not accept censure , an d tha t h e shoul d b e ver y certai n tha t h e wa s righ t before h e gav e it." 30 Th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabine t discusse d th e matter o n Septembe r 10 , an d i t wa s there remarke d tha t "whil e troop s could not be sent out of the United Kingdom on the sole authority of th e Corps Commande r unde r th e la w a s i t stood , i t migh t b e desirabl e t o extend hi s authorit y t o includ e operations based o n th e Britis h Isles." 31 In October , th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e ha d furthe r discussion s in Englan d wit h Genera l McNaughton , resultin g i n Ralston' s cablin g Ottawa tha t i t wa s desirabl e t o wide n th e discretionar y authorit y o f the Corp s commande r (a s McNaughto n ha d b y thi s tim e become ) "t o cover futur e minor projects o f ... temporar y nature. . . . Extreme nee d secrecy argue s agains t prio r submissio n eac h cas e o f suc h plan s t o Governmental authority . Recommen d Wa r Committe e o f Cabine t no w forward McNaughto n genera l authorit y t o ac t i n suc h case s subjec t to hi s ow n judgment. He wil l notif y Ministe r b y mos t secre t mean s i n general term s prio r t o even t wher e practicabl e [italic s added]." 32 To thi s procedure th e Wa r Committe e agree d o n Octobe r 29 , 1941 . But th e first occasion fo r th e exercis e o f the ne w authorit y of the Corp s commander was the projecte d raid o n Dieppe, a n operatio n eve n in th e planning stage not properly described as a "minor project." Accordingly , when Genera l Montgomer y first broached th e proposa l t o hi m o n Apri l 30, 1942 , Genera l McNaughto n though t i t wis e t o consul t wit h th e Canadian Government . "Plan s ar e now being made," he cabled , "whic h involve operation s o f typ e indicate d bu t o n a scal e whic h canno t

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properly b e classe d a s 'minor', " an d requeste d tha t th e wor d "minor " be delete d from th e phras e "minor project s of a temporary nature " then setting th e limi t beyon d whic h hi s discretio n wa s no t t o b e exercised . The Wa r Committe e considere d thi s reques t o n Ma y 1 , an d agree d t o authorize Genera l McNaughto n t o procee d wit h th e Diepp e operatio n on th e understandin g that bot h h e an d th e Unite d Kingdo m authoritie s approved o f th e plan . McNaughton' s affirmativ e decisio n wa s relaye d to th e Governmen t on Ma y 15 , an d th e destin y of th e ill-fate d venture was sealed. 33 The fir m contro l exercise d b y th e Canadia n Governmen t ove r th e commitment o f it s troop s t o militar y operation s ma y b e illustrate d further b y th e procedure s followe d prio r t o th e dispositio n o f force s to th e Fa r East , th e Mediterranean , th e Northeas t Pacifi c an d North west European theatres of war. The reques t fo r "on e o r tw o Canadia n battalion s fro m Canada " t o reinforce th e Britis h garriso n i n Hon g Kon g wa s telegraphe d t o th e Canadian Government by the Dominions Office o n September 19 , 1941 , following approva l o f th e overtur e b y th e Britis h Prim e Ministe r wh o had i n turn accepted the advic e of his Chief s of Staff . Th e proposa l wa s considered b y the Wa r Committe e of the Canadia n Cabine t o n Septem ber 23, but decision was deferred pending consultation wit h the Ministe r of Nationa l Defence (then absent in the United States) an d examination by the Canadia n General Staff . "O n 2 Octobe r th e Ministe r o f National Defence reporte d t o th e Cabine t Wa r Committee that the Unite d King dom Government' s suggestio n had bee n referre d to hi m an d approved , after examinatio n by th e Genera l Staff . Th e Committe e confirme d th e approval fo r th e dispatc h o f th e tw o battalions , notin g tha t th e actua l units woul d b e selecte d b y th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e i n consul tation wit h th e Genera l Staff." 34 (Th e lac k o f adequat e intelligenc e facilities leading to this disastrous decisio n is noted below , in chapter V.) The commitmen t of Canadian troop s t o th e campaig n i n Ital y wa s a more complicate d decision , fo r certai n difference s o f opinio n appeare d between th e Governmen t an d th e arm y command . Th e forme r wa s b y the summe r o f 194 2 becomin g increasingl y responsiv e t o publi c pres sure favouring a more active military role fo r Canadian troops overseas . Two ver y differen t motive s mus t b e distinguished . Th e argumen t tha t at least som e Canadian forces ough t to have large-scale battle experienc e before exposur e o f th e whol e Arm y t o th e ordeal s o f th e projecte d bu t frequently postpone d cross-channe l invasio n wa s a militar y argument , and on the face of it sound. But there was also a political argumen t to th e effect tha t continue d inactivit y o f Canadia n troop s wa s damagin g t o

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the prestig e o f th e Dominio n an d migh t adversel y affec t it s influenc e o n the shapin g of post-war policy . Th e Government , while appreciating th e first, di d no t overloo k th e second . Whe n th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence me t wit h the Britis h Prim e Ministe r i n the Unite d Kingdo m i n October 1942 , Ralsto n sought to impress Mr. Churchill wit h the urgency of it s reques t tha t Canadia n soldier s b e use d i n battl e a t th e earlies t opportunity. Month s o f inactivit y passed . I n Marc h 194 3 th e Canadia n Prime Ministe r cable d t o Mr . Churchil l t o expres s hi s Government' s regret a t th e decisio n no t t o emplo y Canadia n troop s i n th e comin g Mediterranean campaign , an d urge d it s "earnes t re-examination." 35 Bu t the Canadia n commander , anxiou s to preserv e hi s Arm y intact , viewed with displeasur e an y project tha t threatened t o divid e it, an d shared no t a bi t hi s Government' s concer n wit h th e politica l implication s o f th e decision. " I d o no t recommen d tha t w e shoul d pres s fo r employmen t merely t o satisf y a desir e fo r activit y o r fo r representatio n i n particula r theatres," Genera l McNaughto n signalle d o n Marc h 20 . Thi s recom mendation th e Governmen t fel t oblige d t o disregard . Stron g diplomati c pressure wa s brough t t o bea r upo n Mr . Ede n an d Mr . Churchill , resulting i n a directiv e fro m th e latte r t o th e Chie f o f th e Imperia l Staff t o includ e th e Canadian s i n hi s next operation . This prove d t o b e th e Sicilia n campaign . Genera l McNaughton , acquiescing i n th e diversio n o f hi s forces , Insiste d o n hi s righ t t o pas s upon th e feasibilit y o f th e operatio n fro m a militar y standpoint ; afte r three intensiv e day s o f stud y an d consultatio n h e reporte d t o Ottaw a that h e regarde d Operatio n Husk y a s " a practica l operatio n o f war." On receivin g thi s assurance , th e Canadia n Governmen t authorize d th e participation o f th e 1s t Canadia n Division , whic h embarke d a t th e end o f June , an d lande d o n th e beache s o f souther n Sicil y on Jul y 10 . The Allie d conquest wa s achieved in thirty-eight days . In th e urgency of th e nee d t o follo w u p th e successe s i n Sicil y wit h a strik e acros s th e Straits o f Messina t o th e Italia n mainland , th e precis e rol e o f the Cana dian force s ha d bee n neglected . Woul d they , havin g gaine d battl e experience i n th e campaig n jus t concluded , b e returne d t o th e Unite d Kingdom t o reunit e th e Arm y an d shar e wit h those wh o ha d remaine d the lesson s learne d i n combat ? O r woul d th e 1s t Divisio n pres s o n t o Italy, an d perhap s b e joine d ther e b y mor e Canadia n force s fro m th e United Kingdom ? Aske d o n Jul y 2 9 fo r hi s recommendatio n t o th e War Committee , Genera l McNaughto n state d t o th e Ministe r o f National Defenc e that "the importan t thin g for Canada a t the en d of the war wa s to hav e he r Arm y togethe r unde r th e contro l o f a Canadian, " and tha t h e "was oppose d t o the dispersion o f the Canadian Army . . . .

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If th e Canadia n Governmen t decide d upo n dispersion , the n . . . i t would b e wis e t o pu t someon e i n contro l wh o believe d i n it." 36 Thi s development wa s not , indeed , fa r off . The Wa r Committe e favoure d increased Canadia n participatio n i n th e Italia n campaign . O n Augus t 16 Mackenzi e Kin g discusse d th e matte r wit h Mr . Churchil l a t th e Quebec Conference . The Britis h Prim e Ministe r tol d hi m that th e questio n ha d bee n raise d b y McNaughton , I gathered , a s to whethe r our me n goin g to Ital y wa s to b e regarde d a s part o f th e on e operation . H e asked m e i f I coul d sa y that i t was. I tol d hi m I ha d alway s understoo d tha t Sicily wa s simpl y a ste p t o invadin g Italy , an d t o th e invasio n o f Europ e from th e South . I would , however , lik e t o confe r wit h th e Ministe r o f Defence befor e givin g a definit e word. H e sai d t o m e the y ma y b e landin g there a t an y moment . The y ar e probabl y alread y almos t there . I sai d I would hav e th e matte r checke d up , bu t I fel t quit e sure tha t th e Govern ment ha d alway s regarde d th e whol e operatio n a s one . Apparentl y McNaughton ha s questione d this. 37

Mackenzie Kin g consulte d Ralston , wh o informe d hi m tha t afte r examining th e recor d h e wa s satisfie d tha t Canadia n troop s ha d bee n committed fo r th e Italia n a s wel l a s fo r th e Sicilia n campaign. Genera l McNaughton wa s advise d o f thi s interpretation . O n Octobe r 12 , 1943 , the Wa r Committe e formall y endorse d Operatio n Timberwolf, involvin g the build-u p o f th e 1s t Divisio n t o corp s strengt h b y divertin g t o Ital y troops fro m th e Unite d Kingdom . This endorsatio n wa s no t withou t it s effect i n bringin g about, befor e th e year' s end , Genera l McNaughton' s relinquishment of his command. The decisio n t o us e Canadia n troop s i n th e campaig n t o expe l Japanese forces from the Aleutian Islands in the Northeast Pacific was one in which the militar y played a n importan t an d wha t th e Prim e Ministe r regarded a s an improper part . Th e matte r wa s first raised whe n Genera l John L . DeWitt , Commandin g Genera l o f th e Unite d State s Wester n Defence Comman d (includin g th e Alask a Defenc e Command) , visite d Major Genera l G . R . Pearkes , th e Canadia n G.O.C . Pacifi c Command , at Vancouve r o n Apri l 19 , 1943 . Th e tw o officer s discusse d th e possi bility o f a combine d Canadian-America n assaul t upo n th e Japanes e garrison o n Kiska ; General Pearkes ' repor t o f thi s discussion , however, made n o mentio n o f proposed Canadia n participation. 38 O n Ma y 8 , th e chairman o f th e Canadia n Join t Staf f Missio n i n Washington , Majo r General Maurice Pope (wh o also was a member of the Canadian sectio n of th e Permanen t Join t Boar d o n Defenc e an d acte d a s th e Wa r Com mittee's representativ e t o th e Combine d Chief s o f Staff) , discusse d th e project wit h th e Secretar y o f th e Unite d State s sectio n o f th e P.J.B.D. , Mr. J . D . Hickerson o f the Stat e Department :

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Hickerson . . . sai d h e propose d tellin g m e o f somethin g tha t ha d bee n o n his min d fo r som e time . I n doin g so , however , h e wishe d m e t o under stand tha t h e ha d n o knowledg e whateve r o f th e plan s o f th e U.S . Join t Chiefs o f Staff . I t wa s obvious , however , tha t soone r o r late r th e genera l position woul d b e suc h a s to enabl e the m t o moun t a n operatio n t o driv e th e Japanese ou t o f Kisk a an d Attu . Whe n tha t tim e came , Canadia n troops , i n his view , shoul d participate . . . . H e ha d n o ide a o f th e force s tha t woul d be involve d an d fro m hi s ow n poin t o f vie w a mer e toke n forc e woul d b e adequate. I n an y even t h e propose d t o tak e suc h actio n a s wa s i n hi s powe r to se e that a n invitatio n b e extende d t o th e Canadia n authorities. 39

General Pop e observe d tha t "shoul d th e ide a commen d itsel f t o th e Canadian Government , i t woul d appea r t o b e mor e appropriat e fo r u s to intimat e t o th e U.S . Join t Chief s o f Staf f tha t w e wer e desirou s o f associating ourselve s in suc h a project rathe r tha n t o si t quietly awaiting an invitatio n t o d o so." 40 This conversatio n Genera l Pop e dul y reporte d t o th e Chie f o f th e General Staf f i n Ottawa , Lieutenant-Genera l K . Stuart , an d o n Ma y 1 2 General Stuar t authorize d Genera l Pop e t o rais e th e matte r wit h th e Chief o f Staf f o f th e Unite d State s Army , Genera l Georg e C . Marshall . But thi s authorizatio n ha d bee n give n withou t previou s consultatio n with th e Canadia n Government . "I n Stuart' s message, " Genera l Pop e recalled afterwards , there wa s a phras e whic h ra n generall y "tha t h e ha d no t ye t consulte d th e Minister i n thi s respect" . I n th e ligh t o f thi s governin g phrase , th e "heresy " of hi s instructions struck in my min d wit h the clarit y o f th e clic k o f a pebbl e thrown agains t a rock . . . . For , mor e or les s in the word s of an Externa l Affairs telegra m tha t onc e cam e t o m y notice , "th e righ t t o dispos e o f it s fighting forces i s one tha t th e Governmen t especiall y reserve s t o itself". 41

Despite hi s misgivings about how the matter was being handled, Genera l Pope calle d o n Genera l Marshall . "Whil e h e undertoo k n o commitmen t of an y kind , [Marshall's ] manne r seeme d t o indicat e agreemen t i n principle" t o Canadian participatio n i n the Kiska operation; o n May 24 , General Pop e wa s informe d by Marshal l tha t th e Unite d State s officer s commanding in Alask a wer e "delighte d a t th e prospec t o f havin g units of th e Canadia n force s associate d wit h . . . presen t an d futur e opera tions i n th e Aleutia n area. " Marshal l ha d authorize d th e America n commander, Genera l DeWitt , t o confe r immediatel y wit h Genera l Pearkes t o wor k ou t arrangements. 42 It wa s only afte r thi s conference betwee n the Canadia n an d American commanders ha d take n plac e tha t th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabine t learned, a t it s meetin g o n Ma y 26 , o f an y plan s t o emplo y Canadia n troops i n the Alaskan theatre. "Personally, " Mackenzie Kin g commented

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after th e meeting , " I thin k th e Ministe r o f Defenc e shoul d hav e bee n the on e t o b e taking , i f anythin g o f th e kin d wer e contemplated , th e initial ste p i n discussio n wit h the Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabinet, " an d the edito r o f hi s diar y remark s tha t hi s "initia l irritation tha t thi s Canadian participatio n i n th e expeditio n ha d bee n suggeste d t o th e Americans b y th e militar y authoritie s coloure d hi s whol e subsequen t attitude t o th e Kisk a expedition." 43 A t th e Wa r Committe e meetin g the next day (Ma y 27), Mackenzi e King objected strongl y t o ou r Chief s of Staf f an d other s o f th e Hig h Comman d i n Canada negotiatin g wit h correspondin g number s i n th e U.S . befor e th e Minister ha d a ful l knowledg e o f wha t wa s proposed , th e Wa r Committe e included, and , mos t o f all , mysel f a s th e Prim e Minister . I t wa s full y apparent tha t Stuar t ha d gon e ahea d wit h hi s ow n officer s an d Pearkes , o n the Pacifi c Coast , an d tha t he , Pearkes , ha d gon e furthe r wit h hi s corres ponding numbe r in the States , in agreein g to a course of actio n whic h woul d involve ou r troop s bein g engage d activel y wit h U.S . troop s agains t th e Aleutian Islands . I di d no t objec t t o th e projec t a s such , bu t pointe d ou t that th e procedur e wa s entirel y wrong ; tha t th e Governmen t woul d b e i n an indefensibl e positio n i f i t wer e allowe d t o g o furthe r withou t bein g wholly regularized . . . . It wa s finally agreed tha t th e communication woul d have t o com e fro m eithe r th e Presiden t t o myself , o r Stimso n t o Ralston , to ge t matter s o n Ministeria l leve l an d ou t simpl y o f th e militar y level ; indeed thi s whol e thin g ha s worke d fro m th e botto m u p instea d o f fro m the top down. . . ,44

Neither th e Prim e Ministe r no r th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e were mollified b y th e news , reaching them o n Ma y 28 , tha t Canadia n force s were actuall y e n route t o Attu . Eve n thoug h i t develope d tha t th e forces concerne d consiste d onl y o f eigh t officer s proceedin g t o th e Aleutians a s observers , th e Prim e Ministe r continue d t o fee l "incense d that ou r force s shoul d hav e bee n draw n int o thi s business , withou t knowledge o n th e par t o f o r reques t fro m th e Join t Chief s o f Staf f a t Washington. I would have insisted on a cancellation of the whol e thing, were it not that . .. to have cut it off would have raised a serious situation r e relatio n t o U.S . an d Canadia n armie s o n th e Pacific , an d probably involv e Stuart's resignation." 45 Mackenzie King' s instruction s that an y proposa l t o associat e Cana dian force s wit h a n America n expedition agains t Kisk a woul d hav e t o come fro m eithe r th e Presiden t o r th e Secretar y o f Wa r wer e easie r t o issue tha n t o implement . Th e tas k fel l t o Genera l Pop e i n Washington , and h e ha s recorde d tha t h e learne d o f hi s assignmen t "wit h mixe d feelings," an d advise d General Stuar t "tha t th e U.S . Arm y might prov e tough t o mov e in this matter." When Genera l Pop e informe d his frien d and colleagu e o n th e P.J.B.D. , Mr . J . D . Hickerson , "tha t Canad a

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wanted a Stimso n t o Ralsto n invitatio n t o collaborate , h e laughingl y told m e t o forge t whateve r Calvinisti c tendencie s ther e migh t b e i n my syste m an d no t t o se t ou t i n a n attemp t t o refor m U.S . Arm y pro cedure." Th e Unite d State s Deput y Chie f o f Staff , visite d b y Genera l Pope a t th e Pentago n i n th e absenc e o f Genera l Marshall , wa s a t firs t hostile t o th e reques t bu t eventuall y agree d wit h anothe r America n officer presen t tha t ther e wa s "n o reaso n wh y Mr. Stimso n shoul d no t address a genera l invitatio n t o Mr . Ralsto n provide d al l detail s wer e settled throug h th e militar y channel" ; h e als o tol d Genera l Pop e tha t "he di d no t wan t thi s approac h t o Canad a t o g o anywher e nea r th e State Department." 46 Th e episod e illuminate s th e differin g conception s of civil-militar y relation s prevailin g durin g th e Secon d Worl d Wa r a t Ottawa an d a t Washington . The desire d lette r fro m Secretar y Stimso n wa s dul y despatched , an d after considerin g i t o n Ma y 31 , th e Wa r Committee approve d i n prin ciple th e participatio n o f a brigad e grou p i n th e Kisk a campaign . I t instructed th e Canadia n commande r tha t "th e operationa l contro l exer cized b y th e Unite d State s Commande r shal l b e observe d i n lette r an d spirit as fully a s if he were a Canadian officer, " bu t als o empowere d hi m to withdra w hi s troops a t hi s discretio n an d t o resor t directl y t o th e Canadian Government . I t wa s onl y a t th e ver y las t moment , th e da y before th e invadin g forc e se t ou t fro m th e American-hel d islan d o f Adak, tha t th e Wa r Committee , havin g jus t receive d a n appreciatio n from it s militar y adviser , th e Vice-Chie f o f th e Genera l Staff , tha t th e proposed expeditio n represente d i n hi s vie w " a practica l operatio n o f war," finall y authorize d th e Canadia n force s t o proceed. 47 On landin g a t Kisk a on Augus t 15 , th e invader s foun d n o Japanes e whatever i n occupation , an d succeede d onl y i n inflictin g a fe w casual ties upo n thei r ow n side . Thirty-fou r thousan d me n ha d attacke d a n empty island . Bu t i f i n th e ligh t o f thi s anti-clima x th e cautio n o f th e Canadian Governmen t appear s excessive , i t wa s no t withou t reason . It wa s determined no t t o repea t th e disaste r a t Hon g Kong; an d a large number of the fou r thousan d Canadian s takin g par t wer e conscripte d men. The Canadia n Governmen t wa s particularl y anxiou s tha t th e pro cedure whereb y th e Canadia n commande r submitte d directl y t o i t his independen t appreciatio n o f an y operatio n i n whic h th e us e o f Canadian troop s wa s proposed , s o a s t o allo w th e Wa r Committe e t o approve o r rejec t participatio n a s i t sa w fit , shoul d b e followe d i n th e plans fo r th e cross-channe l invasio n definitely projecte d fo r th e summe r of 1944 . O n Februar y 2 1 o f that yea r th e Ministe r o f National Defenc e

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cabled a reques t fo r suc h a n appreciatio n t o Canadia n Militar y Headquarters i n London. "Th e reaso n fo r it, " h e explained , "is th e necessit y for bein g i n a positio n t o assur e Canadia n home s tha t Canadia n staf f and commanders are assured of timely opportunity to get all the informa tion the y nee d s o a s t o b e i n a positio n t o exercis e thei r judgmen t fo r the benefi t o f th e Canadia n troop s fo r who m the y ar e responsibl e t o Canada."48 Genera l McNaughton' s successo r a s commande r o f th e 1s t Canadian Army , t o who m this request wa s referred, was o f the opinio n that th e Canadia n Government' s assen t t o th e forthcomin g operatio n was implici t i n it s decisio n i n Januar y 194 4 t o plac e th e 1s t Canadia n Army "i n combinatio n with " th e 21s t Arm y Group , th e Allie d invasio n force le d b y Genera l Montgomery . Thi s vie w th e Wa r Committe e de clined t o accept . "Th e Canadia n Government, " Ralsto n wrot e t o General H. D. G. Crerar on April 27, "has responsibilitie s to the people of Canad a an d befor e troops ar e embarke d o n th e propose d operatio n the Canadia n Governmen t woul d expec t a repor t b y th e Arm y Com mander advisin g whether or no t h e is satisfied tha t the task s allotte d ar e feasible operation s o f wa r an d whethe r in hi s opinio n th e plan s formu lated fo r Canadia n formations with the resource s which are t o b e mad e available ca n be carrie d ou t wit h reasonabl e prospect s o f success . . . . This i s wholly a matte r betwee n th e Arm y Commande r an d th e Cana dian Government." 49 Genera l Crera r accordingl y expresse d hi s satisfac tion wit h the battl e plans assigne d to th e Canadia n forces . O n Ma y 2 4 a directiv e approve d b y th e Wa r Committe e wa s despatche d t o th e Commander o f th e 1s t Canadia n Army . Thre e o f it s provision s ar e o f particular interest : 8. Yo u an d th e Com d o f an y Canadia n forc e no t operatin g unde r you r command . . . continu e t o enjo y th e righ t t o refe r t o th e Governmen t o f Canada i n respec t t o an y matte r i n whic h th e sai d Canadia n Force s are , or ar e likel y t o be , involve d o r committe d o r i n respec t o f an y questio n o f their administration . . . . 9. I n decidin g whether t o exercise th e authorit y t o withdraw th e Canadia n Force [fro m th e 21s t Arm y Group ] . . . yo u wil l conside r al l th e circum stances including , bu t no t i n any way to b e restricted to , th e following : (a) Whethe r i n you r opinio n th e order s an d instruction s issue d t o yo u by th e Commande r Combine d Force s represen t i n th e circumstance s a tas k for th e Canadia n Force s whic h i s a practicabl e operatio n o f war ; (b) Whethe r i n you r opinio n suc h tas k wit h th e resource s availabl e i s capable o f bein g carrie d ou t wit h reasonabl e prospect s o f success ; (c) Whethe r i n you r opinio n suc h orders , instruction s o r tas k ar e a t variance wit h th e polic y o f th e Canadia n Government ; (d) You r appraisa l o f th e exten t o f prospectiv e losse s t o th e Canadia n Force i n relatio n t o th e importanc e o f th e result s prospectivel y t o b e achieved;

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(e) Th e effec t o f suc h withdrawa l i n preventin g th e succes s o f th e opera tion as a whole; (/) Al l othe r factor s whic h yo u may conside r relevant . Th e authorit y t o withdraw shoul d normall y b e exercise d b y yo u onl y afte r referenc e t o th e Canadian Government , but , wher e th e exigencie s o f th e momen t d o no t permit suc h a reference , yo u have , i n decidin g whethe r o r no t t o exercis e this authority , ful l discretio n t o tak e suc h actio n a s yo u conside r advis able. . . . 13. Yo u wil l kee p th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e constantl y in 0 formed 5

It di d no t prov e necessar y i n th e even t t o exercis e eithe r th e righ t o f reference o r th e righ t o f withdrawal ; but th e Canadia n Government' s insistence o n thei r explici t formulatio n an d acceptanc e b y th e Britis h military authoritie s a t this critica l junctur e of th e wa r i s evidenc e of th e extent to which political consideration s were constantly kep t t o th e fore . The machiner y fo r th e politica l directio n o f militar y affair s wit h which Canad a entere d th e Secon d Worl d Wa r wa s the resul t o f legisla tion datin g fro m 192 2 fo r which , a s w e hav e seen , th e inspiratio n ha d been mor e tha t o f econom y tha n o f efficiency . Th e centralizatio n o f authority unde r a singl e Ministe r o f National Defenc e responsibl e fo r all thre e servic e arm s quickl y prove d unde r th e pressure s o f wa r to o great t o be borne b y any one man, especiall y afte r th e comple x arrange ments involve d i n th e Britis h Commonwealt h Ai r Trainin g Pla n wer e added t o th e load . O n Marc h 30 , 1940 , Mackenzi e Kin g urge d hi s Minister o f Nationa l Defence , Norma n Rogers , t o conside r devolvin g some o f hi s duties . " I favoure d keepin g th e thre e branche s o f th e Defence Departmen t unde r on e Minister, " Mackenzi e Kin g recorde d i n his diary , "bu t matter s woul d hav e t o b e s o arrange d a s to reliev e hi m [Rogers] o f al l detai l r e ai r development. " H e aske d Roger s whethe r he fel t tha t Mr . C . G . Power , the n Postmaste r General , woul d wor k well wit h him . (Mr . Powe r ha d bee n Mackenzi e King' s firs t choic e a s Minister fo r Nationa l Defenc e a t th e outse t o f th e war , but wa s passe d over i n favou r o f Rogers whe n Power himsel f pointe d ou t tha t i t migh t be unwis e to hav e the Ministe r o f National Defenc e fro m Quebe c sinc e this woul d b e sur e t o rais e th e conscriptio n issu e righ t away. ) Roger s suggested tha t Mr . Powe r "shoul d b e mad e a n Assistan t Ministe r o f Defence, t o handl e th e ai r wor k an d t o b e abl e t o answe r question s i n Parliament."51 Hi s suggestio n wa s adopte d i n a slightl y differen t form ; on May 2 2 roya l assen t wa s given to a n amendmen t o f th e Departmen t of Nationa l Defenc e Ac t (1922 ) providin g fo r th e appointmen t o f a Minister o f Nationa l Defenc e fo r Air . Mr . Powe r assume d th e ne w portfolio o n th e followin g day .

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On Jun e 10 , 1940 , th e Ministe r of National Defence was killed i n a n air crash. Rogers ' successo r wa s J. L . Ralston , an d it was Ralston wh o suggested tha t Mr . Powe r combin e his portfolio of Minister o f Nationa l Defence fo r Ai r wit h a ne w portfolio , tha t o f Associat e Ministe r o f National Defence . This pos t wa s created b y a further amendmen t to th e Department o f Nationa l Defenc e Ac t (1922 ) o n Jul y 12 , an d Mr . Power wa s assigne d to it , retainin g his othe r portfolio . Th e amendmen t specified tha t th e Associat e Ministe r wa s "entitle d t o exercis e al l th e powers o f th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence. " A t th e sam e tim e th e post o f Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e fo r Nava l Service s wa s created , and assume d by Mr . Angu s L . Macdonald . A furthe r provisio n o f th e amendment wa s tha t i n th e absenc e o f on e o f th e servic e minister s his power s wer e t o b e exercise d b y another : "i f th e Ministe r o f National Defenc e an d Associat e Ministe r wer e absent , th e Nava l Minister woul d administe r th e whol e Department , an d i f h e to o was absen t thi s authorit y passe d t o th e Ai r Minister . Thu s th e minis ters becam e familia r wit h thei r colleagues ' function s an d duties , wit h resultant advantage s t o th e publi c service." 52 I t i s eviden t tha t th e system could work well only if the individuals concerned wer e personall y on th e bes t o f terms , an d o n thi s poin t on e o f them , Mr . Power , has sinc e written : "Th e thre e wer e boun d togethe r b y tie s o f intimat e friendship. . . . Macdonal d an d Power . . . had suc h admiratio n an d respect fo r Col . Ralsto n tha t the y had n o difficult y whatsoeve r in grant ing hi m th e primac y ove r both , an d b y consen t i f no t b y la w h e wa s looked upo n b y al l as the senio r Minister." 53 This highl y effective tea m remained intac t unti l Novembe r 1944 , whe n Ralsto n an d Powe r re signed, fo r opposit e reasons , ove r conscription . Co-ordination o f th e arme d service s o n matter s o f hig h polic y wa s the functio n o f the Wa r Committe e o f the Cabinet . Wher e service issue s were mainly concerned, the instrument of co-ordination wa s the Defenc e Council which, as re-organized o n September 13 , 1940 , consiste d o f th e Minister o f Nationa l Defenc e (chairman) , th e Associat e Ministe r an d the Ministers fo r Naval Services and Air (vice-chairmen) , an d the thre e Chiefs o f Staf f an d th e deput y ministers fo r th e thre e services . Accord ing to th e officia l historia n o f the Canadia n Arm y i n the Secon d Worl d War, thi s institutio n "wa s a n effectiv e orga n o f interservic e coordina tion."54 Additional apparatu s fo r strategi c plannin g an d co-ordinatio n wa s provided afte r it s creatio n i n Augus t 194 0 b y th e Permanen t Join t Board o n Defence . Although i t wa s confine d t o tenderin g advic e t o th e Canadian an d Unite d State s government s on defenc e problem s pertain -

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ing t o th e Nort h America n continent, * al l bu t tw o o r thre e o f it s thirty-three wartim e recommendations , man y o f crucia l significance , were accepted . Th e Canadia n section, like the American, was composed of fou r servic e personnel an d tw o civilians , bu t i t woul d be misleadin g to suppos e tha t th e large r servic e representatio n le d t o greate r servic e influence. On e o f the tw o civilians in eac h sectio n acte d a s its chairman —the Canadian , O . M . Biggar , the American , th e redoubtabl e Fiorell o LaGuardia; th e other , a senio r foreig n servic e office r enjoyin g th e confidence o f his government , acted a s secretary—th e Canadian , H . L . Keenleyside o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , th e American , J. D . Hickerso n of the Departmen t of State. Th e Wa r Committe e o f th e Canadian Cabine t decide d o n Jun e 5 , 1943 , t o allo w th e chairma n of the Canadia n sectio n t o appea r a t it s meeting s whe n th e Committe e thought his attendance desirable, an d this procedure furthe r strengthene d civilian influence o n the Board. During the early period o f its history, th e wartime secretar y o f th e Canadia n sectio n ha s recalled , ther e wa s a certain tensio n o n th e Board , no t (a s migh t b e expected ) betwee n th e two nationa l sections , bu t betwee n th e militar y member s o f bot h sec tions, o n the on e hand, an d the civilia n members, o n th e other . "Ther e was a noticeabl e tendenc y amon g th e servic e member s t o loo k o n th e civilians a s ignoran t o f militar y affair s and , i n consequence , a s some thing of a burden to the Board. The civilians for their par t fel t tha t some of the service representatives were handicapped by a too stric t adherenc e to conventiona l servic e procedure s an d t o traditiona l line s o f thought . . . . Thes e mutua l hesitation s an d reservations amon g the member s of the Board rapidl y disappeared." 55 More difficul t problem s o f political-military relation s wer e created b y dispersal o f the variou s authorities concerne d wit h th e Canadia n Army . No fewe r tha n thre e separate d centre s o f comman d wer e involved : National Defenc e Headquarter s i n Ottawa ; th e Canadia n Militar y Headquarters i n London , England ; an d th e senio r Canadia n Fiel d Headquarters which , thoug h intende d t o follo w th e fighting in Europe , was throughou t th e greate r par t o f th e wa r locate d chee k b y jow l wit h C.M.H.Q. Betwee n th e defence establishmen t i n th e Canadia n capita l *On on e occasion , whe n i t appeare d tha t th e Boar d ha d exceede d it s advisor y function, th e Canadia n Prim e Ministe r wa s highl y critical , tellin g th e Wa r Com mittee o f th e Cabine t o n Ma y 27 , 1943 , tha t i t "ha d n o righ t t o tak e an y ste p which entere d th e fiel d o f strateg y an d operations . Tha t th e American s wer e t o report t o thei r Governmen t o n matter s o f defence , an d Canadian s t o ou r Government bu t i t wa s fo r th e Government s to conside r thei r recommendations , and t o decid e o n operations , etc. " Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I, 1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 515 .

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and th e oversea s Arm y som e differenc e i n perspectiv e wa s inevitable . Men clos e to , i f no t actuall y engage d in , comba t traditionall y entertai n strategic concept s othe r tha n thos e o f th e me n i n governmen t offices . "Even o n th e administrativ e side, " th e Army' s officia l historia n ha s noted, "despit e th e benefit s o f cabl e an d telephone , th e effor t t o bridg e 3,000 mile s o f ocea n wa s fraugh t wit h difficulties . Geographi c remote ness helped t o produc e differen t type s of thinkin g on militar y problem s and Canada' s militar y leaders becam e increasingl y awar e o f th e neces sity o f close r liaiso n betwee n th e staff s 'o n th e spot ' an d thos e i n Ottawa."58 On e relativel y mino r inciden t illustrate s th e problem . I n January 194 4 th e Chie f o f Staf f a t C.M.H.Q. , London , Genera l K . Stuart, signalle d th e Genera l Office r Commanding , 1s t Canadia n Army i n Italy , concernin g th e replacemen t o f on e o f th e senio r com manders. Hi s recommendatio n differe d fro m tha t o f th e Ministe r o f National Defence , previousl y expressed b y Ralsto n t o Genera l Stuart ; and th e Ministe r naturall y fel t h e shoul d a t leas t hav e bee n consulte d before Stuar t sen t hi s message . H e thereupo n wrot e privatel y t o him : . . . Speaking generally , I would lik e it , particularly i n matters o n these hig h levels wher e question s ar e boun d t o b e a mixtur e o f polic y an d militar y considerations, i f we coul d hav e a n exchang e o f view s an d comment s befor e the matte r become s "set " i n a definit e recommendation . . . . I a m sur e you woul d b e th e first to sa y yourself tha t i t i s just goo d team work anyway , quit e apar t fro m th e "drill" , fo r u s her e [i n Ottawa ] t o b e kept up-to-date an d eve n ahea d o f time i f possible wit h informatio n i n whic h we would be interested. . . . . . . O f this you can b e sure , tha t yo u ca n neve r er r o n th e sid e o f givin g us too muc h o r to o earl y information. 57

As plannin g fo r "Overlord " reache d it s fina l stages , th e oversea s Headquarters becam e steadil y mor e apprehensiv e ove r th e manpowe r situation. A shar p conflic t o f opinio n develope d betwee n senio r officer s at C.M.H.Q . an d Fiel d Headquarter s an d th e staf f officer s a t N.D.H.Q . in Ottawa , wh o wer e attemptin g t o reconcil e a s bes t the y coul d th e military requirement s o f th e forthcomin g operation wit h th e Govern ment's determinatio n no t t o resor t t o conscriptio n fo r oversea s service . "I a m afrai d tha t th e telegram s tha t hav e passe d withi n th e las t wee k or two," th e Ministe r o f National Defence wrote to th e Chie f o f Staf f i n London on March 26, 1944 , "hav e appeare d mor e like thos e emanating from partisan s o n opposit e side s tha n fro m co-worker s i n a commo n cause."58 Genera l Stuart , caugh t i n th e cross-fir e betwee n th e civilia n and staf f planner s i n Ottaw a an d th e officer s overseas , sa w the proble m with commendabl e clarity . O n Apri l 1 h e wrot e t o th e Chie f o f th e General Staf f i n Ottawa :

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In th e past , CMH Q ha s no t understoo d an d ha s no t bee n sufficientl y sym pathetic t o th e broa d problem s an d repercussion s othe r tha n militar y tha t face NDHQ . . . . NDHQ o n the other han d ha s I thin k tende d to emphasiz e the broade r aspect s o f th e proble m a t issue . Bot h o f thes e ar e perfectl y natural development s an d bot h ar e perhap s aggravate d b y th e fac t tha t th e two part s o f NDH Q ar e 300 0 mile s apart . Th e proble m i s no t onl y t o reconcile th e figure s involve d [i.e. , th e differen t estimate s o f reinforcement s required an d o f number s likel y t o b e mad e availabl e unde r th e existin g system o f voluntar y enlistment ] bu t o f greate r importanc e t o reconcil e th e two point s o f view . Representative s o f NDH Q ar e no w her e [i n London ] and ar e engage d i n the proces s o f reconcilin g th e figure s involve d an d I a m in th e proces s o f attemptin g t o broade n th e viewpoin t o f CMH Q i n orde r to brin g i t a s clos e a s possibl e t o tha t o f NDHQ . I a m confiden t of succes s at thi s en d provide d ther e i s som e giv e an d tak e a t bot h ends . CMH Q ha s at time s bee n unnecessaril y alarmin g i n it s presentatio n o f allege d fact s and I sugges t tha t NDH Q ha s perhap s bee n unnecessaril y violen t [in ] it s unexpressed bu t implie d reactions. 59

Some week s late r Genera l Stuar t reporte d t o th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence tha t h e fel t considerabl e progres s wa s bein g mad e i n over coming "th e CMH Q viewpoint " an d it s "tendenc y t o writ e alarmis t cables."60 The difficult y o f maintainin g productive an d harmoniou s relation s between defenc e planner s a t hom e and militar y authorities abroad wa s immeasurably increase d by th e emergenc e of a fundamenta l differenc e of outloo k between the politica l an d militar y branche s o f th e defenc e establishment i n Ottawa . S o lon g a s th e Genera l Staf f a t N.D.H.Q . remained sympatheti c and responsiv e t o th e politica l directive s o f th e Government, an y tensio n betwee n Ottaw a an d th e oversea s Head quarters coul d b e containe d withi n th e bound s o f nationa l safety . Bu t once difference s develope d withi n th e defenc e establishmen t a t home , the prospec t o f a crisis of immens e gravity presented itself. As earl y a s 1941 ther e i s evidenc e o f acut e disagreemen t betwee n th e Prim e Minister an d hi s militar y advisers . On Jun e 10 , afte r a meetin g of th e War Committe e of the Cabinet , Mackenzie King requested the Minister of National Defence and the Minister for Naval Services to remain afterwards. When alone , I sai d t o the m tha t I though t on e or th e othe r shoul d b e pre pared t o tak e o n th e busines s of government . That I fel t thing s wer e getting now wher e i t was almost impossibl e fo r m e to hop e t o lea d th e Administra tion longer . Tha t I though t ther e wa s suc h a differenc e growin g u p betwee n the Defenc e Departmen t an d th e Civi l Governmen t i n matter s o f polic y generally tha t I coul d n o longe r hol d th e tw o together . Tha t I coul d se e there wa s a growin g pressur e fo r conscription . Tha t I woul d b e please d t o be ou t o f th e figh t altogethe r befor e tha t battl e came ; als o tha t I coul d no t

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countenance thi s countr y bein g committe d t o projects i t wa s incapabl e o f carrying out , an d assume responsibilit y fo r anythin g o f the kind. . . .61

Towards th e en d o f th e yea r Mackenzi e Kin g privatel y expresse d th e opinion tha t "bac k o f al l else , I a m positive , i s th e Army' s desir e t o maintain a foremos t position , a certai n jealous y o f th e Ai r Forc e an d Naval Services. " Ralston , h e note d a few days later, "i s becomin g ver y rigid an d I fin d i t difficult , excep t becaus e o f commitment s h e ha s already mad e t o som e i n th e Departmen t [o f Nationa l Defence] , t o understand his attitude. . . . However, w e have reache d th e end of thi s year o f m y lif e wit h th e Governmen t stil l intact." 62 The conscriptio n crisis , which had neve r been fa r fro m th e surfac e of events sinc e th e outbrea k o f war, burs t upo n th e natio n i n th e autum n of 1944 . Despit e earlie r assurance s fro m th e militar y planner s tha t the voluntar y syste m o f recruitmen t woul d b e sufficien t t o sustai n th e troops fighting in Wester n Europe , i t wa s becoming tragicall y apparen t at th e scen e o f comba t tha t i t woul d not . Thi s intelligenc e reache d the Canadia n public whe n a widel y known sport s promote r o f pre-wa r days, home wounded from th e front , tol d a press conferenc e on Septem ber 1 8 that reinforcement s joining Canadian fighting units wer e "green, inexperienced an d poorl y trained, " an d tha t casualtie s a s a resul t ha d been unnecessaril y high . Th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence , Colone l Ralston, immediately set out for Europe to see for himself. From officers in the field he learned tha t th e situatio n wa s as desperate a s rumour main tained, an d h e returne d t o repor t hi s shockin g new s t o th e Wa r Com mittee o n Octobe r 19 , togethe r wit h hi s fir m recommendatio n tha t th e Government immediatel y pu t int o effec t a polic y o f conscriptin g me n for oversea s servic e i n orde r t o bolste r th e flo w o f reinforcements . There followed a Cabinet crisi s of unprecedented severit y in Canadia n political life . Wha t is relevant t o the present discussio n is the part playe d in the ultimate decision b y the senior officers servin g at National Defenc e Headquarters. Eve n whe n face d wit h th e oppositio n o f hal f a doze n of hi s mos t influentia l minister s an d th e possibilit y tha t the y woul d resign, Mackenzie Kin g remaine d confiden t tha t th e militar y situatio n could b e successfull y deal t wit h b y voluntar y enlistment . Wha t shat tered tha t confidenc e wa s th e threa t no t o f ministeria l bu t o f militar y resignations. Th e Arm y Hig h Comman d ha d worke d loyall y i f reluct antly wit h Genera l McNaughto n (brough t int o th e Cabine t t o replac e Ralston) i n hi s unsuccessfu l effor t t o induc e large-scal e voluntar y enlistment. B y th e middl e o f November , senio r officer s o f th e Arm y had becom e convince d that , whateve r exertion s migh t b e made , th e effort woul d no t succeed . The y state d a s muc h t o thei r ne w Ministe r

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at a meetin g wit h hi m i n Ottaw a o n Novembe r 14 . Althoug h the y agreed t o d o thei r bes t t o secur e th e 15,00 0 me n require d b y th e en d of th e year , "i t wa s clea r tha t emotionall y mos t o f the m preferre d t o see th e appea l fai l s o tha t a n adequat e suppl y o f me n coul d b e mad e available throug h conscription." 63 The da y befor e thi s meeting , Genera l McNaughton ha d tol d Mackenzi e Kin g tha t h e though t som e o f hi s senior officer s wer e "plotting" conscription. 64 I n spit e o f this misgiving , and i n th e fac e o f th e unmistakabl e oppositio n o f th e senio r officer s t o continuing th e voluntar y system , th e Ministe r sa w fi t t o issu e a pres s statement declarin g tha t "th e informatio n give n m e b y th e O.C. s con firmed m y belie f mor e tha n eve r tha t continuatio n o f th e voluntar y policy wil l provid e th e reinforcements." 65 Fou r o f th e officer s presen t at th e meetin g promptl y telegraphe d t o McNaughto n t o protes t tha t nothing tha t ha d bee n sai d coul d hav e properl y encourage d hi m i n this belief . One o f the protestin g officers wa s General G . R . Pearkes , a Victori a Cross winne r o f th e Firs t Worl d War , th e G.O.C . Pacifi c Comman d in charg e o f th e 6t h Divisio n o f drafte d troops . (Thirtee n year s late r he wa s himself t o becom e Ministe r of National Defence. ) O n returnin g from th e Ottaw a consultation , h e calle d hi s officer s t o a meetin g i n Vancouver, wher e they proceede d t o giv e interview s to newspaperme n telling o f thei r failur e t o persuad e substantia l number s o f thei r me n to voluntee r fo r oversea s servic e an d o f thei r doub t whethe r th e Government's polic y coul d eve r succeed . Thi s devic e wa s clearly inten ded t o brin g pressur e o n th e Governmen t fro m a publi c b y no w thoroughly arouse d an d alarmed . Learnin g o f the interviews , th e Prim e Minister wrot e i n hi s diary : "I t i s quit e apparen t tha t ther e i s a conspiracy. . . . On e afte r th e othe r ha s bee n comin g ou t an d saying that th e N.R.M.A . me n wer e jus t waitin g fo r th e Governmen t t o d o its dut y an d sen d the m overseas . Tha t look s like th e Arm y defyin g th e civil power . Thes e me n i n unifor m hav e n o righ t t o spea k i n way s which wil l tur n th e peopl e agains t th e civi l power." 66 A muc h grave r even t soo n followed . O n th e mornin g o f Novembe r 22, th e da y Parliament opened , th e Chie f o f the Genera l Staff , Lieuten ant-General J . C . Murchie , an d othe r senio r officer s me t wit h thei r former commander , no w their ne w Minister, a t National Defenc e Head quarters. T o Genera l McNaughto n th e C.G.S . presented , o n behal f of th e militar y members o f the Army Council , a brief memorandum . It s key provisio n rea d a s follows: "Afte r a carefu l revie w of al l the factor s including th e lates t expressio n o f thei r view s b y th e Distric t Officer s Commanding, I mus t now advise yo u that i n my considered opinio n th e

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voluntary syste m o f recruitin g throug h Arm y channel s canno t mee t the immediate problem." 67 Was thi s prosai c documen t a n ultimatum ? Th e officer s presentin g i t regarded i t a s such . "Whil e ther e wa s n o explici t agreemen t amon g them tha t the y woul d resig n i f thei r advic e wa s no t followed , a t leas t one o r tw o o f them understoo d tha t i f th e Ministe r remaine d adamant , resignation woul d b e th e nex t step." * Th e recipien t certainl y believe d he had bee n serve d with an ultimatum. As soo n a s the officers withdrew , General McNaughto n telephone d th e Prim e Minister : He sai d h e ha d quit e seriou s new s tha t th e Headquarter s Staf f her e ha d al l advised hi m tha t th e voluntar y syste m woul d no t ge t th e men . H e ha d emphasized i t was the mos t seriou s advic e tha t coul d b e tendered . . . . He expressed th e opinio n tha t i t wa s lik e a blo w i n th e stomach . H e als o sai d that h e ha d th e resignatio n o f th e Commande r i n Winnipeg. Tha t i f th e Commanders, on e afte r th e other , bega n t o resign , th e whol e militar y machine woul d ru n down , begi n t o disintegrate , an d ther e woul d b e n o controlling th e situation . Instantly ther e cam e to m y min d th e statemen t I ha d mad e t o Parliamen t in Jun e a s to th e actio n th e Governmen t woul d necessaril y tak e i f w e wer e agreed tha t th e tim e ha d com e whe n conscriptio n wa s necessary . I t i s apparent t o m e tha t t o whateve r ba d managemen t thi s ma y hav e bee n due , we ar e face d wit h a rea l situatio n whic h ha s t o b e met an d no w ther e i s n o longer though t a s to th e natur e o f th e militar y advic e tendered , particularl y by Gen . McNaughton . An d i f s o tendere d b y Gen . McNaughto n wh o ha s come int o th e governmen t t o tr y t o sav e th e situation , i t wil l b e m y clea r duty t o agre e t o th e passin g o f th e Orde r i n Counci l an d g o t o Parliamen t and as k for a vote of confidence. . . .es

In thi s wa y ther e wa s formed i n th e min d o f th e Prim e Minister , i n a matter o f minutes , th e mos t importan t decisio n o f th e Canadia n wa r effort. Confronted b y wha t th e Prim e Ministe r som e day s afterwar d obliquely describe d a s a threa t o f "anarchy, " th e anti-conscriptionis t members o f th e Cabine t (wit h th e exceptio n o f Mr . C . G . Powe r wh o resigned) supporte d Mackenzie King' s dramati c volte-face. An order in-council providin g fo r th e immediat e draftin g o f 16,00 0 N.R.M.A . men fo r oversea s servic e wa s approve d o n Novembe r 23 . Ther e wa s *R. MacGrego r Dawson , "Th e Revol t o f th e Generals, " Weekend Magazine, vol. X , no . 44 , 1960 . Mr . Bruc e Hutchison , whos e investigation s firs t brough t the stor y ou t int o th e open , ha s written : "Th e fina l threa t [o f resignation ] was no t pu t i n writin g alon g wit h th e officers ' memorandu m and , i n tha t tense hurrie d interview , n o on e seem s t o remembe r exactl y wha t wa s sai d o r who sai d it . Ther e ca n b e absolutel y no question , however , from th e information given m e quit e voluntaril y fro m militar y sources , tha t th e resignation s woul d have bee n wid e sprea d an d distinguishe d enoug h t o produc e disastrou s conse quences." Bruc e Hutchison , "Mackenzi e Kin g an d th e 'Revolt ' o f th e Army, " Maclean's Magazine, Ma y 15 , 1953 .

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still Parliamen t t o face , an d th e prospec t tha t French-Canadia n Libera l members migh t refus e t o accep t th e ne w policy . Th e Prim e Minister' s motion of confidence wa s carried o n December 7 by a vote of 14 3 to 70 , 34 French-speakin g Liberal s votin g agains t i t les s ou t o f a sens e o f betrayal tha n becaus e o f specifi c pledge s agains t conscriptio n give n earlier t o thei r constituents . Th e threa t o f civi l wa r ha d passed , an d the member s o f th e Arm y Hig h Comman d wer e spare d th e ordea l o f having to decid e whether t o carr y out th e desperat e strateg y o f resigna tion i n wartime. Some 12,00 0 conscrip t soldier s wer e sen t overseas , o f who m som e 10,000 reache d Europ e an d som e 2,50 0 sa w action . Tha t winte r th e general reinforcemen t situatio n improved , an d th e wa r i n Europ e ended befor e further crise s could appear . Bu t th e "revol t o r the Army " was to hav e it s effec t upo n civil-militar y relation s i n Canad a fo r many years afte r th e Germa n surrende r o n Ma y 5 , 1945 . CIVIL-MILITARY RELATION S I N THE NUCLEA R AG E

In 191 8 the Armistice was widely believed to presage a n era o f peace, if not fo r turbulen t Europe a t leas t fo r Nort h America . A moo d o f isola tionism se t in ; tw o decade s passe d befor e i t wa s finall y dispelled . Th e mood o f Canadian s a t th e en d o f th e secon d o f thei r tw o worl d war s was ver y different . Th e hop e tha t internationa l politics migh t i n futur e see tha t unit y o f grea t power s assume d i n th e Charte r o f th e Unite d Nations they knew, as soon a s any people, t o be pitiably slim. Disclosure late i n 194 5 o f Sovie t espionag e i n th e Canadia n capita l revealed , a t least t o member s o f th e Government , th e reckles s perfid y o f Marsha l Stalin's politics ; i f public disillusionmen t di d no t com e unti l th e extinc tion o f liberal democrac y in Czechoslovaki a i n Februar y 1948 , i t cam e then wit h soberin g clarity . "I t i s a n appallin g thought, " th e Ministe r of Nationa l Defenc e reflecte d i n th e Hous e o f Common s i n Jun e o f that year , that althoug h hardl y thre e year s hav e gon e b y sinc e V- E Day . . . man y nations shoul d no w be engaged i n spendin g mone y o n armament s o n a scal e never befor e know n i n th e histor y o f th e worl d i n peacetime . . . . Th e Soviet Unio n ha s floute d [its ] war-wo n friendships , obstinatel y obstructe d every mov e to arrive a t understanding, an d promoted chao s an d disorde r an d the darknes s o f the iron curtain . . . . It has produced a n attitud e i n Canad a towards defenc e whic h i s quit e differen t fro m an y tha t w e eve r ha d befor e in peacetime . O f on e thin g I a m sure , an d tha t i s th e determinatio n o f th e Canadian peopl e to defend ou r country agains t an y attack. . . ,69

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Nor wa s thi s a partisa n view . "Thos e wh o wer e aslee p fro m 193 5 t o 1939," declare d a n Oppositio n spokesma n i n th e sam e debate , "ar e asleep n o longer . W e kno w th e issues." 70 To thei r militar y advisers , th e Chief s o f Staf f an d senio r officer s of th e thre e services , th e Canadia n Governmen t an d peopl e turne d fo r advice an d guidanc e about wha t to d o t o protec t themselve s fro m thei r new enemy . A t th e disposa l o f tha t enem y wa s a n arsena l o f weapon s ranging fro m short-wav e radio transmitter s t o (afte r 1949 ) th e atomi c bomb an d (afte r 1954 ) th e hydroge n bomb ; weaponr y an d strateg y had becom e intricately interwoven, the lin e betwee n militar y an d politi cal decisions blurred beyond recognition. Th e result , i n Canada a s in al l Western nations, wa s to compe l senior military officer s t o exercis e judgment i n area s lying far beyon d thei r traditiona l competence . They hav e becom e increasingl y concerne d wit h internationa l affairs , tha t i s to say , wit h the premise s o f military policy , wit h th e purpose s fo r whic h an d the term s o n whic h militar y force s wil l b e deployed . The y hav e move d upstream towar d th e fountai n spring s o f nationa l policy . Second , thei r support functions—supply , finance , researc h an d development , publi c rela tions, manpowe r management , an d th e like—hav e grow n mor e numerous , difficult an d important . The y hav e move d downstrea m t o a poin t wher e th e river widen s into a bay far broader tha n any they have ever travelle d before. 71

A militar y establishmen t strugglin g wit h thes e unfamilia r responsi bilities coul d coun t itsel f fortunat e to enjo y th e suppor t an d sympath y of th e civilia n community for who m it stoo d o n guard . The professiona l soldier neve r ranked high among the heroe s o f a country no t noticeabl y disposed t o hero-worship , but a t an y rat e h e emerge d fro m th e Secon d World Wa r i n greate r publi c estee m tha n h e ha d a generatio n earlier . "The ol d attitud e ther e use d t o b e toward s sailor s an d soldier s i s a thing of the past," remarked th e Ministe r o f National Defenc e in 1950 . "Our sailors , soldier s an d airme n hav e attaine d an d earne d th e respec t of th e community." 72 I n particular , the y ha d earne d th e respec t o f th e French-speaking community . Nothing in the traditional values of Frenc h Canada conflicte d wit h th e traditiona l value s o f militar y life ; indeed , its severity , its regularity, its discipline and dedicatio n accorde d remark ably wel l wit h th e kin d o f societ y extolle d b y th e defender s o f th e established orde r i n Quebec . Bu t th e commitmen t o f French-speakin g Canada t o th e defenc e o f th e real m wa s boun d t o b e somethin g les s than tota l s o long as the enem y contrived to envelo p its sinister purpos e in th e mantl e of a n ideolog y no t withou t its ow n attractions ; a s Musso lini's Ital y an d Petain' s Franc e fo r a tim e an d t o a n exten t manage d to do . Once , however , th e enem y wa s identifie d a s internationa l com -

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munism, the French-speakin g Canadia n demonstrate d as muc h capacit y for sacrific e a s hi s compatrio t i n Toront o o r Vancouver . O f 10,58 7 men enlistin g in th e specia l voluntee r forc e for servic e i n Korea , 3,13 4 were fro m th e provinc e o f Quebec , a proportio n slightl y highe r tha n that of the populatio n o f Quebec to the population o f the whol e country ; moreover, th e proportio n o f French-speaking Canadian s i n th e specia l force wa s almost exactly the sam e as that o f French-speaking Canadian s to th e tota l population. 73 If , therefore , Canad a continue d t o shar e wit h Iceland th e doubtfu l distinctio n of bein g th e onl y membe r o f th e Nort h Atlantic allianc e no t t o hav e introduce d compulsor y militar y service , i t reflected no t s o muc h th e unwillingnes s o f Canadian s t o sacrific e fo r freedom a s th e unwillingnes s o f thei r Governmen t t o ris k openin g th e old wound s o f th e conscriptio n issue . O n th e wisdo m o f it s diffidenc e opinions differ , an d wil l diffe r fo r a lon g time ; bu t ther e ca n b e n o question that conditions were more favourable for the experiment during the administratio n o f Mr . L . S . St . Laurent , a Canadia n o f Frenc h descent, tha n durin g tha t o f hi s successor . All thes e circumstance s assure d th e militar y establishmen t o f greate r influence o n national polic y than i t had previousl y enjoyed in peacetime . The proposa l t o invit e Europea n force s fro m NAT O countrie s t o tak e up operationa l dutie s alon g th e norther n rada r warnin g lines, favoure d by th e Departmen t o f External Affair s a s improving the cohesivenes s of the allianc e an d offsettin g Unite d State s influenc e i n Canada , wa s objected t o b y th e Chief s o f Staf f an d o n tha t accoun t discarded . Th e decision t o create a North American Air Defence Command (NORAD ) owed muc h t o th e chairma n o f th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , Genera l Charles Foulkes , turnin g hi s power s o f persuasio n upo n inexperience d ministers immediatel y afte r th e chang e o f governmen t i n 1957 . Th e proposal t o acquir e tactica l atomi c weapon s fo r continenta l defence and for Canada's force s in Western Europe indicate d th e influenc e o f the Department o f Nationa l Defenc e a s agains t tha t o f th e Departmen t of Externa l Affair s whos e Minister , Mr . Howar d Green , mad e n o secret o f hi s distat e fo r nuclea r armament s o f an y kind . Th e precis e manner an d exten t t o whic h militar y influenc e shape d thes e an d othe r crucial measure s canno t ye t b e ascertained , bu t ther e ca n b e n o doub t that i t was decisive o n severa l occasions . But despit e th e ne w importanc e o f th e militar y establishmen t i n th e making o f nationa l policy , th e traditiona l idea l o f civilia n supremac y was in no way impaired. O n th e contrary , firm civilian control appeare d all the mor e essentia l in a n er a whe n even the mos t distan t paramilitary skirmish ra n th e ris k o f thermonuclea r catastrophe . "Th e professiona l

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soldier i s answerable to th e government, " th e Leade r o f the Oppositio n declared t o a n approvin g Hous e o f Common s i n 1953 . "Th e profes sional soldie r mus t tak e hi s directio n fro m th e government ; h e mus t carry ou t policie s establishe d b y th e government . I t i s no t fo r hi m t o tell the governmen t what it will do; it i s for the governmen t to sa y what the staf f officer s wil l do. .. . Tha t ha s been th e policy of the supervisio n of ou r defenc e force s eve r sinc e w e hav e ha d defenc e forces." 74 Th e Prime Minister di d no more than express the general will of his country men whe n he expresse d disma y at th e "voca l rocke t rattling " o f "thos e in position s o f militar y authority," addin g tha t h e coul d "thin k o f n o more sterile or irresponsible use . .. of office tha n a tendency to brandis h the symbol s of militar y power." 75 Tha t i n thi s matte r th e Governmen t was prepare d t o practis e wha t i t preache d wa s eviden t h i th e swiftnes s with whic h officia l rebuk e descende d upo n thos e member s o f th e military who from tim e to time ventured to express opinion s a t varianc e with policy . The principl e o f civilia n supremac y continued t o b e buil t firml y int o the institutions b y whic h defenc e polic y wa s made . Th e Cabinet , th e ultimate foru m fo r decision , experimente d wit h th e wartim e devic e of a n Associat e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e ( a portfoli o allowe d to laps e wit h the comin g of peace) whe n in 195 3 Mr . Ralp h Campne y was appointe d t o tha t post . Hi s divisio n o f labou r wit h th e Ministe r of Nationa l Defence , Brook e Claxton , i n keepin g wit h th e post-wa r ideal o f servic e unification , wa s alon g functiona l rathe r tha n servic e lines, th e Associat e Ministe r attendin g mainl y t o administrativ e matter s throughout th e militar y establishmen t a s a whole , leavin g hi s senio r colleague free r t o grappl e wit h increasingl y intractabl e problem s o f policy. Th e lin e betwee n polic y an d administratio n i s notoriousl y diffi cult t o draw , an d thi s functiona l separatio n o f responsibilitie s coul d only succeed , a s the Prime Minister concede d whe n proposing it , o n th e basis o f "a n exceptiona l degre e o f harmon y betwee n th e Ministe r an d the Associat e Minister , an d a n eve n greate r degre e o f franknes s an d understanding tha n i s necessar y between tw o minister s o f th e govern ment havin g quit e separat e departments." 76 Th e tea m o f Campne y an d Claxton worke d togethe r harmoniousl y enough , bu t whe n th e latte r retired in 1954 , an d Mr. Campney became Minister o f National Defence, no Associat e Ministe r wa s appointed . Th e positio n remaine d unfille d until 1957 , whe n Mr . Pau l Hellye r assume d it , onl y t o los e i t i n th e General Electio n som e weeks later. The incomin g Diefenbaker adminis tration di d no t choos e t o appoin t a n Associat e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence unti l 1959 . It s appointee , Mr . Pierr e Sevigny , strengthene d

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 9

9

French Canada' s representatio n i n th e Cabine t withou t noticeabl y eas ing th e heav y burdens fallin g upo n Genera l G . R . Pearkes , Ministe r o f National Defenc e from Jun e 195 7 t o his resignation i n October 1960 . While th e Defenc e Committe e o f th e Cabine t (describe d abov e i n chapter i ) i s normally attende d b y th e Chief s of Staf f an d th e chairma n of th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , it s personne l an d traditio n ar e suc h that th e dominan t voic e i s th e voic e o f th e civilian . Th e principa l military adviser s o f th e governmen t ar e member s o f th e Chief s o f Staff Committee , bu t eve n thi s committee , contrar y t o wha t it s nam e may suggest , i s no t a wholl y militar y group . I t includes , i n additio n t o the Chie f o f Staf f o f eac h o f th e thre e services , th e chairma n o f th e Defence Researc h Board , wh o i s a civilian, * an d (sinc e 1951 ) a permanent chairma n who , whil e a distinguishe d office r o f th e highes t rank (Genera l Charle s Foulke s wa s th e firs t incumbent , succeede d in 195 9 b y Ai r Marsha l F . R . Miller , formerl y Deput y Ministe r o f the Departmen t o f Nationa l Defence) , wa s clearl y intende d t o infus e the Committe e wit h a supra-servic e poin t o f view . Additiona l civilia n chaperonage i s provide d b y th e regula r attendanc e a t it s meeting s o f the Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s an d th e Deput y Minister o f Nationa l Defence , whe n othe r tha n purel y militar y matter s are under discussion—as, indeed, they usually are. Th e presence of these influential non-militar y figure s i n th e Chief s o f Staf f Committe e ha s given ris e t o th e charg e b y a forme r Chie f o f th e Genera l Staf f (note d above in chapter 11) tha t it is " 'packed' to protect the government against the receip t o f unpalatabl e advice . . . ." 77 Whethe r vali d o r not , thi s grave accusatio n i s a s applicabl e t o th e tw o ke y committee s tha t serv e the Chief s o f Staf f Committee , fo r th e Join t Intelligenc e Committe e and th e Join t Plannin g Committe e ar e als o customaril y attende d b y officials fro m on e o f th e defenc e liaison division s o f th e Departmen t o f External Affairs . The restrainin g han d o f th e civilia n bureaucrac y i s foun d a s wel l upon the Permanent Join t Board on Defence which, while less importan t than durin g the Second Worl d War, retains som e responsibility for plan ning fo r continenta l defence . T o a t leas t on e highl y place d militar y observer thi s arrangemen t ha s appeare d les s tha n advantageous . "Th e Permanent Join t Boar d on Defence," Lieutenant-Genera l G . G. Simonds *Whether th e Defenc e Researc h Boar d wa s t o b e unde r militar y o r civilia n control wa s strenuousl y debate d a t th e tim e o f it s creatio n i n 1945-6 , bu t th e principle o f civilia n supremac y i n matter s o f defenc e researc h prevaile d ove r the view s o f th e Arm y ordnanc e an d th e R.C.A.F . A n unusuall y informativ e account o f thi s debat e i s t o b e foun d i n Capt . D . J . Goodspeed , A History o f th e Defence Research Board o f Canada (Ottawa , 1958) , pp . 28-44 .

