South Asia Migration Report 2020: Exploitation, Entrepreneurship and Engagement 9780367337148, 9780367337179, 9780429321450

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South Asia Migration Report 2020

South Asia Migration Report 2020 documents key themes of exploitation and entrepreneurship of migrants from the region. This volume: • • • •

Includes dedicated feldwork from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal; Analyses the impact of South-Asia-migrant-established businesses; Examines legal and legislative recourse against exploitation in destination countries; Factors in how migration as a phenomenon negotiates with gender, environment and even healthcare.

This book will be indispensable for scholars and researchers of economics, development studies, migration and diaspora studies, gender studies, labour studies and sociology. It will also be useful to policymakers, think tanks and government institutions working in the area. S. Irudaya Rajan is Professor at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India. With more than three decades of research experience at the CDS, he has coordinated eight major migration surveys in Kerala since 1998 (with Professor K. C. Zachariah); conducted migration surveys in Goa, Tamil Nadu and Punjab; and provided technical support to the Gujarat Migration Survey. He has published extensively in national and international journals on the demographic, economic, social, health, psychological and political implications of migration on individuals, families, communities, society and the economy. Professor Rajan is currently engaged in several projects on international migration with the European Union, Word Bank, Columbia and Johns Hopkins Universities, and the UAE Exchange Centre, Abu Dhabi. He works closely with the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, the Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs, Government of Kerala, and the Kerala State Planning Board.

South Asia Migration Report 2020 Exploitation, Entrepreneurship and Engagement Edited by S. Irudaya Rajan

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, S. Irudaya Rajan; individual chapters, the contributors The right of S. Irudaya Rajan to be identifed as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-33714-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-33717-9 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-32145-0 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Lists of fgures List of tables List of contributors Preface Introduction: migration statistics in South Asia – the need for a fresh approach

vii viii x xii

1

S . I R U D AYA R AJA N

1 Gendered migration and its impacts on women’s agency and resilience in Pakistan

24

A H M A D S H A H DURRAN I AN D AYE SH A Q AISRANI

2 Productive vs. consumptive uses of remittances by households: evidence from Chitwan Valley of Nepal

58

P R E M B H A N D ARI

3 The unequal landscape of remittances: the case of rural Bangladesh

85

S Y E D A R O Z A N A RA SH ID, MO H AMMA D JA L AL U DDIN SIK DER A N D M D . E M RAN H O SSAIN

4 Migration legislation and regulations in South Asia: an unfnished agenda?

111

P I YA S I R I W I C KRAMA SE KA RA

5 Toward mapping employers and clients: the rise of recruitment fee advocacy and the need for market data in the Gulf construction sector D AV I D S E G A L L

140

vi Contents 6 Migrant businesses in Saudi Arabia: towards an economic sociology of Gulf migration

160

M D M I Z A N UR RA H MA N

7 From environmental disaster to migratory disaster: the Omani network of Bangladeshi fshermen

187

M A R I E P E R CO T

8 Diaspora volunteering: a tool for development or a channel for diasporic (re)engagement with countries of origin – a case study from Nepal

207

N I S H A TH OMA S, MATT B AIL L IE SMITH A N D NINA LAU R IE

9 Restructuring of Nepal’s economy, agrarian change, and livelihood outcomes: the role of migration and remittances

230

J A G A N N ATH A DH IKA RI

10 Identifying reproductive health coverage gaps for rural- and urban-born migrant household heads in the slums in and around Dhaka city, Bangladesh

261

K I M B E R LY CL A IR, AB DUR RA ZZA Q UE , MO H A MMAD Z A H I R U L I SL A M, MO H A MMA D N A H ID MIA , R AZ IB C H O W D H U RY, A H M GO L AM MUSTA FA AN D R A N D A L L K UH N

Index

278

Figures

2.1 3.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 10.1 10.2 10.3a 10.3b 10.4 10.5

Uses of remittances in various household activities (percent) Countries of destination for labour migration from Bangladesh, 1976–2019 Number of new contracts, by country, 2017 Value of new contracts, by country, 2017 Total values of new contracts awarded, by project type, GCC, 2017 Highest values of combined contracts won, by country of company headquarters, 2017 Urban/rural variation in key MNCH outcomes in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal Proportion of mothers in prospective pregnancy tracking lost to followup Distribution of asset quintile by duration in city Distribution of mother’s schooling by duration in city Proportion of pregnancy mothers receiving 4+ antenatal care visits, by duration in city and wealth quintile Proportion of children receiving full immunization coverage, by duration, education, wealth

70 91 148 149 150 151 263 266 268 269 271 272

Tables

I.1 I.2 I.3 I.4 I.5 I.6 I.7 I.8 I.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

Estimations of international migration from South Asia Migration statistics collecting agencies in South Asia Departures for foreign employment from Sri Lanka Departure for foreign employment from Sri Lanka by gender Country-wise overseas employment, Bangladesh Country-wise overseas employment, Pakistan Migration trends, Nepal Chronological order of Kerala Migration Surveys India Migration Survey 2022: sample frame based on 2011 census Productive and consumptive dimensions of household activities Descriptive statistics of measures used in the analysis (n = 139) Multilevel model estimating the amount of remittances (Nepali rupees logged) used by households in productive activities in Chitwan Valley of Nepal, 2013 (n = 139) Multilevel models estimating the amount of remittances (Nepali rupees logged) used by households in consumptive activities in Chitwan Valley of Nepal, 2013 (n = 139) Skill composition of labour outfows, 1976–2018 Wage earners remittance infows (yearly) Minimum household costs other than main food, per month Education costs of a non-residential student of Class X Education costs of a residential student of Class XII Asia – ratifcation status and date of ratifcation of international migrant worker conventions and related conventions: South Asia and the Philippines Annual outfows of migrant workers (offcially reported) Legislative and regulatory and policy frameworks to govern labour migration and recruitment in South Asia Immigration policies: legislative and regulatory framework

2 3 6 6 9 11 14 17 18 65 68 72 75 92 95 97 97 98 113 114 116 130

Tables 4.A1 Structure of emigration legislation in South Asian countries 6.1 The migrant entrepreneurs’ trajectories: profles of 50 selected migrants in Saudi Arabia 9.1 Percentage of households having members in foreign countries to work (except India) from Lachok and Rivan villages 9.2 Percentage of households having members outside the village (to work within Nepal) from Lachok and Rivan villages 9.3 Migration for work both foreign and internal (within the country) by ethnicity in 2008 (percentage of households; n = sample size, number of households) 9.4 Participation in foreign and internal (in-country) migration for work by income group (n = sample size, number of households) in 2008 9.5 Migration for work abroad and its impact on land-renting practice (percentage of households; n = sample size, number of households) in 2008 10.1 Frequency of key pregnancy outcomes by duration, schooling and wealth quintile 10.2 Vaccination coverage of children 12–23 months by duration

ix 138 168 242 243 247 248 250 270 272

Contributors

Jagannath Adhikari is affliated with Australian National University, Australia. Prem Bhandari is with Population Studies Center, University of Michigan, USA. Razib Chowdhury is with Health and Population Surveillance Division, International Centre for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh. Kimberly Clair is with Department of Community Health Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Ahmad Shah Durrani is associated with Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan. Md. Emran Hossain is Director, Daffodil International University (DIU), Bangladesh. Mohammad Zahirul Islam is with the Embassy of Sweden, Dhaka, Bangladesh Randall Kuhn is with Department of Community Health Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Nina Laurie is with the School of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St. Andrews, UK. AHM Golam Mustafa is with Health and Population Surveillance Division, International Centre for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh. Mohammad Nahid Mia is with Health and Population Surveillance Division, International Centre for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh. Marie Percot is with Institut Interdisciplinaire d’Anthropologie du Contemporain (EHESS/CNRS), Paris, France. Ayesha Qaisrani is associated with Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan. Md Mizanur Rahman is Research Associate Professor, Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Qatar.

Contributors

xi

Syeda Rozana Rashid is Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, and Adjunct Senior Research Fellow, The Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Bangladesh. Abdur Razzaque is with Health and Population Surveillance Division, International Centre for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh. David Segall leads research and advocacy on GCC migrant construction workers and recruitment fees for the New York University Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, New York, USA. Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder is Associate Professor, Department of Development Studies Daffodil International University (DIU), Dhaka, Bangladesh, and Adjunct Senior Research Fellow, The Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Bangladesh. Matt Baillie Smith is with Centre for International Development, Northumbria University, Newcastle, UK. Nisha Thomas is with School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK. Piyasiri Wickramasekara is Honorary Research Associate, Department of Sociology and Social Policy, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Sydney, Australia, as well as member of Global Migration Policy Associates, Geneva, Switzerland.

Preface

Following the success of the new series South Asia Migration Report (SAMR) in 2017, I am pleased to present the second edition of the SAMR, which is an extension of the commitment to engage researchers and policymakers within the South Asian region to work towards an understanding of the importance of migration in shaping the region and provide policy interventions based on evidence-based approaches. Given the many changes that keep affecting migration and its relationship among South Asian societies, this need has become even more urgent. It must be noted that the growing breadth of literature and interest in the various socio-economic aspects of migration in the South Asian region are a testament to the increasing importance of the subject. I have been fortunate in my time as an academic both as the editor of the annual series India Migration Report since 2010 and the founder and editor-in-chief of Migration and Development journal since 2012, and have been associated with a large number of experts in the feld over the past few decades, both in academia and policy making, and their prompt response to my request for contributions have made the SAMR 2020 possible. Their vast knowledge and expertise in the feld of migration studies in the South Asian context examine ideas with a holistic approach to the issues and challenges of migration in South Asia that it hoped to provide. We have also planned for the third edition of SAMR in 2023. The SAMR 2020 focuses on the theme of “Exploitation, Entrepreneurship and Engagement” and consists of 10 chapters by 22 contributors. Covering a wide array of topics, the various chapters encompass several discussions on the nature of exploitation, entrepreneurship and engagement, both within the context of the migrant’s countries of destination as well as their origin. All three concepts stem from the innate relationship between migrant networks at the origin and the destinations. Any conceptualisation of the phenomenon of migration cannot exclude the study of these networks, and thus the contributions to this edition provide an invaluable glimpse into it. As always, the edition leaves us with questions that need to be pondered and addressed. The most compelling challenge that presents itself, especially on the South Asian context, is the challenge of climate change and

Preface

xiii

the widespread migration it induces. Numerous instances of climate-related disasters in the recent past have precipitated people being forced to think about mitigating strategies – migration being salient one among them. Furthermore, the role of remittances and even diaspora philanthropy, as well as other voluntary efforts in development and especially in aid and rehabilitation, is important in understanding the role of migrant networks. Second, while generalised macro trends in South Asian migration are more readily available, the understanding of the migration of specifc groups, and the specifc contexts in which they migrate, still needs to develop in South Asia setting to capture the entire breadth of migration from the region – whether they be students, teachers, medical professionals, or many other skilled or unskilled workers migrating to newer locations all over the world. However, the lack of reliable data at a large scale remains a persistent hurdle in understanding and acting upon the various challenges presented and much more urgency to be done in the South Asian region that regard. Therefore, fnally, it becomes very important for the countries in the South Asian region to come together and harmonise migration policies within a SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) framework, taking into notice the history as well as the future of migration outwards and within the region. I would like to thank all the contributors to this volume. Besides, I am also grateful for the emotional support, patience and understanding I have received from my wife Hema and our three children – Rahul, Rohit and Mary Catherine – throughout the years. Finally, I would like to thank and record my appreciation for the hard work put in by the editorial, production, and sales teams of Routledge in bringing out this report on time.

Introduction Migration statistics in South Asia – the need for a fresh approach S. Irudaya Rajan

I.1

Introduction

The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member nations emerged as the primary destination for South Asian migrant workers during the 1970s and the trend has maintained since then, which was also fuelled by expansive development policies as a result of the oil boom. Therefore, in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka), the largest movement of migrant workers is seen to the GCC. The annual outfow of migrant workers from South Asia exceeds 2.5 million (GIZ and ILO, 2015), with the majority of them working in the sectors including construction, fshing sectors and domestic services, and also as drivers. They are also employed in the manufacturing sector as low-skilled and semi-skilled workers. More than 90 percent of all migrant workers from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka take jobs in GCC countries (GIZ and ILO, 2015). In 2017, India was the largest country of origin for international migrants within South Asia (17 million), followed by Bangladesh (7 million) and Pakistan (6 million) (United Nations, 2018). Of the top 10 largest countries of origin of international migrants, three are in South Asia. Over half of all migrants from India and 40 percent of all migrants from South Asia reside in the Gulf. India-United Arab Emirates (UAE) (3.5 million) and India-Saudi Arabia (2 million) are among the top global migration corridors (United Nations, 2018; Rajan, 2017, 2018). Additionally, new trends and patterns of migration have emerged over the past few decades. For example, women are becoming increasingly visible in the migratory movement from South Asia to the Gulf region. The total stock of female migrants in GCC countries has more than doubled in the past two decades, from 2.9 million in 1990 to 5.9 million in 2013 (UNDESA, 2013). Nearly half of the female migrants in GCC countries originated from South Asia. Among the South Asian countries, Sri Lanka has had the most “feminised” labour fows. An overwhelming majority of the workers are from low-income households, and mostly migrate for economic reasons. Migrant women workers from India and Nepal also work in low-skilled occupations such as housemaids and cleaners (IOM, 2010). South Asian countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan have similar patterns of international migration to the Middle East and to some developed countries.

2 S. Irudaya Rajan Table I.1 Estimations of international migration from South Asia Agency

Estimation

UNDESA, 20171

The stock of male international migrants living in South Asia in 1960 was 9.53 million, decreasing to 5.54 million by 2017. The stock of female international migrants in South Asia has decreased overall from 8.29 million in 1960 to 5.35 million 2017. The number of South Asian nationals living abroad (both in other South Asian countries and outside of the subregion) has increased substantially, from 23.89 million in 1990 to over 38 million as of 2017. The estimated annual outfow of migrant workers from fve countries in South Asia totals some 2.5 million migrants (based on various estimates for certain years). India is the largest sending country, based on the emigrant clearance required data (747,000), followed by Pakistan (623,000), Nepal (522,000), Bangladesh (409,000) and Sri Lanka (282,000).

ILO2

Source: Compiled by the author

With this background, this chapter aims to present the available databases maintained by the selected South Asian governments to capture the fow of international migration from their nation. Apart from the other estimations on labour migration by international bodies like UNDESA and ILO (see Table I.1), the data capturing strategies adopted by the country are vital, as this enables us to understand the pattern, fow, stock, social benefts and economic benefts of international migration from the countries in South Asia. Based on the country-based review, this chapter outlines the efforts taken by both state and central government agencies in the respective countries to create a database on international migration with a view of improving data capturing mechanisms in the future. Before examining the country-wise situation, it is essential to think and adopt alternative strategies to capture not only the outfow of labour migration but also other forms of out-migration including student migration. For instance, in Australia, data collection to capture out-migration is done by the Australian Bureau of Statistics via the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) through the overseas arrivals and departures (OAD) data at the airport. Data collected via details provided on passenger cards for every person entering or exiting the country, as well as various processing systems, passport documents and visa information, is vital.3 In the United Kingdom (UK), data collection is done by the Offce of National Statistics via the Long Term International Migration (LTIM) programme. The primary source for LTIM is the International Passenger Survey (IPS), which captures migration intentions and is held throughout the year and data is released on

Introduction

3

Table I.2 Migration statistics collecting agencies in South Asia Pakistan Sri Lanka India Bangladesh Nepal

Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BE and OE), Government of Pakistan Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment under the Ministry of Telecommunication, Foreign Employment and Sports Overseas Employment Division, Ministry of External Affairs Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET) under the Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment (MoEWOE) Department of Foreign Employment in the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security

Source: Compiled by the author

a quarterly basis.4 Here, 250,000 interviews from various ports of exit are collected as sample and analysed. Additionally, refugees and asylum seekers are registered with the Home Offce.5 Lessons can be learnt from these data collection mechanisms, especially in the UK through the IPS and Australia through administrative data and the passenger card system. Thus, there are certain countries that make use of their international airports to capture the outfow of migration. Among South Asian countries, Sri Lanka is the only country which uses international airports to capture the outfow of labour migration. In the case of India, there are 38 international airports (For instance, the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have four international airports each), and these are the gateways for the overseas migrants. Therefore, these airports can be equipped with the technology to capture the outfow of all types of migrants without hindering the passengers. This method captures the actual numbers rather than estimates on international migration. In the selected fve countries, there are certain government agencies collecting data on the outfow of labour migration (Table I.2). In the following sections, a brief history of labour outfow and available databases in South Asian countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and India are discussed.

I.2

Sri Lanka

Since Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948, migration has taken place in intense waves across the country. During the 1950s, it was common for the educated, wealthy, English-speaking elites to migrate to the Commonwealth countries like the UK and Australia. During the early 1980s, as regional and ethnic hostilities began to escalate among citizens, a major chunk of the Tamil-speaking Hindu migrants migrated to Canada. Additionally, there has also been an increase in the magnitude of temporary migrant workers leaving

4 S. Irudaya Rajan the country since the 1980s. The major region where these labour migrants, which includes many women, migrated to is the Gulf (Gamburd, 2010). Countries in South and Southwest Asia are forced into out-migration, owing to various factors such as unemployment, underemployment, a multitude of debts, very low per capita income and a blatant lack of access to the basic needs of life. The same reasons can be applied to Sri Lanka, where out-migration has increased over the years. The Fifth Conference of Heads of State of the Government of Non-Aligned Countries that was held in Sri Lanka in 1976 made a major decision to open up more employment opportunities in the Western regions of Asia for other Asian countries with large labour surpluses. The liberalisation of economic policies that took place in the country in 1977 added further momentum to this decision, causing an increased level of migration of Sri Lankans. Soon, welfare packages were introduced for Sri Lankan employees working abroad and their families along with compulsory registration. This has greatly reduced irregular labour migration in the country (UN RCM Working Group, 2012). The migration of Sri Lankan nationals to overseas countries can be classifed based on their purpose as employment migration, refugee migration, settlement migration, student migration, irregular or clandestine migration and tourism (Institute of Policy Studies and IOM, 2008). The boost in technological development and a greatly improved and expansive construction industry paved way for an acceleration in the economic development of the Middle Eastern countries in the 1970s. As this sector further witnessed an expansion in the 1980s and the 1990s, new employment opportunities opened up for all types of labour – skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled – in the South and East Asian regions. The previous out-migration trend has now evolved with a different focus as contract labour migration. This is a kind of short-term migration, probably for one or two years with a facility of renewal. The idea of contract migration, which involved the provision of labour resources for the development projects in the countries of the Middle East, received a huge amount of attention among the families of the migrants. The major tangible effects that can be seen include the economic impact on the families and villages of the migrant and the subtle changes in the socio-cultural aspects of the destination country, as well as a defnite change in the migrants who return back to their own countries (De Silva, 2012). Extensive research has been undertaken in the feld of migration to analyse different dimensions involved in the process. However, some sensitive and crucial issues such as exploitation of migrant workers, its impact on the role of women in the society, and on the family and young children have been neglected and under-researched (Hugo and Ukwatta, 2010). The number of migrants in Sri Lanka is predicted to be around 858,000. However, this data cannot be entirely trusted, due to the inherent in consistency in the statistics maintained by the government. This can be owed to the cumbersome diffculties that come along with the responsibility of maintaining accurate statistics.

Introduction

5

Another troubling issue that arises here is the migration of a signifcant chunk of people through unauthorised sources, illegal channels and personal contacts, and the inability to identify workers who land in employment opportunities even before their registration process gets formalised. This is obvious from the fact that the actual number of Sri Lankan migrants exceed the number recorded in the data possessed by the government. Another dangerous aspect of this discrepancy in data is the inability of the state to ensure the safety of the employment location and overall well-being of its workers (Dias and Jayasundere, 2002). The Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 1999–2000 included all nine provinces of the country and was carried forth between October 1999 and the third quarter of 2000. The interviews of a vast number of individuals that total up to 7,500 households and data covering 35,181 individuals were used for this survey. The survey is accurate and easily comprehensible as it also considers a huge number of variables that includes income, education, occupation, health, assets and demographics. This, in turn, is of a huge help to us since the data has been meticulously created with the use of various observable control variables. In this survey, individual data and a separate module for international migration were also included which focuses on information regarding current and past migration details that include destination country, the year of departure and the migration history of the entire family (De and Ratha, 2012). Despite the availability of the mentioned data on the outfow of Sri Lankan migrants, in Sri Lanka, the data on international labour migration is available only from 1986. Moreover, the labour migration statistics report published by the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) (2017) pointed out that the departures data collected from 1986–1991 does not provide a clear estimate of the number of Sri Lankans who migrated abroad for work as a proper mechanism to gather real data was absent. So, to overcome this data gap, in 1992 and 1993, SLBFE for the frst time conducted the Airport Survey to capture the actual number of departures from the country. Therefore, in Sri Lanka, data of temporary outfow migration through all the sources are available from 1992 onwards (Yapa, 1995). SLBFE was established by the government of Sri Lanka in 1985, with the data captured by the information technology (IT) division of SLBFE and the statistics on international labour migration from Sri Lanka for employment being disseminated periodically. In 1995, SLBFE felt that the Airport Survey mechanism employed by the Bureau to capture the outfow of migrants for work was not extensive enough. Thus, in that same year, service counters of SLBFE were opened at Katunayaka airport to record the Sri Lankan nationals departing for employment abroad. Only those Sri Lankans who had not registered already with SLBFE had to register at the airport service counters. This mechanism proved to be far more effective, and an increase was captured in the outfow of Sri Lankans for employment in the year 1995 (see Table I.3). It is

6 S. Irudaya Rajan Table I.3 Departures for foreign employment from Sri Lanka Year

Total

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

14,456 14,127 18,428 24,724 42,625 64,983 124,494 129,076 60,168 172,489 162,576

Source: SLBFE (2017)

Table I.4 Departure for foreign employment from Sri Lanka by gender Year

Male (in %)

Female (in %)

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

51.16 51.84 51.03 59.75 63.26 65.59 66.02

48.84 48.16 48.97 40.25 36.74 34.41 33.98

Source: SLBFE (2017)

also seen that the airport survey conducted by SLBFE (1990–1994) did not report such a sudden increase. It is apparent that the statistics before 1995 showed low rate of migration for employment from Sri Lanka, because a signifcant number of migrants proceeded without registering themselves at SLBFE and thus their departures were not accounted. The SLBFE captures data on six different statistics, namely 1) countrywise data, 2) district-wise data, 3) gender-wise data 4) yearly-wise data, 5) age group-wise data and 6) manpower level data (professional level, middle level, clerical and related, skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled and housemaid). Although female migration has been showing a declining trend in recent years, the quantum still stands out when compared with other labour exporting South Asian countries. Since 1986, the gender-wise statistics on

Introduction

7

Sri Lankans departing for foreign employment has been available. The high percentage of female migration from the country and its decline through the years is depicted in Table I.4). From 1988, the total departure of Sri Lankans for foreign employment for manpower is documented. After 1992, statistics on Sri Lankan nationals leaving abroad for temporary employment by destination has also been captured (Yapa, 1995). The SLBFE website publishes the statistical report on Sri Lankan labour migration abroad and is available from the year 2013 (SLBFE 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). So, it is diffcult to provide the exact year they have started capturing other statistics on labour migration from Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, statistics on return fow of migrants (return migrants) is absent. Also, the outfow of students from Sri Lanka who migrated overseas for higher studies is not captured by the Government of Sri Lanka.

I.3

Bangladesh

Bangladesh has had a frm association with migration throughout its history. The labour pattern that is visible in contemporary times dates back to colonial times. People have been migrating – manifesting great mobility – in the Bengal Delta region throughout centuries. The trends of migration continue to rise and are strictly followed in the current scenario whereby almost 500,000 Bangladeshis leave their homes and their country to work abroad for a living. It must also be noted that the remittances of emigrants play a huge role in supporting the economy of Bangladesh.6 A boost in international migration through the ages and the successive increase in the remittances sent home by the labour migrants of Bangladesh greatly hoisted up the economy. The employment sought by more and more Bangladeshi labour migrants in overseas countries and the remittances that naturally increased as a result contributed extensively in implementing anti-poverty measures. When the importance of such migration and its positive effects on their economy became obvious, successive Bangladeshi governments quickly acknowledged its signifcance and began to take steps for the effective management of migration (Siddiqui et al., 2019). Workers from Bangladesh who travel overseas for work can be categorised into the following types based on their capacities – skilled, semi-skilled and low-skilled. The dependency of Bangladesh on remittances of these different types of emigrant labour workers has grown through the years, and continues to increase as more workers exhibit tendencies to migrate abroad for work. This trend has risen to such a level that in today’s world, Bangladesh is one of the major suppliers of labour in the international market. Another point that has to be duly noted here is related to female emigrants. When the total emigration of Bangladesh is considered from a broad scale, the magnitude of women who migrate for the same work is almost negligible (Bélanger and Rahman, 2013). Temporary labour migration, whereby the worker stays for a limited period of time in an overseas country to work in the labour

8 S. Irudaya Rajan sector, is the most popular form of migration in both Nepal and Bangladesh. Therefore, crucial aspects such as policy research that is related to short-term labour migration have been accumulating importance and momentum since the 1990s. These studies on temporary migration cover all lengths and tiny details involved in this migratory process. Yet time and again, it is found that there has been no signifcant study on the actual decision-making process that prompts an individual to migrate from their country to another in search of a living (Asia Foundation, 2013). The International Labour Organisation claims that every year the number of Bangladeshis leaving to work in other countries like Oman, Qatar and Singapore total up to a number above 400,000. There is another estimate that there are up to 9.4 million Bangladeshis living and working in overseas countries. During the month of May in 2017, 2,800 Bangladeshis found their way to the shores of Europe. Even those who manage to reach foreign destinations safely do not enjoy the entire extent of their hopes. They migrate with too much at stake such as their own lives, the risk of being forced into indentured service upon arrival and confscation of their offcial documents. Though Bangladeshis emigrate and land in jobs in the Middle East or Singapore, they often work in unsafe working conditions for extremely long hours in high temperatures within building sites.7 It should also be noted that migration has become an escape out of poverty for struggling women who live in Bangladesh. Since remittances by emigrant labour workers have contributed more to the country’s development than foreign aid, migration has grown to become one of the most important forms of livelihood strategies for Bangladeshis (Islam, 2015). Apart from being a source of employment, migration also helps in offsetting the foreign trade defcit. One of the chief hotspots for migration is Malaysia, a quarter of whose workforce is comprised of migrants. The presence and contribution of migrant workers is extremely essential in many international sectors, especially the multi-billion-dollar palm oil industry (Wickramasekara, 2016). The government of Bangladesh considered the role of the manpower export sector and the signifcant fnancial contributions made by expatriate Bangladeshis has prompted the government to establish an exclusive Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment in 2001. Before the establishment of new ministry, the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) was established in 1976 to support the Ministry of Manpower Development and Social Welfare.8 Now BMET is functioning under the Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment. One of the major functions of BMET is to maintain computer-based databases on migrant workers. 9 Also, the BMET periodically compiles and disseminates the available data with the trend and other aspects of international labour migration from Bangladesh. Therefore, in Bangladesh, BMET is the only government-run agency gathers information on Bangladeshis migrating abroad for work. Despite its

Introduction

9

long history, the details on the outfow of Bangladeshis nationals for employment purposes were absent until the establishment of BMET in 1976 (Mahmood, 1995). Now, we can look at the labour migration statistics captured by the BMET. Since 1976, BMET started to collect the details of labour migration statistics on the fow of Bangladeshi migrants to different destination countries and data on the skill composition of Bangladeshi expatriate workers. The four categories of skill composition are 1) professional 2) skilled 3) semi-skilled and 4) low-skilled. These statistics enable us to understand the nature of work/job in which Bangladeshis have been employed over the years. The available data shows that Bangladeshis are highly concentrated in the Gulf region, and also in some Southeast Asian countries (see Table I.5). Moreover, the remittances statistics have been available since 1976. BMET started gathering gender-wise data on labour migration only from 1991, and hence gender-wise data on Bangladeshi labour migration is available from 1991 to date. In addition, BMET also maintains district-wise data on Bangladeshis migrating overseas for employment since 2005. From the same year, BMET started collecting district-wise gender migration data. Despite the lack of data on return migrants, Bangladesh managed to capture the outfow of labour migration from the country. In addition, at 21 district level offces, a computer-based dataset network had been established as District Employment and Manpower Offces (DEMO), and in 2004, the BMET head offce was linked with the Ministry, Airports and the offce of the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA). Mandatory registration for all types of job seekers at the nearest DEMO commenced from 2004 (Islam, 2015). The Bangladesh government does not capture statistics on student out-migration from the country. Table I.5 Country-wise overseas employment, Bangladesh Country

Employment

Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Oman Bahrain Qatar Malaysia Korea Singapore

257,317 3,235 27,637 72,504 811 76,560 175,927 1,297 41,393

Source: BMET, 2013

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S. Irudaya Rajan

I.4 Pakistan Like other South Asian nations, extensive out-migration of labour has been a prevalent trend in Pakistan since the 1950s. In the early years, the migrating group typically consisted of young working men who sought better job opportunities in the UK. Migrants who fell under this category later managed to land jobs in the other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The different types of migrants from Pakistan can be divided based upon their chief destinations. For instance, Pakistanis who migrate to North America and Europe usually go with longterm plans and often also in the host country along with their families. Those migrants who fall under the low-skilled or semi-skilled categories of labourers, and are often deprived of opportunities to permanently migrate to these developed countries, are forced to pursue temporary migration opportunities. Hence, the most popular destinations for workers from Pakistan are the GCC countries, which impose a ban on any permanent settling of foreign workers. Thus, the migration period to these countries is generally categorised into short term or medium term. Usually a term lasts up to four or fve years, while in some cases it can also extend up to 10 or 15 years due to the extensions of multiple contracts. The other major diaspora of Pakistanis around the world can be located in the UK, the United States of America and Canada (UN RCM Working Group, 2012). They are also considered to be one of the world’s leading suppliers of labour. In closer consideration of the diaspora who have migrated for work, they fair better in upward socio-economic mobility. However, the different dimension of the subjective experience of the expat that consists of long periods of separation and longing for their family, along with long-term impact on their family members of the lone migrant who strives hard in the foreign land to support their family (Azam, 1995). The mid-20th century witnessed a huge surge in the price of oil which in turn resulted in an unforeseen economic boom. This automatically prompted the temporary and circular migration of labourers on a largescale to the GCC countries. Pakistan has its nationals working in the Middle East as well as in other parts of the world, including the UK, North America and a few other European countries, owing to the presence of good job opportunities. With reference to the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BE and OE) records, it has been found that the distribution of these workers who migrate through the offcial process to overseas countries for the sake of employment is concentrated in the GCC countries, with over 95.9 percent. The highest concentrations were found in countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman, which had 50.3, 32.9 and 7.5 percent, respectively. Currently, the total magnitude of Pakistani labourers who have migrated for a job to the GCC countries is estimated to be around 3 million (Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development, 2015). Established in 1971, the BE and OE is a government body in Pakistan that

Introduction

11

plays the crucial role of managing the migration of its nationals to overseas countries for employment. Among their other key roles, they also publish data and statistics related to migration on a regular basis. BE and OE does not cover those labour migrants who take help from the government recruitment agency, the Overseas Employment Corporation (OEC). The OEC also maintains its own records and becomes an additional database for capturing emigrating workers (ILO, 2015). It is to be noted that almost 96 percent of the labour migrants who are registered with the BE and OE have indeed gone to a GCC country. Their distribution among the GCC countries is quite irregular and is scattered across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar (ILO, 2016). It is the duty of BE and OE to compile the data of international migrants from Pakistan who migrate for employment in various categories. Hence, the Bureau collects, compiles and tabulates the data on Pakistanis who emigrate for employment purposes only. Since 1971, the Bureau started to maintain a comprehensive statistical record of all Pakistani migrant workers who proceeded abroad for employment.10 Due to the discovery of black gold (crude oil) in GCC countries, Pakistan witnessed a surge in the number of workers migrating to Gulf. As we notice in Table I.6, Gulf countries are the preferred destination countries for the Pakistanis even in recent times. As per the recent statistics published in BE and OE manpower export analysis report (2018), more than 10.48 million Pakistan nationals have proceeded legally for employment in different countries since 1971. Around 96.15 percent of Pakistanis moved to the GCC countries, particularly concentrated in Saudi Arabia and UAE. The BE and OE compiles the Pakistani international migration labour statistics month-wise, country-wise, region-wise, district-wise and categorywise. Since 1971, the Bureau started to record the outfow of international labour migration from Pakistan in three characteristics, they are country-wise

Table I.6 Country-wise overseas employment, Pakistan Country

Employment

Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Oman Bahrain Qatar Malaysia

100,910 208,635 493 27,202 5,745 20,993 9,881

Source: Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BE and OE), 2019

12 S. Irudaya Rajan (destination), occupational group-wise emigrations (highly qualifed, highly skilled, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) and job category-wise emigrations. From 1981 onwards, in addition to the three characteristics just mentioned, district-wise and province-wise data on the number of Pakistani nationals migrating for work has been captured. The phenomenon of international labour migration from Pakistan is male-centric, and therefore the Bureau has not published gender-wise overseas labour migration from the country. Statistics on the returned Pakistani migrants from abroad who went for work has been not gathered. Likewise, Pakistani students’ international migration is not captured by the Government. Apart from the labour statistics, country-wise Pakistani workers remittances data is published by the Bureau. These reports help in understanding the trends and patterns of international labour migration from Pakistan by analysing the available databases. In 2018, the Bureau initiated a project titled “Registration of intending emigrants via biometric verifcation system linked with National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA)”. One of the modules of this project is to share all other modules data in an online central database. Through this database, various reports and statistics can be retrieved.

I.5 Nepal While international migration from Nepal had always been a reasonable percentage of the total population, it has been limited mostly to India due to geographical and economic convenience. It is only in recent years that labour migrants have sought other countries. Going back through history, it can be found that international migration from Nepal to locations other than India was chiefy through recruitment into the British army. Usually it took place in small numbers, and they were sent to as many destinations such as UK, Hong Kong, Singapore and Brunei. It was only during the late 1980s that Nepalis started to migrate to other destinations for labour purposes. After democracy was introduced in the 1990s, the phenomenon of international labour migration became even more prevalent and was boosted more after international travel was made more safe, easy and systematic. However, it was only by the mid-1990s that the Nepalese government let in private recruitment agencies to recruit workers to a specifc set of countries, which were mostly Gulf countries. Malaysia, Japan and South Korea were some other countries included in this aspect. The workers could be recruited by private agencies only after they obtain a valid approval and clearance from the Ministry of Labour (Shrestha, 2017). The migration of labourers to the Gulf countries and Malaysia in search of work has shown a profound increase over the years, and has risen to occupy a signifcantly huge share in the international migration. On the other hand, immigration into Nepal mostly occurs from India, owing to the open border between the two nations (Sharma et al., 2014), as well as

Introduction

13

historical linkages between the two countries and the low cost of migration and return (Shrestha, 2017). The magnitude of migrants who go abroad for labour is showing a remarkable increase each year, leading to a profound increase in the amount of remittances received every year. The chief countries of migration include the Gulf countries and Malaysia, while their place of origin can be traced back to 75 different districts of Nepal. But as usual, accurate data on the availability of the migration data is an impossible feat in Nepal. This is because of the negligence of both the Indian and the Nepali governments to keep track of the records of those who enter India from Nepal. Many Nepalis migrate seasonally and keep migrating back and forth during the year, making it tough to maintain proper records. Although few extensive studies provide details about the magnitude and the characteristics of the Nepali labour migrants who settled in India, they are largely constricted to a small region only (Sijapati and Limbu, 2012). In Nepal, a large number of citizens are forced into labour migration due to the scarcity of employment opportunities available in their countries and the degrading economic conditions of their homes. Similarly, the Nepalis have migrated in large numbers for the same reason in order to seek employment in the jobs that are offered abroad, and hence, international labour migration has become quite a common phenomenon. It has greatly improved the economic growth of themselves, their families and their host and destination countries. Foreign jobs are currently high in demand in Nepal, owing to a number of factors. The main ones include the period of transition in Nepal’s political and socio-economic systems, and the fact that Nepal as a country is still recovering from a series of dangerous national disasters. It is to be noted that in the time period between 2008 and 2017, Nepal issued a whopping 3.5 million labour permits to labour migrants who mainly undertake journeys to Malaysia and the countries that are a part of the GCC. In the last budgetary year alone, Nepal received a huge amount of remittances worth up to NPR 699 billion (USD 6.56 billion) from all its citizens that are employed in countries overseas. This accounts for more than one-quarter of the national GDP (gross domestic product), which happens to occupy the fourth-highest proportion in the entire world.11 The Department of Foreign Employment, Nepal maintains a database of details from the labour permit applications and permits granted, as well as complaints made, and cases resolved regarding foreign employment. Table I.7 indicates the gender-wise outfow of labour migration from Nepal. The Nepal Living Standards Survey and the data collected by the Nepal Ministry of Labour and Transport Management on overseas migration are some of the other sources of obtaining data on international migration. Another main source that can be referred for data on the remittances received is the data released by the Nepal Ministry of Finance (Kumar, 2008). Apart from this, the National Migration Survey 1996/1997 was conducted by the three organisations – The Center for Population Research and Training

14

S. Irudaya Rajan

Table I.7 Migration trends, Nepal Year

Total labour migrants

Total female labour migrants

Rate of increase in absolute terms (%)

Percent of the total labour migrants

2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014

219,965 294,094 354,716 384,665 450,834 521,878

8,594 10,056 10,416 22,958 27,742 29,152

–

3.9 3.4 2.9 6.0 6.2 5.6

17.0 3.6 120.4 20.8 5.1

Source: Department of Foreign Employment (2015)

(CPRT), Central Department of Population Studies (CDPS) and Tribhuvan University. With a sample size of 19,400, this was the largest sample survey in 1996. Every individual of the sample size was chosen based on a nationally representative probability sampling technique. A thorough and detailed questionnaire that covered both internal and international migration was used during this survey. After this, there was a profound absence of any type of follow-up surveys. Occasionally, the Nepal Institute of Development Studies (NIDS) also manages to create and produce accurate data or provides an estimate of the international migration for labour and remittances. On this note, the Population Division of the United Nations can also be consulted for data, since it also generates estimates of global, regional and country-wise data related to international migration (Kumar, 2008).

I.6 India Within South Asia, India is a major source country for migrants moving to different countries around the globe given its large workforce and diaspora. However, migration studies have gained attention in India only in the recent past. Importantly, international migration is prominent from the selected states in the Southern and Northern India; therefore, migration phenomenon is not observed uniform all over the country. Among the signifcant migrant sending states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu in southern India and Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar the northern part, the labour emigration and remittance sending behaviour differ signifcantly. However, the databases currently available in India to understand both national and international migration phenomenon are still in a nascent stage, with the exception of the state of Kerala, which has had extensive migration surveys and studies since the late 1990s (Zachariah et al., 2001a, 2001b, 2003; Zachariah and Rajan, 2008, 2015; Rajan and Zachariah, 2019). Moreover, databases are

Introduction

15

very much essential to comprehend the migrant’s characteristics like causes of migration, the social and fnancial costs of migration, remittances, return migration, labour issues at destination, illegal migration and human traffcking, labour market demand, skill sets, etc. At this point, it is essential to look at the available databases in India, which has helped towards the better understanding of migration dimensions and features over the time. I.6.1 Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) database on Indian emigrants According to Emigration Act, 1983, a person who has not qualifed for matriculation (below 10th standard) comes under Emigration Check Required (ECR) status.12 These emigrants have to get prior permission by themselves or through recruiting agents in order to obtain emigration clearance from the regional Protector of Emigrants (PoEs) to take up employment in any of 18 countries.13 Thus, the only reliable source (partial data) of information concerning this type of migration is the data available in the regional PoE offces. This data provides the status of migrants with basic information like stock of ECR passport holders migrating to the 18 ECR countries for work and also the state-wise, year-wise breakup data on emigration granted to ECR passport holders for work. In 2017, on the eMigrate webpage,14 the MEA established a sub-section emigration clearance related report under the resources section to publicise ECR emigration data starting in 2007. The available data ranked the top 50 districts sending emigrants (male and female) to ECR countries and top 25 districts sending female (excluding nurses) emigrants to ECR countries.15 Neither Indian missions nor the concerned authorities in 18 ECR countries have any details about the Indian migrants – those who migrate for work. This vacuum in data about these migrants in the destination country is a drawback for overcoming illegal migration, monitoring Indian workers and promoting safety measures. On the other hand, it is not mandatory, and there exist only very few mechanisms in the 18 ECR countries to register these migrants with a mission for future help or networking safe migration. Specifc details about their employment in these countries are generally not available. Thus, it is clear that the government agencies are severely lacking in maintaining the records of Indians working in foreign countries. When it comes to migration of individuals who possess Emigration Check Not Required (ECNR) passports, they can emigrate to any ECR country for taking up unskilled or semi-skilled jobs without their details being recorded in India. The MEA does not have any authentic inclusive database about the number of Indian workers in different countries and their employment patterns. Moreover, lack of precise data has been a major obstruction in reaching out to the emigrant workers and ensuring them a safe, hassle-free and legal migration (Committee on External Affairs, 2019, p. 3). The database published by

16 S. Irudaya Rajan the MEA about emigrants is extremely limited, as well. Finally, it would be appropriate to end this section by quoting the oral evidence presented by the Foreign Secretary (MEA) before the External Affairs Committee on – issues relating to migrant workers including appropriate legislative framework and skill development initiatives for prospective emigrants. It has been very rightly pointed out and we have ourselves been concerned this issue of lack of data. We cannot go on saying that we collect only ECR data because it is in eMigrate. (Committee on External Affairs, 2019, p. 4) However, there are other national-level and state-level databases which include data on migration and remittances. Some of these are: A) National Sample Survey (NSS) data: NSS is a central organisation involved in conducting a series of massive socio-economic survey across India. The NSS 49th round survey covered housing conditions, with special focus on slum dwellers. In this round, it included a section on migration and collected some characteristics of households with migrants. The NSS 64th round survey covered India’s overall situation on employment, unemployment and migration particulars. NSS 49th and 64th round data were extensively used to calculate state-wise migration scenario (Rajan, 2014). The major limitations of the NSS rounds their small sample sizes, which are not suffcient to estimate the stock of migration and remittances behaviour of migrants at both national and state levels. B) Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) data: In 2005, IHDS developed a data set by conducting a national representative survey of Indian households. The scope of the study was to cover topics like economic status, education, employment, marriage, gender relations, fertility, health and social capital. IHDS data were used to estimate and bring out concerns interrelated with migration. C) Reserve Bank of India (RBI): Since 2006, RBI has been conducting surveys among authorised dealers (ADs) who act as intermediaries for remittances received by residents in India.16 Hence, RBI through their surveys among authorised money transfer operators/dealers operating in India estimates India’s inward remittances. The 2016–2017 survey indicates some fndings on remittances fow to India and its dimensions at state level. D) State-level data: Tracing the chronology of state-level large-scale migration surveys, we see the frst survey in post-independent India was conducted in the southern state of Kerala in 1998. In Table I.8, we can see the chronological order of Kerala Migration Surveys (KMSs). Apart from creating data bank on migration stock, KMSs also touch on issues associated with migration. In the later version of KMSs,

Introduction

17

Table I.8 Chronological order of Kerala Migration Surveys No.

Survey

Year

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Kerala Migration Survey Kerala Migration Survey Kerala Migration Survey Kerala Migration Survey Kerala Migration Survey Kerala Migration Survey Kerala Migration Survey Kerala Migration Survey

1998 2003 2007 2008 2011 2013 2016 2018

Source: Compiled by the author

issues related to left-behind wives, children and elderly relatives experiences due to emigration were studied. After nearly a decade following the frst KMS model of migration surveys, states like Goa (2008), Punjab (2010), Gujarat (2011 and 2012) and Tamil Nadu (2015) have also successfully conducted state-level surveys to estimate inter-state, intra-state and international migration from their respective states. There is also a greater need for sharing the available data to enhance the undertaking of migration from India. Keeping this in mind, data collected from a series of Kerala, Goa, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu migration surveys are available for open access. This step can be considered as one of the signifcant achievements in the era of non-open access of database to the third party. The electronic databases are readily available on the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) webpage17 for anyone interested in utilising it for their research and policy work. I.6.2 Imagining the future: India Migration Survey 2022 The major question that arises to any stakeholder’s mind is the importance and necessity of India Migration Survey (IMS) 2022. India, being perceived as demographically dynamic, will have a large share of its population in the productive age in next 30–40 years. Therefore, labour migration within India and outside is seen as a reliable solution to accelerate the quality of life and development. Hence, the development of datasets by conducting IMS on labour migration statistics should provide a timely response to the economic, demographic and social factors affecting labour migration (see Table I.9 for sample details). Notably, outcomes of IMS will signifcantly contribute to enhancing the capacity of policymakers and also regional dialogues through this proposed evidence-based approach. One of the major concerns

18

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of migration studies in India is the scarcity of data on various aspects like characteristics, migration labour conditions, gender, return migration, recruitment costs and left-behind wives, children and elderly. This national-level survey will also provide an appropriate response to the international call for more quantitative analyses in migration studies. Apart from establishing nation-wide datasets on migration, IMS will help to strengthen the effective governance and regulation of labour migration in India. This work will also support the successful implementation of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development goals (SDGs), which include a target on the protection of migrant workers under the goal of promoting decent work and economic growth (African Union Commission, 2017). This helps to project India’s global commitment and continent-wide development frameworks, which acknowledges and recognises the important role of migrants in transforming India. Overall, the data flls an important knowledge gap for policy makers, the research community and other stakeholders. Table I.9 shows the broad technical framework (methodology) for the proposed IMS 2022. The methodology adopted in the IMS 2022 followed from the successful KMS model which had already been utilised in the implementation of similar projects in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Punjab and Goa. Hence, this methodology will be the best ft for IMS. The gathering of data for this massive all-India survey is planned to be accomplished in a single phase. Another big advantage of this methodology is that the other labour-sending countries in South Asia – like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – can also adopt this model to carry out national-level surveys on migration. On the whole, this process also highlights the technical obstacles impeding data accuracy and comparability across region and countries. The estimated budget of this mega project is USD 1.2 billion. The World Bank reported in 2018 that India retains its top position in receiving remittances with USD 80 billion. This fgure apparently shows how signifcantly overseas Indians, and particularly Indians working in Gulf countries,

Table I.9 India Migration Survey 2022: sample frame based on 2011 census States/union territories

Uttar Pradesh Maharashtra Bihar West Bengal Madhya Pradesh

Population

19,98,12,341 11,23,74,333 10,40,99,452 9,12,76,115 7,26,26,809

Number Number of of households districts (2011) 71 35 38 19 50

3,34,48,035 2,44,21,519 1,89,13,565 2,03,80,315 1,50,93,256

Sample % Sample households household to total sample 71,000 35,000 38,000 19,000 50,000

10.71 5.28 5.73 2.87 7.54

Introduction States/union territories

Population

Number Number of of households districts (2011)

Tamil Nadu 7,21,47,030 32 Rajasthan 6,85,48,437 33 Karnataka 6,10,95,297 30 Gujarat 6,04,39,692 26 Andhra Pradesh 4,93,86,799 13 Odisha 4,19,74,218 30 Telangana 3,51,93,978 10 Kerala 3,34,06,061 14 Jharkhand 3,29,88,134 24 Assam 3,12,05,576 27 Punjab 2,77,43,338 20 Chhattisgarh 2,55,45,198 18 Haryana 2,53,51,462 21 Delhi 1,67,87,941 9 Jammu and 1,25,41,302 22 Kashmir Uttarakhand 1,00,86,292 13 Himachal 68,64,602 12 Pradesh Tripura 36,73,917 4 Meghalaya 29,66,889 7 Manipur 28,55,794 9 Nagaland 19,78,502 11 Goa 14,58,545 2 Arunachal 13,83,727 16 Pradesh Puducherry 12,47,953 4 Mizoram 10,97,206 8 Chandigarh 10,55,450 1 Sikkim 6,10,577 4 Andaman and 3,80,581 3 Nicobar Islands Dadra and 3,43,709 1 Nagar Haveli Daman and Diu 2,43,247 2 Lakshadweep 64,473 1 INDIA 1,21,08,54,977 640 Source: Developed by author

19

Sample % Sample households household to total sample

1,85,24,982 1,27,11,146 1,33,57,027 1,22,48,428 1,27,18,976 96,37,820 83,03,612 78,53,754 62,54,781 64,06,471 55,13,071 56,50,724 48,57,524 34,35,999 21,19,718

32,000 33,000 30,000 26,000 13,000 30,000 10,000 14,000 24,000 27,000 20,000 18,000 21,000 9,000 22,000

4.83 4.98 4.52 3.92 1.96 4.52 1.51 2.11 3.62 4.07 3.02 2.71 3.17 1.36 3.32

20,56,975 14,83,280

13,000 12,000

1.96 1.81

8,55,556 5,48,059 5,57,859 3,96,002 3,43,611 2,70,577

5,000 7,000 9,000 11,000 5,000 16,000

0.75 1.06 1.36 1.66 0.75 2.41

3,02,450 2,22,853 2,41,173 1,29,006 94,551

5,000 8,000 5,000 5,000 5,000

0.75 1.21 0.75 0.75 0.75

76,458

5,000

0.75

60,956 5,000 11,574 5,000 24,95,01,663 6,63,000

0.75 0.75 100.00

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S. Irudaya Rajan

contribute towards their homeland. However, the absence of a comprehensive database on these migrants indicates the “uncaring” attitude towards a highly productive and contributing part of the Indian workforce. Therefore, as we compare their fnancial contribution to the Indian economy, the IMS 2022 requires USD 1.2 billion, which is just 1.5 percent of total remittances to India. To support this project fnancially, the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India should take a lead responsibility, along with the state governments in supporting this project. In addition, the Reserve Bank of India and other nationalised banks should also support this venture by contributing fnancial support, along with private money transfer agencies such as UAE exchange centre. Most of the airlines are huge benefciaries of migration. Air India, along with major players in the Gulf, should support this venture. One should also get support corporate social responsibility (CSR) funding for additional support. International agencies such as World Bank, ILO, IOM and UN agencies should be part of this activity so that the Kerala model of migration survey is replicated throughout the world. Finally, the IMS 2022 dataset can provide a single point of reference for quantitative data and statistics on labour migration in India, which enables better migration governance.

Notes 1 https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/ migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017.pdf (accessed 1 June 2019). 2 www.oit.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed.protect/-protrav/-migrant/documents/ publication/wcms_378239.pdf (accessed 12 June 2019). 3 For an explanation of the OAD database, please see:www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/ [email protected]/Previousproducts/3401.0Appendix2Jul%202017?opendocument&tab name=Notes&prodno=3401.0&issue=Jul%202017&num=&view= (accessed 2 July 2019). 4 For an explanation of the LTIM and its defnitions, please see: www.ons.gov.uk/ peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/ bulletins/longterminternationalmigrantsuk/2017 (accessed 14 August 2019). 5 www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-visas-and-immigration (accessed 15 June 2019). 6 www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/216104/internationalmigration-from-bangladesh (accessed 27 June 2019). 7 www.economist.com/prospero/2018/02/27/monuments-to-the-work-ofbangladeshi-migrants (accessed 17 July 2019). 8 www.bmet.org.bd/BMET/index (accessed 2 August 2019). 9 www.bmet.org.bd/BMET/aboutAction (accessed 2 August 2019). 10 https://beoe.gov.pk/director-general-message (accessed 4 August 2019). 11 https://asiafoundation.org/2018/06/06/nepalese-labor-migration-a-status-report/ (accessed 17 August 2019). 12 The government of India, considering the plight of emigrants, separately created a category called Emigration Check Required (ECR). The main objective in forming this category is to provide safe migration for intending emigrants. Under this category, MEA included 18 countries (accessed 23 June 2019).

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13 Afghanistan, Bahrain, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, UAE and Yemen. 14 https://emigrate.gov.in/ext/static/EmigrateBrochureEng.pdf (accessed 27 August 2019). 15 https://emigrate.gov.in/ext/preViewPdfGenRptAction.action (accessed 27 August 2019). 16 https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=17882 (accessed 16 August 2019). 17 http://cds.edu/research/ru/migrationresearch/migration-survey-data/ (accessed 29 July 2019).

References African Union Commission. (2017). Report on Labour Migration Statistics in Africa in 2015. African Union Commission, Ethiopia. Asia Foundation. (2013). Labour Migration Trends and Patterns: Bangladesh, India, and Nepal 2013. Kathmandu: Asia Foundation. Azam, F. I. (1995). Emigration dynamics in Pakistan. International Migration, 33(3– 4), 729–765. BMET. (2013). Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training. Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment, Peoples Republic of Bangladesh online. Retrieved from: http://www.old.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/stattisticalDataAction. Bélanger, D., and Rahman, M. (2013). Migrating against all the odds: International labour migration of Bangladeshi women. Current Sociology, 61(3), 356–373. Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment. (2018). Export of Manpower Analysis 2018 (Islamabad, Government of Pakistan). Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment. (2019). Export of Manpower Analysis 2018 (Islamabad, Government of Pakistan). Retrieved from: http://www. beoe.gov.pk. Committee on External Affairs. (2019). Issues Relating to Migrant Workers Including Appropriate Legislative Framework and Skill Development Initiatives for Prospective Emigrants. Report 23, Sixteenth Lok Sabha, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. Retrieved from: http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/External%20 Affairs/16_External_Affairs_23.pdf. De, P. K., and Ratha, D. (2012). Impact of remittances on household income, asset and human capital: Evidence from Sri Lanka. Migration and Development, 1(1), 163–179. De Silva, W. I. (2012). Seizing the opportunity: Demographic dividend and economic growth in Sri Lanka. Asian Population Studies, 8(3), 249–250. Deutsche Gesellschaftfür Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, and International Labour Organization. (2015). Labour Market Trends Analysis and Labour Migration from South Asia to Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, India and Malaysia. Retrieved from International Labour Organization website: www. oit.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_protect/-protrav/-migrant/documents/publication/ wcms_378239.pdf. Dias, M., and Jayasundere, R. (2002). Sri Lanka: Good practices to prevent women migrant workers from going into exploitative forms of labour. International Labour Offce: Gender Promotion Programme. Retrieved from: http://www.oit. org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/ wcms_160552.pdf.

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Gamburd, M. R. (2010). Sri Lankan migration to the gulf: Female breadwinnersDomestic workers. Middle East Institute. Retrieved from: https://pdxscholar. library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=anth_fac. Hugo, G., and Ukwatta, S. (2010). Sri Lankan female domestic workers overseas— The impact on their children. Asian and Pacifc Migration Journal, 19(2), 237–263. International Labour Organization. (2015). Labour Migration from Pakistan: 2015 Status Report. Islamabad: International Labour Organization and Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development, Government of Pakistan. International Labour Organization. (2016). Measuring migration costs for lowskilled migrant workers from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) and Lahore School of Economics. (Islamabad). International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2010). Study on Irregular Migration, Kadapa, Andhra Pradesh (Hyderabad, India). Institute of Policy Studies and International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2008). International Migration Outlook–Sri Lanka 2008. Retrieved from: https:// lk.one.un.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/International-Migration-OutlookSri-Lanka-2008.pdf. Islam, M. N. (2015). Gender Analysis of Migration from Bangladesh. Dhaka: Bangladeshi Ovhibashi Mohila Sramik Association. Kumar, B. (2008). Nepal. Asian and Pacifc Migration Journal, 17(3–4), 287–309. Mahmood, R. A. (1995). Data on migration from Bangladesh. Asian and Pacifc Migration Journal, 4(4), 531–541. Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development. (2015). Labour Migration from Pakistan 2015 Status Report. Islamabad. Retrieved from: https:// www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-kathmandu/ documents/publication/wcms_514139.pdf. Rajan, S. I. (2014). Emigration from Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu: A Mapping of Surveys on International Labour Migration from India. Philippines: Migrant Forum in Asia. Rajan, S. I. (2017). South Asia–Gulf migration corridor: An introduction. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), South Asia Migration Report 2017: Recruitment, remittances and reintegration (pp. 19–36). New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. I. (2018). Demography of Gulf region. In M. Chowdhury and S. I. Rajan (Eds.), South Asian Migration in the Gulf (pp. 35–59). UK: Palgrave MacMillan. Rajan, S. I., and Zachariah, K. C. (2019). Panel data analysis in Kerala migration surveys, 1998–2013. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India Migration Report 2019: Diaspora in Europe (pp. 330–343). New Delhi: Routledge. Sharma, S., Pandey, S., Pathak, D., and Sijapati-Basnett, B. (2014). State of Migration in Nepal. Kathmandu: Centre for the Study of Labour and Mobility. Shrestha, M. (2017). Push and Pull: A Study of International Migration from Nepal. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Siddiqui, T., Sultana, M., Sultana, R., and Akhter, S. (2019). Labour Migration from Bangladesh 2018 Achievements and Challenges. Dhaka: RMMRU. Sijapati, B., and Limbu, A. (2012). Governing Labour Migration in Nepal: An Analysis of Existing Policies and Institutional Mechanisms. Kathmandu: Himal Books.

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Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE). (2013). Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment. Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE). (2014). Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment. Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE). (2015). Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment. Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE). (2016). Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment. Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE). (2017). Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment. Sri Lanka. United Nations. (2018). International Migration Report 2017-Highlights. UN. Retrieved from United Nations website: www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_ Highlights.pdf. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). (2013). International Migrant Stock: By Destination and Origin. Retrieved from: www. un.org/en/development/desa/population/ migration/data/index.shtml. UN RCM Working Group. (2012). Situation report on international migration in South and South-West Asia. Asia-Pacifc Regional Coordination Mechanism Thematic Working Group on International Migration, accessed 4 February 2014. Wickramasekara, P. (2016). Review of the Government-to-Government Mechanism for the Employment of Bangladeshi Workers in the Malaysian Plantation Sector. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Yapa, K. (1995). Data on international migration from Sri Lanka. Asian and Pacifc Migration Journal, 4(4), 601–612. Zachariah, K. C., Mathew, E. T., and Rajan, S. I. (2001a). Impact of migration on Kerala’s economy and society. International Migration, 39(1), 63–87. Zachariah, K. C., Mathew, E. T., and Rajan, S. I. (2001b). Social, economic and demographic consequences of migration on Kerala. International Migration, 39(2), 43–71. Zachariah, K. C., Mathew, E. T., and Rajan, S. I. (2003). Dynamics of Migration in Kerala. New Delhi: Orient Longman. Zachariah, K. C., and Rajan, S. I. (2008). Migration and Development: The Kerala Experience. New Delhi: Danish Publishers. Zachariah, K. C., and Rajan, S. I. (2015). Dynamics of Emigration and Remittances in Kerala: Results from the Kerala Migration Survey 2014, Centre for development studies (Thiruvananthapuram). Working paper No. 463.

1

Gendered migration and its impacts on women’s agency and resilience in Pakistan Ahmad Shah Durrani and Ayesha Qaisrani

1.1 Introduction The development discourse is increasingly exploring the migration–resilience nexus, especially in the context of communities prone to crises (Scheffran et al., 2012). Indeed, recent studies have found that households with at least one migrant member – usually male – have more stable fnancial positions, expanded opportunities for investment in physical and human capital, improved stocks of knowledge, skills and social capital, and, hence, greater resilience than households with no migrants (Salik et al., 2017; Scheffran et al., 2012). However, in exploring migratory impacts at the household level, these studies tend to overlook the work on migration from a gender lens, which may infuence female autonomy positively or negatively (Ullah, 2017). Male out-migration may enhance female autonomy through more economic empowerment and decision-making authority (Hugo, 2000); or it may impact them adversely through a rise in responsibilities without any change in their autonomy (Gioli et al., 2014). In fact, in South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular, women – who are excluded from migration processes and required to remain behind in sending communities in predominantly caregiving roles after the migration of other (usually male) family members – often contend with mobility restrictions, limited decisionmaking authority and control over household resources, poor labour force participation and limited community participation once their husbands or other male guardians migrate (Paris et al., 2005; Gioli et al., 2014). These constraints can effectively reduce women’s individual capacity to respond to crisis events, and may also have bearing on resilience at the household level, as well. Acknowledging this gap, the present study seeks to put forward a gendered view of the migration–resilience nexus and argue for the mainstreaming of gender in crisis management policies and programmatic action. Using qualitative information gathered from twenty women in food-affected households from Dera Ghazi Khan (D. G. Khan) and confict-affected households displaced in Bannu, the authors highlight: i) changes in gender roles and female agency wrought by male migration; and ii) the impact of these changes on resilience at the individual and household levels. The

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authors fnd that male migration improves resilience at the household level in terms of improved fnancial position and expanded opportunities to invest in human and physical capital. However, the role of intra-household dynamics and family structure was critical in determining the extent of this improvement. As explored in this study, respondents were better able to invest in their children’s health and education (i.e. human capital) if they lived independently and did not have to contend with competing demands on household income prevalent in a joint family system. Further, while female respondents living independently experienced increased decisionmaking authority and control over household income and resources, they still faced restrictions on mobility and employment, causing them to rely heavily on husbands and other male family members, both in day-to-day life and in the context of crisis events. In this context, it is imperative to highlight constraints on agency of women for more gender inclusive and betterinformed resilience planning and crisis management mechanisms. Against this background, this study explores changes in the fnancial, social and political empowerment of women through the lens of access to and control over resources, agency and achievements through a qualitative approach, and proposes policy actions for making the resilient building process more gender sensitive.

1.2 1.2.1

Literature review Gendered migration and left-behind women’s agency

The study of labour migration and its impacts has evolved into three major strands. The frst strand focuses on the impacts of migration on those migrating within and across international borders, both male and female (McEvoy et al., 2012, 370). The second and third strands of this feld study how migration impacts migrant-receiving areas (Mohapatra et al., 2010) and migrantsending areas (Katseli et al., 2006, 25–33), respectively, especially from a social and development context. While the gender perspective has received an in-depth exploration in the frst two strands of literature previously mentioned, considerably less attention has been paid to women staying behind in sending communities after their husbands have migrated in search of work (Desai and Banerji, 2008, 337). Yet, there is signifcant evidence that migration processes are highly selective of men. This is especially true of developing countries, where women with migrant husbands are required to stay behind and look after the family unit in origin areas (Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009, 482). Only 42% of all transnational labour migrants from developing countries are women (Kenny and O’Donnel, 2016).1 Similarly, in countries like India and Pakistan, women are more likely to remain in their places of origin, even if their husbands have migrated to another state/province within the country (Desai and Banerji, 2008, 337; Gioli et al., 2014; Salik et al., 2017).

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Such patterns of migration are reinforced by a confuence of economic, socio-cultural, legal-institutional and policy-level factors. The process of labour migration occurs in a wider social context where migration decisions are taken by the family – not the individual – as a risk-minimisation strategy (Haas and van Rooij, 2010). Women, especially from rural areas, thus lack access to resources essential for migration (i.e. information, funds, asset ownership and social networks), which are usually controlled by other, usually male members of the family (United Nations, 2011). Labour market conditions for women migrants – placement in a defned set of ‘female occupations or positions that do not always match their qualifcations, lower average wages compared to men working in the same jobs, unemployment and underemployment, etc. – also ensure that families are more likely to support the migration of male members as a more viable investment option (Boyd and Grieco, 2003; Fleury, 2016). At the same time, families often assign women subordinate, caregiving roles, which are reinforced by gender norms that restrict ‘good wives/women’ from migrating or venturing outside the home (Fleury, 2016). Finally, laws, immigration policies and institutions in both origin and destination countries serve to restrict women’s migration. A number of labour-exporting countries have laws that restrict women’s mobility and their ability to migrate inside and outside the country without the permission of male guardians (Fleury, 2016; Boyd and Grieco, 2003). Similarly, many labour-importing countries have enacted immigration policies that make it easier for women to immigrate as spouses or dependents of male migrants, while also restricting women migrants from legally sponsoring their husbands’ immigration (Desai and Banerji, 2008). These factors continually reproduce gendered patterns of migration whereby women stay behind in places of origin after migration of their husbands or other male relatives. Literature on this group of women, a relatively recent addition to the feld of migration studies, has focused on whether male migration has emancipatory effects on the lives of women remaining behind, especially in terms of their: i) role and decision-making power in the household; ii) access to and control over resources; iii) mobility; iv) involvement in community and social networks; and v) labour force participation. Some studies have found a positive relationship between male migration and the emancipation or autonomy of the women remaining behind. Studying Albanian women whose husbands were both current and past international migrants using nationally representative housing and living standards measurement data, Mendola and Carletto (2009) found that, over time, male migration in households had the effect of increasing female paid self-employment and decreasing unpaid work. Using demographic data from seventy villages in Bangladesh, Hadi (2001) found that male migration had the effect of improving the decision-making authority of non-migrant wives and leading up to take up new roles within male domains. Similarly, in the rural Sunderbans of India, a qualitative study found that male migration expanded the agency of wives

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remaining behind in terms of their control over household fnances, mobility, and role in household and community decision-making, especially among women living in nuclear families (Bose et al., 2017). However, many studies have found a negative or ambiguous relationship between male migration and the emancipation of women remaining behind, especially in developing countries. A qualitative study conducted in Armenia and Guatemala found that while non-migrant women fulfl additional responsibilities in the wake of their husbands’ migration, both the nature and scope of these tasks serve to reinforce male dominance and female subordination within the household (Menjívar and Agadjanian, 2007, 1260–1261). In Mexico, a study of women observed an intensifcation of their domestic and market labour after their husbands’ migration to the US. Additionally, the study found that women’s market labour integrated them into transnational migration networks, which supported their husbands in leveraging economic opportunities as migrants abroad. However, the intensifcation of women’s labour brought on associated stresses of balancing family and work life, also called the ‘double-burden’. While women functioned as key enablers in the process of transnational migration, they were largely not involved in the migration decisions made by their husbands, refecting limited decision-making power and an overarching economic dependence on men. Women also experienced limited mobility after their husbands’ migration, partly because their families’ dependence on transnational migration networks required them to behave in socially sanctioned ways (Kanaiaupuni, 2000). Moreover, a mixed-methods study conducted in rural Mexico found that women, who were previously restricted to domestic tasks in the private realm, began taking on formerly male responsibilities in public after their husband’s migration, such as shopping and buying household provisions, supervising part-time male agricultural labour on family farms and representing the family at monthly communal assembly meetings. However, their role in communal assembly meetings was limited to observation, their mobility was restricted due to community policing and their interactions outside the home and with ‘other’ men brought on a sense of discomfort among women – especially due to fear of being seen as transgressing their gendered ‘place’ within the community, which was associated with moral impropriety. The level of remittances also structured the experience of women remaining behind, with low or sporadic remittances being associated with feelings of abandonment, marriage dissolution and, eventually, a community-sanctioned search for a new partner – in part, as a strategy to ensure herself and her children can access resources for survival (McEvoy et al., 2012). Evidence of a negative or ambiguous relationship between male migration and women’s autonomy is especially compelling in the Middle East and North Africa. In Morocco, Sadiqi and Ennaji (2004) found that male migration increased women’s independence in managing household fnances, especially if they lived away from their in-laws, and making decisions about their children’s education. It also increased their likelihood of fnding work and becoming

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involved in savings and investments decisions for the household. However, women whose husbands were unable to send a suffcient and steady stream of remittances were less likely to experience these positive effects. Additionally, their restricted access to external fnancing, family land and other productive assets exposed them to fnancial shocks. Another study in Morocco found that the increased tasks and responsibilities undertaken by women after male migration are perceived by women as a burden (Haas and van Rooij, 2010, 59–60). In urban Lebanon, Hjorth (2011) found that male migration did increase the likelihood of women’s labour force participation; however, this typically occurred when women’s work was necessary to fulfl basic household needs in addition to the husbands’ income. Respondents of the study reported an increase in responsibilities inside and outside the home; however, these were usually perceived as burdensome and often limited women’s ability to work outside the home. The increase in women’s responsibilities also did not typically translate into increased decision-making authority, with husbands being consulted in all major fnancial decisions and women being given autonomy over routine expense-related decisions only, a privilege they exercised even before their husband’s migration Finally, a study in Egypt conducted by Elbadawy and Roushdy (2010) found that male migration had a positive effect on women’s ability to make autonomous decisions about primarily household matters; however, this effect diminished once their husbands returned. The South Asia region provides further evidence of the negative or ambiguous relationship between male migration and the autonomy of women remaining behind. A nationally representative survey in Nepal found male migration and the increase in household income due to remittances to reduces female labour force participation by 5.3%, especially among women aged 25–35 living in households with relatively large land-holdings (Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009, 504). In India, Desai and Banerji (2008) found a more context-based relationship between male migration and autonomy of the women remaining behind, with respondents in their sample experiencing an increase in workload and autonomy only if they lived independently, i.e. away from in-laws. A multi-country study of women with migrant husbands from Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco, Egypt and Indonesia also found that women living with in-laws did not have many opportunities to exert control over household fnances and decision-making, while women living independently experienced an increase in work activities outside the home, greater mobility and increased confdence in their own ability to manage household affairs. However, even women living independently were exposed to some kind of policing arrangement, with important aspects of their own and their family’s lives being dictated by husbands remotely (Ullah, 2017). Finally, a mixed-methods study in the Upper Indus Basin of Pakistan found that male migration did not increase women’s control over household income, but reinforced the gendered division of labour, under which womens’ work was restricted to unpaid caregiving work and agricultural work on family-owned farms (Gioli et al., 2014, 263–264).

