Religion and National Integration in Africa: Islam, Christianity, and Politics in the Sudan and Nigeria 0810110377, 9780810110373

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teligion and National Integration in Africa

Juiitca with

JOHN

O.

an introduction by

HUN WICK

"* ra

:.4J08

wmu>A

tm Religion and National Integration in Africa

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IP

8ANFRA.

CA

94108

Northwestern University Press Series in Islam

and Society in Africa

GENERAL EDITORS John Hunwick Robert Launay

EDITORIAL BOARD

Ralph Austen Carl Petry

Lamin Sanneh IvorWilks

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Abun Nasr Mohamed Omer Beshir

Jamil

Rene Bravmann Louis Brenner

Abdullah Bujra Allan Christelow

Lansine Kaba

Lidwien Kapteijns

Murray Last Nehemia Levtzion David Robinson Enid Schildkrout Jay Spaulding

Charles Stewart

Jean-Louis Triaud

Religion and

National Integration in Africa

and Politics

Islam, Christianity, in the

Sudan and Nigeria

Edited with an Introduction by

JOHN

O.

HUNWICK

Northwestern University Press EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL LIBRAE 312 SUTTER STREET SAN FRANCJSCO, CA 94108

— ——

Northwestern University Press Evanston,

Copyright

Illinois

©

60201-2807

1992 by Northwestern University Press Published 1992

All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Religion and national integration in Africa

Islam, Christianity, and Sudan and Nigeria / edited with an introduction by John O. Hunwick. (Series in Islam and society in Africa) p. cm. :

politics in the

—

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-8101-1037-7 1.

Islam

—

Social aspects

Nigeria

—

Christianity.

—

Nigeria.

Politics [1.

Hunwick, John O. BP64.S8R45 1992 1

2.

Social aspects

4. Christianity

Social aspects

Politics

5.

Relations

7.

Christianity

I.

322'.

paper)

—Sudan. Islam— —Sudan. — and government— 1956— Sudan — Islam — and government— 1960— and

Nigeria. 3. Christianity

6.

(alk.

Social aspects

II.

other religions

Islam.]

Series.

'09624—dc20

9 1-45253

CIP

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper

—

for Printed Library Materials,

ANSI Z39.48-1984.

After this

book had gone

the death of

1992.

We

memory.

to press

Mohamed Omer

we were saddened to learn of London in late January dedicate this volume to his

Beshir in

therefore respectfully

Digitized by the Internet Archive in

2012

http://archive.org/details/religionnationalOOhunw

Contents

List

of Participants

Preface

ix

xi

Introduction

i

John O. Hunwick Islam and National Integration in the Sudan

AbdullahiA.

n

An-Naim

A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Conflict in the

Sudan

Francis M.

39

Deng

Commentary on Francis

the Papers of Abdullahi

An-Na'im and

Deng, Followed by General Discussion

The Role of Religion

in National Life: Reflections

Recent Experiences in Nigeria

63

on

85

Ibrahim Gambari

Muslim-Christian Conflict and in Nigeria

Political Instability

101

Don Ohadike Commentary on

Don Ohadike,

the Papers of Ibrahim

Gambari and

Followed by General Discussion

Religion, Politics,

and National Integration:

African Perspective

151

Lamin Sanneh Discussion of Lamin Sanneh's Paper vii

167

125

A Comparative

Participants

Invited Speakers

ABDULLAHI AN-NA'lM, Professor of Law, University of Khartoum; Fellow ars,

at the

Woodrow Wilson

International Center for Schol-

Washington, D.C. Currently (1990) Professor of Law, Uni-

versity

of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada.

FRANCIS DENG, former Minister of State for Foreign

Affairs,

ernment of the Sudan; former Sudanese Ambassador United

States, the

Gov-

to the

Scandinavian countries, and Canada; Visit-

ing Scholar and subsequently Research Associate, the

Woodrow

Wilson International Center

for Scholars; Distinguished Fel-

low, the Rockefeller Brothers

Fund; Jennings Randolph Distin-

guished Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. Currently (1990) Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program,

the Brookings Institution, Washington,

D.C.

