Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4 9781472552297, 9780715626146

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Introduction I Richard Sorabji The translation of this commentary in three volumes will provide the first opportunity for a wide readership to assess for themselves the question of its authorship. In 1602 Francesco Piccolomini disputed the ascription to the sixth-century Neoplatonist Simplicius and proposed Simplicius’ colleague in the Athenian School, Priscian of Lydia, as the author. In this Piccolomini was followed by F. Bossier and C. Steel, using new arguments, in ‘Priscianus Lydus en de In de Anima van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius’, in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34 (1972), 761-822. Their arguments were in turn rejected by I. Hadot in an appendix to her Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978. As the arguments of Bossier and Steel were published in Dutch, however, many scholars have not had a good opportunity to make an independent assessment. This will be remedied by the publication in our second volume of a new version in English of their view, written by Carlos Steel. That volume will also contain, side by side, a translation of Priscian and of our present author, at a point where they are commenting on the very same part of Aristotle’s On the Soul, albeit indirectly in Priscian’s case. Priscian’s comments are indirect in that his Metaphysics of Theophrastus is a commentary on the lost reflections of Theophrastus on the subject matter which Aristotle treats in this part of his On the Soul. Meanwhile, the translators and annotators of the three volumes of translation will be contributing to the debate. Already in the introduction to this first volume, J.O. Urmson explains his reasons for doubting that the author can be Simplicius, while Peter Lautner gives a possible reason for questioning the ascription to Priscian. Further views may well be expressed in the second volume by Pamela Huby, the translator of Priscian, and by myself as general editor, and in the third volume by Henry Blumenthal when translating the final book of our present author. It is likely, however, that some contributors will finalise their opinions only as the work on the three volumes proceeds. This first volume has been translated by J.O. Urmson and annotated by Peter Lautner. An invaluable contribution was also made by

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Carlos Steel, who shared with us his exceptional knowledge of this text. He was kind enough to go through the entire typescript and make possible a large number of improvements. The general editor expresses his warmest gratitude to all parties for their collaboration in this exercise. II J.O. Urmson This is a translation of the commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, attributed to Simplicius, as far as Book 2, ch. 4. The Greek text is that edited by Hayduck in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 11, Berlin 1882. The text discusses short passages of Aristotle, one after another, each passage being indicated in a lemma, of which only the first few words are sometimes given, in which case I have added the remainder of the passage in square brackets for the convenience of the reader. I have made my own translation of the lemmata in order to ensure uniformity in the vocabulary of text and commentary and in order to conform to the given or implied text used by the commentator when it differs from the received text. It is not recommended on any other grounds. I am grateful to Dr Peter Lautner and to Professor Richard Sorabji and his assistants for saving me from many errors and infelicities – perhaps more often but for my occasional obstinacy. Authorship Coming to this commentary after translating the huge commentary of Simplicius on Physics 4, I was immediately convinced, after a couple of pages, that it was not by the same author; the whole style was unfamiliar. I now know that others have shared this belief. I here list some more objective reasons for this intuitive conviction. (1) The exposition of Aristotle’s views in Physics 4 is faithful and acute, and, while clearly written by a Neoplatonist, is an honest elucidation of the views of Aristotle. I share the view of Leonardo Tarán that ‘its intrinsic high quality makes it the best commentary on the Physics even today’.1 This is the more remarkable since in the two independent discussions of place and time, the so-called Corollaries, Simplicius expresses notably different views in markedly Neoplatonic style. In contrast, as others2 have noted, the commentary 1. Tarán, ‘The Text of Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics’, Peripatoi, Band 15, 1987. 2. e.g. Blumenthal, ‘Simplicius(?) on the First Book of Aristotle’s De Anima’, Peripatoi, Band 15, 1987.

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on the De Anima is a Neoplatonic treatise, informative, one presumes, on the views of Iamblichus, but totally untrustworthy as an exposition of Aristotle’s work. Most notably, while Aristotle is commonly, and rightly, taken to hold the view that the soul is the actuality (entelekheia) of the living body, with the exception of contemplative intellect (theôrêtikos nous), which he regards as an independent substance, Simplicius(?) ascribes to him the view that there is a soul that is the actuality of the living body, giving it its form (eidopoiousa), and another soul that initiates the changes (kinêtikê) of the animate body, like the sailor in his boat. This misinterpretation is repeated over and over again throughout the commentary. (2) In the Physics commentary the lemmata are usually of some length, perhaps ten lines. They give the first few words, followed by ‘up to’ (heôs tou) and the closing words. They are always syntactically complete and the commentary is syntactically separate from the lemmata. In the DA commentary the lemmata are sometimes fairly long, in which case only the first few words are given with no indication where they end. Many lemmata are very short, consisting of only a few words and often syntactically incomplete. Sometimes the lemma is syntactically incorporated into the preceding or succeeding commentary. See, for example, 7,17; 15,17; 20,24. Occasionally phêsi (‘he says’) is interpolated into the lemma. (3) The Physics commentary is full of quotations. It is a main source for the Presocratics, and the interpretations of Aristotle by Eudemus, Alexander and others are frequently quoted at length. In the corollaries there are many quotations of later authors such as pseudoArchytus and Damascius. There are no quotations at all in the commentary on the DA. Occasionally the views of Plato and Alexander are discussed but never quoted, not even those of Iamblichus, ‘the best judge of truth’ (ho aristos tês alêtheias kritês). (4) The Physics commentary is full of the caution which Simplicius calls ‘philosophical caution’ (philosophos eulabeia): ‘perhaps’ (mêpote) occurs six times in the commentary on the first chapter of Book 4 alone. The tone of the DA commentary is much more didactic. (5) Without attempting stylistic analysis, one cannot fail to notice differences in the topic-neutral vocabulary. For example, the verb epexergazesthai (‘study’, ‘investigate’) is common in the DA commentary, much more so than the Index Verborum suggests; Hayduck fails to report its occurrence in the first few pages, at 1,9; 2,4; 5,22. Diels’ Index does not list it as occurring in the Physics commentary, and I have not noticed it there. Similarly the adjective diexodikos (‘drawn out’) is common in the DA commentary, but not found in that on the Physics. The adjective anapodeiktos (‘undemonstrated’) is listed as

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occurring fourteen times in the Physics commentary, but apparently is not found in that on the DA. (6) Simplicius in the Physics commentary shows a great interest in formal questions. He frequently supplies premises to Aristotle’s arguments to make them formally valid, and classifies them as being, e.g., in this or that figure of the syllogism. Simplicius(?) in the DA commentary shows no interest in these matters. He is also far less acute on logical and semantical issues. Thus he regularly confuses Aristotle’s notion of terms forming series developing in complexity, such as states, geometrical figures and souls with that of terms derived from or contributing to one central case, as, for example, diets, places and complexions may be called healthy on account of their relation to the central case of the healthy person. The relation of the purely vegetative soul of the plant to the highly complex soul of man is not like that of a healthy complexion to a healthy person. It is difficult to imagine such an elementary mistake by the author of the Physics commentary. It is no doubt possible for a writer to change himself radically enough to explain all these differences between the two works. It is unlikely. The commentary on the De Anima is of value for the light it sheds on Neoplatonic, and especially Iamblichan, views of the soul; it has useful information about various Pythagorean views; it occasionally has value for elucidating Aristotle on points of detail. But it is not a trustworthy interpretation of the main doctrines of Aristotle. III Peter Lautner Scholarly interest in this commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, attributed by all the manuscripts to Simplicius, is not new. Paduan Averroists of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries used it to justify the claim that there is no other internal sense pertaining to cognition than common sensation (koinê aisthêsis), phantasia and memory. More importantly, they used it to elaborate a theory of the active (or, rather, productive) intellect and thereby rectify the Averroist notion of unified intellect, which rendered the immortality of the individual soul impossible and therefore excluded personal reward and punishment of any kind in the afterlife. They tried to re-interpret this heretical view by drawing on the pagan Neoplatonist tradition, especially on the commentaries on De Anima, the most excellent of which, so it was claimed, had been written by Simplicius. Some of these Paduan philosophers, like Agostino Nifo (1469/70-1538) and Marc’ Antonio Genua (1490/1-1563) went so far as to admit that Simplicius’ doctrine of the intellect and of the way it is connected to

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the sensitive soul had been repeated by Averroes as regards the crucial points. Genua attributed even the doctrine of the unity of the intellect to him.3 Unlike the debate on the active intellect, which was a constant source of inspiration to medieval philosophers, the interest in, and even familiarity with, Simplicius’ commentary is entirely without precedent. For we do not know of a medieval Latin translation of the text.4 At least, no such work has survived. It is Giovanni Pico della Mirandola who is said to have discovered the commentary, perhaps in the late 1480s, and thus to have made it accessible to a Western readership. In 1486, he also summarised the conclusiones, basic principles drawn from Simplicius’ text, which, to Pico’s mind, may have concerned the contemporary dispute on the immortality of the rational soul. Alas, some of the statements were regarded by the Papal authorities as heretical. Most probably, the copy he had in his library was written in Greek.5 The editio princeps is an Aldine from 1527 by Francesco Asulano. Some years after, in 1544 at Tübingen, Jacob Schegk also edited some portions of the text along with Aristotle’s De Anima. The Humanist translations known to us were also completed in the sixteenth century. The first is by Giovanni Fasolo (or Faseolo), a disciple of Genua, and came out in Venice in 1543. The second is by Evangelista Longo (Asulano) and was published also in Venice in 1553. The third, a partial one, was made by the Greek Humanist, Michael Sophianus (?-1565) who translated the introductory part of the Proœmium.6 There remains, however, some uncertainty whether we have to reckon with a Humanist translation compiled before that by Fasolo. Or we might surmise the survival of 3. Important expositions of the issue have been offered by B. Nardi, ‘Il commento di Simplicio a De Anima nelle controversie della fine del secolo XV e del secolo XVI’, in Saggi sull’ aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XV, Firenze 1958, 365-443 (he is speaking of Paduan Simplicians on p. 386) and by E. Mahoney, ‘Neoplatonism, the Greek Commentators and Renaissance Aristotelianism’, in D.J. O’Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, Norfolk, Va., 1982, 169-77, 264-83. See also his ‘Philosophy and Science in Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo’, in A. Poppi (ed.), Scienza e filosofia all’Università di Padova nel Quattrocento, Padova 1983, 135-203. 4. As is shown by the table on Mediaeval Latin translations of Aristotle’s works and of Greek and Arabic commentaries, drawn up by B.G. Dod in his ‘Aristoteles Latinus’, in N. Kretzman, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Mediaeval Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, 47-79, esp. 74-9. On the medieval and Humanist translations of Simplicius’ commentaries, see F. Bossier, Filologisch-historische Navorsingen over de Middleeuwse en Humanistische Latijnse Vertalingen van de Commentaren van Simplicius, Part I (Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, Fakulteit van de Wijsbegeerte en de Letteren, doctoral proefschrift), 1975. My thanks are due to Prof. Carlos Steel for making the relevant portions of this unpublished study accessible to me. 5. For further references, see Nardi, op. cit., 373-4. 6. Preserved in Ambrosianus, D 465 inf. fasc. 12, see Hayduck’s introduction, p. VII, and Suppl. IV on p. XIV and F. Bossier, op. cit., 15.015ff. This text may have served as additional material to his translation of the De Anima, published in Venice in 1574.

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a medieval translation. The references in Agostino Nifo’s Collectanea super libros de anima, written in 1498 and published in 1503, might strengthen our suspicion about its existence,7 though Nifo may have been informed by Giovanni Pico and his knowledge of Greek also helped him to get access to the text. But he cites extensive passages in accurate Latin translation the style of which differs from his other references to the same subject a great deal. Differences in terminology may also go to show that the translation he was looking at had been completed in the Middle Ages.8 A further piece of evidence that weighs with us is that Nifo’s teacher and predecessor in Padua, Nicoletto Vernia (1420-1499) seems to have read Simplicius’ work at the end of 1480s.9 His notes on John of Jandun’s treatise show that he was acquainted at least with some passages of Simplicius’ commentary itself and that his knowledge was not derived from the conclusiones alone. Being Greekless, he must have relied on a translation which has been lost by now. It cannot be excluded that both Nifo and Vernia made use of the same translation. The commentary was continuously studied in the sixteenth century, and was taken as by Simplicius. At the end of this century and at the very beginning of the next, however, this attribution became a matter of dispute. Doubt was cast by Francesco Piccolomini (15231604) in his Expositio in tres libros Aristotelis de anima, published in Venice in 1602.10 One group of his arguments was based on a comparison of the style and length of this text with that of Simplicius’ commentaries on Physics and De Caelo. While the in Phys. and the in De Caelo are extensive (latus), diffuse (effusus), contain detailed expositions, as well as digressions against the main adversary, Philoponus, and cite or paraphrase long passages from Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Peripatetic commentator of the early third century 7. Cited by Nardi, op. cit., 378-9. 8. There are very literal translations of 128, 2-11 (in Collectanea II, t c 65, f. 102vb); 136, 20-8 (Coll. II, t c 74, f. 107vb); 160, 17-19 (Coll. II, t c 108, f. 120vb); 209, 11 (Coll. II, t c 156, f. 138ra), see F. Bossier, op. cit., 15.009-15.011; discussion of the whole issue is on pp. 15.004-15.015. In excluding the possibility that Nifo could have undertaken this work, Bossier calls it a translation by a certain Anonymous. In the light of these passages, the verdict by Nardi (op. cit., p. 373), that even though there was such a translation it must have been loose and unreliable, seems to be exaggerated. 9. See E. Kessler, ‘The Intellective Soul’, in C.B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler and J. Kraye (eds.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge 1988, 485-534, esp. 494, and E. Mahoney (1983), 164-6. Vernia himself says at the end of the second book in his copy of John of Jandun’s Questiones super libros de anima that he had completed Book 2, where his marginal notes witness his knowledge of Simplicius, on 6 August 1487; see E. Mahoney (1982), 268. Nardi does not discuss Vernia. 10. See f. 216r. Re-edited in his Commentarii in libros Aristotelis De caelo, ortu et interitu; adjuncta lucidissima expositione, in tres libros eiusdem de anima, nuc recens in ludem prodeunt, Mainz 1608. Some relevant portions of the text have been quoted by Nardi, op. cit., 431-2.

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A.D., just in order to reveal dissent from his views in each particular case, the commentary on the De Anima is laconic and without exhaustive references. The other group of arguments is devoted to establishing a close affinity to Priscian of Lydia’s Metaphrasis of Theophrastus’ De Sensu. For example, the account of light and colours at in DA. 2 is expounded in the Metaphrasis too. Moreover, Priscian makes mention of his commentary on De Anima. Both authors follow Iamblichus, as is clearly stated in the Proœmium of the in DA (1,18-20) and, in the Metaphrasis, in the first chapter which discusses phantasia (23,13 ff. CAG Suppl. I,2). Finally, in both works, there are frequent references to Plutarch, son of Nestorius, who founded the school of the Athenian Neoplatonists.11 It seems, however, that no response was given to Piccolomini’s hypothesis, which may be partly due to the fact that philosophers of the age no longer held problems like the immortality of the rational part of the soul to be significant, at least not in the way it was taken to be by the Schoolmen. They therefore abandoned studying the relevant texts, including Simplicius’ commentary.12 Slowly, the treatise came to be neglected. References to it by later philosophers are extremely scarce. In discussing problems concerning the soul, Malebranche mentions Simplicius in the company of other philosophers, but this does not mean that he read this commentary.13 The next edition, on which the present translation is based, appeared only in 1882, as part of the monumental project of the Berlin Academy of publishing the ancient commentators on Aristotle. The editor, Michael Hayduck, relied considerably on the preparatory work of Adolf Torstrik. This portion of the commentary deals with the views of Aristotle’s predecessors, as does Aristotle in the De Anima, and contains some general remarks concerning the intellect and the soul, which are peculiar to the Athenian Neoplatonists who were heavily influenced by Iamblichus.14 Moreover, here is the proper place to lay down the

11. Some of the arguments crop up in a far more sophisticated form in F. Bossier and C. Steel, ‘Priscianus Lydus en de In de anima van Pseudo (?)-Simplicius’, in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34 (1972), 761-822. The authors appreciate the work of Piccolomini on p. 762. An English version of their paper is to be published as an introduction to Simplicius on Aristotle’s De Anima 2,4-10 in this series. 12. The process has been depicted by B. Nardi, ‘La fine dell’ averroismo’, in his op. cit. in n. 1, 443-55. 13. Cf. De la recherche de la vérité, Paris 1674. My reference is to the reprint in Malebranche: Oeuvres, Tome I, Paris 1962, 291. Leibniz seems to have known only Simplicius’ commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. See G.W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, vol. VI,3, Berlin 1980, pp. 343, 347. 14. This aspect has been well explained by H. Blumenthal, ‘Simplicius (?) on the First Book of Aristotle’s De Anima’, in I. Hadot (ed.) Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin-New York 1987, 91-112, and ‘The Psychology of (?) Simplicius’ commentary on

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principles whereby things of different kinds are to be explained in the right way. In Simplicius’ view, the right interpretation depends on what kind of thing is under examination. Divine or supreme entities require, or allow, an investigation which is different from that appropriate to inferior ones. In discussing this method, he uses the term endeixis (allusion) and its cognates many times. In his view, Democritus was speaking allusively of the intellective reality (noera ousia), and the Pythagoreans were discussing the divided substance (merizomenê ousia) of the soul. It may be of some interest that, following Syrianus, the author of this commentary employs the term endeixis also when discussing soul and intellect. As he says, we can refer allusively to the intellect, as well as display the nature of the soul as being between undivided being and the reality which is divided into bodies.15 But the term is far from being unusual in Plotinus, Iamblichus and the Athenian Neoplatonists. Its use was coloured by the fact that in the Middle Platonic period some of Plato’s dialogues, notably the Protagoras, had been classified as endeictic dialogues though the meaning of the term changed gradually over successive generations of Neoplatonists.16 In Plotinus, it is used to allude to three hypostases and the Good.17 Porphyry relates it to a picture or image (eikonisma).18 Iamblichus was the first to attribute this kind of interpretation to the Pythagoreans. Supposedly, it was their habit to clarify the subject under examination through similitudes and images and then to add the unsayable allusion (aporrhêtos endeixis) to it, which functions by means of symbols. This is the nature of the myths, too, which are intended to allude to things through symbols.19 Similarly, we can only hint at the productive principles in the cosmos or at the benefits –––––– the De Anima’, in H. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd (eds), Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism: Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius, Liverpool 1982, 73-94; discussion is on pp. 94-5. 15. Except 3,31 where he uses it in the sense of ‘mathematical demonstration’, he takes it as meaning ‘allusion’ (or ‘indication’, ‘illustration’), cf. 22,13; 26,11-19; 28,19; 30,5; 34,14; 40,9; 46,14; 49,31-5. 16. Cf. Albinus, Prologus, 3, 148,32; 6, 151,10; and also D.L. III. 49. For further references and bibliographical details, see O. Nüsser, Albins Prolog und die Dialogtheorie des Platonismus, Stuttgart 1991, 62, 85; and H. Tarrant, Thrasyllan Platonism, Ithaca, N.Y., 1993, 52-3. 17. V. 1, 10, 2-3; VI. 8, 13, 48, cf. also III. 6, 12, 25 and VI. 7, 1, 30. 18. See Sent. XLIII, p. 55,9 Lamberz: hôs exô ontos eikonismatos endeiknumenon. For endeiknumenon Mommert puts endeixin (p. 42,4 in his edition). Image and allusion are correlated also in Anonymous’ Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (ch. 27, 221,28 Hermann = 42,41 Westerink-Trouillard-Segonds), a Neoplatonist introduction to Plato, written probably in the sixth century A.D. 19. In Tim. fr. 5,9-15 Dillon. Although Iamblichus explicitly states that the Pythagoreans were adherents of such an interpretation, this does not mean that they named this procedure endeixis.

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passing into the universe from the gods.20 Following Iamblichus, Syrianus also assigns endeixis to the Pythagorean and he takes a further step by saying that the concepts (logoi) in the soul are indicative of intelligible things, as being their images.21 His most renowned pupil, Proclus, offers a more detailed and clear-cut exposition. He regularly connects this method of interpretation with images and symbols. Superior things are to be explained by the aid of endeixis. For secret things must be handed down secretly and no one is entitled to blab out unsayable notions concerning the gods.22 The appropriate way of teaching about such beings is symbolic, endeictic and enigmatic, which fits the nature of the most secret tenets.23 It is contrasted to the tentative (epikheirêmatikos) method, which refers either to the dialectical proof in Aristotle (Top. 8.11, 162a16; De Mem. 2, 451a19) or, in general, to discursive argumentation. Allusion is pictorial, not affirmative (In Remp. 2,8,12) or particular24 and sometimes we hint at the supernatural by means of what is contrary to nature (to para phusin).25 One of Proclus’ successors, Damascius, the last head of the Academy at Athens, followed in the wake of his teacher.26 One chapter of his De Principiis is given over to this subject.27 We can allude to something which is entirely undetermined (adioristos), that is, to what is beyond determination. On the other hand, this is a method which excludes analogical thinking (kat’ analogian theôrein).28 Elsewhere, indeed, he applies the term when 20. In Tim. fr. 10,15 Dillon; cf. frr. 4,3; 33,13-4; 37,12 (with reference to Plato) and in Pram. 23,14-15. 21. See his in Metaph. 10,10; 83,19 CAG VI,1. 22. dei gar ta mustika mustikôs paradidonai, kai mê dêmonsieuein tas aporrhêtous peri tôn theôn ennoias. See in Parm. 928,7-9, cf. 928,15 Cousin; in Tim. I. 7,29-30; 30,8 Diehl. Notice that aporrhêtos means here rather ‘what it is not advisable to divulge’ (though it could be divulged) and not ‘inexpressible on its own’. For a very useful discussion of verbal adjectives ending with -tos in Hellenistic texts, see J. Barnes, The Toils of Skepticism, Cambridge 1990, 17-20. 23. In Parm. 1027,27-30; cf. 1038,14; 1074,6.15; 1075,35. For endeixis and cognates as indirect indication of divine beings, see in Remp. I. 5,8; 56,3; 61,9; 72,9; 84,12.28; 93,14; 113,6; II. 7,27 Kroll; in Tim. I. 7,29-30; 8,22; 15,14-15; 17,13; 19,8; 24,19; 29,23; 30,1.8.15; 32,24; 50,25; 53,2; 54,10; 75,5; 76,11; 80,25; 84,14; 102,7; 130,10; 165,12; 178,31; 188,24-5; 190,10; 196,29; 223,24; 365,21-2; III. 73,21; 230,34 Diehl; Theol. Plat. I. 4, 19,4; I. 28,121,3-4; II. 39 Saffrey-Westerink; in Euclidem 110,8-13; 291,15-17 Friedlein. 24. Contrasted to ‘particular approach’ (merikê epibolê) at in Parm. 1074,15. 25. In Remp. I. 77,25. 26. In Philebum 16,19; 145,6; 209,2; 249,1; 250,4 Westerink; De Princ. I 88, vol. II, 6,3-4, 7,14, 11,18, 12,8; I 93, vol. II, 13,6; I 97, vol. II, 19,15 Westerink-Combès; in Phaedonem I 282,2; 418,2; 420,4; 557,3; II 76,5; 151,3 Westerink. 27. I 85. 28. Vol. I, p. 129,3-4, and see also vol. II, 6,14. Damascius uses the term kata endeixin that is probably his own invention, as has been maintained by L.G. Westerink in his remarks to the entry endeixis, in id. (ed.), Damascius, Lectures of the Philebus, Amsterdam 1959, 132, where he claims also that the noun and the verb are used in a

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speaking of higher entities, such as principles,29 and of how to name them. For him, there is no appropriate name for the One. The name ‘One’ is appropriate only by way of allusion, kata endeixin, and ‘One’ and ‘Good’ are indicative (endeiktikos) of one and the same reality.30 Attempts to understand these entities should proceed by dialectical thought, which starts from divine enigmas unfolding the inexpressible truth in them, or strives toward them and rests in the symbolic allusions to them.31 Moreover, in line with his inclination toward negative theology, Damascius claims that we must at least hint at the inexpressible by way of complete negation (pantelês apophasis) and exclusion of every kind of cognition (tês gnôstikês hapasês anaireseôs).32 Thus it can be seen that when Simplicius dealt with the notion of endeixis, it had already had a chequered career and a distinctive terminology attached to it. What he says about it elsewhere does not differ from the views of Proclus and Damascius. But he both refers to the notion and uses the vocabulary.33 All this is relevant to the authorship of the De Anima commentary translated here. Whoever the author may be, he also applies the term endeixis and related terms. Furthermore, following Syrianus, he uses it when discussing psychological matters. By contrast, this is missing in Priscian’s Metaphrasis since Priscian neither applies the method nor uses the vocabulary. This is surprising for both the methodological introduction and a large part of the account of the intellect have survived. This does not conclusively disprove the hypothesis of Priscian’s authorship of our commentary, since other reasons might be found for the omission. One might be that Theophrastus’ theory did not give an opportunity to Priscian to deploy his whole Neoplatonic armoury.34 But why did Aristotle’s theory, to which Theophrastus’ treatise owed so much, give such an opportunity to our commentator? Or one could suppose that Priscian, if the author of our text, wrote it at a different stage of his life.

–––––– special sense of symbolical expression of realities that are beyond language. This is partly true, but see my n. 22. 29. In Phil. 16,10; 23,3; 62,9.12; 98,5.7; 103,1; 246,1; in Phaed. I 420,4; 526,2; II 15,8; 76,5; De Princ. I 95, vol. II, 16,15; 19,15. 30. De Princ. I 199, vol. II, 23,16-17; in Phaed. I 516,6. He also says that certain words are indicative of forms at in Phaed. I 53,5. 31. In Phaed. I 165,1-3. 32. De Princ. I 92, vol. II, 11,8. 33. Cf. in Cat. 1159,6; in Phys. 147,15-16. 34. Provided he was willing to exploit it at all. As his other work known to us, the Solutiones ad Chosroem (CAG Suppl. I,2), shows, he is modest about exploiting such possibilities.

Textual Emendations Textual emendations, notes of discrepancies between the text of Aristotle as given or implied by our author and that printed by Ross in his edition, and other comments on the text appear as follows: 3,17 phutikou for phusikou. 5,37 phutikas for phusikas. 15,5 hautôn for autôn. 18,34 hestôsi for hestôsai. 21,33 (DA 403b2) ho men gar logos hode tou pragmatos for ho men gar logos, ho de tou pragmatos (as Ross). 22,24 (DA 403b9-10). Accepting ou gar esti tis, phêsin, ho peri ta; but ê ouk estin heis ho peri ta in Ross. 24,20 Supplying kai to aisthanesthai (Torstrik). 28,14 Supplying exetasei (Torstrik). 30,19 tên aph’ heautês eis heautên anelixin kai ek diastaseôs hama sunagôgên (Torstrik). 33,35 kinousan for kinoumenên. 35,27-8 Replacing the full stop after kinêthêsetai by a comma; inserting a semicolon after kinoumenon. 43,37 (DA 407a12-13) Accepting epeidê gar apeiroi, dêlon; but ei men oun kata stigmên, hautai d’apeiroi, dêlon in Ross. 44,27 (DA 407a19) Accepting kai; but ê in Ross. 48,24 (DA 407b5) Accepting legein; but legesthai in Ross. 49,10 ka’keinêi for ka’keinôi. 50,18 (DA 407b9) Accepting legei; but legetai in Ross. 50,36 Adding mê before anapempêi. 58,7 (DA 408b7) Accepting tôi; but to in Ross. 60,13 sumphthinousas for sumphtheiromenas. 61,19 sunekheis haplôs eipein monas for sunekheis kai haplôs eipein monas. 65,32-3 Accepting arithmon kai kinêsin; but DA 409b12 (Ross) has kinêsin kai arithmon. 68,24 autêi for auta. 71,14 koinon for koinêi 77,22 Accepting ê to exêirêmenon ekhousa pros tas loipas; but perhaps hêi for ê.

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79,29 Accepting allêlais; but DA 411b26 (Ross) has allêlois. 80,4 Accepting omission of ou before diairetêi; but DA 411b27 (Ross) has ou diairetêi. 80,20 Accepting allêlôn; but DA 411b26 (Ross) has allêlois. 91,13 kinoumena for kinoumenai. 92,33 Deleting the comma after phusika. 94,6 Accepting toionde esti sôma; but DA 412b27 (Ross) has toiondi. 95,5 ek merous (Hayduck) for merous. 96,2 (DA 413a8-9) Accepting hê psukhê hôsper; but hê psukhê hôsper in Ross. 96,3 eniôn hê entelekheia for eniôn entelekheia. 99,33-4 autenergêta for autenergêton. 105,1 hugieiai for hugeiai (misprint). 107,8 Supplying phamen before phusin. 108,23 tines for tinos. 109,23 (DA 415a19-20) Accepting kata logon; but kata ton logon in Ross. 110,12 (DA 415a26-7) Accepting tôn en tois zôsin ergôn; but tôn ergôn tois zôsi in Ross. 111,22 (DA 415b18) Accepting kai kata phusin; but kai omitted in Ross. 112,4 (DA 415b22) Accepting hê psukhê; but only psukhê in Ross. 112,17 Possibly kai kata tên kata topon for kai tên kata topon. 113,22 Following marginal correction in A: oimai oude sôma phusikon aitiateon, alla logos psukhikos. 115,14 (DA 415b20-5) Maintaining epei d’esti triahê trophê (b20-3) before epei d’apo tou teloushoion auto (b23-5); Ross, following Torstrik, transposes these sentences.

Simplicius On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4 Translation

The Commentary of Simplicius on Book 1 of Aristotle On the Soul The primary and most important object of concern is the truth about things themselves, both about other things and concerning the soul, which is the most relevant of all for us. Second to this is awareness of the opinions of those who have reached the summit of scientific knowledge.1 That is why I think it necessary to study very carefully Aristotle’s work On the Soul. Indeed, many divine insights about the soul have been handed down by Plato also; but these have been studied and clarified by Plato’s interpreters sufficiently and with unanimity. But, while Aristotle brought the study of the soul to completion, as is the opinion of Iamblichus,2 that excellent judge of truth, there is much dissension among those who explain his work, not merely about the interpretation of Aristotle’s text, but also greatly about the subject-matter itself.3 That is why I myself decided to investigate and write of the consistency of the philosopher both with himself and also with the truth. I shall avoid rejoinders to others, but confirm my views on doubtful matters from the clear opinions and statements of Aristotle. Everywhere I shall strive to the uttermost for the truth about things in accordance with the teaching of Iamblichus in his own writings about the soul. That is my sole concern. And now, under the Guide who is the cause of all souls and all reasoning, let us start upon the projected work. Its scope is manifest; it is about the soul. Later we shall consider whether it is about all soul, and why it seems that he makes no mention of that of the heavenly beings.4 But first let us consider whether the study of soul belongs to natural or to the higher philosophy. For settling whether the soul is natural, or superior, or in some way both, contributes to the grasp of its essence. So, since Aristotle does not merely report on the results of his investigation of this matter, but also demonstrates them, adding their grounds, in Book 1 of On the Parts of Animals,5 we must insert and examine what is said there. Taking for granted that the natural scientist must consider not only matter but also form, elsewhere and in animals, he continues: ‘If this is soul, or a part of the soul, or not without soul (for when the soul has gone it is no longer an animal and none

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of its parts remain the same, except in shape alone, like those in fable turned to stone) – if this is so, it would be the task of the natural scientist to discuss and have understanding about the soul, and, if not all of it, in that respect through which an animal is an animal, both what the soul or that same part is, and about the attributes of such a substance. This is especially so since nature is spoken of as, and is, matter, yet also essence. Also nature is both the source of change and its goal. In the case of animals this is either the entire soul or a part of it. Therefore the natural scientist should discuss soul rather than matter, in proportion as their matter is their nature because of soul rather than the reverse. For wood is a bed and a stool because it is potentially both. ‘But one might raise the problem, in the light of this statement, whether it is the province of natural science to discuss all soul or some soul. For, if all, there is no philosophy left beyond natural science. For the intelligible is the object of the intellect, so that knowledge of nature would be all-embracing. For it belongs to the same philosophy to study intellect and the intelligible, since they are correlatives, and there is a single study of all correlatives – sensation and sensible things, for example. Or is it not the whole of soul that is the principle of change, nor all its parts, but of growth the same as in plants, of qualitative change the sensitive, of travel6 still another, and not the intellectual part? For travel is common to other animals, but thought not to any other. So it is clear that we are not to speak of all soul; for not all soul is natural, but some one or more parts of it.’ In that passage it is determined that something in the soul is studied by natural philosophy – those elements that are a form of animality marking off animals as animals (he debates whether to call this soul, a part of the soul or not without soul), and that concerned with growth and sensation, and that which is the cause of change of place. But whatever is intellective7 is the province of first philosophy, which is cognisant of the intelligible and of the intellect which contemplates the intelligible – not only transcendent intellect but also that in us. For things THERE8 are intelligible to intellect in us, and the intellect and the intelligible, being correlatives, are studied by one and the same discipline, as are the sensitive and the sensible. So the study of the soul is neither simply natural nor simply metaphysical, but belongs to both, as was determined by Aristotle in the passage quoted.9 For Aristotle seems to take both natural science and metaphysical philosophy in a broad sense,10 so as to include the soul, extending the first up, the second down.11 For it is clear that the soul is not an essential determination among the natural forms of body; for they are forms of body, but it is more a form of animals, and they are principles of undergoing change, the soul of initiating it. It is a property of the ensouled to be moved by themselves, as is said in

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Physics, Book 8.12 But neither is the intellective element in the soul like the supernatural, purely indivisible, wholly unchanging and clear. So, if one were marking off the limits of the philosophies, on one side natural, on the other metaphysics, that of the soul will be between the two; it itself is seen in breadth, or rather in depth, to the extent that the intellective element of the soul is distant from sensation and vegetation.13 It is clear that scientific knowledge of the soul is like that, since the status of the soul is such as to be between the supernatural and the natural, and such as to have something in common with the supernatural, something descending into the natural. Or, it may be put in another way, which the text will make clear, when Aristotle also investigates the same matter: summing up, Aristotle, in the passage before us says: ‘So it is clear that we (natural scientists, obviously) are not to speak of all soul; for not all soul is natural, but some one or more parts of it.’14 Since he himself includes the intellect of the soul in his discussions and not only the natural parts, it is clear that the investigation of the soul is not entirely natural. So let that be our conclusion. But the scope of the investigation seems to include only the soul of mortal animals.15 For he seems to take no account of the soul of the heavenly beings, except so far as in his strictures on the mathematical demonstrations about it in the Timaeus.16 Perhaps he was satisfied with the Platonic insights about it as sufficient, merely commenting that one should not rely on what appears from mathematics. Perhaps also he judged that it was fit to refer to the heavenly soul by what was said about the sublimity of our intellect. ‘For’, he says, ‘it is clear that he intends the soul of the universe to be such as is the so-called intellect. For it is not like the sensitive or desirous element.’17 For the soul of the universe is pure and intellective reason, wholly and throughout unmixed with secondary lives, because it does not itself come to belong to bodies, but they to the soul, while it remains at rest in itself. Therefore its travel is circular because of its reversion, whole to whole, upon itself.18 Also he clearly is not concerned with the various destinies of the human soul nor most of the choices among ways of life, knowing that the account of these matters has been sufficiently worked out by our leader.19 But he does not take the soul to be inseparable from the body; for he gives the explanation of our not remembering separated life in Book 3, clearly as existing before our arrival into bodies.20 Studying primarily the soul of mortals alone, he leaves not one of its powers and character uninvestigated. But first he gives the formal cause of their bodies, all together, not as bodies, but as living tools. For nature, not soul, is the formal cause of bodies, but that which informs them as living tools is either soul or a part of soul or not without soul. This is the formal cause, through which that which is

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vitally informed with life is able to move. That by which it is moved is something else. For the animal is moved by the soul as the ship is by its pilot; for the sailor also is counted an actuality.21 This soul which moves in a living way is, as we shall learn, somehow other than that in terms of which that which is so moved is defined, since that which moves is not the same as that which is moved, but is divided off in relation to it. It is not the body as such, but the living body, that is moved in a living way, such as walking, flying and breathing. It is living because of the life in it, so that it is moved in a living way through this life. So, since the soul is also the moving principle in the animal, is it the same soul as that through which the animal moves, or is that impossible? For the whole animal would be informed by it, both the moving principle and the moved, and it would not, as Aristotle thinks, be the soul that moves and the animal that is moved. But also the tool is different from its user; also the characterising form of the tool is different from the user. Also the user is an actuality like the sailor in his boat; for the actuality is double, one in virtue of which it is a boat, the other as the sailor.22 So first, as has been said, he assigns a common cause for all the souls of mortal animals which gives them their form, and is double. Then he goes through them, one at a time, giving an account of their differences and at the same time he observes the distinctive way in which what is common to all belongs to each, as demonstrative knowledge dictates, and sees those more leaning towards being tools and those that are allied to the user. He lays down that every soul is an actuality of the organic body, but not every soul according to every power it has. For clearly the intellect is described as maintaining no body23 and as not using the body as a tool. So intellect is not blinded from intellection of greater things by the sight of lesser as sense perception is, through the senses using the body as an organ. He distinguishes sufficiently also concerning the intellective power of souls, seeing one that is practical and making use of imagination, a bodily form of life in accordance with the particular premise.24 The other is theoretical, and that double: one, through the activity proceeding from being, is either incomplete or made complete. It falls away into first potentiality through being incomplete, or it holds firm as more complete potentiality, or even in actuality.25 This makes no use of imagination, but has it in its train as excited together with a contemplative active proceeding and withdrawing from being. The other consists in that activity that is at rest and that concentrates its activity into one as identical with being. In this it imitates even the transcendent intelligence, and it is activity in its essence. In this state of rest it is immortal, since it is thus in contact with the eternal and is everlastingly at rest, pure in its separated life, but departing in a way from itself in its inclination to the secondary way of life, but not

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so as never to be at rest.26 So it is even then unchanging in a secondary way; but what inclines outside is not immortal,27 since it is variable and not present in the separated life. He also distinguished the desiderative powers of the soul from the cognitive, and investigates the nature of the powers that animals have to change their place. All this theorising occurs in Books 2 and 3. In Book 1 he first determines the scope of the inquiry and sets out the number and nature of the problems about the soul to be investigated. He also determines the method of investigation, which starts from opposites and ascends to its essence through the medium of its activity. He then recounts the opinions of earlier men about the soul, accepting some and refuting others, and locates the soul as cognitive and a source of change, incorporeal, indivisible and impervious to bodily changes. He shows that it is neither bodily harmony nor composition nor a formula of mixture, and that it is a principle not as an element or composed of elements but as a rational form. He holds that there is a single soul in each animal, and in rational animals also, that possesses all vital natures and powers, through which it strives rationally and spiritedly and appetitively, and through which it has knowledge, intellectively, or scientifically, or as opinion, or as imagination, or as sensation, as well as having finally the vegetative28 powers. Also, in Book 3, he sees our soul as being in a mean between the extremes of living things in respect of the rational faculty. At times he likens it to the sensitive, at times to the intellective: at times descending to copy the sensitive, at times ascending to a likeness of the intellective: at times concentrated into the indivisible as far as possible and remaining wholly in itself, when it copies the intellect that transcends it, at times somehow leaving itself as it inclines outside, acting outwardly and proceeding into fragmentation: but never altogether departing from the opposite.29 For its fragmentation is with its concentration into indivisibility, and its projection is with its return into itself, and its self-desertion is with its rest in itself, which is weakened when it inclines to the external. So our soul is at the same time at rest and being transformed because of its intermediate position between those that remain wholly at rest and those that are transformed altogether, having some kinship with both extremes, as it is in a way divided and, as if indivisible, simultaneously comes to be and is present ungenerated, in a manner passes away and is preserved imperishable. So we shall not posit that some part of it remains always unchanging and pure, as Plotinus does,30 nor that it proceeds altogether in a tendency to coming to be.31 But it proceeds as a whole and remains in purity in its inclination to secondary being. But the examination of the whole of the discussions will make these things clearer as being the opinions of Aristotle and

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as being explained more obviously by Iamblichus. So now let us turn to the text.32 CHAPTER 1 402a1 We hold understanding to be a fine and precious thing  20

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The introduction both defines the scope of the projected study and praises it as an object of concern to all men. It also focuses the attention of the hearer by making clear the difficulty of the study of essences in general and especially that of the soul. So he assigns all understanding among things fine and precious, but he does not call any knowledge whatsoever understanding, but only the scientific. For that is how we understand, but appearance gives only belief. Imagination and sensation fall short of understanding, since they deal always with accidents and not essence. So understanding is scientific knowledge. The fine and the precious go hand in hand in fact, for all the truly precious is fine and all the fine precious, but they are different in account. The fine is that which is loved and chosen for itself, the precious is what is exalted and transcendent, while other things to which it is precious submit to it. Reasonably, being men and essentially rational, we hold scientific contemplation to be among things fine and precious, as being the highest perfection of rationality, and thus sought by man for itself and, when present, granting him that which is transcendent. 402a2  but one is more so than another, either through its exactness or through being about more valuable and more marvellous objects. All scientific knowledge is fine and precious, but some is finer and more precious than other, either through being more exact, as is geometry in relation to the astronomy that studies celestial phenomena, which lacks exactitude through their great distance, or through being of more valuable objects as, in its turn, is astronomy, even when observational, in relation to some optical geometry. But these disciplines, being mathematical, are inferior to the true sciences, since they are not concerned with substances nor based on genuine principles. The genuine are the substantial forms. Even among studies of substances, for us the study of living things is more exact than the natural science of the heavens, being undeceptive because of their proximity, though the latter is more so33 through being about more valuable objects. For the everlasting is more valuable than what sometimes exists, and the more fundamental, as goal, or as efficient,

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or as form, than the caused, and, generally, that nearer to the gods than that which is essentially further from them. The more exact knowledge is that which is necessary and unceasing and that which is akin to its subject-matter. 402a3 For both these reasons we might reasonably place the inquiry about the soul among the first. Both because of exactitude and because it is about the more valuable and marvellous. For because of the kinship of the soul to itself, what is known is most close to the knower and presents clear and exact the knowledge of the composites. For also our awareness of our composite selves is clear and exact. But the reversion of the soul on itself in intellect and reason is impassible and still more clear and exact.34 But finding itself incorporeal and separate from body in this very reversion on itself, and also cognitive and in command of itself through living in accordance with rational wish, and, as perfect, a basic principle, it will be wondered at as not being torn away from the first principles. For he does not claim it to be primary in itself, but to be among the primaries, through its quasi-continuous descent to them.35 But now the term ‘inquiry’ is used rather than ‘scientific knowledge’; for we say that we know that with which we are exactly familiar. 402a4 Knowledge of the soul seems to contribute a great deal to all truth, particularly of nature: for it is, as it were, the principle of living things. In itself understanding of the soul is fine and precious, as has been said, but still more so if knowledge of it also contributes a great deal to all truth, i.e. to the scientific knowledge of things. For now the truth is not to be understood as sensitive or a matter of opinion, but as scientific and of realities, to which knowledge of the soul not only contributes, but does so greatly. To attain knowledge of realities, since, as he said in On the Parts of Animals,36 it is impossible to know things intelligible without knowledge of the intellect, so it is impossible to do so without knowledge of our own intellect, if intelligible things are in some way knowable to us. Similarly, indeed, sensible things are unknowable without knowledge of the sensitive faculty;37 but since they are not scientifically knowable, nor realities, but it is reason and intellect that studies realities, including those natural, knowledge of these sufficiently contributes to the knowledge of natural things qua scientifically knowable. Further, since the soul is intermediate between the truly intelligible and things natural, between the indivisible and the divisible,

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study of it is able to contribute towards the philosophy of the extremes. Towards primary philosophy, because of the soul’s similarity to the others38 – for ascent from the intermediate to things higher is easier – and towards natural philosophy, especially because scientific knowledge of effects comes from that of causes. So naturally it contributes most to knowledge of nature, because knowledge of effects from causes is more perfect than that which ascends from effects to causes.39 But natural things depend on the soul as on their principle; for living things are the most perfect of things natural, of which he says the soul is, as it were, the principle. He puts in ‘as it were’ because the form and the intellective and indivisible reality is the true principle; but the soul, which departs from the purely indivisible reality, also falls short of being the true principle. For the formal principle is indivisible, since every form is the goal and the final cause, being a completion, and it is the source of the principle of change.40 For intellect is the first changer. He says ‘it seems to be’ not as being debatable but as being agreed by others also. 402a7 We seek to study and know its nature and its essence 

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By these words he sets out more clearly the scope, as being of the soul’s essence and what in themselves belong to the soul itself and through it to living things, being a cognitive study. ‘Study’ refers to the ascent from the obvious and the deliverances of sensation to the truth about it, ‘know’ to the rational scientific understanding. But ‘nature’ does not seem to me to refer to the genus (for that is not the common use41), nor, correspondingly, does it signify the same as ‘essence’. The former refers to so much of it as it leans towards natural beings, but ‘essence’ to that which is akin to the intelligible, and separate. 402a8  then its attributes, [of which some seem to be proper42 to soul, and others to characterise living things via the soul.]43

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The essential attributes, clearly; these are what it has qua soul. And since in relation to scientific knowledge from causes that of essence has precedence over that of attributes, and we wish to acquire scientific knowledge, we naturally seek first to know essence, and then consequent attributes. But, since learning is from things more familiar to us to what is naturally prior, of necessity in teaching he determines the essence from the attributes, of which some seem to be proper to the soul. By ‘affections’ he means not anything whatever that belongs to it, since he does not mean its unchanging intellective activities, but such as belong to it from its being affected, such as its inclination towards body and its life by projection in general.44 For

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this affection is somehow involved in its departure from itself; for the unchanging activity is identical with essence, and not an attribute. Of attributes, which he calls affections,45 some are proper to the soul, such as its contemplative knowledge, which makes no use of sensation or imagination or, generally, the body. Sensitive and imaginative knowledge, and the practical knowledge that employs these, is common and belongs to other living things also. They belong not only to living things, which are composites, but to the soul itself. For, as he will say, they either start from it or terminate in it.46 402a10 But it is altogether in every way one of the most difficult things to find any good evidence47 about it. [For while the inquiry is the same as many others, I mean that about essence and definition, it might easily seem that there is one single method regarding all things whose essence we wish to know, as deduction is of all consequential properties, so that we ought to seek for that method. But, if there is not one common method in regard to definition, the enterprise becomes more difficult. For it will be necessary to find the manner in each case. But, if it were obvious whether it is proof, or division, or still some other method, there are still many problems and doubts about whence the inquiry should start.] Having by the foregoing established that the study of the soul is desirable, and having premised that we especially seek to know its essence, putting on their mettle the mere spectators of being, he first calls to mind the general difficulty of determining the method for discovering essence. Nor is it easy to know if there is a single method, or many. For there may seem to be one, since the essence sought seems to be itself common and one, and so does the common character of its being, and since a single method is traditional – intuitive insight48 by which we recognise determining characters in the case of simple distinctive properties; in the case of complexes, insight by genera and differentiae. Again, there may seem to be many methods, because of the difference of genera and differentiae and, obviously, of the forms also. But, whether there be one or many, or, as is the case, both one and many, it is not easy to grasp it, since every kind of scientific disposition is hard to attain, needing a suitable nature, long training, and a purified life of reason if we are going rightly to capture securely the essence of the object in every case. But this inquiry is not proper to the study of the soul; rather, he says, it is common to many others where we inquire what it is; the method of definition is common to all these cases. Next he suggests, with an explanation, that there is one method; for the science of what obtains per se, which is demonstration, is one,

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and the definition of essence is also one, since division and analysis are likewise one.49 He then says that this method is to be sought – clearly as the acquisition of the way of defining. But since there are also in a way many methods (he recalls that also by the words ‘it will be necessary to find the manner in each case’; for one must use the common method in a particular way in each case) – since, then, there are also many methods, the enterprise, which is to capture the particular being of each, becomes still more difficult. What comes next: ‘but if it were obvious whether it is proof, etc.’ seems to me to be an interpretation of what had been already said: ‘it will be necessary to find the manner in each case’, since that follows for those who accept any single method of definition. For it follows for them also that they must seek from what starting points the particular definition of each thing will result. 402a21 For there are different starting points for different things, [as for numbers and for planes.] There are definitely different ones for numbers and planes,50 and others for natural things, and similarly everywhere. Things demonstrated are called consequential properties, even if essential, because everything proved is predicated as one thing of another, and therefore it is consequential as sequent con another. It is called a property since that also that is common to many must be recognised in its proper fashion by the proof.51 So he thus first called attention generally to the difficulty of attaining the way to define. But he adds also the special difficulty in the case of the essence of the soul, at the same time setting out the problems that he will deal with as follows: 402a22 Perhaps it is first necessary to distinguish in which of the genera it is and what it is; [I mean whether it is a substance and a thing, or a quality, or a quantity, or some other of the categories that have been distinguished.] Since in statements of definition the genus is placed first of all and then the differentia, because the form is indivisible, and indivisibly conjoins the definiendum and its characterisation, the statement, which at once divides and puts together, first makes clear its definiendum on its own and then its characterisation, of which the former is identified and formulated as what it is, the latter as what qualities it has. That is why Aristotle himself, having said that it was necessary to distinguish in which of the genera it is, added ‘and what it is’, making it clear that being in a genus shows what it is, just as the differentia shows its qualities.52

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In the case of the soul, it is debated whether its genus is substance or quality or quantity. That is why he referred specifically to these three categories, as being the three that are discussed in reported views. He adds ‘or else some other of the categories that have been distinguished’ because it is possible that some might place the soul in yet another. For the Pythagoreans and Plato say that it is a substance.53 Others who say that it is a harmony of bodies, and others a certain mixture, place it in the category of quality.54 Xenocrates, who posited that it was a number, seems to place it in quantity.55 402a25 Further, whether it is something potential, or rather some actuality.56 For that is no small difference. The first and most lucid actuality is the form. For form is activity and completion. Not only matter is potential, as being itself incomplete, being realised by being receptive of forms, but also everything informed, and particularly the composite, through its union with matter. Already every body is so, even if it be immaterial,57 since it is not alive as such nor through itself, but through something else. For it is not so as body. But the soul is in truth between forms and the informed, since it wholly through its whole self exhibits its community with each. It is judged by Aristotle to lean not towards the determined but towards the determinant, since it lives and is awakened through itself, and as being the moving principle of bodies. That is why he thus said ‘or rather an actuality’, since it is not so purely and simply, if both the rational soul and the intelligence in which it partakes are spoken of as potential and involving matter. For the same reason ‘some’ is added, because it is not an actuality unqualified and simply, but in descent. That is why it does not maintain its perfect activity, but sometimes the less perfect on the level of disposition. Having placed it as the potential, i.e. the informed, which is in actuality but is not actuality (for that is the form), he has reasonably contrasted with the potential not what is in actuality but actuality itself. For the informed is in actuality, but the form is not in actuality but actuality itself, which is no small difference. For the latter is reality in itself, as we learn in Book 7 of the Metaphysics, but the other indirectly so.58 The former is primary, the latter secondary, the former is cause, the latter is caused.

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Translation 402b1 We must also examine whether it has parts or is without parts 

Every bodily substance has parts, without qualification, different parts being differently positioned. But the intellective substance is purely without parts. But substance between these two has many levels, and soul is included in them. Its descent into what has parts is shown by its apprehension of the knowable from a distance, its transition from one thing to another and its passage part by part through the states under examination. Its participation in the partless is shown by the resting of knowledge upon the knowable (for this is a partless union of both), the ever changing transition from one determining principle to another, and its collection into one after its passage part by part. But Aristotle rather places the soul among the partless, and equally among form, on the one hand as not having parts, on the other because the rational soul transcends not only things with parts, but also the being which is divided up among bodies. 402b1  and whether every soul is of the same species,59 or not  He proposes also an enquiry whether all souls are of the same species, whether vegetative, or sensitive, or rational. Clearly those things are of the same species that are synonymously defined by exactly the same specifying form.60 For things defined more inclusively are of the same genus, not the same species. He judges this issue worthy of enquiry because of those who introduce the differentia in composites from the matter and not from the form, as, in the case of the oboe, they say that sounds produced from the nearer and further holes are different even when a single air-stream is introduced.61 But we shall say that this difference is not in species nor in essence. For, just as being taller or shorter does not make a divergence of species between men, so being higher or lower does not change the species of the sound of the oboe, since every substance that has both its existence and its qualities from some specific form would have its difference from other substances from that form. For both in instruments and in materials difference will come either from the different forms or from the different principles within a single form. It follows for him who posits that souls are of the same species that he must posit that the different powers in a single soul are of the same species, so that in specific form there will be no difference in us between the vegetative, sensitive and rational powers, and any others that there are. But it does not follow at once that if the powers of different animals are of different species, e.g. sensation in the horse and in man (one being arational, the other

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rational), that the several powers in man are of different species, such as the sensitive and the judgmental. For all are human and are characterised as human as an ultimate species, though they have different principles. For there are many principles in each species.62 402b2  but, if not of the same species, whether souls differ in species or in genus. For even if all souls are also forms of life, still, if they differ from each other by priority and posteriority, they would not be within a single genus. For such things are classed together, and the posterior are associated with the prior as are those from or towards a single case.63

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402b3 For at present those who speak and research on the soul seem to confine their attention to that of man.

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He seems to be referring to the Timaeus, which confines itself to the lives of men in its natural history, while he intends to extend the study to the souls of other animals and of plants.64 But the Timaeus seems to me to omit a special account of the souls in other kinds, as considering that others take on the second and third elements in the human soul as from a paradigm.65

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402b5 But we must make sure that we do not overlook the question whether there is a single account of the soul, as of a living thing  For if all are of the same species, there will be a single account of all, as of a man, and as he said, a living thing, but if they are of different species there will be a different account of each according to its species.

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402b6  such as a horse, a dog, a man, a god. He means by ‘god’ the heavenly living being. But since the account of the genus is predicated also of each of the different species, to indicate the difference of the account of species from that of genus he adds: 402b7 But the universal animal is either nothing or posterior. For every ultimate species66 reveals the self-sufficient and independently real existence of a substance, even if it be enmattered, not given substantial existence by the matter or the composite, but itself giving it to the composites and completing the matter, bringing what receives it into activity. But the genus, as existing in itself without

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species, is nothing, for it is always with some specific form of the heavenly, or human, or equine, or something else; or else it is posterior. For in each species the genus is after the species, since the species is indivisibly the whole, but the genus is defined by one partial account of the things contained in the species.67 So, as existing by itself, it is nothing, but, as a partial account contained in the species, it is posterior. 402b8 And likewise if something else common be predicated. Not only if something else be predicated, like a plant, but still more if it be something common as in the prior and posterior. For there is nothing purely common in these, but whatever one says involves some shift.

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402b9 Again, if there are not many souls, but parts, we must consider whether one should first investigate the whole soul or the parts. [It is hard to determine which of these are naturally different from each other] He says ‘if there are not many souls’, that is, if those in different things, one of which is man, should not be different in species, but parts, different not in species through being parts of a single thing, but in their account, like the light weight and illuminative power of fire.68 That is true in the case of a single animal, whether man or any other, in order that each may have a single soul. So, whether the many forms of life in each be called parts or powers, they are to be counted as not different in species, but in account. But those in animals of different species are to be treated as varied in species, in order that primarily their difference in species should be derived from their souls. Aristotle proposes an investigation whether, in the case of souls with many parts, the whole or the parts should be studied first, and which sorts of parts are really different from each other, and which not. For example, the vegetative is different from the appetitive, but the nutritive, growth, and procreative are not many, but all one. The distinction about these matters is difficult, since in truth and reality the soul is one and many, both in the whole of itself and in each form of life. For each is one and many, being both with parts and without parts through its intermediate position, and having neither identity simply throughout itself nor a scattered diversity, nor total separation. For these reasons, the view of correlates is hard to discern in intermediate cases, because of the community of intermediates with the extremes.

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402b11  and whether we ought to investigate the parts first or their functions, [e.g. intellection or intellect, sensation or sense organs, and so with regard to the rest. If functions first, one may again debate whether one should first investigate their correlates, e.g. the object of sense before its organ, and the intelligible before the intellect.] Scientific knowledge is knowledge of activities from essence, but the reverse is clearer to us. We could not know activities that are relative from their correspondence whether to the known, or to the desired, or to what nourishes, without the things to which they are related. These are correlates through the relational linkage, in the way that counteraction and resistance are linked with other substances. Knowledge about their related objects is clearer than about the activities, since the objects are more sensible, such as the sensible itself, and sensible objects of desire and what is intelligible in sensible things. But that which transcends our intelligence we grasp rather through the intelligence.69 402b16 It seems useful not only to know what it is in order to study the causes of the derived attributes [of substances (as in mathematics to know the definition of straight and bent, or line and plane, in order to see to how many right angles the angles of a triangle are equal). But, conversely, knowledge of attributes contributes a great deal to knowledge of the definition. For when we are able to give an account in conformity with experience about the attributes, all or most of them, we shall then be in a position to speak best about essence.] Having set out the problems and also shown the difficulty of the study, he next offers fruitful starting points, first of all for the discovery of every definition. Scientific knowledge comes from the study of the attributes flowing from essences derived from a definition displaying what a thing’s being is, since this study is from the cause. For essence is the cause of attributes. ‘Essence’ here has to be taken in a wide sense as being form, under whichsoever category it falls. Thus the straight line and the triangle are taken as examples, whose consequential attributes we know from their definition. For their definition, which exhibits exactly their being, enables us easily to know what belongs as such to a thing of that sort. So that is scientific knowledge, since the being of each thing is the cause of what belongs to it.70 But sometimes the being of a thing is not recognisable from itself and is, the other way round, recognised from its consequential attributes, which sense and imagination can seize on. So, in mathematics,

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the essence of each number is recognised from the qualities and quantities of the definienda, which can be seized on by sense and imagination. But such things as are substances which are objects of reason and theoretical intellect are not plain from themselves71 for those who live by sensation, and the ascent to them is from their attributes. This must be the procedure in the case of the soul. But in the passage: 402b25 For a definition is the starting point of every demonstration, [so that where one cannot come to know the attributes from the definitions, and cannot even easily conjecture from them, they are all merely dialectical and empty.]

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The explanatory particle ‘for’ is added to show that another reason for the importance of the study of essence is that it provides the starting point of demonstration. Demonstration is reasoning to attributes from definition, but not the reverse climb from the attributes to the essence. So he says that we shall best have something to say about substance, in order that we may have the starting point of demonstration, the definition. To this he adds a sort of corollary for the distinction of correct proposals for definition from the sketchy and superficial. For from definitions that catch the nature of the subject flows knowledge of the attributes, whether more clearly or more obscurely; if it does not follow they are formulated ‘dialectically and emptily’, which is equivalent to ‘verbally and not naturally’. For he is accustomed to contrast the verbal to the natural as what follows the apparent and accepted, but not derived from the nature and essence of things. For he himself applies the term ‘dialectical’ not to knowledge related to reality but to that following accepted opinion. He calls it empty as falling away from the inner nature of things.72 403a3 The affections of the soul also set the problem whether they are all shared by that of which it is the soul, or whether there is something proper to it. [This must be ascertained, but it is not easy. It seems that we do not get affected or act at all without the body in the case of most of them, e.g. anger, rejoicing, desiring, or sensing in general.] As we previously said, he does not call simply every activity of the soul an affection,73 but that which it undergoes when proceeding away from itself. They are not its enduring activities inseparable from essence, but those that are concurrent with it. He requires to infer from these, as being manifest, to the essence of the soul, and, further, to the activities concurrent with the essence, these being concealed in the same way as the essence. Therefore, as he says, it is not easy

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to capture such activities from which alone we might pin down that in the soul which is altogether separate from bodies. He can be seen to posit that all soul is substance as evident, since also every form of life is substance, even the ultimate form of life, since soul is receptive of opposites, such as pleasure and distress,74 desire and repulsion, and since it moves bodies and holds them together, and internally determines living things,75 which are more truly realities than all other bodies. What the living thing is secondarily, that a form of life is primarily, through which living things are what they are. Primarily then, and more truly, every form of life is an essence. He enquires whether there is a soul that is altogether separate from bodies. For he posits as obvious that many forms of life are inseparable, since their activities also are not separate from bodies. It is a very true and obvious axiom that activities are akin to their substances; those of living things are vital, those of rational things are rational. So the separate substance will have altogether separate activities. But all sensations and imaginations and their associated affections – anger, confidence, desire, revulsion – involve the body. So the soul so affected and active is also not in every way separate. There are many levels of difference within the inseparable; the last76 are inseparable as being the actualities of the organic body, by which it is able to move vitally; others initiate motion in organs analogously to the sailor in his boat. Others are inseparable in a superior way, for, as initiating motions in things that move, they are supreme in every way over them and are inseparable from them through their activity in relation to them. But they may have other separate activities, as the sailor in his boat has walking, for example. The practical sciences of reason are inseparable in another way.77 They are involved with sense perception and imagination only in the minor premise,78 and so common to their possessor, but having no need of it in the major premise. The same applies to sciences that study natural things. But those concerned with the intelligible have no use for it, while those active by projection79 in making their study of the intelligible are not without imagination, as accompanying but not as a partner, as does shadow a body in light, reason exciting the imagination through its external procession. That science also is inseparable in this way, as having it wholly as an accompaniment, since the unvarying study that concentrates its activity in its essence is altogether separate, with no support from any bodily conation or cognition.80

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Translation 403a7 Intellection seems most of all proper to the soul.

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Having rejected sensation as shared, as well as affective desires – anger, rejoicing, appetite – taking them also as contained in sensation, since affections are either sensations or not without sensation, and having contrasted intellection, he clearly included in intellection all forms of life superior to sensation, i.e. imagination and all rational activity, to both of which it is common to come from within and to be spontaneously aroused. That is why they seem most proper to the soul. 403a8 But if this is also a kind of imagination, or not without imagination, [even this could not exist without body.] He rightly speaks hypothetically, since not all imagination is intellect (for that of non-rational beings is not, but only that which is rational), which is why ‘of a kind’ qualifies ‘imagination’, nor is imagination intellect unqualified, but this is altogether passive and pictorial intellect.81 But not even all intellection involving rational activity requires imagination, but only such as is not pure activity remaining in itself, as the soul proceeds away from itself and is in part divided from its essence. This is also a kind of affection; and that is why he says that the problem is not about the activities but about the affections of the soul. These he now posits to be not without the body, but in Book 3 he will also prove it.82 But what reason has he for saying that there is a problem, if the discussion is about affections? For it seems obvious that every affection is through some inclination towards body. Or is it because one could raise the problem whether rational activity which has no need of the body, even if it be accompanied by imagination, must be said to be shared by the body? For it clearly exhibits separation, but, if that is so, in such a way that it is not without body, as he more accurately noted; certainly not without the mortal body; for the ethereal vehicle of our soul also is sensitive and imaginative.83 403a10 So if there is some one of the actions and passions of the soul that is proper to it, that could be separated. But if there is none, it would not be separable. Well, going back from activities to essence. For as we know the living from vital activities and the rational from rational activities, so the separate from the separate activities, since the converse is also necessary, that the rational substance have rational activities and the separate separate. Previously he raised the problem about the affections, whether they were all shared with their possessor; now he

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makes the distinction generally, requiring to see the separate element in the soul not from the affections alone but also from its actions, since he knows that the affections are in a way inseparable, but its activities at rest are separate. But how, he asks, will the pebble in the depths never be seen although it is visible?84 Because, I shall say, it ceases to be before it is seen. For what can walk will not inevitably walk; but its nature is to walk. And we shall not require that which is in essence of such and such a sort already so to act, but to have a nature so to act. But the eye also that has its proper activities is inseparable from the whole body in essence. For, I shall say, the proper is not the same as the separate. For it is proper to it to see, but not without the whole body, because it is a property of the eye with the whole. Conversely, the steersman seems to have activities inseparable from the ship, but to be in essence separate, because he is separate qua man and has other activities that are separate. For the activities of the steersman are human, but are in a relational nexus to something else. There is nothing to prevent what is at one time separate being involved in an activity with that from which it is separated. 403a12  but just as the straight has many attributes qua straight, such as touching a bronze sphere at a point, but the straight, however, will not touch this as separately straight. But straightness is unseparated, for it is always found in a body. Just as ‘white’ is ambiguous, sometimes referring to the colour white and sometimes to a white object, so ‘straight’ refers to both straightness and that which is characterised by it, such as a curb-stone, which is altogether body, since straightness is inseparable from bodies. So the straight thing that touches the bronze sphere, qua straight, is a body characterised by straightness, just as the sphere is the bronze. ‘But it will not touch this as separately straight.’ ‘This’ refers to the substrate, but ‘straight’ now refers to the character and to straightness. He wishes by this to study the affections of what is determined and enformed that conform to a determination but do not belong to the determination but to the thing determined, as walking conforms to a way of life but belongs to the living thing. 403a16 It seems that also all the affections of the soul are with body [– anger, mildness, fear, pity, confidence, and also rejoicing, loving and hating. For the body is affected together with these. Evidence of this is that sometimes when violent and manifest situations arise one is not excited or frightened, but

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Translation one is sometimes moved by trivial and feeble events, when the body is swollen and is in the same state as when one is angry.]

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Setting aside the actions, i.e. the activities of the soul, he now speaks only of its affections. These all occur through the inclination towards the body, which is why they are called affections, and they are in a way inseparable from the body, but some with mere bodily accompaniments, others with bodily involvement. These occur in two ways, (1) through the form of life which uses and moves the tool – that is, the living body; and (2) through the form of life itself which gives it the character of a tool.85 He does not now think it worthwhile to recall the affections with mere bodily accompaniments, since these are rather activities. For intellection, even if it does not occur without imagination, is an activity rather than an affection. Especially instanced are those through a form of life which gives the body its character as a tool, anger, mildness and those listed with them, which are affections of that which is changed vitally, as passive, and of the soul as making the change.86 For not even practical intellections87 are included, because they themselves do not make use of the body in their totality, and because not even those which use the body use it as being affected by its own modification, but rather use the living thing as acting; and they themselves remain with an activity of judgement. But the affections now enumerated, which occur in the body as a modification and alteration, even if they occur in the soul that uses them in a discriminating way, still occur in the tool as being vital affections. For they are not as the affections of inanimate things, which occur only under external influences, but, in a way, actively, because of the vital principle. For in the animate the source of change is from within. That is why in the uneducated the bodily mixture is evident and becomes the cause of these affections, while in the educated this is the initiating activity of the soul, which either does so without exciting the body, or controls the change if the body is excited. But Aristotle omitted to mention that the rational soul controls the arousal and domination of these affections, as being obvious from moral philosophy. That is why towards the end of this book it is confirmed that the intellect also rules and controls the body.88 But he confirms that these matters belong to the living thing and not the soul itself, wishing that affections involving modification and alteration should be bodily, and excepting the soul from every affection – not only that which is separate and remains in itself, but also that which uses the body as a tool, and finds its rest in initiating change. But the life of the tool itself, together with the body, alone admits the aforesaid affections. But if the soul that initiates change is itself unaffected,89 how does it control the affections by being

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educated? And how will the soul inclining outwards differ from that which remains as a whole within itself, if it too is unaffected? Or is there some descent and deviation in the activities also, which we call an affection in another way, even if we ought not to call it an affection? For an affection proper is always from outside and involves change caused by something else. But the soul that initiates change and uses the body, receiving nothing from outside and changed by nothing else, descends by its own activity and in a deviant way moves and uses the tool, by acting faintly or irrationally or in a disorderly or otherwise indeterminate way. Education is the cure for this deviant activity. Intellective study is a transition from activity directed to the external to the activity inherent in its essence. Anger, fears and the like, which come in through bodily change, but as a whole are vital motions, are affections of the living thing, in accordance with the life that characterises the living thing, occurring through the action of the soul, either in disorder and without measure, through that which acts without bounds, or in an orderly way through that which acts in accordance with nature and reason. The first evidence, then, that such affections are common to what has a body, is that the body is affected together with them; that is, bodily change takes place. The second is from those who in uneducated fashion according to the mixtures and conditions of their bodies are either unmoved when even strong external pleasures or distress from time to time fall upon them, which he also called affections, or else are moved beyond measure when the body is excited, as excess sperm moves to sex and bile to anger. And when, while nothing distressing occurs from outside, the more melancholic become fearful, the causation of affections by bodily condition becomes even more clear, which calls to its aid the soul that moves the body. For, as he will say, sometimes the activity of the soul is dominant and proceeds into the body, sometimes the affections of the body call to their aid the soul’s activity towards it, not as to a goal as bread calls forth desire, but as bringing about in it affections commensurate with and appropriate to the substrate mixture.90 403a24 If that is the case it is clear that affections are enmattered principles, [so that their definitions are such as ‘anger is a change in a body of such and such a state, or of a part of it, or a power ’] ‘Principle’ makes clear the vital activity, ‘enmattered’ the inseparable involvement of the principle with bodily change, because the affections belong to the composite.91 So, following the facts, the defining principle of the affections will include not only that which is vital but the body also, such as ‘anger is a change in a body in such and such

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a state, or of a part of it’. For it is a bodily change, and therefore a process, but not so simply, but of a certain sort, since, as a whole, it is a vital process and of a body as a living thing, and therefore it is not of a body simply but of a body in such and such a state, that is, of a living body, and in accordance with a certain form of animate life, such as desire, sensation, and self-defence. But sometimes the whole body is not involved, but a part that is primarily receptive of the affection; such as the blood around the heart and the sensitive spirit.92 That is why he said ‘or a part of it’. He adds ‘or a power’ because sometimes the definitions state first the process of that form of life which characterises the organ. For the one that says that anger is the boiling of the blood around the heart, aiming at retaliation, having first stated the bodily process, the material cause, afterwards made the form clear by the objective aimed at. But the one that said that it is a desire for retaliation because of the blood boiling around the heart first spoke of the process of the power, i.e. the form of life that characterises the organ. 403a27  because of such and such and aiming at such and such.

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For every process requires its efficient cause. So, in the complete definitions of affections there should be included not only the body living in such and such a fashion but also what brings this about and what uses it as an instrument, and the final cause, which is a genuine or apparent good. For preservation of the natural state is a good, self-defence an apparent good.

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403a27 These are sufficient reasons for the natural scientist to study the soul, either all or of this sort.

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By ‘of this sort’ he means not only that which informs the organ93 but also that which activates it and uses it as an organ, qua activator and user, and that generally which is inclined towards the body, qua so inclined. But by ‘all’ he means, in addition to these, that which studies the truth about things by projection and by integrating its activity into its essence.94 For, since the essence of the soul is one and many, in so far as it is one and the same in substrate, both remaining in contemplation and from time to time contemplating by projection and inclining towards the body and using the body and moving it, the natural scientist may seem to discuss all soul. For he who studies any aspect is in contact with the whole. But, in so far as the soul is differentiated as being not only one but also many, he who studies it as unseparated would not study the whole but specifically that which is in any way unseparated from bodies, as such.95

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403a29 But the natural scientist and the dialectician would define each thing differently, [e.g. anger. The latter will call it a desire for retaliation, or something like that, the former the boiling of the blood or the warm matter about the heart. The former states the material conditions, the latter the form and the principle.] Since it has been determined how the natural scientist is concerned with the essence of the soul, as being that part of it that it is unseparated from bodies, he also distinguishes the character of this knowledge as following the facts. For that part of it that is unseparated from bodies, as is its nature, must be thought of also in a way that parallels its objects, that is, as itself unseparated. He who follows the facts will have simultaneous knowledge of the vital form and the body, from which it is unseparated. But he who views unseparated life not as such seems to grasp it more superficially and not fundamentally, and so verbally and dialectically.96 For he was accustomed to call the more superficial and unfactual knowledge verbal and dialectical, as being conjectural and not scientific knowledge. But the natural scientist has scientific knowledge, and so will recognise it as unseparated in the way that it is so, and what its form of life under examination is like, and from what body it is unseparated. In the text, having already said that the natural scientist and dialectician will define each of them – the forms and affections of life – differently, he wishes to exhibit the difference with anger as an example. He says that one definition is of the form alone, the other of the matter alone. He does not mean that the natural scientist is concerned only with matter, for he will state clearly that the natural scientist includes both; but, having set his aim to see the difference between the natural scientist and the dialectician, he distinguishes more generally what might be thought to be definitions of anger, in which is included that by matter to make the division complete. So the definition from desire is of the form, that from the heat around the heart from the matter.97 He adds the definition from both as follows:

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403b2 For this is the account of the object.98 But it is necessary for it to be in matter of this sort, if it is to exist. [Just as one account of a house is such as ‘a protection against destruction by wind, rain and heat’, the other will say that it is stone, bricks and wood ] He is not, as the philosopher Plutarch interprets him, distinguishing the account from the account of the object.99 But, having said that the desire for retaliation is the form and the account, he says that it is

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the account of the object, i.e. the form that is the form of anger. But since anger is composite, it is necessary to see the account, i.e. the form, in matter, if it is to exist, since it does not exist without matter. Also in the case of the house, he states the form and the matter separately and adds the account containing both. 403b6  and another that it is in these materials .

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The form, i.e. the protection, is clearly in the wood, stones and bricks. The end is added since in artefacts that for the sake of which is determined from the form. Having distinguished the definitions, he finally asks which is the physicist’s one, and judges it to be that which involves both.100 403b9 [Which of these is the natural scientist? Is it he who is concerned with the matter and ignores the principle, or he who is concerned with the principle only? Or is it rather he who is concerned with their conjunction?] What is each of these?

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The one concerned with the matter, the other with the principle alone. He seems to dismiss the one concerned with matter, demonstrating that no one gives a definition in terms of matter alone, and to distinguish generally definitions giving the principle by what follows. For of enmattered principles some are in terms of substance, according to which composites are substances, such as that of life defining living things, that of fire and those of the other elements, and also of their compounds. Others, consequential on substances, are all principles of attributes. Of these principles, both of substances and attributes, some are conceived as unseparated from matter, as is so in nature, others thought of as existing independently. Only the natural scientist will be concerned with all the enmattered principles, both those in terms of substances and those in terms of attributes, which are not separated nor treated as so being.101 403b9 For, he says, there is no one who concerns himself with the unseparated affections of matter, treated as such, but the natural scientist is concerned with all the behaviour and affections of such and such a body and such and such matter.102 He calls the enmattered forms behaviour and affections, all of which, substantial and attributive, being unseparated, only the natural scientist sees as unseparated.

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403b12 It is someone else who treats them otherwise.

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i.e. not as unseparated, but as separate. It is someone else, for the dialectician, who thinks of even the substantial ones in isolation, does so. 403b13 On some matters it may be a specialist, [such as a builder or physician. About what is inseparable, but not treated as affections of such and such a body but in abstraction, it will be the mathematician.] The specialist also regards them as unseparated, but is not concerned with all, but only attributes. For health is an attribute, as is the smooth planing of wood. He differs from the natural scientist in this way, by his partial concern, as has been said, just as the dialectician differs by seeing even the substantial form as separate. The mathematician’s concern, like that of the specialist, is partial, being of attributes that are clearly unseparated; but the mathematician does not treat them as affections of such and such a body, since he does not treat them as unseparated. He treats, by abstraction and in isolation, of numbers, their interrelations and figures.103

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403b15 He who treats them as separated is the metaphysician. It is obvious that the metaphysician is concerned with things separated. The relevance of the expression ‘as separated’ does not extend to things higher than us, but to our rational life, which he calls intellect. For this, in its tendency towards the body, is both separate and unseparated. The natural scientist sees it as unseparated, but it is revealed as separate to the metaphysician.104

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403b16 But we must return to the course of our discussion. [We were saying that the affections of the soul are unseparated from the natural matter of living things, in the way that such affections as passion and fear belong to it, and not as a line and a plane.] That is, we must return to such affections of the soul as are unseparated from the natural matter of living things, in the way that such affections belong to it. They are called affections of the soul, although of the composite, since the soul quickens and activates them in the composite in the way that we call the light in the air sunlight, since the sun activates it though the air is affected. The natural matter of living things is the organic body most suited to life.105 The words ‘in the way that such belong etc.’ indicate the relevant affections, I mean

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fear and anger and the like, which are not abstractions, like the line and the plane, and cannot be thought of without matter, as in themselves carrying matter along with them, and not as the plane can be thought of without the bronze or any resistant thing. For the plane can be thought of as can the concave without the nose, but passion as is the snub. For being snub is a concavity of the nose, as anger is a desire for revenge in the boiling of the blood about the heart.106 CHAPTER 2 403b20 In our inquiry about the soul it is necessary, [while raising the problems of which we hope to find the solutions as we go on, to take account of the opinions of those of our predecessors who have made known their views about it, in order that we may adopt what has been well said and avoid their errors.]107

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Since the truth about the facts does not fall spontaneously into our laps, and we are initially ill-equipped to study it, first must come a search and our movement towards the opposed opinions, and the raising of the problems about them such as, in the present instance, whether the soul is a substance or not, and, if it is, whether it is so potentially or actually, and whether it is a body or incorporeal. Again, if it is a substance, whether it is separate or unseparated, or both in a certain way. But, since some opinions previously advanced have been opposed to each other, an inquiry about them will contribute greatly to the statement of the problems and to the discovery of their solutions, if we make clear what they had in mind when proposing this and that, refute some and accept others. 403b24 The beginning of the inquiry is to set out what features it most clearly seems to have naturally. Since to know its attributes, as has already been said,108 greatly contributes to the knowledge of what it is. He adds ‘naturally’ to indicate things about it specifically. For its more common attributes do not lead us to the essence proper to the soul.

