South Asia Migration Report 2017: Recruitment, Remittances and Reintegration 9781138227125, 9781315297897

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SOUTH ASIA MIGRATION REPORT 2017

South Asians comprise over 15 per cent of all international migrating population, among the highest in the world. The countries of the Persian Gulf are perhaps still the largest recipients of migrant workers. A unique economy has developed between these two regions, with all South Asian nations being major beneficiaries and featuring among the top 20 countries receiving maximum remittances globally. The South Asia Migration Report 2017 is the first of its kind, documenting migration profiles, diaspora, recruitment and remittances, both in individual countries as well as the South Asian region as a whole. It also discusses skilled, unskilled and internal migrations. The volume: • • •

includes on-the-ground studies from six nations: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Afghanistan; discusses public policy, effects of global recession on the region and its impact on migration; and examines the process of reintegration of returning migrants.

This book will be indispensable for scholars and researchers of economics, development studies, migration and diaspora studies, labour studies and sociology. It will also be useful to policymakers and government institutions working in the area. S. Irudaya Rajan is Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India. His recent works include Politics of Migration (with A. Didar Singh, 2016); Researching International Migration (with K. C. Zachariah, 2015); and Emigration in 21st-Century India (with Krishna Kumar, 2014). He is also the editor of the annual India Migration Report.

SOUTH ASIA MIGRATION REPORT 2017 Recruitment, Remittances and Reintegration

Edited by S. Irudaya Rajan

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 selection and editorial matter, S. Irudaya Rajan; individual chapters, the contributors The right of S. Irudaya Rajan to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-22712-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-29789-7 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Apex CoVantage, LLC

DEDICATED TO THE INSPIRING MEMORY OF PROFESSOR MARIO RUTTEN

CONTENTS

List of figures List of tables Contributors Preface

ix xi xiv xvi

South Asia–Gulf migration corridor: an introduction

1

S. IRUDAYA RAJAN

  1 Migration, transnational flows and development in India: a regional perspective

19

CARO L UPAD H YA AN D MARI O RUT T EN

  2 The influence of vulnerability on migration intentions in Afghanistan

49

CRAIG L O S CH M AN N AN D MEL I SSA S I EGEL

  3 Brains, capital, charity, soft power: the skilled South Asian diaspora in developed countries

77

RUPA CH AN DA

  4 South Asia-Gulf migratory corridor: emerging patterns, prospects and challenges GIN U Z AC H ARIA OO MMEN

vii

120

C ontents

  5 Challenges of labour recruitment for overseas employment: the Bangladesh experience

147

C. R. AB RAR AND M. MOTAS I M B I L L AH

  6 Making migration free: an analysis of Nepal’s ‘free-visa, free-ticket’ scheme

164

BAN D ITA S IJAPAT I , MO HD AYUB AN D H IM AL AYA K H AR EL

  7 Estimating the impact of international remittance on households expenditure in Bangladesh

190

S E L IM RAIH AN, TASN EEM S I DDI QUI AN D RAIS UL A. M AH M O O D

  8 Intra-household dynamics of remittance practices: a case study of Bangladesh

209

S Y E DA RO Z AN A RAS HI D AN D MO HAMMAD JAL AL UD D IN S I K DER

  9 Migration in the global recession and in its recovery in Sri Lanka

230

M Y RT L E P E RE RA

10 Returning home: challenges of reintegration

267

S UW E N D RAN I JAYARAT N E, N I P UN I P ERERA, N E L UK A GUN ASEKARA AN D N I SHA ARUN AT I L AKE

11 Labour emigration and emigration policies in Nepal: a political-economic analysis

292

JAGAN N AT H ADHI KARI

12 Internal migration and labour mobility in Pakistan

321

S AD IA IS H FAQ, VAQ AR AHMED, DAN I SH HAS S AN AN D AS IF JAV E D

Index

343

viii

FIGURES

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1 7.2 7.3 9.1 9.2 9.3

Distribution of overseas Indians, January 2015 (%) Distribution of overseas Pakistanis worldwide, 2011 (%) Distribution of overseas Bangladeshis worldwide, various years (%) Employed workers in the civilian labour force (ages 16 and older) by occupation and origin, 2013 (%) Per migrant bilateral remittance, 2013 (USD mn) FDI flows and contribution by NRIs as individual investors (USD billion) Year-wise trends of overseas employment The headcount poverty rate in the various development regions The direction of migration from different regions of Nepal Labour permits issued by DoFE for the ‘Free-Visa, Free-Ticket’-designated countries, 18 July–12 February 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 Formal and informal labour migration process Number of Bangladeshi overseas employment (1976–2014) Skill composition of Bangladeshi migrant workers in 2014 Trend of remittances sent from abroad Graph showing the trends in departures from 1989 to 2008 Change in occupational pattern of migrants, 2010–2012 Percentage of worker remittances from Middle East countries to total worker remittances ix

81 81 82 90 94 100 149 176 176 178 180 191 193 193 239 240 248

figures

10.1 Total departures for foreign employment by manpower level, 1994–2012 11.1 Foreign labour migrants from Nepal (except India) 12.1 Pakistan’s recent unemployment trend

x

269 295 326

TABLES

I.1 I.2

Demographic trends: South Asia and Gulf (%) Demographic dividend among South Asian and Gulf countries (%) I.3 South Asian emigration: an overview I.4 South-South migration stock in South Asia I.5 Migration policy: South Asia and Gulf Cooporation Council I.6 Nationals and non-nationals in Gulf Cooporation Council (%) I.7 Inflow and outflow of remittances to South Asia and Gulf (USD billions) 2.1 Description of dimensions, components, individual indicators and thresholds of household deprivation 2.2 Migration intentions 2.3 Summary statistics (%) 2.4 Household deprivation on each indicator by dimension and component (%) 2.5 Statistically significant mean difference across migration intentions 2.6 Dimensional household vulnerability (%) 2.7 Multidimensional household vulnerability (%) 2.8 Marginal effect of individual indicators of deprivation on migration intentions 2.9 Marginal effect of dimensional vulnerability on migration intentions 2.10 Marginal effect of multidimensional vulnerability on migration intentions 3.1 Number of immigrants (age 15 or older) by educational attainment xi

2 4 6 8 10 11 12 56 61 62 64 66 67 67 69 71 72 84

tables

3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7

Share of South Asian emigrants by educational attainment in selected OECD countries (%) Non-immigrant temporary worker admissions (I-94 only) by country of citizenship: fiscal year 2013 Selected features concerning the South Asian diaspora in the United States, 2009–2012 (numbers) Distribution of employment by occupation (%) for persons (15–64) born in select South Asian countries living in OECD countries (%) Remittance inflows into South Asia (USD) Significance of remittances in the economy (% shares) Bilateral remittance flows and shares between OECD countries and South Asian countries, 2013 (millions of USD and %) Outflow of migrant workers from South Asia to the Gulf, 2005–2009 Nationals and expatriates in the GCC labour forces, 1975–2008 Remittances flow to Bangladesh and Pakistan from GCC countries, 2008–2009 (USD million) Inward remittances to South Asian countries from migrant workers, 2000–2009 Remittances from GCC countries to India in 2012 Year-wise breakdown of categories of migrants from Bangladesh (2000–2011) Recruitment costs across countries in the Asia-Pacific Types of offenses and the associated penalties under the Foreign Employment Act 2007, Rules 2008 Two-stage regression results for different expenditures Marginal effects from two-stage regressions for savings behaviour Marginal effects from two-stage regressions for investment on farm agriculture Marginal effects from two-stage regressions for investment on agricultural equipment Marginal effects from two-stage regressions for investment on off-farm agriculture Marginal effects from two-stage regressions for investment on enterprise development Marginal effects from two-stage regressions for investment on trade business xii

86 87 88 89 92 92 93 122 134 137 138 139 160 169 182 198 200 202 203 204 205 206

TA B L E S

7.8 Marginal effects from two-stage regressions for investment on transport business 9.1 Departures to GCC and Malaysia for selected years up to 2008 9.2 Departures to GCC countries and Malaysia, 1989–2008 9.3 Major recipients of migrant labour (%) 9.4 Departures for foreign employment by sector and manpower level, 2008 9.5 Worker remittances from 2010 to 2014 (USD million) 10.1 Economic and social integration 10.2 Probit model results of the economically better off and successfully reintegrated models for full sample 10.3 Returnees maintaining links with institutions 11.1 National policies guiding Nepal’s foreign labour migration 11.2 Changing nature of Nepal Government’s policy on women migration 12.1 Employment share by sector (%) 12.2 Percentage distribution of migrant population 10 years of age and over, 2014

xiii

207 240 242 246 246 249 281 282 285 306 311 325 330

CONTRIBUTORS

C. R. Abrar is with the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Dhaka, Bangladesh. Jagannath Adhikari is with Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Australia. Vaqar Ahmed is with the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan. Mohd Ayub is Research Associate with the Centre for the Study of Labour and Mobility (CESLAM) at the Social Science Baha in Kathmandu, Nepal. Nisha Arunatilake is Research Fellow with the Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. M. Motasim Billah is with the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Dhaka, Bangladesh Rupa Chanda is Professor of Economics at the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, India. Neluka Gunasekara is Research Assistant with the Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. Danish Hassan is with the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan. Sadia Ishfaq is Research Associate with the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan. Suwendrani Jayaratne is with the Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. Asif Javed is with the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan. xiv

C ontributors

Himalaya Kharel is Research Associate with the Centre for the Study of Labour and Mobility (CESLAM) at the Social Science Baha in Kathmandu, Nepal. Craig Loschmann is with the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, The Netherlands. Raisul A. Mahmood is with the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Dhaka, Bangladesh. Ginu Zacharia Oommen is with the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Teenmurti House, New Delhi, India; Honorary Associate Fellow, MIGRINTER, University de Poitiers, France. Myrtle Perera is Vice Chairman, Marga Institute, Sri Lanka. Nipuni Perera is Research Officer with the Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. Selim Raihan is with the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Dhaka, Bangladesh. Syeda Rozana Rashid is Associate Professor, Department of Inter­national Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh and Senior Research Fellow, the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Mario Rutten was Professor at the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam. Melissa Siegel is Associate Professor and Head of Migration Studies at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance and UNU-MERIT, The Netherlands. Tasneem Siddiqui is Professor of Political Science and Chair, Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Dhaka, Bangladesh. Bandita Sijapati is Research Director at the Centre for the Study of Labour and Mobility (CESLAM) at the Social Science Baha in Kathmandu, Nepal; he is currently affiliated with the University of Oxford. Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder is Assistant Professor, University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh (ULAB) and Research Fellow, the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Dhaka, Bangladesh. Carol Upadhya is Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. xv

PREFACE

I have been editing the annual series India Migration Report since the last seven years as well as the Journal of Migration and Development over the last five years. As I believe in evidence-based policy, I felt the need to organise the South Asia Migration Report (SAMR) on similar lines, to convince the policymakers in South Asia to mainstream the topic of migration into development policy in the South Asian region within the South Asian Association for Regional Corporation (SAARC) framework. Discussions with several researchers and policymakers working on migration over the last two years convinced me to take up this task, amply aided with the network of scholars whom I came to know over the last 20 years. I wrote to several scholars and invited them to contribute to the first SAMR over the last few months. Some of them readily agreed to contribute and some of them promised to contribute to the future additions of the Report. As of now, the first SAMR (2017) is likely to be out in 2017, followed by the second SAMR in 2019 and the third one in 2021. The subtheme of the SAMR (2017) is ‘Recruitment, Remittances and Reintegration’. This is based on the understanding that migration includes three major processes in the life of a migrant: recruitment from the countries of origin, earning of remittances during the working life at the countries of destination and ending with their reintegration with the countries of origin. However, the chapters included in the current SAMR go beyond these three issues – to discuss issues pertaining to diaspora, vulnerability and labour mobility. The SAMR is organised into 12 chapters, contributed by 26 scholars working in the field of migration in South Asia. Through this report, I would like to emphasise three points for us to ponder. Through South Asian Association Regional Corporation (SAARC), the South Asian countries should not only discuss common currency and visa, as in the European Union, but also include mainstream issues regarding migration into xvi

P reface

the development agenda of every nation. It is impossible to attain Sustainable Development Goals without addressing internal and international migration. Second, more research is required on South-South migration and remittances and also one of the largest migration corridors in the world, that is, South Asia-Gulf migration corridor. Third, South Asian labour-sending countries should form a group like the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to exercise power on the migrants-receiving countries, like the Gulf, to facilitate decent wages and to protect the rights of the migrants. I would like to thank all contributors of this volume. In addition, I am grateful for the emotional support, patience and understanding received from my wife, Hema, and our three children – Rahul, Rohit and Mary Catherine. Finally, I would like to record my appreciation for the hard work put by the editorial, production and sales teams of Routledge, in bringing out this report on time.

xvii

SOUTH ASIA–GULF MIGRATION  CORRIDOR An introduction S. Irudaya Rajan

Globally, there were 244 million international migrations in 2015; it rose from 173 million in 2000 to 222 million in 2010, respectively. Out of the 244 million migrants, about 104 million (43%) were born in Asia1 and another 62 million (25%) migrants in Europe (United Nations, 2015). In other words, two out of five international migrants originate from Asia. The geography of migration flow is changing, in line with changes in the global economy. A much wider range of cities around the world have now become preferred destinations for migrants (International Organisation of Migration, 2015). South Asia is emerging as a migration hub of the world, because the percentage of total South Asian2 migration to international migrant stock was 13.33 per cent in 2005, and increased to 15.13 per cent in 2015 (United Nations, 2015). Majority of the South Asian migrants end up in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for employment. Though South Asia-Gulf migration corridor is one of the largest in the world, this corridor is under-researched (Irudaya Rajan, 2016). The estimated annual outflow of migrant workers from five3 major South Asian labour-sending countries accounted for 2.5 million, and among them India registered the largest (International Labour Organisation, 2015). South Asian migration contribution through remittances to their economy could not be underestimated. For instance, in 2014, the global inflow of remittance reached USD 591 billion and South Asia received USD 115 billion or 20 per cent (World Bank, 2015) of it.