IBRAHIM GAMBARI, former Minister of Foreign

Government of Nigeria;

Affairs, Federal

Professor of Political Science,

Ahmadu

Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria; Visiting Professor of Political Science, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns

Hop-

D.C. Currently (1990) Nigerian the United Nations.

kins University, Washington,

Permanent Representative to

DON OHADIKE,

Senior Lecturer in History, University of Jos,

Nigeria; Visiting Professor, Stanford University. Currently (1990) Associate Professor, Africana Studies ter,

Cornell University.

and Research Cen-

^Participants

LAMIN SANNEH,

Professor,

Center for the Study of World Religions,

Harvard University. Currently (1990) Professor of Missions and

World

Christianity, the Divinity School, Yale University.

Commentators

MOHAMED OMER

BESHIR, Professorial Fellow, Institute of African

Studies, University of

Khartoum; Visiting

African Studies, Northwestern University;

Human

mission on University,

Scholar,

Program of

Member, U.N. Com-

Rights. Currently (1990) Director, Ahliyya

Omdurman,

the Sudan.

IBRAHIM ABU-LUGHOD, Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University.

DAVID LAITIN, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.

JOHN HUNWICK,

Professor of History

and of the History and

Lit-

erature of Religions, Northwestern University.

Other Discussants ABRAHAM DEMOZ,

Professor of Linguistics, Northwestern University.

ABBAS HAMDANI, Professor of History, University of Wisconsin

at

Milwaukee.

LEMUEL JOHNSON, Professor of English and Director of the Program of Black and African Studies, University of Michigan,

Ann Arbor. LANSINE KABA, Director, Black Studies Program, University of Illinois at Chicago.

Preface

This volume contains the papers presented held in

May 1988

at

of its Program of African Studies, vited

Our

at a

as well as a transcript

commentaries on them and the ensuing focus was

one-day seminar

Northwestern University under the auspices of the

in-

general discussion.

on the Sudan and Nigeria because they

illustrate

most graphically the problems facing African countries trying to

weld together peoples of diverse cultures and

nation-states in the late twentieth century, a time

the individual

Muslim

and the

societal levels, a

histories into

when,

at

or Christian often seems to override other loyalties.

seminar explored both the problems raised by religious

and the underlying tensions of class,

ethnicity,

meager national resources.

A

problems

of religion to the

in the relationship

perspective

final

lim and a Christian

Nigerian speakers

—were

as

The

loyalties

and the sharing of

paper posing philosophical state gives a

and reminds us that such problems

Two Sudanese and two

both

primary identification

—

are not

broader

new ones. MusThey were

in each case a

invited to give papers.

asked not only to offer a dispassionate analysis of the situation in their respective countries,

dilemmas

—

—because of

their inevit-

on

possible solutions

their countries face as a result

of the polarization

able sense of involvement to the

but also

to deliberate

of public opinion around widely differing philosophies of govern-

ment and

law.

Formal commentaries were then

faculty at or visiting

of Chicago, and

among

at the

XI

from

seminar these were followed by discussion

the invited participants

from the audience.

solicited

Northwestern University and the University

and questions and comments

^Preface

In preparing these papers and the transcript of commentaries

and discussions spellings

for publication,

I

have attempted to standardize

of proper names and technical terms

as far as possible.

I

decided, for example, to use Sharia rather than the technically

more

correct Shar/'a to simplify preparation of the text

because the word spelling.

scribed

now

appears in English dictionaries with that

Tapes of the commentaries and discussions were tran-

by Richard McGrail,

task well done.

I

to

whom thanks are due for a tedious

then lightly edited the typescripts to ensure that

what may have been quite comprehensible at a

and

in

an oral presentation

conference could also be read smoothly and without serious

danger of misunderstanding. Papers are arranged in the order of their presentation

with commentary and discussion following

as

they did in the seminar. All participants were given an opportunity to revise their papers prior to publication.

published of the papers by Dr.

Deng and

The

Prof.

versions here

Ohadike

differ

considerably in form from those they presented; yet because the substantive issues they address are similar to those they dealt with in their conference presentations, the

commentary and

discussion

sections are not rendered irrelevant.