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has written , "act s a s a barrie r t o direc t contac t betwee n th e Canadia n and U.S . Chief s o f Staf f excep t o n a person-to-perso n basi s withi n individual services . Th e predilectio n o f Canadia n member s o f thi s joint boar d t o experimen t i n th e fiel d o f gadgetr y ha s engineere d decisions o f doubtfu l militar y value , bu t ver y expensiv e i n money." 78 A furthe r exampl e o f ho w th e soldie r i s overshadowe d b y th e civilian i n plannin g fo r nationa l securit y i s provide d b y th e Pane l o n Economic Aspect s o f Defence . Create d i n 1948- 9 t o conside r th e problems o f Canadia n militar y an d economi c assistanc e programme s in relatio n t o th e Marshal l Pla n an d Mutua l Aid , i t ha d becom e b y 1955 th e ke y interdepartmenta l committe e o n al l aspect s o f defenc e policy. It s onl y regular military participant, however, wa s the chairma n of th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , wh o migh t o r migh t no t invit e othe r military member s o f hi s ow n committe e t o attend . It s othe r regula r members wer e al l fro m th e civilia n bureaucracy , an d include d th e secretary o f th e Cabinet , wh o acte d a s chairman , tw o o r thre e officer s of th e Departmen t o f External Affairs , th e deput y minister s o f Defenc e and Defenc e Production , an d representative s o f th e Departmen t o f Finance an d th e Ban k o f Canada . The classica l libera l doctrin e fo r regulatin g relation s betwee n soldiers an d government s is offere d i n Lor d Salisbury' s famou s aphor ism: "I f yo u believ e th e doctors , nothin g i s wholesome ; i f yo u believ e the theologians , nothin g i s innocent; i f you believ e th e soldiers , nothin g is safe. They al l require to have their stron g wine diluted b y a very large admixture o f insipi d commo n sense." 79 Ther e ar e tw o assumption s here: first , tha t th e correctiv e o f commo n sens e i s supplie d b y th e civilian politicia n o r publi c servant ; second , tha t defenc e polic y shoul d properly b e th e resul t o f a dialectica l interpla y o f th e civilia n an d th e military mind , th e latte r untrouble d b y politica l implications . Th e making of national security policy in nearly all of the liberal democracie s since the Second World War has, however, tended t o neglec t the second , and corollary , assumption . Th e traditiona l proces s whereb y objectiv e military advic e is tempered b y civilians mindful o f the politica l environ ment has been replace d b y one in which the militar y mind, no w traine d to recogniz e non-militar y aspect s o f strategy , tender s advic e whic h ha s already take n the m int o account . I n it s America n settin g th e ne w process quickl y acquire d doctrina l legitimatio n a s "th e theor y o f politi cal-military fusion" ; i t ha s bee n lucidl y describe d b y Professo r Huntingdon: This theor y starte d fro m th e undeniabl e fac t tha t militar y polic y an d political polic y wer e muc h mor e closel y inter-relate d i n th e postwa r worl d

THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T 10 1

than the y ha d bee n previously . I t wen t on , however , t o asser t tha t i t ha d become impossibl e t o maintai n th e distinctio n a t the highes t leve l o f govern ment. . . . I t wa s argue d tha t ne w development s ha d rendere d th e ol d categories o f "political " an d "military " sterile , obsolet e an d meaningless . . . . I n par t i t reflecte d th e inherent constitutional difficultie s o f maintainin g a clearcu t delimitatio n o f militar y responsibilities , an d i n par t i t derive d from th e feelin g tha t becaus e wa r ha d becom e total , s o als o ha d th e spher e of militar y affairs . T o a greate r extent , however , i t simpl y reflecte d libera l fear tha t th e increase d powe r o f militar y leadershi p woul d mea n increase d acceptance o f the professiona l militar y viewpoint. Consequently , i t attempte d to weake n an d subordinat e the professiona l military approac h an d t o recon cile increase d militar y powe r wit h libera l value s b y positin g th e inevitabl e transmutation o f militar y leadership . I n effect , th e fusionis t theor y attempt s to solv e th e post-wa r proble m o f civil-militar y relation s b y denyin g it s existence.80 In Canad a n o les s tha n th e Unite d State s thi s fusionis t conceptio n has displace d sinc e 194 5 th e traditional relationship between the civilia n and militar y servant s o f government . I f ther e i s an y differenc e betwee n Canadian an d America n experienc e i n thi s regard , i t ha s bee n i n the greate r emphasi s give n i n Canad a t o achievin g fusio n b y bringin g the civilia n bureaucrac y int o mor e intimat e contac t wit h militar y prob lems, rathe r tha n b y extendin g th e domai n o f servic e officer s t o includ e political matters . Bu t th e latte r developmen t ha s bee n b y n o mean s unknown. I t ma y b e discerne d i n th e creatio n o f th e permanen t chair man o f th e Chief s o f Staf f Committee , i n th e typ e o f office r promote d to senio r rank , and , abov e all , i n th e attentio n pai d t o th e non-militar y side o f senio r office r training . In 194 8 th e National Defence Colleg e offere d th e first of a continuin g series of annua l courses for wha t its handbook fo r participants describe s as the trainin g o f senio r officer s o f th e Arme d Service s an d civi l departmen t of governmen t i n th e principle s o f highe r governmenta l administratio n an d staff work , bot h i n peac e an d war , s o tha t the y ma y b e thoroughl y verse d in inter-servic e an d inter-departmenta l planning , includin g the politica l an d economic aspect s an d th e organizatio n fo r th e centra l directio n o f wa r an d the syste m o f higher command , an d s o become qualifie d t o tak e thei r place s on th e staf f an d inter-departmenta l committee s whic h ar e a n essentia l par t of th e machiner y for plannin g an d directin g the nationa l effort . The thirt y o r s o officer s an d civilian s enrolle d wer e accordingl y instructed i n "(a ) historical , economic , socia l an d politica l factor s affecting Canadia n defence ; (b ) internationa l affair s an d Canada' s foreign policy ; (c ) influenc e o f scientifi c developmen t o n war ; (d ) relationship o f arme d service s wit h on e anothe r an d othe r department s

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of government ; (e ) principle s o f highe r comman d an d o f join t servic e planning on th e strategi c level." Many, if not th e majority , of influential staff officer s o f th e thre e service s ha d b y 196 1 bee n expose d t o thi s training. I t is of some interest tha t the first commandant o f the Nationa l Defence Colleg e becam e afte r hi s retiremen t fro m activ e servic e th e most outspoken criti c of the fusionis t philosoph y of which its curriculum was s o clea r a manifestation . "O n th e subjec t o f defense, " Lt.-Gen . Simonds ha s written , "th e proble m i s no t on e o f attemptin g t o devis e ways o f enablin g th e militar y t o encroac h upo n politica l prerogatives , but o f getting politicians t o fac e th e unpleasan t dut y of making realisti c decisions."81

ChapterFour

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FOREIGN POLICY , LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE RELATIONS , AN D TH E PARLIAMENTARY SYSTE M

Control o f foreign polic y i n a parliamentary syste m i s the responsibilit y of th e Executive . Thi s i s no t merel y a corollary o f th e familia r parado x that parliamentar y government , i n whic h th e Cabine t i s theoreticall y responsible t o th e Hous e o f Commons , ha s i n practic e undergon e " a strange an d alarmin g inversion " s o tha t "th e Common s ha s becom e instead responsibl e t o the Cabinet." 1 Law and convention both prescrib e that crucia l step s i n th e foreig n polic y proces s ar e t o b e take n onl y b y ministers o f th e Crown . Collectivel y thos e minister s se t th e cours e o f external affairs . A foreig n polic y decisio n i s a Cabine t decision . I f a treaty i s needed, Parliamen t ma y be summoned ; but i t doe s no t hav e to be summoned , for ratificatio n ma y b e accomplishe d withou t it s aid . I f money o r legislatio n ar e neede d t o giv e effec t t o a foreig n polic y deci sion, Parliamen t mus t approve ; bu t th e Government' s majorit y i n th e House o f Common s ensure s that approva l i s rarely i f ever withheld . If Parliamen t i s t o se t it s mar k upo n foreig n policy , i t mus t there fore d o s o b y influence . It s method s ar e interrogatio n an d discussion . How effectivel y thes e ar e use d depend s partl y upo n th e abilit y an d drive o f th e Opposition , bu t jus t a s muc h upo n th e readines s o f th e Government t o allo w th e Oppositio n t o pla y it s dialectica l rol e a s th e parliamentary syste m requires. A membe r ma y as k questions ; a minis ter nee d no t answer . Th e Oppositio n ma y deman d discussion ; th e Government ma y refus e tim e fo r debate . Safeguards agains t Cabine t dictatorshi p i n external , a s i n other , affairs ar e o f two kinds . Too flagran t disregar d of parliamentary opinion may disaffec t a Government' s followin g i n th e Hous e t o th e poin t o f threatening it s defeat . I n practic e thi s sanctio n i s no t severe . Th e member, no t th e Prim e Minister , ordinaril y fear s th e cos t an d bothe r of seekin g re-election , an d i n fac t th e weapo n o f dissolutio n i s on e way a Governmen t ma y kee p it s majorit y fro m becomin g maverick . The other , an d mor e important , safeguar d lies outsid e Parliament . To o flagrant disregar d o f publi c opinio n ma y disaffec t a n electorat e t o th e

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point wher e it votes th e Oppositio n int o power . A Governmen t mistak ing voters ' silenc e fo r indifferenc e ma y discove r a t th e nex t genera l election tha t i t i s th e Governmen t n o longer . Thi s sanctio n naturall y operates mor e effectivel y toward s th e en d o f a n administratio n tha n at th e beginning . But t o discus s parliamentar y governmen t i n term s o f sanction s an d safeguards i s to disregar d its centra l assumption . Th e system , if i t i s t o work well , presuppose s a degre e o f politica l maturit y an d restrain t o n the par t o f thos e wh o wor k i t tha t i s somewha t a t varianc e wit h Lor d Acton's dictu m abou t th e tendenc y o f powe r t o corrupt . I t assume s that both Government and Opposition ar e so convinced of its advantages and s o attache d t o it s tradition s a s t o refrai n fro m abuse s whic h ma y irreparably damag e th e system . To determin e legislativ e influenc e o n foreig n polic y withi n a give n parliamentary system, it therefore becomes necessary to inquire into two facets o f politica l behaviour . On e i s th e exten t t o whic h th e Cabine t allows legislator s tim e an d opportunit y fo r constructiv e criticism . Th e other i s th e qualit y o f suc h parliamentar y discussio n a s ma y result . "PARLIAMENT WIL L DECIDE "

On Augus t 14 , 1914 , th e Canadia n Governmen t announce d tha t th e Dominion wa s a t wa r wit h Germany . Member s o f th e Hous e o f Com mons an d th e Senate , meetin g tw o week s late r t o vot e fund s fo r th e prosecution o f th e wa r effort , too k n o par t i n th e mos t momentou s decision o f externa l polic y sinc e Confederation . I n 191 9 Parliament , which ha d no t bee n consulte d abou t goin g t o war , wa s summone d t o approve th e term s o f peace. It s ne w associatio n wit h th e foreig n polic y process wa s du e partl y t o th e Prim e Minister' s emphasi s o n nationa l status; bu t thi s wa s no t Si r Rober t Borden' s onl y motive . I n Canada , as i n Grea t Britain , publi c opinio n blame d "secre t diplomacy " fo r th e calamities o f th e pas t fiv e years , an d looke d t o parliamentar y scrutin y of th e Executiv e a s th e principa l mean s o f preventing thei r recurrence . The Canadia n Governmen t ha d not , o f course , initiate d an y o f th e clandestine diplomati c arrangement s of the pre-wa r year s o r durin g th e war itself , no r wa s i t widel y understoo d tha t a t th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet i t had becom e awar e o f thei r existence . Th e public' s desir e fo r increased parliamentar y influenc e wa s du e mainl y t o it s fea r tha t a Canadian government, at some future imperial gathering or at the Leagu e of Nations , might commit the natio n to war , or to som e course o f actio n leading t o war , withou t it s knowledg e o r approval . The outcr y i n th e Unite d Kingdo m agains t secre t diplomac y wa s

THE LEGISLATUR E 10

5

heard mostl y o n th e politica l left , suc h movement s a s th e Unio n fo r Democratic Contro l drawin g suppor t principall y amon g th e Labou r party. I n Canad a th e lef t wa s preachin g t o th e converted . No t tha t th e Government value d parliamentar y contro l ove r foreig n polic y fo r it s own sake ; later on , in the 1930' s Mackenzie Kin g was to shiel d externa l affairs fro m legislativ e scrutiny a s n o othe r Prim e Ministe r befor e o r since. Bu t th e politica l situatio n o f th e earl y 1920' s le d hi m t o profes s attachment to th e principle . Upo n it , an d i t alone , hi s minority Govern ment foun d som e measur e o f agreemen t wit h th e sixty-fiv e member s of th e Progressiv e part y on whos e support i t depende d fo r continuatio n in office . These wer e th e circumstance s givin g ris e t o th e famou s formul a "Parliament wil l decide. " I t wa s firs t presse d int o servic e durin g th e Chanak crisi s o f 1922 . Withi n hour s o f receivin g th e Britis h Govern ment's "invitation " t o sen d troops t o hel p hol d th e lin e a t th e Neutra l Zone, Mackenzi e Kin g wa s overwhelme d wit h advic e no t t o commi t any Canadia n force s unti l Parliamen t ha d authorize d him t o d o so , an d he accordingl y informe d Lloy d Georg e o n Septembe r 1 7 tha t "publi c opinion i n Canad a woul d deman d authorizatio n o n th e par t o f Parlia ment a s a necessary preliminar y to th e despatc h o f a contingent." 2 Th e Progressives rallie d wit h gratifying enthusias m t o thi s position ; over th e tariff, ove r freigh t rates , ther e migh t b e disagreemen t an d eve n conflic t between them and the Liberal Cabinet , bu t o n the issue of parliamentary control o f foreig n polic y a distinct harmony of interest wa s disclose d fo r the firs t time . " I believ e w e hav e foun d th e basis, " Mackenzi e Kin g wrote soo n afterwards , "o n whic h the Progressive s o f Wester n Canad a may b e brough t int o rea l accor d wit h th e Liberal s o f th e Provinc e o f Quebec an d othe r part s o f th e Dominion." 3 I n hi s statemen t t o th e House o f Commons , th e expedien t becam e a principle : "I t i s fo r Parliament t o decide, " the Prim e Ministe r state d o n Februar y 1 , 1923 , "whether or not we shoul d participat e in war s in differen t part s of the world, an d i t i s neither righ t no r prope r fo r an y individua l nor fo r an y groups o f individual s to tak e an y ste p whic h i n an y wa y migh t limi t the right s o f Parliamen t i n a matte r whic h i s o f suc h grea t concer n t o all the peopl e o f ou r country." 4 A fe w month s later , Mackenzi e Kin g carrie d thi s doctrin e t o th e Imperial Conference . "The decisio n o f Canad a o n an y importan t issue , domestic or foreign, we believe should be made by the people of Canada," he tol d hi s fello w prim e ministers , "thei r representative s i n Parliament , and th e Governmen t responsibl e t o tha t Parliament." 5 Afte r muc h per sistent effort , i t wa s accepte d b y th e Conferenc e and foun d it s wa y int o its publishe d report , whic h include d th e statemen t tha t "i t i s fo r eac h

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government t o decid e whethe r parliamentar y approva l o r legislatio n is required befor e desir e for , o r concurrenc e in , ratificatio n [o f imperia l treaties] i s intimate d b y tha t government." * I n 192 6 Mackenzi e Kin g placed before a receptiv e Hous e o f Common s a resolutio n askin g i t t o approve th e procedur e agree d upo n a t Londo n i n 1923 , explainin g tha t the Governmen t woul d i n futur e submi t fo r parliamentar y approval , prior to , an d a s a condition of , ratification by the Executive , "importan t treaties suc h a s involv e militar y an d economi c sanctions." 6 Thes e categories wer e furthe r broadene d i n 1928 . "Th e da y ha s passed, " Mackenzie Kin g the n tol d th e Hous e o f Commons , when an y government o r executiv e should fee l tha t they should take it upo n themselves, withou t th e approva l o f Parliament , t o commi t a countr y t o obligations involvin g an y considerabl e financia l outlay s o r activ e under takings. In al l case s where obligation s o f suc h a characte r ar e bein g assume d internationally, Parliamen t itself shoul d b e assure d of havin g th e ful l righ t o f approving wha t i s done before bindin g commitment s ar e made . I woul d not confine parliamentar y approva l only t o thos e matter s whic h involv e militar y sanctions an d th e like . I fee l parliamentar y approva l shoul d appl y wher e there ar e involve d matter s o f larg e expenditur e o r politica l considerations of a far-reaching character. 7 In 1950 , a n amendmen t o f th e Nationa l Defenc e Ac t require d tha t whenever th e Governor-in-Counci l place s Canadia n force s o n activ e service, Parliamen t shal l mee t withi n te n day s i f i t i s no t alread y i n session. It i s on e thin g t o mak e provision, b y resolutio n o r b y law , fo r legis lative control ; i t i s anothe r t o pu t i t int o effect . Som e reluctanc e o n th e •"Imperial Conferenc e (1923) , Summary o f Proceedings, p . 14 . While attendin g th e Imperia l Conferenc e o f 1923 , Mackenzie Kin g me t E . D . Morel, th e leadin g spiri t o f th e Unio n fo r Democrati c Control . I n a lette r t o J. S . Woodsworth, th e leade r o f th e Canadia n Labou r party , More l describe d hi s interview wit h th e Canadia n Prim e Minister : " I ha d a privat e an d confidentia l talk wit h Mackenzi e Kin g abou t th e Europea n situation , an d als o abou t ou r circular lette r abou t foreig n polic y control , whic h h e a t th e tim e acknowledge d very courteously . Withou t i n an y wa y committin g himsel f a t all , o r eve n committing myself , I ma y sa y that I gathere d fro m ou r conversatio n tha t h e wa s no t unfavourable t o th e idea , an d I don' t se e wh y yo u o r other s shoul d no t consul t together t o se e whethe r yo u canno t introduc e int o th e Canadia n Hous e a t th e earliest possibl e moment , a resolutio n muc h o n th e line s o f th e Anne x attache d to the letter. . . . "A speec h whic h I hear d Mackenzi e Kin g giv e wit h regar d t o Dominio n participation i n foreig n polic y a t th e Hous e o f Common s dinne r t o th e Prim e Ministers th e othe r day , wa s ver y muc h alon g th e line s tha t I hav e alway s advocated, namely , tha t w e mus t avoi d th e Imperia l Foreig n Offic e ide a an d ensure tha t decision s on foreig n polic y ar e reall y democratic . Tha t w e ca n onl y do by securing full parliamentar y control. . . ." (E . D. Morel t o J. S. Woodsworth, Nov. 16 , 1923 , Woodswort h Papers. )

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part o f Mackenzi e Kin g t o abid e b y bot h lette r an d spiri t o f th e formula tha t "Parliamen t wil l decide " wa s displaye d a s earl y a s 1929 , when a n important decisio n o n th e St . Lawrence Waterwa y projec t wa s taken b y order-in-counci l withou t prio r parliamentar y approval . Whe n criticized for thi s procedure, th e Prim e Ministe r firs t too k refug e i n th e argument tha t Parliamen t wa s no t competen t t o dea l wit h th e kin d of decisio n involved : "I n negotiatin g a n agreemen t wit h respec t t o water-power, water rights , an d navigation , where the consideration s ar e so largely technica l i n thei r nature , Parliamen t i s scarcel y i n a positio n to discus s suc h matter s i n detail ; i t i s fo r expert s t o wor k ou t thes e matters." H e adde d tha t th e principl e o f parliamentar y contro l wa s i n this cas e safeguarde d by a provisio n enablin g Parliamen t t o annu l th e Order-in-Council i f it wishe d to d o so . Thi s explanatio n di d no t satisf y E. J. Garland, a Progressive member from Alberta : I a m afrai d m y righ t hon . frien d i s on th e horn s o f a dilemm a i n thi s case . If becaus e o f a lac k o f technica l knowledg e Parliamen t i s incapabl e o f arriving a t a n intelligen t decisio n i n th e firs t place , lackin g tha t technica l knowledge ho w i s Parliament t o arriv e a t a n intelligen t decisio n wit h regar d to the annulmen t o f an order in council later ?

The Prim e Ministe r then resorte d t o what was later t o becam e a favourite and familia r device , pleading the undesirabl e consequences o f parlia mentary discussio n upo n internationa l negotiation s i n progress . "Th e present moment, " h e declared , "i s perhap s a critica l on e a t whic h t o discuss a n internationa l matte r whic h affect s ou r relation s wit h ou r neighbour t o th e south . I d o no t wis h t o discourag e discussio n i n an y way . . . but i n debatin g thi s matte r I hop e hon . gentleme n wil l bea r in min d th e fac t tha t whateve r i s sai d i n thi s Parliamen t a t thi s tim e may hav e a very far-reachin g effect upo n som e decision s which ma y b e reached i n the very near futur e wit h regard to matter s whic h are o f real concern t o both countries . . . ." 8 The lette r o f th e "Parliamen t wil l decide " formul a wa s observed i n September 1939 , bu t whethe r it s spiri t wa s wholl y i n evidenc e som e authorities ar e incline d t o doubt . "I n th e wee k fro m Septembe r 2 t o September 10, " Professo r K . W . McNaught ha s observed , despite King' s telephon e denia l o f Canada' s belligeren t statu s t o Presiden t Roosevelt, th e Government' s action s coul d b e defende d onl y o n th e assump tion tha t Canad a wa s a t war . Th e enem y wa s defined , al l arme d service s were pu t o n a ful l wa r basis , enem y national s wer e arrested , an d tradin g with th e enem y wa s prohibite d b y order-in-council . O n Septembe r 7 , th e Governor General' s speec h referre d t o "th e stat e o f wa r whic h no w exists" . . . . By the time Parliamen t me t there wa s nothing lef t fo r i t to decide . . . . The Common s wa s bein g aske d t o endors e a polic y alread y implemente d and to give the Governmen t a blank chequ e fo r th e future." 9

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Wars ar e seldo m beneficia l to legislatures . Durin g th e year s 1939-4 5 the influenc e of the Canadia n Parliamen t upo n polic y necessaril y diminished, bu t it s prestig e suffere d perhap s unnecessaril y becaus e o f the Government' s addictio n t o orders-in-counci l a s a metho d fo r takin g decisions. "An y criticis m base d o n th e shee r numbe r o f th e Orders-in Council," on e o f it s critic s acknowledges , would b e bot h sill y an d unfair . . . . Abou t 9 5 pe r cen t o f them wer e fo r approval o f contract s an d routin e administrativ e purposes . Onl y abou t 4 o r 5 pe r cen t wer e "o f a legislativ e character," an d man y o f thes e wer e unex ceptionable. . . . Mr . King' s offence , constitutionall y speaking , i s no t tha t he legislate d b y Order-in-Council , bu t tha t h e di d s o t o a n altogethe r un necessary an d eve n dangerou s degree ; an d th e offenc e i s particularly heinou s because h e had himsel f s o often denounce d it . H e sinne d agains t th e light. 10 THE CABINET , TH E HOUS E O F COMMONS, AN D DISCUSSIO N OF FOREIG N AFFAIR S

The formul a "Parliamen t wil l decide " implie d tha t "Parliamen t wil l discuss"; sensibl e decisio n coul d onl y follo w ful l deliberatio n o f foreig n policy matters . Thi s wa s ver y different , however , fro m wha t th e inven tor o f the formul a was prepared t o allow , fo r i n Mackenzi e King' s vie w the les s th e legislator s discusse d externa l affair s th e better . I t earl y became hi s custo m t o discourag e discussio n b y pleadin g th e nee d t o avoid upsettin g delicat e negotiations . Suc h a ple a ma y b e wholl y legiti mate becaus e wholl y genuine ; every foreig n secretar y ha s ha d occasio n to resor t t o it . Bu t fo r Mackenzi e Kin g it s purpos e wa s les s t o furthe r the settlemen t o f internationa l dispute s tha n t o preven t th e expressio n of politicall y embarrassin g point s o f view . T o suppos e tha t discussio n of internationa l affair s i n th e Canadia n Hous e o f Common s migh t adversely affec t th e cours e o f event s i n Europ e wa s nothin g i f no t absurd, bu t th e absurdit y o f th e argumen t di d no t preven t th e Prim e Minister fro m makin g frequen t us e o f it . I n 1926 , fo r example , whe n J. S . Woodsworth sough t t o plac e befor e th e Hous e o f Common s a motion tha t "Canad a shoul d refus e t o accep t an y responsibilit y fo r complications arisin g fro m th e foreig n polic y o f the Unite d Kingdom, " Mackenzie Kin g promptly sough t to stav e off discussio n on the groun d that "remark s mad e i n th e cours e o f debat e woul d almos t certainl y be cable d t o Europ e wher e thei r bearin g migh t no t b e understood ; i t would b e inadvisabl e t o incu r a ris k o f th e kin d whil e th e Leagu e o f Nations i n it s assembl y a t Genev a i s considerin g matter s o f Britis h

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foreign polic y an d o f great international import."11 I t mus t be adde d i n fairness tha t R . B . Bennet t displaye d a s Prime Ministe r durin g 1930- 5 a simila r antipathy to parliamentar y discussion of foreign policy . Aske d by J . S . Woodswort h i n Novembe r 193 2 t o stat e "what , i f any , i s th e policy o f Hi s Majesty' s Governmen t i n Canad a i n regar d t o th e situa tion i n th e Fa r Eas t an d t o th e Lytto n Report, " th e Prim e Ministe r replied: "I t i s no t though t desirabl e t o ente r int o a discussio n a t thi s time wit h respect t o a matte r o f thi s kind , fo r i t no t onl y canno t serv e the publi c interes t bu t woul d be anticipatin g action tha t migh t be taken , and therefor e i s t o b e deprecated." 12 Bu t i t shoul d als o b e note d tha t Mackenzie Kin g a s Leade r o f th e Oppositio n accepte d thi s evasio n without protest; indeed , a year later, whe n a statemen t o f the Canadia n delegate a t th e Leagu e o f Nation s o n th e Manchuria n crisi s wa s unde r scrutiny i n th e Hous e o f Commons , h e declare d tha t h e woul d no t be responsible fo r provoking parliamentary discussion by commenting on the statement. 13 Afte r 1935 , Prim e Ministe r onc e more , Mackenzi e King steadfastl y refuse d t o b e draw n int o debat e i n Parliamen t o n suc h issues a s the Government' s attitud e to sanctions , collectiv e securit y an d the Leagu e o f Nations. At th e tim e of the Rhinelan d crisis, for example , he me t a reques t fo r a statemen t o f th e Government' s attitud e b y observing: I questio n i f ther e i s anythin g w e o f thi s Hous e coul d ad d whic h woul d b e helpful t o thos e wh o a t th e momen t ar e involve d i n very critical an d delicat e negotiations o n a matte r o f suprem e concer n t o mankind . . . . I thin k i t would b e i n ever y wa y preferable , havin g regar d t o th e extremel y critica l nature o f th e negotiation s an d th e fac t tha t th e situatio n keep s changin g no t only fro m da y t o da y bu t sometime s fro m hou r t o hour , fo r hon . member s of thi s House to forbear , i f the y ca n se e their wa y t o d o so , from preferrin g any reques t whic h migh t provok e discussio n i n ou r countr y a t thi s time. 14

When J . S . Woodswort h responde d t o thi s extraordinar y repl y b y remarking tha t "w e canno t g o indefinitel y withou t havin g som e indica tion fro m th e Governmen t a s t o wha t th e attitud e o f Canad a is, " th e Prime Ministe r answered : May I say to my hon. frien d that, i n a word, th e attitud e o f the Governmen t of Canad a is to do nothing itself an d i f possible t o prevent anythin g occurrin g which wil l precipitat e on e additiona l facto r int o th e all-importan t discus sions whic h ar e now taking plac e i n Europe. . . ,15

This exaggerate d reticenc e di d no t g o uncriticized a t th e time . Saturday Night, acknowledgin g that "Canad a ha s bu t a mino r par t i n th e chorus o f th e oper a no w bein g presente d o n th e internationa l stage, " expressed it s opinion tha t i t woul d nevertheless "b e interestin g to kno w

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what par t w e ar e goin g t o sin g whe n w e d o sing" ; an d th e Winnipeg Tribune inquire d mor e bluntly: "Ho w ca n we uphold th e hands of thos e who ar e endeavourin g t o maintai n the peac e o f th e worl d i f w e simpl y sit lik e a bump o n a lo g an d hav e nothin g t o say?" 16 I t wa s doubtles s owing t o suc h criticis m tha t th e Prim e Ministe r decide d t o brea k hi s long silenc e i n orde r t o mak e a ful l foreig n polic y statemen t i n th e House o f Commons . H e delivere d i t o n Jun e 18 , 1936 ; an d a s hi s remarks were the first he had devote d to the international situatio n sinc e December 6 , 1935 , h e prefaced them with a justification for th e absenc e of previou s statements : It ha s been contende d tha t th e Governmen t ha s not mad e clea r it s policy o n the importan t problems , immediat e an d future , whic h hav e bee n raise d b y the outbrea k an d progres s o f th e Italian-Ethiopia n conflict . I t i s tru e tha t the Governmen t ha s decline d t o mak e a statemen t a t som e critica l stage s when a statemen t woul d b e premature , an d woul d complicat e rathe r tha n advance a solution . I believ e i t wil l b e generall y concede d tha t th e cours e of event s i n Europ e ha s mor e tha n justifie d th e Government' s attitude . It i s undoubtedl y essentia l tha t i n Parliamen t an d outsid e o f i t ther e should b e ful l an d responsibl e discussio n o f th e vita l question s o f Canada' s relations t o othe r states . Ther e ha s not bee n sufficien t discussio n i n th e past . That ha s bee n du e t o ou r slo w emergenc e fro m th e colonia l attitud e o f mind; ou r relativ e immunit y fro m an y seriou s dange r o f wa r o n ou r ow n account; th e rea l difficultie s inheren t i n ou r preoccupatio n wit h th e tremen dous, absorbin g an d paramoun t task s o f achievin g economi c developmen t and nationa l unity , whic h with u s tak e th e plac e o f th e preoccupatio n wit h the fea r o f attac k an d th e dream s o f glor y whic h bese t olde r an d mor e crowded countries ; an d th e unparalleled complexit y o f ou r positio n a s a member o f th e Britis h Commonwealt h o f Nation s an d on e o f th e nation s of th e America n continent. 17

An hones t reckonin g woul d hav e adde d tha t insufficien t discussio n o f foreign polic y i n Parliamen t had als o bee n du e t o th e Prim e Minister' s determination t o kee p Parliamen t fro m discussin g foreign policy; only a few week s earlier, Mackenzi e King had writte n privately that h e wanted "as littl e discussio n a s possibl e . . . i n ou r Hous e o f Common s wit h respect t o the presen t Europea n situation. " If thes e remark s stirre d an y hope s tha t fo r th e futur e th e Govern ment stoo d read y t o embar k upo n a fres h experimen t i n publi c educa tion b y encouragin g discussio n o f internationa l affair s i n Parliament , they wer e soo n disappointed . Parliamen t migh t decide ; bu t i t mus t no t be allowe d t o kno w what i t wa s deciding . I t wa s a curiou s an d unedi fying chapte r i n th e histor y o f Canadia n democrac y when , a s a criti c remarked afte r th e war, "at the time of one of the great worl d crises . . . twenty-seven minute s wer e devote d t o externa l affair s i n th e Hous e o f Commons an d over eight hours to a tariff o n asparagus." 18

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During th e wa r years , Parliament' s influenc e throug h discussio n and debat e suffere d alon g with its decision-makin g powers. "Ideas an d policies no longer travelled upward from Parliamen t but downward from officials t o th e Cabine t an d the n t o th e Hous e o f Common s for cursory approval. Parliamen t i n wartim e held littl e mor e tha n a watchin g brief with a righ t o f criticis m an d th e fina l prerogativ e o f deat h sentenc e against th e Government , an d tha t i t di d no t inten d t o us e excep t i n a suprem e crisis." 19 Th e nadi r o f neglec t wa s reache d o n Januar y 25 , 1940, when , summone d by th e Prim e Minister , Parliamen t listene d t o him announc e its dissolution. Of this occasion a n authorit y has written : The Speec h fro m th e Thron e usuall y ends : "I n invitin g your consideratio n to th e importan t matter s whic h wil l engag e you r attention , I pra y tha t Divine Providenc e may guide an d bles s your deliberations, " o r word s t o tha t effect. Tha t woul d no t d o thi s time ; ther e wer e n o "importan t matters" ; there wer e t o b e n o "deliberations. " Parliamen t ha d bee n summone d onl y to liste n an d leave . So the Speec h thi s time woun d up : "I n al l tha t pertain s to th e discharg e of you r responsibl e duties , ma y Divin e Providenc e b e you r strength an d guide. " Divin e Providenc e neve r ha d a n easier job . Ther e wer e no "responsibl e duties. " Member s ha d bee n summone d onl y t o hea r tha t their dutie s were a t an end . N o othe r Prim e Ministe r i n an y Britis h country , before o r since, eve r dare d t o offe r suc h a n affron t t o Parliament. . . .20

On severa l occasion s durin g th e war , Mackenzi e Kin g warde d off discussion o f foreig n polic y i n th e Hous e o f Common s b y statin g that discussion o f such matters in wartime was not i n th e publi c interest. As late a s 1943 , h e decline d t o mak e any statemen t abou t post-wa r policy on th e groun d that "th e mor e publi c discussio n is diverted to questions about wha t is going to b e th e attitud e of thi s country and tha t country at th e peac e tabl e an d i n th e postwa r period , th e les s th e countr y will be impresse d wit h th e fac t tha t thi s wa r itsel f i s no t ye t won." 21 Mr . Winston Churchill , b y contrast , was under no suc h inhibition; two days later h e outline d t o th e Hous e o f Common s a t Westminste r a Fou r Year Pla n fo r post-wa r Britain . The wanin g authority of th e Canadia n Parliament durin g the Second World War was recalled in later years by a member o f the Wa r Committe e o f th e Cabinet : Members wer e rarel y consulte d eithe r abou t polic y o r otherwise— a fa r cr y indeed fro m th e ol d prewa r day s [i n th e 1920's ] whe n th e sam e Prim e Minister, the n leadin g th e Hous e o f Common s a s a minorit y government , had strenuousl y uphel d th e doctrin e tha t th e Cabine t wa s onl y a committe e of th e Hous e o f Common s an d coul d hav e n o powe r withou t th e prio r decision o f th e member s o f tha t House . I n fact , member s learne d o f deci sions fro m their seat s i n the House , i n man y instance s lon g afte r actio n ha d been taken . I f the y objected , the y wer e tol d tha t ther e wa s a wa r on . Eve n their well-mean t advocac y o f wa r measure s o r decision s wa s discourage d by the ministers concerne d who , rightl y or wrongly, fel t competen t t o handl e

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their ow n busines s i n th e Hous e an d wer e anxiou s t o ge t throug h wit h i t i n order to dea l with pressing problem s in the Department . Even th e mos t abl e and mos t eage r M.P . was boun d t o fee l a sens e o f hi s own impotence . Departmenta l officers , eve n o f th e mos t junio r order , sense d this an d th e prestig e o f Parliamen t decrease d accordingly . Th e publi c bega n to loo k t o th e Prim e Ministe r an d th e member s o f th e Cabinet , they—an d they alone—cam e t o b e regarde d a s responsibl e fo r everythin g concerne d with th e war . Thi s increase d th e prestig e o f th e Cabine t an d Governmen t enormously, an d correspondingl y decrease d tha t o f Parliament . Th e trut h of th e matte r i s Parliament ha s no t ye t [1957 ] recovere d it s position. 22

During th e post-wa r years , discussion of foreig n affair s b y th e Hous e of Common s becam e mor e frequent , bu t improvemen t wa s neithe r spectacular no r rapid . I n 194 7 onl y 45 0 o f nearl y 7,00 0 page s o f recorded debat e were concerned wit h internationa l problems, compare d to 15 0 out o f 5,000 in 1935 . Bu t a t least thi s situatio n coul d n o longe r justly be blamed upon th e Government . Mr . Leste r Pearson , o n becom ing Secretary of State for External Affair s i n 1949 , determine d fro m th e first t o us e hi s hig h offic e a s a n instrumen t o f publi c educatio n an d the Hous e o f Commons a s a mean s o f reachin g th e public . I f hi s efforts wer e no t wholl y successful , th e faul t la y wit h thos e member s of th e Hous e wh o continue d t o b e apatheti c durin g foreig n polic y debates. "S o fa r a s discussion s i n th e Hous e o f Common s ar e con cerned," Mr . Pearso n remarke d i n Ma y 1950 , " I woul d lik e t o se e all the discussio n w e ca n hav e o n externa l affairs . Onc e o r twic e I hav e pleaded fo r more interest in external affair s i n the House o f Commons to empty benche s an d empt y pres s galler y seats , an d th e debate s hav e tailed off . Onc e th e debat e ende d s o suddenl y tha t I foun d mysel f winding u p a discussio n whe n I though t i t ha d jus t begun . Possibl y w e ourselves, i n th e Hous e o f Commons , ar e somewha t t o blam e fo r th e lack o f interest." 23 THE MEMBE R O F PARLIAMEN T AND FOREIG N POLIC Y

If ther e is such a person a s an average member of Parliament, i t may b e said o f hi m tha t ove r th e year s h e ha s no t displaye d muc h interes t i n or knowledg e of foreign affairs . Suc h indifference flow s naturall y enough from th e prevalen t conceptio n o f representativ e democrac y i n Canada . "In ninety-nin e case s ou t o f on e hundred , th e membe r goe s t o Ottaw a to speak for his own constituency and no other. That i s what the member thinks h e i s sen t t o Ottaw a t o do ; tha t i s wha t th e elector s thin k h e i s sent t o do." 24 A s a consequenc e th e membe r devote s n o mor e tim e

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to foreig n polic y tha n h e believe s hi s constituent s woul d wis h hi m to , which i n practic e i s ver y littl e tim e indeed . "Le t u s conciliat e Quebe c and Ontario, " remarked a member o f the Hous e o f Common s i n 1923 , "before w e star t conciliatin g Roumani a an d Ukrainia," 25 an d thi s general orde r o f priorit y ha s no t radicall y altere d ove r th e years . N o one though t i t inappropriat e whe n the Leade r o f the Opposition , R . B . Hanson, remarke d i n th e cours e o f his speech o n th e Addres s i n 1940 : "I di d intend t o say something about the St. Lawrence Waterway , bu t I do not think I should trespass muc h longer o n the time of the House. . . . I cannot , however , refrai n fro m sayin g somethin g abou t th e positio n of truck transportatio n i n Princ e Edwar d Island." 26 If on e look s t o th e Uppe r House , whos e member s hav e n o constitu ents requirin g the m t o fi x thei r attentio n exclusivel y upo n th e hom e front, fo r mor e informe d discussio n o n internationa l affairs , on e look s in vain. O f the American Senate , Joh n Ha y remarke d tha t treaties ente r it a s bull s th e arena , neve r t o leav e alive ; i n th e Canadia n Senat e thi s is no t tru e o f treatie s bu t i t i s o f senators . The y ar e appointe d b y th e government of the day for life, bu t durin g the years to come—an d ther e may b e man y year s t o com e fo r some—rarel y affec t th e cours e o f external policy . Suc h feebl e influenc e i s du e partl y t o th e Senate' s waning power s i n th e constitution ; no t sinc e 1913 , whe n th e Libera l majority i n th e Senat e defeate d Si r Rober t Borden' s nava l bill , ha s the Uppe r Hous e lef t it s mar k upo n nationa l policy , an d ther e i s general agreemen t tha t an y Senate rash enough to repeat th e experimen t would brin g a long-simmering movement fo r it s abolitio n t o th e boilin g point. I t i s du e a s wel l t o th e qualit y o f senatoria l appointments . Wit h a fe w conspicuou s exceptions , thes e ten d t o b e part y workhorse s pas t their prim e fo r who m th e Senat e become s a kin d o f politica l pastur e where ol d ag e may be spen t in tranquil but no t unfamilia r surroundings . One migh t suppos e tha t th e leisurel y temp o o f th e senatoria l life , it s opportunities fo r researc h an d reflection , th e attenuatio n o f part y ties , create unusua l opportunit y fo r elde r statesmanship , particularl y i n internal affairs , i f onl y fo r th e fe w abl e an d willin g t o tak e advantag e of it . Eve n here , however , the talent s o f the aler t senato r ar e consumed by th e extraneou s function s whic h by conventio n th e Uppe r Hous e ha s come t o perform . O f thes e it s rol e a s a divorc e cour t i s b y fa r th e most distracting . "Al l o f th e evidenc e ha s t o b e take n dow n b y th e stenographic staff, " a senato r recentl y complained , "an d i t i s simpl y impossible t o ru n th e Senat e an y mor e tha n thre e day s a wee k an d carry o n a successfu l divorc e cour t proceedings . . . . The result . . . is yo u ca n barel y ge t tim e t o dea l wit h th e specifi c legislatio n tha t

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comes throug h [fro m the Hous e of Commons], " let alon e get tim e for significant contributio n to th e makin g of foreig n policy. 27 Even i n th e Lowe r House , lac k o f opportunit y t o influenc e foreig n policy ha s a dampenin g effec t upo n th e interes t o f individua l member s in internationa l problems . I n th e Unite d State s Senate , whos e member s may no t merel y influenc e polic y but determin e it , it was not s o long ag o that a newl y electe d colleagu e receive d advic e "t o avoi d servic e o n a fancy committe e lik e tha t o f foreig n affair s i f h e wishe d t o retai n hi s hold upo n hi s constituent s becaus e the y care d nothin g abou t inter national questions." 28 Canadia n constituent s car e littl e more , bu t th e member of the House o f Commons ha s not eve n the consolation o f bein g able t o thwar t the Governmen t o n a foreig n polic y matte r t o whic h h e is opposed . Opportunitie s i n Oppositio n ar e restricte d b y th e Govern ment's readines s to allo w time fo r interrogatio n an d debate , and , a s ha s been shown , this until recently was very little time. I t is naive to suppos e that th e Governmen t is eager t o accep t usefu l suggestion s fro m Opposi tion members . " A fe w of these th e Cabine t ma y b e abl e t o accep t wit h dignity; bu t le t thi s becom e frequent , an d th e electorat e wil l naturall y conclude th e simple r solutio n woul d b e t o plac e i n powe r th e part y which i s s o fertil e i n valuabl e idea s rathe r tha n acquir e the m i n thi s circuitous fashion." 29 Fertilit y i n valuabl e ideas ha s not , however , bee n the conspicuou s characteristi c o f parliamentar y oppositions , especiall y in th e fiel d o f foreig n policy . It i s almos t a s rare , perhap s eve n mor e rare , amon g th e ran k an d file supporter s o f th e Government . To o man y brillian t suggestion s from th e bac k benche s ma y caus e th e fron t benche s t o loo k foolis h b y comparison, an d ar e therefor e discouraged . Light s mus t shin e unde r bushels, i f the y ar e t o illuminat e anythin g a t all . Mor e exactly , the y must shin e i n th e parliamentar y party caucus . What influenc e member s may have in this private* gatherin g depend s mainly o n th e inclinatio n o f thei r leade r t o le t the m hav e thei r say . Mackenzie Kin g ha s bee n describe d a s " a grea t believe r i n th e valu e of discussio n in th e part y caucus, though h e neve r permitte d th e caucu s to determin e policy . H e deliberatel y encourage d th e privat e member s to ai r thei r grievance s an d eve n t o attac k th e Minister s and , a t times , was able in this way to get departmental attitudes and procedures change d without direct interventio n o n his ow n part." 30 Th e vitalit y o f the part y *Or nominall y private . A membe r o f th e C.C.F . part y ha s stated : " I kno w inside o f a n hou r wha t ha s take n plac e i n th e Libera l an d Conservativ e caucuse s and I' m not supposed t o know. . .. All the newspapermen know . . . ." Interview for th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation (hereafte r cite d a s C.B.C . interview) .

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caucus tend s t o fluctuat e wit h th e siz e o f th e parliamentar y following, particularly i n th e Governmen t ranks . I f a majorit y i s small , an d there fore precarious , th e caucu s ca n b e extremel y important ; i f i t i s large , and therefore secure, the tendency is for it to degenerat e into a meaning less ritual . On e membe r o f the exceptionall y larg e (20 5 seats ) Conser vative majorit y whic h b y 196 1 ha d bee n i n powe r fo r thre e year s com plained tha t "W e spen d mos t o f ou r tim e i n caucu s talkin g abou t secretarial servic e o r parkin g space . W e ar e neve r consulte d abou t policy, an d hardl y eve r ge t a chanc e t o discus s i t a t all." * Member s of th e Senat e atten d meeting s o f th e parliamentar y caucu s o f thei r party where , accordin g t o on e senator , the y ar e no t alway s welcom e guests: "The y tal k to o muc h i n caucus . Tha t i s th e complain t o f th e M.P.'s. The y ar e alway s givin g the m th e experienc e tha t the y had , and I thin k th e M.P.'s resen t i t a little."31 If the ordinary member, whether on the Government o r the Opposition side of the House of Commons finds himself without influence upon foreign policy decisions, he has increasing opportunity t o gain some experience of external affairs . H e ma y becom e a membe r o f th e Hous e o f Commons Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs . H e ma y atten d meeting s o f the NAT O Parliamentar y Associatio n o r th e Commonwealt h Parlia mentary Association , an d fraterniz e wit h his congressiona l counterpart s in th e Canada-Unite d State s Interparliamentar y Group . H e ma y b e taken o n guide d tours o f America n defenc e installations. He ma y eve n go to Europ e or the Middl e East , althoug h parliamentar y "junketing " is discourage d an d infrequent . Members o f Parliament , mainl y bu t no t exclusively supporter s o f th e Government , ar e normall y include d i n the Canadian delegatio n t o the General Assembl y o f the United Nations . Such assignment s d o no t brin g th e membe r muc h close r t o th e centres o f decision , bu t the y enabl e hi m t o indulg e i n agreeabl e fashion his interes t i n foreig n affairs , the y flatte r hi s sens e o f self-importance , and the y may contribut e something to hi s knowledge and understanding of worl d problems . It canno t b e said, however, that they have dramatic ally improve d th e qualit y of foreig n polic y debate , eithe r i n th e Hous e of Common s o r i n the Senate . Ther e i s a tendency t o describ e a t lengt h *Quoted i n Blai r Fraser , "Backstag e a t Ottawa, " Maclean's Magazine, Marc h 12, 1960 , p . 2 . Othe r member s o f th e sam e part y disagree , on e remarking : "Caucus [is ] a les s courteou s plac e [than ] th e Hous e o f Commons , a mor e raucous place . . . . Fewe r hold s ar e barre d an d fewe r restraint s ar e place d o n the expression o f a n opinion . . . . The storm s tha t blo w i n caucu s fro m tim e t o tim e are prodigious. " Anothe r describe d th e caucu s a s "completel y unfettered, " an d added: "Ther e hav e bee n Governmen t policie s altere d a s a resul t o f th e expres sion o f opinio n i n caucus. " C.B.C . interview .

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the kin d o f world th e speake r woul d like t o liv e in, an d fo r suc h rever y to pas s fo r seriou s analysis . Ther e i s a tendenc y t o appea l t o th e authority o f the written word, without much regard fo r whose word i t is. Finding a pres s clippin g bearin g upo n the topi c unde r discussion , a member wil l quot e it , wav e i t triumphantl y aloft , an d ru n n o greate r risk tha n t o b e aske d t o cit e th e dat e o f th e newspape r fro m whic h i t is taken o r challenge d t o read th e quotatio n i n it s entirety.* Apar t fro m the foreign policy spokesmen of the various parties, few members troubl e to kee p themselve s really wel l informe d o n specia l problem s o f externa l policy; fe w i f an y ar e capabl e o f contributin g muc h o f originalit y an d value to such subjects as defence o r foreign aid , although there i s a limitless fun d o f expertis e o n fores t management , gol d mining , freigh t rate s and th e Grea t Lake s lamprey . Whatever th e reason s fo r this , i t i s no t fo r wan t o f tim e fo r study—not, a t an y rate , i n th e cas e o f member s o f th e part y i n power . So far fro m bein g overworked, the chie f proble m o f th e ordinar y back bencher i n a larg e majorit y ha s bee n t o fin d enoug h significan t activit y to keep his self-respect. The member for the important Toront o constitu ency o f Yor k Centr e wa s quote d a s havin g said soo n afte r hi s electio n in 1957 : "Wha t a m I suppose d t o do ? Every mornin g I g o to m y offic e at nin e o'clock , sam e a s I d o a t home . B y ten, I' m al l through. . . . How d o I spen d th e res t o f the day? " Tw o years later h e tol d a corres pondent tha t h e coul d "stil l handl e al l his constituenc y business , chec k Hansard, answe r his mail, write five additional letter s eac h da y t o tota l strangers i n his riding to invite their view s on public question s . . . and finish before th e mornin g coffee break , wit h nothing to d o excep t listen . . . . H e think s thi s i s equall y tru e fo r al l private MP s wh o represen t urban riding s on th e governmen t side, an d h e say s most o f the m dislik e it a s muc h a s he does." 32 Evidenc e fro m othe r member s tend s t o bea r out hi s experience . On e Governmen t supporte r tol d a n interviewer : The averag e youn g member i s not bus y an d ther e isn' t sufficien t wor k t o do . That i s a sa d stat e o f affair s i n m y opinion , an d becaus e o f i t you'r e goin g to ge t a differen t typ e o f member . . . . I f yo u called a n electio n soon , I fee l that a lo t o f th e younge r member s woul d no t b e back , becaus e there's no t *"Mr. Pearson: . . . A Washingto n repor t o f las t Saturda y quote s a n officia l o f the Boein g aircraf t compan y a s sayin g tha t th e reduce d fund s fo r al l thes e missiles mad e b y th e Boein g aircraf t compan y wil l permi t n o majo r productio n at all , bu t wil l b e use d onl y t o continu e research . Mr . Diefenbaker: Fro m wha t is th e hon . gentlema n reading ? Mr . Pearson: Fro m a pres s statemen t fro m Washington attributin g a repor t t o a hig h officia l o f th e Boein g aircraf t company . Mr. Diefenbaker: Wha t i s th e newspaper ? Mr . Pearson: I hav e no t go t i t befor e me—Mr. Diefenbaker: Ah. " (Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Marc h 28 , 1960, p . 2502.)

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enough t o do . ... Woul d I com e back ? It' s a lon g wa y from home , let' s put it tha t way . We'r e talkin g her e o n a Saturda y morning , an d I haven' t go t very muc h t o d o fro m Frida y nigh t til l Monda y mornin g o r Monda y after noon at 2.30 . That' s a lon g tim e t o wait. . .. I thin k u p things t o do . Man y things. . . . I'v e jus t com e bac k fro m Squa w Valle y an d now I'm tryin g t o entertain th e ide a o f havin g Canad a hos t th e nex t Olympic s i n 1968 . . . . It's somethin g I'v e dreame d ou t o f m y ow n min d t o kee p m e occupie d an d busy. . . .3S

Members o f the Opposition , however , particularl y o f a smal l Opposi tion, ma y wit h ever y justificatio n plea d th e excus e o f overwork , an d i f they ar e overworke d the y ar e als o understaffed . " I coul d kee p a staf f of a t leas t tw o o r thre e goin g ful l tim e on researc h alone, " th e Opposi tion foreig n polic y criti c wa s quote d a s sayin g in Marc h I960, 34 an d i t is primaril y wit h thos e lik e hi m i n min d tha t variou s suggestion s fo r improving members ' facilitie s fo r researc h hav e bee n pu t forward . On e of thes e i s tha t ther e shoul d b e create d fo r th e Canadia n Parliamen t something simila r t o th e Legislativ e Referenc e Servic e o f th e Librar y of Congress . Parliamen t ha s it s ow n library , bu t n o provisio n i s mad e for assistanc e i n preparin g materia l fo r us e i n speeches , an d i t i s ofte n suggested tha t ther e shoul d b e suc h provision . I t i s jus t a s ofte n over looked, however , tha t th e Legislativ e Referenc e Servic e i s peculiarl y the produc t o f a legislatur e no t onl y independen t o f bu t frequentl y a t loggerheads wit h the executiv e branch o f the Unite d State s government ; to expec t i t t o functio n wit h simila r effectivenes s i n th e parliamentar y system ma y be to expec t to o much . A librar y of Parliament equippe d t o carry ou t researc h fo r oppositio n partie s migh t becom e s o effectiv e a s a sourc e o f criticis m o f governmen t policy a s t o temp t th e Governmen t to withhol d fund s an d cram p it s facilities . I t i s tru e tha t it s facilitie s would b e equall y availabl e t o member s o n th e Governmen t side , an d just a s true tha t the y ma y nee d them; * but , a s alread y pointe d out , th e Cabinet ma y hav e understandabl e i f ignobl e motive s fo r dimmin g th e brilliance o f it s ow n parliamentar y supporters . Fo r thes e reason s th e appropriate sponso r o f legislators' researc h withi n a parliamentar y sys tem o f governmen t is the politica l part y rathe r tha n th e bureaucracy. 35 The mos t effectiv e metho d s o fa r devise d fo r improvin g th e qualit y of parliamentar y discussio n of foreig n polic y i s the us e o f parliamentary committees. Thes e ar e discusse d i n th e followin g sectio n o f thi s chapter. *"I ha d a Governmen t Membe r yesterda y tel l m e tha t . . . h e neve r clip s anything. Th e onl y files he ha s i n hi s drawer s ar e correspondenc e files . Well , thi s is fantasti c . . . bu t point s u p th e nee d fo r research , guidanc e an d advice. " C.B.C. interview.

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PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE S

Suggestions t o creat e fo r th e Canadia n Parliamen t som e counterpar t of th e Foreig n Relation s an d Foreig n Affair s Committee s o f th e Unite d States Congres s wer e firs t mad e a t th e en d o f th e Firs t Worl d Wa r a s part o f th e genera l sentimen t fo r a mor e "democratic " foreig n policy . "There shoul d b e a Foreig n Affair s Committe e o f th e Hous e her e a t Ottawa," wrote a membe r o f th e Pres s Galler y i n 1920 , "whic h shoul d insist a s the American Senate does o n seein g ever y document tha t binds the Britis h Commonwealth . I t migh t no t d o muc h goo d bu t i t woul d put a crim p i n secre t diplomacy." 36 I n Marc h 192 4 a Governmen t motion t o creat e a Standin g Committee o n Industria l an d Internationa l Relations wa s adopte d b y th e Hous e o f Common s withou t debate , an d thirty-three member s wer e appointe d t o it . " I thin k th e combinatio n of industria l an d internationa l problems woul d b e a ver y prope r one, " the Prime Minister remarked . "Internationa l question s deal in very large part wit h industria l matters , an d certainl y ou r industria l problem s ar e becoming mor e an d mor e international i n character."* A mor e specific , though unstated , reason fo r th e od d combinatio n wa s the Government' s intention t o us e th e ne w Committe e t o dea l wit h thos e convention s o f the Internationa l Labou r Organisatio n givin g ris e t o problem s o f juris diction betwee n federa l an d provincia l governments , althoug h th e sol e reference durin g it s firs t fe w year s wa s th e I.L.O . Draf t Conventio n on th e Limitatio n o f Hour s o f Wor k i n Industria l Undertakings . I n later year s onl y tw o matter s o f externa l polic y wer e discusse d b y th e Committee: a plan to promote peac e by university scholarships (referre d to th e Committee i n 1931) ; an d th e questio n o f employin g orienta l seamen o n ship s o f Canadia n registr y (referre d i n 1935) . Afte r 193 6 the Committe e hel d n o furthe r meetings . In Septembe r 1945 , th e Prim e Minister , i n respons e t o suggestion s from member s o f th e Opposition , create d a ne w Hous e o f Commons Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs . It s thirty-fiv e member s (te n constituting a quorum ) ar e appointe d t o reflec t part y standin g i n th e House o f Commons, s o that th e Committe e i s in respec t o f membershi p the Hous e o f Commons i n miniature . Ther e is , however , a goo d dea l less partisan feelin g and repartee. No t onl y have Opposition member s of the Committe e generall y refraine d fro m usin g it a s a forum fo r politica l attacks upo n th e Government ; a numbe r o f Governmen t supporters i n •"Canada, H . o f C . Debates, Marc h 24 , 1924 , p . 617 . Thi s sectio n throughou t owes muc h t o Ole g Ale c Chistoff , "Th e Hous e o f Common s Standin g Committe e on Externa l Aifairs : A n Aspec t o f Parliamentar y Contro l o f Foreig n Polic y i n Canada" (unpublishe d M.A . dissertation , Universit y o f Toronto , 1955) .