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403b25 The animate seems to differ from the inanimate especially in two ways, [motion and sensation. We have taken over also from previous generations roughly these two points about the soul.] He wishes to capture the essence of the soul from its attributes. So

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he studies what belongs to it from the things that are characterised by it, namely animate things as such. So what belongs to the animate qua animate according to almost unanimous opinion? It is to have an internal source of motion and sensation.109 For it is self-movement that he now seizes on, not simply motion. For self-movement is proper to the animate, but being moved by something else is shared by the inanimate. Sensation is now instanced, not as belonging to all animate things, but as to them alone. But self-movement belongs to all. For even plants grow bigger and smaller. 403b28 For some say that first and foremost the source of motion is soul. For in whatever it resides, nature is the principle of that thing’s being moved, not of its initiating motion.110 But the soul is not so simply, but of internally initiated living motion. So it does not merely bring about the motion of living things, but it itself moves them. So the life introduced to the body is the principle of such motion in that which moves in a living way. But, since he terms this not simply soul but either a part of the soul or not without soul, we went on to the soul that endows bodies with motion, a more powerful kind of soul than is life, which he distinguishes as the source of motion. He himself treats the soul as the source of motion, but not primarily and especially the soul of generated things, which is now the subject under discussion. But the souls of the heavenly beings are such primarily and especially, unless indeed intellect precedes even these. But our souls do not move mortal bodies, to speak summarily, completely on their own, but they determine the end in relation to something arising from outside, as is said in the Physics,111 and, because of their inclination towards bodies, they are in motion accidentally and could not be primarily and especially sources of motion. Here not even the moving causes of the planets are so, whether they be souls or intellects, since they do not on their own control their entire motion. Perhaps ‘some say’ is added because of Anaxagoras, who does not clearly call the intellect, which he treats as the first mover, soul, and of Empedocles, who says that love and strife, not souls, cause motion, or such natural scientists who make use of only material causes.112

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403b29 But, believing that what is not itself in motion cannot move something else, they supposed the soul to be one of the things in motion. As among material causes one is proximate, another further off and primary, and likewise among formal causes, as with the cause of

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motion. Since the mover is the cause and motion the effect, it is necessary that the first cause should not be in motion in any way, in order that it may rest purely in the cause of producing motion. But Plato requires intermediate causes to be in motion, as descending from the intellect that is the first mover, but not in motion of a bodily kind which is lowest in the chain and belongs to things that are merely moved.113 For in the Laws114 the motion of the soul is mentioned tenth, after the eight bodily motions, and the natural motion that is ninth. For in Plato nature also is in motion, because of its descent from the undivided state, and still more the soul. But Aristotle names only bodily motion, and forbids it being added to any of the causes of motion.115 403b31 That is why Democritus says that the soul is fiery and hot. [For, of the infinitely many shapes of atoms, he says that the spherical are fire and soul, like the so-called motes which are seen in the rays of light through windows. The mixture of all seeds he calls the elements of the whole of nature, as does Leucippus. The spherical ones were soul, since such shapes can pass through everything and set others in motion, being themselves in motion. Thus they conceive the soul to be that which produces motion in living things. That is why they take breath to be the mark of life. For the environment compresses bodies and squeezes out those that produce motion in living things, since they too are never at rest; so there is re-enforcement from outside as other similar ones enter in the course of breathing. For these hinder the extrusion of those already present by counteracting the compression and consolidating force. Things continue to live so long as they can do this. What the Pythagoreans say seems to have the same intent. For some of them said that the motes in the air were souls, others that which moved the motes. These were mentioned since they can be seen to move continuously, even in a complete calm.] He recalls Democritus first, as clearly ascribing bodily motion – for it is locomotion – to the soul, since he supposed it to consist of such atomic bodies as are spherical, as is fire. For, he said, among shapes the spherical, which moves easily and is not prevented by angularity from passing through everything, is suitable for fire and soul.116 The opinion of Democritus about the elements is clear from Physics, Book 1.117 It supposes small indivisible corpuscles, such as the motes that can be seen in the air in the rays of light through windows. Democritus supposed that not these but things like them by their smallness were the elements, all being of the same substance, but differing from each other in size and shape. All compound bodies were composed of

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these, as of seeds. That is why he also calls the elements a mixture of all the seeds, as being the seeds of all things.118 That is why breath was also the mark of life, being the cause of life in two ways, both (1) by preventing the exodus of spherical atoms already present, as the air entering moved against the spherical shapes which both went out of their own accord through their ease of motion, and were forcibly extruded by the compression by the surrounding solids, and as the air that enters fights against the compression itself by clearing away and pushing out the solids; breath is thus the cause of life in this way; and also (2) by resupplying from outside particles similar to the spherical ones that departed. Whether Democritus thus originated life from bodies, or wished to clarify the being of the intellective illustratively by the sphere, we cannot tell. For one need not lean heavily on the Aristotelian version, since in general it is a superficial exposition, like what is alleged about the Pythagoreans.119 For he reports that Democritus holds that the elements were like motes in the air, and that some Pythagoreans held the same opinion, whereas the Pythagoreans would not have thought any such thing, but perhaps were illustrating how the substance of the soul is already divided up and proceeds into the visible.120 404a20 Those who say that the soul is the self-mover have the same tendency. [For all of them seem to have conceived that motion was most akin to the soul, and that everything else was moved by soul.] It has already been mentioned how Plato says that the soul is in motion through its descent from the prime mover.121 But it is said not only to initiate motion but to be self-moved, since it is not completely isolated from the substance without parts and its activity. For the term auto shows for Plato that the unitary substance and the perfect activity are the same thing, just as ‘being moved’ is indicative of the divided.122 So the term ‘composed out of extremes’ is assigned to the mean position of the soul, because of the kinship of the mean with both extremes.123 But Aristotle applies the term ‘motion’ only to the activity that is altogether fragmented and has its being in becoming, and he reasonably denies motion to the incorporeal things that are the cause of motion, whether they be first, or intermediate, or last. 404a24 But they thought that the soul was moved by itself, since they did not see anything initiating motion that did not itself move also. [Similarly Anaxagoras also says that the soul is what initiates motion, as does anyone else who said that intellect

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Translation moved the universe. But not entirely in the same way as Democritus. For Democritus said simply that soul and intellect were the same; for the appearance is identical with the truth, which is why Homer well speaks of Hector as ‘lying with wits distraught’.124 He does not treat the intellect as some faculty whose province was truth, but says that soul and intellect are the same thing. But Anaxagoras writes less clearly about them. For in many places he says that intellect is the cause of beauty and order, but elsewhere that intellect is identical with soul. For it is present in all living things, both great and small, noble and base. But intellect in the sense of wisdom does not seem to be present equally in all living things, not even in all men. So those thinkers who concentrated on the motion of the animate regarded the soul as the principal source of motion.]

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For even if intellect is the first mover while itself altogether motionless, still it is so together with the soul and nature. So if the soul and nature are in motion, the complex from them and intellect will be a moving cause of motion.125 He recalled Anaxagoras who made intellect the cause of motion as himself also saying that it was soul that initiated motion; but he adds ‘but not entirely in the same way as Democritus’. For, since Democritus does not distinguish even the inerrant cognitive faculty that we call intellect from that which is sometimes deceived, such as the life of perception, imagination and belief, because he claims that all appearance is true,126 Aristotle says that he treats intellect as identical with soul – clearly such as is cognitive. So he recounts the praise of Democritus for Homer, who depicted Hector as lying with wits distraught because of the blow, although it is the discerning power of the composite that is damaged by the blow to the body, and not that separate from body. This he calls a faculty of the soul receptive of truth, – clearly the intellect as the source of wisdom, being capable of knowledge. It is nothing remarkable that Homer uses words indifferently by poetic licence. But Democritus, by praising him, clearly calls all forms of knowledge intellect in the sense of wisdom. But he says that Anaxagoras does not altogether treat soul and intellect as the same, because he does not do so clearly and because he seems to say the opposite. For sometimes he assigns only true knowledge to intellect, and thus separates it in a way from soul as not being all of it receptive of truth, except by its highest faculty. But sometimes he declares intellect to be present in all living things and treats it as the same as soul. For soul is present in all, but not intellect, unless someone were to call imagination intellect.127 With this Aristotle contrasts intellect as wisdom, and says that this is not present in all, seeing that it is not present in all men. For they are

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few who can contemplate the truth by scientific wisdom. So it is not present in all men, not because they lack the intellectual faculty, since the soul is a unit possessing all powers, but because they do not use it. 404b8 But those who attended to knowledge and perception of things [treat the soul as principles, some making them many, some only one. Empedocles, for example, holds it to be composed of all the elements, each of which is soul, his words being We see earth by earth, water by water, Divine air by air, destructive fire by fire, Love by love, strife by hateful strife.128 In the same way Plato also, in the Timaeus, composes the soul out of the elements; for like is known by like, and things are composed of principles.] ‘Attended to’, obviously; this has already been said. He has said that the soul is characterised by two things, by initiating motion and by being cognitive. He has recounted how in earlier times they claimed that the soul initiated motion by moving, and adds also how they conceived it to be aware of things. Believing that knowledge was always of like by like and wishing to make the soul, as knower of things, like to those things, in order not to compose it of all the countless things there are, they construct it out of principles, since knowledge of the derived is also from the principles. So the soul, sufficiently completed from the principles, was capable of knowledge not of them alone, but also of things composed of them. Thus, he says, Empedocles constructs it from the four elements and the two principles of change, love and strife. He says not only that the soul is a mixture of them all, but that each principle is aware of its like. For what is aware of anything is a soul. But Plato in the Timaeus129 constructs it out of the indivisible substance and that divided out among bodies, of which the former shows the intelligible, the latter the perceptible determinant through the generative elements of reality – Being, Identity and Difference. These elements, and the different kinds of things in the world like them, Plato considers to be the elements of all things. 404b18 The same doctrine was set out in the treatise about philosophy. ‘About philosophy’ means the work About the Good, which he wrote up from attending Plato’s lectures, in which he narrates the Pythagorean and Platonic opinions about reality.130

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Translation 404b19 That the animal itself was composed of the idea of the one together with the primary length, breadth and depth.

Aristotle was always accustomed to recount and examine the superficial meaning, and to understand words in their colloquial sense. But he did not destroy the truth itself by his thoroughgoing examination131 some people being deceived and taking the numbers to be mathematical and the magnitudes geometrical. But these men turned aside from the main highways, and secretly handed down their philosophy to those worthy, while to others they hinted at it with mathematical expressions.132 The viewpoint of these men is set out more clearly in my commentary on the Metaphysics.133 But now let us say only what is necessary for the explanation of the words before us. In calling the forms numbers, as being the first things to be separated out from the undivided unity (for the realities that transcend forms also transcend division), they spoke in riddles of the total manifold of the forms as the decad; the first formal principles as the first monad and dyad, as not being numbers; and the first triad and tetrad as the first among numbers, the former of the odd, the latter of the even. By their addition came the number ten. After the numbers, they posited geometrical magnitudes rather than natural ones for living things that are secondary and far down in order, and these they connected to the ideal numbers and to their principles and causes. The point was connected to the monad, as being without parts, the line, as being the first extension, with the dyad, and the plane, again as further extended, with the triad, and the solid with the tetrad.134 To judge from the statements of Aristotle, they called the dyad the primary length – not just length, but the primary one – to signify the cause, and similarly they called the triad the primary width and the tetrad the primary depth. They connected all forms of knowledge with the formal and the psychic principles, the intellective, as brought together in undivided unity, with the monad; the scientific as explicative and proceeding from cause, as being other, to effect, and as travelling always without deviation by the same route, they connected with the dyad. They connected opinion with the triad, because of the possibility of its not always taking the same course, but sometimes veering to truth, sometimes to falsehood, and sensation with the tetrad, since it was receptive of bodies. For, they held, in the dyad there was only one extension from each monad to the other, in the triad two from each to the others, and three in the tetrad.135 They connected, further, every object of knowledge, i.e. existents, and likewise the capacities of knowing them, to the principles. They distinguished existents, not by breadth but by depth, into the intelligible, the objects of science and those of opinion and sensation, and,

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likewise, forms of knowledge into intellect, scientific knowledge, opinion and sensation. So the living thing itself is conceived from the division of objects of knowledge, revealing the intelligible worldorder, in which are the pure forms, i.e. the most primary and their principles, the form of the one itself and that of the primary length, which was the dyad itself, that of the primary breadth and that of the primary depth (for being primary must be generally attached to all), i.e. the triad itself and the tetrad itself. He says ‘and the others likewise’.136 meaning the other members of the division of objects of knowledge – the objects of science, opinion and sensation, these too being derived from their principles, the forms, but no longer from the principles themselves, as their elements, but from them as the transcendent causes of the components of each.137

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404b21 Also, differently, [intellect was the one, scientific knowledge two, as going solely in one direction, opinion was the number of the plane and sensation that of the solid.] ‘Differently’ means ‘in another way’. For it displays the same division of existents, not, indeed, qua known, but qua cognitive, these also being dependent on the same principles.

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404b24 For the numbers were said to be the forms themselves and the principles, [and they are composed of the elements; some objects are recognised by intellect, some by scientific knowledge, some by opinion, some by sensation. These numbers are the forms of objects.] After distinguishing separately objects and types of knowledge, he here illustrates their likeness to each other, so that, according to these men, like may be known by like. For the numbers, which are the primary forms themselves, were composed of the elements that were the one itself, the dyad, the triad and the tetrad, and they were said to be the principles of both forms of cognition and their objects. For faculties by which things were recognised were defined by their constitutive principles, as likewise the things known themselves, since these numbers, i.e. the ideal numbers, were forms and also the constitutive principles of these objects. For all things known are defined by their constitutive forms. 404b27 Since the soul seemed to be both originative of motion and cognitive, some of them thus stitched it together from both, and declared that the soul was a self-moving number.

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This account of the soul is Xenocrates’, who wished to exhibit its mean position between forms and the informed and also its special character.138 For the number is form, while being in motion is characteristic of the informed. It is clear that, being between the extremes, the soul is neither simply number nor something in motion.139 For it is inferior to the former, since it has lost its undivided character, but superior to the latter, since it is superior to the divided. So it should be somehow both together, since it is associated with both, a number in motion. But, appropriately to its mean position, it is said to be self-moved. For the soul is intermediate not as reality which is extended, as is the formative principle of the physical, and before that, as these men said, the mathematical substance;140 nor is it like light proceeding from the intellect, an intellective substance ever at rest, but, by proceeding into the apparent on a level with the things irradiated by intellect, it proclaims the enduring and hidden character of the intellective nature. But, while all life shows a certain awakening and effervescence through its special vital character, the intellective life a life undivided and self-contained, the bodily a life divided among bodies and sinking down from one to another, the psychic displays the unfolding and at the same time concentration away from extension which go out from itself and into itself.141 For these reasons, then, Xenocrates declared that the soul was a self-moving number.142 Aristotle, who has said before that the number determines both the knower and the known,143 correctly understands it to be the soul that is called the knower. That is why he said that those who call the soul a self-moving number knitted together the origination of motion and cognition. 404b30 But they disagree about principles, what they are, and how many they are. [Those who regard them as corporeal particularly disagree with those who regard them as incorporeal, and with those who mix them and set out the principles as from both. They also disagree about their number, for some say there is one, some many. Their view of the soul is consequential on these factors. They have not unreasonably assumed that what is naturally originative of motion is one of the primary things. For that reason some thought it to be fire, since that has the finest parts and is most nearly incorporeal of the elements, and also is both in motion and a prime mover.] Since, as he himself narrates, those who have philosophised about the soul compound it from principles, they composed the soul out of such and so many principles as each of them posited. The students of nature made them corporeal, the Pythagoreans and Plato incorporeal, while Empedocles and Anaxagoras made it a mixture of both.144

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Their view of the soul is consequential on these factors, each attributing to the soul the principle or principles he accepted, and treating it not merely as cognitive of things but as also originating their motion. For, he says, they not unreasonably took the cause of motion to be among primary things, since what is moved is altogether effect, but what moves itself instead of being otherwise moved has the nature of a cause. Those who posited that fire was the principle, and ascribed it to the soul as being the body with the finest parts, assign to the soul something more akin to it than those who think it is some other body. For in truth the soul is incorporeal, which is why that with the finest parts is most akin to it as less corporeal than what has grosser parts. Also it seemed more nearly allied to the soul since it appears easily moved itself and originative of motion in other things.

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405a8 Democritus has given the most ingenious explanation [why the soul has each of these characteristics. For soul was the same as intellect, and this must be among the primary and undivided bodies, while it originated motion through its having fine parts and through its shape. He says that the spherical is the shape that moves most easily, and that that was the shape of intellect and soul.] He is adding his reasons, treating souls as intellective, in accordance with commonly shared explanations, and classing them among indivisible bodies in accordance with his own distinctive hypotheses. He is also treating soul as the same thing as the intellect and including the originator of motion among the principles. Among indivisible bodies he finds the spherical to be an easily moved shape and assigns it to the soul.145

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405a13 Anaxagoras seems to say that soul and intellect are different, [as we also remarked earlier, but he treats both as a single nature, except that he makes intellect the main principle of all things. At least, he says that it alone of all things is simple, unmixed and pure. But he assigns both knowledge and motivepower to the same principle, saying that intellect sets the universe in motion.] Anaxagoras so seems because, as he has already said, he attributes to intellect alone what is well and right. ‘He treats both as a single nature’ because he attributes intellect also to all living things.146 ‘Except that he makes intellect the main principle of all things’, since he clearly and above all things praises it as unmixed, since it tran-

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scends all things, and since he assigns both knowledge and motive power to it. 20

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405a19 Thales also, according to tradition, [seems to have conceived of the soul as originating motion, since he said that the lodestone had a soul because it moves iron. Diogenes, like certain others, conceived of it as air, thinking that this had the finest parts and was the principle. He thought that the soul had knowledge and originated motion. Since it was primary and other things were derived from it, it had knowledge; it originated motion since it was finest. Heraclitus also says that soul is the principle, as being the source of warmth from which other things are composed. It is also most incorporeal and always flowing. But what is in motion is known by what is in motion. Both he and the majority believed that things are in motion.] ‘According to tradition’, because no written work of Thales has been handed down. He reported just this about Thales, and that with a degree of censure, that he assigned a soul to the magnetic stone since it causes iron to move, in order to provide evidence that according to him the soul originated motion.147 He did not attribute to him the view that soul was water, although he made water the element, since he said that water was the element of bodies;148 but it is likely that Thales conceived of the soul as incorporeal. What he says about Diogenes is clear. But he seems to be drawing inferences about Heraclitus. He does not represent him as saying clearly that soul was fire or the dry exhalation; but fire was easily mobile as well as fine-grained and by moving moved other things; so it was fitted to be soul, since it permeated all living body and originated motion by itself moving. It was also so fitted as being cognitive. For Heraclitus supposed that things were in continuous change, and he expected what should know them to be likewise, as knowing them by contact, so that as cognitive it would always be in motion. 405a29 Alcmaeon seems to have had roughly the same concept of the soul as these. [For he says that it is immortal because of its likeness to things immortal. This is true of it as being always in motion. For all divine things are in continuous motion, the moon, the sun, the stars and the whole heaven.] Alcmaeon, a native of Croton, is stated by others to be a Pythagorean. But Aristotle, in the Metaphysics,149 thought him worth recalling as having handed down the two lists to the Pythagoreans or having taken them from them. He seems to have been an excellent philoso-

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pher, to judge from what is said here; for he says that the soul is immortal as being like things immortal. In Plato150 also it is said to have the same name as things immortal, since our soul shares by descent in immortality; its immortality is because of its everlasting motion. Similarly in the Phaedrus151 it is shown to be immortal as being in everlasting motion because of being self-moving, not with a motion suited to bodies, but with that of the heavenly souls also, through which their visible bodies are also in eternal152 motion. 405b1 Of the second-rate, some, such as Hippo, have also declared it to be water. [They seem to have been persuaded by semen, because in all species it is fluid. For he also refutes those who say that the soul is blood, on the ground that semen is not blood. Semen was the primary soul. Others, such as Critias, said that it was blood, conceiving that sensation was most characteristic of the soul, and that sensation occurred because of the nature of blood.] Thales also made water the element,153 but of bodies, and he did not think that the soul was in any way body. But as one would expect, Hippo (who, they say, was also an atheist, which is why in the Metaphysics154 Aristotle did not class him with the natural scientists) also here calls worthless, not merely because he says that the soul is a more dense element – for he even thought fit to defend him on that count, by setting out the ground for this conception – but especially because of his atheism.155 But it will make no difference to us whether Critias, who made blood to be the soul was the man who was a member of the Thirty or some sophist. He was led to this view because our bloodless parts, such as bone, were not sensitive.156 405b8 For all the elements have had their supporters except earth. [Nobody has declared for this, unless someone has mentioned it on the ground that the soul was composed of all the elements, or was all of them.]

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That is, supporters who judged that some one element was the principle and fitted to be soul. Nobody judged that it was earth alone because it is dense and immobile. 405b10 Everybody, we may say, has three criteria for soul – motion, sensation and incorporeality. At first, when, of the characteristics of the living thing, he sought out those appropriate to soul, he ascribed to it only motion and sensation. For being fine-grained or incorporeal was not a feature of the living

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thing. But later, from what had been said about the soul, and also because it was easily mobile and also permeates the whole body, he says that being incorporeal was a criterion for everyone. He does not mean incorporeal in a strict sense, but counts the fine-grained as incorporeal. 405b12 Each of these is traced back to the principles. [That is why those who define the soul by knowledge make it either an element or derived from elements, all but one taking roughly the same line. For they say that like is known by like. For, since the soul knows all things, they constitute it out of all the principles. So they who say that there is a single cause or single element also make the soul one, such as fire or air. Anaxagoras alone says that the intellect is impassible and has nothing in common with anything else.] For through the association of the soul with the principles, each of these features belongs to the soul – originating change, sensation and incorporeality. So he has now omitted as self-evident that incorporeality and origination of change are characteristic of the soul. For the corporeal and what is changed with a totally corporeal change, being divisible and having a divided activity, and therefore lacking continuity, belongs to effects and not to principles.157 But what originates change and is incorporeal he himself judges to have the character of a principle as being a cause of such things. But he now also considered it worth stating how those who assign sensation or knowledge in general to the soul attribute it through its affinity to principles. For it is because they believe that like is known by like. He excepts only Anaxagoras from such an explanation, not as failing to assign cognitive power to the principle – since he holds that power to be intellect – but, as Aristotle clearly points out, since he does not think that knowledge occurs through similarity. For he held that intellect was unmixed with other things and had nothing in common with them, nor was partaken in by them, as the word ‘impassible’ shows, but none the less knows everything.158 405b21 Neither did Anaxagoras state how or through what cause intellect, being of this character, has knowledge, nor is this clear from his statements. [Those who suppose oppositions among principles also constitute the soul from opposites. But those who make only one of the opposed, such as hot and cold, and the like, a principle make the soul likewise only one of them. That is why they are guided by names; those who say that the soul is hot say that that is why

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life is so called; those who say that it is the cold say the soul is so called because of breath and refrigeration.159 Such then are the traditional opinions about the soul and the reasons why they are held.] Anaxagoras can be seen from this to accept that the first principle is unmixed with what comes from it and is impassible. By blaming him for not giving the explanation of knowledge and merely saying that the principle is unmixed, appears not to accept the likeness of the principle to what comes from it as being in the same class, but not to agree with their total dissociation either. For that which knows must be in touch with the form of the known, which would not be the case if it had no affinity with it. So he ought in the principle also to have left, not the classification with what comes from it, but the grasp of them through a form superior to and thus causative of them, a form which is not to be classed with them but which, through their inferior likeness to itself, will both produce them and know them.160 By this it is also made clear to those who place elementary principles in the soul that they transfer to the mover161 principles inseparable from what is moved. It is clear that those also who make the soul one of the opposites conceived it as knowing both, knowing the one from the other, since knowledge of opposites is one and the same.

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CHAPTER 3 405b31 We must first consider change.162 [For perhaps it is not only false that the being of the soul is such as those say who assert that the soul is that which moves itself or is able to do so, but the fact is that for it to have change is something impossible.]163 The aim is to examine traditional opinions and to refute whatever is said falsely; also to spell out anything traditional that is not in accord with the customary use of words, so that we may not through it be deceived into accepting the opinions of our ancestors and approving them as true because of the prestige of their authors. Plato uses the word ‘change’ also of the life of the soul as it unfolds, neither being totally fragmented nor remaining purely unitary. He calls this change because of the total descent from unity, and makes self-change the essence of the soul,164 as living essentially such a life, one descended from undivided being but not altogether divorced from it, in order that by ‘the changing’ he might exhibit its declension, and also by ‘the same’ its rest in indivisibility, and its simultaneous rest

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in itself and its procession from itself. But Aristotle is accustomed to call change only the divisible and continuously numerable, in accordance with the common use of the word, so that he not only denies change to the psychic substance but declares that the soul is in no way in motion as such. 20

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406a3 It has already been stated that it is not necessary for what originates motion to be in motion itself. [Everything is moved in one of two ways – either indirectly or in its own right. We call motion indirect when it is in something in motion, like sailors. For these are not in motion in the same way as the boat. For that is in motion of its own right, but they by being in what is in motion. This is clear by reference to their limbs. The proper movement of feet, and so of men, is walking. But this is not the case with the sailors. So, there being two senses of ‘being moved’, we are now considering whether the soul is moved in its own right and participates in motion. There are four kinds of change,165 locomotion, qualitative change, decrease and increase. So the soul would change in one, or many, or all of these ways. If its changing is not incidental it would have some natural form of change: if this is so, it will have a place; for all the listed forms of change are in a place. So, if it is the essence of the soul to be self-changing, its motion will not occur incidentally, as does that of what is white or three yards long. For these things are also moved, but only incidentally; for that of which they are attributes, a body, is what is moved. So they do not have a place; but the soul will, if it partakes essentially in change.] This was already stated in Book 8 of the Physics,166 in which it is proved that all primary changers are unchanging in their own right, and the first of all also incidentally unchanging. Now he recalls it, by the case of the unmoving man in the moving boat, who moves in a way by being transported from one place to another, but not in the same way as the boat, since that moves in its own right, but he who is at rest in it neither moves himself as a whole nor in any of his parts, but only by being in what is moving. So he concedes that the soul undergoes incidental movements made by the body in which it is, but not in its own right. There are four kinds of change, since substantial transformation167 is not included, but only those of the three sorts, of which quantitative change is one, but is counted as two, since it has no common name, as in the Categories.168 That the soul undergoes none of the bodily changes in its own right is recalled by the case of change of place. For what undergoes any of these changes is either a simple body or a

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compound, like a living thing, and these are in a place. This is shown by ‘the listed forms of change are in a place’, since they happen to what is in a place, i.e. what has its own parts in different places, so that the changes which are divisible will be actualities of a divisible thing.169 But the soul is not in a place, being present as a whole in all the body as its minimal form of life, touch, shows, being present as a whole in every one of our parts. For the same soul is receptive of sensations impinging on different parts. It recognises the similarities and differences, not with parts of itself, but all of them with the whole of itself, since it is the same as if I sensed one and you another.170 But how is the soul not subject to qualitative change, when transforming its state from ignorance or badness into excellence or knowledge? For states are qualities.171 But, as was said in Book 7 of the Physics,172 here too the transformations occur after affections that are not of the soul but of the living thing. For the complete presence of the disposition is in the soul, but the transitional transformation prior to its presence is in the composite being. We have restated this more clearly in our commentary on that passage.173 Since the soul is not in a place, it would not undergo the change of things in a place either, unless incidentally. But if it naturally partakes in change, i.e. not through that in which it is but in its own right, it will also be in a place.

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406a22 Also, if it moves naturally, it would also move forcibly, [and, if forcibly, naturally. It is the same regarding being stationary: whither it moves naturally it stays naturally, and, similarly, whither it moves forcibly it also stays forcibly.] Clearly it is the soul of living things in the world of becoming that is the subject of the discussion, and the hypothesis that it originates motion by moving. For it was not postulated universally that all that moved naturally also moved forcibly, which is false because of the celestial objects,174 but it was said specifically about such a soul as originates such motions as affect the whole animal. On these motions forcible motion is parasitic. For such things as sometimes move and sometimes rest naturally as wholes are of a nature sometimes to move forcibly. So the soul also, if it originates motion by being moved, would be moved sometimes, since it does not originate motion always. That is why it will also be moved forcibly, or else neither is the soul in motion sometimes, if it is in motion in a vital manner, nor that which is moved appetitively; and if it moves sometimes it must of necessity move also forcibly.175 For there is no other source save from itself, always and intentionally acting appetitively. In the case of things moved externally, and of bodily motions, when

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they occur, the postulate is true. For if any of these move naturally they also do so forcibly, and, conversely, if forcibly, also naturally. For it could not be forced unless it had some nature, and what has it would have some natural motion. It is rightly postulated also that the same thing rests both naturally and forcibly, and that it would also rest naturally in the place to which it was naturally transported (for what is moved by something else to its own place clearly does not always naturally possess its own place), and again it will be moved to a place that is not its own, contrary to its nature and forcibly.176 406a26 But it is not easy to conjecture what the forced movements and rests of the soul would be, even if one wants to. This is because the rational life is all self-chosen,177 and the forcible is contrary to the chosen. That is why even under the torture of tyrants the soul’s freedom is clear to discern, whether it holds out or not, giving in to the torture in a way freely. 406a27 Also, if it moves upward it will be fire [and if downwards earth. For these are movements of bodies. The same applies to the intermediate motions.] Note how everywhere he shakes bodily motions off from the soul.

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406a30 Also, since the soul is seen to change the body, it is plausible that it originates the same changes that it itself undergoes. [But if so, then by conversion it will be true to say that the soul changes in the same way as the body. But the body changes by locomotion.] For always what originates change is of the same kind as what it changes, as he said in Book 3 of the Physics:178 ‘change will always be of some kind, either this, or of such a type, or of such a magnitude, which will be the origin and the cause of the change, when it originates it’. But it will be wholly active and sometimes passive when it originates change by being changed. For the father creates a human both acting as a human and being in that disposed state. But the sun generates a human179 by acting in accordance with the human species but without being itself human. Again, the hand moves the pen spatially, activating and undergoing spatial motion simultaneously, but the soul that moves the hand only activates spatial motion. But if it acted by undergoing change it would be plausible that both changes should be of the same kind, both the active and the passive. For fire heats by its heat, not by its rarity, and the hand moves the pen by change of place.

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But, they say,180 the plougher is not ploughed, nor the striker struck; however, they originate change by being changed. Nor do the heavens qualitatively change things on earth by themselves being qualitatively changed. Since, I shall say, even if it is the case with changing and being changed in place that there is an activation and an undergoing of the change of place, one did not assign the change in ploughing or striking, nor qualitative change, to the things changed on the basis of undergoing change, but only on the basis of its activating change, through the form of the final outcome being presupposed in the originator of the change as something not undergone but activated. So nothing will prevent the soul from activating bodily changes by itself being changed vitally. How, then, was it judged plausible by Aristotle that the originator of change should undergo the same change as it causes, if it is changed, since this does not seem entirely true even in the case of bodies, even less so in the case of the soul? It is because he who says that the form is presupposed in the originator of change as something activated, not undergone, allows that the originator of change does not always originate change by itself being changed. For181 it follows according to the same form of change that in no way should the unchanged cause change. So on that view the converse182 also is true.

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406b1 So the soul would also be transformed as the body was, [repositioned either as a whole or in its parts.] That is, it will either as a whole or in parts occupy different places, since locomotion is the first form of change imparted by the soul to living things.183

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406b3 But, if that is possible, it would be possible for it to return again after departure. [From this would follow the resurrection of the dead.] For if the body originates the same changes as the soul undergoes, and, conversely, it undergoes the same changes as are originated by the soul, it will change in no way other than those in which the body does, the changes in the body by the soul being predominantly of place. Also the vital changes of the soul will be of place, since it lives only by being present through bodily motion within and dies only through its departure. From this follows the resurrection of the dead, the soul being able to be moved spatially and to go in and out.

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Translation 406b5 With incidental motion, the soul might also be moved by something other than itself. [For the living body may be forcibly pushed.]

Wishing the soul to be unchanging in itself, since he is speaking only of bodily changes, but also changing incidentally by being in a changing body, he says that it can thus change both through itself and through something else. For the body changes through the soul and may be forcibly moved by something else. 20

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406b7 But it should not be that what is essentially self-changing should be changed by something else, unless incidentally, It is clear that what is changed both incidentally by something else and also by itself is not changed by something else in the same way that it changes itself. It is still more plain that what naturally and of itself – which is what ‘essentially’ means – is self-changed is not changed by another thing in the way it changes itself, but only incidentally. For if it were changed in one way by itself, in another by something else, as the planetary spheres are self-moved towards the east but moved towards the west by the fixed sphere, in a similar incidental way what is self-changed is incontestably also changed by another thing.184 But even if something were to change in the same way both of itself and by another, as if someone were to push somebody in the same direction that he was going of his own accord, he is not moved in his own right by himself and through another. For qua by himself it is not from outside, and qua from outside not by himself. The motions are only incidentally the same, because both are in the person that moves. 406b8  just as what is good of or by itself could not be so because of or as a means to something else. He opposed what is good of itself to what is so because of something else and what is good by itself to what is so as a means. For example, health is good of itself as being a perfection of the living body, but the health-giving is so for the sake of health; and excellence is good by itself since it is what all else is for and the goal, but wealth, for example, is a means, as are other so-called instrumental goods. So what is of itself is as such, not because of something else, and what is by itself is not as such a means to something else; and so vice versa. But even if the same thing be desirable both by itself and because of something else, the cases are in principle different.

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406b10 One would say that the soul was most definitely changed by objects of sense, if it is changed. Since, once again, he refers only to bodily change, which the soul does not undergo through sense-objects, but rather the sense-organ which is sundered or conjoined or entirely changed qualitatively. Aristotle said ‘if it is changed’ to indicate this.

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406b11 But, now, even if the soul changes itself, it must be itself changed  The same change, i.e. qualitative change, since this seems to be the sole bodily change of the soul, and, in the way that it is produced by sense-objects, it might be said to be produced also by itself, since it would not occur unless sense-objects were present and operative. 406b12  so that, if every change is a departure of what is changed in the way that it is changed, the soul would depart from its essence, unless it changes itself incidentally; but the change is part of its essential nature. [Some say that the soul changes the body in which it is in the same way as it itself is changed, as does Democritus, who says much the same as the comic poet Philip. Philip says that Daedalus made his wooden Aphrodite move by pouring in liquid silver. Democritus’ account is similar; for he says that the indivisible spheres that are in motion, since it is of their nature never to be stationary, drag and move the whole body. But we shall ask whether the same cause produces heat. How it will do so is hard and even impossible to say.] For every change involves transformation. But what is transformed departs as a whole and entirely from its previous state so that, according to the character of the change, the object departs in that way, e.g. in quantity or quality. So if the soul-substance is changed not incidentally but of itself, it will depart in respect of its essence, so as to come to be or perish.185 For transformations in substance are of this kind. But substance is changed incidentally, either by being in something else that is moved essentially, or through being transformed, not essentially but by being acted upon affectively or according to some other incidental category. The soul might be changed incidentally because of the body in which it is, but certainly not in the categories of affection, quantity or place. For the soul is not a quantity, nor is it in a place, and transformation in affection in the cases of dispositions and excellences is not in the soul but in the living thing. Aristotle does not call the transition from one to another of its own

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activities, which is complete and always occurs from determining principle to another, a change, but only that which is drawn out and continuous.186 Even bodies, when they cross from not changing to changing, or the reverse, are not said to change, lest there be a change of change. But Plato calls also the transitions in activity of the soul changes – such as contemplation and planning – and he calls also the soul’s essential declension from intellective and undivided existence a change, as being a departure, which Aristotle also considered it to be, from its determining principle and form. Aristotle was accustomed to call the determining principle and form essence.187 So the soul will be a departure from formative essence, being given its being and existence through this very change, but not coming nor ceasing to be. Since the soul is said to change in a different way – in essence and activities – Aristotle rightly rejects bodily changes in its case. The discussion about the self-changing tends clearly towards the articulation of the different senses of ‘change’, as the denial to the soul of bodily changes already made clear, and now also, in recounting the views of Democritus and where Timaeus seems to say that the soul and body were given the same change of place,188 since change can be otherwise understood in the case of the soul. For he says that some say this, since others do not do so. What is said about Democritus is clear except that they say that ‘liquid silver’ means quick-silver. He asks those that say that the body moves through the motion of soul-atoms if their motion also brings a body to rest. He derided this as hard to suppose and clearly impossible, but did not go on to the hypothesis that the body comes to rest through the departure of the atoms or their lack of motion. For their departure brought lifelessness, not rest, to the living thing. The followers of Democritus did not suggest the lack of motion of the atoms since they claimed them to be always in motion, and it was impossible to suppose a lack of motion of the soul-atoms in the body, since the living thing underwent no other change than that which these had.189 406b24 But it is altogether clear that the soul does not change the body in this way, [but by some choice or intellection.]

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Clearly not by change of place, as in the theories of Democritus, but ‘by some choice and intellection’. He now says ‘choice’ instead of ‘desire’, and calls imagination also intellection, in order that he may indicate the cause of change in the case of other living things as well, as he will more clearly say in Book 3.190 At the same time, he indicated obscurely what Plato called changes of the soul. For these were desires and intellections as activating the continuous change of bodies and as being themselves developing forms of life.

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406b25 In the same way Timaeus gives a scientific account of how the soul changes the body. [For by its motion it moves the body also through its connection with it. For it consists of the elements and is divided according to the harmonic series of numbers, and, in order that it should have an innate sense of harmony and that the whole should move with consonant motions, he bent the straight line into a circle. He divided the one circle into two, united at two common points. One of these he divided into seven circles, since the motions of the soul were the movements of the heavens.] The Pythagoreans were accustomed to philosophise symbolically via mathematics about the supernatural, the soul and natural phenomena. Plato makes Timaeus play the part of a Pythagorean, and so, as he assigns the five straight-sided solids to the simple bodies, so he depicts the being of the soul of the universe by straight lines and lines curved in a circle, in order to display at the same time its mean place between the undivided and the substance divided amongst bodies, just as the line is a mean between the point and solids, and, at the same time, a descent most close to intellect. It also depicts the undistorted procession from itself, which the straight line signifies, and its reversion upon itself by the line curved in a circle, just as by the bisection of the one straight line and division again into seven of the interior line, it displays its causal comprehension of the heavenly spheres through its own mean place. For it does not do so indivisibly, like intellect, but by development, as soul of which the circular lines are symbols, just as the motion of these lines is symbolic of the life of the soul. For even if intellect also moves the heavens, it is with the soul as well which, through its own developing life as intermediate, leads the indivisible kinetic energy of the intellect into the continuous and divisible activity of the heavens.191 It is this alone that this philosopher calls motion, and he contradicts Timaeus about his ascription of a divided extension and activity to the soul, lest we, following the customary use of words, should so understand Plato, or think it to be a magnitude or motion in a bodily manner. It is clear also that its connection with the body is not to be understood as spatial, but because of its immediate and essential presence throughout the body. The constitution from the elements shows the completion of the soul from substance, the same and the other, and generally that of the constitutive properties common to existents as such, this being applied specifically to the soul. For it is from all the common properties that all things come, but in their own way according to their allotted position. For intellect is from the undivided, but bodily forms

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of life from those distributed among bodies, soul from those that are intermediate. Again, the division according to the harmonic series of numbers signifies the subsistence of all the ratios within it and the mode of their subsistence – carried over into the divided and reassembled into the undivided, and therefore apportioned in accordance with numerical harmony. For through the consonance, the harmony reveals the reassembly of the ratios, which stay the same in respect of their different unique properties. For the numbers signify unique properties. By its own ratios the soul both moves the heavens with a harmonious motion and knows the harmony within things higher and within things lower, because the ratios are connected continuously with the superior and are also causes of the lower. ‘Since the motions of the soul were the movements of the heavens’: since the circular motions provide a picture as being similar to the motions of the spheres. This he disproves, and through the proofs he shows that the soul is incorporeal and that its activity is not continuously divided. For that is the way bodies are, being of extended substance; but not souls by any means, particularly the soul of the universe. 407a2 So, first, it is incorrect to say that the soul is a magnitude. [For it is clear that Plato intends the soul of the universe to be the sort of thing that is called intellect. For he does not intend it to be like the sensitive or appetitive soul. For their motion is not circular.]

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He has already shown that every soul is incorporeal, because changes are the specific activities of bodies, and none is suited to the soul, at least if divisible and continuous, since it is not in a place, as is shown by its presence throughout the whole body and its being whole in every part, which is clear in the case of tactile sensation.192 Also, the soul of mortals would have to undergo some forced motion if it is moved at all; but force is totally opposite to the intentional and self-initiating forms of life.193 Also, the presence of the vital form of life is by nature different from the spatial; for it is impossible for it to be vitally present in the dead, but if soul were spatial it would be possible, assuming that it changed its place, and it would be necessary for it to be moved in such a way, since it would be moved similarly to the body that it moves if it initiated motion in particulars, and the change it imparts to the body is change of place. Further, sensitive alteration, which might seem most likely , is not of the soul but of the organ of sensation. Also, all soul is essentially some form of life, whereas substantial change is a departure in respect of substance, while on the contrary life holds the body also firmly

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together, so long as it is present. Through these arguments he demonstrated that every soul was incorporeal, but in the present passage the rational soul in particular, which he calls intellect, distinguishing it from the sensitive and appetitive, which will not be a circle according to the Pythagoreans since it does not revert upon itself, which is proper to rational souls.194 407a6 But the intellect is one and continuous, as is intellection. [But intellection is identical with thoughts, which are one by succession, not as magnitude is. So intellect also is not continuous in that way, but either without parts or not continuous as a magnitude is.] Following Plato, he establishes essence from activity, especially in the case of the incorporeal, which has neither shape nor colour, from which also one can sometimes infer to essence. But intellection is the activity of intellect, and it is one since whatever is is also one. But it is not one through divisible extension in which neither the whole nor any part is all together, but, even if you take a small bit, it has its parts thus and thus or here and there. But intellection is not like that, but is either one as indivisible, like that of the intellect that transcends the soul, which at once and without transition seizes on all things.195 And,196 as our knowledge of formative determining principles197 is not simultaneously of all but of one form at a time, after the manifestation of the more particular properties the rational knowledge of premises and argument compressing them into the undivided view of the whole and unfolding them into the more particular terms of the premises, recognising separately subject and predicate and again putting them together and seeing both conjoined into one, and thus successive, and finally closing together the whole syllogism into one, not being transformed by the divisible transformation of body. For this neither in any part nor as a whole contained everything together. But our rational knowledge always proceeds from one determining principle to another, viewing the parts of the premises, joining together the whole premise and drawing together the whole argument, and, still more, reaching up from the words to the form, and advancing, not in magnitude nor continuous extension, but rather as those who count from one number to another, with an undivided activity at each stage, since each thought is known undivided and as a whole, the living thing and again the rational and the mortal too, and their totality, as one. ‘For intellect’, he says, ‘is one and continuous’, because the intellect transcending the soul is one as undivided, but our rational being is by its development one as being stretched

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out continuously, but not by continuity as of magnitude but by that which relaxes the pure indivisibility of the forms.198 ‘As intellection also’: because the substance is as its activity. But, since intellection is the thoughts, which are unified by their succession like a number consisting of separate units, not like magnitude, it would not itself be extended. ‘Intellect is not continuous’ as are magnitude and intervals, but it is ‘either indivisible or continuous not as is magnitude’, since both the immaterial form and the rational entity are intellect. But the one is altogether indivisible, the other in a kind of extension, through its development and its relaxation, but not as if it had a continuity of magnitude as bodies do. For as it is below the immaterial forms, so it is raised above bodily extension. In these ways he makes plain its intermediate being between the undivided and that which is divided out among bodies by saying ‘not as magnitude is continuous’; and, by saying ‘either undivided’, the immaterial intellect above the soul, since the intellect partaken in by the soul is also intermediate. For it would not be partaken in by the soul if not commensurate.199 407a10 For how will the soul think, if it is a magnitude? Will it be with the whole or some one portion of itself, [and, of the portions, with a magnitude or at a point, if one is to call these also portions?]

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The pure activity of the rational soul, such as is always that of the soul of the universe, and sometimes that of ours, when it makes no use of sensation or imagination, will, since it does not extend to the body or any bodily form but to things separate from body, neither use the body as an instrument nor as any sort of co-agent, fixing itself without extension on such objects of knowledge as are not unified by such continuity of magnitude. Therefore intellection is also not continuous in that way, but always halting at each determining principle.200 Still less, then, will the thinker201 itself be a magnitude. For the object of thought is one without extension. But if the thinker were a magnitude it would either know the whole object of knowledge with the whole of itself or with some portion of itself. If with the whole of itself, then either the totality with the whole and the more particular special features with parts or boundaries of itself, or else it would grasp also each item among objects of cognition with the whole. But, if with one of its parts, either with points or parts lesser in magnitude, and with each portion or limit cognisant of the whole, or with each cognisant of some more partial feature, while the whole, as a whole, grasps the totality, or both with some part of itself and as a whole grasping the totality. This is put forward first as more plausible. For, if a magnitude is capable of thought, the activity of the whole and of

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each of its parts will be cognitive, and each part will not be cognisant of some things and the whole of others (since that would be as if you were sensible of one thing and I of another). Also the whole would not know all that is known unless of its own right both the whole and its constituents were cognisant of the totality. It is therefore more plausible that the whole and each of its limits, if its contemplation is point by point, or each of its parts, if it knows different things at different time through magnitudes, should know the same thing. When he called not only magnitudes but points also parts without distinction, he added ‘if we may call these also parts’. He next adduces the absurdities consequent on the hypothesis for those, to begin with, who favoured the view that the soul knew the same thing at each point, that it must intuit each point at different times because it did so in motion.

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407a13202 For since they are infinite in number it is clear that the soul will never get through them. [But if by magnitude, it will often, or rather, infinitely often think the same thought, whereas it is clearly possible to do it once.] So neither will there be a circle,203 nor will the whole ever know as a whole. For if the whole does, then all the points in it will have known, and the awareness of the whole will be collected together from them. But it is impossible for all to have known because of their infinity. He adds also the absurdity that follows for those who make the division not by points but by portions. For a division is necessary, since the supposition is that something having magnitude and in motion thinks. What then is the absurdity? It is that it will ‘often, or infinitely often think the same thought’. Often, if the division is into determinate magnitudes, infinitely often, if into indeterminate, since always the next will seize on a half or a third of the one before it. So it is necessary, if the whole is to have cognisance of the object before it, that it will do so often or infinitely often, and, since it is impossible to get through them all, this is impossible. ‘Being often’ is itself absurd. ‘It is clearly possible to do it once’, when, as soon as we think something, we at once go on to something else. 407a15 If contact by any part suffices, why need the soul move in a circle, or even have any magnitude at all? But if it is necessary to know by contact with the whole circle, what is this contact with the parts? The objection refutes all cognition by parts or limits. For if the activity of any part or limit were cognisant of the present object of knowledge, what need to move in a circle, if it immediately grasped the totality

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by contact? And why need the knower have a magnitude, if even any part whatsoever were cognisant of the totality? For it is clear that cognition of anything is in an undivided knower and at an undivided time, so that it neither involves change (since every change takes time) nor is in a divided knower. Nor will it grasp more particular features at different times with a different part, but all as a whole. For what is known must be comprehended indivisibly in an undivided knower, whereas every magnitude is divisible. And if the knower attends at different times to a different feature of the known, but grasps the whole all together and undividedly, of necessity that which surveys all features and then conjoins them all must be one and the same; this is so if he who knows the totality also knows all the more particular features of which the totality consists. The hypothesis that maintains that the totality is known by the whole magnitude, but the more particular features by its parts or limits, is thus refuted. What remains is that which assigns to the whole the contemplation of both the totality and the more particular. For that which assigns both to the parts alone is not worth refutation as being manifestly impossible, since it supposes that the thinker does not even think, given that it is impossible that the parts of the thinker should not be intellective.204 For, he says, ‘what is this contact with the parts’, if the whole thinks but not the parts any more? For the parts of the thinker as such will not be productive of warmth, but themselves intellective. 407a18 Also, how will it think the divisible with the indivisible and205 the indivisible with the divisible?

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All cognition, even if it be of a divisible thing, concentrates it into an indivisible whole, in order to view the whole as a whole. For that which goes through it part by part, seizing on a different one at a different time, is always cognition of that on which it seizes on each occasion. So when it views a whole as a whole it does not view parts with parts, since that is the same as if you were sensible of one thing and I of another,206 but as a single whole, since the whole is compressed within a single indivisible knower. Thus sensation, though it is furthest descended and knowledge of things divisible, stays on the form of the object of knowledge. But every form is indivisible, as bounding indivisibly that of which it is the form, but not as the point which is the limit of a line. For that is indivisible by the contracting and by the vanishing of divisibility and in a worse way; but the form is indivisible by embracing the nature of the divisible. So awareness of the point is awareness of it alone, and not of the line, since the extreme is an element in the line, but awareness through its form is of both the line and its limits.

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Now if the intellect were a magnitude, even if it had indivisible limits, as according to those who give it a linear magnitude, it would not know either the divisible nor the indivisible. For the knower will grasp the totality of the known as a whole and with all of itself. But it will neither know a divisible object with the indivisible element in itself, the point, since a point will not extend alongside a magnitude, in order also to lay hold on it, nor will it know the indivisible element in the object known with a divisible part of itself, since it will not fit with it. For if someone were to assign cognition to magnitude as form he would already thereby admit it to be incorporeal. For the form is a determining principle, not the thing determined.207 Just as it is through the change that we distinguish the origin of motion from the organ vitally changed (for it is not as a body but as living and ensouled that what flies or walks is moved, and the origin of their motion is the soul, which has another activity of change and not the same as the thing changed has, which is why both as the actualisation of an instrument and as using the living body the soul transcends not only body but also the life inseparably bestowed on body, through which it was created a vitally changing thing), so also we need to see the cognitive power and the power through the body as two different things. The latter depends on the life given to the body and is with the body, and is not purely active, but is joined with the affection of the body as it is separated out or mixed together by the object of sense. The former terminates in form and is active unchangeably, the knowing element in the soul that uses it, which is not a magnitude (for no magnitude is form but is given form), and is separated in a way from magnitude, since it has knowledge actively and not passively. But that which thinks will show an even greater separation, since, as he will show, the impassivity of the sensitive and that of the intellective are not similar, nor does the intellect use the body as an organ, especially when contemplating the separated forms, when it makes no use of bodily knowledge, sensation or imagination. What is now demonstrated applies to the intellect, which, as we said,208 is what he calls the rational life of the soul, and which he distinguished from the sensitive and desirous soul. So what is now demonstrated does not only reveal the intellect as incorporeal, but shows that it does not even use the body as an instrument in its intellections. For what use would the undivided, or something proceeding from one determining principle to another,209 have for that which travels by divisible continuity, unless the form cognised were in something divided? For then the instrument becomes co-active because of the apprehension of the divided, since the cognition is of a form that is embodied. So that, when the intellect is cognisant of separated forms, it will not use the body as an instrument, even if imagination follows

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for such an intellect – imagination which is not co-active but simply follows as a by-product, like the shadow of a solid in light or like the dazzling of the eyes by the intense vision of the soul. So all the absurdities listed for him who says that the intellect itself is a magnitude follow also for those who suppose the soul to use the body as an instrument in its intellection of separated forms. Aristotle, having refuted those who say that the intellect is a magnitude, goes on to provide evidence that this is the hypothesis of Timaeus,210 as it appears, writing: 407a19 It is necessary that intellect be this circle; [for intellection is the motion of the intellect and the rotation of the circle. So if intellection is the rotation, intellect also must be the circle the rotation of which is intellection.]

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So the intellect will be neither the actualisation of this circle, nor use it as an instrument, still less be altogether separate if, indeed, according to Timaeus intellection is the rotation of the circle – not, of course, any circle, but of that which he says was split, bent over and wrapped round. So on what basis does he argue that intellect is this circle? It is that the substance of those things whose activities are the same is also the same. Also the rotation of the circle is said to be intellection. But the activity of the intellect is agreed to be intellection, and those whose activities are one are themselves the same. Therefore intellect and this circle are the same. We have already set out how Timaeus presented these matters parabolically in mathematical form.211 407a22 Of what will it think for ever?212 For it must do so [if the rotation is everlasting. For of practical thoughts there are limits, since all are for the sake of something else, and the theoretical are equally bounded by their propositions. For every proposition is a proof or a definition. So proofs both have a beginning and, in a way, an end – the argument or its conclusion; and if they do not have a termination, at least they do not turn back to their starting point, but move forwards, taking in always middle and extreme terms. But rotation tends back again to its starting point. Definitions are always limited.]

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Since the rotation is everlasting, intellection also will be everlasting, since it is identical with the rotation and everlasting in the same way as is the rotation. This is not everlasting as stationary at a single position but as in transformation that is not discrete but continuous, and never stationary or at a limit. As such, intellection will always be of some one thing, since in the transition from one thing to another

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it must be interrupted by the halt in the prior intellection. But the rotation is not interrupted by a halt. So there will always be a thought of the same thing, not stationary but evolving, since it for ever runs through the same thing and never comes to a terminal point. So he asks: ‘of what will it think for ever?’ That it will be for ever he succinctly recalled through the rotation’s being everlasting. For the object of thought would be neither practical nor theoretical, since both practical and theoretical thought have a terminal point. The one starts from the end of practical action and ends with a starting point of action, the other is active straightway by definition, stopping at each term in its collection into a whole; and it begins demonstratively from premises and terminates in the conclusion, and thus has as its terminal point the argument and its conclusion; the conclusion since it is the end point, the argument since it connects together the premises with the conclusion. For it was proved in the Posterior Analytics that the route neither to the starting points nor to the conclusion was infinite, and that, the end points being determinate, the middle portions were also limited.213 But now, while conceding ex hypothesi that there will be no termination, he still reminded us that such an infinity was different from rotation, since the latter is infinite by turning back on itself, the former in a straight line. Similarly, study by division and analysis will be shown to be determinate.214 407a31 Also, if the same rotation occurs many times, one will have to think of the same thing many times. [Also, intellection seems more like a pause and a halt than a change, and the same is true of an argument.] The intellect superior to ours does have the same object of thought always, but not many times. The thought is not repetitive nor at all in extended form, nor at different instants; rather it stays at a single now, indivisibly comprehending the whole temporal infinitude, so that it does not have the same thought many times but once, as the eternal is once. But our thought that moves on, does not do so from the same to the same but from one thing to another, and it returns to the same object through intermediates. But if intellection were the revolution, it would recur and not be eternal and would move on from itself to itself without any other intermediates. Perhaps it is nothing odd that the same thing should recur at different instants, being within temporal duration, finite for generated things but infinite for those in the heavens, since the being of natural things is not eternal, so as to rest in a single now. Why, then, is the intellection also of divine souls215 not one in this sense that it is always of all things and not in transition, but does not, as if being

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eternal, remain in a single now (since the eternal is superior to the psychic), but, while identical, remains from instant to instant in infinite continuity? In this way it is subordinated to the intellect above soul, as also in its contact with the intelligible; the thinking of the latter intellect is through undivided unity, that of the former by a sort of touch. In the former case the manifold of intellections is separated only in form, while, by its indivisible connection, each intellection is what the others are, and thus complete. In the case of the divine souls the connection of the cognitions with each other and that of the objects of cognition with themselves, not being purely indivisible, is already pregnant with division. So, if now and now there is the same intellection, why is it absurd that it should many times think of the same object? It is, I shall say, because in the hypothesis it is not the same thing, but is in transformation, if the rotation is intellection. So intellection is not a simultaneous whole but like ours, who do not yet know the whole but who progress towards it through having previously known the essence, then the animate, and in turn the sensitive and thus the whole living thing. But it is absurd for this to recur again and again. For intellection, once complete, has no need of this in the case of divine souls, for it is more evident in their case – not to mention the need for infinite repetition when not once is it needed. But ‘it is more like a pause and a halt than a change’, especially since in our case, who draw different conclusions from different things, which is argument, the stopping point is more evident than change, since we proceed always from one determining principle to another. For intellection occurs not in transitions but in a halt at each determining principle. 407a34 But, indeed, that which is not easy but forced is not blessedness. Each of the premises is evident. For that which is natural is effortless and absence of effort is a mark of blessedness. Therefore it resides in the natural and not in the forced. For blessedness is imperishability, and even perishable things do not perish so long as they are in their natural state. So the imperishable is always in a natural state. This is presupposed in what immediately follows. 407b1 If change were not the soul’s essence, it would change contrarily to its nature.

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changes it changes contrary to its nature. So much, then, is clear. But why, ‘if change is not the soul’s essence’, as he says, would it ‘change contrarily to its nature’? For change is not the heaven’s essence, and yet its change is not forced. Is it because, as he will say in Book 3,217 intellect is in essence activity, not only that which is superior to souls, but our soul also, when, having contracted all external projection,218 it lives a life that is as far as possible separate and undivided, and therefore includes activity in its essence? Still more so, and not at times but unceasingly, the divine soul of the universe will be activity in its essence, and, if its activity were change, change would be its essence. So, if this is not so, either it will not change or it will change contrarily to its nature.

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407b2 It is painful also to be mixed with body and not to be able to escape, [and it is to be avoided if it is better for intellect not to be mixed with body, as he was accustomed to say219 and as it seems also to many.] By the foregoing he has shown that the intellective element in the soul, i.e. the whole of rational life, is neither a body nor any sort of magnitude; for what has been primarily proved in the case of the soul of the universe applies secondarily to our soul. Now he reminds us that all rational soul whatsoever is naturally separate from body, arguing more especially with regard to the soul of the universe, by concentrating on the absurdities in it. How, then, does he prove the separation of the rational soul, which he calls intellect? Because it is better for it not to be associated with body, not merely as being accepted by Plato but as a majority opinion, since theoretical is superior to practical philosophy, and, of theoretical, that concerning things separate superior to natural philosophy, and that which makes no use of the body to that which uses it, and that which is enfolded in itself to that which goes outside. But this is not better for the soul unseparated from bodies; for its own good is better for each. So for the life that is unseparated from bodies it is better to be with a body, and, if to be without body is better, then the soul is separated from body. So the life with body, which he calls mixture, since it is not pre-eminently natural, is painful for the separate soul; for this happens to it not as separate but as having, in a way, departed from itself, and abandoning what is one’s own is painful.220 That is why such a life is not pre-eminently to be chosen, but bearable for our souls since they can escape from it; for the mixture is temporary. But in the case of the soul of the universe it would be a life to be avoided, since it could never escape from it. The pain is protracted in the case of the soul of the universe, since it is everlasting. That seems to be why he attacks Plato’s words ‘mixture’ and ‘interweaving’;221 for they

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would seem to assign to it222 also an inclination and tendency towards the body and a use of it as an instrument, and thus always the better and its good in separation. So perhaps we should not so understand Plato’s words, nor, still more, believe that the facts are such, interpreting ‘inclination or tendency towards the body’ as meaning that it makes use of the body as being mixed with it, but as meaning that by remaining within itself it reverts to itself and makes the body its own by transcendentally guiding its motion, and putting this forward as an object of desire, in order that we may have a pattern of our own separated life, the everlasting and primary of the occasional and secondary. 407b5 Also the cause of the rotation of the heaven is unclear. [For neither is the essence of the soul the cause of the rotation, since it causes motion thus incidentally, nor is body the cause]

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Such a hypothesis as that the soul’s rotation is the cause of the heavenly rotation having been disproved, its cause remains finally unclear. ‘For neither is the essence of the soul the cause of the rotation’, as those who think that motion is its essence and that its rotation is essential propose as thus causing it. For the soul does not move in a circle nor in any way whatsoever. So it will not be the cause by its motion, for it does not move of itself but incidentally, while the body is not the cause either of its own proper motion or of the incidental motion of the soul. 407b8  but the soul rather than that.

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‘That’ being clearly the body. He adds ‘rather’ because, even if nature be the cause of change, still rather the soul. For the origin of change is superior to the principle according to which things change. For that is how nature is a principle, as being that in accordance with which, not that by the agency of which.223 Perhaps that which is also Iamblichus’ opinion is suggested, namely, that the celestial body has also life through itself, and not derivatively as our bodies do, but as part of its essence and a life that originates change, as being roused to change by itself, but more basically by its soul.224 Therefore the soul is rather the cause for the body than the body for itself. The addition of ‘rather’ may be an indication that there are other even more fundamental causes of motion. For the soul is rather so than the body for itself, but still prior is the intellect in which the soul partakes, and, still prior, the unparticipated intellect.225 This, then, is all correct, but how is it truly said that even for Plato the cause of the heaven’s travelling in a circle is obscure, since it has been proved that the soul does not rotate or move at all? For bodily

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and natural motion has been disproved in its case, and this is also not Plato’s meaning in the case of the soul. For if we understand the motion of the soul as does Plato, as being a form of life that has descended from intellect and slackened its indivisible bond, but is not yet divided up nor has departed from itself, but is turned on itself in a secondary way, which is what he hinted at mathematically by rotation, then the cause of the heavenly rotation is obvious. For the immediate cause of the celestial motion which is continuous and divisible but always perfect, from and to the same place, and always the same, is the aforementioned life, which, by its descent from the undivided, activates division but does not suffer it, and, by its reversion upon itself, remains in a secondary way in itself, bringing about a motion that is always continuous, from and to the same place and always the same. But, as we keep on saying, Aristotle understands it according to the popular use of words, examines it, and says that so understood the cause is obscure.

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407b9 But, indeed, he does not say226 that it is better. [However, the god ought to have made the soul to rotate because to move was better for it than rest, and thus to move better than in another way.] Everything in its own proper state also exhibits goodness. For badness being a deprivation, it is truly something non-existent and thus not good, and, to the extent that it exists it does so by existing parasitically upon a trace of goodness. Therefore he well estimates that he who studies beings should view the good suited to each thing, but should also make an examination of the one from the other from what remains. So now, if motion is not fitting for the soul, the good suited to motion will also not harmonise with it, and he who has seen the good that contributes to the soul will know that it also is exempt from such a motion. He rightly thinks it fitting to attribute the good to the god, and to look to the fact that the good is also the best in all things. He well bears witness to Plato that he does not say that motion is better in the case of the soul, as he himself understands it. For Plato defines both its form and its perfection, attributing to it a being between the undivided and that which is divided among bodies, a complete being, and clearly a simplicity which sustains and preserves such a being, in which itself is the good and the better for the soul.

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407b12 But since such an enquiry belongs to another field [let us for the present set it aside.]

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sion was not principally about change, but whether the soul is moved and whether that is better for it, and that the god’s action should always be for the sake of the good. So it is the enquiry about the good that he sets aside as being more suited to a different field – metaphysics229 – in which it is affirmed of the good that it is in a simple state derived from the primary good. 407b13 But the following absurdity arises both in this account and in most of those concerning the soul. [For they all join the soul to, and insert it in, the body, without adding an explanation why, and in what state of the body. But that would seem to be necessary; for it is through this union that one acts and the other is acted upon, one is changed and the other changes, but none of this happens in just any chance relationship.]

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Having concluded that the soul is not a body, since the proper activity of body was change, but the soul did not change, he demands an enquiry how it is in a body, and what sort of thing not only the soul but also the body, which is its substrate, must be. For that it is connected with the body is clear. In what body, then, in what state? – for not in all. He then takes it as clear that the soul acts and the body is acted upon, and that the former causes, the latter undergoes, change, and he reasonably claims that the one is the user, the other its instrument, and that not any body is an instrument for the soul, but clearly that suited to its form of life, and a different one for a different form of life. For not anything is affected by anything whatsoever. 407b20 But they all simply try to say what sort of thing the soul is, [but add no account of the body that is to receive it.]

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For example, that it vitally changes bodies, one by nutrition, another thus and also by cognition, another also by locomotion and desire, another also rationally. ‘But they add no account of the body that is to receive it.’ For they do not distinguish the organs suited to different forms of life. 407b21 As if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul should clothe itself in any body.

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He rightly knows and says that they used a mythical veil when they said that the rational was inserted into non-rational vehicles,230 dramatising its passionate and irrational form of life.

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407b23 For each body seems to have its proper form and shape. [They speak much as if one were to say that carpentry clothed itself in oboes. For each craft must use its tools and each soul its body.]

CHAPTER 4 [Also another opinion concerning the soul is prevalent, plausible to many no less than those discussed, which has given an account of itself under examination and in public discussions. For some say that the soul is a harmony.231] For the body that is to be changed vitally by the soul must already be alive, and live determined by the form of the soul that changes it. And that is, as he requires in this passage, to distinguish the life in the body derived from the soul that has the function of using it from that which gives the body a form as an instrument and as changing vitally, and to posit that that which gives form to the instrument is always like that which uses it. For just as the craft of carpentry would not make use of oboes, so also the rational soul would not make use of the instruments that had a character fitting for non-rational life, since such use would be adventitious and not natural.232 He seems to me, by this insight, to require that the tool be determined by its likeness to its user, but a derived likeness. For the animate is like the soul derivatively, and has a character not like that of the soul that changes it, but like that which has descended from it by being no longer an originator of change but as determining the thing changed, and it is a descended likeness. In this way the thing changed is made like its originator, as having undergone that which the origin of change activates. But it should not be so likened merely as changed to changer, but also to it as originating change in a certain way, such as in sensation or rationally. Following on this, he proves also that the soul is not a harmony of the parts of the body, neither that which gives its character to that which is changed vitally nor, still less, that which originates change. For certainly the body that is to receive life must be harmonised, and harmonised to chime in with the life that enters it, in order to be suitable for its participation in that life. But that which is suitable for participation differs totally from what is participated, and is a support as matter to form and of form both as what determines the instrument and also that which makes use of it. As an illustration, a certain joining together of timbers is suitable for the shape of the ship, but it is not the same as the form, and, still less, as seamanship. Nor,

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then, is the life of the soul the joining together of the bodily elements, whether the mixture of qualities or the plan of the interrelation of the parts joined or mixed, but they, like matter, stand beneath that which determines the instrument. So why, then, is the opinion that makes the soul a harmony plausible to many? Because, as the form suddenly supervenes on the immediate matter as it gains a perfect suitability, it appears to be the same thing as the suitability. In the same way the shape of the ship seems to be in no way different from such and such a fitting together of the timbers. Also the majority do not distinguish the soul that uses it as an instrument from the life that gives the instrument its form as an instrument. For here even Alexander, the Aristotelian commentator, has made this mistake, and holds that the soul does not use it as an instrument;233 for, he says, a unity does not arise from a user and an instrument. For that reason he would not even allow it power to cause change, but makes it the form of the changed as such, and in that way alone understands it as the actualisation of the body.234 But Aristotle added ‘instrumental’ to ‘body’ and confirms that the soul uses it and changes it, and in that way he dissociates it from nature, since nature is the principle of undergoing change and of passivity, while the soul originates change. How, then, is the living thing a unity consisting of soul and body, if a unity does not arise from user and instrument? Or is that not true as it stands, but in need of some qualification? For when the characteristic condition of the instrument is sundered from the user there is no unity, as in the case of the crafts. But when it is dependent on the user, and the tool becomes bonded to the user as part of himself, a unity results not as that of matter and the form of instrumentality – for the instrument is already presupposed – but through the substantial fusion of instrument and user. He calls ‘public discussions’ those equivalent to those that appeal to the many; but perhaps he is hinting covertly at those in the Phaedo,235 and referring to those that he himself wrote in his dialogue the Eudemus,236 which examined the doctrine of harmony. 407b30 For they say that harmony is a mixture and synthesis of opposites, and that the body consists of opposites. He is not merely conceding that the body of living things is harmonised, but arguing for it. For he takes it as obvious that the living body consists of and is mixed in proportion from opposites; but everything proportionally mixed from or consisting in opposites is harmonised. The conclusion is evident. So it is true that the living body is harmonised. But it has not yet been shown that its harmony is the soul, as he goes on immediately to demonstrate.

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407b32 However, a harmony is some ratio of things mixed together or their synthesis, [while the soul cannot be either of these. Also a harmony cannot originate change, but this especially is the function that just about everybody assigns to the soul. It harmonises better to predicate harmony of health and bodily excellences generally than of the soul.] What this synthesis, and what this ratio, is, he himself makes clear a little further on. But he now assumes so much as that both synthesis and ratio are some sort of relation between things mixed, and proves in the passage before us that the soul is a substance and not a relation. So from this discussion we are reminded not only that the life that uses the body as an instrument is not a harmony, but is that which determines the instrument itself. For every form of life is a substance, since every living thing is such, and since it is receptive of opposites. The question following is about the user. For this is that which originates change, and it is not merely a substance, but a substance that is a principle. But a relational harmony is not a substance, still less a principle. For now let us set aside that which is called a substance by the Pythagoreans, even if it be a mathematical harmony. But Aristotle disproves the thesis of those who think that the soul is a bodily harmony by making a comparison with the cases of health and bodily excellences in general. For neither health, nor strength, nor beauty is a harmony, nor what he more generally calls bodily excellences, which are perfections of the body, but they arise where there is harmony and proportion, whether of qualities, or of homogeneous parts, or of non-homogeneous parts. For they are not proportions themselves, but supervening perfections. Though harmony may seem more appropriate to these than to the soul, since health and strength, even if they belong to living bodies, do not appear to derive from the soul but from the corporeal and its good mixture, while life, even of the lowest form, derives from the soul. 408a3 It is more manifest if one tries to attribute the affections and activities of the soul to a harmony. [It is difficult to harmonise these.] The argument is from activities; for where the activities are different the things themselves are also different. So the activities of the soul include the affective, which he also calls affections, such as are shared with the body – anger and mildness, appetite and revulsion, sensations and imaginations, and also the non-affective, which he calls activities, such as theoretical scientific knowledge, and intellections of things separate. So it is difficult, or rather impossible, to attribute such activities to any sort of bodily harmony. For they all exhibit

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vitality and have their character from the living thing. But this is not through their bodily constitution, even if they belong to a composite. For a form of life is something beyond bodies; but harmony of the parts is a corporeal condition of the qualities of bodies, even if of living bodies, and not life. 408a5 Further, if we speak of harmony, we have two cases in mind. [Most strictly is that of magnitudes in things that change and have a position; it is their fitting together when they so harmonise that nothing of the same sort can intervene. Derivatively, the ratio of the mixed constituents. In neither of these ways is the thesis plausible, for the view that the soul is the fitting together of the parts of the body is too easily exposed. For the fittings together of the bodily parts are many and various.]

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This arrangement is the co-ordination with each other of continuous and enduring parts. So it includes neither integers, since they are not continuous, nor parts of time, since they do not endure,237 nor the elements of speech,238 for both reasons. Fitting together must be of a number of things positioned by each other, with nothing of the same kind coming in between. For harmony and fitting together require a number of objects and join them together. So things that are strictly said to be connected must join together and do so exactly, so that nothing of the same kind as both, if they are alike, or as either, if they happen to be of different sorts, is able to insert itself between them. Thus, if they are of wood, no wood; if of wood and stone, then neither wood nor stone. But there is nothing to wonder at if something liquid like air or water gets in. This is the strict sense of ‘fitted together’ since their position is together with each other. For in the words ‘most strictly, of magnitude in things that change and have a position’ we should not understand that harmony applies most strictly to the fitting together, but that fitting together is strictly of things that change and have a position. In showing what magnitudes were natural, he said that they were things that changed and had a position; for mathematical objects have a position, but do not change. Derivatively from strict fitting together, we more colloquially call fitting together the ratio of the mixed constituents and their proportional mixing and blending. For wine is not mixed with wine, but wine with water, so that both are qualitatively changed by each other and neither remains in its pure state, without either being completely destroyed or too completely dominated by the rest, as if a bottle of wine were poured into the sea, or if both were transformed into another nature by something else, as if the water and the wine were converted into steam by fire. So, if there is to be mixture, it will always be of certain ingredients, and will require the proper proportion to

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each other of the things mixed, so that none should overwhelm the rest and transform it into itself. That is no longer a mixture. In fitting together by juxtaposition, something may be harmonised with something very much bigger, since things so connected are not affected by each other.239 ‘It is not plausible in either way’ – that either harmony by juxtaposition or that by mixture – should be soul, since neither exhibits vitality. In the sense of the fitting together of parts it is ‘too easily exposed’, i.e. disproved, since it contains a more obvious absurdity. For mixture is of the same elements in all, in the case of composite bodies, even if not in the same ratio in all. That of things with parts is not from the same materials, but here of bone with bone or with flesh, there of sinews or arteries, or even of things with unlike elements with others with unlike elements, as of the arm with the shoulder. Nor is the fitting altogether the same; it is not the same of bone to flesh, bone to bone and flesh to sinew. So there will be many souls for each living thing, since the constituent parts are many and the fittings together occur in many ways.

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408a12 What sort of fitting together of what are we to suppose the intellect to be, [or even the sensitive or appetitive element?] He has said that two absurdities follow from the hypothesis. One is that we cannot give a reasonable account of intellect or any other faculty of the soul as being a fitting together of these or any other components. The other is the incongruity of constructing living substances from bodily fitting together. That is what ‘what sort of ’ refers to. 408a13 It is similarly absurd that the soul should be the ratio of a mixture. [For there is not the same ratio in the mixture of the elements of flesh and of bone. Thus the possession of many souls throughout the whole body results if all things come from a mixture of elements, and the ratio of the mixture is harmony, i.e. soul.] ‘Similarly’, to the extent that there are many ratios of mixture and consequently many souls in each body. It is not a similarity that everything comes from the same elements, for in the former case the absurdity is that things do not consist of the same parts. ‘Thus the possession of many souls throughout the whole body results.’ For in each of the parts of the organism there are veins, arteries, sinews, bones, flesh and membranes, mixed together in different ratios. So there will also be many souls, and not in the whole

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body alone, but in each portion of the body made of different parts there will be a plurality of souls. 56,1

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408a18 One might also ask the same question of Empedocles. [For he says that each bodily part exists in virtue of some ratio. Is the soul, then, the ratio, or does it enter the parts as being something else? Again, is love the cause of any mixture whatsoever, or that in accordance with the ratio, and is love the ratio, or something in addition to the ratio? These are the sorts of problems that arise. But, if the soul is something other than the mixture, why, then, with the existence of flesh is that of the other parts of the living thing destroyed also? Further, since each part does not have a soul unless the soul is the ratio of the mixture, what is it that perishes when the soul departs? So, from what has been said, it is clear that the soul cannot be a harmony nor can it move round in a circle. But it can move incidentally, as we have said, and it can move itself, i.e. can move in that in which it is, which is to be moved by the soul. It cannot otherwise change its place.] Empedocles also is criticised for not clearly distinguishing the supervening form of life from its underlying ratio of mixture of elements, and also for not making clear about love itself whether it is the cause only of mixture in the ratio, or also of any mixture whatsoever. For every mixture must come about according to some ratio, but there is much unnatural mixture, while the natural covers a wide spectrum. And does he posit the essence of love to be the ratio of the mixture itself, or something additional to the ratio?240 He next raises a problem for those who do not accept that the soul is a harmony, i.e. a single one, why, if even one mixture is destroyed, that by which flesh exists, the mixtures of all the other parts are destroyed, by which they exist as parts of a living thing, so that the soul must necessarily depart when that which receives it becomes unsuitable. So this is the problem that he sets for those who think that there is not one ratio of mixture, but many in each thing. He also refers us to the thesis that there are at once many ratios, differing for each set of similar parts, and one for the whole living thing, comprising all of them, so that when the more important parts perish the whole perishes also. Next, he sets himself to establish that very thing, that the soul is the ratio of the mixture, since every part has a soul and since when the soul departs the organs perish by destroying this ratio. So each of the parts has a soul, but all a single one present in each. The ratio of the mixture contributes to the presence of the soul, for there must

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be a suitable nature to receive it, but this is not the soul. But, since the suitability of the matter comes from the soul, being its outward appearance, through which comes the ratio of the mixture, it is reasonable that when it departs both the outward appearance and the ratio of the mixture should perish.241 So the argument proving its unchangingness established its incorporeal and undivided being; those disproving the theory of the harmony do not permit it to be imagined to be incorporeal as being an attribute, but to be a substance, and a substance that is a principle. For they exhibit it as originative of change and give it precedence as being present as one throughout the body and as preserving it and as the cause of its suitability for life.