John O. Hunwick Evanston July ippi

XI

johno. hunwick

Introduction

More than

three years have passed since the Seminar

and National Integration University.

convened

in Africa

While I must offer apologies

has

some advantages. had

discussants

addressed are

now as

vant

to say has

still

very

little

become

believe that the delay

I

of what the speakers and

dated.

The problems

with us and their analyses of issues are

they were in 1988. Second,

ine subsequent developments in the

countries

Northwestern

to the participants for the

delay in getting the proceedings published, First,

at

on which we focused

nostications of our speakers

now possible

it is

Sudan and Nigeria

—and

see to

as rele-

to

—

they

exam-

the two

what extent the prog-

and discussants have proved sound.

This introduction to the proceedings of the seminar fore,

on Religion

will, there-

attempt to provide an update in regard to the Sudan and

Nigeria, while leaving the contributions of participants in 1988 to

speak for themselves.

The Sudan The Sudan two

has witnessed a

years. In late 1988

might be prospects

number of dramatic

and the

for

first

half of 1989

an end to the

civil

war.

it

events in the past

looked

The

as if there

Umma party's

junior partner in government, the Democratic Unionist party,

sponsored a peace

initiative in

November

1988; then, in February

army sent a memorandum to Prime Minister Sadiq alMahdi calling on him either to bring the war to an end or to give the army the means with which to fight it. When he proved 1989, the

unable or unwilling to do

either,

on 30 June the army moved and

ousted his civilian government. Lt.-Gen. el

Omar

Hassan

Ahmed

Bashir took over the reins of government at the head of a

JOHN

HUN WICK

O.

Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation. In several

army

factions

had considered

a similar

fact,

move, and one had

been actively preparing a coup for 22 June when

its

were

leaders

rounded up four days beforehand.

From

the outset

that this

it

has seemed doubtful to outside observers

new regime would

succeed in bringing either peace or

prosperity to the Sudan. In mid-1989 the country was essentially

bankrupt, with debts of some $12 billion and payment arrears

of $4.4

billion.

ground

to the

the

war,

civil

Meanwhile, the regular army continued to

which

is

the key to beginning an economic recovery,

clearly requires a massive political will less likely

lose

Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). To end

—and

a military regime

is

than a civilian one to think in terms of a negotiated

solution. Abdullahi

An-Na'im, who was

in the

Sudan

weeks immediately following the coup, concluded script to his

paper that

"at best, [the

new

introducing an element of temporary

for several

in the post-

junta may] succeed in

relief in the security

supply of essential goods situations in the Sudan, but unlikely to

end the civil war and achieve

a peaceful

and

will

it

be

and lasting set-

tlement of the southern problem."

His pessimism seems

justified in the light

of subsequent events.

Despite military aid from two friendly Arab countries, Libya and Iraq, a military solution to the civil ever.

war seems further away than

There has been considerable opposition

ment's policies both from elements in the ians. Several

to the

new

govern-

army and from

civil-

purges of the army have been undertaken, through

forced retirement, arrest and imprisonment, and, most recently, the

summary

ting a

coup

execution of twenty-eight officers accused of plot-

in late April 1990. Civilian protests since

have led to the arrest and detention without

of trade unionists, doctors, academics,

artists,

trial

October 1989 of hundreds

and lawyers

as well

as the dismissal

of about one thousand public servants. 1 In

September 1989,

civilian forces

Lieutenant-General

el

opposed

to the

government of

Beshir, including former

Umma

party

stalwarts, southern political groups, and professional and workers

organizations,

formed a front known

as the

National Democratic

Introduction

Alliance that has set ington. In 1990, a

up

offices in Cairo,

monthly newsletter

London, and Wash-

called the

Sudan Demo-

edited and published by Bona Malwal, began

cratic Gazette,

to

appear from London.

