Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy 9781442656833

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Canada and the Birth of Israel A STUDY IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY DAVID J. BERCUSON

Canadian Zionists of the 1930s were anxious to involve their government in the Palestine question. The pressure they brought to bear was fuelled by a new urgency when British policy in Palestine denied entry to Jewish refugees from the Nazi terror. Today there is a widely held impression that the Canadian government responded quickly and sympathetically to that pressure. Jews and Arabs alike, each for their own purposes, have created the image of a Canada friendly to Zionism, and of Canadian policy directed by such pro-Zionists as Lester Pearson. But as David Bercuson demonstrates, the truth is far more complex. In fact, Zionist efforts to involve Canada in the Palestine question met with considerable resistance from Ottawa, even when Canada was elected to membership on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. The partition of Palestine was eventually supported by Canada, but grudgingly. Ottawa viewed partition as the 'least lousy' solution to a problem that was acutely sensitive both diplomatically and politically. Hardly the champion of Zionism that it has generally been considered, Canada is revealed in Bercuson's study as having established a middle east policy, not on moral or ideological grounds, but on the basis of the politicians' view of its own national interests. DAVID j. BERCUSON

is a professor of history at the University of Calgary. He is the author of a number of books on Canadian history, including The Secret Army and Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial Relations and the General Strike.

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D A V I D J. B E R C U S O N

Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

© University of Toronto Press 1985 Toronto Buffalo London Printed in Canada ISBN 0-8020-2568-4

FOR BOB BOTHWELL AND JACK GRANATSTEIN MY COLLEAGUES AND MY FRIENDS

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Bercuson, David Jay, 1945Canada and the birth of Israel Bibliography: p. Includes index. ISBN 0-8020-2568-4 1. Canada - Foreign relations - Palestine. 2. Palestine - Foreign relations - Canada. 3. Canada - Foreign relations - 19454. Palestine - History - 1917-1948. 5. Israel History - 1948-1949. I. Title. FC251.I7B47 1985 327.7105694 C85-098690-7 F1029.5.I7B47 1985

This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Federal of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Publication has also been assisted by the Ontario Arts Council under its block grant program.

Contents

PREFACE vii

Introduction: The Palestine question 3 1 'A modest beginning' 13 2 'Abominable outrages' 34 3 'A duty which could not be evaded' 54 4 'The best possible person' 74 5 'With heavy hearts' 106 6 'A temporary trusteeship' 134 7 'Zero hour in Palestine' 160 8 'Numerous uncertainties' 180

vi Contents 9 'Half a loaf 199 10 'A gesture of confidence' 223 N O T E S 241 B I B L I O G R A P H Y 271 I N D E X 279

Preface

This book is the second to emerge from a project I embarked on in the fall of 1978. After deciding to leave the field of Canadian labour and social history I turned my attention to the connection between Canada and the founding of the State of Israel in 1948. I intended to write a book about the contributions of Canadians to that event and to concentrate on those who volunteered for service in the Israeli forces and those who helped the Israelis arm themselves in their struggle for survival. I thought I should devote at least one chapter to Canadian government policy on the Palestine question as the context within which the action took place. After about a year of work I realized that Canadians who fought with the Israeli forces had been largely mixed with volunteers from many other countries and could not be studied in isolation. So I broadened the scope of my work to include volunteers from the United States, South Africa, Britain, and as many other countries as time and resources would allow. That study became The Secret Army, published in late 1983. At the same time, my one chapter on Canadian government policy had become thousands of pages of notes, photocopies, and interview transcripts. This was obviously enough for a book. There has been a great deal written about the Middle East conflict and a great deal of nonsense, probably inevitably given the intractable nature of a deadly struggle that has been with us for at least two generations and which will likely be with us for several more generations. In Canada the nonsense far outweighs the serious work because although journalists and propagandists have written and continue to write about Canadian Middle East policy and relations, scholars have paid little attention to the subject. This failure is a reflection of the

viii Preface weakness of Canadian diplomatic history over the last two decades or so. We have some very good diplomatic historians, but we do not have enough of them; most of the baby boomers who became historians went into new areas such as labour and social history, and much of the political history of modern Canada has been neglected. When I began this project a Carleton University political science PHD thesis on the subject had been published by Zacharia Kay (Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment) and Anne Trowell Hillmer, at the Department of External Affairs, was working on her MA thesis, 'Canadian Policy on the Partition of Palestine, 1947.' A few other things have appeared here and there, but, up to now, there has been no fulllength study by a historian of Canadian policy toward the birth of Israel. Canadian supporters of the Arab and Israeli causes have been simplistic, to say the least, in their interpretation of Canadian Middle East policy. They aim, ironically, at the same thing: convincing Canadians that Canadian leaders were friendly towards the Zionist movement, helped the Zionists create the State of Israel, and supported Israel against its Arab enemies. This is a self-serving enterprise in the battle for Canadian public opinion. Thus T.Y. Ismael, one of Canada's leading experts on the Middle East, could write: 'The Second World War, and Western civilization's guilt over an age-old anti-Semitism which had culminated in genocide, the consequent sympathetic view of Zionism, ethocentrism and a European view of Asian and African peoples - these led Canada to a position compatible with the basic premises of the Israeli argument.'1 The national co-chairmen of the Canada-Israel Committee wrote, in the preface to the committee's official history: 'The Jews who laboured to build the State of Israel did not do so without moral and material assistance of friends the world over. This support was forthcoming from large and small states, and in their front rank stood Canada.' They claimed that 'all prime ministers since 1948' had been 'staunch supporters' of Israel.2 There is almost nothing true about these observations. But, after all, they were not made with due regard for historical fact; they were made as part of a battle for Canadian public opinion. Arab partisans aim to convince Canadians that Canada's policy has been one-sided and wrong-headed in its support for Israel; Israeli partisans aim to convince Canadians that Canada has always been, and should remain, a staunch friend of Israel. I have tried to set the record straight with this study. It shows that reality, like life itself, is far more complex, and it

ix Preface aims to explore the way Canadian policy was made, and the factors that shaped it, during this most crucial decade in the history of the Middle East. Canadian policy on the Palestine question was not made in a vacuum; most of the major factors which shaped Canadian foreign policy in the post-war years influenced it. For most of the period under examination in this book, Canada was far more concerned about the impact of the Palestine question on British-American relations than it was about the fate of Jews or Arabs. In fact, Canadian policy-makers usually followed or supported British policies on the Palestine question during the decade 1940-50 or, more rarely, those of the United States. This was, of course, a made-in-Canada decision, made in what was clearly perceived to be the national interest, but it was not arrived at after a Canadian analysis of the Palestine conflict and was not based on Canadian views of how that conflict should have been resolved. Rather, Canada supported what the British or the Americans supported whether or not Canadian policy-makers thought they were right or wrong. Some of the higher-ranked members of the Department of External Affairs were distressed by this but there was little they could do. Prime Ministers William Lyon Mackenzie King and Louis S. St Laurent were understandably more interested in British-American harmony, and what Canada could do about it, than they were in solving the Palestine question or supporting the birth of a Jewish state. The conclusion is inescapable that although Canada was politically and constitutionally independent by the late 1940s, and had made great strides towards enhancing its international reputation, there were definite and practical limits to Canada's freedom of action even after 1945. Those limits were defined by traditional Canadian interests and alliances and by the new reality of the Cold War. I have received much help in this work. My principal research assistant was Susan Kooyman, a bright, energetic, and imaginative worker who combed newspapers, magazines, and House of Commons debates in search of important material. Monique Gwynn in Ottawa, and the late Lt Commander Charles McDermott Stuart in London, provided valuable long-distance help. Anne Trowell Hillmer, at the Department of External Affairs, helped me locate files and fill gaps in my research and guided me through the corridors of Canadian diplomatic records which were then very new to me. At the Public Archives of Canada, Lawrence Tapper and David Smith were also helpful in setting me

x Preface on the right path. The excellent and knowledgeable staff of the Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives in Washington served me well. I was less well served at the Public Records Office in Kew. (I was there in the Big Crush - the Thatcher Government cut-back of 1979 which made the PRO a madhouse that summer. Things are somewhat better there now.) Dr Michael Heymann and the staff of the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem helped me greatly as did the staff at the Israel State Archives. I am also grateful to Mrs Ayala-Zacks Abramov for permission to use the Samuel J. Zacks papers at the Public Archives of Canada and to the Zionist Organization of Canada for the privilege of allowing me to consult their papers at the PAC. Several participants in the events of the 1940s gave generously of their time. Elizabeth P. MacCallum, a great lady by any measure, sat for two long interviews. Paul Martin made time during his busy schedule at Canada House, when he served as the Canadian high commissioner in London, to talk to me about cabinet views on Canadian foreign policy in general and Palestine in particular. J.W. Pickersgill was no less generous and helped me to understand the relationship between Jewish Liberals and the Liberal party of Canada. Senator Lazarus Phillips and Judge Harry Batshaw were both very helpful to me, and Judge Batshaw was particularly useful in explaining the workings of the United Zionist Council's National Public Relations Committee and the Canadian Palestine Committee. The late Moe Appel, who headed the Zionist Information Office in Ottawa in the late 1940s, was more than candid (not unusual for him) in sharing his views and memories. Marvin and Lionel Gelber and George Ignatieff were very helpful and I am also grateful to John W. Holmes. Abba Eban made time in his busy schedule to meet me at the Knesset and to explain why Canada was so important to the Jewish Agency in the late 1940s, and Michael Comay, Israel's first ambassador to Canada, helped me with extensive answers to a mailed questionnaire I sent him. I can only say 'thank you' to everyone and hope that I have not left anyone out. Many colleagues and friends helped with this book but two deserve special mention. Bob Bothwell and Jack Granatstein, two of this country's best historians, became my friends while working with me on the Canadian Historical Review. From the very start of my move into this new field they strongly supported me and guided me. They read and commented on the first draft of this book, and we held many long discussions about the nature of Canadian foreign policy and the personalities of the people who shaped it in those times. I will always be grateful to both and that is why I have dedicated this book to them.

xi Preface One other person deserves special mention. Joyce Woods of the History Department, University of Calgary, worked her fingers to the bone preparing this manuscript, revising it, and getting it ready on time. I do not take that kind of dedication for granted. Thank you, Joyce. My research on this project has been generously supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, by the University of Calgary, and by the Ontario Arts Council and I am grateful. It is usual to add a disclaimer to books such as this, saying that I am solely responsible for its contents even though many people helped me. It happens to be true. DAVID J. BERCUSON

Calgary 1984

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CANADA AND THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL

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Introduction: The Palestine question

London: February 1947. It was a dreary winter in Britain. Less than two years after the end of World War Two, the British economy was still suffering from the ravages of war and the people of Great Britain still had a hard time finding enough food and fuel to feed themselves and to keep warm. There was still no end in sight to rationing, no end to queing up to buy the necessities of life. Things had seemed to get worse over the winter of 1946/7: unemployment increased as major companies closed down for long periods, the British treasury was close to bankruptcy, and the wheat supply dwindled. Then, even the elements seemed to conspire against the British. On 2 February the sun was seen for the last time in four weeks, and four days later a blizzard isolated northern England from the other parts of the country. Food and milk supplies grew short, coal stocks were declared to be 'critically' low, and severe electric power cuts were imposed over the whole of southern England. It was, perhaps, an apt setting for the drama being played out in the Foreign Office: the beginning of the last act of Britain's involvement in Palestine. For several months, since the fall of 1946, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had been trying to cajole Arabs and Jews into a compromise settlement of the Palestine question. The attempt was doomed to failure. The Jews demanded open immigration into Palestine for the refugees from the Nazi Holocaust who were filling up the displaced persons camps in central and western Europe; the Arabs demanded that no more Jews be allowed into Palestine. The Jews demanded that Britain fulfil its promises to create a 'Jewish National Home' in Palestine; the Arabs demanded that Palestine be given immediate independence as an Arab country with an Arab majority.

4 Canada and the Birth of Israel Bevin's London Conference had broken up in late September 1946 in disarray and now, in February 1947, he made one last try. In a cold room at the Foreign Office, with the lights flickering because of power shortages, Bevin put his proposal before the representatives: a British trusteeship over Palestine for four years; independence after that if Arabs and Jews could agree on its terms; the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine over the next two years after which the country's 'economic absortive capacity' would guide the British high commissioner in deciding how many Jews to admit. If this was not acceptable, Bevin warned, Britain would send the Palestine issue to the United Nations. As the power went out once again, Bevin joked that there was no need for candles because the 'Israelites' were in the room. He laughed heartily at his own joke while the Jewish representatives sat in stony silence. Bevin's proposal was no more acceptable to them than it was to the Arabs; three days later Arabs and Jews rejected Bevin's plan. It was the end of Britain's efforts to find a solution to the Palestine question.l

Britain had administered Palestine since conquering it from the Turks during World War One, and the administration had been plagued from the beginning by rival Arab and Jewish claims to Palestine and by Britain's own conflicting promises to Arabs and Jews concerning the future of the area. In an attempt to gain Arab support for the war against Turkey - an ally of Germany and Austria - Britain had made promises to the Arabs in the fall of 1915 which aimed to fulfil Arab demands for independence. The pledges were made in a series of letters between Sharif Husain of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner in Egypt.2McMahon, acting for the British government, tried to persuade Husain to lead his Arab followers in a revolt against the Turks. Husain was willing as long as Britain guaranteed independence to the Arabs after the Turks had been defeated. He had been influenced by Arab nationalists and was ready to risk all in a revolt, if that revolt would achieve Arab independence. He sought British guarantees and they were given. In a letter to Husain, dated 24 October 1915, McMahon promised that 'Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the sharif of Mecca.' McMahon reserved certain areas from his pledge: 'The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and por-

5 Introduction tions of Syria lying to the west of the Districts of Damascus, Horns, Kama and Aleppo' were not 'purely Arab' and were therefore 'excepted from the proposed delineation.'3 Did McMahon thereby specifically exclude Palestine from the area promised to Husain? It is unlikely because he was undoubtedly referring to Lebanon and those other areas lying to the west of Syria that were inhabited by large numbers of Christians. In 1916 this territory was allotted to the French in a secret agreement between Britain and France (the Sykes-Picot Agreement) that virtually divided up the Turkish empire into colonial possessions to be directly controlled by the two powers, or at least to be under their influence, after the war. This was a violation of the McMahon promises, but it was not the only one. In November 1917, in an effort to win favour among Zionists in Britain, the United States, and perhaps even Germany, the British cabinet issued the Balfour Declaration. This was part of a letter written by British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild in which Balfour declared that British policy aimed at 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.' This support was given with the qualification that nothing would be done to 'prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing nonJewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.' 4 The declaration was timely because British forces, led by General Allenby, were at that very moment beginning their conquest of Palestine from the Turks. In fact, the declaration prompted the raising of a Jewish legion, recruited from Jews in Palestine and western countries, to fight under Allenby's command in the liberation of Palestine. II

Britain took Palestine from the Ottoman empire by conquest. Possession was confirmed by the League of Nations in April 1920 when the league conferred a class A mandate for Palestine on Britain. This made Britain legally responsible to develop Palestine economically, socially, and politically to the point where sovereignty could be handed over to its people and the country could gain its independence. There were several such mandates created in the Middle East - Britain was also given a class A mandate for Iraq while France was given class A mandates for Lebanon and Syria - but that for Palestine was different because Britain was instructed by the league to administer Palestine in accordance with the pledges laid out in the Balfour Declaration. In trying to administer Palestine, Britain was caught between the

6 Canada and the Birth of Israel rising ambitions and expectations of the Zionists, who claimed Palestine as theirs by historical right and Half our's pledge, and the Arabs of Palestine and Syria, who claimed Palestine by right of possession and McMahon's promise: two rival peoples, two rival nationalisms. Chaim Weizmann, leader of the World Zionist Organization, and Emir Faisal, Husain's son, tried to work out a compromise in 1919 but the effort was stillborn5 because each demanded concessions the other was unwilling to give. In fact most Arab leaders saw the Zionists only as an ally of British and French imperialism. The Syrian General Congress, meeting in Damascus in July 1919, proclaimed: 'We reject the claims of the Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that part of southern Syria which is known as Palestine and we are opposed to Jewish immigration into any part of the country. We do not acknowledge that they have a title, and we regard their claims as a grave menace to our national, political and economic life.' 6 The British mandatory authorities had an impossible task before them: to reconcile two apparently opposed national movements and to govern, in one territory, two disparate communities bitterly distrustful of each other. In March 1920 the rivalry between Arabs and Jews exploded into violence when Moslems parading through the old city of Jerusalem rioted, destroying Jewish life and property. Henceforth, with each passing year, the two communities grew further apart and there was little or no indication that they shared any common views on the future of Palestine or a common allegiance to a future united country. Although a small group of Jews - Martin Buber and Judah Magnes were among them - held to the vision of a binational state with Arabs and Jews sharing sovereignty in Palestine,7 they had no counterparts among the Arabs and their views were not representative of the majority of Palestine Jews. There was, therefore, almost from the start, no apparent basis for political compromise within Palestine itself. Bloody clashes, periodically erupting between Arabs and Jews, led to several British commissions of inquiry and to second thoughts about Britain's responsibility to the Jews, especially when matched against Britain's obvious commercial and political interests in the rest of the area. In 1936 a full-scale revolt of the Arabs of Palestine broke out led by the mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, which aimed to drive the British and Jews from Palestine and establish an independent Arab state. Fauzi al-Kaukji, an Iraqi officer previously trained by the Turks, was appointed supreme commander of the Arab forces by al-Husseini,

7 Introduction and succeeded, at first, in cutting much of Palestine's road network, isolating Jewish agricultural settlements and restricting British forces to the cities. Britain rushed close to thirty thousand well-equipped troops to Palestine and by early 1937 re-established control and reimposed order. The outbreak of fighting prompted the British to send yet another commission to Palestine, this time headed by Lord Peel, which issued its report in July 1937 recommending that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and an area of permanent British mandate. The British were to retain control of Jerusalem and the surrounding area and of a strip of land to connect Jerusalem to the seaport of Jaffa. The Jews would receive all of Galilee and a strip of territory on the coast to a point south of Tel Aviv, interrupted only by the British area. The Arabs were to receive all the rest. Peel had found that there was no common ground whatever between Arabs and Jews in Palestine and no chance that they could ever share national goals within the confines of a single state. Dividing the country was the only answer.8 Reaction among Arabs and Jews was mostly negative. The Zionists split over the recommendations with the majority, led by Weizmann, indicating their willingness to use the Peel proposals as a basis for further discussion with Britain and a minority - the right-wing Revisionists led by Vladimir Jabotinsky - rejecting the Peel report out of hand. The Arabs too rejected Peel and refused to discuss the proposals. Although Britain went on to establish a commission to draw up a partition plan based on the Peel commission recommendations, the plan was, in reality, dead. In late 1937 the Arab revolt resumed. This time the British reaction was sharp and swift. British troops moved into the countryside and used harsh retaliatory methods to root out the rebels. Gradually the British took control of the road and communication network and suppressed the rebellion. Orders were issued for the arrest of Haj Amin al-Husseini, who fled Palestine, eventually to find his way to Nazi Germany where he continued, during the war, to exhort his followers to revolt against the British and the Jews. Though Britain had the ability to win military victory, it still had no political solutions to the Palestine question, and by 1938 other considerations began to weigh heavily on the British. Adolf Hitler had come to power in 1933, Germany had rearmed, and Nazi ambitions reached out across Europe towards the Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudentenland of Czechoslovakia. It was more apparent with each passing day that Britain had to look to its own defences and could not af-

8 Canada and the Birth of Israel ford to pour large numbers of troops into Palestine. Further, if conflict should erupt between Britain and Germany, British interests in the Middle East, particularly the oil fields of Iraq and the Suez Canal Zone, had to be protected, a job that would be much easier with Arab support. These hard facts led to the issuance of the 1939 White Paper which limited Jewish immigration into Palestine to 75,000 over five years after which no more Jews would be allowed in without Arab consent.9 Land sales to Jews were to be severely cut back as well. Zionists charged that the British had abandoned their responsibilities to the Jews under the mandate, but the British claimed that they had, in fact, already created a Jewish national home in Palestine as promised in the Balfour Declaration - there were, at that time, some 300,000 Jews in Palestine. The Jewish community in Palestine (yishuv) was outraged by what it viewed as a callous surrender to the mufti and feared that the new policy meant yishuv growth would soon end and the Jews would be a permanent minority in Palestine. Worse, the White Paper barred the gates of Palestine to thousands of European Jewish refugees trying to flee Nazi persecution. At first there was little the yishuv leadership could do since Jewish forces were not strong enough to challenge the British and, in any case, Nazism was the greater enemy, but the Jews soon began to smuggle refugees into Palestine. This 'illegal immigration/ as the British termed it, began before the German attack on Poland and continued throughout the war. A mere handful were brought in up to 1945 but the foundation was laid for a much larger drive after the war ended. With the outbreak of war the yishuv threw its support behind Britain despite the White Paper. Jewish industry in Palestine turned to the manufacture of stores and equipment for the British forces, and Jewish men and women volunteered in the tens of thousands to serve with the British. Many of these volunteers were also members of the Haganah, the largest of three underground military organizations which had been created by Jews in the yishuv to defend themselves. The Haganah was essentially the military arm of the Jewish Agency, which had been created by the World Zionist Organization after World War One to represent the Jewish community in Palestine in dealings with British authorities. The agency had been expanded in the 1920s to include non-Zionist Jews, primarily in the United States, who did not share the political aspirations of the Zionist movement but who were, nevertheless, concerned about the welfare of the Jewish community in Palestine.

9 Introduction The Haganah was rivalled by the Irgun Zvai Leumi - National Military Organization - which was founded in 1931 as the military arm of the right-wing Zionist revisionists. It was much smaller and more guerilla-like in structure than the Haganah. There was also a third group, the Lehi or Stern Gang (named after founder Avraham Stern), which was violently anti-British and specialized in the assassination of British officials and representatives. The Stern Gang, blinded by its own fanaticism, continued to struggle against the British during the war and even put feelers out towards the Axis, but the Haganah and the Irgun co-operated fully with the British until the war drew to a close.10 Nazi policy towards the Jews and the onrush of Nazi armies in North Africa made co-operation necessary for a time, but when the direct Nazi threat to Palestine melted away, the truce began to break down. After all, the White Paper and all its restrictions continued to exist as official British policy despite tentative British moves towards partition in 1944. Ill

On 8 August 1942 Gerhard Reigner of the World Jewish Congress handed a telegram to Howard Elting, the American vice-consul in Geneva, and to H.B. Livingston, the British consul, for transmission to World Jewish Congress leaders in Washington and London. The telegram read: 'Received alarming reports stating that, in the Fuehrer's Headquarters, a plan has been discussed, and is under consideration, according to which all Jews in countries occupied or controlled by Germany numbering 3lli to 4 millions, should, after deportation and concentration in the East, be at one blow exterminated.' Reigner had received his information from an anti-Nazi German, but his report was not believed by the British or American governments at that time. n In due course the evidence mounted that Reigner's report was true, and yet, when Soviet tanks crashed through the barbed wire of the Auschwitz death camp in southern Poland in January 1945, the reality of the horror which was finally revealed was far worse than anyone had believed possible. Hitler nearly succeeded in murdering the Jews of Europe - approximately six million were exterminated - but hundreds of thousands remained, and in the winter of 1945/6 many of them began to fill refugee camps in central and western Europe. Most were unable or unwilling to return 'home.' Home as they had known it had ceased to exist, and civilized Europe, the killing ground, had offered no safety. Most of the

10 Canada and the Birth of Israel Jewish remnant wanted to go to Palestine - they had little choice in any case since countries such as Canada and the United States continued to bar them - and the Palestine Jews were desperate to bring them into the country. In the months following the end of World War Two, the Jewish community in Palestine turned increasingly to active resistance and open revolt in its struggle against the British. Haganah was charged with the task of organizing a European network to smuggle displaced persons to Palestine, and month after month refugees sailed for the Promised Land aboard crowded, rusty ships purchased by Haganah and manned by volunteer crews from abroad and by Haganah veterans. The Royal Navy mounted a blockade to stop this illegal immigration, as the British termed it, while the world watched the spectacle of British troops herding the refugees of Hitler's Holocaust into detention camps in Palestine and Cyprus and sending them back behind the barbed wire of the displaced persons camps in Europe. While Haganah concentrated on defying the White Paper, the Irgun and the Lehi intensified their military operations against the British in Palestine. The British eventually stationed 100,000 troops there to counter the mounting campaign of assassinations, ambushes, bombings, kidnappings, and attacks against air bases, trains, officers clubs, and army bases. In January 1946 the Irgun penetrated Aqir air base to steal arms; in February they destroyed three bombers and damaged eight others at Qastina air base; in April they destroyed five railway bridges while the Lehi killed seven British soldiers; in June the Palestine railway network was extensively damaged and six British officers were kidnapped. In July the anti-British terror appeared to peak with the Irgun bombing of the mandate offices in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem when 91 persons - British, Jewish, and Arab - were killed and 45 injured.12 The British responded with wholesale arrests, floggings, curfews, roadblocks, constant searches, martial law, and hangings. By late 1946 there was one British soldier or policeman for every five Jews in Palestine, but the anti-British terror continued while the immigrant ships still sailed from Europe. British attempts to end the Palestine crisis by conciliating both Arabs and Jews were doomed to failure; Jews demanded the right to bring the refugees to Palestine from Europe while Arabs insisted they be kept out. In the fall of 1945 the new Labour government in Great Britain, headed by Prime Minister Clement Attlee and with Ernest Bevin as

11 Introduction foreign secretary, stepped up its efforts to find a solution to the Palestine question. The international power balance had shifted dramatically since 1939 and the United States had emerged as the most important player in the western alliance. Britain clearly needed to line the United States up behind any solution of the crisis. Yet, the destruction of European Jewry had, almost by default, let a vigorous, vocal, and increasingly pro-Zionist American Jewish community assume leadership in the drive to create a Jewish state in Palestine. This development guaranteed that the United States would be a troublesome partner to Britain in its diplomatic efforts to solve the Palestine problem because of Zionist efforts to influence U.S. policy. There was, in fact, a constant tension between the policy-makers in the State Department and much of the political leadership, particularly in the Democratic party, which was increasingly responsive to the political lobbying efforts of American Zionists. To add to Britain's troubles, President Harry S. Truman had been personally moved by the plight of European Jewry and, in July 1945, began to mount a campaign aimed at convincing Britain to allow the immediate entry into Palestine of a large number of Jewish refugees.13 In October 1945 Britain formally invited the United States to join in an effort to find a solution to the Palestine question and the AngloAmerican Committee of Inquiry was established. The committee held hearings in New York, London, and Palestine and was exposed to a full range of both fact and emotion from witnesses representing Arabs, Jews, and the British before returning to Lausanne, Switzerland, to write its report, which was issued 1 May 1946. In it the committee described the terrible plight of European Jewry and recommended the immediate admission to Palestine of 100,000 Jewish refugees. Its recommendations concerning the future of Palestine were not as clear: the mandate should continue to function for the time being; neither an Arab nor a Jewish state should be constituted in Palestine; Jewish immigration should not be subject to an Arab veto but it should also not be allowed to continue until the Arabs were a minority in the country.14 The committee's recommendations were, for the most part, unclear but they were unanimous. Despite this fact they were rejected by the British government, which feared provoking the Arabs by the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews. The reaction of the United States was quite different, and on 1 May, Truman publicly endorsed the committee's recommendation concerning the admission of Jewish

12 Canada and the Birth of Israel refugees. The gulf that already existed between Britain and the United States on the Palestine question was thus immediately widened. The following month the countries co-operated again by establishing a committee headed by Lord Morrison of Great Britain and Henry F. Grady of the United States to study the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry's recommendations to determine how they might best be implemented. On 31 July 1946 it reported to the two governments and recommended that Palestine become a United Nations trusteeship under British administration with Arabs and Jews enjoying self-rule in local affairs. The Arabs were to be allotted 83 per cent of the land area of Palestine and the Jews were to receive the remaining 17 per cent. The committee urged that a solution to the Jewish refugee problem be found within Europe but endorsed the earlier recommendations that 100,000 refugees be allowed entry to Palestine. Britain reacted favourably to the Morrison-Grady proposals, though they were rejected by Truman, and in September 1946 Bevin invited Arab and Jewish representatives to London to discuss them. The World Zionist Organization Executive considered them unacceptable and rejected the invitation while the Palestine Arabs refused to attend as long as Haj Amin al-Husseini remained persona non grata to the British. When the conference opened on 10 September, only Britain and the representatives of the Arab states attended. The Arabs presented a proposal for independence for Palestine with its Arab majority, together with guarantees of Jewish rights including some representation in the Palestine government and the official recognition of Hebrew as a second language. The British tried to conduct informal negotiations with the Zionist Executive, basing their proposals on the idea that Palestine should continue under British trusteeship, but made no headway. The London conference quickly adjourned,15 and in the weeks that followed British, Arabs, and Jews prepared for the final round of discussions, which eventually took place in London in February 1947 and which ended in dismal failure. By early 1947 Palestine was an armed camp. Three underground Jewish armies were conducting military operations against the mandate, and the Palestine Arabs were arming themselves once again. The immigrant ships continued to sail from European ports crammed with refugees, and the political efforts aimed at solving the Palestine question had failed. Britain was receiving no material help from the United States and was no longer willing or able to support the heavy burden of the Palestine mandate. The Palestine crisis was clearly out of control.

1

'A modest beginning'

William Lyon Mackenzie King was effusive with praise for Zionism when he addressed the Ottawa convention of the Zionist Federation of Canada on 4 July 1922. King, elected prime minister in December 1921, was given a 'tumultuous' welcome, and told the delegates in return that he was proud to have the opportunity to address them. He felt deeply sympathetic to Zionist aspirations which were, he claimed, 'in consonance' with the greatest ideals of 'Englishmen' and he applauded Britain's efforts in aid of the Zionist cause. He reassured the convention that Britain would carry out its pledges to the Jews and do so 'in the big and generous manner in which she usually did things.' He strongly endorsed the desire of 'the Hebrew people' for their own homeland where 'they might again make their contributions to the world's literature and civilization' and from which 'they might again shape the world's destinies.'1 The Zionists, of course, loved it; no one would have blamed them for believing that they had a friend in the prime minister's office. But King was a complex man and although he may have been sincere in his sympathies for Zionism in the abstract, his practical approach to the Palestine question was shaped by concrete considerations and particularly by his relationship to, and preoccupation with, Britain. Less than three months after King praised the British at the Zionist convention he was embroiled in a major controversy with them over Britain's expectation that Canada would automatically back London in a dispute with Turkey - the Chanak Crisis. This difference with Britain grew out of King's jealous guardianship of Canadian autonomy. There was, however, no contradiction. King greatly admired the British and was prepared to follow their leadership in many interna-

14 Canada and the Birth of Israel tional questions, particularly those that did not directly affect Canada. At the same time, however, he was determined to maintain Canada's newly won autonomy against what he believed was Britain's constant desire to re-create the more centralized empire of an earlier day. Thus King was prepared to stand up to Britain in matters such as the Chanak Crisis but was more than willing to follow the British lead on questions such as Palestine, whatever the sincerity of his sympathies for Zionism. Despite his words to the Zionists in July 1922, King knew, or would soon learn, that Canada had no interests in the Middle East and, therefore, no reason to become involved. I

Canada was a self-governing British colony in 1917 when the Balfour Declaration was issued; Canadian leaders were not consulted about the promises made to the Zionists and, in subsequent years, did not consider themselves bound by the declaration. There was, from time to time, debate as to whether Canada had legal obligations to the Zionists arising from Canadian membership in the League of Nations which had awarded the Palestine mandate to Great Britain, but the outcome was always unclear.2 In any case it did not matter whether Canada had any true legal obligations since successive Canadian governments, from that of Robert Borden to that of King, made the political decision not to involve themselves in Palestine matters. It was, in light of the growing conflict in Palestine, a prudent decision and it was also an easy one because Canada had no direct political, commercial, economic, or military interest in the eastern Mediterranean until some years after World War Two. In 1930 Canada moved cautiously to increase trade in the Middle East by opening a Canadian trade commission office in Cairo. The office was intended to further Canadian trade with Egypt and surrounding countries such as 'Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Persia and Cyprus.' As the sole Canadian diplomatic office in Egypt, or in the entire area for that matter, the Trade Commission also handled a wide variety of duties that would normally be performed by a consulate. The first trade commissioner, Yves Lamontagne, found the Cairo summers unbearably hot and broke with the usual diplomatic custom of following the Egyptian government to Alexandria, where the sea breezes moderated the extreme heat, to sojourn instead in the mountains of Cyprus.3 Canadian trade links with the Middle East expanded somewhat in

15 'A modest beginning' 1935 when Canada concluded a trade treaty with France giving her 'most favoured nation' tariff concessions. Since Syria and Lebanon were both French mandates, the tariff concessions were extended to them as well. This action was to prove the extent of official Canadian involvement with the Middle East until after World War Two. When a group of Canadian Jews, including prominent Ottawa Zionist Arnold}. Freiman, Toronto Liberal MP Samuel Factor, and Abraham A. Heaps, Co-operative Commonwealth Federation MP from Winnipeg, approached the federal government to ask for the establishment of a Canadian trade commission in Palestine in 1936, they were turned down because the 'possibilities for the sale of Canadian goods in the Palestine market [were] limited' in the words of W.D. Euler, minister of trade and commerce.4 Canada's lack of commercial interest in Palestine was matched by a lack of political interest. Although prime ministers from Wilfrid Laurier to King had all spoken positively about Zionism and had endorsed, in theory at least, the aims of the Zionist movement, this apparent support was not reflected by any decisions of policy. Until 1943, Mackenzie King stayed silent on the White Paper of 1939 despite Zionist entreaties.5 Perhaps he was motivated by the same ambivalence he showed on the question of allowing Jewish refugees into Canada in 1938: in principle and out of compassion he appeared to favour opening Canada's doors wider, but in practice he was unwilling to force the issue against the antagonism of a Quebec that harboured strong anti-semitic prejudices.6 Since Palestine was not an important political question for the vast majority of Canadian voters, caution dictated a prudent course. There was one group of Canadians who were vitally concerned with the Palestine question: the Canadian Jewish community and especially the Zionists, whose roots stretched back to the late 1890s. Zionists in several Canadian communities joined in November 1899 to form the Federation of Canadian Zionist Societies, an umbrella organization active in fund raising and spreading the Zionist message throughout the Jewish community. Jewish organizations in Canada were, for the most part, sympathetic to Zionism and were not split into pro- and anti-Zionist groups as in the United States. The Canadian Jewish community was more uniform than that of the United States, being almost exclusively composed of east European Jews who were primarily orthodox in religion and more Zionist in politics than Jews of western Europe. There had been Jews in Canada since the French

16 Canada and the Birth of Israel regime, but there was no Jewish 'establishment' - well placed within the larger community and deeply rooted in Canada's society and culture - such as existed in the United States. All major Jewish groups such as the Canadian Jewish Congress, established in 1919, and B'nai Brith - an American-based Jewish fraternal order - supported Zionism.7 In 1919 the Zionist Federation hired its first full-time executive director and elected Arnold J. Freiman of Ottawa to the presidency. Freiman was a Lithuanian-born immigrant who arrived in Canada in 1893 and settled in Ottawa in 1900. He had succeeded in building up a thriving retail business while nurturing his interest and support for Zionism. Freiman eventually came to know many of Ottawa's top political leaders; it was his job to present the Zionist case to successive prime ministers. Canadian Zionism suffered from all the internal divisions and ideological wrangling that plagued Zionism the world over. By the 1930s the largest Zionist group in Canada was the Zionist Organization of Canada, successor to the federation, which held a middle position between the right and left, stressing pure Zionism above party ideology and religious affiliation. To the left stood Poale Zion - Labour Zionism - which represented a number of labour and socialist oriented Zionist groups, and to the right was Revisionist Zionism, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky, with its strong authoritarian and militaristic traditions and its uncompromising insistence on the need for armed strength in dealing with the British and the Arabs. In addition there were religious Zionists, affiliated to the Mizrachi, who believed that the Jewish national home should be built along the lines of traditional, orthodox, Judaism rather than the left-wing atheism so predominant among the labour and socialist Zionist groups. In 1940 the Zionist Organization of Canada, the Mizrachi, and the Labour Zionists created the United Zionist Council to co-ordinate political lobby and public relations efforts aimed at furthering the Zionist cause during the war. The ZOC, being the largest group, was allotted eight of the fourteen seats on the council and its president, A.J. Freiman, became president of the council.8 Henceforth Canadian Zionists spoke to the government with a single voice with the exception of the Revisionists who did not join the council and who were not consulted by it. Although Canadian political leaders had attended and spoken to various Zionist meetings since before World War One, the first formal Zionist presentation to a Canadian government appears to have come

17 'A modest beginning' in 1919 when a delegation from the Federation of Canadian Zionist Societies and the Canadian Jewish Congress approached the government to forward a plea to British Prime Minister Lloyd George that the territory of the Palestine mandate include that area east of the Jordan River and north to the Litani River in what is now Lebanon. Thereafter, during the next two decades, other delegations presented their views to the Canadian government on matters such as British restrictions on Jewish immigration in 1921 and the White Paper of 1939. The lobby effort was invariably quiet; it was never backed by threats to withdraw financial or political support from the party in power should the government prove unresponsive to Zionist requests.9 This was not the style of Canadian Jewish political endeavour either in the case of Zionist aspirations or in the more urgent matter of the entry to Canada of Jewish refugees from Nazi persecution during the 1930s.10 Jewish efforts concentrated on quiet persuasion, usually focused on a small group of friends, business acquaintances, or political allies within the major parties and particularly within the Liberal party. II

Canada's first Jewish member of parliament, Liberal Sam W. Jacobs, began his career in the House of Commons when he was elected to represent Cartier riding in the federal general election of 17 December 1917. Cartier had a large number of Jewish voters, most of them immigrants, and Jacob's victory on an otherwise gloomy day for the Liberal party - they captured only 82 seats under the anti-conscriptionist banner of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (most in Quebec) - began a long tradition of Jewish and Liberal representation for that riding that lasted until the 1960s. Jacob's victory was the first for the tacit alliance between Jews and Liberals which began to develop around the turn of the century and which allowed the Liberal party to become the vehicle by which many Jews began to enter more fully into Canadian political life. Although Conservative party leaders such as Robert Borden and Arthur Meighen had voiced their sympathies for the aspirations of the Zionist movement, the Conservatives, for the most part, remained out of touch with Canada's immigrants including the Jews. Traditional Tory support in the Maritimes, Ontario, and British Columbia was heavily laced with people who had little love for non-Protestants or non-British immigrants. During World War One the Conservative government tacitly acknowledged this lack of immigrant support

18 Canada and the Birth of Israel when it adopted the Wartime Elections Act in late 1917 in a bid to rig the federal election of that year. The act stripped the vote from immigrants from 'enemy' countries who had become British subjects (there was, at the time, no 'Canadian citizenship') after 1902 in a blatant attempt to undercut Liberal support among the hundreds of thousands of immigrants who had arrived in Canada during the Laurier administration.11 It is impossible to tell how many Jewish immigrants were affected by the act, but it is likely that, in the long run, it pushed most Jews even closer to the Liberals. In the United States many Jews had early gravitated to American socialism and had become a strong and important component in the development of the American left. To a degree this was also true in Canada, many Jews being involved with early left-wing groups such as the Socialist Party of Canada and the Social Democratic party as well as the Communist Party of Canada. Jews were similarly involved with the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation from the very beginning. David Lewis, a Polish-born Jew who had studied at Oxford as a Rhodes scholar before entering the practice of law, rose quickly through CCF ranks to become national secretary while Abraham A. Heaps, a former Winnipeg labour leader who had been arrested during the Winnipeg general strike, was elected to represent a Winnipeg riding in 1925. In March 1935 the Poale Zion approached J.S. Woods worth, national leader of the CCF, seeking affiliation. Woods worth was not enthusiastic about the affiliation of 'nationalist' groups such as the Labour Zionists and believed the Jews were 'making a mistake by insisting on maintaining their identity in political matters.' The Jewish people, Woodsworth told Poale Zion, were in some ways 'ultra-nationalistic' and if this nationalism was 'over-emphasized' it would 'call forth a counter-nationalism that [would] be very disadvantageous.'12 When Leon Cheifetz, secretary of the Poale Zion, took exception to Woodsworth's remarks and asserted the right of the Jewish people to selfdetermination and to the maintenance of their culture and language,13 Woodsworth replied with a lecture on Jewish conduct: 'the promotion of the interests of a sectional group tends to provoke a certain reaction in other sections of the population, and thus defeat the very object in view. I have sometimes wondered why it is that the Jewish people, with their keenness in intellectual matters, do not always realize inevitable psychological reactions.'14 Woods worth's antipathy towards Jewish 'ultra-nationalism' was linked to an open hostility towards the specific aims of Zionism. When he was approached in 1938 to consider CCF support for a resolution

19 'A modest beginning' seeking the right of Jewish refugees to enter Palestine, he responded with the claim that arguments used to advance Zionism could easily be applied to justifications for returning Canada to the Indians. It was easy for Canadians, Americans, and the British to agree to a Jewish colony, he claimed, as long as it was somewhere else. Why 'pick on the Arabs' other than for 'strategic' and 'imperialistic' consideration, he wondered.15 Herbert Orliffe, Ontario provincial secretary of the CCF, was shocked by Woods worth's attitude. He believed that CCF support for Zionist aspirations was necessary on both humanistic grounds and 'to win the confidence of the Jewish people in Canada towards the CCF movement and train them to look to the CCF for leadership.' Orliffe reminded David Lewis of the thousands of Jewish votes in Canada and claimed that failure to take the lead would 'play into the hands of the Communist Party which [was] already making quite a play for the Jewish vote.' 16 Official CCF attitudes towards Zionism changed dramatically during the war. Woodsworth was replaced as house leader in 1940 by M.J. Coldwell, a man much more sympathetic to the concept of a Jewish national home, while Lewis, who had had little personal sympathy for Zionism before the war, began to shift his position and came out in favour of the abolition of the White Paper during his unsuccessful attempt to win the Cartier by-election in 1943.17 Stanley Knowles, a United Church minister elected in the Winnipeg North Centre constituency after Woodsworth's death, was a strong and vocal supporter of Zionist aims in Palestine. By the end of the war, therefore, the CCF was, if anything, more vigorous in its support for Zionism than any other major party in Canada. Despite this, it was still not the party of choice for most Jews who continued to vote for, contribute to, and even run for, the Liberals in large numbers. Most Jews had entered Canada under Liberal governments from Laurier to Mackenzie King and they shared the liberal capitalist ethic which the Liberal party represented. The Liberal practice of 'reserving' one riding in Toronto (Spadina) and one in Montreal (Cartier) for Jewish candidates virtually ensured that two Jewish MPS would sit in the government caucus to represent the views of the Jewish community. (The scheme was upset in 1943 when Fred Rose, a Communist running for the Labour Progressive party, won Cartier in a by-election.) This was an important consideration, whatever the true weight of those Jewish MPS in the determination of government policy, and it was something the CCF could not realistically hope to match in federal politics. In Montreal and Toronto the Jewish voters in ridings such as Car-

20 Canada and the Birth of Israel tier, St Lawrence-St George, St Antoine-Westmount, and Spadina represented a significant proportion of the total electorate and generally supported Liberal candidates. The connection between the Jewish community and the Liberal party was sustained by the Liberals' apparent willingness to open their ranks to immigrants and to make special efforts to woo ethnic voters. In the 1940 federal election, for example, Brooke Claxton, running for the first time in the St LawrenceSt George riding against Conservative incumbent C.H. Cahan, made a special effort to organize ethnic voters through the use of foreignlanguage election materials, special canvassing committees, and other techniques designed to carry the message that Liberals were especially sympathetic to the concerns of ethnic voters.18 In addition some Jewish communal leaders such as Sam Bronfman, head of the Seagram's distilling empire, and Montreal lawyers Lazarus Phillips and Harry Batshaw were active both in political organizing and in fund raising.19 Phillips was collector of campaign contributions from the Jewish community for the Liberal party in the 1940s and used his extensive legal connections for this purpose. In 1940 he was a member of Claxton's organizing committee.20 Batshaw was a campaign organizer and friend of Douglas Abbott, who was first elected to the House of Commons in 1940 to represent St Antoine-Westmount.21 This pattern was repeated across the country with Liberals such as Paul Martin and Louis St Laurent who had close friends in the local Jewish community and who enjoyed Jewish financial and electoral support.22 More Jews took the plunge into federal politics through the Liberal party than through the Conservatives or CCF. Sam Jacobs was the first; Sam Factor captured Spadina in 1930, a bad year for the Liberals elsewhere. The vast majority of Jews who have sat in the House of Commons have represented the Liberal party. The close and relatively easy relationship that existed between a number of Jewish community leaders and the leading members of the Liberal party was no guarantee of results when Jewish organizations, Zionist or otherwise, approached the government with specific requests for action on matters of concern to the Jewish community. Jewish votes were only important in a handful of ridings and since they were directed to the Liberal party so consistently, they could be taken for granted.23 Anti-semitism was a ,far more potent political factor than the personal friendships that bound some Jewish leaders to a small number of well-placed Liberals, even when combined with the presence of a Jew-

21 'A modest beginning' ish MP in the Liberal caucus. In the 1930s the campaign of the Jewish community to persuade the government to open the doors of Canada to Jewish refugees was aided by prominent Canadian Christians such as Senator Cairine Wilson, Reverend Claris Silcox, Professor G.M. Wrong, Sir Ellsworth Flavelle, and B.K. Sandwell, but it ran into solid opposition within the cabinet, especially from powerful Quebec ministers, and failed. 24 The efforts of Zionists to convince the Canadian government to support Zionist aims were doomed to failure unless a large segment of the non-Jewish public could be swayed to support those aims. Jews within, or on the fringes of, the major political parties had too little leverage when operating in isolation. ill

The outbreak of World War Two doomed a generation of European Jews and dramatically altered the dimensions of the Palestine question and linked it with the fate of the Holocaust survivors. Zionists around the world stepped up their drive to open the gates of Palestine to Jewish refugees even before their worst fears about the destruction of European Jewry were confirmed. In Canada the United Zionist Council established a public relations committee under the chairmanship of Harry Batshaw in May 1941, only one month after its first meeting.25 Batshaw had been involved for at least a decade in a wide variety of Jewish and Zionist activities. One of his first moves was to direct the establishment of a Pro-Palestine committee which was originally intended to be an organization of Christians and Jews friendly to the Zionist cause who would spread the Zionist message throughout the community and take part in Zionist efforts to lobby the federal government.26 In addition to the Pro-Palestine Committee, a Canadian Palestine Committee, modelled after the American Palestine Committee and the Pro-Palestine Parliamentary Committee of Great Britain, was established to 'give expression to the interest, sympathy and moral support of the Canadian people for the Jewish National Home.' 27 The Canadian Palestine Committee was to be entirely non-Jewish in membership. The public relations effects of 1941 and 1942 were feeble and intermittent - a 'modest beginning' as Batshaw later reported.28 But as news of the Holocaust leaked out of Europe to Palestine, and from Palestine to Zionists around the world,29 efforts to line up governments and public opinion behind the Zionist cause increased. In May 1942

22 Canada and the Birth of Israel delegates representing the Jewish Agency, the yishuv, and the American Zionist Emergency Committee met at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City to reconsider Zionist aims during wartime. Since the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the aim of mainstream Zionism had been the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The precise political shape of that home had not been defined and was, in fact, left purposely vague by Zionists who had no wish to create internal divisions over a Utopian objective or run afoul of the British who administered the mandate. The Holocaust changed all that. The Biltmore conference, largely at the behest of David Ben Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, and with the active assistance of Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, the vigorous and dynamic leader of the Zionist Organization of America, called for full Jewish Agency control over immigration into Palestine and demanded that 'Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.' 30 Henceforth statehood was the key objective towards which all others were directed and from which solutions to Jewish problems, such as immigration, would flow. Despite this, Zionist public relations work in Canada virtually ignored the Biltmore conference declaration. Canadian Zionists continued to concentrate on the White Paper and the humanitarian issues connected to it in order to convince the Canadian government to help pressure Britain into dropping the White Paper. In September 1943 the National Council of the United Zionist Council convened in special session in Toronto to form a revitalized National Public Relations Committee, still under Batshaw's direction. The Zionists aimed to win increased support from non-Jewish Canadians, including the clergy and 'various political parties,' in a drive to persuade Britain, through the Canadian government, to abandon the White Paper restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine.31 A campaign was initiated to enlist members into the Canadian Palestine Committee and to establish committee branches across the country. In December 1943 Mackenzie King, prime minister and secretary of state for external affairs, was approached by A.J. Freiman to intervene with the British government to forestall the imposition of the immigration restrictions in Palestine called for in the White Paper which were scheduled to go into effect in April 1944. Freiman claimed that the Canadian government was 'not without responsibility in this matter' and could, because of its membership in the League of Nations, make 'appropriate representations' to the United Kingdom govern-

23 'A modest beginning' ment. Freiman's letter was somewhat intimate in tone and was clearly intended to appeal to the prime minister's friendship as well as his supposed sympathetic understanding of Jewish problems.32 King sought the advice of the Department of External Affairs before replying. The job of drafting an answer was given to Elizabeth P. MacCallum, a new member of the department and its only bona-fide expert on the Middle East. She had been born in Turkey of missionary parents, had graduated from Queen's University, and had worked toward a Ph D at Columbia University in New York before she was lured away in 1925 to work for the Foreign Policy Association under the direction of James G. McDonald (who later became the first United States ambassador to Israel). During six years of intensive work at the association MacCallum published a book, The Nationalist Crusade in Syria, and more than twenty papers for the association's Information Service concentrating on the Middle East. At that time McDonald was interested in Jewish questions and introduced MacCallum to a number of Jewish and Zionist leaders including Felix Warburg and Abraham Tulin of the Zionist Organization of America. She was, therefore, well versed not only in the history of Arab nationalism but also in that of Zionism and showed that understanding in a survey of the Palestine conflict, published in 1929, in which she concluded that the heart of the conflict was 'the opposing forces of two distinct nationalisms.' MacCallum left the Foreign Policy Association in 1931 because of a hearing disorder and spent the next nine years reading, studying, and writing about world problems. In 1942 she joined the European and Commonwealth Division of the Department of External Affairs and specialized in the Middle East.33 She was shy, almost deferential, and precise and turned out carefully reasoned memoranda. At times she seems to have felt it her special duty to debate, in type and behind the closed doors of the department, the points raised by Zionists and their supporters in their briefs and memoranda to the government. Freiman's letter offered the department, and the government, the opportunity to put their views about current British Palestine policy on the record and those views were largely based on MacCallum's reasoning. She rejected all of Freiman's arguments. In a carefully worded and detailed memorandum MacCallum claimed that 'well-informed Canadian Jews, occupying positions of some responsibility,' were uneasy about Zionist policy because it might detrimentally affect the interests of Jews in Palestine and elsewhere. Some of these 'non Zionist Jews' (Peter Bercovitch, Liberal MP for Cartier from 1938 to 1942 had

24 Canada and the Birth of Israel certainly been one of them) considered schemes to mount a mass emigration of European Jews to Palestine 'a mistake' coming at the very moment when a reaction against Hitlerism was bound to 'bring about a permanent improvement in the status of Jews' in Europe. It would be wrong, she maintained, to encourage the people of eastern Europe and the Balkans to plan for a post-war society without Jews. MacCallum believed that Canadian efforts to encourage Britain to abandon the 1939 White Paper would ruin the British effort to force Arabs and Jews to begin 'direct consultation' on important policy questions affecting Palestine which was, in her opinion, the whole point of the White Paper.34 King's reply to Freiman, based on MacCallum's draft, should have dashed any hopes the Zionists may have had about getting the prime minister on side. He told Freiman that the White Paper was not directed at limiting Jewish immigration but was actually aimed 'toward creating political conditions which would facilitate peaceful development of the Jewish National Home.' Seeking the withdrawal of the White Paper would be 'to condemn in advance the effort to establish democratic procedures and the principle that both elements of the Palestinian population must be consulted about policies which closely affect their interest.' The position of the Jews in Europe could best be secured through a victory of the United Nations forces over Nazi Germany while the situation of the Jews in Palestine would be best served 'by agreement among those whose interests are directly concerned.'35 King thus indirectly endorsed the White Paper and made it clear that Canada would not, for the moment, intervene in Palestine matters. Had King changed his view of Zionism since that summer day in 1922 when he addressed the Zionist convention in Ottawa? Perhaps, but his letter to Freiman was no indication of this. Whatever his personal view of the Zionist cause, King was following the same approach to the Palestine question that he had used with other international issues which were not, in his opinion, directly of concern to Canada. He was not about to tell the British what to do, especially when that advice ran counter to British policy and Britain was a close ally of Canada. It was unrealistic of the Zionists to believe otherwise, but it was probably no coincidence that they began to mount a major, sustained, nation-wide drive for public support within weeks of King's reply to Freiman. The new Zionist initiative was announced by Harry Batshaw at the January 1944 convention of the Zionist Organization of Canada. Public

25 'A modest beginning' relations, he told the gathering, were crucial to the attainment of Zionist aims for a 'publicly secured' homeland. The Balfour Declaration had been supported by hundreds of political and church leaders in Britain when it had been issued, he pointed out, and this support had been carefully cultivated by Zionist leaders in Britain. 36 Batshaw's work soon produced dramatic results with new initiatives across the country to rally Christian support for the cause of the Jewish National Home. The two organizations spearheading this work were the Christian Council for Palestine, directed by Henry Janes, a Toronto public relations consultant, and the Canadian Palestine Committee under Herbert Mowat, a former Anglican minister from Toronto. Janes and Mowat had been hired by the United Zionist Council - which paid their salaries and expenses - and were responsible to the council. Janes proved less than adequate in his role and his organization failed to win widespread support among Christian clergy - its designated target group. His extravagant expense claims also led to dissatisfaction among leaders of the United Zionist Council and, eventually, to a parting of the ways by mid-1944.37 Mowat was a huge success. He was a tireless worker, effective speaker, and enthusiastic, even passionate, promoter of the Zionist cause. After a visit to Welland, Ontario, in the spring of 1945, the executive secretary of the local B'nai Brith lodge wrote of him: 'Mr. Mowat certainly sold the non-Jew the idea of Palestine as the rightful homeland of the Jews. I don't know of anyone who is more qualified to speak at non-Jewish audiences on the Palestine question with such sincerity as Mr. Mowat.' 38 The Zionist lobby effort of early 1944 was aimed at convincing King to raise the Palestine question at the forthcoming Commonwealth prime ministers conference and to urge the British to lift the White Paper restrictions on Jewish immigration. In the last week of March delegations headed by representatives of the United Zionist Council and the Canadian Palestine Committee met with King to press their requests. They were accompanied by a number of prominent political, business, and labour leaders and, at one point, by Dr Nahum Goldmann, the Jewish Agency representative in Washington. They were gratified by King's response and were convinced that King 'would be helpful' at the Commonwealth Conference.39 In fact, on 30 March King told the House of Commons that he would see to it that Palestine was discussed at the London meeting. Once King had made his commitment to bring the Palestine question up at the Commonwealth meeting, J.W. Pickersgill, head of the

26 Canada and the Birth of Israel Prime Minister's Office, approached the Department of External Affairs for advice. MacCallum, in response, prepared a long and careful analysis of the background to the 1939 White Paper, its impact on the Arabs and Jews, and the likely direction of Britain's Palestine policy after the war. It was the most thorough history and analysis of the Palestine question yet written in the department and presented a tough-minded assessment of the difficulties Britain would face in the near future. MacCallum also pointed out that Canada, 'recognized as a leader among smaller nations,' would eventually be called upon to support 'the efforts [of both Arabs and Jews] to achieve nationhood and political independence' and would, at the same time, be 'expected to speak in defence of Jews who [would] wish to continue making their homes' in Europe and North America. It would be difficult, she believed, for Canada 'to fulfill all three of these expectations' but she made no suggestions about future courses of action that Canada might adopt. 40 Hume Wrong, associate under secretary of state for external affairs and in charge of the European and Commonwealth Division at External and MacCallum's immediate superior, drew the obvious conclusion: 'I would myself be loath to see any strong advocacy by the Canadian Government of a particular solution to the Palestine problem. No matter what may be done about the White Paper, Palestine will remain, for a long time, a troubled area ... in which it is most unlikely that Canada will have any very direct interest.'41 Wrong, however, was needlessly worried about Mackenzie King meddling in Palestine affairs. The matter was not on the agenda for the Commonwealth meeting and the official, secret, minutes of the conference fail to record any mention of Palestine uttered by King or anyone else.42 King's lack of enthusiasm for Palestine matters did not discourage Sam Zacks. Even though he concluded in August 1944 that Britain would not try to solve the Palestine question until the war was over, he still believed the Canadian government could be convinced to help Zionists 'force a decision earlier.'43 This was wishful thinking because the government was preoccupied with the thousands of tasks necessary for the daily conduct of the war and needed to maintain good relations with Britain. Nevertheless the work of the Zionist public relations machine, carried out by the United Zionist Council and the Canadian Palestine Committee, was stepped up with cross-country speeches, radio addresses, luncheons, the distribution of literature, and personal approaches to prominent Canadians beseeching them to join the Canadian Palestine Committee. Well-known political and

27 'A modest beginning' public figures lent their support to the cause, including F.R. Scott, Chester Martin, Lady Eaton, Senator Salter Hayden, and Senator Adrian Hugessen. In Quebec, Aime Geoffrion, a well-known lawyer with important Liberal connections, Emile Vaillancourt, and JeanLouis Gagnon also joined the committee.44 Until late 1944 Zionist public relations work had largely bypassed Quebec, which represented something of a dilemma for the Zionists and the Canadian Palestine Committee because of their assumption that French Canadian views on Palestine would be biased by deeply rooted anti-semitic feelings. Batshaw set out to remedy this with the help of David Rome of the Canadian Jewish Congress. They approached Paul Guerin, a journalist with La Piesse who also ran a small clipping and public relations bureau, to seek his views on the best way to spread the Zionist message in Quebec. After a number of meetings the three decided to concentrate on a low-key campaign that would include the distribution of press releases to French newspapers and to a select list of Quebecers. At the same time approaches would be made to 'leading French Canadian liberals' to enlist them for membership in the Canadian Palestine Committee. Batshaw worried about the danger that anti-semites in Quebec might support Zionist objectives on the basis 'that they would like to see even Canadian Jews go to Palestine' and he had little doubt that Zionist public relations work would 'meet with greater resistance' in Quebec than was experienced in Ontario.45 IV

On 6 November 1944 as Walter Edward Guiness, first Baron Moyne, was being driven away from the British residence (Embassy) in Cairo, two Lehi assassins stopped his car and opened fire, killing him. Lord Moyne, a close personal friend of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and millionaire owner of the Guiness beverage company, had been chosen by the Lehi as the target of their most daring attack yet because of their belief that he opposed the entry of Jewish refugees into Palestine. The two terrorists were quickly caught, tried, and executed and their deed was condemned by the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi, the elected national council governing the yishuv in Palestine, but in so pro-British a country as the Canada of late 1944, the shot that killed Moyne was truly a shot heard round the world. For most of the war Zionist public relations work in Canada had concentrated on rallying public opposition to the White Paper and at-

28 Canada and the Birth of Israel tempting to enlist the Canadian government as an ally in the cause. Almost no effort at all was spent countering anti-Zionist propaganda since there was so little. As long as the truce between the British and the yishuv had remained in effect in Palestine, Zionists emphasized the tremendous efforts put forward by the yishuv on behalf of the Allied war effort. But when that truce began to break down and attacks on the British started to mount, the United Zionist Council and the Canadian Palestine Committee faced a difficult problem. Most Canadians were ignorant about, and apathetic towards, the Palestine question but they were not ignorant or apathetic about Britain, a close war ally, ancestral home of many Canadians, and Canada's legal, constitutional, and political 'mother' country. When news of the Moyne killing broke, Herbert Mowat was about to leave for a speaking tour of western Canada on behalf of the Canadian Palestine Committee. He was urged to stay home by a representative of the Edmonton Zionist Council who told Rabbi Jesse Schwartz, secretary of the Zionist Organization of Canada, that if he were a Christian he would tell Mowat and the Zionists 'until you set your house in order and root out this gang even if it involves sacrifices of blood, lay off for a little while begging for sympathy.' 46 Even before this message was received, Mowat moved quickly to cover his tracks with a press release that denounced the 'Sternist terrorist organization' and which claimed they could not be a greater barrier to Zionist aims than if they 'were in the pay of the bitterest enemies of the Jewish National Home.' 47 Mowat's tour went ahead and, as usual, produced positive results, particularly in Winnipeg where a speech to the local Press Club brought an immediate improvement in press coverage of Jewish and Zionist news.48 In fact, once adverse press reaction to the Moyne killing died down, many new members were added to the Canadian Palestine Committee in January and February 1945, and Sir Ellsworth Flavelle accepted Mowat's invitation to become national chairman, lending a prestigious name to the organization.49 In late January 1945 a Canadian Palestine Committee-United Zionist Council delegation met in Ottawa with Hume Wrong and Norman A. Robertson of the Department of External Affairs, 50 the two most important men in the department in Ottawa at that time. Wrong was the son of noted Canadian historian G.M. Wrong, and after attending Upper Canada College, Ridley, and the University of Toronto, had joined the diplomatic service in 1927. In 1944 he had been appointed associate under-secretary of state for external affairs, the second high-

29 'A modest beginning' est post in the department. Wrong had a keen intellect, a somewhat biting wit, and a strong sense of personal self-worth. His analysis of international problems was always cool and pragmatic, and he had shown no sympathy for the Zionist position in his previous encounters with the Palestine question. Robertson, under-secretary of state and top man at External, possessed a powerful and penetrating intellect that usually enabled him to get to the bottom of things very quickly. His specialization was international trade but he had an excellent grasp of the wide range of problems that confronted Canadian diplomats in the closing years of the war. Meetings between Zionist leaders and government officials usually produced little more than promises that the Canadian government would forward their views to London and the January 1945 meeting was no exception.51 But this time Zionist pleas for Canadian intervention in Britain's enforcement of the White Paper came against the unfolding backdrop of the Jewish catastrophe in Europe, and Robertson, the ultimate example of bureaucratic coolness, took an uncharacteristically sympathetic view of the Zionist position. He had had little experience with the Palestine question and had considered MacCallum's 1943 views on the White Paper 'objective and realistic' but after the January 1945 meeting he told King that 'the position of the surviving European Jews will be very difficult.' Their property had been seized and their livelihoods destroyed, Robertson noted, and if European governments were to try to restore Jewish property, taking it away from those who had held it during the war, a recurrence of anti-semitism might occur. In his view, therefore, 'the case for permitting the largest possible movement of Jewish refugees into Palestine [was] on compassionate grounds alone a very strong one.' Despite these apparently personal sympathies, however, he knew just how complicated the Palestine question was and he 'did not think that the Canadian Government would wish to press a particular policy for meeting one specific problem upon the United Kingdom Government.' 52 His budding sympathy was, therefore, considerably tempered by his desire not to complicate Anglo-Canadian relations by urging a reluctant Britain to adopt a pro-Zionist position. V

In the spring of 1945, as Hitler's armies dissolved and the victorious allies prepared for the United Nations Conference on International

30 Canada and the Birth of Israel Organization at San Francisco, the United Zionist Council intensified its public relations efforts with a three-pronged campaign aimed at increasing the membership of the Canadian Palestine Committee, placing the Zionist program before as many members of parliament as possible, and pressing the government to adopt a pro-Zionist stance at San Francisco and at the Commonwealth prime ministers meeting scheduled to precede it. In the month of April alone, seventy-six MPS, MLAs, and senators, from all parties and provinces, joined the Canadian Palestine Committee including Ian Mackenzie, minister of veterans affairs, and J.G. Gardiner, minister of agriculture.53 A delegation headed by Sir Ellsworth Flavelle met again with Robertson and presented a brief which claimed that Canadian governments had been sympathetic to Zionist aims since 1912 and were bound to support the Balfour Declaration because of Canada's membership in the League of Nations at the time the Palestine mandate was awarded.54 On 25 April the United Nations conference opened at San Francisco. Mackenzie King headed the Canadian delegation, which also included Gordon Graydon, Conservative party House leader (Conservative party leader John Bracken did not yet hold a seat in the House), and M.J. Coldwell, leader of the CCF, as well as seven alternate delegates, most of whom were members of the Department of External Affairs. Sam Zacks, Saul Hayes, and Sam Bronfman also attended as part of a large gathering of Jewish non-governmental delegates representing organizations from around the world who made up one of the largest groups at the meeting.55 The Zionists among them were particularly concerned with the question of how the United Nations, as successor to the League of Nations, would dispose of former league mandates and particularly the Palestine mandate which was the only class A mandate left. The deliberations at San Francisco focused on proposals by the great powers for a United Nations Organization that had been drawn up at the Dumbarton Oaks conference in October 1944. Those proposals dealt, among many other matters, with trusteeship territories to be administered by the United Nations or assigned to United Nations member countries for administration. No provision had been made that former League of Nations mandate territories would be automatically passed back to the United Nations for determination of their status. When Churchill announced in February 1945 that the Palestine matter would not be considered at San Francisco, he made clear that Britain would continue to administer the Palestine mandate without United

31 'A modest beginning' Nations interference. No one could tell, however, if Britain would continue to pursue this course in the future or would transfer Palestine to the United Nations for administration as a trust territory. If Palestine should come under the administration of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, the policies of that council would obviously be applied to it. Zionists and Arabs knew this and set out to influence the policies to be established to guide the Trusteeship Council in future. The Arab delegations did not focus on the Palestine question but concentrated instead on an effort to force the Trusteeship Council to recognize only the rights of the largest single group in each trusteeship territory. Success would have dealt a serious blow to the legality of the Zionist position in Palestine since the Jews were in a minority there. The Zionists countered this with a campaign to have the specific rights of the Jewish people in Palestine, as defined by the Balfour Declaration, built in to any future trusteeship decisions on Palestine. They did not hesitate to push for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and worked hard to educate the various delegations about the political, legal, and moral bases upon which the Jewish claim was founded. In fact, however, they need not have worried about Arab success because Britain, France, and the United States strongly opposed the Arab proposals and wielded considerable power at the San Francisco meeting. The Arabs had no chance to succeed against these colonial powers, who were jealous of protecting their own interests and possessions around the globe.56 The Zionist lobby at San Francisco spent considerable time and effort to line up the support of the British Commonwealth countries, Canada among them. Canada was, in fact, active in several important areas at the San Francisco meeting (the Canadian role has been covered in detail elsewhere)57but on trusteeship matters Canada, in contrast to New Zealand and South Africa, 58 remained in the background and 'took no active part in the discussion'59 despite the Zionist public relations work of the previous three years. Canada had no colonial dependencies and stood smugly aloof. Once again the efforts of Zionists to convince the Canadian government to involve itself in the Palestine question, however obliquely, had failed. Canada's silence in the trusteeship discussions was not the product of passivism in Canadian foreign policy or of a lack of international influence in mid-1945. Canada was not, by any means, a great power and Canadian influence in creating the foundations of the United Nations and determining the structure of the post-war world was limited, but

32 Canada and the Birth of Israel Canada's active presence at San Francisco and its role on various UN agencies signified a new Canadian vigour on the world scene. Within the realistic limits of a 'middle power' role, Canadian policy-makers were beginning to carve out areas for active Canadian interest.60Canadian diplomats and political leaders, from Mackenzie King down, had arrived at the conclusion during the war that Canada must take an active role in the international arena in order to protect Canadian national interests. Hume Wrong even worked out a theoretical basis for this activism when he formulated the concept of 'functionalism' which King explained to the House of Commons in July 1943. It was based on the notion that representation on post-war international bodies should 'be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question.'61 It was on this basis, for example, that Canada fought for representation on Allied war and post-war planning bodies such as the Munitions Assignment Board, the Combined Food Board, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Post-war Canadian policy was in part more activist, and Canada played a larger role than it had in the pre-war world, because Canadian leaders, at the political level and in the Department of External Affairs, were more assertive and more determined to push Canadian interests on a broad front. This, by itself, however, would not have sufficed to make Canada a leader of the 'middle powers' because, in the international arena, influence flows almost exclusively from power, economic and/or military. Canada was, quite simply, more important in the world in 1945 than she had been in 1939 or is likely to be again. More than one million Canadians had served in the Allied forces. By the end of the war, Canada's navy was the third largest among the allies and its air force the fourth largest, and Canada's agricultural and industrial power had proved important sources of allied strength. Part of Canada's post-war economic power came about by default - the bombed-out factories of Europe contrasted dramatically with the untouched plants of Canada and the United States. But part was due to Canada's wartime determination to spare no effort in the service of the allied cause; Canada's immense wartime and post-war aid to Britain was but one example of this state of mind. Canada was not a great power but it had been an important ally in the larger alliance. Despite Canada's new interest and activism in the international arena, the Middle East and Palestine ranked as low as ever in Canadian

33 'A modest beginning' priorities. In the post-war period Canada had virtually no commercial or strategic interests in the area and, therefore, took no interest in an active role and was quite content to watch from the sidelines while Britain took on the burdensome task of trying to solve this most difficult of international problems. In 1946, for example, Canadian imports from Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine (the only Middle Eastern countries whose commerce with Canada was important enough to be noted by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics) totalled a little over $4 million or about 0.2 per cent of all Canadian imports. In the same period Canadian exports to those countries amounted to about $24 million or only 0.1 per cent of Canadian exports.62 Whatever its potential, the Middle East was not, at that time, an important market for Canada or a key supplier of strategic materials such as crude oil. In fact, Canada did not import a drop of Middle East oil until 1948, and even then oil from Iran and Aden made up only a small proportion of total Canadian purchases, most of which came from Venezuela and the United States.63 Few if any Canadian companies had significant investments in the Middle East and this was reflected in Canada's failure to expand its diplomatic or commercial contacts with the area until 1948 when a Canadian embassy was opened in Ankara, Turkey. Since Canada had little to do with the Middle East, the Canadian government had no wish to get involved. Despite the increasingly sophisticated Zionist public relations campaign at home, no Canadian policy-maker, with the possible exception of Lester Pearson, Canadian ambassador to the United States, advocated an active role for Canada either in attempting to solve the Palestine question or in trying to persuade Britain to adopt one course or another. Pearson, at one point in 1945, gave Zionists the impression in a Toronto speech that Canada should back its vocal support for the Balfour Declaration with action.64 If Pearson truly believed this, he was a minority of one. Canada was not part of the Palestine equation and no amount of Zionist public relations could change this fact even though Jews had some political influence within the Liberal party and were attempting to rally broad public support through the auspices of the Canadian Palestine Committee. By the late summer of 1945 Canada had not made any formal representations to Great Britain on the Palestine question and had not attempted to intercede with Britain to change British policy. Up to this point, judged by its own objectives, the Zionist lobby in Canada had completely failed to achieve its aims; Canadian policy had not been influenced.

