Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6-13 9781472551511, 9781780932088

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Conventions [] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation or the lemmata for purposes of clarity, as well as those portions of the lemmata which are not quoted by Simplicius. Angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Greek text, i.e. additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompanying notes provide further details. () Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words and Bekker page references to the Aristotelian text.

Preface This is the fourth and last volume of the translation of the commentary on Aristotle’ treatise On the Soul, wrongly attributed to Simplicius. I was still a young doctoral student when I started working on this commentary. During lunch breaks I often had the pleasure of discussing difficult passages with my senior colleague at the ‘Aristoteles latinus’, Fernand Bossier, who was himself working on a doctoral project about the medieval translations of Simplicius. We both became convinced that the commentary On the Soul was not by Simplicius, but should be attributed to his colleague Priscian of Lydia, and we set out our arguments in a joint article (1972). In his commentary Priscian proves to be an original philosopher who deserves to be studied, not only as a thoughtful commentator of a complex Aristotelian text, but also because of his own provocative views on the rational soul as a Self in Change. I devoted a large part of my doctoral dissertation – published in 1978 as The Changing Self – to Priscian’s philosophy. In 1995 J.O. Urmson published the first volume of the translation of the Commentary in this series (1.1-2.4). He had also proposed to translate the second volume, 2.5-12, but, having noticed that the author of the commentary could not be the genuine Simplicius, he abandoned that part of the project and preferred to return to his translation of the Physics Commentary from the genuine Simplicius, whom he admired at first for throwing light on his beloved Aristotle. He had made, however, a complete draft of the translation of DA 2.5-12, which I was asked to revise and finish for publication (1997). It was an excellent idea to include in the same volume Pamela Huby’s translation of Priscian’s Metaphrasis. Henry Blumenthal continued the difficult task with the translation of 3.1-5, which was published in 2000, but his untimely death left the project unfinished for many years. Richard Sorabji asked me to take over the remaining section, but in the meanwhile I was taken by other projects, in particular the edition of Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides. Richard often gently pushed me and reminded me of what I had foolishly promised, and it was my pleasure to be able to return to Priscian in the last years before my academic retirement. I had the extraordinary fortune of having a talented doctoral student who shared my interest in the ancient commentators on the soul, Arnis

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Ritups from Riga. He took as the subject of his dissertation DA 3.6, a notoriously difficult chapter, and investigated ancient and medieval commentaries on this text. In the preparation of his dissertation he made a first translation of Priscian’s commentary on 3.6 and we spent together a full week in August 2008 in Jurmala to discuss, correct and improve this first version. A fully annotated version of this translation was integrated as part of his dissertation, which was defended at the Leuven Institute of Philosophy in 2010. I profited also from his draft translation of 3.7-8 and comments and corrections on other chapters. Arnis also made most of the notes to the translation. I completed the annotation and made the last supervision. Arnis also prepared the material for the introduction and some sections are entirely his work. Here again, I take responsibility of the revision and final result. In the preparation of this volume I greatly benefited from this unique interaction. After all, there are few scholars in the world with whom one can discuss difficult passages and subtle speculations as found in this commentary, and Arnis is one of these rare scholars. I also have to express my gratitude to the external readers of my manuscript, who had to vet the text when it was still unfinished. The final version owes much to their criticism. For the translation of the Aristotelian lemmas I stayed as close as possible to the Greek text (so as to help the reader understand the textual comments made by Ps.-Simplicius) without any attempt at originality. Besides using Hamlyn’s translation, I was often inspired by the version of the lemmas in W. Charlton’s translation of Ps.Philoponus. David Robertson took upon himself the composition of the Greek-English and English-Greek Glossary. Quite an effort was needed to make the manuscript, which had been assembled in dribs and drabs over several months, an integrated homogeneous document. For this ungrateful task I owe gratitude to Ian Crystal, who was always ready to work on my manuscript in short terms. Deborah Blake had to reset deadlines continuously to adapt them to reality and made an extraordinary effort to have the book published before the celebration of the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle project in London/Oxford 2012. With this volume the whole corpus of ancient commentaries on de Anima (Themistius, Philoponus, pseudo-Philoponus, pseudo-Simplicius) has now been translated into English, which makes it possible to discover the great richness of psychological doctrines in late antiquity. All scholars on ancient philosophy, and all interested in the philosophical tradition, owe a great gratitude to Richard Sorabji for having envisaged this grandiose project, encouraged scholars to collaborate on it, and motivated institutes and foundations to provide the necessary funding. As we all know, Richard is not just the great mastermind of the project, but takes care of all minute details from the first to the last volume. Reformulating somewhat

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Priscian’s words in the preface of his commentary, one may say that he was in this whole enterprise ‘guide of ours souls (hêgemoni tôn psukhôn) and cause of all arguments (logôn pantôn aitiôi)’. Carlos Steel

Leuven, 8 November 2012

Introduction

The Commentary On the Soul Attributed to Simplicius1 1. The author: Priscian of Lydia Forty years ago I published together with Fernand Bossier a study in which we argued against the traditional attribution of the commentary On the Soul to Simplicius and concluded that it was the work of Priscian of Lydia.2 Priscian belonged together with Simplicius to the group of philosophers who went from Athens into exile in Persia after the closure of the Academy in 529. When we finalized our article we learned from reading Bruno Nardi3 that we were not the first to question the traditional attribution of this commentary. Already by the end of the sixteenth century Francesco Piccolomini, a professor of philosophy in Padua and a sharp critic of the growing tendency to take this commentary as an authoritative guide to Aristotle, suggested that its real author was Priscian.4 And, as Arnis Ritups informed me, William Hamilton, a professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh in the nineteenth century, also had doubts about the attribution of this commentary to Simplicius. After a comparison of Priscian’s Metaphrasis with the commentary on de Anima, Hamilton concluded ‘from strong internal evidence’ that the commentary should be assigned to Priscian.5 The negative side of our thesis (that the commentary is not a work of Simplicius) is now generally accepted by scholars (with the exception of Ilsetraut Hadot6) and many more arguments have been put forward.7 Surprisingly, however, the positive thesis, that the commentary is the work of Priscian, is still regarded with some scepticism. After all, it is said, the author of the commentary could have been another member of the Athenian or Alexandrian school sharing similar views and influenced by similar sources. As a matter of fact, given the limited survival of Priscian’s work in comparison to the massive transmission of Simplicius’ commentaries, it is much easier to deny the traditional attribution of the commentary On the Soul on the basis of differences in style, vocabulary and doctrine than to demonstrate positively that Priscian is its author. In the case of Simplicius we have his long commentaries on the Categories, Physics, and de Caelo and on Epictetus’ Handbook, whereas of Priscian we only have, incompletely, his Metaphrasis of Theophrastus’ Physics

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and, in a Latin version, his answers to the Persian king Chosroes, a work compiled from earlier sources. Only the incomplete Metaphrasis may offer some comparative material for an attribution of the commentary On the Soul to Priscian. Fortunately the preserved text offers a strong argument in favour of this attribution. When discussing the function of the transparent medium in visual perception the author of the commentary On the Soul (136,26-9) refers for a full discussion of his views to his ‘Epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’: kai saphesteron moi tauta en tê epitomê tôn theophrastou phusikôn diôristai. His view on the diaphanes is not a standard one, but a peculiar Neoplatonic explanation, which insists on the ‘transcendent’ transmission of the ‘activity of colour’, thus ensuring that the colour itself is seen, not the medium, though it passes through the medium. One finds exactly the same explanation and expressed in the same peculiar vocabulary8 in Priscian’s Metaphrasis, p. 12,17-30, and precisely in a section wherein Priscian expounds ‘his own views’ on the role of the medium (cf. p. 11,18: dikaion êmas epizêtêsai ei kineitai to diaphanes kai tina kinêsin). Of course, one cannot exclude that Priscian, in formulating his ‘own views’, was influenced by some authority, Iamblichus maybe, who was also, as we shall see, a major source inspiring the author of the commentary On the Soul. But to assume that both authors express the same views on the role of the diaphanes in the same vocabulary because they both – independently from one another – depend on the same source,9 is highly implausible in this case. In fact, a dependence of two different authors on a common source can never explain what is clearly a self-reference from one text to another. If the other work corresponds exactly to this reference, both must be of the same author. Besides, if the author of the commentary On the Soul did not refer to the Metaphrasis, it must have been to some other explanation of Theophrastus’ Physics. We have then to admit that there were at least two such paraphrases composed by different authors at about the same period. This is a most implausible hypothesis as the Physics of Theophrastus was certainly not a standard text in the curriculum. It is already extraordinary to have one Neoplatonic commentary on this text. Why invent a second with the same doctrine expressed in the same vocabulary? Besides, that Priscian is not just the author of the Metaphrasis but also of the commentary On the Soul is also confirmed by other remarkable similarities in vocabulary and doctrine between the two works in other sections. A major objection against taking the reference in the commentary On the Soul as a reference to the Metaphrasis is the fact that the author calls his previous work an Epitome, not a Metaphrasis.10 Nothing excludes, however, that Epitome was the original title of the work. Metaphrasis was probably added as the title of the preserved sections of Priscian’s work by a Byzantine scholar.11 One might object

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again that the term ‘epitome’ is less appropriate as a title for a work that is not just a summary or a ‘synopsis’ of the main argument of Theophrastus, but also includes digressions wherein the author expounds his own views. However, the title ‘epitome’ can also be used for a genre of commentaries such as is the actual Metaphrasis. Besides the examples of this broader use of the term ‘epitome’ I discussed in 1997, 137, Matthias Perkams refers to a passage where Simplicius quotes an extensive text from Geminos’ Epitome of Posidonius. Simplicius refers to this work as ‘ek tês epitomês tôn Poseidôniou Meteorôlogikôn exêgêseôs’.12 As the quotation shows, this work of Geminos was not simply a summary of Posidonius, but ‘une paraphrase exégétique’.13 Interestingly Priscian calls the same work a ‘commentary’ (see Solut. ad Chosr., 42,10-11: ‘commento Gemini Posidonii De Meteorôn’). This example shows that an ‘epitome’ (just as a ‘paraphrasis’) can be much more than a simple summary and may include a more detailed exegesis of the text and even some digressions. Nothing prevents thus that Priscian refers to his previous work with the title ‘epitome’. Finally, if we do not attribute the commentary on the de Anima to Priscian, what is the alternative if one admits that it is not a work of Simplicius either? We will then have to postulate as author another Neoplatonic philosopher, who lived in the first part of the sixth century, who had composed commentaries on the Metaphysics and the Physics, and an epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics (which is different from the Metaphrasis that is preserved). This anonymous author was influenced by Damascius and admired Iamblichus’ treatise On the Soul, as much as his colleague Priscian. Further, though not being Priscian himself, this author shares with Priscian many stylistic and terminological peculiarities, and defends the same views on perception and imagination.14 As we see, the anonymous commentator we have postulated is nothing but a dummy of Priscian. What do we gain with this complication? Is it not much simpler to accept the evidence that the author of both texts is one and the same person, Priscian of Lydia? Having completed the translation of the complete commentary I am now more than ever convinced that Priscian is indeed its author. Nevertheless in conformity with the previous volumes and the current usage in secondary literature we will continue to refer to the commentator in the introduction and the annotation as Pseudo (Ps.-)Simplicius. We do not know where and when the commentary was written, whether it was in Athens, at the court of Chosroes I, or after the return from exile. The admiration for Iamblichus, some peculiar terminology and some doctrines may point to an influence of Damascius, but he is never mentioned. It is however implausible to assume that the commentary was composed when Priscian was with Damascius at the Academy in Athens. The absence of references to pagan

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religion, the avoidance of discussions related to reincarnation and pre-existence of the soul – sensitive issues in discussions with Christians –, the radical simplification of the metaphysical system (on a principle beyond the divine intellect nothing is said), rather indicate that the author has taken some distance from the school to which he once belonged. Besides, the author had already composed his ‘epitome’ of Theophrastus’ Physics and his commentaries on the Physics and the Metaphysics. Further, the style of the commentary shows that it is not based on lectures or intended for lectures, as are the commentaries in the school of Ammonius published under the name of Philoponus. The author does not rely on an impressive philosophical library, as is the case with Simplicius. The commentary is an original and personal engagement with Aristotle’s text, written in a rather idiosyncratic terminology. These are all arguments to situate the composition of the commentary some time after the return from exile in Persia. There are, however, enough shared features to suggest that Priscian was acquainted with the commentary tradition of Alexandria and the Platonizing approach to Aristotle. As we shall see, Priscian occasionally refers to the commentary of Plutarch of Athens. Interestingly Ps.-Philoponus (Stephanus?) uses the same commentary, whereas Ammonius/Philoponus do not seem to have known it. Is this a pure coincidence? Anyway, there must have been some contact with the school in Alexandria as we can otherwise not explain how the commentary of a rather unknown philosopher entered under the name of Simplicius the canon of the commentaries on Aristotle. 2. Aims and presuppositions of the commentator Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle are easily dismissed as examples of ‘Hineininterpretieren’, as they seem to read Aristotle to find in his text a confirmation of views already presupposed before dealing with the text. The ancient commentators, however, do not primarily intend to investigate the ‘right’ interpretation of Aristotle, whatever that may be, but search with the help of Aristotle for ‘the truth of things’, as Ps.-Simplicius too indicates in the preface of his commentary On the Soul: ‘The primary and most important concern is the truth about things themselves’. However, to know the truth is a difficult task ‘since every kind of scientific disposition is hard to attain, needing a suitable nature, long training and a purified life of reason’ (9,28-9).15 The truth does not simply fall in our lap (23,32).16 That is why there are few who are seeing the truth in accordance with scientific understanding (epistêmonikê phronêsis) for although everyone has intellect not everyone uses it (27,22-4 explicating DA 1.2, 404b5-6; cf. 204,3-6). Although the soul loves truth (philalêthês 210,27) and ‘never accepts being disposed in accordance with what is

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false, but rather with the truth that has appeared, entirely and immediately’ (210,28-9) it spends more time in error than in truth. This is in part due to a lack of leisure (skholê), which the pursuit of truth requires (203,33);17 also the concern with the body is a main obstacle since it takes away leisure and produces busyness (askholia, 239,34-7). Therefore, if we want to attain the truth about the soul we cannot only rely upon our own efforts, but must also understand the views of ‘those who have reached the summit of scientific knowledge’ (akron epistêmês, 1,5-6) in this field: Plato has offered many ‘divine insights’ (makaria theorêmata, 1,7-8) about the soul, and Aristotle has further developed the doctrine on the soul and, even if he seems to criticise his master, is ‘Plato’s best interpreter’ (ho tou Platônos aristos exêgêtês, 245,12).18 However, as the commentator notices, Plato has been interpreted sufficiently (hikanôs at 1,9; cf. 3,32; 4,8) and among his interpreters there is a fundamental agreement (sumphônôs), whereas in the case of Aristotle, as soon as his treatise on the soul was completed (1,10-11), there was a dissension (diaphônia) among his exegetes, not only about the right interpretation of the text (hermeneian lexeôs) but also about the things themselves (peri auta ta pragmata, 1,12-14). Therefore, a commentary of Aristotle’s treatise is required. Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary has therefore a twofold aim, to show ‘the consistency (sumphônia) of Aristotle both with himself and with the truth’. This is not an easy task as there are notoriously obscure passages in the treatise, and some interpreters have accused Aristotle of contradicting himself (222,40-223,1; cf. 295,16-19). Ps.-Simplicius intends to interpret problematic passages with the use of other texts wherein Aristotle expresses his views more clearly (1,14-18). In fact, Aristotle is often himself his best interpreter (hermêneuei de autos ho Aristotelês heauton, 302,33-4). The commentator will avoid polemics with previous interpreters, though he occasionally mentions and discusses interpretations of Alexander of Alexandria and Plutarch of Athens. In fact, Ps.-Simplicius is together with Ps.-Philoponus our main source on this lost commentary of Plutarch.19 As we know from Marinus (vita Procli, 12), the young Proclus followed in Athens a course in which Plutarch explained both Aristotle’s de Anima and Plato’s Phaedo. Most probably Plutarch also recommended to his students Iamblichus’ treatise On the Soul, which is the major inspiration of Ps.-Simplicius (Priscian) both in his Metaphrasis and in his commentary. The ‘great’ (174,39) and ‘divine’ (313,2.17) Iamblichus is indeed for our commentator not just another exegete of the text of Aristotle, he is ‘the most excellent judge of truth’ (1,11) we are searching for in studying the text, and he has explained certain doctrines more clearly than Aristotle (6,15-17).20 Only when we follow ‘the teaching (huphêgêsin) of Iamblichus in his own writings about the soul’ (1,18-

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20; cf. 240,37-8) may we interpret Aristotle’s text in accordance with the truth. Notwithstanding this lavish praise for the divine philosopher the commentator takes distances from him on some fundamental points, such as the determination of the skopos of the text (see next under 3) or the question whether the celestial spheres have perception and imagination.21 Yet even then he explains his disagreement as a difference in level between those who look at things from an ordinary human perspective and those like Iamblichus who have reached the summit of knowledge. In his sublime speculations Iamblichus observes the caused things (ta aitiata) from their causes22 as if he was observing a valley from a mountain top, while the author of the commentary belongs to those who still have to make progress, those who ascend to the causes from the things caused (313,7-10). Thus, unlike most modern commentators whose philosophical assumptions, presuppositions and prejudices are hidden from their texts and, perhaps, even from themselves, Ps.-Simplicius does not hide his philosophical allegiance. Unfortunately we have only fragments of Iamblichus’ own views which to some extent have to be reconstructed with the help of Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary itself.23 Thus we lack sufficient external material to see how far Ps.-Simplicius in his vision of truth simply follows Iamblichus and how far he has elaborated upon what he found in Iamblichus or some later authors like Plutarch and Damascius. One should, however, not too easily conclude that Iamblichus’ views are everywhere dominant in the interpretation of the text. In fact, Iamblichus probably never wrote a full commentary on the text, but composed a systematic treatise (suggramma) on the soul in which he may have followed the main line of argument of Aristotle’s own treatise. Anyway, Ps.-Simplicius never refers to Iamblichus for the solution of a textual problem. That he strives in his interpretation ‘for the truth in accordance with the teaching of Iamblichus’ means above all that he adheres to Iamblichus’ views on the soul as an intermediate between the indivisible and divided, both remaining what it is and proceeding from itself in its relation to the body, as a whole identical and changing at the same time. This view on the soul gives him an opportunity to understand the dynamic of the human intellect in its different moments of potentiality and actuality (see below under 4).24 As the commentator aims to show both the inner consistency of Aristotle and his accordance with the truth of things, he constantly has to navigate between what Aristotle’s text says and how the things are. Even if his overall aim is to explain the truth on the soul, it does not mean that he jumps from and above the text to engage in his own speculations. Ps.-Simplicius is not only a Platonic philosopher with a surprisingly original doctrine on the soul and its intellect, but also manifests himself as a careful close reader who

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uses various philological strategies to make sense of an obscure text, paying attention to textual details, such as the use of particles and connectives, transpositions and anacolutha in the construction, and variant readings. Modern commentators could still learn with profit from his attempts ‘to set right’ a difficult text (kathistanai tên lexin 76,11; 136,30; 155,8; 226,21) without intervening with conjectures. 3. The skopos of Aristotle’s de Anima Since Iamblichus the determination of a single skopos of a text has been the first requirement for a consistent interpretation. For our commentator the overall skopos of Aristotle’s treatise is clear – it is about the soul (1,22). But this is still vague as it is not immediately clear whether it is about the whole soul, namely, in all its aspects, and whether it is about all kinds of soul, for Aristotle seems to make no argument about the soul of heavenly beings (1,22-4). Therefore the scope of Aristotle’s treatise is specified further as being only about the soul of mortal living beings (3,29-30). Moreover Aristotle says nothing about what will happen to the human soul after death, nor about the choices of ways of life before a new incarnation, as he assumes, according to Ps.-Simplicius, that Plato has treated these matters sufficiently (4,5-8). Aristotle may have excluded a discussion of the soul of heavenly beings or of the soul of the universe because he considered Plato’s views satisfactory. Maybe Aristotle also thought that what he said about the summit of our intellect (in 3.5-6) may help us to understand by some analogy the status of the celestial soul (3,34-5; 172,6-8). This is indeed possible because, as we shall see, in its summit the soul imitates the higher intellect (5,14-16). Thus, even if we admit that the primary purpose (proêgoumenos skopos) of this treatise is ‘the study of the soul of mortal animals, to which also our rational soul belongs’ (82,11-12), this does not preclude Aristotle from saying some things about the heavenly soul as well, namely, that it is without magnitude, intellective and separately present to its body (73,4-7). The purpose of the third book is further specified as the investigation of ‘the soul that makes choices (proairêtikê psukhê), that is the reasoning and intellective soul in mortal beings’ (172,4-5). This specification becomes crucial when the commentator enters the dense chapters on the intellect, 3.4-5, since several interpreters before him thought that Aristotle was dealing here with the intellect above the soul. Therefore, before starting the textual commentary on DA 3.4 the commentator needs to clarify that ‘the purpose set before us (prokeimenos skopos) is not the intellect participated by the soul’s intellect, nor, a fortiori, the unparticipated intellect, but the rational substance (logikê ousia). This is the case because the treatise is about the soul, and reason is part of the human soul, since the whole soul

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is one’ (218,29-32).25 The same clarification is made again in a preliminary discussion before the commentator embarks on the textual commentary on DA 3.5: ‘I think that not even this [i.e. DA 3.5] is said of the intellect that is participated by soul or the one that is even superior to that, but rather about our rational soul’ (240,2-3). The study of the superior or transcendent intellect definitely belongs to first philosophy (217,23-8). However, also the human intellect, in so far as it is intellective (noeros) and remains in itself without inclining to the body, is subject-matter for the metaphysician (2,33-3,2). The commentator quotes in his preface a long text from de Partibus Animalium 1.1, 641a18-b10 where Aristotle argues that the study of intellect and intelligible objects (ta noêta) falls outside the province of natural science and that therefore not all soul belongs to nature (oude gar pasa psukhê phusis, 641b9, see 2,6-28; cf. 242,3-4).26 One might conclude from this text that natural philosophy studies the soul in so far as it is the form of animal qua animal (2,29-31) or, in other words, the soul ‘whenever it proceeds to nature’ (241,37). This includes all that concerns growth, sensation and local movement (2,32-3). All its intellective (noeros) aspects would then belong to the study of first philosophy (2,33-3,4). In this interpretation, however, there would be no distinct pragmateia devoted to the soul: one part of it would belong to physics, the other to metaphysics, which only considers it in so far as it is separate from the body (21,1-8; 23,14-16; 241,38). However, if one considers that it is one and the same soul that both contemplates the intelligible objects and inclines towards the body and uses and moves it, that is both separate and unseparated from the body, that is both identical and changing, there must also be one science that studies the soul as a whole in all its aspects. Therefore, ‘the study of the soul is neither simply natural nor simply metaphysical but shares in both’ (3,5-6; tr. Urmson modified). In a way, the originality of Ps.-Simplicius’ approach consists in establishing a new, specific discipline which is unlike any other: ‘So, if one were marking off the limits of the philosophies, on one side natural, on the other metaphysics, that of the soul will be between the two’ (3,14-16).27 The intermediate status of psychology as a distinct discipline corresponds to the intermediary nature of the soul itself: ‘It is clear that scientific knowledge of the soul is like that, since the essence of the soul is such as to be between the supernatural (huperphuôn) and the natural (phusikôn) [things], and such as to have something in common with the supernatural, something descending into the natural’ (3,18-21; tr. Urmson, slightly changed). The importance of the intermediary nature of the soul for Ps.-Simplicius’ hermeneutical approach to Aristotle’s treatise cannot be overlooked.28 The mixture of the soul’s essence out of opposite ontological characters also explains the continuous dynamic of its life (or rather lives): turning outside towards divisible bodies and turning

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inside and, imitating the higher intellect, upwards towards indivisible forms. The highest expression of this dynamic is found in the intellectual activities of the soul. 4. DA 3.4-6: the intellect and the rational soul a. The intellect above the soul Although Ps.-Simplicius repeatedly insists that Aristotle is not discussing in DA 3.4-6 the intellect above the soul,29 insight into the nature of this superior intellect may help us to better understand what is characteristic of the human intellect or reason (logos). The superior intellect may be described as ‘eminent’ (huperekhôn 6,2-3; 311,31-6), ‘transcendent’ (exêrêmenos 3,1; 5,15; 14,24; 31,18-19; 42,2.22; 220,34; 223,3-4; 233,39; 312,13-14), ‘superior’ to the soul (kreittôn 47,6-7; 48,15-17; 102,18; 220,25; 227,36; 234,8; 235,20; 240,4; 243,21; 244,40; 248,1; 254,32-3; 258,18; 278,5; 313,4) or huperteros (245,15; 259,33) or separate (khôristos 217,24) or simply ‘above’ (huper 234,36) the soul. Within this intellect a distinction must be made between the imparticipable intellect and the participated. The former is the cause of all things (aitia pantôn), as it is the supreme Form (horos), which comprehends in itself all forms. It is ‘the first indivisible substance, the best [sort of] life, the supreme activity’, it is altogether ‘intelligible, intellection and intellect’, ‘eternity and perfection’, as we learn, following Iamblichus, from Aristotle in Metaphysics 12 (217,23-6). This intellect is ‘one and partless’ as is also its thinking, which ‘grasps without transition, simultaneously all beings’ (42,1-3). Its thinking is eternal and stands in a single now, indivisibly comprehending the whole temporal infinitude (47,6-9). It ‘does not move from forms to things that are informed, so that it can know the latter, but in the thinking of forms itself it knows as from causes the things that are informed and their added properties and, to put it simply, all things that are caused, the matter that receives the last of these, and the things that in some way come into existence along with others (paruphistamena; such as privations), in accordance with the causal thinking (aitiôdês noêsis), in so far as things that are caused are causally anticipated in the forms’ (231,2-7; tr. Blumenthal, modified; cf. 234,36-8: aitiôdês prolêpsis). It is imparticipable (amethektos nous) since it is in no way acted upon or mixed with secondary beings. To be distinguished from this separate intellect is the intellect that is participated by the rational souls (metekhomenos or methektos nous). Whereas the imparticipable intellect can be considered as the efficient principle (poiêtikon 312,14) the participated intellect is the determining or formal cause (horistikê, eidêtikê aitia) of the rational soul (218,12; 312,14-15; 313,3; cf. 249,21-3). Just as natural things belonging to a same species share all in the same form (which is to be

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Introduction

distinguished from the unparticipated separate form) and yet this form is individualized in each of them, ‘so is also the intellect participated in common by all human souls and yet is proper to each’ (249,21-3; cf. 217,29-35; 218,25-9; 251,6-7). The human souls need such a determining principle because they are no longer pure forms but haven sunk into division, temporality and discursivity. The rational faculty of the soul is properly logos, though Aristotle also uses the term nous to indicate it. The participated intellect may be called ‘the soul’s intellect’, not because it would ever be itself a part of the soul, but because it is its singularized formative cause or determinant (218,4-12; 251,6-7). Thus, to express it more precisely, it is not ‘the soul’s intellect’ but ‘the soul belongs to it’ (ou gar ekeinos tês psukhês, all’ hautê estin ekeinou, 246,1-2; cf. 218,6). This intellect ‘grants the soul its being not through distance but through some immediate growing together, and hence rather through “remaining” and not by causing movement but by establishing [the soul] in itself and perfecting it not in a way that is completely separate, but by separating it from the external things while at the same time making it return [to itself] and bringing it into contact most of all with itself and with the intellect itself’ (312,35-40). Since this intellect determines the rational life of the soul, it is not entirely separate from it (218,5-6) and in a way anticipates its character and dynamics (42,34-5; 313,24-30). In its intellectual summit our rational soul shares in a secondary way some of the features of its determining intellect (being separate, impassive, unmixed and being activity in its essence, 245,1) since it is as it were ‘grown together’ with it (234,1-2; 240,24-6; 243,21-2; 244,4-5; 258,29-31). In its own way the essential intrinsic logos of the soul imitates (mimeitai 5,15; 5,40-6,3; 231,7-11) and is likened to (aphomoioi 219,25-7; 235,19-20; 240,29-31) the intellect that determines it.30 Yet even when engaged in the highest mode of thinking the human logos remains different from the superior intellect. The commentator analyzes with Aristotle three differences (see 245,15246,13; cf. 254,4-10), which confirm that the skopos of these chapters is an investigation of human rational life, not a study of the intellect above the soul (240,31-3; 244,2-5; 259,4-11; 262,16-17). b. The threefold rational life Let us now turn to an investigation of the rational life of the soul, which is the subject of DA 3.4. The commentator distinguishes with Aristotle two, or rather three levels (219,28; 222,14; 223,14-15) of rationality within the soul, for ‘reason has depth’ (bathos, 218,36-7). These three modes or ways of rational thinking correspond to the three states of the rational soul in its remaining what it is, proceeding out of itself and returning towards itself.31 First (I) there is the psychic intellect that remains in itself and does not use the secondary

Introduction

11

lives (which are connected to the body) but is active on its own (kath’ heauton); it is not affected by the objects of knowledge, since it does not receive them from outside but ‘projects’ (proballein) them from itself. Second (II) there is the intellect that proceeds outside and is involved with kinds of cognition that are associated with body; this intellect is either in an imperfect state (IIa) or it has been perfected (IIb) by returning to the first intellect whereby it is filled again with forms in a secondary way (218,36-41). We should not understand this threefold distinction as a division between three parts or powers: the three ‘intellects’ or ‘reasons’ (noes or logoi) indicate three different aspects or moments within the rational activity of the soul, whereby none of the three is completely dissociated from the two other. There is never a purely remaining intellect nor an intellect that has fully gone outside itself in proceeding. In its summit (I) our soul is thinking by being what it is, a rational soul; this summit is therefore called our ‘essential intellect’ (ousiôdês nous). It remains in itself and coincides in its intellectual activity with its being, it is separated from the lower lives and outward inclination (219,21-3). Aristotle calls this summit of rationality in us nous (intellect) although properly speaking it is not pure intellect but interwoven with scientific knowledge (epistêmê) and thus with discursivity. Nevertheless, like the intellect above the soul, our highest intellect has in its own way, but secondarily, the intelligible forms as objects of its contemplation.32 Because of its connection with the body the soul cannot remain unaffected on the summit of rationality in contemplation of intelligible objects. It is forced to depart from itself and take care of the body and its needs, thus leaning towards the external things. Its intellect is then ‘proceeding’ or ‘outgoing’ or ‘flowing out’ (rhueis 225,27; 285,7; 236,29). Here again two stages must be distinguished. In its furthermost outgoing the intellect (IIa) becomes potential, passive, imperfect, material (hulikos).33 This intellect is focused on what is external and deals with universals in so far as they are derived from the sensible objects in which they exist. It is therefore involved with sense-perception and imagination which provide it with the necessary materials to think (219,11-12; 229,39-40). It thus resembles the sensitive faculty (to aisthêtikon) because of its inclination to it, as it tends in its activity to what is external (219,24-5). ‘The intellect that corresponds to the soul’s flowing outwards does not think on its own (ou kath’ heauton), nor by itself, nor through itself, but just as sense-perception [is affected] by the sense-object, so is this intellect awakened and filled by the intelligible object and the intellect that is co-ordinate with that, as another [intellect affected] by another because of the otherness of what flows out in respect of what remains’ (223,34-8, tr. Blumenthal, modified). This intellect is like someone before learning or discovering (230,8) and its imperfection is such

12

Introduction

that sometimes it ‘thinks nothing’ (mêden noei, 227,1). Therefore it is comparable to a tablet on which nothing yet has been written and has no strength to cognize the essence of things. Yet in its outward tendency it has already a minimal form of intellectual thought, for it cognizes the accidental properties of things not as individuals (ta atoma) – which are the object of sense-perception and imagination – but as common (koina) properties of a type of things (224,20-38), and thus gains some insight of sensible things, though not a science which knows the essences of things. In that sense it is not really ‘intellect’ (nous), as intellect in the proper sense is what knows intelligible objects, but it is ‘the so-called intellect of the soul’ (429b22): it is ‘nothing in act’, yet it may be called ‘intellect’ because it is potentially intellect (226,31); it is fit to receive the intelligible objects but has not yet done so (229,7-8). Besides this intellect is incapable of knowing itself.34 This imperfect, passive intellect is perishable, but not in the sense that it could be reduced to non-being (mê on) but because it may raise itself up to the state of the remaining intellect (247,35-9). This outgoing intellect can be perfected (IIb) by being filled with intelligible objects provided by the essential or remaining intellect (229,13-14; 242,11-13); this does not mean that they were absolutely non existent in the potential intellect; they were, however, unknown (agnôsta) to it (243,4-5). Like the imperfect intellect it still remains passive (pathêtikos) because it depends in its activity on the essential intellect of the soul and may therefore be called potential (dunamei), but not according to the ‘first potentiality’, as is the case with the imperfect outgoing intellect, but according to the ‘second potentiality’ (219,12-17; cf. 230,4-6; 235,14-17; 236,34-6; 243,15-17). It has acquired a perfect disposition (in fact, its perfection consists in disposition (hexis, 229,19-20), and is thus able to initiate its acts of thinking and to think itself (222,34-5; 227,2; 229,37-8; 243,29-31). Therefore, it may be said to be perfecting itself by its own activity (autenergêtôs 225,30; 230,23; 236,5.14). In fact, neither the imperfect nor the perfected proceeding intellect are entirely separate from the first for they exist with respect to it and come forth from it and proceed from it (219,29-34; 242,21-2). Nevertheless, since the three modes of the soul’s intellect are so different it may be asked whether there is still one intellect in us or if we have three intellects (222,17-22). Ps.-Simplicius explains that the ‘division into two or three’ does not mean that ‘the logoi were altogether separate from each other’, for the first substance itself proceeds from itself and projects the second and third forms of life in itself, these not being insubstantial activities but just this, forms of life’ (219,29-34; cf. 219,39-220,4). Thus the proceeding intellect, in both its stages (IIa and IIb), and the permanent essential intellect (I) are not only different but also the same.35 In fact, the soul ‘never

Introduction

13

departs from itself entirely (for it would then no longer remain substantially one and the same soul), nor does it preserve its identity purely without change. Hence ‘it keeps itself as the same and not the same at the same time, without the otherness changing it altogether or the sameness remaining pure and unchanged’ (241,10-13). In this sense the soul is perfected ‘by itself, but by itself qua other (huph’ heautês  hôs huph’ heteras, 236,22). c. The structure of DA 3.4-5 Having explained with the commentator the three moments within the rational life of the soul we may now tackle the dense chapters in DA 3.4-5 wherein Aristotle discusses ‘the part of the soul with which it knows and understands’ (429a10-11). For the commentator it is evident that Aristotle too distinguishes three types of intellect. There is first the intellect that is said to be nothing (outhen) before it thinks (DA 3.4, 429a24), second the intellect that is able to think itself (3.4, 429b10) and that becomes everything (DA 3.5, 430a14-15) and third the intellect that produces everything (DA 3.5, 430a15). The comparison with sense-perception in DA 3.4, 429a13-14 makes it clear that, at the beginning of this chapter, Aristotle is not discussing ‘all thinking’, but only the outgoing intellect in its imperfect state (IIa) (222,33-4). It is good practice, indeed, to start an exposition with the lowest kind of thinking, since it is the ‘most knowable to the audiences (tois akouousi)’ (223,15-16). Therefore, Aristotle starts from the material, imperfect and potential intellect (IIa) and goes on to the one that proceeds but is perfected (IIb) because it has acquired an intellective disposition allowing it to ‘project’ its own reasons (229,21-5). The first part of DA 3.4 (429a10429b5) examines the imperfect potential intellect and its objects, which include the common accidents (224,20-4), and passive qualities (227,24-5). This form of thinking is involved in technical knowledge and the inferior mathematical sciences which are concerned with shapes, sizes, motions, not with essences (224,24-30). The second chunk of DA 3.4 (429b5-b22) is about the perfected proceeding intellect,36 its way of thinking and its objects among which are the composite substances, informed things (231,18-19; 233,1; 234,5; 232,38) and forms of composite things (234,3-4; 248,289). Besides, the perfected proceeding intellect ‘thinks both things separate from any matter like the substance of the soul and the superior intellect, and also those that are separate in a way, like mathematical and physical forms, which do not require a substrate for their existence, and in this way are separate, but by being determinants of other things they are inseparable from them’ (234,5-9). The investigation of the twofold proceeding intellect is completed at 429b22 (cf. sumplêrôsas at 234,24). DA 3.4, 429b22-430a9 consti-

14

Introduction

tutes an annex in which Aristotle discusses three problems related to both kinds of proceeding intellect; one problem, more related to the imperfect intellect, is how it thinks or does not think itself; another problem is related to the perfected intellect and concerns the question of how it can be said to be thinking by being acted upon; finally, the rest of the chapter (430a5-9) seems to be treating the question of why our intellect does not think always. The transition to DA 3.5 is indicated at 234,27-8 (‘being about to run up to the essential intellect’) and at 239,31-3 (‘And here, having completed the discussion of the intellects that proceed he goes on to the one that projects them and perfects them’). The subject matter of DA 3.5 is clarified as: ‘he now [in DA 3.5] investigates the intellect that is characterized by this essential activity and that thinks the forms, not the forms that proceed (proionta) but those which remain in the essence of the soul itself’ (240,11-13, tr. Blumenthal, modified). As we have seen, the rational soul is, in its summit, similar to the participated intellect that is its formal cause (240,30; 258,15-16). This similarity is evident in the following features of the essential intellect: at (1) ‘it has nothing opposed to it’ (anantithetos, 258,21 based on DA 3.6, 430b24); (2) it is a cause (258,23-4); (3) it knows itself (258,28-9); (4) it is pure actuality that in no way is interwoven with potentiality (258,31-3); and (5) it is separate (258,33-7 based on DA 3.5, 430a22, confirmed at DA 3.6, 430b26). It is ‘separate’ not only with respect of body or corporeal lives, but also with respect of the lower rational lives, ‘namely the practical lives and those that are theoretical according to projection’ (243,16-19, tr. Blumenthal, modified). Hence this intellect ‘will be separate in its essence from the things it does not require for its existence or its activity, even if it is still somehow mixed up with them, in so far as it brings them into existence by a kind of inclination’ (243,24-6, tr. Blumenthal, modified). In these features the essential intellect resembles, as was noticed before, the participated intellect. There is, however, a crucial difference with the participated intellect, as is clear at 430a22, where the participle ‘being separated’ (khôristheis) is used, not the adjective khôristos, clearly suggesting thereby that our intellect is not always separate, like the higher intellect, but sometimes (238,18-19; 240,313; 243,12-14; 245,38-246,1; 246,8-10). ‘For one should not understand the “separable” as referring to what is always separated, but as to what [is separated] sometimes, for “being separated”, [Aristotle] says, “it is what it is”’ (258,35-7). Because the intellect of our soul is never definitely separated in this life and never fully remains in itself, it cannot think without interruption: it sometimes thinks and sometimes does not and, thus, even when it thinks, it has the potentiality of sometimes not thinking (245,18-19). Hence, the soul’s summit is not only ‘intellect’ (nous), but also ‘reason’ (logos), as Aristotle indicates by using the term epistêmê at 430a20. For ‘scien-

Introduction

15

tific knowledge is a rational form of cognition’ (logikê gnôsis). ‘The highest form of the soul’s cognition is thus at the same time thinking and scientific knowledge’ (noêsis kai epistêmê), or as already Plato in Timaeus 28A1 said noêsis meta logou (245,13-14; 249,27-9). It is from this perspective that the commentator interprets DA 3.6 to which we turn next. d. The purpose and structure of DA 3.637 The previous volume of the translation of Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary in this series ended with DA 3.5, whereas this volume resumes the translation with DA 3.6, thus making an unfortunate division between two chapters, which, according to Ps.-Simplicius, are closely related. Indeed, DA 3.6 has as its purpose (skopos, 249,4) to explain what the objects and activities are of the essential, permanent intellect whose essence was discussed in DA 3.5. Since the intellect is better known to us than its objects (248,25; cf. 244,18-22), its essence was examined before its activity and its objects. In this next chapter Aristotle investigates what is the thinking corresponding to this essence and what are its coordinate objects. That this is the general purpose of chapter 3.6 is clear. However, as the commentator observes, Aristotle is obliged to discuss also different side issues in order to clarify the main point of the argument. In fact, the main subject matter of DA 3.6 is dealt with in only a couple of sentences (the opening phrase, an insertion at 430b14-15 and at 430b24-6), whereas most of the argument is concerned with these subsidiary problems. In the opening phrase of DA 3.6 (‘the thinking of the indivisibles (noêsis tôn adiairetôn)) is in those things about which there is no falsity’) Aristotle succinctly defines what the proper activity and objects of the essential intellect are. As we have seen already, this intellect is both ‘intellect and science’ (or ‘intellect and causative reason’ [logos aitiôdês, 248,33]). As we learn from the commentator, this science is always true (for it explains everything from causes). Accordingly the objects of this noêsis /epistêmê are also of two kinds: the ‘indivisibles’, that is, the intelligible forms (ta eidê, 248,34-5; 249,5-6) and ‘the unfolded forms’ which are the objects of scientific understanding, ‘when [the intellect] lays hold of the cause’ (248,35-6). Thus the soul’s essential intellect is on the one hand inferior to the pure intellect – ‘for what is at once thinking and scientific, is inferior to what only thinks’ – and superior to the perfected outgoing intellect, for the latter has science only as an acquired ‘projected’ disposition (262,17-18). Besides, in the scientific knowledge of the essential intellect no error or falsity is possible. For ‘the thinking of the indivisibles, which is impartible, does not have the “somehow” due to its impartibility, and either attains the whole or does not attain it at

16

Introduction

all, so that it is “infallible” according to Plotinus and only true according to Aristotle, and never false’.38 The essential intellect thus takes an intermediary position corresponding to the intermediate status of the soul. This does not mean that the soul’s essential intellect is a combination of the two extremes, since ‘it is not somehow intellective and somehow rational but thoroughly both together or, rather, none of them purely, but it is some simple form between them and therefore [made] of both of them, having something in common with both because of its intermediate state’ (260,8-11). As stated, most of chapter 3.6 deals with subsidiary issues needed to elucidate the main subject. Thus, in order to clarify what ‘the thinking is of the indivisibles (adiaireta)’ Aristotle had to explain in a ‘digression’ (430b6-20) the different uses of the term adiaireton so that from this confrontation we may more clearly grasp what the forms are, which are the objects of our essential intellect (258,5-8). The term adiaireton is ambiguous, as it can mean both ‘undivided’ and ‘indivisible’. To distinguish between the meaning of undivided and indivisible, Ps.-Simplicius marks the term adiaireton by adding ‘in actuality’ to indicate what is ‘undivided’ and by ‘in possibility’ to indicate what is ‘indivisible’.39 In this second section, which offers a necessary clarification of a crucial term in this chapter, there is again another digression (430b14-15), to recall what is Aristotle’s primary purpose, namely to understand what the thinking of the forms is. The third section of chapter 3.6 (430b20-4) examines closely one kind of adiaireta, namely, those that exist as privations, and considers the ways to cognize privations in general. This third part is concluded with another insertion reminding the reader what the proper activity of the productive intellect is (430b24-6). The concluding part of chapter 3.6 (430b26-31) again describes the activity of the productive intellect as a unique combination of intellective and scientific thinking (260,8-11), what corresponds to the intermediary status of the soul. Finally, in the conclusion (DA 3.7, 431a1-4, a text that according to Ps.-Simplicius constitutes the end of 3.6 and not the beginning of 3.7 as in modern editions) Aristotle restates what was said in DA 3.5, 430a19-22 with a different point. There the identity of knowledge and things known was stated to elucidate the essence of the productive intellect; here it is stated to explain its act of thinking. To recapitulate Ps.-Simplicius’ interpretation, the argument of chapter 3.6 is organized around one central theme, how the productive intellect thinks the forms. This central theme is announced at the beginning, developed in two digressions or insertions and summarized in the final part. The rest of the text helps to delineate this

Introduction

17

central theme by contrasting the thinking of the productive intellect with other forms of thinking. 5. DA 3.7-11: practical intellect and principle of movement a. Practical intellect Since for Ps.-Simplicius theoretical philosophy is superior to practical philosophy (48,32)40 and practical concerns may be an impediment to theoretical thinking (238,34-7), it comes as no surprise that he identifies the practical intellect with the lowest stage of our rational life, that is with the passive, material, potential, imperfect, outgoing intellect, which was analyzed in DA 3.4.41 According to Ps.-Simplicius, Aristotle turns to an investigation of practical intellect at DA 3.7, 431a4 (‘he passes to the so called practical intellect’ 263,37-8) and discusses it up to the end of DA 3.11 (cf. ‘he thus concludes his views on the practical intellect’ 315,9-10). It is within the context of practical intellect that we find the discussion (DA 3.9-11) of the principle of local movement. Practical intellect is necessarily engaged with sense-perception and imagination because in action we have to deal with particular things, which may change and can always be otherwise. The rational soul cannot apprehend these objects on its own, and therefore cannot reason on practical matters unless it is connected with sense-perception and imagination.42 ‘For every action (praxis) is about sense-objects, so that in actions the soul uses these objects and in the impulses (hormais) to these actions the memory of sense-objects. In other animals imagination is what initiates and controls actions because they have nothing superior, but in human beings what initiates actions is the practical intellect, when we operate in accordance with reason. But even [reason] is not without imagination: for it uses imaginations since actions are concerned with things that can be perceived by senses and the impulses to them arise with the memory of sense-objects’ (216,39-217,7). Perception and imagination thus provide the concrete objects ‘to be done’ which are assumed by the intellect in the ‘minor premise’ of the practical syllogism, which is always concerned with particular things (5,7-8; 275,10-12; 306,223). Therefore, the particular proposition, not the universal, which comes from the theoretical intellect, is in human beings ‘the proximate cause of movement concerning practical matters which can be different from one moment to another, since they are particular and always need a particular movement to be accomplished’ (314,12-15). Whereas the theoretical intellect aims at truth, the practical intellect is concerned with the good or, more precisely, the practical good or the good to be done.43 Its goal is not ‘a cognition of the good

18

Introduction

but its practice – either in acting justly, or in living temperately, or in behaving with courage’ (264,10-12; cf. 297,6-7). The practical good is opposed to the bad, ‘which are opposites existing in the realm of generation and in ultimate division’.44 Unlike sense-perception and irrational desires the practical intellect is not primarily concerned with what is pleasant or painful (211,7-10; 266,25; 274,35-7) but with the good and the bad ‘even if what is bad has something pleasant or what is good something painful’ (268,8). The rational desire will never pursue what is bad as such, but only what is good or ‘appears’ as good. As the commentator explains: ‘the desirable object is either what is truly good or the apparent good, even if it is not [really good]. For no bad things are desirable and no indifferent things but only what is good. And if something puts on the character of the good, it will also be desirable qua good. This is Plato’s view everywhere and is also taught by Aristotle in his Ethics, when he says that all things desire the good’ (298,39-299,2). Nevertheless, since practical reason extends its desire and consideration to much more possible objects than irrational animals, which have a narrow perspective and only are concerned with what is pleasurable or painful, humans often are confronted with the alternative good or pleasurable (309,7-8). This happens because sometimes the practical intellect is covered and the initiative is taken over by imagination: but because sometimes the practical intellect is overlaid (epikaluptesthai) we too are moved by images (kata phantasias) which then take the lead, most clearly when in dreams imagination without reason darts here and there in an indeterminate way and sometimes moves the living being, but also in emotions as in immoderate desire, anger, pleasure, pain and fear, when the soul is not using reason, and also in diseases like madness. Being of the age of a child is another cause of reason being overlaid (217,8-14; cf. 214,23-6; 296,21-4).

b. The structure of DA 3.7-8 In the opening section of DA 3.7 (431a4-14)45 Aristotle makes a comparison with sense-perception just as he did at the beginning of DA 3.4 (429a13-15).46 Here, however, sense-perception is taken ‘as a capacity to apprehend what is pleasant or painful’, which ‘makes it an appropriate image of the practical intellect, which is not only a capacity to know but also endeavours after what is good and bad’ (264,18-20). Besides, the commentator finds a reference to the common sense in the phrases eskhaton hen and hen kai mia mesotês of 431a19, and explains that it is also used as an image (269,17-18). Hence ‘the purpose (skopos) of this very passage [431a17-20] too is to refer us from sense-perception as from something that is better known [to us] to some unitary thinking of the soul, which discriminates in a common way intelligible objects, whatsoever they are’

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(268,29-31). This ‘unitary thinking’ comprehends not only all practical considerations but brings together both practical and theoretical thoughts (269,10-13; 270,4-12). Ps.-Simplicius regards section 431a20-b1 as a summary and reminder of what was earlier said about the common sense (271,1-2). Such a summary is justified since the common sense is used as an image to explain the unitary thought of the practical intellect. In the next section, 431b2-12, Aristotle expounds his views on the practical intellect directly, without exploiting the image of sense-perception.47 However, in order to demarcate the practical intellect again from another side, Aristotle moves in 431b12-16 to a consideration of the theoretical intellect that is concerned with mathematical objects (276,1-4).48 Since this intellect considers mathematical objects as objects of imagination (hôs phantasta, 276,8; cf. 233,10), it is similar to the practical intellect, which always relies upon objects of imagination, but it is superior to the practical intellect because it deals with mathematical objects ‘in abstraction’ without a reference to sense-objects (276,9-10). The commentator explains in a long digression how the mathematical objects are thought, distinguishing the ‘peripatetic’ mathematics, which is only occupied with abstractions, from the Pythagorean approach, which considers the essences of the mathematical objects and is therefore a real science (276,16-278,17). Finally in 431b16-17 Ps.-Simplicius sees a reminder ‘that every intellect, when it is active, is the same as the objects it thinks and is exactly what it thinks’ (279,6-7). Turning to the next ‘chapter’ (3.8) one may observe with Ps.-Simplicius that this chapter too is often nothing but a summary and reminder or additional comment on what was discussed in earlier parts of the DA: ‘in fact [Aristotle] does not say anything else than what he also said before’ (283,36 on DA 3.8, 432a3-10). Thus, in 431b20-9 he reminds us of the thesis that knowledge in act is identical with its objects in act. In 432a1-3 Aristotle shows again the intermediate status of rational cognition between the knowledge of accidental features, which are perceptible, and the knowledge of the primary forms (282,4-7). The commentator thus summarizes what we can learn from chapters 3.7-8: ‘having revealed in between the practical intellect and the theoretical intellect the intellect that knows from abstraction, and that which knows the sense-objects as sense-objects, and that which knows the natural substances and their forms and that which contemplates the forms in the soul, such as is the scientific intellect, Aristotle went up to its summit, the essential intellect’.49 c. Imagination and thinking When discussing the practical intellect Aristotle notices in DA 3.7, 431a16-17 that ‘the soul never thinks without a phantasm’ (oudepote

20

Introduction

noei aneu phantasmatos hê psukhê).50 The same claim is implied in DA 3.7, 431b2, DA 3.8, 432a8-9 and perhaps even in DA 3.8, 432a1214. In the history of interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology this has been one of his most controversial claims, in particular when it is understood as a universal claim about all thinking. Since imagination relies on sense-perception as its source, and sense-perception does not occur without body, the necessary involvement of imagination in thinking demonstrates that the whole soul, even in its intellective power, is inseparable from the body, as Alexander said.51 The Platonic commentators, however, all attempted to restrict Aristotle’s claim, suggesting that it is only said about the practical intellect or about thinking that deals with geometrical objects.52 They could find a confirmation for their limiting interpretation in the very way Aristotle formulates it, in particular the distinction made between discursive or dianoetic thinking (dianoia) involved in practical reasoning and noetic thinking (noêsis). Thus, Ps.-Simplicius points to the conjunction dio (‘therefore’) which connects Aristotle’s statement oudepote noei aneu phantasmatos hê psukhê to what comes immediately before. If one thus contextualizes the statement, its scope is limited to discursive reasoning: ‘To the discursive soul imagined objects (phantasmata) are present like sense-impressions (aisthêmata); when it asserts or denies good or bad, it also avoids or pursues; therefore (dio) the soul never thinks without imagination’ (DA 3.7, 431a14-17). Throughout his commentary Ps.-Simplicius insists that the soul does not use imagination in its pure intellectual activity, especially when it is contemplating the separate forms, but only in its ‘outgoing’ rational activities.53 ‘But not all intellection involving rational activity requires imagination, but only such as is not pure activity remaining in itself, as the soul proceeds away from itself and is in part divided from its essence’ (17,6-8). Nevertheless even if the outgoing intellect is perfected and does not need imagination to think, some imagination may occur as a kind of by-product of thought’s activity. As the commentator observes: ‘the sciences concerned with the intelligible have no use for imagination, while those active by projection in making their study of the intelligible are not without imagination, as accompanying but not as partner, as does shadow a body in light, reason exciting the imagination through its external procession’.54 When Aristotle claims that ‘it is not possible to think without phantasm’, he makes this statement only about the discursive soul, as the commentator explains: Discursive thought (dianoia)55 often makes use of the external objects, when it requires both the sense-objects and the imprints in imagination either for cognition alone or for the satisfaction of desires towards

Introduction

21

them. Sometimes however it does not need them, yet following its extension outwards, as said, its activity regarding what exists outside is necessarily excited along with [its extension]. Therefore Aristotle says only that ‘the soul never thinks without imagination’, but not that [it always] made use of [imagination]. It is clear that ‘the soul’ in this sentence is the ‘discursive soul’, which he mentioned before [at 431a14] (267,25-32).

When explaining Aristotle’s statement at DA 3.7, 431b2-5 (‘the capacity of thinking thinks the forms in imagined objects’), the commentator notices, that notwithstanding the use of the term to noêtikon,56 the argument is about the role of imagination in practical reasoning: for sometimes in the presence of sense-objects the discursive soul (dianoêtikê psukhê) turns to itself and arouses arguments about things to be done, and in this reflection upon itself it necessarily looks not at the sense-objects themselves but at the impressions [in the imagination] coming from them, and uses these impressions as they become parts of the syllogism in the minor premise. Therefore it necessarily uses the imagination (273,5-10).

To reduce the claim made in DA 3.8, 432a8-9 (‘when one contemplates one must simultaneously contemplate some imagined object’) Ps.-Simplicius comments: what we noticed at every passage where he said that the intellect contemplates the forms in the objects in imagination (phantasmata), namely that he did not mean simply every intellect, but either the practical intellect or the intellect that is interwoven with perception and imagination, so that it may grasp sense-objects or imagined objects, whatever they may be, he himself now determines with one argument that is common to all cases. And this is the intention (skopos) of this passage, namely to teach us in what cases the intellect uses imagination as collaborator. For without imagination it cannot, in the case of the knowledge of sense-objects and imagined objects, have knowledge of these things, regardless of whether as objects of action or solely as objects of cognition. For as they are particulars, the intellect necessarily uses the corresponding modes of cognition as collaborators. Therefore we should not believe, as some Peripatetics do,57 that he wants to say that all intellect is unable to be active without imagination (mê aneu phantasias energein) (283,19-29).

In fact, as Ps.-Simplicius further explains, ‘the theoretical intellect does not always need imagination, unless it considers the senseobjects as from abstraction, but the desiderative and practical intellect is always about particular things and interweaves the particular premise with the universal. Therefore it always needs imagination as collaborator (sunergou) in order to cognize the particulars’ (306,20-4). Another passage challenging the restricting interpretation of Aris-

22

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totle’s claim about imagination seems to be DA 3.8, 432a4-5, where Aristotle writes that ‘the intelligibles are in the forms which are perceptible (ta noêta en tois eidesi tois aisthêtois)’. According to the commentator, however, this passage should be understood as referring to a specific form of thinking. Aristotle means by ta noêta (432a5) ‘the thoughts of the intellect’ (ta tou nou noêmata, 283,35), which consider ‘the forms’ that are in sense-perception and imagination’, namely the abstracted mathematical entities and the accidental properties of perceptible objects. Thus ‘the intellect that thinks these objects, uses perception and imagination as its collaborators. For it is impossible for our soul to apprehend these without sense-perception, since it has fallen wholly outside and no longer has the strength to grasp them from their cause, but must grasp them through perception’ (284,5-8). For many readers of Aristotle it has been difficult to make sense of the last two sentences of DA 3.8, 432a12-14 (‘But what will distinguish the first thoughts from being objects in imagination (phantasmata)? Or is it the case that not even the other [thoughts] are objects in imagination, but that they do not exist without these imagined objects?’). Here again Ps.-Simplicius attempts to limit Aristotle’s claim of the necessity of imagination for thinking: Through this passage, too, Aristotle teaches that not every instance of thinking has imagination as collaborator. Besides he teaches that not even the thinking that uses imagination is identical with imagination, but uses it as something superior uses something inferior (285,38286,1).

By ‘the first thoughts’ the commentator understands those that are capable of knowing substances and immaterial forms, that is the thoughts of the essential intellect of our soul (286,2-16). They ‘never use [imagination] at all, neither do they ever incline towards what is outside, but are to be found in separated life’ (286,10-12). d. DA 3.9-11: the principle of movement Having concluded his argument about every cognitive power of the soul Aristotle starts with DA 3.9 to investigate the soul’s capacity to move and use the body. This is a study that concerns all types of animals, as all are characterized by self-movement in various degrees. Ps.-Simplicius even seems to find some pleasure in presenting the different types of animals from the lowest degree (oysters) to the most developed ones (humans). However, an examination of what causes movement in the soul is more crucial in the case of human animals, where both reason58 and imagination play a role in ‘motivation’, and where a distinction must be made between sensual and

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rational desire. To be sure, the rational desire (or will, boulêsis) ‘naturally commands the desire linked to imagination. But when this desire is not yet educated, it attempts to bring down the will to its own preference, what is no longer according to nature. When, however, the will is not brought down, it will repress with some insistence the movement of this desire’ (311,3-6). Such inner conflict is possible because in human beings ‘the rational life is intertwined with the irrational life, and is often different from it and opposed to it’ (299,32-4). For that reason, chapters 3.9-11 continue in many respects the discussion about practical reasoning in 3.7-8. It appears that the practical intellect is not ‘the sole master’ of movement even in virtuous people whose desire co-operates with reason, not to speak about licentious people in whom reason follows passion. Between these two types of human beings Ps.-Simplicius situates two other types – people with self-control and people without self-control – in whom there is a continuous struggle between reason and desire.59 In their case it is even more obvious that the practical reason is not the sole master. Yet exactly for this reason ‘it can be heavily disturbed and more strongly than the desire in irrational animals, adopting the skill of reason and thus falling down from there into the utmost vice’ (290,2-4).60 When discussing the principle of bodily movement in DA 3.9, 432a15-b13 Aristotle is obliged to come back to a question he touched upon at the beginning of his treatise: in what sense can we speak of different ‘parts’ of the soul? As the commentator explains: ‘[Aristotle] started altogether the argument about these issues now, because he wanted to find what part of the soul initiates movement of bodies; [and therefore] he first had to assess precisely the question he had raised in the introduction [DA 1.1, 402b9-11], namely how one should understand “part” in the case of the soul, namely not in a corporeal manner, but in way proper to incorporeal beings’ (288,18-22). The soul not only has many powers (poludunamos, 286,37), it is also multiple in substance (poluousios, 286,38), and therefore even if it is one and the same, it is not absolutely one and not always (287,22-3). Having clarified the notion of ‘part’ that is appropriate to be applied to an incorporeal substance, the commentator goes through the vegetative, sensitive, imaginative ‘parts’ of the soul to show with Aristotle that in none of them can be found the principle of local movement. But also the theoretical intellect cannot motivate an animal, since it is concerned with truth and falsity and not with things to be done (295,19-22 based on 432b27). In fact a cognitive act – be it in imagination or in reason – can only initiate movement, if it is connected with desire, and desire itself with cognition. For it is impossible to desire something without knowing something in some way whereas it is possible to know something without desiring

24

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anything (289,28-34; 290,40-291,4; 298,9-14). This leads to a first clarification of the principle of locomotion in the soul: it is a ‘desire together with cognition’ (291,10; 292,23). In DA 3.10, 433a9-b5 it is said to be Aristotle’s intention (skopos) ‘to reduce to one the cause of the impulse-driven movement of animals in respect of place, and to reveal what it might be, and not to two principles, as he said until now, namely the desiderative and the cognitive principle’ (297,32-5). Yet desire is the dominant element: ‘This, then, shows that the desiderative power is the primordial moving principle, namely the fact that, when cognition is separated from the desiderative principle, it does not move, whereas desire, whether it is present in what knows rationally or in imagination, does move, going towards what is to be pursued or turning away from what is to be avoided by virtue of its desiderative property’ (298,21-5). Thus Aristotle has ‘solved the problem that he had proposed, namely what part in the soul is for animals the primordial cause of movement in respect of place’ (299,8-9). In the section 3.10, 433b13-24 Aristotle gives a comprehensive survey of all factors contributing to the movement of animals in respect of place (such a skopos is stated at 300,32-4) and thus recapitulates what is more extensively discussed in de Motu Animalium. There are three contributing factors: what moves, that by which it moves and what is moved. The first factor can again be distinguished as an immobile mover (‘the object of desire’) and a moved mover (the desiderative power). As Ps.-Simplicius summarizes, the desiderative power moves the moved bodies in a more proximate manner; it has been aroused by the desirable object and joined its rank, and is therefore said to be moved. By virtue of the pursuit of the object of its desire it moves the living being, which is naturally connected to this pursuit as its underlying instrument. That is also why it is set in motion not by some force, but is moved naturally out of itself along with the impulse belonging to this pursuit. It moves by using something else which is intermediate between itself, the mover (I mean the desiderative power) and what is moved, namely the living being (301,11-17).