Gendered migration, impacts in Pakistan 1.2.2

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The migration–resilience nexus: a gender perspective

Resilience is generally understood as the capacity of a system to withstand shocks or disturbances resulting from social, political or environmental change over a given time period (Adger, 2000; Bahadur et al., 2015). The concept has been defned in diverse ways across both the natural and social sciences (Bahadur et al., 2013), with most defnitions differing in terms of normative focus of the author and the scale, context and temporal dimension of the system under analysis (Moser, 2008). Despite these variations, there is also a great deal of convergence in terms of how the concept is understood. There is now growing consensus that the resilience of a system derives from the interplay of its human and ecological dimensions, owing to the strong interdependency between social and ecological landscapes (ibid.). A number of characteristics common to all resilient systems have been identifed, which include a high degree of equity, diversity, fexibility to change, suffcient preparedness for uncertainty, multiple interconnections at different scales of the system, meaningful community involvement, equitable distribution of power and resources between different actors, and the existence of decentralised and inclusive institutions for governance (Bahadur et al., 2013). The resilience of a system has also been explained in terms of its interlinked capacities to: i) prepare for the potential impacts of different shocks or hazards before they have occurred (anticipatory capacity) (Kellet and Peters, 2014); ii) cope with the immediate impacts of different kinds of shocks once they have occurred (absorptive capacity) (Folke et al., 2010); and iii) adjust to the longer-term impacts of different kinds of shocks and learn how to reduce their harmful outcomes (adaptive capacity) (Malone, 2009). The concept of vulnerability has been employed to address a tendency within traditional resilience thinking to underplay the role of agency and equity in explaining the variable impacts of shocks between and within communities (Ravera et al., 2016; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004). More recently, the concept of transformation – defned as changes that overturn power imbalances which create and sustain vulnerabilities among different groups – has been useful in addressing gaps in the ‘3As’2 framing of resilience and the overall ‘systems thinking’ orientation of resilience studies (Ravera et al., 2016), particularly its tendency to overlook issues of “people, politics and power” and “cross-scalar trade-offs” that shape the way a system responds to shock (Bahadur and Tanner, 2014). Employing the traditional framing of resilience, researchers have studied how migrant households and sending communities respond to shock. A study in lowland coastal Vietnam found that migration and remittances helped offset the various adverse impacts of policy and structural-economic changes on community resilience by spreading risk and broadening opportunities for private investment in human and physical capital (Adger et al., 2002). Similarly, a multi-country review of projects conducted in northwest Africa found that migration enabled the transfer of knowledge, technology and remittances

30 Ahmad Shah Durrani and Ayesha Qaisrani from host to origin communities, thereby strengthening resilience of the latter (Scheffran et al., 2012). While these two cited studies found a positive relationship between migration and resilience at the community level, a study of three districts in the semi-arid basin of Pakistan found evidence to back theories of a ‘migration–resilience nexus’ at the household level (Salik et al., 2017). Using a livelihoods resilience index, the study found that anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive capacities were all higher in migrant as compared to non-migrant households, due to higher and more diversifed incomes and assets, better standards of living, more developed skillsets, stronger social networks and greater access to information within the former. More importantly, within the context of this study, migrant households, as a whole, were found to be more resilient than their non-migrant counterparts, despite evidence that migration reinforced gendered division of labour and the traditional status of women within households. In terms of policy implications, these studies on the migration–resilience nexus point towards facilitating migration both as an adaptive response to actual shocks and as a vehicle for enhancing resilience to potential shocks through knowledge and resource transfer within migrant-sending communities (Scheffran et al., 2012) – in spite of the potentially adverse impacts of gendered migration processes on women’s decision-making power, employment, access to resources, mobility, and integration within community and social networks. Yet, a “gendered view of resilience” (Smyth and Sweetman, 2015a, 2015b) entails an emphasis on the “intra-household dynamics” (of which gender relations are a subset) that shape different aspects of both individual and household resilience in times of crisis (Kiewisch, 2015). It is widely perceived that female-headed households are generally worse off than maleheaded households in terms of poverty (Moghadam, 1997; Chant, 2008) and therefore they are more vulnerable to adverse events. However, there are differences in the experiences of households if categorised in terms of de facto or de jure female headship. For instance, Chant (1997) found that de facto female-headed households have a higher per capita income than de jure female-headed households. A less explored dimension is the gendered vulnerability to shocks and adverse events for female-headed households or households whose males have migrated out leaving behind their families (Klasen et al., 2010). Some studies such as Moghadam (2005) and Chant (2008) found that females and female-headed households are more prone to shocks and adverse events. Response capacities to shocks are undermined owing to their limited ownership of resources such as land and assets, limited mobility and limited access to productive capitals such as credit and insurance markets, the labour market, social networks, etc. (Klasen et al., 2010). Traditional barriers to women’s equality within households and society – i.e. the gendered division of labour and limited decision-making power in households, restricted mobility and access to fnancial services and paid employment outside the home, little or no control over productive assets,

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and lack of meaningful participation in collective and public forums – tend to decrease women’s capacity to resilience by limiting their access to critical sources of knowledge, fnancial safety, leadership opportunity and social capital in times of crisis (Sterrett, 2016; Drolet et al., 2015; Le Masson et al., 2015). Shocks, climate-related or otherwise, can effectively exacerbate these mentioned barriers to women’s equality in family and public life, thereby further reducing their resilience during or after crisis event (Le Masson, 2016; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014). There is also a signifcant risk that post-crisis responses by government and non-government agencies unknowingly reinforce gendered differences in patterns of resilience within households and communities, due to: i) women’s limited visibility and participation in public and institutional settings (Sterrett, 2016); and ii) crisis response agencies’ failure to include women’s voices and address women-specifc needs in planning and delivery processes (Drolet et al., 2015). In areas prone to crises, such as armed confict and natural disasters, experiences of women with migrant husbands may differ from those whose husbands are present. Wijk (1997) studied the vulnerabilities of female-headed households during times of confict in Sri Lanka and Cambodia. He found that coping strategies of female-headed households at times of confict are weakened by the absence of men, thereby raising concerns of security against violence, access to services and resources, gender-based humiliation, etc. Recently, Atinga (2016) stated that confict tends to reinforce patriarchal traditions, lowering women’s agency further. Similarly, Sultana (2010) studied gendered vulnerabilities during times of food in Bangladesh and also concluded that societal norms emphasise marginalisation of women at times of natural disasters such as foods. This is also refected in the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (Olsson et al., 2014), which stated that existing gender inequalities tend to exacerbate during times of climate extremes. In light of this, it is assumed that femaleheaded households are generally more at risk during foods. Nevertheless, as concluded by Klasen et al. (2010), female-headed households are not homogenous and their vulnerabilities are defned by whether the female headship is de facto or de jure, with de jure female-headed households being more vulnerable. Despite this, it is critical to understand that at times of adverse shocks such as confict and natural disasters, factors that make up resilience such as institutions, resources and adaptive facilitators are disrupted and households may face varying degrees of stress to recover from the shock (Bujones et al., 2013). Recognising that there is a dearth of evidence on experiences of left-behind women whose husbands have migrated, this study aims to explore changes in gender roles and women’s agency as a result of male out-migration. Additionally, applying a qualitative lens, this study also attempts to identify differential vulnerabilities of such women at times of crisis, such as natural disasters and armed confict.

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1.3 Analytical framework This study aims to fll existing research lacunas in the interlink between gender and migration by analysing: i) how gendered migration processes affect the lives of left-behind women (specifcally, in terms of their decisionmaking power, mobility, control over resources, employment and integration within community and social networks); and ii) how the gendered impacts of migration shape the women’s resilience and their ability to respond to crisis. We approach the concept of resilience through an agency lens and link adaptive, absorptive and anticipatory capacities and transformation in agency to resilience in a crisis situation (Bahadur et al., 2015). Following this framework allows us to conduct a deep dive into the intra-household power dynamics, shaped by social structures, economic factors and political processes (ibid.). The framework offers insight into understanding shifts in women’s agency, if any, as a result of male out-migration via changes in household headship, mobility, labour force participation, access to and control over resources, decision-making power and community participation that is integrated in a wider system of macro-, meso- and micro-level contexts (Starr and Tabaj, 2015). We defne resilience in terms of adaptive, anticipatory and absorptive capacities and transformation (Bahadur et al., 2015). For analysis, we take guidance from various studies that have imbued resilience in the framework of agency and rights (Walsh-Dilley et al., 2013) and positive transformation (Bahadur et al., 2015). Applying these intersecting frameworks at a microlevel offers detail about the intra-household changes in gender dynamics that may otherwise be masked in community- or household-level analysis.

1.4 Situational context: gender roles and migration in Pakistan In Pakistan, the status of women varies across age, class and ethnography, and is defned by the interplay of socially, religiously and culturally prescribed gender norms with other forms of exclusion in the society (ADB, 2000). The country is strictly guided by patriarchal values that guide the division of gender roles and responsibilities. Men, as the breadwinners of the family, engage in the public arena, while women, with their reproductive and caregiving roles, stay confned to the private realm (Shah, 1986, 24). The notion of ‘honour’ and the institution of ‘purdah’ are prime factors restricting the role of women within the private sphere and limiting their mobility (ADB, 2000; Bhattacharya, 2014). Socially constructed productive roles ascribed to men direct the allocation of household resources in ways that improve men’s capacities of engaging in the public arena and job market, while women are often trained in domestic skills to prepare them to be good mothers and wives (Babur, 2007). This defnes women’s reliance on men for social and economic support and the male dominance that shapes decision-making authorities (ADB, 2000).

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In the Pakistani context, women’s access to resources is limited and their control over productive resources is even more confned. Participation rates in formal labour markets are low, and many working women are often engaged in low-paying jobs, mostly falling in the informal labour market category (ADB, 2016). In rural areas, women are quite often engaged in agricultural activities such as livestock rearing, seed bed preparation, weeding, harvesting, etc., but despite this involvement, they are considered as mere ‘helpers’ in the feld to their male counterparts and are given limited remuneration for their work (Samee et al., 2015). An important factor restricting women’s involvement in paid work is her limited mobility dictated by cultural norms and beliefs (ADB, 2016). Women who are engaged in work outside the realm of her house, especially in formal labour market, are often labelled as ‘unrespectable’ in the society (World Bank, 2006). Migration, although a common livelihood strategy in Pakistan, is largely gendered and is dominated by men. A recent study carried out in the rural areas of semi-arid districts of D. G. Khan, Faisalabad and Mardan found that in a sample of about 600 households, 49% had a migrant member and 93% of those migrants were males (Salik et al., 2017). Studies such as Hamid (2010) state that internal migration is largely dominated by women, but it should be noted here that this type of migration refers to the movement for family unifcation (largely through marriage) rather than for labour market activities. Migration as a livelihood strategy is still largely practiced by men and is driven by factors such as low income gains from farming, limited alternative opportunities in the villages and lack of availability and low quality of basic services, etc. (Salik et al., 2017). Much of the literature on migration in Pakistan has focused on drivers of migration, patterns of migration and impacts of migration on poverty (Gazdar, 2003; Memon, 2005; Hasan and Raza, 2009; Hamid, 2010; Kanwal et al., 2015). Gender considerations, if included, cater to creating an understanding of the type and trends of migration adopted by men and women (Memon, 2005; Hamid, 2010). Hence, there is a paucity of empirical investigations into the impact of male out-migration on left-behind family members, especially on women (wives of migrants) in Pakistan.

1.5 1.5.1

Methodology and study sites Methodology

This study is based on primary data collected in September 2017. The study was undertaken in the disaster-prone district of D. G. Khan and the confictprone district of Bannu in the semi-arid regions of Pakistan. Both areas are strongly patriarchal and largely tribal. One village in each district was selected with the purposive identifcation of high incidence of male labour migration and incidence of crises (foods in D.G. Khan and confict in Bannu). The study relies on qualitative data, gathered through in-depth interviews with

34 Ahmad Shah Durrani and Ayesha Qaisrani twenty rural women (ten in each district) whose husbands had migrated out of the villages. The interviews were aimed at drawing information regarding the differences in women’s responsibilities and empowerment in terms of decision-making (fnancial, social and political) and accessing resources before and after their husband’s migration with the purpose of understanding changes in the intra-household gender roles. The information gathered provides insight into the motivations of migration and the process of coming to the decision to migrate. The discussions also touched upon the respondents’ social capital, in terms of the support of family and community since their husbands’ migration and the overall welfare effect of the migration on the household, as well as on the respondents’ personal life. Challenges and opportunities that have arisen for the left-behind women were also highlighted through targeted questions. One of the key features of this study is that it elucidates women’s experiences during times of crises such as armed confict and foods, in the absence of their husbands. A comprehensive interview guideline was developed, contextualised for the two study districts, based on the different types of crises experienced there. The study does not differentiate between internal and international migration, as the purpose of the study is to understand the experiences of left-behind women who live without their husbands, while their husbands work outside the village (either in a city within Pakistan or in another country). The study does not claim to be representative of the whole country; it rather aims to present a small case study of changes in gender roles and agency of women in the absence of their husbands in two rural areas, while especially probing into their experiences of managing a crisis situation without their husbands. Content analysis was used for drawing out themes from interviews that formed the basis of the results. The study also draws on national- and local-level statistics taken from secondary sources, and extensive literature review to contextualise the fndings. 1.5.2 Bannu district profle The district has an estimated population of 6.7 million, with 6.3 million rural and 0.4 urban inhabitants (Khan, 2009). The rate of poverty is 38.16%, putting the district in the middle of district-wise poverty rankings in Pakistan (Arif, n.d.). Female-headed households display a higher incidence of poverty (41.37%) than traditionally male-headed households (37.08%) (ibid). The literacy rate in the district is low at 32.11%, with the male literacy rate at 34% and the female literacy rate at 10% (Khan, 2009). Unemployment rate in the district is high at 24.22%, with a majority of the workforce employed in agriculture (39%), followed by skilled and unskilled labour (23.7%), services (9.2%), and crafts /skilled trades (6%). The major economic sectors are agriculture, horticulture, leather, textiles and wool-spinning, and food processing, with a total of thirty-three industrial plants in operation, mostly in the leather processing sector (ibid.).

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The district has historically seen successive waves of internal migration, with Wazirs from neighbouring Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Niazis and Abbas is from Mianwali in Punjab forming the secondary tribes in the area alongside the native Banusi tribes (ibid.). In June 2014, after the start of a military operation in the neighbouring tribal agency of North Waziristan, around 85,000 families (an estimated 0.8 million people) were displaced and took up shelter in rented accommodation and spontaneous settlements in the district (The Express Tribune, 2016; Tanqeed, 2016). Initial rapid assessments of the displaced populations needs found that 95% of families experienced disruptions in income and livelihoods sources, 73% experienced diffculties in accessing relief (31% of whom reported lack of national identity cards as the main reason), and a majority of those affected lacked information on the registration process and available services. The rapid assessment also reported that female-headed households were largely excluded from relief distribution (Coordinated Assessments, 2014). 1.5.3

Dera Ghazi Khan district profle

The district has an estimated population of 2.5 million, with 2.16 million residing in rural areas and 0.35 million in urban areas (IMMAP, 2013). The rate of poverty is 44.04%, with the incidence of poverty higher in femaleheaded households (46.36%) than in traditionally male-headed households (42.81%) (Arif, n.d.). The literacy rate of the district is 43% (IMMAP, 2013). In terms of human development, the district is ranked thirtieth of thirty-fve districts in Punjab (Qasim and Chaudhary, 2015). A majority of the population relies on agriculture, and the penetration of industry in the district is limited (Directorate of Industries, 2009). Most of the labour force is employed on a daily wage basis in agriculture, fshery, retail trade and construction (Government of Punjab, 2009). Agriculture in the district is affected by the dry arid climate, and is highly susceptible during monsoons due to fooding by the nearby Indus river, which causes widespread crop damage and soil erosion (Government of Punjab, 2015). The district experienced massive foods during 2010 and continues to be inundated by food waters on a periodic basis annually. As per a rapid assessment conducted by UN (2010) during the foods of 2010, 191 villages were affected in D. G. Khan. This resulted in the damage and/or destruction of about 13,917 houses in the district and a total of 24,760 acres of cropped area came under food water. Inundation remained for ffty-fve days after the foods frst hit (SUPARCO and FAO, 2010). According to a situational assessment conducted by Save the Children (2010) right after the foods, it was reported that food-affected women faced issues of privacy, hygiene and sexual harassment at the temporary shelters where they were residing. The same assessment also reported that 77% of respondents had their homes destroyed.

36 Ahmad Shah Durrani and Ayesha Qaisrani

1.6 Findings 1.6.1

Respondents’ profle

In order to understand the shifts in females’ agency as a result of their husbands’ migration, it is important to understand the profle of women respondents included in the survey. The average age of respondents was 38.5. The average age of left-behind females in D. G. Khan was slightly younger (33.5 years) than of Bannu (42.5 years). On average, the respondents had limited education. Of ten respondents in D. G. Khan, four were illiterate, three had primary level of education (up to grade 5) and three had completed their matriculation. Of the ten respondents in Bannu, fve were illiterate, two had primary level education, two had completed their matriculation and one had completed a BA degree. Out of twenty respondents from both the regions, only six were involved in economic activities and earning an income, while the rest were housewives and were not involved in income generating activities. In D. G. Khan, two of the three earning women were tailors and earned on average 3,000 PKR per month (approximately USD 30). Two of the three working women in Bannu were school teachers, earning on average PKR 35,000 per month (approximately USD 350), and one was involved in the health sector as a polio worker, earning about PKR 15,000 (approximately USD 150). The time since husband’s migration varied drastically with cases as recent as a few months since husband’s migration to as long as thirty years since the husband has migrated. As many as ffteen migrants have moved to the Middle East, while only fve have migrated domestically to other areas. For a majority of them, unemployment at region of origin or low income were the main drivers of migration. 1.6.2 Household headship, decision-making, mobility and control over resources Results show that for the most part, the respondents were not consulted in the decision to migrate, but rather informed once their husbands had decided where and when to migrate (usually by the husbands themselves). In contrast, the in-laws of the respondents (either parents-in-law or brothers-inlaw) were consulted by the husbands before deciding to migrate. Only in fve cases did the husbands consulted their wives before deciding to migrate. The main reasons why the respondents and their children stayed behind was that it was too expensive for them to move as most families had to use savings or take loans to fnance the migration of the respondents’ husbands. Secondly, the families were settled in their own houses in the villages and wives had to take care of their children and in-laws. One important factor considered in the husband’s decision to migrate was the existence of a close-knit, joint family setup that provided support to the left-behind wives to manage the household in the husband’s absence

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in most cases. Eleven out of twenty respondents lived in a joint family setup (living with extended family members, mostly in-laws). It was interesting to note that seven respondents only started living as a nuclear family unit after their husbands’ migration. Only two respondents lived independently even before their husbands’ migration. In D.G. Khan, three out of four families living as ‘nuclear units’ shared the house with other family members but ran their own kitchen. We live separately. We have a common house, but we run our own unit. It’s been a year or two since we live independently. Before that, we lived in a joint setup. Even now, if there is any need, we do share and help each other. –Bano, 43, D. G. Khan A desire to have control over the household matters was evident as the main factor that led some families to move out of a joint system to a nuclear family unit in Bannu. Niaz, 40, Bannu, stated: I now live independently. But before migration, I lived in a joint family. I decided to move out because I wanted more control over household affairs. Twelve women reported that they are the de facto household head in the absence of their husbands. They assumed this responsibility only after their husbands’ migration and in some cases, only after moving out as an independent family unit. However, this headship does not mean that these women are the sole breadwinners. In most cases, they rely on money either coming from their husbands as remittances or from the contribution of their older sons who are engaged in earning activities. In joint family setups, the father or-brother-in-law was the household head; in some cases, even before the husband’s migration. In fact, those who started living independently after their husbands’ migration stated that the decision was made so they could enjoy more control over household resources such as fulflling their own and their children’s needs. Those living independently expressed that they had to take over all the responsibilities in the husband’s absence. There was a mixed response to how capable the women consider themselves in managing the household matters. Those living in a joint family setup usually had very limited control over monetary matters and decisions outside the private sphere. In households where decision-making was limited for women, some women (n = 3, all from Bannu) expressed that although they consider themselves capable of running the household, the family members – specifcally, the in-laws – never put their trust in them to manage the household. However, in matters related to taking care of children and other household management within the realm of the house, some women

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expressed that they have only become confdent in running the household with time and because of their husband’s confdence in them. Those living independently stated that they consider themselves capable of managing household affairs on their own. One respondent from Bannu stated: No, I did not (consider myself capable of running the household), but my husband did. I only became more confdent in my abilities after moving out of my in-laws’ house and in to this home. –Zarmina, 55, Bannu In many joint family units, female autonomy over daily household activities also varied. In D. G. Khan, for example, some women had to rely on other household members (mostly men) even in deciding what to cook, as it depended on what groceries they brought home. In most cases, however, both in D. G. Khan and Bannu, women enjoyed some degree of autonomy in deciding what to cook. In family matters, such as how many children to have, only seven women reported that they were asked about their preference; the rest of them expressed that it was their husband’s decision. In matters related to childrens’ schooling and healthcare, women enjoyed limited autonomy, and even though they were consulted in the decision, their independent decision was only observed in three cases from Bannu and two from D. G. Khan. Considering the social customs of the areas, even for the nuclear families, women are not able to go to healthcare facilities for their children or themselves unaccompanied, so the role of extended family – especially fathers or brothers-in-law – was evident here. While women enjoyed greater freedom in making decisions related to daily household purchases in most cases, owing to their limited mobility, they still had to rely on men of the household to purchase these items. It was observed that migration of the husband introduced some level of autonomy to women for control over productive resources. Before the husbands’ migration, only one woman reported having control over her husband’s income; however, post-migration, eleven women responded experiencing an increase in the control over households’ financial resources, although it was noticed that most women only attained control over these resources after moving out to live independently or after their parents-in-law’s death. In fact, aside from death of the joint family head, competition over household resources emerged as the primary reason why respondents decided to begin living independently. This observation was also substantiated by respondents who continued living in the joint family system. In most joint family systems, complete control over fnances and productive resources is still limited for women. Even for women living independently, use of resources for strategic decisions and uses (such as purchase of land, investment, etc.) is still managed by their husbands. For decisions regarding sale and purchase of property and renovation

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of house, very rarely were women consulted, and mostly, the men of the household made these decisions. It was interesting to note that in terms of mobility for accessing social facilities such as healthcare, children’s school, government services or even visiting friends or family, there was no observable difference in women’s autonomy even after their husband’s migration. In most cases, the mantle of authority only shifted from the husband to another family member, either elder in terms of relation (mother-in-law) or a male household member, generally father or brother-in-law. In many cases, women reported that they still have to seek permission from their husbands on the phone before moving about in the locality. One respondent, who initially lived with her inlaws and later began living independently, reported routinely consulting her husband over the phone when leaving the house to undertake certain tasks. Before migration, I required my husband’s permission every time I left the house, whether for buying daily provisions, visiting the hospital/ clinic, going to the houses of friends or neighbours, or getting work done in a government offce. My children have from a young age walked to school themselves. After migration, I required my mother-in-law’s permission before leaving the home for routine things, like buying groceries or going to work. However, for all other things I still require my husband’s permission over the phone. –Rozina, 32, Bannu It was observed that extended family members, specifcally the parents or brothers-in-law, play a crucial role in in household decision-making. For most cases, especially in D. G. Khan, the involvement has continued even after the husband’s migration. Only in cases where the families started living independently after migration did the involvement of other family members decline. In joint family systems, the extended family’s interference is taken as a norm and intra-household power dynamics prevail even after the husband’s migration. 1.6.3

Impact of migration on household wellbeing

Generally, most respondents observed an improvement in their households’ fnancial position as an outcome of their husbands’ migration. Women reported progress in the standard of education and healthcare that they are now able to provide to their children. As many as seven women reported that the remittances sent back by their husbands have helped their families in investing in building their own house. My husband was able to save enough to buy a house. It is also much easier to fulfl our household needs with his extra income. –Zubeda, 40, Bannu

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Four women reported that with their husband’s migration, they have experienced an increase in their independence, which has immensely boosted their confdence. I am responsible for all things inside and outside the home now. I take our of our family investments, and manage the orchard we have planted. This also involves dealing with non-mahram workers. On matters related to investment in fxed assets, I consult my husband over the phone. Although he has the fnal word in such matters, he trusts me to give him good advice. –Shamshad, 57, Bannu On the other side, most women agreed that their responsibilities both inside and outside the home had increased, while only a few stated that their responsibilities have not changed with their husband’s migration – all of whom were women who continued living in a joint family arrangement. Most women felt excessively burdened by the increase in their responsibilities, with only three women refecting on this positively. There was not an observable change in women’s employment activities after husband’s migration. Only one respondent in Bannu reported that she joined the labour force after her husband’s migration. When asked why they did not work, respondents cited a number of different reasons, such as not needing the additional income, not being allowed to work by husbands or other family members, not being able to balance work and family life, and not fnding work nearby. The last two reasons were also substantiated by the two working respondents in our sample, who said the greatest diffculty they faced in working was travelling in public and balancing their domestic and professional duties. Most women expressed that responsibility of bringing up children in their husband’s absence was the greatest challenge they faced. Another important concern was dependence on extended family members for fulflling daily requirements. Many women, though admiring the support they received, complained that they feel uncomfortable in asking other men for favours for tasks outside the home. Restricted mobility and the need for asking their husbands for permission before going out in case of an emergency were also voiced as major concerns they experience in the absence of their husbands. Particularly in Bannu, women expressed that they have taken on additional responsibilities of managing the external and internal matters of the house, for which they have to deal with external men. Dealing with external men (outside of one’s family) is looked down upon in the conservative, rural societies, so this additional responsibility is considered particularly troublesome by many women. Women also expressed the loss of affection and care received by their children and themselves, as well as their husband in the destination area as a negative outcome of their husband’s migration.

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Largely, women reported that they are comfortable with their husband’s decision to migrate and believe that they are able to manage the added responsibilities well. However, in terms of tasks that require public interaction or going outside the house, they voiced their concern of relying on relatives for helping them, which some women viewed as a discomfort, while others acknowledged the important role of social relations in helping them at times of their husband’s absence. Generally, the betterment brought about by the fnancial improvement of their household and the comparative improvement in autonomy was observed to be the main factors of their satisfaction. Yet, if analysed subjectively, though the husband’s migration has improved overall households’ standards and may have improved households’ resilience, the impact on subjective resilience of women left behind is not linear and may not always improve with husbands’ migration. 1.6.4

Community interactions and women’s agency

Most respondents were not aware of any community-level associations for collective problem solving in their villages. Some reported that even if any such forums exist, they generally are comprised of men and do not involve female members. In Bannu, however, fve women reported the existence of some informal associations such as local jirgas, water-sharing associations and forums to solve electricity failure issues. However, it was reported that before migration, their husbands represented their families in such forums. In their absence, their family is not represented in them. All the respondents reported that even if such forums exist, voices of women are not taken into account by the community, as evidenced by the fact that they are not represented in these associations. In terms of family representation in social gatherings and community events, some respondents in D. G. Khan (n = 3) expressed that they now represent the family at such occasions, and this has also boosted their self-confdence. However, in most cases, women reported that their voice is not heard and their opinions are not given importance in community matters. Exploring community perceptions of women living without their husbands, this study found that generally the community considers women living with their extended families more respectable as compared to those who live on their own. This perception was observed to be more common in Bannu than in D. G. Khan, where women reported that the community does not differentiate in its perceptions. At the same time, those living independently were considered more self-reliant, and thus, less of a burden than those living with their extended families. Tehmina, 28, from D. G. Khan stated: People’s behaviour does not vary. It is the women’s own experience that varies. Those living with in-laws have support from them in their work and care duties for children. Those living independently have to manage everything alone.

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In terms of differences between women living without their husbands owing to different reasons such as migration of husband, death of husband or divorce, it was generally observed that in D. G. Khan, divorced or widowed women were considered more in need of help and support than those whose husbands were working away from village. Women with migrant husbands were generally considered better off than divorced and widowed women. I think divorced women are looked down upon, but widowed women are sympathised with because people understand circumstances are not in their control. Women with migrant husbands are generally thought of as well-off and not in need of much help. –Shamshad, 57, Bannu It was reported that there are no formal mechanisms to help women who are living without their husbands, but informal social networks comprised of relatives, friends and family help them in times of need. The more marginalised women also receive charity through the Islamic mechanism of zakat. However, none of the women in the study sample reported receiving any charity in the form of zakat; they received support from their relatives at times of need. In general, respondents from D. G. Khan spoke positively about the community’s role in helping them in their husbands’ absence. A major factor in the supportive attitude of the community towards each other is the fact that most of the community members are related, thus their social ties are strong. However, a number of respondents from Bannu – who lived in neighbouring North Waziristan before their confict-induced displacement – also refected on the option of receiving external help from the local community with discomfort. This is most likely because, having been displaced from another region, they were not fully integrated in kinship and other social networks in Bannu, where they are now residing. 1.6.5 Women’s agency and resilience during crisis A major feature of this study is that it refects on women’s resilience at times of crisis, especially for those women who experienced these events in the absence of their husbands. Women’s resilience at such times is determined in terms of positive or negative changes in her agency as an outcome of the crises and is pivotal in shaping overall households’ resilience, which ultimately contributes to community resilience. For the purpose of analysing changes in women’s agency at times of crisis, we have purposefully targeted those geographical areas within semi-arid Pakistan that have experienced such situations in terms of confict (district Bannu) and natural disasters (district D. G. Khan). Both situations, owing to their varying nature and scales (slow-onset vs. sudden-onset crises) offer important insights into women’s agency and resilience in the context of crisis-induced displacement, disturbances in livelihood activities, shifts in responsibilities,

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changes in access to basic services and existence or lack of institutional mechanisms and existence of community support at times of confict and climate-related disasters. Thirteen respondents had experienced one or the other form of crisis situations in the recent past that led to displacement from their homes. Four had experienced a confict that sprang up in 2014 in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, as a result of an armed military operation against terrorists, while nine respondents in D. G. Khan had experienced massive foods of 2010. The dynamics of both crises differ. Respondents from Bannu who had experienced armed confict reported that they received a warning days in advance of the military action. Those who received a warning a month in advance reported that they had suffcient time to pack up and relocate, while those who were warned in less than ffteen days in advance reported that they did not have adequate time to make all the necessary arrangements. In addition, security checkpoints on the way and route restrictions made relocating all the more diffcult. Sadkamala, 40, Bannu defnes the situation in the following words: We were informed ffteen days in advance. But this was not enough time to pack our belongings, take our livestock or fnd temporary shelter along the way. Due to the clogging of routes, we had to stop in fve different places along the way. During this time we lacked even basic medical facilities, due to which one of my sisters-in-law died in labour. In contrast to this situation, respondents in D. G. Khan reported being informed about the approaching food just hours in advance before it hit. They only had time to pack up a few important things and had to leave in a hurry. Those feeing from confict zones also had suffcient time to make arrangements for new place of residence well in time, while those escaping from the food zones had to make emergency arrangements, often involving multiple relocations, as well. In both situations, however, there were clear gender differences in division of responsibilities. Women were responsible for protecting and packing up household essentials, while men were responsible for making arrangements for evacuation, shelter and place of relocation. In most cases, the husbands were already in the village or had not migrated when the crisis situation arose. However, in cases when the husband was away, it was noted that in the confict setting, as the early warning was made well in advance, migrant husbands were able to return home to assist their families. However, as food is a sudden-onset disaster, and the early warning was made only a few hours in advance, it was not possible for the husbands to return home to their families in time, especially for those who were working abroad. Nevertheless, even in the absence of the husband, arrangements for transport as well as new place of residence were managed by men. In cases when the husband was not around, male family members and relatives ensured those arrangements.

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It was interesting to note the importance of social capital at times of distress in both situations. From the viewpoint of women, those whose husbands were not around were helped by other male family members for transport and evacuation facilities. For making these arrangements, men also relied on their social contacts in other areas to facilitate the movement. Most women responded that their family members arranged a car with the help of their friends living in another town or city. At the new location, these social contacts were the main facilitators in providing accommodation and assisting with basic needs. However, the role of community members at the point of crisis was limited, as everyone was busy fending for themselves. In both areas, respondents reported that the presence of government provided relief services at the time of crisis in the form of shelter, ration packs, monetary aid, health facilities and rebuilding of houses (in the food zones). Not all respondents reported using those services, though, as they considered themselves self-suffcient or relied on their social contacts and networks for support. An important fnding in this regard, however, is that the government provided services were only accessible to women if they were accompanied with their husbands or other male members in both areas. In most cases, only the men’s names were registered by the government. Moreover, women’s restricted mobility due to social norms and security reasons did not allow them to approach these facilities on their own. In terms of impact on livelihoods, although all those affected by the crisis situation experienced loss or disturbance in their livelihoods as a result of destruction caused by confict or food, those whose husbands had migrated before the crisis faced lesser fnancial strain as those whose economic activities were still based in the village. In that sense, their household resilience during times of crisis was higher than those whose husbands had not yet migrated. However, it does not undermine the support and facilitation available in terms of responsibility sharing when the husbands are around. As stated by Bano, 43, D. G. Khan: Of course, if my husband was around, he would have taken the responsibilities of his kids himself. I had to ask my brothers or brothers-in-law to help us. It was diffcult. On inquiring if respondents felt a change in their existing responsibilities in the aftermath of the crisis situation, it was reported that women did not experience any major shifts in their duties. However, some women did voice discomfort in undertaking their existing responsibilities at the temporary place of residence. Furthermore, they had to invest more time in caregiving activities in such situations if any family members faced health issues. Managing your family out of your comfort zone is diffcult. It was a new place and we wanted to get home. –Sajida, 42, D. G. Khan

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It was deduced that women’s individual agency during crisis situations was very low. On inquiring how they would be able to deal with a crisis situation if one ever occurred again, all women responded that they have not planned on how to manage on their own. They stated that they would not be able to cope with a crisis and manage arrangements in an emergency situation if they do not have support from either their husbands or their male family members.

1.7 1.7.1

Discussion Male migration and its impact on female agency

Our fndings show that respondents had little to no decision-making infuence in the household before their husbands’ migration, especially in matters related to childbearing, household fnances and investment in assets. More critically, at the time of their husbands’ migration, respondents were generally not consulted regarding the migration decision. In contrast, the involvement of other family members in the migration decision – mothers-in-law, by virtue of age, and brothers-in-law, by virtue of gender – was observed more frequently across our sample. Additionally, the involvement of these family members, in terms of mobilising capital, information and social networks, could be the reason why they were given more weight as compared to the respondents themselves. Given how most respondents lived within a joint family arrangement at the time of migration and after, these other family members were key enablers of the migration event by taking responsibility for the respondents and their children in the absence of the de jure family head, i.e. the male migrant. Taking care of other members of the family (especially parents-in-law) is a major reason why respondents did not accompany their husbands during migration, alongside the prohibitive costs of settling in a distant land. These fndings support literature that consider migration processes to be gendered due to a confuence of different factors (Boyd and Grieco, 2003; International Organization for Migration, 2009; Desai and Banerji, 2008; Fleury, 2016). First, we observed that the migration event was generally only made possible by the presence of other family members – usually male but sometimes elder females, such as mothers-in-law – who took the husband’s place as the household head once he had migrated and were responsible for the wellbeing and supervision of his wife and children. Within this context, women (wives of migrants) were primarily assigned a subordinate caregiving role, which was cited by most respondents as the reason for not accompanying their husbands during migration. A majority of respondents also cited diffculties in fulflling this caregiving role as the central challenge they faced post-migration. These fndings lend support to literature on the gendered impacts of migration (Desai and Banerji, 2008), which not only excludes women from migration fows but also subordinates them to other

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family members of the family in a primarily subordinate, caregiving capacity, thereby reinforcing the traditional hierarchy and gendered division of labour in households. Second, we observed the role of intra-household dynamics in shaping the gendered impacts of migration, which, as found in Haas and van Rooij (2010), was undertaken as a family enterprise, with other non-migrant family members mobilising savings, credit services and access to information and social networks to fund and reduce the transaction costs of the migration event. This explains why we consistently observed consultation and involvement of other family members – especially the respondents’ in-laws – in the migration decision. In contrast, few respondents were consulted in the migration decision by their husbands or other family members, and given their subordinate status in the rural household and society and its associated lack of access to sources of credit, information and social capital (United Nations, n.d.), respondents were generally not involved in facilitating the migration process by tapping into social networks critical for reducing transaction costs of the migration event, as found in Kanaiaupuni (2000). Within this context, male migration was observed to have limited effect on the decision-making infuence, mobility, control over household resources and labour force participation of respondents living in joint families. In some cases, such respondents did not even have complete autonomy over deciding what to cook on a daily basis, with their options being dictated by what male relatives (usually acting as the household head in place of the migrant husband) had purchased that day. While women living in joint families reported having greater infuence over daily household purchases post-migration, this is not an area that women were excluded from pre-migration, and hence cannot be considered as an expansion in decision-making authority (Hjorth, 2011). By contrast, there was limited change in respondents’ infuence over decisions related to sale/purchase of durable goods and productive assets, which remained limited or non-existent even after their husbands’ migration. Respondents living in joint families also did not enjoy greater autonomy over deciding where their children would attend school or receive healthcare, with these decisions being made by the (usually) male household head, acting in place of the migrant husband. In most cases, respondents currently or previously living in joint families reported diffculties in ensuring their children were being provided the best possible healthcare and education postmigration because they could not infuence joint family spending decisions in the same way as their husbands. This seems to substantiate research on the role of gendered ‘intra-household’ competition for resources in shaping patterns of household expenditure, which often disadvantage female members (Kiewisch, 2015). Further, contrary to studies that found a positive relationship between male migration and left-behind women’s labour force participation (Hadi, 2001; Mendola and Carletto, 2009) and mobility (Bose et al., 2017), we observed that respondents’ ability to move outside the home was controlled by other household members, such as mothers-in-law or brothers-in-law,

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even after the migration of husbands. This was naturally accompanied by a limiting of respondents’ responsibilities outside the home, with male family members and household heads taking the lead in these areas instead. The subjection of respondents to such policing arrangements and mobility restrictions was consistent with the fndings of other studies, which argue that male migration has a largely negative effect on female agency, and may even lead to the imposition of new restrictions on the wives of migrants that may not have existed earlier (McEvoy et al., 2012). The role of policing and mobility restrictions was also evident in restricting respondents’ labour force participation. Most respondents were not part of the labour force, either before or after their husband’s migration, citing family restrictions, caregiving responsibilities at home and a lack of employment at a suitable proximity to home as the main reasons why they did not work. Furthermore, the only respondent who started working after the husbands’ migration – a de facto household head – did so primarily because the amount he remitted back was not suffcient to run the household, suggesting that there is a negative relationship between male migration and female labour force participation, especially at higher levels of remittance income (Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009). The fndings also support authors who claim that male migration reinforces the gendered hierarchy and division of labour in the household by increasing women’s involvement in unpaid caregiving work (Gioli et al., 2014). At the same time, we found some evidence to support theories that male migration can increase women’s responsibilities, decision-making and control over household resources, thereby creating a context for longer-term transformation of left-behind women’s agency and intra-household gender roles (Hadi, 2001; Mendola and Carletto, 2009; Bose et al., 2017). Twelve respondents reported an increase in their responsibilities inside and outside the home, especially in previously male domains such as management of household fnances and buying daily provisions. This is consistent with the fndings of Hadi (2001), which show that male migration led left-behind women to take on roles in previously male-only domains; in addition to the fndings of Bose et al. (2017), which show that male migration improved left-behind women’s control over household fnances, among other effects. Additionally, while eighteen respondents lived in the joint family arrangements before their husbands’ migration, seven of them eventually moved out and began living independently post-migration. This change in family structure and household headship was accompanied by an increase in confdence and management skills within respondents, primarily because they began taking on new responsibilities in areas where they were previously excluded, especially in relation to the management of daily expenses and buying of household provisions. Respondents living independently also enjoyed greater control over their husbands’ income post-migration, specifcally once they had moved out of joint family homes. Numerous authors (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2004; Desai and Banerji, 2008; Bose et al., 2017; Ullah, 2017) argue that

48 Ahmad Shah Durrani and Ayesha Qaisrani male migration tends to increase female agency in contexts where left-behind wives live independently. However, there are reasons to doubt whether these changes are transformational. First, respondents living in joint families primarily reported an increase in their domestic caregiving responsibilities, rather than increased participation in economic or social activity outside the home. This is consistent with claims that male migration reinforces the gendered hierarchy and division of labour within traditional households (Menjívar and Agadjanian, 2007; Gioli et al., 2014). Second, even respondents who moved out of the joint family setup post-migration were not fully comfortable with the increase and qualitative change in their responsibilities. Most respondents felt uncomfortable by the change in their responsibilities post-migration as in Hjorth (2011), primarily because of the increased burden of tasks and greater interactions with ‘other’ men. And, while respondents refected positively on their increased selfconfdence, improved skills in household management and increased control over household income, their decision to leave the joint family arrangement did not result in them becoming household heads in the de jure sense (Klasen et al., 2010). In fact, the autonomy these respondents enjoyed in terms of making “strategic life choices” (Kabeer, 1999) – e.g. movement outside the home, childbearing and management of household assets – did not change, even after they moved outside the joint family arrangement, indicating that their household headship is merely a de facto arrangement and likely to be rolled back upon the return of the husband (Elbadawy and Roushdy, 2010). Another reason why the respondents’ transitions to de facto household headship cannot be seen as transformational is their continued deference to husbands on range of different matters. For example, we found that husbands continued to dictate decisions related to investments and the management of household assets remotely, similar to other studies that found a negative relationship between male migration and female agency (Hjorth, 2011). Respondents living independently also required the permission of their husbands – obtained telephonically – for leaving the house in emergencies or when supervising non-mehram men (i.e. men who are not blood relations) to undertake agricultural work or repairs around the house. While they felt that this often added to their diffculties in managing the home, they also emphasised the importance of acting in socially sanctioned ways (Kanaiaupuni, 2000), especially because they depended on male family members or other community members for many tasks undertaken outside the home. Thus, while the responsibilities, control of household income and decision-making authority of respondents who began living independently post-migration did increase, other changes accompanying the husbands’ migration served to reinforce male dominance and the gendered division of household responsibilities, both inside and outside the home (Menjívar and Agadjanian, 2007).

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1.7.2 Male migration and gendered household resilience Assessing resilience in terms of anticipatory capacity for households with male migrants showed mixed results, primarily based on the nature of the crises witnessed. For instance, in Bannu, the relatively slow onset and prior information of the impending confict allowed respondent households to plan their response in advance. In contrast, in the wake of a sudden onset disaster such as foods in D. G. Khan, respondents depicted limited preparedness to deal with such a situation. The fact that most respondents admitted that they would not have been able to deal with the crisis situation if they did not receive male family members’ help portrays a limited improvement in their anticipatory capacities for risk management. Nonetheless, we found evidence that male migration enhanced absorptive and adaptive capacities in our sample at the household level, contributing to overall resilience of the household. Respondents stated that they were better able to absorb the disruption in household income in the aftermath of the crisis event due to the remittances their husbands sent back. They also reported increased disposable income, especially if their husbands had migrated transnationally, and ability to invest in various fxed and productive assets, including homes, and commercial and agricultural land, which improved their ability to absorb and adapt to shocks at the household level (Salik et al., 2017). However, this effect was more pronounced in households where women became de facto heads and lived in nuclear family units. After moving out of the joint family home post-migration, these respondents were better able to invest in children’s healthcare and education, which in the long run adds to the adaptive capacity of the household (Himes-Cornell and Hoelting, 2015). By contrast, women who continued living in a joint family were less able to invest in children’s healthcare and education, primarily because without their husbands, they had less control over the division of household resources. In fact, this emerged as the primary reason why women in our sample began living independently sometime after their husbands’ migration. This suggests that while there are some improvements to household resilience as a result of male migration, the degree of improvement in agency is highly contingent on family structure and intra-household dynamics (Kiewisch, 2015). Women’s agency is more likely to improve when leftbehind families have a nuclear structure, with fewer competing demands on household income than in a joint family. This agency translates into a better ability to invest in children’s health and education, which has a signifcant bearing on resilience at the household level. However, the increased resilience of de facto female-headed households stemming from their post-migration investments in human and physical capital was offset by other factors, at both the individual and household levels. In our sample, both women living independently and in joint families experienced restrictions on their ability to engage in formal employment

50 Ahmad Shah Durrani and Ayesha Qaisrani and move outside the home, which, in turn, increased their dependence on their husbands’ remittance income and the support of family members to undertake many tasks in the public sphere. The responses we observed on questions pertaining to community perceptions of respondents – i.e. women with migrant husbands – also indicated that they had less access to informal sources of fnancial assistance from the community in times of need, primarily because they were perceived to be better off than others who could not rely on the remittance income of their husbands. Restricted mobility and reduced access to employment and other forms of fnance all diminish women’s resilience during times of crisis (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014). In fact, one unemployed respondent reported being forced to live with relatives in Bannu for an extended period after feeing her hometown in North Waziristan during the military operation of 2014 because her husband was unable to send her remittances at the time. Similarly, mobility restrictions on respondents that continued even after the onset of crisis meant that they were only able to access critical relief and rehabilitation services through their husbands – who returned to take responsibility their families during the immediate aftermath of the crisis – or other male family members. Further, when asked about factors that were essential to shaping their household’s resilience (Jones and Tanner, 2015), respondents – even de facto household heads – professed to having very little authority or capacity to determine how their households would respond during crisis. In fact, they reported they would not have been able to cope with the crisis without the support of their husbands and other male family members, indicating that their own individual resilience is highly conditioned by gender. Resilience at the household level was also impacted more directly after the migration of respondents’ husbands. In the absence of husbands, respondents’ households were largely not represented on community-level forums for decision-making and dispute resolution, with potentially adverse consequences for household resilience by reducing access to critical information, shared resources and informal safety nets in times of crisis (Tschakert and Dietrich, 2010). This was especially concerning because our study revealed the absence of formal social safety mechanisms in both Bannu and D. G. Khan, especially those geared exclusively towards women. In the absence of formal safety nets, respondents predominantly relied on informal kinshipbased safety nets at the community level. However, it is likely that heavy reliance on kinship-based safety nets and external support causes left-behind women to act in socially sanctioned ways (Kanaiaupuni, 2000), thereby reinforcing the limitations on female agency after male migration. Nevertheless, in the context of D. G. Khan, where respondents continued living in and around their origin communities even after being displaced by the foods, these kinship-based safety nets were vital sources of household resilience, ensuring access to shelter, food, fnance and critical emergency services. However, in Bannu – where respondents were displaced into areas where

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their kinship networks were not as widespread – these informal social safety mechanisms were less effective.

1.8

Recommendations and conclusion

The positive effects of male migration on women’s agency – in terms of decision-making authority and control over domestic resources – were observably shaped by family structure and gendered intra-household dynamics. Women’s agency in the wake of male out-migration also determined their resilience in times of crisis, which did not improve with household resilience. As evident in the accounts of respondents who moved out of the joint family home after their husbands’ migration, left-behind women’s control over fnancial resources (household income and remittances) and ability to invest in their children’s education and healthcare was limited by competing demands over joint household resources by members of the extended family. The resilience of households experiencing male migration can thus further be improved through gender-sensitive policies and programmatic action that improve women’s fnancial decision-making power and control over household resources (Sterret, 2016), such as direct cash transfers to women with migrant husbands, regardless of whether they are household heads. Even in de facto female-headed households, limited female labour force participation, mobility and community participation served to offset the positive impacts on household resilience. Households were still largely dependent on remittances, especially when crisis had disrupted other income fows, and if the stream of remittances was ever interrupted, as observed in one case, this severely impacted household coping capacity. Similarly, mobility restrictions on respondents reduced the likelihood of their households being represented on informal community-level decision-making forums and made them dependent on male family members – and, in some cases, husbands – for undertaking tasks outside the home. These include many critical tasks in the aftermath of a crisis event, such as evacuation, fnding shelter and accessing critical sources of information, relief services and aid. These fndings indicate the need for including gender analyses in vulnerability and capacity assessments in the aftermath of crisis events (Morchain et al., 2015). Finally, respondents reported that having a migrant husband decreased their chances of obtaining fnancial assistance, such as charity, from informal community channels. While households in which respondents were displaced within origin communities could rely on kinship-based social safety nets, respondents displaced outside origin communities were more adversely impacted by the lack of informal fnancial assistance. The lack of formal safety nets and support networks, especially those targeted at women, was also more severely felt in these households. In this context, there is a need for establishing women-specifc self-help groups and social networks to help women access critical sources of support during times of crisis. These groups and networks can also serve as important avenues of promoting women’s leadership and

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voice at times of crisis, especially in the context of government and multilateral disaster response efforts (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014).

Notes 1 This gap is even more pronounced in countries such as Pakistan and Egypt, where gender inequality is prevalent in almost all spheres of life. 2 The ‘3As’ framework refers to resilience defned in terms of adaptive, absorptive and anticipatory capacities, as coined by Bahadur et al. (2015).

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SUPARCO, and FAO. (2010). Pakistan: Flood/Rains 2010 Rapid Crop Damage Assessment. Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission. Food and Agirculture Ogranisation. Retrieved from www.suparco.gov.pk/ downloadables/PAKISTAN_FLOODRAIN.pdf Tanqeed. (June 2016). Suspect Citizens Special Series: Reckoning with Zarb-e-Azb by Shah Shuja and D. Wazir. The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2014). The South Asia Women’s Resilience Index: Frequently Asked Questions. The Express Tribune. (June 27, 2016). High Rise Buildings: The Answer to Urban Slums by Dr Nadeemul Haque/Ali Salman. Business. Tschakert, P., and Dietrich, K. (2010, June 15). Anticipatory Learning for Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience. Retrieved January 21, 2018, from www. ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art11/ Ullah AKM Ahsan. (2017). Male Migration and ‘Left–behind’ Women: Bane or Boon? Environment and Urbanization Asia, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1–15. National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA), SAGE Publications. United Nations. (n.d.). www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/ events/coordination/3/docs/P01_DAW.pdf. Retrieved January 21, 2018, from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/coordination/3/ docs/P01_DAW.pdf United Nations. (2010). Rapid Flood Assessment of D. G. Khan Division and Rahim Yar Khan District. UN OCHA. Retrieved from http://foods2010.pakresponse. info/assessments/Punjab_Floods_Rapid_Field_Assessment_7-9_Aug10.pdf United Nations. (2011). International Migration Report (2009). A Global Assessment. Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/ migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2009.pdf Walsh-Dilley, M., Wolford, W., and McCarthy, J. (2013). Rights for Resilience: Bringing Power, Rights and Agency into the Resilience Framework. Oxfam America. Retrieved from www.atkinson.cornell.edu/Assets/ACSF/docs/collaborations/ oxfam/R4R%20Conceptual%20Framework.pdf Wijk, D. V. (1997). How Female Heads of Household Cope with Confict: An Exploratory Study in Sri Lanka and Cambodia, Save the Children, Humanitarian Practice Network. World Bank. (2006). Women’s Work and Movement into the Public Sphere, World Bank.

2

Productive vs. consumptive uses of remittances by households Evidence from Chitwan Valley of Nepal Prem Bhandari

2.1 Introduction This study examines the productive and consumptive uses of remittances by remittance-receiving households of a migrant-sending setting of rural Nepal. Specifcally, this study investigates: does the extent to which the amount of remittances is being used in various productive and consumptive dimensions of household activities vary by the amount received by a household? To empirically answer this question, this study uses detailed household level data from a rural migrant-sending setting of southern Nepal. Out-migration of youths from poor rural agrarian societies to rich, industrialized societies has been a global phenomenon. In 2015, there were 244 million international migrants globally (3.3% of the world’s population) – an increase from an estimated 214 million people in 2010 (IOM, 2017; 2010). Internal migration is even more prevalent. In 2009, more than 740 million people had migrated within their own country of birth. As the volume of outmigration is increasing, the fow of remittances in migrant-sending countries is also increasing. According to the (IOM, 2017), the volume of remittances increased to US$249 billion in 2016 from US$74 billion in 2000. Studies on migration, more recently, have focused on the consequences of out-migration and the uses of remittances in both receiving as well as sending countries (Jokisch, 2002; de Brauw, 2007; Seddon et al., 2002; de Brauw et al., 1999; Adams, 2011). The use of remittances in productive and/or consumptive purposes has received much attention and is a highly debated issue. Some scholars believe that a large proportion of the remittances received in developing countries are used for consumption (Adams, 2011; Massey and Basem, 1992; Brown and Ahlburg, 1999; Seddon, 2004; Hoermann and Kollmair, 2009; Reichert, 1981). These scholars argue that remittances are used to fulfll consumption needs. In contrast, other scholars argue that remittances are an important source of household income, and the earned income from remittances is invested in productive activities (Penninx, 1982; Beijer, 1970; Kindleberger, 1965; Taylor and Yunez-Naude, 1999). Others report that the households receiving remittances use remittances for consumptive as well as for

Productive vs. consumptive remittances

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productive purposes (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Taylor and Martin, 2001; Stark, 1978; Stark and Levhari, 1982; de Haas, 2007). Despite these arguments, there is a dearth of empirical evidence. Cognizant of the debate, this chapter attempts to address the gap by empirically investigating the uses of remittances in various productive as well as consumptive dimensions of household activities, using the recently collected survey data from rural Nepal. More specifcally, this chapter investigates whether the amount of remittances received by households is associated with the productive vs. consumptive uses of remittances. I argue that the use of remittances in various dimensions of productive and consumptive uses is associated with the amount of remittances received by a household, net of all other theoretically important controls. Additionally, this chapter investigates what other household factors may be associated with the amount of use of remittances in various household activities.

2.2

Background: migration and remittances in Nepal

Nepal has a long history of migration. Nepal, once the melting pot of Indo-Aryan ancestry origin migrants from the south and Mongolian-origin Tibeto-Burmese from the north now has turned into one of the major migrant-sending economies. The country experienced rapid growth in internal migration during 1950s, when the Nepali government opened the Terai region (southern plains) for settlement. This southern Gangetic plain also termed as “the granary of the country” is highly fertile and suitable for agriculture. Since then, the internal migration tremendously increased especially from the hills and mountains (Kandel, 1996; Gerard, 2003; Gurung, 1998; Shrestha, 1990). Labor migration of Nepali youths for international destinations formally began in 1815 with the recruitment of youths in The British Brigade of Gurkha – units of the British Army that were composed of Nepalese soldiers (Rathaur, 2001; Gurung, 1983; Thieme and Wyss, 2005). Such a small labor migration, however, was not a viable option until the promulgation of the Foreign Employment Act in 1985 by the government of Nepal to destinations other than India. This Act licensed non-governmental institutions to export Nepali workers abroad and legitimized certain labor contracting organizations. This expanded migration streams outside of India (Kollmair et al., 2006; Thieme and Wyss, 2005). Estimates suggest that there may be as many as three million Nepalis, or about 10 percent of the total population, working abroad (World Bank, 2009; Government of Nepal, 2071 [2014]). In 1997, about 100,000 migrants were estimated working outside of Nepal (excluding India) (Seddon et al., 2002). The 2011 population census reported about 2 million individuals as migrants (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012). More recently, migration has been a rite of passage and a matter of social status and prestige for individuals (Thieme

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and Wyss, 2005). Over 1,500 Nepalis move outside of Nepal everyday (Pattison, 2014; Kern and Muller-Boker, 2015). Undocumented migration outside the country, which is also very high, is diffcult to estimate precisely. As the volume of out-migration is increasing, the volume of remittances received by migrant-sending households is also increasing over time in Nepal. In 2015, Nepal received 6.6 billion US$ of remittances from outmigration (World Bank, 2016). Remittances from out-migration accounted for about 29 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the country in 2014 (World Bank, 2016). This account does not include the remittances through informal channels. In 2014, Nepal was the third largest remittance recipient in its contribution to GDP in the world, was after standing sixth in 2011 (World Bank, 2011; 2016). Nepal is the largest remittance recipient country in South Asia. Remittances have become an important source of household income for Nepalis (Adhikari, 2001; Hoermann and Kollmair, 2009; Seddon et al., 2002; Sharma and Gurung, 2009). A vast majority of rural households receive remittances from both internal and international migrants (Hoermann and Kollmair, 2009; Seddon et al., 2002; Sharma and Gurung, 2009; Pant, 2008). The Nepal Living Standard Survey (2011) reported that 56 percent of the households in Nepal received remittances (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). In addition, in a study recently conducted in the western Chitwan Valley, of the total migrant households (n = 185), 75 percent (n = 139) reported that the household received remittances from migrants in the previous 12 months (Bhandari and Chaudhary, 2016). Nepal Living Standard Survey 2010–2011 estimates that a household received NRs 80,436 (in nominal terms) in the form of remittances. This estimate comes to be NRs 9,245 in terms of per capita nominal remittances when the whole population is considered. In 2014–2015, the ffth Household Budget Survey (2014–2015) estimated that on average, a household’s share of remittances in its monthly income was NRs 5,304 (17.6 percent of the total average monthly household income of NRs 30,121). According to this survey, the remittance was the third (17.61 percent) most important source of a household’s monthly income (NRs 30,121) after salary, wages, allowance and pension (30.26 percent) and business income (24.43 percent) (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2016). In rural Nepal, it was the second most important source of household income. In the study setting of Western Chitwan Valley, Bhandari and Chaudhary (2016) reported an average annual remittance income of 150,5621 NRs (US$1,505) remittances in a year (NRs 12,546 or US$125 per month). Half of the migrant households received NRs 100,000 (median) per year (or NRs 8,333 per month). Among remittance-receiving households, a household on average received 200,388 NRs (US$2,004) in a year (NRs 16,700 or US$167 per month). The median for the remittance-receiving households was NRs 140,000 per year (or NRs 11,667 per month). Although these numbers in 2013 are not comparable to those of NLSS 2010–2011 due to

Productive vs. consumptive remittances

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difference in year of data collection, both these numbers (mean and median) are slightly lower for both migrants as well as remittance-receiving households of Chitwan.

2.3

Uses of remittances in productive vs. consumptive purposes

Scholars and policy makers around the globe are increasingly concerned about the uses of remittances by migrant-sending households in developing countries. Although both productive vs. consumptive uses of remittances are of central importance, existing studies offer conficting views on the uses. The proponents of the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory argue that migrants are an important source of household income. This earned income from remittances is invested in productive activities (Penninx, 1982; Beijer, 1970; Kindleberger, 1965; Taylor and YunezNaude, 1999). For example, Adams (1998) found that in rural Pakistan, international remittances signifcantly contributed to the accumulation of irrigated and rain-fed land or productive investment assets. Adams attributed this to the tendency of households to spend remittances on land, which offers a higher rate of return than non-farm assets such as vehicles, bikes, etc. Oberai and Singh (1980) and Ecer and Tompkins (2010) also found that some amount of remittances is spent on productive investments such as the purchase of land, farm equipment, and raw materials such as seeds and fertilizers for farming. Those who advocate for negative contribution of remittances argue that a large proportion of the remittances received by households in developing countries are used for consumption. These scholars argue that remittances are used to fulfll consumption needs such as food consumption, construction of houses, and spending on feasts, funerals, weddings, and medical bills rather than in production (Rempel and Lobdell, 1978; Taylor, 1999; Lipton, 1980; Koc and Onan, 2004; Oberai and Singh, 1980; Ecer and Tompkins, 2010). Other scholars argue that the remittances-receiving households use remittances not only for consumptive purposes, but also in productive investments as well (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Taylor and Martin, 2001; Stark, 1978; Stark and Levhari, 1982; de Haas, 2007; Eversole and Johnson, 2014). In a study in the Philippines, Eversole and Johnson (2014) found that the remittancereceiving households used remittances for consumption activities, productive investments, and human capital-enhancing investments such as health and schooling. Bhandari and Chaudhary (2016) further reported that the remittance-receiving households used remittances in a variety of productive and consumptive purposes. Given the subsistence nature of household livelihoods in Nepal, it is also believed that a large proportion of it will be invested in consumptive purposes.

62 Prem Bhandari Using multiple sources such as the Nepal Labor Force Survey; Nepal Living Standard Survey; National Migration Survey, Thailand; Northeast Migration Follow-up Survey, Thailand; the Migration Surveys in Low Income Countries: Guidelines for Survey and Questionnaire Design (Bilsborrow et al., 1984); Mexican Migration Survey (https://mmp.opr. princeton.edu/); various scientifc articles and based on our own survey (Bhandari and Chaudhary, 2016), the following productive and consumptive dimensions of household activities have been identifed and analyzed.

2.4 Uses of remittance: empirical evidence from rural Nepal 2.4.1

The study setting

The data comes from a pilot study felded in 2014 (see for details Bhandari and Chaudhary, 2016) in the western Chitwan Valley, which lies in the south central part of Nepal. Before the 1950s, the valley was primarily covered with dense forests and was infamous for malarial infestation. In 1956, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, in collaboration with the United States government (international cooperation assistance), implemented a malaria eradication program and distributed land parcels to people coming from adjoining districts of the country. The fat terrain with its highly fertile soil and warm climate offered promising opportunities for people who were struggling with the steep mountain slopes. Chitwan’s central location and relatively well-developed transportation network have been the catalytic forces for turning it into a hub for business and tourism. This has resulted in a rapid proliferation of government services, businesses, and wage labor opportunities in the district (Shivakoti et al., 1999). Chitwan, once known as a “death valley,” soon became a melting pot, receiving people from all over the country. Currently, the valley is inhabited mostly by in-migrants, especially from pahad, i.e., the hill and mountains and other adjacent Terai districts including India. Chitwan has experienced dramatic changes in population mobility, transitioning from a frontier destination for in-migrants from surrounding hill districts of Nepal to one of the country’s major migrant-sending districts. Once a migrant-receiving setting has now been turned into a migrantsending area. According to the 2011 census (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011), as many as 29 percent (27 percent for Nepal) of the households reported that at least one member was absent from household. About 9 percent (Nepal = 7 percent) population were reported to be absent of which 16 percent (Nepal = 13 percent) were males and 2 percent (Nepal = percent) were females.

Productive vs. consumptive remittances 2.4.2

63

Data

The data for this study comes from a pilot study conducted in 2013. The migrant-sending households come from 30 randomly selected geographic clusters also called the neighborhoods. The neighborhoods are the lowest level sampling units chosen. The study area of the western Chitwan Valley was frst divided into three different strata based on the approximate distance from Narayanghat, the urban center of the Chitwan District, to select a representative sample of neighborhoods. Stratum 1 included areas nearest to Narayanghat, stratum 3 included areas farthest from it, and stratum 2 included areas in between. The samples were selected at two stages (Barber et al., 1997). In the frst stage, in each stratum ten settlements were randomly sampled based on probability proportionate to size, thus making a total of 30 settlements. These settlements were then divided into non-overlapping clusters called neighborhoods or tol that consisted of 5–15 households. For the purpose of this pilot, we selected ten neighborhoods each from three strata, thus making a total of 30 communities.2 For a detailed discussion of the design and selection procedure of the neighborhoods, please refer to Barber et al. (1997). Altogether there were 394 households in 30 neighborhoods. Of them, 187 households (47 percent) had at least one member (age 12 years and above) away from home for most of the time in the previous six months. This is consistent with the results of the Nepal Living Standard Survey (2010/11), which reported about 53 percent of households in Nepal had at least one absentee living currently within or outside the country. A face-to-face survey was administered to 185 eligible households with a 99 percent response rate. Any individual 18 years and over who could provide information about the household, remittances, and remittance use was interviewed. We strictly followed the standard practice of ethical codes, interviewing and data collection. Consent was read to the informants and permission was obtained prior to the survey. Multiple informants from a household were allowed to respond. This study collected information about each migrant’s characteristics such as age, gender, current place of residence, marital status, and education. Out-migration is defned as any departure from the neighborhood lasting at least three months or more for any reason. It includes movement within or outside of Nepal. The survey collected information on migration and remittances for each household. For each migrant, place (district or country) of migrant’s destination by month (for 12 months), occupation, whether the household received any remittances (money, goods, or gifts) from the migrant during the survey year, and, if received, the amount of money or the value of goods or gifts received by the household from each person each month in the past 12 months. For each migrant, this information was recorded for each month. Similarly, for each household, the survey collected data on whether a household spent any money on specifc domain/item of household activity. If spent, whether this

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money was from the remittances or not, and the amount of money invested/ spent in each activity. Information was collected for each month. 2.4.3

Measures

In general, I used two outcome measures. Outcome 1: productive uses of remittances First, I examined an aggregate measure of productive use of remittances. This aggregate measure includes the amount of remittances (in Nepali rupees which is logged) reported by households in productive purposes (as in Table 2.1) such as: the uses of remittances in farm production and buying tools to be used in farming, human capital investments such as uses in education and health, and deposits in saving accounts. Second, I examined the following separate domains of productive uses, the measurement of which is discussed following. A. USES IN FARMING

This domain includes the total amount of remittances used (logged) in buying items related to farming in the past 12 months by remittance-receiving households. These items are: purchase of seeds, pesticides, renting of a tractor, hiring a wage laborer, buying feed or fodder for farm animals and poultry, investment in fsh farming, swine/pig farming, and land purchase for farming or animal husbandry. B.

USES IN BUSINESS, SAVING, AND INVESTMENT

This domain includes the amount of remittances (in Nepali rupees logged) in business, saving, and investment as reported by remittance-receiving households in the past 12 months. C. USES IN HUMAN CAPITAL ENHANCING

This domain includes separately the uses of remittances in health and education (in Nepali rupees logged) as reported by the remittance-receiving households in the past 12 months. Outcome 2: use of remittances in consumptive purposes Similar to the frst outcome measure, frst, an aggregate measure of the consumptive uses of remittances was used. This aggregate measure included the total amount of remittances (in Nepali rupees, which is logged) reported by households used in consumption such as: the uses of remittances in buying

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65

Table 2.1 Productive and consumptive dimensions of household activities Dimensions Productive Dimensions Farming

Saving and investment Human capital: health Human capital: schooling Consumptive Dimensions Property and ornaments Household items

Media items Food items Clothing Cultural expenses Utilities and other uses Debt payment

Items Seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, renting of farm implements/tools (thresher, chaff cutter, sprayer, corn sheller, etc.), pumpset (rental), tractor (rental), hire farm labor, farm animals (cattle, buffalo, sheep, goat etc.), poultry, fshery, swine/hog farm, feed/fodder for animals/poultry, medicine for animals (veterinary), land for farming or animal husbandry, improve farm sheds/house, building a farm house. Investment in business, house plot, build a new house, house improvement, Dhukuti, group saving, provided loan to friends/neighbors, deposit in bank. Uses in health such as medical expenses (medicine, doctor visits). Use in schooling. Buying a house plot, building a new house, house improvement, purchase of ornaments (gold/silver/ diamond). Bicycle, motorcycle/scooter, tractor, pumpset, car/vehicle, biogas plant, rice cooker, gas stove, refrigerator, electric fan, furniture, water motor/ pump, farm implements. Radio/tape player, TV/DVD/VCR, cell phone/ telephone, computer/laptop. Food (cereals/pulse), vegetables, meat, milk/yogurt/ ghee, oil/spices, sugar/tea/coffee/horlicks. Clothing. Festivals, wedding, pilgrimage, Arghau/funerals/ Shraddha, Bratabandha/birthday/pasani (rice feeding ceremony), donation. House rent, telephone/mobile/internet bill, electricity bill, water bill. Repayment of debt.

