India Migration Report 2017: Forced Migration 9780815369905, 9781351188753

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India Migration Report 2017 The India Migration Report 2017 examines forced migration caused by political conflicts, climate change, disasters (natural and man-made) and development projects. India accounts for large numbers of internally displaced people in the world. Apart from conflicts and disasters, over the years development projects (including urban redevelopment and beautification), often justified as serving the interests of the people and for public good, have caused massive displacements in different parts of the country, disrupting the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. The interdisciplinary essays presented here combine a rich mix of research methods and include in-depth case studies on aspects of development-induced displacement affecting diverse groups such as peasants, religious and ethnic minorities, the poor in urban and rural areas, and women, leading to their exclusion and marginalization. The struggles and protests movements of the displaced groups across regions and their outcomes are also assessed. This volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of development studies, economics, sociology and social anthropology and migration studies. S. Irudaya Rajan is Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India. With more than three decades of research experience in Kerala, he has coordinated seven major migration surveys (1998, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2014 and 2016) in Kerala (with Professor K. C. Zachariah), led the migration surveys in Goa (2008) and Tamil Nadu (2015), and provided technical support to the Gujarat Migration Survey (2010) and Punjab Migration Survey (2011). He has published extensively in national and international journals on demographic, social, economic, political and psychological implications of international migration. He is currently engaged in several projects on international migration with New York University, UAE Exchange Centre, India Centre for Migration of the Ministry of External Affairs and International Labour Migration. He worked closely with the erstwhile Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India; Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs (NORKA), Government of Kerala and Kerala State Planning Board. He is currently co-chairing the working group on NORKA for the 13th five-year plan (2017–2022) of Kerala State Planning Board, Government of Kerala, and is initiating the Kerala Migration Survey 2018, funded by the Department of NORKA, Government of Kerala. He is editor of the two Routledge series, India Migration Report (annual) since 2010 and South Asia Migration Report (biannual), and the founder and editor-in-chief of the journal Migration and Development.

India Migration Report Editor: S. Irudaya Rajan Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India

This annual series strives to bring together international networks of migration scholars and policymakers to document and discuss research on various facets of migration. It encourages interdisciplinary commentaries on diverse aspects of the migration experience and continues to focus on the economic, social, cultural, ethical, security and policy ramifications of international movements of people. Also available: India Migration Report 2010 Governance and Labour Migration India Migration Report 2011 Migration, Identity and Conflict India Migration Report 2012 Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances India Migration Report 2013 Social Costs of Migration India Migration Report 2014 Diaspora and Development India Migration Report 2015 Gender and Migration India Migration Report 2016 Gulf Migration Forthcoming: India Migration Report 2018 Indians in Europe

India Migration Report 2017 Forced Migration

Edited by S. Irudaya Rajan

First edition published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, S. Irudaya Rajan; individual chapters, the contributors The right of S. Irudaya Rajan to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Note: Map not to scale. The international boundaries, coastlines, denominations, and other information shown in any map in this work do not necessarily imply any judgement concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such information. For current boundaries, readers may refer to the Survey of India maps. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-8153-6990-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-18875-3 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Dedicated to the memory of Professor Moneer Alam

Contents

List of illustrations Preface Acknowledgements Notes on contributors 1 Development or developmental terrorism?

x xiii xxi xxii 1

AMIT BHADURI

2 Pushed aside: displaced for ‘development’

6

N A D I N E WA L I C KI AN D MA RITA SWA IN

3 Singur: the exemplar of peasant resistance

29

S A M I R K U M A R DAS

4 Forced displacement: a gendered analysis of the Tehri dam project

46

VA N D A N A A S TH AN A

5 Displacing and relocating peasant social dispositions

64

JOËL CABALION

6 Urban development, smart cities and displacement

98

TA N U S R E E D U TTA AN D R. B . B H AGAT

7 Urban redevelopment, neoliberalism and politics of displacement in Gujarat M R U TU YA N J AYA SA H U

117

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Contents

8 Infrastructure development and forced displacement in Kerala: risks and vulnerabilities

134

K . I N D U A N D S . IRUDAYA RA JA N

9 Conflicts and displacement in the Northeast: land, identity and immigrants

147

WA LTE R F E R N AN DE S

10 Silent violence and neo bondage in the urban informal sector: a study of forced migrants in West Bengal

162

A B H I J I T D A S G U P TA AN D N . P URE N DRA P RASA D

11 The geography of economic migrants: characteristics and location in Bengaluru

176

K A L A S E E TH A R A M SRIDH AR A N D K. C. SMITH A

12 New migrant question: exploitative forms of transit labour in three regions of Andhra Pradesh

188

N . P U R E N D R A PRA SA D

13 Motives for seasonal migration and rights-based policies: evidence from Western Odisha

206

R A J E S H B H ATTACH ARYA AN D P RA SE N JIT SARKHEL

14 Locating gender, re-reading forced migration: a study of the migrant Muslim women in Delhi

230

D E B A B R ATA B A R A L

15 International migration in Tamil Nadu: results from the Tamil Nadu Migration Survey 2015

249

S . I R U D AYA R A JA N , B E RN ARD D’SAMI AN D S . S A M U E L A S I R RAJ

16 Concerns about temporary migration: policymaker’s perspective S . I R U D AYA R A JA N AN D KARTIK YADAV

261

Contents 17 Exploring the capital-labour dynamics: migrants in the gold jewellery-making industry in Kerala

ix 279

S U M E E TH A M .

18 Kerala Migration Survey 2016: new evidences

289

S . I R U D AYA R A J AN AN D K. C. ZACH ARIAH

19 Dalit migration, diaspora and development: Kerala and Punjab

306

S . I R U D AYA R A J AN , STE VE TAYL O R AN D VIN O D K U MAR

20 Immigration policy reforms in OECD countries: a comparative look at the United States

320

S A J I TH A B E E V I KA RAYIL

21 Cinema and migration: nurses and patriarchy

338

H . A R O K K I A R A J A N D RAKE SH S.

Index

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Illustrations

Figures 6.1 Year-wise slum evictions in different parts of Kolkata 6.2 Year-wise slum demolitions in Mumbai 13.1 Month-wise demand for MGNREGA jobs in Bolangir and Nuapada 18.1 Emigration clearance endorsements, 2007–2016

106 108 211 296

Tables 5.1 The survey – social groups and individuals per household 5.2 Distribution of NSSO land categories by caste 5.3 Caste groups and land intervals after submersion (ha) 5.4 Awards received by households and according to caste groups 5.5 Caste groups and residential space in the old village (m2) 5.6 New plots and surface in the old village 5.7 Caste groups and new residential plot surfaces 5.8 New plots’ surfaces and total compensation (Rs) 5.9 Castes’ groups and social uses of compensation awards 11.1 Location of migrants into Bengaluru and year 11.2 Education levels of central and peripherally located migrants, Bengaluru 11.3 Availability of water supply for migrants in central and peripheral parts of Bengaluru 11.4 Access to sanitation, migrants in central and peripheral parts of Bengaluru 11.5 Access to underground drainage, migrants in central and peripheral parts of Bengaluru

68 69 72 73 75 79 79 80 85 180 181 182 182 183

Illustrations 11.6 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.A1 13.A2 13.A3 13.A4 14.1 14.2 14.3 17.1 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 18.7 18.8 18.9 18.10 19.1 19.2 20.1

20.2 20.3

What determines whether migrant locates in centre or periphery? RTE norm compliance across the KBK districts and Nuapada Demographic characteristics of sampled households Estimates of migration propensity Distribution of wealth across non-migrants, family migrants and other migrants Village-wise distribution of sampled households with children aged 6–14 years Distribution of landholding among sampled households Awareness of role of SMCs and RTE provisions in ten surveyed schools Percentage of class of workers and non-workers in Cooch Behar Statistics on land utilization in Cooch Behar as of 16 March 2017 Distribution of landholdings in Cooch Behar State-wise composition of the migrant workforce Sample households in KMSs 2011 and 2016 Response rate for Kerala Migration Survey 2016 Estimated emigrants from Kerala, 1998–2013 Emigration clearance data for Kerala and India, 1997–2016 Estimated emigrants in 2016 and its comparison with previous surveys Educational qualification of the emigrants Socio-economic profile of the emigrants, 2016 Changes of household type by migration status, 2011–2016 Countries of destination of Kerala emigrants, 2016 Emigrants by destination countries and sex Migration status of Dalits, 2014 Estimated Dalit emigrants among Hindus and Christians, 2014 Inflows of foreign workers into selected OECD countries, 1998–2008 (thousands and percentage changes) Temporary-type labour migration, 2007–2012 Immigration policies (restrictive and facilitative) in OECD countries following economic crisis and rising unemployment

xi 184 212 216 219 227 228 228 229 233 234 235 282 293 293 295 297 298 299 300 301 302 302 314 315

321 322

329

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Illustrations

Maps 5.1 Maharashtra, Nagpur and the Gosi Khurd large dam in Vidarbha 5.2 The distribution of social groups in ‘old’ Ambhora Khurd 5.3 Volume and distribution of plots in Naya Ambhora

67 70 81

Preface

I am pleased to present the eighth edition of the India Migration Report (IMR) which focuses on the theme of forced migration caused by political conflicts, climate change, disasters both natural and man-made, and development projects. The pursuit of rapid economic growth by way of commissioning new development and infrastructure projects and the consequent emergence of new cities in India has posed the dilemma of development-forced displacement and migration of displaced populations. Based on the studies from various parts of India, the current volume dwells upon the predicaments faced by those whose lives have been uprooted by the process of land acquisition and forced migration. In this context, it questions the notion of sustainable livelihoods and argues the need for alternative development paths. Before we discuss the contents of the latest IMR, let me recapitulate the principal concerns highlighted in the previous issues. The introductory report, namely, India Migration Report 2010, examined migration management and governance issues in the context of international mobility of labour. Mapping historical trends and phases of Indian international migration, the Report also included the assessment of the flows and characteristics of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and beyond factoring in the gender dimensions. In addition, some chapters examined the prevailing labour laws and human rights violations in the GCC countries and the role played by the unscrupulous recruitment agents, often aggravating the situation both in the countries of origin and destination. The need for a migration policy for India was discussed along with the lessons India could learn from the Philippines – hailed as the country implementing the best migration management practices to protect the rights of migrant workers. The second volume, India Migration Report 2011, focused on internal migration and its multiple facets – identity and conflict. This volume

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discussed the topical issue of unrest created by migration at a time when internal conflicts occurred in some states such as Maharashtra, Goa and Assam. The chapters dwelt upon several aspects intertwined with internal migration such as recruitment, networks, gender dimensions, living and working conductions, rights of migrants and development linkages between migration and poverty. One of the chapters examined the Inter-state Migrant Act, focusing on its deficiencies. In the context of the global financial crisis of 2008, India Migration Report 2012 examined its impacts on migration, return migration and remittances based on first-hand fieldwork conducted by migration experts both in the South Asian region (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka) and the Gulf (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait). Even though large-scale return emigration and decline in remittances was predicted by some policymakers, this was proved wrong by the end of the crisis as minimum disturbances were caused to the mobility of migrants. However, two major changes occurred in terms of the place of origin and destination of migrants according to the emigration clearance data. The state of Uttar Pradesh emerged as the principal state of origin of migrants surpassing those from Kerala, while Saudi Arabia emerged as the chosen destination for Indian migrants overtaking the United Arab Emirates. India Migration Report 2013 focused on one of the neglected dimensions in migration studies, specifically, the social costs of migration. Three groups of persons are affected by mobility of their family members: women, children and the elderly. Although remittances provide the means for better standards of living, the psychological costs borne by those left behind back home cannot be ignored due to its effects on their overall sense of wellbeing. The fourth volume examined the social costs of migration using both qualitative and quantitative methods to unravel the positive and negative consequences of mobility. Conservative estimates indicate that Kerala has one million married women left behind, two million children left behind either by one parent or two parents, and four million elderly parents left behind due to their children’s short-term, long-term and permanent migration. The social, psychological and human costs borne by members of migrant families deserve attention by policymakers both in the countries of origin and destination. Based on several case studies, India Migration Report 2014 examined the role and contributions of Indian diaspora in development activities in their states of origin. The available studies on diaspora have neglected the philanthropic activities of migrants in the states of origin which some experts call ‘giving back’. Donations to promote

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education and health directly contribute to human development of local populations. When students migrate to developed countries and later return as skilled migrants or circular migrants, they help their countries transform the notion of ‘brain drain’ to ‘brain gain’. Focusing on the gender dimensions of migration, India Migration Report 2015 documented the experiences of migrants from across India. The volume illustrated the complex relationship between economics and changing gender dynamics brought about by the process of migration. It also drew attention to many new and interesting concepts such as irregular migration to the Gulf region, marriage migration and domestic worker migration. India Migration Report 2016 dealt with migration to the Gulf region. Apart from the theoretical issues pertaining to Gulf migration, the volume also discussed the contemporary labour recruitment policy in India as well as in the GCC countries. A gendered dimension of India-Gulf migration and the reasons for increasing vulnerability of female migrants was assessed in the context of India’s migration policy. India Migration Report 2017 draws attention to the scourge of forced migration in India. India accounts for large numbers of internally displaced people in the world. Apart from conflicts and disasters, over the years, development projects, including urban redevelopment and beautification, have displaced large numbers of people from different parts of the country. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) report, the most frequently cited global estimates for development-induced displacement is 15 million people per year since 2000. The Planning Commission of India had approximated in 2012 that since independence (1947), about 60 million people had been displaced by development projects. In the post-liberalized era, as special economic zones (SEZs) and mega development projects, financed by foreign and domestic investments, have been commissioned in several states of India, the problems posed by land acquisition leading to development-induced displacement and involuntary resettlement have magnified in scale and intensity. Although it is recognized that development projects should provide for the simultaneous rehabilitation of affected people, this is seldom done. This has led to rural unrest and protests in several states, which continue even today, highlighting the injustices meted out to displaced groups. This volume contains 21 chapters from scholars of different disciplines using mixed research methods. The opening chapter by Amit Bhaduri discusses how displacement undermines development gains by dispossessing people of their livelihoods and argues the need for an

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alternative development path. The subsequent chapters evaluate how forced displacements have impoverished people across different parts of India, in different contexts. Nadine Walicki and Marita Swain look into nine cases of displacement caused by development projects in different states in India and observes how government indifference with little regard for the rights or needs of displaced people had harmed communities. Samir Kumar Das’s chapter retells the story of land acquisition in Singur and of the resistance organized there which had wide-ranging ramifications across the country, in the way it affected the institutional politics in the state of West Bengal. The chapter attempts at retelling the story all over again, reminding us of its immense theoretical and conceptual possibilities. Vandana Asthana’s chapter examines the lived experiences of women displaced by the construction of Tehri dam in the Bhagirathi valley and their relocation in the New Tehri town and the plains of Uttaranchal state of India, through a gender lens. The Gosi Khurd dam constructed on the Wainganga River led to the displacement and resettlement of 93 villages in Maharashtra. Grounded in a qualitative and quantitative village study which followed this process over more than ten years, Joël Cabalion’s chapter seeks to analyze the resilience of peasant social dispositions in a context of structural violence. In the context of displacement caused by urban renewal, Dutta and Bhagat’s chapter attempts to understand the dynamic relationship between urban policy and governance, changing urban neighbourhood spaces and class relationships, with a specific focus on displacement outcomes. Sahu’s chapter, also in the context of urban redevelopment in Ahmedabad, seeks to explore the processes of displacement around a major urban redevelopment initiative called the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project. It examines the socio-economic impact of urban development policy and practice on displaced slum households and provides recommendations that authorities should consider to minimize development-induced livelihood disruptions. Indu and Rajan’s chapter focuses on the multifarious risks borne by two displaced groups, evicted for two different infrastructure development projects from backwater islands adjoining Kochi in Kerala. Using the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) model as a checklist, this chapter evaluates the differential risks that the two displaced groups were subjected to due to the processes of forced displacement, and discusses how differences in compensation provided to the evictees had made one group susceptible to major impoverishment risks and therefore more vulnerable vis-à-vis the other.

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Using his vast experience working on this subject, Walter Fernandes examines migration and ensuing conflicts over land and identity in the northeastern regions of India. Based on the findings from an empirical study conducted during 2014–2015 in two districts in West Bengal, Dasgupta and Prasad attempt to explain how agrarian distress induced migration to the growing urban informal sector, the working conditions and the role of middlemen in the sector leading to new forms of bondage, exploitation and violence. Intra-spatial distribution of migrants within the context of Bengaluru is explored by Sridhar and Smitha in their chapter, using a primary sample survey. Purendra Prasad analyzes how dramatic changes in the political geography, foreign capital investments in industry coupled with agrarian distress and natural calamities have led to major developments leading to the creation of transit labour in three regions of Andhra Pradesh, and argues that neoliberal capitalist development model in each region has contributed to greater inequality among different classes, gender and caste groups. Bhattacharya and Sarkhel, in assessing results from their household survey of migrant and non-migrant families from two districts of Western Odisha, associated with distress migration, argue that the decision to migrate and the nature of migration show heterogeneity because underlying household decisions to migrate might be differently motivated depending on household characteristics which determine the gains and costs of migration. Debabrata Baral’s chapter focuses on the Muslim women who had migrated from Cooch Behar and are now residing in the Jai-Hind camp in Delhi. This chapter outlines the role of agrarian relationships, religious norms and gender roles in migration. The remaining chapters report the findings from the ongoing research projects carried out at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS). Bringing out new empirical evidence on the international migration from Tamil Nadu, Rajan, D’Sami and Raj report the findings from the first comprehensive survey conducted to examine the demographic, social and economic characteristics of emigrants, return migrants, out-migrants and return out-migrants, remittances received, cost of migration and problems faced by them during their stay abroad. Latest results from the Kerala Migration Survey 2016, which is the seventh in the series of Migration Surveys, is presented by Rajan and Zachariah. Rajan and Yadav analyze the economic and social impact of short-term migration to and from India, an area unexplored based on a research project funded by the European Commission. Sumeetha’s chapter illustrates the capital-labour dynamics in the gold jewellery-making industry in the remittance-fuelled Kerala economy,

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and analyzes the pattern of internal migrants in the sector. Rajan, Taylor and Kumar examine the extent to which the relationship between overseas migration and regional development is inclusive within the states of Punjab and Kerala, with particular reference to caste inequities. They also investigate the role of Dalits within the framework of international migration-development nexus in two regions where overseas migration is increasingly heralded as one of the main facilitators of social mobility, economic growth and regional development. This chapter is the first to undertake such critical questioning of Dalit transnationalism, which is often taken as automatically progressive in challenging inequalities. Sajitha Beevi Karayil’s chapter examines the labour policy reforms in OECD countries, especially since the world financial turmoil in 2008, and analyzes its implications for developing countries like India. A Malayalam movie looking at the adversities faced by the female migrants as a central theme has been rare in recent times. Arokkiaraj and Rakesh review a mainstream movie on the subject of migration, specifically through a gender lens. The agony of Malayali nurses caught between the Iraqi government forces and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) during the civil war is portrayed effectively in the film. Before signing off, I would like to report some of the ongoing research on migration at CDS by student researchers. These works are listed as follows: ‘Seasonal Labour Migration and Role of MGNREGS: A Case Study of Mahabubnagar District in Andhra Pradesh’ by Vijay Korra. ‘Cross-Border Migration, Resource Conflicts and Development – The Case of Assam State, India: An Empirical Investigation’ by Rikil Chyrmang ‘Labour in a Globalized World: In-Migration to the Gold Jewellery Making Industry in Kerala, India’ by Sumeetha M. ‘Transnational Linkages and Organisation of Care for the Aged: Experiences from Central Travancore, Kerala’ by Sreerupa ‘Understanding Internal Migration in India: Implications for Regional Imbalance and Gains from Migration’ by Pinak Sarkar ‘Internal Labour Migration from India: Consequences on Labour Market at Destination and Origin’ by Mohd Imran Khan ‘International Migration and its Impact on Human Capital Investments in Tamil Nadu’ by Valatheeswaran C. ‘State and Emigration: A Study on Diaspora and Diaspora Policies’ by Akhil C. S.

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‘Inter-state Labour Migration in India: A Study of Economic Impact on Destination State’ by Madhusudan Nag ‘Internal Migration in Kerala, 1961–81’ by Gayathri Balagopal ‘Gulf Migration and the Educational Mobility of Muslim Women in Malappuram District’ by N. Sabira ‘Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal: Economic Implications’ by Jyoti Parimal Sarkar ‘Linkage Between Internal Migration and Regional Development: A Case of India’ by Prabhat Kumar ‘An Economic Analysis of Education and Employment led Migration from North-Eastern States to Various States of India’ by Pinak Sarkar ‘Livelihood Strategies of Sri Lankan Refugees in Tamil Nadu’ by C. Valatheeswaran ‘Education and Migration from the Northeastern Region of India’ by Rikil Chyrmang ‘Dynamics of Economic Mobility, Migration and Capability Interface’ by Rakesh Ranjan Kumar ‘Role of Migration in Inequality: An Analysis of Kerala’ by Raju John ‘Short Term Family Migration in India: An Analysis of Magnitude and Characteristics’ by Madhusudan Nag As reported in IMR 2016, the South Asia Migration Report 2017 (SAMR) is already published and currently work on the second volume of SAMR is underway (forthcoming 2019). In the upcoming months, I am engaged with three books on migration that are forthcoming: (1) Climate Change, Vulnerability and Migration (with R. B. Bhagat of International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai); (2) Migration, Gender and Care Economy (with N. Neetha of Centre for Women’s Development Studies, New Delhi) and (3) Youth Migration in an Emerging India (with P. Sivakumar of Rajiv Gandhi National Institute of Youth Development, Chennai). Over the last two years, we have also completed two major projects on migration: ‘Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People’, funded by the European Commission and Gender and Migration, sponsored by the Georgetown University in Qatar, and four projects are at different stages: (1) ‘Should We Provide Incentives for Investment Use of Remittances? A Randomized Controlled Experiment for India’, funded by UAE Exchange Centre LLC, Abu Dhabi; (2) ‘A Panel Study of Migration in South India’, funded by New York University; (3) ‘Demography,

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Migration and its Impact on Kerala Economy’, sponsored by the International Labour Organization and (4) ‘Emigrants, Return Emigrants and Non-Resident Keralites in Kerala, 2017’, funded by the Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs, Government of Kerala. Finally, India Migration Report 2018 will focus on Indian diaspora, skilled and student migration in Europe, followed by Refugees in India in 2019. Subsequent IMRs are likely to discuss the subject from the point of view of migration and health and skilled migration from India.

Acknowledgements

The annual India Migration Reports (IMR) over the last eight years have received overwhelming responses and acceptance globally, among readers such as development practitioners, policymakers, researchers and activists, and have emerged as a reference work. I wish to thank all the contributors in making each report in the series a must-read, and in particular for IMR 2017, a valuable contribution inclusive of important and thought-provoking articles on displacement and its effects on human mobility. This series was conceived in 2008 and took final shape in 2010, when the erstwhile Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) established the Research Unit on International Migration (RUIM) at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) in 2006. In general, I am thankful to all the secretaries at the MOIA, and in particular S. Krishna Kumar, K. Mohandas and Dr A. Didar Singh – for their overwhelming support and guidance throughout the life of the RUIM at CDS during 2006–2016. At CDS, K. M. Chandrasekhar, chairman; Sunil Mani, director; Suresh Kumar, registrar; V. Sriram, librarian; and S. Suresh, finance officer, as well as my colleagues, students, administrative and library staff have encouraged, guided and supported me in all the academic endeavours. Over the last seven reports, the earlier directors, K. N. Nair, Pulapre Balakrishnan and Amit Shovon Ray; and Chairpersons N. R. Madhava Menon and Bimal Jalan had provided all the necessary academic support to carry over this task. My own research team members – Sunitha S., K. S. Sreeja, Indu, Malavika and Sheethal – have also raised lots of effort to put together this report. I am grateful in cherishing the emotional support, patience and understanding received from my wife, Hema, and our three children, Rahul, Rohit and Mary Catharine. I would also like to record my appreciation for the hard work done by the editorial and sales teams of Routledge in bringing out this report on time.

Contributors

H. Arokkiaraj is Doctoral Fellow, Department of Social Work, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India. Vandana Asthana is Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Eastern Washington University, Washington, USA. Debabrata Baral is Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR) Post-doctoral Fellow, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Amit Bhaduri is Honorary Professor, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India. R. B. Bhagat is Professor, International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India. Rajesh Bhattacharya is Associate Professor, Public Policy and Management Group, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata, West Bengal, India. Joël Cabalion is Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, Université François Rabelais de Tours, l’UMR CITERES, France. Samir Kumar Das is Professor of Political Science and Dean of Arts, University of Calcutta, Kolkata, West Bengal, India. Abhijit Dasgupta is a doctoral student at the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India. Tanusree Dutta is a doctoral student at the International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India. Walter Fernandes is Senior Fellow, North Eastern Social Research Centre, Guwahati, Assam, India. K. Indu is an independent consultant based in Kerala, India.

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Sajitha Beevi Karayil is Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Government College, Malappuram, Kerala, India. Vinod Kumar is Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India. Sumeetha M. is an independent consultant based in Kerala, India. N. Purendra Prasad is Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Hyderabad, Telangana, India. S. Samuel Asir Raj is Professor, Centre for Diaspora Studies, Department of Sociology, Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, India. Rakesh S. is a doctoral student at the Department of Social Work, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India. Mrutuyanjaya Sahu is Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Dubai Campus, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Bernard D’ Sami is a Senior Fellow in the LISSTAR, (Loyola Institute at the Social Science Training and Research) at Loyola College (autonomous), Chennai. Prasenjit Sarkhel is Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Kalyani, Nadia, West Bengal, India. K. C. Smitha is Researcher, Centre for Research in Urban Affairs, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India. Kala Seetharam Sridhar is Professor, Centre for Research in Urban Affairs, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India. Marita Swain is with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Geneva. Steve Taylor is Professor of Sociology, Department of Social Sciences, Northumbria University, UK. Nadine Walicki is Senior Strategic Advisor, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Geneva. Kartik Yadav is a doctoral student at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India. K. C. Zachariah is Honorary Professor, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India.

1

Development or developmental terrorism? Amit Bhaduri1

It has become a cliché, even a politically correct cliché these days, to say that there are two Indias: the India that shines with its fancy apartments and houses in rich neighbourhoods, corporate houses of breathtaking size, glittering shopping malls and high-tech flyovers over which flows a procession of new-model cars. These are the images from a globalized India on the verge of entering the first world. And then there is the other India: the India of helpless peasants committing suicide, Dalits lynched regularly in not-so-distant villages, tribals dispossessed of their forest land and livelihood, and children too small to walk properly, yet begging on the streets of shining cities. Something stalks the air. The rage of the poor from this other India is palpable; it has engulfed some 120–160 out of 607 districts of this country in the so-called extremist Naxalite movements. The India of glitter and privilege, it seems, is bent on turning its back and seceding fast from the other India of despair, rage and inhuman poverty. This is not just a matter of growing relative inequality between the two Indias. A more brutal process is at work, with the connivance of governments at the central and at the state levels which is not only widening this divide between the two Indias – it is deepening consciously the absolute poverty and misery of poor India.

Obsession with growth The unprecedented high economic growth on which privileged India prides itself is a measure of the high speed at which the India of privilege is distancing itself from the India of crushing poverty. The higher the rate of economic growth along this pattern becomes, the greater would be the underdevelopment of India. We first need to understand this paradox which counterposes growth against development, and challenge this dangerous obsession with growth. Globalization is the

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context in which growth is taking place. The accompanying processes of economic liberalization and privatization are tilting the balance in favour of the market against the nation state. However, the game is no longer what it used to be. Nineteenth-century capitalism developed through a complex process of conflict and cooperation between the state and the market. The state furthered the interest of the market, but at times also regulated it. For instance, it regulated the hours of work, abolished child labour or legalized trade unionism at different points in time. Karl Polanyi, the perceptive commentator on nineteenth-century capitalism, described this as a process of ‘great transformation’ driven by the ‘double movement’ of the market and the state, a process in which the rules for the market were set mostly by the state. When the state fails to play this role, the result is not a freer market and more freedom but growing desperate rage of the poor, which must engulf all sooner or later. It is a badly kept secret of economic theory that it cannot explain how the market gets organized and rules get set. The reason is the free market metaphor, which avoids assigning the state an explicit economic role. For instance, economists talk of prices rising or falling in response to excess of demand or supply in the market, but are at a loss to explain who sets the price in a market of many players, if no one has the power to dictate price? Like Voltaire’s god, they then invent ‘the auctioneer’, the metaphor of the invisible hand of the price mechanism and other tales, trying to pretend that the market operates in isolation like a self-regulating system. High theory verges on idiocy by rejecting history. What is left unsaid is that the situation is far worse when the rules of the market are set by the state on behalf of the large corporations. This indeed is what is being carried out under globalization, also in India. The conventional Left is willingly or unwillingly as much a party to it as the neoliberal Right. Increasingly, rhetoric and not substance divides them. We are living in barren times. The Left is left without any sense of economic direction, any ideas, and ends up following the Right, which is not right. As a result, a many-pronged, merciless onslaught has been let loose on the poor of India in the name of faster economic growth.

Land grab A massive land grab by large corporations is going on in various guises, aided and abetted by the land acquisition policies of both the federal and state governments. Destruction of livelihoods and displacement of the poor in the name of industrialization, big dams for power generation and irrigation, corporatization of agriculture despite farmers’

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suicides and modernization and beautification of our cities by demolishing slums are showing everyday how development can turn perverse. Until September 2006, the Board of Approvals Committee of the Ministry of Commerce had approved 267 special economic zones (SEZ) projects all over India. Land area for each of these projects ‘deemed foreign territories’ ranges from 1,000 to 14,000 ha. So far, for only 67 multiproduct SEZs, 134,000 ha have been acquired, mostly by state industrial development corporations. Similarly, mining rights are being granted to the corporations, mostly over tribal lands. State governments, aided and emboldened by central government policies, are acquiring land to give away to corporations. The Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act of 1996 requires gram sabhas to be consulted for land acquisition. And yet, in Jharkhand and Orissa, this has either been ignored systematically or, as a recent field report documents, the police surround threateningly the ordinary members in the gram sabha meetings, forcing them to agree to the proposals of giving up their lands at throwaway prices (Down to Earth, 31 October 2006). Land acquisition in Singur in West Bengal for the Tatas, or for Anil Ambani in Dadri in Uttar Pradesh (UP), repeats a pattern that is becoming menacingly familiar. We are told ‘trade secrets’ about land use cannot be revealed to the public under the Right to Information Act. Yet a local TV channel reported, uncontested so far by the government, that the West Bengal government gave Rs 140 crore in compensation, while the Tatas will give, according to the deal, only Rs 20 crore after five years for the land, without payment of stamp duty and with provision of free water. The fact that public money worth Rs 120 crore or more is handed over to a corporation must indeed remain a trade secret. Another report claims that on 31 May 2006, the West Bengal state cabinet gave the nod for the acquisition of 36,325 acres of land for various similar national and multinational corporate-led projects.

Left and corporations What we are witnessing is deliberate connivance on the part of the conventional Left in West Bengal with the interests of large corporations against the poor, perhaps in the hope that the corporations will bring about a miraculous transformation of the state, which they are incapable of doing with state power. It is an abject surrender to the conventional wisdom of our time that ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) to corporate-led capitalism, and the type of globalization it signifies – in short the TINA syndrome in the development discourse. This TINA syndrome maintains that the corporations will deliver us from poverty

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by raising the rate of economic growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank tirelessly propagate this ideology in various guises. Now we have a group of Marxist politicians propagating the same. And yet, this model of development that is so widely agreed upon is fatally flawed. The model was already rejected in the last general election in 2004, especially in Andhra. Even earlier economic reforms won neither the Congress Party nor its chief architect Manmohan Singh a favourable verdict in the 1996 election. There is no reason to believe that this corporate-led growth ideology will not be rejected again by our democratic polity either in West Bengal or elsewhere. There are two variants of this ideology relevant for India. In the first variant, massive commercial borrowing from international banks is done by our willing national government for development, encouraged and coordinated by the IMF and the World Bank by engaging multinational corporations leading to various expensive, ambitious giant projects especially in the area of infrastructure. Typically, rules of consultancy and contract are fixed by the World Bank. Almost inevitably, the country subsequently gets caught in a debt trap. Most countries of Central and South America were examples of this variant of the development model until recently. Now, country after country in a rising wave – Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela – have rejected this path of debt-dependent (non-)development. Does our Left have nothing to learn from them?

An alternative strategy The other variant is characterized by a strong presence of the state. State-led or state-sponsored corporations are created and nurtured to compete with multinationals under active government support especially in the world market, while the government tries also to attract direct foreign investment especially in areas where, for some reason, the government corporations are not the preferred option. Nevertheless, the government becomes a ruthless promoter of the corporate entities in search of higher growth, irrespective of how it affects the interests of the ordinary people. This is a case of state-led corporatism, and today’s China seems to fit this description reasonably well, while South Korea, despite the obvious differences in the political and geopolitical situations and debt dependence at an earlier stage might have traversed a similar path. Not only our one-time China-hater Rightists, but our Marxists, who not so long ago ridiculed the slogan ‘China’s path is our path’, seem to have turned

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the full circle in admiration of the Chinese way of corporate-led development. The case of China is particularly misleading in this respect in two ways. First, because the nature and extent of support the Chinese government can give to its state-sponsored corporations or to particular foreign investors, and differentiate among them, if necessary even in terms of a malleable legal system, is not possible for a government, particularly when it intends to follow the path of borrowing heavily under IMF World Bank supervision. They have to comply largely with the interests of those agencies. Second, the single-minded ruthlessness with which the Chinese system can follow its objective of corporate-led growth, at times by changing laws or suppressing the rights of the ordinary people, is fortunately not yet possible in our system. However, what China or any other country does is no justification. The reliance on developmental terrorism by the state on behalf of the corporations against the poor is unacceptable anywhere, no matter what political label is attached. The Indian case could have been restrained by the political compulsions of coalition governments in the centre as well as in several states. However, this has not happened because of a remarkable degree of political convergence on the model of development between the Right and the Left. The challenge facing us is twofold. We must oppose high growth that justifies developmental terrorism by the state on behalf of the corporations. This is the significance of Narmada Bachao Andolan led by Medha Patkar. At the same time, we must chart out an alternative path of development. Although limited, possibilities exist even in the present situation, and we must exploit them fully. The potentials of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, the strengthening of panchayats through their financial autonomy for implementing it, and full control by gram sabhas of the use of their land, and transparency and accountability in governance at all levels through the right to information need to be pushed as far as possible. Pro-people growth in India has to be employment-driven and energized by a genuinely decentralized structure of governance. With that vision of development, it is time we judge the actions of political parties and governments in power by this criterion, and not by their fiery rhetoric.

Note 1 This article was originally published in the Economic and Political Weekly, 42(7): 552–53, 2007.

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Pushed aside Displaced for ‘development’ Nadine Walicki and Marita Swain

This chapter examines nine cases of displacement caused by development in the states of Gujarat, Jharkhand, Kerala and the national capital territory of Delhi. They reveal failed regulation, inadequate enforcement of the law and harm to communities that extend to other cases elsewhere in India. They show that land acquisitions have pushed people aside with little regard for their rights or needs for decades. They are the result of government indifference and a failure to monitor the human rights impacts of projects and establish accountability mechanisms to address them. The chapter shows that: Government power over land and its severe approach to dissent are key factors in enabling and perpetuating displacement in the context of development projects. Land acquisitions are facilitated by the exploitation of ‘public interest’ to justify project approval, the use of ‘special economic zones’ to circumvent legal safeguards, inaccurate land categorisation, prejudice against the poor and working classes, and lack of transparency. With international evictions standards not adhered to, indigenous peoples’ rights are not respected and those affected face a power imbalance when trying to assert their rights. The authorities’ indifference to – and neglect of – the adverse human and socio-economic impacts on the displaced and society at large lead to a fall in living standards and fractured social networks. Internally displaced persons’ (IDP) access to livelihoods becomes more difficult after eviction and income levels, food security, health and education suffer as a result. Housing conditions deteriorate because compensation, resettlement assistance and rehabilitation support are insufficient or not provided. Women and indigenous peoples tend to suffer the adverse effects of displacement disproportionately.

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Data on the patterns of IDPs’ movement and their progress towards durable solutions is inadequate, leading to underestimates of the scale and consequences of displacement. Patterns of movement are not documented because nationwide data on the number, location and needs of those displaced is not publicly available, whether they are resettled or not. In many cases however, displacement tends to become protracted and durable solutions are rare.

Methodology This chapter is based on the findings of three weeks of field research conducted in March 2016 in three Indian states and the national capital territory of Delhi, during which the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) interviewed more than 35 people including IDPs, academics, human rights activists and civil society representatives. The interviews were conducted in Kakkanad, Santhom colony and Thuthiyoor in Kerala; Chandil, Kobhta and Kokoch in Jharkhand; Ahmedabad, Ganesh Nagar and Vatva in Gujarat; and New Delhi, Savda Ghevra and Baprola in Delhi. This article is also based on a review of literature on displacement caused by development in India and elsewhere.

Background to displacement caused by development in India People have been displaced to make way for development in India for centuries, but it became a serious issue in the colonial period (Fernandes 2008: 89). Britain’s objective of supplying capital and raw material for its industrial revolution displaced an estimated 35 million people (Naoroji 1988). Revolts and legal developments culminated in the 1894 Land Acquisition Act (LAA), which is based on the principle of eminent domain (Fernandes 2008: 89). Under it, the state owns all biodiversity, natural resources and land without individual titles, and the state alone has the right to define a public purpose and deprive individuals of their land. After independence in 1947, vast areas of land were required to jump-start the developmental vision that guided the new nation’s policies (Chakravorty 2016: 50). Increasing numbers of people were forced from their homes and land, and rapid economic growth accelerated the process still further. Development and its consequences were viewed as peoples’ contribution to nation-building. From the 1980s, however, protests erupted against impoverishment. Grassroots movements of people displaced and affected by projects played an active

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role in informing affected communities of their rights and advocating collectively against private and state entities. In the 1990s, the government began to institute significant macroeconomic reforms in line with the development paradigm promoted by globalization, liberalization and privatization. India witnessed unprecedented growth and shifted the global economic centre of gravity together with Brazil, China and Russia. Today India is the world’s fastest growing economy and the tenth largest. Large tracts of land have been needed to achieve this growth. Equating economic development with public purpose, the state acquired or diverted common and private land to reach its national macroeconomic objectives (Mathur 2008: 3). The control over land and natural resources is a politically sensitive issue in India. The 2011 defeat of the Left Front government in West Bengal, which had been in power for 34 years, was attributed to widespread discontent, protests and violence triggered by land acquisitions for a chemical industry hub and car factory (Shankar 2012: 1). The price of land has soared over the last decade, and unfulfilled promises of resettlement and rehabilitation have undermined trust (Chakravorty 2016: 49). At the same time, the link between land use and specific development goals has not been made explicit. Decisions to implement projects are made on the basis of ad hoc pressures and a desire to please investors, and the general trend is toward the increased expropriation of land (Shankar 2012: 23). The number of districts with land acquisition cases increased from 130 to 165 between 2011 and 2014 (Shankar 2012). However, as land acquisitions accelerated, employment rates stagnated, and in 2015 India ranked only 130th out of 173 in the UN Development Programme Human Development Index, between Tajikistan and Honduras (Kannan and Raveendran 2009; UNDP 2015: 49).

Scale and process In the absence of government data, independent researchers estimate that at least 65 million people were displaced by development projects between 1950 and 2005 (Cernea 2013). It is an issue that touches all corners of the country, and viewed in its entirety amounts to a national crisis (The Hindu 2006). An estimated 90 per cent of people displaced by development in India were forced from their homes by state-run projects (Chakravorty 2016: 51). Much of the funding for such projects has been provided by public sector banks, and this has increased in recent years (PSA 2012: 53). The government acquires or diverts land in two ways. It can forcibly expropriate forest, private and common land for purposes it deems in the public interest, and it can reclassify forest and common land,

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for example to create a national park or wildlife sanctuary, which may obstruct the rights of those using it. By 2011, more than 6.5 million ha of land had been diverted to ‘public interest’ projects in the agri-business, infrastructure, resource extraction and renewable energy sectors. The decision-making processes for projects, land acquisition, environment impact assessments and forest clearances run in parallel through different ministries and at different levels of the federal structure (Shankar 2012: 25). Final decisions are taken at the central or state level on a project-by-project basis (RRI 2015: 2). Until recently, the state had no legal obligation to resettle or rehabilitate the people it acquired land from. At best, those displaced received a paltry sum toward rebuilding their lives. Faced with growing discontent over several decades, however, the authorities have adopted policies that entitle those displaced to compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation. A culture of secrecy means little data is available on the distribution of such entitlements, but decades of research show that they vary considerably (Chakravorty 2016: 53). Some officials have said projects would not be viable if they had to pay adequate compensation and fully resettle and rehabilitate those affected (Fernandes 2008: 97). There is also a lack of due process across land acquisition, displacement, resettlement and rehabilitation procedures. Development is set to continue causing displacement in India, and on an unprecedented scale. The country plans major projects over the next 15 years in the agri-fuel, infrastructure, resource extraction and renewable energy sectors, and these will require 11 million ha of land (RRI 2014; Mathur 2008: 3; Shankar 2012: 5). The creation of 100 ‘smart cities’ – cities that provide core infrastructure, a decent quality of life to citizens, a clean and sustainable environment and ‘smart’ solutions to urban challenges – will also lead to significant displacement (GoI 2015: 5). Some experts also argue that large dams will remain a necessary development option to provide water for industry and agriculture, because small reservoirs dry up during ever more frequent periods of drought (Scudder 2005: 2). India’s dense and growing population also means that land will become more scarce.

Key findings Government exploits the land acquisition process The justification of public purpose is exploited in the approval of development projects across India. The country’s laws empower states to define public purpose, and recent amendments by those such as Gujarat and Rajasthan widen their scope to do so. Many current projects,

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however, do not serve the public interest (Shankar 2012: 22). A study of three displacement cases in Chennai, Delhi and Mumbai found there was no demonstrable public purpose to justify the evictions that took place (HLRN 2014: 4). Public purpose often serves as a façade for gentrification, whereby the urban poor are removed from coveted areas to make way for commercial ventures and high-income housing. This was the case for those displaced for a so-called canal widening from the Perandur canal in Kochi, Kerala and from central New Delhi to Savda Ghevra and Baprola for Commonwealth Games preparations and urban renewal. The authorities and courts also use pejorative language to justify human rights derogations in the name of driving development and the current real estate boom across the country. Evictions in urban areas are often justified on the grounds of removing ‘illegal encroachers’. The term suggests residents are trespassers or squatters rather than rights-holders and frames the poor as unworthy of legal and constitutional protection (Environment & Urbanization 2009). The result is that only the poorest residents are evicted on account of their irregular or illegal status, as happened in the case of the Perandur canal and evictions from the banks of Delhi’s Yamuna River (IDMC 2016; Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 16). These examples add to an evidence base which shows that land acquisition and resettlement processes reflect prejudice against India’s poor and working classes (HLRN 2014: 6; Mathur 2008: 4). The inaccurate categorization of land also facilitates acquisitions. The government uses ‘wasteland’ as an overarching category that includes all rural land other than forests and privately held agricultural and grazing land (BSC and ActionAid 2012: 39). There is no consistent or legal definition of wasteland, and much of the land acquired for development projects tends to fall under this category. Behind the opaque term lies common property and shared resources that are neither state nor privately owned. The lack of a regulatory framework for this type of land blurs matters further (IDMC 2016). Data and records on acquisitions of such land, upon which many of India’s most vulnerable and marginalized people live and depend, is also scarce. This highlights the need for transparency in land classification and access to public documentation. The national government is making increasing use of special economic zones (SEZs) to expedite large land acquisitions and circumvent legal safeguards. As of May 2016, there were 417 formal approvals for SEZs across India, of which 330 have been notified (GoI SEZs 2016). The majority of acquisitions concern fertile agricultural land that is

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then converted to industrial and commercial use, such as for the smart city in Kochi (Asher and Atmavilas 2011: 320). SEZs facilitate land acquisitions for private gain because the government acquires land under eminent domain for public purpose and then sells it to commercial stakeholders. Rapid clearance processes bypass safeguards and does not require public participation or consultation, or the consent of affected communities before their eviction. The land acquisition process is shrouded in a lack of transparency, which provides ample cover for the corruption of resettlement financing and eligibility. Corruption is prevalent, because there is money to be made in acquisition and resettlement in terms of land, contracts and services (Oliver-Smith 2016). The diversion of funds from a national urban renewal initiative to resettle ‘eligible’ families displaced by the Sabarmati riverfront development project in Ahmedabad instead of using project finance is but just one example. International eviction standards are not adhered For all nine projects IDMC visited, there were no public consultations before evictions took place, and communities did not participate in the resettlement process. IDMC’s findings are consistent with other cases in India, where land acquisition and evictions often take place with little or no prior notice or consultation. People find out about plans from neighbours, when officials come to measure the land or when the bulldozers arrive (Fernandes 2008: 98; HLRN 2011: 3–4, iv, 20). Social and environmental impact assessments were not carried out for any of the nine projects IDMC visited, which appears to be the norm in India and contributes to the exclusion of displaced people from decision-making processes. Detailed studies of displacement caused by projects in Chennai, Delhi and Mumbai also found that no such assessments had been undertaken (HLRN 2014: 4). In cases where they have been carried out they underestimated impacts, neglected whole groups of affected people and included false information (PSA 2012: 46). Evictions are often carried out under a disproportionate and threatening police presence, and sometimes excessive force is used. This was the case not only for half of the projects IDMC visited – in Ahmedabad, Delhi, Jharkhand and Kochi – but also in Odisha, formerly Orissa, and across India as a whole (Mathur 2011: 369). People displaced by preparations for the 2010 Commonwealth Games said police had threatened some residents in an effort to get them to vacate the area (HLRN 2011). Earlier evictions along the Yamuna river in Delhi in 2004 also involved a heavy police presence, which led to injuries and

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deaths and contributed to ‘an atmosphere of uncertainty and terror’ (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 88). The perpetrators of violence during evictions tend to go unpunished, and those displaced have few avenues for recourse. The studies in Chennai, Delhi and Mumbai showed there had been no prosecution or trial of officials involved in the violence and destruction that accompanied the evictions, despite multiple incidents of injury. Nor did the government provide any medical aid or compensation to the victims (HLRN 2014: 4). Of further concern is that there is no evaluation mechanism to monitor the implementation of rehabilitation plans, or any recourse for failure (Padel and Das 2011: 150). Power imbalance in negotiations between project implementer and affected community Given that only the state can define and defend public purpose, the government has the upper hand in negotiations on land acquisition, resettlement and rehabilitation from the outset. A lack of secure tenure means that many communities are unable to negotiate on equal terms. The result is a glaring power imbalance with government, companies and beneficiary middlemen on one side, and those facing eviction and their supporters on the other. The authorities and companies have more access to information, are affluent and do not bear any costs. Provisions that require consultation are manipulated or ignored (Mathur 2008: 4; Shankar 2012: 18). The imbalance becomes more asymmetric still after displacement, because it widens the economic and social inequality between the two sides. In response, people affected by development projects have increasingly taken up forms of resistance throughout the country, ranging from protests and hunger strikes to mass uprisings, guerrilla warfare and armed conflict. Opposition is often met with state violence, which has cost protesters their lives and in some cases led to conflict, but it has not deterred people from opposing the displacement they face (Mathur 2008: 8). Local community resistance efforts have grown into larger social movements made up of indigenous people, farmers, environmentalists and human rights activists, with support from local and international civil society organizations and the media. They include local efforts to improve living conditions and access to services in Savda Ghevra, Kannagi Nagar and Vashi Naka in New Delhi, which were started by the displaced themselves (HLRN 2014: 6). They also include the decades-long and still strong Save the Narmada campaign against a series of dams on the river, and a movement in Odisha that has been resisting plans for a vast steelworks to be built

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and operated by the multinational POSCO corporation for more than a decade. Some struggles have led to projects being withdrawn, as for the proposed bauxite mine in Niyamgiri, and declarations of new protected areas dropped, but they have had limited effect on the general practice of land acquisitions. The cases IDMC studied show that when those displaced have managed to negotiate a better outcome, their efforts have largely depended on civil society, political and media support, and their level of education and affluence (Mathur 2008: 179; GoI 2014: 257). In Kochi, the displaced displayed remarkable agency in their struggle to obtain fairer compensation and rehabilitation support (George and Rajan 2015: 1). The gains people displaced from the Perandur canal and Moolampilly in Kerala achieved were the result of community cohesion, media coverage and support from religious leaders and human rights officials (IDMC 2016). Tireless activism was key in the case of the Chandil dam, and personal connections in the case of Ahmedabad (IDMC 2016). This display of agency takes place in the face of huge obstacles. Maintaining such a struggle involves the loss of time and wages, the cost of long-distance travel to the state or national capital and legal expenses. Those taking part also face threats from local officials and the police (BSC and ActionAid India 2012: 71–2). In prioritizing the acceleration of growth, the government has generally taken the side of companies rather than displaced people (Mathur 2008: xvi; BSC and ActionAid India 2012: 71–2). This was the case for IDPs in Kokoch in Jharkhand, who have received no remedy from either Tata Steel or the government for their displacement to make way for the Noamundi iron ore mine, despite years of protest. There are also major impediments to securing judicial remedies in India. A court case lodged by IDPs in Kokoch 22 years ago is still at the first instance. This is not unusual, given that the Indian court system has a backlog of 27 million cases and is in need of a complete overhaul (Guardian 2016a; 2016b). Compensation and resettlement packages tend to be viewed as welfare rather than a matter of right, and treatment of those displaced as people without rights further entrenches inequality (Fernandes 2008: 98). Indigenous rights are not systematically respected in land acquisitions India’s tribal or indigenous people account for only 8.6 per cent of the country’s population, but at least 40 per cent of those displaced by development projects (Fernandes 2007: 361–2). For dam projects, the figure rises to 60 per cent.

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National legal frameworks to safeguard indigenous rights are not systematically implemented, and in states including Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand and Odisha the extent of indigenous land has been drastically reduced. Much land has been lost to non-tribals or acquired by the government and reclassified as forest or revenue land – agricultural land which cannot be used for industrial or residential purposes. Such processes violate the Indian Constitution and national laws to protect indigenous rights (Mathur 2011: 361–2). The fifth schedule of the constitution has been reinforced by a Supreme Court ruling that prohibits the acquisition of tribal land by non-tribals (HLRN 2016: 24). Despite these legal provisions, however, ministries continue to approve its acquisition. Grievances born out of the government’s failure to protect the land and livelihood rights of indigenous groups has led to guerrilla warfare and conflict. The Naxalite-Maoist insurgencies of the so-called Red Corridor, which stretches from Andhra Pradesh to West Bengal, began as a peasant uprising in West Bengal in the 1960s. The insurgents tap the extractive industry to finance the conflict, and they have found it easy to mobilize local displaced populations, the majority of whom are indigenous and have suffered the negative impacts of development projects (Foreign Policy 2010). The government has responded with counter-insurgency operations that have caused further displacement. It has also labelled protesters and those resisting land acquisitions as Maoists, making it easier to justify repressive measures against them (Padel and Das 2011: 166). The displacement of indigenous communities leads to more than economic losses for those affected. Indigenous IDPs tend to suffer far more than their counterparts in the general population, because they lose a way of life that goes beyond what any resettlement initiative can compensate for (Mathur 2011: 166). The displacement of indigenous villages amounts not only to impoverishment, but also ‘cultural genocide, since every aspect of the social structure is fundamentally altered and undermined, including the economy, political system, material culture, relationship with the environment, religion and system of values’ (Padel and Das 2011: 144–5). The fate of the Ho people displaced by a TATA Steel coal mine in Jharkhand is but one example (IDMC 2016). There is, however, cause for hope. Some gram sabhas, or village assemblies, have recently vetoed the approval of development projects in forest areas (The Hindu 2016). In 2013, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of one such assembly in Odisha’s Niyamgiri hills to reject plans for a bauxite mine. The ruling was seen as a landmark victory in recognizing indigenous rights (AI 2013). More recently, a tribunal

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in Himachal Pradesh state endorsed a gram sabha decision to reject a hydroelectric power plant that would have submerged forest and farmland and deprived local people of their livelihoods (LiveMint 2016).

Authorities respond severely to opponents of projects IDPs and activists have been defending the rights of people affected by development projects and business activities in India for decades (Kothari 2015). As some of those IDMC spoke to for this chapter describe, both state and private agents have targeted such campaigners with killings, torture, physical assaults, raids, arrests and arbitrary detentions (UN 2011: 71–101; PSA 2012: 21, 42). Numerous cases have highlighted a nexus between the police and the private sector (PSA 2012: 21). The threats activists face have led some to seek refuge in the forest or other towns during times of repression (PSA 2012: 21). In Mandala, Mumbai, hundreds of people were detained while conducting a peaceful protest against the demolition in June 2015 of the homes of 3,000 returnees who had originally been evicted in 2005 (Kothari 2015). The authorities have also labelled human rights defenders as Maoists, Naxalites, ‘anti-development opponents of progress’ and ‘anti-national’ elements resisting the state (BSC and ActionAid India 2012: 71–2; UN 2007: 71–101; Kothari 2015; Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 181; Mathur 2008: 6). The government in Odisha has taken a heavy-handed approach to any opposition to development projects, especially to private sector mining, industrial and other ventures. Community resistance is perceived as anti-government resistance, and arrests and detentions are common (Mathur 2011: 368). Similarly, in Uttar Pradesh, female leaders of the National Trade Union Initiative and the All India Union of Forest Working People were arrested and detained in June 2015 for resisting the construction of the Kanhardam. They were accused of ‘waging war against the state’ (Kothari 2015).

Evictions result in community disintegration Displacement rarely involves the direct relocation of an intact community to a purpose-built resettlement site. People tend to be displaced at different times during the land acquisition and eviction process and in different directions, atomizing their social and community networks. This happens for a number of reasons. In some cases, a number of IDPs are obliged to go first to an interim resettlement site, while others are able to negotiate direct resettlement. In others, resettlement is not agreed

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before eviction, and those affected are left to their own devices until a package is offered, if it is offered at all. Some of the people resettled to Savda Ghevra in New Delhi were homeless for months following their eviction while they waited for a resettlement offer, and a study of displacement from Bawana revealed similar findings. Some lived in the ruins of their demolished homes or with family members, but a large number were rendered homeless (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 10; IDMC 2016). Some IDPs are not considered eligible for resettlement. Most states set a date before which families must have been living in the area in order to qualify. Cut-off dates range from years to decades and differ among eviction processes (HLRN 2011: 29; Mathur 2012: 65). Such arbitrary limits exclude significant numbers of people who moved to the area after the date in question, or who are unable to provide documentation to prove they moved before it. Either way, they are forced to separate from their community when resettlement takes place. Resettlement plans can also be used to deliberately divide communities. Close-knit and mixed religious communities in Pushta in New Delhi and the Sabarmati riverfront in Ahmedabad were broken up during their relocation, ostensibly to hasten the process of mixing and integrating families in their new locations, but more likely as a political move to counter the possibility of organized resistance (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 133; IDMC 2016). Eviction is already a painful process, and community disintegration makes it more so. IDMC interviews confirm that displacement caused by development projects has a profound psychological impact on those affected. For many, losing their home and land is akin to losing a loved one, and talking about their eviction evokes distressing memories even years after the event (Fernandes 2008: 93). The effects of leaving behind ancestors and homes that have been built over the years with hard-earned money cannot be fully quantified and compensated. Relationships that provide security and a sense of community are lost, heightening vulnerability and helplessness (Fernandes 2008: 93).

IDPs’ housing conditions deteriorate Compensation for expropriated property tends to be insufficient for people to procure decent housing after their displacement. In the five cases IDMC studied where cash was on offer, not all IDPs were eligible and those who did receive it found it was not enough to buy or build a new home. Rather the cash was used to repay old debts, make short-term investments in material items or buy alcohol, driven at best

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by a lack of awareness about financial planning and investment for the future, and at worst by despair (George and Rajan 2015; Fernandes 2008: 99). In the three cases where compensation took the form of land, either IDPs built homes with borrowed money or the plots lie vacant because of their poor quality or location. Under-compensation results from the undervaluation of land and property, an India-wide phenomenon to reduce taxes, and otherwise negligent valuations (Pandey 1998: 69; IDMC 2016; PSA 2012: 47; Shankar 2012: 7). Dramatic increases in property values during the period between acquisition and eviction are also a factor, as are the use of non-market land values and corruption (Dreze and Sen 2005; Mathur 2011: 67–98). Land officers also tend to set low acquisition prices (Chakravorty 2016: 54). In the resettlement sites IDMC visited, residents said conditions in their government-allocated apartments had deteriorated significantly. This was the case in Santhom colony in Kochi, Vatva in Ahmedabad and Baprola in New Delhi. Beneficiaries in Santhom and Vatva have, nevertheless, to repay a sum for the unit over a number of years. Though recently built, poor construction standards and long periods of vacancy mean the apartment blocks are morphing into ‘vertical slums’. Beneficiaries are not allowed to form residents’ associations until all units are occupied, one result being that the upkeep of common spaces is neglected. Uncertain tenure is also a factor. Apartments were not always allocated according to families’ size and needs. Some disabled residents in Baprola were given units on upper floors, and all families were given two-room apartments regardless of the number of married couples in the household, leading to cramped conditions and a lack of privacy. The latter finding is corroborated across the country, in both urban and rural areas (HLRN 2014: 18–9; Patel, Sliuzas and Mathur 2015: 5). IDPs who had to resolve their own housing needs did not always build safe, large enough or well-serviced structures that protected them properly against the elements. People resettled to Bawana in New Delhi faced poorer quality of housing with reduced access to services in an area with few jobs (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 54). These conditions negatively affected their health (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 151). At the other end of the spectrum, those displaced by the smart city project in Kochi built and live in concrete structures as opposed to their previous clay-built homes, possess title deeds and have paid off any debt they incurred during construction (George and Rajan 2015: 12). The vast majority of urban resettlement sites IDMC visited were on the outermost periphery of the city in question, 20–40 km from the

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areas people were evicted from. Given that they lack job opportunities, schools and health centres, some IDPs and their children commute daily to work and school in the areas they used to live in, and incur extra transport costs in doing so. For others, resettlement has led to isolation, because they are unable to afford to commute or visit family members and former neighbours who resettled elsewhere. Studies in Odisha also found that the rehabilitation programmes associated with most projects were conceived in an ad hoc and uncoordinated way, and did not consider the link between housing and livelihoods (Pandey 1998: 75). In rural areas, IDPs in Kokoch have settled with family members because they did not receive compensation or alternative accommodation. Some in Chandil have been resettled in purpose-built sites, one of which provides conditions similar to nearby towns. Twenty-six years after eviction, however, only eight of the 13 resettlement sites envisaged have been built, and seven of them do not provide living conditions comparable with nearby towns.

IDPs’ poverty and vulnerability increase The displaced have tended not to benefit from India’s unprecedented economic growth or the projects that have displaced them. In only two of the nine displacement sites IDMC visited did the rehabilitation plan provide livelihood support in addition to compensation or alternative accommodation. The plan for the Chandil dam gave some IDPs the opportunity to take up fish farming in the reservoir it created, where they now run cooperatives. The plan for an international container trans-shipment terminal in Kochi allocates each family a job to compensate for lost livelihoods. Eight years after displacement, however, the jobs are yet to materialize. The situation is similar for other IDPs elsewhere in India (Fernandes 2008: 96). Those in Kokoch, Jharkhand, continue to call for jobs at the Noamundi iron ore mine that displaced them. Findings at the national level show that neither the state nor private enterprise has gainfully employed the people they displaced (PSA 2012: 20). This challenges the argument often used that establishing new industries in rural areas will increase employment to the benefit of local people. Displaced households’ income tends to fall because they struggle to keep their work or secure other employment following their eviction. There were few job or livelihood opportunities in the vast majority of the resettlement sites IDMC visited, and IDPs who do not commute to

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hold onto their previous jobs survive on casual labour such as handicrafts and rubbish sorting, or remittances from family members. IDPs in Kokoch previously depended on their land to cultivate rice. Without the funds to acquire land after their displacement, they sell rice beer, firewood and leaves for kindling. Elsewhere in India, and irrespective of the type of projects, people displaced tend to experience a drastic drop in employment security, and their families a corresponding fall in their standard of living (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 144–7). In Kerala there is not a substantial difference between IDPs’ income and that of their counterparts in the general population, but IDPs shoulder more debt (George and Rajan 2015: 10–11). The IDPs IDMC met also face added expenses as a result of their displacement, be it the cost of food, drinking water, transport or registering their allotted plot of land. Bureaucratic barriers, corruption and the negative attitude of some authorities towards residents of resettlement sites also mean IDPs are unable to rely on social security schemes to offset their extra costs (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 144–7). India’s ration card system provides important support for poor families, covering as much as 25 per cent of their living costs, but even IDPs who had a card before their displacement were unable to use it afterwards, either because they couldn’t update their address or they were asked to pay a bribe despite fulfilling the eligibility criteria (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 147). Some IDPs were also asked to pay a bribe on top of the registration fee for their plot of land in order to guarantee their allocation (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 10). Other factors increase the vulnerability of the displaced, such as the issue of eligibility. To be eligible for resettlement, families must submit a list of requisite documents, but doing so does not guarantee they will be resettled. Those eligible are also often evicted without any compensation or rehabilitation. Most of the families resettled to Kannagi Nagar in Chennai, Savda Ghevra in New Delhi and Vashi Naka in Mumbai were unable to fulfil the requirements because they lost the necessary documents during the eviction process, or because government agencies regularly replace them such as to alter residency duration (HLRN 2014: 18–19). Some documents were burned in earlier house fires, and now their new ration cards were dated 1999, leaving them ineligible (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 10). The combination of their loss of assets, lack of livelihood support, drop in income and added expenses leads to IDPs’ long-term impoverishment and heightened vulnerability. Most of those IDMC spoke to had not recovered, even decades after their eviction. A study of 30-year-old resettlement sites in Delhi also found that residents’

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average income was still below the official minimum wage (Roy 2008: 143). A non-governmental organization (NGO) study of the Bawanare settlement site in New Delhi found that households that had been able to survive and recover from temporary impoverishment triggered by shocks before their eviction had been thrown into a state of permanent poverty by their displacement and resettlement (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 10). The consequences of sustained impoverishment are many. Some of the IDPs IDMC met were unable to pay for the housing unit the government allocated to them because of the drop in their income, which in turn undermines their tenure security (IDMC 2016). Some families have taken their children out of school and sent them to work, others cook less to save on fuel, and still others keep their costs to a minimum by not leaving the resettlement site (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 92; HLRN 2014: 40). Such negative coping strategies lead to food insecurity, chronic hunger and malnutrition, the risk of labour exploitation and isolation. Unable to pursue higher education, children are unlikely to escape the deprivation suffered by their parents, as has been well-documented by scholars in India (HLRN 2014: 4).

Women suffer the adverse effects of displacement disproportionately Not all women are affected by displacement and resettlement in the same way, but the process tends to undermine their status and reinforce existing patriarchal structures (Dewan 2008: 129). The breakdown of kinship networks aggravates the situation (Pandey 2009: 18–20; Dias 2012: 156; HLRN 2014: 4). Still responsible for household duties and care of family members, women endure a particular burden following displacement. The loss of access to common resources as a result of rural development projects such as mines and dams mean that women are forced to travel further in search of fuel, food, fodder and water for the family (Pandey 1998: 93). The situation is similar in urban resettlement sites, which decreases the amount of time they are able to devote to working, caring for and educating their children, and sleep (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 55). Limited or no access to previous livelihoods is the norm. In rural areas, the loss of access to forests and common property tends to have a greater impact on women’s livelihoods, because managing such resources for the household was primarily their task (Dewan

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2008: 132). In urban areas, the long commute between resettlement and peoples’ former places of residence takes significant time out of the day, and the cost puts further strain on the family budget. As a result, women either give up their jobs or, as was the case in Savda Ghevra, they leave early in the morning and return late at night, putting their safety at risk (HLRN 2014: 4). In many cases, women are not the direct recipients of compensation payments, nor are they included in job creation programmes (Pandey 1998: 93; IDMC 2016; Pandey 2009: 17; Dewan 2008: 129–30). Women and girls displaced in urban areas face particular challenges in terms of their privacy, security and dignity. At an interim resettlement site in Ahmedabad, the absence of toilets means they have had to resort to defecating in the nearby forest (IDMC 2016). Those displaced in Delhi have also experienced acute difficulties in terms of their access to sanitation (HLRN 2011: 40). At the Bawana resettlement site, the latches on public lavatory doors have been removed, leaving them vulnerable to sexual harassment. There is also a charge for using the toilets, leading many to use nearby fields, but here, too, they face abuse and assault (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 152). Displacement and resettlement also disrupt marriage and dowry systems, which can create difficulties in negotiating spouses. Land and houses often form part of dowry arrangements, and the loss of them, along with reduced wages and unemployment, can make women less eligible for marriage. Families have fewer or no assets with which to negotiate, and displaced families are also often seen as having lower social status. As marriage prospects diminish, the dowry rate rises, making it more costly for the so-called destitute (Dewan 2008: 135). Dowry has also crept in to indigenous marriage practices, where it did not exist before their communities were displaced as a result of living in new communities and being exposed to practices unseen before (Dewan 2008: 135). Another coping mechanism is to marry girls younger (HLRN 2014: 4; Dewan 2008: 135). This was the case in Savda Ghevra, where girls were married at the age of 14 or 15 as a means of protecting them from physical insecurity and violence in the community. The threat of violence in public places limits women’s and girls’ mobility, hinders schooling and reduces their prospects of finding work (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 171; HLRN 2014: 4). Criminal activities that include sexual harassment and violence against women have also been cited as a consequence of displacement in other studies in India (Dewan 2008: 135). Communities react by curtailing their rights, privileges and entitlements (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 104).

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Fate and whereabouts of IDPs are largely unknown IDPs return to their former homes and land appears to be rare. Land acquired for development projects can remain unused or vacant years after evictions take place. This could be due to construction delays, administrative hurdles or projects being presented as a façade for an altogether different type of development such as gentrification. In some cases, such as the Perandur canal in Kerala and the Chandil dam in Jharkhand, IDPs have returned to their previous residences under their own initiative after noticing their land was unused. Former residents on land acquired for the Commonwealth Games in Delhi are seeking the return of unused plots through the courts (HLRN 2011; IDMC 2016). In other cases documented in the literature on displacement caused by development in India, excess land acquired for projects has been sold at a profit rather than being returned to those displaced from it (GoI 2014: 263; Fernandes 2008: 97). An estimated 17 per cent of people displaced by development projects have been resettled, but there is little if any information on their fate, or the extent to which they have been able to integrate locally. There is less still on the fate and whereabouts of the vast majority who have not been resettled. There is also no information on those who have moved on again from their resettlement area, whether within the country or across a border. There is no mechanism to track IDPs’ progress towards achieving durable solutions. The result is that the true scale of displacement caused by development in India is unknown. Based on decades of literature showing inadequate resettlement and the lack of rehabilitation, however, it is assumed that the vast majority of IDPs live in protracted displacement and still face protection and assistance needs (Fernandes 2008: 93; Modi 2009).

Nationwide data on IDPs is inadequate There is no reliable central or state government database that collates the number, location and living conditions of people displaced or adversely affected by development projects in India (GoI 2014: 258). Neither has the amount of land acquired or diverted for development purposes been consistently tracked at the national, state, municipal or district level (Chakravorty 2016: 51). Overall, there is little data publicly available on new and protracted displacement caused by development projects and business activities at any level. Efforts to invoke freedom of information laws to access project documents and land acquisition data have been largely futile. Instead,

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NGOs, activists and academics have taken it upon themselves to collect whatever information they are able to. The Delhi-based Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN) compiles figures on evictions countrywide, and reports that at least 234,000 people were evicted in urban areas between 2010 and 2015 (HLRN 2016: 54). This is a significant start to clarifying the scale of the problem, but the figure reflects only a small fraction of all the evictions that take place. Neither does HLRN’s database track those whom the state does not resettle following their eviction, meaning that the whereabouts and fate of the vast majority of evictees is unknown. The number and fate of those who are not resettled is a significant information gap. Following evictions from Pushta in New Delhi to make way for the Yamuna riverfront development, only 6,000 of the 27,000 families affected were resettled (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 12). The rest, a significant majority, are essentially invisible and likely to be worse off. These same is true of IDPs left homeless following their eviction evicted in preparation for the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi, and those living in Ganeshnagar, an interim resettlement site in Ahmedabad (IDMC 2016). Data on multiple and onward displacement is not captured (Mathur 2008: xv). Overall, the result is that the full scale of the issue nationwide is unknown and many, possibly the vast majority, of those displaced are rendered invisible (Kalyani and Bhan 2008: 16).

Conclusion The cases studied for this article give a sense of how displacement caused by development unfolds in India. Despite the adoption of a number of laws and policies on land acquisition, resettlement and rehabilitation, the phenomenon has had detrimental impacts on the lives of those affected. International standards on evictions are not adhered to when land is taken for development, leading to human rights abuses in the process. The government accelerates its development agenda in a number of ways, including by exercising its power of eminent domain and the exploitation of ‘public purpose’ to acquire land with little consultation or accountability. Affected communities face a power imbalance when trying to assert their rights, and the activists who defend their rights risk reprisals. Far from using resettlement as an opportunity to improve IDPs’ lives, the authorities’ indifference to – and neglect of – its human and socio-economic impacts tends to lead to a fall in living standards, reduced access to livelihoods, healthcare and education, and fractured

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social networks. Women are left particularly vulnerable and indigenous communities are affected disproportionately. Rather than being priority beneficiaries of the projects that displace them on account of their losses, IDPs tend to find themselves trapped in permanent poverty. This is in stark contrast to the profits made as a result of development projects and land resale values that far exceed the compensation on offer. Displacement caused by development in India tends to lead to impoverishment and marginalization, but the degree and processes vary. Processes do not necessarily follow a linear path and their pace differs from place to place and project to project. Sometimes people are displaced to resettlement sites not fit for habitation, others have been made to live in interim resettlement sites for up to a decade with no information about their future, and others still have been left without resettlement and compensation for more than three decades. IDPs will not escape poverty without significant external support and systemic changes to social and economic policies. Given the limited availability of project documents and the lack of systematic monitoring, the true scale of displacement in India is unknown, as are the location and needs of many of those affected. There is no tracking of displacement following eviction, and a seeming lack of concern as to the seriousness of its impacts, including homelessness, in government policy. This is the case regardless of the type of development project or the implementer. Displacement tends to become protracted and durable solutions are rare. Comprehensive and disaggregated data is required for the protection and assistance of those already displaced, as is further transparency about ongoing and upcoming development projects. Much work could be done to ensure development projects do not undermine sustainable development objectives. Monitoring of global development agendas, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the draft New Urban Agenda, which commit to ‘leave no one behind’, including IDPs, should take development setbacks as well as gains into account. Businesses and finance institutions could respect international guidelines for business and human rights, as well as their own policies, and publish data on displacement, resettlement and rehabilitation. UN special rapporteurs could investigate and report on the impacts of development projects and business activities, and UN treaty body committees could solicit information on displacement from states. Parliamentarians, policymakers, religious and community leaders, civil society organizations, academics and voters could all contribute to the formulation of policies that foster inclusive development

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while ensuring that it is financed and carried out responsibly in terms of its social and environmental impacts. Continuing to impoverish people and exploit the natural resources on which sustainable development depends has the potential to cause displacement beyond those immediately affected by a project. Resistance, tensions and conflict can erupt as a result of mismanagement, environmental damage, corruption and the unequal distribution of benefits. Large carbon-intensive energy sector projects such as oil extraction, coal mining and biofuel plantations not only displace people but also generate greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to global warming. Global efforts to reduce carbon emissions to mitigate the effects of climate change, such as carbon sequestration through reforestation, will also need to address the displacement they cause. Development projects can lift millions out of poverty, but they should not simultaneously create new poor or heighten the economic vulnerabilities of those evicted. This undermines global sustainable development objectives. Governments that do not deal adequately with the negative socio-economic impacts of displacement caused by development will have failed to realize the potential of their projects to generate employment, reduce poverty and promote social integration. National governments need to commit to a development model that puts all humans at its centre and does not countenance displacement without compensation, resettlement and full rehabilitation as an inevitable price to be paid for sustainable development. As we embark on implementing the post-2015 global development agendas, IDPs should benefit to ensure displacement does not undermine their achievement.

References Amnesty International. 2013. ‘India: Landmark supreme court ruling a great victory for indigenous rights’, 18 April. www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/ 2013/04/india-landmark-supreme-court-ruling-great-victory-indigenousrights/ (accessed 22 April 2016). Asher, M and Y. Atmavilas. 2011. ‘Special Economic Zones: the new “Land” mines’, in Hari Mohan Mathur (ed.) Resettling Displaced People, New Delhi: Routledge, 317–350. Behavioural Science Centre and ActionAid India. 2012. ‘Development’ versus People: Gujarat Model of Land Acquisitions and People’s Voices. Ahmedabad: St. Xavier’s College Campus. Bhan, Gautam. 2009. ‘This is no longer the city I once knew: Evictions, the urban poor and the right to the city: Delhi’, Environment & Urbanization, 21(1): 127–142.

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Cernea, Michael M. 2013. Progress in India: New legislation to protect persons internally displaced by development projects. Brookings, available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-ront/2013/10/21/progress-in-indianew-legislation-to-protect-persons-internally-displaced-by-developmentprojects/ Cernea, Michael and Hari Mohan Mathur. 2007. Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? Reforming Resettlement through Investments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chakravorty, Sanjoy. 2016. ‘Land acquisition in India: The political-economy of changing the law’, Area Development and Policy, 1(1): 48–62. Dewan, R. 2008. ‘Development projects and displaced women’, in Council for Social Development, India Social Development Report 2008: Development and Displacement, p. 127. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dias, Anthony. 2012. Development and Its Human Cost. New Delhi: Rawat. Dreze, Jean and Amartya Kumar Sen. 2005. India: Development and Participation. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Fernandes, Walter. 2008. ‘Sixty years of development-induced displacement in India: Scale, impacts and the search for alternatives’, in Council for Social Development, India Social Development Report 2008: Development and Displacement, p. 89. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Fernandes, Walter. 2007. ‘Singur and the displacement scenario’, Economic and Political Weekly, 42(3): 204. George, Ann and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2015. ‘Changing cities and changing lives: Development induced displacement in Kochi, Kerala’, An International Journal on Urban Environments, 1(1): 1–18. Government of India. 2015. Ministry of Urban Development, ‘Smart city mission transform-nation: Mission statement and guidelines’. http://smartcities.gov.in/ upload/uploadfiles/files/SmartCityGuidelines(1).pdf (accessed 15 June 2016). Government of India. 2014. Ministry of Tribal Affairs, ‘Report of the high level committee on socio-economic, health and educational status of tribal communities of India’. Government of India. 2016. 13th Annual Report and Accounts 2015–16. Export Promotion Council for EOUs and SEZs. Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India: New Delhi. The Guardian. 2016a. ‘Armed guards at India’s dams as drought grips country’, 2 May. The Guardian. 2016b. ‘India’s long wait for justice: 27m court cases trapped in legal logjam’, 5 May. The Hindu. 2016. ‘Decisions of the people, by the people, for the people’, 18 May. The Hindu. 2006. ‘Evictions now a national crisis’, 10 May. Housing and Land Rights Network. 2016. Housing and Land Rights in India: Status Report for Habitat III. New Delhi: HLRN. Housing and Land Rights Network. 2014. Forced to the Fringes: Disasters of ‘Resettlement’ in India, Analysis, Conclusions and Recommendations. New Delhi: HLRN.

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Housing and Land Rights Network. 2011. Planned Dispossession: Forced Evictions and the 2010 Commonwealth Games. New Delhi: HLRN. IDMC. 2016. Field interviews, March. Kalyani, Menon-Sen and Gautam Bhan. 2008. Swept Off the Map: Surviving Eviction and Resettlement in Delhi. New Delhi: Yoda Press. Kannan, K. P. and G. Raveendran. 2009. ‘Growth sans employment: A quarter century of jobless growth in India’s organised manufacturing’, Economic and Political Weekly, 44(10): 80–91. Kothari, Miloon. 2015. ‘Defenders of economic, social and cultural rights should not be ‘second class’. ISHR. www.ishr.ch/news/defenders-economicsocial-and-cultural-rights-should-not-be-second-class (accessed 3 May 2016). LiveMint. 2016. ‘Will empowering gram sabhas derail development?’, 13 May. www.livemint.com/Opinion/wttwdia1Uxnf9h3QJ2fVzO/Will-empoweringgram-sabhas-derail-development.html (accessed 7 April 2016). Mathur, Hari Mohan. 2011. ‘A blow to tribal life: The impact of privatisation in Orissa’, in Hari Mohan Mathur (ed.), Resettling Displaced People, Policy and Practice in India. New Delhi: Routledge. Mathur, Hari Mohan. 2008. ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Council for Social Development, India Social Development Report 2008: Development and Displacement, p. 3. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Mathur, Hari Mohan. 2006. ‘New livelihoods for old: Restoring incomes lost due to involuntary resettlement’, in Hari Mohan Mathur (ed.), Managing Resettlement in India: Approaches, Issues, Experiences, pp. 67–98. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Miklian, Jason and Scott Carney. 2010. ‘Fire in the hole’. Foreign Policy, 16 August. http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/08/06/fire-in-the-hole/ (accessed 4 June 2016). Modi, Renu (ed.). 2009. Beyond Relocation: The Imperative of Sustainable Resettlement. Mumbai: Sage. Naoroji, Dadabhai. 1988. Poverty and Un-British Rule in India. New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers. Oliver-Smith, A. 2016. ‘Lessons on resettlement: Learned, forgotten, ignored, presentation’, at Land and Climate Displacement Conference. Geneva, 25 April. Padel, F. and S. Das. 2011. ‘Resettlement realities: The gulf between policy and practice’, in Hari Mohan Mathur (ed.), Resettling Displaced People, Policy and Practice in India. New Delhi: Routledge. Pandey, Balaji. 2009. Women’s Alienation – Land Less Development. New Delhi: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Pandey, Balaji. 1998. Depriving the Underprivileged for Development. Bhubaneswar: Institute for Social Development. Patel, Sejal, Richard Sliuzas, and Navdeep Mathur. 2015. ‘The risk of impoverishment in urban development-induced displacement and resettlement in Ahmedabad’, Environment & Urbanisation, 27(1): 231–256. Programme for Social Action. 2012. Negotiating Power: Socio-Economic Study of the GMR Kamalanga Energy Limited Project Affected Area in Dhenkanal, Odisha. New Delhi: The Research Collective.

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Raman Research Institute. 2014. Annual Report 2013-14. RRI: Bengaluru. Raman Research Institute .2015. Annual Report 2014-15. RRI: Bengaluru. Roy, D. 2008. ‘Urban development projects and displacement of the poor’, in Council for Social Development, India Social Development Report 2008: Development and Displacement, p. 141. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Scudder, Thayer (ed.). 2005. The Future of Large Dams: Dealing with Social, Environmental, Institutional and Political Costs. London: Earthscan. Shankar, Gopalakrishna. 2015. ‘The growing threats to India’s financial system’, in Rights and Resources Initiative, Issue Brief, April. Shankar, Gopalakrishna. 2012. Undemocratic and Arbitrary: Control, Regulation and Expropriation of India’s Forest and Common Lands. New Delhi: SPWD. UN. 2007. Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, A/HRC/4/18. UNDP. 2015. Human Development Report 2015. UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders. 2011. Mission to India, 10–21 January 2011, A/HRC/19/55/Add.1.

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Singur The exemplar of peasant resistance Samir Kumar Das

The beginnings One of the slogans that the ruling Left Front – a coalition of Left parties under the leadership of the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) popularized even before it went for State Assembly elections in 2006 was: ‘Agriculture is our foundation, industry our future’ (Krishi aamader bhitti, shilpa aamader bhabisyat). It started realizing the importance of changing its hitherto followed twin strategy of land reforms and revamping rural administration through panchayats1 to industrialization along capitalist lines. However, the Left Front by all accounts was unable to provide the people with any new imaginary. As Banerjee puts it, Singur is ‘a typical example of the Left’s historical surrender to and adoption of the capitalist model of development’ (Banerjee 2010b: 54). The matter was discussed in the 19th Congress of the CPI-M held in April 2008, where the need for an alternative strategy of development was more deeply felt. The issue of industrialization not only triggered one of the most acrimonious debates but introduced by all accounts an element of schism within the party. The Left Front, in power since 1977, acquired a new lease of life of five years in 2006 with a renewed strength of 235 seats in the 294-strong West Bengal State Legislative Assembly, and took it as a massive mandate in favour of industrialization in West Bengal.2 As a corollary to it, representatives of Tata Motors and West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation (WBIDC) paid what is called a ‘surprise visit’ to Singur – about 40 km away from Kolkata – on 25 May 2006 immediately after coming to power. In the same month, Tata Motors announced its Nano car project in the area. The 100,000 crore3 rupee project – widely publicized as the dream project of Ratan Tata, the captain of Tata Motors, promised to offer every Indian ‘the world’s cheapest car’. Nano, thus, became emblematic of the new face of a

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rapidly globalizing India with its upwardly mobile and exponentially bulging middle class. In July 2006, the government of West Bengal issued a gazette notification declaring that the land would be acquired under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 or its undertaking ‘at public expense for a public purpose’ such as ‘employment generation and socio-economic development of the area by setting up a Tata small car project. Mamata Banerjee,4 the leader of the All-India Trinamool Congress Party (TMC) – then in opposition in West Bengal with 30 seats – immediately opposed the establishment of the plant on fertile land. In September 2006, the government took a decision to transfer roughly 1,000 acres of agricultural land owned by about 12,000 plot holders to the Tata group on a 99-year lease for the construction of the factory. The Status Report on Singur prepared by the government on 31 December 2006 reveals that in Singur an acre of sali land (where a single crop is raised each year) is offered a price of Rs 8.70 lakh.5 For an acre of suna (multi-cropping) land, the compensation amount offered is Rs 12.76 lakh. According to Sarkar, the amount of compensation was ‘inadequate’ given the high rate of inflation that is likely to cut into the interest accrued to the amount in future and the emotional value attached to land by the peasants that is always considered incalculable. Besides, the compensation was to be paid to the landowners – not to the persons dependent on land (like the landless labour, bargadars and others) without owning it (Sarkar 2007: 1440). The same point was reiterated by Banerjee et al. that while the government should pursue industrialization, it also must address the three issues of amount of compensation, eligibility for compensation and the credibility of the process (Banerjee & Roy, 2007: 1487–9). It was considered ironic that this was the same Left Front that had strengthened its support in rural Bengal by redistributing legal rights to the sharecroppers and agricultural labourers from the jotdars (owners of large landed estates) in the early years of its rule came out with a policy that threatened to adversely affect them (Sen 2006: 3994). Be that as it may, the Nano car was scheduled to roll out by 2008 (The Economist 2008: 63). As the peasants protested, the government announced a revised package of compensation which inter alia would include an enhanced monetary sum, employment of one member from each family within a year, and 70 acres of land within the project area as against the opposition demand for a total of 400 acres. The exact terms of the deal struck between the Tatas and the government were kept as what Nirupam Sen, the then industry minister,

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described as ‘closely guarded secret’. Bhaduri, however, quotes a local TV news channel that holds that ‘so far West Bengal Government gave Rs 140 crore in compensation, while the Tatas will give, according to the deal, only Rs 20 crore after five years for the land, without payment of stamp duty’ (Bhaduri 2007: 553). According to Ashok Mitra – the first finance minister of the Left Front government – the Tatas were given freebies of the order of Rs 850 crore altogether, besides having been spared the trouble of going into the acquisition process. While many of the estate owners were ‘alleged to be upper caste, absentee landowners living in Kolkata’ (Sen 2006: 3994) – located just 40 km away from Singur – land acquisition adversely hit mostly the small landowners, bargadars, sharecroppers, tenants and landless labourers who had to depend on land without owning it for their livelihood. Sen quotes the results of a survey according to which, there are more than 11,000 people with land titles in the project-affected area. Most of the landowners in Singur are found to be small and marginal peasants whose landholding is less than two bighas. At least 3,500 landowning families cultivate with family labour, and they may be called poor peasants. The number of registered and unregistered bargadars are 607 and 1,200, respectively. Most of the non-agricultural families are actually engaged in agriculture-related supplementary occupations. There are roughly 500 van-rickshaw pullers who transport agricultural commodities, 200 families who depend on rearing cows and goats, 150 families who are vegetable vendors, and roughly 5,000 people who work in local cold storages. The survey team interviewed 400 people (335 landowners and 65 landless people), of whom only 20 voluntarily surrendered their land. The bargadars and agricultural labourers interviewed by the team categorically state that the projected land transfer in Singur would endanger their livelihood, and that they are very much with the popular movement (Sen 2007: 1230).