Although the commentator, in solving the question of what is the intermediary between the desiderative power and a living being, refers to Aristotle’s de Motu Animalium, he defends a different view (‘I think’ [oimai] at 301,30), which is based upon his understanding of the soul as entelekheia of a living body (301,30-302,17; 303,19304,7). The soul is entelekheia of its body in a double sense: as the formal cause that characterises the body as a living instrument and as the user and the efficient cause of this organic body and its movements. Ps.-Simplicius finds in ‘the life that characterizes the instrument as instrument’ (302,10) – and which is bodily but not a

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body (302,8-9; 303,9-10) – the required intermediary between the moving power and the moved body. Aristotle concludes (see to sumperasma at 306,15) chapter 10 ascertaining that the desiderative power is the proximate cause of local movement and that it must always be together with imagination, be it irrational or rational (306,18-20). DA 3.11 opens with a discussion of ‘incomplete’ or ‘less developed’ animals, focusing on the kinds of imagination present in them in order to demarcate rational imagination from these (this is indicated as skopos of this section at 308,20).61 Ps.-Simplicius distinguishes four levels of imagination that guides the desires of irrational animals. At the lowest level there is a vague imagination without a memory (such as in oysters), next there is an indeterminate imagination (such as in worms), then a determinate imagination (in insects such as bees), and finally, there is an imagination that can be taught (we find it in dogs, monkeys, horses and bears; cf. 308,16). One peculiar feature of human imagination is that it participates in deliberation and therefore is called by Aristotle ‘deliberative imagination’. The commentator notices that in human animals imagination and desire can be educated (more easily than in dogs and monkeys). In DA 3.11, 434a16-21 the commentator finds a concluding summary about the practical syllogism, which allows him to restate his own understanding of practical thinking within the different moments of intellective life. The practical intellect is identical with the potential, outgoing intellect but also causally dependent upon the perfected intellect, which offers the major premise in practical reasoning, whereas the minor comes, as was stated above, from imagination. As Ps.-Simplicius explains, ‘for it [i.e., the perfected outgoing intellect] must first consider the so-called major premise and then having connected the particular premise to it produce the practical intellect. The intellect that has habitual knowledge considers the major premise itself by itself, just as deliberative imagination in rational animals considers the particular premise by itself, and the so-called practical intellect considers both connected’ (311,21-7).62 In a ‘more exalted way’ this perfected theoretical intellect too can be said to cause movement, though not directly. ‘The universal proposition is theoretical and exercises movement in a more quiet and exalted manner, whereas the particular proposition is known rather by the deliberative imagination and is causing movement to the living being in a more proximate manner concerning practical matters which can be different from one moment to another, since they are particular and always need a particular movement to be accomplished’ (314,11-15). In the realm of practice, while deliberating about things to be done, the practical intellect connects what it is provided from both sides: ‘Hence the practical intellect in us, which considers and connects both propositions together, adopts the one

26

Introduction

from the theoretical intellect and examines the other by means of rational imagination, and moves the living being towards objects that are or seem to be at some moments preferable’ (314,15-19). By interweaving these two premises the practical intellect causes living beings to move in respect of place (315,11-12). 6. DA 3.12-13: different bodies as organs for different types of soul The purpose (skopos, 315,31) of the final part of the treatise is a study of the ‘organ’ used by the soul, that is, an examination of the different types of bodies (and their composition) that may be used as instruments by the different types of soul (315,21-316,12). Indeed, according to Aristotle a study of the soul must also include a study of the body suited to it, and he criticizes his predecessors for their sole concern with the nature of the soul, leaving out the question what its body must be like (see DA 1.3, 407b13-26). This section is thus not directly related to the expressed primary purpose of DA book 3, a study of ‘the soul that makes choices, that is, the reasoning and intellective soul in mortal beings’. It also does not follow the order of Aristotle’s exposition, which proceeds from the vegetative to the sensitive and then to the rational soul. One may consider it as an appendix in which Aristotle finally fulfils his promise to investigate also the body-organ. Most of the issues discussed in chapters 12-13 had already been discussed earlier in other contexts. The commentator rightly considers this last section as a concluding recapitulation (sugkephalaiôsis: 315,32; 316,8) of questions Aristotle discussed at length earlier.63 According to Ps.-Simplicius, Aristotle defines ‘first what sort of organ the vegetative life needs, secondly what sort of organ is only capable of touch and taste, as in the case of animals that are as a whole incapable of locomotion, and third what sort of organ belongs to the more perfect animals capable of progressive movement’ (316,24).64 Aristotle reaches in these chapters the following conclusions: that more perfect forms of life need to have all the inferior forms of life but not vice versa (315,28-9; 321,5-9); that the body of living beings without sense-perception (plants) is simpler than that of animals with more complex life functions (315,33-4); that, in order to be able to perceive, the body-instrument cannot be made of one element only, nor can one element dominate in it as is the case with earth in plants (315,37-9). Aristotle proceeds in 3.12 (434b8-b24) by investigating why the presence of touch is a necessary condition for being an animal. According to the commentator there are three reasons: first, no other sense can exist without touch; second, no animal can survive without touch (318,25-36; cf. already at 306,30-4), and, third, ‘simply qua

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animal it needs touch, so that it may apprehend the passive qualities, by which every coming to be and passing away and preservation in substance is effected’ (322,32-4). The final section of 3.12 (434b24435a10) treats the greater worth of smell, sight and hearing as being provided by nature for the well being of animals, not simply for their being. It shows that if touch and taste are necessary for the animal qua animal, the three other senses are necessary for animal qua capable of forward movement (324,32-3; cf. 328,24-6; 329,23-4). Finally, the purpose (cf. prokeimenos skopos at 326,3) of 3.13 is ‘to demonstrate that there can be no simple body having sense-perception, and thus that [no simple body] can be an animal’ (326,3-4). As the commentator in 327,15-17 observes, an additional argument is needed to demonstrate that the earthy element (alone or as dominant) is not capable of touch and it is demonstrated in 3.13, 435a21-b19. The last lines of the text (435b19-25) return to the contribution of the various senses to the being and well-being of animals. Not much in these chapters is said specifically about the human body. Nevertheless, Ps.-Simplicius argues with Aristotle that the human body is most easily affected (malista  eupathes) and therefore, on the whole, humans have a more precise sense-perception than other animals although with particular senses other animals may be better provided (317,21-5). At 3.12, 434b3-8 he notices on the basis of the expression ‘discriminative intellect’ (nous kritikos, 434b3) that the discussion touches upon the most perfect animals capable of forward movement, namely humans. To the question of why it is not enough for their preservation to have just an intellect without senseperception (319,35-320,1), two answers are given: first, sense-perception is the only kind of cognition co-ordinated with sense-objects among which animals live (320,3-5; 16-17), and, second, it is impossible for generated animals capable of forward movement to have an intellect ‘yet not to be capable of sense-perception’ (320,8). Such a lack of perception would do good neither to the soul, nor to the body. ‘For the rational soul, which has entirely sank into the body, cannot otherwise be awakened to thinking than by being first awakened through sense-perception, and in actions it uses as a collaborator imagination which comes from perception’ (320,11-13) whereas the body cannot be preserved through the intellect alone but also needs sense-perception (320,13-16). In these last two chapters the commentator offers a rather straightforward exposition of Aristotle’s argument, without too much indulging in ‘Iamblichean speculations’. He reconstructs a coherent reasoning in Aristotle and, in a manner unusual for his commentary, attempts to remake several Aristotelian claims by turning them into syllogistic arguments (e.g. 321,33-322,28; 327,34-328,4). On one occasion (322,25) Ps.-Simplicius notes that the reason for such syllogistic

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clarification is the fact that the way Aristotle has phrased his argument ‘creates a difficulty’ (proskeleia). 7. Fortune of the commentary65 Priscian’s commentary On the Soul, the work of a rather unknown philosopher, owns its great fortune primarily to the fact that it was transmitted under the name of his colleague, the celebrated commentator Simplicius. We do not know how it entered the canon of commentaries on Aristotle, probably to fill the lack left by Simplicius if we assume that the latter never commented on the de Anima. In the second half of the tenth century it was apparently known in Baghdad in Syriac, but not in Arabic translation. It is mentioned in the Fihrist (published in 987), a catalogue or index of works written or translated into Arabic, made by bookseller, calligrapher and bibliographer al-Nadîm (d. 995 or 998), who was perhaps relying on an earlier library catalogue. Al-Nadîm’s editor from the thirteenth century calls the commentary ‘good’ and the phrasing seems to suggest that the commentary was extremely rare.66 No evidence has yet been found to suggest that Arabic philosophers and readers of Aristotle ever used it. It was certainly not known to ‘the Commentator’ Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198). In the eleventh century Ps.-Simplicius’ text or something closely related to it was used by the then hupatos tôn philosophôn, Michael Psellus (1017/18-1078?) in his de Omnifaria Doctrina. His use of the commentary is limited to the sections on the soul and its relation to the body (nr. 32-46). In the second half of the thirteenth century the commentary was studied and used in Constantinople by Georgius Pachymeres (1242-c. 1310) in his outlines of Aristotelian philosophy. In the section on the soul Pachymeres combines elements of Christian speculation with insights and phrases taken from Ps.-Simplicius. The commentary was also known to his contemporary Sophonias.67 In the first half of the fifteenth century Gregorius Scholarius (c. 1400-c. 1473, later patriarch of Constantinople as Gennadius II (1454-1464)) praises Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary as a much wiser and purer interpretation of Aristotle’s de Anima than that of Alexander, even though he seems to have found the Latin interpretations to be superior to even that of Ps.-Simplicius.68 After the collapse of Constantinople in 1453 many educated Greeks and hitherto unavailable Greek manuscripts arrived in Italy. The commentary was carefully read and annotated by cardinal Bessarion (1403-1472) who may have brought it with him from Constantinople before he donated his library to the city of Venice in 1468.69 The commentary reappears in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) in whose library were later found manuscripts of all the known commentaries of Simplicius. In his Conclusiones DCCCC

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(prepared before 1486), Pico includes nine theses based on Ps.-Simplicius’ in De Anima, more than from any other ancient commentator, and in his Oratio de Dignitate Hominis (1486), sometimes called the manifesto of the Renaissance, Pico states (§31,200) that in Simplicius philosophy is ‘rich and copious’ (locuplex et copiosa).70 Pico studied philosophy in 1480-1482 in Padua under Nicoletto Vernia (1420-1499, a long-time student and successor of Gaetano da Thiene (1387-1465)). Vernia claimed to have softened his Averroistic position after reading commentaries of Alexander, Themistius and Simplicius.71 Another student of Vernia – Agostino Nifo (1469/70-1538), who learned Greek only after completing his studies with Vernia in 1490 – used Ps.-Simplicius widely but critically in his early Collectanea (1498) and also later in his Commentaria (15201).72 In the course of the sixteenth century, especially in Italy, Ps.Simplicius’ commentary was studied more than in any other century, before or after.73 It is not an accident that the first edition of the Greek text and all editions of both Latin translations of the commentary appeared in the course of the sixteenth century. Most of the surviving manuscripts come from the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The commentary was widely used by Francesco Vimercato (1512-1571), a commentator who, in turn, was often used as a guide by Ingram Bywater in the late nineteenth century. Although Vimercato mainly taught in France (Collège du Pleissis), after his studies in Bologna, Pavia and Padua he knew Ps.-Simplicius very well.74 Intensive studies of Ps.-Simplicius in the sixteenth century even led to the appearance of a special trend or ‘sect’ that was called, at least by those opposed to this interpretation of Aristotle’s de Anima, the simpliciani or sectatores Simplicii.75 The first, and for 350 years the only, edition of the Greek text prepared by Franciscus Asulanus76 was published by the Aldine press in 1527.77 In the early 1540s Ps.-Simplicius was widely and freely used by ‘the head of Simplicians’ Marco Antonio Genua (Marcus Antonius Januae, 1491-1563) whose pupil, follower and admirer Giovanni Faseolo (1517-1571) produced the first and only complete Latin translation of the commentary in 1543.78 As Faseolo writes about Ps.-Simplicius in his introductory letter: huc spectate, huc mentem illam vestram atque ingenii acumen dirigite; alios omnes negligite; Simplicium unum vobis die noctuque versandum proponite, where ‘all the others’ (alios omnes) include first of all Averroes.79 The second Latin translation, incorporating the beginning of Faseolo’s translation, appeared in 1553 with a title characteristic of the attitude towards this commentator: Commentaria Simplicii Profundissimi, & acutissimi philosophi in tres libros De Anima Aristotelis  (Venice, 1553).80 Marco Antonio Genua, ‘the outstanding figure of the Simplician movement’,81 usually tries to show that among earlier interpreters it is Ps.-Simplicius who has the best

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interpretation of Aristotle. It seems that for Genua only Ps.-Simplicius survives his scrutiny of Aristotle’s text and in all puzzling passages Ps.-Simplicius gets it right.82 Even during the period of its greatest success, when the commentary was read as an authoritative antidote to the Commentator (i.e., Averroes) and a correction to Alexander of Aphrodisias, it was by no means read uncritically. Indeed, there were several voices that found the commentary difficult, dark, verbose or simply wrong. Nevertheless, this was the time when more than one interpreter of Aristotle used Ps.-Simplicius as an authority and some of them even called him divinus (e.g., Genua). To mention just the most influential interpreter of this time and the dedicatee of Genua’s commentary, the Paduan Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589),83 who while admitting that he does not understand some of Ps.-Simplicius’ comments, praises him more than once as the best interpreter of a given passage. On the other hand, the fiercest local opponent of Zabarella and the successor of Genua (in concurrence with Pendasio), Francesco Piccolomini (1520-1604), who, as noted above, was the first to doubt the authenticity of the commentary ascribed to Simplicius,84 was very critical of Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary because it seemed to him not only obscure but also a perversion of Aristotle and Plato. Around 1573, Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617) while lecturing on de Anima in Segovia (the lectures were edited in 1616, shortly before his death) frequently used Ps.-Simplicius as one of his authorities, along with Themistius, Philoponus and Thomas Aquinas; of about 35 references to Ps.-Simplicius only about a quarter express disagreement. The final masterpiece of erudition in the long line of Aristotelian commentaries was produced at the end of the sixteenth century by a group of Jesuits in Coimbra, the so-called ‘Conimbricenses’.85 In their commentary on the de Anima they use Ps.-Simplicius as one of the authoritative interpreters. Out of about 40 instances when the Conimbricenses refer to Ps.-Simplicius, there are only a couple where his interpretation is rejected. In the rest of the cases it is either mentioned as a legitimate possibility or praised as facilior, or verisimilior, or germanior interpretatio or expositio, including simple statements like nobis placet expositio Simplicii. For the next two centuries Ps.-Simplicius was put into the darkness of ignorance together with Aristotle’s writings on philosophia naturalis, although some exceptionally careful commentaries and editions appeared at the very end of the sixteenth century and were widely disseminated during the seventeenth century. Thus Julius Pacius (Giulio Pace), whose commentary on de Anima is an early example of a commentary that does not rely on and does not quote ancient or medieval authorities but follows only the author’s own philological acumen, commends the interpretation of Ps.-Simplicius on all four occasions when he mentions it.86 But from the middle of

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the seventeenth century the decline of interest was considerable. Even the omnivorous Leibniz is silent on this commentary, though he did read other commentaries by Simplicius. Still later Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary on de Anima was read or browsed through by George Berkeley who quotes it at least once (Siris §315). As an exception confirming the general neglect, the commentary was extensively used in Ancient Metaphysics, written by the Scottish judge and maverick Lord Monboddo (James Burnett, 1714-1799), an occasional conversation partner of David Hume. To justify his use of Ps.-Simplicius, Monboddo says that Aristotle can be read by anybody but that Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary ‘is a rare book and in the hands but of few even of the learned’ (Ancient Metaphysics II, 1782, 361). Before the great commentary on Aristotle’s de Anima (18331) by Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, who frequently looked back at the Greek interpreters, including Ps.-Simplicius, for help with some particularly difficult passages, Thomas Taylor (1758-1835) stands out as singularly important. He singlehandedly translated all of Aristotle for the first time into English, adding fragments from the ancient commentators in the notes. In the case of the translation of de Anima (18081), practically all the excerpts Taylor included come from Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary, which he described as the ‘excellent Commentaries of Simplicius’.87 Since Taylor’s translation of Aristotle was published in 50 copies, distributed among friends and never republished before 2003, it is no wonder that his achievement has had little impact on the reading of Aristotle or Ps.-Simplicius.88 Later on (in the 1840s) in Edinburgh William Hamilton, as omnivorous as Leibniz, was reading the Greek commentary both for the light it might shed on Aristotle’s text and for the doctrinal content it might contain. Adolf Torstrik, the first to investigate the manuscript tradition of the commentary when he was the co-ordinator of the committee (1874-1877) preparing the edition of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, expressed a highly negative attitude towards the genus interpretandi used by Ps.-Simplicius in his edition of Aristotle’s de Anima (1862). Not doubting that it is a genuine work of Simplicius, Torstrik took it to be written at the time when Simplicius’ mental powers were in decline and described the work of the commentator as senile, not to say anile.89 In 1882, 355 years after the first edition (1527), the second edition of Ps.-Simplicius’ Greek text appeared, edited by Michael Hayduck.90 After Hayduck’s edition the commentary was used more often in modern commentaries on Aristotle’s de Anima. Thus Georges Rodier (1864-1913), a disciple of Octave Hamelin (who himself was a careful reader of ancient commentators), often quotes Ps.-Simplicius in his edition of de Anima (1900) and on several occasions suggests that his interpretation is the best exposition of a particular passage, though

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more for philological reasons. Robert Drew Hicks (1850-1929), whose edition is still the richest modern edition of Aristotle’s de Anima, while critical at times of Ps.-Simplicius,91 in many passages prefers his interpretation. By later commentators, with very few exceptions on minor points of detail, Ps.-Simplicius is ignored, perhaps, in more than one sense of the word.92 The prevailing position, it seems, has been articulated by Blumenthal who has repeatedly characterized Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary as a ‘Neoplatonic distortion’.93 Apart from a resurgence of interest during the last decades in the later Greek commentators in general, a lonely example of taking Ps.-Simplicius’ interpretation as insightful and valuable for understanding Aristotle is in Lloyd Gerson’s attempt to re-Platonize Aristotle.94 Notes 1. The material for this introduction was prepared by Arnis Ritups and revised by Carlos Steel. Section 1 is by C.S.; sections 2-6 are by A.R and C.S.; section 7 is entirely A.R.’s work. 2. Bossier/Steel 1972. In a shortened form the thesis is restated (with some additional arguments) in Steel 1997, 105-40; in yet a shorter form but again with additional arguments and a discussion of alternative views in Steel 2006, 273-85. 3. Nardi 1951b, 424-41. 4. Piccolomini 1602, 216r. 5. Reid, Works, vol. II, 18523, 860a, note; see also p. 836a, note. Hamilton’s notes appear in his extensive ‘dissertations’ discussing and commenting on the works of Thomas Reid, which he edited. 6. Although Hadot’s reaction was at first positive (1978, 193-202), she later retracted her views (cf. Hadot 1982; 190, 291) and published a long polemical article (2002) to refute my arguments. She concludes: ‘in the last analysis, in the whole of C. Steel’s argumentation, there is not one decisive argument which would allow us to conclude that the commentary on the de Anima attributed by direct and indirect tradition to Simplicius, is inauthentic’. For a short critical reaction, see Steel 2006 and Perkams 2012. As no other scholar apparently shares Hadot’s view, there is no need for further polemics. 7. For a survey on the growing consensus among scholars on the inauthenticity of the commentary see Perkams 2012, 517-18. In the database Thesaurus Linguae Graecae the commentary is marked as ‘[Spuria?] (fort. auctore Prisciano Lydo)’. In the ‘Simplicius’ chapter in the recent Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity Han Baltussen does not discuss the commentary on the soul (711-32). There is, however, a special article devoted to ‘Priscian of Lydia and Pseudo Simplicius on the soul’. Despite this title its author, Frans de Haas, suspends his judgement about the attribution issue: ‘until the question is resolved (if ever), it seems wise to respect the unanimous attribution of the manuscripts, and to consider the commentary as a work of Simplicius’ (p. 760). Nevertheless he uses the commentary to understand better what is argued in the Metaphrasis. 8. energeia khôristôs kai amigôs tô metaxu epokhoumenê. According to the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Priscian and Ps.-Simplicius offer the only pas-

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sages where the adverbs khoristôs and amigôs are used together and are connected to epokhoumenê. 9. See Blumenthal 1996, 68; Dillon/Finamore 2002, 18-24. Even more implausible is Hadot’s suggestion that the terminological parallels between the two works are due to the fact that both follow Theophrastus: ‘The resemblance between these two texts, reproduced by C. Steel on pp. 128f., can perfectly well be explained by the two authors’ utilization of the same source: Theophrastus’ (Hadot 2002, 179). If this were the case, Theophrastus would have been a Neoplatonic philosopher. 10. Blumenthal 1996, 68; Huby 1993, 65; Finamore/Dillon 2002, 23; Hadot 2002, 180. 11. As I said in 1997, 126, ‘metaphrasis’ is never used as the title of a book before the Byzantine period. Hadot (2002, 180) contests this view. However, in the counter-examples she quotes the term ‘metaphrasis’ is never used as the title of a book. Even in the Suda article on Marianus (a poet living at the time of Priscian and Simplicius) the ‘metaphraseis’ are not really titles of works, but refer to his poetical project to ‘rewrite’ classic hexameter poems (such as Theocritus) in iambic verses. This is quite far from what Priscian intends to do. 12. Simplicius, in Phys. 291,21-2 (following the correction of Diels and Todd). Simplicius quotes the text not directly, but takes it from the commentary of Alexander. For this example see Perkams 2005, 520-2, and 2012, 1520. 13. See Todd 2000, 476. 14. There is a difference between the two works on the interpretation of the productive and passive intellect, but this difference can be explained by the fact that Priscian later takes more distance from Iamblichus. See Steel 1978. 15. Anonymous references are always to the edition of Hayduck in the Berlin series. Translations of in DA 1-3.5 are taken from the previous volumes in the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series without identifying the translator’s names (Urmson, Steel, Blumenthal), unless the translation is modified. 16. Ps.-Simplicius clarifies (23,32-24,8) that since we are initially unfit for the contemplation of truth, we have first to engage with opposing views on important questions. 17. The soul spends more time in error than in truth ‘because the living being, a thing that has come into being and is destructible, spends much time unable to receive the rational (emphrônôn) activities of the soul, and much of it being impeded by the affections that impinge on it. In addition it drags the soul round to the needs of everyday life (pros ton bion khreias) and forces it away from the leisure needed for the pursuit of truth. And – the most important point of all – the strong inclination of the soul towards the body, and its embracing the world of becoming, moves it away from turning to itself in which thinking and truth in accordance with reason consist’ (203,30-6). 18. Occasionally Ps.-Simplicius is more specific. Thus Aristotle is said to be following (hepomenôs, 41,31; cf. 146,22-3) Plato in establishing essence from activity or in agreement (homologoumenon, 48,31) with Plato in insisting that it is better for the soul not to be with body. What Plato clearly said about changes of the soul, Aristotle expressed as a riddle (ênixato, 39,37); Aristotle shares on many issues the same views as Plato but, unlike Plato, uses terminology in its ordinary meaning (98,9-11, clarifying different understandings of the self-motion (autokinêsis) of the soul); in some cases

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Aristotle’s manner of argument can be described as Platonic (platônikôs, 149,5); although Aristotle is in harmony (sumphônia) with Plato, he elaborates in a more detailed way matters which Plato treated in a more general and synoptic manner (246,18-21; 247,13-14). Some things are not said by Aristotle because enough (hikanôs) has been said about them already by Plato (e.g. 3,32; 4,5-8). See 211,33-212,27 on phantasia for a clear example of how to interpret Plato with the help of Aristotle understood in accordance with Plato (cf. also 290,32-4). 19. For an annotated edition of the preserved fragments see Taormina 1989. A comparison of both commentaries reveals that occasionally Ps.-Simplicius adopts an interpretation from Plutarch without mentioning him. Both commentators probably rely on Plutarch for their references to the lost commentary of Alexander. On this commentary see Kupreeva 2012. 20. In a similar way the author claims (217,23-8; cf. 28,19-20) to have followed Iamblichus in his interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12. 21. See n. 525 to the translation. Ps.-Simplicius notices a disagreement between Aristotle and Iamblichus in the notion of doxa, which for Iamblichus is a part of non-rational life (309,36-7) while for Aristotle it is the lowest degree of rational life, a view that seems to be shared by Ps.-Simplicius himself (237,9; cf. 309,37-310,2). 22. For Ps.-Simplicius to know something from its causes and principles is the highest kind of knowledge and certainly more perfect than knowing the causes from effects (228,28-9; cf. 8,14-15; 124,28-30). Properly speaking this is the work of an intellect higher than the soul which the soul tries to imitate as much as it can (230,34-231,11). Yet in another way it is also characteristic of scientific knowledge (epistêmê, 237,19-20), and is the work of a physicist (276,31-3). 23. Iamblichus’ de Anima fragments are collected in Finamore/Dillon 2002. In his Metaphrasis too Priscian relies on Iamblichus’ treatise for his interpretation of sense-perception (Metaphr. 7,16-20) and phantasia (Metaphr. 23,13-23). He calls Iamblichus (together with Plutarch of Athens) a genuine (gnêsios) exegete of Aristotle (Priscian, Metaphr. 32,34-5). Similarly, in his Answers to Chosroes, surviving in Latin, Priscian mentions Iamblichus’ de Anima (along with Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Themistius’ interpretations of Aristotle) as a source of his opinions (Sol. Chosr. 42,17-18). See also Huby 1993. 24. See Steel 1978. 25. On the skopos of the third book see also 220,15-17, 220,25-34, 227,356, 247,41-248,1, 254,31-4 and 258,16-17. 26. On the importance of this passage for the determination of the status of psychology between natural science and first philosophy, see also Philoponus, in DA 261,28-31; 10,20-2; 25,10-15; 55,12. 27. Ps.-Simplicius’ determination of the peculiar character of the study of the soul gave rise in the sixteenth century to a new discipline, the scientia de anima, which, according to Agostino Nifo and Marco Antonio Genua, was an intermediary science (scientia media) between natural and supernatural sciences. 28. Ps.-Simplicius does not hide (27,38-28,4; 212,24-6; 254,25-9; 259,1423; 312,6-9) that this paradoxical notion comes from Plato (Tim. 35A3-7), perhaps with a mediation of Iamblichus (cf. 240,35-9). Also Aristotle knows what Plato said about the soul being a middle (254,28; 259,14-23). 29. See n. 25 above.

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30. There is also a relation of similarity or imitation between the imparticipable intellect and the intellect participated by the soul (258,14-15). 31. The three levels or stages of our intellective life are described in detail in 311,14-312,9. See also Steel 1978, ch. 6: ‘The rational life of the soul’. 32. cf. ‘the soul’s ascent to its own highest essence and its remaining in it unifies the activity with the essence because of the complete turning inside’ (240,18-20). 33. cf. ‘like matter’ at 242,17; it is called material because it is acted on in every way (223,17-18). 34. The question whether it is able to think itself is posed as a problem (aporia) (235,14-15 about DA 3.4, 429b26-9) and is solved by saying that it is potentially intelligible (236,33-5; cf. 226,25-6; 244,13-15). 35. See 223,28-9; 223,29-33; 225,26-7; 229,18-19; 229,38-9; 232,36; 236,15; 242,25-6. See also 244,7-29 on the question ‘why would not the intellect that remains and the intellect that proceeds be one?’. 36. At 230,2 Ps.-Simplicius states that DA 3.4, 429b7-9 is about the perfected proceeding intellect; see again at 234,2 (on 429b21-2). 37. For a much more detailed analysis of this complex chapter in the interpretation of Ps.-Simplicius, see Ritups 2010, 213-26 (which contains on pp. 181-212 an early version of an annotated translation of 248,18-262,10). 38. See 250,3-5; cf. 261,12-15; 261,22-4. The quotation comes from Plotinus, Enn. 1.1 [53] 9,13, a comment possibly originating from Plotinus’ own reflection on DA 3.6, 430a26-7 or on Metaph. 9.10, 1051b17-1052a5. 39. The test case for this interpretation is the way Aristotle uses adiairetos khronos in DA 3.6, 430b9 where, according to Ps.-Simplicius, it clearly means ‘undivided time’ and in DA 3.6, 430b15 where it means ‘indivisible time’ (see especially 254,19-23; cf. 251,32-7). 40. ‘Since theoretical is superior to practical philosophy, and, of theoretical, that concerning things separate is superior to natural philosophy, and that which makes no use of the body to that which uses it, and that which is enfolded in itself to that which goes outside’ (48,32-4). At 310,6-7 it becomes clear that in practical matters one can reach only estimation (dokêsis) whereas in theoretical matters one comes to exactness (akribeia). For the commentator dokêsis is clearly connected to seeming (dokein) and opinion (doxa). 41. cf. 264,2-4; 311,14-17. The practical intellect is similar to the passive (pathetikos) intellect for ‘the passive [intellect] is interwoven with the other lives [i.e., perception and imagination], while the practical [intellect] uses them’ (109,3-5; see also 172,15-16). 42. Sensible things are external and individual (124,32-3) and individual things (ta atoma) are cognized by sense-perception and imagination (172,223; 188,11; 224,23, cf. 307,7-9). At 197,5-8 the commentator suggests that doxa too may know individual things, but only when it is connected with sense-perception or imagination. 43. ‘What is to be done (to prakton) is considered as something to be pursued or to be avoided not only in thought, but also in imagination and even in sense-perception. This has been shown by the fact that, in cases of practical reasoning about good and bad, what is called the minor premise is always particular’ (275,9-12). Cf. 295,22-4. See 264,2-4; 264,20; 269,4-5; 275,11; 297,3-4. 44. See 268,16-17. The good that is opposed to bad belongs to the contingent world (cf. 268,21-3). If someone contemplates the intelligible forms ‘he will grasp the true in a way that is not opposed to what is false and will know

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the good that is not opposed to the bad’ (275,28-9; cf. 268,17-18), for the good of the theoretical intellect is ‘necessary and the most excellent’ (299,7-8). 45. For Ps.-Simplicius a new topic starts not after the break between chapters 3.6 and 3.7 of modern editions, but four lines later at 431a4. 46. ‘Aristotle now uses sense-perception as an image’ (eikôn) (264,18). This is a recurrent theme throughout the commentary on DA 3.7; eikôn appears at 264,18 (about 431a4-7), 265,21 (about 431a8 with apeikonizetai at 265,24), 265,30 (about 431a9-12) and apeikonizetai (about 431a13-14) appears at 266,36. Cf. also on the similarity (homoitês) of sense perception and practical thought at 269,29-31. 47. See what is said at 431b2-5: ‘after the argument about sense-perception he now obviously moves to the practical intellect as from an image to its model’ (272,36-7). As the commentator notices, Aristotle had already discussed the practical intellect in between at 431a14-17. 48. At 278,2-3 it is even called ‘mathematical intellect’. 49. 286,12-16. Ps.-Simplicius found an indication of this ascent to the highest intellect in the words prôta noêmata towards the end of DA 3.8 (432a12). 50. See also de Memoria 1, 441b30-1. Aristotle raises the problem already at the beginning of DA, see 403a8: ‘if intellection is also a kind of imagination, or not without imagination’. 51. See Philoponus, de Intellectu 97,16-22; cf. Alexander, de Anima 12,19-22. 52. See Philoponus, de Intellectu 97,13-14; Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 560,1-4. Ps.-Simplicius too notices that ‘the mathematical intellect’, which deals with qualities, quantities and properties, does not think without a phantasm (278,11-12). 53. At 42,38-43,1 the commentator suggests that whenever our rational soul does not use imagination or sense perception in its thinking it is similar to the soul of the universe. 54. 16,23-6; see also 17,13-14; 18,27-8; 45,38-46,1; 77,33-6; 79,38-80,2. In most of these cases it is clear that Ps.-Simplicius means that the perfected outgoing intellect is followed by phantasia. However, in 45,37-46,1, where he speaks about an intellect that cognizes the separate forms, he seems to suggest that also the essential, remaining intellect of the soul has imagination as a by-product of its activity. 55. For Ps.-Simplicius dianoia in this context indicates the practical intellect, see 263,38-9. 56. Ps.-Simplicius explains that Aristotle means by to noêtikon the practical intellect since it is said (431b3) to pursue and avoid (273,26-7). Cf. 275,9-12. 57. cf. 268,8-10. 58. i.e. practical intellect, for the theoretical intellect (that is, the intellect without the will, 298,19-20) does not move (295,19-20). 59. Because of the connection between deliberative imagination and reason Ps.-Simplicius concludes: ‘Hence it sometimes follows it [i.e. reason], sometimes however it declines to something else than what is adjudicated by reason, and either dominates as in the case of people without self-control or is dominated as in the case of self-controlled persons’ (309,16-18). For more on this see 295,22-37; 296,12-17; 296,30-7; 310,24-311,6 and n. 368 to the translation. 60. See also what is said at 310,14-17 on 434a12-15: ‘Our desiderative imagination (orektikê phantasia) surpasses so far the desire in other animals

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that it is somehow equal to reason, as he said, and to the will of reason, so that in practical matters it resists and fights against it, and sometimes even dominates it, whereas at other times it is overcome’. 61. See, in particular, 307,23-40, but the discussion was already anticipated in 293,27-294,2 with respect to DA 3.9, 432b19-26. 62. Before Ps.-Simplicius resumes his commentary (at 313,37) he makes a sideway, and devotes some pages to two problems: one, taken from things themselves (‘how it is possible that the summit of the soul is “not moved” by the intellect that transcends it’), and a second, taken from someone who has reached the summit of philosophy, namely, Iamblichus’ peculiar understanding of DA 3.4-5. 63. Presumably, Ps.-Simplicius considers this part of the text to be a recapitulation because some questions were already discussed in DA 2.11, 423a12-424a15. It should be noted that in his preliminary summaries of DA 3 (5,6-24; 172,4-16) Ps.-Simplicius does not mention the problems treated in the last two chapters of DA. A summary of the chapters is given in 315,21316,12. 64. Judging from 321,9-13 this summary is based mainly on DA 3.12, 434b8-18. See also the summary in 316,9-11; 319,14-22. 65. This section is a revised version of Ritups 2010, 167-74. 66. ‘And indeed there is extant in Syriac a (add. Al-Qifti: good) commentary which is attributed to Simplicius (Sinbilîqiyüs), and he made this for Athåwålis’ (quote from Peters 1968, 40-1; the addition comes from the thirteenth century). So far nobody knows what is meant by ‘Athåwålis’. For more details see Gätje 1971, 20-7 and Gätje 1982, esp. 10-16. 67. Sophonias, in De Anima 1,8. The relation between Ps.-Simplicius and Sophonias’ paraphrase has not yet been properly explored. On Sophonias and Philoponus see Van Riet 1965 (who also has noted one parallel between Ps.-Simplicius and Sophonias). 68. Scholarius, vol. IV (1935), 399,10-400,5 in a letter to a disciple called Ioannes, written before 1450. Scholarius objects to the practice of ‘many of the exegetes’ who are taking Alexander’s exposition of de Anima as a canon (hôsper kanona). It seems likely that Scholarius preferred the interpretation by Thomas Aquinas whose commentary on Aristotle’s de Anima he translated into Greek. 69. Marcianus gr. 413, contains on ff. 157-254v Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary (except the preface) with copious scholia by Bessarion. See Philological Appendix. 70. It seems that at this time Pico did not yet have access to Simplicius’ commentaries on de Caelo, Categories and Physics, and his comment is made on the basis of reading in De Anima alone. In his Conclusiones he mainly uses Ps.-Simplicius’ comments on DA 3.4-5. 71. On Vernia’s change of mind, see Nardi 1951a, 99 where (taken from an edition of 1890/1) one can read Vernia’s ‘testament’ from 3 August 1499. Mahoney 1982, 268-9 n. 7 draws attention to several references to Ps.-Simplicius in an unpublished manuscript (in Bodleian Library, Canonici Miscell. Latini Cod. 506) of Vernia’s Proemium in libro De Anima. Apparently, in his Contra perversam Averrois opinionem de unitate intellectus de animae felicitate quaestiones divinae (Mahoney 1982, 170 dates it as ‘finished perhaps in 1492’) published posthumously in 1504, Nicoletto Vernia uses Ps.-Simplicius constantly. It is not clear which translation was available to Vernia; he might be using a fragmentary (?) translation available in the circles close to his disciple and younger friend Pico della Mirandola, who used it a couple of

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years earlier. Kessler 1988, 494 calls it ‘a lost translation of Simplicius’ but there are no reasons to suppose that there was an earlier translation or that Pico was using a complete translation – he may himself have translated some parts of it that he shared with Vernia. 72. All the editions of Commentaria in libros De Anima (Pisa, 15201) incorporate the Collectanea in libros III De Anima (published as Super III libros De Anima, Venice, 1503). 73. We might say that the interest was mostly local – outside Venice and Padua there are few signs of dealing with Ps.-Simplicius. Peter Lautner mentions (Urmson 1995, 5) a protestant scholar Jacob Schegk who in his Tübingen edition of Aristotle’s de Anima included several excerpts from Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary. 74. Vicomercatus 1543, passim. On him see Nardi 1951b, 404-12 and, especially, Gilbert 1965. 75. An outline of the story, with many historical details, is found in Nardi 1951b. 76. Gian Francesco Torresani (d’Asola) was brother-in-law of Aldus Manutius. 77. It was published together with Alexander’s in de Sensu and Michael of Ephesus on Parva Naturalia. 78. Simplicii commentarii in libros De Anima Aristotelis, Venetiis apud Octavianum Scotum, 1543 (15492). Most of what we know about Faseolo is incorporated in a bio-bibliographical account in Bossier 1975, pp. 15.03215.039. Faseolo’s translation was republished three times (15542, 15643, 15874). 79. cf. Kessler 1988, 524. 80. About the translator, who is called Evangelista Lungus Asulanus, we know nothing. There is a suspicion that it is a pseudonym. 81. Kessler 1988, 523. Kessler also claims that ‘the real breakthrough of Neoplatonism into Renaissance psychology happened only with Genua’, Kessler 1988, 524 and 523-7 for Genua’s psychological views, which are very close to Ps.-Simplicius combined in a way with Averroes. For more on Genua, see Nardi 1955, Spruit 1994, II, 164-73 and now Paladini 2006. 82. There are only posthumous editions of Genua’s commentary. I have used Genua 1576. On Genua’s use of Ps.-Simplicius see Bakker 2007, esp. 169-75. 83. On Zabarella see Nardi 1951b, 417-21; Kessler 1988, 530-4. Note that John Alexander Smith (1863-1939), an influential teacher and a senior editor of the Oxford Aristotle translation and himself a translator of de Anima, told T.S. Eliot that ‘he owed his knowledge of Aristotle chiefly to Zabarella’. See Eliot 1988, 67. This was noticed by Robert B. Todd. 84. On Piccolomini’s critical attitude towards the author of the commentary see further Nardi 1951b, 424-41, mainly based on ‘Capita sententiae Simplicii ex commentariis librorum De Anima deprompta’, in Piccolomini 1602, 216r-finis [222v]. More on Piccolomini in Kessler 1988, 527-30 and, especially, Baldini 1980, who lists (417-20) all the unpublished works of Piccolomini, including several lecture notes on de Anima. 85. Their commentary on de Anima, first published in 1598 with many subsequent editions, was part of an eight volume edition (1592-1606, under the general editorship of Manuel de Góis) of commentaries on Aristotle to be taught in the Jesuit colleges around the world. 86. It is exceptional because in those rare cases when Pacius mentions other commentators his usual tactic is to mention them only in order to

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refute them. Pacius’ translation and commentary was included in a twovolume bilingual edition of all of Aristotle’s writings edited by Isaac Casaubon and first published in 1590 (incorporating what were at the time thought to be the best commentaries on Aristotle). 87. Taylor’s intention was to include much more copious excerpts. He explains why it did not happen: ‘Had my solicitations to two learned men for the loan of these Commentaries, for a few months, been successful, the elucidations would have been still more ample; but the time and great labour spent by me in transcribing from the copy of them in the British Museum, prevented from being more diffuse.’ 88. In addition, in academic circles Taylor was widely ridiculed as a self-taught ignoramus, who did not know any Greek – partly because he on principle avoided using accents while quoting in Greek, insisting that they are of late origin and have no authority. He was indeed an autodidact, but his ability to comprehend the very difficult Greek of Proclus, Plotinus and others is amazing and the amazement is not diminished by the fact that he occasionally misunderstood some passages. 89. Torstrik 1862, vi: ‘Simplicius videtur annis confectus fuisse quum suum in Psychologiam commentarium conscriberet: nam et ceteri ejus commentarii jam scripti erant fere omnes, (laudat enim,) et ipsum interpretandi genus quo in hac re utitur habet senile quiddam, ne dicam anile: tantopere a re propositâ discedit et nescio quo evagatur.’ 90. On Hayduck’s edition see the Philological Appendix. 91. But he is not as critical as his often quoted (e.g., Steel 1978, 9 n. 12) remark on Ps.-Simplicius’ interpretation of DA 3.5 may suggest (‘Simplicius distorts Aristotle’s account in order, as far as possible, to adapt it to his own philosophical presuppositions’, Hicks 1907, lxv). This remark, however, is said about his interpretation of a particular passage, and may make us forget the positive use Hicks often makes of Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary. 92. As a kind of exception one may mention Ronald Polansky who refers to Ps.-Simplicius about a dozen times and explicitly commends him at least twice: Polansky 2007, 89 n. 10 and 155 n. 14. 93. cf. a remark by the translator of the first part of this commentary into English: ‘The commentary on the De Anima is of value for the light it sheds on Neoplatonic, and especially Iamblichean views of the soul;  it occasionally has value for elucidating Aristotle on points of detail. But it is not a trustworthy interpretation of the main doctrines of Aristotle’ (Urmson 1995, 4). 94. Gerson 2005, esp. 163-8.

‘SIMPLICIUS’ On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6-13 Translation

The commentary of ‘Simplicius’ on Book 3 of Aristotle’s On the Soul Chapter 6 430a26-8 The thinking of undivided objects1 is in those things about which there is no falsity, but in things in which there is both falsity and truth, there is already a combination of thoughts [as being one].2 When [Aristotle] discussed the other powers of the soul – the vegetative and sensitive – he [first] taught what their objects are and he considered their activities before their substances,3 advancing from what is more clear to us to what is less clear.4 In his teaching, however, about the intellective [power] he considers before the intelligible objects the intellect – what and what sort of a thing it is –, since the intellect is better known, and next the objects of thought, so that from both [perspectives] we may grasp the activity of the intellect with regard to the intelligible objects and the completion of the intellect by these objects.5 And just as in the case of the passive intellect6 he first discussed its substance and then brought in the objects known to it, which are twofold7 – the formed beings8 and the forms that determine them –, and explained its diverse activity in relation to both objects, so also in the case of the productive intellect, having first considered its substance, its perfection and eternity, he [now] through these [words] teaches what are its objects of thought and what is the activity of this intellect in relation to them.9 Taking the productive intellect as being both intellect and reason10 that is causative or, to put it simply, scientific, he also accordingly proposes two kinds of intelligible objects to it: (i) the indivisible and impartible forms as objects of thought,11 (ii) the unfolded forms which share in unity together with some composition and division as objects of science, when [the intellect] lays hold of the cause. He also [attributes to it] an activity12 which is impartible and only true and never false,13 whereas the activity that is declining towards some partition according to composition and division, in relation to which there is sometimes truth and falsity, is not scientific (for that is always true14), but is entirely related to composition and division; that activity is distanced from the causes and is a matter of opinion – superficial and not touching the depth of things.15 This then is the purpose of the proposed text. In very short terms Aristotle shows right from the beginning both

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what the objects of thought are and what kind of thing thinking is, namely that they are forms, and that thinking is only true. As he says, ‘the thinking of undivided things’ is about those things ‘about which there is no falsity’. Undivided16 is said in various ways,17 as he himself will explain.18 For indeed a length is undivided in actuality, even if it is potentially divisible, and [something may be indivisible] as the point and the limit of extension, which is inferior to extension and falls off into what is not extension but its extreme. But now form is said to be indivisible, and form – as is articulated in the first book of the Physics19 and at greater length in the Metaphysics (about natural form in books 7 and 820 and about the super-natural form in book 12) – is the primary substance, existing by itself, perfection, actuality,21 an indivisible term22 unitarily containing in advance all the reasons unfolded around it and the properties according to which divisible beings exist. This form is simple, not, however, according to a contracted simplicity,23 but according to [a simplicity that] conveys all specific reasons (idious logous)24 which are somehow divided around it; the natural [form] natural reasons and the psychical [form] psychical reason-principles, whereas [the form] that exists by itself, belongs to itself and is exactly what it is,25 supports the mentioned determining forms and unitarily contains them in advance. The very first determining form of the soul is the intellect, which is participated in common by all human souls and yet is proper to each.26 Because the soul’s substance is much more connected with its own determinant form [i.e. the intellect] than are natural things and even more than nature itself, just as it is also indivisibly united to all the other forms because of its indivisibility, it is itself in a secondary way filled with all the forms. [When filling the soul these forms] do not remain exactly such as they were, namely pure forms, but are mixed with the supreme unfolding of the soul’s essential reasons.27 That is why they are ‘comprehended by thinking with reason’28 and, as Aristotle says, are the objects of both thinking and science. Through them the soul has also contact with the leading forms,29 and it also contemplates them once it is made perfect through the forms that are in it, but directly [it contemplates] its own [forms]. And such are the objects of knowledge corresponding to the essential intellect of the soul: both the proximate forms and the more excellent ones. The intellect’s essential activity is such as the [intellect] itself was [said to be]. And the intellect was said to be mixed with the best reason. Therefore, its activity, i.e. thinking, will be such as being also the summit of rational thinking. As thinking it is an indivisible activity and identical with its substance and is of indivisibles, that is, of forms, and is solely and by itself true, having truth that is not opposed30 to falsity. For all falsity is found in the interweaving of one term with another and in the cognition of divisible things, so that

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somehow the knower attains the object, somehow he does not. For neither is someone who does not at all attain it, wrong (‘false’) about the thing of which he has no opinion nor anything to say, nor is someone who has completely got hold of the whole31 wrong, for he is necessarily right (‘true’). Thus falsity and truth opposed to falsity are found in those that somehow attain [the thing]. The thinking, however, of the indivisibles, which is impartible, not having the ‘somehow’ due to its impartibility, either attains the whole or does not attain it at all, so that it is ‘infallible’ according to Plotinus32 and only true according to Aristotle, and never false. As thinking it is such, but as the summit of rationality and as science – not the one according to projection33 but the essential – it is ‘identical with the object’,34 so that it is both science and essential cognition, but in a secondary way. And its sameness is together with otherness and some distance, as also our rational cognition according to projection shows, since it is always in division and collection, both because this cognition does not stand still in accordance with one simple term but is unfolded and because its proper and co-ordinate objects are reasons but not forms, and they are not simply, but with some distance, united to the reasons in the soul, which are essential [reasons]. Rational cognition itself is in relation to itself not without division, and the objects known are related to one another in a similar way, and the 35 of both – the knowing subject and the object known – is corresponding and similar [to each other]. And scientific cognition too is always true, although not as a simply rational [cognition], but as a scientific cognition and from causes, and grasping things wholly as wholes. Thus falsity and truth opposed to it are not found in these cases, but in those where there is ‘already a combination’, namely in rational cognition which proceeded in this way. He said that the combination is ‘of thoughts’. We should not understand ‘thoughts’ (noêmata) as the intelligible forms but as the more particular rational properties (idiômatôn) that come after the forms.36 Therefore he adds:37 430a28-31 as Empedocles said: ‘where sprouted heads of many without necks’ and later were combined by love, so also these, having been separated, are combined, for example, the incommensurable and the diagonal (or the commensurable and the diagonal).38 For what is as it were the form of the square comprehends at once indivisibly all – the sides, the diagonal, their incommensurability, the equality of angles and equality of sides, but each of them is in its own way a property (idiôma) of more particular reason-principles, out of which a rational combination is made.

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Translation 430a31-b5 But if of things that have been or will be, one thinks in addition time and combines it. [For falsity is always in a combination; for even if white is not-white, one has combined not-white. It is possible also to call all of these division. But at any rate, it is not only false or true that Cleon is white, but also that he was or will be.]

In the case of eternal things there is an interweaving only of the predicate and subject,39 whereas in the case of things that come to be and perish [a reference to] time is also needed, since they are not always but sometimes they are and sometimes they are not. And one should read ‘but if of things that have been’ (sc. one makes a combination), and, after having put a comma, infer: ‘it thinks time in addition and combines it’, that is, it thinks and combines time40 in addition to the predicate and subject. Next he again reminds us that ‘falsity always occurs in combination’, since one can even believe that the white is not-white, and that combination is not without division; therefore one should speak of ‘division’ in cases in which there is a combination. 430b5-6 But what makes [them] one, that is the intellect in each case. Reason, which he calls ‘intellect’, interweaves the simple thoughts of the soul, as was already shown, unless perhaps this sentence indicates what he demonstrated in many passages of the Metaphysics, namely, that the formal cause, just as it is cause of being, is also cause of being one for the formed beings.41 And this is also true in the case of natural things, but in the case of souls the form is the intellect, both the participated intellect and the intellect that corresponds to the essence of the soul. For as reason even the latter unifies.42 The text should be construed thus: ‘that which makes each of the interwoven thoughts one is the intellect’. 430b6-10 Since the undivided is twofold – either potentially or actually –, nothing prevents one from thinking the undivided when one thinks length (for it is actually undivided), and in an undivided time; for the time is divided and undivided in the same way as length. We said already that the ‘undivided’ is said in various ways:43 [first], like form, which is not divided in any way, either actually or potentially, [secondly], like length and everything continuous, which is only actually undivided, but potentially is somehow divisible, [and this in two ways] either what really has the natural capacity to be divided, like bodies in the world of becoming, or what only can be

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divided conceptually, like celestial bodies;44 [they can be divided] because bodies have parts. [Thirdly] the point and the now are indivisible, and whatever we call indivisible as limits (for a line as a limit of a plane surface is indivisible in breadth and a plane surface as a limit of a body is indivisible in depth).45 What, then, is indivisible in the way the limit is,46 is itself completely indivisible, not only actually but is also not divisible potentially, yet in a way contrasting with the determining forms of things. For the latter are perfections and unitarily contain all in advance, but points and in general limits, which fall off from extensions and, by the very fact that they are extremes, fall short of that of which they are the extremes, consist in being deprived of the things limited by them. For Aristotle now takes points not like the Pythagoreans supposed them to be, as principles and determining causes of extensions, but as limits, as was said, and extremes. Thus the Pythagoreans accordingly considered the points to be substances (for they made the points identical with the forms that determine divisible things),47 and Aristotle rightly puts them among privations. In short, the argument about the undivided/indivisible [things] is like this. The undivided is twofold – either in potentiality, or actually. What cannot be divided potentially is always also actually undivided, but what is actually undivided is not always indivisible [in the sense of] a potentiality. Thus, length, as he says, and everything continuous is only actually undivided, but both determinant forms and the things that are indivisible as limits qua limits48 cannot be divided potentially and are therefore completely indivisible. Of these two classes the forms are [indivisible] as perfections, superior to the things perfected by them, encompassing all in a unitary way, and primary and by themselves substances, whereas limits [are indivisible] as the extremes of what they limit and have indivisibility as a falling off from the divisible and have simplicity not by virtue of comprehension, as is the case with the forms, but by virtue of a contraction and falling off from extension. [Given the many senses of the indivisible] it is his primordial intention here to consider the indivisibles in the sense of forms and terms. For the intellect as intellect and the essential intellect of the soul is capable of apprehending them in a co-ordinate manner,49 and ‘the thinking of these indivisibles’ is, as he taught,50 true in all respects and never admits any kind of falsity. But in order to distinguish from the forms as indivisibles also objects that are said to be indivisible in another sense, and to distinguish the thinking of the forms from the thinking of the other [indivisible objects], he must next explain in how many ways the undivided is said and what are the acts of thinking co-ordinate to all of them. In fact, the acts of thinking of what is said to be indivisible in a secondary way are no longer pure, as they do not remain in what is purely indivisible. For inasmuch as they know in a co-ordinate manner things that are actually undivided, though still

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potentially divisible, or those that are indivisible according to privation, they also themselves decline from the highest and pure thinking into some potential partition, or51 into knowing the limits not on their own, but incidentally. For by knowing the limited things we know what falls short of them, as we know the crooked by the straight52 and the bad by the good, and in general the privations by the forms whose privations they are.53 If someone thinks not in a co-ordinate but in a superior way, then ‘nothing prevents him from thinking’ them not as they are but as the thinker itself is, no longer being co-divided with objects he is thinking, nor coming down together with them, but thinking them in a causal way and remaining in himself. But now, as it was said, our argument is about the things known in a co-ordinate way. After having, then, said these things in advance, let us now closely follow upon Aristotle’s words.54 430b6-7 Since the undivided is twofold – either potentially or actually The first division he makes is that every undivided is either potentially or actually [undivided]. And this distinction lacks nothing, for what cannot be potentially divided is completely indivisible, but what is actually undivided is not necessarily and in all respects indivisible.

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430b7-9 Nothing prevents it from thinking the undivided when it thinks length (for it is actually undivided), and in an undivided time; for the time is divided and undivided in the same way as length. Even in those things that are potentially divisible there is something undivided55 that makes them56 in actuality undivided. This undivided [aspect], which is inseparable from what is extended itself, holds it together not as its cause, in the way that the form [holds together],57 but as the summit of the formed thing, in the way that health is the perfection of the body of an animal, but not its final cause in the form.58 Nothing indeed, insofar as it is divisible, is able to subsist without its impartible maintenance or to exist according to nature without the perfection that belongs to these things. The intellect that knows in a co-ordinate manner what is actually undivided, but potentially divisible, will think it as it is, namely, as actually undivided. It is also possible to think it as already divided, but when it thinks the whole as one and not yet divided, then it thinks it as undivided. Therefore, he rightly says ‘nothing prevents’, since it is able to know it both as undivided and as already divided. But when it thinks it as undivided, then it does so also in an undivided time. And immediately he made plain the inferiority of the cognition co-ordinate to these things, for it does not know in the

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impartible now that is superior to all time, if one may call ‘now’ what is superior to all time,59 but in time, although in an actually undivided time. It is clear that the intellect that knows these things in a co-ordinate way is not unqualifiedly intellect, but an intellect conjoined and acting together with the rational unfolding, which first introduced extension (for acting in time is proper to the rational life); nevertheless it is intellect as it grants indivisibility to this rational extension. For as long as we think the continuous as undivided, we do not divide the time, but whenever we do divide in halves either length or time, consequently the rest60 is also co-divided. For, if we first know a half of a length, and the other half later, it is clear that also the time is divided together with it into before and after. And again the time, being divided according to before and after, will have one thing known in the moment before and another in the moment after, so that it will be also actually divided. Thus one part of the length will be cognized before, and another part after. Therefore the philosopher rightly adds: ‘for the time is divided and undivided in the same way as length’. For just as is the state of length and every continuous thing, so is also the state of time. And this he clearly confirms through the following: 430b10-14 It is not possible, then, to say what one thinks in each half, for these do not exist, except potentially, as long as it is not divided. But if one thinks each of the halves separately, one divides the time also together [with them], and then it is as if [they were] lengths. But if [one thinks it] as if [made up] out of both, then one does so also in a time related to both. Insofar as one knows [the length] as undivided, one will also not divide the time, as one cannot say what one knows in the first half and what else one knows in the other, so that by the act of thinking one would also have divided the time, as knowing one thing before and another thing later on. For someone who continuously and unchangingly considers the same thing, does not divide the time in which he thinks but only knows that it is potentially divisible, because he could also divide it if he were to consider each of the parts of the length in parts of that time – one before, another after. Hence, if he were to divide the length conceptually and consider a part of it before and another part after, he will always divide the time together with it according to before and after, and then will not know the whole as undivided. And that is why he said nicely ‘as if (hoionei) [they were] lengths’; for it conceives the one as61 many because it conceptually divides it. And therefore he said ‘as if’, because it does not always follow from our conceptual division that things themselves are already divided. Therefore, even if it is not yet a multitude, it is conceived as a multitude. But ‘if we think what is made up out

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of both’ not as many but as one, we will also know both in a completely undivided time, I mean, in time that is actually undivided. And rightly indeed he thus also distinguishes the undivided [aspect] in divisible things from the [indivisibility] of the form:62 not only because [the undivided aspect] can be known in time, but also because it can be divided and, further, because it is completed out of parts (therefore he says ‘out of both’, since he supposes two parts). The formal cause, on the contrary, is entirely impartible and does not have parts. 430b14-15 That which is undivided not in respect of quantity, but in form,63 one thinks in an indivisible time and with an indivisible [part] of the soul. Before finally completing his argument about the thinking of the undivided [aspects] in divisible things he reminds us in between64 of the difference between this [thinking] and the thinking of the forms, so that he may also indicate the reason why at all he started discussing the former mode of thinking. He did so to make clear in contrast the mode of thinking related to the forms. This thinking is neither in time nor divided in any way – actually or potentially. But just as the forms themselves are indivisible, neither stretched out with time, nor partitioned according to some extension, so will also the cognitions, which correspond to them on a co-ordinate level, be altogether indivisible, neither being extended and unfolded in any way, nor at all coming to be in time.65 Although Aristotle said ‘in time’, he nevertheless added ‘in indivisible’ so as to indicate what is above time,66 ‘for all time is divisible’.67 Thus, as the addition ‘of stone’ in the expression ‘ship made of stone’68 destroys its being a ship, so also the addition of ‘indivisible’ to time cancels its being a time. ‘Undivided in respect of quantity’ is something that is a quantity that is not divided, but it is [only] in actuality undivided, not potentially. What is undivided not like that but ‘in form’, that is as form, ‘one thinks’, he says, ‘in an indivisible time’, that is, either in the now, or, to speak more truly, in a way superior to time,69 and ‘with the indivisible [part] of the soul’.70 He thus correctly acknowledges what was said by Plato, namely, that the soul is [made] of both, namely ‘the indivisible being and the being that is partitioned in relation to bodies’.71 Its indivisible and impartible part fits well with the forms, and the soul is conjoined with the indivisible [forms] in a co-ordinate way with its indivisible [part]. And it is again clear72 that his argument is not about the intellect that is superior to the soul’s intellect, neither about the intellect participated by it, nor even less about the imparticipable,73 but about the essential and permanent intellect of the soul. For now he clearly [says]: ‘with the indivisible [part] of the soul’, implying that he also knows [its part] that is somehow divided.

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This is what he says in between about the thinking of the forms, teaching us how it is different from the thinking of objects that are said to be undivided in some other way. And he resumes again the discourse about such thinking, writing the following: 430b16-17 Incidentally and not in so far as these are divided – that with what and the time in which one thinks –, but in so far as they are undivided. He resumes, as was said, the argument about the undivided [aspects] in the divisible objects, [examining] how they are thought of. Having in the middle [of his argument]74 contrasted this with the thinking of the forms, and having said that the latter comes about ‘with the indivisible [part] of the soul and in indivisible time’, he says that the thinking of the undivided [aspects] in the divisible objects neither is done simply with the indivisible [part] of the soul, nor simply in an indivisible time, but with [the part] that is actually undivided, though not also potentially. For what is divisible in the soul is sometimes actually divided in considering something, but sometimes only potentially divisible and not also actually divided. When it examines separately ‘animal’, and then also ‘rational’, and then again ‘mortal’, it divides in actuality the consideration of the human being, but when it gathers the whole at once,75 its cognitive activity becomes undivided but not also incapable of being divided (since it is by nature fit to be divided), but only in actuality. Although the part of the soul that knows these things is divisible and knows them in a time that by nature is divisible, nevertheless, when it grasps the known object as undivided, even if it by nature is divisible, it knows it not as divided and not as in a divided time. Therefore he said ‘incidentally’, for [the soul] knows the divisible not as divided but as undivided, and not as in divided time (although this time is really divisible), but as in an undivided time, and it does not know it with its [divisible part] as divisible, but as undivided. The undivided is [said to be] ‘incidentally’ in them, when taken in relation to their divisibility; for not in so far as they are divisible, are they also undivided, and therefore they will have as divisible the undivided ‘incidentally’, whereby the term ‘incidentally’ does in this case not indicate something inferior but what corresponds to another and superior reason.76 Thus it knows divisible objects incidentally. With the term ‘these’ (ekeina) he refers to the divisible objects, as he himself infers when he says: ‘and not in so far as these are divided’, namely, when one considers their undivided [aspect]. [Aristotle] asks us to understand ‘incidentally’ not only with respect to the things known, which are divisible, but also with respect to what thinks and to the time, namely, that ‘with which’ and that ‘in which’.77 For he added exactly this ‘that with what and the time in which’ to make clear, as we said, that even if the soul

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acts with its divisible part in knowing these things, it acts with it as not divided. Therefore, it knows the undivided [aspect] in the divisible objects per se as undivided, but the divisible objects ‘incidentally’ (since they had the undivided [aspect] according to another reason and not as divided). He shows that the undivided is known per se by adding ‘but in so far as [they are] undivided’. Having said ‘but in so far as undivided’, he confirms through the following [words] that there is ‘something undivided’ in the divisible things. 430b18-20 For in them too there is something undivided but perhaps not separate, which makes time and length one. And this exists likewise in every continuum, both time and length. That in continua there is ‘something undivided’, he proved through the fact that every continuum is ‘something one’ (hen ti). For the ‘one’ itself is ‘undivided’, and what participates [in the one] produces not the one itself, but the unified, since it has parts, what he suggested by calling it ‘something’ (ti). [He said] ‘perhaps not separate’, since he considers not the form of the substrate, but the substrate itself as unified. For this [undivided] is completely inseparable, because it is something of what the substrate itself is, whereas the form has something separate, as he himself indicates in the Physics, calling even the natural forms ‘separate’,78 because they are [substantial] beings and substantiate the substrate, but are not substantiated by it. And that is why, I think, he added ‘perhaps’, meaning that if you take the indivisibility of the form, it is somehow separate, but if you take [the undivided aspect] of the substrate, it is inseparable.79 430b20-3 The point and every division, and that which is in this way indivisible, are made known in the same way as privation. And a similar account holds for other cases, for example, how one cognizes evil or black, for one cognizes [them] in a way by the contrary. After his exposition about the thinking of objects that are only actually undivided, he next teaches about the thinking of objects that are absolutely indivisible, yet have an indivisibility in so far as they are falling off from the divisible bodies. For the plane surface, the line, and even the point and the now have a kind of shape (morphê) of their own and because of it they should not be put entirely among the privations, but as indivisibles they have the character of privations. For just as the plane surface has been given shape according to length and breadth, but according to depth has a character of privation, so also all the other divisions,80 insofar as they depart from the divisible things whose limits they are, are counted among the privations. Again, someone who considers these limits on a co-ordi-

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nate level81 will know them also as being deprived, each in a manner appropriate to their substrate, because of his co-ordinate consideration, according to the privation of the form. For in thinking of the form he will also know the fact of being deprived of it as not participating in it,82 I mean, in the form, upon which privation parasitizes,83 I mean the generated form, since there is no evil parasitizing upon an eternal good,84 nor is there a privation in any other case of eternal forms. How, then, do we cognize privations as privations? In the way we cognize darkness by not seeing light and evil by not seeing good in it, because by the concept of good and by the concept of light we cognize evil and dark, just as by the straightness of the ruler we know the crooked.85 For Aristotle now took ‘black’ and ‘white’ instead of ‘darkness’ and ‘light’,86 since black is also a form.87 It should be noted in the text that Aristotle does not want the point to be thought unqualifiedly as privation. For [it is privation] not as division,88 but as falling short of the extension of the thing, whose limit it is, insofar as it also was affected by privation. ‘The point’, he says, ‘and that which is in this way indivisible’ like the now ‘and every division’, which is privation in the sense that it falls short of its proper extension, ‘are made known in the same way as’ what is entirely ‘a privation’, such as evil. For even if evil entirely leans upon the appearance of good, yet as evil it has its being in the absence of the good.89 Thus also non-being – in so far as nature knows non-being but not absolute non-being – exists in the absence of being in so far as it is non-being, even if it exists upon some being.90

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430b23-4 That which cognizes must be potentially and inhere in it. It seems to me that this saying again clearly shows that the thinking of these divisions is inferior and is left far behind the contemplation of the forms. For the latter consists in pure activity, but the former is interwoven with potentiality, for it is a contemplation of the very form upon which privation parasitizes. When we cognize the form as acting in a privative way, that is, as capable of being absent from the informed things, we think it by an act that is interwoven with potentiality. For [this thinking of privations] does not happen by a perfect or pure activity but by an imperfect activity, which, in accordance with its co-ordinate cognition, does not focus 91 on what is only in actuality, but also on what is in potency and is like something that is deprived. One should again note the following, in order not to fall into problems by introducing superior knowledge of things, which is transcendent and does not know things in a co-ordinate, but in an eminent way. For that knowledge, knows things in accordance with the nature of the knower, and not in accordance with the things known, and thus knows them in a superior way than they are.

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Therefore, he says, ‘it’ – clearly that which knows these [privations] – he wants it to be thought ‘must be potentially’, that is, less perfect than that which thinks the forms, and must be interwoven with potentiality, and the potentiality ‘must inhere in’ that which thinks. This is added so that we should not suppose that that which is thinking must only be in potentiality like the intellect he [already] discussed [in DA 3.4], namely the intellect that proceeds and is still imperfect. For that which thinks is now not said to be in potentiality in the sense that it is not even thinking, but it is as something that thinks and does so in actuality, albeit interwoven with potentiality, that is, with what is imperfect and its own privation. Just as to see dimly does not mean not to see at all but to see with one’s own privation, the same also holds for thinking, when it is somehow mixed with not-thinking. That is what happens when one simultaneously cognizes a form and its privation on a co-ordinate level, for then one not only thinks but also does not think. For a privation can never be thought in itself since it never is in itself. And therefore such an act of thinking is somehow imperfect and interwoven with its own potentiality or privation. 430b24-6 If, however, to someone nothing is contrary of the causes,92 it knows itself, it is actuality93 and is separable. When he discussed above the knowledge of the undivided [aspects] in the divisible objects, he immediately contrasted it with the thinking of the purely impartible [forms], as this thinking too comes about with the indivisible [part] of the soul and is above time.94 For his primary concern was to study the thinking of the forms, and in order to clarify it he took up [the study] of what is undivided in any way whatsoever, supposing that from their confrontation we may more clearly grasp what the pure thinking of the forms is. And now similarly, having discussed the thinking of the ‘divisions’,95 he again contrasts it with the thinking of the forms: (1) the former is compared to the latter as potential to actuality; and (2) as a thinking that is co-ordinate with the privative natures and generated things and that therefore has itself also something opposed to its power is compared to what is ‘separate’ and pure ‘activity’ and has ‘no opposite’; finally (3) as what is related to another is compared to what belongs to itself. All these features are found in a more divine and superior way in the imparticipable [intellect], and therefore also in a secondary way in the [intellect] participated by the soul; therefore they also belong to the primary substance of the soul, even if in an inferior way due to its being already interwoven with the unfolding. Now his discourse is about the [intellect of the soul], as we have often argued before,96 which he wants to be at the same time ‘intellect’ and ‘scientific knowledge’. For the intellect that is superior to the substance of the soul is ‘intellect’, but not ‘scientific knowledge’. Thus the argument is

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now about the substance of the soul and the intellect that corresponds to it, and about it the following statements are made:97 (1) that it has ‘nothing opposed to it’ because it is also everlasting (for it has been clearly said that it is immortal, when he said ‘and this alone of the soul is immortal’),98 whereas in things that come to be there is opposition and privation; and (2) that it is a cause, for [as we have seen] it is productive, just as the intellect that is proceeding is passive. For he said also earlier of the soul that one part of it is productive and another passive, and he posited the productive as principle and cause but the passive as matter.99 Thus also the highest substance of the soul is a cause. But the essential intellect of the soul, as was said,100 is also by being activity, even if in a secondary way. Therefore he now also concludes (3) that ‘it knows itself’. For it is itself the forms in a secondary manner because its existence is cognate with the intellect that is above the soul; for it is not in contact with the intellect through otherness as nature and bodies are, but it is grown together with it. [This essential intellect] is also (4) ‘actuality’ as it is in no way interwoven with potentiality, since it is immaterial, when it is separated from the secondary, projected and outwardly declining lives. Whence having called such an intellect ‘actuality’, he added (5) ‘and separable’, for when it is separated, then it is activity and is unmixed and whatever is now claimed about it. For one should not understand the ‘separable’ as referring to what is always separated, but as to what [is separated] sometimes,101 for ‘being separated’, he says, ‘it is what it is’.102 430b26-9 Saying (phasis) is something of something, just like assertion (kataphasis),103 and true or false is every [assertion], but not all intellect: that which is of ‘what [something] is’ in accordance with ‘what it was for it to be [it]’ is true and is not something of something. Having said and established of the soul’s supreme substance and of the soul’s intellect whatever we first established about the intellect that is above the soul, he again wants, as we also said earlier,104 to demonstrate and clearly teach the difference between our essential intellect and the superior one by the addition of its rational division. And that is why he uses the same expression several times,105 both to explain what the essence itself is of our essential intellect and what its activity is, so that along with what it has in common with the superior things we would also know its difference, and would in all ways envisage the intermediate state of the soul. Since intermediaries are difficult to comprehend and sometimes become less clear because they lack their own names, the ancients made them clear out of both extremes – those which are before and those which are after them.106 Thus Plato [made the soul] out of the impartible and the

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partitioned, not according to juxtaposition but, as he said,107 according to mixture – for ‘it was mixed’, he says, out of both –, so that he might reveal how the whole soul’s substance is wholly simultaneously impartible and leaning towards the being that is partitioned in relation to bodies;108 not as [if it were] partly impartible and partly leaning towards what is partitioned, but it is both throughout – none of them, however, purely; or rather it is not even mixed together out of both sides, but the being of the soul is something simple and specific (idios), yet intermediate between what is truly impartible and the being that is partitioned in relation to bodies, having something in common with each of the extremes because of its middle position. Take, for example, the colour yellow (xanthon):109 it is in reality simple and is not naturally constituted out of a mixture of the extreme colours, white and black, but it is specific and simple, as was said. Yet it is said to be formed out of both extremes because intermediaries have something in common with each [of the extremes]. And since the intermediaries, as was said, do not always have their own names and are not easy to grasp in our acts of thinking, one must, following the best philosophers, attempt to catch them from the extremes. Thus Aristotle attempts to grasp the substance of the soul and its essential activity from both the intellect and scientific knowledge (which is a rational activity according to disposition and projection),110 seeing it as being at once, whole and throughout, intellect and scientific knowledge. Yet the soul is neither intellect, such as is the intellect superior to the soul, nor scientific knowledge, such as is the knowledge from the causes according to disposition and projection. And, as he himself clearly indicates, the soul (or the soul’s cognition) is a scientific knowledge which is identical with the thing known.111 Through its ‘identity with the thing known’ he indicates the intellective [nature] of the soul and of its cognition, through ‘scientific knowledge’ he indicates its rational and unfolded [nature], which sinks from its substance towards otherness. That is why, it seems to me, at the beginning of this text he calls the soul’s essential cognition ‘saying’ (phasis) and adds ‘something about something’ – not as is said by the exegetes Alexander and Plutarch, the son of Nestorius,112 that ‘saying’ (phasis) here should be taken as ‘negation’ (apophasis) or as standing for ‘inner speech’ (endiathetos logos).113 This cannot be true since each of them is a kind of combination whereas Aristotle and before him also Plato everywhere used the word ‘saying’ (phasis) for simple thoughts and expressions.114 Now also [through the term phasis] he indicates the simple thought but through the addition ‘something of something’ (ti kata tinos) he indicated the interweaving of the soul’s essential activity with the unfolding. For [the essential activity of the soul] is such that it is simple and intellective, but when it slackens its simplicity by the interweaving with reason it is not somehow intellective and some-

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how rational but thoroughly both together or, rather, none of them purely but is some simple form between them and therefore [made] of both of them, having something in common with both because of its intermediate state. Therefore he continued with ‘just like assertion’ (kataphasis), so that he may reveal its intermediate status from the extremes.115 In fact, ‘saying’ (phasis) is, [as we have seen], simple, this whole ‘something about something’, whereas ‘assertion’ (kataphasis) is on its own a rational statement (logos), that has its being in ‘something about something’.116 It is as if someone were to say that yellow ‘is capable of dilating the sight just like white’.117 In the strict sense white is dilating [the sight], whereas yellow obtains some likeness to this dilating capacity because it has something in common with white, but it is not capable of dilating on its own. In the same way the essential activity of the soul is not exactly ‘something about something’ (for it was called ‘saying’), but due to its communion with and declension towards reason it shows some form of predication of one thing of another. And this means for him ‘just like assertion’, for [assertion] consists on its own, as was said,118 in the interweaving of one [thing] with another. And it is very good indeed that he did not take in this argument negation (apophasis) but only assertion (kataphasis). In fact, just as non-being in no way can be seen among the intelligible beings, as Parmenides said,119 so also in the same way the soul’s highest substance and the activity that corresponds to that substance, which is full of itself, gives no place to non-being. For even if Plato in the Sophist praises non-being on the level of the intelligibles,120 he does not take it in the sense of destruction, nor in general in the sense of negation but in the sense of an activity and a property that is either (1) superior even to being itself (and such is the super-being)121 or (2) [is taken] in the sense of otherness – not [the otherness] that is divided, but the formal otherness122 (for the otherness opposed to sameness is somehow a primordial property, and the property of non-being is concurrent with this otherness, even if it is not the same as otherness, as is the view of the more accurate interpreters of the Sophist),123 or (3) [is taken] in the sense of causative activity that constitutes the reality of those that somehow fall from being. Anyway, Plato praises non-being on the level of the intelligibles not as something passive but as property, an activity and perfection while the non-being that brings about a destruction of being is expelled from the truly existent things. The summit of the soul is cognately united to these beings on a secondary level and it becomes full of itself, having turned to itself and having been separated from outward projections and fully attached to the superior beings. And even if it has some communion with the unfolded reason, it will have [such a relation] rather to the affirmative than to negative [reason].124

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‘Every is true or false’ is said about the ‘assertion’ (kataphasis) and not about ‘saying’ (phasis). For he adds ‘not, however, all intellect’ (using now ‘intellect’ instead of ‘saying’). In fact, not all intellect is ‘true or false’. For the intellect that goes outside and is potential (what he calls ‘passive’) is sometimes true and sometimes false, whereas the essential [intellect] is never ‘true or false’ but only true. For this [intellect] is capable of grasping ‘what [something] is’ in accordance with ‘what it was for it to be’, that is, is capable of grasping the substance of things. For this is the meaning of considering ‘what [something] is in accordance with what it was for it to be’ (that is, the form itself). Thus the argument could be rephrased as follows: ‘the intellect that knows the substances according to the forms is unreceptive to falsity’. It is obvious that Aristotle usually designates by ‘what [something] is’ the substance, but by ‘what it was for it to be’ the form. In fact in the case of enmattered things he wants there to be a difference between ‘the thing’ (auto) and ‘its being’ (einai auto): auto reveals the substance of the enmattered thing, while einai auto reveals the form.125 In the case of the immaterial things, however, substance and form amount to the same. We have already given the reason126 why the intellect that knows in a co-ordinate way impartible and immaterial beings and, speaking simply, the forms, is always true, when it knows, for it does not somehow attain the thing and somehow not, so that it could be false or true in accordance with the truth that is opposed to falsity. For falsity and truth opposed to falsity is found in interweaving and division, but interweaving and division is found in things that are somehow divisible and are composite, whereas the forms are simple and impartible. And in general falsity consists in somehow attaining the thing, so that it says something about it, and somehow [not attaining it], so that it is just this – ‘false’. It is, however, impossible to attain the impartible according to some aspect, because it is impartible, but either one will know the whole (if one can speak of ‘the whole’ in the case of the impartible things) or not know it at all. And this was what Plotinus also said, as we already mentioned, – the intellect ‘either attains or does not attain’, so that it is ‘infallible’.127 Having spoken, then, about assertion, namely, that it is both ‘something of something’ and either ‘true or false’, he contrasts it with the intellect, saying that it does not have either of them – neither ‘the true and false’, but only the true, nor ‘something about something’, thus explaining again its middle position from the opposites. For when he first said that ‘saying’ is ‘something of something just like assertion’, he indicated through the use of the word ‘saying’ (which signifies something simple), that one should not immediately128 think of some interweaving in ‘saying’. And now [at the end of the lemma] he even more clearly rejects this from the intellect, by

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denyingthat it thinks ‘something of something’, because the intermediate, as has been said, is designated from the opposites. 430b29-31 but just as seeing of what is proper [to seeing] is true but whether what is white is or is not a human, is not always true, so it is with those things that are without matter. He uses a clear image [to explain] the contemplation of intelligible objects, which are simple, namely, the seeing of the proper visible objects, and not some other perception. To be sure, all [perceptions] are true of their proper [sense-objects] and are cognitions of simple things, but sight due to its communion with light, its ability to perceive far away things, the instantaneousness of cognition and its being the least passive and the most active of all the senses,129 can be most properly used as a resemblance of the intellect. Sight, then, is true, except when distance or some other affect (pathos) impedes it. It is always true of its proper [sense-objects], for example, that what appears is white or yellow.130 But whether the white one is the son of Cleon,131 this is not always true, as it is neither a simple thing, nor the proper sense-object of sight. ‘So it is also with things that are without matter’, he says, as it is with the proper sense-objects. He makes the comparison only with respect to the simplicity. In fact, [the immaterial forms] are perfect beings, or, rather, are perfections, pure activities and completely indivisible terms. They are not simple in the same way as the proper sense-objects, for the latter are simple according to contraction, whereas the forms are simple according to an all-comprising simplicity. But the comparison only works when one takes ‘simple’ as a term understood ‘from one and in relation to one’132 and thus having something in common.133

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431a1-4 Science in act is the same as the thing, but potential [science] is prior in time in a single being, but in general [it is not prior] not even in time, for everything that comes to be [comes] from that which is so in actuality. The phrase is almost literally the same as what Aristotle formulated before.134 Yet it is not repeated in vain. As a matter of fact, in the earlier passage the use of the term ‘science’ made clear that the substance and being of the soul’s substantial intellect is slackened in comparison to the [intellect] above the soul; for what is at once thinking and scientific is inferior to what only thinks.135 Since however we use the same words to signify both the activity and substance, we asked at the earlier passage to understand the words ‘intellect’ and ‘science’ with reference to substances, whereas now [we ask to refer them] to activities, so that now we may understand, through the fact that its knowledge is at the same time ‘scientific’,

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that also the intellective activity of the soul, following its substance, is slackened from the superior intellective activity, and we may from there confirm that also its substance is declining. But what sort of ‘science’ is in this passage said of the soul’s substantial activity? It is not the science that comes to be in us as a disposition, nor that which is according to projection,136 which is dissociated from the substance that projects it, and which grasps this substance through some otherness and with some distance, but it is science that is united with its substance because of identity.137 For he wants this ‘science to be the same as the thing’, that is, the substance which both knows and is known, so that he may again indicate the intermediate state [of the soul’s activity], since it has its intellective character through identity – for the intellect in the proper sense is the one which is in its substance activity138 – while having its declension towards the unfolding of reasons due to the fact that it is said to be wholly science. We have explained already at length139 in what sense what is in potentiality is prior in time in a single being. But let us now again shortly recall that this is true in the case of things that come to be and sometimes are – in them there is a progress from what is imperfect to what is perfect. The soul too belongs somehow to these beings because of its connection with this body, as it moves from a state of potentiality to actualizing the forms in theoretical thinking. But in the case of things that are coming to be in all respects, in a single being what is in actuality is never prior in time to what is in potentiality. Since even if a father exists in actuality before the child that is potentially coming to be, nevertheless this [priority of the actuality] is not in a single being. But in the case of the soul [Aristotle] requires us not to understand it in that way, but to admit that also in a single being what is in actuality comes before what is in potentiality. For even if in the common life of the soul with the body, what is in actuality does not come before what is in potentiality, it will come first in the soul itself, which is a single being, exists before the body and was once living separately [from the body], being turned towards itself in an intellective way.140 [Aristotle] said that what is in potentiality is ‘prior in time’ because, as is generally accepted, it falls short in all other meanings of the term ‘prior’, such as [prior] by nature, by respect, by dignity.141 Earlier [at 430a9] he was content to say that what is in potentiality is not unqualifiedly prior in time in the case of the soul, ‘but it sometimes thinks and sometimes does not’,142 as he said there. But now he adds also a reason that makes it a necessary thesis. In this he is again following Plato, for the latter says somewhere that a ‘soul that has not seen the things that are will never come into this [human] shape’.143 Following him, Aristotle requires that ‘everything that comes to be [comes] from that which is so in actuality’, since also in the case of things that come to be in whatever way what is in actuality precedes in time the imperfect

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potentiality, so that it may come to be from it. But the difference in the case of the soul is that what is in actuality precedes [what is in potentiality] also in one and the same being. Therefore, in the case of the other things it is unqualifiedly said that in a single being what is in potentiality precedes what is in actuality, but this is disclaimed for the soul. On the contrary, in one and the same soul what is in actuality precedes [what is in potentiality], so that the soul may also perfect itself when it has fallen down to imperfection, as it was also already active before and had the reasons [in itself] and did not need much effort in order to be active again in a similar way by turning towards itself and running back to its summit. For the soul must by nature be disposed towards such an activity and, because it has already been active many times, have something that makes it at ease towards being active again, and be accustomed towards the mode of return because it had returned towards itself many times, rather infinite times, as it is immortal.