Source: Bhandari and Chaudhary (2016)

fxed property such as a house plot, land, a new house, jewelry, household items, household consumption (foods), festivals and cultural purposes, farm production and buying tools to be used in farming; human capital investments such as uses in education and health; and deposits in saving accounts. Second, the following separate activities are examined, the measurement of which is discussed following.

66 Prem Bhandari A. BUYING ORNAMENTS AND PROPERTY

This domain includes the amount of remittances (in Nepali rupees logged) used to buy property such as land and a new house and repair and maintenance of an old house, and of the purchase of jewelry/ornaments (gold/silver) by remittance-receiving households in the past 12 months. B.

BUYING HOUSEHOLD ITEMS

This measure includes the total amount of remittances (Nepali rupees logged) used in various household items by remittance-receiving households in the past 12 months. These items include the amount of remittances used to purchase a bicycle, a motorcycle, a tractor, a pumpset, a car, a gobar gas, a gas stove, a rice cooker, fridge, a fan, furniture, and other household items purchased during the survey period. C. BUYING MEDIA (ELECTRONIC) ITEMS

This measure includes the total amount of remittances (Nepali rupees logged) used in various electronic media items such as a purchase a radio/tape player, a cell phone/telephone, a TV/DVD/VCR and a computer purchased by a remittance-receiving households in the past 12 months. D. USES IN HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION

This is the total amount of remittances (Nepali rupees logged) reported by remittance-receiving households to purchase food items such as cereals/ pulse, vegetables, meat, milk products, oil/spices, condiments (sugar, tea, coffee, Horlicks, etc.) and clothing. E.

FESTIVALS AND CULTURAL EXPENSES

This domain includes the total amount of remittances (Nepali rupees logged) used in festivals and other cultural events like death rituals (arghau/funerals/shradha), birth rituals (bratabandha/birthdays), rice feeding ceremony (nwaran), pilgrimage and household worshiping (puja). F.

PAYING UTILITIES AND OTHER EXPENSES

The total amount of remittances (Nepali rupees logged) used in paying electricity bills, telephone bills, or mobile phone charges or buying mobile phone recharge cards and or internet charges, paying water bills, donation (dan, chanda), paying house rent, and buying cigarettes or tobacco. G. DEBT PAYMENT

Total amount of remittances used to pay debt (Nepali rupees logged) as reported by the remittance-receiving households in the past 12 months.

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67

2.4.4 Explanatory measures The total amount of remittances received by a household is used as the major explanatory measure to explain whether the use of remittances does vary in productive vs. consumptive investments. This measure was collected as: if a household informant reported that the household received any remittances (money, goods, or gifts), the amount of remittances received from each migrant was collected by asking, “Altogether, how much money did you or your households receive in the past 12 months, including the value of any goods or gifts? Please also tell me: when did you receive it?” The amount (in Nepali rupees) was recorded in the month when the household received the remittance. The amount was summed up for the year and the amount was divided by total number of months the migrant was away from home in the year to calculate migrant months-adjusted monthly remittance.3 The amount of migrant months-adjusted monthly remittance (natural log)4 was used as the explanatory measure. Other measures used as controls are total number individuals in the household, gender of the household head (male/female), median age, median education (number of years of education), the major source of livelihood of a household (farming only, farming/business/migration; or farming/migration), and caste/ethnicity (Brahmin/Chhetri, Dalit, Hill Janajati, Newar, or TeraiJanajati). Household income and distance of a household from the largest urban center of Narayanghat measured as near, far, or in between are also used as controls. 2.4.5 Analysis First, descriptive statistics of each measure used in the analysis are examined. Next, as the data was multilevel in nature (migrant households clustered in neighborhoods), a series of multivariate models using multilevel modeling (hierarchical linear modeling) techniques were estimated. Because each of the outcome measures were used as the amount of remittances (in Nepali rupees logged) spent in various dimensions of productive and consumptive purposes, a multilevel OLS (ordinary least squares) regression as a multivariate tool, which takes into account of clustering of households by neighborhoods, was used to estimate the models.

2.5 2.5.1

Findings Descriptive statistics: migrant households’ characteristics

On average, a household had 5.40 people. The mean age of individuals living a household was nearly 27 years, and the mean age of the elderly people in a household was nearly 52 years. The mean year of education of household members was 6.85 years. Nearly 27 percent of the households had business and migration as livelihood options, nearly 52 percent of them had farming

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and migration only, and about one-ffth of them reported that their major source of livelihood is farming, migration, and business. The average size of cultivated land holding was 10.32 kattha (1 hectare = 30 kattha). Thirtyfve percent of the households reported that their average annual income is below 100,000 NRs Nineteen percent reported their annual income in between 100,000–250,000 NRs Eighteen percent households reported between 250,001–500,000 and 17 percent of the households reported that their annual income ranges over 500,001 NRs in a year. Note that this household income includes the remittances income, as well. Nearly one-half (44 percent) of the households belonged to the high caste Brahmin/Chhetri group, which is followed by 17 percent Dalit, 16 percent Hill Janajati, 13 percent TeraiJanajati and 10 percent Newar. One-third (34 percent) of households each were residing in strata 1 (close to Narayangarh, the largest city of Chitwan) and strata 2 (middle), and 30 percent of them were in strata 3 (furthest from the city center of Narayangarh). 2.5.2 Uses of remittances in productive and consumptive activities A migrant household on average received a total of NRs 200,288 (a minimum of NRs 4,000 to a maximum of NRs 964,000) from migrants in a year (Table 2.2). A household further reported that in a period of one year (in Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics of measures used in the analysis (n = 139) Measures Outcome Measures Productive Uses (Total) Farming/farm production Saving Human Capital – Health Education Consumptive Uses (Total) Property (land, house, jewelry) Household items Electronic media items Food, dairy and vegetables Clothes

Description

Mean (SD)

Min–max

Nepali rupees (NRs) NRs

100,895 (182,970) 0–1,775,700 10,218 (24,207)

0–201,500

NRs NRs

40,388 (164,833) 13,513 (33,923)

0–1,695,000 0–300,000

NRs NRs

36,775 (63,695) 0–360,500 227,542 (378,908) 0–3,089,400

NRs

89,136 (321,409)

0–2,550,000

NRs NRs NRs

5,384 (19,429) 4,215 (13,756) 50,219 (61,347)

0–165,000 0–75,000 0–272,400

NRs

6,293 (15,708)

0–150,000

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69

Measures

Description

Mean (SD)

Min–max

Debt payment (maintenance) Festivals and cultural events Utilities (house rent, utilities) Explanatory Measures and Controls Total remittances received (NRs) Household members Mean age of individuals in the household Mean age of elderly people in the household Mean education of household members Livelihood option: business and migration Farming, business, and migration Farming and migration Total cultivated land Household income (Nepali rupees) Below 100,000 100,001–250,000 250,001–500,000 500,001 and over Caste/ethnicity Brahmin/Chhetri Dalit Hill Janajati Newar TeraiJanajati Location of households from Narayangarh Strata 1 (close) Strata 2 (middle) Strata 3 (far)

NRs

36,179 (89,379)

0–700,000

NRs

23,191 (59,219)

0–412,000

NRs

12,561 (43312)

0–484,800

NRs

4,000–964,000

Number Years

200,388.27 (181,511.12) 5.40 (1.87) 26.51 (8.42)

Years

51.96 (16.94)

24–100

Number of years

6.85 (3.05)

0–12.5

2–13 9–57

1 if yes, 0 otherwise 0.27 (0.45)

0–1

1 if yes, 0 otherwise 0.19 (0.39)

0–1

1 if yes, 0 otherwise 0.52 (0.50) Kattha 10.32 (10.57)

0–1 0–50

1 if yes, 0 otherwise 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 1 if yes, 0 otherwise

0.35 (0.48) 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38)

0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1

1 if yes, 0 otherwise 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 1 if yes, 0 otherwise

0.44 (0.50) 0.17 (0.38) 0.16 (0.37) 0.10 (0.30) 0.13 (0.34)

0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1

1 if yes, 0 otherwise 0.34 (0.47) 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 0.34 (0.47) 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 0.30 (0.46)

0–1 0–1 0–1

Source: Compiled by author Note: US$1 = 100 Nepali rupees (2013)

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Buying property (land, jewelry) Food, dairy and vegetables *Business and saving *Education Debt payment (maintenance) Festivals and cultural events *Health Utilities (house rent, utilities) *Farming/farm production Clothes Household items Electronic media items 0.00

27.14 15.29 12.30 11.20 11.02 7.06 4.11 3.82 3.11 1.92 1.64 1.28 5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

Figure 2.1 Uses of remittances in various household activities (percent) Source: Author Note:*Productive activities

2013), on average, a household used a total of 100,895 NRs (30.72 percent) in productive purposes and a total of 227,542 NRs (69.28 percent) was used in consumptive purposes.5 This clearly shows that households used a large fraction of remittances in consumptive purposes as compared to productive purposes. Further analysis revealed that among various dimensions of household activates, the largest proportion (27.14 percent) of remittances was used in buying property (consumptive activity) such as land, houses, and jewelry, and purchase of food items (15.29 percent) (a consumptive activity) including dairy and vegetables (Figure 2.1). The third and fourth largest proportions invested were in business and saving (12.30 percent) and education (11.02 percent), two important dimensions of productive activities. Of the total, 11.02 percent was spent on debt payment and 7.06 percent of it was used in cultural events such as marriages, funerals, and birthday celebrations. Two other productive activities that included farming and health attracted only 3.11 percent and 4.11 percent of the total remittances, respectively. Detail activities where households used remittances are discussed in (Bhandari and Chaudhary, 2016). 2.5.3 Multivariate results: uses of remittances in productive activities Results from multivariate analysis for productive activities are presented in Table 2.3. As discussed earlier, frst, the association between the total amounts of remittances received on the use of this remittance on aggregate

Productive vs. consumptive remittances

71

amount of productive use of remittances is presented. Next, I examined the association between the total amount of remittances received and each specifc dimension of production activities such as farming, saving and deposits, and human capital investments such as health and education. Overall productive investment Results from multivariate analysis show that each unit increases in the amount of remittances received by a household (natural log) increased the amount of remittances used in productive investments by 0.37 points, net of all other factors (Table 2.3). This result is statistically not signifcant, however, suggesting that although the amount of remittances used in productive purposes increases with the increase of the amount of remittances received by a household, there is reason to believe that this may be statistically untrue. In addition, none of the other factors other than the livelihood option as farming, business, and migration were statistically signifcantly associated with the amount of remittances used in productive purposes. For those households that reported that their major source of livelihood strategy is farming, business, and migration, the amount of remittances used in productive purposes was nearly three times (B = 2.94; p < .001) lower than those that reported that their primary livelihood strategy was business and migration. Remittance use in specifc dimensions of production activities The results show that the amount of remittances received by households was positively associated with the amount of remittances used in all specifc dimensions of productive activities such as saving and deposits, health, and education, except farming. However, none of the results were statistically signifcantly associated with the amount of remittances received. In addition, none of the other household level correlates were statistically signifcantly associated with the use of remittances in farming and saving/deposits. Use of remittances in education was signifcantly associated with household income and caste/ethnicity only. While households with higher levels of income (NRs 500,001 or over) spent nearly three times as much of remittances on education as compared to those households with incomes below 100,000 NRs, net of other controls. One the other hand, hill Janajati households used about 1.62 times less of remittances in education as compared to Brahmin/Chhetri households. Use of remittances in health was statistically signifcantly associated with the number of household members and caste/ethnicity. While the amount invested in health declined with the increase in the number of household members, hill Janajati households spent about 2.40 times less of remittances in health as compared to Brahmin/Chhetri households, net of other controls. None of the other household factors were signifcantly associated with the use of remittances in other dimensions of productive activities

−0.04 (−0.11) −0.23 (−0.82) 0.05 (0.76) −0.007 (0.18) −0.12 (−0.88) – −2.18 (−1.58) 0.33 (0.29) 0.04 (0.33) −0.001 (−0.32) – −1.51 (−1.53) −1.06 (−0.87) −1.71 (−1.36) –

0.37 (1.22)

−0.05 (−0.21) 0.06 (1.13)

−0.02 (−0.73)

−0.02 (−0.24)

–

−2.94** (−2.69) 0.29 (0.33) 0.14 (1.43) −0.004+ (−1.70) –

−0.05 (−0.06) 1.16 (1.20) 1.62 (1.62)

–

Total remittances received (logged NRs) Household members Mean age of individuals in the household Mean age of elderly people in the household Mean education of household members Livelihoods: Business and migration (ref) Farming, business and migration Farming and migration Total cultivated land (kattha) Land squared Household income (Nepali rupees) Below 100,000 (ref) 100,001–250,000 250,001–500,000 500,001 and over Caste/ethnicity: Brahmin/ Chhetri (Ref)

Farming

Productive Use (Total)

Measures

–

0.09 (0.09) 2.25+ (1.75) 1.03 (0.78)

−1.40 (−0.96) −1.46 (−1.22) −0.08 (−0.59) 0.003 (0.95) –

–

0.15 (0.98)

−0.04 (−1.02)

0.06 (0.19) 0.02 (0.31)

0.39 (0.11)

Saving and deposits

–

0.09 (0.09) −0.04 (−0.03) −0.05 (−0.04)

−2.28 (−1.60) −0.62 (−0.53) 0.03 (0.24) −0.0003 (−0.10) –

–

−0.20 (−1.38)

–

0.45 (0.45) 0.24 (0.19) 2.90* (2.27)

−0.92 (−0.66) 2.06 (1.80) 0.15 (1.16) −0.004 (−1.18) –

–

−0.27+ (−1.85)

0.02 (0.50)

−0.38 (−1.23) −0.11 (−1.54)

−0.11* (−0.36) 0.07 (0.93) 0.04 (0.93)

0.34 (0.87)

Education

0.85 (0.03)

Health

Table 2.3 Multilevel model estimating the amount of remittances (Nepali rupees logged) used by households in productive activities in Chitwan Valley of Nepal, 2013 (n = 139)

72 Prem Bhandari

−1.67 (−1.31) −2.42* (−2.04) 0.16 (0.10) −1.29 (−0.92) – −1.66 (−1.50) −0.62 (−0.51) −0.22 – 793.6 – 797.6 – 800.3

−0.87 (−0.88) −0.97 (−1.05) 0.06 (0.05) −0.97 (0.05) –

0.89 (1.07) 1.31 (1.42)

4.35 756.5 737.1 758.5 741.1 759.9 743.8

−2.04 – 806.3 – 808.3 – 809.7

0.90 (0.87) 0.74 (0.66)

−0.25 (−0.19) 0.03 (0.02) −1.08 (−0.67) 0.74 (0.53) –

Note: US$1 = 100 Nepali rupees (2013).* < 0.01 to 0.05 and ** < 0.001 to 0.01 signifcant levels

Source: Compiled by author

Dalit Hill Janajati Newar TeraiJanajati Household location from Narayangarh Strata 1 (close) (Ref) Strata 2 (middle) Strata 3 (far) Intercept – 2 log L (deviance) (Null)# – 2 log L (deviance) AIC (Null)# AIC BIC (Null)# BIC −5.20 – 800.1 – 802.1 – 803.4

−0.25 (−0.25) 1.03 (0.93)

−1.47 (−1.17) −2.39* (−2.03) −1.47 (−0.93) −2.49+ (−1.85) –

7.83 – 795.8 – 797.8 – 799.2

−0.81 (−0.83) −0.99 (−0.92)

−0.56 (−0.46) −1.62* (−1.39) 0.15 (0.10) −2.12 (−1.60) –

Productive vs. consumptive remittances 73

74 Prem Bhandari 2.5.4 Consumptive uses of remittances Following, I discuss the association between the amounts of remittances received by a household and the amount of remittances used in overall consumption, as well as in specifc dimensions of production activities. Use of remittances in overall consumption Overall, the amount of remittances received by a household was statistically signifcantly and positively associated with the amount of remittances used in consumptive purposes (B = 1.37; p < .001), net of all other controls. Except caste/ethnicity, all other variables were not statistically signifcantly related to consumptive use. All the caste/ethnic groups were less likely to use remittances in consumptive uses as compared to Brahmin/Chhetri. Now, let’s turn to specifc uses of remittances in various consumption activities. Fixed assets such as land, property, and jewelry The amount of remittances received by a household was signifcantly positively associated with the amount of remittances used in buying fxed assets such as land and jewelry. One unit increase in household receipt of remittances increased the amount of its use to buy land, property, and jewelry by 0.80 points, net of all other factors. Moreover, increase in the age of household members reduced the amount of remittances used in buying property. Those households that reported (a) farming, business, and migration, and (b) farming and migration as their livelihood options were signifcantly less likely to use remittances to purchase fxed assets as compared to those who reported that their livelihood option was business and migration. Households that reported income over NRs 500,001 invested 2.99 times higher an amount of remittances in buying fxed assets as compared to those households that reported that their income was below NRs 100,000. Similarly, households in strata 2 and 3 were more likely to invest in buying fxed assets as compared to those that lived in strata 1. Household items Households purchased various household items such as a bicycle, a motorcycle, a refrigerator, a rice cooker, a gas stove, a water pump, an electric fan, or furniture in the survey year. Some households also reported remittance was used to purchase these items. As shown in Table 2.4, although the purchase of household items increased with the increase in the amount of remittances received, the association was not statistically signifcant (B = 0.48; p > .05), net of all other controls. TeraiJanajati were signifcantly less likely to purchase household items as compared to Brahmin/Chhetri (B = −2.59; p < .05). However, other measures were signifcantly not associated.

0.80* (2.15) −0.35 (−1.18) −0.17* (−2.43)

0.05 (1.40)

0.30 (2.13) –

−2.76* (−2.06) −2.75* (−2.50) 0.05 (0.44)

1.37*** (5.10) −0.28 (−1.32) −0.05 (−0.99)

−0.03 (−1.26)

−0.03 (−0.27) –

−1.88+ (−1.94) −0.79 (−0.99) 0.13 (1.54)

Total remittances received (NRs, log) Household members

Mean age of individuals in the household Mean age of elderly people in the household Mean education of household members Livelihoods Business and migration (Ref) Farming, business and migration Farming and migration Total cultivated land (kattha)

Fixed assets (land, jewelry)

Consumptive use (Total)

Measures

0.26 (0.21) 0.79 (0.78) −0.10 (−0.87)

0.02 (0.18) –

0.03 (0.96)

0.48 (1.41) −0.35 (−1.26) −0.07 (−1.08)

Household items

1.04 (0.91) 0.94 (1.00) −0.13 (−1.31)

−4.40** (−2.98) −0.68 (−0.56) 0.14 (1.07)

−0.03 (−0.21) –

−0.06 (−1.39)

0.07* (2.16) 0.09 (0.83) –

0.82 (1.99) −0.19 (−0.57) −0.06 (−0.75)

Food

0.79* (2.52) −0.31 (−1.24) −0.14* (−2.37)

Media items

−2.19 (−1.61) −1.94+ (−1.73) 0.15 (1.26)

−0.18 (−1.29) –

−0.03 (−0.86)

0.82* (2.19) −0.08 (−0.30) 0.001 (0.01)

Clothes

−1.19 (−0.85) −0.45 (−0.39) 0.10 (0.81)

−0.006 (−0.04) –

−0.02 (−0.40)

0.69+ (1.76) −0.25 (−0.79) −0.009 (−0.13)

Cultures

−2.18 (−1.58) 0.33 (0.29) 0.04 (0.33)

−0.12 (0.86) –

−0.005 (−0.12)

0.93* (2.42) −0.17 (−0.55) −0.10 (−1.45)

Utilities

(Continued)

1.07 (0.67) 0.23 (0.18) 0.19 (1.30)

−0.31+ (−1.83) –

−0.11* (−2.42)

1.05* (2.38) 0.09 (0.24) 0.09 (1.06)

Debt Payment

Table 2.4 Multilevel models estimating the amount of remittances (Nepali rupees logged) used by households in consumptive activities in Chitwan Valley of Nepal, 2013 (n = 139)

Productive vs. consumptive remittances 75

TeraiJanajati

Newar

Hill Janajati

0.004 (0.00) 1.06 (0.99) −1.59 (−1.08) −2.59* (−2.03)

1.54 (1.53) 0.03 (0.03) 0.68 (0.53) −0.46 (−0.42)

−2.55+ (−1.88) −3.42** (−2.71) 1.38 (0.80) −2.04 (−1.38)

−0.91 (−0.87) −1.43 (−1.10) −1.37 (−1.03) – −0.38 (−0.32) −1.58 (−1.40) 1.47 (0.97) −2.76* (−2.14)

1.49 (1.40) 0.64 (0.53) 2.02 (1.63) –

0.65 (0.50) −1.77 (−1.48) 0.77 (0.47) −1.86 (−1.31)

0.91 (0.92) 0.75 (0.61) 0.93 (0.73) –

−0.002 (−0.54)

−1.67 (−1.31) −2.42* (−2.04) 0.16 (0.10) −1.29 (−0.92)

−1.51 (−1.53) −1.06 (−0.87) −1.71 (−1.36) –

−0.001 (−0.32)

−0.54 (−0.39) −1.15 (−0.87) −1.24 (−0.69) −1.77 (−1.16)

0.24 (0.23) −1.84 (−1.30) −0.23 (−0.15) –

−0.005 (−1.45)

−0.77 (−0.65) −1.23 (−1.11) −1.56 (−1.04) 0.16 (0.13)

0.14 (0.18) −0.89 (−0.88) −0.74 (−0.71) –

−0.004 (−1.40)

−2.00* (−2.29) −1.69* (−2.08) −0.66 (−0.60) −2.26* (−2.38)

Caste/ethnicity Brahmin/Chhetri (Ref) Dalit

500,001 and over

250,001–500,000

1.64+ (1.88) 0.11 (0.10) 0.79 (0.71) –

−0.004 (−1.41)

Debt Payment

0.13 (0.14) 1.41 (1.19) 2.99* (2.45) –

0.004 (1.49) –

Utilities

−0.45 (−0.65) −0.73 (−0.85) 0.58 (0.65) –

Household income (Nepali rupees) Below 100,000 (Ref) 100,001–250,000

0.004 (1.34) –

Cultures

−0.001 (−0.25) –

Clothes

−0.003 (−1.40) –

Food

Land squared

Media items

Consumptive use (Total)

Measures

Household items

Prem Bhandari

Table 2.4 (Continued)

Fixed assets (land, jewelry)

76

−6.21 –

795.9 – 787.9 – 789.9

737.1 755.8 741.1 758.5 743.8

765.7 – 769.7 – 772.5

−2.31 – 747.2 – 749.2 – 750.6

−6.03 –

−1.23 (−1.53) −0.68 (−0.76)

–

Media items

809.8 – 813.8 – 816.5

5.64 –

−0.10 (−0.09) 0.82 (0.64)

–

Food

Source: Compiled by author

US$ 1 = 100 Nepali rupees (2013). * < 0.01 to 0.05, ** < 0.001 to 0.01, and ***< 0.001 signifcant levels

Strata 3 (far) Intercept – 2 log L (deviance) (Null)# – 2 log L (deviance) AIC (Null)# AIC BIC (Null)# BIC

−1.14 751.8

−0.18 (−0.17) 0.22 (0.20)

3.14*** (3.32) 2.00+ (1.92)

0.77 (1.07) 0.94 (1.17)

Strata 2 (middle)

–

–

–

Household items

Location of household from Narayangarh Strata 1 (close) (Ref)

Fixed assets (land, jewelry)

Consumptive use (Total)

Measures

789.5 – 791.5 – 792.8

−1.02 –

−0.67 (−0.70) 0.10 (0.09)

–

Clothes

796.7 – 800.7 – 803.4

1.10 –

−2.25 (−1.99) 0.04 (0.03)

–

Cultures

793.6 – 797.6 – 800.3

−0.22 –

−1.66 (−1.50) −0.62 (−0.51)

–

Utilities

829.3 – 831.3 – 832.7

−4.22 –

1.09 (0.97) 0.62 (0.50)

–

Debt Payment

Productive vs. consumptive remittances 77

78 Prem Bhandari Media items Various media items (or electronic items) purchased by households included a radio/tape recorder, a TV/DVD/VCR, a cell phone/telephone, and a computer. The adjusted results (Table 2.4) show that the amount of remittances used in buying these items was signifcantly positively associated with the amount of remittances received by a household (B = 0.79; p < .05). The mean age of household members was negatively and signifcantly associated with the purchase of household items. The average amount of education in the household signifcantly positively infuenced the purchase of various household items. Other factors were signifcantly not associated with the purchase. Food items The second largest amount of remittances (after fxed assets) was spent on purchasing food items such as cereals/pulse, vegetables, meat, milk and milk products, oil/spices, and condiments (sugar, tea, coffee, Horlicks, etc.). Most households reported that they purchased condiments (97.1 percent), oil/spices (95 percent), meat (91.4 percent) and vegetables (87.1 percent). Among the total households, slightly over half of households reported that they used remittances to purchase condiments (54.7 percent), and oil/spices (51.8 percent). Other households reported that they purchased meat (45.3 percent) followed by vegetables (41.7 percent), oil/spices (25.9 percent), and food (21.6 percent) (please refer to Bhandari and Chaudhary, 2017 for details). The results from multivariate analysis show that the amount of remittances received by a household was positively associated with the amount of remittances used in buying various food items. Interestingly, however, the coeffcient was not statistically signifcant, net of other controls. This suggests that almost all the households, no matter how much they received remittances, use them for food purchases. Regarding other factors, households that reported farming, business, and migration as livelihood options spent signifcantly less amount of remittances in buying food items as compared to those whose livelihood options were based on business and migration. On the other hand, hill Janajati households spent signifcantly less amount of remittances to purchase food items as compared to Brahmin/ Chhetri households. Other factors were not signifcantly associated with the amount of remittances used in buying food items. Clothing A total of 92 percent of households reported that they purchased clothing in the survey year and slightly over half (54 percent) of the total households reported that they used remittances in purchasing clothes. The adjusted results show that the total amount of remittances received by a household signifcantly and positively associated with the amount of remittances used

Productive vs. consumptive remittances

79

in buying clothes (B = 0.82; p < .05). In addition, caste/ethnicity was the only other factor that was associated with the use of remittances in buying clothes. While TeraiJanajati were signifcantly less likely to purchase clothes as compared to Brahmin/Chhetri, other caste/ethnic groups were signifcantly not different from Brahmin/Chhetri. In addition, other factors were signifcantly not associated with the amount of remittances used in buying clothes. Festivals and cultural expenses Of the total remittance-receiving households, 65.5 percent reported that they used remittances to celebrate festivals (such as Dashain/Tiharand others). Slightly over 22 percent used remittances in weddings, and a small fraction of them used remittances in pilgrimages (5.8 percent), funerals (7.2 percent), and birth-related rituals (birthday, paasni, bratabandha, etc.) (6.5 percent). When I examined the association between the amount of remittances received as a factor determining the amount used in celebrating festivals and cultural events, the adjusted results show that the amount of remittances received by a household was weakly but positively associated with the amount of remittances used (B = 0.69; p < .10). The results show that none of the other controls were statistically signifcantly associated with the amount of remittances used in cultural events. Utilities Expenses in utilities included the amount spent on house rent and paying telephone/mobile/ internet, electricity, and water bills. Of the total remittance-receiving households, 55.4 percent reported that they used remittances to pay electricity bills, followed by telephone/mobile/internet bills (43.2 percent). A small fraction of households paid remittances to pay house rent (5.8 percent) and water bills (7.9 percent). The results from multivariate analysis show that the amount of remittances received by a household was positively and statistically signifcantly associated with the amount of remittances received by a household (B = 0.93; p < .05). The results show that none of the other controls, except caste/ethnicity, had a statistically signifcant association with the amount of remittances used in utilities. The hill Janjati households spent a signifcantly smaller amount of remittances in utilities as compared to Brahmin/Chhetri households, adjusting for other factors. Debt payment Of the total remittance-receiving households, 36.7 percent reported that they used remittances to pay debt. The results from multivariate analysis show that the amount of remittances received by a household was positively and

80 Prem Bhandari statistically signifcantly associated with the amount of remittances received by a household (B = 1.05; p < .05). Among other factors, only the mean age of people in the household signifcantly reduced the use of remittances in debt payment. Other factors were statistically signifcantly not associated with the amount of remittances used in debt payment.

2.6 Conclusion Literature on migration and development has much discussed the productive vs. consumptive uses of remittances. However, there is dearth of empirical evidence of the uses in various social and economic dimensions of household activities, especially in developing countries. This study evolves from a growing concern on productive vs. consumptive uses of remittances in the migrant-sending setting of Nepal, one of the developing countries experiencing massive out-migration of young individuals, to offer empirical evidence. Specifcally, this chapter investigates the extent to which the amount of remittance received by a household is being used in various productive and consumptive dimensions of household activities by remittance-receiving households. The evidence comes from household-level data collected from a rural migrant-sending setting of southern Nepal in 2013. Overall, the fndings revealed that households used remittances in both productive and consumptive dimensions of household activities. As indicated by previous literature, the results also show that the amount of remittances used in consumptive purposes is much higher than that was used in productive purposes. Overall, a large fraction of the total amount of remittances spend in various dimensions (69.3 percent) was used in consumption activities, as compared only 30.72 percent in productive activities. More specifcally, the largest fraction of remittances was used to buy fxed assets such as land, houses, and jewelry (27.14 percent), which was followed by food items (15.29 percent). Among productive activities, 12.3 percent was used in saving and 11.2 percent was used in education. The health aspect, one of the components of human capital investment, received only 4.11 percent of the total remittance expenditure. The evidence from the multivariate analysis shows that the amount of remittances received by a household was positively associated with the amount of remittances used in productive dimensions of household activities, but the association was not statistically signifcant. Moreover, the amount of remittances used in specifc dimensions of productive investments examined here that included farming, saving deposits, and investment in human capital – health and education – also did not statistically signifcantly vary by the amount of remittances received by a household, suggesting that the expressed association could be by chance, at least in this study setting. On the other hand, overall, the amount of remittances received by a household was signifcantly and positively related to the amount of remittances used in consumption. Moreover, the remittance-receiving households used signifcantly

Productive vs. consumptive remittances

81

more of their remittances in buying fxed assets such as land and jewelry; electronic items such as computers, TVs and mobile phones; clothing; paying utilities; buying food items; cultural expenses; and debt payment. Based on these results, it is concluded that while remittance-receiving households utilize remittances for both productive and consumptive purposes, a large part of it is spent in consumptive purposes. Thus, encouraging households towards channeling more remittances incomes towards productive investments could be an important policy agenda of the government. This study makes important contributions to the feld of migration research. This study offers empirical evidence of the uses of remittances in productive and consumptive activities by remittance-receiving households, and also helps us generate more questions for future studies. I also believe that the fndings will be useful in developing frameworks and testing the causality of the effects of productive vs. consumptive expenditures of remittances on the socio-economic wellbeing of remittance-receiving households. These fndings will be of interest to those studying the long-term consequences of migration and remittances in sustaining/reducing household-level poverty. Despite these contributions, the fndings are based on data from a small sample of a small part of the southern Terai plain of Nepal, and therefore may not be generalizable to other areas. Moreover, the data is cross-sectional in nature. Thus, the conclusions should be considered rather cautiously.

Acknowledgments This research was supported by the Ronald Freedman and Marshall Weinberg Fund through the Population Studies Center’s Small Grant for Measurement of Remittance Use in a Remittance Dependent Economy at the University of Michigan. I thank Ms. Indra Chaudhary and Dr. Dirgha Ghimire for their support. I also thank the feld research staff of the Institute for Social and Environmental Research-Nepal (ISER-N) for their contributions in quality data collection and Mr. Bishnu Adhikari, Data Manager, ISER-N for assisting with data quality checking and data management. Last but not least, I owe a special debt of gratitude to our respondents who continuously welcomed us to their homes and shared their invaluable experiences, opinions, and thoughts, and have devoted countless hours responding to our survey questionnaires. All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the author.

Notes 1 US$ 1 = 100 Nepali rupees (2013); US$ 1 = 75 Nepali rupees (2010). 2 These neighborhoods are outside of the 151 Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) neighborhoods. 3 Some migrants were away from home for the whole year and some others were away only for a couple of months. Therefore, the migrant-months adjusted amount of remittances received by a household per month was necessary.

82

Prem Bhandari

4 The actual amount of remittances was transformed to natural log to normalize the data. 5 The total amount of remittances received and spent in a year do not match. Households reported that they used some of the remittances savings to purchase items. A few of them also borrowed loan to pay the debt upon receipt of remittances.

References Adams, R. H., Jr. (1998). Remittances, Investment, and Rural Asset Accumulation in Pakistan. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 47(1), 155–173. doi. org/10.1086/452390. Adams, R. H., Jr. (2011). Evaluating the Economic Impact of International Remittances on Developing Countries using Household Surveys: A Literature Review. Journal of Development Studies. 47(6), 809–828. Adhikari, J. (2001). Mobility and Agrarian Change in Central Nepal: Contributions to Nepalese Studies. The Free Library. Retrieved on www.thefreelibrary.com/ Mobility and agrarian change in central Nepal (1).-a092840368. Barber, J. S, G. P. Shivakoti, W. G. Axinnand, and K. Gajurel (1997). Sampling Strategies for Rural Settings: A Detailed Example from the Chitwan Valley Family Study, Nepal. Nepal Population Journal. 6(5), 193–203. Beijer, G. (1970). International and National Migratory Movements. International Migration. 8(3), 93–109. Bhandari, P. B. and I. Chaudhary (2017). A Calendar Method of Collecting Remittance Use Data in a Remittance Dependent Setting of Nepal. Migration and Development. 6(2), 177–197. Bilsborrow, R. E., A. S. Oberai, and G. Standing (1984). Migration Surveys in LowIncome Countries: Guidelines for Survey and Questionnaire Design. London, UK, and Dover, NH: Croom Helm. Brown, R. P. C. and D. Ahlburg (1999). Remittances in the South Pacifc. International Journal of Social Economics. 26, 325–344. Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). Nepal Living Standards Survey 2010/11: Statistical Report Volume Two. Central Bureau of Statistics. National Planning Commission Secretariat, Government of Nepal. Kathmandu. Central Bureau of Statistics (2012). Population Census 2011: Preliminary Report. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal. deBrauw, A. (2007). Seasonal Migration and Agriculture in Vietnam. ESA Working Paper No. 07-04. Agricultural Development Economics Division, The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. Retrieved on www.fao.org/es/ esa. deBrauw, A., J. E. Taylorand S. Rozelle (1999). The Impact of Migration and Remittances on Rural Incomes in China. Paper Presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meetings, Nashville, August 8–11. de Haas, H. (2007). Remittances, Migration and Social Development: A Conceptual Review of the Literature. Social Policy and Development, Programme Paper No. 34, United Nations, Research Institute for Social Development. Geneva, Switzerland. Ecer, S. and A. Tompkins (2010). An Econometric Analysis of the Remittance Determinants among Ghanaians and Nigerians in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. International Migration.1–24.

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Eversole, R. and M. Johnson (2014). Migrant Remittances and Household Development: An Anthropological Analysis: Development Studies Research. An Open Access Journal. 1(1), 1–15. DOI: 10.1080/21665095.2014.903808. Gerard, J. (May 2003). Gill Working Paper 218 Seasonal Labour Migration in Rural Nepal: A Preliminary Overview. Overseas Development Institute, UK. Government of Nepal 2071 (2014). National Population Policy 2071: Government of Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Ministry of Health and Population. Gurung, H. B. (1983). Internal and International Migration in Nepal: Main Report. 5 parts. [in Nepali]. Kathmandu: HMG Population Commission. Gurung, H. B. (1998). Nepal Social Demography and Expressions. Kathmandu: New Era. Hoermann, B. and M. Kollmair (2009). Labor Migration and Remittances in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan Region. ICIMOD Working Paper, Kathmandu, Nepal. IOM (2010). The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change. World Migration Report 2010. Geneva: IOM. IOM (2017). Migration and Migrants: A Global Overview, in IOM (2017). World Migration Report 2018. Geneva: IOM. Jokisch, B. D. (2002). Migration and Agricultural Change: The Case of Smallholder Agriculture in Highland Ecuador. Human Ecology. 30(4), 523–550. Kandel, W. (1996). Impacts of International Labor Migration upon Educational Attainment within Mexican Migrant Households: Preliminary Qualitative Results from Fieldwork. Paper presented at the Coloquio Internacional: La Relaciones Mexico-Estados Unidos Desde La Perspectiva Regional, August, San Luis Potosi, SLP, Mexico. Kern, A. and U. Muller-Boker (2015). The Middle Space of Migration: A Case Study on Brokerage and Recruitment Agencies in Nepal. Geoforum. 65, 158–169. Kindleberger, C. P. (1965). Europe’s Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply. New York: Oxford University Press. Koc, I. and I. Onan (2004). International Migrants’ Remittances and Welfare Status of the Left-Behind Families in Turkey. International Migration Review. 38(1), 78–112. Kollmair, M., S. Manandhar, B. Subedi and S. Thieme (2006). New Figures for Old Stories: Migration and Remittances in Nepal. Migration Letters. 3(2), 151–160. Lipton, M. (1980). Migration from the Rural Areas of Poor Countries: The Impact on Rural Productivity and Income Distribution. World Development, 8(1), 1–24. Massey, D. S. and L. C. Basem (1992). Determinants of Savings, Remittances, and Spending Patterns among U.S. Migrants in Four Mexican Communities. Sociological Inquiry. 62(2), 185–207. National Population and Housing Census (2011). National Report. Volume 01, NPHC 2011, Nepal. Nepal Living Standard Survey (2011). Nepal Living Standard Survey 2010/11: Statistical Report. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics, Government of Nepal. Nepal Rastra Bank (2016). Fifth Household Budget Survey 2014/14. Kathmandu, Nepal: Nepal Rastra Bank. Oberai, A.S. and Singh, H.K.M. (1980). Migration, Remittances and Rural Development: Findings of a Case Study in the Indian Punjab. International Labor Review. 119, 229–241. Pant, B. (2008). Mobilizing Remittances for Productive Use: A Policy-Oriented Approach. NRB Working Paper. Nepal Rastra Bank, Research Department, Serial Number: NRB/WP/4, December.

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Pattison, P. (2014). For Aspiring Nepali Migrants, the Risks Start at Home. Aljazeera America. December 15. Retrieved on September 17, 2015, http://america.aljazeera. com/articles/2014/12/15/for-aspiring-nepalimigrantstherisksstartathome.html. Penninx, R. (1982). A Critical Review of Theory and Practice: The Case of Turkey. International Migration Review. 16(4), 781–818. Rathaur, K. R. S. (2001). British Gurkha Recruitment: A Historical Perspective. Voice of History. 16(2), 19–24. Reichert, J.S. (1981). The Migrant Syndrome: Seasonal U.S. Wage Labor and Rural Development in Central Mexico. Human Organization. 40(1), 56–66. Rempel, H., and R. A. Lobdell (1978). The Role of Urban-to-Rural Remittances in Rural Development. Journal of Development Studies. 14(3), 324–341. Seddon, D. (2004). South Asian Remittances: Implications for Development. Contemporary South Asia. 13(4), 403–420. Seddon, D., J. Adkhikari and G. Gurung (2002). Foreign Labor Migration and the Remittance Economy of Nepal. Critical Asian Studies. 34(1), 19–40. Sharma, J. and G. Gurung (2009). Impact of Global Economic Slowdown on Remittance Infows and Poverty Reduction in Nepal. Mandikhatar, Kathmandu, Nepal: Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS). Shivakoti, G. P., W. G. Axinn, P. B. Bhandari and N. Chhetri (1999). The Impact of Community Context on Land Use in an Agricultural Society. Population and Environment. 20(3), 191–213. Shrestha, N. R. (1990). Landlessness and Migration in Nepal. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press. Stark, O. D. (1978). Economic-Demographic Interactions in Agricultural Development: The Case of Rural-to-Urban Migration. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Stark, O. D. and D. E. Bloom (1985). The New Economics of Labor Migration. American Economic Review. 75(2), 173–178. Stark, O. and D. Levhari (1982). On Migration and Risk in LDCs. Economic Development and Cultural Change. 31(1), 191–196. Taylor, J. E. (1999). The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration Process. International Migration. 37(1), 63–88. Taylor, J. E. and P. L. Martin (2001). Human Capital: Migration and Rural Population Change. In Bruce Gardner and Gordan Rausser, eds., Handbook of Agricultural Economics. New York: Elsevier Science. Taylor, J. E. and A. Yunez-Naude (1999). Education, Migration and Productivity: An Analytic Approach and Evidence from Rural Mexico. Paris, France: Development Centre of the OECD. Thieme, S. and S. Wyss (2005). Migration Patterns and Remittance Transfer in Nepal: A Case Study of Sainik Basti in Western Nepal. International Migration. 43(5), 59–98. World Bank (2009). Impact of Global Financial Crisis on South Asia. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2011). Migration and Development Brief 17: Migration and Remittances Unit. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank (2016). Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016. Third Edition. Washington, DC: World Bank Group and the World Bank. Retrieved on https:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/ 4549025-1450455807487/Factbookpart1.pdf.

3

The unequal landscape of remittances The case of rural Bangladesh Syeda Rozana Rashid, Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder and Md. Emran Hossain

3.1

Introduction

Marium1 (40) of Tangail had the experience of working abroad three times. Her husband Ahmed (60) was a driver at a government corporation. In 1991, Marium went to Malaysia leaving her husband and a 4-year-old daughter-Ayesha behind. There she used to work in a glove manufacturing factory. She spent four years in Malaysia and in every three months she used to send Tk. 20,000 (US$546)2 to her father. Most of the time, her daugher used to stay with her parents in another village. Her father used to spend a portion of her daughter’s money for his own household. She returned from Malaysia in 1995 and migrated again to Saudi Arabia in 1997 to work as a cleaner at a hospital. She worked there for seven years. With the money earned, she bought a homestead and 30 decimals of land (0.3 acres). Her father also made a tin-shed house from her money. In 2003, she married off her 16-year-old daughter and made the couple settle in her own house. Meanwhile, her son-in-law migrated to Jordan, leaving behind Ayesha in her parents’ home. Marium returned from Saudi Arabia in 2006 and three years later went to Malaysia again. This time she took Ahmed along with her. Marium used to remit their money to Ayesha’s account and direct her how to spend it. In 2012, they returned permanently and started a paddy business and leased out the land to cultivators. From this story, one may be tempted to present an overwhelmingly positive narrative of the social impact of remittances and conclude that all participants – both individual migrants and migrant households – beneft equally from the migration and/or relocation experience and the resources that it generates. In essence, a considerable body of research literature has been generated over the last few decades exploring the impacts of remittances by the receiving regions and families. Macro-level research on remittances shows the ways in which overseas migrants’ remittances make a signifcant contribution to the national economies of developing countries; in many instances, international remittance receipts exceed the infow of capital generated by foreign direct investment and offcial development assistant (World Bank Group, 2018). Micro-level research,

86 Syeda Rozana Rashid et al. on the other hand, shows that remittances have also become a vital source of funding for households and an essential source of consumption income for meeting basic needs such as clothing, food and shelter items that enhance quality of life in households, renovating an existing cramped and decaying home or building a new one, and investing in the education of their children to ensure that their futures are more secure and rewarding than their own (de Haan, 1999, de Haas, 2005; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010; Rashid, 2016; Sikder et al., 2017). Remittances also enable households to diversify their agriculture and non-agriculture activities so as to reduce household vulnerability and risk, promote co-insurance and manage investments (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Taylor and Rozelle, 2003; Rapoport and Docquier, 2005; de Haas, 2007; Vargas-Lundius et al., 2008). De la Fuente (2010: 828) describes how “remittances have been portrayed as the human face of globalization given their potential to alleviate poverty by directly increasing household income”. The International Organization for Migration states that “remittances provide a lifeline to poor migrant households” (IOM, 2010: 8). Deshingkar (2006: 8) expresses the view that “remittances are probably helping to sustain rural livelihoods by preventing people from sliding further into poverty which would be a prospect facing them had they depended solely on a deteriorating agriculture base”. Scholars also view the contribution of remittances as a type of ‘risk-sharing contract’ and ‘insurance premium’ against vulnerability and risk (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Stark, 1991; Stark and Lucas, 1988). Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003: 17) states that income from migration provides “a private or informal social protection strategy” for migrant households. Scholars have also express concern against the overemphasising and overgeneralisation of the positive impacts of remittances. De Haan (1999: 26) and de Haan and Yaqub (2008: 19) in particular note that the impact of remittances in the villages of origin is complex, context specifc and contingent on various factors – such as type of migration, demographic profle of migrants and those who stay behind, and how the remittances are used. Gardner and Osella (2004) have also stressed studying the social, economic, political and cultural contexts of migrant households and communities at a micro-social level and the level of households for understanding the varying effect of remittances. Several studies on migration and remittances questioned whether remittances decrease inequality and thus alleviate poverty in rural areas. More than three decades ago, Lipton (1980) noted in his study on rural villages primarily in India: Remittances are unlikely to do much to reduce rural poverty either by fnancing productive and labour intensive investments or by being sent direct to the rural poor [and possibly] tended to increase interpersonal and inter-household inequality within and between villages. (Lipton, 1980: 13)

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87

Similar scepticism was evident in Ghosh (2006: 96) as he notes: Remittances can contribute to investment and output growth, but the process is not automatic. And the promise of remittances is not without pitfalls. Indeed, there is a real danger in overrating its importance or portraying its development potential in an unqualifed manner. This chapter is motivated primarily by this skepticism, and aims to present a more complex picture of remittances and the benefts of this source of income on migrant households in rural Bangladesh. It seeks answers to questions such as the following. In what ways do migrants want to use their remittances? Do all migrant families equally accrue the benefts of migration and remittances that Marium and her family did? If not, what factors determine the unequal attainment of the remittance benefts? How does the different attainment of remittances impact poverty and social relations? Based on data collected over a decade from several migrant-intensive villages following ethno-methodology, the chapter endeavours to advance beyond the positive generalisations about remittances that pervade the research literature so as to highlight the fact that some households are benefting more than others and to better understand why this is so. It attempts to explore the unequal and shifting terrains of remittances and elucidate various factors affecting the remittance behaviour of the people concerned by focusing on the experience of migrant employment, the social circumstances of those who remain in their places of origin, and the combined affect the outcomes of remittances in the family. 3.1.1

Notes on methodology

The methodology used in this chapter is micro-social and ethnographic in orientation, and focuses on investigating the ‘private’ settings and experiences of individuals and households (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994: 257). Data and information used in this article were collected by the authors from their doctoral and other studies carried out at some migration-rich areas of Bangladesh over a period of the past 14 years. The doctoral study titled Livelihood and Social Protection in International Labor Migration: A Case Study of Bangladesh was carried out in two villages, Monpur and Jhumpur of the Daudkandi Upazila of Comilla during 2006– 2007, with follow-up visits during 2010, 2014 and 2018. Another doctoral research titled Remittances and Social Resilience: A Study of Migrant Households in Rural Bangladesh was carried out during 2010–2011 in the villages from districts located in three different regions of Bangladesh: Kisamatpur Sherpur village of Sadullapur upazila of Gaibandha district, in the Northwest region of Bangladesh; the Hasail village of Tongibari upazila of Munshiganj district, located in the central region of Bangladesh; and Baynagar village of Daudkandi upazila of Comilla district in the eastern region of Bangladesh. The third study which was instrumental in writing this paper titled Gendered

88 Syeda Rozana Rashid et al. Practices of Remittance Use and the Shaping of Youth Aspirations: A Case Study of Bangladesh conducted in two (upazila) sub-districts of Tangail district, which is 104 kilometres northwest of Dhaka; namely, Kalihati and Tangail Sadar (Proper).A longitudinal study titled Revisiting Livelihoods, Capital and Risk in Labour Migration from Rural Bangladesh is being carried out in the same Daudkandi villages since October 2019. The frst two studies followed an anthropological approach and collected data and information through ethnographic feldwork. Qualitative data from selected households were collected over a period of 15 months using different anthropological tools, such as a basic household survey, participatory observation, informal interviews and case studies. The house-to-house sociological survey generated information regarding population, households, land distribution, individual and household income in cash and crops, other economic activities, level of education, migration history, migrants’ background, fows and use of remittances, employment, and so on. Primary data for the third study were collected through in-depth interviews with the responsible adults and youths from 24 selected households. Additionally, people were also interviewed in the sub-sample of ten households selected for follow-up visits. Primary data for the study were also collected from Focus Group Discussions (FGDS) with locally important persons i.e., members of the Union Parishad, local non-governmental organisation (NGO) workers, school teachers and social workers. Formal interviews with relevant offcials of the Bangladesh Manpower Employment and Training (BMET), grassroots-level government and NGO workers and bankers were also conducted to get a holistic view of migration and remittance issues. 3.1.2 Organisation of the chapter The article is organised into fve sections. This introductory section will be followed by a discussion of the literature on remittance behaviour to ask why it remains so central to this chapter. The third section will provide an overview of the labour migration from Bangladesh, remittance fow and the socioeconomic context of the communities concerned. Drawing on empirical evidence, the fourth section will concentrate on the preferred use of remittances by migrant families. The ffth section will analyse and discuss the determinants of remittance behaviour and the ways in which they form the uneven terrain of remittances. The concluding section will raise the critical aspect of remittances infuence in maintaining and developing inequality in the community.

3.2 The conceptual framework 3.2.1

Remittances

In a narrow defnition, a remittance usually means the process of sending money to someone at a distance. The term also refers to the amount of money being sent as payment or as a gift to remove an obligation. The process is

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usually done through an electronic network, mail or wire transfer, or by hand. More often it indicates the transfer of money by migrant worker within or outside the country to an individual in his or her place of origin. The World Bank, however, offers a clearer defnition that includes both personal transfers and compensation of the employees as personal remittances.3 ‘Personal transfers’ include all current transfers in cash or in-kind between resident and nonresident individuals independent of the source of income to the sender and regardless of the relationship between the sender and the receiver, and ‘compensation’ represents remuneration of the employees in return for the labour paid as wages and salaries in cash and in-kind transfers and employer’s social contribution. Another concept that pervades remittance literature is social remittances, which denotes the ideas, practices, norms, values and social capital that fow from receiving to sending communities via phone, fax or internet video, or by migrants’ visits to homes (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2013). In this chapter, we take a broader approach to remittances that include both social and economic aspects. Throughout the chapter, we will use the term remittances to refer to cash and in-kind transfers sent to their family members by the overseas migrants from their salaries and other income. 3.2.2 The determinants of remittance behaviour In order to examine the divergent remittance conduct of Bangladeshis and survey remittances diverse effect on the household, the chapter will depend on a few studies carried out in South Asian and African settings. Lipton (1980) was among the most punctual analyst to show a “gloomy” (1980: 14) and “unhappy” (1980: 15) picture challenging “the rags-to-riches” (1980: 15) story of the contribution of migration and remittances “on rural productivity and income distribution”. His negative examination of the impacts of migration and remittances on “rural” (1980: 11–13) productivity and equality was conducted at a time when the entire net remittances were very small and better-off people from most urban centres used to enjoy the beneft of remittances disproportionately. At a later stage, Barham and Boucher (1998) reverberate the same concerns in a chapter that compares the potential (hypothetical) domestic earnings of migrants with the earnings of non-migrants in migrant households. Barham and Boucher (1998: 329) conclude: when the observed income distribution is compared with two no-migration counterfactuals, where migration and remittances are treated as a substitute for home earnings, income inequality was found to be lower in the no-migration counterfactuals. In other words, the potential home earnings of migrants . . . have a more equalizing effect than do remittances on income distribution. Whereas Lipton’s (1980) and Barham and Boucher’s (1998) arguments focus on large scale concerns relating to income distribution and social

90 Syeda Rozana Rashid et al. “equilibration” (Lipton, 1980: 1) for most of the part, they also make us aware about the signifcance of understanding the exceptions to run the show. They stress emphasising the cases that appear not to comply with what is detailed by the majority of migrant householders with respect to remittances and the fnancial circumstances of their families. Drawing on these assumptions Knowles and Anker (1981) in their study of Kenya, a country which was at the beginning of the urbanisation process, argued that remittances beneft the rich more than the poor. Similarly Adams (2006) in a study of Ghana, and De and Ratha (2005) in their study of Sri Lanka, note that remittance infows into household expenditure resulted in increasing income inequality within villages. Stahl (2003: 43) notes that returnee international migrants to Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka suffer higher rates of unemployment and ultimately become a burden to their home communities. One possible explanation for this is that migrants’ return to their homelands with skills that no longer ft the needs of their rural communities. Scholars also notes that remittance income is spent primarily on consumer goods – food, houses, consumer durables – than on assets to an improved future livelihood (Deshingkar, 2006: 18; Sander and Maimbo, 2005: 63). Chami et al. (2003: 9–11) contend that a major portion of remittance income is dedicated to consumption and only a limited amount goes towards savings, or is invested in lodging, agricultural land and other things that are used to be proftable to the economy. Other scholars hypothesise that the practice compounds the surge of resources from rural to urban zones. Oucho and Gould’s (1993) study of sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, found that some rural households draw on remittances to back their youth to move to the cities in their interest of better education. This chapter will use family size, family expenditure, access to resources, insurance against risk and external factors such as changes in the policies of the destinations to be the analytical factors of remittance behaviour of the families which have sent one or more members abroad. The dynamics of gender and intra-household issues will run through the text of the chapter, although the chapter will not in particular deal with these issues in detail.

3.3 The Bangladesh context 3.3.1

Labour migration from Bangladesh

The context of this article is Bangladesh, where migration has become a livelihood strategy for low-earning households, especially in rural areas. Offcial records suggest that an estimated 11 million Bangladeshis are employed in the global job market (RMMRU, 2019). Of them, a large majority of low skilled Bangladeshis are concentrated in the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries and the newly industrialised Southeast Asian countries (Figure 3.1), whereas the skilled migrants and professionals have found a strong presence in Europe

The unequal landscape of remittances

Other Iraq Mauritius Brunei Egypt Japan Italy UK S. Korea Singapore Malysia Sudan Libya Jordan Lebanon Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait UAE KSA

91

254650 75748 69476 74893 23084 2087 55520 10107 41552 782657 1057056 11792 122402 180563 167086 410460 808090 1500870 628950 2371545 4049588 0

500000

1000000 1500000 2000000 2500000 3000000 3500000 4000000 4500000

Figure 3.1 Countries of destination for labour migration from Bangladesh, 1976–2019 Source: BMET (2020a)

and North America. A majority of the migrants are employed in semi-skilled work in the Gulf and Southeast Asian countries (See Table 3.1). According to the Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET), In 2019, a total of 700,159 workers (including 104,786 females) migrated overseas through legal channels from Bangladesh, with an decrease of 4.63 per cent compared to 2018. Semi-skilled and unskilled workers still constitute the largest proportion of migrants compared to professional and skilled workers (413,980 and 320,201, respectively, in 2018) (BMET, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c), although the professional and semi-skilled workers had higher average wages and could send more remittances (Siddiqui, 2009: 19). 3.3.2 The socio-economic condition of the migrants Bangladesh is a developing country and one of the largest deltas in the world, with a total area of 147,570 square kilometres (56,977 square miles). It has a population of about 160.8 million (according to the census of July 2016), which is seventh largest in the world. Population growth rate in Bangladesh is also quite high, at 1.3 per cent. Seventy-three per cent of the

1,775 6,447 8,190 7,005 12,209 22,432 20,611 18,939 17,183 28,225 26,294 23,839 25,286 38,820 35,613 46,887 50,689 71,662 61,040 59,907

543 490 1,050 1,685 2,343 2,449 3,272 5,098 5,484 7,823 9,265 9,619 10,809 17,659 20,792 32,605 30,977 66,168 46,519 32,055

3,201 7,022 10,114 12,311 13,538 27,014 34,981 33,361 31,405 39,078 30,889 38,336 29,356 39,920 41,405 58,615 95,083 95,566 70,377 89,229

6,087 15,725 22,809 24,495 30,073 55,787 62,762 59,220 56,714 77,694 68,658 74,017 68,121 101,724 103,814 147,131 188,124 244,508 186,326 187,543

5,279 5,729 6,160 6,957 5,715 6,074 4,483 730 – – – – – – – – 47 503 236 73 157 1,221 1,895 340 476 707 435 140 541 559 178 627

– – – – – – – –

BOESL 284 1,171 1,994 2,966 7,773 22,218 24,939 26,320 32,460 39,397 27,859 33,818 34,117 36,508 40,258 64,889 59,746 129,479 95,361 74,921

Recruiting agent

524 8,825 14,655 14,572 16,585 27,495 33,340 32,170 24,097 37,076 38,904 39,859 33,528 64,509 63,121 82,102 127,790 113,967 90,551 111,922

Individual

568 1,766 3,455 3,494 1,983 3,892 3,898 1,822 2,642 2,568 2,210 2,223 2,670 5,325 6,004 9,024 11,375 11,112 8,390 6,352

Total

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Others

BMET

Semi– skilled

Less– skilled

Professional

Year

Skilled

Table 3.1 Skill composition of labour outfows, 1976–2018 Recruiting media

Syeda Rozana Rashid et al.

Worker’s category

92

3,188 3,797 9,574 8,045 10,669 5,940 14,450 15,862 12,202 1,945 925 676 1864 1426 387 1,192 36,084 689 1730 1828 4,638 4507 2673 235,064 1.93

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total %

Source: BMET (2020c)

Professional

Year

64,301 65,211 74,718 98,449 99,606 42,742 56,265 74,530 110,177 113,655 115,468 165,338 292,364 134,265 90,621 229,149 173,331 133,754 148,766 214,328 318,851 434,344 317,528 4,150,934 34.03

34,689 43,558 51,590 44,947 26,461 30,702 36,025 29,236 28,327 24,546 33,965 183,673 132825 84,517 20,016 28,729 104,721 62,528 70,095 91,099 119,946 155,569 117,734 1,862,203 15.27

109,536 118,511 131,785 116,741 85,950 109,581 118,516 134,562 113,670 100,316 220,436 472,700 437,088 246,585 272,118 301,552 284,153 203,058 193,403 243,929 303,706 401,796 283,002 5,803,502 47.57 85852 12240 10722 10222 10914 8485 7560 7440 9509 9224 11690 4697 10,590 12,302 13244 147,421 1.21

Others 211,714 231,077 267,667 268,182 222,686 188,965 225,256 254,190 272,958 252,702 381,516 832609 875055 475,278 390,702 568,062 607,798 409,253 425,684 555,881 757,731 1,008,518 734,181 12,199,124 100.00

Total

– – –

–

– – –

– –

–

773

1

15

398 335 419 309 524 149 226 456 306 645 977 619 2172 – – –

BOESL

BMET

Less– skilled

Skilled

Semi– skilled

Recruiting media

Worker’s category

118,670 85,793 85,300 110,669 91,475 76,669 84,401 82,507 85,458 81,608 104,949 362531 207018 – – –

Recruiting agent 92,646 144,934 181,948 157,204 130,686 112,147 140,629 171,227 187,194 173,187 275,590 469459 665092 – – –

Individual

The unequal landscape of remittances 93

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total population resides in rural areas. The population density was 1090 per square kilometre of total area in July 2016 and approximately 18.8 million acres of total cultivatable land in 2008, making it one of the most densely populated countries of the world (BBS, 2017a). There are inequalities in land ownership in the country, whereby 56 per cent of rural households are classifed as functionally landless; that is, they own less than 0.2 ha of land (Toufque and Turton 2003: 16). In addition, from 1986–2007, on average, 1,320 square kilometres (6,000 ha) of land and 232 million people (10 million per year) were affected by food/erosion, and thus 20 per cent became landless (GoB, 2009). Therefore, the proportion of landless people living in the rural areas continues to increase. Bangladesh is a country with one of the world’s highest poverty rates and lowest rates of economic development. However, according to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2016, conducted on 46,076 households (32,096 in rural areas and 13,980 in urban areas) the national poverty rate declined in Bangladesh to 23.2 per cent in 2016, from 31.5 per cent in 2010 and 40 per cent in 2005 implying that rural poverty declined from 43.8 per cent in 2005 to 35.2 per cent in 2010 to 26.4 per cent in 2016, while urban poverty fell to 21.3 per cent in 2005, 28.5 per cent in 2010 and 18.9 per cent 2016 (BBS, 2017b). Over the past two decades, Bangladesh’s economy has successfully expanded. The per capita income in Bangladesh has increased to US$1610 for the fscal year 2016–2017, compared to US$1456 for the fscal year 2015–2016, US$1316 in 2014–2015 and US$676 in 2008–2009. The gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by over 6 per cent annually (currently 7.28 per cent for the fscal year 2016– 2017) over the past few years (BBS, 2017b). The service sector contributed half of the national GDP (49.9 per cent in 2010), followed by industry (29.9 per cent in 2010) and then agriculture (20.2 per cent in 2010), although nearly two-thirds of the population is employed in agriculture, and only around a quarter in the service sector. The rapid expansion of the commercial, transport and construction sectors, the development of a few specialised types of manufacturing activities (such as ready-made garments, leathers and shrimp processing) and the growth in the amount of remittances from expatriate Bangladeshi workers, has brought about important structural changes to the Bangladeshi economy (Bangladesh Bank, 2010). If we take poverty in its multi-dimensional terms such as the overlapping deprivation of education, health and standard of living, as developed by the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) (see Alkire and Santos 2010), and material deprivation, desperation, lack of security, dignity, risk and high cost of thin comfort (Appadurai 2004: 66), then all persons interviewed for the purpose of this study somehow fall into that ‘poor’ category. Yet, people have their own indicators of socio-economic status. People who possess enough land to meet their yearly requirement for rice are known as rich (valos obostha), those who can manage to produce or buy enough to eat three times a day all year round as middling poor (kono rokom chole) and

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those who cannot earn enough to have at least three proper meals a day as the poorest (Khub Garib) in the villages. The trend of migration was higher among the middling poor than the rich and the poorest. The migrant households interviewed tended to belong to this class. 3.3.3 National and household importance of remittances in Bangladesh A consequence of increases in migrant fows is the increase of remittance fows to households. In 1991, the total amount of international remittances received by Bangladesh equalled US$7.6 million. By 2001, the amount of remittances received had increased to US$12 billion, further rising to US$14 billion in 2014, US$15 billion in 2015, US$13 billion in 2016, US$13 billion in 2017, US$15.54 billion in 2018 and US$18.35 billion in 2019 (BMET, 2020a). Throughout the last fve years, remittances received in Bangladesh have increased on average by 13 per cent annually (Table 3.2). The inclusion of unrecorded fows and transfers in kind, including goods, sharing of knowledge and technological transfers sent back by migrants could more than double the actual value of what migrants remit to their homelands, but this and their impacts on the remittance receiving areas are diffcult to estimate (Siddiqui, 2009: 18). In the fscal year 2016–2017,4 Bangladesh received US$12.76 billion as remittances. This is 14.11 per cent lower than the previous year (Bangladesh Bank, 2018a). In 2014–2015, the remittance fgure was US$15.31 billion. Saudi Arabia (US$2.26 billion) was the largest source of international

Table 3.2 Wage earners remittance infows (yearly) Year

Remittances in million US dollars

Year

Remittances in million US dollars

Year

Remittances in million US dollars

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

769.30 901.97 1009.09 1153.54 1201.52 1355.34 1525.03 1599.24 1806.63 1954.95

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

2071.03 2847.79 3177.63 3565.31 4249.87 5484.08 6568.03 8979.00 10,720.00 11,000.00

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

12,168.09 14,163.99 13,832.13 14,942.57 15,270.99 13,609.77 13,526.84 15,544.68 18,354.94

Source: BMET (2020a)

96 Syeda Rozana Rashid et al. remittances to Bangladesh in 2016–2017, followed by the United Arab Emirates (US$2.0 billion) and the USA (US$1.6 billion). Although, to date the highest amount of remittances are sent from Saudi Arabia, its total share is falling each year. In earlier years, 50 per cent of the total remittance received was from Saudi Arabia, whereas it now stands at 23.29 per cent (Bangladesh Bank, 2018b). Bangladesh has witnessed over the years a steady rise in remittance infows as a share of GDP. The contribution of international remittances to GDP was 7.89 per cent in 2015 compared to 9.23 per cent in 2013, 7.75 per cent in 2005–2006, and 6.37 per cent in the most recent fscal year for which fgures were available (2004–2005) (Bangladesh Bank, 2007; FRED, 2015). Remittances amounted to a third of the total amount of government revenue from taxes, and 30 per cent of the total amount of debt service payments. They equalled 60 per cent of the development budget (de Bruyn and Kuddus, 2005: 40); thus, remittances play a very important role in the country’s development. The government of Bangladesh treats foreign aid (concessional loans and grants) as an important resource base for development. In FY 2008–2009, it received US$1.8 billion in foreign aid. The amount of remittances received in 2009 was three times this amount (Bangladesh Bank, 2010). The steady fow of remittances has also helped to increase the supply of national savings. According to the Bangladesh Bank (2010), the recent trends in the private sector savings component show that the infow of workers’ remittances contributed to increasing private savings by 13.40 per cent in FY 2009–2010. It should be remembered that these analyses only take into account the offcial remittance fows. In 2006 the World Bank (2006: xiii) recognised the signifcance of remittances in Bangladesh by noting that international remittances contributed to reduce poverty by 6 per cent. However, HIES data of 2010 shows household income from gifts and remittances accounted for 10.6 per cent nationally (17.28 per cent in rural areas and 7.75 per cent in urban areas) (BBS, 2011: 32). Therefore, the contribution of migrants’ remittances to national development cannot be over-emphasised.

3.4 The preferred use of remittances In what follows, the chapter discusses the priorities of the migrant in terms of using the remittances. Based on the fndings of multi-local studies carried out in different points in time, the section discusses the contextual understanding of the landscape of remittances. 3.4.1

Meeting the food security

As three studies revealed, migrant families in Bangladesh primarily aim to remove constraints such as the lack of basic amenities and risk of falling into poverty by creating opportunities through investing in land, houses,

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education and marriage, the meaning and process of which are highly contextual and socially embedded (Rashid and Sikder, 2016). Remittances provided households with a greater sense of food security by giving the members uninterrupted access to money to meet their dietary needs and food preferences and so ensure an active, healthy life. 3.4.2 Investing in human capital development First-generation migrants paid more attention to facilitating consumption and building tangible property. Those of the second generation, by contrast, expressed their willingness to spend on education. The households wished to achieve social mobility and also invest in the third generation’s education while the second generation remained largely uneducated, something which is also evident in other South Asian contexts (see Osella and Osella, 2000). Our studies found that in general migrant and non-migrant households spend 10–25 per cent of their earning on education of children. The expenses involve study materials such as books, stationery, school dress (once in a year), school snacks, school fees, transportation and private tuition (Tables 3.4 and 3.5). Table 3.3 Minimum household costs other than main food, per month Sectors of household expenses

Cost (in Taka)

Daily groceries 30 days @ Tk. 50 Education per child per month (private tuition + stationery) Electricity bill Premium of private insurance Medical costs Fuel sticks Hospitality (guest) Total

1,500 800 200 200 200 100 1,000 4,000 (US$50)

Source: Based on the information collected from Tangail villages

Table 3.4 Education costs of a non-residential student of Class X Serial No

Particulars

Amount BDT

1 2 3 4

School fee Private tuition (two subjects) Stationery Tiffn Total

80 1,000 500 200 1,780.00

Source: Compiled by authors

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Table 3.5 Education costs of a residential student of Class XII Serial No

Particulars

Amount BDT

1 2 3 4 5

School fee Food Stationery Accomodations Tiffn and transport Private tuition: (for two subject) Total

960 2,000 500 600 600 1,000 5,660.00

Source: Compiled by authors

3.4.3

Buying land

Agricultural land is a scarce commodity in Bangladesh, and more than 50 percent of rural households have become functionally landless and own less than 0.02 ha of land. The landless population is growing at a rate of 1.39 percent per year. In addition, much of the available cultivable land is controlled by small groups of affluent landowners (BBS, 2011). In a country which offers little social protection for poorer people, owning a land carries huge significance. Both migrant and non-migrant households try to accumulate some landed properties which may serve as a source of agriculture or other forms of income on their return home. In the context of Bangladesh, land also serves as a symbol of social status, power and control (Rashid, 2016). As Gardner (1995: 65) observed, social hierarchy in rural Bangladesh is generally understood in terms of people’s access to land. We see a similar trend among Gulf migrants in Kerala, India (Osella and Osella, 2000: 146 ff), Sri Lanka (Gamburd, 2000: 169–170) and Pakistan (Ballard, 2003; Lefebvre, 1999: 204). Migrants belonging to the landless and functionally landless families usually buy cultivable land. Nevertheless, accumulation of rural assets, such as land, depends on the nature of the village economy and opportunities. Our interviews with householders revealed in most cases, migrants cannot accumulate a huge amount of land, so they do it step by step depending on the earning abroad. Often remittances consist only one major source of the total money required for purchasing land, while the family manages to acquire the rest of the money by taking loans from relatives or others with interest and later paying off the loan from remittances. Remittances are also used to fnance short-term and long-term skilldevelopment courses. We came across youths who have taken language and computer training from the nearby local institutions.