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408a34 One might more arguably raise a problem about it as itself changing, turning to such considerations as these: [we say that the soul is distressed, rejoices, is confident and frightened, and also is angry, is sensitive, and thinks. But all these seem to be changes. Thus one might think that it does suffer change, but this is not necessarily so.] Since the soul is both incorporeal and incorporeal qua substance, he distinguishes through these data the soul that gives the living body its character, through which it is alive and subject to change vitally, from that which changes it and uses it as a living instrument. In addition he sees this soul as dual, one whose essence lies in the changing of bodies alone, and having no activity beyond the use of bodies, the other also active in itself and then divorced from all body.242 However, the arguable problem about it as changed directs attention to the soul that determines the living body. For this, as being the actualisation of it as vitally changed, might seem to be subject to the affections of that which it determines. But we must again call to mind that the change of a naturally changing body is of one kind, like the upward motion of fire, while that of a body that is animate, such as growth, walking and flying, is another, and that each change is divisible, and thus is of a divisible substance. That which is given form is of this kind, not that which bestows form. Therefore, as he shows in Metaphysics, Book 7, the natural form is unchanged, though it determines the changed,243 here he shows something similar for the soul that gives its character to that which changes vitally. There are two kinds of activity of the living thing, some rather highlighting the corporeal, some the vital – the bodily character of growth and walking, the vital character of sensations, pleasures and the like. Of these the former are unquestionably changes, the latter seem to be changes. For the organ, which is body, must be affected, and the affection of

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the body is a change. But since it is a living body it is not merely affected, but is so in conjunction with vital activity. Those which highlight the vital more are activities rather than changes. This is why he says yet again in a conditional statement: 408b5 For if distress and rejoicing or thinking are clear examples of change and each is a case of being changed,

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Since the human animal is rational, that which determines the organ will be reasoning. So not only the life that initiates change, and not distress or rejoicing alone, but reasoning also will be change or being changed. For both these things have been said of them, the one if we think of rejoicing and thinking as being the activity together with the affection, the other if we think of them as active participation.244 For as being whitened is different from whiteness, so being changed is from change, and being active from activity. 408b7  but being changed is caused by the soul, What has preceded exhibited the life of the instrument, which is what a living body is, as characterising such a thing by the activities appropriate to it, which are enmeshed with bodily changes, and therefore seem to be a sort of change and, in a certain way, are such. Thence he moves up to the soul that makes use of the instrument, since everything that is changed is changed by something but being changed in regard to anger or thought is caused by a soul, which is not that in accordance with which the change occurs but that which causes it. This, too, is defined by its activity; for to initiate change is its property, and this is not enmeshed with being changed but is present as an efficient cause. Such a form of life is distinguished from the former as is the efficient cause from that to which things accord, and as the purely active from what is enmeshed with bodily changes. By setting them out together in contrast he brings out plainly the difference between the life in accordance with which the changes occur and that which is their cause.245 408b7  as being angry or being afraid is through246 the heart being changed in a certain way, [but thinking is perhaps either similar or something else. Of these some occur by things being changed by travel, others by alteration (which and how are another story).]

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leaping of the heart in anger, the chill of fear and, in the case of thought, sometimes a certain dryness.247 408b11 But saying that the soul is angry [is like saying that it is weaving or building a house. For perhaps it is better not to say that the soul feels pity or is learning or thinking, but that the man does so by his soul.] Since being angry and learning and thinking are, so far as the living thing is concerned, a way of being changed, they belong not to the soul but to the living thing, and weaving and walking likewise. For those too belong to the compound, even if the latter exhibit more of the bodily than does being angry. ‘But the man does so by his soul’: by the one that defines the instrument, on the one hand, since through it he is angry and thinks and generally changes vitally; by that which initiates changes, on the other, since his change is caused by this. But he seems to refer by ‘his soul’ not to that which defines the instrument but that which initiates change, which he principally calls soul. For the other he calls either an image of the soul or ‘not without soul’. He makes this clear by continuing with the following: 408b15 By this I mean not that the change is in the soul, but that it sometimes terminates in the soul, sometimes starts from it, as sensation is from its objects, but recollection comes from the soul and proceeds to the changes in the sense-organs or to their quiescence. [But intellect seems to be present as a certain substance, and not to perish.] By this he more plainly distinguishes the soul that initiates change from the characteristic life of the instrument. For even if this is not itself changed, the change is none the less in some way in it, since what is changed is defined by it. But it is in no way in the soul that initiates change, which remains in undivided activity, not divided, whether it itself changes the instrument, or whether, when the living thing is changed from outside, it projects the critical activity of that which changes it, stabilising its form in accordance with that. For, when he says the change ‘terminates in the soul’, it is not that the change is in it, which he denies, but that the change occurring in the sense-organ, clearly caused by that which is sensed, terminates in the soul’s pure critical activity.248 ‘But recollection comes from the soul and proceeds to the changes in the sense-organs, or to their quiescence’ when the soul that of itself initiates change, awakened by recollection, changes or sets to rest249 the living thing that he called a sense-organ. Now, if starting-point and terminal-point are different, this soul,

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at which sensation terminates and from which recollection begins, is different from the living body. For sensation belongs not to body simply, but to living body, nor is the change and quiescence of the sense organ something corporeal. For the form of life that characterises it is bound up with the living body and you cannot transfer from the living thing to its life, or from its life to the living thing. For it has no activity of its own apart from the living body, whether of pure discernment or of control, since it is definitive of what is controlled, and has an affective discernment because of the body. But sensation also must terminate in some pure activity and in some determining principle according to the form of the sensed object. So this characterising life of the soul that initiates change in relation to the life of that which is changed, qua vitally changed, is needed not by men alone but also by all living things. But the human soul that he calls intellect initiates activity. So he says that ‘it is present’ in the body, obviously, but at times and as something separate, which he elsewhere calls ‘supervening’,250 and he declares it to be a certain substance, not because other souls are not substance, for all life is substance, but as being an immaterial presence and self-subsistent. He adds ‘a certain’ in order to make clear its declension in relation to those which remain for ever in themselves. Thus it is in itself incorporeal and immaterial, so that, though sometimes present in a body and inclined to matter, it does not perish. 408b19 It would have been most likely to perish through the wearing effect of old age. [But, as it is, the case seems to be as with the organs of sensation. For if an old man were to get the right sort of eye he would see as well as a young man. So old age is not a result of an affection of the soul, but of that in which it is, as in intoxication and disease. Thus intellection and contemplation is impaired when something else inside is being damaged, but it itself is unaffected.]

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Aristotle himself teaches us in Physics, Book 1, that things perish through privation.251 The form of that of which there is privation does not admit privation (since nothing admits its opposite), nor does that which partakes by its nature of the form, as fire does not admit cold since it partakes by its nature of its opposite. So that everything perishable perishes because of the level of reality of what receives it adventitiously; for that admits these opposites. Thus such a soul as is self-subsistent and does not have its being in the external living thing is altogether imperishable.252 So, emphasising the separation of the rational element in the soul, he shows it to be imperishable both in Book 3253 and here. So both the life that characterises the

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instrument and that which has its whole being in the use of the instrument, would not subsist without it, so that, if that be perishable, that form of life is shown to be perishable also, unless it characterise or change some imperishable vehicle. The soul that has separate activities, which Aristotle was accustomed to call intellect, will subsist separated from the instrument, just as the boatman is separate from the boat, not qua boatman, but qua man. Those activities of the rational soul are separate which revert upon it itself, which contemplate higher things, which grasp the proper itself, which recognise every form, and which draw together the many properties into a seamless unity. But Aristotle sees evidence of the separateness of rational activity from its being at a peak oppositely to the body. For it is at a peak when the body as living thing is past its peak, obviously in old age. For then, as the body wastes away and the vital powers that make use of it act more sluggishly through the weakness of the instrument, such as sensitive powers and those of desire, the rational element attains a greater strength, since it does not consort with nor perish with the body. Otherwise it would have peaked when the body peaked, and grown feeble with it as it grew old. For of necessity what consorts with it and perishes with it will increase and decay with it. Hence, what does not increase nor decay with it will neither consort with nor perish with it. But the converse does not hold, that if something were to have activities that peaked or decayed254 together with the instrument, it would inevitably consort with and perish with the body. For sometimes an activity using an instrument increases or weakens, not through it being itself affected but because of the instrument. Intending this, Aristotle adds that if contemplation suffers in disease or intoxication the intellect is not necessarily affected. For neither does active sensation grow faint through the sensitive soul being affected in some way, but through the organ employed being so. ‘For if the old man were to get the right sort of eye he would see as well as a young man.’ So similarly intellection is also impeded in unnatural conditions ‘when something else inside is being damaged, but it is itself unaffected’. Why, then, is sensation impeded in its activities in old age, but not intellection also? It is because, as he will go on to say, the former uses the body as an instrument,255 which is why it is also blunted for the reception of lesser sensations by the more intense; but rational contemplation does not use it, even if, through its being co-ordinated with it, it has it as an accompaniment, which is in a way similarly disposed, just as in light a body has a shadow. Also in an opposite way it is fortified by the contemplation of greater things for that of lesser. But, if it does not use the body, how can it be weakened at all when something inside is being damaged, whether it be breath or balance of mixtures? Is it because

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of its connection and co-ordination with it and its use of it for some activities, even if not in those of contemplation? Similarly, the boatman is impeded by contrary wind and waves not only in the use of his ship but also in activities having nothing to do with the ship, since he is unable to carry on with these also because of the disturbance. So, similarly, if someone were to hang a needle from his wrist, his hand making use of it to sew but not to mould, as it needs no instrument for this, given that the needle has its natural size and its normal weight, the hand is in no way hindered for this use nor for moulding. But if the needle gains much weight his hand is hindered not only for sewing but also for moulding. Similarly, therefore, the rational soul also, which uses the body with regard to practical knowledge, though certainly not with regard to the contemplative, is disturbed and hampered when the body is weighed down and is in an unnatural condition, until it is joined together with the body and is inclined altogether to the exterior. But this is not so in old age, since it is not then disturbed by the natural attacks of the body. 408b25 But thought and love and hate are not affections of the intellect, but of the thing that contains it in the way that it does. [That is why, when that perishes, it neither remembers nor loves; for they were not affections of the intellect, but of the composite that has perished. But the intellect is perhaps more divine and impassible.] Since he assigned thought which is rational knowledge to the affections of the composite, he now assigns the intellect as an impassible presence.256 But intellect is also defined as rational knowledge, while he himself calls the life that characterises the rational animal thought and the affective action of the rational animal thinking. To it also belong love and hate. But he calls the rational soul itself intellect, whether as using the compound as an instrument, as does practical reason, or as self-contained activity, as is contemplation. Both are the same activity as impassible and are praised as having some divine element, since it truly rules bodies, reverts upon itself, is at times altogether aloof, and is conjoined with the superior. 408b30 From these considerations it is clear that the soul cannot suffer change. [If it does not change at all it is obviously not self-changing.]

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408b32 Of all the views mentioned, far the most unreasonable is to say that the soul is a self-moving number. [The first impossibilities for such views are those arising from its suffering motion, and the specific impossibilities are those from saying that it is a number.] It is clear that he is cleaning up Xenocrates’ definition of the soul, so that we do not understand it in accordance with the common use of words. The important goal before him is to show that the substance of the soul is superior to every division, not merely that which is continuous. For this he has already proved, having proved that it does not change in the way of bodily changes and that it always goes within certain terminal points and does not know either parts or a whole by parts; in this way he has proved not only that it is not body but that it also has no other magnitude. But since what is commonly called number – that consisting of units, as is mathematical number, and that of bodies indivisible either actually or both actually and potentially, such as the followers of Democritus supposed, or in general separated from each other by position258 – is divisible, since it itself is viewed as divided and consists of things that are divisible and contracted, he proves by his replies to Xenocrates that the soul is not divisible either in the way that number is, or units are or points are, of which, treated as indivisible, number consists. For number consisting of certain bodies is incontestably unsuited to the soul, since it has no magnitude. So Xenocrates, who himself calls the forms numbers and knew that every form was indivisible, while what undergoes motion is divisible and altogether posterior to the forms, exhibits the mean position of the soul by means of both the extremes, calling it a moved number, since it is not simply form but has descended as a whole into division, not totally divided but not remaining as form, having reached a mean position by in a way slackening and loosening the indivisible unification. For this reason he did not say that it simply suffered motion but that it was self-moved, in order to make clear the distinctive character of the mean position, being a slackening, as the term ‘motion’ signifies, but not so as for it to be torn from the self.259 But Aristotle understood number to be a divisible manifold and motion to be what proceeds continuously. So he inevitably denied both of the soul, since it was superior to all division through its mean position. ‘What arises from its suffering motion’ follows also for those others who say that it suffers motion, but specifically from ‘saying that it is a number’. He attacks this in two ways, both by denying that it is a number at all and because motion is incompatible with number consisting of units or points.

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Translation 409a1 How, then, should one conceive of a moved unit, [both through what agency and how, since it has no parts and is undifferentiated? For as suffering and initiating motion it must have differences.]

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That has parts that acts in separate parts, but the unit is indivisible. ‘Both through what agency and how?’ Not through itself, since initiating motion is a different property from being moved, but the mathematical unit does not exhibit either of these nor both. For it would have to be internally different as being both source and object of motion, but every unit is compactly simple. But not through something else either; for if through something internal it will have to be animate, but no unit acts vitally; if through something external, it must either push or pull. But the indivisible can do neither of these.260 So the second ‘how?’ added to ‘through what agency?’ shows that it will not be changed either as animate or by external agency. 409a3 Further, since they say that a line in motion makes a surface, and a point a line, [the movements of the units will also be lines. For a point is a unit that has a position, while the number of the soul is already somewhere and has a position.]

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This argument also has the same aim and does not allow that motion is appropriate for a number consisting of units. But, if it is, it will be more so for one consisting of points, according to those who define a line as the flow of a point. But since some also define the point as a unit having position, a number consisting of units would also be in motion as they acquired a position. But they acquire it in the association of the soul with the body, if the soul is such a number; for it ‘is already somewhere and has a position’ in the animate body. But it is absurd, if all this be conceded, that the motion of the soul should be a line. For a line is the flow of a point. 409a7 Further, if one subtracts a number or a unit from a number, another number remains. [But plants and many animals, when divided, live and seem to have the same kind of soul.] This in itself disproves that the soul is a number, no longer that it changes. For a number is both divided into numbers that are different in form and is diminished by the division. But the soul remains undivided even in the section of the ensouled thing, and is sometimes multiplied many times in number while remaining unchanged in kind, as is the case with plants, of which the shoots that have been cut off retain the same soul, not, perhaps, numerically the same present in the different ones, nor are there many souls of the same

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kind in the whole plant, a different one in a different part. For one thing is given life by one soul. Whence then the soul in the shoot? I say ‘from outside’, whence a soul comes into living things generally, whether it then comes into existence or is already pre-existent. It suddenly enters into the cutting, which has already a perfect suitability to receive it. For because of the feebleness of natural life, nature needs little work to produce the suitability of the substrate. In the same way some animals also come from putrefaction, needing only creation from the wholes, while those that are more complete need also some more specific efficient causes. But how does each cut portion of some living things live when they are divided? That one should, that in which there are the important parts, is not surprising, since the same soul remains in it, but how does the rest live? Not with the same soul, once it is cut off, nor being brought to life by another soul, if it has not acquired the more essential parts wherewith to receive the soul. For that reason its powers will be limited. But how will it have any life at all? For it is not possible to make irradiation alone responsible,261 since, for change and sensation there must be the complete presence of a soul that initiates change and discriminates. So perhaps the same soul is not prevented from being present in the separated parts, so long as both retain some suitability for the undivided life of the soul.

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409a10 It seems to make no difference whether one speaks of units or minute bodies. [For if the little spheres of Democritus were to turn into points, nothing remaining save a quantity, there will be in it an element that initiates motion and one that is moved, as there is in a continuous thing. For it is not being great or small that is responsible for the fact, but there being a quantity.] The absurdity now alleged for those who treat the soul as a number consisting of units is that arising from the necessity of saying that some of the units initiate motion and others are moved, since, if each one is capable of self-motion, what is the need for a manifold, and why is each unit not a soul?262 But if the soul is a number some units will initiate motion and others be moved. But in that case the units will be of different kinds from each other, and point will be different from point. For the units that already have a position in the body become points. He makes the absurdity include Democritus’ opinion about the soul, as following on that also. But previously he recalls the identity of the doctrines of Democritus and Xenocrates in saying that the soul is a manifold, so that, as has been said, it is from this that the same absurdity follows for both. For even if Democritus constitutes the number from certain little bodies, still it is from things

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indivisible through their density and indistinguishable in kind and in their underlying nature. So for both, the soul is a number consisting of indivisible and indistinguishable elements. For it makes no difference to their being a number that the little bodies have a bulk, which Aristotle called magnitude, while units are without parts, which is why he called them small. For it is enough to say that each is a quantity qua manifold to establish that some elements in them of necessity initiate motion and others are moved. For when he says ‘nothing remaining save quantity’ and, again, ‘but there being a quantity’, he means discrete quantity. 409a15 So there must be something that initiated263 motion in the units. [But if that which initiates motion in a living thing is a soul, so also in the case of number, so that the soul will not be both initiator and subject of motion but the initiator only. But how can that be a unit? For it must be in some way different from the others. But what difference could a unitary point have except position?]

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Clearly something , as well as the units that suffer motion, since both each unit and each of the Democritean little spheres will be a soul. He says that what initiates motion cannot be a unit; for it should have some difference from the units that are moved, but there is no difference between unit and unit, and similarly there is no difference in essence between the little spheres of Democritus, of which the soul consists, except position. But he now calls the units forming the number that was to be the soul points, since they have acquired a position because of the soul’s presence in the body. But the points also differ not in kind but only in position. 409a21 So, then, if the units in the body and points are different, [the units will be in the same place as they are. For each will occupy the space of a point. But what prevents an infinite number being in the same place if two can be? For things whose place is indivisible are so themselves also. But if the points in the body are the number of the soul, or if the number of points in the body is the soul, why do not all bodies have a soul? For there seem to be points in all of them, and infinitely many. Further, how is it possible for the points to be separated and freed from the body, if lines do not divide up into points?] Since every magnitude seems to contain points, if not actually, still potentially, and therefore a body does also, he asks whether the units of the soul that have taken a position are other than the bodily points, or the same. So, then, if they are other, the unit of a soul will occupy

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the space of a point of a body. For, being without parts, it will lie in what has no parts. So, first, the body will be animate, not in respect of its magnitude or continuity, but of its points alone. For a continuous thing is not composed of points. But Aristotle does not raise this absurdity, because he is not specifically attacking the hypothesis of the otherness of the psychic points, in addition to the bodily, but, raises another against the hypothesis which posits the soul to be entirely a number consisting of points. If there can be two points in the same place, what is to prevent still more from being so as well, so that all the psychic points are in a single bodily one, which he more commonly called a place, as able to receive them? The result will then be that only the bodily point is animate. But if the psychic points are not different from the bodily ones, so that the points in the body will be the number of the soul, or, put better, the number of points in the body will be the soul, all bodies will be animate, given that there are points in them all. The expression ‘and infinitely many’ that is added exhibits another absurdity consequent on the hypothesis. If there are points in a body they are so potentially and not actually. But potentially there are infinitely many. So their manifold will not be a number, since every number is finite, apart from making the soul potential and not actual in animate things. He sets out another objection that in this way the soul will be inseparable from the body, which is neither true nor pleasing to those who hold this view themselves. ‘If lines do not divide up into points’: for in this way only could souls be separated, if bodies were to divide into surfaces, and these into lines, and lines into points. For they would no longer exhibit continuity. But such divisions are impossible, since points are not parts of but limits of lines, and these of surfaces, and these of bodies.

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CHAPTER 5 409a31 The result, as we have said, is that this is in a way the same as the view of those who suppose the soul to be a subtle sort of body, and, in a way, has the same special absurdity as Democritus’ account of motion being caused by the soul. [For since soul is in the whole of the sensitive body, there will necessarily be two bodies in the same place, if the soul is a sort of body, while, for those who say that it is a number, there will be many points in one point and every body will have a soul, unless it is a different sort from number that is present in the body and other than the points present in it. It also results that the living thing is moved by a number in the way that Democri-

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Translation tus said that motion is initiated. What is the difference between talking of little spheres and of big units, or, generally, travelling units? In either case these must move the living thing by themselves being moved. So for those who combine number and motion in the same thing these are the consequences, and many others similar to them. It is not only impossible for this to be the definition of the soul, it cannot even be an attribute. This is clear if one attempts to give an account in these terms of the affections and functions of the soul, such as reasonings, sensations, pleasures, distress and all similar things. For, as was said earlier, one can scarcely prophesy on this basis.]

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He has already said that for those who say that the soul is a self-moving number there are impossibilities, the first being those arising from its being in motion and specifically from saying that it is a number. But since only those who thought it to be a body could reasonably regard it as being in motion, he relates the affinity of those who define the soul as a number to these in regard to the absurdities, but no longer with regard to its being in motion – for that has already been discussed – but with regard to other objections. For those who say that the soul is some one continuous body – fire, or air or anything subtle – the absurdity follows of putting two bodies in the same place, that initiating and that suffering motion.264 For the soul reaches throughout the living thing. For those who say that it is a number consisting of units, it follows that they put two or even more points in the same place; thus all the points of the soul will be in one bodily point, for the psychic points must be other than the bodily, in order that we be not compelled to accept that every body is animate. Those who say that the soul is a number consisting of units share the same special absurdity that results for those who say that it is a manifold of bodies, apart from those who ascribe motion to it. What follows for them has already been stated, that they say that some of the parts of the soul initiate motion, others suffer it, though they are indistinguishable. He says that other absurdities follow ‘for those who combine number and motion265 into the same thing’. He also immediately adduces them, that not merely is it impossible for the essence of the soul to be such, but the account cannot even hold of its attributes – i.e. that it is a number. For it is not possible for number to belong to the soul in the way that we said that change belonged to it and its affections, contingently, because the body is changed. For what number would one ascribe in any way to reasonings or to the other functions and affections? It is difficult to make it harmonise, as he said with the doctrine of harmony, obviously if we were to conceive of

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it as a number consisting of units, since, corresponding to the intermediate status of the soul which Xenocrates wished to express by means of the self-moving number, these affections belong essentially to the soul in its procession to becoming. 409b18 Three ways have been handed down by which people define the soul. [Some have declared it to be that which most initiates change, since it is self-changing; some a body which is the subtlest and least corporeal of all. We have sufficiently gone through the problems and inconsistencies of these.] It is not the same thing to examine some essence or activity or generally any property of the soul whatsoever as to examine the kind of existence it has. He accepts from those who refer to it that the soul initiates change and is more incorporeal than all visible bodies, and that that of animals has knowledge, some merely of sensible things, some of intelligible things also. But he is still not satisfied with the traditional presentations, whether that it initiates change by selfchange, or that it is more incorporeal by being a more subtle body, or that it knows things by consisting of the elements,266 since it is altogether unchanging and purely incorporeal and exists as a formal, not a material, principle. But the elements are material. By the arguments refuting the contraries he has already established that it is subject to no bodily changes, that the life that characterises the organism as such is incorporeal, and, more importantly, that that which uses and initiates change in the organism is so, and still more the intellective life. Finally he refutes those who say that the soul consists of the elements, in order that it may have knowledge by means of likeness to them of the elements themselves everywhere and of the things composed of them. For Aristotle does not mean that the soul has knowledge in this way, but that there is a certain kinship and affinity of the knower to the known, if active knowledge stops at the known, but that this is formal and in no way material. For when what is known is a composite, such as a sensible object, the knowledge does not rest in the matter nor in the combination, but in the form of the known alone. This is so since knowledge is an activity and not an affection. But that which uses the organism as an aid does not do so without being affected, the affection being constituted not in the knowledge itself but in the body itself. For then the judgement which terminates in the form is an impassible activity and also comes about through the knower’s own activity.267 For there is also some form that enters actively from outside, like light in the air, not through some variation, as the timelessness of its presence and absence makes clear. This is why light is called the actualisation of the transparent.268 And it is as life is to the body, and generally

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form to matter, but from outside. But the activity of knowledge is internal, and this does not belong to the composite as warmth does to fire. For that which terminates in the form and is without parts and is whole at an instant belongs not to a divisible but to an indivisible kind of thing. That is why everything pure is also a principle resting in its formal activity. But the rationally and intellectively active is a principle to a greater extent, and most of all when it does not even use the body as an instrument. What, then, is the kinship of the knower to the known? It is formal, as has been said, and itself vital and discerning. Its being formal makes clear the indivisible affinity of everything with everything. And also the forms nearest to matter, which govern change and are definitive of things as changing, are unified, as are those in the realm of knowledge that are cognitively filled with each other. But the purely undivided unity belongs to the forms, the community of rational concepts to rational substances.269 For not even concepts are torn apart from each other, since their being is not in separation but in a loosened community that has declined from indivisible unity. But there are different degrees of declension. For those that know through concepts that are most proximate to the intellective forms are but little in decline and are highly placed in their community, others on the contrary are further away. And some are contemplative of the primary forms, being attached to them in their essence and not flowing outside in all directions but moving towards themselves and to things greater. But those nearest to matter tend wholly away to the external and seize on neither the greater nor themselves, but only on external things. The intermediate are akin to these themselves, not as identical but as intermediates between extremes; as, on the other hand, when the intermediates contemplate the primary, the kinship and affinity is as of the secondary to the primary. So Aristotle does not deny the affinity of the knower to the known, but he does not posit the affinity to be necessarily identity. For the soul enters into identity neither with the transcendent causes, such as love and strife, nor with the four elements that are inferior.270 How, then, will it know these that are material? Because these are also defined by natural principles, to which the rational principle of the soul is akin.271 But if everything that receives it has to have an affinity with the form that it has, and the form to its receptacle, there will also be an affinity of matter to forms and their rational principles by a weak irradiation, and of these to matter through their determining superiority and the preserving and unifying principle. Unity belongs to things made one and preservation to things preserved. So the known objects are not themselves in the being of the soul, but the formal properties that are akin to them. Rather, they are formal in the intellect but rational in the soul,

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and different in relation to different things. For knowledge of secondary things also is by the forms in the intellect, but they are projected appropriately on each thing known in accordance with the concepts in the soul. We shall now observe these points also in the text272 of the philosopher as we follow it. 409b23 It remains to examine what is meant by saying that it consists of the elements. [They say it to explain how it may sense things and know each of them. But, inevitably, many impossible consequences arise from this view. They lay it down that knowledge is of like by like, as if holding that the soul is these things. But there are not only the elements, but also many other things, perhaps even infinitely many, composed of them. Let us grant that it knows and senses the things from which these are composed; but with what will it know or sense a compound, such as god or man or flesh or bone? Similarly for any other composite. For each does not possess its elements anyhow, but by some ratio and structure, as Empedocles says of bone: The pleasing earth in its well-bosomed vessels Received two parts out of eight of shining liquid And four from Hephaestus: white bones came to be. So there is no utility in the elements being in the soul, unless the ratios and structure are also. For each will know its like, but nothing will know bone or man, unless these others are present. There is no need to say that this is impossible; for who would raise the question whether a stone or a man is in the soul?] For they say this in order that like may be known by like ‘as if holding that the soul is these things’, being unwilling to grant that objects themselves are in the soul. The absurdity of supposing this is particularly manifest in the case of bodies, because it is necessary to suppose that not only the four elements are in it but also all composites. For they are known not just by their elements but also by the ratio of their composition. So the ratio of each element must be present in the soul if it is going to know the whole – that is, the composite. He says that according to Empedocles a god, the heavenly sphere, consists of the elements. He calls Empedocles himself to witness, as recounting the ratio of construction in the case of bones. For earth is said to be pleasing, i.e. harmonic, as being a cube according to the Pythagorean tradition.273 For because the cube has twelve edges, eight angles and six sides, making an harmonic series, they called it a harmony. The word ‘crucibles’ occurs also in the poet; they are vessels in which the mixture of the ingredients occurs: ‘Twenty bellows were all blowing in the crucibles.’274 These Empe-

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docles also calls ‘well-bosomed’ as being broad through their capacity. He mixes for the creation of bones four parts of fire (perhaps saying that bone contains mostly fire because it is dry and white in colour), two of earth, one of air and one of water, both of which he calls shining liquid, liquid because wet, from ‘flow’ , i.e. ‘run’, shining as being transparent.

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410a1 Similarly with the good and the not-good [and in the same way other things].

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It is absurd to say even that any bodies at all are in the soul, still more absurd to say infinitely many, since even in form composites are not to be contained by human intellection, and even more so privations are not to be put into a formal or rational entity. For privation subsists in that which receives principles from outside, and not even in that which partakes in principles as part of its natural development, and still more not in that which gets its being through them. For the forms defining things that have come into being are not privations, but activate privation; they do so as constitutive of being; but the cognitive know cognitively by primarily knowing the good. When a good has come into being, they know it, even when sometimes rejected, and by the very275 rejection of the knowledge of the good they know the bad, just as sight knows the dark not directly as it knows light, but by not seeing light itself. If one were to put things known in any way whatsoever in the soul, not merely the good will be in it but also the not-good. ‘And in the same way other things’; for privations of other forms will be in it also. 410a13 Further, since ‘being’ is ambiguous, [for it signifies substance, quantity, quality or also any other of the recognised categories, will the soul be all these or not? But there do not appear to be common elements of them all. Does it then consist only of the elements of substances? How then will it know each of the other things? Or will they say that there are elements and principles common to each kind, and that the soul consists of these? So it will be quality and quantity and substance. But it is impossible for a substance and not a quantity to consist of the elements of quantity. There are these and other similar problems for those who say that the soul consists of all elements.] He calls things belonging in common to all members of a kind and to nothing else ‘elements of each kind’, as for example it belongs to substance to be self-supporting and not to be in a substrate, to be a support of other kinds and a substrate to them, to be self-contained, and to need no accidental attributes for its existence. That is why the

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substance that is numerically one and the same is receptive of opposites. To quantity belongs measure and being so much, being receptive of equality and inequality and being capable of being finite or infinite. To quality belongs characterisation, being such and such and being like and unlike. But common to the ten are those that are elements of being qua being, but they are not univocally said of all. That is why he said that ‘there do not appear to be common elements of them all’, except as derived from and contributing to one thing. That is why, if the things known are themselves present in the knower, the common elements must exhibit ambiguous reference – ten-fold, like the common elements.276 But if, because of the kinship of their accounts to each other, one account of their identity is sufficient, all areas of knowledge must be the same. For there will be a science, one for one, not only of the univocally named, but also of that derived from and contributing to one thing, as this is clearly explained in the Metaphysics,277 in the way that medicine is of the healthy, although ‘healthy’ is ambiguous. Again, if it be said that the elements of things known are present themselves in the soul, the soul will not be substance only, but also quality, quantity and the other kinds. But its conceptual affinity to all things in no way prevents its being a substance.

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410a23 It is absurd to say both that like cannot be affected by like and also that like senses like and knows like by like.

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It is explained278 also elsewhere that what is actually and wholly like is unaffected by like, as heat by heat, and similarly in the case of dry. Thus the knower is affected by the known, not by the knower. However, it can be affected by itself, since the knower is also known and the known a knower, and sometimes knows as a knower. So it is not simply by likeness.

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410a25 But they treat sensation as action and being acted on, Being acted on is not on account of the sole affection of the organ, but also on account of the judgement itself, or on account of the affection of the sensed form, which is different in account from the sense organ. It is completed by the activity of sensing itself, which is to act. 410a26  and intellection and knowledge likewise. [There are many absurdities and difficulties in saying, as does Empedocles, that each kind of thing is known by its bodily element and, moreover, by its like, as what has been said bears witness. For the parts of the bodies of living things which are simply earth,

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Translation like bones, sinews and hair, seem to sense nothing, so not even their like, as ought to be the case. Further, each of the principles will have more ignorance than awareness. For each will know one thing but be ignorant of many – i.e. all the rest. A consequence for Empedocles is that god will be least wise of all; for he alone will be ignorant of one of the elements – strife – but mortals will know everything since each consists of all the elements.]

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By knowledge he means the scientific kind. These also are cases of action and being acted on. For to recognise things is surely to act with cognitive activity; and it is to be acted on through completion by the intelligible or known object. But in the case of immaterial things, where knowing and being known converge into identity in substrate, they at once act on themselves and are acted on by themselves, not because they are like themselves but because they are in a way unlike in account, since they are both cognisant of and known by themselves. But in the case of material things the known does not converge with the knower, as he will say in Book 3, but are separated in substrate and not only in account.279 Fire is certainly not known by fire. For fire is known but does not also know. And manifest phenomena bear witness that in these cases the two do not converge. For if earth had knowledge, so would also the more earthy parts of it. But it is obvious that no earthy body above all has sensation. In the text we should accept ‘what has now been said bears witness’ in the sense of ‘what will be said’, as the application of the connective ‘for’ makes clear, since it gives a reason. He includes sinews among things insensitive since he regards the sense-organ of touch also as the pneuma. The remaining arguments are clear. For the genuine principle knows itself and knows itself as being a principle, and by its knowledge of itself has also knowledge of all subordinate things through its causative comprehension of them all.280 The result for those who divide up the principles and introduce knowledge by similarity is that they allow knowledge of one thing only to each principle and ignorance of the rest, but to the subordinate compounded of the principles knowledge of everything save of the sphere, which Empedocles hymns as god. For it alone of composites will not have knowledge of strife since strife is not part of its make-up. 410b7 And in general what is the explanation why not all things have a soul [since all are either an element or made of one element, or many, or all? For it is necessary that one, or some, or all should have knowledge.]

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Since the cognitive is intellect and soul, and the elements and things made of them are cognitive, then also the converse will be true, that every element and thing made of them will be soul or intellect, or at least have these qua cognitive, because they are not determined by anything other than being cognitive, and they say that being cognitive belongs to the elements as such.

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410b10 But one may raise the problem also what it is that unifies these. [For the elements seem to be like matter; that which holds them together, whatever it is, is the dominant factor.] Every body, whether it be simple or compound, as it has its being neither in itself nor from itself but through something else that gives it form and from something else, the efficient or final cause, so it has its unity through the formal cause and from the cause that gives it its level of reality. Therefore, what unifies composites as well is the form281 as that in accordance with which, and the efficient cause as that from which. But obviously the cause of being and persistence is superior to that which is given existence and is unified. But the elements are given being and unified, as in living things their persistence through the soul makes clear. So the soul is a principle superior to the elements. For these serve as matter, the soul as form and efficient cause, both as characterising the living thing as form and, as efficient cause, using it as an instrument. 410b12 But it is impossible that there should be something more powerful than and ruling over the soul; [still more impossible in the case of the intellect. It is probable that this is the most primitive and powerful of things in its nature, but they say that the elements are the first of all things.] Clearly among the things present in living things. ‘Still more impossible in the case of the intellect’, i.e. of the rational soul. For it is this that is present. This is more primitive according to the tenor of the argument, which is what ‘probable’ means, since it is present within and does not perish, as he said before,282 and is naturally dominant. For most dominant is that which is transcendentally the cause of coming to be and existence. So some do not do well in promoting the bodily element as ‘the first of all things’. By these words he made plain how the soul has knowledge – that it knows as being form. So its affinity also with the things it knows is not material but is to be conceived as formal.

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410b16 But all even of those who say that the soul is composed of the elements because it recognises and senses things [and those who say that it is the greatest cause of change are not speaking of all soul. Not everything that has sense originates change, for there appear to be certain animals283 that remain in the same place, and yet change of place is thought to be the only way in which the soul causes change in animals.]

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The aim of the statements before us is this, to show that there is something present that is common284 to every soul. I do not mean this univocally, but like things said to be derived from one thing, such as being, good, healthy and change. For there must be something that is present in every soul by which they have something in common and are separated from other things. But earlier thinkers did not hand down what this common thing was. For neither recognition nor sense nor originating change of place is common to all. By ‘recognise’ he seems to mean being rationally cognisant, which is why later on he calls this intellect. But even if not originating change of place, originating change, simply, will seem to belong to all. For to the vegetative belongs growth, which was counted change of quantity. But he says that originating change of place is thought to be the only way in which the soul causes change in animals, because it so changes them using no external aid, as growth uses food from outside. Perhaps also it is because the vegetative has not manifestly an efficient causality, but tends rather to be that in accordance with which change occurs, not an originator of change, so that it is a certain nature. For nature is a principle of being changed and affected, but not an originator of change. Thus in the case of things that use nutrition also, what originates change as such is what gives them substance, as in the case of things undergoing natural change. But change caused by the soul is manifest, since it occurs through conation. 410b21 Similarly with those who compose intellect and sense from the elements. [For plants plainly live without having sensation and the majority of animals do not have thought.]

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For similarly these men also do not speak of every soul. For dumb animals do not have thought (he now means the same by thought and intellect in order to designate rational life). Also plants do not have sense nor do they travel. That is why he comments that those who ascribe origination of change of place to the soul do not speak of every soul.

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410b24 But if one were to waive these points [and were to count intellect as a part of the soul, and sensation likewise, one would still not thus speak generally about every soul nor about a complete soul, nor about a single one. That is what happened to the so-called Orphic verses. For they say that the soul enters from the universe as people breathed in, being carried by the winds; but that cannot hold in the case of plants nor of some animals, since not all breathe in. But this escaped those with this conception.] Since rather mythically, as he himself said, the Pythagoreans seem to have endowed dumb animals also with rational souls, and some even plants, like Empedocles.285 Thus originating change of place, perception and, in addition, thought would have fitted all souls. If, he says, one were to admit these absurdities also,286 so that thought and perception would be part of every soul, even so ‘they would not speak universally about every soul’ (which stands for ‘about the whole soul’). As he said ‘about every’, he explained this by adding ‘neither about a complete soul nor about one’, since each has also other powers, about which they said nothing. It is clear that those also who say that the soul is drawn in by animals’ breathing do not speak of every one. For not every animal nor any plant breathes. Orpheus seems to call the suitability for life ‘breath’ and the universal causes of change ‘winds’ without which particular souls could never animate suitable bodies. He says that this fact, that not all animals breathe, escaped the notice of those who thought that in reality all living things are animated by breath.287

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411a2 If one must compose the soul from the elements, it need not be from all. One of the contraries will be sufficient to distinguish both itself and its opposite. For we recognise by the straight both it and the bent. The straight-edge distinguishes both, but the bent neither itself nor the straight. It has already been thoroughly explained that the affinity of the soul to things known in order to recognise them is not by the elements but is formal and dominant over the enmattered and is of unified form as being indivisible, which is why it unifies also these elements with each other that are in ensouled beings. Now he adds that even if it were necessary to compose the soul out of elements in order to preserve the kinship with the known, it would not have been necessary to do so out of all. For one of the opposites would be sufficient to distinguish both itself and its opposite.288 But I do not think that this is an unqualified truth, but only when one is a privation of the other. For the privation is recognised by the form, as disease by health, since

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every privation consists in an imperfect appearance of that which it is a privation, and at the same time the absence of the perfection of the form. By the thought of the form both its irradiation and its absence are recognised. But when both the opposites are forms how is the one recognised by the other, since it introduces a cause of individuality itself and is recognised not by something else but by itself? But Aristotle was accustomed to call cold the privation of heat,289 if one is to count these as elements, and consistently with himself he says that it is sufficient for heat to be in the soul in order to recognise its opposite. He uses an example to make this clear, the straight as form and the bent as privation, so the bent gives recognition of ‘neither itself nor the straight’, but the straight of both. But if the bent be taken as a form as well, e.g. the circular, it will not be recognised as circular by a straight-edge, but only as not straight. Thus by the curved measure that fits it we shall both know the circular in itself and the straight as not circular.290 His intention here is to exhibit that knowledge is a formal activity. 411a7 Some say that the soul is mixed together in the universe.

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If his central concern from the beginning was with the soul of mortal living things, he has nonetheless already said a little about the heavenly soul, as being without magnitude and intellective, and as present in the body but separated and not, as Plato seems to say, enmeshed with it.291 Now he indicates how the souls are present in the whole elements which they animate them are present – that it is not by being mingled together as ours are, that are stretched throughout bodies and flow into them and become theirs – and that primarily they are not present in these animate things that appear to be their bodies, just as ours are not in our hair or bones. So air is not a living thing as such, and yet it is animate, having a soul within. In this way he at once indicates the declension of such souls in relation to the heavenly, as extending as far as the elements, that come to be and perish in all their parts, but, at the same time, their superiority to ours, since those are self-contained and give life to the elements. Mixture shows an inclination towards body. That is why he also said ‘in the universe’, since mixture is among particulars. 411a8 Perhaps that is why Thales also thought that all things were full of gods.

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mixed. For perhaps that is how ‘Thales also thought that all things were full of gods’,292 by being mixed with them. And that is absurd. 411a9 But this raises certain problems. [For through what cause does the soul in air or fire not make a living thing, but only in mixtures of elements, and that when being present in these as superior?] As was his custom, he elucidates the truth about the present question by problems. Of these, one is why our body that is composite becomes a living thing by the presence of the soul, but not fire, which seems to be animated by a superior soul, and rightly so, since our whole body is perishable, but that is so only in its parts, and if one of them is particular, the other is a whole. So if the whole is superior to the particular, and that which is everlasting in its wholeness to the altogether perishable, and souls enter bodies that are suited to them, as already explained, it is clear that that which animates fire is superior to ours. How, then, is it not a living thing? Perhaps just because its soul is better. For first, as Plato also holds, there is THERE no composition of soul and body, but its body comes to belong to the soul while the soul remains within itself. For the living thing is by composition.293 Secondly, because this visible fire is not pre-eminently the vehicle of this soul, but something greater which is itself secondarily of heavenly composition. If someone were to say that this is so in our case also, let him know that in our case the greater vehicle also tends downwards with the soul to the mortal body, so that it is composed of everything. In their case the visible also is raised up by the greater and is itself given life by it, but, indeed, both do not contribute to the composition of a unit. So the visible living thing is not composed as such out of all things, since it lives not independently but by attachment to the greater, and since it does so altogether as a part, even if one were to allow that it becomes one from all things.294 411a11 One might also investigate for what reason the soul in the air is superior to, and more immortal than, that in living things. He does not enquire whether it is superior, but why it is. And he did not raise the problem why it seems so, but why it is, as being so, but the reason needing to be openly enquired into, though it has already in a way been stated by him, by his attacking those who say that it is intermingled, and not calling fire a living thing. For it is clear that through its separate presence, which is not intermingled with a body nor makes up a composite with it, it is superior to that which is so mixed and makes up a unit with the body. This is the reason for its

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superiority, its transcendent creation of life for dependent bodies with no inclination to the inferior. It is more immortal, not because that in living things is mortal (it is more immortal in the way that the more white is whiter than the white), but because it endures by stricter standards of immortality than does the soul of wholes. That is why Plato calls ours souls in a different sense from those of the immortals, and says that the form of life itself and god are far more immortal.295 411a13 Either way we get an absurdity and a paralogism. For to call fire a living thing is considerably deviant. Since the living thing is a composite of soul and body, with which the soul is clearly mixed; and it is also inclined towards it, and in a way departs from itself. The paralogism is not because fire as a whole or the air is not alive, but through making the souls of the wholes296 extended similarly to ours, and not even freed at times like ours but everlastingly in this state, which is absurd. Also there is a clear statement in the case of the heavenly soul of the consequences for those who enmesh it with the body. 411a15 And it is also absurd not to call them living things if they have a soul within.

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For a living thing is simply that which consists of a body and the soul present within. For it is clear that it no longer remains separate, since it is in a body, and lives and acts together with it. So one must guard against saying that the soul is within, but that it is present though separate, and one must lay down that the wholes are alive, but are not animals, for the reasons already given. 411a16 They seem to think that the soul is in these [because the whole is of the same kind as its parts,]297 He exposes the reason why the many go astray, through which they say that the wholes are also alive, in that there is a soul within them, but that it does not give life separately. For since they saw that the air in us has the same parts as the whole, they thought that similarly both of them were animated by a similar soul. For the soul was in the one in the same way as in the other. Then he immediately adduces the absurdity that results for them. 411a18  so it is necessary for them to say that its soul is of the same kind as in the parts,

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For if by being present also in air as a whole the soul gives it life, it too will have as many parts as does the soul of the parts, i.e. of particular bodies. For it will also be that which uses them as an instrument, and not that which is only separate. But so also the sensitive and imaginative parts; so also anger and desire. For the soul that does not live separately but as present in bodies has need of them. So the soul of the whole of air and the soul of a part will be of the same kind. 411a19 if it is through part of the environment being shut off into animals that animals become animate.298 [But if air, when divided into parts, is uniform, but soul has disparate elements, some of it will clearly be present but some will not. So it is necessary for it either to consist of the same parts or not to be present in any part whatsoever of the universe. So it is clear from what has been said that neither is knowledge present in the soul through its consisting of the elements, nor is it well or truly said that it suffers change.] If a portion of the soul of the environment is shut off, as having the whole special character of life that the whole had, but divided up as circumscribed into a more particular body, just as a portion of air has every quality that the whole has, it will fall short only by being a portion. If the soul in living things is similarly related to that in the elements as wholes, it should be of the same kind. So, since it is not only intellective but also passible, then the other should be similarly situated. If this, making the souls of the wholes sensitive, and never free from this, and like the particular souls that are carried down to that which is inferior, is absurd, and therefore the former remain purely cognitive, it is clear that the soul of the whole of the air will not have the same relation to the particular as the air has to its own parts. For this will be of the same kind as they, but the soul of the whole will be unlike its parts. If this is so ‘some will clearly be present, but some will not’. For since the soul of the whole is not so called totally ambiguously in relation to that of the part, it will have something in common, even if this is common only as things derived from one thing.299 And since the soul in the parts is more subject to affections, one bit of the soul will be present in the whole, the other will not; for only the intellectual would be so. But if the soul of the whole is present as the same, it is not possible for the affective not to be contained in it. That is why he well concludes: ‘So it is necessary for it either to consist of the same parts’ (for then the soul of the whole and that of the parts will have the same parts) ‘or not to be present in any part whatsoever of the universe’ (for he is speaking not of all air but of the cosmos). For one soul will be present in composites and

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living things on account of its connection with the body, through its position and its tendency and inclination to it. But that in the heavens and that in the wholes, which themselves also he has called parts of the universe, are not so present, but vivify bodies as separate from them. This seems to me to bring order to the Aristotelian text better than saying that he denies life to the elements as wholes. 411a26 Since knowledge belongs to the soul, [and sensation and belief as well, also desire and wish and all forms of appetition; and since change of place occurs in living things through soul, as do growth, peak and decline, does each of these belong to the whole soul? And do we think and sense and move, and do and suffer each of the other things with the whole soul, or different things with different portions? And is life in some one of these, or in a number of them or in all, or is something else the cause?]

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The problem is whether the soul in each living thing is one or whether there are many in each, since its activities are many and varied, and, if it is one, whether it is a compound of many substances or simple but many-powered, whence the number of its activities. For there surely will not be many isolated substances that are not the complement of a single soul since, just as the body and the living thing are each one, the soul must also be one. Further, that which says ‘I thought and sensed and was angry and set myself to act’ would not be one unless the soul were in some way one. So it is obviously one: but is it simple in essence, but the possessor of many powers, or is it a manifold in essence also? For perhaps the powers and activity of a simple soul are also simple, as that of the rational soul is rational, or are they a manifold in essence also? If that is so, is the intellectual in us always fused with the affective and the nutritive, or does it acquire them additionally in its inclination towards the body, and is the soul one by being compounded of many forms of life in the same way as the living thing becomes one composed of soul and body, not always fused together in us, but at some times? If that is so, does the fusion come about at some time while the different forms of life pre-existed, or do some come to be at that time? But, if always, are the rest separated from the body because of intellect, or is intellect also inseparable because of the rest? The topic contributes also to the question how bodies are animate, whether through the agency of the whole soul or by some of its powers, and, if by the whole, whether as present in each portion of the body through its different powers, or as a whole everywhere, and whether it is a whole in all its powers or a whole, but not in them all. For it is surely not present in those that are separate.300 So Plato clearly says that the affective, which he calls a mortal form of life, is posterior to

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the rational life, which he also calls immortal.301 I think that Aristotle also holds this view, knowing that the rational life is separate and never uses the body as an instrument, nor sustains any portion of the body, and sometimes totally abstains from the inclination outside, and gathers its activities into its essence, and, separated off on its own, is that which it is. But he says that the rest of life is unseparated and always acts together with the body. For affections and similar occurrences such as sensations, imaginations, and anger belonged not to the soul but to both in combination, as did also such rational activities that used the co-operation of the body, which he called thinking,302 while he called the separate activities scientifically contemplative and intellectual. So where there is total separation there clearly does not remain one made of both – otherwise there would not be total separation, since it is clearly stated about intellect that ‘being separated, it is that alone which it is’,303 so that only the intellective remains. But in the inclination outside of intellect and the life through emanation there is fusion with the other forms of life; but the fusion is not continuous, as is that of the parts of the body, but one fitting for incorporeal things, being indivisibly unified with each other, so that a single indivisible whole is achieved. In this way the sight of black and white is one, acting in two different respects at once, but wholly in both and as one, as itself indivisible comprehending the two in an indivisible whole. If the soul is thus joined together with the body, so that the living thing becomes one out of both, still more must we accept the unification of different forms of life, even if some are inseparable but the other, while separable, yet becoming in a way inseparable through its departure from itself and its tendency to the outside, and becoming fitted to the others, and becoming engaged in the common activities with the whole of itself, but in the separate activities on its own or304 being transcendent in relation to the rest. But now let us go through Aristotle’s text305 together. He distinguished the cognitive activities of the soul from the appetitive, and showed that both have many aspects, the former as opinion, intellect or sensation, the latter in accordance with reason or affection; for appetite is an affective desire, wish is rational;306 to these he adds change of place and vegetative change. He then enquires whether ‘each of these belongs to the whole soul, and to all of that by which we think and sense and are in motion, and do and suffer each of the other things, with the whole soul, or whether different things belong to different portions’.307 But since one part of intellection of something is proper to the intellectual soul, especially the intellection that remains in itself, the activity being brought together with essence, but also that by emanation,308 in so far as it does not use the body as a tool nor bring

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imagination into play, even if that follows on it like an accompanying shadow, and since another sort of intellection of something, which he will say is affective, occurs with imagination,309 he now inquires about this and distinguishes it from the former by saying that it is we who think in these words: ‘and do we think and sense with the whole of it?’ For it is we who are composite who think and sense, not, as in the former case of intellection; for that is proper to the separated soul. So it is the composite that thinks, in the kind of thinking that it possesses, senses and does and suffers the rest all together, for each doing is through the vital activity, while what is suffered is through bodily change. Consequently it is clear that each of these things will belong to the whole soul which is woven together out of all the forms of life. For it is the whole soul that characterises the whole composite, but it is the whole composite that thinks and desires, since it also does them all as one, so that it may recognise both their identity and their difference. So each belongs to the whole soul, though it acts at different times in different forms of life. For it is not in the same form of life that it is nourished and senses, or senses and thinks. But life is something else again beyond each, such as sensation, thought and nutrition, since each of these is not life simply, but of a special kind. So life is something other in the way that animal is other than rational animal, and is in each severally and in all at once that which is in its power, and is, as it were, aroused and on the boil. 411b5 But some say that the soul is divided, and thinks with one part, desires with another. [So what then holds the soul together, if it is naturally divided? Surely it is not the body. For the opposite seems more true, that the soul holds the body together. For when it departs the body disintegrates and decays. So if it is something else that makes the soul one, that would have the best claim to be soul. But it will be necessary to inquire about this in turn, whether it is one with many parts. For, if it is one, why is not the soul one straight away? If it is divided, the argument will again ask what holds it together, and so on ad infinitum.] Surely they, too, intend the whole soul to think and desire, but with different parts. The significance of this is not that the whole does so with different parts, but as divided and with separate portions, since one should say that it is undivided and acts through different forms of life indivisibly fused together. That is why he reasonably asks what holds the soul together. For every divided thing needs something to hold it together. If the soul were divided it would not hold together either itself or any other thing – so not the body either. But the soul surely holds the body together, for ‘when it departs the body disinte-

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grates’. So it is undivided, since if it too needs something to hold it together, we shall either finish with something undivided, and that will be the soul, or we shall continue ad infinitum.

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411b14 One might also raise the problem about the parts of the soul as to the power each exerts in the body. [For if the whole soul holds the whole body together, it is fitting that each of its parts should hold together some part of the body. But this looks like an impossibility. For it is difficult even to imagine what part of the body intellect will hold together and how it will do so.] The whole soul, according to Aristotle and those who suppose it to be divided, holds the body together. But as the whole has sensation through its power of sentience, because each power is indivisibly fused with the whole, and is not something else such as the power to opine on account of division, so the whole soul holds the body together. But this is through its inseparable forms of life through their indivisible fusion in the whole soul, and not through the intellective element.310 But this does not follow for those who think the soul to be divisible. But even if one were to allow that though divisible and also extended together with the body it held the whole body together as a whole, the parts also will be preservative of that with which each is concerned, so that each part of the soul also will be preservative of a bodily part. So the intellect will be also. But this is ‘difficult even to imagine’. For what is immediately preservative is inseparable from what it sustains, while intellect is separate. The former belong to that which they sustain in virtue of doing so, but the intellect belongs to itself since it thinks of itself and reverts on itself. Also, even if what sustains things divisible is itself indivisible, it is still shared out among them. The other does not revert either on itself alone or on the higher, being submerged in what it sustains; but intellect both thinks of things higher and holds on to them. How then is intellection impeded by the body? It is because the body is attached to the whole soul through its forms of life that are inseparable from the soul, and because of this attachment it impeded not only those that make use of it but also those that do not use it at all, as was said with regard to the needle.311 411b19 When divided, both plants and, among animals, some insects can be seen to live, [as having the same kind of soul, if not numerically the same. For each of the parts has sensation and changes its place for a certain time. If they do not continue to do so it is not surprising, for they have not the organs to

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preserve their nature. But, none the less, all the parts of the soul are present in each part, and the souls312 are like to each other and the whole – of each other as being not separable,313 of the whole soul since it is314 divisible.]

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This, too, is indicative of the indivisible attachment of the several essences and vital powers in each part. For the parts, being of something divisible, even if in a way united, each has its own special position, such as the eye and the nose. But the form of life is so united that sometimes all are present also in each part of the body, when it is suitable to accept them all. For a shoot of a plant has the whole of the vegetative soul that provided nutrition, growth and birth. Also, when certain insects are divided into two, each portion moves, senses and is also clearly nourished for a certain time. For the other forms of life are not possible without this. Also it is clear that the whole undivided life is present indivisibly not only in kind but also numerically, as we have already said, in each of the parts that are suited to the undivided life, whether those parts are continuous with each other or separated. But in those that are divided the organs that preserve life, called governing, are not present in both parts, and do not allow the numerically identical soul to be present in both for long. For even in plants the roots are numerically different. But, if the lowest forms of life are indivisibly present together, the more powerful are more so and, like souls, are ‘of the same kind as each other and as the whole’. He is now calling souls not those in a number of living things but the different forms of life in each kind of animal, such as the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational. It is these that are of the same kind as each other and as the whole, not because the vegetative and the sensitive are of the same kind but because of their inseparable fusion with each other, each form of life being together with the others, and, for that reason, each is, in a way, all. For the vegetative in us is the instrument of sensation and reason. It nourishes them and brings them to birth, and the sensitive in us is rational. For sight and hearing and touch are instrumental for reason and imagination listens to it. And the sensitive is also vegetative in a way; desire illustrates this as does enjoyment of food, each involving sensation. The rational also is associated with both; for by its life projected into the mortal it accepts this association with them. Therefore that kind of intellection also is not without imagination. So in this way, then, they are of the same kind as each other, by all being present together indivisibly in the constitution of the living thing. Aristotle says ‘to the whole soul, since it is divisible’, as contingent, according to Alexander’s exposition, being divisible through the body being divided, so that the whole soul appears in each of the parts.315 But let us grant that this shows that the souls of the parts are of

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the same kind as those of the whole; but still it does not inform us of the way in which they are of the same kind, as what follows makes clear. So we should rather conceive that it is not the whole soul as simple but as composed of them, and so composed that it can be divided, since the intellect is agreed to be separated from the rest, and perhaps also the sensitive and the vegetative, if they have their primary existence not in the body that needs nutrition but in something superior. It is well known that even our vegetative life is such as to be fused with sensation and reason, and the sensitive as to be fused with reason. Therefore the parts in us are not altogether the same as is the vegetative in plants and the vegetative and sensitive in dumb animals. For ours are in a way rational, but theirs cannot be associated with reason. The expression ‘of each other since they are inseparable, of the whole soul since it is divisible’ is bad syntax, since it is a transference from soul to parts, and because it employs the genitive instead of the dative case. He said ‘of each other’ when he ought to have said ‘to each other’.316

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411b27 The principle in plants also seems to be a sort of soul. [For this is all that animals and plants have in common, and it is separated from the principle of sensation, while nothing has sensation without it.] He has called the various forms of life in us souls; he did not hesitate with regard to the rational and sensitive as manifestly controlling and informing, and therefore being well called souls; but he thought that calling the vegetative ‘soul’ required some discussion, first calling it a principle and then giving a justification by saying ‘for this is all that animals and plants have in common, and it is separated from the principle of sensation, while nothing has sensation without it’ – clearly passive sensation that is aroused by excitation of the senseorgan. In this way he adequately establishes the informing and controlling nature of the vegetative. For if it is fused with the admittedly informing and controlling forms of life, the sensitive and the rational, it must itself be controlling and informing. Also, if it gives form without them to plants on its own, it should be some self-sufficient form of soul.

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The Commentary of Simplicius on Book 2 of Aristotle On the Soul CHAPTER 1

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In Book 1 he has given an account of the opinions of earlier philosophers, and at the same time examined them, and, by means of the examination established that the soul is a substance; that it is incorporeal; that something of it is determinative of the living body as changing, another initiates change; that the rational soul has certain activities that do not use the body even as an instrument; also, that this especially is in control, and how it knows, not through kinship with what is known in components, but in form. He has also exhibited the difference in ensoulment of elements as wholes from that of their parts, and reminded us that there is one soul in each thing. In Book 2 he starts his own study, and, having made his subject-matter all soul of mortal living things, he inquires especially what is common to them all, in virtue of which all the souls of mortal living things, as we said, are and are said to be souls. But they are not of the same form, nor have they a common feature exactly the same, though they are not indeed completely ambiguously named, since the concept of the life of the soul is in a way single, as that which initiates change from within, and not, as in the case of things ambiguously named, several concepts each applying only to one kind of thing. For the concept of the land dog is other than that of the sea dog , and also that of the starry dog and again that of the dog as a convulsion. In the case of the soul the concept is both one and also has its common content varying in each species, as great variation occurs even in depth, as is the case with things named as derived from and contributing to one thing.317 Consequently, in these cases it is not only the concept concerning the common content that is necessary, or only that concerning that which varies, but a view comprehending both, in order that we may know the facts as they are. The situation is that neither can the common content exist or be accurately viewed without the difference mentioned, nor the variation without the common content. But since our knowledge is piecemeal, and is not capable of grasping both together from the start, before intellection of each separately, the philosopher reasonably first studies what the common feature is, which is com-

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mon for things equivocally named, such as being, the good, the one and the healthy.318 For there is one science of things thus common also, and not only of things named univocally, as he himself teaches in the Metaphysics,319 and also gives a common account of the one itself, although equivocally named. Similarly in the Physics320 also he gives a single definition of change. There is nothing to be censured about giving a common definition of things equivocally named, something that is altogether necessary to do, but there is about being satisfied with what is common and not adding the specific difference in each case, so that then we may gain an accurate knowledge from the common together with the specific. It must again be recalled that his main goal is concerned with the soul of mortal living things, to which our rational soul belongs.

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412a3 So much for the views handed down by earlier philosophers concerning the soul. [So let us make a new beginning, and try to determine what the soul is and what would be the most general account of it.] ‘So much for’ does not refer merely to the narrative but also to the investigation. In this investigation it has become clear that every soul is incorporeal, that it is substantial, that it governs qua formal and that it is an indivisible unity. The proposal is to determine and provide the most general account of the soul, in order that the account may display what is common to every soul with which the account is concerned, while he will add the specific features of each later.

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412a6 We say that substance is one kind of existent  Since the discussion is concerned with the soul in mortal living things, where not every one is of the same sort as all others, nor are they distinguished from each other at the same level only, there being a very great difference in depth321 between them, he is, as has been said, seeking for what is common to all, even if what is common is not univocally so, but varies with each species, so that what is common is also not invariable, not only through differences distinguishing at the same level, but by being variable in depth. For the common feature also differs in its essential nature, being that which it is said to be to a greater or less degree. unlike what is the case with things at the same level, where the distinction is not in that respect but is concerned with the differences. For colour is not present more, or primarily or more fundamentally in white or in black; but being is more fundamentally and actually present in substance than in the other categories; and the good is more fundamentally in the divine cause than in things caused and, among those, in the everlast-

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ing than in the perishable. For being a living thing is different for a man and for a horse, but by dividing differences that are not constitutive, and therefore not qua living thing. But the heavenly and earthly differ also qua living thing. For being imperishable and perishable are differences of being, but are constitutive differences of kinds of living thing, while being self-sufficient or not are differences of being, and being desirable in a way simply or without qualification are constitutive differences of the good.322 So the project is to find such a common feature in the case of souls. He takes it that all soul is substance, because soul is life and life is substance since the living thing is so also, since life is substance before the living thing, by which and through which the living thing is characterised (for it is a substance as a living thing, and as a living thing is receptive of opposites),323 and the body itself is held together through life. So, he takes it for these reasons that the soul is a substance, and not material substance, since matter is incomplete substance, subsisting as some weak completion of form that is receptive of forms. For that which is receptive of forms must have some affinity with them, but certainly not be them. So the matter of life has a weak affinity with life as receptive of it. Therefore life is present to it potentially, but to the soul in actuality. So the soul is not the material substance of living things, but nor is it their compound substance. For the living thing has its being not primarily but secondarily and through its participation in life, and the compound as a whole exists and is a particular thing through its form. For primary existence is as form and particular thing. So life also is both substance and life-giving substance prior to the living thing, since it lives not through participation in life but as being just that life itself. This is the form of living things. So the soul is present as a substance neither as matter nor as the ensouled thing, but will be substance as form. 412a7 Of this, one sort is as matter, which in itself is not a ‘this such’; [another sort is shape, i.e. form, through which a thing is already called a ‘this such’.]

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‘This’ denotes a determinate existence (for it is that which in a circumscribed determination falls under sense perception and pointing), and by the addition of ‘such’ indicates its particularity. Every composite is particular and unlike the form, the former being particular, the latter general and determinant of things of the same kind, as is laid down in other works.324 For matter is not a this such, since it is indeterminate by being incomplete and potential and receptive of a determination, but not yet a determined substance. Nor is form, for it is a determination and a completion and prior and

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intrinsic substance, but not that which is determined and complete and made existent and dependent substance, of which we say ‘this such’.325 This is substance and a substance of a certain kind through its form, but through its matter it is in a way indeterminate and potential. For everything enmattered is perishable and generated and therefore in a way non-existent even when it exists. For in being now it has together with its being also the previous non-being, as generated, and the subsequent , as perishable, and has in both directions the potency of non-being. But through its form it has its determinate existence and completeness and its kind. 412a9 Matter is potentiality, form is actualisation  Matter of course is not potentially, but a substance in potency, not as about to be actually at some time, since it remains always what it is, but as becoming substance through being receptive and through its weak and incomplete existence. But the form is actualisation, as a completion and having its being in completion and as existing itself and holding the composite together in completion.

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412a10  and that in two ways, one like scientific knowledge and the other like its exercise. He is about to lay it down that the soul also is a form, but knows that every pure and primarily existing form is indivisible and therefore does not parcel out the activity from its being, but is activity in its essence, while the soul has primarily declined from the indivisible and has its activity divorced from its essence, and therefore not always present when it declines to body. So he says that form exists in two ways – not that which is immaterial or that which is determinative of the immaterial, but that of generated things, of which the souls are not always active with the same activity, and whose forms are all determinative at different times of all different things. So evidently the soul of mortal living things does not have its essence in its activity, since at times it exists but is not active, or is active in different ways. Therefore it is in disposition an actuality, and not the activity derived from the disposition. For in the case of immaterial things there is identity of essence with activity, and in the case of the soul, to the extent that it is altogether separate, secondarily and through its linkage with the intellect, as it merges into activity.326

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incomplete and not yet determinate, since it is in an indeterminate state in a way yet not in opposition to a determination, but as receptive and seeking one; another is determinate but not in itself but in relation to another – form – and in a way sharing in the indeterminate state in so far as it consists of matter; another is primary, a determination and a completion, since through it the composite is a substance and its actuality is the form.327 He is investigating among which of these soul should be classified, having first recalled that it is a substance on account of the things defined in terms of it; for what is naturally posterior is for us the starting point. Animate and living things are defined in terms of the soul. That these are substances he confirmed from the fact that all natural bodies are. It is absolutely obvious to everyone that these are substances, as being in no substrate and receptive of opposites, because they are also familiar objects of sensation. Now to some, e.g. the Pythagoreans,328 mathematical objects seem to be substances, and artefacts, e.g. to the generality of people, such as a bed and a ship, because of the wood that is their substrate. But, in fact, of these only natural bodies are both thought to be and are substances. For these are the source of the rest, that seem to be so but are not; of mathematical objects, since these are arrived at by abstraction from them, of artefacts as having their being from natural bodies. 412a13 Of natural bodies, some have life, some not. [By life we mean self-nourishment, growth and decay. So every natural body that partakes of life must be a substance, but of the composite kind. Since it is both a body and of a certain sort, since it has life, the soul cannot be a body. For a body is not predicated of a substrate ]

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Detached parcels of elements and what is dead do not have life. Things that have it are all active; they do not participate in life accidentally, like wood in the form of a bed. For living things are substances, so that life is also a substance, and superior to bodily substance, since through them the organic bodies of living things are held together, and since they are receptive of opposites. And in another way the living body is substance more than the inanimate, because living things are roused internally to action and generate substances. So living things are substances, and more so than the inanimate. So also the life in accordance with which living things exist is substance, and in itself primary substance; and the life by whose agency living things are animated is so even more so than the life in accordance with which. And soul is that in accordance with which and especially that by the agency of which. For the life in

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accordance with which is a part of the soul or an image of it, but that which causes change is soul in the fullest sense.329 ‘By life we mean self-nourishment, growth and decay’ not because life consists in these alone – for appetition also, sensation and intellect are forms of life – nor because every living thing has a share in these – only the mortal do, since the heavenly neither feed nor grow nor decay. But since, like Plato, he regards being internally changed as the special feature of animate beings, he singled out the most basic form of life, showing that this also initiates some changes.330 For nourishment, growth and decay are transformations in quality and quantity. The first supplies what is lacking in power and quantity, the second strengthens and adds still more, the third takes away both. Now in the case of inanimate things also there is addition and subtraction, but this being through its own agency is specific to the animate. For a burning fire both continues and increases by feeding and becomes different from time to time, taking in at different times different parts of the burning material. So already there is not nourishment and growth, for the original material does not remain. But there is coming to be and decay of fire, one thing coming to be as the other is destroyed, on each occasion the succeeding thing coming to be from the other that was before it. If we add a little to the surface of a wax sphere we shall slightly increase the previous bulk without the wax being active in the increase but being merely passive and without it being strengthened as a whole. Even if it were water, retaining its previous quantity and increasing by adjacent material rotting and turning into water, it would not be fed or grow. For what was already there would not be strengthened, but extra would be generated at the same place. But among plants and, generally, among things nourished, the power drawing in the food is within, and that which changes it qualitatively and adds to the parts already there and strengthens them as wholes throughout. So these things are alive, because the source of change is within, and that shows that it acts through itself. For even in the lowest form of life there is not only that which changes vitally, i.e. is nourished, grows and decays, but also the source of change, and the power and the substance that brings this about. So the living body is substance as substance composed of body and life. But the soul is substance as life and not as body. The body deprived of life is not even animate, let alone a soul. 412a18  but rather as a substrate, i.e. matter. For the body is not a substrate for life in the way that a substance is for its attributes, but as matter to forms, being made determinate and substantial by them in accordance with activity. Therefore, having said ‘as a substrate’ he added ‘i.e. matter’ in order to make

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clear what sort of substrate it was. For the soul does not depend on the composite, since that depends on the soul, but it is not itself the animate thing. 412a20 So the soul is necessarily a substance as form of a natural body that has life.

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For since he is searching for what is present in common to every soul in mortal living things, he does not adduce the separate self-possessing form, but that which determines the body. For that is common to all. The soul is posterior to the forms, for formal substance is undivided, but the life of the soul unrolls. Rational activity also shows this, since it in a way departs from its own essence and reverts to it as to another, and attaches itself to things known by a kind of departure. So soul is posterior to forms, but nevertheless it approaches towards being a formal cause, as do all natural principles. For soul also determines and gives being through itself, and completes what participates in it. Therefore it is also an actuality. So there are certain forms posterior to the primary ones, that are altogether self-contained, which determine other things, as do all natural forms that are all forms of bodies, and those of souls also, such as the intellect in which souls participated; but the natural form, if not all life-giving, differs from the soul also in indivisibility. For every form is indivisible. But the soul is a certain discursive expression of the life-giving form that unfolds the manifold taken into a unity in the form. And what determines the separate soul is itself not altogether self-sufficient but depends on another, the soul – not body but soul. But the soul, so far as it is other-dependent, is altogether the actuality of a body, and that a natural one, since it is the cause of its existence, whereas the mathematical object is not an existent. Also it is not simply the actuality of a natural body, but of one that potentially has life. For life is in accordance with the soul, and what will participate in it must be receptive of life. Not all natural bodies as such, but living ones, are completed by the soul, and the soul is the actuality of a potentially living body. For even when already alive the mortal body is potentially alive, since life is not fused with body, but comes in from without by the presence of soul, and the body receives life then and as it becomes suitable through a certain mixture and constitution. So the heavenly soul also determines the everlasting body, but not inclining towards it, nor using it as an instrument. But perhaps the heavenly body also does not have life potentially. For it does not have life by mere acquisition, but as even part of its essence. So that body is animate in a different way, as already living in activity, and doing so as being in a way self-changing

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and reaching up from itself to soul, and itself belonging to the soul, while the soul does not belong to it but makes it part of itself. But the soul of mortal living things is the actuality of a natural body, not a form but a discursive expression, and discursive expressions are secondarily formal causes.331 So the soul is a discursive actuality, and does not belong to itself nor remain as a whole within itself as its own, and either as a whole thus has its essence in determining bodies without reverting upon itself, or, if it has two forms of life, through its inclination to body which tends outside from itself, either as giving life to the body or as using the living thing. For also it is the actuality of the natural body that potentially has life, like the steersman of a ship, since it activates and uses the living body. For an instrument is so called because it serves the soul that uses it, not in the way that inanimate natural bodies do, which are themselves given a form, but by no means as organisms, since they have neither their activator nor their user within. For that is specific to animate beings, since the soul is different from other natural forms by being doubly an actuality, as determining and activating the instrument. He seems to have first set out its determining role, and to have added later the role of originating change as being more perfect, since he assigns the instrumental role to every body that has a mortal life. So being an instrument seems to run in harness with having life potentially, but is not the same in account, nor is it so named without variation with reference to the same form of life; but it has life as given a form vitally in accordance with the form of life that it receives, and becomes an instrument for its user, by which it is also given life in order that it may use it in a fused manner and by a single impulse. But that by the agency of which it is changed is utterly different from that in accordance with which, in the way that the efficient cause is different from the formal. So the whole soul of the living thing is one, but it has an element that is transcendent, which initiates change and is the user, and another that reaches out and belongs to the living thing as that which determines it.

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412a21  but its substance is to be an actuality; so it is the actuality of such a body. Having said and laid down that a soul is a substance as form, he adds as a major premise that its substance is to be an actuality, its substance, clearly, as a form, since he often calls form substance. So, since the soul is formal substance, it will be the actuality of such a body as potentially has life. It is said of that which is already alive but is said to live potentially, because it does not live of itself nor as an imperishable body.

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412a22 But an actuality is so called in two ways – like possessed and like contemplated knowledge. [For there is both sleep and waking in the presence of soul, and waking is analogous to contemplation, sleep to having but not exercising.] In making clear what is common to all soul of mortal living things, he does not speak of the separate soul nor of that which brings together its activity and re-integrates it in its essence. For that is proper to the intellectual soul, and that when it is separated, since not only does our rational soul through its inclination towards body have its activity divided from its being, but this is not always complete nor always present as a whole. For activity of sense comes to an end in sleep, and maybe even imagination in deep torpor. Perhaps all knowledge arising from the condition of the soul when departing from itself and through its inclination outwards is impeded in seriously unnatural states of the organs. But we shall also inquire into this later on. But if the soul is continuously present in the animate acting vitally upon it, it continuously activates that activity which determines vitally the body that is its substrate, but not also the cognitive. For this gives out in sleep, so far as it is sensitive, and as imaginative also when in deep torpor. Therefore the soul neither is cognitive activity in its being, nor has cognitive power invariably following on its being, when it communicates with the body, since sometimes when the soul is present, it is not active. So its being is analogous to the dispositional possession of knowledge, but cognitive activity to its contemplation. For even among those about to obtain knowledge the disposition is present continuously until they achieve it, but its contemplation is not without gaps; rather, it is possible not to activate the knowledge one has. Aristotle took being awake as equivalent to cognitive activity and sleep to inactivity. For sleep is also a vital activity, being an inhibition of sensation, not through paralysis nor some weakness but in accordance with some power – for sleep is characteristic of a strong and vital nature – but it is not a cognitive activity and is as such inhibitive of cognition.332 So the soul always is active in some way, if not always cognitively. So why is the soul the first actuality, and not the actuality involving activity?333 For while it will not be contemplative, it is by nature basically an active thing, and active lest it be useless. For that which is in no way active is useless, and nothing useless will be the work of nature, still less of a god. But maybe it was not judged to be the first actuality with regard to every activity, but only with regard to its contemplative activity, since it is not active in this way throughout its existence. But perhaps it is better to say this, that he demonstrates through this that the soul of mortal things has the activity divided from its being, so that, having its being in accordance with the

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projective character of its activity and power, it may achieve completion when it is also active, differing in this way from intellect which is activity in its being, while the soul climbs up to the intellect to become one and in that way fuses both together and raises its activity into being. Certainly the soul of mortal living things seems to parcel out every activity from its being. For even if it has some one invariably as that which gives life, yet, since it is at some time deprived of every kind of activity that belongs to it as its own, it could not be purely indivisible. For before all other division, whether of place or time or that according to the dominance of the idiosyncrasies which individuals of the same kind display, or that of departure into accidental attributes, the separation of its activity from its being is plain to see. This division is plain in the case of mortal living things, since they do not always produce activities of whatever sort that they naturally display in their present state when they are associated with the body.