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Chapter 7 431a4-7 The sense-object seems to make the sensitive [power] from being potential to be actual; for it is not affected or altered. Hence this is another kind of movement; for movement is an actuality of what is incomplete, while actuality [taken] absolutely, i.e. that of what has been completed, is different. Thus far he has completed, I think, the argument about the theoretical intellect in all its aspects. Having started from the incomplete intellect, which is for some time only in potentiality, he ascended towards the intellect that is also proceeding outwards, but is completed according to disposition and projection,144 and through this he climbed up to the essential intellect and examined it in all aspects, considering its substance and its activities, its causality, the fact that it is separate145 and that it is eternal, revealing both what it has in common with what is superior to it and its abasement through its declension sinking down towards the secondary things, and omitting, so to say, none of its aspects.146 From here on he passes to the so called practical intellect,147 which he also calls dianoia (discursive thought)148 and which, in his view, uses imagination and is concerned with what is good and bad, just [as it is also concerned] with falsity and the truth which is its opposite, but not – like the highest theoretical intellect – with what is only true.149 For the proceeding intellect, still being rather incomplete, [as we have seen], deals also with falsity and truth as a theoretical intellect, but it has not yet been shown to be concerned with good and bad in practical matters.150 Indeed, all theory is not only about the true, but always also about the good, but it does not pursue the good as something other than the

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truth, but sets as a goal the truth itself as the best and as partaking in the good. This151 is what Aristotle himself taught us in the Metaphysics, when he said that the mathematical sciences adhere to the final cause in so far as they pursue in cognition truth and precision.152 The practical [intellect], however, does not have its goal in the cognition of the good, but in its practice – either in acting justly, or in living temperately, or in behaving with courage.153 As [Aristotle] intends to discuss this intellect, he sends us again from sense-perception, as from the better known, to the theory of this [intellect], just as he did when he started his argument about the theoretical intellect.154 For there (429a13ff.) he started somehow as follows: ‘if thinking is like perceiving, it would either consist in being affected in some way by the object of thought or in something else of this kind’. Now again he uses sense-perception as an image, not simply as a capacity to know, but as a capacity to apprehend what is pleasant or painful, thus making it an appropriate image of the practical intellect, which is not only a capacity to know but also endeavours after what is good and bad. In [this] same passage he now explains in what sense he said before that the sensitive [power] is ‘affected by the sense-object’: [it happens] not according to the movement, defined by him in the Physics unqualifiedly as incomplete, namely ‘the actuality of what is in potentiality, as long as it is incomplete’.155 For the sensitive [power] is not moved by the sense-object according to this movement, but, if at all, only the sense-organ. For this sensitive life, which is already complete, discerns the sense-object that falls upon it in accordance with a complete activity. For discernment comes from within and takes nothing on from without.156 But the sense-organ needs the sense-object as present and moving, since sense-perception is only aroused to activity in relation to something present, and not also, like imagination, in relation to something absent. And it is in this sense that perception, which first is potential, is said to become actual by the sense-object, namely without being affected by it (for it is not moved, he says, according to incomplete movement); being first not active it later projects, through the presence of the sense-object, its activity whole at once, and this activity is indivisible and all together, and not as movement in division and continuity.157 Therefore [this activity] belongs to a complete thing, and, as he himself says, ‘to something that has been completed’. He rightly added in the text ‘seems’, for the sense-object does not really do something to the sensitive [power], but only ‘seems’ to do so due to its effect on the sense-organ. Therefore he himself gives the reason of his saying ‘it seems’, by using the causal conjunction ‘for’ (gar): ‘for it is not affected or altered’, he says. But ‘the sense-object seems to make the sensitive [power] from being potential to be actual’, though not truly, for otherwise the sensitive [power] would

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be affected by the sensible object.158 What is affected, however, is in movement according to incomplete change. But the sensitive [power] is not moved when it acts, but it stands absolutely still in accordance with actuality.159 For movement is this whole ‘incomplete actuality’, whereas what is said to be unqualifiedly actuality without ‘something incomplete’ is indivisible activity. Such, as was said, is the discernment of the senses. It seems that Aristotle altogether admits that the term ‘movement’ may be applied to it [this discernment],160 if, as he says, there is also ‘another kind of movement’, because it changes at some time from inactivity to activity. For we speak also in such a case of ‘movement’, not a discursive movement, but whole at once, [such as the movement] according to which the presence and absence of individual and particular forms is said to be achieved.161 And he adds the reason why he does not want to put the activity of the senses in movement, a reason we already mentioned. For he says ‘movement is an actuality of what is incomplete’, for [it is the actuality] of something in potentiality, whereas ‘actuality that [is taken] absolutely’, that is, actuality alone without [the addition of] ‘something incomplete’, ‘is different’ from the actuality of something incomplete. And how it is different he clarified by adding ‘of what has been completed’, since it is the actuality not of an incomplete but of a complete thing. This then is said [by Aristotle] as an explanation of what was said in an earlier argument, namely, that ‘to perceive is somehow to be affected’.162 ‘[For he explains] in what sense this [statement] really applies to the perceptive [power], the sense being, not that the perceptive power is really affected, but that, even though it acts according to complete actuality, it does so only at some times when the sense-object is present. The following text sets out the likeness of sense-perception to the practical intellect.

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431a8 Perceiving, then, is like mere asserting and thinking. Here he himself notices, exactly as we said, that the sensitive [power] is compared only in terms of cognition. For in that aspect there is a similarity to both rational and intellective cognitive activity; for asserting and denying is specific to rational consideration, whereas thinking is specific to the intellective163 [power]. 431a9-12 When something is pleasant or painful, it pursues or avoids, as it were (hoion) asserting or denying; and to feel pleasure or pain is to be active with the perceptive mean towards the good or bad or similar things, and avoidance and desire are the same when actual. Through these words he indicates in what cases the perceptive [power] may be taken as image of the practical intellect, namely,

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when it not simply discerns the sense-object but also discerns it as pleasant or painful. For the perceptive discernment of anyone of them in the sense-object – either the pleasant, or the painful – is, he says, like affirmation just as the denial of anyone of them is negation, since such a discernment of the sense-object both as knowable and as pleasant somehow consists in an interweaving, and therefore it is like an affirmation.164 [He says] ‘as it were’ (hoion), because in the proper sense affirmation and negation are found in rational unfolding. Thus, when [the perceptive power] discriminates the senseobject as ‘pleasant or painful’, then ‘it pursues or avoids’, since perception seeks the pleasant as good and avoids the painful as bad, for it belongs to rational discrimination to distinguish often the good from the pleasant and the bad from the painful.165 The pursuit indicates the affection and seeking, and the avoidance the aversion and distance. In enjoying perception holds on to its own activity as something good, and in feeling pain it disowns it as bad. This is the meaning of the sentence ‘and to feel pleasure or pain is to be active with the perceptive mean in relation to the good or bad or similar things’. In this sentence ‘the perceptive mean’ is taken as to be receptive of both the pleasant and the painful, or rather, to express it better, [receptive] of experiencing pleasure or pain, as it is capable of discriminating both. Since the perceptive [power] always uses a bodily organ, it knows the affections that preserve or destroy it and loves the former as being proper and avoids the other as alien. ‘Or similar things’ is added to ‘the good or bad’ because perception never discriminates the good as good or the bad as bad, or seeks the one and avoids the other, but [discriminates] the pleasant as good and the painful as bad, seeking the former and avoiding the latter. For the additional phrase ‘similar things’ refers to things that are similar to the good and the bad, namely pleasant and painful things. Thus first of all the perceptive part must perceive and become actual, and secondly it must feel pleasure or pain. For the discrimination comes before the affection of pleasure or pain, since it is possible to perceive without pleasure and pain, but to feel pleasure or pain without cognition is impossible; therefore by nature cognition is primary in relation to these affections. Third in order is yearning or avoiding, that is to pursue the pleasant or to get rid by all means of what causes pain. This is what is meant by ‘avoidance’, just like desire means pursuit, since it is appetite and stretching out towards the pleasant and striving for it. And this already is activity, for it is not simply in being affected, like feeling pleasure, but also in pursuit, and seeking is not an affection but activity. Thus avoidance and desire [are taken] as activity but not as the feeling of pleasure and pain itself. For these are like affections, the one to be pursued, the other to be avoided, while the seeking of the pleasant and the escape from the painful are like activities: one desire, the other avoidance.

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431a13-14 and that the appetitive [power] and the power to avoid are not different either from each other or from the perceptive [power] but [their] being is different. As he connected desire and avoidance with the perceptive [power], he insisted, before concluding how it is an image of the practical intellect, that ‘the appetitive [power] and the power to avoid’ are in subject one and the same with each other and with the perceptive [power] (for [in the subject] in which there is perceptive discernment, that is, in the perceptive soul, there is also desire and avoidance, and discernment is not in one thing and desiring and turning away in another, but in the same); however, in account and in their own special character (for that is what ‘being’ means) they form a multitude and otherness. For avoiding is different from seeking, and each of them is different from discerning, even if they are always together with discernment. Sufficient proof of their being other is the fact that sometimes sense-perception occurs without desire or avoidance, and sometimes [it occurs] with desire alone without avoidance, and vice versa. Next he gives his doctrine about the practical intellect. And now he takes up166 the image: 431a14-17 To the discursive (dianoêtikêi) soul imagined objects (phantasmata)167 are present like sense-impressions (aisthêmata). When it asserts or denies good or bad, it also avoids or pursues; therefore the soul never thinks without imagination. He calls ‘discursive’ the soul that passes through and revolves around the divided beings; not only in practical matters, but also when engaged in theory, namely, when it is no longer intuitively apprehensive of the forms themselves, but passes through and revolves around the reasons, which are divided around the [forms],168 by being active in a partial way, proper to each particular thing, and by again gathering the individually (idiôs) known things into some common unity, like ‘animal’, next ‘rational’ and then ‘mortal’, and then the three together.169 Subjected to such a cognitive activity are the objects of imagination (phantasta) – which are what phantasmata mean for him, that is, the impressions170 effected in the life of imagination, just as sense-objects are subjected to sense-perception (for he now takes sense-impression (aisthêma) as an equivalent of sense-object (aisthêton)). The objects of imagination are not themselves the objects of discursive thought (for later he will clearly show that the thoughts of discursive reason ‘are not imaginations (phantasmata), but are not without imaginations’).171 Let us look into why they are ‘not without’. The reason is, as said, that the activity of the soul that revolves around the divided reasons is not the same as that regarding the forms themselves, but, because of that division, its activities are

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extended to the external, and along this extension external objects necessarily subsist. Discursive thought often makes use of these [external objects], when it requires both the sense-objects and the imprints in imagination either for cognition alone or for the satisfaction of desires towards them. Sometimes however it does not need them, yet following its extension outwards, as said, its activity regarding what exists outside is necessarily excited along with [its extension]. Therefore Aristotle says only that ‘the soul never thinks without imagination’, but not that [it always] made use of it.172 It is clear that ‘the soul’ in this sentence is the ‘discursive soul’, which he mentioned before.173 By saying that ‘imagined objects are present to the discursive soul like sense-impressions’ he indicates what he will say later [at III.8, 432a12-13], namely that they are not objects of discursive thought (dianoêmata), but are subjected to it as secondary [objects], just like the sense-objects are subject to sense-perception. In accordance with the previously given image of sense-perception – for there too, the capacity of judgement preceded the apprehension of pleasure or pain – here too the discursive thought’s judgement of something as simply knowable will precede the apprehension of something as being good or bad.174 This apprehension he no longer calls ‘as it were [affirmation and negation]’ (hoion),175 but simply ‘affirmation and negation’, because, when discursive thought connects the knowable object with good or bad, it makes an affirmation, and when it dissociates the one or the other from the knowable object, it makes a negation. Similarly again as in the case of sense-perception, the activity of pursuing or avoiding, i.e., pursuing the good and avoiding the bad, follows in the third rank. For the sensitive life must pursue the pleasant and avoid the painful, the one as good and the other as harmful, whereas for rational [life] the good is primarily the aim and the bad is what is avoided, even if what is bad has something pleasant or what is good something painful. That his argument is now not about theoretical knowledge, as if it were never without imagination, like the Peripatetics understand it,176 is also clear from what was said before;177 for there he said that the supreme form of theoretical cognition is ‘separated’ and ‘is just what it is’ and ‘is identical with the thing itself’, and is not attached to it through otherness, and ‘is in substance activity’, remaining ‘unaffected and unmixed’. But also what is now said makes this clear: on the one hand the fact that the [soul] is called ‘discursive’ and not ‘intellect’ or ‘contemplation’, on the other hand the fact that [its thinking] is concerned with good and bad, which are opposites existing in the realm of generation and in ultimate division. The theoretical intellect, on the contrary, either the one that is complete as disposition or the one that is identical with its substance, has uniformly the good that is not opposed to the bad, just as [it has] the true [that is not opposed] to what is false.178 For the false is excluded not only from the

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essential intellect but also from the one that is completed as having the disposition of scientific knowledge; similarly the bad too [is excluded from it]. But because the practical [intellect] is turned towards coming to be and divided things, one finds in it necessarily sometimes what is bad and the good that is opposed to it; for actions have to do with these. For even if [the practical intellect] perfects desire in us, when it disciplines or arouses to right actions, it clearly acts with regard to some partial thing that comes to be, and does not deal with what is always the same like the theoretical [intellect].

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431a17-20 Just like the air made the pupil such and such, and that in its turn something else – and likewise in hearing – but the last is one and a single mean, but being for it is multiple. The purpose of this very passage too is to refer us from sense-perception as from something that is better known [to us] to some unitary thinking of the soul, which discriminates in a common way intelligible objects, whatsoever they are. Each of the five senses indeed knows its proper sense-objects, which are multiple and different, and also discriminates and determines both their sameness and difference from one another with one and the same power (though according to various reasons);179 thus sight [discriminates] the white, the black and the colours between them, taste the sweet, the bitter and the flavours between them, and each of the senses in a similar way its proper sense-objects. In a similar way also the so-called common sense180 knows unqualifiedly all sense-objects and knows with an indivisible cognitive [power] and ‘in an indivisible time’181 both their difference from one another and their sameness; for, as he says at the beginning of the third book, it is similar ‘as if I were to perceive one thing and you the other’.182 From here he wants to refer us to a unitary thinking of the soul, which is itself also a capacity to collect and know all practical matters, opposites like good and bad, not only in matters of sex and food, but also in possessions, and in things to be feared and dangerous, and similarly in all other things. For that which thinks will say and says: ‘I am living in a temperate manner’ and ‘with justice’ and ‘courageously’ and ‘in free manner’, and it knows both the difference between the [actions] he speaks of and their common character, as it produces the thought of these things in an indivisible [power] and in an indivisible way. But there may be in the soul also something that thinks in even more common way, bringing together at the same time both practical and theoretical thoughts, something which will know both the difference and the common character of the theoretical and practicable [thoughts], being again one and the same and indivisible, and capable of comprehending the plurality in an indivisible way. It is ‘one’ according to the intellective life itself, but in account it is ‘multiple’ due to the fact that

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it approaches the different objects known according to different reasons. By using the image of common sense [Aristotle] refers us towards such forms of thinking, both (i) the unitary common [thinking] that is capable of apprehending all practical matters and (ii) [the thinking] that is even more comprehensive than the former and is capable of apprehending all objects of our thought without qualification. This is the purpose of this passage. At the beginning of the text the philosopher writes: ‘Just like the air makes the pupil such and such, and that in its turn something else’. He may seem to begin in such a way, as if he is going to make something correspond to this ‘just like’ (hôsper), for example, ‘thus also such and such practical object or such and such intelligible object [makes] thinking [such and such]’.183 But he does not make the correspondent clause and he did not say ‘just like’ as if he was to make it, but he refers back to something already known. Since he already compared sense-perception to the practical intellect, as what is capable of apprehending pleasant and painful to what is capable of discriminating good and bad,184 he now continues by outlining how sense-perception discriminates between the pleasant and the painful. In this way also the practical discursive thought will know the opposite and different practical objects. Thus he said ‘just like’ not as if he was going to make the correspondent clause, but he made it refer to something already said. Sense-perception indeed has a similarity to practical discursive thought according to another approach too, which precisely the philosopher outlines here. For the ultimate and most partial sense-objects or things to be done are not directly related to something capable of apprehending all of them in common, but [they are related to this common principle] through the organs and cognitive powers that are proper and proximate to each one of them. In such a way indeed the illuminated air evidently works upon the pupil, and that provokes the power of sight to activity, which in turn provokes the common sense. And sound [works upon] the acoustic spirit, and that moves the power of hearing, which in its turn awakens the common sense. And similarly the five senses are related to the [sense] common to all, which encompasses all in one unity; not as if this common sense were assembled from all of them, but as existing before the plurality and working together with them all, both in a way specific to each and in a way common [to all]. In a similar manner also the things to be done, taken as objects of thought, are related to the intellect that is common to all and capable of knowing them, whereby the sense-objects move the imagination in the way described before in the arguments about imagination, and the objects of imagination provoke the proper practical intellect, which is assigned to each of them, into a discursive reasoning about them. For example, the imagination (phantasma) about food provokes reason to judge about it, when, how much and which kind [of

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food] one needs for nourishment, that reason, namely, which is the proximate capacity of judgement of these matters. That reason awakens also the intellect that is capable to judge in a common way about all practical matters. In the same way as this, reason, capable of judgement about food, is integrated into that [common intellect], also the [reasons capable of judgement] about all other objects that are to be sought for and avoided are integrated into it. Hence what discriminates what is the same and different in all these objects must be one [principle], preventing some of them and putting measure on others in a uniform way. And this [common intellect] pre-exists before the multiple reasons and is not assembled out of them, but anticipates in a higher unity their multiplicity in an indivisible way. In the text he says ‘the air made the pupil such and such’, because, for example, it dilated it and, to say simply, aroused the vital affection in it. For, as has been said at length in the arguments about the senses,185 our sense-organ is affected not as a lifeless thing, for instance by only being heated by the external [things], but [it is affected] together with some vague discernment and its own activity.186 Therefore it is not simply affection, but this whole, a particular vital affection. ‘And that [made] something else [such and such]’, since the sensitive affection provokes, as we said, the sensitive life that is directly presiding upon it, like the pupil [provokes] the visual [life] and the ear the acoustic [life]. And it is clear that it does not stop with them (for there is not yet one thing that is last), but only when these sensitive lives themselves run up to the common [sense], for then [is reached] ‘one that is the last’. It is ‘one’, because the common sense is one, in so far as it discriminates the proper objects of all [senses] and it makes statements about all of them as it knows all things. And it is the ‘last’ not as inferior but as superior, though becoming the last for those that are going up from below. And this, which he called ‘the last one’, is also said to be ‘a single mean’. It is ‘single’, since that [power] is also one, and it is a ‘mean’ as it comprehends like a centre the many senses that come forth from it and converge towards it, being both receptive and discriminating. Thus it is a ‘mean’ since also the centre is a mean and since the mean communicates with all extremes.187 As Aristotle is accustomed to distinguish, that [power] is one and single ‘in subject’, because, as one and the same indivisible life, it knows all things; but in account and being, as he is used to say,188 it is multiple, since it recognizes the different properties of the sense-objects according to different reasons. And, as was said,189 he does not infer any more that ‘such is also the case with the practical intellect’, because he now used ‘just like’ not as it is intended to correspond to something [afterwards], but as corresponding to something that was said earlier.

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Translation 431a20-1 With what it ascertains the difference between sweet and hot has been said also earlier; but let it be said also as follows; [for it is something one but as a boundary].

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Having said that ‘the last’ [capacity] of discriminating all sense-objects is ‘one’ and that the same is ‘multiple’ in account, he now further develops this view, demonstrating as it were through exposition190 the truth of what has been said, since he had already asserted before these things in the argument about common sense191 and he now recalls them in summary, making the text rather obscure because of its conciseness. ‘With what part’ then, he says, does this common sensitive [power] ‘determine the difference’ between the things known? Not with one and the same reason, even if it is itself one, but by using different reasons, according to which it knows the different properties in an appropriate manner. For as he himself says, that [power] which is discriminating, is ‘something one just like a boundary’, calling now ‘boundary’ that which he also mentioned before,192 namely the common point towards which various lines concur. For that too, though being the same one and partless thing, has different relations to the different lines. 431a21-3 and these, being one by analogy or number, are to each193 of both in the way194 those are to each other.

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By ‘these’ (tauta) he means sweet and hot, through which he indicates simply all sense objects. These then, ‘being one by analogy or number, are to each of both in the way those are to each of both’, since the cognitive [power] is determined by what is known, as has often been established by him.195 Thus, if the capacity of cognizing sweet and hot is, in so far as it is cognitive, one and the same in number, these objects also will be one and the same with one another in number. If however we attribute to the cognitive [power] a unity according to some analogy and not in number, we will also similarly understand according to analogy the unity the things known have with one another and with the cognitive [power]. In some way both positions are true, namely that the unity is both in number and by analogy, both in the cognitive [power] taken in itself and in relation to the things known, and in the others in relation to one another and to the cognitive [power]. For the cognitive [power] is one in number, since it is one in subject, and one by analogy, but not one in number because it has a similar activity according to multiple reasons. For just as it cognizes the hot by the reason-principle of the hot, so it also [cognizes] the black by the reason-principle of the black. And it is adjusted to both by becoming the same with them in number, since, as was said,196 it is determined according to the thing known, and if it would cognize both at the same time, being the same one thing, it

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will be the same in number with each of them. Thus in this way it is ‘one in number’. Again, [it is one] ‘by analogy’ because it has a similar adjustment to them according to different reasons. For just as [the cognitive power] is informed with the hot according to the reasonprinciple of hot, so it is also [informed] with the sweet according to the reason-principle of sweet. And the things known also become one to each other and to the cognitive [power] either according to number or according to analogy. [They become one] in number because they both are present in a determining way in the cognitive [power], which is one and the same according to number. And [they become one] according to analogy because they are present according to different reason-principles, though in a similar manner because none of the two is more or less present than the other, but as the hot is present, so also the sweet, in accordance with its own reason-principle. In the text there is ‘to each of the two’ (hekatera), and not ‘to each’ (hekasta), since two were taken up: the sweet and the hot. 431a24-b1 For what difference does it make to ask how it discriminates those things which are homogeneous197 or those which are contraries, like white and black? [Let it then be the case that as A, white, is to B, black, so C is to D, as those are to each other; so that it holds by alternation too. If then C and D were to belong to one thing, then it would be the case, as for A and B too, that they would be one and the same, although their being would not be the same – and similarly for those others. The same account would also apply if A were sweet and B white.] Using the example of sweet and hot, which are homogeneous as sense-objects198 and share with each other from greater distance than do contraries,199 because the latter fall under one and the same sense, the former under different senses, he insists that there is no difference [between these two cases]. For if also the [qualities] that are more distanced from one another, such as are the homogeneous, somehow become one both in number and by analogy, so also the contraries, as they are discriminated by the same sense, will have unity in number or by analogy as the former. Thus it will make no difference whether raising the question about homogeneous [qualities] or about contraries. Next he construes an argument, focusing for now on contraries, by using letters, taking white to be A, and black to be B, and assuming other such contraries, like sweet, say, and bitter (for he does not clearly determine of which kind of contraries [he is talking]), on which letters C and D are imposed. Thus, like A will be to B, so C to D, for in both there is contrariety. If, then, A [and] B, when they are known together, become one in relation to each other, C [and] D will similarly become one either in number or by

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analogy; in number because they are known by one and the same [power], and by analogy because [they are known] according to different reasons neither more nor less than the other. In the analogy there is also room for alternation, and as A will be to C, so B to D. This [alternation]200 is added so that we may consider how unity comes about not only in the case of contraries, but also in the case of homogeneous qualities, when, as was said, the one knower is at once the differences.201 For then both sweet and white become one and also black and bitter, which are not contraries but are nevertheless homogeneous according to a more remote genus than colour.202 Therefore the one who concedes that A [and] B, or C [and] D, somehow become one with each other, will also grant that the other two [become one], and besides this, the alternation. And always he will consider their multiplicity together with their unity, since the reason-principles in which the unified [sense-objects] have their being are different. ‘The same account would also apply if A were sweet and B white’: this is shown through the alternation, as in this case no longer contrary [qualities] are assumed, but more distanced homogenous [qualities]. This he again makes more clear through letters and examples, juxtaposing the sweet and white side by side and no longer imposing AB upon the contraries, but upon the latter [qualities], namely upon sweet and white. 431b2-5 The capacity of thinking then thinks the forms in imagined objects, and just as in those what is to be pursued and avoided is determined for it, so, when it is concerned with imagined objects, it is moved also apart from sense-perception. After the argument about sense-perception he now obviously moves to the practical intellect203 as from an image to its model, claiming that ‘it determines what is to be pursued and avoided’ sometimes in the sense-objects themselves, when they are present, as is for instance the case when it sees that the beacon is moved and knows through that sense-object that enemies are going to launch an attack and deliberates, as he himself said, about what is to be done.204 But most of the time it happens that the practical intellect reasons and deliberates while seeing in the imagined objects the impressions of the sense-objects.205 For sometimes in the presence of sense-objects the discursive soul turns to itself and arouses arguments about things to be done, and in this reflection upon itself it necessarily looks not at the sense-objects themselves but at the impressions [in the imagination] coming from them, and uses these impressions as they become parts of the syllogism in the minor premise. Therefore it necessarily uses the imagination. And thus it is clear also from this passage that his assertion ‘it never thinks without imagination’206 is not about the theoretical intellect but about the practical, as we could

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confirm from other passages before and is clear from what is said now.207 And a fortiori, when the sense-objects are absent, the intellect will know in the imagined objects the [things] with which actions [to be done] are concerned: things which are particular, individual and somehow observable and therefore are known in a co-ordinate way by sense-perception or imagination. This is also what the philosopher teaches, when he says that ‘the capacity of thinking thinks the forms in imagined objects’, calling ‘forms’ the shapes of the sense-objects. For as he already often said and will say again,208 not the sensible things themselves, but their forms come to be present in senseperception and imagination; in the former as sense-objects and in the latter as imagined objects. Therefore he also now nicely speaks of ‘forms’, whether you may understand [the forms] of sensible things, or simply [the forms] of the practical things. For also practical things are somehow observable, since even when I want to adorn my own or someone else’s character, the character itself becomes sensible through existing in an individual human being, and even more so because it is obviously known by sense-perception from [observing] its well ordered or disordered movement and activity, what kind [of character] it is. By ‘the capacity of thinking’ he clearly means the capacity of practical thinking, for that is what is seeking and avoiding. And it is said that it ‘thinks’ by taking up ‘the forms’ of things to be done ‘in the imagined objects’ by looking at them, not as if the imagined objects (phantasmata) were thoughts209 (noêmata), but [the things to be done] are something else that is activated in the thinker itself and awakened according to its contemplation of the imagined objects. For [Aristotle] himself will clearly say that ‘these [objects of] thoughts are not imagined objects but are not without imagined objects’.210 And the [practical intellect] looks at the imagined objects, when it takes distance from the sense-objects, either when they are no longer present, or even when they are present, because of its inclination towards itself. That it sometimes also looks at the senseobjects themselves is clear from what he writes: ‘and just as in those what is to be pursued and avoided is determined for it’. He means ‘in those’ sense-objects, as he himself clearly interprets by distinguishing them from those that ‘are apart from sense-perception’, that is the objects of imagination (phantasta). For ‘when’, he says, ‘it is concerned with imagined objects, it is moved’, that is, it is awakened towards reasoning and deliberation regarding them.211 And that [the practical intellect] sometimes looks at the sense-objects, and sometimes at the imagined things, he explains even more clearly through the following: 431b5-8 For example, perceiving that the beacon is on fire, it recognizes with the common [sense], when it sees it moving,

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Translation that it [refers to] an enemy, but sometimes, on the basis of the imagined objects (phantasmata) or thoughts (noêmata) in the soul, as if seeing, it calculates and deliberates what it is going to do in relation to present things.

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When it sees the beacon by itself212 and uses the common sense, it is clear that it looks at the sense-object. I believe that the expression ‘common sense’213 is now used for ‘perception of the common senseobjects’.214 For sight in itself, too, [is capable of grasping these common sense-objects], but the common [sense] seems most of all to be capable of grasping these objects as common, even when each sense co-operates in its own way. Movement is a common sense-object,215 just as the colour of fire and light is a specific sense-object of sight. And the person who thinks acquires knowledge by putting together what he learns from the sense-object and what he learns from reasoning about these things, and infers from this that the beacon is a sign of the presence of enemies. For the moving beacon is a sense-object, but that of which it is a sign is grasped by reason which attends to its usual application. One must read the text in the following way by transposing it somewhat: ‘for example, perceiving that the beacon is on fire, when it sees by the common [sense] that it moves’, and after having put a comma here, infer ‘it recognizes that it refers to the enemy’, knowing this not only from sense-perception, but also from reason. Sometimes it looks at the sense-object, and ‘sometimes’, as he says, ‘at the imagined objects or thoughts in the soul’. He either calls ‘the imagined objects’ themselves ‘thoughts’, since he also calls ‘imagination’ ‘thinking’, as we have shown above,216 or one must distinguish both and posit the phantasmata in the imagination and the noêmata as acts in the thinker himself, being themselves determined by the intelligible forms of things to be done.217 For all rational cognition, even if it is of something external, comes about by returning to itself and judging its own understanding;218 therefore, as he said, ‘every opinion is followed by conviction’.219 Thus he correctly says that the person ‘who reasons and deliberates’ about practical matters looks at ‘imagined objects or thoughts’, not separately sometimes at these, sometimes at others, but at both together, though attending now more to the former, then more to the latter. This person ‘calculates and deliberates about what he is going to do in relation to present things’, grasping present [things] through sense-perception and future [things] through the knowledge regarding the future, obviously rational knowledge. And therefore one should not understand ‘imagined objects and thoughts’ as referring to the same things interchangeably, but refer the ‘imagined objects’ to the impressions,220 and the ‘thoughts’ to the acts of such a [practical] intellect.

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431b8-10 And just as there when it says that something is pleasant or painful, so here it avoids or pursues, and so in action generally. For the [intellect] that is pre-eminently practical does not put the pleasant or painful as aim, as sense-perception and irrational life does, but the good as what is to be pursued and the bad as what is to be avoided. Therefore, since [Aristotle] wants to determine what is desirable and what is to be avoided for the practical [intellect] from what is best known also to sense-perception, that is, from the pleasant and painful, he said ‘just as there’, meaning in sense-perception. Thus when [the intellect] discerns something in this way, not just as something known, but as being such as the pleasant or painful was in objects of sensation – for of such a kind is the good and bad in it [i.e. the practical intellect] –, ‘here’, that is, in such discernment, it either ‘avoids’ the bad or ‘pursues’ the good, and in general it is doing something. For this is the meaning of ‘in action generally’. And it acts either by seeking after participation in the good or by renouncing the bad.

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431b10-12 That which is without action and the true and the false are in the same genus as the good and the bad, but they differ by [being] absolutely and [in relation to] something. What is to be done is considered as something to be pursued or to be avoided not only in thought, but also in imagination and even in sense-perception. This has been shown by the fact that, in cases of practical reasoning about good and bad, what is called the minor premise is always particular. Now Aristotle wants to establish that also when the practical intellect starts speculating in itself about practical matters in a universal way, even when it considers them not as something to be pursued or to be avoided but as something known and universal – for example, what a well governed state should look like and what kind of laws it should apply,221 or in general in what living beings actions (praxeis) are found222 and what sort of things they are concerned with, namely not with those that are always in the same way but with what is changing and contingent,223 – even then, when it considers ‘without action’, that is, without doing something, practical matters and examines what is true and false in them, it is active as practical [intellect] even then; not because it is doing something at that moment but because when something will have to be done, it will use the truth that it holds universally.224 Thus ‘they are in the same genus’, he said, ‘as the good and the bad’. Now, the latter are in the practical [intellect]; hence also the true and false he is talking about here are in the practical [intellect]; and even then the intellect is not active without imagination.225 In fact, even its univer-

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sal theorems are something like what is common in particular cases, when, for example, it says that ‘every well-governed state’ or ‘every well-behaved man’ or something like that. For someone who is viewing the intelligible objects as intelligible will not grasp the universal in sensible things nor will he use the true and false that are analogous to the good and bad, but he will grasp the true in a way that is not opposed to what is false and will know the good that is not opposed to the bad.226 The practical [intellect], however, is concerned with opposites, since it is concerned with things that may be the case and that are subject to change. Thus, even if it makes a universal argument about practical matters it does not entirely stand back from the particulars (for the universals are in the particulars), nor will it entirely stand back from imagination, for imagination apprehends the particulars with which the universals co-exist. In this sense ‘the true and the false’ are said to be ‘without action’, when the intellect, while not acting, reasons rather on a universal level, as I said, about practical matters, and it does so clearly in virtue of practical knowledge. Thinking universally about practical matters ‘differs’ from the thinking involved in action itself, when it must necessarily take along also the particulars, only ‘by being absolutely and in relation to something’. For the former is ‘absolutely’ [thinking] as it is universal based on two [universal] premises, whereas the latter is ‘some’ thinking drawing a particular conclusion out of a particular premise and a universal premise. Having so far completed his argument about the practical [intellect], he wants to run up again to the highest theoretical [intellect] making the ascent through intermediates. Directly after the practical [intellect] comes in the ascent the theoretical [intellect] that is concerned with mathematical objects. Mathematical objects are themselves enmattered, but they do not exist in matter that is generated and in different states at different times. Nevertheless they are enmattered as they exist under all circumstances in extension and some division, and for that reason are also objects of imagination.227 The intellect that considers these objects imposes boundaries and order upon them and both adds what is lacking and removes what is superfluous, and investigates them as objects in imagination (phantasmata), [whereas] the practical [intellect] knows the imagined objects with reference to the sense-objects. In this respect the mathematical [intellect] surpasses the practical. 431b12-16 The [objects] in abstraction, as they are called, one thinks of just as one might think of the snub-nosed: qua snubnosed one would not think of it separately, but qua curved,228 if someone thought of it in actuality, one would think of it without the flesh in which the hollow is; this is the way in which one

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thinks of mathematical objects, which are not separate, as separate, when one thinks of them. Let us pause for a little while, if this is agreeable, to examine what are ‘[the objects] in abstraction’, and why they are so called, and what is the cognitive power co-ordinate with them; and let us start from the assumption that even if objects known are apprehended by their co-ordinate power, they are apprehended in a superior and better manner by a higher level power, which is not co-ordinate with them and which sometimes co-operates with the co-ordinate power, sometimes stands sole by itself and is capable of grasping secondary things from their causes. In this manner also our scientific reason of natural things knows [not only their substances, but] also their perceptible features: sometimes it co-operates with sense-perception and being interwoven with it thus approaches the sense-objects; sometimes it knows without sense-perception the substances of the natural forms and of the composite things that are determined in accordance with [such forms] and it discerns, from the substances as from their causes, also what sort the features and accidental properties the substances have. In this respect the student of nature also differs from the mathematician, as has been said in the second book of the Physics.229 Since the mathematician considers accidental properties, such as shapes, sizes, motions, numbers and harmonious ratios, in themselves, he needs sense-perception for his cognition. The student of nature, however, contemplates both the shapes and the other properties that are proper attributes of the substances from the perspective of the causes of both the forms and the composite substances as substances. Therefore the study of nature too is a philosophy, as it is involved with substance and knows the things caused on the basis of their causes; this is not, however, the case with mathematics, which, as Plato says, is ‘like a bridge’.230 For, as he himself explains,231 ‘its starting point is what it does not know, and its middle term and end come from what it does not know’, as it falls short of the causes because it does not consider the substances. For the cause in the proper sense is always a substance or even something higher than substance.232 I now speak of mathematics not in the Pythagorean sense,233 namely, a science that investigates also the living234 reason-principles, which are capable of projecting235 distances and shapes, which either are produced in the natural bodies or in imagination – for such a mathematics is a philosophy –, but I mean that mathematics which is wholly concerned with the projected things themselves, such as shapes, sizes and motions, which Aristotle is accustomed to call ‘in abstraction’. These [mathematical entities] are contemplated in the naturally constituted bodies; but they are also put forward in the imagination itself. They are said to be ‘in abstraction’ as they are contemplated in themselves without their sub-

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stances, although they do not exist in such a manner; for it is not possible for accidental features to exist by themselves without substances. All such things about which mathematics is concerned are accidental features. Each circle, they say, has all [radii] from the centre equal,236 and all movements about the centre according to one and the same stable pole return to the same position, both those [that move in a] greater [circle] and those [that move] in a smaller;237 and each even number multiplied by an even number can be divided by two up to the monad,238 and each twofold proportion is composed of the sesquialter and the sesquitertian ratio.239 All shapes, motions, monadic numbers and relative ratios are accidental features and are said to be ‘in abstraction’, since they are known not in conjunction with the substances, but by themselves as separate from the substances. For even when they are put forward in the imagination they exist together with the living reason-principles that bring them forward, as they are derived from these and have about them their being as their limits, just as also the accidental features of naturally constituted beings are the final terms of their substances, and the [mathematical] objects in the imagination are not such as some Peripatetics seem to call them ‘from abstraction’, as if they were completely without substance on account of the fact that they are separated from the substances in the sensible realm. For the [mathematical] objects of imagination, too, are related to living reasonprinciples, which are substances, as is demonstrated by their precision, which is greater than that of perceptible objects, and by the fact that they add what is lacking [in perceptible objects] and remove what is superfluous.240 These [mathematical] objects could not be produced from outside nor have what is better from the worse, but they are clearly the immediate result of the projection by the living reason-principles themselves, as is shown also by their critical activity;241 for a critical judgement is never an affect, but pure activity, and comes from within rather than from without. Thus we have explained what are the things ‘in abstraction’, namely, the mathematical objects, not the causes [of these objects], nor [these objects] as substances, but the way in which they are put forward [in the imagination] and as accidental features. The reason for calling these objects [‘mathematical’] is that they are thus considered by those who are usually called ‘mathematicians’ by ordinary people; for these mathematicians do not consider them in conjunction with their substance, as they are, but without their substance. Regarding these perceptible and imagined accidental features, sense-perception and imagination are the co-ordinate modes of cognition. For they are capable of discerning accidental features and not substances, for substances are apprehended by reason and intellect. As Plato says,242 sense-perception ‘does not attain to substance’, and besides it is clear that all sense-perceptions are about qualities,

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quantities and properties. This is why the impressions that arise within the imagination from the perceptible objects are not substances. And, as we have said, such things are considered not only by means of the co-ordinate modes of cognition, but also by means of our intellect. This intellect is sometimes interwoven with sense-perception and imagination and is then active only concerning these [accidental properties] without cognition of the substance of these things (one might call this the mathematical intellect, in accordance with what is customarily called ‘mathematical’ by ordinary people); but sometimes the intellect is not looking at these things, but at their causes, i.e. their substances, both the formal and the composite, and from them as from causes it grasps the accidental features that are caused by these. It is this higher intellect that apprehends substances. About this [intellect] Aristotle has already spoken before243 when he taught us its modes of thinking, positing for the proceeding and already perfected intellect two modes of thinking: the first of these, which corresponds with the unbroken straight line, knows the forms; the other, which corresponds with the broken244 line, knows the composites. But now he is talking not about this [intellect] but about the one that is interwoven with sense-perception and imagination. This is why even this [intellect] does not think without imagination, when it thinks in this way, just as the practical [intellect] never does. For when it grasps the accidental features from their substances, as from their causes, it clearly contemplates them in accordance with a more perfect [way of] thinking, and it does no longer consider objects ‘in abstraction’, as happens when it indeed considers objects in abstraction, not as they are, but separating them from their substances, as when someone sees the snub-nosed not in respect of the combination of hollowness and the underlying flesh, but considers it solely in respect of its hollowness. Thus when someone ‘thinks of the snub-nosed qua snub-nosed’, he does not think of its hollowness as separate, whereas when someone thinks of the hollowness in itself, he considers it as separate. When Aristotle said ‘snub-nosed qua snub-nosed not separately’, one should [expect him] to continue with ‘but qua hollow’, since snub-nosedness is hollowness of the nose, but instead of ‘hollow’ he introduced ‘curved’ as opposite.245 This is because someone who considers the curved when seeing the snub, clearly considers [the curved] in itself [and not in the snub], for it is impossible for the hollow and the curved to be in one and the same thing.246 ‘If someone thought of it in actuality’, he said hypothetically, since someone could think of the curved both in combination with another kind of flesh, like that of the griffins, and by itself. Thus if someone were to think of the curved on its own and not potentially but in actuality, he would think of what is neither separate nor by nature capable of existing separately ‘as separate’.247 He said ‘[the flesh] in which the hollow is’, thus returning to the

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snub-nosed and no longer dwelling on the transition towards ‘the curved’.248 In a similar manner the mathematician considers the mathematical objects – it has been said what kind of things he calls mathematical –, which cannot exist apart from the substances which support and maintain them, ‘as separate’. There are two versions of the text: either ‘not separate as separate’ (khôrista) or ‘not separately as separately’ (khôristôs).249 In the second version the text means that the intellect,250 which, when it is rather according to its nature, apprehends primordially substances and ‘non separately’ only the accidental features, is in the consideration of these [mathematical objects] ‘separately’ active, as if it were departing from itself, [turning] from the activities that are most naturally appropriate to it towards the secondary [activities]. And as he already said earlier, ‘as things are separate from matter, so it is also with what concerns the intellect’.251 Thus when the intellect considers what is inseparable from the substances, that is, the accidental features, as separate, it does so according to its own activities that are inseparable [from the body] and that are interwoven with the ultimate things [i.e. accidental properties] and that are distanced from the activities that are capable of knowing substance. 431b16-17 In general the intellect in actuality is the things it is thinking

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He wants also now to remind [us] of what he has often said before252 and will say again, namely, that every intellect, when it is active, is the same as the objects it thinks and is exactly what it thinks. In order to make the text clear one must transpose it a little and read it thus: ‘in general the intellect is the things it is thinking in actuality’.

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431b17-19 whether or not it is possible [for the intellect] to think of something separated from a spatial magnitude, when it itself is not thus separated, must be investigated later.

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Having examined the ultimate activities of the intellect, which, through their connection with sense-perception and imagination, are capable only of apprehending accidental properties and of apprehending these as existing by themselves, it is as if he is trying to prevent us from believing, on the basis of these activities, that the substance of the thinking subject is itself inseparable from bodies, and therefore he makes us pause and invites us to examine whether it is possible [for the intellect] insofar as it is not separated [from the body] to know the forms that are separate. For we have said before253 that also the intellect that proceeds outwards and that has been perfected by the essential intellect according to a projected disposition,254 is able to know both itself and the separate forms. If indeed it

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would be inseparable [from the body], it would never be adapted to the separate forms nor would it become those forms when it were active. For just as when someone is thinking of health, he is in a state corresponding to the form of health, thus also when thinking the separate he will be in a state of separateness. For it is impossible for what is inseparable to become what is separated. The Philosopher, however, postpones the investigation, maybe because he will explain it later, even if not clearly,255 or maybe because he proposes it to his readers who have the obligation to elucidate the problem from what he has already often taught before.256 For it was said before that ‘it is difficult even to imagine whether the intellect holds together some body’257 and that sense-perception always uses the body as its instrument,258 whereas the intellect never does so,259 and that it is able to know itself.260 A complete turning on itself is however absolutely impossible for a body. But Alexander says that also a not separated intellect is capable of knowing separate objects, because also from the inseparable objects there may be a referral (anaphora) to the separate.261 But this referral would not be the same as thinking. For the referral is as it were a blow and an awakening while thinking is the completion. Thus the soul starts from here below and from inseparable objects because of its complete tendency towards the outside, whereby it can no longer have an activity towards itself or towards the superior beings because of its strong outward tendency. Having applied itself to those images it brings itself back as from images to the primordial forms. For the case of the separable is not similar to that of the inseparable: the latter cannot have separate activities, whereas the separable can indeed bring forth something in an inseparable manner; for when it is interwoven with secondary and inseparable lives, then it also projects inseparable activities. In the same way the universal premise together with a particular premise produces a particular conclusion, but a particular premise could never on its own nor together with a universal premise lead to a universal conclusion.

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Chapter 8 431b20-1 Now, having summed up what has been said about the soul, let us say again  ‘Having summed up’ should not be understood in relation to ‘let us say’, so that he would be saying ‘let us say summarily and concisely’. For [in what follows] he does not infer ‘what has been said [before] about the soul’ nor does he summarize, for example, what was said about the vegetative life or about sense-perception, or imagination, and not even [what was said] about the practical intellect. But ‘having summed up’, he says, that is, having completed all ‘what has

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been said’; and here one must put a comma and infer ‘let us say again’, precisely what he says: 431b21-8  that soul is somehow all beings; for beings are either sense-objects or thought-objects [and knowledge is in a way the objects of knowledge and perception the sense-objects. How this is so we must inquire. Knowledge and perception are divided to correspond to the things, potential knowledge and perception to potential objects of knowledge and perception, actual knowledge and perception to the actual objects of knowledge and perception. In the soul that which can perceive and that which can know are potentially these things, the former the object of knowledge, the other the sense-object.] 15

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He reminds us through these words of those things he has already said (therefore he says ‘let us say again’), namely that ‘in a certain way’ potential knowledge is potentially the knowable things, whereas actual knowledge is these things in actuality. ‘In a certain way’ – this he indicates by ‘somehow’ (pôs) –, since, as he will say, sense-perception is not the sense-objects but the forms of the senseobjects. Thus in actual sense-perception the forms of the senseobjects do not come about from outside but from within, from the substance in act, when [the sense-perception] is also active. For the cognitive activity itself is wholly from within, so that the forms according to which [this activity is] determined [are from within] as well, but the fact that it brings forth its activity and the cognized objects in relation to what is external may produce error. Just as the activity is not external, likewise the forms according to which it has knowledge are not external either. In scientific knowledge are found the scientific objects (epistêta), which he also calls ‘thought-objects’ (noêta), because he also calls scientific cognition and as well every rational activity ‘thinking’ (noêsis), and because even the highest essential intellect of the soul is, as we have seen, somehow also scientific knowledge due to its declining towards reason.262 One should notice that in the case of sense-perception he clearly distinguished the forms born within sense-perception from the sense-objects lying outside. For sense-perception, he says, is not the sense-objects but their forms.263 He does not make this distinction anymore in the case of scientific knowledge but says that it is itself the objects of its knowledge. This is so because scientific knowledge is a capacity to judge both of inferior things, like when it considers natural or mathematical objects, and of things co-ordinate to itself, and it also tends up towards to the superior things. And it is clear that [scientific knowledge] is neither the superior things nor the inferior, but it is those objects that are known on a co-ordinate level with its knowledge, which are in a lower degree such as the first things are, and in

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a superior way such as the things inferior to them are. For according to the [objects] that are in it, [scientific knowledge] both tends up towards the first [things] and is capable of contemplating the secondary things. So that scientific knowledge is itself the things known themselves – but this identity with its objects is more exact [in the case of the knowledge of co-ordinate objects], or in a secondary degree [in case of superior objects] or in a higher way [in case of inferior objects].264 Therefore, having said that ‘scientific knowledge is somehow the objects of knowledge and perception the sense-objects’, he thinks it worthy to ‘inquire how this is the case’, so that we may understand that perception is not identical with the sense-objects themselves but with their forms, whereas scientific knowledge is the things known themselves, with the identity being, as said,265 exact or more lose. Having distinguished both knowledge and sense-perception according to potentiality and actuality and the things known by them as being known sometimes potentially, sometimes in actuality, and having determined when knowledge and perception are potential, namely, when the cognitive [power] of the soul is not exercising knowledge nor perception (but then we say that it is ‘capable’ of knowing and perceiving), he elucidates in what way perception is identical with the sense-objects and scientific knowledge with the things known, writing:

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431b28-432a1 These must be either the things themselves or the forms. But they are not the things themselves, for it is not the stone that is in the soul but its form. It is generally agreed that perception is not the sense-objects but their forms, since every sense-object is divisible,266 whereas an indivisible substance is in no way perceptible. Therefore in the case of perceptible things, the thing and its being are different, as has been clearly defined by the philosopher too.267 But in the case of the objects of scientific knowledge or thought, if the substance known is composite, it will not itself be present in knowledge, but its form will (for each kind of cognition is determined according to the forms and not according to the things having received the form). If, however, the forms themselves are known, be they the natural forms or immaterial forms, like the soul itself and the things superior to [the soul], there is no difference between the thing and its being; and the knowledge that comes about in accordance with the being of things (as is also the case with sense-perception and all cognition),268 will not only be the same as the forms, but also the same as the things themselves, since the being of these things is the same as the things themselves. Therefore in the case of sense-perception a clear distinction has been made [between the forms known and the things them-

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selves], because it knows the external things in accordance with their forms, but [the external things] are not themselves what is in the perception. But this is no longer the case with scientific knowledge. For sometimes it will have the forms of things, when it knows the [composite] things constituted by the forms, and sometimes, in the case of the contemplation of impartible [things], it will have the things themselves, in which case the thing and its being are the same.269 For even if scientific knowledge is of the external things in accordance with the forms that are in itself, it also contemplates the forms that are within itself.270 Having given so much attention to these matters let us proceed further. Since scientific knowledge is twofold – one belonging to the outgoing and perfected intellect, the other belonging to the essential and perfecting [intellect]271 –, the latter is connected with the forms so as to be fully unified with them, the former keeps some otherness, and each of these sometimes comes to be in a potential state, but the perfective knowledge [becomes potential] not because the permanent272 intellect is sometimes distorted, but because that too is impeded according to Plato,273 while the other [becomes potential] because the outgoing intellect is also distorted and because it needs for itself always the superior intellect to come to perfection. 432a1-3 Hence the soul is as the hand is, for the hand is a tool of tools, and the intellect is a form of forms and perception a form of sense-objects. By these words he wants to show that the discerning power of the rational soul is intermediary between the primary forms that are being known and the lowest objects that, while being known, are no longer forms nor are they being known according to their substance but only according to their accidental features. And in order to clarify this intermediary status he uses the image of the hand as ‘tool of tools’. He compares the hand to the soul not in so far as it is a tool – for neither intellect nor perception are like cognitive tools – but in so far as it is an intermediary tool. Hence the argument is: what the hand is among tools, namely the intermediary between those who are using the hand and those things it uses, that the soul is among the cognitive powers, since it knows as intermediary both the primary and the ultimate objects of knowledge. For the hand of the craftsman who is moved by the soul and is its tool, happens to be itself the tool of the craftsman and it in turn uses another tool, for example the axe in order to cut. For this reason the hand is rightly called the ‘tool of the tools’ using it, with some as it were serving it. Yet it is not, as has been said,274 as a tool but as a cognitive power that the soul is intermediary between the most excellent objects of knowledge, such as are the intelligible beings, towards which it tends up in contem-

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plation, and the lowest things, such as are the sense-objects, which it apprehends according to its lowest cognition, namely perception. And the intermediary status of the cognition of the soul is understood with respect to these things that are known from either side of it.275 For the soul contemplates the forms existing in itself no longer as an intermediary, unless it is even here active as an intermediary, insofar as the cognitive power is inferior to the object known276 just as what moves towards an end falls short of the end. And in this way it is possible to understand the intermediate status of the soul not only in the sense that its cognitive power is intermediary between two extreme objects of knowledge, but also its object known. Therefore it is not simply its cognition [that is called intermediary], but the soul itself has been called intermediary between the forms and ‘form of forms’ and ‘form of sense-objects’, which terms all indicate the object known (for both the ‘form’ and the ‘forms’ and the ‘sense-objects’ indicate objects known, just as ‘intellect’ and ‘perception’ indicate cognitive powers).277 But if even according to [Aristotle] the soul is ‘in a way all beings’, wherein does this differ from the supposition of Empedocles, who makes the soul subsist out of the elements and beings, so that it may know the similar by the similar? Yet he criticized this position sharply in the first book.278 Well, as we also said there, he criticized the argument that seemingly supposed that the primary and the lowest beings were themselves in the soul, but not the argument that defines the intermediary status of the soul such that it may communicate with all beings, not however as being them but as existing according to its own mode of existence as one and at the same time multiplied by means of specific rational properties (idiotêtes),279 fitting cognitively to each thing both in virtue of its existence as a whole and in virtue of the mode of being that is appropriate to each thing. Plutarch notes here that Aristotle affirmed above280 that the soul is receptive of the forms, ‘not the whole soul, but only that which is capable of thinking’ (noêtikê), whereas here he said that perception, too, is the sense-objects either in potency or in act. He solves the problem by supposing that Aristotle in the earlier passage used the term noêtikê for the whole rational soul at once, that is, the intellectual and the sensitive, so that what is said there would be concordant with what is said here, namely that the soul receives the forms not only according to the intellect, but also according to perception. But we noticed at the earlier passage, too, that he used there the term ‘forms’ in the strict sense for substances.281 For as he says in Metaphysics Z, one should not call the forms of accidental features ‘forms’,282 unless one should call them ‘forms’ in a different and degraded sense. Maybe one should not just speak of forms, but, altogether, of ‘accidental forms’, just as here he called the forms in perception ‘forms of sense-objects’, that is accidents. For such are the

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sense-objects qua sense-objects, whereas he calls the objects of knowledge simply ‘forms’ as they are substances. 432a3-10 Since thus283 there is no thing beside magnitudes, as it seems, the sense-objects, separated, the intelligible objects are in the sensible forms, both those which are said to be in abstraction and those which are dispositions and affections of sense-objects. And for this reason someone who does not perceive cannot learn or understand anything, and when one contemplates one must simultaneously contemplate some imagined object (phantasmata); for imagined objects are like sense-impressions (aisthêmata) except that they are without matter. What we noticed at every passage where he said that the intellect contemplates the forms in the objects in imagination (phantasmata), namely that he did not mean simply every intellect, but either the practical intellect or the intellect that is interwoven with perception and imagination, so that it may grasp sense-objects or imagined objects, whatever they may be, he himself now determines with one argument that is common to all cases. And this is the intention of this passage, namely to teach us in what cases the intellect uses imagination as collaborator. For without imagination it cannot, in the case of the knowledge of sense-objects and imagined objects, have knowledge of these things, regardless of whether as objects of action or solely as objects of cognition. For as they are particulars, the intellect necessarily uses the corresponding modes of cognition as collaborators. Therefore we should not believe, as some Peripatetics do, that he wants to say that all intellect is unable to be active without imagination.284 For what does he actually say? He says that among the sense-objects there seems to be no thing that is separated from magnitude, that is, from extension. For such, he says, are the senseobjects, namely not separated from extension. These objects then fall into the nature of accidental features, since they exist together with an extension of a certain quantity, which is an accidental feature of something, and they are inseparable from it. ‘The intelligible objects are in the sensible forms’: he calls ‘sensible forms’ this whole ‘the forms of sense-objects that are in perception and imagination’, and ‘intelligible objects’ (noêta) the thoughts (noêmata) of the intellect. In fact he does not say anything else than what he also said before, namely that the intellect ‘thinks the forms in the sense-objects and in the imagined objects’,285 not simply all forms (for it does not think in that way the immaterial forms) but, as he now clearly adds, ‘both those which are said to be in abstraction and those which are dispositions and affections of sense-objects’. ‘Those in abstraction’ indicate the mathematical objects, the ‘dispo-

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sitions’ indicate the qualities of the first and fourth type, such as health, figures, forms, the ‘affections’ indicate the passive qualities.286 When the intellect thinks of these, it uses, as said, perception and imagination as its collaborators. It is impossible for our soul to apprehend these without perception, since it has fallen wholly outside and no longer has the strength to grasp them from their cause, but must grasp them through perception. Hence, when some sense is lacking – the hypothesis is not about someone who is entirely without sense-perception, for such a person could not even know something, but about someone who lacks a particular sense – such a person could not know something of which the sense is lacking. And in the actual cognition of these objects, the intellect adheres, if not to the sense-objects themselves, to the impressions produced from them in the imagination.287 And this is what he means when he says that it ‘must contemplate some imagined object’ (phantasma). One should transpose the term ‘separate’ in the lemma, which is somehow unclear: ‘Since thus there is no thing beside magnitudes, as it seems, the sense-objects, separated’, so that the meaning becomes clearer: ‘since thus there is no thing beside magnitudes separated’. One must then continue with ‘as seem to be the sense-objects’ and must not think that the sense-objects are taken as examples of what is ‘separated from the magnitudes’, but of the contrary, namely, [as examples] of what is not separated. And one must after ‘separated’, as we have transposed the text, pause and then continue with ‘as seem to be the sense-objects’, so that this phrase is not understood with reference to ‘separated’ but with reference to what is said before, namely that ‘there is no thing beside magnitudes’. For, as has been said, the sense-objects are always in extension. The verb ‘seem’ is added, as also Alexander observes, but in his interpretation it is because of the forms of the celestial bodies, which are moved and yet separated.288 I believe however that [the verb is] not only used because of these [celestial] forms, but also because of the natural forms of generated [bodies]. For regarding these forms, too, Aristotle says in the second book of the Physics289 that they are ‘separated’, insofar as they do not need extension or generally accidental features in order to exist; on the contrary by belonging to themselves they provide to the accidental features some kind of existence in relation to the forms themselves and to the composite substances. We call ‘sense-objects’ (aisthêta) in the proper sense what falls under senseperception as objects of perception, which are, as said, the accidental features. We use however often also the term to indicate the formal 290 from the accidental features, as when we want to refer to Galen by means of the expression ‘the physician’ and to Socrates by means of the expression ‘the snub-nosed’ and ‘the baldheaded’. This, then, is the reason why the verb ‘seem’ has its place in the text. When sense-objects are [properly] understood as sense-

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objects, there is really ‘no thing beside the magnitudes’ or extensions of sense-objects. But when the term ‘sense-object’ is used in the case of natural substances, what is said is not true, but it ‘seems’ only to be the case that there is no sense-object separated from magnitude.291 Granted then the hypothesis that ‘there is no sense-object separated from magnitude’, it follows that the knowing intellect makes his thoughts about them rest upon ‘the forms that are sense-objects’, i.e., the forms of sense-objects that are grasped by perception, or the impressions that come from these forms in the imagination.292 And what he first suggested through the verb ‘seem’ he now explains more precisely by determining what in truth these sense-objects are, which do not exist beside magnitudes and of which there are intelligible objects in the sensible and imagined objects. ‘Those which are said to be in abstraction and those which are dispositions and affections of sense-objects’. The cognition of these objects never comes about in the intellect without perception, this is not only so to start with,293 but it must be said in general that there will be no understanding whatsoever of these objects in the intellect without using such forms. For a start, the intellect absolutely needs the forms in perception, since from them also the impressions in the imagination are produced, and in its subsequent thoughts about them it will sometimes be content with the imagined objects (phantasmata). For the imagined object differs from the sense-object as follows: the sense-object is related to the divisible natural substance, which he now calls ‘matter’ (though he does not [mean by ‘matter’] the ultimate substrate of the generated bodies, since also the celestial bodies which are sense-objects would be in matter, as it is now said); the imagined object, on the contrary, being an accidental feature, is always founded per se upon some substance, not however the natural substance, but the vital [i.e., psychic] substance.294 Therefore the imagined object is said not to be in matter. For even if imagination is inseparable from bodies, it is superior to bodies in so far as it is life and substance, being inseparable from them in the sense that also the enmattered form is inseparable from matter.295 Therefore the imagination is inseparable from the bodies not in the sense that it leans upon them, but rather in the sense that it upholds and maintains them.296 He adds the following: 432a10-12 But imagination is different from assertion and negation. For an interweaving of thoughts is what is true and false. Having said that imagination is a form without matter and that our rational life is immaterial, he immediately inferred what was the difference of imagination to reason, so that he also can indicate that it is inseparable from bodies. For reason consists in interweaving,

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either affirmative (the term ‘assertion’ is now taken for this) or negative. Therefore it concerns what is true and false. Imagination however remains in simple narrowed notions as it is body-like and does not have the strength to collect those simple notions, so that it would know some one thing from these many, but it is just each in a divided way. Therefore imagination has no share in truth and falsehood according to interweaving, but both imagination and perception are sometimes true and sometimes false in so far as there is a proper or improper correspondence or non correspondence between the simple [impressions] and the things. The above sentence is thus added to distinguish reason from imagination. One should have said ‘for the interweaving of thoughts is the affirmation and the negation’, but he said that [this interweaving] ‘is what is true and false’, taking what follows from what precedes. For what is true or false follows upon the interweaving.

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432a12-14 But what will distinguish the first thoughts from being objects in imagination (phantasmata)? Or is it the case that not even the other are objects in imagination, but that they do not exist without these imagined objects? Through this passage, too, he teaches that not every instance of thinking has imagination as collaborator. Besides he teaches that not even the thinking that uses imagination is identical with imagination, but uses it as something superior uses something inferior. For he asks why not also ‘the first thoughts’ (‘first [thought]’ he calls what is capable of knowing the substances themselves and most of all the immaterial forms) are objects in imagination, and he answers that even the aforementioned [thoughts] (which he calls ‘the other’), i.e., those which are extended in the sensible and imagined forms, are not imaginations (phantasmata), but even these [thoughts] use the imagined objects as substrate. This does not mean that also the first [thoughts] are like these as Alexander wants. For the [other thoughts], even if they are not themselves what the objects in imagination are, they nevertheless use them, as it is not possible at all for sense-objects and imagined objects to become thoughts without the activity of the intellect related to the ultimate beings (for it knows the divided and sensible objects with cognitions corresponding to them). The first thoughts, on the contrary, never use [imagination] at all, neither do they ever incline towards what is outside, but are to be found in separated life. And notice how [Aristotle proceeds]: having revealed in between the practical intellect and the theoretical intellect the intellect that knows from abstraction,297 and that which knows the sense-objects as sense-objects, and that which knows the natural substances and their forms and that which contemplates the forms in the soul, such

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as is the scientific intellect, he went up to its summit, the essential intellect.298 For in this intellect are found the ‘first thoughts’. And again he confirmed its separated nature, as it does not decline neither into perception nor into imagination. Having concluded his argument about every cognitive power of the soul he now moves towards its power to move bodies, as he himself determines in the following words, namely that he has completed the argument of its power of discernment and will now tackle the power of movement. Chapter 9

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432a15-19 Since the soul of animals has been defined by reference to two powers,299 that of discernment, which is the work of thought (dianoia) and perception, and also that which initiates movement in respect of place, what we have determined so far about perception and intellect (nous) may suffice, but concerning that which initiates movement, we must inquire what it is in the soul. The other things are clear, but we must now note that what he called dianoia,300 he now also calls nous. For, as we have said before,301 the name of intellect (nous) extends to the whole intellectual life and for that reason maybe also to imagination, not that of irrational animals, but that of humans, that is, this whole ‘rational imagination’,302 about which also Theophrastus in his own Physics raises the problem whether it must be taken as rational or as irrational.303 Next he investigates where the power that initiates movement in respect of place is situated, whether in the whole soul or in one of its parts separately. One should not be surprised to see that he talks about ‘part’ in the case of the soul,304 though in the first [book] he rejected this terminology,305 assuming that the soul was not divisible, 306 ‘powers’, which others call ‘parts’. But he knows that in the case of immaterial things there is no power that is not substantial. Hence, as the soul has many powers (poludunamos), it is also manifold in substance (poluousios),307 not that it has this multitude of substances torn asunder (for he contradicts that), but it has that multitude in unity, as the unity in substance is greater than in powers, insofar as substance is more excellent than power. And therefore he assigns to the soul what is most evident, namely that it is of many powers, but he indicates that it is also manifold in substance in a unified way, as said, because he speaks also of ‘parts’.308 432a19-22 Is it one part of it, being separate either in magnitude (megethei) or in account (logôi), or is the whole soul; and if it is one part, is it a special part in addition to those usually spoken of and those which we have mentioned, or is it one of these?

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Having said ‘part’ he added ‘being separate either in magnitude or in account’, because other people seem to tear asunder the parts of the soul, whereas he himself considers their separateness from one another only ‘in account’ (logôi). For he takes logos to indicate a difference in property between the parts and megethos to indicate the difference of a substance that is torn asunder; for a magnitude can be so divided that also its parts, which thus far were continuous, are torn asunder. For in being continuous one part is situated in one place, another in another, either the first or the intermediary or the last – which is spatial division –, whereas no incorporeal substance is in a place.309 Hence the parts [of an incorporeal substance] have gone as wholes through wholes. But, as we have observed in the first [book],310 he does not for that reason posit that our whole soul is absolutely one and separated, as it carries with it both the vegetative and the sensitive soul and altogether the so-called irrational soul – for it is not yet entirely separated311 – but, just as in this life incident to generation the soul is interwoven with this shell-like body,312 so it is, much more, also interwoven with the corporeal lives, when it does not live in a separate manner. Aristotle now claims that this whole soul is one, but not always. He investigates then whether there is ‘one part of it’ capable of moving the body, or ‘the whole soul’ is causing movement according to each of its powers, and if it is not the whole soul, but one part of it, whether it is one of those mentioned, for instance the desiderative or imaginative or perceptive or that capable of reasoning, or some other part in addition to those mentioned, which are usually spoken of. For Plato, who divides the soul into three, into reason, spirited (thumos) and desire,313 apparently only conveys the distinction between the reasoning power and the desiderative power that is connected to irrational cognition.314 Similarly those too who divide the soul into two, the rational and the irrational.315 For these are ‘what is usually spoken of’. In the first chapters the reason has been given why all people characterize the soul mostly by those two powers, that of discernment and that which initiates movement of bodies.316 The reason is, to say it in a Platonic manner, that the soul is not only ‘self-living’,317 but is also for all other things that are in movement ‘source and principle of movement’.318 The soul has the latter power as cause of bodies, not only as the formal cause of bodies as living, but also as their efficient and final cause, as he himself maintained in the first book of this treatise.319 As to the power of discernment the soul has it also by itself. 432a22-b13 A problem presents itself straightaway, in what sense we are to speak of parts of the soul and how many there are. [For in some way they seem to be infinite, and not only those which some mention in distinguishing the reasoning, the

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Translation spirited and the desiderative, or others what has reason and the irrational. For according to the differences by which they separate them, there will clearly be other parts too that are more at a distance than these, namely those about which we have already spoken, the nutritive, which belongs both to plants and to all animals, and the perceptive, which one cannot set down easily either as irrational or as having reason. Further there is the imaginative part, which is in being different from all, but with which of them it is the same or different, presents a great difficulty, if one were to posit separated parts of the soul. And in addition to these, there is the desiderative part, which seems to be different both in account and in power from all. And it would be absurd to tear this apart. For in the reasoning part there will be will, and in the irrational part desire and the spirited; and if the soul is tripartite, there will be desire in each part. And then that issue our present discussion is about, what is it that moves the animal in respect of place? For movement in respect of growth and decay, since it belongs to all, would seem to be brought about by what belongs to all, the generative and the nutritive power. Concerning breathing in and out, and sleep and waking we must investigate later. For these too present great difficulty.]