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3.4.4 Building houses After few years of migration when both the migrant and household identify themselves in a comfortable position, they concentrate on building some tangible properties through buying land, making or renovating a house. Sikder and Peter (2013: 261) argues that decisions to buy land or to build a home were not automatic responses, as if the migrant villagers had entered into these arrangements without any planning. Some of the villagers considered investing in land and a home as future insurance in the village, while others saw it as a necessity for the migrant households to ensure their social identity in their place of origin. In the present study, most of the brick houses in the study villages possess the following features: a one-storied building with a higher concrete foor, brick walls and corrugated iron at the top. A typical tin-shed brick house costs Tk.500,000–700,000 (US$6,400–9,000). In most cases, migrants send payments over time as the non-migrant members of the household erect the house. People invest in building houses, buying land and social occasions in order to boosting kinship ties, and status seeking as part of building informal social safety in the absence of a well-designed and carefully implemented formal protection and insurances (Rashid, 2009). 3.4.5 Investing in agriculture, trade and business Three studies also show that remittances from other working members of the family facilitate the land-poor households in trading enterprises and also to lease-in rice land, which ensures their food security. It was evident that people invested in small trade, farms or businesses as a long-term strategy. Researchers note that investing in business is a way of diversifying the village economy and providing new opportunities for the local people (de Haas, 2006: 567; Rapoport and Docquier, 2005: 71). However, investing remittances in business is not always productive in terms of the local village economy. A positive impact depends on the savings the migrant household has for investment, the business exposure and experience within the family back home, and the condition of the local rural market (Sofranko and Idris, 1999: 464). The areas of investment in the study locations include rice, hatchery, vegetable, poultry, husbandry, and handlooms. Almost all the household interviewed were seen to invest in agriculture in the harvesting season. Remittances contribute to agriculture in a number of ways. First, the costs of production are usually covered by remittances. Migrant households use their remittances in buying seeds, fertiliser and water (for irrigation), as well as hiring labour, if required. Migrant households, having no cultivable land of their own, usually lease land on a short-term or long-term basis using the remittances as payment. People consider remittances as an important, yet unstable, source of earning. Subsistence production of rice and other crops provides a guarantee against the risk of food shortage due to irregular transfer of remittances. Second, rural

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households often consider farming as their principal and permanent occupation and migration as a stopgap strategy to diversify income (Rashid, 2016). There are also cultural notions attached to the land. To quote Mahfuz (55) of Nagpara village: “We have been doing this (farming) for ages. We have to do it irrespective of cost and beneft”. In the villages, families with migrants usually have more cash than others, since they regularly receive remittances. A signifcant number of today’s moneylenders in the villages are thus members of migrant households who lend money to their neighbours and kin for agriculture, migration, medical treatment, and so on. The loan is usually interest free when given to close relatives. However, interest in cash and/or paddy is usually added when the money is lent to distant kin or village-related kin. 3.4.6

Marrying off daughters

This strategy adopted for long-term investment of remittances is very gendered. Girls in the villages are expected to be married off between 15–18. A good marriage is considered a good investment for the future of the daughters. There are some costs involved in the marriages of daughters, including the dowry, gold ornaments, utensils, a gift for the groom and a small feast. The cost of marriage varies from Tk. 10,000–100,000, depending on the socio-economic condition of the household. Many migrant families cover this cost from remittances. Remittances help increase the likelihood of marriage for girls in Bangladeshi rural society. While parents of a girl face tremendous social pressure after the girl reaches puberty, remittances offer them chances to do that. Most migrant parents want to marry off their daughters within the migration period to take the advantage of cash fow.

3.5 The landscape of inequality The studies revealed that the benefts of remittances are not equally distributed for all migrant households. There are numerous examples of households whose social and economic problems were not ameliorated with remittances. While they are idiosyncratic in the depictions of their household challenges, they nevertheless draw attention to key social factors that come into play and which moderate the impacts of remittances. The following section highlights some of these factors. 3.5.1

Family size and household expenses

Analysis of the household data reveals that family size is among the main reasons why some households beneft less from migrant remittances than others. It was evident that remittances cannot be invested in land, physical or human capital development in large families, since large sums are spent for food and other consumption. The investment in education was more

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evident among second generation migrants or in the families with more than one remitter. Among the household studied in different villages, 20–30 percent of migrant households continued to experience fnancial pressures, even with remittances. They were living hand to mouth and struggling to meet the minimum household costs other than the main food. Informal borrowing (Hawlat) from kin, friends and neighbours were found to be a common phenomenon in the villages. Whenever a household is in need of cash, it borrows a small amount from its relatives and neighbours. The money is usually refunded according to the convenience of both the borrower and the money lender. In case the money lender urgently wants it back, the borrower again borrows from another source to pay back the frst lender. This is how the borrowing cycle persists in the society, as well as provides social support to the households. Over the last 20 years, migrant families in the study villages turn out to be the largest benefciary of this informal borrowing system, further widening the gap between disparity between provider and receiver of the loans. Some of the fnancial pressures reported by households relate to loans that they had raised to fnance the migration of family members. The studies found that 15 percent of the migrant families received migration loans from kin and neighbours. Each of these families were still repaying its debts in addition to meeting regular household expenses during the course of the feld work. 3.5.2

Access to social networks

It was evident from the studies that effectiveness of remittances in alleviating fnancial pressures should be considered alongside a range of other factors that affect the household, including the nature of household relationships with other family members and villagers. For example, a migrant household and family members’ gusthi or bongsho (kin/lineage) or roktersomporko (blood line), together with the local customs of villages, made it possible to use the remittances effectively, especially when amounts remitted were small. Gusthi helped enable many of the poor households in the villages to survive through receiving help or support from the members of their gusthi. Support such as shelter, land, money, labour, information and advice are often provided during a crisis (Gardner, 1995: 150–154). In all three studies, almost all the households and migrants interviewed said that they received help from during and after migration in terms of remittance transfer, fnancial assistance, and so on. Women migrants always take the assistance of their natal family to look after the left-behind children, as well as to transfer remittances. The strong relationships and responsibilities among the members of the gusthi, bongsho and roktersomporko may help to build strong social networks, which the members can translate into social capital to promote their

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well-being. Nevertheless, some cases of maintaining the value and status of the gusthi cause problems for their members when they are not allowed to go against not only their own family values, but also the interests of their gusthi. While social networks can impose controls on migrant behaviour (Senne et al., 2011) and even exacerbate a household’s fnancial predicament, migrant networks provide critical support at every stage of the migrant process (de Haas, 2007). Migrants also said that relatives helped them withstand the shocks and further deterioration of the household economy. Yet, the extent to which one can draw upon the kinship network for migration purposes depends on one’s relationship with the immediate and extended family. Migrant households that experience diffculties were, for the most part, socially detached and have to manage their problems on their own. 3.5.3

Access to material resources

For numerous family units, life was diffcult for the migrants and family members live in instability and survive on the edges of destitution (Orozco, 2006: 17). Typically, income transfers to generally poorer people and families constitute a welfare framework that smooths the family’s liquidity issues (Sander and Maimbo, 2005) and contributes to family welfare (Jeanty, 2008). The households that most gain advantage from remittances are not fundamentally the wealthy families (contra Lipton, 1980), but those which have adequate assests and fabric capital to call on when an crisis emerges, or those which do not force extra fnancial strains on the household budget. Quartey (2006: 12) writes that: the proportion of land holding area has a proportional direct effect on household consumption. Households with large land areas are likely to have higher income than households with low land holdings. Even in situations where householders do not cultivate the land by themselves, they could rent it out for a fee. Thus land holdings are expected to have a direct positive effect on consumption via income. Indeed, if the part of land holding is taken as a marker of a household’s access to assets, then 25 percent of the migrants studied were found to have no access to assets. Again, the migrants in emergency circumstances such as sudden layoffs, non-payment of compensation or illness of the migrants uncovered that households which are essentially under-resourced are less able to bargain with the situation. As Orozco (2006: 1) observes regarding migrant families: despite the impact of remittances on the receiving side, ultimately, both senders and recipients are families living on the edge of poverty. These are struggling families with a desire to do better but with limited choices on both ends.

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The surveyed households also reported that they had to spend little of their reserve funds to purchase substitution materials for their homes. Amid riverbank erosion, the cost of household materials rises because of the colossal demand. In the villages, there was a defciency of trees that can produce wood and bamboo. Most wealthy households used cement and sand to form the footings for the houses, and these are more costly, but these households detailed that they gathered bamboo and wood from other villages that required labour and transport. The point being made here is that those under-resourced households on the skirt of defciency have to draw on their small assets, including remittances, to meet the fundamental necessities for their families. Income from migration gives them with a level of bolstered fnances, but not enough to resist unforeseen costs in calamity-prone areas, and certainly not suffcient for the household to look at agricultural production. In these settings, lowincome households are incapable of sparing cash from remittances to contribute to agricultural production or to generate household income. 3.5.4

Lack of insurance against illness and death

Illness or death of a family member can alter even the most carefully articulated plans and can cause radical havoc to a household’s economic position. At least 25 households were found in the studies where remittances contributed mostly to health care expenditures, including doctors’ fees, health check-ups, buying medicines and transport costs to surgeries and hospitals of the family members. In fact, in most of these cases, the main reason for receiving the remittances was solely for medical purposes. The nature of the illness in some cases were such that they needed continuous medical treatment. For example, the eldest son (8 years old) of Rabeya (a migrant’s wife in Kalihati, Tangail) was disabled with a physical disorder, and Rabeya herself had a tumour in her chest. She had already had an operation at the Dhaka Medical College (DMC) and, every week, needed to spend money on medicine. Such a situation can be best analysed by Savage and Harvey (2007)’s observation that while migrant households “use remittance income to survive and recover from crises”, they also add that “remittances should not be seen as a panacea” or quick-fx to the range of social challenges affecting families. 3.5.5

Lack of sustainable investment

Remittances are often unable to bring longstanding positive changes for the migrant and the family due to its lack of sustainable investment. The elderly father of Hossain (34), a Malaysian returnee in Monpur, expressed his disappointment in this way: “He (Hossain) is unemployed since his return. I’m the person maintaining his wife and children.” Hossain, in contrast, said: “I sent Tk.1,20,000 in total from abroad. I was so loyal to my family that I

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sent them almost all my earnings. I’ve never thought of saving something for myself. I should have done that. They have consumed everything.” Hossain is among a signifcant number of migrants who were found to have little access to the remittances they have sent back home in hope that after return they will invest it in some productive venture. Migrants often fail to make long-term investment plans while they are abroad. The families receiving the remittances often fnd it as a source of consumption and save little for the future. Often they have too little to save. As a result, there is a high risk of going back to the pre-migration status as they run out of the money earned abroad. 3.5.6 External factors In addition to the family-specifc issues analysed above, there are a number of external components in relation to international migration, which have major bearing on the economic circumstances of individual migrants and their households. Foremost among these is the experience of migrant employment in the place of destination. The following case illustrates it well: Md. Kalam is a 66-year-old male and head of an international migrant household who lives in the Kisamatpur Sherpur village of Sadullapur Upazila, who meets his household’s experiences with remittances. He draws attention to additional external factors that impact on remittances, namely the precarious nature of migrant work. After borrowing money at huge interest, Azad sent his youngest son three years ago to Malaysia. Azad explains that upon reaching Malaysia, his son faced diffculties. The job he was promised did not materialise, and instead he found an ordinary labouring job working only part-time. He could work for only two to three days per week and sat around for the rest of the week. He is also paid a very low salary, without any overtime or free food and lodging. Azad now realises that the dalal (agent or middleman) has cheated them. His son also informed him that the dalal knew about Malaysia’s economy, but had failed to give them the correct information. His son’s income is mostly spent on his food and accommodation costs in Malaysia, leaving him little to remit. In March 2010, Azad’s son was able to remit Tk. 10,000 (US$145), but three months later, his son asked Azad for Tk. 50,000 (US$722) to renew his work visa in Malaysia. Instead of receiving remittances from his migrant son, Azad now fnds himself having to raise funds to support his son. Like that of Azad’s, a signifcant number of households in the study villages borrowed cash to cover the migration costs in the hope that it will be repaid from remittances. When migrants found themselves stranded and incapable of sending remittances to their families or to pay for their return home, the families back home struggled to meet the consumption and repay the loan. Individuals and households back home usually are less likely to broadcast the negative viewpoint of migrating anticipating possible village gossip such as “expenses incurred for sending family members abroad did

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not generate the expected returns”. Prior to the migration, these families were debt free, but the migration, instead of bringing them wealth, made a burden which prevented them from improving their household income. Migrant-receiving states often change their policies which in turn can tremendously impact the status of the migrants and the remittance fow. For example, over the last few years, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and UAE have virtually stopped issuing new work permits to Bangladeshi workers. Despite issuing demand letters for 70,000 Bangladeshi workers, the Malaysian government revoked the hiring of these workers due to revising its new policy to recruit migrants. Siddiqui et al. (2017) reported that many Malaysian employers had constrained their employees to take two weeks’ unpaid pay off and to work for only two weeks per month. Some employers stated that there were no jobs at the moment so that they could pay only basic wages. A few manufacturing companies even closed down. The worldwide recession also signifcantly affected the jobs of Bangladeshi workers in East Asia, Europe and Africa since 2000. The labour market had constricted also in Romania, Italy and South Korea, and drastically decreased the demand for skilled and semi-skilled Bangladeshi workers.

3.6

Conclusion

This chapter has made a critical analysis of the factors affecting the remittance behaviour and the impact of remittances on migrants and their families. Based on in-depth and qualitative studies carried out in multiple locations of rural Bangladesh, the chapter argued that the landscape of remittances is not equally distributed for all migrant families. While remittances have enabled many households to achieve improvement in their socio-economic conditions, not all households have beneftted equally. A number of social and external factors infuence the extent to which a migrant family can rip the beneft of remittances by reducing the poverty factors. The chapter showed the preferred ways of remittance use including meeting basic needs, paying of loans, investing in physical and human capital, and investing in business. Nonetheless, it also made it clear that remittance income did not result in an automatic increase in family income. Indeed, some households in every migrant community suffered from diverse internal and external diffculties that impacted either the generation of remittances or the household’s expenses. By focusing on social factors such as the size of the family and expenditures, access to material resources and social network, and access to insurance against unforeseen events such as illness, it showed that poverty forced some migrant households to spend their remittances on meeting household basic necessities and repaying debts generated by the migration. The chapter has also shown that external factors in the migrants’ destinations can backfre on households that gamble on raising loans for the migration in the hope that their fortunes will improve. Households in this situation discovered that

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migrant remittances do not automatically generate wealth, and may even impose even greater fnancial burdens on the migrant households. The contribution of the chapter to remittance literature lies in its framing of a critical perspective of remittances’ contribution to alleviating poverty. Against the trend of generalising the positive impact of remittances on upward mobility and poverty alleviation, the chapter demonstrated that the poorest of the poor – those bereft of all resources – remain trapped in their poverty notwithstanding their receipt of remittances.

Acknowledgements We are grateful for the support received from Department for International Development (DfID); Monash University’s Faculty of Arts, Australia; RPC of the University of Sussex, UK; and the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), who have made it possible to write this chapter.

Notes 1 All the names of the respondents and villages in this article have been changed to safeguard confdentiality. 2 1 US$ was Taka 36.60 in January to December, 1991 (Source: www. theglobaleconomy.com/Bangladesh/Dollar_exchange_rate/ (accessed 15 November 2018). 3 https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114950-howdo-you-defne-remittances 4 Fiscal year (FY) spans from July to June.

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———.2015. Quarterly Report on Remittance Infows July-September 2015. Bangladesh Central Bank. Dhaka. https://www.bb.org.bd/pub/quaterly/remittance_ earnings/jul_sep2015.pdf ———. 2010. Financial Market Trends and Monetary Policy Actions. The Bangladesh Central Bank. Dhaka. ———. 2007. Monthly Economic Trends: May 2007. Bangladesh Central Bank. Dhaka. Barham, B., and Boucher, S. 1998. Migration, Remittances, and Inequality: Estimating the Net Effects of Migration on Income Distribution. Journal of Development Economics 55 (2): 307–331. BBS. 2017a. Statistical Pocket Book: 2017. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Government of Bangladesh. Dhaka. ———. 2017b. Household Income and Expenditure Survey-2016–2017. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Government of Bangladesh. Dhaka. ———. 2011. Household Income and Expenditure Survey-2010. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Government of Bangladesh. Dhaka. BMET. 2020a. Overseas Employment and Remittances1976–2019. In: Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET). Government of Bangladesh. Dhaka. www.old.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=34 ———. 2020b. Overseas Employment of Female Workers from 2001 to 2019. In: Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET). Government of Bangladesh. Dhaka. www.old.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action? reportnumber=22 ———. 2020c. Category-Wise Overseas Employment from 1976 to 2018. In: Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET). Government of Bangladesh. Dhaka. www.old.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=9’ Chami, R., Fullenkamp, C., and Jahjah’s, S. 2003. Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?, IMF Working Paper WP/03/189. de Haas, H. 2006. Migration, Remittances and Regional Development in Southern Morocco. Geoforum 37: 565–580. De, P., and Ratha, D. 2005. Remittance Income and Household Welfare: Evidence from Sri Lanka Integrated Household Survey. Development Research Group. World Bank, Washington. deBruyn, T., and Kuddus, U. 2005. Dynamics of Remittance Utilization in Bangladesh. Migration Research Series (MRS) No-18. International Organization for Migration (IOM). Geneva. www.iom.org.bd/publications/6.pdf Access date: 15 August 2018. deHaan, A. 1999. Livelihoods and Poverty: The Role of Migration: A Critical Review of the Migration Literature. Journal of Development Studies 36 (2): 1–47. deHaan, A., and Yaqub, S. 2008. Migration and Poverty: Linkages, Knowledge Gaps and Policy Implication. Presented at the Social Policy and Migration in Developing Countries, 22–23 November 2007, Stockholm. pp. 1–28. de Haas, H. 2007. Remitances, Migration and Social Development: A Conceptual Review of the Literature. Programme Paper No-34. United Nation Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). Geneva. ———. 2005. International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Fact. Global Migration Perspectives No. 30. Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). Geneva. de la Fuente, A. 2010. Remittances and Vulnerability to Poverty in Rural Mexico. World Development 38 (6): 828–839.

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Deshingkar, P.2006. Internal Migration, Poverty and Development in Asia: Including the Excluded through Partnerships and Improved Governance. Presented at the Asia 2015 Conference: Promoting Growth, Ending Poverty, 6–7 March, London. pp. 1–19. FRED. 2015. Remittance Infows to GDP for Bangladesh. Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Economic Research, Federal Reseve Bank of St. Louis. St. Louis.https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DDOI11BDA156NWDB Gamburd, M. R. 2000. The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s Migrant Housemaids. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY Gardner, K. 1995. Global Migrants, Local Lives: Travel and Transformation in Rural Bangladesh. Oxford: Carleton Press. Gardner, K., and Osella, F. 2004. Migration, Modernity and Social Transformation in South Asia: An Introduction. In: F. Osella and K. Gardner (eds.), Migration, Modernity and Social Transformation in South Asia, pp. xi–xliii. Sage. London. Ghosh, B. 2006. Migrants’ Remittances and Development: Myths, Rhetoric and Realities. Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). GoB. 2009. Past Disaster Information in Bangladesh. In: Disaster Management Bureau, Disaster Managment and Relief Division. Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, Government of Bangladesh. Dhaka. IOM. 2010. International Migration and Migrant Workers’ Remittances in Indonesia: Findings of Baseline Surveys of Migrant Remitters and Remittance Benefciary Households International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom. int/system/fles/pdf/indonesia_remittances.pdf Jeanty, C. 2008. The Practice of Remittance Sending: The case of Haitians in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties. Honors Florida State University. Florida. Knowles, J. C., and Anker, R. 1981. An Analysis of Income Transfers in a Developing Country: The Case of Kenya. Journal of Development Economics 8 (2): 205–226. Lefebvre, A. 1999. Kinship, Honour and Money in Rural Pakistan: Subsistence Economy and the Effects of International Migration. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Copenhagen, Denmark. Levitt, P., and Lamba-Nieves, D. 2013. Rethinking Social Remittances and the Migration-Development Nexus from the Perspective of Time. Migration Letters 10 (1): 11–22. Lucas, R. E., and Stark, O. 1985. Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana. Journal of Political Economy 93 (5): 901–918. Lipton, M. 1980. Migration from Rural Areas of Poor Countries: The Impact on Rural Productivity and Income Distribution. World Development 8 (1): 1–24. Orozco, M. 2006. Transnational Families: Lives on the Edge, But in Pursuit of Change. Report by Institute for the Study in International Migration. Washington, DC. Osella, F., and Osella, C. 2000. Social Mobility in Kerala: Modernity and Identity in Confict. Pluto Press. London. Oucho, J. O., and Gould, W. T. S. 1993. Internal Migration, Urbanization, and Population Distribution. Demographic Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 256–296. Quartey, P. 2006. The Impact of Migrant Remittances on Household: Welfare in Ghana. AERC Research Paper-158. African Economic Research Consortium (AERC). Nairobi. Rapoport, H., and Docquier, F. 2005. The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances. IZA Discussion Papers-1531. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Bonn.

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Rashid, S. 2009. Food Price Stabilization Policies in a Globalizing World. In Food Policy for Developing Countries: The Role of Government in the Global Food System. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. Rashid, S. R. 2016. Uncertain Tomorrows: Livelihoods, Capital and Risks in Labour Migration from Bangladesh. University Publishers Limited. Dhaka. Rashid, S. R., and Sikder, M. J. 2016. Choosing a Life: Remittances and Youth Aspirations in Bangladeshi Villages. Working Paper no. 40, Migrating Out of Poverty (MooP), RPC, University of Sussex, UK. RMMRU. 2019. Labour Migration from Bangladesh 2018 Achievements and Challenges. https://www.forum-asia.org/uploads/wp/2019/05/Migration-TrendAnalysis-2018-RMMRU.pdf Sabates-Wheeler, R., and Waite, M. 2003. Migration and Social Protection: A Concept Paper. Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, December, 1645, pp. 1980–2000. Sander, C., and Maimbo, S. M. 2005. Migrant Remittances in Africa: A Regional Perspective. In: S. M. Maimbo and D. Ratha (eds.), Remittances Development Impact and Future Prospects, pp. 53–80. The World Bank. Washington, DC. Savage, K., and Harvey, P. 2007. Remittances during Crises: Implications for Humanitarian Response. Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Briefng Paper-26. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). London. Senne, J.-N., Chort, I., and Gubert, F. 2011. Migrant Networks as a Basis for Social Control: Remittance Obligations among Senegalese in France and Italy. Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011, 73. Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics. Siddiqui, T. 2009. International Labour Migration and Remittance Management in Bangladesh. Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU). University of Dhaka. Dhaka. Siddiqui, T., Sultana, M., Anas, A., and Sikder, M. J. U. 2017. Migration Trends Report 2017. Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU). Dhaka. Sikder, M. J. U., and Peter, H. B. 2013. Remittances and Life Chances: A Study of Migrant Households in Rural Bangladesh. Migration and Development 2 (2): 261–285. Sikder, M. J. U., Higgins, V., and Ballis, P. 2017. Remittance Incomes and Social Resilience among Migrant Households in Rural Bangladesh. Palgrave MacMillan. New York. Sofranko, A. J., and Idris, K. 1999. Use of Overseas Migrants’ Remittances to the Extended Family for Business Investment: A Research Note 1. Rural Sociology 64 (3): 464–481. Stahl, C. W. 2003. International Labour migration in East Asia: Trends and Policy Issues. Migration in the Asia Pacifc: Population, Settlement and Citizenship Issues, pp. 29–54. Stark, O. 1991. The Migration of Labor. Basil Blackwell. Cambridge, UK. Stark, O., and Levhari, D. 1982. On Migration and Risk in LDCS. Economic Development and Cultural Change 31 (1): 191–196. Stark, O., and Lucas, R. E. 1988. Migration, Remittances, and the Family. Economic Development and Cultural Change 36 (3): 465–481. Taylor, J. E., and Rozelle, S. 2003. Migration and Incomes in Source Communities: A New Economics of Migration Perspective from China. Economic Development and Cultural Change 52 (1): 75–101.

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4

Migration legislation and regulations in South Asia An unfnished agenda? Piyasiri Wickramasekara

4.1

Introduction

The major objectives of migration policy are the protection of migrant workers, governance and regulation of migration, and maximizing benefts of labour migration for national development. Central to this is a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework based on international normative foundations (Cholewinski, 2015). Many origin countries in Asia have enacted laws relating to migration at different stages. The Gulf oil boom in the early 1970s and the related rapid transformation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies created a massive demand for migrant workers (Wickramasekara, 2011). These developments led to large-scale movements of workers under different arrangements, and the policy makers realized the need for action to protect their migrant workers. In South Asia, this resulted in revision of very old colonial laws on emigration and immigration. This chapter attempts to provide a comparative perspective on migration legislation in selected counties of Asia. It will review current legal frameworks and their shortcomings in promoting migration governance and protection of migrant workers, and highlight the way forward.

4.2

Methodological notes and defnitions

The study is based on a desk review of existing migration legislation in South Asian countries, including recent amendments, and secondary literature. Most countries have been transparent about their legislation, which is easily accessible in the public domain. What is not readily available is any offcial review of the legal frameworks and their operation. Researchers and international organizations have flled the gap to some extent through ad hoc reviews. Such reviews are neither comprehensive nor easily accessible. This chapter will analyze the legislation in the light of changes in the political, social and economic landscape since their introduction and the international instruments ratifed by the countries as appropriate. It is not possible to discuss in detail the situations in all South Asian countries, in view of disparities in available and accessible information across countries.

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Labour migration and related policies in South Asia comprise two aspects: emigration of nationals and infow of foreign workers into South Asian countries. However, most migration policies and legislation in South Asia have focussed on emigration of nationals for employment abroad. This is partly because of the large numbers involved in out-migration compared to infows. At the same time, no South Asian country has acknowledged itself to be an immigration country, although they may host large numbers of foreign workers. India and Pakistan are good examples. In this sense, the policies and legislation on migration are not inclusionary. The titles of the migration laws indicate this bias: Indian Emigration Ordinance of 1982, Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) Act and the Nepal Foreign Employment Act of 2007, among others. As defned in this chapter, South Asia conforms to the World Bank defnition of the subregion, which covers the following countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This differs from the United Nations defnition, which includes the Islamic Republic of Iran also as part of South Asia. The discussion here focusses mainly on the following countries: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, due to availability of better information. Discussions concerning the migration-related legislation and policies must be conducted within the overall national employment policy framework. This is because overseas migration constitutes part of the employment strategy of national workers. It acts as a safety valve for domestic employment pressures. Migration laws and regulations should be developed as part of a comprehensive approach to employment and labour market policy guided by relevant employment policy standards (such as Conventions Nos. C. 122, C.88 and C.181).1 In many countries however, migration policies may be developed independently of employment policies, given the lack of coordination between responsible ministries.

4.3 Normative foundations of national legal frameworks In discussing legal frameworks relating to migration, it is important to fnd out the range of international instruments ratifed by South Asian countries. Of particular importance are the three migrant-specifc international conventions – the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW); ILO (International Labour Organisation) Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97); and the ILO Migrant Workers Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No.143) – as well as the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181) and the more recent Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189). Philippines is the only country in Asia to ratify the three international migrant worker conventions, as well as C.189. Among South Asian countries, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have ratifed the 1990 ICRMW (Table 4.1).

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Table 4.1 Asia – ratifcation status and date of ratifcation of international migrant worker conventions and related conventions: South Asia and the Philippines ICRMW Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka

C097

C143

21 April 2009

14 Sep. 2006

C181

C.189

24 Aug. 2011

5 July 1995 11 March 1996

5 Sep. 2012

Source: ILO NORMLEX – Information System on International Labour Standards (www. ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11001:0::NO:::); UN Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, https://indicators.ohchr.org/

None of the countries have however, ratifed any of the two ILO migrant worker conventions. Thus, the normative foundation to base migration legislation seems to be missing except in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

4.4

Migration profle of South Asian countries

In terms of migration status, most are primarily origin (emigration) countries, while India and Pakistan represent origin (emigration), destination (immigration) and transit situations. Table 4.2 indicates offcially reported emigration numbers for South Asian countries for selected years since 1990. It shows large increases in recent years, particularly for Bangladesh, where it has reached an all-time high level of exceeding one million. In the case of all other countries, a decline is observed in the past 2–3 years. Even Bangladesh reports a marked fall in 2018. A similar drastic fall is observed in Pakistan also, but it is not possible to fnd reasons for this decline. Lower oil prices and recession in the GCC countries, leading to lower demand for migrant workers, may have been a major factor. What is of more importance than these numbers are the profles of migration (Wickramasekara, 2002, 2011, 2016). • • • •

Most fows represent temporary labour migration on short-term contracts, mainly to the Middle East. The GCC countries act as the major destination, accounting for more than 80 per cent of the fows. Recruitment and placement of migrant workers are dominated by a private sector recruitment industry with multiple layers of intermediaries. The bulk of migrant workers comprise low- and semi-skilled workers in agriculture, construction and services, including domestic work. There is high incidence of irregular migration and traffcking, especially within the South Asia subregion.

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Piyasiri Wickramasekara The share of female migration is high only for Sri Lanka, and recent trends show a declining share. Most female migration is for domestic work in private households in the Middle East. At the same time, there are fows of skilled migrant workers from all South Asian countries on a permanent basis to Australia, Canada, GCC states, Europe (UK) and the USA (Wickramasekara, 2016).

These features (except the last one) primarily indicate the vulnerability of the migrant population from South Asia given their low skills, high dependence on proft-motivated recruitment agencies and concentration in destination countries with poor governance systems. The state authorities, therefore, have to go the extra mile to ensure a sound legal and regulatory framework for protection of these migrant workers.

Table 4.2 Annual outfows of migrant workers (offcially reported) Years

Bangladesh

India

Nepal*

Pakistan

1990 1995

Sri Lanka

Total**

103,814

139,861

83,020

115,520

42,625

484,840

187,543

415,334

121,595

122,620

172,489

1,019,581

2000

222,686

243,182

35,543

110,136

182,188

793,735

2005

252,702

548,853

183,682

143,329

231,290

1,359,856

2008

875,055

848,601

249,051

431,842

236,574

2,641,123

2009

465,351

610,272

219,965

404,568

247,119

1,947,275

2010

383,150

641,356

294,094

364,685

266,445

1,949,730

2011

568,062

626,565

354,716

456,893

262,960

2,269,196

2012

607,798

747,401

384,665

638,587

282,331

2,660,782

2013

409,253

816,655

453,834

622,714

293,105

2,595,270

2014

425,684

805,005

519,638

752,466

300,703

2,803,496

2015

555,581

784,152

499,102

946,571

263,443

3,048,849

2016

757,731

520,938

403,693

839,353

242,930

2,764,645

2017

1,008,525

391,024

382,871

496,286

212,162

2,490,868

2018

734,181

340,157

354,082

382,439

211,452

2,022,311

Source: Compiled by the author based on national sources (Wickramasekara, 2014, 2011); (ILO, 2018) Notes: * For Nepal the data relate to its fscal year which starts from 16 July and ends on 15 July of the following year. ** Total of reported fows for the fve countries.

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4.5 4.5.1

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Existing legislative and regulatory frameworks Existing legislative framework on migration

Recent policies and legislation in the subregion were introduced following the large labour fows triggered by the Gulf oil boom and consequent demand in the early 1970s. However, it took about a decade or more for countries to get their acts together. In most countries, the existing legislation was framed after repealing the colonial legacy – the 1922 Emigration Act which had been enacted in the context of indentured labour mobilization to British colonies. The objectives of the new legislation introduced at the time mainly focussed on facilitating outfows of workers, regulating recruitment agencies and protecting workers, especially those considered to be vulnerable (Abrar, 2005). The latter were identifed to be low-skilled workers and women workers migrating for low-skilled occupations, as seen from the Indian policy of emigration clearance requirements for such workers or destinations with serious protection problems. The focus was also on regulation and control of private recruitment agencies which had mushroomed in the wake of the high demand for labour from the Middle East. The focus of legislative measures in the subregion has also been mainly on emigration of nationals for foreign employment. This is also made clear by the fact that responsible ministries cover only foreign employment and diaspora communities. Several examples are: Sri Lanka – Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare (MFEPW); Bangladesh – Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment; India – Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs; and Pakistan – Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment. Table 4.3 summarizes the administrative and legislative framework regarding overseas employment in South Asia. Dedicated ministries have been established in several countries to coordinate overseas employment. In Bangladesh, the Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Oversees Employment was established in December 2002, taking over the subject from the Ministry of Labour. India set up the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in 2004 and took over emigration issues from the Ministry of Labour. In 2016, the MOIA was merged into the Ministry of External Affairs as a separate division. Pakistan established the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development in July 2013. There have been several changes in ministries handling foreign employment in Sri Lanka since 2007, as seen in Table 4.3; the issue of foreign employment has been returned to the Ministry of Labour very recently following dedicated ministries handling the subject since 2007. It is only in Nepal that the issue of foreign employment is still handled by the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security with the Department of Foreign Employment acting as the focal unit. The institutional framework for overseas employment administration also varies among countries. Following the Philippines model, Sri Lanka

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Table 4.3 Legislative and regulatory and policy frameworks to govern labour migration and recruitment in South Asia Country

Responsible agency

Relevant legislation/regulations

Bangladesh

Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment (MEWOE)

Emigration Ordinance, 1982 (No. 29 of 1982); Recruitment Rules 2002; Overseas Employment and Migrants Act, 2013 repealing Emigration Ordinance of 1982.

India

Protectorate of Emigrants (Ministry of Labour); Ministry of Indian Oversea Affairs (2004–2015); Ministry of External Affairs (since January 2016)

The Emigration Act, 1983; Emigration Rules, 30 December 1983; Emigration (Amendment) Rules, 2009; draft Emigration Bill 2019.

Nepal

Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security (MOLE); Department of Foreign Employment, MOLE; Foreign Employment Promotion Board, MOLE

Foreign Employment Act, 2007 (Act No. 26 of the Year 2042), repealing Foreign Employment Act of 1985; The Foreign Employment Rules, 2064 (2008); Foreign Employment Tribunal, 2010; Foreign Employment (First Amendment) Rules, 2011.

Pakistan

Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development (created in July 2013); Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment;

Emigration Ordinance, No. 18 of 1979 (updated 2012); Emigration Rules, 1979 (updated 2012); 2016 Emigration Act.

Sri Lanka

Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare (2007); Ministry of Foreign Employment (2015–2018); Ministry of Labour, Foreign Employment and Petroleum Resources Development (November 2018); Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE)

Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act, No. 21 of 1985 repealing Foreign Employment. Agency Act, No. 32 of 1980 (amended in 1994, 1995 and 2009).

Source: Updated from related table in Wickramasekara (2011)

established a central bureau for handling all overseas employment functions – the SLBFE – in 1985. In other countries, there are no dedicated agencies, although the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment in Pakistan and the newly established Foreign Employment Promotion Board in Nepal carry out a range of functions.

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4.5.2 Main features of legislation – commonalities and differences Table 4.A1 in the Annex to this chapter shows the structure of the various emigration legislation mentioned in Table 4.3. These share some common features, as well as differences, highlighted as follows. Objectives of the legislation The Overseas Employment and Migrants Act, 2013 of Bangladesh (OEMA) clearly spells out the objectives of the new Act in its title and the Preamble. It is interesting that it directly refers to the need to make the Act consistent with the ratifed ICRMW and other international labour and human rights conventions and treaties ratifed by Bangladesh.

Bangladesh: Overseas Employment and Migrants Act, 2013 – title An Act to promote opportunities for overseas employment and to establish a safe and fair system of migration, to ensure rights and welfare of migrant workers and members of their families, to enact a new law by repealing the Emigration Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. XXIX of 1982), and for making provisions in conformity with the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and the Members of Their Families 1990 and other international labour and human rights conventions and treaties ratifed by the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Source: Government of Bangladesh (2013)

In the case of India, the objectives are not explicitly stated in the Emigration Ordinance, but protection seems a major thrust with the appointment of Protector General of Emigrants and other Protectors of Emigrants under his/her authority. A major function of the Protectors is to “protect and aid with his advice all intending emigrants and emigrants”. The preamble of the Foreign Employment Act of 2007 of Nepal clarifes the objectives: Whereas, it is expedient to amend and consolidate laws relating to foreign employment in order to make foreign employment business safe, managed and decent and protect the rights and interests of the workers who go for foreign employment and the foreign employment entrepreneurs, while promoting that business. It refers to protection of the rights and interests of migrant workers, as well as those of private recruitment agencies.

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The Indian Emigration Ordinance mentions in the subtitle “An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to emigration of citizens of India”, which does little to explain the objectives of the revision. As Kumar and Rajan (2014a) state: “It gives no inkling of crisis in the management of emigration lasting almost a decade when the inadequacies of the Emigration Act, 1922 stood exposed due to the sudden spurt in the demand for less-skilled workers in the Middle East”(Kumar and Rajan, 2014a: 86). The Emigration Bill 2019 of India2 which is still in draft stage lists the main objectives in the title: “A Bill to provide for comprehensive emigration management, to institute regulatory mechanisms governing overseas employment of Indian nationals, to establish a framework for protection and promotion of welfare of emigrants and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. These basically pertain to governance of the migration process and protection and promotion of welfare of migrants. The Ministry of External Affairs, India, explains: Over three-and-a-half-decades down the line; the nature, pattern, directions and volume of migration have undergone a paradigm shift. The large-scale migration of our skilled professionals to developed countries, students pursuing higher studies abroad and increasing presence of our nationals in the Gulf for employment, are some of the salient developments. (MEA India, 2019: 1) The Emigration Ordinance of Pakistan does not explicitly state the objectives of the Act, except in stating that “it is expedient to repeal and, with certain modifcations, re-enact the Emigration Act, 1922 (VII of 1922)” in the changed circumstances although it does not clarify the latter. Under the duties of the Director General, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, two objectives are mentioned: a) control and regulate such emigration; b) look after the interest and welfare of emigrants. The Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act of 1985 is the only Act which specifcally lists of the objectives of the Bureau. It lists 18 objectives covering areas of governance and regulation of migration, protection of migrants and development. It is also the only Act which incorporates the establishment and maintenance of “an Information Data Bank to monitor the fow of Sri Lankans for employment outside Sri Lanka and their return after such employment” (Objective s). It also envisages a mechanism to promote diaspora engagement. Status of revision of legislation Bangladesh, India and Pakistan enacted the frst legislation in 1982 and 1983 in the form of emigration ordinances in the wake of the Gulf oil boom and related large expansion of out-migration. However, it is only Bangladesh

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which has thoroughly revised the old legislation in 2013, repealing the Emigration ordinance of 1982. The government of India has proposed a draft Emigration Bill 2019 to replace the 1983 Emigration Ordinance. It was open to suggestions from the public, but the current status is not known. Pakistan updated the 1979 Emigration Ordinance and Rules of 1983 marginally in 2012 and 2016. India is still retaining the Emigration Ordinance of 1982. Nepal also restructured the Foreign Employment Act of 1985. In Sri Lanka, the 1985 Act remains the main piece of legislation on overseas employment, although it was slightly amended in 1994 and 2009. Scope of the acts Annex Table 4.A1 illustrates the broad structure of the various pieces of legislation. All legislative acts and rules cover emigration of nationals, and foreign workers or immigrant workers are excluded from the Act. All contain provisions for licensing and regulations of recruitment agencies. There are hardly any provisions to deal with special issues faced by women migrant workers, except specifying the minimum age for migration eligibility. The draft Emigration Bill of India intends to cover all categories of Indian nationals proceeding for overseas employment, as well as Indian students departing for higher studies abroad. Thus, its scope is broader than those of other countries. Arrangements for overseas employment administration The Bangladesh Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) acts as a one-stop shop in facilitating overseas employment under the Overseas Employment and Migrants Act of 2013. The Act also designates labour welfare wings in destination countries as needed to look after market promotion and welfare of workers. The Indian Emigration Ordinance of 1982 establishes a system of Protector General of Emigrants and Protectors of Emigrants for emigration clearance, welfare of emigrants and regulation of recruitment agencies. The draft Emigration Bill 2019 proposes to establish an Emigration Management Authority (EMA) by the central government to ensure the overall welfare and protection of emigrants, and to act as the overarching authority to provide policy guidance and comprehensive review and stocktaking on migration-governance management related matters. It also establishes two bureaus, the Bureau of Emigration Policy and the Planning and Bureau of Emigration Administration, to deal with operational matters and welfare of workers. Nodal Authorities will be set up in different states. Nepal’s Foreign Employment Act of 2007 stipulates the institutional framework for overseas employment administration: the Foreign Employment Promotion Board (FEPB); the Foreign Employment Welfare Fund (FEWF), managed by FEPB; the Department of Foreign Employment (DOFE); and the

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Foreign Employment Tribunal (FET). The Emigration Ordinance of 1979 of Pakistan provides for a governance structure consisting of a director general, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE), the Protectorate of Emigrants (POE), and community welfare attachés (CWAs). In the case of Sri Lanka, the Sri Lanka Burau of Foreign Employment – a one-stop shop modelled on the Philippine Overseas employment Administration – has been established by the SLBFE Act of 1985. Enactment of rules to supplement the legislation Except Sri Lanka, other countries have enacted emigration or foreign employment rules to accompany the main emigration legislation. Bangladesh adopted Emigration Rules only in 2002 with the establishment of the Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment. India has updated Emigration Rules of 1983 in 2009, while Pakistan updated its Emigration Rules in 2012. Nepal adopted the Foreign Employment Rules, 2064 (2008) to accompany the Foreign Employment Act of 2007. Registration of migrant workers All laws introduce a system of registration of migrant workers by the concerned government agency. Several acts make it clear that no worker can leave for overseas employment without registration and clearance by the authorities. For instance, Chapter IV of the OEMA 2013 of Bangladesh deals with registration of migrant workers, migration clearance and such matters. India has an elaborate system of migration clearance by the POE in different states as specifed in Chapter V of the Ordinance 1983. The draft emigration bill provides for mandatory registration of all Indian nationals leaving for overseas employment and students proceeding for higher studies. The proposed registration of students is a unique feature for India, not observed in other South Asian countries. The Nepal FEA 2007 deals with approval and selection of workers in Chapter IV. The SLBFE Act stipulates: “Every Sri Lankan leaving for employment outside Sri Lanka, shall prior to such leaving register with the Bureau” (Art. 53[3]). Regulation of recruitment Major provisions in all acts relate to registration, licensing and regulation (including fnes and penalties) of private foreign employment agencies. Various provisions in these acts attempt to protect migrant workers from malpractices of private recruitment agencies. Under the Emigration Ordinance of India, no recruiting agent shall commence or carry on the business of recruitment without a valid certifcate issued by the registering authority. The draft Emigration Bill 2019 defnes the duties and functions of recruitment agencies to focus on comprehensive

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welfare of emigrants and their empowerment, including employment and travel documents, insurance policy, renewal of documents, skill upgradation and pre-departure orientation programmes. The bill provides for mandatory registration of recruitment agencies and student enrollment agencies. It also brings subagents working with recruitment agencies under the purview of the proposed bill. An interesting feature is the provision for rating of recruitment agents and student enrollment agencies. The Emigration Ordinance of 1979 (Pakistan) dealt with the appointment of overseas employment promoters (private recruitment agencies) in its Chapter V. The Si Lanka FBE Act of 1985 is also unique in the establishment of the Association of Licensed Foreign Employment Agencies with mandatory membership of all agencies. Four members of ALFEA are also stipulated to be members of the SLBFE Board of Directors. The Nepal FEA of 2007 refers to private recruitment agencies as “foreign employment entrepreneurs”, and the Preamble pledges to “protect the rights and interests of the workers who go for foreign employment and the foreign employment entrepreneurs while promoting that business”. Promotion of welfare and rights of migrant workers All laws mention protecting and promoting the welfare of migrant workers in some form, but it is only the OEMA of Bangladesh that has a separate chapter (VII) on the rights of migrant workers. The rights specifcally mentioned are right to information; legal aid in case of being victims of fraud; right to fle civil suit in case of violations of the Act provisions or employment contract; and the right to return home. However, the rights mentioned are limited. The Emigration Ordinance of India (1983) has hardly any reference to rights or welfare of migrant worker. The title of the draft Emigration Bill 2019 mentions among the objectives “establish a framework for protection and promotion of welfare of emigrants”. The bill has comprehensive provisions including insurance, pre-departure orientation, skill upgradation, legal assistance, migrant resource centres, help desks, and labour and manpower cooperation agreements/memoranda of understanding (MOUs), among others, aimed at strengthened the welfare and protection of Indian workers abroad (MEA India, 2019). 4.5.3

Evolution of laws and proximate causes and obstacles

Frequent political changes affect the will of governments to proceed with legislative improvements. When one government has done all the homework for a new migration law or revision of the law, a change in the government will put back that work to the beginning. In India, the same may happen when responsible ministers change. A case in point is the situation in Sri Lanka when political changes in January 2015 brought a different minister and party to power. The Employment Migration Authority bill was suspended

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indefnitely, and little has been done to revive that piece of legislation since then (Wickramasekara, 2017). In India, the Ministry of Labour and Employment, which was then handling emigration, had introduced an Emigration (Amendment) Bill in 2002 which lapsed with the dissolution of the 13th Lok Sabha in early 2004 (Kumar and Rajan, 2014a). Another major reason could be lack of political will to change the status quo when remittances fow in freely and fll government coffers. Restrictive or stringent legislation may cause disruptions to the outfow of migration, whereas the status quo will guarantee remittances and outmigration. Origin countries also may think it may turn destination countries to look for alternative sources of labour. This is the dilemma between the “protection of national workers abroad” and the “promotion of overseas employment” highlighted by Wickramasekara (2002: 35). Kumar and Rajan refer to the “lost decade of legislation” in India when almost nothing was done to enact the much-needed migration legislation (Kumar and Rajan, 2014a: 87). Lack of inter-ministerial coordination also leads to limited follow-up to legislative reform where more than one ministry handles migration issues. The typical examples are home or interior ministries and migration and labour ministries. This, however, does not seem to be a major problem in the case of South Asia, except in relation to immigration laws. The pressure to change migration laws is also absent when countries continue to be reluctant to ratify international migrant worker conventions. They allow the divergence between international norms and local legislation to continue in this process. Philippines introduced the 1995 Act on Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos about the same time it ratifed the ICRMW. Changing circumstances and emerging loopholes in legislation led to amendment of this Act by the Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.3 While Bangladesh took steps in 2013 to bring the legislation in line with the ratifed ICRMW, Sri Lanka has done little since the ratifcation of the International Convention in 1996 to modify legislation in line with the convention. India, Nepal and Pakistan have not ratifed any migrant-worker–specifc convention up to now, and are therefore, under fewer obligations to amend migration laws. In Nepal, reform of the legislation in 2007 was caused by major issues in relation to governance and protection including protection of female workers. However, the process for legislative reform was led by the UN Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which had no competence in migration legislation with no collaboration with other agencies such as the ILO with proven experience in the area. The 2012 update to the Pakistan 1979 Emigration Ordinance and Rules stipulates more detailed measures that address various aspects of the full cycle of migration: further streamlining of the operation of overseas employment promoters; better support for migrants while overseas; effective functioning of the welfare fund for migrants and their families; and support for returnees (World Bank Group, 2018).

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In Sri Lanka, the 2009 amendment to the SLBFE Act of 1985, however, was driven by the SLBFE itself and mainly oriented to reducing the powers of the Association of Licensed Foreign Employment Agencies (ALFEA), and strengthening the powers of SLBFE offcers to arrest unlawful recruiters by bringing them as public offcers under the Penal Code, among others (Wickramasekara, 2017)

4.6

Issues and challenges with current legal and regulatory frameworks

The following issues and challenges are affecting the governance and protection of workers. 4.6.1

Absence of an international normative framework to guide legislation

As noted previously, only Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have ratifed a migrantspecifc international convention. Many existing laws have no references to international instruments or frameworks or Conventions which are relevant to the migration laws. While the SLBFE Act of 1985 obviously was enacted long before Sri Lanka ratifed the International Convention, there is no logical reason why it is not referred to in the 2009 amendment to the Act. The draft Emigration Bill 2019 of India states: “Thus, there is need to have a strengthened legislative framework that is fully aligned with the contemporary realities and harmonized with relevant international conventions” (MEA India, 2019: 1). However, there is not a single reference to international conventions in the draft bill. It does, however, refer to “safe, orderly and regular” migration refecting the goals of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (United Nations, 2015) and the Global Compact for Migration (UN General Assembly, 2018). The defnition of migrant workers in most laws does not correspond to ILO or UN defnitions. The result is that only nationals are treated as migrant workers. Therefore, laws exclude foreign workers inside the countries and their protection. They may often be covered under harsh immigration or security related legislation. International migrant worker conventions also require that migrant workers should have access to full information regarding their migration. The OEMA of Bangladesh highlights this right under its Article 26 right to information: “Migrant workers shall have the right to be informed about the migration process, employment contract or the terms and conditions of the work overseas, and the right to know about their rights as per the law before his departure”. International instruments cover both emigrant and immigrant workers. But South Asian laws cover only emigration and are not all-inclusive. In all

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countries, there are sizeable foreign workforces which need protection under applicable laws. A recent review of South Asian migration observed: India, Nepal and Pakistan also need to consider ratifcation of at least one of the migrant worker instruments to raise their moral standing in negotiations with GCC countries and to provide a solid normative foundation for national policy and practice. The national laws also must be modifed in line with international norms, and to ensure enforcement of legislation and mechanisms for access to redress and justice. As the country with the largest immigrant population, India must set an example in this respect (Wickramasekara, 2016: 119–120).

4.6.2

Non-compliance of the laws with ratifed ICRMW

Sri Lanka has not made its migration law compliant with the provisions of the ICRMW, as repeatedly pointed out by various bodies. The Sri Lanka National Labour Migration Policy of 2008 stated: “One of the main gaps in the legislation is that the law has yet to be amended following the ratifcation of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families” (MFEPW, 2008: 49). The Sri Lanka government in its initial report maintained that existing legislation provided many of the standards and guarantees of the Convention (CMW, 2009). The fact remains that the Constitution of Sri Lanka guarantees certain rights, including protection against discrimination and the rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom to form and join a trade union, freedom to engage in any lawful occupation or profession, and freedom of movement to citizens only. This violates several articles of the ICRMW, such as 7, 26, 39 and 40, among others (Crépeau, 2015; Ranaraja, 2010). The CMW however, was not convinced of the guarantees provided by the existing legislation, stating: “the Committee regrets that the State party has not taken any measures to ensure that its legislation is in conformity with the Convention” and recommending that Sri Lanka “take all necessary measures for prompt harmonization of its legislation with the provisions of the Convention” (CMW, 2009: 3). In the concluding observations on Sri Lanka’s second periodic report, the CMW expressed its concern on the absence of comprehensive legislation on migration and inadequate measures taken to ensure compliance of national legislation with the ICRMW. It recommended that “the State party adopt comprehensive legislation on migration and take the steps necessary to ensure that its national laws and policies, including the draft Employment Migration Authority Act, are in line with the provisions of the Convention” (CMW, 2016: 2).

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Outdated legislation dating three decades back

Several countries (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) rely on outdated legislation adopted more than three decades back. Despite some minor changes, the legislation of the 1980s still serve as the primary backbone of labour migration legislation. They have not been adapted to changing circumstances such as growing role of the private sector recruitment agencies, proliferation of subagents who are for the most part unregistered, higher vulnerability of women workers, especially domestic workers, traffcking and smuggling of persons, increasing reliance on fair recruitment practices by the international community and high recruitment and migration costs leading to high debt burdens and forced labour practices (Wickramasekara, 2016). The Emigration Ordinance 1983 of India made a distinction between ECR (Emigration Clearance Required) and ECNR (Emigration Clearance Not Required) countries and persons. Avinash Kumar points out: This categorization of ECR (Emigration Clearance Required) and ECNR (Emigration Clearance Not Required) countries does not make any sense. For one, the Act has not given any powers to the Government to create this distinction and even otherwise, the basic purpose of Emigration Act lays defeated by creating this exception. It is submitted that every emigrant who intends to or goes or has gone out of India for employment should get the beneft of the Act (ILO and FICCI, 2015: 27). Kumar and Rajan have also recommended “doing away with emigration clearance altogether” (Kumar and Rajan, 2014b: 166). 4.6.4

Political changes affecting governance of migration

Sri Lanka has seen several changes in the ministries and ministers dealing with foreign employment and change of key personnel dealing with the issue in recent years. Such political changes keep tarnishing the image of Sri Lanka’s Bureau of Foreign Employment, with the Board of Directors changing under each new Minister. In Nepal, frequent changes in ministers of labour have affected continuity of policies and implementation of migration laws. 4.6.5

Laws have been ineffective in addressing continuing abuses and exploitation

While laws provide extensive protective legal and regulatory provisions, especially regarding recruitment malpractice, there is poor enforcement of the laws in a situation where supply of workers outstrips demand (Wickramasekara, 2014). There has been a systematic failure in all countries to adequately monitor and regulate their activities. This leads to heavy fees,

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debt traps and forced labour practices in countries of destination (Jones, 2015; Wickramasekara, 2014). The fact that all South Asian countries have legalized placement fees also goes against the “employer pays” principle. Proliferation of subagents in different parts of the country who are not registered also makes enforcement diffcult. A policy brief on the OEMA of 2013 remarks: The law was passed in 2013, but adequate number of prosecutions for violations of the provisions of the law is not taking place. While there are a lot of incidents of fraudulence, victims are often worried about pursuing legal action because they fear it will deter them from going abroad, Two important barriers which comes on the way of ensuring prosecution under the law are the lack of knowledge and rights of people and poor fnancial quarters (RMMRU, 2016: 4). In addition, the lack of written documents and receipts also acts as a constraint in pursuing legal action. In Pakistan, although the Emigration Ordinance and Rules of 1979 have been revised a few times, “gaps and loopholes in their implementation remain and adversely affect the safety and rights of migrants. The oversight process is signifcantly hampered by the lack of accessible, disaggregated and statistically comparable data that would help to strengthen the governance framework” (MOPHRD, 2015: 2). Another example is the inability of legislation to control recruitment and migration costs paid by workers. An ILO survey found that Pakistan has the highest migration costs paid by workers in the region amounting to about eight months’ wages (ILO, 2016a). It found that low-skilled Pakistani migrant workers pay on average nearly $3,500 to secure a job in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. It should also be highlighted that a large part of the abuse and exploitation occurs in the destination countries, especially the GCC states, where the jurisdiction of origin country laws do not apply. For example, the GCC sponsorship system (kafala system) traps workers in forced labour situations, but origin countries cannot do anything about it. Even the bilateral agreements and MOUs signed between South Asian and GCC countries do not contain any reference to the sponsorship system (Wickramasekara, 2012). A Colombo Process Meeting of Senior Offcials recognized that: the functioning of labour laws are impeded by the exercise of the Kafala to the considerable detriment of expatriate/migrant workers, and encouraged GCC countries of destination to promote enforcement of labour laws to oversee the work of all occupational categories of expatriate/migrant workers, including migrant domestic workers. (Colombo Process, 2014: 3; cited in Wickramasekara, 2016)

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Lack of gender-sensitive provisions

The General Recommendation 26 of the Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) urges governments to: formulate a gender-sensitive rights-based policy on the basis of equality and non-discrimination to regulate and administer all aspects and stages of migration, to facilitate access for women migrant workers to work opportunities abroad, promoting safe migration and ensure the protection of the rights of women migrant workers (CEDAW, 2008). The existing laws do not contain gender-sensitive provisions, except in the FE Act of Nepal. The FE Act of Nepal prohibits any gender discrimination while sending workers for foreign employment. It also provides for female representation in the steering committee on formulation of policies, and the FEPB. Legislation of other countries makes no specifc reference to gender issues, except imposing an age limit on female migration. This has been criticized on the grounds that it may lead to discrimination and migration of women through irregular channels (ILO and FICCI, 2015; UN Women, 2013). Sri Lanka has no provision for female representation on the SLBFE Board of Directors and the UN Committee on Migrant Workers recommended that migrant workers and women are adequately represented on the Board and that a gender expert with knowledge of migration issues, labour and women’s rights is appointed to the Board in an advisory capacity (CMW, 2016: 3). 4.6.7

Absence of social dialogue and broad-based consultative processes

Most migration laws in South Asia do not provide for social dialogue and consultative processes in migration policy decisions. The Sri Lanka BFE Act does not provide for any representation of migrant workers, trade unions or civil society in its Management Board of Directors. However, four members of the Association of Licensed Foreign Employment Agencies are represented on the Board. This also leads to a confict of interest, since the SLBFE is the regulatory authority of recruitment agencies. Both the UN Committee on Migrant Workers and civil society have recommended that there should be adequate representation of civil society on the SLBFE Board. The Nepal FE Act provides for broad representation by trade unions, women and recruitment agencies in the Steering Committee for formulating policies and making other arrangements for sending workers overseas. The Pakistan 1979 Emigration Ordinance (updated in 2012) provides for an advisory committee to in formulation of policies on all or any

128 Piyasiri Wickramasekara aspect of overseas employment promotion, eradication of malpractices and other related matters. But it does not spell out the composition of the committee.

4.7 National migration policy frameworks A national policy on labour migration can be a useful tool to elaborate on the broader vision, goals and objectives of a country’s migration policy highlighting the rationale of the underlying legal and regulatory framework. Migration policy encompasses both outfow of national workers (emigration) and infow of foreign workers (immigration). The focus in most countries in the region is on emigration. 4.7.1

Emigration policies

Sri Lanka Sri Lanka has pioneered the development of a fully-fedged national labour migration policy (NLMP) in 2008 (MFEPW, 2008), drawing upon the principles and guidelines of the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration (ILO, 2006). The policy was organized according to three key thematic areas: good governance of labour migration, protection and empowerment of migrant workers and their families, and linking migration and development processes. It was developed by working groups representing a broad range of stakeholders – government offcials, social partners (employers’ and workers’ organizations), concerned NGOs and researchers. The NLMP also outlined an action plan to translate policies into action. The Policy was offcially launched by the MFEPW on 24 February 2009 and was adopted by the Sri Lankan Cabinet on 30 April 2009 (MFEPW 2008). The ILO Colombo Offce has supported the implementation of the policy through a technical cooperation programme from 2010. It has helped to implement policy components such as an ethical code of conduct for recruitment agencies, a return and reintegration policy for migrant workers, a safe labour migration information guide and a manual for diplomatic missions on assisting migrant workers, among others. The Sri Lanka NLMP has been recognized as a good practice model,4 and it has served as a model for similar policy documents in Asia (Cambodia, Pakistan and Vietnam), and in Africa (Nigeria and Zimbabwe). Bangladesh also developed a national migration policy through a consultative process to replace its 2006 Overseas Employment Policy document. The Bangladesh Ministry of Expatriate’s Welfare and Overseas Employment issued the “National Expatriate’s Welfare and Overseas Employment Policy, 2016” in January 2016 (MOEWOE, 2016). It spells out guiding principles of the policy and specifc objectives. Each objective is associated with policy directives for implementation.

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Nepal The government of Nepal established its Foreign Employment Policy in 2012 (Govt. of Nepal, 2012). It treats the safety and protection of workers as its upmost priority, recognizing the increase in the number of female migrants, especially for domestic work and the importance of remittances for the economy (DFE-MOLE, undated). Its objectives are to promote overseas employment opportunities, develop skills to beneft from foreign employment, address concerns of women migrant workers, ensure good governance of migration and optimize remittance channels and uses. A High-Level Foreign Employment Coordination Committee was set up to coordinate and follow up on the policy. The Policy has paved the way for a creation of number of directives to supplement the 2007 FE Act with a view at improving the labour migration process and improving migrant rights, including the 2013 Directive on the Procedure on Individual Labour Permits, the 2014 Manual on Registration and Renewal of Orientation Training Institutions, the 2014 Manual on Extending Objective Assistance to Skill Trained Human Resources, and the 2015 Directive on Sending Domestic Helpers for Foreign Employment (Bossavie and Denisova, 2018). Pakistan The Ministry of Overseas Pakistani and Human Resource Development (MOPHRD) also elaborated a National Emigration Policy in 2008 and approved it at a national consultation in December 2008 (MOPHRD, 2015). The emphasis of this policy was on promotion of foreign employment rather than on protection, judging by its rather positive analysis of labour markets in Gulf countries where serious rights violations are commonplace (Wickramasekara, 2011), but it was not endorsed by the Parliament and therefore did not go into effect. Another draft National Policy for Overseas Pakistanis was developed in 2013 which was also not approved by the Cabinet. According to press reports, the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development is again drafting a National Emigration and Welfare Policy for Overseas Pakistanis.5 India is thus, the only country in South Asia not to have developed a national policy on overseas employment. 4.7.2

Immigration policies6

Most South Asian countries have not clearly defned or coherent policies on immigration of foreign workers as the policy focus has been on emigration of workers as highlighted above. Some of the immigration laws in the subregion still seem to rely on outdated legislation derived from colonial laws. The responsibility for immigration may range from ministries of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Justice or Interior,

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or Immigration bureaus and departments, with limited coordination among them. For instance, in Sri Lanka, the Department of Immigration under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for immigration matters. The Home Ministry looks after the issue in India. Table 4.4 has put together some information on institutional and legislative framework relating to immigration. No country in South Asia has acknowledged itself to be an immigration country, although both India and Pakistan have substantial populations of immigrant origin. Given the focus on labour migration, three objectives of admission policies for employment of foreign workers can be identifed: • • •

Regulate and control the infow of low-skilled/semi-skilled workers and protect national workers in the local labour market. Regulate and attract skilled workers, often as part of foreign direct investment programmes. Prevent irregular migration and combat traffcking in persons and smuggling of human beings.

Developing countries normally discriminate against the admission of lowskilled workers given their own large low-skilled population at home, and high unemployment rates. So, few developing countries permit the admission of low-skilled foreign workers – a feature they share with developed countries. Table 4.4 Immigration policies: legislative and regulatory framework Country

Responsible agency

Legislation/regulations (ILO sources)

Bangladesh

Immigration, Bangladesh Police; Board of Investment (work visas) Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau of Immigration

Foreigners Act 1946

India Nepal

Department of Immigration, Ministry of Home

Pakistan

Directorate General of Immigration and Passports, Ministry of Interior Board of Investment (work/ business visas) Controller of Immigration and Emigration Board of Investment

Sri Lanka

Foreigners Act 1946; The Passports (Entry into India) Act, 1967 Immigration Act, 1992, Immigration Rules 1994; Immigration (First Amendment) Act, 2001 Registration of Foreigners Rules, 1966

Immigrants and Emigrants Act, 1980 and subsequent amendments

Source: Compiled by the author, drawing upon country sources

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All developing countries want to attract foreign direct investment and may create special incentives in the form of free trade or special economic zones. South Asian countries also make some concessions on admission of foreign workers to attract foreign direct investments. Still, admission may be reserved for high-skilled workers – for managerial and high skills and technical grades not available at home. Countries such as Sri Lanka have introduced work permit schemes for such admissions to be issued by the Ministry of Labour or Immigration Department on the advice of the Board of Investment. Labour laws and investment promotion laws supplement immigration laws in such cases. Another category of admissions concern business visas for short or long periods with minimum defned investments. There are also residence visa schemes for investors and those contributing to local development. The resident guest schemes in Sri Lanka and Pakistan are examples. In general, national labour laws generally apply to these admitted regularly. Skilled workers get more rights, including family unifcation. The lack of coherent immigration policies in the subregion can be ascribed to several factors: •

•

•

• •

Most movements are informal or irregular in character, including forced labour movements such as from Myanmar and Afghanistan to neighbouring countries. There is concern that a clear policy defning rights of immigrants may encourage further immigration and increase security concerns. India believes that there is a high incidence of Bangladesh workers in irregular status in India, which is contested by the government of Bangladesh. This is a highly sensitive issue, which leads to lack of policy transparency. The India-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950 provides free movement rights to nationals of both countries. However, there are no reliable estimates. Around one million Nepalis are estimated to be in India. Nepal’s government does not treat them as migrant workers, and they are excluded from the purview of the Foreign Employment Act of 2007. Infows of immigrant workers each year may be relatively minor compared to outfows for some countries. This accounts for the major policy thrust on overseas employment of national workers and remittances. The lack of coordination among relevant ministries and agencies dealing with labour, foreign affairs, immigration, police and development also prevent the formulation of coherent policies. There is absence of even basic reliable data on infows of foreign workers. For instance, Sri Lankan press estimates may range from 25,000–200,000 foreign workers currently which are largely in the nature of guesstimates (Kariyakarawana, 2018; Warakapitiya, 2017). Most are believed to be low-skilled workers who enter the country using tourist visas.

132 •

•

Piyasiri Wickramasekara The public and media are more concerned with welfare of national workers, and politicians and bureaucrats are under pressure from these sources. Therefore, foreign workers issues do not come under the limelight. The understaffed administrative structures have poor capacity to protect national workers overseas, and this may result in low priority to issues of incoming foreign workers.

Table 4.4 again highlights that most immigration laws are outdated and have not been revised in the light of recent developments. All countries lack capacity to monitor infows, stay or working conditions of immigrants. For instance, the Bangladesh Board of Investment reported that 100,000 foreigners were working in Bangladesh industries and commercial sectors, but only 10,000 had obtained legal work permits (Workpermit. com, 2007). Small countries such as Nepal are particularly sensitive to presence of foreign workers (Wickramasekara, 2011). It also shows a contradiction when they themselves have large numbers of nationals overseas. Another problematic issue is that of double standards of protection for national workers overseas and foreign workers in the country. In practice, the constitutional rights apply to national workers only. Undocumented lowskilled workers, immigrant women and children are particularly vulnerable and are treated as security threats. There are few pathways to citizenship or naturalization for foreign workers, regardless of the length of the stay in most South Asian countries. The CMW (2016) noted in the case of Sri Lanka that “the State party is increasingly becoming a country of destination and efforts are thus needed to ensure the protection of migrant workers in the State party” (CMW, 2016: 1). However, the primary legislation to deal with them is the Sri Lanka Emigrant and Immigrants Act of 1948, amended on several occasions. The result is that immigration authorities arrest, detain and deport workers without due process (CMW, 2016; Crépeau, 2015).

4.8 The way forward This analysis has heighted the different stages of legislative development on migration in South Asian countries. Some laws and rules are still based on what was enacted about three decades ago, in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Needless to add, these laws cannot address the vast changes that have taken place in the migration landscape over the years. While countries such as India have made several attempts to revise migration laws since 2000, the political will to forge ahead has been lacking. The frequent political changes and subsequent changes in responsible ministries have impeded progress, both in India and Sri Lanka. Thus, there is a large unfnished agenda as regards legal reform to improve governance and protection of migrant workers in the new millennium. A few recommendations for moving forward follow, based on the previous analysis.