2

'Abominable outrages'

The spring of 1945 brought liberation to Europe. The German armies were pushed back into the heart of the Reich and then forced into surrender. The bells of freedom pealed while cheering crowds welcomed their liberators. The victors - hundreds of thousands of Canadians among them - dreamed dreams of home and of peace. It was the most joyous spring in living memory. For the Jews of Europe, the Allied victory brought the promise of life, but little more. In concentration and death camps from Holland to Poland the starving remnants of European Jewry stared out through the barbed-wire fences that had circumscribed their lives for almost six years and waited. Their lives had been shattered. Entire families had been swallowed by the gas chambers; homes, synagogues, and community centres had been destroyed or seized; neighbourhoods had been shelled or bombed into rubble. Most had no families to seek reunion with, no homes to return to, no neighbours to provide succour. Much of European Jewry had been torn by the roots from the society it had lived in for almost two thousand years. Hitler's armies of the night murdered about six million Jews. The Jewish population of central and eastern Europe was decimated; that of the west survived in larger numbers. The Jews of France, Holland, Belgium, and other parts of western Europe made their way home, for the most part, but those from Poland, Hungary, and other parts of eastern Europe made their way to refugee camps, mostly in Austria and Germany, where they were cared for by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (which soon became the International Refugee Organization), by other international agencies, and by Jewish organizations such as the Joint Distribution Committee. The food and

35 'Abominable outrages' medical aid they received helped restore most of them to physical health. Clothing, books, and musical instruments heped restore their humanity. But most of them remained homeless while the United States, Canada, and other countries which had refused to take Jewish refugees before the war continued to refuse them after. 1

Britain and the United States entered the post-war era under new leadership. In July 1945 the British people turned to the Labour party, under Clement Attlee, to guide them into peace. Attlee chose Ernest Bevin, a former trade union leader, as foreign secretary; both men leaned heavily on the professional diplomats in the Foreign Office for advice on matters such as Palestine and that advice was to continue the course Britain had followed since the proclamation of the White Paper in 1939. By the fall of 1945 it was clear that the Labour government, which Zionists had once looked to as their salvation, would keep the doors to Palestine almost completely closed. Attlee, in fact, told the Jews 'not to push to the head of the queue' 2 in trying to get out of Europe. Royal Navy squadrons in the Mediterranean were beefed up and London mounted a determined effort to stop the Zionists from smuggling Jewish refugees into Palestine. The United States was shocked, on 12 April 1945, by the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt had publicly supported the Zionists as long as his administration had had no need to do anything about Palestine, but his support seemed to waver in the last months of his life as he faced the realities of American economic and strategic needs in the Middle East. At a meeting with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia on his way back from the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt experienced Arab antipathy towards Zionism at first hand. He later told Congress that he had 'learned more about the whole problem of Arabia the Moslems - the Jewish problem - by talking to Ibn Saud for five minutes than [he] could have learned in the exchange of two or three dozen letters.' 3 Roosevelt's successor was Harry S. Truman, a former senator from Missouri, who was a complete neophyte in foreign policy. Truman was feisty, direct, quick to judge, and prone to moralizing about international issues. He appeared to take a special interest in the Jewish refugee problem from the start, probably as a result of his Sunday school background and of domestic political considerations - Jews were im-

36 Canada and the Birth of Israel portant in the Democratic Party and numerous in some key states like New York. Truman had first raised the matter at the Potsdam Conference in private correspondence with Churchill and had then sent a representative to Europe. The American representative had reported back that most Jews wanted to go to Palestine, and on 31 August, 1945 Truman sent a letter to Attlee urging Britain to allow 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine.4 Truman's intervention boded ill for good relations between Britain and the United States and thus also for Canada. Up to this point the United States either had taken no position on the Palestine question or had tacitly supported Britain. As long as the White House had been uninterested in the issue the State Department had made the policy and the policy had been to back whatever the British did; London was responsible for the eastern Mediterranean by virtue of her strong presence and interests there. The U.S. had followed this approach despite the ringing endorsation given Zionism by presidents from Woodrow Wilson on. Truman, therefore, had broken precedent on this issue; he had embarked on a path which diverged from the British and the practical unity on Palestine which had existed had been seriously undermined. From the days of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Canadian foreign policy had been based on the concept of North Atlantic unity. Canada was a British-American nation and its foreign policy had to reflect that reality. Canadian institutions were British in form and Canada had strong cultural, commercial, and historic ties with Britain. But Canada lived next door to the United States and faced the reality of American power every day. Canada could easily walk in harness with a United States and Britain that worked together, but Canadian interests, possibly even Canadian survival, were endangered if Britain and the United States went their separate ways. Once Truman began to follow his own course on Palestine, this split became a clear and present danger although it took some time before the extent of the danger could be assessed in Ottawa. Truman's initiative also spurred Zionists to launch a new campaign aimed at getting the Canadian government to take action - in support of Truman, of course. II

In September 1945 the United Zionist Council, in conjunction with the Canadian Palestine Committee, mounted a major drive to convince the government to back President Truman's proposal for the ad-

37 'Abominable outrages' mission of Jewish refugees to Palestine. They presented King with a memorandum urging him to 'use his good offices and influence in London' to secure the cancellation of the White Paper, the admission of a large number of Jewish refugees into Palestine, and the establishment of 'a Jewish commonwealth under international guarantee.' The Zionists asserted that Canada's 'humanitarian idealism' could help 'right a great injustice.' 5 This was the first time King was asked to support the Biltmore program objective of a Jewish state, and the Zionist memorandum was backed by public rallies, speeches, and favourable editorial comment from newspapers across the country. CCF leader M.J. Coldwell told the press that the Jewish record in Palestine 'in terms of both social and economic justice' spoke for itself. 6 In the House of Commons, Stanley Knowles demanded 'that the doors of Palestine should be opened' so that the Jews, who had 'suffered down through the years far more than any human beings had to suffer,' should be freed from the terrible conditions prevailing in European DP camps.7 Feelings of guilt over the Holocaust motivated some editorialists such as that of the Guelph Mercury who noted that Jews had 'met death in its most horrible form' and that their situation under the Nazis had been ' indeed a pitiful one.' 8 But guilt alone was not the overpowering consideration; the real question which the press and others focused on concerned the fate of the refugees. Where else might they go, many newspapers asked, but to Palestine which had been promised to them by the Balfour Declaration and to which they had claim by historical right: 'The Jews of Europe,' noted the Globe and Mail, 'must have somewhere to go.' 9 It was easy for the press to extol mass Jewish emigration to Palestine - and no doubt gratifying to Canadian Zionists - but the press was less adamant about demanding that large numbers of Jews be admitted to Canada. Perhaps they were aware how unpopular this policy was among Canadians. They certainly knew that the government had no intention of changing the basic course it had followed since the early 1930s of not allowing Jewish refugees to find haven in Canada. Holocaust guilt did not count for much in Ottawa. The renewed Zionist campaign against the White Paper did not go unnoticed in the Department of External Affairs. In mid-October 1945 Hume Wrong informed Louis St Laurent, who had agreed to take over the external affairs portfolio temporarily while King took a short vacation, that 'a good many representations' from across the country had been received asking for Canadian government support towards opening Palestine to Jewish immigration and that a local newspaper had

38 Canada and the Birth of Israel been 'flooded with Zionist appeals.' Wrong told St Laurent that the 'general line' on Palestine in the past had been 'as non-committal as could be managed' and recommended a continuation of this course. At this point Britain was actively pursuing United States agreement to a joint Anglo-American inquiry, Wrong noted, and under the circumstances there was 'no reason why [Canada] should volunteer any comments.'10 If Ottawa needed any additional reason why it should not make an independent intervention in the Palestine dispute it came in the form of a dispatch from L. Dana Wilgress, Canada's ambassador in Moscow. Wilgress was a respected civil servant and diplomat who had moved from the Department of Trade and Commerce to the Department of External Affairs in 1943. He had been posted to Moscow because of his extensive knowledge of the Soviet Union and the Russian language and his views on the USSR were held in high esteem in Ottawa. His was an increasingly important position. In September 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, had defected bringing secret documents that revealed the existence of several spy rings operating in Canada and with links to similar rings in Britain and the United States. This was dramatic evidence that all was not well with the wartime alliance and that the USSR and the West might not, after all, share common interests on matters of post-war peace and security. That belief had first emerged at the San Francisco Conference but was strengthened as Canadian diplomats reacted to Soviet behaviour in eastern Europe and observed Soviet intransigence at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 and in the Security Council of the United Nations. The constant Soviet use of the veto discouraged Canadian policymakers from their initial hopes that the United Nations might be an effective organ for collective security and later prompted several of them, especially Wrong and St Laurent, to begin to think about the necessity for a regional alliance of democratic countries. The Gouzenko defection did not, therefore, push Canada completely into the Cold War, but it was the first definite shove in that direction. In the spring of 1946 Wilgress sent a detailed examination of the attitude of Soviet newspapers towards the Middle East and the growing crisis in Palestine to the Department of External Affairs. He concluded from his reading of the Soviet press that the Soviet Union would in future appeal to the Arab masses as 'the champion of the rights of small nations' against the West and would denounce those Arab leaders who acted in collusion with the West and especially with the United Kingdom.11 His views thus coincided with those of Robertson

39 'Abominable outrages' and others who believed that Palestine, not particularly important to Canada in itself, could be a continuous irritant in relations between Canada's two premier allies, the United States and Great Britain. The Wilgress dispatch on Soviet attitudes to the Palestine question did not contain any lengthy or particularly incisive analyses of Soviet Middle East objectives, but it did leave the impression that the USSR would continue to take advantage of unsettled conditions in the area to cause difficulties for the United States and Great Britain. These were, therefore, troubled waters that would likely be made worse by Soviet meddling; it followed that Canada was well advised to say and do nothing that might provide further irritation. The release of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in late April 1946 provided further proof that the gap between Britain and the United States over Palestine was growing wider. That report was ready on 20 April and was supposed to be released simultaneously in London and Washington on 1 May, but three days before the projected release date, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin urged U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to delay it. Despite Bevin's prior commitment to take action on unanimous recommendations of the committee (they were all unanimous) he told Byrnes that the 100,000 Jewish refugees which the committee urged should be admitted to Palestine without delay could not 'all go ... immediately.' The Jews were shipping weapons to Palestine, he claimed, and the refugees were being selected by the Jewish Agency 'for their military qualities.'12 Truman refused to grant Bevin's request and, instead, issued a statement on 1 May supporting the recommendation that 100,000 refugees be admitted to Palestine. The process, he urged, 'should now be accomplished with the greatest dispatch.'13 The British view of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report was passed on to the Commonwealth high commissioners at a meeting shortly after when Prime Minister Attlee announced that before any refugees were admitted to Palestine, a 'purge' of the Jewish leadership would have to be carried out 'right to the top' so that Jewish violence could be suppressed. Vincent Massey, Canada's high commissioner, agreed with the other high commissioners that 'United States assistance was essential' in solving the Palestine question.14 ill

In early May 1946 Sam Zacks met with Elizabeth MacCallum in Ottawa to discuss the Palestine question and the Anglo-American Com-

40 Canada and the Birth of Israel mittee Report. MacCallum told him that Canada had no legal obligations to the Zionists despite Zionist claims to the contrary. Though the Department of External Affairs 'had a great deal of sympathy with Zionist objectives/ the current policy was 'to support rather than to oppose the British position with regard to Palestine.' Canada was firmly attached to Britain in 'sentiment and business interests,' MacCallum reminded Zacks, and there was 'little likelihood' of Canada 'taking a different stand on Palestine than the one adopted by Great Britain.' 15 It was a fair and hard-nosed assessment that accurately summed up Canada's Palestine policy over the previous half-decade. MacCallum had little sympathy with Zionist political objectives even though she was willing to praise the 'moderation and sense of responsibility' of some Zionist leaders, Sam Zacks among them. She believed the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report provided 'no basis for an enduring settlement in Palestine' and thought that 'Zionists should make overtures not only to Arabs in Palestine but also to the surrounding Arab countries.' They should, in her opinion, 'work overtime in devising and publishing to the world their agreement with many points in the general Arab programme.'16 MacCallum clearly believed that it was not too late, even by mid-1946, for moderate Zionists and Arabs to reach a political accommodation short of war. This view was based, in part, on her analysis of intra-Zionist political rivalries. She divided the Zionist camp into those who continued to aim for a Jewish state in all of Palestine as the Jewish National Home and those whom she thought were giving increasing signs of willingness to settle for a compromise with the Arabs. In the first group MacCallum placed Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, leader of the Zionist Organization of America, which was closely allied to David Ben Gurion and to most of the Palestine-based leaders within the Jewish Agency. She placed Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, and Nahum Goldmann, Washington representative of the Jewish Agency, in the second category. She believed Silver and Ben Gurion would go to any lengths, possibly including war, to secure their aims but that Goldmann and Weizmann preferred the diplmatic road of negotiation and compromise. On the Arab side, MacCallum considered the Palestine Arabs, Saudi Arabia, and Syria to be the most intransigent parties, implacably opposed to any compromise with the Jews.17 In this MacCallum underestimated the desire of even 'moderate' Zionists such as Weizmann and Goldmann to achieve statehood, even if only to solve the problem of the Jewish refugees in Europe, while she overestimated

41 'Abominable outrages' the willingness of 'moderate' Arabs to reach an agreement with the Zionists. She was also departing from her earlier and more pessimistic view that Zionism and Arab nationalism were basically incompatible. The Zionist campaign to convince Britain to admit 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine without further delay was supported by most Canadians as recorded in a Gallup poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in January and February 1946. Of those polled 49 per cent agreed that Jews should 'be allowed to settle freely in Palestine' and another 20 per cent agreed that they should be allowed to settle there in limited numbers. Only 7 per cent opposed further Jewish settlement, and 24 per cent were undecided.18 It is likely that the poll reflected a mixture of motives. When the institute conducted a survey in October 1946 to determine which ethnic groups were least desired as immigrants by Canadians, Jews ranked second on the list behind the Japanese and 49 per cent of those polled wanted the government to bar Jews.19 Taken together there can be little doubt that some Canadians favoured Jewish immigration to Palestine because they did not want Jews coming to Canada. The Jewish refugee question posed difficulties for the Canadian government. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry had stressed that the condition of the Jewish refugees in Europe was deplorable and that some sort of resettlement was necessary to solve the problem, but if they could not go to Palestine, they would clearly have to go elsewhere. Would Canada help take them in? In early July Alistair Stewart, CCF MP for Winnipeg North, asked Mackenzie King in the House of Commons whether Canada would allow some of the refugees to enter the country. King pointed to amendments to immigration laws which had been passed in May that allowed 'some increase in the movement of immigrants to Canada without discrimination as to race or creed' but made no specific commitment about Jewish refugees.20 King was just as determined to sit on the fence about Canadian support for Anglo-American Committee recommendations as he was about the admission of Jews to Canada. On 16 July he told the House, in reply to a question posed by Conservative MP Douglas Harkness, that he did not believe 'any useful purpose would be served by a statement on the situation in Palestine by the Canadian government at the present moment.' 21 This approach remained unchanged despite British requests for a Canadian commitment to take in specified numbers of refugees and to support the recommendations of the Morrison-Grady Commission, established by the United States and Britain to study the best

42 Canada and the Birth of Israel means of giving effect to the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations.22 Hume Wrong believed 'no useful purpose would be served by a statement on behalf of the Canadian Government.' 23 Canada's refusal to take an official position on the Palestine question in the summer of 1946 was based, at least in part, on the urging of Elizabeth MacCallum and shows that she was still influential in determining Canadian Middle East policy. When the Canadian government was called upon by Britain to support the Morrison-Grady proposals Hume Wrong was, at first, inclined to think that Canada should agree and he initiated the preparation of a draft statement reflecting that view. At the same time, however, he asked MacCallum to prepare a background paper on Palestine developments which was to have a significant impact on his thinking.24 In it MacCallum urged Canadian neutrality and claimed that any Canadian announcement of support for either Arabs or Jews 'would tend to impede the realization to even a moderate degree of the basic and internationally recognized rights of [both parties].' Her belief in the necessity of Arabs and Zionists working out their own solutions through negotiations and mutual understanding clearly emerged and she displayed no enthusiasm for imposed solutions or partisan Canadian pronouncements.25 One day later, after reading her memo, Wrong changed his mind about the usefulness of announcing Canadian support for the Morrison-Grady proposals. MacCallum's influence on Canada's continuing non-commitment did not, however, end there. Her strong belief in mutual negotiation and recognition emerged in the position paper on Palestine prepared for the Canadian delegation to the fall 1946 UN General Assembly meeting in New York: 'Advocacy by outside nations of the claims of either side might tend ... to retard in some measure the establishment of a regime which would bring peace to Palestine ... it may not be beyond the scope of Arab and Jewish statesmanship to find, with the aid of the United Kingdom a working arrangement which both communities will accept.'26 IV

All over Jerusalem people were preparing for the long afternoon break that makes life more bearable in the heat of the mid-day when at twenty minutes after noon on 22 July 1946 the noise of a small explosion was heard followed by the wail of sirens. The Irgun's most daring raid yet - an attack on the offices of the British mandate in the King

43 'Abominable outrages' David Hotel - had begun. The small bomb was intended to scare passers-by from the vicinity of the large stone building while telephoned warnings to the mandate offices themselves were expected to give ample time for evacuation. But something went horribly wrong: no one left the King David and at 12:37 PM a massive explosion echoed across the city as the south-west wing of the hotel collapsed in a heap of rubble and dust. The Irgun had packed hundreds of pounds of explosives in large milk cans which had been smuggled into the basement and the mandatory offices were completely destroyed. The bodies of ninety-one people - Arabs, British, and Jews - were buried in the ruins. Irgun and Lehi terror was not new, but the blowing up of the King David Hotel signalled a drastic escalation of the anti-British violence, and, whatever its impact on the military and political situation in Palestine, it almost completely derailed the Zionist campaign for public support in Canada. Although the United Zionist Council quickly condemned the King David bombing, calling it 'outrageous and dastardly,' 27 their words were lost in the uproar of public reaction. The Montreal Daily Star pointed to the bombing as 'proof that the underground campaign which has been carried on by the Haganah and associated organizations will stop at nothing in its campaign of terrorism' 28 even though the Haganah was not involved in the attack. The Vancouver Sun called the bombing a tragedy for the Jews which would 'bathe the Holy Land in blood' 29 while the Halifax Herald described the attack as 'one of the most dreadful and despicable outrages of its kind in the annals of human dispute.'30 Throughout these editorials ran a single theme: the Jews had been saved from Hitler's gas chambers by the British and were repaying that salvation with savagery. The Calgary Herald quoted Oxford University professor Arthur L. Goodhard in making its case: 'Do the Zionists ... ever stop to think what would have happened to the Jews if in the year 1940-41 ... the [swastika] had in fact conquered the Union Jack? Every Jew in Europe and Palestine would either have been killed or would be working as a slave for his Nazi masters.'31 The King David explosion occurred during hearings into the Palestine question held by the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs. The committee, chaired by Liberal MP Joseph A. Bradette (a member of the Canadian Palestine Committee), never made a report to the House of Commons on Palestine, and there is no evidence to show that it had any impact on policy-making in general. It was a good vehicle to educate the public and MPS on the Palestine

44 Canada and the Birth of Israel question, however, and Canadian Zionists had asked to appear before the committee as part of their campaign to convince the government to take a stand on the Anglo-American Committee's recommendation. On 12 July 1946 the Standing Committee had agreed to hear both Zionist and Arab representatives. The Zionist delegation, headed by Sam Zacks and including Harry Batshaw, Herbert Mowat, and Marvin Gelber of Toronto, was introduced to the committee on 14 July 1946 by Lieutenant Colonel David A. Croll, a member of the External Affairs Committee and of the Zionist Organization of Canada, who had been elected to represent Spadina for the Liberals in 1945. Croll's political career stretched back to 1930 when he was first elected mayor of Windsor and had included a stint as minister of labour in the Ontario cabinet under Premier Mitchell Hepburn in the 1930s. During a strike against the General Motors Corporation in Oshawa in 1937 he and Attorney General Arthur Roebuck had been forced to resign because they opposed Hepburn's anti-union policies. In two committee sessions, on 19 and 22 July, the Zionists made their case. They claimed that Canada had a responsibility in the Palestine crisis because it had been a member of the League of Nations and was, therefore, one of the countries which Britain must answer to. They argued that Jewish settlers had made the deserts bloom, raised the Arab standard of living, and contributed greatly to Allied victory in World War Two, and they urged the Canadian government to support the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. Mowat concentrated on the question of Palestine's future status and argued that the Jewish National Home, promised by the 1917 Balfour Declaration, should be a prelude to full statehood. He and Zacks claimed that Arabs and Jews got along well in Palestine and estimated that Palestine could absorb many more Jews than the 100,000 recommended by the Anglo-American Committee. Both men also took care to assure the External Affairs Committee that Jewish terrorism in Palestine was an aberration supported only by a handful of Jews who had grown desperate and frustrated at Britain's failure to move away from the 1939 White Paper.32 Their plea came within hours of the King David explosion and must have sounded hollow indeed when the death toll in Jerusalem was tallied. Four days after the King David bombing, Arab representatives appeared before the External Affairs Committe to present their case. They urged Canada not to support Zionist demands, denied that Jews

45 'Abominable outrages' had any claims to Palestine, and asserted that the Arabs and Jews in Palestine had lived peacefully together for centuries until the tranquillity of the land had been destroyed by the Zionists. M.S. Massoud, president of the Canadian-Arab Friendship League and publisher of The Canadian Arab, a small-circulation mimeographed newsletter, lashed out at 'Zionist terrorists' and called upon the Jews not to uproot the Arabs 'from their own soil' or to 'attempt to get even with the inhabitants of Europe, who committed the injustice against them, by inflicting in turn injustice on the Arab.' Massoud claimed that the Zionists aimed to establish a Jewish state in order to 'accredit representatives and agents to the various countries [so] that they may keep their finger on the pulse of nations, in order to safeguard the interests of Jewry.'33 Massoud and other Arab representatives counted on Irgun and Lehi terrorism to turn the public against Zionists, and in fact, Rabbi Jesse Schwartz, executive director of the Zionist Organization of Canada, thought the King David bombing would be 'one of the greatest blows to the Zionist cause.'34 In the month following the attack only two Canadian newspapers printed editorials favourable to the Zionists, but it is difficult to measure the real impact of the King David bombing on Canadian public opinion. An anti-semite, such as Social Credit MP Norman Jaques, did not need the incident to launch an attack in the House of Commons on 'Zionist-Communist forces which seek world control'35 while the columnist for the Berwick, Nova Scotia, Register who wondered 'if Hitler shouldn't have had a free hand to finish [the Jews] while he was at it' 36 did not arrive at this conclusion overnight. It is more likely that the King David bombing and anti-British terrorism only confirmed the anti-Zionist beliefs of those Canadians who were already so inclined while it caused some others to conclude that the Zionists were no more deserving of Canadian support than were the Arabs. In the public arena, however, anti-Zionism grew louder and far more respectable; the Palestine crisis no longer seemed to be a struggle between Arabs and Jews but between Zionists and the British. The major Canadian newspapers which expressed sustained opposition to Zionism, such as the Toronto Telegram, the Windsor Star, and the Montreal Star, did not champion the Arab cause as much as they attacked Zionism for attacking Great Britain. In so pro-British a country as Canada this was hardly surprising. There were, however, Canadians who were increasingly vocal in their sympathy and support for the Arab position on Palestine. A.E. Prince, a professor of political science at Queen's University, charged

46 Canada and the Birth of Israel that the Zionist movement had 'by remote control ... paralyzed and sterilized the Palestinian majority, and [had] prevented Britain as the Mandatory Power from developing the self-governing institutions envisaged in Article II of the Mandate.' Prince saw the Palestine question in purely national terms: the Arabs were blocked in their desire to achieve full self-determination by the British who had been manipulated by the Zionists. His solution was to maintain a ratio of two Arabs for every Jew and to create one state - Palestine - with one category of citizenship.37 Reverend Claris E. Silcox, who had been one of the leading Christian exponents of allowing Jewish refugees into Canada in the 1930s, now became a strong and determined opponent of the Zionist cause. In a University of Toronto Quarterly article Silcox denied that the Jews had any rights to Palestine by virtue of their ancient possession of the land or their age-long prophetic yearnings to return. He claimed, 'with some hesitation,' that the Jews' nostalgia for Palestine 'may have been responsible for ... anti-semitism ... in almost every age' because 'the very insistence of some of their religious leaders on their destined return to Palestine must have militated against their complete identification with the people among whom they were temporarily living.' Silcox believed that Zionist efforts were creating a 'new focal centre of anti-Semitism' that would destroy the sympathy for the Jews which the Holocaust had created. The Jews should give up their nationalist ambitions, Silcox urged, to seek a greater peace 'among men of goodwill.'38 Prince and Silcox undoubtedly epitomized a wider group of Canadians who were alienated by the cruder manifestations of Jewish nationalism and who entertained Utopian views about the chances of peaceful accommodation between Arab and Jew in Palestine and about prospects for a new dawn of tolerance towards Jews in a world of harsh, competing nationalism. Prince, for example, gave no thought to the strong possibility that a unitary state of Palestine with an Arab majority would soon run red with Jewish blood. He ignored the history of Arab attacks against Jews in 1920, 1922, 1929, and 1936 and did not consider the deep and bitter hostility that Arabs felt against Jews in Palestine or their complete mistrust of Jewish intentions. Whether or not Arab violence had been provoked by the Zionist presence or was justified in any way, the Arabs, by 1946, had come to equate all Jews in Palestine, with the possible exception of the small ancient, orthodox Jewish community, with socialism, sectarianism, immorality, and Zionism. Prince ignored all this, but these were facts none the less. Silcox failed to heed the immediate lessons of the previous decade

47 'Abominable outrages' when a virulent, racist, strain of European nationalism had built upon the deeply rooted anti-semitism of at least a thousand years in rationalizing the attempted extirpation of the Jews from the face of the earth. A sovereign Jewish state might have provided a haven for some European Jews who were murdered; goodwill had not saved any. V

On the evening of 28 July 1946 a Royal Air Force patrol bomber spotted a small, unidentified ship off the coast of Palestine and began to shadow the vessel while time, course, and speed were radioed to a nearby Royal Navy destroyer. The ship was undoubtedly carrying another load of illegal immigrants and well-oiled British intercept procedures were quickly put into effect. As the destroyer pulled alongside in the failing light, the crew of the immigrant ship, the SS Haganah, put out an SOS - a signal to the Jews of Palestine that yet another immigrant ship had been discovered. The Haganah, with 2600 persons crammed aboard, dropped anchor in the Bay of Haifa the following morning while British officials debated the fate of the passengers. This was becoming an increasingly common occurrence by the summer of 1946, as Jewish efforts to smuggle refugees into Palestine were stepped up, but the case of the SS Haganah drew special attention in Ottawa. The news story of the interception, carried in the London Times, noted that the SS Haganah was a former Royal Canadian Navy corvette and that other Canadian-built ships were also being used by the Zionists.39 The news that the Haganah and other Jewish blockade runners, as the immigrant ships were referred to in Palestine, were war-surplus Canadian vessels spurred Frederic Hudd, Canada's acting high commissioner in London, to seek further information from Ottawa about the ships. He was told that a number of war-surplus corvettes, currently sailing under the Panamanian flag, had been sold to 'Jewish dealers in New York' by the War Assets Corporation but that the government had 'no control over [the] resale of [those] vessels.'40 Hudd was not satisfied with the disclaimer because he was worried about the potential impact the ship sales might have on Canadian-UK relations and he told the Department of External Affairs had it had 'a responsibility to look a little farther.' 41 At the same time that Hudd made his inquiry, John Holmes, first secretary at the High Commission, approached the Admiralty and asked for specific information about the ships mentioned in the Times story.42 In Ottawa the Hudd inquiries spurred the Department of External

48 Canada and the Birth of Israel Affairs to action. Escott Reid of the Political Division considered the use of the former Canadian warships 'politically embarrassing' and hoped that War Assets would do 'all in their power' to ensure that the situation did not recur.43Hume Wrong approached War Assets, pointed out the sensitivity of the sales, and asked the corporation to 'watch the sales of corvettes and frigates and do anything [possible] to lessen the likelihood of Canadian ships being resold for use in the smuggle of immigrants into Palestine.'44 He also asked the corporation to advise External Affairs when sales were made to allow the department to better prepare for incidents of this kind in the future. J.H. Berry, president of the corporation, agreed.45 The corvettes episode made Ottawa extremely wary about Zionist use of Canadian facilities to promote illegal immigration. When a Jewish organization in Canada sought permission to transfer $30,000 to its New York City headquarters in August (wartime currency controls were still in effect), Ottawa instructed Canada House in London to check with the British to find out if the money 'might be used for [the] purpose of subsidizing migration to Palestine or for [a] similar purpose which might complicate [the] existing situation in [the] eastern Mediterranean.' 46 Officials in the Foreign and Colonial Offices thought it 'likely' that the money would be used for that purpose but did not think it 'worth while' for either government 'to become involved in a controversy with this organisation.'47 Canada's actions in these matters amounted to automatic support for Britain's efforts to enforce the White Paper immigration quotas in Palestine; it was a case where neutrality helped one side more than another. But although there was much sympathy in Canada House and in the Department of External Affairs for Britain's position, it is not necessarily true that Ottawa acted only from a desire to help Britain; there was also a strong desire to stay clear of the entire mess. This latter objective was perfectly consistent with Canada's approach to the Palestine question at that point and consistent with rising Canadian fears about the impact of the Palestine crisis on American-British relations. The illegal immigration was receiving a great deal of support and sympathy in the United States (though not in the State Department) and was directly related to Truman's position on the admission of refugees to Palestine. Britain, however, looked on illegal immigration as just that - a willful Zionist violation of Palestine immigration law which was exacerbating the crisis. Given the choice, a continuation of Canada's pro-British neutrality must have seemed the wisest course in Ottawa.

49 'Abominable outrages' VI

Mackenzie King had not moulded Canada's Palestine policy but he endorsed it, and it suited his approach to international issues which did not appear to him to involve Canadian interests. He was always prepared to fight the British when Canadian autonomy was at stake but deferred to them on other matters. Although he could not have been unaware of the new predominance of the United States in world affairs, he was clearly not as ready to follow Washington as he was to trust London. But King was beginning to give up his tight hold on Canadian foreign policy by the late summer of 1946 and the men who were preparing to take control were far less ready to follow Britain's leadership than he had been. On 5 September 1946 King passed the external affairs portfolio to Louis St Laurent in a successful attempt to keep the reluctant minister in the government. At the same time a number of key changes were made in the top ranks of the department. Lester Pearson returned from his post as ambassador to the United States to become under-secretary of state for external affairs, the top civil servant in the department, while Hume Wrong replaced him in Washington and Norman Robertson was sent to Canada House to become Canadian high commissioner in London. Although the changes brought no immediate shifts in Canadian foreign policy, they brought closer to the centre of decisionmaking two people, Pearson and St Laurent, who saw the world from a far different perspective than did Mackenzie King. St Laurent did not have the ingrained deference to British leadership that coloured so many of King's attitudes and he was far more willing to countenance Canada's increased activism in world affairs. Pearson was one of the architects of that activism; he was also personally ambitious and anxious to carve a name for himself, and for Canada, in world councils. Pearson's views on Canada's position in the world were to become an important factor in the making of Canadian foreign policy. Those views had been moulded by education and experience. He had studied modern history at the University of Toronto and at Oxford before accepting a teaching post at the University of Toronto in 1924. He was recruited into the Department of External Affairs by Dr Oscar Douglas Skelton, under-secretary of state for external affairs, in 1928 and was appointed first secretary. He served for a number of years in London and Ottawa before joining the Canadian legation in Washington in 1942. He stayed in the U.S. capital, eventually becoming Canadian ambassador, until September 1946.

50 Canada and the Birth of Israel Although Pearson was very conscious of Canada's British roots and its continuing ties to the mother country, he was well aware of the importance of the United States to Canada and of its rising power. This, he knew, would be a major influence on Canada's future. 48 It is hard to know how much credence he gave to the hoary old idea that Canada had a unique role to play in interpreting Britain and the United States to each other - the North Atlantic Triangle notion - but it is clear that he believed Canadian policy had to be made in a North Atlantic context and had to be in tandem with Britain and the United States. When those two countries were out of step, he noted in a January 1948 speech, Canada had to 'stop playing the triangle in the international symphony.'49 Canada's freedom to make its own policy was, therefore, limited, even on questions such as Palestine. While these changes were taking place in Ottawa, a new political adviser was settling into his job at the Jewish Agency in New York. He was Lionel Gelber, a Toronto-born political scientist who was appointed in June 1946. Gelber, a Rhodes Scholar, had written a number of books and articles on international relations, was a member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and knew many of the External Affairs mandarins, and some of Canada's rising political leaders, personally. He essentially shared Pearson's views on Canada's place in the world and believed that the Jewish Agency should 'explore the possible use of the good offices of the Canadian government to hasten a settlement between the Jewish Agency and ... the United Kingdom.' Gelber knew that Anglo-American friendship was 'a cardinal item' in Canadian foreign policy and that the Palestine question was a growing irritant to United States-United Kingdom relations. Since the United States, at President Truman's behest, seemed to be moving closer to the Jewish Agency position on the Palestine question, he reasoned, Canada might be persuaded to try to convince Britain to follow along. Gelber thus intended to appeal to Canadian national interests in attempting to get Canada more directly involved in the Palestine question.50 Gelber's belief that Canada's national interest was involved in the Palestine conflict was not, at that time, shared by anyone in the cabinet or at the top decision-making levels in the Department of External Affairs. There was, of course, an awareness that the U.S. and the UK were increasingly at loggerheads over Palestine but Canadian concern was mitigated by two factors: first, the degree of disagreement was by no means clear in late 1946 and, second, there were far more important issues, especially those growing out of the confrontation between the

51 'Abominable outrages' Soviet Union and its former allies in the West, which were drawing the U.S. and UK together. But Gelber's views were prophetic, as was his assessment of the probable importance to the Jewish Agency of Lester Pearson. Gelber told Nahum Goldmann in October 1946 that Pearson would 'be in control of Canada's foreign policies long after Mackenzie King and St Laurent have disappeared from the scene.' It was his view that Pearson would 'be heard from again in broader international, as well as strictly Canadian, activities.'51 The Gelber-inspired Jewish Agency approach to the Canadian government came in late October 1946 when Sam Zacks represented the Jewish Agency in a meeting with Pearson and MacCallum. Zacks tried to convince Pearson and MacCallum that Canada could play an important role in the Palestine question and did not repeat the oft-mentioned Zionist claim that Canada had a legal responsibility in the Palestine matter. He observed, instead, that there was a growing tension between the United States and the United Kingdom over Palestine and that Canada, 'acting in the traditional role of interpreter between the two countries,' could use its influence 'to secure fuller sympathy in the United Kingdom for the proposals made by President Truman ... for the early transfer of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine.'52 This suggestion that Canada was tailor made to play 'honest broker' over Palestine, not between Arab and Jew, but between the United States and the United Kingdom, may well have appealed momentarily to Pearson's diplomatic style (and perhaps to his personal ambition). But his freedom to act was severely limited at that time; as a civil servant he could advise on, but could not execute, policy decisions. He told Zacks that Canada would undoubtedly support 'any plan for Palestine on which the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States could agree'53 - the classic statement of Canadian policy - and although this was not what Zacks was seeking, Pearson added that he personally thought that 'partition in Palestine was the just and only solution to the Jewish problem.' Pearson cautioned Zacks that 'it might be difficult to get Mackenzie King to take leadership on the Zionist question' but promised to forward Zacks's 'representation' to the prime minister.54 VI

Gelber's initiative might have worked if the Canadian public had appeared to be supporting the Zionists as strongly as the American public seemed to be doing and if Canadian Jewish leaders had pressed the case

52 Canada and the Birth of Israel vigorously and continously at the highest government levels. Gelber, after all, made sense and was eventually proved correct. But neither of those conditions existed despite the efforts of the United Zionist Council and the Canadian Palestine Committee. When the Canadian Jewish Congress approached King for a meeting in early 1947, St Laurent and Brooke Claxton, minister of national defence, urged that the prime minister see them because they were 'real leaders' of the Jewish community who had 'rendered a valuable service in preventing the Jewish community in Canada from taking any embarrassing attitude with respect to the Palestine difficulties.' St Laurent added that these Jewish leaders were 'all very good political friends' who gave 'substantial assistance' when required.55 The meeting took place 7 February 1947 and was the highest level gathering between Jewish leaders and the government in many years - King, St Laurent, and six other ministers met with leaders of the Canadian Jewish Congress and three executive members of the Zionist Organization of Canada. It was a golden opportunity for the Zionists and the CJC to discuss all the ramifications of the Jewish refugee problem in Europe including greater access to Canada and Truman's appeal to the British to allow 100,000 refugees into Palestine. But Palestine was not discussed at all; the meeting focused entirely on the Canadian Jewish Congress campaign to convince Canada to allow in more Jewish refugees.56 The mounting Irgun and Stern Gang attacks against the British in Palestine and the resultant upsurge in anti-Zionist and anti-semitic opinion in Canada57 forced mainline Zionist leaders on the defensive in late 1946 and early 1947. They fought the Irgun's branch organizations in Canada (such as the American League for a Free Palestine); they tried to counter the increasingly effective Arab public relations efforts spearheaded by the Canadian Arab Friendship League; and they attempted to convince Canadians that their disavowals of terrorism were sincere, and that they were actually pro-British at heart. It seemed, in the early months of 1947, to be a losing battle; a Zionist Organization of Canada field worker in western Canada reported, in March of that year, that anti-semitism was 'looming larger every day as a political issue in the Dominion.'58 The national Social Credit party, and its chief English and French organs, regularly dispensed anti-semitic propaganda including, at one point, the publication in French of a serialization of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion,59 while small-town Ontario newspapers such as the Burk's Falls Arrow, the Exeter TimesAdvocate, and the Renfrew Mercury printed vicious attacks on Jews

53 'Abominable outrages' and Zionism.60 The larger and more responsible newspapers were far less vehement and some, such as the Globe and Mail and the Ottawa Citizen, continued to maintain a friendly attitude towards mainline Zionism, but almost every organ which commented on the Palestine question cautioned that the Irgun and Lehi were doing serious damage to Zionism's public support. Given this attitude, the government's policy of non-commitment was as appropriate as ever. The likelihood that Canada would play a role in the resolution of this most difficult international question was still virtually non-existent.

3

'A duty which could not be evaded;

Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Webb, commanding officer of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, was livid as he read his announcement to a group of journalists, hastily summoned to regimental headquarters in Jerusalem in the middle of the night of 24 October 1946. Only hours before, bombs had exploded at a number of British army roadblocks around Jerusalem, killing two soldiers and injuring ten others. Webb had ordered his men to round up thirteen newspapermen of different nationalities so that he could tell the Jews, through the press, just what he thought of them. As the journalists scribbled away, Webb denounced the 'bloody Jews' whose skins the British had saved 'in Alamein and other places' and announced that at that very moment his men were pulling one thousand Jews out of their beds. They would stand all night until they could provide proper identification, Webb threatened. He called the Jews 'a despicable race' whose men ate too much carp and whose women bulged in all the wrong places and he told his audience to 'print everything'; he did not care if he was 'out of the army tomorrow.'1 Webb was truly a frustrated man and his frustrations mirrored the increasing difficulties of the British rulers of Palestine in the fall of 1946. Almost every day British soldiers were killed, British property was destroyed, and Haganah ships appeared off the coast of Palestine, ready to test the Royal Navy blockade. British law and order in Palestine was breaking down, and it was clearer with each passing day that the hour of reckoning was approaching for the British mandate.

i

On 6 September 1946 the Foreign Office convened the London Conference to try to find common ground between Arabs and Jews on the

55 'A duty which could not be evaded' Palestine question; the Morrison-Grady proposals were to form the basis for discussion. This was the first round of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's final attempt to mediate between Arabs and Jews. The effort failed completely and the conference was quickly adjourned with a second round scheduled for the near future. The Arab position was clear: they opposed any sort of provincial autonomy within Palestine; they demanded an immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and Jewish land acquisitions; and they proposed immediate independence for Palestine as a unitary state with one legislature. (Jewish rights within this state could be protected by allowing up to one-third of the legislative seats to be set aside for Jewish representatives.) Once Palestine was independent, a treaty would be signed with Britain giving it the right to continue to use its military facilities there. 2 The Zionist position was not as clear. Although Zionist leaders such as Rabbi Silver and Ben Gurion continued to claim all of Palestine in public, they were actually swinging towards partition in private. Weizmann proposed partition to Ben Gurion in mid-September as a compromise solution to place before the British, and Ben Gurion agreed that this was certainly preferable to a continuation of the White Paper regime.3 In the United States Rabbi Silver made quiet approaches to President Truman urging him to issue a statement in favour of partition. At the behest of the State Department Truman resisted but on 4 October he made yet another plea for the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine and, at the same time, urged that Britain bridge the gap between the Arab and Jewish positions.4 At the end of November Silver met Bevin, who came to New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly, and tried to convince him to commit Britain to partition in advance of the upcoming World Zionist congress; if Bevin agreed, Silver pointed out, the scheme could be openly discussed there, allowing Silver and Ben Gurion to line support up for it. Bevin refused to go along and instead warned Silver that if Britain could not find a solution to the Palestine impasse, it would either turn the mandate over to the United States or bring the Palestine question to the United Nations for action.5 Silver undoubtedly knew that there was no chance the United States would take over the mandate, and he, like other Zionist leaders, feared the possible consequences of throwing the Palestine question into the totally unpredictable forum of the UN.

Bevin's threat to turn Palestine over to the UN reflected growing opinion within the Foreign and Colonial Offices that Britain, in fact, had little choice but to go to the UN sooner or later. This conclusion

56 Canada and the Birth of Israel was not due to any perceived legal obligation but was based more on political considerations. One Colonial Office official thought it 'inconceivable as a matter of practical policy that [Britain] should embark on some entirely new line in Palestine without bringing the matter to the United Nations at some stage, or should even continue indefinitely with the present regime.' If the British were to stay in Palestine, he reasoned, the 'correct way of regularising the position' would be to seek a UN trusteeship over Palestine. If Britain were to change its policy in Palestine, either by accepting the Arab proposals and granting independence to Palestine as a unitary state, or by partitioning the area into a Jewish and an Arab state, it was unlikely the Arabs or the Zionists would challenge Britain's right to make such decisions unilaterally and 'would use the United Nations as a forum for making their challenge.'6 Britain's only real choice, therefore, was when and how the issue should be referred to the UN. The UN and the partition question were on the minds of many of the Zionist delegates who gathered at Basle in December for the first World Zionist Organization congress since the war. It was an opportunity to vent the built-up emotionalism and frustration generated by the lack of movement towards Zionist objectives and it gave Silver, Ben Gurion, and their allies a chance to shove aside Weizmann and Goldmann who were considered far too deferential to the British. Weizmann was blocked from continuing as wzo president and a majority of delegates instructed the Jewish Agency not to attend the London conference when it resumed. They also endorsed the 1942 Biltmore demand for a Jewish state in all of Palestine, thus rejecting partition.7 It appeared as if Silver and Ben Gurion had won the day but, in reality, partition and informal participation at the London conference were still very much alive as Zionist options because the Zionist Executive, elected to work with Silver and Ben Gurion, contained a majority in favour of both positions. In fact, shortly after the congress, the Zionists informed the Foreign Office that they would attend the London conference on an 'informal' basis. In the week prior to the scheduled re-opening of the London talks in January 1947, the British cabinet tried to find a solution to the Palestine impasse. They were told by the legal advisers of the Foreign and Colonial Offices that Britain would be legally obliged to obtain the approval of the United Nations before partitioning Palestine but that they were not obligated 'from a strictly legal point of view' to obtain UN assent for the introduction of local autonomy for Arabs and Jews. Despite this, the advisers pointed out, Britain would be committing a

57 'A duty which could not be evaded' serious political error if it did not bring the Palestine question to the UN regardless of what course of action it decided upon and there were 'strong political reasons why it would be extremely difficult to defend the continuance of British administration in Palestine except under [UN] trusteeship.'8 On 15 January the cabinet met to discuss Palestine. Viscount Montgomery, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Viscount Tedder, the chief of the Air Staff, also attended. Montgomery told the cabinet that Palestine was 'of special importance' in British defence plans because of its potential 'as a screen for the defence of Egypt.' Tedder pointed out that if Palestine were partitioned into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and a British controlled enclave around Jerusalem, the 'military facilities required by the Chiefs of Staff could not be established within the Jerusalem area alone while the facilities already available to Britain in Transjordan 'would not alone suffice.' It would be necessary, therefore, for Britain to conclude treaties with both Arab and Jewish states in order to maintain an effective military presence in Palestine. If this could be done, it was not important to the military whether or not Palestine was partitioned. Tedder told the cabinet that the problems the military were encountering in the area would naturally be greatly eased if a peaceful settlement could be found, but if it was necessary to antagonize one of the two communities with an imposed settlement, it was preferable 'from the purely military angle, that a solution should be found that did not involve the continuing hostility of the Arabs.' 9 After the review of the military situation, the cabinet turned its attention to possible political solutions. Bevin reminded his colleagues that the legal advice received from the foreign and colonial offices introduced a further complication: Britain had to find a solution not only agreed to by the Arabs and the Jews, but one that was also likely to be accepted by the UN. He thought that a plan which granted provincial autonomy within Palestine to Arabs and Jews might gain such support if it was adjusted to meet some of the objections that both Arabs and Jews had already raised against it. His own preference was to continue the mandate for a 'transitional period' as a 'bi-national unitary state' with guarantees that either of the two provinces could secede, and become independent, after a fixed period. Even though he had been told that the lack of finality in such a plan would doom it, he still wanted to explore it, or some variation of it, when the London Conference resumed. Most of the cabinet opposed the Bevin scheme and favoured im-

58 Canada and the Birth of Israel mediate partition; it appeared to be the only realistic solution.10 The British high commissioner in Palestine, Sir Alan Cunningham, was also against Bevin's plan for local autonomy within a trusteeship. He thought it included all the bad features of partition without any of the good ones, and he urged that the Palestine matter be put to rest once and for all through partition. Cunningham believed Arab resistance to partition was inevitable but that it was better to face that harsh reality as soon as possible rather than to drag matters out: 'If partition is to be introduced eventually [under Bevin's plan for a five year transitional trusteeship], in so far as Arab resistance is concerned, it would surely be better to deal with it once and for all ... than to have to suppress them once at the introduction of the transitional period, and again when partition proper is introduced.'n This advice came amid growing indications from Washington that the United States was moving away from the Morrison-Grady proposals towards the creation of a 'viable Jewish State.' On 21 January Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the British ambassador that 'the solution which ... would be easiest for the American Government to support would be one based on partition.' n But Bevin was unmoved and when discussions began in London with Arab and Jewish delegations towards the end of January, he refused to advance partition as a British-inspired solution. The discussions produced no agreement. The Arabs stood firm on their demand for immediate independence for Palestine as a unitary state and remained 'implacably opposed to the creation of a Jewish state in any part of Palestine,' while the Zionists confirmed the impression which they had been conveying to the Foreign Office since the late fall of 1946 that they were prepared, as a compromise, to settle for 'a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine.' There was no middle ground and Bevin, with the support of Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech-Jones, brought his proposals forward to the cabinet. Instead of partition, Bevin advanced a plan - the 'Bevin Plan' - that would allow 4000 Jews to enter Palestine per month for two years, after which further Jewish immigration would be conditional upon Arab acceptance or UN arbitration. Palestine would be transformed into a UN trusteeship, with local autonomy for both Arabs and Jews, and after four years, a constituent assembly would be elected by all the people of Palestine to decide the future political status of Palestine. If the assembly arrived at an agreement, independence would follow, but if not, the matter would be turned over to the UN Trusteeship Council

59 'A duty which could not be evaded' for final determination.13 The cabinet approved the plan on 6 February 1947 and it was presented to Arab and Jewish delegations, while a summary was sent to the American secretary of state. When Arabs and Jews both rejected it, the cabinet decided to place the Palestine problem before the UN without any recommendation for action,14 knowing well that the United States, in the words of Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 'would regret any decision of the British Government to turn the mandate over to the General Assembly without recommendations.'15 The British, in fact, did not 'turn the mandate over to the General Assembly' - they had no intention of giving up the mandate at this point - but were, instead, seeking a UN recommendation for a solution. 16They did so despite considerable U.S. and Zionist pessimism that the UN could ever settle the matter without guidance or direction from the country which had handled Palestine since 1917.17 II

On 18 February 1947 Bevin told the British House of Commons that the Palestine question would be put before the United Nations and that every effort would be made to have the matter settled at the September 1947 General Assembly. The announcement did nothing to deter the Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi. From 28 February to 30 March four immigrant ships were intercepted off the coast of Palestine while attacks on British-owned properties and British military facilities continued ashore. On 28 February a bomb explosion ripped through the Barclay's Bank building in Haifa, killing two persons and injuring four others. The next day armed men surrounded and attacked the officers club on King George Street in Jerusalem, placing a large explosive charge inside the building; the south-east wing of the structure was completely demolished killing thirteen and injuring eight.18 The underground armies in Palestine had given their answer to Britain: their war against Britain would continue as long as no solution acceptable to the Zionists was found. The British were anxious to get recommendations out of the UN as quickly as possible and UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie agreed. But how to do it? At first Lie wanted to appoint an ad hoc committee including representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council, with instructions to report back to the UN by the fall.19 The British agreed but the United States did not. Loy Henderson, chief of the Near Eastern Affairs Division in the State Department, was sure

60 Canada and the Birth of Israel the legality of the appointment would be challenged. He proposed, instead, a short special session of the General Assembly to be called as quickly as possible and limited to one item: the creation of a committee of investigation.20 Lie was not sure how quickly this could be done, and worried about other items being slipped on to the agenda, but he soon went along as did the British who submitted a formal request for a special session to him on 2 April 1947. He then polled the UN member countries and, when a majority agreed to the meeting, scheduled it to begin on 28 April.21 On 12 April 1947 Louis St Laurent sent Canada's approval of the special session to Lie, and two days later the cabinet authorized the dispatch of a small Canadian delegation headed by Lester Pearson and including Elizabeth MacCallum and George Ignatieff of the First Political Division of the Department of External Affairs. 22 The Canadians also began to think about the type of investigation committee they might support. R.G. Riddell and other members of the Department of External Affairs favoured a fourteen-state committee which would include the five permanent members of the Security Council.23 This ran directly counter to American plans, however, because the favourite choice of both the State Department and President Truman was a committee of eleven 'neutral' countries including Canada, New Zealand, Turkey, Sweden or Norway, India, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippine Republic. They did not want any permanent members of the Security Council on the committee. The State Department had been considering two other options in the event their first choice was not accepted by the UN, and all three plans listed Canada as a desirable member.24 There is little direct evidence available to show why the United States wanted Canada to be on the Palestine committee but it is, nevertheless, not difficult to understand. Canada had all the characteristics the United States was looking for to qualify it for committee membership. It had a record of strict neutrality on the Palestine question. (It may be the supreme irony that Canada was dragged in to the Palestine question precisely because the government had resisted involvement so strongly in the past.) Canada did not have, in Dean Acheson's words, 'a large and active Jewish community.'25 It had a solid record, compiled during and after the war, of participation on international bodies and its diplomats and foreign service officers had a reputation for excellence. At one point Lester Pearson was one of several candidates under active consideration in the State Department for

61 'A duty which could not be evaded' presidency of the special session; he was only dropped from the list for fear that he might be construed as pro-British because of the Commonwealth connection.26 Canada was an ally, a North American country, and a close partner with the United States in a broad field of activities. Canada, quite simply, could be trusted to arrive at an intelligent, perhaps even independent, recommendation. No thought appears to have been given in Washington to pressuring Canada to follow a United States line on Palestine once on the committee, nor did fears arise that Canada would follow the British position too closely. Besides, at that point in time, no one really knew what the British position on a solution would be - Britain itself did not know. Several days after Acheson's meeting with President Truman, the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa received its first indication of State Department thinking on the size and general composition of the investigating committee when London passed an outline of United States proposals to Ottawa without, apparently, listing the countries Washington preferred. Pearson had 'misgivings' about the U.S. approach. He thought exclusion of the Great Powers from the committee of investigation would seriously weaken its authority and might result in the submission of an impractical report 'entirely unacceptable to [those] states which would have to put in into effect.' Pearson worried that at least one Communist country would be elected to the committee, faithfully following and representing the policies of the Soviet Union, while 'no western state ... would wish to be put in a position of having to represent [the] view of either the Foreign Office or the State Department.' This would give undue influence to the Soviet Union in the resolution of the Palestine question. Pearson did not want the 'Big Powers [to] be permitted to evade their responsibility in Palestine ... by staying off [the] special committee' and believed that a committee of fourteen, including the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and 'possibly China,' with the United Kingdom acting in an 'advisory capacity,' would be more appropriate. He passed these thoughts to Hume Wrong in Washington and asked him to sound out the State Department about its intentions because Canada's information had come directly from London.27 Pearson had definite ideas about the 'general lines of policy' the Canadian delegation to the special session should follow and approached St Laurent to seek approval for them. He suggested that Canada should work to avoid any debate on 'the substance of the Palestine question itself and should press the special session to focus

62 Canada and the Birth of Israel on the more immediate questions of the membership and terms of reference of the investigating committee. If a debate on the substance of the Palestine question did develop, Canada should 'try to keep out of it' and should confine itself 'to uncontroversial general observations.' This approach was, of course, directly in line with previous Canadian policy on Palestine. Pearson preferred a committee of fourteen, including the Great Powers, and told St Laurent that a report from a grouping such as this 'would carry more weight than a report from any committee from which [the Great Powers] had been excluded.' He believed the investigation committee should 'be instructed' to hear any representations the Palestine Arabs or the Jewish Agency might wish to make and should decide what other interested parties it would hear. It should then organize all relevant factual data for presentation to the fall General Assembly meeting and should be 'instructed to make recommendations' to that meeting. Pearson wanted to avoid any debate of the Jewish refugee question until the fall General Assembly, but if the special session should be forced into a discussion of how and where to resettle the Jewish displaced persons in Europe, Canada should avoid the establishment of quotas and should maintain that the most effective contribution it could make to the solution of the refugee problem was through the modification of its own existing immigration regulations.28 He asked the deputy minister of the Department of Mines and Resources, in charge of immigration, to produce a confidential report on how many Jews had been admitted to Canada since Hitler had come to power in 1933 so that the Canadian delegation would 'know what relation these figures bear to any quotas' that might be suggested by other delegations to the special session.29 It is clear that Pearson, at this point, was following the same neutral policy on Palestine that had been laid down by his predecessors despite his 1945 speech in Toronto and his words to Sam Zacks in late 1946. In later years, after his retirement from politics, he was to claim that he became deeply involved in a special way in the Palestine conflict because it dealt with the 'Holy Land.' 30 That may well have been true to some degree but it is also obvious that he was, at the same time, a faithful servant of Canada's political leaders and would carry out their policies to the best of his abilities. He was also no maverick when it came to Canadian refusal to admit Jewish refugees to Canada. The Canadian desire to include the Great Powers on the committee of investigation made sense from one perspective: if a decision was arrived at that had to be imposed by force, Great Power involvement was

63 'A duty which could not be evaded' crucial, and if the Great Powers just happened to agree on a solution, it would be difficult for them to stand back, at the last moment, and refuse to back the UN up. But from another point of view it made no sense at all: Great Power involvement meant Soviet involvement, which could, ultimately, lead to Soviet troops in Palestine as part of a larger, international, military presence. Even if no troops were ever required or sent to Palestine, Soviet involvement on the committee of investigation would give the USSR a direct say in the determination of a solution to the Palestine problem. This was undoubtedly one key factor in the refusal of the State Department to support Great Power membership and its growing determination to stay off the investigation committee. On 22 April Ottawa received its first indication that the State Department wanted Canada on the investigating committee when Thomas A. Stone of the Canadian Embassy in Washington lunched with Dean Acheson. Acheson confirmed information that Stone had picked up earlier at the State Department that the United States was leaning heavily towards a small neutral committee which, in Acheson's opinion, offered the 'only possible hope of providing for a sane examination of the Palestine question.' The member states of this committee, Acheson told Stone, should not have 'publicly committed themselves on the Palestinian question' and should not have 'within their own confines any really serious Jewish problem.' He gave, as examples, the Scandinavian countries and Canada.31 Acheson discussed the matter again briefly that evening at a dinner given by Ambassador Wrong in honour of Mackenzie King who was visiting Washington for talks with Truman. Wrong was left with the impression that Acheson considered the Palestine question an important challenge to the United Nations and that if the special session failed to adopt a 'hopeful procedure' the results would be tragic. Acheson wanted the matter discussed in the UN 'on the ground that it imperilled] the peace of the world' and intended to strongly resist any pressure placed on the U.S. to participate on the special investigating committee because the U.S. did not intend to act as a representative of Jewish interests. He told Wrong that the U.S. would oppose Arab claims to at least one representative on the committee because Palestine was 'no longer a local issue or an issue concerning only Arabs and Jews.' 32 Wrong was rather impressed with the U.S. position and told Pearson that there was 'a good deal to be said for it.' He believed, however, that the investigating committee might be more effective if the individuals named to it were 'of wide

64 Canada and the Birth of Israel reputation and high probity' and did not directly represent the positions of member states. Such a committee might also have a freer hand in drawing up its recommendations. Pearson thought there might be something to the idea and told Wrong he would mention it to St Laurent before leaving Ottawa for New York and the special session.33 On 22 April, Riddell, MacCallum, and Ignatieff met in Ottawa to discuss developments likely to take place at New York. Ignatieff had just returned from there and reported that he too had heard indications that Canada was likely to be asked to serve on the investigating committee. It was agreed that although no country, except the Arab states, was likely to desire membership on the committee, participation was 'a duty which [could] not ... be evaded' because the situation in Palestine had reached a deadlock, and without United Nations action, there did not seem to be any way of settling the issue except through continued resort to force. MacCallum, Riddell, and Ignatieff all believed that if other UN members 'strongly desirefd] to have Canada serve on the Preparatory Committee,' Canada ought to be prepared to appoint a representative 'possessing outstanding qualifications for the work.' 34 The following day St Laurent met with Riddell, MacCallum, and Pearson to summarize the positions the Canadian delegation would take at the United Nations meetings. It was agreed that Canada would support efforts to limit the agenda to one item - the composition and terms of reference of the investigation committee - and to bar substantive debate of the Palestine question. The Canadians would keep silent as long as possible but if that silence became embarrassing, the Canadian delegate might make 'a very brief statement' underlining the importance of UN action in seeking a solution for this difficult problem, and pointing to the damage that might be done to the UN if its efforts 'were inadequate and proved abortive.' It was clear that Pearson was thinking about the Palestine question and the UN in terms similar to Acheson's - this was a challenge to the UN which would test its ability to come to grips with a major international issue. There was a danger that neither Acheson nor Pearson mentioned: a solution acceptable to the UN as a body, and supported by a majority in the UN, might not prove to be a solution that either party was prepared to accept. Pearson did not want Canada to participate on the investigation committee but he recognized that if 'the issue ... was forced,' presumably by the United States, it would be difficult for Canada to refuse. No one in the room spoke in favour of Canadian participation,

65 'A duty which could not be evaded' and although Wrong's suggestion that the committee might best be composed of non-governmental representatives was also discussed, none of those present supported it strongly. They did, however, agree to back the Jewish Agency's claim for a voice in any substantive debate that might develop in the assembly.35 St Laurent took little part in this discussion, if MacCallum's notes are an accurate reflection of it, and it is clear that the Canadian delegation was given considerable leeway, within the limits defined at this meeting, when it departed Ottawa for New York. There was certainly no specific instruction from St Laurent or the cabinet that Canada stay off the committee; St Laurent was apparently resigned to the reality that if Canada were pressed to participate it could not refuse to join. ill

The Canadian government was now facing substantive involvement in the Palestine question for the first time. But that involvement - and it was by no means certain as yet - would fit within the mainstream of the foreign policy that Canada was developing in the post-war era and of those policies that St Laurent was laying out in the post-King period in External Affairs. The involvement was not based on advocacy of any particular solution to the Palestine crisis and was far different from the type of activism that Canadian Zionists had urged on the government for years. Canada would, if pressed, study the Palestine question in concert with others and would then adopt a position on the basis of the findings of an impartial international commission. What could be fairer or more neutral than that? In addition, Canada was being pressed to involve itself by the United States and not by Great Britain; it is entirely possible that this U.S. urging struck a more responsive chord within the Canadian government than a similar request from Britain might have elicited. King, throughout his career, had always strongly resisted any involvement in British adventures that did not appear to him to affect Canadian interests, particularly when there had been no prior Canadian commitments and no prior consultation with Canada. United States pressure, on a problem such as this, was another matter, however, particularly when the U.S. view of the importance of solving the Palestine question within the UN accorded with the Canadian view. Canadian diplomats were also well aware, even at this point, that the Palestine question was beginning to hurt Anglo-American relations and that it had to be resolved, at least to the satisfaction of

66 Canada and the Birth of Israel the United States and Great Britain, as quickly as possible. Canadian involvement on a UN investigating commission was, therefore, perfectly consistent with Canadian interests. Involvement was also consistent with the basic foreign policy goals that St Laurent laid out in a speech inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectures at the University of Toronto in January 1947. Such public speeches are, at best, imperfect guide-posts in determining the basic directions of policy because they are, of course, designed for public consumption. In the privacy and confidentiality of the policy-making process, publicly enunciated principles may be honoured more in the breach than in the observance. Nevertheless, St Laurent's speech stands out as one of the few occasions when a secretary of state for external affairs attempted to establish and explain the broad foundations of Canadian foreign policy and the basic objectives of that policy. St Laurent listed, in order, five 'basic principles': the maintenance of national unity, the establishment and preservation of political liberty, the rule of law in national and international affairs, the preservation of Christian values, and the acceptance of Canadian responsibility in international affairs in keeping with Canada's conception of its role in the world. In this, St Laurent urged, Canada must be willing to accept international duties because Canadian security lay 'in the firm structure of international organization.' In practice this policy had meant that 'the development of international organization on a broad scale [had been] of the very greatest importance' to Canada and that Canada had been 'willing to play [its] role when it was apparent that significant and effective action was contemplated.'36 Canadian participation on a UN investigating committee was consistent with this past conduct particularly since the commission would be charged with recommending a course or courses of action to the fall General Assembly. It is clear, therefore, that although St Laurent, Pearson, and Riddell (who wrote the Gray Lecture) preferred not to be involved, they could, if necessary, give in to the Americans with a clear conscience. These decisions were made behind closed doors; public opinion and the work of pro- and anti-Zionist lobbyists in Canada did not affect the process at all. The government made no announcements outlining its approach to the special session except for a brief statement by St Laurent to the House of Commons on 14 April informing the members that Canada had agreed to the holding of a special session of the UN General Assembly and the establishment of a committee of investigation.37 The only Zionist approach to the government in the weeks

67 'A duty which could not be evaded' leading up to the special session came when the Canadian Palestine Committee sent a letter to St Laurent urging Canada to oppose the appointment to the investigating committee of 'interested parties' so that claimants to the case would not sit in judgment of the issues. The committee also urged the Canadian government to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine as 'the ultimate fulfillment of the mandate,' should this be proposed as a political solution to the problem, and pressed Canada to use its influence to convince Britain to allow 'an immediate and substantial increase in the immigration quotas' for Palestine.38 There is no indication that this letter had any impact on St Laurent's views. IV

The United Nations began its attempt to come to grips with the Palestine question on the morning of 28 April 1947 at its temporary quarters in a former skating rink at Flushing Meadow, in New York City. The small Canadian delegation was accompanied to New York by twelve members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs. The MPS were not part of the delegation but, as privileged observers, they were not forced to queue for tickets to the visitors gallery or eat off trays in the cafeterias. The setting was rather sparse and taxis shuttled to and fro from Flushing Meadow to the hotels in downtown Manhattan where most of the delegates were housed. Unlike most diplomatic gatherings, the social life at the meeting was kept to a minimum and few parties were thrown by any of the delegations. Nevertheless, rumours were rife and Montreal Daily Star correspondent Walter O'Hearn was able to predict on the first day of the meetings that Canada would be a likely candidate for service on the investigation committee, but that the Canadian delegates were not too keen to take the assignment.39 Lester Pearson was guaranteed an important place in the proceedings when, on the first day, he was elected chairman of the First Committee.40 This body was responsible for making recommendations on all political issues before the UN to the General Assembly. Since there was only one item to discuss - Arab moves to add consideration of the Palestine question itself were quickly and easily defeated - the First Committee, and Pearson, were destined for the spotlight. The United States delegation, headed by former Senator Warren Austin, had arrived at New York determined to work for the establish-

68 Canada and the Birth of Israel ment of a neutral investigating committee, now pared down to seven members including Canada, and was able to secure British support early in the session, although the British made no commitments on the specific U.S. nominees.41 The Canadians were now prepared to accept the U.S. proposal (and told the U.S. delegation that they would not oppose it), 42 but they were still very uneasy about serving. Pearson told St Laurent that the United States definitely intended to nominate Canada and that if a question was raised about the propriety of having two Commonwealth members on the committee - Canada and either Australia or New Zealand - the U.S. would 'prefer to have Canada.' Pearson wanted St Laurent's direction and suggested that if the government wished to avoid membership, it should tell the Americans, informally, that Canada did not want to be nominated before the U.S. put forward its list.43 In Ottawa, Riddell and St Laurent talked the problem over; Riddell called Pearson to tell him that the government preferred 'to stay off the fact finding committee if it were possible decently and honourably to do so.' If, however, membership was unavoidable Pearson was not specifically instructed to refuse membership - it would have to be clearly understood that Canada would appoint 'a prominent Canadian' who would act in 'an independent capacity' and who would not receive directions or instructions from the government. 44 In this way Canada would retain its freedom to decide whether to support or oppose the investigation committee's final report. This was involvement without commitment - a logical extension of Wrong's earlier suggestion about an investigating committee composed of independent international experts. Neither the United States nor Great Britain favoured this Canadian idea, which was discussed with both delegations in the early days of the special session.45 Pearson's First Committee got down to work quickly. He arranged to hold the committee meetings at Lake Success, on Long Island, where the facilities were better - the meeting room was wired for simultaneous translation - even though the delegates would have to endure a long drive each day to and from their downtown hotels. He wanted to get the routine business of electing committee officers out of the way immediately and plunge right into the two main questions facing the committee: the role to be played by the Jewish Agency in the committee's deliberations and the composition and terms of reference of the investigating committee. Pearson intended to support a U.S. move to admit Jewish Agency representatives to the First Committee discussions and wanted to refer any other requests for a hearing to a

69 'A duty which could not be evaded' special subcommittee. He was aware that the U.S. intended to press forward with suggestions for a small, seven-member investigating committee and knew that Canada still appeared on the list, but he did not intend to ask the U.S. to withdraw Canada. If Australia was nominated, as he thought likely, an apportunity might then arise to get off the hook 'at an appropriate moment.' 46 V

Pearson opened the First Committee meetings on the morning of Tuesday 6 May. The first day was devoted entirely to the isue of which nongovernmental agencies were to be heard. The Arab countries did not want the Jewish Agency to appear, and the Arab Higher Committee, representing the Palestine Arabs, charged that the General Assembly had discriminated against it and threatened a boycott. Pearson guided the delegates through the discussion carefully but expeditiously, searching for the middle ground and meeting informally with members of different delegations to work out a reasonable solution. In the end the committee decided to invite the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee but to bar all others. Pearson was largely responsible for the compromise.47 At the close of the first day's proceedings, the Argentinian and United States delegates each submitted draft resolutions concerning the composition and responsibilities of the investigating committee which reflected the two main views at the UN about how the committee should be structured. The Argentinians called for an elevenmember committee consisting of the five permanent members of the Security Council, one Arab state 'chosen by lot,' three western hemisphere states aside from the United States, one Southwest Pacific state, and one African state other than Egypt if it was chosen as the Arab representative. The United States sought the establishment of a seven-member committee consisting of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay.48 That night Pearson telephoned Ottawa, spoke to Riddell about the two draft resolutions, and suggested several ways that Canada could extricate itself from the U.S. list of nominees. He thought he might tell the Americans that Canada would withdraw because none of the Great Powers were serving on the committee and Canada 'had already taken a considerable part in the Palestine question during the Special Session.' He recognized, however, that if there was 'an insistent demand

70 Canada and the Birth of Israel for Canada to accept membership/ it might be necessary to give in. Riddell then spoke with St Laurent, who accepted Pearson's view. St Laurent did not want Canada 'to shirk responsibility for things which had to be done' but he also believed it would be 'more convenient' if Canada were left off the investigating committee.49 The Americans put great pressure on Canada to serve. St Laurent was approached by Julius Harrington, of the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, who told him that the U.S. delegation at the UN wanted Canadian support for the U.S. proposals and Canadian agreement to serve. St Laurent's reply was curious: he told Harrington that Canada was not anxious to serve on a committee without Great Power membership and had already done enough, but that 'if ... it were inevitable for Canada to accept membership on this committee, [Canada] would appoint a prominent Canadian ... to act in an independent capacity.'50 This was a clear signal to the U.S. that although Canada was reluctant, it would agree if pressed. That was certainly no way to stand firm; the signal could not have been missed in Washington. What could St Laurent have meant by 'inevitable'? Nothing of this sort would have been 'inevitable' to Mackenzie King. From Thursday 8 May to Monday 12 May the First Committee, under Pearson's guidance, tackled the thorny question of what sort of investigating committee should be established, what it ought to study, and who should serve on it. Rabbi Silver, appearing for the Jewish Agency, urged that broad terms of reference be established while Henry Cattan, representing the Arab Higher Committee, demanded that the Jewish refugee question be excluded from the committee's terms of reference. On 13 May, after almost five full days of work, the First Committee adopted a draft report on terms of reference to be submitted to the General Assembly. It proposed giving the investigating committee 'the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine,' allowing the committee to determine its own procedures. The investigating committee was to conduct its investigations in Palestine, and wherever else it wished, and to receive oral and written testimony from Great Britain, from representatives of the people of Palestine, and 'from Governments and from such organizations and individuals as it may deem necessary.' The draft report instructed the investigating committee to 'give most careful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity' and to prepare a report for

71 'A duty which could not be evaded' the fall General Assembly to be submitted no later than 1 September 194751 This draft agreed with the Jewish Agency submission that the problem of the Jewish displaced persons in European refugee camps was tied to the Palestine question and rejected the position of the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab countries. In light of the continuing illegal immigration into Palestine carried out by the Haganah, the obvious desire of many of the Jewish displaced persons to go to Palestine (as expressed to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946), and the failure of countries such as Canada, the United States, and Britain to open their gates to mass Jewish immigration, the First Committee had arrived at the only realistic conclusion. With the terms of reference of the investigating committee fixed, the First Committee turned to the question of its composition. This was Pearson's moment of truth. The Soviet Union had submitted two proposals which provided for Great Power representation on the committee and the Poles had submitted a similar resolution. These were voted on first and were defeated. An Australian motion, similar to the U.S. proposal, but calling for the establishment of an eleven-member committee of neutrals, was then voted on and passed with U.S. support. The problem then remained as to which states would serve and Pearson, from the chair, suggested that a small subcommittee be established to 'draw up a slate of countries' and to report back. It was Canada's last chance to get out, but the suggestion, in Pearson's words, 'did not meet with any measure of approval.' Senator Austin, speaking for the United States, then put forward his original sevenmember slate with four additional countries to be chosen from the South Pacific, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. The Chilean delegate moved an amendment calling for Guatemala and Yugoslavia to be given two of these four positions and the U.S. motion, as amended by Chile, was passed. Australia and India were then nominated and elected, and the committee was complete. The discussion on committee membership had been somewhat confused; Pearson never found a 'suitable opportunity ... to deal with [Canada's] nomination in the United States proposal.' He later told St Laurent that he had not intervened in the discussion on membership to withdraw Canada's name because he thought such action 'might have been misinterpreted and [could] have had an adverse effect on the discussion.'52 That was putting it rather gently. A Canadian withdrawal at the last moment, before the court of world opinion and in the full glare of publicity, might have undermined the diplomatic influ-

72 Canada and the Birth of Israel ence Canada had carefully built up since 1943 and seriously damaged Canadian credibility in Washington, not to mention the United Nations. The time to withdraw had long since passed. VI

The day after the First Committee concluded its work, the General Assembly debated and adopted its report on the terms of reference and the membership of the investigating committee (henceforth known as the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine - UNSCOP) . It also adopted an appeal to the governments of the nominated states to appoint 'persons of high moral character and of recognized competence in international affairs' who would act 'impartially and conscientiously.'53 Then a Norwegian resolution was passed calling on all governments and peoples 'to refrain, pending action by the Special Committee ... from the threat or use of force or any other action which might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine.'54The General Assembly debate was predictable except for a shocking surprise to the Arabs which came in the middle of Andrei Gromyko's speech for the USSR: the Soviet government, Gromyko stated, expected the committee to recommend one of two courses of action: that Palestine become a 'dual democratic state' with guarantees for both Arabs and Jews or that it be partitioned into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab. Either proposal would receive Soviet support. This was a dramatic shift in the Soviet Union's position and provided a hint that should UNSCOP recommend partition, the USSR and its allies would support the recommendation.55 The special session of the United Nations General Assembly ended on 15 May. The State Department's Office of European Affairs considered it a success and noted that Pearson had 'proved to be an outstanding chairman for [the First] Committee.' They believed he had shortened the committee's work by several days, if not by more than a week, and that he should be considered for the chairmanship of this powerful committee in future.56 Newspapers in Canada echoed these State Department views. The Winnipeg Free Press thought Pearson's work reflected the 'fair minded spirit' of the Canadian approach to the Palestine problem57 while the Vancouver Sun praised Pearson for his impartial and expeditious handling of the business of the First Committee.58 The Canadian Arab Friendship League, however, found nothing to cheer about in the work of the special session. The UN deci-

73 'A duty which could not be evaded' sion to study and report on the Palestine question was 'practically irresponsible and an invitation to ... acts of terror on the part of Zionism/ the league warned. The Arabs would 'never refrain from demanding for ... Palestine the same freedom presently enjoyed by other Arab States' and would 'defend the rights of their fellow citizens in [Palestine] with the same fervor and if necessary political and physical force as other self-respecting nations have done under similar circumstances in the past.' 59 This was an accurate and foreboding reflection of the views of the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab League countries. Even as the UN was embarking on its search for a political and diplomatic solution to the Palestine question, the Arabs were rejecting any solution short of immediate independence. The special session had been a personal triumph for Pearson and, once again, Canada's stature in world affairs was enhanced. But matters had not turned out as the Department of External Affairs or Louis St Laurent had hoped they would. Canada had been conscripted into the search for a solution to the Palestine question despite, or rather because of, Canada's steadfast attempts to stay clear of this thorny problem in the past. It now remained for the Canadian government to appoint a representative to UNSCOP - someone who would represent Canada but whose actions would not, in any way, bind Canada to either reject or support UNSCOP'S findings. Canadian neutrality would be maintained until the last possible moment.