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Who ‘speaks of parts’ clearly speaks of many substances, for the parts of substances are themselves substances, as he claimed in the Categories.320 This multitude is obviously that of one whole (for they are parts as long as they are not divided from one another). But some belong to a whole as being parts of a continuous whole, posited here and there and being divided spatially; others are parts in a manner that is fitting to incorporeal beings whereby each is in all, and [parts] are never spatially kept asunder. Something similar is found also in the case of natural forms where we distinguish, for instance, the hot of the fire from its lightness, without however spatially dissociating them, but distinguishing them only qua property. For where one of the two is, is also the other. It is clear then that Aristotle often admits such an otherness of what are called ‘parts of the soul’, when he affirms that they only differ from one another ‘by being and in account’. But as he does not want them to be considered as separated from one another or as being torn asunder, he rejects from them division, that division namely which fits bodies and continuous beings, which is spatial, as we have said.321 Therefore he does not simply oppose that there is a multitude of parts of the soul (for he agrees that there are many ‘in account’), but that they are torn apart and divided spatially. He started altogether the argument about these issues now, because he wanted to find what part of the soul initiates movement of

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bodies; [and therefore] he first had to assess precisely the question he had raised in the introduction,322 namely how one should understand ‘part’ in the case of the soul, namely not in a corporeal manner, but in way proper to incorporeal beings. For the term ‘how’ (pôs) indicates for him the manner, either corporeal or incorporeal, and the term ‘how many’ (posa) clearly refers to a multitude, not however entirely divided, as is the multitude of a horse and a piece of wood, but divided together with some union, which is either indivisible, as in the case of the point the beginning and the end are indivisibly united, or divisible, as in the case of the line the parts are united by continuity. And it is not without reason that he added ‘how many’, for he did this to indicate that the parts of a continuous thing are (1) sometimes called parts of this continuous being simply according to spatial distance, without reference to their difference in account, as is the case with the parts of a right line and (2) sometimes they are [called parts] not only in this [spatial] sense, but as also different in account, as are nerves and flesh; and that (1) the parts of a continuous being as continuous are potentially infinite (for every continuous is divisible into parts) whereas (2) parts that are different in account, even if they are parts of a continuous being, even if they cannot be comprehended by us, are certainly not [infinite] by nature. For nature does not know an infinite multitude in the present. Aristotle indicated this in the third book of the Physics323 where he attributes wholeness and completeness to beings, but not infinity, and puts infinity only in the process of coming to be, and not in being. It is thus well said of the soul too that ‘its parts are in some manner infinite’. For, even if its parts are not dissociated,324 whether they are taken as parts of something continuous or as parts of something incorporeal, they are always finite, since they are not simply parts as belonging to something continuous, but as different in account. Maybe they cannot be comprehended by us, because they are divided in multiple ways: for instance, by the separate and the non-separate, by the rational and the irrational, by the cognitive and the motivating, by the theoretical and the desiderative, and by the desiderative according to reason [i.e. the will] and the irrational desiderative, and by the perfective and the perfected, and further by the perceptive and non-perceptive, and all the other differences. In this way the [parts of the soul] seem to be incomprehensible for us, as long as we fall short, as is the case now, of giving a survey of all. For the division into two, i.e. into reason and the irrational,325 does not suffice to exhibit all parts of the soul, nor does the division into three, which Plato makes in the Republic,326 namely into reason and the spirited and desire, because Plato did not intend to propose a division of the whole soul, but he took only the three parts needed for practical life, as Aristotle also does when he defines in his Ethics the parts of the soul according to choice puts choice in reason and desire, taking

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desire not as an appetition according to reason, but as the irrational.327 For in his view desire is opposed to reason. Well then, Aristotle seems to divide [in the Ethics] not the whole soul into reason and desire, but the practical and ethical soul.328 And this is also what Plato did, except that he divided the irrational into the spirited and desire. And that was necessary in educational matters, because the spirited always comes to the assistance of reason in the opposition of desire to reason. Let this be said in defence of Plato. It is evident that the vegetative is much more distant by essence from reason than the so-called irrational part of the soul. For this part communicates with reason in more aspects both as cognitive (for it is perceptive or indeed imaginative) and as desiderative (for also the will (boulêsis) of reason is desire of a sort)329 and as initiating movement in bodies in respect of place. The vegetative part, however, stands far from all these. The perceptive part is mentioned not because it too would be more distant from reason than the spirited and the desiderative part, but because it is simply different from the desiderative. For sense-perception is the name of a cognition, the spirited and desire are names of appetites (orexeis), which are derived etymologically from hormê (impulse).330 Yet even the latter always draw the cognitive element along with them, as it is impossible to desire something without knowledge. It is clear then that Aristotle did not take the perceptive power as if it were more distant [from reason], but on the contrary because it is superior to the irrational desiderative part and comes closer to reason. This he made clear by posing the problem whether it should be put as rational or as irrational. In fact, whatever is cognitive, to say it unqualifiedly, is superior to the desiderative capacity corresponding to it, as the latter always needs cognition in order to desire, whereas the former does not need the latter in order to know. And cognition seems by nature to direct the desire, since that which desires in the right manner must first know the rightness, whereas the appetitive capacity forces cognition, when it is itself leading and urging towards things it should not, and forces cognition somehow to direct its thought to the perception of these objects. Therefore, absolutely spoken, as said,331 whatever is cognitive is superior than the desiderative capacity corresponding to it, for the former is shown in the Philebus to belong to limit, the latter to infinity.332 This is more evident in the case of our sense-perception and in the case of the human irrational desire. For both senseperception and desire in a human being are rational. Yet, though [the desire in humans] is rational, it can be heavily disturbed and more strongly than the desire in irrational animals, adopting the skilfulness of reason and thus falling down from there into the utmost vice.333 Sense-perception, on the contrary, tends because of its similarity to rationality to the better part, so that it can perceive itself

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and imitate the reflection of reason upon itself.334 For as we have already seen before,335 to perceive that one perceives is not a common feature of every sense-perception, but only of the rational, and most of all of the common sense, but also already of each sense in particular. Aristotle thus attributes the irrational character mostly to the irrational desire since it is incapable of retaining itself and governing itself because of its strong outwards tendency. Since he considers such a [reflexive] sense-perception as superior to such an irrationality, he puts it between the irrational desire and reason and makes it share in both: it shares in reason because of its affinity to limit and its collection into indivisibility and its reflection somehow upon itself; it shares in irrational desire because of its corporeal being and because it is of something that lays outside. About the imaginative [part] he now only reminds us that ‘it is different in being from all other parts’; if one understands ‘the parts of the soul as separated’ in place, he says, it ‘presents a great difficulty’ whether one must separate this part too from all others or posit it as identical with one of the other parts, and then he moves to the other powers of the soul. But that the imaginative part differs from all other parts in being, we know from what has been philosophized above.336 But why does he only in this case mention especially that ‘it presents a great difficulty for those who separate the parts of the soul’ in place, whether it is in subject identical with the other parts or not – for that it is different in being has already been said –, or is itself different from all other parts as if it were a particular part of magnitude? Maybe [he poses this question explicitly in this case], because this part has apparently much in common with the perceptive power. In fact, since imagination is active according to divisible imprints, which are similar to sense-objects, and since imagination too is a corporeal cognition, therefore the capacity of imagination may seem to be identical in subject with the capacity of perception, and this seems to have been his view too. But since [this capacity] does not at all need sense-objects after the first movement337 for its cognitive activity, but has also much that ‘depends on us’, when we want to activate it, in that aspect it shows to have much in common with the rational power. It also keeps a position intermediary between opinion and sense-perception, and for that reason Plato too puts imagination ‘in the interweaving of both’, as it shares in both because of its intermediate status.338 It is then reasonable that for those who do not immediately want [to admit] that all parts of the soul penetrate through one another, but distinguish them spatially, the problem arises whether this part too is different from sense-perception and opinion or whether it happens to be identical in subject with any of the two. The desiderative part is clearly ‘different in account’, as also its activity shows and the power that is productive of activities. There-

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fore [in the text] ‘power’ is added to ‘account’. For neither is the desiderative identical with the cognitive, as it is not capable of judgement, insofar as it is desiderative, nor with the vegetative: for the latter is absolutely not cognitive, whereas the desiderative is always with cognition. And all agree that the desiderative is not separated in subject neither from reason nor from the capacity of imagination. For indeed there is in reason some desire, namely the will,339 and in the capacity of imagination there is the spirited and desire. For as said,340 it is not possible to desire without cognition. Therefore it always goes together with some cognition. Thus it is excellently shown that ‘tearing apart’ the desiderative from the other parts is ‘absurd’. For the desiderative clearly exists together with cognitive powers and the spirited and sensual desire are also by themselves desires. And also ‘that which moves the animal in respect of place’ offers problems for those who separate the parts of the soul in this [spatial] way. For just as the desiderative part apparently exists both in reason and in imagination, so also the principle of movement, which is the capacity of desire together with cognition, as he will say,341 will be rational or imaginative, each with its corresponding cognition. Hence, it is absurd to separate these parts as if they were magnitudes. And the question is not ‘what is it that moves the animal’ but ‘what is it that moves the animal in respect of place’, since342 we now investigate the cause not just of natural movement, for example the movement of fire, but the cause of the impulse-driven343 movement, that namely in animals. Investigating then ‘what is the part that causes movement in respect of place’, he next infers that there is also a principle of movement according to other movements, so that the addition ‘in respect of place’ when talking about the soul’s power of motion was right. There is indeed another principle of movement, not only such as what moves by nature,344 but also what moves in virtue of another type of life, the so-called vegetative, which is the cause of nourishment, growth and generation. For these too are vital movements, to be nourished, to grow, to generate. The efficient cause of these is, as said,345 the vegetative life, since all and only those beings that share such a life have these sorts of movement [or change]. In his treatises ‘On Memory and Sleep’ and ‘On Breathing in and out’346 he defines the specific power that produces these phenomena too; [sleeping and breathing] are some sort of movements, which are themselves vital, yet they are not proper to the vegetative [soul] – for plants do not sleep or perceive nor do they evidently breath in or out –, nor do they unqualifiedly belong to the soul of an animal, except sleep and awakening. For all mortal [animals], as he wants it in other works,347 even if they have not all been observed at sleep, are recognized by reason sometimes to share in sleep because of the deficiency of their mortal life, which sometimes needs rest and cannot without

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interruption enjoy perception. But breathing in and out is not characteristic of all animals but only of those which have lungs. Therefore it may be proper to another type of life, a more specific one than the common soul of all animals. Therefore it is very well said that ‘these too present great difficulty’. For it is not easy to indicate what life may be the cause of these movements. For it is neither that which moves in respect of place – for neither do the animals that perceive, that sleep or breath in and out, move in respect of place, since neither do they change place as wholes, which is proper of movement in respect of place; nor is it the vegetative soul, for [vegetative] beings do not at all move according to impulse, whereas breathing in and out and sleeping and awaking, though they have also something of necessity, also have something according to impulse. For sometimes we hold back our [breath] and sometimes stretch it out according to impulse. 432b13-19 But as for the movement in respect of place, we must investigate what it is that makes the animal move with progressive motion. [That it is not the vegetative power, is clear. For this movement is always for the sake of something and is either with imagination or with desire. For nothing that is not desiring or avoiding something is moved except by force. Besides, plants would then be capable of movement and would have some part instrumental for this movement.] In an investigation of a problem much clarity and plenty of resources come from the confrontation of opposites. The philosopher uses such a confrontation also in this section. For he first posits what forms of life348 do not cause movement in respect of place, so that from the comparison with these we may easily find what really causes movement in respect of place. He calls it ‘what causes progressive motion’ (poreutikê), as it is not simply the capacity of locomotion (topikê) but of a vital locomotion (zôtikôs topikê). For to move forward involves impulse.349 And thus far he shows that the vegetative soul does not move in respect of place, since in his view progressive movement is ‘always for the sake of something’. That does not mean that growing or nourishing are not processes for the sake of something (for every movement according to nature is related to some end). But one may construe this whole sentence as follows: ‘progressive movement occurs always for the sake of something and is either with imagination or with desire’, so that we do not say of ‘progressive movement’ solely ‘for the sake of something’, but this whole phrase ‘for the sake of something with imagination or desire’. Or if this [interpretation] seems to force the text because of the fact that kai is interposed as conjunctive particle in the phrase ‘and either with imagination’ (for this conjunctive particle seems to launch another argument), one

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must understand ‘for the sake of something’ (heneka tou) in such a way that it is distinguished through its cognitive aspect from the ‘wherefore’ (hou heneka). A being that has progressive movement imagines or thinks beforehand of its goal, taking it as the ‘for the sake of something’ of its movement towards it. If one understands ‘for the sake of something’ in this way [sc. as implying a form of cognition], it will absolutely not belong to beings that move in a vegetative manner. And there will then be the launch of the second argument: ‘and it is either with imagination or desire’. The opposition does not seem just to be between desire and cognition (because ‘imagination’ is a cognitive term) – for what moves is always both desiderative and cognitive –, but seems to me to be a division within desire, which is either imaginative (what is indicated by ‘with imagination’) or rational as is the case with beings that are moved according to thought and reason. For the latter too are moved through will and rational cognition together and do not follow imagination. For Aristotle clearly infers that nothing can be moved that is not desiring. Hence also what is moved with imagination is moved as desiring. Therefore also worms and caterpillars are moved, since they have not yet the desirable object present but have to move to attain it. If this is the case, they also have it first in their imagination so that they can also desire it. For they do not perceive it as long as it is not present. But because of the indeterminate nature of their imagination Aristotle often,350 and in relation to this passage also the philosopher Plutarch,351 does not want to attribute imagination to this type of animal, as he applies the term ‘imagination’ not only to determinate imagination but also to an imagination that can be taught. Therefore Aristotle says that also bees have no imagination, though they have a determinate imagination. ‘Nothing,’ he says, ‘that is not desiring or avoiding something is moved’. He now calls ‘desire’ (orexis) only the desire for something that is to be pursued (for also the aversion for something that is to be shunned is a desire, which desires precisely to avoid it). Added is ‘except by force’, since some animals are drawn involuntarily and are not moved according to their own impulse. The fact that plants do not have organs for progressive movement is also an indication of the same fact, namely that vegetative life is not the cause of movement in respect of place. For to powers proper organs are always assigned. Hence if the vegetative life were a power of movement in respect of place, they would also have the organs corresponding to that power. But since they do not have them (for they are not capable of being moved either as a whole or in their parts), it is evident that their proper life also will not have a power to initiate [progressive] movement. For nature would never be deficient in a whole genus, so that organs would be lacking in them contrary to nature. If however someone were to investigate why

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plants do not need to be moved in respect of place, the reason is, as Aristotle says, that, because they are rooted in earth, they also have their food present.352 Why then did nature not rather arrange that for the more perfect living beings, namely to be nourished without any trouble and without movement? Because, as I shall say, they have a more perfect life, which is not only defined by being nourished, but also by the other forms of life, the perceptive, imaginative and rational, such lives that precisely move to ever different objects and do as it were many things. To such types of life it is not convenient to be rooted in earth. For they would not do many things, nor be moved to many. And notice how the comparison with the vegetative life, which does not cause movement in respect of place, has offered us the occasion to discover what the [life] is that does cause this sort of movement. For if the vegetative life does not cause movement for the very reason that it does not know its goal beforehand and does not have the life of desire, it is clear that these powers353 must absolutely belong to the life that causes movement. 432b19-26 Similarly neither is it the perceptive [power], for there are many animals which have sense-perception, but are stationary and unmoving throughout. [If then nature does nothing in vain and never fails in anything that is necessary, except in beings that are maimed or incomplete, while the animals of this kind are complete and not maimed (an indication being that they can reproduce themselves and have a maturity and a decline) then it follows that they would also have parts instrumental for locomotion.] He does not want the perceptive power to be the cause of impulsedriven movement, just as he also did not want the vegetative power to be this cause. For insofar as it is capable of perception, it is only cognitive of what is present and neither of the past nor of the future.354 But when the power of imagination is more clearly present to the perceptive power, so that by memory of a previous affect one may be led to search for a similar thing, one is set in motion according to that power. If then the power of perception is identical in subject355 with the power of imagination, it is natural that the former must become vague together with the vagueness of the latter. The debasement of imagination is evident in animals. Let us not talk now about the imagination in rational animals, but about that in irrational animals. Some sort of imagination can be trained and is capable of learning: such is the imagination of dogs and horses and bears; another sort lacks that capacity, but it has a determinate memory: such are bees356 which are borne to their usual flowers and to their own hives; another sort of imagination only has an undetermined memory of what is desirable, as is the case with worms, which do not

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move towards a determined spot; another again has absolutely no memory of the former state, but is only tending towards some desirable object: such is the imagination in oysters. For even if food is not present, they open up longing for it, which shows that they have somehow a vague imagination of something as food. For when a dry stalk is thrown in, they close, thus indicating that they were open so far because of food. But the perceptive power is also vague in them, as is clear because they are bereft of the three superior senses. If together with imagination sense-perception has also become vague, the senses of taste and touch are also vague. On this point then there is agreement so far: animals do not have locomotion insofar as they are capable of perception. For if this were the case, oysters also would have locomotion. It would be absurd to explain this only by the fact that they do not have organs for locomotion, as if there were in them a power of movement, but it would not move them because of the absence of organs. The lack of the proper organs for powers may sometimes, and in some animals, occur against nature. But what is against nature cannot be found in whole species, which are eternal and exist according to nature, if what is according to nature is contrary to what is against nature. [This lack of proper organs] will only be found in beings in which what is natural is not complete. But in the whole and eternal species it is always complete. Therefore nothing superfluous comes about in the whole species, ‘neither do they lack something that is necessary’, ‘except’, he says, ‘in beings that are maimed or incomplete’, as in these beings nature falls short of always delivering what is necessary. That this is the case in ‘maimed’ animals is no wonder. For whole species are not maimed, but sometimes some individuals are, which fall under the species; they do not have their perfection according to nature, but somehow also what is against nature subsists in them beside. Therefore, they are also in potency corruptible, as they are not what they are from the beginning. But what about the ‘incomplete’ animals? As one can infer from what is said by Aristotle in other places,357 this category seems also to apply to whole species, which do not have all sense-perceptions, such as the mole rat and the purple murex,358 even though they are capable of locomotion. But how could what is contrary to nature be found in whole species? For what is deficient is against nature. Maybe what is ‘incomplete’, as was already said,359 either is said with reference to the species, as when we say that a blind person is incomplete with regard to the human species which uses eyes, or it is said with reference to the proximate genus, when we call incomplete also a species that is somehow deficient in properties that the proximate genus is capable of. In that sense we call the mole incomplete with regard to the genus of animals with locomotion, wherein the visual power can also exist. As it lacks this power the mole rat360

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is called incomplete with regard to the genus, but not as if its species were naturally capable of having this power, but did not have it. For the genus capable of locomotion has this capacity by nature, yet it is not the proper species of the mole, for regarding its own species every blind-rat, which is only deprived of eyes, is complete. Aristotle also shows that oysters are complete in this sense. For he says ‘animals of this kind are complete’. And he indicated this by pointing to their ‘maturity and decline and reproduction’, which are changes [or movements] coming from the vegetative life. Since they have these movements, animals of this kind cannot be deficient in what is according to their nature. For we discriminate what is according to nature or against nature mainly with respect to vegetative life. That they are animals, is clear by the fact that even oysters have perception. How much more then will the species of the blind-rat be complete, as it also has the capacity of locomotion and uses more sense-perceptions. But it is called incomplete with regard to the whole genus of animals capable of locomotion. That also oysters have maturity and decline, all agree, but about their power of reproduction there seems to be some hesitation.361 However, if we see that some plants have their reproduction not by bearing fruits, but by shoots being cut off [and put in the earth], thus also animals of this kind may, thanks to the humidity they let go from them, make the earth receiving it capable for the reproduction of similar beings.362 Another explanation may be that they are capable of generating, not always however of something similar: thus a fly is said to generate worms, but not flies.363 He nicely concludes ‘then it follows that they would also have parts instrumental for locomotion’. This conclusion corresponds to the text ‘If then nature does nothing in vain and never fails in anything that is necessary’. In between he reminded us that also animals of this sort are complete. But as he reached the main clause after a long digression, he used ‘then it follows’ (hôste). 432b26-433a8 But neither is what is concerned with reasoning and what is called intellect the moving [principle]; [for the theoretical intellect contemplates nothing that is to be done and says nothing about what is to be avoided and pursued, while movement always belongs to someone who is avoiding or pursuing something. But even when it contemplates something of this kind, it does not straightaway command avoidance or pursuit; for instance, it often thinks of something fearful or pleasant, but it does not command fear, but the heart is moved, or, if the object is pleasant, some other part. Again, even if the intellect enjoins us and thought tells us to avoid or pursue something, one is not moved, but one acts in accordance with desire, like the person without self-control. And in general we see that the

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person who has the art of healing does not heal, this implies that there is something else which is master of acting in accordance with knowledge and not knowledge itself. Nor is desire master of this movement; for self-controlled people, even when they desire and want things, do not do those things of which they have the desire, but they follow reason.]

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Also the intellective power of the soul is said not to cause movement, not for the same reason [as it was denied of] the vegetative power, but because it is not the only ‘master of the movement’. For it does not suffice to think [in order to cause movement], and even the cognition and will of the intellect do not suffice, if the corporeal desire is not moving together with it. But even desire is not by itself sufficient in the case of rational beings, if reason too does not give way. Let nobody then come up with the problem: how [do we have to understand] what is said here of the intellective power that it does not move, whereas later364 he wants it to move together with desire. Here, however, it is said not to move because it is taken as not having full control, whereas in the other passage it is taken as moving though together with something else. Therefore what is said here is concordant with what is said there. The theoretical intellect does not at all move, insofar as it is theoretical. For this intellect is about truth and falsehood, not about what is to be done, where we find what is to be pursued or avoided, the object towards what and from where a movement according to nature comes. But that which investigates what is to be done and considers for that reason what is to be avoided and pursued, wants sometimes either to move the living being or to keep it at rest. Yet that is not the only master of [avoidance or pursuit], for even if the intellect enjoins to rest, the heart, for instance, may be set in movement among fearful things and the generative organs upon the thought of sexual pleasure,365 and, the other way around, when the intellect enjoins to move and to flee, the living being does not move and does not flee, as is the case with people without self-control where the intellect and desire are in conflict and desire dominates. Such are people without self-control. Therefore the intellect is not wholly master of the movement of the living being. Even people who have technical knowledge and want to use this knowledge in accordance with reason are sometimes impeded by passion. For even when they are in accordance with reason they are not sole masters of the activity. What is said ‘that there is something else which is master’ should not be referred to the desiderative part, but to the complex of both [intellect and desire], as he himself implies. For neither is desire alone master, as self-controlled people show. In this case too desire is different from intellect but the intellect dominates because self-controlled people follow the intellect and not want (epithumia) or in general irrational desire.

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Chapter 10 433a9-17 Plainly these two move, either desire or intellect, if one sets down imagination as a kind of thought. [For many against their knowledge follow their imaginations, and in other animals thought and reasoning do not exist, but imagination does. Both of these, therefore, can produce movement in respect of place, intellect and desire. But this intellect is that which reasons for the sake of something and is practical; it differs from the theoretical intellect in respect of its end. And every desire is for the sake of something. For that of which there is desire, is the starting point of the practical intellect and the last thing is the starting point of action.] The ‘desire’ (orexis) he now speaks of is the so-called irrational desire; but he speaks of ‘intellect’, in an ambiguous way, either meaning only the rational cognition or also every cognition that is awakened from itself (and not only when the organs are struck by external objects as is the case with sense-perception). Hence, according to this argument imagination also is a form of rational thought.366 Maybe, however, in irrational animals [imagination] always needs some stroke on the organ for its own activity, whereas in the intellect corresponding to reason is also included willing.367 The term ‘imagination’ is now taken as meaning only the cognitive activity and not something that concords with irrational desires. Therefore it is now taken as co-ordinate with thought and distinguished from desires. In the conflict with one another of the intellective and desiderative powers either the intellect causes movement, as in the case of self-controlled people, or desire, as in the case of people without self-control.368 But [when there is no conflict], either in the case of those who always follow reason (such are virtuous persons), or in the case of those who are wholly addicted to passions, both together [co-operate to] cause movement. Indeed, in the case of licentious persons reason follows passion and co-operates with it, and in the case of temperate persons desire is voluntarily subservient to reason. This is also what Aristotle said, philosophizing from a supposition because of the ambiguity: ‘if one sets down imagination as a kind of thought’. For as corporeal life imagination is not thinking, but as it is also awakened from itself, it is sometimes said in that respect to communicate with reason and to be itself thinking. Having said, then, that ‘either desire or intellect moves’, [he faces a problem], since animals have many movements in virtue of their imagination: irrational animals move only according to imagination, whereas rational animals [move according to imagination] only when reason in them either is not active or does not dominate the passions. He gives thus a sort of justification for why he said ‘either intellect or

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desire’. For the argument is true even if one actually puts imagination as intellect, for the moving principles must then be three: intellect, imagination and desire, whereby the will is taken together with the intellect, as has been said.369 One must put a comma after ‘their imaginations’ and infer thus: ‘and in other animals thought and reasoning do not exist, but imagination does. Both of these, therefore, can produce movement in respect of place, intellect and desire’, either separately, as said, in the case of self-controlled persons or persons without self-control, or together, as in the case of licentious and virtuous persons; except that even if each of the two motivates separately, neither does the intellective power set in motion without the will (for the will is also a desire, but not an irrational desire) nor does the irrational power of desire move without imagination, which functions not only as cognizing, but also as assenting to or dominating the desire. But even when both together motivate, the intellect moves following the desiderative power, namely its own [sc. the will] in the case of the virtuous persons, the irrational in the case of the licentious persons. Therefore he will say, giving his preference, that most of all the desiderative power is the principle of movement. For even if it moves either with intellect or with imagination, it moves as the leading principle. For in practical matters what is pursuing or avoiding moves. This is the capacity of desire. Therefore, being itself moved by the desirable object, it moves. The desirable object is capable of moving the desiderative power, taken not as intellect or imagination, but as desiderative. For the intellect that moves is ‘the practical’. This is the intellect that pursues or avoids, being ‘different from the theoretical in respect of its end’. For the end of the latter is truth, of the former the practical good. And for the latter the end consists in theoretical contemplation, for the former the end is reached after movement. And this is what ‘to reason for the sake of something’ means for him. For the end does not consist in reasoning as in the case of theoretical knowledge, but someone must be in movement after the reasoning and reach his goal upon movement.370 And not only is the practical intellect ‘for the sake of something’, namely an end that is different from reasoning, but ‘every desire’. For also irrational desire has the desirable object as different from desiring. For as he says, ‘that of which there is desire’ – and one must put a circumflex on the ou,371 so that it may refer to the object of desire – ‘that is the starting-point of the practical intellect’. For the practical intellect too is a principle of desire and that is set in motion by the object of desire. For even if it is aroused from within, it still goes towards the object of desire. And in that sense, it may be said to be moved by the object of desire. ‘And the last thing is the starting point of action’ that is the last thing of practical reason, in which ends practical reasoning. It is as when someone who desires a shelter in winter and starts thinking and reasoning how what was desirable

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must be realized, and having reasoned finds that it needs supporting elements and also maintaining elements and therefore that it needs stones and bricks to maintain it. He then discovers also that bricks and stones are supported by foundations, so that his whole reasoning ends up with foundations, which are the starting point of action. For one must before all other things lay down the foundations and then stones and bricks, and upon these put last the shelter and thus obtain the object of desire which was the shelter. 433a17-20 Hence it is reasonable that these two appear to be the moving principles, desire and practical thought. For the desiderative principle sets in motion and because of this thought sets in motion because its starting point is the desiderative principle. And when imagination moves it does not do this without desire. Through this passage he shows his preference for the desiderative principle as cause of movement. sets in motion,372 when it consents to desire. Hence desire must always precede the cognitive principle in moving, whereby it makes no difference whether the cognitive principle is intellective or imaginative. 433a21-b5 Thus there is only one thing which moves, the capacity of desire (orektikon). (Or indeed the object of desire (orekton) – for the text has the two forms.) [For if two things, intellect and desire, were to move, they would move by virtue of a common form. But as it is, intellect clearly does not move without desire (for willing is a desire and when one is moved in accordance with reasoning one is also moved in accordance with willing) but desire moves even contrary to reasoning, for sensual desire (epithumia) is a kind of desire (orexis). All intellect is right, but desire and imagination are both right and not right. Hence it is always the object of desire that moves but this is either the good or the apparent good. Not every good however but the practical good. And it is that which can also be otherwise that is practical. That it is such a kind of power of the soul that moves, the so-called desire, is clear. But for those who divide the parts of the soul, if they divide and separate them according to powers, a great many parts arise: the nutritive, the perceptive, the intellective, the deliberative, and furthermore the desiderative; for these differ more from each other than do the sensual desire and the spirited. It is his intention to reduce to one the cause of the impulse-driven373 movement of animals in respect of place, and to reveal what it might be, and not to two principles, as he said until now, namely the

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desiderative and the cognitive principle, but to reduce both of these as well to one. For as the impulse-driven movement of animals is one, we must also assign one cause of it. Hence, even when we indicate two causes for one and the same phenomenon, one has to assume that we indicate these two causes on account of one thing they have in common, if we want to assign the cause of one and the same thing. That is also what Aristotle claims, when he says ‘if two things, intellect and desire, were to move, they would move by virtue of some common form’, as one must in all cases give one explanation of one thing. For if under one aspect this, and under another aspect another thing is the cause of one and the same thing, neither of them would as a whole be the cause of one thing. So there must be some cause comprehending both, that will be as a whole cause of the caused as one. In search of this one cause, he does not ascend to something besides the desiderative and the cognitive, but he takes the desiderative itself as being primarily the cause of movement whereby the cognitive does not move primarily, but in co-operation with the desiderative power. And this means nothing else than that with desire sometimes also comes cognition, so that the cognitive power too moves by virtue of desire. But desire, even if it is always with cognition, does not move by virtue of cognition, but it pursues or avoids by virtue of itself and for that reason produces movement. Since then both desire moves by virtue of itself and cognition by virtue of desire (for cognition would otherwise not move nor pursue or avoid anything), the philosopher excellently determined the capacity of desire as that which moves primordially. For even when we assign two causes .374 Therefore Aristotle too says that ‘the intellect does not move without desire’, since also ‘willing’ (boulêsis) is the proper ‘desire’ of the intellect and an intellect without will, such as the theoretical intellect, does not move. But whenever desire is with imagination, such as the so-called irrational desire is, it moves without reason. This, then, shows that the desiderative power is the primordial moving principle, namely the fact that, when cognition is separated from the desiderative principle, it does not move, whereas desire, whether it is present in what knows rationally or in imagination, does move, going towards what is to be pursued or turning away from what is to be avoided by virtue of its desiderative property. Having determined this he distinguishes next what kind of ‘cognition and desire’, corresponds to the intellect, and what kind to imagination, each taken in itself. The one is always ‘right’, namely when it stands by itself and is not interwoven with inferior lives and cognitions;375 the other, the imaginative, ‘is both right and not right’ because of its indeterminate nature. If at the beginning of the text the reading would be orektikon (sc. desiderative), [there would be no problem] as it has been made very

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clear how that is the one principle of movement. If, however, the reading would be orekton (sc. desirable), one should take it as what is actually a desiderative power, that is what is together both desirable and desiderative. For just as what is known in act is identical with the cognitive power and conversely, so also what is desiderative in act 376 are both one and the same thing in subject. For what is desirable must be known by the desiderative power, so that the desirable object becomes in act also the desiderative power. He concludes this by saying that ‘the object of desire always moves’. And it does not make a difference whether at the beginning one reads orekton (desirable) or orektikon (desiderative), for what is desiderative in act is identical with what is desirable. The desirable object is either what is truly ‘good or the apparent good’, even if it is not [really good]. For no bad things are desirable and no indifferent things but only what is good. And if something puts on the character of the good, it will also be desirable qua good. This is Plato’s view everywhere and is also taught by Aristotle in his Ethics, when he says that ‘all things desire the good’.377 For also the theoretical intellect desires the good, namely the good that corresponds to the truth itself.378 But the practical and, to put it simply, the desiderative intellect379 desires the practical good. Now he is using ‘practical’ in a more general sense, not only for what is to be pursued or avoided by human beings, but also by irrational animals.380 He also characterizes it as ‘that which can also be otherwise’, as it is the result of a process381 and does not always have the same outcome. But the good of the theoretical intellect is necessary and the most excellent. Having thus solved the problem that he had proposed,382 namely what part in the soul is for animals the primordial cause of movement in respect of place, he reminds us again that there are many parts of the soul, ‘divided’ not locally but ‘according to powers’, as being different in account. Therefore most of them can exist together as they are the same in subject, though they can be considered as plural according to different perspectives, as he himself reminded us, ‘the nutritive, the perceptive, the intellective, the deliberative, and furthermore the desiderative’. For the nutritive – here all agree – differs much more from the intellective and from the deliberative and from the desiderative itself than ‘the sensual desire383 and the spirited from each other’ and from reason. For the latter communicate with one another and with reason according to desire. Here he calls the theoretical intellect the ‘intellective’, so that he may indicate the practical intellect with the term ‘deliberative’. The desiderative differs from the deliberative as being the more common term.384 For also something irrational may be desiderative. He demonstrates then through these comments that if one has to set out the parts that are different in power, one should rather set out those parts that are more distant than those that are closer. As said, it was the intention

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in the Republic to set out the parts that are important for education;385 and therefore Plato only taught those three parts, just like Aristotle in his Ethics only distinguishes reason and desire.386 25

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433b5-10 Since desires arise contrary to one another, [and this happens whenever reason and desires are contrary and it occurs in those beings which have a perception of time (for intellect on account of the future gives the order to pull in one direction, but desire [pulls in the other direction] because of what is already there; for what is already pleasant seems both absolutely pleasant and absolutely good because of not seeing the future.] Having already mentioned people with or without self-control he now clearly determines that both these are found in the conflict between two desiderative powers, one being rational, the other irrational. What is common to both is what is unqualifiedly desiderative, but not as a ‘genus’ that is divided into co-ordinate species, but rather as a genus that has ‘[beings] that come from one thing’.387 For the desiderative power of reason388 is better than that of the irrational part, so that there is in them both commonality and difference. Before he renders the [clause] that corresponds to the connective ‘since’ (epeidê) he reminds us in between in what beings this conflict occurs, namely in human beings in which the rational life is intertwined with the irrational life and is often different from it and opposed to it. For in human beings reason, which is capable of knowing time, has also awareness of the future, as also of the past. Sensual desire, as also all irrational life, is unaware of time and does not distinguish temporal measures, but even if it is struck by the past, it does not know it as past, but only as being affected by it in the memory of the affect. And even now it perceives the present not because it gives attention to the fact that it is present, but only by being aware of it as acting upon it. But intellect and reason do not only extend their desire towards the present but also to the future, whereas sensual desire always puts as its end the present of which it also has perception. And reason does not only pursue what is pleasurable but also what is good. For it discriminates the pleasurable as being not always good, whereas sensual desire only looks at the pleasurable, as if this were absolutely good, and at the present, but not also at the future, because it is unaware of time. Whenever, then, the present is pleasurable whereas the future is either expedient or even more pleasurable, sensual desire only pursues what is present, whereas reason, when it is in a natural state, will mostly pursue the future, if that happens to be good. For since sensual desire does not distinguish the future from the present, it takes the present pleasurable as being absolutely pleasurable and good. For it pursues it as one and the

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same thing: what is pleasurable also as what is good. Having said all that in between he now concludes the [clause] corresponding to the connective ‘since’ used at the beginning:

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433b10-13 That which moves will be, on the one hand, specifically one, namely the desiderative power as such – but first of all the object of desire (for this moves without being moved, by being thought of or imagined) –, on the other hand, the things that move will be numerically multiple. To call, as he does, the desiderative power ‘specifically one’ is not exact, but, as said, it is as with [beings] that [are said to be one because they] come from one and are related to one.389 Before he formulates the clause ‘on the other hand they will be numerically multiple’ to correspond to the clause ‘on the one hand specifically one’, he reminds us in between (as there are two sorts of desiderative power, which are sometimes in conflict with one another, namely the rational and that which desires in an irrational manner), that the object of desire moves us before the desiderative power. For the desiderative power too moves because of the desirable object. Hence it is the desirable object that moves primarily, not that which is still in potency, but that which is already actualized, namely by ‘being thought of or imagined’, when it is, at least in subject, identical with the desiderative power. But even then, as it is different in account, it precedes the desiderative power. For the desiderative power clings to the desirable object as its goal. 433b13-15 But since there are three things, one that which moves, second that by which it moves and390 third that which is moved, and that which moves is twofold, that which is unmoved and that which is moved. Through this passage he wants to bring together and teach all factors that contribute to the movement of animals in respect of place, and this is the intention of the lemma. But before we analyse the details, we must pay attention to the text, as do also the interpreters.391 Although Aristotle begins with the connective ‘since’ (epei) as if he is going to make a clause corresponding to it, he apparently does not render the main clause. However, one should supply in thought, after having put a comma after ‘that which is unmoved and that which is moved’: ‘there will be four that contribute to that sort of movement’,392 following which it makes sense to enumerate what are these four: the object of desire, the desiderative power, that by which it moves, and that which is moved. For he had already enumerated three, that which moves, that by which it moves, that which is moved. By inferring, however, that what moves is twofold, namely that

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which is unmoved and that which is moving and moved, he counts next all as four.393 Unmoved is what moves as an object of desire, for ‘by being imagined or thought of’, as he said, that is by becoming an object of desire in act, when it also becomes identical in subject with the desiderative power, it moves; and it moves primarily the desiderative power, insofar as it is different from it in account, since the desiderative power is moved towards the object of its desire as towards its goal. But the goal itself remains unmoved and it is not itself borne towards what loves it. In this sense the object of desire moves as unmoved.394 The desiderative power, which, moreover, moves the moved bodies in a more proximate manner, has been aroused by the desirable object and joined its rank, and is therefore said to be moved. By virtue of the pursuit of the object of its desire it moves the living being, which is naturally connected to this pursuit as its underlying instrument. That is also why it is set in motion not by some force, but is moved naturally out of itself along with the impulse belonging to this pursuit. It moves by using something else which is intermediate between itself, the mover (I mean the desiderative power) and what is moved, namely the living being. This is the intermediary Aristotle apparently discusses in his treatise On the Movement of Animals calling it the vital spirit (pneuma) in us, which is between the moving heart and the moved more solid parts of the living being.395 He mentions in this work also some other intermediary between the upper and the lower parts of the living being, and between the right and the left parts, which he puts rather in the surface that connects the opposite parts, when it is bent either up or down or at right or at left, being somehow moved, somehow at rest.396 For in bending it happens that one of the opposite parts is moved whereas the other is at rest, since what is moved wants always to be moved in such a way that it rests upon something that is fixed. It so happens that the surface between the opposite parts remains still as limit of what stands still but is moved together with the thing that is in movement as the principle of that thing. But whether one calls these intermediates pneuma or a surface of such a kind, it is agreed that they are corporeal, and to these also Aristotle’s interpreters have turned. I believe however that the argument may also be analysed in the following way. As we learn from Aristotle, every soul is the actuality (entelecheia) of an instrumental397 body and uses the living body as its instrument (organon). What uses the body is not just the form of the instrument as instrument. For what uses always transcends that which it uses.398 Since the living being is subjected as instrument to the soul, the soul using it will not itself be, on the whole, form of the instrument, but as user it will be that ‘by which’ and the efficient cause. For what moves resorts under the efficient cause. But the soul of plants, as it is the ultimate, displays the character of the user in a weak sense; already more evident is this character in the souls of oysters and similar

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living beings,399 as they cause movement in respect of place, even if they are not moving as a whole, but only in their parts. The soul of animals that have forward movement is yet more clearly different from [the body] that is moved. For what moves and produces is something else besides what is moved and affected and is not something that belongs to the moved object – certainly not according to Aristotle400 –, so that the same thing is not both moving and being moved. As said, that which is moved is the living being, that which moves is the soul, not as being the formal life of the living body. For such a formal life characterizes the body as living and as instrument, which is, as said, precisely what is moved, whereas the soul corresponds to the moving principle, but not to the form of the moved insofar as moved, and as a mover and producer it transcends the moved and the produced. And because of the soul’s transcendence an intermediary is also needed to connect both [the body and the moving soul] with one another. And this intermediary is not a body, I think (for that will be again what is moved and not that with which it moves) but something that is corporeal, though not a body, such as is the life that characterizes the instrument as instrument. This intermediary life is not moved insofar as it is what it is, namely incorporeal, yet it is the principle of what is moved as of something that is alive, being the formal cause of it just like health [is the formal cause] of the healthy. Because it is as a whole inseparably immersed in the body it is called corporeal.401 That which is moved is the living being, because it is not as body that it is moved by the soul, but as living being. The intermediary is somehow said both to rest and to be in movement: in itself it is unmoved because it is life,402 but it is moved per accidens because of its inseparable interwovenness with the living being.403

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433b15-16 That which is unmoved is the practical good. Not in the sense of what is unmoved per se. For practical things are in change and can also be otherwise.404 But in the sense of the things that move the desire without being moved so as to move. For by remaining or appearing to be good they move.

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totle now calls the desiderative activity ‘movement’ in the Platonic sense; maybe because it always ends in movement and that, taken as a whole, it is efficient movement and not passive.406 This explanation is better than what Alexander says, namely that the desire is in movement per accidens because, by being in the body, it is moved per accidens, as was said, together with its subject. For what initiates movement is not [the soul] that as a whole has come to be in the living body, but [the soul] that has something separate and transcendent and that is characterized as efficient, and this is what needs an intermediary. But the [soul] that characterizes407 the moved qua moved is the immediate formal cause of that moved [body]. Aristotle is his own interpreter,408 explaining in what sense he said the desiderative power to be moved: ‘in the way (hêi) it desires’, thus indicating that it is moved in accordance with the very desire. For here ‘moved’ is not said of the living being, but of the desiderative power qua desiderative. And to make the argument even clearer he claims that desire is ‘some kind of movement’, meaning an activity that ends up as movement in the living being. Hence we should not understand the hê in the phrase hê energeia as a disjunctive conjunction (ê) but as an adverb (hêi) used instead of ‘insofar’ (katho).409 But even if it is used as conjunction, it should indicate that it is allowed to call desire both ‘activity’ as it is an indivisible and perfect activity, and ‘movement’ as it is awakened by the object of desire and ends up in the movement of the living being.410 The living being is in movement according to the proper definition of movement, namely ‘the entelekheia (actuality) of what is moved’,411 not however according to the natural movement, but according to progressive movement originating from the soul, which appertains to living beings. That ‘by which’ as an intermediary ‘the desire moves is already bodily’. By ‘bodily’ he does not mean body (for a body is in all respects in motion), but what is like body and is the lowest form of life. Therefore he postpones the doctrine about it for later when he will investigate the common works of body and soul.412 But to cause movement is not something common to both [body and soul]. For the animate being is not moved by the body, neither is it moved by the life mixed with [the body]. For the latter, as was said, is the defining form of what is moved in a vital way, whereas what moves the body stands on the level of the moving cause.413 It is therefore appropriate that he will talk about ‘that by which it moves’ in the treatise On the Motion of Animals.414 433b21-5 To speak now in a summary way, that which moves instrumentally is found where beginning and end are the same, [such as the hinge; for there the convex and the concave are respectively the end and the beginning (hence the one is at rest, the other moved), the two being different in account, but inseparable in magnitude.]

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As is said, there is also some bodily part that obviously moves in an instrumental way.415 But now Aristotle wants the life that characterizes the instrument as instrument to be ‘that which moves instrumentally’, which, as he will say, both remains still and is moved. Whether he also speaks of this [kind of life] in his treatise On the Motion of Animals, be it explicitly or at least implicitly, this must be taken from there.416 He seems at any rate to discuss the subject also there, for, ‘now’, he says, we have to discuss ‘in a summary way’, that means in a synoptic way, what is said at greater length in that work. And by ‘that which moves instrumentally’ he clearly means that which, on the one hand, comes after desire – for desire does not move as an instrument, but causes itself primarily movement, because, though being awakened by the desirable object, it is from itself borne towards the desirable object, and what serves as an instrument comes after what primarily moves – and, on the other hand, it comes before that which is [only] moved, since it is not only moved but is also moving. Of such a kind is what moves as an instrument, it is moved by what is the primary mover, it moves what is only moved. Let there be then, as was said, also some bodily part of that kind, such as the heart, such as the vital spirit (pneuma), such as the surface between opposite parts!417 But there is also the life that specifies the living being inseparably, characterizing it as something moved. Of this life too it must be said that it moves the living being, because the body is moved according to this life, though not by it, and that it is itself moved by the primary mover, inseparably from the thing moved; this life is as the form of that which is moved and is rather moved per accidens than per se. For what is per se moved is always a body. And it is more proper to understand this type of life as that which serves as instrument than any sort of body. For it is impossible for a body to be with the same part wholly beginning and end – yet Aristotle put this clearly forward, as he wanted the same thing, namely that by which [desire] moves, to be both beginning and end, – but the life with which [the body] is endowed is wholly as a whole moving the living being, being that principle of movement ‘according to which’ [something is moved], not ‘by which’ [it is moved], and being moved per accidens as the formal cause of the moved body. And Aristotle takes the hinge as an image of something that is somehow as a whole wholly in movement and at rest. For the hinge is not taken as a body, but as surface. The hinge is, as also Plutarch wants it,418 the intertwining of two rings, whereby the one is set in the other, when the convex of the one touches the concave of the other. And as Alexander indicates, [the hinge may also refer to what is the case] when a ring, which is set around one fixed pivot, contributes to the turning inside and outside of the door, whereby the pivot remains unmoved, whereas the ring is moved in opposite movements in the turning of the door inside or outside. But, however this may

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be, one has to take of this hinge, as the interpreters want it,419 either the convex of one ring and the concave of the other [ring], or the concave of the ring and the convex of the pivot. And on the latter [sc. Alexander’s] interpretation the convex of the pivot is supposed to be remaining still and the concave of the ring in motion. [Or, in Plutarch’s interpretation], of the two rings the convex of the contained [ring] is moved whereas the concave of the containing [ring] remains unmoved. But neither interpretation seems to me to correspond to the text,420 which supposes that what is at rest and what moves are ‘inseparable in magnitude’, and only ‘in account different’. For Aristotle is accustomed to call ‘inseparable in magnitude’ neither things that are parts of a continuous body (because in a continuous body different [parts] are moved at different places) nor even less things that touch another (because these things are not even connected with one another according to continuity), but these things that are as wholes wholly united with one another in subject. Therefore also Alexander, noticing this, does in his interpretation not apply to the hinge what is further put forward, namely that beginning and end are inseparable in magnitude and that it is at rest and in movement. But he understands what is said with reference to what is the case with our bodies:421 when opposite parts, I mean what is above and below, what is right and left, are being bent, and one of the two stands still and the other is moved, the surface in between them is, as the limit of what is moved, also 422 itself and, as principle of what is at rest, it also remains as a whole wholly at rest. For [this surface] has no depth both being at rest and in movement. But I believe that one should apply the image on the hinge as well, so that it [the image of the hinge] will not have been introduced in vain. How then could we take the image as referring to a body, which has depth and has the convex on one place and the concave on another? Maybe, as we have said, one should not take the image [of the hinge] as a corporeal reality, but just consider the surface of the body, whether the surface which is called convex or that which is called concave. For the convex is always also wholly concave as a whole, and the concave always convex. Whether423 then you consider the inward ring as being moved according to its convex form according to which it touches what contains it, what is moved will certainly be the ring that is contained. For what is moved will be a body. Yet the surface of this body, which is both convex and concave and comes close to what contains it, is moved insofar as it is proximate to the moved body (this is the concave), since it touches as limit more the moved body; but insofar as it comes close according to its convexity to the ring that is at rest and is containing it, it is itself at rest. For it is also limit of the moved body according to the convex, be it in a more remote manner than according to the concave. The convex and the concave are inseparable

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in subject, what Aristotle called ‘in magnitude’. For whatever is as a whole wholly concave, that is also convex. Whether one considers this in a line or in a surface or in a body, the whole may seem to be both in movement and at rest. But it is neither movement nor rest per se (for to be at rest or in movement per se competes, as was said, only bodies), but it is both per accidens and according to a relation of being close to what is moved or to what is at rest. And in that way the image convenes both for the surface between the opposite parts and for the life that characterizes the instrument as instrument, as we have put it. What this life is, one may also more plausibly understand according to the following analogy: since what is moving is a substance, namely a life capable of desiring and what is moved (i.e., the living being) is [a substance], also the intermediate, that by which the moving principle moves, must be a substance. Well, life is substance, but the surface is not, and as intermediary life is even superior than the living being, though inferior to the life capable of desiring.

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433b25-30 For all things are moved by pushing and pulling [hence, as in a circle, there must be something that stays still, and the movement must start from there. In general, as has been said, insofar as the animal is capable of desire, insofar it is capable of moving itself; and it is not capable of desire without imagination. And all imagination is either concerned with reasoning or with sense-perception. Of the latter other animals also share.] How movements that occur from outside can be reduced to pushing and pulling we have learned from him in the Physics.424 But it is worth examining how also natural movements [can thus be explained], for he said ‘all [things are moved by pushing and pulling]’, so also what is in movement according to nature. And he seems to call the cause of movement that which pushes and pulls, either by stretching out or drawing together what is moved, pushing when it stretches out, pulling when it draws together; and he does not only mean the efficient cause, which is the cause ‘by which’, but also the formal as the cause ‘according to which’. [And he seems to call] the moved thing that which is pulled and pushed, either extended or contracted, as is the case when the living being is heated or cooled. When feeling shame it is getting warm because the blood is diffused and extended, in fear it is 425 because the blood is contracted and concentrated, and thus also paleness is to be seen on its surface. But [pushing and pulling are also found] in natural non-vital movements, for example in the movement of the fire upwards the lightness is the power according to which it is moved, whereas the fire itself is in its movement being ‘pulled’ according to its nature and is gathered in a non-violent manner with its own totality and hastens towards it.

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But it is also ‘pushed’ along its dimensional course, and here again not in a violent manner, but as it were in voluntary way, yet it is extended. One must apply ‘to be moved by pushing and pulling’ to what is said before,426 namely that ‘one part’ of the [instrument] by which the mover moves ‘is at rest’, ‘the other moved’. So that ‘what is at rest’ pushes or pulls, ‘what is moved’ is pushed or pulled. In the case of the contained ring the convex [surface] is according to some analogy that which pushes and pulls, the concave that which is pushed or pulled: insofar as it distances itself from the concavity of the containing ring, it is pushed, insofar as it is borne circularly towards the same it is pulled. Hence, if not the ring that is contained, but the containing ring were to move around the inside ring that remains still, then the [containing ring] will remain still according to the concavity of its inside surface, and be moved according to the convexity. For according to the convexity it will rather have what comes close to its own depth, according to the concavity what is further removed from its own depth, but is closer to the ring that remains still or to the pivot, as Alexander understood the hinge.427 The life in accordance with which the [body] in movement is moved will ‘remain still’ according to its contact with its moving principle, that is desire; and will ‘be moved’ according to its contact with the living being. For the [living being] is, as said,428 what is properly moved. Since then pushing and pulling correspond to what remains still, being pushed and pulled corresponds to what is being moved, there will be in every movement what remains fixed and what is moved. ‘Just as in a circle’ the centre ‘stays still’, pushing the circle insofar as it moves it [and makes it] go out of it, but pulls it, insofar as it moves it around itself, and the whole circle is thus itself pushed and pulled. Following upon this he put forward the conclusion of the argument he had proposed. He wants ‘what is capable of desire’ to be the proximate cause of movement and he shows that ‘what is capable of desire’ always comes about ‘with imagination’, which is either rational, such as the imagination in humans is, which is essentially rational (for otherwise it would not harmonize with reason), or irrational (as in beasts). For the theoretical intellect does not always need imagination, unless it considers the sense-objects as from abstraction, but the desiderative and practical intellect is always about particular things and interweaves the particular premise with the universal. Therefore it always needs imagination as collaborator in order to cognize the particulars. But both imagination and intellect move the living being not according to their cognitive character, but according to the desiderative aspect, as was said.429 For it is as capable of desire that a being moves, whether with rational imagination or with irrational life. Therefore he said that ‘in general, what is capable of desire is what produces movement’.

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Chapter 11 433b31-434a5 We must consider also about incomplete [animals], what it is that produces movement, [those which only have perception by touch, whether it is possible for them to have imagination and desire, or not. For pain and pleasure are plainly present, and if these are, desire must be also. But how could imagination be present? Or is it that just as they are moved in an indeterminate way, so also these [sc. appetition and imagination] are present, but in an indeterminate way?] What he calls ‘incomplete beings’, he explained himself: ‘those which only have perception by touch’. For beings which have touch always have taste too, so that they may discriminate through what is pleasant or unpleasant in flavours what is nutritious or not, and accept the one and refuse the other, just as through touch they discriminate what is beneficial or detrimental for the whole body. For animals need both sense-perceptions. But beings which contain much of the earthy element in the whole nature of their body, do not need whatever perception, as they are not by nature capable to be moved in whatever way and therefore incapable to pursue what is preferable or to shun what must be shunned.430 Since they only share in the last level of life, the vegetative, they are already slipping down and come close to natural movements. Sense-perception is found in all beings that somehow are moved from within, since also the so-called incomplete animals are plainly moved, not however according to the whole of themselves, but according to parts. Yet even without the pleasurable or unpleasant according to flavours being present they lay open the hard shell431 covering the flesh in order to search for food. If then someone throws in some dry stalk or some other thing that is hard, they will close as if to avoid something painful, but they receive what is falling upon them, when taking it as nutritious.432 It is clear then that it is not sense-perception that moves them to open or close. For sense-perception is only of what is present, whereas reason and imagination are also of what is absent. And certainly there is no reason in them; for reason is of universals, whereas imagination is concerned with individual sense-objects, even if they are still absent, through the memory of similar things that have already occurred. One has therefore to attribute to these beings necessarily imagination, what also Aristotle infers from the fact that (i) pain and pleasure are present in these animals – this is evident from the fact that they accept what is nourishing but shake off what is alien to them – and that (ii) beings that have pleasure and pain always must have desire. This is even self-evident. For desire tends towards the pleasurable and the painful or also – in those having reason – to the good and the bad. Therefore in mortal animals the two are convertible. If one

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grants that there is desire in them, then there will be certainly pleasure and pain in them, or, conversely, if pleasure and pain would be present, there will certainly be desire. And the argument becomes even more evident when [it is noticed that] they seem to be moving in whatever way to something pleasurable even when it is not present. It is clear then that they move according to desire, and not simply according to perception. For sense-perception is only of what is present, whereas desire is also of what is absent. Beings that have appetite or desire, also have imagination, so that they may be moved to the pleasurable thing by memory of it, as was said. But imagination in such type of animals is much ‘indeterminate’.433 To be sure, indeterminate is also the imagination of worms and caterpillars and [other insects] moving hither and thither in an indeterminate way, but they have this indeterminacy rather in breadth and not in a narrow sense. For they do not seek the pleasurable only on the spot where they remained immobile hitherto, but are also moving in this or that way to this or that thing, and, to say it simply, they adhere to the pleasurable in a determinate way and pursue it in many places everywhere, yet they are indeterminate in the sense that they seek it as it happens to occur and do not go out to it as the bees go to their accustomed pasture or to their own hives.434 As to the incomplete animals, [such as oysters] they too adhere in a determinate way to the pleasurable, but due to the fact that they do not seek that pleasurable in many places, so as to obtain it here or there, but search it only in the very place where they remain, they have this term (horon) only in a narrow manner and it is more indeterminate than in the case of these [insects]. For, as said, they do not put this end term in many places, but only in one place. In that sense also their movement is said to be indeterminate because of its restricted and partial character, and is not such as the movement of beings that change places as a whole. They do not [move] hither and thither, nor do they have an impulse from inside to strive to obtain the pleasurable thing from their own stores, but only go after what seems to be like a reception of the pleasurable, in whatever way it may have fallen to them from outside. 434a5-7 Imagination concerned with perception is, as has been said, also found in the other animals, but deliberative [imagination is only found] in those which are capable of reasoning. Having said that there is imagination found also in incomplete animals, though it is indeterminate, and having granted a fortiori that it is found in the more developed animals, namely those that move in respect of place, and having many times said that even reason in us uses imagination, as imagination is present also in humans and not only in wild animals, he now determines in the most

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philosophical way what is different between human imagination and that of irrational animals. The former participates in some kind of deliberation, as it goes together with opinion and reason and is sometimes set right by rational will, sometimes it also weighs against it so that it sometimes may dominate as in people without self-control (for so much affinity it has by nature with what is rational); the latter [kind of imagination] cannot combine with reason and deliberation. Yet in some [animals], which manifest in themselves also some rationality, there is some form of habituation by rational beings and a training, which does not come from within, but from outside. Nature, in fact, does not suddenly make a transition to what is much distant but goes through what is always proximate.435 For dogs and monkeys and bears and horses, even if they do not have their own reason, can be trained and ordered by human reason, but not in the like manner and not as much as our own imagination. But ants and bees or serpents or water animals cannot, and even less so those who have an indeterminate imagination. This then is the intention of the text, to discriminate the human imagination, which he now calls deliberative, from that of irrational animals. Let us now examine in detail the text. He calls imagination in beings capable of reasoning ‘deliberative’ since he attributes somehow to all imagination the fact of being ambivalent436 and related to contingent things. For deliberation of whatever kind is not about eternal things, which are always in the same state and whose end is necessary, but it is about particular things that can be done and such that sometimes may happen and sometimes not and those that do not always carry with them the same choice. Therefore he apparently does not attribute imagination to the celestial beings, as he does also not grant them sense-perception, as they only act according to intellect. For how could there be whatever sort of deliberation in those beings that move always in the same way and are always in fulfilment (en telei)? If someone attributes to them sense-perception in another sense,437 he philosophizes about sense-perception in another sense and not about that perception according to which we and all mortal animals perceive needing a stroke from outside objects and using sense-organs. But he means [by sense-perception] a cognition of sense-objects that is entirely awakened from inside and that does neither need a stroke or organs, nor does it correspond to affection but entirely to a superior activity. And it does not ascend from the body to the intellect but proceeds from the intellect to the body. He calls it sense-perception (aisthêsis) just because it is about sense-objects. If then someone were to put also imagination in these [celestial beings], he would have to attribute it to them in a similar sense as sense-perception. Aristotle himself clearly indicates the ambivalent character of deliberation when he brings forward:

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434a7-10 For whether to do this or that is already a task for reasoning; [and it is necessary to measure with a single thing; for one pursues the greater; so that one is able, out of many phantasms, to make one.] In the case of ambivalent things, which do not necessarily have one and the same determined end, the question arises ‘whether [to do] this or that’. And Aristotle thus clarifies the rational character of deliberative life. For irrational animals pursue only the apparent pleasurable, as they look to one thing, namely the pleasurable, because of the narrowness [of their perspective], and they [do] not [pursue] sometimes what is good and at other times what is pleasurable – as reason does because its consideration and desire is broader and tends to many things. Therefore the imagination of rational animals is rational, but it is also438 concerned with contingent things. He calls ‘perceptive’ the imagination that is awakened by sense-perception only. For, as has been determined by him in his arguments about imagination,439 there must always first be perception, then the imprints from the sense-objects come to be in the imagination and next the imagination is moved in accordance with these imprints. Deliberative imagination, which is set in movement by these objects, is also itself always at the beginning awakened by sense-perception, but not only by that, for, because of its essential kinship with reason, it somehow enjoys also its deliberation and collaborates with it. Hence it sometimes follows it, sometimes however it declines to something else than what is adjudicated by reason, and either dominates as in the case of people without self-control or is dominated as in the case of self-controlled persons. What then is denoted by ‘deliberative’? Not only that it is concerned with contingent things that have to be done and that are always in another state, but also that it is necessary for the deliberating person to look at one thing and to refer to that thing as the most preferable. This is what he called the ‘one measure’. And indeed when one must choose either what is expedient or what is pleasurable, one deliberates by looking at what is most preferable. But also when one has determined that what is most preferable is expedient and deliberates whether this or that is more expedient, one again deliberates by leaning upon one and the same expedient. Similarly when one sets the pleasurable as goal. ‘Hence one is able, out of many phantasms, to make one.’ The person who deliberates does not look, as was said before, in a narrow way to only this particular thing, but looks at many things, and these things are particulars and generated and exist only at some time and can be in different states at different times and can be compared to one another; – and for this reason there exists ‘what is brought together from many such things by reasoning’, as Plato somewhere said440 – , and he always uses imagination

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as his collaborator. For it is its function to apprehend in a proximate way such objects of cognition. 434a10-12 And this is the reason why it is believed not to involve belief, i.e. that it does not involve belief from syllogism, whereas the latter involves the former. If one were to call ‘belief’ (doxa) simply the cognition of what is superficial and seems to be, one must attribute it above all to nonrational animals.441 And indeed also Iamblichus situates belief in the non-rational life. If, however, [one calls doxa] the cognition that comes from reason and syllogistic reasoning and that is brought together from many particulars to one, i.e. the universal, one cannot attribute this to non-rational animals. ‘The reason’ he gives for the fact that not all imagination he talks about seems to involve belief, though imagination is also followed by desire, is ‘that it does not involve belief based on syllogistic reasoning’. For all desire at least involves cognition of what seems to be. For it is not possible to desire something without cognition, and that cognition always corresponds to what seems to be the case. For estimation (dokêsis) is always about practical matters, just as exactness is about objects of theoretical study. ‘The latter involves the former’ that is, belief based on syllogistic reasoning involves imagination as a consequence, as this kind of belief, too, is about practical matters and what may be at different times in different states.

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434a12-15 Therefore desire does not involve the capacity of deliberation. [But sometimes it overcomes and moves the will,442 sometimes the latter overcomes and moves the former; like a sphere,443 desire [moves] desire, when there is lack of self-control. But naturally what is above always is more authoritative and causes movement, so that they are actually carried along three movements.]

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licentious people, at other times it resists, yet does not dominate, as in the case of people without self-control.445 ‘Like a sphere’, he says, ‘desire [moves] desire’, introducing by way of illustration of what he is saying one ball (sphaira) thrown by players to one another, where the person who is throwing is causing movement, the one who is receiving is moved and again causes movement by throwing. Thus also in the case of people without self-control the inferior desire moves the superior and the superior the inferior insofar as it resists it. And as in the case of people playing a ball game the one who strikes hardest wins, so also in the case of people without self-control the inferior desire wins, whereas in the case of self-controlled people the superior desire wins. And he seems now to use the words ‘lack of self-control’ to refer to any kind of conflict, even if it is not the inferior that dominates but the superior, insofar as the power does not altogether belong to one, but now to this and then to that. The interpreters,446 however, understand the image of the sphere as referring to the celestial spheres, supposing that the sphere of the fixed stars gives its own movement also to the spheres of the planets, so that each of the planetary spheres is moved according to its own movement and the fixed sphere itself according to its own, while the third movement given from the fixed sphere dominates the second [that is the movement of the planetary spheres]. Since ‘naturally’, that is according to nature, will is superior and ‘more authoritative’, as it is also capable of being aroused entirely from itself and sets the good as its goal, it will be according to nature for it to move the second. Maybe when the latter revolts against the superior, this, too, moves somehow the first, as, he said, happens in the case of people throwing the ball to one another. When then the will is not under a spell nor forced, but, on the contrary likely to prevail, there will be a third movement caused by the will, capable of repressing non-rational desire. First by nature comes the movement that as it were gives the commanding order. For, as said, the will naturally commands the desire linked to imagination. But when this desire is not yet educated,447 it conversely attempts to bring down the will to its own preference, what is no longer according to nature. When, however, the will is not brought down, it will repress with some insistence the movement of this desire. 434a16 But what is capable of knowing by science (epistêmonikon) does not cause movement (or: is not moved, for both readings are found)448 [but remains still].

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In the passage that follows he appears to conclude in a summary way all he has said before, starting from above, from the highest level of being of our human souls. For indeed, his whole argument was from the beginning focused on the soul of mortal animals in all its aspects.