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Ratify international migrant worker conventions to serve as a normative foundation

India, Nepal and Pakistan have not ratifed any of the three international migrant worker conventions up to now: the ICRMW, the ILO Migration for Employment, 1949 (No. 97) or the ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary) Provisions, 1975 (No. 143). In view of the comprehensive nature of the ICRMW and its more recent adoption, it may be a better choice for the countries initially. What is immediately required is an in-depth review of the consistency of the ICRMW with existing legislation, obstacles and steps required for an eventual ratifcation in the light of other international instruments already ratifed by the countries. A similar exercise can be undertaken for the two ILO Conventions. Technical assistance can be obtained from the UN Offce of the High Commissioner for Human rights and the ILO for this purpose. Pending any ratifcation, modifcation of laws can draw upon the principles of the relevant conventions and related Recommendations and ILO soft law frameworks: the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labor Migration, 2006 (ILO, 2006) and the ILO General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment, 2016 (ILO, 2016b). 4.8.2

Revise outdated laws on an urgent basis to address observed problems

Section 6 highlighted issues and challenges with existing legislation, some of which date back to the early 1980s. The immediate priority is to revise these laws in the context of current developments and especially protect migrant workers. India has had a chequered history regarding legislative reform (Kumar and Rajan, 2014b). Draft legislation has been developed on several occasions with no attempt to follow them up to a logical adoption. This should not happen in the case of the draft Emigration Bill 2019. The legislation also should focus more on protection than on the migration process. Pakistan needs to come up with a new migration law incorporating various updates in a coherent way, addressing the issue of migration costs and regulation of free visa markets. Sri Lanka needs to revise the existing SLBFE law thoroughly into a comprehensive law encompassing both emigrant and immigrant workers. The priority is on making the law compliant with the ratifed ICRMW, rather than expanding bureaucracy and making the SLBFE all powerful. 4.8.3

Adopt inclusive legislation and policies covering both emigration and immigration

The previous discussion highlighted the need for transparent migration policies and programmes for migration governance and protection of national workers abroad and foreign workers inside South Asian countries. A high-level

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team coordinated by the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, made a series of recommendations for a new policy to be considered by the Indian government in 2009 (CDS, 2009). Its recommendation to develop the policy as an inclusive policy on international migration covering both Indian migrant workers and foreign workers in India is to be welcomed. However, the draft Emigration Bill 2019 focusses only on emigration. My review of South Asian labour migration in 2011 also made a case for an inclusive policy (Wickramasekara, 2011). Only Mongolia in the Asian region has a comprehensive law covering both emigration and immigration: “Law on Sending Labour Force Abroad and Receiving Labour Force and Specialists from Abroad”.7 The merging of laws would also serve to upload outdated exiting laws, particularly on immigration. 4.8.4

Adopt a national policy on labour migration

All countries covered here except India have developed national policies on labour migration. It is more important for India, given its outdated migration laws and changes in ministry portfolios dealing with migration. At a minimum, it would be important to issue a brief migration policy statement which can highlight the long-term vision, goals, objectives and guiding principles of the national policy. Sri Lanka is updating the NLMP, which is now about 10 years old, going through a stakeholder consultation process. 4.8.5

Reliable statistics

Reliable data on outfow of national workers for overseas employment and infows of foreign workers into the country are essential for both policy and legal frameworks. The ILO is trying to promote a comprehensive migration information system for South Asia (ILO, 2018), which would help to strengthen country statistics. While India has excellent capacity for developing statistics, it is India which is lagging other countries in producing genderdisaggregated migration statistics at the national level.

Notes 1 These conventions are: Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122); 1. Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81); Employment Service Convention, 1948 (No. 88); Convention on Private Employment Agencies, 1997 (No. 181). 2 Since this bill is still in draft stage, the chapter does not intend to go into details of the bill. 3 An act amending Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended, further improving the standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes. 4 www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_ id=27 5 https://timesofslamabad.com/19-Nov-2018/national-emigration-and-welfarepolicy-for-overseas-pakistanis-on-cards

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6 This section draws upon Wickramasekara (2011). 7 www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/63069/118886/F-372405618/ MNG63069%20Eng%202015.pdf

References Abrar, C.R. (2005), Study on Labour Migration from SAARC Countries: Reality and Dynamics, a Study Commissioned by BATU-SAARC, Refugee and Migratory Movement Research Unit, University of Dhaka, Dhaka. Bossavie, L. and A. Denisova. (2018). Youth Labor Migration in Nepal, JOBS Working Paper, Issue No. 13, World Bank, Washington, DC. CDS. (2009). Policy on International Migration Reforms in India: Summary of Policy Recommendations. Trivandrum: Centre for Development Studies. CEDAW. (2008). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women General recommendation No. 30 on Women in Confict Prevention, Confict and Post-Confict Situations. Cholewinski, Ryszard. (2015). Migration for Employment. In Richard Plender (Ed.), Issues in International Migration Law (pp. 27–80). Leiden: Brill. CMW. (2009). Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Geneva: CMW/C/ LKA/1, Eleventh session (12–16 October 2009), (Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) United Nations Human Rights Commission, Geneva, 14 December. CMW. (2016). Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Sri Lanka. Geneva: CMW/C/LKA/CO/2, Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, (Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW)), United Nations Human Rights Commission, Geneva, 341st Meeting, held on 7 September. Crépeau, François. (2015). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants: Addendum – Mission to Sri Lanka: A/HRC/29/36/Add.1, Human Rights Council, Twenty-Ninth Session, 2 April. DFE-MOLE. (undated). Labour Migration for Employment: A Status Report for Nepal: 2013/2014. Department of Foreign Employment, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of Nepal. Govt. of Bangladesh. (2013). Overseas Employment and Migrants Act. Dhaka. Govt. of Nepal. (2012). Foreign Employment Policy 2012. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal. ILO. (2006). The ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-Binding Principles and Guidelines for a Rights-Based Approach to Labour Migration. Geneva: International Labour Offce. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ ---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_178672.pdf ILO. (2016a). The Cost of Migration: What Low-Skilled Migrant Workers from Pakistan Pay to Work in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Islamabad: International Labour Organization. ILO. (2016b). General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment Adopted by the Meeting of Experts on Fair Recruitment (Geneva, 5–7 September 2016). Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Branch (FUNDAMENTALS), Labour Migration Branch (MIGRANT). Geneva: International Labour Offce. ILO. (2018). International Labour Migration Statistics in South Asia: Establishing a Subregional Database and Improving Data Collection for Evidence-Based

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Policy-Making. New Delhi: International Labour Organization, ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team for South Asia and Country Offce for India. ILO and FICCI. (2015). Annexure II: Review of Emigration Act, 1983 by Advocate Avinash Kumar. Report of the Stakeholder Consultation on Legislation: Reviewing Legislation on International Recruitment, Wednesday, 26th August, 2015, New Delhi, India. Jones, Katharine. (2015). Recruitment Monitoring Migrant Welfare Assistance: What Works?. Dhaka: International Organization for Migration (IOM). Kariyakarawana, K.K. (2018). Over 25,000 Foreign Professionals Working in Sri Lanka. The Daily Mirror, 1 January, Colombo. www.dailymirror.lk/article/Overforeign-professionals-working-in-SL-143131.html Kumar, Krishna and Irudaya Rajan. (2014a). Chapter 11: Embracing Reforms. In Krishna Kumar and Irudaya Rajan (Eds.), Emigration in 21st-Century India: Governance, Legislation, Institutions (pp. 155–168). New Delhi: Routledge. Kumar, Krishna and Irudaya Rajan. (2014b). Legislation: The Lost Decade. In Krishna Kumar and Irudaya Rajan (Eds.), Emigration in 21st-Century India: Governance, Legislation, Institutions (pp. 86–102). New Delhi: Routledge. MFEPW. (2008). National Labour Migration Policy for Sri Lanka. Colombo: Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare, Government of Sri Lanka. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India. (2019). Salient Aspects of Emigration Bill, Government of India. https://mea.gov.in/Images/amb1/Salient_aspects_of_ Emigration_Bill_2019.pdf MOEWOE. (2016). The Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment Policy, 2016. Approved by the Government of Bangladesh on 25 January 2016 Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment, Dhaka (unoffcial English translation by the International Labour Offce). MOPHRD. (2015). Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development Government of Pakistan Islamabad (2015) Labour Migration from Pakistan. Status Report. Ranaraja, Shyamalie. (2010). Review of National Legislation and Regulations on Migration for Foreign Employment and Their Implementation. Paper prepared for Project on Road Map on the Development of a National Labour Migration Policy in Sri Lanka, ILO Offce Colombo, unpublished. RMMRU. (2016). Ensuring Prosecution under the Overseas Employment and Migration Act 2013. Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU). www.britishcouncil.org.bd/sites/default/fles/policy_brief-gfmd.pdf UN General Assembly. (2018). Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Intergovernmentally Negotiated and Agreed Outcome. United Nations. (2015). Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, United Nations, New York. UN Women. (2013). Review of Laws, Policies and Regulations Governing Labour Migration in Asian and Arab States: A Gender and Rights Based Perspective. Bangkok: Asia Pacifc Regional Offce, UN Women. Warakapitiya, K. (2017). Acute Labour Shortage in Lanka: 200,000 Foreigners Working Here. The Sunday Times, 30 April. Wickramasekara, Piyasiri. (2002). Asian Labour Migration: Issues and Challenges in an Era of Globalization. International Migration Papers No 57. Geneva: International Migration Programme, International Labour Offce. www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ groups/public/-asia/-ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_160632.pdf

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Wickramasekara, Piyasiri. (2011). Labour Migration in South Asia: A Review of Issues, Policies and Practices. Geneva: International Migration Papers No. 108, International Migration Programme, International Labour Offce. www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_protect/-protrav/-migrant/documents/publication/ wcms_179642.pdf Wickramasekara, Piyasiri. (2012). Something Is Better Than Nothing: Enhancing the Protection of Indian Migrant Workers through Bilateral Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding. Manila: Migrant Forum in Asia.http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2032136 Wickramasekara, Piyasiri. (2014). Regulation of the Recruitment Process and Reduction of Migration Costs: Comparative Analysis of South Asia. In ILO (Ed.), Promoting Cooperation for Safe Migration and Decent Work (pp. 33–87). Dhaka: ILO Country Offce for Bangladesh, International Labour Organization. Wickramasekara, Piyasiri. (2016). South Asian Gulf Migration to the Gulf: A Safety Valve or a Development Strategy? Migration and Development, 5(1), 99–129. Wickramasekara, Piyasiri. (2017). The ICRMW and Sri Lanka. In Alan Desmond (Ed.), Shining New Light on the UN Migrant Workers Convention (pp. 249–276). Pretoria: Pretoria University Law press. Workpermit.com. (2007). Bangladesh Imposes Five-Year Limit on Foreign Work Permits. https://workpermit.com/news/bangladesh-imposes-five-year-limitforeign-work-permits-20071023 World Bank Group. (2018). A Migrant’s Journey for Better Opportunities: The Case of Pakistan. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Appendix

Table 4.A1 Structure of emigration legislation in South Asian countries Bangladesh Title

India

Overseas Emigration Employment Act of 1983 and Migrants Act 2013

Nepal

Pakistan

Sri Lanka

Foreign Employment Act, 2007

Emigration Ordinance of 1979 (modifed in 2012)

Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act, 1985 as amended in 1994 and 2009 Part I: establishment of the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment. Part II: the fund of the bureau.

Chapter Preliminary I

Preliminary

Preliminary

Preliminary

Chapter Sending II workers overseas, migration, and such others Chapter Chapter III: III recruitment agents, licence, and such others Chapter Chapter IV: IV registration of migrant workers, migration clearance, and such others

Emigration authorities

Provisions relating to foreign employment

Chapter II: director general and protector of emigrants;

Registration of recruiting agents

Chapter 3: provisions relating to license

Emigration

General Permits for Provisions recruitment relating by employers to prior approval and selection of workers

Part III: promotion and development Part IV: regulation of licensed foreign employment agencies

Legislation and regulations in South Asia Bangladesh

India

Emigration Chapter Chapter V: employment clearance V contract Chapter VI: labour welfare wing and agreements on migration Appeals Chapter Chapter VII: rights VI of migrant workers

Nepal

Pakistan

Provisions relating to classifcation of training and workers

Appointment Part V: of overseas workers employment welfare fund promoters

Rules Provisions relating to foreign employment welfare fund Validation, Offences and Provisions Chapter Offences, savings, etc. penalties penalties relating to VII monitoring and inquiry Chapter Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Constitution, functions, VIII duties and powers of board Chapter IX Chapter X Chapter XI Chapter XII Source: Compiled by the author

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Offense and punishment Investigation and inquiry Trial and settlement of cases Miscellaneous

Sri Lanka

Part VI: payments and cess l PART VII: information data bank Part VIII: association of licensed foreign employment agencies Part IX: staff of the bureau Part X: general

5

Toward mapping employers and clients The rise of recruitment fee advocacy and the need for market data in the Gulf construction sector David Segall

5.1 Toward recruitment: early shifts in advocacy for Gulf migrant rights For decades, academics have researched the sociological, economic, political and anthropological roots and implications of large-scale migration to the Arab Gulf. As part of this research, they have examined the origins and peculiarities of the kafala (worker sponsorship) system in the region and its effect on low-wage migrant workers from South Asia who have focked there (Khalaf 199: 75–76).1 As the price of oil began a 15-year rise in 1999, leading to the rapid development of the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the already signifcant phenomenon of South Asian migration to the region quickly intensifed. A population of a few hundred thousand migrant workers in the GCC in the 1970s would eventually grow to 25 million (Connor 2016). As these migration fows increased – particularly in sectors like construction – human rights and migrant rights organizations raised concerns about workplace health and safety practices, substandard accommodations, contract substitution and confscation of workers’ passports. In the early 2000s, some human rights organizations and media reporting on the situation also described the issue of recruitment fees, but tended to lump it together with these other on-the-ground issues or to treat it as ancillary to them. Human rights advocacy at this time also focused on the role of Gulf governments in failing to curb the aforementioned abuses against migrants (see, e.g., Human Rights Watch 2006).2 Advocates’ relatively exclusive government focus changed following highprofle announcements by academic, artistic and sporting institutions that they would build campuses and host events in the rapidly developing Gulf which would require large-scale construction work. In 2006, the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation announced that it would build a Guggenheim Museum in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The following year, New York University (NYU) and the Louvre Museum both announced

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intentions to open facilities in the same city. In 2010, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) declared that the small peninsular Gulf state of Qatar would become the frst Arab-majority nation to host its signature World Cup tournament, in 2022. Meanwhile, six major American universities – Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell Medical College, Texas A&M University, Carnegie Mellon University, the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and Northwestern University – had already established branch campuses or degree programs in Qatar’s nascent ‘Education City.’ In the wake of these announcements, human rights advocacy organizations began to directly address international businesses and institutions operating in the region as stakeholders with requisite leverage to bring about change (see, e.g., Human Rights Watch 2009, 2012). Meanwhile, a concurrent shift took place: Advocates increasingly began focusing on the issue of ‘recruitment fees’ as a central feature of the migrant worker experience and one that exacerbates all others. A furry of research and advocacy activity ensued.

5.2

Recruitment research comes into focus

In recent years, business and human rights groups, academics and the media have paid increased attention to the issue of recruitment fees, particularly in burgeoning industries like construction. Even some corporations in the Gulf’s construction industry – a sector long averse to addressing this phenomenon – have begun to create industry-led groups and ‘mutli-stakeholder initiatives’ focused specifcally on issues including recruitment fees (e.g., BSR 2017; Responsible Business Alliance 2017). There are several possible reasons for the recent proliferation of in-depth examinations of migrant construction worker recruitment fees. The frst is that certain conditions on the ground have improved, leading to fewer on-site worker deaths and related concerns (Afshaq 2009; Thomas 2012; Arabian Business 2016) and a shift in focus to more persistent issues like the payment of fees. But while overall health and safety standards in the Gulf have improved over the past two decades (Migrant-Rights.org 2015; Construction Week Online 2017), the data underlying related statistics are mostly scant or unavailable. Moreover, despite apparent improvements, reports of serious worker health issues and deaths persist (Human Rights Watch 2017; Aude et al., 2016). The same can be said of substandard worker accommodations and of the failure to pay wages in full and on time. There have been incremental policy and on-the-ground changes like the construction of more adequate lodging and the implementation of electronically monitored ‘wage protection systems’ in several Gulf countries. However, data on these initiatives’ effcacy is hard to come by, government reporting tends to present aggregate and nontime-bound statistics (see, for example, UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation 2016), and overall serious issues persist.

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It is also possible that advocates shifted toward a focus on recruitment because they sensed a unique opportunity to bring about change in recruitment practices. But in actuality, the issue of recruitment fees in regions like the GCC is in many ways more intractable than on-the-ground migrant rights issues like passport confscation, wage payment problems and inadequate accommodations. The practices that lead to recruitment fees exist at multiple levels and across borders, meaning that Gulf governments cannot end the phenomenon by more diligent enforcement of their laws alone. More likely, the shift occurred due to new reporting and scholarship demonstrating the central and amplifying role that recruitment fees play in the experience of migrant workers in sectors like construction. While passport confscation, late payment and nonpayment of wages, contract substitution, and other on-the-ground issues continue to plague the industry to various degrees, indebtedness due to the payment of recruitment fees exacerbates each of these issues by making it diffcult or impossible for workers to seek redress in case of abuse. Workers who owe signifcant amounts of money to registered recruitment agents in their home countries or to their ‘subagents’ operating in local, remote locations are less likely to challenge abusive employers or to simply seek to leave the GCC in case of unrelated rights violations. Given that workers who are not in debt already face signifcant practical obstacles to accessing justice systems in the region, indebtedness resulting from the payment of recruitment fees can lead many into situations akin to bonded labor. Increased focus on recruitment fees also coincided with the rise of the Business and Human Rights (BHR) movement, which after securing gains in the garment sector in the 1990s, was reinvigorated by the 2011 publication of the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs) on Business and Human Rights. Organizations that comprise this movement have been particularly prolifc on the topic of recruitment in recent years.3 Finally, while Gulf governments have implemented reforms to the kafala system, advocates recognize that these changes have been slow and incomplete. Likewise, most migrant-sending country governments are reluctant to engage in any advocacy on behalf of their workers that may reduce their respective allotted worker slots in GCC countries, and therefore diminish remittances sent home. Advocates, particularly in the BHR world, have therefore staked hope on the possibility that in the absence of suffcient governmental action, business stakeholders will act, leading to change and possibly spurring governments to do the same. 5.2.1

Employers and clients as key cogs

Large institutional fnancial backers of mega-projects like the 2022 FIFA World Cup Qatar, Dubai World Expo 2020 and Western academic and artistic institutions have been particularly susceptible to public criticism (see, e.g., Kaminer and O’Driscoll 2014; Ouroussoff 2011) related to conditions on

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their construction sites. Any comprehensive reduction in the persistence of recruitment fees will necessarily involve these high-profle entities. But there also is a need for advocates – and the academics upon whom they depend for information – to more fully understand the specifc entities that sponsor (as kafeels) and/or employ4 GCC migrants in sectors like construction beyond the names behind these highly visible projects, which constitute only a slice of the overall market. Equally important, advocates’ focus should more systematically zoom in on project clients who provide fnancial backing to large construction projects. On a day-to-day basis, it is to their employersponsors that workers’ experiences are most closely tied. And the clients who commission these projects5 – awarding contracts to companies that employ or lease labor – are fnancial benefciaries of a system in which workers pay for their own recruitment.6

5.3

Kafala as a unique (and commonplace) phenomenon

The most fundamental reason for the need to map employers and clients in sectors like Gulf construction relates to the kafala system itself. The kafala structure, which governs the status of migrant workers in Gulf countries, specifcally grants legal powers and responsibilities to the direct sponsor and employer of a worker. Power over migrants therefore fows from these entities and their clients (when clients are distinct from employer-sponsors themselves). Academics and advocates have long noted various attributes of kafala that render it problematic. The system, which likely is rooted in pre-Islamic and Islamic conceptions of the economic ‘guarantee’ of performance or liability (Foster 2001: 136), has several defning features, although not all of them are unique to kafala. For example, one of these features, addressed by Sayed Ali in Permanent Impermanence (Ali 2010: 27), is that kafala does not offer a path to citizenship or permanent residence to the vast majority of low-wage migrant workers. It also ties workers’ status to their jobs, and requires would-be sponsor-employers to apply for permission to bring specifc workers to the Gulf. But employment-based migration schemes are common worldwide. In fact, most major migrant-receiving countries have in place some type of regime for migrant workers based on employment or potential for employment. If prospective migrants do not have close family based in intended destination countries, employment-based migration to these countries often is the only legal option (Bui and Dickerson 2018).7 Instead, the kafala system’s uniqueness lies in the fact that it ascribes powers usually reserved for governmental authorities to sponsors, who sometimes also are the migrants’ employers, sometimes also are the clients sponsoring a project and sometimes are neither or both. In doing so, Gulf variants of kafala explicitly cede ‘normal’ features of state sovereignty to private citizens and business interests, even when those businesses are quasi-governmental in nature. These individuals thereby possess inordinate

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power over migrant workers, a process likened to ‘privatized’ migration (Babar 2013: 4). It is this specifc facet of the system that distinguishes the Gulf from other regions and leads to an employer-worker relationship that has been described as “structural dependence” (Longva 1999: 20–22) or, more seriously, as “structural violence” (Gardner 2010: 29). Indeed, most rights abuses faced by migrants in the Gulf – such as passport confscation, inadequate accommodation, late and nonpayment of wages, dangerous working conditions and restrictions to basic freedoms – can be traced to the power dynamic between employer-sponsor and worker that sponsorship creates, as can depressed wages (Naidu, Nyarko and Wang 2014: 22). Moreover, while rules in many major migrant-receiving countries, like kafala, also fail to provide a path to permanent residency or citizenship for low-wage workers, Gulf states are particularly stringent in this regard (Al Ubaydli 2017). The most important direct result of sponsors – who often double as employers and/or project clients – assuming traditional governmental roles is that for the most part, workers may not change jobs without permission from them. Certain versions of kafala also effectively grant sponsoremployers the right to prevent migrants from leaving the country. Reforms of these arrangements have been modest and incomplete. In 2006 and 2009, Bahrain moved to de-couple migration from employers, although the country rolled back some of these reforms during a period of political unrest in 2011 (Al Sadiq and Wu 2015: 23). In 2015, the UAE reformed its laws pertaining to changing jobs (Al Ubaydli 2016), a move Qatar currently is exploring as part of a slew of recent labor reform pledges and moves in the wake of the ongoing GCC diplomatic crisis.8 Indeed, after years of pledging to abolish the requirement for workers to obtain ‘no-objection certifcates’ from their employers in order to depart from Qatar (Deutsche Welle 2016), the government fnalized this rule in September 2018, and it was slated to be implemented in late October 2018. In the end, however, workers in all three countries still cannot change jobs without some form of approval from their current sponsor-employer, at least prior to the termination of a specifc contract period or without leaving and returning to the country.

5.4 Recruitment fees begin with the employer, not the recruiter In addition to the nature of the kafala system, recent research demonstrating a direct connection between the employer-sponsor and recruitment fees in particular further highlights the need for efforts to systemically map these employers and their clients. While it has long been understood that migrants in the Gulf are dependent on the “good-will of their employer-sponsors” (Gardner 2010: 19) while in the region, recent research has expanded on this notion by showing that the employer-sponsor’s and client’s good (or not-so-good) will is relevant well before a migrant arrives in the Gulf, since

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Gulf-based corporate practices directly infuence recruitment fees (Jureidini 2014; Segall and Labowitz 2017). As with passport confscation, contract substitution, physical and verbal abuse, unsafe working conditions and the failure of workers to pay wages on time and in full, the recruitment fees that many migrant construction workers pay ultimately depend in large part on the power that employer-sponsors and their clients possess. The prevalence and infation of recruitment fees, however, are directly traceable not so much to the relationship between employer-sponsor and worker as to the relationship between employer-sponsor and recruiter (Jureidini 2014; Verité and the Freedom Fund 2016; Manpower Group & Verité 2016; Segall and Labowitz 2017). This is because as a rule, employer-sponsors operating in the Gulf like construction companies and their ‘manpower’ (labor) supplying subcontractors avoid paying for legitimate costs associated with the recruitment of their workforces. Moreover, whereas previous research on the recruitment of GCC migrant construction workers demonstrated corrupt and predatory practices like markups and extortion-like demands by South Asia-based recruitment agencies, recent work has added the corporate practices of engineering and construction companies to the mix of drivers of recruitment fees. Companies in the sector often are quick to point out that even if they would pay all costs associated with recruitment – including fair service fees to recruiters in sending countries – many of those recruiters would charge workers regardless. While this is no doubt correct in many cases, if an employing-sponsoring company does not pay these agencies for the service of recruiting workers – and/or if these employer-sponsors instead demand kickbacks in exchange for business – high recruitment fees are guaranteed (Segall and Labowitz 2017). If/once an employer-sponsor would pay for recruitment, that employer-sponsor would have both a right and incentive to ensure that its recruiters do not in turn then charge prospective workers. Changing the corporate practices of employer-sponsors is therefore a required, even if insuffcient, step to eliminate or reduce fees among migrant workers in sectors like GCC construction. Addressing the recruitment fee phenomenon necessarily entails reform of the corporate behavior of employer-sponsors, most of whom currently avoid pricing the costs of recruitment into bids they submit to clients and then fail to adequately pay recruiters for services rendered. Meaningful reform also therefore requires addressing the practices of clients that commission construction projects, since many or most would not currently accept any bid that does properly account for these costs. Mapping employer-sponsors and the clients who commission their projects therefore would have tremendous research and advocacy value. Academics and advocates ought to pursue a fuller understanding of who these employers and clients actually are, in order to advocate that between them, they bear the costs associated with recruitment, and then ensure that the agencies they hire do not charge workers.

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5.5 Remaining research gaps Very little work has been carried out to execute this type of mapping. This is due in part to a lack of available information from Gulf governments. For example, no Gulf government publishes full rosters of employers, and intermittent reports on worker welfare and steps taken against employers who violate laws tend to be presented in the aggregate, without clearly bounded time periods or sample sets (see, e.g., UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation 2016). Moreover, literature on migrant rights and kafala has tended to be carried out from academic (sociological and economic) angles, not in terms of business dynamics and practices. Neither business case studies nor market surveys – outside of professional journals and websites that publish ‘Top 10’ or ‘Power 100’-type lists of companies in the region (see, e.g., Arabian Business 2018) which sometimes lack methodological clarity – have been carried out. This question also may not be receiving the attention it deserves because of a failure by advocates to be precise with regard to the particular aspect of kafala that renders it so problematic – the granting of governmental power to employer-sponsors. Challenges faced by Gulf migrants are in many ways symptoms of this central facet of the system, rather than essential features or inevitable outcomes of any job-based migration program. Indeed, this same lack of clarity has muddied the issue enough for some Gulf governments to be able to make minor alterations to kafala rules and then claim to have abolished the system altogether.9 As a result, there remains much we do not know about the makeup and breakdown of employer-sponsors and their clients in the GCC construction sector. For example, we do not know what percentage of construction work underway in the GCC is accounted for by mega-projects like ones that are regularly featured in the media. The Local Organizing Committee of the Qatar World Cup, the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, projects that it will employ 38,000 workers at the peak of its building activities. Even though many projects are not commissioned by the Supreme Committee but exist to help Qatar achieve its tournament goals/pledges, this represents a small portion of the migrant work force in Qatar, and a very small slice of the region’s construction industry workforce. Likewise, the Louvre Abu Dhabi has now opened, most Western universities in Doha’s Education City and the UAE have completed major construction works and the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi may never break ground at all, due to reputational and security concerns (Lloyd 2017). So, who, exactly, is employing the hundreds of thousands of construction workers who remain in the region? Academics and advocates also should be seeking answers to questions like: Who are the clients awarding contracts to these companies? What percentage of construction workers are employed/sponsored by medium and large construction companies, as opposed to small subcontractors? What construction companies are winning contracts in specifc countries? Are these frms

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multinational enterprises or locally based companies? If locally based, are they 51–49 percent joint ventures with foreign companies providing expertise to local companies but controlling minority shares, in line with many GCC countries’ laws? (Sociologists and other academics may also wish to explore the way in which ‘local’ companies are themselves actually staffed by foreigners, so that the distinction between ‘local’ and ‘multinational/foreign’ becomes at best academic, or at worst a way for local companies to shield themselves from the type of scrutiny that foreign-based companies might face.) Finally, one of the most important but least well-researched questions about employer-sponsors revolves around labor-leasing (‘manpower’) frms. Experts have pointed out that these frms are increasingly used in places like Dubai (Wells 2016: 14), but again, due to lack of government statistics, it is diffcult to zero in on specifc fgures. While the next section will detail some recent data on employer-sponsors and clients in construction, it should be noted at the outset that no survey of the employment scene in Gulf construction can be considered complete without more details on the true reach of manpower frms, a critical line of inquiry for future research.

5.6

New attempts to plug gaps and preliminary conclusions

Despite the diffculty of obtaining information on employer-sponsors and their clients in Gulf construction, there are ways to approach the problem and begin to collect better data, and several efforts are underway in this pursuit. In June 2016, the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, which tracks corporate human rights policies and practices and encourages transparency on this front, launched a platform to publicize the results of surveys sent to construction frms that included questions on recruitment and employment status. While only a few large companies answered the survey, they offered some intriguing preliminary data. For example, around 62 percent of workers reported as on these companies’ sites were directly employed by the company respondents themselves (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre 2016), not by subcontractors or manpower frms over which they may claim to exercise limited control. Follow-up studies and more far-reaching surveys like this one should be conducted in order to discover the replicability of this fnding. For example, does that trend hold for larger sample sizes and for projects undertaken by small- and medium-sized enterprises, since respondents tended to be larger multinational corporations?10 If it does, researchers should look into why construction companies like these would choose to directly employ most of their on-site workers at any given time. Might it make fnancial sense to work directly with a South Asia-based recruiter, rather than via a local manpower frm, which adds an extra proft-taker to the mix? If so, then the trend of subcontracting, while signifcant, is not necessarily an impediment to working with large

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corporations to implement market-altering reforms. On the other hand, if it does not make fnancial sense or the fnding is not replicated, advocates seeking maximum effect may need to shift toward identifying and working with labor suppliers. In an attempt to further remedy the dearth of information on employersponsors and project clients in Gulf construction, in 2017, the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre and Humanity United jointly launched a Gulf construction project ‘tracker’ that lists new GCC construction contract awards likely to involve low-wage migrant labor (NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Humanity United 2017).11 Researchers gathered data for the tracker to identify the companies that are receiving new construction contract awards in the region and the clients funding those projects, so that advocates, governments and businesses looking to reform their own practices can target their efforts more precisely and effciently. The data spanning the 2017 calendar year and some of the preliminary conclusions drawn from them provide much-needed insight into the Gulf construction scene. For example, even as focus persists on Qatar due to its having won the right to host the massive 2022 FIFA World Cup Tournament, the UAE and Saudi construction markets continued to dwarf Qatar’s in terms of contracts awarded and overall value of those contracts (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).

Saudi Arabia 72

Oman 61 UAE 181

Qatar 35

Bahrain 27

Kuwait 35

Figure 5.1 Number of new contracts, by country, 2017

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Saudi Arabia $23.2 B

UAE $29.5 B

Oman $10.0 B

Qatar $8.0 B Bahrain $5.2 B

Kuwait $12.8 B

In billions, US dollars Figure 5.2 Value of new contracts, by country, 2017 Source: Bhacker, Segall, and Abimourched (2018)

When further broken down by project type and investment value, the data yielded additional results with intriguing advocacy implications. Construction projects related to petrochemicals, which were awarded more often and at higher rates in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait than in other GCC countries, were, for the most part, individually worth more than awards for residential and commercial, infrastructure and leisure, and hospitality-related construction (Figure 5.3). This may mean that these projects employ more workers than others, that materials and other non-labor costs are higher on these projects, or that they pay their workers higher wages (or all, some or none of the above).12 Meanwhile, residential and commercial construction projects constituted a plurality of projects awarded in the region and were the UAE’s major driver of growth in the sector, particularly in Dubai. Thus, despite residential and individual commercial project awards for construction being less valuable, on average, than petrochemical-related ones, the combined overall regional values for both types of awards were nearly equal over the year. For researchers and advocates, a catalog of clients awarding these construction contracts is another critical body of information, since these clients

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Figure 5.3 Total values of new contracts awarded, by project type, GCC, 2017 Source: Bhacker, Segall and Abimourched (2018)

provide funding and therefore possess leverage over other companies, including employer-sponsors, on issues like recruitment. The most valuable individual contracts in 2017 were awarded for oil- and infrastructure-related projects by government-affliated entities. Government-affliated oil companies awarding major contracts included Saudi Aramco, Bahrain Petroleum, Duqm (Oman) Refnery and Petrochemical Industries Company, and the Kuwait Oil Company. Meanwhile, infrastructure and utilities providers like Saudi Arabia’s Saline Water Conversion Corporation, the Kuwait Ministry of State for Housing Affairs and Qatar’s Ashghal and Ministry of Transport and Communications granted some of the largest infrastructure-related construction awards. Other project clients for major projects included public and private real estate companies – particularly those based the UAE – like Miral Asset Management, Azizi Developments, Union Properties, and Nakheel Properties (Bhacker, Segall and Abimourched 2018). Since corporate policies, practices and potential for reform depend in part on the nationality of relevant corporations, it is also important to understand the extents of the market roles played by foreign vs. domestically and regionally based companies. Companies based outside of the Gulf did win contracts with signifcant values, with companies from South Korea, the United Kingdom, China, Italy, India and the Netherlands topping the list (Figure 5.4). But while several large contracts were awarded to a geographically diverse array of companies, of 411 new construction contracts awarded in the GCC

UAE

$0

$2

$4

$8

In Billions, US Dollars

$6

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Figure 5.4 Highest values of combined contracts won, by country of company headquarters, 2017

France

Qatar

Kuwait

Singapore

Greece

Spain

Turkey

Canada

Oman

USA

Saudi Arabia

Netherlands

India

Italy

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South Korea

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152 David Segall according to the tracker’s methodology, at least 43 percent were awarded to domestically headquartered companies. Signifcantly, this already-substantial fgure likely is misleadingly low, since it counts local/foreign joint ventures as ‘foreign’ because some contracts were awarded internationally to companies based in other GCC countries, and because when company headquarters were unknown, the entries were not counted toward this total. More likely, a solid majority of new construction contracts throughout the GCC were awarded domestically. Interestingly, this fgure basically held for the approximately fve-plus months prior to the onset of the 2017 diplomatic crisis between Qatar and a Saudi-led alliance, and for the six-plus month subsequent period,13 meaning that patriotic-inspired domestic awarding does not seem to have spurred this trend and that it therefore likely held prior to 2017 (NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Humanity United 2017). The trend of awarding contracts to domestic frms was particularly pronounced in the UAE, the region’s largest construction market, where over 60 percent of awards were given to domestically headquartered companies. This fgure likely is also misleadingly low by a signifcant margin, for the same reasons described previously. The strength of this ‘domestifcation’ trend in the UAE means that UAE-based companies won a strong plurality of all contracts awarded by GCC countries in 2017 (ibid.). In recent years, several Western project management consultants (PMCs), which typically do not carry out construction works but which advise large project clients, have been identifed in connection with their involvement with high-profle sporting and institutional projects and lobbied in reform efforts. It is therefore also of importance that in 2017, the data confrmed that up to 75 percent of GCC awards involving PMC duties were given to non-domestically based frms.14 Likewise, nearly 65 percent of architecture awards15 were given to foreign-based companies.16 Engineering or engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts tended to skew even more toward foreign companies: less than 10 percent of new contracts were awarded to domestically based frms (ibid.). These fndings, while limited in scope, begin to address some of the research questions previously identifed, but much more research is required to confrm and expand upon them for maximally effcient advocacy.

5.7 Conclusion In recent years, migrant rights researchers and advocates focusing on the Gulf region have begun to zero in on the issue of recruitment fees as central to the worker experience. They also have begun to directly advocate with businesses operating in the region, in parallel with more traditional ongoing government advocacy – a positive step but one which would be rendered much more effective by comprehensive studies of employer-sponsors and clients in sectors like construction.

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Those conducting advocacy can maximize its effcacy by engaging not only the players most sensitive to criticism, but those with the most leverage. Given the central role that employer-sponsors and clients play in the kafala system, doing so will therefore require better data analysis on these entities than is currently available. Because they also sometimes serve as worker sponsors and because they have unique fnancial leverage, in addition to data on employers, the market role of clients who fund large projects is a key area of research that remains under-explored. In the end, any solution to the recruitment fee problem must involve these clients and a serious shift in how they conceptualize the cost of labor. Specifcally, clients will need to encourage and require – via preference in the tender process – the accurate pricing into project bids of all costs related to recruitment. Then, once awards are issued, the same clients must expend resources to ensure that contractors use the earmarked requested funds to actually pay for recruitment agencies and other costs. In some ways, proper exploration of the gaps outlined here might lead to some inconvenient truths. For example, if the Gulf Construction Tracker’s methodology were applied to different years or expanded to capture more market players and data, it may turn out that Gulf-based contractors indeed account for the vast majority of construction award recipients in the region, meaning that advocacy with ‘Western’ construction companies or projects executed by large multinational frms, while necessary and justifed, can only make a limited difference when it comes to issues like recruitment. But if domestic companies must reform in order to change the market, then this fact is essential for advocates looking to encourage such reforms. Gulf-based contractors, subcontractors and clients may be more diffcult to access than some multinational companies, or may be less incentivized to alter practices than international companies, but they are not immune to pressure and in some cases have taken very promising steps, especially for works related to high-visibility projects like the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Gulf Times 2018) or Expo 2020. Indeed, our preliminary research indicates that locally based clients and contractors are the players most critical to long-term and sustainable market reform. Likewise, the role of manpower frms and subcontractors as employers should be explored in a systematic and methodological way that may be inconvenient for advocates, since these frms are more diffcult to locate and less sensitive – at least for now – to pressure than larger brand names. At the moment, there is ample anecdotal evidence that their role has increased in recent decades and years, but the data to back up that assertion is lacking. The degree to which this hypothesis is true should play a major role in the advocacy strategies of those concerned about the rights of migrant workers in regions like the GCC and in sectors like construction. For example, if the vast majority of workers are employed by manpower or subcontracting frms, solutions to the recruitment fee issue should focus on clients and top-tier contractors using fnancial and contractual leverage to encourage

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and require best practices throughout their supply chains, or even to work around their suppliers when possible (by, for example, directly paying for recruitment, rather than relying on suppliers to do so). On the other hand, if most workers are employed directly by large prime contractors, advocates could reasonably look to these types of companies and to their clients for more direct and immediate solutions – and of course, the data may demonstrate that a hybrid approach is warranted. In the end, none of these potential inconveniences should obscure the need to seek more information or lead researchers to shy away from the important truths it may reveal. Ultimately, accurate data will lead to optimized advocacy, even if in the short-term academics and organizations are forced to re-think strategies and re-allocate resources in order to adjust to new fndings. These individuals and organizations should therefore re-double efforts to seek this data and to investigate and analyze important related questions.

Notes 1 Four years before the 1999 oil boom would spur the fow of millions of new migrant workers to the Gulf, Khalaf (p. 76) described the kafeel (sponsor) in the Kuwaiti context as ‘emerging as a new and important social type . . . embodying not only certain legal privileges but also enjoying social and economic power.’ Kafala as an Islamic concept of care or responsibility toward, for example, an adopted child or guest, has been studied for centuries. 2 All of Human Rights Watch’s recommendations in its 2006 report on workers’ rights in the UAE were directed toward governments. 3 In early 2016, Verité, a non-proft organization dedicated to providing tools to eliminate labor and human rights abuses in supply chains, released a report on the role that corruption plays in infating recruitment fees and a guide for companies wishing to reduce their occurrence in supply chains (Manpower Group &Verité 2016). In March of that year John Ruggie, a Harvard professor and the architect of the 2011 UNGPs, published a paper on FIFA’s responsibilities to workers on their tournament sites (Ruggie 2016). As part of its efforts related to the Dhaka Principles with Dignity and Migration, in May 2016, the Institute for Human Rights and Business, an organization dedicated to embedding respect for human rights in everyday business, announced the ‘employer pays principle’, which contends that ‘No worker should pay for a job – the costs of recruitment should be borne not by the worker but by the employer’ (Institute for Human Rights and Business 2012). In June 2016, the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, which tracks corporate human rights policy and encourages transparency on this front, launched a platform to publicize the results of surveys sent to construction frms that included questions on recruitment (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre 2016). In April 2017, the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, which works with business to promote sector-specifc, standardsbased approaches to human rights, published a report that examined the business dynamics driving the recruitment industry of GCC-bound migrant construction workers (NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights 2017). Traditional human rights groups also continued to deal with the issue. In 2015, Human Rights Watch published a guide for construction companies operating in the Gulf (Human Rights Watch 2015), and in June 2017 Amnesty International published a full-length report on recruitment in Nepal (Amnesty International 2017).

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Meanwhile, the industry itself has begun, even if slowly, to respond. In July 2016, BSR, a non-proft that develops sustainable business models by producing research and offering consulting services, released a paper calling on the construction sector to launch an industry-led group that would work toward identifying, sharing and implementing standards and best practices. The Institute for Human Rights and Business, BSR and Humanity United, a foundation dedicated to tackling global problems that are widely considered intractable, convened several construction frms in this pursuit. In February 2017, BSR and six corporate founding members announced the formation of the new effort – ‘Building Responsibly’ – and declared that addressing recruitment fees would be one of the group’s work streams (BSR 2017). Later in the spring of 2017, the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), a corporate-led group dedicated to creating and enforcing ‘industry-wide standard[s] on social, environmental and ethical issues in the electronics industry supply chains’, announced its new Responsible Labor Initiative, a multi-sector, multi-stakeholder effort devoted to responsible labor sourcing and recruitment around the world (Responsible Business Alliance 2017). In practice, the sponsor of a migrant may be distinct from the employer of that migrant. We will use the term ‘sponsor-employer’ both because they often are one and the same and because when they are not, we often consider their normative roles and responsibilities – at least as they pertain to references of ‘employer-sponsors’ here – to be substantively similar. In cases when we would consider roles or responsibilities to be different for an employer that is not also the sponsor, or vice-versa, we revert to using the terms ‘employer’ or ‘sponsor’ as appropriate. To further complicate matters, the client also may be the sponsoring entity, as in the case of domestic work or when a majority-locally owned company provides both funding and building services for the same project. However, in construction, it is more common for the clients who pay to commission projects to solicit bids from entities which, even if locally owned, in turn sponsor the labor required to execute specifc works. We therefore further distinguish between ‘employersponsor’ and ‘client,’ despite a lack of clear dividing lines between the three designations. For that reason, we also explicitly include the term ‘client’ whenever we consider clients – whether they double as employers and/or sponsors or not – to be relevant to the discussion. It remains to be seen whether clients would actually save money in the long term by enforcing responsible recruitment in their supply chains, but there are compelling reasons – related to reputation, workforce satisfaction and turnover, productivity and economies of scale in recruitment – to think so. In the short term, however, paying for recruitment likely necessarily entails expenditures not currently incurred by most clients. Major migrant-receiving countries also admit relatively minuscule numbers of migrants on humanitarian grounds, including as refugees. In the European Union, free movement rules also allow migrants to cross some borders without job offers; in many cases, to seek work. In November 2017, The International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) dropped longstanding labor rights complaints against the government of Qatar in response to government reform pledges. The government also invited the ILO to open an in-country offce, which is attempting to work with authorities to implement these reforms. By the time of writing, the ILO and the Government of Qatar had announced concrete steps to address select longstanding ITUC and ILO concerns, including the ‘no-objection certifcate’ (NOC), but specifc plans to address other issues – including worker recruitment – had not yet been fnalized or released.

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9 In December 2016, outlets like the BBC echoed the government of Qatar’s claim that it had abolished the kafala system (BBC 2016). This was prior to and separate from the ITUC’s October 2017 announcement. 10 Indeed, researchers should take care to be precise about fndings in other ways as well. For example, the fact that a majority of any project’s workers at a given time may be directly employed by the award-winning contractor does not necessarily mean that the majority of construction workers in the GCC are employed by general contractors as opposed to manpower frms or subcontractors. These fgures may be skewed because indirect laborers – those sponsored or employed by subcontractors or manpower frms – are more likely to work one-off or shortterm jobs, meaning that any snapshot in time will tend to skew toward misleadingly high rates of direct employment by ‘prime’ contractors. 11 More information on the methodology used for tracking awards is available on the tracker website, and in separate documents in the author’s possession and available upon request. 12 While project award values do not necessarily correlate to size of labor force, they gives a sense of the relative market strength of clients throughout the region. 13 With the exception of the UAE, where the rate of the domestic awarding of contracts increased, albeit minorly, after the crisis began. 14 Two PMC awards were issued to unknown companies. If one of these companies was domestic, the foreign proportion would drop to 71.2 percent; if both were domestic, the proportion would drop to 67.4 percent. 15 This fgure includes architecture-only awards. It does not, for example, include ‘design-build’ awards, which also involve construction. 16 In both cases, ‘foreign companies’ include joint ventures that feature non-GCCbased companies.

References ‘2014 Construction Week Power 100,’ 2014. Arabian Business. www.arabianbusiness. com/2014-construction-week-power-100-554981.html (accessed 9 August 2018). Afshaq, Ahmed. 2009. ‘Decline in Construction Fatalities,’ Gulf News, 9 March. http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/general/decline-in-construction-fatalities-1.56830 (accessed 4 April 2017). Ali, Syed. 2010. ‘Permanent Impermanence,’ Sociology for the Masses, 9(2): 26–31. Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the American Sociological Association. Al Sadiq, Nouf and YihuiWu. 2015. ‘Evaluating Reforms in the Workforce: A Comparative Study of the Kafala System in Bahrain and Qatar,’ IMES Capstone Paper Series, May. https://imes.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/imes.elliott.gwu.edu/fles/downloads/ documents/Capstone-Papers-2015/Nouf%20Yihui%20Capstone%20 %5Bfnal%5D%20fnal.pdf (accessed 2 February 2017). Al Ubaydli, Omar. 2016. ‘UAE LabourMobility Reforms Create Winners and Losers,’ The National, 20 August. www.thenational.ae/business/economy/uaelabourmobility-reforms-create-winnersand-losers#full (accessed 20 February 2017). Al Ubaydli, Omar. 2017. ‘Should the Arabian Gulf Tweak Its Migrant Worker System? Features of a Points-Based System May Become Valuable,’ Arabian Business, 19 August. www.thenational.ae/business/economy/should-the-arabian-gulftweak-its-migrant-worker-system-1.621075 (accessed 9 August 2018). Amnesty International. 2016. ‘Qatar World Cup of Shame,’ March. www.amnesty. org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/03/qatar-world-cup-of-shame/ (accessed 19 January 2017).

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Amnesty International. 2017. ‘Turning People into Profts: Abusive Recruitment, Traffcking, and Forced Labour of Nepali Migrant Workers,’ 6 June. www. amnesty.org/en/documents/asa31/6206/2017/en/ (accessed 14 November 2017). Arabian Business. 2016. ‘Worksite Deaths in Bahrain Decline by 50%,’ 13 July. www.arabianbusiness.com/worksite-deaths-in-bahrain-decline-by-50-638405. html (accessed 17 October 2017). Aude Ucla, Jean-Baptiste Andrieu and Michaela Lee. 2016. ‘Addressing Workers’ Rights in Engineering and Construction: Opportunities for Collaboration,’ BSR, July 6. https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/report-view (accessed 15 February 2017). Babar, Zahra. 2013. ‘A Regional Perspective: Migration Policy and Governance in the GCC,’ Georgetown University Doha Center for International and Regional Studies. http://eservices.mol.gov.ae/LabourMobility/attachments/babar-theme4E. pdf (accessed 25 October 2017). BBC. 2016. ‘Qatar Abolishes Controversial “Kafala”LabourSystem,’ 13 December. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38298393 (accessed 15 July 2017). Bhacker, Mariam, David Segall and Rola Abimourched. 2018. ‘Research Brief: Gulf Construction Tracker; 2017 Trends in Contract Awards,’ Available for Download under ‘Latest Analysis. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/gulf-constructiontracker-analysis#c204261 (accessed 21 December 2019). BSR. 2017. ‘Building Responsibly,’ February. www.bsr.org/en/collaboration/groups/ buildingresponsibly (accessed 13 March 2017). Bui, Quoctrung and Kaitlin Dickerson. 2018. ‘What Can the U.S. Learn From How Other Countries Handle Immigration?,’ The New York Times, February 16. www. nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/16/upshot/comparing-immigration-policiesacross-countries.html (accessed 2 August 2018). Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. 2016. ‘Migrant Workers in Gulf Construction, Interactive Platform.’ https://business-humanrights.org/ en/migrantworkers-in-gulf-construction (accessed 17 February 2017). Connor, Phillip. 2016. ‘Middle East’s Population More Than Doubles Since 2005,’ Pew Research Center, 18 October: 18. www.pewglobal.org/2016/10/18/middleeastsmigrant-population-more-than-doublessince-2005/ (accessed 6 February 2017). ConstructionWeekOnline. 2017. ‘Improving Safety on UAE Construction Sites,’ 29 April. www.constructionweekonline.com/article-44137-improving-safety-on-uaeconstruction-sites/ (accessed 17 October 2017). Deutsche Welle. 2016. ‘Qatar Announces Labor Reforms But Critics Pounce,’ 13 December. www.dw.com/en/qatar-announces-labor-reforms-but-criticspounce/a-36745020 (accessed 8 November 2017). Foster, Nicholas H.D. 2001. ‘The Islamic Law of Guarantees,’ Arab Law Quarterly, 16(2): 133–157. Brill. Gardner, Andrew. 2010. City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain. Cornell University Press, ILR Press. Gulf Times. 2018. ‘Qatar Step to Pay Back Recruitment Fees Hailed,’ 15 March. www.gulf-times.com/story/585283/Qatar-move-to-pay-back-recruitmentfees-hailed Human Rights Watch. 2006. ‘Building Towers, Cheating Workers: Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in the United Arab Emirates,’ 11 November. www. hrw.org/report/2006/11/11/building-towers-cheating-workers/exploitation-migrantconstruction-workers-united

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Human Rights Watch. 2009. ‘“The Island of Happiness:” Exploitation of Migrant Workers on Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi,’ May 19. www.hrw.org/report/2009/05/19/ island-happiness/exploitation-migrant-workers-saadiyat-island-abu-dhabi (accessed 19 May 2017). Human Rights Watch. 2012. ‘Building a Better World Cup: Protecting Migrant Workers in Qatar Ahead of FIFA 2022,’ 12 June.www.hrw.org/report/2012/06/12/ building-better-world-cup/protecting-migrant-workers-qatar-ahead-ffa-2022 Human Rights Watch. 2015. ‘Guidelines for a Better Construction Industry in the GCC: A Code of Conduct for Construction Companies,’ December. www.hrw.org/ sites/default/fles/supporting_resources/2015.12.21.gcc_brochure_dec_2015.pdf (accessed 14 April 2017). Human Rights Watch. 2017. ‘Qatar: Take Urgent Action to Protect Construction Workers: FIFA, National Associations Should Press Qatar on Heat Risks, Preventable Deaths,’ October. www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/27/qatar-take-urgent-actionprotect-construction-workers (accessed 20 October 2017). Institute for Human Rights and Business. 2012. ‘The Dhaka Principles for Migration with Dignity,’ 18 December. www.ihrb.org/focus-areas/migrant-workers/ dhakaprinciples-migration-with-dignity (accessed 18 January 2017). Jureidini, Ray. 2014. ‘Migrant Labor Recruitment to Qatar: Report for Qatar Foundation Migrant Worker Welfare Initiative,’ Qatar Foundation. Bloomsbury QatarFoundation Journals. www.qscience.com/userimages/ContentEditor/1404811243939/ Migrant_Labour_Recruitment_to_Qatar_Web_Final.pdf (accessed 15 August 2017). Kaminer, Ariel and Sean O’Driscoll. 2014. ‘Workers at N.Y.U.’s Abu Dhabi Site Faced Harsh Conditions,’ The New York Times, 18 May. www.nytimes. com/2014/05/19/nyregion/workers-at-nyus-abu-dhabi-siteface-harsh-conditions. htm (accessed 15 March 2017). Khalaf, Sulayman N. 1992. ‘Gulf Societies and the Image of Unlimited Good,’ Dialectical Anthropology, 17(1): 53–84. Lloyd, Lauren. 2017. ‘Is the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi Dead?,’ The Architects Newspaper, 28 March. https://archpaper.com/2017/03/guggenheim-abu-dhabi-dead/ (accessed 23 September 2017). Longva, AnhNga. 1999. ‘Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: The Kafala System in the Gulf,’ Middle East Report, 211, Traffcking and Transiting: New Perspectives on Labor Migration: 20–22. Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc. Manpower Group & Verité. 2016. ‘An Ethical Framework for Cross-Border Labor Recruitment: An Industry/Stakeholder Collaboration to Reduce the Risks of Forced Labor and Human Traffcking,’ December. https:// www.verite.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/ethical_framework_paper.pdf (accessed 2 March 2017). Migrant-Rights.org. 2015. ‘We Need to Talk about the Safety of Construction Workers in the Gulf,’ 28 April. www.migrant-rights.org/2015/04/we-still-need-to-talkabout-construction-worker-safety-in-the-gulf/ (accessed 17 October 2017). Naidu, Suresh, Yaw Nyarko and Wang, Sing-Yi. 2014. ‘Worker Mobility in a Global Labor Market: Evidence from the United Arab Emirates,’ March. University of Warwick. https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/intranet/manage/ calendar/suresh_naidu.pdf (accessed 26 September 2016). NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Humanity United. 2017. ‘Gulf Construction Tracker.’ https:// gulftracker.business-humanrights.org/gulf (accessed 3 August 2018).

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Ouroussoff, Nicolai. 2011. ‘Abu Dhabi Guggenheim Faces Protest,” The New York Times, 16 March. www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/arts/design/guggenheimthreatened-with-boycott-over-abu-dhabi-project.html (accessed 3 August 2018). Responsible Business Alliance (Formerly the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition). 2017. ‘Responsible Labor Initiative: Promoting the Rights of Workers Vulnerable to Forced Labor Globally,’ 26 June.www.responsiblebusiness.org/ initiatives/rli/ (accessed 14 November 2017). Ruggie, John G. 2016. “FOR THE GAME. FOR THE WORLD.” FIFA and Human Rights. Corporate Responsibility Initiative Report No. 68. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School. Segall, David and Sarah Labowitz. 2017. ‘Making Workers Pay: Recruitment of the Migrant Labor Force in the Gulf Construction Industry,’ NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, 11 April. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 547df270e4b0ba184dfc490e/t/58ec1e9ed1758e3915cb4c5b/1491869348464/ FINALFINAL-MakingWorkersPay-Report-Digital.pdf (accessed 14 November 2017). Thomas, Jen. 2012. ‘Abu Dhabi Releases Construction Death Statistics,’ The National, 24 January.www.thenational.ae/uae/abu-dhabi-releases-constructiondeath-statistics-1.585191 (accessed 5 October 2017). United Arab Emirates Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation. 2016. ‘Worker Welfare Report 2015.’ www.mohre.gov.ae/assets/4ee3e27e/ministry-ofhuman-resources_eng.aspx (accessed 15 July 2017). Verité & The Freedom Fund. 2016. ‘An Exploratory Study on the Role of Corruption in International Labor Migration,’ January. www.verite.org/wpcontent/ uploads/2016/11/Verite-ReportIntl-Labour-Recruitment.pdf (accessed 27 February 2017). Wells, Jill. 2016. ‘Protecting the Wages of Migrant Construction Workers,’ Engineers against Poverty, London. www.engineersagainstpoverty.org/documentdownload. axd?documentresourceid=82 (accessed 25 October 2017).

6

Migrant businesses in Saudi Arabia Towards an economic sociology of Gulf migration Md Mizanur Rahman

6.1 Introduction Migrant labour has been a key feature in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries since the mid-1970s. Out of a population of over 51 million across the six Gulf countries – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates – foreigners account for roughly 25 million, constituting around 49 per cent of the total population.1 In terms of labour force participation, migrant workers are estimated to account for around 70 per cent of the total labour force in these six GCC countries.2 The common narrative for explaining this surge in the foreign population is that the 1973 oil boom, and the unprecedented number of development projects which took place subsequently, attracted massive fows of migrant labour to the region (for details, see Fargues, 2013; Fargues and Shah, 2017). Migrant fows from South Asia and the Arab world to the Gulf states now account for the world’s largest movements of South-to-South migration by far (Fargues and De Bel-Air, 2015). Existing research on Gulf migration has contributed to the broader understanding of migration patterns, the causes and implications of migration, migrant remittances, recruitment and the kafala system, irregular migration, citizenship and naturalization, and many other related issues (for details, see Arnold and Shah, 1986; Kuptsch, 2006; Shah, 1994; Fargues, 2011, 2013; Ullah, 2014; Jamal, 2015; Jain and Oommen, 2016). However, there are new and emerging areas which remain largely underresearched; for instance, migrant-operated businesses in the region. The phenomenon of migrant-operated businesses has changed the character of the private sector in the Gulf countries (Vora, 2011). Of these migrantoperated businesses, some businesses are actually run and owned by migrants themselves. Remarkably, the migrants who are now running and owning businesses came to the region as ordinary migrant workers; later, they progressed from migrant worker to migrant entrepreneur. The emergence of migrant businesses in the Gulf, thus, constitutes a fascinating feld of migration research that has so far been overlooked in the mainstream research on Gulf migration.

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Among the GCC members, Saudi Arabia is the largest country in terms of geography, population and economy. Historically, agriculture, animal husbandry, fshing, Hajj (pilgrimage) and safe trades for business were its major sources of economic life (Sallam and Hunter 2013: 142). However, the oil boom and subsequent economic growth changed the economic activities of the country after the 1970s. Saudi Arabia’s current population is over 30 million,3 of which around 20 million is locals and about ten million foreigners. Migrant labour is thus critical for the country’s economic development. In particular, Saudi Arabia is a popular destination for Bangladeshi migrants, with nearly three million going there for work between 1976 and 2016.4 In terms of skill composition, only around 3 per cent of migrants were professionals, the remaining being broadly categorized as low skilled.5 There are currently around 1.3 million Bangladeshis employed in Saudi Arabia, although some unoffcial reports estimate the real number could be as high as 2.5 million.6 Low-skilled migrants are hired to work in dirty, dangerous and demanding jobs (the ‘3Ds’) under renewable contracts. This chapter concerns those Bangladeshi migrant workers who, despite these challenging circumstances, have transformed themselves into migrant entrepreneurs. Bangladeshi migrants are particularly interesting for this research because they are also Muslims, and they are one of the early migrant groups who have been working in the country since the 1970s. Immigrant entrepreneurship is predominantly seen as a phenomenon of the global North, with immigrants and ethnic economies in the United States and Western Europe receiving far greater attention (Muniandy, 2015). Thus, observation of the social phenomenon of migrant businesses in the global South is changing our understanding of migrant businesses, which up until now has been dominated by interpretations and assumptions framed in the West. Consequently, explanations of how migrants establish businesses under conditions of labour migration in the South remain scarce. Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to explore the making of Bangladeshi migrant businesses in Saudi Arabia. The chapter addresses the following questions: Who are these migrant entrepreneurs? Why do they seek to open businesses? How do migrants circumvent the restrictions imposed on them in running businesses? What makes them entrepreneurs? Broadly, this chapter explains the shift in an individual migrant’s trajectory from migrant worker to migrant entrepreneur with the help of the group characteristics that Bangladeshi migrants possess, the opportunity structure that Saudi Arabia offers to migrant workers and the innovations that migrant entrepreneurs introduce to their businesses in order to make their businesses different and rewarding. This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides data sources and research methods. After the research methods, this chapter addresses migrant entrepreneurship from a theoretical perspective, with a focus on labour migration. This chapter highlights the signifcance of opportunity structure, cultural conditions and innovative practices in the development

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of migrant businesses. Wherever possible, this chapter provides examples drawn from migrant-receiving countries in the Gulf states and East Asia, in order to position it within the context of temporary migration. The next section discusses migration control policies in Saudi Arabia, followed by a section on the characteristics of Bangladeshi migrant entrepreneurs. This chapter then turns to examining the opportunity structure in Saudi Arabia, which allows the emergence of Bangladeshi businesses, before explaining the various innovative strategies that respondents employ to make their enterprises proftable. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the signifcance of the fndings, emphasizing the policy implications.

6.2 Research methods This study focuses on Bangladeshi migrants-turned-entrepreneurs in Saudi Arabia. I defne ‘migrant entrepreneurs’ operationally, as owners or operators of businesses who run or operate those businesses with a share in both investment and proft. Bangladeshi migrant entrepreneurs run different types of micro-enterprises to cater to the needs of nationals and non-nationals (including Bangladeshis). Micro-enterprises in Saudi Arabia are those businesses that employ up to nine employees. Bangladeshis are involved in a myriad of micro-businesses across the country. In order to cover a wide range of migrant businesses, this study identifed 26 types of common businesses that Bangladeshi migrants were principally involved in Saudi Arabia. However, this list of 26 businesses is not exhaustive, as it excludes many other businesses that this study could not include due to lack of accessibility and availability. In total, 50 migrant entrepreneurs from these 26 types of businesses were purposively selected for the interview. I used a semi-structured questionnaire which was constructed after participant observation and informal discussions with migrants and migrant entrepreneurs, and was designed to elicit information on socio-demographic characteristics, nature of business, mobilization of resources, business environment, the challenges of opening businesses and fnally, the strategies employed to overcome barriers. The questionnaire survey was conducted between August 2014 and April 2015. The major research sites were Mecca, Madinah, Riyadh and Dhahran. The questionnaire survey was supplemented by participant observation and informal discussions, as well as small focus group discussions with migrants and migrants-turned-entrepreneurs during my several visits to Saudi Arabia between 2013 and 2015. All respondents in this research were male migrants of Bangladeshi origin. Interviews with the respondents were carried out face-to-face at their sites of business or residence. Migrant entrepreneurs were interviewed in Bengali, the mother tongue of Bangladeshis, and the responses later translated into English. Interviews were conducted with the assistance of a Bangladeshi student who was studying at Dhahran. In addition to migrants-turned-entrepreneurs, I also talked to migrant workers, in order to understand why many migrants

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could not join migrant businesses. Such informal discussions also provided fascinating, complementary insights into the development of migrant entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia. However, I would like to acknowledge the fact that the duration of feldwork was limited by fnancial and time constraints, and that this precluded more in-depth feldwork in certain respects.

6.3

Theoretical orientations

Extensive research has been conducted on migrant (or ethnic) entrepreneurship in North America and Europe (for a review, see Portes, 1995; Thornton, 1999; Kloosterman et al., 1999; Zhou, 2004; Rath, 2000; Panayiotopoulos, 2006). One of the crucial research endeavours in migrant entrepreneurship is to investigate why migrants tend to be entrepreneurs (Zhou, 2004: 1046). Two theoretical approaches are employed in explaining the causes of migrant entrepreneurship: cultural and structural. In her review essay, Thornton (1999) describes the entrepreneurial literature as dichotomous, being split between supply-side and demand-side accounts. The supply side focuses on the individual participants and their traits as entrepreneurs, while the demand side analyzes the context under which entrepreneurship occurs. Broadly, the cultural approach focuses its attention on groups’ cultural properties and ethnic resources. In this vein, several arguments have been advanced at the group level, such as the ‘sojourner thesis’ (Siu, 1952), and the ‘class and ethnic resources’ account (Light, 1994). The sojourner thesis notes that certain groups of migrants have a passion for their homeland and desire to return to their family roots. This thesis stresses that migrants have motivation to succeed, through frugality and diligent work in easily liquidated business ventures in the host society (Siu, 1952). Light (Light, 1994; Light and Rosenstein, 1995) advances a resource theory of entrepreneurship, arguing that the kinds and quantities of resources immigrants possess greatly affect their likelihood of becoming self-employed. The sojourner thesis is particularly relevant in this case. As migrants have temporary status, they tend to work hard and save their incomes in order to take it back to Bangladesh. The resource theory also confers insight into how Bangladeshi migrants use co-national connections to arrange the start-up capital. Prior to the 1980s, cultural-deterministic arguments dominated this area of research. Since the 1980s, studies of a more empirical nature have moved the general conceptualization beyond purely cultural arguments, so as to include structural causes (for details, see Orderuad and Onsager, 2005). The structural approach focuses on the contextual or external forces of society, as well as the constraints and opportunities, in the development of ethnic entrepreneurship. At the structural level, the ‘blocked mobility thesis’ posits that discrimination and racial barriers in a host society produce unfavourable labour market conditions for ethnic minorities (Bonacich and Modell, 1980; Li, 1976). As a result, ethnic minorities look for jobs in the ethnic business arena so as to secure economic prosperity (Barrett et al., 1996;

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Borjas, 1994). We notice the same trend in Saudi Arabia, where migrants, being trapped in low-skilled occupations, venture out into micro-enterprises as an alternative source of higher economic returns. The theoretical basis of ethnic entrepreneurship research made great strides in the 1990s. For instance, Waldinger et al. (1990) argued in favour of an integrative approach, an approach that takes account of socio-cultural features as well as the economic and institutional environment in which entrepreneurs operate. Waldinger et al. introduce the categories or concepts of opportunity structures and group characteristics – that is, market conditions and access to ownership on the one hand, and predisposing factors and resource mobilization on the other hand – thereby combining structure and agency. This interactive model of immigrant entrepreneurship is an attempt to integrate culture with structure, ethnic resources with opportunity structure, and supply with demand (Waldinger et al., 1990). In this approach, the demand for business and the supply of skills and resources interact to produce ethnic entrepreneurship in a host country. Thus, in the light of existing theories, there appear to be two overarching theoretical principles concerning starting a business in a host country: necessity and opportunity (Knight, 2015; Williams, 2007). The former focuses on entrepreneurship as a last resort, the latter on entrepreneurship as a goal. Marked by their offcial status as members of the low-skill group, with the associated immigration status, migrant workers are unable to progress up from ‘3D’occupations, and thereby turn to migrant entrepreneurship. In a study on Polish migrants who migrated to the United Kingdom (UK) in the post-2004 period, Julie Knight reported that the migrant is not motivated to migrate in the hope of starting a business; rather, it is only after experiencing the foreign labour market that the migrant is motivated to start a business (Knight, 2015: 578). This is an emergent phenomenon in Asia, as well. For instance, migrants in Japan and South Korea working in low-skilled positions tend to become migrant entrepreneurs due to lack of occupational mobility (Lian and Rahman, 2014; Rahman and Lian, 2011). From the other perspective, entrepreneurs can be motivated to start a business due to the existence of opportunity. Raman and Lian, for instance, report that Bangladeshi migrants did not fnd any halal food restaurants in South Korea and Japan when they frst migrated in the 1980s and 1990s (Lian and Rahman, 2014; Rahman and Lian, 2011). As Muslims, they perceived the business opportunity for halal food and other ethnic products in these countries, and accordingly worked in low-skilled ‘3D’jobs fora few years to raise funds to start a business. Harris also highlights a similar trend among Poles in the UK (Harris, 2012, as cited in Knight, 2015: 578). This interpretation is echoed in the growing literature which sees migrant entrepreneurs as motivated by both necessity and opportunity (Williams, 2007; Knight, 2015; Minniti et al., 2006; Ram and Phisacklea, 1995). A relevant question in the development of migrant businesses is how migrant businesses become thriving enterprises. We notice that migrant

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entrepreneurs employ different innovative strategies to access a wider clientele and penetrate new and lucrative markets. Although the management literature on entrepreneurship focuses on innovation (Caves and Porter, 1977; Porter, 1998), ethnic business studies tend to overlook the importance of innovation (Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990: 112). Engelen suggests that this is probably due to the marginality of most ethnic and migrant businesses (Engelen, 2001: 211). To Schumpeter, entrepreneurship consists of recombining one’s available resources in new ways; the carrying out of the plans enabled by the new combination is called ‘enterprise’; and the individuals whose function it is to carry them out are called ‘entrepreneurs’ (Schumpeter, 1934: 74). For Schumpeter, innovation is the raison d’être of the entrepreneur (Swedberg, 2009). Schumpeter identifes fve types of innovation: “a new good”, “a new method of production”, “a new market”, “a new source of supply of raw material or half-manufactured goods” and “a new organisation of an industry” (Schumpeter, 1934: 66). Migrants employ one or more of these fve types of innovation in their business to make it proftable. It is fundamental to entrepreneurship that an entrepreneur always has to make a proft, and Swedberg remarks that the Schumpeterian innovations are only viable if they do in principle enable proft: “introducing a new good, a new method of production, and a new market, and so on may well be ‘entrepreneurial’ but unless there is proft, there is no Schumpeterian entrepreneurship” (Swedberg, 2009: 196). Notwithstanding their marginal character, the migrant enterprises in this chapter have prospered because of the resourcefulness of individuals and their willingness to innovate in order to tap co-national (Bangladeshi), greater South Asian (regional) and local (Saudi) markets. This chapter thus explains the shift in an individual migrant’s trajectory from migrant worker to migrant entrepreneur with the help of group characteristics, opportunity structure and innovation.