4

'The best possible person'

The deep blue of the cloudless Mediterranean sky formed the backdrop for the scene that was played out in Haifa harbour on the afternoon of 18 July 1947. By lunchtime crowds had started to gather as close to the docks as British troops would allow; an air of tense expectancy, and barely harnessed anger underscored the historic event in the making: the Exodus 1947, battered and broken, was nearing the end of its run. The ship was a former Chesapeake Bay excursion steamer, originally registered as the SS President Waifield, which had been purchased by the Jewish Agency in 1946 and converted into a blockade runner. On 12 July the ship, loaded with fuel, crammed with 4500 refugee passengers, and under the direction of a mixed crew of Palestinian Jews and American volunteers, had slipped out of the small harbour at Sete, near Marseilles, and headed for Palestine. The Royal Navy had spotted the Exodus almost immediately; when the ship neared the coast of Palestine in the early morning hours of 18 July, the British moved in to seize it. When they boarded the Exodus a battle broke out which raged for hours; British troops using clubs and tear-gas and wearing protective gear fought with immigrants hurling iron bars and canned food while the crew brought steam jets and hot engine oil to bear against the boarders. The Exodus was rammed several times, gunfire crackled sporadically, and two people aboard the ship were killed and the American radio operator mortally wounded. Within two hours the battle was over and the Exodus had been subdued. The Exodus and her Royal Navy escorts steamed slowly into Haifa harbour around 3:00 PM. The ship looked like the sole survivor of a World War Two convoy battle: great gashes ran down both sides of its hull; the decks were black and slippery from fuel oil; the railings had

75 'The best possible person' been ripped off; the life-rafts lay scattered about the decks; and ropes and cables dangled everywhere. Refugees and British sailors alike stared listlessly out of portholes, many wearing blood-soaked head bandages, as the Exodus approached the heavily guarded dock. Press and newsreel cameras whirred and clicked as the ship came to a halt and British officials scrambled aboard. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had announced that the refugees aboard the Exodus were to be sent back to the German displaced persons camps from which they had come, and the work of transferring the passengers from the Exodus to the ss Ocean Vigour began almost immediately. For several hours a slow stream of men, women, and children filed out of the ship, were sent through disinfectant stations, and were then placed inside wiredup cages on the Ocean Vigour and two other ships while, at the same time, the dead and wounded were carried off in stretchers.l Thousands of people watched the unfolding drama of the arrival of the Exodus on the afternoon of 18 July 1947; two would help determine the fate of Palestine. They were Justice Emil Sandstrom of Sweden, chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, and Valado Simic, the Yugoslav representative on the committee. They had started out by car from Jerusalem early in the day for a visit to a Jewish Agency immigration hostel near Hadera, on the Palestine coast north of Tel Aviv, and to the British detention camp for illegal immigrants at Athlit, south of Haifa. The two men, accompanied by Dr Chaim Yassky of the Haddasah Hospital in Jerusalem, were spending the day examining the two facilities and interviewing people. By lunchtime the news had started to circulate throughout Palestine that the Exodus was about to dock in Haifa; the Jewish Agency made a special request that Simic and Sandstrom view the event. Both men decided to go and when the ship arrived after 3:00 PM, they were standing at dockside. They stayed until 6:00 and then returned to Jerusalem. Simic said little on the drive back and seemed absorbed in his thoughts, but Sandstrom tried to keep conversation going and remarked that without the trip to Haifa, 'an important link in the whole visit to Palestine would have been missing.' Dr Yassky replied that he doubted whether any force on earth could stop the Jews from bringing their people to Palestine; it was quite apparent to him that Sandstrom and Simic were both impressed and moved by what they had seen.2 They were not the only members of UNSCOP affected by the lemminglike rush of displaced Jews to Palestine. Ivan Cleveland Rand, member of the Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian delegate to the commit-

76 Canada and the Birth of Israel tee, was no less moved by the spectacle and had already started to form his opinions about the shape of an eventual settlement of the Palestine question by the time the Exodus arrived in Palestine.

I Mackenzie King and St Laurent began to consider appointing Rand to UNSCOP the day after the adjournment of the United Nations Special General Assembly. St Laurent brought a list of prospective representatives to the prime minister, who thought Rand was 'easily the best.' Though King had scrupulously avoided involvement in the Palestine question for so long, he told St Laurent that the matter was 'important to the world and to the future success of the United Nations' and, therefore, Canada should send the 'best possible person.' Rand was not anxious to give up his summer vacation at Shediac, New Brunswick, but indicated he would serve if the government wanted him to do so.3 By the spring of 1947 Ivan Rand was well known and respected, not only in legal circles, but also by much of the general public because of the reputation he was earning on the bench as a liberally minded social reformer. In 1945 Rand had been appointed to settle a strike of Ford Motor Company workers at Windsor, Ontario, and had devised the 'Rand Formula' which allowed non-union workers to stay in a shop dominated by the union but which forced those workers to pay union dues. It was a major breakthrough in Canadian industrial relations and the British high commissioner in Ottawa was not alone in calling it a 'Solomon judgment, which [gave] some satisfaction to both parties.' 4 Rand had been born in Moncton, New Brunswick, in 1884 and had graduated from Harvard Law School in 1912. In 1924 he tried his hand at politics, becoming attorney-general in the Liberal government of New Brunswick until his defeat in the 1925 provincial election. He then became counsel to Canadian National Railways, a capacity in which he served until 1943 when he was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada. It is probable, in his long career with CNR and on the Supreme Court, that he had come to the attention of, and became acquainted with, St Laurent. His background, together with his role in the 1945 strike, made him an obvious candidate for UNSCOP despite his almost complete ignorance of diplomacy and of the complexities of the Palestine question. Since each member country was also supposed to send an alternate, the government decided to appoint Leon Mayrand, son of a Quebec newspaper editor and a career diplomat who had

77 'The best possible person' served with the Canadian Embassy in Moscow and at Canada House in London. The cabinet confirmed Rand and Mayrand at its weekly meeting on 22 May5 and St Laurent made the announcement to the House of Commons one week later. He took care to point out that Rand would be acting on his own: 'The Canadian representative has not been instructed by the Canadian government concerning the policy he is to advocate or support.'6 Within days of the cabinet appointment, Mayrand went to New York to sit in on the preliminary organizational meetings of UNSCOP while Rand extracted himself from his family responsibilities in Shediac and travelled to Ottawa to take a crash course in the history of the Palestine question from Elizabeth MacCallum. Despite her sympathies towards the Arabs she was balanced and neutral in her approach and stressed that the Palestine conflict represented a clash between two nationalisms, Arab and Jewish, both of which were born out of the tragic past of their respective peoples. She believed that the UN'S ability to deal with the Palestine question would be enhanced if it was 'fully recognized that both Arabs and Jews [were] trying to escape from an intolerable past.' 7 Although neither Rand nor Mayrand knew much about the Palestine question, they were far from totally ignorant of it. Mayrand had read Palestine Mission, written by Richard Grossman (a British member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry), as part of his preparation for UNSCOP. He found himself agreeing with Grossman,8 one of the most pro-Zionist members of the 1946 committee. Rand's knowledge came from a totally different source. Through his own involvement with labour-related cases and his Windsor strike experience, he had developed an affinity for the late Louis D. Brandeis, a fellow Harvard graduate. Brandeis has been a labour lawyer and social reformer in the United States from before World War One and had been the first Jew appointed to the United States Supreme Court. When a biography of Brandeis appeared in 1946, Rand volunteered to write a review of the book for the Canadian Bar Review.9 He could not have read the book without becoming aware of Brandeis's deep commitment to, and work for, American Zionism. The Jewish Agency was not sure what to make of Rand. One New York representative described him as 'rather pro-Arab and (proBritish)'10 while Michael Comay, a former South African and an astute observer of the Commonwealth scene, thought Rand 'might be willing to be useful to the British.'n Shortly after Rand arrived in New York he

78 Canada and the Birth of Israel and Mayrand had lunch with Lionel Gelber, who was favourably impressed by his two compatriots. He reported that Mayrand was 'frankly thrilled' at being chosen to serve on UNSCOP12 while Rand was fully aware of the Zionist ties of both Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, another great Jewish-American jurist and Supreme Court justice. It was clear to Gelber that Rand agreed with the Jewish Agency position that the problem of the Jewish refugees in Europe was directly linked with the Palestine question; Rand told Gelber that 'Nobody with the slightest acquaintance with the world scene can be unaware of the connection.' Gelber later concluded that 'great weight' would be attached to Rand's views 'because of the high public and private reputation he enjoys' and that it would 'be fatal to attempt to exert any influence on [him].13 By the end of May the member countries of UNSCOP had chosen their representatives. Sweden followed the Canadian lead by appointing Judge Emil Sandstrom, chief justice of the Swedish Supreme Court, who, like Rand, was given no official instructions or guidance.14 SandStrom was later elected chairman of UNSCOP. The Indian member of the committee was also a judge, Sir Abdur Rahman, who was a Moslem member of the Indian National Congress, a follower of Jawaharlal Nehru, and an opponent of the partition of colonial India into the Dominions of India and Pakistan. Despite his religion, he had opposed the followers of Mohammed Ali Jinnah who worked for the partition; this may have weighed on his judgment almost as much as his religious affiliation. Certainly he turned out to be the most unabashedly pro-Arab member of the committee. The Australian representative was John D.L. Hood, a professional diplomat in the Australian Department of External Affairs, who took great pains, during his tenure on UNSCOP, not to reveal to his fellow committee members his innermost impressions or thoughts on the issues at hand. The Guatemalan delegate, Dr Jorge Garcia-Granados, was by far the most mercurial member of the committee, the most openly anti-British, and the most pro-Zionist. He was a Central American liberal and he was quickly won over to the Zionist cause. His colleague from Peru, Dr Arturo Garcia Salazar, was far more austere in temperament and political inclination. He was Peru's ambassador to the Vatican and a devout Catholic. His religious views coloured his approach to the Palestine question and inclined him to concentrate on the issue of Jerusalem and the holy places more than any other aspect of the problem. Religion played no role in the attitudes of the two eastern European

79 The best possible person' delegates, Dr Karel Lisicky of Czechoslovakia and Valado Simic of Yugoslavia. Both were more influenced by their governments' approach to the Palestine question than were most of the other delegates with the possible exception of Rahman and Nasrollah Entezam of Iran. Lisicky was a good friend of Czech foreign minister Jan Masaryk (a strong Zionist supporter), and was occasionally given direction by Masaryk in the course of UNSCOP's deliberations. Simic was president of the Yugoslav Senate, head of the Yugoslav Bar Association, and a non-Communist democrat in the Communist government of Marshall Josef Tito. The Netherlands delegate, Dr Nicolaas Blom, was a former acting lieutenant-governor general in the Dutch East Indies who betrayed a slight sympathy for the British Colonial officials who were trying to run Palestine. The Uruguayan representative, Professor Enrique Fabregat, was, like Garcia-Granados, a passionate liberal. He had been minister of education and was now serving as his country's permanent delegate to the United Nations.15 The committee was, in sum, a mixed lot. One Jewish Agency official wrote: 'I don't think we can expect very much from them.' 16 II

On 26 May 1947 United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie opened the first formal session of UNSCOP, welcomed the delegates, and then proposed that the committee go into private session for the examination of organizational matters. After the room had been cleared of the press, Lie announced that no hearings would be held in New York; UNSCOP would begin its work in Palestine and plane reservations had been made for early June. Lie's decision not to hold UNSCOP sessions in New York came at the suggestion of the British who believed such meetings would have an 'adverse effect... upon [the] Arabs' because of the large Jewish population in the city.17 It also saved the United States from having to state a clear and unequivocal position on the Palestine question at that time.18 Lie's choice to head the UNSCOP secretariat was Dr Victor Chi-Tsai Hoo, assistant secretary-general, who was to act as Lie's personal representative. Hoo was very anxious to maintain an air of impartiality around UNSCOP'S activities and asked the Jewish Agency not to approach the committee secretariat until the commission members had decided what kind of liaison it wished to establish with the 'interested parties.' He also caused two prospective members of the UNSCOP secre-

80 Canada and the Birth of Israel tariat to be dropped: S. Mahmoud of Egypt and William Epstein of Canada, who were both members of the Middle East and African Sections in the Department of Security Council Affairs of the UN and were qualified experts with much to contribute to the UNSCOP proceedings. Mahmoud was an Egyptian, however, and Epstein a Jew and, in Hoo's eyes, this disqualified them from participation.19 One of the key members of the secretariat chosen by Lie was Dr Ralph Bunche, an American Black who had formerly worked in the State Department and who was now director of the Division of Trusteeship in the UN secretariat. Lie was 'determined that the committee's secretariat should be above reproach - not only technically but politically.' The question of what relationship ought to exist, if any, between the 'interested parties' and UNSCOP caused a great deal of discussion among the committee members and the secretariat before the committee departed New York. On 3 June UNSCOP decided to invite the appointment of liaison officers from the Jewish Agency, the Arabs, and the British to 'supply such information or render such other assistance as the Committee may require.' 20 The committee intended to be as flexible as possible in its relations with the liaison officers, and Jewish Agency official Dr M. Kahany believed that 'by handling the liaison in a tactful manner we can obtain in fact much more than what is contained in the vaguely phrased sentence.'21 When news of this decision reached Jerusalem, the Jewish Agency Executive appointed Aubrey (Abba) Eban and David Horowitz to work with the committee as liaison officers and observers until the committee's task was done.22 Horowitz was an economist who had appeared before the AngloAmerican Committee of Inquiry on behalf of the Jewish Agency and who was then engaged in Zionist political work in Jerusalem. Eban was a new addition to the Jewish Agency's unofficial civil service. He was a Cambridge graduate who had studied Arabic history and literature and who had already developed a reputation as an eloquent debater and speaker. Each man was assigned a number of UNSCOP members to work with (Horowitz was given Rand and Mayrand) and both did valuable jobs in the coming months supplying information and keeping Jewish Agency views before the committee. Although the Jewish Agency Executive had not adopted an openly pro-partition position, Eban and Horowitz were told in no uncertain terms that partition, and Jewish statehood, were the underlying Zionist aims.23 The British liaison officer to UNSCOP was Donald C. MacGillivray, a former deputy district commissioner at Acre, who was, Horowitz

81 'The best possible person' believed, 'free of the prejudices current among colonial administrators.' MacGillivray had taken pains throughout his career as a member of the Palestine government to be evenhanded in his approach to Arab and Jew. He believed that the Arab-Jewish conflict was 'a tragic, irrational and inevitable stroke of fate over which the peoples concerned had . . . no control.' 24 Although the Arab Higher Committee was invited to send liaison officers to work with UNSCOP, it refused to do so and announced a total boycott of the investigation and its personnel. Arab rights, the committee proclaimed, needed no bargaining or confirmation.25 Its refusal was a major blunder. Horowitz and Eban soon struck up a close working relationship on a professional and personal level with several key committee members, including Rand and Mayrand. They were able to obtain first-hand reports of the inner workings of the committee and gained accurate indications about the direction each committee member was taking on the key matters under investigation. It is impossible to accurately determine the impact they had on the outcome of the UNSCOP deliberations, but there can be little doubt that this relationship helped sway some committee members towards the Jewish Agency's goals. The justice of the Arab cause may have been perfectly apparent to the Arab Higher Committee, but few of the UNSCOP members, with the obvious exception of Sir Abdur Rahman, were ready to accept anything on an a priori basis. in

On Wednesday morning, 11 June 1947, Rand, Mayrand, and most of the other delegates and alternate delegates to UNSCOP boarded a plane at New York for the long trip to Palestine. Rand had listened and read much since his appointment to UNSCOP but he had said little in the committee's organizational meetings in New York and had had little contact with the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. He had largely stayed aloof from the minor tempests which had blown up in committee meetings over travel arrangements and the committee chairmanship, but he had supported those committee members who wanted to postpone any decision on whether and when to visit the displaced persons camps in Europe until after the trip to Palestine. Up to the moment of departure from New York he remained optimistic about the committee's prospects for success, and he took the high road in assessing the committee's responsibilities: 'Our object seems to me

82 Canada and the Birth of Israel to be quite clear: to satisfy, not the Jew nor the Arab, but the enlightened and intelligent conscience of mankind as represented by the United Nations ... I am disposed to think that ... the highest morality will ultimately prove to be the highest strategy.'26 By the night of 15 June all UNSCOP members and the secretariat and its staff had arrived in Palestine and had settled in to their living quarters at Kadimah House, a new building on the outskirts of Jerusalem constructed to house officials of the Palestine Police. The committee's first full day in the country was not auspicious: they awoke to a fifteen-hour general strike called by the Arab Higher Committee to protest their arrival in Palestine, and later in the day a British military court sentenced three Irgun prisoners to hang for taking part in a raid on Acre prison. The Palestine government refused to send representatives to testify in public and insisted on meeting the committee in a private session, which caused an uproar within the committee. Garcia-Granados and Josef Brilej, the Yugoslavian alternate, did not want the committee to appear to be favouring the British by holding an in camera meeting prior to the start of open hearings, but the majority, including Rand, decided that the government's case had to be heard and that the committee had no choice but to accept the demand.27 The meeting with the Palestine officials produced several sharp exchanges between Sir Henry Gurney, chief secretary of the Palestine government, and Rahman and Garcia-Granados but Rand merely sat and listened in silence. Although UNSCOP was scheduled to meet representatives of the League of Arab States in Beirut after its stay in Palestine, the Arab Higher Committee boycott effectively cut access to the Arabs of Palestine. On the night of 16 June Sandstrom tried to overcome Arab hostility to UNSCOP with a broadcast over the Palestine Broadcasting Service. He claimed that UNSCOP had come to Palestine with an open mind, that it was impartial, and that it had not reached any prior conclusions, but the attempt was a total failure and the boycott held firm. The next morning Brilej castigated the Arabs in a closed session and urged the committee to censure the Arab Higher Committee for their refusal to co-operate with the investigation but his motion was voted down nine-to-one.28 On the afternoon of 17 June the open hearings of UNSCOP commenced in the Jerusalem YMCA. The heat inside the building was oppressive, the windows were kept open, and the noise of Jerusalem traf-

83 'The best possible person' fie threatened to drown out the testimony. The occasional sound of British police sirens and the tramping of army boots from British patrols underlined the urgency of the investigation. The room was jammed with correspondents, photographers, consular officials, and representatives of various Jewish organizations, but there were no Arabs. Moshe Shertok of the Jewish Agency was the first witness, and his presentation set the pattern for much of what was to follow in the next few weeks. For more than an hour Shertok gave a detailed presentation on the 'geography, people, industry, agriculture and potentialities' of Palestine which, he claimed, was 'a factual introduction' and not 'the Jewish Agency's case which would be presented later.' 29 After his talk Shertok was closely and doggedly questioned by Rahman on immigration and land transfers. Although Shertok advanced no suggestions for a political solution during his appearance, he later outlined Jewish Agency objectives to Robert S. Macatee, the United States consul general in Jerusalem. Shertok told Macatee that the agency would put forward a public claim to all of Palestine but would privately indicate to UNSCOP that it would 'accept partition as [a] settlement.'30 Up to this point UNSCOP had avoided making a decision on what its relationship to the Jewish terrorist groups was to be. It was forced by the Irgun to confront the issue on the first day of hearings, however, when it received a letter from the parents of the three condemned Irgun prisoners asking it to help stop the hangings. The committee was badly divided over what to do. Some members, including Rand, believed it was not appropriate for UNSCOP to intervene and that the hangings would not adversely affect their investigation. The majority, however, thought the executions would be a violation of the UN'S call to all parties to refrain from acts of violence and would make UNSCOP's job more difficult. After a heated debate on the evening of the first session, the majority voted to intervene (Rand, Rahman, and Blom cast the only negative votes).31 Sandstrom then sent a letter to the parents assuring them that UNSCOP would bring the matter 'to the attention of the proper authorities' and telegraphed Trygve Lie asking him to send a message to the Palestine government conveying UNSCOP's concern 'as to the possible unfavourable repercussions that [the] execution of the death sentences might have upon the fulfillment of the task that the General Assembly had entrusted to the Committee.'32 The Palestine government was not pleased with the intervention, but it refused to

84 Canada and the Birth of Israel make any direct comment other than to issue an oblique denial that there was any ulterior motive in having the three men sentenced on the same day that the committee began its deliberations in Jerusalem.33 IV

The sun was beginning to set over the Mediterranean as Ivan Rand and David Horowitz got out of Rand's car on Mount Carmel to survey the vista of Haifa and Haifa harbour which lay below them. From where they stood they could see the domed shape of the Bahai temple, the Jewish and Arab sections of the city, and the ships that lay in the roadstead, their lights beginning to wink on in the twilight. In a corner of the harbour reserved for the Royal Navy, the rusting hulks of Jewish refugee boats rocked gently at their moorings. Horowitz pointed the motley fleet out to Rand and described the drama, suffering, and heroism of the blockade runners and their refugee passengers. Rand stood quietly and gazed out over the harbour. As it grew darker the two men returned to Rand's car and began the long drive back to Jerusalem, passing the detention camp near Latrun where the Jewish Agency Executive had recently been interned. Once again Horowitz took the opportunity to explain the passions which motivated the Zionist leaders in their struggle against the mandatory government. He sensed Rand's 'swift reaction to the story.' It was, Horowitz later wrote, 'the crowning impression of an eventful day, during which [Rand] had been given visual evidence of the Arab attitude to the Jews, the plight of Jewish refugees battering their way toward their haven, and the broad panorama of the Jewish struggle.' As Rand took his leave at Kadimah House he told Horowitz: 'I fully appreciate that you're fighting with your backs to the wall.'34 Rand, Horowitz, and the other members of the committee, accompanied by officers of the secretariat and members of the press, had gone to Haifa on the morning of 19 June on the first day of a two-week program of tours and visits designed to give UNSCOP a close-up view of the Palestine problem. The morning drive from Jerusalem to Haifa was Horowitz's first opportunity to get close to Rand. The day before an UNSCOP subcommittee had issued a ruling that Jewish Agency officials could not ride in the cars of committee members but Rand secured Sandstrom's permission to ignore the ruling and invited Horowitz to join him. The two men got along well from the start and, as they drove north, Horowitz told Rand the story of his life while Rand outlined

85 'The best possible person' some of the principles of his own social and political thinking. Horowitz used the conversation to present Rand with a 'broad review of the various facets of [the Zionist] case' and Rand listened carefully, interrupting only to ask several questions. Horowitz began to get the impression that Rand was particularly interested in partition and told him that although the Jewish Agency and the Zionist movement had not determined their final attitude to partition, he himself believed that 'in existing conditions the proposal offered the sole possibility of extricating the country from its political dilemma.'35 Upon the arrival of the UNSCOP party in Haifa, a municipal reception was held, which the Arabs boycotted, followed by an informal lunch. The committee was due to visit an Arab cigarette factory but the Arab owners of the establishment sent word that no Jews would be allowed to go along. Horowitz later wrote that Rand was 'especially upset' by this information and expressed his 'disgust at our exclusion.'36This incident, combined with the squalid conditions encountered in the Arab factory and the barely hidden exploitation of child labour which the committee members witnessed, appeared to have a significant impact on Rand. Later, toward evening, Rand and Horowitz drove up Mount Carmel to see the view of Haifa harbour. Four days after the trip to Haifa, Horowitz accompanied Rand and a small group of committee members to Rehovoth to visit Dr Chaim Weizmann. Sandstrom and Rand seemed deeply moved and impressed by Zionism's elder statesman, who told them the story of his own life interwoven with the history of the Jewish people over the previous decades. Robert Macatee, the United States consul in Jerusalem, viewed the visit as just another Zionist manoeuvre with Weizmann 'cast in the role of elder statesman in retirement,' 37 but the visit, none the less, impressed Rand and Sandstrom, who saw a strong moral conviction behind Weizmann's lifelong personal struggle. As they returned to Jerusalem the two jurists 'sat silent and meditative, and only murmured: "Well, that's really a great man." ' 38 Rand's impressions were further shaped by a meeting with Reverend William Lovell Hull, a Winnipeg native who had first come to Palestine to do missionary work in the 1930s. Rand knew Hull's father, who practised with a Winnipeg law firm, and agreed to have dinner with him when Hull approached him during an intermission in one of the early UNSCOP sessions. On a warm summer evening while eating on the terrace of the Eden Hotel Rand plied Hull with questions about his life and work and the situation in Palestine. Rand was interested in

86 Canada and the Birth of Israel why Hull had spent so much time in Palestine and was somewhat surprised to hear Hull expound forcefully on the merits of the Jewish people, 'their standards of life and the tremendous work they had done since returning to their ancient homeland.'39 Rand was very discreet but Hull nevertheless gained the impression that he was already somewhat frustrated by the strict security measures that prevailed almost everywhere.40 This was the first sign of Rand's growing belief that the mandatory government no longer had any moral authority to govern and needed to use force to maintain itself. This realization was highly important to a man of Rand's liberal convictions. The time Rand, and other committee members, spent with Horowitz, Eban, and men like Hull was important in moulding their thinking about the Palestine question because pro-Zionist positions were presented in an intimate atmosphere and at an informal and personal level. These views were not balanced by any similar contact with Palestine Arabs because of the boycott imposed by the Arab Higher Committee. The boycott did further damage to the Arab cause during the two weeks that the committee toured around Palestine; everywhere they went they were warmly welcomed by the Jews, ignored or insulted by the Arabs, and exposed to Arab antipathy for the Jews. The visits to Jaffa and Tel Aviv were typical. In the Arab community UNSCOP visitors saw men warning people on the streets not to have any contact with the committee while a young clerk working at the town hall told Guatemalan alternate delegate Emilio Zea-Gonzalez that 'three quarters' of the UNSCOP members were Jews who ought to be hanged.41 In Tel-Aviv, by contrast, 'crowds clapped and sang for the delegates and pressed around their cars to shake their hands.' 42 Though it must have been obvious to UNSCOP members that both Jews and Arabs were trying to sway the committee to different ends and through different means, these experiences underlined the total lack of contact and will to compromise, and the physical and cultural separation, that marked Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. Rand did not become an instant and intense partisan of the Zionist cause as a result of these experiences, and continued to maintain his judicial impartiality in both public and private sessions of the committee, but it is clear that his touring helped form three basic conclusions that marked his contribution to UNSCOP's final report: the mandate must end as soon as possible; the Jews must have a state of their own in Palestine; partition was the only hope for a solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine. Mayrand wrote Pearson that the visits to different parts of Pal-

87 'The best possible person' estine gave committee members 'a good general picture of the country.' The committee could now 'hear and read testimony with a sense of objectivity which [it] did not have before.'43 V

On Saturday 29 June, as a small group of UNSCOP members was visiting the Arab towns of Ramallah, Nablus, and Tulkarm, the Stern Gang struck once more at the British Army in Palestine. At 9:30 in the morning soldiers crossing a Tel Aviv street were machine-gunned from behind; two were killed instantly and a third died later on the operating table. At about the same time a terrorist pushed a Sten gun through a cafe window in Haifa and sprayed the interior with bullets, hitting three officers. The following day Sandstrom called the committee together; after a two-hour discussion, a communique was issued condemning the acts as 'a flagrant disregard' of the General Assembly's appeal for a supsension of violence in Palestine. By this time, Macatee noted dryly, the committee 'was presumably getting acquainted with the facts of life in Palestine.'44 On the morning of 4 July the UNSCOP hearings resumed in Jerusalem. David Ben Gurion, the first witness, outlined the essential elements of the official Jewish Agency case: the settlement of the 'problems of the Jews and Palestine' was the greatest test facing the United Nations; British promises made to the Arabs during World War One had been fulfilled because the Arabs now had their independence in an area ' 125 times the size of Palestine'; the Jews opposed extension of the mandate under British or United Nations authority and could only accomplish the objectives of immigration and Jewish settlement through statehood.45 Like Weizmann, Ben Gurion wove his own history into his delivery of the Zionist political message. It was a story of personal sacrifice beginning at the turn of the century when he had emigrated from Russia to Palestine in pursuit of his Zionist dream and had then spent years farming the land and taking part in the early political and social development of the yishuv. Rand listened, 'impressed by Ben Gurion's statement that he ploughed the land with a rifle on his back.' This, Rand thought to himself, required 'real toughness and character.'46 Ben Gurion was followed by other witnesses,47 including Jewish religious leaders and Jewish Agency experts who stressed the economic viability of a future Jewish state. They claimed that no Arabs had been

88 Canada and the Birth of Israel displaced by Jewish settlement and tried to demonstrate that the Arabs of Palestine were better off than the Arabs of the surrounding countries because of Jewish settlement. One after the other, witnesses attacked the mandatory government, the White Paper, and the suppression of personal liberties in Palestine. Rahman was their most vigorous challenger. When he attempted to pin Ben Gurion down with a series of pointed questions, tempers flared, and Sandstrom was forced to warn the partisan audience to control its vocal support for Ben Gurion.48 When Rahman questioned Rabbi Fishman, president of the central council of World Mizrachi, a religious Zionist organization, on biblical interpretations, there was audible snickering from the crowd which shocked Rand's religious sensitivities.49 Chaim Weizmann's testimony on 8 July was a highlight of the committee hearings. He was obviously at odds with the Jewish Agency Executive and appealed to the committee to sweep away the White Paper and recommend partition along the lines recommended by the Peel Commission 'plus the Negeb [sic].' Ben Gurion, Shertok, and other Jewish Agency officials occupying the front-row seats were visibly upset by this and other parts of Weizmann's testimony; when called back to testify later, Ben Gurion made it plain that Weizmann 'spoke for nobody but himself.' 50 The only departures from the Jewish Agency line came in testimony from a number of members of the Jewish Communist party, who urged that the mandate be ended and that Palestine be granted its independence as a binational state, and from Dr Judah Magnes, president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who offered much the same opinions. Magnes wanted Jewish immigration to continue until the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine were equal so that a binational state could be set up, but he and the Communists had no real answer as to how the government of such a state could function when there were such a deep division between the two communities. Magnes, for example, advocated a board of arbitration in an independent Palestine with ultimate appeal to the United Nations, a process that would sharply limit national sovereignty. Magnes's liberal idealism may have commanded the respect of some committee members, but its unreality was patently apparent given what they had already seen and heard.51 When Shertok took the stand several days later, he totally repudiated Magnes and, in a lengthy presentation that stretched over two days, hammered home one basic message: 'There [could] be no permanent stability and contentment in Palestine or in the world,

89 'The best possible person' insofar as the Jewish position [was] concerned, unless and until [the] elementary craving [for Jewish statehood] [was] satisfied.' 52 At the very moment that Shertok was speaking, British troops in and around Netanya were conducting a house-to-house search for two British sergeants kidnapped by the Irgun on 12 July in reaction to the Palestine government's announcement on 9 July that the condemned Irgun prisoners would, in due course, be executed.53 Shertok ended his testimony on the morning of 18 July, the last day of UNSCOP hearings in Palestine and the day the Exodus docked in the port of Haifa. Rand did not accompany Simic and Sandstrom to watch the ship arrive - he stayed in Jerusalem to hear Shertok concluded his presentation - but he was no doubt aware of the dramatic events that had unfolded at sea the previous night and, perhaps, pictured this forlorn ship joining the other hulks he had seen anchored in the harbour two weeks before. As he and the other members of the committee prepared to leave Palestine for Damascus and Beirut, where they would hear the representatives of the League of Arab States, they undoubtedly reflected on what they had heard and seen since mid-June and perhaps also on the lesson to be learned from the battle of the Exodus. The Jews were determined to bring the remnant of European Jewry to Palestine. They demanded statehood to give them the sovereignty to do so without interference and to protect the society they had built in Palestine over the previous half-century. As long as the mandate continued, or in the event Palestine became a unitary Arab state, or even a binational state, the killings, the retaliations, the illegal immigration, the political and military resistance of the Jews would continue. VI

On 22 July 1947 UNSCOP and the Arab League met in open session in Beirut; UNSCOP was presented with a lengthy memorandum outlining the Arab position on the Palestine question. The following day they met again, this time in secret, at Sofar, to discuss questions that UNSCOP members had submitted to the Arab League seeking clarification of the memorandum. The written answers and the secret discussion clearly set out the Arab League position; there was no room for compromise with the Jews. For example, the Arab League considered 'all Jews who entered Palestine since the Balfour Declaration [to be] illegal.'54 Some had been given 'de facto' citizenship by the mandatory power but others had settled in Palestine without the consent of the

90 Canada and the Birth of Israel government and must be expelled. Those whose status could not be determined would have their fate decided by the government of an independent Palestine which, of course, would be ruled by the Arab majority. Garcia-Granados concluded that up to 400,000 of the 700,000 Jews then in Palestine would be 'subject to deportation.' 55 The Arab League countries claimed that Jewish-Arab hostility in Palestine had been caused by the rise of Zionism and that Arabs and Jews had enjoyed good relations throughout the Arab world in days past. The anti-Jewish rioting that had broken out in Baghdad in 1941 was blamed on Nazi influences in the then-current Iraqi government. When Garcia-Granados seized on this point to ask how the Jews of Palestine might be treated given the Nazi past of the mufti and some of his followers, Lebanese Foreign Minister Hamid Frangie denied that the Arab Higher Committee had been tainted by Nazism: 'If [the mufti] and certain members of the Arab Higher Committee took refuge in Germany during the war, it was not because they sympathized with the Nazi movement,' he claimed, 'but because they were fighting against the Jews/ and therefore also, of necessity, against Great Britain. The only place they could 'find refuge' was in Germany. 56 If this answer was designed to dispel fears that some committee members may have had about the fate the Jews of Palestine might suffer at the hands of a mufti-ruled government, it probably had the opposite impact. It was also apparent, from the views of the Arab League representatives, that the Palestine they envisaged would offer few, if any, constitutional protections to the Jews. It was absolutely clear that no Jewish state, however small, was acceptable to the Arab League countries. A Jewish state, they insisted, would not be 'tolerated by the Arab world' and could not exist 'surrounded by hostile people and states.' Such a Jewish state, they declared, would jeopardize 'the security of the Arab world from within and from without.' Any 'foreign body' among the Arab people 'breaks its integral unity,' they claimed, especially one that might be proclaimed in Palestine. The Arab League representatives told UNSCOP in no uncertain terms that 'the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine [would be] a hostile act' against which the Arab countries would 'defend themselves by all means including violence.' When Sandstrom tried to find out if a Jewish state constituted under United Nations auspices would be considered 'established by violence,' the Arab League representatives ducked the question. Fouad Hamza, the Saudi Arabian representative, claimed this was a hypothetical matter and that the Arab League preferred 'not to say anything until such a decision is

91 'The best possible person' made.' 57 In the opinion of one Jewish Agency observer, this interview may have 'convinced some delegates ... that Jewish Palestine need[ed] a definite form of protection against the Arab world.' 58 Transjordan was the only Arab League state not represented at the Lebanon meetings. It had replied to Sandstrom's invitation to appear before UNSCOP with the puzzling statement that it could not join the other Arab delegations since it was not a member of the United Nations. In place of a formal meeting, King Abdullah suggested a private meeting in Amman. It was apparent to some of the committee members that Abdullah was using the technicality of non-membership in the UN to place his own views before UNSCOP in private and away from the Arab League. Abdullah had harboured lifelong ambitions to rule a Palestine united with Transjordan, and his approach to the Zionists was far more pragmatic than that of the other Arab countries. In public, and when presenting his case as part of the Arab League, however, he would have to toe the line, a line that strongly supported Abdullah's mortal enemy, the mufti. There was, therefore, open disagreement among committee members as to whether or not to meet Abdullah, until Sandstrom decided that an informal meeting was acceptable. After the Sofar sessions Sandstrom and seven other committee members, including Rand, flew to Amman. Abdullah was pleasant and far more flexible on the fate of the Jews of Palestine than the Arab League representatives had been. He declared that the Jews should be allowed to remain as a minority with equal rights and that those Jews already in Palestine, legally or illegally, should be given citizenship. But he was adamantly opposed to any further Jewish immigration and to Jewish statehood.59 Rand was disturbed by what he had heard in Beirut and Amman - the wide gulf separating Arabs and Jews was more obvious than ever and the deep enmity that Arab leaders, including the more moderate Abdullah, felt for the Zionists boded ill for the fate of the Jews of Palestine. As he and other committee members flew back to Beirut to rejoin the main delegation, he looked down at the meandering Jordan River and thought, 'these are the wanderings of the Jews.' He wished only that those wanderings, unlike that of the river, should not also 'end in the Dead Sea.'60 VII

In the early morning hours of 29 July 1947, while dawn was breaking, the three Irgun members condemned to death for the Acre prison break were taken from their cells, escorted to the execution room, and

92 Canada and the Birth of Israel hanged. Several hours later Irgun member Amihai Paglin and several other men drove to an abandoned diamond factory in Netanya, opened a trapdoor in the floor, and brought two British sergeants out of the dark and cramped cellar they had been confined in since their kidnapping on 11 July. Both men, in turn, were hooded, placed on a chair with their legs and wrists tied, and hanged. The two bodies were then driven to a eucalyptus grove and suspended from a tree; a land mine was buried underneath them. When the bodies were later cut down, the mine was set off and one of the corpses was blown to pieces. On the day the Irgun members were hanged, the prison ships carrying the passengers from the Exodus-1947 entered the harbour at Port-de-Bouc, France; at Bevin's order they were to be disembarked and sent back to the German camps they had come from. 61 As the Special Committee settled itself in Geneva to prepare its report, it was more obvious than ever that the ticking time bomb of Palestine was about to explode. Despite Moshe Shertok's urgings, UNSCOP never visited the Cyprus detention camps; now that the committee was in Europe, the question of whether or not to visit the displaced persons camps in Germany and Austria became the first matter for discussion. At its first meeting in Geneva, the committee heard evidence from an official of the International Refugee Organization that 90 per cent of the Jewish refugees wanted to go to Palestine and, despite the objections of Rahman and Hood, decided to send a subcommittee of alternate delegates to visit a number of camps and to report back to Geneva. Rand and most of the other members insisted that the work of the committee should go ahead in the meantime, though Garcia-Granados argued strenuously that the entire UNSCOP membership should take part in the visits. He and Fabregat decided to accompany the subcommittee, which was to be headed by Hood.62 The following day the committee laid out its projected work schedule for the next few weeks. It decided to avoid any discussions of the Palestine problem in general and to look, instead, at proposed solutions based on specific and concrete suggestions of the committee members. Once a solution was chosen from a number of possibilities, ranging from a unitary Arab state to partition, the committee would then decide how its solution would be implemented. Implementation would involve the determination of boundaries, constitutions, essential arrangements for administrative and economic infrastructures, safeguards for minorities, protection for the holy places, and arrangements for the transition period. At each stage in the discussion,

93 'The best possible person' memoranda prepared by Sandstrom, members of the secretariat, or committee members were to be used to focus and direct the deliberations.63 As the committee began to get down to work, the Jewish Agency liaison team arrived from Palestine. Horowitz and Eban were accompanied by Moshe Shertok and several others and were forced to detour via Cairo because of poor air connections. They took advantage of their brief sojourn in the Egyptian capital to sound out Egyptian opinion on the current stage of the Palestine deliberations. They came away with the impression that the threats made by the Arab League at Beirut were only a tactic designed to pressure UNSCOP and that Palestine was not, in fact, a major focus of Egyptian attention, at least not as reflected by the Cairo press. At lunch on 3 August Eban and Horowitz had a long conversation with Ralph Bunche, who passed along the surprising news that the committee had discussed whether or not to invite the British to make another presentation and that Rand had been strongly opposed. Bunche also reported that the major concern committee members had about partition was 'the threat of conflicting irridentisms' which was based on the belief that an Arab state in part of Palestine would not be economically viable. Horowitz and Eban tried to argue the opposite but were careful not to suggest that an Arab Palestine be attached to Transjordan because they were well aware that such a proposal had doomed the 1937 Peel partition proposals from the start because of inter-Arab rivalry. The single dominant impression that Horowitz and Eban gained from this exploratory conversation was that Bunche and the other members of the secretariat were determined 'to ensure that there should be no need for another commission again.'64 The following day Eban wrote a lengthy and very perceptive report on the committee's mood and its likely direction over the next few weeks. He believed the committee would be concerned with finding an immediate solution; abstract justice would not be imporant against 'more practical calculations.' Eban believed that UNSCOP would only be concerned with 'politics as "the art of the possible." ' Under these circumstances the committee would reject an all-Arab state, an allJewish state, or the continuation of British rule in Palestine. The committee had seen strong evidence that a viable Jewish community already existed in Palestine with 'a common purpose and a single hope' which could not 'peacefully be subjected to Arab rule.' There would, therefore, have to be a compromise of some sort - partition, federal-

94 Canada and the Birth of Israel ism, or binationalism. Binationalism, however, had already been described by one UNSCOP member as 'a prayer to God by Magnes.' Eban clearly believed, therefore, even at this early stage, that partition was 'the only tangible solution' which the committee was to consider although the shape of that partition was still in question because some of the delegates, Rand and Lisicky in particular, wanted a federal link between the two projected states.65 Jewish Agency officials were often prone to unfounded optimism; Eban was uncannily accurate in his forecast. In the committee's first days in Geneva it experienced a sharp deterioration in morale. The weather was beautiful and the setting picturesque - the committee's offices were housed in the old Palais des Nations, a dramatic and poignant reminder of the contrast between the impotence of the old League of Nations and the apparent virility of the new UN. But the setting, with the blue of Lake Geneva, the splendour of the fountains, and the majesty of the distant peaks, contrasted sharply with the heat and dust of the Middle East which had added to the immediate drama of the committee's work. In Geneva the committee was isolated; it spent days on procedural questions, it avoided the major issues, its members did not discuss the problem with each other. 66 Bunche, who had clearly emerged as the key man in the secretariat, had his hands full working with Sandstrom to get things back on track. Every day that passed without clear progress towards a report was a day wasted. While the fountains cast their sun-dappled mists towards the shores of Lake Geneva, Trygve Lie waited in New York; the report was due at the end of the month. On 6 August the committee seemed to regain its sense of direction; that day's meeting was 'probably the most useful and important meeting so far' in the words of Jewish Agency liaison officer Moshe Toff. The positions of the different members began to emerge as they engaged in their first substantial discussion of possible solutions. It was clear that the committee wanted an end to the mandate; no one spoke in favour of its continuation, everyone advocated independence for Palestine although there was disagreement on how long the transition period should be. Rahman and Entezam favoured a unitary state with guarantees for Jewish minority rights built in. Simic advocated a binational state. Garcia-Granados refused to advance any definite opinion although it was quite clear to everyone that he favoured Jewish statehood in a part of Palestine. Rand wanted 'a concession of wide autonomy to the Jews and Arabs under the supervision of a great

95 'The best possible person' power' and recognition of the rights of the Jews but he did not commit himself to any definite solution at this point. Salazar seemed to echo this view by declaring himself in favour of 'independence' for Arabs and Jews without making clear whether he meant partition. Lisicky, Hood, and Blom pronounced themselves in favour of partition while Fabregat only urged 'a definitive solution.' Sandstrom declined to put forward his own ideas about a solution but did urge the committee to limit any transition to a year or less. Toff, reporting on the meeting to the Jewish Agency, concluded that a majority for partition was shaping up. 67 At this stage partition was little more than a word. If two totally independent states were to be created, with no connection to each other except for the existing transportation and communications network, that was one thing; if the two states were to be linked in some sort of loose confederation, that was another. And if there were to be links, how strong, how encompassing were they to be? Where was the difference between this latter type of partition and a unitary state with a federal structure such as that of Canada or Australia? What was the difference between partition and cantonization such as that existing in Switzerland? Rand's views were not yet clear and on 6 August Horowitz called on him to re-establish the contact they had had in Palestine and to sound out his ideas about a solution. Rand was very courteous and asked Horowitz what impressions he had picked up on his visit to Cairo. When Horowitz told him that the Jewish Agency representatives did not think the Arab League countries would fight, but were merely haggling with the committee, Rand agreed. He did not believe the threats of violence he had heard from the Arab states in Beirut and thought, instead, that they were 'anxious for a settlement, for finality.' Rand then launched into an explanation of how he viewed the problem and clearly favoured a partition of sorts with the Jewish state free to manage its own territory, to establish its own immigration policies, and to have representation in the United Nations. At the same time, however, he also favoured broad ties linking the Arab and Jewish states including a customs and monetary union, a common communications system, and payment of a permanent subsidy from the Jewish to the Arab state because he did not believe the latter would be economically viable. Horowitz argued against this, but Rand was clearly worried that the Arab state would suffer from a narrow economic base and the lack of talented political and administrative people to manage it. Rand, at this point, was also

96 Canada and the Birth of Israel clearly thinking about a separate status for Jerusalem because he warned Horowitz that in calculating the population of a Jewish state in Palestine, the Jewish Agency could not count on the 100,000 Jews of Jerusalem because the city could be 'completely internationalized.'68 Over the next few days Rand and the other members of the committee, carefully and patiently guided by Ralph Bunche and other members of the secretariat, began to focus their thinking more clearly and started to express their views about the final report. On 7 August the committee met to discuss the question "Shall Palestine be a unitary Arab or unitary Jewish state?' and to explore ideas about binationalism as a solution. Unitary statehood was unanimously rejected although Rahman believed that the Arabs had a 'natural right' to all of Palestine because of promises made to them by the British in 1915 and because the pledges made to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration, and incorporated in the mandate, were not right, just, or legal. Despite these beliefs, however, he claimed he was not prepared to support an 'extreme solution.' His views corresponded to those of Entezam, the other Moslem member of the committee. Rand believed that an Arab state in all of Palestine would be a 'betrayal of the Jewish people and a violation of international agreements.' There was no unanimity on the question of binationalism. Rand and Rahman opposed such a solution but for entirely different reasons. Rand claimed it would lead to deadlock and would deny the claims of both people to a country of their own while Rahman thought binationalism 'idealistic' and proposed one state with proportional representation in the government. This was, in fact, a modified form of unitary state. The other committee members realized this fact; they pointed out that Rahman had claimed that he would not support such a proposal but Rahman denied favouring a unitary Arab state. Hood, Blom, and Fabregat also opposed binationalism but Garcia-Granados, usually the most openly pro-Zionist of the lot, claimed he was ready to consider any scheme that would be acceptable. Lisicky and Salazar expressed great reservations about the idea and only Simic was enthusiastic. He promised to prepare a detailed scheme.69 By 11 August Rand's views were beginning to take shape. He was against giving Palestine wholly to the Arabs or to the Jews and opposed any plan that would force the two peoples to live together within the same state even if they were given equal representation within the government. He had been impressed by Judah Magnes's liberal humanitarianism but he could not accept Magnes's ideas. At the same time he

97 'The best possible person' was disgusted with the recent British record in Palestine and, although he had some sympathy with the trials and travails that the mandatory government itself was forced to undergo, had no sympathy for London. He told Horowitz that Britain had 'an entirely abominable record in Palestine' and had 'turned her back on all her promises'; the record was as bad in Palestine as it had been in South Africa, India, and Ireland. He had clearly been appalled by the treatment of the Jewish refugees and especially by the fuss made over the Exodus, and he thought it 'outrageous and ridiculous' that the British had to keep 100,000 troops in Palestine to maintain order, especially when there was such an economic crisis at home. 70 Rand was clearly not going to recommend a continuation of the mandate! VIII

By the summer of 1947 the displaced persons camps of Europe teemed with a quarter-million Jewish refugees. Their numbers had increased 220 per cent since the Anglo-American Committee had conducted its investigations in early 1946. When the war ended tens of thousands of homeless Jews had left the Nazi concentration and death camps and made their way to the cities and towns where they had been born. When they arrived they found homes, neighbourhoods, entire towns and villages destroyed, or they found their neighbours in possession of what had once been their property. The virus of Nazi anti-semitism had infected many people in the former occupied countries, particularly in eastern Europe where anti-semitism had, in any case, been strong for centuries. Soon anti-Jewish riots broke out in Poland and elsewhere and Jews were hunted, beaten, and killed. It was clear that Jewish life in eastern Europe was finished; the Jews began to move again, often encouraged by the Communist authorities, to the DP camps in the Allied sectors of Germany and Austria. These camps were the destination of the UNSCOP subcommittee, headed by Hood, which set out from Geneva on 8 August. The Jewish Agency tried to 'have the Committee see the worst camps,' 71 but Hood's group was especially careful to determine the real wishes of the majority of the displaced persons and avoided all the camps on the Jewish Agency list. They visited centres in the United States zone of occupation in Germany, in the British zone, in the U.S. sector of Vienna, and in the U.S. sector of Berlin, investigating conditions and interviewing as many refugees and officials as possible

98 Canada and the Birth of Israel within the short time allotted to them. 72 In most of the camps the refugees, sustained by funds supplied by the International Refugee Organization and organizations such as the Joint Distribution Committee, were adequately clothed and fed, but in Vienna, and especially in the large Rothschild Hospital and assembly centre, where a large number of Rumanian refugees had recently arrived, conditions were much worse. There the sickness and poverty horrified the subcommittee, and at one point the Iranian alternate, Dr Ali Ardalan, declared: 'This is a crime against humanity. I never imagined I would witness anything like this.' 73 Almost all the refugees interviewed declared their strong desire to go to Palestine, and the sincerity of those desires was confirmed by camp officials and United States military personnel in charge of the refugees. One thirty-nine-year-old Polish Jew who had survived Dachau told subcommittee members: 'When I was in the concentration camp, I understood that my only future would be in my own country, Palestine, and that was why I wanted to survive - otherwise my life has no sense. I would rather die if I cannot go to Palestine.' A seventy-three-year-old widow who had escaped the Nazis by taking refuge in the Soviet Union told the subcommittee how she had returned to Poland after the war, only to have all her children and grandchildren murdered by Poles in a pogrom: 'I alone escaped but I was shot in the eye,' she explained. 'How can I return to Poland, to the common graves of my dead?' When one young man was reminded that Palestine was no safe haven, that conditions there were difficult, and that Arab animosity was growing, he answered: 'I am tired of wandering from one place to another. I have had enough of being sent from pillar to post. I don't care about conditions in Palestine. It is the same to me whether I die there or elsewhere.'74 The Jewish Agency had an active and very visible presence in the camps, running educational programs, supplying textbooks, giving lessons in Hebrew and the geography of Palestine, working in, and in some cases operating, health centres, and trying to trace missing relatives. The subcommittee saw the signs everywhere and was anxious to determine if the apparent desire of the refugees to go to Palestine was due to Jewish Agency propaganda work. They found that other factors were more important, including the fear of growing anti-semitism in Europe, including Britain, and 'an incapability to start life again in places haunted by memories of endured horror.' 75 They concluded that the desire to go to Palestine was both strong and sincere and that as

99 'The best possible person' many as three-quarters of the Jewish displaced persons in Europe would head there even if a country such as the United States would offer to take them in. Because of the intensity of this desire, the situation of the displaced persons had clearly become 'at least a component in the problem of Palestine.' If something was not done soon about these people, the subcommittee warned, 'the situation in the assembly centres can only go from bad to worse, and may reach a breaking point in the not distant future.' 76 The visit to the displaced persons camps had a major impact on the UNSCOP deliberations. Mayrand had been moved and impressed by the experience77 and MacGillivray, the British liaison officer to UNSCOP, reported that committee members were glad that the subcommittee had gone to the camps because UNSCOP now realized that the camps were 'an integral part of the problem.' 78 There could no longer be any doubt that the question of the Jewish refugees in Europe and the question of Palestine had become directly linked whether or not the Arabs were right about the 'injustice' of such a link. The stink of disease in the halls of the Rothschild Hospital and the determination of the refugees to get to Palestine were facts that most of the UNSCOP members could not, or would not, ignore. IX

The committee accomplished little while Hood's group was away; the burden of the work fell on Ralph Bunche, who spent most of his time sounding out Jewish Agency representatives on their position and preparing a report for Sandstrom on the problems to be encountered in trying to implement partition. 79 Bunche tried to discover whether the immigration question or statehood was uppermost in the considerations of the Jewish Agency and learned from Eban and Leo Kohn that the agency saw the two issues as directly linked.80 The committee was clearly beginning to consider partition as the most probable option but the questions of what kind of partition, the size and boundaries of the two states that would be created, and the economic viability and absorptive capacity of these states were still very much open. It was not until the subcommittee returned and Fabregat, Garcia-Granados, and Hood joined the others on 16 August that the work of preparing the final UNSCOP recommendations drove ahead in earnest. At that point the committee had only two weeks to come up with its report and, so far, little progress had been made.

100 Canada and the Birth of Israel The committee had little trouble agreeing that the mandate must be ended but there was a wide divergence of views about what should then follow. Simic brought forward a detailed proposal for a binational state in which the Arab and Jewish communities would share power regardless of which was larger. He suggested a two-house legislature with one house elected according to population and the other containing equal membership from the two communities.81 This became the pole toward which Entezam and Rahman began to orient their positions, the latter clearly abandoning the unitary Arab state in disguise that he had earlier proposed. Rand submitted a plan for partition hedged round with so many conditions, and in which the two states would be so closely linked, that it was closer to confederation than true partition. He believed that Palestine, a 'Holy Land,' offered a unique problem and therefore needed a special solution in which two closely linked states would be created in such a way that the integrity of the country was, in fact, preserved on several levels. He was so insistent on the need to preserve the economic and social unity of Palestine that he declared himself ready 'to modify the objective of [Jewish] statehood to that of a province in a Palestinian state' if that unity was endangered by partition. Rand's scheme was both high-minded and impractical given the realities of Palestine. He proclaimed that the historical relationship of the Jews to Palestine justified the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and agreed with the fundamental Jewish objectives of self-government and a homeland or a state in Palestine. But he saw that state or homeland as an integral part of a larger "Commonwealth of Palestine" in which the United Nations, presumably representing the world community, had 'a sovereign interest.' He proposed the division of Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and a 'State of Jerusalem' with each having 'full powers of political sovereignty' and a republican form of government with democratic political and judicial institutions. But he also proposed the creation of a 'Central Authority' responsible for interstate transportation, trade and commerce, customs and excise, irrigation, the combined foreign trade of all three states, and a common currency. He believed that the Jewish state should indirectly subsidize the Arab state and that restrictions should be placed on Jewish land ownership and settlement rights in the Arab state although he did not mention reciprocal restrictions to apply to Arabs in the Jewish state. The three states should be tied together by a customs union, and each would raise a local militia for self-defence. Rand also believed that

101 'The best possible person' Britain ought to be allowed to maintain military bases in Palestine and should be the governing power during the transition to independence.82 Rand's views contrasted sharply with those of Fabregat, who presented a plan for partition that was far simpler and more straightforward. Under Fabregat's scheme the Arab and Jewish states were to be totally independent of each other but would be required, within six months of their establishment, to 'agree upon a system of cooperation' respecting a customs union, irrigation and water use schemes, and transportation and communications between them. 83 Rand's proposal, measured against the Fabregat plan, was much closer to confederation than true partition. In fact, Bunche believed Fabregat's plan, with its 'clean cut partition,' was far superior to Rand's. He had no faith in the workability of Rand's 'elaborate' scheme because it depended upon a large measure of goodwill which was, in his opinion, 'completely lacking in Palestine.'84 The written proposals that committee members began to put forward embodying their views about a settlement were a visible sign of progress - there was finally evidence of systematic thinking - but the discussions that usually followed tended to lead nowhere, retracing familiar ground and re-emphasizing the divisions that still existed within the committee. Bunche worried that the committee was getting bogged down just as time was running out while MacGillivray observed that there were 'too many lawyers' on it.85 Failure to report would have been a disaster and a vindication of Britain's policies. Bunche and the other members of the secretariat had been exceedingly careful to take no initiative in the work of UNSCOP but by 20 August it was obvious that the committee was still far from producing a completed document. Bunche decided the time had come to intervene and 'almost forced' Sandstrom to get the committee working on its report.86 Since it was obvious that the committee was loosely split between those who supported and those who opposed some form of partition, Sandstrom split the committee into two groups, each to work on a set of proposals that would later be presented to the full committee and form the basis for a final report. The Working Group on the Federal State Solution consisted of the anti-partitionists Simic, Rahman, and Entezam and was charged with the drafting of a federal state scheme for Palestine. The work was undertaken with the active help of Ralph Bunche. The pro-partition group was split into two committees: the Working Group on Constitutional Matters, with Rand, Sandstrom, Garcia-Granados, and Blorn,- and the Working Group on Boundaries,

102 Canada and the Birth of Israel with Salazar, Hood, Fabregat, and Lisicky. Bunche also wrote drafts for the pro-partition group.87 Although Rand had been included among the partitionists, there was some feeling that he would have been more at home with the federalists88 but he raised no objection to his placement. However limited the sovereignty he was willing to bestow upon the Jews in his scheme of partition, he was in favour of giving the Jews total control over immigration and substantial control over land transfers and purchases within their 'state,' and he recognized, and was willing to institutionalize, sovereign Jewish rights in a part of Palestine. All this set him well apart from Rahman and Entezam, who were opposed in principle to Jewish sovereignty of any sort, and even from Simic, who was willing to concede that Arabs and Jews had equal rights in Palestine but believed they ought to be made to function together in a single state, despite all the evidence he had already seen that this would not work. While the main delegates worked at their assigned tasks a subcommittee of the alternate delegates studied the problem of Jerusalem and the holy places. Mayrand worked with this group. There was already strong feeling among almost all the delegates and alternate delegates that Jerusalem ought to constitute a special case, and none of the proposals advanced at the UNSCOP meetings sought a simple division of Jerusalem between Jews and Arabs and the incorporation of the different parts of the city into the two projected states. The subcommittee's report followed from this and recommended that a special international zone be established, under United Nations control, consisting of Jerusalem and its environs, and that the area be administered by a UN-appointed governor who would also have jurisdiction over the holy places in the rest of Palestine.89 This proposal, which was quite different from Rand's call for separate statehood for Jerusalem, was later incorporated almost without change in the final UNSCOP report. As the UNSCOP deadline approached, the working groups laboured feverishly to prepare their recommendations. The boundary committee had the most difficult job. The geography and settlement patterns of Palestine appeared to dictate a small Jewish state, devoid of the Negev or the western Galilee, lest that state contain a large Arab minority even though such a truncated state would clearly be rejected by the Jewish Agency. Horowitz and Eban lobbied hard for the inclusion of both areas in the Jewish state and were aided in their work by an almost uninterrupted flow of reports from the supposedly secret meetings of the main committee and the working groups which, MacGil-

103 'The best possible person' livray suspected, was coming from Garcia-Granados.90Eban and Horowitz told Bunche that they were especially anxious about the question of territory; if the proposed Jewish state was too small, the Arabs would reject it on grounds of principle, the Jews because of its size.91 This question began to loom larger as UNSCOP's deadline approached. By 25 August, with less than a week to go, the Working Group on Constitutional Matters and the Working Group on the Federal State Solution had 'reached substantial agreement,'92 but the Working Group on Boundaries was having great difficulties and it began to look as if it would not make any submission at all. This would have been the kiss of death to partition because it would have demonstrated that partition was an ideal that could not be defined in the concrete reality of boundary markers. The major areas of disagreement in this group included the disposition of the Negev and western Galilee, and the Jewish Agency continued its strong push to get both included within the Jewish state. Shertok wrote Sandstrom stressing that the Jews required an adequate area of Palestine in a partition scheme and were not 'prepared to accept any scheme of partition provided only [that] it gave them statehood.'93 Horowitz made a personal plea to Rand to support inclusion of the two areas in the Jewish state and was relieved when Rand told him that he would not allow the Jews 'to be placed in a territorial ghetto.'94 By 27 August most of the work of UNSCOP had been completed; the constitutional subcommittee had worked out a scheme for the partition of Palestine which was a compromise between the Rand approach and the more prosaic Fabregat proposals. They entitled it 'The Plan of Partition with Economic Union.' At the same time the federationists presented their proposal for the creation of a federal state in Palestine. Both proposals were voted on: partition was supported by Rand, Lisicky, Garcia-Granados, Salazar, Sandstrom, Blom, and Fabregat. Simic, Rahman, and Entezam backed federation. Hood abstained because of the lack of unanimity.95 Despite the decisive choice, UNSCOP'S work was not finished because the report on boundaries was still incomplete. Speed was of the essence and on 28 August the delegates supporting partition met to work out a compromise that gave most of the Negev to the Jews, with western Galilee going to the Arabs. 96 The following day the entire committee met once again to consider the final version of the UNSCOP report as drawn up by a drafting subcommittee. The first eleven recommendations were adopted unanimously.97 They called for the earliest possible termination of the man-

104 Canada and the Birth of Israel date and the quick granting of independence to Palestine. This was to occur after a short transition period during which the country 'entrusted with the task of administering Palestine' (none was named) would be responsible to the United Nations. Whatever the political fate of Palestine, the UNSCOP Report asserted, the sacred character of the holy places and the right of free access to them should be preserved. The committee also called on the General Assembly to begin exploring ways in which the problem of the Jewish displaced persons could be solved. Other resolutions unanimously adopted called for the establishment of democratic principles and minority rights throughout Palestine, peaceful relations between the two communities, and economic unity. The remainder of the UNSCOP report was divided into a majority report favouring partition with economic union and the minority report advocating federation. The basic rationale behind the views of the majority was presented in four or five short paragraphs: the committee had found two separate and irreconcilable communities in Palestine and in each community neither the will nor the ability to co-operate in achieving common political goals. Partition was, therefore, the only way to give 'substantial expression' to the conflicting national aspirations of Arabs and Jews and provided the finality which was 'a most urgent need in the solution.'98 Partition was, in fact, a reflection of the reality that already existed in Palestine. The partition scheme recommended by the UNSCOP majority called for the creation of two independent states tied together by a monetary and customs union in which minority rights were to be fully protected. Jerusalem was to be kept apart from both states and established as an international zone administered by a governor responsible to the United Nations. A joint economic board, consisting of three representatives of each state and three members appointed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, was to administer the customs and currency of the two states and to oversee the operation of the transportation and communication systems throughout Palestine as well as joint economic development, especially respecting irrigation, land reclamation, and soil conservation. The Jewish state was given eastern Galilee, the coastal plain from Haifa to just south of Tel Aviv, and the north-eastern, central, and southern portions of the Negev. There would be freedom of transit and visit between the two states, and the economic union was to last at least ten years. Both states, upon receiving their independence, where to be eligible for admission to the United Nations. The report was complete; just after midnight on

105 'The best possible person' 1 September 1947, it was released to the public. Rand and Mayrand prepared to leave Geneva without delay. Mayrand claimed in his report to St Laurent that Rand had been 'by far the main contributor to the partition scheme'"but it is, in fact, difficult to fully assess Rand's impact on the final report. He had taken a lofty approach to the Palestine question in his first detailed submission to the committee in mid-August and his call for the creation of a Commonwealth of Palestine was not followed by anyone else. The final version of the majority report was a compromise between his views and those of Fabregat who, in fact, served on the boundary committee but whose thoughts on the subject were probably echoed by GarciaGranados who did serve with Rand. Perhaps Rand was too aware of the spotlight of history, too anxious to make another grand Solomonic judgment, to have any greater impact on the final report than he, in fact, had. Ralph Bunche, in contrast to Mayrand, found Rand to be 'the greatest disappointment' of all the members of the committee (which he thought of as 'the weakest ... in which he had ever participated'). He later characterized Rand as 'an elderly, crotchety gentleman who had apparently never been outside of Canada ... and who talked incessantly without contributing anything.'100 This judgment may have been influenced by the difficulties which Rand's elaborate partition scheme had caused and by Bunche's personal opposition to partition, which he did not consider necessary.101 In one area there can be no doubt about Rand's importance. When Hood decided to abstain on those recommendations that were not unanimous, Rand's vote became crucial because Rand represented a North American and British Commonwealth view on the Palestine question. Horowitz later reflected that 'Canada was known as Britain's most loyal Dominion and could not be charged with antiBritish prejudice. Its seal on the report was regarded by all as being a powerful factor in the UNSCOP chapter.'102 This may appear to be an overstatement, but it is hard to see how the UNSCOP report would have carried the moral and political weight it did in the following months if Rand had joined Hood in abstention or had joined Simic, Entezam, and Rahman in voting against partition. And despite St Laurent's disclaimer that Rand would not bind the Canadian government, the policy-makers and political leaders in Ottawa could not totally ignore the considered views of the respected jurist they themselves had picked as the best man for the job.