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He now speaks of ‘what is capable of knowing by science’ (epistêmonikon) not in the sense of what has scientific knowledge in potentiality, but of what has perfect and already actual scientific knowledge, just as we call huphanton that which has actually been woven and khrusôton what has been made gold. For449 (i) what is [capable of knowing] in potentiality and is still imperfect, both causes movement and is moved: it causes the animal to move in order that by it and by the sense-perceptions and imaginations it will be lifted up towards the contemplation of the forms, yet it is itself moved insofar as it is brought to perfection by the essential intelligible forms of the soul. But also (ii) what is already perfected so that it can already think itself,450 being perfected according to habit and projection,451 even that is agreed to be moved by the light that makes its objects, which are like unilluminated colours, known in actuality, just as the objects of arts [are being made in actuality] by art;452 and [it is also moved] in the sense of dividing its activity from its essence.453 It does not, however, move the animal as its proximate cause, but as being the cause of the practical intellect. For it must first consider the so-called major premise and then having connected the particular premise to it produce the practical intellect.454 The intellect that has habitual knowledge considers the major premise itself by itself, just as deliberative imagination in rational animals considers the particular premise by itself, and the so-called practical intellect considers both connected. Therefore Aristotle next examines whether it is rather the major or the minor premise that causes the animal to move. For even if the major somehow causes movement and scientific reason does so too, it will still be the reason that is habitual and that is proceeding. But [the intellect] (iii) that ‘is separated and is just what it is’455 is characterized by essential activity456 in a secondary way (as it comes after the intellect which transcends even the essence of the soul). Therefore it is called both ‘intellect’ and ‘scientific’ whereby the addition of ‘scientific’ indicates its secondary nature.457 Such an intellect ‘neither causes movement nor is moved, but remains still’. For as he says, it always ‘is just what it is’,458 as it is not intertwined with any secondary form of life, but it integrates its activity into its essence because of its contact with the transcendent intellect. This contact does not take place through otherness459 (for this intellect is not connected with the forms as nature and the bodies are connected [with the forms])460 but rather through union and a congenital sameness, without much otherness occurring. Hence we may also attribute in a secondary way the same properties to the highest (level of) soul, which we also attribute to the intellect that transcends the soul, whereby we indicate its secondary status by adding to ‘the intellect’ ‘scientific’. He reveals thus what is somehow intermediary between what remains and what proceeds, and between the intellective and the developed type of knowledge,

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indicating the essence [of this intellect], its remaining ,461 through the ‘remaining’ and ‘proceeding’, its activity462 through the ‘intellective’ and ‘developed’ type of knowledge. For knowledge is an activity, whereas remaining and procession are substantial realities, which indicate for Plato the intermediary mode of being that is both ‘indivisible and divisible’, as ‘intellect’ and ‘science’ indicate for Aristotle what are for Plato the circular movement of the ‘circle of the same’ and the ‘circle of the other’.463 But before we tackle what follows let us pause for a little while and raise two problems for ourselves, one arising from things as they really are and another from the views of men who have reached the summit in philosophy.464 The problem arising from reality investigates how it is possible that the summit of the soul is ‘not moved’ by the intellect that transcends it (I mean by the intellect that entirely transcends the soul as its efficient cause and by the intellect that is participated in by the soul as its defining cause).465 Hence, according to Plato, the soul is both moved and self-moved.466 How then can we affirm that the summit of the soul ‘is not moved and does not move’, but that ‘it remains’ separated and is ‘just that what it is’,467 even if it is then also dependent on the intellect and is given its being by the intellect. Maybe, as was said,468 its dependence [on the intellect] did not involve any distance but only a growing together without intermediary. For in the case of the natural forms, too, it is not the body that is directly connected to the forms, but the natural reason-principles (logoi) are connected to the form, and through these intermediaries even the divisible thing itself. For the reason-principles come always immediately after the forms. Even the soul’s essence is a reason-principle and even one superior to the natural reason-principles.469 Therefore the soul is much more directly connected with its own form [i.e. the intellect] and it rather grows together with it.470 Movement is characteristic of divisible things, which as Aristotle says, is an ‘activity’.471 Aristotle uses the term ‘movement’ for this [divisible] activity and not, as Plato sometimes does, also for the activity of indivisible beings, as in the case of the highest [level of] intellective activity. For Plato says that the intellect ‘is in movement with regard to the same things and according to the same aspects and in the same manner’ and he calls its highest activity ‘movement’.472 He knows also all physical movements and he separates the soul’s movement from these. Aristotle, however, as he is accustomed, calls the soul’s being and activity ‘immobile’, because he attributes movement only to divisible things, and obviously calls it now ‘immobile’, and he claims that ‘it does not move’, as long as it remains purely in itself. For it moves, when it somehow proceeds.473 Maybe also what Plato means by self-moved is something like this. It is not moved in the absolute sense, but as the intermediary it is indicated by the combination of the extremes, I mean the ‘same’ and

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‘movement’.474 How then does the intellect grant the soul its being? Not through distance but through some immediate growing together, and hence rather through ‘remaining’ and not by causing movement but by establishing it [the soul] in itself and perfecting it not in a way that is completely separate, but by separating it from the external things while at the same time making it return and bringing it into contact most of all with itself and with the intellect itself. Let this be the end of this investigation and the solution of the problem arising from reality. Let us now also examine how we may be in agreement with the divine Iamblichus,475 who understands both the intellect in potentiality and the intellect in actuality as referring to the intellect that is superior to the soul, either the intellect that defines the soul or the unparticipated one, whereas we believe that the exposition about the twofold intellect refers to the essence of the soul itself, as we have often pointed out on the basis of Aristotle’s very words. Yet we will of course not dare to say something opposite to Iamblichus, but will agree with him as much as possible, as we are so much inferior to him as those who are deigned still in need of progress to those who have reached the summit of knowledge.476 The former ascend from the study of things caused to the study of the causes, while the latter conversely look down as it were from an observation post upon the valley, from the causes upon the things caused. For the argument is somehow the same , since in a way the causes and the things caused are the same, because the things caused have their being according to the property and activity of their causes, and such as the cause seems to be specifically and in a simple way, such is also the effect in a secondary way and according to participation. And conversely for those who consider the things caused first, such as the things caused are in a secondary way and in participation, such is also the cause in a simple way and not by participation. Whatever then is considered in the cause according to its property, that is also considered in the things caused. This divine man, then, who, in accordance with his own supreme contemplation, first considered this property in the cause, allows us to consider this property also in the case of the soul, and we are very pleased to examine this property first in the case of the soul and then in this way to remount to its cause [sc. the transcendent intellect]. Thus the fact that it sometimes stands still in a pure way, sometimes moves away from this pure permanence and proceeds to the projection of flowing lives and becomes interwoven with them: this we consider first in the case of our human soul itself as it has its being accordingly, but we claim that also its defining intellect is like this, since it is capable of defining a being that is like this; and again, as for the fact that the soul is sometimes reconstituted to pure activity, namely from its state of potentiality, we claim that the intellect that is defining such

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a being, which is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes comes to be in pure actuality, is itself potentially perfected in that way as well, not in the sense that this intellect would be affected by this potentiality, but in the sense that it defines and constitutes the essence of a being that is as it were affected by being sometimes in potentiality and sometimes again being reconstituted to actuality. This may suffice as our defence with regard to the second question. But let us tackle the next text of Aristotle. 434a16-21 But since one supposition and argument is universal and the other is concerned with what is particular (for the one says that 477 should do this sort of thing, the other that this thing is of that sort, and I am such a person), what already moves is this belief, but not the universal [supposition]. Maybe it is both, but the one is rather at rest and the other is not. Having thus far recapitulated his views on the theoretical intellect of the soul, namely that the supreme intellect only remains and ‘neither moves nor is moved’ he shows in what follows how the proceeding intellect is moved, though it is already perfect and therefore in possession of scientific knowledge. He also shows how it is moved by calling its contemplation ‘universal’, but not ‘indivisible’, thus preserving the eternal and necessary character of its contemplation, which he calls the universal proposition, but the forms it apprehends are not the essential and causative forms, but the forms that are already proceeding and are connected with the reason-principles in the souls that are caused [by the forms] and that are particulars.478 – For such are universal statements: they are predicated of the particulars and have their being inseparably with them. – That it also causes movement, he shows clearly by the fact that it passes on to the practical intellect this universal proposition, which itself moves the living being with the particular proposition. Moving on from there to the practical intellect itself Aristotle summarizes also what we have been taught about it. The universal proposition is theoretical and exercises movement in a more quiet and exalted manner, whereas the particular proposition is known rather by the deliberative imagination and is causing movement to the living being in a more proximate manner concerning practical matters which can be different from one moment to another, since they are particular and always need a particular movement to be accomplished. Hence the practical intellect in us, which considers and connects both propositions together, adopts the one from the theoretical intellect and examines the other by means of rational imagination, and moves the living being towards objects that are or seem to be at some moments preferable. The major premise is separate, as said, and is

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rather at rest, while the minor is more proximate and works by means of all sorts of changes that vary all the time. He points out of what sort the universal and major premise is and of what sort the minor and the particular by saying that each of the two is rational. For he calls them ‘supposition and argument’ (for even the particular premise is rational, as even our imagination is deliberative and as it is known now by the intellect) and he distinguishes them from one another by stating that the one premise claims that one should do ‘this sort of thing’ (he is accustomed, as in the Categories,479 to attribute ‘this sort of thing’ (toionde) to what can come to be in a general sense, for instance that one should honour the good, not this or that, but simply every good) and the other premise defines this particular as being good, for example that Socrates is good. What he calls ‘this’ (tode) is the subject in that premise, a particular thing, for instance Socrates, whereas what is ‘this sort of thing’ (toionde) is what is predicated, as what is predicated is always without previous distinction and therefore not ‘this’ but rather ‘this sort of thing’. He has given two examples of the particular premises: in one he makes the argument as in the third person where he says that ‘this thing is of that sort’, as if he were to make an argument about Socrates, the other as in the first person, when he says: ‘and I am such a person’. ‘What already moves is this belief’: he means the particular premise, and for the time being he attributes to it, since it clearly causes movement, the full explanation of the local movement of the living being, and not to the universal premise. Next, correcting as it were himself, he formulates it more precisely, namely that ‘both move, but the one is rather at rest’, as it causes movement without being moved. For it remains always the same without ever changing and neither is at different times in different states. For it is supposed to be in possession of scientific knowledge. But why is it said to be ‘rather’ (mallon) at rest, and not ‘simply’ at rest? Because it is interwoven with the particular premise and when the latter is changing it changes itself together with it in accordance with this intertwining. Insofar as it indicates that the good is to be honoured, it is eternal, but insofar as it is interwoven with a premise saying this time that Socrates is good, another time Pythagoras or Plato, and concludes that what is to be honoured is at different times different (for the conclusion does not only follow from the particular [premise alone], but also from the universal [premise]), to that extent it is somehow moved as well; and therefore ‘rather’ is added in the statement that it is in itself at rest, indicating thus that it is also itself somehow moved in virtue of its intertwining. He thus concludes his views on the practical intellect:480 that it uses imagination as is found in rational beings and that it interweaves the particular premise with the universal and considers both and that it causes living beings to move in respect of place in virtue

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of both premises, though more proximately and more clearly in virtue of the particular [premise] (to say it more precisely, in virtue of both!), and how [it causes movement] in virtue of each of the two. That which is the cause of movement in an unqualified sense is the desiderative power: this he demonstrated above with many arguments, and now, in this argument on the practical intellect, he points it out by saying that the particular imagination is most of all capable of movement, but he no longer draws a conclusion about this especially. Having discussed perception and contemplation and desire in their entirety (for by ‘imagination’ he also indicates what concerns sense-perception, for he took the one for the other, as the imprints in the imagination come from the sense impressions and imagination is awakened from sense-perception as the latter from the sense-objects)481 he moves next to the arguments about the instrumental bodily part (organon).482 Indeed, from the beginning [of this treatise]483 he criticized those who do not also define what sort of organ is needed for life functions, but only consider the sort of life, and do not at all determine what is receptive of it, what kind of thing it must be. He now sets out to discriminate what are in living beings of whatever kind the ultimate forms of life, what are the forms of life that immediately emerge after them, which in general need bodies as organs to be active (for he leaves out the lives that never use them as they are clearly transcendent), and he moves to the conclusion that the more perfect of the mortal forms of life also have all the subordinated forms, but that it is not the case conversely, and what are the less perfect of the living beings, and what are, as said, those that immediately emerge after them. It is then his intention to talk about the organ, or rather to recapitulate in a conclusion what he had said at greater length [in DA 2.11, 423a12-17], namely that the organ of beings that live in a vegetative way without perception is more simple, since much earth dominates in it. Therefore it is not easily affected and that what is not easily affected does not consist in the mean state of the elements, but is constituted in its being by the dominance of earth and is less easily affected by the sense-objects falling upon it and hence is bereft of sense-perception. For what is capable of perception of whatever sort consists rather in the mean state of the elements and not in the dominance of the earth, as is clear in the case of the power of touch, which is the ultimate sense-organ. Otherwise the perceptive power may not be capable of cognizing the different qualities in the elements, for instance the hot in fire, the cold in water, the wet in the air, the dry in the fire. What is constituted in its being by the dominance of one element will not have the mean status similar to the opposite. He defines then first what sort of organ the vegetative life needs, secondly what sort of organ is only capable of touch and taste, as in the case of animals that are as a whole incapable of

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locomotion, and third what sort of organ belongs to the more perfect animals capable of progressive movement. Regarding their capacity of touch the latter are in no way different from the animals that are incapable of movement as a whole,484 but regarding their capacity of progressive movement, they need to perceive from afar and not touch the objects they encounter directly, but through a medium, and therefore their sense-organs are constituted according to superior elements. In order to reach this recapitulation he had to remind us that every being that lives a generated life in whatever way needs the vegetative soul, while what is capable of perception in whatever way needs the perception of touch and taste, while what is capable of progressive movement needs also the more perfect sense-perceptions. Having started from these presuppositions he will also add his views on what is the organ proper to each particular sense.

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Chapter 12 434a22-6 Everything then that lives and has485 soul must have the nutritive soul, from [the moment of] its generation and486 until its passing away. [For what is generated must have growth and maturity and decay, – and these things are impossible without nourishment. The capacity of nutrition must then be present in all things which grow and decay.] Whatever is alive in any way, and is mortal, needs nourishment. For living beings are not capable, even for a short time, of keeping the form of life without being nourished, because they do not receive life without matter, as is evident from the fact that they live at some time and do not live at another time and that there is something in them that does not receive life in a connatural way, but adventitiously,487 something that is both deprived of life before it receives it and after it loses it. What receives [life] adventitiously is matter, just as what receives it in a connatural way is the actual living being; for nothing remains of a living being as living being after the loss of life, neither did something pre-exist as living before the reception of life. And we have noticed this already many times in our commentary on this treatise.488 Because of the fact that matter receives adventitiously and for that reason is also hurrying towards its privation and is flowing away, and in this flowing away is throwing [life] off as quickly as possible, nature attempts to compensate489 this by its nutritive power. Nourishment, which is an influx, sometimes dominates the outflow, as is the case in growing; sometimes they are equal, as in maturity, sometimes the influx is dominated by the outflow, as in decay. And in the last state too, when there is much outflow, nourishment is needed, so that [living beings] by means of an influx of whatever size may hold out for some time against the greater out-

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flow. Rightly then ‘from their generation until their passing away’ beings that live in this way need nourishment. For they must either be growing or be mature or be decaying. And beings that live in this way need nourishment in each of these conditions. For the nutritive power is not at all present in inanimate beings – maybe if someone would grant that metals too are growing,490 he would admit that the vegetative life is present in them in a much weaker form than in plants –, nor is it found in those that live eternally, as they are not material and do not receive life adventitiously, but live according to a life that is just connaturally rooted in them, and for that reason they need no external help in order to live.491 434a27-9 Sense-perception is not necessary in all living beings;492 [for those things that have a body which is simple cannot have touch, nor can something without this be an animal.]493 He apparently begins by assuming what is to be investigated. The question is why not all living beings have494 the sense of touch and taste to discriminate between what is proper and what is alien to them, so that all living beings perceive by senses.495 In fact, even the body of all the other beings that live with sense-perception, which is such that it can exist as a mean496 and have touch, may be called ‘simple’, because, as has already been said,497 it has its capacity of touch owing to the dominance of one element, namely earth; not that this body is entirely simple, as it exists wholly according to the domination of one element but is also composed out of the remaining elements, as is Aristotle’s view everywhere498 and as is self-evident. What then could have prevented these living beings [sc. such as plants], as they are somehow ‘in the middle’, because they are entirely composed of opposites, even if they are not equal, from having some perception too, to be sure a weaker sort than what is found in beings which have life in a different way [sc. sensitive animals], and as Plato calls it ‘a sleeping sense-perception’?499 But maybe Aristotle did not think it right to attribute to them perception, firstly because they have not, as it were, an awakened perception, but, as Plato said, a sleeping one, and secondly because plants have an earthy nature which is not easy affected, as he himself says.500 For what is capable of perception must be easily affected. Indeed, in the case of beings where nature only concentrates on their existence, it attributes to them the property of not being easily affected, without needing sense-perception, since they have from themselves the character of not being easily affected. But in beings where nature not only takes care of their existence but rather of their existing well, nature assigns to them according to their whole bodily constitution the character of being most easily affected, so that their body may also be most capable of perception.501 Therefore, to speak in general, the

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human body is most easily affected, because it is superior to the other animals by a good mixture [of the elements]502 and by the delicacy of its skin when seen in proportion to its magnitude, so that humans have, when considering their whole body, a more precise sense-perception, whereas, in the particular sense-perceptions, they fall short in comparison with many other animals.503 It is therefore well said that ‘sense-perception is not necessary in all living beings’, since they have no touch and there cannot be another perception before touch. It is not necessary then that sense-perception is found in all [beings], for the ultimate [beings] have also the lowest end. This end is certainly something good, whatever the end is, but one good is better, one is inferior, each appropriate to each of the beings which are brought to that end. Hence also for ultimate beings the ultimate good is appropriate. The good, however, which consists in the capacity of perception, is not the ultimate good: it shows the character of ‘being awakened’ and this corresponds to an activity of judgement. Therefore there must be a good that is even lower, so that also the ultimate beings may be good. Such a good is rather what is concomitant with existence according to sole existence.504 Maybe some things even below these ultimate beings are somehow good, for instance, what is without life, or potential, or material, or privative. But the argument is not about these things. ‘Without’ touch, with which taste too is always connected, ‘it is impossible to be a living being’. For a living being, which is easily affected, as has been said,505 so that it may perceive, must be both perceptive in its whole being (for it will be destroyed unawares when it is without perception) and perceptive in some particular respect, namely in so far as it will be able to discriminate in nourishment between what is proper and what is alien. In this particular respect it must be capable of taste, whereas insofar as it is capable of perceiving as a whole, it is capable of touch. For touch goes through the whole body. Whatever is capable of perception in any way must always have these two perceptions. But what does he propose next?

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434a29-31 Nor those which cannot receive forms without matter. [An animal must have sense-perception,506 if nature does nothing in vain.] Let us first see what he means by ‘those which can receive forms without matter’ so that we may know from the positive statement what ‘those are which cannot receive without matter’. And to what corresponds the negation oute (nor) added before it at the beginning? For it is not simply added, but it seems to have some meaning.507 One may explain the whole text rather as follows. If he now seems to call ‘forms’ the animate forms508 (if at least there might be in the universe some animate form, and not only individuals which are like corpses),

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and if his argument is about forms capable of perception, he does now apparently not assume simply animate forms, but those that are also capable of perception or even capable of cognition in a superior way.509 What can receive such forms without matter are the eternal living beings, which in no way have something [sc. matter] that receives [life] adventitiously. Neither Plato nor Aristotle attributed any form of perception to these beings, because, as has been said,510 they mean by ‘sense-perception’ the passive perception, not the perception that comes wholly from inside according to its proper activity and that is constitutive of the sense-objects and discriminative of them. These [eternal living beings] are then ‘what can receive forms without matter’. And it has been said what kind of forms they can receive, namely cognitive forms, and forms with a superior capacity of knowing, as is the view of these ancient philosophers, and not [a capacity of knowing] through perception. It is, then, also clear what ‘those beings are which cannot receive’ the cognitive ‘forms without matter’, namely the non-eternal living beings. For such living beings always need sense-perception because of what was said before,511 as they are easily affected, and they need the primary sense-perception, the sense of touch. We must thus construe oute (nor) by taking up again what was said before: ‘without this perception (namely touch) nothing can be an animal’, and having connected also the last oute with this passage we will thus bring in the rest of the text: ‘those which cannot receive forms without matter’. In this way a double explanation is given for the fact that mortal animals must absolutely have the sense of touch. One reason is that the other senses cannot exist without touch; the second reason is that, since they are generally living beings and can only receive their cognitive forms adventitiously – for that is what it means not to be capable of perception without matter –, they must also be perceptive in a passive sense, ‘if nature does nothing in vain’,512 that is if it will attribute to animals what is proper to them as animals. For what is good is what is able to preserve each thing, as is also Plato’s view in the Republic.513 What then has not acquired the cause of its preservation according to nature will exist in vain. But nature does nothing in vain. Hence it also assigns to all animals what preserves them according to measures fitting for each. The capacity of perception is what preserves mortal animals, as it becomes the cause for the avoidance of what is alien and the reception of what is proper to them. 434a31-434b2 For everything in nature exists for the sake of something or will be concomitants of those things which are for the sake of something. [If then every body with the capacity of forward movement that does not have sense-perception, would pass away and fail to reach its end, which is the work of nature;

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for how would it be nourished? For stationary animals get this from where they naturally grow, ] This issue is more clearly determined in the Physics,514 namely that, among the things that come about according to nature, some are as themselves ends, such as the forms, virtue and health and everything of this kind, and these things are ‘that for the sake of which’; other things are not themselves ends, but contribute to them, as exercise and proper matter and instruments, other things again follow as concomitants either things that already have reached the end, or are still moving towards the end; thus excrements515 and saliva and, as they say, hairs in the arm-pit are concomitants for those animals which are already healthy,516 and toil and labour are for those which still are moved towards health through exercise. Aristotle apparently divides all things that come about by nature into two groups: those that exist for the sake of something and those that are concomitants, and always introduces together with those that exist for the sake of something also ‘that for the sake of which’. For it is not possible that something is or comes to be for the sake of something if that for the sake of which does not exist. The philosopher rightly adds as a conclusion of the premises discussed before that animals with the capacity of forward motion require sense-perception much more than stationary and imperfect animals. For they encounter bodies that may preserve or destroy them in many ways and in always different places and, as they are more perfect, they even share more perfectly in the capacity of touch itself,517 which is also more active [in them]. Besides, they must necessarily also participate in other senses that are capable of grasping from afar the sense-object, so that they may, by perceiving the destructive or beneficial bodies before they touch them, avoid the former and pursue the latter. Without perception, then, most of all animals, those capable of forward movement could not be preserved. Indeed what is for them the end and the good is, as said,518 the cause of their preservation, which most of all consists in being according to nature. For also the final cause is the strongest cause,519 for the sake of which also the efficient cause works and the formal cause determines and the material cause underlies in a way appropriate to things. And building successfully on what has been said, he infers that for stationary living beings and even for the animals that are stationary nourishment is provided by nature even when they remain on the same spot; this is clearly so in the case of plants, but also in stationary animals: for from the beginning they come to be and continue to exist on the place from which they are able to be nourished. 434b3-8 It is, however, not possible for a body to have soul and intellect capable of discernment and not to have sense-perception, when it is not stationary but is generated [nor if it is not

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generated;520 for why would it not have it? It would have to be better either for the soul or for the body, but in fact it is neither. For the soul would not think any better and the body would be no better because of that. Hence no body, which is not stationary, has a soul without sense-perception.]

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This is clearly not said of all animals with forward movement, but of the most perfect among them, in which there is intellect capable of discernment.521 This problem has been posed in addition to what has been said to answer people who might query why, if animals have a superior cognition according to intellect, this does not suffice for their preservation, even if they are capable of forward movement, but they still need sense-perception. One explanation already many times given is now left aside, namely that it is necessary for animals to have a cognition co-ordinate with the things known.522 Sense-perception is for these objects the co-ordinate cognition, so that they cannot be known by the intellect in these animals except through sense-perception. But that explanation, as I said, Aristotle now leaves aside as it has been given many times. Or rather he does not entirely dismiss it, but by adding another explanation he hints at this one, saying that it is impossible for animals that are generated and are capable of forward movement to have intellect, yet not to be capable of senseperception and he adds again a reason for this. For this [namely to be without sense-perception] is neither better for the soul in respect of thinking nor does it offer the body preservation, if [the body] has not also taken sense-perception. For the rational soul, which has entirely sank into the body, cannot otherwise be awakened to thinking than by being first awakened through sense-perception, and in actions it uses as a collaborator523 imagination which comes from perception. The body too is not preserved only through intellect, but also through sense-perception, which indicates that this thing is nocuous and this beneficial, or that this is painful, that pleasurable and delightful. Hence also the aforementioned reason is given, namely that which assigns sense-perception to sensitive animals, as it is a cognition co-ordinate with sense-objects. Therefore he next formulates as a general conclusion that ‘a body that is not stationary cannot have soul without sense-perception’. In this conclusion ‘not stationary’ is added because of plants which do have a soul without sense-perception, or because of the stars, as Alexander understands it, for they are animate, yet are stationary because they are rooted in their proper spheres and do not move by themselves, as he argues.524 And Alexander seems to explain the text in this way because of what is said immediately before namely ‘it is not possible for a body to have soul and intellect capable of discernment and not to have sense-perception, if it is not stationary but is generated’. For ‘what is not stationary, and has intellect capable of

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discernment and is generated’ is taken [by Alexander] in contradistinction to ‘what has both soul and intellect capable of discernment, but is stationary and not generated’. For among generated things there is not such a stationary animal. In some copies the phrase ‘nor if it is not generated’ is added. Plutarch explains this addition, as if Aristotle would now ascribe sense-perception also to heavenly animals.525 For [as he says,] not even not-generated animals lack sense-perception, because they do not change places by themselves and are therefore stationary. But Aristotle obviously does not at all admit sense-perception in celestial beings, but even denies this in what follows. Therefore, I believe that Alexander has a better explanation of the addition ‘nor if it is not generated’, understanding it in connection with ‘having sense-perception’. In his view the connection is not made with what is just said before, namely ‘it is not possible for a body to have a soul, but not to have sense-perception’, but with what was said at the beginning: ‘sense-perception is not necessary in all living beings, for those things that have a body that is simple cannot have touch’;526 [and one should infer] ‘nor is it necessary for an ungenerated body’ to have sense- perception.527 The attribute ‘capable of discernment’ (kritikon) is added to ‘intellect’ to indicate the theoretical intellect in distinction from the practical intellect. It makes the argument even clearer, for the practical intellect always needs sense-perception, whereas the theoretical intellect apparently does not always [need it]; yet it uses it at the beginning [of its development] and also later always in the consideration of sense-objects.

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434b8-18 But if it does have sense-perception, the body must be either simple or mixed, [but it cannot be simple; for then it would not have touch, and it is necessary to have that. This is clear from the following. Since an animal is an animate body, and every body is tangible and tangible is that which is perceptible by touch, the body of an animal must also be capable of touch, if the animal is to survive. For the other senses, such as smell, sight and hearing, perceive through other things, but something which touches things will be unable, if it does not have sense-perception, to avoid some things and take others. If that is so, it will be impossible for an animal to survive.] That among generated beings there are many forms of life and that some are inferior and ultimate and others ascend somewhat until they reach the level of the intellect that is capable of discernment, and that the inferior and ultimate forms of life always co-exist with the superior but not always vice versa, the superior with the inferior, has already been concluded through what was said before. But what

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kind of organ is proper to each [type of life] and what kind of organ each uses in an appropriate manner, on this issue he apparently gave already some indications before,528 but now he develops the argument more clearly, by distinguishing a vegetative body from a body that is unqualifiedly capable of perception and by distinguishing the latter again from a body that is not simply [capable of perception], but is altogether capable of both forward movement and perception. Having determined the different essence of the organ up to this point, he does not yet qualify it as the organ of the imaginative power or that of the rational power, though he knows that they are different in nature, on the grounds that the body is properly, as he said in the first books,529 ,530 even if it is rational,531 as it is proximately and properly the organ of sense-perception. For imagination and also desire is a kind of perception, at least that which also exists in the other animals, and reason and the will of reason, whenever it uses the body, because it takes both sense-perception and imagination as collaborators,532 uses the body as an instrument. Indeed, as he himself said, ‘whether the intellect holds together some body is difficult to imagine’.533 And thus he again gives the reason why we are not capable, when we apprehend more precise sense-objects, to make on the spot a right judgement about the less clear sense-objects, whereas, in the case of intelligible objects, the more purely we apprehend them, the more we also know immediately the less clear objects.534 The reason is, as he says, that sense-perception needs as organ the body, which, while it is occupied by the stronger affection of the larger sense objects, cannot be affected by the less clear objects because of that stronger affection. The intellect, however, does not use the body as organ in order to know intelligible objects. Rightly then he does now not concern himself with the question of what kind the organ of the intellect or reason must be, but examines of what kind the organ of the sensitive power must be, even if the sensitive power is twofold: the one is as such sensitive and irrational, the other is reason-like as it is grown together with reason. As he said before already enough about the vegetative body, namely that it is somehow simple because of the dominance of earth,535 he now determines of what kind the body must be that is unqualifiedly capable of perception. He makes his argument from division: ‘for, as he says, it must be either simple or mixed’, including ‘simple’ to make the disjunction exhaustive,536 so that he can make his argument, as it were, from scratch; for he had already mentioned that it is impossible [for that body] to be simple.537 Therefore he immediately makes precisely that conclusion, when he says that ‘it cannot be simple’. For ‘what is simple has no touch’ and everything capable of perception ‘must necessarily have touch’. Thus he can conclude again, in the second mode [of the syllogism], that nothing simple is capable of perception, whereby the middle term is ‘to have

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touch’. He presents538 each of the two premises from other [arguments] and first he corroborates through many arguments the premise which claims that everything that is capable of perception must have touch. The other premise, that nothing simple has touch, he will establish later.539 He presents the affirmative premise, which claims that everything that is capable of perception must have touch, by the following argument: (i) ‘an animal – he means the mortal animal – is an animate body; (ii) every body is tangible’ – he does not mean now the heavenly body, for he does not want this body to be tangible, as Plato seems to put it, because this philosopher determines what is ‘tangible’ as what is effective according to the so-called passive qualities;540 by ‘every body’ Aristotle thus means [every] generated body; and one should infer directly after the two given premises (iii) ‘therefore every animal is tangible’, so that the argument is: (i) ‘every animal is an animate body, (ii) every body is tangible, and (iii) therefore every animal is tangible’. But the argument does not draw this conclusion, but concludes that ‘every body is therefore capable of touch’, which undeniably follows from the premise that every body is tangible. For a body must not only be tangible but also somehow capable of touching [other] bodies.541 For as they are all tangible, there must necessarily exist also something that is capable of touching them with discernment, something that is not just said to be touching because of juxtaposition, but because it knows of what kind each body is according to its passive qualities.542 So that the argument again from the beginning may be as follows: ‘(i) an animal is an animate body, (ii) every body is tangible, (iii) everything that is tangible in such a way that it is capable to discern the tangible is capable of touch; (iv) therefore every animal is capable of touch’. But Aristotle omitted the last [iii] premise besides the previous two, yet drew the conclusion upon three.543 Or rather, he did not even leave aside the third, but had already stated it, when claiming that ‘what is tangible is perceptible by touch’, in order to show by conversion that what perceives what is tangible is capable of touch. And thus he may conclude: (iv) ‘therefore every animal is capable of touch’. But he made the argument difficult by positing the converse thesis, and not primordially the premise itself (‘that which is capable of touch is capable of knowing the touchable’), but the premise that is equivalent to it (‘that anything that is tangible can be known by the act of touching’). Having shown through the above arguments that the animal body is capable of touch he demonstrates the same thesis from another perspective through ‘if the animal is to survive’, taking the animal simply qua animal; not simply qua capable of sight, or hearing or taste, for an animal with such [capacities] also needs the senses that operate through a medium, whereas simply qua animal it needs touch, so that it may apprehend the passive qualities, by which every

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coming to be and passing away and preservation in substance is effected. Hence this is the argument: since [an animate body] is passive, as it is something that comes to be, and always touches with discernment bodies that come to be, it is affected by them according to passive qualities either in a commensurate way or in an incommensurate way. What is thus affected is either preserved or destroyed, since it can pursue what is commensurate or avoid what is not commensurate because of its discriminative nature. That which is preserved in the pursuit of the commensurate affection and in the avoidance of an incommensurate affect must be capable of touch. For, as said,544 what is capable of touch is capable of cognizing passive qualities. Therefore the animal must be capable of touch. And the syllogism that he has now articulated is different from the previous one, since it argues from the preservation of animals whereas the former demonstrates the same by [examining] the cognition itself that is capable of apprehending the tangible qua tangible. Further he adds a third argument [to show] that the animal must always be capable of touch, that is, capable of discriminating senseobjects through direct apprehension. The argument goes as follows: an animal must necessarily be perceptive of objects that have a direct impact on it, especially those through which it is also preserved or destroyed. Well, what is able to know objects that have a direct impact on it has the capacity of touch. Therefore an animal is capable of touch. And such is the third argument. The sense-perceptions that know through media are added [in the text] to distinguish them clearly from perceptions that discriminate not through media, i.e. touch and taste. For from the comparison with the perceptions through media we may know better what the immediate perceptions are. On this basis he connects the second argument with the third, not only using the fact that touch is a proximate perception, but also that it contributes to life. For what is touching and proximate and adjacent with what is tangible must have sense-perception; ‘for if it does not have sense-perception, it will not be able to avoid some things and take others’. The conclusion of the third argument ‘if this is so, it will be impossible to survive’ has been taken as effectively the equivalent of that of the second argument. 434b18-22 For that reason taste too is like some touch;545 [for it is concerned with food, and food is a tangible body. Sound, colour and smell do not nourish, nor do they produce either growth or decay, so that taste too must be a sort of touch, because it is a perception of what is tangible and nourishing.]

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not start from what is properly called touch, but from taste, and not now from the so-called passive qualities, but from the flavoured substance. For the affections of sense-objects destroy or preserve the animal primarily according to touch: hot, for instance, or cold and corresponding qualities; [and they do not destroy or preserve the animal] simply qua animal, but qua passive. But that which is flavoured and object of taste, preserves or destroys the animal qua animal. For the animal must necessarily be nourished and because it is a living creature must be able to discriminate also what is flavoured in order to receive what is proper and avoid what is alien to it. For all that is flavoured is corporeal and tangible not insofar as it is flavoured, but insofar as nothing can be flavoured without being tangible. Therefore, because the flavoured too is present in the tangible, it impinges not only as an object of taste, but also as an object of touch, so that in this sense taste too is touch. Since taste also contributes to the being of animals and taste is not without touch, animals that need taste will not only have that, but also always touch. And now too the same conclusion has been reached not simply from what is primarily touch but also from taste, as that too is necessary for the preservation of animals. And since taste is not as such touch, but [is touch] because it cannot exist without touch, and is so because the flavoured and the object of taste are always in the tangible, he declares taste to be ‘like touch’, but not as such touch. Now he explains this more precisely and also adduces the reason, namely that taste is not as such of what is tangible but of nourishment, and nourishment is a tangible body but not insofar as tangible, but insofar as it is flavoured. Again by contrast with its opposite he explains that what nourishes is always in what is tangible. For that which is not tangible but is made known through another thing as medium, as is colour or sound or odour, ‘does not nourish, he says, nor does it produce either growth or decay’. For growth, as has been already said before,546 and decay are related to nourishing, whereby in the former case the outflow is controlled, in the latter the outflow dominates. If we make the antithetical conversion547 of what is said: if sense objects that are not immediately known do not nourish, what nourishes must necessarily exist in objects that are immediately known. In that way he comes again to the conclusion that ‘taste too is some touch’, showing by the addition of ‘some’ the same as what he also indicated by ‘like’, since taste is primarily related to what is nourishing and what is nourishing happens to be always also what is tangible. 434b22-4 These [senses] then are necessary to the animal, [and it is clear that is not possible for an animal to exist without touch.]

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[They are necessary] because they contribute to being, touch because the passive qualities that it is able to apprehend are most of all what preserve or destroy [the animal], taste because it is the capacity to discriminate nourishing things, which the animal also needs in order to exist because of the continuous flux of its parts. 434b24-435a10 But the others [are necessary] for the sake of well-being and for what is already a [particular] kind [of animal, not whatever kind, but they must exist in some, for instance, that are capable of forward motion. For if it is to survive, it must perceive not only when touching but also at a distance. And this would be so if an animal is capable of perceiving through a medium, the latter being affected and moved by the object of perception, and the former by the medium. For just as that which sets in movement with respect of place produces a change up to a certain point, and that which pushes makes something else such as to push and the movement is through a medium – and the first thing produces movement and pushes without being pushed and the last thing is pushed only without pushing and the medium does both (and there are many intermediaries) – so it is with alteration too except that it alters with the thing remaining still in the same place. For instance if someone dips something in wax, the latter would be moved as far as the object was dipped, but a stone is not moved at all, while water is moved to a great distance; and air is moved to the greatest distance and acts and is affected, so long as it remains and is one. Hence in the case of reflection too it is better, instead of saying that the sight goes out and is reflected, to say that the air is affected by the shape and the colour, so long as it remains one. On a smooth surface the air remains one; hence it in turn sets the sight in motion, just as if the sign on the wax were transmitted as far as its boundary.]

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The above mentioned senses contribute to the being of whatsoever animal and without them it is impossible to exist. What about the three other senses? Some animals are by nature bereft of them and others are bereft of them contrary to nature and nevertheless remain animals,548 since they are not necessarily present in them for their being but for their well-being, so that they may be active with superior perceptions. These superior perceptions are not that much struck by the sense-objects because they are moved by them through other things as mediums, and they are rather active, and they characterize ‘already’ not simply the animal, but the more perfect kind [of animal]. He called this [kind of animal] ‘not whatever [kind]’ and confirms that it is superior by the fact that it is capable of forward movement. For that which goes further to have part in its

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proper goal and which chases it through many means and is self-impelled is more perfect than that which remains in a narrow way in some place and awaits its pray, which befalls it mostly by chance, or also awaits that which may destroy it, as it is unable to have foreknowledge from distance before the appearing object reaches it, in order to guard off one object and draw to it another. This demonstration thus has established the greater worth of the three senses with relation to the two others from the perspective of the form and the good. The next demonstration will show them to be preferable also because they are necessary. For they too are necessary, even if not simply to the animal qua animal but to it qua capable of forward movement. If the animal is to be preserved as an animal with forward movement, it needs also sense-perceptions that perceive through a medium, so that it may not be moved by its impulse at random towards harmful things, which are not foreseen and fall upon them suddenly, and may be sometimes destroyed. These senses are therefore themselves necessary, but they are necessary to a superior kind of life and they are more valuable because they have necessity in the sense that they may preserve a superior kind of life. He explains how the perception through a medium occurs. He does not thus divert from what is proposed but he does this in order to show that these [superior senses] are more impassive and more active [than the other two]. For the senses that are immediately struck by their sense-objects are more passive, whereas those through a medium are more impassive as they are not immediately struck by the first mover.549 The more impassive are the more active. For when affection dominates it weakens the discriminative activity. That is what Aristotle himself suggests when he says that what first moves in the case of the three senses, does not immediately affect the sensitive power itself but something else in between, by which – I mean the medium – the sensitive power is moved. In that way it is itself not so much affected, as is something that is struck immediately by the first agent. For it is not the case that, since the first mover first affects some other thing, its movement would not reach also the sensitive power, as if someone would suspect that we do not at all perceive the first mover, supposing that the activity coming from it would not reach us. He then explains how it passes through [a medium] with some examples. For many things that move things with which they are in proximate contact, move through them other things, with which they are not in contact. A hand, for example, moves a stone through a lever and someone may push through some intermediary another person550 who stands further away. The one who first pushes what stands in between makes it too capable of moving the next and sometimes the latter even another. He takes the proposition ‘that which sets in movement in respect of place produces change’ in a general sense551 by adding ,

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because the argument is and to explain to us that also what pushes so that it can also itself make something other .552 And one should connect with the phrase ‘just as that which produces movement in respect of place produces a change up to a certain point’ the phrase ‘and that which pushed makes something else such as to push’ and read it as a continuous whole; so that the meaning of the text is: just as everything that produces movement with respect of place, so also what pushes makes what is proximately pushed change so that it itself can push something else, either at some time or always. This happens when through some medium that is proximately moved by the first mover a push occurs of something else, whereby the first mover remains unmoved in itself, as when the soul moves the body, which, when moved by the soul, itself moves the pen;553 and the production of movement is seen in the first and the medium, the movement in the second and the last; so that the first only moves, and the third is only moved, the middle both; if the pen too which is moved would itself move something else, there could be more intermediaries and more things that are at the same time moving and moved. Of the extreme terms the first only moves, the last is only moved. ‘So it is with alteration too’, he says. The first that causes alteration does not only cause to alter by it, but also alters what is much further altogether. For the ring with the imposition of the seal until some depth, until ‘it .554 Chapter 13

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435a11-21 It is clear that the body of an animal cannot be simple, [I mean, for example, composed of fire or air. For without touch it cannot have any other sense-perception. For every body that is animate is capable of touch, as we have said. Now all the other elements, except for earth, could become sense-organs, but all of them produce sense-perception by perceiving through something else and through media. But touch occurs by touching them; that is why it also has its name. Also the other sense-organs, no doubt, perceive by touch, but through something else; touch seems [to perceive] only through itself. Hence none of these elements could be the body of an animal. Nor can it consist of earth.] In this sentence he clearly formulates his proposed intention, namely to demonstrate that there can be no simple body having sense-perception, and thus that [no simple body] can be an animal. For every animal is capable of perception. Of the five simple bodies555 he

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exempts the divine body entirely from all perception, and the proposed argument does not now concern this body, since from the beginning the argument has been about the soul in mortal animals.556 He makes an argument about each of the other bodies, not only claiming that when a body remains purely simple, it will not have touch, but also when it is dominant in a mixture with other elements, as earth is in plants. How does he demonstrate this? He maintains that every animal, as has also been demonstrated,557 must always have touch but that nothing simple is capable of touch. The last point is not yet demonstrated in this section, and he proves it making an argument for each of the sublunary simple bodies. He admits here that what consists of fire or of air or of water may become a sense organ, but is not itself capable of touch. Earth, however, cannot at all become capable of perception, 558 nor when it is too dominant [in a mixture]. He admits that something composed of fire [could be a sense-organ], not as if this were his own view, but maybe as a view expressed by Plato.559 The latter indeed assigns the fiery element to sight, whereas Aristotle himself gives this role to water,560 since, as he said in the second book,561 fire cannot by itself become a sense organ because of its destructive character, but [only] when mixed in all cases with the other elements. And indeed this is precisely what he there .562 not entirely indeed, rather impossible . encounters the sense-objects, must have pressure and some force, being immediately dissolved by the tangible object, as it is fine-grained. For such a body is easily affected. Therefore the fine-grained elements can become senseorgans, but they are not capable of directly knowing the senseobjects, but must apprehend them through some media, so that the affection does not become incommensurate to these elements, which are easily affected because of their subtlety – because sense-objects in their direct assault on the body always affect the sense-organ –, and thus curtails and destroys the act of touch. The fine-grained elements can thus not be capable of touch. For things which are capable of the sense of touch are said to be what they are due to the fact that they ‘touch’ the sense-objects, namely discriminating them while being in immediate contact with them. Hence they are also thus called.563 For, as is determined in the Physics,564 the name [touch] is first given to things put side by side of which the boundaries are together, even when the things in juxtaposition are neither alive or perceiving. Touch, however, when the term is used for a sense-perception, indicates an activity of discrimination. Yet even that gets its

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name from the juxtaposition which puts together the boundaries of the things juxtaposed. For the sensitive cognition that approaches the sense-object through some medium seems to be itself according to this approach some sort of touch, not however properly nor absolutely. For the boundaries of the sensitive power and the sense objects do not come together in that case. But even the properly called sense of touch 565 adding ‘seems’, because even in the case of the sense of touch is not primordially established in the flesh nor in the nerves nor in another bodily part that touches directly the tangible object, but in the capacity of apprehending the tangible object through these media.566 This medium, however, does not come from outside, as in the case of the superior sense-perceptions, but is a vital and proper part of the living body itself.567 Hence, even if the sensitive power is not primarily located in the medium ‘through which’, but in a secondary way, the contact of the sensitive power with the senseobject can be said to be immediate in the case [of touch].568 He concludes then that even if some of the fine-grained elements may be sense-organs, they will never become such a kind of sense-organ as is the body of the whole animal, but such as to become a sense-organ in one part, say the organ of sight or the organ of hearing. For the body has these capacities according to some parts, but as a whole it is always capable of touch. What is capable of touch must be solid, as has been said,569 and not subtle. But with the argument so far nothing prevents the earthy element also being capable of touch. Therefore, he next demonstrates that neither the earthy element, whether taken as absolutely simple or as too dominant, [is capable of touch], inferring: 435a21-435b19 For touch is as it were a mean between all objects of touch, and its organ is capable of receiving not only all such differences as there are of earth, but also heat and cold and all the other objects of touch. [And for this reason we do not perceive with our bones and hair and such-like parts – because they consist of earth. For this reason too plants have no senseperception, because they consist of earth. But without touch it is not possible for any other [sense] to exist, and this senseorgan consists neither of earth nor of any other of the elements. It is evident, therefore, that this is the only sense deprived of which animals must die. For it is not possible for anything which is not an animal to have this, nor is there any other [sense] except this that something which is an animal must have. And for that reason the other sense-objects, for instance, colour and sound and smell, do not by their excesses destroy the animal, but only the sense-organs, unless incidentally, for instance if a push or a blow takes places at the same time with

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the sound; and by objects of sight and smell other things may be set in motion which destroy by touch. And flavour too destroys insofar as it happens to be at the same time capable of touching. But excess of tangible objects, for instance, hot, cold, or hard things, destroy the animal. For excess in every sense-object destroys the sense-organ, so that also the tangible object [may destroy] touch, and by this the animal is determined; for it has been shown that without touch it is impossible for an animal to be. Therefore an excess of tangible objects not only destroys the sense-organ, but the animal also, because this is the only one it must have.] With ‘touch’ he now means the discriminative activity of such a life, with ‘sense-organ’ the organ that underlies it. Every cognitive activity with the capacity to apprehend opposite properties is a ‘mean’.570 And when it is active with an organ, this organ too must be in an intermediate state with respect to each of the contrary affects originating in it under the effect of the opposites, so that it does not accept this rather than that property but both equally, in order that touch discerns each of the opposites equally, and the organ, which itself receives equally the affection from both, produces judgment to the same extent in both cases. Tangible objects are not only earthy, but some are earthy, namely what is at the same time dry and cold, and others are airy, namely those opposed to them, being hot and humid at the same time, and others are watery, namely what is at the same time humid and cold, and others are fiery, namely what is dry and hot. Therefore the mean between them could not be earthy,571 by nature cold . Again, then, the conclusion follows in the second figure; a sense-organ of touch, if (i) what is capable of touch stands in the middle between hot and cold and dry and humid and (ii) earth is not the middle [between these], as it is determined according to only one of each pair of opposites. Next he connects with this also a second syllogism, as a follow-up: (i) the organ of touch must not only be receptive of earthy qualities, but also of the qualities of the other elements; (ii) the earthy body, as long as it remains what it is, does not receive the qualities of the other elements, but is destroyed in their presence; (iii) therefore it is impossible that what is receptive of all tangible qualities is earthy. For what is receptive must be preserved in the presence of all qualities it is receptive of, so that it may receive them. And he arrives at the same conclusion in a third way, on the basis of evidence and induction. For it is clearly manifest that the parts in an animal that have a more dominant earthy element than the other parts, for instance bones, have no share in perception, although they are parts of the animals. For the element earth, not just the element

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in its pure form, but also earth mixed with others, provided it is dominant, is incapable of sensitive acts, yet not incapable of vegetative ones. Such parts of the animal indeed resemble plants. He infers then the conclusion of the whole argument: (i) nothing without touch can be an animal – this he assumes from what had already been said before;572 (ii) none of the simple bodies can ever have touch – this is taken from what has now been demonstrated (for it has been demonstrated that the organ of touch is neither composed of earth nor of some other simple body, but that it consists in the mean; that it is not earthy, because earth is constituted according to some determinate qualities and is not the mean between the opposites; in the same way it can neither be fiery or watery; for none of these [elements] has its being as an intermediary, but in some determinate properties; and he concludes (iii) that none of the simple bodies can be an animal (that is, none of the bodies in generation and corruption, that need also sense-perception in order for them to be animals).573 according to the conversion with opposition,574 must necessarily have touch. necessarily becomes an animal. If then one destroys ‘touch’,575 one also destroys ‘animal’. But also, he who destroys touch alone, destroys the animal qua animal. Only this sense, as we have seen, is the necessarily constituent of the animal qua animal. For although the three other senses have themselves some kind of necessity as well, they are not constitutive of the animal qua animal, but of the animal as capable of forward movement, as has already been taught.576 To be sure, also the sense of taste implies some necessity, as it also completes [the animal] qua animal, because of its utility for nourishment, but not because it is capable of knowing primordially the essential constitutive qualities [of sensible objects]. The passive qualities are constitutive [of the sensible bodies], but taste is not as such concerned with these qualities, but only with the flavoured ones. And insofar as taste always occurs with touch, it knows the passive qualities too, but it knows them not qua taste, but qua touch. Only the destruction of touch destroys by itself the whole organ of the animal. It may happen that the destruction of some other sense destroys together with it also the whole animal, but [it does] not per se [destroy the whole animal]. Thus it may happen that together with the destruction of the proper organ [of this other sense] the sense of touch too is destroyed for another reason. For example if through the sound of thunder the organ of hearing is damaged, it may happen that the animal itself is damaged because of the sudden and strong impact of the resounding wind upon the living body. But it is not because of the sound that the whole body is damaged but because of strong tangible impact of the resounding wind upon the whole, destroying it in its capacity of touch. In the same manner the poison

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of a wild animal falling upon the tongue destroys the whole animal, not insofar as it is bitter nor insofar as it is altogether the object of taste (for then it would only destroy the sense of taste), but insofar as it is dry and incommensurate with the sense of touch. All this Aristotle clearly articulates, maintaining that each sense organ is destroyed by the excess of its proper sense-objects, but does not always destroy together with it also the whole animal, unless incidentally, as has been said,577 by the fact that the capacity of touch is incidentally in another way injured, as has been explained in the case of sound and of something tasted. In the case of sound he also added what it is that incidentally destroys, namely ‘a push’, but in the case of sight and smell this indeterminate578 by touch. Thus something that stinks,579 because it is cold or dry or, to put it simply, incommensurate, may destroy the whole body because of the incommensurability of its passive qualities, but not insofar as it is ill-smelling.580 In this way also something that is visible, such as a flash of light, may destroy the animal, not insofar as it is too luminous and not commensurate with the eye (for in that manner it would only destroy the capacity of sight), but because it sometimes falls suddenly upon it as hot. For in that case it falls as something tangible upon the whole tactile body. About flavour it has already been said how it may destroy, namely incidentally. But an excess of tangible properties destroys the animal, not incidentally but per se. For just as in the case of the other senses the proper organ is destroyed by the excess of its proper sense-object, so the capacity of touch too is destroyed by the excess of the tangible object. But since the animal has its being qua animal according to its capacity of touch, together with its capacity of touch the animal is also destroyed qua animal. 435b19-25 The animal has the other senses, as we have said, not for its existence, but for its well-being; for instance sight, [in order for it to see, since it is in air or water, or in general in something transparent, and it has taste because of what is pleasant and painful, in order that it may perceive their presence in food and may thus be moved by desiring it; and it has hearing in order to signify something to itself, and a tongue in order to signify something to another.] That an animal has sight and hearing and smelling, not as contributing to its being an animal, but as contributing to its well-being, has been sufficiently determined through what was said before.581 They indeed contribute to the animal insofar as it is capable of forward movement, and as capable of forward movement it is more perfect than as being unqualifiedly animal. But taste, as we have seen, is necessary also for the animal qua animal. In this text, however, it is

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reckoned among the senses that contribute to the well-being [of the animal]. But, as I shall say, both views are true, since [taste] rather contributes to the permanence of the animal and to its existence for a longer time, but does not contribute to its being as such. In fact one can say both of animals that live let us say one hour or whatever part of time and of animals that live a year and more time that they truly ‘exist’.582 Food, however, does not contribute to an hourly existence, but to a year-long existence. Insofar as taste contributes in general to being, it shares this with the sense of touch, insofar as it does not simply contribute to being, but to existence over a longer span of time, in which it is not possible to live without food, in that respect taste is superior to touch and more perfect, since also the participation in being for a longer time is more perfect.

Philological Appendix The edition of Hayduck has often been criticized.1 It is true that it does not correspond to modern standards of a critical edition: the editor only used one manuscript, the Laurentianus 85,21 (A) and collated it with the Aldina edition of 1527 (a). In the preparation of my translation I collated the Laurentianus and, for the last section, two later manuscripts, the Marcianus gr. 413, a fourteenth-century manuscript, which was once in the collection of Bessarion (who corrected and annotated the text) and the Ambrosianus A 185 sup., which was copied in the middle of the fifteenth century.2 Hayduck already noticed that the latter manuscript (and the Ambrosianus A 45 inf. related to it ) corresponds closely to the Aldina edition (p. VI). My collations have confirmed that it has many particularities in common with the edition, and may even have been used by the editor. Surprisingly, Hayduck did not use the manuscript, but was satisfied with the Aldina ‘quae libri manuscripti locum tenet’ (p. VII). Notwithstanding its narrow manuscript basis, the text in Hayduck’s edition is of excellent quality. A new edition based on a complete study of the manuscript tradition would not present a much better text, apart from the correction of some typos (such as kopos for kopros in 319,8!). Of course, the apparatus of a new edition would offer a more complete and correct documentation of the tradition of the text than is now the case. However, Hayduck was basically right: it is indeed possible to constitute a critical text with the Laurentianus and the Aldina. The Laurentianus is dated in the catalogue as fourteenth-century, but it might be earlier. It offers an excellent text with very few copyist errors (‘optime scriptus’). The scribe copied in the margin some scholia, which go back to its model. The scholia are probably due to a Byzantine scholar from the eleventh-twelfth century. Unfortunately this manuscript, made of paper of bad quality, suffered from humidity and various deteriorations, in particular at the upper edges of the folia in the final part. A corrector restored the whole manuscript in the late sixteenth century in a radical way: he fixed pieces of paper in the middle of pages where the text had almost become illegible or at the edges of the pages that had crumbled off and rewrote the text on the papers he had attached to these pages. As Dieter Harlfinger

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has shown, this restoration work is due to the copyist Camillo Zanetti. For his correction Zanetti made use of the Aldina edition. This radical correction makes it almost impossible to retrieve in these passages what was the original text of A. There are, however, a number of later manuscripts that depend directly or indirectly on A before the correction work was done. Hayduck collated partially PMPR. We collated in addition the Marcianus gr. 413, which was not known to Hayduck. This is undoubtedly a direct copy of A, and it was probably also the model from which most recent manuscripts collated by Hayduck derive. It is clear that the Marcianus was copied from A ante correctionem. In fact, in the final quires where A is radically corrected by Zanetti with the help of the Aldina, we see that the copyist of the Marcianus had the greatest difficulty in reading those sections of text. When he could not read the text because it had crumbled off, he left empty spaces in his copy. Bessarion later sometimes intervened with his own conjectures. The Marcianus is therefore a precious witness of an earlier stage of A and it may in some rare cases offer a better reading than the Aldina (and the corrections in A of Zanetti based on the Aldina). In the last section, however, from f. 236v onwards (p. 325,17 in Hayduck’s edition), the Aldina presents the same lacunae in the same passages as the Marcianus and all other copies deriving directly or indirectly from A. Zanetti was therefore obliged to keep these lacunae when he copied the restored text from the Aldina on the attached papers in A. As said, these lacunae in the text can only be explained through the deterioration of the upper edges of the last part of the Laurentianus. The fact that the Aldina edition (and the manuscript on which it depends) has exactly these lacunae is in itself a sufficient proof that it derives ultimately from the Laurentianus. This dependence on the Laurentianus is also evident from the fact that the Aldina lacks the first pages of the prooemium, and starts abruptly at p. 3,1, without any title, with the words ‘kai ton noêtôn’. The Aldina editor added ‘tou prooimiou hê arkhê leipetai’ to warn the reader of this abrupt beginning. We find the same abrupt opening in the Laurentianus and all copies depending on it. The loss of the first part of the prooemium must have happened to the Laurentianus. In fact it is difficult to imagine that the actual folio 1v with no title and an abrupt start of the text without any explanation was the original first folio of the codex. One or two pages must have gone lost. Besides the actual state of the first part of the codex is in a mess. Probably all pages of the first quires had fallen apart and when the codex was bound, they were no longer in the right order. The correct sequence is 1-8, 13, 11-12, 9-10, 14 etc.3 Nevertheless, as Hayduck rightly noticed, one cannot simply assume that the manuscript on which the Aldina was based (as we said, it may have been the Ambrosianus A 185 sup.) derived from the Laurentianus.4 In fact, the Aldina does not have

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some omissions due to homoiteleuton of the copyist of A, for instance on p.108,14-15; 180,12-15; 214,4-5. In all these cases the complete text could not be restored by conjectures.5 The most plausible hypothesis is to assume that the manuscript source on which the Aldina depends (or its model) basically derived from the Laurentianus, but had been corrected in some passages with the use of a manuscript belonging to another tradition. These corrections mainly concern the above mentioned omissions by homoiteleuton. For the rest of the text there is not much difference between the Laurentianus and the Aldina. The existence of a tradition independent from the Laurentianus is confirmed by a few manuscripts. The Matritenis Bib. Nat. 54 (D), from the fourteenth century, contains the full prooemium. The presence of the first pages with the prooemium are not a sufficient argument for the independency of this manuscript: after all, it could have been copied from the Laurentianus before it lost its first folia. But the Madrid manuscript also has some better readings (the most important is the passage noted by Hayduck in the Addenda at 29,23, where all manuscripts except D have an omission). Unfortunately this manuscript does not continue beyond 31,19. Related to D, and probably derived from a common archetype, is the Ambrosianus E 118 sup. (Aa). This fourteenth-century manuscript has the full prooemium and two very short sections of the commentary. Hence it is of almost no use for the edition. A complete investigation of scholia on Aristotle’s de Anima in other manuscripts might identify other partial witnesses from that independent tradition, which may go back to the ancient model from which the Laurentianus itself was copied. As we have seen, the Aldina does not have the many lacunae we find in the copies of the Laurentianus from f. 217r (p. 302 of the edition) on. However from p. 325,17 (f. 236v in A) the Aldina has the same empty spaces. How are we to explain that the Aldina (or rather its manuscript source) has a complete text in all these places where we find broken edges of folia in A, and yet keeps the lacunae incomplete in the last folia? One might assume that in the manuscript source of the Aldina these lacunae were corrected with the help of the same manuscript that also was used to correct the homoioteleuta. As this manuscript was itself incomplete at the end, the copyist of that source manuscript had to stop its correction. This is certainly prima facie the most plausible hypothesis. There is, however, a problem with these complete texts in the Aldina. When one carefully examines how Zanetti introduced the missing passages taken from the Aldina in the upper broken margins of the Laurentianus, it becomes evident that the text he added did not always correspond to what was originally in the Laurentianus. One often sees that in its original state (as far as we can reconstruct it from what remains) the Laurentianus contained more words (sometimes less words) and other words

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than what is now taken from the Aldina. The more one studies the added complete texts, the more one becomes suspicious about the authenticity of some passages. This suspicion even grows when one compares the complete text with the status of the lacunae in the Marcianus, which is, as said, a direct copy of A. This brings me to a less probable, but not impossible hypothesis. The scholar who made the copy that is at the basis of the Aldina edition attempted to complete the lacunae at the end with conjectures of his own philological genius, probably because the manuscript from the other tradition did not cover the last part of the text. At the end he seems to have abandoned this difficult job, leaving it to this modern translator. I know that this is a daring hypothesis which requires for confirmation a study of all the lacunae and their correction. Anyway, it is advisable to be critical about the text of all these passages. In what follows I give a list of corrections in the text and propose a reconstruction of the passages in lacunae in the last pages. List of proposed corrections 250,16 enakolouthos kai homoia] en akolouthos kai homoia. The term enakolouthos is an hapax and a term difficult to justify here. The combination homoios + akolouthos is well attested. Besides a noun is lacking (this cannot be gnôsis, which would make the phrase redundant). 250,37 tô khronôi] ton khronon with a. 251,8 henizetai] correct to henizei. 251,21 delete second to. 252,32 auto  adiaireton] one rather expects auta  adiaireta, auta referring to the potentially divisible things. 253,39 holôs] correct to hôs. 263,35 write khôriston. 264,8 delete ê (8) as diplography [Strobel]. 265,1 add autou. 265,26 read noêtou. 267,7 write proeilêptai [Strobel]. 274,39 write auta for auton. 275,23 read energoun (cf. 275,19-20). 278,8 keep kekommenên as in MSS, rather than kekammenên as proposed by Hayduck. 281,36 replace proiontos by menontos. The phrase 35-6 alla  proiontos is lacking in the Laurentianus and may have been added by conjecture. 284,31 add with Hayduck ousias after eidêtikas. 287,19 delete [an]. 288,38 diakekrimenon] read with the Aldina diakekrimena.

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291,13 epeidê de] delete de (not in A) and replace the full stop after zôon by a comma, and replace comma by full stop after zôois (15). 304,40 after eite one expects a second eite which is lacking. 305,35 prokeimenôi] read proeirêmenôi. 307,4 Hayduck indicates a lacuna before to empeson. The passage aniar|on kai to empeson is restored in A in the edge of f. 22v, but it probably corresponds to the original text. The Aldina has for empeson] hêdu, but this is a conjecture, which however conveys the meaning of the text. We follow the Aldina in the other conjecture: dekhontai for deksamenai A. 312,4 reading energeian for epistêmên. Notice that the scribe of A added after proiontos (3)] tên de energeian dia, maybe because he skipped a passage in his model, but he deleted it afterwards. 316,14 ekhêi] better ekhêi with A (and confirmed by commentary); add kai before heôs with A. 316,26 antanisousa] one expects a verb in the personal form. 317,4 ekhein] read ekhei with a.corr. A and a. 318,7-8 pro[skeitai, all ennoian tina dokei ekhein. mallon de ôde to] holon rhêton A; the text between brackets has been added by the corrector in A. The addition is however longer than the original text lost. 318,8 ti eiê] eiê ti A. 318,8-9 reading with Diels empsykha/-on for apsykha/-on preferred by Hayduck. 318,29 after pathêtikôs the Marcianus adds einai. 319,8 kopos] read kopros with A. 321,16 eipe] add aisthêtikon esti. 322,14-15 alla  autôn sôma] read alla kai haptikon hopôsoun tôn sômatôn. 325,14 allou] read allon with A. 326,15 Hayduck corrects oute into oude. But there seems to be something lacking. Read tên de gên oute epikratousan. See 327,16. Completion of lacunae in the text

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Notes 1. Bossier 1975, 15.003-004 offers a harsh critique of Hayduck’s edition; Hadot (1990, 293) claims that a new critical edition of this commentary ‘is absolutely necessary’; Blumenthal (2000, 10) wrote that ‘Hayduck does not always seem to have been equal to the task and a new edition would be desirable’. 2. The Laurentianus can now be studied in a beautiful coloured digital version at the site of the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana (Teca Digitale Ricerca). Thanks to the Aristoteles Archiv in Berlin I could obtain a copy of the Marcianus and the Ambrosianus. I very much appreciated the help and advice of Dr Pantelis Golitsis. 3. We could find two traces of a numbering of the quires by the copyist (on f. 7v in the left inferior corner a; on f. 22v g); a later hand added the Roman numbers 2 and 4 to indicate the beginning of a new quire on f. 8r and 23r. 4. ‘neque illud verum est  exemplum Aldinum ad verbum ex Laurentiano transcriptum esse’ (p. VII). 5. This is particularly true at 180,12-15 where we have in the omitted text a reference to the opinion of Plutarch of Athens.

Notes 1. It is notoriously difficult to translate adiairetos, which can mean both ‘undivided’, i.e., what is actually undivided, but may be potentially divisible, and ‘indivisible’, i.e., what cannot be divided even potentially. Whatever is ‘indivisible’ is also ‘undivided’ but not everything ‘undivided’ is ‘indivisible’, although in all these cases the same Greek word is used. One faces similar problems with diairetos, meristos and ameristos. Some of Aristotle’s remarks are due to this ambiguity of the Greek term. When it is important for the argument to distinguish clearly between the two meanings we will translate as ‘undivided’ whenever adiairetos refers to what is ‘undivided’ in actuality but is potentially divisible, and use ‘indivisible’ whenever adiairetos is said about things that are both potentially and actually indivisible (cf. below 251,33-4). See also n. 43. 2. ‘as being one’ (hôsper hen ontôn) is not in the lemma and is not commented upon in the following section. 3. On this procedure see Ps.-Simplicius, in DA 15,30-2; 116,22-3; 119,2-3; 131,30-2. For additional reflection on this methodological assumption see 109,19-20; 109,24-30, and 110,1-7. At 41,31 and 146,22-3 the author suggests that this sequence of study stems from Plato. Hayduck does not suggest any passages; Shorey suggests Rep. 5, 477C1-2 or, alternatively, Sophist 247E3-4 (Shorey 1922, 143-4); Steel suggests Phaedo where the soul’s substance ‘is demonstrated from an examination of its activities’ (Steel 1978, 16 n. 42), followed by Lautner (1997, 223 n. 137). 4. Already at 9,2-4 Ps.-Simplicius pointed out that learning (mathêsis) starts ‘from what is better known to us’. At 14,16-24 he admits that in science one knows the activities through knowing the substance, although the reverse order is ‘more clear to us’. At 224,10-13 he states that ‘our reference up (anaphora) to substances starts from activities which are of a clearer kind’. The commentator adheres to the Aristotelian dictum that some things are ‘better known to us’ whereas others are better known by nature or in account (kata ton logon). See e.g. DA 2.2, 413a11-12. Cf. Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 542,23-4 who offers at the beginning of DA 3.6 a similar explanation of Aristotle’s procedure: ‘one should start from the intellect because that is clearer than the objects of intellect, whereas in the case of the non-rational soul one should start from sense-objects because they are clearer’ (tr. Charlton). 5. Such ‘completion’ or ‘filling’ is specifically ascribed to the passive intellect at 224,4-9 and 230,26-9, being one of the reasons why it is called ‘passive’. Thus Ps.-Simplicius understands ‘thinking’ as a twofold process where the active and passive aspects work together and are in a sense distinct but inseparable. 6. The ‘passive intellect’ is the intellect that proceeds outwards and is

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connected with the secondary forms of life (perception and imagination). According to Ps.-Simplicius it is discussed in DA 3.4. 7. The distinction between two kinds of noêta of the passive intellect is found in DA 3.4, 429b10-11: see 230,34-231,7. 8. The ‘formed beings’ (ta eidopoioumena) are the composites of matter and form. 9. According to the commentator, Aristotle discussed the essence (or substance) of the ‘productive intellect’ in DA 3.5 and now, in this chapter, turns to its objects. 10. Even our supreme intellect is never pure thought but is always somehow connected with scientific reasoning. Therefore Ps.-Simplicius characterizes it as being both intellect and reason. Reason is taken here in its summit as a scientific activity which explains everything from causes (that is why it is called ‘causative’ in the text). 11. Change 248,35: nôi to noêta. 12. Since activities of the impartible entities are themselves impartible (see 200,16-17) and since the productive or essential intellect has a strong impartibility (see 240,25-6), its activity too must be impartible. 13. The intellect (nous) is repeatedly said to be ‘always true’ (e.g. 27,2-3; 210,7; also below at 249,37; 252,7-8; 261,25-6) or ‘only true’ (below at 261,14-15; 264,2). The same claim is made about the thinking (noêsis) of intellect at 249,36; 250,7.17; 252,8. However, at 261,2-4 below, it is clear that the soul’s essential, productive intellect alone is always or only true, whereas the outgoing, passive intellect may be both true and false. 14. Although all human knowledge is to some degree involved with division and composition, and thus with a possibility of error and falsity, whenever there is a scientific knowledge, explaining beings from their causes, it is always true. This kind of truth seems to be opposed to falsity whereas it is explicitly said that the truth available to the intellect (nous) and its impartible activity is not opposed to falsity (249,37; 261,14-24). But below 250,19 might suggest that also the truth available to scientific knowledge is not opposed to falsity. See also n. 30. 15. In contrast to scientific knowledge, which is said to proceed from causes (see 237,19-21; 259,33-4; 280,30-1) and to be always true, the commentator sets an inferior form of knowledge, which belongs to the imperfect, material, passive, potential intellect (e.g. 219,3-11). It only scrapes at the surface of things, namely, the accidents, and does not reach the substance or being (ousia). This superficial knowledge is ‘distanced from the causes’. At 219,3-5 this phrase characterizes the imperfect intellect. The passage 248,37-249,4 is misunderstood as describing the second activity of the productive or essential intellect by Taylor 1808, 129; Blumenthal 1991, 202; Blumenthal 1996, 162, and Perkams 2008, 359. The passage is correctly understood by Hamelin 1953, 55 (he makes a parallel with Meno 98A on the unreliability of doxa). 16. On how to interpret and translate adiairetos, see nn. 1 and 43. Here adiairetos is translated as ‘undivided’ because it is a more inclusive term than ‘indivisible’. 17. Aristotle’s pollakhôs legomena (see also below at 251,14) sometimes translated as ‘ambiguously said’ or ‘equivocal’, appears in DA 1.5, 410a13. At that point, the commentator clarifies (69,7-10) it by a reference to to aph’ henos ê pros hen used in Metaphysics (e.g., 4.1-2, 1003a33-b17; also EN 1.4, 1096b27-8) with the example of ‘healthy’; cf. 12,27-8; 69,3-10; 71,14-17; 81,21-2; 82,2-10; 89,21; 96,16-28; 106,33-4; 107,3-4.12.32-5 (where this mode

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of predication is distinguished from homonuma and sunonuma); 131,25-6; and below at 262,9-10; 300,19-20 (contrasted with akribôs). See also n. 387. 18. Below, DA 3.6, 430b6-7. 19. The reference may be to Physics 1.7, 191a19-20, although Aristotle says that ‘it is not yet clear’ whether the form or the substrate (to hupokeimenon) is substance (ousia). In 1.9, 192b1-2, Aristotle states that he will speak later about natural or perishable forms, but this reference is vague. 20. One finds a similar and related reference with an exact quotation from Aristotle’s Metaphysics 8.4, 1044b3-8 in Simplicius, in DC 134,2-7 (in the middle of a long discussion of the lemma from Aristotle’s de Caelo 1.3, 270b16-17) and also in Ps.-Simplicius, in DA 11,22-3 and 57,10-13. 21. cf. 131,24. The form is identified as ‘the primary substance’ in Metaph. 7.7, 1032b1-2; in 8.1, 1042a6-11 there is a list of ‘natural substances’ and it is said that ‘essence’ (to ti ên einai), which according to Ps.-Simplicius stands for ‘form’ (see below, 261,9) is ‘substance’. With ‘super-natural form’ Ps.-Simplicius might be referring to Metaph. 12.7, 1072a31-2, where all of the mentioned characteristics of the form appear together. Such a reading is made possible by an identification of noêton at 1072a30 with eidos. 22. ‘Term’ here translates horos in the ontological sense of a defining or constitutive form. In Aristotle, the word horos means a ‘boundary’ of a body, a ‘term’ as a part of proposition and a ‘definition’ as a part of rational inquiry. Except for ‘boundary’, the other two meanings are also present in Ps.-Simplicius’ usage but the dominant one is horos as a determinant or defining form (horistikon eidos). 23. ‘Contracted simplicity’ is characteristic of points, lines and other limits, see 251,37-252,4. 24. Each eidos or specific form is expressed in a multitude of particular logoi corresponding to the multitude of properties (idiotês/idia) in a concrete individual being of that species. Cf. 12,21-3: ‘each human power is characterized according to one most specific human form, but by different reasons; for to each species correspond many reasons’. See also 250,28-9. Thanks to this doctrine the commentator can explain both the ‘individuality’ of each enmattered form and its universal specific nature. See 217,34ff. with reference to the Stoic doctrine of the ‘individual quality’. See Steel 1978, 126-7. 25. This is the transcendent paradigmatic form. 26. For the general principle, which makes it possible to defend both the unity and the multiplicity of the intellect, see 218,27-9. Although Ps.-Simplicius repeatedly says (218,29-32; 220,16-22; 223,1-4; 227,35-6; 240,2-4; 244,40-245,39; 247,15-16; below at 254,31-4) that Aristotle is not discussing the intellect participated by the soul, he often uses the notion to clarify some point (see 11,14; 42,35; 50,1; 86,28; 217,28-30; below 258,13-15; 312,13-14). Prior and superior to the participated intellect is the unparticipated or rather imparticipable (amethektos) intellect (50,1; 244,40; 246,1; 258,14), which is even less the subject-matter of Aristotle’s treatise (see 218,30-1; 247,16 and below 254,33; pace Iamblichus 313,3-4). The metaphysical picture into which this fits is most clearly stated by Proclus, El. Theol, prop. 23-4; 99-101; 163,166 and 181. Proclus uses amethektos nous throughout his writings and it reappears in Damascius. Note that there is not a single occurrence of amethektos in relation to the intellect in Simplicius’ authentic commentaries. See also Introduction, section 3 and 4a. 27. On this notion, which comes from Proclus cf. Steel 1978, 126-7 with references, and Steel 1997,113. The unfolding is called ‘supreme’ or ‘the best’ because it occurs at the summit of the soul. See also below 249,33.