6.4

Migration control policy in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is a prime migrant destination and remittance source country for migrants from the Maghreb, Mashreq and Asia (Shah, 2010; Kuptsch, 2006; Fargues, 2011; Fargues and De Bel-Air, 2015; Jureidini, 2016). With over ten million non-national residents, with roughly 35 per cent of its total population being comprised of foreigners in 2016, Saudi Arabia is ranked as the second-biggest remittance-sending country and was among the top fve migrant destination countries worldwide in 2016.7 The growth of the foreign population in Saudi Arabia has been steady and remarkable: from nearly 1.5 million foreigners in 1980, to 3.8 million in 1990, 5.5 million in 2000, 8.5 million in 2010 and ten million in 2016.8 The bulk of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia are confned to the bottom of the occupational ladder: around 80 per cent of all foreign labourers are in semiskilled and unskilled occupations (Fargues and De Bel-Air, 2015: 148).

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Broadly, temporary migration control policies are informed and shaped by three basic principles: limited settlement, limited scope for citizenship and limited scope for national culture and identity modifcation in response to external infuences (Castles, 2001: 197). The Gulf countries have developed a sophisticated migration management system known as the kafala (sponsorship) system, which embodies the two common policy stances of international migration: protectionism and the absence of any mechanism for integrating immigrants into society (Fargues, 2006: 18). The Gulf societies are characterized by the dual labour markets entailed by the kafala institution: most nationals are channelled into public jobs, while foreign workers are hired for private-sector jobs (Fargues and De Bel-Air, 2015; De Bel-Air, 2014). The kafala system is instrumental in managing foreign worker fows and subordinating them to citizens (Shah, 1994; Longva, 1999; Colton, 2010; De Bel-Air, 2011; Auwal, 2010; Jureidini, 2016). There are two overarching features of the kafala system: frst, it is both administered and regulated by the Ministry of Interior; second, it is devised around the model of employer sponsorship of foreign labour – that is, the responsibility for a migrant worker and his/her residency lies with the employers (for details, see Zahra, 2015). The job contract is issued by a sponsor (kafeel), which may be a placement agency or a company/institution, or any individual on the condition that he or she is a citizen of the given GCC country. Every migrant, from manual worker to businessperson, needs to go through the kafala system in the region. A migrant worker thereby is tied to his or her kafeel, and the system works such that the migrant worker can only work for kafeel for a specifc period (Longva, 1999; Gardner, 2010; Rahman, 2012; Jureidini, 2016). Kafeels often hold workers’ passports or other travel documents, and sometimes exploit migrants by denying them proper wages and conditions of employment (Colton, 2010; Gardner, 2010). Foreign workers are generally not permitted to transfer their sponsorship or work for another employer without obtaining the approval of the original sponsor (for details, see Zahra, 2013, 2015). Foreigners residing in Saudi Arabia need to obtain an exit permit before leaving the country. Saudi labour law requires the employer to bear the costs of the exit visa and return ticket to the worker’s home country at the end of his or her employment; however, should the employment relationship be broken, foreign workers become illegal residents. Foreign workers are not allowed to marry or have sexual relationships with locals. Specifc policies are pursued to create obstacles to family reunion and long-term settlement (De Bel-Air, 2011, 2014; Auwal, 2010; Fargues and De Bel-Air, 2015; Zahra, 2015). And yet, despite this restrictive migration control policy, some migrants are able to transform themselves into migrant entrepreneurs even within the kafala framework.

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Some predisposing factors for development of migrant businesses

At the group level, two questions are broadly addressed in immigrant entrepreneurship literature: Why do migrants emerge as entrepreneurs? How do they mobilize resources that give them a competitive edge? These questions are usually clustered in two themes: predisposing factors and resource mobilization (Waldinger et al., 1990). When a migrant turns into migrant entrepreneur, his individual migration experience takes on different trajectory from his fellow migrant workers. Table 6.1 presents the individual migrant’s trajectory to becoming an entrepreneur. Among the surveyed entrepreneurs, 36 per cent were in their 30s and 58 per cent in their 40s. All respondents were married except two respondents (Case Nos. 7 and 11). They had different levels of educational qualifcations: 66 per cent had from 6–12 years of schooling in Bangladesh, and 18 per cent had from 13–16 years of schooling. They had migrated to Saudi Arabia between 1986 and 2010; 48 per cent in the 1990s and 48 per cent in the 2000s: they have thus been living in Saudi Arabia for considerable time. With such a long period of stay, all respondents were fuent in Arabic. Respondents had started their frst business in Saudi Arabia after working for several years; 14 per cent began the businesses in the period 2010–present, 72 per cent in 2000–2009 and 12 per cent in 1990–1999. As mentioned earlier, the migrants had come to Saudi Arabia as migrant workers. Among those surveyed, it took on average 7.25 years to transform themselves from migrant worker to entrepreneur – in other words, the surveyed entrepreneurs had worked as ordinary paid workers for on average 7.25 years. The waiting time for starting a new business varies from person to person depending on the availability of start-up capital and fnding a trustworthy kafeel for the formal procedures. The respondents had mostly been students or unemployed before coming to Saudi Arabia. Eighty-four per cent had had no business exposure before migrating. The remaining 16 percent had some sort of agricultural business exposure at the family level. In rural Bangladesh, there are sessional businesses in agricultural products that elder members of an agricultural family often pursue to generate seasonal additional incomes, and other male members of the family often assist with if necessary. The respondents’ prior experience, therefore, did not amount to active business exposure, and it is thus evident that the surveyed entrepreneurs had embarked on businesses in Saudi Arabia without adequate prior experience. One of the obvious reasons for switching from paid employment to selfemployment is that there is little occupational mobility in low-skilled wage employment; migrants need to rely on monthly wages, which are also subject to the availability of work and the economic downturns often caused by oil-price fuctuations (Rahman, 2011). A change in migrant’s occupation or

45–50 13–14

45–50 13–14

35–40 1–5

40–45 6–10

40–45 13–14

35–40 6–10 35–40 11–12 40–45 6–10

Case No. 1

Case No. 2

Case No. 3

Case No. 4

Case No. 5

Case No. 6 Case No. 7 Case No. 8

2002

2001

2005

1997

1995

Year of migration to Saudi Arabia

Married Married Married

Case No. 13 45–50 6–10 Case No. 14 40–45 6–10 Case No. 15 45–50 13–14

1998 1998 1993

Unmarried 2004 Married 1994

Case No. 11 30–35 6–10 Case No. 12 45–50 13–14

2003 1999

Married Married

Case No. 9 30–35 11–12 Case No. 10 40–45 14–16

Married 2003 Unmarried 2000 Married 1998

Married

Married

Married

Married

Married

Ranges Education Marital of ages (ears of status (years) schooling)

Case number

No No No

No No

No No

No No No

No

No

No

No

No

Prior business experience (yes/no)

2008 2004 2003

2008 1999

2007 2000

2009 2014 2004

2006

2005

2006

2003

2006

Year of starting the business

10 years 6 years 10 years

4 years 5 years

4 year 1 year

6 years 14 years 6 years

4 years

4 years

1 year

6 years

11 years

Period worked as a wage worker

Up to 60% Up to 80% Up to 60%

Up to 100% Up to 60%

Up to 20% Up to 70%

Up to 70% Up to 20% Up to 100%

Up to 60%

Up to 100%

Up to 20%

Up to 30%

Up to 50%

Restaurant Laundry Building materials

Painting (building) Building materials Paan shop Laundry Apparel for women and children Hardware Building materials Painting Luggage store

Meat shop

Grocery

Sweet shop

Contributions Nature of of personal businesses in savings to Saudi Arabia start-up capital

Table 6.1 The migrant entrepreneurs’ trajectories: profles of 50 selected migrants in Saudi Arabia

No

No

No

No

No

Do you feel unsafe to run businesses under kafala system?

Locals Locals and South Asians Bangladeshis Locals Locals

Locals Locals

No No No

No Concerned

No No

South Asian No Locals Concerned Locals No

Locals

Locals and South Asian Locals and South Asian Locals and South Asian Locals

Clientele

Married

Married Married

Married Married

Married

Married

Married Married

Married

Married Married

Married Married

Married

Married

Married Married

Case No. 16 40–45 11–12

Case No. 17 25–30 6–10 Case No. 18 40–45 11–12

Case No. 19 30–35 6–10 Case No. 20 40–45 6–10

Case No. 21 35–40 6–10

Case No. 22 30–35 11–12

Case No. 23 40–45 6–10 Case No. 24 35–40 11–12

Case No. 25 45–50 13–14

Case No. 26 40–45 13–14 Case No. 27 35–40 11–12

Case No. 28 30–35 11–12 Case No. 29 40–45 6–8

Case No. 30 40–45 10–11

Case No. 31 40–45 13–14

Case No. 32 35–40 11–12 Case No. 33 35–40 11–12

2003 2004

2002

2001

2002 1999

Missing case 1994 1996

1993 2003

2001

2001

2001 1998

2004 1994

1999

No No

No

Yes

No No

Yes No

No

No No

No

No

No No

No No

No

2007 2007

2008

2009

2012 2009

2007 2002

1999

Missing case 1999 2009

2005

2003 2013

2005 1996

2004

Up to 30% Up to 60%

Up to 30%

Up to 70%

Up to 80% Up to 60%

Up to 40% Up to 100%

Missing case

4 years 4 years

6 years

8 years

10 years 10 years

13 years 6 years

Up to 70% Up to 50%

Up to 30%

Up to 60%

Up to 40% Up to 30%

Up to 30% Up to 50%

Missing case Up to 40%

Missing case 6 years 6 years

5 years

2 years 15 years

1 year 2 years

5 years

Toy shop Phonesand accessories

Vegetables Fruits and vegetables AC repairing Scraps of buildings Stationery, photocopy Perfume

Vegetables

Tailoring (thobe) Fast food Used home appliances (harras) Tailoring Barber shop (haircut) Used furniture (harras) Building materials Barber shop Telecom

No

No

Concerned No

No No

(Continued)

Locals and No South Asian Locals No Locals and No Foreigners

Locals

South Asians Locals and Foreigners Locals Locals

Bangladeshis No Locals and No Foreigners South Asians No

Locals and No South Asian Locals No

Locals No Bangladeshis No

South Asian No Locals and No South Asian

Locals

Married Married

Unmarried 2007

Married Married Married Married Married

Married

Married Married

Case No. 40 40–45 11–12 Case No. 41 50+ 11–12

Case No. 42 25–30 6–10

1–6 6–10 11–12 11–12 11–12

Case No. 43 Case No. 44 Case No. 45 Case No. 46 Case No. 47

Case No. 48 35–40 11–12

Case No. 49 40–45 11–12 Case No. 50 45–50 6–10

Source: Compiled by author

40–45 45–50 30–35 35–40 45–50

Married Married Married

Case No. 37 45–50 6–10 Case No. 38 40–45 10–11 Case No. 39 35–40 11–12

1996 2003

2003

1999 1992 2005 2003 1995

2000 2001

1989 2001 1997

2007 2000

Married Married

Case No. 35 30–35 11–12 Case No. 36 45–50 6–10

1992

Year of migration to Saudi Arabia

Married

Ranges Education Marital of ages (ears of status (years) schooling)

Case No. 34 40–45 11–12

Case number

Table 6.1 (Continued)

No No

No

No No No No Yes

No

Yes Yes

No No Yes

No No

No

Prior business experience (yes/no)

2006 2007

2014

2013 1999 2009 2011 2010

2009

2008 2010

2005 2005 2008

2014 2007

2008

Year of starting the business

10 years 4 years

11 years

14 years 7 years 4 years 8 years 15 years

2 years

8 years 9 years

16 years 4 years 11 years

7 years 7 years

16 years

Period worked as a wage worker

Up to 70% Up to 60%

Up to 20%

Up to 100% Up to 100% Up to 40% Up to 50% Up to 20%

Up to 50%

Up to 40% Up to 60%

Up to 30% Up to 50% Up to 30%

Up to 20% Up to 40%

Up to 70%

Phones and accessories Vegetables Motor workshop Toy shop Grocery Phonesand accessories Garments Plastic bag factory Electronics and mobiles Cafeteria Umrah service Grocery shop Sweet shop Halal chicken supplier Hardware, electrical Vegetable Meat shop

Contributions Nature of of personal businesses in savings to Saudi Arabia start-up capital

Do you feel unsafe to run businesses under kafala system?

No

No No No Concerned No

No

Concerned Concerned

No No No

South Asians No South Asians No and locals

South Asians and locals South Asians Bangladeshis Bangladeshis South Asian South Asians and locals Locals

Locals South Asians Locals and foreigners Locals Suppliers

Locals and No foreigners South Asians No Locals No

Clientele

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employer is not encouraged, compelling migrants to work on fxed wages for long periods. Faced with blocked economic prosperity or a low-wage trap, one of the lucrative options available to migrants is to start a business which is low in start-up capital but high in economic returns. Social pressure also seems to infuence respondents’ decisions to start businesses. For Bangladeshis, the decision to leave the home country to take up work elsewhere is not an individual project; the hopes and aspirations of family and extended families follow the migrant overseas; at root, migration is one strategy – along with marriage, education and housebuilding – through which individual migrants and their families attempt to reposition themselves in their society of origin (Rahman, 2017). In a similar vein, the perceptions of international migration, and the collective strategy that pins its hope on migrants, builds up social pressure on migrants working overseas to seek out businesses for better economic returns for themselves and their families. Generally speaking, the migrants who join in the temporary migration stream tend to be more able, better prepared and more inclined toward risk than those who stay home (Ullah, 2010). Rahman reports that Bangladeshi migration to the GCC countries is basically debt-fnanced migration, and the lenders of the funds for migration actually siphon off the bulk of migration (economic) returns (Rahman, 2015). It is reported that migrant families are forced to exploit valuable family resources to pull together the economic cost of migration, which, in turn, transfers labour migration into debt migration. Thus, labour migration to the Gulf states runs on debt, with migrants and their families indebting themselves in the migration process. Migrant indebtedness further encourages a risk-taking attitude among the migrants, with the migrants’ propensity to take risk also being refected in an entrepreneur’s own words: Taking risk is a part of a migrant life; when I paid over US$4,000 [$5,352] to come to Saudi Arabia by disposing valuable piece of arable land owned by my family, I took high risk. . . . I came to work as a construction worker. . . . My many friends are still working in construction sector. . . . I trusted my kafeel to start this business (grocery shop) with the money that I saved here (Saudi Arabia). I took this risk and this is why I and my family are better off today . . . A migrant entrepreneur (42), Madinah In general, migrants are more likely to strike out on their own and experience less aversion to the substantial risks that this course entails. The same characteristic also gives them an advantage in competition with locals. Surveyed respondents seemed satisfed with low profts because they calculated the economic returns in relation to Bangladesh. Respondents perceived their social status, as well as economic gains, in terms of the very different social hierarchies of their home society. They were more concerned with economic

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mobility in Saudi Arabia than with social status, because their reference point was not Saudi Arabia but Bangladesh. In a new migrant’s eyes, running a business is a compelling alternative to working as a wageworker, setting a role model for others and spurring more migrants to be entrepreneurs over time.

6.6 Resource mobilization Gathering the necessary capital to start a business is indisputably one of the biggest challenges in the process of business creation, especially for temporary migrant workers. Formal credit being inaccessible, migrant entrepreneurs use a number of sources to arrange the start-up capital for their businesses; for example, own savings (100 per cent), borrowing from friends (28 per cent), kafeels (24 per cent) and relatives (18 per cent), or other sources (6 per cent) such as informal credit with high interest, or arranging money from Bangladesh through the hundi9 system. Moreover, migrants use not only various sources, but also multiple sources; that is, they arrange the start-up capital from two or more of the previously mentioned sources. One of the prevalent sources of start-up capital is migrants’ own savings: migrants save in order to fnance their business. Savings are not only widely used as a source for business fnancing, but also a major contributing factor. For example, for 58 per cent of the migrants interviewed, their savings contributed between 41 and 100 per cent of the total start-up capital of their businesses (Table 6.1). Important friendship bonds are formed with other compatriot migrants on foreign soil, through shared experiences at work or through living in the same dormitories or worksites. Confronted by similar uncertainty and socioeconomic experiences, migrants build new relations with fellow migrants in the migration process. This newly formed friendship, shaped by common migration experience, sometimes becomes a valuable source for start-up capital: 28 per cent of surveyed respondents collected partial start-up capital from friends in Saudi Arabia. In addition to friendship networks, we also see limited use of relatives as a source of fnancing the business; 18 per cent of respondents borrowed a portion of their start-up capital from relatives in Saudi Arabia. Most kafeels do not invest in migrants’ businesses fnancially; they are mostly rent seekers, selling sponsorship rights for income. However, some kafeels in fact assist potential migrant entrepreneurs to open businesses by supplying fnancial capital for rental deposits (usually to owners of business places or shops), which is popularly known as ‘position deposit money’ (shop places). It was found that 24 per cent of respondents arranged a portion of their start-up capital from their kafeels. However, it was notable among respondents that they did not favour seeking fnancial investment from kafeels, since such fnancial investment would also involve additional monitoring of migrants’ businesses, as well as proft sharing. One of the

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downsides of such investment from kafeels is that it might confound the relationship, putting further strain on their asymmetric relationship.

6.7

Market conditions: from ‘immigrant jobs’ to ‘immigrant businesses’

As discussed previously, the opportunity structure for the development of migrant businesses primarily comprises market conditions and access to ownership (Waldinger et al., 1990). This section examines the types of businesses that Bangladeshi migrants are involved in, and their pathways to entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia. It is important to note that, even if market conditions are favourable for both co-national and mainstream businesses, the migrants must gain access to ownership of migrant-run businesses. This chapter discusses the pathways to migrant entrepreneurship instead of access to ownership because migrants cannot legally own businesses; this is further elaborated in the relevant section. For a migrant business to arise, there must be some demand for the goods and services it is able to offer. Some migrant businesses primarily serve compatriots’ needs, while others target locals and foreigners in the main market. Table 6.1 presents the different types of businesses that respondents were running in Saudi Arabia. This chapter identifes 26 types of businesses run by 50 selected entrepreneurs. However, this not an exhaustive list of the businesses they were running. Bangladeshis are involved in many other types of businesses, which this chapter could not cover due to a variety of constraints in the research process. We fnd diversity not only in migrant businesses, but also in their clientele, which comprise locals, fellow Bangladeshis and migrants from the Maghreb, Mashreq and Asia. Given the diversity in migrant businesses, as well as the composition of clientele, for the convenience of discussion, this chapter offers a three-fold classifcation of migrant businesses: businesses that serve locals, foreigners and compatriots; businesses that principally serve locals; and businesses that largely serve compatriots and South Asians. Some businesses that serve both locals and foreigners10 are: air conditioner repairs and maintenance; halal chicken suppliers; meat shops; motor workshops; perfume shops; telecoms and mobile accessories; hardware, printing and photocopy shops; sanitary and electrical products; and used home appliances/furniture (a special market called harras). Some businesses that target mainly local populations are tailoring houses (Thobe/Saudi attire), toy shops, book and stationery shops, building (construction) materials, painting, building scraps and laundry. Other businesses that serve principally Bangladeshis and other South Asian migrants are sweet shops, grocery shops, barber shops, luggage stores, paan shops, restaurants and umrah (pilgrimage) services. There is huge demand for rental houses across the country, mainly caused by the presence of large numbers of different groups of foreigners. The

174 Md Mizanur Rahman businesses that serve house-building needs – such as materials and renovation, paint shops (both selling pains and providing painting services) and scrap metal businesses, including construction scrap removal – are in high demand, both in building new houses or renovating old ones. Low-income group locals are especially in need of such services. As many of these migrant entrepreneurs have long worked in the construction industry, they are familiar with the market demands and technical know-how in the sector, giving them advantage over both small and large local enterprises in the sector. It is argued that the long-term dependency on oil revenues and oil-related industries have hindered the formation of a viable local SME (small and medium-sized enterprises) sector in Saudi Arabia (Kayed and Hassan, 2011; Albassam, 2015). The implications of the oil wealth are therefore far-reaching, and touch all aspects of the daily life of ordinary citizens in the country. Most relevant to this research are the attitudes towards work. Saudis seem to have become heavily dependent on the state, and are losing the urge to exploit their full potential (Burton, 2016; Kayed and Hassan, 2011). Indeed, dependency on the state has rendered a large segment of the Saudi population unwilling even to consider employment beyond the public sector. In contrast, since migrants come only with the aim of working and earning a livelihood, they tend to have positive attitudes towards work. Michael Piore, in his classic work Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies, identifed certain jobs that are dominated by immigrants, and remarked that locals have developed aversions towards these jobs because of their negative perception, as well as the branding of these jobs as ‘immigrant jobs’ (Piore, 1979). In Saudi Arabia, it is not only that jobs have been branded as ‘immigrant jobs’: we fnd both that it is migrants who do all the menial jobs, that locals have long shunned those jobs and also that businesses that are low-grade, low-rewarding, and low-threshold types are increasingly seen as ‘immigrant businesses’ and locals have developed an abhorrence against running such businesses. These are not status-consistent occupations for most locals. In Saudi Arabia, registered private-sector enterprises numbered over 1.9 million in 2012, and nearly 87% of these private-sector enterprises operate with fewer than ten employees, locally known as micro-enterprises (Alsheikh, 2015: 6). Micro-enterprises often entail long working hours, cutthroat competition and low profts, and target low-end customers such as low-income group locals and foreigners. Locals own the micro-enterprises, but they do not operate the businesses directly; they usually hire migrants to manage and operate them, entailing the exclusive presence of foreigners in micro-enterprises. As a result, this has further deteriorated the image and attractiveness of such businesses in the eyes of locals. Even if locals today chose to run such businesses for any reason, they would be unlikely to succeed alongside with foreigners. All these features have turned microenterprises into ‘immigrant businesses’ in the eyes of locals, entailing any future plans to attract locals into this sector almost unachievable.

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Pathways to migrant entrepreneurship

The private/public sector dilemma in Saudi Arabia – that is, that locals want to work in the public sector while, despite a high rate of unemployment among locals, foreigners are hired to staff the private sector – creates pressure on the government to embark on pro-national policies and ensure a higher rate of employment among locals in private sector. As early as 1969, the government introduced the Saudization campaign to ensure that priority is given to the recruitment of Saudis when hiring in the private sector (Alsheikh, 2015). However, the Saudization drive could not achieve its target (Koyame-Marsh, 2016; Alsheikh, 2015). As a result, in 2011, Saudi policymakers came up with a new and improved programme, nitaqat, in order to boost the Saudi share in private-sector employment. The main tool of the nitaqat system is visa control; it suspends the privileges of issuing, renewing or transferring visas for non-compliant companies (Alsheikh, 2015). At present, businesses are categorized into fve groups for nitaqat requirement based on the number of their employees (Alsheikh, 2015: 4–7; Koyame-Marsh, 2016; Sevilla, 2014). The companies that employ from 1–9 employees are considered micro-enterprises, from 10–49 as small enterprises, from 50–499 as medium enterprises, from 500–2,999 as large enterprises and more than three thousand as big enterprises. Of these different sizes of companies, it is only micro-enterprises that are exempt from the nitaqat or Saudization requirement. All surveyed Bangladeshi entrepreneurs were micro-entrepreneurs with fewer than ten employees and therefore were exempted from the nitaqat requirement. Among the surveyed Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, the vast majority had at most three employees, while about one in ten was run exclusively by migrant entrepreneurs themselves. Instead of full-time employees, many entrepreneurs made use of part-time employees, especially at peak hours or seasons. As mentioned previously, according to formal procedures, a migrant entrepreneur requires a kafeel to open a business. The kafeel secures the government approval for opening and running a business. It is important to remember that the kafeels offcially own the migrant businesses, and migrant entrepreneurs get employee status in their own businesses as per the kafala system. Francoise De Bel-Air offers a two-fold classifcation of kafeels: small or occasional kafeels, and big kafeels (De Bel-Air, 2011: 3). ‘Small’ kafeels operate within small-scale, person-to-person frameworks. However, ‘big’ kafeels usually set up national-level networks to apply for work visas. It is the small kafeels who assist potential migrant entrepreneurs to circumvent the legal barriers to running a business. Migrant entrepreneurs make an informal fnancial arrangement with kafeels which often involves payment of a fxed amount, mostly monthly, along with offering occasional gifts, free delivery of products and services on demand. In other words, the individual citizen generates disposable income by selling his sponsorship rights – this is

176 Md Mizanur Rahman indeed a means of additional income-generation for many ordinary citizens in Saudi Arabia (De Bel-Air, 2011; Rahman, 2012; Zahra, 2015). A potential entrepreneur’s frst task is to fnd, in the migrants’ words, a ‘good kafeel’. A good kafeel means someone who can be trusted in business dealings, who will not breach the informal contract, or who will not come to strip off business possession abruptly. In a question about whether respondents feel unsafe in doing business in Saudi Arabia, 88 per cent of them said that they do not feel unsafe in running their businesses because of the kafeel’s legal ownership of the business (Table 6.1). Surprisingly, only 12 percent of respondents expressed concern about their kafeel; they were worried that kafeels had the power to take over their businesses at will. However, they also mentioned: “we need to manage the relationship with kafeels”. Saudi Arabia, in the respondents’ opinions, is not the ideal place to run businesses for ordinary migrants, but they still consider Saudi Arabia a better place for migrant businesses than many other host countries, and certainly far better than their home country when it comes to doing business. Thus, the overall perception about doing business in Saudi Arabia indicated a level of comfort and contentment among respondents. The migrant business relies fundamentally on mutual trust and involves mutual obligations and understanding with the kafeel. Since the arrangement is informal and based solely on trust, the experiences of migrant entrepreneurs are also found to be mixed. The author found many cases in which respondents were extremely pleased with their kafeels; as one respondent stated, “my kafeel is like a feresta;11 he takes care of me and comes to help me whenever any problem arises”. Another respondent stated: “my business is a good source of income for my kafeel; so, he is always nice to me”. However, the author also found a few negative cases whereby the kafeel dispossessed migrants of their businesses, and they could not seek legal recourse. Thus, pathways to migrant entrepreneurship are contingent on trust and management of relationships; migrant entrepreneurship has fourished on this informal arrangement in such a way that it has become almost a norm.

6.9 Innovations in migrants’ micro-enterprises Broadly speaking, what transforms ‘migrant business’ into ‘migrant entrepreneurship’ is the deployment of innovations in businesses. As we noted previously, in Schumpeter’s classic analysis (1934), the raison d’être for innovation in businesses is to make profts; and, according to Swedberg (2009), innovation without proft is unviable. Thus, this section explores how and where migrants introduce innovations in their businesses. Drawing on the work of Porter (1998) and Schumpeter (1934), Ewald Engelen discusses where innovation may take place in migrant entrepreneurship in terms of product, process, marketing, sales, distribution, integration and co-operation (Engelen, 2001: 213–215). Given the nature of migrant businesses in Saudi Arabia, this chapter focuses on innovations in relation to products, sales and distribution.

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Product innovation in migrant businesses is found in several areas: creating new products, offering alternative products, introducing ‘old’ products at ‘new’ locations, and ensuring authenticity in products. Innovation in products takes a variety of forms, including in businesses that deal with grocery items, halal meat, halal chicken stores, restaurants, telecoms, fruits and vegetables, toy shops, mobile repairs and accessories, and hardware shops. Grocery shops area case in point whereby migrant businesses permeate beyond the co-national population. Realizing the demand for national and regional products, Bangladeshis have opened up grocery shops with products from South Asia such as bakery items, snacks, rice, culinary, confectionary, drinks, and so on. As a result, there is always something new as well as old products for Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Sri Lankan or Indian customers. Migrant entrepreneurs sell a variety of products from different countries in order to offer wider choices to South Asian customers and increase their clientele. In a similar vein, meat stores also sell products such as beef, lamb and mutton, and entrepreneurs sell meat products of different types and countries of origin. Frozen and non-frozen meats are also an option that local and foreign clienteles consider when they buy meat. Fresh meats are more expensive than frozen meats. Poultry shops have also the same varieties: local chicken and frozen and non-frozen chicken. Some migrant entrepreneurs buy poultry from local frms in distant locations at cheaper prices: this may give them competitive advantage over other poultry shops. Many of these poultry frms are staffed by migrants of Bangladeshi origin; as a result, migrant entrepreneurs sometimes get special deals. Bangladeshi restaurants primarily serve co-national migrants in different parts of the country, except in the holy cities of Mecca and Madinah, where they primarily serve Bangladeshi pilgrimages. Competition between co-ethnic restaurants is overcome by hiring experienced Bangladeshi cooks and offering various Bangladeshi dishes, especially different types of fsh and vegetable dishes. Innovation occurs at both levels: varieties of dishes and authenticity of dishes. Curries prepared by Bangladeshi cooks are regarded as authentic Bangladeshi dishes. Bangladeshi sweet shops, for example, face competition from Pakistani and Indian sweet shops; Bangladeshi sweet shop owners hire Bengali sweet makers from West Bengal in India to compete with others. Fruit shops sell different types of fruits and not necessarily from Bangladesh, India or Pakistan: fruits from Thailand and Malaysia such as rambutan and dragon fruit are also sold, and at high prices. Migrant businesses that deal with mobile phones and phone accessories, repair services, essential electronic products and hardware items are relatively high-end businesses for migrant entrepreneurs. Wholesale suppliers of mobile phones, electronic products and accessories deliver different models combining the relatively old and the very latest, and payment to the wholesale suppliers are made after sale under an arrangement called ‘payment after sell’. The strategy of ‘payment after sell’ reduces the investment costs of businesses for migrant entrepreneurs. Toy shops also have suppliers who

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offer ‘payment after sell’ schemes. As a result, migrant businesses can sell toys, phones and accessories, and other electronic products, at cheaper prices than mainstream stores. In addition, there are some unusual businesses that migrants take up in Saudi Arabia; for instance, barber shops, laundry, readymade garments, paan shops and tailoring. Barbers in Bangladesh are generally Hindus who take this occupation as a caste-designated occupation. Muslim barbers are not common in Bangladesh, except in some big cities. Migrant entrepreneurs identify the demand for barber shops especially from the co-national population. In contrast, laundry services are primarily used by locals. Migrant entrepreneurs open up laundries at convenient locations to attract locals. Bangladesh is famous for its ready-made garments; cheap and affordable ready-made garments are brought to sell to locals, compatriots and other South Asians. Paan is a preparation combing betel leaf with areca nut, lime and sometimes tobacco; it is chewed for its stimulant and psychoactive effects. People from rural Bangladesh and parts of India and Pakistan like to take paan a few times in a day: therefore, there is a huge demand. While Bangladeshis take paan with lime and areca nut, Indians and Pakistanis like to have paan with spices. Bangladeshi entrepreneurs introduce paan to different South Asian communities with their local favours. While paan serves foreign clienteles, tailoring shops attend mainly to local clienteles. Tailoring shops are particularly trained to make thobe, Arab clothing for men. Thus, Bangladeshi entrepreneurs make concerted efforts to increase the level of product differentiation by introducing product innovation to varying degrees. Regarding sales and distribution, spatial, temporal and modality strategies are particularly notable among migrant entrepreneurs. Spatial strategies include attempts to relocate frms for more rewarding markets (Engelen, 2001: 215). To most migrant entrepreneurs, location of business is particularly important; they set up businesses near popular places or in popular streets. Fruit and vegetable shops, and meat and poultry shops, are located in designated markets; grocery shops in populated areas; and barber shops, sweet shops, paan shops and restaurants in areas dominated by South Asian migrants. However, toy shops, photocopy service shops, cafeterias, telecom shops, perfume shops and other similar businesses are usually located in small shopping malls, or on roads and lanes where shop rental is relatively low. Some exceptional businesses such as painting, building materials, old home appliances, motor workshops, hardware, sanitary and electrical shops, or scrap enterprises are usually located outside the mainstream market areas with an intention to compete with the full-price markets. Temporal strategies refer to modifying selling or production hours (Engelen, 2001: 215). Temporal strategies for migrant entrepreneurs are tied to self-exploitation; they tend to open the shop earlier in the morning, by 8 a.m., and close at midnight. Some shops that are not located in shopping malls close their front doors for a few hours at noon. Given the temperatures

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during daytime, shoppers tend to come to markets in the evening; therefore, shops stay open until midnight. Some migrant businesses do not follow regular opening hours, such as painting shops, building construction frms, laundry, tailoring shops, chicken and meat suppliers, plastic bag suppliers and other supplier frms. These businesses are open for longer hours depending on the demand and the season – tailoring and painting shops, for instance, are usually busy during festive seasons. What makes migrant businesses more appealing to customers is that their services are available whenever needed, or at short notice all year round. Strategies that migrants employ to change the modality of sales and distribution are take-away services, tele-sales and home deliveries. Sweet shops, cafeterias and fast food shops are basically take-away businesses; customers do not require a place to sit as in restaurants. One of the convenient and widespread practices is to place orders for goods and services over the phone. Many migrants do not have time to go to grocery, meat or poultry shops because of clashes with working hours or lack of transport; they place their orders over the phone and goods are delivered at a convenient time, often without additional charge. Another service offered to Bangladeshis customers is ‘buy now and pay later’; as most migrant workers receive wages at the end of the month, or may not have money to pay at a particular time, this service benefts both customers and retailers. Hiring part-time employees during peak hours, instead of full-time employees all year round, is another strategy to cut running costs and make higher profts.

6.10

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the dynamics of Gulf migration by identifying the transition from migrant worker to migrant entrepreneur in Saudi Arabia and elucidating the development of migrant entrepreneurship in the migration process. Through constructing Bangladeshi migrant entrepreneurs’ trajectories from the qualitative data, the fndings highlight the dynamic nature of the migrants’ lives over time, accentuating the ability for trajectories to capture this dynamism. This chapter has noted that Saudi Arabia has maintained strict entry, stay and exit policies with regard to the management of low-skilled labour migration. The Bangladeshi entrepreneurs surveyed came to Saudi Arabia as migrant workers and toiled in different sectors of the economy for a considerable period before they transformed themselves into migrant entrepreneurs. However, the change in occupational status has not necessarily entailed a change in immigration status, as this shift still takes place under the framework of the kafala system. This chapter has addressed two important questions at the group level. The frst question concerns why migrants emerge as entrepreneurs in the labour migration process. The chapter reports that there is little opportunity for occupational mobility among migrant workers. Faced with the low-wage trap, uncertainty of work and potential deportation, they seek out alternative

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ways of realizing their migration dream. Migrants fnd the solution in microenterprise, which is known to locals as a low-grade, low-rewarding and low-threshold type of business – but to migrants represents something prestigious, and a potential source of higher economic returns. Apart from blocked mobility, migrants were keen to take up such businesses, despite the considerable risks, because of social pressure from family back home to stay longer in Saudi Arabia and uplift family members from economic stagnation. The second question concerned how migrants mobilize resources for business. This chapter found that personal savings are one of the crucial sources of migrants’ funds for business. Regarding opportunity structure, this chapter has discussed the two conditions for the development of migrant businesses: a niche in which Bangladeshi migrant businesses can viably function, and pathways to migrant entrepreneurship. This chapter has reported that market conditions are especially favourable for the development of migrant micro-enterprises in Saudi Arabia. Migrant businesses are diverse in nature, and so are their clienteles. This chapter has found that the long and sustained channelling of migrant labour has transformed micro-enterprises into ‘immigrant businesses’, with all its ramifcations. This chapter has discussed ‘pathways’ to migrant entrepreneurship instead of access to ownership, because under the kafala system, migrants cannot own the micro-enterprises. Low-skilled migrant entrepreneurs are barred from owning businesses in Saudi Arabia. However, being entrepreneurs, migrants overcome this legal and structural constraint by arranging a kafeel for immigration sponsorship and managing a mutually benefcial relationship with him. In such an informal arrangement, migrants are in a weaker position than the kafeel, exposing them to victimization. Yet regardless of ownership, the majority of respondents showed signs of comfort and security in the business environment in the country. The Saudi case suggests that Bangladeshi migrant businesses do not restrict themselves to co-national clienteles; the Saudi market conditions allow migrant businesses to serve local, co-national and co-regional clienteles, and Bangladeshi migrant entrepreneurs employ various innovative strategies to survive and prosper in the low-threshold market. This research has reported that the shift from migrant workers to migrant entrepreneurs takes place within the framework of kafala system only in a limited way. While the Gulf countries seem to realize the importance of migrant entrepreneurship, the shift from worker to entrepreneur is not formally recognized, although it is blatantly tolerated within the kafala framework. Migrant businesses are offcially owned by kafeels, and migrant entrepreneurs are considered employees in their own businesses, as per their immigration status. As a result, the system offers room for breach of informal contract and subsequent unfair treatment of migrant entrepreneurs. It is important to note that Saudi Arabia pursues considerably liberal policies to attract foreign direct investors and entrepreneurs (Burton, 2016;

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Kayed and Hassan, 2011). However, there is no transparent policy regarding migrant entrepreneurs in the country. Sociologically as well as demographically speaking, nationals in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are not in position to operate millions of ‘immigrant businesses’ proftably, demanding a realistic, inclusive migration policy encompassing new dynamisms in the Gulf migration. Saudi Arabia is undergoing radical transformation under the current leadership. The Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has pushed changes that could usher in a new era for the country. One of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s key projects has been ‘Vision 2030’, a wide-ranging plan to diversity the kingdom’s economy and reduce its dependence on oil. It is widely believed that if successful, ‘Vision 2030’ would transform the country’s economic model, making the private sector the engine of growth and jobs. Given the importance which Saudi Arabia’s visionary and charismatic crown prince attaches to economic diversifcation, it is imperative that leadership also fnds the best way to take migrant entrepreneurs on board and make use of their experiences to achieve economic diversifcation in the kingdom. The Gulf migration research and analysis needs to focus on the experiences of migrant labour in the Gulf with an adequate appreciation of social, cultural and economic context of the Gulf countries. It is imperative to note that over 25 million migrants in the six Gulf states are remitting over US$100 billion annually to their families and relatives in origin countries. Migrant remittances, transfers of cash and in-kindcontributions, are spent on food, education and healthcare, and other basic necessitates, thus contributing to the broader development process in Asia, Africa and the Arab world. These families are indebted to the Gulf nationals and states. With an increasing focus on the migration–development nexus, it is also important to examine the new developments in the Gulf migration such as the emergence of migrant businesses across the Gulf countries. Research on migrant businesses in the GCC states is still in its infancy, and much work is required to understand the emergence of immigrant entrepreneurship with an appropriate methodology and an appreciation of socio-cultural context of Gulf society. This chapter makes an early effort to explore the emergence of migrant entrepreneurship under the conditions of temporary migration in Saudi Arabia. I hope that this research will be of use to those many inspired voices who will continue to carry this line of research forward and contribute to the development of an economic sociology of Gulf migration.

Acknowledgements This research was conducted as a part of South Asian diaspora project, funded by the Humanities and Social Sciences Fund, National University of Singapore (NUS). I would like to thank Mr Imran Reza Mustak Ahmed, who assisted me in the data collection process in Saudi Arabia. Special thanks go to Prof Tan Tai Yong for his support and guidance.

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Notes 1 Compiled from data found in Gulf Labour Markets and Migration. http:// gulfmigration.eu/percentage-of-nationals-and-non-nationals-in-employedpopulation-in-gcc-countries-national-statistics-latest-year-or-period-available. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 The Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) keeps records on the outfow of emigrants from Bangladesh. However, it does not keep records on returning migrants, and as a result, the available offcial data only shows outfow of Bangladeshi migrants. Compiled from offcial statistics found in BMET website: www.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/stattisticalDataAction. Accessed 22 February 2017. 5 Compiled from offcial statistics on BMET website: www.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/ stattisticalDataAction.Accessed 22 February 2017. 6 The data is drawn from a UAE-based organisation, the CIPD Middle East, and Gulf Business news: www.cipd.ae/people-management-magazine/hr-newsopinion/saudi-arabia-bangladeshis and http://gulfbusiness.com/saudi-lifts-hiringban-bangladeshi-workers-report/. Accessed 13 May 2017. 7 As per Migration Policy Institute: www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/ charts/top-25-destinations-international-migrants. Accessed 2 April 2017. 8 ‘Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, Saudi-Arabia: Populations estimated by nationality (1974–2015)’: http://gulfmigration.eu/saudi-arabia-populationestimates-nationality-saudi-non-saudi-mid-year-estimates-1974-2015/. Accessed 30 March 2017. 9 Hundi is an informal funds transfer system widely practiced by Bangladeshi migrants overseas to transfer money from the migrant’s country to the home country, or from the home country to migrants’ host country or elsewhere (for details, seeRahman and Yeoh, 2008). 10 In the Gulf countries, migrants are often categorized as non-nationals or foreigners. Therefore, the chapter uses the terms locals and foreigners. 11 In general, Muslims believe that feresta, or angel, is the most trusted creation of Almighty Allah. All Muslims are directed to put faith in ferestas. Belief in ferestas is one of the six Articles of Faith in Islam. In Bangladesh and South Asia, people sometimes call righteous people ferestas because of the embodiment of qualities of ferestas in them.

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Rahman, Md Mizanur. 2017. Bangladeshi Migration to Singapore: A ProcessOriented Approach, Springer: Singapore. Rahman, Md Mizanur and Kwen Fee Lian. 2011. The Development of Migrant Entrepreneurship in Japan: Case of Bangladeshis, Journal of International Migration and Integration, 12(3): 253–274. Rahman, Md Mizanur and Brenda S. A. Yeoh. 2008. The Social Organisation of Hundi: Channelling Migrant Remittances from East and Southeast Asia to Bangladesh, Asian Population Studies, 4(1): 5–29. Ram, M. and A. Phisacklea. 1995. Being Your Own Boss: Ethnic Minority Entrepreneurs in Comparative Perspective, Work, Employment and Society, 10(2): 319–339. Rath, Jan. 2000. Immigrant Businesses: The Economic, Political and Social Environment, Macmillan: Houdmills. Sallam, A. A. E. A. and M. Hunter. 2013. Where Is Saudi Arabian Society Heading? Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice, 5(2): 141–157. Schumpeter, Joseph. 1934. The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry in Profts, Capital and Credit, Interest and Business Cycle, Harvard University Press: Boston. Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. 2014. Nationalisation Scheme (Nitaqat) in Saudi Arabia and the Condition of Filipino Migrant Workers, Journal of Identity and Migration Studies, 8(2): 7–23. Shah, M. Nasra. 1994. Arab Labour Migration: A Review of Trends and Issues, International Migration, 32(1): 3–27. Shah, M. Nasra. 2010. Building State Capacities for Managing Contract Worker Mobility: The Asia-GCC Context, in World Migration Report 2010, IOM: Geneva. Siu, Paul C. P. 1952. The Sojourner, American Journal of Sociology, 58(1): 34–44. Swedberg, Richard. 2009. Rebuilding Schumpeter’s Theory of Entrepreneurship, in Yuichi Shionoya and Tamotsu Nishisawa (eds.), Marshall and Schumpeter on Evolution Economic Sociology of Capitalist Development, Edward Elgar Pub.: Cheltenham and Northampton. Thornton, Patricia H. 1999. The Sociology of Entrepreneurship, Annual Review of Sociology, 25: 19–46. Ullah, AKM Ahsan. 2010. Rationalising Migration Decisions: Labour Migrants in East and Southeast Asia. Ashgate: London. Ullah, AKM Ahsan. 2014. Refugee Politics in the Middle East and North Africa: Human Rights, Safety and Identity, Palgrave McMillan: New York. Vora, Neha. 2011. Unoffcial Citizens: Indian Entrepreneurs and the State-Effect in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, International Labour and Working-Class History, 79: 122–139. Waldinger, Roger, Howard Aldrich and Robin Ward. 1990. Opportunities, Group Characteristics and Strategies, in Roger Waldinger, Howard Aldrich and Robin Ward (eds.), Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Business in Industrial Societies, Sage Publications: Newbury Park. Williams, Colin C. 2007. Entrepreneurs Operating in the Informal Economy: Necessity or Opportunity Driven?, Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 20(3): 309–319. Zahra, M. 2013. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, Explanatory Note No. 4/2013, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) Programme of the Migration Policy Center and Gulf Research Center: Geneva.

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Zahra, M. 2015. The Legal Framework of the Sponsorship Systems of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: A Comparative Examination, Explanatory Note No. 10/2015, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) Programme of the Migration Policy Center and Gulf Research Center: Geneva. Zhou, M. 2004. Revisiting Ethnic Entrepreneurship: Convergences, Controversies and Conceptual Advancements, International Migration Review, 38(3): 1040–1074.

7

From environmental disaster to migratory disaster The Omani network of Bangladeshi fshermen Marie Percot

7.1

Introduction

Except for the extensive work by M.M. Rahman, little research until now has been done on Bangladeshi migrants in the Gulf, and almost no qualitative studies. Little is known about who they are and about their condition of work and life abroad. Their exact number is not even known. Offcial data from Bangladesh only give a cumulative fgure of 7.1 million documented migrants between 1976 and 2015 (BMET, 2015). It is estimated that between four and fve million Bangladeshis would be living now in the Gulf countries, although these estimates are hazardous, considering the high numbers of undocumented workers (Rahman, 2011a). The frst country of destination is Saudi Arabia, followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Oman has become the third destination for Bangladeshis. Recently, Bangladesh has indeed become the frst sending country of migrants to Oman with – offcially – 704,254 individuals, before India and Pakistan (respectively, 689,201 and 235,769) (Financial Express, 2017). The increase in Bangladeshi workers is particularly striking since they were only 496,761 in 2013. International migration is regarded very positively by the Bangladeshi authorities for the remittances it generates (14.98 billion USD in 2017), but also as a means to mitigate the effect of climate change on rural employment (Government of Bangladesh, 2009). Yet, even if the government has initiated negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman – regarding labor recruitment, it has not been able until now to really negotiate the conditions of employment of its migrant citizens. The latter are, in their vast majority, unskilled migrants whose salaries are among the lowest, compared especially to Indians or Pakistanis (Rahman, 2011a; Kibria, 2011) and who most often fnd themselves in a very vulnerable situation in the destination country. This chapter intends to present and analyze the case of Bangladeshi fshermen from a small island of the Bay of Bengal (Hatiya) who are going by thousands to Oman to work again as fshermen. It is based on several feldworks in Bangladesh and one in Oman.1 It clearly explores a small migratory niche, but has the ambition to highlight the situation of many unskilled

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Bangladeshi migrants having chosen or having been driven to move abroad due to poor situations at home. The environmental factors at play in this case may very well be common in Bangladesh, a country which is more and more impacted by ecological stresses and disasters. In the same way, the networks the migrants from Hatiya are using in order to leave are certainly a paradigmatic example of a model which intrinsically generates a very high migratory cost leading to a high level of indebtedness. Out of a real control by the state, these networks also lead to a “risky” migration in countries where vulnerable migrants have concretely very few rights. The failure of a vast majority of Hatiya migrants, who come back home after having been deported from Oman and more indebted than before their departure, is undoubtedly not unique in Bangladesh, for leaving when you are very poor is always a real gamble. In the next section, I will present the situation in Hatiya and the characteristics of the candidates to migration to Oman. I will then explore the local networks organizing this migration. In the next section, I will analyze the situation of the migrants in Oman and the factors leading to almost unavoidable deportation. At last, I examine the consequences of this migration on the returned migrants and their family.

7.2 Hatiya, an island under pressure Hatiya is a small island in the Bay of Bengal, almost four hours away by boat from the mainland. The island has 452,463 inhabitants living on 371 km², i.e. a density of 1.219 inhabitants per km² (BBS, 2014). The frst striking view of Hatiya is the high number of working children compared to other places in Bangladesh, a clear sign of poverty. Hatiya is indeed ranked among the 10% of “worst” upazilas (districts) according to several factors concerning education of children (number of schools and teachers, school attendance rate, etc.) (BBS, 2014). The literacy rate just reaches 34.2%, compared to 51.8% for the whole country. Many young boys from the age of 6 or 7 start to work in small workshops and restaurants, or as helpers in the agricultural and fshing sectors. Young girls of the same age can be seen along the roads and village paths, constantly gathering in huge bags the fallen leaves for the kitchen fre. Although no statistics have been found, the number of children per family is obviously higher than in many other places in Bangladesh (the number of children my interlocutors had seems to corroborate this hypothesis).2 The weakness of family planning activities on the island, underlined by the local authorities, may be a factor in this regard. The lack of infrastructure in other sectors than education is also striking. One fnds only one hospital for the full island, and a small NGO clinic in the north which has just started two years ago. The only two tar roads are full of holes and it takes more than two hours by local bus to travel the 36 km from north to south. Many villages have no access to electricity and

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in the main market town – Uskali, where the supply comes from an old diesel generated plant – there is a daily cut from 1 a.m.to 10 a.m. Like many places in Bangladesh, and particularly the coastal areas, Hatiya is prone to several environmental disasters. First, the area is regularly hit by cyclones, leading to human and property loss in the region. For instance, in 1991, several thousand people were killed3 in Hatiya. It is still very much remembered by the islanders who are generally able to quote some victims they knew. Another cyclone hit the island in 1998, and still another one, Sidr, in 2007, killing fewer people in comparison but having a devastating effect on the land and property. The young age of the trees everywhere in Hatiya is a clear sign of this. Second, the island is prone to land erosion. It is an endemic phenomenon in Bangladesh, where it is estimated that nearly a million people per year are displaced after their house and land have been eroded (Rahman, 2009). In Hatiya, the erosion is particularly strong at the north of the island. According to the people living on this part of the island, it started in the 1970s, but the level of erosion has largely increased during the past 20 years, leading to the displacement of many people. Erosion is partly compensated by the emergence of new land in the south, thanks to alluvial deposit coming from the Meghna River. The accreted land belongs to the government (it is known as “khas land”) and is supposed to be distributed to landless people, with priority given to victims of erosion.4 Yet, if few people (around 100) seem to have been compensated for their losses and have be given some land on the neighboring island of NizunDwip (just south of Hatiya), the vast majority of displacees had to manage by themselves. People from the north, most of them too poor to invest in buying new land, have thus in large numbers moved to the south of Hatiya to occupy the newly appeared land. They now fnd themselves doubly vulnerable: although it is rare, they can face eviction at any moment and, most of all, these new places are particularly unsafe: the newly accreted land is not protected by embankments and, in case of a storm or cyclone, they would for sure be among the frst victims. To avoid this risk, the frst ones to arrive have gathered and built their huts on the embankments (also government property). These places are now overcrowded, with all the problems induced by promiscuity. There is no industry at all on the island, and the only economic activities are farming, fshing and small local business. Considering the size of the population and its steady increase, however, it is not enough to provide an occupation for each islander. The situation is a bit better at the fshing season, which lasts six months a year (although the very concentrated whole sale market leads to rather low purchase of the fsh), but once it is over, the competition over daily labor in the felds, the only jobs left, is tough. There is thus a high rate of unemployment, particularly among landless people. Very few people in Hatiya leave for the mainland or for countries other than Oman. It is due to the absence of networks for these destinations,

190 Marie Percot the islanders having few connections with the mainland. Almost all of the migrants are going to Oman. All the 199 migrants, ex-migrants or candidates to migration who I have interviewed were coming from landless families, some of them owing just the small plot of land on which they had built their hut. Among them, 70% were coming from the north of the island and had moved to the south following the erosion, in these last 20–30 years, of the small piece of land the family previously had. Among those people, none received any compensation from the state for their loss. So, the people from Hatiya going to Oman are, at frst, human victims of erosion. Most of them live on the embankments in precarious shelters. Few have access to amenities such as electricity or personal tube wells for water. All of my interlocutors were engaged as much as possible in fshing when it is the time. They were hired by a boat owner as laborers, often for the full season. According to them, their income during these months can be good if the fshing is good (up to 800 USD for the full season), and if the boat owner is not struggling too much with the loans he has contracted with the fsh wholesalers. As they are paid by a share of the fsh, it is rather uncertain all the more, as benefts may be drastically hampered by pirate attacks, a common event along the island’s coasts. Regardless, this income has to be used sparingly since, during the lean season (i.e. from November to April), the chance to fnd a job in the felds is rare for them; other workers who are engaged in cultivation throughout the year are often preferred to fshermen. The island being rather isolated, no network exists with the big Bangladeshi metropolises such as Dhaka or Chittagong which would give an opportunity to the poor islanders to fnd jobs, at least during the lean season, as it is often the case in many rural regions of Bangladesh (Khandker, 2012). To sum up, these people are really poor, having for many lost the bit of land they used to have, with no regular income and with no hope of betterment in the future. The only choice open to them is trying their luck in Oman; a chance that many fshermen take. As stated one of my interlocutors, about to leave for Oman: “Since we have lost our house [due to erosion], life is like hell. If I stay here, nothing will ever change. It will be misery forever. It is better to, at least, try something”. The men leaving for Oman are generally between 18 and 35 years old. Most of them are married and already have children. Like most people on the island, they generally live in a joint family. The vast majority have been to school, but for very few years only, so many are indeed practically illiterate. Almost all of them had started to work when they were not even 10 years old, generally as a helper on the boats or a helper in small shops or restaurants. This is often the same case for their own children or the nephews with whom they live. D. Turton (2003) warns against too simplistic an approach in terms of voluntary migration as opposed to forced migration in a binary opposition. He insists on the fact that even refugees may have some agency. And certainly, the fshermen from Hatiya decide at a certain point of time to go to Oman.

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Yet, considering their background and their lack of other opportunities, I argue that their migration is rather located, from the beginning, on the side of forced migration. Their conditions and their status in Oman (see Section 3) reinforce this argument.

7.3

Captains as recruiters: the local network of migration

The connection between Hatiya and Oman is not so old. It is thus possible to precisely trace its origin. I indeed met with the family of the frst islander who left Hatiya to fsh in Oman. The old man was too sick to speak with me, but his sons explained to me the story: in the 1980s, the family was poor. The father trying to fnd a solution for a better livelihood went once to visit a brother-in-law in the neighboring island of Sandwip.5 People of Sandwip had already, at that time, started to migrate to Oman. With the help of this relative, he got a visa and left in 1989 to work as a fsherman. His boss in Oman, according to the sons, “was a good man” and he was soon made a captain. Once a captain, he was in a position to hire fshermen on behalf of his Omani boss, and he naturally recruited in his village. At frst, he helped two of his sons to come, then neighbors. The sons also became captains and recruited other fshermen, as well. In the following years, the fshing sector was developing in Oman and, with more boats, more workers were needed. In this family alone, over 100 people were “given” a contract to Oman. A snowball effect set in: with more fshermen coming from Hatiya, more became captains; i.e. in a position to recruit new islanders – namely to sell them visas. In the meantime, Indians and Pakistanis, who were the frst to be hired as fshermen in Oman, had found new and more proftable networks in the Gulf. It is also the case for the people of Sandwip, thanks to the proximity of the island with Chittagong. People from Hatiya have not been able to do so, and going to Oman as a fsherman is still their only option to migrate. It is diffcult to assess how many they are, but considering the number of fshing boats in Oman and the high proportion of Hatiya people among the crews, an estimate of at least 20,000 people seems reasonable. Almost all of them come from Jahazmara, a southern village where are anchored the biggest fshing boats of Hatiya and where have gathered thousands of the victims of erosion. So, the recruitment is entirely done on a private basis: an individual selling the visa to another one. Such type of visa is called “Urro (i.e. fying) visas” as “it fies directly from a migrant broker in the Gulf countries to a prospective migrant in Bangladesh, bypassing local recruiting agencies and their sub-agents” (Rahman, 2011a: 12). The visas are sold for 2,500 USD in Hatiya, out of which 1,300 USD goes to the Omani boat owner who is the sponsor of the migrant.6 To this amount, the candidate to migration has to add the fees for the visa processing through a travel agent and the price of the fight ticket. Altogether, a job in Oman will cost no less than 3,500 USD, more than the average in Bangladesh that M.M. Rahman estimated at

192 Marie Percot 2,750 USD (Rahman, 2011a: 14). Yet, in Hatiya, there are more candidates than visas to be sold. I have, however, found no migrant, ex-migrant or candidate to migration who already had the capital to invest in the departure. All of them had to borrow a majority of the money. Such an investment and such a risk cannot be an individual decision, frst because it is very diffcult for an individual of this social milieu to borrow such an amount, and second, because most people in Hatiya still live in joint families in which elders (father, elder brothers) are the ones to take the main decisions for the household – and in this case, to start with, to decide who will go. The money is thus generally borrowed under the name of the father or of the eldest brother when the father is no more, but the full family is responsible for the debt. It is rare that the loan is taken from one person only, and I have not heard of many big money lenders in Hatiya. It is borrowed from several relatives and comparatively richer neighbors. The interest rate ranges from 30–50% per year. The full amount has to be paid before the departure of the migrant (hence long before the migrant may send any remittances). Yet, everybody in Hatiya told me that when it is to go abroad, it is always possible to borrow: “People will not trust you if you ask money for something else and they are very reluctant to lend money. But they know that if you are able to go to Oman, the money may take some time to come, but there will be some remittances anyway. So, they are ready to take the risk”. That is also how migrants or ex-migrants explain that to make another choice than Oman like, for instance, opening a small business is not an option since they would not get a loan for such a venture. The prospective migrants have no real idea about the contract they get (people in Hatiya only speak of “having a visa”, never of “having a contract”). None of my interlocutors has been able to show me a document describing his job abroad and its conditions. What they rely on is the given word of the captain family who is selling the visa, an oral contract being the tradition. Aminul, a man who spent seven years in Oman before being deported, explained: Here [in Bangladesh], we never work with contracts. If a man wants to hire you, he just tells it to you. If it is fne for you, you agree and that is it. If he has paid correctly, next time he asks you, you will work again for him; if the earnings were bad, you try to fnd somebody else. If there is a contract from Oman, what does it say that we do not know? The majis [captains in Oman] who sell the visas tell us that it is a job of fsherman in such place or another. If we get the paper from the sponsor [i.e. approval of the visa from the Omani authorities], it is good. And if, once in Oman, you have the job, there is nothing to say. It is OK. That is the way it works here. Although there are in Hatiya some conficts (around 10% of my interlocutors) about “bad visas”, generally for visas known as “free visas” in the

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Gulf,7 the vast majority of migrants had indeed found jobs as fshermen as promised once they had arrived in Oman. Their disappointment or distress rather comes from the conditions they actually meet with in Oman, far from their expectations. Yet, few of my respondents complained about the man who had sold them the visa, and none had the idea that a contract in due form could in any way protect them. Some of them claimed that they had indeed signed a written contract (at the travel agency when processing the visa), but it was a paper written in English and Arabic that they could not understand and for which they did not bother to get a translation. I could not get a proper idea about the existence or non-existence of such contracts, because the travel agents I contacted were very elusive about this topic, as were the state authorities I have met. Yet something is clear: as unskilled workers, the fshermen need to obtain an emigration clearance certifcate from the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) in order to go. They would be stopped at the airport before leaving in case they would not have this paper. Many times, migrants or ex-migrants have shown to me the Emigration Clearance Card that the BMET started to deliver to the Bangladeshi expatriates in 2010. Their migration has therefore been approved by the competent authorities, who either had not checked the contract or had not bothered to check if there was a contract. On the one hand, migrants of Hatiya rarely fnd as a sponsor the man who has sent the visa and a job as a fsherman as they had been promised; on the other hand, astonishingly, four different high-ranking offcials I met in Dhaka absolutely denied that there were any Bangladeshi fshermen in Oman. As I was showing to them pictures of Hatiya fshermen on Omani boats in Omani harbors, their only suggestion was that they had gone there totally illegally and that no protection could be given to such illegal migrants: “These are such people who give a bad name to the country”, concluded one of them. That corruption plays a role at each step of the migration process would be no surprise. Indeed, Transparency International Bangladesh in a recent report intitled “Good Governance in the Labour Migration Process” (TIB, 2017) identifes nine different steps where corruption takes place during this process. Some of my interlocutors stated that, for instance, they had been declared “unft” at the compulsory medical check-up, but later became “ft” after having paid 2,000 BDT. Such practices make the cost of migration higher; this also makes poor and illiterate migrants more vulnerable to dire exploitation in the country of destination, since migrants leaving without even the knowledge that they have a proper contract have no chance at all to claim their rights when problems arise be it about salaries or conditions of work. In a survey with a panel of more than 9,000 Bangladesh migrants, M.M. Rahman found that 58% of them had gone to the Gulf through the service of personal networks (i.e. with a “fying visa”), as is the case for Hatiya fshermen (Rahman, 2011a). According to him, these visas through personal networks would be less costly for prospective migrants since the personal

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bond would induce a reduced price compared to “cold” recruitment agents. One indeed observes the contrary in Hatiya. One can at least point out three hypotheses for the Hatiya case. First, the islanders have no access to any other network (the recruitment agencies of Dhaka or Chittagong do not even take the pain to send sub-agents to recruit in this remote place, and the islanders have very few contacts with the mainland), and so no bargaining power. Second, the very bad income that fshermen get in Oman leaves as the only solution to become a visa broker in order to get some beneft (as already said, that is only possible for those who have succeeded in becoming captain). Third, I will contest the assertion of M.M. Rahman that “fying visas” are cheaper since they come through bonds of kinship or friendship: considering the number of people ready to migrate to the Gulf, it seems to me that “fying visa” brokers have very often become brokers as others, ready to sell to the highest bidder – particularly when they are migrants with bad wages who, having no scope for other source of income – cannot afford to be too generous. It is the case in Hatiya, at least, that even brothers-in-law or cousins sell to their relative visas at the same price they would sell it to another person.8 It is indeed the opinion of my interlocutors – including those who had bought a visa from a relative – who, far from criticizing this behavior, claimed that it is exactly what they would do if or when they would be in a position to do so.

7.4 Living in Oman: from exploitation to deportation In the 1990s, the Omani government took some steps to develop its fshing industry. Apart from investment in new harbors, it started to subsidize the purchase of boats by small investors (WTO, 2008). Those boats, of approximately 15 meters in length, need a crew of 8–10 men and can go on the high see. At the same time, in a move to settle down its nomadic population and to provide them with jobs, it also largely subsidized the purchase of smaller boats for coastal fshing on which two or three people can work. In the frst case, a foreign crew can be hired, while in the second case, only Omanis are authorized to work. This was also part of the policy of “Omanization” which was supposed to reserve jobs for its citizens and to limit the importance of foreign labor (Ennis, 2015; Das and Gokhale, 2010). Actually, nomads did not turn into fshermen and, from the beginning, it is also foreign labor which was – and still is – illegally recruited for the small boats, known as “speed boats”. It is a general feature in Oman, where the failure of the indigenization of labor eventually induced more “illegal” migrants (Safar and Levaillant, 2017). Migration in Oman, like in all other countries of the GCC, is subject to the system of sponsorship called kafala. To quote from M.M. Rahman (2011a: 8): “In a kafala system, a migrant is sponsored by an employer who is a GCC citizen and who assumes full economic and legal responsibility for the employee during the contract period”. A worker in Gulf is thus totally

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dependent on his sponsor (kafeel) and is not allowed to take another job in case he has a problem with him, be it no payment of his wages or violence. If he does so, he becomes an “illegal migrant” in the eyes of the local law. In all the harbors I visited in Oman,9 the large majority of fshermen were Bangladeshi, most of them coming from Hatiya. The frst words told to me in Oman by migrants were indeed a story about humiliation: “We are not even dogs for them”; “To bear the life here, you need to forget that you have a brain and a heart”; “Since I have come here, my heart is like a stone”; “I thought I was a human being, but here we are no more than slaves [das in Bengali]”. Yet, although the job is tough and the boats lack any proper amenities, they did not complain so much about their conditions of work. As Ahmed, a fsherman in Oman since 2014, stated: “It is usual job for Hatiya people. When we are at sea, it is very physical, but as long as you are not sick, it is bearable. If we could get our proper share, the work in itself would be fne. Anyway, there is no other job we know”. The real problems arise for them once they are back to the harbor: problems of proper payment and potential abuse or violence. The bad treatment they get from their Omani kafeel is a recurrent grief. In every harbor I went to, I was given a depiction of the physical and verbal abuse the workers were suffering from, each time before I had even asked a real question. I was directly presented the migrant whose back was showing the scars of having been beaten by a hammer, another one whose leg was badly infected after a work accident and to whom his boss had denied any treatment, the young one who had been kicked in the stomach for not understanding a few Arabic words when he had been in Oman for less than a month, etc. The second unanimous complain revolves around the poor earnings they get. Fishermen have no fxed salary. They are paid by a share of the fshing once the expenses in fuel and food have been deducted. The boat owner then gets 50%; the rest is supposed to be equally divided between the crew members. The problem is that fshermen are denied any access to the fsh market. They are thus totally dependent on their sponsor, who, eventually, only give to the fshermen the amount he is ready to give. It seems that it is always much less than what the fshermen had estimated and much less than what they had been promised before leaving Hatiya. The annual amount my interlocutors acknowledged they have earned during their stay in Oman ranges from 500–750 Omani rials (1,300–1,950 USD). After their own expenses for food, housing, mobile phone, etc., it is a maximum of 1,200 USD that they can send home, but most often less: the average among my interlocutors was 740 USD per year (this has to be compared with the 3,000 USD they have invested in order to come). Not able to put their bad earnings on poor fshing, for they estimate that the fshing is good in Oman, they are clearly aware of the severe exploitation they are subjected to. Yet, they do not see how they could challenge their boss legally. It is true that it is diffcult for migrants to fle a case in Oman, as in any GCC country (Gardner et al., 2014). This is all the more true as the law (including international law) is not very clear about

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the wages of fshermen as well as on their conditions of work. In addition, none of them has a written contract to show. They, consequently, feel stuck in a situation that many of them compare to slavery (“We are like slaves here”, as I was often told). At their arrival from Hatiya, the vast majority of Hatiya fshermen indeed fnd as a kafeel the person who has provided the visa and who is the owner of the boat on which they will work; i.e. a “big boat” for which it is legal to hire foreign workers. They are thus “regular migrants”. The work permit, in Oman, is valid for two years. After this time, it can be renewed if the kafeel is willing to retain the worker. The renewal costs 200 Rials (520 USD) in administrative fees and it is a common practice now for the kafeels to ask the workers to pay this amount.10 To stay as a documented worker is thus another big investment if we compare it to the average remittances sent at home (1,500 USD for two years). The fshermen who had been paid regularly and not too poorly during the two frst years may prefer to ensure a more secure stay in Oman and to do it; the majority – i.e. those who could not invest more, who had too low, too irregular or no wages at all for a period of time and who, in addition, had a particularly disrespectful or violent boss – will rather choose to take the risk of becoming undocumented migrants in order to try to fnd a better place to work. It is most often by going to work on the small boats, something which is theoretically not allowed. They will consequently face deportation at any moment, but will get the possibility to bargain with their labor and a chance to get a better deal compared to the moment they were bond by a bad kafeel. This “advantage” of irregularity is a well-known phenomenon in the Gulf (Rahman, 2011a; Gardner, 2010). It is a strategy, although there are not many options, which is clearly carefully thought about by the migrants when they make the step toward irregularity: “Most of my friends work on speed boats and they are earning better. My malik[boss and sponsor, i.e. in this case, the owner of a big boat] is not a good one and I have not been able to send a lot [of money] at home. My family always complains: ‘What are you doing? Why don’t you send money?’. It is such a headache. So, although I am afraid of the police, after two years I decided not to renew my visa with this malik and to go working on the speed boats . . . It seems I am earning a bit better. Jameel, 21 years old, in Oman since 2012) The kafeel asked me to pay him 250 riyals for the renewal of my visa. He had always been cheating on our share . . . there was a possibility that he will also cheat me on the renewal. Some friends told me that they could fnd a job for me on a speed boat. It is better paid because if you are not happy you can go to another boss. So, I decided to take the risk. (Hussain, 41 years old, in Oman since 2005)

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I knew that my maji [captain] had some relatives he wanted to come to Oman by selling them visas. I was said he had discussed that with the malik. . . . So what chances I had he will renew my visa? I decided to go. (Sagor, 26 years old in Oman since 2011) As it is possible to see, three reasons lead the fshermen to take the path of irregularity: 1) the very bad wages they get as documented migrants – i.e. when working legally – and the possibility to get a bit better earnings when working on small boats; 2) the diffculty they have investing more money for the renewal of their visa, an illegal practice that seems nevertheless to be common in Oman, at least in this sector; and 3) the business over visas between Oman and Bangladesh: Omani sponsors request payment in order to provide a contract and a visa; it is usually an amount of 500 riyals (1,300 USD). The brokers who fnd the workers in Bangladesh, in this case the Bangladeshi captains, take their beneft in addition. It is thus more proftable for both of them to bring in new migrants than to renew the visa of a worker already there. It is diffcult to give accurate estimates regarding the number of fshermen who have become undocumented workers; one may however think that, apart from the ones who have succeeded in becoming captain, they are a majority after two years of stay in Oman. Three facts confrm this hypothesis: 1) the average time in Oman of the fshermen working on big boats (the only legal way) which, for two-thirds of the people I met, was no more than two years, indicating a large turnover with new migrants replacing the ones who had left; 2) the huge number of fshermen working on small boats, thus having become undocumented workers; and 3) the quasi-absence, in Hatiya, of people having come back willingly (i.e. they have returned only after deportation), regardless of age. If deportation may be used as a threat for all migrants, it is all the more an actual danger for undocumented workers. They have to constantly cope with a situation of “deportability”, to quote from De Genova (2013: 1188). Bangladeshi workers in Oman may even be more vulnerable than migrants from other nationalities. Safar and Levaillant (2017: 122) give a fgure of 59% of Bangladeshi nationals among the undocumented workers arrested in Oman in 2014 out of 21,190 people offcially arrested. The hunting for undocumented workers seems to have still increased if one believes the Omani media, which regularly inform of massive arrests in a move to calm down the resentment of the population toward a too high number of foreigners; a resentment which, to quote again from Safar and Levaillant (2017: 124), “is particularly oriented towards irregular workers, who are considered as being responsible for several socio-economic issues and are increasingly being criminalized”. Partly because of their high proportion among undocumented workers (but certainly also because of the menial jobs they are occupying), a racialized stigma is now especially attached to Bangladeshi workers considered as exemplifying the “bad” migrants.