5

'With heavy hearts'

David Horowitz and Abba Eban had spent ten exhausting weeks shepherding the members of UNSCOP around Palestine and keeping a close watch on the committee's deliberations in Geneva but when UNSCOP broke up at the beginning of September, the major part of their work had only begun. After reporting to the Zionist General Council in Zurich, they were dispatched to New York, via London, to work for the passage of the UNSCOP majority recommendations at the United Nations General Assembly due to begin shortly. In London they sought out Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, the secretary general of the League of Arab States and one of the central figures of the Arab nationalist movement. Horowitz and Eban met Azzam in the Hotel Savoy in the heart of London. The noise of traffic penetrated the room as the two men, sitting on each side of Azzam, made their case for a peaceful solution to the Palestine question. Horowitz and Eban stressed a single theme: the Arab countries should end their vain resistance to the Zionist presence in their midst and try to work out a new course based on co-operation and compromise. Azzam listened courteously but his reply was firm: 'The Arab world is not in a compromising temper ... Get one thing into your heads. You will not get anything by compromise or by peaceful means. You may perhaps get something, if at all, by force of arms.' Eban was unperturbed at first. He pointed out that the Jews would not disappear even if there was a war and that negotiations would, therefore, have to take place sooner or later. 'Why not have negotiations before and instead of the war,' he asked. 'You are too rational,' Azzam replied. 'The Arab World regards the Jews as invaders. It is going to fight you. War is absolutely inevitable. If you win the war, you

107 'With heavy hearts' will get your state. If you get your state ... you have a chance that the Arabs will one day have to accept it ... But do not consider for a single moment that you will ever have a chance of our accepting you in advance.'1

I In Canada, public reaction to the UNSCOP majority recommendations was marked by apathy, scepticism, and outright hostility: editorials noted that strong Arab opposition to partition was inevitable and that some power or agency would have to enforce it. There was almost total unanimity that Great Britain should not be called upon to do that thankless job. The one dominant theme was that Britain had done its best for Palestine and had been attacked by the Jews for its efforts. The time had now come for Britain to leave as quickly as possible even if its departure meant open warfare between Arabs and Jews.2 'If the Jewish terrorists are determined to go on killing,' the Calgary Herald observed, 'let them try their conclusions with the Arabs, who are not worried about the opinions of other nations.'3 Several writers compared Palestine to India,4 where the recent partition had provoked bloody civil war, and warned that similar consequences would flow from the UNSCOP recommendations: 'I think time will show that the Jews in Palestine are making a sad mistake in demanding partition,' wrote Elmore Philpott in the Vancouver Sun.5 Others thought the recommendation^ 'fair minded' but unlikely to satisfy anyone.6 La Presse expressed the hope that a UN recommendation would bear weight with both Arabs and Jews but reminded its readers that the Arabs formed the majority in Palestine and, therefore, had rights that could not be disregarded.7 When the UNSCOP report was issued the Zionist mainstream in Canada was still engaged in a rearguard action aimed at disavowing the terrorist acts of the Irgun and Stern Gang. Canadians had been particularly outraged by the hanging of the British sergeants and the Canadian Jewish Congress had quickly issued a condemnation of the 'Irgun criminals and others ... responsible for lawlessness and violence in the Holy Land.' 8 The Zionist Organization of Canada had added its own condemnation of terrorism and labelled it 'inconsistent with Jewish tradition.' 9 Once the UNSCOP report appeared, however, the Zionist movement was quick to shift gears. The Canadian Jewish Congress and the United Zionist Council hailed the majority recommendations,

108 Canada and the Birth of Israel taking great care to stress Rand's contribution (the congress even called it 'the report of Mr. Justice Rand'), and urged the Canadian government to support partition.10 In public declarations and private discussions the Zionists emphasized Rand's name. Moshe Shertok declared: 'This is most satisfactory! We should by all means play up Rand with the Canadians, so as to strengthen their noblesse oblige complex.'11 The Zionist public relations campaign paralleled an intensification of their private lobby efforts. Herbert Mowat, now connected with a new group, based in New York, which called itself the World Committee for Palestine, called on George Ignatieff, a junior member of the permanent Canadian delegation to the UN, to praise Rand's work and to urge that Lester Pearson take on the job of chairman of the General Assembly's committee which would study and make recommendations on the UNSCOP report at the forthcoming UN session.12 (Mowat was only the first of many to urge Pearson to accept.) In Canada, Zionists approached members of the Department of External Affairs, MPS, and cabinet ministers in the effort to line Canada up behind partition. 13 Ignatieff later recalled that Lester Pearson was a favourite target and was 'under very strong Jewish pressure.' As Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton remarked to Ignatieff at one point, 'don't forget George, I don't mind how you vote but... don't forget that I have no Arabs in my constituency and I have forgotten how many hundred Jews.'14 Ignatieff may have been correct about the intensity of the private Zionist lobby at this point but, at the same time, the public campaign was far from vigorous. The national public relations machinery which had been built during World War Two lay mostly unused as Zionist leaders concentrated, instead, on quiet diplomacy to get their message across. There were few public meetings or rallies and even these were small and attracted little attention. At one of the most important junctures of the Palestine crisis, Canadian Jewish leaders reverted to their old practice of appealing to 'friends at court,' just as they had done in the 1930s in their campaign to open Canada's doors to Jewish refugees. They had been unsuccessful in that attempt and were no more successful in this. The Canadian public was generally apathetic about Palestine and many Canadians were hostile to the Zionist movement because of the Irgun and Lehi. These attitudes are probably what prompted the Zionists to resort to quiet diplomacy, but the absence of a vocal lobby gave the Canadian government considerable freedom of

109 'With heavy hearts' action in determining what its response would be to the UNSCOP recommendations. II

Flushing Meadow had been the site of the 1939 New York World Fair; the once futuristic 'trylon and perisphere/ as the white, needle-like, triangular tower and globe which abutted it had been called, still dominated the landscape. The area lay on the northern edge of the Borough of Queen's and was now increasingly criss-crossed with new roads and parkways which carried New Yorkers on their daily journeys from new post-war housing on Long Island to jobs in the older parts of the city. Despite the bustle around it, Flushing Meadow was still an island of tranquillity; a long, tree-lined parkway led through new suburbs, past meadows and woodlands, to a former skating rink where the plenary sessions of the General Assembly were to be held and where the final vote on the UNSCOP majority report was to take place. The setting gave David Horowitz 'the eerie feeling of living in a world of pretence, far removed from the familiar realities of outside.'15 There were many major political and economic issues crowding the agenda for the September 1947 meeting of the General Assembly.16 Canada, a part of the developing western alliance centred on the United States, was most concerned about those issues which grew out of the Cold War. A major civil war raged in China between the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist forces of Mao Tse-tung. Although this civil war was not a matter of immediate UN concern, and was not on the agenda, it formed an ominous backdrop to events in Europe where other armed conflicts were raging or appeared about to break out. In Greece another civil war pitted Communist-backed forces in the north against the royalist government supported by Britain and the United States in the south. There were armed disturbances in Poland and, farther east, in the Ukraine. There was danger of war over Trieste and a growing confrontation between the Soviet Union and the western allies over the future of Germany and the status of Berlin. Korea was also beginning to loom as another trouble spot as the United States, against Soviet resistance, tried to push the UN into an active role in its unification under a democratic government. Even the structure and function of the UN had become a matter of controversy as increasing use of the veto in the Security Council by the Soviet Union continued to upset western

110 Canada and the Birth of Israel hopes that the UN would become a truly effective agency for post-war collective security. The wartime alliance against Germany was no more; the new reality of international diplomacy was Cold War. Canada was becoming increasingly frustrated about the growing inability of the United Nations to take action on a variety of Cold War-related issues, but Ottawa had still not given up completely on the UN and the hope of saving the UN became a major consideration in deciding what stance to take on the Palestine question. In July 1947 Louis St Laurent had told the House of Commons that the UN could be an effective agency to break down 'the influences which divide' that were beginning to prevail 'in some other quarters' - an obvious reference, couched in diplomatic language, to the Soviet Bloc. The UN, St Laurent hoped, could 'act as an organization of civilized states within which universal and friendly cooperation [would] become possible.' The belief that this was still feasible led St Laurent to declare that 'the growth and strengthening of the united nations [sic]' should be 'a real cornerstone of Canada's policy in foreign affairs.' It would be foolish, St Laurent declared, 'to disparage the organization merely because it [had] not, in its short history, already accomplished all that ... [had] been hoped from it.' 17 As a middle power Canada needed a mechanism such as the UN to magnify and focus its existing strengths in the world community and to balance the incredible might and power of the post-war United States. The Palestine question and other issues, such as the fate of Korea, were obvious tests of the UN's ability to act decisively and of its effectiveness, and Canada was still determined to prove that the UN could work. On 11 September the Canadian cabinet discussed the issues that would likely arise at the UN meetings and approved instructions for the delegation about to depart for New York. Although the Palestine issue was addressed, the cabinet gave no specific advice on the partition question and instructed the delegation to seek advice from Ottawa as the Palestine debate unfolded. Since events in New York would form the context within which the cabinet would make its decisions, the reports and suggestions of the delegation were bound to influence the government's views on partition. Rand's endorsement of the majority report was one factor which the delegation was told to take into account - the cabinet pointed out that 'a distinguished member of the Supreme Court of Canada had arrived at certain conclusions after careful consideration of the issues involved' - but it was not the only one. The position of the Great Powers and the prospects of a successful

Ill 'With heavy hearts' implementation of partition were clearly of equal, if not greater, importance.18 The General Assembly meeting opened in New York on 16 September. The large Canadian delegation was initially headed by St Laurent, but he returned to Ottawa within a few days and his place was taken by J.L. Ilsley, minister of justice, who commanded much respect among delegation members because of his intelligence, honesty, and obvious sense of fairness. These were admirable traits, but politicians and diplomats alike are sometimes called upon to make difficult decisions and an overdeveloped sense of fairness can lead to indecision. This was Ilsley's biggest problem in public life; it took him too long to decide, and he constantly agonized over his decisions both before and after he had made them. This self-doubt had worn him down after twenty-one years in the House of Commons; Justice was for Ilsley a retirement post. Ilsley was reluctant to commit himself on partition without considerable thought and study; he wanted to absorb as much background information as possible before making up his mind and insisted on consulting with Elizabeth MacCallum, to hear her point of view, before taking a stand.19 He strongly believed that injustices were going to be done whatever the UN decided and these weighed heavily on his conscience. Despite his good intentions, however, he was almost totally ignorant of the Middle East situation and was a neophyte in the world of pro- and anti-Zionist manoeuvring that inevitably went on at the United Nations. At one point in late September he asked Mowat whether the World Committee for Palestine was going to support partition, 20 obviously unaware that the committee and Mowat were integrally involved with the Jewish Agency which had already announced its backing for the UNSCOP majority report. Ilsley's indecision and inexperience relegated him to a relatively minor role in the delegation despite his cabinet rank. Lester Pearson, who shared St Laurent's concerns about the United Nations (and was, if anything, even more pessimistic about the UN at that point), was the dominant personality of the delegation and effectively ran the show. He had far more experience in the international arena than any other delegation member and had won the acclaim of many members of the diplomatic community for his work in a large number of international conferences and organizations. He had done yeoman service as head of the First Committee at the Special Session of the General Assembly in the spring and it was obvious that his role in the diplomacy of the

112 Canada and the Birth of Israel Palestine question was far from over. The General Assembly had so many items to tackle on its agenda that Secretary-General Lie decided not to put the Palestine matter before the First Committee but, instead, to create an Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question which would be exclusively devoted to the discussion of this difficult issue and the formulation of resolutions for the General Assembly. At the beginning of September it became clear in Ottawa that Washington was going to press Pearson to become chairman of this committee, but Mackenzie King strongly opposed his accepting. He told Pearson that Canada was 'taking on more than she should' and he let St Laurent know, in no uncertain terms, that they 'had better make up' Pearson's mind on this matter. 21 He extracted a promise from St Laurent that the United States and British delegations be told that 'Pearson could not take on this work.' 22 The job thus went to Dr Herbert Evatt, Australian external affairs minister. King may have clipped Pearson's wings over the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee, but Pearson still had plenty of room for his special kind of manoeuvring. Pearson's friend (and prominent reporter) Bruce Hutchison believed Pearson virtually ran the delegation 'on his own.' It was possible, Hutchison admitted, that he was clearing matters with St Laurent, but 'in any case he goes out and lays down policy and commits Canada to anything he pleases without telling Ilsley.' The 'hockey player' - as Hutchison referred to Pearson - was ' so nice that no one would think of checking up on him or asking him anything.'23 R.G. Riddell, chief political adviser to the delegation, agreed with St Laurent and Pearson about the UN and was to have a substantial impact on the moulding of the delegation's views on Palestine. Riddell was head of the First Political Division at External, the section responsible for international organizations. The UN was, therefore, one of his special concerns, and he was determined to avoid UN inaction on Palestine because he believed this was just the sort of crisis that the UN had to handle if it was to have any value. This belief was part of the reason Riddell supported partition; he thought it was the only scheme that had a chance of being adopted by the General Assembly. He also struck MacCallum as being morally concerned with the fate of European Jewry after the Holocaust and too ready to bend over backwards to support pro-Jewish schemes. He was, in her words, an 'anti-antisemite.' 24 Pearson and Riddell did not have matters all their own way on the delegation. Elizabeth MacCallum was still opposed to Jewish state-

113 'With heavy hearts' hood and partition. Although she was a junior member of the department, she was still the only true expert on the Middle East and, as such, her views were important to Ilsley, at the very least. MacCallum did not believe that partition would work without co-operation from both Jews and Arabs, and she feared that an early British withdrawal from Palestine would leave a power vacuum that would be filled by 'Zionist or Arab extremists.' She thought that a temporary trusteeship might lessen the possibility of violence in Palestine because once the British had withdrawn, and Arab and Jewish police were placed under the United Nations, 'there would be nobody left to shoot at. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews would see any point in shooting at each other since neither would be allowed to take over the government of the country.' 25 MacCallum also believed that the Zionist movement was trying to 'confuse the humanitarian issue of displaced persons with the political problem of Palestine' and feared that Rand would exert a great deal of influence on St Laurent in favour of partition 'since Justice Rand and Mr St Laurent had been associated on the Canadian bench.' 26 Canada's Palestine policy was not being made in isolation; it was determined only after the policies of the Great Powers had been discerned, whatever Rand's views. The British position was particularly important to Canada. St Laurent had no intention of automatically trying to co-ordinate Canadian policy on Palestine, or any other foreign policy issue, with Britain or the Commonwealth and he was determined to continue the approach pioneered by Mackenzie King in the early 1920s.27 It was, none the less, important to know what the British would do. The UNSCOP majority proposals rested heavily on Britain's willingness to abandon the mandate and partition needed someone to enforce and police it and Britain was already on the ground with a large military force. St Laurent suspected, as early as March 1947, that Britain would leave Palestine in the near future as part of an overall contraction of the dependent empire that was so obviously visible in the decision to quit India. It became clearer, by the end of September, that he was right. Shortly after the UNSCOP report was issued John Holmes, first secretary of the Canadian High Commission in London, wired that the majority proposals were 'considered unworkable' in 'press and in official circles' there and that there was a strong feeling that the Arabs would greatly resent any support given to partition by London. Although the military had not made up its mind about evacuating Palestine - the army and the air force still wanted to keep their bases there - the Foreign Office were 'pretty solidly of [the]

114 Canada and the Birth of Israel opinion that Arab good-will [was] a much more important strategical factor than a military base in Palestine and favour getting out.' 28 Several weeks later London told Commonwealth countries that it agreed wholeheartedly that 'the Mandate should now be terminated' and took care to point out that Britain had no intention of assuming the responsibility for 'imposing a policy on Palestine by force of arms.'29 There was no question in John Holmes's mind that the British meant every word and were not bluffing, as some observers insisted.30 The Soviet position on Palestine was important to Canada for different reasons. There was deep suspicion of Soviet motives and there was the cold reality that the Soviet Union commanded much automatic support in the General Assembly, with its own three votes (which included two for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Belorussia) and those of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. During the spring special session the Soviet representative had announced that the USSR might support partition if there were no realistic alternatives for a peaceful solution. Mayrand, for one, hoped the UNSCOP majority report would get Soviet backing and pointed to Polish and Czech support for partition as 'certainly an indication that the Soviet Union will generally follow the same course.'31 During the first days of the General Assembly the position of the United States was almost as difficult to discover as that of the Soviet Union. There was, in fact, considerable disagreement in Washington about partition. Loy Henderson, chief of the Near Eastern and African Affairs section of the State Department, was completely opposed to partition, which he believed to be a formula for continuing strife in the Middle East which would inevitably damage the strategic and commercial interests of the United States. Henderson strenuously argued against U.S. support for the scheme in meetings with members of the U.S. delegation in mid-September and in a long memo prepared for the secretary of state. He was supported by most of the members of his department as well as the vast majority of U.S. diplomatic representatives in the Middle East. He was, however, strongly opposed by President Truman's political advisers at the White House, including David K. Niles and Clark Clifford, and by some of the members of the U.S. delegation, especially Eleanor Roosevelt and General John Hilldring, a delegation member who had formerly been responsible for displaced persons in the U.S. zone of occupation in Germany. Truman eventually decided the issue himself and instructed the U.S. delegation to back partition but warned them not to try to pressure other delegations into supporting it.32

115 'With heavy hearts' in

In Palestine, the war between the British and the yishuv continued despite the issuance of the UNSCOP report. Terrorist bombs killed twelve members of the Palestine police in September 1947 as the Irgun and the Lehi kept up their attacks against banks, police installations, and military facilities. On 18 September mandate officials released figures showing that 232 Arabs, Jews, and British had been killed since August 1945. At the Black Sea port of Constanza, the two largest Haganah blockade runners yet, the Pan Crescent and Pan York, began loading thousands of immigrants for the run to Palestine, while in Sofar, Lebanon, representatives of the Arab League met to discuss the UNSCOP report and heard the Iraqi delegation urge the adoption of an anti-western economic and commercial boycott, the expulsion from Palestine and the Arab countries of all Jews who had settled since 1914, and the raising of a volunteer force to fight partition. Although the boycott was shelved because of Egyptian and Saudi objections, the other suggestions were kept under active consideration and the meeting ended with a declaration that the establishment of a Jewish state would lead to 'an unavoidable outbreak of violence' in the area. These events provided the backdrop for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee33 which began 25 September. On 26 September, Arthur Creech-Jones, Britain's colonial secretary, arrived in New York to tell the Ad Hoc Committee that although Britain accepted the UNSCOP suggestion that the mandate be ended, it would not help implement any plan which did not have the agreement of both Arabs and Jews34 - a sure sign, for those willing to take the British at their word, that Britain would not impose partition, on Palestine. Three days later Jamal al-Husseini, speaking for the Arab Higher Committee, rejected both UNSCOP plans and warned that his people would fight any attempt to impose those plans on Palestine. The Arab countries strongly supported this position, leaving little room for diplomatic manoeuvring because the only solution acceptable to them was immediate independence for Palestine as a unitary Arab state. The Jewish Agency, represented by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, officially gave up its claim to all of Palestine and 'reluctantly' accepted partition, thus continuing the game which it had played since the December 1946 meetings of the World Zionist Organization.35 Throughout the long days of meetings the Canadian delegates said nothing; Canada's position would not be revealed until after the United States had announced its position.36

116 Canada and the Birth of Israel On 11 October the U.S. delegation, acting on instructions from the White House, informed the committee that the United States would support the majority plan, with 'some territorial modifications.'37Two days later the Soviet Union also endorsed partition. These announcements did not sway Britain one bit; on 13 October Creech-Jones told a meeting of Commonwealth delegates that the U.S. statement was 'not acceptable to the U.K. in so far as it proposed that the United Kingdom would continue to carry responsibilities of implementation ...' Arabs and Jews must be forced to 'face up to their responsibilities in order that they might accommodate each other and reach some understanding,' Creech-Jones suggested. The only way to force the Arab and Jewish hands was for Britain to announce a definite date for the end of the mandate. Creech-Jones then surprised and somewhat unsettled the delegates with the news that he would ask the cabinet to 'announce the withdrawal of U.K. forces and administration by next spring.' In India, he claimed, similar action had 'had the effect of making both parties accept accommodation.' If Creech-Jones had entertained any hopes that those present would support his government's position, however, he was wrong. Evatt and Sir Carl Berensen of New Zealand clearly backed the UNSCOP majority proposals while Ilsley predicted that 'the Canadian delegation would probably come out in support of the majority report in its main principles.'38 It was now clear that the United States and Britain were poles apart on partition - a continuation of their disagreements over Palestine which had developed soon after the end of World War Two. This rift created a unique opportunity for Canada to act independently and to decide an important policy question on its own merits. Canada could not concert policy with Britain and the United States because Britain and the United States could not concert policy with each other. Canada could have refused to commit itself, as it had done in the past, but Palestine appeared to affect Canadian interests in several important ways: it bore on the future of the UN, it contained more than a possibility of a conflict that could involve Canada, it was a crisis ready to be exploited by the Soviet Union. The Canadians chose to act. Within hours of the Commonwealth delegates' meeting Riddell, in consultation with Pearson and Ilsley, began work on a draft Canadian statement to the Ad Hoc Committee laying out Canada's position on Palestine. Pearson and Riddell had concluded that 'the only proposal that gave any promise whatever of providing a settlement was partition' and that partition was the only course of action that was likely to

117 'With heavy hearts' gain the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly needed for adoption of a substantive motion.39If this estimate was correct, the failure of partition would leave the assembly without any further options and no action would then be taken on Palestine.40 To Riddell and Pearson inaction would be disastrous, especially if Creech-Jones was serious about pulling Britain out, come what may, with or without a settlement in place. The only course open for Canada, therefore - a course that Pearson believed to be 'very much in [Canada's] interests' - was to support partition and try to make it 'as reasonable and workable ... as possible.'41 These very practical considerations lay behind Riddell's draft. He wanted it couched in 'empirical agrument,' with no attempt to meet the moral and political claims which the Arabs had advanced in the Ad Hoc Committee.42 Partition was necessary, Riddell thought, because Arabs and Jews were far apart, could not and would not co-operate on common goals, and could not unite within a single state. These major differences doomed any possibility of success for the UNSCOP minority's federation scheme even though Canada, as a federal country, might have wished to see such a federation established as the ideal solution. The key question for Riddell was 'what arrangement [would] best enable two peoples living within the confines of a restricted geographical area to avoid obstructing one another's development and to enjoy the benefits of stable and progressive government.' The answer was partition. The Ad Hoc Committee, therefore, should concentrate on how this might be implemented and, to this end, Riddell suggested the creation of a subcommittee, to include the permanent members of the Security Council, to work out the practicalities of partition.43 This straightforward approach disturbed Ilsley because there was 'no effort in the statement to judge the questions of principle which [had] been raised in opposition to partition in the Ad Hoc Committee.' 44 MacCallum too was upset because she saw Riddell's draft, with its endorsation of the UNSCOP majority report, as disregarding democratic principles, and because she believed it was still too soon to give up on efforts to conciliate the Arabs and Jews in Palestine.45 Despite these objections the gist of Riddell's draft was approved by the cabinet on 14 October and Ilsley spoke in the Ad Hoc Committee later in the day putting Canada on record 'somewhat reluctantly' in support of partition 'as a basis for discussion.'46

118 Canada and the Birth of Israel IV

Canada endorsed partition in principle, but most other members of the Ad Hoc Committee refused to do so at that stage. A United States resolution endorsing the principle of partition was defeated on 21 October. It was clear that a definite plan had to be put forward and, the following day, three subcommittees were established: Subcommittee I to work out plans for implementing partition, Subcommittee n to draw up proposals for a unitary state, and Subcommittee m to try to bring about Arab-Jewish agreement. The last group was headed by Evatt, made no progress whatever, and quickly abandoned its efforts. Subcommittee I consisted of pro-partition countries: Canada, South Africa, the United States, the Soviet Union, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The United Kingdom was to advise the subcommittees, and both the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee were given permission to appear before them. 47 The work of Subcommittee I was made much more difficult by the British announcement that they would leave Palestine as soon as possible. This clearly changed the circumstances under which the Palestine question had been taken up by the United Nations in the first place. When Britain had approached the UN over the Palestine matter in early 1947, it had sought the UN's advice on a political solution. The implication had been that Britain, as the mandatory power, would listen to that advice and, presumably, implement it. Now, however, it was clear that the British had no intention of doing so unless the UN could recommend a plan for Palestine that was acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. This, in the words of Robert McClintock, adviser to the U.S. delegation, was like trying to 'square the circle or find the fifth dimension.'48 The crucial questions, therefore, were these: if the British were physically absent from Palestine, or refused to co-operate with the UN, how could partition be implemented? What form of government ought to exist in Palestine after the British departure and for how long a transition period should that government rule? When and how should power be passed from the transitional regime to the two new successor states? Partition would not take place by magic; somehow it had to be made to happen in a legally and politically acceptable manner. The Americans tried to solve the problem with an attempt to convince the British to agree to a 1 July 1948 end to the mandate. That would leave enough time for the partition machinery to be put in place

119 'With heavy hearts' and would give the UN a definite date to aim at. They believed, in any case, that the British would not be able to remove themselves physically before then.49 A plan based on these considerations was presented to Subcommittee I in early November; the United States proposed that no transition period should intervene between the surrender of the mandate and the establishment of the Jewish and Arab states in Palestine and suggested that on 1 July 1948 Britain should turn power over to the new independent states. Those states would then assume full responsibility for internal order and defence. The Americans also suggested the establishment of a United Nations commission to assist in the preparation of the new governments and in making arrangements for the transfer of power. They implied that British forces should back up the commission even though the British had clearly announced that they had no intention of doing any such thing. The United States did not want the Security Council to take responsibility for Palestine because they feared the consequences of Soviet intervention.50 The Soviet Union and its allies naturally took the opposite course. They preferred the Security Council to supervise the transfer of power and wanted an immediate end to the mandate: termination by 1 January 1948 and full British withdrawal by 1 April. The Soviet Union clearly did not believe the British were sincere about withdrawal and expected that 'by some manoeuvre' the United Kingdom or other forces of the western powers would quickly re-establish themselves in Palestine.51 This suspicion put the Soviet Union and the United States on a collision course and undermined the possibility of success. The British were unwilling to help resolve the impasse and refused to tell the subcommittee whether Britain would co-operate in implementing the United States plan. They claimed Britain would not pass judgment on the partition plan until the final details had been worked out and presented to the assembly.52 In private, however, the British suggested that 'the plan for partition could not fail to cause prolonged bloodshed' and that 'adoption of [it] would be a source of great embarrassment to the United Kingdom.' They charged that the USSR was trying to establish its own forces in Palestine and were 'concerned lest plans adopted by the United Nations should interfere with [British] plans to withdraw from Palestine.' They now clearly regretted bringing the Palestine question to the United Nations and appeared to want the United Nations to 'fail to reach any agreement whatever on the Palestine question.'53 This was, therefore, a case where their in-

120 Canada and the Birth of Israel terests and the interests of Canada, as perceived by Riddell, Pearson, and presumably St Laurent, were clearly at odds. Pearson supported the American view in general but saw major flaws in the U.S. plan and worked out his own proposal. He agreed with the idea of establishing a UN commission, elected by the General Assembly, to implement partition but he wanted to impose definite conditions on the establishment of that commission. First, it should only operate with British co-operation. Second, it must have U.S. and Soviet support. Third, there would have to be back-up plans ready for implementation by the Security Council should difficulties arise that the commission could not deal with. There would also have to be guarantees that those plans would not be vetoed in the Security Council.54 St Laurent agreed with these ideas although he wondered about the wisdom of putting forward a Canadian proposal at all when 'no one else seemed to be prepared to prescribe.' Above all, he cautioned Pearson not to become 'so prominently identified with the matter as to become stuck with having to serve on the commission [to be appointed by the General Assembly].'55 St Laurent's warning to avoid entanglement in the Palestine question was uppermost in the minds of the Canadian delegates when they prepared their statement to Subcommittee I based on Pearson's ideas. They knew that both American and Soviet proposals could directly involve Canada in the administration of Palestine. Canada had been elected to the Security Council as a non-permanent member for a twoyear period beginning in January 1948, and Security Council involvement might mean Canadian involvement as well. Although the U.S. plan was designed to bypass the Security Council, there was still the danger that Canada would be pressed to serve on an assemblyappointed commission in the same way that it had been manoeuvred into service on UNSCOP. A Guatemalan proposal that military forces to police partition should be provided by the six non-permanent members of the Security Council was even more horrendous.56These considerations, plus the need to bring about a quick and effective compromise between the U.S. and Soviet positions, were uppermost in the Canadian consideration when Pearson spoke in the subcommittee on 4 November. Pearson's speech was a model of diplomacy. He reviewed the proposals already before the subcommittee, pointed out the flaws in each of them, and carefully revealed Canadian thinking. Any transition and transfer plans must pass three tests, he pointed out: they must be legal,

121 'With heavy hearts' practicable, and effective. He supported a suggestion that a small working party consisting of Guatemalan, United States, and Soviet representatives be formed to work out a compromise and urged that the process of finding 'an agreed proposal' begin as quickly as possible; Canada would be prepared to make its views available to this working group.57 When the working group was subsequently formed, Pearson was drafted as a fourth member.58 V

Pearson's manner was well suited to the sometimes frustrating tasks of diplomacy. He had a self-deprecating humour, a slight lisp that could disarm others in small and informal gatherings, and a quick wit. This exterior hid a directness, ambition, and intelligence that enabled him to get quickly to the heart of the most complex diplomatic issues. The Americans had wanted him as chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and had pressed him to assume the chairmanship of Subcommittee I but he had refused. It was obvious, however, that he was named to the working group in the hope that he would perform the diplomatic miracle of bringing about a compromise on transition and transfer and save partition. For this job he was to need all those assets which had already brought him so much praise in the world of international diplomacy. On the afternoon of 4 November Pearson began the long and frustrating job of guiding the working group towards a compromise that would also be acceptable to the General Assembly. His work was made more difficult by the almost complete lack of co-operation from the British and by the obvious refusal of the United States to shoulder any real responsibility for what took place in Palestine after the end of the mandate. Pearson was guided by practical and theoretical considerations which grew out of Canada's past approaches to the Palestine question and out of its national interests. He did not want Canadian troops to be dragged into the conflict. He wanted the prime responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine to rest with the people of Palestine. He wanted to avoid Security Council involvement but he wanted to ensure, at the same time, that the council would be able to take quick action should the people of Palestine be unable to maintain order. He was determined to avoid legal problems that might arise from an assumption, by the United Nations, of sovereignty in Palestine during the transition period.59 Pearson found

122 Canada and the Birth of Israel both the Americans and the Soviets much less concerned about this issue than he was, and he was somewhat amused by the USSR'S insistence that the United Nations charter be given a broad interpretation in this matter - the Soviet Union had been so legalistic and narrow in its approach to so many other international issues.60 At first it appeared as if Pearson's efforts would lead nowhere; he reported to Ottawa on 7 November that the gulf between the United States and Soviet positions was 'becoming more and more apparent.' 61 He, therefore, formulated a number of questions directed at the United States and Soviet representatives, looking for common ground,62 and on the basis of the answers drew up a compromise which was presented to Subcommittee I on 10 November. It looked like a coup of diplomacy; the mandate was to end 1 May 1948, the successor states were to be established sometime between 1 May and 1 July, and the General Assembly was to appoint a commission of from three to five small powers to implement the UNSCOP majority proposals and any other proposals relating to partition decided in the General Assembly. This commission was to 'assist the mandatory,' to be responsible for administering Palestine in the period, 'if any,' between the end of the mandate and the establishment of the Jewish and Arab states, and to act under the 'authority and guidance of the Security Council.' The plan called for the General Assembly to request a continuation of British administration in Palestine 'during the period between the adoption by the General Assembly of the Resolution on Palestine and the termination of the mandate.' 63 Britain torpedoed the compromise. On 13 November Britain's ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Alexander Cadogan, announced that his country intended to withdraw its forces by 1 August and that the mandate itself might be ended any time after Britain discerned that Arabs and Jews would not agree to the settlement proposed by the United Nations.64 Two days later Harold Beeley told MacCallum that the UK might end the mandate 'any time after Christmas' and that it was consulting its legal experts to 'ascertain whether it would be possible to terminate the mandate piecemeal beginning with the areas which the Mandatory Power intended to evacuate first.' Beeley attacked the Jewish Agency by pointing out 'that in relation to partition' its policy was the same as that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets were supporting partition, Beeley claimed, to establish the principle that 'a dissident minority has the right to sovereignty in the territory it occupies.' If accepted at the UN, this principle would be useful for

123 'With heavy hearts' fomenting trouble in eastern Turkey and northern Greece and 'perhaps elsewhere,' he claimed.65 Britain's rejection of the 10 November working group proposals sent Pearson and the rest of the group back to the drawing-board. Pearson tried to consult with members of the British delegation, as he had from the very start of his labours on 4 November, but found it exceedingly difficult to get any co-operation at all. At one point he told two members of the British delegation that London was being blamed to a considerable extent at the UN for its 'uncooperative attitude.' He tried to convince them how important it was that the mandate should be ended on the same day that the Arab and Jewish states were established in order to avoid the challenge that might be raised to the legality of any temporary UN authority that might exercise sovereignty in Palestine during the transition. The British were unmoved. They indicated that the United Kingdom was now thinking of surrendering the mandate by progressively withdrawing from different sections of Palestine and declaring the mandate ended in those areas, as Beeley had mentioned to MacCallum. The British expected that if this were done the local authorities would 'take over almost immediately, especially in the Jewish areas.' Britain was not, however, going to 'be the instrument for transferring authority to anybody.' After the meeting Pearson concluded that 'the principal objective of the United Kingdom Government was to avoid giving consideration to a plan which they distrusted and disliked.'66 Chaos might reign in Palestine, Arabs and Jews might launch wholesale killing, an Arab League invasion might bring full-scale war, east-west confrontation might develop, but Britain, in its perception of its own interests, would remain faithful to its Arab allies and untainted by any association with partition. By 17 November Pearson was becoming increasingly frustrated. In part he blamed the United States for taking 'an unrealistic attitude of easy optimism, brushing aside difficulties and insisting that cooperation of both mandatory power and Arab States can be counted on.' To Pearson the Americans seemed to show little concern for preparing plans that could be acceptable to the British, and they had given no evidence 'of readiness to give material assistance in solving practical problems, such as control of immigration' which would arise as soon as a partition plan was adopted. Pearson wanted the Americans to announce that, in the event of 'disturbances in Palestine following the adoption of a partition plan,' they would be willing to fulfil their

124 Canada and the Birth of Israel responsibilities 'as a good member of the United Nations' but they had 'not been willing to go even this far.' Pearson found the Soviets to be 'at times ... both cooperative and constructive' and at other times 'obstinate, unrealistic and impractical.' Their main aim was to get the British out of Palestine as quickly as possible, so as to end Britain's strategic influence there, and to keep American forces out afterwards. Soviet suspicions of the British were responsible for the USSR's refusal to allow the new states to be proclaimed while British troops were still stationed in Palestine and had led the Soviets to insist that the UN exercise sovereignty in Palestine for at least two months after the end of the mandate. The Soviets refused to admit that there was any legal or constitutional difficulty. 67 Pearson was pleased to have Soviet co-operation but he was not naive about Soviet motives. He believed the USSR was supporting partition as an interim step to some other Soviet objective and that it would later exploit the situation in some as yet undetermined way. Pearson speculated that the USSR might be interested in establishing a Communist state in Palestine as a bridgehead in the eastern Mediterranean or, perhaps, hoped for chaos in the region to provide an excuse to send in troops. He thought it possible that the USSR might 'bedevil the whole Palestine situation in the Security Council' and never fully trusted the Soviets to keep any of the bargains or arrangements he was trying to shape.68 Pearson's strongest condemnation, however, was reserved for the British; he found them unco-operative and he had difficulty understanding their attitude. Though they had brought Palestine to the United Nations in the first place, they now appeared to be hoping that the UN would not find a solution and that they could then be free to quit Palestine whenever they liked and without the interference of any outside agency. They had 'asked the United Nations to deal with the problem, but ... refuse[d] to make any contribution to the finding of a workable solution.' Pearson believed that the UN would be 'greatly discredited' if the Palestine plan failed but that failure was guaranteed 'unless [the] United Kingdom [was] willing to cooperate.' The British were refusing to consult with 'those who are working out a plan' and were taking 'a completely detached attitude.' It was likely, Pearson thought, that Britain would be blamed 'entirely' for the UN'S failure to come up with a solution.69 Despite the total lack of British co-operation, the working group, led by Pearson, forged on and by 18 November had drawn up a new

125 'With heavy hearts' draft proposal for implementation of partition. The plan called for the appointment, by the General Assembly, of a commission of small states to 'act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council.' This commission would administer Palestine during the transition period and was to be free of British interference. The commission and Great Britain were to fix the date for the ending of the mandate, subject to the approval of the Security Council, but no later than 1 August 1948. Britain was to withdraw its forces from Palestine progressively so that they were totally evacuated by 1 August, and was to advise the commission 'as far in advance as possible of its intention to evacuate each area.' The commission was to select and establish a provisional council of government for each state which would be responsible for the administration of its own area under the general guidance of the commission. The provisional councils were to have 'full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation' between the time of the end of the mandate and the establishment of the two successor states. Two months after the British forces completed their withdrawal, and no later than 1 October 1948, independent Arab and Jewish states were to come into existence with boundaries laid out by the UNSCOP majority plan and modified by Subcommittee I. The setting up of the provisional councils of government, the laying out of the frontiers of the two states, and the establishment of Jerusalem and its environs as a UN-administered area were to be carried out by the people of Palestine in consultation with the commission and following the lines laid down by the UNSCOP majority report. If, by 1 April 1948, the commission believed that provisional councils of government were not likely to be established for both the Arab and Jewish state upon termination of the mandate, or were not likely to be able to operate effectively, it was directed to 'communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action as the Security Council may deem proper and to the Secretary-General for communication to the members of the United Nations.' Order in Palestine during and after the transition was to be maintained by 'an armed militia,' recruited within each state by the provisional councils of government, 'sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes/ During the transition these militias were to be commanded 'for operational purposes' by Arab and Jewish officers resident in each state, but 'general political and military control' was to be exercised by the commission.70

126 Canada and the Birth of Israel Pearson, and other members of the Canadian delegation and the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, were not entirely happy with the legal technicalities of the plan, particularly the control to be exercised over Palestine by the commission during the transition, but the scheme was acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union and that was what mattered most. The British, however, were still not satisfied with the plan and forced several minor changes. These gave Britain sole right to decide when the mandate would end and placed total responsibility in British hands for the administration of areas still occupied by Britain. Britain's potential collaboration with the commission was thus kept to a minimum. After Subcommittee I approved the report, it was submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee, together with changes in boundaries and other minor modifications to the UNSCOP majority report, on 19 November.71 Pearson had looked upon the transition and implementation question as a thorny issue because of the great differences that normally separated the United States and the Soviet Union, the ingenuous approach that the Americans seemed to take to the Palestine question, and Britain's refusal to co-operate. At one point 'the junior members of the United Kingdom delegation' complained that he and the Canadian delegation had been 'disloyal' and had deliberately worked against the best interests of the United Kingdom. An angry Pearson later wrote Norman Robertson in London that it was 'inopportune' that Canada had been abused for 'abandoning the United Kingdom line on Palestine when it was quite impossible for anyone, in public or private, to discern what that line was.' 72 In the end he was instrumental in finding a solution and keeping partition alive. He won personal acclaim from American, British, and Canadian journalists 73 but his very success now placed the partition question squarely before the Canadian government; it was time to decide how Canada would vote on the future of Palestine. VI

On the morning of 20 November the final report of Subcommittee I, containing the UNSCOP majority recommendations for the partition of Palestine as modified by the subcommittee, and with the arrangements for the transition and the transfer of power drawn up by Pearson's working group, was submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee. Sub-

127 'With heavy hearts' committee II also submitted its report, which contained a proposal for Palestine to be established as a unitary state with guarantees of minority rights for the Jews. Although Ilsley was still uneasy about making a decision and sought St Laurent's guidance, Riddell strongly urged the government to back partition. He was convinced there was no practicable alternative because the only other solution before the UN - the Arab plan - would not receive the necessary two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and would not be peacefully accepted by the Jews in Palestine if it did pass. Riddell thought that although the partition plan was 'dangerous and provocative' it offered the only hope Against the 'collapse of order and a settlement by force' even though he recognized that this was, in reality, a slim hope. He also believed that, since partition was supported by both the United States and the Soviet Union, a settlement was possible 'in cooperation with the USSR and without their direct intervention.' Riddell was fully aware that the Arabs in Palestine and their Arab League allies might resist partition by war, but he thought that 'failure to adopt the plan' would create even greater dangers because the Jewish Agency would be discredited and Jewish 'extremists,' who were 'prepared to seize the whole of Palestine by force,' might take control of the Zionist movement. The civil war that would then result would place great strains on United StatesBritish relations and 'would certainly serve the best interests of the USSR.' Riddell pointed out that the break-up of the old Ottoman empire had allowed the Arabs to establish a number of independent states,more would soon be set up. Partition would give 'the Western Powers the opportunity to establish an independent, progressive, Jewish State in the Eastern Mediterranean with close ... ties with the west generally and in particular with the United States.' Finally, in Riddell's view, the partition plan would force 'back on the people of Palestine themselves' the bulk of the responsibility for the maintenance of order. 74 Riddell's views helped carry the day in Ottawa though the Canadian delegation had clearly been leaning toward partition for some time. The lack of a concerted British/American policy had given Canada an opportunity to act on the basis of its own perception of its national interests and the opportunity was being well and truly used. Although Canada came to the same conclusion about partition as did, say, the United States, it did so for different reasons. Even though some of the motives of the two countries were obviously the same, Canada did not decide to take this route simply to follow the United States. This was,

128 Canada and the Birth of Israel in fact, one of the few times in the post-war period when Canada formulated a policy so independently. On 22 November Pearson gave Canada's decision to the Ad Hoc Committee. The plan for partition worked out by Subcommittee I was, in his opinion, practical and stood the best chance for success in bringing about a solution to the Palestine problem. It was, he believed, far superior to the vague scheme worked out by Subcommittee n which did 'not really mean anything at all' and was little more than 'a recommendation out of the blue and into the blue.' Pearson told the Ad Hoc Committee that the partition plan was workable on paper and could be workable in practice provided three conditions were fulfilled: Britain had to co-operate; the Security Council had to give the plan its 'active backing and support'; the plan had to be accepted by the people of Palestine 'and by all members of the United Nations.' Canada was not happy about the situation but was compelled to take action and the plan of Subcommittee I had 'the best chance of success of any' that had been submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee. Canada would support it. 75 On 25 November the Ad Hoc Committee voted on the two schemes and the partition plan was approved by a vote of twenty-five to thirteen with nineteen absentees or abstentions. VII

Pearson's prominence in working out the Soviet-American compromise stimulated renewed United States interest in getting Canada more deeply involved in the Palestine question. Members of the United States delegation approached the Canadian delegation to see if Canada was willing to accept nomination to the commission that the General Assembly might establish to oversee the partition agreement. The Canadians 'indicated that they were very reluctant to serve' but the Americans would not accept this answer and decided to approach Ottawa directly. To do so had, after all, worked in the spring when the U.S. had been pressing Canada to accept membership on UNSCOP. On 21 November the United States ambassador to Canada saw Escott Reid to convey State Department hopes that Canada would 'consent to serve.' Pearson's labours in the working group had, in the State Department's opinion, 'given all the conflicting elements a belief in the integrity of purpose and devotion of Canada to a fair solution.' Reid told the ambassador that he would pass the message along but that he

129 'With heavy hearts' 'could not give him much reason to hope' that Canada would accept. 76 St Laurent had been cautious about Palestine all along; he had not wanted to get involved in UNSCOP and was very reluctant to accept the American request. He thought it would be 'unwise' to serve on a Palestine commission as long as the British had troops there. He did not want Canada in a position where it might have to criticize the United Kingdom and, at the same time, he would not want Canada to refrain from such criticism, if it served on a commission, simply because of Canada's Commonwealth connections. Hume Wrong, in Washington, agreed with St Laurent's position but for a different reason. He was convinced that the Department of External Affairs was already stretched to the limit and that Canada had taken on too many international responsibilities. To take on more could cause an 'inadequate performance of the essential functions of the Department.' 77 Pearson appears to have been undecided about service on the Palestine commission. He recognized the accuracy of Wrong's observations and pointed out that Canada had, in his opinion, already fulfilled its obligations to the United Nations in the Palestine matter. He was convinced, however, that the Palestine commission would be weak without Canada and might not be able to fulfil its responsibilities. He also believed Canada could contribute the sort of experienced and skilled people who would be needed for this difficult job. (He was, undoubtedly, referring to himself.) 78 But these arguments did not change St Laurent's mind one bit; he was convinced that Canada must stay away from service on the Palestine commission. King had left Canada for Britain on 30 October to attend the wedding of Princess Elizabeth, leaving St Laurent in charge; St Laurent used his prerogative to call a special cabinet meeting to decide the issue. He may well have been seeking the strong mandate of cabinet before Pearson or the United States had a chance to find a way of bypassing his position. His position on Palestine had, after all, been bypassed before. The cabinet met to consider the matter early on the afternoon of 25 November. St Laurent presented the main arguments against service on the commission and added a few new ones. He claimed that Canada's efforts in the UN to date had given Canada a reputation for 'having taken up the Jewish cause' which would create hostility among the Arabs. He also warned cabinet that if armed force was needed to support the commission's administration, the members of the commission might be expected to furnish troops. The cabinet

130 Canada and the Birth of Israel backed St Laurent and instructed the Canadian delegation to persist in its refusal to serve.79 Pearson's chance to become 'governor of Palestine,' as one cabinet minister put it, had vanished.80 VIII

The General Assembly debate on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee began on Wednesday, 26 November. Ilsley was one of the first delegates to speak and his presentation reflected the anguish and uncertainty in Ottawa over partition. Canada would support partition, Ilsley told the assembly, because it was 'the best of four unattractive and difficult alternatives,' which consisted of doing nothing, establishing a unitary state, setting up a federal state along the lines suggested by the UNSCOP minority report, and partition. Doing nothing would be an abdication of the United Nations' responsibilities which would invite confusion and violence and result in continuing bloodshed and war. The establishment of a unitary Arab state would have been the 'normal and natural' course, Ilsley declared, but the Balfour Declaration, the nature of the League of Nations mandate, and the establishment of a 'well rooted community of nearly 700,000 Jews in Palestine ... and the devotion ... of Jews all over the world to the idea of a Jewish national home in a country which once at least was a Jewish land' made that course unacceptable. The Palestine problem was, therefore, unique; it contained 'a fatal flaw in the otherwise unanswerable Arab case.' Ilsley was more receptive to the notion of a federation and pointed out that the UNSCOP minority plan had 'certain elements of attractiveness to Canadians' because Canada was a federal country. But Palestine was not Canada and federation was rejected by both Jews and Arabs. This left partition, which Canada supported 'with heavy hearts and many misgivings.' Ilsley noted the 'threats of reprisals' and the 'talk of fire and sword' which had been heard at the UN, but claimed it was 'folly to assume that there would be any less likelihood of disorder if any of the other alternatives were adopted.' Something had to be done about Palestine and Canada was satisfied that even though partition was a difficult solution, 'any other solution would be worse.' Ilsley concluded his speech with a plea to the other delegations to shoulder their responsibilities and to vote on this important question.81 The Ad Hoc Committee had not approved partition by the twothirds majority necessary for passage in the General Assembly. Even as

131 'With heavy hearts' Ilsley spoke, frantic lobbying efforts were going on, spearheaded by the Jewish Agency, to get those countries which had abstained or absented themselves from the vote in the Ad Hoc Committee to back partition and to try to get some of the opposition countries to change their approach. The role of the United States delegation has become somewhat controversial because there is clear evidence that some members, at least, put heavy pressure on other delegations to swing them into line. When President Truman had instructed the State Department to vote in favour of partition one of the conditions he put on this support was that the delegation not attempt to influence the views of others. In his memoirs Truman expressed indignation at the U.S. pressure and disavowed any responsibility for it. One former State Department official has claimed, however, that Truman must have agreed to the lobbying effort which was probably orchestrated by David K. Niles and Clark Clifford. 82 None of this pressure was,directed towards Canada, of course, because Pearson had already supported partition in the Ad Hoc Committee. The British kept an eye on the Commonwealth delegations but the United Kingdom delegation was under strict instructions to keep neutral and not to try to influence the votes of other countries.83There is no evidence to show that the Canadian delegation took part in any lobbying efforts and given Canada's hesitant support for partition, it was most unlikely that it did. The debate in the General Assembly dragged on through 26 and 27 November when it was then adjourned for twenty-four hours.84 During the hiatus the Jewish Agency representatives, aided by their American supporters, worked furiously to reverse what appeared to be a tide running against partition. On Saturday, 29 November, the debate was resumed; the General Assembly president, Dr Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, asked the members if there had been any progress made towards bringing Arabs and Jews together. The Lebanese delegate, Camille Chamoun, claimed that no approach had been made to the Arab delegations to conciliate the two sides and that the Arab delegations 'were ready to listen and to discuss any conciliatory proposal which would be capable of providing a reasonable and just solution of the Palestine problem.' He then outlined a rough plan for the establishment of a federal system in Palestine that was essentially based on the UNSCOP minority proposals. This change of direction was probably prompted by the fear that partition would be approved. Following Chamoun, Thor Thors of Iceland took the floor to deny that conciliation efforts had not been made. He had been a member of

132 Canada and the Birth of Israel Subcommittee ill and he claimed that the subcommittee had 'tried everything' to bring the two sides together but 'in vain.' The United States delegate, Herschel V. Johnson, denounced the Lebanese proposal as essentially a resurrection of the UNSCOP minority plan which had already been rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee. Johnson reminded the assembly that no conciliation efforts had been made in the previous twenty-four-hour adjournment and that the Palestine issue 'had been of concern to the world for the past thirty years.' The time had come to vote, he urged. But the debate dragged on: the Syrian, Iranian, and Lebanese delegates wanted more time, more study, more voting on the other UNSCOP recommendations; Andrei Gromyko for £he USSR wanted the vote to go ahead. The Iranians came up with a motion to refer the whole matter back to the Ad Hoc Committee 'for a better solution, taking into account the statement made by Lebanon today' but Aranha ruled it out of order. Chamoun protested but to no avail. Time had run out; Aranha ordered the vote taken. As the secretary began to call the roll of the nations, the votes in favour of partition began to pile up. The United States and the Soviet Union voted for it. Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia favoured it. Thirteen Latin American and Central American countries supported it. The final vote was thirty-three in favour, thirteen opposed, and eleven absences or abstentions. Jews in Palestine and all over the world began to celebrate almost immediately; the Arab delegations walked out of the assembly and the Arabs of the Middle East speeded up their preparations for war. IX

Canada's support for partition, and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, was not freely or lightly given. It came only after a careful consideration of the available options and an independent determination of where Canadian interests lay. The opportunity to make policy so independently grew out of American/British disagreement. In Pearson's view Canada had not acted 'from purely altruistic motives' but from the belief that it was 'very much' in Canada's interests to make partition as acceptable as possible and 'to prevent the responsibility for putting it into effect being left with [Canada] and other secondary states.'85 The delegation had taken a pragmatic approach in working for 'some constructive conclusion to the problem' and in trying to 'avoid the discredit that would have come upon the United Nations if

133 'With heavy hearts' no proposal had emerged from the discussion.'86It may be argued that this was a paper diplomatic solution reached for the very sake of solution, without regard to the realities in Palestine and the Middle East, and that partition, instead of being a solution, was the means whereby the problem was perpetuated. Obviously Pearson, Riddell, and others did not see it that way. They believed that the proposal was the only one which took account of the one reality that made Palestine unique: the Jews, mostly by their own efforts, had created a viable society in Palestine by the fall of 1947; they wanted free immigration or statehood and were willing and able to fight for those objectives. Partition might have worked if at least two of the three conditions outlined by Pearson on 22 November had been fulfilled: British co-operation, active Security Council support in implementing the plan, the cooperation of Arabs and Jews. But Britain did not co-operate in the coming months, the Security Council did not enforce partition, and the Arabs opted for war. Pearson, with the government's support, had played a unique and crucial role at the UN; partition might not have been adopted without his efforts. But the passage of partition in the General Assembly was not the end of the Palestine problem. As the first shots were fired in Palestine the morning after the UN vote, it became clear that the commitment of the UN, Canada, and other propartition countries to the UNSCOP majority solution was soon to be sorely tried.

6 'A temporary trusteeship'

Twenty-four hours after the United Nations General Assembly voted for partition, Palestine was aflame. On the afternoon of 30 November a Jewish-owned bus driving along the highway from Netanya to Jerusalem was ambushed by Arab riflemen; five passengers were killed. That same day the Arab Higher Committee declared a three-day general strike. Armed bands of Palestinian Arabs began to open fire on Jewish traffic and started to place outlying Jewish settlements under siege. On 1 December an Arab mob broke into the old commercial centre of Jerusalem attacking Jewish shoppers and storekeepers and looting and burning the shops. In Haifa shooting broke out between Arabs and Jews starting a five-month battle for control of the city. Fighting quickly spread to the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area; the Arab and Jewish communities throughout Palestine were soon locked in a bitter war for control of the country.l The underground Jewish fighting forces were better organized and better trained than the Arab guerillas, but the Arabs were more numerous and held better positions. Isolated Jewish settlements outside the coastal plain were easily cut off and surrounded, and by January many of these settlements were under siege and in danger of running out of medical supplies, food, and ammunition. The Arab forces were particularly successful in cutting off the Jewish quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem and the Jewish sections of the new city outside the walls. Jewish attempts to push convoys up the road from Tel Aviv were continually thwarted with heavy loss of life. The Palestine Arabs were aided by the Arab League countries. They quickly organized a recruiting and training operation, mainly in Syria and Lebanon, under the nominal leadership of Fauzi al-Kaukji, a former officer in the

135 'A temporary trusteeship' Turkish Army who had led the Arab forces during the Arab revolt in Palestine in the late 1930s. By January al-Kaukji's troops, the Arab Liberation Army, were beginning to infiltrate across the Palestine border to help assault Jewish settlements.2 The Palestine war soon escalated with attack and counter-attack, atrocity and counteratrocity, until Jews and Arabs were locked in mortal struggle from the Negev desert in the south to the Upper Galilee in the north. British forces in Palestine did little to stop the conflict and intervened only when absolutely necessary, usually to protect British lives or property: Britain was disengaging itself from Palestine. The United Nations General Assembly resolution of 29 November, 1947 had called for the establishment of a Palestine commission, and such a body consisting of Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines was duly established within weeks of the partition vote. But Britain refused to co-operate with the commission leaving it with no power to stop the fighting. The British made clear to the commission that they alone would remain responsible for Palestine until the mandate ended and that the full commission would not even be allowed into the country until 1 May. When an advance party of the commission arrived in Palestine in January, it was housed in an unventilated basement opposite British headquarters in Jerusalem. It was soon reduced to foraging for food and drink and accomplished nothing.3 Britain would not stop the war while the United Nations, at this stage, could not stop it. I

Despite the obvious perils that partition posed, Canadian Jews welcomed the United Nations decision and praised Canada's role in the events which led to the 29 November vote. Samuel Bronfman, president of the Canadian Jewish Congress, declared that the General Assembly resolution was 'a great step towards the realization of an ageold dream for the Jewish people.' It was 'heartwarming to Canadians to have history record that Canada played a most important part in the international deliberations which preceded this decision,' he claimed. He believed that partition would 'serve as an encouragement to all who strive to better the lives of mankind by the peaceful means of education and positive creative action.' 4 This was not, however, a universal Canadian reaction. The tiny Canadian Arab Friendship League called the partition vote an act of betrayal by 'the selfish in-

136 Canada and the Birth of Israel terests of so-called "Big Nations," ' which broke, ignored, or forgot their promises to the Arab people. M.S. Massoud, president of the league, told the Montreal Optimist Club that the Arab world 'would '' remember'' Lester B. Pearson and Justice Rand ... who ... did their utmost to impose upon Arabs the infamous partition scheme.'5 The Canadian press was considerably more restrained than either the Arab or Jewish community in its reaction to partition and to the outbreak of war in Palestine. The Globe and Mail called the 29 November vote 'an epoch-making verdict for the Jewish people and for the world.' The paper, like many other Canadian newspapers, claimed the Jews owed much to Great Britain, which had performed a thankless task in Palestine trying to find a formula that would satisfy both Arabs and Jews. Now, it warned, 'no British assistance in setting up the two new states [could] be expected' and the enforcement of partition would lie entirely with the United Nations, 'where it belongs.'6 Both the Halifax Herald7 and the Halifax Chronicle expressed similar sentiments although the latter was far more bitter towards the Zionists. The Chronicle suggested that a Jewish government in the Middle East would soon be enforcing immigration restrictions of its own in the new Jewish state.8 Other Canadian newspapers called upon the Arabs to accept partition as the final judgment of 'the world's highest tribunal.' 9 The Regina Leader-Post was not optimistic that the Arabs would heed this call and believed that there was 'not the slightest assurance that the Arabs [would] content themselves with passive resistance.' The paper claimed that it was 'now up to the Security Council' to follow through on the General Assembly's decision; 'any hesitation, any vacillation [would] be interpreted as proof of weakness and invitation to slaughter.'10 The compromise that Pearson had helped work out at Lake Success, and which led to the successful adoption of the 29 November resolution, placed the ultimate responsibility for maintenance of order in Palestine during the transition period upon the Security Council. On 1 January 1948 Canada was to become a non-permanent member of that body. Canadian Zionists and the Jewish Agency in New York were well aware of this fact and were determined to try to influence Canadian policy towards Palestine. Sam Zacks realized that the government had been 'a little ahead of public opinion' in supporting partition11 and secured the return of Herbert Mowat from his post with the World Committee for Palestine in New York, to resume his position with the Canadian Palestine Committee.12 Mowat soon organized a major

137 'A temporary trusteeship' letter-writing campaign, directed primarily at St Laurent, urging Canada not to waver in its support of partition and to back UN efforts to ensure the success of the plan.13 The campaign had no visible effect. Letters from Zionist supporters, and speeches and resolutions from Zionist friends in the Liberal and CCF parties, had little impact on the government. When Toronto Liberal MP David Croll tried to arrange a meeting between Dr Nahum Goldmann and Mackenzie King in February 1948, the cabinet turned down the request on the grounds that Canada was now a member of the Security Council and that it would be 'improper to entertain direct representations on behalf of one party to the dispute.'14 This action came just days after the appearance of a Gallup Poll which revealed that 23 per cent of all Canadians supported the Arab cause while only 19 per cent backed the Jews (58 per cent had no opinion or were neutral). In Quebec, opposition to the Jews was even stronger than in the rest of Canada: 30 per cent of those polled sided with the Arabs but only 15 per cent supported the Jews.15 Canadian Zionists could find little joy in these figures; Canadian political leaders could find ample reason for caution. In reality, however, public opinion on the question did not matter much. Canadian policy towards Palestine would continue to be determined by those same factors upon which it had been based all along: the national interest as perceived by the policy-makers in the Department of External Affairs and at the highest political levels in the cabinet. II

Since relinquishing his post as secretary of state for external affairs in the summer of 1946, William Lyon Mackenzie King had appeared increasingly to withdraw from the guidance of Canadian foreign policy. When Canada had been chosen for membership on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in the spring of 1947, King had acquiesced with nary a murmur; he had helped St Laurent choose Ivan Rand as the Canadian representative. In the first week of December 1947, however, King returned from the royal wedding in London determined to dampen the new, and to him dangerous, activism which now appeared to mark Canada's external affairs under St Laurent. In a long discussion with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin just prior to his departure, King learned Bevin's views on major world problems.16 He became convinced that the Cold War was in danger of turning hot and that certain world trouble spots - the Middle East and Korea especially

138 Canada and the Birth of Israel - were more likely than others to spark a new global conflict. On the trip back to Canada aboard the SS Nieuw Amsterdam King wrote in his diary: 'I ... think Bevin is right and that while no one wants war, the situation is such that we may speedily drift into it in the light of the riots in the Far East [sic] between Jews and Arabs, etc. as a result of U.N. partition. I am wondering if it was wise for Canada to be as prominent as she was in that question.'17 King's apprehensions and regrets increased after his return to Ottawa. On 6 December he held a long conversation with the Belgian ambassador to Canada, who believed that the UN'S partition resolution would lead to war with the Soviet Union for control of the Mediterranean. King had heard much the same thing in London. He regretted that he had allowed Canada to be represented on UNSCOP and was glad that he had 'stood firmly against allowing Pearson to become Chairman [of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question].' King felt strongly that Pearson had 'lent himself perhaps too wholly to the desires of others.'18 King could not undo what had already been done but he was determined to avoid similar Canadian involvement in another UN mission dealing with the difficult Korean problem. At the end of World War Two Korea, a former Japanese possession, had been occupied by United States and Soviet troops. The Communists held the north, the Americans the south, the 38th parallel was the dividing line. The UN, backed by the U.S., aimed to unify Korea under an elected government; the Soviet Union was determined to set up a Communist regime in the north. At the UN General Assembly held in the fall of 1947, a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea had been established to oversee elections in all of Korea and Canada had accepted membership on it. King was determined to pull out and provoked a cabinet crisis on 18 December 1947, when St Laurent brought forward a recommendation that a Canadian representative be named. King attacked Canada's membership on the commission and, two days later, refused to sign an order in council appointing a Canadian to the body.19 St Laurent was deeply disturbed by King's reaction. He had, after all, been in charge not only of External Affairs but of the cabinet while King had been in Britain and his position was being directly undermined by King's attempt to reverse Canada's decision. He refused to give ground and, towards the end of December, the division between himself and King deepened. There appeared to be no way out of the impasse. Despite a

139 'A temporary trusteeship' plea from President Truman20 and numerous attempts launched from within the Department of External Affairs to present King with an acceptable solution, the prime minister held firm and was able to carry the cabinet with him.21 King had not lost his power over his ministers and was trying to wrest back from St Laurent the guidance over specific foreign policy issues that he had appeared to relinquish in the summer of 1946. His stubborn refusal to give ground on the Korean Coiiimission question after Canada had already committed itself to serve was not simply a manifestation of his old caution in foreign policy questions. It was also a sure sign of his deepening fear of involvement in Cold War issues that developed alongside, and may have been connected with, the deterioration of his mental and physical powers brought on by old age.22 The King-St Laurent split came to a head on 7 January 1948, when the two men discussed the matter after dinner at Laurier House. St Laurent made it clear that if Canada withdrew from the Korean Commission he and Ilsley would have to resign from the government. King protested. He did not care what Ilsley did but he very much wanted St Laurent to stay. He would resign instead. It was a tense moment and perhaps, for the first time, King realized the full implications for the government of his actions. A compromise was soon reached: Canada would take its place on the Korean Commission only after making clear that it would only support such actions as were agreed to by both the United States and the Soviet Union. This path would obviously preclude Canadian support for the holding of elections only in the south.23 This agreement gave St Laurent the means to fulfil Canada's pledge to serve while it allowed King to believe that Canada would not take part in any U.S. scheme to create a U.S.-linked government in only one part of Korea. The very next day King signed the order in council naming the Canadian representative to the commission.24 The crisis had passed but St Laurent now knew without doubt that as long as King continued to sit at the head of the cabinet table, he intended to keep a close watch on Canada's actions in the world arena. St Laurent had always been cautious about Canadian involvement in the Palestine crisis, but now that caution was strengthened by King's new concern over Canada's activism. At the beginning of February the cabinet discussed ways in which the Canadian permanent delegation to the UN could seek cabinet advice before committing Canada to a particular course of action. It was clear that the delegation was no longer to be given the leeway it had enjoyed throughout 1947. King thought

140 Canada and the Birth of Israel that 'the attitude taken by the delegate from Russia of not being afraid to say they were waiting for instructions from their own government was, in the circumstances, the realistic and right one, if done sincerely from that motive.'25 ill

By early 1948 the demands on Canada in the international arena were changing, as King well knew, but not because of increased Canadian activism in trouble spots like Korea and Palestine. Both these crisis points, though serious in the potential impact they could have on the Cold War, were side-shows to the major confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies that was shaping up in Europe. The collapse of consensus over a German peace treaty in the Council of Foreign Ministers, the growing deadlock at the United Nations, and the tightening of Soviet control over eastern Europe were creating renewed fears of a new world war. The United States and Britain feared that Soviet power, applied against the economically destitute countries of western Europe, and combined with a possible internal erosion of democracy and the growth of Communist parties inside those countries, could effectively neutralize western Europe.26 These fears had prompted the United States to create a massive aid program, the Marshall Plan, which both stimulated the economic recovery of western Europe and further widened the political gap between east and west because of the refusal of the Soviet Union and its client-state allies to participate. The Marshall Plan was designed to shore up European governments against the internal upheavals that post-war economic collapse could bring - and which native Communists would undoubtedly exploit - but it offered no military protection against the possibility of the direct application of Soviet arms against one or more European countries. This problem was to be addressed by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Discussions leading to the eventual creation of NATO were initiated by the United States, Britain, and Canada on 22 March 1948. It is difficult to determine which of the three countries was first to propose the creation of a regional security and defence pact but Canada was certainly in the forefront of such thinking. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1947, St Laurent had warned that if the veto crisis in the Security Council was not resolved, allowing for the implementation of true collective security measures, certain countries could 'seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-

141 'A temporary trusteeship' loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security.' 27 There were two prevailing views of the Communist threat in Ottawa in late 1947 and early 1948. Some of the men who made defence and foreign policy feared that the Soviet Union was an inherently expansionist state seeking to impose its will on others directly by force or indirectly by the implied threat of force. Others thought the chief danger from communism came from internal subversion, directed by the Soviet Union, aimed at toppling friendly governments from within. In either case, some sort of defence of western interests was thought to be necessary, and it was clearly in Canada's interest that a defensive partnership be multilateral so that the power of the United States could be more effectively constrained and the overwhelming dominance of the U.S. be somewhat mitigated.28 The negotiations leading to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty were eventually joined by France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Norway and stretched out until late March 1949; the treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. It marked a revolutionary departure for Canadian foreign and defence policy because Canada had never before undertaken specific military obligations during peacetime. Canadian support for the Marshall Plan and NATO became the cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy. The Marshall Plan would revitalize Europe and also strengthen the Canadian economy because the U.S. allowed European countries to make 'off shore' purchases in Canada with Marshall Plan dollars.29 NATO would allow Canada, with its small, post-war, military establishment, to participate in western defence planning and to add its strength to that of other countries in the effort to avoid war through deterrence. Canada thus began to approach other international issues such as Palestine from the perspective of their impact on NATO and the Marshall Plan and on relationships between the two major partners in these military and economic links, the United States and Great Britain. Canada had always perceived its major role in international affairs to be a bridge between the U.S. and Britain, but these new developments added considerably to that perception. IV

Lester Pearson had hoped that partition in Palestine would eventually win acceptance in London; he knew that the United Nations partition

142 Canada and the Birth of Israel plan as approved on 29 November 1947 had little chance of success without British co-operation. Shortly after the General Assembly session ended, however, he found out that the United Kingdom had no intention of altering the position it had taken during the partition discussions. In early December Commonwealth governments were informed that while Britain would not obstruct the implementation of partition, it would 'in no circumstances become involved in enforcing [the] decision or in maintaining law and order' while the UN Palestine Commission tried to implement it. British withdrawal would begin in the near future and the mandatory government would 'maintain administrative responsibility' until mid-May so that the withdrawal could be carried out expeditiously. There would be no co-operation whatever with the Palestine Commission; the British cabinet thought the prospect of sharing authority in Palestine with the UN 'intolerable' and proclaimed it would do everything possible to keep the commission out of Palestine before it was ready to hand over power.30 Both Pearson in Ottawa and Robertson in London were annoyed with the British announcement,31 but their reaction was mild compared to that of Ralph Bunche and other UN officials. British hostility towards the UN was unrestrained; at one point a member of the UK mission to the UN told Bunche that 'it was certain he and [the] rest of [the] Secretariat would be murdered within a week of [their] arrival in Palestine.' Bunche asked, somewhat laconically, if that would take place with or without the 'collaboration of the British government.' When this same British official called on the Canadian administrative officer for the Palestine Commission, he was nearly thrown out of the office. One of Bunche's friends in the United States mission to the UN remarked that Bunche had 'never appeared more upset or more concerned about a problem.'32 Although Britain had no intention of co-operating with the UN, the Foreign Office was determined to keep the channels of communication open to the State Department. The British suggested a new effort to bring Arabs and Jews together and were anxious to prevent the Security Council from acting on the Palestine question out of fear that any such action would bring Soviet forces into the Middle East.33The Americans were not interested in the British suggestion but Loy Henderson hinted that after the situation in Palestine deteriorated further, the U.S. might advocate 'suspension of the partition plan and possible extension of [the] trusteeship scheme for Jerusalem to the whole of Palestine, pending further attempts at conciliation between Jews and Arabs.'34 Harold