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28. Phrase taken from Timaeus 28A1, where it characterizes the knowledge of ‘that which always is but never comes to be’. Cf. 245,8-16 where the same phrase was already used to show that Aristotle is Plato’s ‘best interpreter’. 29. ‘The leading forms’ (ta hêgoumena eidê) refer to the divine paradigms. 30. Reading anantitheton with Hayduck. Ps.-Simplicius’ understanding of a truth that has no opposite falsity may go back to Aristotle’s Metaph. 9.10, 1051b22-1052a4. Some modern commentators admit that Aristotle allows for a special kind of truth in the case of the indivisible and simple terms; see e.g. Modrak 2001, 5; Pritzl 2010. Below at 258,13 Ps.-Simplicius uses anantitheton for separate and pure activity involved in thinking the forms; see also 275,28-9 and esp. 268,17-19, which also speaks of a kind of ‘good’ that is not opposed to ‘bad’. See also n. 14. 31. cf. below 261,22 where Ps.-Simplicius expresses doubts whether the word ‘whole’ (holon) should be used in the case of impartible things. 32. See Enn. 1.1 [53] 9,12-13. Cf. also below 261,23-4. Plotinus’ passage might be related to Aristotle’s Metaph. 9.10, 1051b22ff. For the same quotation from Plotinus in the same context but with some variations see also Ps.-Philoponus, in DA, 491,11-12; 545,3-5; Philoponus, de Intellectu 88,5963; Philoponus, in Cat. 171,12-14; Philoponus, in An. Pr. 1,20-2,1. 33. The notion of ‘projection’ (probolê) is crucial in Ps.-Simplicius’ noetics: ‘For the commentator, the expression proballetai logous does not only mean that the soul “brings forth” concepts, but also that the soul projects them “out of itself” so that they can stand “before” it’ (Steel 1978, 138; cf. n. 82). Knowledge kata probolên comes about when the innate ‘reasons’ (logoi) of the soul are articulated and as it were ‘represented’ to be conceived. Such knowledge is contrasted with the essential knowledge of things that the soul has by turning towards itself and upwards to the intellect that determines its rational activity. 34. cf. Aristotle, DA 3.5, 430a19-21; 3.7, 431a1-2. 35. 250,16 enakolouthos is an hapax and a term difficult to justify. The combination homoios + akolouthos is well attested. Besides a noun is lacking (this cannot be gnôsis, which would make the phrase redundant). We propose to correct the text: en akolouthos kai homoia. 36. On these rational properties falling under the specific eidos see above n. 24. 37. We separate this long quotation as a lemma. 38. One might consider the last phrase as an instance of a false combination of terms, just as the previous one offered an example of a true combination. The additional phrase is found in some manuscripts of Aristotle’s DA. Ps.-Simplicius’ quotation led Torstrik to include it in the text of DA. 39. cf. Ammonius, in Int. 154,12-25; 240,28-35 discussing a similar problem in terms of two kinds of necessity. See also Alexander of Aphrodisias, in An. Pr. 26,1-22. Perkams 2008, 359 here again mistakenly sees the intellect that is above the soul. 40. Reading in 250,37 ton khronon with a. 41. Hayduck rightly refers to Metaph. 8.6, the classic text on the identity of the ‘causa essendi’ and the ‘causa essendi unum’. See also 91,31-92,1-10 and 112,5-8. 42. The whole idea seems to be that not only the intellect participated by the soul is responsible for its being one but also the essential reason of the soul which can be regarded as intellect. Therefore the active sense of henizein

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(430b5 hen poiein) is required. We propose to correct in 251,8 henizetai into henizei. 43. The extensive discussion of various applications of the term adiairetos (251,14-256,14) is partly explained by the grammatical ambiguity of adiairetos which it shares with all verbal adjectives ending with -tos. All of them can have: (1) the passive meaning corresponding to the meaning of the passive perfect participle of the related verb, and (2) the meaning of possibility expressing a possible state of affairs. Neither Aristotle, nor Ps.-Simplicius had any other means of disambiguation than the addition of energeiai or kat’ energeian for the first meaning and dunamei for the second meaning. For a similar practice cf. GC 1.2, 316b19-27 and Philoponus, in GC 34,31-35,1. David Sedley in his analysis of the passage in GC has come to similar conclusions. Sedley also draws attention to another parallel in Phys. 8.5, 258a32-b4. See Sedley 2004, 73-4, esp. n. 17. 44. Celestial bodies occupy three dimensions, yet cannot really be divided because they are not made of the four elements, but are ‘immaterial’ (11,7; 232,4-5). They are not nourished, they neither grow or decay (85,22) and therefore they are not involved in any alteration, for their body has no life ‘acquired’ from the soul, but as a part of its essence (49,32-4; 87,5-12). 45. cf. 65,10-12. 46. In 251,21 delete second to. 47. On the Pythagorean doctrine of the forms and mathematical objects see the more extensive treatment in 28,21-29,23 and 84,30-85,1 and below 277,1-30 with note 233. 48. As W. Charlton in his revision observed, the apparently pleonastic ‘as limits qua limits’ is inserted because lines and surfaces are divisible as such, but not divisible taken as limits of surfaces and solids. 49. To know something ‘co-ordinately’ (sustoikhôs) means that the knower and the object known are on the same ontological level, for example when the human soul knows the forms present in it. One may also know something ‘in a superior way’ (kreittonôs), as god knows temporal things, or ‘in an inferior way’ (hupheimenôs), as when we know divine things. The threefold distinction is often made in Proclus. 50. Reference to the opening phrase of DA 3.6, 430a26-7. 51. We translate kai (252,16) as ‘or’ to make clear that there are two different ways of decline in thinking: either towards the knowledge of what is potentially divisible or to the knowledge of what is divisible as privation (the ‘limits’). See 252,14 which rightly has ê. 52. cf. DA 1.5, 411a5 and Ps.-Simplicius 72,34-6. 53. On this principle see 72,25-9. 54. After having developed the ‘doctrine’ the commentator now explains from that perspective the lexis. The distinction between theoria and lexis is standard in the commentaries of the Alexandrian school. Our commentator rarely applies it in a scholastic manner as does for instance Ps.-Philoponus. 55. This is one of the occasions where neither the immediate context, nor any marker indicates whether adiaireton should here be understood as ‘undivided’ or as ‘indivisible’. At 254,4-8 it becomes clear that here ‘undivided’ is meant. 56. auto  adiaireton: one rather expects auta  adiaireta, auta referring to the potentially divisible things. 57. The formal cause holds every composite being together: see 112,35 and the discussion of DA 1.5, 411b14 at 78,26-79,10. However, the undivided aspect in divisible beings is not the form itself. See also 254,4-8 and 256,12-14.

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58. ‘The final cause in the form’ is nothing but the form as the final cause of a thing. The form is clearly said to be the final cause (hou heneka) at 8,19-20, especially so in the case of the artefacts (22,8-9) although, on the basis of Aristotle’s Physics (2.2, 194a27-30, 2.8, 199a20-32, 2.9, 200a14-30), the claim is more general (111,17-21). Health is a natural perfection present in the living being, but is not ‘the final cause in the form’, which is the soul. For a similar claim about health see 38,4-6; cf. below 319,3-14. 59. At 47,6-8 Ps.-Simplicius noticed that ‘the thought of the intellect superior to ours stays at a single now, indivisibly comprehending the whole temporal infinitude’. This (eternal) now is superior to the psychical now (47,18-19). The commentator seems however to hesitate in applying ‘now’ to what is superior to time, i.e. eternity, because it is more often used to denote the temporal moment than ‘the eternal now’ or eternity in which are the pure intelligible forms. Proclus talks about an aiônion nun (in Tim. 3, 59,19-21; cf. in Parm. 1237,27) to characterize the being of the Forms which is beyond all temporal extension, and observes that this ‘now’ is even more indivisible than the temporal ‘now’ (Proclus, in Tim. 1, 291,7-9). In his view the partless now in time imitates the eternal existence of the Forms (in Parm. 844,8; 873,20); see also Damascius (in Parm. 3, 189,20 Westerink) who calls ‘the now’ a ‘trace of eternity’ (ikhnos aiônion). 60. ‘The rest’ (to loipon) here refers to the second part of the couple ‘time and length’. When time is divided, ‘the rest’ is length, when length is divided, ‘the rest’ is time. 61. Reading in 253,39 hôs for holôs 62. On this distinction see n. 57. 63. The interpretation of the whole phrase hangs on what is understood by adiaireton tôi eidei here. Themistius, as his examples show, took it to be ‘undivided by species’, that is, something that cannot be further divided into species (Themistius, in DA 110,15-19). He was chastised for such an interpretation by Philoponus who made a critical paraphrase of Themistius’ paraphrase (Philoponus, de Intellectu 78,12-79,20) and suggested that one should understand ‘things to be indivisible in form insofar as they are forms’. This is also the view of Ps.-Simplicius (254,25-6). Similar differences may be observed among modern commentators: Hicks (1907, 518) took it to mean ‘any species incapable of further division into subspecies’ (similarly, Ross 1961, 299 and Berti 1978); Tricot understood it as indivisible in form that is indivisible au sens absolu; Siwek at first (Siwek 1957, 259) understood it as specifically indivisible (specifice indivisibile) but then changed it into ‘in accordance with form’ (secundum formam, Siwek 1965, 211); similarly, Barbotin 1966; Bodéus 1993; Polansky 2007). 64. Ps.-Simplicius regards 430b14-15 as a parenthetical remark inserted in the middle of a discussion about undivided aspects of divisible things. By this parenthesis, the commentator says, Aristotle wants to remind us of what is the main theme of 430a26-431a 3, namely the thinking of indivisible forms. If the commentator had known modern editorial conventions he might have bracketed the phrase of 430b14-15. Thus, Bywater thought that 430b14-15 interrupts the argument of 430b6-20 and suggested transposing the sentence after mêkei in b20. In this he has been followed by Ross whose text was used in Hamlyn’s translation. 65. For Aristotle, forms do not come to be and, therefore, of course, do not come to be in time. Cf. Phys. 8.6, 258b18-20; Metaph. 6.3, 1027a29-30; 7.8, 1033b6; 7.15, 1039b20-7. 66. cf. Simplicius, in Phys. 1160,13-1161,21. At 1158,31-2 Simplicius

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interestingly remarks ‘for as god thinks in a non-temporal way the things under time (ta hupo khronon), so we think the things that are beyond time (ta huper khronon) in a temporal way’. 67. A literal quote from Aristotle, Phys. 6.6, 236b26-7 (the same in Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 546,18). The idea that all time is divisible (diairetos) is repeated many times in Aristotle’s Physics 6: 234a10-11; 235a11-12; 237a10, a26, b21; 239a21; 241a15-19. It is also stated in his de Sensu 6, 446b1. 68. The same image is later used by Elias, in Isag. 23,14. 69. On the ‘now’ that is superior to time, see n. 59. 70. The commentator adds the article tôi to aidiairetôi tês psukhês (254,27 and 254,34) and thus distinguishes in the soul an indivisible part from a divisible. 71. See Plato, Timaeus 35A3-7. The reference to the Timaeus is made explicit at 27,38-28,4. It is repeated in a shortened form in 212,24-6, clearly alluded to and used again below at 259,14-23 and 312,6-9. Apart from these explicit references to Plato, the phrase borrowed from Timaeus reappears as a leitmotiv throughout the commentary: 30,15-20; 34,9-10; 40,8-9; 40,30-2; 42,32-3; 50,31-2; cf. 11,33-7; 26,18-19; 88,9-11 and 90,23-4 with slightly different emphasis, not to mention all the passages where the intermediary status of the soul is clearly stated. See also Steel 1978, 32-3. 72. cf. 218,7-13; 227,35-6; 240,2-3; 247,40-248,1 and below 258,16-17. 73. On the difference between the participated and imparticipable intellect see n. 26. 74. See 254,12ff. 75. Similar examples at 42,19-20; 97,6-15; 218,18-20. 76. When we say that something is ‘incidentally’, this is usually taken in an inferior sense than when we say it is per se. In this case, however, ‘incidentally’ indicates a higher perspective, for one is considering the divisible things as undivided. 77. The commentator means that the expression kata sumbebêkos (incidentally) should not only qualify the known objects (the divisible objects are incidentally known as undivided), but also the thinking subject (the divisible part of the soul thinks incidentally qua undivided) and the time in which (divisible, but incidentally undivided). 78. Hayduck (with a question mark) suggests Physics 2.1 where the only possible passage is 193b3-5, which states that nature at best can be separated kata ton logon. A more plausible candidate would be 2.2, 194b10-15, where it is said that the physicist’s knowledge ‘is concerned with things that are khôrista in respect of form but are immersed in matter’. On this problem see Morrison 1985, who argues for ‘separate’ as a correct understanding of khôristos in all of Aristotle’s texts. For some doubts about this view and suggested corrections see Hübner 2000, 331-4. 79. See nn. 57 and 62. 80. Aristotle calls point a ‘division’ (diairesis) also in Metaph. 11.2, 1060b19; it is implied in Metaph. 3.5, 1002a18-20, a34-b11. Hicks (1907, 522), following Thomas Aquinas, who called it signum divisionis, understands diairesis to mean ‘dividing mark’. Thus the point is the division of the line, and the line of the surface, and the surface is the division of a solid. 81. On the difference between knowing privations in a co-ordinate way or in an eminent or causal way, see above 252,11-23. The person who knows in a co-ordinate way will grasp the privations of forms by mixing his own thinking with privations of thinking, just as darkness is ‘seen’ by ‘not seeing’ light. See Plotinus, Enn. 1.8 [51] 9,20-7.

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82. cf. 68,21-2; 72,25-8; 114,9-10; 133,17-20. 83. Such a translation of paruphistasthai was convincingly argued for by Anthony Lloyd who also took into account this passage, see: Lloyd 1987. On the concept of parupostasis see Opsomer-Steel 2003, 25-8. 84. The eternal good can never be deprived of its goodness. Evil only can occur in particular and temporal beings which do not always participate in their perfections. Cf. below 268,17-19 on the good that is not opposed to the bad. 85. See also 252,18-19. On knowing evil as a privation of the good see also Plotinus, 1.8 [51] 9. 86. cf. Hermias, in Phaedr. 14,4-9. 87. ‘Black’ is not a good example because it is not a privation of whiteness but itself a colour and as much a form as the white. Therefore the commentator notices that Aristotle uses ‘black’ here instead of ‘dark’. 88. On ‘division’ see n. 80. 89. cf. 50,19-22; 68,23-6. 90. More on non-being see below 260,26-40 with notes. 91. The verb epiballô and the related noun epibolê was given a cognitive meaning by Epicurus (cf. e.g. Herod. 38). It was often employed by later Platonists to denote the immediate apprehension of an object (in opposition to e.g. sullogismos). See for instance Plotinus Enn. 4.4 [28] 1,17-25. 92. Modern editors and commentators starting with Zeller (2.2, 18622, 443 n. 2) and Torstrik (1862, 196) have suggested that tôn aitiôn here is a result of a scribal error. They have been followed by Bywater (1888, 60), Hicks (1907, 523-4), Ross (1961, a.l). Several ingenious emendations have been proposed. Smith 1931 and its revision in Barnes 1984 omit tôn aitiôn from the translation. In Philoponus, de Intellectu (84,58-9) the lemma has ‘talium’ (translating toioutôn which may be a corruption of ‘tôn aitiôn’). Anyway, his commentary (85,1-5) shows that Philoponus found aition in his text. Thus also Ps.-Philoponus 553,13. Our commentator explains the passage as does Ps.-Philoponus, understanding it as a reference to the causality of the productive intellect (258,23-8). Themistius does not refer to this phrase in his paraphrase. Averroes (in Scotus’ translation) has ‘rerum’. This may have inspired Torstrik to propose the conjecture tôn ontôn. 93. Dative energeiai in the lemma, but the commentator seems to have read the nominative energeia: see 258,31. 94. See DA 3.6, 430b14-15. 95. See n. 80. 96. See n. 72. 97. Ps.-Simplicius relates all of the characteristics given in 430b24-6 to what has been said about the productive intellect earlier in DA 3.5. One finds a similar list of five attributes in Ps-Philoponus 553,6-15. However, according to Ps.-Philoponus, the five are primarily seen as attributes of the divine intellect, which the human intellect may imitate. He probably follows Plutarch (see n. 101 below). This interpretation is not acceptable for Ps.-Simplicius because, in his view, the whole argument in DA 3 is about the human intellect. 98. DA 3.5, 430a23. 99. cf. DA 3.5, 430a12ff. 100. DA 3.5, 430a18. 101. The Greek khôristos, as all verbal adjectives, has the double meaning of potentially ‘separable’ or actually ‘separate’. Our commentator opts for ‘separable’, because he understands the text as referring to the intellect of the

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soul, not to the divine intellect. This passage seems to be a critical comment on Plutarch, who defended exactly the opposite view, as we can learn from Ps.-Philoponus 553,10-12: ‘as Plutarch says, do not think that separable means separable only from the matter of bodies, it means also from psychical powers. He says “separable” from them but he should have said “separated” (kekhôrismenon); for the divine has been separated’ (tr. Charlton). 102. DA 3.5,430a22. 103. Modern commentators starting with Torstrik (1862, 197-8) have suggested several changes to the text with no basis in the manuscripts. Thus, Torstrik thought that instead of phasis and kataphasis Aristotle had written kataphasis and apophasis (negation; cf. below on the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias and also 260,21-3). With Ross 1961 apophasis replaced kataphasis in the main text and kataphasis, though supported by all manuscripts, was entombed in apparatus criticus. This replacement was accepted by Hamlyn (19681, 62 and 145) and Barnes 1984 (revising Smith 1931 who kept the manuscript reading). 104. See the note at 254,31. 105. It is not immediately clear which phrase (lexis) Ps.-Simplicius has in mind but, it must be a phrase characterizing the essential intellect as involving rational division. He probably means ti kata tinos (‘something of something’), which is used both at 430b26 for the substance and at b28-9 for the activity of the soul’s intellect. 106. On this principle, see 157,33-158,1; cf. also 5,38-6,5; 26,26-8; 62,4-6; 212,21-5. Taking into account what follows it is possible that the commentator has in mind Physics 1.5, 188b23-5 where it is said that ‘the intermediaries come from the contraries, like colours from white and black’. 107. Timaeus 35A3, A7. 108. cf. n. 71 on 254,29 (on Timaeus 35A3-7). 109. Whatever the exact meaning of xanthos, Ps.-Simplicius uses it as the colour of wax (149,14-16), bile (e.g., 182,18-23) and honey (e.g., 185,12-14). Edgeworth 1983 mentions passages in other texts where it is used for brown. Cf. Philoponus, in DA 406,24-30 where the intermediate colours are said not to be simple. See also n. 117. 110. Often the commentator connects ‘disposition’ (hexis) with the projected activity of the intellect (on projection see n. 33). To understand it one has to remember that the proceeding intellect is perfected in accordance with a projection (kata probolên) that is not essential but dispositional (kata hexin), and disposition is related to substance but is not substance itself (229,19-21). In other words, having a disposition of knowledge does not mean that it is always activated. See above 225,2-5: ‘It is not the case that, because the soul’s intellect which has inclined to the outside is imperfect, it is such as to be always imperfect, but it can be perfected when, while it remains in its state of inclination to the outside, it is perfected as the knower in disposition (hexin), which is itself a projection of substance’ (tr. Blumenthal). See also 208,21; 229,18-35; 236,29; 262,26; 263,32. 111. cf. DA 3.5, 430a19-20 and 3.7, 431a1-2 (which Ps.-Simplicius considers as the conclusion of 3.6). 112. It is improbable that both commentators shared these two interpretations, which exclude one another. Probably the first was Alexander’s view, the second Plutarch’s. This passage (259,38-260,2) is not mentioned among the sources for Plutarch in Taormina 1989. It appears as fr. viii in: Moraux 1942, 214. For Alexander, cf. de Anima Mantissa 114,10-12; 117,14. 113. A distinction between the expressed logos (uttered speech) and the

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internal logos is usually ascribed to Stoics (see SVF II,43; II,74) but the idea of internal speech goes back to Plato (Sophist 263E; Theaetetus 189E-190A). Philoponus, de Intell. 87,40-4 (preserved only in Latin) refers to this distinction when he explains what cognition by composition is: ‘This predicates one thing of another or denies it, and does so not only in openly uttered speech, but internally in the mind’ (tr. Charlton). The Greek Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 556,10-15, however, uses the distinction in a quite different sense. In his view the assertion in the mind is simple and always true, only the expressed assertion involves composition and can be true or false. 114. See Aristotle, Metaph. 9.10, 1051b24-5 where phasis is clearly distinguished from kataphasis and is related to the incomposites (ta asuntheta at b17), which might be taken as an equivalent of ta hapla. See also de Interpretatione 4, 16b26-8 and 5, 17a17 where it is said that a noun and a verb are just phasis. But as Bonitz remarks, Aristotle does not always make a clear distinction between phasis and kataphasis (cf. Bonitz 1870, 813a1034). The case of Plato is even less clear. In Soph. 263E12 he presents phasis (in the Aristotelian sense of kataphasis) and apophasis as the two types of logos. But Ps.-Simplicius probably had in mind a passage in Timaeus 49E4 about the embarrassment in designating with terms the phenomenal elements, using simple words like ‘this’ or ‘that’. 115. The commentator takes the phrase of 430b26 ‘saying something of something’ (phasis ti kata tinos) to indicate the intermediary status of the human essential intellect: it is neither pure simple grasping as implied in phasis, nor rational composite affirmation (ti kata tinos), but something that is – as a simple nature – this whole together ‘saying something of something’ made of both extremes. The addition ‘just like assertion’ explains the rational element in this simple intermediary nature from the extreme where it is fully present, namely the assertion. 116. cf. Aristotle, de Int. 6, 17a25. 117. cf. 167,9-10. Plato described the white as dilating the sight (Tim. 67E5) in opposition to the black that contracts it. The idea is accepted by Aristotle (Metaph. 10.7, 1057b8-19; Top. 1.15, 107b29-30 and, especially, Top. 3.5, 119a30; cf. also Theophrastus, de Sensu 86.2-3) and became a familiar description or even definition of the white in the later Greek tradition. In none of those cases, however, the yellow (xanthos) is analyzed as also dilating the sight just like the white does. But something like that may have been suggested by the closeness of xanthos to the white (Aristotle, de Sensu 4, 442a22-3; Alexander of Aphrodisias, in de Sensu 81,16-17). See Simplicius, in Cat. 282,34-283,8 following Timaeus against Plotinus who, according to Simplicius, denied closeness of xanthos to the white suggesting instead that phaios (grey) seems close to the white. 118. This is a rephrasing of 260,13-14. 119. This may be a reference to Parmenides fr. 7,1-2, not least because it is also quoted in Plato’s Sophist (237A8-9 and 258D2-3), which will be discussed from the next sentence onwards. Ps.-Simplicius’ exposition comes close to Damascius, in Parm. 3, 116,1-8; cf. 4, 82,1-12. 120. cf. Sophist, 258D5-259B6. 121. The notion of to huperousion, originating in the reflection upon Plato’s epekeina tês ousias (Rep. 6, 509B9) was frequently used by Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius but appears only once in Simplicius, in Cael. 485,16 and only here in Ps.-Simplicius. On this interpretation of the Sophist see Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 504,18-22 who lists different senses of ‘non-being’

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including huperousion. On the different meanings of ‘non-being’ see also Proclus, in Parm. 6, 1073,2-11 ed. Steel; 7, 503,20-504,6 (Latin translation; Greek retroversion in Steel OCT, vol. III, p. 299); Damascius, de Princ. 1, 13,14; Simplicius, in Phys. 243,6-12. 122. The commentator distinguishes formal otherness (explaining that one form is not another) and material otherness (explaining that one individual is different and separated from another). 123. This is probably a reference to the lost commentary of Damascius. See in Parm. 3, 116,7-8 Westerink-Combès. 124. The text of 260,20-40 is translated in Gavray 2007, 198. 125. See Aristotle, An. Post. 1.6-10, 92a6-94a19; Top. 7.3, 153a12-22; Metaph. 1.3, 983a27; 7.1, 1028b34-1030b13. 126. See 250,3-5. 127. Enn. 1.1 [53] 9,13; cf. 250,4 and n. 32 above. 128. Immediately (autothen), without first reasoning or examining, spontaneously, hastily. 129. This closely follows what was said earlier at 128,36-8. 130. cf. 126,24-7; 126,37-127,2; 127,22-3; and 128,4-10. 131. cf. DA 2.6, 418a20-1; Ps.-Simplicius 128,13-15. 132. For ‘from one and in relation to one’ see n. 110. 133. The next lemma is placed in all modern editions at the beginning of chapter 3.7. At Ps-Simplicius’ time there were not yet chapter divisions. It is clear, however, that he considers this lemma as belonging to the discussion on the objects of the essential intellect, which is the subject of our chapter 3.6. In his view, Aristotle begins with a new subject in the following lemma (431a4-7). As he says in his summary and transition (263,30-7), now that the argument on the theoretical intellect is completed Aristotle starts to discuss the practical intellect. Note that Thomas Aquinas also saw the opening phrase of our actual DA 3.7 as belonging to the discussion of DA 3.6. 134. See DA 3.5, 430a19-22 and commentary ad loc. Similar observation led Ross to excise DA 3.5, 430a19-22 because ‘these words cannot have been meant to stand in both places; one early editor must have placed them in ch. 5 while another placed them in ch. 7, and a third included them in both places. They are harmless in ch. 7, which is in any case a collection of scraps; here [sc. in DA 3.5] they seriously interfere with the course of thought, which without them would be continuous.’ (Ross 1961, 296, cf. 303). Somewhat earlier, Hicks wrote that ‘the suggestion that the passage is intrusive in either context should be scouted’ (Hicks 1907, 525). Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 558,4-6 reports that Alexander found the present passage (DA 3.7, 431a1-3 till khronôi) out of order because the words make the same distinction as what was said in DA 3.5. Perhaps following Alexander, Themistius omitted 431a1-4 from his paraphrase whereas DA 3.5, 430a19-22 led him to an extensive meditation. To Alexander’s worries, Ps.-Philoponus (558,7) answered that the logos here is ‘repetitive, not disordered’. For more extensive explanation see Philoponus, de Intell. 91,50-62 and for a restatement of this explanation without any defence of the phrase Sophonias, in DA 128,35129,5. See Netz 2001 for Aristotle’s common strategy of stating the same point at the beginning and at the end of his ‘paragraphs’. 135. On the addition of ‘science’ to ‘thinking’ see above at 245,13-15; 258,16-19; 259,29-34 and the following explanation at 262,18-32. 136. On the disposition in projection see n. 110. 137. See above 250,6-14. 138. The phrase is taken from DA 3.5, 430a18.

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139. At 245,25-246,13 (translated in Blumenthal 2000, 114-15). 140. The pre-existence of souls, which is here taken for granted by the commentator, was within the Platonic tradition tightly bound with the existence of the Forms and recollection or anamnêsis as the core of knowledge. In the Phaedo Plato proves the pre-existence of souls before its immortality is established (see esp. 76D7-E5) and in the Meno he explicitly says that soul was born several times (cf. 81B-C); the idea is implied in Phaedrus (cf. 249E-250C) and Rep. 10. Aristotle nowhere explicitly considers the question of soul’s pre-existence but his claims about the intellect that exists separately (cf. DA 3.5, 430a22) have been seen as in harmony with Plato. 141. Different meanings of ‘prior’ are listed by Aristotle in Metaph. 5.11, 1008b9-1009a14. 142. A quote from DA 3.5, 430a22. Note that Ps.-Simplicius here and implicitly at 245,34-5 shows that he is not reading oukh (as in majority of the manuscripts) in the text of the passage he quotes. Torstrik attributed the appearance of oukh in the text to insane syncretism of Platonists (Torstrik 1862, 185). See also Blumenthal 2000, 147 n. 449. In this, Ps.-Simplicius follows Plutarch of Athens (Plutarch’s opinion is described with approval in Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 535,13-16). Philoponus, de Intell. 59,27-60,41 provides the fullest ancient discussion and shows how to explain both readings as possible without deciding which of them goes back to Aristotle. 143. Ps.-Simplicius has in mind Plato’s Phaedrus 249B5-6 (but Plato’s ‘truth’ in Ps.-Simplicius becomes ‘things that are’ (ta onta)). 144. On the relation between disposition and projection see note at 259,31. 145. Reading khôriston. 146. This is a summary of Ps.-Simplicius’ understanding of DA 3.4-6 making it explicit once again that he saw it as a continuous whole. 147. That from here on Aristotle discusses the practical intellect is also the view of Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 558,11; 34; the reasons are provided at 554,20-37 where it is also clear that theoretical and practical intellect is one in subject. In contrast, according to Philoponus, de Intellectu 92,76-7 Aristotle starts here a discussion about the appetitive part of the soul. Note that Aristotle mentions practical intellect explicitly only at DA 3.10, 433a14-16. 148. Later in the text Aristotle explicitly makes the link between practical intellect and practical dianoia (3.10, 433a18). At this stage the equivalence of dianoia and nous praktikos seems to be established also on the basis of dianoêtikê psukhê mentioned by Aristotle at 431a14. In the commentary as a whole dianoia usually means ‘rational activity’ in the most general sense; that is why for the commentator logikê and dianoêtikê are equivalent (cf. DA 2.3, 415a9); more specifically dianoia is described as ‘the life of a rational animal’ (61,9; cf. 77,7) and ‘discursive activity of reason’ (204,25). For more on dianoia see 226,36-227,2. 149. On the truth that is not opposed to falsity see 3.6, 430a26-7 and commentary 248,37-249,2; 250,19 and nn. 14 and 30. 150. The Commentator identifies the practical intellect with the lowest level of our rational life, i.e. with the outgoing intellect in its not yet perfected state. See Introduction, section 5.a. 151. Delete ê (8) as diplography (Strobel). 152. Hayduck suggests Metaph. 13.3, 1078a31-b4 but the connection with this text is weak – the passage suggests that those who deny to mathematics involvement with the good (agathon) and beautiful (kalon) are wrong since beauty is present in the order, symmetry and definiteness of things and, as

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such, functions as a kind of cause. There is nothing, however, in this passage about truth or precision, but if this indeed is the passage Ps.-Simplicius has in mind, then beauty (kalon) plays a role of final cause. 153. The claim that the practical intellect aims not at knowledge but at practice is similar to Aristotle’s idea that the conclusion of practical syllogism is action. See an example of a practical syllogism at DA 3.11, 434a15-20 although it is not said there that conclusion is action. It is explicitly said in MA 701a28-33 and NE 1147a25-30. 154. This recalls the beginning of 3.4 but the principle is widely used in the commentary. See n. 4 above. 155. See Phys. 3.2, 201b31ff. 156. The curious claim that in sense-perception discernment (krisis) comes from within and takes nothing from without should not be read as solipsistic idealism but in the light of the idea that soul somehow contains the reasons or concepts (logoi) of all things. When a sense-object moves a sense-organ the complete activity of sense-perception is aroused and in an act of perception projects its ‘conceptual net’ on things perceived. 157. To be indivisible, all together and at once are features of complete activity (energeia teleia). The complete activity is not made less complete by the fact that there are conditions under which it occurs, namely, the presence of a sense-object. 158. Add autou 265,1. 159. cf. 125,24-34. 160. Normally Aristotle refuses (against Plato) to use the term kinêsis for psychical activities but see 3.3, 429a1-2 (for phantasia) and 3.10, 433b18 (about orexis). See also n. 410. 161. The commentator may have in mind Physics 7.3, 247b1-14. 162. The quote comes from DA 2.11, 424a1 which the commentator earlier explained (164,32-3) in the sense of being perfected. 163. Reading noêtou 265,26. 164. Perception judges that this thing that is perceived is pleasurable or painful and in this sense interweaves the known with the pleasant or painful thereby making it similar to interweaving subject and predicate in an affirmation. 165. Later, at DA 3.10, 433a25-b10 Aristotle himself speaks about intellect (nous) as the one that is able to distinguish apparent good from real good. 166. Reading proeilêptai (Strobel). 167. The Greek term phantasma is notoriously difficult to translate in English. In order to avoid ‘phantasms’ (with all contemporary psychological connotations) translators usually opt for ‘image’, which, however, may bring the reader into confusion as he can no longer make a distinction between image as eikôn and as phantasma. In analogy with sense-objects we opted to translate phantasma as ‘imagined object’. There is of course another risk of misunderstanding. An imagined object is not an object I am freely dreaming of in my imagination, but ‘an impression’ in the imagination produced by sense-perceptions. Yet the commentator also insists on the active role of imagination in moulding this impression. See 206,11-20: ‘Aristotle calls the activity of imagination an affection because it is subject to division and to impression (tupôtikon) and is inseparable from the bodies, but is within our control because we do not entirely fashion the impressions (tupous) in accordance with things, nor do we bring forward imaginations with our minds altogether on the truth. [] Imagination apprehends the impressions taking only so much in addition to sense-perception, that it does not require

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the constant presence of the sense-objects which the impressions resemble, but brings up the impressions from itself and does not entirely follow what was seen at the first place, but adds and subtracts, transforms and embellishes in every way’ (tr. Blumenthal; see also his n. 234, arguing that imagination cannot as such be equated with an impression, but is an activity related to an impression); 208,22-4: ‘imagination is a power according to which we imprint (tupoumen) phantasmata either determinately or indeterminately, and either truly or falsely and in an ordered or disordered way.’ See further (on phantasma as apotupôma) 267,18-19; 273,3-4; (on phantasmata as tupoi of sense-objects) 214,9; 233,10; 273,8; 274,31; 284,12; 285,1. The pneuma must be ‘suitable for the reception of impressions which are objects of the imagination’ (214,4; 216,26). 168. Each specific form (such as animal or human being) is further developed into a multitude of particular reason principles (logoi) which constitute the individualised instances of the forms. On the relation between the different logoi and the single form they express see earlier at 249,11-21 and 250,25-9. See also n. 24. 169. On dianoia see n. 148 above. 170. See n. 167 above on phantasma. 171. See 3.8, 432a12-13 and commentary ad loc. 172. See nn. 150 and 176. 173. Namely at 431a14, the beginning of the lemma, the first and only occurrence of this term in the DA and in the Corpus Aristotelicum. 174. See 431a9-12 and commentary 265,31-6. 175. As in 431a9 hoion kataphasa ê apophasa. 176. On the Peripatetic thesis that the intellect is not able to think without imagination, see Alexander, de Anima 12,19-22 although he says conditionally ‘if it [i.e. thinking] does not occur without imagination’. Since imagination relies on sense-perception as its source and sense-perception does not occur without body, the necessary involvement of imagination in thinking leads to the conclusion that soul is inseparable from the body. As Philoponus suggests (de Intellectu 97,16-22), Alexander used this argument to prove that our intellect and thereby the whole soul is mortal. Themistius modifies it by saying that the claim applies to the intellect connatural to the soul (Themistius, in DA 113,18-21) ‘but if there is some intellect neither so deficient that it desires, nor so weak that it engages in avoidance, it would not need imagination’ (113,21-3, tr. Todd). For Philoponus the claim is also limited to practical matters and geometrical matters (Philoponus, de Intellectu 97,13-14) and it is said about discursive soul only. Ps.-Philoponus suggests that the claim about the soul never thinking without phantasms applies to the practical intellect which involves desire that presupposes an activity of phantasia whereas theoretical or contemplative intellect sometimes does not use imagination, that is, when it is considering universals (Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 560,1-4). See also 283,27-9 below. 177. See DA 3.5, 430a22-4. 178. On the true not opposed to what is false see nn. 14 and 30. The good that is not opposed to bad does not belong to contingent things that form the realm of human action. 179. Note that earlier, on several occasions (195,23; 196,27-8; 198,26-7; 200,33; 213,34) the author described the discrimination or judgement (he kritikê energeia or krisis) itself as an ‘impartible activity’. See also Simplicius, in Cat. 304,14-15.

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180. On the common sense see DA 3.1, 425a20425b11 and commentary 184,15-187,14. 181. See DA 3.2, 426b30-1 with the commentary 198,31-199,14. 182. DA 3.2, 426b19, not explicitly commented on by the commentator (nor appearing in his lemma). 183. Note that Philoponus considers 431a17-20 to be an insertion (Philoponus, de Intellectu 99,69) meant to compare the unity of sense-perception with the unity of intellect, while Ps.-Philoponus thinks that the other side of comparison that should have followed hôsper in 431a17 is not explicitly formulated but left for us to understand (Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 560,15-18). Hicks notes the lack of an apodosis and provides similar passages (1907, 530); Ross considers the sentence 17-20 hôsper  pleiô as incomplete, having lost its principal clause. He admits, however, ‘that it would be possible, by taking kai in l. 18 to mean “so too”, to treat hôsper  pleiô (ll. 17-20) as a complete sentence’. The latter position is defended by our commentator. 184. 3.7, 431a9-12. 185. See DA 2.12 and commentary 165,29-166,34. 186. See 125,31-4; cf. 119,3-10. 187. On the principle that the middle communicates with the extremes, see above 259,20-7. 188. For a similar claim see 199,18-20. Aristotle does occasionally distinguish what is one in number and many in account (tôi logôi), e.g. GC 1.5, 320b14 (about matter). See also DA 3.2, 427a4-5 with the commentary 199,19-23 where in being (tôi einai) is explained as ‘that is, in account’ (tôi logôi). For a use of this distinction see also Alexander, de Anima 69,5-6. 189. See above 269,20-9. 190. ekthesis. The term is used here in a non-technical sense for the procedure of setting out particular instances by which a general statement is further evidenced. On ekthesis in Aristotle, see Ross 1924, vol. I, 208-9 (with reference to Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles). 191. See DA 3.2, 426b12-23 and commentary ad loc. 192. See DA 3.2, 427a9-14. 193. Ps.-Simplicius reads hekatera (not hekateron) in the lemma confirmed in commentary at 271,15.38. 194. Ps.-Simplicius reads hêi instead of hôs in the lemma, confirmed in commentary at l. 15. 195. This point has been repeatedly stated by the commentator (e.g. 158,6-7; 166,3; 237,13-14). That the soul’s cognitive powers are determined by the object known is Ps.-Simplicius’ interpretation of Aristotle’s often repeated claim that knowledge is in some sense the same as the thing that is known: see DA 3.4, 430a3-5; 3.5, 430a19-20; 3.7, 431a1-2. This principle also applies to sense-perception: see DA 3.2, 425b26-7. For more qualifications in the case of scientific knowledge (epistêmê) see below 280,30-281,6 and the note to this passage. 196. Above at 270,15-16. 197. Ps.-Simplicius (and one group of DA manuscripts) omits mê before homogenê, confirmed by commentary. 198. Embarrassed by the lack of the negation before homogenê (see previous note), the commentator makes not homogenous qualities like sweet and hot ‘homogeneous’ because both are sense-objects. 199. Like hot and cold. 200. We owe this interpretation to Benedikt Strobel. 201. See above 272,6-7. In perceiving at the same time, for instance,

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yellow and sweet, the single knowing subject becomes the different qualities at once and thus may discriminate that this object (honey) is sweet and yellow. 202. Contrary qualities such as white and black fall under the same genus of colour, white and sweet fall under a more remote genus of sensible things. 203. The same is said by Hicks (1907, 537) about 431b2. 204. See the next lemma 431b5-8. 205. See n. 167 on phantasma. 206. DA 3.7, 431a16-17. 207. See n. 150 above. 208. Aristotle never says this explicitly, but see DA 3.2, 427a8; 3.8, 431b28 (‘for it is not the stone that is in the soul, but its form’). The commentator often makes this claim: see 200,5; 225,21; 237,18-20; 280,30-1; 281,12-37. 209. Thoughts (noêmata) taken as objects of thinking. 210. See DA 3.8, 432a12-13. 211. 274,39 reading auta for auton. 212. autothen, i.e., ‘by itself, on its own’, to distinguish the direct vision of a beacon from a vision of the beacon as an object represented in imagination (431b6 hote de ). 213. Bywater 1888, 61 suggested excising tei koinei as a marginal gloss by an annotator; Hicks 1907, 539 counted Bywater’s suggestion as ‘the most satisfactory solution’ and bracketed tei koinei; Bywater is followed by Hamlyn 1993 who omits it from his translation. Ross 1961, 307 says that the best solution is either to accept Bywater’s suggestion or to follow Ps.-Simplicius (see below). For a detailed discussion of this phrase see Gregoric 2007, 112-23 where on p. 120 Gregoric discusses and dismisses the interpretation of Ps.-Simplicius. 214. Earlier in the commentary (185,7-20) Ps.-Simplicius distinguished two different meanings of ‘common’ in the expression ‘common sense’: first, ‘common’ sense as the perception of the common sensibles, such as size or movement: this perception is ‘common’ insofar as it is present to each of the five senses in respect of what they have common with each other; ‘since each sense has a common function as well as its special one’; second, ‘common’ sense means a specific capacity to recognize that different sensible qualities, such as sweet and yellow, belong to the same thing. Here, according to the commentator, Aristotle uses the expression in the first meaning. 215. At DA 2.6, 418a17-18 it is mentioned as example of koina aisthêta along with rest, number, figure and size. See also DA 3.1, 425a16-20. 216. See 202,7-8; 220,39-221,5 (‘he extends the name “intellect” even to the imagination’). This is based on e.g. DA 3.3, 427b27-8 but see also 1.1, 403a8-9 and 3.10, 433a10. 217. cf. 273,28-30. 218. cf. 237,8-11. 219. See 3.3, 428b20 and commentary ad loc. 220. See n. 167 on phantasma. 221. This might be taken to be the most universal question of political science as it is understood in Aristotle’s Politics. 222. This hints to Aristotle’s idea that of all animals only human beings are involved in actions, see NE 6.2, 1139a19-20. 223. In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle clearly delineates contingent things as the subject matter for practical reasoning. See e.g. NE 6.2, 1139b8; 6.4, 1140a1-2; 6.11, 1143b2-3.

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224. The commentator seems to think that even general truths regarding the realm of practical matters, that is truths that are relevant to ethical and political science, are the result of practical intellect, and not just of a theoretical consideration. 225. 23 reading energoun not energoun (cf. 275,19-20). 226. On knowing the truth in a way not opposed to falsity, which is a character of the perfected theoretical intellect, see nn. 14 and 30 (on DA 3.6). 227. Aristotle in his Metaphysics made some suggestions about two kinds of matter, sensible and intelligible as well; the second is closely related to the way mathematical objects exist (see Metaph. 7.10, 1036a9-12; 7.11, 1036b3237a5; 8.6, 1045a33-4). In Neoplatonism the doctrine of intelligible matter received great attention. See for instance Plotinus, Enn. 2.4 [12] on the two matters. Proclus examined the special relation between imagination, the existence of mathematical objects and intelligible matter in in Eucl. 1, 54,14-56,23. 228. The lemmas in Ps.-Simplicius and Ps.-Philoponus, and an important Aristotle manuscript from the twelfth century, the Ambrosianus 435 (H. 50) here read kampulon (curved) which is certainly the lectio difficilior, while the majority of MSS and apparently Themistius have koilon (hollow). The origins of the alternative are obscure. Interestingly Philoponus himself read koilon (see his de Intellectu, 107,59; 108,70-1). 229. See Physics 2.2, 193b23-a11. 230. As Hayduck notices, the image of the bridge is never used by Plato himself, though it expresses the Platonic view on the role of mathematics in education. For the Neoplatonist school of Ammonius in Alexandria the intermediary nature of mathematics between physics and theology is explained by the fact that it deals with subjects that are somehow inseparable from matter (like all objects of physics) and somehow separable from matter (like all objects of theology), see Ammonius, in Isag. 11,22-3; 12,8-11; Philoponus, in Cat. 5,4-6; in Meteor. 1,19-21; in Phys. 1,6-10; 218,25-219,2. The picture of mathematics as bridge appears in Ammonius, in Isag. 13,5 (cf. Asclepius, in Metaph. 20,14 and Elias, in Cat. 121,17, sometimes the image of bridge appears next to the image of ladder). See also Ps.-Galenus, De Part. Phil. 9,3. 231. See Republic 7, 533C. 232. This may be a hint to the Neoplatonic doctrine of the One and the henads as superior to substances. 233. Ps.-Simplicius in his commentary several times states the difference between the Pythagorean approach to mathematics and the approach taken by Aristotle, and usually he is critical of the Peripatetics, see 40,3-11; 84,36-85,3; 251,27-9. Some light on the current passage is also brought by an earlier comment at 233,8-12: ‘Aristotle usually thinks and says that the objects of mathematics exist in abstraction, not like the Pythagoreans looking for rational principles (logoi) which project the mathematical impressions which are in the imagination. []. The Pythagoreans, attending to the living rational principles that project the impressions, made mathematical objects substances. Aristotle denies the substantiality of impressions and says they arise from abstraction.’ 234. zôtikos: the reason-principles (logoi) are ‘alive’ because they are established as substantial forms in the soul. 235. According to Proclus the mathematical objects are ‘projected’ by the discursive reason in the matter of imagination: see in Eucl. 54,14-56,22. 236. See Heron, Geometry 3,13.

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237. cf. Simplicius, in de Caelo, 445,27-9: ‘Aristotle says (289b13) that it is not reasonable that the stars move at the same speed as their circles. For greater and smaller circles in a sphere which are about the same central point or the same pole are restored simultaneously to the same place, but the greater circles move more quickly, smaller ones more slowly’ (tr. Mueller). 238. See Nicomachus, Introduction to Mathematics 1,8,4 and Philoponus, in Nicom. 65,1-3. 239. That is, they are ‘composed of the ratios 3:2 and 4:3’. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 36A-B and 43D; Aristotle, fr. 47 (Rose) taken from Ps.-Plutarch, de Musica. 240. See 233,17-19: ‘the perceived shape is not truly cubic, nor does the physical straight line truly have no breadth; only the mathematical one does’ (tr. Blumenthal). 241. Using mathematical objects (line, triangle, cube) as measures one can pass judgement over physical objects. This judgement would not be possible if the mathematical object were just an abstraction from sense impressions. 242. Theaetetus 186B-C. Cf. also Ps.-Philoponus in DA 564,23: ‘That is why Plato too in the Theaetetus says “imagination does not attain to substance”‘ (tr. Charlton). 243. See DA 3.4, 429b16-20. 244. Translating kekommenên as in MSS (from koptô), rather than kekammenên (from kaptô) as written by Hayduck. 245. On curved (kampulon) see n. 228 at the lemma above. 246. The commentator wants to justify the lectio difficilior: it is more easy to consider the curved separately from the snub-nosed than the ‘hollow’. 247. As Philoponus (de Intellectu 108,83-109,90) explains ‘in actuality’ can be construed either with ‘thinking’ or with ‘hollow’. Ps.-Simplicius defends the second interpretation (attributed to Alexander by Philoponus). Most modern commentators follow the first alternative. 248. On this transition see n. 246. 249. Philoponus too discusses two versions of this text, but they are slightly different. See de Intellectu 109,94-100: ‘It is said that Alexander reads not “they are separate (separata = khôrista) but as if they were separate”, but “not with the separate (separato = khôristôi), but as with something separate”, so as to say that our intellect is inseparable from the body.’ But Philoponus observes that he did not find this reading in Alexander and that it is not probable. It is not probable indeed. But perhaps Philoponus misread his source (Plutarch of Athens?) and the alternative reading had not khôristô but khôristôs as Ps.-Simplicius here says. Or is it the other way around? In any case, Bywater (1888, 62-3) supports his emendation of the whole passage 431b12-17 on the alternative provided by Ps.-Simplicius here. 250. Literally ‘that which thinks’ (nooun). 251. Literal quote from DA 3.4, 429b21-2. See also 3.6, 430b30-1. 252. See DA 3.4, 430a3-5; 3.5, 430a19-20; 3.7, 431a1-2. 253. cf. 229,1-232,10. 254. ‘Projected disposition’ seems to be a concise way to refer to the idea that the perfection of the proceeding intellect consists in disposition and is not an essential state but a projection that depends on the essential intellect. On projection and disposition see n. 110. 255. According to Philoponus (de Intellectu, 111,49-60) Aristotle refers here to his treatment of the question in Metaph. 12.3, 1070a24-6. 256. Ps.-Simplicius leaves open a possibility, rarely considered by modern

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commentators, that Aristotle might have had didactic motives in arousing readers’ interest in some questions, without providing clear and final answers. This open question provoked Averroes to develop his celebrated digression on the conjoining of the material with the agent intellect (in DA 3.36). 257. Close to a quote from DA 1.5, 411b18-19. 258. e.g. DA 3.4, 429b5 but the idea is present throughout DA 2.5-12. 259. Independence of intellect from body is clearly stated at DA 3.4, 429a24-5 but it is introduced very early in the work, see DA 1.1, 402a9; 403a3-11; 1.3, 407b2-4. 260. e.g. DA 3.4, 429b9 (cf. 429b26). 261. cf. 224,20-13. In a similar context Alexander uses anaphora in his de Intellectu 113,6-16 but there anaphora is directed towards divine forms. For reservations about Alexandrian authorship of this work see Schroeder/Todd 2008. 262. On the essential intellect, see DA 3.5-6 and Introduction, pp. 10-13. On its connection with ‘science’, see 248,31-249,4; 258,16-18; 259,30-3; 260,17-20; 262,17-31. 263. See n. 208 at 273,19. 264. The commentator distinguishes three objects of science: (1) objects transcending the level of scientific knowledge, such as the intelligible forms; (2) objects grasped by science itself on its own level, i.e. the level of the soul; (3) physical objects and the mathematical objects when abstracted from them. Science only achieves complete identity with the objects on its own level (sustoikhôs) and only indirectly of the lower and the superior level, knowing the lower in a superior manner (kreittonôs), the superior in a lower way (hupheimenôs). The doctrine comes from Proclus. 265. 281,1-2. 266. A sense-object can only be a body or a property of a body. As all bodies are divisible, they can never become as such identical with the soul knowing them, which is an indivisible incorporeal substance. 267. See DA 3.4, 429b10-12 (and commentary 231,30-41). 268. To become identical with the forms known is a general characteristic of cognition, even of sense-perception, but only in the case of scientific knowledge is there an identity not solely with the forms, but with the things themselves. 269. These observations are partly inspired by Aristotelian questions in DA 3.4, 429b10-22. 270. In natural science one may know corporeal physical objects as composite particular objects or according to the forms that constitute them in matter. In the last case, however, one knows them according to the forms the soul contemplates in itself, and not according to abstracted universals as the Peripatetics thought. 271. On this distinction see Introduction, pp. 11-13. 272. We propose to replace in l. 36 proiontos by menontos. The phrase 35-6 alla-proiontos is lacking in the Laurentianus and may have been added by conjecture in the tradition. Whereas the outgoing intellect may be distorted, the permanent or essential intellect, which corresponds to the circle of the Same is never distorted, but sometimes hindered in its activity and thus made potential. Therefore even the highest intellect in us is not always thinking. See next note. 273. In Timaeus 43D we find a description of what happens when the human soul is incarnated in the body. The affections coming from the

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sense-perception lead to a disorder of the circles of the soul. ‘ in violently shaking the circuits of the Soul they completely hampered the revolution of the same by flowing counter to it and stopped it from going on its way and governing; and they dislocated the revolution of the Different’ (tr. Cornford). Interestingly Iamblichus (followed by Proclus) used this text as an argument against Plotinus’ thesis of the undescended soul. As is clear from the Timaeus text, even the highest part of the soul, its rational faculty represented by the circle of the Same is put out of action. Yet it is not distorted as the revolution of the Different is, but only impeded (Proclus, in Timaeum 3, 333,3-334,3; 2, 314,26-30). Damascius too uses the Timaeus text in antiPlotinian polemics: see in Parm. 4, 15,9-22 (Westerink) and in Phaed. 1, 117,2 (Westerink). Like Damascius, Ps.-Simplicius fully adheres to Iamblichus’ view. There is nothing in the soul that remains unaffected by the connection with the body, even its superior part, the ‘essential intellect’, is not always thinking, but sometimes is hindered and thus falls into potentiality (6,12-17; 89,31-3; 220,12-14). See also Steel 1978, 38-40, 54 n. 9. 274. 282,8-9. 275. That is with respect to what is above the soul or what is below the soul. 276. The known object determines the cognitive power and activity directed towards it (see n. 195) and in this sense is superior to the cognitive power. 277. On the soul as intermediary, see Introduction, pp. 5, 8, 16 and n. 71. 278. See DA 1.2, 404b11-15; 1.5, 409b23-410b15. 279. On how the soul knows all things through specific rational properties, see above 270,29-271,10. 280. DA 3.4, 429a28. 281. See 227,36-228,1: ‘he does not call accidents “forms” (for the sensitive faculty receives these accidents), but rather the substances which exist in their own right or are entirely their own, by virtue of which the things defined with respect to themselves have their substance’ (tr. Blumenthal). 282. Hayduck refers to Metaph. 7.4, 1030a17-b13. 283. Ps.-Simplicius reads in 432a3 houtô for oude, as is clear from his quotation in 284,14.16. In the lemma the Laurentianus has oute (corrected in the Aldina as oude). 284. cf. 268,8-10 and n. 176. 285. See DA 3.7, 431b2. 286. See Cat. 8, 9b27-913 (first type); 10a11-24 (fourth type); the passive qualities constitute the third type of qualities: 8a28-10a10. 287. See n. 167 on phantasma. 288. The celestial bodies, which are separate from the sublunary realm, thus ‘seem’ to be an exception. 289. See Phys. 2.1, 193b4-5; 2, 193b34ff.; 194a1ff.; b12. 290. Add with Hayduck ousias after eidêtikas 284,31. 291. The commentator believes that the formal substance of sense-objects is itself not directly perceptible, as it is not a corporeal divisible entity. 292. See n. 167 on phantasma. 293. In the cognition of these objects the intellect depends upon sense-perception not only at the beginning of the intellectual process, but throughout. 294. The phantasmata are not related to the corporeal substances as the sense-objects, but find their ‘substance’ in the life of imagination. That every form of life is substance and that a living being owns its substantiality to life is a claim often made by the commentator, see 15,35-16,4; 53,20; 54,11; 59,18; 83,6; 83,19-21; 85,11-15; 86,20-36; 132,5-9; 219,34; 244,31.

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295. The form in matter is certainly inseparable from matter, not however as an accidental feature of it, but as the principle that maintains it. 296. To characterize the relation of phantasia to bodies by adverbs anokhikôs kai synektikôs is very unusual (the first of the adverbs is a hapax). 297. Earlier (278,2-3) Ps.-Simplicius called this intellect the ‘mathematical intellect’. 298. For this transition and survey of different levels of intellect see Introduction, pp. 9-11, 18-19. 299. This restates what was said at the beginning of DA 3.3, 427a17-19. Since Aristotle now turns to the second power, i.e. ability to originate motion, it is stated again. That the soul is mainly characterized by these two powers, is also stated earlier in the treatise: cf. DA 2.2, 403b25-7 (implicit in DA 1.2, 405b11-12) and 1.5, 410b16-21. 300. See n. 148. 301. On the extent of psychical powers Aristotle calls nous see 102,13-20; 202,7-9; 220,38-9 and also below at 296,3-6. For a very similar observation see Priscian, in Theophr. 29,3-6 (fr. 298B in FHSG, 1992, 38-9) where the same is said about both Aristotle and Theophrastus. Blumenthal’s comment (Blumenthal 2000, 131 n. 205) that ‘Aristotle, while talking about the relation between thinking and imagination never actually calls imagination intellect’ should be qualified in the light of DA 1.1, 403a8-9 where Aristotle considers a possibility that thinking (to noein) is some kind of phantasia, 3.3, 427b27-8, where it is said that ‘imagination seems to belong to thinking’ (noein) and 3.10, 433a10 where phantasia is said to be some kind of noêsis. 302. Below at DA 3.10, 433b29 Aristotle himself distinguishes between two types of imagination: related either to sense-perception or to reasoning (logistikê). The latter Ps.-Simplicius understands as essentially (kat’ ousian) rational since otherwise it would not be able to harmonize with reason, see below 306,17-19. 303. No such passage has survived; 286,27-32 of the commentary forms the fragment 298A in FHSG, 1992, 38-9. Of all the discussion about phantasia in Priscian, in Theophr. 23,1-25,26 only 25,7-8 seems to imply a special kind of phantasia in rational animals but even there the focus is on what kind of organ they would have. 304. This appears in the next lemma at 3.9, 432a19-21. 305. At DA 1.1, 402b1 Aristotle explicitly mentions soul’s having parts or being without parts (meristê ê amerês) as the problem to be investigated. Aristotle is critical towards those (most probably Plato is meant) who suggest that it has parts in DA 1.5, 411b5-30 but at DA 2.2, 413b11-414a1 it becomes clear that it depends on how the concept of ‘part’ is understood. At DA 3.4, 429a11 Aristotle uses ‘part’ without hesitation although it still has to be established if the part by which the soul knows and understands is separate spatially or conceptually. The discussion is continued with the next lemma and the problem is explicitly stated at 432a22-3. The problem with which Aristotle is dealing in these texts is clearly formulated by Plato in Rep. 436A8-B3. See also Introduction pp. 23-4. 306. Aristotle talks about ‘powers’ of the soul in DA 3.3, 414a29-31 and in many other texts. A verb seems to be lacking after alla (286,26), or should one substitute a verb (kalei) for alla? 307. Apart from this passage (286,38 and 287,3) the word poluousios is not attested in other Neoplatonic authors. Earlier in the commentary (14,8; 21,1-2) it is said that soul is by its essence one and many. Philoponus admits

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that there are different ousiai in the soul (see in DA 192-9), but speaks about the soul as poludunamos (35,10-14; 195,28-30); this term also appears in other authors (e.g. Hermias, in Phaedr. 154,4; 199,15-16). See Steel 1978, 62 n. 35. 308. cf. 76,14-78,14. 309. This is in accordance with Aristotle’s definition of place (topos) as ‘the limit of the surrounding body’ (Phys. 4.4, 212a6). For Aristotle’s struggle with the notion see the whole of Phys. 4.1-5. Morison 2002 offers a recent detailed analysis of the whole topic. At 228,1-3 the commentator, reacting to Aristotle’s note about those who speak about the soul as ‘the place of forms’ (topon eidôn), says that something can be called place ‘as being receptive of what it acquires somehow from outside’ thus keeping an analogy with ‘corporeal place’. On receptivity as the main characteristic of topos cf. also 64,33-4. 310. cf. 76,31-77,23. 311. Delete in l.19 [an]. This is not an irrealis. See 77,8-13: ‘So where there is total separation there clearly does not remain one made of both – otherwise there would not be total separation  But in the inclination outside of the intellect and the life through emanation there is a fusion with the other forms of life’. 312. The shell-like body is the earthy fleshly body (thus called because of Plato Phaedr. 250C6), which is mortal. This body should be distinguished from the pneumatic and the astral body. See on this doctrine of three bodies Dodds in appendix II of his edition of Proclus, Elements of Theology. See also Proclus in Rep. 1,119,14; 1,120,4.28; 2,186,9-11 and Damascius, de Princ. 1,32,11 and in Phaed. 1,168,7 and 62,6. Ps.-Simplicius seems to adhere to this view. In 17,17 he mentioned the ‘ethereal vehicle’ (to aitherôdes  okhêma) of our soul, and in many texts he refers to the vital pneuma. See below 301,18; 303,32. 313. Plato, Rep. 4, 440B-441B; 9, 580D-581A. 314. That is, the desire related to sense-perception. Although Plato divided the soul into three parts, he actually assigned the cause of movement only to two parts, the rational principle and the desire linked to the senses. Aristotle also admits a rational desire, i.e. boulêsis or will. 315. See further 432a26. The division of the soul into reason and an irrational part is attributed to Plato in the Magna Moralia 1182a23, but is a popular opinion which even Aristotle uses in Eth. Nic. 1102a26. 316. See DA 1.2, 403b25-7 (implicit in DA 1.2, 405b11-12) and 1.5, 410b1621. 317. Proclus in El. Th. 189-90; Th. Pl. 5, 140,20 and in other places uses the same notion to describe the essential relation between life and soul; the idea seems to originate from Plato’s Phaedo 105D3-E10. 318. Phaedr. 245C9. 319. As Hayduck notes, the reference is rather to DA 2.4, 415b7-b21. Cf. commentary 111,1-112,37 where the soul is described not only as the formal but also as the final and efficient cause of the living bodies. 320. Hayduck refers to Cat. 5, 3a29-32 which may be read as implying that parts of substances themselves are substances. It is clear that for Aristotle not all parts of all substances are substances but there are examples of parts being substances, for example, parts of animals (Metaph. 5.8, 1017b10-14; 7.2, 1028b8-13). 321. See 287,15. 322. See DA 1.1, 402b9-11. 323. Hayduck suggests Phys. 3.5, 206a sq; the reference might rather be

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to Phys. 3.6, 206b33-207a18, especially 207a7-9: ‘Thus something is infinite if, taking it quantity by quantity, we can always take something outside. On the other hand, what has nothing outside is complete (teleion) and whole (holon)’ (tr. by Hardie and Gaye revised by Barnes); see also Simplicius in Phys. 501,8ff. The commentator’s remark about infinity existing in the process of coming to be could be compared with Phys. 3.6, 206b12-27 where it is said that one way of being for infinity is ‘in potentiality’. 324. Reading with the Aldina diakekrimena. 325. See above n. 315. 326. Plato, Rep. 4, 440B-441B; 9, 580D-581A. Note that the commentator stresses that the tripartite division proposed by Plato is not meant to be exhaustive but is done for the sake of practical and educational purposes (below at 289,17 and again at 299,22-3). 327. cf. NE 6.2, 1139a23-5. 328. Presumably by ‘practical and ethical soul’ the commentator means the soul insofar as it is concerned with practical and ethical matters. 329. boulêsis is notoriously difficult to translate in contemporary philosophical language. The scholastic translation ‘will’ has the connotation of a faculty besides and opposite to the intellect. To avoid this voluntaristic overtone most translators now avoid the term ‘will’ and use ‘wish’. If ‘will’ is too strong a term, ‘wish’ is too weak in this context, as the boulêsis is supposed to dominate sensual desires (cf. 308,10; 310,19). For Ps-Simplicius boulêsis indicates the desiderative aspect of reason or intellect, exactly what scholastic authors like Thomas Aquinas called ‘appetitus rationalis’. This meaning is better preserved by the term ‘willing’ than by ‘wishing’. See also below 291,3; 292,26; 296,9.27.33. 330. This is the only case where Ps.-Simplicius engages in etymologizing. His point is not that the names of thumos and epithumia derive from hormê, but that both names are used to indicate impulses (hormas), and therefore are names of appetites (orexeis) granted that orexis is etymologically related to hormê. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, de Anima 74,1: ‘appetite is a kind of impulse; and of appetite some kind is desire (epithumia), another spirit, another will’. Aristotle himself uses hormê rather sparingly: it is never used in de Anima; in a general sense of natural impulse it appears in Phys. 2.1, 192b18 and Metaph. 5.23, 1023a8; in zoological works it is usually meant to describe sexual impulse or ‘instinct’; only in his discussion of akratic persons Aristotle uses it in a sense close to what is meant by Ps.-Simplicius (‘the hormai of the akratic people go in opposite directions’, EN 1.13, 1102b20). For Stoics, however, hormê became the basic concept in explaining psychophysical mechanism that originates actions and thus was a distinctive feature that distinguishes animals from plants (SVF II 988; III 178) and was the first topic to be considered in ethics (SVF III 1 (= DL VII 84)). This is one of the cases where the commentator relies more on Stoic than Peripatetic or Neoplatonic sources although hormê was already appropriated by Plotinus and Iamblichus (cf. Pyth. 31.205,3-8). For a discussion of the Aristotelian and Stoic usage see Preus 1981. 331. See 289,32-3. 332. In the Philebus Socrates refers to an ancient tradition according to which whatever is said to be has in its nature limit (peras) and unlimitedness (apeiron) (16C-D). Socrates adds to the mixture of these two also the cause of the mixture. There is no doubt that pleasure is said to belong to the unlimited (28A; 31A8-10), whereas the intellect may seem to correspond to the limit but that is never explicitly stated; according to what is said at 30C

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and 31A7-8 it rather seems to correspond to the cause of the mixture. Damascius in his commentary on Philebus (in Phil. 6.4-5; cf. 13.1-3) redefined Plato’s pleasure (hêdonê) and intellect (nous) into a couple of desire (orexis) and cognition (gnôsis). On this see Van Riel 2000, 145-54; Van Riel 2008, cxxi-cxxvii. Ps.-Simplicius follows such a reading. Once pleasure is redefined as desire and intellect as cognition it is possible to see desire as an instance of the unlimited, and cognition as an instance of the limit (peras). The latter identification is more difficult but it makes sense if the cause (aitia) is seen as an additional function of peras. For the commentator there is no doubt that the limit is hierarchically higher than the unlimited and therefore cognition higher and better than desire. 333. The idea that rational animals using the resourcefulness of reason (logos) can reach depths of viciousness incomparable to the evils caused by non-rational animals sounds unusual for a Neoplatonist. See Aristotle, Pol. 1.2, 1253a25-37 on why humans are both the best and the worst of all animals but there the reason is different: humans without law and justice become the worst animals. Cf. Iamblichus, Pyth. 31.203,1-6. 334. The capacity to ‘revert’ or ‘return’ upon itself (epistrophê) is characteristic of incorporeal beings. See Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 15; 43-4; 83-3; 186. This ‘reflexivity’ is most manifest in intellectual and rational activities. See also next note. 335. See 187,27-188,14, especially 187,27-9: ‘On the other hand perceiving that we perceive seems to me to be a special characteristic of humans only: for it is of a rational soul that reflexivity (to epistreptikon) is a function’ and 187,35-6: ‘Therefore our power of sense-perception is rational’. In what follows Ps.-Simplicius reports Iamblichus’ view that sense-perception (aisthêsis) is a homonymous term, because it is so different in rational and irrational animals. See also 79,36. 336. DA 3.3, 427b14-15; 428a24-6 and in the passage under discussion 432a31. Cf. Insomn. 1, 459a14-18. 337. First movements of imagination require sense-objects: cf. 119,14-17; 205,25-26; 209,11. 338. See Plato, Soph. 264B2 which implies that for Plato phantasia is a variety of doxa (cf. Tim. 52A). See also Aristotle’s critical analysis starting with DA 3.3, 428a25-6 (Lycos 1964 argues that Aristotle’s argument refutes what is taken to be Plato’s position; in any case the use to which Aristotle puts phantasia is different from Plato). The commentator discussing the earlier passage (211,33-212,27) already suggested that phantasia for Plato is in the mixture (en mixei) of doxa and aisthêsis and referred (211,33) not only to the Sophist, as in the present passage, but also to Philebus (perhaps meaning 39B; see Blumenthal 2000, 136 n. 265). Now he says en sumplokêi whereas Aristotle explicitly denies (3.3, 428a25-6) that phantasia is a sumplokê of doxa and aisthêsis. 339. On the concept of the will see above, n. 329. 340. 289,32-3. 341. Forward reference to a discussion whose high points appear at DA 3.10, 433a21-6 and 433b27-30. 342. epeidê de deleting de (not in A) and replace the full stop after zôon by a comma. Replace comma by full stop after zôois (15). 343. Jan Opsomer suggested this translation for hormêtikos, which means a movement starting from an inside impetus or impulse, not forced upon the animal from outside.

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344. He means the cause explaining natural movements, such as the upward movement of fire and the falling of stones. 345. The previous sentence is meant. But the same was said already at 112,12-15 without specifying that it is the vegetative soul. 346. This seems to be a reference to a single work ‘On Memory and Sleep’ whereas we recognize two different works; but very early in the tradition of interpretation de Somno was taken to be an immediate continuation of de Memoria (cf. Ross 1955, 1). Which passages the commentator has in mind is not entirely clear but cf. de Iuvent. 2, 468a21-8; 4, 469a23-8; Resp. 21 (= de Iuvent. 27), 480a16-24. Hayduck refers to de Mem. 452a and de Som. 456a. 347. de Som. 1, 454a19-b9. Cf. GA 5.1, 778b23-a10. 348. The commentator often uses zoê almost as equivalent with psukhê, the cause of life. 349. On hormê see n. 330. 350. See DA 3.3, 428a10-11, where phantasia is denied to ‘ants, bees and worms’. This seems to contradict what Aristotle says about bees in Metaph. A 1, 980b23-4 where it is implied that bees have memory [they are said to be phronima; cf. PA 2.2, 648a5-7]. If they have memory (and they do, see below, 293,30-1), they must have phantasia too (cf. de Mem. 1, 450a22-5). In his commentary at DA 428a11 Ps.-Simplicius solves the apparent contradiction as follows. Bees do not have ‘an impression of each thing in a well-defined way, but a more general one of food, and even if it is of the food in this grove, as in the case of bees, it is still not of that food in the discrete individual object, the flower. It is in this way that one must understand that imagination is not present in all (animals), and not that it is not present at all’ (209,22-5, tr. Blumenthal). In what follows the commentator gives a somewhat different explanation, setting the bees at a greater distance from the worms. In contrast to the worms the bees do have a determinate phantasia. However, because Aristotle limits the use of phantasia to phantasia that is also capable of being taught, he says that bees have ‘no phantasia’ (which does not mean that they have no phantasia at all). 351. 292,28-35 forms fr. 50 in Taormina 1989 (with comments on pp. 222-5). 352. The reference is not to DA 3.12, 434b2 (Hayduck), but to DPA 678a11-12. 353. Namely desire and cognition. 354. See below DA 3.10, 433b5-10. 355. Subject in the sense of underlying nature. 356. See n. 350. 357. On imperfect or incomplete animals see HA 1.9, 491b26-8 (cf. 6, 539b10); GA 2.4, 737b8; de Som. 2, 455a7-8 with a back reference to DA. 358. These two kinds of animals seem to be chosen because they are good examples of animals with a missing sense – mole-rats (aspalax) are missing sight, whereas the purple murices (porphura) don’t have organs for hearing (but cf. HA 4.8, 535a13-14). The purple murex is a kind of carnivorous (cf. HA 8.2, 590a34-b4) marine mollusc (Murex trunculus or Hexaplex trunculus) with a spiral shell from which the highest sort of purple was obtained. On the senseperception of purple murex see also de Sensu 5, 444b13-15; HA 4.8, 435a6-9. On the sense of privation involved in this case see Metaph. 5.22, 1022b24-6. 359. Couple of sentences above, 294,16-17. 360. On blind rats or rather mole-rats (aspalax; modern spalax typhlus), see DA 425a11; cf. HA 1.4, 91b27-34; 4.8, 533a3-10. Aspalax is for Aristotle a unique animal combining viviparousness and sightlessness. Cf. Balme 1987.