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I will, however, argue that the Bangladeshi fshermen have no real other option than taking the path of illegality if one considers the structural violence they are experiencing, whether it is the system of visa business at the time of departure and at the time of its renewal, the debt it induced, the poor salaries they get, the abuse they are facing and the virtual impossibility of legally claiming their rights. I will also argue that taking the path of illegality is a form of resistance. To quote from Blunt (2018: 98), “illegal economic immigration by impoverished persons (. . .) is a legitimate form of infrapolitical resistance by subaltern agents confronted with intransigently unjust circumstances”. And, indeed, Bangladeshi fshermen feel very legitimate when they try to stay as much as possible in Oman for they have paid the price. As Hassan, living in Oman as undocumented worker for seven years now, stressed out: I have paid three lakhs11 to come here. I did not bargain and I am still paying on this amount. I am a hard worker. Why should the police be on my back as if I were a thief or a goonda [a thug]?Bangladeshi people have sacrifced a lot to come here. It is only justice that they can work peacefully and earn as much as possible. Staying as undocumented workers is nevertheless another challenge for the fshermen and a constant stress. They become very “precarious residents”, to use the words of Gibney (2009: 10). This stress was largely expressed by my interlocutors: “[The risk of being arrested] is always in my mind. There is not a minute where I am not afraid, because if I was caught, it would be the end of me. The debt is on my shoulder only and my full life would not be enough to pay back the debt”. Although they try their best not to be caught, the vast majority of them end up by being arrested.12 They are then sent to jail, as it is the rule in Oman, after a trial which they do not understand, having no access to a translator and no help of their consulate.13 After six months to a year of detention, they are eventually deported, once their family back home has sent the money to pay the fne they have been sentenced to and which need to be paid for their release. After a few years of hardship, bearing the shame of having been to prison and of fnancial failure, they are back to Hatiya. If we except the few who got the chance to become captains and, thus, to enter the visa business, none of the men I have met had been able to clear the debt which was taken for the departure to Oman. To stay as long as possible in Oman was, however, an important challenge, for as bad as it can be, their earnings in Oman are more than what they can expect once back on the island.

7.5 Consequences in Hatiya: returned migrants and prospective migrants We try to stop them, but they want to go. They say that Allah may help them to fnd a good malik [master, boss]. And so, they go; and we let them go because we need food, because here we don’t have enough. Here they have

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no work and we have no land. And so, we, mothers, also start to hope that Allah will help them and that one day they will be able to buy some land to work on. If they were getting their fair share, it would be enough for us. If those people were thinking that they have crossed so many rivers out of need, they would help them, but they just don’t think about it.

These are the conclusions of Hasina, the mother of a 28-year-old son who was about to leave for Oman. As the words of Hasina show, people in Hatiya are aware of the hardship that fshermen going to Oman are facing; they know that not much in remittances will be sent to the village, and they can observe all around them how the returnees and their family are still struggling with the debt contracted in order to go. For it is clear that for most migrants, the stay in Oman has turned into a detrimental experience. This has not been enough to stop people leaving. As was shown in Section 1, the potential migrants to Oman are people who do not have many options. As they say, by staying in Hatiya, nothing will ever change for them. To go to Oman offers at least a hope: the chance to become a captain. Families who have a father or a son as a captain in Oman are not rich,14 but they have at least been able to insure a better livelihood to their family. Yet, no more than one migrant out of 100 becomes a captain in Oman. It is thus a very risky gamble and this is exactly how people feel it: “I have played and I have lost” is a comment that several ex-migrants made.15 I met with Anisul Rahman, who is a Union16 member of the village of Jahazmara for a ward which counts many migrants to Oman (half of the poor households of this ward would have somebody in Oman). His opinion was clear: “Here, only the poorest go, as a desperate move. In the end, it is almost always more debts for the family”. He admitted that the Omani network has brought some development in the South of Hatiya (more small shops and motorbike taxis, more solar panels and tube wells for water), thanks to the remittances of so many migrants. Yet, he remarked that the benefciaries, except for the captains, where not the migrant families, but the ones who had lent money. The price of this “thin layer of development”, to follow an often-used expression in Bangladesh, is however high not only for the migrants themselves, but also for the local society. The chairman of the same village thus explained: The problem is that since this Omani network has developed, we face many conficts. As a Union member, I am constantly called to calm down people. The quarrels are mainly about visa selling and debts, but there are also many family conficts. When migrants leave, many of them tell me “Please, Union member, take care of my family, watch upon my wife”, but there is nothing much I can do. This migration trend is not good for our community. The poor remittances of the migrants being not enough for the repayment of the debt, the families of migrant or ex-migrant have the diffcult task of keeping their lenders waiting by paying a bit of money from time to time.

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Considering their poor income and the high rates of interest, this is an endless process. As they generally owe several lenders, they may also repay the full amount to one and postpone the payment to another one who is less pressing or less threatening. This leads to conficts even between relatives and close neighbors which may end up in violence. It seems that women are particularly harassed by lenders looking after their money since they are constantly at home: insults and curses are common affairs, which are taken very badly in this society where the question of honor (ijjat) and shame (lajja/ sharam) is so important (Mandelbaum, 1993; Karim, 2011). The visas are another source of conficts. Cases of people having paid for a visa (since the full amount has to be paid in advance) and having to wait for months or not receiving any is not so rare. It is not clear if there is a real intention of cheating when a visa that has been bought does not arrive to the one who has paid for it. The most probable answer is that the seller family (with a member being captain in Oman) has sold the visa too early – i.e. just on an oral promise from the Omani sponsor that he will need more workers – or it can be that the Omani sponsor has changed his mind about the worker he wants to hire. Of course, people who have invested so much in order to go want their money back if there is no visa at the end. Although it seems that a written agreement is often made between the seller and the visa buyer, stipulating the price which has been paid, this paper has hardly any legal value. Regardless, villagers in Bangladesh rarely resort to the justice system altogether, because it is costly, corrupted and is plagued by incredibly long delays (Zafarullah and Siddiquee, 2001; Abu, 2004). Such conficts over debts or visas are thus mainly addressed by village arbitration councils known as “salish” which are a form of confict resolution through mediation (Das and Maru, 2011). “Honorable” men of a village – i.e. elder ones, Union members and local religious leaders – form this type of council. Their role is to try to settle the dispute. According to the salish members I have been able to meet, however, these conficts are diffcult to resolve in a fair way: the debt is due, the lenders are not so rich and the debtor obviously too poor to pay; the money of the visa which has not come has often been already spent, while it is diffcult to decide if there was an intention of cheating. At the end, both parties most often leave the local court being unsatisfed. The migration to Oman has also an impact on the women left behind. Different studies have shown a positive aspect of migration on women left behind in term of standard of living as well, as in terms of empowerment (Gulati, 1993; Hadi, 2001; Archambault, 2010). The case of Hatiya shows a counter example. Almost all of the migrant wives live in a joint family. In these families, it is the father or the brothers-in-law who manage the remittances that the migrant sends at home when he is able to send some. Women have no say in this matter. Furthermore, they are fragilized in two ways. As the female neighbor of a migrant wife remarked, for instance: “Poor Nazreen has lost her gold in order to gather part of the money to send her husband.

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Only her nose ring is left”.17 This gold, given as a dowry by the parents of a daughter at the time of her wedding is apparently often sold to help for the departure of a migrant. Even if it is a bit artifcial to consider that the woman has a real control over this property, it is however a very coveted asset of the village women. Having lost “one’s gold” is also having lost some status in the local community. But worse than that, migrant wives and their children may be sent back to their parents if their husband fails to send enough or no money at all. Fatima, speaking of a cousin of her, described a typical case: For two years, her husband has not sent any money. There are three children. For some time, the brothers have taken care of them all, but they cannot manage anymore with the debt and so many mouths to fed. This is a year now that this daughter-in-law is with her father. She took the children with her. It is diffcult to assess the proportion of migrant wives who are suffering such a destiny since it is considered as rather shameful by the in-laws, as well as by the wives’ parents, but such effect of migration on women has regularly been described by the people I met in Hatiya. Considering the poverty of the joint family they live in, it is also not so surprising. At last, I shall consider here the consequences of migration on returned migrants. The hardship experienced in migration, ending up with a stay in jail and deportation, and the failure of their plans abroad, are certainly a real trauma for these men from which it is diffcult to recover. The position of losers is also not so easy to bear, even if in Hatiya the failure of a migrant is rarely explained by his incompetence, but rather by his lack of luck. Those who go or have been able to go certainly get some prestige for having been abroad,18 even when they have failed to earn money, but the general judgment is also stern. Here are, for instance, some comments which were made in the margin of discussions I had with ex-migrants: “Look at him, he came back with nothing. This year, he was not even able to work as a peon, but next year he will be cutting mud”19; “Before going abroad, he had been captain for two fshing seasons here. Now, he will be happy to be a helper on a boat”; “What will he do? See, he will remain idle”; “Those Omani guys [ex-migrants], they are not ft for the jobs here anymore”. Indeed, most of the ex-migrants I met in Hatiya – all of them deportees – had been unemployed for two or three years following their return. They had different explanations: poor health, nervous breakdown, lack of job opportunity for them, etc. After this time, all of them acknowledged that they had not been able to get jobs that will secure the income they had before going to Oman. The unemployment or the poor earning of the ex-migrants, here again, generates confict inside the family itself. Brothers who have stayed in Hatiya and who are still paying for the debt contracted for the departure of the migrant cannot take so easily the failure of their kin in whom they had invested all of their hope.

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7.6 Conclusion Some studies show cases of successful migration to the Gulf, even in a context strongly limiting the rights of foreign nationals (Percot, 2006; Syed, 2007; Osella and Osella, 2009; Venier, 2016). All of them deal with skilled or semi-skilled workers or with entrepreneurs. The beneft of this migration for unskilled workers is a lot more balanced (Rajan and Sunkendran, 2010; Rahman, 2011b; Gardner, 2012; Sahoo and Goud, 2015). In the case of Hatiya, migration to Oman can even be considered as a disaster. Agustín (2003: 30) warns against “a growing tendency to victimize poor people, weak people, uneducated people and migrant people” and suggests to rather better consider their agency. There is no reason, indeed, to minimize either the rationality of Hatiya fshermen when they decide to leave or their ability to cope with the many traps they encounter from then on. Migrant fshermen and their families surely use as much as possible the “weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1985: 21) with a lot of bravery, imagination and determination. But as Farmer (2004: 315) remarks, “structural violence is structured and ‘structuring’. It constricts the agency of its victims”. Once migrants are trapped abroad, not able to send signifcant remittances to their families, the notion of agency and choice become more questionable. The case of Bangladeshi fshermen in Oman rather leads to highlight how debt contracted to leave adds to the perverse effects of kafala, especially when it obviously pushes migrants toward an illegal status and deprives them of rights and freedom. As J. O’Connell Davidson writes: “The vulnerability of migrant-debtors . . . to exploitation and coercion is a political construction” (2013: 1). To mainly consider the decisions of migration as individual ones, without considering the local political context (at home and abroad), may lead to understatement of the responsibility of states in the situation migrants have to face before and after their departure. For instance, in Hatiya, if piracy were stamped out by the coastguards, if landless people were attributed land as they are theoretically entitled to, if wholesale trade of fsh was regulated, fewer fshermen may be ready to leave, knowing how diffcult it will be for them in Oman. It is, at least, reasons they quote for migrating: if the business over visas was better controlled, migrants would not be trapped in debts for years and thus trapped in the destination country. Similarly, the hardship Bangladeshi fshermen have to bear in Oman is a result of a policy regarding foreign labor which institutionalizes exploitation or, at least, leaves workers without protection against it. When people in Hatiya decide, as they say, to bet everything on possibly “better luck” abroad, they are certainly aware of the risks, but have a very limited power about the outcomes of this decision, left alone as they are to cope with them. Van Hear (2014: 101) remarks that “the capacity for a would-be migrant to navigate the international migration order will be largely shaped by his or her endowments of economic and social capital, or the amount of economic,

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social, and other capital a would-be migrant can call upon”. The migrant fshermen of Hatiya are poorly educated, have no economic capital at all and an access to a single network in order to go. In these conditions, their chances of success are more than constrained: they are near to zero. One can, without too much risk, make the hypothesis that most Bangladeshis coming from the same social background who migrate in the Gulf face a very similar situation. Finally, as I have shown, a majority of the Hatiya migrants were victims of erosion. Dun and Gemenne (2008) have noted that an environmental disaster is rarely the only driver of migration, and it is indeed the case for the fshermen who combine different disadvantages. Yet, erosion – and the lack of compensation for it — can be considered in this case to be at the root of a path leading to migration. Here again, this could be the case of many Bangladeshi migrants, whether they have been victims of erosion, salinity or other of the many possible environmental disasters which affects Bangladesh.

Notes 1 Five months altogether in Bangladesh and one month in Oman, between 2014 and 2018. 2 Most people older than 40 who I met had from fve to eight children. The fertility rate of Bangladesh is 2.1 per woman (World Bank data for 2015). 3 The exact number is not known for Hatiya, but this cyclone killed 150,000 people in Bangladesh. 4 The 1987 Land Administration Manual recognizes the right of landless families to 2 acres each of unoccupied khas land (governmental land). The same year, an order of the Ministry of Land stated that the households affected by riverbank erosion would get priority among the landless for the distribution of such land. Yet, these regulations are poorly implemented (Rahman, 2009; Abrar and Azad, 2004). 5 It takes fve hours by boat to reach Sandwip from Hatiya. Relations between the inhabitants of the two islands are thus not so frequent. Yet, marriages are sometimes arranged between families of Sandwip and Hatiya whose fathers are fshermen and get a chance meet with their boats during the fshing season. 6 According to several interlocutors, the price of the visas was cheaper in the 1990s and the frst decade of the 2000s since, at that time, the Omani bosses were still not asking for money when proposing a visa. 7 The “free visa” has no offcial existence: a Gulf citizen who does not really need a worker nevertheless asks for a visa under a false contract. Once in the receiving country, the migrant has to fnd his own job (i.e. with another employer) and, having found a job or not, he has to pay a monthly amount to the offcial sponsor (in Oman, it is generally between 26 and 52 USD). To quote from Rahman (2011a: 14), “a ‘free visa’ is legal but, paradoxically, as soon as a free visa holder starts working for others, he becomes illegal by law and vulnerable to deportation” if he is caught by the police during working hours. 8 The only persons in Hatiya to whom a visa is provided for free are sons or brothers; something which makes sense since, as a joint family, they generally live on the same budget for large expenditure. 9 During the feldwork I carried on in Oman in 2015, I visited the harbors of Sur, Al Ashkarah, Masirah Island and Duqm.

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10 The older migrants remarked that in the 1990s, the kafeels used to pay themselves this amount, as they are legally bound to. The ease of getting visas for new migrants seems to beat the origin of this new practice. 11 1 lakh is 100,000. 12 The migrant fsherman I met in Oman who had been able to stay for the longest time as undocumented workers had been there for 18 years; most migrants had absconded from their kafeels two to three years before. In Hatiya, the 150 returned migrants I met, almost all them but two being deportees, had stayed as undocumented workers for 3–5 years. 13 None of my interlocutors ever got the help of the Bangladeshi consulate at the time of their trial or during their imprisonment. 14 The only relatively well-off family I have met was the one I spoke about in Section 2: they are an exception for they had succeeded in having three of its members becoming captains, consequently in a position to have sold many visas. 15 One also has to consider that fshermen of Hatiya are used to living in a constant risk, whether it is from environmental hazard (erosion, cyclones), the sea (potential bad fshing season, attacks by pirates), health problems without money to solve it, etc. 16 The union is the smallest administrative unit in Bangladesh. 17 As a symbol of being married, Bangladeshi women traditionally wear a small gold nose ring. 18 The migration to Oman has in a way become a sort of rite of passage, as described by Osella and Osella (2000) and Monsutti (2007). 19 To carry earth in order to build paddy feld dikes, embankments or to dig ponds is a job occupied by many poor people after the harvest season. Poorly paid and particularly exhausting, this job is also a symbol of helplessness.

References Abrar, C. R. and Azad, S. N., 2004. Coping with Displacement: Riverbank Erosion in North-West Bangladesh, RDRS/North Bengal Institute/RMMRU, Dhaka. Abu, E. S., 2004. “Administrative Reform in Bangladesh: Three Decades of Failure.” International Public Management Journal, Stamford, 7(3): 365–384. Agustín, L., 2003. “Forget Victimisation: Granting Agency to Migrants.” Development, 46(3): 30–36. Archambault, C. S., 2010. “Women Left Behind? Migration, Spousal Separation, and the Autonomy of Rural Women in Ugweno, Tanzania.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 35(4): 919–942. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 2014. Bangladesh Population and Housing Census 2011. National Report Volume-3. Urban Area Report. August. Blunt, G. D., 2018. “Illegal Immigration as Resistance to Global Poverty.” Raisons Politiques, (1): 83–99. BMET, 2015. www.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=20 (retrieved 11/05/2015). Das, K. C. and Gokhale, N., 2010. Omanization Policy and International Migration in Oman, Middle East Institute. www.mei.edu/content/omanization-policy-andinternational-migration-oman (retrieved 05/08/2017). Das, M. B. and Maru, V., 2011. Framing Local Confict and Justice in Bangladesh. Policy Research working paper; no. WPS 5781. World Bank. De Genova, N., 2002. “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday L.” Annual Review of Anthropology, 31: 419–447.

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De Genova, N., 2013. “Spectacles of Migrant Illegality: The Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of Inclusion.” Journal of Ethnical and Racial Studies, 36(7): 1180–1198. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/fertility/ world-fertility-patterns-2015.pdf Dun, O. and Gemenne, F., 2008. “Defning Environmental Migration: Why It Matters So Much, Why It Is Controversial and Some Practical Processes Which May Help Move Forward.” Exodesécologiques, Revue Asylon(s), 6 November. www. reseau-terra.eu/article847.html (retrieved 22/09/2018). Ennis, C. A., 2015. “Between Trend and Necessity: Top-Down Entrepreneurship Promotion in Oman and Qatar.” Muslim World, 105(1): 116–138. Farmer, P., 2004. “An Anthropology of Structural Violence.” Current Anthropology, 45(3): 305–325. Financial Express, 2017. “Foreign Workers in Oman: Bangladesh N° 1.” 8 April. www.thefnancialexpress-bd.com/2017/05/08/69630/Foreign-workers-in-Oman:Bangladesh-no-1 (retrieved 18/09/2018). Gardner, A., 2010. “City of Strangers.” In Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrein. ILR Press, 216 p. Gardner, A., 2012. “Why Do They Keep Coming? Labor Migrants in the Gulf States.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, M. Kamrava and Z. Babar (eds.), C. Hurst & Co Publishers, London, 266 p. Gardner, A., Pessoa, S. and Harkness, L., 2014. “Labour Migrants and Access to Justice in Contemporary Qatar.” LSE Middle East Centre. http://soundideas. pugetsound.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4291&context=faculty_pubs (retrieved 31/08/2017). Gibney, Matthew, 2009. “Precarious Residents: Migration Control, Membership and the Rights of Non-Citizens.” Human Development Research Paper, 2009/10, UNDP, New York. Government of Bangladesh, 2009. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Adaptation Plan. www.moef.gov.bd/climate_change_strategy2009.pdf (retrieved 18/09/2018). Gulati, L., 1993. In the Absence of Their Men: The Impact of Male Migration on Women, Sage Publication, New Delhi, 176 p. Hadi, A., 2001. “International Migration and the Change of Women’s Position among the Left-Behind in Rural Bangladesh.” International Journal of Population Geography, 61: 1099–1220. James, C. S., 2008. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, Yale University Press, Business & Economics. p. 392. Karim, L., 2011. Microfnance and Its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Khandker, S. R., 2012. “Seasonality of Income and Poverty in Bangladesh.” Journal of Development Economics, 97(2): 244–256. Kibria, N., 2011. Muslims in Motion: Islam and National Identity in the Bangladeshi Diaspora, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ and London, 167 p. Mandelbaum, D. G., 1993. Women’s Seclusion and Men’s Honor: Sex Roles in North India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, University of Arizona Press. Monsutti, A., 2007. “Migration as a Rite of Passage: Young Afghans Building Masculinity and Adulthood in Iran.” Iranian Studies, 40(2): 167–185. O’Connell Davidson, J., 2013. “Troubling Freedom: Migration, Debt and Modern Slavery.” Migration Studies, 1(2): 176–195.

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Osella, F. and Osella, C., 2000. “Migration, Money and Masculinity in Kerala.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 6(1): 117–133. Osella, F., and Osella, C., 2009. “Muslim Entrepreneurs in Public Life between India and the Gulf: Making Good and Doing Good.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 15: 202–221. Percot, M., 2006. “Indian Nurses in the Gulf: Two Generations of Female Migration.” South Asia Research, 26(1): 41–62. Rahman, M. M. (ed.), 2009. Life on a Swing: Human Rights of the Riverbank Erosion Induced Displacees, ELCOP, Dhaka, 219 p. Rahman, M. M., 2011a. “Recruitment of Labour Migrants for the Gulf States: The Bangladeshi Case.” ISAS Working Paper n°132, September. www.isas.nus.edu.sg/ ISAS Reports/ISAS Working Paper 132-email – Recruitment of Labour.pdf (retrieved 03/08/2017). Rahman, M. M., 2011b. “Does Labour Migration Bring about Economic Advantage? A Case of Bangladeshi Migrants in Saudi Arabia.” ISAS Working Paper n° 135. Rajan, S. I. and Sunkendran, S., 2010. “Understanding Female Migration: Experience of Housemaids.” In Governance and Labour Migration: India Migration Report 2010, S. I. Rajan (ed.), Routledge, New Delhi, pp. 182–195. Safar, J. and Levaillant, M., 2017. “Irregular Migration in Oman: Policies, Their Effects and Interaction with India.” In Skilful Survivals: Irregular Migration to the Gulf, P. Fargues and N. Shah (eds.), Gulf Research Centre, Cambridge, pp. 115–134. Sahoo, A. K. and Goud, T. C., 2015. “Development and Distress: A Study of Gulf Returnees in Andhra Pradesh.” In Diaspora, Development and Distress, A. K. Sahoo (ed.), Rawat Publications, Jaipur/New Delhi/Bangalore/Hyderabad/ Guwarhati/Kolkata, pp. 201–215. Syed, A., 2007. “Go West Young Man: The Culture of Migration among Muslims in Hyderabad, India.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33(1): 37–58. Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), 2017. Good Governance in the Labour Migration Process: Challenges and the Way Forward, 19 p. www. ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/images/2017/ExecutiveSummary_Migration_English.pdf (retrieved 04/08/2017). Turton, D., 2003. Conceptualizing Forced Migration, University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Center, Working Paper n° 12. www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/ working-paper-series/wp12-conceptualising-forced-migration-2003.pdf (retrieved 19/09/2018). Van Hear, N., 2014. “Reconsidering Migration and Class.” International Migration Review, 48: 100–121. Venier, P., 2016. “Spatial Mobility and the Migratory Strategy of Kerala’s Immigrants in the United Arab Emirates.” In South Asian Migration to Gulf Countries: History, Policies, Development, P. C. Jain and G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Routledge, India, pp. 141–156. World Bank, 2015. World Fertility Patterns 2015, Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. WTO, 2008. Examen des politiques commerciales. Rapport du secrétariat: Oman. www.wto.org/french/tratop_f/tpr_f/s201-00_f.doc (retrieved 01/09/2018). Zafarullah, H. and Siddiquee, N. A., 2001. “Dissecting Public Sector Corruption in Bangladesh: Issues and Problems of Control.” Public Organization Review, December, 1(4): 465–486.

8

Diaspora volunteering A tool for development or a channel for diasporic (re)engagement with countries of origin – a case study from Nepal Nisha Thomas, Matt Baillie Smith and Nina Laurie

8.1

Introduction

Since the turn of the 21st century, there has been a renewed interest and recognition among policy makers, academic researchers, development workers and diasporic communities themselves in the potential role diaspora can play in the development of their countries of origin (De Haas, 2009c, 2009a; Faist and Fauser, 2011; Terrazas, 2010). Historically, emigration was viewed as a consequence of underdevelopment or failure of a state’s economic policies, and the resultant brain drain, as further causing poverty and underdevelopment in countries of origin (Chaulagain, 2012; Dean, 2011; Faist and Fauser, 2011), but this negative view has changed over the past few decades. A more transnational approach to mobility and migration (Dean, 2011) has moved beyond a traditional, binary focus on movement – from the place of origin to place of settlement – to one that acknowledges the manifold processes, movements and exchanges of ideas, information and people within contemporary migration. This then presents a new perspective on diaspora as actors with transnational networks, links and connections, which provide a foundation for different and potentially more effective means of contributing to homeland development. As a result, state and non-state actors are now working more closely with diaspora communities to see how diaspora skills, talents and experiences could be mobilised and channelled more effectively for development in both their countries of origin and settlement. Diaspora communities are increasingly being portrayed and celebrated as “direct bearers of developmental objectives, reaching places to which other development machinery has little access” (Sherraden et al., 2008, p. 104). The resurgent interest in diaspora and their development potential is undoubtedly caused by the growing number of international migrants worldwide and the fnancial remittances they transfer back to their countries of origin. It is estimated that in 2017, the number of international migrants reached around 258 million, and the amount of offcially recorded remittances transferred to developing countries increased from US$81 billion in

208 Nisha Thomas et al. 2000 to over US$413 billion in 2016 (UN, 2017). A signifcant amount of research on the migration–development nexus therefore, not surprisingly, has focussed on analysing diaspora’s fnancial remittances and their link to economic development. Many of these studies have established positive and statistically signifcant impacts of remittances on private consumption, improved living standards, poverty reduction, economic growth and innovation in the developing world (Pyakuryal and Suvedi, 2000; Laurie et al., 2015). However, some scholars of the migration–development nexus are more cautious, arguing that remittances alone can address only transient poverty, and that more structural transformations are necessary for eliminating deep-rooted poverty (Terrazas, 2010). International migration is also found to have sometimes aggravated inequality at grassroots and community levels and caused uneven development (De Haas, 2009a; Mullings, 2012). In their research on migration and development in Eastern Punjab, Taylor et al. fnd argue that “international migration can divide as well as unite transnational communities while simultaneously producing and reproducing forms of social inequality and social differentiation across national boundaries”(Taylor et al., 2007, p. 343). A study on Nigerian diaspora organisations in London also reveals that while geo-ethnic diaspora organisations and their transnational interventions can transcend ethnic divides, they can also sometimes “reproduce ethnic differences and insidious divisive politics of belonging” (Lampert, 2009, p. 180). However, despite the numerous and conficting arguments for and against diaspora’s development potential, diaspora’s role as strategic development partners has become more frmly established and prominent within the framework of home states’ and host states’ geopolitical and economic aspirations (Sims, 2008; Thieme and Wyss, 2005).

8.2 The neoliberal discovery of diaspora As Rachel Kunz (2012) argues, the ‘discovery’ of diaspora by states as a credible actor in international affairs is also a result of the neoliberal shift in governing, where state–civil society relations have been transformed and opened up new spaces for agents, actors, expert knowledge and interventions other than those of the state. Diaspora communities thus began to be identifed as an ideal and distant partner by many home states, made possible by the logic of neoliberal governance that emphasised state-non state partnerships as an effcient mode of governing. Many home states developed diaspora strategies1 to actively pursue diaspora communities in order to make them part of the state development strategies. As Larner (2007) argues, diaspora strategies represent a geographic imaginary and political-economic feld that seeks to incorporate populations abroad as subjects and objects of governance. Thus diaspora, who previously contributed independent of the state to the social and economic development of home communities, became quasi-offcial partners in state or non-state development agendas.

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Diaspora’s development role was further reaffrmed when the waves of neoliberalism infuenced and shaped new perspectives and practices in international development and signifcantly altered the landscape of philanthropy, enabling new actors, routes and avenues that have far greater potential than traditional philanthropy (Cobb, 2002). Principles and practices of development underwent signifcant changes as a result of the shifts brought about by neoliberal governance; moving from a purely rational, scientifc and state-centric approach to technical assistance and poverty reduction towards a more participatory approach to empowerment, whereby partnerships between state, market and civil society actors are actively sought and identifed (Baillie Smith and Laurie, 2011). The landscape of traditional philanthropy has also altered considerably, more or less in parallel, with the broader structural transformations that have accompanied neoliberalism. New actors and modalities of philanthropy succeeded to transform philanthropy as it was traditionally assumed – as the sole purview and practice of the rich and the elite – and introduced a range of new structures and strategies of assistance (Johnson, 2007; Jung et al., 2016). For diaspora, who are by no means new actors in development or philanthropy, these broader changes in approaches to migration and the democratisation of development and philanthropy further reinforced their development role, fuelling a greater interest among policy makers in promoting greater and more effective diaspora giving and diaspora-development initiatives.

8.3

Social remittances

While all the societal shifts and transformations in governance, development and philanthropy have led to a range of calculative processes whereby some forms of migration and particular forms of development have come to be more visible and prominent, this has also happened at the cost of others becoming invisible (Sherraden et al., 2008). For example, despite the vast array of studies on diaspora’s contribution to development through fnancial remittances, trade and investments, political advocacy and participation, etc., there is a gap in the policy and academic literature that signifcantly analyses diaspora’s development contribution through social remittances. As noted earlier, a transnational perspective on migration has enabled a new focus on the link between migration and development through diaspora, positioning diaspora in a transnational process and as transnational agents for development (Cohen, 2008). Transnationalism is defned as the “processes by which immigrants build social felds that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement” (Schiller et al., 1992a). The term was adopted to emphasise the “social process in which migrants establish social felds that cross geographical, political and cultural borders” (Schiller et al., 1992b). The transnational perspective on migration views migrants as simultaneously embedded in more than one society, owing to their multiple relations, links, activities and patterns of life that cut across national

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boundaries and territories (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007; Schiller et al., 1992a). Contemporary migrants are therefore designated as ‘transmigrants’ owing to the whole gamut of multiple relations they develop and maintain that span borders, such as the familial, social, economic, political, and religious (Portes, 2011; Schiller et al., 1992b). These transnational social connections are currently perceived as the most powerful mechanism by which diaspora contributes to development in their countries of origin (Lowell and Gerova, 2004). Diaspora communities are a major source of philanthropy, political contributions, technology transfer, tourism, and also more intangible fows of ideas, new attitudes, knowledge and cultural infuences (De Haas, 2009b; Newland and Patrick, 2004). Levitt (1998, p. 926) defned these non-economic transfers as ‘social remittances’ – “the ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that fow from receivingto sending-country communities”. While macro-level social remittances of diaspora communities and organisations are more visible and talked about, the grassroots activities of individual migrants across borders are often not recognised or are seen as small and negligible in comparison to transnational corporations or other more resourceful state and non-state agents. These local level transfers, interactions, experiences and exchanges of ideas, attitudes and cultures are, as Raghuram (2008) noted, largely ‘invisibilised’ in debates on diaspora and development. This chapter focuses on one such avenue of diaspora-homeland transfers, diaspora volunteering, and analyses how it connects with homeland development.

8.4 Diaspora volunteering Diaspora volunteering – volunteer work done by diaspora communities in their countries of origin – is increasingly being adopted by public, private and civil society sectors as a programme tool for strategic engagement with diaspora communities and home/host countries. Members of diaspora are widely assumed to have personal connections and networks, knowledge and personal motivations to volunteer outside the framework of organised volunteer programmes (Terrazas, 2010), yet their volunteer work is often overlooked in the mainstream diaspora-development discourses that continue to pay more attention to diaspora’s economic remittances and other tangible contributions. It is widely recognised now that beyond remittances, entrepreneurial investments, political advocacy and Home Town Associations, diaspora also spend considerable time and resources volunteering on local development projects and providing pro bono professional advice and training to institutions in their home countries (Terrazas, 2010). Migrant volunteering has been rising, particularly in countries of migrants’ settlement that have a strong civil society tradition and a longstanding awareness of the impact volunteering has for the social fabric and cohesion of society (Handy and Greenspan, 2009). Volunteering by diaspora communities in their countries of settlement is also seen and promoted by these countries

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as an instrument to facilitate the integration of migrants and promoting broader citizenship values. Diverse forms of voluntary labour have long played critical roles in fostering community cohesion and trust and enabling mutual help, underpinning the formation of civil society structures in diverse settings. Its meaning has varied widely, often rooted in religious and cultural traditions – yet in recent years, volunteering has become an increasingly important feature of formal development and humanitarian programming. This has led to processes of increasing professionalisation, which often obscure more complex histories and presents of voluntary activity (Baillie Smith and Laurie, 2011), particularly where it is informal and outside the boundaries of mainstream development actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The practices of and approaches to volunteering by members of and organisations in diaspora communities are often shaped by traditional, cultural and religious volunteerism, and mostly take place outside the framework of formal international volunteering programmes. Members of diaspora communities often volunteer in their home countries through alumni networks, professional associations and faith based organisations, as well as directly and spontaneously on a needs-driven basis (Terrazas, 2010). Some volunteer when there is a humanitarian crisis or natural disaster in their home communities, and assist in the post-confict relief and reconstruction efforts in emergency situations. Despite the wide-ranging nature of these activities, informal diaspora volunteering often goes largely unnoticed in the analysis of diaspora volunteering programmes, just as they are invisible in wider international volunteering analyses, due to their informal, spontaneous and need driven nature. While these informal volunteer activities and engagements still constitute much of diaspora volunteering, there are also formal and organised diaspora volunteering programmes provided by many international organisations, multilateral agencies and development organisations as a response to the brain-draining impacts of migration and to capitalise on contemporary diaspora’s new development potential (Chaulagain, 2012). The United Nations’ Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme, established in 1977, was created against a background of serious concerns about the brain drain that emerged in the 1970s, and it seeks to bring knowledge, expertise and experience of qualifed expatriates back to their country of origin through a reverse transfer of technology and knowledge (Chaulagain, 2012). Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) is another initiative, launched in 2001, by the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), to encourage brain circulation and temporary return amongst migrants. There are now a number of diaspora organisations in the Global North that organise formal and informal volunteering programmes for members of diaspora in countries or continents of origin. Many International Voluntary Service Organizations (IVSOs), corporations and development agencies are also investing in and developing their own formal diaspora

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volunteering programmes. The UN State of the World’s Volunteerism Report says that the various formal initiatives that international organisations and development agencies have launched to mobilise diaspora is a sign of the growing signifcance of the diaspora for volunteerism (UNV, 2011). The interest in diaspora volunteering programmes needs to be seen within the growing interest in the geopolitical signifcance of international volunteering and volunteers’ contribution to development (Banks and Hulme, 2014; Gore, 2013; Laurie and Baillie Smith, 2017). International volunteering is seen as a strategy for accomplishing a range of local, national and global objectives (Sherraden et al., 2006) – from community regeneration to even foreign policy objectives under the rubric of ‘smart aid’, ‘soft power’ (Lough and Allum, 2011) or ‘smart power’ (Rieffel and Zalud, 2006), and recognised for its potential to generate social capital (Plewes and Stuart, 2007; Rockliffe, 2005) and build global civil society (Baillie Smith and Laurie, 2011; Lewis, 2005; Sherraden et al., 2008). Despite this increasing interest in international volunteering, research has not kept pace with its growth, particularly in analysing the impacts of various forms and practices of volunteering or the roles of new and divergent actors emerging in international volunteering (McBride and Lough, 2010; Sherraden et al., 2008). There are not many systematic analyses of diaspora volunteering in the international volunteering literature, other than a passing acknowledgement of it as an emergent form or as a possible new area for systematic research (Terrazas, 2010). The gap in the international volunteering literature in analysing diaspora volunteering, its characteristics and impacts could be because of the infancy of organised diaspora volunteering programmes. It could also be due to the divergences in how volunteering is perceived, practiced and manifested in different cultures and languages. Volunteering activities that do not conform to a professionalised notion of volunteering often fail to grab much scholarly focus (Dean, 2011). As Lewis (2005, p. 17) noted, “volunteering varies across cultural groups and contexts and may be informal or occasional, touching on a much wider range of related phenomenon including religious duty, political activism, international solidarity, charitable work or professional internships”. These cultural conceptualisations and practices of volunteering and development could be at odds with some of the professionalised and slightly Eurocentric notions that sometimes still exist in debates on international volunteering and development. As Baillie Smith and Laurie (2011, p. 2) argued, an increasing focus on the “commercialisation and institutionalisation of international volunteering might also have rendered practices such as South-South, or diaspora volunteering less visible”. This increasing tendency of institutionalising and professionalising of volunteering programmes has also been shown to result in a type of volunteering being given prominence that relatively few could afford to engage in compared with informal forms of volunteering (McBride and Lough, 2010; Wallace, 2009). It has also raised criticisms that the formalised and professionalised volunteering programmes promoted by

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many NGOs and IVSOs, and their attendant foci on compliance and quantifying success, would make it more diffcult to bring alternative practices and perspectives on volunteering to the fore, as they may not produce the required tangible or measurable results (Ganesh and McAllum, 2012). The research on which this chapter is based addresses this gap in the literature on the migration–development nexus, international development and international volunteering, and brings to the fore emerging actors and alternative perspectives and practices of development volunteering that are often overlooked in mainstream debates. Diaspora volunteering, like international volunteering, is often presented as an ‘unqualifed good’ (Lewis, 2005). This chapter critically analyses diaspora volunteering, explores the various forms and patterns of diaspora volunteering as practised by members of Nepalese diaspora community in the UK and analyses how diaspora volunteering connects with development in Nepal. The data is drawn from a collaborative doctoral research on diaspora volunteering carried out amongst Nepalese and Nigerian diaspora communities in the UK. The research was carried out in collaboration with Northumbria University, Newcastle University and Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), one of the world’s leading international volunteer-sending organisations. VSO fnanced the feldwork in the UK, Nigeria and Nepal, and the study focused on VSO’s Diaspora Volunteering Programme (DVP) funded by the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID). The DFID-VSO DVP was implemented from 2008–2011 in 18 countries in Africa and Asia, including Nepal and Nigeria.

8.5

Political economy of Nepal

Nepal has a population of about 29 million and is one of the poorest countries in South Asia (WB, 2018). According to the Human Development Report 2018, Nepal was 149th out of 187 countries and territories with about 29% of its population considered as multi-dimensionally poor (UNDP, 2018). Offcial remittance fows are estimated to have reached around 28.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) (above 30% if informal remittance fows are also included), placing it among the top fve countries in terms of the contribution of remittance to GDP (WB, 2018). Nepal has been a recipient of foreign aid since 1952, when it joined the Colombo Plan for Cooperative, Economic, and Social Development in Asia and the Pacifc, and aid makes up a substantive part (29%) of Nepal’s annual government budget in the fscal year 2016/2017 (Pradhan and Zellmann, 2018). Despite rising remittances and offcial development assistance (ODA), Nepal’s internal conficts, violence and natural disasters have signifcantly contributed to high rates of poverty, inequality, displacement and out-migration in the country. Nepal has a tumultuous political history. Although it has always remained an independent country, even during the period of colonial aggravation in South Asia (Pyakuryal and Suvedi, 2000), Nepal has gone through many and turbulent transitions in terms of governance – changing from a family

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oligarchy under a titular monarch for over a century to an absolute monarchy with a king-led, party-less Panchayat system for over three decades, to a multi-party democratic and constitutional monarchy in 1990 and most recently to a republic in 2006 (Khadka, 1993). Instability resulting from the frequent changes in government and the internal conficts has had a profound impact on Nepal’s development. Internal conficts linked to the process of democratisation have had lasting effects. The Maoists’ insurgency in 1996 and the following decade of armed confict has produced a culture of violence in the country marked by massacres, torture, disappearances and displacements (UNDP, 2009). The internal conficts and political unrest have also led to rising inequality in Nepal. The confict also highlighted some of the exclusionary political, social, and economic institutions in Nepal that did not refect the country’s diversity. This context led to the rise of identity-based politics, with an increasing demand for state recognition and greater accommodation of diverse social, cultural and ethnic identities (UNDP, 2009). While migration has always been intertwined with the history of Nepal, the internal confict and political unrest has led to a drastic increase in migration and has also altered the reasons for migration. Although economic reasons were the major causes of migration in the early years, many communities and families were forcefully displaced due to ethnic conficts as well as social and political instability. Nepal also has one of the highest rates of human traffcking in South Asia, and it is estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 Nepalese women and children are traffcked to India and the Gulf countries annually (US Traffcking in Persons report, 2012; cited in in Laurie et al., 2015).

8.6 Nepalese diaspora in the UK Nepal has a long history of international migration, particularly to neighbouring countries such as India and Pakistan (Subedi, 1991; Thieme and Wyss, 2005). The ties between Nepal and Britain began in the early nineteenth century when the Nepalese (Gurkha) soldiers were encouraged to volunteer for service in the East India Company’s army (Sims, 2008). This legacy of military service continued even after Indian independence, with Nepalese nationals comprising the largest group of foreign nationals in the British Army (Sims, 2008). The military connection has also made the UK a popular destination for other Nepalese emigrants seeking employment and education abroad (Brickell, 2012; Sims, 2008; Subedi, 1991; Thieme and Wyss, 2005). The trend of immigration rose sharply after 2004, partly as a consequence of the change in settlement rights of retired British Gurkhas in the UK (Adhikari, 2012). According to the 2011 UK census, the number of Nepalese living in England and Wales is just over 60,000, which is a 969% rise from the 2001 census fgures (Adhikari, 2012).

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Volunteering in Nepal

The voluntary sector in Nepal has had substantial growth since the 1950s, perhaps not surprisingly, considering the number of multilateral and bilateral agencies as well as international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) having their presence in the country. Traditional volunteerism, as with many other countries, was an integral part of Nepalese culture. While Nepal has had a distinct tradition of cultural volunteering in the form of Guthi and Dharma Bhakari (food reserves) within its various ethnic and religious communities in the past, structured volunteering programmes as promoted through national and international NGOs and IVSOs have been rising in popularity in many of its rural and remote regions (Neupane, 2002). Nepal is a favourite volunteer destination for international volunteers, with an increasing number of volunteers in sport and adventure tourism. Nepal had a national volunteer service scheme for its graduate students in the past (NDVS-National Development Volunteer Service), but this was stopped during the period of insurgency (Neupane, 2002). The Female Community Health Volunteer Programme established by the Nepalese government in 1988 is one of the largest of its kind in the world, with over 48,000 female volunteers (Glenton et al., 2010) who have made signifcant contributions to primary healthcare in the country. While the government promotes national volunteerism in health and some of its local governance programmes, it is yet to implement a national volunteering policy that clearly communicates the government’s vision to promote volunteerism in Nepal, and its strategies for working in partnership with the many national and international agencies that are already providing volunteering programmes in Nepal.

8.8

Diaspora volunteering programmes in Nepal

In 2008, the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) announced a £3 million grant to encourage diaspora volunteering in the UK (VSO-DFID, 2008). During 2005–2008, VSO implemented a pilot scheme of a diaspora volunteering programme, whereby they worked with diaspora organisations in the UK to develop volunteering programmes and send diaspora volunteers to their home countries in Asia and Africa (Rodrigues, 2011). Building on the success of this programme and the partnerships VSO had created with diaspora communities, DFID placed the management of their Diaspora Volunteering programme and funding with VSO under the banner of the Diaspora Volunteer Initiative (VSO-DFID, 2008). The programme was expected to “go some way in realising the aims of the Millennium Development Goals” (VSO-DFID, 2008), making a strong case for linking international volunteering with universal poverty reduction and development targets. For both DFID and VSO, the diaspora volunteering programme was one that could contribute to development education – raising public understanding and engagement with development – in the Global

216 Nisha Thomas et al. North, as well as make unique contributions to poverty reduction and development in the Global South. With the already established and celebrated discourse on the diaspora-development nexus, DFID and VSO assumed and expected that their new Diaspora Volunteering Programme (DVP) would further establish this link and enhance the role of diaspora as new actors in international volunteering and development. The DVP managed more than 600 volunteer placements around the world between 2008 and 2011 through 14 diaspora partner organizations in the UK (Rodrigues, 2011), including the Himalayan Development Initiative (HDI) which co-ordinated the Nepalese diaspora volunteering programme. The overall aim of the Nepalese diaspora volunteering programme was to encourage Nepalese professionals living in the UK to take volunteering placements in Nepal in education, health, livelihoods and community development sectors in order to facilitate the fow of skills and knowledge to support government and non-government organizations. HDI managed volunteer placements of more than 50 Nepalese diaspora volunteers from the UK, from 2008–2011, as part of the DFID-VSO DVP. The role of an intermediary diaspora charity in facilitating diaspora (re) engagement with their countries of origin varies from country to country. The nature of engagement diaspora communities have with their countries of origin is shaped and infuenced by a number of factors, such as their history of migration, their lived experiences and current positioning in the host society, and the changes and opportunities in home countries that facilitate diasporic engagement. As individual attributes and motivations affect the nature of volunteering (Wilson and Musick, 1997), the circumstances of migration and settlement also have an equally important role in shaping the nature of engagements diaspora have with their homelands. Nepalese diaspora volunteers primarily consisted of frst- and second-generation migrants owing to their relatively recent migration history.2 Their memories of and personal connections with Nepal are stronger, and have a powerful infuence over the various ways in which they choose to engage with Nepal and its development. Many in the Nepalese diaspora in Britain engage in charitable activities as part of informal diaspora associations and networks such as village/community associations, such as the Gorkhali Samaj UK and Sherpa Association UK, and youth groups, such as the Gurkha Youth Group. While the primary goals of diaspora associations are networking and advancement for the members, along the way, many associations have developed their own charity and philanthropic programmes. These activities are not always homeland development projects, but also aimed at supporting and facilitating the integration and welfare of Nepalese diaspora in Britain, particularly for groups, such as retired Gurkhas who have migrated with their families, students, young professionals and women. Such associations, as Johnson (Johnson, 2007) argued, are an important constituency for diaspora giving and a gateway for re-engaging with homeland.

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Informal diaspora volunteering initiatives I don’t know if I can call it volunteering work, but I have been working with different community groups. One being my own Maidstone Nepali Community, I am like the Youth Co-ordinator of that group. There is a different Gurkha Youth Group where we have about 100 members; I am part of that as well. I have my own charity group as well, it is called Project United. The overall aim of this group is to unite all villages. Because even though I am a Ghurkha, I have so many other friends who are from other villages. So I told them, why not we unite together, you represent your village and I represent my village committee and that way we have a stronger team and we can go to Nepal as a team. (Volunteer Interview, July 2013)

Many young members of the Nepalese diaspora in the UK participate and involve themselves in charity projects for Nepal that are formed as part of village associations, community groups and cultural groups, of which they are members. Some young Nepalese have even started their own charity projects for home communities with friends and colleagues from within the Nepalese diaspora. Many of these projects primarily entail fundraising in the UK and making donations to local charities in Nepal. Sending money to home is a long-standing practice of ‘giving’ within diaspora communities, and the informal diaspora groups and associations, through the transfer of funds they raised in the UK to Nepalese charities, practice a form of collective diaspora giving. Funds are mostly raised through charity runs, cycle races, charity bakes, selling of merchandise, fund raising dinners and cultural events and then donated to causes such as building schools, classrooms, laboratories, libraries or roads, and organising medical camps and awareness programmes, in Nepal. These projects and fundraising efforts by young Nepalese are quite popular among the Nepalese diaspora and often have a snowballing effect in motivating a number of groups and individuals to launch their own ‘charity’ projects, particularly among the young frst-generation Nepalese migrants, who want to engage with Nepal in some meaningful way. As one of the young Nepalese volunteers who was motivated by her peers to volunteer in Nepal commented: Especially among Nepalese youth, they are always actively doing things and projects to help Nepal, people like Gaumati. Because we are in the same circle, it actually infuences you automatically, because the circle is like full of active people trying to do something for the country. You automatically start to think, what am I doing, I need to do something as well. So one is the infuence of the circle that you are in, especially the immediate circle, they are very very active at these things, they are always, most of them, I mean 80% of them are doing some kind of volunteering. (Volunteer Interview, August 2013)

218 Nisha Thomas et al. All the informal Nepalese diaspora volunteers who participated in this research have been either infuenced by peers both in the diaspora and in the broader UK society, or have started off from and continue participating in various philanthropic and fundraising events and programmes in the UK to contribute to Nepal. The growing rate and scale of such forms of collective diaspora giving patterns resonate with the broader changes in the feld of philanthropy, with traditional forms of philanthropic giving augmented by new and more accessible forms of ‘giving’ such as community giving circles, or virtual philanthropy (Nickel and Eikenberry, 2010). Many in the diaspora, as demonstrated by these young Nepalese volunteers, are utilising these new opportunities available for new actors and forms of giving that could transform private diaspora giving into a form of collective diaspora giving. The change in approach, from sending money to local charities in Nepal to personally visiting these communities and organisations in Nepal that they are supporting, came about more as a natural transition and logical next step, rather than as a result of any active search for innovative forms of engagement with homeland. You know, there is a lot of people and the money just disappears like that. You don’t know where the money goes. It is like you have no proof that it has been used. . . . So we thought why not do it ourselves and not risk the money being lost, or not risk the money not getting there. They are saying it is getting there; may be it is getting there, but it is not getting there fully. So if one of us is there, then it will be more productive. So from that perspective, we kind of got there. (Volunteer Interview, July 2013) Volunteering offered the young people in the Nepalese diaspora a more effective way of engaging with home communities that ensured that their fundraising efforts in the UK were not in vain, and the money they raised could be utilised more effectively in home communities with their personal involvement and ownership. Diaspora volunteering, in the case of young informal Nepalese volunteers, emerged as an extension of their charity giving, as an opportunity for engaging with homeland beyond just ‘giving’. The following section explores the informal diaspora volunteering initiatives in Nepal in more detail.

8.10

Informal diaspora volunteering as a means of re-engagement

The informal volunteering activities undertaken by the Nepalese diaspora are diverse in their range and character. They included health and medical camps where volunteers from the UK organised camps in partnership with local volunteers and organisations, visits to schools and hospitals in local communities, community awareness programmes and provision of goods,

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stationaries and funds collected in the UK to recipient organisations in various communities in Nepal. Most of the informal volunteering programmes were organised as part of diaspora village groups or projects started by volunteers themselves such as ‘Live for Change’, ‘Unity in Diversity’, and ‘Grassroots Movement in Nepal’. ‘Live for Change’ is a project initiated by a group of Nepalese youth in the UK that raises funds every year for various activities and development projects in Nepal. In the frst year of Live for Change, the members raised money to fund information technology (IT) projects and a library for a school in Gorkha, the community from which many of the members of Live for Change originated. The following year, the charity organised medical camps and community development activities in remote villages in Nepal with the help of volunteers from the diaspora. ‘Unity in Diversity’ is another diaspora youth initiative that is aimed at bringing the Nepalese youth, both in the diaspora and in Nepal together to work for community development. Although guided by a sense of obligation to home country, these ‘charity’ projects and groups started by the young Nepalese are as much for themselves as they are for Nepal. All the informal young volunteers are frst-generation migrants who moved to Britain as a result of their family’s migration and have spent some of their formative years in Nepal. What these projects offer them is primarily an opportunity to come together as frst generation migrants, share their experience as a young diasporic group in the UK and engage with Nepal, guided by their experience of living in Nepal and Britain, and their identity as Nepalese British. You are transporting a kid from Nepal to the UK, it is a whole different scenario. It is a whole different environment, it is the weather, it’s freaking cold here every day. When you are transporting a kid from that environment to this environment, from 100%, only 10% make it, the rest usually go astray. There the whole education system is different; the whole cultural system is different. I guess the identity crisis comes in at that point. Even at my age after staying here for so long, you still have that identity crisis at some levels. So we have like little . . . we go to colleges, we do little movie screenings, we organise little get-togethers of Nepalese community, they already have their own Nepalese society in each universities. Most of the current universities have their own Nepalese societies, like Kingston, Surrey, etc. so going there, and doing little movie shows, and just getting them together and talking to them about charity works and what they can do. (Volunteer Interview, July 2013) Diaspora associations are avenues through which individuals can express their identities by engaging in activities that allow them to experience both a sense of belonging and identifcation with the broader community, as well as giving them an opportunity to contribute to the society around them (Orozco

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and Garcia-Zanello, 2008). The charity projects started by the young Nepalese volunteers provide them with a platform with which they can experience a sense of belonging, while at the same time envisage a vision for Nepal that is shaped and infuenced by their experience and identity as a Nepalese living in Britain. As it is, these groups and projects may lack the vision, structure and approach to development or volunteering like other diaspora volunteering organisations or diaspora charities such as HDI. Their primary aim is to get together as a diaspora group, and based on their skills and what they believe they can offer to home communities, develop plans and programmes to engage with Nepal in ways that are feasible to them. They do not overtly identify with a particular development issue or cause, nor do they identify volunteering as their primary strategy to achieve their development outcomes. Nevertheless, what these projects and volunteering trips offer to the younger generation in the diaspora is an opportunity to engage with their homeland on their own terms and pace, one that is guided by their experiences, aspirations and circumstances of living as a frst generation immigrant in the UK. Diaspora volunteering is only one of the ways that enables them to reengage with their homeland, and for these informal Nepalese volunteers, diaspora volunteering does not only mean volunteering in Nepal, but also volunteering in the UK to raise money for Nepal. For them, the major aim is to give something back to Nepal in the various ways that they believe they can contribute. The act of volunteering is only secondary to their desire to give back to their country. Even though they have experienced and are clearly aware of the benefts of volunteering in Nepal in terms of the frst-hand experience they gain, the enhanced understanding of local situations or the added enthusiasm and commitment the visits create in them to sustain their engagement with Nepal, they are also aware of the challenges they face as a young diasporic group, and are committed to keep engaging with Nepal in ways that are practically viable for them, combining fund raising in the UK and volunteering in Nepal whenever possible. For them, volunteering is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. You know, all the people that I have showed you, we can’t do that [volunteering often and long term in Nepal]. Because we have a job here, we have families; we have to look after them. We can’t do that. But what we can do is give a bit of time, let’s say two hours a week or three hours a week and raise a bit of money to support these kinds of activities. It is diffcult to do. Raising money is one of the diffcult things to do, because you are asking money for free. But in many ways, it is easier than going back to the country and volunteering. (Volunteer Interview, August 2013) The feasibility of volunteering in their home countries and the resources it requires are major concerns for many diaspora volunteers. Diaspora

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volunteering programmes analysed as part of this research, both formal and informal, were of a shorter duration, lasting from 2–4 weeks, compared to mainstream international volunteering programmes that often last for longer periods of time. While a sense of obligation is an important motivating factor for diaspora communities to engage with their homeland, there are limitations to what they can do, due to their wider obligations and commitments to themselves, their immediate families and ethnic groups in the UK, as well as their extended families and communities in their home countries. The attraction of these informal diaspora volunteering programmes or self-developed charity projects for the young Nepalese volunteers is that these programmes can offer the fexibility and ownership, which formal and structured longterm international volunteering programmes often cannot. Informal volunteering programmes by and through diaspora associations and youth groups acknowledge these challenges and limitations of diaspora, provide a platform to organise around common identities and experiences, and offer fexible and practical ways to contribute to and get re-connected with their communities and people back home. These alternative ways of contributing to homeland development and (re)engaging with their home communities may very well form what Mercer and others (Mercer et al., 2009: 143) call the “amateur development apparatus”. While their role as alternative development actors and contributions to volunteering and development need to be critically analysed before making any normative assumptions, their relevance and signifcance for distinct groups within diaspora communities cannot be neglected.

8.11

“You can’t do it alone”: moving from informal to formal diaspora volunteering I think the importance of the formal rather than the informal is it is like a picture that you draw. The picture is complete if you do it with somebody; all the little strings which might be loose, or left loose if you do personally, they can all be tied together. And that at the end would beneft whatever you are doing; system wise, disease wise, person wise, it will be more complete. (Volunteer Interview, June 2013)

The realisation that the challenges of home communities are greater than what can be dealt with by individual initiatives alone is one of the reasons why many in the diaspora join hands with organisations and groups, both in home and host countries and within diaspora. Diaspora volunteers are also aware of the changes to their homelands, and recognise the need to re-orient themselves in different ways to constructively engage with communities and people they once considered or still consider as ‘home’. People who have left the country 30, 40 years ago, they remember how it was then and they have not kept abreast of what has happened since.

222 Nisha Thomas et al. So for us, for me, until I started going back to Nepal 6–7 years ago more frequently, Nepal was the same Nepal that I left behind. (Volunteer Interview, July 2013) Diasporas’ ‘home’ that they have kept in their imaginary and their relationship with it signifcantly change as they settle down in their host societies and start engaging with their homeland from a distance (Brah, 2005). Once they start to engage with a sense of homeland outside and beyond their own personal engagements, they realise the challenges, structural constraints, bureaucracy and security concerns, and the inadequacies and shortfalls of individual initiatives. For most of the volunteers who participated in this research, their informal and personal attempts to engage with and volunteer in their homelands helped them acknowledge the practical challenges involved and made them opt for more formal and structured means of engagement. In different parts of the country, they speak different languages. So even being a Nepalese, it is really hard. So I won’t say it is really an advantage because if you go volunteering in rural areas of Nepal, you won’t fnd a majority of people speaking Nepalese. That was one of the issues with Mustang, because they were speaking Tibetan, but the people that we were speaking to were speaking in Nepalese because they were travelling to the city more often, and they were able to communicate very well. But some people really didn’t know how to speak Nepalese and they wouldn’t understand if we were communicating in Nepalese. (Volunteer Interview, July 2013) Despite the fact that the diaspora volunteers are returning to their ‘home’, and are often encouraged to do so by their home countries through their diaspora strategies, the volunteers in this study faced a variety of challenges while attempting to engage with homeland development. From local hostility to bureaucratic and institutional challenges, diaspora volunteers experienced a whole range of in-country and transnational responses when they attempted to re-encounter and re-engage with homelands. The diaspora volunteer participants of this study, including frst-generation and informal volunteers who work in partnership with local organisations, relied on intermediary diaspora groups and organisations for volunteering in-country as they need “someone who understands diaspora and the other world” (Volunteer Interview, June 2013). The diaspora groups and organisations that occupy the transnational space and engage in transnational activities and who were intermediaries for the diaspora volunteers acted as a bridge that connected home communities and those in the diaspora. This challenges some of the preconceived notions in diaspora-development discourses regarding diaspora’s transnational connections and ties with their countries of origin and the assumed ease with which they could contribute to

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homeland development. The relationship between homeland and its diaspora is anything but static (Gabriel, 2011), and the tendency in policy discourses to project home as a homogenous, neutral place where diaspora volunteers can safely return, and diaspora volunteers as ‘insiders’ with easy access to local organisations and communities and the capacity to effectively contribute to local development, is highly problematic and needs to be critically analysed.

8.12

Diaspora volunteering and development

A notion of homeland development and the diaspora volunteers’ ability to contribute to development are explicit in many of the policy discussions and debates around diaspora volunteering programmes (Terrazas, 2010). For many of the proponents of diaspora volunteering, the superior knowledge that diaspora volunteers supposedly possess about their homelands and their continued links and connections with their countries of origin, are some of the key unique selling points of diaspora volunteering programmes. However, although embedded in an idea of homeland development, diaspora volunteers and their intermediary organisations did not want to approach volunteering in their home countries with a fxed and defnitive development plan. To be honest, I didn’t have a specifc plan or goal when I started. All I wanted to do was do something at my level, at my colleagues’ level here, and we were open to see what else can be done. So we can’t measure that this is what the objectives were and this is what we have achieved. So it is an open process. So I think we have done very little, not a lot. (Volunteer Interview, June 2013) As shown in the following comment, their aim was that: as a group of friends, representing different villages, to try and make awareness among us [in the diaspora] and in our home villages that us youths need to come together and do things for our villages. (Volunteer Interview, July 2013) In my perspective, you are connecting people; you are opening up vast, vast avenues for diaspora volunteers to connect with their homelands. You are linking them for life actually to their homeland. (Nepalese Diaspora Organisation Interview, June 2013) By downplaying their roles as development ‘experts’, the volunteers and the intermediary organisations were demonstrating an awareness of their own limitations to bring about ‘development’ and a willingness to approach

224 Nisha Thomas et al. volunteering in their home countries as a partnership of mutual learning and long term engagement. The capacity of international volunteering, particularly that of international youth volunteering, to effectively contribute to development has been a particular focus of criticism in the Global South (Jones, 2011), and it is a similar concern shared by some of the participants of our research too. For many of the diaspora volunteers and their intermediary diaspora groups, volunteering in Nepal was a process of (re)engagement with their homeland – embedded in an ‘idea’ of homeland development, but also, in many ways, more than just about development. For many diaspora volunteers and their intermediary organisations, creating networks and links between diaspora communities and home countries is what volunteering was all about. In enabling such transnational partnerships, diaspora volunteering may appear to be the same as any other international volunteering programmes that have the potential to build cross-cultural linkages between international volunteers and destination countries, and promote notions of global citizenship that could transcend boundaries and essentialised identities. However, the distinctiveness of diaspora volunteering programmes is that, underpinning all these transnational linkages is also a greater desire to re-engage and reconnect with their places of origin. Despite their reluctance to adorn a development expert role, the diaspora volunteering partnerships, formed between diaspora volunteers and local host organisations and communities, in many cases were able to build local capacity, work on local issues specifc to the communities and organisations they worked with, and prioritise those ‘local’ issues with the government and other national and international development actors. The partnership with SAF (South Asia Foundation) Nepal, which was successful in bringing together local mental health professionals and those in the diaspora, the establishment of The Alzheimer’s Society, the publication of Dementia First Aid Book in Nepalese that was launched by the President of Nepal and the forming of Senior Citizens Federation (SCF), which has gained considerable recognition and bargaining power with the Nepalese government, were some of the results of medical diaspora volunteering networks in Nepal (Nepal Host Organisation Interviews, March 2013). As a result, elderly care was raised as a country-specifc priority issue in the national planning meeting for the Post-2015 UN Development Agendas by SCF, Nepal. Geriatric care has been included in the curriculum of medical education as a specialised subject by medical schools, and the National Dementia Strategy, developed by SCF and the diaspora volunteers was the frst of its kind in Nepal, to be submitted to the government for inclusion in national healthcare planning. Many of the local host organisations like SCF and local communities saw diaspora volunteers as potential partners who do not neglect local knowledge and locally generated approaches as meaningless, but support causes and priorities that are specifc to the context. In doing that, diaspora volunteers are supporting a development strategy that is essentially contextual, that

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works for the particular context and therefore has the ability to deal with the emergences, ambiguities, complexities and uncertainties of the context (Kemp and Martens, 2007).

8.13

Conclusion

This chapter explored diaspora volunteering as an avenue through which members of Nepalese diaspora community in the UK re-engaged with Nepal and built transnational networks and linkages between home and host countries. Diaspora volunteering is not carefully examined or understood enough in the general diaspora-development debates, which still focus too heavily on the development potential of fnancial remittances. Diaspora volunteering is not suffciently recognised in international volunteering debates, either, where diaspora volunteers, although gaining recognition, remain largely invisible. Our research identifed a number of ways and modalities through which diaspora volunteers and their intermediary diaspora associations connected with local organisations and communities, and showed how a quest to reconnect with their country of origin resulted in a form of volunteering and development that is more contextually rooted and culturally informed. Diaspora volunteers approach volunteering in their home communities as a long-term process of building transnational linkages and networks. However, these transactions do not occur in some vague transnational space, but in concrete local settings linked to one another through various networks (BusumtwiSam and Anderson, 2010; Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Vertovec, 2004). It is in these concrete and individual local settings and locations that diaspora volunteers make distinctive contributions to homeland development. This chapter also indicated some of the limitations of diaspora volunteering. While some diaspora volunteers may have the advantages of a better understanding of local context, speaking local languages and having easier access and connections with local organisations and communities, many volunteers who did not have regular communication or contact with home countries faced a number of challenges and disadvantages while volunteering in home countries. The projection of countries of origin as ‘home’ in diaspora-development discourses often obscures many of the disadvantages and potential challenges diaspora volunteers may have to face while reencountering home communities as (international) diaspora volunteers.

Notes 1 Ancien et al. (2009, p. 1) defne diaspora strategies as “explicit and systematic policy initiatives or series of policy initiatives aimed at developing and managing relationships between homelands and diasporic populations. These policy initiatives vary from highly formalised and structured programs to projects that are quite light in conception and application”. 2 Many of the young informal Nepalese volunteers who participated in this research are children of Gurkha soldiers who served with the British Army, and have arrived

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and settled down in the UK after spending their formative years in Nepal or places such as Hong Kong or Brunei, where the Gurkha regiments had been based.

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9

Restructuring of Nepal’s economy, agrarian change, and livelihood outcomes The role of migration and remittances Jagannath Adhikari

9.1 Introduction Nepali societies, which are culturally and economically diverse, are experiencing tremendous economic, socio-cultural, political, and environmental changes in recent times as they are grappling with the challenges and opportunities brought about by the process of migration and its associated consequences like fnancial and social remittances. The migration of people to foreign countries is a major livelihood option now, causing households and communities to restructure their economies and social and community relationships. This restructuring process and its consequences are locally contextualized, leading to different pattern of changes for different socialcultural groups and regions, which has made it diffcult to elucidate any linear direction of change and development – a phenomenon that is often covered under the concept of alternative modernities (Curry et al., 2015: 1). This chapter aims to understand this process of change with the help of a case study with a population both culturally and economically diverse. Studies for this purpose were conducted in the last two decades using a locallevel approach, but also considering the macro-level processes and how they interact with local-level factors to bring the change. Nepal was incorporated into the world economy particularly since 1950, when the country was opened to outside world. Despite closed polity prior to 1950, Nepal had also experienced slight exposure to the outside world through the migration of some selected citizens to join the British Army and to fnd non-military employment and settlements in India (Seddon et al., 2001). Apart from this selected migration to foreign countries through British Army jobs, Nepal was otherwise largely closed to outside world. The process of modernization intensifed since 1950, along with the higher injection of foreign aid. Agrarian changes began to appear with the project of modernization, which included agricultural development, land reform, education, and health services from the state (Mihaly, 1965). But this agrarian transformation did not take place in a signifcant manner, partly due to the failure of the modernization project to overcome the constraints posed by a feudal political system and social structure, and Nepal’s geographical peripheral

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location in the world economic system (Blaikie et al., 1980; Mishra, 1987). Moreover, it is argued that the rather stagnant economy, particularly the agrarian economy, helped retain the social mechanism of dependency and patron-client relations for subsistence. The political change in Nepal in 1990 further increased the exposure to the outside world, creating conditions for the rapid infuence of recent forms of globalization as seen mainly in the increased mobility of people, often to foreign countries beyond India. This led to changes in household and village economies, in traditional relationships based on land and labour, and in ideology of caste, gender, and identity. The decline in the proftability and returns in smallholder agriculture, increasing land shortage,1 and environmental degradation (Banerjee and Mishra, 2017) were some of the internal factors leading to this change, often creating push factors for migration. The internal changes and the globalization process, as manifested in the international migration, have dovetailed in Nepal, leading to fast pace of agrarian change. Migration patterns in Nepal also have regional dimensions, but this was more so in the past than now. In the past, until the mid-1990s, different regions of the country had differential access to migration opportunities and to remittance income – shaped mainly by geography and historical factors. For example, the middle hills in central Nepal and eastern hills were exposed to migration early on due to recruitment of certain ethnic groups living in these regions into the British Army, and then they started to work in Indian armies in large number. Seasonal migration, mainly within Nepal, and trade associated with such migration had historically been a central basis of livelihood in the harsh environment of the Himalayan region (Furer-Haimendorf, 1975). The Terai region of the country, the plain and agriculturally potential area located adjacent to the Indian border, was mainly dependent on farming, and there was low level of migration except for seasonal migration to India from poorer sections, but, now this Terai region, the breadbasket of the country, has the highest out-migration rate in the country (DoFE, 2018). The top ten districts in terms of volume of out-migrants to foreign countries except India are located in east-central Terai. Accordingly, by the middle of the 2010s, there has been rather a convergence in how different regions of the country and different socio-economic and ethnic groups depend on remittance, especially in the magnitude of migration. However, there are still some differences in the extent and nature of dependence, and the way remittances are used, as this study demonstrates. For example, the poorest households are still not been able to access the foreign labour migration; for them, short-distance migration within the country and to India, where the border is open, has been an option (Adhikari, 2001; Seddon et al., 2001; Adhikari and Gurung, 2009). The hills and mountain areas in the geographically excluded and severely poor far western region have until now been not able to tap the opportunities of the globalization process. People of this region still depend on the historic migration to India. In recent times, the better off from this region have started to go to countries other than India.