143 'A temporary trusteeship' Beeley and others in the Foreign Office were hostile to the idea of trusteeship. Beeley observed that if this proposal were to be adopted the world would 'continue to be confronted with the familiar dilemma of the Palestine problem for years to come.'35 But there was definite interest in London that Henderson, who headed the State Department section responsible for Palestine affairs, was even thinking about the possible suspension of partition.36 Henderson was not alone in this thinking. The policy planning staff of the State Department, headed by George F. Kennan, a senior and respected diplomat, concluded in a report submitted to Secretary of State Marshall on 20 January that partition was contrary to the best interests of the United States and threatened the peace and security of the Middle East. The report, prepared in co-operation with Henderson, asserted that 'one of the major premises on which [the United States] originally supported partition' - that a just and workable plan, with broad support, could be quickly implemented - was no longer valid. Under the circumstances the U.S. should 'take no further initiative in implementing or aiding partition' and 'should take the position ... that the matter should go back to the UN General Assembly.'37 By late January and early February 1948 State Department thinking on the Palestine question was beginning to harden against any proposal for armed UN intervention for two reasons: Communist soldiers would find their way into a UN contingent sent to Palestine, and the participation of U.S. troops would provoke violent anti-U.S. hostility in the Arab world. This approach meant the State Department wanted to limit UN efforts to enforce partition to non-military means.38 If those efforts were to fail, the UN should reassess partition 'with the probable outcome that a special United Nations trusteeship for Palestine be proposed.'39 In fact, the first of several draft trusteeship proposals designed for eventual submission to the UN was drawn up in the State Department as early as 11 February.40 V

The war in Palestine intensified as Henderson, Kennan, and the others in the State Department waited for the right moment to shift the U.S. away from partition. On 2 February the editorial offices of the Palestine Post, the only English-language daily in the country, were demolished by a massive bomb packed inside an armoured car. On the roads and highways Arab riflemen and machine-gunners attacked con-

144 Canada and the Birth of Israel voys trying to bring supplies, ammunition, and medicine from Haifa and Tel Aviv to outlying Jewish settlements. Communication between Tel Aviv and the Jewish section of Jerusalem was particularly difficult. Although bombings continued inside the cities, and the Arab Liberation Army continued to besiege the Jewish settlements south of Jerusalem and to attack other settlements, the battle for the roads was the top priority for both sides. The Jews of Palestine lived largely in major cities such as Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem and were concentrated on the coastal plain. Jewish farming settlements and villages in the Galilee, the Valley of Jezreel, and the northern Negev, however, filled out the boundaries of the proposed new state and had to be held if those boundaries were to have any meaning. But those settlements were easily cut off from the major Jewish population centres by Arab fighters whose towns and villages, usually situated atop hills, dominated the road system and provided the guerillas with excellent bases from which to attack Jewish traffic. Through early February Jews tried to push convoys down the roads; Arabs tried to stop them. In mid-February the Jewish forces, led by the Haganah, shifted their tactics and tried to take the offensive by mounting long-range penetration raids on specific Arab strongpoints. Raids against the village of Sasa and the Sheikh Hussein Bridge were successful but failed to break the tightening Arab stranglehold on the roads. Communications were the Jews' weak spot and the Arabs were determined to exploit this advantage to the fullest. An operational order issued by the Arab Liberation Army at the start of March called for 'the sabotaging of Jewish lines of communication; destruction of bridges and roads leading to Jewish settlements and isolation of those settlements; and ambushes and surprise attacks on Jewish convoys, aiming at their destruction.'41 The Arabs were determined to drown partition in a sea of blood and had no intention of allowing the peaceful division of the land they considered exclusively theirs. Win or lose, each rifle shot gave the enemies of partition in the State Department more reason to try to suspend or reverse the General Assembly's decision of 29 November 1947. VI

King, St Laurent, and other Canadian leaders might well have wished that they had washed their hands of the Palestine matter following the partition vote in the General Assembly, but in January 1948 Canada

145 'A temporary trusteeship' became a member of the Security Council and the war in Palestine was clearly to be a council priority. Canada could not avoid further involvement but Ottawa could ensure that Canadian policy was co-ordinated, as much as possible, with the policies of the United Kingdom and the United States. To do this Canada had to know what those policies were and the signals emanating from Washington were distinctly disturbing. Pearson heard rumours that the British and the Americans were 'concerting action to prevent the subject [of Palestine] from being discussed in the Security Council,'42 while Brooke Claxton, minister of national defence, and Hume Wrong were served up a strong dish of anti-Zionist analysis at a Washington luncheon given by Defence Secretary James Forrestal in January and attended by the secretaries of the army, navy, and air force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisted that partition would be disastrous and would lead to a Great Power confrontation in the Middle East. Wrong noted that 'the tone of the conversation was hostile to Jewish aspirations in Palestine and at times verged on being anti-Semitic in general.'43 On the afternoon of 4 February Wrong met Robert Lovett, Loy Henderson, and Dean Rusk to discuss Palestine and to try to obtain some indication of the U.S. approach to the growing crisis there. He handed them a memorandum which summarized the current situation in Palestine, pointed out the pledges made by the United States in the fall of 1947 to ensure the workability of partition, and sought advice as to the likely direction of U.S. policy there in the coming months. The document reflected the strong Canadian belief that 'the United States should indicate to other states which generally supported their position on Palestine at the General Assembly what concrete policy they propose to adopt or what specific proposals they [would] suggest' when the Palestine issue came to the Security Council.44 Wrong quickly learned that U.S. policy had not been finalized, but Lovett did tell him that the U.S. never had any intention of 'intervening directly with the individual Arab states' to secure the acceptance of partition and that the Arab states, in any case, were not resisting partition by force. Resistance, Lovett claimed, was coming from the Palestinians. This was an important distinction; it meant that Lovett considered war in Palestine to be an internal affair and that no violation of the UN charter had yet been committed. The Americans then dropped several hints to Wrong of the approach that was developing within the State Department. Lovett maintained that the 29 November 1947 General Assem-

146 Canada and the Birth of Israel bly resolution was only a recommendation 'and not a decision' and that it could not be turned into a decision by the Security Council. Rusk added that the Security Council could only enforce partition if Palestine were placed under UN trusteeship and that the Security Council was 'not bound to support the recommendation.' Lovett then argued that the immediate objective 'should be to secure a cooling-off period until the whole situation could be re-examined.' Lovett did not tell Wrong that the State Department was rapidly moving towards the abandonment of partition, and he misled him by claiming that the U.S. had not discussed the issue with the British. He reiterated that oft-repeated U.S. view that the British were still responsible for law and order in Palestine and should shoulder their responsibility. He even suggested, somewhat ingenuously, that 'it was not asking too much of the United Kingdom that they should keep their forces [in Palestine] until an attempt had been made to find a more acceptable solution.'45 Wrong was understandably disturbed by the meeting. He gained the clear impression that the State Department was not going to stand behind partition and wanted, instead, to put the issue back before the General Assembly. He reported to Ottawa that the U.S. appeared to view Palestine 'as a problem to which there is no solution unless there is a drastic change in some of its factors.' 46 In Ottawa, Escott Reid read Wrong's report and concluded that the gap between the British and the State Department was as wide as ever. This realization prompted him to suggest that Canada launch an immediate and concerted effort to keep the United States and the United Kingdom from becoming embroiled in a bitter and unpleasant struggle over Palestine which would only serve the interests of the Soviet Union. A U.S.-UK split, Reid forecast, would stiffen congressional opposition to the Marshall Plan, make more difficult the 'maintenance of a common front ... against Soviet expansion,' undermine the chances for a joint u.S.-UK approach to the question of Germany, and harm the best interests of the Jews and the United Nations.47 On 16 February the United Nations Palestine Commission submitted a special report on security to the Security Council. It emphasized the extreme difficulties the commission had faced in trying to fulfil its mandate to oversee the peaceful transition of Palestine to partitioned independence. The commission complained that Arabs inside and outside Palestine were deliberately trying to alter the assembly's recommendations through force and it charged that armed Arab bands had already infiltrated into Palestine from neighbouring countries. The

147 'A temporary trusteeship' British, though still responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine, were 'engaged in the liquidation of [their] administration and [were] preparing for the evacuation of [their] troops.' These circumstances had forced the commission 'to refer to the Security Council the problem of providing that armed assistance which alone would enable the Commission to discharge its responsibilities.'48 Trygve Lie thought the commission's stance was sound; most of the Security Council members, however, could not have been cheered by the prospect of dispatching troops to enforce partition. With this report, the Palestine Commission placed the Palestine problem squarely in the lap of the Security Council. Canada, as a member of that council, had to decide upon its options and the day after the submission of the commission's report, Pearson sent a long memorandum to the prime minister and the cabinet which summarized External Affairs thinking about the possible courses of action open to the Security Council. The document was strongly influenced by Reid's views on the importance to Canada of working towards U.S.-British co-operation and outlined four options: abandonment of partition and refusal of the Security Council to take action; the establishment of an international armed force to support the Palestine Commission; placing the Palestine question back into the hands of the General Assembly for further consideration; making further efforts at conciliation. The last course could work 'only if the United States and United Kingdom ... agreed as to the form of compromise they thought applicable, and were prepared to put pressure on Jews and Arabs alike to accept this compromise.' King and the cabinet were told that Canada would 'suffer from a bitter public controversy between the United Kingdom and the United States' on Palestine and should at least try to determine if London and Washington agreed that the options outlined by Pearson were the only ones open to the Security Council. If the U.S. and UK agreed on this list, the Canadians could then stress how important it was for the two countries to concert action on one of those options before the matter came up in the Security Council. While this was going on the British might try to 'persuade the Arabs to keep quiet' and the Americans 'might try a similar job of persuasion on the Jews.' 49 These ideas formed the basis for a discussion between Pearson, St Laurent, and King prior to Pearson's trip to New York before the opening of the Security Council session scheduled for 24 February. They were also outlined to the cabinet by St Laurent. The prime minister

148 Canada and the Birth of Israel and the cabinet generally agreed that Pearson's fourth suggestion - a renewed effort at conciliation - was the preferred course of action and that Canada must not commit armed forces to Palestine without the prior approval of parliament - an approval that King doubted parliament would ever give. For the moment, and without definite knowledge of U.S. and UK policy, it was difficult to give the Canadian representatives at the Security Council more definite direction.50 As soon as Pearson arrived in New York, he sounded out Lie, the Americans, and the British. He found the secretary-general 'exceedingly depressed' and 'apprehensive' about the forthcoming Security Council meetings. Rumours had circulated that Lie might make some 'startling proposal for the formation ... of an international force to go to Palestine' - Lie and Ralph Bunche had, in fact, drafted just such a statement - and Pearson urged him to consider carefully the 'dangers and difficulties' that would result from such a proposal being made by the secretary-general.51 Pearson then embarked on his mission to discern whether or not the British and Americans agreed that the four courses of action he had outlined to the cabinet were the only ones open to the Security Council and thus to find out if there was common ground for the launching of a final attempt to bring Arabs and Jews together. He had a long, 'if not particularly illuminating/ discussion with British Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech-Jones, who was worried about what would happen when the Security Council met but whose fears were obviously not yet strong enough to prompt him or the British cabinet to abandon their hands-off approach to the problem. Pearson was rather surprised to find out that the cabinet in London 'had not made any decision, or indeed had any discussions about a policy for Palestine for many months.' Creech-Jones also told him that he had little faith in a new conciliation effort because concessions would be required from Arabs and Jews, and Pearson replied rather bluntly that concessions would also be necessary from the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. At the end of the discussion, Pearson asked the colonial secretary 'point blank' why Britain had placed Palestine before the UN in the first place. Creech-Jones told him that the cabinet had believed that a neutral international body, starting from scratch, might find a solution. But Evatt, who had presided over the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question at the General Assembly in the fall, had made a mistake, Creech-Jones claimed, by setting up two subcommittees, one pro-partition and the other against it, to prepare proposals for the assembly. Instead of trying to bring the Arabs and Jews together, the

149 'A temporary trusteeship' subcommittees had operated on parallel lines and had never even met. 52 Pearson then met with Dean Rusk of the State Department. He presented the Canadian view of the choices facing the U.S. and Britain in the Palestine crisis and warned Rusk that Canada would not commit troops to a Palestine police force made up of small nations alone. Rusk told him little in New York but invited him to Washington for the weekend53 and there Pearson learned that the U.S. would introduce a resolution into the Security Council urging it to take action to enforce partition. The Americans believed that this resolution would be defeated on the grounds that the council had no legal power to do so. Once this question was resolved, however, the U.S. would then introduce a second resolution proposing that if any external interference took place in Palestine, the Security Council should take measures to deal with that threat under Article 37 of the UN Charter which outlined the powers of the council to take collective action in case of threats to the peace. In this way the U.S. would draw a distinction between the power of the council to divide Palestine - a power that State Department officials doubted the council had - and the power of the council to deal with threats posed across international boundaries. Finally, the U.S. would also propose the establishment of a committee consisting of the five permanent members of the council 'for the purpose of bringing about some agreed settlement in Palestine.'54 Pearson gave Ottawa a good picture of the thinking (or lack of it) in London and Washington even if he did little to bring the Americans and the British together. But King was not impressed with Pearson's efforts. 'I feel a great deal of concern with the part Pearson takes in New York,' the Prime Minister recorded in his diary. 'I think he is much too active in the name of Canada ... he does not hesitate to advise both the UK and the U.S. as to what it is wisest for them to do. He likes the international arena but some day it will land us in an obligation from which we will find a great difficulty in being freed.' 55 King had lost out in his battle to extricate Canada from the Korean Commission but he was determined that Canada would not again get involved in the quicksand of Palestine. VII

The United Nations Security Council began its deliberations on the Palestine question with Canada's permanent representative, General A.G.L. McNaughton, in the chair on 24 February. McNaughton was

150 Canada and the Birth of Israel new to the job; he had been appointed on 9 January 1948, after serving for more than a year and a half as Canada's representative on the Atomic Energy Commission. He was an old soldier whose military career stretched back to World War One. He had risen to become commander in chief of the First Canadian Army in World War Two before resigning at the end of 1943 and had then been picked to run the Department of National Defence during the conscription crisis in 1944. McNaughton was forced to give that job up after his failure to win a seat in the House of Commons and was appointed to the AEC in the late spring of 1946. During his tenure on the commission he proved his mettle as a tough negotiator. He was generally cool, unsentimental, courteous, and fair. He was best described by that old maxim 'an officer and a gentleman.' As a diplomat he was every bit the professional although he showed none of the verve and dash which marked the Pearson style. On the day following the opening of the Security Council, the U.S. resolution which Pearson had forecast would come was introduced by Ambassador Warren Austin. It was drawn up in two parts. The first part called upon the council to accept the General Assembly's request of 29 November to implement partition; the second part proposed the establishment of a committee composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council to inform the council regarding the situation in Palestine and to recommend courses of action to the council and, through it, to the Palestine Commission. The resolution also called upon this five-power committee to determine whether the situation in Palestine constituted a 'threat to international peace and security' and, if so, to recommend appropriate courses of action.56 After the meeting the French and Belgian delegations informed the Americans that they would not support the first part of the resolution. The Belgian representative even suggested that partition itself 'might be regarded as a threat to the peace.'57 The following day the Belgians offered an amendment to delete the first part of the U.S. resolution. McNaughton immediately wired Ottawa for instructions on how to vote. There was a crucial difference between the Belgian and American proposals, McNaughton pointed out to St Laurent. Under the U.S. resolution the Security Council would accept the partition plan and responsibility for implementing it. The council would then explore the means to be taken to implement partition within the overall framework of the General Assembly resolution. The Belgian proposal was

151 'A temporary trusteeship' just the opposite. Under it the Security Council permanent members would consult among themselves and examine the situation in Palestine as it had developed since the end of November. They would then inform the council as to whether or not the General Assembly recommendation of 29 November should be accepted and, if so, what action should be taken.58 Pearson saw this distinction and also knew, from his conversations in Washington, that the State Department believed the Security Council had no power to divide Palestine even though it was clearly charged, by the UN charter, with the task of preserving the peace and preventing aggression. The council, in the U.S. view, could only use force if there was a 'breach of the Peace.'59 In Pearson's view the defeat of the first part of the U.S. resolution could be 'interpreted as an abandonment of the Assembly recommendation on partition.' He therefore pressed the cabinet to vote against the Belgian amendment and urged that McNaughton be instructed to tell the Security Council that Canada accepted the assembly partition resolution 'as the starting point for an agreed solution' even though some alterations might have to be made in that resolution. Pearson claimed that any other action by Canada would be 'a reversal of the position' it had taken in November.60 King disagreed. He was convinced that conditions had changed so much since the partition vote that Canada was justified in refusing to support the first part of the U.S. resolution or in supporting the Belgian amendment. King believed that passage of the U.S. proposal would lead to the dispatch of troops to the Middle East and put Canada in direct opposition to Britain. He told Pearson that 'we would raise a very serious question in Canada if it came to be seen that what we were doing was requiring war in Palestine in order to support the U.S. in an attitude which was being wholly and strongly opposed by Britain.' 61 If King was forced to choose between Britain and the United States on the Palestine question, Britain would clearly come first. Throughout the crisis King was loyal to Britain and tended to trust British judgment to steer through the perilous waters of the Palestine minefield without causing a major war. He had had no qualms about Canadian participation on UNSCOP because he had not yet been acquainted with British policy. It was only when he attended the royal wedding in London in the fall of 1947 that Bevin had given him the real thinking of the British government and he became aware of Britain's strong opposition to partition and UN intervention. From then on, and until his retirement in the fall of 1948, he strongly supported the British, even against

152 Canada and the Birth of Israel the Americans. He did not trust American judgment on Middle Eastern matters (and many other issues) and saw no reason why Canada should follow the American course; Canadian interests were not directly involved as they were, for example, in questions of North American defence where he clearly had little choice. King was, therefore, perfectly willing to navigate the Canadian cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war as long as essential issues of Canadian autonomy were not involved. In following this course King was only repeating an earlier pattern. Prior to World War Two he had jealously guarded Canadian autonomy while following the British lead down the slippery path to war. King invited Pearson to the cabinet meeting of 2 March to explain his views but Ilsley was the only minister to support him; St Laurent's position was closely in accord with King's. The cabinet instructed McNaughton to support only the second part of the U.S. resolution (or the Belgian amendment), to abstain on the first part, and to attempt to have the Belgian proposal voted on first. McNaughton was told to state that the Canadian vote 'did not involve repudiation or abandonment of the Assembly's recommendation on partition, but [was] rather a final attempt at conciliation.' Should it be necessary to vote on the entire U.S. resolution first, McNaughton was instructed to abstain. 62 The cabinet vote may not have been a repudiation of partition but it was a definite and important reversal of course. It marked the end of the brief period in which Canadian Palestine policy had been independently fashioned by Canadian policy-makers in the national interest as they perceived it. It was the beginning of a change back to the old course of automatically concerting Canadian action with Great Britain or the United States for the sake of concert alone. At this stage, on 2 March, it was still difficult to determine exactly how the U.S. and Britain were going to get together (Ignatieff, for one, even thought they would drift farther apart), but it was clear that the U.S. was turning its back on partition and this seemed closer to the British approach than Washington's previous course. That was certainly good enough for King on 2 March. The change was largely his doing. He feared a new world war fought over Palestine. He was afraid Canada would get dragged into the Palestine conflict. He was nervous about Canada's new activism in a very dangerous world. He still believed Whitehall knew best about such things despite mounting evidence (in India and Palestine) that the British were not omniscient. And, of course, there was the looming danger, perceived by Escott Reid and others, that the

153 'A temporary trusteeship' U.S./British disagreement over Palestine might kill the embryonic Atlantic alliance. In this context the new policy was as much, perhaps even more, in the national interest as the old. The Security Council voted on 5 March. McNaughton supported the Belgian amendment, which was voted on first, but it failed to pass. (France, Belgium, China, and Syria also favoured this resolution.) The U.S. resolution, with minor modifications, was then voted on and Canada abstained in the balloting on the first part. This portion of the resolution, calling for implementation of the partition plan by the council, was defeated; the remainder passed substantially as it had been proposed. A committee consisting of the U.S., USSR, France, and China (Britain declined to serve) was then established to examine the situation in Palestine and report back to the council within ten days. Discussions with Arab and Jewish representatives began almost immediately and a series of questions was put to both parties, to Britain, as the mandatory power, and to the Palestine Commission, to explore the possibilities for a settlement. At the same time the committee met and consulted with the British to determine if there was any chance that the permanent members could work out a common approach to the problem.63 It was soon apparent to the State Department that little would come of the committee's conciliation efforts but, at the same time, that it would report to the Security Council that a breach of the peace did exist in Palestine and that some means of dealing with this would have to be found. This presented the danger (from the State Department's point of view) that the question of the council's obligation to enforce partition would be left unresolved and would become mixed up with the council's clear obligation under the UN charter to restore peace in the area. This lack of resolution would not do; the partition question had to be cleared up one way or the other. Secretary of State Marshall accordingly instructed Ambassador Austin, on 16 March 1948, to bring forward the trusteeship proposal which had been percolating in the State Department since the start of the year and to call for a special session of the General Assembly to institute it. The partition question had to be resolved 'one way or another' Marshall told Austin, and 'without delay.' 64 Austin revealed the new U.S. position to the world on 19 March. He told the Security Council that the General Assembly's partition recommendation was 'an integral plan' which could not succeed unless each of its parts was carried out and that there was 'general

154 Canada and the Birth of Israel agreement' that the plan could no longer 'be implemented by peaceful means.' Austin then proposed 'that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine ... be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.' This action should be taken 'without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement.' To accomplish this, Austin suggested, the Security Council should recommend a new special session of the General Assembly. In the meantime the Palestine Commission should be instructed to suspend its efforts to implement partition. 65 The Arab representatives were pleased; Trygvie Lie took it as a personal rebuff and for the next few days actively considered resignation.66 Canada had not been consulted, of course, and Austin's speech came as a complete surprise to the public. The United States Embassy in Ottawa reported to Washington that initial press reaction in Canada was 'one of general acceptance tinged with criticism of the United States for its original insistence upon partition.' 67 When Mackenzie King woke to the news on the morning of 20 March, 'a sense of immense relief swept over him. He was optimistic that Pearson and Ilsley would now fall in behind him and that the United States and the United Kingdom would soon find a way of working together.68 But George Ignatieff, in New York, had no such illusions. He was well aware that Britain saw no use at all in trying to impose trusteeship on Palestine and that the British were as determined as ever to get out and hand responsibility for Palestine to the Palestine Commission. The United States, in contrast, clearly believed that Britain had no automatic right to hand Palestine over the the UN unless it was under a trusteeship arrangement. Ignatieff believed that the difference in the U.S. and UK positions following Austin's speech was 'the clearest' he had yet seen.69 The cabinet discussed the United States proposal at its 23 March meeting in an effort to give McNaughton instructions as to how to vote if, and when, the Americans put their ideas before the Security Council in the form of a resolution. St Laurent presented a memorandum prepared in the Department of External Affairs which recommended that Canada support the Americans: 'The Plan of Partition with Economic Union was not put forward by the Canadian Government... the Canadian Delegation ... supported it only because it was the least unattractive of a number of disagreeable alternatives, and the only one with any chance of acceptance ... the Canadian Delegation maintained that the plan should not be adopted unless the permanent members of

155 'A temporary trusteeship' the Security Council were prepared to take the initiative in putting it into effect. By February [1948] ... it was already clear that the permanent members ... could not agree on a course of action ... In the circumstances an attempt must be made to deal with the problem of alternative methods, and the Delegate to the Security Council should therefore give his support to the new course of action.' 70 No one as yet had any indication of where Britain stood on the U.S. proposals, and King was determined that Canada should stay clear of the problem, and not take a position, until the British had spoken. St Laurent himself was at a loss about what to do. Ilsley, and to a lesser degree Claxton, backed the United States and argued that Canada should vote in favour of the American proposals but Paul Martin, minister of national health and welfare, strongly endorsed King's views. He was usually a faithful supporter of the Zionists but he now declared that Canada had been taking positions at the UN 'as a result of pressure' and that Canadian diplomats in New York had been 'advocating policies that they knew nothing about.' St Laurent then added that it was important for Canada to get the British and Americans working together and that McNaughton should be instructed not to take sides. Ilsley finally gave way and the cabinet instructed McNaughton not to take a position on the U.S. proposals until further information was available from London.71 No one in cabinet spoke in favour of maintaining Canadian support for partition; the choice was between doing nothing and backing the 'temporary trusteeship' put forward by the United States. VIII

While the diplomats dithered in New York, Arabs and Jews were killing and being killed in Palestine. The Arab stranglehold on the road system grew tighter and the Jews of Jerusalem, Kfar Etzion, and other towns and villages throughout Palestine were pushed closer to starvation. David Ben Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive and unofficial minister of defence, had decided, with the support of other yishuv leaders, that no settlements would be willingly abandoned whether or not they were situated within the proposed territory of the Jewish state. This politically motivated strategy sometimes amounted to military insanity. Jews paid a heavy toll in blood for the defence of settlements, such as the Etzion Bloc, which were totally surrounded, far from any major concentration of Jewish population, and which

156 Canada and the Birth of Israel could not be relieved without heavy loss of life. By the time resistance collapsed in the Etzion Bloc in early May, it was no longer possible for Jewish forces to carry out an orderly evacuation of the civilian population; when the area was overrun, a frightful massacre took place. Whatever the wisdom of defending smaller and more isolated settlements, however, there could be no question of allowing the Arabs to starve out the Jews of Jerusalem. As the siege tightened in March, continuous efforts were made by the Jews to push supply convoys up the road from Tel Aviv. The convoys were made up of armoured cars and trucks - the 'armour' consisted of thin steel sheet and plywood board and brought food, medicine, and ammunition to the defenders of Jewish Jerusalem. The road ran south-east from Tel Aviv over gently rolling hills until it began to climb steeply upward, twisting through the Judean mountains, as it led up to the Holy City. It passed through canyons and narrow ravines, and the wooded slopes that towered above it offered excellent cover for Arab riflemen and machinegunners. On 24 March, as the Security Council prepared to consider Austin's proposals, a Haganah supply convoy ran into heavy fire near Bab-elwad, a narrow ravine. Arab gunners opened fire and crept to within a few dozen metres of the road, with women and children from nearby villages yelling from above 'Isaac, you will die today' and 'slaughter the Jews.' The lead armoured car was hit and soon fourteen others were burning and the rest were in retreat. The attack on this convoy and other attacks in Palestine took a heavy toll of Jewish lives that day - 105 were killed or wounded while the Arabs lost 14 dead.72 IX

In New York, McNaughton received instructions from Ottawa along with the draft for a speech outlining the Canadian position should he choose to speak. He was unsure what to do. He first consulted with the British delegation, which informed him that its position on Palestine had not changed, despite the U.S. proposals, and that the British intended to carry on with their withdrawal. He then approached the Americans and was surprised to learn that they intended to say nothing at the day's session and would wait until other delegations had given their views on the trusteeship proposals.73 When the council met the president called for speakers but there was no response. The silence was deafening. Finally the Syrian delegate spoke up making reference

157 'A temporary trusteeship' to the approaching Easter holiday and the needs of the Christian community in Palestine. McNaughton was afraid that the council might adjourn for the Easter holiday 'without any clarification of the situation' and decided to deliver his remarks. 74 He was, in the words of Dean Rusk, 'obviously very reluctant to take the floor.' 75 McNaughton's speech was short. He told the council that the expectations and assumptions held by many supporters of partition had not been fulfilled and that it was time to take another look at the situation. There had been no co-operation between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, Britain was giving the UN no assistance at all in arranging for the transition of power, the surrounding countries were 'now said to be assisting the organization of irregular forces to resist partition,' and the permanent members of the Security Council were not agreed on the means of maintaining peace in the area. He claimed that 'a brief but vigorous effort [had] been made to give effect to the plan of partition' surely an overstatement - but that it was clearly beyond the Palestine Commission's abilities to proceed further. If new plans were to be considered, McNaughton suggested, 'the responsibility for them [should] be assumed more directly by the powers which have major interests in that area.' He pointed out that there were many obstacles to trusteeship but he also believed that the 'cooling-off period' it would provide could have 'great merit.' Until Canada had 'some direct evidence' that there was agreement' on the part of the countries most directly concerned,' however, it would neither support nor oppose the American proposals.76 Mackenzie King thought it was 'the most sensible statement that has been made yet' on the Palestine question.77 While McNaughton stalled for time, Ottawa tried to find out what Britain was going to do. Just after the cabinet meeting on 23 March, Norman Robertson was instructed to approach the British to find out where they stood. Robertson had 'a long, worrying conversation' with Bevin, who claimed that Britain intended to abstain and would not even vote for a truce 'under the American resolution' because Britain would undoubtedly be 'the country to impose that truce.' Despite these words, Robertson reported, Britain was prepared to 'accept with a fairly good grace' the passage of the American proposals.78 At External Affairs, Escott Reid took Robertson's report to mean that although the British were not willing to vote for the American proposals, they would be quite satisfied if Canada voted for them and, indeed, such Canadian action 'might even be welcomed.' He, therefore, recommended to St Laurent that McNaughton 'be instructed to

158 Canada and the Birth of Israel indicate to the United States Delegation that he is prepared to support United States proposals for a temporary trusteeship that appear workable.' 79 King, however, disagreed very strongly with Reid's advice, and when cabinet discussed the matter again on 25 March, he was able to keep the cabinet in line. Once again McNaughton was instructed to 'neither support nor oppose any proposal for settlement ... unless the proposal were one upon which the United Kingdom and the United States were agreed.'80 Privately King was not really sure what Britain wanted and not certain if his course had London's approval. He, therefore, asked Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, the British high commissioner in Ottawa, to initiate a secret approach to Attlee through the Commonwealth Relations Office for a private hint of what Britain thought 'would be the best line for Canada to take.' King asked Clutterbuck to 'stress the special secrecy attaching to this approach' and instructed him that it was to be regarded as 'of such special privacy that it should not, repeat not, be disclosed even to Norman Robertson.' 81 Given King's deep faith in, and long-time regard for, Robertson it was an extraordinary request. The British reply confirmed Robertson's earlier report but also gave King the explicit advice he was seeking. Attlee and Bevin had little faith in trusteeship and were determined not to allow British troops to be used to impose it on Palestine. They did feel, however, that matters could not be allowed to drift any longer and that the time had come for the UN to 'take steps to bring its own actions with relation to Palestine into closer conformity with practical possibilities and with the probable course of events.' Although they would not support trusteeship for the moment, they believed that a special session of the General Assembly appeared 'desirable from the point of view of the United Nations itself.' 82 The message from London led King to believe that the U.S. and Britain were finally getting together on Palestine and that Canada could once again walk safely in step behind them; he no longer had to force the cabinet to choose Britain over the United States. McNaughton was, therefore, instructed to vote in favour of a special session as long as he made no commitment about decisions to be taken when that special session met. 83 On 30 March the United States delegation presented two resolutions to the Security Council, one calling for an immediate truce in Palestine and the other seeking the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly to consider the 'problem of future government in [Palestine].' In an effort to win British support, trusteeship was not

159 'A temporary trusteeship' mentioned. The following day, after an impassioned speech by Moshe Shertok who declared that the Jews would refuse to accept the postponement of their impending independence, the Security Council voted unanimously for the cease-fire resolution and approved the resolution calling for a special session by nine votes to none, with two abstentions (the USSR and the Ukraine).84

7

'Zero hour in Palestine'

The Security Council call for a new special session of the General Assembly had no impact on the fighting in Palestine. On 1 April, the very day the council voted, the Haganah High Command met in Tel Aviv to review the increasingly desperate situation of the besieged Jewish sector of Jerusalem. Jewish convoys were not getting through; food supplies were beginning to run out. The Arab High Command in Damascus were well aware that the fall of Jewish Jerusalem would deal a heavy blow to the Zionist cause and were determined to squeeze the Jews until they surrendered or died. David Ben Gurion was equally determined not to allow this to happen. The Haganah High Command reached a decision that changed the nature and the outcome of the civil war in Palestine: they opted to mount a large-scale operation, code-named Nachshon, aimed at occupying a corridor three to ten kilometres wide from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This meant attacks on, and the permanent occupation of, Arab strongpoints and villages close to the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road. The Haganah mobilized 1500 soldiers for the operation and armed them with rifles and machine-guns secretly flown in from Czechoslovakia in the first of many illicit arms-supply airlifts. The Haganah attacks began on the evening of 6 April and fighting on the Road to Jerusalem raged over the next week. The Arab forces were led by Abdel Kader el-Husseini, perhaps their most brilliant commander, who inspired his troops with a series of counter-attacks which almost doomed Nachshon. On the night of 7 April, however, he was killed in an otherwise successful assault on Jewish forces holding the key position at Kastel and, with his death, Palestinian Arab resistance in this sector collapsed.

161 'Zero hour in Palestine' The capture of the Arab village of Deir Yassin was part of the closing phase of Operation Nachshon. Units of the Irgun and Stern Gang were assigned to take the village, on the western edge of Jerusalem, which harboured Arab fighters taking part in the siege of the city. The short battle was followed by a massacre in which hundreds of Arab civilians were killed by Jewish forces, which appear to have run wild in a bloodthirsty quest for revenge.1 The unrestrained killing of Arabs at Deir Yassin was followed, four days later, by the wanton murder of Jews in Jerusalem. A Jewish medical convoy proceeding from west Jerusalem to the Hebrew University hospital on Mount Scopus was ambushed by Arab fighters who closed in on the trucks and ambulances while British forces, located only a few metres away, stood by. After seven hours, more than seventy doctors and nurses lay dead among the smoking remains of the twisted and charred vehicles.2

I As the fighting intensified in Palestine, Zionist leaders in the United States and Canada grew increasingly worried about the future of partition. The shift in U.S. policy, announced to the world by Ambassador Austin on 19 March, was obvious. The change in Ottawa's approach was less noticeable but Canada's support for the calling of a new special session undoubtedly gave Canadian Zionists a strong hint of the nature of the discussions on Palestine taking place behind the closed doors of the cabinet room and the Department of External Affairs. A new lobby effort was clearly needed. In the United States, Zionist leaders embarked on a vigorous program of public declarations, rallies, and, more important, convincing friends in Congress to approach the White House, in a co-ordinated drive to shift the government back towards partition. In Canada a similar effort was made but on a smaller scale. Moshe Shertok was sent to Ottawa from New York for a one-day whirlwind tour, which included a meeting with King and St Laurent on the morning of 13 April (also attended by David Croll and Sam Zacks) and a luncheon speech to a group of members of parliament gathered together by Croll. While Shertok was going the rounds, Harry Batshaw and a number of Zionist leaders met with other government officials.3 King was 'immensely taken' with Shertok, and thought him 'an exceptionally fine advocate' of the Zionist position, but he told Shertok that it would be 'inadvisable' for him or St Laurent to 'express an opinion one way or the other.' 4

162 Canada and the Birth of Israel The Canadian approach to Palestine was not changed by Shertok's efforts - King was still convinced that it would have been better if Canada had left the whole matter alone.5 The government intended to approach the special session very cautiously and to play only a minor part. McNaughton was instructed to keep in close touch with the British and American delegations and to secure as much information as possible about the trusteeship proposals the State Department was preparing. He was warned, however, not to associate himself 'in any way' with the preparation of those plans without specific instructions from Ottawa.6 Ottawa received its first hints of what the U.S. had in mind on 5 April when McNaughton attended an informal meeting of Security Council delegates in the offices of the U.S. delegation. There Ambassador Austin presented some very general proposals, clearly intended to test the waters, for a temporary UN trusteeship that would continue until the Arabs and Jews could agree on the future of Palestine. It would be based on the draft statute for Jerusalem that was to be developed by the Trusteeship Council and would be administered by that council in line with whatever specific instructions were given it by the General Assembly. Palestine would be given as much selfgovernment as possible, but the UN-appointed governor-general would have the right to rule 'by order' if necessary and to call for military assistance from UN states to enforce the peace.7 Few of the delegates in the room were impressed by Austin's presentation. The French representative, Alexandre Parodi, attacked the vagueness of the plan, especially in light of Britain's imminent departure from Palestine. He pointed out that trusteeship could not be imposed without the agreement of the states most concerned and doubted that would be secured by 15 May. As if to underscore this point, the Syrian representative insisted that the trusteeship requirements of the UN charter could only be satisfied if all the Arab states were consulted. Austin disagreed. He insisted that 'states directly concerned' included 'only the present mandatory and the United Nations' and maintained that since it was necessary to impose peace and security in Palestine, the UN and Britain would have to come to some agreement by 15 May. The British, however, were not in a mood to accept the responsibility Austin insisted in thrusting upon them. The UK representative reiterated that his country would express no opinion on trusteeship and was not prepared to take part in any joint trusteeship.

163 'Zero hour in Palestine' When McNaughton pressed him to reveal whether or not Britain would even take part in trusteeship negotiations, he was told that London 'reserved its position entirely' and would have to see the trusteeship agreement before deciding.8 It was clear to Austin that his tentative suggestions were receiving very little support and that the members of the Security Council were waiting for clear and detailed proposals from the United States. The United States had led the way to the abandonment, temporary or otherwise, of partition with Austin's 19 March speech to the Security Council. Most other members of the council, including Canada, were prepared to follow U.S. leadership but it was strikingly apparent from the 5 April meeting that the U.S. was still not willing to lead, except in a very tentative way. And yet there was little time left. In Ottawa the Department of External Affairs concluded that there was only a slight chance of working out a satisfactory trusteeship agreement before 15 May and that other delegations would probably not be prepared to take an active part in developing a plan which the U.S. had proposed 'only in [the] most general terms.' Pearson told Wrong that trusteeship would be no more practicable than partition unless 'some influential power with well established interests in [the] eastern Mediterranean would take a firm initiative' in making certain that decision was put into effect. 9 This narrowed the field to Britain, which was determined to withdraw; France, which was still virtually powerless; and the United States. The U.S. however, had no intention of playing any such role. A State Department internal memorandum, written the day following the private Security Council meeting, stated that the U.S. would not 'substitute itself for Brit[ain] in Palestine' and would only act as a member of the United Nations.10 On 7 April the State Department gave copies of a Draft Temporary Trusteeship Agreement to the delegations of Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, China, and Colombia which contained a detailed plan for a UN trusteeship over Palestine. The document was thirty legal-size pages long and provided far more information than the tentative proposals Austin had put forward two days before. But it did not answer several crucial questions: the states which were to provide troops to help the UN-appointed governor-general maintain order in Palestine were not named; the number of Jewish displaced persons to be allowed into Palestine during the first two years of the trusteeship was not determined; no provision was made for ending the trusteeship, except

164 Canada and the Birth of Israel that it would be terminated when Arabs and Jews came to an agreement on the future of Palestine. The document was silent as to what would happen if they did not come to an agreement.n Pearson was not much happier with the new, detailed proposals. He concluded that the United States was still approaching the Palestine question in 'an unrealistic manner' and was sceptical that new proposals could be produced by negotiations at the General Assembly. He was more convinced than ever that the problem of Palestine could only be solved by an agreement in advance of the UN special session between Britain and the United States.12 Pearson did not think Canada could do much, at that stage, to bring the United States and Britain together but he and others in the Department of External Affairs were determined to find out as much as they could about what was happening behind the scenes in Washington. The United States appeared to be attempting to draw Canada and a number of other friendly countries into the process of hammering out, and possibly even enforcing, a workable trusteeship agreement.13 But the possibility also existed, as McNaughton strongly suspected, that Washington's strong swing toward the Arabs did not really represent the thinking of the State Department but was designed 'merely to elicit comment' prior to the formulation of the true U.S. position. McNaughton, in fact, thought that the State Department was keeping Austin in the dark.14 Unless the Canadian government could get a reasonably accurate picture of what was happening in Washington it could not adjust its own position to fit that of the Americans and the British. Pearson tried to find out. He sent Ambassador Hume Wrong to the State Department to check on rumours that the United States intended to involve Britain and France in a long-term plan for control of the eastern Mediterranean which would have to include a Palestine settlement. He also wanted to know if the U.S. planned to make troops available for service in Palestine should Arabs or Jews resist a UN decision. Wrong talked with Dean Rusk. Rusk told him little about the u.S.-British talks except to say that the matter was then under discussion 'at a very high level,' but he promised to keep Wrong informed if anything definite developed and led him to understand that the United States would be ready to send troops to Palestine if discussions on trusteeship 'developed favourably.' He refused to tell Wrong if the U.S. would assume full responsibility for policing Palestine if no other state joined in. Rusk also made clear that although the U.S. was trying to

165 'Zero hour in Palestine' lead the way in the trusteeship discussions with its tentative suggestions, it was not prepared to commit itself to a complete plan. Wrong got the strong impression that Rusk was not optimistic about the chances of pushing trusteeship through the General Assembly.15 Rusk's information was helpful but was clearly not enough on which to base Canadian policy. Several days later Pearson handed the American ambassador in Ottawa ten questions designed to pin down U.S. intentions regarding the participation of Britain, and possibly France, in an overall Palestine settlement and to clarify the trusteeship plans which the State Department had passed to McNaughton on 7 April. The questions, Pearson told Ambassador Ray Atherton, were ones 'concerning which many delegations might very well wish to have answers.'16 II

The Security Council resolution of 1 April calling for a truce in Palestine had been completely ignored. As Security Council members waited with diminishing patience for the United States to take the lead on trusteeship, Dr Alfonso Lopez of Colombia, council president for April, opened discussions with the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee in an effort to end the fighting. He found 'absolutely no common ground' and told Security Council members at a private meeting in the U.S. delegation offices on 9 April that they would have to draw up truce terms themselves if they expected to make progress. Lopez stressed the need for haste. The situation in Palestine was deteriorating rapidly, he warned, and each side was jockeying for the best possible position in preparation for the expiry of the mandate on 15 May. Lopez had tried to sound out the two sides on the possibility of co-operating to at least maintain essential services, but the Arabs had refused to play a part in anything that smacked of partition. Lopez also hoped that Britain would postpone the date of its final withdrawal. Cadogan, the British ambassador, was unyielding. The situation, as he saw it, was that Britain was being asked to shoulder the burden of maintaining peace in Palestine by itself and indefinitely. Although time was running short in which to find a solution, Cadogan pointed out, the sense of urgency was also growing and sometimes this could be useful 'in getting things done.' Austin took this cue and asked council members to prepare truce proposals which could be offered to both parties in further private negotiations conducted by Lopez. He sug-

166 Canada and the Birth of Israel gested a 'stand-still' truce as the basis for a cease-fire and for the establishment of 'a temporary Government in Palestine to take over from the mandatory.' 17 III

On 14 April St Laurent proposed to the cabinet in Ottawa that McNaughton and his New York staff should constitute the Canadian delegation to the Special Assembly. McNaughton had indicated his willingness to serve but had asked for additional help from E.R. Hopkins, the Department of External Affairs' legal adviser. St Laurent informed the cabinet that little was known about U.S. proposals for a trusteeship, making it difficult to give detailed instructions to the delegation. McNaughton was, therefore, told to ask for advice as the discussion developed at the UN; the Canadian delegation would be kept on a tight rein.18 St Laurent still had no clear idea of Washington's plans, but then, neither did Washington. The Americans were fully aware that time was running out and were beginning to thrash about looking for help from the British who remained coldly aloof. Pearson had suspected for some time that Washington was trying to work out an arrangement in which the British, and perhaps also the French, would co-operate in the establishment of a trusteeship and he undoubtedly realized that continued British refusal to participate would not help AmericanBritish relations. He received the first solid indication that an American initiative was under way when Dean Rusk gave T.A. Stone, first secretary at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, some informal answers to the questions Pearson had submitted to Atherson several days before. Rusk told Stone that the U.S. had proposed to the British that Washington, London, and Paris should approach a number of countries in an attempt to form a group which would draw up plans for joint action on Palestine. He revealed that Canada was one of twelve countries being considered in Washington. The U.S., Rusk emphasized, 'had no intention of underwriting Palestine unilaterally.'19 Ottawa became aware of the full details when the British Embassy in Washington passed copies of the U.S. proposals to the Canadians on 20 April. The U.S. initiative had been launched on 9 April when Washington had approached London with a plan to involve Britain and France in bringing about a truce and imposing a trusteeship on Palestine. The American plan contained three main objectives: the United

167 'Zero hour in Palestine' States, Britain, and France would use 'maximum effort/ diplomatic and otherwise, to obtain a truce based on a military cease-fire and a political standstill; the three countries would unite to present trusteeship proposals to the General Assembly based on the draft statute for Jerusalem that had been worked out by the Trusteeship Council; Britain, France, and the United States would assume joint responsibility for assisting the governor-general of Palestine in the maintenance of security in the country and would invite other UN members, especially Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden, to share the responsibility. The U.S. embassy in Paris had approached the French government at the same time as these proposals were put forward to the British government.20 Despite pleas to London from the British Embassy in Washington that American public opinion would turn anti-British as a result of Britain's continuing refusal to work with the United States, the Americans had been rebuffed. Bevin had told the American ambassador in London that the U.S. proposal was 'unacceptable both to the Cabinet and to the House of Commons' and 'would create a very unfavourable reaction in Britain.' 21 Loy Henderson, head of the Near East and African Affairs Division at the State Department, found the British response 'very disappointing.' He believed the British attitude would be 'very difficult to explain to public opinion in the United States' and would create 'a strongly unfavourable reaction ... which would have repercussions on Anglo-American co-operation throughout the world.' 22 IV

While Britain and the United States jockeyed for position in preparation for the opening of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, the members of the Security Council continued their efforts to bring about a truce in Palestine. On the morning of 12 April another informal meeting of the Security Council was held at the offices of the United States delegation. For the first time Andrei Gromyko attended for the Soviet Union. (Representatives of the USSR's allies on the council had been at other informal meetings at which both truce and trusteeship proposals had been discussed and had made no secret of their objection to the procedure of informal meetings.) Austin led off the discussion with a suggestion that the aim of a

168 Canada and the Birth of Israel truce should be the restoration of tranquillity in Palestine until such time as a governing authority, sanctioned by the United Nations, was set up to take over from the British. He repeated his earlier plea for a cease-fire in place that would not be tied to a 'final political settlement.' Austin suggested that Arabs and Jews should be prohibited from bringing arms, military equipment, or persons capable of taking part in the conflict into Palestine during the cease-fire. This proposal would have restricted the immigration of Jewish displaced persons.23 McNaughton had not expected to speak at this meeting and was not prepared to give an official Canadian view of the U.S. truce proposals. In a surprise move, however, Austin sought his opinion, and McNaughton was forced to give a purely personal reaction to Austin's suggestions. He endorsed Austin's idea of a standstill cease-fire not tied to any permanent political settlement and supported the proposal that Jewish immigration be limited to persons of non-military age. He also suggested that the Palestine Commission, appointed by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947 to oversee the implementation of partition, be used by the Security Council to supervise the truce. McNaughton urged the Security Council to take special measures to protect the holy places and work for the abolition of 'illegal para-military groups and gangs' which were carrying out acts of 'terrorism and massacre [in Palestine] which ... affronted the conscience of the world.'24 He was referring specifically to the events at Deir Yassin.25 Most of the council supported Austin and McNaughton though Cadogan, representing Britain, and Faris al-Khoury, the Syrian delegate, objected to McNaughton's suggestion that the Palestine Commission be used to supervise a cease-fire; it had been set up to implement partition and would, therefore, be unacceptable to the Arabs. Lopez again tried to line up support for a Security Council request to Britain to extend its stay in Palestine but no one supported him. After some discussion it was agreed that Lopez should organize a meeting with some council members to prepare a draft truce resolution. Gromyko spoke for the first time as the meeting was about to conclude. He pointed out that the council's private meetings had initially been held to examine Austin's tentative trusteeship suggestions, not to discuss a truce for Palestine, and he asserted that it was improper for the council to be discussing action on a truce in this way. This was a matter to be discussed at a formal Security Council meeting, he maintained. Why was it, he asked, that 'the whole question of Palestine'

169 'Zero hour in Palestine' was now being discussed in private meetings? Was it because 'some delegations wished to avoid embarassment'? Lopez defended his actions in calling the meeting and maintained that he was fully within his rights as council president to do so. It was clear, however, that the Soviets would not tolerate such 'off the record' council meetings much longer and that the United States and its allies would have to begin coming up with definite and concrete proposals to place before the council in formal sessions.26 The next day Lopez met McNaughton, Austin, Alexandre Parodi of France, and two members of the Chinese and British delegation staffs for a five-and-a-half-hour session aimed at putting a workable truce proposal on paper. Lopez again tried to line up support for an appeal to Britain to extend its stay in Palestine but it was clear that a discussion on this issue would only detract from the main purpose of the meeting and might also endanger the implementation of a truce. 27 McNaughton pointed out that the United Kingdom would be responsible for enforcing a UN cease-fire order in Palestine until 15 May and there was no point drawing up truce proposals that the British were not prepared to live with. He made clear that Canada would not be associated with any truce arrangements that were not acceptable to Britain.28 This said, a drafting group was formed to work under Lopez's direction and by the end of the day the proposed resolution was ready. For the most part it followed the lines suggested earlier by Austin and McNaughton except that no mention was made of the United Nations Palestine Commission to enforce the truce.29 Instead a consular truce commission was suggested to be formed of the chief consular officers of Security Council members with consulates in Jerusalem. This suggestion was in part made to freeze out the Soviet Union which had no diplomatic representative in Jerusalem.30 McNaughton was satisfied with the proposals. He pointed out to St Laurent that they had British and American support and recommended that cabinet give its approval to them.31 The Security Council began its public discussion of the truce proposals at 9:00 PM on 16 April and sat for five hours before the session wound up early the next morning. McNaughton spoke in favour of the cease-fire call, pointing out that it was the product of the efforts of several delegations and warning that the situation in Palestine was continuing to deteriorate.32He and eight other council members voted in favour of the resolution; the Soviet Union and the Ukraine abstained. On 23 April the council adopted a further resolution activating

170 Canada and the Birth of Israel the Consular Truce Commission consisting of the representatives of the United States, France, and Belgium. The commission was supposed to assist the Security Council in supervising a truce but its efforts were limited to observing, and reporting on, the fighting. Arabs and Jews ignored the truce resolution, the fighting continued, and no effort was made by Britain or the Security Council to force compliance.33 V

The special session of the United Nations General Assembly opened on 16 April and, after the election of assembly officers, 'the question of the future government of Palestine' was referred for consideration to the First Committee, the committee responsible for reporting on political issues. On 20 April the United States delegation presented a working paper to the committee containing its proposals for a temporary trusteeship. The document, like the one which the Canadian government had already seen, was based on the Trusteeship Council's Draft Statute for Jerusalem. In the next few days the French delegation presented a separate resolution proposing that the Trusteeship Council be called back into session to consider measures relating to the maintenance of order and security in Jerusalem on an emergency basis. The Australians also presented a resolution requesting the Palestine Commission to proceed with the implementation of the partition resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947.34It was clear that the Australians had not abandoned their support for partition; Sir Carl Berendsen, chairman of the New Zealand delegation, also urged the General Assembly to stick by its original decision on partition and 'show that resolution which the situation demands.'35 Berendsen's plea was lost on Ottawa; the gulf between Britain and the United States over Palestine dominated Canadian thinking and completely overshadowed the question of the future government of Palestine. It was clear that Britain was determined to quit Palestine as soon as possible and officially to end the mandate on 15 May despite the growing chaos there. At one point Harold Beeley gave some members of the Canadian delegation his personal view that a British withdrawal from Palestine prior to the establishment of successor governments, and without the setting up of a temporary trusteeship, would allow 'the vacuum' there to be filled 'naturally' by the 'actions of the inhabitants of the territory without interference.' There would likely be war, Beeley admitted, but a local conflict would not

171 'Zero hour in Palestine' necessarily lead to a confrontation between the Great Powers. The people of Palestine 'seemed determined to settle matters their own way,' Beeley pointed out, and there was 'something to be said for allowing them to do so.'36 (Pearson thought this 'pretty cynical.') It is not clear how closely Beeley's musings followed official British policy, but there had been strong indications for many months that the UK would essentially do in Palestine what it had already done in India in the face of a total failure to bring the two conflicting religious communities together: set a deadline, withdraw, and let the parties fight it out. The United States, however, was determined to keep Britain involved. Rusk told Ignatieff in New York that unless the United Kingdom co-operated more fully with the US, Congress would never approve 'any initiative ... taken by the United States government in regard to Palestine.'38 From Washington came further suggestions from Hume Wrong that the State Department might 'put together the questions of Palestine and the Security Proposals for Western Europe.' This, Pearson told St Laurent, was 'a form of political blackmail.'39 Pearson had no illusions about the unpleasant realities of the situation now unfolding. Canada had returned to the practice of concerting its Palestine policy with Britain and the United States when it voted in favour of a new special session of the General Assembly in early March. King and most of the cabinet had been under the impression that Britain and the U.S. were once again drawing together. Now it was clear that they were not. Divergence was always a nightmare for Canada because it forced Ottawa to choose between London and Washington. Neutrality was impossible under these particular circumstances because a refusal to act was, in fact, an endorsation of the British position on trusteeship. Canada, in addition, was worried about the damage to the American-British relationship that Palestine might cause, and it was believed in External Affairs that no solution was possible for Palestine (and thus for the U.S./British impasse over Palestine) that did not have the support of those two powers. It was beginning to appear, however, that no U.S./British solution was possible - Pearson thought the blame for this could be 'about equally divided' - and that nothing could, therefore, be expected from the General Assembly meeting. The day was 'long since past,' Pearson wrote Robertson, when it was 'of any importance whether the policy of [Canada] in regard to partition was ... sensible or not.' The task now was to decide what instructions to give the Canadian delegation in New York 'in the light of the new situation.'40

172 Canada and the Birth of Israel Pearson was rarely afflicted by indecision but by the last week of April he was clearly at a loss about what to do with the Palestine matter. He was in good company. The debate in the First Committee was going nowhere; it dragged on in an endless discussion over partition in 'a manner ... not apparent from a reading of summary records/ McNaughton later wrote. The lack of willingness of delegations to participate in the discussion almost brought matters to a halt. Much of the debate concerned procedure; a considerable amount of time was spent trying to decide whether the committee should discuss trusteeship in general terms or examine the U.S. proposals before it. It was not until 29 April that the chairman of the First Committee placed a list of topics before the committee for the purpose of guiding discussion on the U.S. proposals.41 This was little more than two weeks before the mandate was due to expire. On 9 April the General Zionist Council, meeting in Jerusalem, had declared that it would establish a Jewish state in Palestine in those areas allocated to the Zionists by the UN partition plan immediately after the mandate expired.42 This announcement, coupled with the lack of leadership from Washington, had created a curious fin de regime atmosphere at the UN which was frozen by indecision while the war intensified in Palestine and the end of the mandate loomed. VI

While the diplomats fiddled in New York, Palestine burned. Heavy fighting raged in the Jerusalem area and Arab irregulars continued to besiege Jewish settlements south of Jerusalem, in the Negev, and in northern Galilee. On 18 April Jewish troops took complete control of the town of Tiberias on the western shore of the Sea of Galilee after almost two weeks of fighting. The real prize in northern Palestine, however, was not Tiberias but Haifa, the only major port in the country and the site of important industrial and refining facilities. On 21 April the British military commander in Haifa informed Arabs and Jews that British forces would soon withdraw from their positions around the city to take up posts in the port area and to concentrate in a number of military camps south of the city. There had been sporadic fighting in Haifa since early in the year and the Haganah had drawn up plans for a swift attack to take complete control of the city after the British pulled out.43 When the Arabs attacked first, despite repeated British warnings, the Jews launched their assault. By 23 April, Jewish troops gained control of the city and that afternoon

173 'Zero hour in Palestine' Arab and Jewish negotiators met under British auspices at the town hall where Jewish truce terms were announced. The Haganah demanded a quick cease-fire, the disarming of the Arab population of the city, the removal of all Arab roadblocks, and the mustering and deportation of non-Palestine Arab males within twenty-four hours. The Jewish negotiators promised to treat the Arabs of Haifa as equals and to allow them to continue to work and live in the city in the future. 45 According to reports originating with the British Palestine police the Arab leaders decided, instead, to begin the evacuation of the Arab population of Haifa despite 'every effort ... made by the Jews to persuade the Arab populace to stay and carry on with their normal lives.'46 By 28 April a large part of the Arab population of Haifa had been evacuated by road and sea to Lebanon. A report published in the Economist several months later attributed the Arab decision in Haifa to 'announcements made over the air by the Arab Higher Committee, urging all Arabs in Haifa to quit.' 47 The flight of the Haifa Arabs was the first mass exodus of Arab refugees from their homes in Palestine. The Arabs fled their homes during the course of the war for different reasons: some feared being caught in the fighting; others were afraid of possible Jewish retaliation (they had heard of Deir Yassin); still others were deliberately expelled by Israeli commanders. But the Arabs of Haifa, by all available evidence, imposed an exile on themselves that need not have occurred and which took place despite the best efforts of local Jewish leaders to calm their fears. The outcome of the fighting in Haifa and Tiberias and the opening of a Jewish assault on the Arab city of Jaffa at the end of April marked a turning of the tide in the war between Palestine Arabs and Jews for control of Palestine. The Jewish forces were clearly gaining the upper hand and taking control over the areas allotted to the Jewish state by the partition plan, with the exception of the Negev which remained in Arab hands. In Jewish and Arab areas partition, in danger at the United Nations, was coming to life almost spontaneously; as the British withdrew their military and civil authority, Jewish and Arab authority began to take control and assume responsibility for the daily lives of the ordinary people of Palestine.48 The Palestine government had virtually ceased to function by the end of April.49 VII

At the United Nations the First Committee continued to move in slow motion. Although debate finally began on the U.S. trusteeship pro-

174 Canada and the Birth of Israel posals on 29 April, it was soon clear to McNaughton and other delegates that there was little enthusiasm for the American plan. On 3 May British Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech-Jones proposed a 'simpler approach' to the developing emergency in Palestine. He suggested the establishment of a 'stabilizing authority' designed to secure as much co-operation as possible between Arabs and Jews in the maintenance of essential services after 15 May and to serve as custodian for the assets of the departing mandatory authority.50 McNaughton had received a hint that this might be in the offing several days earlier and had received permission from St Laurent to break his silence at the UN - a silence that was becoming 'difficult to maintain' in any case51 - and to support Creech-Jones. On 4 May the Guatemalan ambassador to the UN, Jorge GarciaGranados, proposed the establishment of a subcommittee of the First Committee to 'work out proposals for a provisional regime for Palestine' which could take over administration of the country after the mandate formally expired on 15 May. Garcia-Granados, though appearing to take his cue from Creech-Jones, was actually as propartition as ever; he was sure this new subcommittee would conclude that any attempt to enforce trusteeship would be futile but also believed it would waste much time doing so.52 Canada was nominated to serve on this subcommittee, designated subcommittee nine, and McNaughton accepted. Several days earlier the U.S. delegate had suggested a similar committee composed of Security and Trusteeship Council members and St Laurent had given McNaughton permission to serve.53 Subcommittee nine met on 5 May. Time was of the essence and the subcommittee members decided to accept the de facto situation in Palestine as a starting point for their deliberations. Creech-Jones told them that the mandate would definitely end on 15 May, that partition could not be implemented peacefully, and that the Jews would almost certainly carry out their stated intention to establish a state of their own on 15 May. He, therefore, suggested that a temporary commission be established, based on the 'moral force' of the UN, to try to bring Arabs and Jews together and to exercise limited custodial functions in the country, presumably in the operation of essential services. (The 'temporary commission' proposed by Creech-Jones was not to be based on a UN trusteeship; the legal basis for it was unclear and Creech-Jones did not explain how such a body could operate essential services when it did not legally represent anyone. He did suggest that it be composed

175 'Zero hour in Palestine' of the Consular Truce Commission 'with the addition of one or two distinguished persons.') Formal trusteeship must be abandoned, Creech-Jones told subcommittee nine, because it had been rejected by both Arabs and Jews.54 This observation was certainly true but it was also true that the Zionists found his concept of a temporary commission unacceptable.55 Subcommittee nine followed most of Creech-Jones's suggestions and, after hearing from representatives of the Palestine Commission and the Consular Truce Commission, began work on a draft resolution. The job was given to Finn Moe, the Norwegian representative and rapporteur for the subcommittee, who was ready to submit a resolution to the First Committee by 10 May. There was, however, one major complication: Creech-Jones's ideas were totally unacceptable to the United States and, therefore, had little chance of adoption. Canada played a limited role on subcommittee nine; there was far more important work to be done. The United States and Britain had to be brought together lest all chance of UN action before 15 May be lost. Secret talks between the U.S. and the UK began on 5 May, 'largely at the insistence of the Canadian delegation,' to seek common ground somewhere between the British approach, as represented by Creech-Jones, and the original U.S. trusteeship idea.56 Although McNaughton later reported to Ottawa that members of the Canadian delegation 'took no particular initiative in the discussions,'57 it is clear from the State Department records of the meetings that two members, E.R. Hopkins, External Affairs' legal adviser, and J.H.C. Lewis, were active and contributing participants in the trilateral discussions from the beginning, usually working with the British. 58 Although Britain and the United States shared a basic desire to end the fighting in Palestine, keep the Soviet Union out, and delay partition, they were far apart on basic tactical questions. During the trilateral discussions, for example, the Americans finally admitted that the trusteeship they had suggested to the First Committee on 20 April 'would not muster sufficient support in the General Assembly to ensure ... adoption,'59 but they continued to press for a modified form of official trusteeship. They told the British representatives (led by Harold Beeley) that if the UK government would endorse such a course, the State Department would recommend it to the president and Congress. The Americans insisted that UN action in Palestine have a sound legal basis, which the Creech-Jones proposal did not have. This was not a simple matter of diplomatic nicety; the Americans wanted to en-

176 Canada and the Birth of Israel sure that they could 'intervene positively in Palestine' through a UN trusteeship without having to go through the Security Council in the event of 'material Soviet infiltration or intervention.'60 The desire to avoid the Security Council was prompted by the need to avoid the Soviet veto. Britain recognized the U.S. concern but refused to support official trusteeship.61 Any form of trusteeship would mean continued British involvement in Palestine and endanger Britain's relations with the Arab world. On 10 May the British brought forward a proposal, prepared with Hopkins's help and presented to the Americans as an 'Anglo-Canadian tentative draft/ which totally ignored the question of who or what would exercise legal authority in Palestine after 15 May. It aimed to establish a commission 'consisting of representatives of the member states ... on the Truce Commission' to exercise limited governmental authority in Palestine while attempting to mediate between Arabs and Jews.62 Hopkins tried to paper over the differences between the U.S. and the UK63 but his efforts were a complete failure. On the afternoon of 11 may Austin told Beeley that he was now awaiting new instructions from Washington which would likely signal the abandonment of us efforts to place Palestine under a trusteeship. There was little time, Austin said, and little chance for success. When the U.S. had approached Britain in April seeking its agreement to participate in the implementation of trusteeship, the Americans had received a 'flatly negative response/ Austin pointed out. The 'show of cooperation' by Britain since 5 May was, in his opinion, 'an eleventh hour effort... too little and too late.' 64 President Truman approved the new U.S. approach on 11 May and it was presented to the British and Canadians that evening. It was embodied in a draft resolution aiming at the establishment of a UNappointed 'Commissioner for Palestine' who would 'use his good offices as mediator' to arrange for the operation of essential services in the country, take steps to safeguard the holy places, 'promote agreement' on the future of Palestine, and co-operate with the Truce Commission. He was to have no administrative authority at all. At the same time the Palestine Commission, appointed by the General Assembly on 29 November, 1947, was to be discharged.65 It was not much, but it was better than nothing. McNaughton reported to Ottawa that the proposal represented 'the closest basis of agreed action ... possible in view of the continued disagreements between the United States and the United Kingdom and considering the

177 'Zero hour in Palestine' time available.' He intended to give 'initial general support' to the measure on the understanding that Canada was to back any measure that the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed upon.66 Pearson supported this plan but did not want McNaughton to mention publicly that Canada had helped prepare the draft or that Canadian support was 'particularly enthusiastic.'67 St Laurent agreed with Pearson and instructed McNaughton accordingly.68 British and Canadian approval for the U.S. draft was given on the morning of 12 May and the resolution was presented to subcommittee nine on 13 May by Phillip C. Jessup, the American representative. Jessup claimed that the U.S. had not abandoned its view that a temporary trusteeship was still the best course but now believed that such an arrangement was impossible while the fighting continued unabated in Palestine. The new U.S. proposal was consistent with the two points on which most members of the subcommittee appeared to agree - the need for a quick truce and the start of mediation discussions - and the U.S. draft was quickly approved with minor modifications and sent to the First Committee for action. VIII

Most of the political leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine gathered at the Tel Aviv art museum after lunch on 14 May to hear the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel. David Ben Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive and prime minister designate of the Jewish state, wore a suit and tie for one of the few times in his life as he stood to read the declaration. There had been disagreements among the Zionist leadership almost until the last moment about the wisdom of making the move at that time - Shertok and Goldmann had argued that it might be better to wait for a more propitious moment. Almost everyone in the room was aware that the armies of the surrounding Arab countries stood poised for the invasion that was sure to follow. The name of the new country had not even been chosen until twenty-four hours earlier and the words of the Declaration of Independence had not yet been inscribed on the decorative scroll that lay in front of Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion rapped a gavel on the table in front of him and began to read: 'The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people.' He summarized the recent history of the Jews and the Zionist movement and declared the 'self evident right of the Jewish people to be a nation,

178 Canada and the Birth of Israel as all other nations, in its own Sovereign State.' On behalf of the National Council, representing the Jewish people and the Zionist movement, Ben Gurion proclaimed 'the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called the State of Israel.' The new state was to come into existence one minute after the formal end of the Palestine mandate at midnight. The deed had been done; the world awaited the consequences.70 In Washington, six hours behind Tel Aviv time, White House Counsellor Clark Clifford telephoned Jewish Agency representative Eliahu Epstein to enquire if the Jewish state was to be declared that day as previously announced. Epstein confirmed that it would and Clifford, in reply, asked Epstein to send an official request for United States recognition to the White House. Clifford had argued in favour of recognition for some time and, in fact, had suggested that Truman announce such action in advance of the declaration of independence of the new state. He had been sharply rebutted by State Department representatives who warned against the political and diplomatic disaster such action might bring abroad. Clifford had been momentarily outmanoeuvred but he soon received support from another quarter when Chaim Weizmann, then in New York, wrote Truman to request immediate recognition. Truman pondered Weizmann's letter, decided to go ahead, and instructed Clifford to act.71 The recognition was to be kept secret until the last moment, however, and the U.S. delegation at the United Nations was not to be told, despite the urging of Under-Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett. Lovett learned about the move from Clifford on the afternoon of 14 May and was bitter at the news. He concluded that Truman's political advisers 'having failed to make the President a father of the new state ... determined at least to make him the midwife.' 72 IX

The First Committee began to discuss the report of subcommittee nine on 13 May but it was also busy with the report of subcommittee ten, a French-United States proposal to establish a UN trusteeship over Jerusalem to protect the city from further fighting. This report was referred to the General Assembly without recommendation while the report of subcommittee nine was endorsed, after several minor amendments, by a vote of thirty-five in favour, six opposed, and ten abstentions. The First Committee wound up its business at 3:30 PM on the

179 'Zero hour in Palestine' afternoon of 14 May and the final plenary meeting of the special session of the General Assembly was brought to order ninety minutes later by Assembly President Jose Arce of Argentina. He warned there was little time left and restricted the delegates to five minutes each.73 The U.S. delegation was anxious to have the assembly take action on Jerusalem before the expiration of the mandate - due at 6:00 PM - and requested that the report of subcommittee ten be considered first. It was a vain gesture; there was no time left. Shortly after the debate began, Ambassador Austin was called to the telephone, where he was informed that President Truman intended to announced United States recognition of the State of Israel in a few minutes. Austin was rattled by the news and strode out of the building without passing the information to the other members of the U.S. delegation. At about this time the Assembly voted on the report of subcommittee ten; it did not receive the necessary two-thirds vote and, therefore, failed to pass. Debate then began on the report of subcommittee nine - the U.S. proposal to establish a UN mediator (the term 'commissioner' had been changed to 'mediator'). In the press room the news of Truman's announcement came over the wires and the rumour began to spread quickly through the assembly chamber. The Columbian delegate asked the United States delegate to make an announcement about the news but the U.S. representative could only reply that he could not confirm it. The embarrassment of the U.S. delegation, McNaughton noted, 'was obvious.' Half an hour later Jessup took the podium to confirm the news: the state of Israel had been recognized by the United States. The General Assembly then voted on the proposal to establish a UN mediator for Palestine and approved it by a wide margin. At that very moment Arab troops were beginning to pour over the borders of Palestine in a concerted attack on the new Jewish state. It was, in the words of one Canadian editorial writer, 'zero hour in Palestine.'74

8

'Numerous uncertainties'

The settlers of Kibbutz Nirim, about six and a half kilometres southeast of Rafah on the Palestine-Egyptian border, spent the first hours of Israeli independence in fitful sleep, rifles at the ready, watchtowers and guardposts manned. Local Bedouins had brought word that the Egyptian army was massing across the border and would attack in the early morning hours of 15 May. The kibbutz possessed a small number of rifles and automatic weapons and several rudimentary pillboxes had been linked into a defensive perimeter of trenches, mines, and barbed wire; hardly a match for the armoured cars, Bren gun carriers, and tanks of the Egyptian forces. Despite the weakness of the kibbutz defenses, the Egyptians chose not to attack at night but to wait until dawn when their overwhelming fire-power would be even more effective. Just before eight, Egyptian shells began to rumble overhead and explosions churned up the dirt, blew buildings apart, and forced the Jewish defenders to scramble for cover. After a furious bombardment Egyptian armour advanced on the kibbutz; the Arab League invasion had begun. The Arab world refused to accept the legitimacy of the newly proclaimed State of Israel and on 15 May the armies of Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Egypt began to pour across the borders of mandatory Palestine to crush the new Jewish state. The Arab countries told the world that they were restoring order and suppressing the Zionist bands who had upset the tranquillity of Palestine. The Egyptians, crossing into Palestine southwest of Gaza, drove one armoured spearhead towards Tel Aviv, and another across the Northern Negev, through the Judean hills, to the southern outskirts of Jerusalem, linking up with the Transjordan Arab Legion. The legion, led by Colonel