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361. On oysters see HA 5.15, 547b18-20. 362. On spontaneously generated animals (ta automata) see HA 5.1, 539a21-5 and 539b2-14; 5.19, 551a1-8; cf. GA 1.1, 715b26-8. For details see Balme 1962 and Gotthelf 1989. For the reception of this doctrine by Neoplatonists, see Wilberding 2012. 363. cf. GA 1.1, 715b5-8; 1.16, 721a5-8; HA 5.1, 539b10-14. 364. DA 3.10, 433a20-3. 365. cf. 19,31-8. 366. On the application of the term ‘intellect’ to imagination, see above 286,28-32 and n. 301. 367. On the concept of will see above 289,23 and n. 329. 368. Throughout the discussion the commentator distinguishes four kinds of people: (1) the virtuous (spoudaios, 296,15) or temperate (sôphrôn, 296,17) who always follow reason (296,14-15.17), whose desire co-operates with reason (296,31): their motion is initiated by reason and desire working together (koinêi, 296,31.35-6); (2) people with self-control (egkratês) in whom reason initiates motion separately from desire (idiai, 296,30) and dominates desire (295,36-7); (3) people without self-control (akratês) in whom the motion is initiated by desire (296,13-14) separately from reason (296,30-1) and desire dominates reason (308,11; 309,17-18; 310,20-1); (4) licentious (akolastos) in whom reason follows passion (296,16) and irrational desire (296,36-7; 310,19-20) and initiates motion together (koinêi) with the desire it follows (296,31). Thus both in people with and without self-control there is a fight going on between reason and desire (295,28; 296,12; 299,27) and either the one or the other initiates the motion, whereas in both the virtuous and licentious person the motion is initiated by reason and desire working together – in the first case reason works with desire submitted to its commandment, in the second irrational desire works with reason at the service of passions. The latter case is similar to using resourcefulness of reason to aggravate vicious actions (290,3-4). 369. See above 296,8-9 and n. 329. 370. See Introduction, pp. 17-18 on the goal of practical intellect. 371. Ps.-Simplicius clarifies that at 433a15 one should read not ou (‘not’) but hou with a circumflex (i.e., ‘that of which’). 372. Addition suggested by Hayduck. 373. On impulse-driven movement see n. 343. 374. Hayduck indicates a lacuna here. 375. The commentator is interpreting here the Aristotelian phrase ‘all intellect is right’ (nous men oun pas orthos, 3.10, 433a26). Assuming that orthos here is equivalent to alêthes the claim restates what Ps.-Simplicius has argued throughout his commentary on DA 3.6 above (cf. Aristotle, NE 6.3, 1139b15-17 and 6.6, 1141a3-8). Similarly Philoponus, in DA 585,25 – ‘what is truly intellect (alêthinos nous) is always right’; Themistius, in DA 119,17 interprets the phrase as being said about ‘intellect in the strict sense (ho kuriôs)’. Alternatively one might think that Aristotle, speaking about intellect in relation to action, wants to stress the fact that the intellect always aims at the good (and not apparent good) and in that sense is always right. 376. Addition by Hayduck. 377. The commentator seems to have in mind the very beginning of NE 1.1, 1094a1-3 (cf. Rhet. 1.6, 1362a23-6; 1.7, 1363b14 and Polit. 1.1, 1252a2). For Plato see e.g. Philebus 54C9-10; Symp. 205A6-7; Gorg. 499E6-9, Euthyd. 278E-279A. 378. This is a restatement of an earlier remark at 264,5-8.

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379. Ps.-Simplicius clarifies ‘practical’ by means of ‘desiderative’, that is by its necessary or essential feature. 380. This remark hints to Aristotle’s view that action (praxis) is not shared by lower animals and is purely a human endeavour (NE 6.2, 1139a1920; cf. EE 2.6, 1222b19-20). But occasionally Aristotle uses praxis in another sense applicable to other animals as well (e.g. PA 2.1, 646b14-16). For varieties of Aristotle’s usage see Bonitz 1870, 631a20-b21. 381. Literally ‘generated’ (genêton). 382. DA 3.9, 432a19-22. 383. Here the term epithumêtikon is used for bodily desire as different from desire (orexis) in general. 384. The commentator considers the bouleutikon as a capacity of rational desire (boulêsis) distinguished from the non-rational or sensual desire (epithumia). See also nn. 314 and 329. 385. cf. above 289,9-11. 386. cf. above 289,11-14. 387. The desiderative power (orektikon) in people with and in people without self-control does not form a unitary genus but should rather be understood as having something in common like the common notion of ‘soul’ in expressions ‘vegetative soul’, ‘sensitive soul’ and ‘rational soul’; see 12,258; 81,19-22; 91,20-1; 96,23-7. In 71,13-15 other examples of things said to be common in this sense are ‘being’, ‘good’, ‘healthy’ and ‘motion’. At 69,1-3 the same is said about the categories; at 239,10-11 about material and immaterial noêta (but there it is close to homonymy); 262,9-10 applies it to the notion of ‘simple’ (to haploun). Following Aristotle (e.g. Metaph. 4.1-2, 1003a33-b17; 7.4, 1030b2-4; cf. 11.3, 1060b36-1061a7), Ps.-Simplicius calls this mode of predication aph’ henos (which abbreviates aph’ henos kai pros hen). It indicates a certain semantic centre to all things called by the same word even if they do not form one genus (interpreting Aristotle, G.E.L. Owen introduced a designation ‘focal meaning’ for these cases). For a discussion of this way of predication see 98,16-28 and 108,8-20. For the commentator it does not amount to homonymy (107,12). See also above n. 17 at 249,7 and Lloyd 1998, 29 and 78. 388. This is the will (boulêsis). 389. At 299,28-30. 390. The lemma omits eti. 391. Ps.-Simplicius has in mind Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plutarch of Athens, the two commentators whom he uses most often. In fact, Alexander’s worry about the lack of the main clause (apodosis) following ‘since’ (epei) is recorded in Philoponus, in DA 590,39-591,1 after which comes Plutarch’s defence (apologia) of ‘since’ (591,1-7) which in essence is restated by Ps.-Simplicius in 300,35-301,5 without mentioning Plutarch by name. For a short discussion see Hicks 1907, 561. 392. 300,29-301,1 is printed as fr. 53 in Taormina 1989. 393. This is close to Themistius, in DA 120,27-30. 394. cf. Aristotle, MA 6, 700b35-701a1; Metaph. 12.7, 1072a26-7. 395. Aristotle introduces pneuma in de Motu Animalium 10 but the only hint to its location is that it is somehow in the heart (736a14-16). On complexities of Aristotle’s notion of pneuma see the still valuable exposition in Peck 1943, 576-93, and Balme 1972, 158-65; Nussbaum 1978, 143-64; Bos 2003, 31-46. For the commentator pneuma has a close relation to phantasia (214,2-7; 216,26-9) and is the seat of the ‘common sense’ (167,13-17); the pneuma around the heart (perikardion) is the first faculty of touch (197,11-

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12; cf. 70,10-11). For Ilsetraut Hadot this passage shows that Ps.-Simplicius relies on Stoic or medical sources rather than Aristotle (Hadot 1978, 184-5). Cf. extensive discussion about various ways of describing pneuma in Philoponus, in DA 587,21-589,26. 396. Aristotle does not speak about such a ‘surface’ (epiphaneia) in MA, and nothing like it appears in any of his treatises on animals, but behind this remark may stand a peculiar interpretation of MA 9, 702b12-703a3. Cf. 303,31-3 below that may suggest that Ps.-Simplicius is relying on some unidentified commentator. 397. Knowingly or unknowingly following Alexander of Aphrodisias (e.g. his de Anima 16,11-12; cf. 23,24-6) and Philoponus (in DA 217,13-14: organikon de esti to ekhon organa) several modern interpreters like Hicks, Ross and Hamlyn have interpreted organikon in Aristotle’s de Anima (e.g. 2.1, 412a28) as meaning ‘having organs’. Both Plutarch and Ps.-Simplicius (cf. 52,32-5) understand the adjective in another, more natural way as ‘instrumental’. Recently several modern commentators have argued that this indeed is how the word should be understood in Aristotle, see Everson 1997, 64; Menn 2002, 108-11; Polansky 2007, 160; it plays a crucial role in a ‘reconstruction’ of Aristotle’s psychology in Bos 2003. 398. In Alexander’s reading of Aristotle the soul cannot use body as an instrument because there is no unity between the user and its instrument (Ps.-Simplicius, in DA 52,27-32). For the commentator, however, the soul is twofold: ‘So the whole soul of the living being (zôon) is one, but, on the one hand, it has something transcendent that moves and uses [it], and, on the other hand, [something] that is stretched out and belongs to it [i.e. the living being] as determining it’ (87,33-5) and ‘It has been said that the psychical life of mortals is of two kinds; one through which the instrument is given its form as instrument, so that it may be an instrument of the soul, the other as using the already living instrument. This is not an altogether different life (if it were the user would not be of the same nature and life would involve change from the outside), but it is one thing that exhibits two forms, one as giving form to the instrument and not initiating change but characterising what is changed vitally, one as initiating change but as user. For every soul of mortals is an actuality in both respects, since it is changed vitally and also is that which initiates change from within. [] Therefore the complete definition of the soul needs both in order to make clear also that it uses the body as an instrument’ (90,29-36 and 91,3-4, tr. Urmson). Cf. 227,15-17. 399. Perhaps Ps.-Simplicius, after mentioning plants, uses the example of oysters (ostrea) because in Aristotle’s view oysters are so little removed from plants that occasionally Aristotle (see GA 3.11, 761a31-3) calls plants the earthly oysters and oysters water plants. 400. This remark seems to be aimed at the Peripatetics, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias for whom soul is just the form of the body (cf. his de Anima 10,11-14) whereas for Ps.-Simplicius, following Iamblichus, the formal causality is just one aspect of the soul’s twofold entelecheia. 401. The intermediary which Ps.-Simplicius is now describing seems to be the same as what above was called pneuma or ‘surface’ (cf. above 301,17; 301,29-30). However, the commentator understands this intermediary as the life that characterizes the living body. . 402. For Ps.-Simplicius whatever is incorporeal is unmoved or unchanging (56,27) and life is incorporeal, see 66,15-16. 403. Although the soul for Aristotle cannot be said to be in motion on its

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own (DA 1.3, 406a2) it can be so said accidentally (kata sumbebêkos) when the body is moved or changed, see DA 1.3, 406a4-6 and 406b5-6 (with Ps.-Simplicius, in DA 37,16-19) and a conclusion at 1.4, 40.8a30-4. 404. ‘What can be otherwise’ (to endekhomenon) is the standard Aristotelian expression for contingency. 405. The last words have been read differently by various editors: as hêi energeia (Bekker, Trendelenburg, Biehl) meaning ‘desire is a motion insofar as it is activity’, hê energeiai (Torstrik, Ross) suggesting that desire is meant in the sense of ‘act of desiring’ (Ross 1961, 316), or ê energeia (Rodier, Hicks) meaning that desire is a motion ‘or [rather?] activity’ (‘rather’ is a suggestion in Skemp 1978, 182-3 who discusses all variant readings). The second version is not supported by manuscripts. See Hicks 1907, 562-3 for his extensive discussion of this phrase, including his interpretation of Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary. Note that our commentator, knowing that the text could be read in accordance with the first and the third option, explicitly opts for the first version (below at 303,1-2). 406. 302,22-30 is fr. 54 in Taormina 1989, 134 with comments on pp. 230-3. 407. Ps.-Simplicius’ often uses the verb kharakterizein for formal causality. 408. On the commentator’s attempt to interpret Aristotle from Aristotle, see Introduction, pp. 5-6. The hermeneutical principle that the author is his own best interpreter goes back to Alexandrian philologists and is usually ascribed to Aristarchus, the commentator of Herodotus and editor of Homer. Cf. the idea of clarifying ‘Homer from Homer’ in Porphyry, Homeric Questions 1, 56,4 (ed. Sodano). Trendelenburg refers to this methodological principle in the introduction to his de Anima commentary: ‘In commentariis id unum omnium maxime spectavimus, ut Aristoteles ex Aristotele, hi de anima libri e reliquis Aristotelis libris illustrarentur’ (1833, LXVII). 409. In ancient copies no iota adscriptum or subscriptum is found; therefore the commentator has to clarify whether ê or êi is meant. On this see n. 405. The disjunctive conjunction is printed by Rodier 1900; Hicks 1907; Siwek 1965; Jannone 1966. 410. The commentator thus explains in what sense Aristotle may apply kinêsis to the soul’s activity, whereas he is accustomed to understand kinêsis as a corporeal and continuous movement and often criticizes Plato for applying the vocabulary of kinêsis to the activities of the soul (see above 25,23; 34,8-16; 39,8,37; 50,5; 62,12; 312,26). Aristotle distinguishes between energeia and kinêsis, considering the latter an incomplete energeia, see Physics 3.2, 201b31-2; Metaph. 9.6, 1048b29-35. In the latter passage, the examples of kinêsis are learning, walking, building whereas seeing and thinking (noein) are examples of energeia. For problems involved in Aristotle’s distinction see Ackrill 1997, 142-62 (first published in 1965) and Burnyeat 2008. See also n.160 above. 411. See definition of kinêsis: Phys. 8.5, 257b8-9; cf. 3.2, 201b31-2. 412. Ps-Philoponus (491,23-4) refers to the Historia Animalium, which is not plausible (unless one takes this title as covering all biological works [Charlton]). Hicks refers to PA 1.3, 643a35ff.; Ross to MA 3, 698a14-b7 and 8, 702a21-b11. 413. See above 301,34-6. 414. cf. MA 10. 415. As Benedikt Strobel notices, there are two possibilities to interpret organikôs: (1) ‘through an instrument’ (as organikôs is often translated in the literature on DA) (2) ‘as an instrument (by which some primary mover

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Notes to pages 113-119

moves)’. The examples in 303,31-2 (kardia, pneuma zôtikon) suggest that Ps.-Simplicius uses the term in sense (2) – unless there are again instruments by which the bodily instruments move. Also, when Ps.-Simplicius says that desire does not move organikôs (303,26), this can only mean that desire does not move as an instrument (for desire moves through an instrument). 416. On the role of organic instruments in the transmission of movement see MA 701b7f.; 702a8-19; 703a20. 417. See n. 396 above. 418. 304,9-20 is fr. 55 in Taormina 1989, 135 with notes on p. 233. 419. It should be noted that Ps.-Simplicius does not subscribe to either of these views. 420. As Benedikt Strobel notices, the objection that follows is directed against both interpretations of ‘the hinge’. Ps.-Simplicius objects that they both falsely ascribe to koilon and to kurton to different entities (the two rings, in Plutarch’s interpretation, the ring and the pivot, in Alexander’s), thereby contradicting Aristotle’s claim that to koilon and to kurton are ‘inseparable in magnitude’ and thus (as Ps.-Simplicius explains) ‘one in subject’. Ps.-Simplicius is going to argue that to koilon and to kurton refer to properties [of the surface] of one and the same ring – namely the ring which is contained (cf. 305,1-5). 421. Our bodies: literally ourselves. 422. Accepting Hayduck’s addition. 423. After eite one expects a second eite which is lacking. 424. Hayduck suggests Phys. 7.2, 243a17-b2. Cf. MA 10, 703a19-21; IA 2, 704b22. Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 589,7-9 also is surprised to see that Aristotle ‘brings natural movement under pushing and pulling’, which seems to go against the argument in the Physics. 425. Accepting Hayduck’s addition. 426. We propose to read proeirêmenôi for prokeimenôi. 427. Ps.-Simplicius critically explained Alexander’s interpretation above 304,20-8. 428. cf. 301,15-16. 429. In the discussion of DA 3.9, e.g. at 298,18-25. 430. The commentator means plants. 431. The word ostreôdes, which means ‘oyster-like’, suggests that the author is talking about oysters (cf. 294,30-9). Ps.-Simplicius likes to refer to the example of oysters but this is the only passage in which he refers to some experiment. In any case, in Aristotle’s writings this phenomenon is not recorded. 432. Hayduck indicates a lacuna before to empeson (4). The passage aniaron kai to empeson is restored in the edge of f. 22v in A, but probably corresponds to the original text. The Aldina has empeson hêdu, but this is a conjecture which conveys the meaning of the text. We follow the Aldina in the other conjecture dekhontai for deksamenai A. 433. The incomplete animals have imagination, but not a fully articulated, but rather a dim, indeterminate imagination. Ps.-Simplicius often refers to this view in his commentary. See 102,7-9; 106,16; 148,25-6; see also above on the debasement of imagination in animals (293,27-8). 434. See n. 250 above. 435. Reference to the celebrated Aristotelian axiom ‘natura non facit saltus’. 436. amphibolos: cf 109,1. 437. On the question whether the celestial beings have sense-perception, see n. 525.

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438. viz. as well as the imagination of non-rational animals. 439. See e.g. 119,14-17; 205,25-6; 209,11. 440. Phaedr. 249B7-C1. 441. See on this meaning of doxa 208,28-30: ‘opinion is belief about things which can be otherwise and conviction about things that are necessary without cause’. See also 210,32-6. 442. The use of boulêsis in the following commentary (see 310,16.19) shows that the commentator read tên boulêsin in 434a13, and not ekeinên as proposed by Bywater. 443. On hôsper sphaira cf. DA 2.8, 419b27. As the commentator explains below, sphaira here can and has been understood both as ‘ball’ and as ‘heavenly sphere’. The second interpretation was defended probably by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plutarch of Athens, certainly by Themistius in DA 121,33-7 and Ps.-Philoponus in DA 590,10-12, and also by Averroes and Thomas Aquinas (among modern commentators it is supported by Trendelenburg 1877, 455 and Hicks 1907, 569-70). Apart from Ps.-Simplicius, the first interpretation appears in Sophonias, in DA 145,17. In modern times it was defended by Rodier 1900, 559-61, Ross 1961, 318-19 (where on p. 319 he explicitly endorses Ps.-Simplicius’ interpretation; cf. Polansky 2007, 531), and Hamlyn 1968, 154. Barbotin hesitates between the two interpretations (Jannone 1966, 110). For a discussion see Hutchinson 1990, who himself discards both interpretations and, assuming that Aristotle’s sphaira here is the same as Plato’s kuklos in Tim. 43E-44B, suggests that Aristotle is using Plato’s soul-circles from Timaeus as an illustration. 444. This is Cesare according to medieval mnemonic classification. Its most general form is: no S is M; (all) M is P; S is not P. Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Pr. 1.5, 27a5-9. To compare with Ps.-Philoponus who is fond of turning Aristotle’s claims into syllogistic form (for examples see Charlton 2000, 7 or Charlton 2000a, 7) Ps.-Simplicius uses this didactic tool very rarely (for the second figure of syllogism see also below 321,38-9 and 327,24). 445. See n. 368 above. 446. The exegetes Ps.-Simplicius most probably has in mind are Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plutarch of Athens. See n. 443 above. 447. Not yet educated desire is the desire present in uneducated people (cf. 19,4-8; 19,33-8). 448. Both kineitai and kinei is found in the manuscripts, although the former version dominates. Hicks 1907, 571 explains the appearance of kinei by DA 3.9, 432b26-9. 449. The commentator examines the three levels of intellect in the soul to see in what sense they move or are moved. On the three levels of the intellect, see Introduction, pp. 10-15. 450. On the possibility of self-knowledge see DA 3.4, 429b9. 451. On the notion of projection see nn. 33, 110, 136, 144 and 254. 452. This alludes to DA 3.5, 430a12 (‘as art’) and 430a15-17 (‘as light’). 453. According to Ps.-Simplicius, in the case of the essential intellect of the soul (which is the subject matter of DA 3.5), activity and being coincide (it does what it is and it is what it does). But the imperfect outgoing intellect (which is the subject matter of DA 3.4) exhibits a division between its being and its activity. 454. It may be strange to talk about a production of the practical intellect. However, as the commentator said above (311,22), the perfected outgoing intellect is ‘the cause of the practical intellect’ and as its cause it causes the animal to move.

186

Notes to pages 123-125

455. DA 3.5, 430a22-3. 456. That is, an activity that is not proceeding and divided from the substance of the intellect. By being intellect it has this type of activity. 457. See above 258,18-19 and 259,30-8 and Introduction, pp. 9-10. 458. DA 3.5, 430a22-3. 459. This restates what was said above at 258,29-31. 460. cf. above 249,23-4 where it is said that soul is more closely connected to its forms than nature. 461. This passage, which is found in the restored upper edge of fol. 224v in A. , may have been added by the corrector A; there remains a lacuna after monên which we propose to solve by adding . 462. Reading energeian instead of epistêmên (4). Notice that A added after proiontos (3) tên de energeian dia, maybe because he skipped a passage in his model, but he expuncted it. 463. Plato, Tim. 35A1-5, cf. 43C7-D4 and 44B4-6. 464. Such twofold interest has guided the commentator from the very beginning. See the opening phrase of the commentary (1,1-5) and Introduction, pp. 9-13. 465. On the unparticipated and participated intellect see n. 26. 466. According to the commentator the notion of ‘self-moved’ (autokinêtos), which he ascribes to Plato on the basis of Laws 894C-896E, Phaedr. 245C-E, and following Aristotle’s to auto kinoun (DA 1.2, 404a21), contains a peculiar indication of the soul’s twofold character, since ‘self-’ (auto-) indicates its remaining and ‘moved’ (kinêtos) indicates its going out towards divisible bodies. See 246,25-8: ‘Indeed even in Plato “self-movement” shows a certain duality in the soul. The “self-”, which he also habitually uses of the highest forms, applies to its being at rest and to its formal and productive nature, while to the “moved” belong its being passible, proceeding, being perfected and being determined’ (tr. Blumenthal). Cf. also 26,22-8; 62,2-11 (about Xenocrates). See also Steel 1978, 67-8 and Steel 1997, 117-18. 467. DA 3.5, 430a22-3. 468. cf. 240,20-1; 262,25-32. 469. cf. above 249,17-21. 470. cf. above 249,23-4. 471. On the difference between Plato and Aristotle concerning kinêsis see n. 410. 472. cf. Laws 898A9-B3. 473. cf. DA 1.3, 406a2 and see Hicks 1907, 240. 474. See n. 466, though in the present passage the commentator is less self-assured about his interpretation. 475. See on this problem Steel 1978, ch. 7: ‘Conforming to Iamblichus’. This section should have been included in the edition of Iamblichus de Anima by Dillon and Finamore (2002). In the doxographical survey of various interpretations of ‘agent intellect’ in Ps.-Philoponus (in DA 535,4-536,5 followed by his rebuttal) Iamblichus’ interpretation is not mentioned. Ps.Philoponus discusses Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Plutarch of Athens, and Marinus as if these were all the interpretations there are. Ps.-Philoponus’ ignorance of Iamblichus may be accounted for by the fact that Iamblichus’ writings were less known in Alexandria. 476. On the special importance of Iamblichus for the commentator see the introduction to the commentary 1,11 where Iamblichus is called ‘the best judge of truth’, and Introduction, p. 6.

Notes to pages 126-130

187

477. The Aristotle manuscripts and the Aldina add ton toiouton before to toionde. 478. The commentator understands ‘universal’ in the Peripatetic sense for the universal concepts formed through ‘abstraction’ from sense-perception. 479. Hayduck suggests Cat. 5, 3b but toionde does not appear in Aristotle’s Categories. The reference is probably to Metaph. 1003a8-9 or 1039a15-16 where katholou and toionde are connected. 480. Thus according to Ps.-Simplicius the whole of DA 3.7-11 is about the practical intellect. 481. cf. 205,25-6 and above at 309,11-13. 482. With this sentence the commentator concludes the summary of the section about the practical intellect and moves to an introduction of the final part of Aristotle’s DA 3.12-13. 483. DA 1.3, 407b15-17. 484. Change diepheron. 485. 14 reading ekhêi with A (and confirmed by commentary). 486. 14 add kai before heôs with A. 487. Ps.-Simplicius uses the adverb epiktêtôs (adventitiously, derivatively, in a acquired way) and adjective epiktêtos to characterize a certain feature that does not belong to the essence or nature of something but comes from outside and is acquired by it in addition to what it is in itself (cf. 236,27). Thus, light (130,13-14; 132,24.29-30) and colour (134,32-3) do not belong to the transparent as such but may belong to it ‘adventitiously’; in the same adventitious way warmth belongs to the air (132,10-11), life belongs to a living body (230,6-8; 239,6-7) and life is acquired by matter. Similarly, mortal living beings receive cognitive forms adventitiously (epiktêtôs, below at 318,27-8). 488. At 49,32-3 the commentator, following Iamblichus, stated that celestial body is not like ours, which acquires life from somewhere else and may also lose it (cf. 219,18-19) but has life co-essential or connatural to it (the same claim is restated at 87,7-9; see also below at 316,36-9 and 318,11-13). Similarly, Philoponus argues against Proclus that the world only has an acquired eternity and not a connatural one: see de Aeternitate Mundi, 595,16-18; 596,16-25. Of the thirty TLG instances of the adverb sumphuôs (‘connaturally’) 19 are found in Ps.-Simplicius and one in Priscian, Metaphr. 21,15 (in the same sense), not even one occurrence in the authentic Simplicius. 489. 316,26 antanisousa: one expects a verb in the personal form; may be one should add esti. 490. The Stoics considered the earth as a living organism, wherein not only plants of all kinds grow, but also minerals and precious stones are formed in its wombs. The doctrine is found later in Seneca and in Pliny’s Natural History, in Plotinus and Proclus: see Steel 2009, 267-9. Philoponus, in DA 275,22-5 also refers to it. 491. On this doctrine of Iamblichus, see n. 488. 492. Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 598,17-22 reports two versions: zôois (animals) and, like here and in majority of manuscripts, zôsin (living beings). Cf. Plato, Timaeus 77B1-3. 493. The last phrase oute aneu tautês hoion te outhen einai zôon at 434a28-9 is not touched upon by Themistius and Ps.-Philoponus, is deleted by Torstrik, bracketed by Hicks, and removed after ekhein (l. 30) by Ross. But Ps.-Simplicius had it and attempts to explain it later on at 318,21-6. See also n. 506.

188

Notes to pages 130-132

494. At 317,4 instead of ekhein reading ekhei with a.corr. A and a. 495. All living beings, including plants, and even celestial bodies (as Alexander seems to have understood the phrase, see below 320,34-9). 496. On this doctrine of the mean see p. 315,35-8. 497. See 3.1, 425a6-7 and the commentary at 173,9-13; 174,26-8; 180,2-6 and 315,41-316,1. 498. Bones and hairs do not sense anything (112,30-1; 180,2-3; Aristotle DA 1.5, 410a30-b1 and 3.13, 435a24-5 with the commentary 328,5-7) since they consist of earth. Among the sense-organs the earthy element dominates touch although even it is made of all four elements (179,18-19). On the combination of elements in sense-organs see DA 3.1, 424b31-425a8, and commentary 174,17-35 and 179,16-26. For the idea that all perceptible bodies consist of various combinations of four primary qualities and thus also of ‘the simple bodies’ or elements, see GC 2.2-3 (cf. DA 2.11, 423b27-9). 499. This phrase is not found in Plato or any other author. In Timaeus 77B5-6 Plato argues that plants do not only have vegetative life, but also a form of perception with an appetite of what is pleasurable or painful (Taylor 1928, 534 argues that Plato meant no more than the sensibility of plants towards dry, moist, hot, and cold). For Aristotle plants have no share in sense-perception (e.g. DA 1.5, 410b22-3; 2.12, 424a32-4), although they do live (cf. PA 4.5, 681a12-15), have one kind of soul (vegetative) and therefore might be included among ‘living beings’. Proclus defended the Platonic view against Aristotle, and so did also Damascius. Of course, all Platonists insist on the dim, vague character of the perception in plants. On this discussion see Steel 2005, 184-5. 500. DA 3.13, 435a25-b1. 501. Ps.-Simplicius uses the familiar Aristotelian distinction between being simply (einai, zên) and well-being (eu einai or zên), which appear later on at DA 3.12, 424b24 and 3.13, 435b19-21. 502. About the good mixture (eukrasia) as characteristic of human body see 153,16-18; 153,20-4. 503. That humans have a more subtle and precise sense of touch but the other senses are inferior in comparison with the other animals: see DA 2.9, 421a19-26 and also PA 2.16, 660a11-13. 504. That is the good that consists in just being without any added perfection. 505. See above at 317,16-20. 506. This construction of the text shows that the commentator read at 434a28-9 oute aneu  zôion, as is found in all manuscripts. See n. 493. 507. On the reconstruction of this corrupted text see Philological Appendix. 508. Reading with Diels in 318,8-9 empsukha/on for apsukha/on preferred by Hayduck: see Philological Appendix. 509. The standard interpretation of this text is that Aristotle insists on the capacity of animals to receive in perception the forms of the sensible objects without the matter in which they are involved, something plants cannot. Hicks refers to 2.12, 424b1. This is also the interpretation of Ps.-Philoponus: ‘he is talking about plants; these do not receive form without matter as do the senses, but with matter’ (tr. Charlton). Our commentator defends a different view: the ‘forms’ are the soul-forms which constitute the living being. Animals which can receive their form without matter are eternal not generated living beings, such as the celestial beings. Mortal animals cannot receive their soul-form without matter.

Notes to pages 132-135

189

510. On the questions whether celestial animals have sense-perception, see above at 308,27-8 and below 320,29-23 with nn. 437 and 525. 511. At 317,16-20. 512. This claim is not included explicitly in the lemma (434a31), but was already used in DA 3.9, 432b21 (on the purpose of nature cf. 2.4, 415b16-17). 513. Plato Resp. 10, 608E. 514. See Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 198b10-199a32. 515. 319,8 for kopos reading kopros with A. 516. ‘Hairs in the armpit and the grey hairs on the head in old age are not for the sake of something, but are side-effects (sumptômata) of things that are for the sake of something’ (Ps.-Philoponus 595,19-21; tr. Charlton). 517. On the claim that more perfect animals have a more perfect sense of touch, see above n. 503. 518. cf. 318,31-6. 519. On the view that the final cause is the most important cause see Proclus, in Alc. 207,10-13: ‘In general, the ignorance of the final cause renders in all cases the discernment of the other causes useless, since the first and the most important and principal cause is the final.’ See also Proclus, in Rep. 2,88,10-11; 10; in Tim. 1, 355,28-357,23; 368,15-28; 3, 232,14. See also n. 58. 520. This addition is found in all major manuscripts of Aristotle’s text; it was not in our commentator’s copy, but found in other copies, as he said (320,28). Themistius and Ps.-Philoponus had it in their text. Torstrik and Hicks deleted the supplement. See commentary below. 521. That is, human beings. 522. See 231, 17-23; 283,27-9; 286, 9-10. 523. Very early in the commentary (16,19-26) Ps.-Simplicius distinguished various sciences and claimed that the collaboration of imagination is needed in practical and natural sciences whereas in the science that concerns intelligibles imagination accompanies like shadow accompanies light but does not collaborate (similarly, 45,37-46,1). Cf. above 283,24-7. 524. Aristotle’s phrase could be used as an argument that also the celestial bodies, which are in perpetual movement, should have sense-perception (what Aristotelians denied). To exclude this view Alexander has to argue that even the celestial beings are ‘stationary’ animals. See on Alexander’s interpretation of this text Kupreeva 2012. 525. Platonic philosophers generally attributed a form of sense-perception to the celestial beings, to the sun and the stars (influenced by Plato, Tim. 28B-C; 33C; Phaedo 111B), though they insisted that it was another kind of perception, not a passive one. See Plotinus 4.4 [28] 22-7; Proclus, in Tim. 2, 81, 16-85,31; in Parm. 7, 307,10-309,38 ed. Steel; Hermias, in Phaedr. 68,7-26. This was also the view of Iamblichus (see this commentary 174,38175,4). They defended their view in a discussion with the Peripatetics, mainly Alexander of Aphrodisias. The best presentation of the debate between Platonists and Peripatetics on this issue is in Ps.-Philoponus in DA 595,37-598,6. As Ps.-Philoponus informs us, Plutarch of Athens had attempted to read Aristotle’s text in 434b3-5 as an argument for the Platonic view. See Taormina 1989, 233-8. See also Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 4, §9: ‘According to Proclus, the heavenly bodies have no senses but sight and hearing, and this is also Aristotle’s opinion; the reason is that they have only those senses that contribute to a superior mode of existence, not to existence simply, whereas the other senses serve the purpose of existence only. Homer too confirms this when he says: “Sun, thou who seest all things and hearest

190

Notes to pages 135-137

all things”, which implies that they have sight and hearing only. Another reason is that these senses are active rather than passive in perceiving, and further that they are more appropriate to the immutability of the heavenly bodies’ (tr. Westerink). Damascius, however, defended that they should have all senses or none at all. Interestingly our commentator distances himself from this common Platonic view and defends Alexander’s interpretation. In other passages too he distances himself from this view and defends that neither Plato nor Aristotle admit sense-perception in eternal celestial animals (see 318,13-16). If, however, one understands perception in another ‘superior’ sense, one might accept Iamblichus’ view. See 106,27-30; 174,38175,4; 215,19-25; 308,27-36. 526. DA 3.12, 434a27. 527. As we learn from Ps.-Philoponus (who quotes a long text from Alexander’s commentary in 595,39ff.), Alexander found in this supplementary text an argument against attributing sense-perception to celestial animals (see n. 525). ‘Alexander says: For why will the heavenly bodies have sense? Neither for the body of these things it is better to have sense, nor for the soul. Not for the body, because sense would be helpful to bodies that are affected, keeping them away from what is destructive, but it is no help to heavenly bodies since they are unaffected [] But neither will it help their soul, because those that have sense have obtained it in order to recollect universals [] But the heavenly bodies always act intellectually and never desert universals’ (tr. Charlton). 528. cf. 105,10-15; 195,10-12; 269,32-3; 294,7-8. 529. See DA 2.1, 412b18-26 (and commentary 94,1-14). 530. Adding after eipe, aisthêtikon esti. 531. Rational: he means the body capable of functioning as an organ of a rational soul. 532. See n. 533 above. 533. See DA 1.5, 411b18. 534. DA 3, 429a29-b5 (with the commentary 228,8-39), summarized in the next lines 320,25-8. 535. See DA 2.11, 423a12-15. See also the commentary above 315,34-8; 317,4-8. 536. That is, the body is either simple or non-simple (mixed). This is a complete logical division of alternatives. 537. See DA 3.12, 434a28. 538. hupomimnêskôn, literally, to remind, to bring to one’s mind. 539. See DA 3.13, 435a11ff. 540. See Plato, Timaeus 31B4-5: ‘That which comes to be must be bodily, and so visible and tangible’. The passive nature of the sense-perceptions may be inferred from Tim. 42A4-6, 43B7-D2 and 44A7-B1. 541. At 322,14 we read and translate: alla kai haptikon hopôsoun tôn sômatôn. 542. The Greek verb haptesthai means both the touching of bodies by juxtaposition and the perception by touching. Not all bodies touching one another have the capacity of perceiving by touch, only animate bodies. 543. Also Ross notices that there is a problem with the text, but he decided to delete 434b12-13 hapton – haphê as spurious (Ross 1961, 323-4). But this is not a solution for the problem noticed by our commentator, namely that the conclusion does not seem to follow from the first two premises. A third premise is needed, which Aristotle introduces in a converse form. See also Hamlyn (155): ‘the argument for the necessity of touch is somewhat obscure.

Notes to pages 138-143

191

Aristotle is probably playing on a certain ambiguity in the word touch. The point is that if the animal body is touched by other bodies it must be able to touch other bodies, i.e. be capable of perceiving them by touch, if it is to survive.’ 544. 322,8-9. 545. This restates what was said at DA 2.9, 421a18-19. 546. See 316,26-9 but cf. already at 85,19-28 (commenting upon DA 2.1, 412a14-15). 547. antistrophê sun antithesei: see Alexander, in An. Pr. 29,15-17: ‘There is conversion with an opposition among propositions too. For the proposition saying “what is not an animal is not man” converts from “man is animal”’ (tr. J. Barnes et al.) The example is discussed in Aristotle, Topics 2.6, 113b15-26. See also Alexander, in Top. 190,26-193,7. For the same form of argument see 159,21-9; cf. 328,21. 548. ‘Contrary to nature’ is the state of animals that are bereft of a sense-organ they are supposed to have by nature, such as blind humans. Even without sight they remain animals, though without their well-being. 549. First mover, this is the sensible object. 550. For 325,14 allou read with A allon. 551. In a general sense, because he includes under change (metaballein) all possible forms of motion or change, including pushing. 552. The text of 325,17-21 is only preserved in fragmentary form. For a justification of the conjectural additions see Philological Appendix. 553. For the same example see 36,18-23. 554. The text of 325,36-8 is only preserved in fragmentary form. For a justification of the conjectural additions see Philological Appendix. 555. Earth, water, air, fire and the fifth divine element or ether. 556. See 3,29-30; 73,4-5; 81,1-12; 82,11-12; 172,5-6; 218,32; 220,27; 240,4 and 311,11-12. 557. See above, 322,5-323,18 (DA 3.12, 434b9-18). 558. Hayduck corrects in l. 15 oute into oude. But there seems to be something lacking. Read gên oute epikratousan . See 327,16. 559. See Plato Tim. 45B-C: a pure fire (not burning, but yielding a gentle light, similar to the daylight) is contained in the eye-ball and flows through the pupil as a ray towards the object seen. See above 133,31-4: ‘Aristotle is aiming at the Timaeus. How in this text light is said to be a form of fire and how daylight and the flow from sight become compacted to form a single body, that can be gathered from the commentary of Iamblichus on the Timaeus’. 560. See DA 3.1, 425a4: ‘the eye-ball is made of water’. 561. In the second book one could think of DA 2.4, 416a15-16 suggesting that fire burns without limit (with the commentary 113,13-15). But perhaps Hayduck is right in saying ‘rather in the third book III 1 425a5’. In DA 3.1, 425a5-6 Aristotle notices that ‘fire either belongs to none [of the senseorgans], or is common to all of them’. The commentator (179,31ff.) distinguishes between the elemental nature of fire, which is common to all organic bodies, and fire that causes burning, which can never be a sense organ. See also 174,30: ‘he now seems to reject the fire that burns and causes boiling as not being a sense-organ in its own right’. 562. The text of 326,19-23 is only partially preserved: see its reconstruction in the Philological Appendix. 563. As in English, the Greek term for touch (haptesthai) can mean just physical contact, as when two bodies touch one another, or the perception of touching. See n. 542.

192

Notes to pages 143-148

564. Physics 4.3, 226b23: ‘things are said to be touching (“in contact”, haptesthai) when their extremities are together’. 565. The text in 327,2-3 is only partially preserved in the manuscripts. For our proposed corrections see Philological Appendix. 566. See 158,18-21: ‘He apparently judges that the primary sense-organ of touch is in the region of the heart, the flesh and the sinews being sensitive, but not primarily’. 567. The medium is not an external thing as is air in seeing, but something that belongs to the living being itself, namely flesh. 568. Because the medium, namely flesh, is not really an external medium, but a vital integral part of the animal, the contact with the sense-object remains in the case of touch immediate. 569. See 326,20-7. 570. Based on DA 2.11, 424a6-7. 571. The text of 327,33-4 is only preserved in fragmentary form: see Philological Appendix. 572. 318,21-4. 573. The text of 328,20-2 is only preserved in fragmentary form: see Philological Appendix. 574. On this antithetical conversion see above n. 547. 575. Correcting 328,22 to oun  anairoun to ho oun  anairôn (anairoun Hayduck. anairou Aa : an.. Ma). 576. See 324,32-3. 577. At 435b9-10. 578. The text of 329,6-8 is only preserved in fragmentary form. For a justification of this reconstruction see Philological Appendix. 579. 329,7 dunamei Aa; du Ma; reading du. See Philological Appendix. 580. See Ps.-Philoponus, in DA 602,13-16: ‘And if someone raises the difficulty. What? Do not objects of smell destroy the whole body, like mephitic vapours? We reply that these too destroy incidentally through touch. They destroy by making infection, and infection acts by touch’ (tr. Charlton). 581. See 324,19-24. 582. Put full stop after einai (30).

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English-Greek Glossary abasement: huphesis absence: apousia abstraction: aphairesis accidents, accidental features: ta sumbebêkota account: logos accustomed (be), sunethizesthai act, be active: energein action: praxis activity, actuality: energeia actuality: entelekheia adjustment: sunarmogê affect, affection: pathos affected (be): paskhein affected (not easily): duspathês affection: agapêsis affirmation: kataphasis aim: telos alteration: alloiôsis alternation: enallax analogy: analogia animal: zôion animate: empsuchos antithetical: sun antithesei appetite: epithumia, orexis appetitive: orektikos apprehending (capable of): antilêptikos apprehension: antilêpsis argument: logismos, logos arouse: egeirein art: tekhnê ascent: anabasis assertion: kataphasis, phasis attach: sunaptein attribute (v.): katêgorein avoid: pheugein avoidance: phugê awaken: egeirein awakening: egersis, egrêgorsis aware (be): aisthanesthai awareness: sunaisthêsis bad: kakos

beginning: arkhê being: einai, ousia; mode of being: huparxis belief: doxa body: sôma boundary: horos, peras bring together: sunagein calculate: logizesthai causality: to aitiôdes cause: aitia, aition caused, what is caused: aitiatos change: kinêsis, metabolê character: êthos character (put on the): hupoduesthai characterize: eidopoiein choice: to haireton cognition: epignôsis, gnôsis, gignôskein cognitive: gnôstikos cognize: gignôskein, gnôrizein; capable of cognizing: gnôristikos collaborator: sunergôn collection: sunagôgê combination: sunthesis come before: protereuein coming to be: genesis comma (putting a): hupostizein common: koinos common sense: koinê aisthêsis communicate: epikoinônein, koinônein compare, make the comparison: apeikonizein comparison: parabolê, parathesis complete: teleios completion: teleiôsis, telos composite: sunthetos comprehended (cannot be): aperilêptos comprehending: periektikos comprehension: perilêpsis conceive: epinoein, noein concept: ennoia concomitant: sundromos concording: sundromos

202

English-Greek Glossary

concurrent: sundromos conflict: diamakhê conjunction: sundesmos conjunctive particle: sundesmos connection: suzeuxis connective: sundesmos consider: theôrein consideration: theôria constitute (what constitutes): to hupostatikon constitution: sustasis contact: sunaphê contemplate: theôrein contemplating (capable of): theôrêtikos contemplation: thea, theôria continuity: sunekheia continuous: sunekhês continuum: to sunekhes contraction: apostenôsis contrast: antidiastellein conversion: antistrophê convertible (be): antistrephein conviction: pistis co-ordinate: sustoikhos; in a coordinate way: sustoikhôs corporeal: sômatikos, sômatoeidês correction: diorthôsis correspondence: sunarmogê corresponding: enakolouthos critical: kritikos debasement: huphesis decline: huphizanein define: horizein; defining: horistikos; defining form: horos deliberate: bouleuesthai deliberation: boulê deliberative: bouleutikos deny: apophaskein, apophêmi depth: bathos desiderative: orektikos desirable: orektos desire (n.): epithumia, orexis desire (v.): oregesthai determinant: horistikos; determinant form: horos determine: horizein; determining: horistikos; in a determining way: horistikôs difference: diaphora, diaphorotês, heterotês difficult to comprehend: duslêptos difficulty: aporia dilate: diakrinein

dilating: diakritikos discern: krinein discerning: diagnôstikê discernment: krisis discriminate: diakrinein, epikrinein, krinein discrimination: krisis discriminative: kritikos discursive reason: dianoia discursive: dianoêtikos discursive: diexodikos disposition: hexis distinguish: diorizein divisible: diairetos division: diairesis, merismos doctrine: theôria dominate: epikratein, katakratein, kratein education: paideia efficient: poiêtikos eminent way (in an): huperekhontôs end: teleutê, telos enjoy: hêdesthai enmattered: enulos essence: ousia essential: kat’ousian, ousiôdês establish: hedrazein estimation: dokêsis evidence: enargeia exactness: akribeia example: paradeigma exist (what causes to): hupostatikos; exist upon, exist besides: paruphistasthai existence: huparxis, hupostasis; mode of existence: hyparxis, hypostasis expedient: ôphelimos explain: hermêneuein explanation (give an): aitiasthai explanation: aition exposition: ekthesis extend: ekteinein extension: diastasis, ektasis, to diaireton extreme: akros falsity, falsehood: to pseudos feature: pathos final: telikos first mover, primary mover: to prôtôs kinoun form: eidos formal: eidêtikos

English-Greek Glossary fulfilment: telos gather: sunagein generating: gonimos; capable of generating: gennêtikos generation (realm of): genesis genus: genos goal: telos good: agathos habit: hexis habituated (be): sunethizesthai highest: akros hinge: gigglumos hold together: sunekhein hypothesis, hupothesis illustration: eikôn image (be an): apeikonizesthai image: eikôn imagination: phantasia, phantasma imaginative: phantastikos imagine: phantazein imagined object: phantasma immediate: amesos impartible: ameristos imparticipable: amethektos imperfect: atelês impression: apotupôma imprint: tupos impulse: hormê inclination: sunneusis incomplete: atelês incorporeal: asômatos indeterminacy: to aoriston indeterminate: aoristos indeterminate (be): anoristainein individual: atomos indivisible: adiairetos, ameristos indivisibles: ta adiaireta infallible: anamartêtos inferior (in an inferior way): hupheimenôs infinite: apeiros inseparable: akhôristos instrument: organon instrumental: organikos intellect: nous intellective: gnôstikos, noeros, noêtikos intelligible: noêtos intelligible objects: ta noêta intermediary: mesotês; without intermediary: amesos interpret: hermeneuein

203

interruption (without): adialeiptôs interweave: sumplekein interweaving: sumplokê irrational: alogos judge: krinein judgment: krisis know: ginôskein, gnôrizein; capable of knowing: gnôristikos knowledge (acquire): gnôrizein knowledge: gnôsis, epistêmê lack of self-control: akrasia lacks nothing: anellipês launch: aphormê law: nomos length: mêkos licentious: akolastos life: zôê light: phôs likeness: eikôn limit: peras live: zên living: zôtikos living being: zôion locomotion (capable of): topikos; capable of vital locomotion: zôtikôs topikos love: agapan magnitude: megethos maintenance: sunokhê material: hulikos mathematical: mathêmatikos matter: hulê mean: mesotês memory: mnêmê model: paradeigma motivate: kinein move: kinein movement: kinesis; cause, initiate, produce movement, set in motion: kinein; capable of movement: kinêtikos multitude: plêthos name: onoma natural: phusikos nature: phusis necessary: anagkaion, anagkê negation: apophasis, arnêsis nourish: threphein nutritive: threptikos

204

English-Greek Glossary

objects known, objects of knowledge: ta gnôsta objects of imagination: ta phantasta occasion: aphormê opinion (have an): doxazein opinion: doxa; matter of opinion: doxastikos opposed (not): anantithetos opposite: antikeimenos, antithetos; no opposite: anantithetos opposition: antithesis, enantiôsis order: taxis organ: aisthêtêrion, organon otherness: heterotês pain: lupê painful: lupêros parasitize: paruphistasthai part: meros, morion participate: metekhein participation: metalêpsis, methexis, metousia particular: merikos particulars: ta merika, ta merikôtera partition: merismos passion: pathos passive: pathêtikos, pathêtos, paskhôn perceive: aisthanesthai perceptible objects: aisthêta perception (capable of): aisthêtikos perception (capacity of): to aisthêtikon perception (have): aisthanesthai perception: aisthêsis, antilêpsis perceptive: aisthêtikos perfect (n.): teleios perfect (v.): teleioun perfection: teleiotês, teleiôsis philosophy: philosophia place: topos pleasurable: hêdus pleasure (experience): hêdesthai pleasure (feel): hêdesthai pleasure: hêdonê plurality: plêthos potentiality: dunamis power of reproduction: gennêtikos power: dunamis practical: praktikos; practical discursive thought: praktikê dianoia; practical matters: ta prakta praise: humnein precede: protereuein precision: akribeia

predicate (v.): katêgorein predication (n.): katêgoria preferable: hairetos preference: to haireton premise: protasis presence: parousia primordial form: to prôtotupon principle: arkhê, to arkhoeides privation: sterêsis problem: aporia process of coming to be: ginesthai produce: poiein productive: poiôn progressive: poreutikos projection: probolê property: idiotês, idiôma proposition: protasis proximate: prosekhês psychical: psukhikos pure: katharos pursuit: diôxis, metadiôxis quality: poiotês rank: taxis rational: logikos, logoeidês reason, reason-principle (n.): logos reason (v.): dialogizesthai, logizesthai reason: aition reasoning: logismos reception: hupodokhê reference, referral: anaphora remain, remain still: menein reproduction: gennêsis rest, remain still: êremein return to itself: epistrophê return, reflection: epistrophê run back: anatrekhein sameness: tautotês saying: phasis science: epistêmê scientific knowledge: epistêmê scientific objects, objects of knowledge: ta epistêta scientific: epistêmonikos seek: diôkein seem: dokoun self-control (without): akratês self-controlled person: egkratês self-moved: autokinêtos sense impression: aisthêma sense perception: aisthêsis, aisthanesthai

English-Greek Glossary sense-object: to aisthêton sense-organ: aisthêtêrion sensibles, sense-objects: ta aisthêta sensitive: aisthêtikos sensitive power: to aisthêtikon separable, separated: khôristos shape: morphê sleep: hupnos soul: psukhê; of the soul: psukhikos specific: idios, oikeios speculation: theôria spirited: thumos spirited: thumoeidês spot: topos subject: hupokeimenon substance: ousia substantiate: ousioun substrate: hupokeimenon summit: akrotês super-being: huperousios superior: huperteros supposition: hupolêpsis, hupothesis syllogism, syllogistic reasoning: sullogismos synoptic way (in a): sunopsismenôs taste: geusis; capable of taste: geustikos tear apart: diaspan technical knowledge: tekhnê term: horos, onoma theoretical contemplation: theôria theory: theôria; in theory: theôrêtikôs; theoretical: theôrêtikos thing: pragma think: epinoein, noein thinking: noêsis thought: ennoia, noêma thought (objects of): ta noêta

205

time: khronos time (above): huperkhronos totality: holotês touch (n.): haphê touch (v.): hapthestai; capable of touch, power of touch: to haptikon trained (to be): rhuthmizesthai transcendence: huperokhê true: alêthês truth: alêtheia, alêthes turn away: apostrephesthai turn towards itself: epistrephein turning on itself: epistrophê ultimate: eskhatos unaware: anepignôstos unchangingly: aparallaktôs understanding: sunesis undivided: adiairetos unfolding: anelixis union: henôsis unitarily, in a unitary way: heniaiôs, henoeidôs unity: henôsis unmoved: akinêtos unpleasant: lupêros vegetative: phutikos, threptikos view: doxa visual: optikos vital: zôtikos voluntarily, in a voluntary way: hekousiôs wherefore: hou heneka whole: holos will: boulêsis word: onoma

Greek-English Index adiairetos, indivisible, 248,34; 249,11; 251,14.36.37; 252,27.28; 255,6.7; undivided, 249,8.9; 251,14.33; 252,26.31.32; 253,14.29; 254,11; 256,4; ta adiaireta, indivisibles, 249,35; 250,3; 252,5 adialeiptôs, without interruption, 291,30.31 agapan, love, 266,15 agapêsis, affection, 266,6 agathos, good, 266,3.7.15.16; 268,5.7; 298,39.40.41; 299,2.7; 300,6.11.13; 302,21; 307,15; 309,8; 310,36; 314,26.27.28; 315,3.5; 318,30; 319,23; 324,30; to prakton agathon, practical good, 297,3.4; 299,4 aisthanesthai, perceive, 264,16; 265,17; 266,20.22; 269,2; 290,7; 292,31; 308,32; 309,11; 316,6; 317,37; sense perception, 274,17; be aware, 300,3; have perception, 300,5 aisthêma, sense impression, 267,19.33; 315,20 aisthêsis, sense perception, 264,13.17.29; 265,21; 267,5.19.35; 268,3.29; 269,24.26.29.37; 272,36; 273,16.20.25.37; 274,29.36.37.39; 276,23.24.30; 277,35.37.38.39.41; 279,27; 280,10.18.19; 281,23; 282,40; 283,9; 289,27.41; 290,1.4.7.11.32; 294,2.18.37; 296,6; 306,33.38; 307,5.6; 308,27.37; 309,10.14; 311,15; 315,19.20.37; 316,11; 317,18.23.24.25.27; 318,20; 319,16; 320,1.4.10.14.30.39; 321,16.25; 323,9.14; 324,34; 326,4.34; 327,7; 328,19; perception, 266,3.4.7.16; 281,3.14; 282,20; 285,6; 291,31; 294,35; 306,35; 315,18; 316,10; 317,12.14;

319,22; 321,17; 324,22.38; 326,6; 328,7; sense, 268,31.32; 270,14; 272,5.8; 284,8.10.11; 294,1; 317,4; 318,13; 319,20; 322,32; 325,4; 328,32; haptikê aisthêsis, capacity of touch, 319,18; sense of touch, 327,3; katheudousa aisthêsis, sleeping sense-perception, 317,13; koinê aisthêsis, common sense, 268,37; 269,17.18.37; 270,22; 271,1.2; 274,5.6; 290,8; pathêtikê aisthêsis, passive perception, 318,14 aisthêtêrion, sense-organ, 264,25.28.37; 270,15; 315,39; 316,8; 326,14.19.25.28; 327,11.12.13.23.35; 329,1; organ, 328,34; 329,15 aisthêtikos, perceptive, 289,24; 290,25; capable of perception, 293,22; 294,3; 318,10; 321,33.38; 326,5; to aisthêtikon, what is capable of perception, 315,37; 316,10; 317,16; 318,2; capacity of perception, 317,30; 318,34; sensitive power, 264,21.24.36.37.40; 265,1.24; 271,3; 321,30; 325,5.6.8.9; 327,9; perceptive part, 266,20; perceptive power, 265,17.31; 266,13.35.38; 293,24.37 aisthêton, sense-object, 264,21.24.27.30.32.36.40; 265,19.20.32.33.36; 266,2; 267,19.20.26.35; 268.32.36.37; 269,31; 270,1.33.38; 271,13; 272,4; 273,1.3.4.6.8.14.18.20.21.32.40; 274,6.9.18; 281,15; 283,22; 290,29; 306,21; 307,8; 308,34.37; 309,12; 315,21.36; 319,20; 320,17; 321,22; 326,25.28.30.37; 327,10; 329,2.15; sensible thing, 273,19; observable, 273,22; ta aisthêta, objects of

Greek-English Index sensation, 275,1; sensible things, 275,26; sense-objects, 276,9.24; 280,18.19; 281,3; 282,19; 283,9.10.29; 284,22.30.34; 285,3; 321,2; 323,5.23; 324,22; 326,22; sensible realm, 277,24; perceptible objects, 277,25; to idion aisthêton, specific sense-object, 274,10; to koinon aisthêton, common sense-object, 274,7 aitia, cause, 248,36; 276,21.26.31.34.37; 277,32; 278,4; 287,35; 291,14.35; 292,41; 297,33; 298,3; reason, 264,38; 265,10; 287,31; 293,6; 320,9.16; 321,22; 323,39; 328,34; explanation, 314,36; 318,25; 320,2.7; eidêtikê aitia, formal cause, 302,33; 304,7; poiêtikê aitia, efficient cause, 291,21 aitiasthai, give an explanation, 298,5 aitiatos, what is caused, things caused, 276,34; 278,5; 298,8; 313,8-17; 314,5 aitiôdes (to), causality, 263,34 aitiôdês, causative, 314,5 aitiôdôs, in a causal way, 252,22 aition, cause, 249,2; 251,4.5; 277,1.31; 293,22; 297,28.36; 298,6.8; 305,23; 311,22; 313,9.10.11.12.13.15.16.20; 318,32.35; 319,23; reason, 310,2; eidêtikon aition, formal cause, 302,12; 305,25; 319,25; horistikon aition, determining cause, 251,28; defining cause, 312,15; hulikon aition, material cause, 319,25; kinêtikon aition, cause of movement, 306,16; periektikon aition, comprehending cause, 298,7; poiêtikon aition, efficient cause, 301,36; 305,25; 312,14; 319,25; telikon aition, final cause, 264,9; 319,24 akinêtos, unmoved, 301,4.5.10.11; 302,15.16.19; akinêtos kata topon, incapable of locomotion, 316,3; incapable of movement, 316,5 akolastos, licentious person, 296,31.37; 310,20 akousiôs, involuntarily, 292,39

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akrasia, lack of self-control, 310,28 akratês, without self-control, 308,11; 309,18; 310,21.24.27 akribeia, precision, 264,10; exactness, 310,7 akros, extreme, 259,12.23.24.29; 260,12; 312,35; highest, 313,18.27 akrotês, summit, 249,34; 250,6; 263,22 alêtheia, truth, 249,37; 264,6.7.10; 275,21; 299,3 alêthes, truth, 264,1.3; 295,20; 297,3 alêthês, true, 249,6.36; 252,8; 296,25 alêtheuein, grasp the true, 275,28 alloiôsis, alteration, 325,35 alloioun, 325,36 cause alteration alogia, irrationality, 290,11; irrational part, 299,30 alogos, irrational, 289,14; 290,3; 299,28 ameibein, change, 291,37; 307,37 ameristos, impartible, 248,34; 250,3; 252,36; 254,8; 258,4; 259,17; indivisible, 249,15; 264,33; 265,4; 268,38; 288,25; 290,13; 314,2; ta amerista, impartible beings, 261,13; indivisible beings, 312,26 to ameriston, indivisibility, 249,25 ameristôs, indivisibly, 249,25 amesos, immediate, 302,33; without intermediary, 312,19 amethektos, imparticipable, 254,33; 258,14 amphibolon, ambiguity, 296,19; ambivalent character, 308,38 amphibolos, being ambivalent, 308,23 amphibolôs, in an ambiguous way, 296,3.4 anabainein, ascend, 263,31 anabasis, ascent, 276,3 anagkê, necessary, 309,20 anainesthai, reject, 261,31 anairesis, destruction, 260,27 analogia, analogy, 271,18.20.21.24; 305,39 anamartêtos, infallible, 250,4 anantithetos, no opposite, 258,13; nothing opposed to it, 258,21; not opposed, 268,18 anaphora, reference, 276,9; referral, 279,32 anatrekhein, run back, 263,21;

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Greek-English Index

276,1; climb up, 263,33; run up, 276,1; remount, 313,20 anelixis, unfolding, 249,27; 258,16; 262,31; logikê anelixis, rational unfolding, 253,11; 266,1 anellipês, lacking nothing, 252,27 anepignôstos, unaware, 299,37; 300,8.9 anoristainein, be indeterminate, 307,29 antidiastellein, contrast, 255,4; 258,4.9 antikeimena, opposites, 292,4; 327,24.26.27; 328,16 antilêpsis, apprehension, 267,38; 323,5; perception, 289,37.38 antilêptikos, capacity of apprehending, 327,6.24 antistrephein, be convertible, 307,15.16 antistrophê, conversion, 324,6 antithesis, opposition, 292,21; 328,21; sun antithesei, antithetical, 324,6 antitheton, opposite, 264,1; 268,22; ta antitheta, opposites, 261,32; 268,16 aoriston (to), indeterminacy, 307,26 aoristos, indeterminate, 307,36; 308,3.19 aparallaktôs, unchangingly, 253,33 apeikonizein, make the comparison, 262,6; compare, 265,24; apeikonizesthai, be an image, 266,36 apeiros, infinite, 288,31; 289,40 aperilêptos, cannot be comprehended, 288,33.40; 289,6 aphairesis, abstraction, 276,16; 277,6.8.17.23.30; 306,21 aphormê, launch, 292,16; occasion, 293,16 apoklinein, decline 259,17.19; to apoklinon, declension, 262,31 apomimeisthai, imitate, 290,5 aponemein, attribute, 314,26 apopempesthai, get rid of, 266,25 apophaskein, deny, 261,31 apophasis, negation, 260,2.22.27; 265,34; 266,1; 268,12.3; 285,20-33 apophaskein, apophanai, deny 261,31 apoplêrôsis, satisfaction, 267,27 apoptôsis, falling off, 252,3.4

aporein, come up with a problem, 295,16 aporia, difficulty, 290,17.22; 291,8.9.34; question, 272,9; problem, 312,10; 313,1 aporroê, flux, 324,16 apostasis, distance, 266,6; 312,19.36.37 apostenôsis, contraction, 252,4; 262,8 apostenoun: apestenômenos, 249,17; narrow, 285,26; 307,33.36; 309,6; apestenômenôs, in a narrow way, 307,26 apostrephesthai, turn away, 267,1 apostrophê, aversion, 266,6; 292,38 apoteleutan, end, 302,27; 303,5 apotupôma, impression, 267,18; 273,4 apousia, absence, 265,10 arkhê, starting point, 297,20; principle, 301,28; 302,11; 304,32; beginning, 304,3.4.28; 309,14; start, 310,18 arkhoeides (to), principle, 251,27 arnêsis, denial, 265,35; negation, 318,6 asômatos, incorporeal, 288,23; 302,11; ta asômata, incorporeal beings, 288,8.21 atelês, imperfect, 262,34; 263,13; incomplete, 264,22.23.31; 265,1.3.4.13.14; ta atelê, incomplete beings, 306,29 atomos, individual, 265,9; 273,15; 294,14; 307,8; 318,9 autoen, the one itself, 256,6 autokinêtos, self-moved, 312,15.34 autolexei, literally, 262,14 autozôs, self-living, 287,34 bathos, depth, 304,33.35; 306,5.6 boulê, deliberation, 273,38; 308,9.12.25.29.39; 309,16.25 boulêsis, will, 289,23; 291,3; 292,26; 295,14; 296,27.32.33; 298,19; 310,16.19.34.35; 311,1.2.3.6; 321,18; willing, 296,9; logikê boulêsis, rational will, 308,10; 310,19 bouleuesthai, deliberate, 273,3.5; 274,26.28; 309,22.24.27 bouleutikos, deliberative, 299,19; 309,19; deliberative person,

Greek-English Index 309,20.21; to bouleutikon, capacity of deliberation, 310,13.14 diagenesthai, behave, 264,12 diairesis, division, 250,10.39; 252,26; 257,13; 289,7; 292,24; 321,33; distinction, 252,27; logikê diairesis, logical division, 259,7.8 diaireton (to), extension, 252,3 diairetos, divisible, 249,9; 288,32; ta diaireta, divisible objects, 255,3.25; 258,3; divisible things, 255,36; divisible bodies, 256,21 diakrinein, discriminate, 268,34; 270,9; 315,25; dilate, 270,13 diakrisis, discrimination, 266,4; 317,3.39 diakritikos, dilating, 260,16.17 dialogizesthai, reason, 275,35 diamakhê, conflict, 296,12; 299,32; 310,28 dianoia, discursive thought, 263,38; 267,26.37; 268,1.2; discursive reason, 267,21; 270,4; dianoia, 286,27; thought, 292,25; praktikê dianoia, practical discursive thought, 269,27.30 diaphora, difference, 289,5 diaphorotês, difference, 299,31 diaspan, tear apart, 291,6 diastasis, extension, 251,28; 252,4; 253,12; 276,5; 283,30.31.32; 284,23.27.35; logikê diastasis, rational extension, 253,14; topikê diastasis, spatial distance, 288,28 diexodikos, discursive, 265,8 diorizein, distinguish, 266,4.5 diorthôsis, correction, 314,37 diôkein, seek, 266,18; 267,3 diôxis, pursuit, 266,5; seeking, 266,28 dokêsis, estimation, 310,6 dokoun (to), what seems to be, 310,4; what seems to be the case, 310,6 doxa, opinion, 274,24; 290,32; 308,8; belief, 309,35.37; 310,3.7.9; 314,35; view, 312,11 doxastikos, matter of opinion, 249,3 doxazein, have an opinion, 249,40 dunamis, potentiality, 258,32; 263,14; potential, 261,2; power, 268,33; 269,35.36; 286,36.37; 287,24.35; 290,20.39; 293,3.18;

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294,7; 299,11.21; 305,32; aisthêtikê dunamis, sensitive power of the soul, 248,22; diagnôstikê dunamis, discerning power, 282,4; gnôstikê dunamis, cognitive power, 269,33; cognitive faculty, 276,17; kinêtikê dunamis, power that initiates movement, 286,33; 293,4.5; power of movement, 293,2; 294,5; power to move bodies, 286,19; logikê dunamis, rational power, 290,32; oikeia dunamis, specific power, 291,23.24; optikê dunamis, visual power, 294,26; phutikê dunamis, vegetative power of the soul, 248,22; psukhikê dunamis, power of the soul, 248,21; sustoikhos dunamis, co-ordinate power, 276,18.19; threptikê dunamis, nutritive power, 316,26.34 duslêptos, difficult to comprehend, 259,11 duspathês, not easily affected 315,34-6; 317,15-17 egeirein, awaken, 269,37; 273,30.38; 303,4.5.27; 308,33; 309,10.14; arouse, 264,29; 270,13; 310,35 egersis, awakening, 279,33 egkratês, self-controlled person, 310,27 egrêgorsis, awaking, 291,27.39 eidêtikos, formal, 251,4; 254,8; 287,36 eidopoiein, characterize, 324,24; to eidopoioumenon, formed thing, 252,34; ta eidopoioumena, formed beings, 248,29; 251,5 eidos, form, 249,11; 257,33; 279,21; 285,22; 301,33.35; 302,5; 303,36; 312,21.23; 316,16; 318,9; 324,30; kind, 265,6; 324,36; type, 312,3; sort, 315,23; enulon eidos, enmattered form, 285,18; ta eidê, forms, 248,35; 249,6.11.25.26; 250,22; 251,36.37; 252,4.5; 254,13.16.30; 262,36; 265,9; 267,13.24; 273,18.19.21; 274,22; 276,31; 278,8; 279,17.19; 280,19.22.24.29.30; 281,4.19.20.25; 282,22.39;

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283,4.5.6.9.10.20.34.36; 284,24; 285,1; 286,4.14; 311,16.17.37; 312,22; 314,4; 318,4.8; species, 294,7.14.18.19; 299,29; aisthêta eidê, sensible forms, 283,34; gnôstika eidê, cognitive forms, 318,17.19.27; hêgoumena eidê, leading forms, 249,29; horistika eidê, forms that determine, 248,29; khôrista eidê, separate forms, 279,19; phusika eidê, natural forms, 256,10; 276,24; 284,25.26; 288,9; 312,20; sumbebêkota eidê, accidental forms, 283,8 eikôn, image, 264,18.19; 265,31; 267,7.36; 269,18; 272,37; 279,36; 282,8; 304,34.37; 305,14; 310,31; likeness, 265,21; illustration, 310,22 einai, being, 288,13.36; 290,23; 314,7 ektasis, extension, 267,25.29 ekteinein, extend, 305,35 ekthesis, exposition, 270,39 empsukhos, animate, 303,13 enakolouthos, corresponding, 250,16 enallax, alternation, 272,19.26 enantiôsis, opposition, 289,18 enargeia, evidence, 328,5 energeia, actuality, 249,8.15; 258,31; 265,3.12.13.14.19; activity, 248,23.26.30; 260,25.28; 262,31; 263,22.34; 264,26.29.33; 265,5.7; 266,27.29.32; 267,23.30; 268,4.13; 269,35; 270,16; 271,25; 273,26; 279,2.12.15.38; 280,2; 286,9; 290,38.39; 295,32; 302,37; 303,3.4; 308,35; 311,21.35; 312,4.5.6.24.26.28.31; 313,12.25; 325,11; act, 274,22.32; 302,24; aisthêtikê energeia, activity of the senses, 265,11; aitiôdês energeia, causative activity, 260,33; eskhatê energeia, ultimate activity, 279,12; gnôstikê energeia, cognitive activity, 265,25; 267,17; 280,21; 290,30; 296,10; 327,24; haptikê energeia, act of touch, 326,29; kathara energeia, pure activity, 277,29; kritikê energeia, critical activity, 277,28.29; activity of judgement, 317,31; discriminative activity, 325,3; 327,22; activity of

discrimination, 326,34; logikê energeia, rational activity, 259,30; logical activity, 280,26; noera energeia, intellective activity, 262,21.22; oikeia energeia, own activity, 266,7.8; 296,8; proper activity, 318,15; orektikê energeia, desiderative activity, 302,25; ousiôdês energeia, essential activity, 249,32; 259,31; 260,6; 311,30.31; substantial activity, 262,24.25 energein, act, 253,12.13; 257,16; 264,12; 265,2.19; be active, 263,21.23; 267,15; 324,22; 327,25; actualize, 262,36 energêtikôteros, more active 319,19; 324,23.39; 325,2 ennoia, concept, 256,35; thought, 295,26 entelekheia, actuality, 264,23; 265,4.14; 301,31; 303,6.7 epagagein, infer, 296,28 epagôgê, induction, 328,5 epibolê, perspective, 299,13 epidiôkein, pursue, 266,28 epignôsis, cognition, 306,24 epikheirêma, argument, 292,16.20.21 epikheirêsis, demonstration, 324,30 epiklinein, decline, 309,17 epikoinônein, communicate with, 270,29; share in, 290,12 epikrateia, dominance, 315,35.38 epikratein, dominate, 309,17.18; 310,17.29; 315,34; 316,1; prevail, 311,1 epikrinein, discriminate, 268,31 epiktêtôs, adventiously, 316,18.19.24.37; 318,12.27 epinoein, conceive, 253,39; 254,2; think, 297,16; consider, 299,13 epiphaneia, surface, 301,21.26.27.29; 303,33; 304,9.31.37.38; 305,1.13.17.30 epirrêma, adverb, 303,2 episêmainesthai, note, 257,1.20 epistêmê, scientific knowledge, 258,18.19; 259,37; 280,25.27.31.32; 281,2.5.27.29.31; science, 264,9; 312,8; knowledge, 281,22; praktikê epistêmê, practical knowledge, 275,35.36;