Although the military junta

at first strenuously

denied that

had sympathies with the National Islamic Front (NIF), quent actions indicate

that,

on the

contrary, the

its

it

subse-

coup was de-

signed to promote that party's interests. Dr. Hassan al-Turabi,

who was

originally detained,

became upon

his release the

only

former civilian politician allowed to travel freely outside the Sudan. Apparently through his efforts the "Islamic Call" organization (al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya) relocated

Cairo to Khartoum

—

a

move

that

was

headquarters from

its

officially

welcomed by

Mohamed Salih, deputy chairman of the RevoluCommand Council, at a meeting of the organization in

Gen. Zubeir tionary

Khartoum on

May. 2

12

A

number of "nonaligned" government

who are NIF Abdel Rahim Mahmoud Hamdi at

ministers have recently been replaced by others

members or sympathizers:

Mohamed Khojali Saliheen at Information, and AbdulMohamed Ahmed at Education. 3 The heads of all Sudan's

Finance, lah

universities

were replaced in

March 1990

late

regime's "higher education revolution, "4

which

abization of higher education but which

is

cle for its "islamization."5 Finally,

Islamic "militias"

guard

—which, army

senior

cuted

it

of the

likely also to

be a vehi-

one may note the formation of

—apparently an attempt has been suggested,

positions vacated

as part

will stress the ar-

at a

may

kind of praetorian

eventually take over

by dismissed, imprisoned, or exe-

officers. 6

These developments do not appear promising gration.

The

military

mined

to

goal

an Islamic

is

promote the state

government interests

in

for national inte-

Khartoum seems

deter-

of the hard-line Islamists, whose

and the implementation of Sharia

law of the land, while at the same time attempting to "southern problem" by winning the

civil

as the

settle the

war and imposing

its

will

on the non-Muslim segment of the Sudanese population.7 In so doing it is alienating Western governments (in particular, the

john United

Arab

States)

Hun wick

o.

and building stronger bridges with

countries.

On

March

2

Libyan

air

that, there

is

from bases role in

in Darfur.9 Iraq,

Arab

politics,

in the

anxious to gain backdoor access to

Chad, where anti-Habre (and often pro-Gadhafi) hanced

were reports of

power being used against SPLA strongholds

south. 8 Meanwhile, Libya

ating

announced be-

1990, a union was

tween the Sudan and Libya; even before

certain of the

is

now

rebels are oper-

an en-

actively seeking

also a player in this

game,

as

it is

in

certain other sub-Saharan African countries, notably Mauritania. 10

The

policy of Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Socialist regime

is

to

give unqualified support to manifestations of "Arabism"; this translates into support for the

Muslim

biMn

and support

(blacks) in Mauritania,

(Arabs) against the sudan

for the perceived "Arabs" (the

northerners) against the "non-Arabs" (the southerners) of

the Sudan. Both Libya and Iraq, moreover, are trying to score against Egypt,

David

which

is

seeking to reemerge, after

isolation, as leader

its

of the Arab world, though

post-Camp still

endeav-

oring to remain a "moderate" despite loss of face over the stalled Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Iraq has the largest

war machine

—

war

Iraq

in the

Arab world, recently

a conflict in

which some ten thousand Sudanese troops

are said to have fought

weapons,

on the

on

a

chemical

Iraqi side. It also has

as has (probably) Libya.

The

Sudan do not look good. The chances sis

and best-trained

tested in the long Iran-

prospects for peace in the

for dialogue

and an empha-

common Sudanese identity that goes beyond religious and

cultural differences

of our seminar —of which —seem even more remote. several

speakers

were eloquent advocates

Nigeria Although there has been sporadic the past two years,

it

civilian violence in Nigeria in

has been occasioned

more by protest

against

the belt-tightening that followed implementation of the Structural

in

Adjustment Program than by interfaith antagonism. The

world

oil prices in

the 1980s

left Nigeria's

economy

fall

in a pre-

soon a crippling external debt

mounted.