1

S . I rudaya R ajan

Changing demography The world population was estimated around 7.4 billion in 2015, whereas it was just 2.5 billion in 1950 – a three-fold increase in 65 years. Over the last six decades, the global share of the less developed regions have increased their proportion from 67.80 per cent to 82.97 per cent, whereas developed regions have lost their global share from 32.20 in 1950 to 17.03 per cent in 2015. Demography is destiny (see Table I.1 for details). Among the regions, Southern Asia accounted for just 19.54 per cent of the world population in 1950, and has increased its share to 24.80 per cent in 2015. One out of four persons globally lives in Southern Asian regions. India, the second most populous country in the world and located in South Asia, contributed 75.18 per cent proportion of population in 2015, followed by Pakistan with 10.83 per cent and Bangladesh

Table I.1  Demographic trends: South Asia and Gulf (%) South Asia/Gulf

1950

1975

2000

2015

World (in billions) More developed region Less developed region Southern Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka GCC Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia The United Arab Emirates

2.52 32.20 67.80 19.54 1.63 7.96 0.04 79.01 0.02 1.78 7.88 1.70 0.38 1.20 59.21 1.58 4.73 0.26 32.31 0.72

4.06 25.79 74.21 20.50 1.57 8.91 0.04 77.72 0.02 1.66 8.35 1.72 0.54 1.21 53.09 4.78 4.01 0.75 33.75 2.41

6.12 19.40 80.60 23.70 1.42 9.47 0.04 76.00 0.02 1.71 9.97 1.36 0.87 1.25 44.11 3.61 4.19 1.11 40.03 5.71

7.3 17.03 82.97 24.80 1.87 9.23 0.04 75.18 0.02 1.64 10.83 1.19 1.21 1.55 40.87 4.37 5.04 2.51 35.39 10.28

Source: United Nations (2015).

2

I N T RO D U C T I O N

with 9.23 per cent. All other countries, such as Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, exhibited a negligible population size, with the proportion ranging from 0.02 per cent in Maldives to 1.87 in Afghanistan in 2015. On the other hand, GCC region which attracts the South Asian migrants accounts for 1.19 per cent of the total population in the world. However, the Gulf had accommodated only 0.38 per cent global population in 1950. Among the countries in the GCC, Iraq accounted for 59.21 per cent in 1950 and declined to 40.87 per cent in 2015. Except Iraq, all other countries in the Gulf region have shown an increase in their proportion during the last six decades. Most of the population increase in the Gulf is not only due to its high fertility, but also the immigration to the Gulf. Take the example of United Arab Emirates – it accounted for 0.72 per cent population in the Gulf region in 1950 and increased its proportion to 10.28 in 2015. This is true to most of the Gulf countries because they attracted global migration after their oil exploration; the predominant prime movers to the Gulf were South Asians.

Demographic dividend Demographic dividend can accelerate development that can arise when a population bulges in the working age group (UNFPA, 2016). The proportion of working age group of population (15–59 years) has globally increased from 58.70 per cent in 1995 to 61.67 per cent in 2015. Among the more developed regions, the proportion of the working age population constituted 62.06 per cent in 1995 and declined to 59.11 per cent in 2015 due to the largest decline in fertility. Most of the countries in the developed regions are experiencing the second demographic dividend – the population aging. Kerala is a typical example of this phenomenon (State Planning Board, 2009). On the other hand, developed/developing regions registered an increase in its working population from 57.84 per cent in 1995 to 62.07 per cent in 2015 (Table I.2), because these countries have experienced moderate decline in fertility and have entered into the first demographic dividend. This is also reflected vividly in both their child and elderly population. As of now, the proportion of elderly in developed countries (23.88%) has overtaken the proportion of children (16.35%). One out of 4 persons in developed countries is an elderly person above 60 years of age, whereas in developed economies it is just 1 out of 10 persons. Among South Asian countries, except Afghanistan, Nepal and Pakistan, most of the countries account for more than 60 per cent of its 3

S . I rudaya R ajan

Table I.2  Demographic dividend among South Asian and Gulf countries (%) 1995

World More developed Less developed Asia Southern Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka GCC Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia The United Arab Emirates

2015

0–14

15–59

60+

0–14

15–59

60+

31.87 19.56 35.03 32.68 37.87 47.80 39.94 43.89 36.63 46.49 41.61 42.71 29.50 41.16 30.26 44.30 29.96 39.73 26.46 41.45 26.66

58.70 62.06 57.84 59.36 55.83 48.48 54.63 50.61 56.90 48.20 52.72 51.19 61.62 54.34 65.88 50.37 66.89 56.93 71.02 54.27 71.58

9.43 18.38 7.13 7.96 6.30 3.72 5.43 5.50 6.47 5.31 5.67 6.10 8.88 4.50 3.86 5.33 3.15 3.34 2.52 4.28 1.76

26.07 16.35 28.06 24.46 29.55 44.04 29.45 26.87 28.79 27.48 32.66 35.01 24.57 31.03 21.47 40.98 22.32 20.52 15.52 28.58 13.94

61.67 59.77 62.07 63.98 62.03 51.96 63.57 65.78 62.32 65.74 58.72 58.39 61.49 64.43 74.65 54.03 74.25 75.12 82.22 66.40 83.71

12.26 23.88 9.87 11.56 8.42 4.00 6.98 7.35 8.89 6.78 8.61 6.60 13.94 4.54 3.87 4.99 3.43 4.36 2.26 5.02 2.35

Source: United Nations (2015).

population to working ages. The demographic dividend in South Asia is slowly shifting to the Gulf. Though immigration and emigration affect the working age population of both sending countries and receiving countries, it is seen more predominantly in the receiving countries. For instance, United Arab Emirates and Qatar accounts for 83.71 per cent and 82.22 per cent of working age populations, respectively. In fact, most of the countries account for higher working ages, partly by their demographic dividends and their continuous attractiveness to migrants in the working ages from different sending countries. This is one of the reasons for most countries in the Gulf to introduce nationalisation policies like Emiratisation, Saudisation and Omanisation (Hussain, 2015) and 4

I N T RO D U C T I O N

to organise amnesty to get rid of the undocumented migrants. Most of the countries in both South Asia and Gulf reported an increase in the working population as well as an elderly population, necessitated by the decline in child population. In other words, there is still a large supply of labour in South Asia that can take the opportunity to migrate to the Gulf, whereas the Gulf itself has been facing a large supply of labour of its own, thus creating the tension between the Gulf and the South Asian countries. Most of the Gulf countries, hence, strictly implement immigration policies.

International migration from South Asia There were around 37 million South Asian emigrants globally in 2015 (United Nations, 2015) compared to 23 million in 1990. Where do South Asians go? About 8 million live in developed countries and the reaming South Asians (29 million) emigrated to developing countries. South Asians migrate both globally as well as within the South. South Asian emigrants globally stood around 24 million in 1990 and increased to 25 million in 2005 – which is an addition of just 1 million in 15 years (Table I.3). On the other hand, they increased by about 8 million in five years during 2005 and 2010 and an additional 4 million in the next five years. The slow increase of emigration from South Asia is also partly due to the impact of global crisis on migration trends (Irudaya Rajan, 2012b). Out of 37 million South Asians’ migrant stock in 2015, 16 million live in West Asia. Another 12 million live in South Asia itself. We shall discuss South-South migration shortly. Other than Southern and Western Asia, 4 million live in Northern America, followed by 3 million in Europe and a negligible number of Indians in Africa, Oceania, Latin America and the Caribbean regions. Though South-South migration corridor is an important component of South Asia migration, this corridor has shown a decline from 17 million in 1990 to 12 million in 2005, and hovering around the same level over the last 10 years. On the other hand, South Asian migration to the Gulf has taken a new lead with an uninterrupted increase over the last 25 years, notwithstanding challenges such as the global economic crisis and the Nitaqat crisis in Saudi Arabia. In 1990, South Asians in South Asian-Gulf migration corridor accounted for just 4 million, which increased to 8 million in 2005, 12 million in 2010 and 16 million in 2015. In 1990, the South-South migration corridor accounted for 16 million out of 24 million or 60 per cent of the total South Asian migration occupying the 5

S . I rudaya R ajan

Table I.3  South Asian emigration:  an overview Destination Region

World Developed Developing Africa Asia Central Asia Eastern Asia Southeastern Asia Southern Asia Western Asia Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia The United Arab Emirates Europe Latin America and the Caribbean Northern America Oceania

South Asian emigration 1990

2005

2010

2015

23,887,147 2,209,367 21,677,780 46,995 21,626,509 9,598 45,503 192,825 16,940,167 4,438,416 108,202 945 671,008 252,266 41,403 2,487,058 819,653

25,489,138 5,222,196 20,266,942 86,686 20,211,922 13,374 127,619 727,614 11,807,620 7,535,695 261,408 1,210 846,311 546,840 357,364 3,272,541 2,141,000

32,960,646 6,870,077 26,090,569 116,692 26,005,820 9,643 153,687 1,123,843 12,286,404 12,432,243 428,097 1,222 1,185,982 678,438 956,258 4,244,943 4,800,910

36,873,169 7,809,774 29,063,395 141,074 28,951,809 8,380 184,017 1,213,447 12,030,714 15,515,251 470,027 1,226 1,786,324 1,446,537 1,146,588 5,131,003 5,434,865

1,241,182 7,541

2,284,487 11,948

2,978,536 14,706

3,291,208 16,801

833,461 131,459

2,558,689 335,406

3,221,072 623,820

3,720,512 751,765

Source: United Nations (2015).

number one position. However, in 2015, the South Asian-Gulf migration corridor not only took the prime position in South-South migration corridor, but also emerged as one of the fastest growing migration corridors for South Asians accounting for 43 per cent of their mobility. Most of the Gulf migration attracted large-scale unskilled and semiskilled labour from South Asia. This is high time that all South Asian labour-sending countries should form a group like the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to exercise power on the migrants-receiving countries, like the Gulf, to facilitate decent wages and to protect the rights of the migrants. 6

I N T RO D U C T I O N

The South Asia continues to be a major source of labour migrants to GCC region, with nearly two-thirds of the migrants stock in the region belonging to South Asian nationality (Sasikumar and Thimothy, 2015). Most of them emigrate to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In 2015, about 5.1 million South Asian emigrants lived in Saudi Arabia and another 5.4 million in the United Arab Emirates. Other Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Oman and Qatar have registered 1.7 million, 1.4 million and 1.1 million, respectively. The skilled Indian migrants to Europe as well as Northern America combined have shown an increase over the last 25 years – from 2.1 million in 1990 to 7 million in 2015. With the global crisis and migrant crisis in Europe, migration flows to these countries are likely to be affected in the near future.

South-South migration The literature on South-South migration is limited (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). Let us examine the latest situation in this context. Among the six Asian countries, Afghan emigrants were found only in Pakistan in 2015, and now India also receives some refugees from Afghanistan (see Table I.4). Sri Lankans are found in almost all countries in South Asia, the highest receiver being India. India also accommodates Sri Lankan Refugees (Valatheeswaran and Irudaya Rajan, 2011; George, Kliewer and Irudaya Rajan, 2015). Pakistanis are largely concentrated in both Pakistan and Afghanistan and some 578 persons in Maldives. Maldivians are spreading their wings to four countries in South Asia – Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Maldives, the highest being in Bangladesh and India. Of course, Nepal has an open border with India and their presence is the highest in India. Some other Asian countries, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, also accommodate Nepalese citizens. Like Afghanis, Bangladeshis are also moving to both India and Nepal, and India also earlier accommodated refugees from Bangladesh. In addition, India is always concerned about the undocumented Bangladeshi emigrants in India at all levels. Bhutanese are present only in India with larger numbers, and Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Maldives also attract some Bhutanese. Indians’ presence is felt in all countries in South Asia – there are very large number of Indians in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Through South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the South Asian countries should discuss about common currency and visa, as in the European Union. 7

Source: United Nations (2015).

Sri Lanka

Pakistan

Nepal

Maldives

India

Bhutan

128

3,276,673 1,618,687

14,159 8,086

0 0

1995 2015 1995 2015 1995 2015 1995 2015 1995 2015 1995 2015 1995 2015 1995 2015

Afghanistan

Bangladesh

Afghanistan

Years

Country of origin

7 653

0 0 24 52 4,375,155 3,171,022 1,623 53,565 500 233

Bangladesh

Table I.4  South-South migration stock in South Asia

2 227

16,805 28,740

0 0 11,088 6,647

Bhutan

13,339 34,431 20,841 44,732 0 0 951 22120 369,370 446,491 2,916,548 2,000,908 39,329 10,460

India

17 1,364

1,810 199 0 0

Maldives

4 334

0 0

9,670 39,059 334 717 518,212 542,947

Nepal

10 22 1,921,278 1,106,212 79 167 2,371 1,268 0 0 173 803

8,107 348,369

Pakistan

15 33 281,720 155,195 4,289 9,448 78 46 889 578 0 0

Sri Lanka

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Migration policy Either sending or receiving country, every country is silent on its migration policy. In one of the earlier documents prepared by the Centre for Development Studies for the Government of India, we have articulated that the emigration policy of India should be ‘safe, orderly and legal’ (CDS, 2009). Some countries discuss so much about immigration but ignore emigration and other countries do the opposite (see, Irudaya Rajan, 2012a). Let us assess the policy on immigration and emigration articulated to the United Nations (UN) by both South Asia and the Gulf. On immigration (entering into their countries), all countries in South Asia would like to maintain the existing policy, except Pakistan, which is keen on lowering the immigration to Pakistan. On the other hand, only two countries, Oman and United Arab Emirates, would like to maintain the immigration policy; all other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, are keen on lowering the immigration level to their countries, and it is being reflected in their policies as we have seen in the Nitaqat in Saudi Arabia (Table I.5). On emigration (on leaving their respective countries), Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Maldives and Sri Lanka are keen on maintaining their levels of emigration, whereas Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan are keen on expanding their emigration levels to spread their wings and they maintain a policy to raise the emigration level. Among Gulf countries, all of them, except Saudi Arabia, have a policy of non-intervention about their emigration. Only Saudi Arabia is keen on lowering their emigration. All countries in South Asia and Gulf should design their policies on both emigration and immigration to suit the changing needs with times in the context of demographic dividend. For instance, if India wants to reap the benefits of the demographic dividend, it should promote the policy on emigration to promote skilled Indians throughout the world using its Skill India project. This is possible because other countries are passing through the second demographic dividend.