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412a26 For in order of coming to be knowledge is prior in the same person. [So the soul is the first actuality ] For in every case of coming to be the advance is from the incomplete to the complete. And the earlier are less complete than the later and the state of knowledge without its exercise is less complete than when it is exercised. So in its nature and its being, and as a cause, the complete is prior to the incomplete, but in coming to be the incomplete is temporally prior to the complete. However, both the incomplete and the complete are observed in a single thing when, even in a case of coming to be, another complete thing must pre-exist, from which comes what is incomplete in another case. An example is the seed from the already complete living thing that generates it. But in the same thing the incomplete is prior. For first there is the seed, then the embryo, then the living thing. But if the soul is ungenerated, how can it first have its being in an incomplete state and some time later in a complete state, when it is active? For Aristotle also has clearly assigned this sort of priority to coming to be, and for this reason it was fitting for the soul to be the first actuality, as not wholly complete. He does not, indeed, like Plato, use the expression ‘coming to be’ of the soul on account of its first descent into division,334 but not as existing at a time, since our soul also is shown by him to be ungenerated and indestructible, not to mention the superior soul, which he calls the best of things that come to be. But Aristotle uses the word ‘generated’ of things existing at some time. But, if not in its substance, still in activity and completeness, coming to be and perishing are clear in the case of the human soul, which is both harmed and hindered at times. If, however, as Iamblichus thinks, a distorted and incomplete activity would not come from an impassible and complete substance,

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it would have to be affected in some way in its being also.335 So it would be a mean in this way also, not just between the divisible and indivisible, nor the stable and the emerging, nor the intellective and the non-rational, but also between the generated and the ungenerated. It will be ungenerated in being stable, intellective and indivisible, but by its procession, division and association with the irrational it comes to be, being neither purely ungenerated as is the intellective, since it is neither indivisible nor stable, but also not generated like particular things which at times do not exist at all. But it sometimes stands outside itself, as it were, through its association with becoming and does not simply remain stable, but, both together, it remains what it is and comes to be. And yet it never ceases to be ungenerated, but is always linked with itself and has stability from within and, as it were, an influx and supplementation of what departs. But that of it which is generated and in procession is never without the stable and the ungenerated, while its ungenerated part sometimes frees itself from its association with becoming in its life separated from bodies. Therefore the soul is both immortal and stable, always having its immortality and stability inferior to the intellective form of life. And our soul is differentiated with regard to itself; it is pure, so far as befits it, gaining its immortality, stability and indivisibility in its separate and intellective life; for when it has been separated, as he will say, it is its true self.336 But in its inclination outside it remains without totally deserting itself; every rational activity shows this, which does not occur without reversion upon itself, whence comes belief after assent, as it judges and assents to the truth of its judgement; for that is what belief is. This is also shown by the recall from within to the superior and its self-completion. But it does not preserve its stability in a pure state. For because of its inclination outside it as a whole both remains stable and proceeds, and it has neither state wholly divorced from the other. Hence its immortal part is then filled by its mortality throughout itself and it does not remain simply immortal, and the ungenerated finds itself coming to be and its indivisibility divided up. It is no longer activity in its essence, so far as that is lawful for it. So the soul is the first actuality in relation to its generated self through the division of its activity from its essence, and not in the character of that which knows – for it cannot be the composite being – but as scientific knowledge or as form. 412a27  of a natural body that potentially has life. [An organic body will be such.]

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living instrument. This is not an altogether different life (if it were the user would not be of the same nature and life would involve change from the outside), but it is one thing that exhibits two forms, one as giving form to the instrument and not initiating change but characterising what is changed vitally, one as initiating change and as user. For every soul of mortals is an actuality in both respects, since it is changed vitally and also is that which initiates change from within. Aristotle sets out its double aspect in regard to actuality, ascribing the soul to ‘that which potentially has life’ and to an organic body. Both also run in harness entirely, so that that which potentially has a life is the instrument of the soul and the instrument of the soul potentially has life. But these expressions have not the same sense, since one reveals only the lowest form of life, through which the body has the form of being vitally changed, the other that which uses it and initiates its change. Therefore the complete definition of the soul needs both in order to make clear also that it uses the body as an instrument. 412b1 The parts of plants are also instruments, [but altogether simple, as the leaf is the shelter of the pericarp and the pericarp of the fruit. Roots are equivalent to a mouth, for both take in nourishment.] Since, being of the lowest type, the soul of plants is plainly the actuality of that which potentially has life, but the use of it as an instrument is not evident, since it seems to have nothing transcendent to initiate change also, he confirms that the parts of plants are not only alive but also, as instruments of the soul, serve each different need, so that there is the user also in the souls of plants. For it is not as a mere automatism that the leaves protect the pericarp, and this the fruit, or that the roots, in the same way as a mouth, take up nourishment from the earth and send it throughout the whole plant, and the various organs are changed337 by the soul within, each being regulated in relation to each other and to the whole by the soul which moves from within each to its proper task.

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412b4 If then one must state something common to every soul, [it must be that it is the first actuality of a natural organic body.] This is clearly the soul that extends outwards and inclines towards the body, and which also uses the body as a tool. For he calls intellect that which remains stable within itself and is not possessed by the body through its inclination towards it but makes it its possession. But since what is common is not so in the same sense, but like things named as deriving from one thing,338 and since it has been said of

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these that it is impossible to give an exact definition lacking the special character in each case, one must know both what is common and what is special, he, on this account, while stating what is common to all, also insists with a certain reservation ‘if one must state’.339 For it must be stated, but this is not sufficient if one does not add the special character also. When recalling the common definition, he omitted ‘that potentially has life’ as being altogether implicated with being the immediate instrument of the soul. For that must be alive in order that through its life it may be fused with that which initiates its change without force, and may be wakened by the mere impulse of the soul. 412b6 So also there is no need to inquire if body and soul are one, [and so for wax and its shape and, generally, the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter. For, since one and being have many senses, actuality is the central case.]

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It is spelt out more exactly in the Metaphysics340 that everything there is altogether has being and is one. But form primarily exists and is one, and has being through itself. For the composite is in accordance with its form. As of its existence, the form is also the cause of the unity of a composite, in all cases as that in accordance with which,341 but in the case of the animate also as the efficient cause, because it is proper to animate things, as distinct from other natural bodies, that they have within them the principle of change. So ‘one’ and ‘being’ have many different senses, because a thing is so either through itself or through something else, or as incomplete and potential, as is the material; but ‘activity is the central case’, since it is through itself and primary, and is the cause necessarily also both for the being of the composite and for its being one, since it is determined in accordance with what has being and unity through itself. As the white thing is characterised by whiteness, so is that which has being and is one because of being and unity by participation and in composition, but not simply nor through itself, so that that which is determined as a being and a unity may have the relation to formal being and unity that the white thing has to whiteness, even if their names in the former case are not different, as in the case of ‘whiteness’ and ‘white thing’ .342 412b10 So a universal definition of the soul has been given. For it is substance in accordance with its rational principle. That is, that which it is to be a body of a certain sort  This then is the conclusion from what has been said before in Book 2. ‘Universal’ is not to be understood as a univocal predicate, but as

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denoting what is simultaneously common and variable. ‘Substance in accordance with rational principle’ is said as equivalent to ‘according to its form’. In the case of the soul, saying ‘in accordance with rational principle’ fits better than ‘in accordance with its form’, because of the descent of the indivisible into evolution. Further, the rational principle is dependent also on the formal cause. But of forms and rational principles, some are altogether separate from bodies, but others unseparated, not as getting their being from them (for forms are primary beings), but as determining bodies and in that way unseparated. Consequently, he does not conclude that the soul is a separate form or rational principle, but that which it is to be a body of a certain sort, for this is the actuality of an organic body; this is common even to the rational form of life in us as well as to other souls. But we wished to see the common factor first. For the degree of separation of the rational soul was hinted at in Book 1,343 and he will later give an account of it in his own study.344 One must remember that what it is to be a natural organic body that potentially has life is twofold, one as what uses it and initiates change, one as that in accordance with which it is a living instrument and is changed vitally.

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412b11  just as if some instrument were a natural body, such as an axe. [Its essence would be what it is to be an axe, and that would be its soul. Deprived of this it would not still be an axe, except in another sense of the word.]

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The bodies that live through soul are not the only instruments of it; inanimate things are its instruments too. Some are natural, such as stones and cut timber, others are crafted, like the natural things themselves, though serving a certain need for the soul that uses them not qua natural,345 but as well prepared by craft, like a shield and a sword. He says that if some crafted instrument (for it is these that he now calls instruments, as the illustration of the axe shows) were a natural body, which he said in the definition of the soul was an organic natural body potentially having life – if an axe were of that sort, that is what it would be to be an axe. Aristotle was accustomed in the case of informed things to give the name to the informed thing but to exhibit the form as that which makes it such. For him also ‘essence’ will often signify form, as now, in interpreting ‘what it is to be an axe’, he called it its essence, i.e. its form. That would be its soul, if an axe were what potentially has life, and it would also be a living instrument and have that which used it within, and if that were separated from it, it would no longer remain what it was. For each thing is what it is through its form, in the case of the merely natural the principle of undergoing change, in the case

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of the animate also of being changed vitally and of being self-changing.346 One should note that he in no way means that the soul perishes on leaving the body. The term ‘separation’ is used rather in the case of those things that exist after the dissolution.347 He says ‘in another sense of the word’ because the bodies of dead animals are called by the same name as those that are alive, e.g. dog and horse, and similarly their parts, such as a horse’s head. 412b15 But now it is an axe etc. [For the soul is not the rational principle that makes a body of that kind, but is what makes a natural body of a particular kind, which has the principle of change and its absence in itself.]348 He shows from contrast with inanimate instruments what the living instrument is. For the inanimate one, which serves the soul for some purpose, has no less its own potential even when separated from the soul that uses it, since it was not defined in terms of the soul. But this is no longer the case with the vital and animate instrument, which is a natural body and not manufactured like the other. This must be an instrument for the soul as potentially having life and vitally informed, since what makes it what it is and its principle is the soul, and as serving as its instrument. For the soul is the principle of change and its absence in it, since it changes and maintains it, which is proper to the animate. So in this way he has established the nature of the animate by contrast with the dissimilar inanimate. Next he will do so by comparison with the similar; for he makes clear what sort of thing the whole is from its parts. 412b17 One must look at what has been said also in the case of the parts. [For if the eye were a living thing, sight would be its soul; for that is what the eye is according to its account, the eye being the matter of sight, and if that gives out it is no longer an eye except in a different sense, like the stone or the pictured eye. One must apply what is true of the part to the whole of the living body; for as part is related to part so analogously the whole of sensation to the whole of the sensitive body as such. For it is not that which has lost its soul that has the potential to live, but that which has it. Semen and seed are potentially bodies of such a kind.]

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by the eye its body without sight.349 For he at once adds that if sight gives out, ‘it is no longer an eye’. But sight is doubly the form of the eye; in one way it uses it as a living instrument, in another it completes it as a living instrument. The eye with such sight is the matter of the sight that uses it, and if the sight using it gives out it is not an eye, because at the same time the sight characterising it as an eye gives out also. For the sight that uses it also gives it the latter when present, but, when departing, takes it with it. So let it be taken that as sight is to the eye, so is ‘the whole of sensation to the whole of the sensitive body’, qua sensitive. This, as he himself clearly adds, is that which is already alive. For it is not the body that has lost its soul or is like the seed that is called the potentially living, but that which has already life. For the seed does not potentially have life, but is potentially a body of such a kind350 that is immediately receptive of life, and therefore potentially has life by supporting as its matter both the life that determines it as an instrument and that which uses it as an instrument. For the latter life is a form of the living body, as is the sailor of his boat, except that it is not as self-contained that it gives life to and changes the body as the more divine soul does the heavenly body,351 but by its tendency and inclination towards it, and it changes it with an aim of utility, and not through simply being already perfect. So the eye is reasonably said to be the matter of sight, and the whole sensitive body, qua sensitive and already sensitive, the matter of the sensation that uses it as an instrument. 412b27 Thus, as are cutting and seeing, so being awake is an activity, [and as sight and the power of the instrument, so is the soul; but the body is what exists potentially. But as the pupil and sight are an eye, so in the other case soul and body are a living thing.] This is the conclusion of that argument by which the soul was shown not to be the second actuality of the body, but the prior and already divided actuality, which has its activity divorced from its being. He used two illustrations of what a living thing is, the axe and the eye, and reasonably also uses cutting and seeing in the illustrations, as he does being awake in the case of sensation. So much is clear. It was said that the eye is pupil and sight and the living thing is soul and body by ascending to the immediate causes.352 For it is composed of both, for the composite is never matter and form, but is composed of them. 413a4 So it is easy to see that the soul is not separate from the body, nor some parts of it, if it has a divided nature.

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Through this statement he shows both that the soul common to mortal beings, about which he is speaking, is fittingly unseparated from body, and the rational soul is separate, and that ‘unseparated’ has many senses. He also shows that if the same thing should be both separate and unseparated it must be divisible, in order that it may have these contrary properties in different parts, but divisible in a different way, and not as bodies are. That is why he said, hypothetically, ‘if it has a divided nature’. This is not because he does not know, or has not yet shown, that it is not divisible, but because he both knows and proves that every soul is indivisible in a way, since it is incorporeal (body being that which is divisible in an unqualified sense), but yet in another way has parts, looking at its activity that is divorced from its being. So if the stable aspect of the rational soul and that which proceeds be reckoned as different parts, the whole will at once proceed and remain stable in the projection of its evolving life.353 In that way also the whole is said to be inseparable from the body, or certain parts, since each of these is true in a way in the case of the rational soul, since the whole inclines to and proceeds to the body and uses it to serve as its instrument, while also, as now, another part remains stable, and this is separate.354 But being separate is proper to the rational soul, while being unseparated is common to every soul of mortal beings; but not each one will be solely unseparated, but only the rational which is also separate. Further, being unseparated does not belong in the same way to forms of life of instruments that determine the instruments and those that make use of them, nor to the vegetative and the sensitive. These forms of life are very different from each other, still more so the unseparated aspect of rational forms of life from them all. For this is purely in control of bodies, which I think that he himself shows by adding: 413a5 For the actuality of some parts is of the parts themselves.

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He says that in the case of some souls the actuality is such as to be of the bodily parts themselves. These are such as those that determine the organs as organs and those that approximate to natural forms,355 and more obviously have their being as unseparated actualities of bodies. For those that use the living things as instruments are less unseparated and make more clear their essential superiority. By this he at the same time both exhibited the difference of the unseparated and in turn also clearly reminded us that the being of the soul is altogether separate, adding also the explanation. 413a6 However, nothing prevents some from being separate through being the actuality of no body.

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‘Some’ parts, obviously, since the whole soul is at once stable and in procession, and it contemplates without any need of the body, even if in practical matters it uses the body. The stable and the contemplative are called parts of the soul in a way as, again, are that in procession and the practical. He says ‘Nothing prevents’ because the whole soul was called the actuality of the body. For something would if through the whole of itself and all of its activity it was the actuality of body. But nothing prevents it if it is so, not through the whole of its being nor through all its activity. For in that respect it will be the actuality of no body. For it is hard to imagine the intellect holding any body together, as he said in Book 1, since, as he will say in Book 3,356 he who contemplates does not even use the body as an instrument. That is why he is not blinded by the greater from knowledge of the lesser as in sensation. 413a8 But also it is unclear whether the soul is the actuality of the body in the way357 that the sailor is of his boat. By ‘for the358 actuality of some parts is of the parts themselves’ he sets out the unseparated life of all bodies; by ‘however, nothing prevents some from being separate through being the actuality of no body’, the altogether separate life. In this way he views the dual character of the soul. For the actuality as user is both unseparated in a way through its total use of the body, and separate in a way as transcendentally using it to serve as an instrument. If it both uses it in a way, but in a way not completely, as the illustration of the sailor shows, that part of it that does not use the body is altogether separate. Why does he still say that it is unclear, if it is hard even to imagine it? For also obviously the contemplative soul does not use the body as a tool. Is it because use is made even by non-rational beings that it is unclear, before examining each form of life specifically, by what utility is to be distinguished in them beyond their defining the organ, and in which one must look for separate activities also.

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413a9 Let that be in outline a definition and sketch of the soul. He calls the account of the soul handed down an outline and a sketch because he only set out that which is common to all, whereas an exact account is given in terms of the proper essence of each. That essence is proper which also determines specifically what is common.

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413a11 Since clarity and greater rational intelligibility come from the unclear but more obvious 

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The account given was not exact, because it exhibited only what was common to all soul, and that not in the same way, but as derived from one thing, so that it was not possible for an exact account to be given of them all at once, since they are not univocally named, but it is necessary to examine them individually, if we insist on exactitude. So before examination he sets out the method of instruction as being an ascent from the caused to the cause. For this is the suitable method for those who have not completed their inquiry. For naturally, and for the scientific account that follows nature, causes are clearer, but in sense-experience and for us who have not yet achieved our goal, the caused are, as was said at the beginning of the Physics.359 Now he says ‘from the unclear’ (omitting to say ‘naturally and in account’) ‘but more obvious’ (again omitting ‘for us and in sense-experience’) comes clarity. Once again ‘naturally’ is left out, but ‘greater rational intelligibility’ is included. 413a12  we must try in that way once again to examine . He said ‘once again’ because he has already given a summary account, and ‘in that way’ because what is intelligible rationally is superior to and higher than matters of sense-experience.

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413a13 For a definitional account must not only exhibit the fact, [but must include and make clear the explanation. But, now, definitional accounts are like conclusions. For example: ‘What is squaring?’ – ‘An equilateral rectangle being equal to one with unequal sides.’ But such a definition is an account of the conclusion, while that which says that squaring is the finding of a mean line in what is given360 states the explanation.] He provides the reason for the re-examination, which is why he uses the aetiological connective, since one must not rest with things caused, but must ascend from them to their causes. In the Posterior Analytics361 it is said that one sort of definition is the conclusion of a demonstration, another the middle term of the syllogism, and another the whole syllogism differing from a demonstration in the order of terms. It is laid down that the definition corresponding to the conclu-

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sion is that of the thing caused and informed, which is what he now calls the given, while that through the middle term is of the form and the cause. That which differs in position is that which at once refers to effect and cause. For example, man is characterised by his rational life that has determinations. This is the rational mortal living thing, and this is the definition of the composite. The rational life having determinations is the form which is the ground for the conclusion and the given,362 I mean the composite. And in the matter of his own illustration, since, if three straight lines are in proportion, the square constructed on the mean line is equal to the figure encompassed by the extreme lines, which clearly has unequal sides, he who defines the squaring of the unequal-sided by ‘an equilateral rectangle being equal to one with unequal sides’ defines the demonstrated result. This he calls a conclusion as being geometrically demonstrated. But he who defines it as the discovery of a mean line between the unequal sides of the unequal-sided rectangle gives the ground through which a square equal to an unequal-sided rectangle is constructed and proved; for he has given not only the ground of the conclusion but of the given.

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413a20 So we say, to make a start to the inquiry, that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate by life. He has defined the method of instruction as the ascent from what is clear to us to what is naturally such, and has reminded us that a satisfactory proof contains an explanation, and that exactly and not in some sketchy outline. He begins the examination of the soul by the method of instruction from things well-known from sensation, which he does at once by the animate being distinguished, i.e. differing, from the inanimate by being alive. On account of the climb to the cause he does not stay with the animate but leaps up to its cause, the soul. In order not to view the soul still in outline, but with an exact definition, he gives, not a general definition, but one of each kind of soul individually. For the common definition that was given as well contained an explanation (for the actuality is a form and explanation of all that is made complete by it); but even if the common property were predicated univocally, even so, the perception of the common property is not sufficient for exactitude without what is specific. But how is the animate distinguished from the inanimate by being alive? By being changed from within, as is also Plato’s view363 and as its obviousness makes plain. What initiates change is also within. But, if that is so, how can the soul which is awakened by itself not be self-changing? For waking is a kind of change. Or is it because Aristotle has in mind the same facts in the same way as Plato, but describes them differently sometimes respecting the habitual usage

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of language? For he does not call the soul self-changing since he does not even call its activity change. So it is correct according to him also to assign to the soul self-activation,364 since it is aroused by itself. Arousal is a kind of activity, while life exhibits a sort of effervescence and self-excitement. 15

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413a22 But since ‘to live’ has many senses  He was accustomed to refer by ‘has many senses’365 either to the ambiguously named or to things derived from a single case. Here the reference is not to the ambiguously named, since we frame a single conception of life as of one thing. Among things derived from a single case, things completely so called, even if secondly or thirdly or finally, still completely participate and are called by a name that reveals pre-eminently the nature of the thing and the participation derived from it. Things that participate incompletely are named by participation in it, but not, indeed, with a name that signifies pre-eminently this thing. For example, we say that what is still coming to be exists, but do not speak of it as ‘being’,366 and we say that something has been whitened when not yet completely so, but not that it is white. Also we say that men are practising medicine or playing the harp when still learning, but certainly do not call them doctors or harpists, and we say that children are running or drawing, but not that they are athletes or artists. But we say that those who are fully trained are harpists and that they are playing the harp, and similarly in the other cases. In that way the philosopher also calls living things those that are characterised by a complete life which is aroused from themselves, and, among these, primarily those that are active from and towards themselves, secondarily those that are active from themselves on others, in between, those active in both directions, and these according to different measures. All these he both calls living things and says that they are alive. But such things as are incomplete and do not have their arousal purely from within, but one that is between this and being wholly externally changed – these, he says, are alive, but does not also call them animals, in order that the self-and the externally-changed (e.g. those that live in accordance with a vegetative soul) should not be made continuous with an intermediate. Therefore, in indicating the difference of all animate things from the inanimate, he distinguishes them by their living, which is common to living things of every kind; but when he distinguishes being alive from being an animal, it is very clear that being alive through an incomplete participation in life is being added on. For to live through a complete participation fits the animal.367

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413a22  and we say that the thing is alive if any one of these alone be present, such as intellect, sensation, and what follows [change of and rest in place, and growth.] For we say that the thing is alive in which any of these is present. Intellect is taken as exhibiting rational life, in which deliberation is included, sensation not as solely signifying knowledge which is called non-rational but also the desire that is bound up with it.368 So intellect and sensation are pre-eminently indicative of life, changes of vital activities, that of place being present primarily in the more advanced living things, that involving nutritive alteration in all mortal beings.

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413a25 That is why plants seem to be alive. [For they seem to have within themselves a potentiality and a principle such that through it they acquire growth and decay in opposite directions. For they do not grow upwards and not downwards, but equally in both and every direction if they are continually fed and live long enough until they can take their nourishment.] Because of nutrition and growth and decay. ‘Seem’ got its place because of the incompleteness of this kind of life and the disputed territory between what lives and what does not. Hence the need for persuasion to believe that plants are alive. For if everything that receives an increment from other things receives it in one part and not equally in all opposite directions (for even if you were to add something spherically to bronze, you will not increase it also in depth), it is clear that things which grow in every direction will have an internal cause of increment, and growth is a kind of change. So since they have a principle of change in them we rightly consider them to be alive. Once again exhibiting the mean position of this life, he calls it a potentiality and a principle, by principle presenting its authority, by potentiality its incompleteness and its arousal from outside. It was in such contexts that the philosopher was accustomed most often to use the word ‘potentially’. Such a form of life is necessary for all mortals. Through it they are born and reared and persist, since it is the most corporeal form of life and has the same extent as they, and therefore is the lowest and an impure form of life. But if such living things are not wholly aroused by themselves, but by another, what is it that arouses them from outside? Perhaps, being similar to things that are changed by something else, they too would be changed in this way, like the elements by nature and what gives them subsistence, that is, by something else external to them. For even things aroused as wholes from within are also aroused by what gives them subsistence. But because of their fusion with it, and the more they are fused with the cause, the more

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these are self-arousing.369 But things externally changed have, through their separation, an external transmission of arousal. 413a31 This form of life can be separated from the others. But the others cannot be separated from this in the case of mortals. It is clear [in the case of plants, for they possess no other psychic capacity.] For this form of life is immediately in charge of mortal bodies, and restores them by supplement. Others are not to be found in mortals without this, for by it they are both born and nurtured. 413b1 So life is present in all living things through this principle, [but being an animal is due to sensation. For we call animals, and not just living things, even things that do not move nor change their place but have sensation.]

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Not absolutely any form of life (for there are the intellectual and sensible lives), but that distinguished from animal life, the incomplete and lowest form of life. He makes the distinction by saying ‘life is present through this, but being an animal is primarily due to sensation’. 413b4 The first form of sensation present to all is touch. [As nutrition can be separated from touch and all sensation, so touch can be separated from other sensation. We say that the nutritive is that part of the soul in which plants also have a share, while all animals appear to be endowed with the sensation of touch. We shall give later the explanation of these two facts.]

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For it is the most corporeal and passive of all forms of sensation, which is why it can grasp only things that are near. For taste also is conjoined with touch. It is the most necessary for animals, as will be stated later.370 413b10 Now let it be stated merely that the soul is the principle of the above-mentioned [and is defined by them, nutrition, sensation, thought and change.]

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By ‘the above-mentioned’ he means intellect, sensation, and the life of nutrition and change, by principle the formal cause. But the soul is such as not to be what partakes in them, but the intellectual and sensitive limit.371 But since the soul is not the undivided form, nor the very first determinant, but has declined into rational evolution, he said not only that it is the principle of these facts but that it is

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determined by them. For he assigns to the soul ‘both together’ from the extremes, viz. being a principle in such a way as to be in a way determined. Of these, being a principle belongs properly to that prior to the soul, being determined to that posterior to it. By using the word ‘thought’372 rather than ‘intellect’ he shows as before that by ‘intellect’ he refers to reason.

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413b13 Whether each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, [and, if a part, whether so as to be separate only conceptually or also in place ] Since all the above mentioned forms of life belong to rational animals, he proposes to consider whether each is the actuality of different bodily parts, so that the soul will have parts similarly to the body. Since at the end of Book 1 he did not treat each as a soul,373 but all as parts of one soul, it is for the sake of the completeness of the division that he now raises the very question that has been decided, whether each of these is a self-sufficient soul or a part of soul. But he offers no answer to the first question, since he has sufficiently answered it there; for the rest he examines whether they are parts in such a way as to be distinguished from each other only conceptually, i.e. by their properties, or also by place, the different forms of life being situated in different parts of the body, as Timaeus374 seems to locate reason in the head, anger in the heart, appetite in the liver. But he himself utterly separates theoretical reason from the body, and, concerning the other forms of life, he thinks that, because of the fact that sometimes the bodily parts are prepared for the reception of different forms of life, they are not themselves to be divided from each other in a similar way, many being able to be present in the same portion at the same time. For the partition of the soul is different, if it is right to speak of parts in its case, from that of the body, and he shows at once the declension of the soul in relation to the forms through division of whatever sort, and its superiority in relation to body through the presence of them all in one body.

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413b15  it is not hard to see in regard to some of these, but some raise a problem. [For, as in the case of plants, some when divided can be seen to live even when separated from each other.] I do not, following Alexander, think that he says that some raise a problem because of intellect.375 For he has positively declared already that it does not hold the body together, and he immediately adds that matters concerning theoretical power were not yet clear, since the complete theory about it had not yet been handed down, but that

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there is a kind of soul that is different and separated as the everlasting from the perishable. But in some cases – those of vegetation, nutrition, growth and generative power – it is easy to see the unity, and, in the case of animals, those of sensation and desire. For in divided plants the whole vegetative soul is present in them, and also each part of insects both has sensation and moves for a time. Some, however, raise a problem – sight, hearing, smell, taste – since they use separate organs. First, one might judge about these also in comparison with the other senses that they stand apart severally not in themselves but through their organs, each of which has come to be for a different sensation; second, the concurrence of them all into one shows the union of these also with each other, which will call honey both yellow and sweet and well-scented.376 413b18  as if the soul in them was in actuality one to each plant, but potentially multiple 

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Not the one soul being divided into several parts, for then it would be divisible like a homogeneous body, the one in the plant being present also in the cutting to an extent, and making it suitable for the inheritance of its own soul, when it has taken. So the souls in a single plant are multiple potentially, in that they will be present as multiple in it when divided into shoots that have taken. 413b19  in the same way we see this happening in regard to other differences in the soul [in the case of insects when they have been cut up. For not only does each part have sensation and change of place ]

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413b24 But nothing is yet clear concerning intellect and the power of contemplation, [but it looks to be a different kind of

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soul, and this alone seems capable of being separate, as the everlasting from the perishable.] Because he both recognises as intellect the purely indivisible substance superior to the soul, but also calls intellect that which is passable in involvement with the rational life that proceeds and is conjoined with the vital powers of a bodily form, and, in addition, the practical reason that makes use of each form of life but does not consist of them, in order to designate the reason that does not even make use of them, he both calls this intellect, and assigns to it a ‘contemplative power’, by ‘power’ signifying its declension in relation to the superior intellect, since Aristotle does not use the word ‘power’ at all in the case of the indivisible substance, but ‘activity’, while by ‘theoretical’ he reveals its regression into itself and into the superior.377 It is about this that he says that nothing is clear, since the definition of the soul that has been given is also not suitable to contemplative reason qua contemplative and not unified with the bodily forms of life.378 The reverse is true, since contemplation consists in the fact of being separated from them. By this it is clear that reason is another kind of soul which by nature can be separated, alongside those souls not separated from bodies, which now makes up a single substance with them, as being, together with the body, a composite substance, but which at times forsakes all the secondary souls. He did not say ‘it looks’ tentatively, as Alexander thinks, nor is that use of ‘looks’ common among the ancients, but as an alternative to ‘is suitable to be’ and ‘it is apparently’.379 Also the rational soul is different in essence from the others, being both altogether separate from them at times and everlasting, while those perish which are specifically actualities of the perishable body. Certainly it is separate also from all those souls that are unseparated from whatsoever body. For contemplation is a separate activity, and is the activity of a separate substance that is totally alive, or rather, is that very thing, life itself, filling the whole of itself with contemplation. It is neither divisible, as also no other form is, least of all one that is cognitive, nor does it even use the divisible, since it proceeds by terms and because of its convergence towards itself and the indivisible. By this it is also proved to be everlasting; for it will neither be torn asunder as divisible, nor will it fall to pieces like a composite, since it is simple, nor like the forms that are divided out whose matter falls apart, since it is separate. So reason alone is separate, since the other forms of life all have activities of a bodily kind.

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413b27 From these considerations it is clear that the other parts of the soul are not separate, as some say. It is clear that they are different in account. [For to be sensitive and to have opinions are different, if to sense and to opine are different, and likewise with each of the other states mentioned. Further, all of them are present in some animals, in some some of them, in others one only, and this fact creates a difference in kinds of animals. Why this is so, we must consider later. The situation is much the same with different kinds of sensation. Some animals have them all, some some of them, others only one, the one that is most essential, touch.] Parts not like bodily ones, (for this has been proved) but because of the declension from the undivided. He said ‘the other’ since the contemplative intellect is a part through its tendency outside and its involvement with the inferior. These parts are not, as Timaeus says, spatially separate, dwelling in different parts of the body.380 He well establishes the different properties of the co-present forms of life, starting from their different forms of activities. For if sensing is different from opining, so is the sensitive from the opinionative and sensation from opinion. A difference between different kinds of living thing is made by either all forms of life being present, as in man, or not all but most, as in other animals, or one only, the vegetative, as in plants.381 By the above he seems to me also to hint at the internal difference within each form of life. For sensation with reason is not the same as nor wholly without difference from that without reason,382 nor even that which excites determinate images from that of indeterminate imagination. That is why there are different levels in each form of life and also much difference in vegetative life, which either nurtures a rational organism, or a beast that has local motion, or only sensation, or that which lives without sensation and is rooted in the earth. He will give the explanation of these facts a little later. 414a4 Since that by which we live and that by which we sense are ambiguously named, as is that by which we know, [for we say that it is knowledge or the soul, since we say that we know by each of these, and similarly we are healthy either by health or by a part of or even the whole of the body...] It is established that the soul is a form, in the case of mortals not like that which is self-contained and without matter, but of an organic body. For these reasons he takes it that it is a life-giving form, because that is how the animate differs from the inanimate. He then distinguishes causes from effects and places the soul among causes – not material ones, but formal, with which the efficient and final run

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parallel; he also marks off its effects and exhibits the soul as being present in living things as the prime substance. For the natural body, such as is the matter of living things, is a substance, as is, more centrally, the animate living thing, but prior to them and superior the soul as being a self-subsistent substance. For every form is the primary substance and self-subsistent, even more so that which gives life. In distinguishing the formal cause from that to which it gives form with regard to matters now before us for consideration, he says that that by which we live is ambiguously named, not meaning matter. For we do not say that matter is that by which we live but that by which we are able to live, since matter introduces the potential, but that by which we live exhibits life in actuality. But this may be (1) form or (2) the composite, the former being actuality and perfection as form, the latter the composite which exists in actuality and is perfect. For in the same way we say that we know either by knowledge as form or by the soul, not that which is not yet, but that which is already cognitive, and that we are healthy either by health as the form or by the healthy body, but not that which does not partake, though of a nature to partake, unless potentially. 414a8  and of these knowledge and health are shape383 and a sort of form and account [and, as it were, the activity of what receives them, the one of the cognitive, the other of what receives health; (for the activity of qualities seems to belong to what has them and is affected) and the soul is that by which we live and sense and think primarily, so that it must be some account of it and form, but not as are matter and substrate.384 For ‘substance’ has three referents, as we said, one of which is form, another matter, another that composed of these ] He has said this clearly, that knowledge and health are taken as equivalent to form, and, through this, that what lives by soul lives by form, but he no longer seems to speak clearly in part of the rest, since he supplies no apodosis to the conjunction. But even if there is something lacking in the words, the facts are fully explained. For, having called form the activity of what receives it, since it is not self-contained but belongs to something else, he adds what that is that receives it, that it is the cognitive and what receives health, which are clearly already such in activity, and which are also receptive since they are defined in terms of what they receive. It is clear that in the other way we know by one of these and are healthy by the other. This that is given the form he calls what is affected and disposed, as being determined and perfect with respect to something else. The form that determines these he calls efficient as extending

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out to what is in procession and being an activity indeed and perfection, but of something else. So as is knowledge to the cognitive, so is the soul to what lives.385 ‘So that it must be some principle of it and form, but not as matter and substrate.’ From the comparison with the latter, he ascribes more plainly the ‘form’ of living things to the soul. For he does not ascribe to it ‘matter’ not yet living, nor ‘matter’ already living, which he called ‘substrate’, referring to what is controlled and secondary and subordinate to it. The primary position is plainly ascribed to the soul, as being life and first and a self-subsistent substance, while the animate live and have their being through it and by its agency. 414a16  of these matter is potentiality, form actuality, [since that composed of both is the animate, the body is not the actuality of the soul, but it of some body. Therefore those think rightly who believe that the soul is neither without body, nor some sort of body. For it is indeed not body but belongs to body and therefore is present in a body, and in such and such a body, and not as according to earlier thinkers who filled it into a body without first determining in which and in what kind, though not anything whatsoever appears to receive anything whatsoever. It comes about thus quite reasonably; for the actuality of each body naturally comes into that which potentially belongs to it and its appropriate matter. So it is apparent from these considerations that the soul is a certain actuality and principle of that which has the potential to become of a certain sort.386]

CHAPTER 3 [Of the powers of the soul mentioned, all belong to some, some possess all, as we said,387 some possess some, and some only one. The powers mentioned were the nutritive, the sensitive, and those of desire, change of place and thought. To plants only the nutritive power belongs, to others this and that of sensation. But if they have that of sensation they will also have that of desire. Now desire is appetite, spirit and rational wish, and all animals have at least one sense, that of touch. But that which possesses sensation possesses also pleasure and distress, that which is pleasant and that which distresses, and what possesses these also has appetite. For this is desire for the pleasant. Also they have a sensation of food, since touch is sensation of food.]

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It is well that we were not told that matter was that by which we live. For life involves perfection, but matter is a potentiality as being by nature imperfect. But of what is the soul the actuality? He says: of the animate. For that is what is a compound of both, and as we characterise the medical man by medicine and the healthy man by health,388 so from the animate we are led up to the soul as its determinant. For it will be to body or soul; but body is indeterminate and is contrarily opposed to the animate when segregated on its own. But the soul, if segregated on its own, would certainly be a completion, but this is clearly of a certain body – the animate. So he rightly praises those who thought that the soul was neither body nor without body. For the rational element that is separate is especially called intellect by him, but then even this is also an actuality of bodies in its inclination outside, in the way that the sailor is of his boat. But since the life-giving actuality is double, (1) as that which characterises the instrument, to make it an instrument (2) as that which uses the instrument, it is necessary to understand also ‘being without body’ and ‘being related’ to body in two ways, and also belonging to a body that is not any chance one but an organic one suitable for each sort of organic life. For the potential in each case is of the same kind as its actuality, and this relationship is absolutely essential – that the actuality of each should belong in the kindred potentiality. With regard to this he reminded us again of the life-giving potentialities, how many there were and of what sort, how one alone can belong to some, the nutritive; to animals the sensitive in addition; and how a kind of desire follows on this, since both pleasure and distress, the pleasant and the distressing, are added, some as being certain affections of the sensitive, some as producing affections, both being discerned by sensation. He also said what sort of desire follows for all that have sensation, that it is appetite, not being for the good like rational wish, nor for victory or honour or revenge like spirit, but for the sensibly pleasant; and he adds the explanation that they have a sensation of food, while pleasure accompanies food and distress the lack of it. He justifies this on the ground that animals have a sensation of food, touch, which is present also in all animals.

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414b7  for all animals feed on things dry and wet, hot and cold  For all bodies that come to be exemplify these qualities, and through these there are coming to be and perishing and such alterations as growth and diminution. Also touch is very obviously receptive of affective qualities.389

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414b9  and of other objects of sense indirectly; [for a noise or a colour or a smell contributes nothing towards nourishment, while taste is one sort of object of touch. Hunger and thirst are desire, hunger being for the dry and warm, thirst for the wet and cold. Taste is some sort of relish for these.] 35 106,1

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Also touch is an indirect sensation of other objects of sense, such as noises and colours. I do not, however, think that he means to say that, but that sensation is receptive of other objects of sense that are indirectly nourishing. He makes this clear by making the cause of what was said this very fact, that the others contribute nothing to nourishment. But since, as being sweet, taste is nourishing he adds first that taste is also among objects of touch (for the sense of taste belongs also to all that have touch), and then that the dry and the wet and tangible qualities are nourishing as such, while flavours contribute to nourishment as a relish of objects of touch. 414b14 Clarification about this must be provided later; [for the present let it be said just that those living things that have touch also have desire. About imagination it is unclear, and this must be investigated later. Some in addition possess the power of change of place, others also thought and intellect ]

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not only by what will be said in this work but also in Concerning Sensation and its Objects .390 For more exact distinctions are made there about flavours. Having first established that the affective qualities are nutritive by the fact that through them alterations come about, he gives evidence of the same from the life that is desirous of foods. For hunger and thirst are desires for nourishment, of which the former is for the attainment of the dry and warm, the latter for the cold and moist. For thirst is moved towards such comestibles as are cold and moist, while hunger grasps edibles that are drier and warmer. ‘About imagination it is unclear’, not because it does not belong to all animals, if one is willing to call imagination also the indeterminate and inarticulate consciousness of the absence of objects of touch. But it is unclear because sometimes only that which is definite and involves memory is called imagination, sometimes also only that which is a capacity to become accustomed to certain things.391 Having said that those that have touch also have desire, he added also the power to change place, obviously not in all of them, but because this also is among those having power of sensation, as is also the power to think.

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414b18  as do men, or if there is something else of this sort, similar or still more estimable. Something else of this sort similar would be a human soul separated from this solid body, but still using an externally affected body of finer parts. More estimable, if he were to suppose some demonic species which sometimes itself also proceeded into an externally affected body. If the heavenly objects are also living things, and they have sensation and desire, but are not externally affected nor aroused by objects of sense received from outside, but have internal knowledge of all objects of sensation and will harmonise them, in that case ‘more estimable’ would be applied not only to demons, but also to divine living things.

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414b19 So it is clear that there should be a single account of soul in the same way as there is of figure. We have anticipated this, having already determined that in the case of things named from and contributing to one thing, while it is necessary to give some single account, this does not suffice for an exact theory without what is proper to each kind.392 In that way ‘figure’ is predicated of things falling under it not only on its own but also as in ‘rectilinear figure’, first of triangles, second of polygons, since the triangle is present in all the others. But also ‘soul’ is predicated in the same way of different souls. Univocal predicates are also unseparated from what falls under them, but in these cases, even if not separated, still there is one common single nature that is other than the things of which it is predicated without internal distinction and, since it is one, also encompassed in a single account. But where there is the primary and the secondary, what is common is not without internal distinction, but differing in each case. For that reason we do not say that the predicate is a single nature, but that this whole is a single plurality, nor that there is a single account of what is common, but that there is a need for a distinction of the nature proper to each kind in addition to the common account.393 That is why Aristotle also gave the common account, since what is derived from one thing is not altogether equivocal, and yet does not accept it as exact, but rather that which is proper to each soul, so as to give the common account in a way proper to each.394

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414b21 For neither is there figure in addition to triangularity and the rest in that area [nor here soul in addition to those kinds mentioned. But there could be a common account in the case of figures which would fit them all, but it will be proper to no figure; likewise in the case of the kinds of soul mentioned.] Not because what is common is not separate, but because there is not one distinguishable nature in all cases. ‘Nor here soul in addition to those kinds mentioned.’ For each is not soul in the same way, since it is not an actuality in the same way, nor is each unseparated or separate from bodies in the same way. Is then ‘living thing’ not univocally predicated of both men and horses, since it includes differences? Or in this case are they dividing differences, dividing animals, perhaps into rational and non-rational?395 But in the other cases there is not univocality when that which constitutes what is predicated is different, as in the case of the perishable or imperishable living thing, because being perishable or imperishable would not be dividing differences that divide kinds of animals. They would rather be dividing differences of substance, but constitutive differences of what falls under substance. And so the perishable is separated from the imperishable by a constitutive difference. In this way, then, are not dividing differences but constitutive differences of souls: being separate and unseparated, and being separate in a way, unseparated in another, or utterly unseparated, and that which makes use of a body as an instrument as unseparated, or that which gives character to the instrument. For these are dividing differences of the incorporeal substance as such. In these cases the common definition fits them all, to the extent that it is not altogether equivocal, but will be proper to none. For it is so neither to any form qua form, for if it were it would fit none of the others, nor one common to all, since what is common is not a single nature, since the predication is not univocal. 414b25 For this reason it is laughable to seek a common account both in these cases and in others which will not be the individual account of anything there is and will not apply to the appropriate individual species, while omitting an account of that sort.

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is common because there is no such single thing, nor to any of the indivisible species.

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414b28 The matter is much the same concerning the soul as it is concerning figures. [For the prior is always potentially present in the next in the series, both in the case of figures and the case of the animate, as the triangle in the quadrilateral and the nutritive in the sensitive. So the enquiry must be about each in turn, what soul each has, a plant, a man, or a wild animal. One must investigate for what reason they stand in this serial relation. For there is no sensation without nutrition, but nutrition is separated from sensation in the case of plants. Again, without touch none of the other senses is present, but touch is, without the others. For many animals have neither sight nor hearing, nor a sense of smell, and of those having sensation some have change of place, some do not. Finally, the least number has reason and thought. For those of perishable beings that can reason have all the rest, but of those who have each of these not all can reason.] In all cases of derivation from a single case there is a first, a second and a third. What is present in the first is also present in those subsequent, even if altered and always in different and different ways. That which primarily partakes of what is common is not altogether and itself in the subsequent cases. At any rate, substance which is the primary reality is not present in the accidental attributes. But in the case of figures the triangle is present in the quadrilateral and the nutritive is in the sensitive. But not in the same way even in these. For the triangle is not actually present in the quadrilateral as it was on its own, nor is the nutritive present in the sensitive as on its own. For it is altogether inseparably in plants, but in animals the element of use appears more obvious and is in correspondence with sensation. For the soul of these others that have sensation is a whole through the whole of itself, so that its nutritive element is, as it were, fused with the sensitive.396 So he well concludes that it is necessary to give the proper account for each species, in order that we should not rest content with what is common. He intends next to add the reason, as he promised earlier on, why some vital powers exist without the others, but not the others without these, but first he declares which are the powers of each sort.397 What he says is clear. But since eternal beings also partake in reasoning, while reasoning manifests practical intellect, and he himself says that heavenly beings also are practical in On the Heavens ,398 and it is clear that reasoning among them is not imperfect and that their practice is not to satisfy some need, he rightly states

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that the other forms of life are not present in all beings that can reason, but only in the perishable. 415a10  but some do not even have imagination. 30

He now is calling imagination the definite type which includes memory and is a capacity for accustomisation. 415a11 The account of theoretical intellect is different. [It is clear that an account of each of the kinds is very appropriate in the case of soul also.]

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He is not referring to theoretical intellect in imperishable beings but to ours. For he also emphasised about reasoning that for perishable beings it does not occur without the rest, since this was not a philosophical account of that in imperishable beings, but of ours. For in them alone should there be some sort of reasoning which is neither incomplete nor deliberative and uncertain, as Plato also maintains about the demiurge himself.399 But he is speaking of the theoretical element in us, since it is not as it is in imperishable beings, where it is unlike our practical or the passive intellect. Of these the passive is linked with other forms of life, while the practical makes use of them. Now the theoretical intellect is neither of these. So the account of it is different both from that concerned with things higher than our own and from that concerning the other life-giving powers, since it is in us but is not suited to being an actuality. He concludes that the most exact account of the soul is the proper definition of each kind of soul, since it will also include what is common suited to the individual nature of each. He next hands down the method of study concerning each of them.400 CHAPTER 4 415a14 Anyone who intends to make an investigation of the kinds of soul [must grasp what each of them is, then, in the same way, inquire into what comes next and the rest. If one has to say what each of them is, such as what the intellectual or the sensitive is, or the nutritive, one must first say what intellection is and what it is to sense.401]

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Investigation is what he calls scientific discovery. For this intuits the form and what it is to be such pre-eminently, and thence inspects also the thing defined and its essential properties. He refers to the form

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by ‘what it is’, and to the thing defined by ‘the next’, and to its other attributes by ‘the rest’. But how shall we know what it is to be each kind of thing? From its activities, he says, and its actions. For we also know both that it is a living thing from its vital activities and that it is rational from its rational activities, and what an animal is and what a rational one is. Then he adds the explanation also of how we are led up to essence from activities.

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415a18 For activities and actions are prior to powers in capacities in order.402 [If that is so, and we ought to have studied their correlates even earlier, one should first decide about them for the same reason, for example about food, objects of sense and objects of intellect. So first we must speak about food and generation. For the nutritive soul belongs also to the rest, and it is the first and most universal power of the soul, through which life is present in all.] just as for us things informed are prior to their forms and we have to turn our gaze on the informed in order to grasp what it is to be each thing. But the informed, sometimes in activity, sometimes not, is clearly more perfect and clearer to the knower when active. For the potential is both less perfect than what is in activity and not yet an object of knowledge, and, while temporally prior in the case of each generated thing, is logically posterior, since the imperfect is recognised and interpreted via the perfect. ‘If that is so’: if our knowledge of what a thing is comes from its activities, and the activities from the things in relation to which we recognise the activities – the nutritive activity from food as altering it, the generative and cognitive activities as active in accordance with their form, the one from the offspring engendered as creativity, the other from the object known as judgement – if so, it is necessary to make sure about these objects which are correlates, clearly in the relational sense. In that way what nourishes is related to nourishment and object known to knowledge. For, as is said in the Categories,403 qua object of sense colour is simultaneous with sensation, qua colour it is naturally prior. But this is worth consideration: even in relationships the cause is prior to the caused, as is also stated in that work. The object of knowledge has priority as what is sought has over the seeker and as determination over what is determined. For the same reason as that through which activity is before potentiality, so is the object of knowledge before knowledge; for it is prior by nature. But if we begin from below the vegetative soul shows up as first and most universal, because it belongs of necessity to all mortals, and that through which

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all things have life is called prior in distinction from the life of animals. 415a25 For bringing to birth and the use of food are its functions. For it is the most natural of the functions of such living things404 as are perfect and not defective, nor are born spontaneously, to create another like themselves, as animal an animal, [a plant a plant, in order that they may partake of everlastingness and divinity in the way that is possible. For everything seeks that and for the sake of that it carries out its natural activities.]

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He is including growth also in nourishment. So nourishment also contributes to existence, but generation is the most natural function in vegetative life, i.e. it is first and most important as contributing to everlastingness in the way that is possible for mortals, which he rightly praises as divine. For by existing, and still more by living for ever, things partake of the divine. Therefore, in striving towards divinity, everything seeks everlastingness in the way that is possible for it. But it is not surprising that among the individuals of a species some are defective, either naturally impaired like the sterile or externally like eunuchs. But that there are whole species that are born spontaneously is worth consideration, no individual in them contributing to the birth of another. For there might be, through being at the lowest end, even whole species proceeding thus, so that all the individuals of the species exist without offspring, and such as to be collective defectives among living things. Even plants seek divinity through their very vitally aroused grasp of the form. For one should not take seeking an end to be always cognitive, but also to be a grasp of the superior by essential power, if even matter may be said to aim at the divine. 415b2 ‘Being for the sake of ’ has two aspects – for what and for whom. [Since they cannot have a share in eternity and divinity by continuity, because nothing mortal can continue numerically the same, each thing shares in it in the way that it can, to a greater or lesser degree, and continues not as itself but as like itself, not numerically one, but one in kind.]

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As that by which we live is double – being either the form or the informed, so that for the sake of which, i.e. the end, is sometimes perfection and goodness, sometimes the perfect and what is made good. Of these one is such as excellence and health, the other as the worthy man and the healthy man, the one for what – what may be

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achieved – the other for whom – for whom it comes about to partake of it. What follows is clear, that mortals are everlasting as species and not by their own continuity, since they do not remain numerically the same, but are separate from each other. 415b7 The soul of the living body is its cause and principle. [These terms are ambiguous, but the soul is cause in the three senses distinguished. For the soul is cause as the source of change, that for the sake of which and as the essence of animate bodies.]

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There are causes in four ways.405 He treats the soul as the cause of living things in the three ways other than as the material cause. 415b12 It is clearly so as essence: [for essence is the cause of being for everything, but life is the being of living things and the soul is the cause and principle of this. Also the actuality is the rational principle of what exists potentially. It is plain that the soul is cause as that for the sake of which; for as the intellect acts for the sake of something, nature does so in the same way, and that is its goal.] i.e. as form . ‘For essence is the cause of being for everything.’ For all causes contribute to the being of that of which they are causes, but the material cause as receptive and a necessary condition, the efficient as bringing to be by birth, the final as towards perfection and according to nature, the form simply of being. Since the composite has its being through form, as the living thing through life and the animate through the soul, so, since form is the cause of being simply and without qualification either as perfect being or through birth, but of being as such, and life the cause of the being of living things without qualification, and soul is the cause of life, therefore the soul will be the cause of living things as form. But he reminds us of the same fact also through the definition given of soul. For the actuality of what is potentially of any sort is its formal cause. For the composite is potentially the effect and the form is the actuality. But the soul is the actuality of the potentially living, so that he refers to the form as being the essence. He proves that the soul is the cause of living things also as end, having presupposed that that for the sake of which is to be found not only in things done by us rationally and intellectually, but also in natural events as he proved in Physics Book 2, because that for the sake of which is the end.406

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415b17 The soul is such in living things and in accordance with nature.407 [For all natural bodies are instruments of the soul, of those of plants as well as those of animals, since they exist for the sake of the soul.]

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‘Such’ instead of ‘for the sake of which and the end’, which he proved through the bodies of both animals and plants being instruments of the soul. For instruments are for the sake of their user, so that it may act. ‘And in accordance with nature’ is added as providing the beginning of a proof of the same thing. For in natural things the perfect and perfection constitute their good. But we say that the perfect is what is in accordance with nature. But since soul is the best for things that live naturally, and therefore in accordance with nature, and this is the end, the soul must be the end for things that live naturally. 415b20 Being for the sake of is spoken of in two ways, for what and for whom.

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He again reminded us of this in order that we may treat the soul as cause but not as the best end among possible results. For that also is the end as for whom, but the soul is so as for what, since the soul is the cause of living things, not only of life but also of perfect living. 415b21 But the soul408 is also the prime source of change of place [This power is not possessed by all living things. Change of quality and growth are also through the soul. For sensation seems to be a sort of change of quality, but nothing is sensitive which does not partake of soul, and the case is the same with growth and diminution. For nothing decreases or grows naturally without nutrition, and nothing is nourished which does not have a share in life. Empedocles spoke wrongly when he added that growth comes about for plants downwards as they grow their roots because earth naturally tends that way, upwards because fire does likewise.409 He does not well understand up and down; for up and down are not the same for all things and for the universe, but, as the head is of animals, so are the roots of plants, if it is right to call organs the same and different by their functions. Further, what is it that holds together the fire and the earth that move in opposite directions? For they will be rent asunder, if there will be nothing to prevent it; if there will be something, that is the soul which is the cause of growth and nourishment.]

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The efficient cause is that which constitutes by bringing to be, so that which constitutes without bringing to be Aristotle does not call an

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efficient cause, but final. After an inquiry in Physics Book 8410 into what it is that gives the elements their natural motion, he shows that it is that which constitutes them. From this it follows conversely that the soul which naturally moves living things from within by mere impulse should be what constitutes them. For it would not have moved them of its own nature and by mere impulse without also being present as what also constitutes them. But since mortal bodies are not everlasting, it is clear that it constitutes them what they are through bringing to be. So he shows that the soul is also the efficient cause of living things through the fact that it changes them naturally as living things, all as growing and decreasing and, in a word, being nourished, which are quantitative changes, and all animals also qualitatively, since they all have sensation and are qualitatively changed in having sensations, most of them also through411 change of place from within. But it is plain that change of place from within and sensory qualitative change are caused by the soul. But nourishment might seem not to be caused by the soul, since some inanimate things seem to be nourished, since they both increase and decrease and since some ascribe the cause of nourishment to the elements.412 These one must treat as contributory causes,413 but not as causing the change, but the soul. For, as has already been said, ‘nothing is nourished that does not have a share in life’, since addition to the inanimate does not occur in every part of them. But not even among living things is growth because of the travel of particles, as Empedocles seems to say in the case of plants, rooting being through the downward movement of earth, growth upwards because of fire. For, first, up and down are not the same for the universe and for living things. For if, in plants at any rate, roots are at the top, if they are analogous to the head of animals and the controlling parts, earth ought to go downwards as for plants, and fire towards the trunk. For in animals the earthy goes to the bones, the warm to the heart and the liver.414 But also why are the parts not torn asunder from each other, if one part travels upwards, the other down? And why do they not leave the plant, the warmth upwards, the earth under the roots? Or what brings both together into each part? Or what determines how far the growth should go? If anything, that is the soul. For every form preserves as being that through which, but the soul is not the cause of living things only as form, but also as efficient cause. 416a9 But some think that the nature of fire on its own is the cause of nourishment and growth. [For this alone among bodies can be seen to nourish and increase itself, whence one might suppose that in plants and in animals also this is what is at

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work. But it is perhaps a contributory cause, but not simply the cause; that is rather the soul. For the increase of fire is without limit so long as there is fuel ]

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Empedocles, even if obscurely, still quite obviously treats the elements as contributory causes of nourishment. For he treated bodies as causes. But some regard not fire but the nature of fire, i.e. its defining form, as being absolutely and dominantly the cause of nourishment, offering as evidence that it alone among the elements is nourished. For as we regard the fiery form as the cause of upward travel, so of nourishment also, if fire as such is nourished, so that both plants and animals are nourished through the presence of fire. But fire is not nourished, since it does not persist, but continually comes to be, sometimes greater than before when it gets a hold on new material. Nor is it absolutely and dominantly a cause, but rather a contributory cause, of nourishment. For the soul uses it as it causes change. At the same time he proves that fire is not nourished in itself, and that that is proper to the animate, so that we rightly count the soul as cause by the fact that fire increases without limit by burning. 416a16  but there is a limit and ratio [of size and growth for things that are naturally constituted. These are through the soul, not fire, and through ratio more than through matter.]

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The form is to be regarded as the cause of size and their other natural characteristics not only in the case of the animate but for all natural things, and, in accordance with form, the rational evolution proceeding into division from the undivided state. For procession is through intermediate states. So form is the limit as the undivided determinant, reason the intermediate simultaneous collection and division.415 Fire alone is not to be counted as cause, nor a natural body, but the soul’s rational principle is to be treated as cause.416 For growth is rather through rational principle than through matter. Fire is its material cause, but the soul as rational principle, and therefore ‘more than’ it. For the one is in change, the other is its source. 416a18 Since the same power of the soul is nutritive and genetic, it is necessary first to describe food. [For it is demarcated from the other powers by this function.]

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He has shown that it is not bodies nor the natural form of body that is the source of nutrition, but a certain soul that is primitive. He presumes that even if the same soul is also genetic one should still speak first about the nutritive power, since also we are starting from the most primitive, and bringing to birth is a more advanced activity.

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And since the seed follows from nutrition, whether it be a superfluity of food or a portion of the body, as according to those who said that it was blood or marrow,417 or some other product of nature, the product is surely incomplete. So since the discussion concerns the nutritive power, we must first speak about food; for this, understood as equivalent to that which nourishes, is the correlate of nutrition in the category of relation, so that nutrition may be understood as equivalent to being fed. He marks it off from the other psychic powers by this function of nutrition and feeding.

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416a21 Nourishment seems to be of contrary by contrary, [but not everything by everything, but such contraries as are not merely generated from each other but also increased. For many things come to be from each other, but not all gain in quantity, e.g. the healthy from the sickly. But even the former appear not to be food for each other in the same way, water418 being food for fire, while fire does not nourish water. So it seems to be specially among simple bodies that one feeds, the other is fed. But this raises a problem. For some say that like is fed by like, and grows in the same way, while others, as we have said, believe the reverse – opposite by opposite – on the ground that like does not affect like, but food must be transformed and digested. But transformation for everything is into the opposite or intermediate. Also food is affected by what is fed, but this is not by the food, just as the carpenter is not affected by his wood, but this is by him. But the carpenter transforms only into activity from non-function. But it makes a difference whether food is what is added in its final or in its first state. If both, but the latter is undigested, the former digested, it would be possible to call it food in either state. For qua undigested opposite is fed by opposite, qua digested like by like. So it is clear that both parties are in a way right and wrong. But, since nothing is nourished that does not partake in life, what is nourished must be the animate body qua animate.] Since, as he will say, (1) the digested, (2) the undigested are both called food, and the first is like, the second opposed to that which is being nourished, he calls the latter also contrary, not as form to form, since that which nourishes and that which is nourished are both substances, but as the privation of what is being nourished is parasitic upon what nourishes. For what is being nourished is potential, and the contraries are like form and its privation. So also that which is being nourished must be transformed from its contrary, but that

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does not mean that everything transformed from its contrary is being nourished. For the transformation of what is not black into black or from disease into health is not nourishment; rather the transformation must be not merely qualitative, but also quantitative and substantial. For that is what common growth is. But even this is not nourishment, unless what nourishes is more material, what is nourished more formal. This too he substantiates from the case of those who make use of nourishment improperly in the case of elements. For they say that fire is fed but not water, though they come from each other. But if we are going to use ‘be nourished’ in its basic sense, ‘more formal’ must be understood to refer to the whole class of the superior in the way that the animate is different from the inanimate. For what is fed must be animate, but not necessarily that which nourishes. So nourishment will be through the transformation of the contrary, not merely qualitatively, but also quantitatively and substantially into an animate form, that which is nourished acting through being alive, that which nourishes being acted on and assimilated by that which is being nourished. For while still undigested, that which nourishes must be in a contrary state to that which is being nourished, in order that it may be acted on and transformed, since transformation is by the contrary, but it must be assimilated when digested, since in nourishment bone is added to bone, flesh to flesh and in general like to like. But also that which is being nourished must act on what nourishes it, completing what is potential in it and transforming it into a natural material. But, since also that which is now being nourished seems to be transformed from not being nourished to being nourished, he does not say that the transformation is brought about by what nourishes nor, in general, by being affected, but actively and from within, the nutritive life being transmuted from non-functioning into activity.419 416b10  so food also is relative to the animate, and not contingently. ‘Food’ is used as equivalent to ‘that which nourishes’. But since what nourishes and what is nourished stand in a reciprocal relationship, and the animate is nourished qua animate (obviously mortal), what nourishes could be said to be related as such to the animate and not accidentally, as slave is to man. For as being on the right is determined from the liver, so being nourished by the animate. Therefore it is also nourished qua animate.

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416b11 Being food is different from causing growth. [If the animate be considered as a quantity, there is a cause of growth, if it be considered as a particular thing and substance, there is food. For it preserves the substance, which lasts just so long as it is fed ] Certainly what nourishes is transformed in substance and is added as a quantum. It is transformed in substance as having become the same in substance as that which is nourished. But in that way it nourishes, while as an added quantity it causes growth. For the animate is nourished as being preserved as the same substance through the addition, while it grows through the addition of quantity after efflux, obviously when the influx is greater than the efflux, but still even when it is equal or less because of the addition in size after the efflux.

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416b15  and it brings things to be, [not the thing nourished, but something like it. For that is already in being and nothing brings itself to be, but it preserves itself. So such a principle in the soul is a power to preserve what has it as such, while food makes it fit to be active. So, if deprived of food, it cannot exist. But since there are three things, what is nourished, that with which it is nourished and what nourishes it, what nourishes is the first soul, what is nourished is what possesses that soul, what it is nourished with is food. But since it is correct to name everything from its end, but the end is to generate something like itself, the first soul must be what generates its like.420] That nourishment is through substantial transformation is clear from this. For something comes to be, even if not that which is nourished, since it exists already, but something like that which is nourished. So the soul’s power of nourishment acts to preserve. But nourishment makes it fit to act, not as activating the vital power, but as supplementary matter suited to the activity, as the pieces of wood are for the carpenter. For the activity is not without nourishment, but the soul acts from within and of itself. Therefore that which nourishes is the first soul, being first by its closeness to body, but nourishing as being in control of all internal activity through which that which is nourished is fed by possessing it, and the food is transformed, assimilated and given a form like to that of what is fed. And the soul both preserves the substrate and increases it and brings to birth something similar. For it does so by giving a power to the otherwise imperfect sperm to receive the form of the same thing. That is also the best function of such a soul as being the cause of such everlastingness as is possible.

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416b25 ‘That with which it is nourished’ has double reference [in the way that ‘that with which it is steered’ refers to both hand and rudder, the one causing motion only, the other causing and being in motion.421 All food must be capable of being digested, and heat brings the digestion about. Therefore every animate being has warmth.] 30

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That nourishment is that with which a thing is nourished has been clearly stated already. But the food must be digested through warmth, though it is not that which nourishes primarily, (for it has already been said that the soul is the cause of nourishment, fire a contributory cause).422 So three things have been enumerated, that which nourishes, that with which a thing is nourished and that which is nourished; and ‘that with which it is nourished’ has a double reference, and heat will be included in it. So the soul is not to be understood as either referent of ‘that with which it is nourished’. For also the illustrations, the hand and the rudder, are intermediate between the soul as initiating motion and the ship that is moved. But if what it is fed with is intermediate, being the food and the warmth, how is it that both are not changed by the nutritive life? For both the hand and the rudder are by the soul of the steersman. Why then does he say that the one causes, the other causes and is caused? Perhaps both are changed by the nutritive life; but since of those things with which it is nourished one will initiate change, like heat in the living thing, the other being e.g. grain, that is changed by the heat but changes that which is nourished as immediately making it grow and preserving it. 416b30 That completes the outline account of nourishment.

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 because food is contrary in a way to what is nourished when undigested, like it when digested, and because it stands in the category of relation to the animate. By it that which is nourished, being animate, is preserved and increased, and this uses the nourishment, which is changed pre-eminently by the soul but is digested by the agency of heat, to beget its like. 416b30 Nourishment must be clarified further in the appropriate context.  i.e. in the earlier On the Generation of Animals and in On Coming to be and Passing Away.423, 424

Notes All the notes are by Peter Lautner unless otherwise indicated by the translator’s or general editor’s initials (J.O.U. or R.R.K.S. respectively). 1. Here ‘scientific knowledge’ translates epistêmê. 2. Reference presumably to Iamblichus’ De Anima, now lost; a work that may have been served as a manual for the author of this commentary (see 1,18-20; 6,16-17) and was cited by late Athenian Neoplatonists many times. For this and Book 1 in general, see H. Blumenthal, ‘Simplicius(?) on the First Book of Aristotle’s De Anima’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin-New York 1987, 91-112. 3. To explain the link between body and soul was regarded also by Plato (Phaedo 66C1-67B5) as most difficult, and Plotinus reflects on it at IV.8.2.42-5. 4. He touches this problem at 3,29-4,5 and discusses heavenly beings at 24,3425,3; 73,4-7; 74,27-33, and Book 3 of this commentary (215,13-25; 320,28-33). 5. PA 641a17-b10. (J.O.U.) 6. alloiôsis, translated throughout as ‘qualitative change’; phora, translated here as ‘travel’, is change of place. (J.O.U.) 7. Throughout nous is translated as ‘intellect’, noêtikon as ‘intellectual’, noêton as ‘intelligible’ and noeron as ‘intellective’. (J.O.U.) 8. Throughout ekei, when referring to the intelligible world, is translated as ‘THERE’. Similarly words denoting the world of becoming are translated as ‘HERE’. (J.O.U.) 9. Aristotle is interpreted here as thinking that one or more parts of the soul do not belong to the realm of physics and therefore the study of soul is neither simply natural nor simply metaphysical. In the Neoplatonic scheme, on the other hand, the soul, as independent hypostasis, retains the mediating (that is dynamic) function between sensible and intelligible worlds, and hence the study of soul includes both. 10. For en platei cf. in Cat. 239,7-8; 286,27; 287,31; 358,36, and in Phys. 628,21.30(en platei theôroumenôi).33; 629,9.11; 631,3; 637,26 (with reference to Syrianus, which indicates that en platei was known to at least some Athenian Neoplatonists); 647,37; 652,1.21.23.25; 907,17; 958,23; 959,14; 960,2. Carlos Steel points out (‘Priscianus Lydus in de “In de anima” van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34 (1972), 761-822, esp. p. 817) that, unlike en platei, the term kata bathos is never used by the genuine Simplicius in his commentary on the Categories, and regards this as another criterion of authenticity. But, one should add, Simplicius does use it at in De Caelo 507,10 where he speaks of kata bathos diaphora. Furthermore, the term occurs in Ammonius (in Isag. 97,9.12.22; in Cat. 43,4) and in Philoponus (in Cat. 60,22; 76,10; 91,5-6; 101,15; 137,14.18; 165,16) as well. 11. The first is natural science, the second is metaphysics.

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12. Op. cit., 255a7. (J.O.U.) 13. Reading phutikou vice phusikou. (J.O.U.) 14. PA 641b8-10; see 2,27-8. 15. Both Aristotle and our author include man among mortal animals. (J.O.U.) 16. DA 406b25 and Tim. 34A1-4. (J.O.U.) 17. DA 407a3-6. 18. ‘Reversion’ translates epistrophê, constituent of the basic triad (monê – ‘rest’, proodos – ‘procession’) in the philosophy of Proclus, cf. El. Theol. props. 25-39 (see the commentary in E.R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1933, 2nd ed. 1963, 213-23). The triad of rest-procession-reversion is basic insofar as it is not separate from other triads but inheres in them as their ground and moving principle. This triad belongs to the intellect as well, for thinking can be characterised as resting in itself, turning outwards (knowledge of external things) and returning to itself (self-knowledge). See also the thorough discussion in W. Beierwaltes, Proklos: Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main 1965, 2nd ed. 1979, 119-65. Some of his views were objected to by S.E. Gersh, Kinêsis akinêtos: A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus, Leiden 1973, 60-80. In this text, the author equates World-Soul with pure and intellective reason (logos), which indicates its affinity to the Intellect. He may get support from the division of the Intellect by Iamblichus (ap. Proclum, in Tim. II. 313,15-24 Diehl = fr. 60 of his in Tim. in J.M. Dillon, Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta, Leiden 1973). Accordingly, Iamblichus may be in line with those who connect Soul immediately to the Absolute Intellect. Relying on this doctrine, Proclus sets out a threefold division of the Intellect (in Tim. II 313,1-4 Diehl; in Alc. 65, vol. I, p. 53 Segonds). The souls of the gods participate in the middle level of it. Proclus obviously speaks of the World-Soul (he is commenting on Timaeus 37C), as probably did Iamblichus. Notice, however, that our author uses ‘whole soul’ (holê ) when referring to the World-Soul, while in Iamblichus the term signifies the Hypercosmic Soul from which the World-Soul emanates (in Tim. fr. 54, 58 Dillon). Cf. the commentary by Dillon, op. cit., 342. For the relation of soul to intellect in this book, see H. Blumenthal, op. cit., passim. 19. He may have thought of the myth of Er in Plato’s Republic 10, 614B1-621B7, and of the charioteer in Phaedrus 246A2-249D3. 20. DA 430a10ff. (J.O.U.) 21. The last two sentences are, to say the least, surprising. At DA 413a8 Aristotle mentions the possibility that the soul is the actuality of the body as the sailor is of his boat only as an otherwise undiscussed alternative to the quite different account he elsewhere adopts. Our author treats the account of the soul as sailor in his boat, not as an alternative account, as Aristotle does, but as an account of a kind of soul different from the soul which is united to body in the animal. I have translated entelekheia, conventionally, as ‘actuality’. Clearly the sailor activates his boat, and it is translationese to write ‘actuality’. (J.O.U.) And the first sentence is enigmatic in itself too. I. Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978, 197-8 n. 23 thinks that ‘something else’ refers to the non-rational soul alone, while H. Blumenthal, op. cit. (in n. 2), 97 seems to be ready to include the rational soul as well. 22. A distinction, not found in Aristotle, which is to play an important role in that the author probably uses it to meet the objections by Plotinus (IV.3.21.5-21) and to split the lowest soul into two in order to explain the immediate contact of soul with body. Cf. 16,15-19; 17,35-6; 18,24-6; 19,14; 20,32-3; 45,16-17; 51,28ff.;

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56,35-8; 58,18-22; 59,37-8; 87,19-20; 94,8-9; 96,1-15; 105,8-11. The analogy of the sailor in DA 413a8 is puzzling, according to D.W. Hamlyn, Aristotle: De Anima, Books II and III (with passages from Book I), Oxford 1968, 2nd ed. 1993, ad loc., because the argument preceding this is going in the opposite way, for Aristotle argued that insofar as the soul consists of potential functions of parts of the body, it cannot have an existence separate from the body. For the use of the analogy in later Neoplatonists, see H. Blumenthal, op. cit. (in n. 2.), 98-9, and id., ‘Neoplatonic Elements in the De Anima Commentaries’, in Phronesis 21 (1976), 64-87, esp. 85 ff., and id.,‘The Psychology of (?)Simplicius’ Commentary on the De Anima’, in H. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd (eds), Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism, Liverpool 1982, 73-93. 23. DA 411b18-19. Cf. also 406a27. 24. A literal translation; the meaning is that practical intelligence is concerned with the particular interests of particular people, not the disinterested universals of theoretical intelligence. The distinction of theoretical and practical thinking is with reference to Aristotle’s distinction of sophia – phronêsis in EN 6, 1143b2-3 where Aristotle says that intellect in practical reasoning is concerned with the ultimate and contingent and the other (i.e. the minor) premise (ho d’ en tais praktikais tou eskhatou kai endekhomenou kai tês heteras protaseôs). The hetera protasis is clearly the particular minor premiss of the practical syllogism and merikê protasis may be taken to be the hetera protasis. So as the author distinguishes two kinds of theoretical intelligence by their logical character he will be distinguishing both from practical intelligence by their logical character. At 306,20-4 we read that the practical intellect uses particular premisses and needs the contribution of phantasia to get acquainted with particular things. Philoponus(?) also uses the term at in DA 546,12; 593,23-6 (CAG XV), contrasted to katholou protasis. For appropriate uses of merikê or epi merous in logic, see Simplicius, in Cat. 403,30-404,3 (CAG VIII); Philoponus, in An. Pr. 12,18-24 with reference to Alexander (CAG XIII,2); Alexander, in An. Pr. 27,18; 266,30; 341,15-16 (CAG II,1). (J.O.U., P.L.) 25. Aristotle distinguishes two kinds or stages of potentiality. The first is akin to the state of an untaught child who cannot count though later he will be able to use this skill; the second is illustrated with the sleeping geometer who can count though he does not use his skill actually. This state is called first actuality too. The second actuality is the geometer who counts. 26. Inclination or tendency (rhopê) and leaning (neusis) are used by the author to indicate the declining of the soul towards the body, see C. Steel, The Changing Self: A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussels 1978, p. 61 n. 32, but apoklinein is used also to indicate its bent for being upwards (cf. 11,12, but not at 8,32). 27. Because that which inclines outside is imperfect and not self-sufficient (autarkês). Proclus is talking in El. Theol. prop. 209,27 of the vehicles, or subtle physical bodies which Neoplatonists postulate as mean for conveying the soul. These vehicles have an inclination (rhopê) to the world of becoming. 28. Reading phutikas vice phusikas. (J.O.U.) 29. It would be futile to seek for these features in De Anima 3. This is rather a late Neoplatonic summary of the activities of the soul and the tensions within. 30. Enn. II.9.2.4-18, III.4.3.21-7, IV.1.1.12-14, IV.4.12.20-50, IV.4.16.7-21, IV.7.13.8-20, IV.8.8.1-11, V.9.13.13-14. His view was criticised by other Neoplatonists as well, cf. Proclus, in Tim. III.165,8-9, 245,19-246,28, 333,28-336,2 (here he

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mentions Thedorus of Asine (test. 36 Deuse) as defending, and Iamblichus as attacking this doctrine); Philoponus(?), in DA. 535,13-16 where Plutarch of Athens is said to have rejected Plotinus’ assumption. For details of how Plotinus was considered by later Neoplatonists, see H. Blumenthal, ‘Plotinus in Later Platonism’, in H. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus (eds), Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays in Honor of A.H. Armstrong, London 1981, 212-23. 31. Unless he thought of the Stoics for whom the soul was completely corporeal, he may have expounded here two diametrically opposed views – one of which is ascribed to a particular philosopher, the other not – in order to find then a middle way. 32. This is the end of our author’s introduction to his commentary. He now qoutes as his lemma part of the first sentence of Aristotle. It is an unusual feature of this commentary that the lemmata are often very short and syntactically incomplete passages. (J.O.U.) 33. So runs the text; but our author presumably means ‘more precious’, not ‘more exact’. (J.O.U.) 34. At 4,1-5 he was talking about the World-Soul; now he applies the same principle to the human soul to justify its being endowed with reasoning faculty. 35. Descent to the composites of course. The soul is not only aware of itself, but perceives external things as well, which is responsible for its perverted state. 36. Op. cit. 641a36-b2 cited at 2,20-2. There we read that it belongs to the same science to study intellect and the intelligible, which entails however only that it is impossible to know things intelligible qua intelligible without knowing the intellect. 37. As Aristotle goes on to say at op. cit., 641b3-4. 38. Carlos Steel emends alla (‘others’) to aitia (‘causes’). 39. This is an application of what Aristotle says in DA 2, 413a11-12; Physics 1, 184b16-21; Metaph. 7, 1029b3-12; EN 1, 1095a2-4. 40. Strictly speaking, in Proclus the One is the first cause (Theol. Plat. II.3, 29,13-21, 30,22-6 Saffrey-Westerink; El. Theol. prop. 72, 64,24-9 Dodds), but both Proclus (El. Theol. prop. 174) and Plotinus (V.9.3, esp. 21-6) assign the creation of the sensible world to the intellect. 41. Philoponus thinks it does refer to the genus of being, that is, as he says, one of the categories, cf. in DA 26,20-5. 42. Throughout, ‘proper’ and ‘property’ are used in the classical sense of predicates which apply to all of and only the kind of thing referred to. (J.O.U.) 43. Throughout, when the lemma is more than a few words, the Greek text gives only the opening phrase. For the convenience of the reader a translation of the rest of the passage under discussion is added in square brackets. (J.O.U.) But the point has been made by Carlos Steel that our author did not write complete lemmata, as is shown by the many cases where his commentary is dependent on the partial lemma. This Steel presents as a further difference from the genuine Simplicius. 44. It is the soul that, during its procession (proodos), ‘projects’ from itself (proballetai) lives when descending to body; these lives are the sensitive and vegetative, cf. 4,2-4; 6,3-4; 20,35; 77,11-15; 84,8-21; 95,1-2; 218,33-9; 219,32-4; 242,4-6; 250,6-7 (where kata probolên is contrasted with ousiodês, ‘essential’). The source for this doctrine may be Iamblichus, ap. Stobaeum, Ecl. II.174.21-7, as C. Steel has pointed out (op. cit. p. 62 n. 33). As for probolê (‘projection’) in the text, Hayduck points to a gap between pro and bolê, and says one letter has been erased. The Aldine edition puts prosbolê which in Plotinus (II.9.1.35; III.8.10.33) and

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Porphyry (Sent. 43) means ‘intuition’ (so the LSJ, but see Lexicon Plotinianum by J.H. Sleeman and G. Pollet, Leiden-Leuven 1980, ad. loc.). What may be said for probolê, however, is that the author uses it many times, while prosbolê does not occur here in this context, and that intuition of different lives by the soul in descent would make sense in this context only by the supposition that the soul brings them forth by a simple act of intuition. But bringing forth translates probolê again, which is taken by C. Steel, op. cit., 134, 137-8 to indicate the process whereby the soul is estranged from itself. 45. See also 65,35-7. Beside 402a9, pathos and sumbebêkos are used synonymously at Metaph. 1.8, 989b3; 14.1, 1088a17-18; GC 2.10, 337a28. 46. DA 408b16. 47. I take pistis here to mean not ‘belief ’ but the less than demonstrative proof discussed by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics. It is quite easy to acquire beliefs on this matter. (J.O.U.) 48. It is not clear whether kat’ epibolên sunesis means intuition in general or intuition directed to external objects and so different from self-knowledge. The use of kat’ epibolên may be indicative of knowing external things through the senses, cf. 131,36-8. 49. The author may state the kinship of the Aristotelian (analysis) and Platonic (division) versions of logic. Or division corresponds to procession (proodos) and analysis to reversion (epistrophê), see Damascius, in Philebum 54 Westerink, followed by Olympiodorus, 246 Stallbaum. I owe this latter point to A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1990, 17. On the meaning of ‘analysis’ in these authors, see also ibid., 8-11. 50. I.e. for arithmetic and plane geometry. (J.O.U.) 51. The last two sentences attempt to reproduce etymological assertions in the Greek text. (J.O.U.) 52. Genus shows ti esti which Aristotle equates with substance at Top. 1, 103b20-3; Soph. El. 178a4-9; Metaph. 5, 1024b12-16, 10, 1054a13-19, but at Metaph. 7.1, 1030a17 it is said of each predicates. 53. Aristotle may allude to the Pythagoreans when saying that some philosophers considered soul a certain harmony (DA 1.3, 407b30-1; 408a5-6; 2.2, 414a223), while in assigning them the view that the soul is substance the author may have their doctrine on soul-wandering in mind. Or, because it was hard to distinguish Platonic and Pythagorean philosophy even in the Middle Platonic period, he thought of philosophers like Numenius (see fr. 19, 25 des Places), Cronius and Moderatus. For details of the confusion, see J. Whittaker, ‘Platonic Philosophy in the Early Empire’, in ANRW II.36.1, 87-123, esp. 117-21. Or he derived it from Iamblichus who had adopted several doctrines of Pythagorean origin, see D.J. O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived: Mathemathics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford 1989, 37-9 and J.M. Dillon, op. cit., 15, repeated in ANRW II.36,2, 862-902, esp. 872. 54. These may be the Stoics though Sextus says (AM VII.234) only that they considered soul as maintaining the whole mixture (possibly of the body and soul) and according to Hierocles (IV.39-44 Bastianini-Long) it is body and soul that constitute perfect mixture. 55. Xenocrates of Chalcedon, contemporary of Aristotle and head of the Academy, see fr. 180 Isnardi Parente (cf. 30,5-6.20-1; 62,3ff.; 66,2-3), cf. also fr. 179 (ap. Themistium, in An. Post. 43,1-3, CAG V,1), fr. 181-4 (ap. Philoponum in DA 32,31-33,2; 44,11-12; 71,6-14; 81,25-30, CAG XV).