Attempts to create confidence among international

creditors,

carious position,

and

Introduction

coupled with International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure, led to

an

effective devaluation

of the naira against the dollar by some

700 percent and the removal of internal subsidies (notably on petroleum products), which in turn fueled inflation. Interfaith antagonism, rather, has tended to manifest called a

war of words

—

and newspaper

azine

articles.

itself in

open

in public speeches,

Nevertheless,

what may be and mag-

letters,

it is

not difficult to

read a hidden message of interfaith antagonism in the attempt to

overthrow Gen. Ibrahim Babangida's military regime on 22 April 1990. Although the

coup

leader,

Maj. Gideon Orkar, in his single

broadcast concerning the event never mentioned the gion, his attack

nate

till

on "those who think

eternity the political

it is

word

domi-

their birthright to

and economic

privileges

reli-

of this great

country to the exclusion of Middle Belt and the South" 11 would certainly have

been read in Nigeria

as

an attack on the "Muslim"

north for dominating the "Christian" Middle Belt and south. 12

During the past two been

far

years the "religion issue" has, in fact, never

from the surface of debate over

ticular, its future after

my commentary

In

in 1988

I

versus

Muslim

dominate

all

on the papers of

factions as a

means of

some

Professors

political

Gambari and

many cross-

opposition

remarked that

ferences so cross-cut the discontent that

up

—and

away with any kind of monolithic Christian

Nigeria]." Similarly, Professor Laitin

to build

in par-

other issues.

offered the view that "there are too

cutting factors to get

—

the return to civilian rule in 1992^

has, at times, threatened to

Ohadike

Nigeria's future

it

would be very

difficult

a massive organization of the discontent based

religious symbols."

sidered. In the past

[in

"religious dif-

on

Such views may now need to be recon-

two years there

has, in fact,

been a growing

measure of consolidation among groups on either side of the religious divide, an increasing polarity between Muslim Nigerians and Christian Nigerians, and a harsher tone to mutual accusa-

tions of seeking to "dominate" Nigeria. *4 This closing of ranks

may ria

reflect the fact that the

new

political

announced by President Babangida

arrangements for Nige-

in 1989 include as a central

feature the institution of a two-party system.

Although one party

JOHN is

HUN WICK

O.

to bear a label including the

include the Nigeria.

on

word

no

republican, such labels have

There have been no

—no

"left"

and no

the other will

real

meaning

in

of any significance based

parties

clear-cut political ideologies in Nigeria since

i960

in

word democratic and

independence

The good in-

"right" in federal politics.

tentions of the constitution of the Second Republic notwithstanding, politics has continued to

show

remain rooted in regional or "ethnic" plicity

a stubborn tendency to

loyalties.

of parties has generally had the

Even

so, the

multi-

of forcing disparate

effect

groups into political alliances and hence diffusing either northsouth or Muslim-Christian tensions.

This situation

may

be changing

Nigeria moves toward the

as

return to civilian government in 1992.

two

emerge

parties that eventually

they are given and whatever ban gion, essentially be one of religious affiliation

is

fear

will, despite

of each party leader

unlikely event of both being

now

that the

is

whatever

labels

placed on parties based on

Muslims and one of

which banner Nigerians of either

ation that

The

may

Christians.

itself

reli-

The

determine to

religion will flock, except in the

Muslims or both Christians

would no doubt produce

its

own

—

a situ-

tensions. Accusations

by Nigerian Christians that the Babangida regime

is

preparing to

turn Nigeria into an Islamic state (with himself at the head of it) are

growing ever more frequent and

shrill.

Among

other things

General Babangida has been accused of dropping Christians from his

government

in favor

of Muslims and of replacing senior public

An open

servants

who

are Christians with

head of

state

by Christians from the eleven "northern"

Muslims.

letter to the

states

of

Nigeria quotes with approval a statement by the Christian Association of Nigeria, Northern Zone, that "the Babangida administration

is

the principal agent for the islamization of Nigeria. "*5 This

charge, in turn, tends to be connected to the contentious

and

still

unresolved issue of Nigeria's membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference, with Christians alleging that Nigeria's full

membership an Islamic

is

state.

dependent on

its

having the appearance of being

Introduction

Muslim writers and intellectuals have tended to play the numbers game in response, showing that whatever the ChristianMuslim balance in high office may now be, it only reflects the demographic balance of the country as a whole, balance that hitherto has favored the Christians disproportionately; indeed, the

whole superstructure of public

life,

they claim, has reflected a

"Christian" ethos. Needless to say, the

numbers game

is

incapable

of accurate demonstration, given the lack of acceptable census

fig-

ures since independence. Furthermore, the very fact that Nigeri-

ans are framing the debate in terms of balancing public office

between Muslims and Christians sion about the future

and

Lebanon and Northern

call to

bound to cause apprehenmind the tragic experiences of is

Ireland. After the traumatic civil

war of

1967-70, Nigerians are justifiably wary of taking any path that

may

lead

them

in that direction again. Yet the declaration

the leader of the abortive April

coup

north were to be "excised" from the federation until the recognised Sultan [of Sokoto] Alhaji Maciddo"

and

delegation "to vouch that the feudalistic

domination and oppression part of the Nigerian State" 1 ?