Waves of resistance The first wave of resistance emerged from among the local people of Singur. Besides a series of unorganized and spontaneous protests during the initial days of the movement, a formidable section of peasants organized themselves into the Krishi Jami Raksha Committee (Save Agricultural Land Committee) with members ‘ranging from social activists and human rights groups to some radical Left outfits like the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) and Maoists’ (Banerjee 2006: 5296), along with the TMC in Opposition, and started with a demonstration on 1 June 2006 in front of the local

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block development officer’s (BDO) office.6 This inaugurated a new era of peasant resistance in West Bengal. While at one level it represented a broad and albeit loosely defined coalition of forces opposed to any form of land acquisition from peasants, at another level all the forces constituting it were unified in terms of their singular opposition to the ruling Left Front parties and the government run by them. Menon describes these movements as ‘militant mass movements based on non-party, non-funded citizens’ initiatives’ (Menon 2009: 18–19). According to Bhattacharyya, initially the movement was launched by ‘the locals with unclear legal standing like the unregistered bargadars and landowners without proper papers who were excluded from the process of fixing compensation and price for their land’, with the objective of enhancing the compensation amount and broadening the recipient base of compensation. It was ‘the perpetual apathy of the Government and the lethargy of the Left Front’ (Bhattacharyya 2016: 193) that pushed the movement into a violent path and led the protesters to agitate against any acquisition of land per se, regardless of the amount and scope of compensation. Subsequently, the project faced severe opposition from several quarters. It is significant that the women of Gopalnagar, Beraberi Gram Panchayat areas of Singur were the first to raise their voice of protest that eventually turned into a prominent peasant struggle in India (EPW 2006: 5290). Soon after, the then opposition leader of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, led a movement called ‘Save Farmland’ in support of the peasants of Singur. Banerjee’s movement was supported by various social, political and environmental activists (like Medha Patkar, Anuradha Talwar, Arundhati Roy and others) and several Kolkata-based intellectuals (thespians and film personalities like Aparna Sen, Kaushik Sen, Shaonli Mitra, Bratya Basu, Suman Mukhopadhyay, and artists like Suvaprasanna and many others). In the midnight of 25 September 2006, the police lathi charged about 7,000 villagers, including 2,500 women who were demonstrating peacefully at the BDO office in Singur. Hundreds of protesters including several women were severely injured, and 72 activists of the Krishi Jami Raksha Committee (KJRC) – including 27 women – were arrested. The timing of the offer of bonanza was significant. Some landowners who handed over their land to the state government received the bank cheques given to them as compensation against land acquisition the very next day. On 31 October 2006 the chief minister lambasted at the opposition and reiterated that the proposed car manufacturing project would ‘change the face of Singur as well as the State’ (quoted in Business Line 2006a).

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The fall and rise of democracy The Left Front government, boastful and complacent of the electoral mandate of 2006, committed what Bhattacharyya calls the ‘strategic miscalculation’ (Bhattacharyya 2016: 207) by deciding to come down heavily on the protesters. The simmering waves of protest in Singur spread across the state and did not take time to go out of its hands. What Bhattacharyya calls ‘strategic miscalculation’ also ‘re-enacts the 19th century paradigm of industrialisation by expropriation of agricultural land’ (Banerjee 2006: 5297), ironically ‘riding piggy-back on communism’ (Chakravarti & Chakravarti 2007: 964). The collusion of the Communists with the process of primitive accumulation of capital through expropriation of agricultural land was ironic. Banerjee reports that ‘gangs of musclemen’ were deployed by the ‘CPI(M) to intimidate its opponents in Singur’ (Banerjee 2007: 3195). The old British colonial method of imposing Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code to deny the citizens access to complete information on activities carried out in their name and with their money is said to have been followed in Singur. On 30 November 2006, the government clamped Section 144 in the area so as to fence the 997 acres of acquired land – 956 acres of this, as it claimed, was handed over by consent – to ensure that law and order in the region was not affected. According to Bhadra and Guha Ray, an otherwise ‘completely peaceful movement’ was thus sought to be ‘crushed and broken’ since 30 November 2006 (Bhadra & Guha Ray 2007: 3887). On 2 December 2006, about 6,000 security personnel including policemen, combat forces and rapid action forces were deployed. When villagers and members of the KJRC protested, they were lathi-charged. Hundreds of poor peasants including women were severely injured. Around 50 villagers, including 18 women, were arrested and slapped with Section 307 (concerning attempt to murder) of the Indian Penal Code. Among the arrested were a 75-year-old woman and two girls in their early teens. Speaking to news persons at Writers’ Buildings – the then State Secretariat – a couple of days later, Mr Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee7 reiterated that there would be no change in the government’s decision to hand over land at Singur to the Tatas. Discussions with opposition parties would be restricted to the issue of resettlement and rehabilitation of those whose farmland had been acquired for the Tata small car project (Business Line 2006b). As opposed to it, Mamata Banerjee began an indefinite fast in Dharamtala area in central Kolkata after

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the expiry of her 24-hour deadline that she had issued for halting fencing work at Singur. Social activist Medha Patkar was also not allowed to go to Singur on that day. Even after the departure of Tata Motors, the Nano Bachao Committee (Save Nano Committee) seems to be determined to see that some large industrial investment takes place on the same project site. The so-called unwilling peasants (onichhuk chasi) were seen to be collecting their cheques in regular trickle. Until 2 December 2008, reports coming from the field suggested that only about 102 acres out of 997 acres acquired remained to be compensated (Mukherji & Ghosh 2010: 199–215). The active participation of women was ‘one of the most important features of the people’s movement in Singur’ (Khonj Ekhon Parishad 2007: 5290). The fact-finding team of KJRC found that the women had strongly opposed those moves even when men of the family were willing to give up. Women were seen defending their rights and giving evidence of police torture of 25 September before a panel that included Medha Patkar and others on a public hearing organized on 27 October 2006. Women also fasted for days in protest. In Kolepara alone, about 30 women were on fast during this time. On 18 December 2006 Tapasi Malik, the 18-year-old daughter of a landless labourer who was with the movement from the beginning, was found dead inside the fenced fields of Bajemelia village where she lived. Her severely burnt body was recovered by the police in the early hours of the morning from within the fenced area of the factory. The State Women’s Commission reached the spot three days later. It did not take time for Tapasi to become the new icon of women’s protest. As Sinha Ray observes: Sexually violated women in Singur and Nandigram have inverted the narrative of law-preserving violence by exposing the marks of violence on private parts of their own bodies. They are scripting a non-heroic idea of female militancy, which is uncontainable within a heroic narrative of suffering and sacrifice. The instrumentality of sexual violence, governed by gendered relations of power, is resisted by these women as they deploy those very marks of violence to shame their attackers. (Sinha Roy 2012: 129) Tapasi’s ghost would always return to haunt the CPI-M and continue to cause insufferable damage to its popularity and electoral prospects as it did subsequently.

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‘Bye Bye Ta Ta’ On 29 December 2006, Mamata Banerjee called off her indefinite fast that continued for 25 days following appeals by the then President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam and Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh. Following the president’s telephonic talk with Dr Singh and Mr Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, the latter sent Banerjee a letter the contents of which were not disclosed. It was learnt that the chief minister had offered to withdraw prohibitory orders in Singur and hold discussion on allegedly forcible acquisition of land across the table (Business Line 2006c). ‘Bye Bye Ta Ta’ became the favourite slogan of the resistance movement in Singur as the villagers collected to bid goodbye to the Tatas from West Bengal. Tata Motors Limited ceremonially commenced the construction of the plant on 21 January 2007. On 3 September 2008, the Tatas announced suspension of work at Singur with the public announcement that the company ‘ha[d] been constrained to suspend the construction and commissioning work at the Nano plant at Singur in view of continued confrontation and agitation at the site’. Tata Motors’ announcement came when the agitation, led by the TMC outside the site demanding the return of 400 acres of land which it had been acquired forcibly for setting up the project, entered its tenth day (Dam 2008). A month later, on 3 October 2008, Tata Motors Limited announced that they were pulling out of Singur due to the political unrest and agitation. It not only signifies the triumph of popular resistance in times of globalization but reflects that winning elections is not the be-all and end-all of democracy. The Left Front could understand it at great cost. According to Bhattacharyya, ‘In India’s representative democracy the authoritarian option of using the state’s sovereign force to suppress popular resistance, as widely used in pre-democratic Europe or in contemporary China, cannot be exercised with complete impunity’ (Bhattacharyya 2016: 169–70). It only shows that the fate of democracy is decided not in the ballot box, but in the flaming fields and farms of our countryside. In fact, as the Singur case aptly brings out, peasant resistance has its implications for institutional politics in general and elections in particular. Tata Motors announced a new Nano plant at Sanand in Gujarat on 8 October 2008. The pull-out of the Tatas left West Bengal with mixed reactions. The panchayat elections held in 2008 signalled perhaps for the first time since it came to power in the state back in 1977 that ‘the mighty machine’ of the Left Front had started crumbling thanks to the

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popular movement in Singur and other places. For the first time since 1978, the Left Front suffered a setback in the panchayat elections. In the parliamentary elections held in the next year, the ruling Left Front tasted defeat while managing to obtain 15 seats in the Lok Sabha elections as against 35 seats in 2004. On the other hand, the coalition of Indian National Congress, TMC and Socialist Unity Centre bagged 26 seats. Correspondingly, CPI-M’s vote share in 2009 declined to 33.10 per cent from 38.57 per cent in 2004. TMC increased its share from 21.04 per cent to 31.20 per cent during the same period. State Legislative Assembly elections of 2011 sounded the final death knell of the CPIM-led Left Front government in West Bengal. The Front slumped to 62 seats, while the coalition of TMC, Indian National Congress, Socialist Unity Centre and others won as many as 227 seats. The comprehensive win, according to political commentators, is believed to have been catalyzed by one of the most successful peasant movements in contemporary India. Singur is widely believed to be the harbinger of this new history. While the coalition’s victory catapulted TMC-led government into power, it is to be noted that the electoral outcome of 2011 marginalized all other forces that were nevertheless an integral part of the peasant resistance in general and KJRC in particular, and helped TMC and its partners to appropriate and monopolize the oppositional space. The portents were clear even before the elections. As Banerjee observes: Mamata Banerjee quite predictably, harnessed the outburst of anti-LF popular anger in her march towards her next goal – the chief-ministership of West Bengal. Through a clever combination of platitudinous slogans and promises of instant nostrums and histrionics, she has managed to rally the different disgruntled segments of Bengali society – ranging from urban slum-dwellers long deprived of essential services to villagers threatened with displacement by industrial projects. Her rise in West Bengal politics is a sign of the bankruptcy of the traditional Bengali left, as well as the political cul-de-sac that the intelligentsia are facing. (Banerjee 2010a: 21) The rainbow space of civil society activism that emerged in West Bengal in the wake of the Singur movement and other cases of peasant resistance was effectively controlled and monopolized gradually by the TMC, splitting it almost down the middle along party lines.

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The legal battle Mamata Banerjee was sworn in as chief minister of West Bengal on 20 May 2011 and announced the first Cabinet decision of returning 400 acres of land to the ‘unwilling’ peasants of Singur. She followed it up with the drafting of the ‘Singur Land and Rehabilitation Bill, 2011’ that promised to vest part of the land already acquired by the Left Front government, distribute the land-return forms (Dutta, Indrani 2012). On 13 June 2011 the bill was passed in the West Bengal Assembly. Tata Motors moved the Kolkata High Court, challenging the Act on 22 June 2011 with the plea made on 12 September 2011 that the West Bengal government had ‘violated’ the lease agreement with them and ‘unconstitutionally’ taken it over by framing the Act. A single-bench Calcutta High Court upheld the ‘Singur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2011’, validating the government of West Bengal’s act of vesting the land earlier leased out to the Tata Motors. Tatas appealed against the order of Justice I. P. Mukerji passed on 28 September before a Division Bench (Hindustan Times 2011). Significantly after the completion of one year as the chief minister, Mamata Banerjee regretted on 21 May 2012 her inability to return the land to the unwilling peasants in Singur. She however announced that a monthly payment of Rs 1,000 to the victims until the matter was settled in court. The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court struck down the Act on an appeal by Tata Motors, describing it as ‘unconstitutional’ and void. In their judgment, Justices P. C. Ghose and M. K. Chaudhury ruled that the Act had violated the Constitution on three counts. First, it did not have the necessary presidential assent. Second, returning the land to the original owners would not constitute ‘public interest’ and hence the land could not be vested by the government. Third, the Act did not have any provision for compensation to Tata Motors for the losses they would suffer as a result of their withdrawal. However, TMC assured the people of Singur that they were committed to protect the cause of the peasants (Hindustan Times 2012a). The government announced its plan to move the Supreme Court with the TMC Member of Parliament Kalyan Banerjee as their advocate. Mamata Banerjee again hit the streets against the verdict on 23 June 2012. In a two-hour closed-door meeting at the Town Hall in Kolkata, a carefully drafted course of action was drawn up to take the political fight forward. Government lawyers had already announced that they would lodge a fresh appeal to the Supreme Court. After emerging from the meeting, Samir Putatunda of the Party for Democratic

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Socialism, a partner of the TMC-led coalition, made a press statement observing: On the one hand we will fight against the verdict in the Supreme Court and on the other we will conduct a series of agitations in Kolkata, the districts and at Singur to express solidarity with the peasants. All those present in the meeting are united to the cause of returning land to the unwilling farmers. (quoted in Hindustan Times 2012b) Mamata Banerjee revived the KJRC with the new name of Krishi Jomi Jibon Jibika Raksha Committee (Committee for the Protection of Agricultural Land, Life and Livelihood) that went in hibernation after the electoral victory in 2011. It was interpreted ‘as a tactic by Mamata to reach out to her old allies, who had drifted apart over the months’ (Hindustan Times 2012c). If electoral victory turned out to be insufficient to achieve her goal of returning land to the unwilling peasants, she did not waste time to revive the movement in her bid to win the final battle in a court of law. At a time when the reaction to verdict of the Division Bench was ‘reportedly mixed’ (Dutta, Ananya 2012), particularly in Singur, she perhaps desperately needed to win this battle by organizing the masses. The government got a major relief when the Supreme Court extended the interim order of suspension of the earlier Calcutta High Court judgment that struck down the law intended to reclaim Singur land leased out to the Tatas (Venkatesan 2012). On 31 August 2016, the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal delivered one of the most momentous judgements of the year by invalidating the expropriation of land in Singur by the erstwhile Left Front government, and ordered that the acquired properties be returned to their original landowners (The Hindu 2016). The Court called it ‘grossly perverse and illegal’, gave the government 12 weeks’ time to return the land to the landowners, and added that compensation already paid to them on account of the acquisition should not be recovered since ‘they have been deprived of the occupation and enjoyment of their lands for the last ten years’. Further, the Court held that those landowners who had not received the compensation would be permitted to withdraw it from the Office of the Land Acquisition Collector without any prejudice to their rights. Mamata Banerjee welcomed the verdict in the following terms: The Supreme Court judgment on Singur is a landmark victory. We have waited 10 years for this judgment. From the beginning, we had been

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telling that the method of the acquisition was unethical and land was taken away forcibly from the farmers (Anand 2016). After a review meeting on Singur at Nabanna, the State Secretariat, she announced that the process of giving physical possession of land to the peasants in Singur would begin on 20 October 2016 since a major portion of the land at Singur had already been made cultivable. Forty acres would be handed over on 20 October, while another 30–50 acres would be handed over in the next few days. By 10 November, all peasants were expected to get back their land. Of the 957 acres of the plot that had earlier been proposed for the Nano site, 857 acres had been rendered cultivable. The rest of the land, where concrete structures of the factory had been put up, would be converted with the help of soil and agriculture experts. Doubts were expressed by a section of experts on whether the land could be made cultivable within such a small span of time. The cost of converting the land into a cultivable one was estimated to be more than Rs 200 crores, which would be borne by the State Government (Indian Express 2016). To meet the deadline, the government brought in four agencies to work in Singur: Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (KMDA), Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC), Public Works Development (PWD) and Hooghly River Bridge Commissioners (HRBC). Departments of Agriculture, Public Works, Labour and Irrigation were also inducted to expedite the process (Ghosal 2016). It reflects the government’s commitment to the cause that brought it to power.

Concluding observations Why does Singur turn out to be an exemplar of peasant resistance? Singur, as Sumit Sarkar and Tanika Sarkar argue, has introduced ‘a new culture of resistance’ (Sarkar & Sarkar 2009: 13) with its wide-ranging implications for the society and politics of contemporary India. •

First of all, Singur represents the nearly irresolvable dilemma the Communist movement in general and the Communist Parties in particular have been facing in the age of globalization. The Left Front in our case was singularly incapable of bringing in any new imaginary of development in the age of globalization that would have addressed the question of land expropriation of the marginalized peasantry for industrialization. While the schism within the CPI-M became all the more sharp on this question, the already existing divide between parliamentary Left and the radical Left ended up in violence as the former did not succeed

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Samir Kumar Das in addressing – let alone resolving – the dilemma. In many of the land movements, including obviously the one in Singur, the parties of the radical Left are reported to be involved and have been instrumental in driving out the cadres of the Left Front. In neighbouring Nandigram, where the Bhumi Uchchhed Pratirodh Committee (Committee for Resisting Eviction from Land) was formed to protest against land acquisition, the Committee as the first step drove away the CPI-M cadres from the area (Menon 2009: 18–19). The Singur case also compels us to reflect on why winning general elections does not necessarily give a winning party, or for that matter a winning coalition, the absolute right to take the people who may have voted for them for granted. While at one level, general elections are not to be confused as referendums, at another the Singur case also exposes the relative inconsequentiality of electoral politics vis-à-vis popular movements. The resounding electoral victory of the Left Front in 2006 did not easily translate into public consensus about industrialization through land acquisition. It is important to reflect on how social majority gets articulated and becomes involved in popular movements. The social majority plays a role in shaping electoral outcomes as well like what it did since the West Bengal panchayat elections in 2008. All elections post-Singur became the Left Front’s Waterloo. Singur only points to the extraordinarily complex relationship between electoral politics and popular movements. Singur also triggered one of the fiercest see-saw battles in the legal history of the country on such questions as ‘eminent domain’, ‘public purpose’ and so forth. Thus, to cite an instance, Justice Gowda and Justice Misra wrote separate judgments in the Supreme Court but concurred with each other that in eventuality the acquisition had to be quashed due to severe violations of the Act. They differed on the point of whether the acquisition could be said to be for ‘public purpose’ or not. Justice Gowda held that the land acquisition for and at the instance of the Tatas was sought to be disguised as acquisition of land for ‘public purpose’ in order to circumvent compliance with the mandatory provisions of the law: This action of the State Government is grossly perverse and illegal and void ab initio in law and such an exercise of power by the state government for acquisition of lands cannot be allowed under any circumstance. If such acquisitions of lands are permitted, it would render entire Act nugatory and redundant, as then virtually every acquisition of land in favour of

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a company could be justified as one for a ‘public purpose’ on the ground that the setting up of industry would generate employment and promote socio economic development in the State. (quoted in Anand 2016) However, Justice Mishra held that the acquisition was valid insofar as it was taken from the landowners for the ‘public purpose’ of setting up an industrial unit and providing employment: Acquisition of land for establishing such an industry would ultimately benefit the people and the very purpose of industrialization, generating job opportunities hence it would be open to the State Government to invoke the provisions of Part II of the Act. When Government wants to attract the investment, create job opportunities and aims at the development of the State and secondary development, job opportunities, such acquisition is permissible for public purpose. (quoted in Anand 2016) On the other hand, it also points out how popular movements are often used to leverage judicial verdicts, with of course a varying degree of success. •

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Singur as an exemplar speaks of the rainbow nature of the coalition of forces that come together while putting up resistance to land acquisition. In a sense, the coalition implies a certain transcendence of the party lines. But after winning three consecutively held elections in 2008, 2009 and 2011 at different levels, the TMC coalition of parties firmed up their grip on the movement relegating thereby other forces into the background. It is important to see how such organizations as KJRC and others are kept in hibernation or reactivated depending on the requirements of the rule. It only shows how a broad coalition of forces drawing from within parliament and without came together and finally was appropriated and monopolized by the party that eventually claimed to have inherited the mantle of the movement, came to power and finally ‘particized’8 it. Insofar as the rainbow nature of the coalition is rendered monochromatic thanks to its appropriation by the ruling party, Singur sparked off the debate on whether a militant mass movement could become effective independently of the leadership of a vanguard

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Samir Kumar Das party – especially a party with a steep hierarchy and strict command and control structure (Bhattacharyya 2010: 17–21) in the absence of which it meets the same fate of being appropriated by a congeries of ruling parties. Singur is an exemplar insofar as it shows why competitive federalism in India puts the constituent states of the Union in constant competition even to the point of making poor economic logic. Tatas were given what Ashok Mitra calls ‘freebies’ precisely because they were sought to be turned away from Uttarakhand where they initially decided set up their small car factory. When they decided to pack off from West Bengal, Gujarat offered them the competitive advantages and they lost no time to shift to Gujarat. Odisha also offered to host the factory. While there were only a few households in Singur (whose homesteads were acquired) that were rehabilitated to low-lying areas vulnerable to flooding particularly during the monsoons, loss of agricultural land and consequent denial of their absorption in the factory threatened to trigger large-scale eviction of people from Singur to other states mainly as migrant, manual labour. Although in terms of the exact magnitude of human displacement, Singur represents a rather insignificant section of population the figures of which are never accurately counted, the fear of losing home was believed to be a concomitant of the loss of agricultural land and livelihood based on it. According to Fernandes, between 1947 and 2000, ‘development projects’ in West Bengal have used 47 lakh acres of land and have affected 70 lakh persons, 36 lakh of them now displaced persons (DP) and 34 lakh deprived of livelihood without being physically relocated (Fernandes 2007: 203). Singur would have added to that figure.

Singur will continue to be an irritant to the given and otherwise widely accepted theories and concepts of social science. As we retell the story of Singur, anomalies keep unfolding before us forcing us to revisit – if not interrogate – our theories and concepts. Singur therefore is just not another example, but an exemplar par excellence.

Acknowledgements I thank Srimanti Sarkar, my research associate, for having helped me with the collection of primary data used for this chapter. However, lapses, if any, are entirely mine.

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Notes 1 Local self-governing bodies that are set up and function as per the constitutional provisions in different parts of India. 2 The late Subhas Chakrabarty – the redoubtable leader of the CPI-M and the then sports minister of West Bengal – in an interview taken on 11 May 2006, the day when the election results were declared, told me on camera that the verdict was indeed in favour of the CPI-M’s newly adopted industrialization strategy. 3 1 crore = 10,000,000. 4 Also called ‘Mamata Bandyopadhyay’ in Bengali. The two surnames of a more anglicized ‘Banerjee’ on one hand and ‘Bandyopadhyay’ on the other are one and the same. 5 1 lakh = 100,000. 6 The coalition is said to have ‘cut across the line of political fealties, starting from Bhangar in South 24 Parganas to Singur in Hughly [sic], and Nandigram in Purba Medinipur’ (Chatterjee & Basu 2009: 155). 7 Often spelt in some newspapers as ‘Buddhadev Bhattacharya’. 8 I borrow this phrase from my colleague – Sanjeeb Mukherjee – who used it in course of our discussion in order to distinguish it from the otherwise widely known Gramscian category of hegemony. Particization essentially means the unilateral and unbridled control exercised by a ruling party over the society by virtue of holding the reins of power and rule. Unlike the Gramscian category, particization is marked not by consent but absence of expressed dissent. Dissent is not expressed more out of fear than as a function of what Gramsci calls ‘common sense’. Subsequently, the concept was given a theoretical spin by Dwaipayan Bhattacharya for whom ‘party society’ implies that popular disputes take on a partisan character with the effect that there is wider acceptance of the political parties as ‘moral guardians’ of the society. But, what Bhattacharya calls ‘acceptance’ is also driven by fear and force on the assumption that the ruling party is believed to hold a licence for whatever it seeks to do to the society (Bhattacharyya 2009: 59–69).

References Anand, Utkarsh. 2016. ‘Supreme Court Quashes Singur Tata Plant Land Acquisition, Orders Bengal Govt to Return It in 12 Weeks’. The Indian Express, 1 September. Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak et al. 2007. ‘Beyond Nandigram: Industrialization in West Bengal’. Economic and Political Weekly, 4 May, pp. 1487–1489. Banerjee, Partha Sarathi & Dayabati Roy. 2007. ‘Behind the Present Peasant Unrest in West Bengal’. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(22), 8 June, pp. 2048–2050. Banerjee, Sumanta. 2006. ‘Peasant Hares and Capitalist Hounds in Singur’. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(52), 5 January, pp. 5296–5298. Banerjee, Sumanta. 2007. ‘Thirty Years after the Emergency’. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(31), 27 August, pp. 3195–3197. Banerjee, Sumanta. 2010a. ‘Washing Dirty Dhuti in Public’. Economic and Political Weekly, 45(3), 22 January, pp. 20–22.

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Banerjee, Sumanta. 2010b. ‘End of a Phase: Time for Reinventing the Left’. Economic and Political Weekly, 45(46), 19 November, pp. 51–58. Bhadra, Sujato & Siddhartha Guha Ray. 2007. ‘Reflections on Nandigram’. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(38), 28 September, pp. 3886–3887. Bhaduri, Amit. 2007. ‘Development or Development Terrorism?’. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(7), 23 February, pp. 552–553. Bhattacharyya, Amit. 2010. ‘Is Lalgarh Showing the Way?’. Economic and Political Weekly, 45(2), 15 January, pp. 17–21. Bhattacharyya, Dwaipayan. 2009. ‘Of Control and Factions: The Changing ‘Party-Society’ in Rural West Bengal’. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(9), 6 March, pp. 59–69. Bhattacharyya, Dwaipayan. 2016. Government as Practice: Democratic Left in a Transforming India. Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Business Line. 2006a. ‘Buddhadev Justifies Land Acquisition for Tata Project’. 31 October. Business Line. 2006c. ‘Singur: Buddhadeb Ready for Talks on Rehabilitation’. 4 December. Business Line. 2006d. ‘Mamata Calls Off Hunger Strike over Singur Issue’. 29 December. www.dnaindia.com/india/report-mamata-calls-off-hunger-strikeover-singur-issue-. Chakravarti, Uma & Anand Chakravarti, 2007. ‘CPI(M) and the Agrarian Underclass’. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(11), 23 March, pp. 898, 984. Chatterjee, Jyotiprasad & Suprio Basu. 2009. ‘West Bengal: Mandate forChange’. Economic and Political Weekly, 44 (39), 26 October, pp. 152-56. Dam, Marcus. 2008. ‘Tatas Suspend Work at Singur’. The Hindu, 3 September. www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/Tatas-suspend-work-at-Singur/article15296258.ece (accessed 29 November 2016). Dutta, Ananya. 2012. ‘At Singur, People’s Reaction to Court Verdict is Mixed’. 23 June. www.thehindu.com/news/national/at-singur-peoples-reaction-tocourt-verdict-is-mixed/article3559588.ece?utm_source=InternalRef&utm_ medium=relatedNews&utm_campaign=RelatedNews (accessed 29 November 2016). Dutta, Indrani. 2012. ‘Singur, An Act Gone Sour from the Start’. The Hindu (Kolkata), 22 June. The Economist. 2008. ‘Nano Wars’. 30 August, p. 63. Fernandes, Walter. 2007. ‘Singur and the Displacement Scenario’. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(3), 26 January, pp. 203–206. Ghosal, Aniruddha. 2016. ‘Singur Verdict: 50 days Later, Mamata Banerjee to Start Returning Land Today’. The Indian Express. 20 October. http:// indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/singur-land-supremecourt-verdict-mamata-banerjee-return-land-3092059/ (accessed 2 December 2016). The Hindu. 2016. ‘Salience of the Singur Verdict’. 7 October. Hindustan Times. 2011. ‘Tata Motors Challenges Singur Order’. 29 October.

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Hindustan Times. 2012a. ‘Bengal to Decide Action after Getting Copy of HC Verdict’. 22 June. Hindustan Times. 2012b. ‘Court Verdict on Singur Mars Didi’s Home Run’. 23 June. Hindustan Times. 2012c. ‘Mamata to Hit the Streets against Singur Verdict’. 24 June. The Indian Express. 2016. ‘Farmers to Start Getting Physical Possession of Singur Land on October 20, Says CM Mamata Banerjee’. 18 October. Khonj Ekhon Parishad. 2007. ‘Women’s Protests in Singur’, A Report By Members of Khonj Ekhon Parishad. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(52), 5 January, pp. 5290, 5416. Menon, Nivedita. 2009. ‘Radical Resistance and Political Violence Today’. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(50), 18 December, pp. 16–20. Mukherji, Partha N. & Bhola Nath Ghosh. 2010. ‘Democratic Centralism, Party Hegemony, and Decentralisation in West Bengal’. Sociological Bulletin, 59(2), May–August, pp. 199–215. Parthasarathy, Suhrith. 2016. ‘The Salience of the Singur Verdict’. The Hindu, 7 October. www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/The-salience-of-the-Singur-verdict/article15473127.ece (accessed 29 November 2016). [A] Reader. 2006. ‘Violence in Singur’. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(49), 15 December, p. 5088. Sarkar, Abhirup. 2007. ‘Development and Displacement: Land Acquisition in West Bengal’. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(16), 27 April, pp. 1435– 1442. Sarkar, Sumit & Tanika Sarkar. 2009. ‘Notes on a Dying People’. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(26–27), 10 July, pp. 10–14. Sen, Arup Kumar. 2006. ‘Letters: Land Struggle in Singur’. Economic and Political Weekly, 23 September, pp. 3994, 4088. Sen, Arup Kumar. 2007. ‘Singur: Fact and Fiction’. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(14), 13 April, p. 1230. Singh, Shiv Sahay. 2012. ‘Singur Panel Hints at Relaunching Movement’. The Hindu (Kolkata), 23 June. www.thehindu.com/news/national/singur-panel-hints-atrelaunching-movement/article3563497.ecetm_source=InternalRef&utm_ medium=relatedNews&utm_campaign=RelatedNews (accessed 29 November 2016). Sinha Roy, Mallarika. 2012. ‘Rethinking Female Militancy in Postcolonial Bengal’. Feminist Review, 101, pp. 124–131. Venkatesan, J. 2012. ‘In Relief for Mamata Government, Supreme Court Extends Stay of Verdict in Singur Case’. The Hindu (New Delhi). 24 August.

4

Forced displacement A gendered analysis of the Tehri dam project Vandana Asthana1

The process of modern development in post-independence India was related to the role of the state as a primary agent for advancing the agenda of development. Development was marked by large-scale, capital-intensive projects, and an international system of aid for infrastructure projects to increases in agricultural productivity and livestock management. Development categories included large dams, irrigation projects, urban infrastructure, transportation, power plants and so forth. While these categories are considered beneficial in the broad development paradigm it has resulted in fostering social and economic inequalities serving the interests of the narrow elite, destroying the environment, displacing and impoverishing people dependent on the land. Shiva (1994) calls the traditional model of development as an indicator of ‘maldevelopment’. Escobar (1995) argues that development has to be seen as a strategy produced in the first world about the ‘underdevelopment’ of the Third World. However, there is no denial of the fact that over the years a space has arisen for ironing out social inequalities and opening alternative voice claims to represent the marginalized groups. In post-independence India, movements like the Narmada Bachao Andolan against the Sardar Sarovar dam, and the Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangthan have brought into focus serious issues regarding the planning of development projects, and the paradigm of development itself. It has exposed the violence and suppression perpetrated in the name of ‘public purpose’ and ‘national interest’ while indicating with similar movements the alternative path of humane, just and sustainable governance rooted in a truly democratic polity. A large number of scholars and activists have questioned development projects that displace, marginalize and impoverish thousands of poor (Fernandes and Thukral 1989; Kothari 1996; Thukral 1992). A consensus seems to have emerged that development-induced displacement causes considerable social, economic and cultural disruption and

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losses to both the individuals and communities (Dwivedi 1999; Morse 1992; Parasuraman 1993; Thukral 1992; Scudder 1993; Oliver Smith 1991; World Commission on Dams 2000). A path-breaking work on displacement and resettlement is that of Michael Cernea (2000), who points out that forced displacement and being ousted from one’s land and habitat carries with it the risk of becoming poorer than before. Cernea’s impoverishment risk and reconstruction model proposes that the onset of impoverishment can be represented through a model of eight interlinked potential risks intrinsic to displacement. These are identified as landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property, and social integration. In addition, Muggah (2000) and Downing (2002) add loss of access to community services and violation of human rights to the model. Despite a surge of literature on forced displacement, the debates have been highly un-gendered. Gender as a specific category is yet to be recognized in mainstream discourses. The oustees, or the Project Affected Persons, have been portrayed as a homogenous category and not differentiated in state policies. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy (2007) declared that ‘land may be allotted in the joint name of husband and wife’. However, it leaves for the states to formulate their own policies, as resettlement is a state subject. The fact that women experience displacement and relocation in a particularly gendered way is lacking in policy related guidelines concerning oustees or Project Affected Persons. Beyond a general recognition that women suffer more than men, there are no detailed studies of a gendered analysis of forced displacement and resettlement programs. In contemporary literature, displacement study makes general reference to women with other vulnerable groups like tribal or poor. But recent works (Mehta 2000; Mehta and Srinivasan 2000; Srinivasan 1997; Parasuraman 1993; Colson 1999) have broadened our understanding of gender and forced displacement.

Research methodology Field research and interviews were conducted with women during my visit to India in August to December 2004 at New Tehri town and in the villages of Mallideval and Sirain before these were submerged by water during the dam construction. The closure of the T2 tunnel during that time had submerged many parts of the old Tehri town, and rehabilitation was in progress for the forcibly displaced. Interviews

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were conducted in the New Tehri town constructed at a height of 2,000 m to rehabilitate the displaced people. This research work was again undertaken from June to September 2009 and December 2009 to January 2010 in the New Tehri town and in the resettlement sites of Pashulok and Athurwala in Hardwar after the submergence of Mallideval and Sirain villages in my subsequent visits to India. Women as knowledge keepers were the main source of information, as their relationship with nature and water is part of their everyday life. Interviews of women were based on the purposive sampling method (Bernard 1994). Diversity in terms of socio-economic standing was also kept in mind to enable me to understand the differential impacts with special reference to the broad category of women. The specific aim of the research conducted was to assess the impact of displacement and resettlement on women of the region based on their narratives expressed in terms of comparison of the past and the present lived experiences. A narrative based approach was adopted because the memorable experiences of these women are meaningful and they helped in establishing terms of reference to evaluate their experiences since the displacement process began and thereafter.

Gender as a category Gender as a category is most commonly used referring to social roles, social relations and social practices (Gallin and Fergusson 1991). Gender is a powerful social and cultural construct determining the ways in which social relations are structured between men and women. Gender plays a central role in how societies assign roles, responsibilities, resources and rights among men and women (Mehta and Srinivasan 2000). Gender is not merely about bodies; it also includes the institutionalization of masculine and feminine values in the practices of organizations, institutions and the state. Gendered values and practices thus have the potential of marginalizing certain groups of people, including Third World peasants, tribes, women and poor. In the context of development projects, gender becomes especially significant for several reasons. Gender and class/race-based division of labor and distribution of property and power structure people’s interactions with nature, and in the process structure effects of environmental change on people and their responses to it (Agarwal 1996: 126). Gender analysts also point out the way in which these development projects are borne differently by women and men. Several studies discuss and elaborate impacts of displacement in ways that require an evaluation beyond monetary loss of land on the vulnerable communities like

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women and children (Colson 1999; Thukral 1996; Parasuraman 1993, 1997; Srinivasan 1997; World Bank 1994, 2001). Many international conventions have drawn attention to gender justice and reduction in gender inequality. India remains committed to many of these conventions, but there exists a gap between the ground realities and commitment of government to these rights. Often rules that are intended to protect women list women as dependents, rather than full citizens (March, Smyth and Mukhopadhyay 1999). State institutions end up marginalizing women because of their lack of knowledge to perceive what should constitute gender-sensitive programs suitable for the local needs of the people.

Gender in the local context of Uttaranchal Uttaranchal, formerly a part of Uttar Pradesh, became a state in the year 2000 after a major movement led by the hill people of Kumaon and Garwhal Mandals demanded a hill state in which their control over rivers, land, forests and development would actually mean livelihood security and dignity for the common man and woman. The region is geographically and culturally different from the plains, and women constitute half of the population. Sixty-five per cent of the area is covered with forests, and a majority of the population is dependent on these forests for their livelihood. The mountain area is underdeveloped, and there are no means of livelihood except government jobs. Most men migrate to the plains in search of jobs, and most get recruited in the army or work as truck drivers. Being a money order economy, the task of planning the household and the community is left to the women. Women form an integral part of the hill ecosystem. Despite their illiteracy, lack of exposure and drudgery, they have exhibited great potential as leaders. Women in Uttaranchal have spearheaded several movements across the state and played a pivotal role in the formation of the state. These hill women are bound together by the common bond of their tremendous work burden and have traditionally been the invisible workforce, the unacknowledged backbone of the family economy wherever they live in the state.

Development and displacement in the local context The new state of Uttaranchal was largely formed to homogenize with the aspirations of the women based on the dream and vision of a sustainable society in harmony with the nature of the region. However, in

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the nation’s quest for modernity a 260.5 m rockfill dam was envisaged at the confluence of the Bhagirathi and Bhilangana Rivers. The Tehri dam project, a multipurpose project with a reservoir storage spread over 45 km2 was supposed to generate 1,000 MW of power, irrigate 2.70 lakh ha in western Uttar Pradesh, provide 300 cusecs of drinking water for Delhi and 200 cusecs of drinking water for towns and villages of Uttar Pradesh (Shiva and Jalees 2003). Apart from these benefits, the Tehri Hydro Development Corporation brochure mentioned the integrated development of the Garwhal region, including construction of new Tehri town with provision of all civic facilities, improved communication, education and health, and tourism, development of horticulture, fisheries, and afforestation of the region. The dam construction began in 1978 amid police protection, as protests opposing construction of the dam gathered momentum. The dam affected the Tehri town and 125 villages, of which 37 were fully submerged and 87 partially submerged (HRC 1997). Estimates are that around 85,000 people have been displaced (Paranjpye 1988) in both rural and urban locations as a contribution to the painted rock messages en route to the dam: ‘Nation before Self’.

The process of resettlement The process of resettlement in Tehri was designed to mitigate economic hardships and socio-cultural alienation arising out of the displacement processes. Resettlement was meant to help displaced families and communities, and re-establish their social relations, institutions and value systems. In doing so, resettlement goals needed to provide adequate compensation to people facing the hardships of relocation. Forced relocation seriously affects the survival systems and adaptive strategies of the dam oustees. These strategies are aimed at achieving the steadiness in the flow of resources to control and reduce the uncertainty in the minds of displaced people. In spite of these strategies, resettlement in itself is a very traumatic experience for most countries (Cernea 1997). ‘Resettlement’, according to Colson (1999: 26), ‘involves a re-ordering of gender relations across a wide spectrum, but that re-ordering emerges from previous assumptions about gender and the gendered experiences of those involved’. The understanding of gender and their roles is entirely misplaced in resettlement policies. While both men and women experience disempowerment and dependence due to displacement, women experience it more due to their roles in the domestic sphere and a demonetized economy. Policies that are insensitive to gender and their roles embedded in social and historical processes work to the disadvantage of women.

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In the region under study, people in general and women in particular were unhappy at the way in which resettlement and rehabilitation programs have been conducted with practically no participation of the project-affected people. The government, however, claims to have completed entire resettlement of the affected areas, but the ground realities are seemingly different from the government claims. The present packages offered to people are unjust and inadequate to ensure that resettlement will lead to attainment of original standards of living. (Matu 2004) These processes of involuntary displacement are therefore surrounded by ‘physiological, psychological and sociological components’ (Scudder 1993: 13) that destabilizes their traditional cultural practices with a ‘reordering of space, time, relationships, norms and psycho-social-cultural constructs’. The shifts in these traditional practices result in newer practices. These practices are negotiated and renegotiated in the socio-cultural setting of an environment which emerges only after the breakdown of earlier routines and practices. This change makes it very difficult for women to adapt in a new and hostile environment. The research demonstrates that as people experienced new realities, women experienced marginalization in the process. The male biases perpetuate gender inequality, and state institutions and policies are insensitive to women’s needs that are far different from a monetized economy. Processes of development are not gender-neutral; a gap exists in the ways in which distribution and calculation of benefits of development is accomplished. Contributions of women as the invisible workforce have either not been calculated or its benefits have been disproportionately enjoyed by men (Agarwal 1996; Elson 1998). A gender gap exists in both policy and practice, and gender justice remains distant in local and state discourses. In this study, the marginalization and disempowerment of women was evident in the policies and processes of compensation and resettlement of the displaced families.

Lived experiences of women during pre- and post-displacement processes Most women in general experienced the natural environment as their livelihood support system in this region. Biomass played a crucial role in meeting daily survival needs of the vast majority of rural households led by women. Food, fuel wood, fodder, fertilizer, organic manure,

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forest building material (timber thatch) and medicines (herbs) form different kinds of biomass used by women. An important aspect of this biomass-based subsistence economy was that it was mostly non-monetized. Water, fuel, fodder, building materials and even food to a certain extent were all gathered freely from the immediate environment; production and processing of biomass-agriculture, minor forest produce and village crafts were the biggest sources of employment. Women have been responsible, in this subsistence or survival economies for water, food, fuel, fodder, habitat and so forth forming the survival needs of the family. Collection of minor forest produce and herbs not only provided extra income to women but valuable nutrition and medicinal support. Animal husbandry was also an important supplemental activity that contributed to household income. The family members normally shared a single roof living under a single patrilineal unit. The families were mostly subsistence farming communities that provided enough for them to survive, as the topography did not allow them to market or reap surplus produce. Thus, women had free access to these resources, which they claimed by traditional rights under Common Property Resources (CPR; Rawat 1989), while men migrated to the cities to ensure a more adequate livelihood. Most men worked in the plains and sent money home to the women who took care of the household. Women in the resettlement sites complained of lack of access to common property resources that not only constituted a major portion of their survival strategies but also led to a loss of supplemental income-generating strategies. Maina Devi from Mallideval complained: I used to make some extra money by selling wood and milk in the nearby hotels on the highway. The fodder for my cattle was free. Today I have not only lost my land but also the extra household income for my kids. (Personal Interview, Maina Devi, 20 August 2009) Research in this study demonstrated that women’s income at this level mainly fulfilled household and nutritional needs of the family. Yet these aspects of the women need often receive no consideration. The gains that women make from CPRs are not valued in a market economy. There was also a marked difference in the living conditions of communities in their earlier places of residence and the present sites of relocation. The Ganga in the pre-displacement sites was not only a free-flowing river but also a sustainer in terms of providing them fish, fuel wood, drinking water and water for irrigation. They never

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experienced scarcity of water even in the hottest summer. As a woman from new Tehri observed: If you came to my house in old Tehri we could cook your food, go down by the river and get cold water to drink. You did not need a fridge. But in this town, there is no water for three days. Then the quality is bad. It smells in the tank. Tanker and hand pumps are there but you have to go and get it. Tanker will stand here and how does one living at a height come and get it. I see it but I cannot take it. Water in the taps comes only once a week. (Personal Interview, Anon., 20 August 2009) This comment depicts the condition of many women who lived in the old town of Tehri by the riverside where water was easily accessible. The new town of Tehri has been constructed at a height of 1,500 m, and water has to be pumped from the river at two different points to reach the town. Women experience great difficulty in accessing water, as the water pumped to the tanks reaches the taps at times only once a week, and at other times for a couple of hours in the morning. While tankers and community hand pumps try to fulfil this gap in water demand and supply, the construction of the city is such that it is difficult to carry water from tanker supplies to their homes, situated on considerable heights. Women resettled in the plains also face the same problem. The loss of free access to water, timber, roof slate, stones and sand leaves them frustrated. Water is a key issue even for the women in the plains, where in spite of land compensation there is no water to irrigate the crops. On the question of their post-displacement status, Rani Nautiyal responded: We have been given land but if we have no water how can we grow crops and irrigate the land. The government assured us that all amenities would be provided to us before we moved. To this day, we await fulfillment of those promises. Frustrated by the absence of water many families have sold their lands. (Personal Interview, Rani Nautiyal, 10 September 2011) Another woman from Athurwala in Hardwar District complained: I was given land as compensation but agriculture is very difficult here because no irrigation is possible. We have to pay for water to irrigate our fields and we do not have any money. The local

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Vandana Asthana environment is completely different from my village. Pashulok and Athurwala are in the plains of Hardwar District. The flora and fauna, the landscape and the fertility of the soil are not like our mountain region. There we had free water from the river to irrigate our fields and here we have to pay Rs.50 for an hour for tube well water. There I went with my friends to collect water in my bantha (traditional pot to carry water) from streams, and herbs and fuel wood from the forests but now we have to buy everything from the market. (Personal Interview, Anon., 10 December 2010)

Having lived in a labor-intensive and demonetized economy, these women are suddenly exposed to the vagaries of the cash economy in these resettlement colonies and become the double victims of profiteers, intermediaries and their own men. The environment of the Garwhal region in which the women lived had tremendous crop diversity. They grew crops like mandua, jhangora, urd, jwar, bajra, taur beans, ramdana, rice and wheat. The cropping pattern of this region is systematically characterized by mixed cropping. The crop rotation, which is locally known as ‘Sar System’, has been giving good yield of crops. Within a year, the land is given up fallow for six months. Along with these varieties of crops, fruits cultivation is also carried out in the villages. The main fruits grown are malta, orange, nut, peach, plum, apricot and all varieties of citrus and apple fruits. These fruits, though, are mainly grown for the domestic consumption. Nearly 90 per cent of the total cropped area was devoted to subsistence food crops mainly grown for domestic consumption and the local market. Commercial or cash crops occupied a very negligible portion of the cropped area. Women were the primary cultivators in the region, as men migrated to the plains for jobs or are working as wage laborers with petty contractors. But resettlement in the plains has pushed them from a subsistence economy into a consumer and market-oriented economy, where the crop diversity is lost and there is hardly any free water to irrigate the crops. The prospect of cash earning for livelihood expenses are limited. Women observed: The quality of land is very different here so we cannot produce the same crops. Earlier except for salt and sugar, we never bought anything from the plains. We had a twelve-crop food economy. Now we are forced into a consumer economy where we have to buy everything. We have lost our entire food culture. (Personal Interview, Anon., 15 December 2010)

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Women thus experienced a sense of social disarticulation by the processes of displacement. Population displacements arising from the submersion of villages due to large dams disrupted the social support networks with kin and other villagers, built up especially by women. These networks provided small loans of food and cash, or labor exchange, and tided poor families over through periods of shortage in their places of abode in the villages. Their disruption usually goes uncounted in the cost-benefit exercise of large irrigation schemes and rehabilitation programs associated with such schemes of resettlements. Community networks that helped cope with poverty through personalized strategies, informal loans, exchange of food, clothing and durable goods, mutual help with farming, building houses, and caring for children have been lost. These multifunctional yet virtually invisible social networks are nonexistent in their current places of residence. They are a major cause of impoverishment. A lot of aged women whose sons have migrated or work in the plains, or who have been widowed, live in these villages. Mana Devi, who lived her entire life in her village with the help of this community network, felt an acute sense of social disarticulation and helplessness: Married in this village, at the age of eleven I became a widow. Today I am eighty-three. I have lived my entire life in this community that has taken care of all my needs. With no land and no house, where will I go for support? (Personal Interview, Mana Devi, 5 January 2010) Another one said: As men are mostly away in the plains whenever there was a function like a wedding or death in the village, each family would contribute something and there was never any load on one family. Now everything is gone. We have been settled in different towns and our entire community network that sustained us has been lost. (Personal Interview, Anon., 5 January 2010) Thus, women experience a lack of wellbeing. However, their sense of wellbeing is not just related to physical needs but also involves social, cultural, economic, political and psychological support systems. They miss their forest walks for fuel wood and fodder, which was also the time they spent with friends and shared their daily activities. In doing these day-to-day activities, they found their freedom and autonomy to

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run their households. As a young woman from the resettlement site mentioned: I used to get up at 4 am in the morning. I would make chai (tea) and start with the household chores. I would go to the spring to collect water; I would make breakfast and send my children to school. I would then give fodder to the cattle and then with some of my friends from the village, I used to go to collect wood and fodder from the forest. That was the time I spent talking to friends. In the afternoon, I would work in the fields and in the evening cook dinner for the family. I was busy and I could just wander out of my house anywhere I wanted. Here, I still get up at 4 am and finish my household chores but I have no place to go and no friends to talk to and nothing much to do. The environment in the plains is different from the hills. Women in this area do not work in the fields. It is considered inferior, so I am confined to the walls of this tin shed I live in. (Personal Interview, Anon., 3 January 2010) In the plains, hired laborers are required to perform various agricultural tasks. In the villages, women were an integral part of agricultural practices that also included decision-making and equal participation of men and women. In the resettlement sites, it is mostly men who negotiate hiring and supervision of the activities, and women feel marginalized and disempowered in this process. Their participation in day-to-day routine practices is negligible, and the confinement to their household limits their space of social interaction. Confined to the four walls of the house, fear of moving out in an alien environment makes many women depressed, stressed and lonely. This leads to high blood pressure and other health problems. Women also experienced a sense of insecurity in the physical and social space assigned to them. Built houses and residential patterns, cultural and linguistic differences as well as hostility of host populations in the resettlement areas do not provide a sense of security that they experienced in the hills. In their villages and in old Tehri, women felt safe and could move around even in late hours. They could freely wear jewellery and travel to different villages to attend weddings and ceremonies. Now their apprehensions are expressed as follows: I never put a lock in my village at Mallideval. Here I have to lock the house all the time and have to be in the house by 6 pm. It is just

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not safe and many people in this host village consider us outsiders. We have been dumped and are sufferers on both counts. (Personal Interview, Anon., 5 January 2010) Due to a sense of insecurity and distance between kinship groups, women also experience a loss of their support systems. Dependency has overtaken their role of being the primary household keepers. Due to the lack of familiarity and loss of social networks, they become dependent on male members in the household, whether it is traveling back to the village or taking the children to the doctor. The preceding analysis demonstrates that women experience displacement in a qualitatively different way from men. While displacement in general has created impoverishment risks (Cernea 2000), women share these risks with men but experience more marginalization in everyday life due to the socially exclusionary processes at work. In spite of a lesser work burden, women felt that the life of the hills was a better one. In the interviews I conducted, women complained of lack of basic amenities like water, loss of land rights, discrimination in compensation, and absence of a sense of wellbeing and security. Men and women are affected differently by dam projects. Women are harder hit by resettlement than men, since they are more likely to earn their living from small businesses located at or near their residences. Women may also be affected disproportionately in rural areas since they are more often dependent on common property resources. (World Bank 1994: 2/9 in Carino 1999)

Gender bias in state resettlement policy Displacement compensation for the dam affected initially began in 1976 under the Department of Irrigation, Uttar Pradesh. Later with the formation of Tehri Hydroelectric Development Corporation (THDC) in 1990, a resettlement and rehabilitation policy was drafted that became effective in 1995. Two kinds of compensations were provided to the displaced population: land and cash. The displaced people were offered either 2 acres of land in the rural settlement areas or half an acre of land within the periphery of urban municipal centres. Some 200 m2 of a plot to build houses and compensation for a house was calculated on the age and type of house in existence at the pre-displacement site. The resettlers were provided with a possession certificate of land, but that

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did not give them legal ownership of land. In some cases, constructed house allotments to the house were provided after a fixed deposit amount varying from Rs 100,000 to 300,000. In many cases, corrupt government officials also demanded money, in the absence of which many men and women lost their allotted shops or houses. Nowhere was there a recognition of the implications for displacement of women, nor did it recognize gender being an issue in formulating R&R plans. In most cases, allotment of land and cash compensation was made in the name of the male member of the family. Women claimed that the government had treated them unequally. The gender bias in the resettlement package was evident. Due to discriminatory biases inherent in the R&R policy and its implementation, a 12-member expert committee under the Chairmanship of Professor C. H. Hanumantha Rao, a former member of the Planning Commission, was formed in 1996. The committee brought to light the environmental and rehabilitation inconsistencies in the Tehri dam project and made specific recommendations about compensation for women. The unit Family was defined by the committee as husband, wife, minor children and others such as widowed mother dependents on the head of the household. The head of the household is the one in whose name the land is entered in the revenue records (HRC 1997: 14), and he represents the family for compensation purposes. The committee recommended that women should be granted separate compensation. The Committee also approved Rs 43,000 for a single or widowed woman. It was due to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) that the new rehabilitation policy included wife as a beneficiary in the compensation package. Despite the THDC website listing ‘Effective from 9.12.1998, all rehabilitation benefits (land, house, plot and cash provisions) to the affected families, including ex-gratia to additional family members, would be given and registered jointly in the name of both husband and wife’, in most cases this money was not appropriately and equally distributed. Intermediaries, profiteers and corrupt government officials added to the problems of women. Those who had the capability to pay bribes were granted compensation. Allotment/registration of land/house plot were required to be in the joint name of husband and wife, subject to fulfillment of legal requirements, if any, but almost all allotments have been made in the name of the male as household head. Cash compensations, too, have been given to men. Resettlement officers dismiss the idea of women being allotted land rights or compensation. Many women complained that cash compensation granted to their husbands had been squandered away in drinking and short-term consumer goods. Many felt that cash is not

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sufficient to build houses of the kind that they had in villages. As a widowed woman, Rukma Devi narrated her story: We are getting a paltry sum of Rs 40,000 to construct a house in Pashulok. We cannot even construct a single room for this amount in the plains. In Mallideval constructing a house is cheap. Slate and mud is free. So does wood. Help is forthcoming and you only needed a little cement. (Personal Interview, Rukma Devi, 10 December 2010) Women who earned their living by selling household things by the roadside or were hawkers in the old Tehri town have been classified as landless and so are not eligible for compensation. I was a hawker for the last 30 years and there is no provision for me in the R&R policy. (Personal Interview, Anon., 5 January 2010) Another woman said: My husband is unemployed. I used to stitch clothes and work for a living. I have been allotted a shop in Dehradun but have no money to pay for its structure. (Personal Interview, Anon., 5 January 2010) There is no acknowledgement of single women. A widow, unmarried adult daughter and a deserted woman will be considered as dependents. A deserted woman can only receive compensation from her husband through the process of adjudication. She will not be entitled to a separate package (Singh 1992). The contribution of women to the village and the household economy are ignored by state policy There is no attempt to compensate women’s loss of access to resources that have a severe impact on women. Although the government calls its plans a comprehensive rehabilitation policy, rehabilitation does not take place in any form. The term rehabilitation does not end with compensation of land or cash. This process includes a comprehensive treatment of socio-cultural, economic and psychological needs of men and women, and that is lacking in the rehabilitation policy. Gender is yet to be mainstreamed and values neglect women issues. There are no alternative measures or women-specific plans at the resettlement sites. The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (Ministry of Rural Development 2007) could not influence the Tehri Hydroelectric

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Dam Corporation Rehabilitation policy 1998. Since the construction of the role of men and women is understood in a given socio-cultural context, decisions tend to neglect the needs of women.

Conclusion The Tehri dam case study applied a culture-based understanding of the dam displacement processes in Uttaranchal, India, through the lens of women. The project asked the question, ‘How do women experience displacement and relocation in the dam project?’ In a region where women and children make up the majority of displaced population, insensitivity to the needs of women has shaped post-rehabilitation programs in a way where women face impoverishment, income decline and destitution. The eight interlinked potential risks intrinsic to displacement identified in Cernea’s model manifest themselves in the daily lives of these displaced women. They suffer from loss of land, from joblessness and homelessness. Many of them live in tin sheds; they have lost their traditional houses and cannot afford to build new ones; they also suffer from a loss of access to the commons, which creates fodder and fuel wood shortage and decline in income and food diversity. Women face even further hardships when community support structures disintegrate and family and kinship networks break down. Systems of care, protection, compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) remain largely insensitive to women’s needs, leading to a fundamentally disenfranchising experience. In this patriarchal society, women have been denied compensation for land that they cultivated for years but did not have a registration in their name. Cases of ineligibility have been identified in many women-headed households, and widows have been excluded from compensations in the resettlement package. Men are the recognized heads of household; therefore, compensation is often paid only to them. The resettlement process is fraught with impoverishment risks and the reconstruction remains incomplete. Women are forced into adopting a culture they have never known, and limitations in their social space have prevented them from rebuilding their daily practices in a new environment.2 Thus, women remain marginalized at the community level as well as at the national level policy framework because of their disadvantageous position ascribed by patriarchal gender relations. The narratives of women clearly brought out the insensitivity of state discourses to the needs of women. Although the national R&R policy acknowledges gender as a category in resettlement processes, the actual resettlement and rehabilitation is a state issue. State policies

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should take into consideration these problems to enable participation of women and move towards gender justice. Ensuring a narrative-based approach highlights the concerns of women affected by displacement processes, for consideration by policy planners while making decisions that have far-reaching implications in the lives of women in the name of ‘development and public purpose’.

Notes 1 This chapter was originally published in the Economic and Political Weekly, 47(47–48): 96–102, 2012, and is reprinted with permission. 2 Women have started renegotiating their daily lives, although it is a difficult process. For example, during my stay in the resettlement site women would often go to the nearby forestland in Hardwar region to gather fuel wood, but it was always in big groups of 10 or 12. Women mentioned that they felt insecure as they were sometimes victims of the anger and disciplinary powers of the forest rangers who prevent them from picking fuel wood categorizing it as illegal and an offense.

References Agarwal, B. 1996. A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bernard, H. R. 1994. Research Methods in Anthropology, Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. Carino, J. 1999. ‘The world commission on dams: A review of hydroelectric projects and the impact on indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities’, Cultural Survival Quarterly 23(3), Fall. Cernea, M. 1997. ‘The risks and reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations’, World Development 25(10): 1569–87. Cernea, M. 2000. ‘Risks, safeguards, and reconstruction: A model for population displacement and resettlement’, in M. Cernea and C. McDowell (eds.). Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees. Washington: The World Bank: 11–56. Colson, E. 1999. ‘Engendering those uprooted by “development”, in D. Indra (ed.). Engendering Forced Migration: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Refugee Studies Program. Downing, T. E. 2002. ‘Avoiding new poverty: Mining-induced displacement and resettlement’. Paper prepared for Managing Mineral Wealth Workshop, London (15–17 August 2001). Working Paper/Report No 58. London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). Dreze, J., M. Samson and S. Singh (eds.). 1997. The Dam and the Nation. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dwivedi, R. 1999. ‘Displacement, risks and resistance: Local perceptions and actions in the Sardar Sarovar’, Development and Change 30: 43–78.

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Dwivedi, R. 2002. ‘Models and methods in development-induced displacement–review article’, Development and Change 33(4): 709–32. Elson, D. 1998. ‘Talking to the boys: Gender and economic growth models’, in C. Jackson and R. Pearson (eds.). Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy. London: Routledge. Escobar, A. 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fernandes, W. and E. Thukral (eds.). 1989. Development, Displacement and Rehabilitation. New Delhi: Indian Social Institute. Gallin, R. S. and A. Fergusson (eds.). 1991. The Women and International Development Annual. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Human Rights Commission. 1997. Report of Expert Committee on Rehabilitation and Environmental Aspects of Tehri Hydroelectric Project, unpublished Report, New Delhi. Jackson, C. and R. Pearson (eds.). 1998. Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy. Routledge: London. Kothari, S. 1996. ‘Whose nation? The displaced as victims of development’, Economic and Political Weekly, 15 June, 31(24): 1476–85. March, C., I. Smyth and M. Mukhopadhyay. 1999. A Guide to Gender: Analysis Frameworks. London: Oxfam. Matu, S. 2004. Towards Failure and Devastation. Fourth Document. Matu Peoples Organization. Village Cham. Tehri. Mehta, L. 2000. ‘Women facing submergence: Displacement and resistance in the Narmada’, in V. Damadoran and M. Unnithan (eds.). Identities, Nation, Global Culture. New Delhi: Manohar. Mehta, L. and B. Srinivasan. 2000. ‘Balancing pains and gains: A perspective paper on gender and large dams’. Final paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams. Morse et al. 1992. Sardar Sarovar: Report of the Independent Review. Ottawa: Resources Futures International (RFI) Inc. Muggah, R. 2000. ‘Through the developmentalist’s looking glass: Conflictinduced displacement and involuntary resettlement in Columbia’, Journal of Refugee Studies 13(2): 133–64. National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy. 2007. Ministry of Rural Development. Available at www.indiaenvironmentalportal.org.in/files/ NRRP2007.pdf accessed 25 March 2010. Oliver Smith, A. 1991. Displacement Resistance and the Critique of Development: From the Grassroots to the Global. Final Report for ESCOR. Refugee Studies Centre. University of Oxford. Paranjpye, V. 1988. Evaluating the Tehri Dam: An Extended Cost-Benefit Appraisal. New Delhi: Indian National Trust for Art and Culture (INTACH). Parasuraman, S. 1993. ‘Impact of displacement by development projects on women in India’. ISS Working Paper Series No. 159. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. Parasuraman, S. 1997. ‘The anti-dam movement and rehabilitation policy’, in J. Dreze et al. (eds.). The Dam and the Nation: Displacement and Resettlement in the Narmada Valley. New Delhi: Oxford University.

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Rawat, A. S. 1989. Migration and Structural Change: A Study of Rural Society in Garwhal Himalayas. New Delhi: Sarita Book House. Scudder, T. 1993. ‘Development induced relocation and refugee studies: 37 years of change and continuity among Zambia’s Gwembe Tonga’, Journal of Refugee Studies 6(2): 123–52. Shiva, V. 1994. Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development. London: Zed Books. Shiva, V. and K. Jalees. 2003. Ganga: Common Heritage or Private Commodity. New Delhi: RFSTE. Singh, M. 1992. Displacement by Sardar Sarovar and Tehri: A Comparative Study of Two Dams. New Delhi: Multiple Action Research Group (MARG). Srinivasan, B. 1997. In Defense of the Future. Mumbai: Vikas Adhyayan Kendra. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation. 1998. Rehabilitation Policy. New Delhi: THDC. Thukral, E. 1992. Big Dams, Displaced Peoples: Rivers of Sorrow, Rivers of Joy. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Thukral, E. 1996. ‘Development, displacement and rehabilitation: Locating gender’, Economic and Political Weekly 31(24): 1500–3. World Bank. 1994. Resettlement and Development: The Bank-Wide Review of Projects Involving Involuntary Resettlement 1986–1993. Environment Department Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2001. Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. Washington, DC: Environment Department, World Bank. World Commission on Dams. 2000. Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-making: The Report of the World Commission on Dams. London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd.

5

Displacing and relocating peasant social dispositions Joël Cabalion

The imminent forth-coming is present, immediately visible, as a present property of things, to the extent of excluding the possibility that it does not happen – a possibility that theoretically exists as long as it has not happened.1

Since independence in 1947, more than 60 million people have been displaced in India (Fernandes and Bharali 2011) – most of them rural – due to the construction of large dams, thermal plants, extractive industries or new towns among other large infrastructure projects. The extent of land acquisition correlative to these displacements is supposedly near 20 million ha, including 6.8 million ha of forests and 6 million ha of community land (otherwise known as common property resources, or CPR), a figure amounting to approximately 6 per cent of the total geographic area (or 10 per cent of the cultivable area) of the country (Chakravorty 2013). From all the upheavals that Indian rural society has known since independence, the ones which have been precipitated by displacement are among the most colossal, in sheer number, and laden with long-term consequences. Creating a rupture in the frames of existence of a population taken in the totality of its local existence, displacement does not only disarticulate certain forms of solidarity or pre-existing relations; it eventually operates as a revealing indicator of each and everyone’s social forth-coming, accelerating ‘the rupture of coincidences between expectations and chances’ (Bourdieu 2000) of rural classes. If some people can spatially envisage resettling in the newly defined space, some are subject to a form of downgrading while others experiment a favourable re-adjustment.

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Sociological classifications and structure of fieldwork data Grounded in a research which followed over ten years the management, preparation and unravelling of the sequence of displacement and relocation of four agrarian villages in the district of Nagpur in Eastern Maharashtra, this chapter focuses on the processes of reproduction and transformation of social distances and inequalities between the former and the new village site – otherwise called a ‘structure of inequalities in movement’. It is imperative to briefly evoke two categories: jāti and varnā. The former, to which I refer in the analysis, is empirically found all over the country as a category part of ‘regional systems’, while the latter will not be mobilized for it is too imprecise and connoted. I will likewise refer to, though not discuss theoretically here, the administrative categories used and found in the Indian as well as Maharashtrian context: Other Backward Classes (OBC), Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Nomadic Tribes (NT). Three waves of surveys were conducted (‘personal sample’) to reconstruct the local universe of reference and the agrarian structure of these four villages which experience relocation together in the new village of Naya Ambhora. Statistical analyses are based on households (of various kinds; see Lardinois 1977, 1985 for a question of typology) and on castes or caste groups statistically regrouped.2 The total agricultural land of these villages corresponds to 680 ha, among which 484 ha (i.e. 71 per cent) are destined to be submerged along with residential land.3 Land evaluations and the distribution process of compensation awards spread well over ten years from 1995 up to today, which generated tremendous difficulties for displaced people due to the joint increase of land value and production costs, eventually deterring most from trying to rescue and prolong their own experience of agriculture – a fact all the more aggravated by the shattering of family units into multiple new households spatially distant on the new resettlement site. The data file The statistical analysis (done with SPSS), which here alternates with qualitative methods essentially based on the technique of focused, non-directive interviews and ethnographic observation, is based on a file composed of 241 households comprising about 40 active variables built up from secondary data (Collector’s Office, VIDC) and primary data coming from regular surveys in the villages conducted in multiple

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waves with questionnaires. Variables are both quantitative (continuous) and qualitative (as well as they cross official written data with verbal declarations). Certain households sometimes reveal cohabitation within the same house but experience a division of economic capital that is both vertical and horizontal (typically the partition of a father and two supplementary partitions of adult sons already farmers and managing their own share). Apprehending the family structure correctly can sometimes be a major difficulty, as families are being distributed new residential plots on the basis of their size and economic status, in relation for example with the possession of a Below Poverty Line card. Variables are therefore both qualitative and quantitative. They enable outlining the differentiation of the present social structure of the four villages (14 castes), and allow seizing their trajectory in the course of displacement. This chapter thereby limits itself to land-based inequalities (volume of land owned and correlative awards received), spatial inequalities (residential space from the former village to the new site) and inequalities of anticipation (resettlement strategies) towards the new village. Table 5.1 presents the details of the social groups interviewed for the sample of households. It informs in brackets of their administrative categories (OBC, SC, NT, and ST). I have thus met, for this sample, 68.1 per cent of OBC caste families (158 households), 16.3 per cent of SCs (44 households), 14.1 per cent of NTs (34 households) and 1.5 per cent of STs (5 households). It is important to keep in mind here that this sample is entirely composed of groups known as lower castes, tribes (called nomadic or not) and former untouchables. There are no so-called high caste groups: Marathas, Marwaris or Brahmins. If 9 per cent of agricultural land still belongs to a Deshashtha Brahmin family today dispersed over Vidarbha and Madhya Pradesh, none of them regularly stayed or lived in the village well over the last 20 years. The logic of this classification is to remember, as there is a descending-decreasing (or ascending-increasing according to the indicators) order regularly found in most analyses. The regular tabular logic is the following: the first two groups (Teli, then Kunbi and other upper balutedār castes) are relatively dominant and the other two groups are rather dominated, this being a known historical fact in tandem with social representations. If it is not systematic, it is regular enough to be noted. It implies that the first two groups averagely display a higher volume of properties (land, money, space, propensities to act or do, etc.), if balanced with their demographic weight.

CHINA

0

PAKISTAN

1 000

500 kilometers

New Delhi

NEPAL BHUTAN

BANGLADESH Calcutta Calcut ta Kolkata

International borders State borders Mumbai

State capital State of Maharashtra Vidarbha region

Bangalore

Chennai

Gosikhurd dam Districts (Vidarbha) Amravati division 1. Buldhana 2. Akola 3. Washim 4. Amravati 5. Yavatmal 6. Wardha

10

Nagpur

8

4 6

2

7

1 Nagpur division 7. Nagpur 8. Bhandara 9. Chandrapur 10. Gondia 11. Gadchiroli

3

5

9

11

Map 5.1 Maharashtra, Nagpur and the Gosi Khurd large dam in Vidarbha Source: Map drawn by author © Joël Cabalion (2013).

Dhiwar (NT*) Navhi (OBC) Lohar (OBC) Gond (ST*) Dhobi (OBC) Gowari (ST) sub-total 14 castes

Kunbi (OBC) Sonar (OBC) Lodhi (OBC) Sutar (OBC) Mali (OBC) Gurao (OBC) sub-total

Castes

33.6 16.6 3.3 2.1 2.1 1.2 0.8 26.1 18.3 14.1 2.9 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.4 22 100%

63 44 34 7 4 4 3 1 53 241

% of N total

81 40 8 5 5 3 2

N (households)

377 232 201 33 24 16 23 6 303 1,427

515 222 48 44 32 19 12

N (individuals)

* OBC (Other Backward Classes); SC (Scheduled Castes); NT (Nomadic Tribes); ST (Scheduled Tribes).

Source: Fieldwork (personal survey), District of Nagpur, 2004–2012.

Total

Mahar (SC*) Dhiwar Navhi Lohar Gond Dhobi Gowari

Teli (OBC*) Kunbi Sonar Lodhi Sutar Mali Gurao

Caste groups (recoding)

Table 5.1 The survey – social groups and individuals per household

26.4 16.3 14.1 2.3 1.7 1.1 1.6 0.4 21.2 100%

36.1 15.6 3.4 3.1 2.2 1.3 0.8

% of N total

6 5.3 5.9 4.7 6 4 7.7 6 5.7 5.9

6.4 5.6 6 8.8 6.4 6.3 6

Mean (individuals per household)

Dhiwar Navhi Gond Dhobi Lohar Gowari

Kunbi Sonar Lodhi Sutar Mali Gurao

Teli

Count % row

Count % row Count % row

Count % row Count % row

66 27.6%

8 18.2% 33 62.3%

9 11.3% 16 25.8%

Landless*

37 15.5%

9 20.5% 6 11.3%

12 15% 10 16.1%

< 1 ha

*** means α = 0.01 ; ** means α = 0.05 ; * means α = 0.1

Note: The column for ‘landless’ was added.

40 16.7%

4 9.1% 5 9.4%

21 26.3% 10 16.1%

1–2 ha

NSSO categories of land intervals

Source: Fieldwork, Land Awards’ Lists, VIDC, Nagpur District, 2002–2006.

Total

Mahar

CASTES

N = 239

Table 5.2 Distribution of NSSO land categories by caste***

63 26.4%

18 40.9% 8 15.1%

21 26.3% 16 25.8%

2–4 ha

27 11.3%

5 11.4% 1 1.9%

14 17.5% 7 11.3%

4–10 ha

6 2.5%

0 0% 0 0%

3 3.8% 3 4.8%

10+ ha

239 100%

44 100% 53 100%

80 100% 62 100%

Total

Map 5.2 The distribution of social groups in ‘old’ Ambhora Khurd Source: Map drawn by author © Joël Cabalion (fieldwork, 2004–2013). Note: Map not to scale.

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Inequality of chances in resettlement (‘resettling inequalities’) The morphology of social inequalities Inequalities in land distribution remain a classical angle to begin the examination of social distances between castes in rural India. Table 5.2 indicates the land structure by households according to the categories of the National Sample Survey Office. If heterogeneity is relatively strong among all groups, there are however important regularities that ought to be considered from a local perspective wherein inequalities are usually cumulated. If today’s India – at least Vidarbha – does not display the predominance of the former landlords, owners of hundreds of hectares and entire villages, the successors of these dominant castes or the ones that replaced them distinguish themselves by the grip of an inseparable economic and political power. It is particularly the case among the Teli and Kunbi castes which constitute most of the dominant agrarian families, the former customary village chiefs (pāṭīl) and the households that have today largely diversified their activities, if not changed it (some becoming doctors, engineers or more commonly petty merchants or class 3 government servants). Among these two dominant castes, agricultural land is generally of a better quality, a higher fiscal value and a superior form of land tenure, a fact well established by other analyses not presented here. Table 5.2 also indicates that a little over a quarter of the household population of these four villages is landless. Such a high figure hinges upon the important demographic weight of the Dhiwar fishermen, and it is compounded by the other lower service castes, some of them being still practicing their traditional activity (it is the case of Lohars, Dhobis and Navhis). If most caste groups today own land (often less than 1 ha), to possess a small holding does no longer protect from ‘poverty’, be it an officially recorded or simply perceived condition. One only needs to face a bad crop – or a major health issue – resulting in a decrease of income sources, to push a family into the indigence of a situation wherein people already struggle with the minimum to live on. Table 5.3 reveals the apparent irreversibility of the process of depeasantization. Seventy-two per cent of households are now landless (41 per cent of new landless), and about 15 per cent are in a situation of subsistence agriculture (less than 1 ha), where one sells with difficulty or hardly sells agricultural produce. This implies that there are still approximately 13 per cent of average agrarian households (from 2 to 4 ha) almost equally distributed among all social groups. It is possible

Dhiwar Navhi Gond Dhobi Lohar Gowari

Kunbi Sonar Lodhi Sutar Mali Gurao Mahar

Teli

32 15.3%

7 17.9% 3 6.3%

Count % row Count % row

Count % row

13 18.1% 9 18%

Count % row Count % row

< 1 ha

12 5.7%

5 12.8% 3 6.3%

4 5.6% 0 0%

1–2 ha

10 4.8%

2 5.1% 2 4.2%

3 4.2% 3 6%

2–4 ha

*** means α = 0.01 ; ** means α = 0.05 ; * means α = 0.1

5 2.4%

0 0% 2 4.2%

1 1.4% 2 4%

4–10 ha

64 30.6%

8 20.5% 32 66.7%

8 11.1% 16 32%

Former landless

Land intervals (National Sample Survey Office)

Source: Fieldwork, Nagpur District, Land Awards’ Lists, VIDC, 2004–2012.

Total

CASTES

N = 209

Table 5.3 Caste groups and land intervals after submersion (ha)***

86 41.1%

17 43.6% 6 12.5%

43 59.7% 20 40%

New landless

209 100%

39 100% 48 100%

72 100% 50 100%

Total

Displacing and relocating peasants

73

to assume that the 15 per cent of households now representing a livelihood agriculture will take care of it through family labour – even if that depends fundamentally on the will of the heirs to take up agricultural work. It is therefore likely that 13 per cent of village households will now dispose of 70 per cent of daily wage labourers to take care of farming. Such an inversion of the land structure poses numerous issues for employment and outlines a growing tension between residual owners and the newly created mass of daily wage labourers. In a process of land acquisition, inequalities on land directly translate into inequalities in land awards, more commonly referred to as compensations given to the affected people for their agricultural or residential land (see Table 5.4). Such compensation awards form the basis of the state paradigm aimed at preventing or at least mitigating impoverishment risks, while giving the illusion of equity in the process of land acquisition. They are supposed to assist displaced people in relocating in ‘good conditions’. By and large, it is possible to underline that the volume of these compensation awards have a determining practical efficiency in the process of resettlement, without necessarily safeguarding the equity which the GoM claims.4 This table illustrates well how much land inequality deepens according to the various material Table 5.4 Awards received by households and according to caste groups*** Castes

N % of Sum (Rs) (house N total holds)

% of total sum

Mean (Rs)

Minimum Maximum (Rs) (Rs)

Teli Kunbi Sonar Lodhi Sutar Mali Gurao Mahar Dhiwar Navhi Gond Dhobi Lohar Gowari Total

80 60

34.6% 34,757,193 47% 434,465 25,957 26% 21,023,090 28.4% 350,385 45,898

2,247,004 1,613,934

43 48

18.6% 10,878,488 14.7% 252,988 15,693 20.8% 7,260,045 9.8% 151,251 3,679

758,178 763,995

231

100% 73,918,816 100% 319,995

3,679

2,247,004

Source: Fieldwork, Land Awards’ Lists, VIDC, Nagpur District, 2004–2012. Note: On 24 October 2013, 1 euro was equivalent to 84 rupees. *** means α = 0.01 ; ** means α = 0.05 ; * means α = 0.1

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endowments composing the land structure. When one possesses on his holdings agricultural wells and orchards, godowns and storage buildings as well as electrical infrastructure for irrigation, one can note a reinforcement of the inequality of compensation awarded between groups. The first two groups dominate these resources. This table furthermore clubs the awards received for agricultural land as well as for the houses of the displaced. Combining the totality of awards’ sums in a single table unveils a clear-cut inequality between groups of castes wherein a descending order emerges from the dominant castes to the dominated castes. Land inequalities are aggregated with inequalities of place, which is the volume of residential land owned, and lastly illustrates itself in the appropriation of community spaces, by the various religions coexisting in the village (mostly Hinduism and Buddhism). If the process of land dispossession seemingly reifies a ‘community of fate’ in the course of displacement, rural inequalities however structure the material distribution of chances of resettlement. Residential inequality: ‘empty spaces’ and ‘constructed spaces’ The data officially produced in such projects to compensate villagers contains much information on spatial resources: space is divided according to agricultural holdings and domestic space, and has led to very detailed measurements (in m2) that I have presented in Table 5.5. Better compensated villagers have thus been the fastest in relocating to the new village.5 They have taken a stance that is taken position, in the most literal sense. They have occupied physical space faster, accommodated their new residential space ‘before time’ (before ‘it is too late’ to garner any benefits), built their new house while construction prices were still affordable and have restarted their activities in the new village. As Vinod and Pankaj summarized it in the Dalit basti of Ambhora Khurd, ‘they took their checks and left while we got stuck here’.6 During one of my last visits in December 2012 in the village of Ambhora Khurd before people relocated, there were hardly more than a dozen houses left, more than half of them being in the Dalit basti. In the old villages, each house occupied a certain space or was rather situated on a total land residential space that the GoM, to acquire it and compensate people, has divided into two categories of surface: free space (or empty space, khulī jagah) and constructed space (bāndhakām), the latter corresponding to houses, barns, cowsheds, lineage temples (kuldevatā) and so forth. This indicator has been used and cross-tabulated in a similar way than the preceding indicators

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Table 5.5 Caste groups and residential space in the old village (m2) Castes (N = 211)

Constructed space (m2)***

Empty space (m2)***

Total space (m2)**

Teli

74 35.1% 5,488 43% 74 55 26.1% 4,053 31.7% 74 38 18% 1,573 12.3% 41 44 20.9% 1,659 13% 38 211 100% 12,773 100% 61

74 35.1% 5,127 24.7% 69 55 26.1% 6,824 32.9% 124 38 18% 4,999 24.1% 132 44 20.9% 3,812 18.4% 87 211 100% 20,761 100% 98

74 35.1% 10,614 31.6% 143 55 26.1% 10,900 32.4% 198 38 18% 6,609 19.7% 174 44 20.9% 5,490 16.3% 125 211 100% 33,613 100% 159

N % of N total Sum % of total sum Mean Kunbi Lodi N Sutar Sonar % of N total Gurao Mali Sum % of total sum Mean Mahar N % of N total Sum % of total sum Mean Dhiwar Gond N Gowari Dhobi % of N total Navhi Lohar Sum % of total sum Mean Total N % of N total Sum % of total sum Mean

Source: Fieldwork, Houses’ Awards Lists, VIDC, Nagpur District, 2004–2012. *** means α = 0.01 ; ** means α = 0.05 ; * means α = 0.1

already presented. If it appears clearly that there is no single group absolutely dominating village space, the latter indicator yet reveals important differentials which may display reversing trends if one opposes empty space and constructed space. Teli for instance reveal a total constructed space in equal or slightly superior proportions to what they represent in terms of households, or individuals. Such a trend reverses if one draws the comparison with Mahar who still own space to extend, but who have not done it. The group of Kunbi and other castes is in a comparable situation, while the group of Dhiwar generally has less space with regard to its demographic weight of

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households or individuals, particularly insofar as constructed space is concerned. Constructed space refers to the size of houses, thus to the size of households, and to a relative importance the latter have in the relations of production insofar as it includes the equivalent of agricultural barns and godowns situated in the agricultural landscape, except they are here situated in the geographical space of the village. Indeed, only some Teli and Kunbi affluent families (and some Lodhi) do own farm animals: cattle (mostly buffaloes and cows for milk or cows for manure). Such herds generate important sources of income, which evokes the ‘white revolution’ of rural areas in some parts of India. This indicator of space illustrates the expression of ‘space-consuming’, that is the propensity to occupy space in relation with a wide range of activities, including religious ones (more kuldevatā structures among dominant castes plus two main Hindu temples, only one Buddhist Vihār among the Mahar, etc.). Space is not just a resource; it is a base for the symbolic transposition of social relations. The mean of constructed space is about twice more important among the first two groups. The rather low volume of empty space among Teli can here be explained by recent history. During the catastrophic floods of 1994 in the district, many houses of the northern part of the village of Ambhora Khurd crumbled (mostly OBC caste houses). The event precipitated a cycle of segmentation among a dozen households who subsequently settled in the empty space of the southern part of the village where mostly a few barns and godowns belonging to Teli families were present. One can presuppose that the shrinking of their total extensible space took place following that episode. Most of the households moving ‘south’ bought plots for a couple of thousand rupees from their owners (sometimes from their brothers). Total empty space is about twice as much as constructed space in the village. It represents roughly 2 km2. If villagers today perceive their former village site as particularly congested, the fact is that they still disposed of large fallow spaces, a few gardens and tree-shadowed areas where one could stock materials, graze animals or organize collective meals for religious festivals. If space is structuring, and that one could witness inequalities in the volumes and spaces of the former village, is it still possible to find the marks of these inequalities in the new village beyond the single dimension of the size of new constructions? The distribution of the surfaces of new residential plots is neither random nor neutral. The question pertaining to the criteria to be selected for village relocation

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often stemmed from various regional departments in charge to their respective ministries, usually in the aftermath of massive floods. It crystallized in an official manner in the 1970s within the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation of the GoM. The social distribution of new plots: a familialist type of ideology? State criteria for relocation are simple and follow a bimodal distribution: the attributed surfaces of the new plots are a function of the size of households that is of the number of individuals it shelters, as well as dependent upon the opposition between landless and cultivator status. There are three categories of households’ size, whose theoretical distributions are the following according to the socio-professional group: 1 to 5 individuals (185 m2 or 370 m2), 5 to 8 individuals (278 m2 or 555 m2) and then 9 individuals or more (370 m2 or 740 m2). If official documents euphemistically mention the case of non-farmer households, informal exchanges with government servants working in the Rehabilitation Division attest to the use of the expression of ‘landless labourers’, which is less ambiguous and does not allow for confusion between economically diverse households (also practicing agriculture) and economically weak households who are only practicing daily wage labour. The criterion might still appear neutral, and therefore calls for a closer analysis of the ‘familialist’ type of ideology it reveals. A farming family needs more space, not because it specifically keeps more cumbersome properties to its side, which can also be the case of fishermen who often pull their boats out of water to get them repaired in their basti, but because it is generally larger and displaying a complex internal structure, that is a multiple-household type of family structure (multiple kitchens). From an official point of view, it is implicitly a question of demographic increase, even if it is never elicited in such a way by the various government officials. ‘The joint family is the strength of traditional India’. Such a commonly reckoned belief across all social groups merits further developments that are not possible here, as I restrict my argument to the issue of plots. ‘Joint families’ need to be able to remain they are, so as to dispose of enough space to prevent the structure from imploding internally. The more individuals there are in a household, the more it is presupposed that the family type is of a complex and undivided type. If one reckons that most families indeed know an undivided type of family structure (either horizontally or

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vertically), in spite of a more complex typology of households, one should therefore expect an elementary bipartition of residential space (joint/nuclear). It is however not the case. The GoM created five categories of space (from 185 m2 to 740 m2) in order to respond to the wide range of situations and to satisfy the need of space-craving families, from the point of view of their socio-professional activities (agricultural mostly as well as for animal herding). There is indeed a correspondence between the number of individuals and the volume of space given. Plots of 185 m2 correspond to families of an average size of 4.7 individuals, the 278 m2 plots to 5.5 individuals, then 5.7 individuals (370 m2), 6.2 individuals (555 m2) and at last 8.4 individuals (740 m2). These measurements are also correlative to the complexity of household structures. The more complex a household, the larger the plot size will be, in spite of fewer individuals in certain cases as compared to the theoretical distribution. The size of a household is generally correlative as well to the importance in relations of production. From the old to the new village, spatial inequalities are therefore perpetuated, though not in a linear way. The dispersion of distribution values of new plots has posed tremendous challenges for the state, considering surveys were of a very poor nature and easily subject to manipulation. Quite a few landless households got a larger plot than they ‘should’ have gotten; it is usually the case of goat herders from relatively poor background and who could sometimes gain some surface in relation to their activity. The theoretical distribution and the real distribution of plots can therefore vary importantly. The inverse case of the one just described is more common: landless households receiving a smaller size of plot than they should have gotten (185 m2 instead of 370 m2) in relation to their demographic weight, in spite of a correspondingly high number of individuals living in the new house. In reality, the distribution of new residential plots has been subject to a manipulation of representations of family structures from all parts, so as to obtain larger plots or to be awarded many as opposed receiving a single plot. I quickly understood this aspect during fieldwork when I was asked to add individuals in certain families while completing my survey (and in spite of specifying that I was not working for the government): it was usually older sons or daughters either working and/or living outside and having their own family structure, therefore being entitled to a plot themselves unless their main residence was outside the village. Teli and Kunbi families, in particular, have manoeuvred intensely around their kinship networks to gain more plots than they should have. Sometimes these processes were mired in family disputes and went to court, due to which compensation awards often ended up

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being blocked in the Collector Office in Nagpur as long as a family tussle went on. Many households are today dispersed over the new village layout, living on as many single plots as they had kitchens or partitions in the former house. The larger the surface one owned in the former village, the larger the new plot will be (555–740 m2), a fact shown by Table 5.6. These ‘small differences’ concretely mean a difference of 2–3 rooms per house, which again presupposes a larger family size and a more complex household structure, and eventually explains why we find more Teli and Kunbi in this category (see Table 5.7). Table 5.8 illustrates this fact as well but from the angle Table 5.6 New plots and surface in the old village* New plot

N

% of N total

Sum

% of total sum

Mean

185–278 m2 370 m2 555–740 m2 Total

43 81 81 205

21% 39.5% 39.5% 100%

5,767 11,974 14,927 32,668

17.7% 36.7% 45.7% 100%

134 148 184 159

Source: Fieldwork, Houses’ Awards’ Lists, New Plot Distribution Lists’, VIDC, Nagpur District, 2004–2012. *** means α = 0.01 ; ** means α = 0.05 ; * means α = 0.1

Table 5.7 Caste groups and new residential plot surfaces*** Surfaces of new residential plot (m2)

N = 227

Total

185 m2 278 m2 370 m2 555 m2 740 m2 Castes Teli Kunbi Sonar Lodhi Sutar Mali Gurao Mahar

Count % row Count % row

Count % row Dhiwar Navhi Count Gond Dhobi % row Lohar Gowari Total Count % row

4 5.3% 2 3.3%

5 6.6% 4 6.7%

7 2 16.7% 4.8% 19 9 38.8% 18.4%

31 40.8% 23 38.3%

28 8 76 36.8% 10.5% 100% 24 7 60 40% 11.7% 100%

23 10 54.8% 23.8% 10 7 20.4% 14.3%

0 42 0% 100% 4 49 8.2% 100%

32 20 87 69 19 227 14.1% 8.8% 38.3% 30.4% 8.4% 100%

Source: Fieldwork, New Plot distribution lists, VIDC, Nagpur District, 2004–2012. *** means α = 0.01 ; ** means α = 0.05 ; * means α = 0.1

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Table 5.8 New plots’ surfaces and total compensation (Rs)*** New plot

N

% of N total

Sum (Rs)

% of total sum

Mean (Rs)

185–278 m2 370 m2 555–740 m2 Total

50 86 87 223

22.4% 38.6% 39% 100%

5,142,746 30,478,813 36,930,003 72,551,562

7.1% 42% 50.9% 100%

102,854 354,404 424,482 325,343

Source: Fieldwork, Land Awards Lists, Houses’ Awards’ Lists, New Plot Distribution Lists’, VIDC, Nagpur District, 2004–2012. *** means α = 0.01 ; ** means α = 0.05 ; * means α = 0.1

of compensation awards. The more compensation one was awarded, the higher chances are she/he will have gotten a larger plot size. There is consequently an implicit familialist ideology in the logic of plot distribution, a logic which spatially transforms the morphology of inequalities. If the reproduction of positions is sometimes blurred, the significance of the quantitative analyses however attest of this phenomenon which today appears to reinforce the emergence of a class structure – formerly more latent – within the traditional village caste order of the new village, as most dominant castes are concerned by the gain of larger plots.

