Priscian: On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception with ‘Simplicius’: On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12 9781472552105, 9780715627525

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Preface Richard Sorabji The translation of ‘Simplicius’ on On the Soul by Carlos Steel is based on a complete draft by J.O. Urmson. Urmson’s original annotations are marked J.O.U. Apart from a few annotations by the general editor, sometimes marked ‘Ed.’, the great bulk have been supplied by Peter Lautner. There is a purpose in presenting this translation alongside Pamela Huby’s translation, with notes, of Priscian’s Paraphrase of Theophrastus on Sense-Perception. The juxtapostion should help readers to make up their own minds regarding the question of authorship. In 1972, F. Bossier and C. Steel questioned the attribution of the On the Soul commentary to Simplicius and argued for its attribution to his colleague Priscian of Lydia instead. They thus revived the hypothesis put forward by Franciscus Piccolomini in 1602. But their article, ‘Priscianus Lydus en de In de Anima van Pseudo (?) Simplicius’ (Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34, 1972, pp. 761822), being in Dutch, has been less widely read than it deserves to be. Carlos Steel has now updated his views and presents a revised version of the article in English. The portion of the text he here translates is commenting on Aristotle’s views on sense perception. This makes a comparison all the easier, because Huby’s text, which is acknowledged to be by Priscian, purports to represent the views of Aristotle’s successor, Theophrastus, on the very same subject: sense perception. Both texts give a highly Neoplatonist account. Theophrastus’ text was an eight-book treatise on Physics. The fifth book discussed not only sense-perception, but also intellect and imagination and Aristotle’s views on all of these. These topics are reflected in Priscian’s paraphrase. There is a reference by ‘Simplicius’ at in DA 136,29 to his own epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics. Bossier and Steel (p. 763) take this to be a reference by Priscian to the paraphrase of Theophrastus on SensePerception which is translated here. Priscian and Simplicius, to whom the commentaries are ascribed, were among the seven Neoplatonist philosophers who went to Persia when the Christian Emperor Justinian closed the Athenian School in 529. The identity of ‘Simplicius’ remains to be decided.

PRISCIAN On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception translated by Pamela Huby

Introduction Priscian of Lydia and his works Priscian of Lydia was one of the group of Neoplatonists who were active in the Academy of Athens before A.D. 529, when Justinian closed the school because of its paganism. Together with several others, of whom the most prominent were Simplicius and Damascius, he went off for a while to the Persian court, and as a result produced answers to a set of questions supposedly put to him by the king Chosroes. These survive in a Latin translation. They cover a variety of topics from the soul to the Red Sea, and in many cases the sources of the replies are identifiable. There seems to be little original thought here. We are also told in one manuscript, Coislinianus 387, that he wrote commentaries on Plato, none of which have survived, and that he was attacked by Philoponus. The Metaphrase, or, as we shall call it, Paraphrase, of Theophrastus’ On the Soul translated here is the only other surviving work that is certainly by Priscian, though there are respectable arguments by Steel and Boissier that he was also the author of the commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul attributed to Simplicius. An alternative view is that the similarities between these two works are due to the fact that both drew heavily on Iamblichus. We do not know when the Paraphrase was written or what happened to Priscian after he left Persia.1 The Paraphrase is built around Theophrastus’ On the Soul, which has not come down to us. We can however reconstruct parts of it from Priscian and from Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s On the Soul, which gives quotations from it that overlap with those given by Priscian and confirm the accuracy of both. It is clear that Theophrastus, Aristotle’s pupil, colleague and successor (c. 371-286 B.C.) had Aristotle’s On the Soul before him in the form in which we now have it, and that he raised questions about its interpretation. There is a fine summary of the contents of his work in Paul Moraux, ‘Le De Anima dans la tradition grecque’, pp. 283-4. Priscian undertook the tour de force of using it as a basis for his own Neoplatonist account of psychology. The Paraphrase opens with a sentence containing the word ephexês (next), and does not actually name Theophrastus, although it is clear that he is the subject of the main verb. This implies that Priscian is here continuing a commentary on a work of Theophrastus of which On the Soul is not the first part, and we know from Themistius that it formed the fourth and fifth books of Theophrastus’ Physics.2 Some fragments of the earlier

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books survive,3 but nothing of Priscian’s work on them. Further, there is a large lacuna in our text which starts in the section on imagination and continues a short way into the section on intellect. There are a few other lacunae, but they appear to be short. At the end the copyist has a note: ‘look out for the rest’, which confirms the impression that what we have is not the end of Priscian’s work. What we have is based on Aristotle’s On the Soul 2.5-3.5, with the exception of the short chapter 2.6 and the very end of 3.5. Also left out is 3.3 429a2-9, but perhaps only because of the lacuna. So the greater part of Aristotle’s positive views on psychology is covered. In a typically Neoplatonic way, however, Priscian divided his work into three sections: senseperception, imagination, and intellect, following Aristotle’s order but placing greater emphasis on imagination than Aristotle did, for reasons explored by H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on Phantasia’, Rev. of Metaphysics 31, 1977, pp. 242-57. Themistius in DA 102,24-9 and 108,18-109,1 (= Theophrastus 320B and A FHSG) includes some material about the agent intellect quoted from Theophrastus which is not in Priscian and would appropriately follow what we do have from him. We might also, with great caution, extract some information from Theophrastus 321-7 FHSG, passages from Averroes and medieval Latin writers who attribute certain psychological views to Theophrastus. Neoplatonism Priscian uses a Neoplatonist framework derived from Iamblichus of a much simpler form than that found for example in Proclus. He holds that the human intellect on the one hand participates in a higher intellect and on the other is related to the body. It contains logoi by which it can become aware of material objects, but it can also think of abstract things.4 Priscian uses this framework to answer the questions raised by Theophrastus about the meaning of Aristotle’s text. He clearly drew a great deal on Iamblichus. Iamblichus (c. A.D. 245-326)5 was influenced by Porphyry, who himself was a pupil of Plotinus. Thus his activity was about two centuries before that of Priscian. He had great influence on later Neoplatonists, but much of his most important work has been lost. It seems unlikely that he wrote an actual commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul,6 and he probably did not know, or at least did not take much notice of, Theophrastus’ work. But he did write an independent On the Soul of his own, and Priscian largely accepted his views. Although at 7,20 Priscian says that his present purpose is not to study Iamblichus in detail, but to study Theophrastus for additions to the work of Aristotle and to consider the difficulties that he raises, he still makes much use of Iamblichus. The fact that what we have is not the opening of Priscian’s work may explain the way in which he introduces Iamblichus’ name. It occurs at

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intervals almost casually, and that would make sense if in an earlier passage, in his consideration of the earlier books of Theophrastus’ Physics, he had given some explanation of how he was using Iamblichus’ work. We may also assume that he was writing for readers familiar with Iamblichus, so that there was no need to refer to him continually. The result is that we have to use some detective work to establish what is going on, but I am inclined to think that what we have in Priscian is quite a large amount of fairly pure Iamblichus.7 The text Bywater describes eight manuscripts. The most important is his L (Laurentianus LXXXVII.20) of the fourteenth century. The others are either derived from it or are from one very similar to it, but are not to be ignored. There is also a Latin translation by Marsilio Ficino, based on a poor manuscript but still of some value. The first edition appeared in Basle in 1541, and Wimmer edited a Teubner text in 1854. Bibliography Priscian of Lydia Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, CAG suppl. I,2, Bywater, 1886 Philoponus in DA 1-2, Philoponus (?) in DA 3, CAG XV, M. Hayduck, 1897 Simplicius(?) in DA, CAG XI, M. Hayduck, 1882 Themistius in DA, CAG V.3, R. Heinze, 1899

* Han Baltussen, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception, Quaestiones infinitae vol. VI, Utrecht 1993 E. Barbotin, La Théorie Aristotélicienne de l’Intellect d’après Théophraste, Coll. Aristote, traductions et études, Louvain and Paris 1954 H.J. Blumenthal and E.G. Clark (eds), The Divine Iamblichus, Bristol 1993 H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd (eds), Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism: Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius, Liverpool U.P. 1982 W.W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby, R.W. Sharples and D. Gutas (eds) (FHSG), Theophrastus, Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, Leiden 1992 A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1990 Paul Moraux, ‘Le De Anima dans la tradition grecque: quelques aspects de l’interpretation du traité de Théophraste à Themistius’ in Aristotle on Mind and the Senses, ed. G.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen, Cambridge 1978 R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, London 1990 C. Steel and F. Boissier, ‘Priscianus Lydus en de in De Anima van Pseudo(?)Simplicius’, Tijdschrift voor filosofie 34, 1972 C. Steel, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism, Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussels 1978 R.B. Todd, Themistius On Aristotle on the Soul, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1996 G. Watson, Phantasia in Classical Thought, Galway U.P. 1988

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On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception Notes

1. Where he went after leaving Persia is uncertain. There has recently been strong support for the view that the whole group went to Harran in what is now south-east Turkey, and set up a new Academy there. See I. Hadot, ‘The life and work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic sources’ in Aristotle Transformed, pp. 278-89, and P. Athanassiadi, ‘Persecution and response in late paganism: the evidence of Damascius’, JHS 113, 1993, pp. 24-9. But the case is still open. 2. Bywater in the preface to his edition (p. v) says that Priscian is only concerned with the fifth book. He seems to be assuming that the fourth book covered the material relating to Book 1 of Aristotle’s On the Soul, which is historical, and the first three chapters of Book 2, which contain Aristotle’s general account of the soul. He is perhaps supported by the fact that at 22,33-4 Priscian says he wants to go on to the rest of the fifth book, implying that he is already commenting on that at the end of the section on sensation. But if Bywater is correct nothing survives of that fourth book. Han Baltussen, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception, p. 246, considers whether Theophrastus’ De Sensu could have fitted into the fourth book, and thinks not. 3. See Theophrastus 143-4, 146, 149, 153, and 176 FHSG. 4. For a simple account of the psychological views of Simplicius – who may indeed be Priscian – in his Commentary on the On the Soul see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘The psychology of (?) Simplicius’ Commentary on the De Anima’ in Blumenthal and Lloyd, pp. 75-92. 5. But his dates are uncertain. See the Introduction to The Divine Iamblichus, p. 1. 6. See H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Did Iamblichus write a Commentary on the De Anima?’, Hermes 102, 1974, pp. 540-56. 7. See my ‘Priscian of Lydia as evidence for Iamblichus’ in The Divine Iamblichus, pp. 4-13.

Textual Emendations 1,19 2,9 3,6 3,33 8,7 10,15 11,16 11,16 11,24 14,31 17,29 18,23-4 19,21 22,4 22,12 27,10 28,14 28,16 28,21 28,24 33,19

katatetagmenon for katatetamenon. following some MSS and omitting Bywater’s inserted hê. reading sunthesis with the MSS instead of Bywater’s sunesis. keeping the apo of the MSS for Bywater’s hupo. I have suggested a lacuna. horaton instead of the horatou of the MSS. to de of some MSS for the ta de of Bywater. diateinôn for Bywater’s diateinein. keeping meinai against Bywater. keeping the sentence which Bywater wanted deleted. keeping antilegein estin against Bywater. following the MSS in keeping mê nomizesthai and rejecting komizesthai. inserting tou di’ before amphoin. reading hekastê for hekastêi (Steel). reading to with some MSS for Bywater’s tôi. omitting to before pathos with the MSS. keeping asômatois which Bywater wished to delete. reading Wimmer’s pôs for the hôs of the MSS. keeping êi which Bywater athetised, suggesting a lacuna. reading Bywater’s tentative tropên for tropon, which he read. hautêi for autê.

Priscian of Lydia the Philosopher Paraphrase of the books of Theophrastus1 On Sense-Perception 2

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On sense in general: what is the ‘becoming like’ of the sense-organ? His next target is concerned with sense-perception. Since Aristotle3 wants the sense-organs, when moved by the objects of sense, to become like those objects by being affected passively,4 he asks what the becoming like5 .6 For with the senseorgans, and even more with the soul,7 the capacity to become like in colour and tastes and sound8 and shape9 seems absurd.10 Indeed he himself11 also says that the becoming like occurs with regard to the forms and the logoi12 without matter.13 But more work must be done on whether the form is from outside, and as what and where it comes to appear, and whether what is divided up around bodies14 and not gathered together into one is sufficient for knowledge, since every piece of knowledge comes into existence by way of the gathering into one and the indivisible encompassment of the whole known object.15 It is necessary, then, for that which knows to be in an active state corresponding to the form of the object known, and to have projected before itself the distinguishing mark of that thing, and this is the becoming like. But it is necessary for an effect on the sense-organ to initiate perception. For sense-perception is not a faculty that exists entirely separate from bodies, but one that is brought into actuality in the downward inclination16 towards the sense-organs, and that, being completive17 of the living thing, is not capable of being in an active state without them. Nor again, when it is aroused, does it take the initiative18 in jointly stimulating the sense-organ, like imagination,19 because is largely allocated to matter,20 and because of its own whole extension around the things outside, and because it needs the presence of the objects of sense themselves also.21 The objects of imagination are not outside, even if they are simulacra of the things outside, but the objects of sense are outside: for senseperception22 is of these and not of the effects in the sense-organs, but together with these it grasps the forms in the bodies. It is

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not like soulless things that the sense-organs are affected by senseobjects, but as a living body is affected. Hence neither is the whole thing a passive effect nor is it entirely from outside, but it is also by way of own activity: and it is not the case that it is moved first and is active later, but it is not moved at all without at the same time23 being active. And, further, it is not active without being moved. Indeed this kind of motion24 in the sense-organs is made like the sensible forms in that it is produced at the same time by them and also by way of the arousing in the sense-organ of the representative image25 connected with life which occurs in response to them. But this, the likeness of the sense-objects in the sense-organ, is not yet perception;26 it is rather a passive than an active thing, and is corporeal and divisible and stretched out in time, and is hastening towards form but is not yet in its form but is still in movement; but perception encompasses without division the beginning and the middle parts and the end of the sensed object, and is actuality and complete awareness27 and altogether as a whole in the present, and exists directly by way of the form of the sensed object. Hence it is not independent of the effect in the sense-organ, and yet this is not perception for this reason: even though we are affected we are sometimes not conscious , both when sleeping and when awake. Therefore after the passive effect that which is like the object of sense must be perfected into form; for sense-perception, when it is aware , accords with perfect form. But this form of the perceived object is not in the sense-organ: for is an effect and a motion and is in division but not a form; nor indeed is it in the representative image, connected with life, which is transmitted to the sense-organ from the soul; for the action of this is accompanied by a passive effect, and common to both is the motion of the organ and of the life in it. But obviously the form by which sense-perception occurs is indeed in life, in that which consists in activity28 – not that which is separate, but the life of the soul which is completive29 of the living being, and in its30 vital projection which is divided up round bodies. But not even this is sufficient for sense-perception. For the form which has been perfected round the sense-organ in actuality, in that it is divided up around bodies, and does not revert31 to one indivisible unity, is not cognitive, but there is some logos of the objects of sense received beforehand in the soul, which lives even of itself and is not only32 of the compound ; that is why it is both active undividedly and exists as a capacity of individuals (but not in the way that some one particular form comes to be in them), and is a logos cognitive of the objects of sense, subsisting in the soul but not

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settled in the body, one33 thing indeed but not like individual things,34 but having the one comprehending the many, and fitting35 to each of them; for with the one logos of white the soul perceives all the particular whites. It is necessary therefore for a logos of this kind to have been projected36 if there is going to be perception; and it is projected as to something akin, the vital form, being aroused37 and fitted to this likeness of the external form, and being active together with it; for that which is aware is the logos, and the synthesis38 connected with the sensitive soul, and the gathering together into the indivisible in the hypostasis39 separate from bodies. So, then, the soul has the form of the perceived object by the projecting of its40 logos, but not as receiving from it some shape or impression as from a seal.41 For the awareness and the activity are from within and are connected with life. The logos, then, is within the soul and of its substance , but the life completive of the living being, being fastened to these substantial logoi,42 but subsisting by way of its stretching towards the body, this too is connected with sense and is the determination43 and perfection of the living being. Therefore in this is the likeness of the perceived object perfected, but in the sense-organ the activity is incomplete and mixed with a passive effect;44 and the effect is from outside, but the activity is from the life; and the form is in the life of the living being, but the awareness and the understanding are in the activity of the logos. In what way then is the soul made like the objects of sense? Not by receiving something from them, but by being active in accordance with their logos through the representative image of the external forms.45 How, then, is it made like several things at once, and sometimes opposites? because while it is not possible to be affected at the same time by opposites, it is possible to be active ;46 and sense-perception is connected with activity and awareness but not with passive effect; for perception is connected with the logos, and the passive effect is in the sense-organ; and the sense-organ, being body and divisible, is not incapable itself of grasping several things at the same time, and even opposites, in different parts. But the logos is active in gathering together in indivisible the opposites and whatever different things there are; hence it is aware of their difference47 since it holds several at the same time in an indivisible . When then Theophrastus also wants the becoming like to occur by way of the forms and the logoi without the matter, let us accept it, but not that they are simply coming in from outside,48 but that they are arising from the internal logoi in the life by way of the activity of the senses, yet also by being extended towards the things outside and being made like them. It is reasonable then that sense-perception is

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considered to be a faculty as well, since it involves activities.49 The becoming like is, then, on the one hand, in the case of the soul, by way of the activity of the logos, and on the other, in the case of the sense-organ, it is by way of the effect from50 the senseobject, and its own simultaneous vital activity. How then is it affected at the same time by both the bitter and the sweet?51 For it is not, he says, that it is affected by this thing on one part of the tongue, and by the other ,52 but on the same; and with hearing likewise, if indeed it is actually possible to divide up hearing.53 Alternatively, whether it is the tongue that is the organ of taste or the airs in the tongue, in any case, being an entirely divisible body, it is not impossible for it to be affected by one thing on one part, and by another on another; as becomes evident from touch: for it is possible to become warm in one part and to become cold in another at the same time; and the sensitive air of hearing is clearly also divisible. And it has been said54 that the logos is indeed indivisible but is not prevented from being active about opposites at the same time. For it is being affected in the same respect that is not possible with opposites. But whereas heat, as a natural power, would act upon the sense-organ, how would shape and form55 and movement and number make it like ? Or shall we say that these too have some active force, but act rather in a formal way?56 Just as heat and its coordinate powers in a more bodily way and for this reason more strikingly and to produce something more like a passive effect – unless after all it is the case that the special objects of each sense have their activity more clearly and the common ones more obscurely,57 the former being near by as proper , and the others further off. And perhaps the common , as being on a higher level, are not equally congruent with the sense. But even so, the common are still objects of sense and are not known only by thought . It is true however that thought, being withdrawn itself by itself, reasons with regard to some of the objects of sense which are not apprehensible by sense, as when it knows the being of the objects of sense.58 And if sense does not grasp time and number either, thought will have knowledge of these by transmission from the objects of sense. But if knowledge is by becoming like, how, without being affected by the of the objects of sense, is thought made like them? And if it is affected, of what kind is this effect? Alternatively, is it that not even the awareness of sense is by a passive effect, as we said (I am no longer talking about understanding by thought ), but by activity and the projection of logoi? And just as59 from the effect in the sense-organ, which is being perfected into a form resembling the object, is projected the logos of the objects of sense,

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which is being fitted to the sensitive form as its own and60 aroused61 towards its own congruently , so also the logos that is aware of the sensible qualities moves the power cognitive of the substance of the sensible objects in the way proper to it, in accordance with the proper relation of the sensible qualities to the substance from which they proceed. Since, on the one hand, the sense-organ is struck by the special objects of sense with clarity,62 but, on the other, the particular sense grasps the common objects not primarily but secondarily – for primarily sight is of colour, but secondarily of size and movement – the common objects might seem to belong rather to the soul, and it would be as it were incidentally that the common objects were known by sense. But, as has been said, this very thing63 is known by sense, secondarily indeed, but not by thought alone. And it is not by means of an impression that sight64 is conscious of the colourless and the dim, and hearing of silence, but the sense becomes conscious by the very fact that its activity is checked when it makes the attempt, knowing that there wanting and at variance in them by the fact that the logos does not fit, and indeed the sense-organ is also turned off in a way through being affected by the object.65 This, then is the general account of sense-perception.

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The particular senses But about the particular senses, like sight, hearing, and the rest, this meanwhile must be laid down, that sense is not one single thing, as some say, which is differentiated into various kinds by the participating organs; for the variety 66 of the organs is not the major factor in the differentiation of the faculties, nor is it responsible for the division of the faculties, but sense itself, being one,67 of itself is also divided into five, into the means of discerning the particular objects of sense; and on the distinguishing of the senses follows also the differentiation of the organs which adapts them appropriately to each ; for the formal variety takes precedence over the material division connected with the sense-organs, and is more important to their users. But what is seeing or hearing or smelling? And are they all through some medium, as sight is through the transparent, or do some come in contact with their objects immediately? And what is the transparent?68 Well, I think that sight is made complete neither by reception, as being given shape by its objects by way of some effluence from them, nor by emission, with some body being sent out and touching its objects; nor is it that colours move the transparent69 and as it were give it shape, and the transparent then the sight; but the forms, having an active power to act each on

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what is suitable for being affected, are not in every case in contact, but also on things that are at a distance so long as the distance is correct for the former to act and for the latter to be acted upon. For through their being corporeal and confined in something and circumscribed by space, they do not work on an existent of any kind whatsoever, but on what is at a correct distance for the active power of the things which act and for the suitable state of the things acted upon, and also for the size of the effect .70 For instance, the object seen acts on the organ of sight from a certain distance which is correct for both that which is seeing and that which is being seen, for the latter for being acted upon , and for the former for acting . But since it is not simply the case that the effect upon that which has sight from that which is seen creates the perception – for an which is excessive interferes because it is out of scale in regard to the size of the effect by which the perception 71 – it also requires distance. Hence very bright things which are nearer than the right amount hinder and completely prevent seeing. But since perception is made complete not only in the sense-organ’s being acted upon, but also, as has been said, in its being active , that which sees will also be active about that which is seen, not altering it or having any effect on it, but being active about it in a conscious way. For it is not as a body, but as a living thing and a thing that can see, that it is active. Indeed it is because this kind of life and this cognitive power is in a body, and does not contain in itself the causes of the objects of sense in the way the heavenly 72 does, but is made complete by means of the interval between it and them, that this too needs the interval connecting them to be of the right size. These points are also common to hearing and any other that of necessity does not touch its proper objects. But with sight there is the special need for light, which completes both the seeing thing to make it see, and the visible thing to make it be seen, for neither, without light, would the visible thing do anything to that which can see, nor would that which sees be active about the visible thing. For, being like light, both that in us which can see, as some living things show conspicuously, lighting up before them the things being seen by them – hence they can see even by night73 – and also, , the colours which are seen at the edges74 of the transparent in bodies with definite limits, are, it is reasonable to say, both completed by light, having in themselves that which is like light in a more obscure form as compared with their completed actuality in relation to one another. Hence both need external light, that which can see as being like light, and colours as being lights of a kind75 themselves, as their receptacle shows, for these

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are limits of the transparent; and the transparent is a suitability76 for the reception of light, or is some obscure trace of light, which also fills up the gap involved in sight not like air or like water or any other thing, but as the transparent already perfected into actuality by the thing that gives light, and perfecting both, the seeing thing and the seen. Since, if it is the case that the seen thing is so placed for77 brightness that it by itself is sufficient to make sight complete, in the way that we see fire and things that are bright even in darkness, the medium is no longer useful as making complete but only as providing distance of a suitable length; for when placed on the eyes the bright thing is not seen,78 through the disproportion ; but neither are the colours which are seen in light seen when placed on the eyes, because they are not lighted up. Many therefore are the complications which arise in the case of sight. For it seems both to advance outwards through being active about the sense-object which lies outside, and to receive into itself something from the thing which is seen, through being affected in a way by it, and the transparent and the between are believed to convey it79 in that they make it complete by means of light and provide the appropriate length in distance.

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Summary And let us add the observations we have made which are common to all sense-perceptions: (a) the representative image of the sensed object in the sense-organ which is constituted in the likeness of the sensed object by the passive effect and the simultaneous activity ; (b) the representative image perfected into a form in the common life of the compound being; and (c) the logos fitted to these forms which is projected from the sensitive soul, by which judgment and understanding (sunesis) occur.80 Such is the method of enquiry about each sense, which one must take over above all from the philosophical results of Iamblichus in his On the Soul, from which we too now, wishing to sketch the outline of his precise enquiry about each , have written these things briefly;81 since our present project is not this, to go in detail through his dissection of them, but the works of Theophrastus, both, if he adds anything beyond what Aristotle has handed down, to bring it together, and, if he offers us anything by his raising of difficulties, to work it out as well as we can.82

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On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception Is there always a medium between the sense-organ and its object?

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Let us go back then to the views of Theophrastus. He too, indeed, clearly requires that no sense immediately83 touches the object sensed.84 ‘For it is not reasonable’, he says, ‘for what is not common or similar in homogeneous things.’ The transparent

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And he brings in the transparent because it might disturb some through its unusual nature, in that it is said to be seen not in itself but through the colour of something else:85 as if something were said to be tastable through the flavour of something else.86 But the apparent disturbance is easily resolved. For light is said to be the colour of something else as having come from somewhere else, i.e. from the thing that gives light, since light is most closely connected with the things that are seen in that it completes them and brings them into actuality. Hence either, if the transparent has its own87 colour, it is completed, like the colours of other things as well, by light – for light does not remove the proper but on the contrary brings them into actuality – or, if it is colourless88 in itself, it is completed by being as it were coloured by light, and is made capable of being seen. What, then, is the nature of the transparent? For it is not enough to say that it exists in air and water and aether and in certain solids. ‘It is necessary’, he says, ‘for it to be either a passive effect or a state : for it cannot be a body in a body;89 but if it is an effect or a state, we will enquire by what . For it is either by one or by several of the simple . But that is not possible. For the simples themselves, both air and water, are transparent. But that with respect to fire * * * 90 earth too, nay even all compound bodies, if all things are coloured, and colour is the limit of the transparent.’ 91 I92 say that the transparent is not an effect or a state created by something, but exists as a form capable of joining the bodies in creation to the perfection of light, and providing them with a suitability for the reception of both light and darkness, so that they partake essentially of one of them, or in turn of both, or in some mixture.93 For the transparent in fire has light essentially, but that in earth essentially darkness. Hence just as fire is a thing that produces light, so earth is a thing that makes darkness: for darkness is not the privation of light, but itself too an actuality.94 But perhaps we do wrong in supposing that the transparent exists even in earth, if it is true that the transparent is receptive of light. Or we do not do wrong. For it is receptive not only of light, but also

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of darkness, as has been said. And then even earth is coloured, and colour is the limit of the transparent in bodies that are bounded;95 so that even in earth the transparent is not essentially only receptive of darkness, but of this in its depths, but on its surfaces of light also, if colours are lights of a kind, and if it is true that even earth is illuminated on its surface. But the in air and water is receptive of both in turn – and this we are accustomed to call transparent more properly – but that in compounds is according to the mixture. We will not therefore enquire by which of the simple the transparent : for the forms are not by96 the elements nor by bodies generally, but they partake of the forms and are given their characteristics in accordance with them; and for this reason some need light in addition in order to be seen and some do not, like fire and things that shine, in that to a sufficient degree they partake essentially of the light-giving form, and do not need more of it.

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Light and the transparent And in what way is it that the light which extends through it by means of that which gives light is the actualisation of the transparent?97 For it would seem rather to be the activity98 of that .99 But having raised this problem he goes on to solve it, saying that the case is similar to what happens in other things which are affected passively, showing this equally, that as heat is the activity of fire as an active thing, but of the thing being heated as of a thing being affected passively, so also light would be spoken of as an actuality as being an affect of what receives it, not properly being named activity. Hence also he brings in that it is not necessary to look into its names, but that it is sufficient if we understand its nature.100 First therefore I want to make this distinction, that the caused light is one thing, and its cause another, such as that in the sun or in fire; and the argument in the enquiry about what light is is not about the cause, but about that which goes out from it,101 which is what is said to be the actualisation of the transparent which is in air and water and in those things which receive light and darkness in turn. And then, following Iamblichus,102 I want this to be neither body, like the Peripatetics,103 nor indeed an effect or quality of any kind of body; for it is not in the air that light has its being: at any rate when that is moving it stands still, and when that is turning in many ways it is isolated separately104 and preserves its undivided continuity with its cause. But also the immediate presence of it over everything that is capable of receiving it, when that which

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gives light is present,105 and again its immediate cessation when it has gone away, leaving behind no trace of itself, is a sign that light is not a thing that air undergoes. For the affections it does undergo, like heat, do not occur in it immediately, and when fire has gone away it leaves behind some faint form of itself in the thing it has affected. And the facts that it does not occur by transmission nor by change, and that it is not confined within a certain compass, but goes on to everything that is capable of receiving it, and that lights do not combine with one another, all these show that the activity of light is separate from bodies. In what way, then, is it said to be an actualisation ? Not as a passive effect , I will say, nor as a perfection of it occurring in it as in a substratum, but as perfecting it on a separate level,106 not itself to that , but making it belong to itself,107 remaining itself in continuity with that which gives light, and being carried around together with that. This then I have recorded briefly in this way, so that we should not conjecture that light also occurs in a similar way to that in which in other things which are passively affected.108 The nature of light, sight, and colour

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‘But if light is incorporeal,109 why’, he says, ‘is it that it occurs in the presence of fire or, in general, body? For it would appear to be a kind of bodily effluence and a body.’110 It is to solve this that he says: ‘It must not be taken in this way, but as is natural’,111 showing that, at all events, the actuality of light is in some way formal ;112 since heat too is from a form. Hence it is not a body. For it is not by division or effluence, but this itself is the activity of the shining form or whatever we ought to call the form which is the cause of light. ‘But if darkness is seen without light, light will not be the cause in every case of being seen, or else’, as he himself adds, ‘darkness is not visible.’113 For we do not perceive it through an impression, but by privation114 and not seeing; but fire, and anything else there may be of this kind, are seen in darkness as being themselves the cause of the transparent and for this reason not needing that to be seen.115 Therefore fire, in order to be seen, does not need the transparent in actuality, that is, already illuminated: but since there must be some medium116 (for seeing is not by means of contact), this must be transparent, so that it should not, by being solid and resistant, hinder with its darkness-producing property117 the activity of the luminous things on one another, fire I mean and the organ of sense. ‘It follows’, he says, ‘that the cause of colours being seen is colour, and of visibles tout court the visible, if it is the case that light is the

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cause, being the colour of the transparent,118 and visible.’ 119 ‘And it is not absurd’, he says, ‘but even in agreement with the rest:120 for, also, taste is through flavour.’121 ‘But’, someone will say, ‘as flavour is the proper sense-object of taste, and sound of hearing, needing nothing else from outside for the organ of sense to be moved, unless indeed someone should speak of the transsonant,122 as colour needs the transparent, yet even so sound is at once perceived if the correct amount of air is in between, but colour needs the light-giving thing from outside, if it is going to become visible.’ Or else this is special about sight, that it needs light not because it is less perfect than in the case of the other senses, which need nothing else from outside to complete them, but because of the superiority and extraordinary nature of its actuality, since the sensitive faculty is not self-sufficient, but needs some more divine form. For just as our body does not need the soul for the purpose of being heavy and for being carried downwards, but for movement by volition (because this kind of movement is beyond what it can do by nature), and by volition is not for this reason inferior to that which is natural, but superior, so sight too is superior to the other because its actualisation is superior, needing something else to complete it. Perhaps someone may say that the primary visible123 is the thing which shines and light itself, which of itself moves sight and about which it is active, needing nothing else from outside to complete it; and that on the other hand colours, as obscure lights of a kind, are not visible in themselves, but need the primary visible which completes them also. ‘But on this account’, someone might say, ‘light should not have been active along with colours for them to be seen, but, on the contrary, in order to conceal them, as also the greater sound124 pushes out the lesser, and in the case of actual objects the brighter does not allow the less bright to shine through: in the sun, for example, the light of a lantern is not seen. Or perhaps there is not the same relationship between the greater and the less and the primary and what follows . For it is not as less visible that colour is compared with light; for it is not visible at all without light: hence it is visible in a derivative way in that it is completed by it and is seen through that,125 but light itself in itself is sufficient for being seen. But if nothing analogous is found in the case of the other senses, like there being a primary and a derivative audible or tastable, it is a superiority of the primary visible, which, you know, we say to be light, that it perfects other kinds of visibles, with the faculty of seeing being aware not only of light but also of other things through light. And since he is clearly wanting126 the transparent to be moved by colours,127 and extending the problem about how the movement comes about, whether by some effluence,128 or whether the latter are active and the former 129 is

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passive, also to those who do not make seeing happen by means of the transparent, but from colours themselves being borne in, and again to those who suppose that the sense-organ sends out,130 it is right for us to enquire further also if in fact the transparent is moved, and what is its movement.131 Well, it is clear that colours are seen through the transparent as a medium, and if they are placed on the sight itself they are not seen. With regard to this we said that there is a need for the transparent as a medium in order that the things seen may be illuminated. But even when the thing seen is shining, there is a need for the transparent as a medium, in the way that we said then also, because the distance needs to be correct * * * 132 the medium not be solid, so that it may not hinder the activity by its darkness-producing . Is it then that the transparent is useful only as not being a hindrance, just as would be the case if the between were empty?133 Or is that not reasonable, but ought it also to contribute something? For it is not for no reason that the 134 between is a body, but it obviously makes a contribution even with regard to colours; for we would not see if the between were not lighted up. It follows therefore that it also has something to give with regard to things that are shining. And again, if in the case of hearing air is in fact moved in some way, and in the case of smell, and even in the case of touch,135 when it is between that which is warming and that which is being warmed, and in the case of taste, if there is something between the moist things, 136 or if even in the case of these by having been mixed,137 but not by being active, it follows that it is also so in the case of sight. Again, everything which gives light is clearly active on the transparent; such is even that which is too bright: so that even that which shines dimly is active, even if not in such a way as to give light: and colours, having been perfected and illuminated by that which gives light, would themselves also move the transparent. Is it then that they the transparent, and it moves the sight,138 as if it were given shape by the colours? But if the transparent were affected in this way we would perceive it and not the colour;139 but if the colour, this would also move our sight. But as for the transparent – the transparent is also of itself a thing which moves sight, when it is illuminated not by means of something else and not in the way that it is moved by colours – what then is its movement? So that we may know also how the things seen themselves move sight through the medium. I say therefore that just as the thing which gives light perfects the transparent with the activity from that being present, separately, to it and to our eye through the transparent, not as something passively affected but as itself also being made perfect by way of that

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separate activity,140 so also colour, when illuminated, acts on the transparent with a separate activity, which is borne141 upon it,142 and for this reason is present to it not by transmission but immediately and in all of it altogether and as a whole undividedly everywhere, and as it were giving it form separately, and together with that which is thus given form also moving our sight; in such a way that colour itself also acts on our sight, but by using the transparent as a substratum for its own private activity, not as something being affected passively, but as something being given form separately by it. Hence also the activity of colour is present to sight in an unmixed form, and yet is not present in any other way than as being borne on the transparent, since it is borne upon it without being mixed with it. What then does the transparent contribute to seeing, if the activity of colour falls upon it without being mixed with it? Surely it is clear that it is by transporting it.143 For it actually comes upon our sight being borne as a separate thing upon the transparent, as has been said, being present in all of it and undividedly. Hence also all in the same who may be looking perceive the same thing, and as a whole, just as also all those in the theatre hear the sound of the voice as a whole; for sound144 is also an activity which is present in it undivided, as a whole everywhere the same, as a separate thing, in that it is neither carried along together with the air nor altered along with it; for it is evidence of its unbroken presence that it exists as a whole both in all and in each of the hearers and fills them all uniformly. What then? Is it not the case that both the air and the sense-organ are struck and moved in a passive way by that which makes the sound? Or else the effect and the movement begin beforehand around the bodies, but it is not these 145 that are actually sound, nor again hearing, 146 the perfection in actuality set up by way of the form of the movement. But here the effect on the air comes first, since what is heard is through a blow: but what is seen is not through the transparent being affected, but is itself already the colour.147 But if here too someone were to grant that some passive condition were produced on the air by colours, it is not by this that the colour is made perfect so as to be visible, but by the perfect and immediate and everywhere whole actuality of the form being present unbroken in the transparent,148 and indeed moving the sense-organ to produce a passive effect , but with sight existing not in the effect but in the formal perfection of the life and the projection of the logos. But with regard to the object of smell and smelling,149 the effect which occurs in between is clearer,

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since even when the object smelt has gone away the smell remains, not only through the particles which have flowed off, but also because the air has been affected in some way, just as also it has been warmed when it is between that which is warming and that which has been warmed, and as the air is made sweet which is between the tongue and the honey. And here150 too both the perception and its object are by way of the form, but, through the fact that both the sense-organ and the sensible form are more involved in matter in these cases, the effect appears more forcefully, and for this reason more clearly, both upon the sense-organs and in the air, so that it may share in the sensible form. But neither do we sense these by means of an effluence, nor, still more, does anything flowing off from colours produce seeing, but they are seen by being active. And how is it that the power of colour is so strong as to move without effluence and to do this continuously? It is clear that it is continuously active in its own activity, unless, like fire, it needs material151 and a source of light, the transparent. Or perhaps it is the case that not colour only, but, as has been said, actually every object of sense moves the senses by being active; but colour both does not always, but when it is illuminated, and when, as he himself said,152 its matter is present, the transparent, which at the same time both perfects colours by light and is given form in a way by them by the activity from them which is separate – but light is visible not through the transparent but in the transparent and of itself. ‘And the transparent is the same as light, or not to be separated from it’, he says, speaking correctly.153 For neither is there light without the transparent, nor is there perception of this without light; and if it is true that light is the colour of the transparent, this would not be another visible thing alongside colours. What then is the nature of the effect the transparent undergoes to produce sight? For some say that it receives an outline.154 Or perhaps it is not like this, but it has been said that receiving the activity from the objects seen unbroken and joining this to the sense-organ. But visible things are not only colours, but also sizes and shapes, even if in a secondary way, as has already been determined.155 Smell and hearing ‘And smell’, he says, ‘seems through the air as it were being mixed in a way and affected,156 but hearing being given a shape.’157 But it has been said that sense-perception is not by way of a passive effect, nor is sound a shape, but a kind of perfect form of the activity. And smell is

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also not the passive effect but the form. But the air is affected more by these as being more enmattered and more corporeal forms.

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The medium And he enquires if each gets through to the sense similarly, or some more and some less.158 It is very clear, I think, that it is not similarly, but that it both on the greater or lesser power the perceived object has to act, and on the clarity and purity or murkiness of the sense-organ, and again also on the greater or less suitability of the medium for passing on the activity; and again, with regard to distance, according to whether the perceived object is further away or nearer, there arises some difference for its getting through. But how with every there is an intermediate, even if with some the medium is outside, and with others in us, has both been determined sufficiently in Aristotle159 and been thought worthy of mention only by Theophrastus, and no difficulties have been raised.160 But someone might enquire into this, how it is that if, as we said, the presence of the sound occurs immediately, those nearer hear louder and more quickly, or how it is that we see the woodcutter striking earlier, but are aware of the noise later:161 for it is clear that it is not simultaneous with the blow. Surely it is because it is necessary for some effect to have occurred and for the air to have been set in motion earlier,162 and the form of the sound supervenes upon it as a whole later; and the effect and the movement are in time, and the form as a whole supervenes later upon what is happening.163 In the particular case of sound, therefore, the form of the activity later upon the effect, to the extent that the effect gets through by means of the continuity of the air. Hence it is that those who are nearer hear more quickly and louder; for those who are nearer the point at which the thing was struck also receive the effect more quickly and to a greater extent: but that which is seen, on the other hand, does not act on the transparent by producing a passive effect, since neither does that which gives light . Hence it is seen instantaneously, and at the same time, by all by whom it is seen, even if it is not in the same way, but in greater detail by those nearer, because while it is indeed an activity , it still those who are spatially near as on more suitable subjects, because they are bodies.

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‘We must also determine’, says Theophrastus, ‘matters connected with reflections .164 For we say, you know, that as it were an imprinting165 of the shape as well occurs in the air’, himself also equally, like Plato,166 supposing that there occurs some phantasmal167 representative image of the corporeal forms in the light round the smooth .168 But even so we must not suppose that the bendings are corporeal: for that would be a passive effect and out of tune with activity in accordance with nature, and most of all in the case of the heavenly light;169 but we must conceive of the bendings too as involving activity, with that which gives light and that which sees being active to a greater extent on what is smooth and dense and shining, so as to illuminate or see other things also by means of it. For the second activity is of that,170 with the object which is smooth and shining also cooperating because of its kinship with light. And because that which gives light is active on either side, the second is also continuous with the first; and because the smooth cooperates in the second, a certain division of the two occurs, and this is the bending; and in the case of the viewing of faces by means of mirrors there occurs also the bending of sight in actuality, as has been said,171 but the reflection is not by means of a passive effect on the original. And172 Plato too wants some phantasmal representative image of corporeal forms to subsist in the outgoing activity of sight round the smooth , not by means of effluence of bodies but by means of the shadow-painting of the forms, in seeming and appearing. Theophrastus, you know, also equally shows this, saying that in reflections there occurs as it were an imprinting173 of the shape on the air. And he adds that in some cases the senseorgan appears to be homogeneous with its objects.174 For both the tongue senses flavours through the moist, and hearing senses sound through the air enclosed being set in motion. He enquires why therefore (a) it is not the same in the other cases also, and (b) in what way like is affected by like,175 the air by the external air,176 and the moist by the moist. Or perhaps the account is the same in the other cases also. For in each the senseorgan is such as is also the external substratum to the activities of its objects, the transparent in the case of sight,177 and the transsonant in the case of hearing; for it is not as air but as transsonant that it receives sound; and as transodorant in the case of smell;178 hence here also what is in between is either moisture or air; and it is moisture in the case of taste,179 and in the case of touch that which can receive the qualities related to touch. And it is not that the like is affected by the like, but the potential by the actual:180 not indeed as air is affected by air, but as the potentially transsonant by

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the actually transsonic.181 Why then is it moisture in the case of sight, and not what is common to water and air, since the transparent is common to both?182 And why is it not what is common in the case of hearing also, if it is true that the transsonant is also in water? And there is a similar problem in the case of smell also. Or else either of the two is sufficient. For it is also true in the case of things outside, that they do not need a mixture, but whether what is between is water or air, seeing occurs. Why then is the eye-jelly of the eye of water?183 Because water is easier to keep in than air, and denser.184 And why is hearing of air?185 Because air is easier to set in motion, and motion contributes to the perception of sound. But if it is possible to smell without breathing in,186 he says, what stops us from also hearing without air? Because it is not possible for sound to occur without the striking of the air in our ears.187 For the organ of hearing is188 air: but of smell it is not the breath which is being brought in in breathing in, but that is useful for opening up the pores connected with smell189 in those in which they are covered up:190 but for those in which , smelling even without breathing in.

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Sound ‘But as for sound,’ he says, ‘is it in every case against a solid,191 or even apart from a solid, like that of the winds? But these too make a noise by falling upon the earth, and so do thunderclaps , with the blast breaking against a cloud as against a solid.’192 But if the air is connatural with hearing, when the external is joined by a blow, this too193 always being moved and sounding, movement would perceive movement and not sound sound;194 and yet that which is inside would prevent this, as in the other cases also.195 Or is it that the internal sound is not straightforwardly perceptible? At any rate we do not sense it sounding unless we block up our ears.196 But, also, its movement is a living one and not like that of that which is struck. But when it is affected by what has been struck, and receives the form of the sound, then the activity is hearing. The former sound is not therefore a hindrance, since it is not perceived, but its movement, being a living one, even cooperates towards the perception of that which has been struck. But if the sound gets through from outside as far as where hearing occurs, how is it that he197 declares that no sense-perception occurs when the object of sense is in contact? Since in the case of smell also we draw up the smell by breathing in until, obviously, it falls upon proper. Or else the sensible object is where the blow is too, and where the fragrant herb, just as it is also where the colour is; these indeed are things which cannot be brought near to the sense-organs if there is going to be a sense-perception. But the form of the

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activity which arises from them in the medium must be present to the sense-organ as well. For it is not the case, as he himself also brings in, that if nothing came through from the object of sense some perception would be aroused. For indeed colour moves the sight through the transparent, with the medium also doing something and cooperating and itself being moved in a way by the object seen – and in what way has already been described as far as was possible198 – and the perception is not of the medium but of that which is producing the effect. For the act of production and what produces are not the same, nor activity and what is active. And that which produces produces it by way of the act of production, and that which is affected is affected by that which produces , but by way of the act of production from it, and not by the act of production. And we perceive therefore not the activity from the object sensed, but the object indeed, but by way of the activity from it, and so not the medium but the emitting object by way of the form of activity being sent out in the medium. And when Aristotle199 says that the differentiae of sounds, like high and low, are displayed in sound when it is actually being made, and adds that just as colours are not seen without light, so high and low are not without sound, he approves, that it is possible to argue against200 a man who says that light is in a similar relation to colours as sound is to high and low; for it is not light but colour that is in a similar relation to white and black. Or, as a genus, colour, but not light, is analogous to sound. And since colours are not seen without light, just as also high and low without sound, in this respect alone does the comparison hold with regard to being seen.201 Taste

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But202 why does Aristotle claim that the organ of taste is neither moist nor incapable of being moistened, since, he says, what can be tasted is moist? Or it is not as203 moist, someone might say, that it is perceptible by taste, but as moist with flavour.204 In that case the organ should only have been flavourless. Or, since taste grasps its proper object by touching205 as well , it is necessary that it is affected passively, and as by a thing touched; so that also as by a moist thing: hence it is not necessary for the sense-organ to be occupied beforehand by its appropriate moisture. But Aristotle,206 whom Theophrastus also follows, does not want the tongue to be the real organ of taste, nor flesh that of touch, but these to be analogous to the things which are in between in the cases of sight and hearing. For in the cases of touch and taste also there must be something in between, at least if it is

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true that the object of sense, when it falls on the organ itself, never arouses perception; but in these cases that which is in between is not external; for, even when there is something in between, taste or touch is not through this, but together with it; just as, if a shield were in the middle, the stone strikes the hand not through the shield, in the way that the colour is seen through the air, but the hand too, together with the shield, since both have been struck at the same time. Since then, in the cases of touch and taste, that through which is not outside, it will be inside us. And this is in one case the flesh, and in the other the tongue.207 That, then, flesh is also affected is obvious; and it is clear that it is not in the same way as with inanimate things; it is, then, as a function of life, and since the life of the flesh is connected with sense, as a function of sense also. Why then, if it is not that the cognitive element is actually in it? For even if there were also some other organ of touch that was more so and more precise like breath , yet still the flesh has sensing; and let it, on analogy with air in the case of sight, be between the sense-organ more properly so called , but through not being outside but being grown within us it is not thought to be so, but208 it is not for this reason insensitive. Why then, if the flesh has sensing, should we suppose any other organ of touch to be prior ? Because, I would say, when it is too strongly affected by its object falling upon it directly, it dislodges the activity of sensing by the violence of the effect. Hence Aristotle209 also wants there to be something in the middle in the cases of both touch and taste. And by postulating that this grows within living things he also clearly knows that the medium in these cases is connected with life and perception. And that too is rightly claimed,210 that a) the sense-organ must exist in a middle position within the contrariety in the objects of sense, not by way of a mixture of the extremes,211 for it would then already have been affected, but as what is not capable of being affected but is receptive of effects – since what is of the extremes will not be aware of the intermediates: for the like is not capable of being affected by the like,212 and b) the sense-organ is a body and a quantity,213 but it is not as a quantity that it has perception, but by ratio 214 and potentiality. For the sense-organ is in a certain ratio to the objects of sense and is characterized by the form of life which has awareness of bodies. (But since all the objects of sense are attributes or differences of bodies – for they are qualities and quantities: and by what each thing is known, in these its existence also lies – every body would appear to be 215 its differences. Or else the body can be known not only by sense but also by doxastic reason .216 For according to

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Plato217 it is knowable by opinion together with perception, and opinion is capable of grasping bodily substance .218 The number of the senses: Aristotle’s view Aristotle believes that there are no more senses because of the fact that all things are perceptible by us, the touchable by touch, and those through a medium because 220 have these things by which the medium is known – for, on the one hand, this is known only through two simples, air and water, and, on the other, out of these two simples are our sense-organs also :221 for fire either belongs to none or is common to all; nor is earth , or if it is, it is mixed in some way in touch – and he wants, if more than one object is perceived through one sense-organ,222 the possessor of this to be adequately equipped for the several , but if the same thing is perceived through more than one , that which has one of the two to be perceptive of what is perceived through both.223 219

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Responding to this, Theophrastus asks (1) first how,225 since through air and water only. For surely in us through these alone, since our sense-organs are also of these, sight226 of water and hearing of air, and smell of either of these. And (2) secondly, if several through the same , what has this will not in every case also know the several , as for example if through air both the objects of smell and those of hearing, not necessarily both: for it does not also hear the things that it smells: nor is the air simply a thing capable of smelling or simply a thing capable of hearing – at any rate what is in the windpipe is neither – but according to a ratio, and it must have a ratio to each, and what does not have it will not sense both. He urges also: (3) Surely even that is not true, that the sense-organs are simply of unmixed ,227 but they are in accordance with what predominates; at any rate we say (a) that the hot is common ,228 and in some cases the moist: since also (b) that which is most unmixed will be most capable of perceiving, so that even that which is separated from the living creature will be capable of perceiving. Again, (4) if ratio is the cause of perception – for, also, it is destroyed when the ratio is dissolved,229 and the ratio is in the mixture of the several – each of the organs of sense would be out of several.230 But why are the senses of two only? For living is more in the hot,231 and sense of living.232

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Priscian’s replies Starting from the beginning, then, we will say in reply to these questions that, (1) not according to appearance but in accordance with what is scientifically reasonable, the medium is in two only. For of the simple earth, through its solidity and resistance, is not easily affected or receptive of the limits 233 from other things, and fire in a different way through its active nature and the fact that it itself makes forms; air and water however, because they are easily delimitable,234 easily receive and are easily affected and as it were given forms easily: in consequence then our sense-organs are indeed of these.235 (How therefore236 is it that with the Pythagoreans the visual organ is said to be fiery237 and like the sun?238 As being receptive of light, I will say, both through its fine and most transparent and most clear membranes, and through the most limpid liquids contained in them: for light is a fiery form, not as a body but as being participated in by fire.) To sum up, it is through their being easily delimitable that the medium is in two only.239 And (2) if several are through the same , that which has this will know also the several , in those animals which are not maimed or imperfect.240 For this is well maintained by Theophrastus, that several things are known through the same in accordance with ratios, and different ratios with regard to the several.241 And it is necessary for what is really perfect to have all the ratios, if it is going to be perfect. But perfect, clearly, is what participates also in the powers which transcend sense-perception, like man, at any rate if he has received a share of intellect as well. But those who smell but do not hear are imperfect.242 And (3) even if the hot is common to all, and the moist to some, the organs of sense will not be mixed on account of that.243 For neither do the external air nor the water become mixed in their partaking of the hot; for as long as they do not change essentially the simple remain: and even if they are mixed, yet what predominates only out of the two; and if they are simple, what is separated will not be capable of sense:244 since it was not as simple, but as characterized by a certain kind of life, that they were capable of sensing, and deprived of that it is plausible that they were senseless – unless indeed on the more Platonic view it is the things that are really simple to the fullest extent that are most capable of sensing, and the really simple are those that remain in their own wholenesses.

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On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception How is ratio the cause of sense-perception?

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‘In what way, then, is ratio the cause of sense-perception? For ratio lies in the mixture of the several and in the relationship of them to one another.’ This too he solves, placing the ratio not in the relationship245 of the elements, but in that of the sense-organ to its objects.246 But I think it would be better to consider the ratio 247 connected with sense as not primarily in a relationship, but as in a living substance which is aware of the objects of sense; and to suppose that the destruction of the ratio lies in the unsuitable state of the organ which receives it; and to suppose that it is unsuitable by reason of the incongruent application of the object of sense, which destroys its suitability for receiving the ratio. And if it is also the case that perception belongs to living, and living is more in the hot, the hot will also be in the simple in us by way of their adventitious248 partaking of life; and if they are actually mixed, yet the predominance, as has been said, is by way of the two alone. The common sensibles

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Again Aristotle,249 having shown that there is not a special sense for the common , says that we perceive the common by movement (and in this way know them by more than one sense, like size by both sight and touch). But Theophrastus says that it is absurd if shape 250 by movement, when it has not been determined I think * * * .251 We ought then to say that we are able to know the common by movement not in this way, that of movement primarily, and incidentally or secondarily of the rest, but that we are aware in a similar way of all the common , and in the case of absolutely all by movement, that is by being altered.252 And if sight is moved by size, it does not perceive it incidentally as it does the sweet; for sight is not affected or altered by the sweet.253 And even if size had some special sense, it would be perceptible incidentally by the other , as the sweet is. But as it is, it is not like this, but by producing movement. There is not therefore anything peculiar, as a sense, to size; and it is the same for the other which are common. And shape in particular produces movement, and the effect from it is less obvious, but more the activity of the sense, because shape moves the sense, through being more formal, more actively and more steadfastly.

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How we perceive that we perceive Following this, about how we perceive that we perceive, he sets out his argument on the same lines as Aristotle,254 wanting the common sense to be that which has this extra awareness, since it perceives both the activity of each and its inactivity. For the opposites are of the same .255 But the common sense is neither the same as the particular ones nor entirely different. For it is by way of the synthesis of all and their concentration into an undivided one; hence in a way each256 is conscious that it perceives, not as having been divided off but as joined together in the one.257 For it belongs to a power already separate from bodies258 to revert into259 itself and know itself, and each is more corporeal in so far as it has been divided up, and it goes up more to what is apart260 by means of its indivisible unity261 with the others. For in fact this indivisible unity is appropriate to the forms which are apart from bodies. But if, as he himself well claims, it belongs to the same to be aware of opposites, and for this reason of inactivity also, on the one hand even each will grasp what is separate in a way from its own organs262 – for sight would not have perceived that the sense-organ’s not being affected263 was darkness, for it appears to be active even when is not affected – and, on the other, to a greater extent the common , which is aware also of the inactivity of the senses themselves.264 Hence, also the common , but not each , will be conscious of itself and of its own activity: and if of its activity, then also of its inactivity: and if of its inactivity, it would at the same time be both inactive and active, in that it was conscious . Therefore it is inactive, on the one hand, as being divided off and by itself, and, on the other, it is active and as it were transcends its own special activity and inactivity. So that265 in respect of being the common , connected with which also is each , not as each , nor as divided off, but as united in the one union of all , of which it is the function to be aware of the objects of all the senses in the same and undividedly, being active in accordance with the different logoi. Hence also what is aware is in number one and indivisible, but in its being divisible,266 in that it is active in accordance with different logoi. And voice has been called concord in Aristotle,267 since it is perceived in actuality when it is heard; and it is heard when voice and hearing have become one, when they are in concord and conjunction with one another.268 For an excess of the object of sense-perception dissolves or destroys the activity of the

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sense; and perception lies in proportion , and we say that things that are proportionate are pleasant. Is it then that when the sense is not active, it is not in itself proportionate? Or, since it is not active in itself but in its extension 269 towards the things outside and its relation to the objects of sense, it is clear that it will also not have the active proportionality in itself: it will however have the proportionality in potentiality. For the potentiality is present first and in itself is an object of knowledge .270 But let us go on to what comes next, working through the rest of the fifth271 book from another starting-point.272

Priscian of Lydia the Philosopher Paraphrase of the books of Theophrastus On Imagination273 Of imagination, about which next, following Aristotle,274 he works out a view, it must be taken from that man’s works that it is another faculty besides sense-perception;275 and that it differs also from opinion and all rational apprehension; and that, just as perception is moved by sensible forms, being roused as a vital function, and being active about them through the projection of its own logoi, so imagination too is moved by sensible forms, using these as its immediate objects and being active about them.276 Hence this too is a corporeal form of life, and one that is not active without the bodily organs, since the sensible forms by which it is moved are also completed from the representative images in the sense-organs. And we must also add the views of Iamblichus,277 that imagination has developed naturally beside all the faculties of the soul, and represents in itself and moulds all the likenesses of the forms, and transmits representative images connected with the one set of faculties278 to the others, rousing up279 the one set 280 from sense-perception to opinion , and presenting to opinion the second, from intellect, and receiving in itself the images from the wholes: and that it is characterized in a special way by this assimilation, in both producing and receiving what are similar either to the intellective activities , or to those connected with generation,281 or to those in the middle, both representing in itself all the activities of the soul, and fitting those outside to those inside and placing upon the lives282 stretched out round the body the representative images coming down from the intellect. In itself, then, imagination is a faculty of assimilating them283 to itself from there, and it also joins them to the other faculties, being the first cause of

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their being active ; it is not a passive effect nor a movement, but an indivisible and determined activity, and is not moulded by receiving something from outside like wax,284 but is roused from within and by way of the projection of the assimilative logoi to the awareness of the images . But if, as Iamblichus says,285 it also represents in itself the other lives and the rational and intellective activities themselves, how is what Aristotle says still true, that imagination is moved by sensible forms?286 Is it that even if it represents all the superior activities, it is still made into images in accordance with the sensible forms in shape, and as divided up, and in accordance with the reference to the objects of sense, so that it represents even the superior activities by the fact287 that it is moved by the sensible forms? How then is imagination moved even when the sensible are not present? For even if it is moved by the sensible , yet these too it projects when the sensible objects are present and ceases when they are absent. Or perhaps it is not the case that, in the way that sense is moved only when its objects are present, so also is imagination, but rather, when it has been set in motion288 once, it can be aroused on its own account and project the images in accordance with their reference to the forms which have set it in motion. But sometimes289 it needs to have been set in motion not once or twice but several times for it to extend from itself things similar to those that have set it in motion. And it shares having shape and being divided up with sense-perception: but by the fact that it extends from itself images even when the things that set it in motion are no longer present it transcends sense-perception; and by the fact that it always has reference to other things and is assimilated to the different activities of the soul, by this it is both cognate with all the faculties of the soul, and it is a peculiarity of the soul by reason of its power of becoming like . ‘In what then is imagination?’ enquires Theophrastus. ‘For it is neither in connected with sense, since sometimes when the sense-perception is true the image 290is false; nor is it in the sense-organ;291 For the effect made on the sense-organ happens when its object is present, but the images occur also when it is absent.292 Well, I say that imagination is another faculty beside senseperception, but adjacent to it293 and for this reason somehow set in motion by it, and as it were using the sensible forms as its objects,294 from which it is aroused and to which it refers its images , and embroidering295 these in all kinds of ways in virtue of its superior standing;296 and of itself, after having been set in motion once, it is aroused to changing its shape as it may wish; and the sense-organ also receives the representative images of

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the forms being projected from the imagination, as is shown by the fact that their forms,297 having shape and being divisible, do not display what is separate from bodies.298 And I agree, on the other hand, that clearly it is often the case that when the body is moved together with the images , and disposed in accordance with them, the images also appear in the senseorgan, but not as being connected with sense (hence not from outside), nor as undergoing a change by the action of some bodies, but as receiving the forms connected with imagination. And that is not surprising: since even some sort of representative images299 of our reasoning activity come down into our body, as is shown by the turning inwards of our eyes and the knitting of our brows in our studying;300 and if even these solid parts301 are sympathetically affected, it must be that the sense-organ itself receives the traces of life much sooner, as being more closely connected with life. For,302 further, in those things in which the only form of life is that of sense, the organ is also only a sense-organ, but in those in which there is of imagination and desire and reason the organ is also suitable for the reception of this life. It will, therefore, receive also the representative images connected with imagination, insofar as it is capable of imagining, and false ones, if the images are false. And303 just as when perceiving true we can at the same time project false images about them, so, in consequence, our spirit ,304 in that it is on the one hand capable of sensing, receives the true images from the things connected with sense, and, in that it is on the other capable of imagining, the false from the objects of sense and the true from imagination: as when seeing the sun a foot across305 we imagine it to be many times the size of the earth, following the constraints of the measurement of the earth. And neither is the perception of the image , since the image is actually in the sense-organ, but the perception is based on the objects of sense, and the images are from the projection by the imagination: nor is it impossible for the substrate to receive both true and false representative images about the same things, for example the sun, since it receives opposites from different faculties and by way of different forms of life. And nothing prevents the image and the sense-experience from coinciding in the same , even if they are opposites, since they are not entities on the same level , nor actions of the same faculty; and since also the belief and the perception about the size of the sun are in the same , although they are opposites. Let us then give our account of this in this way. And that also has been said, that there is not always a need for the objects of sense to

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be present for imagination to be set in motion, but when it has been aroused and in the projective * * * of such a shape * * * 306 307 Intellect as potential * * * For it308 must not be taken like this, he says, nor in the same way:309 for that is a sophistry; but as some underlying potency,310 as is also the case with material objects.311 And going on a little further he adds: ‘Perhaps this too would seem to be absurd, if the intellect has the nature of matter, being nothing, but capable everything. But it must not be taken in this way, nor of all intellect, but it is necessary to make distinctions. Of what kind, then , and what is the distinction? For matter is not a “this something”, but intellect, if it is not like this,312 what else ?’ We must therefore take the ‘potentially’ also analogically, with regard to the intellect that is connected with the soul;313 for in relation to the intellect in actuality, that is, that which is separate.314 Matter indeed, as being at the lowest level, is reasonably everything potentially, but sense is not like matter. For sense is even said to be form315 and essentially contains the logoi of the objects of sense. But in another way it is said to be potentially the objects of sense as being moved by them to its projection, and needing them to be present and acting on the sense-organ for its own actualisation. But the intellect connected with the soul is neither like matter nor like sense. For it is both a form and a container316 of all forms by its own being, and is active of its own accord, and in itself contains the objects of intellect. But through its kinship with the soul, and through its essential relationship with it, and through its inclination 317 as it were towards the divisible, it itself has descended from the inviolably undivided and entirely united intellective substance and actuality, and also the objects of intellect in it fall short of the exceedingly bright and self-illuminating state of the primary intelligibles, and the continuity between the two has been loosened318 in a way, and is not exact as is the unity in the separate . And for this reason it itself needs the actually perfecting intellect for purely undivided knowledge, and the intelligibles in it also need the illumination from the separate intelligibles, so that they may be perfected as complete intelligibles – for which reason Aristotle319 himself likens them to colours needing the light from the sun – and the conjunction of the two of them is made indivisible by their inviolable unity when joined together. It is in this way therefore that the intellect connected with the soul is potential, that

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is, in relation to the separate intellect, because that is purely indivisible and inviolably united to the intelligibles, which are exceedingly bright and primary and perfect lights, and in that it is perfected by this kind of intellect. And, therefore, we must understand the unwritten tablet320 by analogy with it . For it is not as not having the forms at all, but, just as it itself is intellect potentially, not as not being intellect at all, but as being intellect of such a kind as to need to be perfected by the first intellect, so also the intelligibles in it are indeed intelligibles but such as to need the illumination from those that are separate, so that they may be inviolably intelligibles. Hence also they have been likened to colours,321 and the tablet has been called unwritten by reference to the reception of these perfect forms. Theophrastus is therefore right to declare that it is absurd to ascribe a material nature to intellect, and that it is like matter in being nothing, but capable everything. And he recommends that we ought not to take it in this way, but should seek how it may be said to be potential in another way.322 But how has been said sufficiently for our present purposes: and at the same time the distinction has been made that not all intellect is potential, but what kind is. Intellect and the intelligibles

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Next he raises the question how it becomes323 the intelligibles, and what is its being affected.324 For it must , if it is going to come into actuality like the senses. But what is effect,325 or of what kind is alteration, of an incorporeal thing by an incorporeal thing? And is the starting-point from that or from itself? For by the fact that it is affected it would seem to be from that; for none of the things that are being affected of itself; but from the fact that thinking is the starting-point of everything and in its own power,326 and not as with the senses, from itself.327 Priscian’s reply

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It does therefore become the intelligibles, but, through the looseness, as has been said, of the union328 it is not in the way that the separate intellect is things; and since on the one hand it is joined to them exactly, being brought together by the intellect in actuality, on the other through this it is yet also affected in a way, because having descended from the purely and entirely undivided unity329 of the separate intelligibles, and as it were going out through its kinship with the soul, it is brought to perfection, as one thing by others, by

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both the intellect in actuality and the intelligibles in it. But since it itself brings itself to perfection330 both being aroused of itself and fitting itself to the intellect in actuality, and receiving its perfection from that by its own activity, and since it has not entirely gone out from the intellect in actuality, but, although descended, is joined even so to that, in that it is itself also intellect – hence also, not turning outward in any direction but entering into itself and being brought together with itself as much as possible, it is also brought to perfection by the intellect in actuality331 – for these reasons therefore it is affected in a different way from the senses, and in general it is affected not in the proper sense but homonymously,332 and, rather, it is active. For by its own activity it receives also the perfections from the that are prior and does not receive what it thinks from outside. For it itself also is things, having been made perfect in a secondary way, united with its own objects and at the same time joined to the that are superior because its own have not been torn away from those that are prior. And the intelligibles are also active on the intellect, as are also the objects of sense on sense, but not from outside, since they have not been separated . Hence the activity of both is one, that of the intellect about the intelligibles, and that of the intelligibles on the intellect, by the fact that they have not been torn apart, but the intellect is the intelligibles.333 Again, even with sense it is round the sense-organ that the effect produced occurs, since the primary sensitive is made perfect by way of its own activity, and as receiving the movement from the objects of sense not passively but actively; and to a greater extent the intellect is both active of itself and receives its perfection from the intelligibles not passively but actively; if we even ought to say that it receives but does not bring forward; for starting from itself it is made perfect. And in general, in those things that are moved by something else the effect is as on things being aroused from outside, but in those things whose activities are all from within and which are active as wholes through wholes,334 it is impossible to conceive of any passive effect, except homonymously. For even the potential intellect is activity in its very being335 in a secondary way, and this activity is the opposite of a passive effect, and would never be disposed passively.

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Return to Theophrastus, with Priscian’s comments And, simply, in those incorporeal336 things which are separate from bodies, as he himself says, ‘What is the effect, or of what kind the alteration?’ And passive effects are from outside, but the intellect is a starting-point and from itself. In what way,337 then, is it passive?

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‘For if it is wholly impassible,’338 he says, ‘it will grasp nothing intelligible’,339 calling the perfecting from the intelligibles a passive effect, since it is necessary for the intellect to be pure340 in every way. But since it is made perfect also from the intelligibles by way of its own activity, for this reason we would understand those words ‘a passive effect’ in a broader sense, and not strictly. ‘For the intellect is an impassible thing,’ says Theophrastus, ‘unless indeed “passive” is 341 in another way, not as moving,342 for motion is incomplete, but as activity. And these are different. But it is sometimes necessary to use the same names.’343 You see that in the case of the intellect he redefines ‘passive effect’ neither as incomplete nor in terms of change344 or any kind of movement, nor as from outside, but in connection with activity. And he asks to agree to his use of the names, because we transfer the names from the objects of sense to intellective things. And he asks leave to redefine ‘being affected’ . And it has been said that with the second being made perfect actively by way of the process of perfecting being given from345 the superior * * *346 ‘And in what way is an intelligible affected by an intelligible?’347 : Since it is as a second object of intellect, that is, as capable of activity and as ruling and as being self-actively348 determined by its superior. ‘And in what way does it itself perfect itself?’349 Because, as has been said, it receives even from its superior self-actively. ‘And for what reason 350 not always ?’351 Or perhaps the intellect is always active, but the soul does not always use the intellect even when it is present, in its turning towards bodies. And these men, namely Aristotle and Theophrastus, appear, as we have indeed already said,352 to call intellect sometimes even the whole rational life,353 where at any rate they extend the name of intellect even as far as the imagination.354 And in this way he would with reason enquire in the case of the soul ‘For what reason not always?’ not from the fact that it does not have the potentiality, but from the fact that it is extended towards what is secondary and corporeal and wholly outside itself through the double nature355 of its individual life. For in its turning into itself and its inclination 356 towards intellect is its process towards perfection, and in its tendency towards bodies is its departure from thinking, and the soul is also made perfect both beginning from itself and bringing itself towards the intellect, and self-actively also receiving its perfecting from that. Since, as he says, ‘it is absurd that the activity of the intellect should be from something else moving it, both for other reasons and it is to make something else prior to the intellect, and thinking not to be in its own power,357 unless

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there is some other intellect which sets it in motion.’358 And these things are true whether he were to call intellect the undivided substance participated in by soul or the rational soul itself.359 But what is the implication? ‘For if it is as being active’, he says ‘that it becomes things, and then it is most fully both , things and the intellect would be one and the same’.360 For not only is it the things which are thought , but also it is then most fully intellect, when it is thinking. For that reason he said ‘both’. If therefore when it is things then it is also intellect, intellect and things would be one and the same. Is it then the case that when it is not thinking, not being things it is also not intellect?361 Or perhaps the real intellect and the potential one which is participated by soul thinks,362 in that it is also, even though secondarily, itself essentially actuality. But in the case of the individual soul the difficulty would have standing: for this certainly does not always think. ‘Is it therefore nothing before it thinks?’363 Or else it is like matter, and it is given form from outside by the things which come upon it, when it knows1 364 them. But the soul is actually something before it knows2 , and it is not from outside but from itself that it both makes a beginning and projects the known1 objects, and entering into itself discovers things. And therefore, before knowing1, it is things, but since by this fact the soul has also been divided in a way through not being activity in its substance,365 but possessing a secondary cognitive2 activity which proceeds366 from its substance , as is also the case when it is not knowing2, so also it is things not actively but in its substance . For it is necessary also to think the things in it in a way appropriate to the soul:367 they are not thought by being , but by a cognitive1 act, and they are made objects of cognition1 through the secondary activity which proceeds from its substance – unless then, in the case of the soul, neither existence nor activity are simple nor of one kind, but the one kind stable and the other changing, with the one that is changing proceeding round the one that is stable, with the soul as whole being conscious368 in accordance with both, and for this reason both staying the same and changing at the same time; and at the same time both always being active with regard to the hidden369 activity which is cognate with the stable substance and also with regard to the life which proceeds outwards and changes;370 when it as a whole is turned round the secondary and divided, being also active with regard to these, using opinion together with sense-perception,371 but not with regard to the objects of knowledge2, which are the things inside it, nor still more with regard to the intelligibles, to which through the objects of knowledge2 it is connected as it were in a single continuity. And when to be sure it calls

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back towards the stable things in it the life and activity that have been projected, it is not active about everything at the same time, but now these and now others through its divided nature. So its ‘potential’ and its ‘active’ are with reference to change. Or372 when its outgoing activity by which knowledge2 occurs is not present, then we say that the stable entity which is projective of this is potential, being things, but not being active by way of its outgoing activity. And if, therefore, it does not know1 everything at the same time, but different things at different times, it is not the case that for this reason it actually is different things at different times, and never the same, because it does not change utterly, but there is also something in the soul which is stable, thanks to which things are always situated in it. ‘For it is also absurd’, he says, ‘if existing potentially it is nothing, but in actuality it is something other than itself, when it does not know 373 itself, and through knowing one thing and another is never the same. For this is a kind of undiscriminating and disorderly374 nature’; thus he refutes those who suppose that the intellect is potentially everything and nothing in itself extremely well.375 For first, when it does not think , it will be nothing; and then even when it is thinking, when it thinks other things and not itself, it will be another thing and not itself, and different at different times and continually changing. For this reason he says ‘it is not to be taken like this’, but in the way that was said earlier in the passage in which he thought it right to understand ‘potential’ and ‘in actuality’ analogically,376 and not, as with matter, so with the intellect. For the intellect is a ‘this something’. Nor again as with sense-perception: for this, as he now also adds, does not without the body, but that is separate .377 Hence it does not need things that come outwards for its perfecting. And when, then, the soul is not knowing1 , it is in actuality everything in accordance with its permanent and essential perfection, but its projective activity is lacking: hence it is potential with regard to this; and since it is cognate with the objects of knowledge2 when it knows2 something or other, being in actuality what the object of knowledge2 is, it is not other than itself, because this has substantial existence in connection with all the objects of knowledge2. But it does indeed appear in some way to be in a state of becoming. ‘For when it378 has become each thing in the sense in which it is said to know2 them in actuality, and we say that this happens when it is able to be active through itself, then too it is potential in a way, but not in the same way as before having learned and found out. By what, then, is its coming to be 379? Well, it is either by disposition and potentiality or by substance. It seems to be more a matter of disposition, and this as it were perfects its nature.’380 At any

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rate the soul comes to be381 in a way because it is not uniform like the intellectives, nor purely stable; but it stays the same and has change within its nature at the same time, and it is ambivalent382 because of its intermediate position and its life which is constituted in movement. Hence, also, it is carried down into ignorance by means of its tendency towards the worse, and again it is perfected by knowledge2 by way of its turning towards the better. Hence at times it becomes imperfect and perfect, being on the one hand imperfect when it is ignorant and for this reason potential, since it has the potentiality of knowing1 even then: but when on the other hand it knows2 it is perfect. Hence it is active, and in its being active is its perfection; but since even when it knows2 it is not entirely active, ‘it is on the one hand potential even then, but not however in the same way as before it had learned and found out’,383 in that it has already received its disposition and perfected the projective power of its activities connected with knowledge2. ‘By what, then,’ he says, ‘is its coming to be ? By disposition and potentiality, or by substance?’384 That is, whether the change in the soul comes about in disposition only and potentiality, or also in substance.385 Well, since both the dispositions and the activities are from the substance, it is impossible to suppose that the substance, remaining entirely unchanging and always in the same condition, is sometimes productive of activities which are perfect and of a good type, and sometimes of imperfect and corrupted . For substances are the causes of activities, and the nature of their activities provide us with the material for deducing the type of their potentiality and of their substance. But if someone were to have the idea that there were a twofold386 substance in us and twofold potentialities and activities, and were to think that the one kind were always perfect, but the others were sometimes imperfect and sometimes perfect, if he is talking of them as separate387 , he will make the one many living things, and completely set apart the superior substance, as neither ruling life nor having anything in common, if at least with regard to the second what is in turn imperfect and perfect, in which the life of man is contained . But if in speaking of twofold relations or logoi or lives he were not to destroy the unity of the two, so that what is ours should not resemble a company or any other crowd, but so that all things should come together into one , and grow together towards one principle, we will enquire about this one whether it is uniform and entirely pure and unchanging. But on this account again there will never be in souls either in substance or in activity imperfection or evil or suffering : for their activities

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are in accordance with their substance. But neither is it possible to agree that it is changing in every way: for its life remains through its changes. According to Iamblichus,388 then, the individual soul has received together equally both the stable and the changing, so that in this too intermediacy is preserved. For the superior are stable only, and the mortal are entirely changeable. But the individual soul, as being in the middle, and being divided together with and being multiplied along with all the kinds of things of this world, is not only stable but also changes, living through so many partial lives. And not only with regard to its dispositions, but also with regard to its substance, it changes somewhat. And indeed I think that he himself is demonstrating this when he says ‘It seems to be more disposition.’ For the change and perfecting according to dispositions is obvious: hence ‘more’: but his speaking of ‘more’ itself hinted also at the perfecting by way of substance. Hence he also adds: ‘And this as it were perfects its nature’, , clearly, of the active, as it was not perfect before; for if the substance were entirely perfect neither would the disposition be imperfect, nor the activity which proceeds from the substance alone. Forms with and without matter

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And next he himself also, like Aristotle,389 supposes that some of the forms are without matter, and in these each is itself identical with its being :390 for its being shows its logos and its form, and it itself its whole nature , and in the case of those without matter the whole nature is connected with the form and the logos only; and some are enmattered, and in them the thing itself and its being are different; for it itself by way of the combination of both , but its being is on the contrary by way of the form; since the potential intellect is contemplative of both, he enquires ‘How each of the two, that is, how the in matter, and in abstraction?’ For in fact it is conscious of the enmattered themselves either by way of the combination of both or by way of the form alone.391 Well, these matters have been distinguished more clearly in the genuine expositors of Aristotle, I mean Iamblichus and Plutarch son of Nestorius.392 But still we also must make mention of them in a few words as we examine thoroughly what we are seeking. I say, therefore, that the potential intellect, both that participated in by the soul and the rational itself,393 when it purely uses reason and is not stretched off to the things outside with perception and imagination , in contemplating394 the forms within it and the

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matterless logoi395 within it, by means of these contemplates both the matterless and the enmattered, the former by way of identity and the unity of the matterless with one another, and the latter, which are similar to their cause, as being from cause. For as the intellect in actuality in thinking itself knows1 also all the things after itself, in that it is itself the things which are causes and from these causes also it thinks the effects on a higher level than that on which they exist, so also the potential intellect knows1 the enmattered in a secondary way from the contiguous causes in it, knowing1 those in itself without matter, and then causes of the enmattered. But it knows1 the enmattered not like sense, for this as made particular through qualities, e.g. as hot or cold or white, or something of the kind; but the intellect and the rational life substances also by way of the common forms of the enmattered. Will it then not know1 that fire is hot? Or perhaps the qualities and all the accidents proceed also from each substance. Hence the intellect which knows1 the substance * * * 396 and becomes acquainted with the accidents on a higher level by means of the logos of the substance. But the problem before us is: How does the soul know1 both? – the without matter, I mean, and the enmattered. Indeed, as has been said, both by means of the logoi in itself,397 but the former as coordinate with those in itself or even as superior, and the latter as effects. But those in abstraction are in a way the same as the enmattered forms, but they are thought of in themselves, that is, not with their matter: since they neither subsist separately, nor are they thought of as having been given separate substantial existence. But when we know1 them with their matter, then as enmattered, but when as forms alone, knowing1 that they subsist in matter and not otherwise, then as a result of abstraction. ‘Is it that it is aware of the matterless and the enmattered by different , or by in a different state,398 and again of the things in matter and those resulting from abstraction, or by the same and in the same state?’ Or perhaps both are true.399 For (a) it is the same thing that is aware of differences, what is intellective , I mean, and in the same state. by means of its own logoi. And (b) by different in a way and in a different state, since either it is conscious of its own logoi as causes, when from them it is conscious of the enmattered, or as coordinate with the matterless, or even as effects of the intellective400 forms, and in this way they are made different and in a different state. And in general in the same way that things are separable from matter, so also are the connected with intellect , both Aristotle401 and Theophrastus declare402 –

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either showing this, that just as enmattered forms are separated from matter in thought only and are cognised by this with a different and in a different state, as being set apart in thought alone, so also the forms are separated from the potential intellect in thought alone, since in reality it always exists together with the forms. So that we may understand also how it is said to be potential and nothing actually, because in thought alone – either then they mean this (for it is in this way that Plutarch interprets them), or403 because just as with the things separate from matter, some are really separate like those without matter, but others in thought like those in abstraction, so too both are thought of, the former as really separate, the latter, even if they too are separated in thought, yet would not be subsisting otherwise than enmattered. Or rather that we must deal with the about the intellect in the same way as we treat of the separate and matterless, so that we may understand ‘separate’ not with regard to thought but in its primary sense.404 For just as matterless forms are really separate, so also is the intellect separate: for it is necessary for the matterless forms to subsist before the enmattered, and also to subsist in the realm of intellect, in that they are indivisible and as wholes through wholes405 are full of life and of unified knowledge1; for lifelessness and ignorance are through privation, and privation is in the mixture with matter. Since therefore the without matter are intellective, it is clear that they are actually in the intellect. And the intellect itself is both without matter and essentially joined with the forms which are without matter, if at least both its life and its knowledge1 reverting into itself and finding the entities in itself are indivisible. But since even among the things that are really separate and without matter there is some distinction with regard to descent – for some are entirely indivisible, but others are with some unfolding,406 and others are intermediate as being indivisible and yet definitive of those being unfolded407 – so also the intellect is primarily separate, that in actuality, but secondarily the potential which is participated in by soul, and the rational itself. For this too, even if with unfolding, yet also brings together and is brought together into the indivisible, and both begins of itself and also contemplates the entities in itself: this too then is separate and is full of the separate logoi.