Greek-English Index mathêmatikai epistêmai, mathematical sciences, 264,9 epistêmon, who has scientific knowledge, 311,13 epistêmonikon, cognitive power, 298,33; what is capable of knowing by science, 311,12 epistêmonikos, scientific, 249,1; 311,32.33; 312,1.2; in possession of scientific knowledge, 314,1; 315,1; of scientific knowledge, 268,20 epistêta, objects of science, 249,28; scientific objects, 280,25; objects of knowledge, 280,31; 281,3; 283,10; things known, 281,5 epistrephein, turn towards itself, 263,4.21; return to itself, 263,25; 274,23; make to return, 312,39 epistrophê, return, 263,24; turning on itself, 279,29; reflection, 290,6.13.14 epithumia, desire, 295,28.29; 307,13.16.18; sensual desire, 299,36; 300,4.7.10.12; appetite, 266,26; want, 295,37 epitrepein, enjoin, 295,24.25 êremein, rest, 295,24; 302,15; be at rest, 301,23.25; 305,5.10; 314,38; 315,1.8; remain still, 301,27; to êremoun, what is at rest, 304,21.32 êremia, rest, 314,19 êremizein, keep at rest, 295,24 ergon, work, 303,12 êthos, character, 273,23 euepiblêtos, easy to grasp, 259,28 eulutos, at ease, 263,23 exartêsis, dependence, 312,19 exêgêsis, explanation, 265,16 genesis, realm of generation, 268,16; coming to be, 268,22 gennêsis, reproduction, 295,2 gennêtikos, power of reproduction, 294,39.40; generating, 295,4 genos, genus, 272,24; 275,21; 293,5; 294,23.24.25.27; 299,29; holon genos, whole genus, 294,38 gigglumos, hinge, 304,7.9.15.27.34; 306,7 ginesthai, process of coming to be, 288,36 ginôskein, know, 252,13; 253,1.11; 256,28; 266,14; 267,15; 269,1;

211

270,24.31; 271,6.28; 273,3.16; 276,22.25.34; 277,18; 279,19.28; 280,24; 283,25; 284,9.10.40; 285,28; 314,13; cognize, 256,33.35; 296,34; cognition, 264,11 gnôristikos, cognitive, 293,22.23; capable of knowing, 299,35; 328,28; capable of cognizing, 315,40 gnôrizein, know, 268,32; 273,25; 274,17; 299,38; 314,24; 318,5; cognize, 271,26; acquire knowledge, 274,10 gnôsis, cognition, 253,8; 254,18; 259,37; 264,10; 265,24; 266,23.24; 267,27; 276,30; 278,2; 281,19.23; 282,20.21.26; 283,25; 285,6; 289,26.33; 290,27; 291,1.5; 292,22; 295,14; 298,12.28; 308,34; 309,36; 310,4.5; 319,36; 320,3.17; 323,3; knowledge, 274,30; 280,16; 289,29; 312,3.6; mode of cognition, 277,35.41; 283,27; aisthêtikê gnôsis, sensitive cognition, 326,36; alogos gnôsis, irrational cognition, 287,29; aph’ heautês egeiromenê gnôsis, cognition that is awakened from itself, 296,4.5; epistêmonikê gnôsis, scientific knowledge, 250,17; 262,23; 280,25.26; logikê gnôsis, rational cognition, 250,9.14; 274,23; 292,26; 296,4; rational knowledge, 274,30; ousiôdês gnôsis, essential cognition, 250,8; 259,39.40; psukhikê gnôsis, soul’s cognition, 259,35; sustoikhos gnôsis, co-ordinate cognition, 257,20; theôrêtikê gnôsis, theoretical knowledge, 268,8.9; theoretical cognition, 268,11 gnôstikos, cognitive, 289,22.28; 290,40.41; 291,6; 292,17.22.23; 298,9; knowing, 279,3; intellective, 297,30; capable of knowing, 279,31; capable of cognizing, 322,40; to gnôstikon, capacity to know, 264,18.19; cognitive principle, 297,30.35; cognitive power, 268,38; 271,15.17.19.20.22.23.24; 281,9; 282,23.24; 286,18; 298,12; cognitive character, 306,25

212

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gnôstos, knowable, 265,36; 268,2; to gnôston, what is known, 271,15; the thing known, 271,28; something known, 275,1; ta gnôsta, objects known, 248,28; things known, 271,20.22.32; 281,7; 282,21; knowable things, 280,16; objects of knowledge, 282,13.18.25; objects of cognition, 283,26; 309,32; known objects, 311,20 gonimon (to), capable of generating, 295,3 hairetos, preferable, 314,19; to haireton, choice, 308,27; preference, 311,5 haphê, touch, 306,32 haplotês, simplicity, 249,18; 262,9 haptikon, power of touch, 315,39; capacity of touch, 316,5 hêdesthai, enjoy, 266,7; experience pleasure, 266,12; feel pleasure, 266,21.23.28.30 hêdonê, pleasure, 307,11.13.17 hedrazein, establish, 312,38 hêdus, pleasurable, 264,18; 300,5.6.7.9.10.12.13; 306,30; 307,2; 309,6.8.22.26 hekousiôs, voluntarily, 296,17; in a voluntary way, 305,35 heneka tou, for the sake of something, 292,17.19 heniaiôs, unitarily, 251,24 henoeidôs, unitarily, 249,15.21; in a unitary way, 252,1 henôsis, unity, 272,26; 286,39; 287,1; union, 288,24; 311,37 hermêneuein, explain, 264,21; interpret, 273,36 heterotês, otherness, 259,38; 260,29.30.31; 267,2.3; 268,12.13; 281,34; 288,12; 311,36.38; being other, 267,4; difference, 268,38 hexis, disposition, 262,25; 263,32; 268,17.20; 279,18; 284,3; habit, 311,18 holos, whole, 287,16; 288,5.6; 291,37 holotês, totality, 305,33 horistikos, determining 248,29; determinant 251,28.31; defining, 313,3.24.28; horistikôs, in a determining way, 271,35

horizein, define, 314,27.28; 315,23; 316,2; determine, 268,34 hormê, impulse, 289,27; 291,15.38.40.41; 292,8; 293,22; 297,33.36; 301,15; idia hormê, own impulse, 292,40 horos, term, 249,15; 252,5; 307,34.35; determinant form, 249,21; 251,36; boundary, 271,7; defining form, 303,14 hou heneka, wherefore, 292,18 hulê, matter, 285,14.16.18.22; 316,16.20; 318,4 humnein, praise, 260,26.35 huparxis, existence, 258,30; mode of being, 312,7 huperekhontôs, in an eminent way, 257,22 huperkhronos, above time, 258,5 huperokhê, transcendence, 302,7 huperousios, super-being, 260,28 huperteros, superior, 260,39 hupheimenôs, in an inferior way, 258,16 huphesis, abasement, 263,36; debasement, 293,28 huphizanein, decline, 262,23 hupnos, sleep, 291,27.29 hupodokhê, reception, 307,39 hupoduesthai, put on the character, 298,41 hupokeimenon, substrate, 256,11; 302,29; subject, 266,36.37; 270,30; 271,24; 304,25.26; 305,7; 314,28 hupolêpsis, supposition, 314,22 hupostasis, mode of existence, 282,36; hypostasis, 312,6 hupostatikos, what supports, 249,20; what constitutes, 260,32; 313,28 hupostizein, putting a comma, 250,35 hupothesis, hypothesis, 278,23.24; supposition, 282,30.31; 296,18 idiôma, property, 250,29; 298,24; logika idiômata, rational properties, 250,22 idiotês, property, 249,17; 260,28.29.31; 270,33; 271,6; 282,36; 287,11; 288,11; 313,12.16; 328,18; special character, 267,2 kakia, vice, 290,4

Greek-English Index kakos, bad, 266,3.5.8.15.16; 268,5.7; 307,15 kampsis, bending, 301,24 kardia, heart, 301,19; 303,32 katakratein, dominate, 308,11 kataphasis, assertion, 260,11.13.20; affirmation, 265,34.36; 266,1; 268,1.2; positive statement, 318,5 katarithmeisthai, enumerate, 301,1; count, 301,5 katêgorein, predicate, 250,32.36; 262,24; 314,7.30; attribute, 311,39 katêgoria, predication, 260,20 katekhein, retain, 290,10 katharôs, purely, 258,4 katholikos, universal, 275,24 katholou, in a general sense, 325,16 khalan, slacken, 260,7; 262,22 kharaktêristikos, what characterizes, 302,10.33; 303,20; 305,14 kharaktêrizein, characterize, 287,32 khôrein, penetrate, 290,35 khôristos, separate, separable khôrizein, separate, 278,15 khronos, time, 299,35.36; 300,8; adiairetos khronos, indivisible time, 269,1 khthonios, earthy, 306,34; 317,15; 327,15-38; 328,3.8.15 kinein, move, 264,31; 292,23.25; 293,4.7.17; 295,16.17.18.19.20.23; 296,36.39; 297,2.29; 298,12; 300,23.24; 301,4.6.7.13.19.24.39; 302,14.21; 303,13.21; 304,24; 305,17; 306,8; 307,6; 309,13; 310,19.36; 311,15.22.33; 312,13.16.33; 313,38.39; 314,1.9.18.34.37.38; 315,7.8.9; 325,13.29; cause movement, 295,12; 298,11; 310,18.23.24; 311,15; 312,38; 314,8.13.35.38; produce movement, 302,23; initiate movement, 302,31; be in movement, 302,15; 305,10; set in motion, 296,32; 297,29; motivate, 296,35; exercise movement, 314,12; to kinoun, moving principle, 302,5; 305,17; 306,9; what moves, 303,14; 305,15; cause of movement, 315,14; to prôtôs kinoun, primary mover, 303,30.35.36; first mover, 325,2.8.10.27.28; what first moves,

213

325,4; to kinoumenon, what is moved, 301,40; 302,4.5.11; 304,21.22.41; 305,1.16; 310,23; moved object, 302,1; moved body, 305,5; 306,8 kinêsis, movement, 264,23.31.34; 265,3.6.7.8.11; 273,26; 274,9; 287,35; 291,16.22.35.38; 292,9.11.19.41; 293,10.22; 295,22; 296,22; 297,4.7.28.36; 299,9.10; 300,33; 301,1; 302,25.27.37; 303,4.5; 305,20.23; 306,12; 307,36; 310,31.33; 311,1.6; 312,24.28.29.32; 314,15.36; 325,9; change, 294,32; pathêtikê kinêsis, passive movement, 302,28; phusikê kinêsis, natural movement, 291,14; 303,7; 305,30.31; 306,38; 312,29; poiêtikê kinêsis, efficient movement, 302,27.28; poreutikê kinêsis, progressive movement, 292,9; 303,7; prôtê kinêsis, first movement, 290,29.30; psukhikê kinêsis, soul’s movement, 312,29; topikê kinêsis, movement in respect of place, 297,32; zôtikê kinêsis, vital movement, 291,20; 305,31 kinêtikos, capable of moving, 287,23; 315,16; what initiates movement, 287,33; 288,19; principle of movement, 291,10.16; 296,38; 304,6; what causes movement, 296,16; 298,10; 315,11; what moves, 291,8 koinônia, something in common, 260,16; 290,25.31; what it has in common, 263,35.36; common character, 269,8; commonality, 299,30.31 koinônein, communicate, 282,35; 289,21; 296,21; 299,17; share in, 272,4; 290,34; share, 329,31 kratein, dominate, 295,36; 310,20.34 kratos, power, 310,29 krinein, discern, 265,32; 267,4; 274,39; 276,27; 327,28; discriminate, 266,2.17; 270,23; 272,8; judge, 274,24 krisis, discrimination, 266,21; critical judgment, 277,29; judgment, 267,37; 270,4; 277,29; 321,23; 327,29; discernment,

214

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264,26; 265,5.35; 266,39; 270,16; 275,3; aisthêtikê krisis, perceptive discernment, 265,33; 266,38 kritikon, capacity of judgment, 267,36; 270,5; capacity of discriminating, 270,38 kritikos, of discernment, 287,33.37; capable of judgment, 270,6.7; 290,40 kubernan, govern, 290,10 kuklos, circle, 306,12.13.14 kuros, control, 295,18 logikos, rational, 249,34; 250,22; 253,11.13; 290,1; 292,25; 299,28; 300,22; 314,22.23; 321,16; ta logika, rational beings, 295,15; 315,10; to logikon, rational character, 309,4 logismos, argument, 273,7; reasoning, 273,38; 297,6.8.20; 309,30; praktikos logismos, practical reasoning, 275,11; 297,15 logistikos, rational, 287,29; ta logistika, beings capable of reasoning, 308,22; 309,9; to logistikon, capacity of reasoning, 310,12.13 logizesthai, reason, 273,5; 274,25; 297,5.16.17; calculate, 274,28 logoeidês, rational, 259,37; 306,18.19; 308,11.13; to logoeides, similarity to rationality, 290,4 logos, reason, 249,16.33; 260,8; 267,14.23; 268,34; 269,14; 270,4.7.10.32; 271,4.5.25; 274,13.17; 277,36; 285,24; 289,3.13.14.21.31; 290,3.6.12; 291,29; 292,25; 295,15.31.32; 296,9.14.17.20.24; 298,21; 299,17.30.35; 300,3.10; 306,19; 307,7.8.15; 308,5.8.12.17; 309,7.15.37; 310,15.16; 321,18; reason-principle, 250,29; 271,26.36.37; 272,27; 277,2.19.24.28; 312,21.22; 314,6; argument, 252,23; 263,30; 264,15; 265,17; 268,9; 270,2.14; 271,1; 272,36; 275,31; 276,1; 282,34; 283,23; 288,19; 296,6.25; 301,30; 307,18; 309,11; 311,11; 313,11; 314,22.32.34; 315,16.22; 317,35;

318,10; 320,22.41; 321,11.33; 322,11.18.34; 326,7.8; 328,11; account, 267,1; 287,8.10; 288,13.17; 290,38; 299,11; 300,26; 301,8; 304,22; rational statement, 260,13; aitiôdês logos, causative reason, 248,33; endiathetos logos, inner speech, 260,2; epistêmonikos logos, scientific reason, 276,21.22; 311.29; idios logos, specific reason, 249,19; ousiôdês logos, essential reason, 249,27; phusikos logos, natural reason-principle, 312,20.23; psukhikos logos, reason in the soul, 250,13 lupê, pain, 307,11.13.17 lupeisthai, feel pain, 266,8.9.21.23.30; experience pain, 266,12 lupêros, unpleasant, 306,31; 307,2; painful, 264,18 mathêmatika, mathematical objects, 276,3.4; 278,29.30; 284,2.3 megethos, magnitude, 284,35.38; 285,3; 287,13; 290,24; 291,12; 304,21.23.28; 305,7 mêkos, length, 249,8; 251,35; 253,36 menein, remain, 252,22; 268,14; 302,21; 304,32; 313,38; remain still, 303,21; 311,33; stand still, 313,21 merikos, particular, 314,14.27.29; ta merika, particulars, 275,32.33.37; 283,26; 306,22.24 merikôteros, more particular, 250,22; ta merikôtera, particulars, 314,5.7 merismos, partition, 252,15; division, 264,34; 268,16; 276,6; 287,15; 288,15 meristos, divisible, 286,35; 290,26; ta merista, divisible beings, 249,16; divisible things, 249,38; 268,22; 312,24.31; divided beings, 267,11; divided things, 268,22 meros, part, 288,3; 304,29; 307,1; merê, parts, 254,8 mesos, intermediate, 261,32; ta mesa, intermediaries, 325,33 mesotês, mean, 270,26; 317,6; 327,23.33; 328,15; intermediate status, 290,34; intermediary,

Greek-English Index 302,7.8.15.32; 328,17; mean state, 315,35.38; mean status, 316,1; aisthêtikê mesotês, perceptive mean, 266,10.11 metaballein, change, 265,8; 314,39; 315,2 metabolê, change, 265,2; 302,19; 314,20 metadiôkein, pursue, 266,25 metadiôxis, pursuit, 266,6.26.31; 301,13 metalêpsis, participation, 275,5 methexis, participation, 313,14.15 metousia, participation, 329,33.34 metron, measure, 309,21 mnêmê, memory, 293,24.30.32.33; 300,1; 307,9 monê, remaining, 312,6; permanence, 313,21 monimos, permanent, 254,34 monimotês, remaining, 312,37 morion, part, 286,34.36; 287,4.9.14.25; 288,3.5.12.17; 289,8; 290,16.24; 299,9.21.23; 301,19.21.22.38; 303,32; 304,3.23; 305,13; 324,16; 328,7.10; alogon morion, irrational part, 289,20.21 morphê, shape, 273,18 morphoun, give shape, 256,24 nikasthai, be overcome, 310,17 noein, think, 264,16; 265,26; 273,12.29; 274,10; 278,11.14.15.17.18.25.26.28; 279,21; 283,37; 295,13; 301,6; 311,18; consider, 304,40; 313,19; to nooun, that which thinks, 269,6.10 noêma, thought, 251.9; 267,21; 269,11; 273,29.31; 274,19; 275,9; 283,35; 284,40; 285,8; prôta noêmata, first thoughts, 286,1.2.10.16 noeros, intellective, 248,24; 259,36; 260,8.9; 312,3.27; noerôs, in an intellective way, 263,4 noêsis, thinking, 249,5.7.34; 250,3; 252,15; 258,6; 268,30; 269,3.22; 274,20; 275,37; 278,13; 279,32.33; 280,26; 285,38; act of thinking, 252,11.12; 253,31; mode of thinking, 254,14.15; 278,7; form of thinking, 269,15; thought, 269,9;

215

285,10; 296,11.20.21; logikê noêsis, rational thought, 296,7 noêtikos, intellective, 299,18; intellective power, 265,26; 295,12.17; 296,32 noêton, object of thought, 264,17; ta noêta, objects of thinking, 249,28; objects of knowledge, 249,31; objects of thought, 248,25.26; 249,5; 269,41; thought objects, 280,25; intelligibles, 260,26; intelligible objects, 248,25.27.33.34; 268,31; 275,26; 283,35; 285,4; 321,24.28; intelligible beings, 282,18 noêtos, intelligible, 274,22; 311,17 nomos, law, 275,16 nous, intellect, 248,24.27.32; 249,31; 251,9; 254,32; 257,28; 258,24.28.30; 259,5; 268,15; 270,6; 274,32; 276,7; 277,36.41; 278,6.39; 279,1.6.27.28; 281,32; 283,19.20.24.28.35.36; 284,5.40; 285,6; 286,9.28; 295,14.25.28; 296,9.25.26; 298,19.26; 300,3; 306,24; 308,28.36; 311,32; 312,1.2.8.13.18.27.36; 313,2.26; 314,24; 319,36; 320,14.39; 321,21.28; akrotatos nous, supreme intellect, 313,38; amethektos nous, imparticible intellect, 258,14; unparticipated intellect, 313,4; atelês nous, incomplete intellect, 263,31; gnôstikos nous, intellect capable of knowing, 269,41; horistikos nous, intellect that defines the soul, 313,3; defining intellect, 313,24; huperekhôn nous, transcendent intellect, 311,36; kritikos nous, intellect capable of discernment, 319,34; 320,25.26; 321,6.7; mathêmatikos nous, mathematical intellect, 278,2.3; orektikos nous, desiderative intellect, 299,4; 306,21; ousiôdês nous, essential intellect, 249,31; 258,28; 259,7; 262,16; 263,33; 268,19; 279,18; 280,27; 286,16; pathêtikos nous, passive intellect, 248,27; 261,2; poiôn nous, productive intellect, 248,30.33; praktikos nous, practical intellect, 263,38;

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264,10.19; 265,20.31.32; 266,36; 267,7; 268,21; 269,24; 270,2.34; 272,36.37; 273,5.12; 275,13; 280,10; 283,21; 286,12.13; 297,2.7.11.14; 299,3.18; 306,22; 311,22.24.27; 314,9.10.15.16; 315,9.10.15; proiôn nous, proceeding intellect, 313,39; outgoing intellect; theôrêtikos nous, theoretical intellect, 263,30; 264,2.3.4.15; 268,17.25; 273,11; 286,13; 297,3; 298,20; 299,3.7.18; 306,20; 313,37; 314,17 oistikos, what produces, 249,18 onoma, word, 262,20; term, 265,6; 292,22; name, 326,32 ôphelimos, expedient, 300,9; 309,22.23.24.25 oregesthai, desire, 267,1; 289,29.35; 291,4; 292,28; 300,22; 302,24; 310,5; yearn, 266,24; desiring, 297,9 orektikos, desiderative, 287,29; 289,22.26; 290,38.41; 291,6; 292,23; 295,33; 296,36; 297,1; 298,9; 298,11; 299,20.28; 302,36; to alogôs orektikon, irrational desiderative part, 289,30; irrational power of desire, 296,33; to orektikon, principle of desire, 297,11; desiderative principle, 296,28; 297,35; desiderative power, 298,22.35; 299,27.30; 300,19.21.23.26.27; 301,7.16; 302,34.36; 315,14; capacity of desire, 298,16; what is capable of desire, 306,16.17.26; desiderative aspect, 306,25 orektos, desirable, 298,41; what is desirable, 293,32; 297,16; desirable object, 293,34; 296,40; 297,1; 298,39; 303,27; object of desire, 297,9.12.13.22.32; 300,23.27; 301,5.7; 302,24; 303,4 orexis, desire, 266,26.29.35; 267,5.27; 268,23; 289,13.14.22; 290,1; 291,3; 292,14.22.24.38; 295,17.34; 296,12; 297,8.29; 298,12; 299,18; 300,4; 302,20.28.35.37; 303,3.8.26; 306,9; 307,14; 309,8; 310,3.5.12.13.21.25.27; 315,18; 321,17; appetite, 289,27; alogos

orexis, irrational desire, 289,41; 290,9.11; 295,37; 296,3.10.33; 297,9; 298,20; non-rational desire, 310,11.18; 311,2; oikeia orexis, proper desire, 298,19; phantastikê orexis, desire linked to imagination, 311,4; sômatoeidês orexis, corporeal desire, 295,14.15 organikon, that which serves as instrument, 304,1 organikôs, in an instrumental way, 303,19.21.26.29.30 organon, instrument, 279,27.28; 282,8.9.10.11.14.15.16; 301,14.32.33; 302,4.10; 303,20; 305,14; 315,22.26.31.33; 316,2.12; 321,20; organ, 269,33; 321,9.10.14.16.26; 327,23.25; 328,14.32.35; instrumental bodily part, 315,22; aisthêtêrion organon, sense organ, 308,33; sômatikon organon, bodily organ, 266,13 orthos, right, 298,27.28.29 orthotês, rightness, 289,35 ourania (ta), celestial bodies, 285,13 ousia, substance, 248,28; 259,38; 260,25; 262,20.30; 263,34; 268,13.18; 276,24.25.26.31.32.33.37; 277,1.8.10.17.18.21.24.25.31.33.36.3 7.40; 278,6.15.30.34.39; 279,3.15; 281,18; 283,6.11; 285,15; 286,2; 288,3; 305,16.17; 322,33; essence, 248,23; 260,25; 262,21.23; 289,20; 306,19; 311,21.35; 312,4; 313,29; 321,14; being, 254,29; 256,11; 290,14; 313,26; akrotatê ousia, highest substance, 258,27; 260,24; supreme substance, 259,4; highest essence, 260,24; highest level of being, 311,10; ameristos ousia, indivisible substance, 281,15; asômatos ousia, incorporeal substance, 287,15; aulos ousia, immaterial substance, 281,21; kat’ ousian, essential, 309,15; 328,27; phusikê ousia, natural substance, 284,36; 285,12; 286,14; prôtê ousia, primary substance, 249,14; 258,15; psukhikê ousia, soul’s substance, 259,16.17; soul’s being, 312,31; essence of the soul,

Greek-English Index 311,31; 312,22; 313,4; sunthetos ousia, composite substance, 284,29 ousiôdês, essential, 250,7; 254,34; 311,17; 314,4; substantial, 312, 6 ousioun, substantiate, 256,11 paideia, education, 299,23 parabolê, comparison, 292,6 paradeigma, model, 272,37; example, 272,3; 314,31 parathesis, confrontation, 292,4; comparison, 293,15; 323,11; juxtaposition, 322,16; contrast, 324,1 parousia, presence, 265,9 paruphistasthai, parasitize, 256,31.32; 257,16; exist upon, 257,10 paskhein, be affected, 264,16.21.31; 265,1.17.18.20; 266,28; 270,15; 299,38; 313,29; 321,27; 322,35; 325,6; to paskhon, what is affected, 302,1; 322,37 pathêtos, passive, 323,24 pathos, feature, 276,26; passion, 295,31; 296,15.16.24; affect, 277,29; 300,1; affection, 266,14.22.24.29.30; 270,13.17.18; 308,34; 322,39; 323,23; 325,3; 326,26; 327,28; aisthêtikon pathos, sensitive affection, 270,18; aisthêta pathê, perceptible features, 276,22 peras, limit, 251,29.36.37; 277,20.21; 289,39; 301,27; 304,31; 305,3.5; boundary, 327,1 peratoeidês (to), affinity to limit, 290,13 perilêpsis, comprehension, 252,3.4 periskeleia, difficulty, 322,25 phantasia, imagination, 263,39; 264,28; 267,26; 268,9; 270,1.2; 273,10.12.16.20; 274,20.21; 275,23.32; 277,4.7.8.19.35.39; 280,10; 283,24.28; 284,12; 285,1.16.22.26.30.38.39; 286,30; 290,27.33; 292,14.23.26.27.35; 293,27; 294,2; 296,6.9.22.25.34; 298,20.26; 306,17.20.21.23.24; 307,7.8.10.23; 308,3.6.7.8.18.20.23.28.38; 309,12.31; 310,3.8; 311,16; 315,10.18.21; 320,13; 321,17;

217

aisthêtikê phantasia, perceptive imagination, 309,9.10; alogos phantasia, irrational imagination, 306,19; amudra phantasia, vague imagination, 293,35.36; bouleutikê phantasia, deliberative imagination, 308,21; 309,13; 311,25.26; 314,12.13.23.24; logikê phantasia, rational imagination, 286,31; 306,18.26; 309,8.9; logoeidês phantasia, rational imagination, 314,17.18; merikê phantasia, particular imagination, 315,16; orektikê phantasia, desiderative imagination, 310,14.15 phantasma, imagination, 267,21.22; 270,4; imagined object, 267,33; 273,4.14.20.28.29.30.31.32; 274,18.19; 284,13; 285,11.14; objects in imagination, 286,3.7 phantasta, objects of the imagination, 267,17.20; 270,2; 273,37; 276,6.8.9; 277,22.24; objects in imagination, 283,20; imagined things, 273,40; imagined objects, 283,22; 285,10 phantastikos, imaginative, 290,15; 292,24; 297,30; 298,29; capacity of imagination, 291,2.3; power of imagination, 293,23 phantazein, imagine, 301,6 phasis, saying, 259,39; 260,1.12; assertion, 285,25 pheugein, avoid, 266,15.18.24; 267,3 philosophein, philosophize, 290,21 philosophia, philosophy, 276,33; 277,4 phôs, light, 311,20 phthartos, corruptible, 294,16 phugê, avoidance, 266,6.26.29.31.35; 267,5 phusikos, natural, passim phusis, nature, 258,11; 288,33.34; 292,11; 293,5.6.9; 294,12; 305,22.33; 306,35; 308,15; 310,34.36; 311,3.5.37; 316,26; 317,17; 318,33; 319,28; 321,15; kritikê phusis, discriminative nature, 322,38 phutikos, vegetative, 289,20; 291,19; vegetative power, 295,12 phuton, plant, 247,21; 291,25;

218

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292,41; 293,7; 294,10; 316,36; 317,15; 319,29; 320,19; 326,10; 328,10 pistis, conviction, 274,24 plêgê, blow, 279,33; stroke, 296,8; 308,32.34 plêrôsis, completion, 248,27 plêsiazein, come close, 306,5 plêthos, multitude, 254,2; 267,2; 286,38; 288,4.16; plurality, 269,13.39; multiplicity, 270,12; 272,26; apeiron plêthos, infinite multitude, 288,34 pneuma, spirit, 301,18.28; 303,32 poiêtikos, efficient; poiêtikôs, as the efficient cause, 287,36 poiotês, quality, 284,3.4; 322,9.17.33.36.40; 323,21; 324,14; 327,38; 328,2.28.29; 329,8.9 polis, state, 275,15.25 poludunamos, many powers, 286,37; 287,2 poluousios, manifold in substance, 286,38; 287,3 poreia, progressive movement, 292,13; diastatikê poreia, dimensional course, 305,34 poreuesthai, to move forward, 292,8.18; have locomotion, 294,3 poreutikos, progressive, 292,6.7.9; capacity of locomotion, 294,37.38; having forward movement, 301,39; capacity of progressive movement, 316,5; to poreutikon, what is capable of progressive movement, 316,11 poson, quantity, 254,23; 283,33 pragma, thing, 265,16; 268,12.24; ta pragmata, things as they really are, 312,11; reality, 312,12; things, 254,1; 319,25; ta mathêmatika pragmata, mathematical objects, 276,3.4 prakta, things to be done, 269,31.40; 274,22; what is to be done, 295,21.22; 309,19; practical matters, 264,4; 269,3; 270,6; 275,14.19.35.36; 296,39; 310,6.8.16; 314,14; practical objects, 269,28; objects of action, 283,26; practical things, 273,22; 302,19 praktikôs, in practical matters, 267,12

prattein, practice, 264,11; action, 275,37 praxis, action, 268,23; 273,15; 275,16.18.34; 297,21; 320,12 proairesis, choice, 289,12.13 proballein, activate, 290,31 problêma, problem, 299,8; argument, 306,16 problêtikos, capable of projecting, 277,3; to problêtikon, projection, 313,22 probolê, projection, 250,7; 262,25.26; 263,32; 311,18.19 prodiorismos, previous distinction, 314,30 proginôskein, know beforehand, 293,17 prokopê, progress, 262,34 proodos, procession, 312,6 prophantazesthai, imagine beforehand, 292,18; have first in the imagination, 292,30 proseggizein, come close, 305,4 prosekhês, proximate 294,23-4 prostaxis, order, 311,3 protasis, premise, 306,23; 311,23.28; 314,32; 315,12; 319,15; 322,2; proposition, 314,4.8.9.16 protereuein, come before, 263,2; come first, 263,3; precede, 263,13 proteros, prior, 263,5.6.7 prouparkhein, to be prior in time, 262,38 prôtotupon, primordial form, 279,37 pseudos, falsity, 249,37.38; 264,1.3; falsehood, 295,20 psukhê, soul, 254,28.34; 258,5.30; 259,37; 262,35.39; 263,3; 267,23.31; 268,30; 269,3.10; 274,18; 279,34; 280,9; 281,21; 282,17.30.35.39; 284,6; 286,15.35; 287,28.32; 288,12.21; 290,19; 295,12; 301,31.35; 302,3.14; 303,7.11; 311,10.12.17.39; 312,13.16.36; 313,3.19.23.37; 314,6; 320,9.26; 325,28; 326,7; aisthêtikê psukhê, perceptive soul, 266,38; sensitive soul 287,18; alogos psukhê, irrational soul, 287,19; 289,16; dianoêtikê psukhê, discursive soul, 267,11.32.33; 268,14; 273,6; holê psukhê, whole soul, 287,18.22.24.25; 289,10.15; koinê

Greek-English Index psukhê, common soul, 291,33; logikê psukhê, rational soul, 283,2; 320,11; noêtikê psukhê, soul that is capable of thinking, 282,40; phutikê psukhê, vegetative soul, 287,18; 291,38; 316,9.10; soul of plants, 301,37 rhuthmizesthai, be trained, 308,14.17 sêmainein, designate, 261,32 sêmantikos, what indicates, 287,11; 288,22 skhesis, relation, 271,10; 305,12 skopos, purpose, 268,29; 269,18; intention, 315,31; 326,3 sôma, body, 251,18; 262,35; 277,3.7; 279,15.27.28.29; 285,16.24; 287,21.24.33.35; 288,15; 301,32; 302,8.13.14.29; 303,9.12; 304,1.9.35.37; 305,1.11; 308,35; 311,37; 312,20; 315,27; 317,5.20.21; 319,17; 320,10.13; 321,15.19.20.26; 322,35; 325,29; 327,12.39; haploun sôma, body that is simple, 320,38; simple body, 325,4; organikon sôma, instrumental body, 301,31; phutikon sôma, vegetative body, 321,12.13.32; zôn sôma, living body, 302,3.30; 328,36.37 sômatikos, something that is corporeal, 302,9; 304,37; corporeal, 302,13; bodily, 303,8.9.19 sômatoeidês, corporeal, 288,22; 290,14.27 sôphrôn, temperate person, 296,17 sphaira, sphere, 310,21.23.30; ball, 310,38 spoudaios, virtuous person, 296,15.31.36 stasiazein, revolt, 310,37 sterêsis, privation, 251,31; 252,14.19; 256,23.31.33 sterêtikos, privative, 258,11 sterêtikôs, in a privative way, 257,16 strophê, reflection, 273,7 sugkinein, move along with, 301,15; move together, 301,27; 302,29 sugkrinein, discriminate, 269,26 sullogismos, syllogistic reasoning, 310,1.4.7; syllogism, 273,9; 310,11; 323,1.2

219

sullogizesthai, infer, 307,10 sumbebêkota, accidental features, 277,10.15.21.32.34.35.36; 278,5.35.36; 279,1; 283,6.31.32.33; 284,28.31.32; 285,14; accidental properties, 276,26.28.29; accidents, 283,9 sumbolon, sign, 274,12.13 summetaballein, change together with, 315,3 sumperainesthai, conclude, 295,5; 311,9; 315,5.9.28; draw a conclusion, 315,17 sumperasma, conclusion, 275,39; 295,6; 306,15; 315,6; 319,14; 328,11 sumphônein, correspond to, 304,20 sumphuês, cognate, 258,29; congenital, 311,38 sumphuôs, grown together, 258,31 sumphusis, growing together, 312,19.37 sumplekein, interweave, 251,2; 258,32; 251,9; 276,23; 277,41; 279,2; 280,1; 283,21; 287,21; 298,28; 306,22.23; 313,22; 315,2.5.10; intertwine, 299,33; 311,34.35; connect, 268,1; 314,16; 317,36 sumplokê, being interwoven, 258,16; interweaving, 249,38; 250,32; 260,8.21; 265,35; 285,24; 290,33; intertwining, 304,10; 315,2.3.9; akhôristos sumplokê, inseparable interwovenness, 302,17 sunagein, gather, 267,15; bring together, 300,33 sunagôgê, collection, 250,10; 290,13 sunaisthanesthai, perceive, 290,5 sunaisthêsis, awareness, 299,35 sunaphê, contact, 249,29; 306,9; 311,36; 327,10 sunaptein, attach, 268,13 sunarmogê, adjustment, 271,31; correspondence, 285,31 sundesmos, conjunction, 303,1.3; conjunctive particle, 292,15.16; connective, 299,31.32; 300,15.35 sundromos, concurrent, 260,30; concording, 296,11; concomitant, 317,33 sunekheia, continuity, 264,34; 288,26; 304,23.25

220

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sunekhein, hold together, 321,21 sunekhês, continuous, 251,16.35; 253,14.23; 287,13.14; 288,7.16.27.28; 304,23; to sunekhes (to), continuum, 256,4.5 sunergôn, collaborator, 283,24.27; 309,31; 320,13; 321,19 sunesis, understanding, 274,24; 285,7 sunethizesthai, be accustomed, 263,24; be habituated, 308,13 sunneusis, inclination, 273,33 sunokhê, maintenance, 252,36 sunopsismenôs, in a synoptic way, 303,24 sunthesis, combination, 250,20.21.40; 260,2; logikê sunthesis, rational combination, 250,29 sunthetos, composite, 281,18, ta suntheta, composite things, 276,25; 278,9 sustasis, constitution, 317,20 sustoikhos, coordinate, 252,11 sustoikhôs, in a coordinate way, 252,19; 257,22 suzeuxis, connection, 262,35 tautotês, sameness, 268,38; 311,37.38 taxis, order, 266,24; rank, 268,4; 301,12 tekhnê, technical knowledge, 295,30.31; art, 311,21 teleios, perfect, 262,34; 264,25.26; 311,13; 314,1; 315,28; 316,11; complete, 264,34; 265,15; 268,17 teleiôsis, perfection, 281,37 teleiotês, perfection, 249,15; 251,37; 252,34 teleioun, perfect, 312,38 teleutê, end, 304,3.4 telikôs, final (cause), 287,36 telos, end, 282,23; 292,18; 297,3.4.6.7.8; 300,5; 304,28; 308,25; 309,4; 317,27.28; 319,4.6.8.23; completion, 279,33; goal, 264,8.11; 293,17; 300,27; 301,9; 309,26; 324,25; aim, 268,7; 274,35; fulfillment, 308,30 thea, contemplation, 261,35; 273,30; 311,16 theôrein, consider, 248,25; 253,32; 275,26; 276,7; 280,33; 295,23; 305,9; 311,25; 313,15.16.18.23; 314,16; 315,11.24; contemplate,

249,29; 276,33; 278,13; 283,20; 286,15; theoretical knowledge, 297,6 theôrêtikos, capable of contemplating, 280,37; theoretical, 264,2.3.4; 295,20; 314,11 theôrêtikôs, in theory, 267,12 theôria, study, 258,6; theory, 264,5.14; speculation, 275,14; theoretical contemplation, 297,4; 313,18; 314,2.3; 315,18; contemplation, 257,14; 268,15; 281,28; 282,19; doctrine, 303,11; consideration, 255,9.12; 278,36; 309,7; 321,2; study, 313,9; logikê theôria, rational consideration, 265,26 threphein, nourish, 293,10.11 threptikos, vegetative, 290,41; nutritive, 299,15 thumoeidês, spirited, 291,3 thumos, spirited, 287,28; 289,9.17.18.27; 291,7 topikos, capacity of locomotion, 292,7; zôtikôs topikos, of a vital locomotion, 292,7 topos, place, 291,13.15.35.36.37; 292,41; 307,35.37; spot, 293,33 tupos, imprint, 267,27; 290,26; 309,12; impression, 273,8; 274,31; 277,39; 284,12; 285,1; phantastikoi tupoi, imprints in the imagination, 315,20 zên, live, 264,12 zôê, life, 253,13; 280,1; 286,11; 291,18.30.33.35; 293,10; 298,28; 302,16; 303,13; 304,1.5; 305,17; 306,8; 313,22; 315,23; 316,16.17.18.37; 324,36; 327,22; form of life, 292,5; 293,12; 311,35; type of life, 321,10; aisthêtikê zôê, sensitive life, 264,25; 268,5; 270,19.21; alogos zôê, irrational life, 274,36; 299,33.36; 306,26; 309,37; ameristos zôê, indivisible life, 270,31; bouleuomenê zôê, deliberative life, 309,5; eidêtikê zôê, formal life, 302,3; eidopoiousa zôê, life that specifies, 303,33; eskhatê zôê, lowest form of life, 303,10; 306,37; ultimate form of life, 315,25; genêtê zôê, generated life, 316,9;

Greek-English Index kharaktêristikê zôê, life that characterizes, 302,10; 303,20; 305,14.15; logikê zôê, intellectual life, 286,29; rational life, 268,7; 285,22; 299,33; noera zôê, intellective life, 269,14; oikeia zôê, proper life, 293,4; orektikê zôê, life of desire, 293,17.18; life capable of desiring, 305,16.18; phantastikê zôê, life of imagination, 267,18; phutikê zôê,

221

vegetative life, 280,9; 291,21; 292,41; 293,2.15.16; 294,33.35; 306,37; 316,36; praktikê zôê, practical life, 289,11; sômatoeidês zôê, corporeal life, 287,21; 296,19; 303,10 zôion, animal, living being, passim zôtikos, vital, 270,13.17; 285,15; 291,20-4; 292,7; 301,18; 303,14.32; 315,23; 327,7; living, 277,2.19.24

Subject Index References in this index are to the page and line numbers that appear in the margins of the Translation, and to the Notes to the Translation. abstraction, objects in abstraction, 276,11-279,3; 284,1-285,19; 323,23; see also mathematical objects actuality, how it is different from movement, 264,23-4; 265,12-17; 303,6-8; n. 155; see also potentiality affected, what is capable of perception must be easily affected, 317,16-36; human body most easily affected, 317,21-5; not easily affected, 315,34-6; 317,15-17 affections, preserve or destroy, 266,14-15; 322,27-8; affections of pain and pleasure, 266,20-32; affections of sense-objects, 284,2-4; 285,5-11; vital affections, 270,13-18; commensurate affections, 322,35-40; 326,26-7 affirmation and negation found in rational unfolding, 266,1; in interweaving, 285,20-35; see also falsity affirmation or assertion (kataphasis), 260,11-23; 265,34-6; 266,1; 268,1-2; nn. 114, 115 air and its effect on the pupil in sight, 268,26; 269,19-21 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 260,1; 279,30; 284,24; 286,6; 302,28; 304,12.26; 306,7; 320,20.22.34; nn. 39, 103, 112, 117, 134, 150, 176, 188, 247, 249, 261, 330, 391, 397, 398, 400, 420, 427, 443, 446, 475, 495, 524, 525, 527, 547 animal must be capable of touch, 317,1-318,2; 322,4-324,11; 328,20-3; destruction of touch destroys the whole animal, 328,23-329,18; needs sense

perception for survival, 318,22-30; 319,14-31; incomplete animals, 294,2-295,9; 306,28-307,40; maimed, 294,12-16; more perfect animals cannot be rooted in earth, 290,8-15; domesticated animals manifest some rationality, 308,13-20; gradation of life, see life; see also imagination apodosis, lacking, 269,20-8; 300,36-8 Aristotle, passim, see also Plato; Aristotle has another view on points and planes than the Pythagoreans, 251,27-31; attributes irrationality most of all to irrational desire, not to perception, 290,9; Aristotle does not attribute phantasia to some types of animals because too indeterminate, 292,31-5; Aristotle designates with ti the ousia, with ti ên einai the eidos, 261,9-10; Aristotle’s definition of kinêsis as incomplete act, 303,6-7; according to Aristotle everything in nature is for the sake of something or a concomitant, 319,1-31 awakened, rational cognition is awakened to activity from within itself, 296,3-5.20; 297,12; sense-perception is awakened, 264,29; 308,33; imagination awakened, 309,10.14; 315,21; the desiderative power by the object of desire, 297,12; 302,24; 303,4.27; to be awakened to the activity of judgment is the highest good, 317,30-1 bad, see good bees, do they have phantasia?,

Subject Index 292,35-6; 293,31; 307,23-40; 308,19; n. 350 belief (doxa), 309,35-310,9; in rational and in non rational animals to be distinguished, 310,35-311,9 body, whole body capable of touch, 321,32-324,11; 326,1-327,10; simple bodies, 326,5-328,20; simple body cannot be animate, 326,1-327,17; see also elements; shell-like body, 287,20-1; n. 312; divine body, 326,6; celestial bodies, 251,18; n. 44 breathing, 291,31-41 causes: the four causes, 319,24-30; see also efficient, final, formal celestial beings have no imagination and no sense perception, 308,27-38; 319,17-39; nn. 525, 527; see also bodies cognitive power determined by the object known, 271,15-16; nn. 195, 276; what is known is identical with the cognitive power, 298,32-3; both ‘intellect’ and ‘perception’ are cognitive powers, 282,28-9; soul’s cognitive power intermediary, 282,8-29; see also knowledge comma, 250,35; 274,16; 280,12; 296,27; 300,36 common sense, 268,36-269,3; 269,35-40; 270,12-32; 270,36-272,32; 274,5-10; nn. 214, 215 concomitant features of teleological processes, 319,1-14; see also nature conjunction, 292,15.16.32; 300,15.35; causal, 264,38; disjunctive, 303,1.3 contracted simplicity is characteristic of points, lines and other limits, 248,18-22; 251,37-252,4 co-ordinate knowledge, see knowledge deliberation, about contingent things to be done, 273,38; 308,9.12.22-6.29; 308,38-309,33; deliberate, 273,3.5; 274,26.28; 309,22.24.27; deliberative power indicates the practical intellect, 299,19 desiderative, more common term

223

than deliberative, 299,19-21; desiderative power not a unitary genus, 299,28-30; n. 387; desiderative imagination in humans surpasses that in animals, 310,10-20; desiderative power twofold, irrational and rational, 292,23-7; 300,21-2 desiderative power one with the object of desire, 300,25-8; 301,5-13; desiderative always together with cognition, not vice versa, 289,28-38; 290,37-8; 292,22-8; 298,9-4; n. 332; desiderative power is most of all principle of movement, 296,36-297,2; 297,25-31; 298,15-24 desirable object identical with the desiderative power in act, 298,30-38; 301,5-13 determining, defining form or term (horos), n. 22, see Greek-English Index s.v. horos and horistikos dianoia, may also be called nous, 286,27-8; n. 300; is related to the practical intellect, 264,37-8; 267,8-37; 268,14; 273,6; n. 148 discernment (krisis), not an affection, but pure activity, 277,29; in sense-perception, 263,2-6; 265,5-35; 266,20-1.38-9; of dianoia, 267,37; in mathematical thought, 277,29 discursive soul (dianoêtikê), its thought, its objects, 267,8-37; 268,14; 273,6; see also dianoia disposition, see projection division as limit of divisible things, 256,15-27; n. 80 division, conceptual division of continuous things, 252,29-253,8; see also division of soul earth, dominance of earth makes body incapable of perception, 306,34; 317,15; 321,33-322,28; 327,15-328,15; such a body is not easily affected, 315,34-316,4 efficient cause, 287,36-8; 301,36-40; 302,30-3; 305,25-6; 309,16 eidos, see form elements, 315,35-316,2; 326,3-327,17; 327,30-328,20; see also simple bodies

224

Subject Index

Empedocles: soul is all things, how to interpret, 282,30-8 evil, see good exegetes of the De Anima, 259,40 (Plutarch and Alexander); 301,30; 304,16; 310,30

266,10-19; 267,9.38; 268,2-25; 269,5-25; 275,2-29; 307,15; nn. 14, 84; evil leans upon appearance of good, 257,7-10; highest good to be awakened to activity, 317,30-1 growth and decay 316,13-39; 324,3-7

falsity is found in interweaving, combination of terms, 248,37-249,1; 249,36-9; 250,19-38; 261,16-19; 266,1; 285,21-35; see also truth, affirmation fiery element in sight, 326,16-19 final cause, 252,35; 264,9; 287,36; 319,24; n. 58; final cause is the strongest of all four, 319,25-31; n. 519; mathematics and the final cause, 264,8-10; n. 152 for the sake of something and that for the sake of which; 319,1-14; not always connected with cognition, 392,8-21 form (eidos), indivisible term, actuality, perfection, existing on itself, determining, 249,11-21; 251,37-252,2; indivisible not in a narrow sense, but as comprehending the many logoi falling under it, 249,15-21; 250,10-22.28-9; 252,1-6; 262,4-7; 267,13-18; 312,20-4; n. 168; forms of natural objects, 249,12-19; 284,23-37; supernatural, 249,14; forms are in a secondary way in the soul, 249,25-7 formal cause 251,4; 254,5-15; 256,13; 302,12-33; 304,7; 305,25; nn. 57, 58 future, knowledge of the future not in sense perception, 292,22-3

hinge as image of the instrument by means of which the soul moves, 304,7-305,18

generatio spontanea, 294,37-295,5; n. 362 good is what preserves everything, 318,30-4; 319,23; highest good not opposed to bad, 268,18; 275,29; all desire is for the good or what appears to be good, 297,39-298,8; grades of goodness from the highest to the lowest level, 317,28-35; good versus bad, 252,18; 256,31-2; 257,7-8; discrimination between good and bad is characteristic of practical intellect, 263,39; 264,4.20; 265,29;

Iamblichus, nn. 26, 233, 273, 330, 333, 335, 400, 475, 476, 488, 491, 525, 559; puts belief in the non-rational life, 309,37; considers intellect in potentiality and the intellect in act as transcending the soul, 313,1-30 imagination, rational and not rational, 286,32 306,18-20; nn. 302-3; perceptive imagination, 309,9-13; has no share in truth and falsity, 285,20-35; a form of rational thought, 274,19-20; 296,5-22; n. 216; imagination in rational beings is deliberative, 308,1-39; 309,13-32; different levels of imagination in animals, determinate and not determinate, can be trained or not, 292,28-39; 293,26-294,2; 306,38-307,40; n. 350 imagination: no thinking without imagination, not valid of all thinking as the Peripatetics claimed, 268,9-25; 283,19-284,13; n. 176; only true for practical thinking (is always with imagination) and for some forms of theory, such as mathematical abstract thinking, 267,10.23-36; 273,10-41; 278,11-32; 285,20-35; 306,20-7 imaginative power, intermediary between opinion and perception, 290,32-7; n. 338; related to perceptive power, 290,15-37; 321,17-20; depends on us, 290,29-32 imagined objects (phantasmata), impressions in the imagination, phantasta, 267,17-37; 274,18-19; 284,13; 285,11-14; n. 167 impulse (hormê), term orexis derived

Subject Index from hormê, 289,27; n. 330; impulse implied in all locomotion, 292,7-8; impulse-driven movement, 297,33-6 individuals, 265,9; 273,15; 294,14; 307,8; 318,9 indivisible/undivided said in many ways, potentially or in act, 249,8-11; 251,10-37; 252,25-32; nn. 17, 43 instrument by which the body is moved is the life formally constituting the living being, 301,17-302,17; 303,19-315,18; n. 415; see also organ intellect: does not need an organ for its activities, 321,19-28; always true, 249,36; 250,7.17; 252,8; 261,2-4; is what unifies, 251,1-9 intellect: imparticipable intellect, 245,39; 249,16; 254,33; 258,14; 313,4-16; productive (poiêtikos) cause of the soul, 312,14-15 intellect: participated intellect, defining intellect of the soul, its formal cause, 246,1; 247,15-16; 249,21-7; 251,6-7; 254,22; 312,13-15; 313,3.24-30 intellect: practical intellect, discussed in DA 3.7-11 (see n. 147), goal is cognition of the good or rather its practice, 264,5-13; n. 153; initiates local movement, 297,2-23; is concerned with opposites, 275,29-31; concerned with contingent things, 275,29-39; 302,19-20; 308,24-5; 309,8; 314,14-15; n. 223; consideration of practical matters remains domain of practical intellect also when nothing is done, 275,12-39; n. 224; sense-perception used in DA 3.7-8 as image to explain practical thinking, 264,18; 265,21.30; 266,36; 269,29-31; 272,36ff.; 274,35-9; see also theoretical intellect intellect: theoretical intellect: summary of all stages of this intellect, 263,30-7; does not cause movement, 295,10-37; 298,19-20; how it differs from the practical intellect, 297,2-9; 299,2-8; 320,40-321,2

225

intellect: the term nous can be used for all forms of cognition, 286,28-32; 296,3-7; n. 301; three modes: essential intellect [I], proceeding not yet perfected [IIa], and proceeding but perfected [IIb], 281,31-7; 310,14-311,9; [I]: essential intellect, 246,17; 258,28; 259,7-9; 262,16; 263,33; 268,19; 279,18; 280,27; 286,16; 310,30-311,9; science together with intellect characterize the essential intellect, 248,31-7; 259,30-7; 311,2; n. 10; summit of rational thinking, 249,32-4; 250,6; 259,29; 280,27-8; it is the productive or agent intellect discussed in DA 3.5, 248,31; 258,24-6; n. 9; its twofold objects examined in DA 3.6: indivisible forms and objects of science, 248,30-7; 249,31-2; is always true, 249,36-7; 250,7.17; 252,7-8; 261,14-15.25-6; 261,1-4; 264,2; this intellect is connected with the forms and the transcendent intellect in a congenital manner without otherness, 310,36-311,1; 312,12-313,1; has in a secondary way all features of transcendent intellect, 258,10-38; n. 97; [IIa] passive, 247,27-36; 248,4.27; 261,1-2; nn. 5, 6, 7; outgoing, 257,28; 258,24; 261,2; 279,18; proceeding, 257,28; 258,24; 308,36; 313,39; potential not yet perfected, 310,14-17; not yet completed and imperfect, 257,28; 264,3; 311,14; objects of passive intellect, 248,28-30; [IIb] intellect perfected with disposition of science, 259,31-4; 262,25; 263,32; 279,18; 281,32; 311,17-21; nn. 11, 18 intermediaries known from the extremes, 259,11-29; 261,31-2 intermediate status of soul between what is indivisible and what is divided, 259,10-30; 282,8-29; in remaining and proceeding, 311,1-9; see also Plato irrational desire worst in human animals, 289,41-290,14; n. 333 knowledge, three modes: on a

226

Subject Index

co-ordinate level (sustoikhôs), from a higher perspective (kreittonôs), from an inferior perspective, 252,19; 253,8-9; 257,21-2; 276,18-20; 280,33-6; n. 49; on co-ordinate knowledge, 250,22; 252,6-23; 253,1-10; 254,18.30; 256,27-8; 257,20-34; 258,10; 261,14; 273,16; 276,17-20; 277,40; 280,33-5; 283,27; 286,32; 289,32-9; 291,11; 320,3-17; 323,24; knowing from causes is more perfect than knowing the causes from effects, 276,31-3; 313,8-17; on knowing privations, see privations; on pre-existent knowledge in the soul, see Plato licentious (akolastos), 296,16.31.37; 310,20; n. 368 life, every life substance, 305,16-18; gradation of life and corresponding organic bodies, 321,5-28; inferior forms of life included in superior ones, not conversely, 315,29-30; 321,5-9; secondary forms of life are interwoven with the rational soul in its projection outwards, 258,33; 280,1; 311,34; 327,9; mortal animals receive life adventitiously, 316,15-25; 318,27-8; nn. 487-8; see also matter, animal limit and infinity, 289,39-40; n. 332 limit, indivisible limits as extremes of bodies, 251,19-252,4; n. 23 line as limit, 251,19-20; 256,22 logos, internal and expressed, 260,2; n. 113; logoi expressing the eidos, see form major premise in practical syllogism, 310,23-9; 311,22-8; 313,19-20 mathematical intellect compared to practical intellect, 276,1-10 mathematical objects as projected reasons in imagination, 276,4-10; 277,1-3.18-29; separate, 278,31-279,3 mathematics as understood by Peripatetics considers accidental quantitative properties in abstraction, 276,29-279,3; n. 233;

according to the Pythagoreans science of substances, 277,1-3; n. 233; according to Plato mathematics as bridge, not true science, 276,34-277,1; n. 230; mathematics and the final cause, 264,8-10; n. 152 matter, ultimate substrate of the generated, or divisible natural substance, 285,12-13; two kinds intelligible and sensible, 276,4-8; n. 227; receiving life with or without matter, 316,15-35; receiving forms without matter, 318,12-27 minor premise in practical syllogism always particular, 264,2-4.20; 269,4-5; 275,9-12; 295,22-4; 297,3-4; 311,22-8 mole rat without sight, 294,19-37; n. 358 movement, cause of impulse-driven locomotion investigated in DA 3.9-11; impulse-driven distinguished from natural, 291,12-22; definition of movement, 264,23-4; 265,3-5; 303,6-8; n. 155; four factors in the explanation of movement, the unmoved moving, the moving, that with which, that which is moved, 299,29-305,18; whether movement (kinêsis) can be said of activities of the soul, 265,5-20; 302,25-7; 312,24-40; n. 410; natural movements, 305,21-306,7 natural science is different from mathematics, 276,28-277,1; is a true philosophy, 276,28-34 nature does not make jumps, 308,15-20; everything in nature for the sake of something or a concomitant, 319,1-31; against nature (para phusin), 293,6; 294,6-34; 324,20; what is against nature never in the whole species, 294,7-39; infinity in becoming, 288,33-6 negation, 260,2.22.27; 265,34; 266,1; 268,12.13; 285,20-33; see also affirmation non-being, 257,8-10; 260,23-36; see also Plato

Subject Index nourishment and vegetative function need for survival of mortal animals, 316,13-39; 323,26-324,16 now as indivisible limit, 249,11; 251,19; 256,21-2; 257,4; now as beyond time, 253,9; 254,26-7.34; eternal now, n. 59 nutritive power, needed in mortal animals, 316,24-39, see also nourishment, vegetative power organ, body as organ for the soul, need to discuss organs of the soul, summary of discussion in DA 3.12-13, 315,22-316,12; organic bodies correspond to gradations of life, 321,5-28 otherness, 259,38; 260,29.30.31; 267,2.3; 268,12.13; 281,34; 288,12; 311,36.38 oysters, 293,24; 294,4-39; 298,25; 301,38; 307,3 Parmenides on not-being, 260,23-4 parts of a whole, 288,20-40; parts of the soul, 286,34-287,4; 287,5-291,41; 299,22-4; nn. 305-7 paruphistanai, parasitize, exist beside, 256,31; 257,10-16; against nature, 294,16 perceptive power no cause of locomotion, 293,20-295,9; identical in subject with imaginative, 293,35-7; see also sense-perception Peripatetics, 268,10; 277,22; 283,28; nn. 176, 233, 270, 330, 400, 478, 525 phasis, saying, 259,40-260,22; nn. 114, 115; in 432a10 taken for assertion, 285,25 Philebus on limit and infinity, 289,39-40; n. 332 plants, 247,21; 291,25; 292,41; 293,7; 294,10; 316,36; 317,15; 319,29; 320,19; 326,10; 328,10; do not have organs for locomotion, 292,40-293,8; why do they not have sense perception?, 317,1-318,2; some parts of animals resemble plants, 328,10 Plato: what Plato called ‘thinking with reason’ (Tim. 28A1), or as ‘circle of the same and of the different’ (43C-D) Aristotle

227

describes as ‘thinking with science’, 249,28-30, 312,25; Plato and Aristotle characterize the intermediary from the extremes, 259,29-30; 270,29-31; Plato (Tim. 35A3-7) and Aristotle both take the soul to be intermediary, with an indivisible and a divided part, 254,27-9; 259,14-23; 312,6-9; n. 71; Plato and Aristotle on the meaning of phasis, 260,3; Plato on non-being in the Sophist (258D-259B), 260,26-35; Aristotle agrees with Plato on pre-existent knowledge in the soul, 263,9-13; Plato considers mathematics as a bridge, 276,35; according to Plato perception does not reach substance, 277,37; Plato (Tim. 43D) on the disturbance of the circles of the soul at birth, 281,35-6; Plato’s tripartite division of the soul made for practical reasons, 287,27-9; 289,8-19; 299,22-3; nn. 314, 326; Plato (Soph. 264B2) understands imagination as an interweaving of sense-perception and opinion, 290,32-4; n. 338; Plato and Aristotle agree that only the good can be object of desire, 298,39-299,2; Aristotle sometimes uses as does Plato kinêsis in the case of soul, 265,5-20; 302,25-7; 312,24-40; n. 410; Plato and Aristotle agree on bringing the many to one by reasoning, 309,29-32; Plato on self-movement, 312,15.34; according to Plato (Phaedr. 245C9) the soul is not only life for itself, but also source of life for the body, 287,33-5; Plato and Aristotle do not agree on sense-perception of plants, 317,10-15; Plato and Aristotle do not admit sense-perception in celestial beings, 318,13; Plato (Resp. 10, 608E) understands the good as what preserves everything, 318,31; Plato (Tim. 31B4-5) and Aristotle have different views on what is tangible, 322,8; Plato

228

Subject Index

assigns the fiery element to sight, Aristotle water, 326,16-19 pleasurable versus painful, 264,18; 265,27-266,31; 268,6-8; 269,24-6; 274,33-275,3; 306,31-307,16; pleasurable distinguished from the good, 300,1-14; animals only look at pleasure, 309,5-10 Plotinus, 250,4-6; 261,23-4; n. 32 Plutarch of Athens in text, 260,1; 282,38; 292,32; 302,25; 304,9; 320,29; nn. 97, 101, 112, 142, 249, 341, 397, 420, 443, 446, 475, 525 pneuma, 296,36; 301,18.28; 303,32; n. 395 point as indivisible limit (peras), 249,9-10; 251,18.24 potentiality prior to time in an individual, but not so in the soul, 262,32-263,26; transition from potentiality to actuality in the soul, 312,25-30; distinction of knowledge and perception according to potentiality and actuality, 280,15-281,10; see also thinking practical good, 297,4; 302,18-21 practical reasoning, 297,12-23; 313,8-314,9; see also major, minor premise practical thinking, see intellect: practical praxis also in animals, 299,3-5; n. 380 pre-existence of souls, n. 140 preference in deliberation, 309,18-32 prior, different meaning 263,5-8; n. 141 privation, some indivisibles have the character of privations, 256,23-257,20; knowledge of, 252,14-23; 256,33-257,7; 257,24-37; nn. 81, 85 projection (probolê), 262,26; 263,32; nn. 33, 110; see also science purple murex without hearing, 294,19; n. 358 pursuit and avoidance, 266,18; 267,3; diôxis, pursuit, 266,5; seeking, 266,28; avoidance, 266,6-35; 267,3-5 pushing and pulling, all movement can be reduced to, 305,19-316,15 Pythagoras, Pythagoreans, 251,27; 277,2; 315,4; nn. 47, 233;

Pythagoreans on mathematical objects, 251,27-9; 277,1-3; nn. 47, 233 qualities: opposite and homogeneous, how they are known, 271,1-32; passive qualities, 284,4; 322,8.17.32.36.40; 323,21; 324,14; 328,29-30; 329,8 return (epistrophê) to oneself, reflexivity, 263,4.21-5; 274,23; 290,6-14; 312,39; n. 334; not possible for a body, 279,29; even in human sense perception, 290,4-6 said in many senses with respect to one (aph’ henos ê pros hen), 251,14; 262,9-10; 299,29; 300,19-20; nn. 17, 387 science: in act identical with the objects known, 250,7-8; 259,34-7; 262,12-30; 280,31-281,6; 281,17-30; n. 270; science knows substances of sensible things and explains from their causes their properties, 276,22-34; science twofold corresponding to two types of intellect: outgoing and remaining, 281,31-7; science together with intellect characterize the essential intellect, 248,33-7; 249,30; 250,6-8; 262,16-32; 312,1-2; science in essential intellect always true, 249,1; science as projected disposition not always true, 249,2-3; 250,7-9.30-5; 262,25-7; 263,32; n. 110; see also essential intellect self-control: self-controlled people, 295,35-6; 296,13.31; 299,26; 309,18; 310,27; n. 368; people without, 295,28-9; 296,14.31; 299,26; 308,11; 309,18; 310,21-7; n. 368 self-movement of the soul according to Plato and Aristotle, 312,15-36; n. 466 sense-organs, fine-grained elements cannot be organ of touch, but organ of sight or hearing, 326,12-327,17; sense-organs destroyed by excess, 326,27-8; 327,34-5; 329,1-18

Subject Index sense-perception, always true about proper sense-objects, 261,33-262,10; the five specific senses, 268,32-6; does not attain substance, 277,37ff.; not attributed to celestial beings, 318,13-18; has its objects from within, 280,18-31; is not the sense-objects but their forms, 280,18-31; 281,14-17; needed for both body and soul of generated animals, 319,31-17; why lacking in plants?, 317,15; n. 499; through media and immediate, 323,8-15; 324,37-8; sense-perception shares in reason, 290,5ff.; how the sensitive power is affected by the sense-object, 264,20-265,20; rational reflexivity in sense perception, 289,41-290,14; n. 335; a higher type of perception, 308,30-8; sense-perception often used in DA 3.7-8 as example to explain practical thinking, 264,18; 265,21.30; 266,36; 269,29-31; 272,36ff.; 274, 35-9; see also discernment separable, separated (khôristos), how to interpret, n. 101; can the intellect when not separated know separate forms, 279,10-280,4; essential intellect separated, 258,13.33-7; 260,37-39; 263,34-5; 268,10-14; 310,30-2; to separate in abstraction, 277,16-279,3; natural form is separate, 284,27-37 sight, the most excellent of all sense perceptions, resembles the intellect, 261,36-262,2; see also air skopos (intention, purpose) of the text, 254,31-4; 258,19-20; n. 97; 268,29; 269,18; 283,23; 297,32; 300,33; 308,20; 311,9-11; 315,31 sleep, 291,22-31 Sophist, commentaries on, 260,26-37 soul: as actuality of the body in two senses, as form and as user, 301,31-302,2; 304,5-6; n. 398; as formal cause of the living being, 249,19; 287,36; 302,3.30-303,10; as formal life of the body is that by which it is moved, 302,2-16; as efficient cause, 287,36-8; 301,36-40; 302,30-3; 305,25-6;

229

309,16; as final cause, 302,33-4; compared to tool, 282,1-29; in what sense does it have parts?, 286,34-287,4; 287,5-291,41; 299,22-4; nn. 305-7; intermediary status, 254,27-9; 259,14-30; 270,29-31; 312,6-9; n. 71; soul is all beings, 280,13-281,11; 282,30-9; self-living and cause of life for all bodies, 287,34-8; indivisibly united to its own rational forms, 249,21-7; contemplates its own forms and the forms above, 249,29-31; soul manifold in substance, 286,37-287,3; n. 307; substance manifested in activities of soul, 248,21-4; 262,15-25; n. 2; principle of movement in respect of place DA 3.9-11; moved incidentally as formal cause, 302,16; 303,37; 304,6; disturbance at moment of birth, 281,35-7; n. 273 spirit, see pneuma Stoic doctrines, nn. 24, 113, 330, 395, 490 subject and predicate, 240,32-42 surface: plane surface as limit, 251,19-20; 256,22; surface as intermediary between parts of body in movement, 301,20-31; 304,37-19 tangible, what is perceived by touch, every body is tangible, 321,5-324,11; 327,30-328,22; different views in Plato and Aristotle, see Plato taste, and how it is related to touch, 306,30ff.; 323,20-324,11; 328,26-32 temperate, 264,12; 268,24; 269,7-17; n. 368 Theophrastus, Physics, 286,31-2 theoria/lexis distinction, n. 54 thinking, incidentally or per se, 255,21-37; nn. 76-7; interwoven with potentiality, 257,13-37; see imagination, intellect time in predication, 250,30-7; human beings aware of time, 299,34-300,15; what is above time, 254,20-4; thinking of forms never in time never extended, 254,14-23; 258,3-5

230

Subject Index

toionde and tode: how they are different, 314,25-34 tools, 282,8-17; see also instrument touch, definition, 326,29-38; touch as a mean intermediate state between opposite qualities, 327,18-329,18; its organ, 327,3-11; needed for survival of animal, 322,28-323,8; see also tangible, taste truth: opposed to falsity, 249,1-4; 249,35-250,3; not opposed to falsity, 248,27ff.; 249,37; 250,3-8; 258,13; 275,28; n. 30; see also falsity undivided aspects in divided things, 252,32-254,12; 255,1-256,14; n. 57 unfolding of logoi in the soul, 249,27; 253,11; 258,16; 262,31; 266,1; n. 27; see also form unitary thinking of the soul, integrating both theoretical and practical thought, 268,29-269,18 universals different from indivisible forms, 313,2-8 vegetative function and nourishment needed for survival of mortal animals, 316,13-39; 323,26-324,16; for the sake of something,

292,8-20; not cause of locomotion, but of other changes, 291,18-41; 293,15-18; most distant from reason, 289,20-4; 299,15; come close to natural movement, 306,37-8; vegetative life in metals?, 316,34-6 vital: vital affection, 270,13.17; living reason-principles, 277,2.19.24; vital substance, 285,15; vital movement, 291,20.24; 292,7; 305,31; vital pneuma, 301,18; 303,32; vital organ, 315,23; 327,7; vital locomotion, 292,7 well being as distinguished from sole existence, 317,16-22; some sense-perceptions necessary for existence, others contribute to well being, 324,11-37; 328,22-7; 329,19-34 white versus black, versus yellow, 259,23; 269,14-15; 262,2; nn. 109, 117 will (boulêsis) or rational desire, 289,23; 291,3; 292,26; 295,14; 296,9.27.32.33; 298,19; 308,10; 310,16.19.34.35; 311,1.2.3.6; 321,18; n. 329 wind 328,36.38