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the Committe e hav e criticize d Governmen t polic y t o a degre e unthink able i n th e Hous e o f Commons . A t th e outse t th e Committe e wa s pre vented b y th e rule s o f th e Hous e fro m investigatin g matters othe r tha n those referre d t o i t by the House ; thi s s o restricted th e usefulnes s of th e Committee tha t i n 194 6 th e Prim e Ministe r accepte d a n Oppositio n suggestion tha t th e estimate s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s b e submitted t o th e Committe e fo r scrutiny . Thi s procedure , th e Prim e Minister explained , woul d "giv e th e Committe e a n opportunit y t o dis cuss anythin g that relate s t o externa l affairs . . . . I d o no t believ e it s members wil l b e abl e t o thin k o f anythin g relatin g t o externa l affair s which i t will not b e possibl e t o brin g up b y reference to som e particular appropriation."37 Sinc e 194 6 thi s practic e ha s bee n consistentl y fol lowed, givin g t o th e Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affair s scop e enjoyed b y n o othe r committe e o f Parliament . The mos t importan t function s performe d b y th e Committe e durin g the year s sinc e it s inceptio n are : (i ) expeditin g th e busines s o f th e House o f Commons ; (ii ) extractin g information fro m th e Ministe r an d officials o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs ; (iii ) assistin g th e Government in the formulatio n of policy throug h discussio n unimpaired by part y rancour ; (iv ) examinin g proposed legislatio n o n internationa l affairs t o improv e its quality. It migh t be expecte d tha t th e Governmen t would emphasiz e th e expeditin g an d legislative-scrutinizin g function s of the Committee , whil e th e Oppositio n woul d stres s it s investigativ e an d policy-making roles ; an d durin g th e formativ e year s thes e preference s were clearl y i n evidence. Whil e the Governmen t di d not attemp t t o con fine th e Committee's discussion s t o administratio n a s opposed t o policy , it trie d a t first to restrain an y tendency toward s free-wheeling investiga tion o f foreig n polic y i n th e broades t sense . " I d o no t thin k tha t an y members o f th e Committee, " remarke d th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s i n 1946 , want t o mak e an y determinatio n o f wha t futur e externa l polic y i s t o b e because . . . that i s subject to almos t hourl y change s i n view o f the develop ments takin g place. Probably th e Committe e woul d wis h t o hav e som e infor mation abou t wha t ha s bee n takin g plac e an d wha t ha s bee n th e attitud e taken b y Canad a i n internationa l discussion s s o a s t o for m it s ow n opinio n as t o whethe r tha t wa s prope r o r not , an d wha t i t seem s t o indicat e a s a general trend. 38

After Mr . Leste r Pearso n becam e Secretar y of State fo r Externa l Affair s in 1949 , th e Government' s earl y unfriendlines s t o uninhibite d discus sion o f foreig n polic y b y th e Committe e gav e way t o activ e encourage ment o f suc h discussion . I t i s the practic e fo r th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r

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External Affair s t o appea r befor e th e Committe e a t th e outse t o f it s deliberations t o delive r a genera l polic y statement , an d t o respon d t o questions an d comment s arisin g ou t o f hi s statement , befor e official s of th e Departmen t of Externa l Affair s ar e summone d for interrogatio n on administrativ e matters. " I wil l b e happ y t o b e a s ful l an d fran k a s possible whe n dealin g with question s of policy, " Mr . Pearso n tol d th e Committee i n 1951; 39 an d h e wa s a s goo d a s his word . Whether the Committee may properly assume a policy-formulating role, recommending course s o f actio n t o th e Government , i s a questio n frequently arisin g durin g its work. Th e Governmen t ha s take n th e vie w that it may not formulate policy. "Here we come to a pretty fundamenta l principle," remarke d th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e i n 1950 . "I t i s . . . tha t th e hon . membe r fo r Yor k Wes t wa s no t electe d b y th e people o f Canad a t o mak e suc h decisions." 40 Th e Governmen t ha s occasionally departe d fro m thi s principle , perhap s mos t notabl y i n 1947, whe n th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s attempted t o seek th e Committee' s "fran k opinio n a s t o wha t i t i s advisable , unde r all circumstances, to recommend a t this time" wit h respect t o a proposa l to purchas e housin g fo r th e Canadia n embass y in Washington . Mr . St . Laurent sough t to explai n hi s curiou s initiativ e i n thes e words : As long a s I a m Minister, I d o not mind takin g the responsibilit y fo r matter s which I reall y conside r vital , bu t whe n i t come s t o matter s whic h ar e no t really vital , I shoul d no t lik e t o hav e a controvers y ove r th e manne r i n which w e ar e conductin g th e externa l affairs . Smal l controversie s ca n hav e disastrous effect s o n the large r issues . Therefore , w e want t o avoid , a s muc h as possible , havin g an y smal l controversie s an d reserv e ou r positio n s o that when w e d o hav e a dispute , i t wil l b e abou t somethin g whic h i s reall y vital. . . .41

It i s greatl y t o th e Committee' s credit tha t i t refuse d t o accep t thi s doctrine wit h it s untenabl e distinction s betwee n vita l an d "no t reall y vital" matters , betwee n smal l an d larg e controversies . Th e Oppositio n foreign polic y critic , Gordo n Graydon , expresse d th e sens e o f th e Committee whe n h e remarke d i n reply : The responsibilit y fo r thi s rest s entirel y upo n th e Governmen t an d no t o n this Committee . I thin k th e Committe e must , i n al l fairness , discus s th e question s o the Governmen t wil l the n hav e th e variou s point s o f vie w whic h are brought out . I n this way, the Government may , possibly, arrive a t a mor e sensible, more appropriat e decision . I do not think i t is up to th e Committee . I d o not thin k we should se t a precedent. . . . Such thing s ar e reall y withi n the provinc e o f th e Governmen t rathe r tha n o f Parliament. 42

This vie w wa s later reaffirme d an d ha s prevailed . In 194 9 th e questio n arose whether the Committe e ought to summo n the Canadia n ambassa -

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dor t o China , Mr . T . C . Davis , t o questio n hi m abou t th e wisdo m of recognizing th e Communis t regime . "Nothin g w e ca n fin d ou t fro m Mr. Davis, " a membe r o f th e Committe e remarke d o n tha t occasion , "would b e of any assistanc e in a decision of policy because we have no t got to make that decision." 43 In 195 4 th e Committe e discusse d whethe r the Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s ough t t o infor m i t abou t plan s fo r opening diplomati c missions : Mr. Howard Green: Ar e yo u i n a positio n ye t t o tel l u s wher e th e ne w posts are going to be? Witness (Mr. R . A . MacKay, Department o f External Affairs): I regret , Sir, I a m not . Negotiation s ar e no t complete d i n this matte r an d I thin k i t would b e inappropriate t o make an y public statement . Mr. Green: Th e Departmen t i s stil l takin g th e positio n tha t the y won' t tell us until after th e event . Witness: Well, Sir , I think tha t is a decision fo r the Government. . . . Mr. Green: Tha t mean s tha t th e Committe e ca n hav e n o voic e i n th e decision a s to whether o r no t certai n ne w posts ough t t o b e opened . The Chairman (Mr. L.-P. Picard): Well , I thin k w e ar e a committe e o f the legislativ e branc h an d thes e decision s belon g t o th e executiv e branc h of th e government. 44

The mos t usefu l contributio n o f th e Committe e ha s bee n t o elici t information fro m th e Ministe r an d official s o f th e Departmen t o f External Affair s concernin g both externa l policy an d th e administratio n of externa l policy . I n th e opinio n o f it s ow n members , such succes s a s the Committe e has ha d a s a n investigatin g committee ha s bee n du e t o its ability to question official s directly , thus circumventing the procedur e in the House of Commons where only the Secretar y of State for Externa l Affairs, togethe r wit h th e Prim e Ministe r an d th e Parliamentar y Secre tary, i s availabl e fo r questioning . Th e Committe e ha s bee n carefu l no t to abus e this privilege. Witnesses are treate d wit h courtesy an d respect ; they are no t presse d further i f they plead tha t answer s come better fro m the Ministe r tha n fro m themselves , nor ar e the y cajole d o r bullie d int o disclosing informatio n if the y stat e disclosur e no t t o b e i n th e publi c interest. Thus , h i 1949 , whe n th e Committee considere d whethe r i t should interrogat e th e Canadia n ambassado r t o China , a membe r ex pressed th e sens e of the meetin g when he remarked : " I a m oppose d t o this t o th e las t ditch . I d o no t thin k w e should creat e a preceden t an d call a n ambassado r an d pu t hi m o n th e grille. " Anothe r membe r aske d rhetorically: "D o yo u thin k i t woul d b e prope r fo r thi s Committe e t o look int o th e diplomati c valis e o f an y o f ou r ambassadors ? I t i s stil l worse to as k an ambassado r t o com e here."45 Not al l committees of th e House o f Common s hav e show n suc h consideratio n fo r thei r witnesse s

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and some , indeed , hav e show n a marke d dispositio n toward s "hatche t forays o n civi l servants." 46 Witnesse s appearin g before th e Externa l Affairs Committe e ar e appropriatel y grateful , an d displa y their gratitud e by respondin g t o th e bes t o f thei r abilit y t o questioning . "Fe w Com mittees," remarke d th e Oppositio n foreig n polic y criti c i n 1951 , "hav e found hon . member s mor e satisfie d wit h thei r wor k and the way in which i t i s carried on." 47 In a number o f the other committee s o f the House o f Commons, bot h standing an d a d hoc, foreig n polic y matter s frequentl y come u p fo r dis cussion. For example , during the proceedings o f the Standing Committe e on Mines, Forests and Water in 1959 , consideratio n wa s given to "trad e with Re d China , th e inadequac y o f expor t credi t facilities , th e threa t o f Russian entry into world paper markets, the competition o f cheap labou r in th e Southern U.S.A." 48 The Standin g Committee o n Estimates , whe n reviewing th e propose d expenditure s o f suc h department s a s Nationa l Defence o r Citizenshi p an d Immigration , unavoidabl y move s int o th e realm o f externa l policy . However , thei r practice , unlik e tha t o f th e Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs , almos t invariabl y i s to refrai n from questionin g the broad outline s of government polic y an d t o confin e interrogation t o th e detail s o f departmenta l administration . The succes s o f th e Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affair s i n examining polic y i n it s broades t aspect s ha s le d t o th e suggestio n tha t a simila r Standin g Committe e o n Nationa l Defenc e shoul d b e created . There i s muc h logi c i n th e suggestion . I n fe w othe r area s o f nationa l policy ar e administrativ e decision s relatin g t o expenditur e mor e inti mately connecte d wit h politica l decision s relatin g t o strategy . I n recen t years, enormou s sum s o f mone y hav e bee n devote d t o th e acquisitio n of weapon s whos e strategi c usefulnes s ha s vanishe d eve n befor e the y came int o service , o r whos e strategi c usefulnes s wa s challenge d b y offi cials onc e associate d wit h thei r development , speakin g u p onl y afte r retirement. Th e feelin g wa s widesprea d tha t th e country' s fortun e wa s being squandere d t o n o purpose , an d tha t insufficien t informatio n wa s being mad e availabl e t o Parliamen t an d throug h Parliamen t t o th e public t o permi t a n intelligen t evaluatio n o f wha t ha d bee n don e an d of wha t was proposed. "W e ge t mos t o f ou r informatio n o n continenta l defence, abou t change s i n defenc e concept s an d strategy , fro m th e reports o f [Congressional ] committee s an d no t throug h anythin g w e get fro m th e Governmen t o f Canada, " Mr . Leste r Pearso n complaine d in 1960 . "Al l w e hav e i s a fo g o f silenc e penetrate d occasionall y b y a ministerial platitude." 49 In Marc h 196 0 th e Governmen t responde d t o publi c demand s b y

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creating a special fifteen-membe r Committe e o f the House o f Commons , along th e line s o f a simila r Special Committe e o n Defenc e Expenditure which functione d durin g th e fift h sessio n o f th e twenty-firs t Parliamen t in 1951-2 . I t wa s t o examin e "al l expenditur e o f publi c money s fo r national defence an d al l commitment s fo r expenditur e fo r nationa l defence sinc e Apri l 1 , 1958 , a s reporte d i n publi c accounts , an d t o report fro m tim e t o tim e thei r observation s an d opinion s thereon , an d in particular what , if any, economies consistent wit h the executio n o f th e policy decide d b y th e Governmen t may b e effecte d therein , wit h power to sen d fo r persons , paper s an d records , an d t o examin e witnesses." 50 These term s o f referenc e wer e criticize d b y th e Opposition . The y limited, i t wa s pointe d out , discussio n o f defenc e expenditur e t o wha t had bee n decide d befor e the las t availabl e repor t o f the publi c accounts , and a s this documen t bor e th e date Marc h 31 , 1959 , th e Specia l Com mittee coul d no t tak e up , consisten t wit h it s term s o f reference , th e most recen t an d controversia l o f th e Government' s defenc e decisions — the decisio n t o procee d wit h th e Bomarc-SAG E weapon s system . Th e terms of reference also specificall y confine d th e Committe e t o discussio n within th e framewor k o f establishe d policy . "W e visualiz e a ver y different committee, " declare d th e Leade r o f th e Oppositio n o n Marc h 17, 1960 , one tha t woul d discus s defenc e policy , on e tha t woul d mak e recommenda tions on defence policy . . . . We visualize a committee whic h woul d questio n the Ministe r o n defenc e polic y matters , a committe e whic h whe n necessar y for securit y reasons—an d i t would no t b e necessary ver y often—woul d mee t in camera ; a committe e whic h woul d no t examin e servin g officer s becaus e that i s contrary t o ou r parliamentar y tradition s an d I d o no t thin k i t woul d be wis e . . . , but a committe e whic h coul d examin e expert s i n the field of defence i n this countr y an d outside thi s country an d get their views . . . .51

Such a committe e di d no t materialize . Th e Specia l Committee , i n defi ance o f it s term s o f referenc e an d despit e th e attemp t o f it s chairma n to sto p it , consume d muc h of its time debatin g th e wisdo m of the limit s the Governmen t had place d o n it s freedom of inquiry. A proposal b y its Opposition member s that it should call witnesses other tha n Governmen t officials* wa s defeate d b y a vot e o f th e Committee ( 7 t o 5 ) o n th e grounds that i t "would b e a real departur e fro m ou r practic e i n Canad a to hav e polic y discussion s by thos e wh o hav e n o responsibility." 52 *The Libera l defenc e critic , Mr . Pau l Hellyer , announce d hi s intention , i f th e Committee allowed , t o cal l a s witnes s Dr . Omon d Solandt , forme r chairma n o f the Defenc e Researc h Board ; Genera l Howar d Graham , forme r Chie f o f th e General Staff ; an d Dr . Roge r Hilsman , professo r a t th e John s Hopkin s University .

ChapterFive I N T E L L I G E N C

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THE ORIGIN S AN D DEVELOPMEN T OF INTELLIGENC E FACILITIES

The ter m "intelligence " i s use d throughou t thi s chapte r t o mea n "th e kind o f knowledg e a stat e mus t posses s regardin g othe r state s i n orde r to assur e itsel f tha t it s caus e wil l no t suffe r no r it s understanding s fai l because it s statesme n an d soldier s pla n an d ac t i n ignorance." * I t wa s only slowl y that Canadia n government s cam e to appreciat e th e intimat e connection o f intelligenc e i n thi s sens e an d th e qualit y o f thei r externa l affairs. On e o f th e earlies t occasion s o n whic h th e lesso n wa s drive n home wa s whe n Si r Wilfri d Laurie r summone d Josep h Pop e t o hi s office o n June 22 , 1899 , an d gav e him " a job whic h is nothing else tha n to prepar e th e cas e o f th e Canadia n Govt . i n th e matte r o f th e Alask a boundary."1 Th e searc h thu s begu n fo r material s t o suppor t th e Cana dian contentio n a s t o wher e th e frontie r shoul d ru n revealed , perhap s for th e first time, th e lac k o f eve n th e mos t basi c dat a b y whic h Cana dian vital interests might be safeguarded. It did not take Pope many days to realiz e tha t th e informatio n availabl e i n Canad a wa s wholl y insuffi cient for his purpose, an d on July 1 0 he wrote to a friend in the Colonia l Office fo r assistance : It i s a cas e o f makin g brick s withou t straw . I fin d th e greates t difficult y i n collecting th e paper s necessar y t o a prope r understandin g o f th e case . Ar e there an y blu e book s publishe d abou t 188 8 a t hom e containin g th e corres pondence o f tha t period ? I f ther e ar e I wis h yo u woul d sen d m e a se t o f them—of al l the correspondenc e that ha s bee n publishe d sinc e 1886 . I hav e nothing betwee n th e Russia n Ukas e o f 182 5 & Lord Herschell' s letter s bu t fragmentary despatche s and a few Yankee "E x docs". . . . I dar e sa y you ma y b e surprise d a t m y request s fo r wha t ar e elementar y papers, bu t yo u mus t remembe r m y offic e ha s onl y t o d o wit h th e interna l affairs withi n th e Dominion . Alask a matter s hav e alway s bee n referre d t o the Ministe r o f th e Interior , an d thoug h I sa y i t wit h bate d breath , neve r properly deal t with . . . . We sadly lac k syste m here. 2 *Sherman Kent , Strategic Intelligence (Princeton , 1949) , p . 3 . Othe r studie s relating intelligenc e to foreig n polic y ar e Roge r Hilsman , Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions (Glencoe , 111. , 1956) , an d Harr y How e Ransom , Central Intelligence an d National Security (Cambridge , Mass. , 1958) .

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The materia l wa s dul y supplie d bu t when , a fe w month s later , Pope , his appetit e whetted , wrot e fo r more—"i t i s ver y desirabl e tha t w e should hav e a recor d o f thi s correspondence , an d th e Premie r rathe r looks to me to keep it up" 3—the reply, delaye d for tw o years, indicated that th e British authoritie s coul d not b e counted o n hi future a s regula r purveyors o f confidentia l materials: The P.O . [Foreig n Office] , afte r muc h searchin g o f heart , hav e agree d t o let yo u hav e th e accompanyin g volume s o f th e Alask a Prin t fo r you r personal use , an d o n conditio n tha t whe n yo u ceas e t o b e officiall y seize d of tha t questio n yo u wil l retur n them an d no t pas s them o n t o you r suc cessor. They kno w you but the y ar e scarcel y likel y t o hav e th e acquaintanc e of anyon e wh o succeed s you , a t an y rat e t o suc h a n exten t a s the y dee m requisite for the purpose.4

The searc h fo r informatio n o n Alask a boundar y le d Josep h Pop e t o Washington an d th e Stat e Departmen t i n 1903 , an d there , wit h con siderable reluctanc e o n th e par t o f th e officia l wit h who m h e wa s i n contact (wh o late r becam e apprehensiv e tha t hi s conduc t migh t b e treasonable), h e wa s allowed to photograp h it s collectio n o f documents concerning Russia n occupation of Alaska. 5 The inadequac y o f material s availabl e t o Canadia n government s fo r conducting thei r external relations wa s demonstrate d again a fe w years later whe n the Ministe r o f Labour , Rodolph e Lemieux , wen t t o Japa n to tr y t o negotiat e a treaty limiting th e numbe r o f Japanese wh o would be allowe d t o procee d t o Canad a a s immigrants . Allowe d b y th e British ambassador , Si r Claud e Macdonald , t o rea d Foreig n Offic e papers i n th e embass y library, Lemieu x learned mor e i n Toky o abou t the backgroun d o f th e proble m tha n h e ha d bee n abl e t o fin d ou t h i Ottawa. Je n'a i p u obteni r a Ottaw a [h e wrot e fro m Japan ] qu e de s bribe s d e documents e t d e correspondances, qu i rapportent a c e traite. I I fau t voir e a u contraire le s comm e records d u F.O . a Londre s son t parfait s e t comm e l a genese d u trait e e n es t complete. J'a i p u mettr e l a mai n su r ce s records (1 2 vols. semblable s au x factum s d e l a Cou r d'Appel) . "Forewarned i s forearmed." C'es t en consultant tou t cel a qu e j'ai cause, tou t e n evitant d'aborde r ceux qu i nou s etaien t defavorables . I I faudr a qu e Si r W . [Laurier ] reorga nise dan s l e servic e publi c tou t c e qu i a trai t a l a correspondanc e officielle . II n e fau t plu s qu'ell e soi t reparti e entr e le s different s ministeres. 6

On returnin g to Canada , Lemieu x wrot e t o th e Britis h Foreig n Secre tary to se e if a copy of the serie s coul d be sen t to Ottaw a for th e futur e use o f th e Canadia n Government ; h e emphasize d ho w valuabl e thi s material ha d bee n t o him during his recent negotiation s with the Japan ese authorities , an d promise d tha t it s confidentia l character woul d b e

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respected. Si r Edwar d Gre y replie d tha t i t woul d "no t b e possibl e t o issue complete d volume s of th e serie s owin g to th e stric t rule s w e ar e obliged to observ e with regard to thei r distributio n and t o th e principl e involved i n thes e rules ; but i f yo u wil l specif y wha t specia l documents you ma y wish to have , I wil l gladly do m y best t o mee t your wishes." 7 Lemieux sen t thi s lette r t o Josep h Pop e fo r hi s comments . " I retur n Sir E. Grey' s letter," Pope replied , which I thin k call s fo r n o answer . No t merel y ever y volume , bu t accordin g to m y recollection s nearl y ever y pag e o f th e Confidentia l Prints , contain s some referenc e t o Canada . Th e serie s i s a whole , an d portion s o f i t woul d be of n o use . Wha t a commentar y thi s afford s o n ou r lac k o f system ! I f m y suggestion ha d bee n listene d t o year s ago , w e shoul d no t hav e t o as k anybody fo r thes e paper s today , fo r w e should hav e ha d them ourselves. 8

The growin g need fo r orderl y an d complet e source s o f information to guid e th e Governmen t throug h increasingl y complicate d problem s of externa l policy was a principa l factor leadin g to th e creatio n o f th e Department o f Externa l Affairs . "W e ar e muc h handicappe d here, " Lord Grey , th e Governo r General , had writte n in 1907 , "b y th e wan t of an y organize d Department for th e co-ordinatio n an d reproductio n of information bearin g o n th e relation s betwee n Canad a an d th e U.S." 9 In hi s memorandum of the sam e year to th e Civi l Servic e Commission, Joseph Pop e cite d th e nation' s deficienc y h i wha t a late r generatio n of intelligenc e expert s hav e terme d "basi c descriptiv e intelligence" — "the groundwor k which give s meanin g t o day-to-da y chang e an d th e groundwork withou t whic h speculatio n into th e futur e i s likel y t o b e meaningless"10—as requiring the attention of a special branch of government. This material , he wrote, has bee n s o scattered , an d passe d throug h s o man y hand s tha t ther e i s n o approach t o continuit y i n an y o f th e departmenta l files . Suc h knowledg e concerning the m as is available is, for th e mos t part , lodged i n the memorie s of a fe w officials . . . . A s th e Dominio n grow s thi s stat e o f thing s mus t always b e gettin g worse. I f som e refor m i s no t soo n effecte d i t wil l b e to o late. Eve n now , I a m o f opinio n tha t i t woul d b e a n extremel y difficul t tas k to construc t fro m ou r officia l file s anythin g approachin g t o a complet e record o f an y o f th e internationa l question s i n whic h Canad a ha s bee n con cerned durin g the past fifty years. . . . My suggestio n is , tha t al l despatche s relatin g t o externa l affair s shoul d be referre d by the Priv y Counci l to one department , whos e staf f shoul d contain me n traine d i n th e stud y o f thes e questions . . . . Thes e official s should b e i n close touc h wit h the othe r departments , fro m whic h the y coul d draw al l necessar y information , the ra w material , a s i t were , o f thei r work ; but the digesting of this information, an d its presentation i n diplomati c form , should res t with them. 11

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The creatio n o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s i n 190 9 di d no t and coul d no t o f itsel f brin g int o bein g a stockpil e o f intelligenc e dat a of sufficien t scop e an d qualit y a s t o wor k immediat e improvemen t i n the conduc t o f externa l policy . Tha t ha d t o awai t th e exercis e o f th e right o f legatio n (thu s ensurin g source s o f informatio n independen t of th e Foreig n Office) , and , eve n mor e fundamentally , th e desir e t o strike ou t o n a distinctivel y Canadia n cours e i n foreig n affairs . Bu t i t was a step, however hesitant, i n that direction . During th e year s immediatel y precedin g th e Firs t Worl d War , th e Canadian Governmen t suffered , perhap s fo r th e firs t tim e bu t certainl y not fo r th e last , from a scarcit y of intelligenc e dat a o f th e "speculative evaluative" variety (th e ter m late r assigne d b y professiona l intelligence officers t o th e kin d o f informatio n require d fo r reliabl e predictio n o f probable course s o f actio n o f othe r states 12). Canadia n statesme n during th e year s 1909-1 4 urgentl y neede d som e suc h strategi c assess ment of the intentions o f Germany under the Kaise r in orde r t o respon d appropriately t o Britain' s reques t fo r emergenc y nava l assistance . Th e assumption underlyin g Laurier' s nava l polic y wa s tha t ther e wa s n o emergency. Tha t assumptio n could no t b e s o confidentl y hel d i n 1911 , when th e Borde n Governmen t assume d office , an d th e ne w Prim e Minister di d wha t h e coul d t o obtai n a realisti c appraisa l o f th e likel y danger t o worl d peac e o f th e Flottenpolitik the n i n progress . I n th e absence o f othe r authority , Borde n turne d t o th e Firs t Lor d o f th e Admiralty, Mr . Winsto n Churchill , an d i t wa s fro m thi s eloquen t i f not exactl y impartia l sourc e tha t th e Canadia n Governmen t receive d the informatio n causin g i t t o abando n Laurier' s polic y i n favou r o f a n emergency cas h contributio n t o th e Imperia l Government. 13 The comin g o f the Firs t Worl d Wa r greatl y sharpene d th e anxiet y of the Canadia n Governmen t concernin g th e reliabilit y o f th e intelligenc e sources a t its disposal an d the exten t t o which these wer e being properly exploited. Withi n a year nearl y a quarte r o f a millio n soldier s ha d bee n sent fro m Canada t o th e Western front . Thei r casualtie s were both fear ful an d unexpected , an d a visi t b y th e Prim e Ministe r t o Englan d an d France i n 191 5 lef t hi m i n n o doub t tha t muc h o f th e slaughte r wa s due t o blunder s an d mismanagemen t i n th e strategi c directio n o f th e war. O n hi s retur n t o Canada Borde n cable d t o th e Actin g Hig h Commissioner i n London, Si r George Perley : Please infor m Bona r La w tha t w e woul d appreciat e fulle r an d mor e exac t information fro m tim e t o tim e respectin g conduc t o f Wa r an d propose d military operation s a s t o whic h littl e o r n o informatio n vouchsafed . W e thoroughly realiz e necessit y centra l contro l o f Empir e armie s bu t Govern -

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ments o f oversea s Dominion s hav e larg e responsibilitie s t o thei r peopl e fo r conduct o f War , an d w e dee m ourselve s entitle d t o fulle r informatio n an d to consultatio n respectin g genera l polic y i n Wa r operations . Th e grea t difficulty o f obtainin g information during my recen t visi t t o Londo n seeme d partially occasione d b y lack o f prope r co-ordinatio n betwee n severa l depart ments responsibl e fo r conduc t o f War . Perhap s ne w Counci l o r Committe e can arrang e fo r informatio n an d consultation. 14 As a forme r Canadian , Bona r La w migh t hav e bee n expecte d t o b e sympathetic t o thi s request , an d a s Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Wa r i n a position t o d o somethin g abou t it ; bu t hi s reply t o Borden , transmitte d through th e Actin g High Commissioner , wa s disappointing: We full y realize , I nee d no t say , th e grea t par t whic h you r Governmen t i s playing i n thi s wa r an d a s Si r Rober t Borde n foun d whe n h e wa s her e w e were onl y to o delighte d t o pu t hi m int o possessio n o f al l th e informatio n which wa s availabl e t o th e Cabinet . I t i s o f cours e muc h mor e difficul t t o keep him in touch no w but it is our desir e to give him the fulles t informatio n and i f ther e i s an y wa y whic h occur s t o hi m o r t o yoursel f i n whic h thi s can b e don e I shal l b e delighte d t o carr y i t out . . . . A t th e sam e tim e I should like you to repeat t o him what I hav e sai d to you—tha t i f no schem e is practicable the n i t is very undesirable that th e questio n shoul d b e raised. 16 "Mr. Bona r Law' s lette r i s no t especiall y illuminating, " wa s Borden' s comment, "an d leave s th e matte r exactl y wher e i t wa s before m y letter was sent." He despatched a strongly worded reply: During th e pas t fou r month s sinc e m y retur n fro m Grea t Britain , th e Canadian Government (excep t fo r a n occasional telegra m from yo u [Perley ] or Si r Max Aitken ) hav e had jus t wha t informatio n coul d b e gleane d fro m the dail y Pres s an d n o more . A s t o consultation , plan s o f campaig n hav e been mad e an d unmade, measure s adopte d an d apparentl y abandone d an d generally speakin g step s o f th e mos t importan t an d eve n vita l characte r have bee n taken , postpone d o r rejecte d withou t th e slightes t consultatio n with the authoritie s of this Dominion . It ca n hardl y b e expecte d tha t w e shal l pu t 400,00 0 o r 500,00 0 me n i n the fiel d an d willingl y accep t th e positio n o f havin g n o mor e voic e an d receiving n o mor e consideratio n tha n i f w e were to y automata . An y perso n cherishing suc h a n expectation harbour s a n unfortunat e an d eve n dangerou s delusion.16 This remonstranc e produce d " a numbe r o f th e mos t importan t docu ments whic h hav e bee n circulate d t o th e Wa r Council, " sen t t o th e Canadian Prim e Ministe r wit h instruction s tha t the y b e show n t o no on e els e an d burne d afte r perusal . "The y came, " Borde n late r recalled, "i n a stron g canva s ba g loade d heavil y wit h lead . O n th e voyage, thi s ba g wa s kep t o n th e bridg e unde r direction s t o thro w it overboard in case the ship shoul d be subject t o capture." 17 It als o pro duced a promise by Bonar Law that he would "continu e to se t aside the most importan t [documents ] an d forwar d the m t o yo u later." A t leas t

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one furthe r consignmen t o f thi s characte r reache d Borden , fo r i n Jul y 1916 Si r Georg e Perle y himsel f arrive d i n Ottaw a wit h a bundl e con taining, amon g other items , "fiv e appreciation s o f th e Genera l Staff." 18 Lloyd George' s replacemen t o f Asquit h a s Prim e Ministe r an d hi s creation o f th e Wa r Cabine t i n 191 6 brough t som e improvement i n th e flow of information . The Colonia l Secretar y i n the ne w Government was instructed t o sen d t o th e Canadia n Governo r Genera l " a weekl y lette r for th e personal an d confidentia l informatio n o f [th e Governo r an d his ] Prime Minister." 19 B y Apri l 191 7 thi s ha d give n wa y t o a fortnightl y telegram o f diplomatic intelligence. Th e Canadia n Governmen t was stil l unsatisfied b y these arrangements . In Ma y 191 8 th e Actin g Hig h Com missioner wrote to Si r Robert Borden : You an d I hav e talke d ove r severa l time s th e possibilit y o f obtainin g mor e regularly fo r yo u confidentia l informatio n an d reports . I talke d thi s ove r with th e Colonia l Secretar y mor e tha n onc e bu t n o systemati c arrangemen t was ever put into force. Sinc e Lord Beaverbrook ha s been appointe d Ministe r of Information , I hav e discusse d th e questio n wit h him , an d a coupl e o f months ago he wrote me that he was anxious to furnis h the Prim e Minister s of th e Dominions , throug h th e Hig h Commissioners , wit h th e fulles t con fidential informatio n i n hi s power . H e furthe r wen t o n t o sa y tha t h e wa s willing t o sen d m e confidentiall y for despatc h t o yo u periodi c summarie s of the whole situatio n i n the field and i n political affairs . O f course , I wa s very happy to accept this suggestion an d make an arrangement o f this kind. I t has , however, take n a considerabl e tim e t o pu t i t int o force, an d las t mont h the y wrote m e fro m th e Departmen t sayin g tha t the y foun d i t rathe r a busines s getting things in order and that thei r intelligenc e staf f woul d no t b e complet e for som e weeks . However , everythin g seem s t o be now nearly i n order. . . . I hope , therefore , tha t th e firs t o f thes e report s wil l b e read y i n a fe w day s and tha t thereafte r the y ma y b e forthcomin g regularly. 20

More importan t tha n telegraphe d o r writte n despatche s fro m White hall a s a mean s of keepin g th e Canadia n Government informe d abou t the strategi c directio n o f th e wa r wa s it s membershi p i n th e Imperia l War Cabinet . Th e invitatio n t o Borde n t o atten d " a serie s o f specia l and continuou s meeting s o f th e Wa r Cabine t i n orde r t o conside r urgent question s affectin g prosecutio n o f War , th e possibl e condition s on which in agreement with our Allies we could assent to its termination, and th e problem s whic h wil l the n immediatel y arise " wa s receive d i n Ottawa o n Christma s Day , 1916. 21 Borde n attende d meeting s o f th e Imperial Wa r Cabine t i n February an d March 1917 ; i n June , Jul y an d August 1918 ; an d fro m Novembe r 191 8 throug h Ma y 1919 , meetin g first i n Londo n an d then , a s th e Britis h Empir e Delegatio n t o th e Peace Conference , i n Paris . O f th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet , Lorin g Christie, who , a s Borden's "fide s Achates , ide a man , confidential envo y and genera l righ t han d ma n fo r externa l affairs," 22 sa w muc h o f it s

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deliberations a t first hand, wrote afterwards : "I t brough t th e responsibl e political head s o f th e differen t state s o f th e Empir e fac e t o fac e . . . and i t supplie d them in th e mos t convenient wa y with th e bes t informa tion going . . . . All the commitments o f the Allies, secre t an d otherwise , were lai d befor e them a t th e outse t i n March , 1917 , s o far a s the y ha d not bee n disclose d before . Al l th e card s wer e pu t o n th e table." 23 Ye t even i n thi s bod y ther e wer e th e longueurs inseparable fro m an y com mittee howeve r exalted , an d i n hi s diar y Borde n o n mor e tha n on e occasion vente d hi s impatience . "The n t o Wa r Cabine t wher e som e futile discussio n too k place . As bad a s our Cabinet" (Marc h 29 , 1917) . "Imperial Wa r Cabine t a t 11:3 0 unti l 2 an d long discussio n a s t o channels o f communication . . . . Fool tal k prevaile d i n som e quarters . It i s absur d tha t thi s resul t shoul d hav e take n tw o day s to accomplish " (July 25 , 1918) . An d i t wa s i n th e Imperia l Wa r Cabine t tha t th e Canadian Prim e Ministe r receive d misleadin g estimates o f the economi c advantage t o result fro m participatin g i n the Siberian intervention ; thes e estimates, reinforce d b y equall y misleadin g intelligenc e fro m official s of hi s ow n Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerce, 24 brough t abou t th e Dominion's ill-time d involvemen t i n Russia n affair s i n 1918-19 , fro m which extricatio n wa s t o prov e s o difficult . INTELLIGENCE AN D FOREIG N POLICY: TH E YEAR S BETWEE N THE WAR S

The hop e an d expectatio n o f Si r Rober t Borde n ha d bee n tha t th e Imperial Wa r Cabine t woul d provid e th e basi s fo r a ne w imperia l partnership i n tim e o f peace . A t th e Imperia l Conferenc e o f 192 1 th e prime minister s cas t abou t fo r th e firs t (an d a s i t wa s t o prov e th e final) tim e fo r som e wa y o f implementin g th e protea n Resolutio n IX , which i n 191 7 ha d promise d the m "a n adequat e voic e i n foreign policy and i n foreig n relations, " a n ambiguou s formul a designe d t o satisf y equally thos e whos e eyes wer e fixe d upon th e promise d lan d o f uncon ditional autonom y an d thos e t o who m perfectio n i n imperia l affair s meant a singl e Empir e polic y formulate d i n Downin g Street . Bu t th e Imperial Conferenc e di d no t giv e it s blessin g t o a n Imperia l Peac e Cabinet. Publicly it gave its blessing to very little. Bu t behin d the scene s it wa s though t tha t th e problem s o f empir e coul d b e solve d b y th e panacea o f improve d communications . "Wha t yo u want, " th e Britis h Foreign Secretar y tol d th e member s o f th e Imperia l Conference ,

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is greate r knowledg e an d greate r influenc e o n matter s whic h concer n yo u as parts o f the Empire , an d i n which yo u yourselves , you r Parliaments , you r troops, ma y be involved. Now, ho w can w e bring tha t about ? The suggestio n I mad e t o th e Prim e Ministe r [Lloy d George ] wa s this : yo u want , befor e you ar e involve d i n action , t o kno w wha t ha s happened , t o kno w wha t i s happening fro m da y to day . I think , s o far a s I ca n ascertain , you r presen t knowledge i s inadequate . Wha t d o yo u ge t now ? Onc e a week , I believe , there i s sen t ou t t o yo u . .. a pape r calle d "Th e Britis h Empir e Report" , and anothe r calle d "Th e Foreig n Countrie s Report" , whic h contain s a con densed summar y o f th e information , telegraphi c an d otherwise , o f th e pre ceding week . No w loo k a t th e contras t betwee n tha t an d wha t happen s when yo u com e here . A s lon g a s you ar e i n Londo n yo u ge t th e telegram s from da y t o day , yo u ge t a selectio n o f despatche s an d paper s sen t t o yo u by m e o n importan t matters , an d yo u ge t . . . th e paper s recordin g th e interviews o f th e Foreig n Ministe r wit h various Ambassador s an d Ministers , and th e paper s h e supplie s t o th e Cabinet . Canno t w e brin g you r positio n when yo u ar e awa y fro m her e int o close r conformit y wit h tha t whic h exist s when yo u are here? . . . The suggestion I mad e t o the Prim e Ministe r was this: tha t w e might send out to you, to the Prime Minister s o f the Dominions , once a month , or , i f necessary , onc e a week , a selectio n o f thos e extremel y confidential Foreig n Offic e Paper s whic h ar e no w see n onl y b y th e Cabine t and circulate d t o ou r representative s i n ou r Embassie s an d Legation s abroad.

At thi s junctur e th e Foreig n Secretar y wa s interrupte d b y th e Prim e Minister o f Australia . "Yo u ar e speaking, " sai d Willia m Hughes , "o f sending it by post." "Yes, " Curzon answered, "and a great crisis leading up t o wa r doe s no t develo p i n a wee k o r two . A wa r o r an y grea t affair i n whic h yo u ar e concerne d i s th e resul t o f a proces s tha t ha s been going on for severa l weeks or months." 25 The firs t "grea t affair " i n whic h Canad a wa s subsequentl y involved brought th e countr y to th e brin k o f wa r no t durin g "severa l week s o r months," a s Curzon had predicted, but i n a matter of hours. This was the Chanak crisis . A s i t happene d th e Canadia n Prim e Ministe r learne d of Mustaf a Kemal' s threat t o th e Neutra l Zon e no t throug h a despatc h from th e Unite d Kingdo m Governmen t bu t fro m a loca l newspaper . So muc h migh t have bee n forgiven , eve n thoug h ha d Mackenzi e Kin g been i n Ottaw a rather tha n i n Newcastle , Ontario , h e woul d stil l have been notifie d o f th e crisi s throug h th e pres s rathe r tha n throug h th e regular channe l o f th e Governo r General' s office . Les s easil y par doned wa s th e inadequac y o f Britis h intelligenc e report s durin g th e preceding weeks . N o cable d despatche s fro m an y departmen t o f th e United Kingdo m Governmen t ha d bee n receive d i n Ottaw a prio r t o Winston Churchill's "invitation " t o th e Dominion s t o sen d troops . Foreign Offic e report s o n Turke y an d th e Nea r East , travellin g by se a

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bag, ha d bee n arrivin g a t irregula r intervals . Bu t i n n o cas e wa s a report receive d unde r thre e week s fro m th e tim e o f it s despatch ; i n most case s well over a month elapsed betwee n transmissio n an d receipt; on a singl e da y (Augus t 28 , 1922 ) n o fewe r tha n eigh t reports arrive d at once , thei r date s o f origi n varying from Jul y 1 7 to Augus t 5 ; and n o reports a t al l wer e receive d durin g the te n day s (Septembe r 7 t o 16 ) immediately precedin g th e crisis . Moreover , th e informatio n containe d in suc h Foreig n Offic e materia l tha t di d arriv e lef t muc h t o b e desired . The repor t o f Jul y 2 5 (receive d o n Augus t 28 ) suggeste d tha t th e Greek Arm y was "never i n a more healthy or efficien t state. " The repor t of Augus t 1 5 (receive d o n Septembe r 6 an d th e las t t o reac h Ottaw a before th e Churchil l "invitation" ) consiste d o f a cop y o f a memoran dum fro m th e Italia n ambassado r i n Londo n containin g th e assuranc e that "th e Turk s ar e beginning to conside r wit h increase d inclinatio n th e necessity o f terminatin g the war." 26 I n th e ligh t o f thes e fact s a late r accusation b y Th e Times tha t th e reaso n th e Dominion s remaine d i n ignorance o f th e crisi s unti l i t burs t upo n the m wa s tha t thei r govern ments faile d t o rea d th e despatche s sen t t o the m b y th e Foreig n Offic e was rendere d mor e gallin g b y it s furthe r observatio n tha t readin g despatches "i s n o doub t a laboriou s task , an d i f ther e i s n o excus e for Minister s shirkin g it i n London , i t i s clearly harde r fo r Minister s i n Ottawa o r Pretoria to giv e their time to matters which lie so far away." 27 Had th e Canadia n Governmen t o f that da y bee n anxiou s t o develo p its own effective foreig n policy, th e onl y logical respons e t o the failure of the Britis h Governmen t t o provid e i t wit h som e advanc e notic e o f th e likelihood o f war i n the Middl e East was to pres s strongl y for improve d methods of communication, and t o exercis e th e righ t of legation grante d to Canad a i n 1920 . N o effor t wa s mad e t o mov e i n eithe r o f thes e directions. A n active and independent rol e in world affair s wa s about the last thin g th e Canadia n peopl e wante d a t thi s time . "Ther e i s a curiou s tiredness ove r 'foreig n affairs', " th e edito r o f a Toront o newspape r wrote privatel y i n 1920 . "W e hav e hear d s o muc h o f Wa r Cabinet s and League s o f Nation s an d Ambassador s t o Washingto n . . . tha t many peopl e begi n t o as k i f w e hav e an y question s o f ou r ow n an d whether o r no t ou r statesme n hav e an y interes t i n th e problem s o f Canada."28 The Canadian Prim e Ministe r wa s quick t o sens e thi s moo d and eage r t o cate r t o it . T o improv e th e qualit y o f informatio n migh t sharpen th e obligatio n t o tak e initiatives , an d t o avoi d thi s unpalatabl e situation Mackenzi e King deliberately shielde d himself and his colleague s from intelligenc e whic h migh t mak e isolatio n les s defensible . Thu s h e

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repeatedly turne d dow n suggestion s tha t hi s Hig h Commissione r i n London shoul d meet regularly wit h th e Secretar y of State for Dominion Affairs o r wit h th e Foreig n Secretary , in th e compan y of hi s Dominion colleagues, t o b e furnishe d wit h backgroun d information.* No r wa s h e in a hurr y t o creat e a diplomati c missio n a t Washington . While hi s delay was partl y due to the oppositio n of his Ministe r of Financ e and to th e difficult y o f findin g a suitabl e appointee, the desir e t o improv e his Government's information abou t American affairs wa s not a strongly countervailing factor . Indee d whe n Merchan t Mahoney , th e agen t of th e Departmen t of Externa l Affairs wh o looke d afte r suc h Canadian interests a s th e Britis h embassy i n Washingto n lef t unattended , offere d to sen d t o Ottaw a a dail y summar y o f th e activitie s o f th e Congres s when i n session , the Prim e Minister's office replie d that a dail y bulletin was too much and a weekly woul d be better. 29 A good deal of the infor mation reachin g th e Canadia n Governmen t o n Unite d State s affair s bearing upon Dominion interests cam e neithe r fro m th e Britis h embass y nor fro m th e Department' s agent i n Washingto n but fro m a Canadian newspaperman, To m King , who m th e Cabine t authorize d in 192 2 "t o *As Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Dominio n Affair s a t th e time , Leopol d Amer y late r wrote, "i t wa s lef t t o m e t o kee p i n touc h wit h th e Hig h Commissioner s a s bes t I could . I n th e pres s o f wor k thi s wa s no t easy , unles s som e particula r matte r o f special importanc e calle d fo r a n interview . S o I readil y too k u p a suggestio n o f Mr. Pete r Larkin's , th e Canadia n Hig h Commissioner , tha t I shoul d b e 'a t home ' one mornin g every week for al l th e Hig h Commissioners . Thi s worke d admirably , giving m e a n opportunit y o f tellin g the m collectivel y o f wha t wa s goin g o n i n 'high polities' , a s wel l a s i n economi c o r othe r affair s i n whic h the y wer e generally interested . . . . Unfortunately , whe n Mackenzi e Kin g hear d o f thi s a t the tim e o f th e Imperia l Conferenc e [o f 1926] , h e a t onc e suspecte d a siniste r design on my par t of graduall y workin g toward s som e sor t of Imperia l polic y council situate d i n London—th e grea t bugbea r whic h h e alway s dreaded . S o poor Larki n ha d t o com e an d tel l me , ver y apologetically , tha t h e wa s no t allowed t o se e me except b y himself." L . S . Amery, M y Political Life, I I (London , 1953), p . 377 . Th e Foreig n Secretar y commente d privatel y a t th e tim e o f th e disadvantage t o hi m o f havin g "n o agen t o f th e Canadia n Governmen t her e wit h whom I a m authorize d b y tha t Governmen t t o discus s confidentiall y thes e problems. . . . Wha t I shoul d lik e t o se e i s a bod y o f Hig h Commissioner s possessing th e politica l confidenc e o f thei r Governments , chose n fo r thei r political ( I d o no t mea n party ) qualifications , an d authorize d t o mee t m e regularly a s a body to discus s the urgen t question s o f the da y an d th e developmen t of event s a s they occur . . .. If thes e me n kne w the mind s o f thei r Governments , 'devilled' th e Foreig n Offic e paper s fo r them , an d wer e i n clos e touc h wit h them , they woul d a t leas t kno w wha t point s in ou r polic y mos t affecte d thei r respectiv e Dominions, woul d cal l th e attentio n o f thei r Government s t o whateve r migh t particularly concer n them , an d coul d elici t an y furthe r explanation s o r informa tion whic h the y wer e instructe d b y thei r Government s t o seek. " Si r Auste n Chamberlain t o Si r Robert Borden , Feb . 27 , 1926 , Christi e Papers .

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furnish u s wit h confidentia l report s from tim e to time." * Fo r th e nex t few year s To m Kin g wrot e hi s "despatches " i n th e for m o f persona l letters to th e Prim e Minister ; they wer e read , an d frequentl y answered , and th e qualit y o f thei r informatio n wa s suc h tha t Mackenzi e King continued t o us e thi s unusua l sourc e eve n afte r th e openin g o f th e Canadian legation in 1927 . Of th e thre e world capital s wher e aggression s leadin g t o th e Second World Wa r wer e spawne d an d hatched , only on e b y 193 9 was th e sit e of a Canadian diplomatic mission. The legatio n at Toky o neither fore warned the Governmen t of the dange r of Japanese militarism no r offere d wise counse l whe n th e dange r becam e obvious . Canada' s first minister to Japan , appointe d i n 192 8 and remainin g throughout th e Manchuria n crisis, wa s Herbert Marler . Lik e th e Ministe r t o th e Unite d States , Mr . Vincent Massey , Marle r had bee n a membe r o f th e Mackenzi e Kin g administration whos e diplomati c postin g followe d soo n afte r th e dis appointment o f bein g unabl e to secur e electio n to th e Hous e of Commons. Hi s backgroun d i n busines s an d finance , togethe r wit h th e diplomatist's traditiona l sympathy fo r th e countr y o f hi s mission , predisposed hi m t o th e caus e o f Japa n an d rendere d hi m susceptibl e t o *The Prim e Ministe r officiall y recommende d thi s appointmen t i n a lette r t o th e Governor-in-Council date d Octobe r 25 , 1922 : "Th e undersigne d ha s th e honou r to represen t tha t You r Excellency' s adviser s hav e fo r som e tim e pas t bee n im pressed wit h th e desirabilit y o f havin g a residen t corresponden t connecte d wit h the pres s a t Washington , wh o woul d b e i n a positio n t o ascertai n an d repor t confidentially fro m tim e t o tim e wha t i t migh t b e o f interes t fo r th e Canadia n Government t o kno w touchin g legislative , administrativ e an d judicia l proceeding s in that capital . "The undersigne d understand s tha t foreig n government s ver y generall y emplo y in suc h capacit y America n newspapermen , wh o ca n tal k wit h Senators , Con gressmen, an d executiv e official s wit h th e objec t o f findin g ou t an d reportin g what i t ma y b e usefu l fo r thei r principal s t o know . Man y thing s ar e happenin g i n Washington fro m da y t o da y o f importanc e t o th e Canadia n Government . Durin g the comin g sessio n ther e wil l n o doub t com e u p fo r consideration question s o f special interes t t o th e Dominion , such , fo r example , a s th e regulatio n o f nava l strength o n th e Grea t Lakes ; th e re-writin g o f th e Transportatio n Act , especiall y those section s dealin g wit h labou r an d labou r disputes; th e Bora h Bill , whic h ha s already passe d th e Senate , exemptin g American coasta l vessel s fro m th e paymen t of toll s o n th e Panam a Canal ; tarif f legislation ; th e Shi p Subsid y Bill , an d others . The mos t importan t wor k i n connectio n wit h thes e subject s wil l b e don e i n committee, th e proceeding s o f which ar e ofte n no t reporte d a t all . I t i s particularly desirable, havin g regar d t o thes e an d othe r questions , tha t w e shoul d hav e a trustworthy agen t o n th e spo t closel y t o watc h thi s committe e wor k an d t o furnish u s wit h confidentia l reports fro m tim e t o time . "The undersigne d accordingl y recommend s tha t he be authorize d to engag e in that capacit y th e service s o f Mr . T . W . King , formerl y connecte d wit h th e Canadian Press , Limited , an d no w doin g journalisti c wor k a t Washington , an d to pa y hi m therefor , ou t o f th e Vot e fo r Canadia n representatio n i n th e Unite d States. . . ."

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propaganda tha t it s soldier s wer e bringin g la w an d orde r t o a dis ordered China . Hi s despatche s t o th e Bennet t Governmen t doubtles s reflected th e pro-Japanese bia s to be found i n his private correspondenc e of th e perio d wit h th e Leade r o f th e Opposition, 30 althoug h hi s Prim e Minister's declaratio n a t th e heigh t o f th e crisi s tha t h e wa s unabl e t o offer a n opinion o n event s in the Fa r Eas t becaus e o f "th e sligh t knowl edge tha t we possess"31 suggests that th e intelligenc e the y containe d wa s neither extensiv e no r important . The lac k o f a legatio n a t Rom e ma y hav e deprive d th e Canadia n Government o f informatio n withou t placin g it s policie s a t a disadvan tage, fo r th e mor e tha t wa s know n abou t fascis m i n it s Mediterranea n setting th e bette r dispose d a significan t grou p o f Canadian s becam e towards it . Th e loft y sentiment s o f doctrin e elaborate d b y Mussolini' s publicists, wit h thei r apotheosi s o f order , discipline , family , nation , their pseudo-syndicalis t remedie s fo r industria l unrest , thei r shril l assault upo n th e liberal values, gaine d powerfu l suppor t amon g the elit e of Frenc h Canad a whic h a Canadia n governmen t disregarde d a t it s peril. National Socialis m wa s somethin g els e again . Bu t diagnosi s of th e Nazi movemen t wa s hindere d b y th e severit y o f economi c depressio n at hom e an d b y th e isolationis t tradition. * Event s i n German y wer e consistently misconstrue d a s a nationalis t reviva l of the traditiona l type , distinguished, perhaps , b y th e od d fanaticis m o f it s leaders , b y th e strut an d swagge r of its rank an d file, but fo r al l that a movement whic h might b e comprehende d i n traditiona l terms , appease d an d containe d by traditiona l methods . Th e intelligenc e whic h migh t hav e pu t t o fligh t such wishfu l thought s wa s lacking . Th e Canadia n Government , havin g no missio n a t Berlin , necessaril y relie d o n whateve r Whitehal l migh t select fo r it s instructio n fro m th e despatche s o f Si r Nevil e Henderson , and thes e conveye d a sadl y erroneous interpretatio n o f Naz i polic y an d motives, f Thi s unhelpfu l sourc e was supplemente d b y th e assessmen t of the Canadia n Ministe r i n Paris , Philipp e Roy , wh o informe d hi s Government o n Septembe r 9 , 1938 , tha t Hitler , bein g "a n intelligen t man," woul d no t "tak e th e ris k o f spoilin g hi s wonderfu l achievement s in Germany. " Ther e remaine d tha t o f th e Hig h Commissione r i n Lon don. Mr . Vincen t Massey , whos e mos t endurin g wor k i n a lifetim e of *This vie w i s elaborate d i n m y essa y "' A Lo w Dishones t Decade' : Aspect s o f Canadian Externa l Policy , 1931-1939 " i n H . L . Keenleysid e e t at., Th e Growth of Canadian Policies i n External Affairs (Durham , N.C. , 1960) , pp . 59-80 . f During th e Munic h crisi s Henderso n wrot e o f "Hitler' s ow n lov e fo r peace , dislike o f dea d German s an d hesitatio n o f riskin g hi s regim e o n a gambler' s throw." Quote d i n Feli x Gilbert , "Tw o Britis h Ambassadors : Pert h an d Henderson" i n Gordo n A . Crai g an d Feli x Gilbert , eds. , Th e Diplomats: 19191939 (Princeton , 1953) , p . 543 .

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public servic e stil l la y ahead , wa s the n a gifte d an d experience d diplo matist; bu t hi s closes t associate s i n Britai n wer e o f th e grou p whic h moved wit h disastrou s effec t betwee n Cliveden , Printin g Hous e Squar e and Downin g Street, an d nothin g he learne d fro m the m seem s likel y t o have provide d a usefu l correctiv e t o th e misleadin g despatche s passe d on b y the Dominion s Office. 32 The mos t misleadin g information was derive d a t firs t hand . I n 193 7 Mackenzie Kin g decide d t o g o fro m th e Imperia l Conferenc e t o Germany. Ther e h e me t an d talke d wit h Hitle r an d othe r leadin g per sonalities o f the Third Reich . Lik e s o many others, th e Canadia n Prim e Minister fel l victi m to th e Fiihrer's remarkable capacit y fo r mesmerizing his visitors . "Ther e i s n o doub t tha t Hitle r ha d a powe r o f fascinating men," Mr . Churchil l wrot e in his memoirs ; an d adde d th e sag e advice : "Unless th e term s ar e equal , i t i s bette r t o kee p away." 33 A s betwee n the Prim e Ministe r o f Canad a an d th e perpetrato r o f the Naz i Schrechlichkeit the term s were far fro m equal , an d th e exten t o f Hitler's advan tage ma y b e measure d i n th e opinion s wit h whic h Mackenzi e Kin g returned t o Canada an d which he shared with its public over the nationa l radio: "O f thi s I a m certain . . . . Neithe r th e government s no r th e peoples o f an y countrie s I hav e visite d desir e war , o r vie w th e possi bility o f wa r betwee n eac h other , a s othe r tha n likel y t o en d i n self destruction, an d th e destructio n o f Europea n civilizatio n itself." 34 That th e destructio n o f Europea n civilizatio n wa s precisel y th e Naz i objective wa s "speculative-evaluativ e intelligence " whic h th e Canadia n Prime Ministe r di d not have at his disposal; for , as was remarked o f him in a differen t connection , "Mr . Kin g neve r quit e go t i t int o hi s hea d during hi s economi c studie s a t Toront o an d Harvar d tha t ou r civiliza tion i s dominated b y carnivorous animals." 35 INTELLIGENCE AN D FOREIG N POLICY: TH E SECON D WORLD WA R

The Second Worl d War helped t o dispel some (but not all) o f that "antiDowning Stree t complex " fro m whic h Mackenzi e Kin g ha d suffere d in th e 1930' s an d o f whic h th e Britis h Commonwealt h o f Nation s wa s so nearl y th e victim. * On e inhibitio n soo n t o disappea r wa s th e edic t against meeting s o f th e Canadia n Hig h Commissione r i n th e compan y *A justificatio n of thi s statemen t i s contained i n m y essay , " 'A Lo w Dishones t Decade,'" pp. 72-5 .