Impoverishment as a social destiny Compensation and peasants’ logics of practice The GoM imposes scales of compensation that durably put affected people at a disadvantage as a result of the land acquisition process and the logic of funds’ disbursements. More importantly, but this is a controversial point, it appears that land awards granted to the villagers were most often lower than market prices. The biggest issue, however, lies elsewhere; as many villagers also state that their compensation awards would have been sufficient had they resettled at the time these were handed out. The spreading out of compensation awards in time has entirely played against the interests of most affected people. Fundamentally, if it is the GoM’s fault in a technical sense, it is because of most development projects’ flawed logics, not due to some organized will to impoverish villagers as activists’ slogans understandably put it (‘We want development, not destruction’). The temporality of compensation awards is such that it often pre-exists by at least a decade the actual resettlement of people. ‘Money should have been

Map 5.3 Volume and distribution of plots in Naya Ambhora Source: Gosi Khurd Rehabilitation Division – Project Circle, Nagpur (2009); fieldwork © Joël Cabalion (2013). Note: Map not to scale.

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given at the time of shifting’. If it is easier said than done, particularly for a bureaucracy, such a commonsensical statement uttered by most affected people nevertheless acts as a powerful reminder of their logics of practice. Moreover, such a spreading out in time (and space, because people are not immobile and often migrate in between) unravels to the detriment of the most vulnerable sections among affected people whose management of an incredibly and suddenly high but yet modest sum (as Michael Cernea stresses: ‘how could so much rest on so little?’7) in cash only enables a social reproduction a minima, that is short term (thereby short-lived). Such awards are then used for daily needs (what is called tabiyat-pani in Hindi, meaning health and water) instead of nourishing a long-term perspective to support one’s future resettlement and self-rehabilitation. Consequently, the awards received in accordance with one’s initial material endowments tend to be dilapidated without having served the purpose of organizing the forthcoming, such that the management of the present, the settling of former debts and/or the basic preservation of bodies (in terms of ‘prophylactic type of strategies’, see Bourdieu 1994, that is essentially strategies of biological reproduction) rule out any other possibility or perspective to anticipate the reorganization of existence in the new village; a place where one thus reaches filled with self-despair, no option, or as Vinayak P. would say, himself the son of a peasant and pushed to the city in search of a job: ‘with a lot of promises on paper’. How to apprehend one’s ‘forth-coming’? About the construction of the indicator ‘social uses of compensation awards’ The question comes back again and again and haunts people: ‘What are we going to do? What should we do?’ Though always sincere, it can also hinder the fact that for most villagers, resettling strategies have already been deployed. It has already been a couple of years since one started a project, bought a land plot in Nagpur or in a neighbouring town, sent his children to school or further higher studies in college to assure of a better future and so forth. In brief, there is much to do to explain and understand the multiple strategies through which displaced people attempt to extract themselves from a negative situation and condition; time has passed and has already put to a rough test most of people’s responses and solutions – which opens a large field of analysis. Certain strategies worked as many families found a way or another to face adversity. In other cases, a family segmentation, a life accident, pre-existing and enduring disputes or the simple lack of

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economic resources have limited all possibility to envisage the future. Time and space become compressed dimensions. How can one therefore collect such an exhaustive source of information? How can it be measured, organized and typified so as to pre-view who is engaged in a trajectory of impoverishment, and who is not? An important semantic precision is here required: the objective is not to assert that because some people did well, they may have profited of (forget benefited from) the project. The Gosi Khurd dam just about ‘fell on [their] heads’8 as much as it did on others. Nobody asked to be displaced and least to have to re-organize one’s own existence. If some people managed to avoid risks of downgrading, this does not have the same meaning as ‘profiting of the project’ – a remark that entails an ethereal rationality in people’s heads. It does not mean people do not mention it in such a way, although the very linguistic structure of their statement is not necessarily active: ‘kisī kā fāydā ho gayā, kisī kā nuksān ho gayā’, as Sharad L., the boy of a Gurao local priest told me. Literally, it means ‘some were advantaged while others faced damages’.9 I have never heard clearly that someone profited off the project configuration, as if rationally calculated (fāydā uthānā, to raise profits). It was always differently put, though people do not pay much attention to it, and consisted in statements resituating each and everyone’s positive outcomes in a chain of objective chances and actions over these chances linked to a particular position in local village space. Such semantic precisions are not vain. Imagining too much that some people profited off a project such as the Gosi Khurd dam, or even more modestly asserting that some people ‘managed well’, one tends to forget that it inversely makes others responsible for their failures, that they must have made a ‘wrong choice’ somewhere along the line. Displacement is not a game, not even a social one. The rhetoric of choice is one of power and status. Government servants from the Rehabilitation Division sometimes criticize displaced people for their ‘bad choices’, and inversely blow out of proportion (and decontextualize) the so-called success stories of others who ideally adapted to their new environments. According to them, it is not only administratively important but subjectively reassuring to know that some people are ‘on the good path of rehabilitation’,10 for they need to feel that it is not their fault if people are impoverished. After all, as a sub-divisional officer once said, ‘we are also human beings’.11 To speak of ‘social uses’ thus has a very specific meaning. These uses are of course mere spending choices, varying forms of economic investments enabled by the received awards. Yet such an expression aims at resituating the social frames in which these choices are inscribed and the system of constraints – of a social, cultural, or economic type – to which they are subjected. Such an indicator became theoretically very heuristic

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to explain displacement and resettlement social facts, for it allowed to differentiate depeasantization and impoverishment risks among social groups by focusing on their various strategies to cope with uncertainty and a future ruthlessly shrunk to few options. It could easily be put to further test cutting across regions and types of displacement in India. Any ‘displacement project’ generating large-scale dispossession implies a Herculean task of data production, most of it being relatively accessible and reliable, for it is linked to people’s very resources and does often get contested. Cross-tabulating such data with personally collected fieldwork data on a household basis could help nuance or demonstrate more rigorously the type of discourse that is understandably propagated around in activist-oriented studies (‘everyone becomes poorer’), or just whispered in certain policy circles (‘displaced people face difficulties’). The first perspective is often sociologically poor, for it spares itself the analytical effort to indulge into the complexity of ‘social reality’ and accommodates itself with great difficulty to dissonant narratives deviating from their catastrophist worldview. The second perspective is both sociologically poor and politically wrong, for it deduces its results from theoretically biased angles (usually rational action theory or neo-institutionalist models in policy analysis) according to which the consciousness of political actors and affected people will necessarily meet and overlap one day if a project is well explained, guaranteeing Pareto optimality. It presupposes at best that if a mistake happens, certain aspects of public policies need to be adjusted; at worst, it rejects people’s criticisms and narratives for they are supposed to be entwined in illiteracy, superstition – in other words, ‘bad faith’. Social uses of compensation The social uses of compensation awards engaged by the displaced can be presented in a few different ways. They can for instance be divided, in a dichotomous manner, between productive and unproductive uses of the received sums. Such an economicist vision has a merit: it confronts the GoM to its responsibilities and tragically reveals the structural incapacity of the majority of households to reconstruct their future thanks to compensation, the latter being practically the only paradigm for economic reconstruction offered by the GoM. However, such a synthetic construction, if intelligible (and ideological), does not help resituating the range of strategies deployed by the majority of households. I have therefore constructed a descriptive and synthetic index illustrating the wide range of strategies of the displaced. It comprises twenty modalities of utilization that I have recoded into six categories of social uses.12 Table 5.9 summarizes and resituates

Dhiwar Navhi Gond Dhobi Lohar Gowari

Mahar

Kunbi Sonar Lodhi Sutar Mali Gurao

Teli

Count Expected count % row Count Expected count % row Count Expected count % row Count Expected count % row Count Expected count % row

12 13.6 15.6% 15 11 24.2% 5 7.4 11.9% 9 9 17.6% 41 41 17.7%

Agr. uses 8 7.6 10.4% 7 6.1 11.3% 2 4.2 4.8% 6 5.1 11.8% 23 23 9.9%

Econ. uses

Types of social uses

*** means α = 0.01 ; ** means α = 0.05 ; * means α = 0.1

Source: Fieldwork, Nagpur District, 2004–2012.

Total

Castes

N = 232

Table 5.9 Castes’ groups and social uses of compensation awards***

3 6 3.9% 4 4.8 6.5% 9 3.3 21.4% 2 4 3.9% 18 18 7.8%

Mob. uses 44 45.5 57.1% 33 36.6 53.2% 26 24.8 61.9% 34 30.1 66.7% 137 137 59.1%

Min. uses 3 2 3.9% 3 1.6 4.8% 0 1.1 0% 0 1.3 0% 6 6 2.6%

Agr. econ. uses 7 2.3 9.1% 0 1.9 0% 0 1.3 0% 0 1.5 0% 7 7 3%

Agr. mob. econ. uses 77 77 100% 62 62 100% 42 42 100% 51 51 100% 232 232 100%

Total

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the distribution of choices on one’s social forth-coming. It shows a non-chaotic dispersion of resettlement choices. It particularly shows the maladjustment of approximately 60 per cent of all households. This figure corresponds to minimalistic social uses that are investments that presently do not and cannot secure any future type of economic activity in the transition to the new village. It is here that emerges clearly the formation of a pauperized community of fate cutting across all social groups. If other indicators of a pre-existing poor condition are cross-tabulated with this variable, the intensity of impoverishment risks increases: 70 per cent of households owning a Below Poverty Line card used their awards for minimalistic uses and 75 per cent in the case of landless families. Among the 137 households illustrating minimalistic uses, only 25 (18 per cent) still own a small amount of land (less than 1 ha on average). This group appeared to be homogenous but could still be decomposed in two sub-groups. There were, on the one hand, 51 households (37 per cent) who had not yet invested their sums in their new construction in Nayā Ambhora, and 86 households (63 per cent) who had already started if not completed their new house. The first sub-group is therefore the last one to leave the old village. They are generally living on a day-to-day basis, hoping to gain time if not a re-evaluation of their condition by the state authorities before relocating (a hope which incidentally materialized following the numerous political struggles around the processes of resettlement). The second sub-group had decided to save part of the awards and add them to the state ex gratia payments that were made in order to quickly reconstruct a modest brick house. In both cases, sometimes for different reasons, these households used to have agricultural and/or domestic debts that they decided to erase, at least partially. Unfortunately, the new construction often implied to contract new debts in order to cope with the urgency and increase of material costs. Resettling strategies cannot be analyzed separately. Their efficiency comes from being combined. Agricultural uses typically include buying new land, erasing agricultural debts and buying new equipment. Most households lose a big share of their landholdings, if not everything. Considering that whatever land is left will now be insufficient to make ends meet (‘gujārā kaise ho jāegā?’ means ‘how to survive?’), displacement pushes some peasants to become more productive if they wish to prolong their own agricultural condition. A chain reaction is thus triggered on peasant economic thought leading to a durable need to reinforce calculating dispositions. Until now, land, if pivotal for income, was also if not primarily a source of prestige and political power in rural social space. From now on, land intervals are reduced. It will be

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necessary to do with much less while valuing it much more to keep one’s rank or to yield any profit out of it, if such an eventuality still exists. Resistance to depeasantization is strong among the traditional peasant castes that have either lost or not known any other socio-professional specialization. Inversely, service castes are totally absent from any reinvestment in agriculture. Not a single household from the various service castes has for instance bought any new land. Fifteen per cent of households among Teli, Kunbi, Dhiwar, Lodhi and Mali have bought new land, 11 out of 40 households among Kunbi, and all three Mali households. Only Teli and Kunbi households have thereafter bought agricultural equipment or started a new agricultural activity (in which I include failed attempts, such as in milk farming), which is an indirect indicator of productive investments thresholds. Fifteen per cent and 22 per cent of their households reveal such a range of choices: investment in a tractor, irrigation equipment, digging a new bore well on a new land piece or buying six buffaloes, eight milking cows and so forth. The Mahar themselves are concerned by this will to continue in agriculture. As a matter of fact, numerically important castes are not fully depeasanted. Most Dhiwar were originally landless and very few bought new land; and the ones who did already owned a little before. In the case of Mahar, it is the same but for the fact that they are more inclined to migrate in cities, especially in Nagpur. Out of nine households that bought a residential plot in a city, four are Teli and five are Mahar. Of these nine households, however, not a single one has accepted to give up the new village plot in Nayā Ambhora, which is revealing. Buying a plot in a city is lived as a protection against future hardships. Such a choice is often backed by a generational transition witnessing sons and daughters moving to study in urban areas. Among Teli, their children often already work in towns or cities. By building a house in the city, the head of a family can both accommodate his children’s present as well as his own future, if necessary. In the case of Mahar, uncertainty is stronger. To drive an auto-rickshaw, to open a mechanic shop or to work as a tile labourer in pre-existing circles of sociability is the only known horizon so far. The aching body and the constrained voice: peasant narratives of resignation and indignation I have described and explained what composes the structure of displacement in terms of depeasantization, resettlement inequalities and impoverishment risks. Such a task appears to be important insofar as few works seem to address this issue in a statistically demonstrable manner. Yet, it can also be quite a disembodied task. A quantitative

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perspective, though necessary, strongly overshadows the dramatic dimension of displacement which produces despair, uncertainty and resignation as well as the revolt of each and every one, may it be in a silent form invisible or inaudible to most. Such a perspective on the social suffering of the displaced is important, for it thickens the description of displacement’s effects. A quantitative analysis of displacement cannot relegate in the middle distance the lived experience of oustees and the signification they themselves attribute to their situation. Consequently, I am here preoccupied in resituating two specific village accounts on displacement: the narrative of a peasant man and of a woman agricultural labourer. These are narratives of both resignation and indignation; two sides of the same coin in which displacement appears for what it is: a fabric of uncertainty. Maniram Laxman Narvare is a 70-year-old peasant of the Lodhi caste from the village of Maloda. He used to own 7 acres of land. Although he could cultivate it until recently, his land is now entirely submerged. As he reminds: Farming was our vocation. Our boys and women were hardy people. They themselves worked and if needed they used to employ people. They had farm lands of 10, 20, 25, 30 acres. [. . .] As far as I remember, no one had been an officer [a government servant] out of our Lodhi community.13 Lodhi people have always been (as much as people remember) a rather well-off land-owning caste. They originally came from Madhya Pradesh. In terms of caste hierarchy in Vidarbha, they were among those considered just below the Brahmins and would themselves not accept water from the Teli or Kunbi who are today the dominant groups in this area. Although Maniram is not educated (he had wanted to become a policeman, but his parents refused so that he would till the family land), he pushed his sons to go to school: By putting in hard labour, I educated my son up to matriculation. Now we are forced to become labourers in the forest.14 You understand? Now the house has gone and farming land has also gone. Such an association in his discourse between education and displacement is not a coincidence. By losing their usual life support, there is little left for Maniram and his kin to earn a living, despite their strong attachment to agriculture. Education thereby tends to appear as a potential salvation from the grip of misery.

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If I had to tell what farming is to me, it is life. The farm is companion of life. The farm helps us living our life. Your duty is your life support. For us farming is our life support. I have become old. If I cannot work, I will give it [on contract] to you for one or two thousand or may be for 10 bags of grain. Farming will stop, and other options will have to be envisaged, but what options? ‘What profession? Now I am tired’. Moreover, Maniram did not yet receive his land award, due to his sisters’ disputes in the family about the sharing of the amount. Just like many other families, land acquisition and its subsequent compensation has aroused many a dispute, only lengthening the process. ‘Money is rotting in the District office’. If Maniram often highlights a relation between being educated and having a job, it is not to complain about his sons not having one, it is to signify a sense of dispossession towards life at large and to decry an injustice that needs to be redressed. He feels he has been fooled but in a tragic way. ‘I would like to say in your camera that we should get the land. We should get land for land and my son should get a job’. He cannot recall when things have been planned by the government, insisting he is illiterate: I am an illiterate person so I cannot tell when the work for the dam began; various officers were coming for making enquiries. How big is the house, how many divisions, how many doors, how many windows, how many feet etc., all this was measured. But I do not remember that they started measuring from a particular date. This full census was done. You find these papers in the office of Rehabilitation. We are not the people who maintain the papers; they asked us how many people are there? How many educated? How many uneducated? They recorded all the details. It is not that Maniram does not understand. Most often he knows that whatever he understands simply does not matter. His old age, according to him, also prevents him from taking part in the social movement. I did go in the demonstration. Thousands of people are needed for the demonstrations, but old persons like me are not required. I did go in the Gosi Khurd demonstration. Women were moving about with flags in their hand. I had been to the demonstrations but with so many people there you feel lost. Whatever you understand you speak. To experience what is demonstration like; you go there and stand with crowd. The people like us feel lost there. So many people. You tell me, can we speak when two or ten persons have

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Throughout, a sense of fatigue and self-despair prevails over his will to fight against the injustice he feels he has suffered. ‘They made us dance. [. . .] Yes. Nothing is remaining. Not even a piece of land for urinating. Don’t laugh’. But Maniram’s sense of exhaustion is before anything else, again, a sense of deprivation imposed from outside. He has always considered himself a ‘guardian’ (pālak) of the country, being a peasant and feeding the population. How could this guardian be now left to fend for himself, if not rot? An utter sense of frustration surfaces in his words, Maniram has to remind us many times to not laugh, the matter is too serious (although, but it is not a paradox, he himself often laughs about the situation in the interview). His frustration can suddenly turn to anger, carried as he can be by sharp village insults or expressions dialectal Marathi finds for him. One striking aspect of these talks held with Maniram was to do with the self-perception of his image, more fundamentally of his body and the fate he would prefer for it today, that is his own death, aware of his ‘free fall in senselessness’ (Das, Kleinman, and Lock 1997). The condition of the cultivator is such that he cannot afford a sari for his wife. We do not even have a comb to dress our hair. The whole body is stinking. [. . .] I am moving like a lame man. [. . .] Tell me, why should I live anymore? [. . .] How should we live? Then why should we not drink 50gms liquor? [. . .] In pint of country liquor take some poison. Bhimrao Ambedkar is not worried. Please tell me if these things are false. But you can talk about it because you will be listened to. You must ask this big question. [. . .] The bastards will raze the house down by the bulldozer, anyway. [. . .] The fellow who dies will die and who lives will live. This is how it transpired. Now that I have survived, I will go to the bank of the river. Why not?

Muktabai Rangari is a daily wage labourer of the Mahar caste from the village of Gadpayly. She is Buddhist just like most of her fellow caste members in Maharashtra and a staunch follower of the ideas of Bhimrao Ambedkar. When her husband died, she decided to give away her ten acres of land on lease as she could not handle it alone. But in her near future too, everything will drown and she will be left high and dry. ‘We left our village and came here, in the rebalitation . . .

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rehabel . . . [Everyone laughs], like night, like Nandya.15 I don’t know how to say this word [rehabilitation]’. That day, during the interview, we were seven people sitting on the porch of her new house under construction. As Muktabai remarked, only plastering work was left but she had run out of money to get the work done. As for most interviews, in spite of the gravity of the subject, the atmosphere remained startlingly light and punctuated with humour. Now that we came here leaving our village. Our land is gone, isn’t it? Is there anything left? We built our house, it is ready but there is no work. That’s why then we want a pension from the government! The talk that followed was amusing, if I may say, as we ended up negotiating how much such a pension should be. When asked, Muktabai first hesitated then replied bluntly ‘10,000 rupees a month’ after getting the answer whispered by Rangalal, a fellow drunk peasant sitting beside us. She knows that amount did not sound reasonable; her point was only to raise the question of such a need for the older people no longer able to work in the fields. Muktabai fundamentally feels as dispossessed as Maniram does towards the whole process of resettlement and rehabilitation. Somehow, she even goes to the extent of asserting she does not understand what is going on. ‘Don’t say what I’m saying, you tell me how to say anyway, I don’t understand anything bapa!’ To Maniram as well as Muktabai, their avowal of not understanding, due to not being educated (Muktabai says she is uneducated in quite a funny manner, today prevalent in villages ever since mobile telephones became common: ‘I’m myself so much out of coverage area’, referring to the automated message one hears when a person is not receiving signal), is not what matters the most. What matters are to them their situations and how much they feel like people uncared for (lavarish lok). ‘They threw us here. [. . .] But for us, now that we are here, are we to die hungry or what?’ If Muktabai is angry, she is nonetheless also resigned to this reality to the extent of saying that they are now ready to do anything to be able to survive. As employment options are shrinking, displacement shapes a feeling close to submissiveness among people. Competition for daily wage labour will rise, which by extension will imply again more power resting with the landlords who need agricultural labourers. Such a regressive trend is however not just feared by labourers, as many present landlords are also going to be downgraded to a similar fate. ‘Give us any work, we’ll clear tiles. We’ll sweep, we want such kind of work’. Muktabai will definitely struggle ahead, why then should she not demand ambitious programs from

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the government, particularly for her sons? ‘My demand is to open a mill, do whatever service, a steel company bapa, listen something like incense sticks, candles, this and that, anything!’ Muktabai’s situation is as unfortunate, though differently, as Maniram’s. Her house has not been declared illegible for compensation. She is one among too many whose old village house has not been compensated for it supposedly falls outside of village area, in spite of having been registered in the village council (gram panchayat) and having paid house taxes all these years. ‘Yes. By binoculars. “Your house did not come in our binoculars. That means your house falls in jungle area” they said’. Endowed with scientific rigour in measuring thanks to engineering instruments (a basic tachometer), the state yet failed to realize it is measuring not an inert territory, but village lands that have expanded since decades and whose expansion (due to family cycles of expansion and segmentation) has not been registered properly at the local level, ultimately depriving more than a thousand project affected families of their house awards. Project affected families eventually become labelled as encroachers. If most of them were regularized thanks to the struggles of the social movement, Muktabai’s house award still remains to be granted, if ever it will be so. Although Muktabai faces such hardships, she is ready to work and continue her life with hardly any demands. She would have wanted to get some land like most people. The problem lies with the new generation according to her. Now which work should we give them? Farming doesn’t suit them. Why do they need to sit on chairs like this? That’s the impression I have. What I mean to say is that we will need resources in the future. Today is ok. Today we are used to doing this work; we can do anything, even work in the sun. Now they can’t even cut a stick. ‘Hey Bapu go and cut this stick’ still he won’t do it. Will they even lead a life in the future? Will they be able to? Now you tell me what can be done for them? How will they fill their tummies? They won’t be able to. As many villagers indeed say: ‘There will be mice in the houses and mice in the stomach’, verbalizing their fear of food insecurity.

Conclusion If forced displacement is not the primary cause for depeasantization, it acts as an occasional factor that accelerates its historical process. More dramatically, it is an efficient cause for the total rupture of village life

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and of its correlative organization insofar as it abounds with specific forms of socialization and solidarities, including traditional ones. If relocating, shifting or moving consists in an ‘effect of capital’ (Borja, Courty, and Ramadier 2012), certain movements tighten possibilities and the very structure of inequalities by precipitating processes of impoverishment. By disarticulating the temporal and spatial frames that shape the foundations of social existence (Bourdieu and Sayad 1964, 21), displacement did not so much generate these inequalities but shed light on their determining factors such as the weight of caste, family structure, and class (understood here loosely as a social position) in their production and reproduction. Forced displacement thus constitutes a quasi-archetypical analyzer of the (re)production of inequalities and – as a war or a revolution, an extraordinary social event – manifests the ways by which are activated and reactivated the dispositions that supports them. The ‘order of displacement’ requires resituating the structure of a village as a ‘peasant world’ to review the possibilities that are contained in its inhabitants, according to their various sites of origin, and understanding how people readjust to its implacable realities. Such adjustments intersect hierarchies of both caste and class which coordinate not only the places occupied but the places that are possible to occupy in the Indian society, structured throughout by this double logic of classification. If displacement produces a wide community of fate, entailing a global downward movement for practically everyone, it is because it re-inscribes inequalities of conditions of social existence (rural versus urban, primary sector versus other sectors, etc.). Everything happens as if the initial structure of positions not only tends to reproduce itself but also accentuates the pre-existing differential both materially and symbolically. The community of fate holds on to each and everyone’s destiny but eventually vanishes behind the reality of a spatial transposition that produces a heterogeneous class of survivors; the initial community of fate experienced in dispossession thus finds in the historically accumulated family resources situated in the former village its own limits, commensurate with the unequal dispositions to put up with displacement’s costs. While fishermen, of a relatively dominated background, find a way to reinvest their earnings in the construction of a new house, agrarian castes themselves find in compensation awards a way to buy their situation back in the new village. In all situations, to deprive someone of land is forcing the reconfiguration of relations in new spaces deprived of their anterior frames. To push to resettlement thus requires dispositions to dispose of new sites so as to re-engender new bonds on the basis of pre-existing relations

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that formerly constituted the community. A village space wherein relations existed under certain set of constraints (formal and informal) is now substituted for an individualization of resources and family structures transposed in a new space administratively circumscribed. When some large peasant families managed to complete their impressive new house, some agricultural labourers only ‘manage’ inhabiting the tin shed boxes anticipated for the poorest in case of an emergency eviction from the old villages. Beyond the dimension of compensations, displacement thus has a cost much higher than what appears in monetary terms. The configuration of displacement sheds light on a double system of inequalities intersecting castes and classes: the ones less favourably situated in this double-entry structure are the least disposed to resituate themselves, while others work out their options to try to maintain themselves and not be downgraded. It would ideally be necessary to prolong, on the basis of a cartographic analysis reserved for further work, the analysis of the entanglements of caste effects and ‘site effects’ with regard to the spatial meaning of the new village for most displaced people. Whereas caste was inscribed in physical space, new villages now display a ‘soilless’ social morphology wherein caste no longer has any official recognition. Now scattered over a new rectilinear space that does not have the identical meaning for everyone, new village is function of a spatial quartering of forms of social bonds. It is early to establish a hypothesis on the evolution of social bonds in the new village, although neighbouring ties (in an urban sense) will now be most likely at the centre of attention. According to Bourdieu and Sayad, ‘the transformation of the morphological substrate and more precisely the increase of the volume of a group create a quasi-urban situation affecting the meaning of all behaviours’ (Bourdieu and Sayad 1964, 141). It is thus not so surprising to collect such a common statement about the fact that one ‘feels as in a city’ in the new village, however deprived they are now of the former social frames that ruled village and peasant existence. Because it is a form of disaggregation and socially organized annihilation, displacement appears as a ‘borderline’ form of mobility requiring all the intelligence of villagers’ logics of practice to escape an already announced horizon of impoverishment. If the evolution of the fate of these villages appears to be akin to a global rupture in existence, demanding active responses from all social groups, such a crisis will not modify radically the structure of social positions although certain people, even among affluent peasant families, clearly express a fear of being downgraded. This is because ‘any breach of social equilibrium, [in spite of not modifying radically the structure of positions, and even

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if not sudden in its temporality], takes time to produce all its consequences’ (Durkheim 2010, 10). So considered, even the inheritor of the pāṭīl position in the village one day expressed such angst: What are we going to do if we are left with not even a piece of land? We! We can’t become labourers! We’ve always been what we are [pāṭīl], we can’t start working as labourers. With this dam, even the powerful are getting small. Even the powerful will end up labourers. A sociology of ‘development’ and its effects cannot therefore be achieved without seriously considering the loud injunction calling for the improvement of the ‘common good’, such a call to order dividing social space between the developed and the displaced, urban and rural folks, people of castes and tribal groups. The present paradigm, and the way it unravels in India or elsewhere, strongly suggests that development and displacement (beyond its mere physical aspects) are not only correlated but consubstantial. It reveals that there cannot be any development, in its present dominant formulation, without a massive production of geographic forced migration, often synonymous with a form of descending social mobility for the concerned social groups. Anthropology and sociology of contemporary development issues therefore ought to re-invigorate their focus on the production and reproduction of inequalities and pauperization in so-called development projects to understand its processes better, for lack of being able to prevent them.

Notes 1 ‘L’à venir imminent est présent, immédiatement visible, comme une propriété présente des choses, au point d’exclure la possibilité qu’il n’advienne pas – possibilité qui existe théoriquement aussi longtemps qu’il n’est pas advenu’ (Bourdieu 2000, 210). 2 I refer the reader to the PhD thesis from which this piece originates for more information regarding the question of statistical recoding. See Cabalion (2013). 3 Although one of the four villages is still inhabited at the time of writing this document, three of them (including the biggest) are already displaced and relocated, even if there has not yet been any submergence. Shifting to the new site has spread over a period of five years, from 2008 to 2013, and is still underway for a couple of families, sometimes defiant or more commonly incapable of reconstructing on time. 4 Generally, according to government servants in charge of the project, villagers embody immobility. This aspect is understood through interviews

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Joël Cabalion with government agents for whom land awards shall encourage people to resettle faster rather than helping them to rehabilitate their economic condition. Villagers are so ‘immobile’ that the government designed ex gratia payments to accelerate their resettlement (Rs 10,000 per household). Such payments can be understood as forming a dialectic of negotiation and injunction. The villagers most disposed to avail such grants organize themselves to resettle faster and liberate the payment, while for others the sum is most often too insignificant to propel their shifting, if they can at all avail the sum before police-forced resettlement at the fateful moment of submergence. This descending order of castes in the land structure can be traced even in the rapidity of ‘land occupancy’ in the new village. However, and this is remarkable, the cross-tabulation of the variables ‘total awards’ and ‘construction of the new house’ is not significant (analysis of variance test), which tends to confirm that the rapidity of the departure to the new village depends more upon caste origin and a certain ethos associated to it rather than a varying sum compensation. In September 2009, while only the village of Ambhora Devasthan had been forcibly evicted of its previous homesteads to enable the elevation of an access road to a prestigious regional temple besides it (I therefore exclude the village from this analysis), it has been possible for me to confirm who had already ‘voluntarily’ built their new house and decided to shift (if the household had not already shifted) among the other three villages in the sample. Such an analysis enabled reintroducing the temporal dimension of relocation at a crucial moment when governmental threats of forcible eviction began to be increasingly perceptible. Out of 200 households, 41 per cent had already built their new house or were building it. Out of this figure, Teli households represented more than 53 per cent at that stage, the Kunbi group 40 per cent, Mahar 27 per cent and the Dhiwar group 28.5 per cent. Interview with Vinod C. and Pankaj M., Ambhora Khurd, April 2010. See Cernea and Mathur (2008, 5). Interview with Jagdish G., Nayā Navegaon-Sirsi, April 2011. Interview with Lasne S. and Padole S., Naya Ambhora, April 2011. Discussion with Sanjoy M., former collector of Nagpur District, October 2006. Interview with Ajay W., Weltur, January 2011. The twenty modalities are as follows: (1) Has used all or part of the award to start the new house construction; (2) Bought new agricultural land; (3) Bought new agricultural equipment; (4) Erased agricultural debts; (5) Domestic expenses (health, food, clothing, basic education); (6) Erased domestic debts; (7) Wedding(s); (8) Educational costs (class 10 onwards if outside of village); (9) ITI training; (10) Bought a bike; (11) Bought a car; (12) Alcohol; (13) LIC policy; (14) New economic activity nonagricultural (tea stall, panthelā, etc.); (15) New agricultural activity (e.g. milk farm); (16) Bank deposit; (17) Bought a residential plot in a city (Nagpur, Bhandara, Mandhal, Kuhi); (18) Ordinary production and agricultural costs; (19) Gaming/betting; (20) Other(s). All the following interview excerpts originate in two interviews done with Maniram Narvare and one interview with Muktabai Rangari in April 2011, Maloda (old village) and Nayā Ambhora (new village).

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14 The expression of ‘forest labourers’ (van-majoori) is a highly revealing sociolinguistic reality. The Hindi-Marathi word for labourer literally translates as ‘forest worker’ in Vidarbha, where the reality of forest-based livelihoods is far more important than in other regions of Maharashtra. Such a work is negatively connoted among higher castes, as these labouring activities are usually assimilated to the tribal groups in the region, or to landless castes. Similarly, it also connotes how one is left high and dry, and would have to go fetch food in the jungle to survive. 15 By referring to the night and to the god Nandya, the bull, Muktabai implies that anything can be said or done at night. Her reference to Nandya comes as an ironic Buddhist joke towards Hinduism, implying that Nandya is one of these good-for-nothing gods.

References Borja, Simon, Guillaume Courty, and Thierry Ramadier. 2012. ‘La Mobilité Comme Capital? Doutes et Interrogation’. Forum Vies Mobiles. http:// fr.forumviesmobiles.org/controverse/2012/12/11/mobilite-comme-capital-488. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. ‘Stratégies de Reproduction et Modes de Domination’. Actes de La Recherche En Sciences Sociales 105 (1): 3–12. ———. 2000. Pascalian Meditations. Translated by Richard Nice. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre, and Abdelmalek Sayad. 1964. Le Déracinement. La Crise de L’économie Traditionnelle En Algérie. Sens Commun. Paris: Éditions de Minuit. Cabalion, Joël. 2013. Des Existences Paysannes Au Fil de L’eau : Le Grand Barrage Gosikhurd et Les Déplacements de Population Au Vidarbha, Inde Centrale. Paris: EHESS. Cernea, M. M., and H. M. Mathur. 2008. Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chakravorty, Sanjoy. 2013. The Price of Land: Acquisition, Conflict, Consequence. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Das, Veena, Arthur Kleinman, and Margaret Lock. 1997. Social Suffering. Berkeley: University of California Press. Durkheim, Emile. 2010. Suicide. Translated by J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson. New York: Free Press. Fernandes, Walter, and Gita Bharali. 2011. Uprooted for Whose Benefit? Development-Induced Displacement in Assam, 1947–2000. Guwahati: North Eastern Social Research Centre. Lardinois, Roland. 1977. ‘Structures Familiales et Cycles Familiaux Dans Un Village d’Inde Du Sud (Andhra Pradesh)’. In Cahiers O.R.S.T.O.M.: Série Sciences Humaines, edited by O.R.S.T.O.M. Paris: O.R.S.T.O.M. ———. 1985. ‘Peut-on Classer La Famille Hindoue?’ Actes de La Recherche En Sciences Sociales 57 (57–58): 29–46.

6

Urban development, smart cities and displacement Tanusree Dutta and R. B. Bhagat

India has witnessed a rapid growth in urbanization since independence, and today approximately 31 per cent of the country’s population lives in cities and towns. The urban sector is the major contributor to the country’s GDP. However, developing countries like India face many challenges regarding urbanization and urban development. In this situation, the role of governance is very important to achieve an all-inclusive and sustainable form of urban development. This chapter attempts to look at the urban development scenario of India, the recent approach of urban planning in the country in the context of the Smart Cities Mission launched recently by the current government, and to understand the dynamic relationship between urban policy and governance, changing urban neighbourhood spaces and class relationships, with a specific focus on displacement outcomes. One of the most talked about agenda in recent times is the Smart Cities Mission, declared by the prime minister in 2015. The agenda declared the creation of 100 smart cities in India. In the current urban development discourse in developing countries, sustainable cities are the prime agenda. The smart city mission aims to create cities run by information and communications technology (ICT), centres of economic growth, greener and cleaner cities, and of course, ‘slum-free cities’. Although not fully implemented all over India, some initiatives have already been taken in parts of Rajasthan, Gujarat and Kerala. The chapter will give a brief outlook on the smart cities vision and what possible implications it may have on urban development-induced displacement.

Defining development-induced displacement Most of the development activities in the Global South have not just been associated with beneficial activities for all. Urban development, though it comes with the notions of all-inclusiveness, growth and

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improvement of quality of life and welfare of the public, fails to deliver many of its promises as are stated in the mandates. One such extreme undesirable outcome of urban development in developing countries like India is displacement. Displacement can be of many types depending on the causes, but in this chapter we are dealing with only development-induced displacement in urban areas. In general terms, displacement was defined by Grier and Grier (1978: 8) as: Displacement occurs when a household is forced to move from its residence by conditions which affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings and which, 1 2 3

Are beyond the households’ immediate ability to control or prevent; Occur despite the households having met all previously imposed controls on occupancy; and Make continued occupancy by that household impossible, unaffordable or hazardous.

Displacement is not a new phenomenon in India. For hundreds of years, people have been displaced from their lands under the colonial rulers and the legacy is still continuing. Poor farmers, landless people, tribals or adivasis, people living at the margins, have been evicted from their own soil time and again. Thus, displacement in India has a historical root. After achieving independence, India resorted to such a developmental strategy that it made her dependent on imperialist capital and helped to retain the colonial legacy. In the early 1990s, India’s shift to neoliberal policies actually helped intensify the development-induced displacements further. Not only in rural areas, land in urban areas is also being grabbed under the disguise of ‘public interest’ and people are often forcefully evicted from their houses. Thus, it is important to understand how right to the city is controlled by the state and private investors, and how human rights get violated in the midst of all these processes. In recent years, urbanization and urban restructuring are the most dominant cause of development-induced displacement in urban areas. The areas that lead to this kind of displacement are (a) expansion of urban areas into new territories, (b) restructuring of existing units including the demolition of poverty districts, (c) water-supply projects, (d) public transport projects, especially underground and flyover construction, (e) mass population redistribution schemes within urban

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space, and (f) reconstruction of housing units, usually as an aftermath of war (Terminski 2013). In India, however, (b), (d) and (e) are the most dominant causes of development-induced displacements in urban areas.

Urban development approach in India in recent times The urban development strategy in India in recent times is increasingly relying on planning based approaches. The current urban planning regime in India is rooted in the Town and Country Planning Act of the UK of 1947, and is primarily focused on detailed land use zoning (Ahluwalia 2009). Since the post-independence period the Government of India has been launching several schemes and projects to develop and integrate urban areas in the country. These various schemes, each addressed towards the development of a specific sector, was succeeded by a larger umbrella mission in the liberalization era. One major stride taken towards integrated urban planning in India is the launching of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) in 2005, which aimed to renew or redevelop cities and their inner regions covering different sectors of the urban infrastructure on a large scale. JNNURM made it mandatory for cities to prepare a City Development Plan (CDP) and make their demands for specific projects against the backdrop of the CDP (Ahluwalia 2009). A review of the reforms proposed under the Mission and other pro-liberalization documents makes it clear that these are designed largely to the benefit of domestic and international investors and elite residents in Indian cities. They will serve to exacerbate the inherent exclusionary and marginalizing tendencies of urban development in India. The current government after coming to power in 2014–2015 has replaced many of these flagship missions and launched several new missions and programmes. These are (1) the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Transformation (AMRUT), (2) Smart Cities Mission (SCM), (3) Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) and (4) Heritage City Development and Augmentation Yojana (HRIDAY). The most discussed and lucrative programme among these is the Smart Cities Mission. It covers most of the agendas talked about under the JNNURM and aims to address urban problems with smart solutions aided by digital technologies. A brief description of the Smart Cities Mission is given below, and its practicality in the Indian context will be discussed in the following sections of the chapter. The world is going through a surge of developing smart, sustainable cities, as urban areas are faced with several issues regarding

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population explosion, inequitable growth and environmental challenges. The concept of the smart city has been introduced to highlight the importance of ICT in the last 20 years (Schaffers 2012). Smart cities basically adopt an urban model that will approach urban problems with smart solutions – or in other words, it implies a city’s ability to respond to its problems as promptly as possible. Over the last couple of decades, the global urban development model has resorted to digital technologies for solving urban issues. A useful definition to start to call a city ‘smart’ is when ‘investments in human and social capital and traditional (transportation) and modern (ICT) infrastructure fuel sustainable economic growth and a high quality of life, with a wise management of natural resources, through participatory government’ (Caragliu 2009: 6).

Smart cities vision in India In India, urban problems are mostly outcomes of failed planning systems. Over the decades, rural-to-urban migration is increasing due to deepening agrarian crisis and ecological problems. India’s urban growth rate indicates that in the near future, to achieve faster economic growth, current urban issues have to be managed carefully and there should be efficient use and allocation of resources. Smart cities are cities where information technology is the prime infrastructure providing essential services to everyone. In smart cities, economic development is considered sustainable because it is based on successful market drivers based on a supply-demand framework. It is assumed they benefit all, including citizens, government, businessmen and the environment. Some of the cities with ongoing or proposed Smart Cities Missions include Kochi in Kerala, Ahmedabad in Gujarat, Aurangabad in Maharashtra, Manesar in Delhi NCR, Khushkera in Rajasthan, Krishnapatnam in Andhra Pradesh, Ponneri in Tamil Nadu and Tumkur in Karnataka. Many of these cities will include special investment regions or special economic zones with modified regulations and tax structures to make it attractive for foreign investments. This is essential because much of the funding for these projects will have to come from private developers and from abroad. Let us take a brief look at the plan proposal of the Smart Cities Mission by the government to have a fuller understanding of the agenda and how things should be approached.

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Box 6.1 Some typical features of comprehensive development of smart cities 1

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Promoting mixed land use in area-based developments – planning for ‘unplanned areas’ containing a range of compatible activities and land uses close to one another in order to make land use more efficient. The states will enable some flexibility in land use and building by-laws to adapt to change. Housing and inclusiveness – expand housing opportunities for all. Creating walkable localities – reduce congestion, air pollution and resource depletion, boost local economy, promote interactions and ensure security. The road network is created or refurbished not only for vehicles and public transport, but also for pedestrians and cyclists, and necessary administrative services are offered within walking or cycling distance. Preserving and developing open spaces – parks, playgrounds, and recreational spaces in order to enhance the quality of life of citizens, reduce the urban heat effects in areas and generally promote eco-balance. Promoting a variety of transport options – Transit Oriented Development (TOD), public transport and last mile paratransport connectivity. Making governance citizen-friendly and cost-effective – increasingly rely on online services to bring about accountability and transparency, especially using mobiles to reduce cost of services and providing services without having to go to municipal offices; form e-groups to listen to people and obtain feedback and use online monitoring of programs and activities with the aid of cyber tour of worksites. Giving an identity to the city – based on its main economic activity, such as local cuisine, health, education, arts and craft, culture, sports goods, furniture, hosiery, textile, dairy, etc. Applying Smart Solutions to infrastructure and services in area-based development in order to make them better. For example, making areas less vulnerable to disasters, using fewer resources, and providing cheaper services.

Source: Smart Cities: Mission Statement and Guidelines, Ministry of Urban Affairs, Government of India, June 2015.

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The smart city would be based on three main strategy of development – retrofitting or city improvement, redevelopment or city renewal, and greenfield development or city expansion. In addition to these, there would be a pan-city approach that would incorporate larger areas into city planning. The retrofitting strategy would rely on existing infrastructure and services in some parts of the city, and city development in those parts would take place by improving the existing infrastructure. On the other hand, redevelopment model talks about replacement of the existing infrastructure for building up a more improved and smart city area. Redevelopment strategies would emphasize on mixed land use zoning. Greenfield development aims to expand the urban territory by incorporating peripheral lands for accommodating excess population and building affordable housing for all. The pan-city approach simply aims at providing citywide infrastructure in terms of public transportation and communication technologies that would reach out to all the citizens. The selection of cities to be transformed into a smart city would be based on an equitable distribution criteria based on the fund allocation criteria of the AMRUT. States and Union Territories (UTs) would compete and present their best eligible cities for the Smart Cities challenge. This Mission would be funded by the central government and also from foreign direct investments. Neoliberalism and urban spatial restructuring Neoliberalism is the most powerful force shaping cities in today’s world. Neoliberalism is an economic philosophy of free market economy led by the capitalist class, but unlike liberalism is supported and promoted by the state. Neoliberalism is the dominant aspect of urban policies and planning across most of the developed as well as developing countries (Peck and Tickell 2002). India also adopted a neoliberal approach in its urban development strategy in the early 1990s. Through neoliberalism, cities are getting disintegrated, reconstructed and restructured, transforming city space, built environment and lives of the poor. Cities are also facing a change in the class structure with a new middle-class population rising and increased pressure to fulfil their demands. Thus, in giving way to the development of the city for the middle and upper classes, the rights of the poor are getting violated. How neoliberalism is shaping and reshaping Indian cities has been researched extensively by academicians, and this issue is more relevant in the context of Smart Cities. Harvey (2003, 2005) stated that the most pressing issue in the urban setting is of ‘Land and Displacement’, and planning is used as a tool

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to alienate people from land and resources in the name of ‘greater public welfare’. In India, until the 1960s and even through the 1970s, the role of the state was that of a welfare authority trying to provide basic needs to the poor. However, with the flow of neoliberal ideas and globalization in the late 1980s and 1990s, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced and the PPP Model (Private-Public-Partnership) came into existence, transferring all land development projects to the Corporates, which became the base of urban planning in India. Looking at the history of evolution of slums, it can be seen that most of them are parallel to the development projects. In the mission of making Indian cities world class, the slums and other informal settlements are being forcefully evicted. The cases of forced slum evictions have been widely stated in the works of Bhan (2009) and DuPont (2008, 2011). The right over land has become the core issue of the political economy in developing countries like India (Harvey 2010; DuPont 2011). Displacement of people on a much larger scale is now a consequence of re-urbanization and modernization of cities. According to Michael M. Cernea (1985: 18), In cities such as Sao Paolo, Lagos, Douala, Rabat, Shanghai, or Mexico City, massive investments in infrastructure for transportation, re-housing, sanitation and other services are needed, and will be increasingly needed, for improving living standards and economic expansion. Such urban investment will inevitably entail further land acquisition and involuntary displacement. Worldwide, re-urbanization and urban restructuring have displaced thousands of people in the form of forced eviction. Historically, urban displacement, whether direct or indirect, has been witnessed in three main cases: (1) state-led urban restructuring and Master Planning, (2) creation of special economic zones (SEZ) and (3) gentrification and neighbourhood restructuring and relocation. The three cases and their impacts on displacement will be discussed separately in the context of the Smart Cities Mission in India.

State-led urban restructuring and Master Planning Urban development in cities of Third World countries have most often emphasized ‘slum-free cities’. The existence of slums is considered as lack of ‘adequate’ progress and development, and slum dwellers persistently reflect backwardness. They need to be removed and spaces should be cleared for development (Batra and Mehra 2008). Thus, the

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‘urban poor’ are looked upon as detrimental to the health of the city. There have been many instances in Indian cities to forcefully evict the urban poor or put up decorative walls to cover up slum or squatter settlements, so as to keep them out of sight. Batra and Mehra (2008) also argue that the current instability is created by a cleaner, greener, consumptive city, technologically driven, cosmopolitan in terms of Western urban forms while also preserving the imperial heritage of the city, providing a consumerist lifestyle. In India, city growth has mostly taken place through informalization. Except a few cities (e.g. Navi Mumbai, Pune, Bangalore, Noida), all city forms may be called the ‘unintended city’. The number of squatters in these cities grew in the Master Planning period, especially in big metropolises like Delhi, which attracted huge numbers of migrants from its neighbouring states due to its growing economy. The government, however, has responded to this uncontrolled growth in slums and squatters through some schemes, which were never properly implemented or funded, and through demolitions. Even the resettlement sites are almost always on the peripheries, in underdeveloped rural-urban fringes which are yet to be developed, industrial areas and wastelands. In the past, several lakhs of people living in squatter settlements in urban Delhi have been evicted. Vast areas of Old Delhi were demolished to allow for better surveillance, new technologies, and a plan for extending ‘modern’ Delhi was made for which land was acquired from many sources in the 1980s (Goodfriend 1989). Consequently, the price of land shot up with its growing political and economic importance, growing state control of the land market including policies to control ‘illegal’ encroachment upon land. The Old City was viewed as slum-congested, dirty, obsolete, non-functioning, with indistinctive land use zones, without any green spaces and culture of evolution. Therefore, state policies were formed to shift out about 45 per cent of its population in order to rebuild and revitalize the older city (Jain 1990). Veronique Dupont (2008, 2011) has worked extensively on slum development in Delhi since the 1990s. She argues that missions of world-class cities and beautification agendas have time and again called for slum and squatter demolitions in the capital city. These actions are implemented and legitimized under the name of ‘larger public interest’. Whenever there is change in land use in urban areas that finds better use, slum demolitions have made a way for such development. Due to widespread demolitions and evictions, the urban poor had found housing in either rental unit of dilapidated katras or in the bastis on the riverbed of the Yamuna River. This was an environmentally hazardous zone since the river bed was flood-prone. No basic amenities or

Persons affected (approx.)

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120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 2001

2002

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Figure 6.1 Year-wise slum evictions in different parts of Kolkata Source: Bose, P. B. 2015. Urban Development in India: Global Indians in the remaking of Kolkata. New York: Routledge.

services were provided to the poor, and they lived in inhuman conditions. Resettlement – or broadly speaking, relocation – actually hampers the social networking of the evicted communities. Resettlement destroys the social bonds and ties developed through kinship migration and years of togetherness in slums. There must be many more cases of evictions and demolitions in the country and undoubtedly it is still continuing. With specific land use planning, urban spaces are being brought under formalization, and therefore it is very likely that the informal spaces would be destroyed and cleared. Creation of special economic zones (SEZ) Special economic zones (SEZ) are defined as ‘a specifically delineated duty-free enclave and shall be deemed to be foreign territory for the purposes of trade operations and duties and tariffs’. SEZs are an acknowledgement of the potential of export-led development strategy in accelerating economic growth. Various newspapers report that there have been hundreds of acres of land grab for creation of special economic zones or SEZ by the government in different states of the country in the vision of implementing the Smart City proposal. In the city of Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, to create an effective environment and policy implementation for the IT hub to flourish, and to facilitate export of communication

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technology, the state had set up the Lucknow SEZ. The state government has made many attempts to set up ideal destinations for the IT sector and has already started the process of creating smart and sustainable cities in the state. The state government has transferred 100 acres of land to the IT department for setting up IT city Lucknow on the Sultanpur Road. Also, about 800 acres of the total land the Haryana government got back from Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited (RHSL) in February 2016 will be developed as a global city, having all the attributes of a smart city as the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) government has envisioned. The first attempt is observed in Kerala, in the city of Kochi, to create an IT special economic zone and develop it into a multipurpose SEZ. The proposed shift to a multipurpose SEZ was to move up the value chain of IT-enabled services. A report of the International Displacement Monitoring Centre published in 2016 states that as part of Kerala’s ongoing drive to attract international and multi-national investors, the peri-urban area of Kakkanad on the outskirts of Kochi was designated an SEZ in 1984, with plans for a medium-scale project to construct an information technology park. The area was designated a ‘smart city’, earmarking it for urban infrastructure development and upgrades. SEZs also benefit from tax exemptions to create a more attractive investment environment. Thus, from the different examples cited it is understood that land is being grabbed for creation of smart cities in some parts of the country. It is being developed into IT-based SEZs or multipurpose SEZs. The smart city proposals are being implemented on the land already acquired under the banner of SEZs. With only 40 per cent of the approved 436 SEZs operational in India, even after ten years of land acquisition, it remains to be seen if the government’s plan of setting up 100 smart cities – both greenfield and brownfield – will also turn into what real estate experts term as another ‘land grabbing real estate venture’. There are, however, substantial differences between the smart cities and the SEZs. The SEZ was originally designed to promote urban industrial growth and to facilitate exports, whereas smart cities are areas where people will live and engage in production through an IT-based service delivery mechanism. The Smart Cities Mission has three specific approaches to developing urban areas – that is redevelopment, retrofitting and greenfield development – while the SEZs had only the greenfield approach.

Gentrification, neighbourhood restructuring and relocation The most recent focus on neighbourhood change is, however, urban revitalization and gentrification. In the Global South, it primarily rests

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Slum dwellings demolished

on few assumptions that there is public reinvestment in areas of disinvested capital, leading to displacement of poor and lands from which low classes are displaced find ‘better public use’ (Ghertner 2015). The process of gentrification has to be dealt with very carefully in the context of developing countries, like India, as the economic, social, demographic and political scenarios differ widely. The current trend in the cities of Global South is the new urbanism or urban modernism, which implies slum-free cities, cleaner and greener spaces, an increased number of gated communities and relying on smart technologies. The situation actually prevailing in most of the cities of the developing world, specifically India, depicts a dual nature. The theorization of gentrification and neighbourhood change cannot be satisfactorily accomplished ignoring the role of the state, who plays an active part, since in the Global South urban development processes are mostly government-driven. The issue of displacement or forced eviction cannot be left out while discussing urban gentrification. Gentrification changes neighbourhood character through housing market, economic status, and demographic changes (Bates 2013). The definition of gentrification itself talks about neighbourhood change. Thus gentrification attempts to understand the dynamics of neighbourhood change and

1,20,000 1,00,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 1994

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Figure 6.2 Year-wise slum demolitions in Mumbai Sources: 1994–98 Data – Khapre-Upadhyay, Prasanna ‘BMC to involve residents in fighting encroachments’, Indian Express, 20 February 1999; 2004–05 Data – Field Survey conducted by Narayanan, Mahadevia and Mathews (June–December 2005).

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how it leads to the ultimate exclusionary phenomena of displacement. Deb (2006: 347) stated that presently cities in India are growing according to the logic of capitalist mode of accumulation of surplus. A design intervention in urban areas that is primarily focussed on expanding the urban public sphere accelerates processes of gentrification, displacement and exclusion at the neighbourhood and urban scales. The urban land use is therefore primarily structured by a rent maximizing land market and the geographical pattern that develops is of a dense commercial core, a tendency for ever widening peripheral scattering of industries and the appearance of socially segregated residential neighbourhoods.

Implications on low-income residents The rise in informal settlements in the country raise concerns about the rights of poor in the city, the inclusive approach of the urban policies, and the role of the state in addressing the challenges faced by the poor. Keeping in mind all these issues, the present study is an important one to understand the urban development scenario of cities in developing countries like India and socio-spatial exclusion of the poor. The areas of forced eviction are mostly along the central business districts (CBDs) and fringes of the municipal boundary. Earlier instances of development-induced displacement point out that there is an emerging conflict between the development authority and its activities and the urban poor, who live at the margins. Questions also rise about the quality of life of the displaced persons, the various issues they face in daily life. It also questions the compensation measures provided to the ‘victims of development’ by the government, and whether those compensations are adequate or not. Thus, it also attempts to throw some light on the rehabilitation schemes and issues. The incoming migrants are responsible for raising the share of informal settlements in the city, due to unaffordable housing. Squatters and pavement dwellers are also on the rise along with a rising slum population. All these facts raise concern about the rights of poor in the city, the inclusive approach of the urban policies, and the role of the state in addressing the challenges faced by the poor. Keeping in mind all these issues, the present study is an important one to understand the urban development scenario of metropolitan cities in developing countries like India and socio-spatial exclusion of the poor.

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Challenges in the way of smart city development The Smart Cities Mission of the current government faces several challenges in the way of its full implementation. The Smart Cities Mission is just another large-scale mission by the government to bring all concerned urban issues under the formal structure of the planning system, just like earlier missions such as the JNNURM. The Smart Cities Mission is in fact an all-encompassing approach regarding all the major urban issues. It is conceived as a form of sustainable city development. However, such an ambitious project should be critically analyzed to judge its merits and demerits and how far it is applicable to the urban scenario of India. In an article published in The Hindu in 2015, T. Ramachandran said that ambitious benchmarks were set for the smart cities that the government has envisioned. He questions the extent of successful implementation of the Smart Cities Mission in India, given the track record of urban development and planning. He also said that the monetary costs associated with such a development agenda are going to be huge. A significant number of small and medium towns would be left out of this planning agenda, in the criteria designed to select cities for the Smart Cities Mission. Although nothing can be said before the mission is properly implemented and its effects are witnessed, let us point out some of the possible merits and demerits regarding smart cities in India. Among the possible merits are the following: 1 2 3

4 5

Smart cities would be economically, socially and ecologically sustainable cities. They would make it possible to create special economic zones within the urban areas for driving economic growth. It is believed by the propounders of the smart city concept that there will be a ripple effect of demand, and this would incorporate all the labour force productively. Smart cities would attract foreign direct investment and would bring more economic prosperity to our country. It would be an all-inclusive form of urban development, where the problems of the poor and marginalized would be effectively solved by applying smart technologies.

The list of demerits is, however, a little longer, and most of them emerge from criticisms of the conceived merits stated above: 1

Smart cities promise to be ecologically sustainable cities – but, why ignore that in the agricultural sector of a vast country like India,

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where about half of the workforce is employed in the agricultural sector, a sustainable and equitable form of development can be achieved? Moreover, the greenfield development strategy of the Smart Cities Mission implies incorporation of open spaces along the city peripheries. But in many of the Indian cities, expansion is limited by environmentally hazardous zones. Will building beyond the environmental limits guarantee ecological sustainability? Also, why should there be peripheralization or suburbanization of the poor? Because smart cities will increase the number of gated communities, won’t there be enough social polarization in order to affect the social and communal harmony of the city? It is believed by many neoliberal economists that foreign direct investments are good for the health of urban economics. But, in developing countries like India, would not it pave the way for neocolonialism to anchor its roots in the country? Is it not a geopolitical strategy of new imperialism by the developed nations? Neoliberalism is imposed globally by developed nations through various international agencies like the World Trade Organization (WTO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and so forth, so that market forces get institutionalized and commodification of public assets take place in Third World countries. In the process of formalizing each and every sphere of the urban life, many things get sidelined. Smart cities are actually nothing but modern urban centres of the twenty-first century. The most obvious problem with urban modernism is that it fails to accommodate the way of life of the majority of inhabitants in rapidly growing and largely poor and informal cities, and thus directly contribute to social and spatial marginalization. For example, in the city of Chandigarh, while undergoing formalization, the informal part of the city was excluded from the formal city (Watson 2009). Another problem with the proposed greenfield development is the expansion of land use at the peripheries of the city. The challenge is providing cheap, affordable and adequate transport facilities to the poor, since the poor will be accommodated in the peripheral housing. The smart city proposal only talks about urban development in an isolated manner. In India only 31 per cent of the population lives in urban areas, while the rest is rural. Agriculture is still the major contributor to gross domestic product (GDP), and rural areas serve urban areas as hinterlands. The Smart Cities Mission

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Addressing the challenges The challenges as discussed in the previous section seem to be major hindrances in the way of the implementation of Smart City Mission. Although the concept of smart cities is very lucrative to urban planners, and although developed nations have adopted the smart city model in their urban development strategy, it is still highly debatable in the context of India. There are a number of ways in which the challenges could be addressed. First, the challenges regarding the smart city itself should be addressed one by one. Keeping in mind the level of economic and social development of our country, both of which are part of the urban development, is not conducive to the growth of smart cities or seeking solutions to urban problems by means of digital technology. There is a huge gap in access to many basic amenities and services between different economic classes in the urban area itself. In such a situation, urban development by foreign direct investment would simply propagate market forces, with the real estate market emerging powerful and housing for poor and low-income classes becoming unaffordable. This process is bound to lead to displacement. Rehabilitation measures offered by the state are often not adequate for the victims of displacement. There is increased vulnerability of the poor, even if they get a room for shelter, their livelihood activities along with the education of their children or health of family members may be affected. Thus, one should not find the solutions to urban development-induced displacement in resettlement or rehabilitation schemes. Also, social scientists largely believe that the smart cities approach to urban development would eventually increase inequality. Second, from the perspective of urban planning, some issues need to be addressed. Urban researchers have time and again pointed out that urban problems are the outcomes of failed urban planning. The

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very idea that market forces or communities themselves could solve the urban problems is an unrealistic one, and the role of governance is emphasized for improved urban planning through reformed instruments (Watson 2009). The Smart Cities Mission should be critically assessed in the context of cities of the Global South like India to understand how it promises to be pro-poor and sustainable in the future. In a vast country like India, where most of the cities have grown informally, with a large informal sector, informal market, informal housing and so forth, how far will formalized urban planning and strictly defined land use patterns solve the problems that are already existing? Most urban researchers agree that formal urban planning systems in Indian cities cannot solve the problem, but they are themselves rooted in crisis. Writing on the failure of planning systems in India, Roy (2012) argued that informality should not just be associated with the poor, but as a dominant ideology benefited real estate developers and urban elites. It is needless to emphasize that Indian cities like Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata have historically evolved through informal activities. On the other hand, in recent times whatever planning or formalization of the urban space is taking place poses a threat to the existing social and economic fabric of the city, disrupting lives and livelihoods of people, and the most severely affected are the poor and marginalized. In simpler terms, they lead to exclusionary outcomes. Therefore, urban planning policy in such cities should be developed in such a manner which will address the urban issues and also be all-inclusive. India needs a greater focus on the management of its urbanization. There is a need to adopt a model of balanced urbanization strategy where intermediate and medium-sized towns should be included in the framework of development and planning – to ensure that the benefits of urbanization are shared by all. It is also observed that the United Nations does not talk about the smart cities in the context of urbanization in Third World countries, rather it proposes the development of certain key urban sectors such as transport, energy use, health care, waste management, water supply and so forth. Overall, it requires providing everyone with a much better quality of life (Ramachandran 2015).

Conclusion The preceding discussion makes it clear that the existing state of urban and economic development and the past experiences regarding development-induced displacement in the country compels us to rethink the strategies for the implementation of the Smart Cities Mission. Since

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the smart cities would increasingly rely on private players and foreign direct investments, the Smart Cities Mission can be called as a totally privatized agenda. If urban spaces are totally privatized and are in the control of the private sector only, it will pose several difficulties for the poor. The right to the city would be limited only to the middle and upper income classes who can afford to live in the city and enjoy the services. The poor will remain marginalized and would be further excluded from the urban space, as the urban spaces would come increasingly under the control of private operators. The poor needs subsidized services and amenities, and the government has to ensure these through public policies.

References Ahluwalia, I. J. 2009. Planning for Urban Development in India. Delhi: Indian Council for Research in International Economic Relations. Bates, Lisa. 2013. Gentrification and Displacement Study: Implementing an Equitable Inclusive Development Strategy in the Context of Gentrification. Portland, OR: Portland State University. Batra, Lalit and Mehra, Diya. 2008. ‘Slum demolitions and production of neoliberal space: Delhi’, in Darshini Mahadevia (ed.), Inside the Transforming Urban Asia: Processes, Policies and Public Actions, pp. 391–414. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. Bhan, Gautam. 2009. ‘This is no longer the city I once knew: Evictions, the urban poor and the right to the city in millennial Delhi’, Environment and Urbanization, 21(1): 127–142. Bhattacharya, Srimoyee and Rathi, Sujaya. 2015. Reconceptualising Smart Cities: A Reference Framework for India, (CSTEP-Report-2015–03). Bose, P. B. 2015. Urban Development in India: Global Indians in the Remaking of Kolkata. New York: Routledge. Capital Market. 2014. ‘Urban population to contribute 70–75% of India’s GDP by 2020 – Barclays’, Business Standard, 20 March. www.businessstandard.com/article/news-cm/urban-population-to-contribute-70-75-ofindia-s-gdp-by-2020-barclays-114032000273_1.html/ (accessed 24 March 2017). Caragliu, Andrea, Del Bo, Chiara, and Nijkamp, Peter. 2009. ‘Smart cities in Europe’, in Proceedings of the 3rd Central European Conference in Regional Science (Košice, Slovak Republic, Oct. 7–9). Cernea, Michael. 1995. ‘Social integration and population displacement’, International Social Science Journal, 143(1): 91–112. Deb, K. 2006. ‘Role of the state in city growth, the case of Hyderabad city’, in Sujata Patel and Kushal Deb (eds.), Urban Studies, pp. 340–352. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dupont, Veronique. 2008. ‘Slum demolitions in Delhi since the 1990s: An appraisal’, Economic & Political Weekly, 43(28): 79–87.

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Dupont, Veronique. 2011. ‘The dream of Delhi as a global city’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(3): 533–554. Foreign Trade Policy, 2015–20. Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Government of India (GOI). http://www.sezindia.nic.in/ (accessed 2 April, 2017). Ghertner, D. A. 2015. ‘Why gentrification theory fails in ‘much of the world’’, City, 19(4): 552–563. Goodfriend, D. 1989. ‘The Tyranny of the right angle: Colonial and postcolonial urban development in Delhi’, in Patwant Singh and Ram Dhamija (eds.), Delhi: The Deepening Urban Crisis. New Delhi, Bangalore: Sterling Publishers. Grier, Eunice and Grier, George. 1978. Urban Displacement: A Reconnaissance. Washington, DC: Grier Partnership. Harvey, David. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harvey, David. 2010. The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism. London: Profile. Jain, A. K. 1990. The Making of a Metropolis: Planning and Growth of Delhi. New Delhi: National Book Organization. Khapre-Upadhyay, Prasanna. 1999. ‘BMC to involve residents in fighting encroachments’, Indian Express, 20 February. Mahadevia, Darshini and Narayanan, Harini. 2008. ‘Slumbay to Shanghai: Envisioning renewal or takeover?’, in Darshini Mahadevia (ed.), Inside the Transforming Urban Asia: Processes, Policies and Public Actions, pp. 94–169. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. Narayanan, Harini, Mahadevia, Darshini and Mathews, R. R. 2008. ‘Demolishing lives and livelihoods: Mumbai’, in Darshini Mahadevia (ed.), Inside the Transforming Urban Asia: Processes, Policies and Public Actions, pp. 415–450. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. Peck, Jamie and Tickell, Adams. 2002. ‘Neoliberalizing space’, Antipode, 34(3): 380–404. Ramachandran, T. 2015. ‘The challenging road ahead for our smart cities’, The Hindu, 14 January. Roy, Ananya. 2012. ‘Urban informality: The production of space and practice of planning’, in R. Weber and R. Crane (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Urban Planning, pp. 691–705. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schaffers, H., Komninos, N., Tsarchopoulos, P., Pallot, M., Trousse, B., Posio, E., Carter, D. 2012. ‘Landscape and roadmap of future internet and smart cities.’. https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00769715/document/ (accessed 28 March 2017) Smart Cities: Mission, Statement and Guidelines. 2015. Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India (GOI). http://smartcities.gov.in/upload/ uploadfiles/files/SmartCityGuidelines(1).pdf/ (accessed 2 April 2017). Terminski, Bogumil. 2013. ‘Development-induced displacement and resettlement: social problems and human rights issues’. University of Geneva Research Paper No. 9.

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Walicki, Nadine and Swain, Marita. 2016. ‘Pushed aside: Displaced for ‘development’ in India’. Geneva: International Displacement Monitoring Centre. www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2016/201607-ap-indiapushed-aside-en.pdf/ (accessed 4 April 2017). Watson, Vanessa. 2009. ‘The planned city sweeps the poor away . . .: urban planning and 21st century urbanisation’, Progress in Planning, 72: 151–193.

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Urban redevelopment, neoliberalism and politics of displacement in Gujarat Mrutuyanjaya Sahu

Neoliberalism in contemporary times can be characterized as a producer of extremely diverse trajectories of development and underdevelopment, and simultaneously a begetter of a changing urban order. Cities have become increasingly important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for various neoliberal experiments (e.g. place-making, urban development corporations, public-private partnerships, new forms of local boosterism, and property-led redevelopment). Through innumerable urban development projects, cities are being transformed, pushing out the poor from the domain of public space, taking the entire praxis to an extremely critical level. India is no exception: for the last two decades, Indian cities of various sizes are being remodelled in recent times as ‘world class cities’ to function as nodes of circulation of global finance and high-tech activities of a diverse nature. Apparently the essential objective is to make these cities sufficiently investment friendly, acceptable to the credit rating agencies, and help them emerge as geostrategic points to further neoliberalism in the Global South (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Banerjee-Guha, 2009). To cope with the problems of slow economic growth and dilapidated urban appearance, a series of administrative and financial reforms has been carried out in India since 1990s. Various forms of state restructuring and institutional reconstitution were implemented to introduce and institutionalize neoliberal urbanization. The involvement of the international financial institutions gradually smoothened the aggressive redrafting of a pan-Indian urban planning proposal that in 2005 finally led to the formulation of the largest-ever urban reforms popularly known as the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) (Banerjee-Guha, 2009). The new urban reform has brought a new approach and initiated a new regime of regulation in the Indian urban sector. It has cleared the ground for rigorous implementation of

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neoliberal programmes in several cities located in different parts of the country, impacting the urban economic base, municipal finance, infrastructure, basic services, land and housing market, land use, urban form and most importantly, the shelter and livelihoods of millions of urban poor (Sassen, 1999). Following the wave of economic globalization, many cities like Mumbai, Bangalore, Kolkata, Hyderabad and many others have implemented large-scale urban development projects, such as museums, waterfronts, exhibition halls and parks, business centres and international landmark events, as part of an effort to reinforce the competitive position of their metropolitan economies in a context of rapidly changing local, national and global competitive conditions. The need for investments in basic urban infrastructure and equipment increases dramatically and requires changes in land use. This in turn entails compulsory relocation processes of local people or whole neighbourhoods. Urban resettlement has already emerged as a major problem, dislocating the lives of thousands of people, especially the poor. This chapter examines the contemporary process of neoliberal urban development and its implication on urban poor people. The following section discusses the contemporary redevelopment process in Ahmedabad in the light of the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project. The second section examines the impoverishing effects of displacement on urban poor. While drawing conclusions, the third section suggests the way forward for a sustainable human resettlement. This chapter is based on first-hand data collection through a methodical field survey, focus group discussion in a selected resettlement colony, preceded by a critical assessment and analysis of the data available on slum demolition and their resettlements.

Neoliberal urban development and displacement Dispossession of local people and deepening forms of inequality have been central features of the contemporary urban landscapes across the world. In India, a new mode of regulation facilitating capital accumulation has formed in the burgeoning market economy. Inherited institutions have been reconstituted to open up opportunities for neoliberal projects. Triggering rapid economic growth and bringing tremendous changes to urban landscapes, urban redevelopment has come to the forefront of India’s emerging neoliberal urbanization. A series of market-oriented reforms has significantly changed the urban redevelopment approach in India; administrative and fiscal decentralization empowers the local state with stronger decision-making rights and

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creates entrepreneurial government; the adoption of the land-leasing system and housing commodification facilitates the development of the real estate market; and changing demolition and relocation policies mark the marketization of the redevelopment process. Some see urban redevelopment in primarily political economic terms – as instances of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2008; Mahmud, 2010) and a ‘global urban strategy’ (Smith, 2002), whereby states advance the material interests of upper and middle classes, developers, corporations, and transnational finance by rechanneling public resources and evicting the urban poor. Others conceive of world-class city-remaking projects as a manifestation of the subjective spatial desires and discursive practices of elite and middle classes – a form of ‘bourgeois environmentalism’ (Baviskar, 2003) that aims to clean and remake cities for elite consumption through the removal of the poor from central public spaces (Fernandes, 2006). While both perspectives emphasize important material and symbolic trends, their focus on the agency, desire, and interests of upper classes and bulldozing states underplays the experience and political influence of those most intensely affected by redevelopment and displaced slum residents. Michael Cernea (1993) points out that while displacement from individual urban development projects is low, the frequency of such projects is higher than in some other sectors, resulting in a high overall number of displacements. Furthermore, while the amount of land appropriated for individual urban projects is often minimal compared to that acquired for individual large dam or irrigation projects, the ratio of people displaced per unit of expropriated land is usually higher as a result of high urban population densities. This situation only looks to be intensifying as the global trend of urbanization grows. While in 1980, only 15.8 per cent of the world’s population lived in cities with 4 million or more residents, demographers suggest that by 2025 this will rise to 24.5 per cent globally and 28.2 per cent in developing countries. Rural development projects that have caused displacement have played their own role in this rise, as many resettlers have either been relocated to cities or have migrated there from poor resettlement sites in search of employment. Every year about 10 million people globally are displaced by projects that build dams, transportation systems, or other urban infrastructure, without counting those development projects in other sectors that also cause forced displacement (Robinson, 2003). In India alone, involuntary resettlement is estimated to have affected about 60 million people in the last six decades. The World Bank has estimated that 60 per cent of development-induced displacement every year, about

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6 million people, is a result of urban infrastructure and transportation projects. This same proportion is not reflected in World Bank–assisted projects – in 1993, only 22.6 per cent of displacement was caused by urban and transportation projects. In Mumbai, between November 2004 and March 2005, 90,000 houses were demolished, affecting around 450,000 persons. In Kolkata, 77,000 people were displaced in 2004–2005. And in Delhi from 2004–2006, slum demolitions in connection with the redevelopment of the riverfront and the construction of the athletes’ village for the 2010 Commonwealth Games dramatically affected settlements along the embankments of the Yamuna River, causing the evictions of about 300,000 people, including 200,000 alone from February to May 2004 (Dupont, 2011). Forced displacements not only disrupted the livelihoods of the urban poor and slum dwellers, but it also further impoverished and excluded them. The most irony is that there is no official data about project-affected people, and most of the development projects have resulted in a poor and unsuccessful rehabilitation and resettlement policy. The loss of livelihood without alternative results in impoverishment and marginalization. Impoverishment is the economic statuses of the displaced persons (DP) are reduced by displacement, not from any prior state of poverty. Michael Cernea (1996) has identified eight dimensions of impoverishment risk induced by displacement: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food security, morbidity, loss of access to common property resources and community disarticulation. Ahmedabad: setting the context During the last decades, emerging countries face increased urban renewal and city development projects. Part of this is due to densely populated India, with its cities of multimillion population and the constant growth of social inequality and urban poverty. In order to counter this image of poor infrastructure provision, the Government of India, through the last decade, voted for several urban strategic planning policies to be implemented in some of the most emergent cities. Ahmedabad, the seventh largest Indian city and the former textile industrial capital of India, located in Gujarat, has been witnessing major transformations, as evidenced by phenomenal public and private investments since the 1990s. The city municipality has been implementing a series of mega infrastructure projects purportedly to improve the economic attractiveness as well as living conditions in the city. Among these initiatives was also the redevelopment of the banks of the Sabarmati River. The Sabarmati Riverfront Development (SRD)

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project was initiated by Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) in 1998 with the initial vision of improving the transportation system, building housing for the urban poor, cleaning the river and creating public spaces. There is a sense of jubilation on the part of authorities and the general public with the direction of the urban development policy and the remarkable gains scored thus far. What remains unnoticed, however, is that thousands of slum people have been displaced and adversely affected by the process of urban development. The forced relocation of slum people and their informal neighborhoods has led to further geographical and social exclusion by increasing spatial segregation and denied their right to the opportunity to live in the city. Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project: towards an ‘international metropolis’ The Sabarmati Riverfront Development (SRD) Project is the largest urban development project to be undertaken in Ahmedabad and the first project of its kind in India. It is an urban landscaping and transportation project primarily aimed at transforming both sides of the riverbank into leisure space, with claims of providing solutions to flood management, protection of the river from sewer pollution and creating value on land that is wasted as currently used. The idea of redeveloping the natural banks of the Sabarmati River started in 1966 by the French architect Bernard Kohn, who suggested reclaiming 30 ha of land on both sides of the river in order to make the river ‘beautiful, attractive and useful’ by developing a mixture of commercial, recreational and residential activities (Desai, 2012). The SRD project emerged again in 1997 when the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) established a special purpose vehicle, the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Corporation (SRDC), to develop the city’s riverfront. In 1998, a project proposal was prepared for SRDC by the Environmental Planning Collaborative (EPC), an Ahmedabad-based not-for-profit urban planning firm. The proposal covered a longer stretch of the riverfront (9 km) and proposed a greater area of land reclamation of 162 ha. The 1998 proposal, on the other hand, while lining the river’s edge with public open spaces and promenades, also proposed an almost continuous four- or six-lane road parallel to the river, allocating almost 29 per cent of the total reclaimed land to roads. In fact, earlier proposals were relatively modest in their scale and scope. The 1998 proposal put forth a vision in which the entire face of this central urban area along the river would be transformed through large-scale land reclamation, followed by an

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extensive reorganization of existing riverfront activities, the insertion of new activities and infrastructures, and the introduction of urban design guidelines to create an ordered, regulated and efficient urban space. The Rs 1,200 crore SRD project is one many urban projects that have emerged around the world over the past two decades with the articulation of new urban imaginaries. An important outcome of EPC’s involvement as planning consultant was that the 1998 proposal not only sought to ambitiously redevelop the riverfront but also brought the relocation and rehabilitation of the riverfront urban poor within the ambit of the project. Resettlement and rehabilitation The mega project of the Sabarmati riverfront, with its expanded development areas and the reclamation of hundreds of hectares of public land, led to a massive eviction of a large slum population that was living along the riverbeds for decades. The project has officially evicted 14,000 households directly and indirectly. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community organizations argued that 30,000–40,000 households lived in these settlements. Gujarat Ecology Commission (GEC) (2002) report shows 6,483 households and Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT) survey reports shows around 8,464 households have been displaced (Desai, 2012). Apart from the violent demolition of their homes and evictions from their habitats that provided access to livelihoods, schooling, social and physical security and access to health services, the thousands of working poor residents have been experienced the trauma and social stigma that changed their relationship between society, state and dominant socio-political institutions. Since the project was first proposed in 1997, to date there has been no proper document on the nature of rehabilitation and resettlement and the process therein involved. While the proposal had indicated three resettlement sites on the riverfront itself, these disappeared from consideration without any public discussion. However, demolitions and forced evictions have been the major experience of the riverbank settlers. After local protest and the citywide public hearing organized by Our Inclusive Ahmedabad, the Gujarat High Court directed the local authority to provide some form of shelter to all those who had been evicted or faced eviction. The local authority began to formalize a process of paperwork regarding allotment of rehabilitation housing under the central government’s part-funded Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) Scheme. In the years 2004–2005, 3,000 to 4,000 families were evicted from the

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riverfront as well as from a number of other urban infrastructure projects all over the city (Our Inclusive Ahmedabad 2010). In mid-2008 AMC and SRDC submitted a Resettlement & Rehabilitation (R&R) policy to the Gujarat High Court. The R&R policy stated that (1) about 8,000 families had been found to be fully affected and 4,000 partly affected by the project; (2) fully affected families would be resettled under Economic Weaker Society (EWS) scheme; and (3) a December 2002 cut-off date would be used since the slum survey was completed then. Resettlement provisions, such as the amount of beneficiary contributions and resettlement unit size, were also outlined. Some 13 different sites had been identified where construction of four-storey flats of 25–28 m2 each were to be constructed to house each evicted family irrespective of family size, based on eligibility being validated through possession of identity papers, address proofs, birth certificates and so forth (Mathur, 2012). Resettlement was perceived by the state authorities as necessary, not for attending to the wellbeing of residents but for continuing project construction. Even after the court granted permission for this relocation, some AMC officials threatened many of these families and attempted to shift them to a site other than the one agreed upon and give them smaller houses than mentioned in the civil application. The displacement of these thousands of people in the outskirts of the city resulted in a vicious circle of severe impacts on their daily life quality.The study has made an attempt to understand the impact on the socio-economic livelihood conditions of Shahwadi Nagar resettlement colony households.

The impoverishing effects of displacement The shift of the initial plan to an expansive riverfront project of more than 20 km of mega infrastructure for the completion of the ‘international metropolis’ vision demanded the dislocation of thousands of households along the riverbeds (Pathak, 2011). With the argument of the state’s goal to achieve a city without slums, the authorities forced thousands of people to abandon their houses and move to informal settlements away from the city centre and their living roots. The loss of dwelling and assets caused by forced displacement, and the uprooting from an existing pattern of making a living, carry high impoverishment risks for those affected directly. While the overall economic effects of urban growth for the majority of urban inhabitants are positive, the serious negative effects that occur for a much smaller group along several basic dimensions of their lives (Cernea, 1993) are no less real.

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Impact on economic livelihood The displacement of households and economic units (workshops, commercial shops, small producers’ units, food stalls, and others) deprives those affected either of dwellings, or of employment, or of access to their customers, or of a combination of these losses. The single most critical problem associated with urban displacement is not the loss of housing, but the loss of employment or of site-related income sources and the uncertainty of finding new employment in the relocation area. In Shahwadi resettlement colony, the research findings show that despite the fact that the majority of the people have a basic level of education (74 per cent) and are formally able to work in several positions, their displacement impacted the loss of their job and consequently their household income has dramatically decreased since they have moved to Shahwadi. Unemployment dramatically climbed to almost half for both genders. The consequences of the displacement was so high that the women who were working as housemaids and earning bread for the family could not get even a job. Relative economic deprivation and marginalization begins prior to actual displacement because new investments in infrastructure and services in condemned areas are discontinued long before projects start. The distance of the relocation site from the original place negatively affect the access to employment and social networks, and more generally access to the city resources and opportunities. It violates one of the core principles established within the riverfront development project, of providing resettlement housing in proximity to the previous site (EPC, 1998). Moreover, the devastating effects of far site relocation are well-established through empirical studies over the last 30 years (Cernea and McDowell, 2000).

Health status Massive population displacement threatens to cause serious declines in health levels. Displacement-induced social stress and psychological trauma are sometimes accompanied by the outbreak of relocation-related illnesses, particularly parasitic and vector-borne diseases such as malaria and schistosomiasis. Research finding shows that in Shahwadi Nagar people experienced higher levels of exposure and vulnerability to illness and severe disease than they did prior to displacement. Around 40 per cent of the households claimed to face health problems on a regular basis; while 28 per cent stated that their health issues increase during the monsoon period. Most of the resettled people expressed concerns on health issues due to water quality,

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poor drainage, indoor pollution and excessive concentration of waste in the area that leads to the multiplication of infected mosquitoes, rats, cockroaches and so forth that spread severe diseases. Malaria, typhoid fever, headaches, hair fall, diarrhea, weakness, vomiting and skin infections are some of the problems faced due to water pollution and problematic waste management. The most usual symptoms due to water quality are body weakness (98 per cent), vomiting (68.22 per cent), hair fall (38 per cent), diarrhea (23 per cent), and the prevalence of malaria rose from 15 per cent to 73 per cent especially during the monsoon period. Overall, in the absence of preventive health measures, direct and secondary effects of dislocation includes diseases of poor hygiene and diseases caused by unsafe and insufficient water supplies and unsanitary waste systems. Lack of basic services Shahwadi Nagar resettlement colony is built at the southern periphery of the city, at a big distance from the city centre, and the people’s main sources of livelihood unemployment stands in the core of the problems caused by the lack of accessibility to public services such as health and education. During the survey people stated that public services, such as health centres and schools, are 10–15 km away from their area, a distance that is not reachable in an emergency, since there are no transportation facilities in the area. Basic school facilities are not available, and most of the people cannot afford sending their children to private schools. Prior to displacement, all children had access to education facilities; after relocation only 15 per cent of children’s get access to school. Disturbances in children’s education occur because of the lesser number of schools, long distance and untimely relocation. Despite the fact that the construction designs of the house blocks are planned to provide regular water supply through individual unit taps, the practice showed that a total of 68 per cent of the households have no access to water on a daily level. During the survey, it had been noticed that the main cause of the water supply problems is rooted in the construction problems of the buildings. Wrong calculations on the placement of water pipes, resulted often breakdowns of the water pipes or water inefficiency to the lower unit floors. The quality of housing construction is shady. Cracks in the walls, leakages and seepages are evidence of poor monitoring of the quality of construction and approvals and clearances for the same. The overall results show that the toilet facilities of the households have been improved when compared to the conditions in

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their previous area. The private toilet facilities increased from 28.5 per cent (riverfront slum) to 97 per cent (EWS Housing). However, lack of efficient amount of water received in the households forces people to defecate in the open and community toilets condition is extremely bad, as nobody provides frequent and proper maintenance. Security and vulnerability status The social and cultural disruptions in neighbourhood ties and kinship networks also have deep effects, which are additional to the tangible economic losses. Such non-quantifiable but real social and economic costs are the loss of access to mutual help, child care arrangements, exchange and borrowing opportunities, and other informal support systems. The heterogeneous composition of those compulsorily displaced multiplies risks and virtually guarantees individual tragedies. The research findings reveal that the security status of the area is quite low, as most of the residents around 86 per cent claim to feel insecure among their neighbours. The lack of unity and the residents fell suspicious and in some cases aggressive towards neighbours. Women stated that during the night they feel no security to walk on the dark streets and they do not trust their neighbours. Prior to relocation, people lived all together for decades; issues like security were rare in the area. The residents stated that they hardly face any security issue was there in prior location apart from the usual small arguments; they had great trust on their neighbours and both genders feel secure to walk in the neighbourhood all the hours of night and day. In the process of displacement and resettlement, women are not consulted and women have been neglected in the policy process. The authorities in charge of the relocation do not understand the women’s problems of adjusting to the new locality. Since even under normal circumstances, society is yet to treat women equally. The displaced women need some extra attention to cope with the changed circumstances till such time that they can begin as equals. The interest of women should be given extra attention as they feel out of place in the newly resettled place. Food security Existing evidence indicates that the food scarcity risks are more readily recognized by resettlement agencies than the health-related risks incurred by resettlers. Long-term planning is seldom done. Resettlers’ coping response tends also to address first the immediately perceivable food needs. Satisfying household food needs is one of the

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most pressing challenges for poor people, in particular poor people in urban areas who are more vulnerable to food price shocks. Similar to urban poor, 89.38 per cent of resettled surveyed – when asked to report about shocks incurred by their household during previous year – noted ‘unusually high increase in food prices’. The majority had coped by reducing the quantity and quality of their food, diet with a potential detrimental impact on health outcomes, labour productivity and cognitive development. While there could be several possible explanations for such vulnerability to food insecurity like access to credit card and the rule of informal safety nets merits needs separate discussion. As in other developing countries, access to credit in India is mostly informal and dependent on the existence of social networks (i.e. a direct or indirect relationship between the borrower), where they live or does not have enough information of access trustworthiness and the likelihood of repayment is unimaginable. Similarly the absence of well-functioning formal safety net systems that vulnerable households must rely on social networks for assistance in case of necessity. People’s participation Experience indicates that involuntary resettlement generally causes numerous problems for the affected population. These problems may be reduced to a great extent if people are properly informed and consulted and participated in the process of resettlement planning and implementation. Unlike many of the projects a key element of the SRD project is the primary role of state authorities in initiating, financing, developing and implementing all components of the project in a top-down fashion. Thus, the urban poor living and working on the riverfront were not incorporated through a participatory approach, and NGOs and CBOs were not invited to be mediators with poor communities. Research finding shows that Shahwadi area faces serious issues of active exclusion. A respectful 80 per cent claimed that the AMC has never responded to any need of the area, while 20 per cent stated that the local government rarely responds to their needs. Local democratic participation mechanisms are not respected or are applied in a very ‘formalist’ way, resulting in a new choreography of elite power. However, grassroots movements occasionally managed to turn the course of events in favour of local participation and of modest social returns for deprived social groups. People lost contact with their previous community and claim that they are not able to reorganize a new one. Most of the resettles finds the new environment to be unfriendly and suspicious, they feel unwelcomed and imprisoned into an area that has nothing to offer to them.