181 'Numerous uncertainties' John Glubb, a former British officer working under contract to King Abdullah, and with its top ranks filled by seconded British officers, laid siege to Jewish Jerusalem and heavily shelled it. The Iraqis, launching their drive from Transjordan, attacked westward across Palestine towards the Mediterranean in an effort to cut Israel in half. The Syrians also attacked westward north of the Sea of Galilee, aiming to cut off the finger of Jewish territory known as Upper Galilee, while the Lebanese attacked to the south-east, threatening to link up with the Syrians. Behind the invasion stood Britain, which continued to ship arms and ammunition to Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan, and to pay a heavy monthly subsidy to Transjordan's King Abdullah to keep the legion operating.l The Arabs had more and better fire-power than the Israelis although the numbers in the opposing armies were about equal. But the Arab attack was not well co-ordinated and most Arab officers were poorly trained. The Israelis had few officers trained in regular armies, and few personnel who knew how to use the armour, aircraft, artillery, and communications systems of modern warfare, but they had precious little of these in any case. Although foreign volunteers and illicitly acquired weapons were soon pressed into combat by the Israelis, sheer desperation and a determination to stand fast and die if necessary stiffened Israeli resistance more than anything else at this stage. Thousands of refugees began to pour into Israel from refugee camps in Europe and many of these people were immediately given guns and thrust into front lines where hundreds, even thousands, were quickly killed. For these refugees, for the Israelis, for the foreign volunteers, the massacre of European Jewry under Hitler was a fresh memory: they were determined it would not happen again.2

I Israel's declaration of independence brought new and greater violence to the Middle East but it also brought great rejoicing to Jews around the world. In Canada Jews held meetings and rallies from one end of the country to the other filling the Forum in Montreal and Maple Leaf Gardens in Toronto. Jewish leaders and pro-Zionist non-Jews addressed these mass rallies, welcoming the new state and calling on the government in Ottawa to recognize it as had the United States, the Soviet Union, and an increasing number of other countries.3 David Croll, Liberal MP for the Toronto riding of Spadina, told a cheering

182 Canada and the Birth of Israel throng in Maple Leaf Gardens that Canadian statesmanship had helped make the emergence of Israel possible and asked them to remember the names of Mackenzie King, St Laurent, Rand, Pearson, and Ilsley. Croll declared that Canada should recognize Israel and help 'lead the way in building up a stable, democratic Jewish state in the Middle East' with much to offer to both Britain and the United States 'in the development of democratic ideals and western concepts.' 4 Recognition, however, was not in the offing. Britain made clear to Commonwealth governments on 17 May that it had no intention of following the American lead in recognizing Israel and claimed that recognition would be 'a declaration of hostility to the Arab world.' 5 Britain was also opposed to Israeli admission to the UN calling it 'unfair and legally wrong' because Transjordan had failed to secure a UN seat even though, in Britain's opinion, it enjoyed all the necessary qualifications for UN membership.6 This pronouncement was sufficient to deter action in Ottawa, especially since McNaughton reported from the UN in New York that Truman's announcement of recognition on 14 May had done considerable damage to u.S.-British relations and had, for the moment, ended the co-operation between the American and British delegations that had enabled both to agree on the resolution passed in the General Assembly on 14 May. 7 Recognition, MacNaughton claimed, had been 'embarrassing to [the United States] as a member of the United Nations.' 8 Croll offered public thanks to King, but King strongly supported Britain on the Palestine question. On 17 May Sir Alexander Clutterbuck visited him and explained the British view on recognition. King recorded in his diary that the United Kingdom approach was 'in accord with the views that I myself have fought for in Cabinet from the start, and believe to be the wisest today.' The Truman recognition, King believed, was 'evidence of the impetuousness and lack of real wisdom in American diplomacy.'9 He, certainly, had no intentions of allowing any such impetuous actions on the part of Canada. The following day St Laurent told the cabinet formally what they already knew - that the Palestine mandate had expired and that a Jewish state had been proclaimed - and informed them that the United States and the Soviet Union had already extended recognition to the new state. He believed, however, that 'in view of numerous uncertainties in the situation, including imprecision in the matter of boundaries and the position under the UN Charter, it would not be desirable for Canada to reach any hasty decision in the matter of recognition.'lu

183 'Numerous uncertainties' Britain did not need to apply pressure to Ottawa to keep Canada in line. It must have been clear in London for some time that, as far as Palestine was concerned, the British had a good friend and ally in Mackenzie King and that King was running this particular show. But other Commonwealth governments were not as inclined to toe the British line as was Canada, and Britain was forced to launch a major diplomatic offensive to keep Commonwealth support.11 This was a new development in the Palestine matter. Although Britain had kept Commonwealth governments well informed of Palestine events over the previous two years or so, it had made little effort to twist arms among its Commonwealth partners. No pressures had been applied in Ottawa, for example, to follow the British lead during the debates at the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1947. Suddenly and dramatically, however, this situation changed after Israel's declaration of independence. Britain's most immediate problem was South Africa. Prime Minister Jan Christiaan Smuts had been a strong supporter of the Zionist movement for decades, and on 18 May his government suggested to other Commonwealth governments that they should act in concert to recognize Israel but that if such unity was not possible, South Africa would do so alone.12 Britain took immediate action to try to stop South African recognition, claiming such an act might disturb the 'delicate' negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom aimed at bringing an end to the fighting in Palestine and putting a stop to the 'disturbing fluctuations in United States policy.' Smuts was not convinced; South African de facto recognition was announced on 24 May. Britain then expressed the hope that other Commonwealth governments would not follow suit and Clutterbuck again visited King on 24 May and was assured that Canada would not 'take precipitate action.'13 Britain's plea to the South Africans shows why British attitudes towards Commonwealth Palestine policy had changed. Britain was trying to use the Commonwealth to balance the United States on the recognition issue and thus went to great lengths to build Commonwealth unity. For example, when the New Zealand government decided during the first days of Israel's independence to extend de facto recognition to Israel and informed other Commonwealth governments on 21 May, the British made a plea to Auckland to reconsider. They claimed that the UN partition plan had not been fulfilled by Israel's declaration of independence because no parallel Arab state had been

184 Canada and the Birth of Israel established and because the 'progressive steps' towards partition outlined in the plan had been short-circuited. The British asserted that the new Jewish state 'fulfilled none of the normal requirements for statehood' and could claim neither a stable government nor a defined territory. 14 Whatever the New Zealanders thought of these arguments, they agreed to defer recognition. Australia did not go as far as New Zealand but the government did suggest that Commonwealth members might want to declare that they would be willing to recognize any state which was a UN member. This would have paved the way for recognition by the back door in the event that Israel secured UN membership. In fact, a majority of the Australian cabinet favoured de facto recognition of Israel as long as Australia also recognized an Arab government 'in the part of Palestine assigned to the Arabs.'15 The Australians were anxious to keep the lines of communication open with other Commonwealth governments on recognition and, even though they and the New Zealanders deferred to the British for the moment, they had no intention of delaying recognition indefinitely. St Laurent followed these events closely. On Saturday 22 May, he told Riddell and Ignatieff that he would not recommend immediate recognition of Israel even though he believed that there was some advantage to the action taken by Washington. American recognition had 'made clear to the sponsors of the new State that they could count on sympathetic consideration in the West,' he thought. It was now apparent, he went on, that a Jewish state of some kind would be established and it was a good thing that the leaders of that state would not 'feel compelled to look to Moscow for sympathy.'16 II

UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie was greatly worried about the consequences of UN inaction following the Arab League invasion of Palestine. He hoped the United States would take the lead in the Security Council in proposing firm action to deal with the invasion and was very disappointed when the Security Council meeting of 15 May produced nothing at all. There appeared, he later wrote in his memoirs, to be 'a conspiracy of silence reminiscent of the most disheartening headin-the sand moments of the Chamberlain appeasement era.' 17 That night he launched an appeal to London and Washington for tough Security Council action to stop what he believed to be open Arab

185 'Numerous uncertainties' attempts to use armed force in an international dispute.18 He thought the very future of the UN was at stake. Lie's fears that the United States would do nothing were groundless. On Monday 17 May, the American ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, introduced a draft resolution into the Security Council ordering a cease-fire in Palestine within thirty-six hours and threatening the imposition of sanctions or the use of military action as specified in chapter vn of the UN Charter if the order was not complied with.19 Britain also took action, but of a very different sort. British Ambassador Sir Alexander Cadogan at first tried to stall the U.S. initiative by raising questions about the true nature of the invasion - he questioned whether any aggression was in fact taking place - and then introduced an amendment that considerably blunted the U.S. move. The UK resolution did not order a cease-fire but, instead, called upon the parties to the fighting to abstain from acts of aggression and to help the new UN mediator who was to be appointed in fulfilment of the General Assembly's 14 May resolution.20 The American motion was based on the assumption that a breach of the peace existed and that the Arab states were committing aggression; the British resolution was not. The American resolution 'ordered' the parties to cease military operations; the British 'called upon' them to do so. The American resolution threatened tough action; the British resolution threatened nothing. Canada had to choose. Pearson told St Laurent on 19 May that it would be difficult not to support the American resolution but that Canada had no indication that the Americans would do anything concrete about the situation if the resolution was carried. The U.S. was anxious to avoid the entry of Soviet troops into the Middle East, and military action to back the U.S. resolution might give the Soviets just that opportunity. Nor did Great Power co-operation exist in the Security Council of a kind that could make economic sanctions truly effective. Pearson, therefore, suggested that McNaughton be instructed either to abstain on both resolutions or to vote for the British resolution and abstain on the American one. He believed this was a logical course - take the apparently more moderate British approach first to see if it produced results before moving to the stronger American position.21 The following day he and St Laurent presented the issue to King, who told them 'at once' that Canada should support the British resolution. Even though it was clear that Britain was continuing its strong military support for the Arabs King was somewhat amazed that the British were openly admitting

186 Canada and the Birth of Israel and even defending their actions in this regard - the prime minister had 'little confidence in the judgment of Americans in regard to matters in the middle east' and believed the British had 'the best of reasons ... for the course they [had] pursued.'22 King's trust in British wisdom had turned into blind faith. The last vestiges of the independence Canada had demonstrated on the Palestine question in the fall of 1947 had been swept away by King's insistence on Canadian support for Britain's policies. This approach was reminiscent of the manner in which King had conducted Canadian foreign policy prior to World War Two. He held to old attitudes even though Canada's massive war effort had created a chance for Canadians to exercise a bold and imaginative leadership, not only of the socalled middle powers, but also within the Commonwealth. (The talent certainly existed within the Department of External Affairs for leadership, and the international situation offered numerous opportunities.) Although it was only realistic for Canada to shape its policies within the context of British and American diplomacy, the slavish acquiescence which King insisted upon in the Palestine matter was not necessary, and it is even possible that Canada might have helped the British face reality in Palestine somewhat sooner than they did if Ottawa had not given Whitehall a blank cheque. Once the breach between the United States and Britain over Palestine was again obvious, Canada was caught on the horns of the usual dilemma. In Washington, Wrong met State Department representatives J.D. Hickerson and Dean Rusk on 19 May. They told him that the United States viewed the Arab invasion as a 'threat to the peace' and was anxious to secure 'a standstill order from the Security Council.' Wrong was convinced that unless the fighting ended the United States would lift its embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East which had been imposed in November 1947. The Israelis could then acquire American arms and there would be 'the pretty picture of the United States supplying the Jews with arms and the British supplying the Arabs.' Rusk and Hickerson were bitter towards the British, Wrong reported, and expressed concern about 'the effect of British policy towards Palestine on other matters of great importance' including the Marshall Plan and the NATO negotiations. They reported that Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett had been sharply questioned about British intentions and reliability in a recent closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The division between the U.S. and the UK was 'more acute than ever before,' Wrong reported, but he did not see 'what Canada [could] do about it.' 23

187 'Numerous uncertainties' On 22 May the U.S. resolution was voted on at the Security Council and defeated while the British resolution was adopted with Canada's support. The Israelis accepted the cease-fire call, but the Arabs, with British backing, asked for more time.24 As long as Britain was able to muster enough votes on the Security Council to block a strong ceasefire order (Canada's almost automatic vote added to Britain's leverage), it was obvious that the fighting in Palestine would continue. Pressure began to mount on the British government after the Security Council vote on 22 May. The nature and extent of Britain's support for the Arab war effort - its continuing shipment of arms, its subsidies to the Arab Legion, and the participation of its officers in the legion were well known in Washington, Ottawa, and elsewhere and undermined the consistency of the British position. Phillip Jessup and John C. Ross of the U.S. delegation to the UN strongly urged that the U.S. use this information in a variety of ways to erode support for Britain on the Security Council.25 Whatever pro-British feeling may have been left in Congress and among the American public was also rapidly disappearing. T.A. Stone of the Canadian Embassy in Washington told Pearson of an informal conversation with Senator Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in which Vandenberg, not known as a friend of the Zionists, criticized Britain for doing nothing to stop the Transjordan armed forces which were British trained and officered. Vandenberg told Stone that feeling in Congress was 'running very high.' 26 Britain's open support for the Arabs did nothing to deter Canada. On 26 May the cabinet re-examined Canada's position on efforts to end the fighting in Palestine and the extension of recognition to Israel. St Laurent reported that Israel had been granted de facto recognition by a growing number of governments, including South Africa, and that New Zealand and Australia would likely follow within the week. He pointed out, however, that there were important political factors involved in extending recognition (aside from any legal considerations) and he referred to the strong differences between Britain and the United States. St Laurent noted that the Security Council's efforts to bring an end to the fighting had failed and that 'an acceptable settlement of the whole problem [was] unlikely to succeed.' It was, therefore, possible that the U.S. would soon press the Security Council once again to take action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. King then spoke strongly in favour of keeping Canada lined up with Britain. The British had told the Commonwealth governments that 'premature recognition' of Israel would have 'grave consequences' and had urged

188 Canada and the Birth of Israel that recognition be deferred until 'the situation had clarified/ he reported. Since there was 'no real prospect of effective action by the UN Security Council/ he concluded, Canada should not support the American position on the cease-fire and should not 'take steps at this time' to recognize Israel.27 King was strongly behind Britain, but the British line was beginning to change. Patience had run out in Washington and the U.S. told the British that unless there was some movement towards effective UN action to end the fighting, it would lift its embargo, allowing the Israelis to acquire arms in the United States. 28 That information, combined with the growing exhaustion of the Arab armies in Palestine, turned the tide. On 27 May Cadogan introduced yet another truce resolution in the Security Council which called upon the parties to cease fighting for a four-week period to allow the new United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, to attempt to arrange a settlement of the Palestine problem. During the truce there was to be no importation of arms and other military supplies and no reinforcement of the forces in Palestine. British arms shipments to the Arabs would cease. Although the resolution 'called upon' Arabs and Israelis to comply, and did not order them to do so, it noted that failure to comply would bring the Security Council to reconsider its options 'with a view to action under Chapter vn of the Charter.' On 29 May, after a strongly worded Soviet resolution condemning the Arabs and ordering a cease-fire was defeated, the British resolution was adopted with Canadian support.29 Ill

A tall and somewhat ascetic looking man, Count Folke Bernadotte, a member of the Swedish royal family and president of the Swedish Red Cross, had been appointed UN mediator by Trygve Lie on 19 May. During World War Two Bernadotte had gained a wide reputation for humanitarianism when he had saved thousands of Jewish and other prisoners of the Nazis from extermination as a result of secrete negotiations with SS leader Heinreich Himmler. Bernadotte's reputation for fairness and his Swedish nationality made him acceptable to the members of the Security Council. It was not widely known that he had personally opposed the partition plan and supported the independence of Palestine as a unitary state with an Arab majority and special rights for the Jews.30 Bernadotte apparently had no trouble sympathizing with Jews as victims; Jews striving for power, however, were a far different thing.

189 'Numerous uncertainties' By the end of May Arab and Jewish forces were badly in need of a respite, and Bernadotte was able to arrange a cease-fire based on the Security Council resolution, to start on 11 June. Canada could take little credit for this action despite Ottawa's oft-repeated commitments to the United Nations and to international peace and stability. In fact, the last two weeks of May 1948 were not the finest hours of Canadian diplomacy. King, St Laurent, and Pearson had supported Britain and Britain, in turn, had worked mightily to delay and undermine UN action. The British clearly aimed to give the Arab League countries as much manoeuvring room as possible in their efforts to wipe Israel out. There is no evidence that Canada supported this objective in any way, but Canada's automatic support for Britain at this juncture was clearly helping the British accomplish their aim however honourable Ottawa's intentions may have been. In fact there was little or no effort in the Department of External Affairs to examine British motives in depth. Not a single policy-maker of any consequence in Ottawa pointed out the inconsistencies between the broad policy objectives Canada was supposed to be pursuing in the world and Ottawa's weak response to the Arab invasion. This contradiction was the consequence of Canada's unstinting support for Britain. There was, however, one Canadian diplomat abroad who saw the folly in the British position with great clarity. That, as usual, was Norman Robertson, Canada's high commissioner in London. He compared Britain's support for Transjordan with the support given Vichy France by the United States during World War Two. From the fall of France in the spring of 1940 to the invasion of North Africa in 1942, the U.S. had recognized and maintained relations with the puppet Vichy regime of Marshal Phillipe Petain and had even championed it against the Free French organization of General Charles de Gaulle. The State Department had then argued, Robertson told Pearson, that it was acting out of realpolitik motives and would not permit sentiment to interfere with U.S. views on what was necessary to win the war in North Africa and the Mediterranean. The British support for King Abdullah was based on the same realpolitik considerations, Robertson observed. Bevin deeply and honestly believed that he was doing the necessary thing, according to Robertson, but he was blind to important aspects of a very difficult problem. Robertson was especially critical of the Foreign Office, which was, in his opinion, 'clinging stubbornly to a policy which [was] likely to prove ineffective, and which did not face up to the basic fact of the existence of a Jewish state recognized by the two great

190 Canada and the Birth of Israel powers, one member of the Commonwealth and some dozen other states.'31 IV

On 11 June the guns fell silent in Palestine for the first time in more than six months. The truce came as a welcome relief for both sides. Although the Arabs had failed in their main intention - the destruction of Israel - they still threatened the existence of the new state. Lebanese and Syrian units held portions of territory which the UN had allocated to Israel in Galilee as did the Arab Liberation Army. The Iraqui army had been halted only ten kilometres short of the sea. The Transjordan Arab Legion continued its virtual stranglehold on Jerusalem although the Israelis had managed to carve out a rough dirt track, just south of the legion lines, over which they could send a trickle of supplies to the Jewish part of Jerusalem. The Egyptians remained less than forty kilometres from Tel Aviv and continued to hold the northern Negev. The Negev, allotted to Israel by the UN, was totally cut off from Israeli territory. Still, Israel had survived and that was, for the moment, victory enough. Count Bernadotte, armed with the 29 May Security Council resolution, quickly set about enforcing the cease-fire. It was not an easy task. Arabs and Israelis defied the strictures against re-equipping and rearming their forces and against bringing in reinforcements. The Israelis were better at it. From the beginning of the fighting in late 1947 they had had no access to weapons in Britain or the United States and only limited access elsewhere. They were forced to develop clandestine supply sources and during the truce continued to bring arms, equipment, and foreign volunteers into the country using these underground routes. The Arabs, especially Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan, had relied heavily on regular shipments of British equipment which were cut off on 30 May after the Security Council's cease-fire resolution was adopted. They had no time to develop clandestine sources of their own, though not for lack of trying. Canada fully supported Bernadotte's efforts, and the Canadian government took steps to ensure that Canadian citizens did not violate the UN embargo on the supplying of war material or manpower reinforcements to the Arab and Jewish forces in Palestine. The government had been aware for some time that a number of Canadians were volunteer-

191 'Numerous uncertainties' ing for service with the Israeli forces and that a clandestine recruiting network existed in major cities. But the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had great difficulty collecting information on these activities and much of what it did gather was wrong. The government was reluctant to draw attention to this matter and refused to invoke the Foreign Enlistment Act - a law passed during the Spanish Civil War to discourage Canadians from enlisting in foreign forces - but the Department of External Affairs kept tabs on the issuance of passports to Jews of military age and held up those for persons suspected of planning travel to Palestine to join the fighting.32 The government also kept a close watch on exports to prevent the smuggling of military equipment.33 Both efforts were a failure. More than 300 Canadians eventually joined the Israeli forces while tons of military equipment, from Harvard training aircraft to radio sets, were smuggled out of Canadian ports. The recruiting of volunteers and the smuggling of arms were done with the active knowledge and assistance of leaders of the United Zionist Council and with the help and contributions of thousands of Canadian Jews who believed that even though Canadian law and the UN embargo were important, the survival of Israel was paramount.34 Bernadotte's efforts to enforce the truce were only one part of his assignment. As UN mediator he was also charged with trying to bring about a political settlement of the Palestine question and he knew that if he could not find a solution acceptable to both sides by the end of the four-week truce, the war would likely resume. His efforts were a complete failure. After consulting Arab and Jewish leaders in Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv, Bernadotte retired to his headquarters on Rhodes to receive further delegations and representatives and to write up his recommendations, which were issued on 27 June. Bernadotte almost completely ignored the UN partition resolutions as a basis for settlement of the Palestine question. He recommended that Israel be joined to Transjordan in a union of Palestine in which two states, one Arab, the other Jewish, would enjoy total independence in matters of foreign relations but in which immigration would be under joint control and, ultimately, under the control of the Economic and Social Council of the UN. He further suggested that the Negev be given to the Arab member of this union and that western Galilee be given to the Jewish member as compensation for the loss of the Negev. He recommended that Jerusalem come wholly under Arab jurisdiction and that the Arab refugees be allowed to return to their homes inside Israeli

192 Canada and the Birth of Israel territory.35 The plan was daring but politically naive. Britain and Transjordan were to be the big winners. Israel was, in effect, to lose its newly won independence while the other Arab states were to gain nothing and the Palestinian Arabs were to be denied sovereignty in any part of Palestine. Although Israel accepted Bernadotte's plea for an extension of the truce, it rejected the plan; the Arabs rejected the plan and refused to extend the truce. Fighting resumed on 9 July. V

In Canada the Zionist public relations and lobby effort had ebbed considerably following the United Nations partition vote in November 1947. With the declaration of independence of the State of Israel, and the growing realization among Zionists that Canadian recognition of the new state would be dealyed, the Zionist movement and its supporters mounted an intense public relations drive to persuade the government to act. The campaign was spearheaded by Moe Appel, who, as a former newspaperman and war correspondent for Reuters News Agency, had many contacts among the press, the bureaucracy, and leading Canadian politicians. Appel was set up in Ottawa as director of public relations for the Zionist Information Office and in this capacity worked closely with the leaders of the Canadian Zionist movement and with Major Michael S. Comay, director of the British Commonwealth Division of the Israeli foreign ministry and member of the United Nations delegation of the Provisional Government of Israel. Comay, a former Cape Town barrister and one-time intelligence officer with the South African army, had settled with his family in Palestine in 1945. He knew the Commonwealth scene well and had worked with Abba Eban in trying to line up Commonwealth support at the UN in the fall of 1947. Appel was a vigorous and tireless worker for the Zionist cause. His typical day was a constant round of meetings, lunches, and drinks with newspaper editors, corrrespondents, businessmen, labour leaders, members of parliament, and other public figures whose support might be important to Israel. He travelled constantly to Montreal and Toronto organizing press conferences, supervising letter-writing campaigns, writing radio speeches, and overseeing the printing and distribution of pro-Israeli information.36 He was a true professional in the field of public relations, and, notwithstanding the work of Herbert

193 'Numerous uncertainties' Mowat and his Canadian Palestine Committee, he was the first fulltime lobbyist for the Israeli cause in Ottawa. Appel's objective was recognition.37 His was part of a world-wide campaign mounted both by the Israeli government and by friends and supporters of Israel such as the members of the World Committee for Palestine.38 Appel, Mowat, and Sir Ellsworth Flavelle, chairman of the Canadian Palestine Committee, urged Canadian Zionists and their supporters to write letters to St Laurent seeking Canadian recognition and told them to meet with editors of local newspapers to persuade them to write pro-recognition editorials. Canada's role in the partition process was to be stressed and emphasis was to be placed on Canada's moral obligation to support Israeli independence regardless of what Britain did.39 The Zionist movement received important help in this campaign from the Canadian Jewish Congress which approached the Zionist Organization of Canada in early June to form a joint committee to co-ordinate pro-Israeli public relations work. The congress had always been pro-Zionist but in the post-war period had concentrated on the campaign to convince the Canadian government to allow Jewish refugees into the country and had left pro-Zionist lobbying to the Zionists. The move was an indication that most Canadian Jews were prepared for an all-out drive to influence Canada's policy towards the Middle East.40 While Appel, Mowat, Flavelle, and others worked to sway the government in Canada, Comay approached the Canadian delegation to the UN in New York. In a wide-ranging discussion with George Ignatieff on 7 June, Comay tried to sound out the Canadian position on a variety of issues including the possible reaction of Canada to a change in the designation of the Jewish representative at the Security Council from 'Jewish Agency for Palestine' to 'Provisional Government of Israel.' At one point in the discussion he asked Ignatieff 'pointblank' why Canada was stalling on recognition and Ignatieff was more than candid with his opinions. He told Comay that although Ottawa was not likely to object to a change in name for the Israeli delegation, recognition was another matter. The Canadian government was afraid that its recognition of Israel might prejudice Bernadotte's efforts to find a settlement, and he claimed that Israeli statehood rested on 'de facto grounds' because the UN plan for partition had not been followed. He pointed out, for example, that the peculiar boundaries of the two states envisaged by the partition resolution were based on the assumption of a

194 Canada and the Birth of Israel post-partition economic union. Since this had not transpired, some redrawing of those boundaries might be necessary in light of new realities and to create 'more rational and compact areas.' Here Ignatieff was stating a view shared by Harold Beeley of the British Foreign Office and which outlined, in a strangely coincidental way, the Bernadotte suggestion to take the Negev away from Israel and give it western Galilee in return. 41 Comay replied that the Canadian policy was having the opposite effect to that which was intended and that Canada, and the other countries that had supported partition, should recognize Israel and help force the Arabs to recognize reality.42 Ignatieff seemed impressed with this argument and suggested Comay go to Ottawa to present it to the government. Comay thought Ignatieff somewhat 'defensive' about his position and Pearson's because there were 'divided counsels' in Ottawa on the Palestine question. Ignatieff told Comay that he and Pearson, 'who were intimately connected with the partition policy,' were being 'carefully watched to see that they did not ... try to influence policy too strongly' and that his position in the Canadian delegation was 'not easy' because he 'had to be careful not to cut across General McNaughton.'43 It was an extraordinary admission to make to the representative of a foreign government. Comay went to Ottawa on 19 June. He was able to gain a fortyminute interview with St Laurent and he also saw Ilsley, C.D. Howe, and Walter Harris, parliamentary assistant to St Laurent, before meeting Riddell, Hopkins, Escott Reid, and Elizabeth MacCallum at External Affairs (Pearson was away from Ottawa). He pressed the Israeli case for early recognition and based it on Canada's support for partition. He pointed out that in the UN partition resolution, failure to establish one of the two proposed states was not to interfere with the creation of the other state, and he claimed that it was absurd to argue that Israel should not be recognized unless it had been established following the exact procedures outlined in the November 1947 General Assembly resolution.44 He claimed that recognition was not only a moral obligation on the states that had supported partition but essential to the restoration of stability. He argued that Canada did not stand in the same relationship to the Palestine question as did Britain and thus did not have to wait for the British to act. He asserted that the Jews had been forced to establish their own state, themselves, because of the lack of UN help and that their success should be recognized. MacCallum and Comay got along well. She found him to possess 'a

195 'Numerous uncertainties' singleness of purpose, a ready and well-disciplined intelligence, a personal charm and a familiarity with British Commonwealth affairs' which suited him for his task. She invited him to her home for dinner and after, when he was in a 'relaxed mood' and 'apparently ready to consider any theory on its merits,' asked if it would not have been better for the Jews and the world in general if 'the Zionist movement had addressed itself in the past to making the Arabs their allies, rather than persuading the rest of the world to support the Jews.' 'No/ Comay replied, 'the only way we can succeed is to ram our state down the throats of the Arabs. Then they'll accept it.' 45 Comay came to Canada to place the Israeli case directly before the Canadian government but he was also acutely interested in helping the public relations efforts of Canadian Zionists. Under the guidance of Moe Appel, he addressed the Press Gallery in Ottawa before moving on to press conferences in Montreal and Toronto and meetings with Zionist leaders. He was more than pleased with his reception - he was hailed 'with great enthusiasm' by Jewish leaders as the first official representative of Israel to enter Canada. He told his supporters that they must work for Canadian recognition of Israel and asked them to keep him posted about their efforts. 46 Comay returned to New York before the end of June, his mission to Canada a mixture of success and failure. He had been able to rally Canadian Zionists and stimulate them to greater efforts but he had no success in influencing government policy. He concluded that the government was too timid and too influenced by London to act. He suggested to Dr Walter Eytan, in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, that Canadian supporters of Israel pursue an active public relations policy on the recognition issue because the Canadian government would be quite happy to 'let it slide if nobody was worrying them.' Although there was little chance of immediate success, Comay believed that 'judicious pressure' could produce positive results later on. He reminded Eytan that Canada was 'particularly important' to Israel because of its membership on the Security Council.48 Comay's observations about Canadian timidity and Ottawa's fear of embarrassing Britain were all too true. When the Israelis moved to have the name of their delegation to the UN Security Council changed in early July 1948, from 'Jewish Agency for Palestine' to 'Provisional Government of Israel' (a move supported by both the United States and the Soviet Union), Ottawa strongly resisted despite Ignatieff's earlier assurances to Comay. Elizabeth MacCallum, for example, suggested

196 Canada and the Birth of Israel that the name be changed to 'representative of the Jewish authorities in Palestine' if it had to be changed at all. She preferred the status quo as did Riddell and McNaughton.49McNaughton was, in fact, instructed to vote in favour of a British resolution to reverse the ruling of Security Council chairman Dimitri Manuilsky, the Ukrainian representative, which had allowed the Israelis to use the new designation. The motion was defeated. Comay thought that McNaughton's vote showed that the Canadian delegation had become 'the most timorous' at the Security Council;50he was not far wrong. VI

As the end of the four-week truce drew near, the Security Council and Bernadotte worked for an extension of the cease-fire. Israel agreed but the Arabs refused, even though the Israelis had built up the size and strength of their forces while the Arabs had not. The difference was dramatically clear within days after the fighting resumed on 9 July. The Israelis, concentrating their main effort on widening the narrow corridor linking Jewish Jerusalem to the Jewish-dominated coastal plain, launched a major offensive south-east of Tel Aviv and captured a large portion of Arab territory. Most of the inhabitants of Lydda and Ramie, large towns which lay within this area, were driven out of their homes by Israeli forces after the people of Ramie revolted against a small Israeli garrison force stationed there following its surrender. These people added to the swelling number of Arab refugees.51 To the north, Israeli forces drove the Arab Liberation Army from western Galilee and captured Nazareth but Israeli successes were more limited elsewhere. They were unable to dislodge the Syrians from the small piece of Galilee which the Syrian army had captured after the 15 May invasion and were unsuccessful in trying to dislodge the Egyptians from the northern Negev. The Security Council moved quickly to end this second round of fighting; there was little of the British-American bickering over a truce that had taken place in late May. The delegations of both countries agreed on a resolution that would define the situation in Palestine as a threat to the peace, call upon Jews and Arabs to cease fighting, and threaten strong Security Council action should the call be ignored. The resolution, introduced by the U.S., was adopted on 15 July and Bernadotte, who was then in New York to report to the Security Council, moved quickly to arange a new cease-fire and put his truce observation

197 'Numerous uncertainties' team back into place. On the evening of 15 July the fighting ended in Palestine once again. Moe Appel believed the Security Council's 15 July cease-fire resolution, and Canada's support for it, signalled a change in British attitudes and thought the time had arrived to 'use the fullest pressure' to convince the Canadian government to recognize Israel. He urged Zionist leaders to arrange deputations to visit local MPS and to use as much pressure as possible on local newspapers 'to obtain favourable editorial comment.'52 At the same time, Harry Batshaw, since 1940 a prominent Liberal in the Montreal riding of St Antoine-Westmount (represented in the cabinet by Finance Minister Douglas Abbott), began to organize the submission of a draft resolution on Palestine to the forthcoming leadership convention of the Liberal party, scheduled for Ottawa in early August.53 But the public relations campaign had little apparent impact on the government. An unnamed government spokesman quoted by the Canadian Press maintained that 'there had been no recent developments on the question of Canadian recognition of the Government of Israel' and that Canada's support for the 15 July cease-fire resolution, which mentioned the Provisional Government of Israel, was of 'no significance.'54 Despite this pronouncement there was a slight shift in Canadian policy at the end of July when the Syrian delegate to the Security Council proposed a resolution to refer the Palestine question to the International Court of Justice for 'an advisory legal opinion as to the international status of Palestine after the termination of the mandate.' 55 Although it was soon apparent that Britain and as many as five other countries - Syria, Argentina, Belgium, China, and Colombia were likely to support the resolution, McNaughton was instructed to abstain. On 27 July he outlined the Canadian position to the Security Council: 'To open now the general legal basis upon which the United Nations is acting in regard to Palestine seems to our delegation neither necessary nor desirable for it would inevitably hinder and postpone the negotiations for a peaceful settlement.' Any alternative method for solving the Palestine question introduced at that point, he declared, would undermine the work of the mediator. 56He then abstained on the vote and the Syrian resolution was defeated.57 Up to this point Canada had been prepared to go to almost any length to support British Palestine policy. This was the first indication that Ottawa was beginning to have doubts about the wisdom of British policy and especially London's continuing refusal to face reality.

198 Canada and the Birth of Israel VII

At the end of July, Israel began to line up support for a serious effort at gaining admission to the United Nations (Israel had made a pro-forma application immediately after independence but this had not been followed up). Michael Comay urged Harry Batshaw, and other Canadian supporters of Israel, to try to get the Canadian government to back this move58 while the Israeli UN delegation in New York made discreet inquiries of McNaughton and his staff about the attitude Canada might take to such an application.59 On 3 August a high-level delegation from the Zionist Organization of Canada and the Canadian Jewish Congress met St Laurent to urge Canadian recognition of Israel and to support Israel's admission to the UN. The group was led by Samuel Bronfman and included prominent Jewish leaders and leading Jewish Liberals from Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and Winnipeg.60 It was, Harry Batshaw wrote Comay, 'the most important delegation ... sent yet.' 61 St Laurent was not very receptive to the delegation's pleas. He warned them not to 'press their friends too hard' and he claimed that Canada was not as bound to support Israel as it would have been if the original UN partition plan had been followed. Although he admitted, for the first time, that Canadian recognition of Israel was inevitable, he held out little hope for quick action because Canadian recognition at that point would not, in his opinion, advance the peace process. He promised that Canada would not necessarily delay recognition until after Britain recognized Israel but he added that Canada had no intention of standing alone (as if no other countries had yet recognized the Jewish state). It was obvious to the Jews that St Laurent was not moved by their arguments, by their campaign for public support, or by their private lobby efforts. It was clear, Batshaw reported to Comay, that Canada's course would remain one of 'watchful waiting.'62

9

'Half a loaf'

The heat was heavy and oppressive inside the Ottawa Coliseum on the afternoon of 7 August 1948 as close to two thousand members of the Liberal party of Canada gathered to elect their first new leader in twenty-nine years. Few in the building had doubts about how the voting would go. Mackenzie King was as careful about his exit from politics as he had been through most of his political career, and the succession had been arranged well in advance.1 But when the results of the first ballot were announced, they were even more decisive than most had imagined and the crowd roared in exultation at the margin of victory. Louis St Laurent had received almost 70 per cent of the votes to become the second French Canadian leader in the history of the party. The applause was thunderous as St Laurent rose from his place on the platform and moved to the podium where he stood for several moments, waiting for the noise to subside and shrugging occasionally in embarrassed self-depreciation.2 St Laurent had been chosen by King but those moments behind the rostrum were a hint that both the substance and the style of the man were markedly different from those of the leader he was succeeding. The King era was drawing rapidly to a close. Shortly after the convention King and St Laurent met to discuss the order of succession. King was anxious to stay on as prime minister until 15 November, so that he could lead the Canadian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, due to open in Paris in midSeptember, and attend the Commonwealth prime ministers meeting in London which was to be held in early October. This suited St Laurent, who did not want to begin his prime ministerial duties by attending two international conferences.3

200 Canada and the Birth of Israel St Laurent was to be prime minister; a replacement was necessary to head the Department of External Affairs. There were at least two men in the King Cabinet who might have filled the bill: Paul Martin, who had been secretary of state and who was now, in 1948, minister of national health and welfare, and Brooke Claxton, Martin's predecessor at Health and Welfare and minister of national defence since late 1946. Both men had had a keen interest in international affairs since the 1920s and both had represented Canada at important international meetings. But neither of these men was chosen. St Laurent, with King's approval, went outside the cabinet to pick Lester B. Pearson who clearly shared much of St Laurent's view of the world. Pearson agreed to serve, resigned his position as undersecretary of state for external affairs, and prepared to contest a by-election in Algoma East, a safe Liberal seat. On 10 September 1948 he was sworn in as a member of the Privy Council and secretary of state for external affairs. 4 He was temporarily replaced as under-secretary of state for external affairs by Escott Reid. The change in leadership of the Liberal party, the government, and the Department of External Affairs came during troubled times. Cold War tensions had been building since the Allied victory in Europe and had reached a new peak with the imposition by the Soviet Union of a land blockade on the roads and rail lines that normally gave the western allies access to Berlin. The blockade had been imposed on 24 June 1948, in response to Allied moves to fuse American, British, and French zones of occupation in Germany into a new federal union. Truman seemed to respond directly to the possibility of world war by dispatching two squadrons of B-29 bombers - the type used to drop the atomic bomb on Japan - to England in mid-July, while American General Lucius D. Clay, commander of United States forces in Germany, had warned that war with the Soviet Union was imminent. The western allies, led by the United States, were determined to stand fast in Berlin; they organized a massive airlift to fly food, fuel, and other essential goods to the people of west Berlin. The rapid buildup of Cold War tension in the summer of 1948 took the spotlight away from the war in Palestine, but the Arab-Israeli conflict was still a significant irritant in British-American relations and therefore of concern to Canada. Pearson had, rightly or wrongly, been identified as one of the architects of partition and he and St Laurent both favoured a vigorous and active role for Canada in world affairs. In the first weeks of Pearson's tenure as secretary of state for external af-

201 'Half a loaf fairs, however, Canada remained committed to the pro-British course set by Mackenzie King at the beginning of 1948. For one thing, King was still prime minister and, therefore, capable of influencing foreign policy decisions to some degree. For another, Pearson had still to get elected if he was to keep his post at External Affairs, and although Algoma East was a safe Liberal seat, he was obliged to spend much of his time in September and October shaking hands, kissing babies, and being initiated into the mysteries of Canadian politics. An era of Canadian diplomacy was certainly passing, but it was not quite over yet, and Pearson was still not completely free to resume the quest for an independent Canadian policy on the Palestine question.

I Count Folke Bernadotte was interested in moving his headquarters from the Greek Island of Rhodes to a neutral zone in Jerusalem, and on the afternoon of 17 September 1948 he visited the Jewish Agricultural School in the Red Cross zone to check out the facilities there. Bernadotte and his party found a number of Israeli 'caretakers' at the school in violation of the truce and decided to consult the cease-fire regulations before taking action. The only copy was located in the YMCA, several kilometres away, and Bernadotte decided to retrieve it. As the small convoy of three cars carrying him and his party drove through the Katamon quarter of Jerusalem just after 5:00 PM, the driver of the first car spotted a khaki-coloured jeep parked in the middle of the road and braked to a halt. Three of four men in the jeep got out and approached the UN cars, two walking slowly down the right side of the road and the third moving more quickly towards the last car on the left. As he reached the third vehicle - Bernadotte's car - he stuck the muzzle of a submachine gun in the window and fired a burst into the back seat. Bernadotte and French Colonel Serot, a UN observer, were riddled with bullets and died almost immediately; the Lehi had struck again.5 Bernadotte was murdered after weeks of hectic shuttle diplomacy aimed at bridging the gap between British and American Palestine policy. Despite the Berlin blockade and the general deterioration in east-west relations in the summer of 1948, Palestine was still a matter of immediate concern to both countries. The Security Council had imposed an uneasy truce in Palestine in August but sporadic fighting marred the cease-fire while none of the underlying political causes of

202 Canada and the Birth of Israel the crisis had been resolved. Britain and the United States had major strategic and economic interests in the region and feared Soviet penetration there as well as a loss of influence among the Arab states. If the Palestine question was not resolved quickly, renewed war was likely on a larger scale than before. It was also apparent by the late summer of 1948 that Israel was growing stronger because of the steady influx of displaced persons and foreign volunteers into the Israeli forces and the continuing successes of the Israelis in defying American, British, and UN embargos in acquiring military equipment. The Arabs, once totally dependent on British supplies, were running out of ammunition now that British stocks were no longer open to them. This posed a further problem. Israeli successes in renewed fighting would bring great pressure on Britain to resume arms shipments to the Arabs or to send troops to the region in fulfilment of Britain's treaties with several Arab countries. Should it do so Truman and Congress would not long delay the lifting of the U.S. embargo thus giving Israel direct access to American weapons. The prospect of this type of indirect confrontation between the United States and Britain in the Middle East, while the Soviet Union threatened in central Europe, must have been chilling to British and American leaders. They looked to Count Folke Bernadotte to provide a solution. Bernadotte spent most of August in Sweden chairing the International Red Cross Conference in Stockholm. He left on 1 September and stopped in Paris, Geneva, and Rome before arriving on Rhodes on 3 September. In Paris he met Secretary General Trygve Lie, who urged him to appear before the forthcoming General Assembly to inform the delegates about the situation in Palestine. It was clear that another report was called for, possibly containing the outlines of a settlement. In the next few days Bernadotte redoubled his efforts to find some common ground between the antagonists and flew in quick succession to Alexandria, Amman, and Tel Aviv to talk with Arabs and Israelis. By 10 September he was back on Rhodes where he and his staff began to work feverishly on a new report. 6 Three days later Robert McClintock of the United States State Department and Sir John Troutbeck of the British Foreign Office arrived on the island to confer with him. McClintock and Troutbeck went to Rhodes to co-ordinate the policies of their two countries with Bernadotte. It was a meeting of minds that dated back to early August when the British first approached the Americans with the startling admission that they were ready, under certain conditions, to change their approach to the Middle East con-

203 'Half a loaf flict and accept the reality of Israeli existence. They suggested that the original Bernadotte proposals might form a good basis for a settlement but without his recommendation for a union of Israel and Transjordan. 7 Within two weeks the State Department had agreed to work with the British and the two countries then kept in close touch exchanging ideas about what the Bernadotte report should look like when finally placed before the UN. Both countries agreed, for example, that Israel ought to give up its claim to the Negev and take western Galilee instead and that Arab Palestine be joined to an existing Arab country. They also insisted on repatriation of the Arab refugees. United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin supported these efforts and Marshall told Truman at the end of August that it was essential that Britain and the United States join in pushing a new Bernadotte plan through the UN in order to settle the Palestine crisis.8 The discussions were kept secret; when issued, the Bernadotte report would have to carry a 'made in Sweden' label if it was to have any chance of success in the UN and acceptance by the Arabs and Israelis.9 In fact, Troutbeck and McClintock did not write the new Bernadotte report because they did not have to. Bernadotte knew what the British and Americans were after in a settlement and he was astute enough to know that his recommendations had little chance of success without British and American support. The British and Americans, for their part, already had a good idea of what he would recommend (his first report had been issued in the early summer and had been rejected by the Arabs and Israelis). The Bernadotte report was completed quickly and was transmitted to Trygve Lie in Paris on 16 September. In the introduction to it, Bernadotte explained that the time had come for the General Assembly to take action and that if nothing were done the truce in Palestine would likely deteriorate and the war would resume. He believed that if the Security Council was steadfast in its determination to maintain the cease-fire and the General Assembly was willing to make firm political decisions, chances for a settlement were good. He rejected much of the 29, November 1947 UN partition plan as no longer workable or realistic. He claimed that it had been outrun and revised by events. He now accepted the fact that a Jewish state was a 'living, solidly entrenched and vigorous reality/ and that the Arab dream of a unitary Arab state was 'unrealistic.' He thought that the cantonal and federal schemes that had been put forward from time to time were 'not worthy of consideration.' It was also too late, he concluded, to establish an indepen-

204 Canada and the Birth of Israel dent Arab state in any portion of Palestine because of 'the lack of organized authority springing from Arab Palestine itself, and the administrative disintegration' in the Arab areas which had followed the ending of the mandate. Bernadotte made a number of specific recommendations which he believed should form the basis for action in the General Assembly. He called for international recognition of the State of Israel with boundaries to be fixed by agrement between Israel and the Arabs or, failing that, by the UN. He recommended that the boundaries outlined in the 29 November 1947 partition resolution be abandoned and that Israel give up its claim to the Negev in return for western Galilee. The Arab areas of Palestine, in Bernadotte's view, should be annexed to Transjordan while the Arab refugees should be allowed to return to their homes inside Israel. Bernadotte also recommended that Jerusalem be accorded special status, that Haifa become a free port, and that Lydda become a free airport.10 Although Bernadotte had the full support of the United States and the United Kingdom at this stage, Arabs and Jews had become increasingly hostile to him and his ideas since the early summer. The Arabs, with the possible exception of Transjordan, would not recognize Israel, and inter-Arab rivalries had been inflamed by Bernadotte's apparent favouring of Transjordan. The Israelis were extremely reluctant to accept the Arab refugees back into Israel and they refused to give up their claims to the Negev. The Lehi viewed Bernadotte as an enemy of Israel; the day after his report was submitted to Trygve Lie in Paris, they murdered him.n II

The Bernadotte killing shocked the delegates gathering in Paris for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly and, at first, appeared to solidify international support for the Bernadotte plan. In Washington, Robert McClintock urged quick action in publishing and endorsing the Bernadotte report in the wake of his assassination; he declared that Bernadotte's death would give 'maximum weight' to the recommendations.12 On 21 September Secretary of State Marshall, leading the U.S. delegation to the UN, declared that the Bernadotte plan offered 'a generally fair basis for settlement of the Palestine question.'13 while the following day Ernest Bevin told the British House of Commons that Britain would give its 'whole-hearted and unqualified sup-

205 'Half a loaf port' to the Bernadotte proposals and would insist that they 'be considered as an integrated plan and put into operation in their entirety.'14 The Canadian government was more cautious. The delegation met under Mackenzie King's leadership on 21 September and decided that no statement should be issued on the plan prior to its submission to the General Assembly and that the Security Council was the only 'appropriate place' to express the Canadian view until then.15 There was no serious disagreement with Bernadotte's views in the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa or in the Canadian delegation; it was simply a question of timing and, as usual, keeping in close touch with Britain and the United States to discover their plans. The following day Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, the United Kingdom high commissioner in Ottawa, approached St Laurent with a request that Canada issue a declaration in support of the Bernadotte plan and touched off a trans-Atlantic discussion between Pearson and the Canadian delegation in Paris. McNaughton wanted to endorse the Bernadotte proposals because even though there was no guarantee that Britain or the U.S. were prepared to force the plan on Israel and the Arabs, it represented a substantial measure of agreement between the U.S. and Britain, something Canada had always sought. He recommended that Canada keep in close step with its two allies16 and Pearson agreed. He gave McNaughton approval to express 'general support' for the Bernadotte proposals and told him to be 'co-operative, but not too active' in the campaign to convert the plan into a General Assembly resolution.17 This was entirely in keeping with the approach Ottawa had been following since the early part of the year. Ill

On 15 October 1948 Israel gave its answer to the Bernadotte plan at a crossroads near the small Negev town of Karatiya. According to the terms of the July truce Israel was permitted to use a north-south road through the region to send non-military supplies to Negev settlements while Egypt used an east-west road that intersected the Israeli route to supply its own troops. Both sides often shelled each other's traffic near the strategic junction, but when the Egyptians lobbed shells at an Israeli convoy on 15 October, Israel responded with a full air and ground assault on Egyptian positions. The Israelis were determined to use the provocation as an excuse to reopen the war and drive Egypt out of Palestine.

206 Canada and the Birth of Israel The Israeli government had known for some time that its claim to the Negev was in danger. A prolonged Egyptian occupation of the northern Negev increased the possibility that a political settlement, supported by Britain and the United States, and imposed by the UN, would take the Negev from Israel. In early August David Ben Gurion began to lay plans for a general offensive on the southern front aimed at pushing Egyptian troops out of the area. Israeli forces north of the Egyptian lines were reinforced while fresh troops and supplies were flown over the Egyptians to Israeli forces south of the band of Egyptiancontrolled territory that stretched from the Mediterranean, near Gaza, to the southern outskirts of Jerusalem.18 The 15 October shelling gave Israel its chance; the attack which followed trapped four thousand Egyptian troops in a pocket of territory near the town of Faluja and captured many key roads and road junctions in the northern Negev. The Israelis then drove south and south-west and opened a corridor to Israeli-controlled areas in the central and southern Negev.19 The Egyptians were not driven completely out of the Negev but their position became more precarious by the hour and with each metre of advance, the Israeli army rendered the Bernadotte boundary recommendations more and more obsolete. IV

Lester Pearson liked attending United Nations meetings. It was a chance to get away from his desk-bound routine in Ottawa and to wade into the diplomatic manoeuvring that was his forte. 20 A General Assembly held in Paris must have been particularly alluring. But when the UN Security Council began debating the Negev fighting, McNaughton was in his usual seat representing Canada while Lester Pearson was half-way round the world, winning his political spurs in his adopted home riding of Algoma East. The riding was a large one covering more than 32,000 square kilometres from the north shore of Lake Superior to a few miles east of Sudbury. It was sparsely populated making campaigning strenuous even though the contest was never in doubt - the Liberals had enjoyed a wide margin of success there for years and the Conservatives chose not to contest the by-election. The voting was held on 25 October and Pearson was easily elected. After the results were in, he was driven to Sudbury to catch a midnight train for Ottawa to prepare for the flight to Paris on 29 October.21 The day before Pearson's departure for the UN he received a delega-

207 'Half a loaf tion of Canadian Zionists including Sam Zacks, Harry Batshaw, Moe Appel, and four others who urged him to show a renewed and vigorous leadership at the UN. Canadian Zionists were united with Zionists around the globe in their strong opposition to the Bernadotte plan and continued to press Ottawa to recognize Israel. Pearson appeared to offer them some hope. He told the delegation that Canada would not delay recognition much longer but that it would be unwise for the Zionists to force the issue of Israel's immediate admission to the United Nations because the U.S. appeared to be shifting its position on the Negev. He reassured Zacks and the others that Canada still supported partition, but reminded them that there had been important territorial changes since November 1947 and that the final boundaries of the State of Israel would have to be 'part of a negotiated settlement.'22 Pearson tried to explain why it was important for Canada to try to keep the U.S. and the UK in step and promised that he would 'consider [the question of recognition] while he was in Paris and would make recommendations ... to the government on his return.' 23 He stressed that as under-secretary of state he had followed policies decided upon by the cabinet; now, however, he was the man at the head of External Affairs making policy, and could 'therefore be more helpful ... than ever before.' 24 Pearson gave no commitments; his position, in reality, was little different from that which St Laurent had outlined in his interview with Zionist leaders the previous August. He would go to Paris, size up the situation, and then recommend action to the cabinet. Despite the lack of any concrete assurances, Zacks and the others left with the feeling that the interview had been 'most satisfactory,' that Pearson's sympathies were 'still with' the Zionists, and that he would 'again play an independent and important role in the Palestine discussions at the UN.' 25 Such was the importance of style. When Pearson arrived in Paris on 29 October, the Security Council was wrestling with the problem of the Negev fighting. The council had passed one resolution on 19 October which ordered the fighting to stop (the cease-fire went into effect on 22 October) but which did not clearly call for a return to the former cease-fire lines. When UN authorities tried to get the Israelis to pull back, they refused and pointed out to Ralph Bunche, who had been appointed acting mediator for Palestine, that the 19 October resolution did not clearly compel them to withdraw.26 Israel's chief antagonist at the council was Great Britain, which was

208 Canada and the Birth of Israel determined to restore the pre-14 October cease-fire lines; if those lines were not restored, and if Israel succeeded in pushing Egypt out of the Negev, the Bernadotte boundary proposals would be a dead issue. On 28 October, therefore, the British, together with the Chinese, introduced a second resolution into the council calling for a complete pullback and establishing a council committee to report on measures that could be taken, such as economic sanctions, to force compliance.27 McNaughton at first supported this resolution28 but then got word that the United States would oppose it. Ambassador Austin, in fact, received instructions from Washington to try to delay Security Council action until after the 3 November presidential election in the United States.29 President Harry S. Truman obviously wanted to avoid alienating Israeli supporters among the U.S. electorate. Once again, confrontation loomed between Britain and the U.S.; Canada came to the rescue. Bunche had been working on a draft resolution, intended to complement the Chinese-UK motion, which called on Arabs and Israelis to negotiate a truce, directly or through the acting mediator, convert it into an armistice, and then create a permanent peace. McNaughton refused to sponsor the Bunche resolution. Instead he agreed to a U.S. request to propose the establishment of a subcommittee to study the UK-Chinese resolution and the Bunche proposal, together with any other amendments or revisions that might come forward, and to prepare a single resolution out of them. This was adopted; the U.S. gained its delay.30 The Canadian motion was passed on the afternoon of 29 October, hours after fighting broke out again in Palestine, this time in western Galilee. Even after Israeli forces captured Nazareth in July 1948, the Arab Liberation Army remained in possession of most of western Galilee (the area had been allocated to Arab Palestine under the 29 November 1947 partition resolution). The Arab Liberation Army had refused to recognize UN authority to arrange a cease-fire and had continued to mount harassing attacks on Israeli settlements throughout the late summer and early fall despite UN cease-fire resolutions. The Israeli army was determined to wipe out this threat and prepared to attack the ALA in mid-September; the assault was halted only hours before it was due to start when Bernadotte was assassinated. The troops were held ready, however, and attack preparations went ahead; in the early morning hours of 29 October, the Israelis struck. They quickly overcame ALA opposition. By nightfall on 30 October they had completely driven the Arab Liberation Army and the Lebanese army from Galilee

209 'Half a loaf and Israeli spearheads had reached the Litani River, inside Lebanon.31 The Israelis quickly withdrew from Lebanon but they now possessed the entire Galilee and the Bernadotte proposals had received another blow. The plan to entice Israel to give up the Negev in return for western Galilee was now moot; Israel had western Galilee firmly under its control. On 4 November, the day after the U.S. presidential election, the Security Council met to consider the resolution brought in by the subcommittee established as a result of the 29 October vote. This time Pearson represented Canada. Although he was obliged to report back to the cabinet in Ottawa (Brooke Claxton was acting secretary of state for external affairs in his absence), he obviously had far greater leeway than McNaughton to make independent decisions, both because of his proven diplomatic style and because of his new position as a cabinet minister. In a sense he carried the Department of External Affairs around with him because he headed the department, he was trusted by St Laurent, and he was already a popular figure with the Canadian public who viewed him as somewhat of a Canadian knight in shining armour on the international stage. He was, therefore, in a position to begin to shift Canada's Palestine policy away from the course it had followed under King to the more independent line which had been pursued in the fall of 1947. Pearson was disturbed and upset by events at the Security Council meeting of 4 November. The British, Chinese, and Americans united to push strongly for a resolution designed to force Israel to withdraw and to impose economic sanctions if it refused. Pearson was surprised; he had believed the U.S. would not back anything that included the threat of sanctions, and he tried to convince the council to postpone action until Friday 5 November, so that he could find out what the Americans were up to. The British and Americans would have none of this, however, and lobbied strongly for passage. Pearson resented their haste and tried not to be 'indecently rushed' but there was little he could do.32 At the evening session the resolution was adopted. Pearson voted for it, but he strongly resisted a Lebanese and British effort to have it applied to Galilee as well as the Negev. When the council adjourned, it agreed only to meet again within a few days 'to consider applying the resolution to other parts of Palestine.'33 The 4 November resolution was a British triumph; it embodied the ideal that the UN should impose a settlement in Palestine and that, on the matter of boundaries, that settlement should conform to the Ber-

210 Canada and the Birth of Israel nadotte proposals. The resolution threatened sanctions against Israel if it failed to comply. But the British triumph was hollow; the threat of sanctions was empty unless it was supported by the United States. It was soon clear that the Americans were only bluffing. V

Although Britain worked mightily in the Security Council to restore the 14 October cease-fire lines as a prelude to the introduction of the Bernadotte plan, the fate of the plan would be decided elsewhere - in the General Assembly and, ultimately, in the capitals of the Great Powers. In this larger arena the Bernadotte plan was beginnning to run into trouble by late October. When the General Assembly had passed the Bernadotte plan to the First Committee for discussion on 15 October, the United States and Britain had circulated a joint resolution calling for the establishment of a conciliation commission for Palestine composed of three member states and charged with implementing the Bernadotte proposals. But the United States soon began to back-pedal from this position. Instead of introducing the resolution into the First Committee the U.S. stalled. One American diplomat explained to McNaughton that the 'proximity of [the] United States election made it inexpedient to discuss Palestine.' at that point.34The Americans even began to doubt the UN's legal authority to impose a solution on Israel and the Arabs and suggested that the General Assembly could do nothing more than recommend a settlement while the Security Council tried to keep the peace.35 The Bernadotte plan could not survive without United States support; although Secretary of State Marshall had apparently given that support on 21 September, the realities of American politics intervened. On 22 October New York State Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate for president, charged that the Truman administration was not supporting Israel strongly enough at the UN and was, in fact, abandoning the Democratic party's platform. The Democrats had strongly asserted Israel's right to the Negev and declared that no territorial changes in the November 1947 partition plan would be acceptable to the U.S. unless they were agreed to by Israel.36 Truman could not ignore this challenge to his own integrity and released a statement to the press on 25 October reaffirming his support for the Democratic party's position on Israel.37This press release weakened American support for the Bernadotte plan. The American ambassador in London

211 'Half a loaf fully realized the implications of the Truman statement and strongly objected to it in the knowledge that the carefully constructed U.S.-UK accord on Palestine that had been put together in the late summer was now coming apart at the seams.38 VI

By early November Mackenzie King had ceased to be an important factor in the making of Canadian Palestine policy. The old leader, due to retire on 15 November, had gone to London from Paris in early October to attend the Commonwealth prime ministers meeting and had fallen seriously ill. St Laurent was forced to make a quick trip on 14 October to fill in. Pearson, therefore, was now almost completely free to reassess Canadian Palestine policy and to begin to fashion a new and more independent approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict in line with his own perceptions of the political and diplomatic realities and of Canadian national interests. To him, the strongest reality was that Britain's approach was not working; it was based on the vain hope that Britain, acting alone or through the UN, could salvage an Arab diplomatic victory of sorts, it ignored the new reality of Israeli military strength and the continuing reality of Zionist political influence in the United States. Canada had waited many long months for Whitehall to wake up, but it was now clear to Pearson that this wait could not continue much longer. Britain, with the support of some Security Council members, and even with the apparent backing of the U.S. delegation to the UN, could threaten Israel all it wanted; the truth was that the Security Council was not going to impose sanctions on Israel as long as the Soviet Union had a veto and Truman was in the White House. The Council's credibility (and the U.S.-UK alliance) was being strained by British stubbornness. The Americans were equally concerned by the British approach and had no desire to try to extend the Security Council's withdrawal order of 4 November to all of Palestine. They favoured, instead, Ralph Bunche's efforts to try to get Israel and the Arabs into negotiations leading to an armistice. Truman himself supported this idea.39 On 6 November Phillip C. Jessup of the U.S. delegation explained the American position to Pearson, who quickly agreed; he told Jessup that passage of the Bunche resolution would make it easier to discuss the Bernadotte proposals in the First Committee. He feared the First Committee might adopt a resolution that tied the UN too closely to the Ber-

212 Canada and the Birth of Israel nadotte plan and he asked Jessup how committed the U.S. was to it. Jessup replied that the U.S. saw it 'as being a basis for discussion' but was 'not rigidly committed to every detail.' 40 Two days later, at a long, night meeting of the U.S., Canadian, and British delegations, Pearson joined with the Americans to try to convince the British to see the light. He expressed misgivings about the 4 November resolution and doubts about whether 'the application of sanctions was seriously intended.' He believed it was a major error to make threats that could not be followed up; if the council failed to apply sanctions in the event that Israel refused to withdraw, its remaining authority 'would be completely lost' and the Israelis 'would probably feel free to take over all of Palestine.' The Bunche approach would give the Israelis a way to save face and carry out a withdrawal that they might refuse to agree to under Security Council pressure. Hector McNeil, expressing the British view, claimed that the UK was serious about sanctions but Jessup and John C. Ross, speaking for the Americans, quickly cut the ground out from under him and admitted that their support for the 4 November resolution had been 'a bluff.' They warned that the U.S. would not apply 'serious economic or other sanctions' and revealed that they had been instructed not to support any UK efforts to extend the withdrawal order to Galilee. They, like the Canadians, supported the Bunche approach but McNeil was unmoved. He claimed that adoption of the Bunche resolution would totally undermine the 4 November Security Council order and would confuse the Bernadotte plan deliberations in the First Committee and General Assembly.41 Pearson was getting increasingly fed up with the British. He later told Ralph Maybank, Liberal MP and a member of the Canadian delegation, that the British were wrong to back the Arabs so strongly. They should, instead, 'aim at developing the Jewish state and let it get strong.' He did not agree with the British view that the Israelis were being stubborn or that they were trying to make things difficult for the UN. It was clear to him that they were not going to abandon land they had won in battle even though he believed they would 'try to fall in with any desirable UN course of action.' The Egyptians, Pearson commented, had 'walked in to fight and got a licking' and the Israelis 'could not be expected to give up their gains.' Maybank noted that McNaughton (referred to as 'Sheik McNaughton' in the Canadian delegation while Pearson was 'Rabbi Pearson') was also 'becoming rather

213 'Half a loaf impatient towards England and their pro-Arab-at-all-times-and-allplaces attitude.' 42 On the morning of 9 November Bunche introduced his resolution to a closed Security Council meeting and argued that the only alternative to a steady deterioration in the truce was 'a serious attempt to proceed to a permanent settlement.' He made clear his desire that all prior Security Council truce resolutions, including the one adopted 4 November, remain in force and that the 4 November order be used as a first step towards 'separating the combatents ... withdrawal, and demobilization of their forces.' Most of the delegations at the Security Council supported his proposal as long as its adoption did not imply 'relaxation of the truce resolutions.' The French feared that more action along the lines suggested by the British would only drive the Israelis to take all of Palestine; the Soviet Union thought that any measure that did not aim directly at a peace treaty (the Bunche resolution aimed only at an armistice) 'provided only half the answer' and Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative, proposed several amendments. Cadogan, speaking for the UK, claimed that he did not disagree with the aim of the resolution but that the wrong signal would be given to the First Committee if it was passed.43 British resistance was useless without American support and the Americans were strongly behind Bunche. London was forced to accept the new reality, and the British delegation was authorized to work with the Canadians and Americans to draw up a resolution similar to the Bunche proposal. It was co-sponsored by France, Belgium, and Canada and passed by the Security Council 16 November. It reaffirmed previous Security Council truce resolutions, took note of the General Assembly's efforts to recommend an overall solution to the Palestine problem, and decided, 'without prejudice to the actions of the Acting Mediator' in enforcing the 4 November resolution, that an armistice be established in all sections of Palestine to facilitate the transition from truce to 'permanent peace.' It called upon Arabs and Israelis to negotiate, directly or through the mediator, the immediate establishment of that armistice.44 The Israelis were not entirely happy with the resolution. They still faced possible sanctions if they refused to agree to withdraw to the 14 October cease-fire lines, while the Arabs were not obliged to enter into direct negotiations.45 But Israel recognized one major implication: it was Britain's most important retreat thus far and a harbinger of the eventual fate of the Bernadotte plan.