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Return to ‘potential’ And Theophrastus again suggests most philosophically that the statement that the intellect is things both potentially and actually408 must also409 be taken in the appropriate way, in order that we should not understand ‘potential’, as with matter, in the sense of privation, nor ‘actually’ in the sense of an external and passive perfecting, but neither also as in the case of sense-perception,410 where the projection of the logoi occurs by means of the movement of the sense-organs, and this411 is contemplative of external objects; but both the ‘potential’ and the ‘actual’ of the intellect’s being things are to be taken in an intellective sense: ‘actual’ with regard to indivisible unity and inviolable determination and unified perfection – for intellect’s being things is to be taken in an intellective sense: ‘actual’ with regard to indivisible unity and inviolable determination and unified perfection – for the intellect in actuality is things not by participation nor dividedly, nor as other, but also not as being determined or made perfect by them: but as itself being things and the determination of all and their perfection412 – but the ‘potential’ by way of the conjunction with otherness and the descent into what is being determined in a way and being made perfect, with the otherness appearing more obviously in the case of the rational soul, as is shown also by its contemplation, being brought together with the objects of knowledge1 with unfolding, neither itself being entirely divided up nor being at a distance from things: for it would not have been brought together into the indivisible, nor would it of its own accord and in itself have contemplated the objects of knowledge1; but as it were having its union with things loosened. Hence also it is dependent on that which is inviolably united, and in this way it is potential. Further, this loosening is more obvious in the case of the soul,413 but still also in the case of the intellect which is participated in by it , being both participated in through its descent and suspended from its united and entirely indivisible determination ,414 and being essentially perfected by it; hence415 ‘potentially’. But since it itself is also undivided and not at a distance nor through complete otherness, has descended from the First,416 for this reason it is perfected neither as moved by something else nor as by something else, but perfecting itself and by means of the determining power of that , as being in a secondary way what that is, and united with that also by way of some secondary union. This, then, is the appropriate sense in which, in the case of the intellect, the word ‘potentially’ must be taken. And it seems to me that, here too makes the distinction: ‘we ought to take it in an appropriate sense’, glancing at the tablet with no writing on it which is

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adduced somewhere here by Aristotle417 as a simile for the potential intellect, in order that we should regard also the ‘with no writing on it’ as being in intellect,418 which on the one hand has the forms essentially and has them perfect, but, on the other, is being perfected by the First Intellect and being actually written upon. For the indivisibility and unity of perfection are from there. ‘Potentially the potential intellect is its objects’, as on the one hand by descent and with some otherness, but aroused from itself into the indivisible perfection from the First Intellect: for such is the intellective ‘potential’. ‘But it is in actuality nothing before it thinks’,419 that is, not indivisibly nor in union, until it has been made perfect by the First; but ‘before’, even if it applies to the soul, yet it must not be understood in any way temporally, in the case of the participated420 intellect at least, but with regard to its inferior position and its separation in thought and with regard to its special nature. For as being inferior and as itself, the potential intellect is not yet actuality,421 but in that422 it is joined to the First, being perfected by it or rather perfecting itself in accordance with that, . Relations between the thinker and the thought

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Following these matters, sets out the views of Aristotle, in which that writer brings the separate and matterless into identity with intellect, but in the enmattered each of the intelligibles exists potentially, and the intellect is not actually present in these things. makes further distinctions about what is said and adds some problems.423 So therefore that we may grasp these things also more clearly, we must give a preliminary analysis of the words of Aristotle424 as far as is possible in a few words. ‘Since’, he says, ‘some are in matter and some are without matter’ – such as the incorporeal and separate entities – ‘in those which are separate the thinker and the thought are one and the same.’ For both the intellect, not being extended outside but remaining in itself, thinks things: hence it is the same as its objects: and also all the things without matter, being indivisible and full of life and knowledge1, are as a matter of fact intellective; since also the objects of sense on the one hand, through their being torn apart by matter, are capable of being sensed by others, but some of them are in no way able to be sensed by themselves, but the things without matter, on the other, being objects of intellect, differ also in this way from the objects of sense in not having been torn apart from that which thinks nor being made perfect from outside, but being perfectly thought from themselves. Hence even as thinkers, being still undivided, they are united indivisibly also with that which thinks, and as wholes through wholes being objects of thought they are united as wholes through

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wholes with the intellect, and being objects of thought not by accident but essentially , and being perfect essentially, and for this reason also perfect in their own essence , the objects of thought and the thinkers would be one and the same: so that actually in themselves they would be both objects of thought and perfect objects of thought. But Aristotle has reminded us from the case of knowledge2 also that in the things which are separate the thinker and the thought are one and the same. ‘For speculative knowledge2,’ he says, ‘and that which is known2 in this way are one and the same’425 – that is, because knowledge2, although not being entirely extended outside, but remaining in itself and working within, yet in fact is conscious of things, and what is known2 in this way is the same . For since we say that both that are in matter and those that are in abstraction are objects of knowledge2, with knowledge2 being conscious of them not as coordinate but as from the logoi in itself which are their causes, making distinctions in relation to these he says ‘what is known2 in this way’ – that is, what is known2 as coordinate, and such is what is causative even in the soul itself, and it is this that is the same as knowledge2. Indeed even in the case of sense-perception it has been said already that knowledge1 is not completed in any other way than when the knowledge1 in actuality comes to be identical with that which it knows1 in actuality; so that also the knowledge2 in actuality is the same as that which it knows2 in actuality: but the difference is that that which is the primary object of knowledge1 has not come from outside and does not lie outside as in the case of sense-perception. But if therefore knowledge2 and the object of knowledge2 are identical, even more so, surely are the thinker and the thought united.

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Why are we not always thinking? Hence also with good reason he indicated in the middle as worthy of enquiry and consideration: ‘Why ever then are we not always thinking, at least if both the thinker and the thought are in us? For both are the same.’426 About this we earlier enquired in the way that was possible for us.427 To sum up, in things which are separate , the thinker and the thought are one and the same, as has been said: but in things with matter each of the intelligibles exists potentially. For the enmattered are not intelligibles in themselves, nor essentially, nor coordinately with the intellect. In what way, then is ‘potentially’ used? For if potentially , they will also be actually objects of thought at some time. Or rather they will be, but not coordinately,

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but in accordance with their own causes 428 in the intellect. And since they are of the same property as their causes, they are said also to be intelligible, but potentially, because they are to the transcendent thinker, but by way of the transcendent cause, and not to themselves; for they do not think themselves. Hence he also brings in: ‘so that the intellect does not exist in them’, meaning the enmattered, because they are not objects of thought to themselves, since they are enmattered, but the intellect is without matter; ‘for without matter’, he says, ‘ the intellect is the potentiality of such things.’429 Here ‘without matter’ indicates the matterless of the intellect; but the intellect is the potentiality of the enmattered either (a) as cause of their actualisations (thus Plutarch) or (b) as contemplating them not coordinately but on a higher level, because from a cause; or (c) the potential intellect is the potentiality of such things also, as thinking of these also in accordance with its perfecting from the superior.430 So, the intellect does not exist in the enmattered, but in it the intelligible will exist.431 And having set this out Theophrastus adds: ‘But whenever these things have come into being and been thought, clearly it will possess them, but the intelligibles always, if indeed speculative knowledge2 is the same as things, and this is obviously in actuality: for that is its most proper state.’ ‘In the intellect’, he says, ‘the intelligibles’ – that is the matterless – ‘always exist’, since it coexists with them essentially and is what the intelligibles are. ‘But the enmattered, when they have been thought, they will also exist in intellect’,432 not as going to be thought coordinately by it; for the enmattered never by the intellect which is without matter. But whenever the intellect knows1 the things in it not as themselves only but as causes of the enmattered, then the enmattered will exist in the intellect also by means of their cause. I would not say that these things had been said about the intellect in actuality (for that is not a potentiality), nor the words ‘Whenever they come into being.’433

Notes 1. This title is found in all the MSS, and is repeated at the head of the following section at 23,1-2. Priscian’s subject is Theophrastus’ lost work De Anima , which was itself concerned with Aristotle’s work of the same name. ‘Paraphrase’ is the word used for the rather similar works of Themistius. The Greek word used here is metaphrasis, which is also used by Photius cod. 74 (I 153, Henry = 52a, 15-19 Bekker) of those works of Themistius, and there seems to be no difference in meaning. References to the De Anima (DA) which follow are to Aristotle. 2. aisthêsis covers both ‘sensation’ and ‘perception’, as well as ‘sense-perception’; these terms will be used as appropriate. Similarly the verbs ‘to perceive’ and ‘to sense’ will be used for aisthanesthai, and also sometimes ‘to be aware’. 3. At DA 2.5 418a3-5 Aristotle says that at the time when that which is capable of sensation is affected it is not like its object, but when it has been affected it has become like, and is such as, its object. Theophrastus asks how this comes about. Priscian’s answer draws upon a number of concepts: (a) the object of sense, (b) the effect made by it on the sense-organ, (c) the form and the logos of the object, (d) the life of the living being that has the sense, (e) the logos within the living being, (f) the image which links the logos with the sense to produce sensation, (g) the form resembling the sense-object, which is in the life of the living being. Only (a), (b) and (c) derive directly from Aristotle and Theophrastus, and the relationship between the logos in (c) and that in (e) is puzzling. At 3,5 it seems to be (g) that is a likeness of (c), and at 7,16 (e) is that by which judgment occurs. At 4,28 the status of the ‘sensitive’ form is unclear. See the discussion there. There is a short account of Priscian’s system in C. Steel, The Changing Self, ch. 10, (henceforth CS). 4. DA 2.5 416b33-5; 418a5-6. 5. Han Baltussen, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception, p. 65 n. 61 thinks that the term used here, homoiôsis, is Theophrastus’ own, but that exomoiôsis and its related verb, used at 1,4 (not 2), 7 and 8 are Priscian’s. See also 1,14 and 4,11. At De Sensu 19, Theophrastus says that the word homoios, ‘like’, is vague (aoristos). 6. See Baltussen, ibid. 64. 7. The reference to the soul is more appropriate to Priscian than to Theophrastus. The sentiment of the rest may come from Theophrastus. 8. DA 2.12 424a22-3. There is no obvious reason why ‘tastes’ here replaces Aristotle’s ‘taste’. Shape is an addition to Aristotle’s list. 9. Or, ‘like colour and tastes and sound and shape’. 10. This could mean that Theophrastus thought this notion was absurd, or that he believed that Aristotle held it, but rejected it himself. Caution is necessary with atopon: Baltussen (as yet unpublished) has argued that it need mean no more that ‘strange’. 11. It is not clear whether this is Theophrastus or Aristotle. Aristotle says that sense can receive form without matter, and in accordance

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with the logos of the object. Theophrastus was accepting these remarks and may have repeated them. 12. Priscian is here following Aristotle, DA 2.12 424a26-31. For Simplicius form was a unity that embraced many logoi, cf. in DA 12,22-3; 92,16-18; 113,20-1. That view is not to be found in Priscian. (Henceforth ‘Simpl.’ alone will be used to refer to the commentary on the DA traditionally ascribed to Simplicius. That fact should not be taken to imply any views about whether this commentary is by Priscian himself.) Between 19,6 and 21,8 only ‘ratio’ is an appropriate translation for logos, but after that Priscian introduces a different interpretation. No single English word is appropriate in every case. I therefore keep logos, except where ‘ratio’ or ‘reason’ or ‘account’ is clearly required. Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals (London and Ithaca N.Y., 1994) p. 48, shows the influence of the Middle Platonist view found in Alcinous/Albinus’ Didascalicus ch. 4 of logoi as concepts of later Neoplatonists, including Olympiodorus in Phaedonem 11.7; 12.1, lines 9-25 and Damascius in Phaedonem Part 1,274, Part 2,15 as well as Priscian, but he admits that logoi can also be norms and be actively creative. 13. 1,3-8 = Theophrastus 273 FHSG (first part). Baltussen (as in n. 5), 64-5, compares this section with other aspects of Theophrastus’ views. 14. See n. 20 below. Anything associated with bodies, including the form here discussed, is thought of as divided up in a way that contrasts with the unity of higher entities. 15. cf. Simpl. 125,25-7. 16. That of soul. For neusis see CS 61 n. 32. The word, along with rhopê, is also used frequently by Simpl.? in DA. (Steel refers to the author of this in DA as Priscian. He may be right, but this usage can be confusing.) Both terms ‘indicate the declining of the soul towards the body’, probably following Iamblichus. Plotinus already used neusis similarly: see I.1.12, 21-8. ‘The use of these terms seems to suggest that the tendency of the soul downward is inherent in its nature.’ But sunneusis is upwards. 17. For sumplêrotikê (completive) see A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford, 1990) pp. 86-92. All Imperial philosophers used the jargon-term sumplêrotikê (sc. tês ousias) for an attribute which completes the existence or substance of some object. Here sensation is such an attribute. Lloyd’s account is difficult, matching the difficulty of his subject-matter. To put it shortly, a substance on any level can exist only as a complete thing with all its essential attributes, and each of these is completive of it. See also John Ellis, ‘Alexander’s Defense of Aristotle’s Categories’, Phronesis 29 (1994) pp. 70, 83-8. 18. cf. Simpl. 125,28-9. 19. ‘Imagination’ is a suitable term in this connection for phantasia, the faculty between sense and reason. 20. Reading katatetagmenon with several MSS. For this interpretation see Lloyd, as in n. 17, p. 65. katatetagmenos ‘was understood in the same way by Porphyry and all his Neoplatonic successors. It indicates the universal, that is the genus or the species as it is “in” the species or individual respectively’. Here it is equivalent to ‘divided up around bodies’ in line 10 above. Bywater’s katatetamenon would mean ‘extended’, but applied to the sense-organ it is inappropriate, and it is redundant, in view of the following clause, if applied to the faculty. 21. cf. Simpl. 202,3-5; 214,21-2; and 24,24-7 below. 22. The following passage as far as 2,14 is almost identical with Simpl. 125,30126,3. 23. Reading Wimmer’s emendation hama. The MSS have mia, which would give ‘without as one thing also being active’.

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24. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.219 attributes to Theophrastus, among others, an analysis of sensation and imagination in terms of motions, which is developed further in what follows. 25. ‘Representative image’ stands for emphasis, a word that recurs throughout Priscian’s account. In earlier philosophers it means sometimes ‘reflection’, sometimes ‘appearance’, but here it is the lowest manifestation of life in the ensouled organism (Steel). At 15,8 and 20 there is a different kind of emphasis which is thought to occur in reflections. 26. This renders the touto aisthêsis of the MSS HM2P: BLM1QV have toutôn: Bywater, following Simpl. 125,37 preferred touto hê. 27. krisis and the verb krinein have a basic meaning of ‘discriminate’ or ‘judge’. See R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp. 35-6 and 58. But in many cases in this work the emphasis seems to be on the part played by consciousness in cognition. It is this that turns mere effects in a sense-organ into cognition. What discriminates must be conscious or aware, and so I have used ‘awareness’ and ‘be aware’ for these words in most cases. 28. See n. 98 for alternative ways of translating energeia. 29. See n. 17 above; this life is that of the living being, but also of the soul as the source of that life. See also 3,11-13 below. 30. This is difficult; the pronoun is feminine, and grammatically should look back to aisthêsis (sensation) in line 23, or possibly to zôê (life) in line 25, though that is difficult coupled with zôtikê (vital); it may then refer to soul, concealed in the adjective behind ‘of the soul’ in line 25. The whole perhaps means that the form is projected by the soul. Other occurrences of probolê in Priscian are not helpful, and usually it is a logos that is projected. See n. 36. It should be noted that the alternative reading prosbolê (application) instead of probolê (projection) has had considerable support. 31. For this term see Lloyd, as in n. 17, pp. 126-30, for a full discussion of reversion, and p. 160 for its relation to knowledge. Reverting towards higher entities is the opposite of declining towards body. For divided forms see Lloyd p. 162. But what Priscian is saying here is simply that the form of a sensible object is divided up round the sense-organ. To be known, even at the level of sensation, there must be consciousness of its unity, achieved by reversion. For reverting into oneself see 22,6 and n. 258. 32. Wimmer read meros, meaning ‘part’. 33. Simpl. 126,9-12. 34. Simplicius, using a poetic term, refers to the ‘straitened’ (apestenômenên) unity of these individuals. 35. Bywater follows Simplicius in reading epharmozôn. The MSS reading epharmozon would have ‘the one’ as its subject, and could be intransitive. For epharmozein see H.J. Blumenthal in The Criterion of Truth, p. 259. 36. Steel, CS p. 138, discusses various uses of proballesthai and related terms. Here the logos in the soul is projected from the soul to connect with the likeness of the form of the object which is in the sense-organ. 37. We might say ‘activated’. See n. 61 below. 38. Reading sunthesis with the MSS instead of Bywater’s sunesis , which is perhaps supported by Ficino’s cogitatio, and the occurrence of sunesis at line 16 below. sunthesis would mean the combining of various data of sense, so as to be aware of the objects with which they are connected. 39. level of reality. 40. autou is ambiguous as between ‘the form’s’ and ‘the object’s’. The latter is more probable.

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41. cf. Simpl. 165,4-5; 126,4; Plotinus IV 3,26,30; 6,1,1-36. 42. Steel, CS pp. 133 and 140, says that the soul has these ‘ideal concepts’ in its essence which must always be objects of knowledge. He thinks the idea comes from Iamblichus. 43. See Steel, CS pp. 125-9, for this widespread use of horos. Here it is life which determines and perfects the living being. In C. Steel and F. Bossier, ‘Priscianus Lydus en de “in De Anima” van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius’ in Tijdschrift voor filosofie 34 (1972) p. 772 n. 26, it is said that horos is the fundamental concept of the hierarchical relations between levels. The absolute intellect is the horos of all forms ; cf. Simpl. 217,26. The relationship between the different levels of being is that higher beings in a way always regulate the activity of lower ones. 44. The reading of some MSS would give: ‘but in the sense-organ is incomplete and mixed with a passive effect, and the activity’. 45. Simpl. 126,14-16. 46. Simpl. 196,22-3; cf. 198,35-199,5. 47. Literally, ‘otherness’. But the metaphysical sense of that term seems inappropriate here; cf. 5,13 below. In this sentence, logos must mean ‘reason’, and its activity is on an empirical level. 48. 3,27-9 = end of Theophrastus 273 FHSG. 49. While this seems to be using the standard coupling of dunamis and energeia, it is also making the point that one can only know about dunameis from energeiai, and it is because sensation involves energeiai that we can call it a faculty. Cf. DA 2.4 415a16-20; 1.1 402b10-14. 50. Translating the apo of the MSS. Bywater preferred hupo – ‘produced by’. 51. Sens. 7 448a2-6; cf. DA 3.2 426b29-427a8. 52. Reading Bywater’s addition allôi, supported by Ficino’s alia. 53. 3.34-4.2 = Theophrastus 274 FHSG. 54. Above, 3,25. 55. tupos was used by Stoics and Epicureans to mean ‘impression’, but here ‘form’ in the sense of shape is appropriate. 56. For what follows see Simpl. 127,9-14. 57. The special objects are qualities perceived by one sense each, like colour, odour, flavour, and sound; the common are common to two or more senses, like shape, motion, and number. 58. cf. 19,7-13 below. Priscian is arguing that while some common objects are known by sense, others are known by thought. Of those he mentions here only number is given by Aristotle as such a common object, but both time and being (or substance or essence or existence) raise related problems, as belonging in a way to sense-objects. Priscian then asks how thought is made like its objects, either with or without being affected by them. Instead of answering he suggests that perhaps no kind of awareness is by means of a passive effect, not even sense. There is a further discussion of common objects at 21,16. 59. The view that logoi are projected from the effect in the sense-organ seems to be different from the one, expressed e.g. at 3,3-9, 16-17, and 7,14-15, that it is the soul that projects them. Here we seem to have (a) a logos of sensible objects, which can be fitted to a sensitive form (but see n. 60), and (b) a logos aware of (or that discriminates) sensible qualities, which enables the faculty cognitive of the substance/essence of sensible objects to get to know that. Both logoi are projected upwards to dianoia. See also 19,6-14. 60. This follows Bywater’s reading eidei for the ei de of the MSS, which would give: ‘adapted to the object of sense as its own, and if ’. That is ungrammatical, and

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some change is called for. But it should be noted that ‘form’ is not in the original. 61. It is only here that this word is used of logos on the level of sensation. It is used frequently about phantasia, and once (21,27) of nous. On my interpretation Priscian is here describing an unrealised possibility. Contrast the use of diegeiromenos at 3,4 of the logos projected from the soul, as opposed to this one projected from the effect on the sense-organ. 62. This renders Bywater’s suggestion enargôs for the incomprehensible readings of the MSS. 63. The MSS have de, dê, and de dê here. But the singular form auto de touto is itself puzzling. Presumably it refers to one or other of the common sensibles. 64. cf. DA 2.10 422a20-1; Simpl. 134,35-135,4. 65. cf. Simpl. 189,23-8, an account in simple language of how the eyes may try to see, and be aware of the effect. 66. See 3,26 and n. 47 above. 67. cf. Sens. 7 449a17-19. 68. Bywater took lines 19-21 to be a quotation from Theophrastus. He may be right. 69. Simpl. 136,8-15, 20-4. 70. peisis, found here, and in lines 4 and 6, was originally a medical term, which is to be contrasted with pathos in line 10. Both are effects, but of different kinds, peisis being the result of the activity of forms. 71. cf. DA 2.12 424a28-32; 3.2 426a30-b2 72. Neoplatonists developed the triad being , life , and intellect from Plato’s Sophist 248E-249A and Timaeus 39E. Cf. Iamblichus ap. Proclum in Tim. III 45,8-11 = in Tim. Fr. 65 Dillon. But the notion of divine life encompassing thought comes also from Aristotle, Metaphysics 7, 1072b18-30, where God as thinker and God as living are considered. For the notion that a life may contain the causes of sensible objects see 33,6-11. 73. These can hardly be phosphorescent things, but must be creatures with ‘search-light’ eyes. See Sextus Empiricus, PH I 45. 74. See Sens. 3 439b1-14. Colour is there defined as ‘the limit of the transparent in a body that is bounded’. We need not think of the rainbow effects of prisms. See also DA 2.7 418a31-b10. 75. cf. Simpl. 129,30-1; 135,35; Plato, Timaeus 67C; below 8,22. 76. cf. Simpl. 132,29-31. 77. Or, ‘has such a share of ’. 78. cf. DA 2.7 419a12-14. 79. cf. Philoponus in DA 354,14-16 (Theophrastus 277C FHSG). But there it is colours that are conveyed, while here it seems to be sight. Themistius also uses the word colour at PDA 62, 11. Todd points out that it is also used by Plato at Symp. 202e3, but that is of Eros as intermediary between gods and men. 80. cf. Simpl. 128,24-9; 165,1-6; 189,34-190,21, a long and technical account. 81. For an examination of the influence of Iamblichus in what precedes see P.M. Huby, ‘Priscian of Lydia as Evidence for Iamblichus’ in The Divine Iamblichus, pp. 8-9. 82. The way in which Theophrastus carries out this programme is indicated by Baltussen (as in n. 5) pp. 62-3. 83. ‘immediately’: the Greek is autothen, which replaces amesos (also ‘immediately’) in 5.21. For that reason ‘immediately’ is preferable here to the ‘spontaneously’ which has also been suggested. 84. DA 2.11 423b1-8. 85. DA 2.7 418b5-6. 86. 7,20-8 = Theophrastus 275A FHSG.

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Notes to pp. 16-18

87. Sens. 3 439b13. 88. For the following see DA 2.7 418b4-32. 89. Discussed by Baltussen 74, who refers to Theophrastus’ treatment of Alcmaeon at De Sensu 26. 90. Something is missing. Bywater read ei for the hê of the MSS, without a lacuna. His text would give: ‘But if earth too is related to (kata) fire, nay even’, but the grammar is awkward, and one would expect more in view of lines 14-23 below. 91. Aristotle Sens. 3 439a30, b11-12. 8,1-9 above = Theophrastus 278 FHSG. Aristotle thinks that all compound bodies have an admixture of the transparent elements, air, water, and fire, and that their colour is the boundary not of the bodies themselves, but of their transparent ingredients. 92. The language of what follows shows that this must be Priscian speaking. The word phôtourgos – ‘light-producing’ at 8,15 below is attested by LSJ only for this passage, and skotopoios – ‘darkness-making’ – only for Priscian and some scholia. Both words also appear in [Dionysius], Caelesti hierarchia at 7.1 and 8.2, but are extremely rare. 93. cf. below, 8,23 and 9,11-14, and Simpl. 135,9-10. 94. cf. Simpl. 133,11-13. But that has a different account of earth and darkness/light. 95. Aristotle’s insistence on ‘bounded’ is an attempt to get rid of colourless fluids, which lack a boundary of their own. He ought also, however, to have got rid of colourless solids like glass, crystal, and diamond. 96. Bywater here reads hupo for the apo of the MSS. That would give ‘the forms are not from the elements’. 97. Theophrastus here takes up Aristotle’s claim at DA 2.7 418b9-10 that light is the actualisation of the transparent qua transparent. 98. In this and following passages the word energeia, while often translated ‘actuality’, or ‘actualization’, sometimes seems to call rather for ‘activity’. See J.F. Finamore, ‘Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent’ in The Divine Iamblichus, p. 56, and S. Sambursky, ‘Philoponus’ Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of Light’ in Osiris 13 (1958) pp. 114-17. 99. Discussed in Baltussen 74-5. 100. 8,29-9,7 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG (second part). 101. J. F. Finamore, ‘Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent’ in The Divine Iamblichus, p. 62 n. 9 thinks that this passage suggests that Priscian thought that light travels. 102. For the following compare Simpl. 131,38-132,2, but he does not mention Iamblichus and is much compressed, and the vocabulary is different. Iamblichus in fact held a very complicated view of light which is not reflected in Priscian. See J.F. Finamore, ‘Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent’ in The Divine Iamblichus, pp. 55-64 and n. 101. See also Huby pp. 9-10 and n. 81. 103. Bywater notes that some MSS omit ‘like the Peripatetics’, and others place it after ‘any kind of body’; he hints that it may be a gloss. Could the sense be: ‘like the Peripatetics I want it not to be body’? It could be argued that Strato of Lampsacus held that light was a body (Frr. 65a and 86 Wehrli), but most Peripatetics did not. 104. Some MSS have autokheiristôs for auto khôristôs. That would mean ‘by its own power’. 105. cf. Themistius, in Phys. 197,4-8 = Theophrastus 155B FHSG; Simpl. in Phys. 998,13-16. 106. cf. Simpl. 132,13-14. He speaks of the perfecting of the transparent in 131,16-32. The word teleiotês is not used by Aristotle in this connection.

Notes to pp. 18-19

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107. This is a typical idiom of Iamblichus. I owe the interpretation to Carlos Steel. 108. This probably means that there is no passive effect in the case of light and the transparent. Here again sometimes ‘actuality’ and sometimes ‘activity’ seems appropriate. 109. DA 2.7 418b14-17. 110. Baltussen p. 72 refers to the treatment of Empedocles at De Sensu 8 and 15. 111. 9,30-3 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG (third part). Baltussen p. 72 explains ‘as is natural’ as ‘in accordance with its natural character of being the colour of light in the transparent’, but light can hardly be the colour of light. 112. Baltussen p. 72 perhaps goes too far in saying that Priscian here ‘explains’ what Theophrastus meant. Rather he conjectures that Theophrastus meant something that fits in with his own views. 113. 10,3-5 = Theophrastus 278 fourth part. 114. cf. [Aristotle] Col. 1 791b3, though there darkness actually is the privation of light. H.B. Gottschalk, ‘The De Coloribus and its Author’, Hermes 92, pp. 83-5, argues that this work is by Theophrastus. 115. DA 2.7 419a23-5. 116. DA 2.7 419a20. 117. See n. 92 above. 118. DA 2.7 418b11. 119. Reading horaton for the horatou of the MSS; cf. DA 2.10 422a16-17. The argument is: (a) light is the cause of colours being seen, but light itself is (a) colour, being the colour of the transparent, therefore colour is the cause of colours being seen; (b) light is the cause of visibles being seen, but light itself is visible, therefore the visible is the cause of visibles being seen. 120. Baltussen p. 64 n. 59 points to Theophrastus’ interest in a general explanation. 121. 10,13-17 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG fifth part. 122. cf. Philoponus, in DA 354,14-15 = Theophrastus 277C FHSG. Philoponus says that Theophrastus coined the word translated ‘transsonant’. See also n. 178. 123. cf. Simpl. 135,25-136,2 on DA 2.7 419a6-7: Aristotle does not give the reason why some things are not seen in light, but it is clearly because the primary visible is light and the bright thing that gives off light. So the latter is itself visible and through its light is a cause of the visibility of the transparent and the things seen. But the things that do not have brightness of a kind to give off light are not the cause of others being seen, but are themselves seen through their brightness and in darkness only, because when illuminated by light they cannot show forth their own brightness. So the causes of light are (1) the bright, (2) light and the transparent in actuality, and (3) coloured things; these are perfected by light by way of their own kinship, whether colours are lights of a kind (according to Plato), or limits of the bounded transparent. This appears to be the position introduced here with ‘someone may say’, and criticised by someone else at 11,1. Whether the latter is Priscian himself is not clear, but it is likely that he is opposing a view held by the writer of the ‘Simplicius’ commentary, and therefore not that writer himself. He does go on at 11,5 to suggest an alternative to the criticism he has just expressed, but at 11,11-12 the words ‘the primary visible, which, you know, we say to be light’ may be emphatic, contrasting his own view with that of 10,31 above, where ‘that which shines’ is coupled with light. For ‘obscure lights of a kind’, see also 6,26. 124. The general topic is discussed at length by Aristotle, Sens. 7 447a14-27.

56

Notes to pp. 19-22

The word translated ‘sound’ here, psophos, is not in the MSS, which rather confusedly refers to light, but was plausibly inserted by Bywater. 125. Presumably the transparent. 126. This follows the reading of several MSS, but others have boulomenous instead of boulomenos. Either reading is difficult. I also read diateinôn here for Bywater’s diateinein and the dia tinôn of most MSS in line 16. The text appears to be corrupt and other possibilities exist. 127. DA 2.7 418a31-b1; 419a13-14. 128. DA 2.7 418b15; Sens. 3 440a20; Theophrastus, De Sensu 1. 129. Keeping the reading of some MSS to de. Others have ta de. 130. cf. Theophrastus, De Sensu 5. 131. 11,14-20 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG sixth part. 132. The lacuna follows Bywater’s reading. He also, following some MSS and earlier editors, deleted meinai (to remain) after ‘ not’. The sense is unlikely to be altered, whatever the reading. 133. DA 2.7 419a16. 134. This cannot be the transparent (see above 8,5-30). Priscian does not see the transparent as a body, and it must be air or water. 135. DA 2.7 419a25-30. 136. The tongue and the object being tasted. At 13,21-2 below the example of honey is given. 137. DA 2.10 422a13-14. 138. DA 2.7 419a13-15. 139. cf. Simpl. 136,26-8. 140. cf. Simpl. 132,13-15; 136,8. 141. epokheisthai frequently means ‘riding upon’, but the image seems inappropriate; the sense is revealed in line 25: colour uses the transparent as a substratum. 142. cf. Simpl. 136,8-10; 137,3-5. 143. cf. Simpl. 136,24 (= Theophrastus 279 FHSG) and 37. Simplicius(?) gives the analogy of a lever transporting the movement of a hand to a block of stone. 144. cf. Simpl. 142,4. 145. Bywater suggested ‘ tauta’ for ‘tauta’ in line 13,7. That would give: ‘but sound is not actually about these ’. 146. This follows Bywater’s reading dê for the de of the MSS. With the latter we would have: ‘but the perfection  movement is ’. 147. DA 2.7 418a26. 148. cf. Simpl. 137,5; 155,22-3, and below 14,7. 149. DA 2.12 424b15-16. 150. The immediately preceding case is one of taste, and ‘here’ probably refers to both smell and taste. 151. If the text is sound this must involve an analogy between fire as needing fuel and something to kindle it, and colour as needing the transparent both as its matter and as providing light. 152. Since Aristotle nowhere says precisely this, ‘he himself ’ is presumably Theophrastus. 153. 13,30-14,3 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG seventh part. 154. Democritus supposed that the air between the eye and its object received an impression to form an image . Theophrastus criticized this in De Sensu 51-3. 155. Above 4,33-5,4. 156. DA 2.12 424b16-18. Theophrastus’ views on smell are found also in his de Odor., which opens with the statement that smells are all from mixture, and in

Notes to pp. 22-24

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Caus. Plant. 6.1.1, where we have in full what is compressed by Priscian: the transparent is that which is common to air and water, and it has present in it the dry ingredient in flavour, which is odour. What is mixed in air or the transparent should not however be taken to be some kind of effluence, for that view is criticized at De Sensu 20 (but see also 90), but should probably be taken along with the statement that the air undergoes some effect. 157. cf. Sens. 6 446b8-9; [Aristotle] de Audibilibus 800a3-4 where this view is rejected; Probl. 11.23 901b16. Sorabji, Aristotle Transformed p. 16 n. 71 sees a wave theory of sound here, but appears to be more cautious in ‘From Aristotle to Brentano’ in Aristotle and the Later Tradition, where at p. 231 n. 18 the reference to Stobaeus should be to Porphyry, in Ptolemaei Harmonica 1.3 p. 64 = Theophrastus 716,88 FHSG. Baltussen (as in n. 5) p. 65 considers Theophrastus’ theory of hearing. Andrew Barker, ‘Theophrastus on Pitch and Melody’ in Theophrastus of Eresus On his Life and Work, ed. Fortenbaugh et al., New Brunswick and Oxford, 1985, p. 311, is sceptical about whether Theophrastus held the view that hearing is due to shape at all. 14,10-12 above = Theophrastus 277A FHSG. 158. 14,16-17 = Theophrastus 276 FHSG. 159. DA 2.7 419a13-b3; 2.11 422b34-423b27; Alex. Aphrod. in Sens. 126,21 = Strato fr. 114 Wehrli. 160. 14,22-5 = Theophrastus 275B FHSG. 161. Sens. 6 446a24-b6; Simpl. 142, 10-11. 162. Or, ‘for the air to be affected in some way and be set in motion earlier’. 163. Bywater, following Wimmer, wants to delete the last clause, ‘the form  happening.’ If we keep it, it and the preceding sentence should be seen as making a more general claim, with sound as a particular case. 164. DA 3.12 435a5-10. 165. Baltussen p. 72 and nn. 96 and 97, discusses the term apotupôsis, but he does not refer to the fact that the question here is about reflections. Hans Gottschalk, Strato of Lampsacus: some texts (Proc. of the Leeds Phil. and Lit. Soc., Lit. and Hist. Section vol. XI (1965) p. 155) compares Strato’s theory of light – Fr.133 Wehrli. 166. Timaeus 46AB; Alcibiades 132D-133A; Sophistes 266C. 167. This expression involves a distinction between this representative image, a shape in the air, and the one connected with life introduced at 2,8. At Div. Somn. 2 464b10 Aristotle uses eidôlon of the reflection seen in water, and relates it to but distinguishes it from an emphasis. cf. Syrianus, in Metaph. 7,31-2. Eidôlikê emphasis is found in Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 3.13 (p. 130,3 Parthey) in connection with false prophecy. 168. 15,6-9 = Theophrastus 277B FHSG first part. 169. The sun’s. 170. The sentence is obscure; probably ‘that’ is ‘that which sees’. An alternative version is: ‘for the secondary activity belongs to that which cooperates, and to the underlying object which is smooth and shining .’ 171. Possibly a reference to 15,13 above. 172. From here to 17,33 = Theophrastus 277B FHSG second part. 173. cf. Theophrastus De Sensu 50-3. 174. See Baltussen p. 64. 175. DA 2.5 416b35-417a2. See Baltussen p. 64 and n.60. 176. DA 2.8 420a3-11. 177. Sens. 2 438a13-15. 178. cf. Alex. Aphrod. in Sens. 88,18-89,5; Philoponus in DA 353,8-12; 354,12-16 = Theophrastus 277C FHSG; Themistius in DA 62,29-32; Simpl. 139,2-5; Arius

58

Notes to pp. 24-25

Didymus ap. Stobaeum 1.52.9 (vol. 1 p. 484,19-21 Wachsmuth), who attributes diêkhês to Aristotle. Baltussen is ambivalent here. On p. 65 he accepts that Theophrastus invented these terms, and (n. 66) refers to his habit of creating neologisms in botany, but on p. 257 he says that they look like commentators’ jargon. He ignores the use of diêkhês in Stobaeus mentioned above, which Diels attributed to Arius Didymus. If Diels is correct, this word was supposed to have been used by Aristotle in the time of Augustus. That seems to be wrong, but at least the word was already in use and applied to the Peripatetics. 179. DA 2.9 421b9; cf. 2.10 422a8-12. 180. DA 2.5 417a17-20. 181. Compare, about taste, DA 2.10 422b15-17; about smell, Sens. 2 438b21-4. Baltussen p. 77 relates these ideas to Theophrastus’ De Sensu. 182. Sens. 2 438a12-16. 183. Philoponus, in Phys. 4,20-2 attributes to Theophrastus the view that sight needs ‘optical pneuma’ (144A FHSG). This is not mentioned in Priscian. 184. This renders Wimmer’s emendation eupilêtoteron, following several MSS of Sens. 438a16. Most MSS of Priscian have euepilêptoteron or euupolêptoteron, which might mean ‘more easily enclosed’. 185. See [Aristotle] Probl. 31.29 960a33. But there it is also said that the eye (omma) is of fire. 186. This appears to disagree with DA 2.9 421b18-19, where it is denied that, unlike animals, men can smell without respiration. The matter is discussed further in Sens. 5 442b27-445a16. 187. cf. DA 2.8 420a9-14. 188. Baltussen p. 75 thinks this may be just a careless formulation. But at 16,10-14 above the point seems to be that the eye is made of water, and the corresponding organ of hearing is made of air. 189. GA 2.6 744a1-3. 190. DA 2.9 421b32-422a3; Sens. 5 444b20-4. 191. DA 2.8 419b19-21. 192. Lines 19-20 are clearly from Theophrastus; 20-2 open with ‘but’, and could be his reply that even the winds make a noise by falling on the earth, a solid, and so on. Alternatively it could be Priscian’s comment, but another ‘but’ in line 22 suggests that Priscian comes in here. The following lines are probably corrupt. The argument seems to begin with the statement of Aristotle that air and hearing are connatural (DA 2.8 420a4, but at 420a12 the external air is connatural with the air inside the ears); it passes on to the movement of the external air as the result of a blow, and appears to raise an objection to these points on the ground that movement would be perceived but not sound. At 420a9 Aristotle equates sound with the movement of undispersed air, and at 21 it is the movement of what can be moved in a certain way. Perhaps Theophrastus or Priscian is objecting to this account, and perhaps something is here lost. There is a difficulty in how Aristotle can pass from movement to sound, and Priscian solves it with the ideas of living movement and form at 17,3 and 5. (At De Sensu 19 Theophrastus said that we do not sense sound by sound, but that is different.) Simpl. 143,23-31 stresses the continuity of the air from the initial blow to the actual hearing, and uses the notions of an organ with life and an acoustic life. 193. Probably the air inside the ear. 194. An alternative is: ‘movement would be perceived as movement, but sound not as sound’. In any case the problem is how we pass from the movements of the external and internal air to hearing and sound. 195. ‘The other cases’ must surely be the senses other than hearing. Most likely

Notes to pp. 25-28

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the reference is to DA 2.11 423b17-23, where Aristotle deals with all the senses and denies that something placed actually on the sense-organ would sense it: 7,23-4 above indicates that Theophrastus also held this view. 196. DA 2.8 420a16-17; De Sensu 19; Simpl. 145,11-12. 197. Probably Aristotle. cf. DA 2.7 419a26-31; 2.11 423b20-5. 198. Above 6,27-7,1. 199. DA 2.8 420a26-8. 200. Keeping antilegein estin, which Bywater deletes. Theophrastus contrasts this mistaken view with the correct one of Aristotle. Baltussen compares CP 6.8.2 ho logos ho antilegomenos. 201. 17,33 concludes Theophrastus 277B FHSG second part. 202. Aristotle, DA 2.10 422a34-b2 actually says: ‘Since what can be tasted is moist, it is necessary that the organ be neither actually moist nor incapable of being moistened.’ Priscian’s account looks garbled, but the point is probably to question Aristotle’s concentration on the moist in the case of taste, when flavour is more important. What follows may be from Theophrastus, first raising difficulties and then resolving them. 203. Bywater has added hôs. 204. Sens. 5 442b29. 205. DA 2.10 422a8. 206. DA 2.11 423a11-b26. 207. 18.7-17 = Theophrastus 294 FHSG. 208. I have here followed the MSS readings. Bywater inserted komizesthai in line 23, and deleted mê nomizesthai in line 24. That would give: ‘but by not being brought from outside, but being grown within us’. 209. DA 2.11 422b34-423a21. 210. DA 2.11 424a4-5. 211. DA 424a2-10, but where Aristotle is supposed to have tês aisthêseôs Priscian has to aisthêtêrion; some MSS of Aristotle, including the important E, are said by Ross to have tou aisthêtêriou before tês aisthêseôs, though Ross ignores that and just says that tês aisthêseôs means the organ of touch. This suggests that the – or one – MS of Aristotle available to Priscian did have tou aisthêtêriou. 212. cf. DA 2.4 416a32. 213. DA 2.12 424a26-8. 214. Here, as in the corresponding passage of Aristotle (note 213), ratio is the only suitable translation. 215. The Greek words corresponding to ‘known by its attributes and’ are not in the MSS; an alternative: ‘in the attributes and’ is suggested by Ficino and accepted by Bywater. 216. Priscian introduces as an alternative a different psychological classification, based on Plato, which he does not pursue. cf. Alcinous/Albinus, Didascalicus 4.6-7,18,22. Proclus in Tim. 1.246,10-18 divides logos into doxastikos, epistêmonikos, and noeros: see H.J. Blumenthal in The Criterion of Truth, pp. 270-1. 217. Timaeus 28A and C. cf. Sophist 264B and 30.10-11 below. 218. This appears to be a parenthesis in which the question of how the ousia (substance) of a body is known is raised. On the first view it is not known separately, because its existence lies in its properties, but on the second it does exist apart from them and can be known by opinion. See 4,18-20 above where it is thought, dianoia, that knows the ousia of objects of sense, which is not apprehensible by the senses, and n. 59. 219. DA 3.1 424b22-425a8.

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Notes to pp. 28-29

220. I owe this interpretation to Carlos Steel. A puzzle is that there is nothing in Aristotle about knowing the medium: rather he says that things that are sensed through a medium (are sensed) by the simples, like air and water. 221. The whole sentence is obscure and perhaps corrupt, but the relevant chapter in Aristotle (n. 219) is also obscure. 222. This may misrepresent Aristotle. At 424b31-3 he has: ‘If through one several are perceived being different in genus, it is necessary that one who has a sense-organ of this kind be sensitive to both’. In view of the example of air being of sound and colour at 424b33-4, ‘through one’ must mean ‘through one medium’ not ‘through one sense-organ’. 223. Inserting tou di’ before amphoin, in accordance with some MSS of, and commentators on, DA 3.1 425a2-3. 224. The following sections are numbered to indicate how Priscian’s replies are related to Theophrastus’ questions. 225. Or, ‘with what’. 226. Aristotle here has korê – ‘eye-ball’ or ‘eye-jelly’. Priscian has opsis – ‘sight’, but at 16,10 he did use korê. I assume that Priscian meant what Aristotle meant. Further, Aristotle, like Priscian, has osphrêsis, which usually means ‘smelling’, but must here refer to the organ of smell. 227. cf. DA 3.1 425a3-5. 228. At DA 3.1 425a5-6 Aristotle says that fire is either ‘of no ’ or common to all, for nothing is capable of sensation without heat. Theophrastus has telescoped this. G.M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle, London 1917, repr. Amsterdam 1964, p. 34 takes him to mean that all the sense-organs have heat in common, and some have moisture. It is not clear how, after talk of air and water, the hot and the moist fit in. For Aristotle air was hot and wet and water cold and wet, so Theophrastus may be arguing that a sense-organ, being necessarily hot, cannot be just of water, i.e. cold and wet only. 229. DA 2.12 424a28-31. 230. For Theophrastus’ solution see 21,5-8 below. 231. Long. 5 466a18-19. 232. 19,14-20,9 = Theophrastus 282 FHSG first part. 233. This must be understood in the light of n. 234. 234. For euoristos (easily delimitable) see DGC 2.2 329b31, of the wet and the dry as delimitable in opposite ways, and Meteor. 2.4 360a23 of steam, 4.1 378b24 of the hot as being capable of being affected, and 4.4 381b29 again of water. 235. Simpl. 174,20-6 has a similar account of air, water, earth and fire. 236. This seems to be a parenthetical question and answer. 237. Aristotle, Sens. 2 437b32-438a3, quotes Empedocles (fr. 84 Diels) to the effect that the eyes are fiery, but the language is not like Priscian’s. Plato Timaeus 45B gives his own account of the fiery constitution of the eyes. It is unlikely that Priscian had access to any work of Pythagoras himself, but he could have known the Pythagorean writings of the first and second centuries A.D. 238. Plato, Rep. 6 508B. 239. Priscian supports Theophrastus’ point in (1). 240. DA 3.1 425a9-10. 241. DA 2.12 424a28; 3.2 426a29-b8. 20,22-5 above = Theophrastus 282 FHSG second part. 242. Priscian has here passed from an endorsement of what Theophrastus says in (2) to his own view that a perfect being has all logoi – and intellect. 243. Priscian is attacking (3a).

Notes to pp. 29-31

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244. Priscian is replying to (3b), and bringing in his own idea that life is necessary for sensation. 245. cf. Simpl. 195,9. 246. Theophrastus de Sens. 32. 21,4-8 above = Theophrastus 282 FHSG third part. 247. Up to this point the sense of logos has been ratio, as in the relevant part of Aristotle. But now Priscian, responding to Theophrastus’ point (4), develops his own theory about logos, playing upon the mathematical idea involved but hardly producing a comprehensible argument. 248. Iamblichus (Simpl. 49,31-4; cf. 219,18-19) said that the life of the ‘heavenly body’ was kath’ hauto, ‘intrinsic’, not epiktêtôs, as here. 249. DA 3.1 425a13-18. 250. This corresponds to the word skhêma in Aristotle’s list of common sensibles in the above passage. 251. Wimmer indicated a lacuna here. It is not clear how much is lost, but after it Priscian appears to be developing his own views, though they may be based on those of Theophrastus. The final words before the lacuna, ‘when it has not been determined, I think’ seem to be Priscian’s too. 21,16-20 above = Theophrastus 295 FHSG. Peter Lautner, ‘Rival Theories of Self-awareness in Later Neoplatonism’ BICS 39 = ns 1 (1994) p. 114 takes this to mean that Theophrastus thought it was impossible to apprehend shape through movement. That is surely going too far. 252. Alteration is one species of movement. 253. DA 3.1 425a24. 254. DA 3.2 425b12-26; Somn. 2 455a13-21. 255. 21,32-22,1 = Theophrastus 296 FHSG first part. 256. Reading hekastê for hekastêi (Steel). 257. cf. DA 3.1 425a31, but that is about common sensibles. 258. cf. Simpl. 187,31-3. 259. cf. n. 31, but reverting into oneself is different from reverting to higher entities. See Peter Lautner, as in n. 251, pp. 114-15. 260. This follows Bywater’s emendation of a difficult passage. 261. cf. Simpl. 185,35-6. 262. Or, ‘will have some kind of separation from its own organs’. 263. Reading the to of the MSS for Bywater’s tôi. 264. 22,9-14 = Theophrastus 296 FHSG second part. 265. cf. Simpl. 186,6-9. 266. cf. DA 3.2 427a2-5. 267. DA 3.2 426a27. All the MSS of Aristotle have the Greek equivalent of ‘if concord is voice’, but Ross, using Sophonias and this passage of Priscian, emended to ‘if voice is concord’. See pp. 278-9 of his edition of the De Anima. Aristotle’s passage is discussed at length by Andrew Barker in ‘Aristotle on Perception and Ratios’, Phronesis 26 (1981) pp. 248-66. A.A. Long, ‘The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue’ in Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford 1991, pp. 99-100 n. 6, accepts that the correct reading of Aristotle is uncertain, but points out that two Aristotelians, Priscian and Sophonias, ‘saw no difficulty in the thought that the human voice  is a harmonious sound’. 268. Nothing in this section is attributed to Theophrastus by Priscian, and it reads like his own comments on a difficult passage of Aristotle. The first part is an attempt to explain why voice should be seen as concord: it is in terms of the concord between voice and hearing when they are one, which is not Aristotle’s meaning. Aristotle’s word logos is avoided by Priscian who uses summetros – proportionate – and related terms instead, perhaps because his own use of logos is different.

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269. Although Aristotle uses apotasis of voice at DA 2.8 420b8, where Ross interprets it as ‘volume’, comparing HA 5.14 545a15-20, the only other case in Aristotle, and Hamlyn has ‘pitch’, and Hett ‘compass’, it is used here, as elsewhere, in a different, Neoplatonic, sense. 270. This may be based on Sens. 4 441b21-3 perhaps with some confusion. After a reference to potentiality Aristotle says that perception is analogous not to the acquisition of knowledge but to the exercise of it (theôrein) (Hett’s translation). 271. Of Theophrastus’ Physics. See Introduction. 272. 22,23-4 = Theophrastus 297 FHSG first part. 273. This is an inadequate, but the best available, rendering of phantasia. 274. DA 3.3 427b29-429a9; 3.9 432a30-b3; Insomn. 1 458b30; 459a15-17. 275. 23,4-5 = Theophrastus 297 FHSG second part. 276. DA 3.8 432a9-10. 277. Simpl. 213,25 is like this but not very close. See Blumenthal, ‘The Psychology of (?) Simplicius’ Commentary on the De Anima’ in (ed.) Blumenthal and Lloyd, Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism, p. 87. For a discussion of 23,13-25,26 see P.M. Huby, ‘Priscian of Lydia as Evidence for Iamblichus’ in The Divine Iamblichus, pp. 6-7. 278. The grammar is difficult. Even so Wimmer’s tas tôn heterôn dunameôn for tais tôn heterôn dunamesin, though it has Ficino’s support, is unnecessary. 279. i.e. bringing into consciousness. 280. For this interpretation compare lines 22-3 below, where the representative images coming down from the intellect are mentioned. 281. cf. Iamblichus, ap. Proclum in Tim. I 157,6 = in Tim. fr. 17,10 Dillon and Protrepticus III p. 14,2 Pistelli: the Carmina aurea attributed to Pythagoras refer to the two-fold in human nature, and the alien creature which has grown beside us from birth, which some call the many-headed monster, others a mortal form of life, and others the generative nature. 282. This is the first occurrence of lives in the plural. The doctrine that the soul when it inclines towards the body brings forth lower lives seems to derive from Iamblichus. See CS 62. 283. The auta of the MSS is neuter plural and has no obvious antecedent. Wimmer preferred talla – ‘the others’, and Bywater wonders about atta – ‘some things’. 284. cf. DA 2.12 424a19. 285. cf. Simpl. 214,18-19. 286. DA 3.3 429a1-2. But there is no mention of forms there. 287. This follows the reading of Bywater and earlier editors. hêi: the MSS all have ê = ‘or’, which is difficult to understand. But Bywater’s reading is also difficult. 288. Or ‘stimulated’, but that obscures the reference to motion. 289. cf. Simpl. 214,6-8. 290. Here, exceptionally, phantasia must mean the individual mental image. Theophrastus is following DA 3.3 428a11-12, where Aristotle uses phantasiai in this way. 291. cf. DA 3.3 425b23-5. 292. 24,20-4 = Theophrastus 299 FHSG. 293. cf. Simpl. 214,20-2. 294. cf. DA 3.8 432a9-10. 295. cf. Simpl. 214,12. 296. cf. Simpl. 214,21. 297. tupoi: see n. 55. 298. cf. Simpl. 215,9-13.

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299. What these are is unclear; they connect thinking with facial effects, and perhaps the turning inwards of the eyes is supposed to involve a scanning of images, but if so would these images be in our body? And in the next sentence these bodily parts are treated as inferior to sense-organs. 300. cf. Barlaam de Seminaria, Ethica secundum Stoicos 2.13 PG vol. 151 col. 1362B-C = Theophrastus 447 lines 8-12 FHSG. 301. cf. Simpl. 214,1-2. 302. Gerard Watson, Phantasia in Classical Thought, Galway U.P. 1988, p. 35 says that Priscian here returns to reporting Aristotelian and Theophrastean positions. 303. Watson thinks this reports Theophrastus’ advance on Aristotle. But the language still seems to be that of Priscian. 304. pneuma as a vehicle connecting the soul with the body plays a frequent but small role in Neoplatonic psychology. See e.g. Simpl. 213,37-214,4. Is it more than a coincidence that Theophrastus’ successor Strato (fr. 111 Wehrli) refers to pneuma in connection with sensing? 305. DA 3.3 428b3-4; Insomn. 2 460b16-20; Simpl. 213,15-20. 306. Bywater noted a single lacuna here, indicated by both sets of stars. It covers the end of the section on Imagination, the conjectural title, On Intellect, and the opening of the section on intellect. Bywater suggested that ousiai or dunamei should be supplied, apparently relying on the use of these words with ‘projective’ at 30,17 and 31,24 below; the former is inappropriate but the latter, meaning ‘power’ is possible. Perhaps we should have ‘in the power projective of a shape such as ’. Ficino has in talis formae partu iam enititur sibi ipsi sufficere, which may mean ‘and in the birth of such a form it now produces self-sufficiency’. This may represent what he read, but the conceit is unlike Priscian, and since he goes on: pergamus ad reliqua ‘let us go on to the rest’, which cannot have been in Priscian’s original, and adds more to bridge the gap at the beginning of the section on intellect, this may all have been just his conjectural addition. The reference back in line 24 may be to 24,7-17, but there it is only images, not shapes, that are projected. 307. This title must have existed in the lacuna together with a passage about the intellect, perhaps a discussion of Aristotle DGA 2.3 736b28 and 737a7-13, which is covered in the Themistius passage mentioned in n. 309, at 107,31-2. 308. This is the end of a question about DA 3.4 429a22-4; 429b30-1, as we know from Themistius. 309. This and following quotations from Theophrastus occur in almost identical words in Themistius in DA 107,32-108,7 = Theophrastus 307A FHSG. Instead of ‘nor in the same way’ Themistius has ‘that it is not even itself ’ . Daniel Devereux, ‘Theophrastus and the Intellect’ in Theophrastus, His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, RUSCH V edd. W.W. Fortenbaugh and Dimitri Gutas (New Brunswick and London 1992) pp. 35-6, suggests reading ouden for oude there, which would give: ‘that it is nothing itself ’. This is possibly supported by the Arabic version of Themistius. But all this relates primarily to the question of what Theophrastus wrote, not to our present text. See also n. 375 below. 25,28-9 = Fr.Ia Barbotin. 310. cf. DA 3.5 430a10-12. 311. That Theophrastus explored the similarities and differences between intellect and matter is suggested by Averroes Comm. magn. in DA (CCAA 6,1 387,22-389,63 Crawford) = 308A FHSG and 399,344-6 and 351-61 = 309A, and De connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine (AOCAC 9 f.156F-G) = 308B FHSG; there are further developments by Albertus Magnus in 309C and D FHSG. Averroes indicates that for Theophrastus the main difference was that intellect

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was potentially all ideas (intentiones) of universal material forms, and received universal forms, while prime matter was potentially all the sensible forms, and received individual forms (308A,5-13 FHSG). The argument is attributed wrongly to Aristotle, but Theophrastus and Themistius are introduced later and it is reasonable to suppose that Theophrastus originated it. But caution must be used in interpreting Averroes. See also 29,26-30. 312. i.e. a ‘this something’, an independent substance. cf. 30,31 below. 313. It is uncertain whether this is Theophrastus’ word or Priscian’s. It may take up Aristotle’s odd expression ho kaloumenos tês psukhês nous – ‘what is called the intellect of the soul’ at DA 3.4 429a22, and have been used by Theophrastus in that connection. But Priscian uses it below (26,12 and 26) to distinguish this intellect from one on a higher level, as does Simpl. (243,37 and 245,37) on DA 3.5 430a17. Simplicius also distinguishes it from the passible intellect at 243,37-8, but the expression is not commonly used by him. Steel CS, p. 148 n. 25 accepts it as from Theophrastus. 314. 25,28-26,7 = Theophrastus 307B FHSG; 26,1-6 = fr. Ic Barbotin. 315. DA 3.8 432a2. 316. cf. DA 3.4 429a27-9, where ‘some people’ are said to have described the soul as the place of forms, but Aristotle limits this to the intellective soul. 317. cf. nn. 14, 16, 31. 318. Steel, CS p. 66 n. 53 says that khalaô and related terms are first found in this sense in Priscian, Simplicius, and Damascius. 319. DA 3.5 430a16. But Aristotle does not use augê. 320. DA 3.4 430a1. 321. cf. Simpl. 243,1-6. 322. 27,3-6 = Theophrastus 307C FHSG first part. 323. At DA 3.5 430a14-15 Aristotle says that the potential intellect becomes all things (panta). At 3.4 430a2-5 he deals with the identity of the thinker and the thought, saying that in things without matter – like intellect and its objects – the thinker and the thought are the same. But, we may add, the objects of thought exist somehow when not thought, and equally the thinker, when not thinking exists somehow. This is unlike the separate intellect, which has its thoughts all the time. 324. cf. DA 3.4 429b24-5; Themistius in DA 108,1-6 = Theophrastus 307A FHSG. Commonsense, and Aristotle (Physics 3.3), believe that in the material world, and even in things like teaching and learning, change comes about by something acting on something else, which itself is affected reciprocally, but it is not obvious how this analysis can be transferred to non-material things. So Theophrastus raised a series of questions. His thought is continued at 28,13-29,1 below, and his solution was to say that words must be understood in a different sense in this sphere. Priscian also applies his own theories to this problem. 325. Following the MSS, which omit the definite article. 326. DA 2.5 417b24. 327. 27,8-14 = Theophrastus 307C FHSG second part; fr. Ib Barbotin. Barbotin considers and rejects Moraux’s interpretation at pp. 282-3. 328. cf. Simpl. 62,7. In what follows Priscian distinguishes between the potential intellect and the separate intellect (that in actuality); the potential is made perfect, i.e. actually thinks, by means of (a) the intellect in actuality and (b) the intelligibles. The intellect in actuality has the intelligibles in it, and (line 30) the potential intellect can be united with its own objects (i.e. intelligibles on a secondary level), and through them with the higher intelligibles.

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329. cf. Simpl. 230,23; 236,5, where however similar language is used for a different doctrine. For fuller discussion see n. 348. 330. As well as the activities of the intellect in actuality and the intelligibles Priscian recognises that the potential intellect is also a source of activity. 331. The theory is that this intellect has gone out or descended from the intellect in actuality, and that it can also enter into itself and be united with the objects that are there; through them it is related to higher entities. Cf. 29,25. 332. cf. DA 2.5 418a2. 333. DA 3.4 429b30, 3.7 431b17, 3.8 431b21-6. Barbotin takes ‘the intellect is (identical with) the intelligibles’ as a quotation from Theophrastus = his fr. II. 334. Simpl. DA 305,7-8 gives as an example of wholes through wholes the relationship of convex and concave. 335. DA 3.5 430a18, but Aristotle there uses the expression of the productive intellect. Barbotin sees 28,12 têi ousiai estin energeia (it is activity in its very being) as Theophrastus’ words and makes them his fr. III. 336. Bywater deleted asômatois (incorporeal), but it is in all the MSS. 337. I adopt, with some hesitation, Wimmer’s pôs for the hôs of the MSS. The argument is compressed in Theophrastus’ manner. He seems to have been trying to reconcile the Anaxagorean view of intellect that it is impassible with the fact that knowledge involves some kind of change. This worries Priscian who attempts in what follows to reconcile his own view that knowledge is a perfecting with Theophrastus’ reference to passivity. 338. DA 3.4 429b23-5. 339. 28,13-17 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG first part; 16-17 = fr. IV Barbotin. 340. i.e. unmixed with anything else, cf. DA 3.4 429a18-21. 341. Bywater athetised this, suggesting that there was a lacuna, and comparing Themistius in DA 108,16 (= Theophrastus 307A 25-7 FHSG), but that seems unnecessary, and in any case the sense is not affected. 342. DA 2.5 417a14-17; 3.7 431a6-7. The same passage of Theophrastus is quoted by Themistius in DA 108.15-17 but with kinêton for kinêtikon, except for the late MS C (Paris. gr. 1888) of the fifteenth century. Theophrastus is trying to give a suitable account of ‘passive’ as applied to intellect. We need a middle term to connect activity with passivity; Themistius and Priscian between them give us a passive and an active form of ‘moving’: each is only partially adequate. But Theophrastus’ point is that no analysis in terms of moving is appropriate. See his Metaph. 7b12-16. Priscian’s account of this is in lines 23-6 below. 343. DA 2.5 418a2-3. 28,20-3 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG second part. 344. Reading tropên, as Bywater tentatively suggested, comparing Simpl. 18,35, for the tropon of the MSS, which he printed. 345. In the Addenda et Corrigenda p. xiv Bywater withdraws the confusing note in the apparatus. 346. The lacuna indicated by Bywater here must have been of considerable length. Before it Priscian begins a comment of his own, and after it we are back with Theophrastus. ‘The superior one’ must be the higher intellect. 347. cf. DA 3.4 429a14. 28,29 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG third part; fr. Va Barbotin. 348. See CS, p. 136 n. 72, pp. 148-50; S and B 776-7. The same terms are used to express different relations between aspects of the soul in the Metaphrasis and the De Anima Commentary. In Metaphr. 27,20-28,30 and 29,11 the soul’s own activity in its thinking is emphasised, whereas at Simpl. 229,38, 230,23, and 236,5 the part played by the higher intellect in giving the soul its thoughts is central. For autoenergeia see Philoponus, in DA 35,1; Ammonius, in De Int. 248,18-19, 251,1;

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Proclus frequently uses the related adjective, e.g. at in Parm. 188,8, 248,15, 279,22 and 301,1 always together with autokinêtos (self-moved). 349. 28,31 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG fourth part; fr. Vb Barbotin. 350. In Aristotle this is the intellect: Priscian brings in both soul and intellect. 351. DA 3.4 430a5-6; Themistius in DA 108,27 (= Theophrastus 320A FHSG). 29,1 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG fifth part; fr. Vc Barbotin. 352. This back-reference cannot be traced. It may refer to something that was in the lacuna at 25,26, which must have contained further remarks on the imagination. 353. cf. Simpl. 220,38; 286,27-32 (= Theophrastus 298A FHSG). Discursive rationality, or thinking step-by-step, is distinguished in Neoplatonism from the non-progressive thinking of intellect, which takes in everything all at once. Aristotle usually used ‘intellect’ more widely as interchangeable with rationality (logos). 354. 29,3-6 = Theophrastus 298B FHSG. 355. See CS 55 and nn. 12 and 91. ‘amphibios’ can mean amphibious in the biological sense, as was spelt out by Simpl., in Enkh. Epikt. 78,1-9: amphibians can live in the sea or on earth as they wish; but it was also used by Plotinus, IV, 8,4,32 and later writers of the soul, as intermediate and living two kinds of lives. Cf. amphibolos, ambivalent, at 31,15. 356. cf. n. 16 and 26,16. sunneusis is upwards and aponeusis downwards. 357. DA 2.5 417b24. 358. 29,12-15 = Theophrastus 311 FHSG first part; fr. VI Barbotin. 359. See n. 353 for this wider usage. 360. DA 3.4 430a4-5; 3.5 430a19-20; 3.7 431a1-2, b16-17. 361. 29.18-23 = Theophrastus 311 FHSG second part; 29,18-20 and 22-3 = parts of fr. VIIa Barbotin. 362. Here Priscian applies his own theory of intellect to Theophrastus’ problem. The real intellect is on a higher level, and can be seen as Aristotle’s intellect in actuality: he equates the one participated by soul with Aristotle’s potential intellect. 363. cf. DA 3.4 429a24, but that is slightly different. Barbotin sees this as another quotation from Theophrastus; it is part of his fr. VIIa. Here three possibilities are considered, that the intellect is nothing before it thinks, or that it is like matter, or that it is indeed something; cf. n. 323. 364. In the following pages several words relating to cognition are used, gignôskein, epistasthai, theôrein and krinein, with related nouns and adjectives. One-to-one translation is impossible because English does not have a similar set of verbs with related nouns and adjectives; gignôskein is a general term, but epistasthai means knowledge on a lower level than intuitive thought (nous), which might be called ‘scientific’; gignôskein will be rendered by ‘know1’ and epistasthai by ‘know2’; theôrein means ‘be conscious of ’, or ‘contemplate’, and for krinein, used by Theophrastus and taken over by Priscian, I have used ‘be aware’. See also n. 373. 365. ‘The separation of the act from the substance is the first and most fundamental division experienced by the soul in its descent into the body.’ Steel, CS, p. 138 n. 80, thinks this doctrine goes back to Iamblichus. 366. proienai is one of a triad of terms, along with menein, to remain, and epistrephein, to revert, which were first used by Iamblichus to express the structure and behaviour of the soul. See Proclus, in Tim. II, 215, 5-29 (= Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 53 Dillon), In CS 68-9 it is discussed in Hegelian terms. 367. cf. Simpl. 33,24-34; 276,18-21.

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368. For this rendering of theôrein see Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, p. 182. 369. See CS, pp. 139-40. The hidden activity is the activity belonging to the being of the soul, its essence, as opposed to the projected or extroverted cognitive activity. 370. This life may be seen as that of sense-perception, which goes out to the external world, and then is called back (line 14). 371. DA 3.3 428a25; Plato, Timaeus 28A. cf. n. 216 above. 372. This is a second account of the meaning of ‘potential’ in this context. In each case the point is made that there is something stable in the soul at all times. 373. Theophrastus uses noein here in his own, and Aristotle’s, sense, but at 30,20 Priscian has preferred to use ginôskein in the same connection. 374. I have translated ataktos as ‘disorderly’, although E. Barbotin, La théorie aristotélicienne de l’intellect d’après Théophraste, Louvain 1954, p. 261 (on fr. VIIb) wanted ‘indefinable’. Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 134,6 uses ataktôs in the sense of ‘in a disorderly way’ in a passage that seems to echo a part of Theophrastus’ Metarsiology, which survives only in Arabic and has recently been translated by Hans Daiber, ‘The Meteorology of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic Translation’ in Theophrastus, His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings (see n. 260) pp. 166-293. At [14] 14-15 he gives: ‘it is not correct (to say) that God should be the cause of disorder in the world’. Probably some form of the word ataktos was used by Theophrastus here. See Jaap Mansfeld, ‘A Theophrastean Excursus on God and Nature and its Aftermath in Hellenistic Thought’, Phronesis 37 (1992) pp. 325-6. (At Metaph. 4a4 Theophrastus uses ataktotera of the study of nature, and atakton at 11b4 with apeiron and amorphia for what in Plato and the Pythagoreans result from the indefinite dyad and its relationship to the One.) The language is not un-Aristotelian: Aristotle equates ataktos with para phusin at DC 2 301a4, so that an ataktos phusis will well convey the difficulty of understanding the nature of intellect which Theophrastos is developing. akritos is used from Homer onwards in a variety of senses, and though it occurs only once in Aristotle, at Meteor. 2.5 361b30 of Orion as an unreliable weather sign, it is appropriate here. 375. Who are the people who suppose that intellect is all things potentially and nothing in itself? The view resembles one Aristotle expresses in several places, but is not put exactly in his words. Rather, he distinguishes between ‘potentially’ and ‘actually’ or ‘in activity’. The big question is whether kath’ hauton, ‘in itself ’, has a technical sense here. Priscian may be attacking recent people who hold a view unacceptable to Neoplatonists, for whom Intellect means something more positive. If that were the case it might be right to keep the manuscript reading and reject Wimmer’s insertion of ton before noun. Alternatively Priscian may have supposed, rightly or wrongly, that Theophrastus was refuting a view held by some of his contemporaries, who would then also be interpreting Aristotle’s words. See also n. 309 above. 376. 26,3-6 above. 377. DA 3.4 429b4-5; Themistius, in DA 108,18 (= Theophrastus 307A FHSG). 30,22-31,2 above = Theophrastus 312 FHSG; 30,22-5 and 29 = fr. VIIb, and 31,1-2 = fr. VIIc Barbotin. 378. It is likely that this is a quotation from Theophrastus. In any case it follows DA 3.4 429b5-9 closely, and ‘it’ there is intellect, but Priscian treats it as equivalent to soul. ‘Actually to know’ renders epistêmôn kat’ energeian, taken from Aristotle. 379. This refers to line 8 above, ‘has become each thing’. 380. 31,8-13 = Theophrastus 316 FHSG first part; fr. VIII Barbotin.