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Politics of grassroots protests The SRD project has given rise to new, albeit fragile, alliances in the struggle for social justice and the right to the city. The grassroots protest has the potential to impact the project because there are a large number of families living in the riverbank slums. The helplessness of the slum dwellers has also been accompanied by a sense of betrayal by political leaders since both political parties (the Congress and the BJP) have officially joined hands around the project. However, since both parties have vote-banks in the riverbank slums, some party leaders have attempted to respond to the concerns of slum dwellers. In 2004, some Congress Party leaders and workers founded the ‘Ahmedabad Shaher Ane Riverfront Jhupaddpatti Samiti’, an organization that would fight for the rights of slum dwellers in the city and on the riverbank. Whether the founding of this organization was a result of their empathy towards the slum dwellers or as an attempt to acquire political legitimacy for themselves, or a combination of both, is difficult to say. But since the organization has not held regular meetings and has not attempted to include the slum dwellers as leaders within the organization, many of the riverbank slum dwellers consider this as simply another political ploy to get their support in the form of votes. If members of the Congress Party have been active in trying to mobilize the riverfront slum dwellers, members of the BJP have not been passive either. However, the BJP leaders have not attempted to mobilize the slum dwellers as a collective body that might ask for its rights. Rather, they have taken an approach of pacifying the slum dwellers – an entirely Hindu constituency – with promises that they would be taken care of, and that they must not be led astray by the Congress Party or by NGOs. In 2004 the grassroots organization known as Sabarmati Nagrik Adhikar Manch (SNAM) developed with comprised of a network of community-based organizations (CBOs) located in the riverbank slums. The SNAM began to regularly organize meetings in different slums along the riverbank to mobilize support from within. The protest and movement led by the SNAM emphasized on Hindu and Muslim units in the slum area and rejection of all political parties in the decision-making process. The movement has questioned the neoliberal urban planning and development and reiterated that development must also envisage equality and ecological sanity. The movement replaced the exclusionary narrative of state-led development with a counter narrative of inclusion of local people in the resettlement planning process. Public space is constantly being democratized by organizing rallies,

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seminars and public discussion at various level. The movement also emphasized poor people’s relationship with the state and demanded the rights in the city – be it the right to vote, access to basic services, the right to subsidized food through public distribution system (PDS) or the right to sustainable resettlement. However, the success of the movement determines the extent to which slum dwellers are able to forget their internal social and political differences and mobilize as a group with a shared interest in fighting for the spaces they inhabit. Development projects should be welcomed to any city but only in order to create inclusive changes and equal opportunities for every citizen to enjoy the city’s physical and social infrastructure. The SRD project was initially a positive inclusive project that unfortunately ended up being neoliberal and exclusive. The resettlement scheme of the project provided decent shelter for thousands of project-affected population in areas with amenities like water and sanitation facilities; however it proved weak on sustaining the functionality of these facilities. Moreover it proved to be irresponsible on providing the equally essential basic public services in terms of social infrastructure, which would sustain an inclusive life for the people. The SRD project has been poorly integrated at best into the wider urban process and planning system. As a consequence, their impact on a city as a whole and on the areas where the projects are located remains ambiguous. Urban development in India should be underpinned by adequate planning to ensure access to essential services and minimum standard of living. It is therefore argued that the value of more inclusive development projects and more decentralized, people-centred programs should be part of the new pro-poor policies and a common practice for a more comprehensive development research.

The way forward Knowledge gap: Most of the recent development literature tends to link the compulsory displacement of settled populations only with dam construction, mining and industrial projects. Significant displacements also occur in many urban growth programs. Paradoxical as this may be, urban involuntary displacement still remains a seldom discussed companion of urban growth and renewal in developing countries. Some urban development specialists even deny or dismiss its relevance. Most often, national policies and environmental strategies for urban development are silent about the difficult and politically sensitive problem of forced displacement. Legal frameworks for

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Mrutuyanjaya Sahu protecting rights and entitlements and democratic grievance procedures, are often absent, rudimentary, or unenforced. Most of the academic researchers tend mostly to focus on forecasting macro-urbanization trends, while insufficiently exploring their undesirable implications at the level of individual dwellers. Political leaders tend to highlight the benefits of urban growth, leapfrogging over their painful effects on the people compelled to yield the ‘right of way’. In short, the neglect of development-induced displacement is a lacuna in both urban thinking and urban planning. Democratization of public space: Most resettlement programs, in effect, become extremely large bureaucratic technical organizations operating with specific models of development progress. The compulsory obligation on the part of the project planning and implementing authorities to involve and consult the representatives of the affected communities, including women and members of disadvantaged groups in all phrase of planning, execution and monitoring the Resettlement & Rehabilitation (R&R) plans needs to be taken seriously. The entire decisionmaking process regarding R&R plans must be completely transparent and accountable. The comprehensive plan for resettlement must be made public. It must be brought to the notice of the people likely to be affected through such channels like the local language media, local exhibitions, local meeting and so forth. It needs to be mentioned here that the government and the project authority are under an obligation to take information to the doorstep of the affected population, so as to enable even illiterate persons can acquire full knowledge of the detailed project report, financial plan, economic/financial viability studies, social impact benchmark and other studies. Involvement of civil society and NGOs: Rehabilitation of people affected by development projects is a long-drawn process. It involves an understanding of people and requires planning. It needs the coordinated efforts of specialists from diverse disciplines, including those from voluntary and philanthropic associations, social workers, project officials, and affected persons themselves. In this connection, the role of civil society and NGOs could be quite productive. They have the grassroots experience to creatively design income generating options well suited to the capabilities and needs of the people requiring resettlement. Where NGOs are willing to work with project agencies and sharing their expertise and resources that will help

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to rebuild the lives of relocated people. Thus participation by NGOs may prove very helpful in income restoration programs, for example, small-scale credit programs for women like initiated by Mahila Milan and SPRAC NGO in Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) in Mumbai. Specification of cut-off date: The diversity of urban displacement needs has to be recognized, resettlement policies should be based on the notion universal entitlement and citizenship. Therefore, security of tenure should be provided to all slum dwellers irrespective of their date of arrival in the city. Specification of a cut-off date of arrival in the settlement as an eligibility criterion for R&R programmes should be eliminated. This is not based on any substantial rationale and creates different citizenship’s entitlements in terms of housing. Moreover, cut-off dates can sanction the demolition of houses thereby disenfranchising many vulnerable urban residents and generate further exclusion and impoverishment. Right to the city: The Constitution of India grants right to life, which incorporates guaranteeing shelter and other basic services including the right to livelihood. The fundamental rights as enshrined in Part III and Part IV, embodied Directive Principles of State Policy but ensured unfavourable conditions for democratic judicial action concerning the rights to shelter and livelihood prospects for the urban impoverished. It is in this contextual framework of values and principles that any policy/ legislation should be formulated. The goal for a proper equitable housing policy can only be attained if the policy and the plans are made with the objective of utilizing all our resources, land and human power effectively and efficiently. The movements for the right to the city has been developed by social groups and civil society organizations as an attempt to ensure the better opportunities for people living in the cities, especially the most marginalized and deprived sections. The right to the city calls for a holistic balanced and ensuring the right to adequate housing and providing right to property should be a major responsibility of the state. Comprehensive urban R&R policy: The Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Act 2013, does not offer much solutions to the pains and suffering of millions of uprooted in urban. There should be a separate R&R law for urban cities as the magnitude of displacement and impacts are very high. The R&R programmes and housing policies in general should be articulated to facilitate

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Mrutuyanjaya Sahu the access to employment opportunities, urban services and social amenities. Consequently too, the habitation of the urban poor should be well connected with affordable and efficient public transport systems. The vital connection between relocation place and the access to their means of livelihood should also be taken into consideration. When displacement is unavoidable, the government must establish appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with national and international law to protect the rights of local people. It should be mandatory and enforceable that project-affected people must be given rights to participate at this very stage through mediation of civil society so that they can bring their full weight to bear on the design and content of the plan. There is an immediate need to implement the provisions of the 74th Constitutional Amendment and bring in decentralized people-centric planning, empowering urban local bodies (ULBS) but having stipulated representation of the urban poor on board. Like Gram Sabha at the rural level, the Basti Sabha need to be involved in the post-development project works to ensure the proper implementation of R&R measures.

Sustainability of human settlement Sustainability of human settlement is a vital part of human development. The human settlements today have become, most of the time to show just that settlements have been given to people or alternative settlements have been provided for the people who are displaced so that the political parties and civil society groups do not question the ruling party. Achieving sustainability in the urban spheres becomes crucial, as urban areas are growing everyday with additional population. The infrastructure and the facilities are not enough to handle the populations in the town as the populations have crossed the limit, which must be according to the capacity of the cities. Overcrowding, use of space and amenities for living that should be available for education or recreation, for example, and uncontrolled urban sprawl are a drain and a burden on the ability of a city and it’s the duty of residents to see that conditions improve or at least do not deteriorate. Sustainable human settlement does not mean only the environment but also the other aspects of human being’s life through which he can sustain basically. There should be sustainable economy providing employment, sustainable community with social coherence stability and solidarity, sustainable living environment with stable ecosystems and a sustainable democracy through active participation of local people.

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References Banerjee-Guha, S. 2009. ‘Neoliberalising the “urban”: New geographies of power and injustice in Indian cities’, Economic & Political Weekly, 44(22):95–107. Baviskar, A. 2003. ‘Between violence and desire: Space, power and identity in the making of modern Delhi’, International Social Science Journal, 55(175):89–98. Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. 2002. ‘Cities and the geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism”, Antipode, 34(3):349–379. Cernea, M. M. 1993. ‘The urban environment and population relocation’, World Bank Discussion Paper, Washington, DC. Cernea, M. M. 1996. ‘Public policy responses to development-induced population displacement’, Economic and Political Weekly, (31):1515–1523. Cernea, M. M. and Christopher, M. eds. 2000. Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Desai, R. 2012. ‘Governing the urban poor: Riverfront development, slum resettlement and the politics of inclusion in Ahmedabad’, Economic & Political Weekly, 27(2):49–56. Dupont, V. 2011. Urban Policies and Right to the City. New Delhi: UNESCO House. Engineering Procurement & Construction. 1998. ‘Proposal for the Sabarmati Riverfront Development’, EPC, Ahmedabad. Fernandes, L. 2006. India’s New Middle Class: Democratic Politics in an Era of Economic Reform. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Harvey, D. 2008. ‘The right to the city’, New Left Review, 53:23–40. Mahmud, T. 2010. ‘Surplus humanity and the margins of legality: Slums, slumdogs, and accumulation by dispossession’, Chapman Law Review, 14(1):1–82. Mathur, N. 2012. ‘On the Sabarmati Riverfront: Urban planning as totalitarian governance in Ahmedabad’, Economic & Political Weekly, (47):64–75. Pathak, M. 2011. ‘Ahmedabad riverfront to open as displaced await new homes’. Available from: www.livemint.com/2011/12/15210633/Ahmed abad-riverfront-toopen-a.html. Accessed on 3 March 2016. Robinson, C. W. 2003. ‘Risk and rights: The causes, consequences and challenges of development induced displacement’. Working Paper, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Sassen, S. 1999. ‘Globalization and the formation of new claims’, in R. A. Beauregard and S. Body-Gendrot (eds.), The Urban Moment, USA: Sage Publication, 99–118. Smith, N. 2002. ‘New globalism, new urbanism: Gentrification as global urban strategy’, Antipode, 34(3):427–450.

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Infrastructure development and forced displacement in Kerala Risks and vulnerabilities K. Indu and S. Irudaya Rajan

Kochi is a growing port city located on the west coast of south India, in the state of Kerala. Kochi has witnessed a spurt in both foreign and domestic capital investments with the commissioning of several development projects,1 some of which are of national importance, especially since the last decade. This has also led to developments in building new infrastructure, such as road networks and bridges, to connect the peripheral islands situated northwest of Kochi city to the mainland.2 This study focuses on the multifarious risks borne by two displaced groups, evicted for two different infrastructure development projects from Mulavukad and Puthuvype in 2002 and Kalamukku in 2007, respectively. Adequate compensation could mitigate the impact of the external shock that the evicted families had to bear by restoring their asset status and helping them in rebuilding their lives. As the evicted families bore the brunt of involuntary relocation for the larger cause of infrastructure development, this chapter aims to figure out whether the compensation provided helped to mitigate the shock of eviction on their lives and livelihood. However, the compensation as well as the treatment meted out to those evicted from Mulavukad and Puthuvype differed from those granted to families of evictees in Kalamukku by the district administration, leading to differences in the risks they were subject to, which will be assessed subsequently. Many field studies have discussed the adverse consequences of forced displacement on the evicted groups, which varied according to the local circumstances (Fernandes, 1998; Mathur, 1998). Among the several reported adversities faced by them, Cernea (1996) identifies the onset of impoverishment as the most common underlying phenomena. The Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model for involuntary resettlement underscores the intrinsic risks that cause impoverishment through the process of displacement as well as

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the different ways to counteract or mitigate these risks. The model, formulated and developed in the 1990s, identifies the principal risks of impoverishment and how they can be prevented (Cernea, 2004). The model identifies major socio-economic risks that displaced populations are susceptible to, which include landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property and social disarticulation. Parasuraman (1999) concluded that the most important cause of impoverishment post-displacement in India was owing to the loss of land. Recent studies also highlight the impoverishment effects of displacement on the poor from the cities of Delhi and Chennai (Bhan and Shivanand, 2013; Coelho et al., 2012). Using the IRR model as a checklist, this chapter evaluates the differential risks that the two displaced groups were subjected to due to the processes of forced displacement. It draws attention to the differential nature of compensation provided to these two groups, by the concerned district authorities. Each of the groups displaced was characterized by a different set of initial endowments of livelihood assets. Livelihood assets pertain to people’s core assets on which their livelihoods are built, namely, human capital, social capital, natural capital, physical capital and financial capital (DFID, 2000). The chapter goes on to discuss how differences in compensation provided to the evictees had made one group susceptible to major impoverishment risks and therefore more vulnerable vis-à-vis the other. Vulnerability is defined as ‘the degree of exposure to risk and uncertainty and the capacity of households to prevent, mitigate or cope with risk’ (see GLOPP, 2008).

Methodology Undertaking intensive fieldwork in Bolgatty in Mulavukadu, Kalamukku in Puhthuvype and Malipuram in Vypeen, the study uses extensive in-depth interviews with members of displaced households, Action Council leaders of evicted groups, community elders and religious leaders, non-displaced locals, members of the civil society, administrative and elected members of the local government and GIDA to identify the risks faced due to forced displacement and their coping mechanisms. These interactions included various types of methods, including focus groups discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs), household interviews, observations, and site walks. The fieldwork for the chapter was done during January to May of 2017. A total of 25 interviews were conducted to gain an in-depth understanding of the experiences of the evicted groups.3

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The chapter uses these two instances of displacement from neighbouring islands purposively, as the numbers of people evicted were few and far between when compared to other cases of eviction for development projects that were commissioned in Kochi. By focusing on these two cases of eviction, the chapter emphasizes the inequities in the distribution of benefits to those evicted from Mulavukadu and Puthuvype, unlike those from Kalamukku, who were all beneficiaries of a land-based resettlement policy. The chapter is organized into four sections. Section I gives a brief introduction to infrastructure development projects which caused forced displacement. Section II discusses the differential compensation provided to the evicted at two different time periods. The risks that the displaced were subjected to due to the dissimilarity in compensation provided by the district administration leading to one of the groups becoming susceptible to additional risks making them more vulnerable vis-à-vis the other group as discussed in Section III. The concluding section argues the need for the restitution of incomes, assets and livelihoods of the evictees.

I Causes of involuntary relocation Construction of Goshree bridges The construction of the three Goshree bridges also known as the Ernakulam-Vypeen bridges led to the forced displacement of 30 families from Mulavukad and 33 families from Puthuvype village, the majority of whom depended on fishing and allied activities for their livelihood. The project led to the acquisition of 3.75 acres of land in Mulavukadu and Puthuvype villages. The notification for land acquisition was issued in 2001 and families were evicted in the year 2002. The construction of bridges were planned to link the three islands, namely Bolgatty, Vallarpadom, and the densely populated island of Vypeen, lying towards the northwest from mainland Kochi. This was crucial for better connectivity and integration to mainland Kochi and literally paved the way for major development projects on the islands which for long were in the periphery devoid of any major commercial activity apart from fishing and farming. Construction of the bridges which was a major infrastructural project that took several years of planning was helmed by GIDA. It was in 1994 that the plan for the bridges was initiated but delayed due to

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problems in raising funds for the project.4 Eventually, the funds were raised by GIDA by selling 25 ha of reclaimed backwaters adjacent to the mainland Marine Drive to real estate developers. Reclamation of 25 ha of backwaters was assigned to the Cochin Port Trust. The earnings from the sale of reclaimed land were primarily used to fund the construction of the bridges, to build connecting roads through the reclaimed land and for land acquisition.5 Subsequently, with its completion in June 2004, major development projects of national importance, namely the International Container Trans-shipment Terminal and the Petronet LNG Terminal, were commissioned in the islands of Vallarpadom and Vypeen.6 Construction of connecting road to the Petronet LNG terminal Sixteen families residing in Kalamukku were affected as a result of the acquisition of 0.95 ha of land by the Cochin Port Trust to construct a road connecting Goshree bridges to the Petronet Liquid and Natural Gas Ltd project sites through the special economic zone towards the 35-meter road to Cherai. The Cochin Port Trust had allocated 40 ha of land on the Puthuvype Island for setting up of the Petronet LNG terminal.7 The LNG terminal project, one of national importance, is financed by domestic and foreign capital investments, with a total investment of approximately 4,200 crore. The project site area was declared as a SEZ by the Government of India as per the provisions of Special Economic Zones Act of 2005. Land acquisition process for the LNG plant commissioned in Puthuvype took place in 2007. Although the majority of the affected families lost only a portion of their land, few families had been completely evicted.

II How compensation differed? Compensation granted to evicted families from Mulavukad and Puthuvype The families evicted from Mulavukad and Puthuvype were served the notice of land acquisition in 2001 as per the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, stating that the government intended to take possession of the land for public purpose. They were asked to appear before the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition officer) to prove their claims to

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ownership of the land, the particulars of their claim to compensation and objection if any to the measurement made under Section 8 of the Act. Further, they were served a notice informing them to evict before April 2002 to deliver possession of land to the government. The compensation to the evicted families, however, consisted only of cash. This, however, resulted in protest marches and hunger strikes before the offices of the district administration and GIDA by the Goshree Evictees Action Council that lasted for 89 days. The agitation was called off after the promise of provision of land. After successive meetings called by the District Collector, it was decided to cite the Land Assignments Act to grant land to those eligible and applications were called for from those belonging to the evicted families in July 2002. Only those families whose income levels fell below the official poverty line (Below Poverty Line families) were granted 3 cents of land at Malipuram to build a house. The condition laid down was that the land was to be utilized only for residential purposes and was not to be alienated by sale, gift, mortgage, hypothecation or lease for a period of 12 years. Thus, the evicted families were discriminated on the basis of their levels of current income. Most evictees had serious objection to the valuation process and assessment of the properties and considered the cash compensation fixed as inadequate as the potential value of acquired land was not given due consideration. Those families (14) which fell in the APL (Above Poverty Line) category were denied the provision of land despite the fact that all of the 14 families belonged to backward and lower caste groups, which had been traditionally marginalized from the mainstream Kerala society. Of the 14, ten families belonged to the Dheevara caste group, one belonged to the Ezhava Caste and three to the scheduled caste groups. The evictees in March 2004 again resorted to hunger strikes and protest marches. Later, an offer made by the district authorities after discussion by the 18th General Council of GIDA to grant land at low prices to the evicted APL families, upon the condition that they would not resort to any legal measure to claim higher prices than that was offered for the acquired land by GIDA. This was not acceptable to these families and they continued to wage a legal battle to claim a higher price for their acquired lands from GIDA. The Mulavukadu Panchayat decided to assuage the plight of the evictees from Mulavukad by passing a resolution [No: VII (7)] on 27 May 2008 to grant each family 3 cents of land under the jurisdiction of the Panchayat. As compensation for evictees from nearby Moolampilly, Kothad and Mulavukad, who were displaced for building the road to

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the International Container Transshipment Terminal (ICTT) at Vallarpadom in 2007 also included the provision of land for all irrespective of any bias, the Panchayat considered the denial of land to evicted only to APL families unfair. However, the Panchayat was not bound to distribute the land among the families. Instead it informed the Goshree Islands Development Authority (GIDA) and the district authorities of its decision. The GIDA did not respond positively to the Panchayat’s letter claiming that it had no authority to do so and that the matter was closed. Compensation granted to evicted families from Kalamukku To develop road connectivity to the LNG project site commissioned in Puthuvype, 0.95 ha of land was acquired from Kalamukku in July 2007 under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. Similar procedures were adapted for land acquisition as in Mulavukad and Puthuvype. However, majority of the evictees lost only a portion of their land, while only a few lost their entire land and homes. An Action Council of the evictees was formed to represent their needs to the concerned district authorities in the event of land acquisition. The representatives of Petronet LNG Ltd., Cochin Port Trust and the Action Council members were called to discuss problems related to land acquisition by the district administration. The compensation amount was borne by the Bharath Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and the Cochin port Trust. The compensation promised included cash for house construction, a few cents of land for rehabilitation depending on the extent of the land acquired including access to basic services and the promise of a job for a member of the evicted family in the LNG project. Details such as name of a member seeking employment from each evicted family and educational qualification were submitted to the Tahsildar’s office, to be handed over to the Cochin Port Trust. The Cochin Port Trust was delegated to develop the marshy land allocated to the evictees habitable so that construction of homes was possible. An approach road was to be built with provision for proper drainage and arrangements were made for services such as water connection, electricity to be provided. The evictees who had lost their homes were also provided rent for a certain time period. Revaluation of property was also done after requests from seven families. Despite this, most evictees resorted to the courts claiming a higher value for their properties. The promise of a job for a member of the evicted family was not granted even after huge protests that led to disruption of construction at the project site. Although, at the time of eviction, there was an

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understanding between the representatives of the Company and the district administration that a portion of the employment generated would be given to the evictees, this was denied stating that the project from its commissioning onwards, involved highly technical operations and maintenance activities and, therefore, largely highly skilled and technically qualified persons with requisite experience were necessary. According to the Company, there was no enforceable agreement between the Company and the district administration and thereby, there was no legal obligation to provide employment opportunities to the local people.8 There also occurred some delay in allocating land for rehabilitation to the 16 families; the developed land was allotted only after two years. The facilities including basic services like electricity and water were provided only recently, in December 2016, after nine years had elapsed. Only two families had built houses on the plots and they had to live without electricity for several years.

III Vulnerability of displaced groups Empirical studies have established that compensation which includes the provision of land has been more beneficial than just cash compensation. This section focuses on the major risks that ensued due to processes of displacement and discusses how the evictees from Mulavukad and Puthuvype were subjected to multiple risks unlike those from Kalamukku. Before discussing the risks that both groups of displaced were subjected to and how the compensation practices implemented by the district administration helped to mitigate/exacerbate them, there is a need to have an understanding of the livelihood assets of both groups of evictees. The first group of evictees from Mulavukad, living close to the backwaters comprised largely of the fisherfolk who had low levels of formal education and skills. They derived their livelihood from resource-based activities such as fishing which was also their traditional caste-based occupation. They had access to natural capital such as backwaters and aquatic resources, common property resources and owned few cents of land with basic physical infrastructure with access to water transport. They owned necessary equipment for fishing in the backwaters. Their incomes from fishing often fluctuated, and neither did they have much savings nor did they receive any remittance income. The people belonged to backward castes such as Dheevara, Ezhava and Scheduled caste groups. They had lower social status caste- and class-wise. Thus

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they were poorly endowed with livelihood assets even before the shock of eviction displaced them. Did the compensation provided by the district administration to this group make their livelihoods less vulnerable to the impoverishment risks? Cash compensation was provided to all after valuation of their immovable properties, but land was only granted to those whose incomes fell below the official poverty line. Land was granted in Malipuram, far away from Mulavukad where land price was much lower. The evicted belonging to the APL families were only provided compensation in cash. With the construction of the bridges, the price of the land in and around Mulavukad appreciated manifold as the distance to the mainland was less than five minutes by road. This was construed as a major asset loss to the evicted families as neither could they take advantage of the appreciation in land price as their lands were acquired, nor were they provided land of equal asset value. Land is a major asset for the poor as it is also used as collateral for loans. Those who were granted land could utilize it only for residential purposes and could not convert it into a financial asset in times of need as the allotted land could not be alienated by sale, gift, mortgage, hypothecation or lease for a period of 12 years. All evicted families underwent severe hardship during the interim period, staying temporarily in rented accommodation until their homes were built in the land allotted to them. Compensation for their demolished houses and acquired land was paid according to the assessed market value and not according to their replacement value. Many families used the cash compensation to construct new homes in Malipuram, incurring debts in the process. With regard to jobs, the members of evicted families continued to pursue the same traditional occupation. Livelihoods have been adversely affected for some people who were engaged in fishing as relocation resulted in a weakening of work relations tied to a particular place or work getting disrupted temporarily. All those who were allotted land in Malipuram had to make additional travel for pursuing the same occupation and incurred costs for travel and transport of fishing equipment. Some individuals also shifted to other manual jobs which were available nearby. Schoolgoing children and youngsters pursuing higher education had to shift to educational institutions located nearby. Most evictees, traditionally marginalized from the mainstream society in Kerala due to their caste identities, have felt social and psychological marginalization after eviction, which was expressed in a loss of

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self-confidence in the society and its structures. There was a sense of neglect and injustice due to the apathy shown by the district administration towards them as they had initially demanded land nearby. The coerciveness of the authorities and the trauma endured by them to cope in new surroundings had made them feel victimized by the process of displacement. They have not benefited from new investments in infrastructure and services unlike the non-displaced from Mulavukad and Puthuvype, as they were far removed from the centre of new development activities. Food insecurity, mortality and morbidity were not very pronounced risks that the displaced were prone to due to the access to public distribution systems and primary health centres for the poor in Kerala. However, distance to place of employment, educational institutions and health centres had increased upon resettlement. Although access to common property resources such as water bodies was not affected, reclamation of the backwaters for infrastructure development had reduced the availability of fish and also disruption of traditional modes of subsistence without a transition to a more secure livelihood. This was a common cause of distress among the evictees. Forced resettlement also led dispersal and fragmentation of the community, with the members forced to relocate to different places. The BPL families were resettled in Malipuram in plots allotted to them, but the APL families relocated to other places and hence were scattered. The elderly members of the evicted families expressed feelings of loss and longing for they failed to cultivate a sense of belonging to the new place where they had involuntarily relocated. Removed from their places of worship and cultural space, these families have felt alienated in their new surroundings and yearn to go back to Mulavukad. The relationships with non-displaced relatives and neighbours weakened and their interaction reduced due to the distances that separated them. Most evictees felt uprooted from their lands and familiar surroundings inhabited by their successive generations. Interpersonal ties with the APL families of the group weakened as the evicted were divided based on their income levels. This also resulted in considerably weakening and disrupting the activities of the Action Council of evictees as those who were granted land withdrew from the joint struggle. The kinship groups became scattered and this added to the sense of loss and alienation felt by the evictees. Poor endowment of livelihood assets coupled with the stresses and shock of displacement to Malipuram made the poor much more prone to the hazards posed by impoverishment risks, despite the provision of land to the BPL families.

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The second group of evictees from Kalamukku, comprised of similar caste groups such as Dheevara, Ezhava and scheduled castes, but as a class category they would belong to lower middle and middle-class groups. Some members of evictees’ families had white collar jobs in the government or in private sector while some other held blue collar jobs in shops and offices situated in the mainland. Few families also received remittance incomes. Unlike those evicted from Mulavukad, all of the 16 evicted families, even those whose lands were only partly acquired were granted land near their original dwellings, that is, in their neighbourhood itself. As the land granted was in familiar surroundings, close to where they once lived, there was no major sense of loss related to displacement from the locality. As they did not have to leave the place itself, they also benefitted from access to better physical infrastructure which was built for Petronet LNG Ltd. and other new developments in the area. However, people were unhappy with the price compensation fixed on their immovable properties due to appreciating land value and the assignment of fewer cents of land than what they had owned before acquisition. The evicted families have therefore resorted to a legal recourse to claim a higher price. The affected families also harboured another discontent caused by the blatant denial of the promise of a job for a member of the affected families. A secure job in the Company was a dream that the jobseekers aspired for. This, however, was not granted and they had to continue with their earlier jobs or look for other employment in the mainland. Those families, whose houses were only partially demolished, continued to stay in them after making the necessary repairs. But those, whose houses were completely demolished, had to shift to rented accommodation. However, the land allotted to them was readied for construction only two years after acquisition and the provision of basic services such as water and electricity was granted only recently. Due to such a long delay, only two families constructed houses to settle down in the allotted plot. They had to live without electricity for several years. The other risks prone to displaced groups such as marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property and social disarticulation did not affect this group due to the fact that they were not uprooted from Kalamukku. As they could resettle in the same place, neither was the social or cultural fabric torn apart nor were the ties with their lands severed. Resettlement in the same neighbourhood made the affected families co-beneficiaries of infrastructure development and also cushioned them from the several

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impoverishment risks that had been imposed upon the other evicted group from Mulavukad and Puthuvype. The first group of evictees had been made more vulnerable vis-à-vis the other due to the dissimilarity in their initial endowments which was further intensified by the compensation practices implemented by the district administration.

Conclusions The chapter showed that the nature and intensity of risks that could drive displaced groups to impoverishment varied in each local context and that these risks inherent in involuntary relocation could be cushioned or even evaded by appropriate policy responses. However, specific, context-dependent responses from the district administration suited to the livelihoods and prevailing circumstances are needed each time. The apathy and top-down approach of the administration and discrimination in the provision of land adversely affected those displaced from Mulavukad and Puthuvype (the first group), which eventually led to their polarization, while provision of land in Kalamukku itself lessened the intensity of risks imposed on the second group. In the case of those evicted from Mulavukad and Puthuvype, the compensation policy implemented by the concerned institution was not responsive to their specific needs. Compensation policies influence the access to livelihood assets, but in the case of those evicted from Mulavukad and Puthuvype, it did not work in their favour as these did not reflect their requirements. Therefore, those who were already poorly endowed with assets had become more marginalized after relocation to Malipuram. This had led to a feeling of exclusion affecting their wellbeing. Responsive political and administrative structures that device pro-poor policies and implement them can significantly increase people’s sense of wellbeing, thereby helping reduce vulnerability. The forcibly displaced faced several risks which varied with local circumstances and initial endowments of assets. Restoration of incomes, assets and livelihoods therefore needs to be the emphasis of any compensation policy.

Acknowledgements This study is part of the three-year research project ‘Involuntary Resettlement: A Cross-Country Study on Urban Inequality and Poverty’ from the ‘Safe and Inclusive Cities’ (SAIC) global research programme funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada.

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Notes 1 These include the International Container Trans-Shipment Terminal, Petronet Liquefied Natural Gas Plant Ltd., and the Smart City (Kochi) Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. 2 Kochi is classified as a Tier II city by the Government of India. The city, with a population of 612,434, forms a part of the Kochi Urban Agglomeration. The KUA is the largest urban agglomeration in Kerala and has a population of 2,117,990, according to the Census (2011). The city is governed by the Kochi Municipal Corporation, while the statutory bodies formed to administer the development of the region include the Greater Cochin Development Authority (GCDA) and the Goshree Islands Development Authority (GIDA). 3 Inter-related, multi-disciplinary approaches were used which included a longitudinal household survey and a community profiling exercise to generate quantitative database and qualitative database for the larger study on Involuntary Resettlement in Kochi. This chapter uses interviews carried out as part of the detailed social profiling of displaced communities. 4 The idea of a bridge was first conceived by Sahodaran Ayyappan, minister of the erstwhile princely state of Kochi. As the bridge failed to materialize even after several decades, an Action Council of islanders was formed in 1986 to press for the construction of Ernakulam-Vypeen bridges for easier access to better education, health and other facilities and for faster commute to places of work in the mainland. To highlight the need for the bridges, the Council, in 22 August 1989, organized a novel protest by building a bridge using 400 traditional canoes from Bolgatty to the mainland (see The Hindu, K.A. Martin, ‘Celebrating a Decade of Goshree Bridges’, 4 June 2014). 5 The sale of land fetched Rs 343 crore, out of which less than Rs 80 crore was spent for the construction of bridges (Ibid). 6 The Goshree Bridge originates from the reclaimed land adjacent to the mainland and then passes through the islands of Bolgatty and Vallarpadom and ends in Vypeen in a 3,485-m line (Chandramohan, P.V. 2011. ‘The Cochin Connection’, Special Report, November. Available at www. constructionworld.in/). 7 The Petronet LNG Ltd. is a joint venture company promoted by four Public Sector Undertakings, namely, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Bharath Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Gas Authority of India Ltd. This was formed for the import and re-gasification of liquefied natural gas. Petronet LNG Ltd. also entered into a co-developer agreement with Cochin Port Trust. 8 See Judgment of the Kerala High Court, Petronet LNG Limited v. The Superintendent Of Police on 18 June, 2012.

References Bhan, Gautam and Swathi Shivanand. 2013. ‘(Un)Settling the city: Analysing displacement in Delhi from 1990 to 2007’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 48(30), 30 March. Cernea, Michael. 1996. ‘Public policy responses to development-induced population displacement’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31(24), 15 June.

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Cernea, Michael. 2004. Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, and Reconstruction: A model of Population Displacement and Resettlement, Paper presented at the UN Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Development, 27–29 October, Beijing. Coelho, Karen, Venkat, T. and Chandrika, R. 2012. ‘The spatial reproduction of urban poverty: Labour and livelihoods in a slum resettlement colony’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 47(47–48), 1 December. DFID. 2000. Sustainable Livelihood Guidance Sheets. Department for International Development. UK. Available at: www.livelihoods.org. Fernandes, Walter. 1998. Development Induced Displacement in Eastern India in S.C. Dube (ed). Antiquity to Modernity in Tribal India: Volume I: Continuity and Change among Indian Tribals. New Delhi: Interlndia Publications, pp. 217–300. Fernandes, Walter. 2008. ‘Sixty years of development-induced displacement in India: Impacts and the search for alternatives’, in Hari Mohan Mathur (ed.). India: Social Development Report 2008: Development and Displacement. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 89–102. Fernandes, Walter, Das, J. C. and Rao, S. 1989. ‘Displacement and rehabilitation: An estimate of extent and prospects’, in W. Fernandes and E. G. Thukral (eds.), Development, Displacement and Rehabilitation. New Delhi: Indian Social Institute. GLOPP. 2008. DFID’s Sustainable Livelihood Approach and Its Framework. Globalisation and Livelihood Options of People Living in Poverty. Swiss Virtual Campus. Available at: www.glopp.ch/B7/en/multimedia/B7_1_pdf2.pdf. Kothari, M. 2015. The Global Crisis of Displacement and Evictions: A Housing and Land Rights Response. New York: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Available at: www.rosalux-nyc.org/wp-content/files_mf/kothari11.pdf. Mathur, Hari Mohan. 1998. ‘Impoverishment risk model and its use as a planning tool’, in H. M. Mathur and D. Marsden (eds.). Development Projects and Impoverishment Risks: Resettlement of Project-affected People in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Murickan, Jose, George, M. K., Emmanuel, K. A., Boban, Jose and Prakash Pillai, R. 2003. Development-Induced Displacement: Case of Kerala. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. Parasuraman, S. 1999. The Development Dilemma: Displacement in India. London: Macmillan Press and ISS.

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Conflicts and displacement in the Northeast Land, identity and immigrants Walter Fernandes

Because conflicts have been endemic to Northeast India, much of India lives with the myth of the region being one of unrest alone. Some recent conflicts tend to confirm that stereotype in the minds of many. Among them are the July 2012 Bodo-Muslim conflict, the 2014 killing of Muslims after the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, and road blockades in Manipur. Based on this conviction, many justify measures such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which gives extraordinary powers to the security forces including impunity from prosecution. However, to understand the conflicts, one has to know their socio-historical context. This chapter will attempt such an analysis by taking a look at a few recent conflicts.

Land, immigrants and identity That there are conflicts in the Northeast is beyond doubt. To mention but the last three decades, the 1980s witnessed the tribal-Bengali conflict in Shillong in Meghalaya that caused 25,000–35,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Bengali-tribal conflict in Tripura in the same decade killed some 1,700 Bengalis and tribals and caused 190,000 IDPs (Bhaumik 2005: 160–162). Over 30,000 Reang tribals displaced by conflicts in Mizoram in the 1990s continue to live in camps in Tripura (Fernandes, Datta and Avasia 2017: 53). In the 1990s Manipur witnessed the Naga-Kuki and Kuki-Paite conflicts that resulted in the burning of 10,000 houses, the deaths of 2,000 persons, and more than 50,000 IDPs (Hussain and Phanjoubam 2007: 15–16 and 28–30). In the first decade of the third millennium, ethnic conflicts in the Dima Hasao and Karbi Anglong districts of Assam caused 100,000 IDPs (Mangattuthazhe 2008: 47–48). The Bodo territory of Western Assam experienced violence on three occasions in the 1990s. In the accord it signed on an Autonomous Council with the National Democratic

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Front of Bodoland, the Assam Government refused to include around 1,000 villages in the council on the plea that they lacked a Bodo majority. Efforts to ‘create a majority’ resulted in attacks on Bengali Muslims in 1993, Bengali Hindus in 1995 and Santhals in 1996, which caused a total of 350,000 IDPs (Bhaumik 2005: 163–165). Land and immigrants are common factors in the conflicts, the exceptions being the November 2003 Assamese-Bihari conflict that was about jobs; the Karbi-Dimasa conflict of 2005, presumably engineered by a ‘third party’; and the killing of Muslims in the Bodo area after the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, in which the BJP and the Bodo-dominated party had formed an alliance in the Bodo Territorial Administrative Districts (BTAD). But in one constituency, twenty non-Bodo groups joined hands to support Naba Sarania, an independent non-Bodo candidate. The killings the day after the voting were apparently a reprisal to teach the non-Bodos a lesson for voting differently. But Muslims alone were attacked since they are a soft target (Rahman 2014). That is an indication that in recent decades the ethnic and communal angles have gone hand in hand in some cases. For example, the Assam Movement 1979–1985 began on an anti-immigrant plank but later added a communal angle to it. The Bengali-tribal conflict in Tripura has remained a purely anti-immigrant movement to recover tribal land. In Arunachal Pradesh, the conflict with the Hajong and Chakma settlers combines land with identity. In Manipur the immigration issue is added to the local ethnic tension. This chapter discusses some of the conflicts in order to understand the link between immigration, land and identity.

The Assam Movement The 1979–1985 movement was against what the Assamese considered an attack on their identity by the immigrants. Its catalyst was a by-election necessitated by the death of Hiralal Patwari MP in 1978. In 1979 the election commissioner reported an unexpectedly high rise in the number of voters in the electoral rolls. Many observers supported this view (Hussain 1993: 55). The census and other data confirm the reality of some demographic change in the state attributed to immigration. No census could be held in Assam because of the agitation. But according to official estimates, its population grew from 14.6 million in 1971 to 19.9 million in 1981 (36.3 per cent) against the all India growth of 24.7 per cent. According to the ‘Sample Registration of the Government of India’, the natural population growth of Assam was 0.5 per cent less than the all-India figure in 1970–1972,

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and 1.2 per cent less in 1976–1978. According to the 1951 census, 56.7 per cent of the state’s population spoke Assamese. Some allege that in 1961 there was pressure on non-Assamese speakers to declare Assamese as their mother tongue. One does not know whether that is the reason why the Assamese speakers rose to 62.4 per cent in 1961 but declined to 61 per cent in 1971. Simultaneously the proportion of Bengali speakers had increased from 16.5 per cent in 1951, to 18 per cent in 1961, and 19.7 per cent in 1971. Hindi speakers were 3.8 per cent in 1951, 4.8 per cent in 1961, and 5.4 per cent in 1971 (Visaria and Visaria, 1981: 1777–1780). The change is visible over a longer time. The census data show that Assam had 1,944,444 direct migrants in 1951–2001. That is the difference between what would have been its population if its growth had followed the national average and the excess population as shown in the higher growth during each decade (Registrar General and Census Commissioner 2001: 108–109). With natural growth, this number had reached around 40 lakh in 2001, some 17 lakh of them Bengali-speaking Muslims presumably of Bangladeshi origin and 23 lakh Hindi-, Nepali- or Bengali-speaking Hindus (Fernandes 2005: 3238). The Assamese population considered the rise in the non-Assamese proportion a threat to its identity. The All Assam Students’ Union demanded that the by-election be postponed until the names of ‘foreign nationals’ were deleted from the electoral rolls. ‘Subsequently articles in the local newspapers like Dainik Asom gave what they called statistical data on the massive influx of “illegal settlers” many of whom were alleged to be foreign nationals’ (Hussain 1993: 55). When the agitation began in 1979, some speakers called it ‘Assam’s last struggle for survival’ against ‘the cultural, political and demographic transformation by the immigrants’ who threatened to ‘reduce the indigenous to minorities in their own land’ (Ganguly 2013: 57). That explains why the Assamese speakers who led the agitation were supported by the Bodo, Tiwa, Mising and Rabha tribes and the Adivasi. The movement did not begin as anti-Muslim, but slowly the fear of foreigners came to be linked in the minds of a section of the Hindu Assamese speakers with Bengali-speaking Muslims whom they called ‘Bangladeshi immigrants’. This fear resulted in a number of violent incidents like the Nellie massacre of 12 February 1983 in which more than 200 Muslims were killed. The indigenous tribes who led the attack alleged that the Muslims were immigrants who had encroached on their land (Azad 2014). Land and immigration were central to the local people, but outsiders added a communal dimension to it.

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The communal angle The 2014 attacks on the Muslims in the Bodo territory, the Nellie massacre and similar incidents bring to the fore the communal angle visible today in the discussion on immigration. For example, during and after the 2012 Bodo-Muslim conflict statements were reportedly made among others by the Home Ministry and some BJP leaders about the possibility of ‘illegal Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants’ being behind the trouble. While focusing on ‘Bangladeshi Muslims’, very few are aware that both Hindus and Muslims have migrated from Bangladesh to the Northeast, so have Hindus from Bihar, the rest of the Hindi belt and Nepal. Moreover, an impression is created that Bangladeshi immigration is recent, as such illegal. In reality it began in the nineteenth century and continued after the Partition. From 1891 the British regime encouraged East Bengal peasants to cultivate what they called wastelands in western Assam in order to increase food production, exploit forests and other natural resources and enhance land revenue. The administrators also assumed that Assam had a shortage of labour, so workers had to be brought from outside (Singh 1987: 140). What they considered wastelands according to the colonial individual ownership based land laws were in fact the community resources and sustenance of the Bodo and Rabha tribes who formed the majority in Western Assam where the first immigrants flocked. That laid the foundation of the immigrants becoming a source of conflict around land. Moreover, most zamindars in East Bengal were Hindus while peasants were, by and large, Muslim. As a result, 90 per cent of the immigrants were Muslim (Roy 1995: 64). That added a communal dimension to the threat to land caused by their immigration. By the 1920s the immigrants had gone beyond western to Central Assam. Out of fear that Assam was becoming a Muslim majority province at a time when the Partition was in the air, in the 1930s some leaders of the freedom struggle encouraged peasants from Bihar to migrate to Assam. Nepali migrants followed quietly (Zehol 2008: 60–61). That introduced a Hindu-Muslim division among the immigrants. The Adivasi of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh and tribal as well as non-tribal peasants of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa had entered Assam even before 1891. Rendered landless and impoverished by the Permanent Settlement 1793, they were brought to Assam as indentured labour in the tea gardens (Sen 1979: 15–16). They worked in the tea gardens land which was taken over from the local people through devious means by using the Assam Wasteland Rules 1838. Because they worked on that land, the local people considered them enemies though they too were

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victims of the same colonial processes to which the people of Assam had lost their land (Barpujari 1997: 254–258). Thus, immigration has all along been linked to land and identity because of the real or perceived threat to the indigenous people. This exchange of peoples and goods was also instrumental in integrating the economy of the Northeast with that of East Bengal. The immigrants in their turn became active economic agents. The tea garden workers, for example, built the tea industry that is the backbone of the economy of Assam. They also became a source of conflict because of the livelihood and identity issues linked to the demographic change. A communal colour has also been given to the immigration issue. The violence against them around land and identity ‘began with sporadic rural conflicts in the early 20th century, metamorphosed into communal politics over the decades and now to ethnic polarisation’ (Saikia 2012: 14).

The conflicts in Bodoland The transition from land and identity to the communal colour is visible in the Bodo-Muslim conflicts. Many other conflicts in the Northeast have remained at land or identity and have not taken that colour. The 2003 Dimasa-Hmar conflict in Dima Hasao of Assam was linked to land (News item, The Telegraph, 23 April 2003). The October 2003 Karbi-Kuki conflict in Karbi Anglong of Assam was around a regional autonomous council, but basic to it was the Kuki and Karbi identity linked to a territory (Vandekerckhove 2001: 71–72). Immigration, not religion, was basic to them. The 2012 Bodo-Muslim conflict began with the killing of two Bengali-speaking Muslims in early July and two more on 19 July. On 20 July, four former cadres of the Bodo Liberation Tigers that rules the BTAD were found dead in a Muslim-majority village in Kokrajhar district. No one knows who killed them, but rumours spread that Muslims were responsible for it. Anti-Muslim attacks that began with it spread to the neighbouring Chirang district. Several Muslim and a few Bodo villages were burnt down, 59 persons were killed and 400,000 were pushed to the refugee camps. Four more were killed on 5 August. At this stage some fundamentalist forces turned the anti-Muslim action into propaganda against the Bangladeshi immigrants and tried to present all Muslims as illegal immigrants. The sequence of events looks similar to the October 2005 Karbi-Dimasa conflict in Karbi Anglong. Three Karbi auto-rickshaw drivers were killed, no one knows by whom. Rumours spread that the killers were from the Dimasa tribe. The state machinery was silent for

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two days of the killing spree that followed. A study by a civil society group indicated that the riots were engineered by a third party (Mangattuthazhe 2008). In Kokrajhar too, no one knows who killed the Bodos, but it was attributed to Muslims. Retaliation was instant. The state machinery including the Rapid Action Force was passive for two days after the killings. People’s anti-immigrant feelings had by now turned anti-Muslim.

The Bengali-Tribal conflict in Tripura Tripura has not given a religious colour to its conflicts because most Bangladeshi immigrants to the state are Hindus and the tension is around land and identity. Because of their influx, the tribal proportion has declined from 59.8 per cent in 1951 to 31 per cent today (Bera 2012: 10). Like the rest of the Northeast, Tripura too received Partition refugees. By official count, 174,703 of them were registered from mid-1947 to February 1950. But 435,295 more came from 1951 to 1956. A much bigger number came on their own and found their mode of rehabilitation without official assistance or registration (Bhattacharyya 1988: 14). In the 1985 accord with the tribal militants, 1971 was declared the cut-off year for the immigrants to remain in India. That the influx continued beyond 1971 can be seen from the fact that the tribal proportion in the state has declined from 58 per cent in 1951 (Chattopadhyay 1990: 101) to 36.28 per cent in 1971 and to 31.1 per cent in 2001 (Banthia 2001: xlvi). Moreover, the tribes of the state believe that the more than 500,000 post-1950 immigrants are not Partition refugees but immigrants who have come in search of land. Because of their influx the law was changed, and the tribal community land was alienated to the immigrants under the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act 1960 that recognized only individually owned registered land. Though its official reason is land reforms, the tribes feel that its main purpose was to alienate their community land which was not registered in individual names. Until the 1960s 70,000 Bengali families were rehabilitated on such land (Bhattacharyya 1988: 57–58). To it has to be added land alienation through money lending and other forms. According to one estimate, 20 to 40 per cent of tribal land was alienated to the Bengali Hindu immigrants in the 1960s (Bhaumik 2003: 84). More of their community land was lost in the 1970s to the Dumbur dam on the Gumti River, which was built despite their protests. The 32,000 acres it used displaced 8,000 to 9,000 families (45,000 to 50,000 people), but the state counted only 2,361 individual patta-owning families (13,000 people), 2,117 of them tribal and 234 Dalit (Debbarma 2008: 122).

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That lit the fuse. The Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS) (Tripura Tribal Youth League) was formed in June 1967 in reaction to what they considered illegal occupation of their land, and what they perceived as Bengali cultural and political domination and imposition of Bengali as the official language. The TUJS demanded creation of an Autonomous District Council (ADC) under the Sixth Schedule and adoption of Kokborok as an official language (Bhaumik 2003: 85). After TUJS failed to make a mark by protecting or restoring tribal land and identity, Bijoy Hrangkhwal, a tribal leader, formed the Tripura National Volunteers. While the tribes perceived the Dumbur dam as the hallmark of ‘a Bengali dominated government’, the main issue is lack of equity in rehabilitation. The entire migrant population was settled in Tripura, leading to abnormal pressure on tribal land (Ali 2003). Because of the massive tribal land alienation and decline in their proportion, the indigenous tribes feel that they have become foreigners in their own land. One does not have to deal with every incident linked to the conflict. Suffice it to state that land and identity are basic to the conflict. Apparent peace has been bought by granting them an ADC, but their land has not been restored. Moreover, during the last decade the Tripura government has been renaming monuments and other sites after Bengali heroes, for example the Ujaynta Palace, Rabindranath Tagore Airport, Establ Ground as Swami Vivekananda ground and so forth. It seems to be a part of its effort to control the history and memory of the state by creating new ethnic politics. That can fuel the conflict once again.

Blockades in Manipur Though the three bills passed into law in the State Assembly in August 2015 (see below) are presented by one party as immigration related, the reality is local ethnic tension. The Meitei are 60 per cent of the state’s population, but they live in the Imphal Valley, which is 10 per cent of its territory. So they feel deprived. The Naga feel that their land is their birthright and are not prepared to part with it. They also feel that the Meitei monopolize jobs and political power in the state. Moreover, the Naga nationalist outfit NSCN-IM wants Naga reunification which would affect four of the state’s nine districts, or 90 per cent of its land. Thus the tension continues with no dialogue between the communities. The Naga have been demanding the Sixth Schedule, but in April 2010 the state went ahead with elections to the ADCs without the Sixth Schedule.

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In protest, from 12 April 2010 the Naga Students’ Federation and the All Naga Students’ Association Manipur launched the blockade of National Highway 39 connecting Imphal with Kohima (Nagaland). The blockade had serious economic consequences such as very high price of essential commodities since no supplies could reach the state. But it did not solve the problem because neither side yielded to the other. It needs a better understanding between the communities and that can be arrived at only through a dialogue. Then followed the 120-day highway blockade by the Kuki to demand Sadar Hills district. The Nagas treat four hill districts as their homeland and the Meitei consider the valley theirs. The Kuki, the third family of tribes, feel that they do not have a district of their own. Since the Kangpokpi area of Senapati district has a Kuki majority, they want the district to be bifurcated to form the Sadar Hills district. The Naga oppose it since they consider the whole district theirs. The Sadar Hills District Committee formed in 1974 was reinvigorated in 2011 after the election of new leaders. They demanded the formation of the district before 30 July 2011 and began a five-day blockade of NH-2 and NH-37 when it was not granted. It was followed by an indefinite economic blockade from 1 August 2011 (Shivananda, 2011). The Manipur government negotiated a settlement with them and announced plans to form the district on 30 August, a day before the deadline. The Naga organizations opposed it and imposed an economic blockade on all the national highways in Manipur from 21 August 2011. It was lifted on 22 November in response to the call given by the Union Home Minister. Another blockade began on 4 September 2014 in reaction to the killing of two Nagas in Ukhrul district some 85 km from Imphal (Goswami, 2012).

The three bills of 2015 The immigration issue is given as justification by the Meitei for the three bills passed by the Manipur Legislative Assembly on 31 August 2015. They are: 1 2 3

The Protection of Manipur People Bill, 2015. The Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Seventh Amendment) Bill, 2015. The Manipur Shops and Establishments (Second Amendment) Bill, 2015.

The Meitei claim that the Land Revenue Bill puts restrictions on access to land as a measure to check the increasing pressure on it from the

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immigrants. It stipulates that a non-Manipuri person can purchase land only after submitting an application to the Deputy Commissioner and approval of the State Cabinet. But the problem lies in the definition of ‘Manipuri people’. Persons whose names are included in the National Register of Citizens, 1951 and their descendants would be deemed to be Manipuri. The rest would require a permit to reside and conduct business in the State. Thus, the valley people view the bills as a mechanism to protect the state’s people from immigrants. But the Kuki and Naga find in them a threat to their land. They contend that the cut off year of 1951 would exclude most of them as six decades ago the hill areas were inaccessible and not covered by the survey. They feel that the Meitei have passed the bill in order to gain access to their land (Roy 1995). The president has rejected the bills due to the incorrect definition of Manipuri people and the possible constitutional anomaly that can follow from them (Chakravarty 2015). The tribal or hill people’s Joint Action Committee (JAC) continues to demand their withdrawal. The state government and the valley people claim that the bills do not affect the hill people, that they do not affect them. The JAC charter of demands from the central government included their immediate withdrawal bills and a separate political administrative arrangement for the tribal people within the Indian Constitution. It seems clear that though the short-term demand is the withdrawal of the three bills and the protection of their land through constitutional safeguards such as the Sixth Schedule, the long-term demand is an administration that is separate from that of Manipur (Kipgen 2016). The blockade which began in September 2015 continued in different forms. The Naga and the Kuki fought the bills unitedly but midway through the agitation the state government formed the Sadar Hills and other districts, thus dividing them. The Naga-led blockade lasted till the Congress Government was defeated in the February 2017 elections and those who called the blockade joined the BJP-led government in Manipur. The blockade was withdrawn after it. That possibly shows the political links of the blockade. An effort should be made instead to create an atmosphere required to turn Manipur into a shared heritage of all its people.

Arunachal: Chakma-Hajong resettlement Though Arunachal Pradesh has witnessed an influx of immigrants since the nineteenth century, there has been a conflict only around the rehabilitation of the Chakma and Hajong refugees from the Chittagong

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Hill Tracts (CHT) of the erstwhile East Pakistan, or present-day Bangladesh. The indigenous groups of the state perceive the settlers as a threat to their identity, economy and political power. In 1963 the Kaptai dam in the Rangamanti district of Bangladesh displaced around 100,000 Jumma, the name given to the 11 main tribes of CHT. Around 40,000 of them took refuge in India mainly in Tripura, Mizoram and Assam. Between 1964 and 1969 the Government of India resettled 2,748 of their families (15,000 people) on 10,799 acres of land in the Lohit, Subansiri and Tirap districts of Arunachal Pradesh (Talukdar 2008). By 1979, their population had increased to 21,500, in 1991 to 30,064, and in 2011 to 47,471. Because of the population increase, in 1979 some of them were relocated in Bordumsa, Vijaynagar and Diyun in Changlang district. Because of the demographic change and more land used, the Arunachali began to view them as a threat to their identity. The All Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union (AAPSU) started protesting against ‘the diminishing economic slice for the indigenous population’ (Kashyap and Swami, 2015). Legal challenges followed, and on 17 September 1996 the Supreme Court directed the Election Commission (EC) to initiate the process of granting voting rights to the Chakmas and Hajongs. After scrutiny the EC enrolled 1,497 of them in the voters’ list (Saikia 2012: 76–82). That led to bandhs and protests through the 1990s under the aegis of AAPSU because of their fear of loss of identity and resources. AAPSU also protested against the proposal to grant them citizenship. In reaction to the agitation, the security forces shifted the refugees to camps guarded by them, but the camps lacked basic amenities. The AAPSU in its turn continues to issue deadlines for their departure. The conflict is far from over. All the details are not required. Suffice it to state that while the AAPSU is not opposed to granting them citizenship, it opposes the government’s decision to settle them in Arunachal Pradesh as it indirectly makes them Arunachali. Their demand is that they too should be issued Inner Line Permits (ILP) akin to other people from outside the state (Barooah 2015). The ILP allows non-tribals to vote in Arunachal but debars them from buying land or doing business without a local partner. They resent the perceived danger of losing their culture and identity in their own state due to the immigrants. So they demand their eviction from their state. For the Chakma and Hajong, it is a question of their human right to a life with dignity guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. The problem lies in the failure of the Indian government to consult the local people before resettling them in the state. The frequent quit notices issued to the refugees by AAPSU and the government’s inefficiency in finding a long-term solution have

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fuelled the complex socio-political situation. These issues have to be dealt with for peace to reign.

The issues around conflicts The chapter has given a brief overview of conflicts in the Northeast and has discussed five of them. Those who view the Northeast as a land of conflicts alone may use them as examples to justify their stand. The Government of India used this pretext already in 1958 to impose the AFSPA on the region. The Act that has remained unchanged since then gives extraordinary powers to the armed forces. For example a junior officer may arrest a person on mere suspicion of planning a terrorist act. If the person dies in their custody s/he can be declared terrorist killed while escaping. The security persons have immunity against prosecution for such acts. That turns the conflicts into a purely law and order issue. This official view does not cover all the aspects that have led to conflicts in the region. This chapter indicates that one has to go far beyond this limited view. In fact this view may itself be the major problem. For example, abuses are inevitable when the armed forces enjoy such powers and impunity. It has been alleged that on numerous occasions the armed forces have resorted to means that were in excess with respect to the conflict. The impunity they enjoy is often held to be responsible for the alleged excesses such as extrajudicial killings, illegal arrests of innocent civilians, rapes, burning down of villages and other allege atrocities (ACHR 2005). International organizations have called for its repeal as it is against the principles of human rights and the international humanitarian law. However, the government has refused to repeal it. A consequence of its law and order perception is that efforts are made to resolve the conflicts mainly through negotiations with the militant groups and by providing autonomy through statehood, the Sixth Schedule and special economic packages. Although some of the steps have given short-term benefits, they have failed to achieve long-term results because they do not deal with the real causes. For example, unrest in Arunachal Pradesh is caused by the failure of the government to take the people into confidence before resettling the Chakma and Hojai refugees in the state. In Assam it is the failure to recognise the identity and resource issues. In Manipur internal divisions are intensified by the state’s ‘Divide and Rule’ policy. The centre is yet to recognise the specificity of the region, the identity issue and the autonomy that many of its people, all of which come under threat because of immigration (Fernandes and Borgohain 2017: 16–18).

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A sincere effort has to be made to understand the issues involved, and based on it, to form a strategy aimed at achieving genuine peace with justice. One possible step is to allow the tribes to practice their traditional peace and reconciliation methods which are significantly different from the modern state-imposed ones. The traditional method stands a better chance of solving the conflicts between ethnic groups. It is also essential for the government to accord equal importance to all the communities. The state negotiates with one of the militant groups to the exclusion of the rest as well of the general public and civil society. This approach can even give to the youth in this high unemployment region, the message that they have the option of first joining a militant group and then being rehabilitated with a job after their surrender (Mahanta 2008: 105–108). The measures taken should lay the foundation of equitable distribution of land and resources and protection of identity. Because of it many communities in the region perceive the state and the security forces as not neutral. Another sign of lack of neutrality is the communal colour given to immigration. While Hindus of Bangladeshi origin are treated as Indians or as refugees, Muslims are called illegal immigrants. The present NDA government has gone a step ahead and has introduced a bill in the Lok Sabha to recognize Hindus and other minority immigrants as refugees of religious persecution and grant them citizenship in three years. In reality land is the issue. Most Bangladeshi and Bihari immigrants come from a feudal system that has not seen land reforms. Their poverty and low wages are the push factor motivating them to leave their homes and to bribe the security forces into allowing them into the country and officials to give them a patta (Majumdar 2002: 107–108). The pull factors are the land laws in the Brahmaputra valley that treat the CPRs as state property. It is easy for the immigrants to encroach on the CPRs and bribe officials into giving them an ownership certificate and documents such as a fake birth certificate. The availability of low paid unskilled jobs is another pull factor. The population density in Bangladesh was 1,142 in 2010 (Islam 2010) against 397 in Assam in 2011 and lower in the remaining states of the region (www.census2011.co.in/census/ state/assam.html. accessed on 6 August 2012). That population tends to get balanced through immigration (Zehol 2008: 62). Moreover, 20 per cent of Bangladesh is expected to be submerged within two or three decades because of climate change. So the situation will not improve. Equally important is the fact that as agricultural labourers the immigrants know cultivation techniques but do not own land. After encroaching on fertile land in the Northeast they use these techniques

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to grow three crops in a year and prosper while because of historical reasons such as zamindari or shifting cultivation the local culture is one of a single crop (Fernandes and Pereira 2005: 10–11). Thus the local-immigrant encounter is a meeting of two different histories. That becomes one more threat to the locals who that those who encroach on their land prosper at their cost. Amid these and other issues that cause conflicts, one may be tempted to take sides and make statements about the need to stop immigration. It is easier said than done. One cannot implement it as long as there is a vested interest in immigration and poverty and the border security forces can be bribed. Immigrants cannot be forced out of the region without a massive bloodshed. Moreover, 40 per cent of the Indo-Bangladesh border is riverine that cannot be patrolled easily or cannot be fenced. That also explains why 72 per cent of Assam-Bangladesh trade is ‘illegal’ (Mahanta 2008: 101–102).

Conclusion An effort has been made in this chapter to understand the conflicts in the Northeast. It has been analyzed in the context of land, identity and immigration. It is clear from this analysis that the Northeast cannot afford to absorb all the immigrants but one has also to understand the situation of the immigrants. One needs a multi-pronged attack to get over these problems. Changes are required in the land laws to prevent encroachment. Changes in land ownership are required equally in Bihar, UP and the remaining ‘catchment areas’ of the immigrants to ensure that the impoverished agricultural labourers gain access to land or a decent sustenance. As for the Bangladeshi immigrants, the real solution lies in the integrated development of the Northeast and Bangladesh. That can create an economic vested in development and peace.

References ACHR. 2005. The AFSPA: Lawlessness Law Enforcement According to the Law? New Delhi: Asian Centre For Human Rights. Ali Saleem, H. 2003. Mining, the Environment and Indigenous Development Conflicts. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Azad, A. K. 2014, 22 February. From Nagabanda to Nellie, What Lies Beneath. Retrieved 7 December 2016, from caravandaily.com: caravandaily. com/portal/from-nagabanda-to-nellie-what-lies-beneath/. Banthia, Jayant Kumar. 2001. Census of India 2001, Series 1m India, Primary Census Abstract, Scheduled Castes Table A-8. New Delhi: Registrar General and Census Commissioner.

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Barooah, Sanjib. 2015, 17 December. Chakma Issue Roils Arunachal as Supreme Court Decrees End to Their Statelessness. Retrieved 10 December 2016 from The Wire: thewire.in/17017/chakma-issue-roils-arunachal-assupreme-court-decrees-end-to-their-statelessness. Barpujari, S. K. 1997. History of the Dimasas. N.C. Hills: District Autonomous Council. Bera, Gautam Kumar. 2012. Religion and Society in Sovereign Tripura New Delhi. Abhjeet Publications. Bhattacharyya, Gayatri. 1988. Refugee Rehabilitation and Its Impact on Tripura’s Economy. Guwahati: Omsons Publications. Bhaumik, Subir. 2003. ‘Tripura’s Gumti Dam Must Go’, The Ecologist Asia 11 (no. 1, Jan.–Mar), pp. 84–89. Bhaumik, Subir. 2005. ‘India’s North East: Nobody’s People in No Man’s Land’, in Paula Banerjee, Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury and Samir Das (eds.). Internal Displacement in South Asia. New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 144–174. Chakravarty, I. 2015, 2 December. Why This Town in Manipur Refuses to Bury Nine People Who Died Two Months Ago. Retrieved 20 July 2016, from Scroll.in: http://scroll.in/article/766827/why-this-town-in-manipurrefuses-to-bury-nine-people-who-died-two-months-ago. Chattopadhyay, Dilip Kumar. 1990. History of the Assamese Movement since 1947. Calcutta: Minerva. Debbarma, Sukhendu. 2008. ‘Refugee Rehabilitation and Land Alienation in Tripura’, in Walter Fernandes and Sanjay Barbora (eds.). Land, People and Politics: Contest over Tribal Land in North East India. Guwahati: North Eastern Social Research Centre & IWGIA, pp. 113–127. Fernandes, Walter. 2005. ‘ÏMDT Act and Immigration in North Eastern India’, Economic and Political Weekly 40(no. 30), pp. 3237–3240. Fernandes, Walter and Bhaswati Borgohain. 2017. Rethinking Autonomy, Self-Determination and Sovereignty: Search for Peace in Northeast India. Guwahati and New Delhi: North Eastern Social Research Centre and Indian Social Institute. Fernandes, Walter, Anindita Datta and Hardik Avasia. 2017. The Seven Sisters of Northeast India: Resources, Identity and Conflicts. Guwahati: Action Aid and North Eastern Social Research Centre. Fernandes, Walter and Melville Pereira. 2005. Land Relations and Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Northeast India. Guwahati: North Eastern Social Research Centre. Ganguly, R. 2013. Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and South-East Asia. Abingdon: Routledge Publications. Goswami, Namrata. 2012. The Naga Armed Conflict: Is a Resolution Finally here? Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. New Delhi. Hussain, Monirul. 1993. The Assam Movement: Class, Ideology and Identity. New Delhi: Manak Publications. Hussain, Monirul and Pradip Phanjoubam. 2007. A Status Report on Displacement in Assam and Manipur. Kolkata: Manirban Calcutta Research Group.

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Islam, M. Shahidul. 2010. ‘Bangladesh’s High Population Density: Opportunities amidst Anxiety’. South Asian Soundings, 19 November. Website of Institute of South Asian Studies. Kashyap, Samudra Gupta and and Praveen Swami. 2015. Explained: Everything: You need to know about Nagaland Insurgency. The Indian Express. August 4, 2015. Kipgen, D. N. 2016, 21 September. Politics of 3 Bills and 9 Unburied Bodies in Manipur. Retrieved 3 October 2016 from The Huffington Post: www. huffingtonpost.in/entry/politics-of-3-bills-and-9_b_9147904. Mahanta, Nani Gopal. 2008. ‘What Makes Assam a Perpetual Conflict Zone? Going beyond Management to Conflict Transformation’, in Walter Fernandes (ed.). Search for Peace with Justice: Issues around Conflicts in Northeast India. Guwahati: North Eastern Social Research Centre, pp. 97–117. Majumdar, Anindiyo J. 2002. ‘Human Movement and the Nation State: Dimensions of an Indian Crisis in its North-Eastern Region’, in Joshua Thomas (ed.). Dimensions of Displaced People in North-East India. New Delhi: Regency Publications, pp. 91–101. Mangattuthazhe, Tom. 2008. Violence and Search for Peace in KarbiAnglong, Assam. Guwahati: North Eastern Social Research Centre. Rahman, Rafiul Alom. 2014, 23 May. Round Table India. http://roundtableindia. co.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7485:btad-massacrewhat-it-means-to-be-a-bengali-muslim-in-assam&catid=129:events-andactivism&Itemid=195 (accessed February 14, 2017). Registrar General and Census Commissioner. 2001. Provisional Population Totals, Paper 1 of 2001. New Delhi: Controller of Publications. Roy, Ajay. 1995. The Boro Imbroglio. Guwahati: Spectrum Publishers. Saikia, Hiranya. 2012. The Foreigners Issue in Assam. Times of Assam. December 9. Sen, Sunil. 1979. Agrarian Relations in India 1793–1947. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House. Shivananda, H. 2011. Relocate the Security Forces to Lift Economic Blockade on NH 2. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. New Delhi. Singh, B. P. 1987. The Problem of Change: A Study of North-East India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Talukdar, R. B. 2008. Livelihood crisis for Chakma, Hajong Refugees. http:// www.indiatogether.org/2008/sep/hrt-refugee.htm. Vandekerckhove, Nel. 2001. No Land, No Peace: Dynamics of Violent Conflict and Land Use in Assam, India. Ghent: Ghent University. Visaria, Pravin and Leela Visaria. 1981. Indian Population Scene after 1981 Census: A Perspective. Economic and Political Weekly, 16(44–46), pp. 1777–1780. Zehol, Lucy. 2008. ‘Ethnic Conflicts and Tension: North Eastern Experience’, in Walter Fernandes (ed.). op. cit. pp. 44–65.

10 Silent violence and neo bondage in the urban informal sector A study of forced migrants in West Bengal Abhijit Dasgupta and N. Purendra Prasad Given the magnitude of agrarian distress in the countryside and the poor farm-based income, the number of households depending on agriculture as a primary source of livelihood has been declining steadily. In fact, there is compulsion for the small, marginal farmers and agricultural workers to migrate and engage themselves in non-farm activity in rural and/or urban India depending on the availability of work. Several studies indicated that one of the major destinations for internal migration in India is brick kilns (see Guerin et al. 2015; Majumder 2015). Brick kilns provide employment for seven months by starting production operations every October and continue up to the pre-monsoon season the next year. It is reported that distress-induced migrant labourers get tied to brick kilns as soon as they accept advance wage from their agents or middlemen. In the 1970s, drawing on fieldwork in Gujarat, Breman (1996) pointed out the growing importance of footloose labourers who are free from rural bondage. Despite abundant local labour, Breman highlighted the preference of employers for migrant labour, which is floating and captive, mobile and immobile, coming and going according to the needs of the market. Labour arrangements in brick making and sugar cane cutting are typical forms of neo-bondage (Breman 1996). Migration of labouring classes to brick kilns in India is basically their inclusion in the labour market under adverse conditions. With the rise of the real estate industry and huge investment made by the international companies in the city of Kolkata, there has been a spurt in housing projects in the city. This stimulated the growth of the urban informal sector in Kolkata and nearby districts, providing an important avenue for the vast army of labour. With the rise of migrants from rural to urban, the informal sector has also increased in terms of composition of people who perform multiple petty jobs which are

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often unregulated and beyond any welfare schemes (Sanyal and Bhattacharya 2009). In this process a new group of middlemen called sardars emerged as a powerful category who are well connected with both the rural and urban settings. Sardars employ various strategies in regulating the migrants, and the ways in which migrants counter such strategies is the essence of the chapter. In a nutshell, the chapter raises a question whether the migrants today are gaining freedom from rural bondage, as several scholars pointed out (see Breman 1996; Shah 2006), or getting trapped into new forms of bondage in urban informal sector. This chapter is based on the findings from an empirical study conducted during 2014–2015 in the nearby districts of Kolkata, particularly South and North 24 Parganas in West Bengal. A significant proportion of migrants to the brick kilns of Budge Budge in South 24 Parganas come from Janjgir-Champa district of Chhattisgarh belonging mostly to the suryavanshi panth,1 while a large number of migrants to the Keutia brick kilns in North 24 Parganas come from Nawada, Jamui and Gaya district of Bihar. Our study focused on these two brick kilns.

I. Role of Middlemen in Urban Informal Sector In the context of growing agrarian distress and the lack of farm work in Indian villages, hiring out has become one of the important ways of finding livelihood for poor men and women in rural India (Rogaly 1995). As the local rural economy cannot retain them throughout the year, the labourers often migrate to engage in short-term multiple jobs in supplementing the income at the villages. Our study respondents indicated that migrants enter into even hazardous jobs involuntarily in the urban informal sector due to lack of choice. In comparison to the available work in agriculture, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) or other petty jobs in the villages, annual income from brick making is better which is what motivates the workers. The prospect of regular work for six to seven months and the advance provided during the monsoon, before the start of the working season, encourages the workers to accept even harsh working conditions. Their income comes at the cost of very long working days (12 to 16 hours) for brick kiln workers, half of which are at night. Brick kiln workers’ narratives indicated that it is a power relation between the employers and the workers, and that it is the middlemen or sardars who define and set the terms and condition of labour arrangements. There is a growing class of sardars who control

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a greater share of information and the types of jobs to be offered for the unskilled migrants. Describing the role of sardars, Rogaly et al. (2001) in their study in Bardhaman district of West Bengal argued about the recruitment and different types of contractual agreements that they execute. Sardar is recognized as one who would travel to the workplace in advance, collect the money and the details of the type of the migrant workers needed in the workplace. In fact, the sardars are deeply embedded in kinship and social relations and hence prefer their own caste members for job opportunities, creating caste solidarity among themselves. Migrant labourers belong to marginalized communities while their employers are from the higher echelons of society. As Servet pointed out, even if the working relation is mainly of an economic nature and even if these labour management methods obey capitalist rules (controlling labour and compressing costs) bondage arises in communities where the vertical ties of subordination, historically and socially rooted in the consciousness of both employers and workers are still strong enough to make it acceptable (cited in Guerin et al. 2015). Sardars in brick kilns are similar to what Breman (1996) described in the villages of south Gujarat as mukadams who recruit gangs of outgoing seasonal migrants on the basis of orders provided by the employers of organization under which they work. These mukadams sometimes called as jobber-gang boss/labour broker recruits thousands of harvest workers for the work in different sectors like construction work, brick kiln work. Breman (1996) talks about such mukadams in the brick kilns where they provided advances to the needy migrants who then work in the places where the mukadams take them – be it brick kilns or any other sectors of urban informal sectors. It is because of their networks and contacts, these sardars are often given huge advances of money by their employers so that they secure a reliable supply of labour and also tie labourers under same contractors. For the newer sardars, initial days are tougher as they have to also put out their own money along with the little money that they manage to get from their contractor. A newer sardar, who is new to a business, leads a precarious life as if he does not fulfil his duty to recruit workers for the organization or for his contractor then, he may have to compensate for the loss from his own pocket. On the other hand, if he fails to pay the wages to the labourers then he might have a good chance to get beaten up by the labourers also (Mosse and Gupta 2005). So it is important to acknowledge here that the sardars/mukadams are also under constant pressure to meet the growing demand of the market, the commands and orders from their employers and also occasional

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tussle with their labourers. In the context of the brick kilns of West Bengal, the sardars have their own insecurities to deal with and one needs to pay attention to such insecurities as well. While discussing about the brick kiln of the two parganas, the findings point out that few sardars like the migrants also have poor landholdings, not more than 2–3 acres of land. How these sardars operate, and in what ways they take care of the migrants and their consumption shortfalls, will be discussed in the next section.

II. Sardars and Migrant Networks The networking and operation of sardars and the increase of migrants in the peri-urban areas of Kolkata, particularly in the two parganas, should be understood in the light of rapid growth of housing and construction industry within the larger discourse of building world-class cities. The city of Kolkata receives migrants not only from other districts but also other states. With the mushrooming of different mills like paper mills, jute mills and other variety of industries like dockyards, the city attracted large number of migrants. With economic crisis hitting the city in post-1990s, the jute mills in the state slowly started to die down, but the city along with its industrial areas remain a home for many migrants coming mostly from the border districts of Orissa, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (Shaw 2007). Not only from other states, Roy (2003) showed that a pattern of distress migration is also found from the villages of southern West Bengal to the metropolitan region of Kolkata during the 1990s. With proactive industrial policies by the Left Front government in 2000, Kolkata attracted investment on several housing projects, for example Rajarhat Township, developed by the West Bengal Housing Board, East Kolkata and Baishnabghata-Patuli township, by the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority and many more (Sengupta and Tipple 2007). Today, the places such as Rajarhat in Kolkata are booming with new multinational organizations like DLF, Keppel Land, Unitech, Singapore-based companies like Ascendas, along with many other IT companies. Not only have multinational companies found space in the city, but simultaneously there have also been increases in the number of gated communities and residential buildings in the city. The township development is also a response to the increasing demand for better residential facilities especially from the newly formed elite comprising non-residential Indians (NRI) and the IT professionals working in the computer, electronic and telecom sectors. As Roy (2003) explicitly argues that creating of Rajarhat as a millennial city was a symbolic way through which the Bengali middle

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and upper class (bhadralok) wanted a space of their own to reproduce the social and cultural capital which has a strong inherent connection to land and property. Thus housing multiplexes and colossal skyscrapers have become a catalyst for economic growth and modernization (Sengupta and Tipple 2007). It is important to mention that the case of Rajarhat-New Town as a new township has attracted the middle-class aspirations to stay in gated communities, facilitating the rise of construction and its allied industries. The idea and the boom in the real estate housing became an important strategy to fulfil the dreams of the elite and middle classes. With such intention, the state government decided to facilitate reforms through privatization. As the pressure of creating a world-class city increased, the local peasants and land-owning farmers came under threat as their land was in high demand. The new urban economy provided jobs as maids, drivers, security guards and even some turned into local intermediaries and agents of builders and construction companies (Kundu 2016). The growth of such intermediaries due to the construction industry and overall compulsions of the brick kiln located near Kolkata provided certain opportunities for labour recruitment. Field data showed that there was a network of relation between different layers of sardars and their interrelation with the brick kiln owners/employers. This in fact resulted in the chain of dependence for the migrants over their employers, thus putting them in several exploitative modes. The findings from the South 24 Parganas indicate that a sardar’s role demands a greater connection with the urban job market by developing new connection with the brick kiln employers and reviving the old ones. The sardar’s association with the urban world provides them the needed charisma and contacts to control the migrants and keep them subordinated. These sardars generally take advantage of the desperate condition of the labourers, by providing them cash advances ranging as per migrants and families’ consumption needs which ties the labourers not just for a year that they initially offer, but also at times for next visits and sometimes even life beyond the workplaces. These migrants with less options and no knowledge about the consequences of such transaction often end up in acute financial crisis and also in physical violence. The field narrative also indicates different forms of exploitation, which is not necessarily about cheating the labourers by not honouring the promised payments but the exploitation traverses to other spheres as well. The subordination or the discrimination that the migrants encounter starts from the recruitment process based on kin/caste/gender, where they are not given adequate information about the places of destination, then to that of nature and the intensity of the

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work conditions. The sardar lures them by persuading the migrants with false promises and hopes about the life in the city including ‘free food-lodging’ followed by a range of secondary benefits they will be entitled to get. All the negotiations and the dialogue that happens between the sardars and the migrants are oral promises and there is no written agreement whatsoever. These sardars who are supposed to play a link between the migrants and the brick kiln employers are often found missing from the brick kilns soon after the commencement of the brick kiln season. The invisibility of the sardars makes the migrants vulnerable, as they do not have anyone to approach during the time of crisis. One moment of crisis can be at the weekly allowances when the migrant labourer takes money from their account for daily expenses. The money that they take as allowances are not written down clearly, making the transaction at the end of the season difficult. Due to such informal way of transaction and the migrant’s incapability to read and write make them exploited from their own labour cost. The migrant workers will have to be at the beck and call of sardars, as they have provided the cash advances and employment in overcoming the crisis during the lean seasons of their farm work. One should note that there are at least two or three sardars in the chain of middlemen between migrant labourers and brick kiln employers. The moment the sardar (S1) the first level of contact becomes invisible; the migrants face hardships at every level in the workplace. The invisibility of the sardars also makes them vulnerable to the local politics as the migrants do not possess much knowledge either in terms of language or in terms of geographical diversity of the host places. This absence of direct contact increases the gap between the migrants and host place, leaving the migrants in a difficult position. The sardars (S1) invoke their familiarity in the village and recruit the migrants based on the kinship and other primordial ties, using fictitious kinship terms such as dada/mama/kaka (uncle) of the migrant labourers in the brick kilns. Such fictitious kinship puts lot of obligations in their relation but turns out to be exploitative at the end of it. Interestingly, a few sardars make their family members work in the brick kilns on par with migrant labourers, but on much less rigid terms and conditions. A small group of these workers in the brick kilns are found to be the relatives of sardars, who do not have to pay commission to the sardar and live less like that of a migrant labourer but more as an agent of sardar. The study findings from the South 24 Parganas revealed that migrants are powerless as they do not have the right to ‘choose’ one sardar over another, nor do they have the

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freedom to exit as and when they want to. The patron-client relationship that one notices here in the brick kiln between the migrants and the sardars manifests coercive relation that the patron exerts over the clients. Today, the criteria of being a patron is not only based on the ritual status or high caste status but is based on the sardar’s family credibility, his association with the urban world and also his ability to persuade and control large group of labour migrated. The sardars also belong to the same caste of the migrants and come from the same village to that of migrants. In this process of understanding the relation between the sardar and the migrant labourers, one notices re-emergence of new forms of un-freedom which ranges from unfair recruitment procedure to misinformation about the work sites to exploitation in terms of monetary terms. Exploitation at such levels along with debt-bondage and even control over one’s movement outside the workplace only indicates the grim reality of the informal economy. For the migrants, the problems are manifold. Apart from dealing with the oppressive practices of the sardars, they also need to deal with the local labourers at the workplace who refer them as bideshis.2 The problem mainly arises, due to the poor language skills along with segmentation of their work which does not allow them to have much interaction with the local population, thus maintaining a distance between them. Here one needs to understand the dynamics between different sardars. The invisibility of sardar (S1) from the brick kilns is also due to the fact that some of these sardars have to get engaged with multiple jobs. This is because these sardars are also insecure at different levels about their job, competition among one another to get the best bid with the brick kiln owners in the market and so forth. As discussed, the new sardars (beginners) are sometimes under lot of pressure to provide a large contingent of labourers to their employers. These compulsions make them in turn to resort to unfair means of recruitment, skewed payments and violent ways of controlling the migrants. Thus the character of the informal sector need to be understood for it does not allow anyone to be secure whether the migrant or sardars as far as their jobs are concerned. The chapter now focuses on the second field site: North 24 Parganas. The brick kilns located in the villages near of Keutia in the district of North 24 Parganas has several small and medium industrial units producing minerals, dairy and textile products. The North 24 Parganas population increased over a period of time, with the rising number of migrants to jute mills (see De Haan 1994) for employment till 1990s and now in brick kilns. According to the brick kiln owner Shymal, there are over 600 brick kilns operating in the North 24 Parganas

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alone, which includes migrants, local labour, women and children. The inter-generational migrants from these districts have an interesting story to tell as far as their lineages are concerned. The current Bihari workers in brick kilns informed that their ancestors were all workers in the different jute mills in the district. The migrants were initially seasonal in nature and used to come to the jute mills as they were seen as always ‘available’ and ‘cheap’ labour. As the mills in the North 24 Parganas stopped providing employment, the pattern, nature and type of work changed for the migrants. These migrants became jobless and sought job as agricultural labourers in other districts of Bihar or turned to brick kilns work in North 24 Parganas. The brick kilns were seen as an alternative work site which had the potential to absorb the large fleeting labour population from Bihar. The current Bihari migrants continued to be seasonal migrants similar to their ancestors for a long time but in the last decade, they started to settle down in the areas around the brick kilns. The shift from being seasonal migrants to ‘settled migrants’ became an important turning point in their lives. According to Arun, one of the Bihari migrant labourers after the closure of the jute mills, our fathers were out of work for many months, we all went back home and took up farm as well as non-farm work, but we were on the lookout for work in North 24 Paraganas as we had connections here. When brick kilns provided an opportunity, we all joined and gradually settled down as permanent residents of this village. The field narratives indicated the various ordeals that the Bihari migrants had to go through when they migrated with the web of networks offered by the sardars. To narrate one of the Bihari migrants, Rajender’s story can be useful: ‘my experience with sardars, has been like a nightmare and once the sardar threatened me that if I go back to the village without repaying the loan, then my house will be burnt’. In their everyday struggle between the migrants and sardars, a group of Bihari migrants found a way to negotiate directly with the brick kiln owners. The strategy worked and they came out of the clutches of sardars and turned as permanent residents of the village in the last decade. Rakesh, one of the Bihari respondents from North 24 Parganas remarked that the tensions and anxieties that they had to face every day in fulfilling the sardar’s demands forced them to develop these strategies to deal with the sardars in this particular district. The shift was only possible as the migrants decided to develop new liaisons

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with the brick kiln owners as it was seen as mutually advantageous. The migrants in the brick kilns of the North 24 Parganas claim that elimination of the sardars has given the migrants better agency in terms of controlling their economic and social life. Although these narratives from North 24 Parganas showed hope and some alternatives due to the solidarity forged by a few conscious workers, but their story is also complex. The brick kiln employers saw it as an opportunity to control the workers directly instead of routing through sardars. When Bihari migrants were seasonal, there was uncertainty from the point of view of kiln employers in getting required numbers to do various tasks at different points of time in the kilns. Therefore the kiln owners decided to provide housing and other basic facilities so that the migrants stay in the brick kiln premises. The labourers started to live in the brick kiln premises and formed their own colonies over the years. Our discussion with the brick kiln owners revealed that the Bihari migrants have ration cards, bank accounts and insurance schemes and they have some locus standi now. However the detailed interviews with the Bihari migrants revealed that it is not an act of benevolence by the kiln employers, rather they saw it as an opportunity to control the labour directly. The Bihari workers indicated that the brick kiln owners have assumed similar traits of the sardars and have devised ways of extracting commission from them. Thus the phenomenon of controlling labour and extraction acquired new form in North 24 Parganas. Apart from the brick kiln owners absorbing ‘sardar-like traits’, there have been also contradictions between the local and the Bihari migrants over buying agricultural land in the vicinity. The Bihari migrants who are living in the brick kiln premises for years still do not have right to own cultivable lands. During the brick kiln off seasons, they work as labourers in some local landowner’s field, or in petty jobs such as grocery shops, mechanic shops and so on. It is interesting to note that Bihari residents feel alienated as locals still see them as outsiders. In both the parganas, the migrants are forced victims either of the brick kiln employers or the sardars. It indicates how brick kiln production process is structured in such a way that workers remain as powerless and bonded. Although seasonal migration is an attempt to overcome the hardships in the agrarian sector, but the work in informal sector creates new forms of unfreedom in the urban spaces. These spaces instead of being liberating actually push them into a vicious cycle of despair and subordination. Thus the hope that they bring with themselves from their villages of experiencing better lifestyle and encountering the benefits of the urban world, gets all dissipated due to this new kind of

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unfreedom. Therefore, relation between the migrants and the sardars can be characterized as coercion and exploitation because irrespective of how much work each migrant worker’s family puts in, one is made to believe that they have not earned enough to pay back the advances taken from the sardars. The continuous movement between farm and non-farm work does not provide them with much social security that they expected rather they end up spending considerable amount of money in their daily chores. With all such transactions between the migrants and their sardars, the migrants end up with little or no savings for their family needs. These processes in brick kilns render the migrants vulnerable and make them subject to constant violence without any space for articulating their grievances. Also due to their footlooseness, they are not considered the responsibility by either of the states, be the place of origin or the place of destination. They are hence at the margins and are excluded from both the state government’s jurisdiction. For example, the Interstate Migrant Workmen Act (1979), the main instrument to regulate migration has limitation as it does not take into consideration many issues of seasonal migrants. For this act to be applicable, the migrants are expected to go through the contractors who are registered with the state. Because they are recruited through sardars, and are migrating voluntarily on their own, there is no provision for any protection from the Act. Second, the act makes it a point that the contractors register themselves with the concerned labour office so that they can get the licenses. For instance, the sardar who brings Chatisgarhi migrants in the two brick kilns of South 24 Parganas, are needed to be registered in Bilaspur, for getting the license. However, our fieldwork revealed that out of the ten sardars interviewed, the two local Bengali sardars who bring migrant labourers from other districts of West Bengal like Howrah, Puruliya do not have any licenses and told us that licenses are only required for the interstate sardars. When the inter-state sardars were asked, they claimed to have licenses but when probed further, they stated several reasons why they could not register themselves. Thus several social security and legal protection mechanisms have been put in place on paper by the state, but they are ineffective on the ground.