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56. Throughout I translate entelekheia as ‘actuality’, or ‘actualisation’. (J.O.U.) 57. In Proclus’ circle (not Damascius or Simplicius), the place was taken to be immaterial body (Proclus, in Remp. II.198,25-9, and ap. Simplicium, in Phys. 612,27-9; 615,26) and the vehicle of the soul (Syrianus, in Metaph. 85,27-8; Proclus, in Tim. III.297,25; but see in Remp. I.119,4). The notion of the vehicle is a consequence of their conception of man as a being composed of a rational part, the intellect, as well as of a non-rational part which is closely allied with the body and so with the physical world. The rational soul is bodiless, it achieves its form in a body, in the vehicle which is a spiritual body. For an excellent survey of the vehicle, see E.R. Dodds, op. cit., 313-21. Our author considers soul-vehicle or vehicles material (17,16-17; 74,1-7; 287,16-22). On this issue, see H. Blumenthal, ‘Soul Vehicles in Simplicius’, in S. Gersh and Ch. Kannengiesser (eds), Platonism in Late Antiquity, Notre Dame 1992, 173-89. He suggests that the author returned to the pre-Proclus version of this doctrine which, I think, could not be held by Syrianus, but by Iamblichus who considered it material, yet immortal, see De Myst. III.11 and 14 and in Tim. fr. 81 Dillon, and Dillon’s commentary ad loc. (esp. 373-4) and J.F. Finamore, Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul, Chico, Ca., 1985, 11-12, who compares also the conceptions of Iamblichus and Proclus on pp. 86-7. 58. Hayduck doubtfully refers us to ch. 4 where Aristotle does not claim that activity or actuality is the same as substance. 59. eidos is regularly translated as ‘form’, in metaphysical contexts, and as ‘species’ in logical contexts. Both these are used in this translation, as is ‘specific form’. homoeides, here translated as ‘of the same species’, could equally be translated as ‘having the same specific form’ which is also used to translate it in this translation. (J.O.U.) 60. If the form is the same for all composites which belong to the same species and the matter is what makes them different, as some said, then a special account is needed for explaining the differences among souls that are immaterial. Our author tries to resolve this query by distinguishing differences within a species (e.g. tall and short in the case of men) from specific difference (e.g. men and monkeys in the case of animals), and then, specific difference from the various descriptions within a specific difference. Consequently, the existence of the different faculties of the soul is derived, not from matter of any kind, which would be absurd indeed, but from the different descriptions in the soul as form. Forms and genera are not linguistic entitities though specific forms are to be viewed as corresponding to sets of descriptions. But genus also can be taken as corresponding to a set of more general descriptions, namely the various constituent species. If so, there is no need of matter to explicate specific differences within one genus, which was the reason for introducing matter (cf. 14,1-3). On the problem of how species are in the genus, see A.C. Lloyd, op. cit., 90-1. 61. The question is how the difference in pitch within a continuing sound is to be described. The more holes are stopped, the deeper is the sound. (J.O.U.) 62. On description (hupographê), see J.M. Narbonne, ‘Définition et description: le problème de la saisie des genres premiers des individus chez Aristote dans l’exégèse de Simplicius’, in Archives de Philosophie 50 (1987), 529-54. He treats the doctrine in Simplicius’ in Cat. which seems to be very close to what we find here. 63. For Aristotle, the prior and posterior are things forming a series in which successive members develop from and contain prior members. Persons, families would be an example. Things from or to a single case are those which derive their

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nature from their relation to a central case. Thus diets, complexions, and places are called healthy from their relation to a healthy person. See Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 2nd ed., pp. 52-6 and 62-5 for further explanation and references. (J.O.U.) 64. Possibly a reference to 76E8-77C7. 65. The human soul has rational, spirited and appetitive elements according to Platonic theory. (J.O.U.) 66. eidikôtaton eidos signifies the most specific form, and ‘final form’ (eskhata eidê at 67,2) may refer to the same. Cf. Simplicius, in Cat. 243,23-7. He reports that the Stoics introduced the notion of most specific quality (eskhaton poion at in Cat. 212,18-25) which may be the origin of the term. 67. He may be speaking of the most specific form which contains all the features of the particular thing in question; in contrast, genus contains them in a derivative sense only and requires further specification. 68. E.g. the sensitive souls in two different animals are different not in species, but in their principle (logos). Species, forms and principles are not linguistic entities, but what about description? It may be hard to draw a dividing line between logos and description (hupographê), but the latter is surely implied when we say that ‘this is a sensitive soul in this kind of animal and it differs from that in that kind of animal’. In this way, while descriptions as linguistic entities correspond to sub-sets of a form, logos here seems to be the application of the whole form (e.g. sensitive soul) to another species (e.g. animals of a different kind). 69. He hints at the Absolute Intellect, the second hupostasis, from which our intellect emanated, as well as at the intelligible world. In Iamblichus, this Intellect is the level where monads of Forms are to be placed, which means that Forms come into being in the Intellective (noeros) realm. By monad Iamblichus refers to the cause of the Forms, see his in Philebum fr. 4 Dillon, and the commentary by Dillon in his op. cit., 259-60. 70. Scientific knowledge, then, sets out from definition displaying what the thing is, and concerns essential (kath’ hauto) but non-definitional attributes too, and is identical with demonstration (15,10-11). In Aristotle it starts from preexisting knowledge, only part of which is knowledge of the definition (An. Post. 71a14-15). 71. Reading hauton. Text has auton. Cf. heautou at 14,37. (J.O.U.) 72. Aristotle applies ‘dialectical’ unanimously to the procedure of Plato and the Academy, especially to Speusippus (Metaph. 1, 987b3; 9, 1050b35; 12, 1069a28; 14, 1087b21), not only to following accepted opinion (endoxon) which sometimes is the starting point for himself too. Our author also seems to be aware of this fact when using the term in its ‘Aristotelian’ sense at 21,18-20,24. 73. Cf. 9,5-14. 74. Throughout lupê, traditionally translated as ‘pain’, is translated as ‘distress’. It is a wider term than pain. (J.O.U.) 75. Determines living things by way of co-existing (sumphuôs) with them. 76. I.e. furthest descended from pure being. (J.O.U.) 77. ‘Practical sciences of reason (logos)’, no doubt refer to ethics and politics, cf. 125,7; 275,35-6. 78. An example of a practical syllogism would be: ‘Fowl is easily digestible and good for health; this is fowl’, with the act of eating as conclusion. The minor premise ‘this is fowl’ is supplied by sense-perception. I owe this point to Richard Sorabji. 79. When soul is descending towards body it projects sciences like mathematics

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which stand on the higher grade and are in need of imagination. On probolê, see n. 44. 80. Possibly theology and metaphysics which were held to be the same by e.g. Philoponus (or Ammonius), in An. Post. 331,10-11 (CAG XIII,3). 81. Cf. 214,16-20. Proclus also says (in Eucl. 51,22-3) that phantasia works by way of picturing or shaping impressions and is called passive intellect (see 46,4-9; 95,9-10; 141,2-142,7 and in Remp. I.235,18-19). 82. Chs 7-8. 83. A notion never explicit in Aristotle’s On the Soul, but inherent in Aristotle, who accepted the existence of an eternal body – the stars are made up of aether – and, in implanting desire into the stars (Metaph. 12.7), he may have credited them with life. Our author modifies the notion by emphasising ‘mortal body’ and so leaving open the question whether any kind of intellect is connected to immortal body. 84. For the controversy on whether to define possibility in such a way that something at the bottom of the sea or in the middle of the earth may be called visible, see R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, London & Ithaca N.Y. 1983, 91-3. The relevance is whether an activity of the soul can be called separable, if it is never separated. Aristotle does not put the question quite this way, but he is raising a question of this sort. 85. Cf. 4,28-32. 86. Emotions then occur through the form of life, which may entail that they do not partake in moving the living body, which would be thoroughly un-Aristotelian unless by ‘moving’ the author means the vital and basic form of movement, like birth and death, cf. 37,11-12. 87. Linked to practical sciences, see 46,27-8. 88. Hayduck refers us to Book 3, ch. 10. But both editor and author oddly interpret Aristotle since there, as always, he holds that only orexis – desire – controls action, though reason enables rational animals to desire the good. (J.O.U.) The reference might be to the end of the first book where there are allusions to the distinguished place of the intellect, see 410b13-15, 24ff. Carlos Steel suggests the reference is to Aristotle’s Ethics. 89. apathês. This is usually translated as ‘impassive’ or ‘impassible’. But ‘unaffected’ is more intelligible English and more consistent with ‘be affected’ and ‘affection’, here used to translate paskhein and pathos. (J.O.U.) 90. 408b11. 91. Cf. 22,15.22.27. ‘Enmattered principle’ (enulos logos) is used here to emphasise that it is the principles, and not the Forms, that are involved in bodily changes, cf. Proclus, El. Th., props. 195, 197, 208 and Dodds’s commentary ad loc. 92. Aisthêtikon pneuma means here the ultimate sense-organ (cf. 70,10-11). In this way, the author succeeded in finding a less material sense-organ in order to give an account of sense-perception in less material terms. For the opposition of pneuma and solid body, see 214,1-2. For the process of dematerialisation in treating Aristotle’s theory of sense-perception, see R. Sorabji, ‘From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality’, in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds), Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford 1991, 227-59. 93. The Greek word organon, here translated as ‘organ’, is usually translated as ‘tool’ or ‘instrument’. The bodily organs such as eyes and hands were so called since they were thought of as tools. (J.O.U.) 94. This sentence may indicate that ‘projection’, used here along with ‘integrat-

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ing its activity into its essence (ousia)’, does not always hint at alienation of the soul (pace Steel, op. cit., 61 n. 32) being essentially one and many. Procession (proodos) and projection (probolê) are not necessarily interdependent, for the human soul projects rational concepts to meet sensible forms received in senseperception and this activity does not involve procession. In procession the soul projects or evolves ‘lives’ which are its various activities from the vegetative up to the rational ones. 95. He is the metaphysician, later called dialectician. The natural scientist, however, studies the soul in its unity and, we might add, in its completeness. 96. Cf. n. 72. 97. In contrast with what the adverb ‘dialectically’ suggests in the preceding section, the dialectician or metaphysician is not said to have a superficial knowledge here. He starts from a different kind of definition, that of the form, as Aristotle also states at 403a29-b2. 98. The text has ho men gar logos, ho de tou pragmatos. I read ho men gar logos hode tou pragmatos, as does Ross. (J.O.U.) In the OCT edition, however, Ross accepts the first version. 99. Plutarch’s interpretation relies on his reading of Aristotle’s text; he reads the first version distinguished in the previous note, as has been pointed out by D.P. Taormina, Plutarco di Atene: L’Uno, l’Anima, le Forme, Catania 1989, 186 (the testimony is registered as Fonte 19). For a parallel interpretation, she points to Philoponus, in DA 59,15-18. 100. Notice that at 21,1-8 the author was speaking about the natural scientist as dealing with the soul in its unity. Now he returns to Aristotle’s formula. 101. The author does not ask how enmattered principles can exist on their own, but that by whom they are conceived, or thought of, as existing independently. He states that they are not separated (22,22) and the natural scientist considers all of them as they are, i.e. unseparated from matter. It is the dialectician (22,31-2; 23,5-6.16) who treats a kind of enmattered principle, the substantial one, as separated (or, sometimes, separable – khôrista). Cf. also n. 85. 102. At 403b9 the text reads ou gar esti tis, phêsin, ho peri ta  ‘He says’ (phêsin) is clearly an interpolation by Simplicius. Ross says the text cannot mean what I give as the translation, conjecturally writing ê ouk estin heis ho peri ta  (J.O.U.) 103. We have then a fourfold scheme: the natural scientist studies both kinds as unseparated; the dialectician contemplates substantial accounts as separated; the specialist is concerned with those in terms of attributes as unseparated; and the mathematician examines those in terms of attributes as separated. 104. On the analogy of enmattered principles intellect is also said to be both separate and unseparated, but the author does not explain how the natural scientist discusses it as unseparated. 105. ‘Suited’ (epitêdeios) and ‘suitability’ (epitêdeiotês) are used here in the sense of an inherent though not necessarily realised quality of a body. For other meanings, see E.R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1963, 344-5. The Megarian origin of the term has been pointed out by R.B. Todd, ‘Epitêdeiotês in Philosophical Literature: Towards an Analysis’, Acta Classica 15(1972), 25-35. 106. The snub is discussed by Aristotle e.g. in Metaph. 7.5. According to him, hollow can be thought of without reference to nose, but we cannot say ‘snub’ without implying the nose. For details, see W.D. Ross’s commentary on the Metaphysics, ad loc. Aristotle exploits this notion at DA 3, 429b13-20 too. Our author emphasises

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Notes to pp. 40-43

that passions are not abstractions, like the line and the plane, but any definition of them involves the subject to which they belong. 107. In modern editions this passage is the beginning of Book 1, ch. 2. (J.O.U.) 108. Cf. 8,35-9,14. 109. kai to aisthanesthai supplied by Torstrik. (J.O.U.) 110. Relying on Aristotle who says that natural things contain the principle of motion within themselves (kinêsis, Phys. 2, 192b12-13), the author takes here kineisthai in passive sense (but see Phys. 2, 192b21 where it means ‘causing motion’) and interprets this doctrine as meaning that natural things are moved by the soul located within themselves, contrary to artefacts the mover of which must be from without. So natural movement is from within but at the same time caused by an independent agent within the thing moved. 111. This may pertain to the movement of the animals, cf. Phys. 253a7-20, 259b1-20 and Simplicius’ in Phys. 8,2-6. I owe the references to Richard Sorabji. This remark of Aristotle offers a good opportunity for the author to make a distinction between different kinds of souls. 112. Anaxagoras 59B11, 12, 13 D-K; Empedocles B16, 17, 19, 27, 29, 53, 58, 59 D-K. 113. Laws 10, 897C5, D3, 898A8-B8. By considering the intellect as a mover Plato does not seem to separate intellect and soul as sharply as the commentator suggests. Furthermore, at 892Aff. Plato says that the soul is the cause and source of bodily motions, cf. 896Aff. At 966D9-E4, soul is responsible for motion, as is intellect for order. 114. Laws 894C. (J.O.U.) 115. If the commentator is thinking of the four causes of motion and change then he is right to say that, strictly speaking, motion cannnot cause motion. 116. Democritus 67A135 D-K, Leucippus 68A28 D-K. Diels takes these reports as unreliable. 117. Phys. 1, 184b20-185a5. 118. Democritus 67A69 D-K. 119. Pythagoreans 67A28 D-K, Ecphantus 51A1 D-K. But this information may be derived from the Peripatetic doxographical tradition. 120. The whole passage at 26,11-19 sheds some light on the author’s view of how texts are to be interpreted. Here the key term is endeixis which at 3,31 may mean (mathematical) demonstration (cf. Proclus, in Euclidem 404,15ff.), but here and at 46,14 it clearly refers to the way of revealing an obscure entity (intellective substance) with the aid of an obvious one (sphere). For a similar use in Simplicius, see in Phys. 147,15-16 (‘illustrate the unsayable cause’) and in Cat. 159,6 (‘things said by way of myth and kat’ endeixin’); in Proclus, in Euclidem 110,8-13; 291,15-17; in Tim. I.76,11; 80,25; 365,21-2; Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 5,9 Dillon. The introductory summary of his method of interpretation is placed here because, as it is in this chapter of the De Anima that Aristotle examines the views of his predecessors, the commentator has to deal with this issue here. It is striking however that he does not attempt to give a more detailed account of the doctrines of the philosophers criticised by Aristotle. He does not seem to have found great support from texts other than Aristotle’s. One of the reasons might be that he had no access to them. This raises the question of where this text was written. Perhaps in Harrân, though M. Tardieu (‘Sâbiens coraniques et “Sâbiens” de Harrân’, Journal Asiatique 274 (1986), 1-44, recapitulated by I. Hadot,‘The Life and Work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic Sources’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1990,

Notes to pp. 43-47

167

275-305, esp. pp. 81-8) argues that this city had a good library. Endeiktikôs seems to be used with the same meaning as sumbolikôs (40,3; see also sumbola at 40,16) and ainittesthai at 50,9. 121. 25,17. 122. Plato does not contrast activity with motion, nor does Aristotle interpret him in this way in the De Anima. 123. Cf. also 5,38-6,5. 124. Homer, Iliad 23.698. (J.O.U.) 125. It is Aristotle who holds the first and unmoved mover to be intellect at Metaph. 12.7, but the commentator says at 40,17-20 that intellect needs soul to move the heaven. Moreover, here he treats intellect as part of the human soul. Like the soul, the intellect is a mover, but also is moved by the body it moves. Nature is the inner source of the motion of living bodies. Cf. also Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 76 Dillon. 126. For Democritus, see 427b3, GC 1, 315b9 (= 67A9 D-K). The same view is attributed to Epicurus as well, e.g. by Sextus Empiricus, AM VIII. 9 and 63. 127. Imagination is sometimes called passive intellect, as reported by Proclus as well, and sometimes said to be in all animals (even in the worms although indeterminately). For an examination, see G. Watson, Phantasia in Classical Thought, Galway 1988, 121 and A. Sheppard, ‘Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3’, in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds), op. cit. (in n. 86), 165-75, and H. Blumenthal, ‘The Psychology of (?)Simplicius’ Commentary on the De Anima’, in op. cit. (in n. 18), esp. pp. 87-8. 128. Empedocles B109 D-K. 129. Timaeus 35A1-6. 130. The identity and authorship of the work Aristotle refers to is much debated. See Ross’s note ad loc. in his edition of De Anima. (J.O.U.) 131. There is a lacuna in the Greek. Some such word as exetasei (Torstrik) must be supplied. (J.O.U.) 132. Possibly a reference to the Neopythagoreans. 133. There is no hint of a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Priscian of Lydia (which does not mean that he did not write one), but there are some allusions to such a commentary by Simplicius, which have been collected and thoroughly discussed by I. Hadot, ‘Recherches sur les fragments du commentaire de Simplicius sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote’, in I. Hadot (ed.), op. cit. (in n. 2), 225-46. She thinks the author of this commentary is Simplicius and takes this passage along with 217,23 as ‘auto-citations’ (p. 241). 134. This holds true of the Neopythagoreans. For details, see D.J. O’Meara, op. cit., 132-8. 135. In Sextus Empiricus, AM X. 267ff. we find the same doctrine ascribed to the Pythagoreans. 136. This phrase was omitted in the lemma at 404b21. (J.O.U.) 137. ‘Component’ translates sustoikhos. As Prof. Urmson has pointed out to me, this may refer to things which are at the same classificatory level, e.g. plants and animals are related in this way, plants and immortals are not. But there might be another possibility as well, that sustoikhos signifies the co-ordinating principles of the Pythagoreans (male-female, right-wrong, light-dark, odd-even, etc., and, at the top, one-many, see Aristotle, Metaph. 1, 986a22-6). This may be strenghtened by ‘transcendental causes’. The principles are transcendent causes which are present in each thing by coordinating them.

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Notes to pp. 48-52

138. A version of Test. 180 Isnardi Parente (at 10,34-5), see also 30,20-1. 139. The Greek is corrupt, but this must be its meaning. (J.O.U.) 140. The doctrine of the soul as a mean between divided and undivided beings goes back to the interpretation of Timaeus 35A, cf. H.-R. Schwyzer, ‘Zu Plotins Interpretation von Platons Timaeus 35A’, RhM N.F. 84 (1935), 60-8. ‘Formative principle of the physical’ may be the same as enmattered principle, for which see nn. 91, 101. ‘Extended’ translates diastatikos (see also Timaeus Locrus 100E; Plutarch, De primo frig. 16, 952B, and Cornutus ND 21. The last two references are taken from Timaios Lokros: Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele, kommentiert von M. Baltes, Leiden 1972, 165) and means that, in contrast to soul, physical principle and – according to the Pythagoreans – mathematical substance, like line and plane, involve spatial extension. At 42,29-30, it is our rational nature that is said to be in extension by way of development (anelixis) and relaxation (khalasmos), but this extension is not a spatial continuum as in the case of bodies. The soul may be extended only in time in virtue of the reasoning process which proceeds from premisses towards conclusion. 141. The final clause of this long sentence is corrupt in the Greek. (J.O.U.) Torstrik’s emendation (tên aph’ heautês eis heautên anelixin kai ek diastaseôs hama sunagôgên) has been accepted. There is a reference again to the middle position of the soul, its procession from, and reversion to, its own nature. At 34,13-15 we are told that this is Plato’s doctrine. 142. Cf. n. 138. 143. What Aristotle says is precisely that ‘number’ is used in two senses: that which is counted or countable, and that by which we count, see Physics 4, 219b5-8, 223a24-8. In the latter passage he claims that the soul is the only being which has it in its nature to count, and of the soul the intellect (I follow the translation by E. Hussey, Aristotle: Physics, Books 3 and 4, Oxford 1993). The commentator transforms this relation of counted to that by which we count to that of the known (countable number) to the knower (counting soul). 144. The commentator takes over the method of Aristotle who attempts first to set out the ways in which the problem under discussion can be solved and only then ascribes these (sometimes arbitrarily constructed) views to his predecessors. 145. Cf. Lucretius I.186, 205. 146. Anaxagoras 59B12 D-K. 147. Thales 11A22 D-K. 148. Thales 11A D-K. 149. Aristotle, Metaph. 986a27. (J.O.U.) 150. Plato, Tim. 41C. (J.O.U.) 151. Plato, Phaedrus 245C. (J.O.U.) 152. aïdios; this word is usually used of timeless entity, not of the everlasting. (J.O.U.) 153. Thales 11A22 D-K. 154. Aristotle, Metaph. 984a3. (J.O.U.) 155. Hippo 38 A10 D-K. 156. Critias 80 A23 D-K. 157. At first glance, the inference may be too rash. But sunekhon refers to the soul which keeps the animal body together (70,14-15), see also Aristotle, DA 410b12, 411b6-18. A body left by the soul is moved with an entirely corporeal motion, like a stone. There remains the question how divided motion is to be interpreted, for bodily motion is supposed to be continuous. Perhaps, instead of

Notes to pp. 52-55

169

‘divided’, we should speak of ‘divisible’ activities and refer to 35,3 where the author says that divisible changes will be actualities of a divisible thing. But soul cannot be divisible as bodies are, neither can it be subject to changes which bodies undergo. Another explanation may be to refer to 40,19-20 where divisibility is clearly linked to continuity. 158. Anaxagoras 59A100 D-K. 159. This sentence is obscure in the Greek and untranslatable to make clear sense. It appears that life (zên) is associated with boiling (zein) – though zein does not occur in the text – and soul (psukhê) with refrigeration (katapsuxis). Psukhê is etymologically connected with anapsukhon by Plato at Cratylus 399E. (J.O.U.) 160. Both the terms sustoikhos and hupheimenos, and the doctrine that things produced by a form possess an inferior likeness to it, are characteristic of the Neoplatonists of Athens (225,8-9; 280,32-3; 305,18; Proclus, El. Theol. prop. 204, 178,28-180,3 Dodds; in Tim. II.128,15-129,2). 161. Reading kinousan instead of kinoumenên at 33,35. (J.O.U.) 162. From here to 39,39 in particular it is not possible to keep the same translation of kinêsis throughout, and it will be translated sometimes as ‘motion’, sometimes as ‘change’. 163. This passage opens ch. 3 of Book 1 in modern editions. (J.O.U.) 164. The commentator may think of Phaedrus 245C5 where Burnet and Moreschini read – supported by the MSS. – aeikinêtos, but there is a papyrus (Oxy. 1017) which puts autokinêtos. On the problem, see F. Decleva Caizzi, ‘Aeikinêton o autokinêton? (Plat., Phaedr. 245C)’, Acme 23 (1970), 91-7. Philoponus also reads autokinêton in his De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum 247,23-4 Rabe. He uses aeikinêton, however, when quoting the whole demonstration at 271,18-23.25-8. 165. ‘Change’ translates kinêsis. 166. See the first sentence of the lemma. Reference is to Physics 8.5, 6. 167. metabolê is always, rather artificially, translated as ‘transformation’, to distiguish it from kinêsis. (J.O.U.) Drawing on in Phys. 1066,3ff., 26-7; 1081,17ff., C. Steel thinks (op. cit., 114-15) that Simplicius does not accept substantial change, which is in line with what we find here, for the commentator (Priscian, according to Steel) seems to exclude ab ovo that there can be such change in the soul. Steel’s view has been objected to by I. Hadot, ‘La doctrine de Simplicius sur l’âme raisonnable humaine dans le commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète’, in H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd (eds), Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism, Liverpool 1982, 46-70, esp. 59-62. See also the discussion on pp. 71-2. The commentator returns to the issue at 38,29ff. Cf. n. 185. 168. Cat. 14, 15a13ff. Quantitative changes are increase and decrease. The other changes are of quality and of place. Substantial transformation is a creation of a new substance out of an one which is destroyed. 169. Cf. n. 157. 170. So says the text. Richard Sorabji’s proposal: if ‘otherwise’ is not understood, the same meaning can be obtained by Torstrik’s proposal of reversing the last two clauses (cf. 42,17-18): ‘not with parts of itself, since that would be the same, but all of them with the whole of itself.’ 171. Cat. 8, 8b28ff. 172. Physics 246a2-3, 10-13. (J.O.U.) 173. We do not know whether Priscian wrote a commentary on the Physics, but Simplicius did devote long passages to the issue at in Phys. 1061,25-1063,16 and 1064,28-1067,2 (CAG X). This passage, along with 198,5, is considered by K.

170

Notes to pp. 55-60

Praechter in his entry ‘Simplicius’, RE II,3 col. 204 as a reference to Simplicius’ in Phys. 174. As was said by Simplicius, in De Caelo 374,8-10 as well: the heavens are eternal and what is eternal is of necessity, not by force. 175. Replacing the full stop after kinêthêsetai by a comma in line 27 and inserting a semicolon after kinoumenon in line 28. (J.O.U.) 176. Paraphrase of Phys. 4, 215a1-6. 177. autoproairetos refers to the free choice and goes along with autexousion, see Hierocles, in Carmen Aureum XXIV. 21, 103,14 Koehler (for some clarification, see N. Aujoulat, Le néoplatonisme alexandrin. Hiéroclès d’Alexandrie, Leiden 1986, 330-1); Simplicius, in Epictetum 108 Dübner; Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 108,32 Westerink. 178. Aristotle, Phys. 202a9. (J.O.U.) 179. The heat of the sun is needed for reproduction, and in animals its increase in spring stimulates seasonal reproduction. 180. I cannot identify them, but by phasin the author may simply hint at the received opinion. 181. Perhaps we should understand: ‘this makes the rival requirement plausible, for’. 182. The converse at 406a32 is that the soul changes in the same way as the body. Aristotle repeats the argument for unmoved mover in Book 3, 426a4-6. 183. Phys. 8, 260a26. 184. Planetary spheres cannot be moved by force, as stated at 35,12. Thus moving by force and moving incidentally are entirely different insofar as, in the case of planetary spheres, both moving by themselves and moving incidentally by the fixed sphere are aspects of their necessary movement. Philoponus at one stage thinks the fifth sphere was moved by force, by the sphere of the moon. 185. Cf. Aristotle’s repeated statement in Phys. 5 that, while all change is transformation, some transformation is not change, e.g. coming-to-be. (J.O.U.) The conclusion is that soul can suffer substantial change, which however does not mean that it is supposed to come into being or perish. Rather, its change kat’ ousian consists in departing from the formal essence – a view ascribed to Aristotle – or from the intellective and undivided existence – in Plato, so says the commentator. Cf. also 93,9-12. For another view, see C. Steel, op. cit., 61-3. 186. Aristotle distinguishes changes which involve a middle phase from changes which do not, at Phys. 5, 224b29-32, 229a16; Metaph. 11, 1067b13; 12, 1069b1. In the next sentence, ‘to changing’ has been inserted by Torstrik, and the argument is not by Aristotle. But, as Richard Sorabji has pointed out to me, we could think of two contexts in Aristotle: (1) DA 2.5: the switch from not thinking to thinking should not be called paskhein nor alloiôsis, unless in a secondary sense; (2) the ban on change of change is frequent in the Physics. 187. For horos (here, ‘determining principle’), see Metaph. 7, 1038b20-1, 1039a20, on eidos, Metaph. 5, 1015a10; 7, 1029a29ff., 1033b17, 1035a2, 1037a29, 1038a26; 8, 1044a10; 9, 1056a5. For the significance of horos in this commentary, see C. Steel, op. cit., 125-31, who shows that horos means that by which the essence of something is constituted and determined. Furthermore, that which determines something is its form (eidos). Both horos and eidos are used interchangeably throughout this commentary. To determine something is to give it form (cf. 18,15; 45,12; 83,29; 84,25-30). It is also important that horos in Neoplatonism, and not in Aristotle, has some efficacy and is translated whenever possible as ‘determination’,

Notes to pp. 61-67

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‘determining principle’. It is what imposes form (eidos) on the indeterminacy of matter. Hence horos and eidos are repeatedly conjoined. 188. On the World-Soul, Tim. 34A8-B9; on human soul, 44A7ff., 69C5ff., 89A1ff. 189. For Epicurus, atoms are eternally moving, cf. Ep. Hdt. 43. 190. Ch. 10, 433a11ff. 191. Tim. 34Bff., 36Eff. On this method of interpreting Plato’s text, see H. Blumenthal, op. cit. (in n. 2), esp. 105-8. 192. Cf. 33,6ff. Accordingly, the same soul receives sensations impinging on different parts of the body (35,5-8). 193. For ‘self-initiating’, see 37,30, 324,26. The term is used in ethical contexts by Eustratius, in EN 33,29 and Michael, in EN 526,21 (both in CAG XX). 194. Syrianus also considers that intellect returns to itself and connects this view to the Pythagorean verses at his in Metaph. 108,14-30 (CAG VI,1). 195. See 42,20-1. This is the Intellect unparticipated in the soul, cf. C. Steel, op. cit., 123-4. 196. There appears to be an anacolouthon here; or else ê could replace kai and we could read ‘or else, as our knowledge ’ (J.O.U.) 197. On the term, see C. Steel, op. cit., 125. It denotes the ‘determining principle’ (horos) which gives form (eidos). 198. Cf. 50,6-7; 62,7-10; 67,6-7. For an analysis of the passage, see H. Blumenthal, op. cit. (in n. 2), 107-11. 199. The commentator is silent about it, but if this intellect is commensurate, it is because of the harmonic ratios it constitutes, see 40,30-40. 200. ‘Determining principles’ (horoi) indicates that intellection is indivisible. 201. Here and at 44,22 and 25, ‘thinker’ (to nooun) refers to the capacity or part of the soul, not to the person who thinks. 202. At this point the received text of Aristotle reads ei men oun kata stigmên, hautai d’apeiroi, dêlon , ‘So, if it is at a point and these are infinite in number, it is clear ’. However in the commentary this lemma begins epeidê gar apeiroi, dêlon , ‘For if they are infinite in number, it is clear ’. The translation follows this and not the received text. Ross, in his apparatus, says that the lemma reads hautai d’epeidê gar; Hayduck says that his manuscript A (Laurentianus 85,21) has the reading given above, but the Aldine edition has hautai d’. (J.O.U.) 203. Reference on the one hand to the Pythagoreans who were taken to talk about the circular activity of the intellect, in contrast to sense-perception and appetite, cf. 41,22-3 and, for a refutation in detail, 44,6ff. On the other hand, this is the view of the Timaeus as well, see 43Cff., here 46,3-5. 204. Up to this point, it is not clear why the thinker cannot consist of parts successively thinking one part of the object to be known after another. At 43,6ff. what the commentator rejects is that the thinker cannot know the whole object of knowledge with some portion of itself. Examination of this problem of why the thinker cannot consist of such a parts begins at 44,29 only. 205. The received text of Aristotle reads ê, ‘or’, not kai, ‘and’. (J.O.U.) 206. The expression is taken from Aristotle’s DA 3, 426b19-20, who uses it to illustrate that the discrimination of white from sweet is not by different senses. Here, however, it is used to explain the absurdity that parts of the thinker seize parts of the object known, while at 43,17-18 it is used to elucidate that seizing the whole thing known by the whole thinker does not amount to seizing parts by parts of the thinker. 207. If knowledge of the point does not involve knowledge of the line of which

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Notes to pp. 67-72

it is the limit (peras), but knowledge of the form does involve knowledge of the line whose horos it is, and both point and form are indivisible, then, in contrast to peras, horos must refer, not only to the outline, but also to the whole structure given by the form to the object known; it is equivalent to form. Cf. also n. 187. 208. 23,13-14. 209. Again, kath’ horous points also to the determining role of the forms, see also 47,37-8. 210. 43Cff. 211. 40,4ff. 212. Reading ti with an oxytone accent, as do Hayduck’s text and the received text of Aristotle. But the manuscript A and the Aldine text read ti unaccented, so that the translation would be ‘It will always have some thought’. Our author’s comment suggests the reading adopted. (J.O.U.) 213. An. Post. 1, 19-21. Theôrêtikos is used to mean discursive, which is unusual in this commentary, see 305,20-5; 313,37. 214. The former is inferior because it does not revert. As for division and analysis, both are with the aid of terms and therefore are bounded, cf. A.C. Lloyd, op. cit., 17. 215. Distinguished both from human soul and the World-Soul which is also divine, but single, divine souls are responsible for the motion of the heavenly spheres. Cf. Proclus, in Tim. I, 14-16. 216. 407a2ff. 217. Ch. 5, 430a17-18. 218. The identification of our soul with the intellect may at first sight seem unjustified, but as our soul is considered to have abandoned all projection into the exterior, which means projection of vegetative and sensitive lives, it will contain rational life only. On probolê, see also n. 44. 219. I conjecture from 48,31 that our author read legein and not legesthai, as in the received text of Aristotle, Plato being the subject of the verb. (J.O.U.) 220. In this interpretation, Aristotle’s argument is tortuous indeed since at 48,35 we are told that for the soul unseparated from bodies, it is better to be with body (‘life’ means the state of the soul). But to be with body involves mixture which is painful for the separate soul. Further qualification would be needed as to why what is better for the soul unseparated from bodies is painful for the separate soul, as we are dealing with states of one and the same soul. However, this argumentation never turns up in Aristotle who fails to make this Neoplatonic distinction between separate and unseparated souls or states of the soul. By interpreting the text in this way, the author aims at justifying Plato’s expressions. 221. Hayduck refers us to Timaeus 36E, falsely. We have meignus and memeigmenê in Tim. 35B1-3, 54D4, 59A4, 61A8, summixis (but no mixis) at 60B8, 60D5, 80E2, sumplokê in Soph. 240C1, 248E7, 259E6; Theatet. 202B5; Politicus 281A3, 306A1, 308E1, 309E10. The commentator uses the word ‘Platonic’ which means not only ‘represented by Plato’ but also ‘held by the Platonists’ and Plotinus did claim that the intellect is sumplokê and sunthesis of all, cf. VI. 2. 21.55-6. 222. Reading ka’keinêi for ka’keinoi at 49,10 and taking it to refer to the soul of the universe. (J.O.U.) 223. ‘By the agency of which’ translates huph’ hou and refers to the efficient cause, see 58,1-3 and the classification of causes by Porphyry in Simplicius’ in Phys. 10,25-11,15 (CAG IX) and by the author of this commentary at 70,28-32. For the origin of the term, see H. Dörrie, ‘Präpositionen und Metaphysik’, MH 26 (1969),

Notes to pp. 72-78

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217-28, repr. in his Platonica Minora, München 1976, 124-36. ‘In accordance with which’ translates kath’ hou and refers to the formal cause, the sample on the strength of which things are produced. 224. It is hard to decide whether Iamblichus wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. He has a work of his own entitled De Anima (see 240,37-8). This passage suggests either that Iamblichus did compose a commentary on the De Anima where this minute explanation of ekeinoi would fit, or his De Anima contains clusters consisting of very close analysis of Aristotle’s text. On the problem in general, see H. Blumenthal, ‘Did Iamblichus Write a Commentary on the De Anima?’, Hermes 102 (1974), 540-56, and J. Dillon, op. cit., 21-2. 225. This kind of distinction is clearly set out in Proclus, in Tim. II, 313,1-4 and in Alc. 65, vol. I, p. 53, Segonds. 226. The lemma reads legei. Ross, who reads legetai, does not mention this reading in his apparatus. See 50,49. (J.O.U.) 227. Adding mê before anapempei. (J.O.U.) 228. As for Alexander, this may be a reference to his commentary on the De Anima, now lost (see R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation’, ANRW II 36,2, 1176-1243, esp. 1186, and H. Blumenthal, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Later Greek Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima’, in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung. Paul Moraux gewidmet, Bd. II, Berlin-New York 1987, 90-106); and on Plutarch of Athens, see D.P. Taormina, op. cit., pp. 116, 187-8; she registers this passage as Fonte 20. 229. Hayduck puts ta Meta ta phusika and refers us to Metaphysics 12.10, but we may equally well think of the lectures on the Good (cf. 28,6-9) or find here an allusion to Plato’s Republic 509B. 230. Although the commentator applies the same term (okhêma) to the vehicle or chariot of the soul, he speaks figuratively since this kind of vehicle cannot be equated with soul-vehicles he is speaking about elsewhere. For vehicle, see n. 57. 231. In the received text of Aristotle ch. 4 begins at ‘Also another opinion’. In reading this discussion of the theory of the soul as a harmony the reader should forget the use of that English word in musical contexts. In Greek music harmony is concerned with successive, not simultaneous, sounds. Such expressions as ‘How can his view on X be harmonised with his view on Y’ retain the sense of the Greek word. (J.O.U.) 232. By ‘rational soul’ (logikê psukhê) he means the intellect (cf. 41,26; 61,11) and also makes clear here that the part of the soul which makes use of the ensouled body as an instrument is the intellect which is located in the human soul and differs both from the intellect in which the soul partakes and the unparticipated Intellect. 233. See his De Anima 23,24-6 (CAG Suppl. II,1 Bruns). As H. Blumenthal has pointed out (op. cit. (in n. 228), 99), Alexander failed to make a Neoplatonic distinction. 234. Alexander’s De Anima 12,24-5; 16,7; 103,3-4. 235. Phaedo 91C6-94B2. Here Socrates points out that the harmony theory of the soul contradicts the belief in its existence before birth and conflicts with the theory of recollection. 236. Eudemus, fr. 45 Rose. 237. He is talking about definite periods of time, not about instants that are not parts of the time, but limits if it. 238. ‘Elements’ translates moria which, it seems, cannot be assimilated to

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stoikheia. The stoikheia of speech (logos) are the letters while moria can signify sentences as well. 239. The term for juxtaposition, parathesis, is not used by Aristotle and the commentator may have taken it from Stoic sources (SVF II, 153,220; 154,10; 157,38; 220,25-40; III, 255) or from Alexander of Aphrodisias (De Mixtione III, 216,17ff. Bruns, CAG Suppl. II,2) who uses it when discussing Chrysippus’ theory. 240. Empedocles B96 D-K. 241. The matter must have a nature suitable for receiving the soul, but this suitability comes from the soul itself. The apparent contradiction can be eliminated by introducing emphasis of the soul which enables matter to receive soul. Strictly speaking, emphasis means ‘outward appearance’. In a broader sense however it has the meaning of ‘reflection’, ‘irradiation’ and, when used to explain how form contacts body, ‘impression’ (cf. 63,23; 67,25; 72,26-7; 165,3; 166,19; Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 40,4-6; 64,20-1; Proclus, in Tim. I, 36,23-4; 111,8-9; 126,19-20; 233,16-18; 243,24-5; 387,12-14 (paralleled with ‘trace’); 434,22-7; II, 108,20-2; III, 12,24-5 (paralleled with ‘pregnant’)). The term is now applied to the soul as the form of a certain matter. For suitability, see n. 105. 242. The differentiation is of rational and non-rational parts of the human soul, as has been made clear at 51,29-52,2. 243. With some doubt, Hayduck refers us to chapters 8 and 10, but it is hard to see what kind of unmoved and physical form Aristotle is speaking of in those passages. 244. Participation, not in the absolute Intellect, but in the intellect which, though above the soul, is united to it in a way. 245. Cf. ‘In accordance with which’ refers to the formal cause, see n. 223. 246. Our author reads tôi, Ross reads to. (J.O.U.) 247. According to Philoponus (in DA, 156,29-32, CAG XV), when we are thinking, the brain or some other part of us is subject to change and for this reason also our face alters. Philoponus says that for Heraclitus fire is dry exhalation and the soul is made up of exhalation. Furthermore, the proper activities of the soul are initiating change and thinking (op. cit., 87,10-26). But Philoponus, and our author, may have taken it from medical theories or experience. and not necessarily from some interpretation of Heraclitus. 248. By ‘critical activity’ the author usually refers to working of the senses (18,34-5; 124,5-6; 152,22-3; 163,30-3; 166,3-5.15-17; 185,5-7; 286,17-21) or phantasia (277,28-9) insofar as these capacities discriminate impressions caused by perceptible objects. This kind of critical activity is expounded at 59,7-11 where kritikê is translated as ‘discernment’. 249. Our author clearly interprets Aristotle’s kinêseis ê monas to mean change or rest by writing kinei ê êremizei. Ross interprets Aristotle’s phrase to mean ‘movements or persistence in the sense organs’. (J.O.U.) 250. Hayduck refers us to GA 2.3, 736b28. 251. At 1, 192a4-5 Aristotle says only that privation is not a reality, but in Metaph. 8, 1044b33 he explicitly connects privation and passing away. 252. The argument takes for granted that the soul that is form of the body gives life to it. 253. Ch. 5. 254. Reading sumphthinousas instead of sumphtheiromenas. (J.O.U.) 255. DA 1.4, 429a25-7.

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256. That is, to take the other horn of the dilemma, not born with the body. We find the alternative at 63,12. 257. Reading sunekheis haplôs eipein monas instead of sunekheis kai haplôs eipein monas in line 61,19. (J.O.U.). monas (translated as ‘only’) may reveal that the commentator thinks Aristotle regarded only the physical activities as changes, i.e. activities that are divisible and continuous. As the rational soul is exempt from the physical world, its activities are also free of physical marks. This doctrine may have indicated a restriction for a Neoplatonist since Plato also termed the activities of the soul as kinêseis. 258. What kind of physical numbers Democritus’ followers had in mind is not clear. They might have regarded numbers as consisting of atoms. The Pythagorean Ecphantus, too, considered units (monades) to be corporeal, see DK 51A2. According to D.L. IX. 36, Democritus wrote a work entitled Numbers. Simplicius (in Phys. 81,34-82,6 CAG IX) tells us that Democritus allowed the atoms to be divided ad infinitum potentially as they have parts and magnitude. But they are actually too thick to cut. Cf. Th. L. Heath, History of Greek Mathematics, Oxford 1921, vol. 1, 181, and the discussion by S. Makin,‘The Indivisibility of the Atom’, AGPh 71 (1989), 125-49 (he does not discuss the passage above) and R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, London & Ithaca N.Y., 1983, 354ff. 259. Explanation of Test. 180 Isnardi Parente, see 10,34-5 and n. 48. The commentator explains Xenocrates’ view by saying that the ideal numbers posited by Xenocrates (and Speusippus as well) are forms that are indivisible and the soul as form is also indivisible. 260. According to the author, pushing and pulling involve extending and contracting respectively, cf. 305,22-4 with reference to Aristotle Phys. 7.2, 243a16ff. But what has no parts cannot be extended or contracted either. 261. For irradiation of form which enables body to receive the form itself, see 56,21ff., and n. 241. As for the argument, the stress seems to be on the complete presence of the soul, for irradiation seems to allow bodies only to have life, not sensation or change which presupposes life. 262. It is doubtful whether this is the correct explanation of Aristotle’s argument. Its basis appears to be the discussion in Phys. 257a33-258a27. See Ross’s comment on DA 409a10-16. (J.O.U.). 263. The received text of Aristotle reads kinêson – will initiate motion. (J.O.U.) 264. Considering soul to be a kind of subtle matter (pneuma), the Stoics also faced the problem of how body penetrates body, a view generally taken to be absurd. For the late Neoplatonists, the problem turns up in the form of what soul-vehicle and light are. For details, see R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, London 1988, 79-122. 265. arithmon kai kinêson. Order of received text reversed. (J.O.U.) 266. E.g. for Plato (Phaedr. 245C) it initiates change by self-change; for the Pythagoreans (DK 58B40 = DA 404a16ff.) and the Stoics (e.g. SVF II, 782, 836, 879; Hierocles I, 5-29), it is made up of matter, however fine it may be. 267. The term ‘judgement’ (krisis) which terminates in the form, indicates the process whereby Aristotle’s theory of sense-perception was interpreted in less material terms. The evolution of explaining his theory in this manner has been traced in R. Sorabji, op. cit. (in n. 92), though without mentioning this commentary. 268. See DA 2, 418b4ff. Aristotle means that light is what converts a medium that can potentially be seen through into one that can actually be seen through. 269. The intellect in us is is also called rational substance at 42,21-3.

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270. It is Empedocles who held Love and Strife for principles governing the four elements, cf. B21, 22, 26, 35. 271. Cf. also 86,24. Natural principle may be akin to enmattered principle and different from forms, see 87,12-13. It embraces the soul as well, and is formal cause in a secondary, derivative, sense, cf. 87,13-14. 272. On lexis: in the school of Ammonius, Simplicius’ teacher, a discussion of the doctrine in a passage (the protheôria according to Philoponus, in DA 424,4 and 13) is often followed by a discussion of the text of the same passage, with an extract from the same lemma repeated. See E. Évrard, L’école d’Olympiodore et la composition du ‘Commentaire à la Physique’ de Jean Philopon, Diss. Liège, 1959. I owe this point to Richard Sorabji. 273. Empedocles, B28, 29, 134. 274. Homer, Iliad 18.470. 275. Reading autêi instead of auta at 68,24. Cf. autôi tôi in line 26. (J.O.U.) 276. Categories are called common elements (koina) too, cf. Top. 108b22. 277. Metaph. 1003b12ff; and 1061b30ff. See also EN 1096b27ff. (J.O.U.) 278. GC 328b18. (J.O.U.) 279. Hayduck refers us to ch. 4, though at 430a1ff. we are told only that the intellect is potentially the intelligibles in things without matter where thinker is the same as the objects of its thinking. There is no mention made of difference in account or in substrate. 280. Knowledge of things is knowledge of their forms. The explicit origin of this doctrine is to be found in Alcinous (Didasc. 163,14ff. Whittaker-Louis) who claims that God knows things by having their forms within itself. For details, see the notes by J. Whittaker in his edition, p. 98, and by J. Dillon in Alcinous. The Handbook of Platonism, translated with an introduction and commentary by J. Dillon, Oxford 1993, 94-5. This comprehension of the genuine principle is causative because the principle also creates the subordinate things. 281. For formal cause, see n. 223. 282. 408b18, here at 59,15-21. 283. Cf. Historia Animalium; he cites sponges and some crustaceans. (J.O.U.) 284. Reading koinon instead of koinêi at 71,14. (J.O.U.) 285. Pythagoras, DK 14,8, 31B29, 117; Empedocles, perhaps, B110. 286. Printed in CAG as quotation, but in fact a paraphrase. (J.O.U.) 287. Cf. fr. 223, 226, 228a Kern. 288. A paraphrase; printed in CAG as quotation. (J.O.U.) 289. Metaph. 12, 1070b12. 290. The commentator points out that Aristotle’s account of privation is not comprehensive, for sometimes it seems to depend on which of the opposites (e.g. straight line or circle) is to be qualified as form and which as privation of this form. In Phys. 2, 193b19 Aristotle says that privation is, in a way, form. See also the comments by Simplicius at in Phys. 280,10-281,10 which differ from what we read here. 291. There is no sumpeplegmenê in the Timaeus as we have it in the text now. Forms of sumplekein are to be found in 80C6 and 83D6. 292. Thales 11A22 (= Aristotle’s report) and A1 D-K. 293. By ‘living thing’ Plato refers to the sensible world as a whole, not only to plants and animals, see Timaeus 30C2-31B2, 37D2. 294. Although the vehicle of the soul is considered to be material, this kind of matter cannot be of the sublunar elements. Rather, if anything, it is aetherial. On

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the number of vehicles in Simplicius, see H. Blumenthal, op. cit. (in n. 57), 176, with reference to Simplicius’ in Phys. 965,26-30; 966,3-6 (CAG X). 295. Timaeus 41C7; see also Phaedo 106B1-107B2. 296. Our author uses the word holon, translated as ‘whole’, in a way that may confuse. At 74,20 ff. he contrasts the soul of air or fire with the souls of wholes which are here composites of soul and body. In the present passage and onwards he also uses ‘whole’ of air or fire as an element in contrast to particular parcels of air or fire. (J.O.U.) 297. For an explanation of Aristotle’s highly compressed argument from 411a16 to 411a23, see Ross’s commentary ad loc. (J.O.U.) 298. This clause is a part of the sentence beginning at 411a18. (J.O.U.) 299. For the pros hen relation, see n. 318. 300. I.e. the intellect, the functioning of which cannot be connected to a particular bodily organ, see DA 2, 413b27. 301. Timaeus 41D. 302. ‘Thinking’ translates dianoêtikas, which signifies discursive thinking as opposed to the intuitive or contemplative. 303. DA 430a22 (J.O.U.) 304. The text reads ê to exeirêmenon ekhousa pros tas loipas, which I have translated. Perhaps we might read hêi instead of ê giving a translation ‘as being transcendent’. (J.O.U.) 305. On lexis, see n. 272. 306. In Aristotle, wish is a rational desire for a good as a final end, that is end in itself, cf. EN 3, 1111b26; 1113a12, 15, see also Top. 126a13; DA 3, 432b5. The commentator also takes it as a rational capacity, cf. 289,22-3; 291,2-3; 292,25-7; 296,8-9.26-7.33; 308,10; 310,19. 307. This is a paraphrase of Aristotle. Exact wording is quoted below at 77,38. (R.R.K.S.) 308. Emanation is contrasted with remaining in itself, and paralleled with procession. 309. 3, 430a22. 310. Body is, then, kept together in virtue of the indivisible fusion of each faculty (life) of the soul in the whole soul. While ensouled, body cannot be disintegrated because the faculties of the soul, though each having its own seat within the body, are intimately linked together. The only exception is the intellect, but there is no bodily organ of which the task would be to think. Therefore, even if the intellect is separable both from the body and from the other parts of the soul, its separation alone would not necessitate the decay of the body, or any part of it. The whole soul is said to be present in each part of the body, but this presence is qualified by the term ‘irradiation’ (emphainesthai) which in turn means that this is not a complete presence. The different faculties belong to a particular part of the body and irradiate into the other parts, cf. 79,13ff.; 80,6. 311. See 60,35ff. (J.O.U.) 312. Ross reads allêlois; i.e. the parts are alike. At 79,29 our author reads allêlais; i.e. the souls are alike. (J.O.U.) 313. This is how our author understands the text at 80,17, where he criticises it as ungrammatical. But in fact Aristotle means ‘as being not separable from each other, while the soul as a whole is divisible’. (R.R.K.S.) 314. Ross reads ou diairetêi. Our author omits the ou at 80,4, giving an explanation why the soul is called divisible. Regarding the translation ‘of each

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other’, see 80,20. Our author reads allêlon; Ross corrects to allêlois. (J.O.U.) But Ross’s correction is needless. 315. Philoponus has the same view, see his in DA 200,32-3 (CAG XV). What Alexander adds to this notion at his DA 30,29-31,6 (CAG Suppl. II,1) is that soul is not divisible in the same manner as magnitude and number are; rather, its division is according to the capacities and their differences. See also H. Blumenthal, op. cit. (in n. 228). 316. Philoponus, too, reads allêlon (cf. his in DA 200,25) without making any objections against grammar. See also n. 314. 317. Since plant, animal and human souls are only analogically related, they are distinguished not like species at the same level of division (sustoikhos) but in depth (kata bathos). The pros hen relation implies that one of them would be a central case and that, properly speaking, the rest could not be called soul. Cf. 96,25ff. For ta hos aph’ henos kai pros hen legomena, see Aristotle, Metaph. 4.2; 7, 1030b2-6; 8, 1043a30. On ambiguously named things or homonyms, see Cat. 1. The usage of homonymy in the Early Academy has been traced by H.J. Krämer, ‘Zur geschichtlichen Stellung der Aristotelischen Metaphysik’, Kant-Studien 58 (1967), 313-54. The Neoplatonic interpretation of it has been investigated by A.C. Lloyd, op. cit., 28-9, 77-8. See also I. Hadot, edition of Simplicius’ in Cat., fasc. III, Leiden 1990, pp. 41, 85, and n. 60. 318. Being, the one (in Metaph. 3, 1001a5-b25; 7, 1040b16-24) and the good (EN 1.4, esp. 1096a14-25) are the most comprehensive universals and common to each thing independently of what category they belong to. For Aristotle, derivation from one thing or ‘focal meaning’ can be illustrated by the different applications of ‘healthy’. A healthy man possesses health, a healthy diet produces health. In each case health provides a focus, so that the different applications are not merely ambiguous. The Neoplatonists, by contrast, do not interpret the doctrine as largely one of meaning. See n. 395 below. On the soul’s being and being one, see 91,30ff. Health is a standard example in Aristotle of ‘focal meaning’. But we must be cautious in applying the term ‘focal meaning’ to problems raised by the Neoplatonists, see A.C. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 78 n. 3. 319. Metaph. 1003b. (J.O.U.), cf. 69,8-9. 320. Phys. 201a10-11, b31-2. (J.O.U.) 321. Lions and tigers are animals in some sense, not merely equivocally or analogically. So they are distinguished at the same level (sustoikhos). Man and lion differ as animals, however, in depth (kata bathos). 322. Constitutive (sustatikai) differences are differences in genus or common nature and separate things at different levels. Divisive (diairetikai) differences are at the same level of division and distinguish coordinate species. For a different distinction between divisive (diairetikos) and constitutive or same-level (sustatikos) differences, see Ammonius, in Porphirii Isagogen 118,11-18 (CAG IV,3). The distinction itself may come from Porphyry, Isagoge 10,5-21 (CAG IV,1). Boethius translates the terms as divisiva and constitutiva respectively, cf. 36,5ff. (CAG IV,1). 323. Hayduck plausibly suggests that the clause in parentheses should be transferred to a position before ‘since life is substance ’ at 83,7. (J.O.U.) 324. Simplicius (in Cat. 80,15ff. (CAG VIII)) explains Aristotle’s theory of the categories in this way. 325. horos in the sense of determination often goes together with teleiotês (completion), as has been observed by C. Steel, op. cit., 125 nn. 10-11.

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326. Carlos Steel points out that sunairousês eis tên energeian, ‘merges its activity into its essence’, gives better sense. 327. The first is the matter, the second the composite of matter and form, the third the form in itself. In Metaph. 7.3, however, Aristotle does not treat them as substances, but only candidates for being substance. On the other hand, Simplicius clearly claims that substance is said in three ways: kata tên hulên, kata to suntheton and kata to eidos (in Cat. 74,18-19; 80,17-18). 328. On the Pythagoreans, see Aristotle, Metaph. 1, 985b23ff.; 987b22. 329. Life is, then, a cause in accordance with which there are living things and ‘in accordance with which’ is used to signify the formal cause (cf. 87,32-3). Soul, however, is the efficient cause and therefore prior to life (see also 91,34). On the evolution of the different lives of the soul, see 4,24; 6,3-4; 20,35 and n. 37 above. 330. Phaedrus 245E. 331. Strictly speaking, only the pure forms are to be called formal causes, and, even if it is a formal being (88,1-2), the soul cannot be ranked among them because of its inclination towards body; see also 90,14-15. On the other hand, the soul is the discursive expression (logos) of a form. 332. What Aristotle says in De Somno 454b10-26 is that sleep is the shackle (desmos) and rest of the sensitive capacity. 333. Aristotle explains in DA 2.5 that first actuality corresponds to possessing knowledge, second actuality to using it. The example is also given by Aristotle at 412a10, quoted above. 334. In using the term ‘coming to be’ Plato is not speaking of the descent of the world-soul into division; see Timaeus 34B2-37A2. 335. According to Iamblichus, De Myst. 1.10, there are two levels of impassibility within the individual soul. The soul itself is essentially superior to any affection, and so are its logoi as well, but it is the cause of the composite being affected. See Dodds’s commentary to Proclus’ El. Theol. prop. 80 in op. cit., pp. 242-3. For the use of the verb pathainesthai and its cognates by the Neoplatonists, see here 251,17; Porphyry, De Abstinentia I. 42 (117,12 Nauck), Sent. 29 ch. 2; Proclus, El. Theol. prop. 209 (182,31 Dodds); Simplicius, in Cat. 316,12; Olympiodorus, in Meteor. 9,28-9 (CAG XII,2). 336. 3.5. 337. Reading kinoumena instead of kinoumenai at 91,13. (J.O.U.) 338. Cf. n. 318. 339. If every soul has a pros hen-and-aph’ henos relation to a primary being (or concept), that is, they are derived from, and directed to, a single entity, then what is impossible is not only giving an exact and common definition of them, but also ranking souls among homonyms. But Plotinus called them homonyms just to emphasise that they do not have the same definition (VI.7.18.36; VI.3.1.6-7 and 21, references are taken from A.C. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 78 n. 3). Here the commentator seems to follow Plotinus in this respect, but at 98,16ff. he retains the distinction. 340. Metaph. 1003b. (J.O.U.) 341. ‘In accordance with which’ is a term for the formal cause, see n. 223. 342. Notice that while in Aristotle being and one are universals that lack independent existence, the commentator is talking about formal (eidêtikos) being and unity, hence making clear that each has an existence on its own. 343. Ch. 4, 408a12-13. 344. Ch. 5. 345. Deleting comma after phusika at 92,33. (J.O.U.)

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346. In Aristotle, as D. Hamlyn has pointed out (Aristotle: De Anima, Books II and III, Oxford 1968, 2nd ed. 1993, 86), the essence of an axe is its function. 347. The soul does not perish after having left the body, but that does not mean that it remains the same form of the same, now decayed, body. It may suffer some change, cf. 38,29ff. and n. 175. 348. The ‘etc.’ (kai ta hexês) refers to the expansion which this translation supplies. In his commentary on the Physics Simplicius always writes ‘from  to ’, giving the first and last phrases of the passage to be discussed. (J.O.U.) 349. Alexander takes ophthalmos to mean the body of the eye in his De Anima 145,7-9 (CAG Suppl. II,1). 350. At 94,6 our author has toionde esti sôma; the received text of Aristotle at 412b27 has toiondi. (J.O.U.) 351. By ‘more divine soul’ the commentator refers to the souls initiating the motion of heavenly spheres. These souls are divine but inferior to the World-Soul. Cf. Proclus, in Tim. I, 14-16. 352. See also 245,28-9 where we are told that in the case of immediate causes what exists in actuality precedes/pre-exists (proüparkhei) that which exists potentially in that which has been brought about by the cause. This is in line with the doctrine that the soul is not the second actuality of the body, but the prior actuality. 353. For generative life (or power), see 219,36; 287,20; Philoponus, in DA 119,18-21; Porphyry, ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev. 3, 11; Proclus, in Crat. 105,23 Pasquali, El. Theol. prop. 209, frequently at in Tim., e.g. 77,4; 111,18; 168,25, and see the index by Diehl; Damascius, De Princ. 381 Ruelle. 354. This clause is ungrammatical in the original. The grammar can be corrected by reading either ek merous (Hayduck) or ekhontos for ekhousês in 95,5. (J.O.U.) 355. It is most probable that natural form is equivalent to enmattered form (285,18) which is inseparable from the bodies and contrasted to immaterial form (84,14; 103,31). 356. At 411b18 and 429b5. (J.O.U.) 357. The text reads hê psukhê hôsper. Ross writes hê psukhê ê hôsper, giving the meaning ‘it is unclear whether the soul is the actuality of the body in this way or as the sailor is of his boat’. (J.O.U.) 358. Reading eniôn hê entelekheia as in our author’s lemma at 413a5 and in the received text of Aristotle vice eniôn entelekheia. (J.O.U.) 359. 1, 184a16ff., see also Metaph. 7, 1029b3-12; EN 1, 1095a2-4. The commentator discusses it at length at 109,24-30. 360. I.e. a line which is a mean between the unequal sides of the given rectangle. (J.O.U.) 361. An. Post. 1.8; 2.10. 362. ‘Given’ translates pragma, usually rendered as ‘object’ or ‘thing’. For pragma as contrasted with sumperasma (conclusion), see 97,25-6 and Anonymus, in An. Post. 564,3-4; 576,27-8; 593,123-13; 594,18-19 (CAG XIII,3). 363. Phaedrus 245E. 364. autenergêton is probably a Neoplatonic coinage, never used by Aristotle. See 99,35; 225,30; 230,23; 236,5.14; Philoponus, in DA 114,26; Proclus, in Parmenidem 611 Cousin, in Alc. 18,7 Segonds, Theol. Plat. VI.22; Iamblichus, De Myst. IV.3, 149,8-9 Des Places. 365. On the Neoplatonic usage, see I. Hadot, Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, fasc. III, Leiden 1990, pp. 41, 85-94. 366. on here may mean also ‘exists’ or ‘is’. The distinction may remind someone

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of the Platonic distinction between Being and Becoming, but in the text there is no trace of it. Neither is there any distinction of the tenses. Rather, we are dealing with the difference between verbs and nouns/adjectives interpreted in Neoplatonic terms according to which verbs express process, i.e. per def. imperfect, while nouns and adjectives are signs of constancy and completedness. 367. Aristotle in his biological works calls plants (phuta) animate beings (empsukha). But in everyday life plants were counted as inanimate (apsukha). Thus, to be vegetarian was to eat only the inanimate. (J.O.U.) 368. Desire is divided into two classes: irrational, of which he is speaking now, and rational, mentioned at 77,26 and equated with deliberation. 369. Reading autoenergêta instead of autoenergêton. (J.O.U.) 370. DA 2.11; 3.12. 371. That is, the intellectual and sensitive lives. 372. ‘Thought’ translates dianoêtikon, which usually signifies discursive intellect as opposed to nous. 373. 411a26-b3. 374. Hayduck refers to Tim. 31 and 69A. (J.O.U.) 375. Alexander may have preserved the Aristotelian problem of the separability of the soul while the commentator (and Philoponus, in DA 225,20-31) thinks the difficulty is about the senses which use separate organs. Cf. H. Blumenthal, op. cit. (in n. 228), 105. 376. For Aristotle, common sensation apprehends objects proper to it (motion, rest, number, magnitude and shape) and particular perceptibles are grasped by the particular senses. But, e.g., how is our sight able to judge this mug of honey to be sweet? The commentator credits common sensation with this ability when saying that common sensation is present in all the particular senses by virtue of their community and therefore is capable of taking on percepts of different kinds (185,5-20). Cf. Aristotle, DA 425a21-5; 30. 377. This seems to be a fourfold scheme of the intellect: (1) Absolute Intellect, (2) passible intellect which however is not said to inhere in the human soul, but (3) practical intellect and (4) theoretical intellect are parts of the rational soul (even if (4) is called a kind of soul at 102,5 (but see 103,13-14). The distinction of (3) and (4) is explicitly rooted in Aristotle, DA 3.5. Thus, we have here the well-known threefold scheme though in a more detailed form. See also n. 18. 378. This appears to be the translation of Hayduck’s text. But it might be better to restore the tôi excised by him and take oude as having replaced mêde, when the translation would be: ‘since the definition given is neither suitable to contemplative reason  nor to that unified to bodily forms of life’. (J.O.U.) 379. Cf. 101,18ff. 380. Timaeus 31B. 381. The wider and narrower use of zôion is well illustrated in the foregoing sentence, in which it has, necessarily, been translated both as ‘living thing’ to include plants, and as ‘animal’ to exclude them. (J.O.U.) 382. Humans have sensation with reason while non-rational animals are endowed with sensation without it. The doctrine comes from Iamblichus who thinks that reason pervades the human soul so as to make our sensation rational, cf. 187,35-188,3. 383. morphê, ‘shape’, is used by Aristotle and his commentators with the same metaphorical sense as eidos, ‘form’. 384. The translation of Aristotle’s text from 414a4 onwards seeks to preserve

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the syntax of the original, or, rather, its lack of syntax, as our author comments on it. The unwieldly sentence is of the form ‘Since p, so that q’. (J.O.U.) 385. The analogy seems to be wide of the mark because knowledge results from the activity of the faculty of knowledge (to epistêmonikon) but soul cannot issue from what lives. The reason for this analogy is that knowledge is a sign of the activity of the knowing faculty, just as soul is of the living thing qua living. Cf. 104,38. 386. At this point Chapter 3 begins in modern editions. Our author makes no break of any kind. (J.O.U.) 387. 413b32. 388. The text misprints hugieiai as hugeiai. (J.O.U.) 389. Aristotle discusses passive or affective qualities (pathêtikai poiotêtes) at Cat. 9a28-10a11. They are called pathêtikai qualities not because the things that possess them have themselves been affected somehow. It is because each quality of this sort is productive of an affection of the senses that they are called pathêtikai. E.g. sweetness produces a certain affection of taste. We can assign such qualities to the soul too, like madness and irascibility. For details, see J. Ackrill’s commentary in his Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford 1963, 106-7. 390. De Sensu 4, 440b30ff. 391. About the extent to which animals have imagination, cf. DA 3.11, and ‘Simplicius’ in DA 209,17-25. 392. See 81,14ff.; 91,20ff. 393. The Greek has no main verb in the foregoing sentence; it is reasonable to supply phamen, with Hayduck, but perhaps before phusin in 107,8 rather than before mian in 107,9. (J.O.U.) Alternatively, phamen can be understood as implicit. (R.R.K.S.) Treating univocal predicates unseparated from what falls under (hupokeimenon) them, the commentator may also have had in mind Iamblichus who, Simplicius says at his in Cat. 23,25-24,5, claims that the predicates (katêgoriai) have the nature of being predicated of what falls under them univocally – for they share the account with it. 394. The Neoplatonists treat the case of things named from and contributing to one thing differently from Aristotle. Aristotle leaves the healthy man who possesses health and the healthy diet which produces health, etc., all at the same level. But the Neoplatonists think that the different items which relate to the focus (to health, in Aristotle’s example) may participate in the focal item to different degrees, and so form a hierarchy of primary, secondary, etc. Each of these has a slightly different nature, even though there is a common account of them. The predicate is, then, neither altogether univocal, nor altogether equivocal. In the present context, soul is said to be like figure. ‘Rectilinear figure’ does not have altogether the same application to triangles and to polygons, because polygons are secondary, being made up of triangles. The secondariness here is an ontological one, and ontology plays a much larger role in the Neoplatonist doctrine than in Aristotle’s. See A.C. Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 28-30; 77-8, and I. Hadot, op. cit. in n. 319, 41, 85. 395. Dividing differences divide coordinate species at the same level. On differences of levels, see n. 394. The contrast is with constitutive differences as explained in n. 322. When there is a constitutive difference, the generic term (e.g. living thing) is modified in its essence by the difference (perishable/imperishable). The terminology of ‘dividing’ and ‘constitutive difference’ will be discussed by Carlos Steel in the introduction to the commentary on Book 2, chs 5 to 12. 396. Following this line of thought, the sensitive element is fused with the

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intellective. That is, we find here the Iamblichean doctrine repeated at 187,35188,3. 397. Reading tines for tinos at 108,23. (R.R.K.S.) 398. Cael. 2, 292a20ff. 399. Timaeus 34A9ff. 400. Book 2 Chapter 3 ends here in modern editions. (J.O.U.) 401. This translation, at variance with those of Ross, Hamlyn and the Oxford translation, is intended to conform with our author’s interpretation. (J.O.U.) 402. Simplicius has kata logon. Ross reads kata ton logon, which, he says, clearly means ‘in logical order’. (J.O.U.) The Aldine edition of our author also puts kata ton logon. 403. There is no such passage in Categories. At 7b35-8a9 we read only that sensibles are prior to senses. A proper reference might be to Sens. 439a14ff.; Metaph. 4.5, 1010b30-1011a2. 404. Simplicius has tôn en tois zôsin ergôn; Ross has tôn ergôn tois zôsi. (J.O.U.) 405. Cf., e.g., 103,34-5. The commentator here refers to the four Aristotelian causes, but elsewhere he adds other kinds as well. See 70,31 where he is speaking of hupostatikon aition, and, e.g., 112,21 where he makes mention of contributory causes (sunaitia). 406. Phys. 2, 194a27ff., 199a20-32, 200a14-30. Although the author is not clear about the issue, ‘natural events’ may cover phenomena like winter rain that occurs, as explained by D. Sedley (‘Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?’, Phronesis 36 (1991), 179-96), in order that the crops may grow (the passage discussed is Phys. 198b32-199a8). 407. Simplicius reads kai kata phusin. Ross omits kai: ‘the soul is naturally such’. (J.O.U.) 408. Simplicius has hê psukhê, Ross only psukhê. (J.O.U.) 409. Empedocles, A70 D-K. 410. 8.4, 254b33-256a2. 411. Possibly kai kata tên kata topon for kai kata tên topon. (J.O.U.) 412. Allusion to GC 1, 321a2-19, 30ff. Even if stones are considered by some to grow, this is not growth in the proper sense but addition, for growth means increase of the whole thing, not only of some part of it. Cf. Philoponus, in DA 275,15ff. 413. sunaitia are matter, shape (eidos) and instrument, see Simplicius, in Phys. 26,5-7; 316,24-28; in Cat. 327,12-13 (CAG VIII); Philoponus, in Phys. 5,7-16; 186,19-21; 241,3-5 (CAG XVI); in Meteor. 4,24-30 (where time, motion and place are called sunaitia, matter and form cause); 120,15-19 (CAG XIV,1). 414. One objection to Empedocles is that if, in plants, the roots are up and the parts above ground therefore down, fire, which goes up, ought to go to the roots and earth, which goes down, to parts above ground. Another objection is that in animals the distribution of earthy and fiery materials is not in any direction of up and down. (R.R.K.S.) 415. In the course of its procession (proodos), the soul unfolds or evolves (anelittei) its content/essence in different forms. As regards form, it is undivided and cannot suffer change but predetermines the logoi which come from it and develop the properties contained in the form. This development requires time, i.e. it occurs in a divided state. On the other hand, all the properties to be unfolded are collected in the form and, it seems, some properties are collected in the logos as well. Thus logos, too, can contain more than one property, which indicates an

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intermediate state between undivided form and informed matter. For a more detailed explanation, see C. Steel, op. cit., 126-7; he refers to 249,15-19 as parallel. 416. The text of the preceding sentence is corrupt; the translation follows a marginal correction in A. (J.O.U.) 417. As for blood and sperm, see Anaxagoras A46, Diogenes B6, Parmenides B18, Pythagoreans B1a; for marrow and sperm, see Hippo A12. All references are to D-K. 418. I.e. liquid, presumably oil, as Ross suggests. (J.O.U.) 419. Contrary to what this sentence suggests, Aristotle is not talking about transmutation of nutritive life. This is a well-articulated Neoplatonic doctrine, viz., that being the most elementary form of life within the soul, nutrition is the last which issues from the soul progressing out of its original state. 420. Ross, following Torstrik, transposes the last two sentences. (J.O.U.) 421. The translation follows what appears to be the text used by our author. At 116,3 he writes dia ti oun to men legei kinein, to de kinein kai kineisthai, ‘Why then does he say that the one causes motion the other causes it and is in motion?’; the received text reads to men kinoun kai kinoumenon, to de kinoumenon monon, ‘the one (the hand) causing and being in motion, the other (the rudder) being in motion only’. Simplicius treats the soul as causing the motion of the ship in the illustration. (J.O.U.) 422. Cf. 113,5ff. Fire can be the instrumental cause. 423. GA (e.g.) 4.8; GC 1.5. 424. At this point Aristotle’s discussion of the vegetative soul ends, as does Book 2 Chapter 4 in modern editions. The remainder of Book 2 and of the commentary on it is occupied with a discussion of sensation. (J.O.U.)

Appendix The Commentators* The 15,000 pages of the Ancient Greek Commentaries on Aristotle are the largest corpus of Ancient Greek philosophy that has not been translated into English or other European languages. The standard edition (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, or CAG) was produced by Hermann Diels as general editor under the auspices of the Prussian Academy in Berlin. Arrangements have now been made to translate at least a large proportion of this corpus, along with some other Greek and Latin commentaries not included in the Berlin edition, and some closely related non-commentary works by the commentators. The works are not just commentaries on Aristotle, although they are invaluable in that capacity too. One of the ways of doing philosophy between A.D. 200 and 600, when the most important items were produced, was by writing commentaries. The works therefore represent the thought of the Peripatetic and Neoplatonist schools, as well as expounding Aristotle. Furthermore, they embed fragments from all periods of Ancient Greek philosophical thought: this is how many of the Presocratic fragments were assembled, for example. Thus they provide a panorama of every period of Ancient Greek philosophy. The philosophy of the period from A.D. 200 to 600 has not yet been intensively explored by philosophers in English-speaking countries, yet it is full of interest for physics, metaphysics, logic, psychology, ethics and religion. The contrast with the study of the Presocratics is striking. Initially the incomplete Presocratic fragments might well have seemed less promising, but their interest is now widely known, thanks to the philological and philosophical effort that has been concentrated upon them. The incomparably vaster corpus which preserved so many of those fragments offers at least as much interest, but is still relatively little known. The commentaries represent a missing link in the history of philosophy: the Latin-speaking Middle Ages obtained their knowledge of Aristotle at least partly through the medium of the commentaries. Without an appreciation of this, mediaeval interpretations of Aristotle will not be understood. Again, the ancient commentaries are the unsuspected source of ideas which have been thought, wrongly, to originate in the later mediaeval period. It has been supposed, for example, that Bonaventure in the thirteenth century invented the ingenious arguments based on the concept of infinity which attempt to prove the Christian view that the universe had a beginning. In fact, Bonaventure is merely repeating arguments devised * Reprinted from the Editor’s General Introduction to the series in Christian Wildberg, Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, London and Ithaca, N.Y., 1987.