Nationals and non-nationals in the Gulf The Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) network has provided information that around 50 million persons has enumerated in 2015 in GCC. Among the Gulf Countries, Saudi Arabia was at 30 million in mid2014. Interestingly, the percentage of national population to total population of GCC region was 51.9 per cent, and non-nationals recorded 48.1 per cent (Table I.6). Among the countries, United Arab Emirates registered 88.5 per 9

No intervention

Maintain

√

GCC

Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates

Source: United Nations (2013).

√

√

√ √ √ √ √ √

Raise

√ √

√

Lower

No intervention

√

√ √ √

Raise

√

Maintain

No intervention

√

No intervention

√

√ √

√

Lower

√

Lower

√

√ √ √

√

Raise

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Raise

Policy on emigration 2013

Policy on immigration 2013

Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

South Asia

Table I.5  Migration policy: South Asia and Gulf Cooporation Council

I N T RO D U C T I O N

Table I.6  Nationals and non-nationals in Gulf Cooporation Council (%) Years

1970–1975

1985

1995

2001/2002

2010–2016

Bahrain Nationals Non-nationals

82.47 17.53

63.5 36.5

61.8 38.2

60.0 40.0

47.98 52.02

Kuwait Nationals Non-nationals

30.94 69.06

27.7 72.3

36.1 63.9

37.0 63.0

30.65 69.35

Oman Nationals Non-nationals

91.61 8.39

81.6 18.4

72.7 27.3

74.0 26.0

54.59 45.41

Qatar Nationals Non-nationals

40.53 59.47

47.7 52.3

29.6 70.4

28.0 72.0

10.11 89.89

Saudi Arabia Nationals Non-nationals

88.71 11.29

69.3 30.7

67.9 32.1

70.0 30.0

67.28 32.72

The United Arab Emirates Nationals 36.13 Non-nationals 63.87

36.2 63.8

25.1 74.9

20.0 80.0

11.47 88.53

GCC Nationals Non-nationals

63.5 36.5

61.4 38.6

61.5 38.5

51.01 48.99

79.42 20.58

Sources: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, Demographic and Economic Database 2016.

cent non-nationals, followed by Qatar (85.7%) and Kuwait (69.2%). Among the non-nationals, South Asians together form the highest, and India is undoubtedly a leading non-national community in the Gulf. If we look at the share of labour force among non-nationals, this is more than the total population as non-nationals are brought to fill the gap in the labour force. Francoise De Bel-Air (2015) noted that foreign nationals have record 88.5 per cent of the country’s total population in the United Arab Emirates; most of the people were from Asian countries, particularly from India, and foreign nationals share 96 per cent of the Dubai’s employed population, particularly Asia (86.9%).

Remittances The World Bank estimates that the global inflow of remittances has reached USD 591 billion in 2014. In 1975, this number was only USD 11

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9.5 billion. The remittance flow to developing countries was estimated to reach USD 436 billion in 2014, an increase of 4.4 per cent from the previous year (World Bank, 2015). Generally, migration has become a key policy issue for many more countries, depending on the state of national economy and the employment situation. South Asian nations’ administrative perspective reflects that out migration from South Asia is supportive of reducing poverty, unemployment and increasing foreign exchange through remittance (Pong-Sul Ahn, 2004). The money that migrants send home is important not only to their families, but also for their country’s balance of payments. In many developing regions, like South Asia, remittances represent a significant proportion of the GDP as well as foreign exchange receipts (Irudaya Rajan and Narayana, 2012). Globally, South Asian regions have registered 3.7 per cent growth rate in remittances in 2015, while other regions, such as East Asia and the Pacific, recorded only 2.8 per cent. In 2015, around 20 per cent of the world remittances ended up in South Asia. South Asia received just USD 0.43 billion in 1970, which increased dramatically to USD 5.3 billion in 1980, USD 10.2 billion in 1995 and continues to grow to reach USD 115 billion in 2014. In 2014, the total inflow of remittances to South Asia was about USD 115.4 billion, whereas the outflow of remittances from the Gulf is estimated at USD 98.2 billion (Table I.7). All that the Gulf countries

Table I.7  Inflow and outflow of remittances to South Asia and Gulf (USD billions) South Asia

Inflow

Gulf

Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka South Asian GCC World

0.26 14.98 0.01 70.38 0.003 5.7 17.06 7.03 115.42 0.81 591.96

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates

GCC South Asia World

Sources: World Bank (2015).

12

Outflow 2.36 18.12 10.30 11.23 36.92 19.28

98.21 7.76 417.51

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think of is reducing the dependence on labour migration so that they can reduce the outflow of remittances. The highest outflow of remittances is from Saudi Arabia, followed by United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. Similarly, the highest inflow of remittances comes to India from emigrants followed by Pakistan and Bangladesh. This is a win-win situation for both South Asia and Gulf. Whatsoever in migration, who is the winner? Who is the loser?

The South Asia migration report As of now, my plan is to bring out three editions of the South Asia Migration Report (SAMR) published once in two years, starting from 2017 and ending in 2021. The subtheme of the 2017 SAMR is ‘Recruitment, Remittances and Reintegration’, based on the understanding that migration starts with recruitment from the countries of origin, remittances earned during their working life at the countries of destination and ends with their reintegration with the countries of origin. However, the chapters included in the current SAMR go beyond these three issues and discuss about diaspora, vulnerability and labour mobility. The introductory chapter of Carol Upadhya and Mario Rutten discusses migration, transnational flows and development in India from a regional perspective. This is based on a larger project conducted by the authors on the broad theme of ‘Provincial Globalisation’ (ProGlo). ProGlo is a five-year collaborative research programme of the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bangalore, India, funded by the WOTRO Science for Global Development programme of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), The Netherlands. This chapter reviews the migration and development debate and the current state of knowledge about flows of migrant resources to India and argues that tracing transnational connections and flows at the regional level will provide a more nuanced understanding of their social and economic implications. The second chapter explores the influence of vulnerability on migration intentions within the context of Afghanistan, one of the South Asian countries, by Craig Loschmann and Melissa Siegel. They construct a profile of household vulnerability through individual indicators of deprivation along four principal dimensions and then perform a regression analysis estimating the influence on migration intentions. Their result supports the suggestion that it is not the ‘poorest of the poor’, or in our case the ‘most vulnerable of the vulnerable’, who aspire to move, 13

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indicating that households have a realistic understanding of their capabilities, taking into consideration the inherent costs and risks associated with cross-border movement. Over the past two decades, thinking on skilled migration outflows and the diaspora has shifted significantly, away from the concept of brain drain towards brain gain and brain circulation. This shift is also evident in the three most populous South Asian countries, namely Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, which have a sizeable diaspora spread around the world. In this context, Rupa Chanda focusses on the contributions made by the skilled diaspora from these countries based in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia to their source economies and their policies and other factors that have enabled these contributions. The strategic and economic implications of ‘Asianisation’ of migrant workers in GCC countries, particularly its impact in terms of migration and remittances, are undoubtedly an important aspect in the context of the emerging Gulf-South Asia strategic relations. The social networking and the informal links, which have added additional impetus to the South Asia-Gulf migratory process, and the flow of workers to the Gulf are likely to continue in the future. Though Gulf migration is both transitory and circulatory in nature, the ongoing demand for expatriate workers from the GCC States has contributed to the existence of both second and third generation migrants in the region. However, Ginu Zacharia Oommen argues that the flow of migration from South Asia is still revolving around certain geographical locations, communities and families, and it is yet to permeate horizontally in the sending societies. The lack of a unified voice, a visibly weakened SAARC and the non-sensitive attitudes of sending countries have intensified the socio-economic uncertainties of migrant workers. There are a number of problems that labour recruitment industry is faced with in Bangladesh. Though successive governments have taken several initiatives to streamline the sector, the issues of visa trading, bringing dalals under legal cover and accessing the skilled labour market have thus far been left unattended. The absence of a proper and bold policy initiative in this regard has begun to have a debilitating impact on this lifeline of national economy. Collectively, the sending countries should impress upon the Gulf region that their employers and recruiters are widely engaged in this dubious exercise that is forbidden under their own national laws. C. R. Abrar and M. Motasim Billah argue that the Gulf States should be told in no uncertain terms that preying on the poor migrant workers is tantamount to be ‘haram’ in Islamic faith that they so zealously safeguard. 14

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One of the recently announced schemes in Nepal was ‘Free Visa, Free Ticket’ to international migrants. Governments, international organisations and civil society groups have adopted several measures to address what is seemingly a flawed recruitment practice – that of the workers being responsible for paying for their employment. Among the many initiatives, the ‘zero-cost migration’ for workers has received much consideration as the ‘ideal condition’ or ‘aspiration’ in bilateral labour negotiations, regional discussions and international forums. Thus, when the Government of Nepal (GoN) announced in July 2015 that the process of labour migration from Nepal would be free of cost, or with the minimum cost possible, it generated much interest and speculations on the issue, including mixed reactions from different groups, both in-country and elsewhere. Bandita Sijapati, Mohamed Ayub and Himalaya Kharel seek to understand and elucidate the different aspects of the ‘Free Visa and Free Ticket’ scheme and its implications on the foreign employment sector. Significant inflows of remittances into the economies of the developing countries have macroeconomic effects, which may have critical and important implications. However, available studies show different types of results with respect to the effects of remittances on economic growth. In the context of Bangladesh, remittance plays an important role in terms of its contribution to the gross national income and foreign exchange earnings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that remittance has helped alleviating poverty for many of the households, both in the rural and urban areas. In this context, Selim Raihan, Tasneem Siddiqui and Raisul A. Mahmood argue that remittance plays a very important role in Bangladesh with regard to macroeconomic stability, aggregate demand, household wellbeing measured by consumption level and their poverty incidence. More specifically, the result of marginal and income effects of ‘logit’ regression suggest that the probability of the household to be poor decreases by 5.9 per cent, if the household is a receiver of remittances. Syeda Rozana Rashid and Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder attempt a micro-social analysis of the processes, in which remittances are transferred and used by the members of the household in rural Bangladesh. In examining the remittance practices within the household, the chapter unveils the different ways in which locally embedded social norms and their practices impact the formation and functioning of the remitter-recipient nexus. It argues that co-insurance, trust and negotiation are amongst the key determinants of remittance decision making, since they fundamentally help converge the contrasting interests and preferences regarding the use of remittances. Myrtle Perera examines the effect of the global recession on the migration patterns of Sri Lanka and the consequent impact on the key areas of 15

S . I RU D AYA R A J A N

employment and remittances. There was a sharp dip in the magnitudes of migrants and a corresponding decline in foreign remittances. Another significant effect of recession was the change in the profile of migration. For the first time, female migration – especially large numbers going for jobs as housemaids – showed a definite dent, declining from 60 per cent in the 1980s to only 29 per cent in 2014. This slack has been taken up by male migrants, both unskilled and skilled, and some increase in the professional and clerical occupations. Government policy has been revised regularly to provide safe migration, secure employment and welfare benefits to migrant families. Using information from 2000 returnee migrants, Suwendrani Jayaratne, Nipuni Perera, Neluka Gunasekara and Nisha Arunatilake assess the factors affecting the successful reintegration of returnee migrants, and the effectiveness of existing programs and institutions to improve the reintegration process. The study finds that majority of the returnees have not integrated successfully: close to 80 per cent of the surveyed have not been able to improve their family economic situation, while 94 per cent have not been able to improve the possession of productive assets. Although there are a variety of programmes and institutions to help the returnees, very few (less than 10% of the sample) of the returnees maintained any links with institutions and few have received assistance for reintegrating. Most available programmes are not specific to returnee migrants. Further, majority of the available reintegration programmes catered to the lowskilled workers. Jagannath Adhikari discusses the gradual evolution of emigration policies and institutional development in Nepal since its formation as a ‘state’, but focusses mainly on policies after 1950 when Nepal also opened itself up to the outside world. These policies are then analysed from a politicaleconomic perspective. The rulers or the political class developed migration policies the way they suited them the best. This was especially so until 1990. Debates on human and migrant labour rights and the assumptions on the nexus between remittance/migration and development have also been influencing the policies since 1990. Accordingly, the social concerns, like poverty reduction, gender equality and empowerment, and development of human capital have entered into policies on emigration in recent times. But, still, the author believes that there are entrenched self-interests of government agencies, politicians and agents involved in formulating policies and sending workers abroad. Pakistan has seen high levels of internal migration in the recent decades. According to secondary information, economic migrants make up to 20 per cent of the total migration in the country. Sadia Ishfaq, Vaqar 16

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Ahmed, Danish Hassan and Asif Javed, through their in-depth analysis, argue that internal migration has not received its importance in academic circles due to the inadequacy of national mobility data. Their findings explain that, despite lack of data and definition issues, there is credible information that a significant number of people are moving (internally) across Pakistan. They are primarily motivated by income opportunities, security of household and assets. They require support mechanisms to deal with labour market inefficiencies in urban areas. Finally, the ruralrural migration is usually undertaken by the poorest of the poor. They require targeted social safety nets.

Notes 1 Asian region includes Central Asia, Eastern Asia, Southeastern Asia, Southern Asia and Western Asia. 2 South Asian countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

References Ahn, Pong-Sul. 2004. Migrant workers and Human Rights: Out-Migration from South Asia. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. Centre for Development Studies. 2009. Background Report for National Policy on International Migration, Research Unit on International Migration, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. De Bel-Air, Francoise. 2015. Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in the UAE, Explanatory Note No. 7, GLMM, http://gulfmigration.eu. George, Miriam, Wendy Kliewer, and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2015. Rather Than Talking in Tamil, They Should Be Talking to Tamils: Sri Lankan Tamil Refugee Readiness for Repatriation. Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 34, No. 2, pp. 1–22. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM). 2016. Demographic and Economic Database, http://gulfmigration.eu/gcc-total-population-and-percentage-of-nationalsand-non-nationals-in-gcc-countries-national-statistics-2010–2015. Hussain, Zakir. 2015. Immigration Policies of the GCC Countries: Implications and Responses, in S. Irudaya Rajan and Marie Percot (eds.) Dynamics of Indian Migration: Historical and Current Perspectives, pp. 93–163. New Delhi: Routledge. International Labour Orgainsation (ILO). 2015. Labour Market Trends Analysis and Labour Migration from South Asia to Gulf Corporation Council Countries, India and Malaysia. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration. International Organisation for Migration (IOM). 2015. World Migration Report 2015: Migrants and Cities New Partnerships to Manage Mobility. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration. Irudaya Rajan, S. 2012a. Editorial. Migration and Development, Volume 1, No. 1, pp. 1–4.