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381. This takes up ‘coming to be’ in line 12, but is applied in a different sense by Priscian. 382. cf. n. 355 above. 383. This is a close repetition of lines 9-10 above, which accounts for the expression ‘on the one hand’. See n. 378. 384. This passage of Theophrastus, together with Priscian’s development of it (31,24-32,18), is discussed in CS 55,8. Steel thinks the latter is an almost verbatim account of Iamblichus’ views. 31,24-5 above = Theophrastus 316 FHSG second part. 385. This section features the triad of being or substance, activity, and potentiality, but that is already there in Theophrastus. Involved here is a question about changes kat’ ousian – ‘in substance’, to which Priscian replies that substances must change if they are the source of good and bad activities. 386. Simpl. 240,8-10 speaks of our intellect as twofold, and of its proceeding into lives and thoughts – theôrias – which are either imperfect or perfect. For discussion of this passage see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic Elements in the De Anima Commentaries’, Phronesis 21, 1976, pp. 79-81. This may be Priscian’s target, and if so Simplicius and Priscian are unlikely to be identical. 387. See CS 90, n. 43 and 100 n. 28 for similar use of this word in Simpl. (251,21; 262,25). 388. See also Simpl. 6,16; 89,33; 240,37, for references to Iamblichus by name. For related views in Proclus see Steel, ‘L’Ame: Modèle et Image’ in The Divine Iamblichus, pp. 19-20, 25 n. 31. See also G. Shaw, ‘The Geometry of Grace’, ibid. pp. 110-20, and for a discussion of Iamblichus here see Huby, ibid. p. 8, and for the possibility that Priscian was using Iamblichus in the previous pages ibid. pp. 10-12. 389. DA 3.4 429b10-23. 390. 32,25-7 = Theophrastus 318 FHSG first part; 32,21-2 = fr. IXa Barbotin. 391. Steel, CS pp. 17-18 nn. 50-1, says that in what follows Priscian uses the three ways by which something can be known derived from Iamblichus: gnôsis can be superior to its objects (politics), or on a level with them (introspection), or inferior (gods); cf. Ammonius in De Int. 135,14-32; Stephanus in De Int. 35,19-33. 32,29-33 above = Theophrastus 318 FHSG second part. 392. cf. Philoponus in DA 529,22-3. Plutarch, an Athenian, was leader of the school of Athens in the early part of the fifth century, dying c. 431/2. He was influenced by Iamblichus and taught Syrianus and, in his old age, Proclus. 393. Priscian here relates Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ potential intellect to the Neoplatonists’ intellect participated in by soul and the rational soul. Cf. 29,3-5 above, and n. 353, and 34,24-5. Priscian leaves it unclear whether the participated intellect and the rational soul are one and the same. See also 35,15-17 and n. 414. 394. This participle is feminine singular. Its antecedent should therefore be the rational soul. But the following ‘it’ is also feminine singular, and should refer to something else. Perhaps we should read hautêi for autêi and translate ‘within itself ’. See n. 397. 395. For logoi in the soul see Proclus in Alc. 250.5-251 and Blumenthal in The Criterion of Truth, p. 274. 396. Bywater indicates a lacuna here, to be filled with something like ‘knows also the accidents’. This is easy palaeographically, but the sense might better support ‘knows also the qualities’. Perhaps nothing is needed, and we should have ‘also’ instead of the lacuna followed by ‘and’. There remains a puzzle about the switch to the soul, rather than the intellect, in what follows. 397. Reading hautêi for autêi. 398. DA 3.4 429b20-1. 399. 33,25-7 = Theophrastus 318 FHSG third part; fr. IXb Barbotin. It is

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uncertain where the quotation from Theophrastus ends, but in any case it is followed by Priscian’s exposition of his own account. Aristotle had said obscurely that the intellect is aware of different kinds of intelligibles either by (something) different or by the same thing differently disposed. This is fully discussed by Charles Kahn, ‘Aristotle on Thinking’ in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, eds M.C. Nussbaum and A.O. Rorty, Oxford 1992, pp. 370-2. Theophrastus seems to have enquired about this, but we cannot extract much from Priscian about any answer he may have given. Rather Priscian tries to answer the problem in terms of the Neoplatonist account of the various levels of intellect and its objects. 400. This translates the word noeros, which was not used by Aristotle, and means ‘of the nature of ’, or ‘on the level of ’ intellect. For want of better alternatives we have also used ‘intellective’ for noêtikon at 33,28 above. 401. DA 3.4 429b21-2. Priscian quotes Aristotle’s words almost exactly. They are however obscure, and he goes on to give three Neoplatonist interpretations. Presumably Theophrastus had added nothing. Aristotle used pragmata to refer to material objects, but the parallel statement has only the article ta – the ‘things’ in the loosest sense, presumably the intelligibles. ‘Separable’ must mean only ‘separable in thought’. 402. 33,32-34,2 = Theophrastus 318 FHSG fourth part; 33,32-34,1 = fr. IXc Barbotin. 403. cf. Simpl. 234,6-10. In view of 32,34-5 above, this is likely to be the view of Iamblichus. 404. i.e. as existing independently. This is part of a third view. Is it Priscian’s own? See also n. 430. 405. cf. n. 334 above. 406. Steel, CS pp. 126-7, explains anelixis as discursivity, a characteristic of the soul which has descended into division and ‘unfolds its total being  in a succession of states and forms’. (The quotations in his notes are from Simplicius’ commentary, not from the present work of Priscian.) The verb anelittein is used, as Todd points out, by Plato at Philebus 15E3, as well as by Themistius PDA 28,14, but in both cases with no metaphysical implications. 407. cf. Simpl. 221,25-8 and Steel, CS p. 127. But Steel relates this passage to intellect and soul, whereas it seems rather to deal with their objects, the forms and intelligibles, supposing that corresponding to the hierarchy among intellects and soul there is a similar one among their objects, so that the entirely indivisible are in the intellect in actuality, the intermediate are effects of the latter and causes of those being unfolded, i.e. those in the soul. See 32,25 ff. especially 33,1-32. 408. DA 3.4 429b6-9. 409. Theophrastus has elsewhere called for care in the interpretation of Aristotle’s words. See e.g. 26,5. 410. 34,29-35,1 = Theophrastus 317 FHSG first part; 34,29-31 = fr. Xa Barbotin. 411. Perhaps sense-perception, though probolê, projection, is the immediate antecedent. 412. Simpl. 217,26. 413. In this passage a distinction is made between the soul (unqualified) and the participated intellect, but it is clear from line 10 above that this is still the rational soul. 414. This must be the First Intellect. See n. 416. 415. ‘Hence’ renders Bywater’s dio. L1 has ou – ‘not’, which seems unsatisfactory. L2 and the other MSS have ho, which could give ‘which is’. 416. In the comparatively simple system that appears in Priscian this must be the First Intellect which is at the highest level of intellect and soul, and from which

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the rest are descended; the full expression, ‘First Intellect’, is given at line 28 below. So we have the series: First Intellect, participated intellect, rational soul. 417. DA 3.4 429b30-430a1. 418. 35,24-7; 29-30; 32-3 = Theophrastus 317 FHSG second, third and fourth parts; 35,29-30 and 32-3 = fr. Xb Barbotin. 419. Lines 29-30 and 32-3 should be taken together and are similar to DA 429b30-1, but there are some differences, of which the most noteworthy is the introduction of ‘potential’, so that where Aristotle has ‘the intellect’ Theophrastus has ‘the potential intellect is potentially its objects’. Aristotle does not say this, but later writers have taken it for granted that this was what he meant. If Priscian is correct – and he may not be – Theophrastus is the pioneer in this interpretation. The other differences are trivial: men  de may have been substituted for all’ by Theophrastus to avoid the harsh hiatus of entelekheiai ouden; Theophrastus, with whom Simplicius agrees, has prin noein, but Aristotle, followed by Themistius, has prin an noei. 420. i.e. by the soul; see 33.1-2 above and n. 393. 421. Bywater suggests an alternative, entelekheiai, which would give ‘is not yet in actuality’. 422. Reading hêi for ê. 423. 36,6-9 = Theophrastus 319 FHSG first part. 424. DA 3.5 430a10-19; 3.4 430a3-4. But except for the words ‘the thinker and the thought are one and the same’ this is not a precise quotation from Aristotle, and the question arises whether Priscian is being careless or whether he is here quoting from Theophrastus. 425. This is an almost exact quotation of DA 3.4 430a4-5. 426. DA 3.4 430a5-6. But again Priscian gives at best a paraphrase of Aristotle’s words, and again we may ask whether it is rather Theophrastus whom he is quoting. 427. 29.1-3 above. 428. In the following section we must distinguish between aitia as the singular first cause, and aitia as the plural causes on a lower level. 429. Lines 16-18 relate to DA 3.4 430a7-8. For the changes in the approach to the concept of dunamis indicated in the following lines, see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Dunamis in “Simplicius”,’ in Dunamis nel Neoplatonismo. Atti del II Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo, edd. F. Romano and R.L. Cardullo, Florence 1996, 149-72. 430. As at 34,2-21 three views are given, of which the first is that of Plutarch. 431. Almost a quotation of much of DA 3.4 430a7-9. Is it a direct quotation from Theophrastus? 432. 37,23-30 = Theophrastus 319 FHSG second part; 34,24-7 = fr. XI Barbotin. 433. The copyist of the ancestor of our MSS clearly supposed that this was not the end of Priscian’s work, for he wrote the word zêtei – ‘look out ’ at this point.

English-Greek Glossary be able: dunasthai be absent: apeinai abstraction: aphairesis accident: sumbebêkos accidentally, by accident: kata sumbebêkos accord (of its own accord): eph’heautou aph’heautou accordance (be in accordance with): akolouthein account (give an account of): apologizesthai account (on its own account): aph’ heautou acquainted (become acquainted with): gnôrizesthai act: dran, energein, poiein acted (be acted upon): paskhein action: energêma, dran (pres. part.) active (be active): energein, poiein active state (be in an active state): energein active: drastikos, energêtikos active thing: energêma actively: energêtikôs activity: energêma, energeia; be an activity: energein; by its own activity: autenergêtikôs; capable of activity, involving activity: energêtikos actual(ly): energeiai, entelekheiai actualisation: energeia, energein actuality: energeia; in actuality: entelekheiai, kat’ energeian; be brought into actuality: ousiousthai adapt: sunarmozein adequately (be adequately equipped): arkein adjacent: prosekhês advance outwards: proienai adventitious: epiktêtôs affect (n): pathêma, pathos

affected: en pathei affected (to be affected), paskhein affected easily: eupathês affected (incapable of being affected): apathês affection: pathos agree: homologein, sungignôskein, sunkhôrein air: aêr, pneuma allocated to matter: katatetagmenos alter: alloioun alter along with: sunalloioun alteration: metabolê ambivalent: amphibolos analogically: kata analogian analogous, on analogy with: analogos analogous (be analogous): analogein analogy: analogia analysis (give a preliminary analysis): prodiarthrein appear: phainesthai, diaphainesthai, ekphainesthai, emphainesthai appear (come to appear): epiphainesthai appearance: to phainomenon application: prosbolê apprehensible: katalêptos apprehension: hupolêpsis appropriate: oikeios appropriate (be appropriate): prosêkein appropriately: oikeiôs appropriateness: oikeiotês approve: episêmainein arise: gi(g)nesthai, engi(g)nesthai, histanai arouse: diegeirein, egeirein arousing: diegersis ask, ask leave: axioun, zêtein assimilate: aphomoioun assimilation: aphomoiôsis assimilative: aphomoiôtikos attribute (n): pathos

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audible: akoustos awake: egrêgorôs aware (be aware): aisthanesthai, sunaisthanesthai, krinein, theôrein aware: kritikos awareness: krisis, epikrisis awareness (having awareness): kritikos awareness (have extra awareness): epikrinein be: gi(g)nesthai, einai bear: epipherein become, be in a state of becoming: ginesthai begin, make a beginning: arkhesthai begin beforehand: prokatarkhein beginning: arkhê being: ousia, to einai; come into being: gi(g)nesthai belief: doxa belong: einai (+ gen.) bending: klasis better (the better): kreittôn between: metaxu between (the thing/space between): to metaxu bitter: pikros black: melas blast: pneuma block: emphrattein blow: plêgê bodily: sômatikos, sômatoeidês body: sôma borne (be borne): epokheisthai bounded (be bounded): horizesthai break: prosrhêgnunai breath: pneuma breathe in: anapnein breathing (in): anapnoê briefly: sunêirêmenôs bright: lampros bright (exceedingly bright): huperlampros brightness: lamprotês bring: komizein (Bywater) bring in: eispherein, epagein, epipherein bring forward: proagein bring near: prospelazein bring together: sunagein, sunairein

bring towards: prosagein brought (be brought into actuality): ousiousthai by itself: kath’ heauton call back: epanakalein can: dunasthai capable: dunamenos, dunatos, hoios te capacity to: dunaton carry along together: sumpherein carry around: sumperiagein carry down: hupopherein carry downwards: hê epi to katô phora causative: aitiôdês cause: aitia, aition, aitios; be a first cause: prokatarkhein; caused: aitiatos; as the causes of: aitiôdôs cease: apoleipein cessation: apoleipsis change (n): tropê, metabolê; (v): metaballein, alloioun changeable: metablêtos characteristics: kharaktêrizein characterize: kharaktêrizein check: kôluein circumscribe: perigraphein clear: katharos, enargês, akribês clearly: saphôs cloud: nephos coexist: suneinai cognate: sumphuês cognate (be cognate): paraphunai cognise: krinein cognitive: gnôristikos, gnôstikos, epistêmonikos cognitive (the cognitive element): to krinon cognitive (by a cognitive act): gnôstôs coincide: sumbainein colour (n): khrôma; (v): khrônnunai, khrôzein colourless: akhrous combination: to sunamphoteron combine: sunkeisthai come: hienai, hêkein come down: kathêkein katienai come outwards: proerkhesthai come through: diikneisthai come together: sunerkhesthai come in: engi(g)nesthai come into being: gi(g)nesthai come to be in: engi(g)nesthai

English-Greek Glossary come into existence: histanai come upon: epigi(g)nesthai come to be something (v): gi(g)nesthai coming to be (n): genesis company: khôros compare: paraballein comparison: parabolê compass (confine within a compass): perigraphein complete (adj): teleios, pantelês complete (vb): teleioun, epiteleioun, epitelein complete (make complete): apotelein, epitelein, teleioun completed: teleios completely: pantelôs completive: sumplêrôtikos, sumplêrein complications: poikilia compound: sunthetos comprehending: perilêptikos conceal: epikaluptein conceive: noein, huponoein concentration: apokoruphôsis concord: sumphônia condition: diathesis confine: katekhein congruent: summetros congruently: summetrôs conjunction: sunaphê conjunction (put in conjunction): sunarmozein connatural: sumphuês connect: sunaptein connected with: oikeios conscious (be conscious): sunaisthanesthai, epaistanesthai, theôrein conscious (become conscious of): krinein conscious of: theôrêtikos conscious (in a conscious way): kritikôs consequence (in consequence): akolouthôs, hepomenôs consist in: histanai conspicuously: periphanôs constitute: aphorizein constituted (be constituted): sunistanai constraint: anagkê contact (n): epaphê contact (be in contact): ephaptein, haptesthai

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contact (come in contact): ephapatein contain: periekhein, horizein container: periektikos contemplate: theôrein contemplation: theôria contemplative: theôrêtikos contiguous: prosekhês continuity: sunekheia continuity (in continuity): sunekhês continuous: sunekhês continuously: sunekhôs contrariety: enantiôsis contribute: suneispherein, suntelein contribution (make a contribution): suntelein convey: diaporthmeuein cooperate: sunergein coordinate: sustoikhos coordinately: sustoikhôs corporeal: sômatikos, sômatoeidês correct: summetros, summetrôs corrupt: diastrephein cover up: epikaluptein creation: genesis darkness: skotos darkness-producing, that which makes darkness: skotopoios deduce: sullogizesthai define: aphorizein definitive: horistikos delimitable (easily): euoristos dense: puknos, eupilêtos departure: apostasis dependent (be dependent on): artên deprive: stêrein depths: bathos derivative: hepomenos: in a derivative way: hepomenôs descend: hupobainein descent: hupobasis describe: diarthrein desire: orektikos destroy: anairein, dialuein, ptheirein destruction: dialusis determination: horos determine: horizesthai, diorizesthai determining (power): horos develop naturally beside: paraphunai differ: diapherein difference: heterotês, diaphora

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different: diaphoros, heteros, heterôs, allos different (make different): heteroioun differentia: diaphora differentiate (into various kinds): eidopoiein, diaphorôs differentiation: diaphora, diaphorotês dim: eskotismenos dimly: amudrôs directly: êdê, amesôs discerning (means of): diagnôsis dislodge: ekkrouein disorderly: ataktos display: dêloun dispose: diatithenai disposition: hexis disproportion: assumetron dissection: diarthrôsis dissolve: dialuein, luein distance: apostasis, diastasis, diastêma; be at a distance: diistanai; be at a correct distance: summetrôs distinction: diaphora, diairesis; make distinction(s): dielein, diorizesthai; make further distinctions: epidiarthrein, antidiastellein, episêmainein distinguish: diakrinein distinguishing (n): diakrisis; distinguishing mark: kharaktêr divide: merizein, summerizein divided: meristos; divide off: diairein, merizein; divided off: meristos; divide up: merizein, dielein; divided up: meristos; as divided up: meristôs dividedly: diêirêmenôs divisible: meristos, diairetos division: merismos, merizein, apomerismos, diairesis; without division: ameristôs do: dran, poiein double (nature): amphibios doxastic: doxastikos ear: ous earth: gê; of the measurement of the earth: geômetrikos edge: peras effect: pathêma, pathê, pathos, peisis,

aitiatos; receive or undergo effect: paskhein; effect to occur: paskhein effluence: aporrhoê, aporrhoia element: stoikheion embroider: poikillein emission: ekpompê emit: ekpempein empty: kenos enclose: apolambanein encompass: perilambanein encompassment: perilêpsis end: telos enmattered: enulos, enulôs enter into: eisienai entity: ousia equally: isos, isôs, hôsautôs essence: ousia essential: ousiôdês essentially: kat’ ousian, ousiôdês, -ôs evidence: tekmêrion evident: enargês, -ôs evil: kakia excess: huperbolê excessive: huperballein exist: histanai, huparkhein, einai; exist in: enuparkhein; exist together with: sunousiousthai existence: ousia; have, be given, substantial existence: ousiousthai; come into existence: histanai extend: apoteineisthai, diateinein, parateinein extension: apotasis external object: exô keimenon extraordinary: huperphuês extreme: akros eye: ophthalmos, omma eye-jelly: korê faculty: dunamis faint: amudros fall short of: apoleipesthai fall upon: prospiptein false: pseudês fasten: artan fiery: purios fill: plêroun; fill up: teleioun fine: leptos fire: pur first: prôtos

English-Greek Glossary fit: epharmozein, sunarmozein, sunaptein flavour: khumos; with flavour: enkhumos; flavourless: mê enkhumon flesh: sarx flow off: aporrhein follow: hepesthai, sumbainein; follow on: epakolouthein; it follows: akolouthon; following: akolouthôs force (active force ): drastêrion forcefully: sphrodrôs form: eidos, tupos; give form: eidopoiein; that makes form: eidopoios formal: eidêtikos, eidikos; in a formal way: eidêtikôs fragrant: euôdês from itself: aph’ heautou full: plêrês function: ergon gap: to metaxu gather together: sullambanein, sunairein; gathering (together) (n): sunairesis generation (connected with generation): genesiourgos genus: genos get through: diikneisthai getting through: diixis give: suneisagein, endidonai glancing at: hupidomenos go away: aperkhesthai go back: epanienai go on: proieinai go out: ekphoitan, proienai go up: anienai good of its kind: agathoeidês grasp (v): antilambanein, ekhein, noein; capable of grasping: antilêptikos grow together: sumphuesthai; grow within: sumphuês hand: kheir handed down: paradosis happen: sumbainein, gi(g)nesthai hasten: speudein have: ekhein hear: akouein; heard: akoustos; hearing: akoê; object of hearing:

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akouston; capable of hearing: akoustikos heat (n ): thermotês heat (v): thermainein heavenly: ouranios heavy: barus herb: arôma hidden: kruphios high (of pitch): oxus hinder, be a hindrance: empodizein, parapodizein hold: ephaptesthai homogeneous: homogenês homonymously: homônumôs, kath’ homônumian honey: meli hot: thermos hypostasis: hupostasis identity: tautotês ignorance: agnoia ; to be ignorant: agnoein illuminate: katalampein, epilamprunein, lamprunein, ellampein, phôtizein; illumination: katalampsis image: phantasma, phantasia, emphasis; make into images: apeikonizein imagination: phantasia; by the imagination: phantastikos; object of imagination: phantaston; capable of imagining: phantastikos; connected with imagination: phantastikos imaginatively: phantastikôs imagine: phantazesthai immediate: prosekhôs, athroos immediately: amesôs, autothen, athroôs, athroos impassible: apathês imperfect: atelês imperfection: ateleia implication: to epagomenon impossible: adunatos impression: tupôsis, epereisis imprinting: apotupôsis in between: metaxu in itself: kath’ hauto inactive (be): argein inactivity: argia inanimate: apsukhos

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incidentally: kata sumbebêkos inclination: neusis, aponeusis incomplete: atelês incongruent: asummetros incorporeal: asômatos individual: atomon, kata meros, merikos indivisible: amerês, ameristos, adiairetos indivisibly: ameristôs indivisibility: to ameriston inferior: kheirôn; inferior position: huphesis; be inferior: huphiesthai initiate: proêgeisthai; taking the initiative: proêgoumenôs insensitive: anaisthêtos inside, to be inside: enuparkhein instantaneously: akhronôs intellect: nous; object of intellect: noêton; in the realm of intellect: noêtôs; intellective: noeros, noêtikos; in an intellective sense: noêrôs intelligible: noêtos interfere: parapodizein intermediacy: mesotês intermediate: ana meson, mesos; intermediate position: mesotês interval: apostasis, diastasis inviolable: akraiphnês; inviolably: akraiphnôs involve: epipherein isolate: apotemnein join: sunairein, sunaptein; essentially joined with: sunousiousthai; join together: sunaptein; capable of joining: sunarmostikos judgment: krisis keep in (easy to): euphulaktos kind: genos; of one kind: monoeidês kinship: suggeneia, homophuia knitting (of brows): sunagôgê know: (see n. 364) ginôskein, gnôrizein, eidenai, noein, epistasthai; (be) know(ing): epistêmôn; knowable, known: gnôstos; known: epistêtos; known object (object known), object of knowledge: gnôston, epistêton; able to know: gnôristikos;

knowledge, piece of knowledge: gnôsis; knowledge: epistêmê; having knowledge: gnôristikos; connected with knowledge: epistêmonikos lacking (be) elleipein lantern (of a) lukhniaios lay down: diorizesthai learn: manthanein leave: enkataleipein, kataleipein length (of a suitable length): summetros level (lowest): eskhatos; on a higher level: kreittonôs; on the same level: sustoikhôs lie: keisthai life: zôê; connected with life: zôtikos; as a function of life: zôtikôs; lifelessness: azôia light: phôs, augê; that which produces light: phôtourgos; give light: phôtizein, ellampein; light-giving: phôteinos; like light: phôtoeidês; light up: phôtizein, diaphôtizein, prolampein like: homoios; become like: exomoiousthai; becoming like: exomoiôsis, homoiôsis; of becoming like: aphomoiôtikos; make like: aphomoioun; liken: apeikazein likeness: homoiôma, homoiotês limit: horos, peras; with limits: horizesthai limpid: diaphanês liquid: hugros live: zên; live through: diazên; living: zôion; living being, living creature, living thing: zôion living: zôtikos logos: logos loosen: khalazein looseness: to kekhalasmenon, khalasmos low (of pitch): barus luminous: phôtoeidês maimed: pepêrômenos major factor: proêgoumenos make: poiein; make capable of being seen: apotelein

English-Greek Glossary man: anthrôpos; of man: anthrôpeios many times the size of: pollaplasios material: hulikos, hulê matter: hulê; involved in matter: enulos, hulikos; matterless: aêlos medium: meson membrane: humên middle: mesos; middle position: mesotês; in the middle: ana meson, metaxu mirror: katoptron mix: mignunai, anamignunai; mixed: summigês, miktos; without being mixed: amigôs mixture: mixis, summixis moist: hugros moisten: hugrainein moisture: hugrotês, hugron mortal: thnêtos motion: kinêma, kinêsis; set in motion: kinein mould: diaplattein, ekmattein move: kinein; move together with: sunkinein; that which moves: kinêtikos; that which is moved by something else: heterokinêtos movable: kinêtikos movement: kinêsis; produce movement: kinein: movement comes about: kineisthai multiply along with: sumplêthunein murkiness: amudros name (n): onoma name (v): onomazein nature: hupostasis, phusis; in accordance with nature: kata phusin; within its nature: emphutos; by nature: phunai; beyond nature: huperphuês; natural: phusikos; be natural: phunai, kata phusin; develop naturally beside: paraphunai necessity: anankazein need (n): khreia; (v): khrêizein night: nux noise: êkhos; make a noise: psophein number: arithmos object: pragma, hupokeimenon obscurely: amudros

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obvious: enargês; be obvious: diaphainesthai, diaphanês occupy beforehand: prokatalambanein occur: gignesthai, engignesthai, sumbainein, sumpiptein of itself: kath’ hauton, aph’heautou one: heis open up: dianoigein opinion: doxa opposite: enantios, antikeimenos; be opposite: antikeisthai, antikeimenôs ekhein organ: organon organ of sense: aisthêtêrion original: prôtotupon other: allos otherness: heterotês ought: dein, deisthai out of scale: asummetros outline: tupos; receive an outline: hupotupousthai own: oikeios, idios, heautou part: meros, morion partial: meristos partake: metekhein; partaking: metalêpsis participate: metekhein participation: methexis particle: morion particular: meristos, kata meros, kath’ hekasta; made particular: merikos pass on: dibibazein passive (thing): pathêma passive, effect: pathos, pathêma; passively: pathêtikôs peculiar: idios peculiarity: idiôma perceive: aisthanesthai perceived object: aisthêton perceptible: aisthêtos perception: aisthêsis perceptive: aisthêtikos perfect: teleios; perfectly: teleiôs perfect (v), make perfect: apotelein, teleioun, epitelein perfecting (n): teleiôsis perfection: teleiotês, teleiôsis; bring to perfection: teleioun; process towards perfection: teleiôsis permanent: menôn phantasmal: eidôlikos

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place: aphorizein place upon: epitithenai pleasant: hêdus point: arkhê pore: poros possess: iskhein, ekhein potency: dunamis potential: dunamei potentiality: dunamis; in potentiality: kata dunamin potentially: dunamei power: dunamis; in its own power: eph’ heautôi; more powerful: kreittôn precedence, take precedence: proêgeisthai precise: akribês predominance: epikrateia predominate: epikratein presence: parousia, pareinai; be present: pareinai, enuparkein preserve: sôzein prevent: kôluein primarily: prôtôs, proêgoumenôs primary: proêgoumenôs; in its primary sense: kuriôs principle: arkhê prior: proteros private: idios privation: sterêsis proceed: proienai, proerkhesthai produce: poiein; be produced: engignesthai; act of production: poiêsis productive: apodotikos project: proballein projection: probolê projective: problêtikos, kata probolên proper: oikeios, idios, kurios; in the proper sense: kuriôs; properly: idikôs, kuriôs property: idiotês, idiôma proportion: summetria; proportionality: summetria proportionate: kata summetrian, en summetriai provide: parekhesthai pure: kathareuein, akêratos; purely: katharôs purity: katharotês push out: ekkrouein

quality: poiotês quantity: megethos, posotês ratio: logos rational: logikos real: ontôs; really: tôi onti, ontôs reality, in reality: kat’ ousian reason: logos; of reason: logikos; reasonable: eulogos; with reason: eulogôs; for no reason: matên reason (v): logizesthai; reasoning: logikos receive: dekhesthai, eisdekhesthai, anadekhesthai, paradekhesthai; apolambanein; receive a share of: metalambanein; receive together: sullambanein; receive beforehand: prolambanein; that which receives: dektikos; easily receive: euparadektos receiving (n): paradokhê receptacle: hupodokhê reception: eisdokhê, hupodokhê receptive: dektikos record: hupomimnêskein redefine: aphorizesthai reference: anaphora refer, have reference: anapherein reflection: anaklasis refute: elenkhein relation: skhesis relationship: parabolê, skhesis remain: menein, diamenein, emmenein remind: hupomimnêskein remove: aphaireisthai represent (in itself): apotupousthai representative image: emphasis require: axioun, dein, deisthai resemble: proseoikenai; resembling: homoios resistance: antitupon resistant: antitupos resolved easily: euapolutos responsible: kurios revert: epistrephesthai, strephein rouse: anegeirein, egeirein rule: arkhein same: homoios; be in the same condition: hôsautôs ekhein; in the same respect: kata to auto; in the same way: homoiôs

English-Greek Glossary scientifically: kata to phusikon seal: sphragis second, secondary: deuteros secondarily, in a secondary way: deuterôs see: horan, theôrein, idein; that which can see: horatikos; seeing: horan, horasis; of seeing: horatikos; object seen: horaton; seen: horatos seeming: dokein self-actively: autenergêtôs self-illuminating: autophanês self-sufficient: arkein heautôi send out: ekpempein, ekpempesthai, hienai sensation, sense-perception: aisthêsis; object of sensation, object of sense-perception: aisthêton sense (n): aisthêsis; (v): aisthanesthai; sense-experience: aisthêma; sense-object: aisthêton; sense-organ: aisthêtêrion; connected with sense: organikos, aisthêtikos; capable of being sensed: aisthêtos; capable of sensing: aisthêtikos; of sense, of the senses: aisthêtikos; sense-perception: aisthêsis; senseless: anaisthêtos sensible: aisthêtos sensitive: aisthêtikos separable: khôristos separate (adj): khôristos separate (v): diairein, khôrizein, diaspan; separately, on a separate level, as a separate thing: khôristôs separation: khôrismos set apart: khôrizein, aphistanai, apodialambanein set out: diarthrein, diatithenai, ektithenai set up, be set up: histanai settled: hidrumenos shadow-painting: skiagraphia shape: morphê; having shape: morphôtikos; changing its shape: diamorphôsis; give shape: morphoun share: metekhein, koinônein shield: aspis shine: lampros; shine through:

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diaphainesthaisthai; shining: lampros sight: opsis silence: siôpê similar: homoios; be similar: proseoikenai; similarly, in a similar way: homoiôs; in a similar relation: homoiôs; be in a similar relation with: analogein simile: paradeigma simple: haplous; simply: haplôs simulacrum: aphomoiôma simultaneous: hama situated, be situated: histanai size: megethos, metron; of the right size: summetros sketch: hupographein sleep: katheudein smell (n): osmê, osphrêsis; (v): osphrainesthai; of smell: osphrantikos; object of smell: osphranton; sensation of smell: osphranton; smelling: osphrêsis; capable of smelling: osphrantikos smooth: leios solid: stereos; solidity: stereon sophistry: eristikon soul: psukhê; of the soul: psukhikos; soulless: apsukhos sound (n): psophos, êkhos; (v) êkhein source: aph’ hou space: topos spatially: kata topon special: idios, exairetos; in a special way: idiôs; special nature: idiotês speculative: theôrêtikos spirit: pneuma stable: monimos; be stable: menein stand still: histanai start: arkhesthai starting-point: arkhê state: hupostasis, diathesis stay the same: menein steadfastly: stasimôs stimulate jointly: sunkinein stone: lithos stretch off: apoteinein stretch out: parateinein, katateinein stretching: tasis strictly: kuriôs strike: plêttein striking (n): plêgê; strikingly: plêktikôs

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strong: iskhuros; strongly: sphrodrôs studying: zêtêsis subsist: huphistanai substance: ousia; substantial, of a substance: ousiôdês; in its substance: ousiôdôs substrate, substratum: hupokeimenon suffering: pathos sufficient: hikanos; to a sufficient degree: arkontôs; be sufficient: arkein suggest: hupomimnêskein suitable: epitêdeios suitability: epitêdeiotês sun: hêlios; of the sun: hêliakos superior: kreittôn, kreittonôs superior standing to: huperanekhein superiority: kreitton, periousia supervene: epigi(g)nesthai suppose: hupolambanein, hupotithenai, tithenai; suppose to be prior: proupotithesthai surface: epiphaneia, peras suspend: apaiôrein sweet: glukus; make sweet: glukazein sympathetically affect: sundiatithenai synthesis: sunthesis tablet: grammateion take: lambanein; take over: lambanein taste: khumos, geusis; tastable: geustos; what can be tasted: geustos; of taste: geustikos tear apart: diaspan; being torn apart: diaspasmos tear away: apospan temporally: khronikôs tendency: rhopê thing: pragma think: noein, noesthai; think of: noein, epinoein; thinking: noein; thinker: to nooun; thought: dianoia, epinoia, to nooumenon; that which is thought: nooumenon; object of thought: noêton; be thought: noêtos; by thought: dianoêtikôs; think right: axioun this something: tode ti through itself: di’ heautou thunder-clap: brontê time: khronos tongue: glôtta

touch (n): haphê; (v) thingannein; touchable: haptos; related to touch: haptikos; by touching: haptikôs tout court: haplôs trace: ikhnos transcend, be transcendent: exaireisthai transfer: metapherein transmit: diapempein, endidonai; by transmission: anapempein, diadosis transodorant: diosmos transparent: diaphanês, diaugês transport: diabibazein transsonant: diêkhês transsonic: diêkhêtikos be out of tune with: apaidein turn: strephein; in turn: para meros; turn off: paratrepein turning (n): strophê, rhopê turning inwards: sustrophê twofold: dittos type: eidos unbroken: apolutos, apolutôs unchanging: ametablêtos undergo effect: paskhein underlying: hupokeimenos understand: epistasthai, akouein, huponoein understanding: sunesis undiscriminating: akritos undivided: adiairetos, ameristos undividedly: ameristôs unfold: anelittein unfolding: anelixis unify: henoun uniform(ly): monoeidês, monoeidôs union: henôsis; in union: hênômenôs unite: henoun; unity: henôsis, to hênômenon; in unity: hênômenôs unmixed: amigês, amiktos; in an unmixed form: amigôs unsuitable: anepitêdeios; unsuitable state: anepitêdeiotês unusual: asunêthês unwritten: agraphos use: khrêsthai, khrêsis useful: khrêsimos variance, be at variance: diistanai

English-Greek Glossary variety: heterotês violence: sphodrotês visible: horatos visual: optikos vital: zôtikos, tês zôês voice: phônê volition: hormê wanting, defective: ellipes warm: thermos wax: kêros

whole: holos; as a whole: holos; wholeness: holotês; wholes through wholes: holoi di’ holôn windpipe: pharunx wish: horman withdraw: anagein without matter: aülos woodcutter: drutomos work: energein; work through, work out: epexergazesthai world, of this world: perikosmios

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Greek-English Index adiairetos, indivisible, undivided, 9,16; 22,22; 26,25.27 adiairetôs, undividedly, 22,21 adunatos, incapable, 3,25; 18,2; impossible, 4,5; 25,17; 28,11; 31,27 aei, always; 13,32; 16,23; 24,17; 25,25; 29,1.2(bis).7.26; 30,8.22; 31,28.33; 34,5; 37,6.25.28; continually; 30,28 aêr, air; 6,30; 8,2.6.23; 9,11.14.19; 10,20; 12,3; 13,3-24 passim; 14,10.14.29.33; 15,8; 15,25-16,22 passim; 18,15.22; 19,17-30 passim; 20,14.30 agathoeidês, of a good type, 31,29 agnoein, be ignorant, 31,19 agnoia, ignorance, 31,17; 34,17 agraphos, unwritten, with no writing, 26,29; 27,2; 35,25.26 ainissesthai, hint; 32,21 aisthanesthai, be aware, 11,14; 14,28; perceive, sense, 3,2; 10,15; 12,12.33; 13,25; 15,28; 16,24; 17,2.21; 19,31; 21,17.32(bis); 22,4.11; 25,10 aisthêma, sense-experience, 25,21 (contrast phantasma, energêma) aisthêsis, perception, sensation, sense-perception, 1,3-22 passim; 2,9-26 passim; 3,21.23.32; 5,9; 6,5.6.9; 7,11; 13,22; 14,4.12; 17,7.8.12.15.18; 18,12; 19,11; 20,5.26; 21,5.13; 22,28; 23,5.7.16; 24,15.17.21.25; 25,15.16.23; 31,1; 33,3.11; 35,1; 36,34; 37,3; sense, 4,14-15,16 passim; 7,16.24; 10,23; 11,9; 13,31; 14,16; 19,10.14; 20,8.9; 21,17.18.28.30.32.33; 22,13.20.29; 23,7.16; 24,10; 26,8.9.13; 27,9.14.27; 28,1.3; 30,11 aisthêtêrion, sense-organ, organ of sense, 1,4-5,8 passim; 6,2.8; 10,18; 11,18; 13,6-14,8 passim;

14,19; 15,26.31; 16,16; 17,12; 20,17; 21,7; 22,12; 23,12; 24,22-25,6 passim; 26,11; 28,4; 35,1 aisthêtikos, of sensing, of the senses, 3,30; of sense; 25,6; connected with sense, 24,21; 25,12; capable of sensing, 25,11; sensitive (with eidos, form), 23,9.11; 24,26; perceptive, 19,22; sensitive, 4,7; 28,4 aisthêton, object of sense, sense-object, 1,3-6,17 passim; 7,24; 10,17.20; 13,22-4; 14,18; 15,26.32; 17,9.10.15.22(bis); 21,8-28 passim; 22,20-23,7 passim; 24,6-23 passim; 25,13.25; 26,9.10; 27,32; 28,5.26; 36,16-17; capable of being sensed, 36,16 aisthêtos, perceptible, perceived, 17,2.6; sensible (of form, cf. aisthêtikos), 2,7; 13,24 aithêr, aether, 8,3 aitia, cause, 31,30; 33,6-10 passim; 37,15.21.33 aitiatos, caused, effect, 9,8; 33,8.20.31 aitiôdês, which is a cause, 33,8; causative, 36,33 aitiôdôs, as the causes of, 6,13 aition (neu.), cause, 9,8.9.16; 10,14.15; 37,13(bis) aitios, cause, 10,3.4.7; 20,5; 21,5; 33,11.29; 36,31; 37,20.32 akêratos, pure, 32,8 akhronôs, instantaneously, 15,2 akhrous, colourless, 5,4; 7,34 akoê, hearing, 4,2(bis).7; 5,5.10.20; 6,16; 10,18; 12,3; 13,7; 14,11(T); 16,16; 17,5 akolouthein, to be in accordance with, 32,10 akolouthon, it follows, 12,2.6

Greek-English Index akolouthôs, in consequence, 20,15; following, 23,4 akouein, hear, 12,33; 13,4; 14,27.34; 16,14.23; 19,28; 20.28; 22,25(bis); understand, 26,29; 28,20; 30,30; 34,13; 36,2 akoustikos, capable of hearing, 19,29 akouston, object of hearing, 19,27 akoustos, audible, heard, 11,11; 13,9 akraiphnês, inviolable, 26,25; 35,4 akraiphnôs, inviolably, 26,16.27; 27,1; 35,15 akribês, clear, 14,19; in detail, 15,3; exact, precise, 18,21; 26,20 akribôs, exactly, 27,16 akritos, undiscriminating, 30,24 akros, extreme, 19,2.3 alêthês, true, 20,1; 24,3.21; 25,10.12.13.18; 29,16; 33,27 alloioun, alter, 6,10; 21,23.25 allos, different, 30,19.20.28; other, 35,6 amerês, indivisible, 2,28; 3,7.25.27; 4,8 ameriston (neu.), indivisibility, 35,29 ameristos, indivisible, 1,11; 22,8(bis).23.25; 26,16.27; 34,16-26 passim; 35,4.12.18.31; 36,14; undivided, 13,1; 22,3; 26,21; 27,18; 29,16; 35,19; 36,19 ameristôs, without division, 2,12; undividedly, 2,30; 12,22.31; indivisibly, 35.33; 36,19 amesôs, immediately, directly, 5,22; 18,26 ametablêtos, unchanging, 31,28; 32,8 amigês, unmixed, 20,4 amigôs, in an unmixed form, 12,27; without being mixed, 12,28.29 amiktos, unmixed, 20,1 amphibios, double (nature), 29,8 amphibolos, ambivalent, 31,15 amudros, murky, 14,19; faint, 9,20; obscure(ly), 4,15; 6,24.28; 10,3 amudrôs, dimly, 12,8 anadekhesthai, receive, 17,4 anagein, withdraw, 4,19 anairein, destroy, 32,6 anaisthêtos, insensitive, 18,24; senseless, 21,2 anaklasis, reflection, 15,6.20.24 analogein, be in a similar relation,

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be analogous, 17,30; 18,9; on analogy with; 18,22 analogia, analogy, 26,29; kata analogian, analogically, 26,5; 30,30 analogos, analogous, 11,10 anamignunai, mix, 14,10(T) anankazein, of necessity (does), 6,16 anankê, constraint, 25,15 anapempein, by transmission, 4,22 anapherein, have reference, 24,17; refer, 24,27 anaphora, reference, 24,6.13 anapnein, breathe in, 16,19 anapnoê, breathing, 16,17; breathing in, 17,19 anegeirein, rouse, 23,16 anelittein (Att.), unfold, 34,23 anelixis, unfolding, 34,23.26; 35,10 anemos, wind, 16,21 anepitêdeios, unsuitable, 21,11 anepitêdeiotês, unsuitable state, 21,10 anienai, go up, 22,7 anthrôpos, man, 20,27 anthrôpeios, of man, 32,4 antidiastellein, make distinction, 36,32 antikeimenos, opposite, 25,20.21; antikeimenôs ekhein, be opposite, 25,23 antikeisthai, be opposite, 28,13 antilambanein, grasp, 2,1; 4,21.34; 18,5; 36,9 antilêptikos, capable of grasping, 19,13 antilegein, argue against, 17,29 antitupon, resistance, 20,12 antitupos, resistant, 10,11 apaidein, be out of tune with, 15,11 apaiôrein, suspend, 35,18 apathês, impassible, not capable of being affected, 19,2.4; 28,16.20 apeikazein, liken, 26,23; 27,1 apeikonizein, make into images, 24,5 apeinai, be absent, 24,10.24 aperkhesthai, go away, 9,18.20 aph’ heautou, on its own account, of its own accord, 24,12; 26,14; of itself; 24,28; 27,21; 28,6; 34,26; from itself; 24,14.16; 27,11[12

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with MSS reading].14; 28,8.16(T); 29,11.28; 35,31; 36,19 aph’ hou, source, 13,30 aphaireisthai, remove, 7,33 aphairesis, abstraction, 32,32; 33,20.24.26; 36,30 aphistanai, set apart, 32,2 aphomoioun, make like, 3,31; assimilate; 23,23; 24,17 aphomoiôma, simulacrum,1,21 aphomoiôsis, assimilation, 23,18 aphomoiôtikos, assimilative, 23,27; of becoming like, 24,19 aphorizein, place, 21,8; define, redefine, 28,25.27; constitute; 31,16 apodialambanein, set apart, 34,4 apodotikos, productive, 31,29 apokoruphôsis, concentration, 22,3 apolambanein, enclose, 15,27; receive, 31,23 apoleipein, cease, 24,10 apoleipesthai, fall short of, 26,18 apoleipsis, cessation, 9,18 apolutos, unbroken, 13,3 apolutôs, unbroken, 13,13; 14,7 apomerismos, division, 10,1 aponeusis, inclination, 26,16 apophainesthai, declare, 17,8; 27,3; 34,1 aporein, raise difficulties, problems, questions, 7,22; 9,1; 14,25; 27,8 aporia, difficulty, 29,25; problem, 11,15; 16,8 aporrhein, flow off; 13,18; 13,26 aporrhoê, effluence, 5,23; 9,32; 10,2; 11,15; 13,28 aporrhoia, effluence, 13,25; 15,22 apospan, tear away, 27,31 apostasis, departure, 29,10; interval, 6,14; distance, 35,19 apotasis, extension, 1,20; 22,30 apoteinesthai, be stretched off, 33,3; extend, 3,31; 29,8; 36,13.27 apotelein, make complete, 5,22; make perfect, 13,12; perfect, 26,23; 30,2; make (capable of being seen), 8,1 apotemnein, isolate, 9,15 apotupousthai, represent (in itself), 23,14.20; 24,2.4.7 apotupôsis, imprinting, 15,7.25

apsukhos, soulless, 2,2; inanimate, 18,18 argein, be inactive, 22,16(bis) argia, inactivity, 22,1(T).10.14-16.18 Aristotelês, Aristotle, 1,5; 7,21; 14,24; 17,25; 18,1.7.28; 19,14; 21,16.33; 22,24; 23,4; 26,23; 29,3; 32,25.34; 34,1; 35,25; 36,6.10.24 aristotelikos, what Aristotle says, 24,3 arithmos, number, 4,11.21; 22,21 arkein, be sufficient, 16,9; be adequately equipped, 19,20; arkein heautôi, be self-sufficient, 10,25; arkontôs, to a sufficient degree, 8,29 arkhein, rule, 28,30; 32,3 arkhesthai, begin, make a beginning, 29,11.29; 34,27; start, 28,9 arkhê, beginning, 2,12; starting-point, 22,34; 27,13; 28,17; point, 15,1; principle, 32,7 arôma, herb, 17,11 asômatos, incorporeal, 27,10(bis); 28,14; 36,11 artan, fasten, 3,12; (pass.) be dependent on, 35,14 aspis, shield, 18,14.15 asummetron, disproportion(ate), 7,5 asummetros, out of scale; 6,5; incongruent, 21,11 asunêthês, unusual, 7,26 ataktos, disorderly, 30,25 ateleia, imperfection, 32,10 atelês, incomplete, 3,14; 28,21.24; imperfect, 20,22.28; 31,18.19.30; 32,1.4.24; less perfect, 10,22 athroos, immediate, immediately, 9,16.18; 13,13; 14,26; as a whole, 14,30; athroôs, immediately, 9,20; 12,22 atomon, individual, 2,33 atopos, absurd, 1,6; 10,16; 21,19; 26,1; 27,3 (all T) augê, light, 26,24 aülos, without matter, 32,26.28; 33,10.18; 34,9.18.19(bis).21; 36,14.17; 37,17.31; matterless; 33,4-6.25(T?).31; 34,12.14.15; 36,7; 37,19.28 autenergêtôs, self-actively, 28,30; 29,1.12; by its own activity, 27,22

Greek-English Index autophanês, self-illuminating, 26,18 axios, worthy, 37,5 autothen, immediately, 7,24 axioun, require, 7,24; claim, 18,1.30; 22,9; want, 18,28; maintain, 20,23; ask, 28,23; 33,25; ask leave, 28,27; think right, 30,30 azôia, lifelessness, 34,17 barus, heavy, 10,26; low, 17,25.28.29.32 bathos, depths, 8,21 blepein, look, 12,32 brontê, thunder-clap, 16,21 dei, deisthai, need, 1,20; 6,14.26; 10,8.9.19.21.22.25.27.30.33.34; 11,24; 16,9; 24,14; 26,11.21.24.32.33; 31,2; there is a need, 11,22.23; require, 6,60; ought, 11,27; must, 17,13 dekhesthai, receive, 3,9.18; 9,4.17.23; 14,7; 16,1,3; 21,10; 23,19; 24,30; 25,1.5.12.18.20; 27,22.29; 28,6.8(bis); 29,1.12 dektikos, receptive, 8,17.18.21.23; 19,3; 20,12.18; which receives, 9,12; 21,12 dêloun, display, 17,26; show, 6,27; 9,24.34; 24,31; 32,27; 34,2; 35,11; indicate, 37,19 deuteros, second, 15,14.16.17; 28,28.29; 32,4; secondary, 29,7.31; 30,3; 35,22 deuterôs, in a secondary way, 14,9; 27,30; 28,12; 33,9; 35,22; secondarily; 4,33.34; 5,3; 21,22; 29,24; 34,24 diabibazein, transport, 12,30; pass on, 14,20 diadosis, transmission, 9,21; 12,22 diagnôsis, means of discerning, 5,15 diairein, separate, 14,3(T); divide off, 22,19; diêirêmenôs, dividedly, 35,6 diairesis, division, 15,17; distinction, 26,4 diairetos, divisible, 22,22 diakrinein, make distinction, 27,7; distinguish; 32,33 diakrisis, distinguishing, 5,16 dialuein, dissolve, 20,6; destroy; 21,12

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dialusis, destruction, 21,10 diamenein, remain, 32,11 diamorphôsis, changing its shape, 24,29 dianoêtikos, by thought, 4,25 dianoia, thought, 4,18(bis).21.24; 5,4 dianoigein, open up, 16,17 diapempein, transmit, 23,16 diaphainesthai, shine through, 11,4; appear, 13,25; be obvious, 21,29; 32,20 diaphanês, transparent, 5,20.21.25.26; 6,18.27.28.30; 7,9.26.32; 8,1-30 passim; 9,11; 10,7-19 passim; 11,14-26 passim; 12,7-31 passim; 13,10.14.30-14,6 passim; 15,2.33; 16,7; 17,16; limpid, 20,19; obvious, 35,9.15 diaphora, difference, 14,22; 19,8.10; 33,27; distinction, 34,21; differentiation, 5,12; differentia; 17,25 diaphoros, different, 3,24.25; 22,21.23; 24,18.20.24; 25,19.20 diaphorôs eidopoiein, differentiate into various kinds, 5,12 diaphorotês, differentiation, 5,17 diaphôtizein, light up, 12,2 diaplattein (Att.), mould, 23,26 diaporthmeuein, convey, 7,9 diarthrein, describe, 17,18; set out, 37,24 diarthrôsis, dissection, 7,20 diaspan, separate, 32,1; tear apart, 28,3; 36,18 diaspasmos, being torn apart, 36,16 diastasis, distance, 5,28; 6,6; 7,3.10; 11,24; interval, 6,15 diastêma, distance, 6,2; 14,21 diastrephein, corrupt, 31,30 diateinein, extend, 11,16; 29,6 diatithenai, set out, 21,33; dispose; 24,33; 28,13; treat of; 34,13 diathesis, state, 8,4.5; condition, 13,11 diaugês, transparent, 20,18 diazên, live through, 32,17 diegeirein, arouse, 3,4; 28,10 diegersis, arousing, 2,8 diêkhês, transsonant, 10,19; 15,33; 16,1.5.8 diêkhêtikos, transsonic, 16,6

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dielein, make a distinction, 9,7; 26,3(T); divide up; 4,2(T) dieukrinein, examine thoroughly, 33,1 di’ heautou, through itself, 31,10 diikneisthai, come through, 17,15(T); get through; 14,16.33; 17,7(T) diistanai, be at a distance, 5,27; 6,1; 35,12; be at variance, 5,7 diixis, getting through, 14,22 diorizesthai, lay down, 5,11; make a distinction, 9,6; determine, 21,19 diosmos, transodorant,16,2 dittos (Att.), twofold, 31,32.33; 32,5 dokein, seeming, 15,23 doxa, belief, 25,23; opinion, 19,11.12; 23,6.16.17; 30,10 doxastikos, doxastic, 19,11 dran, act, 4,10.12; 5,26; 6,1; 26,11; do, 6,19; (pres. part.) action, 24,35 drastêrion, active force, 4,11; active, 5,26; active nature, 20,13 drastikos, active, 5,31 drutomos, woodcutter, 14,28 dunamei, potentially, 16,5; 26,5.7.9.31; 37,9.11(bis).14; potential, 16,4; (of nous, ousia), 26,26; 27,6.7; 28,12; 29,33; 30,16.18.22.25.30; 31,5.10.19.22; 32,31; 33,1.9; 34,5.6; 34,24-36,4 passim; 37,21; kata dunamin, as well as we can, 7,23; in potentiality, 22,32 dunamenos, capable, 9,17.23 dunamis, faculty,1,16; 3,31; 5,14; 10,25; 11,13; 23,5.13.15.23.24; 24,19.24; 25,19.22; potentiality, 19,6; 22,32; 29,7; 31,12-33,20 passim; 37,18.19.21.34; potency, 2,30; 25,29; power, 4,9.13.30; 5,26.31; 6,13; 13,27; 14,18; 20,27; 22,5; 31,24 dunasthai, be able, 31,9; can; 24,11 dunaton (to), capacity, 1,7 dunatos, capable, 26,2; 27,4; possible, 3,21; 4,6; 16,13.14; êdê, directly, 2,14; already, 6,31; 10,9; 13,10; 19,2; 22,5; 31,23; 36,34 egeirein, arouse, rouse, 1,18; 4,29;

23,7; 24,1.12.27.29; 25,26; 27,21; 35,31 egrêgorôs, awake, 2,16 eidenai, know, 19,27; 20,22; 33,14.16.24 eidêtikos, formal, 5,18; 9,34; 13,15; 21,30 eidêtikôs, in a formal way, 4,12 eidikôs, formal, 21,30 eidôlikos, phantasmal, 15,8.20 eidopoiein, give form, 12,23(bis).26 (contr. paskhein); 13,33; 20,15; 29,27; (with diaphorôs) differentiate into various kinds, 5,12; eidopoios, that makes forms, 20,13; eidos, form, 1,8.9.14; 2,1-3.8 passim; 3,16.20.28; 4,17.18; 5,26; 7,14.15; 8,10.26.27.29; 9,21; 10,1.2.3.26; 13,8.13.21.23.25; 14,13-15.30.31.32; 15,9.21.22; 17,5.13.24; 19,7; 20,19; 22,9; 23,7.9.12.15; 24,4-25.1 passim; 25,20; 26,8.13(bis).30; 27,2; 32,26-33,4 passim; 33,14-34,21 passim; 35,27; type; 31,32 eikotôs, reasonably, 26,7 einai, exist, 8,17; 19,9.10; 30,4.23; 33,9; 34,20.27; 36,7; 37,10; being, 9,14; 30,4; being (what it is), 32,27(bis).29.30; tôi einai (contr. arithmôi), in its being, 22,22 (cf. onta); einai (+ gen.), belong; 5,1; 22,5 eisdekhesthai, receive into itself, 7,8; receive, 27,29; eisdokhê, reception, 5,22 eisienai, enter into, 27,25; 29,29 eispherein, bring in, 16,17 ekhein, possess, 37,25; grasp, 3,24; 22,10; have, 14,18 êkhein, sound, 16,24; 17,2 êkhos, sound, 10,20; 17,2,6; noise, 14,28 ekkrouein, push out, 11,3; dislodge, 18,27 ekmattein (Att.), mould, 23,14 ekpempein, emit, 17,24; send out, 5,24; 11,18; 17,24; ekpompê, emission, 5,23 ekphainesthai, appear, 35,10 ekphoitan, go out, 27,18.23

Greek-English Index elleipein, be wanting, be lacking, 5,6; 31,4 emmenein, remain, 13,18 emphainein, display, 24,32 emphainesthai, appear, 24,33 emphasis, representative image, 2,8.20; 3,19; 7,12.14; 15,9.21; 23,12.15.22; 24,29; 25,2.9.12.19 emphrassein, block, 17,3 emphutos, within its nature, 31,15 empoiein, have (an effect), 6,10 enantios, opposite, 3,20.21.25; 4,8.9; 22,1.10 enantiôsis, contrariety, 19,1 enargês, clear, 4,14; 13,17.24; evident, 4,5; obvious, 18,18 enargôs, clearly, 24,32; with clarity, 4,32 endeiknunai, show, 9,3; demonstrate, 32,19 endidonai, transmit, 2,21; give, 28,28 energeia, actuality, 2,13.27; 6,25.30; 7,31.34; 8,16; 9,5.34; 10,24; 13,13; 26,17; 27,9; 29,25; 30,23.30; 31,4; activity, 2,4.24; 3,10-34 passim; 4,15.26; 5,6; 7,13; 9,1.4.5.25; 10,2.12; 11,25; 12,18-13,1 passim; 13,28-14,32 passim; 15,11.14.21.32; 17,5-24 passim; 18,27; 21,30.34; 22,15(bis).18.27; 23,21 (contr. energêma); 23,26; 24,3.4.7.18; 25,1; 27,28; 28,2-24 passim; 29,13; 29,31-30,19 passim; 31,24-33 passim; 32,10.11.24; being active, 23,25; actualisation, 8,30; 9,10.24; 26,12; 37,20; energeiai, actually, 16,5; 26,21; 27,19.21.23.26; 34,6.30.32; 37,12; in actuality, 26,6; 27,16; 30,23.30; 31,3.6; 33,7; 34,24; 35,5; 37,33; actual, 16,4; 35,3.5; kat’ energeian, in actuality, 7,13; 13,7; 17,26; 22,25; 31,9; 37,1.26; actual, 36,35; 37,1.2; connected with activity, 3,22; 17,26 energein, be in an active state, 1,13.17; be an activity, 15,4; be active, 2,4-6,30; 3,5; 3,19-4,20 passim; 7,8; 10,32; 12,6-8; 13,27.29.31; 15,13.16; 22,16.17.21.23.29.30; 23,8.10.11; 26,14; 27,28.32; 28,7.10; 29,2;

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epikratein, predominate, 20,2.32 epikrinein, have extra awareness, 21,34 epikrisis, awareness, 24,1 epiktêtôs, adventitious, 21,15 epilamprunein, illuminate, 12,9 epinoia, thought, 34,3-5.7.9.11.13 epiphainesthai, come to appear, 2,8 epiphaneia, surface, 8,23 epipherein, bear in, 11,17; bring in, 17,14; involve, 3,32 episêmainein, approve, 17,28; make a distinction, 35,24; indicate, 37,5 episkêptein, urge, 20,1 epistasthai, know2, 29,28; actually know, 29,28.33; 31,6.20.21; understand, 34,7 epistêmê, knowledge2, 30,17; 31,17; 36,26.27.31.34; 37,1.3.25 epistêmôn, (be) know(ing)2, 31,8 epistêmonikos, cognitive2, 29,32; connected with knowledge2, 31,24 epistêton, object of knowledge2, 30,11.12; 31,5-7; 36,29; 37,2 epistêtos, known2, 36,26.29.32(bis) epistrephesthai, revert, 2,28; 22,6 epitarassein, disturb, 7,26 epitêdeios, suitable, 5,27; 15,4; 25,8 epitêdeiotês, suitability, 6,28; 8,11; 14,20; 21,13; suitable state, 5,31 epitelein, make complete, 6,9; perfect, 11,12; complete, 36,35 epiteleioun, complete, 11,1 epizêtein, enquire, 11,19 epokheisthai, be borne, 12,21.28(bis).31 ergon, function, 22,20 eristikon, sophistry, 25,28 eskhatos, on the lowest level, 26,7 eskotismenos, dim, 5,4 euapolutos, easily resolved, 7,28 eulogos, reasonable, 7,25(T); 11,27; 20,11 eulogôs, with reason, 29,6 euôdês, fragrant, 17,10 euoristos, easily delimitable, 20,14.20 euparadektos, easily receive, 20,14 eupathês, easily affected, 20,12.14 euphulaktos, easy to keep in, 16,11 eupilêtos, dense, 16,11 exaireisthai, transcend, 20,26; 22,17; 24,17; be transcendent, 37,14.15

exairetos, special, 6,17; 10,22 exêgêtês, expositor, 32,34 exêgeisthai, interpret, 34,8 exô, external, 15,32; 16,23; 20,3,30; outwards, 27,24; 30,9; 31,2; outside, 1,21.22; 14,23; 16,9; 22,30; 33,3; 36,13.27; 37,2 exô keimenon, external object, 35,2; that which lies outside, 7,8; 14,23 exomoiôsis, becoming like, 1,8.14 exomoioun, make like, 4,11 exomoiousthai, become like, 1,4.7 gê, earth, 8,7.14.15.17.19.22; 16,21; 19,12; 20,12; 25,14 geômetrikos, of the measurement of the earth, 25,14 genesiourgos, connected with generation, 23,20 genesis, creation, 8,11; coming to be , 31,12.25 genos, genus, 32,16 geusis, taste, 10,18; 12,5; 16,2; 18,3.5.9.10.13; geustikos, of taste, 4,3 geustos, of taste, 18,1; what can be tasted, 18,2; tastable, 7,28; 11,11 gi(g)nesthai, arise, 14,22; become, 10,21; 20,30; 27,8.14; 29,18; 31,8(bis).19; be in a state of becoming, 31,8; come to be , 31,13; come into being, 37,24.34; occur, 3,28; 16,10.15; 17,8; 24,24; 35,2; happen, 14,31; be, 17,12; 18,10 gi(g)nôskein, know, 1,13; 5,2; 19,16(bis); 20,23; 29,27.30; know1, 30,20; 31,3.20; 33,7.10.11.17.23; 37,32 glôtta (Att.), tongue, 4,1.3(bis); 13,21; 15,27; 18,8.17.28 glukus, sweet, 3,35; glukazein, make sweet, 13,20 gnêsios, genuine, 32,34 gnôrizein, know, 4,18.20; 5,3.7; 21,18; 22,6 gnôrizesthai, become acquainted, 33,17 gnôristikos, able to know, 21,20; cognitive, 2,32; having knowledge, 4,22 gnôsis, piece of knowledge, 1,12;

Greek-English Index knowledge, 1,10; 4,22; 26,21; knowledge1, 34,16.20; 36,15.35(bis) gnôstikos, cognitive, 2,28; 6,13 gnôston, known object, object known, 1,11.13; 29,29; object of knowledge1, 35,11.13; 37,3 gnôstos, knowable, 19,12; known, 19,9.11; that which it knows1 37,1 gnôstôs, by a cognitive1 act, 30,2 graphein, write, 35,28 hama, simultaneous, 3,34; 7,12; 14,29; at the same time, 2,5.7.14; 3,21,24-6.34; 4,8; 13,33; 15,3; 25,10; 27,31; 30,7(bis).15.19; 31,15 hapax, once, 24,11.13.28 haphê, touch, 4,5; 19,15 haplous, simple, 8,6(bis).25; 19,17.18; 20,11.31.32; 21,1.3.4.14; 30,4; haplôs, tout court, 10,14; straightforwardly, 17,2; simply, 3,29; 6,4; 19,29; 20,1; 28,14 haptesthai, be in contact, 17,8 haptikos, related to touch, 16,3; of touch, 18,25 haptikôs, by touching, 18,4 haptos, touchable, 19,15 hêdus, pleasant, 22,28 hê epi to katô phora, being carried downwards, 10,27 heis, one, 1,10.11; 2,28.31.33(bis); 3,1; 5,11.14; 8,5; 22,3.5.19.22.25; 28,1; 30,13; 32,2.7(tris) hêkein, come, 7,30 hêliakos, of the sun, 25,23 hêlioeidês, like the sun, 20,16 hêlios, sun, 9,9; 11,4; 25,14.18; 26,24 henôsis, union, 22,20; 26,20.25; 27,16; 35,14.23; unity, 22,8(bis); 27,18; 32,5; 33,6; 35,4 henoun, unite, 22,19; 26,17.27; 27,30; 35,15.17.24; 36,20.21; 37,5; unify, 34,16; 35,4; to hênômenon, unity, 35,29; hênômenôs, in unity, 35,33 hepesthai, follow, 11,6; 18,8 hepomenôs, derivative, in a derivative way, 11,8.10; in consequence, 25,11 heteroioun, make different, 33,31 heteros, different, 22,2; 33,25.29; 34,3

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heterôs, in a different way, 20,13; 27,26; 33,25.29.32; 34,3 heterotês, difference, 3,26; otherness, 35,8.10.20.30; variety, 5,13.19 heterokinêtos, be moved by something else, 28,9; 35,20 hexis, disposition, 31,11.12.23.25-7; 32,18.20(bis).24 heuriskein, discover, 29,29; find, 34,20; (find out), 31,11.23 hidrumenos, settled, 2,33 hienai, send out, 7,30; come, 12,30; 27,9; 36,2 hikanos, sufficient, 1,10; 2,26; 7,1; 9,7; 11,9 histanai, exist, 2,14; come into existence, 1,12; arise, 3,30; (be) set up, 13,8; consist in, 2,24; be situated, 30,22; stand still, 9,15; be, 24,19 hoios te, capable, 1,18; possible, 3,21; 4,9; 8,6; can, 8,4 holos, whole, 1,19; 2,3; 23,17; 32,27.29; 34,16; 36,20(bis); as whole, 30,6.10; as a whole, 2,14; 12,22.33(bis); 13,1.4.13; 30,6.10; holoi di’ holôn, wholes through wholes, 28,10; 34,16; 36,20(bis) holôs, entirely, 2,5; 36,27; generally, 8,26; in general, 9,31; 27,27; 28,9; wholly, 28,16; 29,8; at all, 11,7; 26,30.31 holotês, wholeness, 21,4 homogenês, homogeneous, 7,25(T); 15,25 homoios, like, 2,2.17; 15,29(bis); 16,4(bis); 19,4(bis); resembling, 4,27; similar, 7,25(T); 15,31; 16,8; 24,14; the same, 33,6 homoiôs, similarly, 14,16.17; in the same way, 15,3; 31,11.22; the same, 15,29; 21,28; in a similar relation, 17,28.30;18,18; in a similar way, 21,22 homoiôsis, becoming like, 1,5; 3,28.33; 4,22 homoiotês, likeness, 7,13; 23,15; homoiôma, likeness, 2,9; 3,5,14 homoioun, make like, 2,7; 3,18.20; 4,23 homologein, (T) agree, 10,16 homônumôs, homonymously, 28,11;

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kath’ homônumian, homonymously, 27,27 homophuia, kinship, 27,19 horan, see 6,3-7,6 passim; 7,31; 8,28; 10,3.4.6.7.8.13; 11,2-23 passim; 12,16; 13,27; 14,27; 15,3.13.14; 17,27.32(bis); 18,15; 25,14; seeing, 5,19 horasis, sense of sight 6,8; 10,10; 12,29; 13,26; 16,10 horatikos, that can see, 6,12.19.20.26; of seeing, 11,12 horaton, object seen, 6,1; 14,8; 17,17 horatos, visible, 6,18-20; 10,14(bis).15; 11,6.7.8.11.12; seen, 6,4; 7,1.8.27(T?); 8,1; 13,9; 14,8; 15,1.3; 17,17 horizesthai, be contained, 32,4; be determined, 23,26; 28,30; 35,6.8; bounded, 8,19; with limits, 6,23 horistikos, definitive, 34,23 horman, wish, 24,29 hormê, volition, 10,27.29 horos, limit, 20,13; determination, 3,13; 35,4.7.18; determining power, 35,22 hôsautôs, equally, 4,16 hôsautôs ekhein, in the same condition, 31,28; 33,26.28 hudôr, water, 6,30; 8,2.7.23; 9,11; 16,6.8.10(bis).11; 19,17.23.24; 20,14.30 hugrainein, moisten, 18,2 hugros, moist, 12,5; 15,27.30.31; 18,2-6 passim; 20,2.29; liquid, 20,19 hugron, moisture, 16,2(bis).6 hugrotês, moisture, 18,7 hulê, matter, 1,8; 3,29; 13,32; 26,2.4.7.8.12; 27,4; 29,27; 30,31; 32,32; 33,21-34,8 passim; 34,17.31; 36,11(bis); 37,18.19; material, 13,29; hulikos, material, 15,17; 25,29; 27,3; by matter, 36,16 humên, membrane, 20,18 huparkhein, exist, 2,31; 13,15; 19,1; 34,6; 37,16-32 passim huperanekhein, superior standing, 24,28 huperballein, be excessive, 6,5 huperbolê, excess, 22,27

huperlampros, exceedingly bright, 26,27 huperphuês, extraordinary, beyond nature, 10,24.28 huphesis, inferior position, 36,2 huphiesthai, be inferior, 36,3 huphistanai, subsist, 2,32; 3,12; 15,23; 33,22.24; 34,11.15(bis) hupidomenos, glancing, 35,25 hupobainein, descend, 26,17; 27,17.23; 35,20 hupobasis, descent, 34,22; 35,9.17.30 hupodokhê, receptacle, 6,27; reception, 6,28; 8,12; 25,8; 27,2 hupokeimenon, substrate, substratum, 9,26; 12,25; 15,33; 25,19; object, 15,14; 23,9; 24,26 hupokeimenos, underlying, 25,29 hupolambanein, suppose, 11,18 hupolêpsis, apprehension, 23,6 hupomimnêskein, record, 9,24; remind, 36,24; suggest, 34,29 huponoein, conceive, 28,11 hupopherein, carry down, 31,17 hupostasis, hypostasis, 3,7; nature, 32,28.29; state, 26,19 hupotithenai, suppose, 21,11; 30,26; 31,28 hupotupousthai, receive an outline, 14,6 iamblikheios, of Iamblichus, 23,13 Iamblikhos, Iamblichus, 24,2; 32,13.34 idikôs, properly, 8,24 idiôma, property, 10,11; peculiarity, 24,20 idios, special, 4,14.32; 21,17.26; 22,17; own, 7,32; 12,2; 25,17; proper, 10,17; private, 12,25; peculiar, 21,28 idiôs, in a special way, 23,18 idiotês, special nature, 36,3; property, 37,13 ikhnos, trace, 6,28; 9,18; 25,5 iskhein, possess, 29,32 iskhuros, strong, 13,27 isôs, equally, 9,3; 15,8.24; ex isou, equally, 32,13 kakia, evil, 32,10 kalein, call, 10,3; 28,17; 29,16

Greek-English Index kata to auto, in the same respect, 4,9 katalampein, illuminate, 15,13 katalampsis, illumination, 26,22.33 kataleipein, leave, 9,18 katalêptos, apprehensible, 4,19 katateinein, stretch out, 23,22 katatetagmenos, allocated to matter, 1,19 katekhein, confine, 5,29 kathareuein, be pure, 28,18 katharos, clear, 20,18 katharôs, purely, 26,21.26; 27,17; 31,14; 33,2 katharotês, purity, 14,19 kathêkein, come down, 25,2 katheudein, sleep, 2,16 kath’ heauto, in itself, 6,24; 7,27.34; 10,34; 11,9; 22,29-31.33; 23,23; 30,26; 36,23 kath’ heauton, of itself, 2,28; 5,14; 10,32; 12,14; 14,2; by itself, 4,19; 22,17 kath’ hekasta, particular, 4,32; 5,15 katienai, come down, 23,22 katoptron, mirror, 15,18 keisthai, lie, 37,3 keimenon, see exô kekhalasmenon, looseness, 27,15 kenos, empty, 11,26 kêros, wax, 23,26 khalazein, loosen, 26,19; 35,14 khalasmos, loosening, 35,15 kharaktêr, distinguishing mark, 1,14 kharaktêrizein, characterize, 19,7; 21,1; 23,18; give characteristics, 8,27 kheir, hand, 18,15 kheirôn, inferior, 10,28; worse, 31,17 khôra, standing, 29,25 khôris, apart, 22,7.8 khôrizein, separate, 20,4; 21,1; 28,1; 34,3-28 passim; 36,6; set apart, 34,5 khôrismos, separation, 36,3 khôristos, separable, 33,32; separate, 1,16; 2,24; 3,7; 9,24; 12,19; 14,1; 22,5.11; 24,31; 26,7.20.22.26.34; 27,15.18; 28,14; 31,2; 34,8-28 passim; 36,6.12(bis) khôristôs, separately, 9,15; 12,21.23.26; 33,22(bis); on a

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separate level, 9,27; as a separate thing, 12,17.31; 13,2 khoros, company, 32,6 khrêizein, need, 10,24 khreia, need, 6,17 khrêsimos, useful, 7,4; 11,26; 16,18 khrêsis, use, 28,26 khrêsthai, use, 5,17; 12,25; 23,10; 24,26; 28,22; 29,2; 30,11; 33,3; 34,11 khrôma, colour, 1,6; 4,34; 5,25; 6,22.26; 7,6.29.32; 8,19.22; 11,14.17.20; 12,9.15.27; 13,30.31.33; 14,5.6.9; khrônnunai, colour, 7,34 khronikôs, temporally, 36,2 khronos, time, 2,10; 4,6.20; 14,31 khrôzein, colour, 8,8.19 khumos, taste, 1,6; flavour, 7,28; 10,17(bis); 15,27 kinein, move, 1,4; 2,4-6; 4,30; 9,14; 10,18.28.32; 11,14.19; 12,3-24 passim; 13,5.14.28.31; 16,24; 17,16.17; 21,24.31; 23,7.9.12; 24,4.7-10; 26,10; 29,13; movement comes about, 11,15; set in motion, 14,29; 15,28; 24,11.13.26.29; 25,25; 29,15; produce movement, 21,28.29 kinêma, motion, 2,6.19.22 (cf. energêma) kinêsis, motion, 16,12; 28,22; movement, 2,12; 4,11; 5,1; 10,27; 11,19; 12,16; 13,6.8; 14,30; 16,24(bis); 17,3.6; 21,17.19-21.23; 23,25; 28,5.24; 31,16; 35,1 kinêtikos, movable, 28,21; which moves, 5,25; 12,14 klasis, bending, 15,8.10.18 koinônein, share, 24,15 koinos, common, 2,22; 4,15-17,33; 5,1.2; 6,16; 7,14.25(T); 16,6-8; 19,18; 20,3.28; 21,16-22,18 passim; 32,3; 33,14; general, 5,9; in a broad sense, 28,19 komizein, bring, (18,23 Bywater’s conjecture) korê, eye-jelly, 16,10 kreitton (to), superiority, 10,24; the better, 31,18; the superior, 28,27.31; 29,1; 37,22 kreittôn, (Att.) on a higher level,

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4,16; superior, 10,29(bis); 32,2.15; 33,20 kreittonôs, superior, 10,30; on a higher level, 33,9.16; 37,21 krinein, be aware, 2,18; 3,6.26; 22,10.13.20.22; 33,25(T); become conscious (of), 5,6; cognise, 34,4 krinon (to), the cognitive element, 18,20 krisis, awareness, 2,13; 3,10.16.22; 4,25; judgment, 7,16 kritikos, having awareness, 19,7; aware, 4,29; 19,4; 21,9; 33,27 kritikôs, in a conscious way, 6,11 kruphios, hidden, 30,8 kurios, proper, 17,10; 37,27; responsible, 5,14 kuriôs, properly, 9,4; in the proper sense, 27,27; strictly, 28,19; properly so-called, 18,23; in its primary sense, 34,13; important, 5,18 lampros, shining, that shine, 8,28; 10,2.31; 11,22; 12,2.8; bright, 6,7; 7,2; 10,31; 11,4 lamprotês, brightness, 7,1 lamprunein, illuminate, 12,20 leios, smooth, 15,9.12.15.17.21 leptos, fine, 20,17 leukos, white, 3,2(bis); 17,30; 33,12 lithos, stone, 18,14 logikos, rational, 23,6; 24,2; 29,5.17; 33,2.13; 34,25; 35,10; reasoning, 25,1; of reason, 25,7 logizesthai, reason, 4,19 logos, account, 5,9; 15,31; ratio, 19,5-21,12 passim; argument, 9,9; 21,32; reason, 19,11; 33,2 logos (see n. 3), 1,8; 2,29-5.7 passim; 7,15; 13,16; 22,21.23; 23,8.27; 26,9; 32,5-33,30 passim; 35,1; 36,31 luein, dissolve, 22,27 lukhniaios, of a lantern, 11,4 manthanein, learn, 31,10.23 matên, for no reason, 11,27 megethos, size, 5,1; 14,9; 21,18.24.26.28; 25,23; quantity, 19,5(bis) melas, black, 17,30

meli, honey, 13,21 menein, be stable, stay the same, 30,5.7.13.17.21; 31,15; 32,17; remain, 9,28; 20,31; 21,4; 31,28; 36,13.28 menôn, permanent, 31,4 merikos, made particular, 33,12; individual, 29,8.25; 32,13.16 merismos, division, 2,20; 5,18 meristos, partial, 32,18; particular, 2,31; divisible, 2,10; 3,23; 4,4.7; 24,31; 26,16; divided off, 22,17; divided, 30,10.15; divided up, 24,15 meristôs, as divided up, 24,6 merizein, divide up, 1,10; 2,25.27; 22,7; 35,11; divide off, 22,4; divide, 5,15; 29,31; division, 5,1 meros, part, 3,24.35; 4,1; kata meros, particular, 3,2; 5,10; 22,2; individual, 2,31; para meros, in turn, 8,13.23; 9,11; 32,4 mesos, intermediate, 19,3; 34,23; middle, 2,12; 23,20; 32,16; ana meson, intermediate, 14,23; in the middle, 18,14; 23,20; 32,16; meson, medium, 5,20; 7,3; 11,20.21.23 mesotês, intermediate position, 31,16; middle position, 19,1; intermediacy, 32,14 metaballein, change, 20,31; 24,35; 30,5-28 passim; 32,11.14.17.19 metablêtos, changeable, 32,15 metabolê, alteration, 27,10; 28,15 (both T); change, 30,16; 31,15,26; 32,12.20 metalambanein, receive, 20,27 metalêpsis, partaking, 20,30; 21,15 metapherein, transfer, 28,26 metaxu, gap, 6,29; between, 12,4.5; 13,19.21; 16,10; 18,22; the (thing) between, 12,1.2; the (space) between, 7,10; 11,26; in between, 10,21; 13,17; 16,2; 18,9.11.12.13; in the middle, 18,28; (the) medium, 10,10; 11,24; 12,16; 14,20.23; 17,13.16.23.24; 18,30; 19,16(bis); 20,10.21 metekhein, share, 13,24; 20,27; partake, 8,13.27.29; participate,