16

"real

would

lead a

be practised in any

within the army

that,

and

aristocratic quest for

will never again

shows

by

that five states of the far

at

any

some men are ready to risk civil war in pursuit of their goals. One might simply write off Maj. Gideon Orkar as a naive

rate,

ranter,

but the severity of the fighting in Lagos at the time of the

coup shows that he must have had considerable support (though

how much of his program his fellow soldiers knew about is not clear). Had he been even slightly more successful, a major conflagration could have erupted within the army,

have sparked conflict

As

in the

Sudan, so in Nigeria, power struggles conducted un-

of "religious"

ior,

easily

among civilians.

der military regimes in a political

oneself) or

which might

issues.

At

vacuum

stake, however,

is

are expressed in terms

the right to retain (for

impose (upon others) ways of life, patterns of behav-

systems of law, and expressions of culture.

of distrust of the perceived "other"

who

is

An

atmosphere

boxed with a Muslim

john or Christian label

duced

o.

is

Hun wick

pervasive;

to a single issue: faith.

danger of being

all

issues are in

A

deep sense of Sudanese-ness or

re-

Nigerian-ness, of which several seminar participants spoke both

eloquently and passionately,

under the harsh

realities

is

of the

danger of being eroded

in real

new

politics

being played out in

the two countries.

Notes i

Lists

of those detained were published in

and 22 January 1990. 2 Republic of Sudan Radio,

May 3

31

12

May

releases

by Africa Watch on

1990; reported in

Sudan Update,

8

18

1990.

See Africa Confidential, 19 April 1990.

4 The new appointments were announced by Republic of Sudan Radio on March 1990; reported in Sudan Update, 20 April 1990.

5 The agreements to unify Sudan with Libya (signed in March 1990) contain clauses that promise the spreading of the

and Islamic values and culture and 1990;

its

across the world

Tripoli

on

2

Islamic da'wa

and the dissemination of Arabic language

use in education. See Middle East International, 16

March

and Sudan Update, 30 March 1990.

6 "Tribal militias" (Popular Defense Forces), formed with government

encouragement under Sadiq al-Mahdi's regime and accorded under General

Bahr

el

el

Ghazal, the southern Blue Nile, and the

the notorious ed

Da

ien

(March 1987) and

el

official status

number of massacres

Nuba Mountains,

Jebelein

in

including

(December 1989) mas-

of Africa Watch of 23 January 1990. The "Islamic miliin contrast, are urban-based. Popular Committees with a watchdog-vigi-

sacres; see tias,"

Beshir, have been responsible for a

news

release

Khartoum area, and there is now manned by NIF personnel. For this and

lante function have been established in the

a

Popular Defense unit for the capital

a

summary of

other recent developments, see the report of David Hirst in the

Guardian (London), 29 March 1990. 7 General el Beshir has also held open the option of allowing

(or forcing?)

the south to secede, thus allowing creation of a purely "Arab" Islamic state in the north. 8

Africa International (Paris), no. 224 (February 1990): 10.

9

See Africa Confidential, 6 January 1989, 1-2.

1 December 1989. As reported in Punch (Lagos), 24 April 1988, 8. 12 That this is so is demonstrated by the fact that it was found necessary officially to deny such an interpretation. A letter from the Nigerian ambas-

10 See Africa Confidential, 11

sador to the United States in the that "the insurrection

by a few

New

officers

.

York Times of 2 June 1990 states .