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Irudaya Rajan, S. (ed.). 2012b. India Migration Report 2012: Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances. New Delhi: Routledge. Irudaya Rajan, S. (ed.). 2016. India Migration Report 2016: Gulf Migration. New Delhi: Routledge. Irudaya Rajan, S. and D. Narayana. 2012. The Financial Crisis in the Gulf and Its Impact on South Asian Migration and Remittances, in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.) Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances: India Migration Report 2012, Chapter 5, pp. 74–93. Routledge. Ratha, Dilip and William Shaw. 2007. South-South Migration and Remittances. World Bank Working Paper Number 102, Washington, DC. Sasikumar, S.K. and Rakkee Thimothy. 2015. From India to the Gulf Region: Exploring Links between Labour Markets, Skills and the Migration Cycle. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. State Planning Board. 2009. Growing Old in Kerala, UNDP/Planning Commission project on strengthening state plans for human development, Thematic Study Series 6, State Planning Board, Thiruvananthapuram. United Nations (UN). 2013. World Population Policies Database 2013. New York: United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, Population Division, Policy Section. https://esa.un.org/PopPolicy/wpp_datasets.aspx. United Nations (UN). 2015. International Migrant Stocks by Destination and Origin. New York: United Nations, Departments of Economics and Social Affairs, Population Division. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/ data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). 2016. Sub-National Estimates of Human Capital Indicators: Localizing Investments for the Demographic Dividend [Poster]: UNFPA Upcoming Report. New York: United Nations. Valatheeswaran, C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2011. Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in India: Rehabilitation Mechanisms, Livelihood Strategies, and Lasting Solutions. Refugee Affairs Quarterly, Volume 30, No. 2, pp. 24–44. World Bank. 2015. Annual Remittance Data. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://www. worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migrationremittances-data.

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1 MIGRATION, TRANSNATIONAL FLOWS AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA A regional perspective Carol Upadhya and Mario Rutten1

Contemporary development discourses often represent migrants from developing countries as ‘agents of development’ (Faist 2008), because of the substantial resources that they transmit back home through remittances, investments and philanthropic donations. Accordingly, the relationship between migration and development has emerged as a key area of research, with numerous policy initiatives at the international and national levels directed at enhancing the connections between diasporic communities and their countries of origin. In this chapter, we argue that to fully understand the connections between ‘migration’ and ‘development’, it is necessary to carefully unravel the complexities of various forms of transnational mobility and remittances. The diverse transactions that are usually homogenised into categories, such as remittances or diaspora philanthropy, are in reality multifaceted social processes that are embedded in and inflected by the specific histories, social structures and political-economic formations of the home regions of the migrants or diasporic groups. We argue further that the outcomes of migrant resources can be best understood by tracing their movements through the transnational social fields that connect mobile subjects with their home regions. We first briefly review the migration and development debate, and then summarise the current state of knowledge on ‘reverse flows’ to India, which include remittances, diaspora philanthropy and investments as well as intangible resources such as knowledge, cultural orientations or political ideologies.2 We then draw attention to the multifaceted, multidirectional 19

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and multifocal nature of these flows and to the interconnections among them, and argue that only by reinserting migrant resources into their broader social context can we better understand their impacts on the home regions. Finally, we outline a methodological framework for mapping and analysing patterns of mobility and reverse flows in India.

Migration and development debate A substantial body of development research and policymaking today focusses on the potential benefits of international migration for developing countries, particularly on the resources that are sent by migrants to their families or communities at home. This ‘development mantra’ (Kapur 2004) views migration as an opportunity rather than a negative outcome of poverty and underdevelopment, as migrants from the South working in the North augment their skills and resources and become conduits through which human and financial capital is reinvested in their countries of origin (Clemens et al. 2014). The emergence of migrants as ‘heroes of development’ (Khadria 2008) and remittances as a ‘development tool’ (Bakker 2015) is linked to the influence of neoliberal ideology in the international development policy arena, which has entailed a rollback of development aid from both nation states and international institutions. The current discussion on migration and development was initiated by the 2003 World Bank report on Global Development Finance (2003), which claimed that the inflow of financial resources from developed to developing countries in the form of migrant remittances and philanthropy – at USD 90 billion a year globally – was nearly twice the total flow of official development assistance. Subsequently, international development agencies have repeatedly highlighted the significance of migrant remittances as a key source of capital and investment for developing countries (e.g. the UNDP’s Human Development Report 2009 [UNDP 2009]). Recent figures put the volume of international remittance transfers to developing countries at USD 300 billion in 2010 – an increase of about 270 per cent in the past decade (Guha 2011a: 2). In addition to household-level remittances, diaspora philanthropy is recognised as an important category of migrant transfers (Geithner et al. 2004; Merz et al. 2007).3 In India, the discussion on migration and development has focussed mainly on two issues – ‘brain drain’ (Khadria 1999) and the macroeconomic impact of remittances (Nayyar 1994) – but in this chapter, we show that the effects of migration and remittances to India are much more varied and complex than these discussions suggest. The current interest in migration and development has produced a large amount of literature detailing the types, volumes, channels, destinations, 20

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impact of remittances and other kinds of resource transfers. Most of these studies aim to determine whether and how resources sent by migrants to their home countries contribute (or not) to ‘development’. However, this work suffers from several theoretical and methodological problems. First, due to paucity of data, it is practically impossible to adequately assess the ‘impact’ of migration on development either by measuring the net losses and gains of migration (Maimbo and Ratha 2005) or by modelling the macroeconomic effects of remittances (Guha 2011b). The inadequacy of official data is compounded by the large proportion of remittances that flow through informal channels (Pieke et al. 2007). Further, most studies remain straitjacketed by conventional notions of both migration and development and simplistic models of their interconnections (De Haas 2010).4 Second, migration research often views mobility as a one-way process that mechanically connects ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ countries (Raghuram 2009), while studies of remittances also concentrate on unidirectional flows of resources. Moreover, remittance research is often carried out in isolation from migration studies, as if these two kinds of flows (of people and resources) were not interlinked processes. Third, the migration and development literature often constructs migrants primarily as economic actors, focusing narrowly on financial transactions to the neglect of other dimensions, such as ‘social remittances’ (Levitt 1998), that is, intangible flows of knowledge, ideas, ideologies, cultural products and organisational practices (Levitt and Rajaram 2012, 2013). Similarly, much more attention has been paid to the economic impacts of remittances than to the potential socio-cultural, ideological and political reverberations of diasporic connections with the homeland (Mohan 2008). The dominant view of migration and remittances as economic processes with primarily economic outcomes fails to take into account the cultural meanings, political motivations or social implications of resource transfers. Fourth, there is the problem of scale. Despite a growing recognition that transnational networks connect migrants with their home regions or towns at various scales, the development literature has focussed mainly on the relationship between nationally defined diasporas and their home countries, and on the macroeconomic impacts of remittances – an approach that has been criticised as ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). On the other hand, we have a number of micro-level qualitative or ethnographic studies that examine how remittance flows connect particular villages or communities with migrant members (Carling 2014). While this literature provides a useful corrective to the national scale bias, many of these studies ignore the larger 21

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political-economic context that shapes patterns of migration and remittances. Few scholars have neither attempted to capture at once the multiple scales of transnational mobilities and flows or the interconnections between different types of flows, nor has much attention been given to the intermediate scale of the region. In short, to fully unravel the intricacies of the multiple potential connections between ‘migration’ and ‘development’, we need to track transnational flows in all their complexity. Before discussing how this might be done, in the following section we provide a brief account of what we currently know about flows of migrant resources to India.

The Indian scenario Since the 1970s, the Indian government has formulated a range of policies and programmes to encourage non-resident Indians (NRIs)5 to invest in India, creating a form of transnational ‘financial citizenship’ (Amrute 2012; Lessinger 1992). After 2002, when the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora released its report (GOI 2002), India’s engagement with overseas Indians (OIs) broadened as they came to be viewed as an important source not only of foreign exchange and investment capital, but also of knowledge, expertise and skills. While many Indian diasporic communities across the world have long maintained connections with their home regions, such as by sending remittances to families at home or donations to local temples or schools, the creation of institutional, legal and financial frameworks to facilitate their engagements with India has both reinforced and reshaped these connections. In addition to national-level policymaking, several state governments (such as Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab) and even district-level bodies have forged direct relationships with their own diasporas by setting up NRI cells to channel donations and investments to development programmes or organising local ‘Pravasi’ events. In this section, we summarise the available information on four types of migrant transfers to India: (a) household remittances and NRI deposits (individual-level transfers); (b) diaspora philanthropy; (c) direct investments; and (d) intangible resources. However, as detailed below, available data sources do not provide a clear mapping of these various kinds of flows nor their ultimate destinations or uses. Remittances

By 2001, India was already the largest recipient of overseas remittances in the developing world (World Bank 2003), and the country continues to 22

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hold first place.6 Remittances rose dramatically from the 1990s, due to several policy changes and incentive schemes promulgated by the Government of India (Kapur 2010: 112–113). World Bank figures put total remittance receipts in India at USD 55 billion in 2010,7 and calculated remittances at 4 per cent of GDP and 23 per cent of international reserves in 2013,8 but such estimates are unreliable (Guha 2011a). There are two main channels of household-level remittances: direct transfers to families at home through official banking channels or other money transfer organisations and local withdrawals from NRI accounts.9 According to Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data, the largest proportion of remittance receipts in 2008–2009 consisted of family-level remittance transfers at USD 14,288 million, followed by local redemptions from NRI accounts (USD 11,217 million) and ‘personal gifts and donations’ at USD 1,525 million. Total ‘private transfers’ in the same year amounted to USD 46,903 million.10 In addition, we have several state-level studies such as the periodic Kerala Migration Surveys, focusing on Gulf migration (Zachariah et al. 2002; also see Dhak and Shah 2014 for a survey of Gujarat). Kerala provides the most dramatic example of a ‘remittance dependent’ regional economy, and is also the most studied state in India with regard to outmigration, yet existing studies do not provide a clear picture of the interlinkages between migration and development even in this case. In 2008, around one-fourth of households in the state had one or more emigrant or return migrant members, and remittances accounted for about one-third of the state’s net domestic product (Zachariah and Rajan 2010: 4–8). Several scholars have suggested that this high level of remittances provided the ground for the ‘Kerala model’ of development (Zachariah et al. 2001a, 2001b), but others argue that remittances instead have given rise to a consumer-driven economy marked by stark imbalances, a decline in agricultural production, stagnant industrial development and high rates of unemployment (Kannan 2005). Moreover, micro- and macro-level studies of remittances often yield contradictory findings. High levels of migration and remittances in states such as Kerala and Punjab seem to have contributed to economic growth or enhanced social welfare overall (Banerjee et al. 2002; Oberai and Singh 1980), yet micro-level studies suggest that remittances may have negative effects, such as by sharpening social or economic divisions in migrants’ home communities (Ballard 2003; Taylor et al. 2007) or undermining local economic autonomy (Gardner 2008). As shown in several villagelevel studies, migrants tend to display their new-found wealth by constructing opulent houses in their home villages or engaging in other forms of ‘conspicuous consumption’, confirming the negative view that 23

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migrant resources are often ‘wasted’ on unproductive forms of expenditure rather than being invested in ‘productive’ activities (De Haas 2007: 16–17). Migrant investments may also inflate local land prices, exacerbating inequalities in land ownership (Gardner 1995). Transnational connections have been observed to strengthen relations of caste domination or inequality (Taylor and Singh 2013; Taylor et al. 2016) or lead to social conflicts (Osella and Osella 2000). These conflicting conclusions suggest that many more local-, regional- and state-level studies are needed if we are to understand more clearly the outcomes of migrant resource transfers, which are likely to be highly variable across regions. Diaspora philanthropy

‘Diaspora philanthropy’ is increasingly recognised as a significant modality of migrant resource transfers to India (Viswanath and Dadrawala 2004). This term encompasses a wide range of activities, from donations to religious institutions, NGOs or charities to individual social welfare projects funded by migrants in their native villages. According to one estimate, NRI donations to religious organisations and charitable institutions totalled USD 5,472 million between 1995 and 2002 (Kapur et al. 2004: 183). However, there are no reliable figures on the extent, destinations or uses of such diaspora philanthropy, partly because a large proportion of such funds enter India through informal channels (Guha 2011a: 15). Donations flow into India through a range of routes – remittances to family members who are requested to make donations to local temples or development projects, direct gifts by visiting migrants or via registered trusts or foundations. Kapur et al. (2004: 195) found that the two most important channels for Indian diaspora funds were informal family or personal networks and faith-based (religious) organisations, followed by international, diasporic and national NGOs. In addition, there are numerous development-oriented private initiatives promoted by wealthy NRIs who build schools or temples in their home regions – a form of philanthropy that usually escapes official statistics. Our review of the literature suggests that it is only through micro-level studies that we can get a sense of the range of migrant resources that flow into different regions and locales in India, as well as the local perceptions and effects of these transfers. For example, several studies suggest that migrant philanthropy in the home village may create divisions and conflicts between migrant and non-migrant households rather than enhancing overall welfare. The local people who are the targets of migrant-funded development projects may perceive these activities cynically, for instance, 24

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as migrants’ investments in their own social status or as an attempt to make their stay more comfortable when they come for their annual visits (Dekkers and Rutten 2011; Taylor et al. 2007). Direct investment

In addition to private savings schemes, various incentives to attract business investments by NRIs have been offered by the central and state governments, especially since 2005, for instance by setting up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) exclusively for NRIs. However, RBI statistics do not reveal what proportion of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India comes from NRIs or OIs, either as individual investors or through companies, nor do we have aggregate statistics on purchase of land, real estate and other investments by NRIs. Kapur (2010: 105) notes that the level of NRI investment in India between 1991 and 2004 was just 7 per cent of total FDI, at USD 2.8 billion. A survey of Indian origin households in the United States showed that the majority of NRI investments were ‘passive’, going into real estate (33%) or bank accounts (28%) rather than business or other investments (Kapur 2010: 93–94). This finding is significant because it confirms the popular perception that land and real estate are major destinations of NRI money coming into India – an important transnational flow on which there are few studies (but see Ananth 2015; Varghese and Thakur 2015; Varrel 2012). Social remittances

Most attention has been paid in the literature to transfers of material resource, but intangible flows emanating from the Indian diaspora, such as knowledge, ideas and know-how, professional and scientific collaborations and political or religious ideologies, arguably exert more influence on India’s development trajectory (Kapur 2010).11 While the Government of India has been interested in tapping NRIs for their social and cultural capital in addition to their economic resources (Kapur 2003), many NRIs in turn are deeply engaged in political advocacy and social movements in India (Bose 2008). OIs have organised themselves into significant pressure groups, both in pursuit of their own interests and to pursue their vision of development or social causes in India (Gandhi 2002). ‘Religious transnationalism’ is another example of intangible flows (van der Veer 2002) – religious organisations are especially prominent destinations for NRI donations, with mixed and controversial results. NRI contributions to the construction or renovation of temples or to religious/cultural 25

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organisations have been instrumental in sharpening intercommunity conflicts in India (Rajagopal 1997). However, transnational connections forged by political or religious movements do not necessarily result in increased radicalisation, as is often assumed, but may have more complex outcomes such as a trend towards ‘moderation’ or support for religious or social reforms within migrants’ own communities (Ahmad 2005; Osella and Osella 2008; Simpson 2003). NRI connections with India

This selective review of the literature from the South Asian region shows that diasporic and migrant subjects are actively involved in India at various scales and through diverse economic, political and social connections. Remittances, investments and philanthropy by OIs constitute a substantial (and highly uneven) flow of financial and intangible resources to India, yet the quality of data on these cross-border flows in terms of volume, scales, content, channels, destinations and impacts is poor. We do not have a clear picture of how patterns of migration and remittances vary across different regions or social groups. What kinds of networks link different towns and regions with migrants abroad, what resources flow through them and what are their key destinations and uses? What role do local actors play in attracting, directing and utilising migrant remittances or philanthropy? How have state institutions, at different levels, responded to migrant activities and investments within India? To answer these and related questions, a more nuanced methodology is required to map and analyse transnational movements and connections, the channels of transmission, the purposes for which migrant resources are used and their consequences for the development of the recipient regions.