III. Violence and Neobondage From the preceding discussion, it is quite evident that the migrants in both the districts are subjected to different forms of violence and bondage. The study findings clearly indicate the processes through

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which ‘unfreedom’ and exploitation is unabated which is corroborated by several other studies. For instance, Picherit (2009) in his work on maistries in Andhra Pradesh argues that relations maistry shares with migrants revolve around different shades of violence which are more symbolic at times than physical. In the fieldwork discussed above, symbolic has been referred in the sense that the sardar has a tendency to recruit migrants from the same caste and often appoints his own kin members as workers to act as a vigilante. According to Oslen and Murthy (2000) many migrant workers have no scope to negotiate with the maistries as they are too destitute. Most of them have no land or any sort of capital to fight for their rights or to fall back on other secondary resources. In the brick kilns of South 24 Parganas, one of the migrants, Sanjeev from Chhattisgarh, remarked that ‘I know that I do not gain much from the brick kilns, but I do not have much choice. I have to follow my sardar wherever he takes me’. This narrative expressed a certain kind of forced migration as the migrant’s life journey is controlled by the sardars as his knowledge about work leads to his power. It is the sardar’s prerogative to choose, decide and control the migrants to accompany him to the workplace. The exploitative practices in the brick kilns continue in terms of controlling the bodies of women, men and children. There are specific works for women and children with strict geographical demarcation. During the working hours, interaction is prohibited or allowed at a minimal level. The work in the brick kiln is very much based on the geographical locations of the migrants and it has been noticed that the local workers do not interact much with the migrants, citing issues related to language. One of the Chhattisgarhi migrant labourers, Raj, remarked ‘that the palm tree there in the field separates “us” from “them”. The brick kiln employees have strictly told us not to talk, gossip and waste time with the local workers. We want to work hard and pay back the money as soon as possible’. The field data from South 24 Parganas brick kilns revealed that the migrant women workers are substantial in number and that their position is more dismal in terms of imposing domination and patriarchal values. The women workers had no idea about the advances taken or how much money their husbands collect from the weekly allowances. Women workers are a lot more helpless and are kept outside the decision-making process. In the brick kilns, one of the migrant women, Sheela from Chhattisgarh, remarked ‘my husband keeps a track of all the money matters and he talks with our sardar about wages. I have only come here to work’. Different narratives and experiences from the women migrant labourers throw light on how they have minimal

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idea about the work for which they have been hired, but at the same time they are often subjected to disputes with the local labourers who call them ‘loose’ or ‘dirty’ women. The women workers said ‘we do not understand why our cash advances turned into wage debts never come to an end?’ Another woman respondent said that ‘we heard that once our husbands take cash advances, we are forced to pay 25% of it as commission to the sardars’. Some of the migrants who are unable to pay the commission or cannot afford to pay the advances on time, do not understand that working under sardars in the villages or away from brick kilns in farm work is also a continuation of the freedom being controlled by the sardar. It is also important to understand how ‘surplus value exploitation’ takes place in the kilns. Not only are the migrants cheated with their monetary transactions, but outside the brick kilns, in host villages too they had to perform work if the debt is not fulfilled. The discrimination also happens in the local markets as the migrants are often cheated with grocery and vegetable products sold at higher prices. There are also occasional episodes of violence as the local people in the villages surrounding the brick kilns are always suspicious about the non-Bengali migrants due to the instances of robbery, theft and even smuggling of young boys and girls to other states. The local population attitude to such migrants reveals that ‘it is difficult to trust new people every season. Most of them are footloose, and they don’t come to the same place every time’. Thus, apart from managing the brick kiln work and paying the debt, they also had to deal with such daily episodes of violence affecting their wellbeing. This chapter highlights how a different form of violence and neo-bondage is being produced in the urban informal sector. Elaborating this point, Prakash (1990) says that it is based on a relationship of indebtedness of an employee to the employer as the ‘generous money offered as advance’ or in common parlance a loan signifies a surrender of labour power that the labourers offer to the master or the creditor. As Breman and Guerin (2009) propose in the context of brick kilns that the time period of migrant’s work in brick kilns leads to elimination of all agency to debate and argues about the rightful wages that they do not receive till the end. Such forms of payment bear resemblance to the characteristics of a form of bondage and indicate that indebtedness can be considered as neo-bondage. Carrying the trajectory of their discourse of neo bondage forward, it can be argued that rise of such new forms of bonded labour can be seen in connection with the reinforcement of the ‘casualization and the informalisation of labour relationships’. It makes senses for one to see that neo bondage

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is a result of commodities becoming monetized at an alarming level and due to unsteady job markets and the constant fear of losing jobs in such competitive labour market, choosing and perhaps not raising voices to work under one man of same caste and village may be seen as strategy of securing one’s job (Breman and Guerin 2009: 6).

Conclusion This chapter tried to engage with the arguments of the existing scholarship on the ever-growing informal sector in urban areas and how the rural migrant labour is drawn into the wider circles of debt bondage and new forms of exploitation. The study is based on an ethnographic study in 24 North and South Parganas and it tries to trace the conditions under which agricultural workers see brick kiln work as an alternative employment. Also the migrants perceived that because brick kilns work offers one-time big cash advances along with a promise of higher wages, better living conditions in urban area, it is beneficial for the migrants. However, the accumulation strategies of urban entrepreneurs (in this case brick kiln owners) created layers of middlemen to extract the tedious work from migrants at suboptimal cost. The chapter in fact discusses the relation between sardars and migrant workers, sardars (S1) and sardars (S2), employers and migrant workers and highlights how ‘power’ operates in the web of relations. The relationship between migrants and sardars in the Parganas does exhibit some forms of power and coercion that directly has an influence over the migrants and their families. The study findings indicate that there is enormous violence that is inflicted on the helpless migrants who do not have an agency either in rural (at their own villages) or in urban (the kiln work site) as the employers control the workers through layers of sardars. Sardars, in order to be competitive and sustain themselves in the market, use social (caste and kin networks), economic (cash advances, debt bondage), and political (lacunae in the state policies) networks to create conditions of subordination. This in turn makes the workers’ labour power cheaper and docile. To sum up, these contemporary forms of bondage as Guerin et al. (2015) point out are not a remnant of the past but a key feature of the present-day capitalism.

Notes 1 Suryavanshi Panth is a small sect in Chhattisgarh with membership from Dalit background. 2 Bideshi in Bengali denotes someone who is not a native of the land.

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References Breman, Jan. Footloose Labour: Working in India’s Informal Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996. Breman J and Guerin. 2009. “Introduction On Bondage: Old and New” In Breman, J., Guérin, I. and Prakash A (eds). India’s Unfree Workforce: Of Bondage Old and New. New Delhi. Oxford University Press. De Haan, Arjan. Unsettled Settlers: Migrant Workers and Industrial Capitalism in Calcutta. Rotterdam: Verolen. 1994. Guerin, Isabelle, G. Venkatasubramanian, and S. Kumar. ‘Debt Bondage and the Tricks of Capital’. Economic and Political Weekly, 50, no’s 26 & 27 (2015): 11–18. Kundu, Ratula. ‘The Village in the Urban and the Urban in the Village: Making Sense of Place in Rajarhat New Town’. Economic and Political Weekly, 51, no. 17 (2016): 93–101. Majumder, Bhaskar. ‘Forced Migration of Labourers to Brick Kilns in Uttar Pradesh – an Exploratory Analysis’. Economic and Political Weekly, 50, no’s 26 & 27 (2015): 19–26. Mosse, David and Sanjeev Gupta. ‘On the Margins in the City: Adivasi Seasonal Labour Migratory in Western India’. Economic and Political Weekly, 40, no. 28 (2005): 3025–3038. Oslen, K. Wendy and R. V. Ramana Murthy. ‘Contract Labour and Bondage in Andhra Pradesh’. Journal of Social and Political Thought, 1, no. 2 (2000). From www.yorku.ca/jspot/2/wkolsenrvramana.htm Accessed 20 May 2017. Picherit, D (2009). ‘Workers, trust us!’: Labour middlemen and the rise of the lower castes in Andhra Pradesh. In Breman, J., Guérin, I., and Prakash, A. (Eds.), India’s Unfree Workforce: Of Bondage Old and New. New Delhi. Oxford University Press. Prakash, Gyan. Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labour Servitude in Colonial India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990. Rogaly, Ben. ‘Contractual Arrangements for Rural Workers in Asia’. Development in Practice, 5, no. 2 (1995): 165–169. Rogaly, Ben et al. ‘Seasonal Migration, Social Change and Migrants Right: Lessons from West Bengal’. Economic and Political Weekly, 36, no. 49 (2001): 4547–4559. Roy, Ananya. Calcutta Requiem: Gender and the Politics of Poverty. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2003. Sanyal, Kalyan and Rajesh Bhattacharya. ‘Beyond the Factory: Globalisation, Informalisation of Production and the New Locations of Labour’. Economic and Political Weekly, 44, no. 22 (2009): 35–44. Sengupta, Urmi and Allan G. Tipple. ‘The Performance of the Public Sector Housing in Kolkata, India in the Post-Reform Milieu’. Urban Studies, 44, no. 10 (2007): 2009–2027. Shah, Alpa. ‘The Labour of Love-Seasonal Migration from Jharkhand to the Brick Kilns of Other States in India’. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 40, no. 91 (2006): 93–118. Shaw, Annapurna, ed., Indian Cities in Transition. Chennai: Orient Blackswan Publisher. 2007.

11 The geography of economic migrants Characteristics and location in Bengaluru1 Kala Seetharam Sridhar and K. C. Smitha While there is considerable research on the intra-spatial distribution of migrants within a city, in this chapter, we look at the phenomenon in the context of Bengaluru, which is home to a large number of migrants. We examine how, if at all, the spatial development of Bengaluru (see Sridhar (2007)) has pushed the poor outside of the central city. The findings in this chapter are based on large primary surveys of Bengaluru’s households, which are being funded by the Indian Council of Social Science Research and Azim Premji University Research Grants Foundation. The intra-city location of migrants is important to study because the delivery of public services such as roads, sanitation and solid waste management is typically poor in the periphery of Indian cities such as Bengaluru, hence it is relevant to understand the profile of migrants who contribute significantly to the city economies where they locate (see also Sridhar, Reddy and Srinath (2013)). In this chapter, we examine individuals who migrated to Bengaluru in search of employment, whom we call the ‘economic migrants’. There is substantive credence to making this ‘economic’ assumption, given the revelation from the National Sample Survey 2007–2008 that 32 per cent (not 20 per cent as pointed out by the Economic Survey of 2017–2018) of all inter-state migrants moved for employment, as pointed out recently by Kundu and Mohanan (2017). We study economic migrants into Bengaluru in the context of their occupation, income and education, hypothesizing that those migrants with lower levels of education and incomes would be those living in a more peripheral location. It is possible to examine the preceding question since the primary surveys have been done in 27 representative wards of the city, and it is feasible to examine if those with lower education, in occupations with lower skills, and consequently lower incomes, are in more peripheral locations, compared to their

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counterparts with higher levels of education, occupations which require higher skills, and higher incomes, who presumably reside in more central locations. Another hypothesis is that those who have moved in earlier to the city also reside in more central locations compared to those who have moved recently. Hence the chapter examines the spatial distribution of migrants within the metropolitan area, by their income, occupation and education levels, and temporally. We also study and model the determinants of the decision of migrants to locate in the centre vis-à-vis the periphery. The chapter is organized as follows. First, a brief review of the literature on the spatial distribution of migrants is presented, following which there is a succinct section on methodology of the study, following which the findings from the data set are presented, focusing first on the profile of migrants, then on the differences across those who locate centrally and peripherally. Then the chapter reports results from a probit model that was estimated to understand what factors motivate migrants to locate within the metropolitan area. The chapter concludes with a summary and policy implications.

Existing literature While there is a vast amount of literature on migrants, this chapter focuses more narrowly on the spatial distribution of migrants within cities, given the scope of what is attempted here. Ozo (1986) documented the locational pattern, and subsequent residential mobility, of new migrants in Benin City, Nigeria, finding that as a result of sentimental attachment to village of origin, migrants from the adjoining rural region tended to have a bias in their city location for a sector of the city lying in the same direction with their village of origin. The chapter also reported a pattern of out-migration from the inner zone of the city. Ahmad (1992) analyzed initial settlement patterns, locational choice between neighbourhoods and mobility behaviour of migrant households in Karachi. A key finding was that ethnic considerations are dominating choice of location and also a major influence on the subsequent mobility of migrant households. Therefore, residential segregation in terms of ethnicity is likely to increase as more migrants come into the city. This may have disastrous spatial consequences in view of the increased ethnic disturbances in the city. The migrant households are also seen to settle mostly in peripheral Katchi Abadis, which is stretching the city outward, similar with Bengaluru, and what we find in this chapter. Locating close to major employment centres was not

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found to be an important consideration for the migrants but accommodation near workplaces was still preferred. Schell and Graicer (1993), while analyzing migration to the inner city of Tel Aviv, argued that the process was triggered off by the decline in new constructions relative to the constitution of new households in Israel. But a back-to-the-city movement was not stimulated by manipulative elite or by the decline in housing prices in the inner city. Instead, the inner city became the preferred location of several groups of lifestyles including young urbanites, yuppies and dinkies, and young mobile households, as well as more family-oriented households seeking high-status flats in the inner city. Dokmeci and Berkoz (2000) investigate residential-location preferences with respect to different age groups, household sizes and income groups in Istanbul. The results showed a strong desire for mobility in middle and older age groups, which is in contrast with the findings of studies focused on the West. While young people’s preferences were found to be concentrated in the periphery, a large percentage of middle and older age groups preferred to move to the intermediate area between the core and the periphery, which happened to be the most easily accessible zone in the city for work, reinforcing the standard urban models. Wu (2006) found, using the cases of Beijing and Shanghai, that demographic factors such as age and education were significant predictors of both actual moves and prospective mobility within these cities. Migrants who rented public housing as their initial housing choice were much less likely to make moves subsequently. Longer-term migrants seemed to gain some degree of residential stability, making duration of residence the single most influential factor for mobility rate. Vaughan and Feindt (2007) studied migrant settlement patterns in Monterrey, Mexico, by investigating two components: (1) points of entry and (2) intra-city mobility. It was found that migrants arriving in Monterrey from rural and small-town backgrounds tended to concentrate outside the central city on arrival. Generally migrants who changed neighborhoods after arrival tended to direct their moves outward from the site of their initial location. However, even in the case of migrants who settled in the central parts of the city and then moved outward, only a fifth relocated at the extreme periphery. Substantial numbers moved only short distances or moved toward the centre of the city. While in recent years migrants involved in peripherally directed moves tended to experience more occupational mobility than other migrants, about three-fourths of the outward movers experienced little or no upward occupational mobility between arrival and move. Furthermore, more than three-fifths of upwardly mobile migrants either did not move or relocated closer to the centre of the city.

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Wu (2008) attempted to understand the geography of migrant residents taking the case of metropolitan Shanghai, with data drawn primarily from the 2000 Population Census, 1996 Basic Establishment Census, and a migrant housing survey completed in 1999. He found that the migrant distribution in metropolitan Shanghai displayed a strong degree of centrality until the late 1990s when the inner suburb became the main receptor for new arrivals. Subsequently, he found the geography of migrant residents shifted in tandem with deconcentration of the local population and, to a lesser degree, industrial relocation. Areas with a large number of manufacturing enterprises but a smaller state sector were likely to see a high share of migrants in the total population. New arrivals also were attracted to areas already concentrated with migrants. Cui, Geertman and Hooimeijer (2014) found that skilled migrants have better access to the cities compared with all migrants and even compared with urban natives, as they concentrate in the sub-districts with more professional jobs and a larger share of both work unit housing and commercial housing in both Shanghai and Nanjing. There is no dearth of studies on internal migration in the context of India. A study by Chand Kiran et al. (2009) found that there was a significant increase in urban growth in the peripheries of both Bangalore and Hyderabad. With respect to peripheries and spatial distribution of the poor, Kundu, Pradhan and Subramanian (2002) found ‘degenerated peripheralization’ characterized by lack of infrastructure, urban services, presence of heavy industries polluting environment. Summarizing, the international studies on the subject have found that clustering of migrants occurs around their geography of origin (Nigeria) or ethnicity (Karachi), social status (Tel Aviv), demographic characteristics (Istanbul) and economic reasons (Monterrey, Shanghai, Nanjing). The few studies focusing on India with respect to the geography of migrants, find that suburbanization has meant inadequate infrastructure and services, but a significant growth has occurred in the periphery/suburbs in prominent cities such as Hyderabad and Bengaluru. This chapter adds to this literature by examining the geography of the economic migrant, taking the case of Bengaluru.

Methodology The data set for the research in this chapter has come from large primary household surveys of 2,700 households in Bengaluru, which were rolled out in August 2016, with funding support from the Azim Premji University and Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR). For purposes of this chapter, a migrant is identified by response to

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the question: did you come to Bengaluru in search of employment? If they said yes, the respondent was considered a migrant, otherwise considered a native. Hence a migrant for purposes of this chapter is considered based on economic reasons only. We examined various socio-economic characteristics of migrants into Bengaluru, and compared the characteristics of the centrally located migrants with their counterparts in the peripheral areas.

What is the profile of migrants? In our sample, there were 556 migrants out of the 2,700 respondents, accounting for 21 per cent. Most (86 per cent) of the migrants were in the age group 21–50 years, with more than half (58 per cent) being female. Only about 20 per cent of migrants had graduate degrees or higher. More than half (58 per cent) had monthly incomes in the Rs 10,000–20,000 range. The striking finding was that a majority (86 per cent) of them were in occupations such as driving, farming, house-keeping, plumbing or daily wage earning occupations. About 4 per cent of migrants were in information and communications technology (ICT) related occupations, and an additional 10 per cent had their own business. More than half of the migrants were in private firms, with only 9 per cent in government or public employment. More than half of them also were employees, working for an employer, with only 12 per cent being self-employed. But more than 80 per cent of the migrants were in regular/permanent jobs, with only 18 per cent being in temporary jobs (across the central and peripheral locations of the city). In our data set, we have information on when the migrants found their first job in Bengaluru. We used this as our year of migration, although it may be possible that there may have been a time lag since when they moved to the city looking for work, and when they found the first job. Table 11.1 summarizes the year of migration for the sample of Table 11.1 Location of migrants into Bengaluru and year Year of Before 1981– 1991– migration 1980 1990 2000

2001– 2010

After 2010

Total number of migrants

Ward Central 0.00% 4.90% 20.59% 44.61% 29.90% 204 (37%) Location Periphery 1.14% 9.09% 26.42% 39.20% 24.15% 352 (63%) All 0.72% 7.55% 24.28% 41.19% 26.26% 556 migrants Source: Based on the survey conducted by the authors.

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migrants. It shows that a majority (41 per cent) of our migrants moved in the new millennium, during the first decade, 2001–2010. This is also the median of the distribution.

Location of migrants and differences Out of the migrants, 37 per cent located in the wards we defined as centrally located, and the remaining (63 per cent) located in peripheral wards.2 When we examine the spatial location of the migrants across the city’s centre and periphery, Table 11.1 shows that of those migrated ‘recently’ (which is defined as the period after 2010), a greater proportion located in the city’s central parts, compared with those locating in the peripheral areas. Given this, we noted that on average, the typical migrant moved to Bengaluru in the middle of 2003. If we were to take all those who moved after 2003, only 22 per cent of all migrants who moved after 2003 located centrally, whereas more than 35 per cent of migrants who moved after 2003 located in the periphery of the city, confirming that due to various reasons, the later migrants to the city must have been pushed to the periphery. Further, we found that the weighted average income of the typical migrant located in the central part of the city was higher, being Rs 18,240, compared with that for the peripherally located migrant, which was only Rs 16,911. Hence the peripherally located migrant is poorer in relative terms when compared with the centrally located migrant. In terms of their education, Table 11.2 confirms that there is no meaningfully significant difference across the centrally and peripherally located migrants. Table 11.2 shows the low level of education of the migrants in general, with 80 per cent of them being less than graduate level (which includes illiterates, literates without formal education, and various levels of education until intermediate or diploma/ vocational courses). However, in relative terms, the migrants locating Table 11.2 Education levels of central and peripherally located migrants, Bengaluru

Centre Periphery All migrants

< Graduate

Graduate or above

81.37% 79.26% 80%

18.63% 20.74% 20%

Source: Based on the survey conducted by the authors.

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in the periphery were on average more educated than their central counterparts, as 21 per cent of the peripherally located migrants had a graduate degree or above, compared with only 19 per cent of their centrally located counterparts. Given the occupational distribution of migrants, nearly 61 per cent of the low-skilled workers located in the periphery, whereas only 39 per cent located in centrally located areas. The weighted average income of the centrally located migrant is higher, at Rs 18,240, when compared with that of the peripheral counterparts, who were earning only Rs 16,911 on average. We find the peripherally located migrants are disadvantaged in more than one way. When we examined distance travelled to work, one-way, by the most direct route, the peripherally located migrants were more distant (5.4 km) than their central counterparts, who travelled only 5.1 km on average to get to their place of work. However, the surprise is that in terms of travel time, both the central and peripherally located migrants spent the same (about 28 minutes on average one way). The puzzle does not end there. We examined access to public services such as water supply, sanitation (access to toilets) and drainage, for the central versus peripherally located migrants. Tables 11.3–11.5

Table 11.3 Availability of water supply for migrants in central and peripheral parts of Bengaluru

Water supply available on premises Water supply not available on premises Total

Centre

Periphery

Total

166 (81.37%)

306 (86.93%)

472

38 (18.63%)

46 (13.07%)

84

204

352

556

Source: Based on the survey conducted by the authors.

Table 11.4 Access to sanitation, migrants in central and peripheral parts of Bengaluru

Toilet on premises Toilet not available on premises Total

Centre

Periphery

Total

197 (96.57%) 7 (3.43%) 204

343 (97.44%) 9 (2.56%) 352

540 16 556

Source: Based on the survey conducted by the authors.

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Table 11.5 Access to underground drainage, migrants in central and peripheral parts of Bengaluru

Access to underground drainage No access to underground drains Total

Centre

Periphery

Total

193 (94.6%) 11 (5.4%) 204

328 (93.18%) 24 (6.82%) 352

521 35 556

Source: Based on the survey conducted by the authors.

summarize respectively the access to each of these public services for the central and the peripherally located migrants. While peripheral migrants are in less skilled occupations, have lower income and commutes more to their jobs, they have better access to public services than the centrally located migrants. While only 81 per cent (166 out of 204) centrally located migrants had access to water supply on their premises, 87 per cent (306 out of 352) of peripheral migrants had this on their premises (Table 11.3). With respect to access to sanitation (Table 11.4) and drainage (Table 11.5), there was no meaningful difference across the central and peripherally located migrants, while we would have expected the peripherally located migrants to be at a disadvantage.

What determines the location of migrants in the centre or the periphery of the city? Standard urban models developed by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967) and Muth (1969) predicted that the city centre has the advantage of access to the jobs (assuming they are located in the centre), hence all locations in the city centre are expensive in terms of land and housing, with those locating near the periphery having high transportation costs, with their land/housing costs being low. We assumed that the standard urban model applies to the migrants also, hence we estimated a probit model of the location of the migrant in the centre vis-à-vis the periphery as dependent upon the house rent, travel distance (to work), and other socio-demographic characteristics of the migrant, as specified below. Yi = Φ−1 (β0 + β1 Gender + β2 Religion + β3 Income + β4 Completed education + β5 Distance to work + β6 Rent + β7 Access to water supply + β8 Age + β9 Marital status + ei)

(1)

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Table 11.6 What determines whether migrant locates in centre or periphery? Parameter

Estimate

Std. error

Z

Sig.

Sex (1 = Male; 0 = Female) Age in completed years Marital Status Education Religion Distance Travelled by the most direct route (One Way in km) Water supply within the premises (1 = Yes; 0 = No) Income Rent per month Intercept

0.46 −0.01 0.23 0.07 −0.52 0.00

0.13 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.01

3.38 −1.43 1.61 2.17 −3.55 0.35

0.00 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.72

0.38

0.17

2.22

0.03

0.00 0.00 0.39

0.00 0.00 0.40

−1.78 −1.96 0.96

0.08 0.05 0.34

Source: Based on the survey conducted by the authors.

In equation (1), Φ−1 is the inverse cumulative distribution function (assuming a normal distribution), and the exogenous variables being socio-demographic and economic in nature, are self-explanatory, taking off from the earlier discussion. Table 11.5 summarizes the results from the probit estimation of what determines whether the migrant locates in the central (0) or peripheral part (1) of the city. The urban determinants as per housing costs are as per expectation, which implies that higher rents dissuade migrants from locating in the periphery, and could as well encourage them to locate in the central part of the city, but the economic significance is limited (the coefficient is zero). Distance to work has no significant impact on the migrant’s decision to locate in the centre vis-à-vis the periphery. Higher incomes lead to less likelihood of migrants locating in the periphery, and may encourage more central location of migrants. Again its economic significance is close to zero. Men and the more educated are more likely to locate in the periphery; non-Hindus are more likely to locate in the central parts of the city. Better public services, indicated by the access to water supply, lead to location of migrants in periphery. Observations: 506 Notes on codes: Religion: 1-Hinduism 2-Islam 3-Christianity 4-Jainism 5-Sikhism 6-Others

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Marital Status: 1-Never married 2-Married 3-Widowed 4-Divorced 5-Separated Education: 0-Illiterate 1-Literate 2-Up to Primary 3-Middle 4-Secondary 5-Intermediate/PUC 6-Diploma/IT/Technical 7-Graduation 8-MBBS 9-Graduate in Engineering 10-LLB 11-Post-graduate 12-CA/ICWA/C 13-Phd/DSc/D.Phil/D.Sc 14-Postgraduate in Engineering 15-Post-graduate in Medicine 16-Others

Summary of findings and implications We have examined a large data set of migrants in Bengaluru, based on our primary surveys, who constitute 20 per cent of our sample of 2,700 households in the metropolitan area. We have found that the majority of migrants are mostly in low-skilled occupations. Most migrants (63 per cent) located in the peripheral wards, and the remaining located relatively more centrally. We also found that the relatively recent migrants (those that moved after 2003) had located only peripherally, lending credence to the hypothesis that the recent migrants are pushed out of the city centre. The migrants locating in the periphery were on average more educated than their central counterparts, they also had better access to public services such as water on their premises, when compared with migrants who had located centrally. Based on a probit estimation of what drives migrants to locate centrally vis-à-vis peripherally, we find that high rents deter migrants from locating in the periphery, who may move to central locations, possibly to locate close enough to their jobs. Higher income migrants are less likely to locate in the peripheral areas of the city. Hence we find that the central parts of the city are not always superior with respect to access to basic public services such as water supply. This comes as a surprise because central city residents in this study are of higher income, and their higher income does not translate into demand for better services. Next, we find that while the peripheral migrant has to commute a larger distance than the central migrant, the travel time taken by each of them is more or less the same, which implies that the road infrastructure (outer ring and peripheral roads) are better in the periphery than in the centre, which is possibly congested. Hence both these findings call for more attention to public services in the centre, given the caveat that we base these on averages, not on the extremes. Finally, we note that high housing rents dissuade migrants from locating in the periphery; high rents rather may actually

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persuade migrants to locate in the central parts, closer to their place of work. While this is in line with what standard urban models predict, the preliminary findings in this chapter may be taken as general agreement that rental housing needs to be made more affordable.

Notes 1 This chapter is based on research that has been funded by the Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR) and Azim Premji University Research Grants Foundation, to whom we are immensely thankful. I thank Prof. Irudaya Rajan for providing the motivation to write a chapter, which happens to be the first one based on the fresh data set we have just created. Thanks are due to the survey team led by Mr. Uday Kumar for their assistance with rolling out the extensive primary surveys, as per schedule, and the data entry operator Mr. Venkat for his coordination of the data entry, cleaning and relevant cross-tabulations. I thank Ms. Latha at ISEC for her assistance with the literature survey, and the monitoring of the surveys. Any errors remain ours. 2 We defined the central wards as those located in the East, South and West zones of the city. The remaining were classified as peripheral wards. Defined this way, 12 wards are centrally located, the remaining 15 wards are peripheral.

References Ahmad, N. (1992). Choice of Location and Mobility Behaviour of Migrant Households in a Third World City. Urban Studies, 29(7): 1147–1157. Alonso, W. (1964). Location and Land Use: Toward a General Theory of Land Rent. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bertaud (2014). Cities as Labor Markets, Marron Institute on Cities and the Urban Environment, WP #2. New York: Marron Institute. Chand Kiran, T. R., K.V.S. Badarinath, C. D. Elvidge, and B. Tuttle (2009). Spatial Characterization of Electric Power Consumption Patterns over India Using DMSP-OLS Nighttime Satellite Data. International Journal of Remote Sensing, 30(3): 647–661 (15). Cui, C., S. Geertman, and P. Hooimeijer (2014). The Intra-Urban Distribution of Skilled Migrants: Case Studies of Shanghai and Nanjing. Habitat International, 44: 1–10. Dokmeci, V. and L. Berkoz (2000). Residential-Location Preferences According to Demographic Characteristics in Istanbul. Landscape and Urban Planning, 48(1–2): 45–55. Kundu, A. and P. C. Mohanan (2017). India, a Very Moving Story. The Economic Times, 11 April. Kundu, A., B. K. Pradhan, and A. Subramanian (2002). Dichotomy or Continuum: Analysis of Impact of Urban Centres on Their Periphery. Economic and Political Weekly, 37(4): 5039–5046.

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Mills, E. S. (1967). An Aggregative Model of Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan Area. The American Economic Review, 57(2): 197–210. Muth, R. F. (1969). Cities and Housing: The Spatial Pattern of Urban Residential Land Use. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ozo, A. O. (1986). Residential Location and Intra-Urban Mobility in a Developing Country: Some Empirical Observations from Benin City, Nigeria. Urban Studies, 23(6): 457–470. Schnell, I. and I. Graicer (1993). Causes of In-Migration to Tel-Aviv Inner City. Urban Studies, 30(7): 1187–1207. Sridhar, K. S. (2007). Density Gradients and their Determinants: Evidence from India. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 37(3): 314–344. Sridhar, K. S., A. V. Reddy, and P. Srinath (2013). Is It Push or Pull? Recent Evidence from Migration into Bangalore, India. Journal of International Migration and Integration (Springer), 14(2): 287–306. Vaughan, D. R. and W. Feindt (2007). Initial Settlement and Intracity Movement of Migrants in Monterrey, Mexico. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 26 November: 388–401. Wu, W. (2006). Migrant Intra-Urban Residential Mobility in Urban China. Housing Studies, 21(5): 745–765. Wu, W. (2008). Migrant Settlement and Spatial Distribution in Metropolitan Shanghai. The Professional Geographer, 60(1): 101–120.

12 New migrant question Exploitative forms of transit labour in three regions of Andhra Pradesh N. Purendra Prasad

The state of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana was bifurcated in the year 2014. With the loss of capital city Hyderabad to Telangana state, the state of Andhra Pradesh1 is in the process of building a new capital city Amaravati by re-visualizing development in its three regions. As a result, Andhra Pradesh is experiencing large-scale acquisition of land in the three regions (south, north coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema) for the purpose of new capital city Amaravati, special economic zones (SEZ), power plants (solar, wind, nuclear), pharma cities, airports, mineral extraction, new ports, information technology (IT) parks and other commercial and residential projects. In addition, the decline of agricultural incomes, severe droughts, non-incorporation of local labor in the industrial and developmental projects in each region have further pushed the workers into several informal employment both in rural and urban areas, resulting in precarious, insecure and vulnerable situations. This complex situation has led to an unprecedented scale of involuntary migration and various forms of intense exploitative forms of transit labour in all three regions. This chapter analyzes ways in which different categories of farmers, agricultural workers, fishermen and other laboring classes are forced to migrate and provides varied and tense narratives in three different sections. The data for this chapter was collected through extensive field visits to several villages in capital city region of Amaravati and acqua culture work sites in south coastal Andhra; Visakhapatnam, Srikakulam and Vizianagaram in north coastal Andhra; and Anantapur district in Rayalaseema region.2 The primary data was collected through focus-group discussions, interviews with different categories of farmers and workers in all three regions, and political activists in different districts.

I. Land Pooling and Transit Labour This section analyzes how the land pooling mechanism adopted by the state in order to build new capital city Amaravati and the growing acqua

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production and processing units have created an army of transit labour in south coastal Andhra. This region comprises six districts – Krishna, Guntur, East Godavari, West Godavari, Nellore and Prakasam. Amaravati, the new capital city, is being built in an area of about 50,000 acres, from the land pooled from 29 villages. It is located on the banks of the Krishna River between the Vijayawada and Guntur districts. The scale of conversion of fertile agricultural land is unprecedented. Agrarian social structure of south coastal Andhra indicates that there is concentration of land ownership among the absentee landlords, non-cultivating resident households and rich peasants who have been holding land in anticipation of the higher real estate value rather than agricultural production (Vamsi and Prasad, 2017). The strategy for financing the capital city seems to be on the one hand, acquire/pool land from farmers, and on the other, attract capitalist investors by promising a long-term lease of huge chunks of this accumulated land. Land prices already soared about 500 per cent after the choice of Amaravati became clear, bringing a new dynamic between landowning and landless classes. All commodities and services are priced 20 to 30 per cent higher compared to prices in the neighbouring regions (Reddem, 2017). The landowners got a reasonable compensation package, but the landless agricultural workers are promised a mere Rs 2,500 per household per month. However, what is in store for the small farmers, assignees without clear titles, tenants and landless workers, artisans and petty traders after land pooling? A small proportion of farmers quickly reinvested the money they got from the lands they sold in the capital city region in the neighboring districts. However, a large majority of these farmers has not resorted to this, and they are not clear about how their labor would be useful in the emerging new economy. Second, the estimates from Tulluru mandal (a key area for the capital city) alone indicate that there are about 30,000 tenants, 60,000 agricultural workers, and several traditional craftsmen, non-agricultural workers, petty traders, while landowners number about 5,000. Most of the workers and tenants belong to Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC). A huge reserve army of labourers in the region are hoping that they will find some employment. Tenants from this region are already facing intense problems. Discussions with them revealed that the lease price went up by 20 per cent, when they entered and started competing outside the capital city region. This is not surprising given the fact that there is a vastly increased rate of tenancy (75 per cent and more) in the coastal Andhra region in the last decade. The vulnerability of tenants is evident from the fact that all the five reported suicides in Guntur district in the month of September 2015 were those of tenants.

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The government claims that it has acquired 7.5 lakh acres of government land without displacing the poor. In reality, the Andhra Pradesh government amended Act 9 of 1977 (AP Assigned Lands Act) in 2006 to reclaim (in the name of public purpose) large tracts of assigned lands that belong to the extreme poor. The condition for resumption of these lands for public purposes is written into the assignment deed, or the ‘D Form patta’, leaving the poor very little space to resist the same. Balagopal (2007) has pointed out that the poor who depend for livelihood on public land have to just leave it and move. They may be cultivating it without any title or on assignment or lease from the government, or they may be grazing sheep, quarrying stone, tapping palm toddy, catching fish and so forth on this land. Every land acquisition only adds to the woes of forcible dispossession and displacement. Most of these assignees are Dalits (or tribals), the impact of acquiring government lands is even more disastrous. In a sense this narrative of capital city Amaravati is a classic case to understand the forced migrant labour that it is going to be produced in the next few years. Indeed Marx (1977) saw migration as a more violent process where poor people will be forcibly removed from their means of subsistence and hurled onto the labour market as proletarians, who are unprotected and deprived of their right (Giddens, 1994). The Delhi-based conservationist pointed out that floodplains of Amaravati will soon have casinos, resorts, the secretariat and so on. The floodplain is about 35 km2 in the total area of 216 km2 planned to be used for the phase I and phase II of the city (Desikan, 2017). Commenting on this process, Ranabir Samaddar (2016) rightly argued that this envisioning of cities and the accompanying hyper-commodification of land will lead to new forms of social marginalization and increased precarity among migrant labour, severely impairing their ability to negotiate city space and society at large. As Amaravati is in the early stages, one needs to see how these dynamics are going to unfold in the near future. Now turning to acqua culture in the region, 70% of pond prawn farm production in India takes place here, and AP ranks first in prawn and fish farm production. Coastal Andhra region has 974 kms of coastline and about 97 lakh acres is under cultivation, out of which 7 lakh acres (7.5%) is under acqua culture. In Krishna, west Godavari and Nellore districts, fish and prawn farm ponds have been cultivated for the last 20–30 years. With serious losses in acqua culture, in the past, the production declined and farmers showed less interest. However, in the last three years, the production has again increased in Krishna, east and west Godavari districts. According to socio-economic survey conducted by A.P government, 236,482 acres

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has been registered under acqua culture till October, 2016 (Planning Department, 2017). The report noted that another 415,908 acres under acqua culture is unregistered, thus accounting for about 7 lakh acres of acqua farming. The acqua production farmers have been manipulating the records showing that land is not under agriculture to convert the fields into acqua farms. Hundreds of assigned lands owned by dalits have been encroached by acqua farmers. For instance, in Ilavarru village of Nandivada Mandal, 165 acres of assigned land has been encroached. Generally, acqua farmers take permission for 10 acres of land for prawn farming but effectively cultivate 15–20 acres by encroaching assigned land, government land, drains etc. It is estimated that 28,000 acres has been encroached in Krishna district alone indicates the magnitude of the problem in the region. There is high tenancy reported in south coastal Andhra in the last decade (Prasad Purendra 2015). With acqua culture boom, the absentee landowners have being giving the land on lease to acqua farming, rather than tenants for agricultural crops. The phenomenon of reverse tenancy also prevails as acqua farmers have been leasing in the lands from small and marginal farmers and quite a few also sold their lands. This process has been displacing tenants, small and marginal farmers and hence most of them have no option but to migrate. In the mandals where acqua culture is predominant, more number of people migrated out compared to non-acqua farm villages in the region. While acqua farmers have been accumulating surplus substantially and have shifted their base to nearest urban centres, their own kin members got engaged in the allied acqua culture business such as acqua feed, transport, inputs to the farm ponds. This has lead to growing disparities and inequalities between acqua farmers and other categories. From 2014–15, acqua culture cultivation has increased to such an extent that milk dairying has dropped to second place (AP Committee, 2017). The production of coconuts got drastically reduced due to acqua culture. For example, in west Godavari district, the production of coconuts per hectare during 2012–13 was 19,869 which dropped to 13,576. Similarly, it dropped from 16,744 to 14,671 per hectare in Krishna district. The fresh water Kolleru lake in Krishna and Godavari districts providing irrigation to 222,637 acres also got contaminated due to acqua farming (ibid:16–17). The impact of acqua culture has been quite serious on the livelihoods of people. The drainage water from prawn pond farms is supposed to be let out only after treating the used water by effluent plants. But this is not followed resulting in polluting the water bodies with toxic and chemical components in it. In the prawn pond farms, the

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owners use high dosage chemicals and tonnes of salt to enhance the salinity of water which pollutes the agricultural fields and water bodies adjacent to prawn farms. With extensive acqua culture, lot of villages in south coastal Andhra are facing acute drinking water problem. Drains have got closed down. The contaminated water has entered into canal water and other water bodies severely affecting sources. The field respondents indicated that village drinking water ponds have been contaminated and hence every household is forced to buy drinking water incurring a cost of Rs 600–1000 per month. Skin, respiratory, gastroenterology and neurological diseases have increased enormously compelling them to spend thousands of rupees on health. It is also affecting cattle health and milk production severely. In the acqua processing units, workers are employed in cleaning jobs – head and tail cleaning, applying salt and chemicals and subsequently pack it in ice boxes. In most of processing units, local workers are not employed but the workers from other states. Women workers in these processing units work a minimum of 12 hours at 8 degree temperature in the midst of ammonia, chlorine, and other poisonous gases. No protective gear such as hand glouses, gum boots are provided to these workers. The workers are not paid minimum wage, provident fund, financial assistance during accidents, holidays etc. There have been several accidents reported in t

II. SEZs and Transit Labour North coastal Andhra has a coastline of 340 km, receives good annual rainfall of 1,100 mm and is rich with forest and natural resources. Visakhapatnam, the largest city in Andhra Pradesh has one of the big ports, a steel plant, the Hindustan Shipyard, a naval base, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd, Coromandel Fertilizers, Hindustan Zinc, Bharat Heavy Plate and Vessels Ltd. and so forth. The region has many rivers and tributaries – Nagavalli, Vamsadhara, Sarada, Varala, Gosthani, Champavati, Janjavati, Bahuda. Despite the region being resource-rich, why is it most backward with large-scale migration? This section tries to explain this question and the concomitant exploitative forms that emerged with migration in the recent two decades. To begin with, Visakhapatnam steel plant in 1970s marked a significant landmark of public sector enterprises3 in the country providing a development model for the North Andhra region. In 1971, 25,000 acres of land was taken by the steel plant from 64 villages, identified 16,500 displaced people who were given ‘R-Cards’.4 The plant started functioning in 1985. The steel plant employed about 20,000 workers

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in the first phase, of which 6,330 belonged to the displaced households. Subsequently it provided employment to another 2,000 people. While the steel plant was not able to fulfil its commitment to provide employment to all the displaced households, it did generate both direct and indirect employment in the region. The steel plant and other public sector enterprises in the region provided a template and definition of ‘development’ for the local communities. In the post-1990s, when several development projects such as Merchant power plants5 nuclear power plant, Andhra Pradesh Petroleum, Chemical and Petrochemicals Investment Region (APPCPIR), Pharma city, Port development, SEZs and Bauxite Ores were proposed, the local communities imagined that these projects will provide direct and indirect employment. However, the proposed industrial development in the last two decades has been quite contrary. Thousands of acres have been acquired for Achyutapuram, Rambilli SEZ, Jawaharnagar Pharma city, thermal power plants at Komarada, Parvada, Gangavaram port,6 Brandex garment industry and so forth. Land was taken away from farmers, but several SEZs remained non-starters with no sight of honouring their commitments written up in the agreements. Because of vast tracts of forests (11 per cent) and type of soil,7 cultivable land in the region is very limited. However, acquisition of these limited land resources is justified in the name of industrial development. The industrial units in the region employed workers on contract and as casual labour initially but later recruited outside labour, making the local workers go in search of employment elsewhere. The power plants use large water resources, creating further scarcity of water for agriculture in the region. For example, Komarada thermal plant’s water needs are met by the state government’s allocation of 2 tmc water by the Thotapalli irrigation project on the Nagavalli basin. For nuclear plant another 2 tmc water has been agreed by the state government. Most of the development projects in the region are not providing employment to the local communities in the pretext that the local communities are neither qualified nor possess any specialized skills. In fact, the ruling parties (TDP, Congress, YSRCP) pursued the development projects aggressively in the region for the last two decades despite contrary evidence available elsewhere in the country. To cite few examples, when the states of Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and West Bengal withdrew their proposal regarding the nuclear power plant, Andhra Pradesh state not only agreed for the Kovvada nuclear power plant (NPP) project with 61,000 MW reactors in Srikakulam in the year 2016, but also is in the process of agreeing to further NPPs in Nellore and Prakasham districts. In fact, Andhra Pradesh has been

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a hub for NPPs, solar power plants, medical equipment and so forth. Kovvada power plant will displace about 8,000 people in five villages in Srikakulam (Haidar, 2016). Similarly, bauxite mining in the scheduled areas of Visakhapatnam district is another instance which several studies indicated that mining pursued by the previous Congress and the present TDP government will affect the tribal commons extensively and their sources of livelihoods (Prasad et al., 2012). The entire coastline of the north Andhra is filled with pharma units. They have been polluting water, air and marine resources. In establishing pharmaceutical units, the companies offered compensation of Rs 90,000 per acre to the farmers in the early 1990s but by 2000s it was raised to Rs 220,000 per acre. The difference is that now companies pay higher cash compensation which is a one-time package, leaving aside all the obligations of providing employment to the displaced households, contributing to infrastructure development of resettlement colonies and so forth. About 60–70 pharma companies came after 2005 and have been the major pollutants ever since. Leave alone employment, pharma companies pauperized the local communities. Our study respondents indicated that, at the time of establishing companies, they promised to provide a job for every household, give homestead land and 5 cents for cattle. Instead they gave cash compensation for land and loan facility8 for each displaced household for building a house. This promoted significant number of farmers to build houses by spending 3 to 4 lakh rupees. As a result, all the households ended up with huge debts. When farmers were unable to repay, the banks auctioned and took away the houses. So they were deprived of not only land but also house and employment. The companies recruited non-locals in the pharma companies, and hence the local labour had to move out in search of casual work such as mud work and rod bending, and construction work both in rural and urban areas. A few locals who got employment in the pharma industries were not even paid minimum wage, safety measures were not followed, and they were provided with no provident fund and other benefits. Indeed the audit companies have pointed out that more than half the companies have not been complying with the safety mechanisms, thus violating the rules. There is a close nexus between the companies and political parties. In Tadi village where pharma company is located, green belt restriction is supposed to be at least 500 meters but it was reduced to 250 meters by the YSR government. At the ground level, the companies do not even follow the 50 meter green belt restriction. Other consequences are that bore wells are dried up and the water has become unusable even in those which are functioning.

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Schools in some of these villages where pharma units are located had to shift which led to children drop-outs. All these conditions produced transit labour who are footloose and keep migrating depending on the availability of work. Today, with severe coastline pollution, fishermen are unable to fish. Local people are dependent on these companies even for their regular drinking water needs. The fishermen are forced to live by migratory incomes. Given this volatile situation, the region witnessed struggles in Sompeta, Kakarapally to stop power plants, against Gangavaram port by fishermen, against SEZs in Achyutapuram and against several pharma and chemical industries (Sarma, 2007, 2011). In one of the villages Tikkavani palem, as the companies did not provide employment to 350 displaced households, the local communities had to cut down the waste disposal pipes of the companies into the sea. This created havoc and subsequently agreed to provide jobs which they retrenched after a year. The companies worked out a strategy to dispense the local labour by giving a one-time cash compensation package. On the other hand, the state has been actively privatizing the public sector companies. The companies such as Hindustan Zinc were weakened by the NDA government in 2001 by privatizing and gifting it away to the Vedanta multinational company. After the Congress Party came to power, this industry closed down. All the berths in the Visakhapatnam port have been privatized. The crucial ore handling plant has been sold to Vedanta company. These are instances of how private players made profits by taking over public sector companies. Visakhapatnam steel plant (VSP) does not have its own mine, while state government has given permission for mining to Brahmani steel and POSCO, a German company. Both Congress and BJP have been trying to sell the shares of VSP. Similarly other public sector companies like BHPV, shipyard were also being sold away but with the workers resistance, it has been stalled. The north coastal Andhra region witnessed widespread displacement, dispossession, precarious livelihoods due to polluting and hazardous industries that have come up in the recent past. This resulted in massive health hazards to local communities, ecological degradation, crop destruction, depletion of marine resources and cattle. The field respondents indicated a number of health problems such as respiratory problems, asthma, kidney-related issues, skin diseases, neurological problems, reduction of pregnancies and so forth. For instance, in Gangavaram port, the respondents narrated unlivable conditions that exist in the village due to intense coal and ash pollutants. There is more pollution at night and hence they cannot even open windows in the house.

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With rising diseases and debt burden, quite a few have sold their gold and assets for health care. Today people are left with no other employment source hence forced to migrate. One of the respondents remarked that ‘our lives have been totally destroyed with the coming of the port’. They also indicated two sets of problems with the type of employment available in north Andhra region. One, most of the jobs available are contract and insecure jobs. Second, these jobs involve hazardous work environments that generate more health problems. They struggle to survive in their own villages with the highly contaminated air, water and dust ash, and this situation intensifies when they enter into the worksites. A close scrutiny of migration patterns in the region indicates the following trends: First, people from rural areas migrate not only to the nearest city Visakhapatnam but to different states including Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Kerala, Gujarat and Manipur. Each occupational group is forced to diversify its portfolio in order to survive. For example, fishermen not only migrate to different states for fishing activity but also to sell different handmade products, which compels them to travel long distances and work in harsh conditions. Other categories of people revealed that they have been intensely exploited by the contractors at different places. Women bear the brunt of these hardships both at the migrant sites as well as in their own villages when men migrate out. Increased thefts and sexual harassment are not uncommon. Second, a large proportion of skilled and unskilled workers are recruited from Bihar, Chattishgarh, Orissa, Kakinada and Visakhapatnam. After the 2006 anti-Gangavaram port movement, all the companies in the region have gradually reduced the recruitment of local labour. When there is any mobilization or protest from the local communities, private security and PR agencies of the companies step in to weaken the movement either by strong repression, false police cases or co-opting certain leaders by providing a one-time cash package and silencing them. There is a peculiar situation today that educated unemployed youth in the villages have to pay the middlemen or agents 2 to 3 lakh even to get the contract jobs. On the other hand, the state has been magnanimous in not only facilitating9 the land transfers to the companies at lowest price but also waiving huge amounts of taxes, concessions in terms of water, electricity and so forth. Third, villages look completely deserted, with large number of migrants from other states residing. These migrant workers stay in some of the houses without paying rent as locals have

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abandoned their houses due to unlivable conditions. The outside migrants have been working on housekeeping, loading and unloading, cleaning, waste disposal and so forth. The companies in the region function three shifts implying its operations round the clock with cheap migrant labour. It is a paradoxical situation where the local communities in the village (all of them) migrate out for livelihood, outsiders reside in the village in abandoned houses and that there is no belongingness for any one. This is a clear instance of workers feeling alienated both at work and at the place of living. Fourth, interviews with the workers who migrate to Chennai indicated that they go for construction work, housekeeping, kalasi, loading and unloading in godowns and so forth. If a migrant works with a bigger company or gets a job through market agencies, they are paid less because there is provision for accommodation and regular work. If they find work on their own, wages are better but no security of employment. However, both the set of migrants indicated that their savings are adequate just for their living and children’s education. The migrant fishermen’s narratives are quite distinct, and hence a case study from D Matsalesam village in Srikakulam district is presented here. This village has 500 households, all belonging to fishermen. Most of them are Vada Balija caste. Prawn hatcheries and pharmaceutical companies have been polluting the water including the marine resources with chemical effluents, and hence fishing is no longer an option in the village. With no employment in the village, they have been migrating to Junagadh, a fish export business in Gujarat. Eight workers are recruited in operating each of the mechanized Jettis (boats) comprising head drivers, side drivers, cooks, helpers, and other laboring workers. The workers go into the sea for 20–25 days at a stretch, and day-to-day management in the boat is the responsibility of side driver. Head drivers earn Rs 25,000, side drivers earn Rs 12,000 and other workers earn between Rs 7,000–10,000 per month. The owner gives Rs 5–10 lakh as an advance to the head driver depending upon his skill. In turn the head driver gives Rs 60,000–70,000 for each of the workers as an advance. All of them as a team work for eight months from August to April and return to their villages for four months from April to June/ July. The head driver earns about Rs 3 to 4 lakh per annum while rest of them earn Rs 60,000 to 1 lakh per annum. In the four-month period that they return home, they spend on living expenses, consumer goods, children’s education, house repairs and so forth. Unless they work again for four months back home, they cannot survive. A few of them

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in the village work as auto drivers or at agricultural and other laboring jobs for four months. The women go for mud work, construction work, agricultural work and roughly 20 days of MGNREGA work. This case study is presented to indicate the plight of about two lakh fisher migrants from Srikakulam district alone. It also reveals the precariousness of the transit labour, who are forced to take up dangerous and risky jobs in Gujarat. When people die of ill health in the sea, the kin members do not even get an opportunity to see the dead bodies. The fishermen in these mechanized boats go deep into the sea touching the Pakistan borders as well. When they are caught by the Pakistani navy, which has happened in few cases, they do not even have any resource to come back. If they fall sick, or have any other needs, it will take one week for them to come to the coast. A significant number of respondents reported that they have been suffering from kidney, liver, skin and respiratory diseases. On the coast of Srikakulam, if they have to continue living by fishing activity, they require mechanized boats as they have to go deep into the sea. Also chemical companies have surrounded the sea coast in Srikakulam, emitting poisonous gases and contaminating the marine resources. As the sand also became polluted, fish die if they come out in the waves. Therefore the fishermen from the region have been going through a tumultuous journey in order to survive by migrating out to long distances. If one looks at the state affirmative action, fishermen are classified as BC A. In this category, there are relatively better doing caste groups who garner all the benefits. The other important intervention by the state is subsidized rice through public distribution system. However, state recently introduced a biometric system because of which migrants have to frequent their villages not only to receive subsidized rice but to retain the ration card. Thus the preceding migrant narratives indicate migration is not a choice for the poor people but the only option for survival after they have been alienated from their land, marine and other resources. Jan Breman (1996) rightly points out migrants are the archetypical worker in a capitalist world system, and they are often vulnerable to different forms of exploitation.

III. Drought, Distress Migration and Transit Labour The Rayalaseema region is located in the Deccan Plateau which has been an arid, semi-arid and chronically drought-prone region for centuries. This region consists of four districts: Anantapur, Cuddapah,

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Chittoor and Kurnool. The region has a geographical area of 67.29 lakh ha and has a population of 130 lakh. The cultivated area is 24.16 lakh ha of which only 5.57 lakh ha (23 per cent) is irrigated with underground water and some river water. It has 14.9 lakh ha (22 per cent) under forest land mostly without cover. The groundwater irrigation as well as river water irrigation is also undependable in the region. There are very few industries in the region and livelihoods are dependent mostly on rain-fed farming which is prone to very frequent droughts. The annual average rainfall in this region ranges from about 350 mm to about 650 mm from both southwest and northeast monsoon (Prasad, 1998). For the past two decades starting from 1995, the region has been experiencing an unprecedented frequency of droughts. In February 2012, the District Administration of Anantapur district reported that there were only two normal crops in the past 14 years. There were about 3,000 farmers suicides reported during 1999–2017. This section tries to explain the increased transit labour from the region as much as the new predicaments of migrants, not just agricultural workers, small and marginal farmers but also medium and big farmers who were forced to migrate in the last decade. In Anantapur about 25 lakh acres is cultivated, most of it with one crop (i.e. groundnut). 90 per cent of them are all small, marginal farmers. Out of 25 lakh acres, about 5–10 lakh acres have not been sowed from 2013–2017, which indicates that one-third of the productive land was kept fallow due to inadequate water sources forcing people to migrate. Another 20 per cent witnessed either failure or weak germination of seeds which resulted in huge losses. It is estimated that there are about two lakh bore wells in Anantapur district, of which two-thirds are dried up. Today only 30,000 bore wells are functioning (Reddy, 2015). The overexploitation has depleted the groundwater table and the bore wells are drying up faster than ever, resulting in wilting of crops. Even the fruit trees like citrus, sweet lime, pomegranate, banana and papaya are wilting due to drying up of bore wells. Our field study indicated that apart from groundnut, farmers in the recent past have been cultivating crops such as karabuja (muskmelon), papaya, pomegranate, tomato, bitter gourd, chillies and so forth. Entrepreneurs from other regions identified water sources, bought lands at cheaper prices and went in for horticulture crops such as pomegranate, guava, mango and so forth. This is primarily speculative and real estate capital which is in the process of acquiring lands in Anantapur district as it is adjacent to the city of Bengaluru. These entrepreneurial farmers fence their agricultural fields, restricting the entry of cattle and sheep.

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As this is the seventh successive drought year, with huge losses in agriculture, very few choices exist for local farmers in finding alternative employment or fodder for cattle. Milk dairying is also not an option because of scarcity of fodder for animals. It was reported that small, marginal farmers also use tractors because there are no bullocks with them. Even those with irrigated lands, the water table is going deeper, bores are frequently drying up, hence they have been spending lakhs of rupees on new bore wells, thus slipping into indebtedness and poverty. Our study respondents from Padamatipanivalem village narrated how misery is thrust upon them by the supply spurious seeds by the local seed agents. This year the whole village went in for the muskmelon crop. As 120 villages in the Kadiri sub-region in the district cultivated muskmelon, the seed agencies could not supply the required quantity on time, hence they quickly made a fortune out of selling the spurious seeds to the farmers. A kilogram of muskmelon seed costs Rs 30,000–35,000. Thus the farmers from this sub-region incurred huge losses due to spurious seeds. ‘When we complained about the spurious seeds, the agricultural officers asked us to produce bills where we bought. At no point of time the seed and pesticide shops give us the bills nor do we demand from them’. The respondents indicated that ‘nobody comes to our rescue when we lose out on every count including spurious seeds. Seed companies sell the seeds without government permission as these agencies have connection with agriculture department and political leaders’. It is not only the agricultural workers; small, marginal farmers but also the medium and large farmers migrate. The strategy is only in terms of some going on daily basis, some seasonal and few others permanent migration. A respondent Uttanna from Eethod village said he has a debt to the tune of Rs 6 lakh because of failure of bore wells. If we don’t repay the debts, we will have to sell our only source of livelihood land. There are about TEN B.Tech who are unemployed and then work for few months in the village and migrate out. Wages for males in the village are Rs 120 but if you go to Punganuru, the nearest small town, you get Rs 250. However, they will have to work from early in the morning 4 a.m. till 8 p.m. and it will be 10 p.m. by the time they return home. A significant number of farmers reported that they sold cattle in the last three years. The migrant strategy has been to send the youth to Bengaluru for work, adult men and women go to nearest urban centre as daily migrants, admit the children in hostels and leave old men and women to stay back home. The impact of two decades of drought conditions, groundwater going deeper and deeper and crisis in agriculture has reached a new peak which is forcing people to strategize migration differently for various groups.

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The discussion with the migrants indicated a few insights: First, the proportion of people migrating has increased, and most of them go to Karnataka and Kerala states. It was revealed that medium and large farmers also migrate and are forced to work in the urban informal sector from petrol pumps to security personnel. Second, there is hardly anyone in the village to even engage in everyday conversation with the elderly dependents who remain back home. Knowing well that working and living conditions are harsh, people are inclined to migrate. They live under the bridge, in temples, abandoned houses, on the pavement and so forth. Several migrants in Kerala have been resorting to begging, while sex trafficking among adivasi and Muslim women in Kadiri has increased. Third, one of the big farmers from Danduvaripalli who owned 40 acres of land had to migrate and work as security personnel. It is not uncommon to witness farmers with 30–40 acres migrating in this region. Earlier only SCs, STs and OBCs used to migrate; now upper caste households also migrate in the last 15 years. Back home they have lands and hence, migrant incomes are re-spent on agriculture. Even if they feel let down by the successive droughts and loss of crops, they keep reinvesting in agriculture with the hope that they will be able to overcome their debts. There is more compulsion on part of the upper castes to continue agriculture compared to other caste groups. The migrants used to return only during festivals. But now after state government introduced the biometric system, a fingerprint is a must for getting subsidized rice. Everything is linked to the biometric system. Even if they do not want to get subsidized rice, they certainly do not want to lose their identity, as the ration card will be the basis for any future development benefits such as health cards, MGNREGA card, crop loan waiver, insurance, subsidies and so forth. In fact the study findings indicated that old age pension, widow pension and other benefits are more of a political issue. If you have allegiance to one particular political party, that will be the basis on which your eligibility will be increased, not just the factual information. The discussion with the migrants indicated that all categories aspire to educate their children. That is the hope on which their everyday struggles are battled. However, education and health have been massively privatized, hence expenditure on these counts has also increased manifold. On an average, every household is spending anywhere

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between Rs 1,000–3,000 per month on education. At least one member in the family reported to be having high blood pressure (BP), diabetes or other chronic disease. Therefore, each family spends about Rs 1,000 on health care. In addition, mother and child health, pregnancy and other health issues, they spend about Rs 5,000–10,000 at least twice in a year. In every house, there are at least two cell phones for which they spend about Rs 500 per month. This is in addition to the expenses related to cooking gas/firewood, festivals, and social gatherings. All these expenses are ‘essential needs’ that emerged from the developmental discourse. In addition to the crop expenses, they borrow money in order to cope with scarcity and drought, marriage and other social expenditure, debts due to accidents or unforeseen expenses, all of which is spent by borrowing money with exorbitant interest rates. In many families, unmarried members, unemployed youth, old age persons and disabled responsibilities actually fall on individuals contributing to the economic hardships of the households. The point here is that it is not only drought, distress, crop loss that has been creating compulsions for migration but also these so-called essential needs. Hence, people have been on search for different kinds of employment, formal, informal both in rural and urban areas.

Discussion By challenging the individualistic and structural functionalist explanations of migration, several scholars argued that labour migration is an inevitable process in the transition to capitalism (Breman, 1985; Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan, 2003; Alpa Shah, 2006). In the last two decades, the capitalist development has caused deeper fissures on the livelihoods of people. Explaining Marx’s characterization of capitalist transition, Paul Sweezey (1978), says, ‘By means of machinery, chemical processes and other methods, it is continually causing changes not only in the technical basis of production, but also in the functions of the laborer and the labour process’. From the field insights, it is clear that the dual strategy of capital accumulation through land and dispensing with labor is evident in the neoliberal development model of all three regions. This process has resulted in the creation of transit labour, whose lives are deeply fragmented thus paving the way for more intense exploitative forms. As Guerin et al. (2015) point out, the alliance between capital and the state through politicization of employers are instrumental in the persistence of these forms of labour exploitation. In brief, few trends can be discerned from the narratives of three regions. One, land has been taken over for different developmental purposes from small, marginal farmers rendering them landless and

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unemployed. Assigned lands of dalit communities have been increasingly encroached either by the landowning classes or taken back by the state for public purposes. This situation is forcing a large section of lower classes and castes to migrate. Second, all the development projects employed a miniscule proportion of skilled and technical people in regular jobs, while most of the jobs are contractual and casual work. As a rule, local labourers are not employed in any of these projects. This has lead them to become transit labour in all three regions. Third, all the development projects that came up in the last two decades have been highly polluting and ecologically disastrous affecting the human and cattle population seriously. This has resulted in scores of people across the regions with all kinds of diseases forcing them to become indebted and impoverished. Fourth, while the industrial projects have not been able to provide any social security measures such as provident fund, gratuity, accident insurance at the work sites etc, the state on the other hand is frequently making them to enroll themselves as residents in order to avail benefits like subsidized rice, Arogyasri health card. The biometric system introduced by the state has put the migrants constantly on the run to retain their identity cards. In the current scenario, a large exodus of the ‘footloose’ migrants from three regions in Andhra Pradesh to different work sites in rural and urban areas is not only for mere survival but also to satisfy the growing consumption needs. The capitalist development is displacing and dispossessing different categories of people on the one hand and creating ever-increasing needs on the other. Contradictions between migrants and locals, skilled and unskilled, contract and regular workers have in fact intensified. Any form of resistance is labeled as anti-development by the state. It is in this context that we need to understand the complexity of migration and new migrant question that is challenging the existing development theories.

Notes 1 Roving bands of labourers, moving from one construction site to another reminds us of the late 19th century phenomenon of destitute labour. At the same time, they indicate that the neo-liberal city is based on a combination of the most virtual and primitive forms of accumulation. In this paradoxical combination, migrant labour becomes the “transit labour”. They are like the informal miners of Bellary: migrants from the decimated agricultural sector, escaping poverty and disease at home only to be sucked into an immensely exploitative labour market (Samaddar, R, 2016). In the post-bifurcation, the state of Andhra Pradesh comprises 13 districts in three regions – south, north coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema. The districts in south coastal Andhra include Krishna, Guntur, East Godavari, West Godavari, Nellore and Prakasam. Visakhapatnam, Srikakulam and

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Vizianagaram are three districts in north coastal Andhra while four districts Anantapur, Kurnool, Kadapa and Chittoor comprises Rayalaseema region. Fieldwork was undertaken in the villages of Nidamarru, Venkatayapalem, Undavalli of CRDA region in south coastal Andhra during February, August, December, 2015; Parwada, Thadi, Tikkavanipalem, Eebonagi villages in Visakhapatnam, Kovvada, Koppili, D. Matsalesam in Srikakulam and Bobbili in Vizianagaram districts during February–March 2016; Diguvapalli in Hindupur-Lepakshi region, Vandamannuru, Kothapalli, Eethod, Padamatipanivalem, Pendigundu Thanda in Tanakallu mandal of Kadiri in Anantapur district in March 2017. There is coastal acqua culture authority act according to which state governments are supposed to discourage agricultural fields conversion to acqua culture. Only those lands which are not suitable for agriculture, state should encourage acqua culture. The data indicates that in the mandals of Kalidindi, Nadivada and Kaikaluru in Krishna district and Bheemavaram, Kalla and Eluru in west Godavari district, acqua culture is higher than milk dairying. Several enterprises such as Hindustan Shipyard, a naval base, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd, Coromandel Fertilisers Ltd, Bharat Heavy Plate and Vessels Limited, Hindustan Zinc Ltd came up prior to the 1970s. R Card means rehabilitation and resettlement card which provides entitlement to the displaced households regarding the promised benefits for their loss of land and livelihood. The two power plants – Lanco Infratech’s 360 MW Kondapally second phase project and GMR’s 220 MW barge-mounted Tanir Bavi plant – were allocated natural gas from K-G D6 in 2010, but they have been selling power in the open market in the absence of any power supply agreements with the state power utilities. These two merchant power plants have been asked to sign long-term power purchase agreements to sell power at a regulated price as they are using natural gas allocated at a regulated price of $4.2 per MMBTU from the K-G basin. People in Gangavaram have been displaced twice, once with the steel plant and now the port. Gangavaram port is located in 3,000 acres of land, of which 1,800 acres has been acquired from private land owners and 1,200 acres has been allotted by the government. Red sandy loam soil (73 per cent) and lateritic saline patches of land (27 per cent) which do not hold water. It is a different story that the pharma companies gave not more than onefourth promised as loan amount. For instance, Gangavaram port owners were not only able to get a Rs 1,500 crore loan from the public sector banks but also huge tax concessions as well.

References Andhra Pradesh Committee (2017). Janam Nettina Acqua Pidugu. Vijayawada: Andhra Pradesh Communist Party of India (Marxist). Balagopal, K. (2007). Land Unrest in Andhra Pradesh II – Impact of Grants to Industries. Economic and Political Weekly, 29 September, pp. 3906–3911.

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Breman, J. (1985). Of Peasants, Migrants and Paupers: Rural Labour Circulation and Capitalist Production in West India. New Delhi: Clarendon Press. Breman, J. (1996). Footloose Labour: Working in India’s Informal Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Desikan, S. (2017). Amaravati Could become the Prototype for Building Cities. The Hindu, 26 April. Giddens, Anthony.1994. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. Cambridge University Press. Gidwani, V. and K. Sivaramkrishnan. (2003). Circular Migration and Rural Cosmopolitanism in India. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 37 (339). Guerin, I., G. Venkatasubramanian, and S. Kumar. (2015). Debt Bondage and the Tricks of Capital. Economic and Political Weekly, 50 (26 & 27), 11–18. Haidar Suhasihi. A.P Set to be Country’s Nuclear Power Hub. The Hindu, 21 July, 2016. Marx, K. (1977). Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Prasad, P. (1998). Famines and Droughts – Survival Strategies. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. Prasad, P., V. Vakulabharanam, K. Lakshminarayana, and S. Kilaru. (2012). Tragedy of the Commons Revisited (II) – Mining in Tribal Habitats of Araku Valley. Economic and Political Weekly, 20 October, 47 (42). Prasad N Purendra (2015). Agrarian Class and Caste Relations in ‘United’ Andhra Pradesh, 1956–2014. Economic and Political Weekly, April 18, Vol. 1, No. 16, pp. 77–83. Reddem, A. (2017). Inflation Haunts Amaravati Farmers – in New Capital, Cash-for-Land Pushes Up Prices of Goods, Services 20% to 30%. The Hindu, 11 June. Reddy, M. (2015). Local Impact of Climate Change: Worsening the Farmers Distress in Drought Prone Rayalaseema Region. Unpublished Paper. Samaddar, R. (2016). Migrant and the Neo-Liberal City. Economic and Political Weekly, 25 June, 51 (26 & 27), 52–54. Sarma, E.A.S. (2007). Help the Rich, Hurt the Poor – Case of Special Economic Zones. Economic and Political Weekly, 26 May, 1900–1902. Sarma, E.A.S. (2011). Kakrapalli: Another Blot on India’s Democratic Systems. Economic & Political Weekly, 12 March, 46 (11), 12–15. Shah, A. (2006). The Labour of Love-Seasonal Migration from Jharkhand to the Brick Kilns of Other States in India. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 40 (91). Sweezey, P. (1978). Karl Marx and the Industrial Revolution in D. Mcquarie (ed.). Marx – Sociology/Social Change/Capitalism. London: Quartet Books. Vamsi, V. and P. Prasad. (2017). Babu’s Camelot: Amaravati and the Emerging Capitalist Dynamics I ‘New’ Andhra Pradesh. Economic and Political Weekly, 52 (2), 69–78.

13 Motives for seasonal migration and rightsbased policies Evidence from Western Odisha Rajesh Bhattacharya and Prasenjit Sarkhel1 In parts of rural India which are in economic distress as a result of depressed agrarian conditions or with a history of chronic external shocks (natural, economic, political, etc.), internal migration (often seasonal) has been one response of the poor rural households to persistent economic problems. Distress migration of seasonal character due to natural disasters, forced displacement and systematic lack of livelihoods is quite common in many areas. At the same time, migration has also been viewed as a ‘routine livelihood strategy’ which enables poorer households to attain consumption smoothing, repay debt and make crucial investments in physical and human capital (Deshingkar 2010). It has been recognized that the migrant labourers make significant contributions to the Indian economy – in sectors like construction, small industries, brick kilns, quarries and mines, hospitality services, textiles and so forth (Deshingkar and Akter 2009). The bulk of the migrant workforce works in the informal sector and comes from asset-poor households (with limited physical, financial and human capital) (Srivastava 2003 cited in Deshingkar and Akter 2009). It has been argued that the current policy approach has a ‘sedentary bias’ since it is dominated by measures to stop migration from rural areas by supporting rural livelihoods (De Haan 1999). There is no recognition of the fact that migration might occur due to voluntary choice by households in search of higher income or for accumulative purposes. Therefore, voluntary migrant workers – who, nevertheless, are exploited in the urban informal economy where they mostly end up working– fall through the cracks of the social welfare policies that refuse to recognize their agency (Bird and Deshingkar 2009; De Haan 1999; Gupta 2003; Mosse et al. 2002: Deshingkar 2008). In Western Odisha, repeated droughts since 1960s were the primary factors behind out-migration. But this area also has significant

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landlessness, unequal distribution of land, high levels of poverty and widespread absence of urbanization, industrialization or development of the rural non-farm sector. According to some estimates, nearly 300,000 people migrate from Bolangir district in Western Odisha alone (Deshingkar 2008), most of them to brick kilns in major cities of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Recruitment of labour units (parents with children) through labour contractors is considered the dominant form of migration in these parts, though there is evidence of increasing trend of single male migration from households in some districts like Kalahandi and Bolangir (Ali and Sharma 2014). Some authors have argued that seasonal migration through labour contractors places labourers in relations of bondage to the labour contractors/recruiters (Breman 2008; Mosse et al. 2002). There is a substantial literature that has documented the harsh working conditions at destinations (Deshingkar and Akter 2009; Gupta 2003). This form of migration has a negative impact on children’s education in areas like the KBK (Kalahandi, Bolangir and Koraput) districts of Western Odisha where children often accompany parents to destinations (Smita 2008). This type of migration presents a significant challenge to implementing government’s program of universal elementary education for all children (enshrined in the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 [RTE Act]). In this context, it has been argued that social welfare policies like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) can significantly reduce distress-led migration (Sharma 2010). By improving local employment opportunities, MGNREGA can increase the opportunity the cost of migration (Imbert and Papp 2014).2 In this chapter, based on primary data collected from ten villages in Bolangir and Nuapada districts of Odisha, we argue that, contrary to the dominant narrative on migration in KBK districts of Western Odisha, seasonal migration shows heterogeneity in terms of the size of the migrating unit – the single male migrant being quite common in our sample in addition to the traditional mode of migration in family units (consisting of parents and one or more children). We believe that such single member migration is for accumulative purposes rather than as response to emergencies.3 In this chapter, we econometrically explore the idea that heterogeneity of households’ motives for migration might have a visible and distinguishable outcome in the cross-section, namely, the size of the migrating unit. By correlating the size of the migrating unit to household characteristics, we seek to identify the likely motives behind each type of migration (distress-induced vs. income-enhancing, coping vs. accumulative, etc.).

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Our findings in this chapter are that public policies related to employment (MGNREGA) or education (RTE Act), as well as social security provisions, are not statistically significant in their impact on households’ decision on the size of migrating unit. Household assets and demography, education level and caste are statistically significant in shaping the migration decision and the nature of migration. By showing systematic differences in characteristics of households undertaking family migration and single member migration, we suggest that size of the migrating unit is a useful variable in discerning migration objectives. The rest of the chapter is structured in the following manner. In the following section, we locate our study in the context of seasonal migration in Western Odisha and review the existing literature. Next we present the econometric model. Then the survey and the data are discussed, and finally we present and discuss the regression results with supportive additional data from the survey. In the final section, we offer our concluding observations.

Seasonal migration in Western Odisha One of the most studied regions for distress-induced migration in India is Western Odisha – in particular, the region commonly referred to as KBK. In this region, just before the celebration of Nuakhai – the harvest festival – labor contractors from other states start scouting the villages in search of laborers, most often for work in brick kilns of neighboring Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. These labor contractors – known as Sardars or Khatadars – usually make an advance payment for family units consisting of parents and children, called patris (or pathurias). The typical destination for migrant families in Bolangir and Nuapada is Hyderabad, where they work at brick kilns. Once the advances are paid and the families and individuals enlisted, the local labour contractor arranges for their journey to the local train station (often in the middle of the night to escape detection, if the labour contractor is unregistered), their journey to destination by train being supervised by another person, who is the link between the district in Odisha and Hyderabad. At the time of recruitment, Sardars give the migrant unit an advance (Dadan) and contract for a weekly wage (piece-rate specified per thousand bricks) at the worksite. The full payment of the contract amount is settled at the end of the contract, after deducting the advance and the weekly payments. In our sample households, we found migrating units were typically left with little savings at the end of the contract period after deduction of advance and weekly

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payments. However, the advance amount can often be quite significant for the households sending migrant laborers and is usually used for festival celebrations as well as for repairing houses, purchasing land and so forth. The human cost of working at the brick kilns under these conditions can be substantial. The work at brick kilns often involves the presence of child workers, who, because of their small hands and light bodies, are found suitable for work like making balls of wet clay, walking on dried bricks to flip them and sorting coal. At the brick kiln, workers, including children, often work for 12–15 hours a day (Deshingkar and Akter 2009). Living and working conditions are dismal, and their weekly advances are barely enough to sustain their expenditures on basic daily necessities. This system of advance-based labour recruiting often places families and individuals in relations of bondage with the employer/contractor, with gruesome consequences involving physical violence and mental torture (Ambasta 2014). From the existing studies, the following features of seasonal migration in Western Odisha are summarized in Deshingkar and Akter (2009: 11): Research conducted under the DFID-funded Western Odisha Rural Livelihoods Project (WORLP) in Nuapada and Bolangir shows a dominance of STs and SCs in migration streams from these poor districts (Panda 2005). The poorest and the richest as well as the upper castes did not migrate seasonally. In Bolangir more than 90% migrants were going to work in brick-kilns in Andhra Pradesh. The WORLP research also shows that although migration rates among females are lower than males, significant numbers of females do migrate (39% of the migrants in Khariar block were female). There were also many migrating children: male children (below 14 years) constituted 14.89% of the total number of migrants and female children (below 14 years) constituted 13.47% of the total migrating individuals in the sample. Diversity in nature of seasonal migration – voluntary/accumulation/distress-induced as opposed to involuntary/coping/incomeenhancing – has been noted by many scholars in their works on India (see f.n.1). This heterogeneity may also be product of a dynamic outcome of social change in native locations4 as well as changes brought about by migration process itself.5 However, in the context of KBK districts, migration is understood as predominantly a coping strategy either in response to emergencies

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like drought or due to durable inequalities and inadequate access to resources. Seasonal family migration mediated by the labour contractor is taken as the dominant practice in KBK districts of Western Odisha in the existing literature. However, data from the fieldwork, on which the present chapter is based, suggests that there is heterogeneity in the pattern and nature of migration. For example, there are many households from which there was a single or a few (but not all) seasonal migrant(s) in the year for which we collected data. Ali and Sharma (2014) found that family migration is common in Nuapada while single member migration is common in Bolangir – the average number of migrants per household being 3.1 for Nuapada and 1.7 for Bolangir. We believe that heterogeneity in size of the migrating unit reflects underlying differences in objectives of migration. Mosse et al. (2002) also notes where migration is a coping strategy, socio-economic factors play a dominant role. In contrast, migration for the income smoothing motive is correlated with household size that proxies for available labour. We argue that a correlation between household characteristics and observed size of the migrating unit can help establish heterogeneity in migration objectives in the cross-section. Given the dominant narrative of distress-induced migration in KBK districts, the thrust of public policies has traditionally been to provide local wage-employment opportunities as well as to create local assets through rights-based programs like MGNREGA – in which job-seeking households are required to be provided with 100 days’ employment locally. This is the dominant theme of non-governmental organization (NGO) intervention in the areas. Parida (2016) found that MGNREGA has been successful in stemming distress-induced seasonal migration in Mayurbhanj and Jajour districts of Odisha by providing local job opportunities for poor and socially marginalized groups and refers to similar findings in Odisha as well as other Indian states. Casual observation in terms of number of households and persons demanding work in the MGNREGA scheme for the years 2012–2013 and 2013–2014 (years preceding the survey) reveals that there is seasonality in the demand for work (Figure 13.1). Given that the Kharif crop season lasts from June to November, the demand for work among households as well as individuals shows a steep decline during this period. The households therefore face a choice between MGNREGA jobs or out-migration in search of wage work outside the villages between November to May.6 As migration in family units with children is prevalent in KBK districts, the implementation of universal elementary education faces

Motives for seasonal migration

NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS/PERSONS

HH_2012-13

Persons_2012-13

HH_2013-14

211

Persons_2013-14

3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

Figure 13.1 Month-wise demand for MGNREGA Jobs in Bolangir and Nuapada Source: MGNREGA Public Data Portal (author’s estimate).

significant challenges. Awareness campaigns as part of the program to implement RTE are expected to wean migrant families away from their traditional strategy of migrating as a family unit of parents and one or more children. In those cases where both parents or entire families have to migrate, the state government has set up seasonal hostels in villages which run through the migration period, so that children can stay in the village and attend the local school. The RTE Act prescribes a set of norms corresponding to children’s education. These relates to the stipulation of a pupil-teacher ratio for the primary and upper primary classes, norms for school building, including separate toilets for girls and boys and other infrastructural facilities, a minimum working day and teaching hours in a school per annum and so forth. Formation of the School Management Committee (SMC) is also an important aspect of RTE Act and an important step towards participatory educational development. Some of the key functions of SMC are monitoring of enrolment and attendance and implementation of the government schemes like mid-day meals. In 2013–2014 the KBK districts meet the requirements for the minimum number of working days for the primary and upper primary schools and close to 90 per cent of the schools have formed the school management committee (Table 13.1). However, as we will show later, this aggregate picture can be misleading as far as actual outcomes on the ground are concerned.

35.37 13.24 38.12 50.04 15.8 2.1 7.7 222 222 91.6 100 63.4 114 96.6

Primary schools with PTR above 30 (%) Upper primary schools with PTR above 35 (%) Primary schools with SCR above 30 (%) Upper primary schools with SCR above 35 (%) Single teacher schools: primary (%) Single teacher schools: primary + upper primary (%) Single teacher schools upper: primary only (%) Average instruction days primary Average instruction days upper primary Government schools with SMC (%) Boys toilet Girls toilet Gross enrolment ratio (GER) primary Net enrolment ratio primary (NER)

34.39 9.79 42.64 49.24 19.1 1.7 6.2 220 219 87.4 15.5 97.7 113.2 92.8

Bolangir 26.53 7.18 35.70 40.57 15.4 3.8 0.00 226 226 90.2 99.9 98.9 102.9 87.8

Koraput 24.95 5.41 34.93 45.86 3.8 0.00 3.4 226 224 93.9 28 43 130 100

Nuapada 20.85 6.15 30.25 35.63 9.28 1.14 7.05 221 233 85.91 95.33 68.86 105.84 89.05

Odisha

30.43 16.64 30.18 30.76 11.46 1.19 11.94 224 225 93.20 94.45 84.63 101.36 70.20

India

Note: PTR (Pupil-Teacher Ratio) = Total Enrolment in Primary schools/Total Teachers in Primary Schools; SCR (Student Class Room Ratio) = Total Enrolment in Primary schools/Total Class Rooms in Primary Schools; GER = Total Enrolments in Grade I–V/Total Population of 6–11 years; NER = Total Enrolment in Grade I–V/6–11 age group or Total population of 6–11 years; SMC = School Management Committee.

Source: District Report Cards, DISE (www.dise.in/drc2013-14.htm, last accessed on 1 March 2017).