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ousia, substance, 4,30.31; 21,9; 29,16.31.32; 30,3.8; 31,12; 31,25-32,2 passim; 32,9.10.18.25; 33,13.15.16.17; being 4,20; 26,13; 30,18; entity, 36,12; existence, 19,12; kat’ ousian, essentially, 26,9; 35,18.27; 36,21.22; 37,10.28; in reality, 34,5; in its very being, 28,12; kata tên oikeian ousian, in their own essence, 36,22 ousiôdês, essential, 26,15; 31,4 essentially, 8,14.15 substantial, 3,11.12 ousiôdôs, in its substance, (contr. energêtikôs 29,33) 30,1; essentially, 8,13.20.29; 20,31 ousiousthai, have, be given, substantial existence, 31,7; 33,22; be brought into actuality, 1,17 oxus, high, 17,25.27.29.32 pantêi, entirely, 2,3; 22,2; 26,17; 27,18; 31,28; 32,8.15.23; 34.22; 35,11; in every way, 28,18; 32,11; utterly, 30,21 pantelês, complete, 35,20 pantelôs, entirely, 1,15; 27,22; 35,17; completely, 32,2 pantodapôs, in all kinds of ways, 24,27 pantôs, entirely, 4,4; 31,22; at all events, 9,32; in every case, 16,19; 19,26; absolutely, 21,23 paraballein, compare, 11,6 parabolê, relationship, 11,5; comparison, 17,33 paradeigma, simile, 35,26 paradekhesthai, receive, 23,18 paradokhê, receiving, 23,26 paradosis, what has been handed down, 7,22 parakeleuein, recommend, 27,5 paraphunai, develop naturally beside, 23,13; be cognate, 24,19 parapodizein, hinder, 10,11; 11,25; be a hindrance, 17,5; interfere, 6,5 parateinein, stretch out, 2,11; extend, 8,30 paratrepein, turn off, 5,8 parekhesthai, provide, 7,4.10; 8,12; 31,32 pareinai, be present, 1,20;

12,18.23.27.32; 13,2.13.33; 17,13; 24,8-10.16.23; 25,25; 26,10; 29,2; 30,16 parousia, presence, 9,17.31; 13,3; 14,26 paskhein, undergo effect, 14,6; be passively affected, 9,2.4 (contr. poiein); 9,30; 12,19.26 (contr. eidopoieisthai); be affected, 1,4; 2,2.16; 3,21.35; 5,8.27; 12,12; 13,10; 14,11.14; 15,30; 16,4; 17,4.20(bis); 18,18.26; 19,2; 21,25; 22,12.13; 27,8.11.17.27(bis); 28,27.29; be acted upon, 5,28.31; 6,3 (all contr. poiein); 6,8 (contr. energein); receive effect, 14,34; effect to occur, 14,29; be passive, 11,16 (contr. poiein) pathê, effect, 3,34; pathêma, effect, 1,14; 2,15.19; 13,6; 24,23; passive effect, 2,17; affect, 9,5; passive thing, (contr. energema); 2,10; thing undergone, 9,19 (cf. pathos) pathêtikos, passive, 13,11; 28,16.21; 34,32 pathêtikôs, in a passive way, 13,5; to produce a passive effect, 4,14; 13,14; passively, 28,6.7.13 pathos, attribute, 19,7.19; effect, passive effect, 2,1.3.21; 3,15(bis).22.23; 6,10; 8,3.4.9; 9,13.26; 13,9.15.25; 14,12.13.30.32-4; 15,1.10.19; 18,27; 19,3; 21,20; 23,25; 27,10; 28,9-26 passim; effect produced, 28,4; affect, 4,14; thing undergone, 9,19 (cf. pathêma); suffering, 32,10; en pathei, being affected, 27,12 peisis, effect, 6,1.4.6; passive effect, 7,12 pepêrômenos, maimed, 20,22 peras, surface, 8,21; edge, 6,23; limit, 6,27; 8,9(T).19 periekhein, contain, 6,14; 20,19; 26,8.14 periektikos, container, 26,13 perigraphein, circumscribe, 5,29; confine within a compass, 9,22 perikosmios, of this world, 32,16 perilambanein, encompass, 2,13 perilêpsis, encompassment, 1,12

Greek-English Index perilêptikos, comprehending, 2,33 periousia, superiority, 11,11 Peripatêtikoi, Peripatetics, 9,13 periphanôs, conspicuously, 6,21 phainesthai, appear, 15,23; 31,8; seem, 26,1 phainomenon, appearance, 20,11 phantasia, imagination, 1,19; 23,3-24,30 passim; 25,13; 29,5.25; image, 24,22(T).33 (contr. phantasma); 25,9 (contr. emphasis); 25,11 phantasma, image, 23,17; 24,1.12.16.24(T).27.34 (contr. phantasia); 25,15-17.21 phantastikos, by the imagination, 25,17; connected with the imagination, 25,8.9; of imagination, 25,7; capable of imagining, 25,12 phantastikôs, with imagination, 33,3 phantaston, object of imagination, 1,21; connected with imagination, 24,35 phantazesthai, imagine, 25,14 pharunx, windpipe, 19,30 philosophein, (produce) philosophical results, 7,18 philosophôs, philosophically, 34,29 phônê, the sound of the voice, 12,33; sound, 13,1.7; 14,12.26.30.32; 15,28; voice, 22,24.26 phôs, light, 6,17.24.26(bis).28(bis); 7,5.10.29.33(bis).34; 8,11-30 passim; 9,5-10,4 passim; 10,15.22.32.33; 11,2.5.7(bis).9; 12,12.13(bis); 13,30-14,5 passim; 15,9.11.15; 17,27.28.29.31(bis); 20,17.19; 26,28 phôteinos, light-giving, 8,29 phôtizein, give light, 6,31; 7,30; 8,30(T); 10,21; 12,7.9.10.17; 15,2.13.16; light up, 7,6; illuminate, 8,22; 10,9; 11,22; 12,15 phôtoeidês, like light, 6,26; luminous, 10,12 phôtourgos, that produces light, 8,15 phtheirein, destroy, 20,6; 22,27 phunai, be natural, 9,33; by nature, 10,28 phusikos, natural, 4,10; kata to phusikon, scientifically, 20,11

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proêgeisthai, initiate, 1,15; take precedence, 5,18 proêgoumenos, major factor, 5,13 proêgoumenôs, taking the initiative, 1,18; primarily, 21,9.21; primary, 10,31.33; 11,6.10; 37,3 proerkhesthai, proceed, 4,31; come outwards, 31,2 proienai, go on, 9,22; go out, 9,10; 15,21; 30,16; proceed, 29,32; 30,3.6.9; 32,25; 33,15; advance outward, 7,7 prokatalambanein, occupy beforehand, 18,7 prokatarkhein, begin beforehand, 13,6; be first cause, 23,24 prolambanein, receive beforehand, 2,29 prolampein, light up, 6,21 propherein, adduce, 35,26 prosagein, bring towards, 29,11 prosbolê, application, 21,12 prosdeisthai, need in addition, 8,28; need more, 8,29 prosêkein, be appropriate to, 22,9 prosekhês, nearer 15,4; near by, 4,15; adjacent, 24,25; contiguous, 33,10 prosekhôs, immediate, 23,9 proseoikenai, be similar, 23,19; resemble, 32,6 prospiptein, fall upon, 12,29; 16,20; 17,10; 18,11.26 prosrêgnunai, break against, 16,22 prostithenai, add, 7,22; 23,13 proteinein, offer, 7,22 proteros, prior, 27,28.32 prôtos, first, 26,32; 35,20.28.31.33; 36,4 prôtôs, primarily, 4,33.34; primary, 11,11; 26,18 prôtotupon, original, 15,20 prouparkhein, be present first, 22,32 proupotithesthai, suppose to be prior, 18,25 pseudês, false, 25,9.10.13 psophein, make a sound, 13,5; make a noise, 16,21 psophos, sound, 1,7; 10,18; 11,3; 16,1.13.15.20.24(bis); 17,4-32 passim psukhê, soul, 1,4; 2,21-3,32 passim; 5,1; 7,15; 23,13; 24,18(bis).19;

26,15; 27,19; 29,2; 29,11-30,7 passim; 30,21; 31,3.14.26; 32,9.13.16; 33,2.18; 34,25; 35,6; 36,1.33; 37,8 psukhesthai, become cold, 4,6 psukhikos, of the soul, 2,25; connected with the soul, 26,6.12.26 psukhros, cold, 33,12 puknos, dense, 15,12 pur, fire, 7,2; 8,7-10,12 passim; 13,29; 19,18; 20,13.20; 33,14 purios, fiery, 20,16.19 Puthagoreioi, Pythagoreans, 20,16 rhopê, tendency, 29,10; 31,17 sarx, flesh, 18,17.18.21.24 siôpê, silence, 5,5 skhêma, shape, 14,9.12 skhêmatizein, give a shape, 14,11 skhesis, relationship, 21,6.8(bis); 26,15; relation, 22,31; 32,5 skiagraphia, shadow-painting, 15,22 skotopoios, darkness-producing, 11,25; that makes darkness, 8,15 skotos, darkness, 7,2; 8,12.15.16.18.20; 9,12; 10,3.5.7; 22,11 sôma, body, 1,10.16; 2,1.3.25.33; 3,7.12.23; 4,4; 5,24; 6,11.12; 8,4(bis).8.26; 9,12.13.31.32; 10,1.26; 11,27; 19,4.7.8.10.11; 20,19; 23,22; 24,32.35; 25,2; 31,1 sômatikos, corporeal, 5,29; 15,9.21; 29,8; bodily, 9,32; 19,12; 23,11 sômatoeidês, corporeal, 2,10; 14,15; 22,6; 23,10; bodily, 4,13 sôzein, preserve, 9,16; 32,14 speudein, hasten, 2,11 sphodrôs, forcefully, 13,23; strongly, 18,26 sphodrotês, violence, 18,27 sphragis, seal, 3,9 stasimôs, steadfastly, 21,31 sterein, deprive, 21,2 stereon, solidity, 20,12 stereos, solid, 25,4 sterêsis, privation, 8,16; 10,6; 34,17(bis).31 stilbein, shine, 15,12.15 stoikheion, element, 8,26; 21,7

Greek-English Index strephein, turn, 27,24; revert, 34,20 strophê, turning, 29,3.9; 31,18 sullambanein, gather together, 3,26; receive together, 32,13 sullogizesthai, deduce, 31,32 sumbainein, follow, 10,13; happen, 24,23; 31,9; coincide, 25,21; occur, 28,4 sumbebêkos, accident, 33,15.16; kata sumbebêkos, incidentally, 5,2; 21,21.24.26; by accident, 36,21 summerizein, divide, 32,16 summetria, proportion, 22,27; proportionality, 22,31.32; en summetriai, 22,29 and kata summetrian, 22,28 proportionate summetros, congruent, 4,17; correct, 5,28; 6,2; 10,20; 11,23; of the right size, 6,15; of a suitable length, 7,4; appropriate length, 7,10 summetrôs, congruently, 4,29; at a correct distance, 5,30 summigês, mixed, 3,14 summixis, mixture, 8,25 sumperiagein, carry around, 9,28 sumpherein, carry along together, 13,2 sumphônia, concord, 22,24 sumphuês, connatural, 16,22; cognate, 30,8; 31,5; grow within, 18,29 sumphuesthai, grow within, 18,23; grow together, 32,7 sumpiptein, occur, 15,17 sumplêrôtikos, completive, 1,17; 3,11 sumplêroun, be completive, 2,24 sumplêthunein, multiply along with, 32,17 sunagein, bring together, 34,26 sunagôgê, knitting (of brows), 25,3 sunairein, join, 26,25(bis); gather together, 1,11; bring together, 7,22; 27,17.25; 34,26; 35,11.12 sunairesis, gathering, 1,11; gathering together, 3,7; synthesis, 22,3 sunaisthanesthai, be aware, 21,23; be conscious, 5,5; 22,4.14.16; perceive, 21,34 sunalloioun, alter along with, 13,2 sunamphoteron, combination, 32,30.32

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sunaphê, conjunction, 26,24; 35,8 sunaptein, join, 14,8; 16,23; 23,24; 27,16.23.31; 36,4; join together, 22,5; fit, 27,21; connect, 6,15; 30,12 sunarmostikos, capable of joining, 8,10 sunarmozein, fit, 3,4; 4,28; 23,21; adapt, 5,17; in conjunction, 22,26 sundiatithenai, sympathetically affect, 25,4 suneinai, coexist, 37,28 sunêirêmenôs, briefly, 7,18 suneisagein, give, 12,3 suneispherein, contribute, 11,27 sunekheia, continuity, 9,16; 14,33; 26,19; 30,13 sunekhês, in continuity, 9,28; continuous, 15,16 sunekhôs, continuously, 13,28.29 sunergein, cooperate, 15,14.17; 17,6.16; be active along with, 11,1 sunerkhesthai, come together, 32,6 sunesis, understanding, 3,6; 3,16; 4,25; 7,16 sungeneia, kinship, 15,15; 26,15 sungignôskein, agree, 28,25 sunistanai, be constituted, 7,13 sunkeisthai, combine, 9,23 sunkhôrein, allow, 11,4; agree, 32,11 sunkinein, move together with, 24,32; jointly stimulate, 1,18 sunneusis, inclination, 29,9 sunousiousthai, be essentially joined with, 34,19 suntelein, make a contribution, 12,1; contribute, 12,29; 16,12 sunteleoun, perfect, 12,9 sunthesis, synthesis, 3,6 sunthetos, compound, 2,30; 7,14; 8,8.25 sustoikhia, level, 25,22 sustoikhos, coordinate, 4,12; 33,19.30 sustoikhôs, in an appropriate way, 30,1; coordinately, 36,30.32; 37,11.12.20.30 sustrophê, turning inwards (of eyes), 25,2 tarakhê, disturbance, 7,29 tasis, stretching, 3,12

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tautotês, identity, 33,5 teleios, perfect, 2,18; 13,12; 14,13; 20,25; 26,23.28; 27,2; 31,19.20.29.33; 32,1.4.23.24; 35,27; 36,22(bis); complete, 2,13; 26,23; 36,22(bis); completed, 6,25 teleiôs, perfectly, 36,19 teleiôsis, perfecting, 28,17; 32,20.22; 34,32; perfection, 13,15; 28,7; process of perfecting, 28,28; process towards perfection, 29,9 teleiotês, perfection, 3,13; 8,11; 9,26; 13,8; 27,22.29; 31,4.21; 35,4.7.29.32 teleioun, make perfect, perfect change, 1,17.26; 2,17.26; 3,14; 4,27; 6,31(bis); 7,14; 9,27; 12,17.20; 13,33; 26,21.28.32; 27,20(bis).26.30; 28,5.9.19.28.31; 29,11; 31,13.18; 32,22; 34,32; 35,7-36.5 passim; 36,18; bring to perfection, 27,20(bis).26.29; make complete, 6,14; 7,2.3.10; complete, 6,18.24; 7,31.32; 8,1; 10,23.30.33; 11,8; 23,12; fill up, 6,29 teleôs, completely, 6,7 telos, end, 2,12 thea, viewing, 15,18 theatron, theatre, 13,1 theios, divine, 10,25 Theophrastos, 24,20; 27,3; 28,20; 29,4; 34,2.29; 37,24 theôrein, be conscious, 30,6; 32,33; 33,29.30; 36,31; contemplate, 33,4.5; 34,27; 35,13; 37,21; see 6,23 theôrêtikos, speculative, 36,26; 37,26; contemplative, 32,31; 35,2; conscious of, 36,28 theôria, contemplation, 35,10 thermainein, warm, 4,10; 12,4.5; 13,19.20; heat, 9,3

thermainesthai, become warm, 4,5 thermos, hot, 20,2.9.28.30; 21,13.14; 33,14 thermotês, heat, 4,9.12; 9,2.20; 10,1 thinganein, touch, 5,24; 6,16; 7,24 thnêtos, mortal, 32,15 tithenai, suppose, 8,17; 15,9.10; 21,11; 32,25; postulate, 18,29; deal with, 34,12 tode ti, this something, 26,4; 30,31 topos, space, 5,29; kata topon, spatially, 15,4 tropê, change, 9,22; 28,24 tropos, method, 7,16; (28,24 v.l.) tunkhanein, be as a matter of fact, 36,15; be in fact, 36,29 tupos, form, 4,10; outline, 7,19 tupôsis, impression, 3,9 zên, live, 2,3.29; 20,9(bis).29(bis); 21,13(bis) zêtein, ask, 1,5; 19,22; enquire, 8,5.25; 14,16,25; 15,28; 24,20; 29,7; 32,8,31; look into, 9,6; 27,5; seek, 33,1 zêtêsis, enquiry, 9,10; 37,5; studying, 25,3; question, 20,10 zôê, life, 2,23(bis).25; 3,11.15.16.30; 6,12; 7,14; 13,15; 18,19; 19,6; 21,1.14; 23,10.22; 24,2; 25,5.6.8.20; 29,5.9; 30,9.14; 31,16; 32,3.5(bis).12.18; 33,13; 34,16.20; 36,15; tês zôês, vital, 2,20 zôion, living thing, 1,17; 6,21; 18,29; 32,2; living being, 2,25; 3,11.13.16; living creature, 20,5 (T); living, 2,3; animal, 20,22 zôtikos, vital, 2,25; 3,4.34; connected with life, 2,8.25; 3,10; 18,29; 25,5; living, 6,12; 17,3.6; 21,9 zôtikôs, as a function of life, 18,9; as a vital function, 23,7

Index of Passages References in bold type are to note numbers.

ALCINOUS/ALBINUS

Didascalicus 4, 12; 4.6-7,18,22, 216 ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS

In De sensu 88,18-89,5, 178; 126,21, 159 AMMONIUS

In De interpretatione 135,14-32, 391; 248,18-19, 251,1, 348

ARISTOTELES

De Generatione et Corruptione 2.2 329b31, 234 Meteorologika 2.4 360a23, 234; 2.5 361b30, 374; 4.1 378b24, 234; 4.4 381b29, 234 De Anima 1.1 402b10-14, 49; 2.4 415a16-20, 49; 2.4 416a32, 212; 2.5 416b33-5, 4; 2.5 416b35-417a2, 175; 2.5 417a14-17, 342; 2.5 417a17-20, 180; 2.5 417b24, 326, 357; 2.5 418a2, 332; 2.5 418a2-3, 343; 2.5 418a3-5, 3; 2.5 418a5-6, 4; 2.7 418a26, 147; 2.7 418a31-b10, 74; 2.7 418a31-b1, 127; 2.7 418b5-6, 85; 2.7 418b9-10, 97; 2.7 418b11, 118; 2.7 418b14-17 109; 2.7 418b15, 128; 2.7 418b4-32, 88; 2.7 418b14-17, 109; 2.7 419a6-7 123; 2.7 419a12-14, 78; 2.7 419a13-14, 127; 2.7 419a13-15, 138; 2.7 419a16, 133; 2.7 419a20, 116; 2.7 419a13-b3, 159; 2.7 419a23-5, 115; 2.7 419a25-30, 135; 2.7 419a26-31, 197; 2.8 419b19-21, 159; 2.8 420a3-11, 176; 2.8 420a4, 192; 2.8 420a9-14, 187; 2.8 420a12, 192; 2.8 420a16-17, 196; 2.8 420a26-8, 199; 2.8 420b8, 269; 2.9 421b9, 179; 2.9 421b18-19,

186; 2.9 421b32-422a3, 190; 2.10 422a8-12, 179; 2.10 422a8, 205; 2.10 422a13-14, 137; 2.10 422a16-17, 119; 2.10 422a20-1, 64; 2.10 422a34-b2, 202; 2.10 422b15-17, 181; 2.11 422b34-423b27, 209; 2.11 422b-423a21, 209; 2.11 423a11-b26, 206; 2.11 423b1-8, 84; 2.11 423b17-23, 195; 2.11 423b20-5, 197; 2.11 424a2-10, 211; 2.11 424a4-5, 210; 2.12 424a19, 284; 2.12 424a22-3, 8; 2.12 424a17-31, 8; 2.12 424a26-8, 213; 2.12 424a28-31, 229; 2.12 424a26-31, 12; 2.12 424a28-31, 241; 2.12 424a28-32, 71; 2.12 424b15-16, 149; 2.12 424b16-18, 156; 3.1 424b22-425a8, 219; 3.1 424b31-4, 222; 3.1 425a2-3, 223; 3.1 425a3-5, 227; 3.1 425a5-6, 228; 3.1 425a9-10, 240; 3.1 425a13-18, 249; 3.1 425a24, 253; 3.1 425a31, 257; 3.2 425b12-26, 254; 3.2 425b23-5, 291; 3.2 426a27, 267; 3.2 426a29-b8, 241; 3.2 426a30-b2, 71; 3.2 426b29-427a8, 41; 3.2 427a2-5, 266; 3.3 427b29-429a10, 274; 3.3 428a11-12, 290; 3.3 428a25, 371; 3.3 428b3-4, 305; 3.3 429a1-2, 286; 3.4 429a14, 347; 3.4 429a18-21, 340; 3.4 429a22-4, 308; 3.4 429a22, 313; 3.4 429a24, 363; 3.4 429a27-9, 316; 3.4 429b4-5, 377; 3.4 429b5-9, 378; 3.4 429b6-9, 408; 3.4 429b10-23, 387; 3.4 429b20-1, 398; 3.4 429b21-2, 401; 3.4 429b23-5, 338;

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Index of Passages

3.4 429b24-5, 324; 3.4 429b30-1, 308; 3.4 429b30, 333; 3.4 429b30-430a1, 417, 419; 3.4 430a1, 320; 3.4 430a2-5, 323; 3.4 430a3-4, 424; 3.4 430a4-5, 360, 425; 3.4 430a5-6, 294, 426; 3.4 430a7, 428; 3.4 430a7-8, 429; 430a7-9, 430; 3.5 430a10-12, 310; 3.5 430a10-19, 424; 3.5 430a15, 323; 3.5 430a16, 319; 3.5 430a17, 262; 3.5 430a18, 335; 3.5 430a19-20, 360; 3.7 431a1-2, 360; 3.7 431a6-7, 342; 3.7 431b16-17, 360; 3.7 431b17, 333; 2.8 431b21-6, 333; 3.8 432a2, 315; 3.8 432a9-10, 276, 294; 3.9 432a30-b3, 274; 3.12 435a5-10, 164 De Sensu 2 437b32-438a3, 237; 2 438a13-15, 147; 2 438a12-16, 182, 184; 2 438b21-4, 181; 3 439a30, 91; 3 439b1-14, 74, 91; 3 439b13, 87; 3 440a20, 128; 4 441b21-3, 269; 5 442b27-445a16, 186; 5 442b29, 204; 5 444b20-4, 190; 6 446a24-b6, 161; 6 446b8-9, 157; 7 447a14-27, 124; 7 448a2-6, 51; 7 449a17-19, 67 De Longitudine Vitae 5 466a18-19, 231 De Somno 2 455a13-21, 254 De Insomniis 1 458b30, 459a15-17, 274; 2 460b16-20, 305 De Divinatione Somn. 2 464b10, 167 Metaphysica 12 1072b18-30, 72 Historia Animalium 5.14 545a15-20, 269 De Generatione Animalium 2.3 736b28, 307; 2.3 737a7-13, 307; 2.6 744a1-3, 189 [ARISTOTELES] De aud. 800a3-4, 157 De col. 1 791b37 114 Probl. 11.23 901b16, 157; 31.29 960a33, 185 ARIUS DIDYMUS ap. Stob. I 484,19-21, 178 AVERROES

Comm. magn. in DA (CCAA 6,1 387,22-389,63 Crawford), 311; 399,344-6 and 351-61, 311 De connexione int. abstr. cum homine (AOCAC 9f,156F-G), 311

BARLAAM DE SEMINARIA

Ethica secundum Stoicos 2.13, 300 DAMASCIUS

in Phaedonem 1,274, 12; 2,15, 12 EMPEDOCLES

84 Diels, 237 EPICURUS

Letter to Menoecus 134,6, 373 IAMBLICHUS

De Myst. 3,13 (p.130,3 Parthey), 167 Protrept. III 14,2 Pistelli, 281 in Tim. Fr. 17,10 Dillon, 281; 53 Dillon, 365; 65 Dillon, 72 ap. Simpl. in de Anima 49 and 219, 248 OLYMPIODORUS

in Phaedonem 11,7; 12,1, lines 9-25, 12 PHILOPONUS

in de Anima 35,1, 348; 353,8-12, 178; 354,12-16, 178; 354,14-16, 79, 122; 529,22-3, 392 in Phys. 4,20-2, 183 De Aeternitate Mundi 18-19, 80 PLATO

Alcibiades 132D-133A, 166 Philebus 15E3, 406 Respublica 6 508B, 238 Sophistes 248E-249A, 72; 264B, 217; 266C, 166 Symposium 202E3, 79 Timaeus 28A and C, 217, 371; 39E, 72; 45B, 198; 46AB, 166; 67C, 75 PLOTINUS

I 1,12 21-8, 16 IV 3,26,30, 41; 6,1,1-36, 41; 8,4,32, 355 PORPHYRY

in Ptolem. Harmonica I 3 p.64, 157 PROCLUS

Aet.mundi 18-19, 75 In Alc. 250,5-251,2, 395 in Parm. 188,8, 248,15, 279,22, 301,1, 348 In Tim. 1 157,6, 228; 246,10-18, 216; 2 215,5-29, 366 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

Adv. Math. 7.219, 24 PH I 45, 73 SIMPLICIUS

In De Anima 6,16, 388; 12,22-3, 12; 18,35, 344; 33,24-34, 367; 49,31-4, 248; 62,7, 328; 89,33, 388;

Index of Passages 92,16-18, 12; 113,20-1, 12; 125,25-7, 15; 125,28-9, 18; 125,30-126,3, 22; 125,37, 26; 126,4, 41; 126,9-12, 33; 126,14-16, 45; 127,9-14, 56; 128,24-9, 80; 129,30-1, 75; 131,16-32, 106; 131,38-132,2, 102; 132,13-14, 106; 132,13-15, 140; 132,29-31, 76; 133,11-13, 94; 134,35-135,4, 64; 135,9-10, 93; 135,35, 75; 135,25-136,2, 123; 136,8-15, 20-4, 69; 136,8, 140; 136,8-10, 142; 136,24, 143; 136,26-8, 139; 136,37, 143; 137,3-5, 142; 137,5, 148; 139,2-5, 178; 142,4, 144; 142,10-11, 161; 143,23-31, 192; 145,11-12, 196; 155,22-3, 148; 165,1-6, 80; 165,4-5, 41; 174,20-6, 235; 185,35-6, 261; 186,6-9, 265; 187,31-3, 258; 189,23-8, 65; 189,34-190,21, 80; 195,9, 245; 196,22-3, 46; 198,35-199,5, 46; 202,3-5, 21; 213,15-20, 305; 213,25, 277; 213,37-214,4, 304; 214,1-2, 301; 214,6-8, 289; 214,12, 295; 214,18-19, 285; 214,20-2, 293; 214,21, 296; 214,21-2, 18; 215,9-13, 298; 217,26, 43, 412; 219,18-19, 248; 220,38, 353; 221,25-8, 407; 229,38, 348; 230,23, 329, 348; 234,6-10, 403; 236,5, 329, 348; 240,8-10, 386; 240,37, 388; 243,1-6, 321; 243,37-8, 313; 245,37, 313; 251,21, 387; 262,25, 387; 276,18-21, 367; 286,27-32, 353; 305,7-8, 334 In Physica 998,13-16, 105 In Enkh. Epikt. 78,1-9, 355 STEPHANUS

in De Int. 35,19-33, 391 STOBAEUS

vol.1 484,19-21, 148

101

STRATO

65a and 86 Wehrli, 103 111 Wehrli, 304 114 Wehrli, 159 SYRIANUS

in Metaph. 7,31-2, 167 THEMISTIUS

In De Anima 28,14, 406; 62,11, 79; 62,29-32, 178; 107,31-2, 307; 107,32-108,7, 309; 108,1-6, 324; 108,15-17, 342; 108,16, 341; 108,18, 377; 108,27, 351 In Physica 197,4-8, 105 THEOPHRASTUS

Passages from FHSG: 155B, 105; 273, 13, 48; 274, 53; 275A, 86; 275B, 160; 276, 158; 277A, 157; 277B, 168, 172, 201; 277C, 79, 122, 178; 278, 91, 106, 111, 113, 121, 131, 153; 279, 143; 282, 232, 241, 246; 294, 207; 295, 251; 296, 255, 264; 297, 272, 275; 298A, 353; 298B, 354; 299, 292; 307A, 309, 324, 341, 377; 307B, 314; 307C, 322, 327; 307D, 339, 343, 347, 349, 351; 308A, 311; 308B, 311; 309A, 311; 309CD, 311; 311, 358, 361; 312, 377; 316, 380, 384; 317, 410, 418; 318, 388, 389, 397, 399; 319, 423, 432; 320A, 351, 447, 300; 716,88, 157 Barbotin Ia, 309; Ib, 327; Ic, 314; II, 333; III, 335; IV, 339; Va, 347; Vb, 349; Vc, 351; VI, 358; VIIa, 361, 363; VIIb, 374, 377; VIIc, 377; VIII, 380; IXa, 390; IXb, 399; IXc, 402; Xa, 410; Xb, 418; XI, 432 De Sensu. 1, 128; 5, 130; 19, 5, 192, 196; 26, 89; 32, 246; 50-3, 173; 51-3, 154 Metars. [14] 14-15, 374 Metaph. 4a4, 374; 7b12-16, 342 De Odor. opening, 156 Caus. Plant. 1.1.1, 156; 6.8.2, 200

‘SIMPLICIUS’ On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12 translated by Carlos Steel

Introduction The author of the Commentary On the Soul Whoever studies the commentary ‘On Aristotle On the Soul’ attributed to Simplicius and is acquainted with his voluminous commentaries on the Physics, the De Caelo and the Categories starts doubting whether this commentary is by the same author. This was Urmson’s experience when he started translating in DA after in Phys. 4: ‘Coming to this commentary after translating the huge commentary of Simplicius on Physics 4, I was immediately convinced, after a couple of pages, that it was not by the same author; the whole style was unfamiliar.’1 This was also my experience when, preparing my doctoral dissertation on Iamblichus’ doctrine of the soul, I came to study this commentary extensively because, as its author says, it is deeply influenced by Iamblichus’ thought. These doubts where shared by my older friend F. Bossier who was then working on the medieval tradition and reception of the commentaries of Simplicius. So we agreed to publish an article in which we assembled all of the arguments against the traditional attribution and attempted to prove that the commentary is the work of Priscian of Lydia, who belonged together with Simplicius to the Academy in Athens and went with him into exile at the Persian court after the suppression of the School in 529. When we had nearly finished the article, we discovered that the Italian philosopher Francesco Piccolomini had already anticipated our hypothesis and also furnished the main arguments in his own commentary on the DA.2 The article was published in Dutch in the Louvain Tijdschrift voor Filosofie and immediately received the attention of Mme I. Hadot in her monograph on Simplicius.3 We were often asked to publish an English version of the article, but we believed the evidence of the inauthenticity to be so overwhelming that we lost all motivation to repeat the elaborate argumentation to justify our conclusion. Our argument has always been: just start reading and ‘after a couple of pages’ you will be convinced. However, to our surprise, many scholars continued to question our argument and still defended the traditional attribution. Mme Hadot, who first had given her reserved approval, later came back to the question and became the principal advocate of the traditional attribution of the in DA to Simplicius. In her view, the obvious differences between the in DA and the other commentaries of Simplicius could also be explained by postulating an evolution in Simplicius’ commen-

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tary technique and his growing dependence upon Iamblichus or by pointing to the different intentions of the works commented upon. The textual parallels with the work of Priscian could be explained by a common school tradition.4 In the introduction of her edition of the commentary on the Enchiridion she again develops her main arguments against our thesis, rejecting above all any suggestion of a difference between the doctrine of the soul in the in DA and that in the other commentaries of Simplicius.5 The publication of the translation of the in DA in this series gives me the opportunity to develop, without any polemics, the main arguments Bossier and I developed in the 1972 article, summarizing it and using new evidence and new instruments such as the Thesaurus linguae graecae.6 In this essay I will first argue against the traditional attribution of the commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima to Simplicius, and then argue that Priscian of Lydia is the real author of the in DA. I. The Commentary is not a work of Simplicius A. The traditional attribution In the Preface to the Berlin Edition M. Hayduck describes 14 manuscripts (and the ‘editio princeps’ of 1527) which can be divided into two groups. There is first a large group of manuscripts that offer almost the entire text of the Commentary and share some striking features: they all miss the first part of the prooemium (1,1-3,1) and they have important lacunae in the last pages of the commentary (325-9). The oldest manuscript in this group is the Laurentianus 85,21 (A) from the 13th-14th century (with many later revisions) which is certainly the source, directly or via intermediaries, of all other copies in this group. Because the beginning of the prooemium is lacking in this manuscript, we also miss the title and the attribution of the work. However, Simplicius is explicitly mentioned as author in the titles of Books II and III. To the second group belong a number of manuscripts that only offer small parts of the commentary. The most important is the Matritensis Bibl. Nat. (D) from the 14th century which contains the entire prooemium and the first section of the first book (until 31,19). It has the title ,Ek tîn toà Simplik8ou e9j tÕ per< yucÁj ,Aristot2louj m2roj. Other manuscripts only have the prooemium, and/or some selected scholia in the margin of the Aristotelian text. In some manuscripts those excerpts are anonymous. There are many more partial copies of the commentary than those mentioned by Hayduck. Without a full investigation of the manuscript tradition it is not possible to establish whether all those manuscripts depend upon the same model. In any case, A and D are so similar that they must derive from a single model (from the 13th century), which must also have been the source for the other partial versions of the text. This manuscript had the full prooemium and the title with the attribution to Simplicius.

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The manuscript tradition is confirmed by the indirect tradition of the text. The commentary was used by Michael Psellus (11th century) in his compilation De omnifaria doctrina, but, unfortunately, this philosopher never refers to Simplicius by name. Important also is the testimonium of Sophonias (around 1300). In the prooemium of his own commentary on the DA, the compiler tells us that he has taken much from the previous commentators and particularly from the commentary of Philoponus. However, a careful analysis shows that he also used the commentary attributed to Simplicius. Cf. Sophonias 125,6-14 = Simpl. 224,2-10; Soph. 3,2-3 (a Christian transposition of Simpl. 1,20-1). In the same preface the author also presents the different types of exegetical works devoted to Aristotle. Thus he distinguishes clearly between the real commentaries and the paraphrases. And he mentions as the most celebrated commentators of Aristotle: Simplicius, Ammonius, Philoponus and Alexander. Of course, this passage is not specifically about commentaries on the De Anima (there is no such commentary by Ammonius), and cannot be used as an argument that the author knew the commentary of the De Anima under the name of Simplicius. However, it seems plausible that this was the case. This supposition is further confirmed by the reference to Simplicius in a list of recommended commentaries on Aristotle which has been preserved in the Jerusalem Codex Patr. 106, f.7 (end 13th century):

e9j tÕ per< tÁj yucÁj tÕ Ólon FilÒponon, {j ka< kre8ttwn, À Simpl8kion À Qemist8ou par£frasin This list in fact enumerates the three commentaries on Aristotle’s On the Soul that have come down to us: those by Philoponus, Themistius and the one attributed to ‘Simplicius’. It thus seems that the attribution of the commentary to Simplicius was commonly accepted in the Byzantine tradition. A commentary on On the Soul by Simplicius is also mentioned in the famous catalogue in the Fihrist of al-Nadim (987-990). ‘The [treatise On the Soul] is extant, with a good commentary which is attributed to Simplicius, in Syriac, and which was made for Athawalis.’7 This reference in the Fihrist is very valuable because it is the oldest attribution of such a commentary to Simplicius. However, the text is puzzling. For in no manuscript of the Greek tradition is there a dedication to any Athawalis. Besides, Simplicius never dedicated any of his commentaries. Perhaps the dedication was added to the Syrian translation. After all Athawalis seems to be a Syriac name.8 Anyhow one can conclude from the Fihrist that already in the 7th-8th century (when most Syriac translations were made) a commentary on the DA circulated under the name of Simplicius. It is not evident whether this commentary must be identified with the one that is still extant, but this seems plausible. If not, one must admit that there was another commentary on On the Soul attributed to Simplicius which has not survived.

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The unanimous attribution of the in DA to Simplicius, both in the manuscripts and in the indirect tradition, is of course a strong argument in favour of the traditional authorship. However, one should not forget that there are other cases of unanimous attribution which have been proven to be false. Thus in all the manuscripts of Simplicius’ in De Caelo the first book is attributed to Damascius, although nobody would ever contest its attribution to Simplicius.9 And what about the pseudo-Philoponus and many other pseudo-attributions in late Neoplatonism? B. Arguments against the traditional attribution 1. The method of the commentary (a) The method of Simplicius10 Simplicius always approaches the Aristotelian text with the primary intention of explaining it to his readers as faithfully as possible. ‘His exposition of Aristotle is faithful and acute, and, while clearly written by a Neoplatonist, it is an honest elucidation of the views of Aristotle.’11 Therefore, his works rank even today among the most valuable commentaries on Aristotle, and no scholar can attempt to understand a difficult Aristotelian text without consulting them. His commentaries also contain a rich historical and doxographical documentation, which has considerably enlarged our knowledge of the antecedents of Aristotle’s philosophy and of the later development of the Peripatetic school. In fact, in order better to understand Aristotle’s text, and in particular the purpose of his often acute criticism of his predecessors, Simplicius makes an effort to bring us in direct contact with the philosophers who preceded Aristotle and against whom he reacted (the Presocratics and Plato), quoting long extracts from their works. In doing so he in fact continues a procedure that had already started with Aristotle himself, who in his treatises often gives a historical survey of the various views of his predecessors and occasionally quotes from them in order to criticize them. Whenever Simplicius discusses those sections in Aristotle, he asks whether his criticism is justified and he tries to find out what precisely Aristotle is attacking in them. This is an important question, because the commentator knew from experience that stupid or malign readers (such as John Philoponus) liked to use these critical remarks to ridicule the whole endeavour of philosophy by pointing to the insoluble disagreements between the philosophers.12 Therefore, he let the accused parties speak for themselves, quoting from their work. Thanks to this ‘historical’ interest of Simplicius we have preserved long sections of the Presocratics (such as the Poem of Parmenides). He also gives long quotations from the dialogues of Plato to show that the opposition between the disciple and the master is not about the truth and reality – but only a question of different language. For whereas Aristotle uses the ordinary meaning of terms, Plato (and the Presocratics) often used a more

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poetical and metaphorical language, which Aristotle criticized because he understood the terms in their ‘apparent meaning’ (tÕ fainÒmenon), for instance when Plato talks about the ‘motion’ of the soul. However, if one is aware of the difference in language and in method, it becomes evident that Plato and Aristotle are in fundamental agreement about the ‘truth’.13 Simplicius uses the same historical method of interpretation whenever he is confronted with an obscure or ambiguous passage or an apparent contradiction in the Aristotelian text. He usually confronts his own exegesis with the different interpretations in the tradition. He discusses the problems and solutions of the famous commentators on Aristotle and often quotes long sections from their work before he carefully proposes his own views on a question. Among all commentators he respects most of all Alexander of Aphrodisias: he calls him the most careful and industrious, the most authentic of all commentators on Aristotle.14 He is the commentator par excellence. In fact, Alexander’s commentaries on the Physics and the De Caelo constitute the substrate of Simplicius’ own works. However, this respect and gratitude to Alexander does not imply that he accepts without discussion all his interpretations. On the contrary, he often criticizes his views for the sake of the truth, knowing that Alexander himself would have preferred the truth above friendship.15 One of the questions on which he departs from Alexander is the latter’s naturalistic interpretation of the soul as ‘entelecheia’ of the body.16 He also castigates him for his suspicious and even malevolent attitude towards Plato which prevents him from seeing the fundamental harmony between Aristotle and his master.17 Iamblichus is another authority for Simplicius, particularly in his commentary on the Categories. In the introduction of this work he frankly admits that he attempted to follow as far as possible the exegesis of Iamblichus, that he has copied many sections from his commentary, and that he has often used the actual words of the Syrian philosopher. In this commentary the influence of Iamblichus is dominant. However, this never leads Simplicius to a distorted interpretation of the Aristotelian text nor to a simple repetition of Iamblichus. He remains faithful to his own method: he is primarily interested in explaining the text and tries to solve the problems that arise from it in a confrontation with different views. Thus even this commentary is a well documented study which contains valuable information on the logical and semantic discussions in the Stoic and Peripatetic tradition. Moreover, on many occasions Simplicius manifests a certain reserve vis-à-vis the over-subtle and speculative considerations of Iamblichus.18 And he often tries to bring down the lofty thoughts of Iamblichus to a more commensurate level, that is, to a mode of discourse in which terms are used in their proper sense and not metaphorically. We find here again the soberness of the commentator, who has a great admiration for Iamblichus’ elevated thought, but watches out for the overspeculative character of his exegesis. To conclude. The commentaries of Simplicius give us a clear and scho-

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lastic interpretation which remains close to the Aristotelian text, though the general frame of his exposition is Neoplatonic. They contain a rich documentation of the development of the philosophical debate from its beginnings to late Antiquity. His commentaries are thus a beautiful example of the ideal he cultivated during his whole life: the philomathia, the desire to know, to learn, and to gain an encyclopaedic knowledge with a great respect for the classical Greek tradition. (b) The commentary on the De Anima The commentary on the DA is a genuine ‘commentary’: it follows Aristotle’s text, line by line, develops his arguments and explains difficult phrases and words. Yet it is ‘totally untrustworthy’ as an exposition of Aristotle’s work.19 It may occasionally have some value for elucidating some point of detail in the text, but mostly the commentator passes over the text and the obvious meaning of the argument. Instead of clarifying Aristotle’s text, the author approaches the text from a preconceived view of the soul which he absolutely wants to find within the Aristotelian text itself. As R.D. Hicks rightly observes, ‘The Neo-Platonist Simplicius distorts Aristotle’s account, in order, as far as possible, to adapt it to his own philosophical presuppositions.’20 This is clear from the very beginning of this work. After having expounded in a general introduction his own views on the soul, the author concludes: ‘But the whole development of the arguments will make these doctrines more clear as being the views of Aristotle and as being expressed more obviously by Iamblichus. So now let us turn to the text.’21 And in the important introduction to DA 3.4-6, after having developed his own doctrine about the active and passive intellect, the commentator concludes: ‘After having determined those things beforehand let us take the Aristotelian text again and investigate whether what we have determined beforehand conforms with it.’22 One understands that a commentary with such a hermeneutical approach rarely contributes to a better understanding of Aristotle’s work, which is what frustrated our modern commentators. Thus Torstrik in his own commentary shows his irritation with this work. He supposes that it was composed at the end of Simplicius’ life when the author had lost some of the capacities we admire in his other works. For his interpretative method in this work has a certain ‘senile’ quality. Being an old man, the author can never stick to his text and starts all kinds of digressions: ‘Ipsum interpretandi genus quo in hac re utitur habet senile quiddam ne dicam anile: tantopere a re proposita discedit et nescio quo evagatur.’23 This may be true from the point of view of a commentator who is only interested in better understanding what Aristotle meant in a particular text. But whoever takes the trouble to go through the difficult digressions will discover in this commentary, hidden under Aristotelian terms, a most original philosophical doctrine on the soul.

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Just like Simplicius, the commentator of the in DA always tries to defend the Presocratic philosophers and Plato himself against the criticism of Aristotle. In his view Aristotle only examines ‘the apparent meaning’ (tÕ fainÒmenon) and understands their words ‘in a colloquial sense’ (sunˇqeia tîn Ñnom£twn) without searching for their deeper significance. In fact, those ancient philosophers often liked to express their views in poetical language using vocabulary in a metaphorical sense. Aristotle attacks them on the superficial level of expression, for instance when he criticizes Plato for talking about the ‘motion’ of the soul. Nevertheless both philosophers have fundamentally the same doctrine of the soul, though they express it differently.24 All these declarations fit perfectly with the statements of Simplicius in the three other commentaries. However, the author of the in DA simply maintains this harmony position (which was generally accepted in the school) and never tries to corroborate his interpretation by quoting from those ancient philosophers to let us evaluate their opinions more fairly against Aristotle’s critique. Although the first book of Aristotle’s DA contains an extremely rich documentation of the Presocratics, the author never gives a literal quotation that goes beyond Aristotle’s text. He seems to admit that the information in Aristotle is sufficient.25 A nice example is in DA 250,22-3 where he quotes a text of Empedocles from Aristotle, while Simplicius in in DC 587,1-2, on the occasion of the same quotation in Aristotle (DC 3.2 300b31) gives two more lines of Empedocles not quoted by Aristotle. Only about the doctrine of the Pythagoreans do we find in the in DA more information than what is provided by Aristotle, but this extra information probably comes from Iamblichus.26 Even more remarkable is the fact that the author never gives a quotation from the dialogues of Plato, although he continuously defends his doctrine and sometimes refers to his works. He seems to suppose that his readers know the texts of Plato sufficiently. But this again shows that this author lacks the sense of historical documentation which so characterizes Simplicius. Further, in the explanation of difficult passages of the Aristotelian text our author follows an entirely different method from that of Simplicius. We never have that wide comparison of different views before he formulates his own interpretation. On the contrary, as the author explicitly writes, he will avoid polemics with others and try to ‘investigate the consistency of the philosopher both with himself and with the truth’ (1,14-15). In the interpretation of problematic passages he will first seek help from other texts and statements of Aristotle that are clear. This may be an excellent hermeneutical principle: try to explain Aristotle through Aristotle. However, we read further that he ‘will strive to the uttermost for the truth in accordance with the teaching of Iamblichus in his own writings about the soul’ (18-20). The author is not interested in polemics because he is convinced that the truth about the soul has been perfectly expressed by Iamblichus himself, ‘the excellent judge of truth’. For an authentic interpretation of the Aristotelian text one must follow Iamblichus’ guid-

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ance. In fact, our author has an unlimited admiration for this philosopher who has reached the summit of knowledge. In opposition to Simplicius, he never expresses any reservation about his lofty speculations and never tries to bring them down to a more commensurate level. ‘We never would dare to say something opposite to Iamblichus, but we try as far as possible to conform to him who has reached the summit of science.’ 27 The whole commentary is sustained by an Iamblichean inspiration and an Iamblichean language, even if the author – that again is characteristic of him – never gives a literal quotation from his work, whereas we owe to Simplicius large extracts from Iamblichus’ works, particularly in his in Cat. He does not even make it clear whether Iamblichus’ work On the Soul on which he depends so much, is a commentary or an independent treatise. Besides Iamblichus the author refers to Alexander, to Plutarch of Athens, and once to Themistius. There are twenty references to Alexander and there is a long quotation in which his explanation of the echo is discussed (141,22-32). One wonders why so much attention is given to this topic. But it is evident that Alexander does not have the authority that he had for Simplicius. Our commentator seems to have had a certain appreciation of Plutarch of Athens whom he quotes fourteen times, but he rarely follows his interpretations which remain rather close to the text. 2. Language and style (a) The vocabulary An analysis of the vocabulary of the in DA compared with the authentic works of Simplicius provides several hard arguments against the traditional attribution of the commentary. When Bossier and I published our article, we had to rely on the indices of the Berlin editions which are often very deficient. Now it is possible to check the entire vocabulary thanks to the Thesaurus linguae graecae. Of course, the author of the in DA shares with Simplicius the standard Neoplatonic vocabulary and the typical phrases of the Aristotelian commentary tradition. Nevertheless he often uses a particular terminology that sets him apart not only from Simplicius but also from the other commentators. It seems that he has often coined new terms in order better to express his original doctrine on the soul. If there are any parallels, it is with ‘Priscian of Lydia’ (which is not surprising if he is the real author) and with Damascius. Let me start with some innocent examples without doctrinal implications. The commentator of in DA uses 12 times the verb 1pexerg£zomai in the sense of ‘to examine, to investigate thoroughly’ (1,9; 2,4; 4,8; 5,22; 5,26; 81,3; 101,4; 159,34; 191,1; 233,29; 246,30; 270,39; 319,26), twice 1pexergas8a (5,26; 81,4) and once ¢nepex2rgastoj (4,13). The use of this term in this sense is very rare in the Greek commentaries. Simplicius uses the term or its derivatives nowhere in his commentaries (altogether about

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2,500 pages in the Berlin edition). The only contemporary author using the term is Priscian of Lydia: see Metaphr. 1,9; 7,22; 22,34; 23,4. If Simplicius really were the author of in DA, why should he have avoided this term in all his other commentaries? My second innocent example: there are in in DA four examples of the use of 1rî (17,29; 158,34; 178,27; 329,26) and three of fˇsw (17,34; 36,25; 293,10) as an interjection (‘inquam’). In the whole corpus of Simplicius we could find not a single example of this use. But we find two examples (9,26 and 20,17 ) of it in Priscian. This cannot be a coincidence. The rare verb ¢na8nomai (‘refuse, reject’) occurs six times in in DA. There is only one instance in Simplicius (in DC 115,10), but in Damascius there are 14 examples. Another remarkable expression is the construction ∑stamai kat£ with the accusative, which always gives the modern translator terrible problems. This expression is not absent in Simplicius and other Neoplatonic authors, but in in DA it is so often used (about 80 cases) that it becomes like an expletive verb having lost its strong sense. Again Priscian offers nice parallels for this usage. A particular use of this construction is the expression kaq,Órouj (or ba8nein kaq,Órouj) to talk about discrete acts of knowledge (as opposed to a continuous motion). See for instance: 11,32; 39,4; 42,13; 43,5; 45,33-4; 46,19; 47,37; 61,27; 103,3; 121,32; 221,27. There is one instance in Damascius, De Princ. II, 162,20, but not a single case in Simplicius.28 Another interesting example is the metaphorical use of some terms in a specific Neoplatonic context. Thus the verb cal£w (and calasmÒj) in the sense of ‘relaxation’ or ‘loosening’ (for example of unity) is attested by 12 examples in in DA. Simplicius uses the term, but never in its metaphorical sense, except in one passage (in Phys. 88,14) where he gives a summary of Damascius’ interpretation of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides. Damascius often uses the term in this peculiar sense (13 examples). Here again Priscian confirms the usage of in DA: there are five cases. Another striking example of metaphorical use of a term is ¢post2nwsij and the related verb ¢postenÒw. We find them 23 times in in DA (three times the rare adverb ¢pestenwm2nwj): not a single example in this sense in Simplicius (there are two cases, in DC, 485,2 and in Phys. 18,4 but in the standard physical sense), but eight in Damascius. Another example is Øfiz£nw (‘to sink downwards’) which occurs in in DA five times, but never has this metaphorical sense in the genuine Simplicius. Again Damascius offers examples of a similar use of the term. Simplicius never uses the adjective diexodikÒj, which occurs seven times in the in DA. Another favourite term of the in DA is ¢n2lixij (¢nel8ttw). This term is, of course, much beloved by Neoplatonic authors, such as Proclus, when talking about the ‘unfolding’ of a unity. But we have 34 instances of these terms in the DA commentary, whereas in the whole work of Simplicius there are only seven examples of a metaphorical use (four of which are quotations from Iamblichus, and the others stand in an Iamblichean context). Again there are nice parallels in Priscian’s Metaphrasis (four instances) here again. On

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the other hand, the author of the in DA never uses the term aÙqupÒstaton, which Simplicius uses to characterize the hypostatic Intellect, nor the favourite expression of Simplicius Ólon Ólü 0autù 1farmÒttein when talking about the self-reflection of the soul which can wholly convert upon itself.29 Probably the most conspicuous group of terms in the in DA is Óroj and the related (di-)[ristikÒj and (di-)[r8zw, not just in the logical sense of ‘defining, definition’, but more often in the ontological sense. To ‘define’ something means ‘to give it form’, to ‘constitute it’. The term Óroj is almost equivalent with e!doj. For the form is the defining principle of its subject matter; thus the soul is the ‘defining’ principle of the body, insofar as it constitutes it as a living organism. This group of terms together with related terms such as carakthr8zw, carakthristikÒj, e9dopoi2w, e9dhtikÒj occur more than 300 times in this commentary. They are certainly the most characteristic signature of this work.30 Of course, those terms, and particularly [r8zw, Óroj, [ristikÒj are also used by Simplicius, but never in this particular sense, although he had many occasions to use this vocabulary when talking about the matter-form relation. In my view, this vocabulary argument suffices in itself to demonstrate that the in DA cannot be a work of Simplicius. Other examples of peculiar vocabulary in the in DA will be mentioned when we discuss the doctrinal differences between this commentary and the genuine works of Simplicius. As we have seen, the only parallels for a particular use of terms (except Priscian) are to be found in Iamblichus and Damascius. Therefore it is no surprise that there is more terminological resemblance between the in DA and the in Cat. of Simplicius and the corollaria de loco and de tempore, because in those texts Simplicius is much more dependent upon Iamblichus and his Athenian master than in his other running commentaries. (b) Style Simplicius formulates his arguments in a clear scholastic discourse. His long periods have a transparent syntactic structure corresponding to the order of the argumentation which makes it easy for the reader. He does not like brachylogy or elliptical sentences and avoids a terse and obscure style. He rather likes a certain redundancy to express his thought, which makes his commentaries verbose, prolix and drawn out. The reader never has to make a special effort to understand what the author had in mind without expressing it in writing; he never has to halt at a phrase whose connection with the whole sentence remains obscure. On the contrary, he can cursorily read the long scholastic periods and easily summarize for himself what the commentator has set out at length. This scholastic approach to the text is also evidenced by his interest in formal questions. Thus Simplicius ‘frequently supplies premises to Aristotle’s arguments to make them formally valid, and classifies them as

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being, e.g., in this or that figure of the syllogism’.31 He also shows a great interest in the composition and the articulation of the Aristotelian text, both as a whole and in its various sections. Thus, at the beginning of a new section, he often summarizes the ‘status quaestionis’: what Aristotle has so far argued, what the next problem is and how it is related to the preceding section. Such an introductory sentence often begins with a participle such as e9pèn or de8xaj.32 Therefore the commentary is always clearly distinguished from the text of the lemma. The first words or phrases of an exposition never stand in a syntactic connection with the Aristotelian text. The commentary always begins with an independent sentence which can easily be understood without the lemma. The lemmas are usually given in a shortened form with the 3wj toà formula. The polished construction of the sentences, the orderly character of the exposition, and the arrangement and clarity of the argument confer a character of tranquillity and scholarly seriousness on the whole work. The style is never nervous or terse. Even in the sharp invectives against John Philoponus the expression remains elegant, expansive and drawn out, and the pathos with which he defends his philosophy against Philoponus is translated into a rhetorical abundance rather than into a compact structure. One may say that the style of his commentaries reflects faithfully his own spiritual life and the true nature of his intellectual enterprise. Simplicius is not a creative thinker who develops in writing his own philosophical views; he is above all the industrious encyclopaedic and erudite scholar who studies with quiet zeal what his great predecessors in the philosophical tradition have said, surveying, ordering and critically examining their divergent opinions. In writing his commentaries his first ambition is to get better acquainted with the text and better to articulate his own thoughts about some disputed questions. But in doing so he hopes that his readers too may profit from his work. How different is the eloquence of the author of the in DA. Gone are clarity, order, and the calm discursive argument in well formed periods with respect for classical grammar.33 The style is terse and often ‘jerky’, full of anacolutha and interruptions. It is as if we see the author struggling with his ideas when writing. Many periods are not well constructed because the author takes liberties with syntactical rules. He cannot refrain from adding a new consideration or from inserting an additional explanation in the period, which often destroys the syntactical unity: this explains the frequent anacolutha.34 Besides he makes ample use of adjectives, participles and dependent adverbs turned into substantives often followed by complements.35 There are awful examples of substantival constructions with tÒ.36 This makes his style very complex, untransparent, harsh and stiff. In many passages the author does not take his time to write down quietly and integrally the whole explanation: a short indication, an independent phrase suffice to express what he means. Unfortunately for the reader those phrases are not at all clear. Only after having read the

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commentary several times and having become acquainted with the author’s personal views, can the reader understand what is hinted at in some obscure phrases. This is not easy or smooth reading. Often the reader must make a real effort to follow the complex grammatical construction, and has to stand still at a phrase that is too dense for him to understand what is at stake. Therefore most modern articles written about topics in this commentary, for instance the noetics, contain numerous errors of interpretation, because scholars have not first read the commentary as a whole. In comparison with Simplicius, this author has little interest in the logical structure and in the articulation of the Aristotelian text. But probably the most striking contrast with Simplicius’ procedures is the way he connects the lemmata with their respective commentaries. In fact, in many sections the commentary does not begin with an independent sentence (which is the rule in Simplicius), but with a phrase that is syntactically dependent upon the preceding lemma.37 The explanation of a text may be connected to the lemma as an apposition introduced by tout2sti, dhladˇ38 or through a causative conjunction such as 1peidˇ, diÒti, æj39 or as a genitive absolute (as in 20,6-8; 82,15). As in Simplicius’ works the commentary sections often start with participles such as l2gwn, e9pèn. However, often the principal verb is lacking, which means that fhs< ,Aristot2lhj must be supplied in the preceding lemma to make the construction grammatically correct.40 Some comments are nothing but hasty observations noted without much attention to style and grammar. One has the impression that many lemmata in the edition of Hayduck were originally not lemmata in the technical sense and should be reintegrated into the running commentary. As we have seen, in a number of manuscripts the commentary is written in the form of scholia in the margin of the Aristotelian text. This may have been the oldest tradition of the commentary (except for some introductory sections in which the author gives his general views about a particular subject before attacking the text). A new edition could clarify this text tradition. 3. Doctrinal differences It is not easy to compare the doctrines developed in the in DA with those discussed in the genuine commentaries of Simplicius on Aristotle. After all, the commentary on On the Soul only rarely touches upon cosmological, physical or logical problems. On the other hand, we do not find discussions on psychological issues in the other commentaries. Besides one should not expect great divergence between those commentaries and the in DA since both Simplicius and the author of the in DA share a common Neoplatonic view of the World, the Soul, the Intellect and the Forms, and both try to interpret Aristotle in harmony with Plato. Nevertheless, on many important issues the two authors have divergent views.

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(a) The doctrine of the soul Both commentators defend the fundamental tenets of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the soul: it is a self-moving principle of life and motion, immortal and incorporeal, separate from the body (at least the intellective soul), impassive, the intermediary between the divisible and indivisible, etc. However, throughout the in DA we find an original doctrine of the soul which is not shared by Simplicius. (1) First there is the definition of the soul as an ‘entelecheia’ of the body. According to the in DA the soul is an ‘entelecheia’ of the body in a double sense, both as the formal principle which gives the body its organic structure and life functions and as the motive principle which uses the living organism as an instrument. ‘So the whole soul of the living being is one, but it has an element that is transcendent, which initiates motion and is the user, and another that reaches out and belongs to the living thing as that which determines it’ (87,33-5). To designate the soul as formal principle the commentator uses a variety of terms such as tÕ [ristikÒn, carakthristikÒn, e9dhtikÒn, tÕ e9dopoioàn, etc. However, his favourite expressions to distinguish the two modes of the soul are the prepositional constructions tÕ kaq,Ó versus tÕ Øf,oá.41 The use of the two constructions is so frequent that it is almost the signature of this text. Therefore, it is all the more surprising that Simplicius, in the hundreds of pages of his own commentaries, never uses this distinction when talking about the soul and its twofold mode of being an ‘entelecheia’.42 Even more astonishing is the fact that Simplicius never uses this distinction to explain the difference between soul and nature, a question he often discusses (against Alexander). To be sure, both Simplicius and our commentator admit that nature is just a principle of being moved and being changed passively, whereas the soul is also an active principle of change. However, the commentator on the DA explains this difference between nature and soul using his favourite expressions: ‘Even if nature be the cause of change, the soul is still more so. For the origin of change is superior to the principle according to which things change. For that is how nature is a principle, as being that in accordance with which (tÕ kaq,Ó) not that by the agency of which (tÕ Øf,oá)’.43 Simplicius himself never uses this prepositional expression. On the contrary, he even explicily denies that nature may be called the kaq,Ó principle of bodies (cf. in Phys. 289,4-13). In his view nature is neither form nor matter, but rather a ‘capacity’ (1pithdeiÒthj) for being moved and changed.44 (2) The definition of the soul as self-motion. In the in DA we find a peculiar interpretation of the Platonic notion of aÙtok8nhton. According to this view Plato designates by the compound term aÙtok8nhton the identity within change which characterizes the soul. For the soul is not simply movement and change as is the physical body, it is a self-in-change. The compound term thus indicates how the soul, as an intermediary between

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the divisible and the indivisible, simultaneously shares both extremes. It can be called kinhtˇ insofar as it goes outside itself into becoming and division, and aÙtÒ insofar as it never completely goes outside itself, but, in its movement, preserves its identity and undividedness, thus remaining itself. This interpretation of aÙtok8nhton deviates considerably from the generally accepted Neoplatonic explanation which understood this term primarily as self-movement.45 This was not forgotten by our commentator. Nevertheless, he clearly shifted the emphasis from self-movement to preservation of identity in change. Simplicius, on the contrary, always gives the standard Neoplatonic interpretation of the term, pointing to the double character (diplÒh) of the soul as being both moved and moving.46 It is interesting to notice that the author of the in DA also talks about a diplÒh in the soul, but he thus designates the double character of the soul between the permanent and the changing element.47 (3) The doctrine of the substantial change of the soul. Following Iamblichus, the author of the commentary on the DA defends the provocative thesis that the human soul changes substantially. Simplicius nowhere defends such a doctrine in these terms. For a full exposition of this argument it suffices to refer to my The Changing Self. In her recent edition of Simplicius’ Commentary on Epictetus, Mme I. Hadot has attempted to detect traces of such a doctrine also in the work of Simplicius.48 I know those texts: but they only show that Simplicius is somehow dependent on Damascius in his doctrine of the soul. On the other hand, the author of the in DA never uses the typical vocabulary of Damascius as e!doj tÁj Øp£rxewj and oÙsièdhj m2qexij to talk about the substantial change of the soul. (4) The doctrine of the probolˇ or projection outwards of the soul is one of the most original contributions of this commentary in DA to the Neoplatonic doctrine of the soul. This doctrine, again, is entirely absent from Simplicius’ genuine work, together with the vocabulary of prob£llw, probolˇ, problhtikÒj, that is so typical of the in DA. For a discussion of this topic I again refer to my The Changing Self. (b) Logical issues Even in the use of logical and semantical terms the author of the in DA often deviates from the standard school terminology as we know it from the commentaries on Aristotle. So in characterizing substance he likes to use the verb 0dr£zw (and its derivative aÙq2draston: 68,32; 83,4 and 0drastikÒj) a term never used in this context by Simplicius. There is also the expression kat> b£qoj diafor£ (‘difference in depth’) which indicates that a term is predicated of its different subclasses in an ‘analogical sense’, neither univocally nor homonymously, but kreittÒnwj or Øfeim2nwj: thus the rational soul is said to be more ‘soul’ than the vegetative.49 But the most interesting example of an idiosyncratic terminology is his peculiar

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use of the distinction between divisive (diaretika8) and constitutive differences (sustatika8). This distinction goes back to Porphyry and was standard in the School of Ammonius.50 Divisive differences divide a genus into different subclasses or species: those differences do not belong to each subject in the genus, but only to that subject that belongs to a particular species. Thus, according to Simplicius, rational and non-rational, perishable and imperishable are divisive differences of the genus ‘animal’. Constitutive differences characterize the genus or the common nature as a whole and make abstraction of the specifying differences of the subclasses. Thus, whatever is a feature of ‘animal’ (or ‘living being’) as such and what sets it apart as a genus from other genera, for example ‘minerals’, is a constitutive difference of ‘living being’, for example self-motion, perception, etc. The author of the in DA has quite an original interpretation of the ‘constitutive differences’. In his view those differences modify the generic character of a concept in such a way that it becomes an analogical concept that cannot be predicated in the same sense of all the subjects belonging to the genus. Thus ‘substance’ and ‘accident’ are constitutive differences of ‘being’, because they do not make two coordinate species within the genus (as horse and man within the genus animal) but modify the generic concept intrinsically in its constitutive features. For a self-supporting substance is ‘being’ in another sense than the accidents. For that reason ‘perishable’ and ‘imperishable’ must also be considered as constitutive differences of the common nature ‘animal’, whereas rational and non-rational are not. ‘For being an animal is different for a man and for a horse, but by divisive differences and not by constitutive differences, and therefore not qua animal. But the heavenly and the earthly differ also qua animal. For being imperishable and perishable are divisive differences of being, but are constitutive differences of animal.’51 The Commentator explains further: ‘There is no univocity when the constitutive features of what is predicated differ, as in the case of the perishable or imperishable animal, because being perishable or imperishable are not divisive differences of “animal”. But they are divisive differences of substances, but constitutive differences of what falls under substance [i.e. animal]. And so the perishable is separated from the imperishable by a constitutive difference.’52 Simplicius, on the contrary, considers ‘perishable’ and ‘imperishable’ to be divisive differences. In his view it is even excluded that contrary terms such as mortal and immortal could be constitutive terms; ‘for nothing is constituted by contrary terms’.53 Simplicius never links the constitutive differences with the problem of analogical concepts. He would also have rejected as impossible what is a consequence of the doctrine in the in DA, namely that constitutive differences cannot be predicated of each subject of which the generic term is predicated. That, however, was precisely the definition of the constitutive differences in Simplicius’ own view. On this point the differences between the two authors amount to a contradiction.

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(c) Some other examples One could mention many other doctrinal differences between Simplicius’ Commentaries and this Commentary on the DA. Consider the doctrine of the divine movers of the celestial bodies. Whereas in his Commentary on the Physics Simplicius argues that the movers of all the celestial spheres are totally unmoved and even excludes accidental motion from them, the author of the in DA declares that it has been proved in Book 8 of the Physics that only the First Mover is totally immobile, both per se and per accidens, whereas the other celestial movers are moved per accidens.54 Of course, one could not exclude that Simplicius might have changed his mind on this debated question. However, if he had changed his position, he would never have referred explicitly to his commentary on Physics 8 where we find exactly the opposite thesis defended. It is also interesting to notice that for the author of the in DA the transcendent causes may not be called poihtik£ (because all efficient causality implies a coming to be) but must be considered as t> Øpostatik£ (because they are causes of being, not of becoming: see 235,36 and 112,5-6). Simplicius, on the contrary, never avoids talking about the divine intellect as ‘efficient cause’: cf. in Phys. 314,21 and 316,2. Let me conclude this section with one last example inter multa. In the prooemium of the in DA the term e∏dhsij is interpreted as ‘scientific understanding’ (6,22-4) whereas Simplicius (rightly) argues that this term denotes the general concept of knowledge of which ‘science’ is a particular kind.55 4. The references to previous works In the commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul the author refers six times to his previous works. There is one reference (136,29) to an epitome of the Physics of Theophrastus: there is no such a work of Simplicius, but, as we will show in the second part of this essay, this epitome must almost certainly be identified with the Metaphrasis of Priscian. Two references (28,20 and 217,27) are to a commentary on the Metaphysics. There is no commentary on this work by Simplicius. However, there is some indirect but problematic evidence that Simplicius may have written such a commentary.56 However that may be, we can not compare the cross-references of the in DA with this lost commentary. Finally, there are three references to a commentary on the Physics (35,14; 120,24 and 198,5). If Simplicius actually is the author of the in DA, it should not be difficult to identify these references because we still have his bulky commentary on the Physics. However, a comparison of the relevant sections in both commentaries reveals such a divergence in content and expression that it is impossible to accept that the cross-references in the in DA relate to the in Phys. of Simplicius. Therefore, the three references to a commentary on

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the Physics furnish three important arguments for rejecting the attribution of the in DA to Simplicius. The first reference to a commentary on the Physics occurs at 35,10-15. In this section an objection is raised against Aristotle’s argument that the soul never undergoes change. It seems evident that the soul is not subject to quantitative change; but what about qualitative change? Is the transition from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge not an alteration? For a solution to this objection the commentator refers to Aristotle’s discussion of alteration in Physics 7.3 (246a10-48a9): ‘Transformations occur after affections (p£qh) that are not of the soul but of the living being. For the sudden presence (¢qrÒa parous8a) of the disposition is in the soul, but the transitional transformation (diexodik] metabolˇ) prior to its presence is in the composite thing. And we have explained this more clearly in our commentary on this passage.’ That the reference here is to Physics 7.3 is confirmed by another reference at 121,29-35. Learning, it is said, is ‘a sort of coming to be’ (g2nesij). This does not imply that ‘the soul itself is altered – for alteration is a change that is continuous and everywhere divisible, whereas the soul always halts at discrete terms (kaq,Órouj ∑statai) but the soul comes to be in a cognitive disposition all of a sudden (¢qrÒwj) whereas the alteration is seen to happen in the living being, as has been said in Physics Book 7’.57 In Simplicius’ Commentary on Physics 7 we read an extended and detailed exposition of Aristotle’s argument at 246a10ff. All alterations concerning ‘affective qualities’ are processes in time. However, the acquisition of virtues is not an alteration, but a perfection of the soul, although it may be preceded and accompanied by bodily changes. Besides, virtues have their existence ‘in relation to’ something, and there is no alteration of relative entities. Therefore neither the acquisition of a virtue nor the actualization of it may be considered as an ‘alteration’. In this long scholastic exposition Simplicius gives us the standard interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine. In this sense, the whole argument ‘is in line with the discussion’ in the in DA58 which presupposes that interpretation. Nowhere, however, either in this section or elsewhere in his long commentary on the Physics, does Simplicius make an opposition between ¢qrÒa parous8a and diexodik] metabolˇ, nor does he use the remarkable expression kaq,Órouj ∑stasqai, which plays a role in the in DA. As a matter of fact, throughout this commentary, the expression (kaq,Órouj ∑stasqai) is used to characterize the thinking of the soul. As we experience it, the cognitive activity of the soul is a discursive process. In reasoning the soul passes from one term to another, composes propositions with subject and predicates, concatenates propositions in syllogisms, etc. For the soul cannot render intelligible every form in one indivisible act, as does the divine intellect which thinks eternally always the same objects. The soul is forced to think 1n parat£sei, now this form, then another, and to pass from one intelligible object to another and so through intermediar-

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ies back to the same. In this process of thought there no longer exists an indivisible connection of the knowing subject with the objects known; there is only a kind of touching them (1pafˇ). In this discursive process the soul manifests its divisible character. Even divine souls have this discursivity, but they have it in an eternal time. However, notwithstanding this discursivity and divisibility, all rational souls share in the indivisibility of the intellect. For, as our commentator shows, their thinking activity is not a continuous (sunecˇj) process, as is a physical motion or an alteration. Thinking is a discontinuous process, a jumping, as it were, from one moment to another, as if it were composed out of discrete monads. In fact in each act of knowledge, the soul somehow stands still at the object known which is its Óroj or its defining term: = kat> tÕ gnwstÕn tÁj gnws2wj st£sij (11,31-3). And even when the soul passes (meta-ba8nein) continuously from one term to another, the act of thought is not itself 1n metab£sei but always stands still at each term of knowledge.59 This ‘standstill’ (st£sij) of the cognitive act upon the known object and its transition from one term to another (= kaq,Órouj ¢e< 1n tÍ metabolÍ b£sij) manifests its participation in indivisibility. Hence acts of thought never have a continuous extension ‘but it is rather as those who run from one term to another, with an undivided activity at each stage, since each thought is known undivided and as a whole’.60 When we then turn to Simplicius’ Physics commentary, we nowhere find a discussion of the discontinuous character of knowledge, and the very specific vocabulary (kaq,Órouj ∑stasqai, ba8nein) is entirely lacking. There is an interesting digression on the distinction between physical time and psychic time in the Corollary in Time, in which Simplicius discusses the opinions of Iamblichus and Damascius. We know that Damascius argued that time proceeds by leaps and discontinuously. It is very plausible that the author of the in DA was influenced by both philosophers in his views on time. However, Simplicius himself never develops such a theory in his own commentary, and even in the Corollary he never gives an account of the doctrine of time in terms used in the in DA. We have another allusion to the same doctrine in the third reference to the Physics, which occurs in the commentary on DA 3.2 426b23-6. In this section Aristotle is discussing the ‘common sense’. He argues that this sense can compare and distinguish impressions from the different particular senses, for example, white and sweet. This discrimination, however, occurs not at separable moments, oÙd,1n kecwrism2nü crÒnü. After a brief explanation of this phrase, the commentator offers a possible deeper meaning: ‘Perhaps Aristotle suggests (a9n8ttetai) that the pure and perfect activities of the soul, which always advance according to terms, are in a time which is composed out of now-moments as monads, but not such a time as the physical time which is a continuum. We have discussed this matter at length in our commentary on the Physics. For judgement is not divisible, but a perfect act, and whole at once in the now.’61 This is a rather

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obscure suggestion, and we are happy to know that it has been discussed ‘at length’ in the author’s commentary on the Physics. But, to our surprise, we find no more explanation of this interesting doctrine in Simplicius’ commentary on the Physics, not even in the Corollary on Time, where Iamblichus’ views on time are discussed at length. The editor of the in DA was puzzled about this reference to the Physics. Where could Aristotle have discussed this theory of time? I believe that we have here again a reference to 7.3 and particularly to the concluding paragraph: ‘For it is because the mind is at rest and has come to a halt that we are said to know’ (247b9-13). Aristotle here nicely explains the verb 1p8stamai as a sort of standing still or halting (stÁnai t]n di£noian). This section of the Physics could have offered Simplicius an excellent occasion to develop ‘at length’ a doctrine of thought as a discontinuous process, which advances and comes to a halt according to terms (kaq,Órouj). But we find no single comment of this kind. On the contrary, Simplicius gives quite a different explanation of this Aristotelian text (cf. 1077,3f.). Aristotle, it is said, here follows his master Plato who in the Timaeus explains how our incarnated souls have suffered from the shock of birth and have fallen into ignorance: only when souls have acquired rest again, may they recover their innate knowledge. Aristotle has this doctrine in mind when he says that the soul comes to a halt in knowledge. It is nice to find in this Aristotelian text a harmony with Plato, but it remains a rather dull comment on a most interesting observation of Aristotle which has quite a different meaning. In this case, the commentator on the DA surpasses Simplicius in originality and philosophical speculation. The second reference to the Physics occurs in an explanation of DA 2.5, 417a14-17: ‘We first talk as if to be affected (p£scein) and to be changed (kine√sqai) and to be active (1nerge√n) were the same thing. The three terms must, however, be distinguished. For motion or change (k8nhsij) is not the same as activity (1n2rgeia): it is an imperfect activity, as Aristotle says.’ But, as the commentator observes, Aristotle has not yet explained how ‘being affected’ (p£scein) and being moved or changed (kine√sqai) differ from each other. Therefore he makes his own attempt to differentiate these terms. If p£scein is used as a specific term for all changes according to ‘affective qualities’ (such as becoming hot or wet), then the term kine√sqai has a much wider extension: for it also comprehends locomotion, substantial change, etc. But if the term is used unqualifiedly for all kinds of transformation (tropˇ) that come about by the agency of something else, it may seem that ‘to be affected’ is equated with ‘change’ (metab£llein). For all change is by the agency of something else and involves some transformation. However, one should make a further distinction. Not all change, perhaps, is identical with ‘to be affected’, but only substantial, qualitatitive and quantitative change. For change occurs whenever a whole is in transformation ‘through a different ordering with different things at different times’ (¥llote ¥lloij sunt£ttesqai). ‘But such a change as both

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preserves the same ordering with other things and remains in its natural state, when what is in change (or motion) is not affected, but activates the transmigration (met£stasij) through different spaces, is not, as we have said in the commentary on Physics Book 4, a case of being affected, since it involves no transformation.’62 Some further comments about this obscure explanation of the difference between kine√sqai and p£scein would be most welcome. But all our attempts to find an explanatory parallel text in the voluminous commentary on the Physics have been in vain. The reference to Physics 4 is probably a copyist’s error for Physics 8. Simplicius approaches the problem mentioned here in his commentary on Physics 8.7 261,13-23 when discussing the ontological primacy of locomotion over all other forms of motions. Following Aristotle he explains that locomotion does not change the status of the thing in motion, neither in substance nor in quantity nor in quality. Therefore a thing in locomotion is more perfect than a thing involved in another mode of change (in Phys. 1272,19-25). The argument of this section in the commentary is certainly coherent with the ideas expressed in the in DA. However, here again we do not find an explanation of the rather obscure phrases used in the commentary on DA. This is, however, a reasonable expectation if a commentator refers explicitly to an earlier work. Thus in the whole commentary on the Physics we never find the expression ¥llote ¥lloij sunt£ttesqai or 1nerge√n t]n di£foron tîn tÒpwn met£stasin. The possible origin of this vocabulary about change is again Iamblichus. According to Iamblichus the different accidents cosubsist in the substance and they form one coordination (sÚntaxij) with it.63 Probably our commentator is influenced by this Iamblichean vocabulary, and uses the expression ¥llote ¥lloij sunt£ttesqai to designate a modification in the structural arrangement of substance and accidents which is characteristic of change, whereas in locomotion we have just a migration in space without any structural change or tropˇ. To conclude: the cross-references, which are usually a strong argument in favour of an attribution, are in the case of the commentary in DA a serious counter-argument. Conclusion I have argued that the commentary on Aristotle’s DA stands apart from the other commentaries of Simplicius in its different technique, in its particular style and idiosyncratic vocabulary, and in its doctrinal differences. In addition there are no cross-references between this commentary and the other commentaries. Are those arguments, which could be supported by many more examples, sufficient to reject the traditional attribution to Simplicius? Is it not possible to explain those differences through a development in the thought and commentary style of Simplicius? One might suppose that there is an evolution in his work from an Alexandrian

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perspective to a more Athenian Neoplatonism (Damascius and the influence of Iamblichus). In his earlier work (the in Ench.?) the Athenian influence would be limited, whereas in the in DC and the in Phys. we find already a more speculative tendency as is evident from the Corollaries on Place and Time, which show a strong influence of Iamblichus and Damascius. Still later we have the in Cat. where the author follows Iamblichus closely, and finally there is the in DA where the author is fully inspired by Iamblichus in his speculative explanations of Aristotle’s treatise and has lost all interest in an ‘historical’ approach to the text. However, this hypothesis of a doctrinal evolution seems to be untenable for two reasons: (1) Within the authentic works of Simplicius one can discover no evolution in thought, vocabulary or style. On the contrary, it is surprising how coherent and homogeneous the doctrinal content is of all those works and how similar the style and vocabulary. Even the commentary on the Enchiridion, which has a somewhat peculiar character, defends the same doctrines and uses a very similar vocabulary and cannot be considered a special Alexandrian work (pace K. Praechter). And although the influence of Iamblichus may be strong in the commentary on the Categories, the author keeps a distance from his too lofty speculations, as we have seen. Besides, on all issues where we find doctrinal differences with the in DA, the other commentaries of Simplicius constitute a coherent doctrinal bloc. So if there were an evolution in Simplicius’ work, this hypothesis could only be verified in his ‘last’ work, the in DA. Only in this work would he have distanced himself from his previous works. (2) If there is an evolution in a literary production, it should never be such that it abolishes the identity of an author. The hypothesis of an evolution may explain some doctrinal differences. Thus it is always possible that a philosopher changes his opinion, has another view on a certain problem, makes other distinctions, or offers another emphasis (as we will see in the case of Priscian who modified his interpretation of Aristotelian noetics). It is also possible that he is later more influenced by an authority (say Iamblichus) than at an earlier stage. But this hypothesis cannot explain radical differences in language and style, in the technique of commenting, and in fundamental doctrines. Why should an author switch to an entirely different mode of commenting, to a new style and vocabulary? Why should he start using a term like 1pexerg£zomai? And how could one explain through an ‘evolution’ such terminological and doctrinal differences as the interpretation of aÙtok8nhton or the meaning of sustatika< diafora8? From all these considerations only one conclusion is valid: the commentary ‘On Aristotle On the Soul’ cannot be the work of Simplicius.