Nuancing transnational flows In this section, we elaborate our main argument that remittances, philanthropic donations and other kinds of ‘reverse flows’ are multifaceted, multidirectional and multinodal, and hence cannot be reduced to simple one-way, singular transactions (as they are often represented in the development studies literature). First, as noted above, studies of migration and development often ignore the crucial social, cultural, political or ideological dimensions of migrant resource flows, analysing them in isolation from the larger context within which both mobility and resource transfers take place (Levitt 2008). Yet, such flows are in reality multidimensional in character – they are not 26

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simply economic transactions but are deeply embedded in social networks and transmitted through a range of social mechanisms, such as kinship and caste networks, to diverse recipient sites. For example, fluctuations in NRI deposits and other private capital flows are usually viewed as outcomes of financial factors such as changing interest rates or government incentives (Gordon and Gupta 2004; Singh 2009), but often, non-economic (especially political) factors are more significant in decisions by NRIs to remit, invest or donate to India (Lessinger 1992; Walton-Roberts 2004b). Conversely, studies of transnational political or religious movements or other kinds of ‘social remittances’ often treat them as entirely separate from economic flows, although mobilising funds is usually a key activity of diasporic actors in such cases. Transnational flows are not only interpellated by local, national and transnational socio-economic structures and processes, but may also have profound (and often unintended) political or cultural consequences. For instance, funding for development activities is often accompanied by new models and practices of development or ideas of the ‘good society’, which may reshape existing development paradigms or programmes in the recipient country. Second, what are treated as different ‘types’ of transfers (family remittances, investments, donations) are often closely entangled and not easily separated. In Coastal Andhra, diaspora philanthropy is just one strand in a multiplicity of flows, including business investments, which emanate from affluent non-resident Telugus (NRTs). For example, the NRI Educational Society (NRIES) in Guntur merges philanthropy with business interests by providing free education to poor and meritorious students, while also running private fee-paying institutes for upper middle class students.12 Similarly, the mushrooming of super speciality private hospitals in the region is linked to NRT investments, even as NRT doctors also promote charitable activities in the health sector (Heerink 2012). Unravelling the intertwined paths and ultimate destinations of resources travelling through transnational networks is all the more difficult, because the channels and destinations of migrant transfers may diverge as well as converge. In Central Gujarat, money deposited in NRI bank accounts (which would be counted in official statistics as investments or remittances) may be withdrawn by local relatives who are asked to make donations in the NRI’s name to religious or charitable organisations (Dekkers and Rutten 2011; Guha 2014; Guha and Dhak 2013). Similarly, while contributions to religious organisations may be viewed as purely ‘religious’ in nature, many such institutions (such as the Swaminarayan organisations) use these resources to sponsor social development activities. Rather than slotting such transactions into discrete categories, such as ‘remittances’, 27

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‘philanthropy’ or ‘investment’, it is more useful, if difficult, to try to retain these complexities in tracking transnational flows. Third, neither ‘migration’ nor ‘remittances’ are simple unidirectional processes; rather, the exchange of resources between migrants and their families or communities at home is usually multidirectional, while migration, too, is increasingly circular or multipolar in nature. People, money, things and ideas move in various directions and along multiple paths as interconnected flows through more or less structured networks or institutional arrangements. What have been singled out as discrete processes of ‘migration’ and ‘remittances’ are not just two sides of a coin, but also two strands in a larger complex of networks and exchanges.13 For example, the migration process is often supported by the migrant’s family and remittances may be regarded as repayment of such debts (Dekkers and Rutten 2011: 3; Singh 2006: 378). Yet the large investments that are made by potential migrants and their families in the migration process itself – in education, attaining certifications, visa fees, travel costs and support for migrant children while they get established abroad – are often ignored in macroeconomic studies of migration and development. Moreover, for some migrants, such investments ultimately do not pay off (Rajan et al. 2011). Investment in higher education, in India or abroad, is a particularly crucial strategy that underwrites high-skilled migration (‘permanent’ as well as circular) and illustrates the high level of investments that are made in the migration process. Student migration, in turn, has become a key channel of mobility from India, with mixed consequences for young migrants who may get cheated by visa and education agents or end up studying in substandard institutions abroad (Baas 2010; Lagerwaard 2012; Rutten and Verstappen 2014). The growing transnational ‘educational regime’ may also have negative implications for social development in the home regions, by widening local inequalities or reshaping the educational priorities and career choices of local youth (Harriss and Osella 2010; Upadhya 2016). Fourth, transnational connections and exchanges may get reproduced (and also altered) across several generations. A case in point are the Patels of Central Gujarat, who first migrated to East Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and from the early 1970s to the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western countries. Many of these migrants have maintained ties with their home villages and continue to send back various kinds of remittances and resources, but the nature of these connections and resource flows have changed over time. While most remittances from East Africa migrants were used for household consumption, to make improvements to the ancestral house and as investments in agriculture 28

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through the boring of tube wells or purchase of land, the more recent flows from Patels living in the United Kingdom and the United States go mainly into bank accounts and real estate (non-agricultural land and housing property) or are used for philanthropic projects, especially in the education and health sectors (Chandra 1997; Rutten 2012; Rutten and Patel 2002). Strategies of mobility unfold over time and often over generations, which means that a longitudinal approach would better capture the multidirectional and multidimensional character of these flows. The circulation of migrants themselves, who return to their homes periodically or permanently, is an important aspect of multidirectionality that may significantly impinge on social and cultural configurations in their home villages or towns (Ramji 2006; Walton-Roberts 2004a). A growing number of highly educated NRIs are returning to India to work, start businesses or to retire, bringing with them accumulated knowledge, capital and other resources as well as intangible resources such as political ideas or ‘know-how’. Returned NRIs, or ‘RNRIs’, who often ‘return’ not to their native towns or villages but to India’s ‘high-tech’ cities, such as Hyderabad and Bangalore, bring with them new aspirations, ideals and ideologies that are conditioned by their experiences abroad, in turn inflecting the cultural orientation of the middle classes in India (Chacko 2007; Upadhya 2013; Varrel 2011). The earlier predominant one-way flow of highly skilled labour from developing to high-income countries is being replaced by more complex circular and multipolar movements of skills, capital and technology between specialised regional economies. For example, wealthy Indian-origin IT entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley have invested significantly in the IT sector in India as venture capitalists or entrepreneurs (Saxenian 2006; Upadhya 2004), while Indian IT professionals circulate through various sites in the global informational economy (van der Veer 2005; Xiang 2007). Another example of multi­ directionality is the return of NRIs’ children to India for school or college, who stay with grandparents or are enrolled in elite ‘international’ boarding schools that promise to provide not only a good education, but also a grounding in ‘Indian culture’. In other cases, grandparents move in the other direction, travelling to the United Kingdom or the United States to take care of grandchildren to enable both NRI parents to pursue their careers (Lamb 2002). Finally, the forms, destinations and uses of transnational flows are shaped by the kinds of migrant and transnational organisations or networks through which they move. As Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011) point out, what comes back is influenced by migrants’ prior experiences and the ideas and practices that they take with them. By treating different 29

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kinds of mobilities – of people and resources – to and from (and within) a region as disconnected and discrete processes, we curtail the possibility of producing more in-depth and fine-grained analyses of these flows.

Mapping transnational flows Only by reinserting migrant resource flows back into the transnational social fields, through which they travel (and of which they are constitutive), can we begin to understand the significance of reverse flows and their effects in the recipient regions and communities. In this section, we review key concepts that have developed around the idea of transnationalism and discuss their theoretical potential. We also draw on anthropological literature that provides additional insights into processes of migration, the formation of transnational connections and their consequences for migrants and their home regions. The idea of transnationalism came into prominence in the early 1990s (Glick Schiller et al. 1992) and caught the attention of many social science scholars, leading to the development of the interdisciplinary field of transnational studies (which draws especially from anthropology and sociology). Since then, the concept has been refined and employed in various ways, reflected in terms such as ‘transnational community’ and ‘transnational network’ (Kivisto 2001). The terms ‘transnational social space’ and ‘transnational social field’ refer to ‘combinations of social and symbolic ties and their contents, positions in networks and organisations, and networks of organisations that cut across the borders of at least two national states’ (Faist 2010: 1673). In contrast to the older field of migration studies, the transnational approach emphasises the dynamics of mobility and the creation of cross-border ties (Vertovec 2003, 2009). Transnationalism is not so much a territorially grounded concept as an ‘optic or gaze that begins with a world without borders, empirically examines the boundaries and borders that emerge at particular historical moments, and explores their relationship to unbounded arenas and processes’ (Levitt and Khagram 2007: 5). Although social ties between migrants and their home countries is a much older phenomenon, it is argued that transnational connections have only recently acquired the ‘critical mass and complexity necessary to speak of an emergent social field’ (Portes et al. 1999: 217). Scholars have suggested that systemic or structural shifts are occurring in places that have significant patterns of outmigration, or that transnationalism may at least deepen or broaden the ongoing processes of transformation in the home region (Vertovec 2004). The transnational lens has the advantage of encompassing both sides of these flows (migrants and 30

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those at home) within the same framework, by mapping the networks and channels through which people and resources move. The anthropological literature has contributed additional insights into how transnational social fields are formed and maintained. A number of studies point to the centrality of marriage practices in migration strategies and the reproduction of transnational networks (Beck-Gernsheim 2007; Charsley and Shaw 2006; Palriwala and Uberoi 2005). Similarly, migration and reverse flows may alter or reinforce structures of caste, kinship or political power, or extend these relations through transnational spaces (Velayutham and Wise 2005), and often creating transnational networks of caring and support or ‘transnational families’ (Baldassar et al. 2006; Gardner 2006). Geographical mobility should also be understood as one among several interlinked strategies of social mobility, which may include transnational marriages, pursuit of foreign educational certifications or visible acts of philanthropy. Such mobility strategies may have unintended consequences for local societies, as when remittances create inequalities between migrant and non-migrant households or introduce consumption-oriented lifestyles that others seek to emulate. An emergent ‘culture of migration’ (Ali 2007) may foster new aspirations among village youth, contribute to the reinforcement or reconstitution of cultural, religious, community or regional identities (Kalyanaraman and Koskimaki 2013; Verstappen 2016) or introduce new social imaginaries or aspirations for modernity (Gardner and Osella 2003; Osella and Osella 2006, 2007). From an anthropological perspective, transnational networks and connections, like all social relationships, are created and sustained in part through the exchange of gifts, flows of commodities and other material transactions (Werbner 1990, 2000). By abstracting particular transactions out of their social contexts, development-oriented studies often refuse to recognise the thick cultural substratum of various forms of reciprocity or the centrality of consumption or the accumulation of symbolic capital to mobility strategies. Remittances are never just individual financial transfers aimed at sustaining households far away, but are motivated and structured by social relations of kinship, family or caste, by cultural identities based on religion or language or by political imaginations of national or subnational homelands. Flows of money, gifts, commodities, ideas and people through transnational social fields are not just economic processes, but are loaded with cultural meanings. Viewing specific resource flows within their social and cultural contexts provides a deeper understanding of their larger significance and local effects. Drawing on these insights, in the following section, we sketch out a theoretical framework for tracking resource transfers from migrants to 31

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their home regions in order to better understand their consequences. The complex nature of transnational social spaces demands a nuanced approach that not only captures their multidimensional nature, but also the various scales at which transnational connections and networks are formed – especially the regional scale.