Kalahandi

RTE indicators

Table 13.1 RTE norm compliance across the KBK districts and Nuapada

Motives for seasonal migration  213

Estimation strategy Seasonal migration involves costs in terms of erosion of fixed assets like land and physical durables, loss in learning outcomes of children migrating with parents, loss of income from public wage employment programs and so forth. Stark and Fan (2007) demonstrate that the ‘cost of separation’ could be a crucial determinant of migration patterns, as the decision to migrate alone or with family is endogenously determined within the household given the returns from migration. For our study area in Western Odisha, we observe two kinds of migration: migration by one or more adult members of the family (referred hereafter to as ‘other migration’) and migration by all members or all adult members of the family (referred hereafter to as ‘family migration’). The migrant household enters into a verbal contract in advance that simultaneously decides the duration and size of the migration unit (along with bargaining over advance amount, weekly piece-rate, medical facilities, etc.). The log odds of different migration alternatives (i.e. family migration or other migration) over non-migration can thus be modelled as a multinomial logit (MNL) such that (Greene 2008; Vadean and Piracha 2009):7 ln Ωm|b (𝕩) = ln

P (y = m | 𝕩) P ( y = b | 𝕩)

= 𝕩 βm|b for m = 1, 2 . . .(1)

where m denotes the size of the migration unit and takes a value of 1 if single migrant and 2 for multiple and family migrant and b denotes the base outcome (i.e. no migration). Here, 𝕩 is supposed to include the co-variates that capture the opportunity cost of out-migration. The equations for the migration alternatives can be solved to obtain the probabilities of each outcome: P (y = m | 𝕩 ) =

exp (𝕩 βm|b )

∑

2

exp (𝕩 βm|b )

(2)

m=1

As adult members constitute the effective labour force in the household, migration of all adult members imply that the expected return from household’s asset base (land, livestock, non-farm assets, etc.) at source is relatively lower for family migrants compared to other migrants. Moreover, migration of all adult members will also reveal (1) households’ choice of migration income over expected household income from public welfare programs like MGNREGA, since there

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will be no family members at source to avail the benefits of such local employment programs; and (2) households’ decision regarding children’s elementary education, as there will be no family members at source to look after children if they are left behind to continue their studies in the local school. Since study villages have a long history of seasonal migration and since migration is based on advance and other payments specified in the contract (albeit verbal and informal), we recognize that the realized and expected income of the household from migration outcome is unlikely to be significantly different. Seasonal migration being a recurrent phenomenon in this part of Odisha, we assume that households have near perfect information about the returns from migration and the choice of the mode of migration reveals the households’ estimates of benefits and costs from out-migration. As explanatory variables, we include landholding as well as index for household durable assets and livestock. Existing literature suggests that landholding should be negatively correlated with propensity to migrate (Deshingkar and Start 2003; Keshri and Bhagat 2012). Mosse et al. (2002) suggest that land constraint may be significant for families migrating out of distress. It may not be significant for migration for income-enhancing or accumulative purposes. For the asset index we included eight household durables (item numbers 8 to 15 in Table 13.A1 of the Appendix), and assign a score of 1 if the households possess such assets and 0 otherwise. We divide the actual score of the households by the maximum score (i.e. 8) to arrive at the asset index. We also aggregated the livestock of the sampled households using the Standard Livestock Index (SLU) into a total livestock index. We used the following conversion factors: cattle = 0.5, buffalo = 0.5, sheep and goats = 0.10, pigs = 0.20 and birds and poultry = 0.01 (Akter et al. 2008). Higher livestock might be negatively correlated with family migration since there will be no family member present at source to look after the household’s stock livestock and also because households with higher livestock will experience economic distress to a lesser degree. It is not expected to have any significant impact on migration for income-enhancing or accumulative motives. The adult equivalent measure of the family size is computed using the OECD definition of equivalence scale: Adult Equivalence of a household = 1+ (Number of Adults − 1) × 0.7 + 0.5 × Number of children (Chakravorty 2014). In addition, higher number of dependents might influence migration, so we included dependency ratio as an explanatory variable (Deshingkar and Start 2003). Instead of adults

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over 65 years of age, we include members that are declared to be too old to work, along with children, as dependents. To analyze the influence of children’s education on migration decision we take enrollment ratio as one of our explanatory variable. We expect that family migration decisions are more likely to be influenced if the enrolment ratio is higher, so that the cost of family migration in terms of loss in education and discontinuity in human capital accumulation is also higher. We also include the highest educational level of the household, since higher educational attainment will imply greater ability of the household to calculate the cost of forgoing children’s education. Based on secondary unit-level data on migration, Keshri and Bhagat (2012) found that educational attainment has significant impact on decision to migrate. As far as the nature of migration is concerned, we expect educational attainment to affect the decision of households from which all members or all adult members migrate rather than those which send one or few adult members. We also include two measures of public support programs as dependent variables: old age pension schemes and MGNREGA. Old age pension schemes will likely lower the probability of migration by lessening the burden of family dependents and is likely to affect family migrants (migrating out of distress) rather than other migrants (migrating for income-enhancing or accumulative purposes). We take the MGNREGA workdays only for the last two years preceding migration as current year workday figures might lead to endogeneity bias – people that have not migrated might report higher MGNREGA workdays. We use two fixed effects: caste dummies with Scheduled Caste as the reference category and regional dummies for the village. We expect caste variables to be significant in determining decision to migration and nature of migration – in particular, Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) are more likely to migrate and more likely to migrate out of distress (i.e. more likely to have all members of family migrating) seasonally. The village fixed effects are also expected to capture the school infrastructure effects and RTE Act compliance, among other things (see Table 13.A2 of the Appendix).

Data and characteristics of sample villages The primary survey used in this chapter is part of a larger baseline survey for Oxfam India done by Rajesh Bhattacharya in ten villages in two districts of Western Odisha – Belpada block in Bolangir district and Khariar block in Nuapada district. The villages were chosen by

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Oxfam India – based on the prevalence of reported distress migration and their possible impact on children’s education – for an education project in partnership with two NGOs working in those blocks. We have a stratified random sample, with the relevant population of households with children aged 6–14 years, with full enumeration of the stratum of migrant households and a random sample of 50 per cent of the stratum of non-migrant households. We have 319 households with 552 children reportedly aged 6–14 years (see Table 13.A3 of Appendix). The entire survey was conducted between last week of July and third week of October in 2014. Almost 40 per cent of the sampled households migrated at least once during the last three years from the period of survey. In terms of social groups majority of the migrant households belongs to the Scheduled Tribes category (61.11 per cent), followed by Scheduled Castes category (22.22 per cent) and the Other Backward Castes category (15.28 per cent). Demographics of the sampled households across the non-migrant and migrant households are reported in Table 13.2. While not much variation is observable in family size across the migrants and non-migrants, it is interesting to note that in terms of care work, family migrants have a higher burden in terms of having higher number of children on an average compared to the other migrants. But at the same time family migrants did not report any

Table 13.2 Demographic characteristics of sampled households Household demographics/ education

Household size

Non-migrant (N = 247)

Family migrant (N = 31)

Mean Max Min Mean (SD) (SD)

5.04 13 (1.57) Adults 2.54 9 (1.01) Children 2–5 0.24 2 years (0.44) Children 6–14 1.64 4 years (0.80) Old and unable 0.12 2 to work (0.40)

2 1 0 1 0

Max Min Mean (SD)

5.41 10 (1.53) 2.80 5 (0.84) 0.35 2 (0.55) 1.51 4

3

0.12 (0.39)

0

Source: Survey data collected by the authors.

Other migrants (N = 41)

2

2 0 1

Max Min

5.25 10 (1.69) 2.51 6 (0.92) 0.14 1 (0.35) 1.68 4 (0.87) – –

3 1 0 1 –

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217

presence of household members that are too old to work. Thus, the extent to which the presence of dependent members influences the propensity to migrate needs to be investigated further. From Tables 13.A1 and 13.A4 in the Appendix, we can see that family migrants are characterized by significantly lower landholdings compared to single and non-migrants. More than 80 per cent of our migrant households are landless, marginal or small farmers according to the NSSO definitions of the terms (marginal = less than 1.01 ha and small = 1.01 ha to 2.00 ha, where 1 ha = 2.47 acres). As can be seen, migration is indeed dominated by the landless or the smallest land holders. At the same time, except for poultry that might have a lower rearing cost, family migrants have less livestock relative to single migrants and non-migrants. Also for majority of household durables, excepting bicycles, family migrant’s reports lower asset base than single migrants and non-migrants. While asset poverty might push family migration, higher number of schoolgoing children could discourage family migration, if the discontinuities in education are considered as potential costs – a consideration likely to be influenced by the highest education level of the members of the household. In our sample, family migrants have relatively lower educational levels compared to other migrants and non-migrants. However, the average number of schoolgoing children doesn’t statistically differ across non-migrants and migrants, both family and other migrants.8 There were 51 children in the age group 6–14 years from 72 migrant families who migrated with family members in 2013–2014. All 51 children were attending school at the time of migration. We surveyed all the schools in the ten sample villages – all of them government schools, co-ed and non-residential. None of the schools had electricity connection. The overall pupil-class room ratio is 36.7, but it varies widely from 13.7 to 58 across schools. The average pupil-teacher ratio for the ten surveyed schools is 29.8, and it varied widely across schools ranging from 13.7 to 43.5. The average pupil-teacher ratio in the primary sections of all the schools combined is 32.2, but ranging from 15 to 56.5 across schools. During our survey, most of the schools had formed their SMCs. Our field observations suggest that there might be significant lack of awareness among parents about the activities and goal of SMC (see Table 13.A4 of the Appendix). Finally, we also take a look at the uptake of MGNREGA work in the study area. In 2011–2012 (i.e. two years prior to the survey), 80 households out of 319 interviewed obtained work in the MGNREGA scheme. The average work days were close to 30. In the next year, the

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workdays reduced to 27 and only 43 households received work under the scheme. We also calculated percentage of households with beneficiaries of old-age pension in our sample – 18 per cent for non-migrants, 24 per cent for other migrants and 16 per cent for family migrants. It appears that asset paucity and weak education level are likely to be associated with migrant households but might be more significant for households that migrate as a family unit. However, they are also the ones with fewer old age dependents. The extent to which these household characteristics interacts with the expected benefit of public support programs would be more likely to determine which of these constraints becomes binding for the household in determining the pattern of migration.

Results and discussions We report the MNL estimates in Table 13.3. The relative risk ratios are estimated using the heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. The marginal effects of the PROBIT estimates of overall migration propensity are also reported where the dependent variable is binary coded with 1 if the household members migrate either singly or in multiple numbers and 0 otherwise. For the multinomial logit model, we carried out the Wald test of combining the alternatives but the hypothesis that the alternatives modes of migration are indistinguishable is rejected,9 indicating that the alternatives are unlikely to be substitutes and are independent. Finally, we also tested for the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives (IIA) property of the model and found that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that odds of the outcomes are independent of other alternatives. The findings of the probit model are in conformity with the existing literature. The disadvantaged class (i.e. the STs) have a higher probability of migrating relative to the OBC and the general class (Breman 1996; Deshingkar and Start 2003; Keshri and Bhagat 2004; Mosse et al. 2005; Rao and Rana 1997; Rao 2005; Rogaly et al. 2001). In fact, the latter has a 21 per cent less chance of migrating relative to the STs. Similarly, we find that larger households and households with lesser number of dependents are more likely to migrate. Here, availability of one additional adult member increases the probability of migration by 6 per cent. A higher dependency ratio indicates a lower availability of effective labour and thus lowers the probability of migration (Deshingkar and Start 2003). Also, increased landholdings, higher asset base captured by the asset index and greater number of livestock discourage migration (Coffey et al. 2015). Lower landholdings can increase

Table 13.3 Estimates of migration propensity

Scheduled Caste Dummy OBC/General Dummy Household Size (Adult Equivalent) Dependency Ratio Enrolment Proportion Highest Education Level Livestock (Standard Live Stock Unit) Landholding (ha) Asset Index NREGA work days 2011–12 NREGA workdays 2012–13 Pension Dummy Migration Dummy 11–12 Migration Dummy 12–13

Probit marginal effects

Relative risk ratio Other

Family

−0.0359 (0.0651) −0.209*** (0.0784) 0.0653** (0.0307) −0.138*** (0.0500) −0.0699 (0.141) −0.0185** (0.00917) −0.0503* (0.0307) −0.0474* (0.0295) −0.294** (0.130) 0.0002 (0.0013) −0.002 (0.002) 0.018 (0.058) −0.085 (0.096) 0.021 (0.060)

0.951 (0.455) 0.170** (0.149) 1.684*** (0.332) 0.363** (0.152) 0.576 (0.577) 0.930 (0.077) 0.952 (0.149) 0.963 (0.141) 0.069** (0.074) 0.989 (0.017) 0.965 (0.045) 1.202 (0.550) 0.798 (0.550) 1.073 (0.477) 0.390 (0.624) 0.25 110.7*** 319

0.603 (0.393) 0.288* (0.207) 1.211 (0.361) 0.456 (0.246) 2.737 (4.882) 0.799** (0.072) 0.161*** (0.090) 0.385* (0.218) 0.983 (1.696) 1.006 (0.011) 1.008 (0.023) 0.778 (0.570) 0.505 (0.590) 0.742 (0.522) 0.220 (0.580)

Constant Pseudo-R2 Chi-Square Observations

0.14 50.41*** 319

Source: Estimated by the authors based on the field survey data. ***, **, * Significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

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the need to diversify activities and supplement rural income (Keshri and Bhagat 2012). Households with higher level of education are less likely to migrate – those with one additional year of education have 2 per cent less chance of migrating. This is in agreement with Keshri and Bhagat (2012). However, having an enrolled child doesn’t seem to have any impact on the migration decision. Interestingly, having access to either of the public support programs (i.e. old age pension and MGNREGA) have no effect on overall migration propensity. Contrasting the PROBIT and the MNL estimates provides interesting insights into the determinants of family and other migration. Household size and dependency ratio affects other migrants in the same direction as family migrants. However, both of them are insignificant in the case of family migrants. Probably, when the households migrate as a whole, the costs of dependents are internalized. Besides, family migrants in our sample had children as dependents, not older people. On the other hand, family migration decisions are negatively related to landholdings and livestock indicators. The negative sign of livestock indicates the wealth effect on migration as well as the fact that if households migrate with all family members, the loss of livestock might be substantial (Haberfeld et al. 1999). Asset index is found to be significant for the other migrants and it reduces their odds of migrating compared to family migrants. Household asset is an indicator of economic status and the significance of asset index for other migrants probably indicates that other migrants are relatively better off and their motive for migration is governed by income-enhancing or accumulating concerns rather than subsistence-securing concerns. In case of education-related variables we find that the highest level of education of the households affects family migration but doesn’t affect the single member migration. We did not find any impact of enrolment in either the overall migration propensity or in single and family migration. Migration persistence seems to be ineffective in both overall migration propensity and single and family migration. Interestingly we find neither of the two public support programs (old age pensions and MGNREGA) have any influence either on the family or other single migrants in the sampled households. Given the fact that one major objective of MGNREGA is to provide alternative income opportunities during seasonal employment this finding merit serious attention. Interaction with migrants, gram panchayat, block and district officials, and NGO field staff as well as our survey data reveal that returns from MGNREGA falls short of income from seasonal migration. The annual income of the average family in our sample working at a brick kiln in Hyderabad is Rs 46,540.

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Consider what the family could get alternatively in the MGNREGA program – a maximum of Rs 14,300 in the year (if one of the family members get full 100 days’ work at Rs 143 per day in 2013–2014). It is still less than one-third the family’s income from migration in 2013– 2014. In 2015 attempts have been made to increase the workdays in MGNREGA from 100 to 150 and then subsequently to 200 days, and wage rate has also been increased to Rs 174. Poor coverage of MGNREGA in the study area, however, casts a doubt on the effectiveness of such potential increase in income, in reducing migration. For instance, in 2013–2014, out of 247 non-migrants only 24 households (9 per cent of the non-migrants) got work in MGNREGA scheme with average workdays close to 30. The absence of any impact on the child enrolment on migration decision despite the fact most of the schools in survey area have implemented several of the RTE recommendations to varying degrees, including the formation of SMC, needs further explanation. Inadequate awareness of RTE provisions makes SMC members less than capable of executing the functions assigned to SMCs. Of the SMC members we surveyed, none was aware of the provision that 25 per cent of seats in private schools are reserved for poor children and children from marginalized communities. Further, 40 per cent did not know that (a) SMCs can recommend additional classroom construction, (b) SMCs have a role in tracking attendance of children and (c) teachers should be monitoring the learning of students in an ongoing basis and no student can be detained (see Table 13.A4 in the Appendix). We suspect such lack of awareness about RTE norms creates a barrier towards realizing the actual cost of education deprivation from migration in terms of study days lost. Also, in our survey of schools at the native villages as a part of the overall study, we saw that schools admit students in the age-appropriate class at any time of the year as per RTE rules. However, in order to prevent year-loss of students due to migration, the schools admit them and promote them to upper classes accordingly, but do not have the resources to provide remedial and special lessons for these students to make up for the lost class lectures, as mandated by RTE rules.

Concluding observations Our study finds that seasonal migration in Western Odisha can also be seen as partly due to economic distress and partly for income enhancement. We propose that this heterogeneity in migration has an observable outcome – the size of the migrating unit, family migration

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(involving all members or all adult members of household) vis-à-vis other migration (involving one or few, but not all, members) using household survey data from migration prone districts in Western Odisha. We surmise that family migration might be distress driven but other forms of migration related to accumulation motive might co-exist. In support of our claim, we find that decision to migrate as a family is influenced by the wealth stock while labour constraints becomes binding for other migrants. Our observations and data from the field reveal that rights-based employment programs like MGNREGA might not be effective for arresting either form of migration. In fact, income from migration can be high enough for households to ignore the human costs of such migration as well as the cost of disruption of children’s education. The gaps and shortfalls in the implementation of RTE in the surveyed areas further compound this effect. Given the fact that simple focus in MGNREGA would not be adequate, convergence of various development projects might be needed to ensure viable livelihood for migration prone areas. This includes insuring farmers comprehensively against droughts or other natural calamities, such that shocks like these do not wipe out annual income completely or erode their asset base. The existing school infrastructure has to be expanded as per the norms and standards laid down in the RTE Act. One major feature of the RTE in these areas is the provision of remedial classes to make up for the lost education for the children if they accompany the migrants. In our surveyed schools we did not find evidence of any such provisions for remedial teaching. SMCs should be central to tracking migrant and child workers and ensuring remedial teaching for them. While the government can be urged upon to ensure the supply of education, much greater awareness and participation of community members, for instance in the SMC activities, is required to generate the demand for education in families prone to migration.

Notes 1 The household survey reported in this chapter was conducted as part of a baseline study by the corresponding author for Oxfam India’s education project in Bolangir and Nuapada districts in Odisha. We use the survey data here with the permission of Oxfam India. For field assistance and data collection we are grateful to Mr Prasid Chakraborty and his team at SRG Consultancy Marketing Planning Services. We are grateful to the participants of the Conference on Development-induced Displacement and Migration, Land Acquisition and Resettlement held on 3–4 March 2016 at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, and the editors of the book for their comments on the draft version presented at the conference.

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2 Initiated in 2006, MGNREGA entitles every rural household in India to 100 days of work at state-level minimum wage. 3 Heterogeneity in migration motives and pattern in drought-prone areas have been noted by several scholars (Rao 2001; Rogaly 2003; Rogaly and Coppard 2003; Seeley et al. 2003; Deshingkar and Start 2003; Shah 2006; Start and Deshingkar 2006). Households’ motive might change over time, often as a result of repeated migration. ‘Coping migration can become accumulative over time, as information improves, skills are acquired and relationships with employers stabilise’ (Deshingkar and Start 2003: 8). 4 ‘Overall, the emergence of peasant capitalism in West Bengal from the 1970s has resulted in more days work and higher real wages for migrant workers both from within the state and from outside it. This has made it possible for wage workers to view migration as a way of earning and accumulating a useful lump sum, rather than simply surviving through food payments during the period of work, as had taken place in the past’ (Rogaly and Coppard 2003: 396). 5 ‘For example Rao (2001) refers to three kinds of migration in his study of Anantapur and Rayadurga districts in Andhra Pradesh. Type 1 is migration for coping and survival. Type 2 is defined as migration for additional work/ income. It takes place when the work in the village is over, normally after harvesting all crops. Type 3 is migration for better remuneration or a better work environment or opportunity to use skills or acquire new skills. They observe that there is a continuous transition between the different types. For instance, people from Rayadurga district were migrating for survival in the 1970s but changed to Type 2 in the 1990s. In Anantapur they began with Type 2 and moved on to Type 3’ (Deshingkar and Start 2003: 2). 6 It is to be noted that most of the sown area in the surveyed villages of Bolangir and Nuapada is unirrigated. According to Census 2011, none of the villages has more than 5 per cent if its sown area is under irrigation. 7 One could also perceive migration events as ordered outcomes and model them as an as an ordered logit model (Greene and Hensher 2009). Postestimation diagnostics of the ordinal model revealed, however, that the proportional odd assumption is not maintained in the ordered choice model for migration decision. We also tried to apply the generalized ordinal logit model but it met with convergence problems. 8 It must be noted though a median number of children for non-migrants and single/multiple migrants are 2 while most of the family migrants have a single child. 9 The null hypothesis of the no-distinction between other to family migrants is rejected at the level of less than 1 per cent. Similarly, the null hypothesis that all the coefficients associated with non-migrants and other migrants and non-migrants and family migrants are zero are rejected at less than 1 per cent and 10 per cent level of significance, respectively.

References ActionAid. 2005. ‘Bolangir to Hyderabad and the Politics of Poverty’, available at www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/bolangir_to_hyderabad.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017).

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Akter, S., Farrington, J., Deshingkar, P., Freeman, A. 2008. Livestock, vulnerability, and poverty dynamics in India. ILRI Discussion Paper 10. Nairobi (Kenya): ILRI. Overseas Development Inst., London (UK), ILRI, Nairobi (Kenya). Targeting and Innovation. Ali, Z. and Sharma, A. 2014. Migration Trends from Coastal and Western Odisha: A Study of Migration Incidence and Issues. In Studies, Stories and a Canvas. Centre for Migration and Labour Solutions, Ajeevika Bureau, available at www.aajeevika.org/assets/pdfs/Odisha State Migration Profile Report.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017). Ambasta, P. 2014. Brutalised migrants of Western Odisha. The Hindu, 3 January, available at www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/brutalised-migrants-ofwestern-odisha/article5530859.ece (last accessed 1 March 2017). Bellak, C., Leibrecht, M., and Liebensteiner, M. 2014. Short-term labour migration from the Republic of Armenia to the Russian Federation. Journal of Development Studies, 50(3), 349–367. Bird, K. and Deshingkar, P. 2009. Circular migration in India: Policy brief no. 4. ODI World Development Report 2009. Breman, J. 1996. Footloose Labour: Working in India’s Informal Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Breman, J. 2008. On labour bondage, old and new. Indian Journal of Labour Economics, 51(1), 83–90. Chakravorty, U., Pelli, M., and Marchand, B. U. 2014. Does the quality of electricity matter? Evidence from rural India. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 107, 228–247. Coffey, D., Papp, J., and Spears, D. 2015. Short-term labor migration from rural north India: Evidence from new survey data. Population Research and Policy Review, 34(3), 361–380. De Haan, A. 1999. Livelihoods and poverty: The role of migration-a critical review of the migration literature. The Journal of Development Studies, 36(2), 1–47. Deshingkar, P. 2008. Circular Internal Migration and Development in India. In Migration and Development within and across Borders: Research and Policy Perspectives on Internal and International Migration (pp. 161–187). Geneva: International Organization for Migration/Social Science Research Council. Deshingkar, P. 2010. Migration, remote rural areas and chronic poverty in India. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper, 323. Deshingkar, P. and Akter, S. 2009. Migration and human development in India. Overseas Development Institute, MPRA Paper No. 19193, available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19193/1/MPRA_paper_19193.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017). Deshingkar, P. and Start, D. 2003. Seasonal Migration for Livelihoods in India: Coping, Accumulation and Exclusion. London: Overseas Development Institute. Görlich, D. and Trebesch, C. 2008. Seasonal migration and networks-evidence on Moldova’s labour exodus. Review of World Economics, 144, 107–133. doi:10.1007/s10290-008-0139-y.

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Greene, W. H. 2008. Discrete Choice Modeling. In T. Mills and K. Patterson (eds.), The Handbook of Econometrics: Vol. 2, Applied Econometrics, Part 4.2 (pp. 7–78). London: Palgrave. Greene, W. H. and Hensher, D. A. 2009. Modeling Ordered Choices: A Primer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO978051184506. Greene, W. H. and Hensher, D. A. 2010. Modeling Ordered Choices: A Primer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Greenwood, M. J. 2016. Perspectives on Migration Theory – Economics. In M. J. White (ed.), International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution (pp. 31–40). Netherlands: Springer. Gupta, J. 2003. Informal labour in Brick Kilns: Need for regulation. Economic and Political Weekly, 38(31), 3282–3292. Haberfeld, Y., Menaria, R. K., Sahoo, B. B., and Vyas, R. N. 1999. Seasonal migration of rural labor in India. Population Research and Policy Review, 18(5), 471–487. Hare, D. 1999. ‘Push’ versus ‘pull’ factors in migration outflows and returns: Determinants of migration status and spell duration among China’s rural population. The Journal of Development Studies, 35(3), 45–72. Imbert, C. and Papp, J. 2014. ‘Short-Term Migration and Rural Workfare Programs: Evidence from India’, available at www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/ Imbert.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017). Keshri, K. and Bhagat, R. B. 2004. Temporary and seasonal migration in India: The magnitude, pattern and characteristics. Malaysian Journal of Tropical Geography, 35(1–2), 17–30. Keshri, K. and Bhagat, R. B. 2012. Temporary and seasonal migration: Regional pattern, characteristics and associated factors. Economic and Political Weekly, 47(4), 81–88. Lee, E. S. 1966. A theory of migration. Demography, 7–57. Mathias, C. 2012. Internal versus international migration and the role of multiple deprivation. Asian Population Studies, 8(2), 125–149. Mosse, D., Gupta, S., Mehta, M., Shah, V., Rees, J. F., and Team, K. P. 2002. Brokered livelihoods: Debt, labour migration and development in tribal western India. Journal of Development Studies, 38(5), 59–88. Mosse, D., Gupta, S., and Shah, V. 2005. On the margins in the city: Adivasi seasonal labour migration in Western India. Economic & Political Weekly, 40(28), 3025–3038. Parida, J. K. 2015. MGNREGS, rural employment and distress migration: A study in Odisha. MPRA Paper No. 62084, available at https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/62084/8/MPRA_paper_62084.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017). Parida, J. K. 2016. MGNREGS, distress migration and livelihood conditions: A study in Odisha. Journal of Social and Economic Development, 18(1–2), 17–39. Parida, J. K. and Madheswaran, S. 2015. Determinants of seasonal migration in India. Manpower Journal, 49.

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Rao, G. B. 2001. Household Coping/Survival Strategies in Drought-Prone Regions: A Case Study of Anantapur District. Andhra Pradesh, India: SPWDHyderabad Centre. Rao, N. 2005. Power, Culture and Resources in Gendered Seasonal Migration from Santhal Parganas. In S. Arya and A. Roy (eds.), Poverty, Gender and Migration. New Delhi: Sage Publication. Rao, N. and Rana, K. 1997. Women’s labour and migration: The case of the santhals. Economic & Political Weekly, 32(50), 3187–3189. Reyes, B. I. 2001. Immigrant trip duration: The case of immigrants from Western Mexico1. International Migration Review, 35(4), 1185–1204. Rogaly, B. 2003. Who goes? Who stays back? Seasonal migration and staying put among rural manual workers in Eastern India. Journal of International Development, 15(5), 623–632. Rogaly, B., Biswas, J., Coppard, D., Rafique, A., Rana, K., and Sengupta, A. 2001. Seasonal migration, social change and migrants’ rights: Lessons from West Bengal. Economic & Political Weekly, 36(49), 4547–4559. Rogaly, B. and Coppard, D. 2003. They used to go to eat, now they go to earn: The changing meanings of seasonal migration from Puruliya district in West Bengal, India. Journal of Agrarian Change, 3(3), 395–433. Rosenzweig, M. R. and Stark, O. 1989. Consumption smoothing, migration, and marriage. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 905–926. Seeley, J., Ryan, S., Khan, I. A. and Hossain, M. I. 2003. ‘Just Surviving or Finding Space to Thrive? The Complexity of the Internal Migration of Women in Bangladesh’, University of East Anglia, Norwich. Shah, A. 2006. The labour of love: Seasonal migration from Jharkhand to the brick kilns of other states in India. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 40(1), pp.91–118. Sharma, A. 2010. Rights-based legal guarantee as development policy: The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. UNDP Discussion Paper. UNDP India. Smita, S. 2008. ‘Distress Seasonal Migration and Its Impact on Children’s Education’, available at http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/1869/1/PTA28.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017). Stark, O. and Levhari, D. 1982. On migration and risk in LDCs. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 31(l), 191–196. Stark, O. and Simon Fan, C. 2007. The analytics of seasonal migration. Economics Letters, 94(2), 304–312. Start, D. and Deshingkar, Priya (2006) ‘Occupational Diversification, Household Strategies, and Non-Farm Options in Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh’, in John Farrington, Priya Deshingkar, Craig Johnson and Daniel Start (eds), Policy Windows and Livelihood Futures: Prospects for Poverty Reduction in Rural India, Delhi: OUP. Vadean, F. P., & Piracha, M. 2009. Circular migration or permanent return: What determines different forms of migration? IZA discussion paper No. 4287. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Appendix

Table 13.A1 Distribution of wealth across non-migrants, family migrants and other migrants Sl. No.

Wealth/assets

No migration

Other migrants

Family migration

2

Landholding (ha) Poultry

3

Pig

4

Sheep

5

Goat

6

Cattle

7

Buffalo

8

Television

9

Electric fan

10

Telephone

11

Bicycle

12

Bullock cart

12

Chair

14

Table

15

Watch/clock

0.88 (1.68) 1.13 (2.23) 0.04 (0.38) 0.13 (1.92) 0.44 (2.13) 4.23 (7.44) 0.53 (3.25) 0.16 (0.37) 0.28 (0.45) 0.61 (0.49) 0.85 (0.35) 0.17 (0.38) 0.35 (0.48) 0.13 (0.33) 0.29 (0.45)

0.73 (0.97) 0.88 (1.36) 0.00 (0.00) 0.29 (1.87) 1.37 (4.61) 4.39 (5.02) 0.44 (2.81) 0.10 (0.30) 0.22 (0.41) 0.61 (0.49) 0.68 (0.47) 0.22 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43) 0.07 (0.26) 0.24 (0.43)

0.41 (0.51) 1.19 (2.27) 0 (0.00) 0.1 (0.54) 0.26 (1.44) 0.48 (1.98) 0 (0.00) 0.06 (0.25) 0.13 (0.34) 0.52 (0.50) 0.81 (0.40) 0.00 (0.00) 0.23 (0.42) 0.06 (0.24) 0.19 (0.40)

1

Source: Survey data collected by the authors.

Table 13.A2 Village-wise distribution of sampled households with children aged 6–14 years District

Block

GP

Name of villages

Households who migrated in 2013–2014

Nuapada Khariar Duajhar Khudpej Lanji Dabri Bolangir

Total

Gudabhali 7 Kikribeda 3 Dumerjor 9 Kodaldungri 5 Bhairajpur 5 Belpada Bagdor Banmal 9 Malpada 4 Beheramunda Mundagaon 7 Kandhenjhula Bahabal 17 Sargimunda 6 72

Total number of households in the sample 19 23 46 22 27 45 30 35 45 27 319

Source: Survey data collected by the authors.

Table 13.A3 Distribution of landholding among sampled households Landholding

Non-migrants

Other migrants

Family

Landless Marginal Small Medium and above

46 144 40 17

9 22 8 2

13 13 3 –

Source: Authors calculations from survey data.

Table 13.A4 Awareness of role of SMCs and RTE provisions in ten surveyed schools Role and functions

SMC can recommend for additional classroom construction SMC has a role towards enrolment of out-of-school children SMC has a role in tracking attendance of children SMC has a role in tracking school working days and hours SMC has a role in monitoring teachers’ attendance SMC has a role in developing of school development plans SMC is the first line for grievance redressal for parents and teachers in the context of Right to Education Teachers should be monitoring the learning of students in an ongoing basis and no student can be detained 25% of seats in private schools are reserved for poor children and children from marginalized communities Source: Survey data collected by the authors.

Percentage of SMCs not aware 40.0 20.0 40.0 20.0 30.0 50.0 30.0 40.0 100.0

14 Locating gender, re-reading forced migration A study of the migrant Muslim women in Delhi Debabrata Baral Literature on gender and migration is quite limited. There are even fewer studies that look at migration from Muslim women’s perspective (Chaudhuri 2005; Hilsdon 2006; Singh et al. 2014). On one hand, the scale of migration among female is increasing. For example, in India out of 309 million internal migrants, around 218 million migrants are female (Census of India 2011). Even as per the International Labour Organization, female domestic workers in the world constitute around 43.6 million (Simonovsky and Luebker 2011, as cited by Tomei and Belser 2011). But on the other side, the sex-disaggregation data on migrants are decreasing as per United Nations Department of Economic and social affairs (Hovy 2013 as cited by Fleury 2016). The presence of multiple categories makes it tough to comprehend and define migration (Clarke 1965; Demko et al. 1970). However, migration has been dominantly analyzed and defined through categories like change of residence (Mishra 1981; Newman and Matzke 1984; Ghosh 1987; Rubenstein and Bacon 1990; Johnston 1994), duration of residence (Shrivastava 1983; United Nations 1970; Goldscheider 1971), geographical mobility (Eisenstadt 1953; Zelinsky 1971; Darsky 1978; Ross 1982) and so forth. It should not be mistaken here that these categories are mutually exclusive. Although these categories are extremely important, still they somehow fail to explain the experience and map the role and status of women migrants at their place of origin and the place of residence. Hence it becomes extremely significant to study migration from a gender perspective, as migration is not a gender-neutral concept. But at the same time, assuming women as a universal category is equally problematic. The challenges and opportunities faced by women belonging to different social groups and identities are different. This chapter is a study on the migrant Muslim women who have

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231

migrated from Cooch Behar1 district of West Bengal and are currently residing in Jai-Hind camp2 in Delhi. This chapter will first outline the factors that facilitated migration among the Muslim women from Cooch Behar to Delhi. With reference to the experience of the migrant Muslim women, this chapter argues that migration among the Muslim women should be treated as forced migration and the Muslim women migrants should be categorized as ‘internally displaced persons’. Second, the chapter maps the trends and patterns of migration among these Muslim women. Third, it will further outline the challenges and negotiations undertaken by these Muslim women in their host society.

Migrant Muslim women as internally displaced people: factors impacting ‘the right to work’ Key factors that influence migration among women are education status (Kanaiaupuni 2000; Richter and Taylor 2008; Afsar 2006), marital status (Shaw 2005), gender-based discrimination (Petrozziello 2011; Afsar 2006; Ferrant et al. 2014), getting freedom from familial control (Asis 2002), and women as dependents following their husband (Ghosh 2009; National Sample Survey Organization 2005; Bakewell et al. 2009). For example, migration is higher among young women from rural households (Lauby and Stark 1988, as cited in Curran and Saguy 2001). While fear of immoral behaviour and prostitution restricts the migration among single women (Pittin 1984, as cited by Kanaiaupuni 2000), studies have suggested that females migrate not for their own personal gains but for their family needs (Chant and Radcliffe 1992, as cited by Barbieri and Carr 2005). Females also migrate in order to avoid forced marriage (Lam and Hoang 2010, as cited by Ferrant et al. 2014). This chapter attempts to add to this literature on gender and migration. This section attempts to argue that these Muslim women migrants from Cooch Behar should be categorized as ‘internally displaced persons’ and their migration should be classified as forced migration. Literature suggests that migration from Cooch Behar is around 23 per cent (Roy and Sen 2011). A preliminary survey of the Jai-Hind camp suggests that around 900 families are residing in this Jai-Hind camp. These families have migrated from different villages of Cooch Behar district of West Bengal, mainly from from Dinhata, Nazirhat, Brahmanhat, Sahibgus, Salmara, Sudrihat, Garaljuda and Kumargus. In terms of religion this settlement has equal numbers of Hindu and

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Muslim residents. In Cooch Behar, the population breakdown is Hindu 74.06 per cent, Muslim 25.54 per cent, Christian 0.15 per cent, Sikh 0.02 per cent, Buddhist 0.07 per cent, and Jain and other 0.01 per cent (Census of India 2011). This statistic suggests that around one-quarter of the population in Cooch Behar is Muslim but in terms of migration around half of the migrants residing in the settlement are Muslim. Hence this section will attempt to explore the relationship between religion and migration. Religious-cultural norms: the rationale for gender-specific division of labour Out of all the 18 districts in west Bengal, Cooch Behar ranks 16th in the gender-based income Index (Government of West Bengal 2010). The migrant women suggested that the economic opportunities are more for males in Cooch Behar. The males can take tuition classes, engage in market or can be tailors. But for women the public and private demarcation is very strict. In Cooch Behar the roles of Muslim women are defined through their religious-cultural norms. The public-private division is very binding on these women. The entry to the public sphere is limited. The woman engages primarily in the private spheres through cooking, cleaning, and child-rearing. They even undertake sorting and packing of agriculture goods. The family and community settings restrict and limit the economic roles and duties of women. There are few places where the ‘system of village’ does not permit the wife to go outside of their homes for working. In short, the role of Muslim women is to create and facilitate conditions around which the man can do the work. These religious cultural norms limit their participation in economic activity in the public spaces. Moreover, the social division of labour employs them in unpaid domestic work. An impression on the nature of the women workforce and the categories in which they employ themselves in Cooch Behar can be gauged from Table 14.1. Even if the income generated through participation in agriculture is insufficient, still the socio-cultural norms restrict the participation or employment of the Muslim women in agriculture. To add, the social division of labour employs them in unpaid domestic work. Hence these women are forced to migrate out of Cooch Behar in order to contribute economically in their household, as their ‘right to work’ is determined by the socio-cultural norms and family-community settings in the village.

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Table 14.1 Percentage of class of workers and non-workers in Cooch Behar Sl. No.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Number of Percentage Percentage females of females of female working out of total working population Cultivators 61,620 Agricultural 133,688 labourers Household 19,436 Industrial workers Other workers 47,672 262,416 Total working females

Percentage of female working out of total female population

4.5 9.7

6.03 13.04

4.5 9.7

1.42

1.89

1.4

3.4 19.1

25.6 25.6

3.4 19.1

Total population of Cooch Behar = 2,819,086 (Total female population = 1,367,544); Total working population in Cooch Behar = 1,024,717 (males and females). Source: Census of India (2011).

Tracing the economic security in the agrarian structure As outlined earlier, Cooch Behar is a predominantly rural, agrarian economy. Around 70 per cent of population depends directly or indirectly on agriculture as a means for livelihood. An agrarian relation reflects the rural social formations and outlines the socio-economic profile of an area. But lesser researched areas are the impacts of the agrarian economy on the life and livelihood of the people, especially the women. Cooch Behar as a district is industrially insufficient to provide employment opportunities to the people, as the number of people employed in registered factories and state government offices are 0.1 per cent and 0.28 per cent, respectively3. Agriculture is a primary source of income in Cooch Behar. Information outlining agrarian structure and size of landholding of Cooch Behar is given in Table 14.2. In Cooch Behar, the male members are primarily the income earners. They employ themselves in agricultural activities. But this income is barely enough to meet their everyday expenses or during any emergency. It does not even provide for future security. Moreover, any irregularity in agricultural cultivation or production makes the entire family economically vulnerable. To add, agriculture is no

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Table 14.2 Statistics on land utilization in Cooch Behar as of 16 March 2017

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Year 2011–2012

Area (thousands ha)

Total reporting area Forest area Area under non-agricultural use Permanent pastures and other grazing land Permanent Pastures and other grazing land Land under miscellaneous trees grooves not included in net area sown Culturable waste land Fallow land other than current fallow Current fallow land Net area shown

331.57 4.26 62.17 0.21 0.03 7.75 2.09 0.07 0.84 254.18

Source: Directorate of Agriculture (evaluation) Government of West Bengal as cited in http://coochbehar.nic.in/htmfiles/dist_summaryprofile.html.

longer a profitable and a highly pursued economic activity. Hence people are moving away from agriculture. To add, even the landholders are undertaking cost-cutting measures by reducing the labourers working in the field. These cost-cutting measures have left the men unemployed for days and at times for seasons. Moreover, in Cooch Behar people undertake seasonal agriculture cultivation. There is no regular cultivation through circulation of various crops. Hence any instances of irregular rainfall make them economically vulnerable and debt-ridden.

The size of family and its impact on the distribution of landholdings As per the migrants, the size of landholding is an important factor in determining migration. They suggested that in Cooch Behar people who migrate out generally do not have any ownership of land. Among the migrants few are marginal landowners, wage earners or work as contractual labourers. For the rural economy, land is an important factor for production and also as a means for subsistence. With the growth in the size of family, the size of land distributed to each family members is reduced. Individuals who have a small piece of land find it tough to meet their ends. The income generated through these landholdings is very low. It mostly fulfils the immediate needs of the family

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Table 14.3 Distribution of landholdings in Cooch Behar Sl. No.

Size-Cass in 2010–2011

Number of landholdings

Percentage of people holding land

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Marginal Small Semi-medium Medium Large Total

254,309 49,158 19,540 231 40 323,278

9.02 1.28 0.69 0.008 0.0014 11.46

Total population of Cooch Behar = 2,819,086 (Census of India 2011). Marginal = below 1 ha; Small = 1 ha and above but less than 2 ha; Semimedium = 2 ha and above but less than 4 ha; Medium = 4 ha and above but less than 10 ha; Large = 10 ha and above. It includes mostly institutional holding. Source: Agriculture Census of West Bengal as cited in the official site of Cooch Behar, http://coochbehar.nic.in/htmfiles/dist_summaryprofile.html downloaded on 5 May 2017.

(Census of India 2011), but it is insufficient if the family members want to convert their ‘kuccha’ house to a ‘puccha’ house or want to marry off their children. Table 14.3 outlines the number and size of landholdings in Cooch Behar. Rescaling of borders and its impact on property relations On 1 August 2015, India and Bangladesh exchanged 162 enclaves4 (Ministry of External Affairs 2015). India shares a roughly 4,096 km border with Bangladesh and only half of this border has been fenced. As per the National Informatics Centre, in Cooch Behar district, the total proposed border fencing in phase III is 375.5 km, out of which 268.06 km of work is undertaken. Upgradation work under phase III is done for 84.87 km. India plans to fence the entire border land by 2019. This rescaling of the border played an important role in migration. As according to the migrants, there was a large community that had initially existed, but the rescaling of the border divided the community into two nationalities. The fencing impacted the property relations among the people, and many people’s land and houses fell on the other side of the border. Contrary to the government position,5 the migrants further argued that the gate of the fences opens at 6 a.m. and closes around 8 a.m., and in the evening it again opens at 6 p.m. and closes at 8 p.m. There is even a waiting period of one hour for people to cross

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the fences. The people are not allowed to carry any commodities from the Indian side to their houses, which unfortunately lie in the Bangladesh side. If they do, they are harassed by the officials on the borders. It becomes a criminal offence. Any violation of this rule gets them imprisoned or they get beaten up by the police from both the sides of the borders. Moreover, if they have to attend their farms, they have to do so during the day as in the night they are not allowed to stay back. Hence their fields remain unattended and unguarded at night. The farmers fear growing any vegetables like potatoes, or tobacco, as they fear the crop can get stolen. They have been getting frequent orders to remove their houses and lands from the Bangladesh side. These people migrate due to lack of proper resettlement measures of the Indian government. They migrate to earn for either buying a piece of land, for building a house or to undertake agriculture cultivation. Studies have suggested that on one hand ownership of land, home or business reduces migration among females while facilitates migration among males (Donato 1993; Cerrutti and Massey 2001; Kanaiaupuni 2000, as cited by Richter and Taylor 2008). But this is a study where both females and males have migrated despite having ownership of property. Limited economic opportunities in the urban neighbourhoods The urban share of population in Cooch Behar is 10.3 per cent of total population, while the rural population makes up 89.7 per cent (Census of India 2011). The migrants suggested that the employment opportunities available to these women in their immediate urban neighbourhoods or in the other urban areas in West Bengal is very limited. For example, the women who undertakes domestic work in a household gets 1 kg rice and around 20 to 40 rupees per day. In other words, she earns around 600 to 1,200 rupees per month with 30 kilograms of rice. But in Delhi the women earn around 15,000 to 21,000 per month by working in five to seven houses. Hence it becomes economically beneficial to migrate out from their locality and even their state into the metropolitan cities. The migrant Muslim women as internally displaced persons: an argument Literature suggests that forced migration is an administrative category should not be uncritically operationalized (McNevin 2013), as it can subsume and oversimplify the multiple status within it (Philo 2014). This category should be treated as a transitory category (Nyers 2015).

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Coercion, conflict and violation of human rights are identified as the important aspects for defining and categorizing forced migration. But mostly, the violation of human rights has been subsumed under the categories of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, development-induced displacement, environment and disaster-induced displacement, smuggled people and trafficked people. The concept of forced migration has been very loosely defined. The UN definition of internally displaced persons is generally accepted: persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. (UN 2004) To add, the experiences and life situations of these Muslim women contradicts with Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:6 1

2

Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

In this context, the chapter suggests that the migrant Muslim women should be categorized as internally displaced persons as their ‘right to work’ in Cooch Behar is determined and governed through structural factors like family community setting, socio-cultural norms, gender roles, religious norms, agriculture and agrarian property relations and rescaling of borders. These settings or structural factors limit their economic opportunities that directly affects the life and livelihood of these Muslim women and their families. In this context, this chapter suggests that the category of ‘forced migration’ needs to be revisited by taking the experience of these Muslim women.

Mapping the pattern of migration among the Muslim women Around 326 million or 28.5 per cent of people constitute internal migrants in India (NSSO 2007–2008). In India migration is either long term (i.e. involving relocation of the migrant) or short term (i.e.

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seasonal or circular migration where the migrants move back and forth between place of origin and place of residence). Short-term migrants vary from 15 million (NSSO 2007–2008) to 100 million (Deshingkar and Akter 2009). Out of these around 70.7 per cent are women (Census of India 2011). This section attempts to outline the pattern through which these Muslim women migrate from Cooch Behar. Migrating with family: the implications of consumption and saving patterns in the city A preliminary survey of the Jai-Hind camp suggested that people from Cooch Behar have been migrating in to this camp with their familiies. There are three important reasons why People from Cooch Behar migrate with their family (i.e. husband, wife, with or without children). First, the cost of living is very high in the city and income is barely enough for meeting the needs. Although the man’s income provides immediate relief, in times of emergency (i.e. illness and marriage) the income of one person is insufficient. For example, these migrants don’t prefer to go to the government hospital even if the checkup is free as the waiting period is extremely time-consuming. It is not possible for them to take regular breaks from work due to the fear of losing their job or being replaced by another domestic worker. Hence they prefer to visit the private hospital, as it less time-consuming even though it is expensive. In the city, the income of one person can be spent on day-to-day expenses like clothes, food, rent and bills, while the other person’s income is saved for the future. The income of the females provides social security and well-being of the family. Second, in few cases even the non-earning members of the family have a functional role. For example in the absence of parents, the girl child takes care of her siblings. At times she also cooks and cleans the house. After some years, the girl child accompanies her mother and starts to work as a domestic worker, thus contributing to the income of the house. For the boys, the focus of the parents is to educate them. But mostly after getting primary education, these boys leave their studies and start doing odd jobs. They engage themselves as car cleaners or rag pickers. The educated ones aspire to work as support service staff in malls or offices. From unpaid domestic work to paid domestic work: the changing spheres work Generally, the female migrants are a source of cheap labour; therefore they are encouraged to work as domestic workers. Domestic work is a part of unregulated, informal work. This unregulated character

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empowers the employers of these domestic workers to hire and fire them as per their will. On the other hand, in their place of origin, the females were not encouraged to work outside their homes. As mentioned earlier, social division of labour employs them in unpaid domestic work in their own household. Consumption, property and kinship relations as the drivers of circular migration The people residing in this camp are generally very mobile. There is a circulatory pattern of migration between the place of origin and the place of residence. In the initial years, the migrants from Cooch Behar came to Delhi thinking they would work for two to three years and will go back. In the initial years, the migrants work for a long time in Delhi then they return to their place of origin for a few months. But during their stay these migrants realize that the income and savings that they brought from Delhi are generally consumed in their everyday needs. Left with no savings, they again migrate out to the city to again earn and save. After a point, the pattern of circular migration started to break. Now the frequency of migrants going back to their place of origin varies. Some go back once in six months or once in a year or in two years. Generally the ownership of land, agriculture and kinship relations in their place of origin governs their migration patterns. Neighbourhood and kinship structure: the network operating in migration Studies have earlier suggested that younger women are motivated to migrate by seeing older female migrants (Mahler 1999, as cited by Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003). In this study, it was observed that the family members, extended kin and neighbourhood friends already settled in the host society are the primary networks that facilitate migration. These migrants get an idea of the economic opportunities in the host city through them. Even the migrants get work-related information or vacancies of work through their networks. At times these kin members and friends accompany them to the host society. For example, a respondent stated that she got the courage to migrate as one of her cousin’s brothers was already settled in the host society. Initially, these migrants find accommodation in or around familiar settlements. The migrants don’t feel alienated due to the presence of known people or the kinship structure in the host society.

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The migrants in the city: outlining the adaptation, negotiations and changes What is the impact of migration on the migrants and their families? Few studies have suggested that when males migrate, the wives who had stayed back have more autonomy in making decisions regarding land, children’s education and household expenditures (Afsar 2011; Martin 2004; Gammage 2004, Fadloullah, Berrada, and Khachani 2000, as cited by De Haas 2009). This section analyzes the way these migrant women have adopted and negotiated with different power circles in the city. Redefining the private space and gender segregation of labour market: methods for re-negotiating religious-cultural norms Studies have suggested that single mother, widows or divorced women migrate to escape social stigma or cultural bias (IOM 2004, 2005a, as cited by UNFPA 2006). In this study, migration facilitated the negotiation and re-negotiating of the social, cultural and religious norms. In Cooch Behar, religious-cultural norms limited the economic opportunities of the migrant women. These migrant women feel that the city is more commercial and less religious. Since these women migrate through the networks of kinship and neighbourhood ties, the expectations to follow the religious-cultural norms does not disappear. But when economic hardship overpowers them, these women start to redefine the meaning of private space. While the majority of the men work in the neighbouring local retail shop or in the nearby malls (e.g. Ambience mall, DLF mall, Vasant Square mall) as security guards, cleaners, liftmen, rag pickers or even as waiters, or as professional cooks in the nearby apartments, the women contribute to the family income by working in around five to seven houses as maids or as half-day servants in the houses. These women renegotiate the traditional social division of labour and their role set. They re-define private spaces in terms of homes or through four walls. Hence, they prefer or undertake domestic work as they feel they are not working in public spaces but are working within the private sphere. This is how the Muslim women adapt and negotiate the traditional norms. Gender roles: changes and continuities of the form and the content Studies have suggested that unskilled and semi-skilled migrants remit more than high skilled migrants (Taylor and Ruiz 2006, as cited by De Haas 2009). There is also a gender perspective on the issues on

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remittances. Few studies suggest that male migrants from the Philippines remit more than female migrants (Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2005, as cited by Pfeiffer and Taylor 2008). While the female migrants from the Jai-Hind camp argued that both the men and women contribute in sending money back for the siblings or the old parents that are left behind, but the intervals through which they send money vary. Some people send money once a month, while others send it once in five to six months. The money is generally sent to look after the needs of the old parents. When the families migrate they leave behind the old parents who look after their houses and siblings or other kin. Their unmarried girls and the daughters-in-law, for instance, who are left behind generally look after these old parents. On one hand, the migrated Muslim women might have resettled in a different geographical locality and re-negotiated their gender roles in the place of their residence, but still few of the gender roles have not changed. For example, girls are taking care of the parents. This is manifested when they send money home at regular intervals. But on the other hand, the economic independence of the migrated Muslim women has re-negotiated the forms of gender roles, it has improved the autonomy and self-esteem among women. To add further, there are instances where respondents feel unwelcomed and humiliated by the prejudices and cultural bias of people at their place of origin. Many times these women are socially shamed for not following the cultural and religious traditions. Negotiating the right to the city: the contesting politics What are the rights of migrants in a city? The Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Services) Act 1979 is inadequate to safeguard and govern the lives and living conditions of these migrants. In the city, due to lack of proper legislations or guidelines, the life and livelihood of the migrants are getting entangled within the informal or illegal power structures. The migrants are paying rent for the small units/settlements even though the land is illegally encroached by the local villagers and the thekedars. The initial rent ranges from 500 to 1,200 rupees for a unit. The average dimensions of the unit are 10 feet by 6 feet. The rent did not include either the cost of electricity or water. Once a week the water tanker comes, and the residents of the camp pay 50 rupees per household for the water tankers. There is a scramble for water. The electricity is provided through private players. They charge around 8 or 9 rupees per unit, while in the regularized colony/houses nearby the cost of electricity starts from 4.20 rupees. This informality and irregularity impacts the psychology of

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both the male and female migrants. The fear of getting homeless in the unknown host society (i.e. the city) is a major worry for the migrants. To add, most of the times, they have to surrender to the arm-twisting of the thekedars and their apathetic and insensitive attitudes. For example, these migrants agreed to rent the accommodation even though there was a lack of toilet facilities for the women. But things changed on 25 April 2014 as a fire broke out in the Jai-Hind camp. The entire camp burnt down. After this tragedy the inhabitants, thekedars, local villagers and the state are fighting over the ownership of the land. In this fight both the migrant men and women struggle to legalize their irregular settlements. They have been running around negotiating with different institutions of the state to regularize their settlement. Empowering through community relations Apart from the kin, neighbourhood relationships are important categories for empowerment. Along with them, these migrants also accumulate knowledge and schemes that can benefit them by working and interacting in different households. The female migrants work mostly in the educated middle class households. These people help them in negotiating in different offices and institutions. For example, opening up a bank account for an uneducated/illiterate person requires a witness. Mostly the people help their domestic workers in those activities. Even some respondents suggested that people pass on information of various government schemes. Opening up bank accounts, postal bank accounts or other government schemes become easy for domestic workers to access with the help of their employers. From economic security to commercial mindset: the changing mindset The people have been residing in this settlement for over 16 years. The economic insecurity pushed them out of their place of residence. The initial idea of the migrants was to earn some money for buying land and building a house only to later return back to their village. Over the years these migrants have been trying hard to secure their future by building a small house or buying some farmland in their place of origin. Many of the residents have successfully bought land in Cooch Behar to build their own houses. But still they prefer to live and struggle in the city. The perspectives of the migrants have changed over this period of time. Now they prefer to build a house and invest in agricultural land. They prefer to visit the village during the yielding periods. The farmland and the

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houses are seen as an added economic value. Many female respondents stated that they would prefer to live in the city as they have a choice to earn. As in Cooch Behar, the opportunity to earn is quite limited.

Conclusion This study on the Muslim women provides an opportunity to understand the larger political processes like community, nationality, religion and economic empowerment. It also highlights how structural inequality is embedded in the society. From this study the following recommendations are suggested. Legislation and policy recommendations This study suggests that first, encroachment is a major problem of the city. Hence providing living arrangement for seasonal or temporary migrants would definitely reduce the problem of encroachment and solve the housing problems of the migrants. Second, the migrants are unable to access subsidized food through the public distribution system. Hence the women work overtime and the child starts working at an early age. This chapter suggests that the migrants should be given temporary ration cards. This will solve the problem of women and demotivate the children from working at an early age. Third, during rainy season diseases like fever and cold infest the settlement. To add further, working for long hours, irregular food habits, improper toilet facilities, lack of sanitation in homes and neighbourhoods and expensive healthcare services impacts the health of the migrants. Expenses on health are a major cost for the migrants, hence these migrants either work harder to cover their health expenses or they totally ignore their health. This chapter suggests for a regular health checkup, dispensation of information and knowledge at regular intervals. Fourth, the migrant women are mostly employed as domestic maids or workers. They belong to the informal sector. The migrant women work for 12 hours a day. On an average they work in five to eight houses per day. The absences of any union or group or organization make them vulnerable. They even get exploited physically and at times sexually. Often sexual exploitation done by the employer goes unreported, as the fear of social shaming is quite dominant. Hence regulation is highly needed to shield these migrants from domestic violence and violence at their workplace and prevent exploitation. A gender responsive policy for migrants is the need of the hour. Fifth, skill upgradation can empower the migrants. Sixth, due to seasonal and circular

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migration practices the children of the migrants either dropping out or not attending the school at all. To add, the girl child is the worst victim of the circular migration. Hence educating adults and challenging gender roles should be a major focus of policy or legislation. Seventh, the high rate of migration can also be linked with a pattern of uneven development. Hence policies should aim at strengthening and providing socio-economic safeguards at the migrants’ place of origin. Eighth, information regarding the sex-disaggregated data on migration in India needs to be collected. The economic contribution of the migrant women at the level of immediate household, family and in contributions to GDP needs to be recorded and assessed. Without this data, policy frameworks may lack their thrust. Incorporating the women’s perspective will make the policies more inclusive and will reduce the vulnerability of the migrant women. Apart from the legislative inclusion, this chapter also argues for challenging and changing various socio-cultural norms. This chapter strongly suggests for revisiting the category of internally displaced persons and re-defining forced migration, as gender matters.

Notes 1 As per the Census of India, Cooch Behar is also known as Koch Bihar and Coochbehar. It is surrounded by Jalpaiguri district in the north and west, and the state of Assam in the east. It even shares international boundaries with Bangladesh towards the south, southeast and southwest. 2 Jai-Hind camp (also popularly known, as Bengali Basti) is an unauthorized slum colony in Masoodpur village in Vasant Kunj, Delhi. The authorized apartments of Delhi Development Authority surround this camp on three sides. 3 Derived from the section, ‘Some Employment Statistics’ from the website of National Informatics Centre, Cooch Behar District Centredownloaded from http://coochbehar.nic.in/Htmfiles/cob_employment.html#employment2 4 An enclave is a territory belonging to one sovereign power but is located inside the territory of another sovereign power. As per the district administration Koch Bihar is the only district in West Bengal, which has several Chhit Mahals or enclaves in the neighboring Bangladesh. Even Bangladesh possesses several enclaves inside Koch Behar district. 5 The farmers who own agricultural land on the Bangladesh side are allowed to attend their farms anytime between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. 6 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 through General Assembly Resolution 217A.

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15 International migration in Tamil Nadu Results from the Tamil Nadu Migration Survey 2015 S. Irudaya Rajan, Bernard D’Sami and S. Samuel Asir Raj Tamil Nadu lies in the southernmost part of the Indian Peninsula and is bordered by the union territory of Puducherry and the South Indian states of Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. It also shares a maritime border with the nation of Sri Lanka. Tamil Nadu covers an area of 130,058 km2 and has a population of 75 million as per the 2011 census. Tamil Nadu is the eleventh largest state by area and the sixth most populous state in India. The state was ranked sixth among the states in India in terms of the Human Development Index in 2011. Tamil Nadu is the second largest state economy in India with Rs 4,789 billion (US$71 billion) in gross domestic product. The state has the highest number (10.56 per cent) of business enterprises and stands second in total employment (9.97 per cent) in India, with a population share of about 6 per cent of the nation’s total. Tamil Nadu was ranked the third most developed state in India based on the ‘Multidimensional Development Index’ in a 2013 report published by a panel headed by former Reserve Bank of India Governor Dr Raghuram Rajan. The Tamils were the forerunners of India’s migrant laborers. The 1830s witnessed the emergence of the ‘coolie migration’, where a large number of Indians, particularly Tamils, were forcibly taken from their homeland to work as indentured laborers in British plantations in the Caribbean Islands (West Indies) and to the countries in Asia and Africa such as Burma, Ceylon, Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa. The first stage of this forceful migration witnessed the Tamils taken to far-off countries as indentured laborers to the sugar plantations. The second stage witnessed the assimilation and integration process in the host countries. The third stage witnessed the decolonization process in which some Tamils were made ‘stateless’, and this problem exists even today. The fourth stage of migration witnessed in the 1970s and

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1980s saw a large number of workers leaving Tamil Nadu for Singapore, Malaysia and the Gulf when the Southeast Asian countries witnessed the ‘economic miracle’. The oil-rich Gulf countries during the oil crisis made ‘petro-dollars’ and had invested in modernization and required huge labor. India, and particularly the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, responded by sending a huge labor force to the Gulf region. It is estimated by the Centre for Development Studies that there are 9 million Indians currently working in the Gulf region alone. The Tamil Nadu Migration Survey (TMS) 2015 was commissioned by the Non-Residence Tamils (NRT) Welfare Board under the Commissioner of Rehabilitation, Tamil Nadu, through funding from the Tamil Nadu planning commission. Additional resources were provided by the Loyola Institute of Social Science Training and Research, Chennai, Centre for Diaspora Studies, M S University, Tirunelveli, Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, Rajiv Gandhi National Institute of Youth Development Institute and Centre for Development Studies. The TMS, among 20,000 households in all the 32 districts of Tamil Nadu, was coordinated by the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, which is the lead partner in sampling, preparation of the questionnaire, data entry, analysis and preparation of the report.

Demography In 2011, the population of Tamil Nadu grew at an annual rate of 1.5 per cent, and this is much higher than that recorded during the last two decades. During the last ten years, Tamil Nadu added about 10 million people to its population, compared to the increase of 7 million during 1971–2001. Among the districts, Kancheepuram district had the highest annual exponential growth rate (3.3 per cent) followed by Thiruvallur and Coimbatore (3.0 per cent). The Nilgiris had a negative population growth rate of 0.4 per cent, and this was the lowest in the state. In 2011, the proportion of females to total population was the highest in Thanjavur (50.9 per cent) and lowest in Salem (48.8 per cent), mostly due to the neglect of female children. Chennai is the most populated district and Perambalur is the least populated one. Chennai is also the most crowded district in Tamil Nadu. The second most densely populated district is Kanyakumari at the southernmost coastal tip of India. Population density is the least in the Nilgiris, a popular hill station in Tamil Nadu. Like other South Indian states, Tamil Nadu is demographically advanced. Sixteen of 32 districts have a sex ratio favourable to females. The sex ratio is highest in the Nilgiris and the lowest in Dharmapuri

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followed by Salem and Krishnagiri. These three areas are famous for their female discrimination. Additionally, crude birth and death rates have dropped considerably. Moreover, infant mortality and total fertility rates have seen significant decreases. In fact, Tamil Nadu has the lowest total fertility rate in the country after Goa and Kerala. This has led to Tamil Nadu being categorized as an ‘ageing’ state. Additionally, literacy has improved and the gender gap in literacy has been mediated. In 1981, the gender gap was 27.7, which shrunk to 12.9 in 2011. Male literacy rate was 86.8 per cent and the corresponding figure for females was 73.4 per cent. The proportion of illiterate persons in the households is higher in rural areas (11.6 per cent) compared to urban (4.6 per cent). In urban areas, about 38 per cent of the households have more than four literate members, but in rural areas the corresponding figure is 28 per cent. Population projections show that Tamil Nadu will achieve its peak population in 2031 after which there will be a sharp decline. Also, there will be negative annual exponential growth from 2041. As it is today, the total fertility rate is likely to remain below replacement level in the coming decades.

Interstate migration and mobility Tamil Nadu is among the states with negative net interstate migration. Mobility in Tamil Nadu (25.4 per cent) is less than the average mobility among states in India which is 30.6 per cent. If ranked on the basis of mobility, Tamil Nadu holds the 29th position among the 35 federal constitutional divisions which include the 28 states and 7 union territories. Mobility among women is higher than among men in most states in India including Tamil Nadu. The main reason for this is that a large chunk of migration in India is marriage-induced. According to the 2001 census, the index of population mobility in India was 44.6 among females but only 17.5 among males, which is a difference of 27.1 percentage points. In Tamil Nadu, the mobility index was 29.5 among females and 21.2 per cent among males, with a difference of 8.3 percentage points, much lower than the difference at the all-India level. Tamil Nadu ranks 30th when organized by highest mobility rates among females, and it stands at 19th when organized by highest mobility rates among the male population. Among the most populous districts, Viluppuram and Kancheepuram see the most intra-district migration and among the least populous districts, Ariyalur and the Nilgiris are those with the most intra-district migration. Chennai, Thiruvallur and Kancheepuram are the top three

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districts in terms of percentage of out-migrants in their population as well as the absolute number of in-migrants. Inter-state in-migration in Tamil Nadu seems to be an urban phenomenon as majority of the population migrating from other states is enumerated in the urban areas. There are more urban settlements in certain districts, and this ranges from 0.2 per cent of total population in Virudhunagar to 6.8 per cent of total population in the Nilgiris. Migrants constitute the majority of population of the Nilgiris, Chennai and Thiruvallur districts. From the 2001 Place of Birth census data, Tamil Nadu gained 29,603 migrants from Rajasthan and 4.8 per cent of Tamil Nadu’s migrants were from Rajasthan, followed by Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, accounting for a net gain of 7,926 and 2,560 migrants, respectively. Despite being the state which sends the highest number of migrants (33.3 per cent of total in-migrants), Kerala had a net gain of 14,922 migrants from Tamil Nadu, and this is because in Tamil Nadu, out-migrants outnumber in-migrants from its neighbour to the west. Tamil Nadu’s net loss of migrants was accounted for by its other neighbour Karnataka, as the latter gained 31.5 per cent of the migrants going out of Tamil Nadu. Other neighbours, Pondicherry and Andhra Pradesh, contributed around 14.3 and 5.1 per cent of the net loss of in-migrants, respectively. Maharashtra is the only non-neighbouring state that received over 15 per cent of the out-migrants from Tamil Nadu, and it accounted for 24.2 per cent of the net loss of migrants from the state.

Immigration When it comes to immigration, persons from Sri Lanka represent the highest immigrant population in Tamil Nadu. The other major immigrant group is people from Myanmar. There were 205,816 immigrants in 2001, consisting of 104,066 male and 101,750 female immigrants. The proportion of male and female immigrants in the total immigrant population of Tamil Nadu is equal. The rural-urban residence of immigrants to Tamil Nadu stands at 45 to 55 per cent. A major chunk of the immigrants are from countries in Asia, representing 98 per cent of the total immigrants. The major immigrant-sending countries apart from Sri Lanka and Myanmar are Malaysia and Nepal. According to place of birth data, immigrants from Europe, Africa and America prefer urban settlements and immigration is biased towards urban areas, accounting for 84 per cent, 80 per cent and 87 per cent, respectively. The highest immigrant-sending countries from these continents are the UK, Uganda and the US, respectively.

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Emigrants According to the TMS 2015, emigrants from Tamil Nadu living in any part of the world are estimated to be 2.2 million. On the other hand, return emigrants who return after working abroad is estimated as 1.3 million. Emigration is a phenomenon that is observed throughout Tamil Nadu with Chennai (3.2 lakh), Coimbatore (1.9 lakh) and Ramanathapuram (1.4 lakh) districts with the largest number of emigrants. Theni (13,802), Dharmapuri (14,594) and the Nilgiris (5,868) districts are ranked the lowest in this context. Among the taluks in Tamil Nadu, Ramanathapuram (92,915), Tiruchendur (63,892) and Agatheeswaram (63,100) have large number of emigrants. Interestingly, around 20 taluks in Tamil Nadu do not have any emigrants as per the TMS 2015. The Non-Resident Tamils (emigrants and return emigrants) were estimated to be 3.5 million as per TMS 2015. According to the Kerala Migration Survey 2014, the emigrants, return migrants and Non-Resident Keralites were estimated as 2.4 million, 1.3 million and 3.7 million, respectively. It is estimated that the number of migrants of all types in Tamil Nadu was 5.4 million in 2015. Emigrants account for 40 per cent of the total migration. Although Chennai has the most number of emigrant households, the district with the highest percentage of emigrant households is Perambalur. Singapore reports the largest number of emigrants from Tamil Nadu which is 4.1 lakh. The Gulf region comprises of the top five countries receiving emigrants from Tamil Nadu – with both United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia accounting for 4.0 and 3.5 lakh, respectively. The US, the most sought-after destination for highly skilled emigrants with 3 lakh and Malaysia with 1.9 lakh are some of the other top countries preferred by Tamil Migrants. The Gulf region (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait) accounts for 1.1 million Tamil emigrants, which is half of the total emigrants from Tamil Nadu. Singapore is the most sought-after destination accounting for 19 per cent of total emigrants. UAE occupies the next position with 18 per cent. Males constitute 85 per cent of emigrant population, and 64.5 per cent are married. Hindus are over-represented among the emigrants compared to their total population. The emigrant population in Tamil Nadu is only 14.7 per cent women, and that leaves male population constituting 85.3 per cent of the emigrant population. As to religion, 74.9 per cent are Hindus, 15.2 per cent Muslims and 9.7 per cent Christians. Regarding education, 29.2 per cent have a secondary level education, 14.4 per cent have a technical degree or diploma and 12.4 per cent have a professional degree. Women are either illiterate or on

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average more educated than men. It is seen that people migrate mainly for better employment opportunities and to leverage the disparity of exchange rates between countries. The most common occupations for males are engineer followed by agriculture and animal husbandry labourers. The occupation of most the female emigrants is engineer, followed by construction worker/labourer (12.9 per cent) and household worker/maid/servant (11.7 per cent).

Out-migrants The estimated number of out-migrants (OMI) in Tamil Nadu is 1.02 million and that of return out-migrants (ROM) is 0.91 million. The total number of interstate out-migrants (ISM) is 1.93 million, and this is less than that of the total Non-Resident Tamils. Tirunelveli (158,964), Krishnagiri (114,665) and Tiruppur (83,654) have emerged as the most out-migrating districts according to the TMS 2015. Similarly, the highest return out-migration was estimated for Salem district (109,857), followed by Madurai district (93,940) and Tirunelveli district (66,543). Karur, Madurai, Theni and Kancheepuram also have more return out-migrants. Around 5.8 per cent of the total households have one or more out-migrants. Around 4.1 per cent of the total households in Tamil Nadu have one or more return out-migrants. Among the taluks, Chennai emerges in the prime position in both OMI and ROM with 73,107 and 58,936, respectively. Next to Chennai, Tiruppur taluk ranks first with 57,428 migrants, followed by four taluks – Radhapuram (49,900), Tenkasi (44,429), Alangulam (31,976) and Ambasamudram (26,503), all belonging to Tirunelveli district, occupying the first ten most migrating taluks in the state. Among ROM, Madurai South emerges as the leader with 54,292 return out-migrants, followed by Tenkasi (39,223) and Salem (38,322). Karnataka receives the most number of out-migrants from Tamil Nadu. It has 43.1 per cent of total out-migrants as of now and receives 38.8 per cent of the total return out-migrants. This difference in the share of the out-migrants from Karnataka shows that the state has always been the favourite place of settlement of Tamil out-migrants. The destination which has the second most number of OMI (17.8 per cent) and ROM (22.8 per cent) is Kerala. Andhra Pradesh with 8.1 per cent of the total OMI and 12.2 per cent of total ROM occupies the third position. All these three states, Karnataka, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, are the immediate neighbouring states of Tamil Nadu. Another attractive settlement for Tamil Nadu out-migrants is Maharashtra, which is

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the only non-neighbour of Tamil Nadu that receives a share of over 5 per cent of both OMI and ROM. In the case of the out-migrant population of Tamil Nadu, the age group from 20 to 24 represents the maximum number of total migrants across all ages (i.e. 26.9 per cent of the total out-migrant population migrates at this age). The age group from 25 to 29 also shares 22.4 per cent of the total out-migrants. Observation of female migration across age groups shows that the migration of male and female population is equal up to early teenage years, and from the age of 15, migration has been dominated by male population. ROM population also shows similar numbers as that of OMI, migration increasing in the early ages and peaking at the age of 20 to 24 which represents 26 per cent of the total ROM. It decreases from there, with age group 25 to 29 representing 19.6 per cent of the total population and the age group 30 to 34 representing 16.5 of the total return out-migrants. Moreover, Hindus are the dominant out-migrant population in Tamil Nadu, with 88.2 per cent share of OMI and 91.9 per cent of ROM. Christians share 7.6 per cent of the OMI population and 4.2 per cent of the ROM population, and Muslims share around 4 per cent of both ROM and OMI population. Looking at educational attainment, it is seen that the people who have completed up to secondary school education form 29.5 per cent of the total out-migrants and those who have completed higher secondary school is around 9 per cent of the total out-migrants. Around 37 per cent of the out-migrant population has completed a degree or more. There are more illiterate women among the total migrant women and the female population that has completed secondary schooling is 20.6 per cent of the total. This number is 32.6 per cent among males.

Remittances The total remittances to Tamil Nadu in 2015 was estimated to be Rs 61,843 crore, according to the TMS 2015. This is close to Kerala’s remittances accounting to Rs 68,000 crore. A total remittance of Rs 61,843 crore indicates an average per capita remittance of Rs 8,500 to the total population of 75 million in Tamil Nadu. For Kerala, the per capita remittance was Rs 21,000 in 2014. According to our estimates, the remittances to Tamil Nadu are equivalent to 14 per cent of the state’s domestic product. The per capita income of the state was Rs 66,635, without taking remittances into account, but would be Rs 75,214 if remittances are taken into account. Remittances were 6.8 times the

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money that the state received from the central government as revenue transfer and 1.8 times the entire government expenditure. In other words, 85 per cent of the households received remittances for their day-to-day needs. Another major share was used for the education of the children. About 31 per cent of the households deposited the remittances into banks as savings. About 7 per cent of the households in Tamil Nadu used money for purchasing or building a house, while 19 per cent of the households in Kerala used their remittances for the same purpose. The highest remittances were received by Hindus, followed by Muslims and Christians. Muslim households received the highest total remittances (Rs 87,567) and household remittances (Rs 20,595) per household followed by Christians. An average Muslim household received the highest remittance in Ramanathapuram district followed by Kanyakumari. Among Hindus households, this average was highest in Perambalur followed by Sivaganga. Among the Christian households, average remittances per household were highest in Ramanathapuram followed by Coimbatore. However, only 7.2 per cent of the households in the state had the direct benefit of the remittances. The households that receive remittances vary from 32 per cent in Perambalur to 0.5 per cent in the Nilgiris. Eighty-five per cent of the households received remittances for their day-to-day needs. Another major share was used for the education of the children. About 31 per cent of the households deposited the remittances into banks as savings. About 7 per cent of the households in Tamil Nadu used money for purchasing or building a house. About 50 per cent of the households used the money for hospital expenses.

Financing migration The average cost of migration incurred by an emigrant from Tamil Nadu is Rs 108,112 compared to Rs 76,243 for a Kerala emigrant. On an average, emigrants from Tamil Nadu pay Rs 32,000 higher than their counterparts in Kerala. The highest expenditure is the money given to recruitment agencies, which is 50.4 per cent of the total, followed by visa charges and cost of air tickets. However, the average cost of emigration reported for the return emigrants in Tami Nadu was Rs 90,340, which indicates that the cost of emigration has gone up in recent years. The GCC countries where half of the emigrants are concentrated spent on an average of Rs 76,127 for migration. However, Tamil migrants spent between Rs 82,689 (Malaysia) to Rs 130,251

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(Singapore) to work in these countries. About 52 per cent emigrants had met the expenses from their own savings, whereas 44 per cent had received support from their parents. The most important corridors of migration from Tamil Nadu were Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the US and Malaysia. The cost of migration to these countries varied from Rs 93,000 to Rs 130,000. The average cost of migration to Germany was high (Rs 180,000), followed by the UK (Rs 160,000) and South Africa (Rs 150,000). Migration costs to Ireland were the least (Rs 15,000). The most expensive migration from Tamil Nadu was to the US (up to Rs 900,000) followed by Germany (up to Rs 800,000) and Singapore (up to Rs 600,000). About 52 per cent of emigrants had met the expenses from their own savings, whereas 44 per cent had received support from their parents. About one-fourth of the emigrants borrowed the money from their friends or took a loan from money lenders. Most of the migrants had taken money from more than one source.

Employment and savings It is estimated that over 60 million people fall in the ‘employable’ category. Among them, only 52 per cent were gainfully employed. Forty-six per cent were not in the labour force, of which most are women. The largest portion of women among the employed was in Ramanathapuram followed by Tirunelveli and Erode. The unemployment rate for the general population is 4.5. The unemployment rate among the general population is highest in Vellore (11.5) and lowest in Erode (1.5). The unemployment rate among the female population is high in Cuddalore district. The rate for Hindus is high in Vellore (11.8), while for Christians it is in Cuddalore and for Muslims it is in Ramanathapuram and Thoothukkudi. Most of the unemployed persons had completed their secondary education but have no degree (39 per cent). Another 23 per cent of the unemployed had completed their graduation and 28 per cent had attained education higher than graduate level. Savings, investments and debt are all significantly higher for Non-Resident Tamil households. Migrant households in Coimbatore had the highest average savings (Rs 400,000) followed by Madurai (Rs 300,000) and the lowest average savings was in Dharmapuri. The investment pattern is also in favour of Coimbatore (Rs 8,000,000) and Kanyakumari came second (Rs 1,800,000). Investment is least in Vellore.

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Return migrants According to the TMS, the return emigrants in Tamil Nadu are estimated to be 1.3 million with 6.1 return emigrants per 100 households. The highest number of return emigrants is from Saudi Arabia with 278,962, followed by the United Arab Emirates with 254,438. The other two countries which report the largest proportion of return emigrants are Singapore with 18.8 per cent and Malaysia with 12.5 per cent. The highest number of return migrant households is enumerated in the Sivaganga district (35.1 per 100 households) followed by Perambalur district (34.7 per 100 households), and both Nagapattinam and Ramanathapuram with 18.7 and 19.4 per 100 households, respectively. Most of the migrants from Tamil Nadu are from the majority religion Hinduism. Chennai, being a metropolitan city, has people of all religions. The TMS 2015 clearly indicates the reverse as far as migration of minorities (Christians and Muslims) are concerned. Muslim emigrants constitute 12.9 per cent (twice to the percentage of their population in Tamil Nadu) and Christians 7.0 per cent. For example, 19.37 per cent of Muslims from Chennai are Return Emigrants (REM). Chennai has 9.02 per cent of Muslim population, and 21.98 per cent Christians from Chennai are REM. Christians constitute 7.62 per cent of Chennai’s population. Kanyakumari with its 44.74 per cent Christian population (2011 census) has 15.82 per cent REM. Ramanathapuram, which has the highest number of Muslims at 14.65 per cent (2011 census) in Tamil Nadu has only 7.71 per cent REM. Among Hindu population in Tamil Nadu, Sivaganga shares the highest return emigrants at 12.5 per cent. Return emigrants had been in general engaged in casual jobs such as the workers employed in private sector or in non-agricultural sector, as agricultural labourers or self- employed, all of which come under the unorganized sector. Many of the returned male migrants did not have a problem with salaries and wages (78.0 per cent and 79.6 per cent), while the female migrant workers did. Particularly, 39.1 per cent of women did not get the promised salary. Further, 63.4 per cent of REM did not get proper food and another 50 per cent did not get accommodation. Ninety-five per cent of male emigrant workers did not get medical facilities and close to 89 per cent women migrant workers did not have access to public health systems. Return migrants faced different problems such as fall in wages, low wages and escalation in the cost of living, and as a result could not save much money. Fall in wages and low wages constitute 68.8 per

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cent of the problems faced by the REM. This is in spite of the fact that 42.2 per cent of the REM went abroad through the social network of their friends and relatives. Thirty per cent went through the recruitment agents and individual agents.

Impact on women and elderly According to the special survey conducted among return emigrants as part of the TMS, about 39.1 per cent of women reported that they have not received the promised salary as against 21.0 per cent among men. Similarly, 21 per cent of men and 11 per cent of women had problems in receiving their regular wages – either it was delayed or denied. However, 91 per cent of both men and women did not approach the Indian embassy in the countries of destination when they had problems. On the reasons for return, 37.6 per cent of them reported that their contract was not extended and another 18.8 per cent mentioned that it was the family problems at home that caused their return. One of the major social costs of migration is indeed strained family relations. Another 8 per cent reported lower wages at the countries of destination as the major reasons for return and another 8 per cent returned due to their poor health. The total number of women left behind due to husbands’ migration is estimated as 1 million, and this is again not discussed in the policy circle. This number in Tamil Nadu is almost similar to the estimate of Gulf wives, which stands at 1 million in Kerala. Such women were found highest in Perambalur (26.0 per cent) Sivaganga (19.1 per cent), Ramanathapuram (17.4 per cent), Ariyalur (13.5 per cent) and Pudukkottai (11.3 per cent). The special survey conducted among women left behind (WLB), as part of the TMS, revealed that these women were more qualified than males in the general population. The average years of schooling among WLB is 10.7 years, higher than both males (8.5 years) and females (7.3 years) in the general category. Half of them married while their husbands were working abroad. About 90 per cent of them never visited the country that their husbands worked in. About 97 per cent of them communicated with their husbands through mobile phones. Eighty per cent of them received remittances directly from their husbands. A vast majority of WLB (81.5 per cent) could see a leap in their financial status owing to the migration of their husbands. Some of them could repay their debts (26.8 per cent), construct their own houses (21.1 per cent), purchase gold ornaments (12.1 per cent) and provide good education to their children (13.5 per cent). Majority of

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them gained social status and dignity in their social circle (49.9 per cent). Their lifestyle and quality of living were considerably improved (47.2 per cent) with the emigration of their husbands. However, WLB experienced loneliness (69.9 per cent) and had to take up added responsibilities in the absence of their husbands (60.5 per cent) which were indicated as the major drawbacks. In addition, they also expressed insecurity (38.9 per cent), fear and anxiety (18.9 per cent) and concerns regarding the health of their children (26.2 per cent) as other problems experienced by them. Over 10 per cent of the population of Tamil Nadu are elderly, that is, above the age of 60. The highest elderly proportion can be seen in Dharmapuri district (18.1 per cent) followed by Tiruvannamalai (14.7 per cent) and the lowest in Cuddalore (5.5 per cent). The sex ratio among the elderly is favourable to females. About 54 per cent of the total elderly are widows, whereas only 15 per cent of the total elderly are widowers. Elderly in NRT households have more frequent checkups and are more aware of their health status. They spend more money on healthcare, as most prefer private hospitals to government-run ones. The male elderly spend more than their female counterparts on healthcare.

Acknowledgements The Tamil Nadu Migration Survey (TMS 2015) was commissioned by the Non-residence Tamils (NRT) Welfare Board under the Commissioner of Rehabilitation, Tamil Nadu, through funding from the Tamil Nadu Planning Commission. Additional resources were provided by the Loyola Institute of Social Science Training and Research, Loyola College (autonomous) Chennai, Centre for Diaspora Studies, M S University, Tirunelveli, Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur and Rajiv Gandhi National Institute of Youth Development and Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. We are grateful to B. Anand, IAS, Principal Secretary and Commissionerate of Rehabilitation and Welfare of Non-Resident Tamils and Vice Chairperson Santha Sheela Nair, State Planning Commission, Government of Tamil Nadu and K. Ramesh of NRT.

16 Concerns about temporary migration Policymaker’s perspective S. Irudaya Rajan and Kartik Yadav

International migration can have a considerable impact on demographic, social and economic structures, both at home and in the host country. India has no specific policies on temporary migration, and its emigration is governed by the Emigration Act of 1983. This report looks at concerns and perspectives of researchers and policymakers on the economic and social impact of short-term migration to and from India. The number of temporary migrants has grown worldwide in response to employers’ demands for more flexible labour, which presents a major challenge for labour regulation in the receiving countries. Regulation needs to balance several competing interests, in particular the interests of employers, local workers who fear this influx of competition and the migrant workers themselves. As part of the Indian chapter for EURA-NET Project (2016), temporary migrants, policymakers and other experts were identified and interviewed regarding various facets of migration. All interviewees were characterized as either belonging to the ‘origin country’ point of view or the ‘destination country’ point of view. In all, 41 policymakers and other experts were interviewed belonging to various categories such as ministers of the central and state government in charge of non-resident affairs, secretaries (joint/deputy/additional) in these ministries and also Protectors of Migrant (POM), officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Human Resource Development (for student migration) as well as the Ministry of Tourism. Professors and researchers at universities and think tanks (such as the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade) were also interviewed to understand the current trends and global contexts of migration. The remaining interviewees were civil society actors and those working in international organizations. Data collection in India was conducted in the cities of Pune, Bangalore, Delhi, Hyderabad, Bombay, Cochin and the state of Goa.

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These interviews highlighted that although the migration discourse has evolved over the years, in the absence of a concrete guiding policy, the treatment of mobility issues and response to them is ad hoc, discretionary and unpredictable. This is unfortunate since the number of migrants is quite significant and cannot be ignored. Many researchers pointed out that not only the developed countries but even developing countries like the Philippines do a far better job of keeping track of migration in and out of the country. All temporary emigrants should be registered with the Central Government, should be insured, should get the protection of the concerned Embassy during illness or loss of jobs, should be given opportunities in India for upgrading their skills, as a minimum. (policymaker, Indian Foreign Services, 5 June 2015) In our study, both policymakers and researchers agreed that India’s status as a major source country of highly skilled migrants has been firmly established and that developed countries needs to acknowledge this in their treatment of Indian nationals. Another fact highlighted was that India needs to respond strongly to the acute exploitation and mistreatment of its citizens working in the Gulf countries. Social security issues and labour rights as the migrants work for short time need to be major concerns for India. (researcher, research institute, 6 June 2015) According to me, the people from non-EU countries are discriminated against and they lack labour rights on par with the locals. (researcher, think tank, 7 June 2015) In this chapter, we elaborate on the major findings from our interviews and discuss the economic and social implications of temporary migration.

Migration trends Emigration Being one of the oldest civilizations in the world, India has played an active role in global migration. India’s advanced textile industry and high agricultural production resulted in a skilled work force that was in high demand globally. During the Islamic invasions, this

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emigration turned into enslavement and resulted in the export of a large number of skilled labour as slaves (Jackson 1999). Thus, pre-colonial emigration from India was mostly forced, and it picked up pace during the colonial times. Even after the British abolished slavery in 1833, it included a clause that allowed slavery inside India and enslavement of Indians for colonial markets operated by the East India Company. Therefore, the British not only perpetuated but also encouraged both slave-holding and slave-trading in the region (Major 2014). Indians began emigrating to the West by choice only as late as 1900, and that too mostly for academic purposes to countries such as the UK and France. More than a century of imperialism had left India sufficiently exposed to the European culture resulting in the countries sharing a rich legacy and common political institutions, as evident from the presence of Eurasians and the Anglo-Indian diaspora as well as from the widespread use of English in various parts of India. The US started emerging as an attractive destination only after passing of the 1965 Immigration Act, and emigration to the country picked up considerably in the early 1970s, with a number of skilled Indian doctors emigrating to fill the shortage created by the Vietnam War. This soon turned into an avalanche of skilled people with professional expertise or technical qualifications emigrating to the US (Lowell 2003; Khadria 2006; Buga and Mayer 2012), and today they are the second largest (4.46 million) as well as the most socio-economically successful minority ethnic group in the US (Ministry of External Affairs, GOI 2016). Around the same time, emigration of semi-skilled workers to the Middle East also picked up due to the oil boom there, and today over 6 million Indians live in the Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia (3 million) and closely followed by the United Arab Emirates (2.8 million), Kuwait (0.9 million) and Oman (0.79 million) as per the Ministry of External Affairs, GOI (2016). Most work in the construction, oil and natural gas, trading, and financial sectors and the majority of them are labourers. Some semi-skilled workers also migrate to work on plantations, in cargo handling, restaurants, as caddies in golf clubs, as barbers and in wholesale/retail and textiles in the high-income countries of the Southeast Asia region such as Malaysia and Singapore (MIDA Report 2013). However, these two are very distinct streams of migration in terms of skill set, experiences, socio-economic attributes and intentions to migrate. We will discuss these in greater detail in subsequent sections on economic and social impact of migration.