.

did not reflect religious division

was a sectional madness similar to the abortive 1976 coup of Lieut. Col. Bukars [sic] Dimka. Last month's coup in Nigeria or a north-south split. It

8

Introduction were merely

plotters

a

band of

have accepted large sums of

irresponsible

money

and greedy

officers,

to start the rebellion."

known

to

Such an explana-

raises more questions than it answers. on the place of Sharia in the constitution for the Third Repub13 lic in Constituent Assembly meetings in November 1988 became so acrimonious that General Babangida had to step in and halt discussion of the issue. A series of articles on the Sharia issue is contained in the African Guardian

tion,

of course,

A debate

(Lagos), 24

October

For a defense of Sharia and a plea for

1988, 19-26.

Mahmud

implementation, see Abdulmalik Bappa

Bauchi

State),

A

its

(Honourable Grand Khadi,

Brief History ofShariah in the Defunct Northern Nigeria

(Jos,

Nigeria: Jos University Press, 1988). 14 See reports in Africa Confidential, 2

The Christian Association of Nigeria many Christian denominations and sects.

4-5.

December is

1988, 5-6; 9

June 1989,

an umbrella organization for the

On

the

Muslim

side the

Supreme

Council for Islamic Affairs does a similar job, although severe antagonism exists

between pro- and anti-Sufi groups. The so-called Sokoto Accord,

designed to reconcile partisans of both Izala ("Wahhabl") and Sufi tendencies,

was reaffirmed on tions of

18

December

January 1988 in the wake of the local government

1987, in

which

Christians rather than "Sufis," Izala candidates.

See

Izala

and

Muhammad

members had been advised

elec-

to vote for

had voted for Christian rather than Umar, "Sufism and Anti-Sufism in

"Sufis"

Sani

Nigeria" (M.A. thesis, Bayero University, Kano, 1988), 222^99.

The open letter is reproduced in part in African Concord, 5 February The same issue of that magazine has a multicontributed article entitled "Before Nigeria Burns," with a summary box that reads: "Christians 15

1990, 36—37.

allege the gradual Islamisation

of Nigeria. Muslims deny the charges and claim

that the structures of the Nigerian nation are built

on

a Christian foundation.

Religion assumes the centre stage in a macabre dance and Nigeria

is

perched

on the edge of a precipice." 16 Alhaji Maciddo, the eldest son of the late Sultan Abubakar III and a staunch traditionalist, was proclaimed sultan by the Sokoto "kingmakers" a mere two days after his father's death. Shortly afterward the Sokoto state government annulled this decision and proclaimed its support for another son, precariously

Ibrahim Dasuki

—

a

move

that led to severe rioting. Because Dasuki, a former

diplomat and successful businessman,

is

known

to be close to General Ba-

bangida, the reversal was widely interpreted as interference in Sokoto's affairs

by the Nigerian head of state. This of another pro-Babangida

Abubakar

Alhaji, to the office

Bello's assassination in

trying to establish a ular. In

da,

situation,

member of

the

coupled with the recent elevation

Sokoto "royal" family, Alhaji

of Sardauna of Sokoto (vacant since Sir

Ahmadu

January 1966), has led to speculation that Babangida

power base

extreme versions,

is

where he has hitherto been unpopa conspiracy theory emerges that would see Babangiin Sokoto,

having parted company with his (largely Christian) Middle Belt supporters

(notably the "Langtang mafia"), seeking to ally himself with traditional

power

structures of the Islamic north to support his bid to remain as president after

the return to civilian rule. See Africa Confidential, 6 April 1990, 3-4. 17

See The Punch, 24 April 1990,

8.

Islam and National Integration

abdullahi

Sudan

in the

a.

an-na'im

Introduction Strict

adherence to a monotheistic religion such

been perceived

Christianity, or Islam has often

The monotheistic

exclusive. as

creed

itself

as

Judaism,

as necessarily

usually perceives of

God

being extremely jealous, demanding of believers total loyalty

without association with any "other."

made

It is

not surprising, there-

whenever that conception of the monotheistic creed

fore, that

the effective basis of collective political identity

it

is

tends to

exclude nonbelievers according to the degree of their nonbelief.

and

Similarly, the ideal constitutional

monotheistic belief would treat

its

legal

system of such a

subjects according to their rela-

tionship with the underlying belief.