214 Canada and the Birth of Israel VII

On Saturday 6 November United States President Harry S. Truman met Under-Secretary of State Robert Lovett and U.S. Ambassador to the UK Lewis W. Douglas at Key West, Flordia. They devoted most of the meeting to the Palestine question and United States policy towards the Bernadotte plan. Only days before Truman had scored an upset victory in the U.S. presidential election by defeating Governor Thomas E. Dewey and Henry Wallace, Truman's former secretary of commerce, who was running for the newly formed Progressive party. (Despite his efforts to curry favour with Jewish voters on the Palestine question, Truman had lost New York State to Dewey.) Truman's problem was to reconcile the Palestine plank of the Democratic party platform (which he had endorsed on 25 October), the position taken by Secretary of State Marshall on 21 September, and the British insistence that Israel give up the Negev. The result was a presidential directive sent to the Paris delegation which was shot through with ambiguity. The delegation was told, for example, that Truman endorsed the Democratic party position approving Israel's claim to the Negev but was reminded that this endorsation 'would mean that [the] U.S. would not support a claim by Israel to Jaffa and western Galilee now in its military occupation.' Truman thought it was possible that Israel might trade territory in the south for land in the north and believed his stand might induce a negotiated boundary settlement. But he also suggested that if there was no agreement on boundaries, Israel should 'relinquish Galilee and Jaffa and the Egyptians should relinquish the Israeli portion of the Negev.' (Truman made no suggestions about how Israel was going to be either persuaded, or forced, to give up its gains in western Galilee.) In light of these basic policy decisions, the U.S. delegation in Paris was instructed to review the draft resolution it had prepared with the British in mid-October and to bring it more into line with current realities and policies. In doing so, however, the delegation was told to continue 'to subscribe to all the seven basic premises in the Bernadotte Plan and all [the] specific conclusions, with the exception of [the] recommendations regarding the boundaries of Israel.' Israel and the Arabs could choose the 29 November 1947 boundaries, or new boundaries agreed to by both sides. 'In plain language,' the delegation was told, Truman's position was that 'if Israel wishes to retain that part of [the] Negev granted it under [the] Nov[ember] 29 [1947] resolution, it will have to take the rest of [the]

215 'Half a loaf Nov[ember] settlement which means giving up western Galilee and Jaffa.' The delegation was warned not to come up 'with a plan of its own at this stage' and was reminded that U.S. efforts should be directed towards having Arabs and Israelis settle the matter themselves or 'stick to the Nov[ember] 29 boundaries.'46 Truman was asking the United States delegation at Paris to square the circle. On 15 November Moshe Shertok addressed the First Committee and gave that body Israel's views on the Bernadotte boundaries. The suggestion that Israel relinquish its claim to the Negev was 'in itself a sufficient reason why the Government of Israel could not consider the [Bernadotte] report... a basis for discussion/ Shertok warned. Israel would not give up any part of the Negev, claimed Jewish Jerusalem as a permanent part of Israel (along with a corridor linking it to the coast), and now insisted that all of Galilee should be part of Israel.47 Since Truman had told the American people on 25 October that the U.S. would not support any boundary changes to which Israel did not agree, the U.S. delegation was in a bind. The day following the Shertok speech, the U.S. delegation met to draw up its plans and decided, essentially, to end its support for the Bernadotte boundary recommendations.48 The U.S. remained strongly in favour of establishing a conciliation commission for Palestine, but not for the purpose of imposing a Bernadotte-style settlement. VIII

The British were finding themselves increasingly alone, and the chances of salvaging a diplomatic victory out of the ruins of their Palestine policy slipped away by the hour. They could not even turn to the Commonwealth for succour. At a meeting of Commonwealth delegates held 17 November to discuss the Palestine question, Pearson told Hector McNeil that he had serious doubts about trying to pass an assembly resolution on Palestine which aimed only to implement the Bernadotte proposals. He did not think such a resolution would pass. If it did, it would take a 'resolute use of sanctions' to enforce it. Hood, representing Australia, told the British that his country had supported partition all along and saw no reason to change its policy and both the New Zealand and South African representatives agreed with him. McNeil quickly closed the meeting with the observations that Britain had 'little support from this group' and that there was now almost no chance at all of developing a concerted Commonwealth policy. He

216 Canada and the Birth of Israel then told Pearson privately that there was a good chance that the U.S. would not support the Bernadotte plan.49 Despite all the signs of impending failure, however, Britain stuck to its course and the day after the meeting with Commonwealth delegates, introduced a resolution into the First Committee 'designed to implement the Bernadotte proposals.' It called for the establishment of a conciliation commission that would set the boundaries in Palestine according to Bernadotte's recommendations and carry out his other suggestions such as the repatriation of the Arab refugees. 50 The United States and other countries soon responded with amendments designed to separate the Conciliation Commission from the Bernadotte plan. Pearson supported the United States; his speech to the First Committee on 22 November laid out Canada's position. He began with a general review of the reasons why Canada had supported partition and he defended that decision as the only one possible at the time. He admitted, however, that the expectations of the pro-partition group at the UN had been 'too optimistic' and that 'the conditions which would have made [peaceful partition] possible did not exist.' It had become necessary to make adjustments in the November 1947 plan, he observed, but those adjustments had been 'confused and, all too frequently, violent.' Now the UN would have to take action once again and Pearson laid out the basic conditions which he believed had to be accepted if peace was to be 'restored and maintained.' These were the emergence of an independent Jewish state; the failure of an independent Arab state to emerge; the absolute necessity that 'territorial and political adjustments' of the partition decision be made 'by the people of [Palestine] themselves,' either directly or through mediation; and the need to ensure that the 'further process of settlement' be peaceful. This statement became the basis for Canadian policy on the ArabIsraeli conflict for years to come. It clearly stated the Canadian belief that a peace settlement could not, and should not, be imposed on Arabs and Israelis and that it was, instead, 'the people who live in that area' who would have to work out 'the terms of their own association.' Pearson stressed that the acceptance of this analysis placed heavy responsibilities on Arabs and Israelis. The Arabs would have to accept the reality of the emergence of a Jewish state and admit their failure to destroy that state, while the Israelis would have to accept the principle of compromise built in to the 29 November 1947 partition resolution and place 'self-imposed limits' on their demands. Pearson then turned to the immediate task facing the UN. Although he genuflected towards

217 'Half a loaf the British position, and called their draft resolution 'a good basis of discussion/ he clearly supported the U.S. in calling for a broadening of the proposed scope of operations of the Conciliation Commission and seeking to limit that commission's need to follow the Bernadotte guidelines. Pearson suggested that the Conciliation Commission's primary function should be 'to initiate negotiations' which should take into account 'the November 29th resolution and the Mediator's Report as well as the situation ... in Palestine under the truce.' 51 The Pearson speech marked Canada's return to an independent policy on the Palestine question. True, it resembled the approach of the United States. But it had not resulted from a mania for walking in American footsteps. Pearson had decided, quite simply, that the results of the war in Palestine combined with the political realities which then prevailed in Washington made any other course unrealistic and he aimed to get the UN, and Canada's allies, back on track as quickly as possible. Since there was no chance at all that the United States would be won over to Britain, it was clear that the British would have to be dragged over to the United States and that Canada had a definite national interest in helping to do the dragging. The best way to do this was to get the British to stop trying to impose settlements on Palestine which the Americans would not, and could not, agree to. If there was to be a settlement, therefore, the Arabs and the Israelis were best left to do it themselves. If they could not, at least the Security Council could keep an uneasy peace, which was better than a continuing war. It is hard to know if Pearson truly believed that negotiations between Arabs and Israelis would produce a settlement, but it is clear that he was convinced that the UN could not impose one at that stage. The Bernadotte plan was now in its death throes. The British had little support. The Arabs and their allies, the Israelis and their allies, the United States, most of the Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union and its client states were all opposed to any imposition of the Bernadotte plan on Palestine. By the time the British resolution was reported out of the First Committee on 4 December, it had been changed so much that it bore little resemblance to its original version. The resolution was then debated in the General Assembly: it proposed a Palestine conciliation commission to consist of three states which would assume the functions once exercised by Bernadotte. The office of the mediator was to be terminated while the Commission would be requested to begin its work at once towards bring about a settlement. The resolution instructed Arabs and Israelis to place Jerusalem under a

218 Canada and the Birth of Israel permanent international regime and to arrange for the return of the Arab refugees to their homes. This resolution was supported by the United States, most of the Commonwealth (including Canada), and Latin America, but it was opposed by the Soviet Union and the Arab countries. Britain, finally recognizing reality, voted in favour of it, and it passed by more than a two-thirds margin on 11 December.52 Before the close of the session, the United States, France, and Turkey were named to the commission. In the months and years ahead the Palestine Conciliation Commission made no more progress towards a full peace than Bernadotte, Bunche, or all the people, agencies, and commissions that had preceded it had done. IX

On 26 November 1948 Moshe Shertok called on Pearson to inform him that Israel intended to apply to the Security Council for UN membership in the near future and to ask for Canadian support. Pearson replied that he would refer the matter to Ottawa and told Shertok that it would be easier for Canada to support the application once the General Assembly had completed its work on Palestine, especially if Israel accepted the General Assembly resolutions. When he asked for the cabinet's views, he reminded Claxton that a Canadian vote in favour of Israel's admission to the UN would mean that Canada now recognized Israel and that further action in this regard would probably not be necessary for the present. Pearson favoured Israel's admission to the UN, especially if Israel accepted and pledged to implement whatever emerged from the General Assembly.53 Israel, however, did not wait for the General Assembly. On 29 November 1948 - one year to the day after the partition vote - Israel made its application to the Security Council for admission to the UN. The move was premature. Several council members, especially France, were somewhat unnerved by the application and decided to defer action until after the General Assembly had completed its work on the British resolution; R.G. Riddell, representing Canada, supported them.54 On Friday morning, 10 December, Pearson again met Shertok to discuss Israel's application for UN membership. By that time the First Committee had completed its work on the British resolution and the General Assembly was on the verge of voting on it (it passed the next day). Pearson told Shertok that if the General Assembly passed the resolution by more than a two-thirds majority. Canada would 'vote for

219 'Half a loaf [Israel's] admission to [the] United Nations.' When the Assembly adopted the Palestine resolution by slightly more than a two-thirds majority on the following day, the Israeli delegation concluded that Canada's vote in the Security Council 'was ... definitely clinched.'55 Riddell came to the same conclusion and prepared to vote in favour of Israel's application when it came before the council on 15 December (Pearson had left Paris for London on his way back to Ottawa). In Ottawa, Claxton agreed with Pearson and Riddell that 'it would not be advisable for the Canadian Delegation on the Security Council to be in the position of preventing the Security Council from approving Israeli membership by our vote alone.'56 When the council met on 15 December the French representative pressed for a further postponement of two days claiming that his government had not yet given him instructions while Cadogan submitted a draft resolution seeking an indefinite postponement. Canada had little choice but to support the French request, which most of the council agreed with. 57 Riddell was not upset by the delay but he and Pearson were growing concerned about the position that Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate, was taking on Israel's admission; Malik appeared to be calling for Israel's admission to the UN with the boundaries described in the 29 November 1947 partition resolution. Riddell and Pearson discussed this over the telephone on 16 December. There is no record of their conversation, but when the French got in touch with Charles Ritchie of the Canadian delegation after Pearson and Riddell had spoken, they mentioned that they might seek a further postponement until January 1949, and Ritchie told them that Canada would support them.58 The Security Council met again on Friday, 17 December. The French, counting on Canadian support, sought a one-month's postponement of the vote on Israel's application. The Canadian concern over the Soviet position on Israel's boundaries emerged strongly in Riddell's speech backing the French request. He told the council that Canada would have liked to move immediately on the Israeli application but was finding it 'more difficult than ... expected' because of the boundary question. Riddell asked Malik if the Soviets were prepared to force Israel to withdraw from those areas not assigned to them by the 29 November 1947 UN resolution and whether the USSR was equally ready to enforce the other conditions of that resolution such as the creation of an Arab state and an economic union. He reiterated the point Pearson had made to the First Committee on 22 November:

220 Canada and the Birth of Israel assembly resolutions were recommendations only and a settlement in Palestine must be one 'on which agreement amongst the parties must be reached.' Canada did not want to postpone the Israeli application indefinitely, he claimed, but it now wanted an opportunity to give the question 'more careful consideration.'59 Malik did not try to ease Riddell's fears. Riddell voted in favour of the French resolution and abstained on a British resolution to postpone action indefinitely and a Syrian resolution to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. All three motions were defeated. Finally the vote was taken on Israel's application for membership. The United States, the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Argentina, and Colombia voted in favour; Syria voted against; and Canada, China, France, Britain, and Belgium abstained. The application did not receive the necessary seven votes and was lost.60 The Israelis were furious at Canada. Shertok called the Canadian abstention 'a definite breach of promise' (referring to Pearson's assurances of support on 10 December) and an 'unexpected sin.'61 Michael Comay wrote Pearson a personal note to express his 'surprise and disappointment' and to remind him of the support he had previously promised.62 There can be no doubt that Riddell abstained at Pearson's instructions nor that those instructions were his alone to give following the cabinet's 1 December decision, reaffirmed by St Laurent on 15 December, that Pearson should make the final decision. Pearson's own explanation to Comay centred on the boundary matter. The difficulties encountered by the Canadian delegation on 17 December were, he maintained, 'genuine, and ... unforeseeable.' The Soviet view on the legality of the partition boundaries 'perplexed' him, he wrote Comay, because it appeared to give a 'new and ... entirely wrong significance to the acceptance of Israel's application for membership in the United Nations.' Canada had, therefore, tried to get more time to clarify the issue and when it could not, 'it had no alternative other than to abstain.'63 Comay might have wondered why the United States had not had the same degree of concern. Pearson was undoubtedly anxious to some degree about boundaries but he was also worried about something else. When he had arrived in London for talks with Bevin on his way home to Ottawa, the British foreign secretary had told him that Israel's admission to the UN would prejudice secret negotiations, then in progress with the United States and Trans Jordan, aimed at gaining American recognition of Trans-

221 'Half a loaf Jordan and support for its admission to the UN in return for similar British action regarding Israel. This conversation, together with his concerns about the Soviet view on boundaries, prompted him to instruct Riddell to abstain.64 Pearson had made his promises to the Israelis, but Bevin's concerns were obviously more important to him than his word to Shertok. X

The question of Canadian recognition of Israel remained. There was no longer any reason to delay it and Pearson had called for such action in his 22 November statement to the First Committee. At the 21 December cabinet meeting Pearson explained that de facto recognition of Israel (as opposed to Israeli admission to the UN) 'would not... embarrass the UK government nor prejudice the United Kingdom negotiations with Trans-Jordan.' There were also strong signs that Britain itself was ready to extend de facto recognition to Israel in the near future. 65 (There was still no question of de jure recognition, which would have implied that Canada recognized Israel as a state with definite boundaries and which would have committed Canada to support an Israeli application for UN membership.) Pearson therefore proposed, and the cabinet agreed, that quick action be taken. On 24 December 1948 Canada extended de facto recognition to the State of Israel.66 Canadian Zionists were overjoyed.67 Shertok, still smarting from Canada's 17 December abstention, thought that 'half a loaf was better than 'no bread' but was not personally prepared to accept the de facto recognition as 'compensation' for the abstention.68 In Canberra, Australia, the Canadian high commissioner handed the Australian acting minister of state for external affairs a copy of Canada's message to Shertok. He read it carefully, and then commented: 'This is important but it was inevitable.'69 In later years, Elizabeth MacCallum remained convinced that Canadian recognition of Israel was hurried along by the Zionist lobby and may have been Pearson's payment to them for Canada's abstention on the Security Council.70There is, however, no evidence to back up this suspicion, and Pearson never mentioned it to the cabinet as a reason for his recommendation. The evidence actually points the other way. By early August 1948 it was certainly clear to St Laurent that Canada would recognize Israel at some point because Canada had supported partition and it would not have been consistent to do otherwise. But

222 Canada and the Birth of Israel the time and place of that recognition was another matter and was determined by the eccentricities of Mackenzie King as well as by the necessities of Canadian diplomatic interests as interpreted by St Laurent and Pearson. It was totally outside the hands of the Zionist lobbyists. In pushing for Canadian recognition of Israel and Canadian support for Israel's admission to the UN, the Zionist lobby was no more successful than it had been in the previous eight years of effort.

10

'A gesture of confidence'

On the day the Security Council failed to approve Israel's application for membership in the United Nations, Israel's southern front commander, Yigal Allon, discovered the key to Egyptian defences in the north-western Negev. Egypt had refused to negotiate with Israel, as called for in the Security Council's 16 November resolution, and the real decisions about boundaries would be made on the battlefield. Israeli military leaders, therefore, placed a large force at Allon's disposal and instructed him to mount a final assault to expel the Egyptians from Palestine. On 17 December 1948, while poring over an archaeological guide to the Holy Land, Allon discovered a long-forgotten road that bypassed Egyptian defences at the village of al-Auja, approximately sixty kilometres south of Gaza and just inside the PalestineEgyptian frontier. He chose this for his main axis of attack for the Israeli forces. Israeli gunners began to shell Egyptian positions near Gaza on the afternoon of 22 December and Israeli columns began to advance toward the Mediterranean. The Egyptians on the coast prepared to defend themselves but the Israeli move was a feint; the main Israeli force attacked south-west from Beersheba. Within days the Israelis had captured al-Auja and pushed on to assault Abu Ageila and other towns inside Egypt. They then began to swing north, to cut the Egyptians off from their supply sources, and drove to the gates of al-Arish, a major Egyptian air base in the eastern Sinai.l On 28 December the Security Council was called into session to take action over the renewed fighting in Palestine. The Canadian delegation was instructed to support any resolution that the British and Americans could agree upon, no matter how strongly worded, but to steer clear, if at all possible, of voting in favour of sanctions.2 On 29

224 Canada and the Birth of Israel December a British resolution was passed which contained no direct references to sanctions but, instead, called for an immediate cease-fire and the implementation of the Security Council resolutions passed 4 November and 16 November. Canada voted for the resolution even though the United States abstained (the U.S. delegation had not received instructions).3 Britain's resolution was weak but British resolve was not. If it could not get the Security Council to take quick and effective action, it would do so itself. On 30 December the British informed the United States and Commonwealth governments that they intended to send troops to Trans Jordan, were considering the resumption of arms shipments to the Arabs, and would intervene in the Sinai fighting on behalf of Egypt if the Egyptian government called for British aid under the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty (this stipulated that Britain would help defend Egypt in case of attack). 4 The Americans were shocked. They urged the UK government not to resume arms shipments or to intervene in Egypt but they also sent a strong message to the Provisional Government of Israel outlining Britain's intentions and demanding that Israel withdraw from the Sinai. The Americans threatened that a continuation of Israel's presence in Egypt would prompt the United States 'to undertake a substantial review of its attitude towards Israel.'5 The Israelis admitted their troops were operating in Egypt but maintained those operations were 'tactical' only and implied that they would be withdrawn once the Egyptians were forced out of Palestine. Ben Gurion was very perturbed by the American action but he realized the danger of defiance and ordered Allon to pull back. Allon, under protest, agreed and instructed his forces to withdraw from the Sinai and concentrate around Rafah, near the coast on the Palestine-Egypt border, to prepare to capture the town and cut the main Egyptian supply lines to Gaza and the north-western Negev. 6 The Egyptians, however, had had enough. On 6 January they informed Ralph Bunche that they would cease fire within twenty-four hours and send a delegation to Rhodes for armistice talks if the Israelis took the pressure off Rafah. Ben Gurion agreed despite the entreaties of his commanders and by nightfall on 6 January it looked as if the first Arab-Israeli war was finally ending.7

I The Royal Air Force had flown regular photo reconnaisance missions over Israeli territory from the start of the war until November 1948

225 'A gesture of confidence' when an Israeli fighter shot down a high-flying Mosquito light bomber on its picture-taking run over Israel. The Israelis played down the incident - they wanted no direct confrontation with Britain - and the British government was not anxious to advertise the encounter. But on 7 January 1949 another armed confrontation took place between the two countries and, this time, no one took the trouble to hide it. On the morning of 7 January four British fighters flying from an RAF base at Deversoir, Egypt, flew a low-level armed reconnaisance mission over Israeli positions near Rafah. It was foolhardy to send British fighters to an area in which Egyptian fighters of the same type regularly flew strafing runs and the four RAF aircraft were shot down by Israeli fighters and anti-aircraft gunners. When more British planes were sent out to look for the missing fighters later in the day, one more British aircraft fell to Israeli guns.8 Thus, as the Israelis and Egyptians put the cease-fire into effect, an outraged British government threatened retaliation and put air units around the eastern Mediterranean on the alert. The following day the British landed a battalion-size force at Aqaba on the southern tip of Transjordan.9 Hume Wrong and Norman Robertson were puzzled by Britain's belligerence. Wrong thought that an end to the war was finally in sight and that 'if handled properly' the State of Israel could become a useful and friendly ally of the Western Powers which would help resist Soviet penetration in the area. The real question at that point, he believed, was whether there was 'greater danger of Soviet penetration with Israel friendly to and supported by the west... or with Israel deprived of all or part of the Negeb [sic] and hostile towards the Western Powers.'10 Robertson agreed. He thought Britain had 'everything to lose and nothing to gain' by clinging to its crumbling military alliances with the Arabs in the face of Israel's new military power.11 The opposition to Britain's policies was also strong in Britain. Churchill attacked the government for allowing British aircraft to fly through a combat zone, while the Economist, an influential weekly magazine which generally supported Bevin's approach to the Palestine question, called the latest British moves 'incomprehensible.'12 It was time for Bevin to recognize reality in Palestine; the aircraft incident and the landing of British troops threatened to change the complexion of the conflict in a major and dramatic way. Bevin had followed his anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli course in the pursuit of Britain's national interests as he saw them, but he had clearly pushed too far and now the pursuit itself endangered Britain's interests. In the third week of January, Bevin made 'a very abrupt... change in course,' in the

226 Canada and the Birth of Israel words of U.S. diplomat Robert McClintock, and moved closer to the position that United States and United Kingdom strategic interests in the region could best be founded on a friendly Israel.13 He concluded an agreement with the Americans to extend de facto recognition to Israel if the United States would recognize Transjordan. Truman accepted and on 29 January the Foreign Office made the announcement after notifying the Commonwealth governments.14 New Zealand followed suit immediately and Australia within a few days.15 The Israeli-Egyptian talks on Rhodes began slowly and with great difficulty but, under Bunche's guidance, both sides moved towards an agreement. It was signed on 24 February 1949 and was soon followed by other armistice agreements concluded between Israel and Lebanon (23 March) and Israel and Syria (20 July). Negotiations between Israel and Transjordan were more complex. Israel tried to pressure King Abdullah to agree to changes in the demarcation line that would give Israel more of a hold in the hills of Samaria overlooking the coastal plain. Abdullah agreed and as the negotiators haggled in public on Rhodes, Israelis and Transjordanians met in secret in Jerusalem and Amman and worked out an agreement which included the transfer of small pieces of territory from one country to the other. This agreement was then sent to Rhodes to form the basis of the Israeli-Trans Jordan armistice. All these armistice agreements were intended by Bunche and the Israelis to pave the way to full peace. The hope proved to be in vain although they came close to success in the case of Transjordan. A peace treaty between Transjordan and Israel was worked out and initialled by both sides, but Abdullah did not submit it to his parliament quickly enough. He was too interested in completing his annexation of Judea and Samaria (the intended heartland of Arab Palestine), and he was assassinated by a follower of the mufti before the agreement could be signed.16 II

In early February 1949 the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Eliahu Epstein, visited Ottawa to promote Canadian-Israeli trade, sound out the Canadian government on the exchange of consular representatives, and determine Canada's reaction to a renewed Israeli application for UN membership. Escott Reid planned to use the occasion to tell Epstein that the Canadian government had been upset about the Israeli attack against the Egyptians in December 1948 and

227 'A gesture of confidence' that Israel could not automatically count on Canadian support, either for aid or for admission to the United Nations, unless Israel cooperated more fully in the peace-making process on issues such as the internationalization of Jerusalem and the repatriation of the Arab refugees. Reid wanted Pearson to tell the Israelis that Canada would be happy to co-operate with Israel but that such co-operation could not be one-sided.17 Epstein's visit was a mixed success. He spoke to the minister of finance, Douglas Abbott, about the possibility of concluding barter arrangements between Canada and cash-poor Israel, but Abbott emphatically rejected the idea which was contrary to Canadian trade practices. When Epstein asked about the possibility of Canada extending credits to Israel, Abbott claimed it was too early to discuss this subject 'in any form.' Epstein was, naturally enough, 'rather discouraged' by the meeting, but his conversation with Reid was even worse. He found Reid 'extremely unfriendly.' Reid apparently accused Israel of undermining the Security Council's decisions and was 'very critical' of the Israeli position on the Arab refugee question. He claimed that Canada's de facto recognition of 24 December 1948 did not automatically imply that Canada would support Israeli membership in the UN. Epstein 'emphatically rejected' Reid's accusations and told him that he was surprised 'to find such an attitude in the department of a Government considered friendly to Israel.' According to Epstein Reid was taken aback and tried to smooth things over; he told Epstein that he only wanted to warn Israel 'in a friendly way' about problems it would face at the UN.18 Later in the day Epstein met Pearson, who was 'rather apologetic' about the Canadian abstention on 17 December. Pearson claimed that if he had been in Paris 'he might still have been able to do something to straighten things out.' (He did not tell Epstein that the final decision on the vote had been his whether he had been in Paris, London, or Ottawa.) Pearson reassured Epstein that there would be no repeat performance as long as the situation in the Middle East remained stable; Canada would support Israel's application for UN membership. He also told Epstein that Escott Reid did not represent the views of the Department of External Affairs and that Epstein 'should completely disregard [Reid's] opinion of the subject of [Israel's] admission to the United Nations.' This was good news for the Israelis but it was tempered by Pearson's coolness to the idea of establishing official relations between Canada and Israel through an exchange of consuls. Full diplomatic re-

228 Canada and the Birth of Israel lations would be set up as soon as possible, Pearson said, but only 'at the appropriate moment.' 19 On 24 February 1949 Israel renewed its application for admission to the UN and McNaughton wired Ottawa for instructions. The cabinet decided to support Israel's admission in the hope that such action would 'encourage moderate parties and policies in Israel by a gesture of confidence.'20 McNaughton was instructed accordingly and Wrong, in Washington, was asked to pass the information to Epstein. On 4 March the Security Council passed a U.S.-sponsored resolution that recommended to the General Assembly that Israel, as a 'peace-loving state ... able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the [UN] charter,' be admitted to the United Nations.21 McNaughton made a short speech, claiming that the situation in the Middle East was now much clearer than it had been in December 1948, and voted in favour of the resolution, which passed with the support of nine countries.22 (Britain abstained and Egypt voted against.) The Israeli application was placed before the General Assembly in New York in mid-April and was referred to an ad hoc committee; it did not have smooth sailing. There was concern over the status of Jerusalem, the refugee issue, boundaries, and even the lack of Israeli action in prosecuting Bernadotte's killers. Israel faced a new and powerful diplomatic opponent in the Vatican when Pope Pius xn issued an encyclical on 15 April 1949 warning the UN not to admit Israel to membership until it was satisfied that Israel would agree to the internationalization of Jerusalem. Opposition to the admission began to build in Latin America because of the papal action, and the admission was not voted on in committee until early May. 23 When the admission resolution was finally placed before the General Assembly, Canada agreed to co-sponsor it along with the United States, Australia, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, and Uruguay. On 11 May McNaughton told the assembly that Israeli admission to the UN would mark 'a significant stage in the political growth' of Israel and that Canada looked 'forward to Israel representing and upholding those traditions of freedom and democratic progress through which the purposes and principles of [the UN could] best be advanced and to the contributions which Israel [could] make to the accomplishment of the aims of the United Nations.'24 The resolution passed with thirty-seven in favour, twelve against, and nine, including Britain, abstaining. Pearson told a Toronto audience five days later that the Canadian vote signified the extension by Canada of full de jure recognition to Israel.25

229 'A gesture of confidence' Canada's de jure recognition did not end Canadian interest in the Palestine question. In the months that followed Canadian diplomats and political leaders were called upon to make decisions about issues such as the Arab refugee problem and the internationalization of Jerusalem. Canada had first been called upon in the fall of 1948 to help provide relief for the refugees, and, although the response was rather slow and niggardly at first, Ottawa soon began to make regular contributions through the appropriate UN agencies.26 The Jerusalem issue was raised once again in the General Assembly in the fall of 1949 when the UN reaffirmed its November 1947 recommendation that Jerusalem become an international enclave and called upon Israel and Transjordan to begin putting the international regime in place. This time, however, Canada opposed the move as unrealistic despite intense lobbying by Roman Catholic groups in Quebec who insisted that Ottawa follow the Vatican line.27 Canada, instead, favoured the far more realistic solution of placing a UN commission in charge of the holy places while sanctioning the civil control of Jerusalem by Israel andTransjordan. 28 By the end of 1949 Canadian-Israeli relations began to assume an air of normalcy; an Israeli consul general was dispatched to Montreal and a Canadian trade mission visited Israel as part of a tour of Middle Eastern and south Asian countries.29 Canadian diplomatic representation in other areas of the Middle East was soon expanded and embassies were established in Lebanon, Egypt, and Israel. Canada ceased to play any direct role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, as Ottawa's attention was focused more closely on the Cold War. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in February 1949, and the invasion of South Korea by Communist North Korea in June 1950, prompted a rapid expansion of the Canadian armed forces including the permanent establishment of a Canadian military presence in Europe and the eventual dispatch of over 20,000 combat troops to Korea. At the same time, Canadian political and military leaders became more concerned about the possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack on North America and drew closer to the United States in planning and constructing air-defence systems for North America. Although the Arab-Israeli conflict continued to fester, the possibility of war in Europe and North America, and the actuality of war in Korea, captured the attention of Canadian policy-makers. Lester Pearson's international and domestic reputation was enhanced by his part in the Palestine crisis. It was not the first time Pear-

230 Canada and the Birth of Israel son had made a splash on the world stage; he had had an increasingly high profile since the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Conference in 1943. But in Canada, if not also in Washington and New York, he was perceived as having played a crucial role at various stages of the partition crisis. He received important press attention at a time when he was just launching his political career and this notice strengthened the popular view that he was a truly famous and accomplished Canadian. The Middle East was to play a key part in Pearson's career at yet another juncture. In the fall of 1956, after Britain, France, and Israel had invaded Egypt, Pearson proposed the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force, UNEF, to replace the invading troops (thus speeding their departure from Egypt) and to form a buffer between Egypt and Israel. It was not the first time that the idea of a UN peace force had been put forward, but Pearson's proposal to the United Nations General Assembly in November 1956 came at the right moment and with the usual Pearsonian flare; it won him the Nobel Peace Prize. When St Laurent retired in 1957, Pearson, a genuine Canadian hero, was a shoo-in for the leadership of the Liberal party. After the Diefenbaker interregnum, he was elected prime minister in 1963. Ill

It is somewhat ironic that the Arab-Israeli conflict proved such a boon to Pearson's career. He, like King and St Laurent, had been very reluctant to involve Canada in this complex international question in the first place. But he was not alone. No one in the cabinet or in the upper ranks of the Department of External Affairs had been anxious to intervene in the Palestine crisis; up to the spring of 1947 the Canadian government stayed as far as possible from the Palestine question. Prime ministers from Laurier to King proclaimed their support for the general objectives of the Zionist movement - invariably in front of Jewish audiences - but steered clear of giving any specific aid, diplomatic or otherwise, to those same Zionists. In fact, Canadian Zionists asked for little substantial help from Ottawa until the appearance of the White Paper of 1939 which severely restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine. The White Paper and the outbreak of World War Two marked a change in Zionist thinking in Canada and a shift to activism through the United Zionist Council's National Public Relations Committee and the Canadian Palestine Committee. Canadian Zionists wanted their government to try to convince Britain to lift the White Paper re-

231 'A gesture of confidence' strictions on immigration and approached King in 1943 after a major public relations effort. King, relying on the views of Elizabeth P. MacCallum, refused to help them. Canada had no direct interest in the Palestine question and Britain was an important ally in the war effort, to say the least. King, therefore, specifically endorsed the White Paper, and for the next four years Canada generally backed Britain's position on the Palestine question, whatever that position was. Thus in 1946 the Canadian government tried to stop the Jewish Agency from using war-surplus Canadian vessels to smuggle immigrants into Palestine although, at the same time, it refused Britain's request to admit Jewish refugees from displaced persons' camps in Europe, thereby lessening the pressures on Palestine. Canada's mildly pro-British, but basically uninvolved, position during this period was based on King's refusal to meddle in a strictly British matter and a general feeling in the Department of External Affairs that the British were doing their best to handle a difficult situation. King had had, and continued to have, many serious disagreements with the British on a whole range of issues affecting Canadian autonomy but Palestine was not such an issue. As John W. Holmes has put it: 'On Palestine [King] supported the British as if he were Arthur Meighen.'30 King's influence on Canada's Palestine policy was profound. Although he often questioned the wisdom of British policy-makers on a variety of international issues (and jealously guarded Canadian autonomy against their encroachments, real or imagined), he was usually ready to trust British guidance in matters such as Palestine which did not appear to him to concern Canada directly and in which Britain seemed to have a wealth of experience. He was certainly far more willing to trust the British on such matters than he was the Americans, and he no doubt believed that Britain alone could steer the world through the dangerous shoals of the Palestine crisis without provoking a major world confrontation. As long as King was in direct control of Canadian foreign policy, therefore, he made sure that Canada supported Britain on Palestine. The one time he was not in control, and seemed to have lost interest in this matter at least, was in the fall of 1947 when he went to London to attend the royal wedding leaving St Laurent in charge. It is no coincidence that this was the one period until after King had virtually left the prime ministership in the fall of 1948 when Canadian policy-makers independently moulded Canadian Palestine policy in accord with Canada's interests. Although King passed the External Affairs portfolio to Louis St

232 Canada and the Birth of Israel Laurent in the fall of 1946, Canada's policy did not change. St Laurent was no more eager than King had been to risk British anger over Canadian meddling in the Palestine matter and he had far more important concerns to deal with arising out of the Cold War. Thus the intense Zionist lobby effort that was redoubled after the end of the war was singularly ineffective. It did not reflect the attitudes of the Canadian public and the politicians knew it. Canadians were not generally proZionist and the opponents of Zionism had a field-day with each new report of an Irgun or Lehi attack against the British in Palestine. The Zionists were, if anything, hard pressed to hold what public support they had in the face of those attacks; Canada was, after all, still a very British country in its demographic make-up and it had just fought at Britain's side for six years. The Zionist lobby was also ineffective because of the way Canadian foreign policy was made. The Department of External Affairs and the cabinet determined Canadian external policies; the House of Commons had, and has, almost no impact on the process. Policy was recommended to the cabinet by the under-secretary of state for external affairs through the secretary of state for external affairs after it had been discussed within the department. In the cabinet the recommendations of the secretary of state usually carried the day unless they conflicted with the views of the prime minister (King, when he had been both prime minister and secretary of state for external affairs, did not, obviously, have this problem). The cabinet was, and is, a highly political body and the chase for votes never ends. But special interest groups have been remarkably unsuccessful in making a mark on the determination of Canadian foreign policy and Canadians are far more wary, and less tolerant, of foreign policy lobbying than are Americans. Thus the professionals in External Affairs are more important in the determination of policy than are those of the United States State Department. They do not have to cope with the sort of powerful rivals found in the U.S. Congress, in lobby groups, or in the White House itself, who make life difficult for U.S. diplomats. This is true today and it was true in the 1940s. It may be that the biggest obstacle the Zionist lobby had to overcome was the nature of the policy-making process itself. Canadian policy towards Palestine began to change in the spring of 1947 when Canada first became directly involved. That involvement was not wholly voluntary, of course, because Canada was manoeuvred into participation on UNSCOP by the United States. Lester Pearson did

233 'A gesture of confidence' not engineer this. He had been instructed by St Laurent to steer clear of membership on the committee if it was possible and he tried his best to follow his instructions. In the end, however, he had no choice except to bow to American wishes. He and St Laurent were, it is true, far more flexible than King would have been because they had more faith in the UN and were more willing to play a role in international affairs, but they were still reluctant to participate, for all that. This was Pearson's first major involvement in the Palestine matter and much has been written of it. He himself recorded in his memoirs: 'I must admit that I became emotionally involved in a very special way because we were dealing with the Holy Land - the land of my Sunday School lessons. At one stage of my life I knew far more about the geography of Palestine than I did about the geography of Canada.' He claimed that he 'never wavered in [the] view that a solution to the problem was impossible without the recognition of a Jewish state in some form in Palestine.'31 There is no reason to doubt Pearson's sincerity or conviction even though these words were written many years later. He did, after all, make a strongly pro-Zionist speech in Toronto in 1945. But what direct impact did this have on the making of Canada's Palestine policy from 1947 to 1950? It is inconceivable that Pearson would have pursued a policy he believed was not in Canada's interest; nor would he have pursued a policy because of his sympathy for the Zionists. When the interests of Zionism or Israel clashed with those of Canada, or with the Canadian policies established at the political level, Pearson naturally, and as a matter of course, served Canadian policy and interests first. It did the Zionists no harm to have a friend like Pearson in External Affairs, but his influence in the policy-making process was limited until he became secretary of state in September 1948 and, at that point, he changed Canadian policy not out of sympathy for Israel but because of his assessment of the realities of the situation, an assessment which jibed with that of Norman Robertson. Once Canada had been chosen to serve on UNSCOP, the Canadian government tried to keep its options open by naming Justice Ivan C. Rand, rather than an official government representative. There is no evidence whatever that Rand went to Palestine with any preconceived notions about specific solutions to the Palestine question, but there is no doubt that, while there, he decided the mandate must be ended and a partition made. The kind of partition which he favoured, however, was quite close to federation and his sympathy for Zionism was not so

234 Canada and the Birth of Israel strong as to lead him to conclude that the Jews should have a state no matter what else happened. Rand wanted a partition that would have preserved the unity of Palestine - an impossible task. And Rand's sympathy for Zionism never led him to deny that the Arabs of Palestine also had a right to a state. Rand had influence in UNSCOP - the final recommendations of the majority mirrored his views on the maintenance of economic unity in Palestine - and his vote in favour of partition was certainly important, but it is hard to judge just how much influence he had. Ralph Bunche had little regard for Rand's abilities, although this assessment may reflect nothing more than the prejudices of a hard-headed diplomat trying to deal with a high-minded jurist who was out of his element. But Rand certainly had an impact on the decision of the Canadian government. St Laurent and other cabinet members were given a decided nudge towards partition by Rand's support for the UNSCOP majority recommendations. IV

Until 1945 Britain governed Palestine without United States interference and, for all intents and purposes, American Palestine policy paralleled that of Britain despite pro-Zionist pronouncements from congressmen and presidents. Canada, therefore, could follow a pro-British policy that was also in concert with the U.S. approach to the Palestine question. But that situation clearly began to change after the end of World War Two when Truman began to take issue with Britain's handling of Palestine. The split between Britain and the United States was not wide at first but it became a virtual chasm by the fall of 1947 when the U.S. decided to support partition and Britain did not. This was directly contrary to Canada's interests, which rested solidly on the maintenance of good relations between Britain and the United States the North Atlantic Triangle. At the same time, however, the U.S.British disagreement - and King's absence from Ottawa and his apparent lack of interest in the matter - gave Canadian policy-makers an opportunity to assess the Palestine situation for themselves and to determine by themselves a course that would serve Canadian interests. They chose partition. Although it was the same solution favoured by the United States, it was not arrived at simply to keep in step with Washington. Canada's decision to support partition was strongly influenced by a belief in External Affairs, and in the cabinet, and this was the only so-

235 'A gesture of confidence' lution with enough support at the General Assembly to pass and that a failure of the UN to act on its first important international issue would seriously undermine it. Robert A. Spencer has called it 'a dangerous example of reaching agreement for agreement's sake'32 and there was certainly that in it. But what choice was there? Partition was not great but, to the Canadians, it was the best of a poor lot of options. Given the facts of the Palestine question, the only alternative to 'agreement for agreement's sake' was to do nothing. This would not have destroyed the UN but it would have damaged it. Saving the UN, or 'agreement for agreement's sake,' may not have seemed as important in later years, after the UN began to reveal its many failings and failures, but it was important in the fall of 1947 when Canadian diplomats still had high hopes for it. Besides, there appeared to be a slight chance - and it was only a slight chance in the opinion of Pearson, Riddell, and others - that partition might lead to a relatively peaceful solution. One other factor was important in the decision to support partition; the belief that the emergence of a pro-western state in the Middle East would serve western interests. It was put most succinctly by Riddell but he undoubtedly mirrored the thinking of other principals in the cabinet and the Department of External Affairs. No evidence whatever has emerged that Ottawa favoured partition in order to empty the European displaced persons camps of Jews and thereby lessen the need for the Canadian government to allow some of those Jews into Canada. Nor is there evidence that the Zionist lobby had any impact on the decision. It was made inside the Department of External Affairs, in consultation with the Canadian delegation at the UN, and approved by the cabinet. It was obviously better for the Liberal government to have Jewish votes than not to have them, but Jewish votes were still not very numerous in Canada and most Jewish voters backed the Liberals without condition anyway. Canada, therefore, backed partition on its merits and because of an awakening perception of how Canadian interests should be served. The UN'S brand of partition did not work; war broke out in Palestine the day after the General Assembly vote and within weeks the State Department began to prepare the ground for a change in United States Palestine policy from partition to 'temporary trusteeship.' The Americans could not carry the British with them because London was determined to get out of Palestine as quickly as possible and had no intention of keeping British troops there to impose either partition or trusteeship on the people of Palestine. When the second special

236 Canada and the Birth of Israel General Assembly on Palestine met in the spring of 1948 to reassess its earlier actions, the United States failed to provide the strong and purposeful leadership which might have derailed partition. Washington was reluctant to make specific proposals or, more important, commitments, and the entire American initiative stalled. King was anxious to lead Canada away from its independent support for partition and back to its traditional support for Britain. He returned from a trip to London in late 1947 convinced that Canada was meddling in affairs that were none of the country's business, that the Department of External Affairs was too ambitious, and that Canada ran the risk of involvement in armed conflict in places like Korea and Palestine. He had never warmed to the UN and he felt no particular loyalty or obligation to it. He tried to withdraw from the Korean Commission and he was determined to keep Canada as far as possible from involvement in the Palestine question. From the beginning of 1948 almost to his retirement, he kept the cabinet on course and behind Britain on Palestine; St Laurent deferred to him every time. It is almost impossible to know what St Laurent's own thinking was on this matter, but there is a good chance that he was content to let King fulminate over Palestine while the negotiations over NATO were proceeding. Although King had endorsed the start of discussions between Canada, Britain, and the U.S. which had led to the NATO negotiations, he remained deeply suspicious of such foreign commitments. Palestine may have been just the distraction St Laurent needed to divert King's attention from NATO. Pearson and other partition supporters in external affairs toed the line, while the Canadian delegation at the UN was kept on a short leash. In the end King allowed the cabinet to support the Americans on trusteeship, even though he did not trust U.S. judgment, but only after he was certain the support did not displease Britain and may, in fact, have advanced Britain's interests. It has been claimed many times by Canadians that Canada achieved a new stature and status in the world after 1945 because of the Canadian war effort; Canada is supposed to have come of age in 1945. In some ways that is true, but Canada's experience with the Palestine crisis should lead to a re-examination of how independent Canada had actually become after World War Two. Independence in an interrelated world is relative, of course, especially for a middle power such as Canada. Canada, for example, had little choice but to become involved in the Cold War because of Canada's close social, economic, cultural, and political ties with Britain and the United States not to mention its geo-

237 'A gesture of confidence' graphic location. Canada's independence in a Cold War context can only be measured by the degree of its commitment, not by commitment itself. But Palestine was not a matter of central concern to Canada as was, for example, nuclear proliferation or North American air defence. Canada could have determined its own policy on Palestine throughout the crisis but, for most of the period, chose not to. Under King's direction Canada showed as little independence on the Palestine matter as it had demonstrated during most of the crises that rocked the international scene in the 1930s. Canada's lack of independence during most of the Palestine crisis probably hurt the cause of British-American unity far more than it may have helped because an independent Canadian approach to the Palestine question might have convinced Britain to face the hard realities of Israeli independence far earlier than it did. Although King initiated Canada's swing back to Britain in early 1948, he did so with the acquiescence of St Laurent and Pearson who were willing to support Britain even when the British were clearly doing their best to undermine UN efforts to bring peace to Palestine. St Laurent and Pearson did not share King's faith in Britain but they were deeply concerned about the fate of the North Atlantic Triangle, and the negotiations over NATO and the Marshall Plan, and they believed that the u.s.-British split over Palestine could severely damage AngloAmerican unity. They too, therefore, were willing to abandon Canadian independence on the Palestine question for the sake of a North Atlantic unity which they feared might be further eroded by an independent Canadian policy. North Atlantic unity thus became the prism through which the Palestine problem was viewed and the cause to which it was subordinated. It was no longer of prime importance that the Palestine crisis be solved; it was more important that the crisis of Anglo-American disunity over Palestine be resolved. If the less important matter of Palestine was settled at the same time, well and good. If not, it could always be resolved later and, in the meantime, trusteeship might keep it on the back burner. The Canadian concern over the British-American split did not diminish after Israel declared its independence and this prompted Canada to hold off on the recognition of Israel. King insisted on not getting out of step with Britain. The British tried to stop Commonwealth countries from recognizing Israel; they wanted to strengthen their hand at the UN and in dealing with the United States. They had to twist arms in Canberra and Wellington, but no pressure was necessary in Ottawa;

238 Canada and the Birth of Israel King was most willing to follow the British lead. Canada also withheld recognition in the belief this would help the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, in the performance of his very difficult task of trying to bring peace to Palestine. Recognition, it was thought, would prejudice Bernadotte's efforts and Bernadotte became Canada's major hope, for a time, of bringing the United States and Britain together behind a common policy. Canada's failure to recognize Israel was, therefore, more than tactical at this point; it strongly implied that Canada might support a Bernadotte solution that fell short of Israeli independence. This was an extension of Canada's reversal on partition. In the fall of 1948, with Mackenzie King on the way out and St Laurent and Pearson on the way in, Canada once again began to follow an independent course on the Palestine question. This change was largely Pearson's doing. It was obvious to him by late October that Britain was failing in Palestine and that the time had come to reassess Canadian policy, to help the British see the new realities, and to bring them into line with the Americans. It had been hard, up to this point, to know precisely what the Americans were up to - there were many indications that they themselves were unsure. But it had become abundantly clear to Pearson that Truman, the Congress, and much of the American public would not support any solution to the Palestine question that did not include an independent Israel substantially like that projected by the partition plan. Pearson realized that the United States would not use economic power to pressure Israel, except in the most dire of circumstances, and would never send troops to Palestine; he recognized that Israeli military power had enforced a partition of sorts that could not be undone; he knew that Britain was out of touch with reality and drawing dangerously closer to a major confrontation with the United States over the Palestine question. Robertson had been the first to see the problem with Britain's position from his vantage point in London. Their conclusions led to Canada's recognition of Israel and its support, in the spring of 1949, for Israeli membership in the United Nations. Pearson did not engineer Canada's recognition of Israel because he was pro-Zionist. However strong his personal support for Israel may have been, for example, he did not risk endangering Britain's efforts to arrange United States recognition of Transjordan or its admission to the UN by supporting Israeli membership in December 1948. Canada's extension of de jure recognition to Israel in the spring of 1949 marked the beginning of the establishment of the full range of

239 'A gesture of confidence' normal relations between Canada and Israel and signalled the start of a growing Canadian interest in, and involvement with, the Middle East which is greater today than ever. Over the last several decades Canada has tried, not always successfully, to balance its support for Israeli legitimacy with its desire to maintain good relations with the Arab countries. This policy was, and is, consistent with Canadian interests in two ways. Israel is the only stable democracy, and the only reliable western ally, in the region and, because of these facts, the preservation of Israel remains an important policy objective for Canada. At the same time, however, the Arab countries have become an important market for Canadian goods and services - in sharp contrast to the 1940s while Arab diplomatic power in arenas such as the UN has increased tremendously since the 1940s. The result has been an expanded Canadian diplomatic and commercial presence in the Middle East and, inevitably, some Canadians have been prompted to question Canadian Middle East policy, which does, after all, take Israel's legitimacy for granted and which, therefore, calls for Arab recognition of Israel as part of any peace process. This type of questioning is narrow-minded and unrealistic. Those who are tempted to follow this approach would do well to study Pearson's speech to the UN on 22 November 1948 because the observations it contains are as valid today as they were then. V

The Middle East has changed greatly since the end of the first ArabIsraeli war: the conservative, British-allied monarchies that ruled in Iraq and Egypt have disappeared; the Gulf states, virtual colonies then, have become wealthy beyond imagination; and Saudi Arabian economic power rivals that of the western industrial countries. Britain has no presence 'east of Suez' any longer and the Suez Canal was nationalized by Egyptian president Gamal Nasser in 1956. Transjordan became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan after its annexation of Judea and Samaria in early 1950 but its once significant military power is now dwarfed by that of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. In March 1979 Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty despite harsh condemnation from a Soviet Bloc that is now bitterly hostile to Israel, and from Egypt's one-time comrades-in-arms and supporters of the Palestine Arab cause around the world. It is indicative of the nature of Middle East affairs that the only step so far taken toward a final and peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict should have been condemned by so many.

240 Canada and the Birth of Israel Canada has a much higher stake in the Middle East today than it did in the spring of 1947 when Ottawa was manoeuvred into participation on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. The importance of that stake was dramatically revealed in the summer and fall of 1979 when Conservative Prime Minister Joe Clark announced his intention of moving Canada's embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Israel's capital. The response from the Arab states, the Canadian business community, and a large number of pundits and commentators was immediate and hostile; Clark quickly backed off. His gesture had been intended as a dramatic demonstration of Canadian support for Israel (regardless of how many Jewish votes he believed it would gain him) and this broke precedent. Canadian policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict is generally even-handed. If recognition of the State of Israel is taken to be a pro-Zionist or pro-Israeli act, rather than the acceptance of reality, then Canada is, and has been from at least December 1948, 'pro-Israeli.' But if 'pro-Israeli' is measured by other yardsticks such as a consistent and one-sided championing of the Israeli position in diplomatic arenas, a generous extension of aid to Israel at the expense of aid to the Arab countries, the donation or sale of weaponry to Israel and the refusal to make arms available to the Arabs, or hostility to the general aspirations of the Arabs and refusal to maintain good relations with them, then Canada is no more 'pro-Israeli' than it is 'proBrazilian.' For many years Canadian leaders believed Canada had no interest in the Palestine question but that belief began to change in the fall of 1947 when the decision was made to support partition. That decision was made within a Cold War context; the national interest as interpreted by the Department of External Affairs and by the cabinet was to be served by solving the Palestine conflict without a Great Power confrontation or a rupture in British-U.S. relations and by the establishment of a pro-Western democracy in the region. Some of these imperatives changed in the months and years to come and some of the tactics and specific details of Canadian policy changed as well. But in general the overall Canadian approach has been remarkably consistent since the fall of 1948. It is based on the belief that a solution to the ArabIsraeli conflict should not be imposed from the outside, that the conflict must be resolved without war, and that it can only be resolved, permanently, through negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries. It is really a very simple policy, unremarkable and not very novel. But in the upside-down world of the Middle East it is still beyond reach.

Notes

CanDelUN CCF Papers CCG, NY CfCA CZA DBA Files

Canadian permanent delegate to the United Nations Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Papers Canadian Consulate General, New York Canadian Jewish Congress Archives, Montreal Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem Department of External Affairs Files (at the department) DBA Records Department of External Affairs Records (at the PAC) FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States Hansard Canada, House of Commons Debates 101 'Inter-office Information,' Canadian Jewish Congress ISA Israel State Archives, Jerusalem NAW National Archives, Washington PAC Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa PRO Public Records Office, London SSEA Secretary of state for external affairs UNSCOP United Nations Special Committee on Palestine PREFACE 1 Tareq Y. Ismael, 'Canada and the Middle East,' 267 2 S. Bessin and D. Kaufman, Canada-Israel Friendship, 9 INTRODUCTION

1 Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill, 21-2 2 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 267-75

242 Notes to pages 5-20 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Ibid., 419-20 Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel, 107-10 Antonius, 285-6, 437-9 Ibid., 441 Sachar, 180 Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle, 30 See ibid., 43-69, for the story behind the White Paper. Sachar, 229-36, 247-8 Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, 57ff The violence is well documented in }. Bowyer Bell, Terror out of Zion. Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948, 31 Sachar, 262-4 Ibid., 270-8 CHAPTER 1

1 Ottawa Journal, 4 July 1922 2 Zachariah Kay, Canada and Palestine, 41-3, 58-60 3 PAC, Department of Trade and Commerce Records RG 20, vol 1415, file 301. Treasury Board minute of 1 October 1930; Payne to Barre, 10 October 1930; Wilgress to Parmelee, 25 May 1932 4 Ibid., vol 1029, file 18:195, Rosenberg to Euler, 9 January 1936; Euler to Rosenberg, 11 January 1936 5 Kay, 66 6 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, vol 2, 197-8 7 Kay, 17-30; Canadian Jewish Congress, Congress Bulletin February/March 1945, 2 8 Kay, 83 9 Interview with Judge Harry Batshaw (July 1980) 10 I.M. Abella and H. Troper, 'The Line Must Be Drawn Somewhere' 11 John English, The Decline of Politics, 153-4 12 PAC, MG 28, iv, I, CCF Papers, vol 166, Woodsworth to Cheifetz, 12 March 1935 13 Ibid., Cheifetz to Woodsworth, 17 May 1935 14 Ibid., Woodsworth to Cheifetz, 18 May 1935 15 Ibid., vol 165, Woodsworth to Orliffe, 24 October 1938 16 Ibid., Orliffe to Lewis, 7 November 1938 17 Ibid., vol 168, Lewis to Wiseman, 15 September 1943; David Lewis, The Good Fight, 19, 31, 227 18 PAC, MG 32 B5, Claxton Papers, vol 220, Claxton Memoirs, 503-6

243 Notes to pages 20-6 19 Interview with Senator Lazarus Phillips (July 1980); Peter C. Newman, Bronfman Dynasty, 52-3 20 Phillips interview 21 Batshaw interview 22 Interviews with the Hon. Paul Martin (August 1979), Hon. Jack Pickersgill (July 1980), Moe Appel (June 1979) 23 Pickersgill interview 24 Lita-Rose Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf, 132, 140-1; Abella and Troper, 'The Line Must Be Drawn/ 179, 188-9 25 CZA, Zionist Organization of Canada Minutes and Correspondence, file S5-786, Minutes of United Zionist Council Meeting of 8 April 1941 26 CJCA, Palestine Collection, 'A Proposal for a Canadian Palestine Committee' 27 Ibid. 28 CZA, Files of the Political Department, file S25-1998 'Summary of Report Delivered by Harry Batshaw K.C. ... at the 27th Convention of the Zionist Organization of Canada' 29 CZA, Zionist Organization of Canada Minutes and Correspondence, file S5-786, Lauterbach to Schwartz, 9 December 1942, 2 February 1943 30 Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 8 31 CZA, Files of the Political Department, file S25-1998 'Summary of Report Delivered by Harry Batshaw ... at the 27th Convention' 32 PAC, DEA Records, RG25, cl, vol 1839, file 583/2, Freiman to King, 3 December 1943 33 Interview with Elizabeth P. MacCallum (July 1980) 34 DEA Records, cl, vol 1839, file 583/2 'Memorandum for Mr. Glazebrook ...,' 17 December 1943 35 Ibid., King to Freiman, 24 December 1943 36 CZA, Files of the Political Department, file S25-1998 'Summary of Report Delivered by Harry Batshaw ... at the 27th Convention' 37 PAC, MG 30, c!44, Samuel J. Zacks Papers, vol 1, Zacks to Schwartz, 14 April 1944 38 Ibid., vol 3, Carrel to Zacks, 24 April 1945 39 CZA, Central Office London Files, file z4-14731, Freiman to Weizmann, 31 March 1944; Files of the Political Department, file S25-7496 'Report to Members of Public Relations Committee,' nd; PAC MG 26, j4, King Papers, vol 381, file 3971 'Memorandum re Meeting of the Prime Minister with a Delegation of the Canadian Palestine Committee ...,' 7 April 1944 40 King Papers, vol 310, file F3308 'Postwar Policy and the 1939 White

244 Notes to pages 26-35 Paper/ nd 41 Ibid., 'Memorandum for Dr Gibson/ 8 May 1944 42 Minutes of the Commonwealth prime ministers meeting are found in King Papers, vol 332, file 3407 43 Zacks Papers, vol 3, Zacks to ? 21 August 1944 44 CJCA, Palestine Collection, Minutes of the United Zionist Council, 12 October 1944 45 Zacks Papers, vol 1, Memorandum re Eastern Division's Public Relations, 8 December 1944 46 Ibid., Wershof to Schwartz, 10 November 1944 47 CJCA, Palestine Collection, Press Release from the Canadian Palestine Committee, 11 November 1944 48 Zacks Papers, vol 3, Dorfman to Zacks, 2 December 1944 49 CZA, Files of the American Section, New York, file Z5-1123. Report of Herbert A. Mowat for January and February 1945 50 Ibid. 51 King Papers, vol 310, file 3308 Robertson to King, 1 February 1945 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid., 'Additions to Canadian Palestine Committee since April 1, [1945]' 54 Kay, 116-17 55 Eliahu Elath, Zionism at the UN, 14-15 56 Elath, 5-10, summarizes the situation at San Francisco. 57 John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, vol 1, 245ff 58 Elath, 38-9, and other diary entries 59 Holmes, 254 60 An early comment on this trend can be found in Lionel Gelber, 'Canada's New Stature.' See also Stacey 374ff and Holmes, 104ff. 61 Stacey, 332-3 62 Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Branch, Trade of Canada: Articles Exported to Each Country (Ottawa, 1948), 211-12, and Trade of Canada: Articles Imported from Each Country (Ottawa, 1948), 86-7 63 Figures are available in Dominion Bureau of Statistics Publication 65-007, Imports by Commodities, for years 1945-50, December issues. 64 CJCA, Palestine Collection, Minutes of meeting of the Public Relations Committee on Pro-Palestine, 3 March 1945 CHAPTER 2 1 See, for example, I. Abella and H. Troper, None Is Too Many, 190ff. 2 Abba Eban, Abba Eban, 59

245 Notes to pages 35-43 3 Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 16-17 4 Ibid., 33, 39 5 CZA, Files of the Political Department, file s2577496, 'Addendum to the Memorandum to the Prime Minister of Canada on the Jewish National Home in Palestine,' 29 September 1945 6 CCF Papers, Jewish General Correspondence 42-51, Statement by M.J. Coldwell, 2 October 1945 7 Ibid. Statement by Stanley Knowles, House of Commons, 2 October 1945 8 CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5/455, 'Canadian Public Opinion Speaks Out on the Palestine Issue,' nd 9 Ibid. 10 Department of External Affairs, DEA Files, file 47B(s), Memorandum for Mr St Laurent, 15 October 1945 11 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, part 1, Wilgress to secretary of state for external affairs, 23 March 1946 12 Ganin, 62 13 Ibid., 63 14 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, part 1, Massey to External, 2 May 1946 15 Provincial Archives of Manitoba, MG 2j, Jewish Historical Society of Western Canada Collection, 'Report of National Executive Meeting of Zionist Organization of Canada,' 12 May 1946 16 CZA, Files of the American Section, file z5 3028, Friedman to Zacks, 15 May 1946 17 King Papers, vol 310, file F3308 'Dr. Nahum Goldman [sic],' 30 October 1946 18 Regina Leader-Post, 9 February 1946 19 101, 31 October 1946 20 Canada, Hansard, 8 July 1946, 3211-12 21 Ibid., 16 July 1946, 3487 22 Canada, Documents on Canadian External Relations, 12 (1946): 362-5 23 DEA Records, F6, vol 1048, file 2-4-0, Memorandum for Mr St Laurent, 1 August 1946 24 Documents on External Relations, 12 (1946): 367 25 DEA Records, F6, vol 1048, file 2-4-0, 'Statement on Displaced Persons and Palestine,' 31 July 1946 26 Documents on External Relations, 12 (1946): 717-18 27 Zacks Papers, vol 2, Schwartz to Zacks, 23 July 1946; Montreal Daily Star, 24 July 1946, 13 28 Montreal Daily Star, 22 July 1946, 10

246 Notes to pages 43-52 29 30 31 32

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55

Vancouver Sun, 23 July 1946, 4 Halifax Herald, 24 July 1946, 6 Calgary Herald, 22 July 1946, 4 Zacks Papers, vol 2, Executive Board Minutes, Zionist Organization of Canada, 19 August 1946; Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, 12 July 1946, 199-202; 19 July 1946, 203-29; 22 July 1946, 1946, 230-58 House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, 26 July 1946, 263-4 Zacks Papers, vol 2, Schwartz to Zacks, 5 August 1946 Hansard, 31 August 1946, 5744-8 CJCA, Palestine Collection 'Memorandum on Publicity/ no 6, 12 November 1946 A.E. Prince, 'Canada and the Problem of Palestine' C.E. Silcox, 'Impasse in the Holy Land' London Times, 30 July 1946 DBA Files, file 8903-c-40c, Sissons to Burwash, 3 August 1946 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, part 1, Hudd to Wrong, 13 August 1946 DEA Files, file 8903-c-40c, 'Note for Mr Smith,' 25 September 1946 Ibid. Reid to Wrong, 15 August 1946 Ibid. Wrong to Berry, 27 August 1946 Ibid. Berry to Wrong, 3 September 1946 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, acting secretary of state for external affairs to acting high commissioner for Canada, 19 August 1946 Ibid. 'Dominion' to 'External/ 20 August 1946 Lester B. Pearson, Words and Occasions, 25-34 Ibid., 71 CZA, Files of the American Section, file zS/1298, Gelber to Goldmann, 31 October 1946 Ibid., Gelber to Goldmann, 29 October 1946 King Papers, vol 310, file F3308, 'Memorandum for the Prime Minister/ 15 November 1946 Ibid. Zacks Papers, vol 2, Schwartz to Zacks, 10 November 1946; CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5/1292, Zacks to Gelber, 12 November 1946 King Papers, vol 429, file '1947 Saber to Scythes/ St Laurent to R.G. Robertson, 11 January 1947

247 Notes to pages 52-9 56 101, 10 February 1947 57 CZA, Zionist Organization of Canada Minutes and Correspondence;, file S5787, Cheifetz to Lauterbach, 14 March 1947 58 Zacks Papers, vol 2, Schwartz to Zacks, 7 April 1947 59 101, 4 March 1947 60 CJCA, Palestine Collection, 'Memorandum on Publicity/ 25 February 1947 CHAPTERS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18

Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle, 280-1 Ibid., 278 Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 112-13 Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 97-8 Ganin, 113-14 PRO, Foreign Office Records, FO 371/G1858/E416, 'Reference of the Palestine Question to the United Nations,' 4 December 1946 Ganin, 115-17 PRO, Cabinet Papers, CAB 129/16, cp(47)28, 'Palestine: Reference to United Nations,' 13 January 1947 PRO, Cabinet Minutes, CAB 126/11, CMJ47) 6th Conclusion, Minute 3 Confidential Annex, 15 January 1947 Ibid., Minute 4 Confidential Annex, 15 January 1947 Cabinet Papers, CAB 129/16, cp(47)31 'Palestine: Future Policy,' 16 January 1947 (Annexes I and n) Wilson, 102 Cabinet Papers, CAB 129/16 cp(47)49 'Palestine: Joint Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 February 1947 Bethell, 296-7 NAW, General Records of the Department of State, RG59 (henceforth State Department Records), 867N.01/2-1247, Wilkins to American mission, London, 12 February 1947 Foreign Office Records FO371/61769/E1786, Foreign Office to New York, 3 March 1947 State Department Records, 867N.01/2-1547, Acheson to Henderson, 15 February 1947; CZA, Files of the American Section, file z4/15279, Gelber to Jewish Agency Executive, 14 February 1947 State Department Records, 867N.01/5-2347, London to secretary of state, 23 May 1947

248 Notes to pages 59-68 19 Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, 160 20 State Department Records, 86/N.01/3-2047 'Memorandum of Conversation,' 20 March 1947 21 Lie, 160; State Department Records, McClintock File, box 8, file January-March 1947, New York to secretary of state, 26 March 1947 22 DEA Files, file 47B(s) SSEA to secretary general of the United Nations, 15 April 1947 23 DEA Files, file 5475-co-40c, SSEA to Canadian Ambassador Washington, 14 April 1947; State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/4-1447, Atherton to secretary of state, 14 April 1947 24 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/4-1747, Acheson to Henderson and Rusk, 17 April 1947 25 DEA Records, F6, vol 1048, file 2-4-0, Canadian ambassador Washington to SSEA, 23 April 1947 26 State Department Records, McClintock File, box 8, file April-May 1947, McClintock to Ross et al, 16 April 1947 27 DEA Files, file 47B(s), SSEA to Canadian ambassador - Washington, 18 April 1947 28 Ibid., file 5475-CD-40c, Pearson Memorandum to St Laurent, 19 April 1947 29 Ibid., Pearson to Keenleyside, 18 April 1947 30 L.B. Pearson, Mike, vol n, 213 31 DEA Records, B-3, vol 2152, 'Palestine and the Special Assembly of the United Nations,' 22 April 1947 32 Ibid., vol 1048, file 2-4-0, Canadian Ambassador - Washington to SSEA, 23 April 1947 33 Ibid., B-3, vol 2152, Wrong to Stone, 24 April 1947 34 DEA Files, file 47B(s), 'Memorandum [on] likely procedures at Special Session ...,' 24 April 1947 35 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-40C, Memorandum for File, 25 April 1947 36 R.A. MacKay (ed.), Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954, 388-99 37 Hansard, 1947, vol m, 1999 38 ISA, Foreign Relations Files, RG 93.03, box 2266, file 24, Zacks and Flavelle to St Laurent, 17 April 1947 (henceforth Israel Foreign Office) 39 Montreal Daily Star, 28 April 1947 40 King Papers, vol 428, file 1947, CCG, NY to SSEA, 29 April (no 499) 1947 41 Foreign Office Records FO 371/61780/E5047 'Report on Special Session of United Nations Assembly,' 13 June 1947 42 NAW, RG84, Records of the United States mission to the United Nations, 1945-1949, box 107, file IO:GA: Special Committee on Palestine

249 Notes to pages 68-77

43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

'Memorandum of Conversation between Mr Raynor and Members of the Canadian Delegation/ 2 May 1947 DEA Records Al2, vol 2093, AR 35/1, part 2, CCG, NY, to SSEA, 1 May 1947 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-40C, Riddell memorandum to Beaudry and Reid, 3 May 1947 Ibid., 'Memorandum for Mr. Pearson/ 1 May 1947; State Department Records, McClintock File, box 8, file April-May 1947, Popper to Rusk, 5 May 1947 King Papers, vol 428, file 1947, CCG, NY, New York to SSEA, 5 May (no 524) 1947 Ibid., 12 May (no 555), 1947 Ibid., 7 May (no 536); 7 May (no 537) 1947 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-40c, SSEA to CCG, NY, New York, 7 May 1947 Ibid., SSEA to Canadian ambassador - Washington, 9 May 1947 King Papers, vol 428, file 1947, CCG, NY to SSEA, 14 May (no 573); 14 May (no 576) 1947 Ibid., 15 May (no 579) 1947 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, secretary general, United Nations to SSEA, 15 May 1947 King Papers vol 428, file 1947, CCG, NY, New York to SSEA, 16 May (no 586) 1947 Ibid., 15 May (no 583); 16 May (no 585) 1947 State Department Records, McClintock File, box 8, file June-July, 1947, 'Report on Special Session of the General Assembly/ 26 June 1947 Winnipeg Free Press, 17 May 1947 Vancouver Sun, 19 May 1947 Canadian Arab, April/May/June 1947, 2-3 CHAPTER 4

1 Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle, 316-33. 2 Israel Foreign Office, file 21, box 2269 'Memorandum u.N. visit with Judge Sandstrom and Mr. Simitch [sic] to Immigrant's Camps/ 18 July 1947 3 PAC, MG26 j!3, King Diary, 19 May 1947 4 Foreign Office Records, FO 371/61783, United Kingdom high commissioner, Ottawa to Foreign Office, 5 February 1946 5 PAC, RG2, 16, Records of the Privy Council Office, Cabinet Conclusions, 22 May 1947

250 Notes to pages 77-83 6 Hansard, 1 June 1947, 3708 7 DEA Files, file 8903-40c, 'Memorandum for Mr. Justice Rand/ 31 May 1948 [sic] 8 CZA, Files of the American Section, file zS-487 n, Mayrand to Gelber, 30 May 1947 9 Ibid., Batshaw to Gelber, 30 May 1947; I.C. Rand, 'Louis D. Brandeis' 10 Israel Foreign Office, file 21 box 2269, Kahany to Jewish Agency Executive, 4 June 1947 11 Ibid., file 15 box 2266, Comay to Jewish Agency Executive, 11 June 1947 12 CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5-1323, Gelber to officers of the Jewish Agency attached to the Committee of Inquiry, 5 June 1947 13 Israel Foreign Office, file 6 box 93, Gelber to members of the American Section, 16 July 1947 14 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, Canadian ambassador - Washington to SSEA, 2 May 1947 15 Jorge Garcia-Granados, The Birth of Israel, 8-15; David Horowitz, State in the Making, 162-5 16 CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5-1326, Kahany to Jewish Agency Executive, 4 June 1947 17 Foreign Office Records, FO 371, 761778, United Kingdom ambassador to the United Nations to Foreign Office, 17 May 1947 18 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/5-2247, Marshall to Austin, 13 June 1947 19 CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5-1326, Kahany to Jewish Agency Executive, 26 May 1947 20 Israel Foreign Office, file 21, box 2269, Hoo to Silver, 4 June 1947 21 CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5-1326, Kahany to Jewish Agency Executive, 4 June 1947 22 Abba Eban, Abba Eban, 76 23 Horowitz, 159 24 Ibid., 160-1 25 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/6-1147, Macatee to Secretary of State, 11 June 1947 26 King Papers, vol 428, Rand to King, 8 June 1947 27 Garcia-Granados, 41-3; CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5-3097, Special Bulletin of 16 June 1947 28 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/6-1747, Macatee to secretary of state, 17 June 1947 29 Ibid., 501.BB Palestine/6-2347, Macatee to secretary of state, 23 June 1947

251 Notes to pages 83-91 30 Ibid. 31 Garcia-Granados, 56-61; State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/6-2347, Macatee to secretary of state, 23 June 1947 32 Garcia-Granados, 59-60 33 CZA, Files of the American Section, File Z5-3092, Palcor News Agency Bulletin of 23 June 1947 34 Horowitz, 169-70 35 Ibid, 169 36 Ibid, 167-8 37 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/6-3047, Macatee to secretary of state, 30 June 1947 38 Horowitz, 177 39 William I. Hull, The Fall and Rise of Israel, Foreword, np 40 Ibid., 268-9 41 Garcia-Granados, 82-3 42 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/6-3047, Macatee to secretary of state, 30 June 1947 43 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-l-40c, Mayrand to Pearson, 7 July 1947 44 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/6-3047, Macatee to secretary of state, 30 June 1947 45 Ibid., 501.BB Palestine/7-747, Macatee to secretary of state, 7 July 1947 46 Israel Foreign Office, file 1, box 2270, Memo of conversation between Horowitz and Rand, 6 August 1947 47 A good summary of the testimony is given in State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/7-747, Macatee to secretary of state, 7 July 1947 48 Ibid., 501.BB Palestine/7-1447, Macatee to secretary of state, 14 July 1947 49 Ibid., 501.BB Palestine/7-2147, Macatee to Merriam, 21 July 1947 50 Ibid., 501.BB Palestine/7-1447, Macatee to secretary of state, 14 July 1947 51 Ibid. 52 Israel Foreign Office, file 19, box 2272, 'Evidence of Mr. Shertok before UNSCOP. 17.7.47 (Conclusion)' 53 Bethell, 323-4 54 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/8-147, Pinkerton to secretary of state, 1 August 1947 55 Garcia-Granados, 201-5 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Israel Foreign Office, file 1, box 2270, 'Meeting of UNSCOP,' Toff Memo

252 Notes to pages 91-101 of 6 August 1947 59 Garcia-Granados, 208-10 60 Israel Foreign Office, file 1, box 2270, 'Minute of a conversation between Mr. Radak and Mr. Rand on 11.8.47' 61 Bethell, 336-8 62 Garcia-Granados, 212-13; Israel Foreign Office, file 1, box 2270, 'Report on the Meeting of UNSCOP on 30.7.47 at Geneva 63 Israel Foreign Office, file 1, box 2270, Special Committee on Palestine, Work Programme of the Committee, 1 August 1947 64 Ibid., Memo of conversation between Bunche, Eban, and Horowitz, 3 August 1947 65 Ibid., file 38, box 2266, 'The United Nations Committee on Palestine Situation Report - 4th August, 1947' A.S. Eban 66 CZA, Files of the American Section, file zS-1337, 'Si' to Lourie, 4 August [1947] 67 Israel Foreign Office, file 1, box 2270, 'Meeting of UNSCOP/ Toff Memo of 6-8-47 68 Ibid., 'Conversation between Justice Rand and D. Horowitz,' 6 August 1947 69 Ibid., 'Minutes of UNSCOP'S Private Meetings on August 7th, 1947' 70 Ibid., 'Minute of a Conversation between Mr. Radak and Dr. Bunche on 11.8.47.' 71 Ibid., file 21, box 2269, Kenen to Lourie, 2 June 1947 72 UNSCOP Report to the General Assembly (henceforth UNSCOP Report), vol n, 15 73 Garcia-Granados, 225 74 Ibid., 219-20; UNSCOP Report, n: 16 75 UNSCOP Report, n: 15 76 Ibid., 16 77 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/8-1947, Clark to secretary of state, 19 August 1947 78 Foreign Office Records, FO 371, 61786/E4855, Smith to Garran, 23 August 1947 79 Israel Foreign Office, file 1, box 2270, 'Some Items from the UNSCOP Meeting of 14.8.47' 80 Ibid., Memo of conversation between Bunche, Kohn, and Eban, 14 August 1947 81 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, vol 1, 'Memorandum by Mr. Simic' 82 Ibid., 'Memorandum by Mr. Rand 83 Ibid., 'Memorandum by Mr. Rodriguez Fabregat'

253 Notes to pages 101-7 84 Records of the United States mission to the United Nations, 1945-1949, box 57, file us/A/AC. 1471-75, Memo of conversation, 24 September 1947 85 Foreign Office Records, FO 371/61786/E4852, MacGillivray to Smith, 21 August 1947 86 Records of the United States mission to the United Nations, 1945-1949, box 57, file us/A/AC. 14/1-75, Memo of conversation, 24 September 1947 87 Horowitz, 220; ISA, RG. 93.03, file 1, box 2270, 'Meeting of UNSCOP, 20-8-47' 88 Foreign Office Records, FO 371/61786/E4852, MacGillivray to Smith, 21 August 1947 89 Israel Foreign Office, file 1, box 2270, 'Special Committee on Palestine, Subcommittee Four' Report, nd 90 Foreign Office Records, FO 371/61786, MacGillivray to Mathieson, 20 August 1947 91 Israel Foreign Office, file 1, box 2270, 'Conversation with Dr. Bunche 22nd August, 1947' 92 DEA Records, F6, vol 1048, file 2-4-0, Mayrand to SSEA, 25 August 1947 93 Israel Foreign Office, file 21, box 2269, Shertok to Sandstrom, 23 August 1947 94 Horowitz, 218-19 95 UNSCOP Report, i: 8; Garcia-Granados, 242 96 Garcia-Granados, 244-6; DEA Records, vol 1048, file 2-4-0, Mayrand to SSEA, 1 September 1947 97 The sequence of events is given in UNSCOP Report, i: 8 while the recommendations of the committee - unanimous, majority, and minority - are recorded on 42ff. 98 Ibid., 47 99 DEA Records, F6, vol 1048, file 2-4-0, Mayrand to SSEA, 1 September 1947 100 Records of the United States mission to the United Nations, 1945-1949, box 57, file us/A/AC. 14/1-75, Memo of conversation, 24 September 1947 101 Ibid. 102 Horowitz, 225 CHAPTER 5 1 Abba Eban, Abba Ebon, 85-7