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Immigration Immigration to India again consists of two distinct streams. Most of it is informal and unrecorded (illegal) movement of the poor from Bangladesh and Nepal who hope to be a part of India’s massive informal labour market. It is estimated that more than 3 million people have migrated illegally from Bangladesh to India, but it is difficult to ascertain the number of undocumented migrants since no reliable data exists. Undocumented immigration into India from Bangladesh can cost as little as US$30 due to porous borders, enabling the arrivals to settle down in any part of India for a far brighter future than back at home for a very small price. According to India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, in 2009 there were about 50,000–100,000 Burmese Chin immigrants, around 13,500 undocumented migrants from Afghanistan and about 7,700 from Pakistan. India witnessed one of the most severe crises of immigration arising out of political instability during the time of partition in 1947 and again in 1971 when Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan. At the end of 2015, there were 201,281 refugees and 6,480 asylum seekers in India (UNHCR 2015) belonging to countries like Tibet, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and ethnic Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka. A smaller, second category of immigrants consists of the skilled expatriates from developed countries working for top multinational companies who have been transferred-in-job to tap into India’s booming market. These highly skilled expatriates from Europe and the US are mainly concentrated in technology hubs such as Bangalore, Gurgaon or Hyderabad and in the financial hubs of Mumbai and Delhi (Tumbe and Mukherjee 2015). Another emerging category of immigrants are the lifestyle seekers (those people who travel for reasons beyond sightseeing). These are people from affluent industrialized countries who migrate in order to find a more meaningful and relaxed life (Torkington 2012). As they are relatively affluent, they occupy privileged positions in relation to the local population (Benson and O’Reilly 2009), and most also work to support their lifestyle. In places like Goa and Dharamshala, many of the lifestyle migrants work as fashion designers, while others run restaurants or guesthouses, sell jewellery or work as yoga teachers, massage therapists or spiritual healers (Korpela 2014). India has also been a favourite destination for travellers who are particularly interested in its traditional medical practices known as Ayurveda and Siddha, or the lifestyle practice of yoga or meditation. Interviewees also identified medical tourism as a growing source of temporary immigration to India.

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Student migration Emigration for academic purposes started around the 1900s, and today India has grown into a leading player in the international students market in tertiary sector education and is the second most important sending country after China. The US remains the most popular destination for Indian students and attracts more than half of all Indian students going abroad to study. While its share of students from India dropped from 73.4 per cent in 2000 to 53.6 per cent in 2009 (Mukherjee and Chanda 2012), it has managed to arrest that decline. There was a 29.4 per cent growth in academic enrolments of Indian students in 2014 compared to 2013 (as per the Institute of International Education and the US Department of State). The UK overtook Australia in 2009 to become the second most important destination for Indian students (the UK attracted 17 per cent of all Indian students studying abroad in 2009), but the exorbitant financial demands on Indian students and tightening of visa rules has resulted in a 50 per cent drop in applications between 2010 and 2013. Countries like Australia, Germany, France, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Italy and Ireland are expected to gain in the future, since education there is considerably cheaper and part-time jobs are easier to secure as compared to the US or the UK. Mukherjee and Chanda (2012) also identify various factors which motivate Indian students to pursue higher education abroad (apart from market features of the host countries which attract them) as well as the constraints faced by the students. The emigration is mostly driven by intense competition within India and the high quality of education which these countries provide. A foreign degree may also open gateways to enter the labour market of that country, though countries are increasingly setting up restrictive policies on that front. Our interviewees pointed out the problem of information asymmetry, with students who wish to study abroad relying on information related to the courses (duration, scholarships and job prospects, etc.) provided by websites and visa agents, which often turns out to be false. There needs to be a systematic mechanism in place for disseminating correct information (such as education fairs).

Economic impact of migration Almost all the interviewees agreed that both emigration and immigration in the country are largely motivated due to economic reasons. The drivers for emigration identified in our interviews are the low wages

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in informal sector in India, growing working-age population, and low rate of employment generation. Migration affects the labour market at the place of origin and destination. For low-skilled Indian emigrants, that is mitigated since the Indian economy faces both unemployment and underemployment, and outward migration lessens the burden of finding a job and eases pressure on public institutions like government hospitals. In destination countries, they affect markets by lowering the cost of labour and therefore face the backlash by native unskilled labour, who are worse off. In fact, most interviewees agreed that we should create effective measures to regulate labour movement from Bangladesh since it leads to social unrest in India. Illegality of Bangladesh immigration is always a burning issue, especially because of the religious dimension. (researcher, policy institute, 6 June 2015) The economic returns for migrants and their families are closely related to their skill levels. Unskilled labour migrants to the Gulf countries often complain about longer working hours, poor living and working conditions and poor access to basic amenities. Indians in the Gulf countries often undergo harassment and face social isolation. High-skilled temporary migrants in OECD countries are well-off because their employers, both overseas and Indian, take care of them. The unskilled temporary migrants in the Gulf are vulnerable to many economic discriminations and exploitation. (researcher, international think tank, 9 June 2015) In the high skill category, the returns are much better. Skilled Indian migrants and students abroad face stiff competition from their counterparts in Southeast Asia and China who are more skilled, more motivated and willing to work at lower wages due to greater support from their government. But the widespread use and fluency of English give Indians a tremendous advantage in migrating. It is the Indian returnees from Europe who gain the most in economic terms, and their experience of working abroad enhances their earning potential as well as social status back at home. For the highly skilled immigrants from developed nations, their stint in India is a positive addition, though not accompanied by financial benefit. Most immigrants thought that being in India, even for a short while, is a challenging task and once they return to their country, they are looked upon with great respect and their efforts are much appreciated.

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We next focus on three economic aspects of migration: remittances, brain drain and return migration, which were highlighted by the interviewees. Remittances As per a Grant Thornton India Report (2016), the average monthly minimum wage in Europe, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Australia is over US$1,600 in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, which is over 850 per cent of the Indian monthly minimum wage (US$175), which enables Indian emigrants (both skilled and unskilled) to send back significant sums of money home. Indians sent more money home last year than any other group of migrants. A World Bank report estimates that India received $70.39 billion in remittances in 2014. That’s ahead of China, which got $64.14 billion, and more than all the remittances received by the Philippines, Mexico and Pakistan combined (WSJ 2015). Thus, in social and economic terms, they twice help the state. One of our interviewees asserted: Most of the unskilled and semi-skilled people migrate to the Persian Gulf region for economic reasons. What is often ignored by most researchers is that the basic pay and exchange rates play a huge role in pushing people abroad. (professor, higher education institute, 21 June 2015) Migrant remittances are among the most tangible benefits of migration, and is usually spent by the family back home to improve their quality of life. As per a study by Mahapatro et al. (2017), more than 90 per cent of households used remittances for consumption (food 70 per cent, education 35 per cent, health care 33 per cent and other purposes 33 per cent). In such cases remittances help in poverty alleviation and human capital enhancement. Therefore, while there seems to be some positive impact on incomes and investment, the major function of migration remittance is to act as a safety valve for families back home in poor areas. The impact on asset and income inequality is more mixed. In Kerala, which is India’s top migrant-exporting state to the Gulf, consumption expenditure of the top 5 per cent of households is almost 40 times more than that of the lowest 5 per cent in real money terms. The reason is not all households are equally benefited by these migrant flows – only 19 per cent of the households today receive remittances compared to around 31 per cent in the 1960s. This is because over

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a period of time, informal networks get formed which aid migration only for people within specific communities or castes. Thus, it is not the poorest who migrate even though they are the ones in greatest need of it. Emigration of the better-off and their remittances back home may exacerbate income inequality even more. Interviewees pointed out that temporary migration fosters social inequality in India: In most cases, it [immigration] promotes social equality in India. Though inequality acts as a push factor, immigration brings new opportunities. (researcher, global research institute, 18 June 2015) Emigration in India is rooted in inequality, so it promotes both economic and social inequality in India. (researcher and policymaker, 24 June 2015) Inequality is growing. I came across some estimates which say that the consumption expenditure of the top 5 per cent of households in Kerala is almost forty times more than that of the lowest 5 per cent. This is in real money terms. The reason is that not all households benefit equally from these migrant flows. Only 19 per cent of the households today receive remittances compared to around 31 per cent in the 1960s. Emigration definitely leads to inequality. (researcher, think tank, 7 June 2015) Tumbe (2010) finds that households in the top 25 per cent consumption quintile receive nearly 50 per cent of all remittances, thus further exacerbating existing inequalities. This reflects the fact that the poorer sections of society are not able to migrate due to relatively lower labour mobility and lower returns on migration for them. Over time, this leads to the formation of informal networks, which aid facilitate migration only for people within specific communities or castes. Brain drain Policymakers and researchers caution against the migration of specialists and talented young people who migrate abroad in search of better opportunities. The debate of brain drain is very prominent in India and from the opinion of our respondents, we could comprehend that India has not been able to utilize its rich human resource efficiently.

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All interviewees pointed out that a big issue is how to ensure that the problem of brain drain turns to brain gain. Some of the poor states in India provide subsidized education for medical or other professional categories of education . . . (it is a concern) if talented people are moving out from these institutions seeking to go abroad but not willing to go to rural areas. A doctor trained at the cost of public money . . . is not willing to work in rural areas but wants to go to the US. That is serious brain drain. (policymaker, government, 10 June 2015) There seems to be some success in attracting immigrants back to India thanks to the booming economy and the gloom in international markets. But countries like the US continue to attract a significant number of qualified students. The Indian diaspora in such countries is therefore well-trained, economically well-off and politically active. Indian doctors and engineers enjoy high respect globally and are influential members of their communities, at least in the US and the EU. It is important that India transforms its labour markets and universities such a way that the elite human resource of the nation is accommodated. The government should not focus on the short-term immediate benefits associated with emigration, since migration in the high-skilled category such as that of scientists, engineers, doctors, management and IT professionals, who are already in short supply, may lead to a decline in productivity in India. Our education system may also face a shortage of teachers and researchers unless we manage to attract them back. Return migration Khoo, Hugo and McDonald (2008) highlight that most countries of destination of temporary migrants expect them to return home, and also discuss the likely effectiveness of temporary migration programs that assume temporary migrants will return home. The resilience of the Indian economy during the global financial crisis and emergence of attractive job opportunities in various sectors in the past decade has led many highly skilled Indians who had settled abroad to return home. This return is considered beneficial for the source country, as return migrants come back with global exposure, increased knowledge and the latest technical skills, thus turning brain drain into a case of brain circulation. Return migration provides extra talent to the employment market . . . such circulation is good for global integration. (retired government officer, 28 June 2015)

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S. Irudaya Rajan and Kartik Yadav The challenge is that at present the debate on brain drain vs. brain gain has become like migration protection vs. migration promotion. However, today people are going abroad for employment opportunities and when they come back they utilize their brain or experience in the development of the nation. Currently, it is seen as brain circulation. (professor, institute of labor migration, 14 June 2015)

However, developed countries which are the main destination countries (like the UK, the EU and lately, the US) need to review their immigration laws to make it easier for temporary migrants to obtain work and residence permits in a way that benefits both sides. Most countries in the EU, like the Netherlands and Finland, do not have any officially stated policy towards temporary migration, and there are no pathways to convert temporary migration into a permanent stay. The UK’s recent move to increase the minimum salary threshold requirement to £30,000 from the earlier £20,800 has drawn a backlash from the Indian information technology (IT) community of immigrants as well as students planning to study in that country. There exists a dichotomy since multi-nationals are increasingly hiring immigrants to minimize costs and attract global talent, but governments are responding by placing restrictive caps on movement and stay of the worker. In this tussle, the emigrant suffers since moving for a very short duration makes it difficult for her to assimilate in the host country as well as in the home country after return. Thus, emigrants should have the choice to return or stay back in the host country, and not be coerced to leave due to sudden policy changes in that country. Forced return is a problem. Temporary migration has a positive impact on the origin societies only when the return happens with personal choice. When the migrants return out of no choice, it becomes a burden on the origin country. As emigration is a choice of the migrant, so should be the return . . . The impact is negative on the migrant when the migrant wishes to move permanently but state policies does not ensure that (policymaker and professor, international research institute, 15 June 2015) I had huge hopes on returning to India in terms of a better job and increased prospects in marriage market. Expiry of my visa forced me to return to India, else I would have preferred to stay in UK. (Indian returnee from UK, 1989, male, 18 June 2015)

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With India’s economy already being the third largest in the world (in PPP terms) and growing fast, it is conceivable that Indian highly skilled migrants will transform into a much-desired resource in the years to come. Therefore, the difference in treatment and the restrictive rules currently being applied to third-country nationals should be reconsidered. The same does not hold true for return migrants belonging to the unskilled category. Some interviewees stated that companies hire temporary unskilled foreign labour because it is easy to get rid of them when not needed anymore. Return migration flows in this category should be anticipated by the government in advance so that workers can be accommodated in the labour force without leading to conflicts. A major criticism with respect to migration and reintegration programmes in India is it’s unduly focussed on migrants who are able to make some investment, which is not suitable for majority of return migrants to India . . . formulation of reintegration programmes needs to move beyond merely as a response to a crisis such as one in Saudi Arabia. (policymaker and researcher, national think tank, 9 June 2015)

Cultural aspects Migration can often be a difficult process for migrants, their families and entire societies, which are torn apart and need to adapt to this change. All migrants, irrespective of their age, categories and skills were of the opinion that being mobile can influence ones’ attitudes and outlooks to a large extent. Many Indian migrants, returnees and their families have acknowledged the positive learnings and attitude changes they incorporated due to their stint abroad. They have in general been open in integrating the positive aspects of the host country in their day-to-day lives. Europeans in India are on a comparatively better position when it comes to language and religion, as compared to the Indians in Europe. In most of the parts of India, one can survive if comfortable with fluent English and knowing the local language is not always a must. But this is not the case in most European countries. It was noted that this advantage in terms of language made India a preferred option to Europeans compared to other South Asian regions. The majority of the Europeans we interviewed were of liberal religious views or atheists and most of them did not face any discrimination in India.

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Overall though, the extent of assimilation of international migrants within the Indian society is limited and experiences are varied. In corporate organizations, most people were happy with the levels of appreciation irrespective of the location. The highly skilled international expats are able to enjoy a high quality of living in big cities of India and are well-respected within the gated communities where they live. However, life outside the big cities and their gated communities is tough – it is common for foreigners to experience differential treatments in terms of being stared at and being fleeced by local vendors and auto-rickshaw drivers. Even tougher is adhering and adapting to the conservative norms of the Indian society, which frowns upon women wearing loose or revealing dresses, socializing with men, and openly drinking. Few pockets such as Goa, Pune, Manali, McLeod Ganj and so forth are more friendly and relaxed in their attitude towards foreigners, and the people there are much more accustomed to accepting foreigners compared to the other regions. However, there is widespread stereotyping of international migrants from the poorer countries, which leads to trust issues in the society and have resulted in them finding the country unsafe. Even in global cities like Delhi and Bengaluru, the locals frown upon the African, Nepali and Middle Eastern students. On some occasions, racial slurs and attacks have been reported by the media. The Europeans mostly face restrictions while renting accommodations and using local community resources, since many Indians find their culture ‘too modern’. To the Indian society, foreign arrivals bring an increased diversity of ideas and public thought exposure to new skills and practices, and increased multicultural lifestyle practices and thus they help develop society. The Indian government should therefore do more to educate and sensitize the Indian public about this. These migrants bring increased diversity of ideas and public thought, exposure to new skills and practices, and increased multi-cultural lifestyle practices. The government should therefore do more to educate and sensitize the Indian public about this. Unfortunately, migrants from Africa and Nepal are regularly found to be engaged in crimes and drug trade, which tarnishes the image of the entire community.

The way forward Going ahead, it is expected that global inequality, urbanization and climate change will result in turbulent times for the world. The migrant crisis sweeping Europe is likely to get worse if the Middle East remains unstable for long. The EU as well as the US are responding by tightening

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border measures and restricting the number of refugees who cross their borders, and this is likely to result in tougher migration laws, making it even more difficult for Indian workers to emigrate. A report of the European Migration Network (2015) states that the scale of unfilled vacancies in Europe is significant, and public opinion seems to be an important barrier for European countries to develop more extensive links between their migration policies and identified labour shortages. This is unfortunate since the markets in developed countries like Japan and the EU could benefit Indian workers and give it a chance to train its young population to better achieve the demographic dividend, while helping them meet the twin challenges of shrinking markets and ageing workforce. There has been a global shift from an industrial economy to a service economy and now towards a care economy. India can be a potential source of quality manpower not only for the IT sector but also many others, including the healthcare, construction, research and development and services sectors. There is a need to better embrace emigration from India in light of its demographic dividend, global footprint and structural economic change, and do away with the difference in treatment and the restrictive rules currently being applied to third-country nationals. With India’s economy already being the third largest in the world (in PPP terms), and growing fast, it is conceivable that Indian highly skilled migrants will transform into a much desired resource in the years to come.

Acknowledgements The data collected for this chapter was part of a larger study entitled ‘Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People’ (EURA-NET) funded by the European Commission. In this project, the transformative characteristics and impacts of people’s temporary movements were studied in the European-Asian transnational social space, by interactions with former movers (returnees) and to those who do not necessarily move but are connected to migrants through the networks and relations they sustain across borders.

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Naujoks, D. (2009). Emigration, immigration, and diaspora relations in India. Migration Information Source. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from: www.adapttech.it/old/files/document/3553MPI_IMMIGRAZIONE.pdf. Nayyar, D. (1994). Migration, Remittances and Capital Flows: The Indian Experience. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Oommen, T. K. (1989). India: ‘Brain drain’ or the migration of talent? International Migration. 27(3) pp. 411–425. Özden, C., Parsons, C. R., Schiff, M., and Walmsley, T. L. (2011). Where on earth is everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral migration 1960– 2000. The World Bank Economic Review. 25(1) pp. 12–56. Reserve Bank of India. (2013). Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, 2012–2013. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India. Roberts, G. W. and Byrne, J. (1966). Summary statistics on indenture and migration affecting the West Indies, 1834–1918. Population Studies. 20(2) pp. 125–134. Sasikumar, S. K. and Husain, Z. (2008). Managing International Labour Migration from India: Policies and Perspectives. ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series, New Delhi. Sasikumar, S. K. and Thimothy, R. (2012). Migration of Low Skilled Workers from India to the European Union. CARIM-India Research Report 15/2012. European University Institute. Retrieved from: www.india-eu-migration.eu/ media/CARIM-India-2012-15.pdf. Savinetti, N. F. (2015). Encountering Difference: The Experience of Nordic Highly Skilled Citizens in India. PhD thesis. Tampere: Tampere University Press. Saxenian, A. (2005). From brain drain to brain circulation: Transnational communities and regional upgrading in India and China. Studies in Comparative International Development. 40(2) pp. 35–61. Schiller, G. N., Basch, N., and Blanc, C. S. (1995). From immigrant to transmigrant: Theorizing transnational migration. Anthropological Quarterly. 8(1) pp. 48–63. She, Q. and Wotherspoon, T. (2013). International student mobility and high skilled migration: A comparative study of Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. SpringerPlus. 2(1) pp. 132–146. Siddiqui, Z. and Tejada, G. (2014). Development and highly skilled migrants: Perspectives from the Indian diaspora and returnees. International Development Policy. 5(1). Singaravelou. (1990). ‘Indians in the French Overseas Departments: Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion’. In C. Clarke et al. (eds.). South Asians Overseas: Migration, Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 75–87). Srivastava, R. and Sasikumar, S. K. (2005). ‘An Overview of Migration in India, Its Impacts and Key Issues’. In T. Siddiqui (ed.). Migration and Development: Pro-Poor Policy Choices. Dhaka: The University Press (pp. 157–216). Tinker, H. (1974). A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830–1920. London: Oxford University Press.

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Torkington, K. (2012). Place and lifestyle migration: The discursive construction of ‘glocal’ place-identity. Mobilities. 7(1) pp. 71–92. Tumbe, C. (2010). Remittances in India: Facts and Issues. Paper presented at the 52nd Annual Conference of the Indian Society of Labour Economics, 17–19 December, Dharwad. Tumbe, C. and Mukherjee, D. (2015). ‘Economic Linkages and India-EU Mobility’. In R. Chanda and P. Gupta (eds.). India-EU People Mobility: Historical, Economic and Regulatory Dimensions. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press (pp. 28–51). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2015. UNHCR statistical yearbook 2015 (15th ed.). Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/59b294387/unhcr-statisticalyearbook-2015-15th-edition.html Valatheeswaran, C. and Irudaya Rajan, S. (2011). Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India: Rehabilitation mechanisms, livelihood strategies, and lasting solutions. Refugee Affairs Quarterly. 30(2) pp. 24–44. Vertovec, S. (1995). ‘Indian Indentured Migration to the Caribbean’. In R. Cohen (ed.). The Cambridge Survey of World Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 57–62). Working Paper No. 1 International Migration Policy: Issues and Perspectives for India BinodKhadria, Perveen Kumar, Shantanu Sarkar and Rashmi Sharma International Migration and Diaspora Studies Project, Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 110067, India Abstract, December 2008. World Bank. (2011). Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank. (2013). Migration and Remittance Flows: Recent Trends and Outlook, 2013–2016. Migration and Development Brief 21. Washington: World Bank. World Bank. 2015. “Remittance Prices Worldwide – An Analysis of Trends in the Cost of Migrants Remittance Services.” Issue n.14. Washington, D.C: The World Bank. https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ rpw_report_june_2015.pdf. Zachariah, K. C., Irudaya Rajan, S., and Joseph, J. (2014). ‘Kerala Emigration to Saudi Arabia: Prospects under the Nitaqat Law’. Chapter 16, pp. 229– 239 In S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). India Migration Report 2014: Diaspora and Development. New Delhi: Routledge.

17 Exploring the capital-labour dynamics Migrants in the gold jewellerymaking industry in Kerala Sumeetha M. The changes in the production regime in the gold jewellery-making industry are associated with the expansion of local markets and the integration of the Indian economy with the world economy. The altering consumption patterns as well as certain changes in state policy have had a direct impact on the organization of labour in the industry. The traditional caste-based occupation has given way to a complex system marked by minute specialization, detailed division of labour and an influx of migrant labour. When the nature of work changed, migrant workers became a critical element, providing capital with a readily available reserve of labour. Their entry is facilitated through the operation of an institutional mechanism and a set of intermediaries, who actively divide the labour market into segments. The incorporation of migrants has changed the objective and subjective conditions of work. A turbulent post-1990s market has ushered in changing workplace structures. This has seen increasing organization of work in workshops and the shifting of work to sub-contracting units. At present, majority of the workshops are appendages to huge retailers. The wholesalers play a major role in organizing production and labour. The lack of direct access to markets by independent units has strengthened the position of intermediaries like wholesalers in the industry. The empirical evidence from the industry shows that a strict labour hierarchy decided the status and stability of workers in certain job tasks.

Gold jewellery industry – significance and policy changes India is the world’s largest gold market and has been an important consumption centre since liberalization.1 Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka account for over 40 per cent of the country’s

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gold demand (World Gold Council, 2011). Prior to the 1960s, gold work was home-based and an exclusive preserve of master craftsmen, who were assisted by apprentices. The easing of caste-based restrictions saw the entry of diverse communities into the industry. Restrictions on gold import made smuggling rampant and drove away traditional goldsmiths from the vocation.2 Three important policy changes since the 1990s had a direct bearing on the gold industry.3 The expansion of the market towards other parts of the world and a booming domestic gold industry propelled by remittances from the Middle East to Kerala, transformed the organization and structure of the industry. The production, distribution and marketing links in the industry have boosted the presence of intermediaries and multiple stakeholders. The domestic production of gold is negligible in India. Mining and production accounted for only two tonnes in 2010–2011. Three of the gold mines, two in Karnataka and one in Jharkhand, cater to around 0.5 per cent of the country’s annual gold demand. India therefore relies on imports to meet its gold jewellery production (Honey, 2013; Reddy, 1996). India is known to be the largest importer of gold in the world (RBI, 2010). Gold in the total import bill of the country has gone up from 8.1 per cent in 2001–2002 to 9.6 per cent in 2011. This was seen as a serious cause of concern in raising the country’s current account deficit (CAD), and the government hiked import duties on gold substantially to control this deficit. Gold contributed to nearly 30 per cent of the trade deficit during 2006–2007 to 2008–2009 (RBI, 2010). The two main segments of the gems and jewellery business in India include gold and diamond jewellery. A major portion of gold jewellery manufactured in India is for domestic consumption. India continues to be the world’s largest gold market. The demand side for gold in India has no authentic estimates. However, indications are that about 80 per cent of the demand is for jewellery fabrication (mainly of over 22 carat purity) for domestic use, 15 per cent for investor demand (which is relatively elastic to gold prices, real estate prices, financial markets, tax policies, etc.) and barely 5 per cent for industrial use (Reddy, 1996). The demand pattern for gold has changed according to changing lifestyles and individual consumer preferences. The re-orientation of production regimes has dismantled traditional industries, with increasing division of labour and minute specialization of tasks. This has created the need for a labour force that is trained to suit the volatility of market conditions.4 The repeal of the Gold (Control) Act 1968 stopped licenses being issued to goldsmiths for work. It therefore permitted all communities to venture as workers

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into the industry. A sudden spurt in investment following deregulation policies expanded production frontiers, and demanded a steady supply of workers. Sourcing in-migrant workers for different tasks met the growing labour demand in the industry. Gold jewellery-making units, once a cottage industry, now became appendages to huge retailers. Sub-contracting became prevalent in the industry, thereby transferring the risks of production to people lower down the labour hierarchy. The macro-changes in the industry therefore resulted in a complete overhaul of production, consumption and distribution networks. These changes have transformed the capital-labour dynamics in the industry. The two marked changes are the spread of workshops as production centres and the increasing dominance of intermediaries in organizing production. These changes in the capital-labour organization have also posed a number of challenges. Traditional goldsmiths opting out of their hereditary occupation is not a distress-driven phenomenon alone, but is a spin-off effect of the socio-economic reforms in Kerala. The emergence of wholesalers controlling the bulk of operations in the industry is another interesting development.

Kerala’s position in the gold industry in India The study is centred on Kerala, known for its much-developed social sector and organized labour movements. Kerala’s association with gold started when Romans exchanged gold coins for spices. The earliest use of gold jewellery was in temples and royal courts. The historical significance of gold is that it has been regarded as a powerful symbol of upward mobility. Earlier, lower caste Hindus were allowed to adorn themselves only with polished stones and bones. Thus, the use of gold was a symbolic protest against the caste system prevalent in the state. According to industry sources, Kerala tops the country in gold consumption with the largest number of retailers, more than 5,000, compared to 1,000 a decade earlier. The demand for gold in Kerala grows by 15 per cent every year, more than the national average of 13 per cent (Radhakrishnan, 2011). Kerala has just 3 per cent of the country’s total population, but handles about 20 per cent of the total gold sales. Trissur and Kozhikode are two important production centres of gold in Kerala. In the early 1990s, there were only 200–300 units in Trissur and 100–200 units in Kozhikode; within a span of ten years this increased to 2,500–3,000 and 1,000–1,200 units, respectively. Together, both these centres account for nearly 80 per cent of the total gold jewellery production in Kerala.

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Data The empirical data of this chapter is based on the findings and observations gathered during an intensive fieldwork during a course of three years from 2010–2013 in the gold jewellery-making industry in Trissur and Kozhikode districts in Kerala. It also relies on a larger data set, the Inter-State Migrant Survey conducted by the Centre for Development Studies in 2012 that collected data on migrant workers in gold jewellery-making from four districts of Kerala (Trissur, Trivandrum, Ernakulam and Kozhikode).

Migrants in gold jewellery-making Secondary sources reveal that a majority of the migrants in Kerala who are engaged in jewellery work are from West Bengal. The survey results indicate that nearly 40 per cent of the migrants are from West Bengal, while 18 per cent are from Uttar Pradesh. They are experts in machine-made chains. Most of the equipment for making machine-made chains is bought from Agra. Nearly 17 per cent of the migrants to Kerala are from the neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu. These include long-term migrants from Tamil Nadu and are especially concentrated in Thiruvananthapuram. The practice of Tamil Kammalans (goldsmiths) migrating to Kerala is not a recent phenomenon. While 7 per cent of the migrants are from Bihar, 6 per cent are from Orissa. The workers from Maharashtra are engaged in carat testing Table 17.1 State-wise composition of the migrant workforce State

No. of migrants

% share of workers

West Bengal Tamil Nadu Maharashtra Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Andhra Pradesh Orissa Bihar Northeast Total

125 51 20 2 57 12 18 22 4 311

40.19 16.40 6.43 0.64 18.33 3.86 5.79 7.07 1.29 100

Source: Inter-state Migrant Survey, 2012.

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and purifying work. They constitute about 8 per cent of the migrants. About 4 per cent of the workers are from Andhra Pradesh (Sumeetha, 2012). There are also workers from Rajasthan engaged in finishing work, but there are very few workers from the Northeast. Nearly 80 per cent of the migrant workers are from North India. The fieldwork gives detailed evidence on how globalization and deregulation policies have affected the gold jewellery-making industry. A direct result of the deregulation policy was the increasing influx of migrant workers into the industry in Kerala. Another was the sudden disappearance of home-based work, which had been associated with gold for a long time. As labour process theories advocate, one of the important mechanisms for capitalist accumulation to thrive is to search for profitable labour reserves whose maintenance and renewal are in two separate economic and physical spheres. Labour migration is gendered and depends on age. The young male workers easily find a place in the industry. It is difficult to accommodate women migrant workers because the working and living spaces of migrant workers are not demarcated. It is observed that young male migrants stay in the workshop itself to complete orders. Kerala has the largest number of retailers inside the country. These retailers have extended operations outside India, especially to the Middle East. Strategies of production and nodes of accumulation suggest the power of local capital has expanded over a large globalized market. These have ramifications for the organization and the structure of the industry. One such profound influence is exhibited in the incorporation of migrant workers into an industry that operated solely on caste lines up to the late 1950s. The structure and organization of the industry in the post-1990s has thrown up myriad questions and opened up a variegated path for analysis. Work and workplace relations are no longer local; there are profound influences of global prices, policies and actions on the industry and labour of the industry. A labour process framework garners the changes in the capital-labour control dynamics and captures the patterns of capital-labour relations. This does not restrict the analysis to a single dimension that looks at capital-labour antagonism alone. The intermediaries and the chains that operate between labour and capital are considered important to the industry. Most of the migrants in the gold jewellery-making units found themselves clinging to their jobs because of a lack of other opportunities, rather than out of their own choice. The fact of being a migrant made it difficult to gain entry and upward mobility in the industry. It was easier for relatively inexperienced workers to find employment in migrant-owned workshops. Even in firms that allocated designing

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work to migrants, they were under constant pressure from the market to produce new and innovative designs. Workers who stuck to old designs alone faced a lack of employability in the industry. When migrant workers managed to gain entry into new workshops, they were trained for a particular period. During the training period, the workers were provided food, lodging, and a weekly payment of Rs 100. Some workers slowly graduate to doing soldering work, while others remain in the training phase for three to four years. There is a training period for local workers too, in which they are paid subsistence wages. However, in their case, the training does not last for more than seven months. While deciding the payment structures too, negotiations were rampant. Experienced local workers often working with the rolling pin/ dyeing machine were paid time wages. This naturally protected them against the volatility of markets. Piece-rate payments differed according to the kind complexity of work. Thus, employers did not arbitrarily fix piece-rates in the industry; it was subject to bargaining on both sides of capital and labour. Despite the possibility of negotiation on wages in the workplace, both migrant and local workers admit that wages are low in the industry. For local workers, while wages increased with experience in the industry, workplace observations show that this does not hold true for migrants. Fieldwork also shows that some experienced migrant workers have an upper hand in the workplace, while bringing in new recruits or allocating work. They are regarded as crucial entities in the workshop and have control over their working time and nature of work. Moidu, a migrant worker at a chain manufacturing unit in Ollur, was regarded as a trusted worker and was given certain privileges in the workshop. He was the only migrant worker allowed to work on the rolling pin or the dyeing machine. The ‘indeterminacy of identity replaces the indeterminacy of labour with which relations of control and exploitation are seen as embedded by labour process theory’ (Smith and Thompson, 1998, p. 562). Capitalists through the extensive use of a set of migrants counter resistance by local workers. Docility of migrant workers is manufactured or anchored, because most often the migrants realize that they are exploited, and, in order to ensure their survival in the industry, readily succumb to exploitation. The economic question of survival thus becomes the characteristic feature of migrant labour. Earnings and savings from migration vary by ethnic group, gender, occupation, wage rates, living costs, contracting arrangements and debts (Rao and Mitra, 2013, p. 846). A close observation of the

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industry reveals that workers who had taken an advance from the employer did not receive the promised amount as wages. For such workers regular remittances are difficult. Women migrant workers who often do gold work in their homes are not paid wages. Bengali design workers seem to have an upper hand in the industry when compared with other migrants from Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan. Job profiles, though crudely defined, were strictly allocated in the shop floor. Export houses and large retail production centres preferred experienced migrant workers in their workshops. Most of these workers at least have prior experience of one year in the industry. An export unit in Erinchery employs migrant workers who go back to their villages after six or seven months of work and then come back after taking a break for three or four months. They bring in fresh and innovative designs that are in vogue in the market. Migrants are also employed as helpers in the industry. These workers are the most vulnerable and get the lowest pay in the industry. Local workers do not generally work as helpers. Units that work with a majority of local workers are not free from being monitored monitoring. In Unit A, the employer often organizes surprise visits to check the progress of the workers. In the same unit, the manager is a family member, making supervision more effective. Experience in the job need not have a generalizing effect on the workers. Workers who get time wages are often insensitive to the changes in the production process and sudden market fluctuations in demand. Working hours in the industry depend on structure and nature of the work. Work is often for long hours both for migrant and local workers. Migrants often stay in the workplace itself, making it difficult for them to differentiate between hours of work and leisure. Industry sources report that rather than their inability to find rented accommodation, employers make it a point to provide housing in the workshop itself. My visits to workplaces proved that migrants often had to work in unhygienic and unsafe conditions. Their submissive nature, dexterity and ability to work for long hours minimize the cost of labour in the workplace, thus enabling capital to employ migrant workers. Units solely operating with the help of migrants also closely observe the movement of the workers. Certain units have electronic surveillance systems, which subject migrants to the disciplinary gaze. Sub-contracting of procurement and labour recruitment is a crucial spatial strategy employed by capital in its process of accumulation. Capital uses geographical differentiation and uneven development in recruiting immigrant ethnic groups that help to minimize the conflict between labour and capital (Prasad-Aleyamma, 2011). The Kerala

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Model is a constellation of advanced social policies and comparatively high levels of education, health and female empowerment. Unlike other artisans in India, the quitting of traditional Viswakarma gold workers from their traditional vocations cannot be seen solely as a distress-driven step. Data collected shows that while gold prices had escalated and retailers began to dominate production structures, it became unviable for the traditional goldsmiths to maintain production units. They migrated to unskilled work and took up jobs like painting and construction work. Another group of workers started migrating to gold manufacturing units in the Middle East during the early 1980s. A third group gave up the occupation voluntarily, paving the way for better education for second-generation workers. As a result, the second-generation workers moved out of caste-based occupational rigidities. It is in this socio-economic landscape of Kerala that the influx of labour migrants into gold jewellery-making units throws open numerous possibilities for the owners of workshops, thereby altering the nature and structure of the workplace. This poses numerous questions with regard to the changes in the labour process, practices in the new workshops, labour recruitment, and the role of different players in the industry.

Acknowledgements This chapter is based on my PhD dissertation, Labour in a Globalised World: Inmigration to the Gold Jewellery Making Industry in Kerala, India, that was awarded by Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, India. I would like to thank my supervisors Dr S. Irudaya Rajan and Dr K. N. Harilal for their critical comments. I also would like to thank the workers, union leaders and other stakeholders in the industry for their wholehearted responses to my questions.

Notes 1 India’s jewellery demand was 552 tonnes in 2012, which grew to 662 tonnes in 2014. India continued to be the world’s largest consumer of gold jewellery in 2014, with 662 tonnes. China is the second largest consumer, with a demand of 623.5 tonnes of jewellery in 2014. The combined demand volumes for gold jewellery in India and China have grown by 71 per cent over the last ten years. These two markets accounted for 54 per cent of the consumer gold demand in 2014. 2 While the gold jewellery marketing prospered in the early 1980s, control of production and marketing was concentrated in the hands of a few retailers

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in the state. Escalating gold prices led to stringent controls in the workplace that resulted in cutting labour costs and introducing mechanization to the industry. 3 This included a repeal of the Gold Control Act 1968, the introduction of new provisions related to gold in the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) and the grant of permission to non-resident Indians (NRIs) to bring in up to 5 kg (subsequently raised to 10 kg) of gold on the payment of a small duty (Rs 220 per 10 grams) in foreign exchange. An NRI is a citizen of India who holds an Indian passport and has temporarily emigrated to another country for six months or more for employment, education or other purposes. 4 Studies on the footwear industry of Agra (Knorringa, 1999), the diamond industry of Surat (Lawrence, 2013), the weaving industry of Banaras (Ciotti, 2007) and the Lucknow Chikan embroidery industry (Hughes, 2012) assess the changing role of artisans, the expansion of markets and the destitution of traditional workers in these industries.

References Ciotti, Manuela. 2007. Ethno Histories Behind Local and Global Bazaars: Chronicle of a Chamar Weaving Community in the Banaras Region. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 41(3): 321–354. Haynes, E. Douglas. 1999. Just Like a Family? Recalling the Relations of Production in the Textile Industries of Surat and Bhiwandi, 1940–60. In Parry, Jonathan et al. (eds.) The World of Indian Industrial Labour, Contributions to Indian Sociology, Occasional Studies 9.141–169. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Honey, R. 2013. Gold and Consumer Behavior: A Comparative Study of Kochi and Delhi, Centre for Comparative Studies, Working Paper Series 2013, Kochi. Hughes, Christina. 2012. Gender, Craft and Creative Sector. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 18(4): 435–454. India: Heart of Gold, World Gold Council Report. Nov 10, 2011. Accessed online on 24 Sept, 2011 (www.worldgoldcouncil.org). Karin, Kapadia. 1995. The Profitability of Bonded Labour: The Gem Cutting Industry in Rural South India. Journal of Peasant Studies, 22(3): 446–483. Knorringa, Peter. 1999. Artisan Labour in the Agra Footwear Industry: Continued Informality and Changing Threats. In Parry, Jonathan (ed.) The Worlds of Industrial Labour, Contributions to Indian Sociology, Occasional Studies 9.303–328. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Lawrence, Bab. 2013. Emerald City, the Birth and Evolution of Indian Gemstone Industry. New York: SUNY Press. Maruthur, Sumeetha. 2012. Strategies for Managing Labour in the Gold Jewellery Making Industry, in Kerala, India. Indian Journal of Labour Economics (IJLE), 55(4): 653–674. Prasad-Aleyamma, M. 2011. Caste, Ethnicity and Migration: Linking Recruitment and Labour Process. In Rajan, I. S. (ed.) India Migration Report: Migration, Identity and Conflict 173–182.

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Radhakrishnan, M. 2011. Gold’s Own Country. India Today. Rao, Nitya and Mitra, Amit. 2013. Migration, Representations and Social Relations: Experiences of Jharkhand Labour Migration to Western Uttar Pradesh. The Journal of Development Studies, 49(6): 37–41. RBI. 2010. Indian Gems and Jewellery Industry, Occasional Paper 138, RBI. Reddy, Y. V. 1996. Gold in the Indian Economic System, Address by the Deputy Governor, RBI at the Gold Economic Conference Organised by World Gold Council at New Delhi on Nov 28. Smith, C. and Thompson, P. 1998. Re-Evaluating the Labour Process Debate. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 19(4): 551–577.

18 Kerala Migration Survey 2016 New evidences S. Irudaya Rajan and K. C. Zachariah

Historically, Kerala has had long trade contacts with the Middle East. The cultural and economic links of Kerala with the Arab world are older than those with the other regions of the world. Centuries after, recruiting manpower has become more important than the mere exchange of goods. However, the Indian migration to the Gulf region received a boost after the oilfields were discovered and after drilling of oil commenced on a commercial scale. The price hike of 1973 marked a major transition in the demand for labour and marked an upsurge of labour from nearby non-Arab countries like India. According to a sample survey in Kerala conducted by the Department of Economics and Statistics, the number of emigrants from Kerala in the Gulf countries became 641,000 in 1992–1993 as compared to 186,000 in 1980 (Department of Economics and Statistics, 1982, 1994).

Migration Surveys 1998–2016 Periodic migration surveys to monitor migration to and from a state (Kerala) have been conducted by CDS starting from 1998; subsequent surveys were conducted in 2003, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2013 and 2016. In addition to the few regular surveys, a few ad hoc surveys have also been conducted like the Kerala Ageing Survey, Kerala Mental Health Survey and Kerala Child Survey. Apart from this, Kerala-style migration studies have been done in Goa (2008), Punjab (2010), Gujarat (2012), and Tamil Nadu (2014). The following section gives a brief description of the Migration Surveys in Kerala. The 1998 Kerala Migration Survey Started as a one-time study during March–November 1998, the first Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) soon developed itself as a continuous

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periodic activity called Migration Monitoring Study, Kerala. The Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR) financially supported this study under its Indo-Dutch Programme on Alternatives in Development (IDPAD). Large-scale surveys were used to collect data on different types of migrants: emigrants, return migrants, out-migrants and return out-migrants. Data was collected from 10,000 households across 200 localities selected at random from all the 14 districts of the state (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2003). The 2001 Return Migrant Survey After the success of the 1998 survey, there were two major initiatives undertaken. First, a special Return Migrant survey (Zachariah, Nair and Rajan, 2001), which studied the problems faced by the emigrants after returning to Kerala. Problems of rehabilitation of return migrants who had problems of reabsorption in the Kerala economy. Only 9 out of 14 districts based on the return emigrants were taken in the 2001 survey identified from the 1998 KMS (Zachariah, Nair and Rajan, 2006) The 2001 Gulf Migration Survey To examine employment, working conditions and wage levels on Kerala emigrants in the United Arab Emirates, CDS undertook a study on the request of the Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs (NORKA), Government of Kerala in 2001. This was the first study where data was collected from the Gulf region and was thus called the Gulf Migration Study (GMS 2001). Data was collected from Dubai, Sharjah and Abu Dhabi (Zachariah, Prakash and Rajan, 2003, 2004). The 2003 Kerala Migration Survey The second Kerala Migration Survey, which was done in 2003, was part of another huge project called ‘Economic Consequences of Emigration in South Asia: Case Studies of Kerala and Sri Lanka’. Sponsored and financed by the South Asian Network of Economic Institutes (SANEI) and affiliated with the Global Development Network (GDN), this research also collected information on household expenses on education and health while studying its primary objectives of measuring migration and remittances. Five thousand households from the 1998 survey were resurveyed and 5,000 new households were surveyed.

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This helped in the development of panel data that was a novelty in migration studies (Zachariah and Rajan, 2009).

The 2007 Kerala Migration Survey Again, at the request of NORKA, CDS conducted migration surveys in 2007. Experiences with KMS meant that 10,000 households were enough for the estimates of migration at the state level. Apart from the regular migration modules, the 2007 KMS looked into health status and educational qualification of the household members, their outstanding loans, debts and costs on health expenses (Zachariah and Rajan, 2012a).

The 2008 Kerala Migration Survey Conducted ten years after the first one in the series, this one was also financed by NORKA. However, in the 2008 survey the sample size was increased to 15,000 households, and thus it was expected to yield better reliable estimates in the 2008 survey. In this survey, most variables were analyzed further at two levels: districts, taluks and religion (Zachariah and Rajan, 2012b).

The 2009 Return Migration Survey This survey was done by CDS to assess the impact and effects of global recession on the emigrants of Kerala in accordance with a special request from NORKA. This study looked at how many migrants lost their jobs, how many returned home, the impact of job losses and measures taken for rehabilitation (Zachariah and Rajan, 2012c).

The 2011 Kerala Migration Survey This survey was extremely special that it coincided with the census year 2011. Thus, the results of the survey were comparable to that of the census details. The midpoint of the survey period was 1 March 2011. The sample of 15,000 households was distributed across the districts, like that in the 2008 survey (Zachariah and Rajan, 2012d).

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The 2013 Kerala Migration Survey KMS 2013 was the sixth in the series of migration monitoring studies being conducted by CDS. Sample size was kept similar to the 2008 and 2011 surveys. Panel data was made for 4,575 households, and new data from 10,000 households were collected for the survey. These migration surveys in general have helped measure migration and return migration, thereby looking into the geographical aspects of migration, distribution of migrants by religion, caste and so forth. The characteristics of migrants and non-migrants (age, sex, marital status, educational qualifications, occupation) have all been examined in the surveys. The impact of migration on the population of Kerala and the economy in general has also been studied (Zachariah and Rajan, 2016).

Kerala Migration Survey 2016 Panel studies had been started for the first time in 2003 since the second Kerala Migration Surveys and thus repeated in every five years. The KMS surveys were not originally intended to form a panel data of households, though in 2003 close to 4,795 households were revisited from the first survey conducted among 10,000 households in 1998. Up to 2013, there were six panels: (a) 1998–2003–2008–2013; (b) 2003–2008–2013; (c) 1998–2008–2013; (d) 2008–2013; (e) 2003– 2013; and (f) 1998–2013. But all these data sets are a sub-section of each panel with the same households (see also Zachariah and Rajan, 2011). The Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) 2016 was conducted as a panel survey of the KMS 2011. For the first time, it covered all the households enumerated in 2011, unlike the previous panel surveys. KMS 2016 revisited the 15,000 households of KMS 2011 to gather information. Out of the 15,000 households, 13,195 households were identified and covered (Table 18.1). The survey couldn’t trace the remaining 1,801 households, which either moved out of the area or were wrongly enumerated in the 2011 KMS. The response rate for the state is 88.3 per cent, which varied from 63.7 per cent in Pathanamthitta district to 97.9 per cent in Malappuram (Table 18.2). We also believe that the KMS 2011 survey for Pathanamthitta district had some problems.

Table 18.1 Sample households in KMSs 2011 and 2016 Districts

Thiruvananthapuram Kollam Pathanamthitta Alappuzha Kottayam Idukki Ernakulam Thrissur Palakkad Malappuram Kozhikode Wayanad Kannur Kasaragod Total

Number of sample households in 2011

Number of sample households in 2016

Total

Rural

Urban

Total

Rural

Urban

1,200 1,150 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,150 1,000 1,150 1,150 1,000 1,000 1,000 15,000

700 950 850 700 850 950 600 900 850 1,000 800 950 800 800 11,700

500 200 150 300 150 50 600 250 150 150 350 50 200 200 3,300

1,066 1,052 637 927 931 815 1,111 947 802 1,077 1,057 975 927 871 13,195

654 877 548 648 782 774 555 758 695 978 713 925 652 699 10,258

412 175 89 279 149 41 556 189 107 99 344 50 275 172 2,937

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

Table 18.2 Response rate for Kerala Migration Survey 2016 Sample HH HH surveyed HH not Response in 2011 in 2016 located in rate 2016 Thiruvananthapuram 1,200 Kollam 1,150 Pathanamthitta 1,000 Alappuzha 1,000 Kottayam 1,000 Idukki 1,000 Ernakulam 1,200 Thrissur 1,150 Palakkad 1,050 Malappuram 1,100 Kozhikode 1,150 Wayanad 1,000 Kannur 1,000 Kasaragod 1,000 Kerala 15,000 Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

1,066 1,053 637 927 931 816 1,111 947 802 1,077 1,057 975 927 873 13,199

134 97 363 73 69 184 89 203 248 23 93 25 73 127 1,801

88.8 91.6 63.7 92.7 93.1 81.6 92.6 82.3 76.4 97.9 91.9 97.5 92.7 87.3 88.0

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Sampling errors The sample of KMS 2016 is more or less the same as that of KMS 2011. A few households are however left out. Although the sample is a representative random sample of the 2011 households in the state, it is strictly not a random sample of households in Kerala in 2016. Some of the households in 2016 are new households formed during 2011– 2016. Some households which existed in 2011 could have disappeared during 2011–2016. Thus the sample in the 2016 survey is not strictly a random sample of all households in Kerala in 2016. The number of new households formed during 2011–2016 would be approximately 500,000 or only about 6–7 per cent of the total number of households in Kerala at that time. Although the new households may not be exactly similar to the old households, the total impact of the deficiency of the sample may not affect significantly the estimate of emigrants. The new households could be only about 5–6 per cent of the total. The emigrants per household of the newly added households may only be marginally different from emigrants per household of the old sample. Therefore the error in the number of emigrants would be relatively very small.

Emigration from Kerala – estimated through the Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013 The main aim of each survey was a proper documentation of the number of emigrants and return emigrants, its impact on Kerala’s social, economic, demographic and health sectors. Since 1998, the emigrants from Kerala are estimated to have increased. But there was a gradual reduction in the increase of emigrants in between the surveys. About 4.7 lakh emigrants were estimated as new emigrants in 2003 compared to 1998. The inter-survey increase in 2003–2008 had a decline of 3.5 lakh compared to that of in the 1998–2003 period. Again there was a reduction in the inter-survey estimates with 2.1 lakh over a five-year period (Table 18.3). Over the years, there has been a drop in the number of emigrants, and some districts witnessed a negative growth rate in the number of emigrants. This can be attributed to the global recession of 2008 that gripped the Gulf countries. Many people moved back to the state after they lost their jobs during this time. Since most of the emigrants reside in Gulf countries, the drop showed a substantial difference in the estimate. As of 2013, Malappuram has the highest number of emigrants and Idukki has the lowest.

2003

1998

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

308,481 168,046 207,516 148,457 120,990 133,720 131,719 75,036 89,351 106,569 5,792 7,880 120,979 121,237 284,068 178,867 189,815 177,876 334,572 271,787 199,163 167,436 13,996 7,704 119,119 202,414 67,851 71,449 2,193,412 1,838,478

130,705 102,977 97,505 62,870 35,494 7,390 103,750 161,102 116,026 296,710 116,026 4,552 88,065 38,747 1,361,919

11,995 32,488 49,961 −51,290 −9,529 16,277 55,260 31,713 −71,514 46,813 19,780 −4,306 8,275 −16,091 119,832

−78,749 −40,070 −29,608 12,667 28,109 1,898 15,134 −85,700 −47,795 74,311 7,556 12,878 163,926 52,574 87,131

140,435 59,059 −12,730 56,683 −17,218 −2,088 −258 105,201 11,939 62,785 31,727 6,292 −83,295 −3,598 354,934

37,341 45,480 36,215 12,166 71,075 490 17,487 17,765 61,850 −24,923 51,410 3,152 114,349 32,702 476,559

2011–13 2008–11 2003–08 1998–03

2008

2013

2011

Increase/decrease in migration

Number

Thiruvananthapuram 241,727 229,732 Kollam 199,933 167,446 Pathanamthitta 141,343 91,381 Alappuzha 93,096 144,386 Kottayam 107,931 117,460 Idukki 23,967 7,690 Ernakulam 191,373 136,113 Thrissur 230,081 198,368 Palakkad 70,506 142,020 Malappuram 455,696 408,883 Kozhikode 226,499 206,719 Wayanad 22,568 26,874 Kannur 291,321 283,045 Kasaragod 104,334 120,425 Kerala 2,400,375 2,280,543

Districts

Table 18.3 Estimated emigrants from Kerala, 1998–2013

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The survey indicates that there was a fluctuation in the number of emigrants after 2008. By analyzing through a five-year period gap between 2008 and 2013, five districts had a decline in sending out their emigrants. Malappuram district had sent out the largest number of emigrants. But the number of emigrants from Thiruvananthapuram, Kollam, Pathanamthitta, Thrissur and Palakkad districts in 2011 was fewer than the corresponding numbers in 2008. In 7 of the 14 districts, emigrants per household were fewer in 2011 than in 2008.

Estimation of emigrants in 2016 The data available in the Ministry of External affairs, Government of India, indicates that workers granted emigration clearances from Kerala stood at the top position until 2009, since then which has been overtaken by Uttar Pradesh. Kerala has a higher flow of migration than Tamil Nadu until 2013. Six states in India (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh) have a higher proportion of workers than the proportion of Kerala (Figure 18.1). After the global crisis, the wage differentials among the low or unskilled labourers between Kerala and the Gulf have considerably narrowed down due to the changing labour market situations in both regions, where the average wage rates are higher than the national average (Rajan, Prakash and Suresh, 2015). So Emigration Clearance

30.0 Kerala

Uttar Pradesh

Tamil Nadu

Bihar

25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Figure 18.1 Emigration clearance endorsements, 2007–2016 Source: Data compiled from MOIA Annual Reports 2007–2015 and POE Analytics.

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Table 18.4 Emigration clearance data for Kerala and India, 1997–2016 Year

Kerala

India

Proportion Year

1997 156,102 416,424 37.5 1998 91,720 355,164 25.8 1999 60,445 199,552 30.3 2000 69,630 243,182 28.6 2001 61,548 278,664 22.1 2002 81,950 367,663 22.3 2003 92,044 466,456 19.7 2004 63,512 474,960 13.4 2005 125,075 548,853 22.8 2006 120,083 676,912 17.7

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Kerala

India

Proportion

150,475 180,703 119,384 104,101 86,783 98,178 85,909 66,058 43,133 25,166

809,453 848,601 610,272 641,356 626,565 747,041 816,655 804,878 782,083 520,960

18.6 21.3 19.6 16.2 13.9 13.1 10.5 8.2 5.5 4.8

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the annual reports of Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs and Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

Required (ECR) of Kerala is coming down and the place is replaced by the six states explained earlier (Table 18.4). There is a reduction in the savings among the emigrants due to the high cost of living, and the financial benefits have also decreased due to migration which has affected the attraction of emigration (Zachariah and Rajan, 2012c). Now people are more aware of the cheating and fraudulence at the time of migration and in Gulf than in previous times, so they are conscious about selecting destination countries rather than attractiveness in the destination countries. Another factor is the age structural changes in Kerala’s population. The youth population of age 20–34 years has a decline in 2011 (23.1 per cent) compared to that of 2001 (26.0 per cent). Also when we look at the population from 1961 onwards, the proportion of the younger age group (0–14 years) has a decline over the years. Thus there is no future prospect of increasing emigration from Kerala. Among the total sample households in 2016, 16.9 per cent are the emigrant households. Among the emigrant households, 26 per cent households have more than one emigrant. The current estimation of emigrants has been done at the district level. As per the estimate, the total emigrants from Kerala is 2.27 million in 2016, which was closer to the 2.28 million in 2011. When comparing it with the KMS 2013, there was a drastic decline in emigration in between the period (Table 18.5).

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

1,066 1,053 637 927 931 816 1,111 947 802 1,077 1,057 975 927 873 13,199

229,732 241,727 264,419 167,446 199,933 162,712 91,381 141,343 105,000 144,386 93,096 119,540 117,460 107,931 153,117 7,690 23,967 4,090 136,113 191,373 116,936 198,368 230,081 186,951 142,020 70,506 74,361 408,883 455,696 397,103 206,719 226,499 245,490 26,874 22,568 23,264 283,045 291,321 289,972 120,425 104,334 128,770 2,280,542 2,400,375 2,271,725

34,687 −4,734 13,619 −24,846 35,657 −3,600 −19,177 −11,417 −67,659 −11,780 38,771 −3,610 6,927 8,345 −8,817

22,692 −37,221 −36,343 26,444 45,186 −19,877 −74,437 −43,130 3,855 −58,593 18,991 696 −1,349 24,436 −128,650

Households Sample households Emigrants Emigrants Emigrants Increase/decrease Increase/decrease 2016 2016 2011 2013 2016 2016–2011 2016–2013

Thiruvananthapuram 846,460 Kollam 693,666 Pathanamthitta 329,482 Alappuzha 548,581 Kottayam 503,719 Idukki 278,106 Ernakulam 866,109 Thrissur 819,643 Palakkad 701,615 Malappuram 908,025 Kozhikode 772,270 Wayanad 198,971 Kannur 608,155 Kasaragod 299,776 KERALA 8,374,574

EMI

Table 18.5 Estimated emigrants in 2016 and its comparison with previous surveys

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Socio-economic profile of emigrants, 2016 Emigrants from Kerala include persons at all levels of education, starting with illiterates and ending with those having a high professional level of education. Out of the total number of emigrants, 38.4 per cent had completed secondary and higher secondary education. Only 2.4 per cent were illiterate. Gender-wise distribution of educational qualification revealed that a higher percentage of female emigrants are better educated than their male counterparts. While a majority of male migrants (42.4 per cent) have completed secondary and higher secondary education, nearly half of female migrants have a degree or more (Table 18.6). It is also to be noted that there is a huge gap between illiterate male emigrants (1.5 per cent) and illiterate female emigrants (7.4 per cent). Actually this is not the illiterate percentage; it is the percentage of young ones who have not yet entered into the educational field. Among the emigrants aged 18 years or above, this was only 0.2 per cent. As seen in the previous surveys, Muslims are the majority among the emigrants, followed by Hindus and Christians. About 15 per cent of the emigrant households are still in below poverty line. But among this BPL family, 10.1 per cent have a motor car, which is a symbol of their increasing level of standard life. About 69 per cent emigrant families are using LP gas for cooking purposes, while 30.3 per cent are still using wood for cooking their food. The emigrants’ first choice has always been to construct a very good house for their family. Here we can see about 59 per cent have a luxurious or very good house for their dwelling. In the study, luxurious houses are defined

Table 18.6 Educational qualification of the emigrants

Illiterate Less than primary Primary to less than secondary Secondary and higher secondary Degree and above Others Total

Male

Female

Total

1.5 3.2 21.4 42.6 19.9 11.5 100.0

7.4 11.5 13.0 15.5 47.8 4.7 100.0

2.4 4.4 20.1 38.4 24.1 10.5 100.0

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

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Table 18.7 Socio-economic profile of the emigrants, 2016 Religion Hindu Christian Muslim Ration card Yes APL BPL Fuel used for cooking Wood Electricity Kerosene L.P. Gas Type of house Luxurious or very good Good Poor or Kutcha Total

Per cent

Owned land in cents

40.9 17.2 41.8

< 10 cents 10–20 20–50 50–100 100+ Household amenities Motor car Taxi/truck/lorry Motor cycle/scooter Telephone Mobile phone Television MP3/DVD/VCD Refrigerator Computer/laptops Microwave oven Internet connection

99.4 81.6 18.4 30.3 0.4 0.5 68.7 59.0 35.8 5.2 100.0

20.0 39.4 24.7 8.7 7.2 24.3 5.0 47.9 45.9 94.6 92.9 42.7 78.1 27.6 12.6 16.4

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

as those houses with three or more bedrooms. Only 5 per cent have a poor or kutcha house. Only 2 per cent of emigrant households have no land. Among those who own land, the majority have less than 50 cents, while 4 per cent have more than 100 cent of land their own. Average land size of the emigrants is 20 cents. One out of four emigrant households has a motor car. About 50 per cent of the emigrant households have two-wheelers. Two-wheelers are common among the females who manage the day-to-day needs of these households (Table 18.7).

Change in household types Table 18.7 describes the change in the household type over a five-year gap. There were 15.5 per cent emigrant households changed as non-migrant households. Normally the emigrant households may have shifted as return emigrant or out-migrant households in which an emigrant can return back or return and work in other states of India. How did this happen? This may have happened due to the shift of

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Table 18.8 Changes of household type by migration status, 2011–2016 2011

2016 Emigrant Return OutReturn NonTotal emigrant migrant out-migrant migrant

Emigrant Non migrant Out-migrant Return emigrant Return out-migrant Total

64.8 4.8 15.8 18.8 5.0 17.6

17.5 2.0 1.9 35.8 2.5 7.9

1.5 2.0 32.2 1.8 5.5 3.6

0.6 0.7 10.6 0.6 14.9 1.6

15.5 90.5 39.6 43.1 72.0 69.3

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

emigrant family to a new household and the parents remained there, thus eventually the household changed to a non-migrant household. It is well-known that the number of households in Kerala increased due to the migration. The emigrants’ first dream is to construct a very good house. This approach has demolished the joint family system and created a nuclear family setup. About 17 per cent emigrant households of 2011 became return emigrant households while 19 per cent of return emigrant households became emigrant households in 2016. Thus the return emigration is replaced and the net effect of return emigration is less or negligible (Table 18.8).

Countries of destination Among the Gulf countries, UAE had the highest stock of emigrants from Kerala, which increased in 2016 compared to 2011. All the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) except UAE and Qatar had a fall in emigration from Kerala over the period. There was a slight increase in the emigration to US and Canada. In general, there was a reduction in the emigration from Kerala (Table 18.9). The emigration path is always skewed to Gulf countries. However, the choice of emigration to the US, Canada and the UK is higher among females compared to that of males. Seven out of ten females prefer to go to the Gulf countries, as opposed to nine out of ten males. One out of ten females prefer the US as their destination country (Table 18.10).

Table 18.9 Countries of destination of Kerala emigrants, 2016 Countries

Per cent in 2016

Per cent in 2011

United Arab Emirates Saudi Arabia Oman Qatar Kuwait Bahrain Australia Canada Ireland Malaysia Singapore UK US Other Countries Other South East Asia Africa Other West Asia Other Europe Total

41.5 22.5 7.6 8.4 5.5 3.8 0.7 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.5 3.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4 100.0

38.7 25.2 8.6 6.5 5.6 4.5 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.5 2.0 3.0 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 100.0

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

Table 18.10 Emigrants by destination countries and sex

Gulf countries Australia Canada Singapore UK US Other countries Total

Male

Female

92.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 1.1 2.7 2.4 100.0

71.1 2.1 4.0 1.7 4.3 12.8 4.0 100.0

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

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Conclusion The CDS has conducted seven large-scale migration surveys in Kerala since 1998 and is also planning to organize the eighth migration survey in 2017–2018, funded by the Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs, Government of Kerala. Over the last two decades, the quantum of emigrants has shown an increase but with declining trends. For instance, the increase during 1998–2003 was 476,559 persons, whereas it was 354,934 persons during 2003–2008 and 206,903 persons during 2008–2014. However, between the last two surveys, there has been a decline in the stock of emigrants of 128,623 persons. The reasons are many, as can be seen from the data provided by the annual reports of earlier MOIA as well as MEA. The number of emigrant clearances from India has reached its highest level, with 848,061 persons in 2008 before the global crisis. After the crisis, the number declined to 610,272 persons in 2009 (an absolute decline of 238,329 persons). It took almost five years for India to reach closer to the pre-crisis level of 816,655 persons in 2013 and then started declining again to reach 520,960 in 2016, much lower than the global crisis impact. This is also true about Kerala. The proportion of the Kerala emigration clearances to the total clearances in India stood at 21.29 per cent in 2008 (of course, it was 37.49 per cent in 1997), and then declined steadily over the last few years to reach 4.83 per cent in 2016. According to the emigration clearance data, one out of every five emigrants who left India in 2008 was a Keralite, and this has reached 1 out of 20 persons in 2016. The following reasons are postulated for the decline of emigrants, based on Kerala migration studies over the last 20 years and the general demographic transition over the last 20 years. 1

The demographic structure of Kerala is different from that of India. India experiences a demographic dividend whereas Kerala experiences population ageing. The fertility rate of Kerala is below replacement level (less than two children over the last 20 years). Result: the proportion of children below 14 years, which was 42.6 per cent in 1961 (the first census of Kerala after its formation in 1956), declined to 35.0 per cent in 1981 and 23.4 per cent in 2011, the latest population census. The child proportion declined by almost half in 50 years. On the other hand, the migrant prone age group (20–34) increased from 22.5 in 1961 to 27.1 in 1991 (demographic dividend) and declined to 23.1 in 2011 – almost reaching the same level of 1961 (the end of demographic dividend). This is one of the reasons why Kerala receives an equal number of

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2

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S. Irudaya Rajan and K. C. Zachariah internal migrants from other states of India in the recent periods, which we call replacement migration. After the global crisis, the wages in the Gulf (during the crisis, wages declined) have not increased drastically, and it is no longer profitable for Kerala emigrants to work in the Gulf countries (say for US$300). Keralites are slowly vacating from the Gulf and are replaced by people from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, including neighboring countries such as Nepal and Sri Lanka. Over the last few years, many Keralites used their Gulf experience to move to English speaking countries such as the US, the UK, Canada, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand for permanent residence. This is an emerging type of step migration by Keralites – Kerala to the US via Dubai.

Finally, the decline in quantum should not be a concern when it is quality that really matters (Skill India)!

References Department of Economics and Statistics. 1982. Survey on Housing and Employment. Government of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram. Department of Economics and Statistics. 1994. Report on Migration Survey, 1992–93. Government of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram. Rajan, S. I., B. A. Prakash and A. Suresh. 2015. Wage Differentials between Indian Migrant Workers in the Gulf and Non-Migrant Workers in India. Chapter 20, pp. 297–310 in S. I. Rajan (ed). India Migration Report 2015: Gender and Migration. Routledge. Zachariah, K. C., P. R. Gopinathan Nair and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2006. Return Emigrants in Kerala: Welfare, Rehabilitation and Development. Manohar Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2009. Migration and Development: The Kerala Experience. Daanish Publishers, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2011. Economic and Social Dynamics of Migration in Kerala, 1998–2003: Analysis of Panel Data. Chapter 12, pp. 361–377 in S. Irudaya Rajan and Marie Percot (eds). Dynamics of Indian Migration: Historical and Current Perspectives. Routledge, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012a. Diasporas in Kerala’s Development. Daanish Publishers, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012b. A Decade of Kerala’s Gulf Connection. Orient Blackswan, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012c. Impact of the Global Recession on Migration and Remittances: The Kerala Experience. Chapter 10, pp. 169–196 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2012. Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances: India Migration Report 2012. Routledge, New Delhi.

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Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012d. Inflexion in Kerala’s Gulf Connection: Report on the Kerala Migration Survey 2011. Centre for Development Studies (Thiruvananthapuram) Working Paper No. 450. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2016. Kerala Migration Study 2014. Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 51, No. 6, pp. 66–71. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2003. Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: Determinants, Differentials and Consequences. Orient Longman Private Limited. Zachariah, K. C., B. A. Prakash and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2003. The Impact of Immigration Policy on Indian Contract Migrants: The Case of the United Arab Emirates. International Migration, Volume 41, No. 4, pp. 161–172. Zachariah, K. C., B. A. Prakash and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2004. Indian Workers in UAE: Employment, Wages and Working Conditions. Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 39, No. 22, 29 May, pp. 2227–2234. Zachariah, K. C., P. R. Gopinathan Nair and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2001. Return Emigrants in Kerala: Rehabilitation Problems and Development Potential. Centre for Development Studies Working Paper No.319. Thiruvananthapuram.

19 Dalit migration, diaspora and development Kerala and Punjab S. Irudaya Rajan, Steve Taylor and Vinod Kumar The states of East Punjab (hereinafter Punjab) and Kerala both have a long and continuing history of significant overseas emigration and intra-diasporic migration but with distinct dynamics, destinations and implications. The relationship between international migration and economic growth and development within India is now an area of key research and policymaking within the nation. In particular, intense and increasing scrutiny and legislation is being applied to the enhanced social mobility apparently enabled by overseas migration, and to the remittances, investments and philanthropic donations transmitted ‘home’ by Indian diasporic communities living abroad. One recent commentator (Sahoo 2014) goes as far as to claim that ‘in the last two decades, India has progressed from a poor underdeveloped economy to one of the most successful and prosperous economies in the world because of diaspora contributions, which today are manifold’. Punjab and Kerala record some of the highest levels of overseas remittances in the world, let alone within India (Kapur 2010), and the two states are often held up as exemplars of the overseas migration-regional development nexus, as models for other Indian states to follow (Zachariah and Rajan 2012; Dusenbery and Tatla 2009). Drawing upon original social research conducted during 2014 and 2015 within Punjab and Kerala,1 this chapter will examine the extent to which the relationship between overseas migration, economic growth and regional development is inclusive within these states, with particular reference to caste inequities. More specifically, our aim is to investigate the role of Dalits within the international migration-development nexus within two regions where overseas migration is increasingly heralded as one (if not the only) main facilitator of social mobility, economic growth and regional development. We will be comparing Punjab, which has witnessed significant Scheduled Caste (SC) overseas migration, including to Western societies such as the UK, with Kerala,

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where international Dalit emigration has been insignificant, particularly movement to the Global North.

Punjabi transnationalism and Dalits The northwestern state of Punjab has been a major source of international migration from India, particularly to Western societies, for over two centuries. Indian Punjabis, originating particularly from the predominantly rural Doaba region,2 now constitute a significant proportion of the global South Asian diaspora, and particularly economically successful part of that population. Existing studies of the global Indian Punjabi village diaspora emphasize the strength of continuing links between this group, including those born and raised away from India, and the people and places of Punjab, particularly through kinship ties. They constitute a ‘transnational community’. The progressive consequences of Punjabi transnationalism, in particular the upward social mobility experienced by many Punjabis through international migration networks and the flow of significant diasporic investments, remittances and philanthropy to Punjab (Singh and Singh 2008; Dusenbery and Tatla 2009; Thandi 2015), are undoubted. However, a predominant focus upon these aspects of Punjabi transnationalism within academic literature has obscured the issues of caste differentiation and caste-based social exclusion within the overseas migration process. These are issues which this chapter investigates. Within rural Doaba, Sikhs constitute between 70 and 90 per cent of the population (Ram 2016). Sikhism opposes and dilutes the rigid caste-based hierarchy, hereditary occupations and rules of pollution/ non-pollution associated with Hinduism – intrinsic to its very foundation was the religious conversion of the ‘untouchables’. However, despite a clear opposition to caste differentiation within the scriptures and spiritual teaching of Sikhism, and of course specific provisions prohibiting caste-based discrimination within the Indian constitution, it has been widely established that caste-based hierarchies and social exclusion on the basis of caste, especially in relation to land ownership and sale, economic resources, religious worship/management, social ecology and demography, marriage and cremation practices and political control and administration, are significant aspects of cultural practice and lived experience within contemporary, Sikh-majority Punjab (Judge and Bal 2009; Ram 2012, 2016; Jodhka 2014). Jat Sikhs, estimated at 60 per cent of the Punjabi Sikh population, are the ‘dominant caste’ (Jodhka 2014; Ram 2016) of Punjab (numerically, economically,

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politically and socially), but the state also has a large proportion of SCs/Dalits, spread across different religions. At now over 30 per cent of the Punjabi population, the Dalit population is greater in number but their share of land ownership lower than in any other Indian state. Jats and Dalits continue to ‘live in extreme contrast of affluence and deprivation’ (Ram 2007). While Punjab as a whole is being urbanized, the SC population is growing in rural areas and Dalits are particularly concentrated within the Doaba region, with their population constituting 50 per cent or more of some Doaba villages and with Chamars, Ad Dharmis and Ramdasia/Ravidassia Sikhs (titles which are often used interchangeably to refer to the same people), as well as Chuhras, Balmikis/Valmikis/Mazabi Sikhs (labels which are also interchangeable), being the most numerous among them. Despite the overall maintenance of relative economic inequalities between Jats and Dalits in Punjab (Judge and Bal 2009; Bahadur 2015; Ram 2016), some Punjabi SCs (especially Chamars and Ramdasia/Ravidassia Sikhs) have experienced rising economic prosperity in absolute terms during the post-Green Revolution era of the past 40 years, particularly enabled by occupational diversification, access to reservations, educational opportunities and the very overseas migration that is part of the focus of this chapter. Existing studies (e.g. Taylor and Singh 2013; Taylor 2014a) demonstrate that it is Doaban Jat Sikhs who have dominated transnational Punjabi migration, and that this dominance has been enabled by superior access to material resources, transnational intra-caste migration networks and intra-caste endogamy. Consequently, academic studies of the global Punjabi diaspora, and their transnational connections, have focused largely upon Jats. However, an increasingly significant number of Punjabi transnationals hail from beyond the dominant caste. For example, it is estimated that as many as 12 per cent of UK Eastern Punjabis belonged originally to Scheduled Castes, with a large proportion of these from the Chamar and Ravidassia communities of Doaba (Hardtmann 2009; Taylor 2014b). The long tradition of international out-migration from Doaba has, to some extent, spread throughout the caste order and academic studies of this phenomenon are beginning to emerge (e.g. Ghuman 2011; Singh 2013; Taylor 2014b; Lum 2016; Dhanda 2017). However, our focus here, upon the reasons for the inclusion and exclusion of Punjabi Dalits from the overseas migration process and upon the impact of Punjabi Dalit transnationalism, particularly in terms of social mobility, economic growth and regional development within Punjab, is not covered by this emerging literature.

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Keralan overseas migration and Dalits The southern Indian state of Kerala has experienced a unique development process, characterized by high volumes of migration outflows to the Arabian Gulf and other parts of the world. Labour mobility has been an important livelihood strategy employed by households and societies in Kerala to cope with poverty, unemployment and adverse conditions. Over the last three decades, migration has been a key engine of social, political and economic transformation in the state. According to estimates from the Kerala Migration Survey 2011, over 10 per cent of the 33 million Keralite population lives outside the state (Zachariah and Rajan 2012). One out of every five households in Kerala has a migrant, with migrant workers constituting the single largest contributing group to the economy. According to estimates for 2011, Non-Resident Keralites have contributed 60,000 crore remittances to the state, accounting for around 31.2 per cent of state income (Zachariah and Rajan 2012). While migration has contributed to the meteoric rise of Kerala’s growth figures, there is little evidence that current migration contributes positively to reducing social disparities. Migrants in the state primarily originate from districts of Mallapuram, Thrissur and Thiruvananthapuram that have a high percentage of Muslims and Hindus, while the representation of Dalits among recorded migrants is notably lower than among other groups. For instance, of the 15,000 households surveyed in 2011, 2,736 households had one emigrant but only 53 SC/ST households had a migrant member (Zachariah and Rajan 2012). The Dalit community accounted for only 1.9 per cent of total migrant households in 2011, with as few as 2.9 per cent of Dalit households having migrating members. This is not commensurate with the representation of Dalits within the overall population. High volumes of remittance receipts have contributed significantly to reducing poverty, unemployment and relative deprivation in Kerala. However, the migration-induced development model has thus far excluded Dalits and other weaker sections of the state. Migration has actually intensified the developmental divide between different caste groups. Osella and Osella (2003) maintain that while migration in Kerala is ‘a key tool in family strategies towards upward mobility and identity fashioning’, it has also led to deepening inequality as well as changes in the nature of inequality. Migration has not positively affected the socio-economic outcomes of the Dalits of Kerala, and they continue to be among the most marginalized communities within the state. The existing data clearly indicates that the better off are benefiting more from opportunities provided through migration than other sub-groups. Individuals’ access to migration opportunities is limited by

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their economic, political and social-cultural conditions (Zachariah and Rajan 2009). Individuals from economically stable communities in well-connected regions stand to reap the benefits of migration, whereas the movement of Dalits is often restricted to badly paid unskilled jobs. Osella and Osella (2000) note the exclusion of lower castes from certain migration streams (particularly to Western nations) and maintain that lower caste groups have been, to some extent, able to participate in migration to the Gulf. This aspect of differential access to migration is central to the quest for economic growth alongside social justice. Issues of inclusive growth are increasingly pertinent in formulating policy responses to the knowledge that Kerala’s development path has successfully produced high growth figures alongside increasing inequalities. There is a literature on inequality and caste disparities within Kerala (Deshpande 2000; Osella and Osella 2000, 2003; Kurien 2006), but this fails to include the particular experiences of Dalit communities with respect to migration. This chapter offers a nuanced analysis of the economic, social and cultural barriers to Dalit migration in Kerala. Surveys of, and interviews with, intending and return migrants from Dalit communities in Wayanad, Palakkad and Pathanamthitta enhance our understanding of the socio-economic barriers to Dalit migration. The government must undertake sustained efforts to absorb Dalits into migration and increase their opportunities and access to international work experience. A move towards an inclusive migration policy can help address the exclusion of Dalits from the migration process and ensure that Kerala’s migration system is no longer inequitable.

The research process Drawing upon the aforementioned context, this chapter examines the extent to which the relationship between overseas migration, economic growth and regional development is inclusive within Punjab and Kerala, with particular reference to caste inequalities. Punjab It has already been established that the Doaba region of Punjab has both the highest percentage of Dalits within it, and the greatest proportion of overseas migrants from it, when compared to other areas of the state and many other states in the nation. Furthermore, Chamars/Ravidassias/Ad Dharmis, from where most Punjabi Dalit overseas migrants originate, are also in the majority among the SCs of Doaba, with Mazabis/Balmikis/Valmikis being concentrated within the Majha and Malwa regions. Consequently, our empirical research (semi-structured interviewing

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and non-participant observation) was based in Doaba, and more specifically within the part of Saheed Bhagat Singh Nagar (SBS Nagar) which has the highest concentration of Dalits and Dalit migrants in the state. Thirty-two in-depth semi-structured interviews with a mixture of former and current Dalit overseas migrant individuals (12) and (20) individuals who had conjugal or kinship ties with Dalit Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) were undertaken, alongside a further 28 interviews with Dalits in these villages who had no direct connection to overseas migration. This was then followed by five in-depth case studies of Dalit philanthropic and social reform projects in the locality. Kerala As per the 2011 Census of India, there are 68 Scheduled Castes in Kerala and they constitute 9.8 per cent of the population. Of them 99.9 per cent are Hindus, with a negligible number of Sikhs and Buddhists. Kerala is the state with the lowest Adivasis population in the country, with the Scheduled Tribes (ST) population constituting just 1.5 per cent of the total population. The methodological approach of the Keralan research was distinctly different to that adopted in Punjab, due to the much lower number of Dalit overseas migrants from/in the state and their scattering around the different regions. In order to obtain a broad picture of Dalit overseas migration from Kerala, in particular its relationship to employment, social mobility, remittances, inclusive growth and development, data was extracted and analyzed from the 2011 Government of India Census and the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) Kerala Migration Survey 2014, the latter a survey of 14,577 households across the state. Never before has there been an attempt to present such a picture of Dalit overseas migration from Kerala. This was then complemented by 15 case studies of ST families and their attitude towards migration within the Attappady region in order to gain a more qualitative understanding of Dalit overseas migration from Kerala.

Overseas Punjabi Dalit migration Significance, destinations and employment of Punjabi Dalit transnationals It is clear from our research, supporting the arguments of others (Taylor 2014b), that overseas Dalit migration from Punjab is more recent than the well-documented story of Jat Sikh mobility which stretches back over the past two centuries. It has become increasingly significant

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from the 1970s onwards but destination countries have also differed from those travelled to and settled in by the higher Punjabi castes. While we have witnessed the establishment of significant Jat Sikh communities within Western nations such as the UK, Canada, the US, Australia and New Zealand, the most frequent destinations for Punjabi Dalit overseas migrants lie within the Middle East, countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. While the Middle East remains the most frequent destination for Punjabi Dalit overseas migrants, we have also seen a recent rise in Dalit migration to Western societies, particularly via (intra-caste) kinship and marriage networks. However, the employment destinations of Dalit migrants are far less professionalized than their higher caste counterparts, whose educational and occupational success within the metropolitan centres of Western societies has been remarkable. The majority of jobs performed by Punjabi Dalits abroad, whether in the Middle East or Western societies, remain unskilled, low paid and temporary – jobs such as building labourer, truck driver, farm labourer, petrol pump attendant and, more recently, old age care worker. This may be the result of a more recent migration, but the current temporary and low paid nature of work for Punjabi Dalits abroad means that migration is often temporary, insecure and individualized. Many of our interviewees have made frequent sojourns to different nations, returning when temporary labour contracts ended and then travelling again when further opportunities arise. This means that chances to establish themselves and their families overseas, to move from a sojourner to a permanent settler, are more limited for Dalits than for Jats. It also means that the Dalit overseas migration process from Punjab is highly gendered and male dominated – the unskilled, labouring opportunities available are almost overwhelmingly filled by male migrants. Nevertheless, we can identify significant groups of Punjabi Dalits as truly transnational actors – frequently moving (physically, financially, virtually, socially and culturally) across international borders. Dalit transnationalism, inclusive growth/ development and inequality One crucial finding to report is that all of our interviewees bar one are Chamar/Ad Dharmis, the relatively privileged (economically, occupationally and socially/culturally) from the heterogeneous Dalits of Punjab. The evidence from our case studies, observations and interviews was that this group continue to monopolize overseas Dalit migration and, as such, continue to be the dominant caste fraction within the

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Dalit population. This supports the findings of some other related research projects (Taylor 2014b), where it is argued that such overseas migration has exacerbated inequalities between Chamars/Ad Dharmis and other groups within the Dalit population. Furthermore, our data suggests that as most of our Punjabi Dalit migrants concentrate the majority (over 80 per cent) of their transnational resources and activities on personal consumption, for example personal house building and investment in familial education within Punjab, they are involved in a process of ‘sanskritization’, an adoption of the cultural values, priorities and practices of the dominant caste, in an attempt to (re)assert their difference from, and superiority over, other (non-migrant) castes in Punjab. This only reinforces the unequal and oppressive caste order, thereby undermining inclusive growth and development. We did uncover some interesting recent changes in the nature and impact of Punjabi Dalit transnationalism. While personal consumption remains the priority for the majority of overseas Dalit migrants, it may be declining in significance as other investments and activities develop. There has been a marked rise in Dalit migrant investment in social, political and religious development projects in Punjab, and we uncovered numerous examples of these. Our research revealed that Dalits had been hitherto excluded from such NRI projects previously, when they had largely been financed by other castes (Taylor and Singh 2013; Taylor 2014b). Consequently, we have seen widespread Punjabi Dalit investment in, and the building of, educational, health, water and sanitation facilities in Punjabi villages which the local Dalit population can benefit from. However, by far the most significant development in recent years has been the rise of Dalit migrant involvement and investment in political/religious institutions and activities associated with the Ad Dharm/Ravidassia community. This has accelerated particularly since 2009 and the Vienna shooting of two Ravidassia Saints associated with the Dera Sant Sarwan Dass, Ballan (DSSDB). Jalandhar, Punjab, which in turn led to caste-based protests, violence and state curfews. The concomitant proliferation of over 9,000 Sikh and non-Sikh Deras, as ‘alternate spiritual sites for the oppressed (facilitating the) near-exodus of Dalits from Sikhism towards the . . . Deras’ (Ram 2007), other institutions and activities representing the assertion of Punjabi Dalit identity and resistance to caste oppression not only represent a challenge to the mainstream religion of Punjab and to Sikh identity but also threatens the security of the state and nation (Ram 2012). Punjabi Dalit migrants have been extremely active (financially, socially and politically) within this movement (Singh 2013), and our research respondents and the locality under study were no exception. Our interviewees suggested that the resources obtained via overseas

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migration have enabled the development of this very movement. As one commented, ‘migration is a big tool for SCs to getting freedom from the dominance of Jats. Now SCs have money, Pukkha houses, cars, their own songs and gaining political power . . . we are asserting our identity and independence’. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that it is still only one fraction of the Dalit population of Punjab (and an already relatively privileged fraction) that is gaining from overseas migration, the projection and assertion of Ravidassia identity and the associated religious/political movement. This does not amount to a fully inclusive development process.

Overseas Keralan Dalit migration Kerala Migration Survey 2014 The Kerala Migration Survey evidenced the employment pattern of the people of Kerala according to their religion and castes. The total sample selected for the survey was 14,577 households throughout the state. The survey covered 8,505 Hindu households and 3,000 Christian households. SCs and STs among Hindus are 12.0 per cent and 3.7 per cent, respectively, and among Christians, it is 2.2 and 0.3 per cent, respectively. The survey evidenced that South Kerala points towards the highest percentage of SCs and STs among Christians. Though the social status is the same, the statutory benefits of Hindu Dalits are not available to Christian Dalits. Dalit migrants Focusing only upon overseas migration, Table 19.1 presents a breakdown of migrants and non-migrants among the Dalits of Kerala, and it shows that more than 86 per cent of Hindu Dalits are non-migrant, Table 19.1 Migration status of Dalits, 2014 Hindu

Emigrant Non-migrant Out-migrant Return emigrant Return out-migrant Total

Christian

SC

ST

SC

ST

4.6 86.1 2.7 3.9 2.6 100.0

2.3 86.8 4.5 1.9 4.5 100.0

7.7 81.5 7.7 0.0 3.1 100.0

11.1 66.7 11.1 11.1 0.0 100.0

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

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Table 19.2 Estimated Dalit emigrants among Hindus and Christians, 2014 Hindu

Thiruvananthapuram Kollam Pathanamthitta Alappuzha Kottayam Idukki Thrissur Malappuram Kozhikode Kannur Kasaragod Total

Christian

SC

ST

SC

ST

6,484 4,716 4,716 3,537 589 589 1,768 1,768 2,947 1,179 1,768 30,064

2,358 589 589 589 589 0 0 0 0 589 0 5,305

0 0 0 2,947 589 589 589 0 0 0 0 4,716

0 0 0 589 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 589

Source: Survey conducted by the authors.

and of these SCs have migrated abroad more than STs. However, among Christian Dalits, STs have a higher percentage of emigrants compared to SCs. Conversion to Christianity appears to increase migration opportunities. Table 19.2 gives the estimated number of emigrants among Hindu and Christian Dalits throughout the 14 districts of Kerala. As Christian STs are small in numbers, the Christian SCs and STs are combined for further analysis. Our research shows that the educational status of Keralan Dalits improves following migration. Overseas emigrants have better qualifications than non-migrants. The proportion of Dalit migrants with a minimum of 10th standard is 57 per cent for SCs, 56 per cent for STs and 33 per cent for converted Christians. Also, most of the converted Christian migrants are diploma holders. Of SC migrants, 11.8 per cent are also professionally qualified. Skilled, professional labourers are starting to replace overseas Dalit unskilled manual labourers. A crude comparison of educational attainment of Dalit emigrants on the basis of average years of schooling reveals that SCs have 13 years and STs have 12 years of educational attainment, while converted Christians have 15 years of schooling. These average years of schooling are much higher than the non-migrants of the sample.