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of hi s Dominio n colleague s wit h th e Foreig n Secretar y o r th e Secretar y of Stat e fo r Dominio n Affair s t o receiv e background information supple menting th e dail y despatches . Thi s ster n prohibitio n wa s i n forc e a s late a s 1939 , an d was relaxed onl y when the High Commissioner pleade d that th e pressur e o f busines s o n member s o f th e Britis h Governmen t was making it difficul t fo r hi m continuall y to b e requestin g special audi ences. Onl y afte r th e wa r bega n di d meeting s tak e plac e o n a regula r rather tha n o n a sporadi c basis . "Thei r immediat e practica l purpose, " an authorit y ha s noted , "wa s th e conveyin g o f up-to-dat e an d accurat e information abou t wartim e development s t o th e Dominio n representa tives fo r transmissio n whe n the y deeme d i t desirabl e t o thei r govern ments, bu t the y serve d equall y a s a channe l b y whic h th e view s o r the representation s o f dominio n government s coul d b e conveye d b y their Hig h Commissioner s t o th e Secretar y o f Stat e o r t o th e Foreig n Secretary."36 The wa r gav e grea t impetu s a s wel l t o th e flo w o f informatio n i n the despatche s whic h dail y wen t ou t fro m Londo n t o th e Dominio n capitals—"sheaves of telegrams," as the Secretar y o f State fo r Dominio n Affairs describe d them , "o n al l an d ever y subjec t o f mutua l interest — foreign affairs , economi c development , militar y co-operation , eve n domestic issue s her e whic h ar e likel y t o interes t ou r partners . W e tell the m everythin g w e can." 37 I n th e vie w o f Mr . Winsto n Churchil l too muc h wa s communicate d t o th e Dominio n government s i n thi s fashion; i n Decembe r 194 0 h e enjoine d th e Dominion s Offic e "no t t o scatter s o much deadly and secret information over this very large circle" or t o "ge t int o th e habi t o f runnin g a kin d o f newspape r ful l o f deadl y secrets."38 Of greate r significanc e tha n th e quantit y o f materia l thu s receive d was it s quality ; i t i s a t leas t arguabl e tha t th e Dominio n government s would hav e bee n serve d bette r ha d the y receive d nothin g a t al l rathe r than the distorted view s relayed t o them i n the later 1930's . The qualit y of informatio n sen t ou t b y th e Churchil l Government , however , wa s of a different , an d better , grade , th e mor e valuabl e fo r bein g truste d by it s recipients . (Marsha l Stalin , i t wil l b e recalled , pai d n o hee d t o the warnin g of Mr. Churchil l i n February 194 1 tha t Britis h intelligenc e sources had informatio n leading them to believ e that a German invasio n of Russi a woul d tak e plac e som e tim e i n Jun e o f that year. ) "Th e coo l and carefu l appreciatio n o f the militar y situatio n prepared b y the Chief s of Staf f an d sen t ou t o n 4 May 1940, " writes Professor Mansergh , "wa s a model o f its kind." 39 Hardly a model (fo r it wil l stand alone) , bu t n o less valuable , wa s th e documen t compose d b y Mr . Churchil l himsel f

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on Jun e 16 , 1940 , to lessen the shock of the fal l o f France fo r th e prim e ministers an d peoples of the Dominions. "I n i t he explained tha t Britain's resolve t o continu e the struggl e alon e wa s 'not base d upo n mer e obstin acy or desperation ' bu t upo n a n assessmen t o f 'th e rea l strengt h o f ou r position', whic h h e the n proceede d t o examin e i n som e detail. " A s h e observed later , "al l came true." 40 Lapses wer e inevitable . O n Septembe r 19 , 1941 , ther e wen t ou t from th e Dominion s Offic e a woefully inadequat e appraisa l o f th e situa tion i n the Fa r East , detectin g "sign s o f a certai n weakenin g i n attitud e of Japa n toward s Unite d State s an d ourselves, " reportin g a n improve ment i n th e defence s o f Malaya , urgin g th e reinforcemen t o f th e garrison a t Hon g Kong , an d requestin g Canadia n troop s fo r tha t pur pose.* There wer e als o errors o f omission. Th e offe r o f union to Franc e in Jun e 1940 , the ultimatu m to th e Frenc h flee t an d it s bombardmen t at Oran , th e tex t o f th e Atlanti c Charter , th e unconditiona l surrende r formula—these wer e som e o f th e matter s o f momen t t o th e Canadia n Government abou t whic h i t wa s not consulte d an d whic h consequentl y provoked in Mackenzie King reactions ranging from irritatio n to outrage . But notwithstandin g th e occasiona l breakdown , th e Canadia n Prim e Minister wa s highl y satisfie d bot h wit h th e machiner y fo r transmittin g intelligence between members of the Commonwealth and with the qualit y of th e informatio n thus transmitted. Mackenzi e King's fervent defenc e of the syste m delivere d t o th e Canadia n Hous e o f Commons o n Februar y 17, 1941 , an d late r tha t yea r i n Londo n i s i n strikin g contras t t o Sir Rober t Borden' s dissatisfactio n a t a comparabl e stag e o f th e pre ceding war. One o f the consideration s i n his rejection o f the proposa l t o reconsti tute th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinet , mentione d i n hi s speeche s o n th e subject i n 194 1 bu t no t ther e give n th e prominenc e i t assume d i n *The tex t o f thi s fatefu l telegra m i s give n i n ful l i n Col . C. P . Stacey , Si x Years o f War: The Army i n Canada, Britain an d th e Pacific (Ottawa , 1955) , pp. 440-1. The Ministe r o f Nationa l Defenc e a t th e tim e late r admitte d tha t "th e considerations se t ou t i n th e telegra m wer e ver y largel y th e factor s whic h influenced me " i n recommendin g t o th e Canadia n Governmen t tha t troop s b e sent to Hong Kong. (Quote d i n ibid., p. 442). Canada wa s no t th e onl y Dominio n t o suffe r a s th e resul t o f poo r intelligenc e from th e Unite d Kingdo m Government . I n it s despatche s t o Australi a an d Ne w Zealand urgin g the us e o f thei r troop s i n Greec e i n 1941 , "the hope tha t Turke y and Yugoslavi a migh t act wa s mentioned afte r Ede n an d other s ha d sai d explicitl y that n o suc h hop e wa s reasonable . . . . Moreover , on e o f Eden' s las t cable s [to London ] wa s no t repeate d t o Ne w Zealand . I t reported , amon g othe r things , that Longmore , fo r th e Ai r Force , wa s no t confiden t tha t h e coul d giv e adequat e air suppor t t o th e operations . . . ." F. L . W. Wood, Th e New Zealand People a t War: Political an d External Affairs (Wellington , 1958) , pp . 183-4 .

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his ow n mind , wa s th e nee d fo r th e Prim e Ministe r o f Canad a t o sta y within clos e cal l o f th e Presiden t o f th e Unite d States . Th e associatio n of Frankli n Roosevel t an d Mackenzi e Kin g ha d no t begu n i n studen t days a t Harvar d Universit y (King' s graduat e wor k ther e wa s don e i n 1897-9, wherea s Roosevel t entere d Harvar d a s a n undergraduat e i n 1900), bu t tha t Mackenzi e Kin g allowe d a popular belie f t o th e contrary t o persis t suggest s the infinit e satisfactio n he derive d fro m a rela tionship h e wa s later won t t o describ e i n somewha t extravagan t terms . Their meeting s a s Presiden t an d Prim e Ministe r ha d begu n i n Marc h 1937; the y reache d th e summi t o f achievemen t i n th e rendezvou s a t Ogdensburg i n August 1940 . Such meeting s wer e o f valu e chiefl y fo r th e polic y decision s whic h were thei r outcome , bu t thei r importanc e a s a sourc e o f informatio n is not t o b e overlooked . Indee d th e cable s sen t b y th e Prim e Ministe r of Canada t o th e Prim e Minister o f the Unite d Kingdo m in th e summe r of 1940 conveye d th e content s o f th e President' s min d wit h mor e fidelit y than di d those reaching Mr. Churchil l fro m Lor d Lothian , hi s ambassador i n Washington ; for a fe w fleeting weeks th e Canadia n Governmen t fully justifie d it s subsequently inflated reputatio n a s the Anglo-America n "interpreter." Thereafter , a s Mr . Churchil l an d Frankli n Roosevel t forged thei r ow n friendship , an d a s Anglo-America n co-operatio n grew mor e intimat e i n ever y aspec t o f th e commo n cause , th e Unite d Kingdom an d the Unite d State s ha d steadil y less need of an interpreter' s services. Th e Canadia n Government, n o longe r sol e confidan t o f each , became increasingl y preoccupied with the vexin g task o f tryin g to kee p itself informe d o f wha t th e strategist s of th e Gran d Allianc e wer e u p to. I n Novembe r 1941 , th e Unite d State s governmen t consulte d repre sentatives of the United Kingdom , China, the Netherlands an d Australi a concerning negotiation s tha t ha d bee n i n progres s betwee n America n and Japanes e official s sinc e September ; bu t despit e wha t a n America n historian ha s describe d a s "the clear Canadia n interes t i n th e politica l and securit y problem s o f th e Pacific, " th e Canadia n Governmen t wa s at n o tim e consulte d or informed. * Thi s wa s only th e firs t o f a numbe r of simila r episode s i n th e month s t o follow . The appointmen t i n 194 2 o f Majo r Genera l Mauric e Pop e a s th e War Committee' s representative i n Washington, an d th e creatio n durin g *CoI. Stanle y W . Dziuban , Military Relations between th e United States an d Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington , D.C. , 1959), p . 70 . "Th e failure t o includ e Canada amon g th e power s invite d t o discus s th e Pacifi c problem s i n lat e November," Sumne r Welle s note d afte r a conversatio n wit h th e Canadia n charge d'affaire s i n Washington , "continued , despit e al l explanations , t o rankle. " lbid.,p.7l.

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the sam e yea r o f th e Canadia n Join t Staf f Missio n (se e above , chapte r n), adde d tw o potentiall y usefu l channel s o f communication . Intelli gence, however , continue d t o mov e sluggishl y an d intermittently . "Looking bac k o n those days, " Genera l Pop e ha s written, my recollectio n i s tha t whil e ou r Britis h friend s tol d u s al l the y fel t the y reasonably could , th e attitud e o f th e American s wa s as mut e a s that o f thei r highly-prized little-nec k clams . Eve n so , i f w e wer e preclude d fro m askin g direct questions , wha t wit h a wor d her e an d a phras e there , adde d t o a n eloquent reticenc e o n anothe r occasion , no t onl y coul d a fai r pictur e o f th e situation a t th e momen t b e assembled , bu t als o a n intelligen t forecas t coul d be mad e of thing s that wer e to come . I thin k it is fai r to say tha t not onl y was th e C.J.S.M . abl e t o kee p Ottaw a abreas t o f C.C.O.S . thinking , bu t also t o indicat e th e strategi c tren d fo r th e nex t month s t o come. 41

In additio n t o Commonwealt h an d America n sources , th e Canadia n Government ha d it s ow n listening posts abroad . Th e importanc e o f it s French legatio n wa s muc h enhance d afte r th e fal l o f Franc e b y th e decision no t t o break off diplomatic relations wit h the Vich y regime but to allo w its representative in Canada t o continu e hi s dutie s in exchange for wha t Mr . Churchil l wa s t o describ e a s " a windo w throug h whic h they coul d loo k a t wha t wa s happenin g i n France." 42 A membe r o f the Departmen t o f External Affairs , Mr . Pierr e Dupuy , charge d'affaire s at th e missio n which , afte r th e fal l o f France , ha d move d t o London , made thre e visit s t o unoccupie d Franc e i n 194 0 an d 1941 , ostensibl y to discuss the interests of Canadians in that area with the Vichy authori ties, actuall y to gathe r political information . The considerabl e sympathy in Frenc h Canad a fo r Marsha l Petai n woul d i n an y cas e hav e mad e i t difficult fo r th e Canadia n Governmen t t o hav e broke n of f relation s during th e firs t fe w month s o f hi s regime , bu t durin g 194 1 an d 1942 , and particularl y afte r th e Diepp e rai d i n Augus t 194 2 (whe n Petai n sent a message of congratulation to th e Germa n defender s for inflictin g great losse s o n th e Canadia n forces ) nothin g coul d hav e bee n mor e popular tha n severance , an d i t wa s only becaus e Mr . Churchil l insiste d on th e valu e o f Mr . Dupuy' s contact s tha t diplomati c relation s wer e preserved unti l November 1942. * Two other potentially important observation posts were created by the Canadian Government during the Second World War. As Minister to the *From Londo n i n Augus t 194 1 Mackenzi e Kin g ha d cable d a n explanatio n t o Ernest Lapointe : "I n conversatio n toda y Mr . Churchil l wa s quit e emphati c i n his desir e t o hav e Dupu y continu e a s charg e d'affaires . H e sai d tha t Dupu y wa s the onl y mean s o f contac t tha t he , Churchill , ha d wit h Vichy , an d tha t whil e Dupuy migh t b e optimisti c himsel f i n reportin g thing s tol d hi m whic h hav e t o be verified , nevertheles s h e gav e muc h informatio n whic h i s mos t helpful. "

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Soviet Union , Mr . Dan a Wilgress went to the wartime capital a t Kuiby shev. Mr. Wilgres s was at th e time of this appointmen t Deput y Ministe r of Trad e an d Commerce ; h e ha d lon g experienc e o f Russia n affairs , having bee n a membe r o f th e Canadia n Economi c Missio n t o Siberi a in 1918-1 9 an d returnin g t o th e Sovie t Unio n o n a numbe r o f late r occasions; h e spok e th e Russia n language , enjoyin g in thi s respec t a n advantage ove r hi s America n colleagues . Major Genera l Victo r Odiu m who went to open Canada's legatio n at Chungking had no special knowl edge o f Fa r Easter n affair s an d spok e n o Chinese , bu t hi s despatches , in so far a s they may be presumed to have furnished hi s Prime Minister' s knowledge of th e country , migh t conceivably have shape d th e cours e of post-war policy . A t th e Quebe c Conferenc e o f 1943 , when Frankli n Roosevelt an d Mr . Churchil l disagree d abou t th e plac e o f Chin a i n future internationa l organization , Mackenzi e Kin g expresse d th e vie w that "th e new generatio n o f Chines e wer e quit e differen t fro m th e old. There wa s a new China, a youthful Chin a tha t ha d t o b e reckone d wit h and mus t not b e underestimated." 43 THE CONTEMPORAR Y INTELLIGENCE COMMUNIT Y

By "th e contemporary intelligenc e community " i s mean t th e resource s now a t th e disposa l o f th e Canadia n Governmen t fo r collectin g an d evaluating informatio n usefu l i n shapin g it s externa l policies . The y include th e following: (1 ) Canadia n representatio n abroad ; (2 ) repre sentatives of other Commonwealt h countries; (3 ) agencie s o f the Unite d States government ; (4 ) certai n undefine d "intelligenc e exchanges" ; (5 ) the repositor y o f informatio n an d experienc e o f governmen t personne l at home . (1) I n 195 3 the then Secretar y o f State fo r External Affairs , Mr . Leste r Pearson, addresse d th e followin g remark s t o th e Hous e o f Common s Standing Committe e o n Externa l Affairs : In ou r concentratio n of interest s ove r ne w method s o f consultation , over new internationa l agencies to b e se t up , w e sometime s forge t tha t w e have an ol d an d trie d metho d o f consultatio n through th e regula r diplomati c services. . .. Our best sources of information ar e usually the messages which we get from ou r representatives abroad. . . . I d o not , for instance , have to rel y onl y o n thi s weekl y [international] committee in Washington to find out wha t i s likely to happe n in Korea. We have ou r Canadia n Ambassador [to th e Unite d States ] i n touc h wit h th e State Departmen t every day. . . . Similarly fro m ou r European missions we

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knew withi n a matte r o f hour s wha t Mr . Dulle s wa s talkin g abou t o n hi s recent visit s t o Paris , Bon n an d London . W e di d no t hav e t o appl y t o an y central agency. Mr. Davi s for instanc e is a pretty activ e person a t Bon n an d he foun d ou t wha t wa s sai d ther e an d th e report s wer e o n m y des k almos t within twenty-fou r hours ; an d th e sam e i s tru e i n respec t o f ou r head s o f mission i n Paris an d London. 44

The qualit y o f th e informatio n receive d i n thi s wa y depends , first , o n the strategi c locatio n o f Canadia n mission s abroa d and , second , o n th e abilities o f the member s of those missions . By 196 1 Canad a ha d it s ow n diplomati c representatio n i n roughl y fifty countries i n al l the majo r region s o f th e globe , a s wel l a s represen tation throug h permanen t delegation s i n th e Unite d Nations , th e Nort h Atlantic Council , th e Organizatio n fo r Europea n Economi c Co-opera tion, an d commissioner s o n th e internationa l supervisor y commis sions fo r Cambodi a an d Vietnam. * Thi s wa s a far-flun g networ k b y any standard , especiall y whe n fortifie d b y th e wide r commercia l con tacts o f th e Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerce . It s expansio n ha d been exceedingl y rapi d sinc e 1939 , o r eve n sinc e 194 5 whe n Canad a was represented i n less than a quarter of the countrie s i n which mission s had bee n establishe d fifteen years later . Even so , ther e wer e deficiencies . Th e hea d o f missio n i n mor e tha n one ke y capita l divide d hi s tim e an d energ y betwee n hi s missio n ther e and anothe r i n som e othe r country . A s recentl y a s 196 1 th e Hig h Commissioner i n Malaya wa s als o responsibl e fo r Canadia n representa tion i n Burma ; th e ambassado r t o Norwa y wa s als o ambassado r t o Iceland; th e ambassado r t o Belgiu m wa s als o ambassado r t o Luxem bourg; th e ambassador t o Costa Ric a ha d to find time for ambassadoria l duties i n Managua , Tegucigalp a an d Panam a City . The n ther e wer e a number o f countrie s wher e Canad a ha d n o diplomati c representatio n of an y kind , includin g (i n 1961 ) Afghanistan , th e Republi c o f China , the Republic o f Korea, Hungary , Iraq, an d Jordan . It s absence , i t is fai r *Canadian embassies wer e locate d i n Argentina , Austria , Belgium , Brazil , Burma, Chile , Colombia , Cost a Rica , Cuba , Denmark , th e Dominica n Republic , Ecuador, Finland , France , the Federa l Republi c of Germany , Greece , Haiti , Honduras, Iceland , Indonesia , Ireland , Israel , Italy , Japan , th e Lebanon , Luxem bourg, Mexico , th e Netherlands , Nicaragua , Norway , Panama , Peru , Poland , Portugal, Spain , Sweden , Switzerland , Turkey , th e Unio n o f Sovie t Socialis t Republics, th e Unite d Ara b Republic , th e Unite d State s o f America , Uruguay , Venezuela, an d Yugoslavia ; high commissioners' offices i n Australia , Ceylon , Ghana, India , Malaya , Ne w Zealand , Nigeria , Pakistan , th e Union o f Sout h Africa, and the Unite d Kingdom ; legations in Czechoslovaki a and Iran . A com missioner's offic e ha d bee n opene d i n th e Federatio n o f th e Wes t Indies , no t ye t a Commonwealt h member ; consula r office s i n th e Philippines ; an d ther e wa s a military missio n i n Berlin .

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to add , wa s ofte n a s much du e t o th e Departmen t o f Financ e a s to th e Department o f Externa l Affair s (se e chapte r i) ; i n th e cas e o f th e People's Republi c o f Chin a i t wa s du e t o a continuin g polic y o f non recognition, denyin g to Canad a a s to th e Unite d State s a listenin g pos t however hampere d b y inhospitabl e authorities . In 194 8 th e Departmen t o f External Affair s a t Ottaw a receive d fro m its mission s oversea s n o fewe r tha n 22,50 0 despatche s an d letters , an d 22,000 telegram s an d teletyp e messages , figure s whic h i n th e absenc e of mor e recen t dat a mus t b e presume d t o b e ver y muc h exceede d b y those o f the presen t day . The qualit y of these intelligence source s is less easily estimated . B y 196 1 th e grea t embassie s i n London , Pari s an d Washington, an d th e Permanen t Missio n t o th e Unite d Nation s i n New York, eac h th e siz e o f a smal l foreig n office , wer e operatin g a t pea k efficiency unde r the directio n o f member s of tha t selec t grou p o f senio r officials a t th e summi t of th e publi c service . Informatio n receive d fro m such sources may be presumed to be as full an d a s accurate a s any in th e world, an d n o les s perceptivel y interpreted . Removed t o mor e exoti c posts , however , th e Canadia n diplomatis t operates with less assurance as a purveyor of intelligence. H e wil l be less experienced tha n th e senio r an d exceptionall y gifte d publi c servant s presiding over the historic embassies ; a Heeney, a Robertson o r a Leger could no t b e spare d fo r Djakart a o r Beiru t (thoug h i t shoul d b e note d that Mr. Escott Rei d was spared for New Delhi). That is neither unusual nor decisiv e for, a s ha s bee n wisel y remarked , "n o governmen t servic e can b e mad e u p entirel y o f first-class men; . . . efficienc y i s finally determined no t b y th e star s bu t b y th e averag e secon d class." 45 Appraisal o f th e averag e secon d clas s i n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs come s best, perhaps , from outsid e observers ; a n Australian find s its member s "articulate , worldly-wis e yet earnest , seekin g fe w favour s but determine d t o b e active." 46 I f the y ar e handicappe d h i th e intelli gence aspec t of their work (a s opposed t o it s negotiating and propagan dist aspects) , it is less by their persona l qualitie s than by the long-stand ing (i f diminishing ) departmenta l prejudic e agains t specialization , an d the assumptio n that i t i s no t onl y possibl e bu t desirabl e fo r a n officia l to serv e jus t a s effectivel y unde r pal m a s unde r pine . Th e practi cal consequenc e o f thi s generalis t approac h i s th e shiftin g o f personne l every tw o o r thre e year s betwee n missio n an d missio n an d betwee n home an d abroad ; an d a s th e mos t intelligen t o r ambitiou s o f foreig n service officer s ca n hardl y acquir e rea l expertis e durin g s o shor t a sojourn, ther e i s accordingl y a shortag e o f expert s an d a n impairmen t of th e qualit y o f intelligence . I t shoul d b e stresse d tha t thi s defec t i s

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being overcom e b y longer posting s (especiall y o n countr y an d regiona l desks i n th e Departmen t a t Ottawa ) an d b y a mor e rationa l allocatio n of postings ; a n Arabic-speakin g office r wil l rarel y an y longe r fin d hi s special knowledg e diminishing through disus e in som e Latin-America n capital, an d are a specialist s ar e no w retained a t th e Eas t Bloc k fo r five years or eve n longer. (2) Supplementing , an d i n som e area s substitutin g for , Canadia n sources o f informatio n ar e thos e o f othe r Commonwealt h nations . Before th e emergenc e o f th e Commonwealt h i n Afro-Asia , th e Unite d Kingdom wa s by far th e mos t importan t source . "Throug h ou r missio n in London, Canad a House, as well a s through ou r embass y i n Washing ton an d at other posts where we are both established," th e Unde r Secre tary o f State fo r Externa l Affair s commente d in 1952 , "w e d o hav e th e advantage o f a grea t dea l o f informatio n whic h come s t o th e Unite d Kingdom throug h thei r muc h wide r networ k o f posts." 47 Bu t eve n b y 1952 othe r Commonwealt h capital s wer e assumin g greater importanc e along the communications system. New Delhi had alread y demonstrate d its importance durin g the Korea n War, its embassy in Peking furnishing the Canadian Government with valuable dat a abou t the People's Repub lic of China. Whereas much of the informatio n received from th e Unite d Kingdom cam e fro m th e Commonwealt h Relation s Office , informa tion fro m India n source s was usually conveyed i n conversatio n wit h th e High Commissione r i n Ne w Delhi , a mar k o f th e especia l confidenc e reposed i n Mr . Escot t Rei d a s Canada' s representative , an d passe d o n in hi s despatches. * *Since som e Canadian s ten d t o exaggerat e th e valu e an d significanc e o f th e "Ottawa-New Delh i axis, " opinion s o f qualifie d India n observer s o n thi s matte r are o f particula r interest . On e India n schola r comments : "Wit h Canada , fo r various reasons , Indi a cam e t o hav e a n unusuall y war m friendshi p whic h wa s next onl y t o tha t wit h th e Unite d Kingdom ; indeed , i t woul d b e n o exaggeratio n to sa y tha t a t th e en d o f 1956 , Indi a an d Canad a wer e close r t o eac h othe r i n some respect s tha n wa s Indi a eve n wit h th e Unite d Kingdom. " M . S . Rajan , "India an d th e Commonwealth , 1954-56, " India Quarterly, vol . XVI , no . 1 , Jan.-March, 1960 , p . 31 . Th e India n contributo r t o th e Round Table's lubile e issue remarks : "Til l Indi a becam e independent , Canad a wa s t o mos t Indian s n o more tha n a nam e o n a map . Al l interes t i n Americ a wa s directe d toward s th e United States . Onc e freedo m wa s attained , however , relation s wit h Canad a ex panded rapidly . Th e considerabl e economi c assistanc e received , an d th e fac t that th e tw o countrie s sa w ey e t o ey e o n man y issue s o f foreig n policy , helpe d greatly i n this . Bu t th e primar y caus e wa s tha t Indi a foun d Mr . St . Laurent , Mr. Pearso n an d Mr . Diefenbake r (al l o f who m hav e visite d th e country ) sympathetic personalities . Part y politic s i n Canad a hav e ha d n o influenc e o n Indo-Canadian relations. " "A n India n View, " Round Table, no . 200 , Sept . 1960 , p. 373 .

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A potentiall y importan t sourc e o f political informatio n wa s the prim e ministers' meeting , wher e th e leader s o f a n expandin g Commonwealt h more o r les s trienniall y indulge d i n wha t thei r spars e communique s described a s "fran k an d friendl y exchange s o f views. " A numbe r o f member governments , however , including Canada's , wer e disinclined t o use this forum t o ventilate intra-Commonwealt h grievances, thu s striking off thei r agend a (althoug h no t of f the agend a o f bilatera l discussio n t o which a number o f delegates reverte d when in London) suc h importan t matters a s th e Kashmi r dispute , th e neutralis t respons e t o communis t aggression, and the political implications of apartheid.* Whethe r any rea l unburdening o f min d an d hear t coul d tak e plac e unde r suc h circum stances migh t well be doubted. A furthe r barrie r t o communicatio n was concern ove r security . Olde r member s coul d no t hel p bu t fee l som e misgiving a t sharin g sensitiv e informatio n wit h ne w an d untrie d col leagues of such exotic politica l complexio n that the assassinatio n i n 195 9 of the trotskyite Prime Minister of Ceylon, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, was thought t o hav e deprive d th e Commonwealt h o f on e o f it s truste d senior statesmen . I t ha s thus come about that no t muc h of interest flows indiscriminately throughou t th e entir e Commonwealt h communication s network, eac h membe r instea d decidin g fo r itsel f which , i f any , o f th e others ar e t o b e favoure d recipient s o f politica l secrets . I f thi s works , as i t must , t o th e disadvantage o f th e "secon d clas s members, " i t doe s preserve th e qualit y o f informatio n for th e favoure d few. f (3) I n payin g tribut e t o th e valu e o f Unite d Kingdo m intelligenc e sources fo r Canadia n foreig n policy , th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s observe d i n 195 2 tha t "w e ar e als o indebte d t o th e United State s i n muc h the sam e wa y for th e informatio n and assistanc e that w e get from Washingto n . . . whic h i t woul d b e ver y difficul t t o do without." 48 Fro m th e variou s part s o f th e Unite d State s polic y machine, informatio n o f al l kind s pour s int o th e Canadia n capital , im pelled mainl y b y fea r o f surpris e attac k upo n th e commo n continent . *Even a t th e prim e ministers' meetin g o f Marc h 1961 , whic h resulte d i n Sout h Africa withdrawin g its application t o remai n i n th e Commonwealt h a s a republic , discussion o f apartheid too k plac e onl y wit h th e permissio n o f th e Sout h African Prim e Minister ; ha d Dr . Verwoer d refuse d t o giv e permission , th e issu e could no t wit h propriet y hav e bee n discussed . Se e Canada , H . o f C . Debates, March 17 , 1961, p. 3085 . fSuch a practice , howeve r subversiv e t o Commonwealt h ideals , i s no t new . At th e Imperia l Conferenc e o f 192 3 "ver y confidentia l matter s wer e discusse d not at the Conferenc e but at a meetin g of 'Prim e Ministers, ' a devic e to exclud e the Iris h Fre e Stat e an d India." R. MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, I , 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p . 46 1 n .

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Political personages shuttl e bac k an d forth , sometime s alone , sometime s in committee . Th e tw o embassie s continuousl y engag e i n transmittin g political intelligence . Militar y intelligenc e i s gathere d principall y b y th e Canadian Join t Staf f a t Washington , wit h it s contact s a t th e Defens e Department an d th e Offic e o f International Securit y Affairs , whil e "some 60 Canadian officers o f the army, the navy and the ai r force" (th e Minis ter o f National Defenc e disclose d i n Marc h 1960) , "sittin g i n dail y o n various committee s a t th e Pentagon, " kee p "th e Chief s o f Staf f her e i n Ottawa advise d b y letter , telegra m an d telephone." 49 Scientifi c an d technological intelligence , relatin g mainl y t o weapon s development , i s the responsibilit y o f th e Defenc e Researc h Board , an d gathere d a t it s liaison post s a t th e Unite d State s Ai r Researc h an d Developmen t Com mand a t Baltimore , an d a t th e Unite d State s Ai r Forc e Cambridg e (Mass.) Researc h Cente r an d Lincol n Laboratory ; th e historia n o f th e Board ha s writte n tha t i t probabl y "obtaine d a relativel y bette r retur n for th e mone y whic h i t ha s spen t o n liaiso n tha n fo r an y othe r typ e of expenditure." 50 Intelligenc e o n subversiv e activit y i s exchange d b y the Roya l Canadia n Mounted Police and the Federa l Burea u of Investi gation, a n arrangemen t tha t becam e widel y know n i n 195 7 whe n th e Canadian Governmen t threatened t o en d it to preven t the imprope r us e of informatio n by Unite d State s authoritie s beyon d th e contro l o f th e administration.51 The proximit y o f th e Unite d State s ha s on e othe r importan t i f over looked advantag e fo r th e Canadia n intelligenc e community . Th e Ne w York Times, a n intelligence source not to be despised for being unclassi fied,* ma y b e rea d i n Ottaw a twelv e hour s afte r publicatio n a t a cos t of $1 6 a year . (4) Governmen t official s hav e mad e ver y occasiona l an d ver y guarde d references t o "th e intelligenc e exchanges. " Fro m thei r crypti c comments it i s impossible t o tel l whethe r thes e constitut e specia l source s o f infor mation, o r specia l kind s o f information . "Th e intelligenc e exchanges, " *"The trut h is, " wrot e Phili p Ker r whe n privat e secretar y t o Lloy d Georg e i n 1917, "tha t on e derive s fa r mor e new s fro m th e pres s tha n fro m an y othe r source, an d ever y da y i n th e clu b [Th e Travellers ] on e see s lon g row s o f hig h Foreign Offic e officials , includin g Balfour , goin g eagerl y t o th e notic e boar d t o find ou t wha t i s reall y happening. " Quote d i n J . R . M . Butler , Lord Lothian (London, 1960) , p . 66 . Fort y year s late r a forme r Canadian foreig n secretar y expressed th e vie w tha t "ther e ar e foreig n correspondent s o f newspaper s whos e despatches ca n b e a s full , shrewd , an d usefu l a s an y diplomat's . Sometime s the y are base d o n a n eve n greater knowledg e an d broade r experienc e o f th e countr y —and it s people—abou t whic h the y ar e bot h writing. " Leste r B . Pearson , Diplomacy i n th e Nuclear Ag e (Toronto , 1959) , p . 16 .

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remarked th e Unde r Secretar y of Stat e for Externa l Affair s t o member s of th e Senate Standin g Committee in 1958 , "hav e t o remain secret . . . . This i s a field in whic h I hop e yo u wil l no t pres s me." 52 An d n o on e did. Government s d o no t ordinaril y disclos e th e existence , le t alon e the details , of an y espionage or clandestin e intelligence activit y in which they ma y b e engaged , an d th e Canadia n Governmen t i s n o exception . Having som e if not complet e acces s to th e produc t o f the Anglo-Ameri can espionag e systems , i t ha s littl e incentiv e t o embar k itsel f o n suc h a dangerou s an d disreputabl e enterprise . Ther e ha s bee n n o publi c discussion o f th e propriet y o f Canadia n participatio n i n clandestin e intelligence work , bu t mos t officials , i f aske d fo r thei r opinion , woul d probably subscrib e to the view expressed in 194 6 b y the Royal Commis sion investigatin g Sovie t espionag e i n Canada : "Th e transplantin g of a conspiratorial technique , whic h wa s firs t develope d i n les s fortunat e countries to promot e an undergroun d struggl e agains t tyranny , to a democratic societ y . . . i s singularly inappropriate." 53 (5) Th e mos t importan t secto r o f an y intelligenc e communit y i s t o b e found a t hom e rather tha n abroad , fo r th e mos t accurat e an d elaborat e information ca n have little beneficial effect upo n foreign polic y i f ignored by it s recipient . Th e proble m o f th e responsivenes s o f politica l leaders to information supplie d b y expert s has bee n discusse d briefl y i n chapte r ii. The problem t o be considered her e is that of collating, evaluating and transmitting t o th e maker s o f nationa l polic y th e informatio n receive d from governmenta l contacts throughou t the world . The mos t strikin g feature of the machiner y by whic h thes e task s are performed i s the absenc e o f anything resembling the Centra l Intelligenc e Agency o f th e Unite d State s government . Th e muc h smalle r scal e o f intelligence operation s i n Canada , togethe r wit h mor e efficien t proce dures fo r sharin g an d co-ordinatin g information—procedure s resultin g both fro m th e parliamentar y syste m an d th e intimac y o f th e Ottaw a environment—make a n autonomou s intelligenc e secto r les s urgen t i f not altogethe r unneccessary . The centr e o f foreig n polic y intelligenc e i s withi n the Departmen t o f External Affairs , wher e thre e aspect s o f intelligenc e wor k ma y b e dis tinguished. Ther e is , firs t o f all , th e importan t functio n o f bringin g information t o the attentio n o f those responsibl e fo r foreig n policy deci sions. Thi s presuppose s a goo d dea l o f knowledg e an d indee d o f wisdom. The volume of incoming despatches is so great that only a select few ca n b e brough t befor e th e senio r official s o f th e Department , an d fewer still before the Secretary o f State for External Affairs. Mr . Howar d

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Green, commentin g i n 195 9 o n "th e numbe r an d th e qualit y o f th e dispatches whic h com e i n t o th e ministe r o f th e Departmen t ever y da y from al l over th e world, " confesse d tha t he di d "no t thin k tha t perhap s more than 1 0 per cen t of the total volume woul d b e passe d on t o me." 84 In 194 6 th e procedur e fo r disposin g o f incomin g despatche s wa s des cribed b y th e Associat e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs . Asked b y a membe r o f th e Hous e o f Common s Standin g Committee , "How doe s th e informatio n ge t t o th e to p polic y me n i n th e Depart ment?," Hume Wrong replied: It depend s on the natur e an d urgenc y of th e subjec t ho w a n incomin g docu ment i s treate d i n th e Department . Routin e communication s g o t o th e division concerne d wit h th e matte r i n th e Departmen t an d the y ca n dispos e of them . Matter s affectin g polic y g o straigh t t o th e to p an d ma y the n g o down, an d the y ma y b e brough t u p b y th e Unde r Secretar y t o th e Prim e Minister. Yo u canno t la y dow n a genera l rul e fo r dealin g wit h busines s of that sort . W e hav e varyin g correspondenc e coverin g a larg e rang e o f subjects. Q. I t come s dow n t o th e ol d sourc e o f th e mai l an d t o who m i t i s directed; whethe r i t i s marke d privat e an d confidentia l o r jus t confidential . A. No , i t is not nearly a s automatic a s that. I wis h sometime s i t coul d b e made automatic , bu t i t i s impossibl e t o d o it . A larg e elemen t o f huma n discretion an d intelligenc e must b e allowe d for . Q. A s lon g as the strea m o f communicatio n i s smal l an d th e Departmen t is smal l i t ca n ac t i n on e way , bu t afte r a whil e a s volume grow s yo u hav e to hav e a system? A. Yo u hav e t o hav e a system , an d i t i s no t somethin g yo u ca n reduc e to a simpl e formul a becaus e ther e mus t b e a residua l elemen t o f judgment as t o wha t treatmen t thi s deserve s i f i t i s obviousl y a n importan t question . Usually i t wil l g o t o th e chie f o f th e divisio n concerne d an d h e wil l tak e i t up wit h th e Unde r Secretar y o r mysel f who , i f th e matte r require s it , wil l see that i t i s brought t o th e attentio n o f th e Prim e Ministe r [an d Secretar y of Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs] . O n th e othe r hand , sometime s i t migh t b e obviously a matte r whic h nee d no t b e brough t t o th e Prim e Minister' s attention o r require th e persona l attentio n o f th e Unde r Secretar y o r myself . I d o no t kno w an y larg e organizatio n excep t possibl y a mai l orde r hous e which can reduce t o an absolut e formula ho w to trea t incomin g communica tions.55 By the early 1950' s the increased volume o f incoming communication s had le d to the formation withi n th e Department of a Political Co-ordination Sectio n havin g amon g it s dutie s "providin g a numbe r o f politica l information service s fo r Cabine t Ministers " an d preparin g regula r reports "o n th e backgroun d an d curren t aspect s o f majo r internationa l developments" fo r th e genera l us e o f member s o f th e Department. 56 (In a late r reorganizatio n th e Politica l Co-ordinatio n Section , strippe d of th e secon d o f these functions , wa s rename d the Liaiso n Service. ) A n

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officer o f the Department visits the Prime Minister eac h da y to brin g t o his attention important informatio n received during the previous twentyfour hours . Th e foreig n servic e office r performin g thi s tas k fo r th e administration heade d b y Mr. Joh n Diefenbake r is, unlike hi s predecessors, a senio r membe r o f th e Department , an d hi s ran k i s a measur e of hi s importanc e i n th e polic y proces s whe n relation s betwee n th e professional foreig n servic e an d it s politica l master s ar e les s ultimat e than in the past. A secon d functio n of intelligence wor k performed within th e Depart ment o f Externa l Affair s i s tha t o f collatin g th e return s o f th e variou s agencies o f government, such as the Defenc e Research Boar d an d eac h of th e thre e services , whic h maintai n thei r ow n system s fo r gatherin g information. Th e integratio n o f political , scientifi c an d militar y intelli gence i s th e primar y task o f on e o f th e tw o defenc e liaison division s of the Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . Th e Departmen t als o provide s the chairma n of the Join t Intelligenc e Committe e which , with its representatives fro m th e thre e services , brings intelligenc e dat a t o th e atten tion of the Chief s o f Staf f Committe e and othe r senio r interdepartmenta l bodies concerne d wit h problems o f national defence . Finally, th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s ma y itsel f contribut e to intelligenc e source s b y bringin g it s ow n experienc e an d judgmen t to bea r upo n information received. This function, passing imperceptibly into th e real m o f polic y plannin g (discusse d i n chapte r vi) , consist s primarily o f forecasting foreign policy , anticipatin g political an d strate gic contingencie s an d attemptin g to devis e ways and mean s fo r copin g with them . Onl y i n recen t year s ha s th e intelligenc e communit y i n Canada consciousl y addresse d itsel f t o thi s importan t aspec t o f it s work; durin g th e Secon d Worl d War , th e historia n o f th e Canadia n Army ha s observed, the country had "no intelligence organizatio n . . . capable o f makin g a full y adequat e estimat e o f th e situatio n i n th e Far East." 57 Toda y th e Join t Plannin g Committee , compose d o f repre sentatives o f th e thre e service s an d officer s o f th e tw o defenc e liaiso n divisions o f th e Departmen t of External Affairs , "co-operat e [s] closel y with th e intelligenc e an d plannin g agencies of th e arme d force s i n th e preparation o f paper s fo r consideratio n b y th e Chief s o f Staff." 58 For a small (or, i f it be preferred, a middle) power , Canada is unusually an d perhap s uniquel y wel l endowe d wit h diversifie d source s o f foreign polic y intelligence . It s ow n fact-gatherin g apparatu s i s no w located i n ove r fift y countries ; i t ha s acces s t o muc h o f th e produc t of th e immens e intelligence community of th e Unite d States ; an d a s a senior membe r o f th e Commonwealt h o f Nation s i t occupie s a centra l

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position i n th e far-flun g communication s networ k linkin g thirtee n countries togethe r i n on e o f the mos t remarkable if unpublicized intelli gence system s i n th e world . If , therefore , i n spit e o f thes e tremendou s assets, th e foreig n policy decision s o f a Canadia n governmen t see m ill suited t o their objectives , responsibilit y rest s t o a n unusual degre e upo n those minister s wh o fail t o exploi t th e exceptiona l intelligenc e facilitie s at their disposal .

Chapter Six PLANNIN

G

PLAN O R N O PLAN ?

"There is no suc h thing as originality in foreign policy, " Mussolin i onc e remarked i n a moment of clarity. Th e possibility , le t alon e the wisdom, of plannin g for a future a s inscrutable a s that awaitin g a member of th e modern state s system remains in doubt. Geograph y set s a hard i f not a n iron la w fo r foreig n minister s o f al l nations , an d i t i s remarkabl e ho w even the mos t powerfu l dictatorships , free r tha n mos t to manoeuvr e an d sacrifice wit h a minimum regard fo r lif e an d happiness , stray s o slightly from th e ol d establishe d ways . Governments o f open societies , planning for foreig n polic y i n th e sens e o f mappin g a detaile d cours e fo r th e longer run , have been restrained b y more than the inertia an d fickleness of thei r electorates . The y hav e encountere d an d t o som e exten t share d a libera l democrati c traditio n tha t i s hostil e t o polic y plannin g o n th e grand scale . I f (paraphrasin g Dicey) al l wer e planners fift y years ago , planning as a panacea later los t muc h of its allure . "I n politica l activit y men sai l a boundles s an d bottomles s sea, " Harol d Laski' s successo r at th e Londo n Schoo l o f Economic s affirme d i n a famou s lecture : "There i s neither harbou r no r shelte r no r floo r fo r anchorage , neithe r starting plac e no r appointe d destination." 1 Thi s reactio n wa s mor e than a philosophica l movement ; it wa s the outcom e of har d an d tragi c experience. Planner s allowe d t o indulge thei r fearfu l logi c ha d led much of mankin d not t o Utopi a bu t throug h the valle y of a totalitaria n ordea l to th e unspeakabl e horror s o f "the fina l solution. " But a s th e survivin g liberal democracie s move d defensivel y int o th e second hal f o f the twentieth century, planning for nationa l policie s began to appea r i n a ne w and seductiv e guise . Fo r thi s th e externa l challeng e of Sovie t (an d increasingl y o f Chinese ) communis m wa s mor e tha n anything responsible. Tha t challeng e wa s not new . Since 191 7 (perhap s earlier) Wester n liberalis m ha d bee n startle d b y a riva l clai m t o inter pret th e democrati c tradition , an d th e interpretatio n provide d b y Lenin was a s different fro m tha t o f liberal democrac y a s State and Revolution from Mill' s O n Liberty. Bu t b y 195 0 a mor e threatenin g aspec t wa s apparent. Communis m was n o longe r a riva l theory ; i t ha d becom e a rival example , offerin g glitterin g prize s o f productivit y an d prestig e t o those lookin g t o Mosco w for model s an d methods . Plannin g i n its mos t

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doctrinaire for m wa s hel d t o b e th e ke y t o thes e triumphs . "Th e hig h vocation o f Sovie t diplomacy, " write s a Bolshevi k cour t historian , "i s made easie r by the fact tha t i t wields a weapon possessed b y none o f its rivals o r opponents . Sovie t diplomac y i s fortifie d wit h th e scientifi c theory o f Marxism-Leninism . . . [whic h gives ] i t a specia l positio n i n international lif e an d explain s it s outstanding successes." 2 Couched i n thes e terms , it migh t appea r t o it s Afro-Asia n audience s that thi s greates t o f al l "grea t debates " wa s n o mor e (i f n o less ) tha n the ol d argumen t abou t "pla n o r n o plan. " Bu t t o th e exten t tha t thi s interpretation prevailed , the case of liberal democracies alread y identifie d in Afro-Asia n mind s a s th e unreconstructe d exemplar s o f planlessnes s was bound t o be lost by default. I t therefor e becam e urgentl y necessar y to recast it s terms, to make clear beyond doubt that its protagonists were not planners on the one hand an d non-planners o n the other, but totali tarian planner s o n th e on e han d an d libertaria n planner s o n th e other . The rehabilitatio n o f th e polic y planne r ha d begun , eve n i f hi s appea l stemmed no t fro m inne r conviction , o r no t yet , bu t fro m externa l necessity. What mad e hi s triump h certai n wa s th e growin g convictio n o f Western public s tha t th e achievement s o f Sovie t technolog y ha d re sulted in spit e of—perhaps eve n because of—th e rigour s o f Soviet plan ning. Durin g th e month s followin g th e launchin g o f th e sputnik — the firs t o f man y subsequen t Russia n intrusion s int o space—les s an d less was heard of the doctrinal incubus supposedly hindering communis t technological breakthroughs . The fashionable contrast was now between the aimlessnes s an d drif t o f libera l democracie s an d th e ster n an d purposive mission of Soviet society. With mounting frequency an d bluntnes s the poin t wa s mad e tha t i t woul d be necesar y fo r th e Wes t t o emulat e the Sovie t exampl e to survive . The democracie s (s o a growin g numbe r of thei r leadin g citizen s wer e saying ) neede d somethin g o f th e sens e of missio n and directio n o f the communis t world, som e doctrinal under pinning fo r decision s hithert o pragmatic , t o challeng e a s muc h a s t o respond, and, above all, foreign policie s continuousl y relatin g t o a longterm assessmen t o f nationa l goal s an d o f th e method s b y whic h thes e might be attained . The planne r wa s back o n his throne . FOREIGN POLIC Y PLANNIN G AND TH E NATIONA L STYL E

Of al l th e libera l democracies , th e Unite d State s ha s mos t ardentl y reassessed planning as a technique and indee d a s a condition of national

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survival. Suc h was the natura l respons e of the leade r o f the nation s tha t were standin g togethe r i n consciou s oppositio n t o th e sprea d o f com munist influence. Bu t it was also a response wholly in keeping with what W. W . Rosto w ha s calle d "th e America n nationa l style, " discerne d a century o r mor e ag o by de Tocqueville : "American s hav e a grea t dea l of curiosit y an d littl e leisure ; thei r lif e i s s o practical , s o confused , s o excited, s o active, tha t bu t little time remains to the m for thought . Suc h men ar e pron e t o genera l idea s becaus e the y ar e thereb y spare d th e trouble o f studyin g particulars." 3 Thu s emerge d th e parado x o f " a nation o f individualistic empiricist s . . . powerfully drawn to a particula r use o f highl y abstrac t concepts," 4 a n attractio n a t onc e a caus e an d a condition o f th e plannin g approac h t o foreig n a s t o othe r nationa l affairs. Fo r th e assumptio n of the foreign policy planner mus t necessarily be that there is order an d rhyth m in the movemen t o f events , a pattern, even a gran d design , whic h wis e reflectio n wil l disclos e an d carefu l analysis exploit t o th e nation's advantage . For i f history wer e otherwise, one crisi s succeedin g another a t random , devoi d o f reaso n an d regular ity, impervious to understanding and s o incapable of prediction, wherei n lay the planner's task ? Did he have a task a t all? The American nationa l style discourages such questions, just as the British style , empirical , pragmatic, expediential , shyin g awa y fro m abstrac t principle , distrustfu l of doctrine, assume s thei r answer s t o b e negative . "A n eminen t Britis h economist," a Canadia n colleagu e onc e recalled , "wh o wa s i n th e public servic e use d t o sa y tha t h e rejoice d whe n som e civi l servan t o r minister referre d t o hi m a s academic . H e the n kne w tha t h e ha d bee n guilty o f thinkin g as much a s si x months ahead." 5 The Canadian style , despite the influence of the French-Canadian tradition (itsel f ver y differen t fro m th e rationalist , Cartesia n traditio n o f modern France) , resemble s th e Britis h i n it s inhospitalit y t o basi c assumptions abou t planning fo r foreig n policy. Ther e is a stron g dispo sition t o dea l wit h externa l affair s i n a workada y manner , eschewin g doctrine an d th e lon g view , taking one thin g a t a tim e an d bein g pre pared t o take much time ove r that on e thing. Cautious, patient , compro mising, flexible , ar e th e word s b y whic h Canadia n foreig n minister s of recen t year s have describe d thei r endeavours ; such words , whil e no t unknown t o th e vocabular y o f planning , ar e ther e use d mor e ofte n a s pejoratives tha n a s praise. * For thi s attitud e a numbe r o f circumstance s hav e bee n responsible . Perhaps mos t basi c hav e bee n th e circumstance s o f Canadia n histor y *Professor Harr y Johnso n call s the m "weasel-adjectives. " Se e hi s "Canada' s Foreign Trad e Problems, " International Journal, vol . XV , no . 3 , Summe r 1960 , p. 235.

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and th e absenc e fro m tha t histor y o f a revolutionar y tradition compar able t o that i n the Unite d States. * I f revolution s breed philosopher s an d heroes they also beget doctrinaires, and that ster n sense of self-righteous ness which , i f i t sustain s th e weak , i s no t a n unmixe d blessin g fo r th e strong. Fro m th e America n revolutionar y traditio n derive s tha t charac teristically America n belie f tha t som e swif t an d spectacula r strok e ma y permanently solv e problems whic h in their natur e admi t onl y o f amelio ration. Th e Canadia n style knows no comparabl e addiction t o th e "one shot solution, " t o the "crash program, " t o "doctrines" whether the y bea r the nam e o f Monro e o r Stimson , Truma n o r Eisenhower . Ther e ha s been littl e i n Canadia n experienc e t o encourag e th e expectatio n tha t injuries t o societ y ma y b e heale d i n th e sam e fashio n an d wit h th e same hope o f success as a machine is repaired o r a n appendi x removed . It i s th e Canadia n styl e t o tr y t o garde n i n th e fiel d o f politics , no t to da m o r dredge . The pragmatic approach t o foreign policy is natural in a country which, like Canada , ha s fe w i f an y opportunitie s fo r exercisin g importan t an d sustained assault s upo n majo r internationa l problems . Lackin g bot h resources an d occasions fo r bol d an d independent approaches , it s initia tives ar e limited to thos e rar e occasion s whe n (a s durin g the Sue z crisi s in Novembe r 1956 ) a n inspire d mediatio n ma y sav e th e grea t power s from thei r ow n miscalculations . It s polic y mus t nearl y alway s b e on e of respons e t o th e move s of others . This , t o some , ha s seeme d t o mea n that Canada ca n hav e n o foreig n polic y o f it s own , implyin g tha t a policy o f respons e i s no t a foreig n polic y a t all . "A s i f th e Canadia n Government could have a foreign or external policy lik e the government s of othe r countries, " wrot e a membe r o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs i n 1938 . "T o asser t tha t you r governmen t ca n for m a polic y is t o asser t tha t i t ha s a choic e o f actio n an d a capacit y t o giv e th e choice effect." 6 "Ove r th e years, " a senio r Canadia n diplomatist , no w retired, has written , I hav e heard a numbe r o f earnes t soul s (som e o f who m wer e noticeably long-haired), glibl y talk of Canadian foreign policy , and thi s to m y no littl e puzzlement. An d afte r a spel l of ove r a decad e in posts abroad my min d i s still unreceptive in this regard. That, over the centuries, the Unite d Kingdom should hav e strive n to preven t a first-class European power from occupyin g the Low Countries; that, as long as she was able to d o so, she did everythin g in he r power to ensure the securit y of the Sue z Canal ; that neither Germany nor Russi a shoul d succee d i n establishin g themselves on th e norther n shores of th e India n Ocean; that Franc e ha s eve r bee n watchfu l ove r he r north *I hav e draw n her e fro m m y essay , "Fro m Canada " i n Fran z M . Joseph , ed. , As Others Se e Us : Th e United States i n Foreign Eyes (Princeton , 1959) , pp . 280-1.

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eastern frontier ; an d tha t th e Italians , sinc e th e earlies t times , hav e resiste d the southwar d thrus t o f th e Teutoni c races—thes e ar e object s o f foreig n policy that I find it easy enough to understand. Bu t when I tur n m y mind t o our s o fortunately placed country , I a m at a loss to kno w i f it i s possible fo r us rationall y t o asser t tha t ther e i s suc h a thin g a s a Canadia n foreig n policy.7

However thi s ma y be , i t i s tru e tha t th e incentiv e t o pla n policie s i n external affair s i s greatl y reduce d b y th e comparativ e unimportance of Canada in the genera l configuration o f power politics. A forme r Cabine t Minister, experienced i n diplomacy, has mad e this plain: It would , o f course , b e idl e t o preten d tha t Canada , lik e othe r countrie s i n the free world, ha s succeede d i n constantly keepin g the initiativ e i n planning much o f it s foreig n polic y durin g thes e disturbin g year s sinc e th e Secon d World Wa r ended. . . . We have, a s you know, rarel y bee n i n a position t o take th e initiative , an d w e have , throughou t thes e years , bee n ver y largel y on the defensive . I n consequence , ou r foreig n polic y ha s bee n wha t I migh t call responsive ; jus t a s when , i n playin g hockey , wit h tw o o r thre e o f th e Canadian tea m i n the penalt y box—a phenomenon whic h does , o n occasion , arise—we ar e constraine d t o pla y a purel y defensiv e rol e rathe r tha n a n aggressive on e i n which we can us e our ful l force s o f strengt h an d initiative . . . . This makes it difficul t t o discus s accurately an d realistically th e manne r in whic h ou r foreig n policie s ar e planne d sinc e s o frequentl y the y hav e been shape d t o dea l wit h aggressio n o r th e menac e o f i t agains t ourselve s and ou r friends. 8

Another facto r accountin g fo r th e pragmati c approac h t o foreig n affairs ha s bee n th e manne r an d metho d o f th e Prim e Ministe r an d Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s throughou t muc h o f th e forma tive period o f Canadian foreign policy . "Upo n man y matters of external policy," a clos e associat e ha s writte n o f Mackenzi e King , "h e too k decisions a s al l i n th e day' s work ; tha t is , excep t fo r th e advic e an d knowledgeability o f hi s principa l adviser s i n th e publi c service , the y were decision s base d no t upo n profoun d persona l stud y o f issues , bu t upon the apparen t needs of the moment." 9 It i s unlikely that th e subject of thi s appraisa l would have taken seriou s issu e wit h it, an d mor e tha n once h e confide d t o hi s diary , a s o n Apri l 20 , 194 1 (th e "gran d Sunday" o n whic h h e an d Frankli n Roosevel t worke d ou t th e Hyd e Park Agreemen t together) : " I recal l wha t Lor d Morle y sai d abou t not plannin g to o fa r ahea d i n politics . Tha t event s determin e wha t i s possible."10 Such a styl e might no t b e expecte d t o surviv e a chang e i n govern ment an d minister , bu t onl y i f i t i s no t deepl y ingraine d i n th e bureaucracy a s well. In Februar y 196 0 th e Secretar y o f State fo r Exter nal Affairs , Mr . Howar d Green , suggeste d i n hi s firs t majo r revie w of

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foreign affair s i n th e Hous e o f Common s tha t th e tim e ha d com e "t o drop th e ide a tha t Canada' s rol e i n worl d affair s i s t o b e a n 'hones t broker' between th e nations. We must decid e instea d tha t ou r rol e i s t o be t o determin e th e righ t stan d t o tak e o n problems , keepin g i n min d the Canadian background and, above all, using Canadian common sense . In effect , th e tim e ha s com e t o tak e a n independen t approach." 11 Thi s statement wa s o n th e whol e wel l receive d throughou t th e country , wit h one curiou s exception . Member s o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s were disturbe d at the implication s of their Minister' s remarks , and eve n relatively junio r foreig n servic e officer s (wh o on e woul d hav e though t might respon d enthusiasticall y t o suc h a cal l t o greatness ) privatel y expressed misgiving s abou t hi s "magnificen t obsession " an d hi s "politique de grandeur."* So cautiou s a respons e reflected , o f course , th e traditiona l bia s o f their calling . Th e attitud e o f th e professiona l diplomatis t t o foreig n policy plannin g i s essentiall y negative , scornfu l o f th e bol d initiative , distrustful o f th e gran d design . Mr . Georg e Kenna n ha s wel l describe d "the wear y skepticis m that characterize s th e mor e experience d range s of th e diplomatic profession . . . . The professional . . . sees th e task of diplomacy a s essentiall y a menia l one , consistin g o f hoverin g aroun d the fringe s o f a proces s on e i s powerles s t o control , tidyin g u p th e messes other peopl e hav e made, attempting to keep smal l disaster s fro m turning int o bi g ones , moderatin g th e passion s o f government s an d o f opinionated individuals. . . ,"12 It would be hard to describe more exactly the Weltanschauung of th e Departmen t o f External Affairs . Reinforcing i t i s th e operationa l cod e o f th e foreig n servic e officer , traditionally hostil e t o blueprint s an d th e forwar d look . A senio r official o f the Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s onc e remarke d t o a smal l group o f academic social scientist s that in his view foreign polic y "i s th e result o f a continuin g serie s o f ad ho c decisions , whic h frequentl y hav e to be made with inadequate stud y and inadequate data . . .. It is always a cas e o f realizin g a s full y a s yo u ca n th e implication s o f wha t yo u propose t o do , an d o f doin g i t accordin g t o th e bes t judgmen t yo u ca n make i n a singl e circumstanc e a t th e momen t o f time."* I n thi s classi c *One suc h officer , free d fro m reticenc e b y recen t resignatio n fro m th e Department, gathere d togethe r i n a widel y circulate d magazin e articl e severa l of hi s forme r Minister' s utterances i n thi s vein , describin g the m a s hi s collectio n of "Greenery. " "To b e influential with modest means, " the articl e concluded , "on e needs t o b e modes t i n demeanour. " Peyto n V . Lyon , "Canad a I s Becomin g a Mouse Tha t Roars," Maclean's Magazine, Jun e 18 , 1960 .

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statement o f th e pragmati c approac h t o foreig n politic s a measur e o f rationalization ma y b e detected . Fo r i f a n aversio n t o plannin g i s th e occupational prejudic e o f th e foreig n servic e officer , th e ple a o f over work, o f the stead y unrelenting stream o f detail an d crisi s sai d t o mak e reflection difficul t i f no t impossible , i s hi s occupationa l disease , espe cially i n th e senio r ranks . Doe s h e exaggerate , doe s h e welcome , th e pressures an d th e dail y strai n a s a n escap e fro m th e planner' s har d creative tasks ? T o suc h a questio n it woul d b e presumptuous t o retur n a final answer; but on e may recall, i n leaving it , Walte r Bagehot' s vie w that i f the hea d o f a large enterpris e spend s hi s lif e a t hi s desk , there i s likely somethin g wrong with th e organization. 13 MACHINERY FO R FOREIG N POLICY PLANNIN G

The genera l scepticis m i n whic h th e plannin g o f Canadia n foreig n policy ha s bee n hel d b y government s and bureaucrac y alike is reflecte d in th e deart h o f specia l machinery . Ther e ha s neve r bee n withi n th e Department o f Externa l Affair s th e equivalen t o f th e Stat e Depart ment's Polic y Plannin g Staf f establishe d i n 1947 , o r th e Permanen t Under-Secretary's Committe e o f th e Unite d Kingdo m Foreig n Offic e established i n 1949; f an d n o Ministe r o r senio r officia l ha s publicl y suggested it would be desirabl e to have one. Specia l planning bodies ar e perhaps les s essentia l i n th e parliamentar y system , wher e th e Cabine t is responsible for policy decisions, than in the presidential. But consciou s *Quoted i n B . S . Keirstead , Canada i n World Affairs: September 1951 t o October 1953 (Toronto , 1956) , p . 37 . Th e U.S . Stat e Departmen t ha s a simila r operational preferenc e fo r "makin g polic y o n th e cables. " "Despit e uncounte d high-level directive s stressin g th e nee d fo r previsio n an d a n adequat e operationa l plan," write s a n America n authority , "th e Departmen t retain s muc h o f it s pre 1941 disinclinatio n t o pla n i n advance . Agencie s exis t withi n th e Departmen t whose functio n i t i s t o plan , actin g unde r th e genera l directio n o f th e Assistan t Secretary fo r Polic y Planning ; muc h effor t i s expende d i n devisin g blueprint s for th e future . Th e objectiv e observer , however , i s stil l impressed b y th e exten t to whic h th e usua l des k office r refuse s t o 'dea l wit h hypothetica l questions ' an d seems t o ge t considerabl e satisfactio n ou t o f makin g th e 'brus h fire ' approac h a normal operatin g procedure. " Charle s O. Lerche , Jr. , Foreign Policy of the American People (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J. , 1958) , p . 43 . fThe wor k o f th e Polic y Plannin g Staf f i s wel l known ; tha t o f th e Permanen t Under-Secretary's Committe e muc h les s so , fo r it s existenc e ha s onl y recentl y been disclose d b y it s sometim e chairman , Lor d Strang : "Th e dut y o f thi s com mittee wa s t o tr y t o identif y th e longe r ter m trend s i n internationa l affair s an d to prepar e studie s o n th e possibl e bearing s o f thes e trend s upo n th e futur e formulation o f Britis h policy. " Lor d Strang , "Insid e th e Foreig n Office, " International Relations, vol . XI , no . 1 , Apri l 1960 , pp . 19-20 .