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by the commentator Philoponus 700 years earlier and preserved in the meantime by the Arabs. Bonaventure even uses Philoponus’ original examples. Again, the introduction of impetus theory into dynamics, which has been called a scientific revolution, has been held to be an independent invention of the Latin West, even if it was earlier discovered by the Arabs or their predecessors. But recent work has traced a plausible route by which it could have passed from Philoponus, via the Arabs, to the West. The new availability of the commentaries in the sixteenth century, thanks to printing and to fresh Latin translations, helped to fuel the Renaissance break from Aristotelian science. For the commentators record not only Aristotle’s theories, but also rival ones, while Philoponus as a Christian devises rival theories of his own and accordingly is mentioned in Galileo’s early works more frequently than Plato.1 It is not only for their philosophy that the works are of interest. Historians will find information about the history of schools, their methods of teaching and writing and the practices of an oral tradition.2 Linguists will find the indexes and translations an aid for studying the development of word meanings, almost wholly uncharted in Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon, and for checking shifts in grammatical usage. Given the wide range of interests to which the volumes will appeal, the aim is to produce readable translations, and to avoid so far as possible presupposing any knowledge of Greek. Notes will explain points of meaning, give cross-references to other works, and suggest alternative interpretations of the text where the translator does not have a clear preference. The introduction to each volume will include an explanation why the work was chosen for translation: none will be chosen simply because it is there. Two of the Greek texts are currently being re-edited – those of Simplicius in Physica and in de Caelo – and new readings will be exploited by 1. See Fritz Zimmermann, ‘Philoponus’ impetus theory in the Arabic tradition’; Charles Schmitt, ‘Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics in the sixteenth century’, and Richard Sorabji, ‘John Philoponus’, in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987). 2. See e.g. Karl Praechter, ‘Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 18 (1909), 516-38 (translated into English in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1990); M. Plezia, de Commentariis Isagogicis (Cracow 1947); M. Richard, ‘Apo Phônês’, Byzantion 20 (1950), 191-222; É. Evrard, L’Ecole d’Olympiodore et la composition du commentaire à la physique de Jean Philopon, Diss. (Liège 1957); L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962) (new revised edition, translated into French, Collection Budé; part of the revised introduction, in English, is included in Aristotle Transformed); A.-J. Festugière, ‘Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus’, Museum Helveticum 20 (1963), 77-100, repr. in his Études (1971), 551-74; P. Hadot, ‘Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l’antiquité’, Museum Helveticum 36 (1979), 201-23; I. Hadot, ‘La division néoplatonicienne des écrits d’Aristote’, in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung (Paul Moraux gewidmet), vol. 2 (Berlin 1986); I. Hadot, ‘Les introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens’, in M. Tardieu (ed.), Les règles de l’interprétation (Paris 1987), 99-119. These topics are treated, and a bibliography supplied, in Aristotle Transformed.

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translators as they become available. Each volume will also contain a list of proposed emendations to the standard text. Indexes will be of more uniform extent as between volumes than is the case with the Berlin edition, and there will be three of them: an English-Greek glossary, a Greek-English index, and a subject index. The commentaries fall into three main groups. The first group is by authors in the Aristotelian tradition up to the fourth century A.D. This includes the earliest extant commentary, that by Aspasius in the first half of the second century A.D. on the Nicomachean Ethics. The anonymous commentary on Books 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics, in CAG vol. 20, is derived from Adrastus, a generation later.3 The commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias (appointed to his chair between A.D. 198 and 209) represent the fullest flowering of the Aristotelian tradition. To his successors Alexander was The Commentator par excellence. To give but one example (not from a commentary) of his skill at defending and elaborating Aristotle’s views, one might refer to his defence of Aristotle’s claim that space is finite against the objection that an edge of space is conceptually problematic.4 Themistius (fl. late 340s to 384 or 385) saw himself as the inventor of paraphrase, wrongly thinking that the job of commentary was completed.5 In fact, the Neoplatonists were to introduce new dimensions into commentary. Themistius’ own relation to the Neoplatonist as opposed to the Aristotelian tradition is a matter of controversy,6 but it would be agreed that his commentaries show far less bias than the full-blown Neoplatonist ones. They are also far more informative than the designation ‘paraphrase’ might suggest, and it has been estimated that Philoponus’ Physics commentary draws silently on Themistius six hundred times.7 The pseudo-Alexandrian commentary on Metaphysics 6-14, of unknown

3. Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford 1978), 37, n.3: Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, vol. 2 (Berlin 1984), 323-30. 4. Alexander, Quaestiones 3.12, discussed in my Matter, Space and Motion (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1988). For Alexander see R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation’, in W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, part 2 Principat, vol. 36.2, Philosophie und Wissenschaften (1987). 5. Themistius in An. Post. 1,2-12. See H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Photius on Themistius (Cod. 74): did Themistius write commentaries on Aristotle?’, Hermes 107 (1979), 168-82. 6. For different views, see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Themistius, the last Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle?’, in Glen W. Bowersock, Walter Burkert, Michael C.J. Putnam, Arktouros, Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M.W. Knox (Berlin and N.Y., 1979), 391-400; E.P. Mahoney, ‘Themistius and the agent intellect in James of Viterbo and other thirteenthcentury philosophers: (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate)’, Augustiniana 23 (1973), 422-67, at 428-31; id., ‘Neoplatonism, the Greek commentators and Renaissance Aristotelianism’, in D.J. O’Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (Albany N.Y. 1982), 169-77 and 264-82, esp. n. 1, 264-6; Robert Todd, introduction to translation of Themistius in DA 3.4-8, in Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect, trans. Frederick M. Schroeder and Robert B. Todd (Toronto 1990). 7. H. Vitelli, CAG 17, p. 992, s.v. Themistius.

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authorship, has been placed by some in the same group of commentaries as being earlier than the fifth century.8 By far the largest group of extant commentaries is that of the Neoplatonists up to the sixth century A.D. Nearly all the major Neoplatonists, apart from Plotinus (the founder of Neoplatonism), wrote commentaries on Aristotle, although those of Iamblichus (c. 250–c. 325) survive only in fragments, and those of three Athenians, Plutarchus (died 432), his pupil Proclus (410–485) and the Athenian Damascius (c. 462–after 538), are lost.9 As a result of these losses, most of the extant Neoplatonist commentaries come from the late fifth and the sixth centuries and a good proportion from Alexandria. There are commentaries by Plotinus’ disciple and editor Porphyry (232–309), by Iamblichus’ pupil Dexippus (c. 330), by Proclus’ teacher Syrianus (died c. 437), by Proclus’ pupil Ammonius (435/445– 517/526), by Ammonius’ three pupils Philoponus (c. 490 to 570s), Simplicius (wrote after 532, probably after 538) and Asclepius (sixth century), by Ammonius’ next but one successor Olympiodorus (495/505–after 565), by Elias (fl. 541?), by David (second half of the sixth century, or beginning of the seventh) and by Stephanus (took the chair in Constantinople c. 610). Further, a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics has been ascribed to Heliodorus of Prusa, an unknown pre-fourteenth-century figure, and there is a commentary by Simplicius’ colleague Priscian of Lydia on Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus. Of these commentators some of the last were Christians (Philoponus, Elias, David and Stephanus), but they were Christians writing in the Neoplatonist tradition, as was also Boethius who produced a number of commentaries in Latin before his death in 525 or 526. The third group comes from a much later period in Byzantium. The Berlin edition includes only three out of more than a dozen commentators described in Hunger’s Byzantinisches Handbuch.10 The two most important are Eustratius (1050/1060–c.1120), and Michael of Ephesus. It has been suggested that these two belong to a circle organised by the princess 8. The similarities to Syrianus (died c. 437) have suggested to some that it predates Syrianus (most recently Leonardo Tarán, review of Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus, vol.1 in Gnomon 46 (1981), 721-50 at 750), to others that it draws on him (most recently P. Thillet, in the Budé edition of Alexander de Fato, p. lvii). Praechter ascribed it to Michael of Ephesus (eleventh or twelfth century), in his review of CAG 22.2, in Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeiger 168 (1906), 861-907. 9. The Iamblichus fragments are collected in Greek by Bent Dalsgaard Larsen, Jamblique de Chalcis, Exégète et Philosophe (Aarhus 1972), vol. 2. Most are taken from Simplicius, and will accordingly be translated in due course. The evidence on Damascius’ commentaries is given in L.G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, vol. 2, Damascius (Amsterdam 1977), 11-12; on Proclus’ in L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962), xii, n. 22; on Plutarchus’ in H.M. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’, Phronesis 21 (1976), 75. 10. Herbert Hunger, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, vol. 1 (= Byzantinisches Handbuch, part 5, vol. 1) (Munich 1978), 25-41. See also B.N. Tatakis, La Philosophie Byzantine (Paris 1949).

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Anna Comnena in the twelfth century, and accordingly the completion of Michael’s commentaries has been redated from 1040 to 1138.11 His commentaries include areas where gaps had been left. Not all of these gapfillers are extant, but we have commentaries on the neglected biological works, on the Sophistici Elenchi, and a small fragment of one on the Politics. The lost Rhetoric commentary had a few antecedents, but the Rhetoric too had been comparatively neglected. Another product of this period may have been the composite commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (CAG 20) by various hands, including Eustratius and Michael, along with some earlier commentators, and an improvisation for Book 7. Whereas Michael follows Alexander and the conventional Aristotelian tradition, Eustratius’ commentary introduces Platonist, Christian and anti-Islamic elements.12 The composite commentary was to be translated into Latin in the next century by Robert Grosseteste in England. But Latin translations of various logical commentaries were made from the Greek still earlier by James of Venice (fl. c. 1130), a contemporary of Michael of Ephesus, who may have known him in Constantinople. And later in that century other commentaries and works by commentators were being translated from Arabic versions by Gerard of Cremona (died 1187).13 So the twelfth century resumed the transmission which had been interrupted at Boethius’ death in the sixth century. The Neoplatonist commentaries of the main group were initiated by Porphyry. His master Plotinus had discussed Aristotle, but in a very independent way, devoting three whole treatises (Enneads 6.1-3) to attacking Aristotle’s classification of the things in the universe into categories. These categories took no account of Plato’s world of Ideas, were inferior to Plato’s classifications in the Sophist and could anyhow be collapsed, some 11. R. Browning, ‘An unpublished funeral oration on Anna Comnena’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society n.s. 8 (1962), 1-12, esp. 6-7. 12. R. Browning, op. cit. H.D.P. Mercken, The Greek Commentaries of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Grosseteste, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI 1 (Leiden 1973), ch. 1, ‘The compilation of Greek commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’. Sten Ebbesen, ‘Anonymi Aurelianensis I Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos’, Cahiers de l’Institut Moyen Age Grecque et Latin 34 (1979), ‘Boethius, Jacobus Veneticus, Michael Ephesius and ‘‘Alexander’’ ’, pp. v-xiii; id., Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, 3 parts, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, vol. 7 (Leiden 1981); A. Preus, Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus on the Movement and Progression of Animals (Hildesheim 1981), introduction. 13. For Grosseteste, see Mercken as in n. 12. For James of Venice, see Ebbesen as in n. 12, and L. Minio-Paluello, ‘Jacobus Veneticus Grecus’, Traditio 8 (1952), 265-304; id., ‘Giacomo Veneto e l’Aristotelismo Latino’, in Pertusi (ed.), Venezia e l’Oriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento (Florence 1966), 53-74, both reprinted in his Opuscula (1972). For Gerard of Cremona, see M. Steinschneider, Die europäischen Übersetzungen aus dem arabischen bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts (repr. Graz 1956); E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London 1955), 235-6 and more generally 181-246. For the translators in general, see Bernard G. Dod, ‘Aristoteles Latinus’, in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds), The Cambridge History of Latin Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge 1982).

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of them into others. Porphyry replied that Aristotle’s categories could apply perfectly well to the world of intelligibles and he took them as in general defensible.14 He wrote two commentaries on the Categories, one lost, and an introduction to it, the Isagôgê, as well as commentaries, now lost, on a number of other Aristotelian works. This proved decisive in making Aristotle a necessary subject for Neoplatonist lectures and commentary. Proclus, who was an exceptionally quick student, is said to have taken two years over his Aristotle studies, which were called the Lesser Mysteries, and which preceded the Greater Mysteries of Plato.15 By the time of Ammonius, the commentaries reflect a teaching curriculum which begins with Porphyry’s Isagôgê and Aristotle’s Categories, and is explicitly said to have as its final goal a (mystical) ascent to the supreme Neoplatonist deity, the One.16 The curriculum would have progressed from Aristotle to Plato, and would have culminated in Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides. The latter was read as being about the One, and both works were established in this place in the curriculum at least by the time of Iamblichus, if not earlier.17 Before Porphyry, it had been undecided how far a Platonist should accept Aristotle’s scheme of categories. But now the proposition began to gain force that there was a harmony between Plato and Aristotle on most things.18 Not for the only time in the history of philosophy, a perfectly crazy proposition proved philosophically fruitful. The views of Plato and of Aristotle had both to be transmuted into a new Neoplatonist philosophy in order to exhibit the supposed harmony. Iamblichus denied that Aristotle contradicted Plato on the theory of Ideas.19 This was too much for Syrianus and his pupil Proclus. While accepting harmony in many areas,20 they could see that there was disagreement on this issue and also on the issue of whether God was causally responsible for the existence of the ordered 14. See P. Hadot, ‘L’harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d’Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Catégories’, in Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Rome 1974), 31-47; A.C. Lloyd, ‘Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic’, Phronesis 1 (1955-6), 58-79 and 146-60. 15. Marinus, Life of Proclus ch. 13, 157,41 (Boissonade). 16. The introductions to the Isagôgê by Ammonius, Elias and David, and to the Categories by Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Elias are discussed by L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena and I. Hadot, ‘Les Introductions’, see n. 2 above. 17. Proclus in Alcibiadem 1 p. 11 (Creuzer); Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena, ch. 26, 12f. For the Neoplatonist curriculum see Westerink, Festugière, P. Hadot and I. Hadot in n. 2. 18. See e.g. P. Hadot (1974), as in n. 14 above; H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’, Phronesis 21 (1976), 64-87; H.A. Davidson, ‘The principle that a finite body can contain only finite power’, in S. Stein and R. Loewe (eds), Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History presented to A. Altmann (Alabama 1979), 75-92; Carlos Steel, ‘Proclus et Aristotle’, Proceedings of the Congrès Proclus held in Paris 1985, J. Pépin and H.D. Saffrey (eds), Proclus, lecteur et interprète des anciens (Paris 1987), 213-25; Koenraad Verrycken, God en Wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van Ioannes Philoponus, Ph.D. Diss. (Louvain 1985). 19. Iamblichus ap. Elian in Cat. 123,1-3. 20. Syrianus in Metaph. 80,4-7; Proclus in Tim. 1.6,21-7,16.

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physical cosmos, which Aristotle denied. But even on these issues, Proclus’ pupil Ammonius was to claim harmony, and, though the debate was not clear cut,21 his claim was on the whole to prevail. Aristotle, he maintained, accepted Plato’s Ideas,22 at least in the form of principles (logoi) in the divine intellect, and these principles were in turn causally responsible for the beginningless existence of the physical universe. Ammonius wrote a whole book to show that Aristotle’s God was thus an efficent cause, and though the book is lost, some of its principal arguments are preserved by Simplicius.23 This tradition helped to make it possible for Aquinas to claim Aristotle’s God as a Creator, albeit not in the sense of giving the universe a beginning, but in the sense of being causally responsible for its beginningless existence.24 Thus what started as a desire to harmonise Aristotle with Plato finished by making Aristotle safe for Christianity. In Simplicius, who goes further than anyone,25 it is a formally stated duty of the commentator to display the harmony of Plato and Aristotle in most things.26 Philoponus, who with his independent mind had thought better of his earlier belief in harmony, is castigated by Simplicius for neglecting this duty.27 The idea of harmony was extended beyond Plato and Aristotle to Plato and the Presocratics. Plato’s pupils Speusippus and Xenocrates saw Plato as being in the Pythagorean tradition.28 From the third to first centuries B.C., pseudo-Pythagorean writings present Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines as if they were the ideas of Pythagoras and his pupils,29 and these forgeries were later taken by the Neoplatonists as genuine. Plotinus saw the Presocratics as precursors of his own views,30 but Iamblichus went far beyond him by writing ten volumes on Pythagorean philosophy.31 Thereafter Proclus sought to unify the whole of 21. Asclepius sometimes accepts Syranius’ interpretation (in Metaph. 433,9-436,6); which is, however, qualified, since Syrianus thinks Aristotle is realy committed willy-nilly to much of Plato’s view (in Metaph. 117,25-118,11; ap. Asclepium in Metaph. 433,16; 450,22); Philoponus repents of his early claim that Plato is not the target of Aristotle’s attack, and accepts that Plato is rightly attacked for treating ideas as independent entities outside the divine Intellect (in DA 37,18-31; in Phys. 225,4-226,11; contra Procl. 26,24-32,13; in An. Post. 242,14-243,25). 22. Asclepius in Metaph. from the voice of (i.e. from the lectures of) Ammonius 69,17-21; 71,28; cf. Zacharias Ammonius, Patrologia Graeca vol. 85 col. 952 (Colonna). 23. Simplicius in Phys. 1361,11-1363,12. See H.A. Davidson; Carlos Steel; Koenraad Verrycken in n. 18 above. 24. See Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1988), ch. 15. 25. See e.g. H.J. Blumenthal in n. 18 above. 26. Simplicius in Cat. 7,23-32. 27. Simplicius in Cael. 84,11-14; 159,2-9. On Philoponus’ volte face see n. 21 above. 28. See e.g. Walter Burkert, Weisheit und Wissenschaft (Nürnberg 1962), translated as Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge Mass. 1972), 83-96. 29. See Holger Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period (Åbo 1961); Thomas Alexander Szlezák, Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien, Peripatoi vol. 4 (Berlin and New York 1972). 30. Plotinus e.g. 4.8.1; 5.1.8 (10-27); 5.1.9. 31. See Dominic O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford 1989).

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Greek philosophy by presenting it as a continuous clarification of divine revelation32 and Simplicius argued for the same general unity in order to rebut Christian charges of contradictions in pagan philosophy.33 Later Neoplatonist commentaries tend to reflect their origin in a teaching curriculum:34 from the time of Philoponus, the discussion is often divided up into lectures, which are subdivided into studies of doctrine and of text. A general account of Aristotle’s philosophy is prefixed to the Categories commentaries and divided, according to a formula of Proclus,35 into ten questions. It is here that commentators explain the eventual purpose of studying Aristotle (ascent to the One) and state (if they do) the requirement of displaying the harmony of Plato and Aristotle. After the ten-point introduction to Aristotle, the Categories is given a six-point introduction, whose antecedents go back earlier than Neoplatonism, and which requires the commentator to find a unitary theme or scope (skopos) for the treatise. The arrangements for late commentaries on Plato are similar. Since the Plato commentaries form part of a single curriculum they should be studied alongside those on Aristotle. Here the situation is easier, not only because the extant corpus is very much smaller, but also because it has been comparatively well served by French and English translators.36 Given the theological motive of the curriculum and the pressure to harmonise Plato with Aristotle, it can be seen how these commentaries are a major source for Neoplatonist ideas. This in turn means that it is not safe to extract from them the fragments of the Presocratics, or of other authors, without making allowance for the Neoplatonist background against which the fragments were originally selected for discussion. For different reasons, analogous warnings apply to fragments preserved by the preNeoplatonist commentator Alexander.37 It will be another advantage of the present translations that they will make it easier to check the distorting effect of a commentator’s background. Although the Neoplatonist commentators conflate the views of Aristotle with those of Neoplatonism, Philoponus alludes to a certain convention 32. See Christian Guérard, ‘Parménide d’Elée selon les Néoplatoniciens’, forthcoming. 33. Simplicius in Phys. 28,32-29,5; 640,12-18. Such thinkers as Epicurus and the Sceptics, however, were not subject to harmonisation. 34. See the literature in n. 2 above. 35. ap. Elian in Cat. 107,24-6. 36. English: Calcidius in Tim. (parts by van Winden; den Boeft); Iamblichus fragments (Dillon); Proclus in Tim. (Thomas Taylor); Proclus in Parm. (Dillon); Proclus in Parm., end of 7th book, from the Latin (Klibansky, Labowsky, Anscombe); Proclus in Alcib. 1 (O’Neill); Olympiodorus and Damascius in Phaedonem (Westerink); Damascius in Philebum (Westerink); Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Westerink). See also extracts in Thomas Taylor, The Works of Plato, 5 vols. (1804). French: Proclus in Tim. and in Rempublicam (Festugière); in Parm. (Chaignet); Anon. in Parm (P. Hadot); Damascius in Parm. (Chaignet). 37. For Alexander’s treatment of the Stoics, see Robert B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics (Leiden 1976), 24-9.

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when he quotes Plutarchus expressing disapproval of Alexander for expounding his own philosophical doctrines in a commentary on Aristotle.38 But this does not stop Philoponus from later inserting into his own commentaries on the Physics and Meteorology his arguments in favour of the Christian view of Creation. Of course, the commentators also wrote independent works of their own, in which their views are expressed independently of the exegesis of Aristotle. Some of these independent works will be included in the present series of translations. The distorting Neoplatonist context does not prevent the commentaries from being incomparable guides to Aristotle. The introductions to Aristotle’s philosophy insist that commentators must have a minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus, and this they certainly have. Commentators are also enjoined neither to accept nor reject what Aristotle says too readily, but to consider it in depth and without partiality. The commentaries draw one’s attention to hundreds of phrases, sentences and ideas in Aristotle, which one could easily have passed over, however often one read him. The scholar who makes the right allowance for the distorting context will learn far more about Aristotle than he would be likely to on his own. The relations of Neoplatonist commentators to the Christians were subtle. Porphyry wrote a treatise explicitly against the Christians in 15 books, but an order to burn it was issued in 448, and later Neoplatonists were more circumspect. Among the last commentators in the main group, we have noted several Christians. Of these the most important were Boethius and Philoponus. It was Boethius’ programme to transmit Greek learning to Latin-speakers. By the time of his premature death by execution, he had provided Latin translations of Aristotle’s logical works, together with commentaries in Latin but in the Neoplatonist style on Porphyry’s Isagôgê and on Aristotle’s Categories and de Interpretatione, and interpretations of the Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistici Elenchi. The interruption of his work meant that knowledge of Aristotle among Latin-speakers was confined for many centuries to the logical works. Philoponus is important both for his proofs of the Creation and for his progressive replacement of Aristotelian science with rival theories, which were taken up at first by the Arabs and came fully into their own in the West only in the sixteenth century. Recent work has rejected the idea that in Alexandria the Neoplatonists compromised with Christian monotheism by collapsing the distinction between their two highest deities, the One and the Intellect. Simplicius (who left Alexandria for Athens) and the Alexandrians Ammonius and Asclepius appear to have acknowledged their beliefs quite openly, as later

38. Philoponus in DA 21,20-3.

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did the Alexandrian Olympiodorus, despite the presence of Christian students in their classes.39 The teaching of Simplicius in Athens and that of the whole pagan Neoplatonist school there was stopped by the Christian Emperor Justinian in 529. This was the very year in which the Christian Philoponus in Alexandria issued his proofs of Creation against the earlier Athenian Neoplatonist Proclus. Archaeological evidence has been offered that, after their temporary stay in Ctesiphon (in present-day Iraq), the Athenian Neoplatonists did not return to their house in Athens, and further evidence has been offered that Simplicius went to Harran (Carrhae), in present-day Turkey near the Iraq border.40 Wherever he went, his commentaries are a treasurehouse of information about the preceding thousand years of Greek philosophy, information which he painstakingly recorded after the closure in Athens, and which would otherwise have been lost. He had every reason to feel bitter about Christianity, and in fact he sees it and Philoponus, its representative, as irreverent. They deny the divinity of the heavens and prefer the physical relics of dead martyrs.41 His own commentaries by contrast culminate in devout prayers. Two collections of articles by various hands have been published, to make the work of the commentators better known. The first is devoted to Philoponus;42 the second is about the commentators in general, and goes into greater detail on some of the issues briefly mentioned here.43

39. For Simplicius, see I. Hadot, Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris 1978); for Ammonius and Asclepius, Koenraad Verrycken, God en wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van Ioannes Philoponus, Ph.D. Diss. (Louvain 1985); for Olympiodorus, L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962). 40. Alison Frantz, ‘Pagan philosophers in Christian Athens’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 119 (1975), 29-38; M. Tardieu, ‘Témoins orientaux du Premier Alcibiade à Harran et à Nag ‘Hammadi’, Journal Asiatique 274 (1986); id., ‘Les calendriers en usage à Harran d’après les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d’Aristote’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin 1987), 40-57; id., Coutumes nautiques mésopotamiennes chez Simplicius, in preparation. The opposing view that Simplicius returned to Athens is most fully argued by Alan Cameron, ‘The last day of the Academy at Athens’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 195, n.s. 15 (1969), 7-29. 41. Simplicius in Cael. 26,4-7; 70,16-18; 90,1-18; 370,29-371,4. See on his whole attitude Philippe Hoffmann, ‘Simplicius’ polemics’, in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987). 42. Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987). 43. Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1990). The lists of texts and previous translations of the commentaries included in Wildberg, Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World (pp. 12ff.) are not included here. The list of translations should be augmented by: F.L.S. Bridgman, Heliodorus (?) in Ethica Nicomachea, London 1807. I am grateful for comments to Henry Blumenthal, Victor Caston, I. Hadot, Paul Mercken, Alain Segonds, Robert Sharples, Robert Todd, L.G. Westerink and Christian Wildberg.

English-Greek Glossary

absence: apousia abstraction: aphairesis absurd: atopos absurdity: atopia, atopos accept: apodekhesthai accepted: endoxon accompany: epakolouthein act (vb.): dran action: energêma, ergon, praxis active: energês, energêtikos be active: energein activity: energeia, ergon add: epagein, prostithenai addition: prosthêkê, prosthesis advance: prokopê adventitiously: epiktêtôs aetiological: aitiologikos affection: pathêma, pathos, peisis be affected: paskhein, pathainesthai affective: empathês non-affective: apathês, oikeiotês affinity: koinônia air: aêr akin: sungenês aloof: arrhepês ambiguous: homônumos analogously: analogon be analogous: analogein analysis: analutikos analytic: analutikos anger: orgê, thumos animal: zôion animate: empsukhos animate (vb.): zôoun appearance: emphasis appetite: to epithumein, epithumia appetitive: orektikos argument: epikheirêma, epikheirêsis, logos, sullogismos arise: egeirein arousal: egersis

arrangement: thesis artefact: tekhnêton articulate (vb.): diarthrein articulation: diarthrôsis ascend: anagein, anienai ascent: anaphora assimilate: exomoioun association: koinônia astronomy: astronomia atheism: atheia atheist: atheos atom/atomic: atomos attribute (vb.): aitiasthai attribute/s: sumbainon, huparkhonta essential attributes: ta kath’ hauto, ta kath’ hauta automatism: tautomaton axiom: axiôma awareness: gnôsis, katalêpsis, sunaisthesis, theôria becoming: genesis, to ginesthai belief: pistis bend around: katakamptein blessed: makarios (be) blinded: apamblunesthai blood: haima blow: plêgê body: sôma bound: horos without bound: aoristos breath: anapnoê breathe: anapnein breathing: anapnoê bring about: apotelein by-product: parakolouthêma category: katêgoria causal: aitiôdês causation: aitios causative: aitiôdês

196

English-Greek Glossary

cause: aitios cause (vb.): aitiasthai be a cause: aitiasthai change: kinêsis source of change: kinêtikos changer: to kinoun character: kharaktêr, kharaktêristikos externally changed: heterokinêtos change qualitatively: alloiousthai changing qualitatively: alloiôtikos choice: hairesis, proairesis circle: kuklos classed together: homotagês co-active: sunergon cognition: gnôsis cognitive: epistêmonikos, gnôstikos, gnôristikos collection: sunagôgê colour: khrôma coming to be: genesis commensurate: summetros commentator: exêgêtês not commensurate: asummetros common: koinos common elements: ta koina community: koinônia comparison: parathesis compel: anankazein complete: athroos, holikos, teleios complete (vb.): teleioun completion: apoteleutêsis, teleiôsis composite: sunthetos composition: sumplêrosis, suntaxis, sunthesis compound: sunamphoteron comprehension: perilêpsis concave: koilos conceive: noein concentrate: sunagein concentration: sunairesis conception: huponoia (be by) concomitance: paruphistanai condition: diathesis, hexis, katastasis be in a condition: diatithesthai conjectural: doxastikos conclude: sumperainein conclusion: sumperasma, sunagomenon concurrence: sundromê connection: sumplokê, sundesmos, sunaphê consciousness: sunaisthêsis

consequential attribute: sumbainon consist in/of: sunkeisthai consistently: akolouthos constitution: diorganosis, sustasis constitutive: hupostatikos, stoikheiôdês, sustatikos contact: epaphê be in contact: ephapthesthai contain: periekhein not contained: aperilêptos contemplation: to theôrein, theôria continuity: sunekheia, to sunekhon contracting: apoptôsis contrary: antikeimenon contrary properties: ta antikeimena contributory cause: sunaitios controlling: arkhikos convergence: sunneusis co-ordination: suntaxis corpuscle: sômation correlate: antikeimenon correspondence: apotasis cosmos: kosmos counteraction: antibasis countless: apeiros craft: tekhnê create: demiourgein creation: poiêsis dark: skotos decad: dekas decay: phthisis, phthora declension: to hupheimenon, huphesis, hupobasis define: diorizein, horizein definiendum: horismenon definition: horismos, horos deliberation: boulêsis deliberative: bouleutikos demiurge: dêmiourgos demon/demonic: daimonion demonstrate: apodeiknunai, deiknunai, endeiknunai demonstration: apodeiktikos, apodeixis demonstrative: apodeiktikos demonstratively: apodeiktikôs depart: aphistasthai, apogenesthai, ekbainein departure: apostasis, ekbasis, ekstasis, exodos depend: anartan, artan, exaptein, exartan

English-Greek Glossary depth: bathos derivatively: epiktêtôs derived: ekbebêkuia derived from and contributing to one thing: aph’ henos kai pros hen descend: apoklinein, hupobainein descent: hupobasis desire: to epithumein, epithumia, orexis object of desire: orektos desire (vb.): oregesthai descriptive: apographikos destiny: lexis destroy: anairein, apollunai detached parcel: apospasma determination: horos determine: aphorizein, diorizein, horizein develop: anelittein development: anelixis deviant: diestrammenos deviation: diastrophê divorce (vb.): apallattein dialectical: dialektikê dialectician: dialektikos dialogue: dialogos differ: diapherein, diaphorein difference: diaphora, to diaphoron, heterotês Difference: thateron different: diaphoros diminish: elattesthai diminution: meiôsis discrete: diorismenos discriminate: krinein disintegrate: diapneisthai (in a) disorderly (way): ataktôs disposition: hexis disprove: elenkhein dissolution: dialusis distance: apostasis distinguish: antidiairein, aphorizein, diairein, diakrinein, diorizein distinction: antidiairesis, diakrisis, diorismos without distinction: aparallaktos distress: lupê disturbance: tarakhê divide: diairein dividing: diairetikos divine: makarios, theios divisible: diairetos, meristos

197

division: diairesis, diairetikos, diakrisis, diastasis, merismos divisive: diastatikos doctrine: doxa dominant: kurios dominance: epikrateia dominate: epikratein domination: katokhê dry: xêros duration: paratasis dyad: duas dyad itself: autoduas earth: gê effect: aitiatos effervescence: zesis efficient (cause): poiêtikos, to huph’ hou efflux: aporrhoê element: stoikheion embryo: embruon emotional: empathês empty: kenos end: telos enduring: monimos enjoyment: apolausis enmattered: enulos enmesh: sumplekein ensoulment: psukhôsis essence: ousia, to ti ên einai be part of essence: sunousiousthai eternal: aïdios, aiônios eternal being: to aïdion ethereal: aitherôdês examination: elenkhos examine: elenkhein excellence: aretê exhalation: anathumiasis exist: huparkhein, huphistanai existence: huparxis, hupostasis, to einai exodus: exodos explanation: aitios, exêgêsis explanatory: aitiologikos extend: diistanai extension: diastasis eye: omma, ophthalmos everlasting: aïdios, aiônios everlasting motion: aeikinêton everlastingly: aïdiôs everlastingness: aïdiotês, to aei einai evolving: genesiourgos

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English-Greek Glossary

evolution: anelixis falsely: mê alethôs, pseudôs finite: peperasmenos fire: pur fit (vb.): epharmozein, harmozein fitting together: sunthesis fixed sphere: aplanês flavour: khumos follow: akolouthein, hepesthai (be in) flux: epirrhein forced: to biaion form: eidos, idea pure form: autoeidos two forms: duoeidês formal: eidêtikos, eidikos formal cause: to kath’ hauto free (vb.): apallattein, apoluein freedom: hekousion function: ergon fuse with: sumphuein fusion: sumphusis, sunaphê generate: gennan generation: gennêsis generative: genikos, gennêtikos genuine: alêthinos, alêthôs genus: genos of the same genus: homogenês geometry: geometria goal: telos good: agathos goodness: agathotês grasp: antilêpsis, katalêpsis, proslêpsis ground: aitios grow: auxanein growth: auxêsis, auxêtikon Guide: hêgemôn halt: epistasis, stasis harmonic: enarmonios harmonic series: harmonikos harmonise: harmozein, diakosmein harmony: harmonia hearer: akroatês hearing: akoê heart: kardia heavens: ouranos hinder: empodizein hint at (vb.): ainittesthai human: anthrôpeios, anthrôpinos hypothesis: hupothesis

idea: idea ignorance: agnoia, apaideusia illuminative power: phôtistikon image: eidôlon imagination: phantasia, to phantazesthai imaginative: phantastikos imitate: mimeisthai immaterial: aülos immediate: prosekhês immediately: amesos immobile: akinêtos immortal: athanatos immortality: athanasia, to athanaton impassability: apatheia impassible: apathês, apathôs imperishable: aphthartos impinge: prospiptein imply: episêmainesthai impossible: adunatos impulse: hormê inactivity: argia inanimate: apsukhos incline (vb.): aponeuein, neuein, rhepein inclination: neusis, rhopê incompatible: asunklutos incorporeal: asômatos increase (vb.): auxanein independently: autotelôs indestructible: anôlethros indeterminate: aoristos, aoristôs indeterminate state: (to) aoristainein indicate: endeiknunai indicate obscurely: ainittesthai indication: endeixis indicative: dektikos, dêlôtikos individual: atomos individuality: idiotês indivisibility: (to) ameriston indivisible: amerês, ameristos, atomos indivisibly: ameros, ameristos infer: anagein inferior: hupheimenos infinite: apeiros infinitely: apeiros infinity: apeiria ad infinitum: eis apeiron inform: eidopoiein informing: eidêtikos inhibition: anastolê inhibitive: anastaltikos

English-Greek Glossary insensitive: anaisthêtos inseparable: akhôristos inseparably: akhôristôs insight: sunesis, theôrêma, theôria instrument: organon instrumental: organikos intellect: nous, noêtikon intellection: to noein, noêsis intellective: noeros, noêtikon intelligible: noêtos intentional: hekousion interconnection: sumplêrôsis intermediate: mesos intermediate position: mesotês no intermediate: amesos internal: endothen interpret: exêgeisthai, hermêneuein interpretation: exêgêsis, hermêneia interpreter: exêgêtês interval: diastêma intuit: noein intuitively: kat’ epibolên introduce: eisagein invariable: anexallaktos involvement: sumplokê irradiation: emphasis judge (vb.): enkrinein, epikrinein judgement: krisis juxtaposition: parathesis kind: genos kinship: oikeiotês, sungeneia (have) kinship: epikoinônoun know: eidenai, epistasthai, gignôskein, gnôrizein knowledge: eidêsis, to gignôskein, gnôrisis, gnôsis, epistêmê object of knowledge: gnôrimos, gnôstos scientific knowledge: epistêmê lack of motion: akinêsia level: bathos life: zôê, to zên lifelessness: azôia light: phôs liken: apeikazein likeness: mimêsis limit: peras line: grammê list: sustoikhia

199

live (vb.): zên living thing: zôion living thing itself: autozôion love: philia magnitude: megethos man: anthrôpos manifold: plêthos mark off: aphorizein material: hulikos mathematics: mathêmata matter: hulê matterless: aülos mean: mesotês measure: metron without measure: ametros memory: mnêmê metaphysics: meta ta phusika method: methodos mix (vb.): meignunai mixture: krasis, mixis modification: tropê monad: monas mortal: thnêtos, thnêtoeidês mote: xusma motion: kinêsis, kinêma (ease of) motion: eukinêtos motionless: akinêtos move (vb.): kinein mover: kinêtikos, to kinoun myth: muthos natural: autophuês, phusikos, kata phusin natural science/history: phusiologia nature: phusis necessary: anankaios, anankê necessarily: ex anankês necessity: ananke of necessity: anankaios non-rational: alogos nourish: trephein nourishment: trophê, threpsis number: arithmos be numerable: arithmein nutrition: threpsis, trephein, trophê nutritive: threptikos object of sensation: aisthêtos object of science: epistêtos object of sense: aisthêtos objection: epibolê, epikheirêma

200

English-Greek Glossary

one: hen One itself: autoen opinion: dogma, ta dokounta, doxa, doxastikos opposite: antikeimenon, antikeimenos, enantios organ of sensation: aisthêtêrion originative: arkhikos otherness: heterotês outline: tupos painful: epiponos passion: pathêma passive: pathêtikos paradigm: paradeigma part: meros, morion without parts: amerês, ameristos of dissimilar/different parts: anomoiomerês partake: metekhein partial: merikos participation: antilêpsis, methexis, metokhê particular: merikos partition: merismos partless: amerês, ameristos pattern: paradeigma perceptible: aisthêtos perception: to aisthanesthai, to aisthêtikon perfect (vb.): agathunein perfection: teleiôsis, teleiotês, teleiôs einai perish: phtheiresthai perishable: phthartos persist: diamenein, epimenein persuasion: peithô phenomena: ta phainomena pictorial: morphôtikos place: khôra, pou, topos plane: epipedon, epiphaneia planet: planêton, planômenon plants: ta phuomena, phuton plausible: pithanos pleasure: hêdonê, hêdus pneuma: pneuma point: sêmeion, stigmê pointing: deixis position: taxis, thesis possibility: dunamis postulate: axiôma potency: dunamis

potentiality: dunamis potentially: dunamei power: dunamis practical: pragmateiôdês, praktikos, praktos pre-exist: proüparkhein (be) pregnant: ôdinesthai premise: protasis presence: metousia (be) present (within): enuparkhein present together: sunuparkhein preservation: sôtêria, sunokhê preserve (vb.): diasôzein, sôzein, sunekhein primary: proêgoumenos principle: aitios, arkhê, arkhikos, arkhon, logos principle itself: autoarkhê privation: sterêsis problem: aporia, aporon proceed: bainein, proienai proceeding: basis procession: to proïenai, proodos product: ergon, pragma project (vb.): proballesthai projection: probolê projective: problêtikê proof: elenkhos property: idion, idiotês proportion: summetria prove: deiknunai, elenkhein psychic: psukhikos pupil: korê qualification: diorismos qualitative change: alloiôsis, alloiôtikos quality: poion, poiotês, to toiade einai quantity: poson, posotês raise a problem: aporein raising of a problem: diaporia ratio: logos rational: logikos reality: hupostasis, ta onta primary reality: to prôtôs on reason: logos reasoning: logismos, logos receive: dekhesthai receptacle: hupodokhê receptive: antilêptikos, dektikos

English-Greek Glossary recognise: gignôskein, gnôrizein, krinein recollection: anamnêsis refute: elenkhein regression: epistrophê relation: skhesis category of relation: to pros ti relational linkage: antithesis relax: khalazein relaxation: khalasmos remain: diamenein, hupomenein resistance: antereisis resistant: antitupos rest: êremia, êremêsis, monê rest (vb.): êremein, menein restore: anaplêrein result: apotelesma result (vb.): apotelein resurrection: (to) anistasthai retaliation: antilupêsis revenge: antilupêsis reversion: epistrophê revert to/upon: epistrephein revulsion: apostrophê rotation: kuklophoria, periphora rule (vb.): arkhein science: epistêmê scientific: epistêmonikos scope: skopos secondary beings: ta deutera secretly: aporrhêtos see: horan self-activation: autenergêtos self-arousing: autenergêtos self change/changing: autokinêtos self-chosen: autoproairetos self-defence: amuna as self-defence: amuntikon self-desertion: heautês apostasis self-evident: autothen gnôrimon self-initiating: authormêtos self-mover/moving: autokinêtos self-movement: endothen kineisthai self-sufficient: authedrastos, autotelês self-supporting: authedrastos sensation: to aisthanesthai, aisthêsis, aisthêtos concerned with sensation: aisthêtikos as/in sensation: aisthêtikos, aisthêtikôs

201

without sensation: anaisthêtos (have) sensation: aisthanesthai sense: aisthêsis, aisthêtikos, sêmainomenon of sense: aisthêtikos sense-object: aisthêtos sense-perception: aisthêsis sense (vb.): aisthanesthai sense-organ: aisthêtêrion sensible: kat’ aisthêsin, aisthêtikos sensible thing: aisthêtos be sensible: aisthanesthai sensing: to aisthanesthai, to aisthêtikon sensitive: aisthêtikos, eupathês not sensitive: anaisthêtos sensitive faculty: to aisthêtikon of sentience: to aisthêtikon separate (vb.): diakrinein, khôrizein separate/separated: diêrêmênon, khôristos not separated: akhôristos separation: apostasis, diakrisis, khôrismos, to khôriston series: analogia shape: morphê, skhêma shift: exallagê ship: naus, ploion sight: opsis, thea simple: haplos simplicity: haplotês signify: sêmainein size: megethos without size: amegethês sketch: hupographê soul: psukhê sound: êkhô space: khôra speak in riddles: ainittesthai species: eidos of different species: anomoioeidês ultimate species: eidikôtaton eidos of the same species: homoeidês sphere: sphaira stability: to monimon, monimotês stable: monimos (in a certain) state: diakeimenos steersman: kubernêtês straight: euthus study: theôria subject to qualitative change: alloiousthai

202

English-Greek Glossary

subordinated: hupotetagmenon subsistence: hupostasis substance: hupostasis, ousia substrate: hupokeimenon subtract: aphairein subtraction: aphairesis suitability: epitêdeiotês suitable/suited: epitêdeios sun: hêlios sunder: apospan superfluous: epeisodiôdês superiority: huperokhê supernatural: huperphuês supervene: epeisienai, epigignesthai supplement: epirrhoê supplementation: anaplêrômatikon surface: epipedon, epiphaneia sustaining: sunektikos symbol: sumbolon syllogism: sullogismos taste: geusis, khumos teaching: didaskalia tear away/apart: apospan temporal: khronikos tend: epiklinein tendency: to neuein, neusis term: onoma terminate: apoperatousthai, apoteleutan tetrad: tetras tetrad itself: autotetras text: lexis theoretical: theôrêtikos theory: hupothesis, theôria there: ekei thing: to on, pragma thing in the world: diakosmion particular thing: to tode ti think: epinoein, hêgeisthai, noein thinking: to dianoeisthai, dianoêtikos thought: to dianoeisthai, dianoia, dianoêtikos, ennoia, noêsis time: khronos timelessness: (to) akhronon tool: organon touch: epaphê, haphê object of touch: haptos touch (vb.): haptesthai trace: ikhnos tradition: paradosis transcend: huperekhein

transcendent: exêrêmenon, exerêmenos, huperekhon transform: metabainein, metaballein transformation: metabolê transition: metabasis, metastasis without/in no transition: ametabatos transitional: diexodikos transmission: paradokhê transparent: diaphanês travel: phora travel (vb.): pheresthai triad: trias triad itself: autotrias truly: alêthôs truth: alêtheia turn back: epanakamptein unaffected: apathês unceasing: aparaleiptos unchanged: akinêtos, anexallaktos unchanging: akinêtos unchangingness: akinêtos understand: eidenai, ekdekhesthai understanding: eidêsis, katalêpsis undivided: amerês, ameristos, atomos unfold: anaptussein, anelittein ungenerated: agenêtos unify: henein, henizein, henopoiein union: henôsis, koinônia unitary: ameristos unite: henein unity: henôsis, to henômenon universal: katholou universe: to holon, to pan univocal: sunônumon unmixed: amigês (be) unmoved: akinêtos unmoving: akinêtos unparticipated: amethektos unreasonably: alogos unseparated: akhôristos unsuitable: anepitêdeios use: khrêsis, sunêtheia use (vb.): khrasthai variation: parallaxis, tropê without variation: aparallaktos various: diaphoros vary: exallattesthai, parallattesthai vegetative: phutikos vehicle: okhêma vessel: angeion

English-Greek Glossary view: doxa, thea view (vb.): episkopein viewpoint: ennoia vital: zôtikos water: hudôr way: tropos what it is: to ti esti

white: leukos whole: holos, sunolon wholeness: holotês wisdom: phronêsis (rational) wish: boulêsis word: onoma, rhêma, rhêton world-order: diakosmos

203

Greek-English Index

abiastôs, without force: 91,27 adiairetos, indivisible: 31,9.11; 61,31; 62,1; 64,3.5; undivided: 63,6. adiaphoros, there is no difference: 12,17; without difference: 103,23; indistinguishable: 64,3.5; 65,31 to adiaphoron, identity: 63,38 adiaphorôs, indifferently: 27,11 adiarthrôtos, inarticulate: 106,16 adiastatos, without extension: 43,4.7 adiastrophos, inexorable: 40,11 adunatos, impossible: 4,26; 43,29; 44,1.22.24; 65,17.34; 91,21 aeikinêton, everlasting motion: 32,10; be always in motion: 39,29 aêr, air: 23,21.22; 26,6.9.16; 54,24; 65,22; 66,31; 28,12; 73,12; 74,10.29; 75,8.14.19.24.25.31.32; 76,7 agathos, good: 38,1.3.4.5.7; 48,35; 49,10; 50,21.22.23.25.26.27.28.34; 51,2.3.4; 68,15.23.24.25.27.28; 71,15; 82,2.33; 83,4; 105,21; 11,27; goodness: 50,19 agathotês, goodness: 110,34 agathunein, to perfect: 73,20; to make perfect: 110,34 agein, to place: 30,32 agenêtos, ungenerated: 6,11; 89,23.28.37.38; 90,1.5.8.23 agnoein, do not know: 94,34 agnoia, ignorance: 70,16 agonion, angularity: 25,29 aïdios, everlasting: 7,11; 46,17.18.19.24; 49,8; 73,30; 82,34; 87,6; 101,22; 102,31; 103,4; 110,37; 112,11 aïdiôs, eternal: 32,13; everlastingly: 74,31 to aïdion, eternal being: 108,24 aïdiotês, everlastingness: 110,20; 115,18

aiglos, shining: 68,13.14 ainittesthai, to speak in riddles: 28,24; to indicate obscurely: 39,37; to hint (covertly) at: 50,9; 53,2; 92,26; 103,22 aiônios, everlasting: 5,16; eternal: 47,9.12.16 aisthanesthai, to have sensation: 78,29; 101,27; 112,16; to be sensible: 43,18; 44,33; to sense: 35,9; 69,15; 71,12; 76,20; 77,29.38.39; 78,2.6.9.10; 79,20; 103,29 to aisthanesthai, sensation: 16,33; 24,20.22; 63,24; 69,22; 70,8; perception: 27,25; sensing: 103,8 aisthêsis, sensation: 2,23; 5,5; 6,25; 8,28; 9,10; 15,6; 16,10.20.34.35; 29,8.15; 32,29.31; 41,13; 43,1; 44,34; 45,29; 54,6; 57,14; 58,24; 59,4.6.11; 60,18.23; 77,6; 80,13.27; 84,35; 85,20; 88,28; 94,2.14; 95,35; 96,30; 97,4.33; 99,5.8.9; 100,11.12.13.18; 102,7; 103,19.23; 105,20.21.28.34.36; 106,27; 108,17; 110,2; sense: 15,2.4; 71,35; 101,30; sense-perception: 83,26 kat’ aisthêsin, sensible: 100,8. aisthêtêrion, sense-organ: 38,14; 58,26.34; 59,1.6; 70,11.80,29; organ of sensation: 41,22 aisthêtikos, sensitive: 2,25; 3,5; 4,1; 7,35; 9,11; 12,3. 17.20; 17,16; 20,14.16; 41,21.27; 45,27.31; 47,31; 60,7.18; 75,16; 79,30.32.36; 80,11.14.15.23.27.31; 88,19; 94,2.3.13. 22; 95,11; 100,20; 103,18; 105,17.19; 108,13.15.17.18; 112,18; of sense: 88,12; concerned with sensation: 2,32; 3,17; (as) sensation: 20,14; 33,7.13; 77,26; 78,11; 79,35.38; 103,27; sensible: 14,22;

206

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sense: 71,18.31; of sensation: 101,25; has the power of sensation: 106,21; has sensation: 112,16 to aisthêtikon, sensitive faculty: 8,5; 69,25; perception: 72,4.6; sensing: 69,25; of sentience: 78,29 aisthêtikôs, as sensation: 5,36; in sensation: 52,10 aisthêtos, sensible [thing]: 2,23; 3,4; 8,4; 14,24; 66,9.24; sensed: 58,35; 59,12; 69,24; sensation: 35,6; 60,25; object of sensation: 29,14.21; object of sense: 38,11; 45,22; 105,33. 34.36; 106,28.29; 110,2; perceptible: 28,1; sense-object: 38,14.20.21 aitherôdês, ethereal: 17,17 aitiasthai, to cause: 26,37; to attribute: 31,15; 50,28; to make responsible: 63,20; to count as cause: 113,14; to be cause: 111,2; to treat as cause: 113,4; to regard as cause: 113,6.8.18 aitiatos, caused: 7,12; 11,24; 82,33; 96,28.31; 97,7.11; 110,3; effect: 8,12.14; 25,16; 29,4; 30,34; 33,11; 97,13; 103,34.36; 111,16 aitiôdês, of a cause: 30,35; causal: 40,14; causative: 33,32; 70,14. aitiologikos, explanatory: 15,9; gives reason: 70,10; aetiological: 97,6 aitios (aitia), cause: 1,21; 2,33; 4,15.16.17; 8,12.14.15.36; 11,24; 14,31.37; 19,5; 20,27; 25,7.11.14.16.17.24; 26,4.10.31.36; 28,29.34; 29,4.23; 30,34; 33,12.22; 36,13; 39,36; 40,40; 49,18.20.21.24.25; 50,3.10.17; 56,5.8.32; 58,2; 63,17; 67,19; 70,20.30.31.33; 71,7; 72,13.30; 74,9.13.18; 82,33; 86,24.35; 87,14.33; 89,17; 91,33; 92,4.18; 94,24; 95,20; 96,28.30; 97,8.13.14.35; 99,20.33; 100,19; 103,34; 104,4; 110,3.27; 11,1.2.5.6.10.13.15.18.32; 112,2.13. 21.36; 113,1.12.24; 115,28.32; principle: 7,7.25; fundamental: 7,11; ground: 2,3; 32,21; 97,17.24.26; causation: 19,40; reason: 11,15; 32,8; 75,4.6; 97,6; explanation: 4,9; 33,16.26; 97,31; 98,3; 103,28; 105,23; 109,20

akatallêlos, bad syntax: 80,18. akhôristos, inseparable: 4,8; 16,5.13.14.16.17.19.27; 17,28.33.36; 18,10.22; 20,6; 33,35; 65,6; 76,31; 77,19.20; 78,32; 79,1.8.32; 95,3; not separated: 102,25; unseparated: 18,6; 21,6.8.12.13.15.16.17.21.22.23; 22,19.28.29.31; 23,2.8.15.18; 24,4; 48,35.36; 77,4; 92,20.21; 94,29.30.31; 95,7.8.9.12.18.19.20; 96,4.7; 102,33; 107,3.19.27.28.29 akhôristôs, inseparably: 45,18; 108,15 to akhronon, timelessness: 66,32 akinêsia, lack of motion: 39,27.28.30 akinêtos, does not change: 61,26; unchangingness: 56,27; unchanging: 34,23.24; 37,16; 66,13; motionless: 26,34; unchanged: 37,2; 57,10; not subject to change: 66,15; immobile: 32,27 akinêtoun, to be unmoved: 19,34 akmazein, be at a peak. 60,4.9 akoê, hearing: 79,36; 101,27 akoinotêton, dissociation: 33,29 akolouthein, to follow: 15,17; 21,16; 43,30; 45,28; 52,10; 62,15; 105,18; 112,8; to be accompaniment: 16,27; to parallel: 21,14 akolouthôs, consistently: 72,32 akouein, to take: 14,32; to understand: 30,23; 39,21; 40,25; 50,6.17.30; 52,31; 54,28; 61,24; 62,11; 92,14; 114,1.19; 115,35 akraiphnês, pure: 5,17; 90,12 akribeia, exactitude: 7,17; 98,5 akribês, exact: 7,1.8.13.19.20.22; 91,21.30; 96,18.25.27; 98,1 and passim; accurate: 17,15; 82,10 to akribes, exactitude: 7,3; 96,23 akribôs, exactly: 7,28; 97,31 akroatês, hearer: 6,21 akron, summit: 1,5; end-point: 46,35; limit: 3,15; extreme: 5,39; 6,10; 8,10; 14,13; 26,27.28; 30,7; 62,5; 100,24 aktis, ray of light: 25,32 Alcmaeon, 32,1.2 alêtheia, truth: 1,4.11.15.19; 7,29.33.34; 8,29; 11,8; 14,8; 20,35; 23,32; 27,9.17.22; 28,14; 31,3; 73,25; reality: 72,15 alêthes, obviously: 9,27; true: 13,31; 16,7; 27,4; 34,7; 35,31; 37,2; 52,36;

Greek-English Index 53,11; 65,6; 70,22; 94,3; truth: 29,7; 72,25; 90,17; inerrant: 27,2; in fact: 85,2 alêthinos, genuine: 7,7 alêthôs, truly: 8,8; 50,2; really: 14,5; rightly: 73,28; genuine: 20,27 mê alêthôs, falsely: 34,5 Alexander of Aphrodisias: 50,37; 52,28; 80,4; 93,31; 101,18; 102,28 alloiousthai, subject to qualitative change: 35,9; to change qualitatively: 36,24.25; 38,15; 54,34; 86,2; 112,16 alloiôsis, qualitative change: 2,25; 18,35; 19,13; 41,21; 58,10; 99,12; 105,30; 106,10; 112,18 alloiôtikos, changing qualitatively: 36,27; 109,33; qualitative change: 38,19 alogistos, non-rational: 51,25 alogos, non-rational: 7,3; 12,19; 51,25; 52,1; 89,37.39; 96,12; 99,8; 107,22; beast: 103,26; dumb: 80,15 ta aloga, dumb animals: 71,33; 72,2 alogôs, unreasonably: 30,33 amegethês, without size: 73,6 amerês, partless: 11,32; seamless: 60,2; undivided: 42,21; 44,10.14.33.36; 58,30; without parts: 28,30; 64,7.25; 66,36; has no parts: 64,26; indivisible: 42,27.29.34; 45,1.2.5.6.8.10.33; 62,25; 77,16.17 amerôs, indivisibly: 44,13.16; 47,8 ameristos, indivisible: 3,13; 5,29; 6,1.6.10; 8,8.17.18.19; 10,22; 27,38; 50,7; 62,3.8; 66,36; 67,1.4.7; 72,20; 77,15; 78,32; 79,3.13; 84,10.12; 86,29; 89,36.38; 90,1; 92,18; 94,35; 102,12.19; 103,4; unitary: 26,25; 34,10.13; undivided: 25,22; 28,23; 29,3; 30,8.17; 39,10; 40,8.19.30.34; 42,17.32; 44,10; 47,21.26; 50,13; 56,27; 78,19.23.24; 79,22; 86,19; 89,6; 100,21; 103,13; unity: 34,11.14; partless: 11,31.34; without parts: 11,27; 14,10; 26,24 to ameriston, indivisibility: 86,29; 90,13.24 ameristôs, indivisibly: 10,22; 13,17; 40,15; 44,36; 77,14; 78,20.30;

207

79,22.27; 80,3; indivisible: 82,17; undivided: 42,5; 48,17 amesos, no intermediate: 98,34; immediately: 100,3 ametabatos, without transition: 42,3; not in transition: 47,17 amethektos, unparticipated: 50,1 ametros, without measure: 19,29 amigês, unmixed: 4,2; 31,18; 33,19.24.26 amphibolos, doubtful: 1,16; uncertain: 109,1 amphibolôs, tentatively: 102,28 amphisbêtein, to debate: 2,31; 10,28; to question: 73,21; be debatable: 8,21 amudresthai, be weakened: 6,7 amudros, weak: 63,14; 67,25; 83,11.14; 84,4 amudrôs, faintly: 19,24 amuna, self-defence: 20,29 amuntikon, as self-defence: 20,14 anadeixis, manifestation: 42,4 anadekhesthai, to admit: 19,16; be subject to: 57,6; to accept: 80,1 anadramein, to climb up to: 89,2 anadromê, climb: 15,12; 97,35 anagein, to extend ... up: 3,8; to raise: 89,3; to infer: 15,31.; to connect: 28,29; 29,2.11; to lead up: 105,2; to ascend: 8,15; 97,8; to leap up: 98,1 anairein, to destroy: 28,14; 56,10.11 anaisthêtos, not sensitive: 32,24; insensitive: 70,10 anaisthêtôs, without sensation: 103,27 anaklêsis, recall: 90,19 analogein, be analogous: 88,21; 112,28 analogia, series: 68,10 analogon, analogously: 16,15; in proportion: 97,18 analogôs, in the same way: 91,12 analutikos, analytic: 9,35; analysis: 47,3 anamnêsis, recollection: 58,25; 59,1.2.5 anankaios, necessary: 7,13; 10,26; 17,23; 23,31; 34,20; 46,6; 75,12; 76,4; 82,8; 100,15; must be: 64,11; 76,19; 91,24 and passim

208

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anankaiôs, of necessity: 9,3; inevitably: 62,12 anankazein, to compel: 65,28 anankê, necessary: 21,33; 22,2; 25,17; 28,22; 41,18; 43,31.35; 67,39; must be: 91,27; of necessity: 60,11; 63,31; 64,9; 110,8; fortune: 36,4.5 kat’ anankên, forcibly: 26,7; of necessity: 35,28; 44,16; necessary: 92,4. ex anankês, necessarily: 56,12; 67,18 anapalin, conversely: 112,8 anapempesthai eis, to refer to: 3,35; 56,14; to go back: 17,21; to ascend: 5,27; to lead: 24,14; 109,21 anaphainesthai, be plain: 89,10; to show up: 110,7 anaphora, ascent: 8,12.28; 14,6; ascending: 94,24; transfer: 59,8 anapimplanai, to fill: 90,22 anaplattein, to construct: 55,22 anaplêrein, to apply: 85,26; to fill: 103,1; to restore: 100,4 anaplêrômatikon, supplementation: 90,7 anapnein, to breathe: 72,12.15 anapnoê, breathing: 4,23; 72,10; breath: 26,4.10; 72,16 anaptussein, to unfold: 42,7 anartan, to depend: 29,27 anastaltikos, inhibitive: 88,30 anastellein, to control: 19,7.17; to reject: 68,24 anastolê, inhibition: 88,27; rejection: 68,24 anateinein, to reach up: 42,15; 87,11 anathumiasis, exhalation: 31,28 Anaxagoras, 25,8; 26,37; 27,13; 30,30; 31,14; 33,16 anektos, bearable: 49,5 anelittein, to explicate: 29,4; to unfold: 34,9; 86,31; to unroll: 86,20; to develop: 39,39; 40,18 anelixis, development: 40,15; 42,21.29; evolution: 92,17; 100,22; 113,19 anellipos, fully: 104,19 anemos, wind: 72,13 anepexergastos, uninvestigated: 4,13 anepistrophos, does not revert: 79,5; without reverting: 87,16 anepitêdeios, unsuitable: 56,12

anexallaktos, unchanged: 63,7; invariable: 82,26 angeion, vessel: 68,9 anienai, to ascend: 6,1; to move up: 57,35 anisotês, inequality: 68,36 (to) anistasthai, resurrection anôlethros, indestructible: 89,28 anomoioeidês, of different species: 12,18.20; 13,4.7; 14,1; of different sort: 54,22; unlike: 75,33 anomoiomerês, of dissimilar parts: 53,30; with unlike elements: 55,12; of different parts: 55,33 anomoios, unlike: 69,1.34; dissimilar: 93,24 antekhein, to study: 1,7; to strive: 1,18; to hold out: 36,5; to grasp: 106,14 antereisis, resistance: 14,20 anthrôpeios, human: 4,6; 12,21.35; 13,15; 18,1; 36,17; 57,23; 59,14; 106,25 anthrôpeiôs, exhibiting humanity: 36,16 anthrôpinos, human: 68,18; 89,32 anthrôpos, man: 12,10.20.30.31; 13,3.6.28.31.37; 27,23; 34,25; 36,15.17; 58,18; 59,14.38; 82,35; 97,14; 103,20; 106,22; 107,21; 115,2; person: 36,16 antibainein, to move against: 26,6 antibasis, counteraction: 14,20 antidiairein, to distinguish: 21,35; 41,26; 45,31; 82,23.27; 99,1; 100,9; to make distinction: 100,10; be in distinction to: 110,9 antidiairesis, distinction: 82,30 antidiastellein, to contrast: 27,20 antikeimenon, opposite: 5,26; 6,5; 27,15; 59,26; 99,18; opposed: 24,5; correlate: 14,12.19.22; 109,35; contrary: 66,18; equivalent: 113,35; thing facing us: 24,1. ta antikeimena, contrary properties: 94,32 antikeimenôs, opposite: 41,15; oppositely: 60,4; contrarily opposed: 105,3 antilambanesthai, to deal with: 6,26; to be concerned: 21,11; to be

Greek-English Index receptive: 105,36; to grasp: 21,18; 43,10; 44,8.13; 45,7; 100,14 antilegein, refute: 5,28; to contradict: 40,21 antilêpsis, participation: 11,29; grasp: 110,28. antilêptikos, seizes on: 15,2.4; 67,14; receptive: 27,9.17; 29,8; 35,6; 105,31; grasps: 60,2 antilupêsis, retaliation: 20,19.21; 21,36; revenge: 23,29; 105,22 antiparathesis, contrast: 93,16 antirrhêsis, rejoinder: 1,16 antistrophos, converse: 17,23; 70,22; reverse: 37,2; 8 antithesis, relational linkage: 14,20; relational sense: 109,36 antitithenai, to contrast: 11,20; to oppose: 38,3; to relate: 109,37 antitupos, resistant: 23,27 to aoristainein, indeterminate state: 83,34; 84,26 aoristos, indeterminate: 43,34; 83,29; 84,28; 106,16; vague: 102,8 aoristôs, in an unbounded way: 19,25; indeterminate: 103,24; 105,3; without bounds: 19,31; without limit: 113,15 apaideusia, ignorance: 35,9 apaitein, to ask: 56,1; 78,20 apallattein, to free: 90,9; to divorce: 90,21 apamblunesthai, be blinded: 5,3 aparaleiptos, unceasing: 7,13 aparallaktos, without variation: 87,29; without distinction: 107,5.7 apatasthai, to be deceived: 28,15 apatheia, impassability: 45,27 apathês, unaffected: 19,16.19; 60,22; 69,17; cannot be affected: 69,14; impassible: 33,21.25; 61,8.14; 66,29; 89,34; non-affective: 54,6 apathôs, impassible: 7,21 apeikazein, to liken: 5,39 apeinai, be absent: 106,17 apeiria, infinity: 43,30; 47,1.8; 68,37 apeiros, countless: 27,31; infinite: 43,26; 46,35; 47,15.19; infinitely many: 68,17; infinitely: 65,1.3 eis apeiron, ad infinitum: 78,25 apergazein, to bring about: 86,6 aperilêptos, not contained: 68,17

209

aperkhesthai, to go: 2,7 apestenômen, contracted: 61,34 apestenômenos, compactly: 62,23 aph’ henos kai pros hen, derived from and contributing to one thing: 69,3.8; 81,21; 91,20; 96,24; 98,16.18; 106,33; 107,12; 108,8 aphairein, to subtract: 63,1; to take away: 85,27 aphairesis, abstraction: 23,9.25; 85,5; subtraction: 85,28 aphienai, to dismiss: 22,13; to omit: 107,38 aphistasthai, to depart: 5,18; 6,5; 49,3; 50,8; 56,12; 74,28; 86,21; 94,1; to leave: 6,3; 93,10; to abstain: 77,2; to be isolated: 26,25 aphixis, arrival: 4,11 aphomoioun, to make like: 27,30 aphorizein, to mark off: 3,14; 103,35; 114,2; to determine: 5,24.26; 25,4; 52,3; to distinguish: 21,13; 24,34 aphormê, starting point: 14,28 ta aphrodisia, sex: 19,37 aphtharsia, imperishability: 48,4 aphthartos, imperishable: 6,12; 48,5; 59,31.32.35; 83,2; 88,4; 107,24.26; 108,32.34; 109,3 aplanês, fixed sphere: 37,28 apodeiknunai, to demonstrate: 10,12; 97,23 apodeiktikos, demonstrative: 4,37; demonstration: 9,34 apodeiktikôs, demonstratively: 46,30 apodeixis, demonstration: 15,8.10.13; 97,9.10.13; proof: 10,5.15; 111,26 apodekhesthai, to accept: 5,28; 24,8; 33,28; 66,9; 107,12 apodidonai, to give:4,10.14; 55,20; 82,5.7.8.18; 91,21; 96,19; 98,2; 102,21; 106,34; 107,11.14; 108,19; 11,14; to hand down: 96,17.23; to produce: 89,11; to adduce: 86,18; to allow: 70,15; to assign: 4,34; 87,27; 89,25; 98,12; 102,17; to set out: 96,18; to ascribe: 65,38; 71,36; 104,30.32; to attribute: 30,31; to declare: 108,23; to refer to: 102,4 apodokimazein, to reject: 39,16 apogenesthai, to depart: 90,7 apographikos, descriptive: 97,2

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apoklinein, to descend: 3,20; to lean: 4,38; 8,32; 11,12 apokrinesthai, to offer an answer: 101,3 apolambanein, to gain: 52,23; 90,13; to shut into: 75,20.22 apolausis, enjoyment: 79,38 apoleipein, to leave: 4,13; 33,31; 112,33; to desert: 90,15; to come to an end: 88,11; to segregate: 105,4.5; to give out: 88,19; 93,32.35; to forsake: 102,27; to fall short of: 6,25; 8,19; 75,25; to depart: 56,20.26; to be inferior to: 7,6; to cease: 90,5 apollunai, to destroy: 54,35; 56,20 apoluein, to free: 74,31; 75,29 apomerizein, to parcel out: 84,11; 89,4 aponeuein, to incline: 21,3 apoperatousthai, to terminate: 58,35 apophainesthai, to report: 2,2; to show: 59,32.35; 112,8; to prove: 17,11; to construct: 55,22; to declare: 27,18; 59,17; 101,19 apophaskein, to deny: 39,18; 62,13 apopiptein, to fall away: 15,22 apoptôsis, contracting: 45,1 aporein, to raise the problem: 2,18; 17,14; 56,33; 70,26; 74,12; 78,26 aporia, problem: 17,8; 11,25; 56,8; 57,4; 73,24.25; 101,16.18.27 aporon, problem: 56,13 aporrhêtos, secretly: 28,17 aporrhoê, efflux: 115,10.11.12 apospasma, detached parcel: 85,8 apospan, to tear away/apart: 7,25; 62,11; 67,6; to sunder: 52,38 apostasis, distance: 7,4; departure: 9,7; 11,29; 86,22; separation: 99,34 heautês apostasis, self-desertion: 6,7 apostrophê, revulsion: 15,36; 16,11; 54,6 apotasis, correspondence: 14,18 apoteinesthai, to refer to: 12,31; to be directed to: 19,26; to extend: 43,2; 104,26; to tend: 67,13 apotelein, to bring about: 50,15; to achieve: 77,15; to make up: 74,16; to complete: 93,34; to result: 52,40; 97,22 apotelesma, result: 111,34

apoteleutan, to terminate: 45,23; 59,4; 66,29.35 apoteleutêsis, completion: 83,11 dia apoteleutêsin, be at the end: 110,24 apousia, absence: 66,32; 72,27.29 aprosdioristos, unqualified: 11,15 apsukhos, inanimate: 19,2; 24,15; 85,13.15.28; 27,21; 92,32; 93,16.17; 97,28.34; 98,6.37; 103,33; 112,19.23; 114,20 aretê, excellence: 35,10; 38,5; 39,2; 53,25.28; 110,35 argia, inactivity: 88,27; non-functioning: 114,32 Aristotle: 1,6.11.13.17; 2,2; 3,6.7.22; 4,28; 6,16; 11,10.34; 19,8; 25,23; 26,28; 28,12.33; 30,21; 32,4; 34,16; 36,31; 39,5.11.12; 46,7; 52,28.32; 59,37; 60,3; 62,11; 66,21; 67,18; 72,31; 76,37; 77,23; 78,28; 88,26; 89,24.30; 90,36; 93,1; 102,19; 107,11; 112,6. Aristotelian, 26,14; 76,11 arithmein, be numerable: 34,16; to count: 34,32; 42,17 arithmos, number: 10,11.35; 23,9; 28,16.22.25.26.27.29; 29,28.31.35; 30,3.6.7.10.20.21.23; 40,32.35.37; 42,25; 54,16; 61,21.30.35; 62,1.5.11.15.16.34; 63,1.2.3.4.6.8.33; 64,2. 4.5.17.31.36; 65.3.4.16.18.20.25.29.32.35.37; 66,1. 2; 79,21.26.27 tôi arithmôi, numerically: 68,35 kat’ arithmon, numerically: 110,37 arkhê, principle: 2,24; 3,11; 5,31; 8,15.16.18.19.20; 11,11; 24,27.30; 27,32.33.36.37; 28,25.30; 29,2.11.17.21.27.28.33.35.36; 30,25.26.27.31.32; 31,1.11.17; 32,26; 33,5.6.8.11.14.24.27.31.34; 49,30; 52,34; 67,26; 70,12.13.14.16.35; 71,21.27; 80,21.27; 92,1; 93,23; 99,21.22.23; 100,6.17.19.22.24; 111,1; starting point: 10,8.10; 15,8.10.13; 46,29; start: 81,27; 97,27; origin: 36,13; source: 85,4; beginning: 24,9; 73,4; cause: 49,29 to ex arkhês, original: 85,32 arkhein, to rule: 19,10; 71,1; to

Greek-English Index govern: 67,2; be in control: 115,22; to be guidable: 93,8 arkhesthai, to be based: 7,7; to subordinate: 70,13.16; to be derived: 27,32; to start: 5,26; 9,14; 46,28.31; to begin: 59,5; 97,33; 110,7; to come from: 76,37; to be controlled: 59,10; 104,31 to arkhon, principle: 100,24 arkhikos, basic principle: 7,24; dominant: 72,20; principle: 56,29; 66,37.38; governs: 82,17; has a character of a principle: 33,12; rules: 61,14; of control: 59,10; controlling: 80,23.30.31; originative: 33,17; in control: 81,7; 95,12; primary: 83,22.23 arrhepês, aloof: 61,15 artan, to depend: 8,15 artios, even: 28,26 asômatos, incorporeal: 5,29; 7,23; 24,3; 26,30; 30,29; 31,3.4.26; 33,2.3.7.8.12; 41,3.9.25.32; 45,12; 56,27.29.35; 59,20; 66,8.12.13.15; 77,13; 81,4; 82,16; 94,35; 107,30 astheneia, weakness: 60,7; 88,28 astronomia, astronomy: 7,2.4 asummetros, not commensurate: 42,35 asunklutos, incompatible: 62,17 ataktôs, disorderly: 19,25.30 atelês, incomplete: 5,11; 83,11.29; 84,4.25; 89,14.18. 19.20.22.34; 93,3; 98,32; 99,1; 109,1; 113,34; incompleteness: 99,15.23; imperfect: 72,27; 104,37; 108,26; 109,30; 115,26; not completely: 98,24 atelesteros, less complete: 89,15; less perfect: 109,28 atelôs, incomplete: 5,10; 11,4; 100,9; incompletely: 98,21 athanasia, immortality; 32,8; 74,21; 90,11 athanatos, immortal: 5,16.20; 32,7.8.10.11; 74,10.19 20.22.24; 76,36; 90,10.22.23 to athanaton, immortality: 90,13 atheos, atheist: 32,18 atheia, atheism: 32,21 athroos, complete: 35,12; 39,4 athroôs, all together: 44,16; suddenly: 52,24

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atomos, atomic: 25,27; indivisible: 25,31; undivided: 63,26; 79,23; atom: 39,24.27.28.30; individual: 107,38; 108,1; 110,23 ta atoma, individuals: 108,5; 110,21.26 atopia, absurdity: 55,8 atopos, absurdity: 43,23.30.32; 46,1; 48,29; 51,6; 55,19.29; 62,36; 63,30.36; 64,2.29; 65,2.15.17.19.23.29; 67,38; 72,5; 74,25; 75,10; absurd: 44,2; 47,27.31; 55,24; 68,16; 69,14; 73,23; 74,32; 34; 75,28; odd: 47,14. aülos, immaterial: 11,7; 59,18.20; 69,31; 84,14.19; without matter: 103,31; matterless: 42,28.31.34 aulos, oboe: 12,7 autenergêtos, self-activation: 98,13; self-arousing: 99,33 authedrastos, self-supporting: 68,32; self-sufficient: 83,3 authormêtos, of his own accord: 37,30; self-initiating: 41,15 autoarkhê, principle itself: 29,22 autoduas, dyad itself: 29,18 autoeidos, pure form; 29,16 autoen, One itself: 29,17.32 autokinêtos, self-moved: 26,24; self-moving: 32,11; self-change: 34,12; self-changing: 39,17; 98,8.11 autokinêtôs, as self-changing: 87,10 autophuês, natural: 52,2 autophuôs, be of the same nature: 90,31; be of its own nature: 112,10 autoproairetos, self-chosen: 36,3 autotelês, self-sufficient: 13,11; 80,33; 101,2 autotelôs, independently: 74,7 autotetras, tetrad itself: 29,20 autothen, in itself: 7,26 and passim autothen gnorimon, sef-evident: 33,9 autotrias, triad itself: 29,19 autozôion, living thing itself: 29,15 auxanein, increase: 85,37; 112,14.20.34; 115,9.11; 116,11; grow: 85,22.39; 86,6; 99,20; 116,8 auxêsis, growth: 2,25; 57,8.14; 85,19.26.32.36; 99,14.19.21; 105,30; 110,15; 112,24.26; 113,2.22.23; grows bigger: 24,24 auxêtikon, concerned with growth:

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2,32; 14,6; growth: 71,21.24; 79,18; causing growth: 115,5; of growth: 101,24 axiôma, axiom: 16,7; postulate: 35,31 azôia, lifelessness: 39,28; (denies) life: 76,12 badisis, walking: 4,23; 18,17; 57,8.14 badistikos, walking: 16,19; walks: 17,30 badizein, to walk: 58,16 bainein, to proceed: 42,13; 103,3; to walk: 45,15 basis, proceeding: 47,37 bathos, level: 11,27; 16,13; inner: 15,22 ek bathous, fundamentally: 21,18 en bathei, in depth: 3,16 kata bathos, in depth: 81,21; 82,24.27; depth: 28,11; 29,1.13.17; 99,19; different levels: 103,25 biai, forcibly: 35,19.22.25.27.28.32.34.37; 37,19 to biaion, forcibly: 35,24; forced: 36,14; 41,14.16; 48,1.4.9 bios, way of life: 4,6 boulêsis, (rational) wish: 7,24; 77,27; 105,22; deliberation: 9,7 boulesthai, to wish: 9,1; 24,17; 26,13; 27,30; 30,4; 66,3.21; 92,25 and passim; to regard: 70,11; 85,22; to require: 25,13; to mean: 93,10; to intend: 60,16; 78,17 bouleutikos, deliberative: 109,1 daimonion, demonic: 106,26; demon: 106,30 deiknunai, to demonstrate: 2,3; 41,25; 45,30; 97,22; to give justification: 80,26; to prove: 10,13; 46,34; 48,26.30; 52,11; 53,12.18; 56,27; 61,26.27.29.35; 94,35; 97,25; 103,4.12; 111,17.21.23; 113,14; to state: 34,22; to show: 32,11; 41,3.9; 47,3; 57,11; 61,26; 85,24; 89,29; 94,17.34; 112,13 deixis, pointing: 83,26 dekakhôs, ten-fold: 69,4 dekas, decad: 28,24 dekhesthai, to receive: 19,22; 51,20; 59,28; 63,22; 87,4; 99,17 dektikos, receptive: 11,5; 15,36; 20,15; 53,21; 68,35.36; 83,9.12.14.30; 84,3.27.35; 85,12;