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In this second part I will argue that the commentary ‘On Aristotle On the Soul’ is the work of Priscian of Lydia, author of the Metaphrasis in Theophrastum. Our main argument for this attribution is the reference that the author of the commentary makes at 136,29 to his ‘Epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’. This earlier work must be identified with the Metaphrasis in Theophrastum of Priscian. The Metaphrasis is the only work of Priscian which has survived in Greek, and even that text is only partially preserved.64 We have the sections on Perception and on Imagination, and, after a lacuna in the manuscripts, a discussion of Intellect. The Metaphrasis is not just a summary of Theophrastus’ Physics: the author also attempts to solve some of the problems raised by Theophrastus within the Neoplatonic framework of Iamblichus’ doctrine of the soul. Unfortunately this important work of Theophrastus, which consisted of eight books, has not survived, but we can reconstruct parts of it.65 As we learn from Themistius, the discussion on the Soul occupied the fourth and the fifth book of Theophrastus’ Physics: 1n tù p2mptü tîn Fusikîn, deut2rü d5 tîn Per< yucÁj.66 The extant section of the Metaphrasis only concerns the fifth book (cf. 22,34: t> d2 loip> toà p2mptou bibl8ou). But it is probable that Priscian also commented upon the previous and the later books of the Physics. Certainly he must have ‘epitomized’ also the fourth book in which Theophrastus discussed the definition of the soul after a doxographical introduction. As a matter of fact, the Metaphrasis as we have it now opens ex abrupto with a sentence which only makes sense if there was a previous discussion: per< a9sqˇsewj aÙtù [ skopÕj 1fexÁj. Notice the 1fexÁj and the implicit reference to Theophrastus with aÙtù. There is also a reference to an earlier discussion on 29,4 (}dh 4famen) which cannot be identified in the actual surviving text. This again must be a reference to the lost epitome of the fourth book. Whether Priscian also summarized the Books 1-3 and 6-8, or was only interested in the psychological discussion, remains uncertain. The work of Theophrastus was also known to Simplicius who quotes from the first and the third book, but never uses it in a discussion about the soul.67 In all manuscripts, which depend upon a 14th-century copy, this paraphrase of Theophrastus is attributed to Priscian of Lydia. The actual title cannot be the original one since the term met£frasij is not used before the Byzantine period. Not much is known about Priscian besides the fact that he belonged to the group of Neoplatonic philosophers around Damascius who went in exile to Persia after the closing of the Academy in Athens. Whether this paraphrase is really his work, we cannot check. For the only possible term of comparison is the Solutiones ad Chosroem which only exists in Latin and is nothing but a compilation. However, there are no serious arguments to doubt the traditional attribution. For Priscian of

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Lydia is such a little known philosopher that it is implausible that his name would have been attached to an anonymous commentary. It seems, however, that he had some reputation in the tradition because his name is mentioned in an old list among the famous commentators of Plato, but this testimonium remains doubtful.68 However it may be, if our argument is correct, we must also ascribe to him this original and speculative commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul. As I have said, our main argument for this new attribution is the reference to an ‘Epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’ which occurs in the commentary on DA 2.7 419a13-19. Aristotle here discusses the function of the transparent medium in visual perception. A colour stimulates the transparent which in turn stimulates the sense-organ. This explanation emphasizes the mechanic-passive character of the sensation process. The commentator, however, tries to reduce this passivity by insisting on the active and direct character of sensation. The medium only plays a subsidiary function (sunerge√n 136,13.36). Its only role is to transfer the activity of the colour without being modified by it itself. Therefore it does not activate sight by itself without colour. ‘For if the transparent had stimulated sight by itself, the perception would have been of that medium, and not of the coloured object. As it is, we grasp both it and the intervening interval. I have explained this more clearly in the epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’ (136,26-9). As a matter of fact, one finds an extended discussion of the nature and the function of the transparent in the Metaphrasis (8,1-15,5) where Priscian starts from the problems raised by Theophrastus: ‘What then is the nature of the transparent?’ From 11,25 onwards, the commentator examines the role of the transparent in sense perception. He first establishes that the transparent is not only required because of the need of an interval between object and organ, but also because it contributes something to the senses (suneisf2rein ti de√ 11,27). But what is this contribution? Is it that the colour stimulates the transparent and that it in its turn stimulates the sight to perceive, as if it were informed by the colours? But in this manner we would perceive the transformed medium and not the colour, which would destroy the immediacy of perception. However, we do see the colour itself and immediately. Hence it must be the colour itself which stimulates the organ of sight. What then is the function of the ‘movement’ of the medium? It must be such a movement that the perceived object is conveyed by it immediately and without modification. ‘I say therefore that the colour, when illuminated, acts upon the transparent with an activity which is brought upon it in a separate manner (cwristîj) and for this reason it is present to it not by transmission but immediately and in all of it altogether and as a whole undividedly everywhere.’ Therefore Priscian rightly compares the presence of the activity of colour in the transparent to the presence of the light in it, which actualizes it while being present in it in a separate manner.

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A comparison of this section of the Metaphrasis with the corresponding pages in the in DA gives strong evidence that the author of this commentary is referring at 136,29 to this section of the Metaphrasis. In fact, we find in both texts a similar formulation of the problem concerning the function of the transparent and a similar solution expressed in the same peculiar terminology. Moreover, the text of the Metaphrasis is more elaborate, whereas the in DA argues as if the doctrine of the Metaphrasis is presupposed. Let us compare the two texts (using S provisionally as sign for the author of the in DA, P for Priscian). The aporia:

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The aporia: P 12,14.12-13 The transparent can also of itself stimulate sight. But in that case, we would perceive the affection of the transparent and not the colour; but if the colour S 136, 26-8 But if the transparent stimulated sight of itself, the perception would have been of that and not of the coloured object. As it is, we grasp it  The solution: P 12,17-30 Just as the thing which illuminates perfects the transparent when the activity that comes from it is present to it in a separate manner and present to our eye through the transparent, not as if were passively affected, but as itself also being perfected by way of that separate activity –, so also colour, when illuminated, acts on the transparent with an activity, which is carried upon it in a separate manner  and is present at once and in all of it together and as a whole undividedly everywhere, and as it were giving it form in a separate manner; together with that which is thus given form also stimulates our sight . Therefore the activity of colour is also present to sight in an unmixed way since it is carried upon it without being mixed with it. What then does the transparent contribute  ? Surely it is clear that it is by transferring it. 13,12 The colour (is made visible) by the perfect  actuality of the form being present in the transparent in an absolute manner  S 132,13 is  activity  present in it [the transparent] in a separate manner and perfecting it. 136,8 The colour that is perfected by light acts on the  transparent not in a passive manner but as an actuality, as imparting to it a certain light-like activity 137,3 The sense-organ is stimulated by the colour which supplies the activity which is carried upon the transparent to the sense-organ, carried separately and without mixture upon the intermediate. Therefore the activity is present all at once and altogether as a whole  136,24.37 By transferring the activity  155,23 The colour is present in an absolute manner and as activity 

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The conclusion, that the reference to the ‘Epitome of Theophrastus’ actually concerns the Metaphrasis, is further confirmed when we compare the whole text of the Metaphrasis, in so far as it has been preserved, with the in DA. For a detailed comparison shows that the correspondence we have discovered between the two texts is not just an isolated case. In many other sections of the in DA the commentator exploits the Metaphrasis extensively and literally. So the opening section, with the general characterization of sense-perception, is the substrate of the exposition of the same topic in the commentary on the DA. A careful analysis shows that the commentator follows the text of the Metaphrasis line by line, sometimes literally copying it, sometimes paraphrasing or summarizing it. One may compare:

P 1,11-2,6 Since all knowledge comes about through the conjoining into one and the indivisible encompassing of the whole known object, the affection of the sense-organ must precede the perception ; because of the whole extension outside  it cannot be active without the ; nor indeed having been aroused itself previously does it stimulate the organ (as in the case of imagination)  For perception is of and not of the affections in the sense-organs, but together with

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these it grasps the forms in the bodies. It is not like inanimate things that the sense-organs are affected by sense-objects, but as a living body is affected. Therefore it is not entirely an affection nor altogether from outside, but it is also by way of its own activity, and it is not the case that it is moved first and is active later, but it is not moved at all without at the same time being active. Nor yet indeed is it active without being moved. S 125,25-34 Since all knowledge comes about through the conjoining into one and the indivisible encompassing of the whole know object, and since the affection of the sense-organ must precede because of the inclination outside of the sensitive life which cannot be active without the organ nor, having been aroused previously, also stimulate the organ, it is clear that it is not perceiving the affections in the sense-organs, but that together with these it grasps the forms in the bodies. And this also is clear that the sense-organ is not affected by things external in the way that the inanimate things are; it is affected as being alive. Therefore it is not entirely an affection nor altogether from outside but by way of its own activity, and at the same time it is moved and active. It is superfluous to quote more Greek texts. One may still compare P 2,6-14 with S 125,34 – 126,4. But as a last illustration of the procedures of the commentator let us compare S 126,11b-15 with P 3,1-20a. We see how the commentator has summarized the long text in P and made one single period of it. The first clause is literally transferred from P, but is now made a genitive absolute. The main clause is taken from P 3,18. What in P was a question and an answer, has been transformed into one affirmative sentence without even changing the order of words. The commentator skips the middle section of the argument in P (3,2-17), because it is a repetition of an argument he discussed earlier in his work. It will suffice to summarize it in a parenthesis.

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P 3,1-20 For with the one concept of white the soul perceives all particular whites things. In what way then is the soul made like the sensible objects? Not by receiving something from them, but by being active in accordance with their concept. S 126,11-16 For the soul perceives all particular white things with the one concept of white. Therefore the soul is made like the sensible objects not by receiving something from them, but by being active in accordance with the concept appropriate to them. About the ‘sensibilia communia’ we find similar arguments in P 4,9-5,4 and in S 126,24 – 127,14. One notices again typical terminology such as plhktikèteron e9dhtikîj. In the in DA the commentator adds a point that is not directly based upon the Aristotelian text, namely that a sensible object must act upon the sense organ ‘at a suitable distance’: ‘For these points must be inserted, even if they are not now clearly stated by Aristotle’ (127,2). This topic, however, is discussed at length in P 5,21-7,6. These parallels between P and S are probably not accidental. Another example. At 419a6 Aristotle leaves the question open ‘why some objects are not seen in light, but only in darkness, like charcoal’. The commentator gives his own explanation of the phenomenon (see 135,25136,2). Priscian offers a similar explanation of it at 10,30 – 11,14. A most interesting correspondence between the two texts occurs regarding an account of the nature of darkness. In P we find a most extravagant theory regarding the essence of darkness which goes against the traditional view; particularly the Aristotelian. As it is said in 8,16: ‘Darkness is not the privation of light, but is itself an actuality’ (8,15-16). ‘For just as the transparent in fire has light essentially, that in earth has darkness essentially. Hence just as fire is a thing that produces light, so earth is a thing that produces darkness (skotopoiÒn).’ And further he talks about the ‘darkness-producing property’ of the earth ( skotopoiÕn 9d8wma 10,11-12). This most extravagant theory of darkness (which even has a Manichaean flavour) has to my knowledge never been defended by any philosopher in antiquity. It is therefore no coincidence that we find a reference to this theory in the in DA, whereas the real Simplicius is silent about it in all of his commentaries. In the commentary on 418b10 S raises the question whether darkness is the privation of light or the ‘actuality of the earth’. In the first case, the transparent is not subject to light or to

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darkness through two potencies, but only through one: when it is actualized, there is light; when it is not, darkness. However, if darkness is not just a privation, but is itself an actuality of the earth, so that it does not create darkness by interposition, but by imparting some specific character (9diÒthta) opposite to light, as is the case with cold in relation to hot, and black to white, then there will be two potencies, one characterised by the ability to illuminate, the other by the ability to darken; for darkness will not consist only in the absence of light, but will need something positive to be present (133,8-17). There is no reason why the commentator should discuss both alternatives here. Certainly there is no occasion for it in Aristotle’s text because the philosopher strongly defends the privation theory as the commentator knows: ‘But Aristotle treats it as a privation’ (133,17) notes the commentator, and he stops the discussion. The only reason to insert this heterodox view on light in this section of the commentary is that he himself must have once adhered to it, as is clear from the Metaphrasis, perhaps following Iamblichus’ views. For the other correspondences between the two texts we only give the references. P 15,6-25 and S 142,25-7 (on the echo); P 16,14-17,15 and S 143,23-31; 145,6-12 (about the air in the organ of hearing); P 18,7-30 and S 158,14-36; 161-4 (about touch; and in particular S 161,9=P 18,25); P 20,9-16 and S 174,18-26; P 20,22 and S 175,11. Further P 21,16-32 and S 182,34-183,20; P 21,32-22,23 and S 185,27-186,11 and S 187,31f.; P 21,4-16 and S 195,1-12; P 5,4-6 and S 135,1-7 and 189,23-8. In all these cases there are no literal parallels, but there is a strong similarity in terminology and style and such a similar development of the problems that we can only explain it by accepting the identity of P and S. Additional evidence is the affinity between the second part of the Metaphrasis about imagination (phantasia) and the general discussion that the commentator upon the DA devotes to this topic before starting his detailed explanation of the lemmata of Aristotle. In both texts there is a remarkable influence from Iamblichus (cf. 214,19 and P 24,2; 23,13). A lengthy comparison would again oblige us to quote long sections of Greek texts. Let us just indicate the main similarities: P 23,1-10 and S 213,25-33; P 23,24-7 and S 213,34-5; P 24,32-25,13 and S 213,35-214,4; P 24,8-14 and S 214,5-13; P 24,27-8 and S 214,12 (215,36; 206,20-208,10); P 24,1-7 and S 214,18-20; P 24,28-32 and S 215,9-13. Again, those parallels are not so literal as in the section on perception. It is, however, evident that S has made his commentary on DA with the Metaphrasis before his eyes (and not vice versa). For in some cases the text of P is more developed, and sometimes the phrases of P are so mixed up and summarized in S that one cannot fully understand the ‘new’ text in S without having first read P. A beautiful example is S 213,35-214,4. It is said that the activities of thought in our soul also have a repercussion upon the body, not only the pneumatic body, but also the ‘solid organ’. What this ‘solid organ’ might be and what kind of a disposition it may acquire is not at all clear in the text. It becomes,

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however, clear when we compare this passage with the corresponding section in P 24,32-25,5: the repercussion of thought on the ‘solid body’ is nothing but the frowning of the eyebrows which accompanies our rational activities. The third part of the Metaphrasis that survives is devoted to the interpretation of the celebrated Aristotelian doctrine of the intellect ‘in potency’ and ‘in act’. When we compare this section with the commentary on De Anima 3.4-6, we again find the same vocabulary and similar phrases in the discussion of the noetic doctrine. There is, however, a striking difference between the two texts. In the Metaphrasis Priscian identifies the noàj 1nerge8v with the unparticipated divine intellect, and the noàj dun£mei with the participated intellect. In the in DA the commentator understood both the intellect-in-act and the intellect-in-potency as principles belonging to the structure of the rational soul. In The Changing Self I have compared both interpretations. In my view, the doctrinal difference between the two works can easily be explained if one admits that Priscian in his earlier work, the Metaphrasis, rather faithfully reproduces the Iamblichean doctrine of the Intellect, whereas in the later commentary he came back to the more traditional interpretation of DA 3.4-6, reading those chapters as a characterization of the immanent structure of the rational soul. The peculiar terminology that he had employed in the Metaphrasis to describe the relation between the absolute and the participated intellect, he now transfers to the moments of the rational life within the soul. Nonetheless, he was convinced that by this application he remained perfectly true to Iamblichus’ thought.69 As an exegesis of Aristotle’s doctrine, this is a radical shift. However, there is no fundamental difference in doctrine because both texts, the Metaphrasis and the in DA, develop the same doctrine of the intellect. Conclusion As we have seen, there exists between the Metaphrasis of Priscian and the commentary ‘On Aristotle On the Soul’ attributed to Simplicius a remarkable similarity in doctrine, vocabulary and style: ‘modus loquendi necnon sententia simillima’ (as Piccolomini said). For many expressions in the in DA which rarely or never occur in Simplicius’ authentic works, we find parallels in the Metaphrasis. Both texts also heavily depend upon Iamblichus in the formulation of their psychological doctrine. In principle there are four possible hypotheses to explain those striking similarities. (1) The author of the in DA plagiarizes Priscian. Against this hypothesis, we can argue than when someone is plagiarizing another, one can easily set apart in his work the ‘excerpts’ taken from that other source, because they have another vocabulary and stylistic characteristics. But we have

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seen that the parallels with the Metaphrasis are not isolated, but run through the entire commentary. Moreover, the author of the in DA uses language like Priscian’s in the Metaphrasis, even when he diverges from the doctrine defended there, as is evident in his interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of the active and passive intellect. It is difficult to suppose that an author would continuously imitate the vocabulary and the modes of expression of another author, unless there is an actual attempt at falsification. But why would Simplicius try to imitate Priscian? (2) For the same reason it is also excluded that Priscian plagiarizes the in DA. Besides, the comparison of both texts has demonstrated that in DA presupposes P and not vice versa. (3) The authors of both works could have used a common source. One may think of Iamblichus’ treatise On the Soul whom both authors profess to follow closely in their explanations. Is it not better to explain the literal correspondence between both texts through their dependence on a common source, as is often the case? However, against this hypothesis, one can argue (i) that an accurate comparison of some parallel passages shows that the author of in DA was working with the text of P before him (and not a common source), first transcribing, then summarising; (ii) the parallel texts do not constitute sections that can be isolated in the two commentaries, which is the case when two independent authors use the same third source, but we find throughout in both texts similar vocabulary and stylistic elements which can only be explained by the identity of their author (for example, the use of 1rî, fˇsw as an interjection or the use of the verb 1pexerg£zomai); (iii) although both texts refer to Iamblichus, they never quote him literally: cf. S 240,37f. with P 32,13. Therefore a common dependence upon Iamblichus is a very improbable hypothesis to account for the literal resemblances between both texts, since in quoting their common source they are never literal. (4) The most plausible hypothesis remains that the two works must be attributed to the same author, namely Priscian. Our main argument for this hypothesis is the self-reference in the commentary on the DA which can only refer to the Metaphrasis. Besides this reference, there is also another implicit reference to the Metaphrasis in the commentary that I have not yet discussed. At 286,27-32 the commentator notices that Aristotle sometimes uses the term noàj to designate what he calls in other texts di£noia, ‘stretching the name of intellect to cover all rational life, as far as imagination’: of course, not the imagination in irrational beings, but that in humans ‘about which Theophrastus too inquires in his own Physics whether it should be regarded as rational or irrational’. Now, Priscian mentions the same opinion of Theophrastus in the same words in his Metaphrasis 29,3-6 and he refers to an earlier passage in his work (now lost) for a fuller discussion of this topic. It is evident, then, that the author of the in DA considers the ‘Epitome

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of the Physics of Theophrastus’ as his own work. When he started his explanation of the Aristotelian treatise On the Soul he fell back on his earlier work, his ‘Epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’, in which he had already discussed similar problems, and he freely used arguments and phrases taken from it. That an author so literally copies from his own work is not exceptional. One can give many examples in contemporary academic careers. Besides it is remarkable that we find the most literal quotations from his earlier work in those sections of his Commentary where he unfolds his own views on perception and phantasia and adopts a distance from the Aristotelian text, as in the in DA 213,23-214,27 where he first presents his own view on phantasia and only afterwards (starting from 214,28f.) gives his interpretation of the DA 428b10. And the section on perception in in DA 125,24-126,16 comes as a conclusion in which he summarizes his own views. That the Metaphrasis is an earlier work of the author of the in DA is also clear from many indications. Thus we find in the Metaphrasis a first development of the doctrine of the soul as [listikÒn which is so typical of the in DA. And as we have seen, the exposition on the intellect in the Metaphrasis represents an earlier stage in which the author stands much closer to Iamblichus. After all, the whole work is not very systematic, the use of certain technical terms is not fixed, and the problem of the relation between the soul and its participated intellect is not solved. There remains, however, one serious objection against our claim, namely the exact formulation of the reference in the in DA 136: ‘I have explained this more clearly in the epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’. Is it possible that Priscian would have characterised his own explanation of Theophrastus as an ‘epitome’? The literary genre of the epitome was very popular in antiquity.70 Authors made their own summaries, of their own works and of their great predecessors. The reasons for this popularity are well explained by Galen in the introduction of his sÚnoyij per< sfugmîn. However, it seems difficult to consider the Metaphrasis of Priscian as an ‘epitome’, because he does much more here than summarize the basic doctrines of Theophrastus. The situation is even more complicated because we know from the catalogue of Theophrastus’ works that there had existed an 1pitom] fusikîn besides the eight books of the Physics.71 Perhaps the work of Theophrastus on which Priscian was commenting was not the Physics of Theophrastus, but an epitome of his Physics. And we should then correct the reference as follows: ‘I have explained this more clearly in on the epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’.72 However, this solution is wholly implausible. First, as we have seen before, the Physics on which Themistius and Priscian are commenting contained several books, which is unlikely for an ‘epitome’. Secondly the expression used by Priscian in this reference does not admit such an interpretation, particularly the fact that Qeofr£stou is inserted between 1pitom] and fusikîn. There is only one interpretation possible: ‘in the epitome (that I have made)

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of Theophrastus’ Physics’. If we take this as a reference to the Metaphrasis, this earlier work must have originally had the title 1pitom] fusikîn Qeofr£stou. However, can this work of Priscian with all its Neoplatonic speculations on perception, imagination and intellect be considered an ‘epitome’ of Theophrastus? One may object that this ‘epitome’ is not really a summary or shortening of the text in the strict sense, but an original interpretation. But the same may be said of the ‘paraphrases’ of Themistius, and the ‘epitomai’ of the Platonic works made by Galen (of which unfortunately only the Arabic version of the epitome on the Timaeus survives). It seems that the term ‘epitome’ should not be interpreted in too narrow a sense.73 It is here used in contrast with a real ‘commentary’ upon a work (ØpÒmnhma) which gives a detailed explanation of the texts (as is the case with the commentary in DA), whereas the ‘Epitome-metaphrasis’ only presents the basic doctrine of Theophrastus’ doctrine, though set in a Neoplatonic context. Notes 1. cf. Simplicius. On the Soul, vol. 1, p. 2. 2. cf. Expositio in tres libros Aristotelis de anima, Venice 1602. We owe this reference to the excellent study of B. Nardi, ‘Il commento di Simplicio al “De Anima” ’ in Saggi sull’ Aristotelismo Padovano del secolo XIV al XV, Florence 1958, pp. 431-3. 3. F. Bossier-C. Steel, ‘Priscianus Lydus en de In De Anima van pseudo(?)-Simplicius’ in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 34, Leuven 1972, pp. 761-822. For the first reaction to the article, see the Appendix in Le problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978. 4. cf. ‘La vie et l’oeuvre de Simplicius d’après des sources grecques et arabes’ in Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, ed. I. Hadot, Berlin-New York 1987, pp. 23-7. 5. cf. Simplicius. Commentaire sur le manuel d’Epicète. Introduction et édition critique du texte grec par I. Hadot, Brill 1996, p. 107: ‘Je ne reviendrai pas sur la question de l’auteur de ce commentaire qui, jusqu’à preuve du contraire, reste, pour moi, Simplicius.’ 6. This revision of the 1972 article is my own work and has not been discussed with F. Bossier. However, since most arguments are simply taken from that article, they express our common opinion. 7. I owe this very literal translation from the original Arabic to Dr D. De Smet (Leuven). 8. cf. the notice by M. Tardieu in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin 1987, p. 26 n. 69. 9. cf. preface of the edition of Damascius. Traité des Principes, vol. I, Paris 1986, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii ed. Westerink-Combès. 10. The following obervations are mainly based upon an analysis of the Commentaries on Aristotle, leaving out the Commentary on Epictetus which has a particular character. 11. cf. J.O. Urmson, Simplicius. On the Soul, vol. 1, p. 7. 12. cf. in Phys. 37,7-8.

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13. cf. in DC 296,6-9; 297,1-4; 301,21-2; 557,19-20; 640,28-31; in Phys. 21,19-20; 36,28-30; 1249,12-17; 1336,35-6. 14. cf. in DC 378,21; in Phys. 80,15; 291,21; 1170,2.13; 1176,32. 15. cf. in DC 301,19-21. 16. cf. in DC 378,27-9; 381,9-10; in Phys. 1219,9-10. 17. cf. in DC 377,20-34; 358,27-364,14; 297,1-4. 18. cf. in Cat. 3,6-7; 315,2; 364,6-8; 376,13-33; cf. also 147,1-22; 232,31-233,2. 19. cf. J.O. Urmson, On the Soul, vol. 1, pp. 2-3. 20. cf. R.D. Hicks, Aristotle. De Anima, London 1907, p. lxv. 21. cf. in DA 6,15-16; 67,32. 22. cf. in DA 221,33-4. 23. cf. A. Torstrik, Aristotelis De Anima, Berlin 1862, p. vi. 24. cf. in DA 202,25-7; 98,9-12; for the expression sunˇqeia tîn Ñnom£twn (also used by Simplicius, see in Phys. 1249,13-17) cf. 28,13; 34,5-6,17; 40,22-4; on the harmony between Plato and Aristotle see 246,18-21. 25. cf. the laconic phrase in in DA 31,26-7: safÁ d5 t> per< Diog2nouj ;storhm2na. 26. cf. in DA 28,12-29,23 (with reference to his commentary on the Metaphysics). 27. cf. in DA 313,1-30. 28. After the completion of this Introduction I came upon two other examples of peculiar vocabulary. The author of in DA uses the rare substantive = p£qh 25 times; this term never occurs in the authentic works of Simplicius, but there is one instance in Priscian, 3,34. On the other hand, the term p£qhsij only occurs in Simplicius’ authentic works, never in the in DA. My second example: the perfect Øpestrîsqai in the sense of Øpoke√sqai is used 18 times in the in DA, but never by Simplicius. There are four instances in Damascius. 29. cf. in Ench. I,93 and XXXVIII, 269-270 ed. Hadot and in DC 140,13-14. 30. cf. The Changing Self, pp. 125-6. 31. cf. J.O. Urmson, Simplicius. On the Soul, vol. 1, p. 4. 32. Other examples are 1kq2menoj, dior8saj, [ris£menoj, ¢podoÚj, sumperan£menoj, proq2menoj de√xai, m2llwn deiknÚnai, etc. Even in the commentary on the Enchiridion, which has a peculiar character, we often find the same structure. 33. For instance, the author often uses the ‘genitive absolute’ in constructions that are not acceptable in a polished style: cf. 20,6; 41,13.; 69,8-10; 82,15-17. 34. Some examples: 42,1-20; 61,24-62; 221,20-32. 35. See adverbs such as aÙqormˇtwj (37,30; 324,26), aÙtenergˇtwj (225,30; 230,23; 236,5), ¢pestenwm2nwj (44,37; 62,23; 285,26; 307,26), ¢nexapatˇtwj (126,37) and many other examples mentioned in the index of Hayduck. The author likes to use adjectives of - ikoj followed by a genitive: thus 1ndotikÒj metadotikÒj, . and even adverbs derived from them such as kinhtikîj, gnwstikîj, [ristikîj, poihtikîj, kritikîj, periektikîj tinoj. A nice example is 125,21-23. 36. e.g. 146,4-6 (with the unacceptable double tÕ tÕ) or again 147,3-5. Other examples 157,15f.; 159,1. 37. Examples: 69,23-6; 46,7; 7,17; 13,22; 22,12; 31,8-11; etc. 38. Examples: dhladˇ, 8,35; 22,7; 27,6; 35,20; 39,33; 49,28; 64,12; etc.; tout2sti, 13,27; 22,31; 23,18; 32,26; 37,2; etc. 39. Examples: 24,11; 38,13; 58,14; 61,19; 31,15. 21; 36,3. 40. Examples: 17,2; 17,21; 48,24; 51,24; 53,7; 55,19; 69,28. 41. cf. 4,17-20; 45,14-19; 51,28-53,1; 56,35-59,14; 86,17-87,35; 90, 29-91,4; 105,10-11; 301,30-304,7. For a similar use of these prepositional constructions we

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can only quote some passages in Damascius: cf. De Princ. I, p. 48,7-49, 4th ed. Combès. 42. Thus for example in in DC 279,6-22; 380,16-19; in Phys. 268-9. Simplicius could have used this expression, when discussing how the soul is related as principle of motion to the living body moved by it: see in Phys. 1208,30ff. 43. cf. 49,28-31; 24,27-31; 52,30-5; 71,26-30; 91,34. 44. cf. in Phys. 289,12; 287,13.20; in DC 379,11; 381,32-3. 45. cf. my discussion of this topic in The Changing Self, pp. 67-8. 46. cf. in Ench. I,95-105; XXXVIII,250-65; 317-19 ed.; in Phys. 317,11-18; 318,12-15; 421,28-9; 824,15-16. 47. cf. in DA 246,25-8. 48. In the introduction to this edition Mme Hadot devotes a very long section to the question of the substantial change of the soul: see pp. 70-113. 49. Examples of the expression: 16,13; 29,13; 81,21; 82,24.27; 99,19; 103,25; 147,17; 251,21. We find two examples in the genuine Simplicius, in DC 505,16 and 507,10, but there the expression has no logical sense (t]n kat> b£qoj). See also n. 10 by Peter Lautner in this translation. 50. cf. Ammonius, in Isag. 118,11-18; Philoponus, in Cat. 40-1. 51. in DA 83,1-3 (translation of Urmson modified). 52. in DA 107, 21-7 (translation of Urmson modified). 53. cf. in Cat. 59,5-13 and 77,23-6. 54. cf. in DA, 34,22-4; 24,34ff. and 25,6-8. For Simplicius’ views cf. in Phys. 1261-3. I owe this reference to Dr Istvan Bodnar (Budapest) who is preparing an article on ‘Alexandre of Aphrodisias on celestial motions’ in which the question of per accidens motion of the celestial movers is discussed. 55. cf. Simplicius, in Phys. 12,17ff; and Philoponus, in DA 22,5-15. 56. cf. I. Hadot, ‘Recherches sur les fragments du commentaire de Simplicius sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote’ in Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin 1987, pp. 225-45. 57. For other references to Physics 7.3: see 123,16-19 and 130,29-34. 58. cf. Charles Hagen, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 7, 1994, p. 148 n. 274. 59. cf. 47,37-8. 60. cf. 42,12-35. 61. cf. 198,2-7. 62. 120,22-6. Cf. also 121,8-9 1n tropÍ ka< tÍ ¥llote ¥llV diaq2sei. 63. cf. Simplicius, in Cat. 62,4-6 and 314,14f. and in Phys.; cf. also Iamblichus, De Myst. I,4-13,1. 64. For a short presentation of this work, see also the introduction by P. Huby in this volume. 65. On the various references to the ‘Physical works’ of Theophrastus, see Theophrastus of Eresus, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, Leiden 1992, n. 137; for a short presentation of the Physics see Die Philosophie der Antike, Bd. 3, her. H. Flashar, Basel-Stuttgart 1983, pp. 480-1. 66. cf. Themistius, in DA 118. 67. cf. in Cat. 435,26 and in DC 564,24. 68. cf. the notice in ms. Coisl. 387 (10-11th c.): ‘The most useful commentators on Plato are Gaius, Albinus, Priscianus, Taurus, Proclus, Damascius, John Philoponus who also polemicized against Priscianus, and often against Aristotle.’ The fact that ‘Priscianus’ is mentioned between Albinus and Taurus rather suggests that he is a Middle Platonic commentator. However, the reference to Philoponus puts him again in the late Neoplatonic circle. M.Baltes-H.Dörrie (Der Platonismus im 2. und 3. Jh. n. Chr., Bd. 3, 1993, no 76,5) have corrected the text and replaced

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the name of Priscianus after Taurus. However, if anything must be changed, I would rather propose to correct he second ‘Priscianus’ into ‘Proclus’: ‘John Philoponus who also polemized against Proclus, and often against Aristotle.’ That there ever was a polemic between Priscian of Lydia and Philoponus cannot be excluded, but it seems more obvious that this notice refers to the well known treatises of Philoponus against Aristotle and against Proclus. In my opinion the Priscianus who appears in this list of Plato-commentators is a contemporary of Albinus and Taurus. 69. cf. The Changing Self, ch. 7. 70. On epitome as a literary genre, see I. Opelt, ‘Epitome’ in Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, V, Stuttgart 1962, col. 944-73. 71. cf. the references in Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, ed. by W. Fortenbaugh, Leiden 1992, sub no 137 ‘Inscriptiones librorum ad opera physica spectantium’). 72. Thus Usener, Analecta Theophrastea, Leipzig 1858, p. 28; cf. M. Hayduck’s note on p. 136 of his edition and H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1879, p. 102,1: 1n tÍ 1pitomÍ (i.e. in commentario ad epitomen, breviter ut nos quoque). P. Steinmetz, Die Physik des Theophrasts, Berlin-Zurich, 1964, p. 10,4 even proposes to correct the text of the edition: 1n to√j e9j t]n 1pitomˇn. 73. The term 1pitomˇ is used by Alcinoos for his handbook of Platonic doctrines. Its recent editor, J. Whittaker, remarks that this term should not be taken as a ‘résumé d’un ouvrage plus long’ (ed. Budé, Paris 1990, p. ix).

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energeiai] energeia tetarton] ogdoon monou] monon add ) after touto and ( before oude exêrêmena] exêrêmenou apapalin] anapalin misprint perikhethen] periskhethen proiontos] proientos oude] oun ge holô] holê ta auta] tade ton  ton ] to  to  aisthêtikên] akoustikên eti] epi and delete epi aristês] aretês aisthêtikou] aisthêtou aisthêtikou] aisthêtou heterois] heteron semi-colon after aisthêtêrion sômatikês] hoptikês hê de] ho de monês] monon hôste] hote

Commentary on Book 2.5-12 of Aristotle’s De Anima CHAPTER 5 416b32 These matters having been settled, let us speak generally about all sense-perception.1 After his study of the vegetative soul he moves on to that which is immediately superior to it, the sensitive soul. He will use the former mode of exposition, starting, as I said before,2 from the objects and moving through the activities which are intermediate towards its essence.3 But meanwhile he discusses in advance things useful towards his proposed study. For since sense-perception is a way of being affected, as he has already stated when he said that the soul changed the body qualitatively,4 sense-perceptions being alterations, he first determines that what is affected by something requires to be potentially similar to what affects it – not actually similar while being affected, but having been affected. Thence he concludes that senseperception cannot be active unless it is moved by things external. For if what senses must be affected, but nothing is affected by its like, still less by itself, sense-perception could not be actual on its own without what acts on it; so that before that thing acts on it the faculty of sense-perception is potential, and not actual, but it becomes actual when what acts on it is present. But since what acts on it is of two kinds, potential and actual, such will be the case with sense-perception and perceiving, being sometimes potential, sometimes actual. That is the whole aim of the proposed text. But the parts are to be interpreted as follows.

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416b32 Let us, he says, speak generally about all sense-perception. For he will speak about each sense individually, but first he speaks about sense-perception unqualified and makes a general study of them all.

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416b33 Sense-perception comes about by something being changed and affected,

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Not the sensitive life itself, for it is an activity of judgment,5 but by the sense-organ being changed. This is why he used the words ‘by something being changed’ – obviously the sense-organ. And since all proper sensible objects by which the sense-organ is primarily changed are qualitative, it is also reasonably said to be affected and altered. For qualitative change is affection and alteration.6 416b34  for it seems to be some alteration.

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‘Seems’, since sense-perception is not itself alteration but appears such to those who transfer the affection of the sense-organ to the activity which is bound up with it and uses it. 416b35 But some say that like is also affected by like. [It has been said7 in the general discussion about acting on and being affected how this is possible or impossible.]

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He examines this also in On Generation and Corruption,8 where he discusses the argument not in its application to the area of nourishment or sensation but generally and simply about acting on and being affected. This is why he now said that it was said ‘in the general discussion of acting on and being affected.’ For he does not simply call the work On Generation ‘general’ but the discussion presented there is about acting on and being affected. 417a2 But there is a problem why there is no perception of the senses themselves as well,

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‘But there is a problem’ is, I think, in response to ‘it has been said’.9 For he says that in that work there was a general discussion of acting on and being affected and that the problem that seems to arise about the senses has to be solved by those very discussions. But what is the problem, and why does it seem to be a problem? Perhaps because an activity, although it is vital and cognitive, is not directed to either itself or its organs, although being self-aroused, unless the senseorgan is changed, being first affected by something external. For to be active from within and self-initiated and to change bodies is characteristic of life, but not to need the change of those bodies for its own activity. For ‘why is there not perception of the senses themselves’? He did not say ‘the senses’ as equivalent to ‘the sense-organs’ as Alexander interprets him.10 For speaking of ‘the user’ as equivalent

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to ‘the instrument (organon)’ is not likely. He adds the following question:

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417a3  and why without external objects they do not bring about perception, when fire, earth and the other elements are within, Obviously the elements are within the organs; but this remark is not, as Plutarch thinks,11 directed at Empedocles,12 who locates the elements in the senses themselves. For Aristotle has already refuted that, while now, as well as not refuting it, he even defends the seeming problem. So the problem is this, why the sensitive life, being cognitive, is not cognisant of itself, being aroused itself, by itself, to itself, but cognisant only of bodies, and moved by them. But if it also has need of sense-objects, that are bodies, in order to achieve knowledge of the sense-objects themselves, why is it not aroused towards the sense-organs that are present, since they also are sensible, through being composed of the four elements? ‘For’, he says, ‘why is there no perception of the senses themselves?’ He first sets the problem why they are not receptive of themselves, and then also ‘why without external objects they do not bring about perception’, i.e. why they are not active in sense-perception (for that is what it is for sense to bring about sense-perception) although sense-objects are present, even without the presence of anything external, since the elements are present in the sense-organs.

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417a5  of which there is perception, either of themselves or of their attributes. For perception is of the elements, either of their essential properties or of the accidental attributes they have otherwise. For we perceive the resistance of the earth which is its essential property and also whatever colour or magnitude it may have.

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417a6-9 It is thus clear that the faculty of sense-perception does not exist actually, but only potentially. [Hence it must be as with the fuel which does not burn through itself without something to make it burn. Otherwise it would burn itself and need no actually existing fire.] He solves through these arguments the apparent problem. For arousal of itself by itself belongs to a perfect and permanently active13 form of life. Such life as is not self-aroused or as reaches out to the external objects is not self-sufficient, but needs something else and is potentially and is somehow imperfect for that reason, as being in need

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of the activity of something else either as object or as efficient cause. But that life which is lacking in only one of these ways, either self-aroused but moving towards the external or reverting upon itself by external agency, is neither altogether imperfect nor wholly potential. But the life which is stimulated by something external and is receptive only of the external is merely potential, as being lacking in both ways. For the sensitive, being the lowest form of cognitive life, is both primarily cognitive of other things and not of itself and also moved by external things, not as inanimate things are, but being aroused from within, in order that the activity may also be vital, and also it is dependent on the affection which primarily comes into the sense-organ by external causation, even though aroused from within. While also perfected through the internal projection of the concepts,14 it is said to be perfected by things external, since it is perfectly aroused by itself concerning the affection aroused in the sense-organ by these external things; this is as they say that bread excites the desire, though it does not act on the desire which is aroused from itself concerning the bread, and as Plato blames the body for the badness of the soul, not as acting on it, but because the soul is made bad by itself through its excessive attention to the body.15 Similarly imagination also grasps only external things, and is originally stimulated by the affections of the sense-organs; but after the first stimulation it also from itself projects its impressions and is active even when external stimuli are absent. But sense-perception always requires them to be present in order to be active. Therefore the faculty of sense-perception is only potential and not also actual, since it is never active on its own without the presence of the external. Why then is there no perception of the senses? It is because the reversion on itself16 is characteristic of a self-perfecting activity, whereas senseperception is only potential. But why does it not grasp the elements in the sense-organ? Because the sense-organ has to be acted on by the sense-object in order that the sense-perception may be excited into activity, but nothing is acted on by itself, just as the combustible does not burn without what kindles it. So he met the second problem also by this – that as the combustible does not burn without what kindles it, so obviously the sense-organ would not be acted on by itself. But, since fire is actually present in the sense-organ, why does it not stimulate the sense? Because not even external fire acts on the sense itself, but on the sense-organ, but itself does nothing to itself. 417a9 But since we use ‘to perceive’ in two ways, [(for we say that that which potentially hears and sees hears and sees even when asleep, as well as that which actually does so) ‘perception’

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must be used in two ways, in one of the potential, in the other of the actual.] As he says that there are two uses of ‘to perceive’, of the potential and of the actual, so ‘perception’ is used in two ways. For him, ‘perception’ denotes the essence of such and such a soul, ‘to perceive’ its activity. Rightly, he treats the activity as the guide to the essence. So the essence also will be either potential or actual, not potential in the primary and most imperfect way, which consists in privation, but in the second way, like the condition of the man who knows but does not activate his knowledge; for the essence is already characterised by the sensitive form. But even this is imperfect as potential; for perfection comes with activity, and a perfect essence is that which is active according to its nature, while that which is sometimes not active falls short of absolute perfection. 417a13 Likewise also ‘to perceive’17 [both potentially and actually].

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Led up from activity to essence as from effect to cause, he also considers it to be more scientific to view an effect from its cause and an activity from its essence. 417a14 We first talk18 as if to be affected (paskhein), to be changed (kineisthai) and to be active (energein) were the same thing. [For change is a kind of activity but imperfect, as has been said elsewhere.] He has previously said that sense-perception ‘comes about by being changed and affected’, but later he has also said ‘already active’ in distinction from the potential, and, in the same context, he has used ‘being changed’, ‘being affected’ and ‘being active’ of actual perception. He acknowledges this, and defends ‘activity’ as being used well in a certain way of change because, as was said in the Physics,19 change is an imperfect activity; for it is clear that perfect and indivisible activity is not change. But he has not yet explained how being affected and being changed differ from each other. So, if one were to use ‘being affected’ exclusively of change according to affective qualities,20 it is clear that change would be of wider scope. But if simply of all sorts of transformation (tropê) that come about by the agency of something else, ‘being affected’ would seem to be equated with change. For all change21 is by the agency of something else and involves some transformation. Perhaps substantial, qualitative and quantitative change always involve transformation, and particularly all change that brings a transition from an unnatural state to a natural or the reverse. For whatever is changing as a whole is in a transformation

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through different ordering with other things at different times. But such a change as both preserves the same ordering with other things and remains in its natural state, when what is in change (motion) is not affected but activates the transmigration through different spaces, is not, as we have said in the commentary on Physics Book 8,22 a case of being affected, since it involves no transformation. But we should pay attention to what Aristotle says: 417a17 But all things are affected and changed by that which is efficient and in act.

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It is clear that [the efficient cause] is ‘in act’ that character that the thing acted on is at one time in potency, but later becomes it in act, given that by being affected it becomes like what acts on it. But neither does friction contain heat, although it produces it, nor does a whip contain weals.23 For the productive need not undergo what it produces, but be active, and in that way the productive is in act like what is brought about in what is acted on, not as being affected but as being active. For not only according to Plato but also according to Aristotle, the forms of things brought about are anticipated in the productive cause,24 not, obviously, as being affected but as active and essentially in those beings where activity is identical with essence. 417a18 So things are affected in a way by their like, in a way by the unlike, [as we said; while being affected it is unlike,25 having been affected it is like.]

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For what is still being affected is potentially but not actually like what acts on it, but what has been affected is like without qualification. 417a21 We must also distinguish between potentiality and actuality. By which being affected will be distinguished as involving transformation and a different condition at different times, but not an actual change.

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417a22 For we are now saying what we say about them simply.26 [There is something that is knowing in the way that we would say that a man is knowing because man is among things that know and possess knowledge. But there is a way in which we call already knowing someone who has acquired grammar. Each of these is capable but not in the same way, the one because the species is like that, and the matter, the other because if he

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wishes he can contemplate if there is no external impediment. But he who is already contemplating it is in actuality and fully understands this letter A. So both the former are potentially knowing. But one of them has, by learning, been altered, and has often varied from the opposite state,] [‘Simply’ at 417a22] as equivalent to ‘without distinction’. In this connection he sets out the duality of the potential by the illustration of the knower. One sort is a potentiality to come to be, providing an imperfect suitability, the other sort a potentiality to be active through an already developed disposition to be active, but which is not in fact active and thus falls short of perfection. For the perfect consists in three: essence, potency and act. So every human being is potentially a knower as having a natural capacity to become so by learning, and this is so for the species, i.e. human nature, and this sort of potentiality is material, as being perfected by becoming and by reception from elsewhere. That is why ‘and the matter’ is added. But the other who has already acquired a disposition to knowledge which he is not activating, has not the same capacity; for he has no ability to become but to contemplate, not through a material capacity but through a formal capacity; but [it is the formal capacity] of divisible things, not only because the activity has been torn apart from essence, but still more because it is divided through not being always active, either because man does not always wish for it, or because he is impeded by something. Aristotle himself made both plain by ‘if he wishes he can contemplate it if there is no external impediment’. For plainly a man sometimes wishes and his wish is thwarted. But even if such a one falls short of undivided perfection and of being always perfected, still sometimes he becomes perfect by standards appropriate to him, when he is actually contemplating. The former two sorts of knowers were both somehow imperfect and potentially so, but the first of them has been perfected by an alteration ‘through learning’, which is a sort of coming to be. Not that the soul itself is altered – for alteration is a change that is continuous and everywhere divisible, whereas the soul always halts at discrete terms27 – but the soul comes to be in a cognitive disposition all of a sudden, even if this occurs from time to time, through a projection from within, whereas the alteration is seen to happen in the living being, as was said in Physics Book 7.28 He said ‘has often varied from the opposite disposition’ either because the perfect disposition later on suddenly supervenes upon several and repeated projections of more particular concepts, or because ‘often’ was said as equivalent to ‘sometimes’, which I prefer more. For in the Treatises on Demonstration he says clearly that one sort of ignorance is negative, the other is an opposite, the first sort being merely29 deprived of the truth, the other embraces the contradictory false-

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hood.30 So sometimes the turning to knowledge comes from false opinion and from a contrary disposition. 417a32  but the other has been altered from the possession of sense-perception or knowledge of writing without exercising it to exercising it in another way. [But ‘being affected’ also has no single sense, but one is some destruction by its contrary,] 10

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In order to be cognitively active the organ does not at all need to be altered in any way, unless the person be drunk or diseased or asleep. But to be sensibly active it needs to be affected in some way, not, indeed, through substantial coming to be in order to become sensitive, being changed in substantial characters, but changing in regard to certain accidental qualities that are themselves affective – thus ‘in another way’. But before making plain in what sort of other way, since he said that capacity was of two sorts, he now recalls that being affected is also in two ways. For something must be said about both. ‘Since one is some destruction’ and change from form to privation brought about by the contrary, perhaps warmth by cold, so that having reached privation of warmth it may be made like the cold thing that acted on it, in which the privation of warmth is inherent. 417b3  the other is rather the coming to be31 and preservation of the potentially existent [by the actually existent to which it is like in the way that potentiality is to actuality.]

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He accurately adds ‘rather’, since even in coming to be a perfective principle contributes, and what is affected is changed by that principle which is in actuality that which the affected is potentially. Therefore the affected is like the agent, but as the potentially existent is like the actually existent. Thus, having meanwhile clarified the double nature of being affected, he will finally explain how that which has a disposition comes in another way to actuality from not being actual. 417b5 For what has knowledge comes to exercise it, [which either is not alteration, for the advance is to itself32 and to actuality, or is another kind of alteration. Therefore it is not well to say that the thinker, when he thinks, is changed, as nor the builder when he builds. So bringing to actuality from being potential the contemplator and thinker is not teaching, but ought to have another name, and that which learns and acquires knowledge from that which is actual and can teach it should not be said to be affected, or else there should be said to be two types

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of alteration, the change into conditions of privation and that to possession and a natural state.] This should be joined onto ‘to exercising it in another way’.33 He had said earlier both about the man who perceives in act and about the man who exercises a knowledge of writing34 or knowledge in general, that they [exercise it] ‘in another way’. Now he lays down how he who knows changes from not exercising to exercising his knowledge. Later he will speak of the man who perceives and will add the difference between them. The arrival at contemplation from the possession of knowledge is not alteration, because alteration is qualitative bodily change, but in the contemplation of knowledge there is no need of bodily change, unless, as was said, the person be ill or asleep or drunk, when there is need of change, not so that the body will aid in the activity but so that it will not impede it. Only the psychic advance to activity from non-active possession is necessary. That is also clear. ‘For the advance is to itself and to actuality’, that which has the knowledge being perfected by itself into activity itself, the body remaining unaffected. Therefore such a change is not alteration ‘or is another kind of alteration’, which is why Aristotle does not call psychic change either alteration or process [kinêsis]. But, knowing that Plato so calls them, not as being bodily processes or even alterations,35 he says ‘another kind of alteration’. But it is not surprising that the thinker, when it thinks, is not altered, when the activity is of the soul on its own; yet how is the builder not altered when he builds? Is it because, even when he uses the change of place of his body, he is not changed qualitatively? If even he who uses his body is not altered, still more so he who does not even use it. Next, he also gives the difference between the change of the soul from ignorance to knowledge and that from possession to exercise: the former is brought about by teaching and learning, on which certain bodily change follows, as is said in Book 7 of the Physics36 the latter through the sudden projection of concepts from itself. Now a certain bodily alteration follows learning, because of the reference from perception to concepts through the memory – not that learning is an alteration. For learning itself comes about through the activity of the soul in regard to concepts. Even the bodily alteration which follows on learning is not an affection, if one understands affection as being only destruction and the change to privation, as is the common custom, or else it is affection of the other sort, if one calls the change to possession or form or the natural condition37 an affection. Having determined these points about cognition he applies them also to the sensitive faculty.

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417b16 Of the sensitive faculty the first change comes from the begetter, [and, when generated, it has already sense-perception in the same way as it has knowledge. And we speak of senseperception in actuality in a similar sense as ‘to contemplate’.] 30

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[The first change comes from the begetter] because the sensitive life is not simply of the soul, but of soul involved with body. Therefore it comes into existence together with the living being, and the generation of that being is ‘the first change of the sensitive faculty’, which brings it into existence. [This coming to be] corresponds to the learning process, just as the ‘generated’ corresponds to the man who has acquired the disposition [of knowledge]. ‘And we speak of senseperception in actuality in a similar sense as to contemplate. ‘In a similar sense’ because in both cases perfection is in the same respect, and because in the case of perceiving also the judgement is by the soul and comes from within and through the projection of concepts. So ‘in a similar sense’ in that respect. 417b19 But there is a difference because in the one case the agents of the activity are from outside, [what is seen and what is heard, and similarly the other sensible objects. The reason is that actual perception is of particulars, but scientific knowledge of universals, and these are in a way in the soul itself.] That is to say that the sense-organ must be acted on by the external sensible objects, which are not in the perceiver. These are said to be the agents of the activity, not as introducing the judgement but as producing some affection in the sense organ, with regard to which the activity of judgement is aroused. But objects of scientific knowledge are not thus agents. For they do not terminate in an affection nor do they come from outside the cognitive faculty. For sensation is of particulars, but scientific knowledge is of universals. But particulars which are corporeal and divisible and caused exist entirely outside the soul which is incorporeal and not divisible, and is the cause of living things, while universals are in the soul, though not those predicated of particulars.38 For these are in the particular things themselves and are separated out by the soul only conceptually,39 but the objects of scientific knowledge are superior to the sensible objects by many degrees, as much as scientific knowledge is to perception. Objects of scientific knowledge are in the soul. But he calls objects of scientific knowledge ‘universal’ in the way that in Book 6 of the Metaphysics he declares first philosophy to be ‘universal’,40 even though he has laid it down that it is about separate and unchanging substances, inferring ‘but, if there is some unchanging substance, this is prior and universal philosophy because it is first in that way’. Also

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the things in the soul are thus universal as first and causes of particulars. But since the intelligible forms are above all first and causes, being indivisible and substances belonging entirely to themselves, whereas those in the soul have their being through rational unfolding,41 being not indivisibly unified, and are causes secondarily, so for this reason universals are the absolutely first causes of all things, the intelligibles, and scientific knowledge is anchored in them through intellect. For it is by intellect that we know terms, and the forms are terms. But these are not primarily in the soul but secondarily, and in so far as the soul is connected with the intelligibles. For this reason they are said to be in the soul ‘in a way’, since it is through the link42 with the intellect.

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417b24 Therefore it is in its power to think whenever it wishes. In the power of the intellective being, whether the intellect in the soul itself, or the soul aroused to intellect, or the man with scientific knowledge through his having within him the intelligible forms, from which, as from causes, the secondary are scientifically known.

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417b24 But to perceive is not within its power, [for the sensible object must be available.] He means clearly ‘[not within] the faculty of sense-perception’, because the sensible object, which is an individual and external, must be available, and must not merely be there but also present to the faculty of sense-perception so that it may act in a way on the sense-organ and upon its being acted on the perceptive soul may project the common concepts within it of the sensible things in a way appropriate to the affect and recognise the sensible object through its own activity, being in a state of accord with the form of the sensible object.43

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417b26 The same applies to the sciences of sensible things [also for the same reason, that sensible objects are particular and external.] Such as those for which forms or rational entities are not sufficient, as they are for the theoretical sciences, but which encompass particulars and external things, such as are the practical sciences and productive skills. For these need also the presence of sensible objects. 417b28 But another opportunity may occur again to clarify these matters. [But now let so much be decided, that what is

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said to be potential is not homogeneous, but one variety is as if we were to say that a boy was capable of commanding an army, the other as if we should say it of a man in his prime; this is so for the faculty of sense-perception. But since we have no word for this difference, but they have been distinguished as being different and how different, we must use ‘be affected’ and ‘be altered’ as if they were proper terms. The faculty of senseperception is potentially like what the sensible object is already in actuality, as has been said. So it is affected when it is not like, but, having been affected, it is made like its object.]

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[He means: another opportunity] to clarify how universals and their contemplation are within our power. He will speak more clearly about this in Book 3.44 Next he concludes that the faculty of sense-perception is potentially in living things in the second mode [of potentiality],45 and is said to be affected and altered improperly, since it is not the soul that is affected or altered, but the sense-organ. And even this is not affected in a destructive manner but in such a way that it comes to be, not however as a substance, but as being self-sufficient to receive the activity, just as a substantial affection produced the body as receptacle for the perceptive substance. So the faculty of senseperception will be potentially as the sense-object already actually is. For that is determined by some form, not potentially but actually, but the faculty of sense-perception is not yet [determined] before it is actual, but capable of being so according to the second potentiality; but later, in being actual, it stands still46 at the form of the sensible object, not as being affected – for it does not become white or hot – but in activity, not acting like efficient causes, but in judgement and cognition. However, some sort of affection remains in the sense-organ. But since in actual perception47 the faculty of sense-perception stands still at the form of the sensible object, as all knowledge stands still through the conjoining into one and the indivisible encompassing of everything known, and since the affection of the sense-organ must precede because of the inclination outside of the perceptive life which cannot be active without the organ, or especially without its arousing and stimulating the organ, it is clear that it is not perceiving the affections of the sense-organs but that with these it grasps the forms in bodies. And this also is clear, that the sense-organ is not affected by things external in the way that the inanimate is; it is affected as being alive. Therefore it is not entirely an affection nor altogether from outside, but is also in accordance with its own activity and at once is acted on and acts. Such a joint affection and activity, which comes about as caused by sensible objects and according to the arousal towards them of the life in the sense-organ is made similar to the

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forms in the sensible objects. But that is not yet perception, since it does not occur as a pure activity, being divided and corporeal and extended in time. For perception indivisibly encompasses the beginning, middle and end of the sense-object, and it is an activity, being a perfect judgment48 and standing still at once as a whole in the instant at the form of the sensible object. This form is not imposed like a seal on wax49 (which is not proper to life), nor does it proceed into depth50 (still less does it stand still with a cognitive activity),51 but it is projected from within by the concept of sensible objects which is preconceived in the soul. (This is not the soul that gives life to the organ as an organ, but that which uses it when already alive, so that by transcending the body it may act indivisibly and have knowledge of sensible objects.) The concept is one, but not according to the contracted unity52 in individual things, but as fitting53 each of them in an appropriate way according to the formal unity which encompasses all individuals causally. For the soul perceives all particular white things according to that one concept; for that which judges is the soul through the appropriate contact54 of that which is known, and it is appropriate because the soul has in its substance a preconception of the same property [that is perceived]. Therefore, the soul becomes like its sensible objects not by receiving something from them but through being active in accordance with the concept appropriate to them. Now that this has been determined generally of all sense-perception we must go on to what follows.

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CHAPTER 6 418a7 Each sense must be discussed, beginning with the sensible objects. [‘Sensible object’ has three uses, in two of which we say that we perceive them as such, in one incidentally. In one of the two the object perceived is proper to each sense, in the other common to all. I call proper that which cannot be perceived with another sense and about which one cannot be deceived, as sight of colour, hearing of sound, and taste of flavour.] Since the study of each sense proceeds from that which is relationally opposed, in accordance with the initial programme he reasonably calls to mind the objects of sense first, noting that ‘sense-object’ has three uses, in order to separate off incidental sense-objects and to limit the discussion to sensible objects as such. And he will teach which of these are primarily recognised, and which secondarily, by each of the senses. For both the proper and the common are sensible as such,55 but primarily the proper, since the essence of each sense is assigned to these objects in its own way, secondarily the common

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because they always act on the sense-organ together with the proper sensibles which act upon the sense-organ pre-eminently and more strikingly. But how can he say that the common are common to all? For only sight and touch apprehend size and shape. So perhaps ‘all’ is used instead of ‘most’. But perhaps hearing is plainly also of size, judging that the object faced is large or small by the resonance. Also smell and taste [apprehend size, for] by the transference in more or fewer parts, the one grasps the fragrant, the other the sweet. But perhaps shape also might be recognised by these senses, even if not accurately, for by the transference56 of the senses or of their objects [one is aware] that the dimensions are about equal or that one is much greater. So the proper and common sensibles differ from each other in that way, in that the former belong to one, the latter to more senses, and the former infallibly stimulate the sense that is related to them, clearly when it is in its natural state and when acting at a suitable distance and not impeded by an intervening body, as when the eye is so by a thick mist or merely by an external object. (For these points must be inserted, even if they are not now clearly stated by Aristotle.57) But the latter do not thus fall exactly under the senses, since each sense is pre-eminently of the proper, but grasps the common together with them. Also sight does not judge the size of the thing seen as it does its whiteness, but, while accurately grasping the colour, it recognises the shape roughly, sometimes mistakenly, seeing the curved as straight and the straight as bent. Also, perhaps, the proper, being more affective and corporeal, fall under perception with better correlation, since it is a corporeal type of cognition, and one distinguished from the light which through its very great activity is accurately recognised by sight; but the common sensibles, being more form-like seem to be less well correlated with perception; not that they are not recognised at all by sense, but only by reason,58 as is substance; for they are also object of perception, though not so clearly as are the proper sensibles. 418a13 Touch has many different forms, [but each sense judges about these objects and is not deceived about these being colour or sound ]  because touch is especially receptive of the affective qualities,59 since it is the most affective of the senses. There are many affective qualities which touch recognises as proper sensibles, warmth, cold, dryness and fluidity, hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, heaviness and lightness, since these are also affective.

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418a16  but about what is coloured or where it is [or what is making the sound or where it is. So it is such things that are said to be proper to each sense. Common are motion, rest, number, shape and size. For such things are proper to no sense but common to all. For some change is perceptible to both touch and sight.] It is deceived about what the coloured substance is because substance is known incidentally by sense. About where it is because the size of the extension is grasped secondarily as being a common sensible. 418a20 Things are said to be incidentally sensible, [as, for example, if the white thing is the son of Diares. This is perceived incidentally because this that is perceived happens to be what the white thing is.] [‘Incidentally sensible’ are] such features as are present in sensible objects but are themselves either totally imperceptible, such as being the son of Diares or the substance of things, or are so at least to the sense now active, as the sweetness of honey is to the eye. Such things are incidentally sensible as being present in the sensible object. Similarly we say that a bald man practises medicine because the practitioner happens to be bald. And we call ‘incidental’ not only what is incidental to that which is in itself of a certain kind, but also the underlying substance, if it is not such qua substance; thus we say that the master is incidentally a man and the sculptor likewise, since he is not such qua man. So in that way even substance is incidentally perceptible. But how could substance be reasonably said to be incidental to the white thing that we perceive? For the opposite is true. Or perhaps this is is even more true: regarding being itself, the white is incidental to the substance in so far as it partakes in existence through the substance, but regarding sensibility, the substance is incidental to the white which is preeminently and as such sensible; thus by coexisting with the white the substance partakes in being perceptible, not by being secondarily sensible, like the common sensibles, but because of its coexistence with the sensible reason is aroused to form an opinion about it. Similarly in the Categories60 a master was said to be incidentally a man. 418a23 Therefore also the perceiver is not as such affected by the object. [Of things sensible as such it is the proper objects which are principally sensible, and it is to these that the essence of each sense is naturally related. So61 that of which there is sight is what is visible.]

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The perceiver is not affected by the white thing in the respect that the white thing is the son of Diares, since neither secondarily nor at all is being the son of Diares perceptible as such. If the proper sensibles are primarily sensible objects as such (since the common, even if they are sensible as such, are secondarily so, and the proper sensibles are the cause of the common being perceptible), these proper sensibles must be principally sensible.62 He himself adds why this is so, that it is because the essential nature of each sense is to be related to them. For certainly, they are also naturally related to the common sensibles, but related not as such but through a more common essence; each as itself and in its specific essence is related to the proper sensibles. Therefore and of necessity we are led up to the specific essence of each sense not from the common sensibles but from the proper, because each has its natural relation to these. For sight is not related to size qua sight, but to colour: in act when standing still at its form in seeing, and before that characterised by potentiality, neither being perfected from itself alone and from within, nor only externally by the sensible object, but by the sense-organ being affected by that in a way similar to what affects it; but the sense-organ is affected in a vital manner and the affection terminates in formal activity as the sensitive soul recognises the sensible object by projection of concepts and stands still at its form. So both the perfect state of each sensation and its potency is determined by the form of the sensible object itself, clearly being so vitally and actively and cognitively, and therefore substantially, for the natural activity is akin to the active substance. Consequently we are reasonably led from the proper sensibles to the proper essence of each sense, since it is from the more obvious and corporeal attribute that we are led to the essential, vital, incorporeal and to what is rationally grasped from the perceptible. He starts with sight as being the most obvious and valuable sense because of the instantaneous activity, its active nature that is affective in the least degree, its luminousness63 and its analogical relation to the sun; and, since sight is of the visible, he teaches us what the visible is. CHAPTER 7

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418a26 The visible is colour and what can be described verbally but happens to be nameless. [What we are referring to will be clear as we go on.] Since whatsoever is perceptible is always body, clearly the visible is so as well. The visible body either has in itself that through which it is said to be properly visible, which he calls the visible as such, or it

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receives adventitiously the cause of its being seen, as air is seen because of light. Of that which has in itself the cause of its being seen, some is seen only in light, like colours and such as are shining in such a way as to be able actively to fill the intervening transparency, some only in the dark, such as have a certain phosphorescence but not enough to provide light as well, like the scales of some fishes and fungi, some rotting pieces of wood and horns, some both in light and darkness, as fire is seen in the dark when no light appears from elsewhere and it itself is insufficient to illuminate all the intervening air, and in light when the transparent becomes actually transparent by its agency, or it is even seen in sunlight although it does not contribute itself to the visibility of the sunlight. So already everything visible will be so either through some adventitious perfection, such as the actually transparent, or as being naturally visible. In the latter case [the visibility] will either not be self-sufficient, and they will require light to be actually seen, like coloured objects, or self-sufficient, like that of everything luminous and fiery. But of these latter again some will not be able, some will be able, to provide light, and of these some will be able to fill all that intervenes, like the sun which is always seen from the same distance and never becomes fainter in itself, while some will sometimes fill the interval perfectly, by not becoming faint and the interval being small, so that it can be seen by its own light, sometimes will not illuminate the whole interval through being faint or placed at a distance. So they are seen also in darkness. Everything visible seems to be either light or akin to light; fire and the sun are so through generating light; and the kinship of light to everything luminous is also perceptibly obvious. So if, hypothetically, the luminousness of horns and similar things were increased it would itself provide light. In fact a piece of wood was seen at night to provide a moonlike light for a whole room. But also colours, as being lights of a sort according to Plato64 and as limits of the transparency of solid things according to Aristotle,65 and as arousing actual transparency, and as being seen in no other way than by being themselves illuminated by light, make clear their community and kinship with light. But we must turn to the text:

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418a26 The visible is colour and what can be described verbally.66 These words comprehend everything that is visible as such, such as colour and what he says is nameless. For ‘luminous’ and ‘fiery’ signify what illuminates but not that which appears only in the dark, like that in fungi and scales. So not everything visible as such apart from colour has a name, whether always in light or only in the dark or in both light and dark.

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418a29 For the visible is colour; [that is that which is upon that which is visible as such. As such, not in account but because it has in it67 the cause of its being visible. Every colour is capable of stimulating the actually transparent, and that is its nature; therefore it is not visible without light, but all the colour of each thing is seen in light.] Instead of ‘something visible’ we now have ‘the visible’. Upon this object he explains ‘that which is visible as such’. ‘For’, he says, ‘that [colour] is that which is upon that which is visible as such’. For it is not colour nor luminousness that is seen but the coloured through its colour and the luminous through its luminousness. Each of these, the coloured and the luminous, is visible as such, ‘not in account’ because being visible is not included in the definition of the coloured as essential to it, nor conversely,68 as in the case of essential attributes, but because it has in it ‘the cause of its being visible’ in contrast with the transparent, which is seen not through what is its nature but through the light adventitious to it. For the formal cause of the coloured thing being seen is the colour, not as colour but as activating the transparent and naturally conjoined with it. Also light is the cause of air being visible, but sometimes coming and sometimes departing while the air remains. On this subject, when setting out the differences between things visible as such, he first speaks about colour, giving its definition not qua colour, as in About sense and its objects,69 but qua visible differently from other visible things, as activating the actually transparent (clearly that surrounding it), when it itself happens to be actually illuminated. The transparent is that which throughout the whole of itself is sometimes without light but sometimes illuminated by the presence of what illuminates it. That is the actually transparent, which is potentially so before receiving the light. But colour, enveloped by the actually transparent and itself perfected by light, activates the actually transparent, not by altering it or transforming it nor by causing some affection. For to transform and affect what receives them is specific to affective qualities. Also everything that comes to be has need of these [affective qualities] in order to be made suitable for the reception of forms, but, when prepared, they are no longer perfected through affection but by the forms through their active presence;70 as life comes to a body, as shape to a house, as health, as knowledge, to things that receive them, as is explained in Physics Book 8.71 So in order for the body to become suitable for the reception of light it needs affective qualities; it becomes such when it becomes air or water or glass. Being already suitable, if a light-source be present, it is perfected without being affected and through activity. For the forms are just this – activities and perfections, while the affective qualities are not, at least without

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qualification, forms, but affective forms72 if so at all, as being sullied in the process of becoming and appearing in change and being full of imperfection. That is why they appear together with a change from imperfection to perfection. But such as are forms and perfections, these come both actively and all at once. ‘Therefore it is not visible without light’: for the actually transparent is illuminated, and is activated by colour, but not the potentially transparent. For when not illuminated nor surrounded by the actually transparent, colour is invisible. It has been stated in what way it activates, that it does not do so affectively nor by transformation, but actively, in a perfecting way and by formal presence, not a substantial presence like that of life, but through the activity proceeding from substance and after substance, as do conditions and dispositions.

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418b3 Therefore, concerning light we must first grasp73 [what it is. There is something transparent.] Perhaps because, as we have already said, everything that is seen is either light or is akin to light. So the fact that colour is invariably seen in light shows to those who are to learn about the visible and sight that the account about light is necessary. But since light is the perfection of the transparent we must first gather what the transparent is. For light is not like intellection which remains in the essence which produces it and is identical with its essence. But light also is an activity, but neither the same as what activates it nor remaining in it, nor yet torn away from it, but it simultaneously itself holds to that which sends it forth,74 and is given to another, not in an affective manner, but suddenly and in a perfecting manner; its kinship to that which receives it is everywhere to be seen, so that either can be recognised from the other. For the receptive is potentially what that which has received is actually. Actuality, definition and perfection75 are the nature that characterises that which has received – it is all that actually, but that which is receptive is all that potentially; it is like health, through which both that which is healthy and that which can be made healthy are characterised; the latter in an imperfect way, the former in a perfect, so that both that which is receptive and that which has received are determined by the imparted actuality. Also scientific knowledge, following nature, recognises from the defining form both things that are actually so defined and things that are receptive of the form as being characterised by its imperfect trace. But some one who is still searching ascends from things caused and first in relation to us to the naturally first, the causes, and from the imperfect to the perfect, and from these recognises perfection. Indeed, we come to know what light is from the transparent which underlies light as its matter and is perfected through it when it becomes actually

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transparent, because perception attends to that which is illuminated and not primarily to the form.76 But he will also speak about the form itself in the most clear way – for what could be more clear than light? So the simple property of light also becomes known to our intellection by simple intuition from perception. We reason that it is incorporeal and that it is not an affection but actuality: the former since we see it penetrating throughout the transparent, the latter because of its timeless cessation and presence. For affections come to be and cease in time, and bodies, at least material bodies, do not pass through each other. However, the fire that comes from light is material, since it is a body, but also the air that receives it. Is light then a substance, like the life that is imparted to the body by the soul? But even if life itself enters the body suddenly and again departs, nonetheless the progressive generation of the composite must come first, and decay must follow on life’s absence. But also life is receptive of opposites, and a living thing is obviously a substance, so that its defining form, which is life, also is a substance. But neither is the illuminated air substance qua illuminated, just as the adventitiously warmed is not, nor is it or light receptive of opposites, nor does any change precede its presence or follow upon its absence. But it is simply actuality, not entering into the transparent as into a substrate, but being in it separately and perfecting it, never being separated from what brings it forth, but seated in it and holding on to it. Therefore it changes places together with its source, but it does not undergo changes in any way together with what receives it when that changes. 418b4 Transparent I call that which, though visible, is not visible through itself [properly speaking, but through the colour of something else. Of such sort are air and water and many solid bodies. For they are not transparent qua water or qua air, but because the same sort of nature is present in both of them and in the eternal body on high.]

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In the light we do not only see the transparent, but also what is coloured. The difference between both is that the transparent qua transparent is only seen as illuminated, the coloured also as coloured. Therefore the latter is visible through itself because it has in its own nature the colour, which is precisely what is seen in the light, whereas the transparent is not visible through itself, because the light is something adventitious to it, which is solely seen as existing in the transparent. For even if the same thing is both transparent and coloured, as are horn and chalk, those things are solely seen as transparent in the light. But what is the nature of the transparent? In other works Aristotle also knows about the determinate transparent,77 but here his argument is about the indeterminate transparent,

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which is a body which receives throughout the whole of itself (or even from itself) the light as something adventitious and thus becomes visible. And this is the nature of the transparent: the aptitude to receive the light throughout the whole of the parts that have this nature.

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418b9 Light is the actuality of this thing, of the transparent qua transparent. Light is this as perfecting it, but not at all as proceeding from it. He says ‘qua transparent’ since light is the perfection of the transparent as such. 418b10 That in which it is78 is potentially also darkness. In those transparent things where the potential is, there is darkness; since the celestial body has also been said to be, and is, transparent, which it always is actually, as having in itself also the efficient cause of light. For the celestial body79 is at once a source of light and transparent. Therefore, even if some portion of it is prevented by the cone of the earth from being illuminated by the sun’s light, still it is not in darkness because of its own light. Where there is potentially light, as in air, there is not only light but also darkness. So, if darkness is the privation of light, the transparent is not sometimes substrate to light, sometimes to darkness, through being subject to two potentialities, but through the same potentiality being both perfected in light and not in darkness. But if it is not a privation,80 but is itself an actuality of the earth, so that it does not create darkness by interposition but by imparting some specific character opposite to light, as is the case with cold in relation to heat and black to white, then there will be two potentialities of them both, one by aptitude to illuminate, the other by aptitude to darken. For darkness will consist not only in the absence of light, but will need something to be present. But Aristotle treats it as a privation. For even if he says that it is a contrary, he does not place them in opposition as form to form, but in order that we may not oppose it as privation to possession, but as privation to form. For in one way both change into each other – as privation and form – but in another way it is impossible – as from privation to possession.81 418b11 For light is like a colour of the transparent [when it is transparent in actuality because of fire or such a thing as the body above. For this too possesses some property which is one

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and the same. So it has been stated what the transparent and light are.]