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aversion t o plannin g may be detecte d i n the fac t tha t ther e i s not now , nor ha s ther e eve r been , a n Externa l Affair s committe e o f th e Cabinet , matching it s committee s o n defenc e an d economi c policy , wher e th e minds o f fou r o r fiv e minister s togethe r wit h thos e o f senio r civi l servants an d hig h militar y officer s migh t grappl e collectivel y wit h questions of foreign policy in a more reflectiv e fashio n tha n th e day-to day operation s o f a busy foreign offic e allow . If an y institution s concer n themselve s mainl y wit h foreig n polic y planning, thes e ar e th e interdepartmenta l committee s o f senio r civi l servants drawn from variou s departments o f government. O n suc h com mittees th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s traditionall y occupie s a commanding position , frequentl y supplyin g thei r chairmen . Thei r us e for th e consideratio n o f foreig n polic y problem s date s fro m th e firs t Mackenzie Kin g administratio n o f 1921-5 . Whe n th e Prim e Ministe r of tha t da y wa s urge d t o expan d th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , he replied t o th e suggestion: We are no t confined , so far a s permanent official s ar e concerned , to th e staf f of th e Department , i n th e consideratio n o f foreig n affairs . I a m a stron g believer i n th e polic y o f inter-departmenta l co-ordination , an d th e presen t government, I think , ha s mad e a distinc t progres s i n applyin g thi s policy . The waterway s question s outstandin g wit h th e Unite d States , whic h i n m y opinion constitut e th e mos t difficul t an d mos t momentou s issu e o f Canadia n foreign policy , hav e bee n studie d fo r tw o year s b y a stron g inter-depart mental committee , whic h i s makin g a mor e thoroug h analysi s o f th e situa tion tha n t o m y knowledge ha s eve r bee n mad e b y a Canadia n government . When th e Genev a Protoco l wa s unde r consideration , a simila r committe e was appointed , an d a t th e presen t tim e question s o f Orienta l Immigratio n are bein g considere d jointl y b y th e Immigratio n an d Externa l Affair s Departments. *

During th e late r 1930' s th e devic e fel l int o disuse , bu t cam e bac k into it s ow n durin g th e Secon d Worl d War , particularl y durin g th e last tw o year s whe n post-wa r problem s bega n t o b e systematicall y considered. On e o f th e mor e importan t interdepartmenta l committee s thus constitute d wa s th e Post-Hostilitie s Plannin g Committe e create d in Februar y 1943 , dealing , amon g othe r matters , wit h possibl e Cana *Mackenzie Kin g t o N . W . Rowell , Dec . 7 , 1925 , Rowel l Papers . Th e inter departmental committe e examinin g th e Genev a Protoco l wa s compose d o f th e following: O . D . Skelto n an d W . H . Walke r o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs; L . C . Moye r an d R . O . Campne y o f th e Prim e Minister' s office ; Majo r General J . H . MacBrie n an d Commodor e W . Hos e o f th e Departmen t o f National Defence ; W . S . Edward s o f th e Departmen t o f Justice ; Thoma s Mulve y of th e Departmen t o f th e Secretar y o f State ; O . M . Biggar , Chie f Electora l Officer; an d R . H . Coats , Dominio n Statistician .

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dian approache s t o internationa l organizatio n fo r th e comin g peace . In 194 3 the War Committee of the Cabinet create d a n interdepartmental committee t o conside r internationa l monetar y problems , an d i n Jun e of tha t yea r th e Interdepartmenta l Committe e o n Internationa l Civi l Aviation (replacin g the Interdepartmenta l Committee on Air Transpor t Policy se t up i n May 1942) . O n thes e an d othe r suc h committees, per haps te n o r twelv e i n all , were t o b e foun d th e sam e ke y member s of the bureaucratic elite to whom the Government was learning to turn with increasing frequency and confidenc e for guidanc e on a broadening rang e of domesti c an d foreign policy problem s (se e above , chapte r n) . Man y of thes e ke y officials , thei r rank s deplete d b y th e deat h o f som e an d the entr y int o non-governmenta l occupation s o f others , hav e continue d since 194 5 t o exercis e thei r importan t influenc e o n polic y plannin g through such committees as the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trad e Polic y an d th e Pane l o n th e Economi c Aspect s o f Defenc e Policy.

Chapter Seven N E G O T I A T I O

N

THE NEGOTIATO R AN D HI S CHANGING WORL D

Much ha s bee n mad e i n recen t year s o f th e deca y o f th e metho d o f conducting foreig n polic y b y negotiation . Th e lamen t proceed s charac teristically fro m negotiator s themselves , usually , indeed , fro m retire d negotiators. Their memoir s deplor e th e passin g o f "the old diplomacy, " the diplomac y of which they had th e goo d fortun e to b e th e las t expon ents, diplomac y i n it s rightfu l sens e an d prope r meaning . Lor d Vansittart wrot e of "The Decline o f Diplomacy"; Sir Victor Wellesle y of "Diplomacy i n Fetters. " Si r Nevil e Blan d note s " a growin g tendenc y . . . to substitut e fo r th e discree t exchang e o f note s tendentiou s pres s conferences an d abus e ove r th e air, " and resolutel y refuse s t o sull y hi s edition o f Satow' s Guide t o Diplomatic Practice b y offerin g neophyte s hints for thei r effectiv e exploitation . "Wha t w e have com e t o cal l diplo macy i n th e cours e o f th e pas t twent y years," observe d Hug h Gibson , "has faile d t o achiev e result s an d ha s le d int o al l sorts o f disasters. Bu t it wasn' t reall y diplomacy . I t wa s th e usurpation o f diplomati c func tions b y politicians an d inept amateurs." 1 The eclipse of the negotiator i n foreign policy ha s bee n caused , para doxically enough, by a n expansion o f his functions. No longe r i s it suffi cient fo r hi m t o explai n hi s government' s policy , o r a versio n o f tha t policy, t o th e governmen t t o whic h h e i s accredited ; h e ha s t o a n increasing exten t t o explai n i t t o it s people . H e has , that i s t o say , a propagandist function , an d mor e tha n eve r th e effectivenes s o f th e modern diplomatis t depend s upo n th e shrewdnes s an d imaginatio n h e brings t o it s performance . Wherea s th e negotiatin g functio n stand s a t the origi n o f hi s art , the propagandis t functio n i s comparativel y new, generated b y spectacula r improvement s i n th e technolog y o f communi cations. Million s o f peopl e previousl y isolate d fro m worl d event s might no w b e appeale d to , an d th e negotiato r ha s accordingl y ha d thrust upo n hi m th e unaccustome d rol e o f publi c persuader . H e mus t address himsel f no t onl y t o official s bu t t o mas s public s bot h a t home and abroad . So far , then, fro m contracting , th e univers e o f moder n diplomac y has bee n infinitel y expanding . Bu t thi s expansio n ha s rarel y bee n

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regarded wit h muc h favour . Mor e ofte n tha n no t th e negotiato r ha s looked upo n the propagandist aspec t o f his work a s a threat t o his posi tion rathe r tha n a mean s t o furthe r triumphs . Temperamen t ha s bee n in par t responsibl e fo r thi s fearfu l response . Th e old-styl e diplomatists , Mr. George Kenna n has observed , tended everywher e t o vie w propagand a wit h distast e an d skepticism . Th e profession o f diplomac y induce d a weary detachment , foreig n t o al l politica l enthusiasms an d e x parte pleas . Propagand a smacke d o f over t interferenc e in th e domesti c affair s o f othe r countries—somethin g tha t wen t strongl y against th e grai n o f diplomati c tradition . Mos t diplomatist s wer e instinctivel y convinced tha t government wa s everywhere i n some degre e a conspiracy an d that, whateve r th e outwar d trapping s o f democracy , i t wa s alway s mor e important t o influenc e a fe w selec t individual s tha n t o appea l t o th e broa d electorate. Th e professiona l diplomatis t thu s tende d t o sh y off , tempera mentally, fro m th e ver y though t o f distributin g propaganda . An d h e wa s generally held , the n a s now , b y th e enthusiast s o f th e propagandisti c approach, t o b e quit e unqualifie d for thi s sor t o f work. 2

In on e respec t thes e enthusiasts , th e ne w apostle s o f mas s enlighten ment an d mass bewilderment , wer e absolutel y correct , fo r th e profes esional diplomatis t di d lac k on e o f th e mos t importan t qualification s of th e successfu l publi c persuader . H e was , a s a rule , unknow n t o th e public. And , bein g unknown , h e ha d littl e influenc e wit h it . I t wa s easier, it was surely safer (s o i t was argued) fo r government s to entrus t the propagandis t functio n t o a celebrity . Th e hea d o f governmen t or , if unavailable , th e foreig n minister , bein g th e mos t celebrated , wer e best equippe d fo r th e job . Failin g thes e potentates , i t coul d b e give n t o generals an d admirals , t o pres s lords , t o captain s o f industry , even t o stars fro m th e firmamen t o f entertainmen t (fo r wh o shon e mor e brightly tha n they?)—t o almos t anyone , i t mus t have seeme d t o thos e who mad e diplomacy their career , bu t themselves . The professiona l negotiato r migh t hav e born e thes e intruder s wit h more composur e had the y concerned themselve s solely wit h tha t aspec t of diplomac y fo r whic h their reputations wer e though t t o qualif y them . Such hopes were quickly dashed. "The ar t o f diplomacy," Harold Nicol son ha s observed , "a s tha t o f watercolours , ha s suffere d muc h fro m the fascinatio n whic h i t exercise s upo n th e amateur." 3 Fe w o f thos e imported t o hel p wit h diplomati c publi c relation s hav e bee n conten t with tha t alone . Nearl y al l hav e yielde d t o th e temptatio n o f believin g themselves, precisel y becaus e o f thei r extra-diplomati c status , bette r qualified tha n th e professiona l t o perfor m hi s traditiona l assignments . Sometimes th e belie f wa s justified ; mor e ofte n not ; bu t alway s i t reduced hi s effectiveness . Fe w caree r negotiator s ca n rea d withou t sympathy th e cr i d e caeur o f th e Unite d State s ambassado r i n Londo n

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in 1941 , Joh n G . Winant : "Th e increasin g numbe r o f peopl e wh o negotiate wit h the British Government, ofte n withou t definite assignmen t to th e Embassy . . . seriously interfer e wit h th e work o f the Embassy . I wan t ver y muc h t o hav e ou r relation s wit h th e Britis h bot h friendl y and orderl y s o tha t w e ca n buil d confidenc e tha t permit s continuin g trust an d co-operation . Pleas e hel p me." 4 Bu t no help came . Th e pligh t of hi s colleagu e i n Mosco w wa s n o les s pitiable . "Fo r lon g months, " writes Admira l Willia m H . Standle y i n hi s memoirs , " I sa w Specia l Representative afte r Bi g Dignator y com e t o Russia , leapfro g ove r m y top-hatted head . . .. I als o watche d the situation deteriorate." 5 The mor e grandios e ambition s of th e amateu r diplomatis t hav e bee n sustained b y a variety of forces, no t leas t b y a prejudiced publi c which , when things go wrong, so quickly makes a scapegoat o f the professional : Some diplomat n o doubt Will launc h a heedless word , And lurking war leap out .

But thi s hostility , powerfu l a s i t wa s an d is , coul d no t o f itsel f hav e propelled th e interloper s t o thei r presen t dizz y height s o f powe r an d influence. Technolog y ha s been mor e than anythin g responsible fo r that. An ambassado r i n foreig n part s use d t o b e ver y muc h o n hi s own . He woul d hav e instructions , o f course , bu t thes e wer e necessaril y phrased i n genera l terms , leavin g hi m fre e t o fil l i n importan t details , frequently t o mak e policy i n his ow n right. I n 189 8 Si r Julian Paunce fote, th e Britis h ambassado r a t Washington , urge d upo n th e Foreig n Office tha t certai n concession s b e grante d t o Spai n i n negotiation s the n proceeding i n th e America n capital . "I f Pauncefot e ha d no t associate d himself wit h thi s policy, " th e Actin g Foreig n Secretar y minuted , " I confess I shoul d have rejecte d it a t once; but h e knows our views , he is on th e spot , an d h e is a man o f solid judgment . It seem s a stron g orde r to rejec t hi s advice." 6 Today , nothin g i s mor e easily , o r readily , done. Autonomy t o th e moder n negotiato r i s almos t unknown . Hi s dis cretionary power s hav e bee n steadil y weakene d b y th e telegraph , th e telephone, an d the four-engine aircraft . Whatever natio n h e represents , whateve r for m o f governmen t h e serves, th e diplomatis t experience s a predicamen t commo n t o hi s pro fession. Ye t diplomatist s o f differen t countrie s ar e confronte d wit h special problems , an d thei r commo n predicamen t i s presente d i n different ways . The Canadia n negotiato r i s no exception . Hi s experienc e illustrates a t onc e th e pressure s an d tension s t o whic h th e diplomatis t of ever y natio n i s prey , an d th e peculia r historica l environmen t fro m which, a s a Canadia n diplomatist , h e come s an d attempt s t o defend .

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THE DEVELOPMEN T O F NEGOTIATING MACHINER Y

Much th e greate r par t o f Canada' s negotiation s wit h othe r countrie s has been , a s it remains, wit h the Unite d States . Befor e the appointmen t of a Canadia n Ministe r t o Washingto n i n 1926-7 , th e Dominion' s interests wer e formall y th e responsibilit y o f th e Britis h ambassado r t o the United States. The developmen t of distinctively Canadian negotiatin g machinery wa s largely a response t o a well-founded feeling on th e par t of successiv e government s a t Ottaw a tha t thes e interest s coul d no t b e adequately cared fo r i n this way. Criticism attache d partly , an d by no mean s improperly , t o th e repre sentatives o f th e Britis h Governmen t themselves . Thu s i n th e after math o f th e negotiation s a t Washingto n i n 187 1 ther e wa s widesprea d and advers e comment i n Canadian newspaper s upon th e less than help ful attitud e o f Si r Edwar d Thornto n (who m wit h hi s wif e eve n th e Secretary of the British delegation ha d describe d a s "a dreadfull y drear y pair, lookin g as i f the lif e ha d fade d ou t o f the m i n Sout h Americ a an d the spiri t wa s evaporatin g in Washington" 7). Thornton' s successor , Si r Lionel Sackville-West, was recalled i n th e memor y of a n aid e of Josep h Chamberlain a s "a ma n o f extremely reticent nature , who seldo m spok e unless someon e spok e t o him . S o retiring , indeed , wa s he , that , i f I remember aright , hi s onl y ora l contributio n t o th e 3 0 meeting s o f th e Conference [dealin g wit h a fisherie s disput e o f grea t importanc e t o Canada] wa s th e expressio n o f a wis h tha t a certai n windo w might b e closed."8 I t wa s Sackville-Wes t (bes t know n for th e naiv e interventio n in a n America n presidenta l campaig n resultin g i n hi s recall ) wh o i n 1888 faile d t o transmi t to th e Unite d State s authoritie s th e term s o f a Canadian protes t agains t American occupatio n o f par t o f th e dispute d territory alon g th e Alask a frontier ; when , a decad e later , th e Canadia n Government cam e to prepar e it s case , ther e wa s nothing in th e record , as Joseph Pop e wrote in some disgust to Laurier, "to indicat e what part of H.M . Dominion s wa s bein g encroache d on , an d consequentl y th e protest, a s such , i s worthless . Thi s i s th e mor e aggravatin g when w e consider tha t Canada' s caus e was all that i t shoul d be. W e were specifi c . . . but old West botche d it." 9 But th e mor e fundamenta l grievanc e was not tha t Canadia n interest s suffered fro m bein g "botched" by British negotiators . I t wa s rather tha t on man y matter s th e interest s o f Britai n an d Canad a wer e no t onl y different bu t diametricall y opposed , s o tha t a Britis h ambassador , charged with responsibility fo r both, could uphold one only by sacrificing the other. I t became the settled and , once again, well-founded conviction

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of successiv e Canadia n government s that, face d wit h thi s dilemma , th e British ambassado r woul d pursu e hi s imperia l mandat e a t th e expens e of th e Canadian . T o hav e Canad a negotiat e wit h th e Unite d State s authorities wher e Canadia n interest s wer e involve d seeme d essentia l i f sacrifices wer e not to becom e a ritual. The remed y too k tw o mai n forms . Fo r th e occasiona l bu t (fro m the Canadia n standpoint ) crucia l conference s i n whic h Britis h an d American representative s met , sometime s fo r month s o n end , i n a n effort t o clea n th e slate , nothin g les s tha n th e persona l interventio n o f the Prim e Ministe r himsel f wa s though t sufficien t protection . Thu s Sir John A . Macdonald too k par t a s a member o f the Britis h delegatio n at th e Hig h Commissio n i n Washingto n i n 1870-1, * whil e Si r Wilfri d Laurier, hi s positio n a s Canada' s representativ e mor e clearl y define d than Macdonald's , similarl y negotiate d fo r th e Dominio n a t th e Join t High Commissio n o f 1898-9 . On th e mor e frequen t occasion s whe n specifi c topic s wer e unde r negotiation, th e Canadian Governmen t woul d send its own negotiator t o Washington to se e that the Dominion's point of view was receiving suffi cient attention . This practice implie d a lack o f confidence in the capacit y of th e Britis h ambassador , a s wel l a s erodin g (th e imperial authoritie s often charged ) th e the n sacre d principl e o f th e diplomati c unit y o f th e Empire; i t wa s therefore neithe r highl y publicized no r ver y ofte n used . But i t wa s indispensabl e o n occasion . I n 1907 , George C . Gibbons , a civil servic e membe r o f th e Canadia n sectio n o f th e Internationa l Waterways Commission , wen t a t Laurier' s behes t t o Washingto n t o see how the British ambassador was making out in negotiations intende d to result in a permanent Boundary Waters Commission betwee n Canad a and th e Unite d States . "M y visi t t o Washingto n wa s no t satisfactory, " he reporte d t o th e Prim e Minister . " I go t little fro m Mr . Bryc e excep t talk, nine-tenths o f it quit e outsid e th e issue . His courtes y an d persona l kindness mak e it awkwar d to tel l th e truth , bu t I hav e ha d a n oppor tunity a s I hav e neve r ha d before o f sizin g th e situatio n u p an d th e truth demand s tha t I shoul d tel l yo u that Mr . Bryc e i s of no assistanc e but, in my opinion, a n obstruction t o obtaining wha t ought to be insiste d upon, a permanent Commission." 10 A few days later Gibbon s wrote: " I think i f yo u woul d mak e i t clea r t o Mr . Bryc e tha t yo u wan t m e t o join i n th e negotiation s a t Washingto n wit h Mr . Roo t an d th e Ameri can authorities , w e wil l hav e a chanc e o f accomplishin g something . I do not se e how they can refuse ou r proposals, i f properly presented . Th e * Macdonald's negotiation s ar e brilliantl y describe d i n Donal d Creighton , John Ai Macdonald: The Ol d Chieftain (Toronto , 1955) , pp . 82-102 .

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matter will fiddle along , month after month , if left t o th e Britis h Ambassador, an d I very much doubt eve n then of his being abl e to accomplis h anything. I a m no t a t al l clea r tha t I can , but , i f I fail , i t wil l no t b e for wan t of effort." 11 Laurie r accepte d thi s suggestio n and Bryce , to hi s credit, di d no t object . No r di d Gibbon s fail . Tw o year s late r th e Governor Genera l o f Canad a wrot e to th e Colonia l Secretary : I hav e despatche d a cabl e t o you , wit h th e greates t satisfaction , beggin g you i n th e nam e o f th e Dominio n Govt . t o instruc t Bryc e t o sig n th e Gibbons Draf t Treat y r e Internationa l Waters . Thi s Treat y i s a grea t triumph fo r Gibbons , Si r Wilfri d Laurie r an d Canadia n diplomacy . I n saying thi s I d o no t wis h t o impl y an y disparagemen t o f Bryce , wh o ha s i n many respect s prove d a n admirabl e Britis h Ambassado r t o th e U.S. , bu t it i s impossibl e t o den y tha t th e direct , outspoke n an d rathe r choleri c manner o f ou r Canadia n Amateu r Diplomatis t ha s bee n mor e successfu l than th e deferentia l attitud e toward s Roo t o f th e Britis h Ambassador. 12

This wa s not th e onl y occasio n o n whic h Canadian negotiator s wer e to fin d faul t wit h Jame s Bryc e a s a protecto r o f Dominio n interests . Even on e s o devoted to the Britis h connection a s Joseph Pope privately expressed disma y a t Bryce' s readines s to tur n agains t Canad a fo r th e sake o f Britis h foreig n policy . I n 1911 , sen t t o Washingto n to hel p i n the negotiations ove r pelagic sealing, Pope note d i n his diary: Called upo n Mr . Bryce . Fea r w e ar e goin g t o hav e troubl e t o ge t hi m t o sustain ou r view , i.e. , tha t w e shoul d receiv e compensatio n fro m Russi a and Japan , i n retur n fo r abstainin g fro m Pelagi c Sealin g i n th e Wester n half o f the Pacifi c Ocea n . . . [Ma y 10] . . . . Mr. Bryc e mad e me sta y behind , and spok e to me at lengt h sayin g the U.S . conside r ou r positio n quoad Russi a an d Japa n a s a piec e o f shar p practice. Tha t w e wer e partner s an d shoul d wor k together . Th e charg e o f sharp practic e brough t b y the author s o f th e schem e t o ta x ou r cas e i s rich. Mr. Bryc e wh o seem s wholl y o n thei r sid e i n thi s busines s urge d m e t o withdraw my statement whic h I can't d o ... [Ma y 19] .

A yea r later , dealin g the n wit h fis h rathe r tha n wit h seals , Pope' s impression wa s unchanged . "Mr . Bryce, " h e wrote , "i s o f cours e al l for yieldin g to the U.S. . . . It's a shame." 13 Repeated incident s o f this kind mad e th e eventua l creatio n o f a separat e Canadia n missio n i n Washington inevitable, although it was no t unti l si x years after th e righ t of legatio n ha d bee n establishe d i n 192 0 tha t Mr . Vincen t Masse y received hi s credential s a s Canada' s firs t Ministe r t o Washington . The ne w legatio n wa s soo n immerse d in th e minutia e of negotiatio n which for m a norma l an d necessar y featur e o f Canadian-America n diplomacy. In les s than th e first year o f its existenc e it despatche d ove r

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a thousan d message s to th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s a t Ottaw a and ove r thre e hundre d message s t o th e Unite d State s Secretar y o f State, i n additio n t o countles s othe r les s forma l communication s wit h various agencie s of the America n government, dealing with suc h matter s as boundar y waters , immigration , allocatio n o f radi o broadcastin g channels, suppressio n o f smuggling , extradition, fisheries . Thu s eve n a t this earl y stag e ther e wa s littl e t o justif y th e charg e o f W . S . Fielding , the Ministe r o f Financ e whos e oppositio n delaye d th e creatio n o f th e mission fo r severa l years , tha t " a Canadia n representativ e a t Washington . . . would have an almost entirely ornamental position" as "there is really n o diplomati c work he could do." 14 The Canadia n legatio n (whic h i n 194 3 becam e th e Canadia n embassy) i n Washingto n wa s th e norma l bu t no t th e onl y mean s o f negotiating wit h th e Unite d States . Th e missio n o f Georg e Gibbon s resulted i n 190 9 i n th e creatio n o f th e Internationa l Join t Commission , a standin g tribuna l o f si x commissioner s in eac h o f it s Canadia n an d American sections , authorize d b y th e Treat y bringin g i t int o bein g t o settle dispute s submitte d b y th e tw o government s ove r th e system s of waterways whic h follo w an d travers e th e frontier . To observ e tha t th e celebrated Articl e I X o f thi s Treaty , providin g fo r referra l o f "an y other matter s of difference arisin g . . . along the common frontier," has yet t o b e invoke d i s no t t o sugges t tha t b y confinin g itsel f t o dispute s over waterway s th e Commissio n ha s devote d itsel f t o trivia : wher e water i s scarce , the welfar e o f peopl e an d th e rat e o f economi c growt h are at stake, and there can be no more vital national interests than these . The Commissio n has faile d t o produc e a mutually satisfyin g solutio n i n only one of the thirty odd cases of which it has bee n seized; it eventually resolved, despit e man y setback s an d uncertainties , th e futur e o f th e immense hydro-electri c resource s o f th e Columbi a Rive r system . There ha s bee n som e tendenc y fo r Canadia n leader s mistakenl y t o attribute thi s recor d o f achievemen t t o th e natur e o f th e institution , rather tha n t o th e exceptiona l relation s o f th e tw o Nort h America n neighbours which alone have made it possible; an d therefore to urg e th e institution upo n othe r countries . " I a m convinced, " Mackenzi e Kin g wrote i n 1923 , "tha t [th e Internationa l Join t Commission ] contain s th e new world answer to old world querie s a s to th e mos t effectiv e method s of adjustin g internationa l difference s an d avoidin g th e war s t o whic h they giv e rise";15 i n 194 2 h e expresse d t o Presiden t Roosevel t th e vie w that it might serve as the basis fo r post-war internationa l organization. 16 But a s a prescriptio n fo r th e ill s o f others, thi s ne w worl d remed y wa s wholly inappropriate , arisin g a s it di d fro m a wholly differen t situation :

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The toad beneath th e harrow know s Exactly wher e eac h tooth-poin t goes . The butterfly upo n the roa d Preaches contentment t o that toad.

The butterfly i s wiser now. But more than once in recent year s Canadian spokesmen hav e commende d th e Internationa l Join t Commissio n t o audiences i n Asia, a s thirty years previously they had don e to audience s in Europe . I t ma y b e presume d tha t th e Asians , i f mor e polit e i n thei r response, hav e bee n n o les s sceptica l o f th e suggestion . The Permanen t Join t Boar d o n Defence , lik e th e Internationa l Join t Commission a foru m fo r functiona l negotiatio n wit h th e Unite d States , is discussed abov e i n chapte r in . Canadian interest s in the United Kingdom were attended t o by a High Commissioner man y year s befor e hi s diplomati c statu s wa s formall y signified. (Th e specia l natur e o f th e offic e o f Hig h Commissione r i n London i s referred t o abov e in chapter n. ) I n 192 8 th e British Govern ment fo r th e firs t tim e sen t it s ow n Hig h Commissione r t o Ottawa . Thereafter tw o instruments fo r negotiatio n wit h the Britis h Governmen t were availabl e t o Canadia n ministers . Mackenzi e Kin g preferre d t o negotiate throug h th e Britis h Hig h Commissione r i n Ottaw a rathe r tha n through th e Canadia n Hig h Commissione r i n Londo n becaus e h e could then conduct negotiations himself. "To se e from m y office windo w on an adjoining sid e of Parliament Square a building which I know to be that o f th e representativ e o f th e Governmen t o f th e Unite d Kingdom, " he remarked i n 1928 , "wit h whom , a t a moment' s notic e I ca n confer , or who, at a moment's notic e ca n confe r wit h m e . .. is, I assur e you, deeply comfortin g t o on e in m y position." 17 Canadian interest s i n countrie s othe r tha n th e Unite d State s an d th e United Kingdo m were fewer , an d th e nee d fo r negotiatio n les s urgent . In Franc e a n agen t o f th e Dominio n governmen t ha d i n fac t i f no t i n law represente d Canad a sinc e 188 2 whe n Hecto r Fabre , originall y appointed b y th e governmen t o f th e provinc e o f Quebec , wa s com misioned by Ottawa to follo w instruction s from the Hig h Commissione r in Londo n s o a s t o improv e relation s betwee n th e tw o countries ; i n 1911 h e wa s succeede d b y Philipp e Roy , wh o assume d th e ne w titl e of Commissione r Genera l o f Canad a i n Franc e and , althoug h withou t official recognitio n o r diplomati c standing , attende d t o a variet y o f diplomatic dutie s befor e hi s appointmen t i n 192 8 a s Canada' s firs t Minister t o France. The presenc e i n Ottaw a o f a numbe r o f consula r representative s o f foreign countrie s provided th e governmen t with a method o f negotiatio n

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prior t o th e openin g u p o f Canadian diplomati c mission s abroad ; these , while lackin g diplomati c accreditatio n an d formall y responsibl e onl y for commercia l affairs , wer e resorte d t o o n occasio n a s i f member s of a regula r corps diplomatique. At th e tur n o f the century , Laurier, wishing t o soun d th e Frenc h Governmen t o n th e questio n o f th e compen sation i t migh t b e prepare d t o accep t i n exchang e fo r relinquishin g fishing an d other rights on a section o f the Newfoundland shore , entere d into negotiatio n wit h the Frenc h consu l genera l i n Montreal, A . Klecz kowski, notwithstandin g the doubt s o f th e Colonia l Secretar y whethe r "the Frenc h consu l woul d b e i n an y cas e abl e t o spea k fo r hi s govern ment or ... d o anything more than express his own personal opinions."* Similar approache s wer e made to th e Japanes e consu l i n Vancouver, S . Shimizu, an d th e consu l genera l i n Ottawa , Tatsgor o Nosse , o n th e subject o f Japanes e immigratio n durin g the perio d 1899-1909 . But th e mor e usua l metho d o f negotiatin g with foreig n government s before th e creatio n o f Canadia n mission s abroa d wa s t o exploi t th e facilities o f the Britis h government. The conflic t o f interest s confronting a Britis h ambassado r charge d wit h the protectio n o f Canadia n interest s in som e foreig n country was usuall y not s o acut e a s i n th e cas e o f th e British ambassado r i n Washington, but o n occasio n i t coul d be ; an d a s in matters of trade and commerce his knowledge of Canadian condition s and requirement s wa s likel y t o b e sligh t an d hi s interes t i n drivin g a hard Canadia n bargai n even slighter , the practic e develope d o f sendin g to th e ambassador' s sid e a Canadia n negotiator , usuall y o f Cabine t rank, t o fortif y th e Dominion's case . The fledgling Canadian diplomatis t was ofte n tempte d o n suc h occasion s t o dispens e entirel y wit h th e ambassador's services . But there usually supervened the recollection that the credential s o f a Canadia n negotiato r wer e likely t o b e greete d wit h suspicion b y a foreig n government , i f recognize d a t all ; th e presenc e of th e ambassador , i f onl y t o hove r ceremoniousl y i n th e background , was therefor e essential . Sometime s hi s expertis e wa s a s helpfu l a s hi s status, an d a visitin g Canadian mission , workin g i n clos e co-operatio n with th e residen t Britis h authority , coul d achiev e result s no t possibl e if either worke d withou t th e other . I n 190 7 Rodolph e Lemieu x wa s abl e * Joseph Chamberlai n t o th e Ear l o f Minto , Jan . 18 , 1899 , Laurie r Papers . Chamberlain wa s i n error , fo r th e negotiation s continue d fo r ove r tw o years . I n 1901 Laurie r informe d th e Governo r Genera l tha t h e ha d recentl y see n Kleczkowski i n Montrea l an d tha t th e latte r ha d "advise d hi s Minister—M . Delcasse—to thro w u p th e claim s o f th e Frenc h i n Newfoundlan d entirely . H e considered the y were of littl e us e to Franc e an d tha t th e Ministe r woul d probabl y be incline d to com e t o term s excep t fo r th e stron g anti-Englis h feelin g i n Franc e which ha d bee n stirre d u p b y th e Fashod a question. " Memorandu m o f intervie w with Laurier , Jan . 19 , 1901, Mint o Papers .

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to persuad e th e Japanes e governmen t t o undertak e t o limi t futur e emigration t o Canad a largel y becaus e o f th e assistanc e o f th e Britis h ambassador i n Tokyo , whic h th e Canadia n generousl y acknowledged . "Whatever ma y b e th e outcom e o f th e negotiations, " Lemieu x wrot e from Japan , "Canad a owe s a debt o f gratitud e t o th e Britis h Ambassa dor. Afte r havin g presente d m y credential s t o th e Foreig n Offic e i n Tokio, he took, from th e beginning, a deep interes t i n the question itself . He no t onl y obtaine d fo r Canad a th e ful l suppor t o f Hi s Majesty' s Government—but h e personall y attende d eac h an d ever y meetin g a t the Foreig n Office . H e thu s gav e Canad a th e prestig e o f Grea t Britai n . . . an d besides , w e ha d th e benefi t o f hi s vas t experienc e a s a diplomat."18 The relationshi p betwee n Canadia n an d Britis h authoritie s i n suc h a situatio n wa s no t alway s s o untroubled . Israe l Tarte , Ministe r o f Public Work s i n th e Laurie r Government , whil e i n Europ e i n 190 0 t o arrange fo r Canadia n participatio n i n a n internationa l exhibition , suc ceeded i n irritatin g th e Colonia l Secretary . " I hav e see n somethin g of Mr. Tarte' s manner s & temper sinc e h e ha s bee n ove r here, " Josep h Chamberlain wrot e t o th e Governo r Genera l o f Canada , "an d I a m sorry tha t h e ha s s o much influenc e i n th e Dominio n Government . Hi s idea evidentl y i s that Canad a shoul d practicall y b e regarde d i n Franc e as almos t a n independen t Frenc h Republic . H e ha s bee n ver y fuss y and irritable , an d th e Commissioner s o f th e Exhibitio n hav e foun d i t almost impossibl e t o satisf y hi s requirements." 19 Som e years later, whe n W. S . Fielding , th e Ministe r o f Finance , wen t t o Berli n t o negotiat e a trad e agreemen t wit h th e Germa n government , simila r tensio n arose . "I d o no t doub t hi s sincerit y i n wishin g to maintai n an d i n a genera l way strengthe n th e Imperia l tie, " wrot e a membe r o f th e editoria l staff o f Th e Times t o it s Toront o correspondent , "bu t [Fielding ] seem s to m e t o hav e acquire d a tast e fo r larg e negotiation s an d th e sens e of wielding plenipotentiar y powers , an d I thin k h e ma y indulg e tha t passion fro m day to day withou t quit e realizin g how far it is carryin g him. Th e wa y i n whic h negotiation s wer e undertake n i n Berli n ha s caused som e regre t here." 20 Thes e isolate d incident s becam e les s an d less frequent a s the British Empir e transforme d itself int o th e Common wealth o f Nation s an d a s th e doctrin e o f diplomati c unit y wa s replace d by th e concep t o f a like-minde d communit y o f independen t states . The relianc e o f successiv e Canadian government s upo n Britis h negotia tion o f thei r day-to-da y interest s i n foreig n countrie s wa s howeve r t o continue fo r som e time ; apar t fro m legation s a t Washington , Pari s an d Tokyo n o more mission s were opened unti l the eve of the Secon d Worl d

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War. Eve n today , wit h mor e tha n fift y diplomati c establishment s o f its own , the Canadia n Governmen t relie s i n som e countrie s upo n th e British embassy for negotiating with their government s on its behalf. POLICY-MAKING AN D NEGOTIATION: AT HOM E AN D ABROA D

The discretionar y power s o f Canadia n negotiators , a s thos e o f othe r countries, wer e from a n earl y date severel y curtaile d b y improvement s in communicatio n which made home governments reluctant t o delegat e authority t o thei r representative s abroad . Rodolph e Lemieux , Ministe r of Labou r an d Postmaste r Genera l i n th e Laurie r Government , wa s one o f th e firs t t o experienc e their effect . Afte r week s of intensiv e an d difficult negotiatio n wit h th e Japanes e authoritie s h i Toky o o n th e question o f limitin g furthe r emigratio n t o Canada , Lemieu x fel t h e had reache d a satisfactor y agreemen t an d o n Decembe r 5 , 1907 , h e cabled t o Laurie r a synopsi s of th e proposal s an d advise d thei r accep tance. "Enfin, " h e wrot e elatedl y but , as i t wa s to prove , prematurely , "tout ser a fini lundi a 3 p.m. le 9 decembre . Le s negotiations, grac e a Sir Claude Macdonald, ont pu terminer plut tot qu e je ne crois. Bien que le trait e rest e c e qu'i l es t dan s so n integralite , i l s e trouv e desormai s profondement modifi e pa r I'accor d conclu." 21 Thi s moo d o f triump h was rudel y jarre d fou r day s late r b y th e arriva l o f a telegra m fro m Laurier statin g tha t th e term s o f th e arrangemen t wer e unacceptabl e to th e Canadia n Government . I n som e exasperatio n Lemieu x wrot e t o Sir Louis Jette, the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec and a relative having some influenc e wit h the Prim e Minister , in a n attemp t to clea r u p wha t he regarded t o b e no mor e tha n a misunderstanding: II es t impossibl e a cett e distance , d'explique r pa r cablegramm e tou s le s details d e I'accor d qu e j e sui s e n mesur e d e conclur e si—comm e j e I'esper e —je recoi s me s instruction s dan s c e sens . J e comprend s l e desi r d e Si r Wilfrid d'obteni r tou t c e qu e Noss e a promis , mai s si , indirectement e t e n fait, j'arrive au meme resultat, il n'y a pas a hesiter. Dix minute s d e conver sation ave c Si r Wilfri d mettraien t le s chose s a point , mai s j e sui s a 1'autr e bout d u monde! 22

To Laurie r Lemieu x wrote a length y letter o f explanation , concludin g with th e remar k tha t he , Josep h Pop e an d th e Britis h ambassado r ha d "spent man y hour s an d man y day s to reac h thi s stag e o f th e negotia tions" an d tha t al l fel t tha t "althoug h no t perfect , th e arrangemen t

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under presen t circumstance s i s the bes t obtainable." 23 But thi s entreaty , and other s (includin g a ple a fro m th e Britis h ambassado r t o th e Governor General) , wer e o f n o avail . Lemieu x wa s instructe d no t t o conclude any agreemen t wit h the Japanes e governmen t and to retur n to Ottaw a t o explai n hi s proposal s t o th e Cabinet . Thi s confrontatio n took plac e o n January 11 , 1908 . My explanatio n o f th e whol e schem e [Lemieu x wrote ] an d th e recita l o f negotiations occupie d th e whol e day . Th e propose d arrangemen t i s no t onl y accepted, bu t everyon e admit s tha t I hav e obtaine d mor e tha n coul d hav e been expected . Th e reasons wh y settlemen t wa s deferre d ar e (1 ) becaus e they di d no t full y understan d th e term s o f th e proposals . (2 ) Becaus e th e British Columbi a member s wante d t o se e m e befor e an y acceptanc e coul d be made . (3 ) Becaus e thi s bein g th e grea t issu e durin g th e presen t session , they fel t a littl e nervou s abou t sayin g "yes " fro m suc h a distance . M y explanations, however , hav e bee n full y accepted , an d afte r I ha d rea d m y report (7 0 pages) , everybod y congratulate d m e ver y warmly. 24

An eve n les s happ y outcom e awaite d anothe r Canadia n negotiato r in later year s who attempte d t o exercis e discretionar y authority withou t precise instruction s fro m hi s hom e Government . Thi s wa s Dr . W . A . Riddell, th e Canadia n Permanen t Advisor y Office r a t th e Leagu e o f Nations, whos e repudiatio n b y th e Canadia n Governmen t a t th e tim e of th e controvers y over oi l sanctions against Ital y provide s a n importan t footnote t o th e diplomati c histor y o f th e 1930's . During th e las t day s o f th e Bennet t administration , th e Canadia n delegation a t Geneva, acting with the suppor t of the Prime Minister, ha d taken certai n initiative s concernin g sanction s agains t th e Mussolin i regime, whic h ha d begu n t o wi n favourabl e respons e fro m th e advo cates o f collectiv e security . The chang e o f Governmen t a t th e Genera l Election o n Octobe r 14 , 1935 , lef t Dr . Riddell , no w i n charg e o f th e delegation, i n som e uncertaint y abou t ho w t o proceed . Presse d b y events an d lacking replies to hi s cabled request s for specifi c instructions , he fatefull y decide d t o spea k i n favou r o f imposin g oi l sanctions . "I t seemed a moment," he wrot e afterwards , "whe n a n immediat e decisio n had t o b e take n i f sanction s wer e t o becom e reall y effectiv e an d i f I were t o safeguar d Canada' s interests." 25 Histor y ha s confirme d thi s verdict, i f not th e propriet y o f a caree r diplomatis t settin g hi s country' s policy on a cours e its governmen t was not prepare d to follow . Dr. Riddell's initiativ e wa s dogge d b y il l fortun e for , barel y a n hou r afte r his request s fo r instruction s arrived a t Ottawa , replie s wer e sen t tellin g him specificall y t o avoi d th e actio n h e ha d alread y take n b y th e tim e they reache d him . Wor d o f wha t h e ha d don e brough t a n immediat e and shar p repriman d t o th e effec t tha t request s fo r instruction s shoul d

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arrive sufficientl y i n advance to permit full consideratio n of th e situation by the Canadia n Government , and that h e was on n o accoun t t o ac t in an importan t matte r i n th e absenc e o f instructions . Dr . Riddell' s tele graphed repl y t o thi s messag e pleade d "th e difficult y o f m y position : with meagr e instructions and n o basi c statemen t o f polic y to co-operat e fully t o secure effectiv e applicatio n o f economi c sanction s whil e safe guarding Canada' s interests . I regre t exceedingl y if I hav e cause d th e Government an y embarrassment." 26 Th e Prim e Ministe r remaine d unmoved, an d cable d coldl y tha t th e positio n take n b y Dr. Riddel l was neither soun d policy nor withi n the scop e o f hi s authority . The Cabine t considered carefully whethe r t o repudiat e immediatel y th e statemen t o f the Permanent Advisor y Officer , bu t onl y whe n mounting publicity ha d drawn world-wid e attentio n t o "th e Canadia n proposal " di d i t d o so . A pres s statemen t wa s issue d o n Novembe r 29 , th e fina l paragrap h of whic h was a s follows: The suggestio n whic h ha s appeare d i n th e pres s fro m tim e t o time , tha t th e Canadian Governmen t ha s take n th e initiativ e i n th e extensio n o f th e embargo upo n exportatio n o f ke y commoditie s t o Italy , an d particularl y i n the placin g o f a ban upo n shipment s o f coal, oil , iro n an d steel , i s due t o a misunderstanding. The Canadia n Governmen t ha s no t an d doe s no t propos e to take the initiative in any such action; an d the opinio n whic h wa s expresse d by th e Canadia n membe r o f th e Committee—an d whic h ha s le d t o th e reference t o th e proposa l a s a Canadia n proposal—represente d onl y hi s personal opinion , an d hi s views as a member o f th e Committee , an d no t th e views of th e Canadia n Government. 27

It remaine d Dr . Riddell' s belie f tha t hi s repudiatio n wa s du e t o th e circumstance tha t th e Prim e Ministe r an d th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affair s wer e both ou t o f th e countr y a t th e tim e th e pres s statement wa s give n ou t an d th e Departmen t lef t i n charg e o f "tw o French Canadians, " Ernes t Lapointe , a s Actin g Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , an d Lauren t Beaudry , a s Acting Unde r Secretary. 28 I n this h e wa s i n error . A n exchang e o f telegram s betwee n Skelto n an d Beaudry on November 28 and November 29 makes clear the proposal t o disavow Dr. Riddell originated not in Ottawa but at Sea Island, Georgia , where th e Prim e Ministe r an d hi s Unde r Secretar y ha d withdraw n fo r a brie f bu t i n th e even t unattainabl e respite fro m th e pressur e o f worl d events. Ha d Dr . Riddel l followe d mor e closel y th e cours e o f th e elec tion campaig n h e woul d hav e ha d som e forewarnin g of th e probabl e response o f th e futur e Prim e Ministe r t o an y untowar d initiatives fro m permanent diplomati c officials; i n a speec h a t St. John, Ne w Brunswick, Mackenzie Kin g ha d criticize d th e Bennet t administratio n fo r leavin g

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the conduc t o f Canadia n polic y durin g th e Ethiopia n crisi s "i n th e hands o f thre e wh o hav e neve r bee n returne d t o responsibl e position s in th e institution s of the country." 29 The "Riddel l incident " ha s com e t o exer t a n important , i f unremarked, influenc e upo n th e foreig n polic y proces s i n Canada . I t engraved indelibl y upo n th e mind s o f hi s colleague s (mos t o f who m later ros e t o hig h position s i n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs ) th e unwisdom o f exercising important diplomati c initiatives withou t explicit political directio n fro m th e Eas t Block . I n 195 9 th e Unde r Secretar y of Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s wa s aske d b y a membe r o f th e Hous e o f Commons Standin g Committee to commen t on th e degre e o f discretio n customarily allowe d a Canadia n representativ e abroad . Th e repl y suggests that Dr . Riddell' s experience cas t a long shadow : I woul d sa y tha t consultatio n o n an y questio n o f polic y betwee n a repre sentative abroa d an d th e governmen t a t hom e woul d b e complet e an d continuous. . . . Nowadays wit h communication s a s promp t an d secur e a s the y are , an y representative abroa d . . . ca n get in touc h wit h Ottaw a withi n a da y and consult, o r ge t instruction s a s t o th e actio n h e shoul d take . Tha t i s on e result—and I thin k tha t i s tru e o f al l th e diplomati c services—o f th e enormous speedin g up , no t onl y o f telegraphi c bu t telephoni c communica tions, [and ] o f th e provisio n fo r automati c cypherin g whic h the y hav e between a goo d man y o f the importan t offices . A situatio n i n whic h th e representativ e i s isolate d fo r a whil e an d ha s t o use hi s ow n judgmen t withou t bein g abl e t o infor m hi s governmen t doe s not happe n ver y muc h now ; i t i s very rare. 30

The rol e o f th e Canadia n representativ e a t th e Unite d Nation s pro vides even less opportunity for independen t initiatives, for th e proximity of Ne w York City to Ottawa allows virtually continuous consultation. I n periods o f crisis the foreig n minister himself may , at shor t notice, arriv e to tak e charg e o f negotiations , a s Mr . Leste r Pearso n di d a t th e tim e of th e Sue z crisi s i n Novembe r 1956 . Instruction s prepare d b y th e Cabinet fo r Security Council delegates in 194 8 enjoine d them specifically to see k authority from th e Governmen t before makin g any commitment, or, i f time did no t permit , to abstai n from voting. 31 Delegates t o th e Genera l Assembl y hav e bee n allowe d eve n les s room fo r manoeuvre , and th e frequenc y wit h whic h a s a consequenc e they hav e resorte d t o withholdin g thei r vot e ha s cause d the m t o b e known t o th e pundit s of the delegates ' loung e a s "th e tota l abstainers. " While a numbe r o f abstention s hav e bee n du e t o governmen t polic y rather tha n t o th e lac k of it , th e testimon y of a parliamentar y member

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of th e delegatio n (th e mor e impressiv e a s comin g fro m a supporte r of th e Government ) i s that Ottaw a keep s a clos e an d almos t distrustful watch upo n it s activitie s a t al l times . Mr . Arthu r Smit h complaine d to th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s i n 196 0 tha t th e delegation foun d itsel f "consistentl y i n a positio n o f havin g t o refe r t o your offic e an d you , in turn, t o your advisers, on question s o f procedur e and policy, " an d h e wondered whethe r i t wa s no t leavin g itsel f "some what inflexibl e realizing ho w quickl y event s tak e place. " Mr . Norma n Robertson replied : Basically, i t i s very importan t t o se e that an y statement s mad e i n th e nam e of Canad a ar e consistent , tha t the y ar e i n lin e wit h Cabine t policy ; an d whenever yo u can , yo u wan t t o chec k an d confir m befor e a decisio n i s taken. A goo d man y quic k decision s hav e t o b e take n i n th e cours e o f th e Assembly, bu t som e o f the m hav e quit e importan t consequences . No w tha t we hav e a prett y goo d an d ver y fas t syste m o f communicatio n wit h ou r office, I think there is a great dea l t o be said fo r encouragin g [th e delegation ] to consul t frequentl y an d quickl y wit h th e Governmen t i n Ottawa , whe n they can . Bu t there ar e situation s whe n a sna p decisio n ha s t o b e mad e an d the ma n i n charg e ha s t o us e hi s bes t judgment , whic h ma y no t alway s coincide wit h th e judgmen t here . I d o no t thin k an y Governmen t ca n delegate responsibilit y to , le t u s say , a delegatio n a t a conference , o r mor e particularly th e Unite d Nations .

This wa s especiall y th e case , h e added , wit h socia l an d economi c questions, fo r thes e require d mor e extensiv e interdepartmenta l consul tation i n Ottaw a tha n purel y politica l questions. 32 Hi s repl y di d no t altogether satisf y Mr . Arthu r Smith , wh o observe d tha t i f th e Unde r Secretary's argumen t were carried to its logical extreme , "i t would mean there woul d b e little poin t i n havin g the delegatio n ther e a t all—rathe r just a spokesma n wh o i s responsible fo r repeatin g view s that ma y hav e come out o f th e offic e o f a civil servan t in Ottawa. " A s i t was , h e con cluded, "befor e yo u g o t o hav e a cu p o f coffe e yo u hav e t o receiv e instructions."* The styl e of Canadia n negotiation ha s thu s come t o b e characterize d by a reluctanc e o n th e par t o f professiona l diplomatist s t o commi t their government s i n th e absenc e o f instructions , b y a n exaggerate d *Canada, H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes o f Proceedings an d Evidence, no . 12 , Apri l 6 , 1960 , pp . 302-3 . Th e testimon y o f an America n congressiona l member o f th e Unite d State s delegatio n during th e same Assembl y offer s a n instructiv e comparison . "Onc e th e broa d limit s o f national polic y wer e establishe d on an y issue, " Mr . Harol d Riegelma n recalled , "there remaine d a wid e are a fo r negotiatio n within whic h th e delegat e i n charg e had a ver y rea l an d challengin g discretion." Lette r t o Ne w York Times, Marc h 14, 1960.

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circumspection i n makin g publi c statements, * an d b y a readiness , no t shared b y th e professio n a t large , t o acquiesc e withou t complain t i n that genera l demotio n o f thei r plac e i n th e schem e o f governmen t brought abou t b y twentieth-century politics an d technology . Suc h a styl e is no t withou t it s advantages . "Quie t diplomacy " ha s com e int o favou r as th e resul t o f repeate d indiscretion s b y les s inhibite d representatives . And ye t i t ha s it s price, exacte d chiefl y i n th e for m o f opportunitie s fo r constructive intervention s misse d o r neglecte d b y diplomatist s abroa d for fea r o f the consequence s t o com e fro m home . POLICY-MAKING AN D NEGOTIATION: ABOVE AN D BELO W

Among th e force s assailin g the traditiona l positio n o f th e professiona l diplomatist i s the growin g popularity o f what has com e t o b e know n a s "summit diplomacy, " a proces s o f negotiatio n wherei n b y a kin d o f inverted Gresham' s la w senio r statesme n driv e ou t junior , an d politi cians, preferabl y head s o f government , tak e ove r direc t responsibilit y for wha t wa s onc e th e ordinar y wor k o f caree r ambassadors . Thi s trend wa s particularly strikin g in th e Unite d Kingdo m durin g th e year s between th e tw o worl d war s whe n a n unusuall y brillian t corp s o f professional diplomatist s foun d itsel f increasingl y displace d b y " a succession o f politician-diplomat s wit h suc h strikin g an d memorabl e characteristics as plus-fours , Scot s brogues , shagg y coiffures , whit e linen neckties , underslun g pipes , an d variou s kind s o f umbrellas." 33 The eclips e o f diplomatist s b y politician s ha s bee n les s obviou s i n Canada, partl y becaus e prio r t o 194 5 fe w caree r ambassador s serve d as alternativ e channels for negotiation ; bu t i t ha s take n place . Negotiating a t th e summi t has alway s been t o Canadia n governments a natura l wa y o f dealin g wit h dispute s wit h th e Unite d States , fo r th e Prime Ministe r an d othe r member s of his Cabinet wer e never more tha n a day' s journe y fro m Washingto n t o whic h the y coul d an d ofte n di d *In 194 6 th e Associat e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s remarke d in repl y to a questio n whethe r an America n Stat e Departmen t practic e of the time requiring oversea s representative s t o clea r publi c statement s wit h Washingto n before deliver y wa s followe d i n Canada : "W e trus t t o th e goo d sens e o f ou r representatives abroa d no t t o sa y thing s whic h ar e embarrassing , an d i f the y d o we reserv e th e righ t t o criticize , whic h w e exerciz e withou t stin t i n th e cas e o f a lapse. " Canada , Hous e o f Common s Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes o f Proceedings an d Evidence, no . 4 , Jun e 4 , 1946 , p . 67 .

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directly repai r t o take up matters with the Presiden t an d his administra tion. I t thrive d a s neve r before o r sinc e durin g th e earl y month s o f the Secon d Worl d Wa r whe n Mackenzi e Kin g an d Frankli n Roosevel t met severa l time s t o dispos e o f issue s larg e an d small . Th e rol e o f th e Canadian legatio n wa s necessaril y diminishe d by thi s practice . O n on e occasion, whe n th e Canadia n Minister , Lorin g Christie , wa s present a t their discussion , th e Presiden t "turne d t o Christi e an d said : 'Yo u wil l not min d i f [i n future ] I g o over you r head an d tal k straigh t acros s th e phone to Mr. King' . Christie sai d no; o n the contrar y h e woul d be very much relieved." 34 I n 194 3 th e Hous e o f Common s wa s informe d tha t in regar d t o certai n negotiation s ordinaril y th e concer n o f th e legatio n the Canadia n Ministe r (the n Leighto n McCarthy ) had playe d no part whatsoever , whic h dre w fro m a n oppositio n criti c th e comment : "If agreement s o f thi s sort , involvin g Canad a an d th e Unite d States , are not matters for discussion by our legation a t Washington, wha t is the legation for?" 35 Th e answe r t o thi s criticism , whic h th e Prim e Ministe r did not give at that time, was that so long as matters might more expedi tiously be taken u p b y the tw o heads o f governmen t there wa s no poin t in involvin g th e legation . "I t i s indee d fortunate, " Mackenzi e Kin g wrote o n the ev e of one o f his visits to Frankli n Roosevelt , "tha t w e so completely shar e eac h other' s confidenc e an d sympathies . Ther e i s absolutely nothing that we do not feel abl e to discus s with each other." 36 No Canadia n Prim e Ministe r an d America n Presiden t hav e sinc e come close t o approximatin g this camaraderie , whic h owed much to th e extraordinary circumstance s o f war . Presiden t Truman' s relation s with bot h Mackenzi e Kin g and Mr . St . Laurent , whil e cordia l enough , seemed someho w lackin g i n warmth ; th e presidenc y o f Genera l Eisenhower brough t a temporar y reviva l o f persona l diplomac y i n Canadian-American relations . I n Decembe r 1956 , Mr . St . Laurent wa s easily persuade d t o joi n th e Presiden t i n hi s favourit e pastime . " I wa s very happy," the Prime Ministe r tol d the House of Commons soo n after wards, when, toward s th e en d o f m y shor t holida y i n Florida , I receive d a telephone cal l fro m th e Whit e Hous e tha t th e Presiden t woul d b e gla d i f I would dro p of f a t Augusta , Georgia , o n m y wa y back , hav e lunc h wit h him an d hav e a gam e o f golf . Wel l I foun d i n fact , yo u know , tha t a gam e of gol f wit h on e o f thos e electri c go-cart s wa s abou t th e bes t wa y t o hav e an internationa l conferenc e becaus e yo u ar e gettin g of f th e go-car t quit e frequently fo r onl y a coupl e o f minute s bu t fo r tim e enoug h t o reflec t o n what ha s bee n sai d u p t o th e the n presen t momen t an d t o reflec t o n wha t is goin g t o b e sai d whe n yo u ge t bac k o n th e sea t o f th e go-cart . . . . I came awa y wit h th e impressio n tha t th e gol f gam e ha d bee n ver y enjoyabl e

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but tha t ther e ha d bee n othe r aspect s o n th e hal f da y I spen t wit h hi m that wer e quit e mor e importan t tha n th e gol f score. 37

Thirty year s previousl y Lloy d Georg e ha d discovere d th e danger s o f doing diplomati c business on the gol f links, 38 while half a century previously Si r Wilfri d Laurie r ha d reacted , a littl e to o violentl y perhaps , against th e flatter y o f Londo n duchesses . Mr . St . Laurent' s excursio n into go-car t diplomacy , however gratifying t o Canadia n self-esteem , ra n the doubl e ris k o f misunderstandin g an d neglec t whe n th e moo d o f mateship passed . Canada's introductio n t o summit diplomacy o n the larger worl d scen e may perhap s b e date d fro m th e Colonia l Conferenc e a t th e en d o f th e nineteenth century ; it s distinctivel y twentieth-centur y qualit y wa s firs t savoured whe n Mackenzi e Kin g allowe d himsel f t o b e bundle d int o a Liberator bombe r an d flow n t o Londo n i n 194 1 fo r conference s wit h Mr. Churchil l an d other Britis h war leaders. I n recen t year s Canadians , while professin g scor n for the airborn e diplomac y tha t Joh n Foste r Dulles carrie d t o suc h remarkabl e length s an d heights , hav e bee n profoundly satisfie d t o watc h thei r ow n leader s circl e an d re-circl e the glob e i n a swif t successio n o f good-wil l tours . These , i t shoul d b e added, hav e ordinaril y ceremonia l rathe r tha n politica l significance ; the Canadian diplomatis t abroad has rather less often tha n his American colleague suffere d th e mortificatio n of havin g his foreig n ministe r dro p from th e sk y to assum e personal charg e o f negotiations becomin g reall y interesting fo r th e firs t tim e i n year s o f painfu l preparation . Mr . Leste r Pearson, whe n Canadia n foreig n minister , wen t s o fa r a s t o counse l against thi s method . "W e migh t well be advise d to leav e more o f diplo macy to the diplomats," h e wrote. "They ar e trained fo r the job and they are usuall y happ y t o conduc t a negotiatio n withou t broadcastin g th e score afte r eac h inning . . . . But when foreign ministers, or, eve n more , when head s o f governmen t meet , wit h thei r inevitabl e retinu e o f press , radio, an d television companions , with experts, advisers, and adviser s to advisers, wit h clever me n t o wor k behin d th e scene s an d eve n clevere r men t o suppl y th e scene s behin d whic h t o work , the n thing s ten d t o become difficult." * Wel l awar e of the temptation , Mr . Pearso n wa s no t *Lester B . Pearson, Democracy i n World Politics (Toronto , 1955) , p . 62 . Thi s view o f negotiation, it has been pointed out , "tha t one should pic k goo d negotiator s to represen t hi m an d the n giv e the m complet e flexibilit y an d authority— a principle commonl y voice d b y negotiator s themselves—i s b y n o mean s a s self evident a s it s proponent s suggest ; th e powe r o f a negotiato r ofte n rest s o n a manifest inabilit y t o mak e concession s an d t o mee t demands. " Thoma s C . Schelling, Th e Strategy o f Conflict (Cambridge , Mass. , 1960) , p . 19 . Sovie t negotiators hav e demonstrate d thi s mor e obviousl y tha n most ; se e Phili p E . Mosely, ed. , Negotiating with th e Russians (Boston , 1947) , passim.