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In this context, this chapter is aimed at providing an insight into how the present form of international migration is creating conditions for rapid social, economic and political changes that is evident in Nepal in the last three decades. Studies in other parts of the world also show similar migrationinduced changes (or rather, changes induced by the whole process of globalization, which includes migration and mobility of people and other fows of capital, knowledge, and new values associated with migration) (Connell, 2007; McGregor, 2009a, 2009b; Patterson and Macintyre, 2011). In many places, such changes happened in a way to defy the predetermined notion of linear change and progression, as Curry et al. (2015: 1) argue taking the case of Pacifc region: with greater attention to local-level factors and role of agency, the notion of pre-determined outcomes is questioned by the recognition that change is neither unidirectional nor, indeed, a scripted transition from a precapitalist economy to a capitalist one or from tradition to modernity. As different people and communities have produced a variety of outcomes in response to new opportunities of migration, this chapter also gives attention to examine the dynamics of change among different groups of people having access to different economic, social, and cultural resources.

9.2 Migration and restructuring of village and household economy and livelihood outcomes A common route for restructuring in many developing countries, including Nepal, has been the integration of off-farm income (mainly remittances) and activities with the existing farming system, which has helped in the diversifcation of income sources for village households. It is an inevitable concomitant of such restructuring that there have often been substantial changes in how farm households earn their living, how much they earn, and in their income-earning priorities. Such changes in the livelihood strategies of individual village households eventually lead to fundamental changes in the agrarian systems, as is now happening in many villages of Nepal. Migration of people to distant lands and economic and social remittances they bring home have become a main source of household income now in Nepal. Recent studies have shown that foreign remittance is equivalent to 31.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank, 2016) and that about 56%of households received remittances as of 2010–2011 (CBS/GoN, 2012), which formed a major part of their household income. Considering all the remittances that enter Nepal through formal and informal channels, migration and remittances comprise the major economic sector in the country. It is estimated as of 2010–2011, that about 35% of the household income comes from remittances (CBS/GoN, 2012), but this must have increased, given the rapid rise in migration during the period from 2010–2011 to 2016–2017.

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About 2.7 million Nepali youths, of whom about 95% are male, work in foreign countries other than India, and in recent times, about 1,500 youths move to foreign countries (other than India) every day (DoFE, 2018). There is no real estimate of Nepali people working in India.2 Similarly, people also move within the country for work – seasonally and temporarily, but the extent of this is less as compared to international migration. The consequences of this migration have thus been seen in the whole livelihood structure of rural areas including food security strategies, land use patterns and management and use of common resources like forest. The recent agrarian change or restructuring seen in Nepal is not an isolated case. By now, remittances have become the main source of rural household income in many developing countries. In 2015, worldwide remittance fows were estimated to have exceeded $601 billion, of which, developing countries are estimated to receive about $441 billion (World Bank, 2016: V). The true size of remittances,3 including unrecorded fows through formal and informal channels, is believed to be signifcantly larger. Despite the growing contribution of remittances to household income, people still carry out farming as a main livelihood strategy. While there has consistently been a decline in the contribution of agriculture to GDP, this sector still employs a large majority of the population in developing countries and continues to play a major role in the overall socioeconomic development of these countries. There are many pathways for agriculture, including the use of remittances, to generate employment and income for rural poor. This also means that this sector has potential to improve livelihood and food security. However, there is still a lack of understanding as to how this recent form of agrarian transformation (with integration of migration and remittances) can be a driver for a better farm economy and health of rural people in terms of their food and nutritional security. The migration-induced globalization and the consequent agrarian restructuring have led to some contradictory outcomes. This has led to, on the one hand, impressive outcomes in terms of reduction in poverty rate. Poverty rates in Nepal dropped from 42% in 1995–1996 to 25% in 2010–2011 – thanks mainly to remittances (CBS/GoN, 2012). Another longitudinal study also illuminates how remittances helped avoid the expected livelihood crisis in Nepal (Blaikie et al., 2002). In the mid1970s, a study by Blaikie et al. (1980, 2002) revealed that road-induced and market-led integration in west-central Nepal would not deliver the benefts of increased agricultural production, increased commercialization and trade, but rather would deepen dependency and underdevelopment. The sources of income from traditional farming with a meagre supplement of remittances from people working in foreign armies were not expected to postpone the impending crisis. In their follow-up study in 1998, the same authors found that there were more opportunities of income through remittances as people started taking the advantage of global economic change and improved their living conditions.

234 Jagannath Adhikari But, at the same time, there has been no concomitant achievement in food and nutritional outcomes (taking the case of India, see Pritchard et al., 2014). For example, malnutrition remains a serious development challenge in Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Laos. In Nepal, apart from malnutrition, there are food crises in general sometimes leading to hunger deaths. The rate of stunted growth among children younger than 5 years old, the marker for chronic malnutrition, in Nepal is still alarmingly high at 37.4% (CBS/GoN and UNICEF, 2014).4 The possible reason for this could lie in both agricultural policies and in a lack of opportunities and policy support to make it possible for investment of non-farm income like remittances in the farm economy, and in good nutritious foods. On the other hand, growing dependence on expensive fashion foods like packaged food, and feminization of farming and farmwork – one of the outcomes of migration-induced changes – leading to overload on women and children and lack of care (Gillespie et al., 2012: 117), also restrain the achievement of better food and nutritional security. The access to income from remittances is helping to buy fashion foods (Adhikari and Hobley, 2015; Sunam and Adhikari, 2016), but this has also been facilitated by overload of work onto women. The migration of men in general has also caused severe problems for women in China – even in a country with socialist political system – especially for migrants’ left-behind wives, who seemed to have a hollowed life (Wu and Ye, 2016). 9.2.1 Migration and change in land use and agrarian relations Questions have also appeared as to whether positive effects like contribution to poverty reduction and continuity of fow of outside income in the form of remittances make the economy sustainable. A number of issues that have emerged because of out-migration are: farming is dependent on ageing population and a female labour force (i.e., feminization of agricultural work), and also on cropland abandonment and underutilization. A large body of literature in Nepal now reveals that cropland abandonment is a rapidly growing phenomenon in the last two decades (Adhikari, 1996; Khanal and Watanabe, 2006; Paudel et al., 2014), and migration of youths is blamed for this. A survey conducted by Nepal’s Ministry of Agricultural Development shows that in 2013–2014, of the 4.1 million hectares of available arable land, a total of 1.03 million hectares (or 24.9%) has been left uncultivated (MoAD, 2014). Studies have identifed various ‘drivers’ of land underutilization, which include migration (Adhikari, 2015; Gartaula et al., 2012; Jaquet et al., 2015), urbanization, and socio-environmental causes (Ojha et al., 2017). Ojha et al. (2017: 158) argue that land underutilization happens through ‘socio-environmental pathways’, which operate across scales, yet are deeply rooted in local dynamics of agrarian change: socio-cultural changes that favour out-migration, evolving economic opportunities that make farming less proftable, and a policy context in which the gravity of

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the land abandonment challenge goes unrecognized. On the other hand, a few studies have examined the resurgence of dairy and cash crops like cardamom, other fruit trees, and vegetables in peri-urban areas or those locations connected by roads.5 But, in general, it is seen that remittances have been largely used for immediate consumption purposes, and only a small fraction of it (about 2.8%) is used for productive sector use (CBS/GoN, 2012), even though it is not clear as to what constitutes the productive sector. It is still not clear how far this migration and land abandonment will continue. The migration transition theory, which is akin to demographic transition theory, postulates that migration will decline as the society advances with the rapid rise in development and telecommunication facilities (Zelinsky, 1971). Zelinsky identifes fve phases in migration with initial phase of fully subsistence farming in which mobility is limited within the village and small areas. In the second phase, mobility within the country and to foreign lands becomes rapid and overwhelming. Nepal is now in this second phase. And, one can still question as to whether Nepal will reach to a fnal stage (ffth stage), in which there is limited mobility confned to intra-city or some inter-city mobility as migration is absorbed by telecommunication facilities requiring less physical mobility. Looking at the changes taking place in Nepal, as the case study presented here shows, it is still seen that various drivers, especially related to pull factors, will help continue migration. There is still no formation of a sustainable economic base in Nepal, which could make people choose to stay. As a matter of fact, there are questions as to whether the present form of migration and use of remittances would lead to a sustainable and self-dependent economy. Both land use conversion and land use intensity changes affect food production and food security (Lambin et al., 2000; Li et al., 2014, 2015), but there are questions about how far out-migration is linked to these. Rudel et al. (2000) argue that out-migration can lead to cropland abandonment. On the other hand, Fang Yangang (2014) argues that out-migration can facilitate mechanization and thus can increase cropping intensity and can help transfer land from less productive households to real farmers engaged in effcient production. At the international level, the outcomes of outmigration on agriculture are mixed, especially in Latin America, where land availability in general is high and mechanization possibility exists. For example, in rural Ecuador, migration and remittances played a positive role in agricultural production (Gray, 2009; Gray and Bilsborrow, 2014). On the other hand, Robson and Berkes (2011) found that migration had caused de-intensifcation of crop farming in the same country. Nepal’s case clearly reveals that until now, the frst scenario is evident, and there are questions about whether the second scenario (i.e., playing a positive role) will evidently come into practice, even though a few cases of positive relation have also been reported especially in peri-urban areas, where returnee migrants have invested in cash crop production using modern technology (Sunam and Adhikari, 2016; Adhikari and Hobley, 2015). Like the phenomenon of

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‘rural exodus’ in Nepal, out-migration has caused ‘village hollowing’ (Long et al., 2012; Zhang, 2010; Zhang et al., 2015) and ‘geographical separation of elderly (rural areas) and youths (urban area)’ (Liu et al., 2010) in China. Another study revealed that out-migration does adversely impact land use intensity, but that can be overcome with policies like less labour-intensive technology, increased use of agricultural inputs like fertilizers and pesticides, capital-intensive technology and availability of capital, and a support system to make agricultural benefcial in order to attract youth (Liu et al., 2016). In this context, this study reveals, as will be demonstrated later, that there are possibilities for the use of remittances in agro-enterprises if there is good access to market through social networks, as well as road access. As the study villages were progressively connected with road networks to the market centre (i.e., Pokhara town), returned migrants and their families changed the crop farming patterns to produce more vegetables, poultry, and milk to supply to the market in the more fertile land, but abandoned the farming in distant and less productive land. This shows that both ‘intensifcation’ and ‘de-intensifcation’ of crop farming has taken place in a village due to migration and remittances. But this pattern needs to be looked at contextually as the study area represents a case of easy access to the market due to establishment of road and social networks. The agrarian restructuring of recent times has also affected all the relations related to land and labour in rural areas. This also includes landlord tenant relations, land rental conditions, and caste relations. A recent study has revealed that the domination of traditional landowners and moneylenders have declined drastically because of the newly rich people, created so because of remittances (CESLAM, 2017). Another study has also revealed that because of migration and shortage of labour, the wage rate for farmworkers has increased (Sunam and Adhikari, 2016), and terms and conditions for land leasing relaxed in favour of tenants (Adhikari, 2010). Migration and remittances have also been the main drivers of urbanization and market centre development. Migration has become the main force for urbanization. In Nepal’s case, studies have shown that internal, international migration and urbanization are interrelated (Adhikari, 2001; Poertner et al., 2011). Some people migrated to urban areas for work, and then, after making some savings and becoming aware of the process, they migrated to foreign countries for work. Then, after returning from work in foreign countries, they shifted to urban areas and, in some cases, also invested their remittances in enterprises, which further encouraged rural-to-urban migration. The iteration has continued, and has resulted in a rapid pace of urbanization. Remittances and the new ideas brought by migrants encouraged them to shift to urban areas. Even when family members are working in foreign countries, they would encourage their wives and children move to urban areas for the education of the children (see Padoch et al., 2008; Wilson and Rigg, 2003). At the same time, growing connection of rural and urban areas through road and communication further intensifed rural-urban connection –

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making rural households partly urban in its way of thinking and in accessing non-farm income sources. In other countries like Vietnam and China, state policies supported or forced rural-to-urban migration, leading to rapid urbanization (Nguyen and Locke, 2014). But, in Nepal, as discussed previously, international labour migration and remittances generated are thus much more important in rural-to-urban migration. The employment opportunity generated in urban areas or rural market centres through the investment of remittance savings would further encourage people to move or commute to urban areas. For example, the construction sector in urban areas, developed mainly through international remittances, has been a source of employment for rural youths, who either migrate to urban areas or commute there, but eventually this work would help them to move permanently to urban areas. There has been increased migration from rural areas to urban areas for construction work (Adhikari and Deshingkar, 2015; Adhikari and Seddon, 2000). Accordingly, international migration has been helping in making livelihood activities of a household located in multiple locations spanning from foreign countries to urban centres and market centres. Because of commuting and dependence on urban areas for the marketing of household production and purchase of goods and commodities including food, mobility from rural to urban areas – and vice-versa – has increased. In a way, there is blurring of rural and urban boundaries as people increasingly traverse these boundaries in their daily lives. A study in two villages in west-central Nepal has revealed that 70% of the livelihood strategies of an average household in one village and 80% of the livelihood strategies in another village were located in either a fully urban area or in a rural market centre (Adhikari and Bohle, 2002), demonstrating the diversifed and multiple-location livelihoods of rural households, and greater fow of goods and commodities and people’s movement between the rural and urban areas in Nepal. Migration and remittances have played a major role in such a transformation of the rural economy and society. 9.2.2

Migration, ‘new rurality’, and hybrid livelihoods

The type of agrarian change in Nepal – increased blurring of the boundary between rural and urban, and linking of livelihoods of a household located in different geographical locations – is not an isolated phenomenon. In fact, this is a growing general tendency in developing societies. This has also been termed as ‘new rurality’ (Kay, 2008; Hecht, 2010) to characterize the new semi-subsistence, semi-urban, and semi-globalized rural households. Like in Nepal, agrarian livelihoods for people living in rural areas across the globe have not disappeared, but rather have become diversifed, hybridized, and deterritorialized. A part of the household, some family members, especially elderly people, live in rural areas, some members in urban areas, and some family members in global metropolises, and the relative contribution of farm income in total household income is declining (Wilson and Rigg, 2003). Even

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the poorer and marginalized households have used different pathways to improve their livelihoods, which has made their livelihood structure complex. Subsistence farming, though, contributes less and less; it forms the basic skeleton of the livelihood, as it is still considered to be stable. Sometimes this subsistence farming provides a cushion against the vagaries of the market economy, changes in prices of food, and fuctuating employment or wage prospects (Isakson, 2009). Accordingly, as in South Africa (Isakson, 2009), Nepalese rural households make use of complementarities between market and non-market, capitalist and non-capitalist, and multi-sited urban and rural economic activities. This is the pattern in other countries, too (Deere, 1990; Bryceson, 2000; Bryceson et al., 2000). For example, Rigg (2006: 183) summarizes the following features of the agrarian change in developing countries: • • • • • • • •

Occupations and livelihoods in the countryside are diversifying. Occupational multiplicity is becoming more common and more pronounced. The balance of household income is shifting from farm to non-farm. Livelihoods and poverty are becoming delinked from land (and from farming). Lives are becoming more mobile and livelihoods correspondingly delocalized. Remittances are playing a growing role in rural household incomes. The average age of farmers is rising. Cultural and social changes are being implicated in livelihood modifcations, and in new ways.

The changes taking place in rural areas as identifed by Rigg (2006) are both the result of globalization processes and state policies on agriculture and rural development. Again, globalization, especially in the form of development co-operation, infuenced the policy processes in developing societies like Nepal. Since 1990, the emphasis of development policy shifted from state-sponsored agriculture development to neo-liberal policies. Taking the case of Nepal, government’s investment in agriculture declined from about one-ffth of the national budget to agriculture in late 1980s to about 2% late in the frst decade of the 2000s, which also coincided with decline in farm productivity (Adhikari, 2009a). This was also one of the factors causing more migration in this period – to both urban areas within the country and international labour markets. 9.2.3 Agrarian change and understanding of migration process The agrarian change that is happening in developing societies – as seen in the diversity in livelihood strategies, transnationalism, and risk reduction through diversifcation of income portfolios – has also infuenced the

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theoretical debates in migration. The traditional approach of push-pull theory is increasingly seen as inadequate in explaining the migration pattern. In its place, theories like ‘new economics of labour migration’ (NELM – which emphasizes family decision-making for migration to diversify income and reduce risks), network theory (family connections and networks determining who migrates), livelihoods (assets, capabilities, policies determining the migration for better livelihood outcomes), and transnationalism have been forwarded. The empirical evidences exist for all these explanations, and most of the evidence so far in terms of linkages of migration and development has been heterogeneous (de Haas, 2010). The new agrarian change also has been seen in resource management. As the longitudinal case studies described in this chapter reveal, the new ‘rurality’ has led to less pressure on land leading to underutilization of cultivated land and forests. There has, in fact, been increased forest or tree cover now than in the past. Therefore, the relation between population growth and environmental degradation has not moved in a simple and direct manner, and the simplistic assumptions made in the Malthusian thesis or in the Grand Theory of Himalayan Degradation6 were not always tenable (Ives and Messerli, 1989). This rather positive infuence of new ‘rurality’ on the environment has also noticed in other countries (Hecht et al., 2015). The question is again whether this trend would continue, given that a nexus of the corporate world and powerful global politicians controls economic and cultural globalization taking place now. Until now, people as far back as in Nepal’s villages are coping with this by dovetailing this global change with the local change, as illustrated by the following case study.

9.3

Views from the grassroots: migration, village economy, and agrarian change, 1989–2015

A study was conducted in two-village case study site in 1989, 1997, and 2008, and was revisited for observation in 2013 and 2015. These repeat studies and observations helped to elucidate how migration patterns have intensifed and what consequent changes took place because of such migration. The case study was conducted in Lachok and Rivan villages. 9.3.1

The case study site: the Lachok and Rivan villages

Lahchok and Rivan villages are located in Kaski district in west-central Nepal, about 20–30 kilometres in a northwesterly direction from Pokhara in the Mardi and Seti river valley. Until late 1980, one had to walk all the way from Pokhara to these villages, and it could take three hours to walk almost along the Seti River and then one hour to walk along the Mardi River to reach Lachok, and fve hours to reach Rivan – the former is located on the foothills and the later on the mountain slope. The core Rivan village is a Gurung-dominated village, and Lachok is a Brahmin-Chettri–dominated

240 Jagannath Adhikari village. Members of the Dalit group are present in both villages. As Gurungs slowly started to move down into foothills and river valleys from hilltops, generally by investing savings generated from remittances from work in foreign countries, mainly in the past in the Indian and British armies, they have also settled in Lachok in signifcant numbers. They now tend to shift to urban centres or market centres. This is a general pattern seen in the middle hills region of the country. Since the mid-1980s, a few dirt roads were constructed linking Pokhara to immediate hinterland – mostly within the government-declared urban areas, which then further extended in a step-wise manner towards rural villages. This process also helped shorten the walking distance to Lachok in the late 1980s for those who can afford taxis or buses, if available. By the early 1990s, a road was constructed linking Pokhara and Baglung through the assistance of the Chinese government made these villages accessible as the road passed through Hyanjya’s Milanchowk from where it would take one and half hours to reach Lhchok and two and half hours to reach the Rivan. Milanchowk was a short stopover point for the people walking through Hyanjya, and a meeting place for local villagers. It used to have one or two tea-shops to cater passers-by until the mid-1980s, but as this became a nodal point for the villages located north, it started to develop as a major market centre. Today, it looks like a bustling market with a rapid increase in number of houses each year. By the middle of the frst decade of the 2000s, roads were further expanded and, by 2008, there was a road linking Milanchowk with Lachok and other villages in the Mardi-Seti river valley. Now one can reach the village by a bus, even though the frequency of bus service is still low. Milanchowk also draws many people from surrounding areas, including Lachok and Rivan villages. People having savings invest in land and houses here, as there are good private schools and it is easy from here to reach Pokhara in case of emergency. As savings in the villages are generated mainly by outside income sources, the migration and remittances are important for this purpose, too. 9.3.2 Migration pattern: past and now The history of migration in the villages clearly indicates that they did not remain isolated even in the past, but exposure to the outside world was open to a certain group of people and this exposure had, in fact, brought some changes in the village, but the changes were not that dramatic – frst because only a few people from certain groups (mainly Gurungs) had participated in distant migration through army service. The other groups that had participated in migration were the poorer groups (like Dalits) and middle-class families, who undertook migration for civilian and army service in India. The incomes from these services were not that high, and these savings generally were invested in the village itself except for those few who had worked in the British Army after 1950 and started moving out to urban areas.

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As stated previously, migration began taking place in these villages a long time ago. Elderly villagers talk about the stories of migration they heard from their ancestors. This clearly means that migration had been taking place even in the distant past like early 19th century, but then it was a risky affair to migrate especially for the British-India army service. Elderly villagers mentioned a few cases in which people who had gone for work in the army service were punished by the government, but this did not continue for a long time. By the late 19th century, more and more people from villages went for army service in India, and this increased in the early to mid-20th century because of the world wars. Gurungs (i.e., from Rivan village) commonly entered this army service. This was the same situation in other neighbouring Gurung villages. The absence of many adult young males in these Gurung villages made women able to self-organize and form camaraderie so that they could help each other. As a result, these Gurung villages have strong women’s organizations, which nowadays are called AmaTolis. A few Chettri households also participated in army service. This army service has continued until now, but to a very small extent. After the 1950s, British army service became lucrative, and these soldiers could generate savings. As a result, Gurungs and few others who had participated in army service generated savings, which was initially invested in the village land itself, especially in paddy land in lowlands, and in nice houses within the village. Since the 1960s, these people started to move to Pokhara, as they understood the value of education of their children. They used their savings to buy the land, built the houses, and then shifted there. This trend has now intensifed, especially among the Gurungs. It has gone so far as that about 60% of the households in Rivan, a Gurung-dominated village, have either partly or completely moved to Pokhara (urban centre). Their houses and land are now abandoned. Apart from army service, people had also migrated to work in non-army services in India, and a few went to settle in Assam and Meghalaya in India. Dalits used to move seasonally to Pokhara and Terai villages for work in the winter season. They would do caste-based work like tailoring, blacksmithery, and other manual work in the farm. But, then, until the mid-1980s, agriculture was important as a main source of livelihood. The village was largely a self-suffcient place to meet the low consumption level of that time, and only salt, sugar, and a few non-food items that were not produced locally were brought in from Pokhara market. People also did not sell much in the market, except for occasional selling of animals in the seasonal markets. A few, especially Dalits, would make bamboo baskets and mats to be sold in Pokhara during market fairs. Milk was produced, but was consumed locally. Vegetables were also produced, but to a limited extent, as there was no market for this in the village. From the early 1990s, things have started to change in the village – both in terms of migration, interaction with market, and other socioeconomic changes. A clear change in the village’s complete integration with the market

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emerged from this time, which coincides with greater change in politics, the infuence of mass media and a greater communication pattern, road linkage with urban centres, and the high magnitude of migration to foreign countries for work bringing in remittances to most households. Farming patterns also changed, with more and more interest in commercial or market-oriented vegetable farming, dairy production, and poultry production for market. There is also now higher commuting to Pokhara, in addition to permanent shifting of some household there. With access to transportation facilities, even some young boys and girls commute to Pokhara for their college level education. There is also expansion in educational facilities within the village – in both public and private sector. There are private boarding (English-speaking) schools in the village now. 9.3.3

Migration: 1989–1990, 1997, and 2008

The following two tables show the changes in migration patterns. The comparison of migration to foreign countries and migrating within the country for work shows that, in relative terms, migration to foreign countries for work has expanded more rapidly (in terms of participation of households) than migration for work within the country, which has rather just stagnated or declined. As Table 9.1 shows, in 1989, foreign migration was limited within the India except a few Gurungs who had been recruited into the British Army, and who were working in UK. Otherwise, foreign labour migration was confned within India for both civilian and army jobs. The civilian work in India was primarily seasonal unskilled work in households or in factories. As the table shows, by then, only 15% of Brahmin households, 25% of Chettri households, and 50% of Dalit households had members (usually one member) working in India in civilian jobs, and this work was mostly seasonal. Only among the Gurungs, eight families (out of 60 studied) had members in the UK with the British Army, and 25% of them had a member working in the Indian Army. This shows that there was a distinct cultural difference in the type of work being done, and the magnitude of migration. Poorer households had participated mostly in seasonal works in India, and, as a result, more Dalits migrated seasonally to India for some work and income. Table 9.1 Percentage of households having members in foreign countries to work (except India) from Lachok and Rivan villages

Brahmin Chettri Dalit Gurung

1990

1997

2008

- (India seasonal 15%) - (25% in India, mostly seasonal) - (50% in India, mostly seasonal) 8 (UK army, 25% Indian army)

16.4 27.1 28.7 43.8

43.4 45.4 66.4 73.2

Sources: Adhikari (1996); Seddon et al. (2001); Adhikari (2009b)

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The pattern of migration as discussed previously had started to change since the mid-1990s with the opening of migration to the Gulf countries and Malaysia, and this change was somewhat evident in 1997. This study revealed that about 17% of Brahmin households, 27% of Chetri households, 29% of Dalit households, and 44% of Gurung households had member(s) working in foreign countries beyond India, mainly in Gulf States and Malaysia. This clearly shows the beginning of a new trend of migration for work beyond India. This trend further magnifed in 2008, when about 50% of households had member(s) working in foreign countries beyond India. There was slight variation across ethnic groups, but the overall trend was that of rapid increase in migration for all groups – about 45% in the cases of Brahmins and Chetri, 66% in the case of Dalits and 73% in the case of Gurung households. These data clearly show that there is a distinct new trend in foreign labour migration: rapid increase in migration rate for all social groups. The migration to India has declined concomitantly, even though a few still migrated to India then, but this has declined rapidly. Table 9.2 shows that, in contrast to foreign labour migration, there is not much change in migration within the country for work/jobs. Proportionately – i.e., in terms of proportionate participation of households – this internal migration has more or less remained stagnant in recent times (1997–2007). For the period from 1990–1997, there was some expansion or increase in participation rate for few groups, especially Brahmins and Chettris, and these rates were stagnant for others. But, in the period from 1997–2007, there was slight decline in participation rate in this migration for all social groups. This essentially means that in the period from 1997–2007, there was no expansion of job opportunities within the countries for the people of this village. 9.3.4

Village situation in the 1990s

In the early 1990s, the village and household economy in Lachok and Rivan clearly revealed that there were two major interlocking spheres of the economy: the village-farming system and off-farm work. The former did not involve much cash income, since most crops were grown for subsistence, but the latter (off-farm work) involved cash. It is because of this interlocking Table 9.2 Percentage of households having members outside the village (to work within Nepal) from Lachok and Rivan villages

Brahmin Chettri Dalit Gurung

1990

1997

2008

16.7 10.0 2.7 12.9

26.4 29.5 4.8 12.5

24.6 25.9 1.7 12.0

Sources: Adhikari (1996); Seddon et al. (2001); Adhikari, (2009b)

244 Jagannath Adhikari that changes in off-farm employment (i.e., mainly migration and remittance) affected the farming system directly for those taking part in such employment and indirectly for those not taking part, or taking part to a lesser extent, in such employment. A study conducted in the two villages in 1989–1990 with a sample of 200 households (62 Brahmins, 60 Gurungs, 27 Dalits, and 37 Chettris) revealed that landholding per household was very low, at 15 ropani (0.75 ha; 1 ha = 20 ropani), and 80% of households were not self-suffcient in food production. There were obviously differences in landholding status across caste and class lines. For the villages as a whole, outside earnings (offfarm income) contributed about 38% of total household income, but there was a wide variation in its contribution to the household income of different ethnic groups. It contributed about 60% to the total income of Gurungs, 25% to Brahmins, 26% to Chettris, and 9% to the Dalits. Earnings from employment abroad were the main source of off-farm income for Gurung, Chettri and Dalit households, while for Brahmin households, employment within Nepal was the main source of off-farm income. Given the variation between households and ethnic groups in the level of total earnings, it was important to determine whether that level of earnings was derived from a single source or from many sources. The household survey conducted in 1989–1990 showed that each village household was dependent on many sources of income, but the particular sources varied in importance between ethnic groups. These sources were grouped for convenience into three categories: off-farm income (that was mainly remittances), farm income, and wage employment within the villages. External remittances (from foreign countries) and pensions, followed by farm income, were important sources of income for Gurung households, and only a few derived income from local or village wage employment opportunities – in farm as well as non-farm sectors. Among the Brahmins and Chettris, farm income, followed by internal remittance, were important sources of income, and poorer households among them, especially more in case of Chettris (as they had less land in comparison to Brahmins), also undertook wage employment within the village. The case of Dalit households was completely different; labouring jobs within the village were the main source of income. It contributed nearly half (about 48%) of their household income. They were also employed in ‘off-farm’ work outside the village, but the remuneration for this was low – often lower than in local agricultural employment. As a result, they tended to stay in the villages. They found it diffcult to obtain access to remunerative ‘off-farm’ work because of their lack of education and social networks – and their ‘untouchability’. But the opportunities for wage employment within the village were created, largely because of the injection of outside income to Gurung households. ‘Outside earnings’ constituted the main source of cash income in the villages, a part of which was distributed within the village to households which did not take part in external economy through wage

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labouring opportunities, and wages were paid mainly in cash. As Gurung households were heavily involved in outside employment and started to live in Pokhara, they rented out a signifcant part of their land to mainly Brhamins and Chettris, who then employed Dalits as they needed some more labour now. When the study area was revisited in 1994, it was observed that emigrants were diversifying their country of destination. New destinations included the Gulf, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Japan. Among these countries, more jobs were taken in Gulf countries, particularly by Dalits, Brahmins, and Chettris. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia were mostly the destinations for Gurungs, who obtained access to employment there through the connections they had with people already working there and following the channels and procedures they advised. The Hundi system was primarily used by the people undertaking these new-found foreign labour opportunities to send their money home. A detailed survey was conducted in 1997 to examine the migration pattern in the village, and all households in the Lachock village were studied through a small questionnaire. This village also included Gurung households, as they had been coming down to foothills by buying land and building houses. This study revealed that a total of 281 households out of 630 – that is, 45% of all households – had one or more members (a total of 348 individuals) working away from home. These data did not include seasonal migration/ employment, although in fact, many households were involved in seasonal work in Pokhara and in development project sites within the region. Including the seasonal migration of about 250 households (taking the lower end of the range of estimates given by ‘key informants’), 85% of all households depended to some degree on ‘off-farm’ or non-farm income. In other words, about 16% of the total population were involved in temporary or seasonal migration. The study further revealed that the distribution of off-farm/non-farm employment was very much skewed in favour of the wealthier classes. There was only one household from the poorest 10% of households which had access to such employment. Among the poorest 20% of households, only 8% had jobs away from home. By contrast, the fgure for the wealthiest group (the top 10% of households in the wealth ranking) was 87%; in other words, 55 of these 63 households had access to such employment. Similarly, proportionately more members per household from this richest group were involved in ‘off-farm’ work. Even though a clear trend linking an increase in the percentage of households participating in ‘off-farm’ jobs with an increase in wealth rank could not be frmly established, proportionately more households from wealthier classes were involved in such jobs. Out of a total of 630 households in the village, 150 households had members working abroad. These households had sent in total 186 members; a few households sent 2–3 members, but a large majority of households had only one member in foreign employment. With a few exceptions,

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there was consistent increase in the proportion of households sending member(s) abroad as the wealth rank increased. For example, the poorest 20% accounted for only 2.7% of those employed abroad. About 75% of the households involved in foreign employment had household members in India; about 77% of all people from the village involved in foreign employment were in India. The second most common destination, perhaps surprisingly, was Qatar, in the Gulf, which accounted for 12% of all those working abroad; and the third most common destination was Saudi Arabia, with about 7% of all villagers involved in foreign employment. Other countries where people had gone for work included Hong Kong, Oman, and the UK, but their importance in terms of the numbers of people was relatively insignifcant. Some 20% of those working abroad, however, were now employed in the countries of the Gulf. The same pattern was also evident in case of outside employment within the country. In fact, domestic jobs seemed even more unequally distributed in favour of richer classes than the foreign jobs. The lowest 50% in the wealth ranking were hardly involved at all in ‘off-farm’ employment within Nepal; the top 40% accounted for roughly 70% of all households and household members involved in work away from home but within the country. 9.3.5

Village situation in late 2000s

Another study was conducted in the same site in 2008 to examine the impact of migration on land relations among the households and social groups in the village. A total of 1,015 households were included in the study and, like in 1999, it was a census of the village household population. In the study villages, 52% of households had members who had migrated to a foreign country for work. In all, 689 persons (657 male and 29 female) had gone abroad to work from the 1,015 households. If the household size of the village is considered to be an average of 5.6 members, then the labour force that had migrated comes to around 12% of the total population. In a 1997 study, 150 out of 630 households of Lachok had members in foreign countries, so the share of migrants was 23%; this had increased to 52% in 2008. In a study in 1990 conducted in the same village, there were no households with members working in Gulf countries. The migrants were generally working in the Indian and British armies, or doing factory and manual work in India. The number of those heading to the Gulf countries began to increase after 1996. By ethnic groups, 73% of Gurung households had members working in foreign countries, followed by Dalits (68% of households), whose members were working in Gulf countries, Malaysia, or India. In other groups, 40%– 50% households had members who had gone abroad for work (Table 9.3). Table 9.3 gives a comparative picture of migration for work both abroad and within the country in 2008. It shows that 2.3% of households had female members in foreign countries and 50% of households had male members in

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Table 9.3 Migration for work both foreign and internal (within the country) by ethnicity in 2008 (percentage of households; n = sample size, number of households) Brahmin Chettri Dalit Gurung Magar Newar Tamang Total (n = (n = (n = (n = (n = (n = (n = (n = 426) 174) 232) 142) 9) 17) 11) 1015) % households 43.4 with members in foreign labour % households 2.3 with female members in foreign labour % households 24.6 with members in service in Nepal % household 4.9 with female in service in Nepal

45.4

0.0

25.9

2.3

66.4 73.2

55.6

58.8

54.5

52.2

5.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.3

1.7 12.0

11.1

17.6

9.1

17.3

0.0

0.0

9.1

3.5

2.2

0.4

6.3

Source: Adhikari (2009b)

foreign countries. Compared to other caste/ethnic groups, the Gurungs and Dalits had more members working abroad. The volume of those leaving the village for work in other parts of the country was much lower. Brahmins and Chettri households had more people who had migrated for work in other parts of the country (25%), while it was 1.7% for Dalits. In terms of wealth groups, the middle class had more participation in foreign labour migration (57%), followed by the poor group (51%) and the wealthy group (49%). In the case of internal migration for jobs, however, there were more members from the wealthier households (36%), fewer (20%) from the middle-income group, and very few (6%) from poor households. Therefore, the wealthier group had more access to employment within the country, which was primarily due to higher education (Table 9.4). The same pattern was also observed in the 1997 study. Among the 198 households with migrants within country, 61 members were engaged in teaching jobs, with highest share for Brahmins and Chettris. These teachers had migrated to remote places within the district or to remote districts like Mustang, Mugu, Humla, and Jumla. The sources of employment for other internal migrants were police and army service, and offce work. By 2008, there was also a diversifcation in the destination countries, where migrants from the village went; they had gone to 21 different countries

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Table 9.4 Participation in foreign and internal (in-country) migration for work by income group (n = sample size, number of households) in 2008

Households with male foreign migrant labour (%) Households with female foreign migrant labour (%) Households with male service holder (Nepal) (%) Households with female service holder (Nepal) (%)

Rich (n = 186)

Medium (n = 445)

Poor (n = 384)

All households (n = 1015)

48.9

57.3

51.3

52.3

3.2

1.1

3.1

2.3

35.5

19.6

6.0

17.3

10.2

2.9

1.0

3.5

Source: Adhikari (2009b)

this year. This was a big change – from India in 1990 (with a few cases in UK in the British Army), and to India, Gulf countries, and Malaysia (a few in Japan, Taiwan, UK, and the USA) in 1997, and to 21 countries in 2008. In 2008, a large proportion (27%) of them had gone to Qatar, and then to Malaysia (21%), Saudi Arabia (19%), India (14%), and Dubai (7%). Therefore, Gulf countries were much more important now. Regarding the destinations for different ethnic groups, it seemed that Gurungs’ participation in migration to developed countries like UK, USA, Bahrain, and Singapore was comparatively very high as compared to other groups. Brahmins and Chettri households also had members in these developed countries. Dalits’ migration was confned to Gulf countries and India. A few Gurungs, Brahmins, and Chettris had also migrated to India in 2008, but they were working in the army service and other civil jobs, but Dalits who had gone to India had taken mainly the menial jobs. This study revealed that there had been rapid changes in land-based relationships because of increased migration. After the 1990s, land was also useful for getting access to foreign employment in Malaysia and the Gulf states. Land was increasingly used as collateral to obtain credit from landlords in the village and/or urban moneylenders. This was observed more in the case of Dalits. Further, the Dalit households also depended on local brokers (usually Gurungs, Brahmins, and Chettris) for access to urban moneylenders who happened to be the kin-members of these local brokers and get a small cut from the credit delivery process and helping moneylenders to recover their loans. Accordingly, moneylenders for poor migrants like Dalit migrants were now located mainly in the urban areas, and local elites would connect these Dalits to moneylenders in the urban areas. In the earlier phase of migration (like prior to 1990 or until the late 1990s), these migrant Dalits obtained credit within the village – from village elites. The interest was high (about 3% per month), but now they had to depend on local elite as an agent to

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connect to urban moneylender, some of whom were from the same village but had migrated to urban area (Pokhara) a long time back. Foreign labour migration was found to have profound impact in 2008 on land-renting practices in the village. Moreover, transactions of land had also increased. Foreign labour migrants with small savings had invested in land in the villages. Those earning more invested in land at market centres or small towns, and those with sound savings invested in urban areas. Likewise, those migrants who were unsuccessful lost a part of their land. They had to sell the land to pay back loans. Generally, the borrower made a legal commitment in the loan agreement to give up land if he/she defaulted on repayment within a given time. Usually, the local brokers forced them to sell the land and pay back the loans. By 2008, landholding of a household had already been reduced due to population pressure. Even though people had migrated to urban areas and other places, most of them still hold the land. The average household ownership was reduced to 10 ropanis (0.56 ha) in 2008 from 15 ropanis (0.77 ha) in 1990. This means that average landholding in the village had declined by about one-third in 20 years. However, this land was still unequally distributed. In 2008, ownership of Khet (lowland where paddy is produced) was concentrated among the Gurungs, followed by Chettris and Brahmins; the average household holding of Khet land was 8.2 ropanis (0.42 ha) among Gurungs, 8.3 ropanis (0.43 ha) among Brahmins, 7.6 ropani (0.37 ha) among Chettris, and 3.1 ropani (0.15 ha) among Dalits. One of the reasons for Gurungs’ high ownership of Khet land is the investment of their earnings from remittances on Khet land, especially in the past. Therefore, there was a net transfer of Khet land from other groups to Gurungs. In recent times, the tendency was to invest remittances in land and house in urban centres. More than 80% of Gurungs and higher castes (Brahmins and Chettris) had owned some Khetland, but, in case of Dalits, only 34.1% of them owned this type of land. The situation was slightly different for Pakho land (upland, where paddy cultivation is not possible). It was more equitably distributed than Khet land. Eighty-seven percent of households had Pakho land, but the average size of Pakho land was smaller per household (1.9 ropanis, or 0.1 ha). Gurungs had larger holding of Pakho, followed by Chettri and Brahmin groups. One of the reasons for having less Pakho in Lahachok was due to the fact that it is located in the foothills and some of the Pakho had been converted into Khet also through irrigation. There had been several changes in land-based relations when the study was conducted in 2008, thanks mainly to foreign labour migration and remittances. One major change noticed was that Dalits with income from foreign employment had been buying the land in villages and their focus was on Pakho land, as it was cheaper in comparison to Khet land. The wealthier groups who have migrated from the villages to urban centres have been selling parts of their land in the villages, especially Pakho land. The price of Pakho land has decreased. Nevertheless, poor households, regardless of caste

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and ethnicity, have been losing land, especially those not beneftting from remittances or those who have been unsuccessful in migration. In terms of economic status, there were transfers of both Khet and Pakho land to the better-off groups from the poorer groups. The second major impact was observed in land-renting practices. Despite population pressures and decline in average landholding as discussed previously, the practice of renting land seemed to have increased, mainly because of migration of workers for temporary work. The practice of renting-out land was very high among the Gurungs, who were very much engaged in seeking work abroad. In general, more land was available on rent because of increased migration. Many Dalit households had been obtaining land for cultivation on rent. Brahmins and Chhetris in 2008 were no longer renting others’ land like they were in 1990; therefore, the Dalits had the opportunity to do so. Even though Dalits were also seeking employment abroad, they also cultivated land on rent because they had no land, especially Khet land. Dalit women, migrant wives, had also taken leadership roles for obtaining land on rent and working on it. The terms and conditions for renting land have also changed. It had become less and less stringent. Landowners bore all the cost of external inputs, whereas in the past, tenants had to bear all these costs for the farm inputs. In order to analyze the land-renting practice and the impact of migration, data were categorized in terms of participation in foreign labour migration and non-participation. Table 9.5 shows that those who had participated in foreign labour migration had relatively larger sizes of land, of both Khet and Pakho. Similarly, the renting-out was signifcant among the participants compared to non-participants. Renting-in land was very high among the non-participants. This clearly shows that migration has infuenced landrenting practices. Apart from changes in land tenure practice, abandoning the land was also commonly seen. This was especially true in Gurung village, where distant Table 9.5 Migration for work abroad and its impact on land-renting practice (percentage of households; n = sample size, number of households) in 2008 Participation in foreign labour Participants (n = 528) Non-participants (n = 487) All households (n = 1,015)

Land ownership

Renting-out land

Renting-in land

Khet

Pakho

Khet

Pakho

Khet

Pakho

8.8

4.2

15.3

10.2

12.1

2.5

5.3

2.6

5.7

4.6

32

7.5

3.2

10.8

7.3

22.7

Source: Field Survey, 2008

11.7 7.2

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Pakho land was abandoned from cultivation as early as mid-1990s. But now, this practice of not cultivating the land has expanded rapidly – so much so that even the fertile and valuable lands like Khet are kept fallow due to lack of labour in the family, high wage rates for the hired labour, and not getting trusted individuals to rent the land. Such abandoned felds have been converted into plantations. In the neighbouring Gurung village of Luwang, such abandoned felds, which are quite large, are converted into tea estates. In addition to changes in land use and land-renting patterns, tremendous change was also observed in the use of forest resources. Until the late 1990s, there was high dependence on forest for fuelwood, fodder, and timber, but the access to forest was not equitable and just. Though forest was a common resource, the Dalits were not allowed to be members in community forests, as forests were managed by elite groups only, and Dalits got the access only through the patrons to whom they had provided their caste services. On the other hand, with Dalits being virtually landless, they did not have livestock and thus did not require much fodder – but they needed charcoal for their iron-smithing works to make farm implements and repair other iron pots and utensils. Their patrons usually provided the charcoal, and also allowed Dalits to make charcoals in their forests. By the frst decade of the 2000s, the economy in the village changed, and the traditional patron-client relationships had almost broken down, making it harder for Dalits to get access to the forests of their previous patrons; therefore, they had started to demand their rights to forests. As a result, there was an intense confict in access to forests, but by 2008, the Dalits’ dependence on this traditional role had declined, and there was plenty of fuelwood available now in private lands and that forest had in fact expanded. Migration and remittances had a greater role in this change. Therefore, Dalits needed not much charcoal now, and then there was greater availability of fuelwood in private lands. Therefore, the desire to have access to the forest had declined. Moreover, there was access to gas (cylinder gas) for those having good remittances. 9.3.6

Refections on changes in the village as seen in 2013 and 2015

The village was undergoing vast change as it appeared in revisits made in 2013 and 2015. By this time, the road had connected the village to Pokhara. The places where there used to be two tea-shops in thatched houses – a place where the Village Development Committee (VDC) offce was/is located now looked like a bustling market centre with huge concrete houses. In general, concrete houses lined the road in the village. In 1990, there was not a single concrete building, except a part of a school building. Even in the middle of the village, not touched by the motorable road itself, concrete houses had sprung here and there by 2015. This was made possible, as told by villagers, due to high cash income, as well as availability of materials like cement and roads due to transport facilities.

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It was surprising to fnd a remittance agency coming to the village itself. A fnancial co-operative formed by the villagers had started doing the remittance business. In fact, it was the main activity of the co-operative, apart from providing credit to people. As the migrants working in foreign countries have increased, this made it possible to have a proftable remittance agency in the village. As reported by the manager of the remittance agency, around Rs 20 million in remittances is handled by this agency in a month, and its command area is slightly larger than these two villages. There was also a transformation in the enterprise development in the village. New enterprises have sprung up. For example, a Chettri man who had established a concrete block factory – to produce concrete block for the village as well as to other villages – stated that he had been to Malaysia for three years, and after that, he started doing this business. Now that there is electricity and road access, he thought of doing some business. There were two other such factories in the village – all run by returned migrants. In agriculture, also, there were some major changes. A few medium-sized dairy industries have been started and they kept 10–20 cows/buffaloes. Milk was collected in the collection centres and then in the morning and evening, tractors would take the milk cans to Pokhara’s chilling centre. Similarly, a number of green-houses for the production of tomatoes and other vegetables could be seen – producing both seasonal and off-seasonal vegetables, again for Pokhara market. There were three huge poultry farms, which almost looked like industrial farms, to produce chicken and eggs for the Pokhara market. In a way, a trend in commercialization in farming and enterprise development could be seen in the village. Access to electricity and roads, and easy accessibility to major marketing centres like Pokhara, were important, but the access to remittances, knowledge, and awareness about the world on the part of migrants were also equally important for this transformation. A number of private boarding schools were also seen running, and some of the schools and other concrete houses were built on the paddy feld. As a result, availability of plain land for farming had in fact declined because of house construction and road construction, but there was a tendency to intensify the plainland (in the foothills) through intensive vegetable production and by growing three crops (paddy, maize, and short season vegetables like potatoes). These were the visible changes from outside. At the same time, there were changes in socio-cultural spheres, in gender relations, and in caste relations. Caste taboos were breaking down – at least caste-based discriminations were not visible in tea-shops and public space the way it was visible in the 1990s. Interestingly, a few tea-shops which had imposed caste discrimination (like asking a Dalit to stay outside the shop to have tea/food and asking him/her to wash the glass/plate) did not sell food now, as they said they could no longer enforce that discriminatory practice. But, then, they could not personally accept the new change of ‘non-touchability’ of Dalits (i.e., the need to wash the dishes used by Dalits if they come to buy their tea/food), and thus gave up

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the business. This clearly shows that forces of non-touchability are growing and becoming stronger, and thus elderly and conservative people were forced to observe it or isolate themselves from the public affairs. However, many other tea-shops operated by higher-caste shop owners did not enforce such discrimination. Moreover, Dalits, especially the young Dalits, were stronger now in demanding equal service for equal payment, and they refrain from washing the dishes if they pay the same price for services. On the other hand, a few higher-caste households were found to have gone back to traditional education of their children (ancient Sanskrit education in strict Brahministic ways). More of such schools have opened up now – mostly from private initiatives or through co-operation of like-minded individuals. The cursory observation of the village life clearly showed that farm workers were mainly women, and more of them were also seen taking the vegetables, milk, and other products to market centres. In the schools, also, the participation of girls had increased signifcantly. As this village had private as well as public schools, and had easy access to market centres and major urban centres, there was low level of migration of migrants’ wives to market centres for the education of the children. Still then, interest in the education of children was seen still high among the high-caste households compared to Dalit households. A large majority of Gurungs had gone to Pokhara or had connections there, and they tend to send their children to Pokhara (the main urban centre) for study. Shortage of labour was also felt in the village. Farm households coped with this by intensifying the fertile part of the feld and de-intensifying or abandoning the less fertile land. As there was no intermediate migration (i.e., migration of migrants’ wives and children for education) to market centres in this particular village because of its easy access to market centres and the urban centre (Pokhara), women and elderly parents of the migrants had time for farming. In fact, Dalit women wanted to rent-in the land if it is of fertile nature as they wanted to increase income or get some food through production. As they did not have their own land for this purpose, they could do so. In one instance, a tractor ploughing the land was also observed. As tractors are now used for transportation of goods and commodities to and from the market, they were also used for ploughing wherever land type was suitable for this (i.e., plain land). As the village (Lachock) was located in the foothills, some of the land here could be ploughed by a tractor. On the Dalit side, also, a sense of resistance to breakdown the traditional division of work and caste discrimination has been growing, thanks to education and awareness from the knowledge of the outside world. In the mid-1990s, Dalits started to boycott the practice of ploughing the land through the traditional patron-client relationship, which required them to work under semi-bonded conditions. Political ideology espoused by Maoist political party (one political group which waged the ‘people’s war’ in the period 1996–2006 that led to the killings of about 17,000 people) had already reached to the village through its leaders and it had some infuence in

254 Jagannath Adhikari organizing this resistance. However, only a few who had access to remittance could afford to stick to this boycott, but other Dalits could not resist, and they started to follow this ploughing work. But, by late in the frst decade of the 2000s, and more so in 2013 and 2015, it was seen that this traditional division of work had already been broken almost completely. Brahmin and Chettri youths now plough the land by themselves, and there is no hesitation to perform this task – this is so because of both the breaking down of the traditional caste practices, as well as high wages to be paid for ploughmen now. Therefore, both modernity and the wage market have helped to bring changes. Looking at the material consumption in the village, it is clearly revealed that modern material things have penetrated to every household. Most of the households had access to symbol of modernity like radio, TV, cameras, mobile phones, new clothes, and knowledge of the world, thanks to remittance income. These modern commodities have also become cheap as they come from the global market (especially China) and are also accessible to people because of the inter-linkage of local and global market channels. A few had access to computers – both desktops and laptops. Many others have now seen these things. In the past, only a few people like Gurungs and few migrants from other social/cultural groups were mainly the source of cash income and cosmopolitan-ness, and they were held high in society – their new dress, especially army dress, radios, and knowledge of the world, was a kind for ‘envy’ for the villagers. It is no wonder that these migrants used to carry radios hanging on their shoulders whenever they walked about the village in order to show their symbol of modernity. This is not so now as most people have access to these symbols of modernity. This does not mean that there is no demand for these symbols – new symbols have been created, and there is a growing desire for these symbols (like reputed brands of mobile phones), and thus it has also created a situation of perpetual unhappiness. In the past, a few material things would make people of the village happy. In a few cases, a return to past traditions has also been seen as a ‘symbol’ of prestige, and accordingly, a few high-caste households have sent their sons to study Sanskrit language in a Brahmanistic way so that their dress and habit are different. These sons are encouraged to follow all the traditional practices, but mainly within their households and within their groups, as they are restricted from expressing some of their practices (like untouchability) in public space. So, after a period of distaste for such practices (like studying Sanskrit), now there is some resurgence for such education for the upper-caste groups like Brahmins. In 2013 and 2015, it was observed that the new ‘patrons’ were the ones who could help people to move out through loans and connections. These new ‘patrons’ help develop links to people in Pokhara who could provide loans and information about migration and outside opportunities. Some of these people were the former residents of the village who moved out to Pokhara in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Restructuring, agrarian change, outcomes

9.4

255

Conclusion

Looking at the changes in the village, we can see parallel changes in both the ‘economic system’ and the ‘cultural system’ – largely brought about by migration and remittances and greater integration with the market economy and education. These changes have moved in tandem in order to make life easier. Traditional associative life based on caste and ritual have given way to new associations based on the need to have connections to the outer world, and this also been facilitated by new links of rural people to urban people (like new patrons located in urban areas, or other patrons who could connect people to resourceful people in urban areas). Therefore, there is more interaction with urban areas – not only for material things, but also to seek ideas and knowledge, loans, and guidance from their ‘new patrons’ who live in urban areas like Pokhara. Accordingly, the growing migration has helped to better integrate the rural and urban, and causing the diversifed, hybrid, and multi-locational livelihood pattern for the households. This is the ‘new rurality’ now, as discussed previously and which has been a global phenomenon. But, in Nepal’s case, this ‘new rurality’ has its own characteristics, especially because of the long-entrenched caste system, resource endowment patterns, and, of course, because of a different history of exposure to the modern-world practices like education. The study clearly illustrated that different groups within the villages have used the opportunities of migration and remittance income in different ways to suit their conditions and interests (also shaped by the local social structure and the rebellion it would create, like the boycotting of ploughing work by the Dalits), leading to different types of changes in their livelihood patterns and aspirations – again shaped by their everyday realities. The longitudinal study of the village also helps us to understand how migration and remittances can be used in different purposes under different contexts. The fndings of the study clearly defy various assumptions made about the impact of migration and remittances. At the least, the study confrms that as people see infrastructure coming to their villages like road transportation, electricity, educational institutions, and marketing opportunities, the tendency to invest remittances in agro-enterprises and other business opportunities will grow. This would also help the returning migrants to use their knowledge and experiences to create such enterprises. Therefore, complementary facilities are important if people are to be encouraged to invest their remittances in enterprise development, including farm enterprises. Hence, there are possibilities that migration and rural/agricultural development could go hand in hand. However, the ways different people respond to this opportunity are different depending on their position (caste/ ethnicity, cultural resources, network relationships with people in urban areas, education and ownership of land, etc.) in society, creating a complex dynamics of change.

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Notes 1 Average landholding size for a family in 2011 was 0.6 ha, according to Nepal Living Standard Survey III in 2010. Only 0.7% of households have landholding of more than 4 ha, and more than half the household population has less than 0.5 ha farm size (CBS/GoN, 2012). Therefore, Nepal is now basically a country of small and marginal landholders. 2 The estimates range from 0.9 million to 3.5 million (Adhikari and Gurung, 2009). 3 As of 2016, countries like Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Laos get a signifcant amount of remittances, falling in the top ten remittances-receiving developing countries in terms of share of remittances to their GDP (World Bank, 2016). Notably, remittances account for more than offcial development aid. For example, India gets the highest remittance ($72.2 billion) in the world. Other countries also get signifcant remittance – Bangladesh ($15.8 billion), Indonesia ($10.5 billion), and Nepal ($6.4 billion) (World Bank, 2016). 4 Nepal also looks bad on other nutrition indicators. For instance, the prevalence of anemia in women 15–49 years is 35% (DoHS, 2011), prevalence of anaemia in children (6–59 months) is 46% (DoHS, 2011), and only 47% of children ages 6–23 months consumed food rich in vitamin A (DoHS, 2011). A similar situation also exists in India, as reported in detail in a recent publication (Pritchard et al., 2014). Rates of malnutrition in Bangladesh are among the highest in the world. 5 www.icimod.org/?q=1673 6 This theory states a linear relationship between population growth, expansion of cultivation in environmentally sensitive land, land degradation and deforestation, decline in soil fertility, and less production and less food, and then that the cycle would continue, leading to further degradation of the environment.

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10 Identifying reproductive health coverage gaps for rural- and urban-born migrant household heads in the slums in and around Dhaka city, Bangladesh Kimberly Clair, Abdur Razzaque, Mohammad Zahirul Islam, Mohammad Nahid Mia, Razib Chowdhury, AHM Golam Mustafa and Randall Kuhn 10.1 Introduction The global urban population grows by 80 million people every year (UNICEF, 2018). Since 2007, more than half of the world’s population has lived in urban areas (Rashid, 2009). Both international and internal migrants, particularly those in the Global South, are increasingly moving to cities, or “urban agglomerations,” to pursue better economic and/or educational opportunities (Haque, 2005: 43; United Nations, 2013: 3). In South Asia, where internal migration is more common than international migration (Deshingkar, 2005: 3), social networks and family relations are signifcant “pull factors” that draw migrants to urban areas (Haque, 2005: 42). In the past three decades, Dhaka city experienced an annual average growth rate of 7%, largely as a result of rural to urban migration (Mohit, 2012: 612; World Bank, 2007: 1). Internal migrants are typically poorer than international migrants (Haque, 2005: 42), while individuals moving to the city are primarily young adults and women of reproductive age (United Nations, 2013: 3–4). In South Asia, men continue to make up the majority of rural-to-urban migrants (Jolly and Reeves, 2005: 7) However, an increasing number of women are moving to the cities in India and Bangladesh, primarily to pursue employment in the garment industry (Deshingkar, 2005: 12). Although cities typically offer more opportunities for social mobility, better access to high-quality health services and higher levels of women’s participation in the work force compared to rural areas, this so-called “urban advantage” is stratifed by socio-economic status (Cohen, 2006: 64; United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 2018). The rapid rate of urbanization worldwide has led to overcrowding and the expansion of informal settlements (Cohen, 2006: 64). Between 1990 and 2014, the world’s slum population increased by 25% from 690 million to 880 million (UNICEF, 2018: 7).

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In Bangladesh, urban areas are growing 2.5 times faster than rural areas (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2010) and approximately 37.4% of Dhaka’s population lives in slums (UNDP, 2010; Mohit, 2012: 615). The “urbanization of poverty” (Pradhan, 2013) has strained cities’ ability to provide basic services, including water and sanitation, healthcare, and education (Cohen, 2006: 64; World Bank, 2007; Rashid, 2009: 575). Within urban areas, access to health services is stratifed not only by income, but also by duration in the city; compared to the urban-born, recent migrants tend to have weaker social networks, which can facilitate access to resources (UNDP, 2010: 73).

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Bangladesh is experiencing rapid urbanization. Although 36% of the population currently live in urban areas (World Bank, 2018), the urban population of Bangladesh is increasing at a rate of 3.55% each year and is expected to exceed the rural population by 2039 (National Institute of Population Research and Training [NIPORT] et al., 2016). This shift is caused primarily by rural-to-urban migration (Afsar, 2003). The emergence of a pluralistic health system with numerous stakeholders investing in the health of marginalized populations, including women, children and the urban poor, has led to signifcant improvements in maternal and child health outcomes. Efforts to scaleup the availability and accessibility of maternal health services since the mid-1990s, such as the deployment of community health workers at the district and subdistrict levels, have contributed to substantial reductions in maternal mortality (Chowdhury et al., 2013: 1734). Maternal deaths in Bangladesh have decreased from 194 deaths per 100,000 livebirths in 2010 to 143 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2015 (Kamal et al., 2016: 1). The availability of maternal health services has also increased in urban slums. A recent analysis of data collected from the 2013 Bangladesh Urban Health Study found that slum areas were more likely than non-slum areas to have community health workers and equally likely to have non-governmental organization (NGO) and public health facilities (Govindaraj et al., 2018: 35). Bangladesh has also made achievements in immunization and oral rehydration therapy programs (Chowdhury et al., 2013: 1738) and, compared to other low-income countries, has made signifcant inroads towards reducing neonatal mortality (Rubayet et al., 2012). Figure 10.1.d shows that on immunization outcomes, Bangladesh has a higher percentage of children aged 12–23 months who received the measles vaccination compared with India, Pakistan and Nepal. Ninety percent of urban children and 84.8% of rural children in Bangladesh have received the measles vaccination, compared with 74.3% (urban) and 55.6% (rural) of children in Pakistan, and 93.2% (urban) and 80.3% (rural) in India. Despite these gains, Bangladesh continues to face high rates of child malnutrition and low utilization of maternal health services, such as antenatal

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care (ANC), skilled birth attendants and institutional deliveries (Chowdhury et al., 2013: 1738). Figure 10.1 shows that urban areas of Bangladesh fare poorly on maternal healthcare utilization when compared with other countries in South Asia. Only 46% of women from urban areas and 26% of women from rural areas received at least four visits during pregnancy by any provider, compared with 66% (urban) and 45% (rural) in India and 76% (urban) and 62% (rural) in Nepal (Figure 10.1.a). The proportion of births attended by a skilled health professional is also lower for both urban and rural Bangladeshi women compared with women in India, Pakistan and Nepal. Nationwide, only 42% of births among women in Bangladesh were attended by skilled health personnel, compared to 52% of births in Pakistan and 58% of births in Nepal (Figure 10.1.b). Bangladesh also saw a lower percentage of births delivered in a health facility compared to India, Pakistan and Nepal (Figure 10.1.c). In Bangladesh, 57% of births among urban mothers and 31% of births among rural mothers were delivered in a health facility. In Pakistan, 68% of births among urban mothers and 40% of births among rural mothers were delivered in a facility. In contrast, more than 75% of births among both urban and rural women in

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Figure 10.1 Urban/rural variation in key MNCH outcomes in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal Source: Compiled by authors

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India were delivered in a health facility. Home deliveries and deliveries in which trained birth attendants are not present can increase risk of maternal mortality and inadequate treatment of obstetric complications (Nahar, Banu, &Nasreen, 2011). The effects of this “Bangladesh paradox,” in which signifcant achievements in health outcomes exist alongside poor rates of utilization and persistent poverty, are more apparent when comparing health outcomes of slum and non-slum residents (Chowdhury et al., 2013: 1734). The urban slum population in Bangladesh – an estimated 5.7 million people – is highly diverse, mobile, and vulnerable to precarious economic and living conditions which can negatively impact health (Khatun et al., 2012). Women residing in urban slum areas face high rates of intimate partner violence and early marriage, as well as weaker social networks (McNab and Freedman, 2016: 17). Women face additional barriers to accessing health services in areas where conservative gender norms have restricted their mobility in public space (Chant, 2013: 21–23). An analysis of the 2006 Bangladesh Urban Health Study found that women residing in slums reported greater diffculty with physical mobility and had poorer mental health scores compared to non-slum women (Govindaraj et al., 2018: 48). In addition, children living in slum areas have poorer growth outcomes, including a higher moderate-to-severe stunting rate, compared to rural children (Govindaraj et al., 2018: 33). Despite improvements in availability of maternal health services in urban areas, utilization of such services remains low, particularly in slum areas. Data from the 2013 Bangladesh Urban Health Study show that rates of home delivery are higher for women living in slums compared to women residing in non-poor urban areas (Adams et al., 2015: 3), while utilization of any health facility for ANC, delivery or a newborn exam was 22–25% lower for slum children compared to non-slum children (Govindaraj et al., 2018: 38–39). Maternal and neonatal mortality rates are higher in urban slum areas, with 43.7 neonatal deaths per 1,000 live births recorded in slums compared to 37 neonatal deaths per 1,000 live births nationally (Khatun et al., 2012: 1). A comparison of 2001 and 2010 Bangladesh Maternal Mortality and Health Care Survey data found an increase in both urban and rural women’s use of ANC provided by medically trained providers; however, a substantial gap remained between wealthy and poor urban residents’ use of facilities for deliveries (Kamal et al., 2016). Among urban women who did utilize healthcare facilities, poorer women tended to use public facilities, while wealthier women visited private sector facilities (Kamal et al., 2016: 5). These fndings suggest that the purported “urban advantage” of increased availability of health services in cities may be misleading without accounting for socio-economic differences among urban residents (Saravan, Sakdapolrak and Butsch, 2012; Matthews et al., 2010).

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10.3 Migrant health outcomes: maternal and child health services Migration status also impacts health outcomes and access to services. Droughts, foods, cyclones and other water-related climate events impacting rural areas in the low-lying delta regions of Bangladesh have resulted in waves of mass migration into Dhaka city, which has been called “an urbanized area of migrated people” (Molla et al., 2017: 336). Among Dhaka slum dwellers, an estimated 53% migrated from outside of the city (Marshall and Rahman, 2013: 7). Barriers to health service utilization among recent migrants from rural areas include lack of resources, a lack of familiarity with the urban health services environment and prioritization of economic concerns over health needs (Kusuma et al., 2018: 161). Child health is also impacted by migration status, with lower rates of child survival among migrant poor communities than among other urban poor residents (Islam and Azad, 2008). An increasing number of rural-to-urban migrants are women (Roy, Tisdell, and Alauddin, 1992). Among both male and female respondents surveyed in the 2015 Urban Health and Demographic Surveillance System, the primary cause for internal migration was reported to be marriage/joining a family (Razzaque et al., 2019: 75). Household heads who have recently migrated into cities from rural areas typically have weaker social networks, which can decrease awareness of safe and reliable health services and impede health service utilization (McNab and Freedman, 2016: 17–18). In addition, ruralto-urban migrant women may retain perceptions and beliefs about maternal healthcare rooted in their experiences in rural settings. For example, in a mixed-methods study with women living in Dhaka city slums that were part of the BRAC Manoshi program, women expressed a preference for homebirths due to the lower costs and the presence of trusted family members – beliefs also found among rural women (Chowdhury et al., 2013: 3–4). Other studies have identifed women’s negative perceptions of health facilities and the healthcare system as barriers to utilization. A 2015 study with female slum residents in Dahka reported feelings of mistrust towards community health workers and a belief that health facilities were “intimidating and scary” or only to be used for emergencies (McNab and Freedman, 2016), while 70% of women surveyed in the 2013 Bangladesh Urban Health Study believed delivery at a health facility to be unnecessary (Govindaraj et al., 2018: 39). Further, logistic regression analysis of the 2006 Bangladesh Urban Health Survey found that migrant women were less likely than non-migrant women to utilize ANC, take vitamin A after delivery and receive a post-birth medical exam (Islam and Gagnon, 2016). We build on these existing analyses by providing further evidence of migrant disadvantages in maternal and child health service utilization among migrants in a large-scale slum population sample. We also provide

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preliminary exploration of gradients by socioeconomic status among migrants and non-migrants.

10.4

Methods and materials

The diversity of Bangladesh’s urban population, coupled with substantial variations in the quality and utilization of urban health services, presents challenges for data collection and tracking. Standard surveillance techniques, such as household surveys, are unlikely to accurately capture the range of health-seeking behaviors associated with poorer and more mobile segments of the urban population (McNab and Freedman, 2016: 10). The Urban Primary Health Care Project was developed to address these potential gaps using the Health and Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS). The HDSS collects information on pregnancy outcomes, mortality, marriage and divorce, migrations, safe motherhood practices and fertility regulation from select slums in Dhaka (North & South) and Gazipur City Corporations (Razzaque et al., 2019, Ch. 3). Fieldworkers who received training on data collection and interviewing techniques visited 31,577 households during a quarterly (three-month) cycle. Eligible women were interviewed for data pertaining to pregnancy outcomes. Data on pregnancy outcomes (live birth, still birth or miscarriage), safe motherhood practices (mode of delivery, place of delivery, who attended the birth and ANC), contraceptive use and background characteristics (education, age, occupation, marital status) have been collected since January 2016, with daily checks performed to ensure data quality. One limitation of prospective registration data is that respondents are not typically followed when they leave the site. In the case of pregnancy tracking, a major concern is that migrants may be more likely to return to the rural area around the time of childbirth. Figure 10.2 shows that it indeed the case that the pregnancy tracking data in the HDSS has a relatively high rate of pregnancies with missing outcome 30 25 20 15 10 5 0