Transnationalism at a regional scale Although the idea of transnationalism has stimulated an outpouring of research and rethinking on the implications of international migration, this literature has tended to reproduce the problem of ‘methodological nationalism’. As noted above, most studies of migration and development in India remain at the level of the nation state, glossing over significant regional variations in patterns of migration, the nature of migrant networks, the volume, kinds and destinations of remittances and other reverse flows. However, transnational social fields are shaped by institutional actors, power dynamics and policies at, below and above the level of the nation (Caglar 2004), hence the study of transnational ties and flows must be multi-scalar. There is also a need to investigate the ‘reconfiguration of place, landscape and space by transnational flows’ (Bruslé and Varrel 2012), particularly in relation to provincial towns (Scrase et al. 2015; Verstappen and Rutten 2015). Yet, the literature on migration and transnationalism in India has largely ignored the intermediate level of the region – a socio-economic or cultural formation below the level of the nation state and also smaller than most states in India, but larger than the taluka or district. The region is not a readily definable geographical unit; it is usually not coterminous with a political entity, and may have a primarily agroeconomic, cultural, linguistic or political identity, with inchoate or shifting boundaries. Yet, across much of India, regions are recognised as salient socio-spatial categories, characterised by distinct histories, social formations, languages or cultural configurations (Misra and Niranjana 2005).14 Regions have their own dynamics that cannot be captured by micro-level studies and are often glossed over in state- and national-level analyses. We argue that the region is the most appropriate scale for mapping patterns of mobility and reverse flows, not only because of India’s great regional diversity, but also because transnational flows are shaped and inflected by the specific histories, social structures and political-economic formations of the ‘migrant-sending regions’. Focusing on the regional scale will, therefore, produce a more grounded understanding of the interconnections between the diverse places, people and scales that constitute the 32

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transnational social fields through which remittances, diaspora philanthropy and NRI investments move. In addition, a series of regional-level studies will allow for comparison of particular processes or dimensions of reverse flows across regions, which may reveal significant correspondences between types of migration or diasporic networks and the kinds of resources that come back. The proposed methodology would also map the institutional structures, networks and key nodal points, through which resources move or which direct, facilitate and motivate these flows. Processes of transnationalisation may transform social institutions (e.g. of citizenship, education or kinship), and these institutional changes in turn influence transnational ties (Faist et al. 2010: 8–10; cf. Portes 2003). With the strengthening of transnational ties, older institutions may acquire new meanings or functions, and new institutions may emerge at various levels – local or regional (such as schools or welfare organisations funded by migrants), national (changes in citizenship rules) and transnational (migrant associations). A growing literature has documented the diverse associations, voluntary organisations and networks that have emerged to channel migrant resources such as ‘hometown associations’ (Caglar 2006; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011: 3) argue for a stronger focus on collective (as opposed to individual) social remittances, that is, the deployment of remittances in organisational settings such as NRI-supported NGOs. Thus, an important research strategy for studying the local or regional outcomes of cross-border flows is to identify the political, economic and socio-cultural institutions in migrants’ countries of origin that have been transformed by transnationalism. To illustrate the usefulness of a trans-regional (rather than transnational) ‘optic’ with a focus on mediating structures and connections, we take the example of ‘diaspora philanthropy’ and its variations across several regions of India. A large but unknown number of diasporic and transnational organisations as well as individual NRIs are engaged in philanthropic activities in India (Sidel 2004), including formal associations as well as informal networks. Such organisations or networks may be very broad based or narrow in their membership, but most are constructed on the basis of regional, linguistic, religious or caste identities, and in most cases their activities are directed to their own home towns or regions (Guha 2014; Rajan et al. 2016; Rutten 2008; Thandi 2006; van Kampen 2012). Many diasporic organisations mobilise donations to support development projects in areas such as education, health and rural development, while local NGOs and charitable foundations, in turn, may solicit NRI donations to support their activities (Portes et al. 2007). NRI philanthropic 33

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activities may emanate from existing organisations or create new ones; link new institutional structures to existing local organisations in India; or promote the establishment of new kinds of NGOs or social movements in the target areas. The social composition of such associations presumably influences the kinds of developmental or social welfare activities that they sponsor in India. However, we have few case studies of the activities of NRI-sponsored NGOs or development initiatives. Below, we provide a brief comparative sketch of three regional diasporas and their philanthropic activities – Patels from central Gujarat, Punjabi migrants from the Doaba region and Telugu NRIs from Coastal Andhra. The Gujarati Patels constitute a large and powerful diaspora with a long tradition of supporting development schemes in their home villages, particularly for education and health. The Gujarat state government has actively courted NRI investments through concessional schemes and events such as the biannual Vibrant Gujarat summit. Yet it appears that the majority of donations to this region are not channelled through state institutions or formal organisations but primarily through informal village, caste or religious organisations or networks. Many Patel NRIs provide donations directly when they visit their native villages or transmit them through their local relatives. This avoidance of formal channels may be due, in part, to their distrust of government bureaucracy (Rutten and Patel 2007) or to the ideological role of hindutva and religious sentiments that influence many overseas Patels to donate to temples and religious organisations (Dekkers and Rutten 2011: 16–18). A similar pattern is seen in the Doaba region of Punjab, with its long history of outmigration and transnationalisation and close involvement of diasporic groups with their home villages (Tatla and Dusenbery 2010). Philanthropic remittances have grown in importance over the last several decades (Walton-Roberts 2005, cited in Rajan and Varghese 2010: 104). While earlier generations of migrants often sent donations to establish large memorial gates in their home villages and towns in memory of their ancestors, currently such resources are directed more to supporting development activities or gurudwaras (Singh 2008, cited in Rajan and Varghese 2010: 104). According to one estimate, INR 1,600 crore were donated by NRIs to the Doaba region during the five-year period up to 2008 (Rajan and Varghese 2010: 104). The Government of Punjab has taken several measures to attract and channel such funds, for example, by establishing a state-level Department of NRI Affairs in 2002 (Sahai et al. 2011). However, official measures have probably not succeeded in capturing even a fraction of the informal flows that typify diasporic relations with the home region. 34

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The pattern of diaspora philanthropy in Coastal Andhra is quite different from that seen in central Gujarat or the Doaba. US-based NRTs frequently raise money and organise developmental activities in the home region, especially for rural areas, and these resources are usually channeled through registered trusts or public-private schemes. The Andhra Pradesh state government not only set up a state-level department of NRI Affairs, but several districts have also established their own NRI Cells to promote NRI engagement with local areas. Roohi’s research revealed that resources channelled through the Guntur District NRI Cell are primarily directed to the donors’ home villages or towns, where many still have family members living.15 Much of the philanthropic activity in the region is spearheaded by diaspora associations in the United States, such as the Foundation of the Telugu Association of North America (TANA) and the ‘Adopt a Village – Support your Motherland’ scheme of the American Telugu Association (ATA).16 A number of foundations and trusts headed by NRIs or with NRI support are working in Coastal Andhra, such as the Ramineni Foundation, Society for Rural Scholars and the Shankara Eye Hospital (Heerink 2012; Roohi forthcoming). Highly educated NRTs tend to support initiatives linked to their professions, such as medical education, while religious donations appear to be less significant in Andhra compared to the Doaba region of Punjab or Central Gujarat. These examples illustrate the variability of the phenomena that are usually lumped together as ‘diaspora philanthropy’. Even within a single region, we find a complex congeries of transnational flows, characterised by different sources, channels and destinations, which can only loosely be understood as similar practices. In order to explain these patterns and variations, we need to track such flows at the regional level and then compare spatial and economic differences in their form, destinations and uses. We also need to contextualise reverse flows within transnational social fields that have been shaped by the specific histories and social formations of the home regions. For example, the different migration patterns of the dominant landowning communities of Coastal Andhra and Central Gujarat, which are linked to the agrarian structures and social histories of these regions, may explain their differing modes of transnational giving and engagement with the home villages. The landowning castes of Andhra transnationalised themselves through higher education, especially in engineering and medicine, followed by migration to North America, creating a regional diaspora of highly educated, professional NRTs. This regional diaspora usually supports health, education or rural development initiatives and tends 35

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to channel funds through formal channels such as NGOs, government schemes or registered trusts. In contrast, Patel migrants have established themselves abroad – in Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States – mainly as small businessmen and traders. For them, maintaining strong links of caste and kinship with their native villages through direct donations can be seen as a key strategy of both social mobility and security. The socio-economic characteristics and historical formation of these regional diasporas thus help to explain these divergent patterns of giving. Thus, the methodological framework, outlined in this section, will allow us to better delineate and contextualise processes of transnational mobility and flows and also provide a conceptual basis for cross-regional comparative studies.

Conclusion Flows of migrant resources – tangible and intangible – to developing countries are believed to influence processes of economic and social development. Such resources enter the home villages and towns of migrants by traversing transnational social fields and have diverse implications for local economies, social structures, politics and cultural orientations. The nature and effects of reverse flows are highly variable and complex and depend on a range of factors, including the historical and social specificities of the migrant-sending regions; the types and pattern of mobility from the region; the institutional structures that shape and direct transfers of resources. In order to go beyond current discussions on remittances, diaspora philanthropy and migrant investments, an ethnographically ‘thicker’ and theoretically sophisticated account of transnational connections and flows is needed, in particular by paying more attention to the social, political and cultural configurations of regional transnational social fields. We suggest that the regional scale is best suited for mapping and analysing flows of migrant resources to India, while keeping in view the multi-scalar nature of transnational social spaces. Our proposed methodological approach to this research problem centres on mapping regional transnational social fields and the organisational structures and networks that facilitate and direct reverse flows. This approach will allow us to better delineate and understand the implications of mobilities and transnational flows and to compare these processes across regions, which in turn will generate a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the migration and development nexus in India. 36

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Postscript This chapter is a slightly revised version of an article that was earlier published in the Economic and Political Weekly (Volume 47, No. 19, pp. 54–62, 2012). The chapter summarises the research agenda and early findings of the Provincial Globalisation research programme, co-directed by Mario Rutten and Carol Upadhya. The chapter has been revised and updated by Upadhya alone, following Prof. Rutten’s untimely demise, to reflect recent work on this topic and some of the findings of the programme. The objective of the Provincial Globalisation (‘ProGlo’) programme was to examine the connections between international migration from India, the formation of transnational networks and social development, by mapping the ‘reverse flows’ of resources – both tangible and intangible – that are sent by migrants and diasporic communities to their regions of origin. The programme consisted of five doctoral and postdoctoral projects located in three regions of India – Central Gujarat, Coastal Andhra Pradesh and Coastal Karnataka – focusing on key provincial towns and their rural hinterlands. The outputs of the component research projects, some of which are cited here, have documented the diversity of material flows, such as household remittances, investments in land or businesses and financial support for NGOs, as well as ‘intangible’ flows such as social aspirations, cultural assertions and religious ideologies. By mapping transnational networks and flows at a regional scale, the programme has produced significant new knowledge about how migration and ‘reverse flows’ of resources are shaping socio-economic transformations in India as well as more general insights into the economic, social, political and cultural effects of international migration.

Notes   1 The original version of this chapter was published in the Economic and Political Weekly (47, no. 19: 54–62, 2012). The paper was an output of the Provincial Globalisation research programme, a collaboration between the AISSR, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands and the NIAS, Bangalore, India, funded by the WOTRO (The Netherlands). Although Mario Rutten lived to see the successful completion of the programme in October 2015, several publications and two doctoral dissertations were still in the pipeline at the time of his death. My endeavour, supported by members of the Provincial Globalisation programme, is to complete all the work that Mario had planned and pursued, some of which is reflected in this revision. The inputs of all the ‘ProGlo’ team members to this work are gratefully acknowledged. For information on the programme, see: www.provglo.org.   2 We use the term ‘reverse flows’ to refer to the entire gamut of remittances, investments and other resources – tangible and intangible – that are sent by migrants

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  6

  7   8   9 10

or diasporic communities to their families or communities in India. However, the term has a different meaning in macroeconomics, referring remittances that are used not for consumption or investment but for debt amortisation, reserve accumulation or capital flight (Das and Serieux 2010). Development experts have not always held such a positive view of migration. The contemporary enthusiastic view succeeds an earlier period of pessimism that highlighted the ‘brain drain’ or the loss of human capital to the developed world caused by migration, which in turn followed an earlier phase of optimism. For detailed accounts of these shifts, see Castles (2008), De Haas (2010) and Faist (2008). We leave aside here the problematic use of ‘development’ in this literature, which tends to refer only to income growth (De Haas 2005, 2007) and to ignore several decades of critical thinking and post-development literature (Davies 2007). In this chapter, we use the terms ‘NRI’ generically and interchangeably with the currently official term ‘OIs’, in consonance with the popular usage of ‘NRI’. OI in government parlance includes all types and generations of people of Indian origin around the world. Since the 1970s, the Government of India has devised a series of special categories and linked policies which have progressively incorporated OIs into India’s economy and polity. The NRI category was formulated in the 1980s, followed by the Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) scheme in 2002 (which granted visa-free entry and rights to property ownership to ‘people of Indian origin’ with foreign citizenship), and most recently the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) category in 2005 (Roy 2006). NRI is an official category created mainly for taxation purposes, designating Indian citizens who are resident abroad for more than 183 days a year, while the PIO and OCI cards are like long-term visas, available only to non-citizens (Indian origin people who have taken up foreign citizenship). On the implications of these policies for citizenship and nation, see Amrute (2012), Biswas (2005), Dickenson and Bailey (2007), Edwards (2008) and Xavier (2011). World Bank Migration and Development Brief no. 24, April 13, 2015. Available at: https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/ 334934–1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief24.pdf, accessed 8 May 2016. World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPRO SPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21352016~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSit ePK:476883,00.html, accessed 8 October 2011. World Bank Migration and Development Brief no. 24, 13 April 2015. https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934– 1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief24.pdf, accessed 8 May 2016. The Government of India has introduced various savings deposit schemes in commercial banks specifically for NRIs; in some schemes family members may be given limited withdrawal rights. Guha’s (2011a: 9–10) analysis of RBI data reveals that local withdrawals from NRI accounts have become more important compared to conventional family level transfers via money transfer organisations. However, macro-level data on migration and remittances available from the National Sample Survey (NSS) and the RBI are quite limited (Kapur 2010: 114–15).

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11 A large body of work, stemming from Anderson’s (1992) ‘long-distance nationalism’ thesis, has studied the involvement of diasporic communities as social and political actors in their countries of origin (Featherstone 2007; van der Veer 1995). However, this literature has been largely ignored in the development and migration debate. 12 This information is drawn from Sanam Roohi’s forthcoming doctoral dissertation, University of Amsterdam. 13 The brain drain/brain gain literature does attempt to measure the net effects at the macro-level by balancing investments in human capital in the migrantsending countries against potential inflows of new knowledge or return migration of highly skilled personnel (Beine et al. 2001). However, these analyses mostly remain at the macro-level. 14 There is no space here to expand on the question of the region, except to note that it is not merely a spatial or scalar concept (Sivaramakrishnan and Agrawal 2003). Conceptual issues about region and scale and their methodological importance will be clarified in a forthcoming paper (see Koskimaki and Upadhya 2013). 15 Source: Sanam Roohi’s forthcoming doctoral dissertation, University of Amsterdam. 16 TANA website, viewed on 8 December 2011 (http://www.tana.org/?docid =29); ATA website, viewed on 8 December 2011 (http://www.ataworld.org/index. cfm?select = projects &project_type=charitable%20projects).