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always abl e t o resist ; his successors , lackin g his backgroun d i n profes sional diplomacy , were a t times eager t o succumb . POLICY-MAKING AN D NEGOTIATION: OPEN AN D CLOSE D

In Canada , a s elsewhere, the tragedy of the First World War was widely attributed t o th e evi l machination s o f diplomatist s allowe d t o hatc h nefarious plot s hidde n fro m a watchfu l public . Close d diplomac y had been th e virus , ope n diplomac y wa s t o b e th e cure . Ther e wa s n o surer wa y o f discreditin g externa l polic y tha n t o shou t "secrecy " a t those responsible . Mackenzi e King as Leader o f the Opposition , lackin g argument to attack the Government fo r announcing in 192 0 th e negotia tion with the British Government o f the right of legation a t Washington, took u p th e familiar cry : "Well , Sir, al l I ca n sa y is, it i s a might y bad beginning i n a ne w departure i f our foreig n polic y . .. i s to b e boun d up wit h a secrec y fro m th e start . W e ar e drivin g righ t int o th e ver y vortex tha t create d th e whol e situatio n i n Europe , goin g agains t th e very thing which the allied nations have been urging so strongly, namely, that diplomac y shoul d no t b e secre t bu t tha t i t shoul d b e ope n an d above board." 39 Afte r becomin g Prime Minister , Mackenzie Kin g paid lip-service t o th e principl e o f ope n diplomacy , not leas t becaus e o f it s strong appeal t o thos e sixty-fiv e representative s o f the Progressiv e part y on whos e continuing parliamentary suppor t th e lif e o f hi s Governmen t depended. It wa s also usefu l i n imperial relations. Throughou t th e firs t Macken zie King administration a series o f crise s large an d smal l aros e between Ottawa an d Whitehall , an d a stead y strea m o f agitate d telegram s passed between the two. It was then Mackenzie King's aim to loosen the hold which the British Government sough t to retai n ove r the conduc t of the Dominion' s externa l affairs , an d fo r thi s purpos e i t wa s frequently expedient t o mak e publi c hi s correspondenc e wit h tha t Government . Much o f it , however , in accordanc e wit h a no w firmly established con vention o f intra-Commonwealt h consultation , wa s secre t correspon dence, an d t o brin g dow n th e text s o f secre t despatche s require d th e approval o f th e Britis h Governmen t a s autho r o r recipien t (an d als o of an y o f th e Dominio n government s affecte d b y thei r disclosure) . I n effect, therefore , th e Unite d Kingdo m authoritie s possesse d a powe r of veto ove r th e publicatio n o f thei r correspondenc e wit h th e Dominio n

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Government merel y b y markin g i t "private " o r "confidential" ; an d even in the case of communications not s o marked it was the contentio n of old-fashione d constitutiona l authoritie s that, addresse d a s the y wer e (until 1926 ) t o th e Governo r General , suc h message s require d th e Governor's approva l befor e disclosure—approva l no t likel y t o b e forthcoming i f the Britis h Government, whom the Governo r a s yet stil l represented, directe d otherwise . The disput e laten t i n thes e circumstance s aros e i n 192 3 whe n th e Canadian Governmen t wishe d t o brin g dow n it s correspondenc e wit h the Unite d Kingdo m Governmen t t o clarif y Canada' s constitutiona l position i n regar d t o th e Treat y o f Lausanne . T o suppor t hi s case— a strong one—Mackenzi e Kin g agai n invoke d popula r sentimen t against secret diplomacy . In a letter to the Governor General's secretar y (afford ing, incidentally , a fai r exampl e of his literary style i n it s characteristic , though not it s best, form), h e wrote: With respec t t o correspondenc e betwee n th e Governmen t o f Canad a an d the Governmen t o f Grea t Britai n o n matter s originatin g wit h th e Canadia n Government, an d with respec t t o which th e fulles t publicit y i s desired, . . . unless—when th e retur n o f suc h correspondenc e i s aske d fo r b y th e Hous e of Commons—th e Governmen t i s fre e t o exercis e th e sam e judgmen t an d discretion wit h respec t t o th e promp t presentatio n t o Parliamen t o f th e correspondence requeste d a s i s exercise d wit h respec t t o al l othe r return s of correspondence , documents , etc. , i t wil l b e increasingl y difficul t t o avoi d the charg e tha t th e Administratio n i s lendin g itsel f t o a specie s o f secre t diplomacy with respect t o public busines s whic h i s in no way warranted, an d which, wer e th e impressio n permitte d t o b e fostered , woul d b e mos t un fortunate fo r ou r inter-imperial an d internationa l relations. 40

In hi s repl y th e Governor' s secretar y argue d tha t correspondenc e addressed to the Governor General was in fact a s in form th e Governor General's Correspondenc e and, as such, his to disclose or withhold as he saw fit . Thi s sanctit y of officia l correspondence , h e insisted , "doe s no t imply secre t diplomacy " bu t wa s "intende d t o provid e a saf e mean s whereby matter s o f publi c concer n ma y b e discusse d i n private." 41 Mackenzie King's eventua l response wa s to rais e th e whol e question a t the Imperia l Conferenc e later i n th e yea r where , after muc h argument, a resolution , largel y drafte d b y him , settle d i t alon g th e principle s h e desired. It s mos t important paragraph s wer e these : The Conferenc e gav e it s attentio n t o th e desir e o f th e Parliament s o f th e various part s o f th e Empir e t o b e afforde d th e fulles t informatio n possibl e on al l matter s o n whic h negotiation s wer e goin g on , o r discussion s takin g place, betwee n tw o o r mor e Governments . The Conferenc e recognize d that , i f consultation , t o whic h i t attache d great importance , wa s to be carried ou t effectively , thi s mus t involv e a fran k

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and confidentia l exchange o f views in written o r telegraphi c communications , and tha t man y o f the communication s exchange d betwee n th e Governments , particularly i n connectio n wit h foreig n polic y an d defence , coul d no t b e made public . A t th e sam e tim e th e feelin g o f th e Conferenc e wa s tha t a s many communication s a s possibl e ough t t o b e mad e availabl e fo r th e us e of th e Parliaments , an d i t was thought desirabl e t o discus s th e circumstance s in whic h officia l communication s betwee n th e Government s coul d an d could no t b e made public . It wa s generall y agree d tha t an y officia l communicatio n no t marke d "confidential" o r "secret" or not clearl y intende d t o b e treated a s such migh t be regarde d a s availabl e fo r publicatio n wtihou t referenc e t o an y othe r government. It wa s understoo d that , s o fa r a s eac h Governmen t wa s concerned , an d subject t o th e nee d fo r mutua l consen t i n certai n cases , th e responsibilit y a s to publicatio n o f correspondenc e wit h othe r Government s reste d wit h th e Ministers o f th e Crow n i n th e Dominion s a s i n Grea t Britain. 42

Mackenzie King' s disenchantmen t wit h "ope n covenants , openl y arrived at " coincided , surel y no t b y accident , wit h th e strengthenin g of hi s parliamentary position in 1926 , an d with a lengthening experience of diplomati c negotiations fortifyin g a tast e fo r secrec y acquire d a s early a s 190 8 whe n he undertoo k a missio n t o Englan d a t th e reques t of Presiden t Theodor e Roosevel t th e rea l purpos e o f whic h ha d bee n deliberately conceale d fro m th e public. * I n 192 9 th e Britis h Prim e Minister, Ramsa y MacDonald, pai d a visi t to Ottawa . Mackenzie King invited hi m ou t t o hi s countr y retrea t i n th e Gatinea u Hills , an d the y "had a delightful tramp together through the woods and over the moors, and tea togethe r i n my little cottag e by the lake. Tha t particula r experience ha s convince d m e mor e tha n eve r o f th e wisdo m of wha t I hav e done a t Kingsmere . I believ e tha t mor e an d more , muc h o f ou r publi c life i s going to b e carrie d o n i n th e open , an d tha t partl y as a mean s of self-preservation fro m th e stress , strai n an d pressure s o f th e highl y intensified an d comple x lif e o f ou r day , me n wh o hav e reall y grea t problems t o conside r ar e goin g to mee t i n th e quie t retreat s o f Natur e and thres h out thei r problem s there." 43 Henceforth , thi s belie f in the value o f intimat e negotiatio n wit h leader s o f government , untrouble d by th e mischievou s scrutiny of th e publi c an d th e press , influence d t o an increasin g exten t Mackenzi e King' s conduc t o f externa l policy . I t was manifeste d in a distrus t o f multilatera l conferences—"th e mor e I *"The Canadia n Cabine t coul d no t possibl y announc e tha t Kin g wa s goin g t o England a t Roosevelt' s request , an d a n ostensibl e reaso n fo r th e tri p ha d t o b e found. . . . [Thi s was ] tha t . .. he was being sen t t o Englan d t o discus s variou s aspects o f [immigration ] wit h th e Governmen t o f th e Unite d Kingdom. " R . MacGregor Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, I , 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p. 160 .

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1

see o f conference s th e les s patienc e I a m comin g t o hav e wit h them, " he exclaime d i n a n unusuall y fran k outburs t i n th e Hous e o f Common s hi 1937—and , mor e positively , i n a decide d preferenc e fo r "quie t diplomacy." Hi s reactio n t o th e "Atlanti c Charter " meetin g betwee n Roosevelt an d Churchil l i n th e summe r o f 194 1 wa s revealin g i n thi s respect. "To me , i t is the apotheosi s of the craze for publicity and show," he wrot e in his diary . "Ther e i s no nee d fo r an y meetin g of th e kind." 4* Mr. Leste r Pearso n brough t t o hi s offic e a s Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affair s fro m 194 9 t o 195 7 th e trainin g an d th e outloo k o f twenty year s i n professiona l diplomacy . I t i s no t surprising , therefore , that h e share d t o th e full , an d helpe d i n considerabl e degre e t o formu late, th e reactio n agains t negotiatin g i n th e limeligh t s o dominan t i n recent years . "Th e purpos e o f negotiation, " h e ha s written , is th e reconciliatio n o f interests , th e explorin g o f a situatio n i n a n effor t t o find som e commo n ground , som e possibilit y o f compromise , th e seekin g o f agreement throug h mutua l adjustments . Suc h adjustment s ar e no t mad e easier, an d ma y well be made impossible , when th e negotiator s fea r tha t an y concession o r compromis e wil l withi n th e hou r b e printed , pictured , o r broadcast bac k hom e a s a capitulation. . . . There ar e situations—an d the y ar e sometime s th e mos t difficul t an d important ones—wher e . . . highl y publicize d meeting s offe r th e leas t promising o f al l method s o f negotiating . A n atmospher e o f dram a i s inevit ably generate d whe n th e spotlight s o f th e worl d ar e focusse d o n a singl e "parley a t th e summit" . Suc h a n atmospher e ma y wel l b e a publi c relation s officer's dream , bu t a negotiator's doom . . . .4B Negotiations conducte d i n public, in fact, b y political personages , ar e simpl y not permitte d t o fail—a t leas t fo r som e time . Thi s i s on e reaso n tha t diplo matic negotiation s should normall y b e conducted i n private. . . . Full publicity for objective s and policie s an d result s doe s no t mean , o r a t least shoul d no t mean , tha t negotiatio n mus t alway s b e conducted , ste p b y step, i n public . Certainl y n o privat e activity , no t eve n a publi c relation s business, coul d b e operate d b y suc h methods . An d governmen t i s toda y th e most importan t an d delicat e activit y of all . Negotiatio n i n a n agitate d gold fish bowl, then, is often a serious obstacle t o the reaching of agreement. . . ,46 These reflection s ma y appea r t o embod y n o mor e than th e conventiona l wisdom o f thei r subject , bu t reflectio n o f an y kin d i s rar e enoug h i n politicians, an d o f thi s kind rare r still .

Chapter Eight P

R O P AG AN D A

PROPAGANDA VERSU S "PUBLICITY"

In commo n wit h leaders o f liberal democracie s everywhere , the maker s of Canadia n foreig n polic y have been reluctant to develo p a s part o f th e ordinary machiner y of governmen t th e instrument s o f wha t i s variousl y described a s information, propaganda, psychological or political warfare . Ready enoug h t o exploit suc h devices in war, the Canadia n governmen t has regarde d the m a s inappropriat e fo r peacetim e use . I t wa s onl y gradually, an d wit h eviden t distaste , tha t th e legitimac y o f propa ganda a s a mean s o f implementin g foreign polic y i n norma l time s wa s established, a s it becam e apparen t tha t th e ol d dichotomie s o f "peace " and "war " wer e no longer relevan t to the internationa l scene . An d eve n then th e mos t experience d an d knowledgabl e official s wer e incline d t o approach i t wit h great caution . "I t i s a very tricky business, " remarke d Mr. Leste r Pearso n i n 1953 , "t o conduc t psychologica l warfar e i n a time o f col d wa r an d throug h th e agenc y of coalitio n o f fre e states." 1 Notwithstanding thes e inhibition s agains t usin g propagand a t o influence th e foreign policies o f other states , Canadians hav e been quit e ready to accep t i t for anothe r and , as they conceive it, a more innocuous purpose, creatin g a climat e o f opinio n abroa d i n whic h Canadia n interests coul d blosso m an d prosper . Provide d n o attemp t wa s mad e directly t o interven e i n matter s o f hig h policy , provide d effort s wer e confined t o wha t late r becam e know n a s "projectin g a favourabl e image o f th e Canadia n community, " n o seriou s objectio n wa s raised . In thi s dilute d version , ofte n describe d a s "publicity " s o a s t o avoi d a more offensiv e i f mor e accurat e connotation , propagand a ha s becom e an accepted for m o f governmental activity. Indeed, i t has bee n suggested that suc h activit y i s mor e importan t t o th e Canadia n governmen t tha n to most others. "W e are a comparatively new arrival on the internationa l scene," Mr . Vincen t Masse y ha s written , "an d les s i s know n abou t Canadian lif e than would be the case if we had been a grown-up membe r of th e family o f nations for a longer time . . . . The paradox o f enjoying at th e sam e tim e th e complet e independenc e an d th e privileg e o f membership i n the Britis h Commonwealt h is confusing to th e foreigner . This impose s a specia l obligatio n o n u s t o enlighte n other s a s t o ho w

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we carr y o n ou r affairs." 2 Th e enlightenmen t o f foreigner s ha s bee n in fac t a continuin g if incidental par t o f th e wor k o f Canadia n officials , from W . T. R . Presto n wh o in 1900 wished to destro y al l lantern slide s depicting Indians , ic e palace s an d sno w slides, 3 t o Mr . Leste r Pearso n who in 195 4 remarked t o a n America n audienc e tha t Canad a wa s afte r all "fa r more tha n a n enormou s col d spo t o n th e map , inhabited b y Mounties, Eskimo , trappers , quintuplet s an d Ros e Marie." 4 An d i f th e need has lessened, i t has not yet passed. EARLY PROPAGAND A FO R IMMIGRATION AN D TRAD E

Propaganda wa s firs t employe d i n ai d o f externa l polic y t o brin g more peopl e t o th e country . "Ou r immigration policy, " remarke d th e Minister responsibl e fo r i t i n 1911 , "i s i n th e firs t instanc e simpl y a n advertising policy—a means of placing the advantage s of Canada before such peopl e i n othe r countrie s a s w e desir e t o com e t o Canada." 5 Enlisted i n thi s caus e wer e a variet y o f propagandis t techniques , em ployed th e mor e vigorously , i f crudely , b y Dominio n agent s unre strained b y th e nicetie s o f norma l diplomati c practice . The y soo n ra n into trouble . Europea n countries , i f the y di d not , like Russia , forbi d emigration altogether , wer e no t anxiou s to los e thei r labou r forces , an d they prohibite d wit h varyin g degree s o f severit y an d effectivenes s emigration propaganda b y foreign agents. Canadia n propaganda becam e the subjec t o f officia l complaint t o th e imperia l authoritie s b y th e German ambassado r i n London; th e Hamburger Nachrichten deplore d "th e arrogance o f th e Canadia n [Hig h Commissioner ] Lor d Strathcona , and th e utter disrespec t show n b y him . .. i n publicl y conductin g his emigration propagand a o n German soil . . . . Apart fro m th e weakening of th e Fatherlan d whic h th e succes s o f suc h propagand a entails , th e attempt to lure our fellow-countrymen to this desolate , sub-arcti c regio n is, upo n human e ground s alone , t o b e denounce d a s criminal." 6 I n the Unite d Kingdom , however , th e Hig h Commissione r an d th e agent s of th e provincia l government s coul d an d di d giv e free r reig n t o then ingenuity. Newspape r advertisements , letter s t o editors , pamphlets , lec tures abette d b y the magi c lantern, sough t t o depic t th e Dominio n a s a land o f opportunit y i f no t o f mil k an d honey . "I n late r year s tw o exhibit wagon s wer e o n th e mov e i n Irelan d an d Scotland , an d tw o motor car s travelle d throug h Englan d . . . , stopping whereve r a crowd could b e collecte d an d a n opportunit y fo r speakin g an d givin g ou t pamphlets coul d b e found." 7

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Propaganda wa s similarl y presse d int o th e servic e o f commercia l policy. Agent s alread y engage d i n drummin g u p immigrant s turne d their attentio n t o good s an d capital . Joh n Dyk e i n Liverpoo l wa s instructed i n 188 5 t o "furnis h informatio n o n .. . question s o f trad e . . . between Canada an d Europe," and henceforth depicting the fortunes awaiting trader s an d investor s i n th e ne w Dominio n becam e a n increasingly important aspec t of the wor k of Canadian agent s and , later , of trad e commissioners . Member s o f th e Canadia n Economi c Commis sion whic h visite d Russi a i n 191 8 wer e keenl y awar e o f th e valu e o f propaganda i n pursuing its objectives : Before leavin g Siberi a you r Commissio n urge d tha t a n illustrate d pamphle t describing Canada an d he r resource s shoul d b e prepared an d translate d int o Russian fo r distributio n throughou t Siberia . No t havin g ha d tim e t o ac complish this durin g thei r sta y i n Vladivostock , a smal l leafle t wa s prepare d for distributio n throug h th e mediu m o f th e Trad e Commissioner . You r Commission, however , fee l tha t th e origina l proposa l shoul d b e carrie d out , and a carefull y prepare d pamphlet in Russian issue d fo r wid e distribution . It wa s arrange d befor e th e Commissio n lef t fo r Siberi a tha t certai n moving picture films illustrating Canadian nationa l lif e an d industrie s shoul d be prepare d an d forwarde d fo r us e throughou t th e country . The y failed , however, t o com e t o hand , an d you r Commissio n no w recommen d tha t a series o f suc h film s b e prepare d wit h th e prope r Russia n title s an d mad e available fo r us e b y th e Trad e Commissione r i n carryin g o n a n illustrate d propaganda throug h th e mediu m o f th e co-operativ e societies , th e zemstvos , the school s an d othe r suitabl e organizations , wh o woul d b e gla d t o arrang e for th e exhibit of these films. 8 WARTIME PROPAGAND A I N THE UNITE D STATE S

The Canadia n Governmen t di d no t ventur e in th e compan y o f it s mor e powerful Allie s int o th e excitin g experiment s conducte d a t Crew e House an d late r b y Georg e Creel' s Committe e o n Publi c Informatio n (although Canadian s serve d unde r Lor d Beaverbroo k i n th e Britis h Government's Ministr y o f Informatio n create d i n Februar y 1918*) . Lacking bot h appetit e an d mean s fo r psychologica l warfar e o n suc h a scale, th e Canadia n Governmen t resorte d fo r th e firs t tun e t o propa ganda fo r th e purpos e o f achievin g a politica l objectiv e o f externa l * Beaverbrook, accordin g t o on e critic , relie d o n Canadian s "whos e experienc e of foreig n affair s an d whos e knowledge of foreig n language s was a s limite d a s hi s own." Laurence Lyon, Th e Pomp o f Power (London , 1922) , quote d i n Harol d D . Lasswell, "Th e Organizatio n of Psychologica l Warfar e Agencie s in Worl d Wa r I " in Willia m E . Daughert y an d M . Janowitz , eds. , A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore , 1958) , p. 12 3 n.

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5

policy a s distinc t fro m commercia l advantage . Th e objectiv e wa s t o enlist America n sympath y fo r th e Allie d cause . Th e metho d coul d hardly hav e bee n mor e discreet . I n Januar y 191 7 th e Canadia n Prim e Minister, Si r Rober t Borden , aske d Majo r Charle s W . Gordon , a Canadian autho r bette r know n as Ralph Connor , i f he would exploit hi s considerable reputatio n i n th e Unite d State s t o spea k ther e o n th e subject o f th e Allied , an d particularl y o f th e Canadia n wa r effort . "I t occurred to me," Borde n wrot e to the Colonial Secretary , that h e migh t g o informall y t o som e o f th e citie s i n th e Unite d State s an d deliver addresse s descriptiv e o f condition s a t th e front , wher e h e ha d a n experience o f man y months , an d o f th e wor k an d achievement s o f th e British forces , an d mor e especiall y o f th e Canadia n Arm y Corps , t o whic h he wa s attache d a s a chaplain . I t wa s suggeste d tha t incidentall y h e coul d set fort h i n thes e addresse s th e cause s whic h ha d compelle d Canad a t o throw hersel f hear t an d sou l int o the struggl e an d that i n this way he migh t awaken i n hi s audience s a fulle r appreciatio n o f th e purpos e o f th e Allie d nations an d o f th e magnitud e o f th e issu e a s i t concern s th e whol e world. 9

No soone r ha d Gordo n arrive d i n Washingto n tha n th e Unite d State s broke of f diplomatic relation s wit h Germany , an d a fe w week s late r i t was a t war . H e wa s advise d b y th e Britis h ambassado r t o confin e hi s efforts "t o a campaig n devoi d o f an y grea t publicity," 10 an d event s i n any case soo n made mor e ambitiou s effort s unnecessary . Th e Canadia n Government throughou t 191 8 too k th e view , wel l expresse d b y a prominent Toront o busines s ma n a t th e time , tha t "t o fin d th e Unite d States ou r associat e i n foreig n policy , eve n t o th e fightin g point , i s s o much beyon d ou r wildes t hope s o f thre e year s ag o tha t w e fee l tha t what America n sentimen t need s fo r th e momen t i s a certain amoun t of letting alone." 11 The proble m aros e agai n betwee n Septembe r 193 9 an d Decembe r 1941. Whe n i n th e sprin g an d summe r o f 194 0 th e twiligh t wa r deepened int o th e blac k nigh t o f battle and disaster , th e voice s o f many influential Canadian s wer e raise d t o deman d tha t thei r Government appeal t o America n opinio n t o pres s th e Roosevel t administratio n int o closer co-operatio n wit h th e Unite d Kingdom . Mackenzi e King , lik e Borden befor e him, was greatly averse to propaganda o f this kind. While he di d no t shrin k fro m placin g privatel y befor e th e Presiden t an d hi s officials request s fo r materie l an d othe r form s o f assistance , h e wa s intensely sympatheti c t o th e President' s difficultie s i n copin g wit h isolationist opinio n i n a n electio n yea r an d mos t anxiou s t o avoi d any thing i n th e natur e o f a publi c appeal , o r th e kin d o f privat e appea l which migh t becom e public . Thu s h e viewe d wit h grea t displeasur e a speech mad e b y th e Attorne y Genera l o f Ontari o o n April 3 , 1940 , urging tha t Canad a "brin g abou t th e activ e participatio n o f th e Unite d

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States i n suppor t o f th e Allie d cause." 12 Th e speec h wa s widel y an d adversely commente d upon i n th e America n press , an d dre w fro m th e Secretary o f Stat e th e extraordinaril y shar p publi c rebuk e tha t "n o nondescript utterance s o f minor official s o r individual s abroad . . . have anything remotely t o d o with the polic y o f this Governmen t a t hom e o r in it s international relations." 13 The Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Exter nal Affair s describe d th e spec h a s "th e mos t stupi d an d harmfu l . . . made b y an y Canadia n i n years, " th e Canadia n Ministe r telephone d from Washingto n t o repor t tha t i t ha d greatl y strengthene d th e han d of th e isolationists , an d th e Prim e Minister though t i t advisabl e t o issu e a statemen t declarin g tha t "th e Canadia n Governmen t particularl y ha s no though t o f attemptin g t o intervene , directl y o r indirectly , i n th e affairs o r policies o f the United States." 14 But feelin g persiste d tha t i t should . Th e forme r Minister t o th e United States, W. D. Herridge, sought support fo r a mission to Washington o f eminen t statesme n an d soldier s o f th e Allie s t o infor m th e American public and governmen t of the urgenc y of th e situatio n an d o f the nee d fo r massiv e an d immediat e assistance ; h e propose d tha t th e Canadian Governmen t shoul d initiat e thi s project , firs t b y seekin g th e President's approval , an d the n b y taking i t u p wit h th e government s of France an d th e Unite d Kingdom . Althoug h th e Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affair s privatel y describe d the proposa l a s "cockeyed and dangerous " (a n opinio n full y share d b y hi s Prim e Minister) , th e Canadian legatio n i n Washington was instructed t o broac h i t informally with th e Secretar y o f Stat e who , a s expected , sternl y disapproved . Mackenzie Kin g wa s als o instrumenta l i n deflectin g a proposa l o f th e Prime Ministe r o f Australi a tha t th e Unite d Kingdo m an d th e Domin ions shoul d simultaneousl y appea l t o th e Presiden t and , throug h him , American opinion , fo r immediat e aid . "An y chang e o f polic y i n th e United States, " he cabled t o Mr. Churchil l o n May 24, 1940 , "wil l hav e to resul t fro m convictio n tha t a chang e i s necessar y i n their ow n interest. I fee l strongl y that a t the present momen t an y public appea l b y out side government s woul d arres t rathe r tha n assis t th e formatio n o f public an d Congressiona l opinio n favourabl e t o action." 15 Eve n t o such modes t proposal s a s publi c lecture s b y pro-Allie d speaker s h e was distinctl y cool . "Wit h respec t t o wha t yo u hav e i n min d a s t o lecturing in the United States," he wrote to a correspondent offerin g he r services a s a publi c speake r t o America n audiences , " I mus t tel l yo u that from th e beginning of the war ou r Governmen t has rigidl y refrained from identifyin g itsel f i n an y wa y wit h propagand a in tha t country . W e have not eve n sough t to divid e responsibility wit h th e Unite d Kingdom.

PROPAGANDA 18

7

We hav e ha d t o infor m th e Britis h Governmen t tha t it s ministr y mus t use its own judgment and take responsibility for suc h work i n the nature of propagand a i n th e Unite d State s a s i t deem s advisable." 16 Ther e can be no doub t tha t thi s polic y of restrain t was the righ t policy , and wholly justifie d b y events . Late r i n th e wa r th e Prim e Ministe r referre d to th e matte r i n the Hous e of Commons: There wa s i n th e Unite d State s a stron g feelin g agains t an y attemp t o n th e part o f Canad a t o influenc e th e peopl e i n a wa y whic h migh t b e hel d t o b e political, namely , to mak e fro m Canad a b y way o f propagand a a n effor t t o bring th e Unite d State s int o th e war . I t wa s hel d th e reaction s migh t b e serious. I a m justifie d i n sayin g that I wa s aske d b y the highes t authorit y i n the Unite d State s t o se e tha t grea t car e wa s take n t o avoi d makin g an y move b y whic h i t coul d b e sai d tha t th e governmen t o f Canad a wa s tryin g to influenc e publi c opinion i n th e Unite d State s wit h a vie w t o havin g th e United State s brough t int o th e wa r agains t it s will. 17 By 194 1 th e cas e fo r restrain t ha d les s t o commen d it . Frankli n Roosevelt ha d bee n triumphantl y returne d fo r a thir d term , isolationis t sentiment wa s o n th e wane , Anglo-America n co-operatio n wa s assum ing th e mor e tangibl e for m o f a n easterl y flo w o f munition s an d suppl y if only , a s yet , fo r "cas h o n th e barrel-head. " Thi s rus h o f event s ha d tended t o obscur e th e natur e an d exten t o f Canada' s ow n contributio n to the war effort, an d Mackenzie King becam e increasingl y responsive to the great pressure on the Government to step up its informational activi ties i n th e Unite d States . B y Ma y 1941 , eve n th e Washingto n legatio n urged thi s course: We . . . respectfull y sugges t tha t yo u shoul d a t a n earl y dat e delive r a speech somewher e in th e Unite d State s to b e carrie d o n a nationa l hook-up , publicizing th e war-effor t o f Canada , an d urgin g th e America n natio n an d government to se e that th e tools which they ar e s o splendidly manufacturing, and asked for by Mr. Churchill , reach th e sourc e wher e they ar e desperatel y required an d no t sun k i n th e Atlanti c Ocean . Further, w e respectfull y sugges t tha t Ernes t Lapoint e [th e Ministe r o f Justice] shoul d a t th e earlies t possibl e moment delive r a simila r speec h i n the Unite d State s which shoul d b e broadcas t throughou t th e country , reply ing to the articl e i n Life whereb y the Provinc e o f Quebe c i s classed a s "Fift h Columnist", a s wel l a s urgin g deliver y o f th e tool s unde r protectio n whic h will preven t their bein g sunk. 18 While thes e suggestion s wer e no t acte d upon , i t i s clea r tha t th e Prime Minister' s thought s wer e movin g i n th e sam e direction . A fe w weeks earlie r h e ha d himsel f spoke n wit h Cordel l Hul l abou t th e inade quacy o f informatio n abou t Canada in th e Unite d States . " I tol d hi m of my havin g wante d t o avoi d an y interferenc e whe n th e Lend-Leas e Bil l was on . Sai d I ha d bee n askin g mysel f whethe r i t migh t no t b e wel l

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to giv e a radio broadcas t t o th e U.S . settin g forth Canada' s position." 19 By mid-summer he was considering new machinery fo r a sustaine d pro gramme o f informatio n i n th e Unite d States . "Ther e is , a s yo u know, " he wrot e t o th e Ministe r i n Washingto n i n September , a ver y stron g feelin g throughou t th e country , an d mor e particularl y o n th e part o f th e Press , tha t Canad a shoul d have , i n Ne w York , a n offic e some what simila r t o tha t ove r whic h Si r Geral d Campbel l preside s [th e Unite d Kingdom Informatio n Office] . I doub t i f thos e wh o hav e t o d o wit h th e creating o f publi c opinio n an d public prejudice i n Canad a wil l eve r b e satisfied tha t th e Governmen t i s doin g it s dut y unles s som e additiona l agency o f th e kin d i s established . I migh t sa y I thin k th e sam e woul d b e more o r les s true o f the Member s o f Parliament . As matter s no w stand , th e Legatio n i s coming i n fo r wholl y unwarrante d as wel l a s unnecessar y criticis m o n th e scor e o f inadequat e publicit y bein g given i n th e Unite d State s t o Canada' s wa r effort . Indee d th e criticis m is , as you will know, aime d no t less at myself tha n th e Legation. . . . I a m sur e tha t somethin g ca n b e worke d ou t whic h wil l preven t an y conflict o f jurisdiction s or o f services. 20 The Minister , no t unnaturally , wa s less sure , an d too k unkindl y t o th e creation i n th e neighbourin g America n cit y o f a n agenc y boun d t o become t o som e exten t a riva l o f hi s own . "Ther e i s nee d fo r u s t o continue an d expan d the quiet work that is being don e i n this country," he conceded in a letter to the Prime Minister. "There is need perhaps for a mor e dramatic presentation from Ottaw a of our wa r effort . Bu t thi s is not th e momen t t o establish , wit h th e attendan t publicit y require d t o meet th e Canadia n criticism s to whic h yo u refer , a registere d burea u i n the Unite d States , whic h woul d naturally hav e to justif y it s existence b y attracting an d retainin g th e publi c eye." 21 Fo r th e momen t thi s vie w prevailed. Bu t Pear l Harbo r dispose d o f an y remainin g objections , an d in 194 2 th e Wartim e Informatio n Boar d cam e int o being . The consideration s leadin g th e Governmen t t o tak e thi s importan t step were describe d by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons on July 13 , 1943 : The succes s o f th e combine d effort s o f th e allie d power s depend s largel y upon mutua l good-will . Good-wil l i n tur n demand s accurate , ful l an d con stant information . I t i s the acknowledge d ai m o f the enemy' s propagand a t o sow discor d amon g th e Unite d Nation s b y spreadin g lie s an d half-truth s i n each o f th e allie d nation s abou t it s partners . S o importan t d o th e Nazi s consider thi s warfare of words, o r political warfare , that the y hav e spen t an d continue t o spen d staggerin g sum s o n propaganda . Th e germ s o f fals e pro paganda ca n onl y d o their evi l work i n th e darknes s o f ignorance . The y ca n be destroye d onl y wit h th e ligh t o f truth . Bu t i t i s stil l mor e satisfactor y i f accurate informatio n ca n b e supplie d befor e th e fals e propagand a i s spread abroad. Tha t i s why ever y fre e countr y a t wa r ha s give n s o muc h attentio n to disseminatin g informatio n outsid e it s ow n borders .

PROPAGANDA 18

9

Before th e presen t war , Canad a ha d littl e o r n o experienc e o f thi s important sid e o f wartim e activity . Th e governmen t approache d i t wit h caution an d hesitation . Fo r obviou s reasons , i t wa s mor e importan t fo r Canada t o se e that accurat e informatio n wa s availabl e i n th e Unite d State s than in any other country. Before th e Unite d States entered th e wa r that was a matte r o f extreme delicacy . Afte r th e entr y o f th e Unite d States , th e technical difficultie s wer e no t s o great , bu t th e America n peopl e becam e increasingly absorbe d i n thei r ow n wa r effort , an d consequentl y relativel y less intereste d i n th e activitie s o f anothe r country . Thi s situatio n increase d the dange r o f misunderstandings . Ther e wa s a growin g concer n i n Canad a to find some means of preventing possible misunderstandin g b y the provisio n of accurat e informatio n t o th e Unite d States . Severa l hon . member s gav e expression t o tha t concern . Th e concer n wa s full y share d b y th e Govern ment, an d i t wa s ou t o f tha t concer n tha t th e Wartim e Informatio n Boar d was established. 22

The Wartim e Informatio n Boar d (W.I.B. ) wa s fro m it s inceptio n placed unde r th e ministeria l directio n o f th e Presiden t o f th e Priv y Council ( a portfoli o the n an d normall y hel d b y th e Prim e Minister ) "in order, " a s Mackenzie Kin g later explained , "tha t interdepartmenta l co-operation migh t be mor e effectivel y obtained . Thi s wa s no t likel y t o be th e cas e t o th e sam e degre e i f th e Boar d remaine d unde r an y on e other particula r minister." * It s firs t chairma n wa s Charle s Vining , a public relation s counsello r no t previousl y i n governmen t service , wh o had prepared fo r the Government a report o n the need for informationa l activity an d o n th e machiner y b y whic h i t migh t b e provided . On e recommendation o f th e Vinin g Repor t wa s tha t externa l an d domesti c information service s shoul d b e combine d unde r a singl e administration , and accordingl y th e ne w W.I.B . too k ove r th e wor k an d personne l o f the smal l Burea u o f Publi c Informatio n whic h sinc e Jul y 1940 , unde r the Departmen t o f Nationa l Wa r Services , ha d concerne d itsel f solel y with informatio n o n th e hom e front . Whe n Charle s Vinin g resigne d for reason s o f health , th e W.I.B . chairmanshi p wa s mad e a n advisor y rather tha n administrativ e positio n an d a ne w post , tha t o f genera l manager, created . T o i t was appointe d Mr . Joh n Grierson , th e directo r of th e Nationa l Fil m Board . Mr . Grierso n full y agree d wit h th e recommendation i n the Vinin g Report tha t "ther e shoul d b e nothin g in the natur e o f a publicity campaign , that ther e shoul d b e a minimu m of commotion, tha t th e office s o f th e Boar d shoul d b e smal l an d efficient , *This sam e consideratio n had le d t o a numbe r o f othe r wartim e agencie s an d functions bein g placed unde r th e Presiden t o f th e Priv y Council , wit h th e resul t that th e Prim e Ministe r wa s greatl y overburdened . T o mee t thi s situation , th e post o f Parliamentar y Assistan t t o th e Presiden t o f th e Priv y Counci l wa s created i n 1943 , and firs t occupie d b y Brook e Claxton . Upo n hi m devolve d th e duty o f administerin g and dealin g i n th e Hous e o f Common s wit h th e Wartim e Information Board .

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that the y shoul d largel y wor k throug h th e pres s an d othe r instruments , and no t i n an y way see k to tak e th e plac e o f th e press." 23 Earl y i n th e war h e ha d writte n t o member s o f th e Prim e Minister' s staf f abou t th e dangers of too large and to o nois y propagand a machinery: I mus t say , I don' t lik e the idea o f a bi g Ministry o f Informatio n wit h larg e personnel, o n th e line s o f th e Englis h one . I t became , a s yo u know , a disaster o f heavy-weight officialdom. . . . The alternativ e method—an d on e whic h I thin k woul d admirabl y sui t Canadian condition s . . . —is to have a Bureau o f Information whic h travel s as ligh t a s possible. . . . All you requir e i s a smal l group o f liaiso n officer s or secretarie s o f information—on e fo r eac h mediu m whic h th e Governmen t wishes t o use—wit h a principa l Secretar y o f Informatio n wh o woul d repor t directly to the Prime Minister an d convey policy decisivel y to the others. . . . Your informatio n servic e woul d therefor e b e somethin g i n th e natur e o f a flying squad, proceeding fro m specifi c jo b t o specifi c jo b an d co-operatin g with peopl e onl y i n respec t o f specifi c jobs ; but doin g s o with th e authorit y of th e P.M . i n the backgroun d an d a considere d an d singl e polic y regardin g the variou s problem s involved , e.g. , nationa l unity , presentation o f Canadia n views t o th e Unite d States , advisin g th e Britis h Informatio n Servic e o n Canadian realities , etc . . .. One of the principa l problems wil l be to kee p the lunatic s i n leash. I hav e already hear d the m talk o f working the peopl e u p t o feve r pitch , forcin g th e U.S. int o the war by preventive tactics. . . ,24 There i s considerabl e dange r fo r Canad a i f i t i s exploite d a s a bas e fo r th e cruder form s o f propaganda . . . . There i s no questio n bu t tha t America n opinion i s super-sensitive t o exploitatio n by the crude r form s of propaganda , and tha t ill-wil l ma y be create d b y it. .. . I n othe r words , whil e th e voic e of Canad a mus t inevitably develop grea t importanc e in the Unite d State s at the presen t time , i t ma y b e wis e to determin e wit h grea t car e an d foresigh t the nature o f that voice . I have advised the [British ] Embassy a t Washingto n to concentrat e fo r th e tim e bein g o n a n intensiv e developmen t o f cultura l relations betwee n Englan d an d the Unite d States . . . . Th e sam e polic y might b e adopte d b y Canad a wit h a judiciou s introductio n o f informatio n concerning Canada' s wa r activities , it s view s o n th e war , and , particularly , its nationa l interpretatio n o f th e democrati c issue s a t stake. 25 These view s coul d no t hav e mor e exactl y coincide d wit h th e Prim e Minister's ow n opinions, an d the y wer e n o doub t recalle d b y hi m whe n he appointe d thei r author a s genera l manage r o f th e W.I.B . A t th e same tim e the y wer e easie r t o expres s tha n t o carr y int o effect . Th e W.I.B. was frequently an d heatedl y criticized , partly o n th e groun d tha t it ha d becom e a n instrumen t fo r politica l part y propaganda , bu t also , and perhap s mor e fairly , tha t i t ha d no t remaine d a s modes t i n siz e and i n demeanou r a s i t se t ou t t o be . Thes e charge s wer e naturall y rejected b y th e Government . "I t i s modest , i t i s no t aggressiv e i n an y

PROPAGANDA 19

1

improper sense, it has an admirable personnel, an d is doing a good job, " declared Brook e Claxton to th e Hous e o f Common s in 1943 . H e des cribed it s work in these words: The me n i n charg e o f th e Washingto n an d Ne w Yor k office s receiv e a n advance upo n a stor y comin g throug h ove r th e Canadia n Pres s o r th e British Unite d Pres s fro m Canada . The y a t onc e ge t int o contac t wit h th e heads o f th e America n service s an d th e editor s o f th e leadin g America n papers, pointin g out tha t thi s story is of the typ e which would interes t them . . . . The members o f the Boar d hav e assiste d i n th e preparation o f articles , have provide d facilitie s an d material s fo r writer s an d fo r journalist s havin g to do with the war effort. . . . The Board replie s t o inquiries—and the y ar e pouring i n al l th e time—an d i t furnishe s stil l photograph s an d othe r materials. . . . The Boar d ha s co-operate d i n th e closes t possibl e wa y and has th e friendlies t relation s wit h bot h th e Britis h Ministr y o f Informatio n officials i n th e Unite d State s an d th e Offic e o f Wa r Informatio n o f th e United States . Th e latte r organizatio n ha s helpe d i n th e disseminatio n o f Canadian new s al l ove r th e worl d becaus e o f arrangement s mad e b y th e Wartime Information Board .

He wa s asked why, in the cours e of his exposition , he ha d implie d that the W.I.B . was not a propagand a organization : Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury): . . . I s not the whole thin g propaganda , t o make the people o f the Unite d State s understand wha t Canad a i s doing? Mr. Claxton: If m y hon. frien d uses the wor d "propaganda " in tha t sense , which i s it s tru e litera l sense , I agre e wit h him . Bu t propagand a ha s i n addition certai n unfavourabl e connotations , an d I d o no t us e th e wor d fo r that reason. 26 PROPAGANDA AN D FOREIG N POLICY SINC E 194 5

In 1943 , answerin g a question whether the Wartime Information Boar d would b e continue d a s a peacetim e instrument of government , Brooke Claxton replied fo r th e Prime Minister that "i t i s absolutely certain that [its] wor k will not g o on afte r th e wa r in its presen t form . . . . If th e work now done by the Boar d is carried on, i t wil l b e totall y changed in character an d certainl y change d i n nam e an d form." 27 Th e futur e o f W.I.B., and, more generally, of post-war government information policy, were considere d by th e Mackenzi e King administration soon afte r th e end of hostilities against Japan. A memorandum prepared by the general manager o f the Board in August 1945 argue d strongly for th e continuation o f it s externa l activitie s wit h th e objec t o f conveyin g factua l information abou t Canadia n life t o th e peopl e o f othe r countries , par ticularly i n th e Unite d States . Fo r thi s purpos e a ne w agenc y wa s

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proposed outsid e th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s thoug h workin g closely wit h that Department , havin g its ow n informatio n officer s who , like th e officer s o f th e Department s o f Trad e an d Commerc e an d National Defence , woul d b e unde r th e genera l supervisio n o f head s o f diplomatic mission s whil e reportin g independentl y t o th e agency' s Ottawa headquarters . These recommendation s wer e largely accepted. I n September 194 5 th e W.I.B . wa s disbanded. I n it s place emerge d a new Canadian Informatio n Servic e (C.I.S.) , unde r th e guidanc e o f a n inter departmental committe e o n whic h wer e represente d thos e department s and agencie s havin g a n interes t i n externa l informationa l activity — External Affairs , Trad e an d Commerce , th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation an d the National Fil m Board . The chairman of this guiding committee wa s th e Cler k o f th e Priv y Council , the n Mr . A . D . P . Heeney. The C.I.S. had its own director, Mr. Geoffre y C . Andrew, who , prior t o this appointment, had been assistant director o f the W.I.B. (Th e director o f W.I.B . a t th e en d o f th e war , Mr . A . D . Dunton , becam e chairman o f th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation. ) Operating wit h som e o f th e staf f an d a muc h smalle r par t o f th e budget o f the W.I.B., th e C.I.S . was neither charge d wit h no r equippe d for th e majo r responsibilit y of conducting political warfar e o n an y scale . It confine d itsel f t o th e tas k o f providin g more o r les s factua l informa tion abou t Canad a for overseas governments and publics. I n thi s modest function, performe d on a modest scale, it acted i n close conjunction with the Departmen t o f External Affairs . I n additio n t o th e Unde r Secretar y of th e Department , wh o represente d it o n th e guidin g committee, a less senior officia l wa s a member of the C.I.S . working committee which me t once o r twic e a wee k t o revie w an d direc t operations . Dail y contac t between th e personne l o f C.I.S . an d o f th e Departmen t wa s assure d if only becaus e th e tw o wer e house d i n th e sam e building . It s oversea s officers i n London, Pari s an d Canberra (th e C.I.S . had succeede d t o the W.I.B. office s i n thos e capitals ) wer e member s o f th e Canadia n diplo matic mission s there an d responsibl e t o thei r heads , while in New Yor k City an d Washingto n they worke d ver y closel y wit h th e consu l genera l and th e ambassador . Liaiso n betwee n th e tw o wa s i n fac t s o intimat e and thei r function s s o simila r tha t i t quickl y becam e eviden t tha t ther e was littl e poin t i n maintainin g the C.I.S . a s a separat e institution . B y order-in-council, th e C.I.S . o n Februar y 5 , 1947 , wa s integrate d int o the Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . Since 194 6 th e Departmen t o f External Affair s ha d bee n experiment ing with a small information division of its own. Its name , the Associat e Under Secretar y o f th e Departmen t conceded , wa s "possibl y a littl e

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misleading. W e debate d fo r som e time befor e the nam e was agree d on . The nam e use d fo r correspondin g activitie s i n th e Departmen t o f Stat e at Washingto n i s th e Cultura l Relation s Division , whic h strike s m e a s being rather high-soundin g and no t a particularl y significan t title . S o we adopted perhap s th e mos t nondescrip t titl e t o indicat e th e portio n o f the Departmen t whic h wa s concerne d wit h a collectio n o f dutie s con nected wit h providin g data an d answerin g queries."28 Whe n th e C.I.S . was disbanded in 1947 , it s director became the head of the Department' s information division , and mos t of its staff wa s taken into the Departmen t to augmen t th e personne l o f th e division . Th e proces s o f integration , reported th e Department's chie f administrativ e officer i n 1947 , "wa s no t an eas y jo b a t first." 29 H e di d no t elaborat e thi s crypti c statement , perhaps implying a more than routine administrative difficult y i n absorbing additiona l personne l fro m a disbande d agency . Th e establishe d foreign servic e officer s looke d upo n th e ne w arrival s with somethin g of the diplomatist' s traditiona l contemp t fo r th e manipulator s o f mas s media, whil e th e ex-informatio n officers , sensin g thei r inferio r status , sought t o leav e i t behin d b y strivin g afte r appointmen t t o politica l divisions of the Department. It was a marriage of convenience bu t i t was not a happ y marriage , an d th e forme r directo r o f th e C.I.S . lef t th e Department soo n afterwards . The informatio n division had reall y ver y little t o d o with propaganda as a n instrumen t o f foreig n policy . I t acte d a s th e Department' s pres s office, furnishin g text s of officia l statement s to th e diplomati c corps an d the Parliamentar y Pres s Gallery . I t share d wit h othe r division s th e jo b of circulatin g withi n the Departmen t informatio n derive d fro m incom ing despatches , an d o f preparin g "genera l report s fo r th e backgroun d information o f mission s o n economi c an d politica l development s i n th e various countrie s i n whic h ou r missions ar e located , o r o n trend s o f thought an d polic y i n the Department." 30 I t prepare d th e Department' s publications an d referenc e materials. In short , i t wa s doin g what it was supposed t o d o i f i t poole d informatio n amon g th e member s o f th e Department, conveye d t o th e hom e publi c somethin g o f th e directio n and detai l o f Canadia n foreig n policy, an d projecte d t o people s abroa d a favourabl e impression o f Canadia n life . Ther e wa s littl e i f an y con scious attemp t t o influenc e th e policie s o f othe r governments . This mor e frankl y propagandis t tas k wa s th e responsibilit y o f th e International Servic e o f th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation . The creatio n o f a government-owned short-wave broadcasting station had bee n urge d b y th e C.B.C . a s earl y a s 1937 , althoug h withou t an y suggestion tha t i t shoul d b e use d fo r transmittin g propaganda . Indeed ,

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when the United Kingdo m Ministry of Information revived the proposa l in 1941 , on e o f th e opposin g arguments brought forwar d b y a n officia l of th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s wa s "th e danger o f indulgin g i n 'propaganda' abroad." 31 The term was evidently not thought t o embrac e the mor e innocuou s i f n o les s constructiv e functio n o f projectin g "th e major issue s a t stak e i n th e presen t war , which woul d b e a positiv e factor i n strengthenin g th e resistanc e withi n th e occupie d countrie s o f Europe, . . . exchanging views an d information with othe r part s o f the Commonwealth, an d . . . reaching the countries o f South America, " for these wer e cite d a s favourabl e consequence s o f th e proposal . O n September 27 , 1941 , the Prime Minister minuted: " I favou r th e shor t wave station & intended t o recommen d it s establishmen t a t las t meetin g o f War Committe e ha d principa l member s bee n present. " Thre e year s were to pass, however, before th e short-wav e facilities were used by th e Government fo r th e transmissio n o f propaganda . Durin g th e interval , the Wartim e Informatio n Boar d use d th e transmitter s o f th e Britis h Ministry o f Informatio n an d Unite d State s Offic e o f Wa r Informatio n to carr y som e o f it s materia l abroad . Bu t th e exten t t o whic h thes e facilities coul d b e exploite d wa s limited, fo r th e principa l them e o f th e W.I.B. propagand a wa s th e distinc t an d o n occasio n th e superio r achievement o f th e Canadia n wa r effor t vis-a-vi s thos e o f th e Unite d States an d th e Unite d Kingdom . Suc h a messag e wa s mor e fittingl y carried ove r Canadian tha n Anglo-American facilities , an d in 1944 , the year o f th e invasion , th e Cabine t authorize d th e creatio n o f th e Inter national Servic e o f th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporation . It s trans mitter wa s located a t Sackville, New Brunswick, an d its operatin g head quarters, mainl y fo r technica l reasons , i n Montreal , th e neares t larg e city. C.B.C.-I.S. bega n it s broadcast s i n Februar y 1945 . These consiste d principally o f short-wav e transmissio n o f programme s to th e people s of Germany an d o f occupie d Europe , an d thei r objective s wer e t o disrup t the Axi s caus e an d t o sustai n th e moral e an d vigou r o f th e resistance . But th e comin g of peace brough t a sudde n end t o thi s wor k s o recentl y begun; i n Ottaw a (a s i n al l othe r Allie d capital s sav e Moscow ) ther e was no disposition t o continue propaganda a s a conventional instrumen t of foreig n policy . Foreig n languag e broadcastin g wa s continued , an d indeed expanded, but the emphasis was solely upon projecting "a pictur e of Canadia n life wit h special reference to social , cultural , an d economi c development."32 The communis t seizur e o f powe r i n Czechoslovaki a radicall y altere d the character o f C.B.C.-I.S. broadcasting. Prio r to 194 8 there had bee n

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built up in Czechoslovakia wha t the directo r o f the Internationa l Servic e later describe d a s "on e o f ou r larges t an d mos t responsiv e Europea n audiences."33 Rather than abandon i t to the raucous monopoly of Radi o Prague an d Radio Moscow , th e Canadian Governmen t fatefull y decide d to continu e t o broadcas t programme s in Czec h an d Slova k bu t t o alte r their conten t s o a s t o achiev e tw o wholl y ne w purposes : "(1 ) t o expound an d develo p th e aim s an d policie s o f th e Wester n democrati c powers an d particularl y of Canada; (2 ) t o comba t communis t ideolog y and Sovie t imperialism." 34 Othe r area s o f Easter n Europ e wer e soo n added a s target s o f transmission . Short-wav e broadcastin g i n Russia n to th e Sovie t Unio n wa s begu n i n Februar y 1951 , an d a Ukrainia n service, als o directed a t the Sovie t Union, was inaugurated i n July 1952 . Transmission i n Polish t o Poland wa s started in 195 3 and, following the revolution i n Hungar y i n 1956 , programme s i n Magya r wer e beame d to th e peopl e o f that unhapp y land . The valu e o f thes e effort s wa s atteste d t o b y th e assiduit y o f Sovie t jamming, although (s o smal l was the proportion o f programming reach ing its intended audience ) i t might be, an d was, asked whether the game was worth the candle . T o thi s questio n the directo r o f the Internationa l Service i n 195 3 returne d the followin g answer : The mai n argument s i n favou r o f maintainin g thes e programme s [t o Eastern Europe ] ar e reason s o f prestige , sinc e i t woul d appea r t o b e indis pensable t o stres s i n people's mind s the independenc e o f Canad a a s a n entit y distinct fro m Grea t Britai n an d th e Unite d States , an d reason s o f strategy , since i t i s importan t t o secur e channel s o f communicatio n whic h ma y become usefu l i n tim e o f emergency . I n th e cours e o f conversation s wit h senior official s o f th e Voic e o f Americ a an d th e B.B.C. , I wa s tol d tha t th e Voice o f Canad a i s renderin g a goo d servic e t o bot h thes e broadcastin g organizations b y keepin g a middl e cours e betwee n th e aggressiv e Voic e o f America an d th e dispassionat e Voic e o f Britain. 35

No forma l apparatu s o f liaiso n kep t th e Internationa l Servic e i n touc h with th e politica l broadcastin g instrumentalitie s o f Canada' s allies , notably th e Voic e o f America an d th e B.B.C., but th e Servic e was kept closely informe d o f bot h long-rang e policie s an d day-to-da y program ming. "Ther e i s a constan t flo w o f information , o f material, " th e Service's directo r remarke d i n 1953 . "I t i s a sor t o f Niagar a o f teletypes."36 The proces s b y whic h propaganda , s o obviousl y a n instrumen t o f foreign polic y an d a s suc h the prerogativ e o f foreig n offices , becam e i n Canada a s in the United Kingdom (and later on as in the United States ) the responsibilit y o f a separat e instrumen t outsid e th e Departmen t o f External Affairs , di d no t reflec t settle d conviction s abou t th e inabilit y

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of diplomatist s t o becom e propagandists . Ther e wer e n o inhibition s o n that score in Ottawa. "Ever y Canadian officia l i s an information officer, " commented th e Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s i n 1947 , "or should be." 37 It was due, rather, to a tradition o f public broadcasting over a state-owne d radi o system , an d t o th e locatio n o f th e system' s short-wave facilitie s in Montreal, ove r a hundred miles fro m th e capital . To hav e move d thos e facilitie s to Ottaw a woul d no t hav e bee n impos sible bu t it would have been costly. So , for better o r worse , the decisio n was taken t o entrus t th e preparatio n a s well a s the transmissio n of pro paganda t o th e Internationa l Servic e in Montreal . I t ma y b e assume d that i t wa s take n wit h som e awarenes s o f th e difficultie s tha t migh t follow a s a consequence, fo r by that time there wa s available the experi ence o f th e Britis h Governmen t whic h ha d attempte d wit h indifferen t results t o divid e th e propagand a functio n betwee n th e B.B.C . an d th e Foreign Office.* With the inauguration of broadcasting to Eastern Europe three year s later , th e Internationa l Servic e embarke d o n a mor e obviously propagandis t tack , an d th e increasingl y importan t proble m of effective liaiso n betwee n th e Servic e an d th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs becam e th e subjec t o f searchin g inquir y b y th e Hous e o f Commons Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs . The earlies t statemen t o f arrangement s fo r liaiso n wa s give n b y th e Secretary o f Stat e fo r External Affair s t o th e Standin g Committe e i n May 1951 . Mr . Leste r Pearso n concede d tha t "i n th e earlie r day s of the Servic e . . . consultatio n wa s not a s effectiv e a s migh t hav e bee n desired." T o improv e it , a foreig n servic e office r wa s appointe d fo r liaison duties with the International Service , an d th e Department under took t o suppl y it with "policy guidanc e memoranda which are supposed to gover n th e polic y sid e o f thei r broadcastin g t o foreig n countries. " *"When wa r broke ou t . .. the B.B.C., whils t maintainin g their independence , entered int o a gentlemen' s agreemen t wit h th e Governmen t t o accep t officia l guidance i n thei r treatmen t o f publi c affairs . Tha t i s t o sa y the y undertoo k t o conform t o officia l policy , whils t reservin g th e righ t t o execut e i t i n thei r ow n way b y th e fre e selectio n o f speakers , arrangemen t o f programmes , an d s o forth . The Ministr y responsibl e fo r givin g guidance was t o b e th e Ministr y of Information. . .. I t i s perhaps no t surprisin g tha t thi s arrangemen t di d no t wor k well . In th e firs t place , th e B.B.C . ha d n o acces s t o secre t informatio n regardin g th e conduct o f th e war , a circumstanc e whic h le d t o a numbe r o f discreditabl e mishaps. Secondly , to o man y people i n th e Ministr y o f Informatio n an d i n othe r Government department s trie d t o influenc e an d guid e the B.B.C . i n thei r day-to day handling o f affairs . Sinc e interest s o f Governmen t department s o r eve n sections o f th e Ministr y o f Informatio n wer e ap t t o conflict , guidanc e fro m different officia l source s wa s ofte n contradictory . Th e resul t wa s friction , resent ment o n bot h side s an d a mountin g sens e o f unmerite d dissatisfactio n wit h th e performance o f th e B.B.C. " Th e Inner Circle: Memoirs o f Ivone Kirkpatrick (London, 1959) , p. 156 .