87,1; 94,6; 111,7; receives: 13,14; 52,13; 56,12; 67,23; 68,19; 104,20.21.22; admits: 59,25.26; able to receive: 64,33 dektikôs, indicative: 79,13; shows: 80,6 dêlôtikos, signifies: 40,36; shows: 62,26; indicative: 99,10; denotes: 83,25; reveals: 98,20; exhibits: 104,7 dêloun, to refer to: 8,27.30.32; 18,8; 82,5; to illustrate: 79,37; to manifest; 108,24; to designate: 71,35; 102,16; to express: 66,2; to clarify: 26,13; to reveal: 13,11; 102,20; to exhibit: 62,5; 65,2; 73,1; 93,3; 98,14; 99,7; to make clear: 20,6.21; 58,22; 59,20; 66,32; 67,1; 72,34; 80,8; 86,13; 91,4; 98,6; to make plain: 71,8; to show: 15,9; 28,2; 33,21; 41,11; 73,17; 77,25; 86,4.20; 90,15.18; 92,30; 93,17; 95,13; 96,9; 100,26; 101,15.30 dêmiourgein, to create; 73,20 dêmiourgos, demiurge: 109,2 Democritus, 25,25.26.30; 26,1.16; 27,1.6.12; 31,7; 39,19.23. 29; 61,31; 63,37.38; 64,3.15; 65,14 Dêmokriteios, of Democritus: 39,33; Democritean: 64,13 ta deutera, secondary beings: 6,14 diabebaioun, to confirm: 19,11; 52,33 diabolê, attack: 61,4 diairein, to divide: 4,22; 10,23; 63,4.18; 65,7.9; 75,23; 79,19; 80,5.9; 101,25; 102,1.5; to make division: 43,31; to distinguish: 5,21; 10,19.27.31; 21,29; 29,12.29; to tear asunder: 103,4 diêrêmenon, separate: 42,25 diairesis, division: 21,30; 29,16.21.26; 43,33; 61,33; 63,5; 65,10; 101,1 diairetikos, division: 9,35; 47,3; dividing: 82,35; 83,3; 107,21. 25.29.31 diairetos, divisible: 80,4.18 diakeimenos, be in a certain state: 36,16 diakosmein, to harmonise: 106,29 diakosmion, thing in the world: 28,3 diakosmos, world-order: 29,16 diakrinein, to distinguish: 5,6;

Greek-English Index 22,9.14; 51,21.30; 52,26; 56,35; 58,2.27; 77,24.36; 96,13; 98,37; to separate: 28,22; 45,22; 47,23; to elucidate: 73,25; to sunder: 38,14; to divorce: 84,12; to answer: 101,3 diakrinesthai, be divided from: 17,8; be decided: 101,1 diakrisis, distinction: 15,14; 107,11; division: 113,21; separation: 28,23 dialambanein, to interrupt: 46,22.23 dialektikê, dialectical: 15,21; 21,20 dialektikos, dialectician: 21,9.24.28; 22,32; 23,5 dialektikôs, dialectically; 15,17; 21,18 dialogos, dialogue: 53,3 dialuesthai, to fall into pieces: 103,5 dialusis, dissolution; 93,11 diamenein, to remain: 47,19; 110,38; to have stability: 90,6; to persist: 99,26 to dianoeisthai, thinking: 57,20.25.27; 58,14.19; thought; 58,11; 61,5.10 dianoia, thought: 2,27; 61,7.9; 71,34 dianoêtikos, thought: 100,25; has the power to think: 106,21; thinking: 77,7 dianoêtikôs, in regard to thought: 57,36 diaphanês, transparent: 66,33; 68,14 diapherein, to be different: 6,28; 13,27; 14,1; 52,25; 57,29; 63,35; 87,24; 107,13; 114,29; to be a difference: 11,22; 21,6; 63,22; to differ: 12,26; 19,18; 23,4; 24,15; 26,2; 52,15; 64,19; 86,29; 89,1; 97,10.13.34; 103,33; 107,8; to make difference: 32,23; 64,5 diapherontôs, differently: 21,9.23 to diapheron, difference: 21,25 diaphônia, dissension: 1,12 diaphora, difference: 4,35; 12,9; 13,8; 16,13; 21,28; 64,14.15.16; 78,8; 81,25; 82,24.27.30; 83,1.3.4; 98,36; 102,3; 103,19. 22.25; 107,21.22.25.27.30; differentia: 9,25.26; 10,22.28; 12,5 meta diaphoras, of a special kind: 78,12 diaphorein, to differ: 56,16; 82,27; to differentiate: 90,12; be different: 82,34

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diaphoros, various: 4,6; 80,22; different: 12,7.14.15.16.18. 22;13,28.29; 35,6; 39,17; 40,36; 47,1; 51,15.16.21; 54,3.4; 55,16.31; 62,20.23; 63,9.34; 67,7.30; 76,28; 77,18; 78,19; 79,27.30; 89,8; 92,10; 94,31; 95,5.11; 98,31; 100,30; 101,5.6.10; 103,15.16.17; 106,3 to diaphoron, difference: 14,2; 58,5; 81,9; 95,20; 103,26 diapneisthai, to disintegrate: 78,23 diaporia, raising of the problems: 24,1; statement of problems: 24,6 diaprepês, highly placed: 67,9 diarthrein, to set out: 28,20; 46,15; to articulate: 102,8; to explain: 72,21; to spell out: 34,5; 91,30; to make clear: 56,4 diarthrôsis, articulation: 39,17 diasôzein, to preserve: 6,12 diaspan, to scatter: 4,11; to isolate: 76,17; to tear asunder: 112,30 diastasis, extension: 28,31; 29,10; 40,21.35; 42,16.29.31; division: 78,31; extended: 42,26 kata diastasin, extended: 41,5 diastatikos, divisive: 30,11 diastrepein, to distort: 89,34 diastrophê, deviation: 19,19 diastêma, interval: 42,27 diathesis, condition: 19,34.40; 52,38; 54,13; 60,21; state: 88,15 diatithesthai, be in a condition: 61,2; be disposed: 104,24 didaskalia, teaching: 9,4; 96,27; teach: 82,5; instruction: 97,29.32 diêkein, to extend: 73,14 dielenkhein, to refute: 46,4 diestrammenos, deviant: 19,25 diestrammenôs, in a deviant way: 19,23 diexienai, to get through: 43,26; 44,1; to run through: 46,24; to go through: 44,30 diexodikos, transitional: 35,13; drawn out: 39,5 diexodos, examination: 6,15; passage: 11,31.33 dikhôs, alternatively: 2,12 diienai, to pass through: 25,29 diistanai, to extend: 28,32; to

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divorce: 94,19.37; to stand apart: 101,29 Diogenes of Apollonia, 31,27 diorganôsis, constitution: 87,6 diôrismenos, discrete: 64,10 diorismos, distinction: 14,7; qualification: 52,37 diorizein, to determine: 2,29; 3,6; 21,11; 22,8; 82,18; 106,33; to separate: 79,24; 101,28; to define: 57,37; 61,9; 96,16; to distinguish: 27,2; 45,13; 56,2; 97,27.34; 98,6; 101,5; 103,33; 104,3; to explain: 69,9.17; 73,31; to make distinction: 17,26; 106,9; to lay down: 83,29; 97,10; to establish: 66,17; to describe: 113,27 dittos, dual: 56,38; two kinds: 57,12 dogma, opinion: 1,17 ta dokounta, opinions: 6,16 doxa, opinion: 5,28; 24,5.20; 25,31; 28,9; 29,6.15; 34,4.7; 52,23; 63,37; 81,1; 103,19; belief: 6,24; view: 10,35; doctrine: 63,38 doxastikos, conjectural: 21,20; opinion: 77,25; power to opine: 78,31; opinionative: 103,18 doxastikôs, as opinion: 5,36; matter of opinion: 7,35; of belief: 27,4; judgmental: 12,21 doxaston: object of opinion. 29,14.21 doxazein: opining: 103,18 dran, be operative: 38,21; to act: 114,28 duas, dyad: 28,25.31.33; 29,6.9.32 dunamis, power: 4,13; 5,2.6.21.22.34; 12,20.13,32; 20,17.22; 27,24; 33,17; 60,6; 72,9; 76,22.23.32; 78,27.30; 79,14; 85,2.6; 86,2.7; 88,28.39; 101,21.23; 102,10.14.17.18; 108,21; 109,7; 110,29; 113,26.34; 114,2; 115,17.18.25; possibility: 29,6; potency: 83,38; 84,2; faculty: 27,2.9.18; 55,21; potentiality; 84,1; 99,22.23.25; 104,35.37; 105,15.16; 110,6; capacity: 29,12; 109,22; potential: 93,19 en dunamei, potential: 11,4.8.18.19 kata dunamin, to the uttermost: 1,18 dunamei, potentially: 2,17; 5,10.11; 24,2; 61,31; 64,23; 65,2. 3.5; 83,14; 84,2; 86,16.36; 87,2.3.8.19; 88,2.3;

90,28.37.38.39; 91,7.25; 92,27.37; 93,5.21; 94,5.6.7; 101,34; 102,1.4; 104,13; 111,15; potential: 11,14; 83,30.34; 92,3; 104,6; 105,13; 109,27; 114,9.28 dunasthai, be able: 16,15 and passim; to have potentiality: 94,4 duoeidês, two forms: 90,32 dusdiakritos, hard to discern: 14,12 duskherês, distress: 19,36; distressing: 19,39 duslêpton, difficulty: 6,21; 9,19; not easy to grasp: 9,28; difficulty of attaining: 10,16 ean, to permit: 56,28; to allow: 79,25 egeirein, to awake: 11,11; 59,2; 98,8; to wake: 91,28; to arise: 16,37; 78,14; 80,29; to arouse: 98,13.29; 99,28.29.31.32; 106,28; 101,27; to rise: 49,34; 85,13 to egeirein, arousal: 99,24 egersis, arousal: 19,8; 98,14.33; 99,35; awakening: 30,16; waking: 98,9 egrêgorsis, being awake: 88,26; 92,15.21 eidenai, to have understanding: 2,10; to understand: 6,24; to know: 4,7; 24,11.12; 62,4; 77,1; 84,10; 94,35; to see: 92,25; to learn: 4,20 eidêsis, understanding: 6,18.22.23.25.26; 7,32; knowledge: 109,31 eidêtikos, formal: 4,14.16.17.34; 8,19; 28,24; 29,2; 39,13; 42,3; 66,14.23.37.40; 67,29; 70,30; 71,10; 72,20; 73,1; 81,8; 82,17; 86,20.23; 87,14.32; 88,1; 92,18; 100,19; 103,35; 104,3; 11,15; of species: 13,8; informing: 80,23.29.30.32; ideal: 28,29; 29,36; gives form: 70,29; 90,33 eidêtikôs, formal: 92,9 eidikos, bestows form: 57,10; specifying: 12,4; formal: 25,15; 114,15.17 eidikôtaton eidos, ultimate species: 12,21; 13,11 eidikôs, specifically: 10,30; in form: 47,22 eidôlon, image: 58,22; 85,18 eidopoiein, to inform: 4,16.18.27; 11,5.9.18.21; 1815.26 29; 20,32;

Greek-English Index 30,5.6; 93,2.21; 97,11; 109,24.25.26; 110,32; 115,24; to give form: 45,24; 51,32; 52,27; 57,9; 80,32; 87,22.30; 90,30; 104,4.24; to receive (form): 87,30; to be form: 22,2; 44,36; to have form: 91,2 eidos, form: 2,5.30; 3,9.10; 4,30; 5,32; 7,7.12; 8,17.19; 9,26; 10,22; 11,3.4.5.9.10.34; 12,4.6.12.14.15.17.22; 14,32; 20,14.21; 21,15.22.24.26.31.36; 22,1.3.4.7.9; 28,22.24; 29,22.28.32.35.37; 30,5.6; 33,29; 36,29.35; 37,1; 39,12; 41,16; 42,4.15.23.31; 44,35; 45,1.4.11.12.23.24.29.36; 46,3; 50,30; 51,27.29; 52,16.24.31.41; 56,3; 57,11; 58,33; 59,12.25.26; 60,2; 62,3.4.6.7; 63,4.7.34; 66,26.31.34.35; 67,2.4. 8.10.23.24.30; 68,17.22.29; 69,24; 70,32.36.37; 71,9; 72,25,27. 28.34.36; 74,23; 77,19; 79,33; 80,33; 83,11.12.13.18.21.22.28.30.38; 84,1.4.9.10.14.16.28.30; 86,12.15.18.19.23.26.28.30.31; 87,13.23.38.39; 88,1; 90,27; 91,31.32.33; 92,16.17.19.20.21; 93,3.4,5.7.30.33; 94,8.25; 95,17; 97,12.16; 98,3; 100,3.21; 101,13; 103,2.6.31.33; 104,2.8.10.11.15.16. 17.20.25.28.29.35; 107,33; 109,14.16.24.34; 100,32.37; 11,5. 9.12.16.17; 112,35; 113,5.8.17.21.28; 114,7.10.22; 115,26; species: 12,9.10.11.23; 13,4.11.15.16.17.18.19. 20; 14,2; 81,20; 82,26; 107,38; 108,1.5.19; 110,20.21.25.37; kind: 36,11.12.21; 64,4.19; 79,21.32; 98,2; 106,35 eilikrinês, clear: 3,14; pure: 99,28; lucid: 11,3 eilikrinôs, in purity; 6,19; purely: 11,13.27; 67,4; simply: 14,10 eisagein, to introduce: 12,6; 70,15; 72,30; 104,7 eisienai, to enter: 26,6; to return: 37,6 eiskrinein, to insert: 51,25 ekbainein, to depart: 8,18 ekbasis, departure: 89,9 ekbebêkuia, derived: 52,4 ekbebêkotôs, derivatively: 52,5

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ekdekhesthai, to understand: 28,13; 40,23; to approve: 34,7 ekei, there: 73,4 ekhein, to have: 3,20 et passim; + Gen., to belong to: 3,6 ekhein pros, to be in relation: 7,1.7 ekhô, sound: 12,8.11 ekluein, to loose: 62,9 ekphainein, to make clear: 3,21; 6,22; 62,9; 88,7; to explain: 6,16; to expose: 75,6; to exhibit: 14,35; 90,32; 103,36; to show: 14,28; to display: 14,30 ekpiptein, to fall away: 5,11 ekstasis, departure: 38,23; 39,11.13; 41,23; 77,20; abandoning: 49,4 ekteinein, to stretch out: 42,22; to reach out: 87,37 ektithesthai, to set out: 5,24; 8,25; 10,18; 14,27 ektragôdein, to dramatise: 51,26 elattesthai, to diminish: 63,5 elenkhein, to refute: 24,8; 34,4; 44,6.18.22; 66,18; to disprove: 41,3; 49,19; 50,5; 63,3; to examine: 28,12; 50,17; 53,4; to prove: 50,3 elenkhos, proof: 41,3; examination: 50,24 elenktikos, disproving: 56,28 elleipein, to lack: 96,32 to elleipon, lacking: 85,26 embruon, embryo: 89,22 empathês, emotional: 51,25; affective: 59,10 Empedocles, 25,9; 27,34; 30,30; 56,1.2; 68,2.4; 70,17; 72,3; 112,25; 113,1 emphainein, to exhibit: 11,10; 54,9; 55,7; 58,17; 62,21; to depict: 40,8; to reveal: 91,1; to highlight: 57,13.19; to make clear: 95,19; to appear: 80,6; 108,16 emphasis, appearance: 56,25.26; 72,27; irradiation; 63,23; 67,25; 72,29 empodizein, to hinder: 60,41; to impede: 79,9 empsukhos, animate: 3,12; 19,4; 24,15.18.19.22.23; 45,14; 47,31; 52,4; 57,8; 62,24.27.36; 63,5; 64,27.34; 65,1.5.27; 72,21; 75,21; 83,22; 84,33; 85,22.29; 85,9.15;

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87,9.23; 88,16; 91,34; 93,9.19.24; 97,28.34.35; 98,6.36; 103,33; 104,1.33.38; 105,2. 4.5; 111,10; 113,14.17; 114,19.20.22.37; 115,1.2.3.4; 116,11.12; living thing: 32,30.32; 63,11 enallagê, divergence: 12,10 enantios, opposite: 15,36; 33,36; 34,2; 53,5.6.9.21; 59,27.29; 68,35; 72,24.29.33; 83,9; 84,35; 85,12; contrary: 36,3; 114,4.6.10.11.21.26; 116,10 enantiôs, in opposition to: 84,26; in a contrary state: 114,24 enargeia, obvious, 8,28; obviousness: 98,7 enargês, clear: 1,17; 7,19.20.22; 14,21; 15,16; 51,11 and passim; evident: 15,35; 48,2; plain: 104,29; obvious: 16,6.7; 19,9; 23,12; 53,9; 55,8 enargôs, manifest; 70,6; obviously: 96,11 enarmonios, harmonic: 40,38; 68,5 endekhesthai, be possible: 10,37; 37,6 and passim endeiknunai, to demonstrate: 22,13; 88,37; to indicate: 73,8.13; to hint at: 28,19; to illustrate: 26,18; to refer to: 49,31; to exhibit: 30,5; 34,14; 81,9; 95,20; 99,22; to show: 71,13; 94,30; to display: 40,9 endeiktikôs, illustratively: 26,12; parabolically: 46,14 endeixis, demonstration: 3,31; indication: 49,35 endidonai, to impart: 37,5; 41,20; to concede; 46,36; to give: 45,20; to assign: 36,28; to bestow on: 45,18 endotikos, endows: 24,32 endothen, internal: 24,20 and passim; internally: 24,28; kineisthai, self-movement: 24,21.24.30 endoxon, accepted: 15,19.21 energeia, activity; 5,9.11.14.16.27; 9,6.8; 11,3.17; 13,14; 14,16.17.21; 15,28.29.32; 16,6.8.10.17.28.36; 17,5.6.9. 21.24.28.36.37; 18,3.20.27.34; 19,3.6.19.23.26.27; 20,1.3; 21,1; 26,24.25.29; 33,10; 39,4.8.16; 40,20.21; 41,4.10.31;

42,18.24.38; 43,16; 44,8; 45,15; 46,11.12.13; 48,15.18.19.20; 51,9; 54,3.4.9; 57,2.13.18.19.29.32.37; 58,9.30.32.35; 59,9.11.15.36; 60,4.13.15.18.34; 66,6.26.29.30.34.37; 69,25.29; 73,2; 76,15.17.23; 77,3.21.24.32; 78,3; 81,7; 84,10.11.12.15.19.20.22; 86,13.21; 88,8.11.12.20.21.23.26.27.30. 35.38.39; 89,2.4.6.10.11.31.34; 90,16.24.26; 94,20.36; 95,29.30; 96,14; 98,12.13; 99,10; 102,19.33; 103,8.17; 104,20.22.26; 109,18.19.21.22.28.31.32; 110,6; 113,31; 114,32; 115,19.22; energy: 40,19; action: 85,14; actuality; 104,8.9; active: 36,21 kat’ energeian, active: 57,27; 66,23; actively: 66,31; 114,32; in actuality: 104,7; actually: 84,3 energeiai, actually: 24,3; 61,31; 64,22; 65,2.4; 69,17; 108,14; in activity: 87,10; in actuality: 104,7 energein, be active: 6,12.24; 17,31; 36,26; 45,23; 46,29; 57,2.29; 58,3; 84,15.17.18; 85,36; 88,22.31.33.34.37; 89,1.24; 98,30; 109,34; be (in) activity; 61,13; 77,22; 109,26; be action: 18,34; to exercise: 89,15.16; to bring about: 36,30; to act: 6,4; 19,25.31; 36,20; 60,7; 62,19.25; 77,5.16; 78,7.9; 88,17; 111,25; 115,17.20; to activate: 23,20.21; 36,18.20; 39,38; 52,8; 68,21; 88,18.25; 115,18 to energein, activity: 36,28.34; 50,13; 88,32 energêma, action: 61,11 energês, active: 85,9 energêtikos, active: 5,13; 45,21; 88,33 energêtikôs, active: 36,14; actively: 36,29; 45,25 enginesthai, to occur: 19,1.2; be present (within): 59,15.21; 61,8; 71,5; to come about: 66,30; to enter: 66,31 enistanai, to attack: 62,16; 64,29 enkataduein, be submerged: 79,5 enkrinein, to judge: 22,10; 33,12 ennoia, viewpoint: 28,20; thought:

Greek-English Index 72,28; conception: 98,18; concept: 84,16.19 entelekheia, actuality; 4,20.30.31; 5,1; 11,1.3.13.16.18.19.20.21; 16,14; 35,3; 84,18; 86,25.34; 87,2.14.18.36.39; 88,2.31.36; 89,26; 90,25.35.36; 91,6; 92,3.23; 94,16.18; 95,14.15. 18.22.28.29.31; 96,1.3.5.7; 98,3; 100,31; 101,33; 102,32; 104,35. 37; 105,9.10.14.15; 107,19; 109,8; 111,15.16.17; actualisation: 45,16; 46,6; 52,32; 57,5; 66,32; 84,1.4 entomon, insect: 79,11.19; 101,26 enulos, enmattered: 13,12; 20,5; 22,15.22.27; 72,20; 73,10; 83,35 enuparkhein, be present (within): 26,5; 68,1; 69,4.10; 71,2. 3; 74,35; 76,8.10; 99,4; 101,26; 102,2; 103,19; to belong to: 105,15 epagein, to continue: 2,6; to provide: 97,6; to set out: 65,5; to adduce: 43,23; 75,16; to add: 13,9; 15,14; 27,1.28; 72,8; 86,13; 93,32; 94,3; 101,20; 104,21; 108,20; to point out: 33,18; to note: 17,16 epakolouthein, to accompany: 16,25 epanakamptein, to turn back: 47,2 epaphê, contact: 31,33; 44,9; touch: 47,22 epeisienai, to supervene: 59,17 epeisodiôdês, superfluous: 52,2; comes in from without: 87,4 eperkhesthai, to examine: 96,13 epexergasia, investigation: 5,26; examination: 81,4 epexergasthai, to study: 1,9; to examine: 2,4; to work out: 4,8 epexienai, to grasp: 44,16 ephaptesthai, be in contact: 21,5; to seize, 44,31; to lay hold on, 45,9 epharmozein, to fit: 45,10; 72,38; 107,31.33 ephetos, is sought: 6,33; 110,4; desirable: 83,4 ephienai, to seek for: 84,27; 110,5.19; to aim at: 110,30 ephistanai, to attack: 49,8; to insist: 91,23 epibolê, objection: 65,21 kat’ epibolên, intuitive: 9,23; directly: 68,26 epideiknunai, to show: 5,31; 48,25;

217

to make clear: 6,15; to illustrate: 29,30; to establish: 9,17 epigignesthai, to supervene: 56,1 epikheirêma, objection: 44,6; argument: 62,30; 70,12 epikheirêsis, argument: 54,3 epiklinein, to tend: 71,25 epikoinônoun, to have kinship: 6,10 epikratein, to dominate: 54,35 to epikratein, attainment: 106,12 epikrateia, dominance: 89,8 epikrinein, to judge: 90,17 epiktêtôs, derivatively: 49,32; by acquisition: 87,8; adventitiously: 52,28.30; from outside: 68,19 epimenein, to retain: 85,37; to persist: 113,10 epinoein, to think: 22,21.32; 23,25.28 epipedon, plane: 10,11; 23,25.28; surface: 62,28; side: 68,7 epiphaneia, plane: 28,31; surface: 65,9.11; 85,36 epipherein, to raise: 56,9; to adduce: 65,33; to add: 95,13; to move: 67,2 epipolaos, superficial: 15,15; 21,17.19 epiponos, painful: 48,24; 49,3.4.7 epirrhein, be in flux: 90,6 epirrhêma, follows: 80,8 epirrhoê, supplement: 100,4 epirrhônnunai, to strengthen: 85,27.37.39; 86,3 episêmainesthai, to add: 60,16; to imply: 73,21; be significance: 78,18 episkeptein, to consider: 34,3; 100,30; to examine: 67,34 episkopein, to view: 50,23; to inspect: 109,16 epistanai, attack: 74,14 epistasis, halt: 47,34; consideration: 110,3.24 epistasthai, to achieve knowledge: 88,24; to have knowledge: 88,25; to know: 90,26; 103,30; 104,9.23; to note: 93,9 epistêmê, scientific knowledge: 1,5; 3,18; 6,37; 29,14; 54,7; 84,7; 90,27; science: 2,20; 7,6; 9,34; 16,20; 69,7; 82,4; discipline: 3,4; knowledge: 4,37; 7,27; 34,2; 88,5.23; 89,13; 104,10.14.16.27 epistêmôn, acquires scientific knowledge: 9,1

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epistêmonikos, scientific: 6,26.32; 7,34.35; 8,13.24.36; 9,28; 14,16.29.36; 21,20.21; 27,22; 29,4; 96,30; 109,14; cognitive: 104,11.21.27; knowledge: 35,10; capable of knowledge: 27,10 epistêmonikos hexis, dispositional possession of knowledge: 88,22; state of knowledge: 89,15 epistêmonikôs, scientifically: 5,35; 77,8; scientific kind: 69,28 epistêtos, scientifically knowable: 8,5.7; object of science: 29,13.21; known: 69,30 epistrephein, to revert to/upon: 41,28; 49,14; 79,3; 86,21 epistreptikos, reverts upon: 60,1; 61,15 epistrophê, reversion: 4,5; 7,21.23; 40,12; 50,14; 90,16; regression: 6,6; 102,20 episumbainein, to result: 75,10 epitêdeios, suitable: 9,28; 52,14.15.17; 56,23; 72,14; 79,17; 87,5; 101,37; capable: 68,37; suited: 23,22; 51,15,21; 79,23; 115,19 epitêdeiotês, suitability; 52,23; 56,25.31; 63,13.15.27; 72,12 to epithumein, appetite: 16,33; desire: 78,16.17 epithumêtikos, desirous: 4,1; 45,31; appetitive: 41,27 to epithumêtikon, appetite: 101,8 epithumêtikôs, appetitively: 5,35 epithumia, desire: 15,36; 16,11; 75,17; appetite: 54,6; 7,27; 105,21 epitimêsis, censure; 31,22; reservation: 91,23 epizêtein, to seek: 9,1.18; to investigate: 74,9; to search: 86,17 erastos, is loved: 6,29 êremêsis, rest: 39,28; pause: 47,34 êremein, be unmoving: 34,25.27; to rest: 35,25.33 êremia, rest: 36,1 êremizein, to bring to rest: 39,25.27; to set to rest: 59,3 ergon, action: 17,27; 18,30; work: 88,35; occurrence: 77,6; activity: 54,2.6; product: 113,33; function: 65,38; 110,11.12.16; 114,2; 115,27; task: 91,15; behaviour: 22,26.27

eskhaton, extreme: 45,4 and passim; particular thing: 90,2 êthikê, moral: 19,9 euelenktos, easily disproved: 55,8 eukinêtos, moves easily: 25,28; ease of motion: 26,7; easily moved; 31,5.12.29; easily mobile: 33,1 eukolos, easy: 9,27 eukrasia, good mixture; 53,34 euôdês, well-scented: 101,32 eupathês, sensitive: 75,29 euporios, fruitful: 14,28 euthus, straight: 14,33; 40,7.12.12.13; 47,2; 72,34.36.37.38.39 and passim exairein, to except: 19,3; 33,16; to dissociate: 52,34; to remove: 61,20 exallagê, shift: 13,24 exallattesthai, to vary: 14,2; 82,26.28; 108,9; to change; 12,11; be different: 87,32; to develop: 41,15 exaptein, to depend on: 52,39; to attach: 74,7 exartan, to raise up: 74,3; to depend: 74,19 exêgeisthai, to interpret: 21,35; 93,31; to be exposition: 80,4 exêgêsis, interpretation: 10,5; explanation: 28,21 exêgêtês, interpreter: 1,9; commentator: 52,28 exêllagmenon, variable: 92,5 exêrêmenon, transcendent: 3,1; 5,15; 29,23; 67,19; 77,22; 87,34; 92,8; exempt: 50,26; transcends: 11,36; 14,24; 31,18; 42,2; 45,17; transcending: 42,21 exêrêmenôs, transcendentally: 49,15; 71,6; 96,8; transcendent: 74,18 exergasia, investigation: 82,16 exergasthai, to investigate: 82,15 exerkhesthai, to depart: 78,23 exetattein, to examine: 34,4 exienai, to go out: 26,6 existanai, to separate: 5,13; to divorce: 34,13; to stand outside: 90,3; to depart: 38,23.26.28 to exô, external: 6,8 and passim exodos, exodus: 26,6; departure: 37,12; 39,27 exomoioun, assimilate: 114,23.26 (poiêtikê) exousia, poetic licence: 27,11

Greek-English Index gê, earth: 32,25; 68,5.12; 70,6; 91,12; 103,28; 112,25.29.33 geinos, earthy: 70,6.7 geôdês, earthy: 112,31 genesiourgos, evolving: 95,1 genesis, coming to be: 6,14; 85,32; 89,13.14.19.25.27; 105,30; 112,6; creation; 110,13.23; birth: 110,24; 111,7.11; world of becoming: 35,20; becoming: 66,3; 90,3; bringing to be: 112,12 genesin ekhein, be born: 110,12.23 genesis sumbainein, be generated: 86,1 en genesei, initially: 23,33; that comes to be: 105,29 genêtos, generated: 25,1; 47,15; 83,35.37; 84,15; 89,31.37; 90,2.25; 109,29; has come into being; 68,22.23; that comes to be: 73,14; 89,30; coming to be; 89,32 genikos, generative: 28,2 gennan, to generate: 89,21; to bring to birth; 110,11 gennêsis, generation: 110,16 gennômenon, offspring: 109,34 gennêtikos, procreative: 14,6; brings to birth: 79,35; 113,31; 115,25; birth: 79,18; generates: 85,14; generative: 101,24; 109,34; genetic: 113,26.29 genos, genus: 8,30; 9,25; 10,21.26.27.29; 12,26; 13,8.9.22; character: 38,27; kind: 28,3.31; 69,12; 82,21; 101,22; 102,24; species: 106,26; sort: 34,31 geômetria, geometry: 7,1.4 geômetrikos, geometrical: 28,16.28 geômetrikôs, geometrically: 97,23 geusis, taste: 100,14; 101,27; 106,2 ginesthai, to come to be: 6,11; 38,30; 39,14 and passim; to evolve: 46,24 to ginesthai, becoming: 26,29 gignôskein, to be cognisant of: 2,33; 3,1; 43,12; to have knowledge; 5,35; 8,13.27.29; 66,21; 70,6; 71,8; 106,29; be cognitive: 31,34; to recognise: 9,24; 10,15; 15,2; 42,8; 72,20. 34.37; 109,32; to know: 7,18; 8,3; 9,2.21; 14,19; 27,25; 31,32.33; 33,15.21.29; 34,1; 40,38; 42,18; 43,19.21.27.29; 44,9.15.18.19.33; 45,7.10; 47,29.30;

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50,26; 61,28; 66,22.30; 67,9.21.28; 68,1.25; 69,4.16.21.32; 70,4; 81,8.24; 109,27; to identify: 10,25; be familiar: 7,28; be aware of; 27,28 to gignôskein, knowledge; 69,6.27.28; 76,13 gnôrimos, familiar: 9,2; 84,36; intelligibility: 96,22.35; recognised: 15,3; well-known: 97,33; known: 80,13; object of knowledge: 109,28 gnôrisis, knowledge: 33,26 gnôristikos, knowing: 27,30; recognises: 71,19; recognition: 71,18; 72,36; knows: 70,12; cognitive: 30,2; cognisant: 71,19; has knowledge: 66,20 gnôrizein, to know: 14,34.36; 27,34; 29,31; 33,34; 66,12; 67,36; 68,2.23; 69,29; 91,22; to have knowledge: 33,21; to recognise: 69,29; 71,11; 72,29.31; 78,8; 109,30 gnôsis, knowledge: 2,21; 6,23.27; 7,13.19.31.33.34; 8,1. 2.6; 9,10.12; 11,31; 14,21; 15,17.21; 21,12.19; 27,13.15; 29,2.14; 33,19; 42,3.6.13; 44,35; 45,29; 61,1.7.8; 66,23.26.28; 67,31; 68,25; 70,15.17; 73,1; 81,27; 82,10; 88,13; 95,34; 99,8; 110,1.6; discovery: 109,14; awareness: 45,2.3; cognition: 16,30; 44,6. 11.29.35; 45,36; 47,25; cognisance: 44,1 gnôstikos, cognitive: 5,21.28; 7,24; 8,27; 27,2.5.27; 29,26; 30,32; 31,31; 33,17; 43,15; 68,22; 70,21.23.24; 77,24; 88,18.20.21.23.26; 103,2; 109,33; 110,28; cognisant: 44,7.10; 70,1; cognition: 30,24; 45,11; 88,30; knowing: 29,12; 34,1; 71,9; is aware of: 27,37; knowing element: 45,23; knower: 30,22; 45,19; 66,39; 67,17; 69,19.20; 70,2.4; recognises: 60,2; knowledge: 14,16; 31,18; 33,13; 66,34; has knowledge; 66,8; 70,7; form of cognition: 29,33; type of knowledge: 29,29; realm of knowledge: 67,3 gnôstikôs, by cognition: 51,19; cognitively: 67,3; 68,23; 88,31 gnôstos, known: 7,19; 14,18; 29,26.37; 30,22; 33,29; 43,18; 44,14.15; 45,8.10; 66,22.23.24.39; 67,17.32;

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68,27; 69,4.10.19.20; 70,1.2.4; 71,9.10; 72,19.23; 81,8; 86,22; 110,1; knowable: 8,4; 11,31; object of thought: 43,8; object of knowledge: 29,11.15.21.29.33; 43,4; 44,7; 109,34; 110,4.6; object of cognition: 47,25 grammê, line: 23,25.30; 40,8.9.16; 44,37; 45,3; 62,28.29.32.37; 65,7.9.11 graphein, to write: 1,14; 46,5; 53,3 gumnasia, training: 9,29 haima, blood: 20,16.19.22; 23,30 hairein, to capture: 9,30; 10,4; 24,16; to seize: 42,2; to gain: 82,10; to grasp: 44,16; 81,27; 109,25 hairesis, choice; 4,6 hairetos, chosen: 6,29; 49,5; desirable: 9,17; 38,9 haphê, touch: 70,11; 79,37; 100,12.14; 105,26.31.34; 106,3.19 haplous, simple: 9,23; 34,34; 40,5; 62,23; 70,22; 76,16.21.23; 80,8; 103,5 haplôs, merely: 2,2; 57,18; 93,8; entirely: 3,27; on its own: 106,36; in an unqualified sense: 94,36; unqualified: 17,4; 72,25; without qualification: 11,26; as such: 4,24; absolutely: 100,8; 113,6.11; simply: 11,13.16; 15,27; 20,11.12; 24,21.28; 59,5; 69,21; 71,21; 78,12; 83,4; 86,35; 90,4; 92,7; 111,8.11 haplotês, simplicity: 50,33; simple state: 51,4 haptesthai, to touch: 18,5.6.11.13; to connect: 54,20.21 haptikos, touch: 35,5; tactile: 41,13 haptos, object of touch: 106,2.4.5.17 harmonia, harmony: 5,30; 10,33; 40,35.39; 52,11.22; 53.4.5. 11.13.19.23.24.26.28.29.32; 54,2.8.11.14.19.27; 55,6; 56,9; 66,1; 68,7; fitting together: 52,26 harmonikos, harmonic series: 40,32; 68,7 harmozein, apply: 48,25; to harmonise: 52,13; 53,8.10; 65,38; to fit: 50,25; 72,5; 92,16 hêdonê, pleasure: 15,36; 57,15; 105,18.24 hedrastikos, supports: 68,33 hêdus, pleasure: 19,36; pleasant: 105,19.23

hêgeisthai, to think: 1,7; 33,18 hêgemôn, Guide: 1,20 hêgemonikos, important: 56,17; 63,19; controlling: 112,28; governing: 79,25 to hêgemonikon, authority: 99,23 hêkein, to reach: 1,5; 65,24 hekousion, freedom: 36,5; intentional: 41,14 hekousiôs, intentionally: 35,29; freely: 36,5 hêlios, sun: 23,21.22; 36,16 helkein, to draw: 72,10; 86,2; to take up: 91,12 hêmôn autôn, ourselves: 7,20 hen, one: 2,28; 3,25; 5,14; 28,10; 82,3.5; 92,2.5.6 henein, to unify: 67,1; 77,14; to unite: 79,14.16; be unity: 82,17 henizein, to unify: 42,25; 43,5; 70,31.33.34; 72,21; 102,23; to make one: 67,28 henopoiein, to unify: 70,26 to henopoion, unifying: 67,26 henoeidês, of unified form: 72,20 hênômenôs, as a unity: 86,31 to hênômenon, unity: 101,31 henôsis, union: 11,32; unification: 62,8; 77,19; unity: 28,23; 29,3; 47,21; 67,4.7.27; 101,23 hêpar, liver: 101,7 hepesthai, to follow: 10,6.7.12.15; 15,17; 20,8; 21,13; 37,1.13; 40,22; 45,29; 46,2; 55,19; 63,37; 64,2; 65,23.29.32; 77,34; 78,34; 88,20; 96,29; 101,18; 105,21; be consequential: 22,17; 30,30; to accompany: 105,24; be consequent: 43,23; 65,2; 74,33 Heraclitus, 31,27.32 hermêneia, interpretation: 1,13 hermêneuein, to explain: 72,8; 104,19; to interpret: 93,4; 109,30 heterokinêtos, changed by external agency: 62,27; externally changed: 98,33; 99,34; changed by something else: 99,29 heterotês, difference: 12,13.14; 35,6; otherness: 64,29 di’ heterotêtos, external: 99,34 heuresis, discovery: 14,29; 24,6 heuriskein, to find: 31,11

Greek-English Index hexis, disposition: 9,28.34; 35,13; 39,2; 84,18.19; 88,24; condition: 11,18; state: 35,10 Hippo, 32,15.17 hippos, horse: 12,19; 82,35; 93,13; 107,21 hippeios, horse’s: 93,14 histanai, to ally to: 4,38; to maintain: 93,24; to rest: 66,26.37; to remain: 19,18; 75,30; to stay: 47,8; be stationary: 46,19; to stop: 66,23; to terminate: 59,11 historein, to recount: 5,27; 27,6.27; 28,12; 39,19; to report: 26,16; 31,21; to give account: 81,3; to narrate: 28,8; 30,27; to say about: 31,27; 32,18 historia, inquiry: 7,15.27; 24,6; version: 26,14 holê di’ holês, wholly and throughout: 4,2 holê pros holên, whole to whole: 4,5 holikos, complete: 50,32; universal: 72,13; whole: 73,29 (to) holon, the whole: 13,17; 14,4; 17,35; 34,27; 42,5.12; 43,10.11.13.15.17.18.20.27.28; 74,29.30; as a whole: 20,11; universe: 73,3.17 holôs, universally: 86,1 holotês, wholeness: 73,30 Homer, 27,6.11 homoeidês, of the same species: 12,2.3.5.15.16.24; 13,3.32; of the same form: 81,14; of the same part: 82,23; of the same kind: 63,9; 75,12.18.27.32; 79,28.31; 80,2.6.7; 83,28; 89,9 homogenês, of the same genus: 12,4 homoiomerês, of similar parts: 53,30; 56,15; has the same parts: 75,8; consists of the same parts: 76,5; homogeneous: 101,36 homoios, similar: 27,19.37; 93,26 and passim; same: 35,7; like: 67,36; 69,1.14.15.16.17.18; 90,2 homoiotês, similarity: 8,11; 33,18; 70,15; likeness: 29,30; 32,27.33; 52,3.4.7; 66,20; 69,21 homoioun, to make like: 52,8.9 homologein, to admit: 45,12; to accept: 56,9; 65,27

221

homologoumenôs, unquestionably: 57,15; admittedly: 80,30; incontestably: 62,2; agreed: 80,10 homônumos, ambiguous: 18,8; 75,35; 81,17; ambiguously named: 98,16; in different sense: 74,22; equivocal: 107,12.32; has the same name: 32,8; by the same name: 93,13 homônumôs, ambiguously: 81,15; in another sense of the word: 93,12; ambiguously named: 98,17 homotagês, classed together: 12,27 homotagôs, classed with: 33,33 horan, to see: 3,17; 4,38; 17,29.30; 102,3 horasis, seeing: 94,5.21 hôrismenon, definiendum: 10,23.23; determinate: 84,26.27; 103,24; definite: 106,18; 108,29 hôrismenos, determinate: 83,38 horismos, definition: 10,9; 14,29.30; 15,15; 20,26; 22,15; 61,23; 92,37; 97,9.12; 111,14 horistikos, (method of) definition: 9,33.35; 10,21; determinative: 81,5; 84,14.16; way of defining: 9,37; 10,16; 22,16; 68,22; 96,14; defines: 58,18.20.29; determines: 57,4. 11.24; 86,19.27,32; 87,6.16; 88,17; 95,10.16; 104,25; determining: 16,1; 52,7.17.22; 53,20; 67,25; 87,25; 92,21; definitive: 59,10; 67,3; 97,5; designates: 30,21; determinant: 83,28; definitional: 20,8 horistikôs, by definition: 46,30; as determining: 87,24 horizein, mark off: 2,31; 24,18; to make determined: 86,12; to define: 4,21; 6,19; 12,4; 13,18; 15,4; 18,15.16; 21,10.23; 29,34.37; 50,30; 62,32.33; 65,20; 66,4; 67,21; 84,32.33; 93,19; 97,21.22.24.29; 104,22; 109,15.17; 113,15; to characterise: 78,6; 83,8; to determine: 11,12; 43,33; 46,36; 51,29; 57,6; 70,24; 83,25.30.32; 86,24; 87,35; 92,5; 94,8; 96,20; 100,23.24.24; 104,25; 110,5; 112,34; to pattern: 45,12; to bound: 47,3; to give definition: 22,13; 98,2; be criterion: 33,2 horizomenos, determined: 92,9

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hormê, appetitively: 35,30; conation: 71,29; impulse: 87,31; 91,28; 112,9.11 kath’ hormên, appetitively: 35,28 hormêtikos, by desire: 51,19 horos, term: 3,10; 9,24; 28,2; 46,30; 97,9.12; terminal point: 61,27; determining principle: 39,4; 43,5; 47,37.38; 59,12; 103,3; determinant: 28,2; 100,22; 105,2; 113,21; proof: 97,30; goal: 8,20; determination: 83,26.30.31; 84,27.29; 110,5; mark: 26,4; bond: 50,7; pattern: 45,12; definition: 15,16; 18,16; 20,17; 21,29; 22,9; 39,12; 42,3; 82,7.8; 91,3.22.25; 97,16; 98,1; 102,22; 109,9; position: 46,19; boundary: 43,10 kath’ horous, discretely: 45,33; 46,19 hosautôs, unchanging: 6,13 hudôr, water: 31,24.25; 32,14.16; 54,24.34.38; 68,13; 85,37.39; 114,17 hugieia, health: 23,3; 53,25.27.32; 72,26; 104,11.14.16; 105,1; 110,35 hugros, liquid: 54,24; wet: 68,13; 65,27; 106,4.13 hulê, matter: 2,4.13.16; 11,4.6; 12,6.14; 13,12.13; 21,26. 27.30.31.34; 22,3.4.12.13.14.20.24.26; 23,19.22.26; 52,16. 21.23.40; 56,24; 59,21; 66,25.34; 67,24.25; 70,36; 83,21.23.29.34; 84,1.2.29; 86,10.12.14; 93,30.35; 94,7.12.14.25; 103,6; 104,1.5.6.7.28.30.35.36.37; 110,29; 113,11.23; 115,19; material: 85,31 hulikos, involving matter: 11,14; 20,20; material: 25,11.14; 66,14.24; 67,21; 70,2; 71,10; 83,10.11.15; 92,3; 103,34; 112,2.6; 113,23; 114,15 hupagein, to approach: 86,24 huparkhein, to be: 1,5; 2,26; 6,11; 13,23; 16,18; 41,35; 63,9; 65,17; 67,38; 71,19; 81,13.15; 82,25; 91,23; 96,18.24; to belong to: 4,36; 8,26; 9,6.13; 14,36.37; 23,19.24; 24,18.19.23; 33,6; 65,35; 66,3; 68,32; 70,25; 71,21; 77,29; 78,5.8; 95,9; 100,29; 105,12.17; 106,3.15; 110,8; to obtain: 9,34; to have being: 91,32; be present: 27,18.21; 59,18;

71,14.16; 75,34; 76,2.3.6; 83,22; 86,17; 99,6.11; 100,6.12; 101,12; 103,37; 108,9.27; 112,11; to exhibit: 69,4; to happen to: 34,2; 49,3; to occur: 48,10 ta huparkhonta, attributes: 24,11.17; 109,17 ta kath’ hauto ; essential attributes: 109,15 huparxis, real existence: 13,11; existence: 83,25 huperartan, to raise: 42,32 huperballein, to overwhelm: 55,2 hupereideon, transcends forms: 28,23 huperekhein, to transcend: 6,2; be supreme: 16,17; be superior: 30,9; 61,25; 62,13; be bigger: 55,4 huperekhon, transcendent: 6,30.34; superiority: 73,15 huperokhê, superiority: 67,26; 95,19; 101,14 hupêretein, serve: 87,21; 91,9; 93,23; 95,5; 96,8 huperphuês, supernatural: 3,13; 19,20; 40,4 huphêgêsis, teaching: 1,20 hupheimenos, lower thing: 40,39.40; inferior: 33,33 to hupheimenon, declension: 73,13 hupheimenôs, to a lesser degree: 82,29; by descent: 32,9 huphesis, declension: 34,14; 59,20; 67,8; 101,14; 102,18; decline: 67,9 huphistanai, to exist: 13,15.19; 93,11; 108,22; to subsist: 59,19.30.34.39; 68,19; 83,12; to display: 89,8; to constitute: 112,8; to give substance: 71,18; to give subsistence: 99,30.32; to construct: 27,32.35 huphizein, be inferior: 30,8; 67,20; 90,11; be below: 42,31; to decline; 67,7; to sink down: 30,18; be subordinated: 47,20 huperteros, higher: 1,24 hupnos, sleep: 88,12.19.27 hupobainein, to descend: 5,40; 19,23; 25,19; 34,12; 50,7; 52,6.7; 62,7; to decline: 84,12; 100,22 hupobasis, descent: 7,27; 11,29; 19,19; 25,22; 26,23; 34,11; 40,10;

Greek-English Index 50,12; 89,28; 92,18; declension: 39,10; 103,13 hupobebêkotos, in descent: 11,16 hupodeigma, example; 21,25; illustration: 92,36; 94,19 hupodeiknunai, to indicate: 98,36 hupodekhesthai, to receive: 56,23 hupodokhê, receptacle: 67,24; accepts: 79,17; reception: 101,10; inheritance: 101,37 pros hupodokhên, to receive: 115,26 hupographikos, sketchy: 15,15; 97,32 hupographê, sketch: 96,17 hupographein, to indicate: 13,8 hupokeimenon, underlying: 64,4; subject: 15,16; 42,7; is employed: 60,19; containing: 51,10; substrate; 18,14; 20,4; 21,2; 63,15; 68,33; 69,31; 70,3; 84,35; 85,2; 86,10.13; 88,17; 104,29.31; 115,25; material: 55,10; 114,29 hupokeimenôi, in fact: 6,27 hupokeisthai, be present: 42,41; be substrate: 86,11 hupolambanein, to hold: 6,32; to think: 75,5; to suppose: 25,13; 55,17; to conceive: 27,29; 34,1 hupomenein, to endure: 54,15.17; to remain: 85,32 hupomimnêskein, to call to mind: 9,20; to remind: 53,19 and passim; to recall: 9,37; 34,24; to call attention: 10,16 huponoia, conception: 32,21 hupopherein, to carry down: 75,30 hupostasis, substance: 14,21; subsistence: 40,33; reality: 59,28; existence: 80,11 hupostatikos, constitutive: 68,22; constitutes: 112,5.9.11.12; gives level of reality: 70,31 hupostrônnusthai, be support: 52,16; 94,7; to stand beneath: 52,21; to underlie: 56,3 hupotetagmenon, subordinated: 104,33 hupothesis, theory: 31,9; 39,33; conditional statement: 57,20; hypothesis, 35,20; 43,23; 44,20; 46,5.36; 49,19; 55,19; 64,30; 65,2; supposing: 67,38.

223

ex hupotheseôs, hypothetically: 17,2; 94,33 hupotithenai, to suggest: 9,33; to suppose: 25,27.31; 26,1; 31,32; 39,26; 44,23; 47,3; 61,32; 67,39; 78,28; 106,26; to posit: 12,16; 16,6; 17,10; 28,28; 30,27; 31,1; 51,33; to put forward: 43,15 huphourgein, to serve: 93,18 Iamblichus: 1,11; 6,16; 49,31; 89,33 iasis, cure: 19,25 iatrikê, medicine: 69,9 idea, idea: 28,10; form: 29,17; 33,32 idiai, separately: 22,4; 42,8; 82,1; specifically: 62,15; individually: 98,2 idion, property: 3,12; 10,14; 58,1; specific feature: 82,20; 85,23; special character: 30,5; 91,21.25; distinctive character: 62,9 idios, own: 92,26; 101,37; proper: 9,4.10.31; 10,8; 16,31.38; 17,32.34.35; 24,13.22; 41,29; 51,27; 60,2; 77,31; 88,9; 91,34; 93,24; 95,6; 96,19; 106,35; 107,10.13.32; 108,3.4.19; 109,9; 113,14; individual: 10,3; 107,37; specific: 82,9.10; 85,29; 87,23; 98,5; special: 10,17; 12,34; 65,15.28; 79,15; 91,22 idios kata sumbebêkos, consequential property: 10,12 idiôs, especially: 6,21; specifically: 21,7; 64,29; 102,32; special: 48,11 idiotês, property: 9,23; 40,28.37; 42,5; 60,3; 62,21; 66,6; 67,29; 101,5; 102,17; idiosyncrasy: 89,8; special feature: 43,9; special character: 75,20; feature: 43,13; 44,13.17.19; individuality: 72,30 kat’ idiotêta, specific: 40,36 idiotropôs, in a distinctive way: 4,36; in a way proper to each: 107,13; in a special way: 10,2; suited to each: 109,10; specifically: 40,28; 96,13.19; in proper fashion: 10,15 ikhnos, trace: 50,21 isotês, equality: 68,36 kakia, badness: 35,9 kakos, bad: 68,25 to kakon, badness: 50,20 kalein, call: 2,32; 3,36; 15,28; 19,20.36; 27,20; 28,32; 39,5.9.12.35; 49,2; 53,28; 54,5.33; 58,21; 59,15;

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61,9.20; 64,17.33; 68,7.10; 71,20; 72,13; 76,10; 77,7; 79,25.29; 80,22; 88,1; 92,35; 95,26; 96,17; 97,12.22; 98,20.28; 99,8; 102,13.17; 104,24; 106,16; 109,14; 114,7 kallos, beauty: 53,27 kalos, fine: 6,18.22.28.31.37; 7,32 euthus kanon, straight-edge: 72,37 kardia, heart: 20,16.19.22; 23,30; 58,7.11; 101,7 katakamptein, to bend around: 46,10 katakhrêsis, misuse: 28,15 katalampanesthai, to irradiate: 30,14 katalêpsis, awareness: 1,6; reception: 60,26; grasp: 2,1; 9,27; apprehension: 45,36; understanding: 8,29 katalêptikos, studies: 7,2 katapsuxis, chill: 58,11 katarithmein, to reckon: 95,1 katarkhein, be dominant: 20,1; be on control: 25,7; to bring about: 24,29; to initiate: 85,25 kataskeuazein, to establish: 56,18.28 katastasis, condition: 88,14 katateinesthai, be stretched throughout: 73,9; be extended: 74,30 katêgoreisthai, be predicated: 10,13; 13,8.21.22; 98,4; 106,36; 107,3.5.20 katêgoria, category: 10,30.32; 14,33; 38,33; 82,33; predication: 107,35; predicate: 108,2 katêgoroumenon, predicate: 42,8; 92,14; 107,4.9.23; 108,3 katharos, pure: 4,2; 8,18; 17,6; 42,38; 58,35; 59,9.11; 66,37; 84,9; 90,19 katharôs, purely: 3,13; 13,24; 34,10; 45,21; 47,26; 58,3; 66,13; 89,7; 95,13; 102,12; pure: 6,13; 42,23 kathêgemôn, leader: 4,7 kath’ heteron, dependent: 83,32 kathistanai, to bring order to: 76,11 katholikon, generally: 21,29 katholikôs, generally: 22,14 katholou, in general: 6,21; universal: 92,11.14; universally: 72,7; general: 9,19; generally: 17,26 katokhê, domination: 19,8; grasp: 110,29 to keimenon, object: 54,20 kenos, empty: 15,23

kenôs, emptily: 15,18 kephalaion, topic: 76,31 kephalê, head: 93,13; 104,7 kêrinos, wax: 85,34 kêros, wax: 85,36 to khairein, rejoicing: 57,20.25.27 khalasmos, relaxation: 42,30 khalazein, to relax: 42,23; to slacken: 50,7; 62,7.10; to loose: 67,6 khalepotês, difficulty: 10,17 kharaktêr, character: 18,14 kharaktêristikos, characterising: 4,29; 57,32; 59,7.13.36; 61,10; 66,16; 70,37; 90,34; 105,10; gives character: 52,12; 56,36; 57,12; 107,29; characterisation: 10,23.24; 68,37; characteristic: 19,29; 52,37; 58,28 kharaktêrizein, to characterise: 12,22; 18,9.12; 20,18.23; 27,26; 92,6; 93,37; 94,14; 98,29; 105,1; to bring about; 20,4; to have character: 52,1.5; 54,10 khôra, space: 64,25; place: 99,14 to khôrêtikon, capacity: 68,10 khôrismos, separation: 49,11; 77,9; 93,11 khôristos, separated: 4,9; 5,17.20; 22,22; 23,12.15; 45,37; 46,2.8; 48,1.2.3; 78,1; 90,9; 96,14; 107,4; separate: 7,23; 8,33; 15,33; 16,5.7.9.12.18.28; 17,23.24.27.34.36.37; 18,1.2; 19,14; 23,5.7; 24,3; 27,9; 48,27.33; 54,7; 59,16.36.37; 60,34; 74,15; 75,1.16; 76,35; 77,1.8.19.22; 79,1; 84,20; 86,18.32;88,7; 90,13; 92,19.21; 94,26.29.31; 95,6.8.20; 96,6.7.10; 102,32.33.34; 103,6.7.10.15; 105,7; 107,16.20.27.28; separable: 17,20; 80,17 to khôriston, separation: 17,15; 45,26; 59,31; 60,3 khôristôs, (as) separate; 48,17; 75,20; 76,10; separated: 73,6; separately: 75,7.17 khôrizein, to separate: 18,6; 23,11.13.16; 27,16; 43,3; 59,38; 61,32; 63,25; 65,8; 70,3; 71,16; 76,30; 77,3.10; 80,10.27; 88,9; 90,14; 93,7.18; 100,1; 101,9,22;

Greek-English Index 102,24.25.31; 106,24; 107,26; to divorce: 57,3. khrasthai, to use: 4,29.30.38; 5,5.5.12; 10,2; 16,23; 18,24.33; 19,1.14; 22.24; 20,27.33; 21,3; 24,11.24; 31,16; 34,8; 43,3; 45,17.23.28.29.33.34.38; 46,3; 48,33; 49,13; 51,14.24.32.33; 52,3.17.27.29.33.36.38.39.41; 53,19.21; 56,38; 57,34; 59,33; 60,24.26.29.36; 61,1.12; 66,16,27.39; 70,37; 71,23.24; 72,34; 75,16; 77,1.7.33; 79,9; 81,7; 87,7.18.20.21.23.31.34; 89,27.31; 90,30.32.34; 91,3.4.7.10.18; 92,28.33; 93,6.18.33.35.36.37; 94,8.14.20.22; 95,5.18.25.33; 96,7.8.10.12; 97,6; 99,25; 100,26; 101,28; 102,19; 103,3; 105,11; 106,25; 107,28; 108,16; 110,11; 111,25; 114,16.18; 116,12; to make use: 9,11; 25,11; 43,1; 60,6; 79,9; 95,10; 96,12; 102,15.16; to employ: 9,12 khreia, need: 108,26 to khrêsimon, utility: 94,11; 96,13 khrêsis, use: 8,30; 34,6.17; 40,22; 49,10; 52,2; 57,2; 60,32. 33.39; 61,24; 102,29; purpose: 93,18 khrôma, colour: 41,32; 68,11; 82,31; 105,35; 110,2 khronikos, temporal: 47,8; of time: 89,7 khronos, time: 44,11.12; 54,17; 79,20; temporal: 47,14 tôi khronôi, temporally: 109,28 kata khronon, temporally: 89,18 khthonios, earthy: 83,2 khumos, taste: 106,2.3; flavour: 106,4.8 kinein, be source of change: 2,13; to initiate change: 3,11; 19,7.15.17.22; 58,1.30.32; 59,2; 66,11; 81,6; 91,3.8.27; 92,28; to initiate motion: 24,27; 25,6; 27,1.28; 41,20; 64,11.14; 65,23.21; 115,36; to guide motion: 49,15; be originative of motion: 31,5; to cause motion: 25,10; to cause change: 19,21; 37,2; 51,13; 71,22; be originator of change: 71,27; to make change: 18,31; to excite: 16,26; 103,24; to move:

225

4,18.21.22.25.27.28; 16,15.16; 19,24.40; 21,4; 25,3.5; 26,22.32.33.34; 27,28; 30,3.24.35; 31,29.30.31; 34,25.28; 35,25.26.27.28.29.30; 36,7; 40,17; 49,23.24.25; 50,4; 51,1; 61,22; 62,9; 63,32; 65,16; 66,2; 91,14; 112,8.9.10; to change: 36,9.11.15.24; 37,1.17.19; 38,12.16.18.22.23.24; 39,7.32; 40,2; 41,18.19; 45,13.14.19; 48,8.12.13.14.21; 51,9; 52,5.9.10.12.30.31.33.34; 56,33; 66,11; 71,24; 90,34.36; 91,3; 112,14; to originate change: 36,15; 37,8.9; 53,22; 71,18; to quicken: 23,20; to bring about motion: 24,29 to kinein, motion; 24,20.30; 25,17.18; 65,29; change: 92,1; 93,23; 94,10.11; 116,7 kineisthai, to undergo change: 3,11; 34,33.34; 35,15; 36,10.32; 37,8.9; 51,13; be moved: 3,12; 4,19.21,22.25.26.27.28; 19,37; 24,27; 37,13; 62,5.9.21.28; 63,32.34; 64,8.14; 65,15; 106,14; 116,11; be in motion: 25,12.13; 26,35; 30,6.8; 32,13; 34,19.20; 62,33; 65,17.18.21; 77,29; be changed: 18,30; 19,23; 33,9; 37,20.21; 57,5.11.12.28.30. 36.37; 58,1.8.15.28.29.31; 59,13; 65,36; 71,27; 85,23; 91,2.13; 92,28; 93,9; 98,6; 99,30; 116,2.5.13; be subject to change: 56,37; to undergo change: 71,29; 93,8; to undergo motion: 62,4; to have motion: 103,27; to move: 79,20; 101,27; to change: 57,4.7; 63,4; 67,2; 81,5; 86,5; 90,32.33.35; to suffer change: 61,17; to suffer motion: 62,14; 64,12; 65,24.31 kinêma, motion: 19,28 kinêsis, change: 2,24.30; 8,20; 19,7; 20,7.10; 33,10; 34,3.8.10.17.30; 35,1; 36,10.13.26.27.31.32; 37,1.5.9.11.17; 38,13.20.22.24.26.27; 39,5.8.11.14.17.21.31.36.37.39; 41,10.20.23; 44,11; 45,13; 47,35.37; 48,7.13.14.19.20; 49,29.34.36; 50,36.37.51,9; 52,9; 54,27.29.30.31; 57,7.16.17.19.22.25.28.33.35; 58,4.5. 10.23.26.29.33; 59,2.6; 65,35; 66,15; 71,29; 78,4; 82,6; 85,24; 93,23;

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98,9.11; 99,10.21; 112,4.18; process: 20,11.12.22.25; movement: 24,21; 34,29; 36,1; motion: 25,8.19.20.23. 26; 26,30.31.37; 31,34; 32,11.29.31; 35,23.30.33; 36,8.19; 39,24.25; 40,16.20; 41,1.2.14; 43,25; 48,10; 49,22.25; 50,5.6.11; 62,10.12.17. 31.37; 65,33; 112,8 kinêtikos, source of change: 5,22.29; 56,38; originates change: 33,12; 49,33; 52,35; motive power: 31,19; activator: 20,33; kinetic: 40,19; principle of change: 27,35; moving: 11,11; 16,1; 26,36; changer: 34,23; originative of motion: 30,1.32.34; origination of motion: 30,24; moves: 24,29; power to change: 52,30; originator of motion: 31,11.23; originating change: 33,7; 52,6; 56,30; 71,19. 20.21.22; 72,4; 87,26; initiates motion: 16,15; 26,23; 62,20; 63,31.34; 64,8; causes to move: 31,23; cause of motion: 25,15.18.24; changes: 51,18; 59,36; 77,27; 93,9; 106,20; initiating: 19,6; 27,27; origination of change: 33,8; 71,36; initiates change: 57,24; 58,19.21.27; 63,24; 66,7.17; 81,16; 116,5; initiates activity: 59,15; activates: 87,19; cause of change: 72,13; 112,22; of change: 100,18 kinêtikôs, as activating: 87,25 kinêtos, in motion: 30,10; object of motion: 62,23; changing: 34,14 to kinoun, changer: 8,21; 52,8; originates motion: 34,20; mover: 25,9.16; 26,21.23; originates change: 36,11; source of change: 19,4; 86,4.6; 113,25; originator of change: 36,13.29.32.34.35; source of motion: 24,26.33.34; brings about: 20,27; origin of motion: 45,13.15; origin of change: 49,29; activator: 87,22; initiates change: 87,34; 98,7 klados, shoot: 63,8.11.13; 79,17; 102,2; cutting: 101,37 klinê, bed: 2,17 klinein, to veer: 29,8 koilos, concave: 23,28 koilotês, concavity: 23,29 koinônoun, to have in common with: 3,20; 71,16; 80,26; to associate:

12,28; 30,10; 79,39; 89,12; to consist of: 65,30; to have a share in: 85,21; 112,23; to communicate: 88,21 koinônia, community: 9,22; 11,10; 14,13; 67,5.6.9; association: 33,6; 62,35; 80,1; 89,39; 90,4.9; associated: 80,17; union: 11,6; affinity: 33,30; 65,19; 67,1; kinship: 26,28 koinos, common: 9,21.31; 10,2.15; 13,23.24; 16,21; 24,13; 33,20; 34,31; 64,33; 68,31; 69,1; 71,14.18; 75,35; 76,1; 77,21; 81,13.20.22.25.26; 82,1.2.4.7.9.19.25.26.28; 83,5; 86,17.19; 88,7; 91,16.20.22.23.25; 92,15.24; 95,7; 96,18.19; 98,4.5; 107,31.34; 108,1.2.4.10.20; 109,10; single: 106,34; 107,5.7.9.10. 11.13.36.39; 108,3; general: 48,10; 83,28; universal: 110,8; composite: 61,7; (adv) generally: 53,27 koinôs, general: 98,2 ta koina, common elements: 69,3.4.5 kôluein, to prevent: 18,2;26,5; 63,26; 64,31; 69,12; 95,22.27.28.30; 96,5; to hinder: 60,39 korê, pupil: 94,22 kosmos, cosmos: 76,7 krasis, mixture: 10,34; 19,5.34; 20,4; 52,20; 53,5; 60,30; 68,9; 87,5; blending: 54,33 krasthai, be mixed: 53,8.9 krisis, judgement: 66,29; 69,24 krinein, to discriminate: 19,1; to distinguish: 72,24; to recognise: 29,34; 35,6 kritês, judge: 1,11; supporter: 32,25 Kritias: 32,22 kritikos, discriminating: 18,35; discriminates: 63,25; discernment: 59,9.10; discerning: 27,8; 66,40; discerns: 105,20; critical: 58,32.35 kritikôs, as judgement: 109,37 kruphion, hidden: 30,15 ktasthai, to obtain: 88,23 kubernêtês, pilot: 4,19; steersman: 17,36; 87,19; 116,3; boatman: 60,32 kuklikos, circular: 4,4; 40,16; 41,2; 72,37.38.39; 73,1 to kuklophoreisthai, rotation: 49,22 kuklophoria, rotation: 49,20; 50,9.10

Greek-English Index kuklos, circle: 40,7.12; 41,28; 43,27; 44,5.8; 47,6.8.10.12.14; 49,23; 50,3 kuklôi kineisthai/phereisthai, rotation: 49,18.19.21 kurieuein, to control: 19,10 kurios, in command of: 7,24; controls: 19,8; dominant: 71,6; truly: 16,2.4; essential: 63,21; superior: 49,29 kuriôs, dominantly; 113,6.11; true: 7,6; centrally: 104,1; in the fullest sense: 85,18; genuine: 70,12; the central case: 92,3 lanthanein, be deceptive: 7,9 lêgein, to terminate: 9,14; to end: 46,29; 31,33 legein, to discuss: 2,29; to speak: 2,12 and passim; to say: 2,18 and passim leipein, leave: 2,20 leleukasmenon, white object: 18,9 leptomerês, fine: 31,1.4.29; of fine parts; 106,25; subtle: 65,14.22; 66,11; fine-grained: 32,32; 33,4 leukasthai, be whitened: 57,28; 98,24 leukos, white: 18,8; 68,11; 74,20; 77,15; 82,31; 96,6; 98,24; 114,12 to leukon, white thing: 92,8.10 leukotês, whiteness: 57,28; 96,6.8.10; colour white: 18,8 lexis, text: 1,13; 21,23; 67,33; 70,8; 76,11; 77,24; expression: 80,17; words: 104,19 lêxis, destiny: 4,6 logikos, rational: 5,32.38; 11,14.36; 12,3.18.19; 16,9; 17,3. 5.13.23.24.25; 19,9; 23,14; 36,3; 41,26.28; 42,6.12.19.21.28.38; 45,30; 48,25.27.29; 51,25; 57,23; 59,31.39; 60,4.8.26.41; 61,7.8.9.10.11.20; 67,4.29; 68,18; 71,3.34; 72,3; 76,23. 24.36; 77,7.27; 78,13; 79,31.35,39; 80,16.22.31; 81,6; 82,12; 86,21; 88,10; 90,15; 92,24.25; 94,29.37; 95,4.6.8.12; 97,14.15.16; 99,7; 100,22.29; 102,13.30; 103,26; 105,7; 107,22; 109,19.20; 113,19; logical: 51,2; verbal: 21,19; discursive: 87,14; of reason: 9,29; 77,26; 79,36; conceptual: 69,12 logikôs, rationally: 5,34; 51,20; 52,10; 66,38; 79,19; verbally: 15,18.19; 21,18

227

logismos, reasoning: 65,37; 108,24.25.26.33.35 logos, reasoning: 1,21; text: 3,21; 20,6; ratio: 40,33.37; 53,13.15.17; 54,31; 55,10.24.26.31; 56,4.5.6.7.8.14.15.19.21.22.25.26; 67,40; 68,1.4; 113,16; speech: 54,17; plan: 52,21; rationality: 6,33; word: 42,15; discussion: 6,15; 7,11; 23,17; 25,1; 35,20; 39,17; 51,1; 53,1.18; 80,25; 82,22; form: 23,6; formula: 5,31; argument: 48,11; 56,27; 66,18; 71,4; 94,17; definition: 107,31; account: 4,8; 6,28; 12,34; 13.3.5. 8.9.18.19.30; 14,1; 20,5.9; 30,4.12; 51,6; 69,5.6.24; 70,1.3; 82,5.18.19; 87,28; 93,30; 96,17.18.23.25.30; 97,2. 3.5; 103,10; 106,31.34; 107,10.11.13.36.37.39; 108,19.31; 109,6.7; statement: 10,21.23; examination: 21,22; reason: 4,1; 7,21; 8,5; 14,5; 16,20.26; 19,31; 79,37; 80,13.14.17; 100,26; 101,7.8; 102,15.16.20.22.25; 103,7.23; 113,21; relation: 92,8; rational principle; 92,12.16.17.18.19.21; 113,22.23.24; discursive expression: 86,30; 87,13; rational concept: 67,5. 8.31; principle: 12,15.22.23; 20,5.9; 21,33.35; 22,1.2.12. 14.15.18.19.22.27; 67,21.22.24; 68,19; 86,24; 93,22; 96,33; 104,15.28; 105,14; respect: 77,16; order: 109,23 logôi, conceptually: 101,4; logically: 109,29 peri hou ho logos, speaking about: 94,29 kata ton logon, rational: 96,22.35; rationally: 11,19 poiein logon, to make mention: 1,24; to discuss: 21,4; to say: 73,5; to take account: 3,30; to include something in discussion: 3,26 lupê, distress: 15,36; 105,18.24 lupeisthai, to distress: 57,21.24 lupêros, distressing: 105,19 makarios, divine: 1,7; blessed: 48,9; blessedness: 48,1 makariotês, blessedness: 48,3.4 manthanein, to learn: 11,23 to manthanein, learning: 58,14

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marturesthai, to witness: 68,3; to bear witness: 70,5.8; to give evidence: 106,11 mathêmata, mathematics: 15,2; 40,3 dia tôn mathêmatôn, in mathematical form: 46,14 mathêmatikos, mathematical: 3,31.33; 7,5; 23,6.7; 28,16.19; 30,12; 53,24; 54,30; 61,30; 62,21; 84,36; 85,4; 86,35 mathêmatikôs, mathematically: 50,9 mathêsis, learning: 9,3 megethos, size: 26,1; 60,38; 113,18; 115,13; magnitude: 28,16.28; 40,23; 41,7; 42,26.27.28.36; 43,6.7.15.21.22.31.33; 44,5.9.14.18; 54,5.6.9,11.24.25; 46,1.4; 48,24; 54,26.29; 61,29; 62,2; 64,6.21.26 megethikos, in magnitude: 42,16; of magnitude: 42,22.30; 43,4 meignunai, to make mixture; 30,29; to mix: 48,22; 49,13; 53,13.17; 54,31.33; 55,1.31; 68,10; 73,3.22.23; 74,17.27; to mingle: 73,8; to intermingle: 74,14 mignumenon, ingredient: 68,8 meiôsis, grow smaller: 24,24; diminution: 105,31 mêkos, length: 28,11.34; 29,17 melas, black: 77,15; 82,32 melankhôlikos, melancholic: 19,39 meli, honey: 101,32 memnêsthai, to remember: 4,9; to recall: 25,26 menein, to rest: 35,34; 47,16; to remain (at rest): 4,4; 6,2.8.12.14; 19,14; 34,15; 47,18; 49,14; 50,14; 54,34; 59,19; 62,7; 63,6.7.20; 64,9; 73,34; 75,1; 77,9; 84,3; 87,15; 90,4.15.20.23; 91,18; 93,7; 95,2.12; be at rest; 6,8; 30,14; 34,15; be unchanging: 5,19; be stable: 89,36 menein en heautôi, self-contained: 30,17 merikos, partial: 13,18.19; 43,12; 61,23; portion: 75,25; specific: 63,7; of the part: 80,7; particular: 42,5.7; 43,9; 44,12.17.19.21; 72,14; 73,17.29.30; 75,15.23.30.31; 83,27.28 merikê protasis, particular premise: 5,8 ta merika, parts: 81,10

to merikon, particularity: 83,27 merikôs, by divisible: 41,20 merismos, fragmentation: 6,4.5; division: 40,32; 47,26; 50,13; 61,25; 62,6.13; 89,7.28; 90,26; 101,14; 113,19; divided: 40,34; partition: 101,12; separation: 67,6; 89,10 meristos, divisible: 8,8; 33,10; 34,16; 35,3; 40,19.21; 41,10.34; 42,11; 44,14.27.28.29.35; 45,1.2.6.8.10.34.36; 57,8.9; 61,19.32.35; 62,4.11; 66,36; 79,4.14; 89,36.39; 94,31.33.34.36; 101,35; 103,1.2.4.5; has parts: 11,26.29.35; 62,19; fragmented: 26,29; with parts: 11,36; 14,9; divided: 30,9; 33,10; 44,12; 58,31; 78,15.19.21; 94,27.33; 103,6; separation: 14,11; piecemeal: 81,26 meristôs, in part: 17,8; 62,19; different: 101,30 merizesthai, be divided: 6,10; 11,36; 26,18; 28,1; 40,9.31.35; 41,4; 42,33; 50,8.32; 62,7; 88,10.38; 90,24; 94,18; 101,11.35; be separated: 30,18; 110,38; be shared out: 79,4; to have parts: 100,31; be fragmented: 34,9 merizein, to divide up: 70,14 meros, part: 2,4.7.14; 4,17; 11,30; 12,35; 13,26.28.29.32; 20,10.15.17; 24,31; 41,12.35; 42,12; 43,9.21; 44,21.25.30.32; 55,7.10.16; 61,28; 65,11; 68,11; 72,6; 73,15.29; 75,32.33.35; 76,2.5.10; 77,13; 78,35; 91,5.9; 93,13.26.27; 94,27.32.36; 95,1.3.5.14.16.24.26; 96,3 mesos, be between: 3,19; 11.8; intermediate: 8,7.11; 14,12; 25,18; 26,31; 40,18; 47,11.13; 67,14.15; mean: 26,28; 30,11; 40,9; middle portion: 46,36; middle (term): 97,9.12 mesôs, in between: 98,31 mesotês, mean: 5,38; 30,4.10; mean place; 40,18.4; intermediate position: 6,9; 14,10; mean position: 62,4.10; 99,22; intermediary status: 66,2; mean position: 26,27 meta ta phusika, metaphysics: 3,5.7.15 metabainein, to transform: 42,11.16; to move on: 47,13; to go on to: 44,3

Greek-English Index metaballein, to transform: 6,8.9; 35,10; 37,3; 38,16.33; 54,37; 55,2; 114,10.11.25.29.30; 115,6.7.23; be variable: 5,20; to turn into: 85,38; be in transformation: 47,28 metabasis, transition: 11,30; 39,4.9; 46,22; 47,37 metabatikos, moves on: 47,10 metabolê, change: 11,32; 19,21.33; 20,10; 31,32; transformation: 34,30; 35,11.13; 38,26.31; 39,3; 42,11; 46,19; 114,12.14.21.31; 115,15 metalêpsis, receives: 63,3 metapherein, to transfer: 33,36; be transference: 80,19; to transport: 34,25 metastasis, transition: 19,27 to metaxu, intermediate: 14,13; 40,32; 42,32 metekhein, to partake: 11,14; 33,20; 35,17; 42,34; 50,1; 59,27.28; 68,20; 100,20; 104,12; 108,10.24; 110,19; to include: 108,29; to exemplify: 105,29; to share (in): 32,9; 84,28; to contain: 68,12; to participate: 52,15; 85,9; 86,25.28.36; 98,19.21 methexis, participation: 11,31; 52,14; 57,27; 83,16.20; 92,7; 98,21,22; 99,2; to partake of: 110,36 methistanai, to occupy different places: 37,4; to transmute: 114,33 methodos, method: 9,20.23.36; 10,2.7 metokhê, participation: 52,15 metousia, presence: 113,9 metron, measure: 19,36; 68,35; 72,39; 98,31; degree: 67,7; standard: 74,21; bound: 97,15.16 migma, mixture: 27,36 mimeisthai, to imitate: 5,15; to copy: 6,3 mimêsis, likeness: 6,1 misein, to hate: 61,5.11 mixis, mixture: 5,31; 49,2.6.9; 54,38; 55,3.6.9.24.26; 56,3.5.7.10.11.13.19. 22.25.26; 73,17.18; mixing: 54,32; involvement: 20,7 mnêmê, memory, 108,19 mnêmoneutikos, involves memory: 106,18 monadikos, monadic: 62,30 monas, monad: 28,25.30; 29,3.9; number: 42,17; unit: 61,30.35;