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Because, as coloured things are seen because of their colour, so the transparent is because of light. But light is not colour, all the same, but ‘like a colour’ because it is not naturally fused with the transparent qua transparent as colour is with coloured objects, but it becomes present through fire or the superior body. For, as we were saying, the actuality of the transparent is not from its own agency but is a perfection of it. Even if the celestial body is at the same time a source of light and transparent, still it is different for it to be transparent and to be a source of light. 418b14  that it is neither fire nor any body whatsoever, [nor an emanation from any body – for thus also it would be a sort of body,] He adds this not about the transparent but about light and he is aiming at the Timaeus.82 How in this text light is said to be a form of fire and how daylight and the flow from sight become compacted to form a single body, that can be gathered from the commentary of Iamblichus on the Timaeus.83 418b16  but it is the presence of fire or something similar in the transparent. The phrase ‘something similar’ must be understood to refer only to that which illuminates. This ‘presence’ must not be understood in a local sense, but as the perfection of that which receives it through the productive activity of that which illuminates, terminating not in an affection but in actuality.

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418b17 Nor is it possible for two bodies to be simultaneously in the same place. Material bodies, without a doubt.84 How then is the fiery light in the air? For they will not go in little pieces through each other’s pores, as Proclus supposes,85 both because the whole air is seen to be illuminated throughout itself and because the continuity of the light with its cause would not be preserved and because the illuminating source would not be active through all of its parts, being impeded by what resisted it, nor would the whole of its surface be seen by us all at once when also the rays from our eyes, as they say, pass through the pores of the transparent. And what would be the natural motion of light? For being a body it will have one. Not a circular motion! It seems that

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a motion in a straight line would suit it best. But yet it cannot be [a motion] in a straight line, for up and down are opposites and not both together. But light travels equally up and down and sideways. And how could there be some timeless motion? For it would be faster than that of the whole heaven, which revolves the sixth part in four hours, but the starlight comes as soon as they rise, imperceptibly,86 as they themselves would say, since it is in reality all at once everywhere.87

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418b18 Also light seems to be the opposite of darkness. [But darkness is the privation of such a state from the transparent, so that it is clear that light is the presence of the state. Also Empedocles and any one else who said the same were wrong to say to say that light was in motion, sometimes arriving between the earth and its environment but escaping our notice. For that is contrary to the obviousness of the argument and contrary to the observed facts; for it might escape attention over a short distance, but it asks far too much to say that it escapes notice travelling from east to west. The colourless can receive colour and the soundless sound. The colourless is the transparent and the invisible or scarcely seen as something dark seems to be. The transparent is like that, but not when it is transparent in actuality, but when it is so potentially ] This also contributes to the clarification of the nature of light as not being corporeal but having its being as a perfection. For darkness88 consists in absence and privation, but not of a body. For air in darkness does not occupy a smaller place nor does it appear to have become diluted, nor at sunset or the quenching of fire would there be a sudden spatial repositioning of a body; but as darkness is the privation of light, which he calls a ‘state’ as being the perfection of what shares in it, in the absence of a source of light, so light is the presence of this. The state of possession and perfection is called ‘presence’ while ‘this’ is ‘fire or something similar’ (for that is what it refers to) because it proceeds through the productive activity of such. He has said that light is like a colour of the transparent, but, as he says, the transparent is in itself colourless. As such it would well receive the adventitious, such as colour, since its own would not impede what enters it. He does not say only that the transparent without light is colourless but also that it is ‘invisible or scarcely seen’, when we also say that it is ‘dark’,89 being invisible since not seen through direct intuition.90 But since it is entirely sight that judges that it is dark, as every sense also does the privation of its own sensible object, and since sight does not judge that it is dark by seeing anything, but by just not seeing, becoming aware of the dark in the attempt to see. So it is ‘scarcely something seen’. This is proper to the

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transparent without light, to be seen in some way, even if not through intuition. Just as colours are themselves invisible without light, but yet when one is trying to see them, they do provide a kind of awareness of themselves.91 418b31  for the same nature is sometimes darkness, sometimes light.

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The same nature is that of the transparent. For it is sometimes darkness, sometimes light, as receptive of each in turn. 419a1 Not everything is visible in light [but only the colour possessed by each thing. For some things are not seen in light but cause perception in darkness, such as fiery phenomena and luminous things (these do not have any single name) such as a fungus, horn, the heads of fishes and their scales and eyes. But their own colour can be seen in none of these.]

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For luminous things that are not able to emit light, which he said were nameless, are seen in darkness. But what does he mean when he says that ‘only the colour possessed by each thing’ is seen in light? Yet also the illuminated transparent can be seen. Is it that the transparent is not seen in the light as in something else, as colour is, light being as such the actuality of the transparent? Having said both how the transparent is seen, when it is transparent in actuality, and how colours are, he goes on to an account of things seen in darkness, ‘such as fiery objects and luminous things’, not so luminous as to produce light (for they would no longer be seen in the dark) but like charcoal and red clouds, glow-worms and other things that shine in darkness without emitting light. Of any of these not even its own colour is seen, only its brightness, since the colour of these also is seen in light, and they shine without light. 419a6 The reason why these can be seen is another story. [Now so much is clear, that what is seen in light is colour. Therefore also it cannot be seen without light.]

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He himself does not now give the reason, but it is clear. It is because light and the luminous that gives out light are what is primarily seen. That which is thus luminous is both itself visible and becomes through light a cause of being seen for the transparent and things seen in light. But things that do not have the sort of luminousness that is able to provide light do not become a cause of other things being seen, and are themselves seen because of their luminousness and only in the dark, because things lit by light do not display their

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own luminousness. So that primarily the luminous that is a cause of light is seen, secondarily light and the actually transparent, thirdly coloured things. These are perfected by light through their kinship with it, whether colours are certain lights, as according to Plato,92 or are present as limits of a definite transparent area.93 Besides things in the dark are seen otherwise, and, above all, the darkness itself is seen in a different way. In concluding his treatment of colour he also writes as follows:

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419a9 For that is what it is to be a colour – to be capable of stimulating the actually transparent; [and the actuality of the transparent is light. There is a clear indication of this; for if one puts something coloured on the organ of sight itself it will not be seen.] [This is the characteristic of colour] as visible, clearly, and not as colour, taking colour as what is visible without qualification. This is so when it itself is perfected by light, since one lying in darkness does not stimulate the air illuminated from elsewhere. But the illuminated stimulates, not affectively94 but, like the source of illumination also, actively. For the colour also that is perfected by light acts on the actually transparent not affectively but as an actuality, as imparting to it a certain activity in the form of light. It imparts this as in itself perfected by light to the also perfected transparent, so as to stimulate sight through the medium of the actually transparent and not immediately, because the transparent also co-operates in the stimulation of sight by the colour seen, just as a lever does in the manual moving of a rock. An indication of this is that a coloured object placed on the eye is not seen, as not being able to stimulate the eye without the transparent.

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419a13 But colour stimulates the transparent, such as air, and the sense-organ is stimulated by this, which is continuous. [For Democritus’ statement on this is incorrect, since he believes that if what is in between were to become void even an ant in the heavens would be seen exactly. For that is impossible. For sight comes about when the sense-organ is affected in some way. Now it cannot be affected by the colour seen itself. The only remaining option is that it is affected by what is in between: hence there must be something in between.] For the transparent is stimulated by the colour as sharing in the activity which it excites, and this stimulates the sense-organ as imparting a share in its activity. But it does not do so as activating and stimulating sight by itself and without the colour, as heated iron

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does even when the fire that warmed it is not present, but by transferring95 the activity of the colour as the lever moves the stone while being itself moved manually. Therefore the transparent also no longer stimulates the sight on its own when colour is absent. But if the transparent stimulated sight by itself, the perception would have been of that and not of the coloured object. As it is, we grasp both it and the intervening interval. I have explained this more clearly in the epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics.96 But now, having established Aristotle’s statement, we say that colour stimulates the transparent immediately. He says ‘by that which is continuous’, not with the eye alone but also with the colour, so that through the continuity he might show that the stimulation is immediate at both limits. The senseorgan is stimulated by the intermediate; but we do not grasp the intermediate as illuminated as being the stimulant in itself, but we see the luminous or colours through it, while it does not stimulate the sight by itself, but in such a way as by this co-operating with the object of sight and transmitting its activity. When he adds, after his reply to Democritus, ‘Now it cannot be affected by the colour seen itself. The only remaining option is that it is affected by what is in between’, we must supply ‘immediately’,97 since the sense-organ is stimulated by the colour which supplies the activity which is carried upon the transparent to the sense-organ, carried separately and without mixture upon the intermediate. Therefore the activity is present all at once and as a perfect whole, and the activities of the different colours in the same medium. But why is it impossible for a sensitive faculty to be immediately stimulated by the colour seen itself? Is it because light is necessary for him who sees in order to grasp colours, and for colour in order to stimulate sight? So both need to be contained within light. That is why the actually transparent must be in between, so that each can be perfected by it. Hence not absolutely everything visible refuses to be seen when placed upon the eye, but what has colour, for the luminous could be seen if it did not overwhelm the eye by its incommensurability. 419a20 For if there were a void nothing would be seen at all, never mind accurately. [So the explanation why it is necessary that colour be seen in light has been given.] Nothing with an intervening void, obviously; not just a coloured thing, but absolutely nothing. For, since light is the actuality of the transparent, not even the medium would be seen. For the medium that is seen must be actually transparent. But neither the coloured thing would be seen, because there would be no actually transparent to illuminate the eye and the colour, if the medium were void, nor any luminous thing would be seen; for when these are at a distance, their

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activity is transferred to the medium which is transparent either potentially or actually.98 419a23 But fire is seen in both of them, dark and light [and necessarily so. For by its agency the transparent becomes transparent.] For things whose luminosity is faint and not able to illuminate stimulate the potentially transparent only in darkness, not by illuminating it, but enough to be seen through it, and in that way score over colours by stimulating the transparent without light; but through the faintness of the luminosity they are not seen in light. I think that it is not that the luminous things do not act on the illuminated transparency, but that the sight, through experiencing the reception of a greater light, no longer has the power to see that which is faint. But fire, because of its greater luminosity, so as also to provide light, is seen in light, either in daylight, and generally when there is another source of light, and it is not prevented from being seen from a suitable distance, or in light provided by itself, so that people near see it at night and even receive its light. To this he adds ‘and necessarily so’ – that a thing should be seen in light, obviously when, as must be added, it is looked at in its own light, since fire is like that, so that it itself brings the potentially transparent to be actually so. But even in darkness fire is seen at night by people at a distance. But since what stimulates must either be present with what is stimulated or the activity of what stimulates must be conveyed to it, consequently if the intervening interval were void the one would not stimulate, the other would not be stimulated, nor would mere suitability99 suffice for it to be affected. Alexander100 objects to Aristotle that he seems to have discussed only visible things, with nothing about the activity of sight, about which the discussion was proposed, and defends him as having said that the visual power was stimulated by the actually transparent, and became actually that which was visible.101 Also towards the end of this book Aristotle says this of all perception, that it is receptive of perceptible objects without matter.102 All this is correct, but it should also be pointed out that even if the activity in the sense-organ involves affection, still, in the sensitive life, the reception of the sensible object is through its own activity, and it does not receive anything externally,103 but by projection of concepts it stands still at the forms of the things perceived, not being affected by them, but acting according to them cognitively, not creatively.

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419a25 The same account holds of sound and smell. [Nothing of them that touches the sense-organ causes perception.] The same in so far, as he immediately adds, as the activity is conveyed through some medium from outside in those cases also.

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419a27 But the medium is stimulated by smell and sound, and by this each of the sense-organs. [But if one places the sounding or odorous object on the sense-organ itself, it creates no perception.] It has been said that [smell and sound] stimulate through a medium which does not itself stimulate but which conveys the causation104 from the sensible object. Why then do we not perceive sensible objects that lie on the sense-organs themselves? Because of asymmetry perhaps, or also since there is need of an intermediary, as of the lever in the movement of the rock manually. 419a30 The same is true of touch and taste [but it is not apparent. The explanation will be clear later.] For he holds that there is a medium even in these cases, but that it is not apparent because the medium is internal,105 not external. 419a32 The medium of sound is air.

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The air was thought worthy of mention now since its resonance is more obvious, for water also carries sound, if less so, as he will say.106 419a32  but that of smell is nameless. [For it is an affection common to air and water, related as transparency is to colour to what smells and occurs in both. For also aquatic animals have a sense of smell. But man, on the one hand, and other land animals that breathe, cannot smell without breathing. But the explanation of these facts will be given later.] Some call this medium diosmon,107 as conveying the smell, analogously to the transparent. For as that is given form by the activity of light and colour and generally of things seen, so the resonant (diêkhes)108 is suited to the reception of sounds and the diosmon to that of smells. The diosmon is in both air and water. With regard to ‘But man on the one hand’, even if he has not stated the contrasting case it is clear what that case would be – ‘but animals that do not breathe’ on the other. He will later give the explanation why these can smell even without breathing, whereas the animals that breathe do not.109

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CHAPTER 8 419b4 Now let us first make distinctions about sound and hearing. [Sound is of two sorts; one is actually such, the other potentially. For we say that some things have no sound, such as a sponge, wool, while others do, such as bronze and smooth solids, because they can make a sound; this is to make a sound actually between it and the sense of hearing.] ‘First’ since after sight it is more perfect than the others, since it has a wider extension. ‘Sound is of two sorts, one actually such, the other potentially.’110 ‘Actually’ and ‘potentially’ sometimes refer to the existence of the objects, but sometimes they refer to them not as beings, but as sensible objects. For a piece of wax that is already white is actually white but sometimes is potentially visible, and what is still yellow is also potentially white. But what is in fact white and is seen is actually in both ways. So with sound, one is potentially so and is just that – sound – when the substrates are solid and smooth and such as to have a sound, while when the substrates are not such there is not even potentially sound. But the other which is already occurring is actually sound, even if no one hears it, being a sound actually but potentially audible, while when it is heard it is also actually sensible. ‘This is to make a sound actually between it and the sense of hearing’ is said of that which is actually so in both ways.

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419b9 An actual sound is always of something against something in something. [For it is a blow that makes it. Therefore it is also impossible for there to be the sound of a single thing; for the striker and the struck are different. So what sounds sounds against something.] It is ‘of something’ that hits ‘against something’ that is hit, ‘in something’ that is resonant by receiving the activity of the blow and conveying it, when both or one of the things that fall upon each other are solid, more so if they are smooth and the collision is hard and severe and the medium is capable of receiving it and conveying the activity that it receives from them. Therefore sound does not occur in a void, since what conveys it must be a body, nor in what is not resonant.111 419b13 A blow does not occur without local motion. [But, as we said, a sound is not a blow by any chance thing. For if wool hits something it makes no sound ]

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For what strikes must approach from elsewhere and collide with what is struck, so that there is some body between what is to strike and what is struck, since there is no void. That is what the sound is in, when it is resonant and is suddenly confined through the speed of the motion and thus remains undispersed. For then it receives the activity of the blow. 419b15  but bronze and such things as are smooth and hollow, [bronze because it is smooth, while hollow things produce many strokes by reverberation after the first, since what is in motion cannot get out.]

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He now gives an account not simply of sound-sources, but of those that are well sounding. These must be solid, as the example of bronze also makes clear, and smooth, because the air confined between falls on one surface of the sounding object and is preserved undispersed, and the activity is received as a single whole. Hollow, because the blow of the confined air is repeated many times and remains undispersed and swiftly moving through the sharp motion of what strikes and entrapped in the hollows and strikes them repeatedly because of the difficulty of making a way out. 419b18 Sound is heard in air, and in water, but less so. [But neither air nor water controls the sound.]

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The organ of hearing which is confined in the tympanum is air, but the body that conveys from outside the sound is not only air but also water, even if less than air as being denser and clogging the channels of the ear.112 ‘But neither air nor water controls the sound’, since as receptive they are the intermediate causes of the sound but not its creators. Those control it. For what receive it are material things, except that air itself makes a sound if struck by a whip or a rod, when it answers to two accounts, one as that by which the sound is, the other as that in which, and it controls it as that by which but not as receptive. For not being in control was asserted of things receptive.113 419b19  but there must be a blow of solid objects against each other and against the air. [This happens when the air that is struck remains where it was and is not dispersed. Therefore if it is struck swiftly and hard it makes a sound. The motion of the object that strikes must be greater than that of the dispersal of air, as if someone were to hit a pile or eddy of sand that was moving swiftly.]

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I think that what is said has to be understood in two ways. (1) If two solids strike each other and the air contained between them by the motion, then, if there is going to be a sound, [the air] must be struck and remain where it is and not be dispersed, because of the speed and severity of the blow, the motion of that which strikes exceeding the dispersal of the air, as happens when by the rapid circular motion of filled cups the liquid in them is not spilt, even though the mouth often goes to the bottom, since the speed of the circular motion overcomes the outpouring of the liquid. (2) He also mentions the case of the beaten pile, e.g. of lying corn or anything else similar, or of a moving eddy of sand or corn, if the beating remains swift as well as severe and thus overcomes the scattering of the grains that are then together. For the blow scatters them, but the severe and swift blow overcomes the dispersal through its swiftness and falls on the pile or eddy as one, and, because it is severe, it produces a sound. So the passage before us has thus to be understood in both ways: it is about solid objects striking at once each other and the air between, and also as separately about solid objects that sometimes strike each other, and about those that sometimes strike the air, like the blow of the whip when the air remains and is not dispersed. The rest similarly to the above.

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419b25 An echo happens when the air bounces back like a ball from air that has become a unit because the container that limits it prevents its dispersal.

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Aristotle seems to say about the echo that, when the originally struck air travels as far as something hard, smooth and hollow, which becomes a sort of container because of its hollowness, and when it remains a unit and undispersed and falls upon the smooth and hollow solid, it travels back like a ball as it is reflected from it, and that this is the echo. But I believe that Alexander rightly claims to understand that an echo occurs neither because the air that is first struck travels itself as far as the container nor because the same air is reflected back from that container as far as what struck upon it. This he rightly claims. For it is not plausible that the travel of the air should be so fast through the blow, and it is necessary, as is claimed about things thrown, that the mover should be always present with what is moved. But we must consider whether he rightly judges the following matter. He writes thus: ‘But the first air, when struck, remains continuous and undivided because of the speed of the blow, and determines the shape of that after it with a similar blow to be as it itself was given by the blow, and this again the one after it, and thus the progression goes on continuously as far as the container. For so long as the blow given is stronger than the dispersal of the air, so long it continues,

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each being shaped one after the other, which was shown to happen also in the case of things thrown.114 The last one that is struck and shaped close to the vessel is prevented from giving the blow still further by the container, and rebounds back like a ball from the resistance of the solid and again strikes and shapes the air this side, and thus again the transmission of the blow and the sound happen in the same way.’115 One may object against all these statements of Alexander that they place sound in shape and do not determine the transmission of the blow, whether the air first struck strikes what succeeds it, as it is clearly said to shape it, and what blow – a resonant blow – there could be on air by air which is continuous and remains unified, or by the solid that struck the first air successively striking that which came next. But, if we envisage a division [of the air] throughout, the air that sounds will no longer remain unbroken, and that which strikes would have to be present to each. So I do not think that like the presence of the source of illumination and that of the source of colour in the actually transparent, which immediately activates that which is to become visible, the mere presence of the solid in the resonant area activates the sound, but that it does so by striking, i.e. by imparting some affection.116 For a blow is an affection. But the sound is not an affection but an activity of the things that strike which is present in the resonant together with the affection, but in a separable manner.117 Therefore the affection precedes, and all the air is affected so far as the activity extends, and the air remains one, continuous and unbroken, but not throughout itself pre-eminently, but in relation to that portion of itself near the solid, while the other parts sympathise, as it were, more and earlier those that are closest to the part first affected, less and later those further off. That is why people nearer hear louder and earlier than those far off. For the strength and speed and their opposites are determined proportionally to the affection. So the latter parts are not struck or shaped by former ones, but they sympathetically receive the same form from that which strikes initially and activates, and the affection is handed on in a divided manner since the bodies affected are divided, and the earlier do not strike those that follow, but transfer the blow. Also the resonant activity is present as a whole118 in a separable manner in all of the air that suffers the blow; for otherwise the same activity would not exist everywhere throughout the extent of the sound. But it extends through the air that is there and hands on the affection of the blow, the air remaining unbroken, continuous and a unity. So when this unified air comes in contact with some solid and no longer preserves a continuous straight path like the previous portions because the solid forms a barrier, but ‘either in the part that was affected and preserves the activity or in that adjacent to it’ the activity of that which first sounded is carried to the parts119 on this

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side of the solid, then the echo referred to comes about. It is not the solid that is struck which makes the sound, but the air that sounded at the beginning uses the solid which is smooth and hollow as a contributing factor in the reflection, which through its smoothness preserves the air unbroken, which is more compressed and given its form by the sound and is not dispersed, and therefore given its form more plainly. By the resistance the solid prevents the forward exit of the activity and becomes a concomitant cause120 of the reflection in this direction.121 That is how Aristotle’s ‘when the air bounces back like a ball’ is also to be understood. It is not that the air is in motion as transported, but that it is actively resonant throughout its sound.

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419b27 It seems that there is always an echo, but not a clear one, [since the same occurs with sound as with light. For light also is always reflected – otherwise there would not be light everywhere, but darkness where the sun did not shine. But it is not reflected as by water or bronze or also anything else smooth, so as to make a shadow, by which we determine the light. But the void is rightly said to control hearing. For air seems to be void, and it is this that causes hearing, when it is stimulated, continuous and unified. But because of its loose texture it makes no audible sound unless what is struck be smooth. But then it becomes single at once, because of the surface, since the surface of the smooth thing is single.]

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[There is always an echo], clearly only when something makes a noise. ‘The same as with light; for light is also always reflected’: he is calling reflection (anaklasis) not only the activity of light from solids at equal angles to what is opposite to them, but also what more recent writers call deflection (diaklasis)122 [or breaking up of rays] from liquids. For from both the light is everywhere and not only where the sun strikes, even if not always such as to cause a shadow, as does the reflection from water or bronze. The sound reflected sideways imitates the deflection of light; the fact that the echo is more readily heard by those whose ear is placed at right angles shows that an echo also, like light, proceeds rather in a straight line. An echo imitates a reflection, the readily heard that which casts a shadow, that which is not heard through faintness that which casts none. ‘But the void is rightly said to control hearing’ by those who call air empty space123 and, as he himself adds, it controls not as causing (for he denied that) but as conveying,124 and in this way it causes hearing. He also reminds us that what is struck needs to be smooth if there is to be a sound. For if the surface of what is struck is smooth, the enclosed air remains united and is not disrupted by the lumps and hollows of what is struck.

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420a3 So that which causes sound is that which sets in motion a unit of air continuously as far as the hearing. [There is air naturally fused with hearing.] He calls ‘that which causes sound’ that ‘which sets in motion a unit of air’, not that which is merely capable of moving it, but that which actually does so. ‘A unit of air’, since that which is set in motion has to remain unbroken, whether this be air or water. But now he is speaking of that which conveys sound best. And he shows the way in which the air is a unit by continuity; for air is not a unit as an indivisible or as what is conceptually one, but as a continuum. ‘[That which sets in motion] as far as the hearing’ means not what is really heard but that which is sufficient to be heard, even if no one hears it.125 ‘Air is naturally fused with hearing’126 – not the air outside (which is not naturally fused with it ), but that which is conjoined with it by nature to constitute an organ. For the air which is living and characterized by auditive life is such as the liquid in the eyes which is characterized by visual life.127 420a4 Since it is in air, the interior air is set in motion by the motion of that outside.

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‘Since it is in air’, clearly the hearing. For the interior air was said to be naturally fused with that. Auditive life consists in this, in one way as characterising a living organ, i.e. one vitally united, in another way as making use of such an organ.128 So by being in air, i.e. in the resonant, when that outside is set in motion and becomes actually resonant, it itself is set in motion, taking a share in the sound. The sense-organ also is affected by what first strikes, whilst the activity from what strikes is conveyed through the exterior resonant air to that which is naturally fused with it. 420a5 Consequently an animal does not hear with all of itself, [nor does the air pass through into all of it. For it does not contain air throughout but129 in only that part which is set in motion and is animate.] [‘not with all of itself ’] but where the vital organ of hearing is. ‘The animal does not contain air throughout’ – obviously such air as is naturally fused with the auditive life and is naturally given its form in this way.

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420a7 Air is soundless as such, [as being easily disrupted. When it is prevented from being disrupted the motion of such air is sound.]

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Throughout ‘soundless’ signifies to him that which does not activate sound and what is not receptive of sound. So without qualification the air qua air is soundless, as being easily disrupted. For the fact of being easily disrupted is also a constitutive character of air. But when it is prevented from disruption and set in motion either by what had struck it first or what primarily had struck something else and secondarily it, when the blow prevents disruption, it makes a sound,130 so that it does not do so as air, but as being capable of being prevented from disruption.

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420a9 The air in the ears is confined in a chamber so as not to be moved, in order that it may accurately perceive all differences of motion. The air naturally fused with the hearing is enclosed by solids in order that it may not be immediately moved by what strikes it, for the sake of the accuracy of the perception of all the different motions. For there both must be an affection of the sense-organ, and yet the affection must be commensurate in order that the activity of judgement131 be successful and the activity be not blunted by the affection. But the affection would not be commensurate, if the air were struck immediately. In order that it may perceive accurately, it must not be severely affected but act undisturbed. For more severe affection impedes judgement.

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420a11 Because of this we hear also in water, [because it does not invade the naturally fused air, or even into the outer ear, because of the spirals in them. When that does happen hearing ceases, as it does when the membrane is damaged, as in the case of the skin covering the pupil of the eye.] By ‘because of this’ he means because the air naturally fused with the ears is confined in a chamber and enclosed by solid bodies and is not immediately moved by things striking it. Because it is enclosed, water does not enter the naturally fused air. For if it entered, it would blunt the auditory activity either by chilling or by moistening or by condensing. So when it does get into the outer ear it impedes hearing; but it does not easily enter because of the spirals. Just as what is called the horn-like coating of the eye is transparent, when it comprehends the fluid organ naturally fused with the sight and stands as an intermediate between the internal and external transparent media, but when it is damaged, it prevents sight, so also the membrane containing the naturally fused air,132 which conducts sound and is between the external and internal conductors, prevents hearing when it is damaged and not in its natural state.

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420a15 Also it is a sign whether we hear or not that the ear will always make a sound like a horn. [For the air in the ears always has its own motion, but a sound is external and not within.] Since nature absolutely does not wish the naturally fused air to be struck immediately from outside, nor condensed nor disturbed, it has guarded it with its barriers and spirals. So previously it was said to be unmoved as not being immediately moved by the sound-sources. But because it is living, it always has its own motion. For if we put our hand to the ear and push gently inwards we hear a sound occurring, the air inside being compressed by the push and, as it moves, presses on the ears because of its small volume and makes a sound, like the breath blown into horns used as instruments. The sound is the sign of hearing, because the air has its vital motion; otherwise there would be no sound when the ear was pressed. There being no sound is a sign of lacking hearing because of illness or of the air not moving at all or only weakly. But since the sound in the air occurs when either a solid moves and strikes the air or air moves and hits upon a solid, having laid down that the sound in the ears comes about in this way he added ‘like a horn’. For also a horn used as an instrument makes a sound when the wind is moving and strikes on the solid. ‘For the air in the ear always has its own motion’: but it does not always make a sound. For ‘a sound is external and not within’, i.e. a sound does not occur through the air’s making its own internal motion, but through either it itself striking something solid or something else striking it. Sound is external in this way. 420a18 That is why they say that hearing is by what is void and resonant – because we hear by what contains determined air.

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Those who incorrectly call air void,133 also say that we hear by what is void, since we hear by the naturally fused proximate air as an organ, so long as it is vigorous – to indicate which he added ‘and is resonant’, obviously when there is that sort of pressure by the hand. And ‘this is because we hear by what contains determined air’: determined but not circumscribed, for that might happen to external air as well; but it is characterised by its vital sound. ‘We hear’, that is we composite beings or also we as constituted by a the soul as a whole, hear ‘by what contains determined134 air’, i.e. by the auditive life which makes use of [the determined air] as an organ. 420a19 Does what is struck or what strikes make the sound? Or perhaps both [in different ways? For sound is the motion of what is capable of movement in the way that things rebounding from

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smooth surfaces are, when struck against them. But, as has been said, not everything makes a sound when it hits or is hit, as if a needle strikes a needle, but what is struck needs to be smooth, so that the air will rebound and vibrate all together.] It is things striking and being struck that must be responsible for sound, and things that receive it, as resonant things. It has been said that often both accounts apply to one and the same thing. For air is at once what strikes and is struck and also what receives the sound. The same applies to water. So he inquires whether what strikes or what is struck is more responsible and adds that both are, even if in different ways, the one as active, the other as passive. That strikes which is in motion and impinges, what it impinges on is struck. That both are responsible is shown by the fact that the resonant trapped in between rebounds like things which bounce from smooth surfaces when struck against them. For since it is not dispersed it must rebound in this way in order to remain one and continuous, when struck either primarily or also as sharing the blow with others that were previously struck, but struck in such a way that the blow and the resonant activity135 conferred by the things that struck anticipate disruption. Its motion is not local motion, as is the case with things that tremble, but a swift exchange of blow and activity, likened to the leap ‘from smooth surfaces when struck against them’, because this too occurs all at once through a blow from the both solid and smooth, and is transferred from these to others. So, since both what strikes and what is struck must have an even surface, i.e. a smooth one, so that the air be trapped in greater quantity and ‘will rebound and vibrate all together’, it is reasonable that not only that which strikes but also what is struck is responsible for the sound. Conversely, the rebounding shows the swift transmission of the blow and the sound.

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420a26 The differences between sounding objects are shown in actual sounds. [For just as colours are not seen without light, so high136 and low are not without sound.]

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For Plato says that we know the capacities and essences of things from their activity,137 and therefore as we know the capacity to make a sound from the sound, so we know that it does so in this way from a sound of this sort. ‘For just as colours are not seen without light, so high and low are not without sound.’ He does not mean the actual sound by ‘high’ and ‘low’, but the things that make high and low sounds, in order to accord with what precedes. He speaks of sounding objects to show that, just as light is different from colours, so sound also is different from high and low, except that light is the efficient

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cause of the visibility of colours, sound is the cause of the recognition of high and low as being their effect and indicating them. 420a29 These [‘high’ and ‘low’] are used metaphorically from tangible things.

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He does not mean that the words concerning the audible are used in a similar sense as those about the tangible and the audible. For in the case of the tangibles we call the opposite of ‘sharp’ [oxu] not low but blunt. But he likens the cases to each other analogically, as he will say clearly. 420a30 For the high stimulates sense-perception in a short time for long, [the low in a long time for short.]138 He here refers to the high as the audible and to sensation as the auditive.139 ‘In a short time for long’ means being heard ‘swiftly over a long distance and remaining for a long time’, while the low is said to do so ‘in a long time for short’ because it both is heard slowly and penetrates to a shorter distance and persists for a shorter time. Aristotle does not say this as his opinion but writes it as being said by others. He seems to be aiming at the Timaeus140 which proposes that concord comes from a high and a low sound, the high first and more quickly stimulating the hearing and more intense initially, then fainter, when the low which is concordant with it, falling on the sense similarly to the fading high sound, is smooth and not rough, because of the similarity, since the high first stimulates the hearing and lasts a certain time, the low later. But Aristotle does not think it right to distinguish the high and the low by being fast and slow, but analogously to the sharp and blunt of masses, the one stabbing, the other pushing. Similarly the high sound penetrates and, as it were, strikes to the depth, while the low is more superficial and exerts pressure, like things superimposed that press. Therefore, having stated the opinion of others he adds: 420a31 But the high is not in fact fast, the low slow, [but the stimulus of the one becomes such through its speed, of the other through its slowness, and they seem to be analogous to the sharp and blunt of the touch. For the sharp, as it were, pricks while the blunt,141 as it were, pushes, because the one stimulates in a short time, the other in a long time, so that it comes about that the one is fast, the other slow. Let that be the explanation of sound. For even if speed is consequent upon being high, as in the case of

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echoes from afar (for in the case of near ones the prior perception142 of the high either does not occur or is imperceptible), still the characteristic [of swift and high] is different and exhibits a peculiar nature. But even if, as we said, speed is consequent upon being high and slowness on being low, still they are not the same, but, he says, ‘the stimulus of the one becomes such through its speed’, of the high much in a short time. ‘Through its speed’, i.e. according to its speed, not according to its height, for to stimulate the sense in a short time is indicative of speed, not of height, just as stimulation over a short distance in a long time is indicative of slowness, not of lowness. Therefore, even if we say that these stimulations are by the low and the high, it is not qua high and low but qua fast and slow that we shall be speaking of them. For as there is the sharp and the blunt in masses, these being according to their shapes, so that the one pricks, the other presses, since the one stimulates in a short time, the other in a long time, it results that the former is quick and the blunt is slow – for it is accidental in a way and not essential that the sharp is fast or the blunt slow – so also the high and low in sounds are not as such but consequentially fast and slow. That is the meaning of the text as we have it before us. But if in the lemma the text did not read ‘but the high is not in fact fast’ but ‘the high is fast in this way’143 it could be understood as an objection against the obvious falsehood which says that being fast and being high are the same thing, and the low and the slow. On these he makes a distinction according to his opinion that the stimulus by the high is short, that of the low is long, because they are so through being fast and slow. Again the text reads: ‘The sharp, as it were, pricks, while the blunt, as it were, pushes because the one stimulates in a short time, the other in a long time’; but the text does not say that ‘the one is fast, the other slow’. For in this way he reasonably concludes ‘so it comes about’, and it is in a way incidental that the sharp is fast, the blunt slow.144

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420b5 Voice is a sound made by the animate; [for nothing inanimate has a voice, but they are said to have it on account of similarity. Examples are the aulos, the lyre and such other inanimate objects that exhibit range, melody and articulation.145 This seems to be because voice also has these features. But many living things do not have a voice, such as those that are bloodless and, among those with blood, fishes. This is intelligible ] Voice is a species of sound, belonging to other animals as well as the rational, and in this way is unique as meaningful and communicative. That is why it has gained a special name. It is clear that only animate beings have a voice and that the aulos and the lyre are said to have a voice through similitude, because they have a range which is called

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an intervallic voice by musicians,146 like song, which musical instruments imitate. For by the range they imitate the melody in the voice and by the intervals of the sounds the language articulated by syllables. It is also obvious that many animals do not have voice, those namely that do not breathe. 420b11  since sound is motion of air. [But those that are said to have a voice, like those in the Achelous, make a noise with their fins or something else similar, but voice is the sound of a living thing not produced by any chance part. But, since everything makes a sound by something striking something in some medium, which is air, it would seem reasonable that only those things which receive air have a voice.]

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By ‘air’ he means the breathed out air, and by ‘sound’ not every sort, since sound also occurs in water, but voiced sound. Also, when he adds ‘since everything makes a sound by something striking something, in some medium, which is air’, by ‘in some medium’ he clearly means that which is most resonant and is needed by the voice, since water is also resonant, even if less so. Why should there not be voice in water also? Maybe because it involves an imagination that can signify,147 and to signify requires a more perfect life that can communicate and has an articulated imagination,148 so that it must use organs that are warmer and endowed with purer elements. Hence beings with a voice have a heart and live in the air. But also the voice, as the best of sounds since it comes from a more perfect form of life,149 also reasonably inhabits the most resonant medium. 420b16 Nature already makes use of the air breathed in for two functions. [Just as it uses the tongue both for taste and for talking, of which taste is necessary, wherefore more possess it, but language is for the sake of well-being, so it also uses the breath for the internal warmth as being necessary (why so will be stated elsewhere) ]

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‘Necessarily’ for the cooling of the warm region around the heart and further to stimulate it by fanning. For if it remains inert it is quenched, and if not cooled it destroys the animal by excess. Also for150 the removal of the dirty superfluities that collect there. All these functions, although they are multiple, have necessity as a common character, and therefore are called ‘one’,151 and an account of them is given by him in On the Parts of Animals and in On Respiration.152

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420b22  and for the voice to provide well-being. [The organ of breathing is the pharynx.] He himself also distinguishes in Platonic fashion things which contribute to being, among which are the necessary, from things which contribute to well-being.153 Voice as such is of this kind, existing for signalling and communication, and still more language as also perfecting reason. For it is very obvious that taste is necessary as contributory to nourishment, by which living things exist. ‘The organ of breathing is the pharynx’ or what is called the rough windpipe, through which the air breathed enters and exits. But the air does not leave it altogether, since it does not like other tubes contract and collapse, which its hardness and thickness prevent, so that it always contains air in itself. So in vocalisation it is not only the windpipe but also the air contained in it that is struck by the expelled air which is held for a time and expelled all together.

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420b23 That for which this part exists is the lung. That for which it primarily and principally exists is the heart. But the immediate goal of the windpipe is the lung, since this immediately needs respiration. But primarily the heart, for this is the warmest, and the lung through its juxtaposition to the heart.

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420b24 For in this part animals with feet have more warmth than others. [Also the area about the heart is first in its need for breath. Therefore it is necessary for air to enter by being breathed in. So the blow of the air breathed by the soul in these portions on the so-called windpipe is voice. For not every sound made by an animal is voice, as we said;] He is calling animals with feet those that are not aquatic. Of these animals those that breathe are warmer in this part, the lung, and more so in the heart, as being more awakened through their life’s being more perfect. ‘So the blow of the air breathed is caused by the soul in those parts.’ For, since everything is moved by something else and vital motions are caused by the soul, in order to exhibit the cause of motion the Philosopher accurately said ‘by the soul’ and we should not understand this as Alexander thinks ‘in accordance with the soul’.154 For ‘by which’ exhibits the efficient cause, while ‘in accordance with’ exhibits the formal. Within soul, one part is that ‘in accordance with which’, as characterizing the vital organ, which alone is regarded by Alexander, another is that ‘by which’, that which uses the organ and which also activates the living body. So the soul in the respiratory organs, i.e. that which uses them, by them regulates a

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little and sets in motion all together the air that is breathed and with it strikes the air that remains in the windpipe and the windpipe itself with a significatory purpose,155 and this produces voice, which simply is such a blow. 420b30 For it is possible to make a sound both with the tongue and in the way those who cough do. [But that which strikes must be animate and involve some imagination; for voice is some significant sound and not the result of air breathed out as in coughing. But with it it strikes the air in the windpipe against the windpipe.] It is plain that sound made with the tongue is not voice, nor that made with the hands. But a cough may seem to be voice because it occurs in the region of the windpipe and made by breathed out air but it is surely not. For a cough is an involuntary and not purposive falling of the breathed air on the windpipe itself, while voice is purposive and is not directly the breathed air striking on the windpipe, which is what happens in coughing through the attempt of nature to clear away some phlegm or other thing solid or fluid that has fallen into the windpipe. But the voice uses the air present in the windpipe as a means, so that the held breath all together strikes the air present in the windpipe, and through it the windpipe itself. This he makes clear by saying that ‘voice  is not the result of air breathed out as in coughing’, which directly strikes the windpipe. ‘But with it’, clearly ‘the air breathed out’, ‘it’, clearly the living being, ‘strikes the air in the windpipe against’. So it is the contained air which is set in motion by the sudden motion of the breathed air and strikes more forcibly on the windpipe. 421a1 It is a sign of this that one cannot speak breathing in or out, but holding one’s breath. It is with this that he who holds his breath sets it in motion. [It is also clear why fishes have no voice, for they have no pharynx. They have not this part because they do not receive air nor breathe. The explanation of this is another matter.]

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The breather sets it in motion, clearly being animate and set in motion by the soul, not using the air breathed in for breathing in or out, but holding it in order that with it he may suddenly strike the air in the windpipe and bang it against the windpipe. So one cannot simultaneously breathe in and speak if voice consists in the holding of air breathed in and its motion in the windpipe, but breathing consists in the passage of air out of or into the lung. He postpones speaking of fishes as not breathing to On the Parts of Animals.156 For they use

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water instead of air and gills instead of the lung for the cooling of the heat around the heart. CHAPTER 9 421a7 It is less easy to make distinctions about smell and the odorous than about matters discussed above. For it is not clear what sort of thing odour is, as what is sound or light157 or colour. [The reason for this is that we do not have this sense in an precise manner ] The fact that our sense of smell does not recognise its object clearly, save as something odorous, shows that we do not have this sense in a precise nor in a articulated way. For sight does not recognise an object merely as visible but also as light or as colour, together with its shades. And hearing recognises a sound as such and its varieties. The sense of smell does not thus recognise what the object is, yet is not altogether unaware whether this smell is sweet, that bitter or dry or sharp, but it does not clearly discriminate, as we may best know from our consciousness.158 It is also clear from the fact that there is no name given to the odorous in general which exhibits its underlying nature and from the fact that all the more particular names are taken from objects of taste. For it is thence that we have sweet, bitter and sharp. But it is not the case as with objects of touch, where, even if there is no common name because of their generic differences, the more particular names are not taken from another sense. It is also shown by the fact that we sense nothing odorous without its being unpleasant or pleasant, not because smell is of these alone as Plutarch suggested159 (for we sense also that it is bitter or sweet), nor indeed is it as with taste, as Themistius would have it.160 For that grasps certain tastes indifferently and without any pleasure or dislike, and, in those cases where pleasure or dislike follows, if the tasting is in accordance with nature, something more judgmental161 prevails rather than affective attraction or repulsion through liking and dislike. But the sense of smell is far more characterized through this (i.e. affective attraction and repulsion) than acting according to judgement about what causes the pleasure and the dislike. One might ask whether man himself is responsible for having a poor sense of smell, since he does not share in that sense with exactness, which is why he is inferior to many animals in this respect; or is it, as Plato162 thinks, that the nature of the sense of smell is such because its object also is hybrid and not included among the elements but among intermediates, not because the forms of odorous things are imperfect (for every form is perfect, or rather a perfection), but because the

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things that receive the forms are composite and not simple and liable to transformation? For Aristotle also locates the odorous in a mixture of the flavoured dry with the shared moisture of water and air.163 Or perhaps both are true; for the odorous is not simple and therefore the sense of smell is not as precise as the others, and also man has a poorer share in this than many other animals. But, since he gave a partial explanation why odour and the odorous are less easily distinguished, which is that we do not have that sense in a precise form, he gives grounds for suspecting that he regards it as the sole explanation. In ‘what sort of thing odour is’ we must not understand ‘odour’ in contradistinction from ‘odorous’, but we should consider that the odorous is conjoined with odour since the odour in act is also the odorous. Thus the inference ‘as what is sound, light or colour’ follows consistently, since the audible and the visible are consistent with the odorous. 421a10  but inferior to that of many animals. For man has a poor sense of smell 

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He has a poor sense of smell because judgement here is contaminated with the affections, and also in comparison with the other senses. It is inferior to that of other animals not because they have better judgment of odorous forms (for that is impossible for them in all kinds of sensation, since for them in all kinds of sensation the confusion of judgement with affection is much greater than ours in relation to smell), but it is because they score over us by picking up the odorous object at a greater distance as do vultures and insects, and by moving towards the scent on a small occasion, like dogs following on the tracks of wild beasts. 421a11  and senses nothing odorous without the pleasant or unpleasant, since the sense organ is not precise. Not because only these exhibit the pleasant and the unpleasant; for these are always consequent on other things; nor because this sense distinguishes the pleasantness and unpleasantness of the odorous together with their other differences. For Aristotle would not on that account have condemned the sense organ as inexact – on the contrary, that is a sign of exactitude.164 But he says that because our organ of smell is not precise for judgement, it needs stronger and more striking impressions in order to be excited to recognition,165 so that through its strength the impression becomes pleasant or unpleasant. And that is why it is not without the pleasant and the unpleasant, as not occurring without dislike or pleasure being felt, since the sense-organ needs to be more strongly affected as being inexact. And this is

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because it is not framed for easy judging activity, so that it also does not deliver a pure judgement, being impeded by the affection. For without exception the sense-organ must be affected in some way by the object sensed, but the stronger affection inhibits the activity of judgement. So, since our organ of smell naturally requires a stronger affection, as is shown by the fact that always pleasure or distress is felt, it is not surprising that its judgement is weaker in comparison with our other senses.

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421a13 It is likely that creatures with hard eyes should perceive colours in the same way  He uses hardness of eye as an example of an inexact sense-organ. For among hard-eyed animals, such as crabs, the organ of sight needs a greater and stronger affection.

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421a14  and that the differences of colour should not be clear to them except as being frightening or non-frightening. [That is how the human race is in regard to odours.] It is not that these animals sense only the frightening and the non-frightening and not colour or differences of colour; for it is not possible to be frightened about nothing, as is also the case with being pleased. If they are sometimes afraid, sometimes oppositely disposed, it is clear that they perceive different objects of sight – which are colours. It is that they do not receive these without either being disturbed or being soothed, of which he calls the one case frightening, the other not so, because their sight is not stimulated except by being strongly affected. This is shown by ‘except as being frightening or non-frightening’, instead of ‘except of being frightened or fearless’, since the term aphobos, ‘non-frightening’ is not used as denial (of fear) but as signifying a state contrary to being frightening.

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421a16 For it seems to be analogous to taste, and similarly the species of flavour to those of smell. [But our taste is more accurate because it is a kind of touch; and man has this sense most accurate. For in the others he is inferior to many other animals, but in touch he is much more accurate than the rest.] For as the sense of smell is to things smelt, so is taste to things tasted, and, alternando,166 as the sense of smell is to taste, so are the objects of smell to those of taste. These have an affinity with each other since the object of taste is flavour, which is the solution of the dry in water and the object of smell is the solution of a flavoured dry (stuff) in a moist compound of air and water. And the affinity of the sense of smell

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to taste is its being receptive of a related substance; but taste exceeds smell in accuracy because it too is a kind of touch and man has touch most accurately of all because of the delicacy of his skin and his good temperament167 of his body. 421a22 That is why he is the most intelligent of animals. [A sign of this is that in the human race, the difference between being well endowed and badly endowed is in accord with this sense, and with no other. For the thick-skinned are badly endowed, but those with soft skins are well endowed.]

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Because the whole human organism is, by good temperament, suitable for the reception of the soul that works through intelligence. ‘Most intelligent’ is used either because the other species too that have an articulated and skilful imagination,168 are said to be intelligent in a general sense, in the way that we also speak of the ‘virtue’ of a horse; or because, among things in the world of becoming, only the human being shares in intelligence and virtue.169

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421a26 Just as a flavour may be sweet or sharp, so with smells. [But some things have a corresponding smell and taste, I mean e.g. a sweet smell and a sweet taste, others the reverse. In the same way a smell may be pungent and dry and acid and oily. But, as we said, since smells are not very perspicuous, as are flavours, they have been named according to likeness of objects, the sweet from saffron and honey, the pungent from thyme and similar things. The same applies to the other smells. As with hearing and each of the senses one is concerned with the audible and inaudible, another with the visible and invisible, so the sense of smell with the odorous and the odourless. The odourless is so either from being incapable of having a smell or as having a slight and feeble one. ‘Tasteless’ is used in the same way. Smell is also through a medium such as air or water. For wateranimals seem to perceive smells whether or not they have blood, just like those that live in the air. For some of them also go to meet their food from a distance as they get a scent of it. That is why it seems a difficulty if they all smell equally, and yet man can smell when he breathes in but not when he is not breathing in but is holding his breath or breathing out, whether at a distance or near, or even if the object is placed inside the nostril. It is common to all that what is placed on the sense-organ itself is imperceptible, but not perceiving without breathing in is confined to humans. This is experimentally clear. So the bloodless animals, when they do not breathe in, might have some

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sense beyond those mentioned. But this is impossible since they sense an odour. For the sensing of the odorous is also the smelling of the agreeably and unpleasantly scented. Also they are seen to be impaired by the same strong smells as is man, such as that of bitumen, sulphur and the like. So it must be that they smell, but not by breathing in. It seems that for humans the sense-organ is different from that of other living things as their eyes are from those with hard eyes. For human eyes have lids as a barrier and sort of cover, and unless these are moved and drawn up they do not see. But hard-eyed creatures have nothing of the sort, but see immediately what is occurring in the transparent medium. So, similarly, also the organ of the sense of smell in some animals has no cover, like the eye, while those that take in air have some covering which is removed when they breathe in as the veins and the pores are distended. That is why breathing animals do not smell in a wet element; for they have to smell by breathing in, and it is impossible to do this in water.] The names ‘sweet’, ‘bitter’ and the like have been transferred from flavours to smells. But not idly – for why not from objects of touch or sounds? Rather it is because, as was said,170 there is an affinity of smells to tastes also with relation to their bearers, because of the solution of the flavoured in the compounded moisture of air and water. Why then does a sweet smell not always follow on a sweet flavour? It is because sometimes the flavoured matter, as it dissolves, changes its character, and the change of character turns it into something of the same kind or into just the privation of the bearer. ‘The sweet from saffron and honey’: in the case of honey the taste goes together with the sweet smell, but not in the case of saffron, for its quite different taste is in discord with its sweet smell. The fact that the names are transferred and not primarily applied to objects of smell shows that they are not used in a proper sense. For who would say that a smell was sweet or sharp in the proper sense, unless through reduction to objects of taste? It is obvious that the sense of smell wholly detects171 the odourless just by sensing nothing, and also detects not just the strong smelling but the weak as well. But it is also very clear that it is by something external in between that conveys the activity of the object of smell to the sense, and that doing this, which we call smell-transmission,172 is common to air and water. For fishes also smell in water as they rush to the bait, just as beings in air do. For there are bloodless creatures not only in water, molluscs among them, but also in air, such as insects which also smell without breathing. Man, however, and other creatures that breathe, though of a nature to smell, do not do so when they do not breathe in but either breathe out or hold their breath. How then do those who are

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not of a nature to breathe? For it might seem that if they do not breathe in they do not smell but detect odours by some other sense. For it is obvious that they do detect them, since bees visit honey even from a distance 173 when there is a fire; but also they 174 to be destroyed by bad or heavy odours. But if they sense, it is clear that it is by a sense of smell. For smelling just is that – the sense which detects odours. These too use air for smell-transmission which conveys the activity of the object of smell, not by breathing it in but by the transmitter approaching right up to the sense-organ of smell. For we too smell by using the air in that way, using it as a smell-transmitter to bring it close to the sense-organ. But we, in order that it may bring it close, wish to open up what then obstructs the conveyance,175 and to open it up we use the air that is breathed in. But they have no need of this since they have no obstruction. In the same way the eyes of hard-eyed creatures without eyelids see straight away without making any change. It is clear also that animals that breathe cannot smell in water, since they cannot even breathe in. 422a6 Odour is of dry things as flavour is of the fluid [and the sense-organ of smell is potentially such.]

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For the flavoured dry matter, by being freed in the transmitting medium, creates the object of smell, as he will say in On SensePerception.176 But the object of taste, even if it be dry, does not become sensible to taste by its flavour unless it be made fluid, as he will soon say.177 The sense of smell is potentially like its object, standing still at its form in its activity, just as all sensation does in relation to its proper object. But before being active it does so potentially. CHAPTER 10 422a8 The object of taste is a kind of object of touch. [That is the reason why it is not perceptible through an interposed foreign body; nor is touch.178 Also the body in which there is the flavour, the object of taste, is in the fluid as its matter. That is a kind of object of touch.]

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Not as such but as regards its substrate. For flavour is the object of taste as such. But the quality of flavour must be present in the substrate if it is going to become actually tasteable. Therefore what is tasted is also tangible in its substrate; for fluidity is tangible. But nothing tangible stimulates touch through some external medium, for if through some medium it will be its own. So that the object of taste does not either; for it stimulates with the fluid and the fluid is

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tangible. ‘Nor is touch’ connects with ‘through an interposed foreign body’. ‘Also the body in which there is the flavour, the object of taste, is in the fluid as its matter.’ The text must be construed as follows: also the body which is the substrate to the flavorous quality, which is tasteable and which invariably occurs in the fluid, underlies it as its matter.179 For it is not in the way that the transparent receives not the colours but the activity from them that the fluid receives the activity of the flavour, but it receives the flavour itself as matter receives form, being analogous only through its receptive support180 of the things which it is said to receive, since clearly in one way the flavour is in the fluid as an accident, as being based in it, in another way as forms are in matter as upholding it and fixing it in themselves.181

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422a11 Therefore even if we had lived in water we should have perceived something sweet thrown in. [Our perception would not have been through the medium but through its being mixed with water as in a drink.] It is not that the water transmits the activity of the sweet, as air does that of colours, but that it itself takes on the sweetness and acts on the sense-organ as sweet. So it is not like perceiving through a medium.

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422a14 But colour is not thus perceived, by mixture, [nor by emanations.] The mixture of something with something exhibits a passive participation,182 but the colour is present in the air unmixed and in act. For the air is not given a colour and thus acts on the sense-organ. Nor indeed is the coloured object seen by bodily emanation from itself travelling to the sense-organ.

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422a15 There is nothing that functions as a medium, [but as the visible is colour, so the tasted is flavour. But nothing produces a sensation of flavour without fluidity, but it must have either actual or potential fluidity, as does the salty. For it is easily dissolved itself and is capable of moistening the tongue.] In the case of colours and sight there is a medium different from both, the transparent. However, in the case of taste there is no external medium. But as colour is to sight, so is flavour to taste. The flavour becomes tasteable either by already actually being in the fluid, like the sweet taste of honey, or by being capable of being made fluid when it becomes so either by itself, being dissolved by the warmth of the

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mouth like juices or by being mixed with the warmth of the mouth like pepper. But salts are themselves dissolved by the warmth in the mouth and are made fluid and, by moistening the tongue as well, are mixed with still more fluid that surrounds it. 422a20 Just as sight is of the visible and the invisible, [(for darkness is invisible but sight distinguishes it also) and also of the excessively bright, (for this also is invisible, but in a different way from darkness) so is hearing of sound and silence, of which one is audible, the other not, and of a great noise in the way that sight is of the very bright, (for as a small sound is inaudible, so in a way is one that is great and violent) and as one thing is said to be totally invisible like the impossible in other contexts, another that is by nature visible but is not so, or poorly so like the footless and the pipless, so also taste is of the tasty and tasteless, and this as having either a slight or poor flavour or one destructive of taste.] It has often been said to be obvious that each sense which primarily and by apprehension recognises its proper sensible object, if it does not perceive it when it tries, and by the very fact of not apprehending it, is also aware of the privation of its proper object. This object is imperceptible because of deficiency since a perceptible183 form is not present in the substrate. But the sense recognises also the incompatibly excessive sensible object, which is reasonably said to be imperceptible in another way than as privation; for on the contrary it is through the excessive presence of a perceptible form. For the sense cannot adjust itself to it as being excessive, and, once again, by the very failure to adjust it recognises it as imperceptible. So sight recognises the excessively bright, hearing the over-loud thunder and taste that which destroys it and weakens its activity by its impact. So whenever we talk about imperceptibility through privation, as when we say of a substrate which is also the support of that which is perceptible by apprehension, that it is imperceptible when it lacks the form, although of a nature to have it, or has it only weakly, as we sometimes say of things that have them only vestigially that they have no foot or no pip, that sort of imperceptible is recognised by the relevant sense of each. But when we talk about imperceptible as equivalent to a negation, as when we say of the voice that it is invisible, that sort of [perceptible] is absolutely not perceived by the relevant sense, since the negation is also applied to things not falling under the form [of that sense]. Therefore he also drew attention to the variety of meanings of the one word ‘invisible’, in order that we might see what sort of invisibility is recognised by sight and what not. For sight does not observe what is not possibly seen, as is the case

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with voice, but it recognises what is of a nature to be seen, even if not actually visible, or poorly. Either the faintly visible or the harmfully so through excess is poorly so. ‘So also taste is of the tasty and the tasteless’, but clearly not of what is impossible to taste. So that is omitted, but what is tasteless though falling under [the sense of taste] is divided into ‘what has a slight or poor flavour or one destructive of taste’. He said ‘slight’ either as equivalent to ‘not at all’ in the Attic idiom, of what has the nature to have a taste but has it not, or he omits this as being well known because it was often said, and calls ‘slight’ what has a faint taste, and by ‘poor’184 he does not refer to the same thing pleonastically but, I think, to what makes the taste unpleasant, which also lacks taste in a way, since the sense of taste shrinks back from it. In addition to this there is also what is destructive.

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422a31 The basic distinction seems to be of the drinkable from the undrinkable. [For taste is in a way of both. But of the latter the taste is poor and destructive, of the other natural.] The form of the tasteable is flavour. But since this is either actually or potentially fluid if it is to be perceptible, and actuality is prior to potentiality, and the actually fluid is drinkable, that, reasonably, is basic.185 Now he is calling drinkable a flavoured watery fluid with a mild and obvious flavour. Hence, as is clear from what he himself said, the undrinkable will be a watery fluid that is flavourless, or has a weak or unpleasant flavour, or is destructive of the sense of taste. For it would not be basic if not fluid. ‘Poor’ is clearly used to comprise what is neither altogether tasty and what is weakly so and unpleasantly so. For it is also called destructive.

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422a33 The drinkable is common to both touch and taste. Now he refers not only to the [drinkable] that we have distinguished above from the undrinkable, but to what is common to both. For what was there undrinkable is common to touch as fluid and to taste as being untasteable by privation, either through weakness or through excess. 422a34 Since the object of taste is fluid, its sense-organ must neither be actually fluid nor incapable of becoming fluid. [For taste is affected in some way by the tasteable qua tasteable. So the sense-organ of taste must be capable of becoming fluid without being destroyed, but not be fluid. A sign is that the tongue senses nothing if it is perfectly dry or too fluid. For that

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becomes touching186 of the first moist thing, as when, having first tasted a strong flavour, one tastes something else, and as for the sick everything seems bitter through sensing with a tongue that is full of such fluidity.]

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That the sense-organ of taste must lack flavour is clear, since flavour is the proper sensible of taste. So in order that a flavour present within may not impede discrimination187 of others it must be without flavour but capable of becoming affected by flavours – not by becoming different in substance but so that remaining the same thing it may share in the quality. Aristotle will not even allow it to be fluid, since, even if taste is not the reception of the fluid qua fluid, it is not without fluidity. But dryness of the tongue is thought to be an illness, and therefore it must naturally possess a certain fluidity, even if flavourless or of a quantity so as to not to impede its activity by diluting the flavoured fluid that enters. But also dryness fights against the fluid that enters and does not permit the affection and, by the affection, the judgement by the sense-organ of the flavour in the fluid. Hence the tongue senses well when it is neither totally dry nor too fluid, especially if its fluidity has a flavour, as in the case of people with jaundice or who have previously tasted something else with a flavour. ‘For that becomes touching of the first fluid thing,’ since the tongue is affected by the thing tasted, not through some medium but by contact, if the fluidity about it be more copious than of the latter, as it is proximate of which there is touch. Hence ‘first’ may refer to the proximate fluid thing or also to the previously present flavoured fluidity, as in the case of those who have previously tasted something flavoured. 422b10 The forms of flavours, [as in the case of colours, are simple when opposite – the sweet and the bitter – while the succulent borders on the one, the salty on the other. Between these are the pungent, the dry, the sour and the sharp. For these seem approximately to be the varieties of flavours. So the sense of taste is what is potentially such, the object of taste is what makes such a flavour actual.] As of colours the extremes are white and black, the others in between these, so in taste the extremes are the sweet and the bitter, the rest in between. All extremes are simple, as unmixed with each other, while those between are mixed from the extremes, not as being mixed up together with them, since they themselves exist simply but are sometimes said to be mixed and derived from each other because of what they have in common with the extremes. The others are different from each other in form, but the sour seems to be an excess of

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dryness. So the forms of flavours are not to be circumscribed, but people try to reduce them all to those that are most obvious. So he did well to say ‘these seem approximately to be the varieties of flavours’. Having stated what the object of taste is he says that the sense of taste,188 which was also an object of the enquiry, is what is potentially such, since actual knowledge is defined by what is known and has its status according to the form of that. Clearly the organ is affected, and the thing tasted makes it to be affected by acting on the organ in some way.

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CHAPTER 11 422b17 About touch and the tangible there is the same account. Because, as in the case of the other senses he studied the corresponding knowledge from the object of knowledge, so now also he determines what touch is from the object of touch. He sets out two problems about it. One is whether the sense of touch is one or many, because objects of touch are also many and seemingly of different sorts, and contain very many oppositions; the other is whether its sense-organ, i.e. the organ primarily underlying the sense of touch, is flesh in living things with blood and what is analogous to flesh in bloodless ones, or whether these are a medium as air is in the case of the first three senses, while the sense-organ is another thing.189 Thus he himself apparently judges that the primary sense-organ of touch is not flesh or its analogue, but, as he says in On Sense-Perception,190 that of touch and taste is in the region of the heart, the flesh and the sinews being sensitive, but not primarily. In this inquiry he depicts the flesh as not sensitive but analogous to the media, air and water. At least he makes it clear in concluding the discussion, saying191 both that ‘the differences of the body qua body are tangible and their sense-organ192 is that of touch’ and that ‘that in which the sense called touch primarily resides is the part which is potentially such’. He adds ‘primarily’193 to make it clear where the sense-organ of touch, about which he was inquiring, should be placed. Seeing this, he would not allow that flesh was the sense-organ, since the heart was the primary sense-organ of touch and taste, while flesh had the role of a medium in relation to it, but was itself sensitive, even if secondarily. He himself makes this clear, holding that the medium must be naturally conjoined [with the organ] and not foreign to it. A medium that is naturally conjoined and not of a different nature communicates in the life that is related to the ruling principle194 [of the soul]. But why would one not say that bones are sensitive, although they are naturally conjoined [with the organ]? Because, I shall say, they do not retain the role of a medium

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towards sensation, being by nature attached to vegetative life. That is the way in which he decides the second problem. The first problem was whether the senses of what are counted as tangible are not many, since they contain many oppositions. For even if one sense-organ is common to all, whether it be the primary one or the naturally conjoined medium, that is not sufficient to establish that there is a single sense, since the tongue is common to touch and taste, even though they are not one. However, he lays it down that the sense of touch is one, with a fine demonstration that each of the other senses admits a plurality of oppositions. He again inquires correctly, since even if there are many oppositions, there must be some single common nature for each sense to which the plurality is related, e.g. light in the case of sight; for colour is visible as a sort of light. Also sound in the case of hearing, in smelling scent, which is the flavoured substance released in the shared moisture of air and water, flavour in taste. So he rightly investigates what is common in the case of touch, even if it has no name, and lays down that it is that which is distinctive of bodies qua bodies, of which the four elements are the principles, i.e. of those bodies that come to be and perish. For there is a common defining form195 of the bodies as becoming, a form which has its consequent specific properties; with regard to position, weight and lightness and the inclinations between these;196 with regard to their mutual interaction, heat and cold, dryness and fluidity, and qualities woven out of these such as smoothness and roughness, hardness and softness and the like.197 In this way he has handed down to us the single common genus of objects of touch, at least the fact, even if it has been given no common name. But we must turn to the text. He says that the same argument holds for both touch and its object. 422b17 For if touch is not a single sense but many, then necessarily objects of touch will be of many kinds. [It is problematic whether there are many senses or one, what is the senseorgan of the tangible, whether it be flesh and, in other kinds, the equivalent, or not so, but that is a medium ] The converse is also true that, if what is touched is many kinds of sensible objects, then the sense of touch is also many kinds of senses. But since the central discussion now is about the sense of touch he starts from that, so that, having shown that the objects of touch are not many kinds of sensible objects, he will have it accepted by the antithetical converse198 that the sense of touch is also one. Having raised the problem whether it is one sense or many, he adds on to it the other problem, what the sense-organ of the object of touch is, ‘whether it is flesh and the equivalent in other kinds, or not so’, by

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‘other kinds’ meaning bloodless animals. He at once reveals his opinion that ‘that is a medium’. He suggests in what sense it is a medium by adding: 422b22  and the primary sense-organ is something else within, [For every sense seems to be concerned with a single opposition; e.g. sight with white and black, hearing with high and low, taste with bitter and sweet. But the object of touch contains many oppositions – hot and cold, dry and moist, hard and soft, and others similar.] [‘Primary’] since flesh also is an organ of sense, but secondary. Otherwise the other would not have been a primary sense-organ but simply a sense-organ. It is like the moisture in the eye and the air in the ears. For there the external air or water was not the intermediate sense-organ.199 Next he elaborates the first problem arising from the fact that it seems that each of the other senses is concerned with a single opposition, but this one with many. 422b27 But there is some solution at least of that problem, [that in the case of the other senses also there are many oppositions, e.g. in voice not only high and low but big and small, smoothness and roughness of voice and others similar. There are also other similar differences concerning colour.] He well says ‘some solution’ and that it is directed only to the problem arising from a plurality of oppositions. He will add another solution also on the same issue, whether it is one or many, arising from the fact that there is no apparent common genus of objects of touch.200 The present solution does not meet this, but only that from the plurality of oppositions, so, reasonably, is not a solution without qualification but ‘some’. What then is the solution? ‘That in the case of the other senses also there are many oppositions’. For it is clear that hearing will recognise sound in all its proper characters, including the opposite ones that it may exhibit, such as being great and small, smooth and rough. He is not referring to the features of masses, so as to obtrude unnecessarily the common sensibles, as Alexander thought,201 but to the specific features of sounds, which hearing alone recognises. That is why ‘in voice’ is included, as Plutarch also well observed.202 ‘There are also other similar differences concerning colour’, such as greatness in the case of a glittering colour and in general of that thing which is more quickly seen and strikes the sight more strongly, like the colour of gold and silver, and smallness in the case of that which needs more light in order to be seen and which stimulates the sight more weakly, such as that of lead. There is also

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smoothness in the case of things that are soft to sight, like that of flowers, as there is roughness in the case of things fragmented. But, even if light is common to all things seen, you may find very many differences between bright things that shine and those that do not but are seen in darkness, and among shining objects in relation to each other, and in things seen in darkness. The difference is greatest among transparent things, which shine more obviously or more weakly, either because of the difference of shining objects or of the transparent or in addition of both. So it is not to be wondered at if also in relation to the single nature of objects of touch many differences should arise. So the problem arising from the plurality of opposites has been solved and he now investigates the next: 422b32 But it is not perspicuous what the single substrate is for touch, as sound is for hearing. [Whether the sense-organ is within or not, but is the flesh immediately ]

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For the problem is put forward not because of the nature of things but because of our ignorance. That is why he did not say that it is not ‘single’ but that ‘it is not perspicuous’ [what the single is]; perhaps because the concept of the nature of the thing deserts us because there is no common name; but sometimes vice versa because the thing which characterises generally generated things as such is difficult to hunt out, when the name of it also is lacking. The Philosopher has raised the problem of what the common feature is. Before stating what this seems to be he inquires what the sense-organ of touch is. This is in order to strengthen now by this inquiry the problem about touch, that it is not one, by attacking the seeming proof of its being one from the fact that its sense-organ is one. For if flesh is not the primary sense-organ, it is extremely unclear whether the primary are not many. But even if it is one, it is still not obvious that touch is the one sense of all the objects. For, just as while the tongue is the common organ basic to both touch and taste, these are not one, so nor are all the perceptions of things called tangible one, even if there is a common sense-organ for them all. This is in order that he may show that through its sense-organ touch is more corporeal than the other senses and more subject to affection, and thereby find the object of sensation conjoined with it, which is what characterises bodies subject to affection.203 So he shows how touch is corporeal and passive from its primary sense-organ. But even this sense-organ does not at once and immediately approach the sensible object, nor does any organ of the other senses, lest strong affects should impede the activity of judgement; neither will this organ be capable of grasping the sensible object through foreign media, but it requires a medium naturally conjoined with it, being vitally affected by the sensible

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object and already, even if weakly and secondarily, displaying an activity of judgement, and then stimulating the sense-organ that is primarily and more clearly maintaining that activity. Since the primary sense-organ of touch requires a more active source of stimulation – for taste also is a kind of touch and is not well roused to its proper activity unless it be stimulated by what is vital and already sensitive – the form of life which determines it, is probably not as separate [from the bodily organ] as are the other senses,204 and because of its lesser independence, it will not stretch out also to foreign objects. 423a1  the fact that sensation occurs immediately on contact seems to be no indication. [For, even as things are, if one were to stretch something round the flesh, making a sort of membrane, this would similarly signal a sensation immediately when touched. It is however clear that the sense-organ would not be in this membrane. But if it were also to become fused with the body the sensation would come through even more quickly. Thus such a portion of the body seems to be in such a state ] Since because it is more corporeal and more subject to affection it also raises the suspicion that the primary sense-organ is immediately present to the sensible object. To this Aristotle first objects that flesh is not the primary sense-organ, even if we sense immediately on contact with it. For even if a membrane were stretched around the finger, sense would be simultaneous with contact, and even faster if it were to become fused with the finger, but certainly it is not for that reason sharing vitally in the life of sensation. For it would be faster for that reason, but still the primary sense-organ would not be in the membrane, not even in the one fused. Why then would there not be touch through a foreign medium, since we sense both through a membrane and through water when the finger is wetted? Perhaps this is not through a medium as in sight, as he himself will make clear by the illustration involving the shield.205

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423a7  as if air had been naturally joined in a circle round us; [for we would have seemed to have perceived sound, colour and smell with one single sense, and sight, hearing and smell would have seemed to be one single sense. But now, because the medium through which the stimuli come is differentiated, the sense-organs mentioned are clearly distinct. But this is now unclear in the case of touch.] By such a supposition he simultaneously shows that it is not necessary for that which is naturally fused to us and in immediate contact

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with the sensible object to be the primary sense-organ, and that it is not necessary that because there is a single medium the perceptions through its stimulation should be one, thus extending the first problem. But now, when the media are distinct and the sense-organs for the first three senses are plain, their plurality is plain to see. ‘But this is now unclear in the case of touch’ – what the primary sense-organ is and whether the tactile senses are one or many. 423a12 For the animate body cannot be composed of air or of water. [For there must be something solid. It remains that it is a mixture of earth and these, which is what flesh and the like presumably is.] By this he wishes to give the explanation why the primary senseorgan is unclear in the case of touch. That is why he uses the explanatory connective ‘For’. At the same time he clarifies what sort of thing the medium is in the case of touch. So what is the explanation of the unclarity? Because in the case of touch, just because it is touch, the object perceived must approach the living sensitive body. But the living body of things generated and perishable cannot be composed of air or water, so that it could have been like to the foreign media intervening in the case of the other senses, but it must be hard and therefore mixed from earth and the other elements. 423a15 So that it is necessary that the body also should be the naturally attached medium of the sense of touch  He is referring to the body of living things. This must necessarily be the naturally attached medium between the sense of touch and its object. The conclusion that the medium must be naturally attached to the sense of touch, does not necessarily follow from what has now been said; rather it is taken from the fact that universally there exists something that transmits, which will later be recalled, and the fact that, in the case of touch, the stimulus does not occur through something external, but the body must be affected by the sensible object itself. From this it necessarily follows that our body (that is made clear by ‘naturally attached’) has the role of that ‘through which’. And one must understand the text in this way: ‘so that it is necessary that the naturally attached body should be the medium of the sense of touch’,206 which is the primary sense-organ, and clearly also of the object of touch, since, in the case of touch, there must be something that transmits, without being external. He explains the medium which, as it were, transmits, that it is animate and hard and mixed from earth and the other elements. For the medium must be vitally affected in order better to stimulate the primary organ of

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touch, which is more inactive than the other sense-organs, because of the more corporeal character of the tactile life,207 and it must be mixed, since the composition of the animate body must be such as that of the generated living thing. But:

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423a16  through which the perceptions occur, which are multiple. [That they are multiple is made clear by touch in the case of the tongue. For it senses all sorts of objects of touch through the same part as it senses flavour. So, if other flesh had also sensed flavour, taste and touch would have seemed to be one and the same sense. But as things are they are two because they are not convertible.] He spoke in this problematic way because the tongue also, as he himself points out, is the organ of two senses,208 being sensitive to both flavours and objects of touch in the same portion, so that the two would have seemed to be one if also the other flesh had recognised flavours. But since it recognises only objects of touch, so that their functions are not convertible, but the one that is of flavour also recognises objects of touch, while what is of touch does absolutely not recognise flavours, the difference is clear. 423a21 One might raise this problem: if every body has depth, and this is the third dimension of magnitude, [and if there is some body between two bodies, these cannot touch each other; now neither the fluid nor the damp is without body, but must either be water or contain it; things touching each other in water whose surfaces are not dry, must have water between them with which the extremities are covered; and if this be true, things cannot touch each other in water, nor in air (for air has the same relation to things in it as water has to things in water, though this escapes us more easily, as it escapes animals in water that a damp thing touches a damp one); if so, is sensation of all things alike or differently of different things, just as now taste and touch seem to be by contact, the other senses from afar? But this is not the case, but we perceive both the hard and the soft through other things, as we do the sounding, the visible and the odorous. But these we receive from afar, the others from near, which is why it escapes us. For we really receive everything through a medium, though it escapes us in these cases (i.e. touch and taste). However, as we also said earlier,209 even if we were to perceive everything tangible through some membrane which escaped us as intervening, we should still be as we are now both

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in water and in air. For we now believe that we touch the objects themselves and that there is nothing in between.]

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For body has three dimensions. He has already taken it that in the case of touch the medium is not external but is naturally attached, and has said that, even if a membrane is stretched around, touch still occurs, which makes it seem to be through a foreign medium.210 Now he wishes to demonstrate by these, the difference of touch from the three senses, not only when a membrane is stretched around but also whenever some medium is placed between the sense of touch and its object, as when both are wet with water and the water is present between them, which is a body and therefore also has depth and prevents an immediate conjunction of the things that touch each other. And perhaps even in the case of things in air some body composed of air intervenes, if air as well as water has an adhesive211 character. So there is not always a medium, for not even one composed of air or water itself. And even in the cases where there is a medium which does not hinder the sense of touch, it does not transmit the activity as in the case of the three, but it is affected together with the flesh, as he clearly confirms by the illustration of the shield. So much is clear. In the text ‘must either be water or contain it’, being water applies to the fluid, containing it to the damp. In ‘things cannot touch each other in water’ ‘immediately’ must be understood. Next he gives support, lest the other senses would be like the three because in their case some medium may intervene, and makes a distinction on this basis: 423b12 But the tangible differs from the visible and the audible. [We perceive the latter because the medium affects us, but we perceive the tangible not by the agency of the medium but together with it, like somebody struck through his shield being struck. For it is not that the shield was struck and then passed on the blow, but it happened that both were struck at once.]212

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So since in the case of touch and taste nothing external has the function of transmission, but there needs to be something in their case also that transmits so that the primary sense-organ, as has already been said,213 should not be immediately affected by its proper sensible object and blunted in its activity of judgement, in their case also what transmits, is required, even if it is not foreign, but naturally attached, being animate as was said, through the sensitive soul. In that way it would be naturally attached to the primary sense-organ. For the primary must also be affected in some way by the sensible object, as the excesses that reveal the affection show, but enough to be stimulated to activity, while the excessive affection hinders it.