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But, Mr. Pearson insisted , "w e do not . . . tell the m how they will carr y out tha t policy . W e do not write their scripts , an d I thin k I a m right i n saying tha t w e d o no t censo r thei r scripts , bu t w e examin e al l thei r scripts afterward s and if, in our opinion , the y depart fro m th e policy laid down, w e brin g i t t o thei r attention." 38 Tw o year s late r h e reported : "Every mont h I ge t a grea t stac k o f text s o f broadcast s t o countrie s behind th e iron curtai n . . . and I try to see the line being followed and to satisf y mysel f i t i s the righ t line." 39 Th e text s wer e also furnishe d t o the Canadia n diplomati c mission s in th e targe t countrie s fo r thei r com ments an d criticisms. 40 In 195 2 a n attempt wa s made to secur e a still close r relatio n betwee n the Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d th e Internationa l Servic e b y appointing t o th e Servic e a s it s directo r genera l a senio r Canadia n diplomatist, th e lat e Jea n Desy , a t tha t tim e ambassado r t o Italy . Des y did not resig n fro m th e Departmen t t o tak e o n his new position, an d a s a continuing member of it he enjoyed what his predecessors an d succes sors coul d no t enjoy—th e righ t o f acces s t o al l departmenta l files . H e informed th e Standin g Committe e i n 195 3 o f thi s privileg e an d it s consequences: " I a m entitle d t o rea d al l th e secre t memoranda , secre t telegrams, secre t document s coming fro m al l ove r th e world , fro m ou r missions, an d these documents enable m e to for m a n opinion a s to what is goo d [propaganda ] an d wha t i s bad." 41 I n practice , however , th e director's resor t t o departmenta l file s appear s t o hav e bee n limite d t o what th e Department' s official s themselve s decide d t o sen d fo r hi s guidance. A foreign servic e officer, Mr . Yvo n Beaulne (wh o had serve d under Des y in Rome), travelled once or twice a week between Montrea l and Ottawa to acquire confidential documents for the Director's perusal . Within th e Departmen t itsel f a politica l co-ordinatio n sectio n wa s created o n Marc h 1 , 1953 , primaril y fo r th e purpos e o f "keepin g th e C.B.C. informe d o f development s whic h shoul d b e reflecte d i n thei r broadcasts,"42 and it was to this section that Mr. Beaulne (o r Des y when in Ottawa) turne d fo r informatio n an d directio n o n policy . Further alteration s i n th e liaiso n apparatu s occure d betwee n 195 3 and 1959 . With the appointment late in 195 3 of an International Servic e official (Mr . Charle s Delafield ) a s Desy' s successor , th e Departmen t of Externa l Affair s withdre w Mr. Beauln e fro m hi s courie r duties . It s political co-ordinatio n sectio n continue d t o ac t a s a channel o f commu nication t o th e Internationa l Service , bu t th e Servic e itsel f assume d greater responsibilit y fo r keepin g i n touc h wit h Ottawa . I t ha d fo r thi s purpose it s ow n polic y co-ordinatin g unit , whos e hea d wa s responsibl e for liaiso n wit h th e Departmen t bot h b y dail y telephon e conversation s

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and b y persona l visit s to Ottawa . Th e hea d o f th e polic y co-ordinatin g unit als o transmitte d th e Department' s view s on polic y t o th e chief s o f the variou s language sections withi n the Service . Such machiner y migh t work well enough whe n there wa s agreemen t all round o n th e purpos e an d conten t of politica l broadcastin g abroad. But enoug h wa s alread y know n o f wha t ha d happene d elsewher e t o suggest th e wisdo m of anticipatin g a certai n tension betwee n a separat e propaganda agenc y an d th e regula r foreig n office , an d o f doin g what could b e don e t o ensur e that wha t might ideally b e a health y blending of experienc e did not degenerat e int o a crippling rivalry . To som e critics an obviou s weakness lay i n the physica l separation of th e two . "Why in the world, " demande d th e Oppositio n foreig n polic y critic , Gordo n Graydon, i n 1953 , should w e separat e th e CB C Internationa l Servic e b y puttin g Jea n Des y i n Montreal an d the n havin g a commuter servic e wher e a ma n commute s bac k and fort h onc e or twice a week t o tel l hi m wha t th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs want s beame d t o othe r countries ? . .. I thin k wha t w e shoul d hav e is a CB C Internationa l Servic e righ t her e i n Ottawa , an d Jea n Des y o r whoever i s responsibl e fo r th e materia l tha t goe s ou t shoul d b e righ t her e on th e spo t wher e consultation s ca n continuall y g o o n instea d o f a .. . remote control o f policy.43

Following this blunt criticism, Jean Des y wa s aske d whethe r "h e would think advisable , a s wa s suggested , that bein g th e bi g boss . . . o f th e CBC-I.S., h e shoul d statio n himsel f i n Ottaw a instea d o f Montreal. " He replied : " I d o believ e tha t i t i s mor e usefu l fo r m e t o b e nea r m y personnel i n Montreal , t o wor k i n clos e co-ordinatio n wit h them , than to b e in Ottawa." 44 Th e sam e opinion wa s offered b y his successor , Mr . Delafield, i n 1959. 45 Some member s o f th e Hous e o f Commons Standin g Committee o n External Affair s displaye d a commendabl e curiosit y abou t wha t migh t happen i n the even t of a fundamental disagreement over policy between the Internationa l Servic e an d th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . " I think the divisio n of authority, the divisio n of direction, an d th e division of approva l wit h respec t t o thes e internationa l broadcast s leav e ver y much t o b e desired, " Gordo n Graydo n declare d i n 1953 . " I thin k th e government ought to giv e consideration right away to makin g sur e there is one boss an d on e final person who is responsible fo r th e Internationa l Service broadcasts . A s i t i s no w i t i s certainl y ver y confused." 46 Jea n Desy attempte d t o dispel the confusion . "I a m not servin g two masters, " he insisted . "Wherea s th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Revenu e [th e Minister through who m the C.B.C. reported t o Parliament ] ma y be compare d t o

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my Father Superior , a s they sa y in clerical circles, the Secretar y of Stat e for Externa l Affair s i s mor e lik e a 'directeu r d e conscience' , a spiritua l director. I a m at liberty to follow the advic e of my spiritual director, bu t should I commit any sin I have to turn to my Father Superior , eithe r for absolution o r reprimand." 47 Desy did not mak e it appear a s if the advic e of hi s "spiritua l director " was much of a forc e t o b e reckone d with : " I receive no definit e instruction s fro m th e Departmen t of External Affairs , I receiv e information , an d i t i s fo r m e t o decid e a s t o whethe r I a m going to sa y this o r t o sa y that. I f I mak e mistakes , the y ar e m y own, because I a m actin g unde r n o precis e instruction . The y rel y o n m y judgment, an d i f my judgmen t should fail , the n I a m responsible." 48 If it shoul d fai l s o drasticall y a s t o warran t th e director' s removal , th e power to remov e was that of the Ministe r of National Revenue, not tha t of th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs. 49 I n th e les s improbabl e event of disagreement over the tone or content of broadcasting, however, the line s o f responsibilit y appeare d blurred , an d i t wa s no t unti l th e following yea r (1954 ) tha t th e Standin g Committee received a direc t if reluctant answe r fro m Desy' s successor : Q. (by Mr . Starr): Doe s th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s influenc e th e content o f th e Internationa l Servic e broadcasts ? A. (b y Mr. Delafield): W e are always guided by their advice . Q. (b y Mr . MacNaughton): Wh o ha s th e fina l veto ? A. I d o not thin k th e questio n ha s actually arisen , s o I woul d no t know . Q. Bu t in a cas e wher e i t di d arise, wh o would hav e th e final say? . . . Is it the CBC or the Departmen t o f External Affairs ? . . . A. I thin k tha t perhap s Externa l Affair s migh t mak e som e commen t o n that point . . . . A. (b y Mr . R . M . Macdonnell, Assistant Under Secretary): I woul d certainly endors e what Mr . Delafiel d ha s sai d abou t ther e bein g n o dispute s of thi s sor t havin g arisen , an d I thin k i t i s ver y unlikel y tha t the y woul d arise. However , w e feel quit e confident tha t th e CB C would giv e du e weigh t to suggestion s mad e i n the political field. . . . Q. I t woul d almos t b e a cas e o f "whe n i n doubt , leav e i t out. " A. Tha t might possibly be so. Q. Wher e would the final responsibility lie ? A. (b y Mr. Delafield): I t rest s wit h th e CBC . Q. Yo u say: "I t rests with the CBC. " A. Yes . Th e CB C i s th e agen t chose n b y th e governmen t fo r th e esta blishment an d presentation o f the International Service. 50

The assuranc e that n o importan t conflict ove r policy ha d take n plac e between th e Internationa l Servic e an d th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, conveye d t o th e Hous e o f Common s Standin g Committe e i n 1954 an d reaffirme d i n 1959 , wa s o f cours e n o guarante e tha t thei r future relation s woul d continu e untroubled . The principa l potentia l

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source o f difficult y wa s Easter n Europe . A s th e monolithi c blo c o f Stalin's da y gav e wa y t o th e mor e puzzlin g challeng e o f a communis t "commonwealth," disagreemen t ove r th e rol e o f politica l broadcastin g in th e foreig n polic y proces s wa s not onl y likel y bu t inevitable . An d i n countries wher e the propaganda functio n wa s vested i n a n agenc y sepa rate fro m th e foreig n office , suc h disagreemen t coul d hardl y tak e plac e without dispute s betwee n th e two . I n th e Unite d Kingdo m i t ha s bee n charged withou t convincing refutation that th e B.B.C.' s Russian Servic e displayed " a to o pro-Sovie t attitud e fo r th e jo b i n hand " an d ha d followed a lin e o f "mora l compromis e an d appeasement"; th e sam e grave accusation wa s later levelle d a t its Yugoslav Service. 51 While there is n o direc t evidenc e o f Foreig n Offic e dissatisfactio n wit h broadcast s from Bus h House , intellectual s i n universit y an d othe r circle s fre e t o express thei r view s were critical o f the dispassionat e an d restraine d ton e of B.B.C . comment o n communis t affairs . I n th e Unite d States , o n th e other hand , th e separatio n o f propagandis t agencie s fro m th e Depart ment o f Stat e (wher e the y ha d originall y reposed ) wa s designe d t o permit a mor e vigorou s prosecutio n o f col d wa r activities , implici t i n the promis e t o "liberate " th e Easter n Europea n satellites , tha n i t wa s felt th e Foreig n Servic e woul d approv e o r allow . Th e enthusias m wit h which th e Voic e o f Americ a an d othe r instrument s o f th e Informatio n Agency too k u p thi s mandat e brough t upo n the m th e ver y differen t charge that thei r operation s lent t o American foreign polic y a shril l an d strident ai r th e administratio n neithe r intende d no r favoured . A stud y prepared fo r the Senate Foreig n Relation s Committe e has recommende d that th e propagand a functio n b e brough t bac k unde r Foreig n Servic e control, s o a s to guar d "agains t th e tendenc y o f th e informatio n activi ties, unde r th e pres s o f particular event s o r current s o f opinion a t hom e or abroad , t o generat e a separat e foreig n polic y an d t o expres s i t with out referenc e t o broade r polic y considerations." 52 In Canad a thi s tendency is minimized by the parliamentar y syste m of government, whic h mor e effectivel y tha n th e presidentia l co-ordinate s the instrument s o f nationa l polic y an d protect s the m fro m captur e b y special interests . No r ha s ther e bee n an y stron g desir e t o influenc e foreign polic y i n thi s way , fo r th e member s o f intereste d partie s ar e scattered an d few , and th e effor t involve d i n bringin g pressur e t o bea r upon th e governmen t o f a smal l an d relativel y unimportan t powe r ha s hardly seeme d wort h while . Some , however , hav e persiste d notwith standing thes e handicaps , particularl y thos e whos e ancestor s o r wh o themselves ha d mad e thei r wa y fro m th e nation s o f Easter n Europ e fallen t o communis t rule . Th e mos t importan t grou p amon g the m

PROPAGANDA 20

1

politically ar e th e 500,00 0 Canadian s o f Ukrainia n origin ; thei r in fluence was demonstrated b y the decision to inaugurate Ukrainian broad casts t o th e Sovie t Union , a polic y whic h o n th e fac e o f i t appear s subversive o f the non-provocativ e approac h to Eastern Europea n affair s clearly favoure d i n the Department o f External Affairs . Thei r spokesme n have expresse d thei r desir e fo r a stil l mor e strongl y anti-Sovie t line . I n 1959 th e directo r o f th e Internationa l Servic e wa s interrogate d b y a member o f Parliamen t o f Ukrainia n descen t amon g whose constituent s were man y with relatives in Eastern Europe : Q. (by Dr . Kucherepa): Hav e yo u receive d an y complaint s o r representa tions fro m Canadia n individual s o r organization s relativ e t o you r pro gramming [t o Eastern Europe]? A. (by Mr. Delafield): . . . It i s true tha t w e do receive a certai n amoun t of commen t an d suggestion s a s to th e typ e of thin g we should do . Q. D o you follow any of these suggestions ? A. W e assess the m and , depending on the guidanc e an d advice w e receive , we adjust ourselve s accordingly . . . . Q. Hav e yo u i n recen t year s bee n requeste d b y anyon e t o chang e you r policy relativ e t o th e degree , shal l w e say , o f you r psychologica l warfare , which yo u may be carrying o n i n your politica l broadcastin g t o thi s area ? A. A s yo u know , ther e i s a variet y o f Canadia n opinio n o n thi s subject . Q. Ma y I assum e tha t mos t o f you r broadcast s behin d th e iro n curtai n are designe d t o counterac t communis t propagand a whic h i s bein g dissemi nated i n that area ? A. Yes , bu t w e d o i t no t b y givin g wide r publicit y t o tha t propagand a than i s necessar y i n replying ; also , w e ten d t o tak e a positiv e approac h i n this field, that is , by ... presentin g a Canadia n vie w o f Canada' s position , the wester n position , an d th e virtue s o f th e wester n stan d o n a particula r issue.63

From this , an d other , testimon y i t i s eviden t tha t th e Internationa l Service ha s displaye d remarkably few of the characteristics usuall y associated wit h a propagand a agenc y lyin g beyon d direc t foreig n offic e control. I t ha s no t struc k ou t o n it s ow n line o f policy, i t ha s refraine d from experimentin g with ne w techniques an d methods , i t ha s appeare d wholly conten t t o accep t th e guidanc e o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs o n ever y aspec t o f it s operations . Suc h deferenc e i s s o differen t from th e behaviou r o f propagandist s elsewher e tha t on e look s fo r explanation. It i s to be found partl y in the centripeta l an d co-ordinating action o f th e Cabinet , partl y i n th e traditio n o f interdepartmenta l co operation, partl y in th e administratio n o f th e Service . Bu t perhap s th e most poten t inducemen t t o complianc e i s t o b e foun d i n th e circum stance tha t th e whol e propaganda establishmen t ha s increasingl y com e

202 TH

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to be viewed as a marginal concern, th e funds fo r which could be applied to the solutio n of more urgent problems without public protes t an d with no damag e t o th e nationa l interest . An y majo r contretemp s i n whic h the Internationa l Servic e becam e involve d woul d quickl y brin g thi s argument int o th e open, an d s o it has preferre d the quie t lif e t o th e ris k of n o lif e a t all . Early i n 1960 , a n interdepartmenta l committe e wa s forme d t o con sider the future rol e of the Internationa l Service . I t wa s put t o i t that b y the simpl e expedien t o f turnin g th e Sackvill e transmitte r i n a differen t direction, a n audienc e in the Canadian nort h coul d b e served , and mor e usefully served , tha n audience s i n foreig n countries . Thi s us e o f short wave a s a n ai d t o Prim e Minister Diefenbaker' s celebrate d "vision " of northern developmen t provided a tempting alternative to the increasingly controversial policy of transmission to Europe, but th e polic y eventually agreed upo n prove d rathe r different . Th e Cabine t ordere d a cu t o f $500,000 fro m th e $1,900,00 0 sough t b y th e Internationa l Servic e fo r its 196 1 operations . T o achiev e thi s econom y withou t to o drasti c a reduction o f it s propagandis t role , i t wa s decide d tha t foreig n languag e broadcasting t o Italy , th e Netherlands , Norway , Sweden an d Denmark , which ha d continue d withou t interruptio n sinc e 1945 , shoul d b e dis continued, an d replace d b y transmission s i n Englis h an d i n Frenc h t o Africa sout h of the Sahara, with special emphasi s on the Commonwealt h audience i n Ghan a an d Nigeria . N o alteratio n wa s contemplate d i n broadcasts to Eastern Europe. The new operation bega n o n January 29 , 1961.

References

CHAPTER ONE : THE POLITICA L EXECUTIV E

1. R . MacGrego r Dawson , Th e Government o f Canada (Toronto , 1949), p. 22. 2. O . D . Skelton , Life an d Letters o f Si r Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto , 1921), II , p. 163. 3. Quote d i n J . W . Dafoe , Clifford Sifton i n Relation t o Hi s Times (Toronto, 1931) , p. 333. 4. Wilfri d Laurie r t o J. S. Willison, Oct. 14, 1899 , Willison Papers. 5. Jame s Bryce to Lord Grey, July 4, 1910, Grey Papers . 6. Quote d i n Henr y Borden , ed. , Robert Laird Borden: Hi s Memoirs (2 vols. , Toronto, 1938) , I, p. 245. 7. Borde n Papers . Se e als o Gaddi s Smith , "Canad a an d th e Siberia n Intervention, 1918-1919, " American Historical Review, vol . XLIV, no . 4 , July 1959 , pp. 866-77. 8. R . MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, I , 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , pp. 341, 417 . 9. Diar y of Sir George Foster, June 5, 1921, Foster Papers . 10. Ibid., Aug. 13, 1921. 11. W . Downi e Stewart , "Viscoun t Bennett : Som e Persona l Reminis cences." (Fro m a newspaper , th e titl e an d dat e o f whic h ar e unavailable. ) 12. J . W . Dafo e t o Vincen t Massey , July 22 , 1932 , Dafoe Papers . 13. Harr y Sifto n t o J . W . Dafoe , Jul y 10 , 1932 , Dafoe Papers . 14. Se e Dawson, Mackenzie King, I, pp. 443-6. 15. Memorandu m by O. D. Skelto n o f telephon e conversatio n wit h R . B . Bennett, Oct . 10 , 1935 , Department o f Externa l Affairs , Ottawa . 16. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Feb. 10 , 1936 , pp. 67-8 . 17. Toront o Star, Sept. 16 , 1922 . 18. Quote d in Dawson, Mackenzie King, I, p. 409. 19. Quote d in ibid., p. 410. 20. W . S. Fielding to Mackenzie King, Sept. 18 , 1922 , King Papers. 21. Ernes t Lapoint e t o Mackenzi e King , Sept . 19 , 1922 , King Papers . 22. W . S . Fielding , "Memorandu m o n Canadia n Representatio n i n th e United States, " Apri l 24 , 1923 , Fielding Papers . Se e also Joh n S . Galbraith, The Establishment o f Canadian Diplomatic Status a t Washington (Berkele y and Los Angeles, 1951) , p. 86. 23. Quote d i n K . W . McNaught , "Canadia n Foreig n Polic y an d th e Whig Interpretation , 1936-1939, " Report o f th e Canadian Historical Association, 1957 , p. 48. 24. Bruc e Hutchison , Th e Incredible Canadian (Toronto , 1952) , pp . 236-7.

204 REFERENCES

, PAGE S 12-2 9

25. Th e Times, Aug. 22, 1941. 26. A . D . P . Heeney , "Cabine t Governmen t i n Canada : Som e Recen t Developments i n the Machinery of the Centra l Executive, " Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. XII, no. 3 , Aug. 1946, p. 289. 27. W . E . D . Halliday , "Th e Executive of th e Governmen t o f Canada, " Canadian Public Administration, vol . II, no . 4 , Dec . 1959, p. 240. 28. Canada , H . o f C . Specia l Committe e o n Defenc e Expenditures , Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, no . 11 , Jun e 10 , 1960 , p. 266. 29. Walte r Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951) , p . 474. 30. Canada , H. of C . Debates, Dec. 18, 1945, pp. 3734-5. 31. Ibid., July 15 , 1960, pp. 6377-8. 32. Lette r to the author, Aug. 6, 1960. 33. "Canadian-America n Meeting, " Th e Economist (London) , Sept . 10 , 1955. 34. Canada , H. of C . Debates, March 28, 1960 , p. 2509. 35. Ibid., July 12 , 1943, pp. 4670-1. 36. Ibid., p. 4670. 37. Ibid., Jan. 24, 1956, pp. 463-5. 38. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6 , May 3 , 1956, p. 154. 39. Ibid., no. 1 , April 4, 1952, pp. 19-20 . 40. Nanc y Harviso n Hooker , ed. , Th e Mofjat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Papers o f Ja y Pierrepont Mofjat (Cambridge , Mass. , 1956) , p. 373. 41. Diar y of Sir Joseph Pope, March 4, 1909, Pope Papers. 42. 2 George V, c. 22. 43. Borde n Papers. 44. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, April 2, 1946, p. 490. 45. W . A . Riddell , World Security b y Conference (Toronto , 1949) , pp . 140-1. 46. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, April 2, 1946, p. 490. 47. Ibid., July 12, 1943, p. 4670. 48. Kennet h W . Thompson , Political Realism an d th e Crisis o f World Politics (Princeton , 1960) , p. 106. 49. Jacque s d e Bourbon-Busset , "Decision-Making in Foreig n Policy " i n Stephen D . Kertes z an d M . A . Fitzsimmons , eds. , Diplomacy i n a Changing World (Notr e Dame, 1959) , pp . 79-80 . 50. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, April 2, 1946, pp. 491-2 . 51. Hutchison , The Incredible Canadian, p. 424. 52. Ibid., pp. 433^. 53. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , March 18 , 1958. 54. Th e Listener, Jan. 10, 1957, p. 69. 55. Round Table, vol. XLVIH, 1957-8 , p. 291. 56. Blai r Fraser , "Th e Ma n Who'l l Spea k fo r Canada, " Maclean's Magazine, Nov. 9 , 1957. 57. Th e Ear l o f Ronaldshay , Th e Life o f Lord Curzon, II I (London , 1928), p. 149. 58. Lor d Grey to James Bryce, June 2, 1909, Grey Papers . 59. Dawson , Mackenzie King, I, pp. 174-5 .

REFERENCES, PAGE S 29-4 3 20

5

60. Jame s Bryce to Lord Grey, July 4, 1910 , Grey Papers . 61. W . F. Slade n to Mackenzie King, Jan. 24, 1923 , King Papers . 62. Lor d Willingdon to Mackenzie King, May 2, 1928 , Kin g Papers . 63. Dawson , Th e Government o f Canada, p. 188 . CHAPTER TWO : THE BUREAUCRAC Y

1. J . E . Hodgetts , "Th e Civi l Servic e an d Polic y Formation, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol. XXIII , no . 4 , Nov . 1957 , p. 471. 2. R . Barr y Farrell , "Th e Plannin g an d Conduc t o f Foreig n Polic y i n Canada" (unpublishe d doctora l thesis , Harvar d University , 1952) , p . 68 . 3. Ottawa Journal, July 21, 1949 . 4. J . J . Deutsch , "Som e Thought s o n th e Publi c Service, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol . XXIII , no . 1 , Feb . 1957 , pp. 85-6 . 5. M . W . Sharp , "Reflection s o f a Forme r Civi l Servant, " typescrip t o f speech delivere d on Nov. 14 , 1958 . 6. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Ma y 24 , 1960 , p . 4184 . Th e speaker wa s Mr. Dougla s Fisher. 7. K . C. Wheare, Government b y Committee (Oxford , 1955) , pp. 23-4 . 8. Sharp , "Reflection s of a Forme r Civi l Servant. " 9. Lt.-Gen . G . G . Simonds , "Wher e We'v e Gon e Wron g o n Defense, " Maclean's Magazine, June 23, 1956 . 10. K . C. Wheare, Th e Civil Service in th e Constitution (London , 1954) , pp. 27-8 . 11. Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 19391944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 38. 12. Globe an d Mail, Apri l 9 , 1958 , "Th e Governmen t an d th e 'Esta blishment.' " 13. Financial Post, Jan . 9 , 1960 , "Namin g o f Deput y Ministe r Trick y Political Question. " 14. Arthu r Meighe n to Lorin g Christie, Jan. 13 , 1926 , Christi e Papers . 15. Lorin g Christi e t o Si r Rober t Borden , Marc h 15 , 1926 , Christi e Papers. 16. R . MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1, 1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p . 454. 17. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, July 25, 1942 , p. 4712. 18. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , May 17 , 1948 , p. 18 . 19. Leste r B . Pearson , "Canadia n Diplomacy, " addres s give n t o th e Alumni Federation , th e Universit y o f Toronto , Jan . 11 , 1947 . Quote d i n Farrell, "Th e Plannin g and Conduc t o f Foreig n Polic y i n Canada, " p . 157 . 20. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee on Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6 , May 6 , 1954 , p. 148 . 21. Ibid., no. 11 , May 24, 1956 , p. 274 . 22. Ibid., no. 1 , Nov. 18 , 1949, p. 24.

206 REFERENCES

, PAGES 44-63

23. Victo r Odiu m to Mackenzie King, May 20, 1942, King Papers. 24. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, Aug. 1, 1942 , p. 5151. 25. Leste r B . Pearson, "Internationa l Publi c Relations, " addres s give n t o the Canadia n Publi c Relation s Society , Montreal , Jan . 5, 1954 . Dept. o f External Affairs , Statements and Speeches (Ottawa , 1954) , no. 2. 26. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , April 4, 1952 , p. 24 . 27. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, May 15 , 1931, p. 1651 . 28. Ibid., p. 1647. 29. Ibid., pp. 1647, 1649 . 30. Mackenzi e King to P. C. Larkin, April 23, 1924, King Papers. 31. N . W. Rowell to Mackenzie King, Nov. 30, 1925, Rowell Papers. 32. O . D. Skelton to Mackenzie King, Dec. 9, 1925, King Papers. 33. Mackenzi e King to N. W. Rowell, Dec. 7, 1925, Rowell Papers . 34. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 4, June 4, 1946, p. 63 . 35. Ibid., p. 61. 36. Ibid., p. 63. 37. External Affairs, vol . V, no. 7, July 1953, pp. 220-1. 38. Towards a Stronger Foreign Service: Report o f th e Secretary o f State's Public Committee o n Personnel, June, 1954 (Washington , D.C. , 1954). 39. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , Feb. 23, 1953 , p. 36 . 40. "Th e Foreign Servic e Office r Competition, " External Affairs, vol . X, no. 9, Sept. 1958 , p. 229. 41. Ibid., p. 228. 42. Marce l Cadieux , L e Ministere de s affaires exterieures (Montreal , 1949), pp. 75-7. 43. Farrell , "Th e Planning an d Conduc t o f Foreig n Polic y i n Canada, " p. 127. 44. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 9, May 17 , 1956, pp. 240-1. 45. Ibid., no. 6, May 6, 1954, pp. 149-50 . 46. Ibid., no. 4, Aug. 6, 1958, p. 163. 47. Deutsch , "Som e Thoughts on the Public Service," p. 86. 48. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , May 17 , 1948 , p. 16 . 49. Ibid., no. 2, April 8, 1952, p. 34. 50. Mackenzi e King to J. L. Ralston, Sept. 28, 1927, King Papers. 51. Col . C. P . Stacey , "Th e Canadian-American Permanen t Join t Boar d on Defence , 1940-45, " International Journal, vol . IX, no . 2 , Sprin g 1954, pp. 108-9 . 52. Lorin g Christi e t o O . D . Skelton , Jul y 26 , 1940 , King Papers . 53. Col . Stanle y W . Dziuban , Military Relations between th e United States and Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington , D.C., 1959), p. 73. 54. Ibid., p. 73. 55. Ibid., p. 74. 56. Diar y entr y o f Dec . 29, 1941 . Quoted i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I, p. 326.

REFERENCES, PAGES 63-72 20

7

57. Nanc y Harviso n Hooker , ed. , Th e Moffat Papers: Selections from th e Diplomatic Papers o f Ja y Pierrepont Moffat (Cambridge , Mass. , 1956) , p . 374. 58. Dziuban , Military Relations between th e United States an d Canada, p. 75. 59. Memorandu m of th e Ministe r of Nationa l Defence , Marc h 11 , 1942. Quoted i n Maurice Pope, unpublished manuscript. 60. Ibid. 61. "Memorandu m fo r th e Prim e Minister, " Apri l 13 , 1942, King Papers . 62. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 4, May 26, 1948 , pp. 97-8 . 63. Ibid., p. 98. 64. Diar y entr y fo r Ma y 14 , 1943. Quoted i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p. 501. 65. Th e Brooking s Institution , Th e Administration o f Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations (Washington , D.C. , 1951), p. 244. 66. W . H . Walke r t o Josep h Pope , Ma y 13 , 1909 , Under Secretar y o f State: Semi-Officia l Correspondence . 67. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 4, 1909 , col. 1983. 68. Pop e diary , Jan. 16, 1910. 69. N . W . Rowel l t o Mackenzi e King , Nov. 30, 1925 , Rowell Papers . 70. Mackenzi e Kin g t o Rowell , Dec . 7 , 1925 , Rowell Papers . 71. Canada , H . o f C . Selec t Standin g Committe e o n Industria l an d International Relations , Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, no . 1 , Marc h 25, 1930 , p. 11 . 72. Canada , H. o f C . Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes o f Proceedings an d Evidence, no . 1 , Oct. 25, 1945 , pp. 7-8 . 73. Ibid., no. 3, May 30, 1946 , p. 51. 74. Ibid., no. 2, Nov. 22, 1949 , p. 54. 75. Ibid., no. 3, Dec. 6, 1957, p. 94. CHAPTER THREE : THE MILITAR Y ESTABLISHMEN T

1. Henr i Bourassa , Great Britain an d Empire (Montreal , 1902) , p . 4 . 2. Quote d i n O . D . Skelton , Life an d Letters o f Si r Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto, 1921) , II, p. 293. 3. Leagu e o f Nations , Records o f th e First Assembly (1920) , p . 379. 4. Henr y Borden , ed. , Robert Laird Borden: Hi s Memoirs ( 2 vols. , Toronto, 1938) , II, p. 606. 5. Ibid., pp. 827, 817 . 6. Quote d i n Gaddi s Smith , "Canadia n Externa l Affair s durin g Worl d War I " i n Hug h L . Keenleysid e et al., Th e Growth o f Canadian Policies i n External Affairs (Durham , N.C., 1960), p. 46. 7. H . M . Urquhart , Arthur Currie: The Biography o f a Great Canadian (Toronto, 1950) , pp . 274-81, 318-21. 8. Elizabet h Armstrong , Th e Crisis o f Quebec, 1914-18 (Ne w York , 1937).

208 REFERENCES

, PAGES 73-86

9. Georg e F . G . Stanley , Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1960: Th e Military History o f a n Unmilitary People (Toronto , 1960) , p. 347. 10. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Apri l 4 , 1922 , p. 669. 11. Col . C. P . Stacey , Si x Years o f War: The Army i n Canada, Britain and th e Pacific (Ottawa , 1955) , p . 9 . 12. Quote d in ibid., p. 8. 13. Leagu e of Nations, Records of th e Fifth Assembly (1924) , p. 222. 14. Ibid., p. 221. 15. Ibid., Records of th e Ninth Assembly (1928) , p . 61. 16. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 30 . 17. See , fo r evidenc e o f suc h tensio n i n th e Unite d States , Mar k S . Watson, Chief o f Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C. , 1950). 18. Samue l P . Huntington , Th e Soldier and th e State (Cambridge , Mass. , 1959), p. 315. 19. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 321. 20. Canada , H. of C . Debates, Sept. 8 , 1939, p. 36. 21. Quote d in Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 317. 22. Quote d in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 47 . 23. Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , pp. 40-1. 24. Quote d in ibid., p. 38 . 25. Montrea l Star, Nov. 20, 1939. 26. Margina l not e o n Norma n Rogers ' diar y o f hi s visi t t o th e Unite d Kingdom, entr y for Apri l 20 , 1940 , Kin g Papers . 27. Quote d in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 261. 28. Quote d in ibid., p. 261. 29. Quote d in Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, I, p. 156. 30. Quote d in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 263. 31. Quote d in ibid., p. 263. 32. Quote d in ibid., p. 308. 33. Ibid., p. 333. 34. Ibid., p. 442. 35. Lt.-Col . G . W . L . Nicholson , Th e Canadians i n Italy, 1943-1945 (Ottawa, 1956) , p. 24. 36. Quote d in ibid., pp. 343-4. 37. Quote d in Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, I , p. 545. 38. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 497. 39. Quote d in Maurice Pope, unpublishe d manuscript. 40. Quote d in ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Quote d in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 498. 43. Pickersgill , The Mackenzie King Record, I, p. 515. 44. Quote d in ibid., pp. 515-16. 45. Quote d in ibid., p. 517. 46. Mauric e Pope, unpublishe d manuscript. 47. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 500. 48. Quote d in Col. C. P . Stacey , Th e Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945 (Ottawa , 1960) , p . 42 . 49. Quote d in ibid., pp. 42-3 .

REFERENCES, PAGES 87-105 20

9

50. Quote d i n ibid., pp . 648-9 . Th e directiv e i s printed i n it s entiret y a s App. "A," pp. 647-9. 51. Quote d in Pickersgill, Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 75 . 52. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 81. 53. Quote d in ibid., p. 81. 54. Ibid., p. 82. 55. H . L . Keenleyside , "Th e Canada-Unite d State s Permanen t Join t Board o n Defence , 1940-1945, " International Journal, vol . XVI, no . 1 , Winter 1960-1 , p. 55. 56. Stacey , Six Years of War, p. 215. 57. Quote d in ibid., pp. 223-4. 58. Quote d in ibid., p. 224. 59. Quote d in ibid., pp. 224-5. 60. Quote d in ibid., p. 225. 61. Quote d in Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, I, p. 221. 62. Quote d i n ibid., pp . 303-4 , 313. 63. R . MacGrego r Dawson , "Th e Revol t o f th e Generals, " Weekend Magazine, vol. X, no. 44, 1960. 64. Ibid. 65. Quote d in ibid. 66. Quote d in ibid. 67. Quote d in ibid. 68. Quote d in ibid. 69. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, June 24, 1948 , p. 5779 . 70. Ibid., p. 5810. 71. Joh n W . Maslan d an d Laurenc e I . Radway , Soldiers an d Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton , 1957) , p. 3. 72. Canada , H. of C . Debates, Aug. 31, 1950, p. 105. 73. Ibid., May 8, 1951, p. 2801. 74. Ibid., Feb. 2, 1953, p. 1532. 75. Speec h a t Depau w University , Jun e 9 , 1960 . 76. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, Feb. 2, 1953 , p. 1527. 77. Lt.-Gen . G . G . Simonds , "Wher e We'v e Gon e Wron g o n Defense, " Maclean's Magazine, June 23, 1956. 78. Ibid. 79. Quote d i n Lad y G . Cecil , Life o f Robert, Marquis o f Salisbury, I I (London, 1921), p. 153. 80. Huntington , The Soldier and the State, p. 351. 81. Simonds , "Where We've Gone Wrong on Defense. " CHAPTER FOUR : THE LEGISLATUR E

1. R . MacGrego r Dawson , Th e Government o f Canada (Toronto , 1949), p. 434. 2. Quote d i n R . MacGrego r Dawson , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1,1874-1923 (Toronto , 1958) , p . 411. 3. Mackenzi e King to J. R. Boyle , Oct. 3, 1922 . Quoted i n ibid., p. 413.

210 REFERENCES

, PAGE S 105-11 9

4. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Feb . 1 , 1923 , p . 33 . 5. Quote d in Dawson, Mackenzie King, p. 465 . 6. Canada , H. of C . Debates, June 21, 1926 , p. 4762 . 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., Feb. 25 , 1929 , pp. 422-3. 9. K . W . McNaught , "Canadia n Foreig n Polic y an d th e Whi g Inter pretation, 1936-1939, " Report o f th e Canadian Historical Association, 1957, pp. 51-3 . 10. Eugen e Forsey, "Mr. Kin g and Parliamentary Government," Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol. XVII, no . 4 , Nov . 1951 , p . 458. 11. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 15 , 1926, p. 1561 . 12. Ibid., Nov. 18 , 1932, p. 1368 . 13. Ibid., May 16 , 1933, p. 5067. 14. Ibid., March 23, 1936 , p. 1332 . 15. Ibid. 16. Saturday Night, Dec . 14 , 1935; Winnipeg Tribune, May 14 , 1936 . 17. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, June 18 , 1936, p. 3862. 18. Ibid., July 4, 1947 , p. 5198 . 19. Bruc e Hutchison, Th e Incredible Canadian (Toronto, 1952) , p. 267 . 20. Forsey , "Mr . Kin g and Parliamentary Government," p. 463 . 21. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 19 , 1943 . 22. C . G . Power , "Caree r Politicians : Th e Changin g Role o f th e M.P., " Queen's Quarterly, vol. LXII , no . 4 , Winte r 1957 , pp . 488-9 . 23. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 3 , May 1 , 1950, p . 77 . 24. Quote d i n Norma n Ward , Th e Canadian House o f Commons: Representation (Toronto , 1950) , p . 10. 25. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, June 15, 1923, p. 4001 . 26. Ibid., Nov. 12 , 1940, p. 33. 27. Intervie w fo r th e Canadia n Broadcastin g Corporatio n (hereafte r cited as C.B.C. interview). 28. Quote d in H . A . Innis , Great Britain, th e United States an d Canada (Nottingham, 1948) , p. 5. 29. Dawson , Th e Government o f Canada, p. 452 . 30. J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto, 1960) , p. 9. 31. C.B.C . interview. 32. Blai r Fraser, "Backstag e a t Ottawa, " Maclean's Magazine, Marc h 12 , 1960, p . 2. 33. C.B.C . interview. 34. Le e Beland , "Paul Martin : Architec t wit h a Needle, " Toronto Star, March 29 , 1960 . 35. Se e Donald Eldon , "Towar d a Wel l Informe d Parliament : Th e Use s of Research, " Queen's Quarterly, vol. XLIII , no . 4 , Winte r 1957 , p . 524 . 36. J . A . Stevenso n t o J . W . Dafoe , Jan . 23 , 1920 , Dafo e Papers . 37. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, May 10 , 1946, p. 1395 . 38. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 , May 21 , 1946 , p. 4 .

REFERENCES, PAGES 120-129 21 1

39. Ibid., no. 1 , May 22, 1951 , p. 8. 40. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, Sept. 5, 1950, p. 296. 41. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 5 , Ma y 20 , 1947 , p. 128. 42. Ibid., p. 139. 43. Ibid., no. 4, Nov. 24 , 1949 , p. 123. 44. Ibid., no. 9, May 18 , 1954, p. 249. 45. Ibid., no. 4, Nov. 24 , 1949 , pp. 122 , 125 . 46. D . M . Fisher , "Parliamentar y Committee s i n th e 24t h Parliament, " Waterloo Review, vol. II, no . 1 , 1960, p. 78. 47. Canada , H. ofC. Debates, May 7, 1951, p. 2756. 48. Fisher , "Parliamentar y Committee s i n th e 24t h Parliament, " pp . 69-70. 49. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 17 , 1960, p. 2192. 50. Ibid., p. 2178. 51. Ibid., pp. 2189-90. 52. Canada , H . o f C . Specia l Committe e o n Defenc e Expenditures , Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, no . 8 , Jun e 1 , 1960 , p. 192. CHAPTER FIVE : INTELLIGENCE

1. Pop e diary, June 22, 1899. 2. Josep h Pope to John Anderson, July 10 , 1899, Pop e Papers. 3. Pop e to Anderson, Jan. 27, 1900, Pope Papers. 4. Anderso n to Pope, Feb. 19, 1902, Pope Papers. 5. Josep h Pope to Cliffor d Sifton , Jul y 8, 1903, Pope Papers. 6. Rodolph e Lemieux to Sir Louis Jette, Dec. 4, 1907 , Lemieux Papers. 7. Rodolph e Lemieu x t o Si r Edwar d Grey , Dec . 13 , 1907 ; Grey t o Lemieux, Feb. 11, 1908 . Lemieu x Papers. 8. Josep h Pope to Rodolphe Lemieux, Feb. 24, 1908, Lemieux Papers. 9. Lor d Grey to Lord Elgin, Jan. 14, 1907, Grey Papers. 10. Sherma n Kent, Strategic Intelligence (Princeton, 1949) , p. 11. 11. "Memorandu m fo r Consideratio n of th e Civi l Service Commissioners , May 25 , 1907. " Civi l Servic e Commissio n 1908 : Minutes o f Evidence , I , pp. 48-50 , Sessional Papers o f Canada, vol. XLII, no . 15 , 1907-8 . 12. Kent , Strategic Intelligence, p. 39. 13. "Admiralt y Memorandu m on th e Genera l Nava l Situation, " Sept . 20 , 1912, Borde n Papers. 14. Henr y Borden , ed. , Robert Laird Borden: Hi s Memoirs ( 2 vols. , Toronto, 1938) , II , p . 62 1 (hereafte r cite d a s Borden Memoirs'). 15. Bona r La w t o Si r Georg e Perley , Nov . 3, 1915 . Quoted i n ibid., p . 621. 16. Si r Rober t Borde n t o Si r Georg e Perley , Jan . 4, 1916 . Quoted i n ibid., p. 622. 17. Ibid., p. 623. 18. Bona r Law to Sir Robert Borden, July 6, 1916, Borden Papers.

212 REFERENCES , PAGES 129-143

19. Secretar y o f Stat e fo r th e Colonie s t o th e Governo r Genera l o f Canada. Quote d in Borden Memoirs, II, p. 625. 20. Si r Georg e Perle y t o Si r Rober t Borden , Ma y 31 , 1918 , Borden Papers. 21. Borden Memoirs, II, pp. 625-6. 22. Gaddi s Smith , "Canadia n Externa l Relation s durin g Worl d Wa r I " in H . L . Keenleysid e e t al., Th e Growth o f Canadian Policies in External Affairs (Durham , N.C., 1960) , p. 47. 23. Lorin g Christie to George Wrong, Dec. 30 , 1919, Wrong Papers . 24. Report o f th e Canadian Economic Commission (Siberia) (Ottawa , 1919). 25. "Note s o f Meeting s o f Representative s o f th e Unite d Kingdom , th e Dominions, an d India , hel d i n Londo n i n Jun e an d July , 1921, " Kin g Papers. 26. "Memorandu m for th e Prim e Minister, " Dec . 16, 1922, King Papers . 27. Th e Times, Feb. 8, 1923 . 28. Si r Joh n Williso n t o Si r Campbel l Stuart , Dec . 7, 1920 , Willison Papers. 29. F . A. McGregor to Merchant Mahoney, Feb. 2, 1924 , King Papers. 30. E.g. , Herber t Marle r t o Mackenzi e King , Dec . 28 , 1931 , King Papers. 31. Canada , House of Commons Debates, April 7 , 1932 , p. 1825. 32. Se e Thoma s Jones , A Diary with Letters (London , 1954) , pp . 179-81, 218 ; The History o f "The Times": Th e 150th Anniversary an d Beyond, 1912-1948, Par t II , 1921-1948 (London , 1952) , p . 938 ; John Evelyn Wrench , Geoffrey Dawson and Ou r Times (London , 1955) , p . 369; Vincent Massey , O n Being Canadian (Toronto , 1948) , pp . 76-7 . 33. W . S . Churchill , Th e Second World War, I, Th e Gathering Storm (London, 1949) , p. 250. 34. Speec h give n over the nationa l network of the Canadia n Broadcasting Corporation, Jul y 19, 1937 . 35. Fran k H . Underbill , "Th e Close o f a n Era : Twenty-Fiv e Year s o f Mr. Mackenzie King," Canadian Forum, Sept. 1944. 36. Nichola s Mansergh , Survey o f British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change, 1939-1952 (London, 1958) , p. 402. 37. Speec h of Lord Cranbourne, Feb. 19, 1945, quoted i n ibid., p. 401. 38. Quote d in ibid., p. 46. 39. Ibid.,p.4l. 40. Ibid., p. 42. 41. Mauric e Pope, unpublished manuscript. 42. Quote d i n J . H . Cranston , Ink o n M y Fingers (Toronto , 1951) , p. 180. 43. Kin g Diary , Aug . 21 , 1943 , quoted i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, 1,1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 553. 44. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 1 , Feb. 19, 1953 , pp . 18-19 . 45. E . L. Woodward, "The British Foreign Service " i n J. E . McLean , ed., The Public Service and University Education (Princeton , 1949) , p . 175. 46. J . D. B. Miller, in Canadian Forum, Aug. 1959 .

REFERENCES, PAGE S 144-156 21

3

47. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 2 , Apri l 8 , 1952 , p. 35 . 48. Ibid. 49. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, March 28 , 1960, p. 2508. 50. D . J . Goodspeed , A History o f th e Defence Research Board o f Canada (Ottawa , 1959) , p. 84. 51. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, April 10 , 1957, pp. 3358-9. 52. Th e Senat e o f Canada , Proceedings o f th e Standing Committee o n External Relations, June 25, 1958, p. 23. 53. Th e Report o f th e Royal Commission . . . t o Investigate th e Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information t o Agents o f a Foreign Power (Ottawa , 1946) , p . 83 . 54. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, July 9, 1959 , p. 5741. 55. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 4 , Jun e 4 , 1946 , p. 71 . 56. "Th e Department o f Externa l Affairs, " Referenc e Paper no . 6 9 of th e Information Divisio n o f th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s (Ottawa , 1959, mimeo.), p. 9. 57. Col . C. P. Stacey , Six Years o f War: The Army i n Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa , 1955) , p. 441. 58. "Th e Department o f External Affairs," p . 7. CHAPTER SIX : PLANNING

1. Michae l Oakeshott, Political Education (Cambridge , 1951) , p. 22 . 2. E . V . Tarle , Istoria Diplomatii, III , pp . 763-4 . Quote d i n Ma x Beloff, Th e Foreign Policy o f Soviet Russia, II, 1926-1941 (London , 1949) , p. 394. 3. Quote d i n W . W. Rostow, "Th e American Nationa l Style, " Daedalus: Proceedings o f th e American Academy o f Arts an d Sciences, vol . LXXXVII, no . 2, 1958 , p. 118 . 4. Ibid. 5. W . A . Mackintosh , "Governmen t Economi c Policy : Scop e an d Principles," Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol. XVI , no. 3 , Aug. 1950, p. 325. 6. Lorin g Christie, "Note on Munich," Nov. 1, 1938, Christie Papers . 7. Lette r t o th e author , Jun e 13 , 1959. 8. Addres s b y th e Ministe r o f Nationa l Healt h an d Welfare , Mr . Pau l Martin, Sept . 1 , 1955 . Dept. o f Externa l Affairs , Statements an d Speeches (Ottawa, 1955 , mimeo.), no. 29. 9. Jame s A . Gibson , "Mr . Mackenzi e Kin g an d Canadia n Autonomy , 1921-1946" i n Canadia n Historica l Association , Annual Report, 1951 , p. 20. 10. Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 201. 11. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Feb . 10 , 1960 , p. 930.

214 REFERENCES , PAGES 156-172

12. Georg e F . Kennan , "Histor y an d Diplomac y a s Viewe d b y a Diplo matist" i n Stephen D . Kertes z an d M . A. Fitzsimmons, eds., Diplomacy i n a Changing World (Notr e Dame , 1959) , pp . 107-8. 13. Se e J . E . Hodgetts , "Th e Civi l Servic e an d Polic y Formation, " Canadian Journal o f Economics an d Political Science, vol . XXIII, no . 4 , Nov. 1957 , p. 478. CHAPTER SEVEN : NEGOTIATION

1. Hug h Gibson , Th e Road t o Foreign Policy (Ne w York, 1944) , p . 63 . 2. Georg e F . Kennan , A History o f Soviet-American Relations, II , Th e Decision to Intervene (Princeton , 1958) , p . 191. 3. Harol d Nicolson , Curzon: Th e Last Phase, 1919-1925 (Ne w York, 1939), p. 54. 4. Foreign Relations o f th e United States, 1941, III, Th e British Commonwealth, th e Near East an d Africa (Washington , D.C., 1959) , p . 27 . 5. Willia m H. Standle y an d Arthu r A . Ageton , Admiral Ambassador t o Russia (Chicago , 1955) , pp . 195-6 . 6. Quote d i n Charle s S . Campbell , Jr. , Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 (Baltimore , 1957), p. 35. 7. Quote d i n Jame s Phinne y Baxte r III , "Th e Britis h Hig h Commis sioners a t Washington in 1871, " Proceedings of th e Massachusetts Historical Society, June 1934. 8. Si r Willoughby Maycock, With Mr. Chamberlain in th e United States and Canada, 1887-1888 (Toronto , 1914), p. 34. 9. Josep h Pop e to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Oct. 4 , 1899 , Laurier Papers . 10. Georg e C . Gibbon s t o Si r Wilfri d Laurier , Dec . 16 , 1907 , Laurier Papers. 11. Gibbon s to Laurier, Dec. 21, 1907, Laurier Papers . 12. Lor d Gre y to Lord Crewe , Jan. 11, 1909, Grey Papers . 13. Diary , entry for Feb. 20, 1912 , Pope Papers . 14. "Canadia n Representatio n i n th e Unite d States, " memorandu m b y W. S. Fielding, April 24, 1923 , King Papers, Fielding Papers . 15. Mackenzi e King to Charles McGrath , Jul y 21, 1923 , King Papers . 16. J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto, 1960) , p. 433. 17. "Som e Recent Developments in Canada's Externa l Relations, " addres s by Mackenzi e King befor e Toront o Boar d o f Trade , Nov. 22, 1928. 18. Rodolph e Lemieux to Lor d Grey , Dec . 13, 1907, Lemieu x Papers . 19. Josep h Chamberlai n t o th e Ear l o f Minto , Ma y 31 , 1900 , Minto Papers. 20. G . W. M. Grigg to J. S. Willison, April 22, 1910 , Willison Papers . 21. Rodolph e Lemieux to Sir Louis Jette, Dec. 5, 1907 , Lemieux Papers . 22. Lemieu x to Jette , Dec . 10, 1907 , Lemieux Papers . 23. Lemieu x to Sir Wilfrid Laurier , Dec. 10, 1907, Lemieux Papers . 24. Lemieu x to W. T. R. Preston, Jan. 14, 1908, Lemieux Papers. 25. W . A . Riddell, World Security b y Conference (Toronto , 1947) , p . 124. 26. Ibid., p. 130.

REFERENCES, PAGES 172-185 21 5

27. Documents Relating t o th e Italo-Ethiopian Crisis (Ottawa , 1935) , p. 172 . 28. Riddell , World Security by Conference, p. 129 . 29. St . John Telegraph Journal, Sept. 4, 1935 . 30. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 3 , March 12 , 1959, pp. 48-9 . 31. Kin g Papers. 32. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no . 12 , April 6 , I960 , pp . 302-3 . 33. Gordo n A . Craig , "Th e Professiona l Diploma t an d Hi s Problems , 1919-1939," World Politics, vol. IV , no. 2, Jan. 1952 , pp . 147-8 . 34. Quote d i n Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , p . 115 . 35. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Jul y 9 , 1943 , p . 4567 . 36. Mackenzi e King to O . F. Brothers , Apri l 14 , 1941 , Kin g Papers . 37. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, Jan. 9, 1957 , pp . 31-2. 38. Se e Lor d Riddell , A n Intimate Diary o f th e Peace Conference an d After (London , 1933) , p. 225 . 39. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, May 17 , 1920, p. 2532 . 40. Mackenzi e King to A. F. Sladen , March 17 , 1923, King Papers. 41. Slade n to Mackenzie King, April 12 , 1923, King Papers . 42. Unpublishe d text, King Papers. 43. Mackenzi e King to P. C. Larkin, Nov. 30, 1929 , King Papers . 44. Quote d in Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, I , p. 233. 45. Leste r B . Pearson , Democracy i n World Politics (Toronto , 1955) , pp. 57 , 62 . 46. Leste r B . Pearson , Diplomacy i n th e Nuclear Ag e (Toronto , 1959) , pp. 35 , 44. CHAPTER EIGHT : PROPAGANDA

1. Canada , House o f Commons Standing Committee o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, no . 1 , Feb . 19 , 1953 , p . 13 . 2. Vincen t Massey , O n Being Canadian (Toronto , 1948) , p . 159 . 3. Canada , House o f Commons Journals, 1900 , App . I , p . 490 . 4. Addres s b y Mr . L . B . Pearso n a t Rollin s College , Florida , Feb . 21 , 1954, i n Dept . o f Externa l Affairs , Statements an d Speeches (Ottawa , 1954 , mimeo.), no. 9. 5. Canada , House o f Commons Debates, Marc h 13 , 1911 , p . 5168 . 6. Quote d i n Beckle s Willson , Th e Life o f Lord Strathcona & Mount Royal (London , 1915) , p. 496. 7. H . Gordo n Skilling , Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy (Toronto , 1945) , p . 18 . 8. Report o f th e Canadian Economic Commission (Siberia) (Ottawa , 1919), p . 17. 9. Si r Robert Borde n t o Walter Long , Apri l 12 , 1917 , Borde n Papers . 10. Charle s W. Gordon (Ralp h Connor) t o Sir George Foster , Marc h 28 , 1917, Borde n Papers . 11. Si r Edmun d Walke r t o Rober t Donald , Ma y 18 , 1917 , Walke r Papers.

216 REFERENCES , PAGES 185-201

12. Ottawa Citizen, April 4, 1940. 13. Ne w York Times, April 5 , 1940. 14. Pres s statement by the Prime Minister, April 11 , 1940. 15. Mackenzi e King to Winston Churchill, May 24, 1940 , King Papers. 16. Mackenzi e Kin g t o Mrs . George d e Grippenberg , Oct . 25 , 1940 , King Papers . 17. Canada , H. of C . Debates, July 13 , 1943, pp. 4728-9. 18. Leighto n McCarthy to Mackenzie King, May 7, 1941, King Papers. 19. Quote d i n J . W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record, I , 1939-1944 (Toronto , 1960) , p. 190. 20. Mackenzi e King to Leighton McCarthy, Sept . 24 , 1941 , King Papers. 21. Leighto n McCarthy to Mackenzie King, Sept. 27, 1941 , King Papers. 22. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, July 13, 1943, p. 4705. 23. Quote d in ibid., p. 4709 . 24. Joh n Grierso n t o W. J. Turnbull, Nov. 2, 1939, King Papers. 25. Joh n Grierso n t o A. D. P. Heeney, Nov. 2, 1939, King Papers. 26. Canada , H. o f C . Debates, July 13 , 1943, pp. 4709-11, 4713. 27. Ibid., p. 47'12. 28. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6 , June 9, 1948 , p. 146. 29. Ibid., no. 7, May 27, 1947, p. 206. 30. Ibid., no. 6, June 9, 1948 , p. 147. 31. Memorandu m for th e Prim e Minister , Sept . 18 , 1941 , King Papers . 32. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6 , March 12 , 1953, p. 142. 33. Ibid., p. 142. 34. Ibid., p. 142. 35. Ibid., pp. 140-1 . 36. Ibid., p. 170. 37. Ibid., no. 7, May 27, 1947 , p. 209. 38. Ibid., no. 1 , May 17 , 1951, p. 17 . 39. Ibid., no. 1 , Feb. 19, p. 14 . 40. Ibid., p. 14. 41. Ibid., no. 6, March 12 , 1953, pp. 170-1 . 42. Ibid., p. 171. 43. Ibid., no. 2, Feb. 26, 1953 , p. 46. 44. Ibid., p. 48. 45. I n an interview with the author, Dec. 31, 1959. 46. Canada , H . o f C . Standin g Committe e o n Externa l Affairs , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 2, Feb. 26, 1953 , p. 51. 47. Ibid., no. 6, March 12 , 1953, p. 138. 48. Ibid., p. 170. 49. Ibid., no. 2, Feb. 26, 1953 , p. 53. 50. Ibid., no. 12 , June 10 , 1954, pp. 400-1. 51. Pete r Wiles , "Repor t o n th e Russia n Service, " Th e Spectator (London), Jan . 3, 1958 . See also ibid., correspondenc e column s fro m Jun e 21, 1957 , to Sept. 6, 1957 , and in Dec. 1959 . 52. Th e Formulation an d Administration o f United States Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 78. 53. Canada , H . o f C . Specia l Committe e o n Broadcasting , Minutes o f Proceedings an d Evidence, no . 12 , June 16 , 1959 , pp. 429-30 , 434.