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Migration flows Gulf countries are the most common destinations of Keralan Dalits, with most attracted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The highest proportion of STs in the sample migrated to Saudi Arabia and the UK followed by the UAE. Thirty-three per cent of converted Christians in the sample also migrated to Saudi Arabia. The picture is different for SCs, who have most commonly migrated to the UAE followed by Saudi Arabia and Oman. Economic profile Our research reveals economic inequality between migrants and non-migrants, shaped by the remittances received by members of the migrant households from its members living abroad. We found very little evidence of overseas remittances being directed to anywhere other than migrant households or personal consumption. Evidence from the case studies Case studies done in Attappady among Scheduled Tribes discussed their attitude towards overseas migration. The tribals in Attappady region are mainly of three sub-castes, namely Irulas, Mudugas and Kurumbas. Almost all these people’s livelihoods depend on agriculture. They are unaware of any benefits brought to the area as a result of overseas migration and they have no sources of information about migration. There are some first generation Dalit migrants from the area but, in general, the available migration network is very limited and the cost of overseas migration is too prohibitive for the vast majority of Dalits in the area. While young, educated Dalits are interested in moving away from traditional forms of agriculture, SC and ST reservation policies actually act as a disincentive to leave India, given the opportunities that could be lost.

Conclusions Caste inequalities are deeply entrenched within both Punjab and Kerala, with Dalits in both states very clearly the most disadvantaged of both state populations. Dalit overseas migration is a much more recent phenomenon, significant from the 1980s onwards, when compared to wider caste migration in both Punjab and Kerala. This is particularly pronounced in Punjab, where higher caste migration has

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a history stretching over two centuries. Dalit transnationalism is much more significant in terms of numbers, destinations and impact from Punjab when compared to Kerala. This is a result of greater educational opportunities, occupational diversification and rising incomes, particularly for Chamar Dalits within the Doaba region of Punjab, following the green revolution, as well as the wider, deeply embedded history and culture of overseas migration from Doaba. Chain migration and migration networks among some Doaban (Chamar) Dalits have arisen from the 1980s onwards, with the UK a particularly favoured destination. The proportion of Dalit migrants from Kerala, within a state with high rates of overseas migration, is very small due to a lack of available migration opportunities and migration networks. Those Keralite Dalits who do manage to migrate overseas enhance educational, employment and income prospects for themselves and their households. Conversion to Christianity among Dalits in Kerala appears to increase the chances of overseas migration and the benefits that can accrue from this. Almost all remittances from Dalit overseas migration from Kerala are directed towards personal consumption and the households of migrants themselves, with very little evidence of any wider developmental or philanthropic investment. The far greater numbers involved in, and the much longer history of, Punjabi Dalit migration, when compared to Kerala, particularly to the Global North, means that there are wider and more significant Dalit transnational networks in turn facilitating significant Dalit reverse flows (economic, political and cultural) back to Punjab. However, it is crucial to recognize that Punjabi Dalit migration and the associated migration networks and reverse flows have been monopolized by one relatively privileged group among the heterogeneous Dalits of Punjab: the Chamars of Doaba. Given that the majority of the Punjabi Dalit reverse flows investigated are directed towards personal consumption and sanskritization within Doaba, Punjabi Dalit overseas migration is sustaining and deepening existing caste and regional inequalities within the Dalits of Punjab. While there have been some recent moves towards more investment in cultural and political transnationalism among the diasporic Ravidassias, this also largely supports the dominance of the Doaban Chamars among Punjabi Dalits. So while the very small numbers of Keralan overseas Dalit migrants explains a negligible relationship between Dalit migration and challenges to caste inequality there, even within a state (Punjab) of relatively high Dalit international migration, any concrete evidence of significant impact upon existing caste inequalities is limited to say the least. Our overall argument supports those who have started to

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challenge previously dominant and celebratory discourses on the migration-development nexus by questioning an assumed positive impact of ‘transnationalism from below’ upon sending regions. Some have recently done this in relation to Punjab and Kerala (Walton-Roberts 2014; Thandi 2017). However, this chapter is the first we know of to specifically undertake such critical questioning of Dalit transnationalism, which is often taken as automatically progressive in challenging inequalities.

Notes 1 The project upon which this chapter is based, ‘Overseas Dalit Migration and Inclusive Growth: Punjab and Kerala’, was funded by the Indian Centre for Migration, part of the then Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. 2 This region is constituted by the districts of Hoshiarpur, Kapurthala, Jalandhar and Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar (SBS Nagar, formerly known as Nawanshahar).

References Bahadur, B. (2015) ‘Mapping Occupational Changes and Social Mobility among the Dalits: A Sociological Study of a Village of Malwa Region of Punjab’, Political Economy Journal of India 24 (1): 42–48. Deshpande, A. (2000) ‘Does Caste Still Define Disparity? A Look at Inequality in Kerala, India’, The American Economic Review 90 (2): 322–325. Dhanda, M. (2017) ‘Casteism Amongst Punjabis in Britain’, Economic and Political Weekly 52 (1): 62–65. Dusenbery, V. A. and Tatla, D. S. ed. (2009) Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy in Punjab: Global Giving for Local Good, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Ghuman, P. (2011) British Untouchables: A Study of Dalit Identity and Education, Farnham: Ashgate. Hardtmann, E. (2009) The Dalit Movement in India: Local Practices, Global Connections, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Jodhka, S. S. (2014) Caste in Contemporary India, New Delhi: Routledge. Judge, P. S. and Bal, G. (2009) Mapping Dalits: Contemporary Reality and Future Prospects in Punjab, New Delhi: Rawat. Kapur, D. (2010) Diaspora, Development and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Kurien, P. (2006) ‘Caste Mobility, and the Gilding of Rituals: The Impact of Gulf Migration on Ezhavas in South Kerala’ in Verma, H. S. and N. Hasnain (eds.) Stagnation, Retrograde Change, or Positive Progress? Vignettes from the Journey of the Other Backward Class Communities in the Process of Change in India, New Delhi: Serials Publications.

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Lum, K. (2016) ‘Casted Masculinities in the Punjabi Diaspora in Spain’, South Asian Diaspora 8 (1): 31–48. Osella, F. and Osella, C. (2000) Social Mobility in Kerala: Modernity and Identity in Conflict, London: Pluto Press. Osella, F. and Osella, C. (2003) ‘Migration and the Commoditisation of Ritual: Sacrifice, Spectacle and Contestations in Kerala, India’, Contributions to Indian Sociology 37 (1&2): 109–140. Ram, R. (2007) ‘Social Exclusion, Resistance and Deras in Punjab: Exploring the Myth of Casteless Sikh Society in Punjab’, Economic and Political Weekly 42 (40): 4066–4074. Ram, R. (2012) ‘Beyond Conversion and Sankritisation: Articulating an Alternative Dalit Agenda in East Punjab’, Modern Asian Studies 46 (3): 639–702. Ram, R. (2016) ‘Structures of Social Exclusion, Dera Culture and Dalit Social Mobility in Contemporary East Punjab’, Contemporary Voice of Dalit 8 (2): 186–195. Sahoo, A. K. (2014) ‘Diaspora, Transnationalism and Development’ in Rajan, S. I. (ed.) India Migration Report 2014: Diaspora and Development, New Delhi: Routledge. Singh, G. (2013) ‘Religious Transnationalism, Development and the Construction of Religious Boundaries: The Case of the Dera Sachkhand Ballan and the RavidassDharm’, Global Networks 13 (2): 183–199. Singh, G. and Singh, S. (2008) ‘Diaspora Philanthropy in Action: An Evaluation of Modernization in Punjab Villages’, Journal of Punjab Studies 14 (2): 225–248. Taylor, S. (2014a) ‘The Diasporic Pursuit of Home and Identity: Dynamic Punjabi Transnationalism’, The Sociological Review 62 (2): 276–294. Taylor, S. (2014b) ‘Religious Conversion and Dalit Assertion amongst a Punjabi Dalit Diaspora’, Sociological Bulletin 63 (2): 224–226. Taylor, S. and Singh, M. (2013) ‘Punjab’s Doaban Migration-Development Nexus: Transnationalism and Caste Domination’, Economic and Political Weekly 48 (24): 50–57. Thandi, S. S. (2015) ‘Punjabi Diaspora: Conceptualizing and Evaluating Impacts of Diaspora-Homeland Linkages’ in Rajan, S. I., V. J. Varghese and A. K. Nanda (eds.) Migration, Mobility and Multiple Affiliations: Punjabis in a Transnational World, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Thandi, S. S. (2017) ‘Promise of Punjabi Diaspora: Rhetoric and Reality of Failed Engagement’, Economic and Political Weekly 52 (3): 58–61. Walton-Roberts, M. (2014) ‘Diasporas and Divergent Development in Kerala and Punjab: Querying the Migration-Development Discourse’ in Sahoo, S. and B. K. Pattanaik (eds.) Global Diasporas and Development; SocioEconomic, Cultural and Policy Perspectives, New Delhi: Springer: 69–85. Zachariah, K. C. and Rajan, S. I. (2009) Migration and Development: The Kerala Experience, New Delhi: Daanish Publishers. Zachariah, K. C. and Rajan, S. I. (2012) Diasporas in Kerala’s Development, New Delhi: Daanish Publishers.

20 Immigration policy reforms in OECD countries A comparative look at the United States Sajitha Beevi Karayil In almost all the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, foreign labour force as percentage of total labour force was growing almost continuously up to 2008, as evident from the OECD statistics. Especially for the US, there had been an uninterrupted increase in the share of the foreign-born labour force, from 12.3 to 16.5 per cent, during the decade preceding the economic crisis in 2008. But, the crisis resulted in a significant negative impact. Average net migration into OECD countries almost halved, from 4.4 persons per thousand population in 2005–2008 to 2.6 persons per thousand in 2009–2012. Several major immigration countries, especially the US, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, witnessed declining migration levels and net migration remained well below the pre-crisis levels. Labour migration also declined continuously since the economic downturn, falling 12 per cent in 2012. It was particularly visible in the European OECD countries (European Economic Area), where the decline was around 40 per cent during 2007–2012.1 However, several countries experienced a rise in the number of labour migrants received. For instance, in Australia and Canada, labour migrant inflows increased by 6 per cent, while Japan showed a sharp increase of 21 per cent (OECD 2014). Thus, the labour policy response to the world financial turmoil has been uneven across the OECD members. The chapter attempts an analytic and comparative review of these regulatory reforms, focusing on the US, and analyzes the implications for developing countries like India. Tables 20.1 and 20.2 make an overview of the trends and patterns of immigration in selected OECD countries, which present a comparative picture of the US. Compared to permanent settlers or long-term workers, the inflows of temporary workers are progressively welcomed over time (OECD 2011).2 As data reveals (Table 20.1), the US has been leading with 450,000 temporary workers3 in 2008 (i.e. 19 per cent of total temporary worker admissions in OECD countries). The share of

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Table 20.1 Inflows of foreign workers into selected OECD countries, 1998– 2008 (thousands and percentage changes) 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

2008

Australia Permanent settlers 26.0 32.4 36.0 51.5 59.5 65.4 Temporary workers 37.3 39.2 33.5 39.5 71.2 110.6 Canada 100.5 116.6 110.9 112.6 139.1 192.5 Switzerland 26.8 34.0 40.1 40.0 46.4 76.7 France Permanent workers 5.4 6.9 8.5 7.6 10.9 23.8 Temporary workers 4.3 7.5 9.8 10.0 10.7 9.9 UK 37.5 64.6 88.6 89.5 96.7 77.7 Japan 101.9 129.9 145.1 158.9 81.4 72.1 New Zealand Permanent settlers 4.8 7.8 13.4 7.7 12.9 12.6 Temporary workers 28.4 35.2 59.6 77.2 106.0 136.6 US Permanent settlers 77.4 106.6 173.8 155.3 159.1 166.5 Temporary workers 242 355.1 357.9 396.7 444.4 449.9 OECD Total Permanent immigrants NA NA NA NA 4783* 4568 Temporary workers NA NA NA 2133 2331 2381

Percentage change, 2008/1998 152 196 92 186 321 129 107 −29 162 381 194 86

Source: Calculations based on OECD website at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/54/43185467. xls and OECD (2010, 2011). * Represents data for 2007. NA = Not Available.

temporary workers in the total foreign labour force of the US has also been quite prominent (around 73 per cent). Of course, the US is the largest immigration country in the world, with more than 41 million foreign-born residents in 2013. Yet, relative to the size of its population, the immigrant population in the US (13 per cent) is either below or just comparable to that of other settlement countries (Australia, 28 per cent; Canada, 20 per cent;4 New Zealand, 25 per cent) and a number of European countries (e.g. Germany, 13 per cent; Ireland, 16 per cent; Spain, 13 per cent; UK, 12 per cent) (OECD 2015). Indeed, the post-crisis situation as manifest in Table 20.2 reveals a continuing setback in temporary labour inflows into the US, comparable to the overall situation in the OECD, as against the significant positive trends noticed in other traditional settlement countries.

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Table 20.2 Temporary-type labour migration, 2007–2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012/2011 2012/2007 Thousands

Change (%)

OECD Total 2,526 2,505 2,091 2,069 1,958 1,873 −4 US 286 305 243 251 226 211 −7 Canada 64 80 79 88 93 98 6 Australia 141 167 199 184 197 229 16

−26 −26 53 62

Source: Compiled and computed from OECD (2014). Notes: The figures are rounded. The table includes all the countries for which standardized data are available, except the Czech Republic.

Another recent trend in the OECD region is a noticeable rise in the number of highly skilled or highly educated immigrants. Their number increased by 70 per cent over the past decade to exceed 31 million, though they have a higher unemployment and over-qualification rates than their native peers (OECD 2014). The proportion of highly educated immigrants (i.e. those having at least a college degree) in the US comes to around 37 per cent of those of working age, as against 34 per cent OECD-wide and 26 per cent across the EU. However, the unemployment and underemployment rates among US immigrants are also quite high. One in two highly educated immigrants in the US is either inactive or unemployed or overqualified for the current job. Moreover, the US has one of the highest gender gaps in terms of the employment of migrants, with only 57 per cent of migrant women being employed. The proportion of immigrant naturalization is also relatively low in the US as compared to other countries, especially in the case of lower-educated immigrants from lower-income countries. Overall, while the general perception of discrimination towards immigrants is lower in the US, this is not seen in the case of lower-educated immigrants (OECD 2015). International student migration is also an area of significant policy attention in OECD countries. Since 2000, the number of international students more than doubled universally, reaching 4.5 million in 2012, with 75 per cent enrolled in OECD countries. More than half of the international students in OECD countries originate from Asia, essentially China (22 per cent)5 followed by India (OECD 2014). With this introduction and settings, this article makes a detailed enquiry into the nature and characteristics of US immigration policy, focusing on the component of labour migration, in the backdrop of the policy reforms in some other OECD members.

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The US immigration system: a historical outline The evolution of the US immigration system has had historical undertones. The history of US immigration policy can be classified into four main phases, namely, the open door era, door-ajar era, pet-door era, and Dutch-door era (Meyers 2004). During the ‘open-door era’ (i.e. 1820–1880), there were hardly any restrictions put on immigration. During the 1800s, when the US was still developing, migration was an integral part of the success of the US economy. Some restrictions began to be imposed during the second phase of the ‘door-ajar era’ (i.e. 1880–1920).6 The door-ajar policy gained momentum after 1890, due to factors like a fluctuating economy and the peak level of immigration in the US history (until the 1980s).7 However, foreign policy considerations often delayed the implementation of restrictions. With the beginning of the ‘pet-door era’ (i.e. 1920–1950), the immigration policy became much more restrictive, since the national origins quota system allowed only a favoured few to enter.8 However, during this period of world wars, there was wartime demand for imported labour due to rapid expansion of war industries. Moreover, during the Second World War, the mounting influence of foreign policy considerations led to liberalization of US immigration policy.9 Since 1950 (1965, according to another version) – that is during the ‘Dutch-door era’ – total immigration increased, with the positive war-related trends like demand for labour and foreign policy considerations, continuing even after the war. The Nationality and Immigration Act of 1965 (effective in 1968) abolished the national origins quota system so that immigrants from all countries could compete more equally for the available visas.10 The 1965 Act also repealed the Asia-Pacific triangle restrictions. Moreover, a new selection system, the categorical preference system, came into being which gave preference to certain categories of immigrants like relatives of US citizens and resident aliens, professionals, artists and persons alleviating labour shortages.11 Since 1965, one of the important features of the American immigration policy has been an attempt to encourage immigration of investors and highly skilled workers. For example in 1990, the H1B program for foreigners, who have at least a bachelor’s degree, was created to meet the temporary labour shortages in specialty occupations (i.e. highly skilled categories like physicians, engineers, accountants, and programmers). In sum, the labour migration flows into the US have historically coincided with the regulatory reforms in the country, emerging out of changing economic conditions and foreign policy considerations.

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The labour migration policy in the US: some recent trends During the period since 2006, while permanent immigration rose in the US,12 admissions under the employment-based preference categories fell sharply. Rather than a drop in demand or change in the caps, the ‘administrative delay’ was responsible for this decline (OECD 2008, 2011). The number of H1B visa holders (temporary workers in specialty occupations) has been rising steadily and reached 462,000 in 2007.13 Demand for H1B visas is usually much higher than availability, exhausting the numerical limit of 65,000 visas14 on the first day of visa application itself (e.g. in 2005 and 2007). But recently, especially with the economic downturn, demand for this visa also declined. In 2011, it took more than eight months to fill the H1B cap (OECD 2011). This could be due to the provisos set in the government stimulus package, which prevented American companies that receive federal money from hiring overseas skilled workers15 (The Hindu 2009a). According to the visa legislation introduced in the US Senate in 2009, which reformed the H1B and L1 (intra-company transferees)16 visa programs, the US firms looking for skilled foreign professionals are required to make a ‘good faith’ attempt to recruit local workers first.17 Moreover, the US government decided on stricter screening following complaints of misuse of H1B visas. Fraud prevention tactics, including worksite visits, were also adopted to prevent such misuse (The Hindu 2009a). In addition, the USCIS (US Citizenship and Immigration Services) proposed redefining an ‘employer’ in tune with a definition under British Common Law, which would disqualify many Indian firms from obtaining H1B visas for their employees (The Hindu 2010). In addition to such restrictive measures, under the Emergency Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Act (the Border Security Bill) 2010, the US hiked the fee for certain categories of H1B and L1 visas by a minimum of $2,000 for the next five years. The law is applicable to the firms employing 50 or more workers and having 50 per cent or more of them on the H1B visa. As reported in a WTO (World Trade Organization) press release (Department of Commerce 2010), the Government of India raised this issue with the US trade representative, terming it as discriminatory and WTO-incompatible,18 since the bill would adversely affect the Indian companies that use these particular visas in large numbers. Recently, India also launched a complaint at the WTO over the high cost of US work visas, stating that the US law almost doubled visa fees for skilled workers, that is to around $45,000 per applicant (The Hindu 2012).19

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Moreover, there has been a leap in the rejection rate of L1 visas, which has risen to 40 per cent, up from 7 to 8 per cent earlier (The Hindu 2011a). A recent report by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General (IG) notes various norms of the L1 visa program as vague and makes a number of recommendations to curb the potential abuse of the program, including more rigorous consideration of new petitions (The Hindu 2013b). Indeed, as noticed from USCIS data, India is the prominent supplier of H1B workers and second important supplier of L1 workers in the US. For scientists, the US visa rules require renewal of visas every year. They do not get multiple entry visas for five or ten years, and the process of security clearance is also time-consuming. Such a strict visa regime for scientists is to remove any applicant who may seek to transfer technologies involving weapons of mass destruction, missile systems and dual-use items that could be exploited by terrorists. But, as a result, scientists who intend to attend meetings and other professional activities are put to lots of trouble (The Hindu 2011b). Apart from such a strenuous and discriminatory regime for the highly skilled, temporary migration schemes for lower and medium-skilled workers also reveal signs of restraint. Though the number of temporary admissions under H2A (seasonal agricultural worker) program increased from less than 50,000 in 2006 to 173,000 in 2008, in March 2010, the labour market test20 for H2A employers was strengthened, and stricter wage requirements were introduced (OECD 2010). It is noticeable that there are no large-scale admissions under H2A, despite having no numerical cap for this category. This is because the US farm employers rely mostly on illegal workers, owing to stringent labour market tests for temporary foreign employment, as also the long-term labour needs in the agricultural sector (OECD 2009). Temporary workers in other sectors (like hotel and restaurant workers, landscape workers and other low-skilled workers in seasonal occupations) under the H2B visa face a cap of 66,000. Moreover, this visa is available only for the countries designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security. For the religious worker (R1) visa,21 new regulations came into effect in November 2008, which made the application process lengthier and documentation requirements more rigorous (OECD 2010). The H1C program for registered nurses in healthcare shortage areas expired in December 2009, and currently there exists no stipulated visa for the entry of nurses. It would be difficult for nurses to get admission through other temporary (non-immigrant)22 visa categories like H3 (trainees), H1B (specialty workers) and J1 (exchange visitors) and the permanent immigration category of EB3, owing to the non-availability as well as

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the non-suitability of such visas. As Aiken and Cheung (2008) note, while estimates show that the US will be short of almost one million professional nurses by 2020, the country appears to lack a concrete and comprehensive national policy regarding nurse immigration. Though the comprehensive immigration reform was introduced as a bill in December 2009, recommending changes to the temporary worker programs, employers and opponents of regularization strongly opposed the bill (OECD 2010). The immigration reforms, which attract not only less skilled but also talented engineers from countries like India,23 remain on the list of priorities for the US administration (OECD 2011). But attempts to pass this legislation continued to be unsuccessful. The favourable US policy towards international students24 is largely due to the prospects of retaining them as highly skilled long-term workers,25 since the US industrialists prefer professionals with US degrees.

Labour migration policies: a comparative and closer look at the US Judgment by various departments, which could be repetitive, is involved in the final approval of temporary entry into the US. While the USDOL (US Department of Labor) and USCIS (US Citizenship and Immigration Services) verify the alien’s qualifications and influence on the local labour market, the USDOS (US Department of State) and USCBP (US Customs and Border Protection) regulate admission by judging visa applications and at times judging qualifications again. This broad picture itself shows the difficulty as well as uncertainty of obtaining admission into the US. To add, the US appears to follow a differing or discriminatory policy towards different entry categories, based on characteristics like skill and country of nationality. For instance, in the case of medium and lower skilled categories like specialty occupation workers (H1B) and seasonal non-agricultural workers (H2B), the US employer must obtain foreign labour certification from the USDOL,26 prior to filing entry petition with the USCIS. While the labour certification process for H1B takes only a few working days, for less-skilled categories like H2B it may take several months (USCIS 2006). But in the case of preferential/specialized visa categories like treaty traders/treaty investors (E1/E2), border crossing card: Mexico (BCC),27 business visitors (B1), and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) professional workers (TN/TD), additional approval by any government agency is not required prior to applying for the visa.28 Thus, the US government’s

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bureaucratic requirements are seen to become less stringent when the categories admitted are highly specialized or as part of regional/bilateral arrangements/treaties. In contrast, in other ‘settlement countries’ like Australia and Canada, temporary migration is much encouraged. Since the Australian government does not directly control the size and composition of temporary migration programs, one out of ten Australian workers is a temporary migrant (Kukoc 2011). Temporary migration is largely uncapped and also continuously renewable in Australia. In the US, however, the non-immigrant admissions are subject to stay limits except in the case of the preferential entry categories, for which unlimited visa extensions are possible. For seasonal non-agricultural workers (H2B), a less skilled category in the US, initial entry is for a maximum of one year and extension of stay is possible only up to three years. The other categories with shorter length of stay are business visitors (up to one year), registered nurses in healthcare shortage areas (up to three years), trainees (generally up to two years), and workers in international cultural exchange programs (up to 15 months), most of them being medium-skilled with competitive advantage for developing countries like India. However, for highly specialized categories, which cater to the larger capitalist and strategic interests of the country, the maximum length of stay is much longer in the US, for example the intra-company transferees (up to seven years) where big multi-national companies (MNCs) are involved. Some among the uncapped categories in Australia are the subclass 457 employer sponsored visa, temporary business skills and working holiday makers.29 In Australia, the demand for Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass 457) visas increased to 126,400 in 2012–2013 and India replaced the UK as the top origin country. Notably, under the subclass 457 visa, the partners, children and even relatives could be covered and all of them can obtain full work and study rights (The Law Library of Congress 2013). New temporary worker schemes were also introduced by Australia, like the Seasonal Worker Program beginning in July 2012. Moreover, the visa application process, particularly for those applying for temporary visas, was simplified during 2013 (OECD 2014). In the US, however, the medium and lower skilled entry categories like H1B and H2B, which are widely demanded, are subject to visa caps. The family unification provisions are also not quite attractive, with spouses allowed to work in very limited cases like the high-end or preferential categories. In Canada, temporary foreign workers remained the largest group of temporary migrants, even during the economic recession in 2009.

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For the lower-skilled, Canada’s temporary labour programs are more detailed and forthcoming compared to the US. Canada has three types of temporary foreign worker programs: a seasonal agricultural workers program (SAWP) for harvesting workers from Mexico and Caribbean, a live-in caregiver program (LCP) and a working holiday maker program. Migrants coming under LCP may apply for a permanent residence permit after being employed in this status for two years (OECD 2010), and having once applied for permanent resident status, they can move on to any other employment.30 Such provisions for the less skilled are quite liberal, when compared with the case of the US. Moreover, in order to make Canadian migration policy more flexible and responsive to changing labour market needs, in 2008 the government set out an ‘Action Plan for Faster Immigration’, which aims at accelerating the processing of visa applications and introducing the possibility to amend admission procedures on short notice through ministerial instructions. The Canadian government has enunciated further ambitious plans, like starting an online job portal and raising the number of immigrants under the new scheme of ‘Canada Experience Class’, which permits students to become permanent residents after three years of study and one year of work (The Hindu 2013d). Various other programmes of the Canadian government include ‘Express Entry’, which is meant for ensuring a steady supply of skilled workers when there are skills shortages, and an ‘Action Plan for Faster Family Reunification’. Recently, especially since the 2008 economic crisis, stricter admission criteria are getting announced in these settlement countries as well. For instance, in Canada, in August 2010, the government announced changes to the temporary foreign worker programs like more rigorous assessment of the genuineness of job offers (OECD 2011). In June 2014, a more comprehensive overhaul of the program was announced, which included measures like a rigorous Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) and caps on low-wage temporary foreign workers (OECD 2014). Still, when compared with other OECD members, the US has adopted greater number of restrictive measures and very few facilitative measures (Table 20.3), for addressing the economic and labour market issues associated with the financial crisis. Though the less skilled seasonal workers from other EU members remain the major category of temporary inflows in most of the EU countries, lately they are trying to fill their labour shortages, especially that of the highly skilled, from third countries. For instance, the EU has proposed an ‘EU blue card’, which provides for residential and work permits for non-EU nationals, along the lines of the US ‘green card’.31 The blue card

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Table 20.3 Immigration policies (restrictive and facilitative) in OECD countries following economic crisis and rising unemployment Policy change

Country

Restrictive measures Temporary Adjusting numerical migration limits

Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, UK, US Limiting possibilities to Canada, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, change/renew permits Spain, UK, US Promoting return Czech Republic, Japan, Norway, Spain migration Strengthening labour Australia, Canada, Ireland, Italy, market tests/reviewing New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UK, US shortage lists Changing permanent Australia, Italy, Spain, UK migration policy

Facilitative measures New schemes to attract skilled/entrepreneur migrants Seasonal employment/labour migration schemes New policies to retain international graduates Improved employment conditions/ provisions for unemployed migrants

Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway Australia, Finland, New Zealand, Poland Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, UK Australia, Japan, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, US

Source: IMSED Research (2010), Table 2.2, p. 16.

will enable qualified manpower, in sectors like information technology, engineering, telecommunications, and research and development (R&D), to work for an initial two-year period in a host EU country with provision for relocation elsewhere within the bloc. Some other features of this scheme include equal treatment with EU nationals with respect to a series of socio-economic rights and better conditions for family re-unification like spousal employment (Dawson 2013; The Hindu 2008). These are some constructive steps intended to attract highly skilled immigrants. The other important schemes for foreign nationals are the Schengen Visa (SV) and the EU Single Permit. While the former facilitates short-term entry of foreigners as business visitors, the latter seeks to harmonize and simplify the procedures for obtaining work and residence permits for non-EU nationals (Mukherjee and Goyal 2013).

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The country-wise analysis shows that most EU members adopt various attractive policies for the entry of temporary workers, especially from non-EU countries like India. In Belgium, out of 8,600 work permits issued to highly skilled workers in 2012, around one-third were supplied to Indians (2,800 persons) (OECD 2014). Belgium provides unlimited market access, in terms of both eligible duration and employer, for non-EU nationals under Type A permits. Under Type C permits, entry under any salaried profession with any employer, along with the possibility of extension, is possible for temporary workers (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2011). Such cases depict high labour market flexibility, whereas in the US the market access is greatly limited in respect of time, employer and country of nationality. Belgium even allows exemption from work permits, under specific circumstances, for the executives, recently this facility being extended to other management professionals (OECD 2010). But, in the US, the visa-free entry32 is permitted only for a favoured few countries and for a limited period (going up to three months) under certain business visitor categories. While the application process for new arrivals is quite stringent in almost all the EU countries, after living in countries like the Netherlands, Austria and France for some years with a work permit, foreign nationals may obtain a residence permit that allows for any lawful employment. In France, the full work permits33 granted to non-EU nationals do not have a time restriction, whereas in the US only those entering under certain preferential visa arrangements, in none of which India has been a participant, are exempt from stay limits. Moreover, foreigners requesting a work permit in occupations experiencing labour shortages are not subject to labour market testing in France, while the Netherlands exempts highly skilled immigrants from such rigorous tests (EMN 2013; OECD 2008). In the Netherlands, the new migration policy rules introduced in June 2013 recommend simplifying the application procedure for a permit and making employers more accountable for the sponsored migrants along with offering fast-track processing. Such measures could be emulated by the US, where the visa categories like H1B and H2B that are in huge public demand, are subject to stringent and time-consuming admission conditions.34 Many EU countries provide attractive fiscal incentives to foreign professionals, which are not prevalent in the US, where even students have to pay taxes on their scholarships.35 For instance, France provides tax exemptions for bonuses, directly related to the foreigners’ assignment in France, which may be claimed up to five years; and tax deductions for the social security payments (like pension and health insurance) that expatriates make to countries other than France (Kahanec and

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Zimmermann 2011). It is also noticeable that countries like Austria and Netherlands have preferential policies for research scientists, while the US policy towards scientists, as observed earlier, is quite restraining. In the Netherlands, by June 2007, the work permit requirement for research scientists and their families was removed and, recently, the fees for family reunification, study and scientific research has been lowered (OECD 2014). The less-skilled temporary migration is also facilitated in Netherlands by making changes in the work permit procedures introduced in 2006, which, for instance, removed the obligatory five-week period for reporting the job vacancies (OECD 2008). Since immigration has significantly contributed to employment growth in Germany, a working group, ‘Harnessing the Foreign Workforce Potential and Fostering a Welcoming Culture’, was set up to attract qualified foreign workers to Germany and to assist their integration into the German labour market and society. Foreign family members can have unrestricted access to the German labour market, as per the ‘Act on Improving the Rights of Persons Entitled to International Protection and the Rights of Foreign Workers’ that entered into force in September 2013 (OECD 2014). The Employment Ordinance (Beschäftigungsverordnung), which came into effect in July 2013, permit employers to recruit third-country nationals with university degree or formal vocational training abroad, in certain occupation groups where there is lack of qualified personnel. For university graduates, the Federal Employment Agency waives the labour market test and, at times, approval from the agency may also be waived. This is in stark contrast to the situation in the US, where H1B workers, whose minimum qualification is a bachelor’s degree, are subject to various labour condition requirements, to curb the potential entry of medium skilled under this visa. Hence, unequivocally, the US is quite restrictive to labour migrants at all skill levels.

In lieu of conclusion Despite being a traditional settlement country and a major destination for international labour migrants, the US appears restricted as well as trade discriminatory with respect to migrant workers. Most other OECD members follow relatively favourable policies towards temporary workers, especially the highly skilled. Countries like Canada are seen to have a liberal policy posture, even in the case of the less skilled. A careful analysis of the admission and stay conditions in the US reveals that the country follows a biased policy towards different entry categories based on skill and nationality of the alien. Such differentials are

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reflected in various provisions of temporary visas, namely, entry procedures, visa caps, visa fees, stay limits, family unification provisions and the like. Indeed, the economic and strategic considerations have historically been instrumental in determining the migration flows into the US. The current trends also reveal interest group dynamics in the form of capitalist/commercial interests, foreign policy considerations and domestic pressure groups like labour unions, playing significant roles in shaping the labour migration policies of the US. Thus, while empirical studies (e.g. Aguiar and Walmsley 2009) estimate strong welfare/efficiency gains from increased labour mobility, the unwillingness of high-income countries like the US to receive more immigrants, especially the less skilled, from developing countries like India, is because of the perception that gains from immigration are not momentous when compared with the associated political and fiscal costs. Unless they receive reciprocal advantages like access to key areas of investment interest in developing countries, no more labour will be admitted by these countries. In such a context, preferential or bilateral arrangements could themselves be the immediate way forward, under which labour mobility would be mutually beneficial as also more accountable. For such labour negotiations to become effectual, it is also necessary that the source and destination countries be equally proactive in minimizing the related negative consequences and maximizing the potential benefits, for example the former providing appropriate training to migrant labour and the latter ensuring their safe and timely return.

Acknowledgements This chapter is based on the doctoral research undertaken by the author at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, affiliated to Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. I am grateful to my supervisor, Prof. K. N. Harilal, whose insightful comments helped the successful completion of the work.

Notes 1 This fall is largely driven by reduced inflows to Spain and Italy, where the economic conditions continued to remain unfavourable. 2 However, a good proportion of temporary labour migration occurs among the OECD countries themselves, which is a pertinent point to notice. For instance, almost three-quarters of German immigrants arrive from other EU countries, which makes this country the second notable destination in the OECD after the US.

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3 Since the OECD statistics appear to cover only some prominent temporary entry categories applicable to all the OECD countries, this data would amount to underestimation, especially in the case of US which has more detailed categories of temporary admission. 4 As Deardorff and Michalowski (2003) note, in Canada, temporary migrants constituted a larger share of foreign-born population and total population (3.5 per cent and 0.7 per cent, respectively), as compared to the US (2.5 per cent and 0.3 per cent, respectively). 5 China, with over half a million emigrants in 2012, sends the largest number of migrants to the OECD countries (i.e. almost 10 per cent of all migrant flows to the OECD). 6 The anti-Chinese movement led to restrictive laws in California and other Western states in the 1860s and 1870s. In 1875, the Congress passed the first restriction, which was on the Chinese women coming for prostitution and on convicts. In 1885, the Congress approved the Foran Act, which prohibited the entry of contract labourers. 7 Over one million immigrants arrived per annum, between 1905 and 1907, in 1910 and in 1913–1914, which equaled more than 1 per cent of the US population. Permanent immigration was the main source of foreign labour in US up to the mid-1920s. It was between 1942 and 1964 that Mexican migrant workers started to arrive on a large scale, under the Bracero Program, to meet wartime labour shortages. 8 Faced with economic recessions, the Congress passed the national origins quota acts of 1921 and 1924, which sharply curtailed immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe and stopped Asian immigration. With the Great Depression in 1929, the previously temporary national origins quota system was made permanent. 9 For instance, in 1943, the Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act and replaced it with a small quota. Moreover, during 1917–1941, foreign policy considerations often delayed restrictions on immigration from the Western Hemisphere (mainly Mexico). Western Hemisphere countries continued to be exempted from quota restrictions until 1965, and it was with the opposition of President Ford that Congress finally set a quota of 20,000 on Mexican immigration in 1976. 10 The policies established under the 1965 Act are still largely in place, despite having been modified at times. 11 The Immigration Act of 1990 (effective 1992) increased the number of visas available to immigrants with required skills, from 54,000 to 140,000 annually, and created five major preference categories. The first priority was given for foreigners with extraordinary ability, outstanding professors and researchers and multinational executives and managers (cap is 40,040 per year), then came professionals with advanced degrees or persons of exceptional ability (40,040 plus visas not used in higher preferences), skilled and other workers (40,040 plus visas not used in higher preferences, but with an annual limit of 10,000 visas for unskilled workers), special immigrants (9,940, with a maximum of 5,000 religious workers), and finally, employment creation workers (9,940). The cap for all categories covers family members, too (Tullao and Cortez 2006). 12 In 2006, permanent immigration was the highest since 1991.

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13 Temporary H1B visas can be adjusted to permanent resident status, which shows the long-term demand for such services. As noticed by Tullao and Cortez (2006), following the Immigration Act of 1990, almost half of H1B visa holders adjusted to permanent residency. 14 However, the total number of H1B visas issued each fiscal year is far higher than the annual quota. This is because the quota applies only to initial H1B visas, not to visa extensions/renewals. Moreover, certain categories like educational and non-profit research organizations, the initial 20,000 applicants with a US master’s degree or higher and the exchange visitors currently in the US under J1 visa are exempt from the H1B cap. 15 The Employ American Workers Act (EAWA), part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, barred the companies receiving stimulus funding from replacing US workers with temporary skilled foreign workers on H1B visas. 16 A temporary visa category under which an international firm or corporation can send its employees, who have been working for the firm for at least one continuous year out of the last three, to the US temporarily in order to work for the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate, in a capacity that is primarily managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge. 17 The NASSCOM (National Association of Software and Service Companies) president criticized this reform saying that its provisions are targeting Indian firms, restricting their ability to compete in the US market, and the legislation is against the principle of free trade (The Hindu 2009b). 18 As mentioned in the press release, the bill will have an additional cost implication of more than $200 million annually. 19 The US and European service industries also push for a more liberal policy on movement of service suppliers, especially in hotel and restaurant, software, insurance, and financial industries (Haque 2001). As the software giant Microsoft notes, the current H1B visa system, with a numerical limit of 65,000 set by Congress in 1990s, is greatly disruptive to the business planning and operations of US industries. In 2013, 40,000 additional vacancies could not be filled through the H1B lottery, since the cap was reached in the first week itself (The Hindu 2013a). 20 Such tests are meant not only to restrict the entry of the less skilled, who become a fiscal burden for the destination country by accessing public services without paying sufficient taxes, but also to protect the native less skilled labour. See note 26 for details on labour market tests. 21 Inclusion of religious workers within the immigrant category of EB4 expired in September 2009. 22 Generally, a foreign citizen must obtain a ‘nonimmigrant’ visa for temporary stay or an ‘immigrant’ visa for permanent residence in US. 23 The immigration reforms put forward a number of provisions like an increase in H1B visas, increasing the number of permanent resident visas to technology graduates and legalization of the undocumented (www. workpermit.com/immigration-video.htm, accessed 7 February 2014). See www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2013/12/09/80652/ making-sense-of-the-senate-and-houses-visions-of-immigration-reform/ (accessed 10 February 2014) for a detailed discussion on various proposals under the comprehensive immigration reforms.

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24 For international students, the US continues to be the major global destination, with India (15 per cent), China (12 per cent) and South Korea (11 per cent) as the major source countries (The Hindu 2011c). 25 Analysis by the Brookings Institution shows that around 30 per cent of the H1B employees in 2010 were former students at American universities. As per the USCIS data, more than 150,000 of them applied for green cards (permanent residence) since 2010 and the applicants are largely (nearly one-third) Indians (The Hindu 2013c). 26 Certifications from DOL are of different forms. For H1B nonimmigrants, a Labour Condition Application (LCA) and for H2A and H2B nonimmigrants, an Application for Alien Employment Certification must be filed in accordance with DOL instructions. The LCA (Form ETA 9035 or ETA 9035E) includes several attestations with regard to the employer’s responsibilities, like wages, working conditions and benefits to be provided to H1B nonimmigrants. Application for Alien Employment Certification (Form ETA 750) has to be filed at least 45 days before the workers are required and the stipulations are that there are not sufficient US workers who are able, willing, qualified and available for the employment offered to the alien; and that the wages and working conditions of similarly employed US workers will not get adversely affected (USCIS 2006). 27 The border crossing card (BCC) or ‘laser visa’ is a machine-readable card with a biometric indicator-like fingerprint, issued to the Mexican nationals. The BCC is valid for ten years and the eligibility requirements are the same as those for a B1/B2 visa (temporary visitor for business or pleasure) (Monger and Barr 2010). However, the Mexican nationals with a BCC are not recorded as nonimmigrants, since they are generally exempt from completing Form I-94, based on which the data on nonimmigrant admission and departure are collected. 28 By ‘preferential’ visa categories, the article implies those related to FTAs, visa waiver programs, reciprocal exchange programs or some other form of specialized arrangement. Irrespective of the exact form of the bilateral relationship, it is intended to highlight that US provides preferential access for migrants from certain countries, which tend to be partners in some bilateral/regional arrangements with US. For instance, while E1 and E2 visas are issued under the provisions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between US and the foreign state, TN visa is available only for the members of NAFTA. 29 www.migration.wa.gov.au/VisaEntry/Pages/VisaEntryAndImmigration. aspx (accessed 3 February 2014). 30 www.osce.org/eea/19251 (accessed 4 February 2014). 31 Permanent resident status is popularly known as ‘green card’ in US. 32 While visas permit entry into a foreign country, work permits set out the conditions of work. In some countries, both visas and work permits exist, whereas in countries like US, visa performs both these functions (IOM/ World bank/WTO 2004). 33 Full work permits are granted only to highly skilled immigrants like those working in a managerial position (i.e. those generally with high-level work experience and a university degree). 34 There are cases of human trafficking reported in US (The Hindu 2011a, 2011d). As cited, contract workers engaged by global corporations are

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put to forced labour and debt bondage in US. Seasonal workers under the H2B guest worker scheme (500 workers from India) are trafficked into US ‘with dishonest assurances of becoming lawful permanent residents and subjected to squalid living conditions, fraudulent payment practices, and threats of serious harm upon their arrival’. 35 As evident from the USCIS website, even the categories of students and trainees, not meant for employment in US, are required to file income tax return. Thus, it is not just wages, but any source of income like tips and scholarships are subject to tax in US (www.irs.gov/Individuals/InternationalTaxpayers/Taxation-of-Nonresident-Aliens, accessed 5 February 2014).

References Aguiar, A. and T. L. Walmsley. 2009. ‘Economic Analysis of U.S. Immigration Reforms’, selected paper for Agricultural & Applied Economics Association’s 2009 AAEA & ACCI Joint Annual Meeting, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 26–28 July. Aiken, L. H. and R. Cheung. 2008. ‘Nurse Workforce Challenges in the United States: Implications for Policy’, OECD Health Working Paper No 35, October. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Dawson, L. R. 2013. ‘Labour mobility and the WTO: The Limits of GATS Mode 4’, International Migration, 51(1): 1–23. Deardorff, K. and M. Michalowski. 2003. ‘North American Mobility: Regional Synergies in Collecting Migration Statistics’, Working Paper No 11, April. Geneva: Joint ECE-EUROSTAT Work Session on Migration Statistics Organized in Co-Operation with the UN Statistics Division. Department of Commerce. 2010. ‘Anand Sharma Raises Issue of H1B & L Visa with USTR’, WTO Press Release, 10 August. New Delhi: Government of India. EMN (European Migration Network). 2013. ‘Attracting Highly Qualified and Qualified Third-Country Nationals to France: Good Practices and Lessons Learnt’. First Focussed Study 2013, French Contact Point of the European Migration Network, July. Haque, M. S. 2001. ‘Quest for an Implementation Mechanism for Movement of Service Providers’, T.R.A.D.E. Occasional Paper No 7, July. Geneva: South Centre. The Hindu. 2008. ‘EU Proposes “Blue Card” for Third World Professionals’, 3 March. The Hindu. 2009a. ‘H-1B Visa Provisions Target Indian IT Companies’, 25 April. The Hindu. 2009b. ‘U.S. Tightens H-1B Visa Norms’, 11 May. The Hindu. 2010. ‘U.S. H-1B Visa Counter Opens’, 2 April. The Hindu. 2011a. ‘U.S. L1 Visa Rejections at 40%’, 19 November. The Hindu. 2011b. ‘India Asks U.S. to Relax Visa Regime for Scientists’, 30 July. The Hindu. 2011c. ‘More Indians Apply for Courses in U.S.’, 17 April. The Hindu. 2011d. ‘Migrant Workers in U.S. Exploited, Says Union Leader’, 10 November.

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The Hindu. 2012. ‘India Takes U.S. to WTO on Visa Fees’, 11 April. The Hindu. 2013a. ‘Current H-1B Visa System Incredibly Disruptive: Microsoft’, 24 April. The Hindu . 2013b. ‘U.S. May Tighten L-1 Visa Rules to Curb Fraud’, 11 September. The Hindu. 2013c. ‘Waiting for Green Light on Green Cards’, 25 May. The Hindu. 2013d. ‘Canada Looking for South Indian Migrants’, 9 January. IMSED (International Migration, Settlement & Employment Dynamics) Research. 2010. Migration Trends and Outlook 2009/2010. Wellington: New Zealand Department of Labour. IOM/World Bank/WTO. 2004. ‘Background Paper’, prepared for Trade and Migration Seminar, Geneva. 4–5 October. Kahanec, M. and K. F. Zimmermann. 2011. ‘High-Skilled Immigration Policy in Europe’, DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No 1096, January. Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. Kukoc, K. 2011. ‘Integrity and Other Challenges in a Sustainable Migration Program and Australia’s Skill Needs’, presented at 5th Annual CPD Immigration Law Conference organized by Department of Immigration and Citizenship of Australian Government, Melbourne. 11 March. The Law Library of Congress. 2013. ‘Guest Worker Programs’. Global Legal Research Center, February. www.loc.gov/law/help/guestworker/2013008925%20FINAL091013.pdf (accessed 11 February 2014). Meyers, E. 2004. International Immigration Policy: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Monger, R. and M. Barr. 2010. Nonimmigrant Admissions to the United States: 2009, Annual Flow Report. Washington, DC: Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Mukherjee, A. and T. M. Goyal. 2013. ‘Examining Mode 4 Commitments in India and the EU’s Agreements: Implications for the India-EU BTIA’, Working Paper No 396, February. Bangalore: Indian Institute of Management. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development). Various Years. International Migration Outlook, SOPEMI. Paris: OECD Publishing. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development). 2015. ‘Is US Still Land of Opportunities for Migrants’, Migration Policy Debate No 5, August. Paris: OECD Publishing. Tullao, T. S., Jr. and M. A. A. Cortez. 2006. ‘Issues and Prospects on the Movement of Natural Persons and Human Capital Development in the PhilippineAmerican Economic Relations’, PIDS Discussion Paper Series No 2006–07, February. Manila: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. USCIS (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services). 2006. ‘Temporary Migration to the United States: Nonimmigrant Admissions under U.S. Immigration Law’, U.S. Immigration Report Series Volume 2, January. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

21 Cinema and migration Nurses and patriarchy H. Arokkiaraj and Rakesh S.

Take Off is a Malayalam thriller movie inspired by the real ordeal of 46 Indian nurses who were stranded in Tikrit, Iraq, during the country’s civil war in 2014. Though the central theme of the movie is the rescue efforts taken by the Indian authorities, it excels because of its focus on multiple dimensions. The gargantuan project initially brings out the hardships undergone by many aspiring nurses from Kerala in their personal and professional spheres, and breaks the silence that surrounds their life as migrant women.

Non-Resident Keralites (NRKs) in Malayalam movies From 1980s, Malayalam films have continuously focused on the lives and experiences of the Malayali males migrating to and from the Gulf countries. Although international migration from Kerala is a male phenomenon, female migrants are not negligible. Many Malayalam movies such as Varavellppu, Perumazhakalam, Arabhikatha, Maqrib, Pathemaari, Mohavalayam and so forth have tried to look at the lives of expats through different lenses, but very few movies have looked at the gendered aspects. In 2011, a female-centric film, Gaddama, plugged the gap and portrayed the life of a woman from Kerala who migrated to a Gulf country to work as a domestic worker. Take Off carries this journey forward by depicting the lives of many aspiring migrant nurses from Kerala by plotting a real rescue incident that happened in Iraq during 2014.

Take Off lensing the agony of Malayali nurses Sameera (Parvathy Thiruvoth), the female protagonist, is close to reality because the majority of the nurses migrating from Kerala to foreign countries can easily relate to her in numerous ways. Apart

Cinema and migration

339

from capturing the agonizing experience of captive nurses, this movie touched the very core issues faced by nurses migrating from Kerala to foreign countries. First, the financial issue faced by Sameera to take up a job in Iraq is a hurdle encountered by many aspiring nurses migrating from Kerala. Second, the nursing job abroad is considered a high earning profession especially among Malayalees, so families take loans and admit their children in private nursing colleges. Sadly, nursing students after college education are financially pressurized to pay off their debts incurred by their family for education. In the book Moving With the Times: Gender Status and Migration of Nurses in India, Sreelekha Nair writes, in a state like Kerala, the high rate of educated unemployment and the nursing profession being considered an instrument of upward mobility by the lower middle class and poor have resulted in a significant number of women joining the nursing profession. For most of them, the choice of nursing is a mere move towards migration, and these are depicted through several scenes in the movie. In one of those scenes, wherein the International Red Cross agency begins to evacuate the stranded nurses from the hospital, the nurses refer to their financial commitments back home and express their unwillingness to move from Iraq until they get their outstanding salary from the hospital. In real life, this is the hard reality faced by nurses working abroad. Sameera’s first meeting with the Indian Ambassador Manoj (Fahadh Fazil) is another scene where the protagonist painfully exposes the contemporary problems faced by nurses in Kerala. She cites issues such as poor working conditions, low professional status, indecent remuneration, stigmatization of nursing and so forth, which force nurses from Kerala to move abroad. In this movie, there are frequent references to high salary, better working conditions and importantly the respect the nurses get for their work abroad.

Stained-glass ceiling in Muslim community Shirin Ebadi, the first Nobel Prize for Peace winner from the Islamic world, quotes ‘Women are the victims of this patriarchal culture, but they are also its carriers. Let us keep in mind that every oppressive man was raised in the confines of his mother’s home’ (2016: 189). Through the fictional Muslim character of Sameera, the film tries to unthread the agonies of a woman caught up in a cobweb of personal, professional and societal pressures. One will find many references to the patriarchal power structure in the movie. In one of the scenes, Sameera says: ‘How long will I be afraid? Growing up I was scared of my father, then my husband, and now my son’.

340

H. Arokkiaraj and Rakesh S.

Uzma Naheed, a member of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), has pointed out that Muslim women in India are neither decision makers nor opinion givers. She further added that men in the Muslim community are the main reason for Muslim women’s miserable condition. The filmmaker has expertly fictionalized a character that teases the orthodox class in Muslim community which restricts women and at the same time, many Muslim characters including her second husband (Shaheed) in the movie, which becomes an answer to the conventional stereotyping of Muslims. On one hand, we see Asif Ali and his family overpowering Sameera, and on the other hand Shaheed giving space to Sameera to fulfil her desire. Therefore, primarily making women aware of their liberty and rights is important than moving towards their empowerment. From a traditional Muslim family, divorcee Sameera marries Shaheed (Kunchacko Boban), the one she finds suitable to accompany her while going to Iraq. Decisions to marry Shaheed and to work abroad are the decisions made by Sameera to uplift her family. Although there are some compulsions and selfishness in marrying Shaheed, on the larger part liberal Sameera entirely makes this decision to be more progressive in life and to fulfil her family commitments.

Insights from Take Off Take Off is not only a pioneering attempt at bringing forth the multiple issues faced by Kerala nurses but also an attempt at deconstructing the image of Malayali nurses working in foreign countries. The movie urges us to think about a section of women in our society who negotiate the most daunting socio-economic structures on both the personal and professional level. It forces us to think about those nurses who struggle to make a livelihood in tough circumstances in foreign countries.

References Davis, Anita Price and Marla J. Selvidge (2016) Women Nobel Peace Prize Winners, North Carolina: McFarland & Co Inc. Ebadi, S. (2016). 2003-A New Prophetic Voice in Iran. In A. P. Davis, & M. J. Selvidge, Women Nobel Peace Prize Winners (pp. 182–191). North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc. Nair, Sreelekha (2012) Moving with the times: Gender, Status and Migration of nurses in India, New Delhi: Routledge. TwoCircles, Mainstream News of the Marginalized (25 June 2009) viewed on 5 April 2017, http://twocircles.net/2009jun24/muslim_women_india_are_ miserable_condition_uzma_naheed.html.

Index

Page numbers in italic indicate a figure. Page numbers in bold indicate a table. AAPSU see All Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union (AAPSU) Above Poverty Line (APL) families 138, 139, 141–2 access to public services, for migrants in Bengaluru 182, 182–3, 183 Act on Improving the Rights of Persons Entitled to International Protection and the Rights of Foreign Workers 328 ADC see Autonomous District Council (ADC) Adivasi 150 AFSPA see Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) agricultural labourers 162; in Northeast 158–9 agricultural sector, smart cities and 110–11 agriculture: in Cooch Behar 231–2 Ahmad, N. 177 Ahmedabad: infrastructure projects 120; SRD project 120–2; transformations 120 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) 121 Ahmedabad Shaher Ane Riverfront Jhupaddpatti Samiti 128 Aiken, L. H. 323 AIMPLB see All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) Akter, S. 204, 207 Ali, Z. 208

All Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union (AAPSU) 156 All Assam Students’ Union 149 All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) 337 All-India Trinamool Congress Party (TMC) 30, 35–8 All India Union of Forest Working People 15 All Naga Students’ Association Manipur 154 Alonso, W. 183 Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh 188–90 AMC see Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) AMRUT see Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Transformation (AMRUT) Anantapur, Andhra Pradesh 197–200; bore wells 198; cultivation 197–8; farmers migrating from 198–9 Andhra Pradesh: indigenous rights in 14; maistries 172; nuclear power plant 192; out-migrants from Tamil Nadu 251; transit labour in 188–201 Anglo-Indian diaspora 260 animal husbandry 52 apartments, allocation of 17 APL see Above Poverty Line (APL) families Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) 147, 157 arrests 15

342

Index

Article 21 of the Constitution 156 Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 235 Arunachal Pradesh: AAPSU 156–7; Chakma-Hajong resettlement 155–7; Inner Line Permits (ILP) 156 Asian Development Bank 4 Assam: Assamese speakers 149; Bengali-speaking Muslims 149; Bodo-Muslim conflict 150, 151–2; census of 1951 149; direct migrants in 149; identity threat 149; Permanent Settlement 1793 150; population growth 148–9 Assamese (language) 149 Assamese-Bihari conflict 148 Assam Movement (1979–1985) 148–9 Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Transformation (AMRUT) 100 Australia: average monthly minimum wage 264; immigrant population in 318; Indian students migration to 262; Jat Sikh communities 309; Keralites migration to 301; labour migrant inflows 317; temporary migration in 324; temporary worker schemes 324 Austria: research scientists in 328 authorities: opponents of projects and 15 Autonomous District Council (ADC) 153 Azim Premji University Research Grants Foundation 176, 179 Baishnabghata-Patuli township 165 Balagopal, K. 190 Banerjee, Kalyan 37 Banerjee, Mamata 30, 32–5, 37 Bangladesh 261 Bangladeshi Muslims (immigrants) 149; as illegal immigrants 158 Bardhaman district of West Bengal 164 Basic Establishment Census (1996) 179 basic services, to displaced population 125–6

Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) Scheme 122 Bawana resettlement site 21 Beijing, China 178 Belgium: market access 327; work permits 327 Bengali-tribal conflict in Tripura 152–3 Bengaluru, economic migrants in 180–6; access to public services for 182, 182–3, 183; average income 181; determinants of central/peripheral location 183–5, 184; education levels 181, 181–2; location and differences 181–3; occupational distribution 182; overview 176–7; profile of 180–1 Benin City, Nigeria 177 Beraberi Gram Panchayat, Singur 32 Berkoz, L. 178 Bhadra, Sujato 33 Bhaduri, Amit 31 Bhagat, R. B. 213, 218 Bhagirathi River 50 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 107, 128 Bhattacharjee, Buddhadeb 33, 35 Bhattacharya, Rajesh 213 Bhilangana River 50 Bhumi Uchchhed Pratirodh Committee 40 bias, against women 57–60 biomass 51–2 birth rate, Tamil Nadu 248 blue card, EU 325–6 Board of Approvals Committee of the Ministry of Commerce 3 Boban, Kunchacko 337 Bodoland, conflicts in 151–2 Bodo Liberation Tigers 151 Bodo-Muslim conflict 150–2 Bodo Territorial Administrative Districts (BTAD) 148 border crossing card (BCC) 323 bourgeois environmentalism 119 Brahmini steel 193 brain drain 265–6 Breman, Jan 162, 164, 173, 197 brick kilns 162–3; annual income of average family 218; Bihari

Index migrants in 169–70; exploitative practices in 172; geographical locations and work in 172; living and working conditions 207; surplus value exploitation 173; women migrant labourers in 172–3; working hours 207 British Common Law 321 BSUP see Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) Scheme BTAD see Bodo Territorial Administrative Districts (BTAD) Calcutta High Court: on Singur land 37–8 Canada: choice of emigration to 298; increase in emigration to 298; Jat Sikh communities within 309; labour migrant inflows 317; since economic crisis of 2008 325; student migration to 262; temporary foreign worker programs 325; temporary migration in 324–5 Canada Experience Class 325 capitalism: labour migration and 200–1; nineteenth-century 2 capital-labour dynamics 276–83; see also gold jewellery-making industry CBD see central business districts (CBD) CBO see community-based organizations (CBO) CDP see City Development Plan (CDP) census of 1951 149 central business districts (CBD) 109 Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT) 122 CEPT see Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT) Cernea, Michael 47, 119–20, 134–5 Chakma-Hajong resettlement 155–7 challenges, in developing smart cities 110–12; addressing 112–13 Chandil dam, Jharkhand 13, 18, 22 Chaudhury, M. K. 37 Chennai, Tamil Nadu 247 Cheung, R. 323

343

China 4–5, 264 Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) 155–6 CHT see Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) cinema, and migration 335–7 City Development Plan (CDP) 100 civil society, in resettlement 130–1 Cochin Port Trust 137, 139–40 commercial borrowing from international banks 4 Common Property Resources (CPR) 52 Commonwealth Games (2010) 10–11, 22–3, 120 communal colour to immigration, in Northeast 150–2, 158 Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) 29; see also Left Front community-based organizations (CBO) 128 community disintegration, evictions result in 15–16 community relations 240 community resistance, as antigovernment resistance 15 compensation 9; insufficient, for home 16–17; Kochi infrastructure development 137–40; social uses of 82–7, 85; Tehri dam resettlement 57–60; as welfare 13 conflicts, in Northeast 147–59; see also Northeast, conflicts in Congress Party 128 Constitutional Amendment (74th) 132 Constitution of India, right to life 131 Cooch Behar, West Bengal: agrarian economy 231–2; border rescaling and fencing 233–4; class of workers and non-workers 230, 231; employment opportunities 231; gender-based income 230; landholdings distribution in 232–3, 233; land utilization in 232; people migrating with family from 236; population breakdown is 230; religious-cultural norms 230, 238; size of family 232–3; urban neighbourhoods 234

344

Index

corporations: land acquisition/grab by 2–3; Left and 3–4 corruption: in land acquisition/grab 11; in resettlement 58 courts 10 Cui, C. 179 cultural aspects of temporary migration 268–9 Dainik Asom 149 Dalits 303–15; Keralan overseas migration and 306–7; overseas Keralan migration 311–13; overseas Punjabi migration 308–11; overview 303–4; Punjabi transnationalism and 304–5 data: on IDP 22–3 death rate, Tamil Nadu 248 Deb, K. 109 debt-dependent (non-)development 4 democratic participation mechanisms, SRD project and 127 democratization of public space 130 demography of Tamil Nadu 247–8 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 322 depeasantization 71, 73, 84; resistance to 87 Deshingkar, P. 204, 207 development: displacement and 46–7; modern 46; as strategy 46; traditional model of 46 Devi, Maina 52 Devi, Mana 55 Devi, Rukma 59 Dhiwar 71, 75–6, 87 DHS see Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Dimasa-Hmar conflict in Dima Hasao, Assam 151 Directive Principles of State Policy 131 displacement, caused by development 46–7; background to 7–8; community disintegration 15–16; defining 98–100; impoverishment risk 120; indigenous communities and 13–15; post-independence 64; power imbalance after 12–13; World Bank on 119–20

District Administration of Anantapur 197 D Matsalesam village, Srikakulam 195–6 Doaba, Punjab 304–5, 307–8, 314 Dokmeci, V. 178 domestic production of gold 277 domestic work and Muslim women 236–7 dowry 21 Dumbur dam on Gumti River 152–3 Dutch-door era, of US immigration policy 320 East Bengal 150 East Punjab see Punjab Ebadi, Shirin 336 economic crisis of 2008 317 economic growth 1–2 economic impact of temporary migration 262–4 economic liberalization 2 economic livelihood, of displaced population 124 economic migrants 176–86; see also Bengaluru, economic migrants in Economic Weaker Society (EWS) scheme 123 education, average household expenditure on 200 Emergency Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, US 321 emigrants: Kerala 291–7; Tamil Nadu 250–1 emigration 259–60; pre-colonial 260; remittances and 264–5; semiskilled workers 260; skilled work force 159; to the West 260 employment, Tamil Nadu 254 Employment Ordinance, Germany 328 encroachment 241 English 260 Environmental Planning Collaborative (EPC) 121–2 EPC see Environmental Planning Collaborative (EPC) Escobar, A. 46 essential needs 200

Index EURA-NET Project (2016) 258 European Migration Network (2015) 270 European Union (EU): blue card 325–6; fiscal incentives to foreign professionals 327–8; labour migration policies 325–8; Schengen Visa (SV) 326; Single Permit 326 evictions: community disintegration and 15–16; nonadherence of international standards for 11–12; police presence in 11–12; public purpose of 10; violence during 12 fate of IDP 22 Fazil, Fahadh 336 Federal Employment Agency, Germany 328 Feindt, W. 178 food security, SRD project and 126–7 footloose labourers 162 forced migrants, in West Bengal 162–74 forced migration: defined 235; human rights and 235 France: emigration to 260; labour migration policy 327–8; student migration 262; tax exemptions to foreigners’ assignment in 327–8 Gaddama (movie) 335 Ganeshnagar, Ahmedabad 23 Ganga 52 Gangavaram port 194 Garwhal region 54 GCC see Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) GEC see Gujarat Ecology Commission (GEC) Geertman, S. 179 gender: as category 48–9; international conventions and 49; in local context of Uttaranchal 49; migration and 228–42 gender-based income, in Cooch Behar 230 gender bias, in Tehri dam resettlement policy 57–60

345

gendered values and practices 48 gender roles, Muslim women 239 gender segregation of labour market 238 gentrification 10; urban development processes and 107–9 Germany: employment growth in 328; Employment Ordinance 328; migration costs to 254; student migration to 262 GIDA see Goshree Islands Development Authority (GIDA) globalization 1–2 global urban strategy 119 gold, domestic production of 277 gold jewellery-making industry: domestic production of gold 277; empirical data 279; Kerala’s position in India 278; migrants in 279, 279–83; overview 276; policy changes 276–8; significance 276–8 Goshree bridges, construction of 136–7; compensation to affected families 137–9 Goshree Evictees Action Council 138 Goshree Islands Development Authority (GIDA) 135, 136–9 government: counter-insurgency operations 14; exploiting land acquisition process 9–11; missions and programmes for development 100 gram sabhas 14–15 Grant Thornton India Report (2016) 264 greenfield development, for smart cities 103, 111 Grier, Eunice 99 Grier, George 99 Guerin, Isabelle 173–4, 201 Guha Ray, Siddhartha 33 Gujarat: mukadams 164; Nano plant 35; urban redevelopment and displacement in 117–32 Gujarat Ecology Commission (GEC) 122 Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) 298

346

Index

Gulf countries/region 247; emigrants from Tamil Nadu 250; Indian migration to 286 Gulf Migration Study (GMS 2001) 287

human rights 235 Human Rights Commission (HRC) 58 human settlement, sustainability of 132

H1B visa programs, US 320, 328; demand for 321, 327; India and 321–2; labour certification process for 323; reforms in 321 H1C visa programs, US 322 H2A visa programs, US 322 H2B visa programs, US 322; labour certification process for 323; stay limits 324 Hajongs see Chakma-Hajong resettlement Harnessing the Foreign Workforce Potential and Fostering a Welcoming Culture 328 health care, average household expenditure on 200 health status, of displaced population 124–5 Heritage City Development and Augmentation Yojana (HRIDAY) 100 Himachal Pradesh 15 Hindu-Muslim division 150 Hindustan Zinc 193 HLRN see Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN) Hooghly River Bridge Commissioners (HRBC) 39 Hooimeijer, P. 179 Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN) 23 housing conditions of IDP 6, 16–18; apartment allocation 17; insufficient funds 16–17; in rural areas 18; in urban areas 17–18 Hrangkhwal, Bijoy 153 HRBC see Hooghly River Bridge Commissioners (HRBC) HRIDAY see Heritage City Development and Augmentation Yojana (HRIDAY) Human Development Index (2011) 246

IDMC see Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) ILP see Inner Line Permits (ILP) IMF see International Monetary Fund (IMF) immigration: communal colour in Northeast 150–2, 158; in Tamil Nadu 249; temporary migration 261; trend 261 imperialism 260 impoverishment risk and reconstruction model 47, 120, 134–5 indentured labour, in tea gardens of Assam 150–1 Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) 176, 179 indigenous rights, land acquisitions and 13–15 Inner Line Permits (ILP) 156 insecurity, women and 56–7 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 7, 11, 107 internally displaced persons (IDP): access to livelihoods 6; defending rights of affected people 15; fate and whereabouts of 22; housing conditions 6, 16–18; indigenous 14; nationwide data on 22–3; poverty and vulnerability 18–20; resettlement and 15–16 International Labour Organization 228 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 4 Inter-State Migrant Workmen 239 Interstate Migrant Workmen Act 171 interstate migration, in Tamil Nadu 248–9 intra-company transferees 324 Ireland: Keralites migration to 301; migration costs to 254; student migration to 262

Index Islamic invasions 259–60 IT professionals 165 Jai-Hind camp, in Delhi see Muslim women, migrating from Cooch Behar to Delhi Janjgir-Champa district of Chhattisgarh 163 Japan: labour migrant inflows 317 Jat Sikhs: transnational Punjabi migration and 305 Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) 100, 110, 117 jewellery business 277; see also gold jewellery-making industry JNNURM see Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) Joint Action Committee (JAC) 155 joint family system 77, 298 Junagadh, Gujarat 195 jute mills 165 Kalam, A.P.J. Abdul 35 Kalamukku, compensation granted to evicted families from 139–40 Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu 247 karabuja (muskmelon) 198 Karachi, Pakistan 177–8 Karbi-Dimasa conflict of 2005 148 Karbi-Kuki conflict in Karbi Anglong, Assam 151 Karnataka, out-migrants from Tamil Nadu 251 Katchi Abadis 177 KBK (Kalahandi, Bolangir and Koraput) districts, Western Odisha 205–6; RTE norm compliance across 209, 210 Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal 38 Kerala: gold jewellery-making indusrty 278–83; out-migrants from Tamil Nadu 251; overseas Dalit migration 311–13; overseas migration and Dalits 306–7; remittances to 252 Kerala Migration Survey (KMS): estimated emigrants (1998–2013) 291–3, 292; March-November 1998 286–7; in the year 2003

347

287–8; in the year 2007 288; in the year 2008 288; in the year 2011 288; in the year 2013 289 Kerala Migration Survey (KMS 2016) 289–91; change in household types 297–8, 298; countries of destination 298–9, 299; educational qualification of emigrants 296, 296; estimated emigrants 293, 293–4, 294–5; response rate for 289, 290; sample households in 289, 290; sampling errors 291; socio-economic profile of emigrants 296–7, 297 Keshri, K. 213, 218 khatadars 206 Kiran, Chand 179 KMC see Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) KMDA see Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (KMDA) knowledge gap 129–30 Kochi infrastructure development 134, 136–7; capital investments in 134; differential compensation to evicted families 137–40; Goshree bridges construction 136–7; Petronet LNG terminal 137; vulnerability of displaced groups 140–3 Kohn, Bernard 121 Kokborok (language) 153 Kokoch, Jharkhand 13, 18–19 Kokrajhar 151–2 Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (KMDA) 39, 165 Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) 39 Komarada thermal plant 191 Kovvada nuclear power plant project 192 Krishi Jami Raksha Committee (KJRC) 31–4, 36, 38 Krishi Jomi Jibon Jibika Raksha Committee 38 Kuki, in Manipur 154–5 Kunbi caste 71, 75–6, 78–9, 87–8 Kundu, A. 176, 179 L1 visa programs, US 321; rejection rate of 322

348

Index

LAA see Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (LAA) labour market: gender segregation of 238; migration affecting 263 Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) 325 Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Act (2013) 132 Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (LAA) 7, 137 land acquisition/grab 2–3; corruption 11; government exploiting process of 9–11; inaccurate land categorization 10; indigenous rights and 13–15; SEZ and 10–11; trade secret 3 landholdings: distribution in Cooch Behar 232–3, 233; KBK districts 216, 218 land utilization, in Cooch Behar 232 LCP see live-in caregiver program (LCP) Left Front 3–4, 8, 29–32, 35–7, 39–40 live-in caregiver program (LCP) 325 LMIA see Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) Lodhi 76, 87–8 low-income residents, urban development and 109 Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh 106–7 Mahar 75, 87, 90 Maharashtra: out-migrants from Tamil Nadu 251 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) 163, 205, 208; annual income from 219; demand for work 208, 209; distress-induced migration and 208; objective of 208, 218; poor coverage of 219; workdays 213, 215–16 maistries 172 Malayalam movies: non-resident Keralites in 335 Mali 87 Malik, Tapasi 34 Malipuram, Kerala 138, 141–2, 144

Mallideval village 47–8 Manipur: Kuki 154–5; Meitei 153–5; Naga 153–5; road blockades in 153–5 Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms 154–5 market: as self-regulating system 2; state and 2 marriage 21 Marx, K. 190, 201 Meitei 153–5 MGNREGA see Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) Middle East 260, 269; Kerala’s trade contacts with 286 migrants: economic 176–86; economic returns for 263; in gold jewellery-making indusrty 279, 279–83; intra-city location of 176; spatial distribution of 177–9 migration: categories defining 228; cinema and 335–7; cultural aspects 268–9; economic impact of 262–4; gender perspective 228–42; human rights and 235; Interstate Migrant Workmen Act 171; labouring classes 162; Marx on 190; as routine livelihood strategy 204; short-term multiple jobs and 163 Mills, E. S. 183 mining rights 3 Ministry of Home Affairs of India 261 Mitra, Ashok 31 mobility, in Tamil Nadu 248–9 Mohanan, P. C. 176, 179 Monterrey, Mexico 178 Mosse, D. 208, 212 mukadams 164 Mukerji, I. P. 37 Mulavukad, Kochi 136; compensation to evicted families from 137–9 Multidimensional Development Index 246 Murthy, R. V. Ramana 172 Muslims: Bangladeshi immigrants 149–50; killing in Bodo area 148, 151–2

Index Muslim women, migrating from Cooch Behar to Delhi 228–42; changing mindset 240–1; community relations 240; consumption and saving patterns 236; domestic work 236–7; drivers of circular migration 237; factors influencing migration 229–34; gender roles 238–9; legislation and policy recommendations 241–2; life situations of 235; migrating with family 236; neighbourhood and kinship structure 237; pattern of migration 235–7; public spaces 238; religious-cultural norms 238; right to the city 239–40; see also Cooch Behar, West Bengal Muth, R.F. 183 NAFTA see North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Nagas, in Manipur 153–5 Naga Students’ Federation 154 Nagpur, relocation of agrarian villages in 65–95; see also peasants, resettlement of Nair, Sreelekha 336 Nandigram 40 Nano car project, of Tata Motors 29–30; see also Singur land acquisition Narmada Bachao Andolan 5, 46 Narvare, Maniram Laxman 88–91 National Highway 39, blockade of 154 National Informatics Centre 233 The Nationality and Immigration Act of 1965, US 320 National Register of Citizens, 1951 155 National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy 59–60 National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy (2007) 47 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 5 National Sample Survey (2007–2008) 176 National Trade Union Initiative 15 Nautiyal, Rani 53 Naxalite-Maoist insurgencies 14

349

Naya Ambhora 65, 86–7; volume and distribution of plots in 81 negotiations, power imbalances in 12–13 neighbourhood change, gentrification and 107–9 Nellie massacre 150 neoliberalism 103–4, 111, 117–20 Nepal 261 Netherlands: migration policy rules 327; research scientists in 328 New Tehri town 47–8; see also Tehri dam project New Zealand 301, 309 NGOs see non-governmental organizations (NGO) Nobel Prize for Peace 336 non-governmental organizations (NGO) 122, 130–1, 214 Non-Residence Tamils (NRT) Welfare Board 247 non-residential Indians (NRI) 165 non-resident Keralites, in Malayalam movies 335 North 24 Paraganas 168–9 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): professional workers 323 north coastal region of Andhra Pradesh 190–7; fishermen in 193, 196; industrial development 191–2; migration patterns in 194–5; pharma companies 192–3; pollution 193–4; power plants 191–2; public sector enterprises 191; rivers and tributaries 190–1; subsidized rice 197 Northeast, conflicts in 147–59; agricultural labourers 158–9; Assam Movement (1979–1985) 148–9; Bengali-tribal conflict in Tripura 152–3; Bodo-Muslim conflict 150–2; Chakma-Hajong resettlement 155–7; issues around 157–9; land and immigrants in 148 Nuakhai 206 nurses, US visa programs and 322–3 OECD countries: immigration trends and patterns in 317–19, 318–19;

350

Index

international student migration in 319; labour migration since economic crisis of 2008 317; skilled and educated immigrants 319 open door era, of US immigration policy 320 Oslen, K. Wendy 172 out-migrants (OMI) in Tamil Nadu 251–2 overseas Keralan Dalit migration 311–13 overseas Punjabi Dalit migration 308–11 Oxfam India 213–14 Ozo, A. O. 177 Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act 3 Pareto optimality 84 Patkar, Medha 5, 34 Patwari, Hiralal 148 PDS see public distribution system (PDS) peasant resistance, in Singur 31–2; see also Singur land acquisition peasants, resettlement of 64–92; compensation 80–7; distribution of new plots 77–80, 79–80; narratives of resignation and indignation 87–92; residential inequality 74–7; social inequalities 71–4; social uses of compensation 82–7; sociological classifications and data 65–6, 68–9 Perambalur, Tamil Nadu 247 Perandur canal in Kochi, Kerala 10, 13, 22 per capita income of Tamil Nadu 252 Permanent Settlement 1793 150 PESA see Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act pet-door era, of US immigration policy 320 Petronet LNG terminal 137; compensation to affected families 139–40 Picherit, D. 172 plots, social distribution of 77–80, 79–80

Polanyi, Karl 2 police presence, in evictions 11–12 Population Census Census (2000) 179 POSCO 193 poverty of IDP 18–20 power imbalances in negotiations 12–13 power plants, Andhra Pradesh 191–2 Pradhan, B. K. 179 Prakash, Gyan 173 prawn hatcheries 195 privatization 2 Project Affected Persons 47 pro-people growth 5 protests, SRD project and 128–9 public distribution system (PDS) 129 public purpose 10 public services, for migrants in Bengaluru 182, 182–3, 183 public space, democratization of 130 Public Works Development (PWD) 39 Punjab 303–15; overseas Dalit migration 308–11 Punjabi transnationalism 304–5 purchasing power parity (PPP) 264 Pushta, New Delhi 23 Puthuvype, Kochi 136–7; compensation to evicted families from 137–9 PWD see Public Works Development (PWD) Rabha tribe 150 Rajarhat Township, Kolkata 165–6 Rangari, Muktabai 90–2 Rao, C. H. Hanumantha 58 Ray, Sinha 34 Rayalaseema region, Andhra Pradesh 197–200 Red Corridor 14 redevelopment strategies, for smart cities 103 regional disparities, smart cities and 112 Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited (RHSL) 107 religious-cultural norms 230, 238

Index remittances: gender perspective on 238–9; to Kerala 252; migrant 264–5; to Tamil Nadu 252–3 resettlement: Chakma-Hajong 155–7; civil society and NGOs 130–1; democratization of public space 130; gender bias in 57–60; peasants 64–92; SRD project and 122–3, 131–2; Tehri dam project 50–1, 57–60 retrofitting strategy, for smart cities 103 return emigrants in Tamil Nadu 255–6 Return Migrant survey (RMS 2001) 287 return migration 266–8 return out-migrants (ROM) in Tamil Nadu 251–2 RHSL see Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited (RHSL) Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE Act) 205–6, 209, 210, 219, 227 Right to Information Act 3 right to life 131 right to the city 131, 239–40 road blockades, in Manipur 153–5 Rogaly, Ben 164 Roy, Ananya 113, 165–6 RTE Act see Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE Act) rural areas: smart cities and 111–12 rural development projects 119 rural economy 163 Sabarmati Nagrik Adhikar Manch (SNAM) 128 Sabarmati River 120–1 Sabarmati Riverfront Development Corporation (SRDC) 121 Sabarmati Riverfront Development (SRD) project 11, 120–2; economic livelihood 124; eviction of population 122; food security and 126–7; grassroots protests 128–9; health status 124–5; impoverishing effects 123–7; lack of basic services 125–6; people’s

351

participation 127; resettlement and rehabilitation 122–3, 129, 131–2; security and vulnerability status 126; towards international metropolis 121–2 Sadar Hills district 154–5 Salem, Tamil Nadu 247 Sample Registration of the Government of India 148–9 SANEI see South Asian Network of Economic Institutes (SANEI) Sarania, Naba 148 sardars (middlemen) 163; brick kilns and 164, 166–7; class of 163–4; invisibility of 167; kinship and social relations 164; labour supply 164; market demand and pressure 164–5; migrant labourers and 166–73; networking and operation of 164–5; role of 164 Sardar Sarovar dam 46 Sarkar, Sumit 39 Sarkar, Tanika 39 Saudi Arabia 250 Savda Ghevra, New Delhi 10, 12, 16, 21 Save Farmland 32 savings, Tamil migrants 254 SBM see Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) Schengen Visa (SV) 326 seasonal agricultural workers program (SAWP) 325 seasonal migration 170; children’s education and 205; as coping strategy 207–8; data and demographic characteristics 213–16, 214; droughts and 204–5; estimation strategy 211–13; heterogeneity 205, 207–8; landholdings 216, 218; public policies and 206, 208; socioeconomic factors 208; through labour contractors 205–7; see also Western Odisha, seasonal migration in Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code 33 security, SRD project and 126 semi-skilled workers 260

352

Index

Sen, Nirupam 30–1 sex trafficking 199 SEZ see special economic zones (SEZ) Shahwadi Nagar resettlement colony 125 Shanghai, China 178–9 Sharma, A. 208 Shiva, V. 46 Singapore, emigrants from Tamil Nadu 250 Singh, Manmohan 4, 35 Single Permit, EU 326 Singur land acquisition 3, 29–42; affected people 31; agricultural labourers 31; bargadars 31; compensation for 30–1; departure of Tata Motors 35–6; electoral politics and democracy 33–4; landowners 31–2; Left Front 29–32, 35–7, 39–40; legal battle on 37–9; resistance 31–2, 34; Status Report on 30; TMC on 30, 35–8 Singur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2011 37 Sirain village 47–8 skilled expatriates 261 slavery 260 smart cities 101–3; addressing challenges 112–13; challenges in developing 110–12; defined 101; development strategy 103; greenfield development 103; ICT and 101; proposed cities as 101; redevelopment strategies 103; retrofitting strategy 103; special economic zones (SEZ) 106–7; typical features of 102; see also urban development Smart Cities Mission (SCM) 100; see also smart cities SNAM see Sabarmati Nagrik Adhikar Manch (SNAM) social distribution of new plots 77–80, 79–80 social forth-coming 64 Socialist Unity Centre 36 social uses, of compensation 82–7, 85 South 24 Paraganas 167–8 South Asian Network of Economic Institutes (SANEI) 287

south coastal region of Andhra Pradesh 188–90 spatial distribution of migrants 177–86; see also Bengaluru, economic migrants in special economic zones (SEZ) 3, 10–11, 106–7 SRD see Sabarmati Riverfront Development (SRD) project SRDC see Sabarmati Riverfront Development Corporation (SRDC) standard urban models 183 state: and market 2 state-led urban restructuring 104–6; special economic zones 106–7 state-sponsored corporations 4–5 student migration 262 sub-contracting of procurement and labour recruitment 282 Subramanian, A. 179 Supreme Court: judgment on Singur 38–9 sustainability: of human settlement 132; in urban spheres 132 Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) 100 SWAP see seasonal agricultural workers program (SAWP) Sweezey, Paul 201 Take Off (movie) 335–7 Tamil Nadu 246–57; as an ageing state 248; demography 247–8; elderly and 256–7; emigrants 250–1; employment and savings 254; financing migration 253–4; geographical area 246; immigration 249; interstate migration and mobility 248–9; out-migrants 251–2; overview 246–7; as populous state 246; remittances 252–3; return migrants 255–6; women and 256–7 Tamil Nadu Migration Survey (TMS) 2015 247, 250 Tamils, as migrant laborers 246–7 Tata, Ratan 29 Tata Motors 3, 29–39; see also Singur land acquisition tea gardens, indentured labour in 150–1

Index Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangthan 46 Tehri dam project: benefits of 50; displacement by 50; gender bias in resettlement policy 57–60; as multipurpose project 50; resettlement process 50–1; women and 51–7 Tehri Hydro Development Corporation 50 Tehri Hydroelectric Dam Corporation Rehabilitation policy 1998 59–60 Tehri Hydroelectric Development Corporation (THDC) 57–8 Telangana 188 Tel Aviv, Israel 178 Teli caste 71, 75–6, 78–9, 87–8 temporary migration 258–70; Australia 324; brain drain 265–6; Canada 324–5; cultural aspects 268–9; economic impact of 262–4; emigration 259–60; immigration 261; overview 258–9; remittances 264–5; return migration 266–8; student migration 262; United States 324 textile industry 259 Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu 247 thekedars 239 There Is No Alternative (TINA) 3–4 Thiruvoth, Parvathy 335 TINA see There Is No Alternative (TINA) TMC see All-India Trinamool Congress Party (TMC) Town and Country Planning Act of the UK of 1947 100 township development, Kolkata 165–6 transit labour, in Andhra Pradesh 188–201; north coastal region 190–7; Rayalaseema region 197–200; south coastal region 188–90 tribes in Tripura 152–3 Tripura, Bengali-tribal conflict in 152–3 Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act (1960) 152 Tripura National Volunteers 153

353

Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS) 153 TUJS see Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS) UN Development Programme Human Development Index 8 unemployment 124; Tamil Nadu 254 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 250 United Kingdom (UK): choice of emigration to 298; cost of migration to 254; Dalit migration to 313; as immigrant sending country 249; Indian students migration to 262; Town and Country Planning Act of 100 United Nations 113 United States (US): choice of emigration to 298; compared to other OECD countries 323–8; discriminatory policy towards entry into 323–4; Emergency Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Act 321; foreign-born labour force in 317; immigration reforms 323; immigration system, historical outline of 320; increase in emigration to 298; international students policy 323; Jat Sikh communities within 309; labour migration policy 321–3; The Nationality and Immigration Act of 1965 320; permanent immigration in 321; policy towards scientists 328; Tamil emigrants 250 urban development: approach 100–1; displacement and 98–100; JNNURM 100, 110, 117; knowledge gap 129–30; low-income residents and 109; management of 113; neighbourhood restructuring and relocation 107–9; neoliberalism 103–4, 111, 117–20; planning systems and 113; smart cities 101–3; special economic zones (SEZ) 106–7; state-led restructuring 104–6

354

Index

urban informal sector, in West Bengal 162–74; growth of 162–3; housing projects 162, 165–6 urbanization see urban development urban neighbourhoods, of Cooch Behar 234 urban planning 112–13 urban redevelopment 117–32; displacement 119–20; marketoriented reforms and 118–19; neoliberal urbanization and 118–20; in political economic terms 119 USCBP see US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) USCIS see US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 321, 323 US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) 323 US Department of Labor (USDOL) 323 Uttaranchal: development and displacement in 49–50; hill ecosystem 49; as state 49; women in 49; see also Tehri dam project Vada Balija caste 195 Vaughan, D. R. 178 Vedanta multinational company 193 Vietnam War 260 violence: in Bodo territory of Assam 147–8, 151; in brick kilns of West Bengal 166, 168, 171–4; evictions and 12; Singur land acquisition and 32, 34, 39–40; state 12; against women 21 Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh 190; bauxite mining in 192; Gangavaram port 194; privatization 193; steel plant 191, 193 voluntary migrant workers 204 vulnerability of displaced people 18–20; Kochi infrastructure

development 140–4; SRD project and 126 WBIDC see West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation (WBIDC) West Bengal 3; forced migrants in 162–74; Left Front in 3–4, 8, 29–32, 35–7, 39–40; Singur land acquisition 3, 29–42 West Bengal Housing Board 165 West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation (WBIDC) 29 Western Odisha, seasonal migration in: children’s education and 205; as coping strategy 207–8; data and demographic characteristics 213–16, 214; droughts and 204–5; estimation strategy 211–13; heterogeneity 205, 207–8; landholdings 216, 218; public policies and 206, 208; socioeconomic factors 208; through labour contractors 205–7 whereabouts of IDP 22 WLB see women left behind (WLB) women: access to sanitation 21; access to water 52–3; bias against 57–60; coping mechanism 21; imigrant labourers in brick kilns 172–3; impact of Tamil migration on 256–7; insecurity 56–7; participation in Singur movement 34; during pre- and post-displacement 51–7; in rural areas 20–1; social disarticulation 55; SRD project and 126; subsistence or survival economies 52; Tamil emigrants 250–1; in urban areas 21; violence against 21; wellbeing 55–6 women left behind (WLB) 256–7 World Bank 4, 119–20, 264 World Trade Organization (WTO) 321 WTO see World Trade Organization (WTO) Wu, W. 178–9