254 Notes to pages 107-13 2 See, for example, Globe and Mail, 2 September 1947, and 10 September 1947, as well as Halifax Herald, 5 September 1947 3 Calgary Herald, 3 September 1947 4 Halifax Chronicle, 3 September 1947 5 Vancouver Sun, 13 September 1947 6 Winnipeg Free Press, 3 September 1947 7 State Department Records, 867N.01710-47, Harrington to secretary of state, 2 October 1947 8 101, 31 July 1947 9 Congress Bulletin, August 1947, 18 10 Ibid., September 1947, 19; 101, 25 September 1947; Globe and Mail, 2 September 1947; CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5/487 i, 'Statement Issued by United Zionist Council,' 5 September 1947 11 Shertok' s remarks are pencilled on a Gelber memorandum to the Jewish Agency Executive, 17 September 1947 in CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5/485 n. 12 DBA Files, file 5475-CD-40c, Ignatieff to Pearson, 3 September 1947 13 Interview with Marvin Gelber, November 1980; PAC, MG 26 L, St Laurent Papers vol 18, file 'Palestine 1947-48,' Richard to St Laurent, 24 September 1947 14 Peter Stursberg, Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma, 72 15 David Horowitz, State in the Making, 237-8 16 Issues specifically before the UN are summarized in Maurice Western, 'Canada's Role in the Second Assembly,' 126ff. A Canadian view of the China question is that of Bruce Hutchison in University of Calgary Library, Hutchison Papers file 1.2.1, Hutchison to Dexter, 17 November 1947 17 Hansard, 4 July 1947, 5078 18 King Papers, vol 429, file '1947, Saber to Scythes,' King to St Laurent, 10 September 1947; Cabinet Conclusions, 11 September 1947 19 Interview with George Ignatieff (November 1980); MacCallum interview,- Pickersgill interview 20 CZA, Files of the American Section, file Z5/471, Confidential Memorandum from H.A. Mowat, 25 September 1947 21 King Diary, 19 September 1947 22 Ibid., 22 September 1947 23 Hutchison papers, file 1.2.1, Hutchison to Dexter, 15 November 1947 24 MacCallum interview (July 1980) 25 DBA Records, p6, vol 1048, file 2-4-0, MacCallum to Ilsley, 3 October 1947; MacCallum to Ilsley, 7 October 1947

255 Notes to pages 113-17 26 Records of the United States mission to the United Nations, 1945-1949, box 57, file us/A/AC. 1471-75 27 See St Laurent Papers, vol 155, file 100 for correspondence containing St Laurent's views: MacDonnell to St Laurent, 4 March 1947; St Laurent to MacDonnell, 11 March 1947; MacDonnell to St Laurent, 11 March 1947. 28 DEA Records, F6, vol 1048, file 2-4-0, high commissioner for Canada in Great Britain to SSEA, 3 September 1947, no 1412 29 Ibid., SSEA to CCG, NY, 23 September 1947 30 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, vol I, Holmes to Pearson, 8 October 1947 31 DEA Records, F6, vol 1048, file 2-4-0, Mayrand memorandum for the under-secretary, 10 October 1947 32 The manner in which the us decision was arrived at and the conflicts between the State Department and White House can be traced from the following sources: Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, vol n, 184ff; Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 116ff; State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/9-2247, Henderson to secretary of state, 22 September 1947; State Department Records, McClintock File, box 8, file September-October, 1947, Hilldring to Johnson, 24 September 1947; State Department Records, 'Palestine Reference Book of Dean Rusk' (henceforth Rusk Reference Book), box 1, 'United States Position with Respect to the Question of Palestine, 30 September 1947. 33 State Department Records, McClintock File box 8, file SeptemberOctober, 1947, Douglas to secretary of state, nd; Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle, 347 34 Wilson, 122 35 Jorge Garcia-Granados, The Birth of Israel, 248-50 36 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-2-40c; CCG, NY to SSEA, 11 October 1947 37 Wilson, 122 38 DEA Files, file 47B(s), Ignatieff Memorandum, 13 October 1947 39 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 6, 'The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly,' 27 December 1947 40 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40 vol iv, Pearson to Plumptre, 3 April 1948 41 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 3, Pearson to Robertson, 30 December 1947 42 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-2-40c, vol 1, Pearson to St Laurent, 13 October 1947 43 Ibid., CCG, NY to SSEA, 14 October 1947, no 1321 44 Ibid., Pearson to St Laurent, 13 October 1947

256 Notes to pages 117-22 45 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), CCG, NY to SSEA, 13 October 1947, no 1319 46 Cabinet Conclusions, 14 October 1947; DEA Files, file 5475-co-2-40c, vol 1, 'Text of a Statement Made on October 14, 1947 in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine ...' 47 R.A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO 1946-1949, 145; CJCA, Press Release of 10 November 1947 from Canadian Palestine Committee 48 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/10-2547, Lovett to United States ambassador to the United Kingdom, 25 October 1947; 501.BB Palestine/10-2847, Merriam to Henderson, 28 October 1947 49 State Department Records, Rusk Reference Book box 1, McClintock to Lovett, 20 October 1947 50 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-2-40c, vol 1, CCG, NY to SSEA, 2 November 1947, no 1525 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 DEA Records, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 6, 'The Policy in Regard to Palestine ...,'27 December 1947 54 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-2-40C, vol 1, CCG, NY to SSEA, 2 November 1947, no 1525 55 Ibid., Memorandum for the secretary of state for external affairs, 3 November 1947 56 Ibid., CCG, NY to SSEA, 6 November 1947, no 1566 57 DEA Records, F6, vol 1049, file 2-4-0, 'Text of Statement of Mr. L.B. Pearson ... November 4, 1947' 58 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, vol I, CCG, NY to SSEA, 5 November 1947, no 1550 59 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 6, 'The Policy in Regard to Palestine ...,' 27 December 1947; DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, vol i, CCG, NY to SSEA, 6 November 1947, no 1566; file 5475-CD-2-40c, CCG, NY, to SSEA, 5 November 1947, no 1551 60 DEA Records, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 6, Pearson to Holmes, 30 December 1947 61 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-2-40c, vol 1, CCG, NY to SSEA, 7 November 1947, no 1590 62 DEA Records, F6, vol 1049, file 2-4-0, CCG, NY to SSEA, 10 November 1947, no 1599 63 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, vol 1, CCG, NY to SSEA, 12 November 1947, no 1625 64 Spencer, 146

257 Notes to pages 123-31 65 DEA files, file 47B(s), MacCallum memorandum of conversation with Harold Beeley, 19 November 1947 66 Ibid., Riddell memorandum of 16 November 1947 67 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, vol 1, CCG, NY to SSEA, 17 November 1947, no 1692 68 Hutchison Papers, file 1.2.1., Hutchison to Dexter, 15 November 1947 69 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, AR 35/1, vol 3, SSEA to high commissioner for Canada, London, 17 November 1947 70 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-2-40C, vol 1, CCG, NY, to SSEA, 18 November 1947, no 1709 71 Spencer, 146; DEA Records, F6, vol 1049, file 2-4-0, 'Text of Statement by Lester B. Pearson ... in ... the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question ... November 22, 1947' 72 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, AR 35/1, vol 6, Pearson to Robertson, 30 December 1947 73 DEA Records, F6, vol 1049, file 2-4-0, SSEA to CCG, NY, 20 November 1947; Montreal Daily Star, 26 November 1947 74 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), CCG, NY to SSEA, 21 November 1947, no 1746 75 DEA Records, F6, vol 1049, file 2-4-0, 'Text of Statement by Lester B. Pearson ... in ... the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question ... November 22, 1947.' Italics in the original. 76 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/11-2147, Memorandum for the files, 21 November 1947; DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, vol I, SSEA to CCG, NY, 21 November 1947 77 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-2-40c, SSEA to CCG, NY, 22 November 1947; file 5475-CD-1-40, Canadian ambassador to the United States to SSEA, 22 November 1947 78 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, CCG, NY to SSEA, 22 November 1947, no 1763 79 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-2-40C, vol 1, Reid Memorandum for the acting under-secretary of state for external affairs, 24 November 1947; Cabinet Conclusions, 25 November 1947 80 CZA, Files of the American Section, file z5/470, Lourie to Shertok and Gelber, 25 November 1947 81 Ibid., file Z5/1341, Statement on Palestine: Rt. Hon. J.L. Ilsley, Canada, 26 Nov 1947 82 See Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 325ff; Wilson, 125-8. 83 Foreign Office Records, FO 371/61890/E11240, 'Votes of Commonwealth Countries on Palestine,' 24 November 1947; ibid., FO to United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations, 26 November 1947

258 Notes to pages 131-40 84 The final day at the UN debate is summarized in a press release summary issued by the UN Department of Public Information, for Saturday, 29 November 1947. Other accounts are in Eban, 95-9 and Wilson, 126-8. 85 DEA Records, A 12, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 3, Pearson to Robertson, 30 December 1947 86 Ibid., 'The Policy in Regard to Palestine,' 27 December 1947 CHAPTER 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

N. Lorch, The Edge of the Sword, 46-7 Ibid., 51 Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel^ 295-6 101, 1 December 1947 Canadian Arab, vol m, no 7/8/9 Toronto Globe and Mail, I December 1947 Halifax Herald, 11 December 1947 Halifax Chronicle, 3 December 1947 Montreal Daily Star, 2 December 1947 Regina Leader Post, 2 December 1947 Israel Foreign Office, file 10, box 2270, Mowat to Silver, 15 December 1947 Ibid., Lourie to Zacks, 19 December 1947; Silver to Mowat, 19 December 1947; Mowat to Silver, 31 December 1947 The letters are to be found in St Laurent Papers, vol 18, file 'Palestine, 1947-48.' DEA Files, file 47fi(s), Cabinet memorandum, 16 February 1948 Regina Leader-Post, 7 February 1948 King Diary, 25 November 1947 Ibid., 3 December 1947 Ibid., 6 December 1947 Ibid., 18 December 1947; 21 December 1947 Harry S. Truman Library, Truman Papers, Confidential File, State Department Correspondence, file 11, Truman to King, 5 January 1948 King Diary, 27 December 1947 Ibid., 4 January 1948, is typical of his daily diary entries at this time. Ibid., 7 January 1948 Truman Library, Truman Papers, Confidential File, State Department Correspondence, file 11, King to Truman, 8 January 1948 King Diary, 5 February 1948

259 Notes to pages 140-9 26 Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 13-24 27 Ibid., 33 28 A good example of current thinking in official circles can be found in Lester B. Pearson, 'Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance,' Foreign Affairs, 27, 3 April 1949, 369-78. 29 A good summary of the impact of the Marshall Plan on Canada can be found in R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, American Dollars - Canadian Prosperity, 83ff. 30 PRO, Records of the Colonial Office, CO 537/3906, Outward telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, 7 December 1947 31 DBA Files, file 47BJs), Pearson to Robertson, 12 December 1947; Robertson to Pearson, 31 December 1947 32 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/1-1948, Austin to Secretary of State, 19 January 1948 33 Foreign Office Records FO 371/68402/E266, Foreign Office to Washington, 1 January 1948 34 Ibid., Washington to Foreign Office, 5 January 1948 35 Ibid., Beeley minute, 8 January 1948 36 Ibid., Foreign Office to Washington, 20 January 1948 37 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 546-54 38 Ibid., 574-81, 600-3, 619-25 39 Ibid., 588 40 Ibid., 697 41 Lorch, 56-64 42 DEA Files, file 47B(s), Pearson to Wrong, 30 December 1947 43 King Papers, vol 310, file 3308, Wrong memorandum of 14 January 1948 44 DEA Records, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 3, SSEA to Canadian ambassador to the United States, 26 January 1948 45 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 6, Canadian ambassador to the United States to SSEA, 4 February 1948 46 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, Wrong to SSEA, 5 February 1948 47 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), 'The Palestine Issue in the Security Council,' 6 February 1948; Reid memorandum for Riddell, 9 February 1948 48 Lie, 165-6; FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 630-1 49 King Papers, vol 310, file 3308, Memorandum to cabinet, 17 February 1948 50 King Diary, 18 February 1948; Cabinet Conclusions, 19 February 1948 51 DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 20 February 1948 52 Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA, 21 February 1948 (no 232)

260 Notes to pages 149-58 53 Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA, 21 February 1948 (no 234) 54 Ibid., Memorandum to the secretary of state for external affairs, 23 February 1948 55 King Diary, 25 February 1948 56 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 657-8 57 DBA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 27 February 1948 58 Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA, 1 March 1948 59 King Papers, j4, vol 310, file 3308, Memorandum for the secretary of state for external affairs, 'The Palestine Problem,' 1 March 1948 60 Ibid. 61 DEA Files, file 47fi(s) Memorandum for the secretary of state for external affairs, 1 March 1948 62 King Diary, 2 March 1948; Cabinet Conclusions, 2 March 1948 63 Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, 169 64 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 728-9 65 Ibid., 742-3 66 Ibid., 744 67 State Department Records 501.BB Palestine/3-2248, Atherton to secretary of state, 22 March 1948 68 King Diary, 20 March 1948 69 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 22 March 1948 70 Ibid., Memorandum to cabinet, 'Palestine/ 22 March 1948 71 King Diary, 23 March 1948; Cabinet Conclusions, 23 March 1948 72 Lorch, 65-8; New York Times, 25 March 1948 73 DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 23 March 1948 74 Ibid. 75 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/3-2348, Ross to Rusk, 23 March 1948 76 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1 vol 5, 'Statement by General A.G.L. McNaughton ... on the Suspension of the Partition Plan for Palestine/ 24 March 1948 77 King Diary, 24 March 1948 78 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 5, Dominion to External, 24 March 1948 79 DEA Files, file 47B(s) 'Memorandum to the Secretary of State for External Affairs/ 25 March 1948 80 King Diary, 25 March 1948; Cabinet Conclusions, 25 March 1948 81 Records of the Colonial Office, CO 537/3906, UK high commissioner in Canada to Commonwealth Relations Office, 25 March 1948 82 Ibid., Machtig to United Kingdom representative, Ottawa, (nd); King Papers, vol 310, file 3308, 'Memorandum Received from London for

261 Notes to pages 158-67 Private Information of Mr. Mackenzie King/ 27 March 1948 83 DBA Files, file 47B(s) Pearson memorandum for St Laurent, 30 March 1948 84 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 776-7 CHAPTER 7 1 N. Lorch, The Edge of the Sword, 93-6 2 Ibid., 124 3 CJCA Palestine Collection, Palestine Information Office. Memorandum, 16 April 1948 4 King Diary, 13 April 1948 5 Ibid., 16 April 1948 6 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), SSEA to CanDeluN, 3 April 1948; Colonial Office Records, co 537/3906, UK high commissioner in Canada to Commonwealth Relations office, 1 April 1948 7 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 5, CanDeluN to SSEA, 5 April 1948, no 381 8 Ibid., 5 April 1948, no 382 (Italics in the original) 9 Ibid., SSEA to Canadian ambassador, Washington, 6 April 1948 10 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 803 11 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, vol 4, Ignatieff to Riddell, 8 April 1948. The draft trusteeship document is attached. 12 DEA Records, Al2, 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 5, Pearson to Robertson, 7 April 1948 13 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/4-748, Ross to secretary of state, 7 April 1948 14 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), SSEA to Canadian ambassador, Washington, 9 April 1948 15 Ibid., Canadian ambassador, Washington to SSEA, 9 April 1948 16 DEA Files, file 5475-CD-1-40, vol 4, Riddell note for file, 15 April 1948; DEA Files, file 47B(s), Riddell to SSEA, 9 April 1948 17 DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 10 April 1948, no 403; State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/4-1048, Austin to secretary of state, 10 April 1948 (two sections) 18 Cabinet Conclusions, 14 April 1948 19 King Papers, vol 310, file 3308, Pearson to King, 16 April 1948 20 DEA Files, file 47B(s), Wrong to Pearson, 20 April 1948 with attachments 21 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 826 22 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), Balfour to Wright, 17 April 1948, attached to

262 Notes to pages 168-73 Wrong to Pearson, 20 April 1948 23 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/4-1348, Austin to secretary of state, 13 April 1948 24 DEA Files, file 4/B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, April 13 1948, no 411 25 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/4-1248, Rusk to Lovett, 12 April 1948 26 DEA Files, file 4/B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 13 April 1948, no 411 27 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestiane/4-1348, Austin to secretary of state, 13 April 1948 28 DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 13 April 1948, no 415 29 Ibid., 13 April 1948, no 414 30 Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 137 31 DEA Files, file 47B(s), Pearson to SSEA, 14 April 1948 32 Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA, 17 April 1948; DEA Files, file 9693-40c, 'Statement by General A.G.L. McNaughton in the Security Council on April 15 [sic] 1948' 33 DEA Files, file 47B(s), McNaughton to St Laurent, 14 June 1948. This is a report by McNaughton on the activities of the Security Council, Trusteeship Council, and General Assembly from early April to midMay 1948. 34 Ibid. 35 St Laurent Papers, vol 18, file 'Palestine, 1947-48,' 'Statement by Sir Carl Berendson ... April 20, 1948' 36 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 19 April 1948, no 451 37 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR35/1, vol 5, Pearson to Robertson, 21 April 1948 38 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 19 April 1948, no 450 39 DEA Files, file 47-B-l-(s), Pearson to SSEA, 19 April 1948 40 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 5, Pearson to Robertson, 21 April 1948 41 DEA Files, file 47B(s), McNaughton to St Laurent, 14 June 1948 42 The State Department received authoritative word of this only on 23 April when a wire service story was confirmed by the United States Consulate in Jerusalem. See FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 842-3. 43 Lorch, 103-5 44 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), secretary of state for Commonwealth Relations to SSEA, 23 April 1948 45 Israel Foreign Office, box 66, file 15, Bidmead to A/A.I.G., C.I.D., 23 April 1948 46 Ibid., 24 April 1948; 26 April 1948; 28 April 1948 47 The Economist, 2 October 1948, 540-1

263 Notes to pages 173-81 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Abba Eban, Abba Eban, 105 Wilson, 138-9 DEA Files, file 4/B(s), McNaughton to St Laurent, 14 June 1948 Ibid., Pearson to SSEA, 30 April 1948 Jorge Garcia-Granados, The Birth of Israel, 278-9 DEA Files, file 47BJs), Pearson to SSEA, 28 April 1948, contains pencilled note from St Laurent giving permission to McNaughton. Ibid., McNaughton to St Laurent, 14 June 1948 Eban, 107 DEA Files, file 47B(s), McNaughton to St Laurent, 14 June 1948 Ibid. The Anglo-American-Canadian discussion can be traced in State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/5-648; 5-848; 5-948; 5-1048; 5-1148. The last two of these documents leave no doubt that, as far as the American negotiators were concerned, the British and Canadian negotiators were working together. DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 10 May 1948, no 551 Ibid. Ibid., 10 May 1948, no 557 State Department Records, 501.BB Palestine/5-1048, Austin to secretary of state, 10 May 1948 Ibid., /5-1148, Austin to SSEA, 11 May 1948 Ibid. FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 978-9 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 12 May 1948, no 559 Ibid., Pearson to SSEA, 12 May 1948 Ibid., SSEA to CanDeluN, 13 May 1948 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 986-7 Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948, 283-93 On the recognition issue see ibid., 293-4 and FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 972-83 State Department Records, 867N.01/5-1748, Robert A Lovett, 'Memorandum of Conversation,' 17 May 1948 DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 15 May 1948, no 573; FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 986-7; Kurzman, 295-6 Globe and Mail, 14 May 1948 CHAPTERS

1 DEA Files, file 47fi(s) secretary of state for commonwealth relations to SSEA, 22 May 1948

264 Notes to pages 181-91 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

David J. Bercuson, The Secret Army, 134-5 Congress Bulletin, June 1984, 24 Globe and Mail, 17 May 1948, 5 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 6, SSEA to high commissioner for Canada, London, 18 May 1948 DEA Files, file 5475-CR-2-40, secretary of state for commonwealth relations to SSEA, 18 May 1948 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093 file AR 35/1, vol 6, SSEA to high commissioner for Canada, London, 18 May 1948 Ibid., 17 May 1948 King Diary, 17 May 1948 Cabinet Conclusions, 18 May 1948 DEA Files, file 50168-40 'Palestine, Recognition of Jewish State: Policy of Commonwealth Governments,' 9 September 1948 (?) Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., File 47fi(s) 'Note for File,' 27 May 1948 Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, 175 This is detailed in ibid., 175-82 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 1008-11 Ibid., 1028-9; Lie, 182 SEA Files, file 47B(s) Memorandum for SSEA Re: Palestine, 19 May 1948 King Diary, 20 May 1948 DEA Files, file 47B(s), Canadian ambassador to the United States to SSEA, 20 May 1948 Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill, 197 State Department Records, McClintock File, box 10, Ross to Rusk, 21 May 1948 DEA Files, file 47B(s), Stone to Pearson, 24 May 1948 Cabinet Conclusions, 26 May 1948 FRUS, 1948 vol v, part 2, 1027-8 Ibid., 1067-9; DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 31 May 1948 Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948, 502 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 6, Robertson to Pearson, 31 May 1948 Cabinet Conclusions, 2 June 1948 Ibid., 22 June 1948

265 Notes to pages 191-8 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59

Bercuson, 44-9, 60-4 Sune O. Persson, Mediation and Assassination, 138ff Zacks Papers, vol 2, 'M.A. Appel Expenses for June 1948 ...' Ibid., Appel to 'Key Members of National Public Relations Committee' CZA, Files of the American Section, New York, file Z5-454, Memorandum from Sir Ellsworth Flavelle, 4 June 1948 CJCA, Palestine Collection, 'A Welcome for Israel into the Family of Nations' 4 June 1948 101, 8 June 1948; 15 June 1948 Israel Foreign Office, box 69, file 16, 'Note on Talk with George Ignatieff ...," 7 June 1948. DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 14 June 1948 contains Beeley's views as passed on to Ignatieff on 12 June. The Bernadotte Report was not issued for another two weeks. Israel Foreign Office, box 69, file 16, 'Note on Talk with George Ignatieff ...,' 7 June 1948 Ibid. DEA Files, file 8903-E-40, 'Visit to Canada of Mr. Michael Comay . . . , ' 2 July 1948 Ibid. Israel Foreign Office, box 69, file 16, Comay to Zacks, 25 June 1948; box 126, file 3, Comay to Infeld, 6 July 1948 Ibid., box 126, file 3, Appel to Comay, 26 June 1948; box 69, file 16, Comay to members of the Israeli Delegation, New York, 13 July 1948 Ibid., box 126, file 3, Comay to Eytan, 29 June 1948 DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 6 July 1948 Cabinet Conclusions 7 July 1948; ISA, RG93.03, box 69, file 16, Comay to Batshaw, 12 July 1948 Kurzman, 599-600; Jerusalem Post, 24 October 1979 Israel Foreign Office, box 126, file 2, Appel to 'Key Zionists,' 14 July 1948 Ibid., Batshaw to ? 14 July 1948 Ibid., Appel to Comay, 16 July 1948 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 22 July 1948 Israel Foreign Office, box 72, file 21 'Report of the Representative of Israel at the United Nations to the Foreign Minister, May 15-July 21 [1948]' Ibid. Ibid., box 126, file 2, Comay to Batshaw, 28 July 1948 Ibid., Comay to McNaughton, 31 July 1948

266 Notes to pages 198-208 60 101, 2 August 1948; 3 August 1948 61 Israel Foreign Office, box 126, file 2, Batshaw to Comay, 5 August 1948 62 Ibid. CHAPTER 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Lament, 235ff Ibid., 239 Ibid., 243 Pearson, Mike, i: 294-6 Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948, 627-9 Sune O. Persson, Mediation and Assassination, 192-5 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 1266 Ibid., 1363 Ibid., 1373 Persson, 195-201 Ibid., 203-9 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 1413 Ibid., 1415-6 Persson, 213 DEA Files, file 47BJG), CanDeluN to SSEA, 28 September 1948, no 58 Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA 27 September 1948, no 44 Ibid., Memorandum 'Palestine - Report of the Mediator,' 27 September 1948 David J. Bercuson, The Secret Army, 191 Ibid., 206 Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 230 Pearson, Mike, n: 6-9 Israel Foreign Office, box 69, file 16, Zacks to Lourie, 29 October 1948 DEA Files, file 47B(s), Ignatieff memorandum on visit of M.A. Appel et al, 19 November 1948 Israel Foreign Office, box 69, file 16, Zacks to Lourie, 29 October 1948 Ibid., Lourie to Eban, 29 October 1948 United Nations Archives, DAG 13, Missions and Commissions, UN mediator and acting mediator for Palestine, 1948-9, Bunche Files, DAG 13/3.3.0, box 8, Israel, part m, Eban to Bunche, 27 October 1948 DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 29 October 1948, no 294 Israel Foreign Office, box 69, file 16, Lourie to Eban, 29 October 1948 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 1535 DEA Records, A 12, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 9, CanDeluN to high commissioner for Canada, London, 30 October 1948

267 Notes to pages 209-20 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Bercuson, 195-6, 210-12 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 5 November 1948, no 338 Ibid. Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA, 21 October 1948, no 241 Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA, 21 October 1948, no 245 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 1507 Ibid., 1512-14 Ibid., 1516-18 Truman Library, Clifford Papers, box 13, Palestine Telegrams and Cables (1), Lovett to Truman, 14 November 1948 NAW us mission to the United Nations Records, box 87, Memorandum of Pearson/Jessup conversation, 6 November 1948 DEA Files, file 47fi(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 11 November 1948, no 375 Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Maybank Papers, box 5^ file 91, 'Diary/ 9 November 1948 DEA Files, file 47B(s), CanDeluN to SSEA, 11 November 1948, no 375 State Department Records, file 501.BB Palestine/11-1448, Paris to Secretary of state, 14 November 1948 Israel Foreign Office, box 186, file 5, Eban to Epstein, 15 November 1948; Clifford Papers, box 13, Palestine Telegrams and Cables, Epstein to Niles, 1 November 1948 State Department Records, file 501.BB Palestine/11-1048, Lovett to American Embassy, Paris, 10 November 1948 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 1584 Ibid., 1595-7 DEA Files, file 47B(s) CanDeluN to SSEA, 17 November 1948, no 412 Ibid., Ignatieff memorandum for the acting under-secretary of state for external affairs, 19 November 1948 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches no 48/61, 'Statement on Palestine,' L.B. Pearson, 22 November 1948 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 1661-2 DEA Files, file, 5475-CR-2-40, CanDeluN to SSEA, 26 November 1948, no 483 Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA, 4 December 1948, no 545 Israel Foreign Office, box 2414, file 19, Shertok to Batshaw, 11 January 1949 DEA Files, file 5475-CR-2-40, Reid memorandum, 14 December 1948 Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA, 15 December 1948, no 625 Ibid., CanDeluN to SSEA, 17 December 1948, no 637 Statements and Speeches, no 48/65 'Application of Israel for Membership in the United Nations,' Riddell Speech, 17 December 1948

268 Notes to pages 220-5 60 DEA Files, file 5475-CR-2-40, CanDeluN to SSEA, 17 December 1948, no 637 61 Israel Foreign Office, box 2414, file 19, Shertok to Batshaw, 11 January 1949 62 DEA Files, file 5475-CR-2-40, Comay to Pearson, 18 December 1948 63 Ibid., Pearson to Comay, 3 January 1949 64 Cabinet Conclusions, 21 December 1948 65 Ibid. 66 Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, vol 1, January 1949, 29-30 67 101, 24 December 1948 68 Israel Foreign Office, box 2414, file 19, Shertok to Batshaw, 11 January 1949 69 DEA Files, file 50168-40, high commissioner for Canada in Australia to SSEA, 24 December 1948 70 MacCallum interview (July 1980) CHAPTER 10 1 Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel, 343-5 2 DEA Files, file 47fi(s) SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 26 December 1948 3 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 1699 4 Ibid., 1701-3; DEA Files, file 47B(s), secretary of state for Commonwealth relations to UK high commissioner, Ottawa, 30 December 1948 5 FRUS, 1948, vol v, part 2, 1704 6 James G. McDonald, My Mission in Israel, 119-22; Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill, 261-2 7 Kimche, 263; FRUS, 1949, vol vi, 621 8 Bercuson, 221-3 9 Kimche, 263; DEA Files, file 47fi(s) Message from the United Kingdom Government, 4 January 1948. This note informed Canada that troops would be dispatched to Aqaba. 10 DEA Files, file 47fi(s) Canadian ambassador to the United States to SSEA, 14 January 1949 11 DEA Records, Al2, vol 2093, file AR 35/1, vol 10, Robertson to Reid, 26 January 1949 12 State Department Records, 867N.01/1-1449, London to secretary of state, 15 January 1949

269 Notes to pages 226-35 13 Ibid., 867N.01/1-2849, McClintock to Ethridge, 28 January 1949 14 FRUS, 1949, vol vi, 711 15 DBA Files, file 50168-40, New Zealand high commissioner to SSEA, 29 January 1949 and Greene to SSEA, 3 February 1949 16 A summary of the negotiations can be found in Kimche, 265-72 and in Sachar, 347-53. 17 DEA Files, file 47B(s) Memorandum for SSEA, 7 February 1949 18 Israel Foreign Office, box 2414, file 19, Elath (Epstein) to minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 February 1949 19 Ibid., DEA Files, file 47fi(s) 'Admission of Israel to the United Nations/ 10 February 1949 20 Cabinet Conclusions, 20 March 1949; DEA Files, file 5475-CR-2-40, SSEA to CanDeluN, 1 March [sic], 1949 21 S. Musallam (ed.), United Nations Resolutions on Palestine, 101 22 DEA Files, file 5475-CR-2-40, CanDeluN to SSEA, 5 March 1949 23 Some of the difficulties are summarized in DEA Files, file 5475-CR-2-40, CanDeluN to SSEA, 19 April 1944 and 22 April 1949. 24 Ibid., 11 May 1949 25 Cabinet Conclusions 18 May 1949 26 W.E.C. Harrison, Canada in World Affairs, 103-4 27 St Laurent Papers, vol 53, file I-II contains many letters and petitions from Quebec. 28 Harrison, 103 29 DEA Files, file 5475-CR-2-40, 'Israel's Membership Application,' 16 May 1949; file 10924-40, Monty to Heasman, 15 November 1949 30 John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, vol 2, 121 31 Lester B. Pearson, Mike, vol 2, 213, 217 32 R.A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs, 148

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Public Archives of Canada Department of External Affairs Records Privy Council Office Records Department of Trade and Commerce Records Department of External Affairs Department of External Affairs Files UNITED STATES

National Archives General Records of the Department of State Records of the United States Mission to the United Nations Harry S. Truman Library Foreign Affairs Files, Palestine President's Secretaries Files State Department Correspondence Files White House Confidential Files United Nations Archives Mediators Files GREAT BRITAIN

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272 Bibliography Records of the Colonial Office Cabinet Minutes and Papers ISRAEL

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Public Archives of Canada Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Papers Joseph N. Frank Papers William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary Ivan C. Rand Papers Louis S. St Laurent Papers Samuel J. Zacks Papers Zionist Organization of Canada Papers Provincial Archives of Manitoba Ralph Maybank Papers Jewish Historical Society of Western Canada Collection University of Calgary Library Bruce Hutchison Papers United Church Archives United Church of Canada Papers Claris E. Silcox Papers Canadian Jewish Congress Archives H.M. Caiserman Papers Palestine Collection

273 Bibliography U N I T E D STATES

Harry S. Truman Library Chapman Papers Clifford Papers Elsey Papers Johnson Papers McGrath Papers Snyder Papers Wolfsohn Papers GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs - Documents on Canadian External Affairs Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Branch, Trade of Canada: Articles Exported to Each Country - Trade of Canada: Articles Imported from Each Country Canada, House of Commons. Debates United Nations. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly (UNSCOP Report) United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) PRIVATE JOURNALS AND P R O C E E D I N G S Canadian Jewish Congress, Congress Bulletin - Inter-Office Information United Church of Canada, Record of Proceedings INTERVIEWS U N I T E D STATES

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274 Bibliography CANADA

Conducted by Author Moe Appel Judge Harry Batshaw Abba Eban Lionel Gelber Marvin Gelber John W. Holmes George Ignatieff Elizabeth P. MacCallum Hon. Paul Martin Hon. J.W. Pickersgill Sen. Lazarus Phillips

BOOKS, ARTICLES, AND UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS Abella, I.M., and H. Troper. 'The Line Must Be Drawn Somewhere: Canada and Jewish Refugees 1933-9,' Canadian Historical Review (June 1979): 178-209 - None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys 1982 American Jewish Committee: American Jewish Yearbook. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1945 Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. New York: Capricorn Books, 1965 Bell, J. Bowyer. Terror out of Zion. New York: Avon Books, 1977 Bercuson, David J. The Secret Army. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1983 Bessin, Shira and David Kaufman. Canada-Israel Friendship. Toronto: Canada Israel Committee, 1979 Betcherman, Lita-Rose. The Swastika and the Maple Leaf: Fascist Movements in Canada in the Thirties. Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1975 Bethell, Nicholas. The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle between the British, the Jews and the Arabs, 1935-48. London: Andre Deutsch, 1979 Chiel, Arthur A. The Jews in Manitoba. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961 Collins, Larry and Dominique Lapierre. O Jerusalem. New York: Pocket Books, 1973

275 Bibliography Cuff, R.D. and J.L. Granatstein. American Dollars - Canadian Prosperity. Toronto: Samuel Stevens, 1978 Depuy, Trevor N. Elusive Victory: The Arab Israeli Wars, 1947-1974. New York: Harper and Row, 1978 Donovan, Robert J. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948. New York: W.W. Norton, 1977 Eban, Abba. Abba Eban, An Autobiography. New York: Random House, 1977 Elath, Eliahu. Zionism at the UN: A Diary of the First Days. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1976 English, John. The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901-1920. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977 Freiman, L. Don't Fall off the Rocking Horse. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978 Ganin, Zvi. Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979 Garcia-Granados, Jorge. The Birth of Israel: The Drama as I Saw It. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948 Gelber, Lionel. 'Canada's New Stature,' Foreign Affairs, 24 (1945-6): 277-89 Gilbert, Martin. Auschwitz and the Allies: How the Allies Responded to the News of Hitler's Final Solution. London: Michael Joseph/Rainbird, 1981 Hancock, W.K. Smuts: The Fields of Force, 1919-50. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968 Harrison, W.E.C. Canada In World Affairs, 1949 to 1950. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1957 Hillmer, Anne Trowell. 'Canadian Policy on the Partition of Palestine 1947.' Unpublished MA thesis, Carleton University, 1981 Holmes, John W. The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, vol 1. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979 - The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, vol 2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982 Horowitz, David. State in the Making. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953 Hull, William I. The Fall and Rise of Israel: The Story of the Jewish People during the Time of Their Dispersal and Regathering. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing Company, 1954 Ismael, Tareq Y. 'Canada and the Middle East,' in Tareq Y. Ismael and Peyton V. Lyon, Canada and the Third World. Toronto: Macmillan, 1976 Kay, Zachariah. Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1978 - The Canadian Press and Palestine: A Survey, 1939-48,' International Journal 18, 3: 361-73

276 Bibliography Keirstead, B.S. 'Canada at the Crossroads in Foreign Policy/ International Journal, 3, 2: 97-110 Kimche, Jon and David. Both Sides of the Hill. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1960 Krammer, Arnold. The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947-53. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974 Kurzman, Dan, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War. New York: Signet, 1970 Lewis, David. The Good Fight. Toronto: Macmillan, 1981 Lie, Trygve. In the Cause of Peace. New York: Macmillan, 1954 Lorch, N. The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949. Jerusalem: Massada Press Ltd., 1961 MacKay, R.A. (ed.). Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970 McDonald, James G. My Mission in Israel. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951 Miller, Merle. Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman. New York: Berkley Medallion Books, 1974 Mussallam, Sami (ed.). United Nations Resolutions on Palestine, 1947-1972. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1974 Newman, Peter C. Bronfman Dynasty: The Rothschilds of the New World: Toronto- McClelland and Stewart, 1978 Pearson, Lester B. Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, vols I and n. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972 and 1973 - Words and Occasions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970 Persson, Sune O. Mediation and Assassination: Count Bernadotte's Mission to Palestine in 1945. London: Ithaca Press, 1979 Prince, A.E. 'Canada and the Problem of Palestine,' Queen's Quarterly, 53, 1 (1946): 64-8 Rand, I.C. 'Louis D. Brandeis,' The Canadian Bar Review, 25 (1947): 240-50 Reid, Escott. Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977 Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976 Silcox, C.E. 'Impasse in the Holy Land,' University of Toronto Quarterly, 16, 2 (January 1947): 123-32 Slonim, Shlomo. 'The 1948 American Embargo on Arms to Palestine,' Political Science Quarterly, 94, 3 (Fall 1979): 495-514 Smith, I. Norman. 'Security Council Membership - A Challenge to Canada,' International Journal, 3, 2 (Spring 1948): 111-19

277 Bibliography Soward, F.H. and E. Mclnnis. Canada and the United Nations. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956 Spencer, R.A. Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO, 1946-1949. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959 Stacey, C.P. Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, vol 2, 1921-48; The Mackenzie King Era. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981 Stursberg, Peter. Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma. Toronto: Doubleday, 1980 Thomson, Dale C. Lotus St. Laurent: Canadian: New York: St Martin's Press, 1968 Truman, Harry S. Years of Trial and Hope: Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, vol n. New York: Signet, 1965 Western, Maurice. 'Canada's Role in the Second Assembly,' International Journal, 3, 2 (Spring 1948): 120-31 Wilson, Evan M. Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979

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Index

Abbott, Douglas 197, 227; and Jews 20 Abdullah, King 181, 189, 226; position on Palestine 91 Abu Ageila 223 Acheson, Dean 58-9, 61; views on UN 63 Acre prison 82 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question 112, 115-18, 126, 128, 130-2, 138, 148 Algoma East, riding 201, 206 Allenby, General 5 Allon, Yigal 223 American League for a Free Palestine 52 American Zionist Emergency Committee 22 Amman 91 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 11-12, 38-41, 71, 80, 97 anti-semitism 15, 20-1, 29, 41, 45-6, 52, 97-8, 112, 145 Appel, Moe 193, 195-6, 207; career prior to 1948 192 Aqir air base 10 Arab Higher Committee 69-71,

73, 82, 90, 115, 118, 134, 165, 173; boycott of UNSCOP 81-2, 86; and UNSCOP Report 115 Arab Liberation Army 135, 190, 196, 208 Arab lobbying 44-5 Arab refugees 173, 196, 203-4 Arab Revolt of 1936 6-7 Aranha, Oswaldo 131-2 Arce, Jose 179 Ardalan, Ali 98 Argentina 167, 197 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 54 al-Arish 223 Atherton, Ray 165 Athlit 75 Atomic Energy Commission 150 Attlee, Clement 10, 35-6, 39, 158 Auschwitz 9 Austin, Warren 67, 71, 150, 153-4, 162-5, 167-9, 176, 179, 185, 208; pleas for cease-fire 168 Australia 68, 71, 132, 167, 170, 184, 187, 215, 226, 228; recognizes Israel 226 Austria 97

280 Index Axis 9 Azzam, Abdul Rahman, Pasha 106 B'nai Brith 16, 25 Balfour, Lord Arthur 5 Balfour Declaration of 1917 5-6, 8, 14, 22, 25, 30-1, 33, 44, 89, 96, 100, 130 Batshaw, Harry 20-2, 24, 27, 44, 197-8, 207 battle for the roads 144 Beeley, Harold 122, 142-3, 170, 175-6, 194; opposes trusteeship 143; views on British withdrawal 170-1 Beersheba 223 Beirut 89, 91 Belgium 60, 141, 150, 153, 163, 167, 170, 197, 213, 220 Belorussia 114 Bercovitch, Peter 23 Berensen, Carl 116, 170 Berlin 97; blockade 200-1 Bernadotte, Count Folke 188, 190-1, 194, 196, 201-3, 238; career prior to 1948 188; views on partition 188; arranges cease-fire 189; arranges second truce 196; assassinated 201; and Britain 202-3; and United States 202-3 Bernadotte plan 191-2, 203-5, 207, 210, 213-14, 216-17; supported by Marshall 204; supported by Bevin 204-5; rejected by Israel 215 Berry, J.H. 48 Berwick, Nova Scotia, Register 45 Bevin, Ernest 3-4, 10, 35, 59, 75, 92, 137, 158, 167, 203-4, 221,

225; and Anglo-American Committee 39; plan for local autonomy 58; on trusteeship 158; supports Bernadotte plan 204-5; moves to recognize Israel 226 Biltmore program 22, 37, 56 bi-nationalism 6, 57, 88-9, 94, 96, 100 Blom, Dr Nicolaas 79, 83, 95-6, 101, 103 Bolivia 135 Borden, Robert 14, 17 Bracken, John 30 Bradette, Joseph A. 43 Brandeis, Louis D. 77 Brazil 60, 131, 167 Brilej, Josef 82 Britain 3-5, 7-8, 13, 29, 30-1, 39, 55, 107, 119, 122, 126, 128, 133, 135, 140, 153-4, 163, 165, 181, 210, 218, 220, 228; and Arab revolt of 1936 7; and White Paper 8; co-operation with yishuv 8; and Jewish revolt 10; and Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 11; and Morrison-Grady Commission 12; and the mandate system 30; and illegal immigration 35; violence against by Jews 43, 54, 59, 87, 92, 115; and the UN 56; and UNGA special session of 1947 68; and Canadian policy 113; strategic interests in Palestine 114; policy on UNSCOP report 115; announces withdrawal 116; clashes with U.S. over Palestine 116, 146, 234; announces end to mandate 118; opposes partition 119; and abandonment of mandate 123; refuses to co-operate with UN 135, 142; and

281 Index NATO 140; and trusteeship 143, 162, 176; refuses to postpone withdrawal 165; proposes temporary commission 174; agrees with U.S. on mediator 176; subsidizes Transjordan army 181; refuses to recognize Israel 182; and Arab invasion 185; supports Arab invasion 187; shifts position on cease-fire 188; and Bernadotte's second plan 202-3; and Israeli withdrawal from Negev 208-9; accepts Bunche resolution 213; pushes Bernadotte plan 216; threatens intervention 224; and Commonwealth policy 236 British Commonwealth. See Commonwealth Bronfman, Samuel 20, 30, 135 Buber, Martin 6 Bunche, Dr Ralph 80, 93-4, 96, 99, 101, 103, 105, 142, 148, 207-8, 211, 213, 224, 226, 234; assessment of Rand 105; angered by Britain 142; and Armistice talks 226 Bunche resolution 213 Burk's Falls Arrow 52 Byrnes, James F. 39 Cadogan, Sir Alexander 122, 165, 168, 185, 188, 213 Cahan, C.H. 20 Cairo 27, 93 Calgary Herald 43, 107 Canada House, London 48-9, 77 Canadian Arab 45 Canadian-Arab Friendship League 45, 52, 72, 135

Canadian Institute of International Affairs 50 Canadian Institute of Public Opinion 41, 137 Canadian Jewish Congress 16-17, 27, 52, 107, 135, 193; and recognition of Israel 198 Canadian Palestine Committee 21-2, 25-8, 30, 33, 36, 43, 52, 136, 193, 230 Canadian trade commission office in Cairo 14 Canadian trade with the Middle East 14, 33, 239 Cartier, riding 17, 19, 20 Cattan, Henry 70 CCF. See Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Chamoun, Camille 131-2 Chanak Crisis 13 Cheifetz, Leon 18 Chile 71 China 153, 163, 197, 208, 220 Chi-Tsai Hoo, Victor 79 Christian Council for Palestine 25 Churchill, Winston 27, 30, 36, 225 Clark, Joe 240 Claxton, Brooke 52, 108, 145, 155, 200, 209, 219; and Jews 20 Clay, Lucius D. 200 Clifford, Clark 114, 131, 178 Clutterbuck, Sir Alexander 158, 182, 205 Cold War 109-10, 137-40, 146, 200, 229, 236 Coldwell, M.J. 19, 30, 37 Colombia 163, 197 Colonial Office 55 Comay, Michael S. 77, 192-6, 198, 220; career prior to 1948 192;

282 Index lobbies Canadian government 193; goes to Ottawa 194; assesses Canadian policy 195 Combined Food Board 32 Commonwealth 31, 39, 61, 68, 105, 113, 116, 129, 131, 142, 182-4, 192, 215, 224, 226, 236; Conference of 1944 25, 26; Conference of 1945 30; and recognition of Israel 183; Conference of 1948 199; members break with Britain 215; and British influence 237 Commonwealth Relations Office 158 Communism, Canadian views on 141 Communist party: Canada 18-19; Palestine 88 Conservative party 17, 20, 30 Consular Truce Commission 169-70, 175-6 Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 15, 18-20, 30, 41, 137; and Jews 19 Council of Foreign Ministers 140 Creech-Jones, Arthur 58, 115-17, 148, 174-5 Croll, David A. 44, 137, 161, 181-2; seeks Canadian recognition of Israel 182 Grossman, Richard 77 Cunningham, Sir Alan 58 Czechoslovakia 60, 69, 114, 135 Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel 177 Deir Yassin 161, 168, 173 Democratic party, and Israel 11, 36, 210, 214 Denmark 135

Dewey, Thomas E. 210, 214 displaced persons camps 34, 71, 92, 97 Dominion Bureau of Statistics 33 Douglas, Lewis W. 214 Dumbarton Oaks conference 30 Eaton, Lady 27 Eban, Abba 81, 93-4, 99, 102-3, 106; assigned to UNSCOP 80; evaluates UNSCOP 93; lobbies UNSCOP 102 Economist 225 Edmonton Zionist Council 28 Egypt 33, 167, 180, 228-9, 239 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 145 Elting, Howard 9 Entezam, Nasrollah 79, 94, 100-3, 105 Epstein, Eliahu 178, 226-8 Epstein, William 80 Etzion Bloc 155-6 Euler, W.D. 15 Evatt, Dr Herbert 112, 116, 148 Exeter Times-Advocate 52 Eytan, Walter 195 Fabregat, Enrique 79, 92, 95-6, 99, 101-3 Factor, Samuel 15, 20 Faisal, Emir 6 federalism 102-3, 117, 130-1 Federation of Canadian Zionist Societies 15, 17 Fishman, Rabbi 88 Flavelle, Sir Ellsworth 21, 28, 30, 193 Flushing Meadow 67, 109 Foreign Enlistment Act 191

283 Index Foreign Office 3-4, 35, 113, 142, 189-90, 194 Foreign Policy Association 23 Forrestal, James 145 France 5, 15, 31, 141, 150, 153, 163, 165, 167, 170, 213, 218, 220 Frangie, Hamid 90 Frankfurter, Felix 78 Freiman, Arnold J. 15-16, 22, 24 functionalism 32 Gagnon, Jean-Louis 27 Galilee 7, 102-4, 135, 144, 172, 191, 194, 196, 203-4, 208-9, 212, 214-15 Gallup poll. See Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Garcia-Granados, Jorge 78, 82, 90, 92, 94, 96, 99, 101, 103, 174 Gardiner, J.G. 30 Gelber, Lionel 50-1, 78 Gelber, Marvin 44 General Zionist Council, declares intention to establish Jewish State 172 Geneva 94, 105 Geoffrion, Aime 27 George, Lloyd 17 Germany 7-8, 97 Globe and Mail 37, 53, 136 Glubb, Colonel John 180-1 Goldmann, Dr Nahum 25, 40, 51, 56, 137, 177 Goodhard, Arthur L. 43 Gouzenko, Igor 38 Grady, Henry F. 12 Gray Foundation Lectures 66 Graydon, Gordon 30 Gromyko, Andrei 72, 132, 167-8 Guatemala 71, 118, 120, 228

Guelph Mercury 37 Guerin, Paul 27 Gurion, David Ben 22, 40, 55-6, 87-8, 155, 160, 177, 206; appears before UNSCOP 87; proclaims Israeli independence 178 Gurney, Sir Henry 82 Hadera 75 Haganah 8-10, 43, 54, 115, 144, 156, 160, 173 Haifa 89, 104, 134, 144, 172, 204; Jewish capture of 172 Haiti 228 Halifax Chronicle 136 Halifax Herald 43, 136 Hamza, Fouad 90 Harkness, Douglas 41 Harrington, Julius 70 Harris, Walter 194 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 239 Hayden, Senator Salter 27 Hayes, Saul 30 Heaps, Abraham A. 15,18 Henderson, Loy 59, 114, 142-3, 145, 167; suggests trusteeship 142; and British response to trusteeship 167 Hepburn, Mitchell 44 Hickerson, J.D. 186 Hilldring, General John 114 Himmler, Heinrich 188 Hitler, Adolf 7 Holmes, John W. 3, 9-10, 21-2, 29, 34, 37, 47, 97, 112-14, 231 Hood, John D.L. 78, 92, 95-7, 99, 102, 105, 215; abstains on UNSCOP Report 103 Hopkins, E.R. 166, 175-6, 194 Horowitz, David 81, 93, 95-7,

284 Index 102-3, 106, 109; assigned to UNSCOP 80; and Rand 84, 95; lobbies UNSCOP 102; makes plea to Rand 103; views on Canada's importance 105 House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs 67 Howe, C.D. 194 Hudd, Frederic 47 Hugessen, Senator Adrian 27 Hull, William Lovell 85-6 Husain, sharif of Mecca 4-5 al-Husseini, Abdel Kader 160 al-Husseini, Haj Amin, mufti of Jerusalem 6-7, 12 al-Husseini, Jamal 115 Hutchison, Bruce 112 Ignatieff, George 60, 64, 108, 152, 154, 171, 184, 193-4; and Comay 193-4 illegal immigration 8, 10, 12, 48, 54, 74-5, 84, 115 Ilsley, J.L. 112, 116-17, 127, 130-1, 139, 152, 154-5, 182, 194; heads Canadian delegation to UN 111; supports partition 130 India 60, 71 International Court of Justice 197 International Refugee Organization 34, 92, 98 Iran 69 Iraq 8, 33, 180, 239 Irgun Zvai Leumi 9-10, 42, 45, 89, 92, 107-8, 115, 161, 232; members hanged 91-2 Jabotinsky, Vladimir 7, 16 Jacobs, Sam W. 17, 20 Jaffa 7, 173, 214-15 Janes, Henry 25

Jaques, Norman 45 Jerusalem 6-7, 42, 96, 102, 104, 134-5, 155, 178, 190-1, 204, 229, 240; international status of 96, 102, 104, 204: siege of 144, 156, 160 Jessup, Phillip C. 177, 179, 187, 211-12 Jewish Agency 8, 22, 25, 27, 39-40, 50-1, 56, 62, 65, 68-71, 74-5, 77, 79-80, 83, 85, 87-8, 94-7, 99, 102-3, 111, 115, 118, 122, 127, 131, 136, 165, 231; work in displaced persons camps 98; and UNSCOP Report 115; lobbies for partition 131 Jewish Agency Executive 22, 80, 84, 155, 177 Jewish immigration 6, 8, 17, 22, 24-5, 58, 71, 88 Jewish Legion 5 Jewish National Home 3, 21-2, 24-5, 28, 40, 44 Jewish refugees 3-4, 8, 11-12, 15, 21, 29, 34-7, 39, 41, 44, 46, 51-2, 55, 62, 71, 74-5, 97, 99, 104, 108, 231 Johnson, Herschel V. 132 Joint Chiefs of Staff 145 Joint Distribution Committee 34, 98 Kahany, M. 80 Kastel 160 al-Kaukji, Fauzi 6, 134 Kennan, George F. 143 al-Khoury, Faris, objects to U.S. cease-fire proposals 168 King, William Lyon Mackenzie 13, 15, 22, 24-6, 29-30, 32, 37, 41, 49, 51-2, 63, 65, 70, 76, 112-13,

285 Index 129, 137, 139, 144, 147-9, 151, 154-5, 157-8, 161, 182, 185, 187-8, 199, 201, 205, 211, 230-1, 233, 236, 238; attitude to Britain 13, 24; and Anglo-American Committee 41; and Jewish refugees 41; and Morrison-Grady Commission 41; reaction to partition 137-8; clashes with St Laurent over Korea 138-9; on Pearson 149; supports Britain 151-2, 186-7, 231; fears dispatch of troops 151; fears Canadian activism 152; meets Shertok 161; refuses to recognize Israel 182; and Canadian policy 231 King David Hotel 10, 42, 43-4 Knowles, Stanley 19, 37 Kohn, Leo 99 Korea 110, 138, 229, 236; and Canadian troops 229 Korean Commission. See United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea Labour government 10 Labour party 35 Labour Progressive party 19 Labour Zionists 16, 18 Lake Success, NY 68 Lamontagne, Yves 14 La Presse 27 Laurier, Sir Wilfrid 15, 17-18, 36 League of Arab States 73, 82, 89, 90, 95, 106, 115, 127, 134; meets UNSCOP 89; position on Palestine 89-91; invasion of Israel 180 League of Nations 5, 14, 22, 30, 44, 94, 130 Lebanon 5, 15, 17, 173, 180, 229 Lehi 9-10, 27, 45, 87, 108, 115,

161, 204, 232; assassinates Bernadotte 201 Lewis, David 18-19 Lewis, J.H.C. 175 Liberal party 15, 20, 137, 230; and Jews 17; elects St Laurent 199 Lie, Trygve 59-60, 79, 83, 94, 112, 147-8, 202-4; considers resignation 154; and Arab invasion of Israel 184 Lisicky, Karel 79, 94-6, 102-3 Livingston, H.B. 9 London 3, 106 London Conference 4, 12, 54-9; failure of 12 London Times 47 Lopez, Dr Alfonso 165, 168-9; fails to arrange truce 165 Lovett, Robert A. 145-6, 178, 186, 214 Luxembourg 141 Lydda 196, 204 Macatee, Robert S. 83, 85, 87 MacCallum, Elizabeth P. 23, 26, 29, 39, 42, 51, 60, 64-5, 77, 111, 112-13, 122, 194-5, 221, 231; early career 23; and the White Paper 24, 26; and Anglo-American Committee 40; views on Zionists 40; views on partition 117; and Comay 194-5 MacGillivray, Donald C. 80-1, 99, 101, 102-3 Mackenzie, Ian 30 Magnes, Judah 6, 88, 96 Mahmoud, S. 80 Malik, Jacob 213, 219-20 mandate system 5, 30 Manuilsky, Dimitri 196 Marseilles 74

286 Index Marshall, George C. 143, 153, 203-4, 210, 214; supports Bernadotte Plan 204 Marshall Plan 140, 146, 186, 236; Canadian role in 141 Martin, Chester 27 Martin, Paul 200; and Jews 20 Masaryk, Jan 79 Massey, Vincent 39 Massoud, M.S. 45, 136 Maybank, Ralph 212 Mayrand, Leon 76-7, 81, 86, 102, 105, 114 McClintock, Robert 118, 202-4, 226 McDonald, James G. 23 McMahon, Sir Henry 4-5 McMahon letters 4-6 McNaughton, A.G.L. 149, 151-8, 162-6, 169, 172, 174-7, 179, 182, 185, 194, 196-8, 206, 208-10, 212, 228; career prior to 1948 150; speaks on partition 157; endorses cease-fire 168-9; supports Bernadotte plan 205; supports Israeli admission to the UN 228 McNeil, Hector 212, 215 Meighen, Arthur 17 Mexico 60, 167 Mizrachi 16 Moe, Finn 175 Montgomery, Viscount 57 Montreal Daily Star 43, 45, 67 Morrison-Grady Commission 12, 41-2, 55, 58 Mount Scopus 161 Mowat, Herbert 25, 28, 44, 108, 111, 136, 193 Moyne, Walter Edward Guiness, Lord 27 Munitions Assignment Board 32

Nablus 87 Nazareth 196, 208 Nazi Germany 7-8, 24 Negev 88, 102-4, 135, 144, 173, 191, 194, 196, 203-4, 206, 208, 209, 214, 224 Netanya 89, 92 Netherlands 69, 141, 167 New Zealand 31, 60, 68, 132, 167, 183-4, 187, 215; rejects trusteeship 170; recognizes Israel 226 Niles, David K. 114, 131 North Atlantic Treaty 229 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 140, 171, 186, 236; Canadian role in 140; and Palestine 153 North Atlantic Triangle 50, 141, 234, 236 North Atlantic unity 36, 50, 116, 127, 140-1, 146, 152-3, 171, 186, 217, 234, 236; and Pearson 238 Norway 60, 72, 141 O'Hearn, Walter 67 oil 8, 33 Operation Nachshon Orliffe, Herbert 19 Ottawa Citizen 53 Ottoman Empire 5

161-2

Paglin, Amihai 92 Palais des Nations 94 Palestine Conciliation Commission 216-17; first mooted 210; supported by Canada 218; supported by the United States 218 Palestine mandate 5-8, 14, 30, 46, 56, 77, 114, 118, 123, 142; dissolves 173 Palestine police 115

287 Index Palestine Post 143 Panama 135, 228 Paris Peace Conference of 1946 38 Parodi, Alexandre 162, 169 partition 7, 9, 55-8, 72, 93, 95, 102-4, 113, 117, 125-8, 130, 133, 141, 150, 170-1, 173, 175, 193, 203, 215, 233-5, 238; and Rand 95; supported by the United States 114; voted on 132; Arab reaction to 135; Jewish reaction to 135; reaction of Canadian press 136; public reaction to 137; abandoned by U.S. 153-4; abandoned by Canada 155 Pearson, Lester B. 33, 49, 51, 60-2, 64, 66-8, 70, 72-3, 86, 108, 111-12, 116, 120, 122-3, 126, 128-33, 136, 138, 141-2, 147-9, 151-2, 154, 163, 165-6, 171-2, 177, 182, 185, 189, 200-1, 205-7, 209, 211-12, 215-21, 227-30, 232-3, 236, 238; views on Canadian foreign policy 50; on the special session of 1947 61; attachment to the Holy Land 63; as chairman of First Committee 68-70; views on partition 117, 120, 132-3; and working group on partition 121ff; style 121; assesses Soviet motives 124; acclaimed for work at 1947 UN General Assembly 126; and UN Palestine Commission 129; views on UN'S duty 147; on U.S. trusteeship proposals 164; fears U.S.-British split 171; chosen secretary of state for external affairs 200; and Bernadotte plan 205, 216; and Algoma East by-election 206; reassesses Canadian policy 211;

supports Bunche proposal 212; lays out new Canadian policy 216-17; and Israeli admission to UN 218; pushes recognition of Israel 221; career after 1949 230; role in policy-making 233; and change in Canadian policy 238; and North Atlantic unity 238 Peel Commission 7, 88, 93 Peru 69 Philippine Republic 60, 135 Phillips, Lazarus 20 Philpott, Elmore 107 Pickersgill, J.W. 25 Pius XII 228 Poale Zion 16, 18 Poland 60, 71, 97, 98, 114 Potsdam Conference 36 Prince, A.E. 45-6 Pro-Palestine Committee 21 Pro-Palestine Parliamentary Committee of Great Britain 21 Protocols of the Elders of Zion 52 Qastina air base 10 Quebec 15, 27, 137, 229 Rafah 224 Rahman, Sir Abdur 78, 81-3, 88, 92, 94, 96, 100-3, 105 Ramallah 87 Ramie 196 Rand, Ivan Cleveland 75-7, 81-2, 85-7, 89, 91, 94-7, 100-3, 105, 108, 113, 136-7, 182, 233; career prior to UNSCOP 76; and Zionism 77; instructions to 77; views on UNSCOP task 81; and Horowitz 84; contribution to UNSCOP 86, 105; impressed by Ben Gurion 87; and partition 95, 100; scheme for

288 Index Palestine 100-1; and UNSCOP 233-4 Rand Formula 76 recognition of Israel 184, 187-8, 193, 195, 207; by Truman 178; and Canada 182, 192-4, 238; and Britain 182, 226; and Commonwealth 183; and Canadian Zionists 198 Regina Leader-Post 136

Rehovoth 85 Reid, Escott 48, 128, 146, 152, 157, 194, 200, 226-7; supports U.S. on trusteeship 157-8 Reigner, Gerhard 9 Renfrew Mercury 52 Revisionist Zionism 7, 9, 16; in Canada 16 Rhodes 202 Riddell, R.G. 60, 64, 66, 68-70, 112, 116, 120, 127, 133, 184, 194-5, 218-21; and the UN 112; views on partition 117, 127 Ritchie, Charles 219 Robertson, Norman A. 28-9, 38, 49, 126, 142, 157-8, 171, 189, 225, 238; bypassed by King 158; opposes British actions 189 Roebuck, Arthur 44 Rome, David 27 Roosevelt, Eleanor 114 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 35 Rose, Fred 19 Ross, John C. 187, 212 Rothschild, Lord 5 Rothschild Hospital 98-9 Royal Air Force 224 Royal Canadian Mounted Police 191 Royal Canadian Navy 47 Royal Navy 10, 35, 74, 84; blockade 54

Rusk, Dean 145-6, 149, 157, 164-6, 171, 186; reveals U.S. plans for trusteeship 166 St Antoine-Westmount, riding 20, 197 St Laurent, Louis 37-8, 51-2, 60, 62, 64-6, 68, 70-1, 73, 76, 105, 110-13, 120, 127, 129-30, 137-40, 144, 147, 150, 152, 154-5, 157, 161, 166, 169, 171, 174, 177, 182, 184-5, 187, 193, 198-200, 205, 209, 211, 220, 230, 232-4, 236, 238: and Jews 20; attitude to Britain 49; becomes secretary of state 49; on Canadian foreign policy 66; on UN 66, 110; and UN Palestine Commission 129; clashes with King over Korea 138-9; on trusteeship 154; opposes recognition of Israel 198; elected Liberal leader 199; chooses Pearson as successor 200; policy on Palestine 232 St Lawrence-St George, riding 20 Salazar, Arturo Garcia 78, 95-6, 102-3 Sandstrom, Judge Emil 75, 78, 83-5, 87-8, 91, 93-5, 99, 101, 103; appeals to Arabs 82 Sandwell, B.K. 21 San Francisco Conference. See United Nations Conference on International Organization Saud, King Ibn 35 Saudi Arabia 40, 239 Schwartz, Rabbi Jesse 28, 45 Scott, F.R. 27 Sea of Galilee 181 Security Council 38, 59-60, 109, 117, 119-20, 125, 128, 136, 140,

289 Index 145-7, 149-51, 154, 156, 158, 163, 165, 185, 187-8, 195-6, 207, 209; votes for special session 159; and U.S. trusteeship proposals 163; tries to arrange Palestine truce 167; discusses Palestine cease-fire 169 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 186-7 Shertok, Moshe 83, 88-9, 92, 103, 108, 158-9, 161, 177, 215, 218, 220-1; opposes trusteeship 159; lobbies Canadian government 161; angry at Canada 220; reacts to Canadian recognition 221; rejects Bernadotte plan 215 Silcox, Claris E. 21, 46 Silver, Rabbi Abba Hillel 22, 40, 55-6, 70, 115 Simic, Valado 75, 79, 94, 96, 100-3, 105 Sinai 224 Skelton, Oscar Douglas 49 Smuts, Jan Christiaan 183 Social Credit party 45, 52 Social Democratic party 18 Socialist party, Canada 18 Sofar 89, 115 South Africa 31, 118, 132, 183, 187, 215; recognizes Israel 183 South Korea 229 Soviet Union 38, 63, 71, 98, 109, 118, 122, 126, 132, 140, 153, 159, 169, 218, 220; and partition 114, 116, 119 Spadina, riding 19-20, 44 Spencer, Robert A. 235 ss Exodus 1947 74-6, 89, 92 ss Haganah 47 ss Pan Crescent 115 ss Pan York 115

State Department 11, 36, 48, 55, 60-1, 63, 72, 114, 128, 131, 142, 146, 149, 151, 153, 163-4, 167, 171, 175, 178, 203, 232; views on Canada 63; and trusteeship 143, 145-6; and partition 145-6; on powers of Security Council 151 Stern Gang. See Lehi Stewart, Alistair 41 Stone, Thomas A. 63, 166, 187 Suez Canal Zone 8 Sweden 60, 69, 75, 167 Sykes-Picot Agreement 5 Syria 5-6, 15, 33, 40, 153, 180, 197, 220, 239 Syrian General Congress 6

Tedder, Viscount 57 Tel Aviv 7, 86, 104, 134, 144 Thors, Thor 131 Tiberias 172-3 Toff, Moshe 94-5 Toronto Telegram 45 Transjordan 57, 91, 180-2, 204, 220, 239 Transjordan Arab Legion 180 Troutbeck, Sir John 202-3 Truman, Harry S. 11-12, 35, 39, 55, 60-1, 63, 114, 131, 139, 176, 178-9, 203, 208, 210-11, 214, 234, 238; endorses AngloAmerican Committee findings 11; and Jewish refugees 55; supports partition 114; recognizes Israel 178; instructs U.S. delegation 214-15 trusteeship 12, 30-1, 56-8, 113, 142, 145-6, 153, 156, 158, 163-6, 173-4, 176-8, 235-6; and u.s. 153-4, 162-3; and St Laurent 154;

290 Index supported by Canada 155; discussed at UN 170 Trusteeship Council 31, 58, 154, 162, 167, 174; Draft Statute for Jerusalem 170 Tulin, Abraham 23 Tulkarm 87 Turkey 4, 13, 33, 60, 218 Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 114, 159, 169, 220 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union United Kingdom. See Britain United Nations 4, 24, 56-7, 59, 63, 72, 88, 104, 110, 118, 128, 197 United Nations Conference on International Organization 29-31, 38 United Nations Economic and Social Council 104, 191 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 42, 109, 133, 138; session of 1946 42, 55; special session of 1947 60, 72; session of 1947 71, 106, 111, 130-2, 140; special session of 1948 154, 170ff; debates Israeli admission, 1949 228 United Nations Palestine Commission 135, 146, 150, 153-4, 168, 176; and Britain 142 United Nations peace-keeping force (1956) 230 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 32, 34, 230 United Nations Security Council. See Security Council United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. See UNSCOP

United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea 138, 236 United Nations Trusteeship Council. See Trusteeship Council United States 5, 8, 10, 31, 33, 35-6, 39, 65, 114, 118, 123, 126, 128, 131-2, 140, 150, 158, 170, 175, 224, 228; and Anglo American Commission 11; Zionism in 11; and Morrison-Grady Commission 12; and illegal immigration 48; and Jewish statehood 58; attitudes towards Canada 60; views on investigating committee 63, 68; pressure on Canada 65, 68; relations with Britain 65; and UNGA special session of 1947 68; and partition 114, 116, 145; splits with Britain over Palestine 116, 146, 185-6, 234; fears Soviet intervention 119; and NATO 140; and trusteeship 142, 153-4, 162-3, 166-7, 170; calls for truce and special session 158; rejects temporary commission 175; agrees with Britain on mediator 176; recognizes Israel 178; and Arab invasion 185; and Bernadotte's second plan 202-3; pushes for Israeli withdrawal from Negev 209; and Bernadotte plan 210; favours armistice 211; and economic sanctions 212; and Bunche resolution 213; supports Palestine Conciliation Commission 218; and Israeli withdrawal from Sinai 224 United States State Department. See State Department United Zionist Council 16, 21-2, 25-6, 28, 30, 36, 43, 52, 107, 191; National Public Relations

291 Index Committee 22, 230 UNSCOP 73, 78, 107-8, 109, 111, 113-15, 125-6, 130-3, 232-4; Arab boycott of 81, 86; arrives in Palestine 82; hears Ben Gurion 87; hears Weizmann 88; meets League of Arab States 89; and displaced persons camps 92, 97-9; settles in Geneva 92; begins deliberations 92; finalizes report 103; recommendations 103-4; contribution of Rand 105; Canadian reaction to report 107, 109 Uruguay 69, 118, 228 USSR. See Soviet Union Vaad Leumi 27 Vaillancourt, Emile 27 Valley of Jezreel 144 Vancouver Sun 43, 72, 107 Vandenberg, Senator Arthur 187 Vatican 228-9 Venezuela 33, 118 Vienna 97-8 Wallace, Henry 214 War Assets Corporation 47-8 Warburg, Felix 23 Wartime Elections Act 18 Webb, Richard 54 Weizmann, Chaim 6-7, 40, 55-6, 85, 88, 178; testifies before UNSCOP 88 Welland, Ontario 25 White Paper of 1939 8-9, 15, 17, 19, 22, 24-6, 29, 35, 37, 44, 48, 88, 230-1 Wilgress, L. Dana 38 Wilson, Senator Cairine 21 Wilson, Woodrow 36 Windsor Star 45

Winnipeg 28 Winnipeg Free Press 72 Winnipeg North Centre, riding 19 Winnipeg North, riding 41 Woodsworth, J.S. 18-19 World Committee for Palestine 108, 111, 136, 193 World Jewish Congress 9 World Mizrachi 88 World Zionist Organization 6, 8, 12, 40, 56, 115 Wrong, G.M. 21, 28 Wrong, Hume 26, 28, 32, 37-8, 42, 49, 61, 63, 65, 129, 145-6, 163-5, 171, 186, 225, 228; disturbed by U.S..-Britain split 146; seeks details of U.S. policy 164 Yalta Conference 35 Yassky, Chaim 75 yishuv 8, 22, 27, 28 Yugoslavia 71, 114 Zacks, Sam 26, 30, 39-40, 44, 51, 62, 136, 161, 207 Zea-Gonzalez, Emilio 86 Zionist Executive, World Zionist Organization 12, 56 Zionist Federation of Canada 13, 16 Zionist General Council 106 Zionist Information Office 192 Zionist lobbying 17, 21-2, 25-6, 28-9, 33, 36-7, 44, 66, 108, 161, 192, 196-7, 230; and recognition 193, 198, 222; and Pearson 207; effectiveness of 232 Zionist Organization of America 22-3, 40 Zionist Organization of Canada 16, 24, 28, 44-5, 52, 107, 193, 198