Index

ACTON, LORD , 10 4 Adak, 8 5 Admiralty, First Lor d o f (U.K.) , 12 7 Afghanistan, 14 2 Africa sout h o f th e Sahara , 69 ; broad casting to , 20 2 Afro-Asian nations : an d planning , 15 2 Agriculture, Ministe r of , 1 7 Air Forc e Cambridg e Researc h Cente r (U.S.), 14 6 Air Researc h an d Developmen t Com mand (U.S.) , 14 6 Aitken, Si r Max , 128 . Se e also Beaver brook, Lor d Alaska Boundary , 163 ; documents , 124-5 Aleutian campaign : Canadia n Arm y in , 82-5 Alexander, Fiel d Marshal , Ear l o f Tunis: an d W . L. Mackenzi e King, 30 ambassadors: t o Nort h Atlanti c Treat y Organization (NATO) , 41 ; t o Spain, 43; to China , 121 ; to Unite d States, 141 , 192 ; t o Italy , 19 7 ambassadors, Germany : t o Unite d Kingdom, 18 3 ambassadors, Unite d Kingdom : t o United States , 5 , 29 , 162 , 168 , 185; a s negotiator s fo r Canada , 163-5, 168-7 0 Amery, L . S. , 133 n Anderson, Majo r Genera l T . V. , 6 2 Andrew, Geoffre y C., 192 Anglo- Japanese alliance : propose d re newal, 8 apartheid, 145 , 145 n appeasement, 1 1 Armistice (1918) , 9 5 Army, British , 7 1 Army, Canadian , 72 , 77 , 81 , 82 , 86 , 99n; i n Siberia , 7 , 130 ; officia l historian, 63 , 73 , 75 , 149 ; Norwe gian campaign , 77-8 , 79 ; Nort h Africa, 78-9 ; Diepp e Raid , 79-80 ; and government , 80-1 ; Italy , 80-2 ; Hong Kong , 80 , 138 , 138n ; an d post-war policy , 81 ; Aleutian cam -

paign, 82-5 ; Wester n Europe , 85-7, 90-5 ; an d Nationa l Defence Headquarters (N.D.H.Q.) , 89-91 ; and Canadia n Militar y Head quarters (C.M.H.Q.) , 89-91 ; man power situation , 90-5 ; i n Firs t World War , 18 5 Army Council , 93 Ashton, Majo r Genera l E . C. , 6 1 Asquith, H . A. , 12 9 Athlone, Ear l of : an d W . L . Macken zie King , 3 0 Atlantic Charter , 138 , 18 1 atomic attack , 1 5 attaches: diplomatists ' dislik e of , 56 , 56n; agricultural , 57 , 65 ; air , 62 ; commercial, 57-8 ; financial , 57 , 65; labour , 57 , 65 ; military , 56n , 57, 61-5 ; naval , 62 ; press , 57 , 65 ; scientific, 57 , 65 ; technica l assis tance, 5 7 Attlee, Clement , 2 5 Attu, 8 3 Augusta, Georgia , 17 6 Australia, 139 , 142n , 192 ; Prime Minis ter of , 131 , 138n , 18 6 Austria, 14 2 Axis powers , 19 4

BAGEHOT, WALTER , 30 , 15 7 Balfour, A . J. , 146 n Ballantyne, C . C. , 7 Baltimore, Maryland , 14 6 Bandaranaike, S . W. R . D. , 14 5 Bank o f Canada , 33 , 100 ; Deput y Governor of , 59 n Beaudry, Laurent , 68 ; an d "Riddel l incident," 17 2 Beaulne, Yvon , 197 Beaverbrook, Lord , 184 , 184n ; Minister of Informatio n (U.K.) , 129 . Se e also Aitken, Si r Ma x Behring Sea Seal Treaty , 5 Beirut, Lebanon , 14 3 Belgium, 64 , 142 , 142n . Se e also Lo w Countries

218

INDEX

Bennett, R . B. , 37 , 39n ; an d Cabinet , 8-9; privat e papers , 9 , 9n ; an d External Affair s portfolio , 22 ; an d O. D . Skelton , 41 ; an d Vincen t Massey, 44-5 ; o n Hig h Commis sioner fo r Canad a i n Unite d King dom, 44-5 ; o n Fa r Easter n crisis , 109; an d parliamentar y discussion of foreig n affairs , 109 ; Govern ment of , 135 ; an d Italo-Ethiopia n War, 171 , 17 3 Berlin, Germany , 64 , 135 , 142 n Biggar, O . M. , 89 , 158 n Bland, Si r Nevile , 16 0 Boer War , 5 Bomarc-SAGE, 12 3 Bonn, Wes t Germany , 6 4 Borah Bil l (U.S.) , 134 n Borden, Si r Frederick , 7 3 Borden, Si r Robert , 12 , 21 , 22 , 104 , 138; an d foreig n policy , 6-8 ; an d Cabinet, 6-8 ; an d Siberia n expedition, 7-8 ; Governmen t of , 21 ; and Imperial Wa r Cabinet , 71-2 , 129-30; an d Firs t Worl d War , 71-2; nava l policy , 113 , 127 ; wartime propagand a i n U.S. , 18 5 Boundary Water s Commission : pro posed, 16 4 Bourassa, Henri : anti-militaris m of , 7 0 Brazil, 142 n British Broadcastin g Corporatio n (B.B.C.), 195 , 196 , 196n , 20 0 British Columbia , 14 n British Commonwealth . Se e Common wealth o f Nation s British Commonwealt h Ai r Trainin g Plan, 76-7 , 8 7 British Empir e Delegation , 12 9 "British Empir e Report, " 13 1 British Unite d Press , 19 1 Bryce, James , 5 , 29 , 164- 5 Bureau o f th e Budge t (U.S.) , 1 6 Bureau o f Publi c Information , 18 9 "bureaucratic elite, " 34- 8 passim; 34 n Burma, 142 , 142 n Burns, Majo r Genera l E . L . M. , 4 3 Bush House , 20 0 Byng, Genera l J . H . G. , Viscoun t Byng of Vimy , 7 2 CABINET, 98 , 171 ; representation , 1-2 , 99; an d foreig n policy , 4-20 , 103 ;

secrecy, 5n , 14 , 14n ; resignations , 9, 26 ; minutes , 13n ; Registrar , 14 ; secretary, 100 ; dictatorship , 103-4 ; in Secon d Worl d War , 111-1 2 committees: war , 12-14 , 18 , 63 , 65 , 76, 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83-4 , 85 , 88 , 89, 89n , 92 , 111 , 139-40 , 159 , 194; Genera l Policy , 12 ; Recon struction an d Development , 12 ; Emergency Plans , 15 ; Defence, 73 , 76, 99 ; Externa l Affairs , 15 8 Cadieux, Marcel : o n F.S.O . examina tions, 52- 3 Calder, J . A. , 7 Cambodia, Internationa l Truc e Super visory Commission : representatio n on, 14 2 Cambridge University , Departmen t o f Slavonic Studies , 5 5 Camp David , 1 7 Campbell, Si r Gerald , 18 8 Campney, Ralp h O. , 98 , 158 n Canada: a s "fire-proo f house, " 74 ; a s "interpreter," 139 ; a s "middl e power," 149 ; an d "nationa l style, " 153-4 Canada House , 57 , 61 , 65 Canada-United State s Interparliamen tary Group , 11 5 Canada—United State s Ministeria l Committee o n Join t Defence , 17-1 8 Canada-United State s Ministeria l Com mittee o n Trad e an d Economi c Affairs, 1 7 Canada-United State s relations : pela gic sealing , 165 ; fisheries , 165-6 ; boundary waters , 166 ; immigra tion, 166 ; broadcastin g channels , 166; smuggling , 166 ; extradition , 166 Canadian Broadcastin g Corporatio n (C.B.C.): an d propaganda , 192 , 193-202; Internationa l Service , 193-202 Canadian Commercia l Corporation , 5 9 Canadian Commissione r i n Paris , 6 6 Canadian Fiel d Headquarters , 8 9 Canadian Informatio n Servic e (C.I.S.) , 192-3 Canadian Militar y Headquarter s (C.M . H.Q.), 61 , 78 , 86 , 89-9 1 Canadian Press , 134n , 19 1 Canberra, Australia , 19 2 Carr, Colone l N. O. , 61

INDEX

caucus, parliamentar y party : discus sion in , 114-15 , 114n , 115 n Cavell, R . G . Nik , 19 , 59 Central Intelligenc e Agenc y (U.S.) , 147 Ceylon, 142n , 14 5 Chamberlain, Si r Austen , 133 n Chamberlain, Joseph , 163 , 168 , 168 n Chanak crisis , 10 , 29 , 105 , 131- 2 Chateau Laurier , 35 , 35 n Chief Electora l Officer , 158 n Chief o f th e Genera l Staff , 8 3 Chief o f Nava l Staff , 6 1 Chief o f Staff , U.S . Army , 61 , 83 , 100 ; Deputy, 8 5 Chiefs o f Staff , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 65 , 72-3 , 76, 84 , 96 , 100 , 146 ; an d Depart ment o f Externa l Affairs , 74- 5 Chiefs o f Staf f (U.K.) , 137 . Se e also Imperial Genera l Staf f Chiefs o f Staf f Committee , 15 , 36 , 73 , 149; Chairman , 97 , 99 , 100 , 101 ; civilian influenc e in , 99 ; criticize d by Genera l Simonds , 9 9 Chile, 142 n China, 135 , 139 , 141 , 142 ; Sino-Sovie t bloc, 19 ; People' s Republic , 121 , 143, 144 , 151 ; Minister to, 14 1 143, 144 Chistoff, Ole g Alec , 118 n Christie, Lorin g C. , 8 , 38-40 , 40n , 46 ; and R . L . Borden , 38-9 ; an d Arthur Meighen , 38-9 ; an d W . L . Mackenzie King , 39 , 39n , 41 , 42 ; influence o n policy , 40n , 41 ; view s on Europea n crisis , 40n ; missio n to Londo n (1920) , 66 ; on Imperia l War Cabinet , 129-30 ; o n Cana dian foreig n policy , 154 ; Ministe r to U.S. , 17 6 Chungking, China : legatio n at , 14 1 Churchill, Winston , 30-1 30-1, ,31n 3 In,, 63 , 81 , 82, 111 , 139 , 141 , 177 , 181 , 186 ; and Imperia l Wa r Cabinet , 12 ; and Anthon y Eden , 27 ; nava l policy, 127 ; an d Chana k crisis , 131; o n Hitler , 136 ; an d Domin ions Office , 137 ; o n Canada' Canada' s policy toward s Vichy , 140 , 141 1 4 In n Citizenship an d Immigration : Depart ment of , 122 ; Minister , 3 7 civil servants , higher : an d polic y pro cess, 32-8 ; interchangeabilit y of , 34; socia l contact s among , 35, 35n 35n,, 36; a s "mandarins, " 35-6 ; an d

219

politics, 36-8 ; an d "steppin g stones t o Ministry, " 37 n Civil Servic e Commission , 37 , 41 , 43 , 48, 49 , 126 ; chairman , 3 4 civilian supremacy , 65 , 97-10 2 Clark, Colone l Hugh , 2 1 Claxton, Brooke , 15 , 21-2 , 23 n 9 8 189n, 19 1 Clerk o f th e Priv y Council , 41 , 19 2 Cliveden, 13 6 Coats, R . H. , 158 n Coldwell, M . J. , 4 4 collective security , 10 9 Colombia, 142 n Colombo Plan , 19 , 56n . 58 , 59 n Colonial Conference , 17 7 Colonial Office , 12 4 Colonial Secretar y (U.K.) , 129 , 18 5 Columbia River , 16 6 Combined Chief s o f Staf f (U.K.-U.S.) , 62, 63 , 64 , 82 , 14 0 Combined Plannin g Committe e (U.K. U.S.), 6 3 commercial policy : an d propaganda , 184 Commissioner Genera l o f Canad a i n France, 16 7 Committee o f Imperia l Defence , 7 3 Committee o f State : proposed , 7 3 committees, interdepartmental , 34-5 , 59, 59n , 202 ; an d foreig n polic y planning, 158 ; an d Departmen t o f External Affairs , 158-9 ; informa tional activity , 19 2 Panel o n th e Economi c Aspect s o f Defence Policy , 100 , 159 ; Post Hostilities Planning , 158-9 ; Ai r Transport Policy , 159 ; Externa l Trade Policy , 159 ; Internationa l Civil Aviation , 159 ; Internationa l Service, C.B.C. , 20 2 Commonwealth o f Nations , 4 , 19 , 25 , 30n, 38 , 69 , 136 , 169 , 202 ; an d consultation, 138-9 , 139n , 178-80 ; as intelligenc e source , 141 , 144-5 , 149; i n Afro-Asia , 144 ; "secon d class members, " 145 , 145 n Commonwealth Parliamentar y Associa tion, 11 5 Commonwealth Relation s Offic e (U.K.), 14 4 communism, Soviet , 151 . Se e also Marxism-Leninism Congo Republic , 6 9

220

INDEX

Congress (U.S.) , 118 , 133 ; Librar y of , 117; opinio n in , 18 6 conscription, 76 , 77 ; crisi s of 1917 , 72 ; crisis o f 1944 , 90- 5 Conservative party , 27 , 37 ; foreig n policy spokesma n for , 44 , 50 ; par ty, 27 , 37 ; foreig n polic y spokes man for , 44 , 50 ; parliamentar y caucus of , 114n , 11 5 Consul general : i n Ne w Yor k City , 19 2 consuls, foreign : a s channel s fo r nego tiation, 167-8 ; French , 168 ; Japanese, 16 8 Co-operative Commonwealt h Federa tion (C.C.F.) , 44 , 114 n Costa Rica , 142 , 142 n Coyne, James , 35 n Craig, Genera l Malin , 6 1 Creel, George , 18 4 Crerar, Genera l H . D . G. , 8 6 Crerar, T . A. , 7 Crewe House , 18 4 Cuba, 142 n Currie, Si r Arthur , 7 2 Curzon, Lord , 28 , 130- 1 Czechoslovakia, 64 , 95 , 142n ; broad casting to, 195- 6 DAFOE, J. W. : o n R . B . Bennett, 8- 9 Davis, T . C. , 121 , 14 2 Dawson, R . MacGregor : o n Arthu r Meighen, 8 defence: imperial , 5 ; Nort h American , 61; post-194 5 attitudes , 95- 8 Defence, Ministe r o f (U.K.) , 3 1 Defence Committee , Cabinet , 12 , 1 5 Defence Construction , Ltd. , 5 9 Defence Council , 8 8 Defence Production , Ministe r of , 15 , 17 Defence Researc h Board , 123n , 146 , 149; civilia n directio n of , 99 , 99 n "Defence Schem e No . 1, " 7 4 Defense, Departmen t o f (U.S.) , 146 ; Secretary, 1 5 Delafield, Charles , 197 , 198 , 19 9 Delcassé, Théophile , 168 n Denmark, 64 , 142n ; broadcastin g to , 202 Department o f Nationa l Defenc e Ac t (1922): amended , 87 , 8 8 despatches: dispositio n of , 147-8 , 19 3 Désy, Jean , 46 , 47, 67 ; and C.B.C.-I.S., 195, 197- 8 DeWitt, Genera l Joh n L. , 82 , 8 3

Dicev, A . V. , 15 1 Diefenbaker, Joh n G. , 24 , 38 , 116n , 144n; an d Externa l Affair s port folio, 27 ; an d Sidne y Smith , 27-8 ; and Howar d Green , 28 ; an d Hig h Commissioner fo r Canad a i n U.K., 45 ; o n civilia n supremacy , 98; an d Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, 149 ; "vision " o f norther n development, 20 2 Dieppe Raid , 140 ; Canadian Army and , 79-80 diplomacy: "summit, " 4 , 175 ; secret , 104-5, 118 , 178-81 ; Soviet , 152 ; "old," 160 ; an d propaganda , 160-1; "quiet, " 175 ; airborne , 17 7 diplomatic unity , doctrin e of , 164 , 16 9 diplomatists: functional , 57 , 65 ; an d politicians, 17 5 Director General , Externa l Ai d Pro grammes, 60- 1 Djakarta, Indonesia , 14 3 doctrines: Eisenhower , 154 ; Monroe , 154; Stimson , 154 ; Truman , 15 4 Doherty, C . J. , 7 Dominican Republic , 142 n Dominion Affairs , Secretar y o f Stat e for (U.K.) , 133 , 133n , 13 7 Dominion Statistician , 158 n Dominions Offic e (U.K.) , 80 , 137- 8 Downing Street , 130 , 13 6 Draft Conventio n (I.L.O. ) o n th e Limitation o f Hour s o f Wor k i n Industrial Undertakings , 11 8 Drew, George: Hig h Commissione r fo r Canada i n U.K. , 4 6 Dulles, Joh n Foster , 142 , 17 7 Dundonald, Majo r Genera l Th e Ear l of, 7 1 Dunton, A . D., 19 2 Dupuy, Pierre : missio n t o Vichy , 140 , 140n Dyke, John , 18 4 EAST BLOCK , 11 , 39n , 47, 56n , 144 , 173 . See also Externa l Affairs , Depart ment o f Economic Advisor y Committee , 2 2 Ecuador, 142 n Eden, Anthony , 81, 138n ; an d Winsto n Churchill, 2 7 Edwards, W . S. , 158 n Eisenhower, Dwigh t D. , 154 , 17 6

INDEX

Emergency Council , 1 2 Empire, diplomati c unit y of , 164 , 169 espionage, Soviet , 9 5 "Establishment," the , 3 8 Europe, 74 ; Western , 92 , 97 ; occupied , 194; broadcastin g to , 195-7 , 200-1, 20 2 External Affairs , Departmen t of , 4 , 8 , 15, 17 , 18 , 24 , 25 , 29 , 33 , 34 , 38 69 passim, 97 , 100 , 120, 121, 133, 166, 173 ; origins, 20-1 , 46 , 126-7 ; legal adviser , 39 , 66 , 68 ; counsel lor, 40 ; an d Unde r Secretar y o f State fo r Externa l Affairs , 41 ; re cruitment o f ambassador s from , 42-3; "stripe d pants " attitud e of , 44; in-servic e training , 46 , 54-5 ; recruitment, 46-54 ; examinations , 47-53; generalis t concept , 53 , 143-4; specialist s in , 53-1 , 143-4; "lateral entry, " 53—4 ; promotions , 55-6; diminishe d prestig e of , 56 ; and Departmen t o f Trad e an d Commerce, 57-61 ; an d adminis tration o f foreig n ai d programmes , 58-61; an d militar y attaches , 64 , 64n; an d Departmen t o f Nationa l Defence, 64 , 64n, 74-5, 97 ; organization, 65-9 ; an d Hig h Commis sioner fo r Canad a i n U.K. , 66 ; press office , 68 ; inspectio n service , 68; politica l co-ordinatio n section , 68-9, 148 , 197; African des k offi cer, 69 ; interna l liaison , 69 ; rela tions wit h Minister , 69 ; size , 69 ; as intelligenc e centre , 147-9 ; liai son service , 148 ; Weltanschauung, 156; plannin g in , 157-9 ; an d propaganda, 192- 3 divisions: administrative , 68; African (proposed), 69 ; American , 67 , 68 ; Commonwealth, 67 , 68 ; consular , 67, 68 ; defenc e liaison , 67 , 99 , 149; diplomatic , 68 ; economic , 59n, 67 , 68 ; European , 68 ; Fa r Eastern, 67 , 68 ; historical , 67 ; information, 53 , 67 , 68 , 192-3 ; Latin American , 69 ; legal , 67 , 68 ; Middle Eastern , 69 ; personnel , 53 , 68; protocol, 68 ; treaty, 68 ; United Nations, 58 , 6 7 External Affairs , Departmen t o f (Australian), 65- 6 External Affairs , Secretar y o f Stat e for,

221

4, 13 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 24 , 26 , 28 , 37, 41 , 97 , 119 , 121 , 147 , 148 , 155, 181 , 196; and Prim e Minister, 17, 24-8 ; Parliamentar y Unde r Secretary to , 21 ; Parliamentar y Assistant to , 22 ; Parliamentar y Secretary to , 22 , 121 ; and Unde r Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 38-41 , 39n , 40n; and De partment o f Externa l Affairs , 6 9 External Affairs , Unde r Secretar y of State for , 9 , 13 , 15 , 19 , 34 , 37 , 38-41, 42 , 43 , 57 , 58 , 64 , 65 , 67 , 99, 144 , 145, 147, 148 , 173, 174, 186, 196 ; an d Secretar y o f Stat e for Externa l Affairs , 38-41 , 39n , 40n; Associate , 47 , 67 , 68 , 148 , 175n, 192 ; Acting, 5 4 External Ai d Office , 60- 1

FABRE, HECTOR , 16 7 Far East , 74 , 13 8 fascism: attitude s towards , 135- 6 Fashoda, 168 n Federal Burea u of Investigatio n (U.S.) , 146 Ferguson, Howard : High Commissione r for Canad a i n U.K. , 45 Fielding, W . S. : an d Chana k crisis , 10 ; and righ t o f legation , 11 ; resigna tion, 11 ; opposes representatio n i n U.S., 133 , 166; mission t o Berlin , 169 Finance, Departmen t of , 15 , 33, 34 , 59 , 100; Minister , 10 , 12 , 13 , 15 , 16 , 17, 26 , 72 , 78 , 133 ; Assistan t Deputy Minister , 59n ; and repre sentation abroad , 14 3 Financial Post, the , 39n Finland, 142n "fireproof house, " Canad a as , 7 4 First Worl d War . See Worl d Wa r I Flottenpolitik, 12 7 Foreign Affair s Committe e (U.S.) , 11 8 foreign aid , administration of, 58-6 1 "Foreign Countrie s Report, " 13 1 Foreign Offic e (U.K.) , 54 , 55 , 66 , 125, 127, 131 , 162 ; an d B.B.C. , 196 , 196n, 20 0 Foreign Operation s Administratio n (U.S.), 6 0 Foreign Relation s Committe e (U.S.) , 118

222

INDEX

Foreign Secretar y (U.K.) , 125 , 130-1 , 133, 133n , 137; acting, 16 2 foreign service : Australian , 66 ; French, 66; Unite d States , 66 ; Iris h Fre e State, 6 6 foreign servic e officers : recruitment , 46-54; in-servic e training , 46 , 54-5; examinations , 47-53 ; quali fications, 53-4 ; promotion , 55-6 ; shortage of , 56 ; sicknes s benefits , 56n; hardship s of , 56n ; as purvey ors o f intelligence , 143-4 ; opera tional cod e of , 156-7 . Se e also External Affairs , Departmen t o f forest management , 11 6 Forrestal, Jame s V. : o n Cabine t De fence Committee , 1 5 Forsey, Eugene : o n W . L . Mackenzi e King an d constitutiona l govern ment, 37n, 108 Foster, Si r George , 7 , 8 ; offere d Exter nal Affair s portfolio , 2 2 Foulkes, Genera l Charles , 97 , 9 9 France, 64 , 96 , 138 , 140 , 142 , 142n, 143, 153 , 154 , 167 , 168n , 169 , 186, 19 2 Fredericton, N.B. , 27 freight rates , 105 , 116 French Canada : an d militar y establish ment, 70-2 , 96-7 ; an d conscrip tion, 95 , 97 ; an d Korea n War , 97; representation i n Cabinet , 99 ; an d fascism, 135 ; and Vichy , 140 ; and "national style, " 153 ; and Secon d World War , 187 "fusion": concep t o f civil-militar y rela tions, 100 , 102

Germany, Federa l Republi c of , 142n Ghana: Hig h Commissione r fo r Can ada in , 142n ; broadcasting to , 20 2 Gibbons, Georg e C. , 164- 5 Gibson, Hugh , 16 0 Globe an d Mail, the , 37-8 gold mining , 11 6 Gordon, Majo r Charle s W . (Ralp h Connor), 18 5 Gordon, Donald , 35 n Governor General , 107 , 129, 131, 165, 168n, 169 , 171; and Prim e Minis ter, 28-31 ; an d Unite d Kingdo m government, 179-8 0 Governor i n Council , 2 1 Graham, Lt.-Gen . Howard , 123n Grand Alliance , 62 , 13 9 Graydon, Gordon , 27 , 44 , 50 , 120 , 198 Great Lakes : lamprey , 116 ; nava l strength on , 134n Greece, 138n , 142 n Green, Howard , 16 , 121 , 147-8 ; be comes Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , 24 , 28 ; an d John Diefenbaker , 28 ; an d De partment o f Externa l Affairs , 69 ; opposes nuclea r weapons , 97 ; o n Canadian foreig n policy , 155- 6 Grey, A . H . G. , 4t h Ear l Grey : a s Governor General , 29 , 126 , 165 Grey, Si r Edward , 1s t Viscoun t Gre y of Fallodon , 125- 6 Grierson, John : o n wartim e propa ganda, 189-90

HAITI, 142n Hamburger Nachrichten, 18 3 Hankey, Sir Maurice, 13n GALLUP, GEORGE , 5 3 Hanson, R . B. , 113 , 191 Harvard University , 136 , 139 Garland, E . J. , 10 7 general elections : (1935) , 45 , 171 ; Havana, Cuba , 5 8 (1957), 24 , 27, 37, 45, 98 ; (1958) , Hay, John : o n U.S. Senate, 113 27, 3 8 Health an d Welfare , Ministe r of, 1 5 General Staff , 73 , 80 ; Chie f of , 61 , 78 , Heeney, A . D. P., 58 , 143 , 192; on Wa r 90, 93 , 99 , 123n ; Vice-Chie f of, 8 5 Committee o f Cabinet , 1 3 "generalists," 53-4 , 143- 4 Hellyer, Paul , 98 , 123n Geneva, 39 , 43 . Se e also Leagu e o f Henderson, Si r Nevile , 135 , 135 n Herridge, W . D. , 37 , 18 6 Nations Geneva Protocol , 15 8 Herschell, Lord , 12 4 Genoa Conferenc e (1922) , 3 9 Hickerson, J. D., 82 , 83, 84-5, 89 George VI , King , 30 , 31n High Commissio n a t Washingto n Germany, 64 , 154 , 183 , 185 , 194 ; (1870-1), 163 , 164 declaration o f wa r o n (1914) , High Commissione r fo r th e Unite d 104; intelligenc e concerning , 12 7 Kingdom: i n Canada, 16 7

INDEX High Commissioner s fo r Canada : I n Australia, 142n ; i n Ceylon , 142n ; in Ghana , 142n ; i n India , 64n , 142n, 143 ; i n Malaya , 142n ; i n New Zealand , 142n ; i n Nigeria, 142n; i n Pakistan , 61 , 142n ; i n Union o f Sout h Africa , 142n ; i n United Kingdom , 44-6 , 61 , 66 , 127, 128 , 129 , 133 , 133n , 135-6 , 136-7, 142n , 144 , 167 , 18 3 High Commissioners , Dominion : meet ings of, 133 , 133n , 136- 7 Hilsman Roger , 123 n Hitler, 135 , 135n ; visite d b y W . L . Mackenzie King , 11 , 136 Honduras, 142 n Hong Kong , 85 ; Arm y at , 80 , 138 , 138n; intelligenc e concerning , 138 , 138n Hose, Commodore Walter , 158 n House o f Commons , 14n , 15 , 23 , 24 , 26, 42 , 76 , 95 , 98 , 103-2 3 passim, 134, 138 , 187 , 191 ; Speaker , 14n ; Leader of , 24 ; an d discussio n o f foreign affairs , 108-13 , 115-1 7 committees: Standin g Committe e o n External Affairs , 19 , 47 , 50 , 54 , 115, 118-23 , 141 , 147 , 173 , 196 202 passim; propose d Standin g Committee o n Defence, 73 , 122-3 ; Standing Committe e o n Industria l and Internationa l Relations , 118 ; Standing Committe e o n Estimates , 122; Standin g Committe e o n Mines, Forest s an d Water , 122 , 123; Specia l Committe e o n De fence Expenditure , 12 3 House o f Common s (U.K.) , 11 1 House o f Representative s (U.S.) , 7 6 Howe, C . D. , 15 , 57, 58 , 59 Hughes, William , 13 1 Hull, Cordell , 187- 8 Hungary, 142 ; revolutio n (1956) , 195 ; broadcasting to , 19 5 Huntington, Samue l P. : o n civil-mili tary relations , 100- 1 Husky, Operation , 81- 2 Hutchison, Bruce : o n W . L. Mackenzi e King, 11 ; o n conscriptio n crisi s (1944), 94 n Hutton, Majo r Genera l E . T. H. , 7 1 Hyde Par k Agreement , 15 5 ICELAND, 97 , 142 , 142 n Ilsley, J . L. : o n Treasur y Board , 16 ;

223

threatens resignation , 2 6 Immigration, 68 , 180n , 183 ; oriental, 5 , 158, 168 , 170- 1 Immigration, Departmen t of , 15 8 Imperial Conferences : (1921) , 8 , 38 , 130; (1923) , 39 , 105-6 , 106n , 179-80; (1926) , 30 , 133 n Imperial Defence , 5 Imperial Defenc e College , 5 5 Imperial Defenc e Conferenc e (1909) , 12 Imperial Economi c Conferenc e (1932) , 8-9 Imperial Genera l Staff , 129 ; Chie f of , 71-2, 8 1 imperial preference, 5 Imperial Wa r Cabinet , 6 , 71-2 , 104 , 129-30; propose d reconstitution , 12, 138- 9 India, 142n , 143 , 144 , 144 n Indian Ocean , 15 4 Indonesia, 142n , 14 3 Information, Ministr y o f (U.K.) , 129 , 184, 184n , 190 , 191 , 194 , 196 n Information Agenc y (U.S.) , 200 Information Offic e (U.K.) , 18 8 intelligence: an d trad e commissioners , 57-8; Join t Intelligenc e Commit tee, 99 , 149 ; "basi c descriptive, " 126; "speculative-evaluative, " 127 , 136; i n Firs t Worl d War , 127-30 ; "British Empir e report, " 131 ; "foreign countrie s report, " 131 ; and Chana k crisis , 131-2 ; an d W. L . Mackenzi e King , 133-4 ; o n United States , 133-4 ; an d Fa r Eastern crisis , 134-5 ; an d Naz i Germany, 135-6 ; supplie d b y United Kingdo m Governmen t dur ing Secon d Worl d War , 137-9 ; exchanges, 141 ; an d foreig n servic e officers, 143-4 ; Commonwealt h o f Nations a s sourc e of , 144-5 , 149 ; United State s a s sourc e of , 145-7 , 149; subversiv e activity , 146 ; mili tary, 146 , 149 ; scientific , 146 , 149 ; and Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, 147- 9 Interior, Ministe r of the , 12 4 International Cooperatio n Administra tion (U.S.) , 6 0 International Joint Commission, 43, 166 International Labou r Organisation , 11 8 International Waterway s Commission , 164

224

INDEX

interpreter, Canad a as , 13 9 Iran, 142 n Iraq, 14 2 Ireland, 142n , 18 3 Irish Fre e State , 30 , 6 6 Israel, 142 n Italo-Ethiopian War , 9 , 110 , 171- 3 passim Italy, 64 , 96 , 135 , 142n , 197 ; Arm y in , 80-2; propose d sanction s against , 171-3; broadcasting to, 202

and L . S . St . Laurent , 25-6 ; an d governors general , 29-31 ; an d General A . G . L . McNaughton , 37, 77 ; o n civi l service , 37n ; an d Department o f Externa l Affairs , 38-41, 46-7 , 66-7 ; an d Unde r Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 38-41 ; an d Lorin g C . Christie, 39 , 39n , 42 ; an d O . D . Skelton, 39-41 , 40n ; an d Join t Staff Missio n at Washington , 62-3 ; and Departmen t o f Nationa l De fence, 65 , 87 , 91-2 ; o n Canadian JAPAN, 64 , 134 , 138 , 142n , 165 , 169 , American relations , 74 ; an d mili 191; Minister to, 134 ; U.S. negotia tary affairs , 75-6 ; an d C . G . tions with, 139 Power, 78 ; an d Arm y durin g Jetté, Si r Louis , 17 0 Second Worl d War , 78-9 , 81 , 82 , Jinnah, M . A. , 3 6 83-4; visi t t o Unite d Kingdo m Johns Hopkin s University, 123 n (1941), 79 , 177 ; an d Permanen t Johnson, Harr y G. , 153 n Joint Boar d o n Defence , 89n ; an d Joint Chiefs of Staf f (U.S.) , 8 3 conscription, 91-5 ; an d Parliament , Joint Intelligenc e Committee, 99 , 14 9 105, 106 , 106n , 107 , 108-10 , 111 Joint Plannin g Committee, 9 9 12; an d Progressiv e party , 105 ; a t Joint Staf f Committee , 7 3 Imperial Conferenc e (1923) , 105 Joint Staf f Missio n a t Washington , 62 6; an d orders-in-council , 108 ; o n 4, 140 , 146 ; United Kingdom, 62 Manchurian crisi s (1933) , 109 ; o n Jordan, 14 2 Rhineland crisi s (1936) , 109 ; an d Justice, Departmen t of , 158n ; Minister , parliamentary part y caucus , 114 ; 12, 1 5 "Downing Stree t complex, " 133n , 136-7; an d Commonwealt h con sultation, 138 ; and Franklin Roose KARACHI, Pakistan , 64 n velt, 139 , 176 ; polic y toward s Kashmir dispute , 14 5 Vichy, 140n ; view s o n post-wa r Keefer, Francis , 2 1 China, 141 ; an d decision-making , Keenleyside, Hug h L. , 47 , 8 9 155; o n interdepartmenta l commit Kemal, Mustafa, 13 1 tees, 158 ; an d Internationa l Join t Kemp, A. E. , 7 Commission, 166 ; an d "Riddel l Kennan, George : o n diplomac y an d incident," 172-3 ; an d Harr y S . propaganda, 16 1 Truman, 176 ; and negotiation , 176 , Kenny, Ai r Commodor e W . R., 6 2 178-81; an d Ramsa y MacDonald , Kerr, Philip , 146n . Se e also Lothian , 180; missio n t o U.K . (1908) , 180 , Lord 180n; Atlanti c Charter , 181 ; an d King, W . L . Mackenzie , 8 , 15 , 22 , 29 , wartime propagand a t o U.S. , 185 78, 118 , 191 ; an d Hig h Commis 8; an d W.I.B. , 188-9 ; an d C.B.C.sioner fo r Canad a i n U.K. , 7 , 45 , I.S., 19 4 132-3, 133n , 167 ; an d Cabinet, . administrations: 1s t (1921-5) , 10 , 9-12; an d Chana k crisis , 10 , 105 , 42, 178-9 ; 4t h (1935-40) , 73- 4 131-2; an d W . S. Fielding, 10-11 ; King, Tom, 133-4 , 134n and Munic h crisis , 11 ; and Hitler , Kingsmere, 11 , 18 0 11, 136 ; an d Imperia l Wa r Cabi - Kiska, 82- 5 passim. Se e also Aleutia n net, 12 , 138-9 ; an d Cabine t secre campaign tariat, 13-14 , 13n ; conduc t o f Kleczkowski, A. , 168 , 168 n external affairs , 18-19 , 18n , 24 ; Korea, Republic of, 14 2 and Externa l Affair s portfolio , 23 , Korea, Unite d Nation s Temporar y 25; and J. L . Ralston, 23n , 79 , 92; Commission on , 2 6

INDEX

Korean War , 141 , 144 ; Frenc h Canad a and, 9 7 Kucherepa, J . W., 201 Kuibyshev, U.S.S.R., 14 1 LABOUR, MINISTE R OF , 77, 125 , 17 0 Labour party , Canadian , 106 n Labour part y (U.K.) , 105 LaGuardia, Fiorello , 8 9 Lamb, Si r Frederick , 56 n Lapointe, Ernest , 10 , 11 , 14n , 22 , 140n , 187; an d "Riddel l incident, " 17 2 Larkin, P . C. , 133 n Laski, Harold , 15 1 "lateral entry" : an d Departmen t o f External Affairs , 53- 4 Laurier, Si r Wilfrid , 7 , 10 , 20 , 37 , 39 , 66, 124 ; relation s wit h Cabinet , 5-6; an d Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, 20-1 ; "vorte x o f mili tarism," 70-1 ; Governmen t of , 73 , 169, 170 ; nava l policy , 127 ; Join t High Commission , 164 ; Newfoundland Shore , 168 , 168 n Laurier House , 2 6 Lausanne, Treat y of , 17 9 Law, Bonar , 127 , 12 8 League o f Nations , 10 , 67, 71 , 74 , 104 , 108, 109 , 132 ; Permanent Advisor y Officer at , 171 . Se e also Genev a Leahy, Admira l Willia m D. , 6 1 Lebanon, 55 , 142n , 14 3 legation, righ t of , 11 , 132 , 165 , 17 8 legations: Paris , 169 ; Tokyo , 169 ; Washington, 62 , 165 , 166 , 169 , 176, 186 , 187 , 188 . Se e also: missions, diplomatic ; representa tion abroa d Léger, Jules , 14 3 Lemieux, Rodolphe : missio n t o Japan , 125-6, 168-9 , 170 . lend-lease, 18 7 Lenin: State an d Revolution, 151 "liaison letters, " 74- 5 Liberal party , 15 ; in Quebec , 105 ; par liamentary caucus , 114 n liberalism, Western : an d planning, 151 2 Library o f Congress (U.S. ) : Legislativ e Reference Service , 11 7 Life, 18 7 Lincoln Laborator y (U.S.) , 14 6 Liverpool, Eng. , 18 4 Lloyd George , David , 105 , 129 , 131 , 177; an d Si r Rober t Borden , 71- 2

225

Loggie, Colone l G . P. , 6 1 London, Eng. , 69 , 138 , 143 London Schoo l o f Economics , 15 1 Longmore, Ai r Chie f Marsha l Si r A. , 138n Lothian, Lord , 139 . Se e also Kerr , Philip Low Countries , 15 4 "Ludendorff philosophy, " 7 6 Luxembourg, 142 , 142n . Se e also Lo w Countries Lyon, Peyto n V. : o n "Greenery, " 156 n Lytton Report , 10 9 MACBRIEN, MAJO R GENERA L J . H. , 37 , 158n McCarthy, Leighton , 17 6 MacDermott, T . W . L., 53 Macdonald, Angu s L., 8 8 Macdonald, Si r Claude , 125 , 17 0 Macdonald, Si r Joh n A. : an d Hig h Commission a t Washington (1870 1), 164 , 164n MacDonald, Ramsay , 18 0 Macdonnell, R . M. , 19 9 MacKay, R . A. , 12 1 Mackenzie, Ian , 14n , 74- 5 McNaught, K . W. : o n "Parliamen t wil l decide," 107 McNaughton, Genera l A . G . L. , 86 ; appointed Arm y Commander , 37 , 77; representativ e a t Securit y Council, 43 ; chairman , Canadian section, Internationa l Join t Com mission, 43 ; an d W . L . Mackenzi e King, 77 ; authorit y fo r us e o f troops, 77-82 ; an d J . L . Ralston , 79; relinquishe s Arm y command , 82; an d conscriptio n crisi s (1944) , 92-5; Ministe r o f Nationa l De fence, 92- 5 MacNaughton, Alan , 19 9 Madame Burger's , 35 , 35 n Mahoney, Merchant , 13 3 Malaya, 138 , 142 , 142 n Mallory, J . R. : o n Cabine t secretariat , 13n Managua, Nicaragua , 14 2 Manitoba, 10 7 manpower situation : i n Army , 90-5 . See also conscriptio n crisi s (1944 ) Mansergh, Nicholas : o n Britis h intel ligence, 13 7 Marine an d Naval Services , Departmen t of, 7 2

226

INDEX

Marler, Si r Herbert: Ministe r t o Japan , 42, 134- 5 Marshall, Genera l Georg e C. , 83 , 85 Marshall Plan , 10 0 Martin, Paul , 16 ; on Canadia n foreig n policy, 15 5 Marxism-Leninism, 152 . See also Soviet communism Massey, Vincent : a s Governor General , 31; Ministe r t o Washington , 42 , 134, 165 ; Hig h Commissione r fo r Canada i n U.K. , 44-5 , 135-6 ; o n propaganda, 182- 3 materiel, war : expor t of , 1 9 Meighen, Arthur , 38 , 39 ; an d relation s with Cabinet , 8 Messina, Strait s of , 8 1 Mewburn, Genera l S . C., 7 Mexico, 142 n Middle Eas t Centr e fo r Arabi c Studies , Foreign Office , 5 5 military establishment : attitude s to wards, 70-2 , 96-7 ; civila n contro l of, 71 , 97-102 ; increasin g respon sibilities, 96 ; influenc e o n policy , 97; trainin g o f senio r officers , 101-2 militia: reorganizatio n of, 11 , 72- 3 Militia an d Defence : Oversea s Minister , 7; Departmen t of , 72 ; Minister , 73 Mill, J . S. : O n Liberty, 15 1 Miller, Ai r Marsha l F . R. , 99 ministers, deputy : appointmen t of, 3 7 ministers, diplomatic : t o Unite d States , 11, 39n , 42, 61 , 62 , 163 , 186 , 188 ; to France , 42 , 135 ; t o Japan , 42 . See also: missions , diplomatic ; representation abroa d ministers, diplomati c (U.S. ) : t o Can ada, 6 4 Minto, G . J . Elliott , 4t h Ear l of : o n governor generalship , 28-9 , 29 n missions, diplomatic : openin g of , 19 20; head s of , 42-6 ; i n France , 20 , 42, 45 , 66 ; i n Germany , 43 ; i n Japan, 20 , 42 , 45 , 66 ; i n Mexico , 20; i n Spain , 43 ; i n U.S.S.R. , 20 ; in Unite d States , 41 , 42 , 45 , 61 , 66. See also: ministers , diplomatic ; representation abroa d Moffat, Ja y Pierrepont , 20 , 35n , 62 , 6 3 Montgomery, Genera l Bernard , 79 , 8 6 Montreal, Que. , 168 , 194 , 196 , 197 , 19 8 Moran, H . O. , 61 Morel, E . D. , 106 n

Morley, Lord , 15 5 Moscow, U.S.S.R. , 151 , 19 4 Moyer, L . C. , 158 n Mulvey, Thomas , 158 n Munich crisis , 11 , 40n Munitions an d Supply , Minister of, 1 3 Murchie, Lt.-Gen . J . C . : an d conscrip tion crisi s (1944) , 93- 4 Murphy, Charles , 2 1 Murray, Si r George , 1 2 Mussolini, 96 , 135 ; o n foreig n policy , 151 Mutual Ai d Progra m (U.S.) , 10 0 Mutual Securit y Administration (U.S.) , 60

NATIONAL DEFENCE , DEPARTMEN T OF , 4, 33 , 68 , 74 , 78 , 122 , 158n , 192 ; representation abroad , 61-2 , 64 ; and Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, 64 , 64n, 74-5, 97 ; organiz ation, 87-8 ; an d conscriptio n crisi s (1944), 91- 5 National Defence , Ministe r of , 12 , 14n , 15, 17 , 19 , 72 , 73 , 74-5 , 80 , 81 , 82, 85-6 , 87 , 88 , 95 , 96 , 98 , 120 , 135n, 146 ; Associate , 15 , 88 , 98 ; for Air , 87 , 88; for Nava l Services , 88, 91 ; Deputy , 9 9 National Defenc e Act : amende d (1950), 10 6 National Defenc e College , 15 ; curricu lum, 101- 2 National Defenc e Headquarter s (N.D.H.Q.): an d C.M.H.Q. , 89 91; an d conscriptio n crisi s (1944) , 92-5 National Fil m Board , 189 , 19 2 National Researc h Council , 7 7 National Reserv e Mobilizatio n Ac t (N.R.M.A.), 93 , 9 4 National Revenue , Ministe r of, 198- 9 National Socialism : attitude s towards , 135-6 National Wa r Services , Departmen t of , 189 naval policy , 113 , 12 7 Navy Departmen t (U.S.) : oppose d t o Joint Staf f Missio n a t Washington , 62-3 negotiation: an d diplomatists , 160-2 ; and technology , 162 , 170, 174 ; with U.S., 163-8 ; an d Britis h ambassa -

INDEX

dors, 168-70 ; discretionar y autho rity allowe d in , 173-5 ; style , 174 5; Soviet , 177 n Nelles, Commodor e P . W., 61 Netherlands, 64 , 139 , 142n ; broadcast ing to, 202 . See also Low Countrie s New Delhi , India , 143 , 144 , 144 n New Yor k City , U.S.A. , 14 3 New York Times: a s sourc e o f intelli gence, 14 6 New Zealand , 3 On, 142n; and Common wealth consultation , 138n Newfoundland Shore , 168 , 168 n Nicaragua, 142 , 142 n Nicolson, Harold , 16 1 Nigeria, 142n ; broadcasting to, 20 2 North America , defenc e of , 89 , 14 5 North America n Ai r Defenc e Com mand (NORAD) , 9 7 North Atlanti c Treat y Organizatio n (NATO), 19 , 28 , 68 , 97 ; ambas sador to , 41 , 142 ; Defence College , 55; Parliamentar y Association , 11 5 Norway, 142 , 142n ; broadcastin g to , 202 Nosse, Tatsgoro , 16 8 nuclear weapons , 96 , 9 7 OAKESHOTT, MICHAEL , 15 1 Odium, Brig.-Gen . Victor : Hig h Com missioner fo r Canad a i n Australia , 43-4; Ministe r t o China , 14 1 Office o f Internationa l Securit y Affair s (U.S.), 14 6 Office o f Wa r Informatio n (U.S.) , 191 , 194 Oliver, F . S. , 72 Ontario, 113 ; Attorne y Genera l for , 185-6 opposition parties , 96 , 104 , 114 , 123 ; feebleness of , 3 ; leade r of , 16 , 98 ; foreign polic y spokesmen , 27 , 117 , 120, 122 , 198 ; member s o f Parlia ment, 117-1 9 Oran: bombardmen t o f Frenc h flee t at , 138 order-in-council, 44 , 107 , 108 ; P.C . 1719 (Jul y 15 , 1916) , 2 1 Organization fo r Europea n Economi c Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) : repre sentation in , 14 2 Ottawa, 69 , 125 , 132 , 166 , 194 , 196 , 197, 198 ; U.S . servic e attache s at , 61-2; U.S . Ministe r at , 64 ; an d New Delh i "axis, " 144 n

227

Overlord, Operation , 9 0 Overseas Ministe r of Militia , 7 PACIFIC: securit y problem s of , 139 , 139n Pakistan, Hig h Commissione r fo r Canada in , 61 , 142 n Palmerston, Lord , 56 n Panama, 142 , 142 n Panama Cana l tolls , 134 n Panama City , Panama , 14 2 Panel o n Economi c Aspect s o f Defenc e Policy, 100 , 15 9 Paris, Canadia n Commissione r in , 6 6 Paris, France , 14 3 Parkin, Georg e R. , 28 , 29n Parliament, 76 , 93 , 95 ; dissolutio n of , 103; an d foreig n policy , 103-2 3 passim; Speec h fro m th e Throne , 111; Librar y of, 11 7 Parliament, member s of , 188 ; French speaking Liberals , 95 ; i n Secon d World War , 111-12 ; an d foreig n policy, 112-17 ; Britis h Columbia , 171 parliamentary assistants : t o Presiden t of th e Priv y Council , 21-2 , 189n ; to th e Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , 2 2 parliamentary committees, 118-23 . Se e also: Hous e o f Commons , commit tees Parliamentary Pres s Gallery , 118 , 19 3 parliamentary secretaries : t o th e Secre tary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , 22, 12 1 parliamentary unde r secretaries : t o th e Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 2 1 parties, political : Liberal , 15 , 105 , 114n; Conservative , 27 , 37 ; C.C.F., 44 , 114n ; Progressive , 107 , 178; an d researc h facilities , 11 7 Pauncefote, Si r Julian , 16 2 Peace Conference , Pari s (1919) , 7 , 129 Pearkes, Majo r Genera l G . R. : an d Aleutian campaign , 82-4 ; an d con scription crisi s (1944) , 93 ; Minis ter o f Nationa l Defence , 9 9 Pearl Harbor , Hawaii , 76 , 188 Pearson, Leste r B. , 15 , 16 , 20 , 23 , 25 , 26, 27 , 37n , 42 , 43 , 44 , 116n , 122 , 144n, 183 , 196 , 197 ; resign s a s Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 23-4 , 56 ; an d L . S . St .

228

INDEX

Laurent, 26-7 ; o n "striped-pants " state o f mind , 44; an d Departmen t of Externa l Affairs , 47 , 69 ; an d parliamentary discussion o f foreign affairs, 112 , 119-20 ; o n Specia l Committee o n Defenc e Expendi ture, 123 ; o n source s o f informa tion, 141-2 , 146n ; an d Sue z crisi s (1956), 173 ; o n negotiation , 177 8, 181 ; o n psychologica l warfare , 182 Peking, People's Republi c of China, 14 4 Pensions an d Nationa l Health , Ministe r of, 14 n Pentagon, 85 , 14 6 Perley, Si r George , 127 , 128 , 12 9 Permanent Advisor y Officer , Leagu e o f Nations, 17 1 Permanent Join t Boar d o n Defenc e (P.J.B.D.), 13 , 62 , 63 , 82 , 88-9 , 89n, 16 7 Permanent Under-Secretar y o f Stat e for Foreig n Affair s (U.K.) , 41 , 41n; Committe e of , 157 , 157 n Peru, 142 n Petain, Marsha l Henri , 96 , 14 0 Philippines, 142 n Picard, L.-P. , 12 1 Pickersgill, J. W., 35n , 37n planning: an d foreig n policy , 149 ; an d U.S.S.R., 151-2 ; an d Wester n liberalism, 151-2 ; an d Afro-Asia n nations, 152 ; an d U.S. , 152-3 ; an d U.K., 15 3 Poland, 142n ; broadcasting to, 19 5 Policy Plannin g Staff , U.S . Stat e De partment, 157 , 157 n Pope, Si r Joseph, 20 , 38 , 40, 46 , 47, 66 , 124, 125 , 126 , 162 , 165 , 170 ; memorandum o f 1907 , 46 , 126 ; Under Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Ex ternal Affairs , 65-6 ; creatio n o f Department o f Externa l Affairs , 126 Pope, Lt.-Gen . Maurice , 43 ; chairman , Canadian Join t Staf f Missio n a t Washington, 63-4 ; an d Aleutia n campaign, 82-5 ; representativ e o f War Committe e o f Cabine t a t Washington, 139-40 ; o n intelli gence i n Secon d Worl d War , 14 0 Portfolio, Ministe r without , 1 4 Portugal, 142 n Postmaster General , 78 , 87 , 17 0 Power, C . G. , 78 ; an d J . L . Ralston ,

88; Associat e Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence, 88 ; Ministe r o f Nationa l Defence fo r Air , 88 ; an d conscrip tion crisi s (1944) , 94 ; o n Parlia ment i n Secon d Worl d War , 111 12 President o f th e Priv y Council , 22, 189 , 189n; Parliamentar y Assistant , 21 2, 189 n press, 188 ; i n U.S.A. , 134n , 186 ; a s source o f intelligence , 146 , 146n ; Lester B . Pearson on , 146 n Press Gallery , Parliamentary , 118 , 19 3 pressure groups : an d foreig n policy , 200-1 Preston, W . T . R. , 18 3 Pretoria, Unio n o f Sout h Africa , 13 2 Prime Minister , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 33 , 66 , 121, 145 , 155 , 170 ; primacy of , 3-4; an d foreig n policy , 3-4 , 18 20; an d Cabinet , 4-20 ; an d Secre tary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs , 17, 24-8 ; an d Departmen t o f Ex ternal Affairs , 20-1 ; an d Gover nors General , 28-31 ; principa l private secretar y to , 33 ; a s nego tiator, 164 , 175- 6 Prime Ministers ' Meetings , Common wealth: a s source s o f intelligence , 145, 145n ; March 1961 , 145 n Prince Edwar d Island , 11 3 Printing Hous e Square , 136 . Se e als o Times, The Privy Council , 126 ; Presiden t of , 22 , 189, 189n ; Clerk of , 34 , 37 n Progressive party , 107 , 17 8 propaganda: an d diplomacy , 160-1 ; and "publicity, " 182-3 ; an d immi gration, 183 ; an d commercia l policy, 184 ; i n U.S.A. , 184-9 1 Public Information , Committe e o n (U.S.), 184 public opinion , 103-4 , 186-8 ; o n con duct o f Firs t Worl d War , 72 ; an d conscription, 92 ; an d post-194 5 defence policy , 95-8 ; an d "secre t diplomacy," 104 ; an d Chana k crisis, 105 ; indifferenc e t o foreig n affairs, 13 2 Public Works, Ministe r of 24 , 16 9 QUEBEC, provinc e of, 96 , 113 , 167 , 187 ; Lieutenant-Governor, 17 0 Quebec Conferenc e (1943) , 141 Queen's University , 3 9

INDEX RADAR EARL Y WARNIN G SYSTEMS , 9 7

Radio Moscow , 19 5 Radio Prague, 19 5 Rae, Saul , 35n , 53 Ralston, J . L. , 23n. , 78, 79 , 82 ; an d conscription crisis , 90- 2 Read, John , 6 8 reciprocity, 5 Red Cros s Society , Canadian , 6 1 Reid, Escott, 35n , 143, 144 Reid, J. D. , 7 representation abroad , diplomatic , 121 , 141, 142-4 ; Afghanistan , 142 ; Australia, 142n , 192; Austria, 142; Belgium, 142 , 142n; Berlin, 142n; Brazil, 142n ; Burma , 142 , 142n; Cambodia, 142 ; Ceylon , 142n ; Chile, 142n ; China, People' s Re public of , 143 ; China, Republi c of , 141, 142 ; Colombia, 142n ; Costa Rica, 142 , 142n ; Cuba , 142n ; Czechoslovakia, 142n ; Denmark , 142n; Dominica n Republic , 142n ; Ecuador, 142n ; Finland , 142n ; France, 142 , 142n, 143, 167, 169, 192; Germany , Federa l Republi c of, 142n ; Ghana , 142n ; Greece , 142n; Haiti , 142n ; Honduras, 142n; Hungary, 142 ; Iceland, 142 , 142n; India, 142n , 143, 144 ; Indonesia , 142n, 143 ; Iran, 142n ; Iraq, 142 ; Ireland, 142n ; Israel, 142n ; Italy, 135, 142n ; Japan, 134 , 142n, 169; Jordan, 142 ; Korea, Republi c of , 142; Lebanon , 142n , 143; Luxembourg, 142 , 142n ; Malaya , 142 , 142n; Mexico , 142n ; Netherlands, 142n; Ne w Zealand , 142n ; Nica ragua, 142 , 142n ; Nigeria, 142n ; North Atlanti c Treat y Organiza tion, 142 ; Norway , 142 , 142n ; Organization fo r Europea n Eco nomic Co-operation , 142 ; Pakistan, 142n; Panama , 142 , 142n ; Peru , 142n; Philippines , 142n ; Poland , 142n; Portugal , 142n ; Spain , 142n; Sweden, 142n ; Turkey , 142n ; Union o f Sout h Africa , 142n ; Union o f Sovie t Socialis t Repub lics, 141 , 142n ; United Ara b Re public, 142n ; Unite d Kingdom , 142n, 143 , 144, 146, 163, 165, 169, 192; Unite d State s o f America , 120, 133-4 , 142n , 143 , 144 , 146 , 163, 165 , 169, 192; Uruguay, 142n;

229

Venezuela, 142n ; Vichy, 140 , 140n; Vietnam, 142 ; Wes t Indies , The , 142n; Yugoslavia , 142n . See also: ambassadors; Hig h Commissioner s for Canada ; ministers , diplomatic ; missions, diplomati c Resolution IX , 13 0 Riddell, W . A. , 22 , 171- 3 passim; "Riddell incident, " 22 , 171- 3 Riegelman, Harold , 174 n Robertson, Norman , 20 , 41 , 42n , 67 , 143, 17 4 Rogers, Norman , 77 , 87 , 8 8 Rome, Italy , 19 7 Roosevelt, Franklin , 84 , 107 , 141, 155, 166, 176 , 181, 185, 187; and W . L . Mackenzie King , 139 , 176 Roosevelt, Theodore , 18 0 Root, Elihu , 164 , 165 Rostow, W . W. , 15 3 Roumania, 11 3 Rowell, N . W. , 6 , 7n , 71 ; o n Depart ment o f Externa l Affairs , 4 6 Roy, Philippe : Commissione r i n Paris , 42; Ministe r t o France , 42 , 167 ; on Hitler , 135 ; Commissione r General o f Canad a i n France , 16 7 Royal Canadia n Ai r Force, 62, 63, 64n, 72, 92 , 99n Royal Canadia n Mounte d Police , 14 6 Royal Canadia n Navy, 62, 63 , 72, 9 2 Royal Commissio n o n Espionage , 14 7 Royal Navy , 7 3 Royal New Zealand Air Force, 138n Russell, Lor d William , 56 n Russia, 154 , 165, 184. See also U.S.S.R. SACKVILLE, N.B., 194, 202 Sackville-West, Si r Lionel , 16 3 St. John , N.B. , 172 St. Laurent , L . S. , 15 , 27 , 120 , 144n; Secretary o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affairs, 23 , 23n , 25; Governmen t of, 23-4 ; an d W . L . Mackenzi e King, 25-6; and Leste r B . Pearson , 26-7; an d conscription , 97 ; an d Harry S . Truman, 176 ; and Dwigh t D. Eisenhower , 176- 7 St. Lawrenc e Waterway , 107 , 113, 158 Salisbury, Lord , 10 0 sanctions, 109 ; oil, 171-3 passim Satow, Ernest : Guide t o Diplomatic Practice, 16 0 Saturday Night, 109-1 0

230

INDEX

Scotland, 18 3 Sea Island , Georgia , 17 2 Second Worl d War . Se e Worl d Wa r I I Senate, 104 ; Libera l majorit y in , 113 ; and foreig n policy , 113-17 ; an d parliamentary part y caucus , 11 5 Senate (U.S.) , 114 , 118 , 134n ; Foreig n Relations Committee , 20 0 Sevigny, Pierre , 98- 9 Shimizu, S. , 16 8 Ship Subsid y Bill (U.S.) , 134 n Siberia: Arm y in , 7 , 130 ; Economi c Mission to ; 141 , 184 Sicily, Arm y in , 81- 2 Sieyes, Abbe , 2 4 Sifton, A . L. , 7 Sifton, Si r Clifford , 5 ; o n immigration , 183 Simonds, Lt.-Gen . Guy : o n Chief s o f Staff Committee , 36 , 99 ; o n P.J.B.D., 99-100 ; firs t comman dant, Nationa l Defenc e College , 102; on civil-militar y relations, 102 Sino-Soviet bloc , 1 9 Skelton, O . D. , 9 , 18n , 66 , 158n ; an d W. L . Mackenzi e King , 18n , 39 41; influenc e o n policy , 40 , 40n ; and R . B . Bennett , 41; o n Depart ment o f Externa l Affairs , 46 ; "young men, " 47 ; an d generalis t ideal, 53 ; an d "Riddel l incident, " 172 Smith, Arthur, 17 4 Smith, Sidney : Secretar y o f Stat e fo r External Affairs , 24 , 27-8 ; an d John Diefenbaker , 27- 8 Solandt, Omond , 123n South Africa , Unio n of . Se e Unio n o f South Afric a South America , 19 4 Spain, 142n , 16 2 specialists, 56 ; and "generalists, " 53- 4 Spicer, Keith : o n administratio n o f foreign ai d programmes, 59n , 60 n Stalin, 95 , 137 , 20 0 Standing Committe e o n Externa l Affairs, Hous e o f Commons . Se e House o f Commons , committee s Standley, Admira l Willia m H. , 16 2 Starr, Michael , 19 9 State, Secretar y of , 20 ; Department , 158n State, Secretar y o f (U.S.) , 60 , 166 , 18 6 State Department (U.S.) , 54, 82, 85, 89, 125, 141 , 157n , 175n ; Cultura l

Relations Division , 193 ; propa ganda, 200 Stephen, Si r James , 3 3 Stimson, Henry , 84 , 8 5 Strang, Lord , 157 n Strathcona, Lord , 18 3 Stuart, Lt.-Gen . Kenneth , 83 , 84 , 90- 1 Suez Canal , 15 4 Suez crisi s (1956) , 26 , 27 , 28 , 17 3 Sweden, 64 , 142n ; broadcasting to , 20 2 Switzerland, 142 n TARIFF, 105 ; legislatio n (U.S.) , 134 n Tarte, Israel , 16 9 technical assistance : Unite d Nations , 5 8 technology: Soviet , 152 ; an d negotia tion, 162 , 170 , 17 4 Tegucigalpa, Honduras , 14 2 Thornton, Si r Edward , 16 3 Timberwolf, Operation , 8 2 Times, The, 132 , 169 . See also Printin g House Squar e Tocqueville, Alexis de, 15 3 Tokyo, Japan , 12 5 Toronto, Ont., 9 7 Trade an d Commerce , Departmen t of , 4, 15 , 19 , 22 , 33 , 34 , 38 , 192 ; International Economi c an d Tech nical Co-operatio n Division , 19 , 59, 59n ; an d Departmen t o f Ex ternal Affairs , 57-61 ; an d foreig n aid, 58-61 ; Trad e Commissione r Service, 59n ; an d intelligence , 130 ; representation abroad , 14 2 Trade an d Commerce , Ministe r of , 15 , 17, 19 , 57 ; Deputy , 14 1 trade commissioners , 57- 8 Transport, Departmen t of , 3 3 Transportation Ac t (U.S.) , 134 n Treasury Board , 15-17 , 19 , 59 Treaties: Behrin g Se a Seal , 5 Trondheim, Norway , 7 8 Truman, Harr y S. , 26 , 17 6 Turkey, 64 , 18n , 142 n Tweedsmuir, Lord : an d W. L. Macken zie King , 3 0 "twilight war, " 7 7 UKRAINE, SOVIET , 113 ; broadcastin g to , 195-201 Ukrainian-Canadians: an d foreig n policy, 200- 1 unconditional surrender , 13 8 "under Cabinet, " 33- 8 passim

INDEX Union fo r Democrati c Control , 105 , 106n Union Government , 6 , 8 , 1 2 Union o f Sout h Africa , 142n ; with draws applicatio n t o remai n i n Commonwealth a s republic , 145 n Union o f Sovie t Socialis t Republic s (U.S.S.R.), 53 , 64 ; Sino-Sovie t bloc, 19 ; invasio n o f b y German y predicted, 137 ; representatio n in , 141, 142n ; an d planning , 151-2 ; diplomacy of , 152 ; propagand a of , 194; broadcastin g to , 19 5 United Ara b Republic , 142 n United Kingdom , 54 , 73 , 76 , 139 , 154 , 175, 183 , 186 , 195 ; foreig n service , 43, 66 ; Canadia n representatio n in, 142n , 143 , 144 , 146 , 163 , 165, 169, 192 ; a s sourc e o f intelligence , 145; plannin g and nationa l "style, " 153 United Nations , 26 , 18 8 Charter, 9 5 Emergency Force , 6 9 General Assembly : delegatio n to , 26 , 115, 173-4 , 174n ; U.S . delegatio n to, 174 n Permanent Missio n o f Canad a to , 142-3 Security Council , 43 ; Canadia n representative, 17 3 United State s o f America , 64 , 138 , 158 , 195; foreig n servic e of , 43 ; civil military relation s in , 76 ; influenc e in Canada , 97 ; representatio n in , 120, 133-4 , 142n , 143 , 144 , 146 , 163, 165 , 169 , 192 ; governmen t agencies, 141 ; a s sourc e o f intelli gence, 145-7 , 149 ; embass y a t Ottawa, 146 ; planning and nationa l "style," 152-3 ; machiner y fo r ne gotiating with , 163-8 ; negotiation s with, 175-6 ; inadequatel y in formed abou t Canada , 183 , 187- 8 University o f London : Schoo l o f Oriental an d Africa n Studies , 5 5 University o f Montreal , 4 6 University o f Toronto , 27 , 13 6 Uruguay, 142 n VANCOUVER, B.C. , 97 , 16 8 Vanier, Majo r Genera l Georges : a s Governor General , 3 1 Vansittart, Lord , 16 0 Venezuela, 142 n

231

Verwoerd, Hendrik , 145 n Vichy, 140 , 140 n Vietnam, Internationa l Truc e Super visory Commissio n for , 14 2 Vining, Charles , 18 9 Vladivostok, 18 4 Voice o f America , 195 , 20 0 WALKER, SI R EDMUND : o n wartim e propaganda t o U.S. , 18 5 Walker, W . H. , 38 , 46 , 65 , 67 , 158 n War Cabine t (U.K.) , 129 , 13 2 War Committee , Cabinet . Se e Cabinet , committees War Committee , Unio n Government , 12 War Counci l (U.K.) , 12 8 War Departmen t (U.S.) : oppose s Canadian Join t Staf f Missio n a t Washington, 62- 3 War Offic e (U.K.) , 7 7 War, Secretar y o f (U.S.) , 62 , 8 4 War, Secretar y of Stat e for (U.K.) , 128 Wartime Informatio n Boar d (W.I.B.) , 22, 194 ; origins , 188-9 ; criticism s of, 190-1 ; post-wa r role , 191- 2 Washington, D.C. , 69 , 125 , 132 , 139 , 143, 145 , 17 5 Washington Disarmamen t Conferenc e (1921-2), 3 8 "weasel-adjectives," 15 3 Welles, Sumner , 139 n Wellesley, Si r Victor , 16 0 West Indies , the , 142 n Wheare, K . C . : o n committees , 36 ; on civil servant s an d politics , 3 6 White, Si r Thomas , 7 White House , 17 6 Wilgress, Dana : Ministe r t o U.S.S.R. , 140-1; Economi c Missio n t o Sibe ria, 14 1 Willingdon, Lord : an d W . L . Macken zie King , 3 0 Wilson, Si r Henry , 7 2 Winant, Joh n G. , 16 2 Winnipeg Tribune, 11 0 Woodsworth, J . S. , 106n , 108 , 10 9 World Wa r I , 14 , 66, 77 , 93 ; an d mili tary establishment , 71-2 ; an d intelligence, 127-8 ; "secre t diplo macy," 17 8 World Wa r II , 14 , 22 , 33 , 34 , 55 , 6 4 75-96 passim, 99 , 100 , 136 , 155 , 169, 176 ; an d Cabinet , 11-12 ;

232 INDE

X

and militar y establishment , 75-6 ; Wrong , Hume , 47 , 67 , 14 8 prestige o f Parliamen t during , 108 , 111-12; an d intelligence , 149 ; an d YOR K CENTRE , membe r for , 11 6 interdepartmental committees , Yor k West , membe r for , 12 0 158-9 Yugoslavia , 64, 138 , 142n ; broadcasting Wriston Repor t (U.S.) , 5 0 t o B.B.C.) , 200

CANADIAN UNIVERSIT Y PAPERBOOK S Other titles in the serie s 9 Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System C. B. Macpherson 14 Th e Life an d Times of Confederation P. B. Waite 17 A Prophet in Politics Kenneth McNaugh t 18 Democratic Government i n Canada Robert MacGrego r Dawso n 23 Towards a World o f Plenty? Barbara War d 38 Th e Union Nationale Herbert F . Quinn 41 Th e Future of Canadian Federalism Paul-André Crépeau an d C . B. Macpherso n 54 Th e Progressive Party i n Canada W. L. Morton 58 Th e Protective Tariff i n Canada's Development J. H. Dales 67 In Defence o f Canada, Volume I : From th e Great Wa r t o the Depression James Eayr s 74 I n Defence o f Canada, Volume II : Appeasement an d Rearmament James Eayrs 78 Th e Social Credit Movement i n Alberta John A. Irving 83 Pollution, Property, an d Prices J. H. Dales 84 Agenda 1970: Proposals fo r a Creative Politics edited by Trevor Lloy d an d Jack McLeo d 95 Th e Politics of Survival: Th e Conservative Party o f Canada, 1939-45 J. L. Granatstei n 97 Close the 49th parallel etc: The Americanization o f Canada edited b y Ian Lumsde n