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There is excess when the action of the sensible object on the primary sense-organ is immediate. What, then, is it that transmits in the case of taste and touch? He says that it is the tongue in the case of taste, but the whole flesh in the case of touch. He distinguishes these in what follows, writing: 423b17 In general it seems that just as air and water are to sight, hearing and smell, so are the flesh and the tongue to their sense-organ as each of those is. [For neither here nor there would there be perception if the sense-organ itself were touched, for example if someone put something white upon the surface of the eye. In this way it is clear that the sense-organ of touch is inside. In that way what happened would be the same as in the case of the other senses. For it does not perceive things placed upon the sense-organ, but it does perceive things placed upon the flesh. So the medium of the sense of touch is flesh.] He said ‘each of these’, though he has mentioned before two, air and water, either because he said that these serve for three senses or because ‘these’ are not to be understood to be air and water, but simply the transparent which convey sound and smell.214 These are three and are not found only in air and water, but in other things as well. Flesh and the tongue are similarly situated as these in so far as they too are media and have the function of transmission. For clearly, in so far as these are naturally attached, whereas the others are foreign, there is not a similar analogy. Therefore we are not in a position to say that flesh is altogether insensitive, as is water. For the likeness is not of that sort, but qua being transmitters, and this as in relation to the primary and sensitive. ‘In this way it is clear that the sense-organ of touch is inside’; for it is in the heart, as is said elsewhere.215

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423b26 These216 then are the differences of the body qua body. [I mean the differences which distinguish the elements, hot and cold, dry and moist, about which we spoke earlier in the books on the elements.] ‘These’, of which he said that they become perceptible when placed on the flesh. Through these, as we have already said, the single genus of the nature of tangible things is determined, that which characterises bodies qua bodies, not absolutely, but such as he exhibited through the distinctive differences of the elements; thus [these features that characterise] bodies qua passive, which are generated and perishable. For their principles are the four elements, and their differences are first the passive qualities. He says that he has spoken

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of them in ‘the books on the elements’, so called On Coming to be and Passing away.217 423b29 Their sense-organ is that of touch, and that in which the sense called touch primarily resides is the part which is potentially such. [For to perceive is to be affected in some way, so that what is in act makes that which is potentially so such as it itself is. Therefore we do not perceive what is similarly hot and cold or hard and soft, but their excesses, since the sense is a kind of mean state between the opposites in things perceived. It judges sensible objects in that way. For the mean is capable of judgment.]

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Having determined the genus of tangible objects, he now determines from them the sense of touch. For it is that which is potentially like what is tangible, because the actively cognitive always is in a state corresponding to the form of what it knows.218 But the sensitive is stimulated by the object sensed, being insufficient in itself. Therefore also ‘to perceive is to be affected in some way’, but not as being destroyed but as being perfected. Therefore it is not ‘affected’ absolutely, but ‘in some way’; in short, it is so affected as to receive its perfection from elsewhere. The sense of touch is in potency, not in act; for it is in act when touching. Through the agency of the body perceived the sense becomes actually such as that body is because of the appearance219 of the form which comes into the sense-organ from it, since the activity of judgement and the perfect state corresponding to the form is from within and according to the concepts of the perceptible things which are inherent in the substance [of the soul]220 – for knowledge and the determination of knowledge is not imposed from without like a seal or mould221 – but the sense-organ must be affected by the object sensed. For affected is what is potentially such but not what is actually so. How, then, is it possible for the senseorgan, being liable to affection, not also actually to share in affective qualities itself? And if it already shares in them how will it be affected in regard to them? But, he says, ‘it is not the similarly hot etc. that it will perceive’, but the excessive, and in this way it is affected by the dissimilar, ‘since the sense is a kind of mean state’. Either he is using ‘the sense’ as equivalent to ‘the sense-organ’, or, if it is the sensitive substance itself, it is not so absolutely but some sort of mean because it uses the mean tempering of the sense-organ as its substrate. 424a6 For it becomes in relation to each of them the other extreme. [And just as what is about to perceive white and black must be neither of them in actuality but potentially both (and

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similarly in the case of the other senses), so in the case of touch it must be neither hot nor cold. Further, as sight is in a way of the visible and the invisible, and similarly the other senses are of opposites ] [‘For it becomes’ that is] the intermediate which becomes like the cold in relation222 to the excessively hot. So when he claims again that the sense of touch is neither hot nor cold he does not mean that it is totally without a share in them, but is a moderate mixture of both. 424a12  so touch is also of the tangible and intangible. [Intangible includes that which has only to a small degree the special character of tangibles, which is the condition of air, and the excesses of tangibility, as with things destructive of touch.] For in cold weather we perceive by touch that the air is not hot, [and we perceive both] that which has a slight heat and that which has it in excess.

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424a15 So an account has been given of each of the senses in outline. For he makes a more articulate examination of the sensible objects in a work specifically about them.223 CHAPTER 12 424a17 It must be accepted universally concerning all senseperception 

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Having made a study separately about each sense, he resumes the common account of it all. He gives the defining form224 of perception qua perception, and the characteristic present unqualified in the sense-organ of any sense whatsoever. 424a17  that sense is that which is receptive of the form of things sensed without matter, [as wax receives the device on a ring without the iron and the gold, and accepts the golden or bronze device, but not qua gold or bronze.] It is evident that a sense is a receptive substance. But since there are many other things of that sort, he now gives the specific feature of the sensitive substance, that it is affected by something external and is not altogether aroused of itself to actual contemplation, as are intellect and scientific knowledge and opinion and already imagina-

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tion itself.225 But, while every actual cognition is defined by the form of its object, not being affected by it but being active, and active not creatively but with judgement and understanding,226 the other cognitive activities obtain their perfection from their own being and project the form of their object of themselves, but that of sensation requires also the object sensed which lies outside in order to project actively the form of that object. That is why it is said to be both subject to affection and receptive of forms which, as it were, enter from elsewhere, and to be perfected by other things. An indication thereof is the fact that, being the lowest form [of cognition], sense-perception must use an organ, and in such a way that it neither is itself strong enough to be self-sufficient in its use nor has an organ sufficient for the life that uses it, but one that needs first to be affected227 in some way by the sensible object, the vital activity being aroused simultaneously with the external affection. So the organ, being a body, has in the life of sensation an activity that is affective,228 but the sense that uses it is active without affection, projecting from within the concepts of the objects perceived in correspondence with the affective activity of the organ, by which concepts, as has been said, it understands and judges actively. It is consequently said to be receptive of forms and to be affected by what has colour or flavour or sound because its organ needs to be affected by these, having received an appearance of the forms in them. For as the activity in the agent is akin to the form that is produced in its effect, so the affection according to the forms makes clear the kinship with the agent; and, by the appearance of the form which enters the sense-organ by the agency of the sensible object both the life in [the sense-organ] becomes active and the life that uses it229 projects its activity of judgement pure according to the concepts which are akin to the affective activity in the sense-organ; [and its activity is pure], since it is not affected nor receives the forms from outside. For the cognition is from within, and so also the state corresponding to the object of knowledge. But the sense is said to be affected and to become the forms because the sense-organ receives the formal appearances from outside, and not without activity; for it receives the forms without matter, since every sensible object is not a form but enformed. As it exists through form, so the sense names it through its form and it is recognised through it. So the sense-organ receives the appearance of the form and the sense, being in a state corresponding to the form, recognises the sensible object. So it is as the wax receives the device of the golden ring, but does not take in the gold and is not affected by the gold, but receives only the mould and is affected by what is moulded.230

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424a21 And similarly the sense of each [sensible] is affected by that which has colour or flavour or sound, but not as each of these is named, but as of a certain kind and according to a ratio.231 The sense is affected by being aroused to its proper activity while the sense-organ is primarily affected. Also, the sense is affected by the composite thing,232 and ‘not as each of these is named’. For the composite thing also is active according to its form, and the sense receives the formal activity, not by being determined, e.g. being whitened or sounding or being sweetened or being heated, nor being so affected, but as being cognitively active with regard to the white object or the sound or any of the others, and it is said to be affected because, when the sense-organ receives the activity from outside, it is then itself aroused. For even if the body grows hot, the reception of the form does not consist in becoming hot but in cognitive activity233 according to the form of heat, since, as being heated, the organ becomes something sensible, but not sensitive. So that even if the sense of sight is segregated by a white object,234 it is not by being so affected that it makes its judgement, but by its activity according to the form of whiteness.

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424a24 The primary sense-organ is that in which this power resides. The sense-organ of each sense is different. But that in which is the common feature of all sensation, about which the present discussion is, is ‘the primary’ – which is probably the vital breath (pneuma) –, ‘in which this power resides’, i.e. the common sense that includes them all and is not some sense but simply sense, since it is active with them all and encompasses them all.235

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424a25 These are the same thing but their essence is different. [For what senses must be a magnitude, but neither being sensitive nor sense is a magnitude but some ratio (logos) and power of the former.] As we have seen, there is on the one hand the soul of the vital organ which characterises it as such and is related to it as a form towards the being informed by it, and there is also the soul which uses the body as an instrument.236 For this soul also is an actualisation of the body through its inclination237 towards it and is determined by the use of it. As the user and the organ become one because of their joint activity, so one and the same thing comes to be from both, but they differ and are distinguished from each other in essence. Especially

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[distinguished from each other] are the user and the sense-organ, which is what senses, but also the sensitive principle itself [is distinguished from the bodily organ], since it has a double cause, one material as a magnitude and as a body, the other formal, through the sensitive life which characterises it as a living organ.238 For neither is the life itself a magnitude, still less the user soul, but it is ‘some logos and power of the former’: one sort of soul is this insofar it determines the organ itself, the other, because its being consists in using it, and this soul is properly called a logos and not a form. For the form is indivisible whereas the logos239 is an unfolded essence, and such is the life of the soul.240 Since there are many rational principles (logoi) both vital and natural, the sensitive life is rightly said to be ‘some logos’, but also ‘the power’ of the sense-organ, the one as that through which it is moved vitally, the other as what initiates the motion. For motion is the actualisation of the potential.241 And thus there is a power both in the thing moved and in what initiates motion. Those distinctions about power are made in Metaphysics, Book 5.242 424a28 From these considerations it is clear also why sometimes excesses in sensible objects damage the sense-organ; [for if the stimulation of the sense-organ be too strong the ratio (logos), which is sense, is destroyed ]. For the sensitive life itself, which recognises the forms at both extremes and is similarly related to both, is a mean, not by being determined by both but as active with both, and it comes to be in its own organ which is receptive equally of the appearances from both. So the organ itself is in a mean, not as projective but as receptive, and not of pure activity but such as is mixed with affection. So if the affection destroys the constitutive mean243 through excess at either extreme, the sense organ is destroyed qua sense-organ, and, he says ‘the logos is destroyed’, this being sensation.244 For when the receptive organ is destroyed through its asymmetry, of necessity the particular life which forms the organ is also destroyed because its being consists in determining the organ, as is also that life which uses the organ, if its being consists solely in using an organ. For if it does not, but it either has separate activities, as does the master of a boat qua man, or exists primarily in an eternal body,245 it is broken up insofar as it is no longer using the organ, but not absolutely. 424a31  as are concord and pitch when the strings are violently plucked. Sometimes when they are even broken, when the concord is totally

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destroyed, sometimes when the concord activity is merely246 impeded through the violence of the stroke. The illustration is very well suited to the corporeal symmetry of the organ, but not to the sensitive life. For the life is not itself a concord but flourishes upon the concord.

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424a32 And why is it that plants are not sensitive, since they have a certain psychic element and are affected by objects of touch? [For they are both heated and chilled. The explanation is that they have no mean state, nor such a principle as to receive the forms of sensible objects ] The inquiry is plainly stated and also the discovery of the explanation in terms of the corporeal property as material and life as formal. For ‘they have no mean state’ has to be understood to refer to the corporeal symmetry between the extremes, ‘such a principle as to receive the forms of sensible objects’ to refer to the life of sensation, about which how ‘receptive’ has to be understood has already been set out.247 424b2  but they are affected together with their matter. That is to say, they are determined by their qualities and characterised accordingly, but they are not also aroused to cognitive activity in relation to them. And as the activity is in accordance with and together with the form, so the affection is with the matter. For if a composite thing is pre-eminently determined by heat in being heated, so also is the matter of the composite, and as the matter is primarily determined by the forms which give it its essence, so are the composites by the qualities.248 424b3 But one might raise the problem whether anything would be affected by an odour if incapable of smelling, [or by a colour if incapable of seeing, and so in the case of the rest. But if what is smelt is an odour, the effect it produces, if anything, is smelling. So that nothing incapable of smelling can be affected by an odour, and similarly in the case of the rest. Nor indeed can things capable of sensing except in the way that they are sensitive.] He has said that some insensitive things are affected, and of these some are affected together with their matter, like things being heated or cooled, some without their matter, as is the wax which receives the device on the ring without the gold or the iron; he has also called sensation an affection.249 By the problems before us and their solution he distinguishes the different sorts of affections and agencies which bring about the affections. For some of these agencies (1) work by

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altering and modifying what receives them, and it is clear that what receives them is affected as it is altered, as things being painted are affected by being coloured and things which receive an agreeable smell from things near them and things that are sweetened and those heated and also things becoming more audible like a string that is relaxed and tightened. But other things (2) are active with regard only to the form, and come to transmit to the receiver some form without affection, in the way that I said that wax shares in the device.250 Still more clearly the air shares in light and in general what is intermediate between the sense-organ and the sensible object transmits the activity of the sensible object.251 For in that way transparent media transmit the activity of colour and the resonant that of what sounds and the conductor that of what smells. If the tongue and flesh are also media, we should have in the case both of flavours and tangible objects such things as receive the activities as transmitters, but in these cases as at once also secondarily sensitive. Finally (3), some agencies concern sensible objects as such, when the receptive is sensitive, if these are related to each other and interact, the sensitive being sensitive to the sensible object, the sensible object being sensible to the sensitive. Hence the sensible object acts qua sensible on what senses it, but as colour and as sound [on the medium], the one on the transparent, the other on the resonant, even if there is nothing that sees or hears. In the latter case, it is not by some activity, but by receiving the activity of the others that the medium becomes in actuality transparent or resonant; but the sensitive becomes actual also through its own activity, since it has the activity of judgment. So affecting and being affected have three forms, one by the alteration and modification of the receptor, one by the transfer252 of formal activity by the agent and the receptor’s participation therein, this also being called an affection because it is accomplished from outside, and one, in addition to reception from outside, being determined by its own activity, this also being an affection since the reception is from outside. Here only there is sensation. Therefore not all things have sensitive affection.253 So in distinguishing these the Philosopher raises the problem whether the odorous or colour act on non-sensitive things. And now he takes the line that they do not, since, he says, ‘what is smelt is an odour, but an odour acts on the sense of smell’ and the sense of smell is a particular sense. He concludes that things without a sense of smell are not affected by odours. He says ‘and similarly in the case of the rest’ since nothing is affected by colours except the sighted. He adds ‘nor indeed can things capable of sense, except in the way they are sensitive’. For even if a being with hearing can sense, still it will not be affected by colour but in the way that it is sensitive, by sound, and that being with a sense of taste by flavour. It is clear that the statements are true, so long as

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the thought and statement is not merely of colour or of smell as such, but of sensible objects as such. For nor are things without sense affected by sensible objects as such. 424b9 It is at the same time clear also as follows: neither light and darkness nor sound nor smell affects bodies, but that in which they are, [as it is air accompanied by thunder that splits wood.] This argument also has the same tendency as that previously stated, that the forms of sensible objects clearly have as such no effect on bodies qua bodies, but through their substrates. Thus thunder sometimes breaks up timber not by its sound but because the blast of air in which the sound is blows hard and strikes the timber. For not only do sensible objects have no effect qua sensible objects, but nor as such do they provide a share in their activity, but in some other way, as, if something coloured lying on top of something were to push it down with it, it would clearly not be through its colour but through its weight, and, if something heats, through its heat. So its action then would be neither as sensible object nor as colour. 424b12 But things tangible and flavours do affect them; [if they did not by what would inanimate things be affected and altered? So do the objects of the other senses affect them? Or is not every body affected by smell and sound, and are not those that are affected indefinite and impermanent, like air – for it smells as though having been affected?] He seems to support the contrary, that sensible objects act on things lacking sense also, but by both the arguments he makes plain the truth, that the forms of sensible objects sometimes have an effect as sensible objects, as when254 they act upon the sensitive, and also not as sensible objects. That is so in two ways: for they act both through their own forms and through their substrate or accompaniments. That they have an effect is especially obvious in the case of tangible objects and flavours. For the inanimate also are heated and become sweet and salty as they are altered, as he himself says, and also being affected in the way we first mentioned.255

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424b17 Or to smell is to perceive. That is to say, to consist not in the activity from outside alone but also in its own, if to perceive is to be cognitively active.257 171,1

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424b17 But air, when affected quickly, becomes perceptible. The transparent receives the activity from the source of light all at once, the resonant and the conveyer of smell not all at once, since they seem to receive the activity by having been previously affected, but the affection takes time but quickly. So the affected air either becomes a conveyer of smell in actuality through previous affection258 or also receives the activity of the odorous as from something else, and becomes perceptible. Sometimes it itself is affected and becomes odorous, but always it conducts the activity of the odorous to the sense of smell, in both cases not becoming perceptive but perceptible, because it does not also stand still at the form of the sensible object from within through its own activity.

Notes 1. The Greek term aisthêsis and its cognates can range in their application between sensation (such as a pain) and sense-perception (whether of a quality or object, or that something is so). Within the present discussion of sense-perception, aisthêsis is translated as ‘sense-perception’, ‘perception’, or ‘sense’; aisthanesthai as ‘to perceive’; to aisthêton as the ‘sensible object’ (which, of course, may be an instance of a quality); to aisthêtikon as ‘the faculty of sense-perception’; aisthêtikos ‘sensitive’, ‘sentient’, or ‘perceptive’; and, aisthêtêrion as ‘sense-organ’. 2. For a summary of the method to follow see 23,32-24,8. 3. Later, at 146,22, the commentator hopes to get support from Plato for his claim that the essence of the soul is to be elucidated from its activities, see n. 135. 4. In 415b21ff. Aristotle explains that the soul is the principle of motion (change) in living things, not only the principle of locomotion (for not all living things have this), but also the principle of qualitative changes such as growth and alteration of which sensation is an example. ‘For sensation is thought to be a kind of alteration.’ 5. Correct 117,7 energeiai to energeia (cf. 124,6). 6. Qualitative change is discussed by Aristotle at length in GC 1.4, 319b10-33, and defined as change in respect of affection (or quality) in Metaph. 12.2, 1069b12; 14.1, 1088a32; Cat. 4, 15b12; Phys. 5.2, 226a26; 7.2, 243a9; GC 1.2, 317a27; 5, 320a14. See also Phys. 6.10, 241a32; 8.7, 260a33. Alloiôsis is connected to pathos at Phys. 7.3, 246a2-3; 4, 248a13-15. But in the Categories he considers affection (pathos) and quality (poion, poiotês) as different categories. Furthermore, he never uses the term peisis and never claims that affection is qualitative change. The author of the commentary may have derived this notion from Iamblichus who – according to Simplicius (in Cat. 326,15-18 CAG VIII) – says that qualitative change, like many other kinds of change, is to be subsumed under affection. Peisis is a common term for affection in the Neoplatonists, e.g. Priscian, Metaphrasis 6,1.4.6. 7. The author seems to have read eirêtai men instead of eirêkamen: see commentary 117,25. 8. 1.7-9, see also Phys. 3.3, 202a21ff. 9. At 416b34. 10. This may be a reference to Alexander’s commentary on the De Anima, now lost, or to his Quaest. 82,35-6. For details of his activity see R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation’, ANRW II 36.2, 1176-1243, esp. p. 1186. There is no such view to be found in his extant works. If ‘the senses’ were equivalent to the ‘sense-organs’ then we should require the sight to perceive the eyes which are bodies and made up of the elements, just like all objects of sense-perception. 11. A reference to Plutarch of Athens who founded the Athenian School of the Neoplatonists and wrote a commentary on the De Anima. Our text is Fonte 21 in D.P. Taormina, Plutarco di Atene, L’Uno, L’anima, le forme Catania-Roma 1989, see also her notes on pp. 188-90.

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12. Empedocles speaks about elements as constituents or organs of the senses in B 84, 85, 86, 109 DK, and see also Theophrastus’ report in De Sensibus chs.7-11. 13. ‘Permanently active’ translates kat’ energeian hestôsa. ‘Permanence’ does not necessarily involve temporality because many of its functions are surely instantaneous. The clause hestêke kata is discussed briefly in n. 46, and see also Steel’s introductory essay. 14. In this context, logos is translated throughout as ‘concept’. To keep a distance from the modern notion, we should be aware that these concepts are innate in the soul and not products of abstraction. They are active and inhere in the essence of the soul which contains them because of its origin in the Intellect. The internal concepts are internally projected, so as to perfect the sensory information coming from outside. 15. See e.g. Phaedo 81B2-3; Timaeus 86B1-87B9; Phaedrus 248A1ff.; Rep. 571D; Sophist 228A1-D10; Laws 730E1-732E8. The term kakunomenê (‘is made bad’) occurs at Timaeus 42C1 when Plato examines the wandering of the soul into another body, and is used many times by Plotinus, cf. III 2.4.23; III 2.8.11; VI 7.6.24; VI 7.7.1. Note the distinctive theory of causation (‘blames’ translates aitiatai, literally ‘treats as cause’), which is analogous to occasionalism, except that there is an intentional aspect, since the soul is aroused concerning (peri), and not merely on the occasion of the appearance of, the quasi-cause. (Ed.) 16. For self-awareness in Neoplatonism as requiring reversion on oneself, see Peter Lautner, ‘Rival theories of self-awareness in Late Neoplatonism’, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, vol. 39 (new series 1), 1994, pp. 107-16. 17. aisthanesthai, as in all MSS and possibly in Philoponus (in DA 295,31-3). This is repetitive of 417a9, but the commentator gives an explanation for this repetition. Ross, following Alexander in Quaestiones 3.3, 83,6 Bruns CAG Suppl. II,2, reads aisthêton. (J.O.U.) 18. legomen. Ross has legômen – let us talk. 19. 3.2, 201b31-2; see also 8.5, 257b8-9 where we find entelekheia (actuality) instead of energeia although the meaning may be the same. 20. pathêtikê poiotês. Explained in Categories ch. 8 9a28-10a11. The traditional translation is ‘passive qualities’. We follow Ackrill’s translation. 21. metabolê; a word which here means change in general, including coming to be, ceasing to be, alteration or qualitative change, and the locomotion (kinêsis) that is often also translated as change, because it may have that general meaning. 22. This cannot be a reference to Phys. 4. We propose to correct tetarton to ogdoon. It is also impossible that this is a reference to Simplicius’ commentary on the Physics. See Steel’s introductory essay. 23. This unconsciously queries the principle that cause need be altogether like effect. (Ed.) 24. In Physics 2.3 Aristotle says that the craftsman or the sculptor (as efficient cause) knows the notion (as formal cause) of the statue before turning to construct a statue. According to Physics 2.7, 198a24ff. formal, efficient and final causes often coincide, and in De Anima 2.5, 415b8-27 Aristotle is speaking about the soul standing to body as cause in all three ways. On productive cause cf. also Physics 2.2, 195b5-8. As regards Plato, we should think of the Demiurge or Creator of the Timaeus. 25. The commentator appears to read anomoion without the definite article at 121.3. 26. The text differs from that of the MSS and Torstrik and Ross. Simplicius(?) puts nun gar haplôs legomen, ha legomen peri autôn. The MSS., Ross and Phi-

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loponus read nun gar haplôs legomen peri autôn. Influenced presumably by the MSS., the Aldine edition of this commentary omits ha legomen. (J.O.U.) 27. On this doctrine, see Steel’s introductory essay. 28. Phys. 7.3, 247a6-248a1. Aristotle emphasizes (b1ff.) that states of the thinking part are not alterations for alteration takes place by sensible objects. 29. Reading monon for monou at 122.5. 30. An. Post. 1.12, 77b16-33; 16, 79b23. 31. Ross’s text omits genesis and has a different word-order. 32. See textual note to 123,4 below. Aristotle here plays on the contrast between alloiôsis (alteration, etymologically: becoming other) and ‘advance to itself’. See Georges Van Riet, ‘La théorie thomiste de la sensation externe’, Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 51 (1953), pp. 374-408. 33. At 417b1. 34. grammatikê; this is usually translated ‘grammar’; but, as Aristotle’s example of recognising the letter A shows, he had not in mind the as yet non-existent study of grammar. (J.O.U.) 35. For soul and kinêsis see Phaedrus 245C5ff., Timaeus 36C-37C, 43D-44A. 36. Both the MSS and the Aldine-edition put Zeta (Book 6), which has been emended by Hayduck. His reference is to Physics 7.3 and we may think of 247b1-248a6. Accordingly, learning and other processes of the thinking part of the soul are not alterations. Alteration pertains to the objects sensed and occurs in the faculty of sense-perception. (J.O.U.) 37. katastêma, condition, is originally an Epicurean term (cf. Epicurus, Fr. 68 Usener) signifying a constant state or structure of the body. Though very rarely, it is used also by the Neoplatonists (cf. Porphyry, De Abstinentia IV 6, p.237.21 Nauck; Simplicius’ in Phys. 231,1). Here it does not necessarily refer to the condition of the body alone, for it is paralleled to change into possession and form. 38. Here we meet the usual, threefold division of universals: (1) the transcendent noêta that provide the universal form for the thing informed, e.g. the form of horse for the horses, (2) the form which exists only in the individuals and (3) the universal predicates (katêgoroumena) which are posterior and exist in our mind when we substract all differences that modify a certain form in the outside world, see A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1991, 49-53, 62-8 with reference to Simplicius’ in Cat. 82,35-83,20. 39. ‘only conceptually’ translates kata monên epinoian. For an explanation of the passage see D.P. Taormina, ‘Anima e realtà del conoscere. Hypostasis e hyparxis nei commentatori tardoantichi al De Anima’, in F. Romano and D.P. Taormina (eds.), HYPARXIS e HYPOSTASIS nel Neoplatonismo, Firenze 1994, pp. 101-31, esp. 128. 40. Metaph. 6.1, 1026a29-30. 41. logikê anelixis, rational unfolding, refers to discursivity, as has been pointed out by C. Steel, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussels 1978, pp. 1267, 134 n. 65. 42. In the majority of cases (47,21; 61,16; 79,14; 84,21; 99,33; 219,2; 249,29) the term ‘link’ (sunaphê) refers to a non-physical contact of the soul with the forms or intellect. There are only two exceptions (76,9; 163,14). 43. The question is whether the concepts or rational forms (logoi) projected from within are said to be common in the sense of being universal or not. Since these concepts are not products of abstraction, which are necessarily universals, one could claim that in order to fit in with the form of the thing sensed they should be

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somehow particular. But they are called common because, in each sense perception, we recognise a common sensible character, e.g. ‘blue’ or ‘white’. See also 126,10ff. 44. De Anima. 3.4. 45. The second way of potentiality is like the state of the sleeping geometer who is able to count though not counting in the moment, while the first way is like the state of uneducated children who cannot count though they are able to learn it. 46. ‘Stands still’ translates hestêke kata; an expression that signifies how any cognitive act (be it perception or thought) apprehends in a discrete indivisible moment its proper object as a whole. Some further passages treating this issue: 4,38; 47,7-8; 51,31; 66,14.23-6.34; 75,30-1; 118,30; 121,32; 128,23-4; 164,31; 189,36; 223,12; 237,27-8. For further references see index under histasthai kata and Steel’s introductory essay. 47. This characterisation of perception corresponds literally to Priscian’s Metaphrasis, 1,11ff.. See Bossier-Steel, p. 767 and Steel’s introductory essay. 48. To call perception ‘krisis’ is to call it a judgment of reason in Stoic usage, but merely a perceptual discrimination in Aristotle’s. The Late Neoplatonist view is that reason (logos) and intellect are involved, because there is a projection of concepts (logoi). 49. Despite Aristotle’s use of this analogy at 424a17ff. below, if form were imposed like a seal on wax, then following Stoic patterns we would have to accept a materialistic theory of sense-perception, which however cannot be reconciled with the efforts of our commentator to keep soul and its cognitive activities away from material components and in this way avoid problems arising from that kind of a doctrine. Moreover, it is not proper to life because this kind of life or vital process involves activity but pure reception is said to be passive. See also 165,4-5. At 164,29ff. this theory is replaced with doctrine based on appearances of the form of the thing sensed; these appearances enable the sense to apprehend the form itself. 50. Because proceeding into depth involves three-dimensionality and bodily structures. But the commentator aims at keeping cognitive capacities away from material components as far as possible. 51. The passage has been bracketed by Steel thinking that it explains the previous clause. 52. Contracted translates apestenômenê, a term used by poets (Theocritus, 22,104) and philosophers (Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Top. 56,3 CAG II,2). It turns up in this commentary many times (44,37; 61,34; 62,23; 173,26.36; 249,17; 285,26; 307,26) to exhibit the difference between the unity of the individuals in which they keep their particularity (merika at 61,33-4), as in the case of sets of numbers, and formal unity in which they gain a common form. The term is used also by Simplicius (apestenômenê gnôsis at in Phys. 18,4 CAG IX) to express a similar difference. 53. Fitting translates epharmozôn, a term to express the appropriate contact between the soul and concepts projected by it from within and the forms of the things sensed. It is used also by Priscian (Metaphrasis 3,1). The term may have originated in a physical context for Alexander of Aphrodisias (ap. Simplicium in Phys. 871,2) introduced a second sense of ‘together’ (hama) to escape accepting interpenetration. This second sense of ‘together’ is called ‘fitting with each other’ (to epharmozon); this does not imply spatial overlap. Alexander himself uses the verb in his De Anima (63,8-13) and we find it also in Quaestiones 3.9, 97,7-12 which may indicate that the term had some psychological relevance as well. Since the theory of the soul was regarded by the Peripatetics as part of natural science, it may be plausible to suppose that the term was also used in a psychological context. Simplicius uses the term epharmogê at his in Phys. 587,32-4. For further exami-

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nation see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Proclus on the criterion of truth’, in P. Huby and G. Neal (eds.), The Criterion of Truth, Liverpool 1989, pp. 257-81, esp. 259. 54. Contact (epaphê) is used in a metaphorical sense, as at 31,33; 44,9, referring to an immediate grasp of the wholeness of the thing known. See also Priscian’s Metaphrasis 10,10. 55. Common sensibles are not listed in this book. These are size, shape, number, movement and rest. At De Anima 424a16 unity is also added to the list. In De Memoria 451a17; 452b7-9, Aristotle adds time. 56. ‘Transference’ translates here metaphora (and metapheromenê at l.32); a term unique in this context in the late Neoplatonists. Perhaps the commentator refers to a process whereby smell and taste can perceive ‘shape’ and ‘size’ by transferring the object they perceive, for example by letting the sweet sugar move in the mouth, or by transferring the organ of perception, for example moving the nostrils in different directions. 57. Aristotle appreciates the role of the distance, that is the role of the medium, when speaking of eyes unable to see things placed upon them, cf. 419a25-7; see also our text 136,15ff. and, for some modification, 137,11ff. In fact, Aristotle never explicitly qualifies his claim that perception of the proper sensibles is infallible, as does the Commentator here. 58. This is contrary to Aristotle, and would imply that animals, since they lack reason, cannot perceive the common sensibles. But our Late Neoplatonist author involves logos in sense-perception, as does the Middle Platonist Didaskalikos, ch. 4. 59. The commentator pays attention to only one of the three groups considered by Aristotle (Cat. 9a28-10a11) as affective qualities. These are (1) qualities producing an affection of the senses, such as bitterness, sweetness, heat and cold; (2) qualities which are brought about by an affection, such as paleness, darkness and other colourings; (3) qualities of the soul, which are present right from the birth as a result of some affection, e.g. mad distraction (manikê ekstasis) and irascibility. He does it because only the qualities belonging to the first group can be perceived by touch directly. Later, at 322,8-10, he draws attention to Plato who held a similar view in the Timaeus 31Bff. 60. Cat. 7a6-36. 61. In modern editions Chapter 7 begins here. But the commentator does not see a natural break. 62. This does not mean that the commentator would think that common sensibles are derivative in their being. Proper sensibles only enable us to perceive the common sensibles, e.g., by uniting percepts of touch and sight so that we apprehend size. Elsewhere (127,12), common sensibles are said to be form-like to a greater extent and therefore they cannot be brought about by proper sensibles. 63. It is of luminous nature because its activity is linked to the light, see 136,10. 64. Timaeus 67C-68D, where colour is said to be a kind of flame (phlox, 67C6). 65. De Sensu 3, 439b11-12. 66. After the general doctrine (theôria), the commentator now states the detailed explanation of the text (lexis), repeating as it usual the first lemma. 67. en autôi at 130.13 appears to be quotation. Ross reads en heautôi. 68. The text reads apapalin at 130,12, a misprint for anapalin. 69. De Sensu 3, 439a6-440b25. 70. Active presence translates energetikê parousia. The adjective is added because parousia in itself is said to refer to possession (hexis) and perfection at 134,29 (cf. also 141,40; 142,2) and the addition is intended to indicate the process whereby a certain substrate is being informed.

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71. The reference is wrong. Hayduck thinks of Physics 7.3 and the best reference may be to 245b9-246a1 and a17-b3. 72. The use of the term pathêtika eidê seems to be unique among the commentators, but Plotinus uses it at III 6,4,31-34, referring to an affective part of the soul which of course cannot be body or corporeal at all, only a certain form. 73. At 131.13 lêpteon; the received text of Aristotle reads lekteon. 74. Reading proientos not proiontos at 131.20: cf. p. 132,15 proagontos. 75. Along with definition (or determination, horos), perfection (teleiotês) is often applied to characterise the form, cf. 83,31; 84,29; 194,26; 217,32; 249,15 as well as 159,19 where we find horistikon eidos; for this latter see also n. 195. 76. This is not to say that perception fails to attend to form, since elsewhere we are told that what the senses grasp is form not matter. The commentator here claims only that it is the form of the informed thing and not the pure form that we perceive. Light conceived as pure form is imperceptible in itself, while the things illuminated are perceived, and this is the way of acquiring indirectly knowledge of what light is in itself (which is a pure form). 77. The term hôrismenon diaphanes does not occur in Aristotle, but we should think of De Sensu 3, 239a28-9 where he says that the nature of light is lodged in the indeterminate transparent in bodies which lack fixed boundaries, while colour is the surface of the transparent in bodies which possess fixed boundaries. 78. At 133,1 en hôi esti, Ross has en hôi tout’ esti. 79. Aristotle thinks the celestial body is a fifth element distinct from fire, even if (GA 2.3, 737a1ff.) generative heat in animals is analogous to it. For Plato the celestial body is fire. Philoponus in his Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World (fragments translated in this series by Wildberg) backs Plato. Simplicius compromises: there is a fifth element but it consists of the purest fire, in Cael. 12,28-30; 16,20-1; 66,33-67; 85,7-15; 130,31-131,1; 360,33-361,2; 379, 5-6; 435,32-436,1. 80. It is not clear where the commentator took this view from. Philoponus attacks this doctrine, not in the relevant part of his in DA (341,10-342,16 CAG XV), but in his De Opificio Mundi and ascribes it to the Manichaeans (II 6, p. 69,13-16) and seems to be unaware that some of the Athenian Neoplatonists held a similar view. For further details see É. Evrard,‘Philopon, la ténèbre originelle et la création du monde’, in Aristotelica. Mélanges offerts à Marcel De Corte, Brussels-Liège 1985, pp. 177-89, though he does not pay any attention to these Athenian texts. The same notion of darkness as a positive property of the earth is to be found in Priscian as well; see Steel’s introductory essay for further references. 81. That the commentator did not necessarily rely on Manichaean sources when taking this view is indicated by the effort to ascribe some positive mark to other privative qualities, such as cold and black. This effort might have got some feeble support from the Physics 5.1, 225b4-5; 2, 226a23ff. where Aristotle says that even privation can be denoted by affirmative terms, such as naked, white and black. Simplicius discusses it at length in his in Phys. 827,20ff. where he assigns a certain presence (parousia) to these qualities, which justifies their affirmative name, although he does not claim that darkness is positive. 82. Hayduck refers to Tim. 45. Ross says that it is aimed at Empedocles, quoting De Sensu 437b23 and 438a4. 83. Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 89 Dillon. In his commentary (Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta, ed. with trans. and comm. by J. Dillon, Leiden 1973, p. 383), Dillon says that Iamblichus may have been giving a purely physical exegesis at this point and refers to Calcidius’ De Visu (cols. 236-247). There may be another explanation: Iamblichus may have made an attempt to interpret Timaeus 45B4-C6 in accordance with the doctrine that light

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is immaterial. We may recognize Iamblichus’ inspiration in the subsequent discussion of light on p. 134,6-20. 84. Simplicius is here referring to an idea found in Syrianus and Proclus that some bodies are immaterial, in spite of being corporeal, and so can interpenetrate (see Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, ch. 7, where some of their texts are translated). Syrianus thinks that the corporeal vehicles which carry our souls can interpenetrate with our bodies. Proclus distinguishes supracelestial light from ordinary light, identifies it with place, and allows it to interpenetrate the physical universe. He thinks the celestial body is also immaterial (simple) in Remp. 2.50.3, and this is why the light of the sun can penetrate it, as can our psychic vehicles (2.163, 1-7). Proclus, however, thinks that ordinary light is a body, namely the purest form of fire (2.8.22-7), and that it is material; On Light quoted by Philoponus Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World (18,18-19,11). Hence it cannot interpenetrate the moon (in Remp. 2.167, 1-7), and as our author tells us, it penetrates the air only by being chopped up (kermatizesthai). Philoponus attacks the idea of light penetrating by being an immaterial body (in DA 328,13-21), and argues that light is not a body (326,39-329,4). Our author evidently agrees with Philoponus against Proclus in saying that light is not a body. There is a disagreement between Simplicius and Proclus. According to Simplicius in Phys. (623,11-18) matters can interpenetrate; it is rather qualities which prevent interpenetration. Simplicius allows the celestial spheres to interpenetrate other bodies (in Phys. 531,3-9; 616,23-617,2; 623,32-624,2; 643,18-26; 966,3-14). Although he calls the celestial immaterial (232,4-5) in apparent agreement with Proclus, his more precise statement is that it has a special kind of matter, capable only of rotation (133,24-134,9). There is further disagreement between Syrianus and our author who denies that the pneumatic of the soul interpenetrates with our body, and even doubts if we have such a vehicle. 85. The term katakermatizomena (‘are in little pieces’) is used by Plato many times (Meno 79C3, Rep. 395B, Parm. 144B6, Sophist 225B10, 257C8-9, 258D8, this latter being cited by Simplicius in Phys. 137,25); see also Plotinus (III 9,2.2; V 1.2.35; VI 2.12.10; VI 2.22.14) and Porphyry (Sent. 35, p. 39.16 Lamberz). It seems then that Proclus admitted some kind of interpenetration for material entities. 86. ‘Imperceptibly’ translates anepaisthêtôs; a rare term used – also in adjectival form – almost exclusively by later Neoplatonists (one of the few exceptions being Themistius, in DA, 107,14 CAG V,3); cf. Syrianus, in Metaph. 100,38 CAG VI,1; Simplicius, in Cat. 309,3 CAG VIII, in Phys. 1198,39 CAG X; Philoponus, in DA. 8,6; 72,3; 263,2; 332,36; 345,4.6.11. They might have taken it from the Timaeus Locrus 100B. 87. Our author offers six arguments to deny that light is a body, although the first argement might only show it was not an enmattered body. Simplicius (in Cael. 16,20-1; 130,31-131,1) comes round to Plato’s view that light is a kind or form (eidos) of the fire. 88. At 134,24 and 27 ho skotos. In Aristotle (e.g. at 418b18) and elsewhere in this Commentary (e.g. at 133,12) to skotos. 89. The transparent must be dark, that is colourless, for if it had colour of its own then this colour would impede reception of other colours. See also Themistius’ in DA, 60,34-8 and Philoponus’ in DA, 345,17-20. 90. kat’ epibolên. The expression denotes an immediate grasping of an object either by the intellect (intellectual intuition) or by the senses (as in this case). A possible distinction between the intuitive act of a sense and that of the intellect is shown by the term haplê epibolê (simple act of intuition) at 131,37-8 with reference

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to the intellect (noêsis) though here we are dealing also with a taking up of sensible features by the intellect through sense-perception. Cf. also 9,23-4. It seems then epibolê is used in this text to denote an act of the intellect which involves sense-perception and does not pertain to intelligible entities. 91. Correct oude into oun ge at 135,6. The conjunction all’ oun ge often has the sense: ‘however that may be’. 92. Colour is flame issuing from different bodies, cf. Timaeus 67C7-9. 93. This is Aristotle’s view at De Sensu 3, 439b11-12. According to the commentator’s own view at 137,9, light encompasses colours, and light is the actuality of the transparent (137,17). 94. For stimulation affectively would mean passive reception; see the same distinction at 36,14.29-30; 45,25; 120,33-4. 95. The term for transferring this activity is diabibazein or diabibastikos, used quite often in such a context; see also 136,37; 137,22; 138,18.22.31; 139,2.26; 140,15; 163,18; 169,19.22-3; 179,5.24; Philoponus in DA. 327,21; 340,33; 362,3; 365,14; 366,36; 367,2.4; 398,24; Priscian, Metaphrasis 12,29-30; 14,20-1. It refers to a physical process whereby the activity or the impact of colour or sound (or of the blow caused by the sound) is conveyed to the sense (or sense organ) through a medium. Consequently, there always must be a medium which transfers the activity and this medium stimulates the sense and must be body (139,30). The exact way of conveying this activity seems to have nothing to do with more general physical theories. The term itself is used only once by Simplicius, in his in Phys. 362,21; but that passage concerns the way the soul is transferred from sensible things towards the intelligibles. In his physical works, Philoponus never uses the term with this meaning. 96. The passage has been taken by C. Steel and F. Bossier, ‘Priscianus Lydus en de in De Anima van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34 (1973), 761-822, esp. p. 763, as a reference to Priscian’s Metaphrasis, p. 12. See Steel’s introductory essay. 97. The addition has not only spatial but temporal significance as well. For the immediate transmission enables the sense to apprehend its object instantaneously, as the commentator says later. 98. The medium is transparent actually when it is seen, while potentiality implies darkness; see also 133,1ff. 99. Suitability, epitêdeiotês, signifies here a (passive) capacity while elsewhere (52,23; 63,13.15) an inherent quality of a body; for further references see Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Soul. 1.1-2.4, trans. J.O. Urmson, London-Ithaca, N.Y. 1995, p. 165, n. 105. 100. In his extant works Alexander does not tackle this problem, but he appears to be aware of it at his Quaestiones 3.7, 92,15-23 Bruns, CAG Suppl. II,2. The commentator takes sides with Alexander’s defence throughout in this commentary when emphasising the impact of projecting concepts (logoi) in the course of sense-perception. 101. The text at 138.8 is corrupt but this may be the sense of the original. Read ginomenên instead of ginomenês. 102. Ch. 12, 224a17-18, explained at 165,31-166,34. 103. Externally translates exôthen (‘from without’) and refers to a mere reception of the forms of sensible bodies. 104. Presumably, causation, poiêsis, is used here in the sense of activity, energeia, see 136,24.37. This may be reinforced by the simile of the lever, to be found at 136,25 as well. 105. The medium is internal because it is in the body and not between the body

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and the thing touched or tasted. It is the flesh, see 422b34-423a13, explained at 160,31-162,3, the organ for these senses being for Aristotle in the heart. 106. Ch. 8, 419b18. 107. A term never used by Aristotle, but cf. 154,8.19.21.30; 164,9; 169,21; 171,3.5. See also Etymologicum Magnum 136,23 Gaisford; Alexander of Aphrodisias, in de Sensu 89,2 CAG II,1; De Anima 51,20 (he may hint at the Peripatetic coinage of the term); 53,5 and Mantissa 123,22 CAG Suppl. II,1; Themistius, in DA 62,32 (reference to unnamed commentators); 69,9; 70,18 CAG V,3. Priscian, Metaphrasis 16.1; Sophonias, in DA 84,14.16; 90,14; 96,18; 97,13. In his in DA 354,14 CAG XV, Philoponus thinks that one of the inventors of the term was Theophrastus (= Theophrastus 277C FHSG); see also 253,5; 306,24; 352,12-20; 354,10; 358,7; 390,30-1; 391,4-5; 393,13.26; 394,12. 108. See also 145,36; 146,5; 148,24.30; 169,20.28; 171,3. In his extant works Aristotle makes no use of the term but Arius Didymus (ap. Stobaeum, Ecl. I 489,14-21 Wachsmuth) attributes it to him. See also Priscian, Metaphrasis 10,19; 15,33. Sophonias, in DA, 84,16; 85,19; 87,37; 88,9; 96,18. In his in DA, 354,15 CAG XV, Philoponus thinks that, along with diosmon, diêkhes was coined also by early Peripatetics (he names Theophrastus = 277C FHSG), see also 306,23; 340,33-7; 353,8-20; 357,15-22; 358,3-7; 364,22; 368,15; 373,7-11. The term might be a Peripatetic coinage; see Alexander of Aphrodisias, in De Sensu 88,18-89,5 CAG III,1; Themistius, in DA 62,31 CAG V,3. 109. Ch. 9, 421b9-26. 110. Ross reads energeia and dunamis instead of Simplicius’ energeiai and dunamei. For justification see his Aristotle. De Anima, ed., with intr. and comm. by Sir David Ross, Oxford 1961, p. 247. (J.O.U.) 111. We find the same argument at 137,16-22. 112. These may be the liquid and crystallised parts in the ear of which Philoponus was speaking at in his in DA 364,33-4. They are located in front of the tympanum and block the entering air and thus defend the drum of the ear. 113. Cf. 131,23-30. 114. See the case of javelin, Phys. 8.10, 266b28-267a22, De Caelo 3.2, 301b23-30. 115. Here Alexander clearly states the idea of wave motion. For an earlier articulation, see Ps.-Aristotle Problems 11.6. The passage quoted here has been preserved in a different form in Alexander’s De Anima 48,12-20. Some clauses are literally the same but our commentator had a copy with a longer version for the lines 25-8 in his commentary are not to be found in Alexander’s text as we have it now. Alexander’s explanation must have been well known since Philoponus also quotes it (in DA. 361,5ff. CAG XV). His version is much the same as our commentator’s, the only great difference being that in Philoponus the clause ho edeikhthê ginomenon kai epi tôn rhiptoumenôn (141,27-8 in our commentary) has been left out. But this may be an addition by a later hand as well for there is no trace of it in Alexander’s text either. For further discussion, see P. Donini, ‘Testi e commenti, manuali e insepramento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica’, ANRW II 36.7, 5027-5100, esp. 5045-56, who thinks that Alexander’s De Anima is a compilation of his own commentary on Aristotle’s work. 116. The commentator’s criticism rests on the assumption that by imparting affection the solid must be actively present throughout in this process and, being continuous with the rest, the first pocket of air which is struck cannot transmit the blow – which is an affection, not activity – onto the next pocket and this one onto the next, and so on until the vessel. Thus the vessel cannot be affected by air in the same way as it could be affected by the solid.

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Notes to pp. 174-179

117. By ‘in a separable manner’ the commentator means only that sound is not to be fused with blow, see also 142,17. 118. Reading holê instead of holôi at p. 142,17: cf. Priscian, 13,1. 119. There is no reason to bracket merê in 24 as did Hayduck. 120. Concomitant cause is contrasted with cause in a primary and unqualified sense (haplôs kai kuriôs aitios) at 113,6-11. 121. Changing ta auta at l.31 to tade: cf. l.24. 122. One of the authors referred to is Proclus; see Hupotupôseis 7.14.3, p. 218,18. The earliest occurrence of this view is in Alexander of Aphrodisias ap. Olympiodorum in Meteor. 69,15; 210,16. Olympiodorus discusses it at length at his in Meteor. 43,14-25; 47,18-48,1; 214,20-8. 123. Air is said to be void by the majority of people; see Simplicius in Phys. 647,17ff. 124. Insofar as it transfers the activity of the thing striking the air onto the sense-organ or sense and therefore it cannot be called (efficient) cause of hearing, but only concomitant cause (sunaition); see also n. 92 125. Change in l. 21 ‘ton  ton ’ into ‘to  to ’. 126. Ross’s reading is different: akoêi de sumphuês estin aêr (‘the organ of hearing has connatural air’). For an explanation and details see his commentary p. 249 and the apparatus to 420a4. 127. ‘is characterised’ translates eidopoioumenos, which refers to the activity of auditive and visual lives that give the air and the liquid a special form; cf. 4,16; 20,31; 52,27; 167,28. 128. This remark has been made on the ground of a general distinction according to which the characterising form is different from the user; see e.g. 4,29-33, and for further references, n. 22 in J.O. Urmson (trans.), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4, London-Ithaca N.Y. 1995, pp. 158-9. 129. alla is not in manuscripts, but added by Torstrik. 130. Supplying psophei with Hayduck at 144,10. 131. kritikê energeia refers to the discriminating activity of the sense itself which is aroused with regard to the affection in the sense-organ. This discrimination is not to be confused with opinion here since it belongs to the sense. At 196,20-1 we are told that the sight discriminates not only the white and the black but also their difference from each other (hê pros allêla autôn diaphora), and this kind of sensitive discrimination (aisthêtikê krisis) is not affection, not even a change, but an indivisible activity (198,26-7.33-4, cf. 199,7-8), see also 124,6; 144,21; 152,23; 161,9-10; 163,31; 169,31. For the preliminaries see R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, London-Ithaca N.Y. 1993, 35-6, 58-9. 132. On the structure of the tympanum see also 140,15ff. 133. Similarly to calling air void, this also may be the common opinion. 134. The commentator interprets hôrismenon in a metaphorical sense: the internal air is not just bounded or confined, but is characterised through the life which determinates (horistikon) it as a living organism, cf. 57,4. It is used in the same sense as kharaktêrizomenos (‘is characterised’) is at 145,30. 135. For this resonant activity see also 142,17-33. 136. The word oxu is translated as ‘high’ in acoustical contexts and refers to pitch. It can also mean a shrill or piercing sound. It also means ‘sharp’ when referring to shapes and ‘bitter’ when referring to tastes. Thus ‘high’ and ‘sharp’ are translations of the same word in what follows. Both J.A. Smith and W.D. Ross use ‘sharp’ and ‘flat’ instead, which is convenient but odd. Trebles may sing flat and basses may sing sharp. But it is not clear that ‘high’ and ‘low’ are entirely satisfactory. It sometimes appears that the difference is between being piercing or

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mild, since high pitch, independently of tone and volume, does not seem especially to affect the sense of hearing. [J.O.U] 137. Reference to Plato’s Phaedo where the immortality of the essence of the soul is demonstrated starting from an examination of its activities (cf. 41,31). Cf. C. Steel, op. cit., p. 16, n. 41 and 42. On the other hand, P. Shorey takes it as a reference to Rep. 477C1-4, or, perhaps, to Soph. 247E3-4: see his ‘Simplicius, de Anima 146,21’ in CPh 17 (1922), 143-4. 138. The comment that follows shows that the author interprets epi polu to refer to distance and to the duration of the sound, and en oligôi khronôi to the period in which the sensation occurs (‘swiftly for the high, slowly for the low’). ‘Throughout we must understand that Aristotle is advertently or inadvertently prescinding from volume. A loud bang, for example, affects the hearing more than a quiet squeak of a mouse; but if volume and tone be neglected we are no doubt more affected by higher sounds’ (J.O.U.). 139. Correct aisthêtikên into akoustikên at 147,3. 140. Timaeus 80A2-B9. 141. This is the reading of the codices of Aristotle and is so quoted in the commentary, though not included in the lemma. But the sharp does penetrate and the blunt does press. It is surely the high which ‘as it were’ [hoion] penetrates and the low which as it were presses, and it is they which are to be analogically explained. The paraphrase of Themistius and Vat. 1339 both read baru, which is easier to understand. (J.O.U.) 142. ‘Prior perception’ translates prolêpsis, a term usually referring to an activity of reason; e.g. we must preconceive the definition before grasping the attributes (Philoponus, in DA 41,30-1). Here however it signifies a purely sensitive activity which does not involve awareness or consciousness, see also 126,14; 147,10. 143. The commentator had in his Aristotle text a variant reading at 420a31: houtô dê instead of ou dê. 144. Things come about in an incidental way (sumbainei kata sumbebêkos) when features (such as ‘fast’) are brought about as by-products of the thing (‘the sharp’) of which they are the features. It is the sharp that comes about per se, but because this happens to be fast as well, this quality comes about along with the fast though incidentally only. 145. As Ross says, the meaning of apotasis, melos and dialektos is disputed. Contrary to Ross, who thinks that apotasis means ‘volume’, J.O. Urmson thinks that HA 545a15-20 supports the translation ‘range’ (high and low), which is confirmed by diastêmatikê phônê in the commentary. In ancient music diastêma means the same as ‘interval’ in modern music. It is hard to see how volume and its variation could be thought to mimic voice. Articulation is the individuation of sounds as in speech or as when a note is repeated on a piano. 146. See e.g. Aristoxenus, El. Harm. I 3,11.15.22; 14,11.15; Archytas B 1.66 D-K; Porphyry in Ptol. Harm 6.4-25; 86.11-13 (Düring). 147. This is the only occurrence of the phrase phantasia sêmantikê. By accompanying voice with this special kind of phantasia the commentator thinks that voice in itself has significative function; this is why he claims that it requires a communicative life endowed with articulated phantasia. Cf. 149,6-8; 150,10, and see the term sêmantikê hormê (significatory purpose) at 150,2. The cue of this notion may be found in Proclus who uses lektikê phantasia at his in Parm. 1020,10 and in Crat. 19,22 Pasquali, which seems to have a very similar meaning. For the later passage in Proclus, see A. Sheppard, ‘Phantasia and Analogia in Proclus’, in D. Innes, H. Hine and C. Pelling (eds.), Ethics and Rhetorics. Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday. Oxford 1995, pp. 343-51.

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Notes to pp. 182-186

148. Imagination is articulated (diêrthrômenê) when it enables the animal to form clear and distinct images that can be expressed. The higher animals also possess articulated memory, see 293,27-31. 149. This is the life which enables animals including humans to utter meaningful signals and to communicate. 150. There is no reason to add in l.35 as did Diels, it may suffice to correct; eti to epi, corresponding to the first epi in l.33. 151. From this commentary it seems as if the author had in his Aristotle’s text hen after anankaion in 420b21. There is no trace of this hen in the manuscripts. However, in his edition Ross thought it necessary to add on after anankaion. Is it possible that this hen is a corrupt trace of an original on? 152. De Part. Anim. 3.6, 669a16-23; De Resp. 13, 477a14-33. 153. to eu is mentioned as a cause in the Timaeus 68E5-6, and we can think also of Critias 48B as well. In Aristotle see also Metaph. 12.9, 1075a6; 10, 1075a15; De Sensu 1, 437a1. But if by ‘Platonic fashion’ we may mean the fashion of the Platonic tradition, then the reference to Plotinus, II 1.5.20-1 is palpable. 154. To accuse Alexander of failing to make this Neoplatonic point may be inappropriate. He may explain it as ‘in accordance with the soul’, which is a reference to the formal cause (elsewhere called ‘in accordance with which’ – to kath’ ho), because Aristotle himself too defined soul as a form. 155. sêmantikê hormê seems to be accompanied with significatory imagination (see 148,25 and n.147) for to utter a voice requires this kind of imagination, possibly evoking significatory purpose which in turn leads to articulate and meaningful voice; cf. also 150,8-10 where – in contrast to voice – cough is treated as not kath’ hormên, that is without (significatory) purpose. 156. De Part. Anim. 3.6, 669a2-5, 20-3. 157. Adding against Ross ê to phôs (cf. Commentary 151,1ff., 35-7). 158. ‘Consciousness’ translates sunaisthêsis. In Stoicism it is treated as a perceptual, not a rational activity (see Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp. 86-7), and as it happens, the same may be true here. For the reference may be to the co-operation of two particular senses which are in our case smell and taste. 159. This passage on Plutarch of Athens has been registered as Fonte 22 in D.P. Taormina, op. cit. (her commentary is on pp. 190-3). Plutarch may have relied on the Timaeus 67A1ff. where Plato claims that the only way we can classify odours is into the pleasant and the unpleasant. Our commentator’s point is that pleasant and unpleasant are inevitable accompaniments of every odour but from this we cannot infer that all odours as such are pleasant or unpleasant, since classification must be based on the definition. 160. Themistius, in DA 68,4-8 CAG V,3. He posits an analogical connection between tastes and odours and for this reason the names of the tastes can be applied to odours as well. 161. By introducing activity of judgement (to kritikôteron) the commentator avoids classifying odours into pleasant and unpleasant since these evoke liking and dislike only, while this activity is capable of discriminating the odours to a greater extent. 162. Timaeus 66D2-67A6. 163. De Sensu 5, 443a8ff., esp. 443a12. 164. The commentator draws on De Sensu 5, 433b20ff. 165. ‘Impressions’ translates peisis; a term used usually parallel to pathos, but here one need not to think of any Stoic reminiscence in the commentator’s doctrine,

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cf. his criticism on the seal-theory at 126,2-4 and 165,1-14; ‘recognition’ translates gnôsis. 166. enallax; if a:b::c:d then a:c::b:d. 167. ‘Temperament’ translates eukrasia signifying the approriate blend of the ingredients of the body. 168. On the difference between the imagination in human beings and in irrational animals, and on the different grades of imagination in the ‘ladder’ of nature, see especially the fine account in the in DA 308,1-39. 169. Reading aretês instead of aristês at 153.24. aretê – virtue – is properly possible only for humans, not for horses. 170. cf. 153,12-15. 171. The verb antilambanesthai and its cognates signify the process whereby outer objects are grasped, mostly by the senses (118,18; 175,30; 176,24; 269,24-5), though it refers to the activity of the whole soul to grasp the intelligible (11,29; 67,14) which is outside of it. See also 110,28. 172. For smell-transmission (diosmon) see n. 105, for conveying the activity of the object of smell toward the sense, n. 93. 173.This is an addition of Diels, based on Themistius, in DA 69,13 CAG V,3. 174. Addition by Hayduck, based on Themistius, in DA 69,26 CAG V,3. 175. prospelasis is not charted in the LSJ. 176. De Sensu 5, 442b28-443a23. 177. Ch. 10, 422a10-14. 178. oude gar hê haphê. This is the reading of the codices as well as of the commentator. Ross emends to oude gar têi haphêi. The present translation is based on the interpretation given in the commentary below. 179. Aristotle’s text has hulêi, while the commentator seems to read the nominative form and gives hulê when reconstructing Aristotle’s argument. Several mss. support the nominative form. 180. Receptive support (dektikê hupothesis) refers to the state of the fluid which is to receive, not the activity from the flavours – as does the transparent in the case of sight – but the flavours themselves. However the underlying state of the fluid is analogous to that of the transparent. The reason for this modification is the immediacy of the sense of taste, cf. 155,20. 181. This would mean that flavour is both accident and form of a certain substrate – which is the fluid. This identification of form and accident is not too far away from Aristotle’s view exposed in the Categories where at ch. 5, 3b19-21 we are told that the form (or species) defines the quality as referring to the substance. 182. Passive participation (pathêtê methexis) means here participation by means of receiving affection from the thing in which – in our case – the fluid is supposed to participate. It makes it possess the flavours themselves and in this way constitutes a mixture. For the term pathêtos, see Ps.-Aristotle, De Mundo 392a33; Plotinus, III 6.6.5, III 6.12.56, IV 4.26.16, VI 1.27.2, VI 4.8.13; Damascius, in Phaed. 78,5 Westerink; Philoponus, in DA 441,29; 443,15; 596,2. 183. One must correct at 156,6 aisthêtikou into aisthêtou, and so also at 156,8 (cf. also 156,14). The only other reference to aisthêtikon eidos is at 119,37 where the term clearly has an active sense ‘perceptive’ and not ‘perceptible’. 184. Placing comma after ekhon (30), not after phaulon. This may have some impact on Aristotle’s text as well; see Ross’ notes in his commentary, op. cit., p. 258. 185. ‘Basic’ translates arkhê (see also 157,1) that usually means principle, which may be an explanation of why actuality is prior to potentiality.

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Notes to pp. 194-199

186. The commentator reads hautê gar hê haphê (cf. 157,24), just as Sophonias (in DA, CAG XXIII,1): Ross corrects hautê into tautê (thus) and drops the article hê. In his commented edition, however, he gives hautê gar haphêi, and for a short justification see p. 258. 187. For krisis see 66,29; 69,24 and n. 129. The passage reflects the problem of how a particular sense is able to apprehend or, indeed, discriminate objects not proper to it. The commentator examines it at length in 126,19-127,14 and see n. 53. Because of its immediacy the sense of taste evokes the problem of how it is capable of discriminating other qualities if it has already received the flavour itself. 188. The primary sense-organ of the taste is the heart. The sense of taste is potentially a certain flavour and actual tasting is determined by the object of taste and established according to the form of the object of taste, cf. 158,28-9. 189. Reading heteron or heterôs instead of heterois at 158,17. 190. De Sensu 2, 439a1. 191. At 423b26. 192. aisthêtikon, literally what can perceive, usually refers to the faculty of sense, not the sense-organ, but the lemma referred to reads also aisthêtikon with reference to the sense-organ, cf. 423b29. 193. At 423b31. 194. Although hêgemonikon is originally a Stoic term, the commentator uses it in a different sense. At 214,23-4 it refers to the moving principle of the animals, and in non-rational animals it happens to be the imagination and also in humans imagination is the ruling principle – though only when the activity of reason is impeded by sleep or drunkenness. 195. This form is responsible for the elementary characteristics of the body, such as weight and position. For this reason it is called natural form (86,28) too. The commentator calls it common defining form (koinon horistikon eidos), which clearly refers to horos (determination, definition). Furthermore, this form is not privation but activates privation (energei tên sterêsin, 68,21-2) and is constitutive (hupostatikon) of the generated bodies; it is this form according to which bodies gain their existence; cf. also 86,26-7; 231,33-8 (notice the use of to ti ên einai, essence). 196. Heavy bodies naturally incline to the lowest position, the lightest (fire) to the highest, air and water to intermediate positions. 197. These further pairs of qualities are derived from hot, cold, fluid and dry at Aristotle GC 2.2. 198. The antithetical converse is ‘If many senses, many objects’; the simple antithetical is ‘If not many objects, not many senses’. 199. Put semi-colon after aisthêtêrion at 159,32. We interpret this elliptic phrase as follows: In seeing and hearing the fluid in the eye and the air in the ears play a similar role as intermediate sense-organ to that of the flesh in the case of touch. 200. 423b11ff. 201. Reference to the features of masses would contain allusion to their shape and size; these are however regarded as common sensibles. 202. Fonte 23 in D.P. Taormina, Plutarco di Atene. L’Uno, l’Anima, le forme, Catania-Roma (1989); see also her notes on pp. 193-5. Plutarch’s point is to emphasise the similarities between touch and other senses, which is quite in line with Aristotle’s proposal. 203. For touch as more subject to affection than the other senses see also 127,16-17. 204. The text is corrupt at 161.17. Hayduck’s conjectural emendation is translated here. 205. At 423b15-17.

Notes to pp. 200-206

227

206. haptikon means literally ‘what is capable of touching’ and is translated as ‘sense of touch’ though it can mean ‘organ of touch’ as well. The commentator seems to apply such terms without making distinction between these meanings in all cases. 207. At 162,30 we suggest correcting sômatikês into haptikês. 208. But not the primary organ. 209. 423a2-4. 210. 423a3ff. 211. prospelastikon; not in LSJ, though the corresponding verb is. 212. The Greek lemma reads ‘But the tangible differs from the visible and the audible and also by what follows’ which again shows that the commentator had no complete lemmas. 213. 422b2, explained at 159,31-6. 214. Aristotle used hekastos, which is translated here as ‘each’. hekastos refers to an indefinite plurality. The Greek for ‘each of two’ is hekateros. The point does not arise in English. 215. De Sensu 2, 439a1-2, though there Aristotle says only that the organ of touch is near the heart. The commentator repeats this view at 158,28-9 as well. 216. At 164,17 hautai. Ross and most of the codices read haptai while Philoponus puts hapta. Themistius paraphrased the text as ‘its objects’ (in DA 76.32-3) and thus he may have read hapta in Aristotle’s text. Notice that at 158,23 the commentator reads haptas in a quotation of this lemma! 217. GC 2.2, 329b2ff., and ch. 3. 218. Actively cognitive is also the sense of touch, not the organ, since it stand still at the form of things sensed. For the term hestêke kata, see n. 44. 219. ‘Appearance’ translates emphasis and refers to the appearance of the form in the informed. Elsewhere (56,25-6), the author says that it is the emphasis of the soul by means of which the soul enables the living matter to receive it, which means that to receive form the matter has to go through two stages: (1) to receive the appearance of the form and then (2), by the aid of this, to acquire the form itself. Appearance makes matter suitable (epitêdeios) for receiving the form. This holds for the soul as well, being form of the body. Here, until 165,15, we are dealing with a criticism of the Stoics who were talking about impression (tupôsis, tupos) of the form into the matter. The rejection of this allegedly physical explanation of sense-perception is embedded by the commentator into a sketch of his emphasistheory. For a detailed exposition of what role appearance plays in sense-perception, see 165,31-166,34. Cf. also n. 221 in J.O. Urmson (trans.), Simplicius. On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4, London-Ithaca N.Y. 1995, p. 174. 220. These concepts are projected from within by the soul, see 124,32ff. 221. This allusion to the Stoic theory is to be found and criticised also at 126,4-5. Cf. n. 46. The commentator rejects any explanation of the sense-perception which makes use of physical terms. 222. Inserting pros before to huperballon at 165,16. Cf. pros hekateron in the lemma. 223. In the De Sensu. 224. On defining form (horistikon eidos) see 52,16-17; 57,11; 67,3; 68,22; 83,28; 84,14-16; 86,19.27.32; 104,25; 159,16, and C. Steel, The Changing Self, Brussels 1978, pp. 125-9, also with reference to kharaktêristikos as a striking part of the vocabulary of this text. 225. The difference between sense-perception on one hand and intellect, scientific knowledge (epistêmê) and imagination on the other is explained at 208,21-31. 226. The point is that the commentator rejects that the sensitive faculty is

228

Notes to pp. 206-208

passive in the course of sense-perception. It is active though not in a creative way (by bringing about its objects) but with judgement or understanding (or insight, sunesis); cf. 138,15; 164,30-1; 167,5. Its activity consists of projecting concepts that are in accordance with the form of the thing sensed. 227. ‘first to be affected’ translates the term propatheia, which for the Stoics was a preliminary to emotion. Here, however, the term refers to a previous affection of the sense-organ by thing sensed. This is however not an application of the emphasis-theory to sense-perception because in that case it would be the sense itself that suffered a previous affection from the external objects. At 171,3-5 we are told that also some media (the resonant and the conveyer of smell) receive the activity of things sensed by having been previously affected. 228. For affective activity, see 54,4; 102,8; 166,23-4; 190,3-4; 213,31. It is contrasted not only to pure and intellective activities but also to the activity of judgement (kritikê energeia, 166,23-5) which belongs to the sense. 229. This is the life which uses and moves the tool (the sense-organ), see 18,24-6; 19,14; 94,8-9; 96,1-15; 105,8-11. 230. Elsewhere the commentator rejected that sense-perception can resemble reception of the seal into the wax. This passage does not contradict his claim because he modifies this kind of reception in a way which may be in line with his view. Here we are not dealing with a physical process but only with a certain, not necessarily physical impression of the form of the thing into the informed (cf. also 169,7-8). 231. The translation ‘ratio’ represents one interpretation of Aristotle’s logos, which gets its plausibility from 424a28-32. Our commentator takes it quite differently. 232. sunamphoteron (or sunolon) usually signifies the thing composed of matter and form, which is active according to its form. 233. Our commentator here agrees with Philoponus, even terminologically (gnôstikos being the word for ‘in cognitive activity’). See Richard Sorabji, ‘From Aristotle to Brentano: the development of the concept of intentionality’, in Henry Blumenthal and Howard Robinson, eds., Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supp. vol. 1991, pp. 227-59, which translates parallel texts. 234. cf. Timaeus 67E2ff. 235. This view of the common sense (koinê aisthêsis) according to which it contains all the particular senses, is to be understood in the way that the common sense co-ordinates the working of the particular senses. Elsewhere the common sense is likened to the centre of a circle, the particular senses to points on its periphery. An examination of this passage as connecting the common sense to the doctrine of pneuma is to be found in I. Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978, pp. 184-6. 236. This distinction plays important role in the commentary, see 16,15-19; 17,35-6; 18,24-6; 19,14; 20,32-3; 45,16-17; 51,28ff.; 56,35-8; 58,18-22; 59,37-38; 87,19-20; 94,8-9; 96,1-15; 105,8-11. For further explanation see n. 22 in J.O. Urmson (trans.), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4, London-Ithaca N.Y. 1995, 158-9. 237. Inclination (neusis) points to the tendency of the human soul toward the body. The term has been examined by C. Steel, The Changing Self, Brussels 1978, pp. 61-2. 238. This cause is also the efficient since formal and efficient cause often coincide. 239. l.32 reading ho de (referring to logos) instead of hê de.

Notes to pp. 208-212

229

240. logos as unfolded essence is identified with the soul also at 194,35-41 with the remark that this logos is concentrated into the undivided (ameristos) which is the form. The commentator is talking about unfolding logoi at 249,27 and 262,31-2 (connected to epistêmê). For the unfolding activity as discursivity, the spreading out of discursive thought in contrast to unitary intuition, see C. Steel, The Changing Self, pp. 126-7. 241. This definition comes from Aristotle’s Physics 3.1, 201a10-11. 242. Metaph. 5.12, 1019a15-b1. 243. Constitutive means (sustatikê mesotês) may refer, not to the sensitive life itself, but rather to its mediate position in virtue of which it sustains senseperception. At least, the sequence at 11-12 where we read that destruction of the sense-organ precedes destruction of the sensitive life forming that organ. 244. For every sensation is a logos – as the commentator says at 194,39. 245. ‘Master’ alludes to the intellect, as the eternal and ruling part of the human soul, ‘eternal body’ to the vehicle (okhêma) of the soul, which is made up of aether. 246. Reading monon instead of monês at 168,19. If the text is followed we have ‘when the projection of the sound alone is impeded’. 247. At 165,31ff. 248. These may be the affective qualities of which the commentator was speaking in 127,16ff. 249. 2.5, 416b33-4. 250. See 166,32-4, but cf. also 165,6ff. 251. For the transmisson of the activities of the object sensed to the sense-organ, see n. 93. 252. ‘Transfer’ translates metadosis (see also metadotikos at 136,21; 169,16; 174,25), a term that may have the same meaning as the one that diabibazein and its cognates have. 253. ‘Sensitive affection’ translates pathê aisthêtikê. The emphasis is on the ‘sensitive’ because this kind of affection involves activity on the part of the thing affected. 254. In line 23 read hote instead of hôste. 255. At 169,11ff. 256. Formal activity is where the affection of the sense-organ by the object sensed terminates. This activity is formal because the sensitive soul recognises the object by projecting concepts and stands still at its form; see 128,26-9. 257. Cognitively active may be related to active with judgement (kritikôs) and insight (sunetikôs) but opposed to creatively (poiêtikôs) active; see 166,4-5. 258. For ‘previous affection’ (propatheia) see n. 224.