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62,17.18.19.21.24.25.34; 63,1.28.30.31.33.34.35; 64,11.12.13.15.17.24; 65,24.30; 66,1 monê, rest: 6,7; 34,14; quiescence: 58,26; 59,2.7 monimos, unchanging: 3,13; 5,14.17.19; 9,6.8; remains in itself: 77,32; unvarying: 16,28; enduring: 15,29; 17,28; 30,15; stable: 89,38; 90,2.8.10; 94,37; 95,6.26; remaining: 17,6 to monimon, stability: 90,13.20 monimôs, unchangingly: 21,2; firmly: 41,24 monimotês, stability: 90,11 morion, part: 2,8.11.24.28.31; 3,24.26; 8,2; 11,27; 14,3.4.5.14; 34,27; 35,3.5.6.7; 42,1.37; 43,22.23.31; 44,4.6.7.10.13.23; 52,11; 53,30; 54,12.16; 55,30.33; 56,11.17.19.21; 63,10.19.22; 65,31; 70,6; 74,8; 75,13.15.19.22; 76,6.33; 78,26.36.37; 79,14.16.19.23; 80,5.19; 85,18; 86,3; 99,17; 100,28. 30.32; 101,2.4.9.12.26; 103,9.12.14.16; 112,29.34; portion: 43,12; 77,2.30; 78,19; 101,11 morphê, shape: 51,27; 104,14 morphôtikos, pictorial: 17,5 muthos, myth: 51,22 muthikos, mythical: 51,24 muthikon, mythically: 72,2 nastotês, density, 64,3 naus, boat: 4,31; 16,19; ship: 17,36; 52,18.25; 59,37; 60,33.34; 87,19 neikos, strife: 25,10; 27,36; 67,19; 70,18 neuein, to decline: 84,13; to incline: 87,7; 91,17 to neuein, tendency: 23,15 neuron, sinew: 70,10 neusis, inclination: 49,9.12; 73,17; 76,8; 94,11; tendency: 77,20 noein, to have in mind: 98,10; to understand; 49,11; 105,11; to have object of thought: 47,6; to intuit: 43,24.25; 109,15; to conceive: 22,20; 62,18; 66,1; 71,10; 80,8; to think: 21,14; 42,36; 43,6.7.32; 44,3.22.23.24.25.27; 45,26; 46,16.25. 27; 47,5.27; 57,27; 60,17; 76,20;

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77,29.35.37.38.39; 78,2.6.10.15.17; 79,3.6; [(Perf) intellection: 46,22] to noein, intellection: 16,31.34.35; 17,5; 18,27; 60,21.22.30; 69,27; 77,31.35; 78,1; 79,7; 82,1 noêma, thought: 42,18.24 noeros, intellective: 2,33; 3,14.17; 4,2; 5,6.40; 6,1; 8,17; 9,6; 11,27; 19,26; 26,12; 29,3; 30,13.15.17; 31,8; 39,10; 48,24; 66,17; 67,8; 73,6; 77,11; 89,37.38; 90,1.10.14; intellectual: 88,9 noerôs, intellectively: 5,35; 66,38 noêsis, intellection: 5,4; 18,31; 39,34.35.38; 41,30.33; 42,1.24; 43,5; 45,33; 46,3.9.12.17.21.24; 47,12.17.22.35.38; 54,7; 60,24; 68,18; 80,2; thought: 47,10; thinking: 78,2; cognitive: 75,31 noêtikon, intellectual part: 2,26; 27,23; 76,3.24; 77,8.31; 100,20; intellective: 44,23.26; 45,27; 75,27; 78,33; intellect: 3,3; 77,25; capable of thought: 43,15 noêtos, intelligible: 2,21.22.33; 3,1.2.3; 8,3.4; 14,23; 16,23.24; 28,1; 29,13.16; 47,21; 66,9; 69,30 nosos, disease: 72,26 nous, intellect: 2,21.22; 3,1.25.34.36; 5,2.15; 6,3; 7,21; 8,2.3.5; 14,24; 15,5; 17,2.4.5; 19,11; 23,14; 25,3,7.9.18; 26,34. 36.37; 27,3.5.10.13.14.16.19.20.21; 29,14; 30,13.14; 31,10.14.15.17; 33,17.19; 40,10.15.17.19.30; 41,26.30.33; 42,2.20.21.26.34; 45,5.28.30.32.37.38; 46,2.3.4.6.12.13; 47,6.20; 48,15.30; 50,1.7; 55,17.20; 59,15.37; 61,8.9.11.12; 67,29; 70,21.23; 71,3.20.31; 76,30; 77,10.12; 78,37; 79,2; 80,10; 84,21; 85,20; 86,28; 87,1.2; 91,19; 95,31; 99,5.7.9; 100,18,26; 101,19; 102,10.12.13.16.18; 103,13; 105,7; 108,24.31; 109,4; intelligence: 11,14 kata noun, intellectual: 100,8; intellectually: 111,19 ôdinesthai, be pregnant: 47,26 oikeios, relevant: 1,4; proper: 51,8; 91,14; specific: 41,9; at home with: 20,4; kindred: 105,15; akin: 7,19;

16,7; appropriate: 107,38; 108,1; own: 19,23; 35,2.35.36; 48,35; 49,4; 59,9; 66,30; 75,32; 86,21; 89,6; suited: 51,3; related: 18,32; normal: 60,38 oikeiôs, exactly: 14,34; affinity; 67,23; in own way: 40,30; appropriately: 67,32 oikeiotês, kinship: 7,18; 81,9; affinity; 66,22; 67,16.17.24; 69,12; 71,9; 72,19; 83,13.14 oikia, house: 22,4 oinos, wine: 54,33.36.38 okhêma, vehicle: 17,17; 51,25; 59,35; 73,36; 74,3 omma, eye: 60,20 to on, thing: 8,1; 27,29.30; 28,2.3; 30,32; 69,29; 70,20; 110,19; existent: 40,27; 82,21; what there is: 91,30; being: 9,19.22; 69,1; 71,15; 82,2.32; 83,3.4; 92,6; ‘being’: 68,30 ta onta, reality; 28,9 onkos, bulk: 64,6; 85,35 onoma, term: 15,22; 26,27.30; name: 34,31; 92,9; 98,20.33; word: 28,13.15; 34,6.9.17; 40,22; 50,17; 61,24; 99,25; expression: 28,19; 89,27 onomazein, to name; 25,23; to describe: 98,10 ontôs, true: 8,17; truly: 61,14; actually: 82,32 ophthalmos, eye: 45,40; 79,15; 93,28.29.30.31.32.33.35.36; 94,2.12.20.22 opsis, sight: 68,25; 77,15; 79,36; 93,30.31.32.33.35.37; 94,1.13.13; 101,27 optikos, optical: 7,4 oregesthai, to strive: 5,34; 110,20; to set to act: 76,20; to desire; 78,7; to seek: 102,9; 110,27 orektikos, orectic: 5,21; desires: 106,10; appetitive: 14,6; 77,24; aiming at: 20,19.21; as/of desire: 20,14; 60,8; 101,25 orektos, desired: 14,18.23; object of desire: 49,15 orexis, conation: 16,29; seeking: 110,28; appetition: 85,20; desire; 16,31; 20,3; 21,36; 23,29; 39,35.38;

Greek-English Index 77,26; 79,38; 99,9; 105,18.21; 106,12.19.27; aim: 21,31 organ, to excite; 19,7.37 organikos, organic: 5,1; 16,14; 23,23; 85,11; 90,38; 92,23.27.36; 103,32; 105,12.13; of the organism: 55,30; instrumental: 38,7; 52,32; 87,26; is instrument: 87,28; 93,21; of instrumentality; 52,40; as organism: 87,22 organon, tool: 4,15.29.37; 5,3.5; 18,25.29; 19,2.14.15.24; 52,4; 77,33; 91,17; 96,12; instrument: 12,13; 43,3; 45,32.35.37; 46,2.7; 49,10; 51,14.15.23; 52,1.16.22.26.27.29. 30.36.37.40.41; 53,19.20; 56,38; 57,31; 58,18.21.27.31; 59,33.39; 60,7.13.15.19.24.37; 61,12; 66,39; 70,37; 75,16; 77,1; 81,6; 87,7.20.25.30; 90,29.30.31.33.39; 91,4.5.7.9.26; 92,30.31.35; 93,6.16.17.22.33.34.36; 94,7.8.14; 95,4.9.18.22; 96,8; 105,10.11; 107,28.29; 111,24.25; organ: 16,15; 20,18.23.32.33; 45,14.16.28; 51,21; 56,20; 57,17.23.35; 69,23; 79,25; 88,15; 95,16; 96,14; 101,28.29; organism: 66,16.17; 103,26 orgê, anger: 16,11; 19,38; 20,19; 21,25.29; 22,2; 23,29; 54,5; 58,10; 77,7 orgilôs, in regard to anger: 57,36 orgizesthai, be angry: 58,7.13.14.17.19 to orgizesthai, anger: 16,32; 20,9 Orpheus: 72,12 osphrêsis, smell: 101,27 ouranios, heavenly (being): 1,23; 3,30.35; 108,25; heavenly object: 106,27; celestial object: 35,22; celestial: 50,11; heavenly: 3,35; 13,15; 25,2; 32,12; 40,14; 49,32; 73,5.13; 74,1.32; 83,2; 85,22; 87,8; 94,10; of the heavens: 7,9; 41,1; 47,15; in the heavens: 13,7 ouranos, heavens: 36,24; 40,17.20.38; 48,10.14; 49,18.20; 50,3.10; 76,9 en ouranôi, heavenly: 7,2 ousia, essence: 1,5; 5,15.27; 6,21.26; 7,13; 8,24.25.31.32.36; 9,2.4.18.19.21.30; 10,17; 12,9; 14,16.31.32; 15,10.12.31.32.34.35;

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16,4; 17,21.31.33.37; 21,2.11; 34,11; 37,20.24; 38,23.24.29.30.31.32; 39,10.12.13.15; 40,26; 41,23.31.33; 42,24; 48,7.13.14.15.18.19.20; 49,21.22; 56,8; 64,16; 65,33; 66,6; 67,11; 76,22.24; 77,3.32; 79,17; 84,11.12.20; 86,21; 88,8; 90,24.26; 62,3.4; 96,19; 102,30; 109,21; 11,4.5.17; what is: 47,30; 93,29; 94,20; character: 4,13; reality: 7,36; 8,5.6.17.18; 11,22; 14,8; 16,2; the real: 47,30; status: 3,19; entity: 42,28; 68,19; kind of thing: 66,36; faculty: 27,23; substance: 2,12; 7,6.8; 10,33; 12,12; 13,11; 15,5.13; 16,8.9; 17,23; 22,16.18.19; 24,2.3.14; 26,1.19.24.25; 28,1; 30,13; 34,14; 40,9.27; 41,23; 46,11; 50,31.32.33; 53,17.20.22; 55,22; 56,29.35; 57,9; 59,17.18; 61,25; 67,5; 68,32; 69,11; 76,16.18; 81,4; 82,21.32; 83,6.7.8.10.16,19.20.22.23.30.31.32. 33.34; 84,2.24.25.31.33.34.36; 85,10.13.14.15.16; 86,7.8.11.20; 87,36.38.39; 88,1; 89,31.34; 92,11.15; 102,12.26.34; 103,36.37; 104,2.3.33; 107,25.30; 108,11; 114,7; 115,6.7.9; being: 5,9.14; 10,4; 17,7; 26,13; 28,2; 34,13; 40,7; 42,21; 67,28; 84,10; 88,10.20.22.38.39; 89,2.3.5.10.17.35; 94,19.37; 95,21; primary being: 92,20; form: 2,14; existence: 39,10; 84,4; 86,35; existent: 86,35; nature: 5,34 kat’ ousian, essential: 95,19; substantial: 114,22. ousiodês, essential: 3,9; 10,13; 110,29; substantial: 7,7; 22,27.32; 23,5; 34,30; 41,23; 53,1; 82,17; 114,13; 115,15; in substance: 38,31; in terms of substance: 22,15.21; is substance: 69,13; reality: 16,28; as being: 115,3; being: 19,27 ousioun, to give (substantial) existence: 13,13; 99,14; to give being: 86,25 ousiousthai, be essentially: 6,31; 34,12; to become substance: 84,4; be given existence: 70,33; be given being: 70,34; be realised: 11,5; be made existent: 83,32; to get being:

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68,21; 92,20; to have being: 59,33; 83,17; 89,23;104,34; be substance; 41,5; be essence: 57,1; be made substantial: 86,12; be given substantial existence: 13,12; to have essence: 84,17; 87,15 pakhumerês, has gross parts: 31,4; dense: 32,20.27 to pan, universe: 3,35; 4,2; 40,7; 41,5; 42,38; 48,19.28; 49,6.7; 76,6.10; 112,27 panspermia, elements: 26,3 parabolos, deviant: 74,26 paradeigma, paradigm: 12,34; example: 72,34; pattern: 48,16; illustration: 96,9; 97,18; 115,36 paradidonai, to give account: 4,35; 92,26; to set out: 87,25; 90,37; 96,4; to hand down: 1,8; 28,18; 32,5; 66,4; 71,17; 82,13; 101,21; 109,11; to lay down: 5,1; to state: 32,3; 84,25; to offer: 14,28; to recount: 68,4; be traditional: 9,23; 34,4.6; 66,10 paradokhê, transmission: 99,34 paradosis, tradition: 68,6 paragein, to derive: 98,21 paraginesthai, to come into: 63,11; to be found: 100,5 paragraphein, to insert: 2,4 parakolouthein, be accompanied: 17,13; to accompany: 77,35; be accompaniment: 18,23.26; 60,27 parakolouthêma, by-product: 45,39 ta parakeimena, adjacent material: 85,38 paralambanein, to include: 20,9; 21,27.30; 109,10; to involve: 20,15; to add: 99,2 parallatton, varying: 81,20 parallaxis, variation: 81,21 parallattesthai, to vary: 81,23.25 paralogon, paralogism: 74,25.29 paramuthia, explanation: 9,33 parapetasma, veil: 51,24 parapodizein, to impede: 60,21.23; 79,7; 88,14; to hamper: 61,2 paraskeuê, produces: 63,15 paraskeuesthai, to prepare: 92,33; 101,10; to make fit: 15,17 paratasis, duration: 47,14 kata paratasin, in extended form: 47,7

parathesis, comparison: 53,25; 104,29; contrast: 93,25; juxtaposition: 55,3.5 pareinai, be present: 5,21; 35,4.5; 37,12; 38,21; 41,24; 56,22; 31; 63,9.25; 73,6.8.11; 75,3; 76,33; 79,16.26; 84,13; 88,11.16.21.24; 89,5; 93,37; 101,36; 105,26 parempiptein, to come in: 54,19; to insert: 54,22; to get in: 54,24 parempodizein, to impede: 60,33 paresis, paralysis: 88,28 paruphistasthai, to occur: 35,24; be by concomitance: 50,22; be parasitic upon: 114,8 paristanai, to exhibit: 21,25; to present: 99,24; to bring out: 58,6 parousia, presence: 35,13; 40,26; 41,12.16; 56,23; 63,24; 64,18; 66,32; 73,27; 74,15; 87,4; 101,15 paskhein, be affected: 9,6; 16,12; 19,33; 23,22; 51,16; 55,5; 57,16.18; 60,15.17.19; 71,27; 104,27; be passive: 18,31,33; 36,26; 85,36; to undergo change: 36,28.35; 82,8.34; to suffer: 50,14; 77,30; 78,3.4; be in a state: 74,31; to undergo affection: 15,28 patêr, father: 36,15 pathainesthai, be affected: 89,35 pathêma, passion: 17,18.26; affection: 18,21; 19,36 pathêtikos, affective: 16,32; 54,4; 56,4; 76,25.36; 77,26. 35; 105,31; 106,9.27; affection: 77,26; passive: 17,4; 80,28; 100,13; 109,4; passible: 75,27; 102,13 pathêtikôs, passively: 36,29; 45,25; passive; 36,14 pathêtos, affected; 106,25.26 pathos, affection: 9,4.5.8.9; 15,24.27; 16,11; 17,8.9.11.12.25.27; 18,15.18.28.30; 19,2.5.12.13.16.17.20.29.32.40; 20,2.4.5.8.26; 21,25; 22,24.26.27; 23,13.18.19.24; 35,12; 38,33; 39,1.2; 45,22; 54,1.5; 57,6.26; 61,6.7.10; 65,36.38; 66,3.26; 69,23; 76,1; 77,6; 105,19.20; affected: 66,27; passive: 36,21 peisis, affection: 57,17 peithô, persuasion: 99,16

Greek-English Index peperasmenos, finite: 65,4; limited: 97,14.16 pephrontismenôs, carefully: 1,6 pephuken, has a nature: 17,31.32; 94,27.33; is its nature: 21,14; is naturally: 89,12; is of a nature to: 104,12 pephukôs, naturally: 35,25.32.33; by nature: 102,35 peras, boundary: 43,9; finite: 68,36; limit: 43,12.20; 44,6.7.13.19.37; 45,4.5; 46,20.25; 65,11; 100,21; 113,16.20 perasthai, to have terminal point: 46,28; be limit: 46,36; be finite: 47,19; be terminal point: 47,1 periekhein, to contain: 13,18.20; to surround: 26,8 to periekhon, environment: 75,20.22 periektikos, bounding: 44,36 periektikôs, bounding: 45,1 perigraphein, to circumscribe: 75,24 perigraphê, circumscribed: 83,25 perilambanein, to include: 16,35 perilêpsis, comprehension; 40,15; 70,14 perilêpton, encompassed: 107,6 peripherês, curved: 72,38 periphora, rotation: 46,8.12.17.18.23.26; 47,1.4.29; revolution: 47,12 perispoudaston, most important object of concern: 1,3; 6,20 perittos, odd, 28,26 pêrôma, defective: 110,13.26 pêrousthai, be defective: 110,20 phainomenon, visible: 66,8; 73,36; 74,4.6; apparent: 15,19 ta phainomena, phenomena: 7,2.4; 70,6 to phainomenon, appearance: 27,4 to phaneron, visible: 26,19 phanon, apparent: 30,14 phantasia, imagination: 5,7.12; 6,25; 9,11; 15,2.4.10.16.20.24.26.36; 17,1.2.3.4.6.14; 18,28; 27,20; 39,35; 42,1; 45,29.38; 54,6; 77,6.34.35; 79,37; 80,2; 102,7.9; 106,15.16.17; 108,28.29; picture: 41,1; image: 103,24 phantastikos, imaginative: 9,11;

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17,17; 75,17; 88,19; imagination: 88,13; of imagination: 27,3 phantastikôs, as imagination: 5,36 phantazesthai, to appear: 52,24; to imagine: 56,29 to phantazesthai, imagination: 103,24 pheresthai, be transported: 35,34; to go: 48,34; to travel: 112,32; to move: 50,3 pheuktos, avoided: 49,6 philein, to love: 61,5.11 philia, love: 25,10; 27,36; 56,4.7; 67,19 philosophein, to philosophise: 30,27; 40,4; be philosopher: 32,6 philosophia, philosophy: 1,24; 2,20.30.33; 3,8.15; 8,10; 19,9; 28,18 philosophos, philosopher: 1,15; 21,35; 40,20; 67,32; 82,1; 98,28; 99,24; philosophical: 108,34 prôtos; metaphysician: 23,11.12.16 philotheamôn, spectator: 9,19 phobeisthai, be afraid: 58,7 phobos, fear: 19,27.39; 23,24; 58,11 phora, travel: 2,25.26; 4,4; 58,10; 71,35; 112,24; 113,7; motion: 40,38; 41,2; 57,7; locomotion: 37,5; movement: 24,1; 41,1 phôs, light: 16,26; 23,21; 30,12; 45,40; 60,28; 66,31; 68,26 phôtistikon, illuminative power: 13,30 phronêsis, wisdom, 27,10.13.20.22 phthartos, perishable: 48,5; 59,34; 73,28.30; 82,34; 83,2.35.37; 101,22; 102,31; 107,24.26; 108,27.33; 110,37; perishes: 73,14; perishing: 89,32 phtheiresthai, to pass away: 6,11; be destroyed: 85,33; to cease to be: 39,14; to perish: 38,30; 48,4; 56,17.20.26; 59,21.22.28.29; 71,5; 93,10; 102,31; be damaged: 60,22.30 phthinein, to decay: 85,22; 86,6 phthisis, decay: 85,19.26; 99,14 phthora, perishes: 59,24; 105,30; decay: 85,32 phulattein, to avoid: 1,16 ta phuomena, plants: 99,13.16 phusikos, natural: 1,24; 2,1.20.29; 3,5.9.15.19.24.26.27; 8,6.7.12.15.16; 10,11; 20,30; 22,10.25; 23,18.22;

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25,21; 28,28; 47,16; 48,33; 50,4; 54,29; 57,11; 63,14; 67,22; 84,24.34; 85,3.5.7; 86,16.24.27.28; 87,1.18.21.24; 90,28; 92,1.27.30.32.33.36.37; 93,8.20; 95,17; 103,37; 110,11.16; 113,17.22.28; physical: 30,12 ho phusikos, natural scientist: 2,5.9; 21,4.9.11.24.26.27.28; 22,28; 23,4.15; 25,10; 32,19 ta phusika, natural phenomena: 40,4 phusikôs, naturally: 8,8; 15,18; natural: 8,32; 16,22; 57,7; in accordance with nature: 111,28 phusiologein, to give scientific account; 40,1 phusiologia, natural science: 3,7; 7,9; natural history: 12,31 phusiologos, natural scientist: 21,21; 30,29 phusis, nature: 2,16.28; 4,15; 8,13.30; 9,28; 15,16.20.22; 19,31; 22,20.27; 25,21; 26,35; 30,15.35; 31,16; 35,37; 45,2; 48,7.9.13.14.21; 49,28.30; 52,34; 54,36; 56,23; 63,14; 64,4; 71,26; 88,29.34; 89,16; 96,29.30.33,35; 98,20; 99,30; 104,37; 107,5.8.17.34; 111,8.22.26.27.28.29; 113,1.5.33; natural: 3,20.24; 11,20 phusei, naturally: 9,3; 35,17.19.21.31.32; 37,24; 41,16; 48,27; 71,6; 97,30; 110,2.21; by nature: 110,7 kata phusin, natural: 20,38.35,33.35; 48,2.3.5.10; 49,2; 56,6; 60,37; 61,4; 71,28; 112,7.9; naturally: 24,10.12; 35,24; 84,32; by nature: 88,33 para phusin, unnatural: 56,6; 60,21; 61,2; 88,15 phutikos, vegetative: 3,17; 5,37; 12,3.17; 14,5; 71,21.25; 77,28; 79,18.30.32.34; 80,11.13.15.24; 95,10; 98,35; 101,26; 103,21.25; 110,7.16; of plants: 91,10; of vegetation: 101,23 phuton, plant: 2,25; 12,33; 13,22; 24,24; 63,7.9; 71,35; 72,3.11; 79,11.17.26; 80,14.21.26.32; 86,1; 91,5.6.9.13; 101,25.34.36; 102,1.5; 103,21; 108,16; 110,26; 111,24; 112,25.28.29.33; 113,9 piptein, to fall: 83,26

pisteuein, to confirm: 1,16; 19,12; 84,33; 91,8; to provide evidence: 31,24; 46,4; to establish: 80,30; 103,17; 106,10; 114,15; to justify: 105,25 pistis, evidence: 19,32; belief: 90,17.18 pithanos, plausible: 52,22 planêton, planet: 37,26 planomenon, planet: 25,6. platos, breadth: 28,11; 29,17; width: 29,1.13 en platei, broadly: 3,7; widely: 3,16 Plato: 1,8.9; 10,33; 25,18; 26,22.26; 27,38; 28,4.6; 30,29; 32,8; 34,8; 39,8.37; 40,5.23; 50,2.5.6.29.30; 73,7.33; 74,22; 76,35; 85,23; 89,26; 98,7.10; 109,1 Platonic, 28,7; 49,8.11 plattein, to imagine: 79,1; 95,32; 96,11 plêgê, blow: 27,7.8; excitation: 80,28 plêrein, to fill: 67,3 plêrês, full: 73,19.20.24 plêrôma, complement: 76,18 plêsiazein, to approximate: 95,17 plêthos, manifold: 28,24; 47,22; 62,12; 63,32; 64,1.7; 65,4.28; 76,17; 86,31; plurality: 55,33 ploion, ship: 4,20; 116,1; boat: 34,24.26; 94,9; 96,2; 105,9 plôtêr, sailor: 4,20.31.32; 16,15.18; 94,9; 96,2.9; 105,9; boatman: 59,37.38 Plotinus, 6,13 Plutarch of Athens: 21,35; 50,37 pneuma, air-stream: 12,8; pneuma, 70,11; breath: 60,30; spirit: 20,16 poiein, to make: 12,10; 16,24; 68,7 and passim; to act: 51,12; 69,26.30.32; to create; 36,16 to poiein, action: 69,22 poiêsis, creation: 63,16 poiêtês, poet: 68,8 poiêtikos, efficient (cause): 58,2; 63,17; 70,30.32; 87,32; 103,35; 104,25; 112,5.6.12.37; producing: 105,20 poiêtikôs, as creativity, 109,34 poion, quality: 10,29.34; 15,3; 38,28; 69,11 kata poion, qualitative: 112,16; 114,13.21

Greek-English Index poiotês, quality; 35,10; 52,20; 53,29; 54,12; 75,25; 85,25; 105,29.32; 106,9 to poioun, efficient: 7,11; 20,36.37; 111,7 ta pollakhôs legomena, things equivocally named: 82,2.6.7 pollaplasiazein, to multiply: 63,6 poludunamos, many-powered: 76,16 polueidês, varied: 76,15 porisma, corollary: 15,14 poson, quantity: 10,29.35; 15,3; 38,28; 39,1; 64,7.9.10; 69,11; 71,22; 85,27; 115,10 kata poson, quantitative; 112,15; 114,13.22; as quantum: 115,6; in quantity: 115,8 posotês, quantity: 85,25 to pote on, sometimes exists: 7,11 pou, place: 39,1 pragma, thing: 1,3.18; 15,20; 29,34.35.36.37; 44,29; 54,18; 66,12; 67,14.28.37; 98,17.20.22; subject-matter: 1,14; the given: 97,12.17.26; product: 54,4; fact; 20,8; 21,13.16; 23,32; 49,12; 81,24; 98,9; 104,19; object: 21,33.35; 22,1 pragmateia, work: 1,7.10.21; 63,14; investigation: 3,27; subject-matter: 81,12; study: 6,19; discipline: 7,5 pragmateiôdês, practical: 15,21; important: 61,24; factual: 21,19; matter of fact: 28,14 pragmateuesthai, to be concerned: 4,7; to study: 4,12 to pragmateuesthai, enterprise: 10,3 praktikos, practical: 5,7; 9,12; 16,19; 18,31; 46,27; 48,32; 60,41; 61,12; 95,27; 102,15; 108,24; 109,3.5 praktos, practical: 46,26.28 praotês, mildness; 18,29; 54,5 prattein, be in practical matters: 95,25; be practical: 108,24 praxis, action: 46,29; 109,18.23; practice: 108,26 proagein, to include: 3,8; to proceed: 29,5; to lead: 40,18 proballesthai, to propose: 12,2; to frame: 98,18; to project: 67,33; 79,38; to modify: 58,32; to carry on: 60,35 problêma, problem: 5,25; 10,18; 14,27 problêtikê, projective: 88,39

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probolê, outgoing: 6,6; projection: 9,7; 16,23; 20,35; 21,3; 48,17; 95,1; emanation: 77,12.33 kata probolên, outwardly: 6,4 proêgeisthai, to precede: 8,35; to come first: 23,33 proêgoumenos, main: 82,11 proêgoumenôs, primary: 1,3; primarily: 4,12; 14,2; 73,36; 115,31; central: 73,4; in its proper state: 50,19; especially: 48,28; 81,12; truly; 50,20; predominantly: 37,10; pre-eminently: 49,2.4; 98,20.22; 99,10; 109,15; principally: 51,1 proerkhesthai, be in procession: 95,24 to proerkhesthai, procession: 66,3; emerging: 89,36 progenês, primitive: 71,4 proairesis, choice; 39,34 proüparkhein, to pre-exist: 76,28; 89,20 proüphistanai, be pre-existent: 63,12 proïenai, to proceed: 5,9.13; 6,4.13.14; 15,28; 17,7; 20,2; 26,19; 30,13; 62,12; 90,21; 95,1.2.4; 102,13; 106,26; 110,25; 113,20; be in procession: 90,8; 95,27; 104,26; to come from: 89,34; outwards: 88,14 to proïenai, procession: 34,15 prokeimenos, projected: 1,21; be before us: 3,23; 28,21; issue; 12,5 prokopê, advance: 89,14 prokoptein, to progress: 47,30 prolambanein, to take for granted: 2,4; to presuppose: 48,6; to take: 86,31; to predetermine: 36,28.34 proodos, procession: 16,26; 40,11; 89,39; 113,20; route: 46,35 prooimion, introduction: 6,19 prophanês, manifest: 1,22 prosagoreuein, to call: 15,23; 21,20; 23,14; 34,10.17; 40,20; 54,6; 59,37; 62,3; 68,13; 74,15.22; 89,30; 91,19; 98,12.35; 105,8; 108,29; 112,6; to refer to: 38,13; 111,17; to name; 98,22; to term: 24,32; to give name: 93,2 ta pros allêla, correlatives: 3,3 prosaptein, to add: 25,24 prosballein, to fix on: 43,4; to attend: 44,5

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prosdeisthai, to have need of: 16,22; 17,13 prosdiorizein, to add account of: 51,20 prosêkein, to belong to: 1,15; to fit for: 77,14; be appropriate: 57,32; 62,31; be needed: 59,14; be suitable: 102,22; to fit: 99,3 prosekhês, proximity: 7,9; closeness: 115,22; proximate: 25,14; 67,8; immediate; 40,26; 50,10; 53,23; 91,26; 94,24; close: 40,10 prosekhôs, immediately; 79,1; 94,6; 116,7 prosuphainesthai, be posterior: 76,37 prosistanai, be present: 58,2 proskrinein, to add: 86,3; to assimilate: 115,24 proslambanein, to acquire; 62,34; 64,18; 76,26 proslêpsis, grasp: 33,32 proskairos, temporary: 49,6 proskeisthai, to belong to; 67,4 prosphoron, contributes; 50,26 prospiptein, to fall into; 23,32; be added: 105,29; to impinge: 35,6 prosthêkê, addition: 49,36; 83,26; 115,10; increment: 99,17.20; qualification: 111,11.12 prosthesis, addition: 85,28; 112,23; 115,12 prostithenai, to add: 2,3; 10,16.27.31; 11,15; 15,9; 20,17; 22,5.8; 24,12; 52,32; 72,22; 77,27; 82,9.20; 85,27.34; 87,26.38; 91,24; 95,21; 105,23; 106,20; 109,20; 114,27; 115,7.8; to set out: 24,9; to propose: 14,3; to increase: 99,19; to put in: 8,17 protasis, premise, 42,6.7.13.14; 46,31.34; 48,2; 87,39 proteron, first: 1,24 and passim pseudein, to deceive: 27,3 pseudos, false: 35,22 to pseudos, falsehood: 29,7 psophos, noise: 105,35 psukhê, soul: 1,4.6.10.19.20.22.25; 2,6.7.9.11.14.16.19.24.27.28.29.31.32; 3,8.10.16.17.18.19.23.24.25.30.35; 4,2.6.9.12.16.17.19.26.28.34; 5,1.25.28.29.33.38; 6,9; 7,18.21.32;

8,1.9.11.15.16.18.35; 9,4.10.14.17. 31; 10,29; 11,9.14.28.35.37; 12,1.2.15.16.25.29.33; 13,25. 26.27.31; 14,3.8; 15,7.24.25.27.35; 16,37; 17,7.9.17.18.27; 18,18.20.31; 19,1.6.9.11.13.17.18.22.30; 20,1.30; 21,2; 23,18.19.31; 24,2.14.25.28.31.32.33.34; 25,1.2.7.9.10.13.20.22.27.30; 26,19.20.21.27.34.35.37; 27,5.9.14.16.19.24.27.30.33.36.39; 30,1.3.4.12.21.22.23.26.28.31; 31,1.3.6.9.10,12.13.22.23.24.28.30; 32,7.9.12.17.22.26.28.31; 33,6.7.34.36; 34,12.19.28.34; 35,4.12.13.15.20.23.26.27; 36,1.5.8.19.30.34; 37,3.5.10.14.16; 38,11.14.19.23.34; 39,2.3.8.13.15.20.22.32; 40,2.4.7.15. 18.22.24.29.32.38; 41,1.3.5.7.9.10.13.17.21.22.25.29; 42,2.20.34.35.38; 45,15.17.23.31.40; 47,17.20.24.34; 48,10. 11.15.16.19.25.26.27; 49,2.20.21.23.26.27.29.34.35.37; 50,1.4.5.25.26.30; 51,1.7.8.12.15.17.23.28.30; 52,1. 4.5.29.32.35; 53,12.17.26.32.33.35; 54,2.4; 55,6.25.29.32.33; 56,10.12.20.21.23.24.35.36; 57,4.12.30.35.36; 58,13. 15.18.20.21.22.27; 59,4.13.15.18.29.31.39; 60,41; 61,17. 20.22.23.35; 62,5,13.16.35.37; 63,3,5.8.10.11.20.22.25.26.31.33.37; 64,4.13.16.17.23.25.31.36.37; 65,5.6.8.15.16.24.26.33.36; 66,2.5.8.21; 67,20.30.37.38; 68,16. 27; 69,10.11; 70,20.21.23.35; 71,1.3.8.13.16.23.29.33; 72,3.5.6.7.10.17.19.33; 73,5.8.12.14.27.31.34.36; 74,3. 10.22.23,27.30.34.35; 75,5.7.9.10.12.14.18.19.21.31.33; 76,2.13.14.18.19.21.27; 77,5.17.24.28.31; 78,1.4.22.23.25; 79,7.18.26.28.29; 80,3.11.18.19.21.22.24; 81,6. 10.12.14.19; 82,11.14.16.18.19.22; 83,5.6.10.15.16.22; 84,9.11.15.17.20.31.33.37;

Greek-English Index 88,2.7.9.14.16.20.31; 89,3. 4.11.23.25.27.29.32; 90,10.30.39; 91,3.6.9.10.13.16.26.27.28.29; 92,11.17.22.24.25.31.34.37; 93,5.11.17.21.22,29; 94,4.17.23.26.28.35; 95,7.15.21.24.28; 96,2.17; 97,33; 98,1.2.8.11.35; 100,16.19.21.28.31.32; 101,1.2.3. 15.22.26.33.37; 102,3.4.12.22.25.30; 103,31.34.37; 104,2. 10.17.27.30.32.38; 105,2.3.5.6; 106,24.31; 107,2.3.18.19; 108,7.17; 109,9; 110,8; 111,1.3.10.13.14,17.22.24.28.29.32; 112,2.4.9.13.18.19.22.35.36; 113,12.14.24.26.29; 115,17. 21.27.32.35.36; 116,3.13 psukhein, to animate: 72,14.16; 75,9; 76,32 psukhikos, of the soul: 6,22; 8,25; 10,17; 15,31; 21,11; 34,9; 39,37; 40,17; 50,6; 52,21; 55,21; 61,25; 65,31; 67,22; 78,36; 80,34; 81,16; 86,20; 101,12; 113,23; psychic: 29,2; 30,19; 34,18; 64,30.31.35; 65,27; 90,29; 111,12; soul-: 38,29; 39,24.30 psukhôsis, ensoulment: 81,10 psukhros, cold, 72,32; 105,27; 106,12.13 ptêsis, flying: 4,23; 57,8 pur, fire: 13,30; 22,16; 25,25.28.30; 31,1.28; 36,7.22; 54,37; 57,7; 59,27; 65,22; 66,35; 68,11.12; 70,4.5; 73,27.32.36; 74,15.26.29; 85,29.33; 112,26.30; 113,1.5.8.9.10.13.15.22.24; 115,32 pureios, fiery: 113,7 Pythagoreans, 10,33; 26,15.17.18; 28,8; 30,29; 32,3; 40,3.5; 41,27; 51,23; 53,24; 68,5; 72,2; 85,1 rhein, to flow: 67,11; 73,9; to run: 68,14 rhêma, word: 27,11; 49,8.11; statement: 71,13 rhepein, to incline: 4,3; 5,20; 6,8; 19,18; 20,34; 59,21; 61,3; 74,28; 95,4 rhêton, statement: 1,18; 94,28; word: 28,21; text: 6,17; is said: 2,4; passage: 3,23 rhis, nose: 23,28.29; 79,15 rhopê, inclination: 5,19; 6,3.15; 9,7;

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17,12; 18,22; 25,5; 74,18; 76,8.26; 77,3.12; 87,17; 88,10.14; 90,15.20; 91,19; 105,9; tendency: 6,14; 49,9.12; 94,10; 103,14; influence: 19,3 rhusis, flow: 62,32.38 saphênizein, to clarify: 1,10; to explain: 1,12; to make clear: 10,27; 53,16; 93,26 sêmainein, to signify: 8,31; 28,34; 40,12; 62,10; 93,3; 102,18; to refer to: 100,27; 109,16; to have sense: 91,1; to indicate: 39,36; to ascribe: 104,31; to mean: 71,4; to inform: 80,7 sêmainomenon, sense: 39,17 sêmantikos, indicative: 26,26; means: 29,25; signifies: 40,37; 98,23; signifying: 99,8 sêmeion, point: 28,30; 40,10; 43,11.20.22; 44,37; 45,2.8.9; 62,17.32; 64,27.34; 65,9 semnos, exalted: 6,30 sidêron, iron: 31,23 simos, snub: 23,29 skepsis, enquiry: 50,35; 51,3; 97,27; investigation: 109,12.14 skhêma, shape: 2,8; 25,29; 26,1.7; 31,12; 41,32; 52,18.25; figure: 23.10; 106,32.36; 107,1.15; 108,6.12; form: 85,10 skhesis, interrelation: 23,10; relation: 53,16.17; connection: 60,31 skhetikos, relational: 53,23 skhisis, bisection: 40,13 skhizein, to split: 46,9 skia, shadow: 16,25; 45,39; 60,28; 77,37 skopein, to see: 23,5; to view: 42,13; to examine: 66,6 skopos, scope: 1,22; 3,29; 5,24; 6,19; 8,25; aim: 21,8; 34,4; 71,13; 82,12; goal: 61,25; concern: 73,4 skotos, dark: 68,25 smikrotês: smallness: 25,33 sôma, body: 3,9.10; 4,3.8.10.15.23.24; 5,3.5; 7,23; 9,7.9; 10,33; 11,7.8.11.36; 15,33; 16,1.2.5.7.11.14.26; 17,10.12.13.14.16.33; 18,7.10.12.19.22.23.25.32.33; 19,1. 7.10.14.16.22.33.37.40;

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20,2.9.10.12.13.15.20.26.34; 21,3.4.8.12.13.16.23; 22,26; 23,8.14.23; 24,3.31.33; 25,3.5.27; 26,3.12; 27,9; 28,1; 29,8; 30,17; 31,1.3.10.25.31; 32,11.16.17; 33,2.4; 34,34; 35,4; 36,9.33; 37,3.4.8.18.19;38,5.34; 39,6.20.25.27.33; 40,2.6.9.24.31; 41,4.9.11.19.20.24; 42,30.32; 43,2.3; 45,14.17.19.20.21.33; 48,22.24.27.30.33.35.36; 49,1.9.13.14.25.32.35.37; 50,32; 51,8.10.11.13.18.20.30.31; 52,11.13.32.35; 53,6.7.8.11.19.33; 54,5.11.13; 55,9.30; 56,30,36; 57,1.3.4.7.17.18.31; 59,5.6.9.11. 16.21; 60,4.5.6.9.14.25.28; 61,1.4.28.30; 62,1; 63,36; 64,20. 23.25.27.36.37; 65,3.6.8.12.14,19.22.23.27.28; 66,8.11.33.39; 67,38; 68,16; 70,7.27; 72,2.12.14; 73,6.9.11.17.26. 31.34.35; 74,16.19.27.33; 75,1.15.18.24; 76,9.18.30.32; 77,1.2.5.7.17.33; 78,22.23.27.29; 79,7.16; 80,5.12; 81,5.7; 83,9; 84,13.23.34; 85,3.12.13; 86,7.8.9.11.15.27.33.34; 87,2.3.4.6.8.13.15.17.18.19.20.27.36; 88,2.4.10.17.21; 89,12; 90,10.28.38; 91,4.17.18.29; 92,1.19.21.23.28.30.31.36.37; 93,10.13.31; 94,2.6.9.10.18.26.29.32.35; 95,2.4.17.25.28.31.33; 96,1.4.5; 100,3.31; 101,6.9.14.20.36; 102,25.26.31.33; 103,16.32.37; 104,12; 105,2.3.5.6.8.11.12.29; 106,24.25.27; 111,1.24; 112,12; 113,4.28.32; 115,21 sômation, corpuscle: 25,32; minute body: 63,29; little body: 64,2.6 sômatikos, bodily: 5,30; 11,26; 16,29; 19,5.12.33.34; 20,7; 25,21; 30,28; 33,9; 34,33; 35,30; 36,8; 37,17; 38,13.20; 39,16.18; 42,31; 43,2; 52,19; 53,25.26.28; 54,8.10.12; 55,22; 57,33; 58,4.9; 61,27; 64,24.30.33.34.35; 65,27; 66,15; 71,7; 78,4.36; 85,11; 95,16; 100,30; 101,9; 102,23; 103,12; corporeal: 57,13; of body: 42,11; 53,28; 54,12;

77,13; 101,13; in the body: 37,9; to body: 27,8 sômatikôs, in a bodily manner: 40,24 sômatoeidês, of bodily form: 5,7; 19,28; 40,31; 102,14; of bodily kind: 103,7; bodily character: 57,14; bodily: 19,28; 25,19.23.26; 30,18; 36,31; 45,29; 50,4; 58,17; corporeal: 33,9; 53,34; 54,12; 99,26; 100,13 sophistês, sophist: 32,23 sôstikos, preserves: 50,33; 115,17 sôtêria, preservation (of life): 20,28; 79,25 sôzein, to preserve: 72,23; 90,20; 115,10.24; 116,8.11; to retain: 63,27 sperma, seed: 26,2.4; 89,20.22; 94,4.5; sperm: 115,26 sphaira, sphere: 18,5.11; 26,13; 37,27; 40,14; 70,17; 85,34 sphairikos, of the sphere: 41,2; spherical: 26,7 sphairion, little sphere: 64,13.16 sphairon, heavenly sphere: 68,3 sphairoeidês, spherical: 25,28.29; 26,5.11; 31,11 sphairoeidôs, spherically: 99,18 sphallesthai, be deceived: 34,5 spoudê, concern: 1,20 stasimon, stopping point: 47,36 stasis, halt: 46,22.23.24; 47,38; absence of change: 93,23 en stasei, stationary: 46,20 sterein, to deprive: 86,9; 89,6 stereos, solid: 26,8.10; 28,32; 40,6.10; 106,24 sterêsis, deprivation: 50,20; privation: 59,24.25.26; 68,18.20.21.29; 72,25.26.27.32.35; 114,8.9 stigmê, point: 18,5; 43,24.28.30; 62,1.29.32.33.38; 63,35.36; 64,17.18.21.22.24.25.28.30.31. 32.36.37; 65,1.3.8.11 stoikheiôdês, constitutive: 29,34.36; by the elements: 72,19; in components: 81,8 stoikheion, element: 5,31.32; 22,17; 25,30.33; 26,16; 27,35; 28,2.4; 29,22.32; 31,25; 32,16.20.25.26; 40,26; 52,19; 55,9.28; 56,3; 66,12.14.19; 67,20.35.39.40; 68,3.31; 69,2.11; 70,21.22.24.34.35; 71,7.32; 72,17,21.22.32; 73,7.14; 75,26;

Greek-English Index 76,12; 81,9; 85,6; 99,30; 112,7.20.24; 113,4.7; 114,16 strephein, to turn: 50,8 sullambanein, to conjoin: 10,23; 100,14; to join together: 42,14; to include; 99,7; to comprehend: 47,9; 77,17; to bind up with: 59,7 sullêpsis, collection: 46,30 sullogismos, argument: 42,7.15; 46,32.33; 47,36; syllogism: 42,10; 97,9.10 sullogizesthai, to reason: 15,11; to draw inference: 32,27; to argue: 46,10; 53,7 sumbainein, to occur: 18,21; to arise: 65,17; to result: 55,29; to happen: 102,5; be result: 64,34; 65,13; 70,14; be attribute: 65,34 sumbainon, consequential attribute: 14,33 sumballesthai, to contribute: 7,36; 8,10; 24,11; 106,1 sumbebêkos, attribute: 2,11; 6,25; 8,36; 9,4.9; 14,30.31; 15,1.6.11.17; 22,18.19.22.28; 23,3.7; 24,13; 56,29; 86,11; accidental attribute: 68,33; 89,9; 108,13; accidentally: 85,9; 115,2 kata sumbebêkos, indirectly: 105,33.34.35; as accident: 25,5; contingently: 65,36; 114,35; as contingent: 80,4; incidentally: 34,23; 35,16; 37,15.21.22.25.28.32; 38,24.29.31.34; 49,24.26; incidental: 34,28 sumbolikos, symbolically: 40,3 sumbolon, symbol: 40,16 summetria, proportion: 53,29; 55,1 summetros, commensurate: 20,4; on a level with: 30,14; suited: 50,23.25; has the same extent: 99,27 summetrôs, equivalent: 53,1; in correspondence: 108,16; in proportion: 53,8; proportionally: 53,9 summignusthai, to intermingle with: 74,16 sumperainein, to sum up: 3,22; to be conclusion: 3,27; to draw conclusion: 47,26; to conclude; 51,8; 76,4; 92,22; 108,19; 109,8; to close: 42,10 sumperasma, conclusion:

239

46,31.32.33; 92,13; 94,17; 97,9.11. 17.22.25 sumphônia, consonance: 40,35; consistency: 1,15 sumphônos, with unanimity: 1,9; harmonised: 52,13 sumphtheireisthai, to perish with: 60,9.10.13.14 sumphthinein, to decay with: 60,11.12 sumphuein, to fuse together/with: 76,25.27; 78,20.30; 80,14.31; 87,4; 108,18 sumphuôs, internally: 16,1; in a fused manner: 87,31; is part; 52,39; is nature; 59,26.27; is part of something’s natural development: 68,20; is bound up with: 99,9 sumphusis, fusion: 53,1; 76,29; 77,12.13; 78,3; 79,33 sumplekein, to involve; 16,20; 18,3; to link with: 109,4; to combine: 65,32; to enmesh: 57,33; 58,1; 73,7; 74,32; to knit together: 30,24 to sumplekomenon, complex: 26,36 sumpeplegmenos, enmeshed: 58,4 sumplêrôsis, interconnection: 40,28; composition: 74,5 sumplêrein, to compound: 30,26; to compose: 74,4.6; 80,9; to comprise: 56,16; to make up: 70,18; 74,17; 102,26; to complete: 27,33; to consist of: 61,33 sumplokê, nexus: 18,2; connection: 40,24; involvement: 102,13; 103,14; interweaving: 49,9 sumprattein, be involvement: 18,23 sumptussein, to compress: 42,6; 44,34; to enfold in itself: 48,34 sunagein, to concentrate: 5,15; to put together: 10,24; to bring together: 112,34; to connect; 40,34 sunagomenon, conclusion: 53,10 sunagôgê, collection: 11,33; 113,21; constituents; 40,36; compression: 26,8.9; unification: 30,19; addition: 28,27 sunairein, 6,2; 16,28; 21,15; 44,29; to gather: 77,3; to connect: 46,34; to link: 29,3; to include: 48,18; to conjoin: 44,17; to merge: 84,21; to

240

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draw together; 42,14; 60,3; to bring together: 88,8; to comprehend: 44,14 sunairesis, concentration: 6,6; connection: 47,23.25 sunaisthêsis, awareness: 7,20; consciousness: 106,17 sunaitios, contributory cause: 112,21; 113,3.6.12; 115,32 sunamphoteron, compound: 58,16; combination: 66,25; both in combination: 77,5; both together: 100,23 sunaphê, contact; 47,21; is conjoined: 61,16; fusion: 99,33; connection: 76,9; attachment: 79,14; linkage: 84,21 sunapoleipein, to give out too: 93,36 sunartan, to attach: 79,8; to link: 90,6 sunartêsis, attachment: 79,8 sunathroizein, to collect: 43,29 sunauxanesthai, to increase with: 60,11 sundesmos, connection: 97,6; conjunction: 104,18 sundiatithesthai, be similarly disposed: 60,27 sundromê, concurrence: 101,31 sundromos, concurrent: 15,30.31 sunekheia, continuity: 42,22.30; 43,5; 45,34; 47,20; 64,27; 65,10; 110,37 kata sunekheian, continuously: 34,16; 40,40; 41,4; 62,12; 88,16.18.24; continuous: 39,6.38; 46,20; 61,26; 77,13 sunekhein, to maintain: 5,2; to preserve: 67,27; to hold together: 41,24; 78,22.23.24.29.31; 83,10; 84,6; 85,11; 95,31; 101,19; to sustain: 73,20; 77,2; 79,1.2.6 to sunekhesthai, persistence: 70,33.34. sunekhês, continuous: 7,26; 31,32; 40,19; 41,11.30; 42,16.20.26.28.33; 43,5; 50,10.15; 54,15.16; 61,19; 64,28; 65,22; 79,23 sunekhizein, to make continuous: 98,34 to sunekhon, continuity: 33,11; holds together: 78,20.21 sunekteinesthai, be extended together with: 78,34. sunektikos, sustaining: 16,1; 50,33;

sustains: 79,3; preserves: 56,31; 67,26; 112,35; preservative: 78,35.36.37; 79,1 suneptugmenos, conjoined: 42,9 sunergein, be partner: 16,25; be co-agent: 43,3; be co-active: 45,38 sunergon, co-active: 45,35; aid: 66,27; 71,23; co-operation: 77,7 sunesis, insight: 9,24 sunêtheia, use: 50,16; habitual use: 98,10 sunêthês, common: 8,30; customary: 34,5; 40,22 sunethizesthai, to become accustomed: 106,18 to sunethizesthai, accustomisation; 108,30 sungeneia, kinship: 66,21.40; 67,16; 69,5; 71,10; 72,23 sungenês, akin: 8,33; 67,14.22.28; allied: 31,5; of the same kind: 54,19.21 sunginesthai, to consort with: 60,8.10.12.14 sungramma, writing: 1,19; written work: 31,21 sunarmozein, to attach to: 29,19; to harmonise: 55,4; to fit: 77,21 sunaptesthai, be in contact with: 5,16; be fused with: 89,3; 91,27; 99,33; be connected: 40,40; 51,11; to attach itself to: 86,22; be bonded: 52,40; be joined together: 77,17; be attached: 67,11 sunuphainein, to wave together; 78,5 sunuparkhein, be present together: 79,28; 90,3; be associated: 16,10; be co-present: 103,16 sunuphistanai, to exhibit also: 50,19 sunistanai, to compose: 26,2; 66,20; to constitute: 66,28; 111,27; to join together: 54,21; to conjoin: 102,14; to compound: 30,28; to consist of: 102,16 sunkatateinesthai, to tend downwards with: 74,3 sunkatathesis, assent: 90,17 sunkatatithesthai, to assent: 90,18 sunkeisthai, to consist in/of: 53,6.8.10; be composed of: 64,28 ta sunkeimena, constituent parts: 55,15

Greek-English Index sunkhôrein, to concede: 34,28; 53,7; 62,37; to accept: 77,18; to allow: 62,30; to admit: 72,6 sunkineisthai, be excited together: 5,13 sunkrinein, to conjoin: 38,15; to mix together: 45,22 sunneusis, convergence: 103,4 sunokhê, preservation: 67,27 sunolon, whole: 68,2 sunônumos, in the same sense: 91,20; 96,26; univocally: 107,23; univocal: 108,2 sunônumôs, univocally: 69,2.7; 71,14; 82,3.25; 98,4; 107,20; has a common feature: 81,15; univocal: 92,14; 107,4.34 sunousiousthai, be part of essence: 49,33; 87,9; to have together with its being: 83,36 suntattein, to class with: 32,19; to join together: 61,3; to add to: 62,26; to regulate: 91,14 suntaxis, co-ordination: 60,31; is co-ordinated: 60,27 sunteinein, to focus the attention to: 6,20 suntelein, to contribute, 1,25; 7,34; 8,7; 24,6; 56,22; 74,5; 76,31; 106,4; 110,15.18.23; 111,6 sunthesis, composition: 5,31; 68,1.4; 73,34.35; construction: 68,4; joining together: 52,17.19; fitting together: 54,18.19.25.27.28.29.33; 55,3.7.13.16.17.20.22; synthesis: 53,5.13.15.16 sunthetos, composite: 7,19.20; 9,13; 11,6; 12,6; 13,13; 20,7; 22,2.16.17; 23,20.21; 27,7; 35,14; 54,11; 55,9; 66,24.35; 67,40; 68,2.17; 70,18.31; 73,26; 74,16.27; 76,7; 77,39; 78,2.6; 83,27; 84,5.30; 86,14; 90,27; 91,32.33; 92,4; 94,24; 96,16.17; 102,27; 103,5; 104,8.9; 111,9.16; compound: 26,2; 34,34; 70,16.28; 76,16; 83,16.18; composed: 26,27; 86,7 sunthetôs, in composition: 92,7 suntithenai, to put together: 42,9; to join: 52,10; to compound: 76,26; to connect: 55,4 suntrekhein, to converge: 69,31;

241

70,2.5; to run in harness with: 87,27; 90,38; to run parallel: 103,35 sustasis, constitution: 40,26; 54,10; 80,3; composition: 74,1 sustatikos, constitutive: 40,28; 83,1.3.5; 107,27.30; constitutes: 107,23 sustoikhia, list: 32,4 sustoikhos, listed with: 18,30; at the same level: 82,23.27.30; component: 29,23; classification: 33,31; class: 33,27 ta kath’ hauta, essential attributes: 8,35 tarakhê, disturbance; 60,34 tarattein, to disturb: 61,2.3 tattein, to assign: 6,23; to classify: 84,31; to include: 70,10; 115,34 tautomaton, automatism: 91,10 tauton, Identity: 28,3; same: 40,27 and passim tautotês, similarity: 35,7; identity; 67,18; 69,6; 78,7; 84,19 taxis, position, 40,30; 76,8 teinein, to tend: 39,18; 87,17; to set: 56,13; to have an aim: 62,30; to extend: 91,17 tekhnê, craft: 52,39; 92,34 tekhnêton, artefact: 22,8; 85,1.5; crafted: 92,33.35; manufactured: 93,20 tekhnitês, specialist, 23,1.2.6 tekhnousthai, be instrumental: 79,36 tekmairesthai, to evidence: 60,3; to judge: 101,29; to offer as evidence: 113,6 teleios, complete: 5,11; 20,26; 21,30; 26,25; 63,17.24; 83,32; 88,11; 89,14.16.18.19.20.21.24.26.34; 91,3; 98,28; 99,2; 101,21; advanced; 99,11; perfect: 11,17; 52,23; 63,13; 87,26; 96,28.31; 104,9.25; 109,27; 110,12.34; 111,11.27; 112,1; fully: 98,27 to teleion, completeness: 101,1 teleiôs, completely: 98,19 teleiôs einai, completeness: 83,38; perfection: 111,8 teleiôsis, completion: 69,31; 90,19 teleiotês, perfection: 6,34; 38,4; 50,31; 53,28.31; 72,28; 104,8.26.36; 110,33; 111,27; is perfect: 94,12; completion:

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Greek-English Index

8,20; 11,4; 83,31; 84,5.6.29; 89,1.32; 105,4 teleioun, to bring to completion, 1,10; to make complete: 5,10; 98,4; to complete: 13,13; 69,25; 86,26; 87,2; 114,29; be complete; 47,32 teleôs, completely: 62,7 telikos, final: 20,27; 70,30; 103,35; 111,8; 112,6 telos, goal: 2,14; 7,11; 20,3; 38,6; conclusion: 46,35; terminal point: 46,32; end: 22,8; 25,4; 46,28; 100,32; 110,33; 111,18.21.23.29.30.33; finally: 42,10 en telei, perfect: 50,11 tetagmenôs, in an orderly way: 19,31 ta tethneôta, the dead, 37,13; 93,12 tetras, tetrad: 28,26.32; 29,1.8.11.33 Thales: 31,20.21; 32,16; 73,19.22 to tharrein, rejoicing: 16,33 tharros, confidence: 16,11 thateron, Difference: 28,3; other: 40,27 and passim thaumazein, to wonder: 7,25 thaumasia, marvellous: 7,17 thaumastos, remarkable: 27,12 thea, sight: 5,4; view: 14,13; 42,5 theasthai, to see: 42,9 theatos, revealed: 23,16 theios, divine: 47,17.24.33; 48,19; 61,14; 82,33; 94,10; 106,30; 110,18.19.29 to theion, divinity: 110,27 thelein, to wish: 21,25 themis, lawful: 90,25 theôrein, to consider: 2,5; to study: 2,22.30; 3,4; 14,4.30; 18,15; 20,30; 21,3.7; 24,19; 82,1; to observe: 4,36; 67,33; 89,19; to see: 68,26; to display: 82,19; to look at: 93,27; to view: 44,30; 61,33; 81,27; 98,1; to contemplate: 88,6; 95,25; to discuss: 21,5; to regard: 23,2 to theôrein, contemplation: 60,17; exercise of scientific knowledge: 84,8 theôrêma, insight: 1,8; 52,3 theôrêtikos, scientist: 2,15; contemplates: 3,1; 27,22; 60,1; 67,16; 95,33; study: 7,8; 8,27; 20,35; studies: 8,6; 16,22; surveys: 50,22; of contemplation: 60,32; 61,13; 102,10; theoretical: 5,8; 15,5; 46,27;

48,32; 54,7; 101,8.20; 102,20; 108,31.32; 109,2.5; contemplative: 9,10; 61,1; 67,10; 77,8; 88,32.36; 95,26; 96,11; 102,17.22; 103,13 theôrêtos, theoretical: 46,27 theôria, study: 1,25; 2,23; 3,5; 6,21; 8,9.27; 12,33; 14,31; 15,10; 16,24; 19,26; 23,33; 47,3; 81,11; 92,26; 109,11; insight: 3,32; examination: 97,33; consideration: 104,4; awareness: 43,29; perception: 98,5; vision: 45,30; view: 81,23; theorising: 5,23; theory: 101,21; 106,35; contemplation: 5,8; 6,32; 44,21; 60,26.28; 88,23.25; 102,24.33; 103,1 tên theôrian poiein, contemplation: 43,21 theos, god: 7,12; 13,6.7; 50,27; 51,2; 68,2; 70,17; 73,19.20.24; 74,23; 88,34 thermantikos, productive of warmth: 44,25; warmth: 66,35 thermos, hot: 25,25; 105,27; warm: 106,12.14; 112,31 to thermon, heat: 69,18; 72,32.33; 115,34; 116,7.13; warmth: 115,31; 116,1.6 thesis, arrangement: 54,15.18; position: 54,18.25.27.29.30; 61,32; 62,33.34.36; 64,17.18.19.24; 79,14; 97,13; order of terms: 97,10 thinganein, to contact: 44,4 thixis, contact: 44,24 thnêtoeidês, mortal: 74,3 thnêtoeidôs, mortal: 87,27 thnêtos, mortal: 3,30; 4,17.33; 17,16; 25,3; 41,13; 42,9; 73,4; 74,19; 76,36; 80,1; 81,12.14; 82,11.22; 84,17; 85,21; 86,17; 87,3.12; 88,7.38; 89,4.11; 90,29.35; 94,28; 95,7; 97,15; 99,12.26; 100,2.5; 103,32; 110,8.17; 112,11; 115,1 to thnêton, mortality; 90,22 threpsis, nutrition: 114,1; nourishment: 109,37 threptikos, nutritive: 14,6; 99,12; 105,17; 108,13.15.18; 109,32; 113,26.28.30.34; 116,2.4; of nutrition: 100,19; 101,24; nutrition: 78,11; 79,18; nurtures; 104,26; nourishes: 79,35; of nourishment: 115,17; vegetative: 79,37

Greek-English Index threptikôs, by nutrition: 51,18 thumeisthai, be angry: 76,20 thumoeidôs, spiritedly: 5,35 thumos, anger: 18,29; 19,27; 23,24.28; 75,17; 101,7; spirit: 105,23 thuris, window: 25,32 timios, precious: 6,18.22.28.29.30.32.37; 7,1.32; estimable: 106,23.25.30 tithenai, to count: 3,8; to take: 4,8; to suppose: 65,14; to posit: 6,12; 10,35; 56,8; to propose: 24,7 and passim tode ti, particular thing: 83,18.19; ‘this such’: 83,24.29.33 to einai, existence: 12,12; 66,7; 68,34; 71,6; 83,38; 91,32; 110,16; existing: 110,8; being: 14,30.34; 26,29; 39,14; 47,16; 67,6; 70,28.33; 84,5; 85,5; 92,2; 111,5.9.10.11.12 to aei einai, everlastingness: 110,7; living forever: 110,19 to eph’ heautou on, which is in its power: 78,13 to heautou on, self-contained: 68,33; 86,26; 103,31; 104,20; self-possessing: 86,18 to heteron, diversity; 14,11 to hou heneka, final cause: 8,20; for the sake of which: 22,8; 110,31.33; 111,19.21.23.31; what all else is for: 38,6 to huph’ hou, efficient cause: 20,25; 91,34; efficient causality; 71,25; by the agency of which: 49,31; 85,16.17; 87,32; causes: 58,3.5 to kath’ ho, in accordance with which: 49,30; 70,32; 71,26; 87,32; 91,33; 112,36 tomê, section: 63,6 to ontôs on, truly being; 6,28 to prôtôs on, primary reality; 108,11 to pros ti antikeimenon, in a reciprocal relationship: 114,37 topikos, of place: 36,19.26; 37,9,11; 39,21; 41,20; 89,7; 112,18; spatial: 41,16 topikê, locomotion: 25,26 topikôs, spatially: 36,18; of change of place: 36,22; in place: 32,25; 37,13; spatial: 36,20; 40,25; 41,17; of place: 39,33 topos, place: 2,32; 5,22; 34,26.33;

243

35,1.2.15.16.18.34; 39,2; 41,11.18; 64,33; 71,18.20.22.36; 72,4; 77,27; 99,11; 101,5; 106,20; 112,3.17; part: 101,6 kata topon, by locomotion: 51,19; local: 103,27 topôi, spatially: 103,15 to ti ên einai, essence: 9,35; 14,3; what it is to be: 92,12.22.27; 93,4; 109,14.17.25; what makes it what it is: 93,22 to ti esti, what it is: 9,32; 10,25; 14,25.29; 24,12; 109,16. 31; definition: 10,7; 15,8.11.13 to toiade einai, quality: 12,12 to toionde, being such and such: 68,37; kind: 83,39 to pros ti, category of relation: 114,1 to tosonde, being so much: 68,36 trephein, to nourish.14,18; 78,9; 79,20; 86,2.6; 109,36; 112,15.19.22; 113,7.8.9.10.13; 114,6.7.8.9.10.11.15.17.18.20. 23.24.25.28.30.31.36.37; 115,1.3.6.8.9.16.21.23.29. 30.31.33.34.35; 116,5.7.10.12; to rear: 99,26; to nurture: 100,5; to feed: 85,22.39; 105,27; 114,1.3; 115,24; 116,1 to trephein, nutrition: 71,28 trias, triad: 28,25.32; 29,1.6.10.33 trigônon, triangle: 14,33; 107,1.2; triangularity; 107,15 tripous, stool: 2,17 tropê, modification; 18,32.35; 19,13; change: 19,28; variation: 66,31 trophê, food: 79,38; 86,2; 105.24.25; 106,11; 109,33; 110,11; 113,27.32.35; 116,4; nutrition: 80,12; 99,14; nourishment: 85,19.25.31; 91,12; 106,1.5.11; 110,15.16; 112,19.21; 113,2.4.8.12; 114,4.5.14.27.34; 115,18.20.30.31.32; 116,9 trophimos, nourishing: 105,36; 106,1.3.9 tropos, way: 3,21; 16,19; 17.27; 19,20; 24,4; 29,25; 39,15; 40,1; 57,34; 66,4; 68,28; 74,13; 79,34; 80,7; 87,9.10; 94,32.34.36; 95,26; 104,23; method: 5,25; 9,37; 97,29.32; 109,10; kind: 66,7; manner: 6,11; 10,1.6; mode:

244

Greek-English Index

40,33; procedure: 15,7; presentation: 66,10; character: 21,12 tupos, outline: 96,16.17; 97,31; 98,1 Xenocrates, 10,34; 30,4.20; 61,23.24; 62,3; 66,2 xêros, dry: 31,28; 68,11; 69,18; 105,27; 106,4.12.14 xêrotês, dryness: 58,12 xulon, wood: 2,17; 54,23.24; 85,2.10; 115,19; timber: 92,32. xusma, mote: 25,33; 26,16 zên, to live: 4,24; 7,24; 11,11; 15,6; 16,1.3.8; 17,22; 18,15; 20,12.13.20.26; 22,16; 31,31; 37,12; 38,4; 45,14.17; 48,17; 49,32; 51,28.29; 53,8.11; 54,13; 56,36; 57,4.13.31; 59,6.7.8.30; 60,5; 63,18; 65,24; 70,34; 72,16; 74,7; 75,2; 79,11; 81,5; 83,20; 84,33; 85,10.13.15.17.21; 86,7; 87,2.10.18.20; 88,4; 90,31; 92,31; 94,4.9; 98,35; 99,15.29; 102,6; 104,5.6.7.17.27.30.34.36; 110,32; 111,1.3.10; 112,13.14; 116,6; be alive: 11,7; 56,37; 74,29; 75,3.7; 86,4; 87,3; 88,3; 91,8.26; 93,13; 94,3; 97,34; 98,6.15.32.37; 99,1.2.4.6.13.16.22; 102,34; 103,28.29; be animate: 20,15; 73,12; to have life: 87,27; 90,32 to zên, life: 26,4.5.10; 78,10.12; 83,15; 85,20; 97,28; 100,6.8.9.10; 104,37; 110,9; 111,12.13; 112,1.2 to zeon, effervescence: 98,14 zesis, effervescence; 30,16 zêtein, to investigate: 1,14; 2,2; 3,22; 5,25; 14,4; 84,3; to consider: 1,27; to look for: 96,15; to ask: 22,9; to deal with: 10,18; to seek: 9,21.36; 10,8; 82,24; 108,2; to enquire: 9,32; 16,4; 74,11.13; 77,28; 81,12; 88,16; 91,29; be under examination: 11,31 zêtêma, inquiry: 9,31 zêtêsis, inquiry: 12,2.5; 24,9; search: 23,33 zêtoumenon, problem: 76,14 zôê, life: 4,3.10.19.24; 5,8.18.21; 9,7.29; 12,25.32; 13,32; 14,9; 16,3.4.6; 18,17.24.26.29; 19,15; 20,13.18.23; 21,17.22.24; 22,16; 23,14.23; 24,31.33; 26,12; 27,4; 30,17; 34,9; 35,5; 36,3; 39,39;

40,17.18.31; 41,15.22.24; 45,18.20. 31; 48,25.36; 49,1.16.33; 50,6.12; 51,15.16.21.26.30; 52,1.13.14.21.27; 53,19.20.34; 54,11.13; 56,3.31; 57,25.32; 58,3; 59,7.33.35; 61,10; 63,14.27; 66,16.33; 71,35; 72,12; 74,23; 75,23; 76,36.37; 74,4.12.19; 78,5.9.20.32; 79.8.15.22.27.30.33; 80,1.22.30; 81,16; 83,6.14.17.19.21; 85,7.9.11.15.19.21.24; 86,5.8.9.20; 87,1.5.8.9.16.19.29.30; 88,2; 90,10.11.14.29.31.37.39; 91,2.7.25.27; 92,24.27.37; 93,5.21; 94,5.6.7; 95,2.10; 96,4; 97,14.16; 98,14.29; 99,2.7.9.15.25.27; 100,3.10.19.29; 101,6.9.10; 102,6.13.15.23.34; 103,7.17.20.25.26; 104,33; 105,13; 106,11; 109,5; 110,10.16; 111,9; 112,23; 114,23.32; 116,2.5; living (thing): 28,27; 34,12; power: 27,8 kata tên zôên, in a vital manner: 35,27 zôion, animal: 2,3.6.7.10.14.27.30; 3,10.29; 4,25.27.28.33; 5,22.33.39; 8,2.25.27; 9,13; 12,18.32; 13,30; 14,1; 18,17; 19,12.29; 28,10; 61,9.10; 63,16.18; 66,9; 71,23; 72,12; 75,3.21.26; 78,12.13; 79,11; 80,15; 93,12; 99,1.3; 100,9.11; 101,24; 102,8; 103,21; 105,17.25.26.28; 106,16.30; 108,16; 110,10.14; animality: 2,30; living thing: 7,9; 13,2.4.7; 23,19.22; 24,29; 27,18; 31,16; 35,1.12.20.24; 37,5; 39,3.28.31.32.36; 42,19; 47,31; 52,35; 53,7.20.33; 54,10; 55,15; 56,11.16; 58,9.15.31; 59,3.14; 70,35; 71,2; 73,5.12.27.32.35; 74,7. 10.15.20.26.27.34.35; 76,7.14.26.29; 77,18; 79,29; 80,3; 81,12.14; 82,11.22.35; 83,1.2.3.7.8.9.16.19.21; 84,17; 85,12; 86,18; 87,12.33; 88,7.38; 89,4.11.21.22; 93,28.29; 94,20.23; 95,15; 98,28.32.35; 99,11; 100,7.15.29; 103,19.37; 104,1; 106,27; 107,20.22.24.25; 109,17.20; 110,12.26; 111,22.24.28.30; 112,7.9.15.24.27.28 zôiopoion, gives life: 89,5 zôopoieisthai, to bring to life; 63,21 zôopoiia, creation of life: 74,19

Greek-English Index zôoun, to animate: 63,10; 72,3; 73,8.27.32; 85,17; to give life: 63,10; 73,16; 74,5; 75,8.14.18; 87,17.31; 94,9; to vivify: 76,10 zôtikos, vital: 4,15.23; 5,29.34; 16,8; 17,22; 19,2.4.28; 20,6.9.12; 21,15; 30,16; 37,11; 41,16; 57,14.15.18.19; 58,9; 60,6; 66,40; 78,3; 79,14; 88,27.29; 93,19; 99,10; 102,14; 108,21; 109,19; 114,29; 115,18; life-giving: 86,29.30; 103,32; 104,3;

245

105,10.15; 108,21; 109,7; vitality: 54,9; 55,6; of life: 83,13; living: 92,29; 93,6.17.34 zôtikôs, vitally: 16,14; 18,30; 36,30; 41,17; 45,13.18; 51,18.28.31; 52,2; 56,37; 57,5.12; 58,19; 59,13; 62,25; 86,5; 87,30; 88,16.17; 90,33.35; 91,2; 92,29; 93,9.21; 110,27; living; 24,28; 55,22; life-giving: 83,20; 86,30; in a living way: 24,30

Subject Index

activity, activities of being as opposed to activities extending outwards, 19,27 as opposed to change, 57,19 divisible, 33,10 separate, 102,33 affective and non-affective activities, 54,4-7 vital, 16,8; 20,6 unchanging and intellective activities, 9,6; 15,29 actuality, prior actuality as contrasted to secondary actuality, 94,18 vital, 105,9 affection, and attributes, 9,4 kinds of, 9,9-14 such as anger and fear, 23,18-30 affective paralleled with non-rational of the body, 18,20-20,4 animate, opposed to physical movement, 57,7 monad, 62,21-25 body containing monads and points, 64,20-65,12 (Democritus’ theory), 65,13-66,3 (in a) broad sense (or horizontal differences) and in depth (or vertical differences), 1,16-17; 3,7 cause, material, 25,11-14; 103,34 formal, 4,14; 25,11; 87,14-32; 103,35 final, 20,27; 70,30; 103,35 constitutive or giving level of reality, 68,22; 70,31 change, not activity, 57,19 different from changing, 57,28 condition which characterises the tool, 52,37

continuity, our logical substance extends into infinity, 42,22 definition, revealing existence, 14,30 of affections, 20,26 of the soul, 20,26 Xenocrates’ definition of the soul, 92,36-7 desire, affective as opposed to rational, 77,26 determination, every form is determination, 8,20 substantial, 3,9 formal, 42,3 indivisible, 50,7 disposition, determining, 9,36; 10,16 dispositional actuality as opposed to activity arising from disposition, 84,18 scientific, 9,28; 35,10; 88,22; 89,15 elements, are given existence and unity, 70,34 generative elements of things, 28,2 idea-numbers as elements, 29,32-4 bodily elements, 52,9 enmattered accounts/principles, 20,5; 22,15-27 eternal being shares in reasoning, 108,24 evolution/development, rational, 100,22; 113,19 and relaxation of the rational substance, 42,30 food/nourishment, general account of it, 114,5-116,13 form, animate, 114,22 immaterial, 84,14; 103,31 vital, 21,15; 103,32; 104,3

248

Subject Index

first forms, 67,10 imagination, as affective and pictorial intellect, 17,15 indeterminate and articulated, 102,8-9; 103,24 connected to memory, 106,18; 108,29 infinity, in time, 47,8-9 and quantity, 68,35-7 instrument, body as instrument for the soul, 56,36; 70,36; 81,5 intellect, the intellect which is above the soul, 42,34; 47,20; 86,28 distinguished from thought, 61,7-11 intellection, activity of the intellect, 41,33 theoretical and practical, 46,27 referring to imagination, 39,35 irradiation, as kinship in the matter, 67,24-5 of the form, 72,28-9 knowledge/cognition, distinguished from contemplation, 8,29 bodily knowledge, 45,29 non-rational, 99,8 practical, 9,12 rational and dialectical, 21,19 final (= sensation), 44,34 (scientific) knowledge, concerning the soul, 3,18 one of the non-affective activities of the soul, 54,6-7 life, its different forms, 51,16-21; 77,18 moving, 66,16 developed lives, 39,39 limit, intellectual and sensitive, 100,20 and point, 43,9-20; 44,8-13 logical soul is everlasting, 102,21-103,4 matter, physical, 23,18-22 vital, 83,13 not a particular thing, 83,29-39 movement of the celestial bodies, 49,17-30 nature, not substance, 8,30 and soul, 4,15; 24,27; 52,34; 71,20 formal principle, 49,30

number, soul as self-moving number (Xenocrates’ theory), 10,35 ff.; 30,4 ff.; 62,3 ff.; 66,2 formal number, 28,29; 29,36 harmonic, 40,32 power and principle, 99,24 principle, material, 66,14.24 formal, 28,24; 29,2; 66,14.23 preservative and unifying, 67,26 constitutive, 29,34-6 recollection and sensation, 58,23-59,20 rest/permanence, the soul’s rest in itself as opposed to its departure of itself (of its original state), 6,7 reversion, rational knowledge reverts upon itself, 41,28; 49,14; 79,3 of the soul, 7,5; 7,21; 40,12; 61,15; 90,16 and projection, 6,6 sensation, not accompanied by understanding, 6,25-6 theoretical knowledge does not use it, 9,10-11 and affections, 16,34-5 differs from opinion, 103,17 ff. as judgement, 105,20 sense-organ, sensation is aroused by a blow on the sense-organ, 80,28 ff. sight, apprehends darkness, 68,25-6 its matter is the eye, 93,30-94,14 species, ultimate, 67,2 soul, definitions, 66,4-67,34 as form and efficient, 70,36 substance, composed, 83,16; 86,7 material, 83,10.15 mathematical, 30,12 of the soul, 61,25 rational, 42,21.28 intellective, 30,13 vital, substance, 55,22; 83,20 actuality, 105,9 movements/changes, 4,18-25; 16,14; 19,28; 37,11; 90,33-5 instrument/tool, 4,15; 93,17-33 opposed to bodily movement, 78,3