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van der Veer, Peter (ed.). 1995. Nation and Migration: The Politics of Space in the South Asian Diaspora. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. van der Veer, Peter. 2002. Transnational religion: Hindu and Muslim movements. Global Networks, Volume 2, No. 2, pp. 95–109. van der Veer, Peter. 2005. Virtual India: Indian IT labour and the nation-state. In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 276–290. Princeton: Princeton University Press. van Kampen, Wanda. 2012. Money to India: Transfer Channels for Remittances in the Guntur Region, Andhra Pradesh. Provincial Globalisation Research Report No. 2. Bangalore: NIAS and AISSR. Varghese, V. J. and Vivek Thakur. 2015. A troublesome home? Transnational property and its discontents in the Indian Punjab. In International Migration and Development in South Asia, edited by Md. Mizanur Rahman and Tan Tak Yong, 101–117. London: Routledge. Varrel, Aurelie. 2011. Return migration in the light of the new Indian diaspora policy: emerging transnationalism. In Dynamics of Indian Migration: Historical and Current Perspectives, edited by S. Irudaya Rajan and Marie Percot, 301–317. New Delhi: Routledge. Varrel, Aurelie. 2012. NRIs in the city: identifying international migrants’ investments in the Indian urban fabric. Samaj: South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 6 [online]. Available at: http://samaj.revues.org/3425. Velayutham, Selvaraj, and Amanda Wise. 2005. Moral economies of a translocal village: obligation and shame among South Indian transnational migrants. Global Networks, Volume 5, No. 1, pp. 27–47. Verstappen, Sanderien. 2016. Mobility and the Region: A Multi-Scalar Ethnography of the Vohra Gujarati Community, in India and Abroad. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Amsterdam. Verstappen, Sanderien, and Mario Rutten. 2015. A global town in central Gujarat, India: rural-urban connections and international migration. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Volume 38, No. 2, pp. 230–245. Vertovec, Steven. 2003. Migration and other modes of transnationalism: towards conceptual crossfertilisation. International Migration Review, Volume 37, No. 3, pp. 641–665. Vertovec, Steven. 2004. Migrant transnationalism and modes of transformation. International Migration Review, Volume 38, No. 3, pp. 970–1001. Vertovec, Steven. 2009. Transnationalism. London: Routledge. Viswanath, Priya, and Noshir Dadrawala. 2004. Philanthropic investment and equitable development: the case of India. In Diaspora Philanthropy and Equitable Development in China and India, edited by Peter F. Geithner, Lincoln C. Chen, and Paula D. Johnson, 259–289. Cambridge: Global Equity Initiative and Harvard University Press. Walton-Roberts, Margaret. 2004a. Returning, remitting, reshaping: non-resident Indians and the transformation of society and space in Punjab, India. In Transnational Spaces, edited by P. Jackson, P. Crang, and C. Dwyer, 78–103. London: Routledge. Walton-Roberts, Margaret. 2004b. Globalisation, national autonomy and non-resident Indians. Contemporary South Asia, Volume 13, No. 1, pp. 53–69.

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Walton-Roberts, Margaret. 2005. Transnational educational fundraising in Punjab: old practices, new readings. International Journal of Punjab Studies, Volume 12, No. 1, pp. 129–152. Werbner, Pnina. 1990. The Migration Process: Capital, Gifts and Offerings among British Pakistanis. Oxford: Berg. Werbner, Pnina. 2000. Introduction: the materiality of diaspora: between aesthetics and ‘real’ politics. Diaspora Volume 9, No. 1, pp. 5–20. Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2002. Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences. Global Networks, Volume 2, No. 4, pp. 301–334. World Bank. 2003. Global Development Finance. Washington, DC: World Bank. Xavier, Constantino. 2011. Experimenting with diasporic incorporation: the overseas citizenship of India. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Volume 17, No. 1, pp. 34–53. Xiang Biao. 2007. Global ‘Body Shopping’: An Indian Labour System in the Information Technology Industry. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Zachariah, K. C, K. P. Kannan, and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2002. Kerala’s Gulf Connection: CDS Studies on International Labour Migration from Kerala State in India. Thiruvananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies. Zachariah, K. C., and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2010. Migration Monitoring Study, 2008: emigration and remittances in the context of surge in oil prices. CDS Working Paper No. 424. Thiruvananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew, and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2001a. Impact of migration on Kerala’s economy and society. International Migration, Volume 39, No. 1, pp. 63–88. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew, and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2001b. Social, economic and demographic consequences of migration on Kerala. International Migration, Volume 39, No. 2, pp. 43–71.

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2 THE INFLUENCE OF VULNERABILITY ON MIGRATION INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN Craig Loschmann and Melissa Siegel

This study explores the micro-level determinants of migration in Afghanistan. Contrary to the bulk of academic work, which takes a revealed preferences approach and looks exclusively at migration behaviour, our analysis takes into consideration stated preferences utilising migration intentions. The reasons are two-fold: first, our data allow for a more robust analysis of intentions rather than behaviour; and second, migration intentions are not likely plagued by an endogeneity problem as is migration behaviour allowing for causal inference. While there may be instinctive doubt as to whether intentions approximate actual behaviour, a body of literature suggests plans to migrate are in fact a good, albeit imperfect, predictor of future migration behaviour (Gardner et al., 1985; De Jong, 2000; Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008; Creighton, 2013). Nonetheless, our goal is not to argue whether intentions do robustly predict actual migration behaviour, but to investigate the drivers of those intentions in their own right. The reasons why an individual chooses to migrate are wide ranging and cut across a broad spectrum of economic, social, cultural and political lines of explanation. Traditionally, movement has been understood to be caused by differences between locales in certain economic-related factors, including employment and wages. In an insecure environment, much like Afghanistan, however, where the line between voluntary and involuntary movement is blurred, it seems sensible to avoid presupposing that migration is strictly economic in nature. With this in mind, we consider the issue through the broader lens of household vulnerability, a measure which 49

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incorporates a range of socio-economic factors allowing for a more comprehensive analysis. In our model, vulnerability is the result of two factors: the high uncertainty of a detrimental shock occurring and the low resilience to cope if that shock happens to materialise. Therefore, vulnerability is caused by the combination of exposure to risk (high uncertainty) and lack of entitlements (low resilience). We follow the conceptual framework put forth by Ahmed and Gassmann (2009; 2010), which understands vulnerability in a post-conflict setting to be caused by functioning losses within four principal dimensions: (1) human security; (2) exchange freedom; (3) social capital; and (4) access. By classifying losses along these four dimensions, we are able to identify specific indicators within each allowing for measurement. With this conceptual and practical framework at hand, the research question to be answered is: does vulnerability influence migration intentions, and more specifically which vulnerability-related factors are associated with concrete plans to migrate? The analysis, therefore, is a two-step process. We first profile household vulnerability using individual indicators of deprivation defined along four dimensions both in a dimensional and multidimensional fashion, and then perform a regression analysis estimating the influence on migration intentions. Afghanistan makes for an interesting case study for any number of reasons, but particularly due to the migration-related trends over the last decade. Prior to the fall of the Taliban in 2001, a substantial portion of the Afghan population resided abroad as refugees, mostly in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Since then, however, the country has witnessed a massive return from abroad, 5.7 million people by UNHCR accounts, due in part to the perception that support from the international community would foster in an era of enhanced security as well as a more robust political and economic environment. While progress has been made in certain aspects of everyday life, overall vulnerability remains stubbornly high. The most recent National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment for Afghanistan (NRVA) for 2007–2008 estimated some 9 million people, or 36 per cent of the population, living in absolute poverty without the ability to meet his or her basic needs (MRRD and CSO, 2009).1Add to this picture the current withdrawal of foreign troops from the country and it should come as no surprise that many Afghans, including those who have only recently returned, once again entertain the possibility of moving abroad. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We begin by highlighting the theoretical foundation used for understanding the determinants of migration. The following section, then, provides a working definition of 50

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vulnerability and an outline of our measurement criteria, followed by a description of the empirical model used in the regression analysis. The next section goes on to offer a brief review of migration trends in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, as well as an overview of our sample. We then present both descriptive and empirical results, before concluding in the last section.

Micro-level drivers of migration Academic study on the causes of migration has blossomed over the years, helping to paint a more nuanced picture as to why an individual may want and/or decide to move both within and across borders. Traditionally, migration theory has been highly influenced by neoclassical economic thought, including the standard push-pull model. The more contemporary new economics of labour migration, however, developed over the last 30 odd years, has made up for some of the inherent limitations embedded within the neoclassical perspective. Incorporating many of the fundamental concepts from the livelihoods approach common in development studies, the new economics of labour migration perspective offers a more comprehensive explanation as to why certain individuals aspire to migrate. At its most basic, neoclassical migration theory argues that the individual’s motivation to migrate is based on a rational cost–benefit calculation, where income maximisation is the underlying objective (Harris and Todaro, 1970). In effect, migration therefore is determined by a simple expected wage differential between origin and destination, incorporating the probability of an individual to be employed at destination (Todaro, 1969), as well as the probability she/he is deported if crossing borders illegally (Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). In line with the human capital perspective, migration is treated here as an investment, in that an individual chooses to move where she/he is most productive and thus able to collect the highest wage based on factors like age, experience, education, skills and so on (Massey et al., 1993). Thus, the neoclassical model underlines the individual agency of the migration process, even if that agency is in a sense deterministic. What is more, an important implication of this perspective is that migration is inversely related to overall socio-economic development, and the proclivity to migrate should decline as a country moves up the development ladder (De Haas, 2010b). Corresponding to the neoclassical framework is the push-pull model of migration developed by Lee (1966). Here, the cause of migration is believed to be the result of broadly defined ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ factors 51

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from the areas of origin and destination, respectively, which either push an individual to move away from their location or pull them towards a particular destination. Hence, the push-pull model emphasises the structural environment at both origin and destination of the migration process. Common factors which may push a potential migrant include lack of employment, famine, conflict, lack of social services and the like. Pull factors, on the other hand, are in effect just the mirror image of the push factors, making both essentially two sides of the same coin. It is, in fact, for this reason that the push-pull framework is commonly criticised as having little heuristic value and limited explanatory power (McDowell and de Haan, 1997). By and large, the neoclassical perspective, including the push-pull model, fails to provide a comprehensive explanation as to which particular factors are significant in motivating the migration process. Both are commonly criticised for oversimplifying heterogeneous migration systems in diverse environments, due to the application of unrealistic assumptions, including perfect markets, full information and free choice. Moreover, the neoclassical approach stresses individual agency, even if it is a deterministic type of agency, and does not give enough consideration to the structural environment, while the push-pull model does just the opposite (De Haas, 2010).As such, this perspective offers too narrow of an explanation as to why some people want and/or ultimately decide to move while others choose to remain (McDowell and de Haan, 1997). In response to these limitations of the neoclassical theoretical framework, the new economics of labour migration rests on the assumption that the migration decision is not considered by just the individual, but rather within a larger social context of typically the household or greater family. Migration, therefore, is driven by a collective effort to not merely maximise income, but also minimise risks to income generation (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Taylor and Dyer, 2009). As such, migration is viewed as a means by which the household is able to increase capital assets, diversify sources of income and provide income insurance in environments characterised by highly imperfect capital and insurance markets. An important implication of the new economics of labour migration is that the ‘poorest of the poor’ are generally restricted from moving, given that they are unable to assume the costs and risks inherent in leaving ones’ home. Moreover, in contrast to the neoclassical perspective, overall socioeconomic development is likely to lead to increased movement, at least in the medium term, creating what some authors have dubbed a ‘migration hump’ due to individuals having both higher capabilities and aspirations to migrate abroad (De Haas, 2010b). 52

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Noticeable in the new economics of labour migration are the conceptual similarities with the livelihoods approach to development. In this framework, a livelihood is defined as the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living (Carney, 1998). Consequently, livelihood strategies are the range of decisions households explicitly make in order to meet unique priorities, which commonly consist of maintaining, securing and improving the living condition of the household. Migration of a household member, especially when considering the expectation of remittance transfers, is one such possible strategy helping to diversify income sources and overcome social, economic and institutional development barriers (De Haas, 2010). The new economics of labour migration embedded with the livelihoods approach to development allows for a richer explanation of the micro-level motivations of migration. The individual agency of the migration process is taken into account as households explicitly strategise to improve wellbeing, yet not at the expense of ignoring the importance of the local contextual environment, including the structural constraints to development. In fact, ‘it is the complex interaction, rather than opposition, of individual agency and macro structures within an historical context which provides a more useful framework for understanding why people migrate’ (Kothari, 2002: 10). One factor directly linking individual agency and the structural constraints to development is pervasive deprivation. While poverty has long been integrated into the equation concerning why certain individuals may wish to or decide to migrate, more often than not the focus has been exclusively on monetary indicators of poverty like low income. This monetary focus has corresponded to the narrow attention on voluntary forms of labour migration, while disregarding the involuntary migration by refugees and asylum seekers where deprivation may not be solely due to low income. In an environment where any classification in terms of the type of migration is problematic because underlying causes blend, be they economic, political or humanitarian, it is useful to take a broader perspective. With this in mind, De Haas (2009: 2–3) rightly points out that ‘it is important to emphasise that all migrants face structural constraints and that the degree to which they can exercise agency is fundamentally limited . . . it is therefore probably more appropriate to conceive of a continuum running from low to high constraints under which migration occurs’. In light of this notion, and taking into consideration the fragile environment characterising Afghanistan, we choose to inspect the aspirations to migrate based on household vulnerability. To the best of our knowledge, 53

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the explicit way vulnerability influences migration has not been looked at prior. Still, this seems only a small, logical step stemming from the new economics of labour migration incorporating the livelihoods approach to development, with vulnerable households in a context deficient in social protection possible aspiring to apply an informal coping strategy like migration. Still, because migration abroad inherently incorporates high costs and risks, we expect, as the new economics of labour migration hypothesises, that the ‘most vulnerable of the vulnerable’ have low capability and therefore realistic aspirations for such cross-border movement.