English-Greek Glossary absence, apousia act (to act), dran, energein, poiein active, drastikos, energein activity, energeia, energêma actuality, energeia, entelekheia adventitious, epitkêtos affect, apotelesma affected (to be affected): paskhein affection, pathê, pathos, peisis affective, pathêtikos agency, poiêsis air, aêr alteration, alloiôsis analogy, analogia animal, zôon animate, empsukhos appearance, emphasis apprehend (to apprehend), antilambanesthai, epiballein argument, epikheirêma, logos arouse (to arouse), egeirein articulated, diêrthrômenê ascend (to ascend), anienai asymmetry, asummetria attribute, sumbebêkos awareness, sunaisthêsis beginning, arkhê blow, plêgê body, sôma capacity, dunamis causation, poiêsis cause, aitia/aition change, metabasis, metabolê, kinêsis change (to change), kinein, metaballein character, emphasis characterise (to characterise), eidopoiein, horistikos, horizein, kharaktêristikos, kharaktêrizein coexist (to coexist), sunuparkhein cognition, gnôsis

cognitive, epistêmonikos, gnôstikos collision, prosptôsis colour, khrôma coming to be, genesis communicative, koinônikos community, oikeiotês concept, logos concomitant cause, sunaition concord, sumphônia condition, diathesis consciousness, sunaisthêsis constitutive, sustatikos contact, epaphê, thixis contemplation, theôria continuity, sunekheia controls, kurios converse, antistrophos corporeal, sômatikos, sômatoeidês cough, bêx dark, darkness, skotos deflection, diaklasis demonstrate (to demonstrate), deiknunai desire, orexis destruction, phthora determinate, horismenos determination, horos determine (to determine), aphorizein, diorizein, horizein development, anelixis difference, diaphora, heterotês dimension, diastasis diosmon, diosmon discovery, heuresis disposition, hexis distance, diastasis, diastêma divide (to divide), diairein divided, meristos ear, ous earth, gê

English-Greek Glossary echo, êkhô efficient, kinêtikos efficient cause, to huph hou element, stoikheion emanation, aporrhoia end, telos essence, ousia, to einai eternal, aidios example, paradeigma excess, huperbolê excite (to excite), diegeirein eye, omma, ophthalmos faculty of sense-perception, aisthêtikon flavour, khumos flavoured, enkhumos flesh, sarx form, eidos, idea formal, eidêtikos function, ergon general, katholou, koinos genus, genos grasp (to grasp), antilambanesthai hear (to hear), akouein hearing, akoê heat, thermon, thermotês human being, anthrôpos ignorance, agnoia illuminate (to illuminate), katalampein, phôtizein imagination, phantasia imitate (to imitate), mimeisthai immediate, prosekhês immediately, amesôs imperfect, atelês, atelôs imperceptible, anaisthêtos, apenaisthêtos inanimate, apsukhos inclination, neusis, rhopê incommensurability, asummetron incorporeal, asômatos independence, akhôriston indeterminate, aoristos individual, atomos indivisible, ameristos intellect, nous intellection, noêsis interpret (to interpret), diermêneuein, exêgeisthai

231

intuition, epibolê judge (to judge), enkrinein, krinein juxtaposition, parathesis know (to know), ginôskein knowledge, epistêmê, gnôsis language, dialektos, hermêneia learning, mathêsis life, zôê light, phôs limit, peras liquid, hugros local motion, phora luminous, lampros lyre, lura magnitude, megethos material, enulos, hulikos matter, hulê meaning, ennoia medium, meson, mesotês, to metaxu membrane, humên memory, mnêmê mix (to mix), kerannunai, mignunai moisture, hugros, hugrotês nature, phusis negation, apophasis object, to pros ho odorous, osphrantos opinion, to dokoun, doxa opposite, antithesis, enantios organ, organon part, meros, morion partake (to partake), metalankhanein participation, metalêpsis, methexis particular, merikos passive, pathêtos perceive (to perceive), aisthanesthai perception, aisthêsis perfection, teleiotês pleasure, hêdonê pore, poros possession, hexis potentiality, dunamis practical, praktikos presence, parousia

232

Indexes to On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12

present (to be present), enuparkhein, huparkhein, pareinai principle, arkhê prior perception, prolêpsis privation, sterêsis problem, aporia, aporon productive, drastêrios, poiêtikos progression, proodos project (to project), proballein projection, probolê projective, problêtikos property, idiotês proof, apodeixis pure, katharos purpose, hormê, telos quality, poiotês quantity, poson raise a problem, aporein rational, logikos ray, aktis reason, logos rebound, aphallesthai receive, dekhesthai, eisdokhê, katadokhê receptacle, hupodokhê reception, analêpsis receptive, dektikos recognition, gnôsis recognise (to recognise), ginôskein, gnôrizein reduction, anaphora reflection, anaklasis relation, pros ti; in relation, ekhein pros remain (to remain), menein, diamenein, emmenein, hupomenein resistance, antitupia resonance, diêkhes, êkhôs resonant, diêkhês, êkhêtikon repositioning, metastasis respiratory, anapneustikos rest, êremia, monê rest (to rest), êremein result, apotelesma reversion, epistrophê revert (to revert), epistrephein ruling principle, hêgemonikon science, epistêmê

scientific, epistêmonikos see, horan self-aroused, aph’heautês egeireisthai self-initiated, aph’heautês egeiromenê self-perfecting, autotelês self-sufficient, autarkhês, autotelês sensation, aisthêsis sense, aisthêsis; to sense, aisthanesthai sense-object, aisthêtos sense-organ, aisthêtêrion sensible, aisthêtos sensible object, aisthêtos sensitive, aisthêtikos sensitive principle, aisthêtikon separate, khôristos separate (to separate), khôrizein shape, morphê; to be shaped, suneidopoieisthai share (to share), metalankhanein, metekhein sight, horasis, opsis sign, sêmeion signifies, sêmantikê; significatory, sêmantikos similarity, homoiotês simple, haplous sinew, neuron size, megethos skill, tekhnê smell, osmê, osphrêsis smell transmission, diosmon smooth, leios; smoothness, leiotês solid, stereos soul, psukhê sound, êkhê, êkhos, psophos; soundless, apsophos spatial, kata topon species, eidos stand still at, histasthai kata start, arkhesthai steersman, kubernêtês stimulate, kinein, kinêsis; stimulation, kinêsis strike, plêttein substance, ousia substrate, hupokeimenon suitable, epitêdeios; suitability, epitêdeiotês to be superimposed, epikeisthai support, hupothesis surface, epiphaneia

English-Greek Glossary sympathise, sumpaskhein; sympathetically receive, sumpaskhein tangible, haptos taste, geusis, khumos; tasteable, geustos temperament, eukrasia tempering, eukrasia term, onoma, horos terminate, apoteleutan text, lexis theoretical, theôrêtikos theory, theôria thing, to on, pragma time, khronos; timeless, akhronos tongue, glotta tool, organon touch, haphê; to touch, haptesthai trace, ikhnos transfer, diabibazein transference, metaphora transformation, metabolê, tropê transition, metastasis transmission, diadosis transmit, diabibazein; transmitter, diabibastikos transparency, to diaphanes transparent, diaphanês transport, kinein travel, phora truth, alêtheia tympanum, tumpanon, mêninx

unaffected, apathês unbroken, athruptos unchanging, akinêtos underlie, hupokeisthai undispersed, athruptos unfold, anelittein unified, heis unit, hen unity, henôsis universal, katholou use, khrêsis; to use, khrêsthai various, diaphoros vegetative, phutikos vessel, angeion vibrate, seiesthai view, doxa virtue, aretê visible, horatos; visual, horatikos vital, zôtikos; vitally, zôtikôs voice, phônê void, kenon water, hudôr wax, kêros way, tropos white, leukos without qualification, haplôs whole, holos windpipe, artêria word, onoma world of becoming, ta en genesei

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Greek-English Index adêlia, unclarity, 162,9 adiairetos, undivided, 141,23; indivisible, 143,29 adioristôs, without distinction, 121,11 aêdês, unpleasant, 156,39 aêdizein, to make unpleasant, 156,31 aêdôs, unpleasantly, 157,2 aêr, air, 127,2; 129,6.13; 130,17.18.36; 132,4.10; 133,7; 134,6.8.18.25; 136,7; 138,30; 139,6; 140,7.10.13.15.16.18.24.26.29; 141,4.8.10.12.20.22.35.36.37.39; 142,17.19.21.28.32.33; 143,8.12.14.16.17.18.20.22.26.28. 29.31; 144,3.5.7.8.11.15.23.25.32; 145,14.15.26.28.31; 146,1.15; 148,19.20.22.28; 149,11.13.15.26; 150,1.2.9.10.13.14.16.30; 151,27; 153,14.31; 154,8.10.11.19.25; 155,19.23; 158,17.22; 159,8.33.34; 161,4.33; 163,15.16; 164,3.6.8.9; 165,20; 169,18; 170,30; 171,1.5 aerios, composed of air, 162,11; 163,15 agein, to conduct, 171,8; to bring, 123,32; to convey, 138,1; eis tauton, to equate, 120,17.18 ageustos, tasteless, 156,25.26.31; untasteable, 157,7 agnoein, to be unaware, 151,4 agnoia, ignorance, 122,4; 123,15; 160,30 aidios, eternal, 168,14 ainittesthai, to suggest, 159,29 aisthanesthai, to sense, 116,30.35; 119,30.31.33; 120,1.6; 124,31; 151,11; 152,9.35; 154,5.18; 161,25.31; 167,26; 169,27; 170,4; to be sensitive, 168,23; to hear, 145,8; to perceive, 118,25; 124,4; 126,12; 128,2.13; 138,23; 144,13.20; 152,28; 153,1; 155,16;

156,3; 164,32; 165,10.20; 170,32.34; to , sensing, 123,36; sensation, 123,34 aisthêsis, sensation, 116,19.25.26.31.35; 117,3.5.13.24; 118,3.6.19.20.22.23; 119,18.20.21.23.32; 120,9; 122,8; 124,8.14; 126,16; 128,30.36; 147,1.3.28; 154,34; 158,35; 165,26; 168,10; 169,9.36; perception, 118,17; 123,20; 125,25.37; 126,1; 127,10.12.14; 131,35.37; 136,27; 138,10; 144,16; 161,37; 162,32; sense, 117,23.24; 118,2.9.17.20; 119,28.29; 126,17.23.34.37.38; 127,13.17.23.28; 128,18; 135,1; 147,28; 150,35; 151,11.20.32; 152,1.3.26; 154,7.15.19; 156,2.17; 158,12.15.17.25.35.37; 159,5.19.22.25.35; 160,7; 161,1.3.5.17.20; 162,2.12.34; 163,10.18.24; 164,7.27; 165,11.12.22.26.27.28.29.31; 166,30.31.35.38; 167,2.13.14.15.16; 170,1; kat’ , perceives, 122,30; ek , perceptibly, 129,28 aisthêtêrion, sense-organ, 117,8.10.14.30; 118,3.15.21; 119,7.10.15.22.23.26.27.29; 124,3.5.34; 125,24.27.30.32.35; 128,26.27; 136,19.33; 137,3.4; 138,11.20.23; 143,33; 144,17; 152,10.14.19.23.24.29.38; 159,26.30.31.32.33; 160,35.38.39; 161,4.8.14.23.24.35; 162,1.7.25.29; 163,30.37; 164,5.26; 165,2.6.8.12.14.28; 166,22.23.27.31.38; 167,5.12.13.25.34; 168,2.9; 169,18 aisthêtikon (to), faculty of sense-perception, 116,33; 118,27;

Greek-English Index 119,19; sense-organ, 158,24; 161,29; 162,3; 163,34; 164,10; sensitive principle, 167,26; sense, 165,1; sensitive faculty, 123,27.32; 124,33; 125,13.18.20.25; 137,6 aisthêtikos, sensitive, 116,21; 117,7; 118,12; 119,4.37; 122,13; 123,28.30; 124,32.34; 125,17.28; 128,28; 138,12; 158,20.22.30.34; 161,16.27; 162,10.35; 163,33; 164,14.31; 165,12.32; 167,9.28, 33; 168,3.21.29; 169,23.24.25.26.30.37; 170,4.6; who perceives, 122,32; of sensation, 166,7 aisthêtikôs, in application to sensation, 117,18; in sensation, 118,19; 166,14; sensibly, 122,12 aisthêtos, sensible object, 117,9; 124,3.13.31; 125,1.8.21.35.36; 126,3.6.14.17.34; 127,26; 128,12.25.29.30; 135,2; 138,13.14.15.22.23; 156,3.7; 159,20.21.22; 161,9.10.11.23.35; 162,21; 163,31.34.35.37; 165,23; 166,29; 168,1.28; 169,18.19.24.26.27; 170,7.8.12.15.19.21.23.24; 171,9; object, 154,35; 156,5; perceptible, 128,2.7.15.35; 129,3; 138,10; 156,6.19.35; 164,18; 165,4; 171,1.6; sense object, 118,15.16.20; 119,23; 125,18.24; 126,2; object of sensation, 161,6; sensible thing, 124,35; 125,4; 159,20; 167,9; (object) sensed, 139,20.21; 152,22; 164,31; 165,6; 166,7; sensible, 118,16; 127,12.18.24.25.29; 128,6.8.9.16.17.33; 154,32; 156,8; 157,12; 160,1; object of sense, 126,20; 139,14; thing perceived, 138,15; 165,2; object perceived, 162,10; 166,16; oud’, imperceptible, 127,26 aitiasthai, to blame, 119,13; to be an explanation, 151,33 aitiaton, effect, 120,2.3; (thing) caused, 124,9; 131,30 aitiôdôs, causally, 126,10 aitiologikos, explanatory, 162,7

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aition, aitia, cause, 120,3.35; 124,10.19.20.22.30; 125,23; 128,16; 129,5.6; 130,13.15.17; 131,31; 133,4; 134,9; 135,28.30.32; 140,18; 146,29; 162,6.8; 167,26; explanation, 151,30; 168,25; is responsible for, 151,20; reason, 135,24.25 akhôristos, independence, 161,18 akhronos, timeless, 132,2; 134,14 akhroun, colourless, 134,32.34 akhumos, flavourless, 156,39; 157,18; lacks flavour, 157,11; without flavour, 157,13 akinêtos, unchanging, 124,16.17; not moved, 144,12; unmoved, 145,5; inert, 148,34 akoê, hearing, 126,30; 140,14; 143,15.21.28; 144,2.15.28.33; 147,10.13; 151,2; 156,11; 159,7; 160,8.12.27; 164,4; sense of hearing, 139,22; ear, 140,16 akolouthein, to follow on, 123,22; 151,16; 153,32; to be consequent, 152,12 akolouthôs, following, 131,28; consequently, 151,36 akouein, to understand, 123,23; 134,2; 147,38; 151,34; 164,8; to hear, 139,20; 140,13; 142,11; 143,7.8.10.21.22; 144,1.22; 145,1.11.13.23.24.25.26.28; 169,28 akoustikos, auditive, 143,24.29; 144,3.27; 145,32; 147,3; with hearing, 170,5 akoustos, audible, 139,20; 146,34; 147,3; 151,36; sound, 153,29 akribeia, exactness, 152,14; 153,15 akribês, precise, 151,29.32; 152,10.13.15.29; articulate, 165,23; accurate, 153,16; to , accuracy, 144,16 akribôs, accurately, 122,22; 126,33; 127,4.6.11; 144,13.20; 149,28; with exactness, 151,21 akros, extreme, 157,32.34.35; 165,15; 168,9.27 aktis, ray, 134,12 alêthês, true, 128,3.4; 151,28; 159,21; 170,6; to , truth, 122,5; 170,22 alloiôsis, alteration, 116,26;

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117,11.12.13; 121,30.31.34; 122,34.35; 123,10.19.21.22; 169,32 alloiousthai, to be altered, 117,10; 122,10; 123,11; 125,13.14; 130,27; 169,11.12; 170,27; to be an alteration, 121,31 allotrios, external, 145,19.22; foreign, 155,6; 158,31; 161,10.19.30; 162,12; 163,9.32; 164,12; different, 155,27 amblunein, to blunt, 144,18.26 amblus, blunt, 146,35; 147,16.32.35; 148,4.8 ameristos, indivisible, 120,13; 124,20; 125,26; 167,32; undivided, 121,26 ameristôs, indivisibly, 124,21; 126,1.8 amesôs, directly, 150,10.16; immediately, 161,8.23; 162,9; 163,23.29 ametokhos, without share, 165,18 amigôs, without mixture, 137,4 amiktos, unmixed, 157,33 amudrousthai, to become faint, 129,21.23 amudrotês, faint, 129,24; faintness, 143,7; weakness, 157,7 amudros, faint, 137,30; 147,11; weak, 152,25; 154,5; 156,15.39; 160,17.23 amudrôs, faint, 156,30; faintly, 156,24; 157,2; weakly, 161,12 anagein, to reduce, 158,3 anaimon, bloodless creature, 154,10 anaimos, bloodless, 158,16; 159,27 anairein, to destroy, 168,18 anaisthêtos, imperceptible, 156,5.7.10.13.14.17.18; insensitive, 164,13; 169,6; without sense, 170,8 anaklasis, reflection, 142,27.31.37; 143,6 anaklazein, to reflect, 141,15.18; 142,37; 143,2 analambanein, to raise, 159,25 analêpsis, reception, 138,13 analogein, to correspond to, 123,32.33; to be analogous, 155,12 analogia, analogical relation, 128,38; analogy, 164,12; kata , analogically, 146,35 analogon, analogously, 139,2;

147,15; analogue, 158,19; equivalent, 159,27 analogos, analogous, 153,8; 158,16 anankaios, necessary, 131,15; 149,8 passim; to anankaion, necessity, 149,2.6.8 anankaiôs, of necessity, 128,20 passim anankê, must be, 132,7 anapempein, to lead up (to), 120,2; 128,21.33 anaphainesthai, to appear, 131,2 anaphora, reduction, 123,20; 154,3 anapleos, full of, 131,2 anapnein, to breathe, 139,8.9; 148,18.20.31; 149,11.23.26; 150,1.8.9.10.13.16.17.19.21.23.27.2 9.34; 154,11.14.20.25.27.28 anapneustikos, of a nature to breathe, 154,12; respiratory, 149,33 anapnoê, breathing, 149,9.18; 150,28 anaptos, intangible, 165,19 anatolê, rise, 134,19 andriantopoios, sculptor, 127,38 anegeiresthai, to be aroused, 124,28 anegersis, stimulates, 148,34 anekhein, to uphold, 155,15 anelittein, to unfold, 167,32 anelixis, development, 124,21 anepaisthêtos, imperceptible, 147,22 anepaisthêtôs, imperceptibly, 134,19 anexapatêtôs, inerrantly, 126,37 angeion, container, 141,9.13.17.18.25.28.29 anienai, to ascend, 131,31 anillesthai, to shrink back, 156,32; to anillomenon, repulsion, 151,18 anomoiogenês, of different sort, 158,3 anomoios, dissimilar, 165,11 anônumos, nameless, 129,2.38; 135,12; 139,1; no name, 151,9 anosphrantos, odourless, 154,4 antapodidonai, to state the case, 139,7 anthos, flower, 160,18 anthrax, charcoal, 135,20 anthrôpeios, human, 153,20.23 anthrôpinos, human, 121,17 anthrôpos, human being, 121,16; man, 124,29; 127,38; 128,1.10;

Greek-English Index 139,6; 151,20.29.38; 153,17; 154,12; 168,14 antidiaireisthai, to be in distinction with, 120,8; to be distinguished, 157,5 antidiastolê, contrast, 130,13 antikeimenon (to), object, 116,22 antikeimenos, opposite 142,38; 146,34; 169,9; opposed, 126,19; contrary, 153,6; contradictory, 122,5; is at both extremes, 168,3 antikeimenôs, oppositely, 152,36; on the contrary, 156,8 antilambanesthai, to grasp, 119,21; 125,31; 126,32; 127,5.7; 136,28.34; 151,15; 161,11; to pick up, 152,5; to apprehend, 126,28; to detect, 154,4.15; to be aware of, 156,4; to receive, 137,34; 153,2; to observe, 156,22 antilêpsis, to grasp, 137,8 antilêptikos, receptive, 118,18; 119,3.15; 127,16; 153,15; grasps, 119,15; detects, 154,19; reception, 157,16 antiphrattein (to), interposition, 133,12 antiphraxis, forming a barrier, 142,22 antirrhêsis, reply, 137,1 antistrephein, to be convertible, 163,2 antistrophos, converse, 159,21.24 antitithenai, to oppose, 130,19; (pass.) to be in opposition, 133,18 antithesis, opposite, 160,26; sun , antithetical, 159,24 antitupia, resistance, 118,24; 141,30; 142,30 antitupoun, to resist, 134,10 aoratos, invisible, 134,35.36; 135,6; 156,1.18.20.21 aoristos, indeterminate, 132,28 apaitein, to require, 163,32 apêllotriôsthai, to be of a different nature, 158,32 apamblunein, to weaken, 156,12; to blunt, 163,31 apantan, to meet, 119,25; 160,5 apatasthai, to be deceived, 127,22 apatômenos, mistakenly, 127,8 apathês, unaffected, 123,6

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apathôs, without being affected, 130,37; without affection, 166,15 apeikazein, to liken, 146,11 apêkhêsis, sound reflected, 143,3; echo, 147,22 aperilêptos, not to be circumscribed, 158,2 aphallesthai, to rebound, 146,16.18 aphienai, to emit, 135,20; 156,26 aphixis, arrival, 122,34 aphobein, to be fearless, 153,5 aphobos, non-frightening, 152,33.34; 153,3.5.6 aphorizein, to determine, 164,19 aphôtistos, is without light, 130,24 apodeixis, proof, 160,37 apodidonai, to be in response, 117,25; to provide, 129,9.20.29.30; 135,29; to produce, 141,3; to deliver, 152,21; to receive, 139,29 apodotikos, gives out, 135,26 apoginesthai, to depart, 130,18; 132,6; to cease, 132,3 apolambanesthai, to acquire, 121,19; to be contained (pass.), 140,26; to be confined, 140,7; to receive, 123,33 apolêgein, to fade, 147,12 apoleipesthai, to fall short of, 119,39; 121,14.27; to be inferior, 151,21; to desert (act.), 160,32 apolimpanein, to leave, 149,11 apologeisthai, to defend, 118,11; 120,11; 138,7 apolusis, solution, 153,13.30 apolutos, separate, 161,18 apolutôs, in a separable manner, 142,5.17; unmixed, 155,23 apopallein, to rebound, 146,5.7 apophasis, negation, 156,17.19; kata , negative, 122,4 apophatikôs, as denial, 153,6 aporein, to set a problem, 118,18; to raise the problem, 160,34; 163,5; 169,4.37 aporêtikos, problematic, 162,33 aporia, problem, 117,23.25.27.28; 118,11.29; 119,25; 159,25.34; 160,1.3.26.29.37; 161,37; 169,9 aporon, problem, 158,12 aporrhoia, emanation, 155,24

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apospasthai, to be torn away, 131,20 apostenoun, to contract, 126,9; to compress, 145,8 apotasis, range, 148,13.15 apoteinesthai, to be directed, 118,9; to reach out, 118,31; to aim at, 133,32; 147,9 apotelein, to bring about, 120,33.35; to cast (shadow), 143,6; to provide, 137,33; to terminate, 124,7; 128,28; to make perfect, 130,30; to be effected (pass.), 166,20; to come about (pass.), 142,25 apotelesma, effect, 146,30 apotelestikos, provides, 137,31 apoteleutan, to terminate in, 134,4 apôtheisthai, to bounce back, 141,10.32; to rebound back, 141,30 apotos, undrinkable, 156,33.38; 157,5.6 apotribein, to clear away, 150,12 apousia, cessation, 132,2; absence, 132,8.12; 133,16; 134,23.28 apsophos, soundless, 144,5.7 apsukhos, inanimate, 119,5; 125,31; 170,26 argos, not easily stimulated, 162,29 arguros, silver, 160,16 aretê, virtue, 153,23.24 arkhê, beginning, 126,1; principle, 159,10; 164,22; 168,28; basic, 156,33.36; 157,1; tên arkhên originally, 119,16; initially, 147,11; ex , initially, 126,20; 142,14; at the beginning, 142,26; originally, 141,11; first, 142,24 arkhesthai, to start, 116,22; 128,36; 159,23 artêria, windpipe, 149,10.12.15.18; 150,1.2.7.9.10.13.15.18.20.25.26.2 artos, bread, 119,11 askios, casts no shadow, 143,7 asômatos, incorporeal, 124,10; 128,35; 131,38 aspis, shield, 161,32; 163,20 asthenôs, weakly, 145,13 astrôios (phôs), starlight, 134,19 asummetria, asymmetry, 168,11 assumetron (to), incommensurability, 137,12;

asymmetry, 138,23; is non-commensurate, 144,19 asummetrôs, incompatibly, 156,6 atelês, imperfect, 118,32; 119,1.35.37; 120,13; 121,12.29; 131,29.31; 151,24; to , imperfection, 131,2.3 atelôs, imperfect, 131,26 athroos, suddenly, 122,2; 131,22; 132,6; all at once, 171,2; sudden, 123,18; 134,25; 150,19; instantaneous, 128,37; to , unit, 141,13 athroôs, all of a sudden, 121,32; all at once, 131,4; 134,12.20; 137,5; 146,13; 171,3; suddenly, 140,2; all together, 146,16; 149,14; 150,14 athruptos, undispersed, 140,2.8.11; 141,3; unbroken, 141,39; 142,7.20.28; 143,17 atomos, individual, 124,32; to , individual thing, 126,10 Attikos, Attic, 156,28 aulêtikos, hollowed, 145,10 aulein, to be used as an instrument, 145,17 aulos, hollow, 148,13 austêros, dry, 151,4 autarkês, self-sufficient, 118,31; 129,17.18 autotelês, self-perfecting, 119,21; self-sufficient, 125,16 barus, low, 146,26.27.29.30.34; 147,5.9.14.15.17.20.30.31.35; 148,1.3 barutês, being low, 147,25.29; weight, 159,12; 170,18 bathos, depth, 126,5; 147,17; 163,5.13 bêttein, to cough, 150,5 bêx, cough, 150,7.9.11.16 biaios, involuntary, 150,8 biblion, book, 138,9; work, 165,24 blaptikôs, harmfully, 156,24 blepein, to see, 134,11; 137,12; to look at, 137,36 blepharon, eyelid, 154,26 boulesthai, to wish (for), 121,23.25.26; 124,27; 145,4; 154,23; 162,6; 163,10; to allow, 57,15; 158,28; to hold, 158,31; to propose, 147,9 bradus, slow,

Greek-English Index 147,6.15.20.24.31.34.35.36; 148,1.3.6.8 bradutês, slowness, 147,29 brankhion, gill, 150,30 brontê, thunder, 156,11; 170,13 deiknunai, to show, 131,15; 141,27; 159,23; 161,5.7.34; to demonstrate, 159,3 deiktikos, is shown, 146,5 dekhesthai, to receive, 126,15; 129,5; 130,25.29; 131,23; 132,16.29; 134,3.33; 138,13; 139,26.29; 140,3.8; 146,1; 151,25; 155,11; 166,19.25.27.28.31.33; 157,2.6; 169,8.11.12.16.23.29; 170,31; 171,2.4.6; to , reception, 121,18 dekhomenos, receptor, 169,32.33 dektikos, receives, 130,33; 131,22.23.25.27.29; 132,4; 140,19; 145,36; receptive, 132,8.11; 135,10; 138,10; 140,18.21.22; 144,6; 155,13.14; 165,29.31; 166,8.17; 168,5.7.28.29; 169,26; to , receptive organ, 168,10 dêlôtikos, means, 147,5; exhibits, 149,30; signifying, 153,7; refers to, 157,27 dêloun, to denote, 119,32; to signify, 144,6; to make plain, 121,24; to make clear, 140,6; 150,15; 158,31; 162,22; to show, 136,33; 143,4; 146,21; 152,25; 153,4; 154,2; 163,35; to exhibit, 147,23; 149,28; 151,7; 155,22; 164,21 derma, skin, 153,17 despotês, master, 127,38; 128,10 diabibastikos, carries, 138,31; transmitter, 169,22; conveys, 139,2; 140,15; conveying, 143,10 diabibazein, to transfer, 136,24.37; 137,22; 170,30; to convey, 138,18.22; 139,26.29.30; 154,7.20; to transmit, 155,18; 163,18; 169,19 diadidonai, to give (further), 141,26.29; to hand on, 142,15 diadosis, transmission, 141,32.34; 146,19; exchange, 146,11 diagraptein, to depict, 158,23 diainein, to wet, 163,12 diairein, to distinguish, 121,7; to divide, 156,26; division, 156,26

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diakhein, to disperse, 141,6; 142,29 diaklasis, deflection, 142,39; 143,3 diakomizein, to convey, 138,2 diakonein, to serve for, 164,6 diakrinein, to discuss, 117,17; 121,8; to segregate, 167,9; to distinguish, 147,15; 149,5; 152,13; 165,2; 167,25; 169,10.37 dialambanesthai, to intervene, 137,16 dialampein, to shine, 135,21 dialektos, language, 148,16 diamenein, to remain, 142,20 dianistasthai, to achieve, 118,14 dioignunai, to open up, 154,23.24 di’ hou (to), intermediary, 138,24; transmission, 163,28; 164,11; what transmits, 162,19.25.26; 163,31; that through which, 162,23; transmitter, 164,4 diaphainein, to be transparent, 132,25 diaphanês, transparent, 129,8.13.16.32; 130,14.16.22.23.25.26.27; 131,5.6.7.16.17.32.34; 132,1.20.21.22.24.25.26.27. 28.30.33.36; 133,3.5.9.22.23.25.27.28.29.31; 134,1.32.35; 135,9.14.16.17.28.33.36; 136,4.9.11.12.13.16.18.20.25.27.31; 137,3.10.17.20.25.27.29.37; 138,8; 139,3; 142,1; 144,28.30; 155,10.28; 160,22.24; 164,8; 169,20.28.30; 171,2; transparent thing, 133,2 diapherein, to differ, 120,15; 126,35; 167,24; to be a difference, 124,1 diaphora, difference, 144,13; 146,20; 151,3.10; 152,12.32.35; 153,1; 158,4.24; 160,13.20.22.24.25; 164,17.21.23 diapherontôs, differently, 130,21 diaphoros, different, 137,6; 144,17; 158,1; to , difference, 122,33; 123,15; 130,19; 132,21; 163,10; 169,11; different forms, 127,15 diaphônein, to be in discord, 154,36 diaporein, to be a problem, 158,36 diarthroun, to discriminate, 151,5 diarthrôsis, articulate examination, 165,23

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diasaphein, to clarify, 125,9 diaspasthai, to be torn apart, 121,22 diastasis, dimension, 126,35; 163,7; distance, 129,21; interval, 148,16 diastêma, distance, 126,37; 127,23; 136,28.32; 146,4.7 diastêmatikos, intervallic, 148,14 diateinein, to extend, 142,6 diathesis, condition, 121,9; 131,11; state, 153,7 diatithesthai, to be disposed, 153,1 didaskalia, exposition, 116,22; teaching, 123,16 didaskein, to teach, 126,23 diegeirein, to excite, 152,17 diegersis, arousal, 125,36 dieirgein, to prevent, 163,14 dieirgon, obstruction, 154,26 dieisdunein, to penetrate, 147,17 diêkhein, to be resonant, 139,31 diêkhês, resonance, 138,30; resonant, 139,4.26; 140,2; 142,3.5; 143,31.32.35; 145,36; 148,24.30; 169,20.28.30; 171,3; cause of sound, 164,8; conveys the sound, 143,18 diermêneuein, to interpret, 117,2 dieron (to), damp, 163,22 diêrthrômenê, articulated, 148,26; 150,35; 153,22 diexodikos, progressive, 132,7 diexodos, exit, 142,31; passage out, 150,28 diienai, to go through, 134,7; to penetrate, 147,6 diikneisthai, to extend through, 142,19 dioristikos, distinctive, 159,10 diorizein, to settle, 116,18; to set out, 168,29; to decide, 158,36; to articulate, 148,16; to explain, 120,15; 136,29; to make distinction, 139,10; 167,37; to determine, 123,26; 126,16; 141,34; 158,11; to limit, 141,9; diôrismenos, distinct, 162,1 diorizousa, distinctive, 141,9 diosmon, diosmon, 139,2.5.6; conductor, 169,21; smell-transmission, 154,8.19; (smell-) transmitter, 154,21.22; conveys of smell, 171,3.5;

transmitting medium, 154,30; cause of smell, 164,9 dokimazein, to judge, 141,21 dokoun (to), opinion, 159,28 doxa, opinion, 147,19; 166,2 doxastikê (gnôsis), opinion, 128,9 dran, to act, 119,11.28.29; 122,20; 124,34; 126,27; 155,24; 158,8; 169,38; 170,19; to have effect, 170,12.15.23.25; to affect, 128,26; to work, 169,11; agent (part.), 166,21 drastêrios, productive, 134,3.31 drastikos, active, 161,16 drimus, bitter, 151,4.9.13; 153,28 dunamis, potentiality, 121,7; 133,9.14; potency, 121,15; 128,30; capacity, 121,21; 146,32; power, 138,8; 167,12.15.29.34.36.37; kata , potentially, 121,29 dunamei, potentially, 116,27; 118,28.32; 121,5.16.18.21; 123,24.25; 125,13.18.19; 130,25; 131,6.23.25; 133,1.2.7; 137,37; 139,12.13.15.16.17.19.20; 154,33.35; 156,35; 158,5.26; 164,27.30; 165,7; potential, 116,32.35; 119,2.3.18.21.31.34.35.38; 120,8; 121,12; in potency, 120,29; 164,34; capable, 143,16; to , potentiality, 125,21; potential, 167,35 dunasthai (to), potentiality, 128,24; to be possible, 131,26 dunatos, has capacity, 121,30; is able, 135,29; capable, 125,20; 144,11; 170,4; can, 121,25 dunaton (to), capacity, 122,16 dusdiexodeuton (to), difficulty of making a way out, 140,12 dusôdês, bad odour, 154,17 dustheôrêtos, difficult to hunt out, 160,33 ean, to permit, 157,20 egeirein, to arouse, 117,30; 118,13.16.31.34; 119,6.8.10.12; 124,6; 125,29; 128,9; 166,1.13.39; 167,6; 168,32; to rise, 161,15; to stimulate, 163,35; to be awaken (pass.), 149,25

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endeês, in need of, 118,32.33.34; lacking, 119,3 endeia, deficiency, 156,5 endeiknusthai, to reveal, 159,28; to demonstrate, 163,10 endiaitan, to endow, 148,27.28 endidonai, to give to, 131,20; to impart, 131,27; 132,5; 133,13; 136,10.11; 137,4 eneinai, to be within, 118,6.7; to be present in, 118,21 energeia, activity, 116,23; 117,7.15; 118,2.30.32; 119,6.20.23.33.34.38; 120,2.4.11.13; 121,2.22; 123,4.11.22; 124,1.4.6; 125,1.16.33; 126,2.5; 127,11; 128,27.32.37; 130,37; 131,10.18.24; 134,31; 136,10.22.37; 137,4.21; 138,3.5.12.13.18; 139,4.26.29; 140,3.8; 142,4.6.18.23.25.30.38; 143,34; 144,19.27; 146,10.11.22; 152,21.23; 154,7.20; 155,10.11.18; 156,12; 161,10.13.15; 163,18.31.36; 165,4; 166,5.13.14.15.20.23.39; 167,2.6.11; 168,7.14.19.32.33; 169,19.22.29.33.35; 170,16.30.31.34; 171,2.4.5.6.8.9; active, 121,13; 137,10; actuality, 131,28.38; 132,13.33; 133,11.27; 134,4; agency, 165,2; act, 121,15; kat’energeian, actual, 120,9; 121,9; 125,25; 129,32; 139,23; 146,20; 158,6; 166,3; active, 166,1; through activity, 130,37; actively, 129,8; 131,4.5. 8; 136,7; actually, 129,16; 130,22.23.25; 131,7; 136,4.9; in act, 151,35; 155,23 energeiai, actually, 116,28; 118,27; 120,29; 121,5; 125,19; 129,13.17; 130,27; 131,23.25.29.33; 133,3; 137,10.37; 138,8; 139,12.13.15.17.19.20.21.22; 142,1; 143,17.32; 155,1.10.11.30; 156,34.36; 164,31; 165,3.7.8; in act, 120,29.30; 128,23; 165,1; in actuality, 123,23; actual, 116,33.34; 117,1; 119,19.31; active, 120,28.33 energein, to be active, 116,28; 118,1.19; 119,17.18.20.39;

120,6.8.10; 121,14.23; 122,10; 123,4; 125,28; 126,15; 127,28; 128,32; 134,10; 154,35; 166,4.22; 167,2.5.8.16; 169,15; 170,34; to act, 120,32; 125,34; 126,8; 127,1; 136,9; 137,28; 138,15; 144,21; 155,20; 169,26; to be actual, 116,32; 125,20.21; to be in act, 122,30; to exercise, 122,9.28.32; to activate, 119,36; 121,20; 131,19; 136,22; 142,1.2.14; 143,6; to be actively, 166,17; to work, 153,21; to , actuality, 122,27; 123,6; 154,34; 166,28; 169,29; to be actuality, 169,30 energêma, activity, 125,34.37 energêtikos, active, 130,31; 168,5 energêtikon (to), active nature, 128,37 energêtikôs, as active, 120,34; 121,1; in activity, 125,22; actively, 128,31 enginesthai, to come about, 120,17; to come to be in, 168,5; to come into, 119,7; 165,2; to inhabit, 148,30; to enter, 130,29; 132,6.13; 166,21; to be present, 133,26 enidrusthai, to be seated in, 132,15 enistasthai, to attack, 160,37; to object, 161,24 enkatôkodomeisthai, to be confined, 144,12.23 enkeisthai, to be present within, 157,12 enkhumos, flavoured, 151,27; 153,30.33; 154,30; 156,37; 157,2.19.23.24.28; 158,8 enkrinein, to judge, 158,18 ennoia, meaning, 147,37; concept, 160,31 entelekheia, actuality, 121,7; 122,25; 123,5; 125,19; 135,16.17; 136,10; 137,13.22; 167,21; 169,29; actualisation, 167,35 entelekheiâi, actually, 135,33; 137,20; 157,10 entithenai, to impose, 126,4; 165,5 entomon, insect, 152,6; 154,11 enudros, aquatic, 149,23 enulos, material, 132,3; 134,6 enuparkhein, to be present, 150,13.14 epagein, to add, 118,5; 133,31;

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exêirêsthai, to transcend, 126,8; to single out, 127,10 exakouesthai, to be heard, 147,6 exakoustos, heard, 143,5.6; 147,4 exêgeisthai, to interpret, 118,4; to clarify, 122,26 exienai, to exit, 149,10 exisazein, to be equal, 126,35 exô (to), external object, 118,6.19.21.30; the external, 118,34; 119,2.19 exomoioun, to make like, 122,19 exudaroun, to dilute, 157,19 gê, earth, 118,7.25; 133,6.12; 162,13.27 genesis, coming to be, 121,12; 122,12.21.22; 125,16; process of becoming, 131,1; to become, 121,20; generation, 123,31; 132,7; ta en , the world of becoming, 153,24 genêtos, comes to be, 159,11; generated, 160,33; 162,10.31; 164,22 gennan, to beget, 123,29.33 gennêtikos, generating, 129,26 genos, species, 121,17; genus, 159,16; 160,4; 164,19.29; kind, 123,10; kata , generic, 151,10 geuesthai, to taste, 151,17 geusis, taste, 126,31; 149,8; 151,14; 153,8.10.11.15.16.35; 154,1.32; 155,5.28; 156,11.12.25.27.31.32.39; 157,4.7.16; 158,20.29; 159,2.8; 161,2.14; 163,28; 164,1.2 geustikos, of taste, 157,11; sense of taste, 158,5; 170,6 geustos, objects of taste, 151,8; 153,11.12; 154,3.31.36.37; 155,4.7; 157,9; 158,5.8; thing tasted, 153,10; 157,26; bearer of taste, 153,30; tasteable, 155,2.8.30; 156,34; tasty, 156,25 ginesthai (to), becoming, 121,18 ginôskein, to know, 124,24.30; 131,34; 146,23.24.30; 151,6; to recognise, 126,23; 127,11; 131,29; 166,30.32 glôtta, tongue, 150,4.6; 155,34; 157,17.22.25; 159,2; 161,2; 162,33; 164,1.3.10; 169,21

glukazesthai, to be sweetened, 167,3; 169,14 glukus, sweet, 126,32; 127,28; 151,4.8.13; 153,25.28.31.32.34; 154,3; 155,17.18.20.30; 157,32; 170,26 glukutês, sweetness, 155,19 gnôrimos, becomes known, 131,38; well-known, 156,29 gnôristikos, recognises, 127,18; 160,21; 168,3 gnôrizein, to recognise, 125,1; 127,7.14; 128,28; 131,23.32; 150,36; 151,2.3; 156,3.6.10.17.21.23; 160,8 gnôsis, knowledge, 118,15; 125,27; 158,6, 11; 165,5; is recognised, 126,34; recognition, 152,17; cognition, 127,10; 166,3.25 gnôstikos, cognitive, 117,29; 118,12; 119,4.5; 126,5; 164,31; 166,5; 168,32; cognisant, 118,12; has knowledge, 126,9 gnôstikôs, in cognition, 125,23; cognitively, 128,31; 138,15; 167,5.8; 170,34 gnôstos, known, 125,26; 127,23; 158,6; 164,30; to , object of knowledge, 158,10; 166,26; object of cognition, 166,3.6.7 gônia, angle, 142,38 grammatikê, writing, 122,8; knowledge of writing, 122,31 graphein, to write, 147,8; to read, 147,37 gups, vulture, 152,6 gupsos, chalk, 132,26 hallesthai, to bounce, 146,6.11 halsis, leap, 146,12 haphê, touch, 126,28; 127,15.18; 153,16; 155,3.6; 157,4.6.24.27; 158,9.11.18.20.25.29; 159,2.9.18.19.22.23; 160,28.35.36; 161,1.2.4.7.14.15.26.29; 162,2.6.8.9; 163,8.9.28; 164,1.2.27; 165,19.20 haploikôs, simply, 157,34 haplous, simple, 131,37; 151,25.28; 157,33 haplôs, unqualified, 117,4; 165,28; simply, 118,18;20; 120,17; 121,10;

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hôrismenos, definite, 135,36; determined, 145,24.28.29.31; determinate, 132,28 horistikos, defining, 132,9; 159,11; 165,27; forms, 168,11; determines, 167,30; characterising, 149,31; characterises, 150,34 horizein, to determine, 125,19; 128,30; 131,28; 142,12; 161,17; 164,29; 167,2.22; 168,4.12.31; 169,2.35; to give definition, 130,19; to characterise, 131,20; to define, 131,29; 158,6; 166,3 hormê, purpose, 150,2; kath’ , purposive, 150,8.10 horos, term, 121,32; 124,23.24; determination, 165,6; definition, 130,11; 131,19; defining form, 131,28 hou heneka, that for which, 149,16.17 hualos, glass, 130,36 hudatinos, composed of water, 162,11 hudatôdês, watery, 157,37.38 hudôr, water, 130,36; 138,31; 139,6; 140,13.15.17; 143,2.8; 144,22.26; 146,1; 148,21.24; 150,30; 151,27; 153,13.14.31; 154,8.9.28; 155,16.18; 158,22; 159,8.33.34; 161,30; 162,4; 163,12.16.21.22.23; 164,4.7.8.9.13 hugiazesthai, to be healthy, 131,26 hugieia, health, 130,33; 131,25 hugrainein, to moisten, 144,26; 154,32; 155,31; to wet, 161,30; to become moist (pass.), 157,10 hugros, liquid, 140,30; 142,39; 143,25; 144,30; 155,34.35; 156,38; moist, 150,12; 153,14; 154,29; 155,5.7.9.11.14; 156,34.36.37; 157,1.6.9.10.15.16.19.21.22.25.26. 28; 163,21; moisture, 151,27; 153,31; 159,8.33 hugrotês, moistness, 155,3; 157,17.18.20.23; moisture, 159,14 hulê, matter, 121,19; 131,33; 138,11; 155,7.12.15; 165,30; 166,28; 168,30; 169,1.2.7 hulikos, material, 121,17.21; 140,19; 167,27; 168,26 humên, membrane, 161,26.28.30; 163,8.11

huparkhein, to occur, 126,1; to be fact, 150,35; to provide, 149,4; to belong to, 148,10; to reside in, 158,25; to be (present), 127,26.29.30; 130,17; 134,36; 135,36; 154,1; 159,1.3; 163,13; 164,27; to exist, 142,18; 162,19 huparkhon (to), property, 118,24 huperairesthai, to be superior, 124,13 huperairein, to be over-loud, 156,11 huperballein, to be excessive, 156,7.8.9; 163,36; 165,16; to be in excess, 165,21 huperbolê, excess, 148,35; 156,24; 157,7; 163,35; 165,10; 168,2.9 huperekhein, to be greater, 126,35; to exceed, 153,15 hupertithesthai, to postpone, 150,20 huph’ hou (to), efficient cause, 118,33; that by which, 140,20.21; 149,29.32 huphistasthai, to be, 151,26; to exist, 157,35; 168,15 hupnôi (en), asleep, 122,11 hupodeigma, example, 163,20; illustration, 168,20 hupodokhê, receives, 125,16; 132,31; receptacle, 125,18; reception, 130,30; 139,5; 153,20 hupokeimenon, underlying, 127,31; 151,7; substrate, 132,13; 139,13.18; 154,37; 155,1.2.9; 156,6.13.20; 160,27; 165,13; 170,13.25; object, 150,36; 151,3 hupolambanein, to claim, 141,16 hupomenein, to remain, 140,27; 141,6 hupomnêma, commentary, 133,35 huponoia, suspecting, 151,32; suspicion, 161,23 hupopiptein, to fall under the senses, 127,4; 156,26 hupostrônnusthai, to be substrate, 133,10; to underlie, 131,33; 155,9; 156,14; 158,15; to be basic to, 161,2 hupothesis, support, 155,12; ex , hypothetically, 129,28 hupotithesthai, to suppose, 134,7; to place, 163,11 husterizein, to be later, 142,10

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khôrizein, to separate (off), 124,13; 126,22; 132,15 khrasthai, to use, 116,21; 117,14; 118,4; 120,10.12; 123,13.14; 126,8; 142,27; 143,30; 145,32; 148,26; 149,32.34; 152,29; 154,20.22.25; 155,13; 166,10.12.15.23; 167,21.22.23.25.29.30; 168,12.13.15 khreia, is needed, 148,23 khrêsimos, useful, 116,24 khrêsis, use, 166,11 khrôma, colour, 118,26; 127,7; 128,23; 129,1.7.30.36.38; 130,2.5.8.9.16.19.20.25; 131,6; 132,23; 133,22.23.24.25; 135,5.15.17.22.35; 136,2.3.5.8.14.18.20.22.24.26.30. 32.35; 137,1.3.6.7.8.12.20.26; 139,3; 142,1; 146,25.28.29; 150,34; 151,1.36; 152,27.33.34.35; 153,2; 155,10.19.21.27.28; 157,31; 159,6; 160,13.14.15; 166,18.36; 169,20.27.38; 170,3.5.7.17.19 khrômatizein, to give colour, 155,23; to colour, 169,13 khronos, time, 126,1; 132,2; 147,1.4.7.27.29.33; 149,14; 171,4 khrônnunai, to colour, 127,21.22; kekhrôsmenos, coloured, 129,18; 130,10.11.15; 132,20.22.25; 133,23.25; 135,34; 136,16.28; 137,16.19; 155,25; 170,17 khrusos, gold, 160,15; 166,32.33.34; 169,3 khumôdês, of flavour, 155,1; flavorous, 155,8 khumos, taste, 151,15; flavour, 153,9.12.25.26.32; 154,29.32; 155,1.7.11.14.29.30; 156,27.34.37.39; 157,12.13.14.30.32; 158,3; 159,8; 162,34; 163,1.2.3; 166,18.36; 169,22; 170,6.20.26 kinein, to change, 116,25; 117,8.10.30; 118,1; 120,6.7.9.14; to move, 116,29; 118,14; 119,5; 136,25; 141,21; 143,17; 144,16.24; 145,6; 149,27; 151,7; to activate, 130,27; 149,32; to act, 125,34; 161,14; to make change, 154,27; to initiate motion, 167,36; to set

in motion, 143,26.31.32; 144,9; 149,34; 150,19.23; to stimulate, 119,2.15.23.28; 125,29; 126,37; 136,7.13.16.18.19.20.21.26.27.30. 33.36; 137,3.7.9; 138,2.3.4.7.19.21; 146,1; 147,10.13.28.33; 148,5; 153,4; 155,2; 160,17; 161,17; 161,16.37; 164,32 kineisthai, to be in motion, 120,24; 142,33; 146,3; to move, 140,11; 145,9.14.15.18.19.21; 167,36 kinêsis, change, 117,10; 120,12.13.14.16; 121,31; 123,13; process, 123,8; stimulus, 147,25; 148,3; 162,21; stimulation, 119,16; 136,13.33; 147,29.30; motion, 134,13.17; 140,29; 144,14.17; 145,12.19.20; 146,10; 148,19.28; 150,19.28; 167,35; moving, 136,15; movement, 138,25 kinêtikos, causes, 119,11; stimulates, 162,28; arousing, 129,32; sets in motion, 143,14.16; activating, 130,16.21; efficient (cause), 149,30; activates, 136,4; initiates motion, 167,35 kinoun (to), the cause of motion, 149,28 koilos, hollow, 140,4.9; 141,12.14; 142,27 koilotês, hollowness, 141,12 koinê, generally, 116,19; 117,3; 126,16 koinon (to), compound, 153,13 koinônein, to communicate, 158,32 koinônia, to have in common, 157,35 koinônikos, communicative, 148,11.26; for communication, 149,7 koinos, general, 117,5; 153,22; common, 126,24.26.27.36; 127,5.12.24; 128,15.16.18.19.25; 157,4.6; 159,2.8.9.11.16; 160,10.33.35; 161,2.4; 165,26; 167,13.15; common character, 49,2 koinôs, general, 117,25; 151,6; common, 124,35; 151,9; 154,8; 158,38; 160,4.19.31.35; shared, 151,27 kôluein, to impede, 121,24.26; to inhibit, 152,23; there be external impediment, 121,25; to hinder, 163,18; to prevent, 137,32;

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melos, melody, 148,16 menein, to remain, 123,6; 125,24; 130,18; 131,19; 141,13.23.27.36.39; 142,6; 143,12.17; 146,7; 147,14; 148,34; to be entrapped, 140,10 mêninx, tympanum, 140,14; 144,31 merikos, particular, 122,1; 124,19; 151,7.10; 168,11 meristos, divided, 121,21; 125,37; 142,15; divisible, 124,9.10 meristôs, in a divided manner, 142,15 merizesthai, to be divided, 121,23; to be fragmented, 160,19 meros, part, 117,1; 142,24; to kata , particular thing, 126,12; ek , partial, 151,30 meson (to), medium, 163,9; mean, 165,14.16 mesotês, medium, 158,32; mean (state), 165,11.13; 168,4.6.8.27 metabainein, to be transferred, 146,14 metaballein, to change, 120,21; 122,13.14.18.23.32; 123,3.25; 132,17; 133,20; to become different, 157,14; to vary, 121,35; to , change, 120,18 metabasis, change, 123,5 metabibazein, to transfer, 142,16; to hand on, 142,20; to convey, 143,34 metabolê, change, 120,19; 121,9; 122,18.35; 123,1.7.8.17.23.28.32; 131,2.3; 132,12; transformation, 151,26; turning, 122,6 metadidonai, to provide a share, 170,16 metadosis, transfer, 169,33 metadotikos, imparting, 136,21; transmits, 169,16 metagein, to transfer, 117,15 metalambanesthai, to share in, 136,20; 157,15 metalankhanein, to partake, 128,5; to share in, 169,17; to receive, 169,13 metalêpsis, participation, 169,32 metapherein, to transfer, 126,32; 153,27; 154,1 metaphora, transference, 126,33; kata , metaphorically, 146,32

metastasis, transition, 120,24; repositioning, 134,37 metaxu (to), medium, 161,10; 163,8; intermediate, 169,18; 170,31 metekhein, to share, 134,28; 151,21; 161,27; 165,8.9; to have a share, 151,30 en methais, drunk, 122,11 methêmerinon (phôs), daylight, 133,33 methexis, participation, 155,22 methistasthai, to change place, 132,16 methuein, to be drunk, 123,2 kata metra (tês pathês), proportionally to affection, 142,11 metron, standard, 121,28; degree, 124,14 mignunai, to mix, 155,32.35; to , mixture, 155,21 mikrotês, small, 180,9 miktos, mixed, 157,34.35; 162,13.27.30 mimeisthai, to imitate, 143,2.6; 146,15.16 mixis, mixture, 151,26; 155,22 mnêmê, memory, 123,20; mention, 138,30 mokhlos, lever, 136,14.25; 138,24 molis, scarcely, 134,35; 135,4 môlôps, weal, 120,31 morion, part, 126,32; 134,10; 142,9.13; 149,16.21.24.26.33; 158,26; 164,28 mousikos, musician, 148,14; musical, 148,15 nephos, cloud, 135,20 neuron, sinew, 158,21 neusis, inclination, 167,22 nikan, to exceed, 140,28; to overcome, 140,31.34 noein, to understand, 140,25; 141,3; 142,32; 162,23; 168,27.29; to think, 124,27 noêsis, intellection, 131,17.37 noêtikos, intellective, 124,28 noêtos, intelligible, 124,20.23.25.30 nosêma, illness, 157,17 en nosois, diseased, 122,11 nous, intellect, 124,23.26.28; 166,2 nux, night, 137,3; 138,1

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oxutês, being high, 147,24.28 ozein, to be odorous, 170,30 pakhumerês, dense, 140,16 pakhumerôs, roughly, 127,7 pakhunein, to condense, 145,4 pakhunomenos, thick, 127,1 pakhutês, thickness, 149,13 paraballein, to place, 143,5 paradeigma, illustration, 121,11; example, 140,6; 161,32 paradidonai, to set out, 121,11 paraginesthai, to come to, 130,32; to come to be, 132,2 parakeimenon, adjacent, 142,24 paralambanein, to include, 130,12 parallêlou (ek), pleonastically, 156,30 parapempesthai, to move through, 116,23 parapodizein, to impede, 127,1; 134,10.33; 144,21.27.33; 152,21; 157,12.19; 161,9; to prevent, 133,6 parapolauein, to partake, 128,7 paraskeuazesthai, to develop, 121,17; to be framed, 152,20 parastatikos, indicative, 147,28 parateinesthai, to extend, 126,1 parathesis, juxtaposition, 149,20 paratrepesthai, to change character, 153,32 paratropê, change of character, 153,33 pareinai, to be present, 116,33; 118,15.20.21; 119,18.19; 124,33; 125,7; 137,5; 138,2; 141,20.39; 142,5.18; 155,23; 156,6; to be in, 132,14; to appear, 129,12; mê , to be absent, 119,17 pareisagein, to obtrude, 160,10 pareisduein, to get into, 144,27 parekhesthai, to provide, 135,6 parempiptein, to intervene, 163,15.25 parempodizein, to impede, 168,19 paristanai, to confirm, 163,19 parousia, presence, 130,24; 131,9; 132,2.12; 133,16; 134,1.3.29; 141,40; 142,2; 156,8 paskhein, to be affected, 116,25.27.28.30; 117,16.20.22.26.30;

120,5.7.10.14.16.18.23.25; 121,3.5.6.8; 122,12.16.23.24.25; 123,24.26; 125,13.14.32; 128,12.13.26.27; 138,4.14; 142,6.15.17; 143,33; 144,17.20; 145,30; 152,22; 153,4.26; 158,7; 161,12; 162,21.28; 163,30.34; 164,32.33.34; 165,6.9.11; 166,4.13.17.19.24.26.34.36.38.39; 167,4.5; 168,24.30; 169,4.6.9; 170,2.3.5.8.28.29.30; 171,4; to be acted on, 119,22.24.27; 120,27.29.30.33; 124,3; to take on, 155,19; to undergo, 120,32; (to) paskhon, passive, 146,2; affection, 157,20 pathainomenôs, affective, 151,17 pathê, affection, 142,11; 144,21; 152,19.22.25.31; 161,9; 169,31.33.35.37; kata , is affected, 125,15 pathêma, affection, 125,27.34 pathêtikos, affective, 120,15; 122,14; 127,9.16.17.20; 128,37; 130,27.35.38; 131,1; 164,23; 165,8; 166,14; subject to affection, 161,6.21; 166,8; capable of becoming affected, 157,13; passive, 161,4.7 pathêtikôs, as being affected, 120,33; 121,1; 125,22; affectively, 136,8 pathêtos, passive, 155,22; 164,22; 165,7 pathos, affection, 117,14; 119,7.10.16; 122,13; 124,5.7; 125,24.30.33; 130,27.29.31; 131,8.38; 132,2; 134,4; 138,12; 142,3.4.5.20; 144,18.19; 151,40; 152,4; 163,35.36; 167,10; 168,7.8; 169,10.16; 171,4; enginomenon , experiencing, 137,29; affect, 125,1; kata , in an affective manner, 131,21; affectively, 136,10; epi pathei being acted on, 124,34;  empoioun to affect, 130,27 peirasthai, to attempt, 135,3.6; to try, 156,4; 158,3 peisis, affection, 123,23.25; 166,13.21; 168,33; impression, 152,16.18 pephukos, has natural capacity, 121,16; naturally related, 128,18;

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phôs, light, 127,10; 129,6.9.11.12.13.14.15.17.19. 23.25.26.27.29.30.33.34; 130,3.15.17.25. 26.34; 131,5.12.13.14.15.16.17.19.34.36.37; 132,4.11.20.23.24.26.30.31.36; 133,4.6.7.8.11.13.16.22.24.25.31. 32.33; 134,6.13.16.19.21.22.27.31. 35; 135,4.8.10.11.12.14.16.19.20. 22.23.26.27.28.29.31.32.33.34.35; 136,6.9.11; 137,7.9.17.23.26.28. 29.31.33.34.35.37; 139,3; 142,36.37.38; 143,1.3.4; 146,24.29; 150,34; 151,1.36; 159,6; 160,16.19; 169,18; 170,9 phôtistikos, illuminates, 129,38; 134,2; source of light, 133,4.28.29 phôtizein, to illuminate, 129,12.24; 130,22.24.36; 131,5.6.34; 132,10.21; 133,15; 134,4.8.10.28; 135,14; 136,7,8.14.34; 137,24.25.32; 160,20.21.23; to be source of illumination, 141,40; to be source of light, 137,32; 171,2 phôtoeidês, form of light, 136,10; to , luminousness, 128,38 phronein, to think, 123,10.11 phronêsis, intelligence, 153,21.24 phronimos, intelligent, 153,19.21.23 phthartikos, destructive, 125,15; 156,27.32.39; 157,3; destroys, 156,12 phthartos, perishes, 159,11; perishable, 162,11; 164,22 phtheirein, to destroy, 148,35; 154,17; 164,33; 167,8.9.10; to damage, 168,2.12 phthora, destruction, 122,17; 123,23; decay, 132,8 phulattein, to preserve, 120,22; 142,28 phusikos, natural, 167,33 phusis, nature, 121,17; 131,25.29; 132,23.27.31; 134,22; 135,8.9; 145,9; 147,23; 148,31; 151,7.17.22; 159,5; 160,25.29.32; 164,20; phusei, naturally, 131,31; 143,3.4; para , unnatural, 120,20; not in natural state, 144,33; kata , natural, 120,20.23; 123,25; 128,32; 134,13; naturally, 126,38; 152,24; 157,18; by nature, 143,23

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phutikos, vegetative, 116,20; 158,35 phuton, plant, 168,23 pikros, sharp, 151,9.25; 157,32 pistis, to establish, 159,1 plagia (eis ta), sideways, 143,3 Platonikôs, in a Platonic fashion, 149,5 platos, surface, 146,15 plêgê, blow, 139,26.32; 140,3.9.23.28; 141,1.6.19,22.23.24.26.32.34.36.37; 142,4.17.19; 144,10; 146,9.10.11.13.18; 149,25; 150,3; stroke, 168,20 plêktikos, striking, 152,16 plêktikôterôs, more strikingly, 126,26 pleonektein, to score over, 152,5 plêroun, to fill, 140,29 plêthos, plurality, 160,26; 162,2 plêttein, to hit, 139,25; to strike, 139,33.34; 140,10.12.25.27; 141,4.11.17.18.22.31.34.35.37. 38.40; 142,3.12.14.16.25; 143,11.12.13.33.34; 144,9.16.25; 145,3.15; 146,7.8.9; 147,17; 149,14; 150,1.11.15.16; 160,15 plôtêr, master (of boat), 168,14 pneuma, air, 145,3.9.12.14.17; 150,8; 170,14; breath, 145,11; 154,13; 167,15 pneumôn, lung, 149,16.18.19.24; 150,28.31 poiein, to affect, 116,27; 170,10.20; 171,7; to act, 116,32.33; 117,19.20.22.26; 199,13; 120,30; 121,5; 125,23; 151,19; 170,1; to reveal, 163,35; to cause, 143,2.10; to bring about, 118,6; to make, 117,5; 142,26; 158,8; to produce, 120,32; 135,19 poiêsis, causation, 138,22; action, 163,37; activity, 157,19; agency, 169,11.24; interaction, 159,14; affecting, 169,31 poiêtikos, what acts, 116,34; causing, 143,9; efficient (cause), 120,27.35; 125,7.33; 133,4; 146,30; productive, 120,27.35; 125,7; agent, 124,1.4.6; brings, 120,20; creator, 140,18 poiêtikôs, creatively, 138,15; 166,4 poion (kata), qualitative, 120,19 poiotês, quality, 120,16; 122,14.35;

127,16.17; 130,28.35.38; 155,1.8; 157,15; 159,12; 164,23; 165,8; 168,31; 169,3; kata , qualitatively, 116,25; 123,19; qualitative, 117,11 poioun (to), productive, 120,33; agent, 122,24; 166,20; 168,33; active, 146,8 poros, pore, 134,12; channel, 140,17 poson (kata), quantitative, 120,19 potos, drinkable, 156,33.36; 157,4 pragma, thing, 121,22; 127,27; 146,23.35; 155,13; 160,29.32.33; fact, 159,17; bearer, 153,29.34 praktikos, practical, 125,7 proagein, to produce, 125,17; 131,17; to bring forth, 132,15 proballein, to project, 119,17; 124,35; 126,6; 166,6.16.24 problêma, problem, 158,36 problêtikos, projective, 168,6 probolê, projection, 119,9; 121,33; 122,1; 123,19.36; 128,28; 138,14; 166,8 prodiorizesthai, to determine first, 116,26 proêgeisthai, to come first, 132,7; to precede, 125,27; 132,12; 142,5 proêgoumenos, central, 159,22 proêgoumenôs, primarily, 117,9; 119,4; 131,35; 135,25.32; 143,9; 146,8; 154,1; 156,2; 166,38; especially, 125,29; pre-eminently, 126,26; 127,4; 128,6; 142,7; 169,1 progeuesthai, to taste previously, 157,24.28 proienai, to proceed, 131,10; 132,35; 143,4; 148,29; to come from, 148,29 proienai, to send forth, 131,20 prokeimenon, proposed, 116,24; propose, 117,1 prokeisthai, to be proposal, 138,7 prolambanesthai, to discuss in advance, 116,24; to be first, 147,10; to preconceive, 126,6; to anticipate, 120,35; to gather first, 131,16 prolêpsis, prior perception, 147,23; preconception, 126,14; proodos, progression, 141,25

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prouparkhein, to be present previously, 157,28 pseudes (to), falsehood, 148,1 pseudodoxia, false opinion, 122,6 pseudos, falsehood, 122,6; 148,1 psophein, to have a sound, 139,18; to sound, 141,39; 143,20.27; 167,3; 170,14; to make sound, 142,36; 145,19.34; 148,28; 150,4 psophêtikos, causes sound, 143,14.16; sounds, 169,20; capacity to make a sound, 146,23; audible, 163,26; makes sound, 146,26 psophos, sound, 138,16.19.29.31; 139,12.17.18.20.22.23; 140,1.17.18.20; 141,32; 142,3; 143,11; 144,6; 145,20.21.22; 146,21.23.24.25.26.28.30; 148,9.10.19.20; 150,6.34; 151,2.36; 158,7; 160,8.27; 166,18.36; 167,3; 169,27; 170,6.10.14 psukhê, soul, 116,20.25; 118,33; 121,31.32; 123,11.21.30; 124,10.11.12.14.18.24.28.29.34; 125,14; 126,7.12.13.14; 128,28; 132,5; 145,31; 149,26.27.28.29.30.33; 150,24; 153,21; 163,33; 167,19.21.29 psukhein, to chill, 144,26; to cool, 169,7 psukhikos, of the soul, 119,12; 167,32; by the soul, 123,36; psychic, 123,3; 168,24 psukhos, cold, 165,20 psukhron, cold, 122,19.20; 133,13; 165,16.17 psukhrotês, cold, 127,18; 159,14 pugolampis, glow-worm, 135,20 pur, fire, 118,7; 119,27.28; 129,26; 132,4; 133,26.30.32; 134,1.26.30; 136,24; 137,23.30; 138,2 pureios, fiery, 134,6 purôdês, fiery, 129,19.38; 135,18 rhabdon, rod, 140,19 rhipizein, to fan, 148,34 rhiptein, to throw, 141,20.28 rhopê, inclination, 125,28; 159,13 saphênizein, to make plain, 122,15;

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to make clear, 161,32; to clarify, 162,8; to explain, 130,6 sarx, flesh, 158,15.16.21; 159,20.31; 160,38; 161,25; 163,1.19; 164,2.3.10.12.18; 169,21 seiesthai, to vibrate, 146,16 selênaios, moonlike, 129,30 sêmainein, to mean, 143,21; to indicate, 145,27; to signify, 148,25; to notice, 166,10 sêmantikos, signifies, 130,10; can signify, 148,25; significatory, 150,2; indicates, 146,31; signalling, 149,7; meaningful, 148,11 sêmeion, indication, 136,15; 161,20; sign, 145,1.11; 150,21; 152,14; device, 169,8.17 sidêros, iron, 169,8 skhêma, shape, 126,27.32; 127,7; 130,32; 141,33; 147,32 skhêmatizein, to determine the shape, 141,23.24.27.28.31; to place in shape, 141,35; to shape, 142,13 skia, shadow, 143,2.6 sklêrophthalmon, creature with hard eyes, 152,27.28.29 skopos, aim, 117,1 skorpismos, scattering, 140,35; 141,2 skorpizein, to scatter, 140,35 skoteinos, dark, 134,35 skotizesthai, to darken, 133,15; to be in darkness, 134,25 skotos, dark, 129,9; 130,1.3.4; 135,1.2; 136,1; darkness, 129,11.25; 133,1.2.7.9.10.11.12.15.16; 134,21.27; 135,8.9.13.18.19.21.31; 136,1; 160,21.22; 170,9 smikrotês, smallness, 160,16 sôizein, to preserve, 134,9; 142,22.23; to retain, 158,35; (pass.) to remain, 157,24 sôma, body, 116,26; 118,1.13.14; 119,12.14; 123,6.13.14.30; 125,18.31; 126,8; 127,1; 129,3.4; 130,32.35; 132,3.4.5; 133,3.13.26.30.34; 134,5.24.26; 140,1.15; 142,15.24; 149,32; 153,18; 155,6.7.8; 158,24; 159,9.10; 160,33; 161,6; 162,5.10.11.14.16.22.31;

163,5.7.15; 164,17.20.21; 166,14; 167,7.27; 168,15; 170,10.12 sômatikos, bodily, 122,35; 123,1.17.22; 155,24; 162,30; corporeal, 124,9; 127,9; 134,22; 168,26 sômatoeidês, corporeal, 125,37; 127,10; 128,34; 161,5.7.21; 162,29; 168,20.27 sôron, pile, 140,32; 141,2 sôtêria, preservation, 122,21 speudein, to rush, 154,9 sphaira, ball, 141,10.14.30 sphodron (to), strength, 142,12 sphodrotês, severity, 140,28; violence, 168,20 sphragis, seal, 126,4; 165,5; device, 166,33 stasis, state, 165,4; 166,26 stenokhôria, small volume, 145,9 sterein, to deprive, 122,5 stereos, solid (thing), 129,31; 139,18.27; 140,23.25; 141,4.5.30.37; 142,2.8.21.22.24.25.27.37; 142,8.21.22.24.25.27.37; 144,15.24; 145,14.18; 146,13; 150,12; hard, 162,13.27 stereotês, hardness, 149,12 sterêsis, privation, 119,35; 122,18.19.20; 123,23; 133,8.18.19.20; 134,23.27; 135,2; 153,34; 156,4.8.13; 157,7 stêrizein, to fix, 155,15 stilbein, to glitter, 160,14 stoikheion, element, 118,7.8.10.16.21; 119,22; 148,27; 151,23; 159,10; 164,21.23.24 stoma, mouth, 155,32.33 stomion, mouth, 140,30 strophê, attention, 119,14 sullogizesthai, to reason, 132,1 sumbainein, to come about, 117,6; 148,7; to result, 147,34; to be incidental, 129,3.5.10; to arise, 160,25; to happen, 130,22; 150,11 sumbebêkos (to), attribute, 118,22.24; 128,34; accident, 155,13; property, 118,25; incidental, 148,7; accidental, 122,14; 147,34; kata , incidentally,

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sunaisthêsis, awareness, 135,7; consciousness, 151,6 sunaition, concomitant cause, 142,31 sunamphoteron, composite thing, 166,39; 167,1 sunanaphainesthai, to appear with, 131,3 sunaphê, link, 124,26; conjunction, 163,14 sunaptein, to connect, 124,25 sunartan, to conjoin, 143,23 sundesmos, connective, 163,7 suneidopoieisthai, to receive the same form, 142,14 sunekheia, continuity, 134,9; 136,32; 141,25; 142,22; sunekheiâi, continuously, 143,14; kata , continuously, 141,25 sunekhês, continuous, 121,31; 136,19.31; 141,23; 142,7.20; 146,7; to , continuum, 143,20 sunektikôs, with understanding, 166,5 sunergein, to aid in, 123,2; to co-operate, 136,13.36; to be contributory, 149,9 sunergon, contributing factor, 142,26 sunêtheia, common custom, 123,24; idiom, 156,28 sungeneia, kinship, 129,27.34; 135,35; affinity, 153,30 sungenês, akin, 131,14; to , related substance, 153,15 sungenôs (ekhein), akin, 129,26 sungramma, work, 117,21 sunharmozesthai, to adjust itself, 156,9.10 sunhuparkhein, to coexist, 128,7.8 sunhuparkhon (to), accompaniment, 170,25 sunhuphistasthai, to come into existence together, 123,31 sunienai, to understand, 16,17 sunistasthai, to form, 133,34; to collect, 149,1; to be composed of, 162,4; to be composite, 162,30 sunkhusis, confusion, 152,4 sunkirnasthai, to be mixed up, 157,34 sunôthein, to push with, 170,17 suntattein, to order, 120,22 suntaxis, ordering, 120,23

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suntelein, to contribute, 129,14; 149,5 sunthetos, composite (thing), 132,7; 145,31; 151,25; 169,1.2.3 suntrekhein, to contribute, 122,22; to go together, 153,35 sustatikos, constitutive, 144,8; 168,8 sustellein, to contract, 149,12 sustoikhos, corresponding, 158,10; conjoined, 161,6 sullabê, syllable, 148,16 takhos (to), speed, 141,22; 147,24.25.26.27.31 takhus, swift, 147,4; fast, 147,20.31; 148,1.3.6.7 takhutês, speed, 140,2.28.31; 141,1; 142,12; 147,20.21 tattein, to assign, 126,25 teinein, to have a tendency, 170,1 tekhnê, skill, 125,7 tekmairesthai, to be guide, 119,34 teleiopoiein, to fill perfectly, 129,22 teleios, perfect, 118,30; 119,38; 120,13; 121,15.28; 122,2; 126,3; 131,32; 139,11; 148,25.29; 149,25; 151,24; 165,3 teleiôs, perfectly, 119,10; perfect, 131,27; to  perfection, 131,3 teleiôsis, is accomplished, 169,34 teleiotês, perfection, 119,38.39; 121,14.27; 123,35; 129,16; 130,37; 131,4.9.16.21.24.32; 132,36; 134,23.28.29; 151,24; perfect state, 128,29 teleiôtikos, perfective, 122,23; perfecting, 132,35; is perfection of, 133,27; 134,3 teleioun, complete, 129,8.20 telos, end, 126,2; 138,9; purpose, 149,18; en telei, perfected, 121,27 têrein, to preserve, 140,8 thaumastos, surprising, 123,11 theasthai, to see, 137,34 theôrein, to contemplate, 121,25.28; 123,34; to see, 131,22; to exercise (knowledge), 122,28; to study, 158,10; to make study, 165,26; to , contemplation, 125,11 theôrêtikos, theoretical, 125,5 theôria, study, 116,20.24; 117,5; 126,20; contemplation, 121,21; 122,34; 123,1; 166,2

thêrion, wild beast, 152,7 thermainein, to warm, 132,11; 136,23 thermainesthai, to become hot, 125,22; 167,8; to grow hot, 167,6.7; to be heated, 167,3; 169,2.7.14; 170,18.26 thermon, warmth, 122,19; 149,21; hot, 165,10.16.17.20; 167,8; heat, 133,13; warm (region), 148,33; 149,19.24; thermos, warm, 148,26 thermotês, heat, 120,31; 159,14; 165,21; 169,1; 170,18; warmth, 127,18; 155,32 thesis, is placed, 129,24; position, 159,12 thinganein, to be on contact, 161,21.25 thixis, contact, 161,26 thlipsis, pressure, 147,18 threptikôs, of nourishment, 117,18 thripsis, friction, 120,31 thrupsis, dispersal, 140,29; 141,26; disruption, 146,10 thruptein, to disperse, 141,9; 146,6; to thruptesthai, disruption, 144,8.10.11 timios, valuable, 138,36 topikos, of place, 123,13; in a place, 134,3; spatial, 134,26 topôi (en), in a local sense, 134,24 trakhutês, rough, 160,10; roughness, 160,18 trepein, to transform, 130,27; to modify, 169,11 tropê, transformation, 120,17.18.20.21.26; 121,8; 130,28; 131,8; modification, 169,32 trophê, nourishment, 149,8 tropos, mode, 116,22; way, 120,11; 122,9.15.26.29.31; 136,1; 145,16; 146,3; 162,33; 170,28 tunkhanein, to share, 153,24 tupos, mould, 165,5; 166,34; outline, 165,22 tupoun, to mould, 166,34 tupsis, beating, 140,34 tuptein, to beat, 140,32; to strike, 145,34.35.37; 146,2.3.4.14.17; 148,22; 150,14.17.25 xanthos, yellow, 139,15

Greek-English Index xêros, dry, 151,27; 153,13; 154,29.30.32 xêrotês, dryness, 157,17.20; 159,14 zên, to be alive, 125,32; 126,17; to live, 143,24; 145,6; 162,10.16; (participle) life, 166,14 zêtein, to be question, 118,5; to search, 131,21; to inquire, 146,2; 158,27; 159,4.8; 160,35; to investigate, 160,26 zêtêsis, inquiry, 168,25 zôê, life, 117,7; 118,12; 119,4; 123,30; 128,28.36; 130,32; 131,9; 132,5.6.8.9; 138,12; 143,24.29; 144,2; 145,32; 148,25.29; 149,25; 158,33.35; 161,17.28; 162,10.30;

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166,12.23; 167,28.34; 168,3.11.21.26.29 zôon, living being, 121,34; 123,31; 132,9; being, 153,24; living thing, 124,10; 125,13; 149,9; 158,16; 162,31; animal, 144,1.2; 148,10.17.35; 151,21.30.38; 152,2.35; 153,19; 159,27 zôoun, to give life, 126,7 zôtikos, vital, 117,28; 119,6; 128,35; 144,2; 145,11.30; 149,27.31; 161,16; 166,13; 167,14.19.28.33; living, 143,29; characteristic of life, 117,31; proper to life, 126,4; vitally, 143,30; 161,11.27; 162,28 zôtikôs, in a vital manner, 128,26; vitally, 128,31; 167,35

Index of Names and Subjects affection affective qualities, 120,15-16; 122,14-15; 127,16-17; 130,28-38; 164,23; 165,8 in hearing, 141,11-142,34 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 118,4; 138,5; 141,16.33; 149,29.31; 160,11 appearance, 165,3; 166,19-31; 168,5-6 Aristotle, 120,26.35; 127,3; 129,32; 132,27; 138,5; 141,11; 147,8.14; 151,26; 157,15; 161,24 awareness consciousness, 135,7; 151,6 cause formal, 130,15; 167,26-7 material, 167,27 productive, 120,35; 125,23; 133,4; 140,18 cognition its corporeal type, 127,10 Democritus, 137,1 determination of knowledge, 165,5-6 development of secondary causes in the soul, 124,20-1 elements Empedocles’ theory, 118,7-10.15-21 lack of sensitive activity, 118,19-21 purer elements, 148,27 Plato’s theory, 151,21-3 principles, 159,10; 164,18-25 Empedocles, 118,9 form intellective which is the primary cause, 127,19-23 sensitive, 119,37 formal activity, 128,27

formal unity, 126,10 common defining, 159,11 hearing, 139,10ff. Iamblichus, 133,34 imagination signifying, 148,25-7 articulated, 153,20-4 aroused from itself, 166,2 inclination of the soul toward body, 167,21-2 intellect knows the terms (horoi) and forms, 124,23-4 aroused from itself, 166,2 intellection remains in the substance which produces it, 131,17-18 intuition/apprehension, 131,37; 134,35-135,7; 156,3.14 judgement, 123,36; 124,5; 126,2-16; 151,40-152,8; 152,15; 165,31-166,34 knowledge as opinion, 128,9 life auditive, 143,16-25.29-30; 144,2-4; 145,32 of sight, 143,24-5 sensitive, 138,11-15; 161,26-8; 167,25-8 light, 131,13 ff. object of sense-perception common, 126,24-127,14; 128,15ff. particular, 126,24-127,14; 128,15ff. incidental objects, 127,24-128,15

Index of Names and Subjects Plato, 119,13; 120,34; 123,9; 129,31; 135,35; 146,22; 151,22 Plutarch of Athens, 118,9; 151,13; 160,12 Proclus, 134,7 projection of concepts, 118,29-119,29; 121,32-3; 122,1; 123,18-19.30-7; 124,32-125,2; 126,5-16; 138,13-14; 165,31-167,11 purpose significatory, 150,2 reversion, 119,1. 21 sense-organ its affection, 117,13-15; 119,7-22 tempering, 165,12-14 the first sense organ which is the vital pneuma, 167,13-17 of sight, 136,20-137,13; 152,29-31 of smell, 152,11-26 of touch, 159,19-36 sense-perception projection of concepts, see above summary of the theory on it, 169,4-170,8 sensitive substance, 125,17; 165,13; 177,10-16 life, 117,7-11; 168,3-15

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form, 156,5-9 sight, 129,1ff. smelling, 150,35 ff. standing still at the form, 118,30; 125,1-2.21-7; 126,2-9; 128,23-9; 138,11-15; 154,30-5; 164,29-34; 166,30-4; 171,2-10 substance/essence unfolded, 167,32 unmoved and indivisible, 124,17-20 can be known only by reason (logos), 127,12-14.26-7 underlying, 127,31-2 of the sense, 128,17-18 active, 128,32-3 can be known from activities, 146,22-3 taste, 154,37ff. term, 121,32; 124,23-4 Themistius, 151,14 Theophrastus, 136,29 touch, 158,10ff. transparent, 132,35ff. vital principles (logoi), 167,33 wax-model of sense-perception, 126,4; 166,32; 169,7-19