Methodology Definition and measure of vulnerability

In order to explore how migration is related to vulnerability, we first must present a workable definition. The literature on vulnerability stems from the seminal work of authors like Sen (1981, 1999); Jodha (1988); and Chambers (1989), each making a concerted effort to reconceptualise the notion of poverty as more than the conventional lack of income. However, despite the obvious similarities between poverty and vulnerability, the two concepts are not synonymous. While poverty can be thought of as the deprivation of different indicators, such as income, consumption, health, education and the like, vulnerability is better understood as the uncertainty caused by deprivation across those different indicators. Thus, poverty is a static condition at a moment in time, while vulnerability is a dynamic condition related to the insecurity about the future (Moser, 1998). Typically, an individual or household is deemed to be vulnerable if at risk of falling into poverty at some future period. Vulnerability, therefore, is intrinsically related to the risks individuals and households face and the manifestation of those risks as shocks materialise. From the outset, we are able to conceptually disaggregate vulnerability into two distinct components: the internal and the external (Chambers, 1989). The internal side of vulnerability pertains to the idiosyncratic risks faced by particular groups of individuals or households, due to weak risk management and low coping ability once faced with a shock (Prowse, 2003). Examples of possible factors which cause internal vulnerability include low income, insufficient education or lack of an informal network for support. The external side, on the other hand, concerns the covariate risks, stress and shocks present in the surrounding environment which threaten the livelihood security of all

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members of a community or whole society. Examples of possible events which cause external vulnerability include a conflict, natural disaster or macroeconomic crisis. While the external side is the underlying cause of uncertainty over time and the internal side reinforces poverty once a shock hits, it is the combination of the two which constitutes vulnerability (Ahmed and Gassmann, 2009). This breakdown into separate internal and external components, while conceptually helpful, is also practical when attempting to operationalise vulnerability as it distinguishes it from the more common poverty measurement (Ahmed and Gassmann, 2010). Given the internal component gauges low coping ability, it can be measured by the individual’s or the household’s lack of entitlements. The external component, on the other hand, gauges uncertainty in the environment and may be measured by the individual’s or household’s exposure to risk. Therefore, in sum, it is both the lack of entitlements (internal) and the exposure to risk (external) which creates vulnerability and ultimately influences well-being. Beyond simply separating into two components, in order to more comprehensively measure vulnerability, it is ideal to take a multidimensional approach in line with recent efforts of poverty measurement.2 Here, it proves useful to think of functioning losses individuals and households face categorised by entitlements and capabilities. In a fragile environment like Afghanistan, functioning losses may be put into four broad dimensions: (1) loss in human security; (2) loss in exchange freedom; (3) loss in social capital; and (4) loss in access. The first, loss in human security, relates to individual security and well-being over time and incorporates deprivation in income, health, shelter and the like. The second, loss in exchange freedom, includes a shortage in resources able to be consumed or traded, as well as the inability to gain additional resources through the labour market. The third, loss in social capital, describes a reduction in the sense of belonging of individuals within a particular network, resulting in less informal sources of support. And the fourth, loss in access, consists of the absence of infrastructure or underutilisation of fundamental social services necessary for a healthy socio-economic environment (Ahmed and Gassmann, 2009: 25–26). Following the classification of these four dimensions of losses within the two separate components of vulnerability, the next step is to identify specific indicators for measurement. As in any exercise of this nature, the choice of indicators is highly discretionary and dependent on the objectives of the study. Nevertheless, our decision to include certain indicators is determined by the literature as well as how well they capture the

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idiosyncrasies of the particular context in question, and more practically with consideration of the data available. We then follow the ‘dual cut-off ’ method developed by Alkire and Foster (2011), which first assigns individual thresholds in order to classify a household as deprived or not for a particular indicator, before applying an overall cut-off for both dimensional and multidimensional vulnerability. Regarding thresholds, our choices were largely driven by the literature and in line with Ahmed and Gassmann (2010: 11–12) or by the data itself when no clear threshold exists. For example, the threshold for ‘average income per capita’ follows the USD 1.25/day poverty line developed by Ravallion et al. (2009) and subsequently adopted by the World Bank, while the threshold for the ‘number of able-bodied household members employed’ is relative to the particular context and derived by taking the mean estimate of the sample. The final list of all indicators broken down by dimension and component, along with their corresponding thresholds, used to gauge deprivation and subsequently profile household vulnerability is listed in Table 2.1. Table 2.1 Description of dimensions, components, individual indicators and thresholds of household deprivation Dimension

Variable

Household is deprived if

Dimension 1: Loss in Human Security

Internal: Lack of Entitlements Average income per capita

below the USD 1.25/day poverty line Number of income sources less than two sources Food security problems securing food once every few months or more Savings does not save External: Exposure to Risk Frequency of income income not received every received month of the last year Condition of house construction material of the floor is dirt, sand, dung or cane Type of sanitation no toilet or toilet is a shared pit/ latrine or pan/bucket Source of water source of water is a river, lake, pond or stream Reliability of fuel for main source of fuel is wood, cooking straw/shrubs/grass or animal dung

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Dimension

Variable

Household is deprived if

Dimension 2: Internal: Lack of Entitlements Loss in Exchange Educational attainment of Freedom household head Number of households members available to work Ownership of house Ownership of land Ownership of livestock External: Exposure to Risk Number of able-bodied household members employed

educational level of the household head is less than secondary less than the sample mean, 0.56 no ownership of house no ownership of land no ownership of livestock less than the sample mean, 0.40

Dimension 3: Loss in Social Capital

Internal: Lack of Entitlements Membership in community no household member has organisations membership in any community organisation Help from social networks cannot count on informal arrangements for help External: Exposure to Risk Quality of social networks trust of people in the neighbourhood is low

Dimension 4: Loss in Access

Internal: Lack of Entitlements Use of school Use of health services Use of financial services

a child aged 6–14 does not attend school no household member uses the health clinic or hospital no household member uses a financial institution (bank, money transfer operator or microfinance institution)

Source: Authors.

As for both the dimensional and multidimensional cut-off which allows us to categorise a household as vulnerable or not, consideration of past exercises of a similar nature and also of the number of indicators within each dimension leads us to ultimately set it at 33 per cent.3 Hence, a household is considered vulnerable if deprived in over a third of the individual indicators, weighted equally, within that dimension. 57

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The formal expression of the dimensional vulnerability index (DVI) for dimension d is: DVI d =

1 n ∑DVid , where n i =1

DVid = 1 if

d

∑w I

x ix

> k.

x =1

Here, n represents the number of households; and DVid is the binary variable for dimensional vulnerability for house i, taking a value of one if the aggregated and weighted indicators in that dimension, wxIix, is greater than the cut-off, k, which equals 33 per cent. As noted, each indicator within a dimension is weighted equally and sums up to one. When scaling up to the multidimensional level by aggregating all indicators across dimensions, the procedure is by and large identical. The only essential difference is that dimensions are now weighted equally, causing individual indicators to be given a relative weight depending on the absolute number of indicators making up each particular dimension.4 A household deprived in more than a third of individual indicators with varying relative weights across dimensions is characterised as multidimensionally vulnerable. Formally, the multidimensional vulnerability index (MVI) can be expressed as: MVI =

1 n ∑OVi , where n i =1 d

OVi = 1 if ∑w x I ix > k. x =1

Here, OVi is a binary variable for overall vulnerability for house, i, taking a value of 1, if the aggregated and weighted indicators across all dimensions, wxIix, is greater than the cut-off, k, which again equals 33 per cent. As stated, each dimension is weighted equally and sums up to one, while each indicator is given a relative weight dependent on the absolute number of indicators within that dimension. Last, after identifying which households are considered multidimensional vulnerable, we go one step further by indicating the degree of vulnerability. Here, we simply categorise a multidimensionally vulnerable household as either ‘less vulnerable’, if deprived between our original cut-off of 33 per cent and a newly applied 50 per cent cut off, or ‘very vulnerable’, if surpassing the 50 per cent cut-off. In other words, a 58

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multidimensionally vulnerable household deprived in up to a half of all indicators, relatively weighted, across dimensions is understood to be less severely vulnerable than those households which are deprived in more than a half of all indicators, relatively weighted, across dimensions. Regression analysis

Following measurement of household vulnerability within each dimension and across dimensions, we then perform a regression analysis using a probit model to estimate the predicted probability that a household contains an individual with the intention to migrate. The formal expression of the model is: P (M i = 1|X i ) = φβi X i where Mi indicates the binary dependent variable of household, i, taking the value of 1, if it contains an individual with concrete plans to migrate, and 0 otherwise; Xi is the binary independent variable indicating treatment based on whether the household is characterised as deprived on an individual indicator, Ix, or vulnerable on a particular dimension, DVId, or across all dimensions, MVI; βi represents the regression parameter to be estimated; and φ indicates the cumulative normal distribution function. The models are estimated using robust standard errors and controlled for by whether the household has a member who is a current migrant, whether there is a return migrant in the household, household size, ethnicity, district type and province.

Contextual background Migration in Afghanistan

While migration in Afghanistan since the late 1970s has been clearly influenced by the persistent conflict that has engulfed the country, it is often overlooked that movement as a means of livelihood has been a way of life for many in this region throughout its history. In fact, the long history of migration which helped establish today’s transnational social networks is rooted in the close ties that bind ethnic groups across modern-day political borders (Kuschminder and Dora, 2009). It is no surprise then that when looking to escape the hardship and uncertainty of the last 35 years, the vast majority of Afghans have sought refuge in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Within this timeframe, migration trends in Afghanistan can be broken down into three distinct periods. The first began with the Soviet invasion in 59

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1979, which followed the Marxist coup by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) a year prior, and came to a close when the Najibullahled communist regime collapsed in 1992. This era marked the worst refugee crisis of the late 20th century, with the number of Afghans exiled abroad peaking at 6.3 million in 1990 (UNHCR, 2013). Even though the general insecurity of this time was clearly driving migration flows, it is important to remember the economic destitution that accompanies such a situation. Individuals taking refuge either in neighbouring countries or further abroad were not only fleeing direct violence, but also the limited livelihood opportunities available because of conflict (Stigter, 2006). In the direct aftermath of the fall of the Najibullah regime, Afghanistan entered into the second period of its migratory flows. As the Mujahideen stepped into power, the overall net migration rate of the country briefly turned positive with a massive influx of returning refugees from predominately Pakistan, and also Iran. Despite this optimistic sign, however, repatriation did not last long, as infighting between rival Mujahideen groups vying for power and the later takeover by the strict Taliban regime in 1996 once again led to increased violence and overall hardship. As such, the official refugee count never dropped below 2.5 million, and in fact began to rise again towards the turn of the century (UNHCR, 2013). The third and final period brings us to the present day, characterised by the migratory patterns following the ouster of the Taliban regime post9/11. Similar to the second period yet more robust, since 2001, Afghanistan has experienced massive repatriation with an estimated 5.7 million voluntarily returning refugees (mostly from Pakistan) making their way back (UNHCR, 2013b). Durable return to rural origins, however, has been increasingly less frequent as many subsequently head towards urban centres in search of better employment opportunities. Moreover, because of the many years abroad, returnees typically arrive with strengthened social networks in their countries of exile allowing for increased crossborder labour mobility (Kuschminder and Dora, 2009). Nevertheless, even if cross-border labour opportunities do not pan out, it is not difficult to imagine these social links are maintained and nurtured in the likelihood that future conflict and insecurity once again force individuals and whole families to seek refuge abroad. Sample

The data used in this analysis originate from an Afghanistan household survey collected for the IS Academy ‘Migration & Development: A World in Motion’ project.5 The data collection in Afghanistan was 60

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funded by both the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Organisation for Migration. The survey was developed as a way to explore a diverse set of themes related to the relationship between migration and development processes. A range of separate modules within the survey capture in-depth information of both individuals and households, including general socio-economic characteristics, migration histories, future migration plans, return migration, remittances, transnational ties and more. The data collection took place in April and May of 2011. While a purely random sample was not possible due to the limitations of conducting fieldwork in high-risk areas of Afghanistan, particular attention was paid to capturing the diversity of the population in order to increase the representativeness of the sample. Indeed, the five provinces of Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar and Kandahar were chosen because of their highly populated urban centres, geographical dispersion and varied profiles of migration. Moreover, within each province stratification between urban, semi-rural and rural communities was applied as a way to capture different socio-economic groups.6 These communities were then identified to be eligible for enumeration at random, with 10 classified as urban and 5 each as semi-rural and rural. Additionally, the survey process followed a random starting point and fixed interval sampling methodology to increase representativeness within that primary sampling unit. The overall sample is comprised of a total 14,777 individuals within 2,005 households from 100 communities, with one main respondent answering for all household members. Table 2.2 illustrates the total number of households with at least one member having concrete plans to migrate abroad, disaggregated by where they are located in terms of district type. Of all 2,005 households in our sample, 349 or 17 per cent have a member with intentions to migrate. Noticeably, urban households are Table 2.2  Migration intentions District type

No Yes

Urban

Semi-rural

Rural

Total

785 78.27% 218 21.73%

424 84.80%   76 15.20%

447 89.04%   55 10.96%

1,656 82.59%  349 17.41%

Source: Authors.

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twice as likely as having a member with migration intentions compared to rural households, with semi-rural households falling in between. Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics for households in our sample, disaggregated by migration intentions to provide a simple mean difference. First, we see around 10 per cent of the total sample has a current migrant in the household while 55 per cent report a return migrant, neither of which show a statistically significant mean difference regarding migration intentions. The average household size is seven members, also not significantly different across intentions. The majority of the sample, nearly 90 per cent, is either Pashtun or Tajik corresponding to the two largest ethnic groups in the country, with all having a statistically significant mean difference. By design, the sample is around two-to-one urban relative to semi-rural and rural, with both urban and rural having Table 2.3  Summary statistics (%) Migration intention

Migrant household Return migrant household Household size Ethnic group Pashtun Tajik Other District type Urban Semi-rural Rural Province Kabul Herat Balkh Nangarhar Kandahar

p-value

No

Yes

Total

9.96

11.75

10.27

53.99

58.74

54.81

7.41

7.21

7.38

46.98 42.15 10.87

29.51 50.72 19.77

43.94 43.64 12.42

*** *** ***

47.40 24.60 26.99

62.46 21.78 15.76

50.02 24.94 25.04

***

20.29 21.20 14.98 19.99 23.55

18.91 14.33 43.55 20.34 2.87

20.05 20.00 19.95 20.05 19.95

Significance levels: ***p