Yet despite the strenuous efforts of adherents

dous suffering of perceived or

real

and the horren-

enemies and opponents, none

of the monotheistic creeds has managed to maintain

the

itself as

exclusive basis of collective political identity or to establish

constitutional

and

legal

nificant period of time.

throughout

history,

system over extensive territory for a

The pure

polity of believers has remained,

an unattainable

ideal. Believers

have always

had to contend with the existence of unbelievers and cater to

demands and expectations Faced with

its

sig-

as fellow

human

this reality, Christian

their

beings.

Europeans took the lead in

formally and explicitly abandoning the monotheistic ideal of a

monolithic polity and modifying the role of religion in public thereby opening the

way

for the

as the secular nation-state.

1

is

known

facilitated

within

development of what

This

shift

was

life,

i^ABDULLAHI

^A.

lAN-NA'IM

Christianity by the belief that Christ himself was unconcerned

with temporal

affairs.

Yet because this interpretation of Christ's

position took several centuries of struggle and suffering to evolve, it

may be assumed

that

it

was prompted by other

practical considerations. Moreover, ification

intellectual

and

would appear that the modlife was a necessary but

of the role of religion in public

insufficient condition for the state.

it

development of the modern nation-

Costly wars and painful economic and political adjustments

may be in store who followed their example.

for the

European Christians took that

signifi-

have had to be endured since; and more nations of Europe and those

For centuries cant step, the

after the

Muslim peoples of the world continued

to hold fast

to their ideal of the universal Islamic state. Unlike Christ,

Muhammad was

clearly very

concerned with the temporal

affairs

fact established the concept of umma, of community and political unity among believers. Moreover, based on this ideal Muslim jurists have developed a systematic and comprehensive legal order, the Sharia, which the community and its

of his followers and in

supposed to implement

rulers are

governments had

little

in practice. 1

the Prophet, and their public affairs reflected ty with Sharia, in these ideals

little

true conformi-

Muslim peoples have always maintained and hope

rulers expressed

ples

Thus, while their

to do with the community envisaged by

for their realization. 2

commitment

to

implement

Sharia,

were willing to wait for the fulfillment of the

their faith

So long

as their

Muslim peo-

ideal.3

In the meantime, however, local and general circumstances

have changed so

much

that they bear almost

no resemblance

those prevailing at the time of the original conception of the

lim

Mus-

umma in which the Sharia is supposed to be implemented.

particular,

Muslim peoples have come

to accept,

and even

to

In

insist

on, the pluralistic nation-state as the basis of their domestic and international relations.4

Whereas

in the

West the

order that regulates relations ly

nation-state

and the international

among

have evolved gradual-

states

out of the experience of European peoples, these institutions

were suddenly but 12

effectively

imposed on the Muslim peoples,

Islam

and T^ational Integration

its

original form,

facing a real dilemma.

pendent and

free to

On the one hand,

pursue their Islamic

impossible to achieve that ideal in

realities

they are politically inde-

on the other hand,

ideal;

which they must operate make

the practical circumstances under it

peri-

Muslims find themselves

over,

is

Sudan

Now that the colonial

especially during the colonial period.

od, at least in

in the

historical conception.

its

The

of the nation-state and the international order on which

predicated are irrevocable; yet they are also irreconcilable with

it is

the original notion of

umma

and the

Sharia. Moreover, given the close link

order and the political regime of the

seem

secular approach does not

context. 5 that

Is it

practical context

of

between the Islamic moral

Muslim

polity,

an explicitly

Muslim

a viable option in the

modern Muslims

possible for

would enable them

historical formulation

to evolve a formula

to realize their Islamic ideal within the

of the present nation-state and international

order? I

suggest that, although

notion of

modern

it is

impossible to reconcile the original

umma and the historical

nation-state

formulation of Sharia with the

and international

order, the reverse

possible. In other words, perhaps the Islamic ideal

fined by interpreting the fundamental sources of Islam,

the Qur'an will

and Sunna, or Traditions of the Prophet,

modern Muslims with both

provide

ive identity,

one consistent with the

nation-state,

a

realities

would be conducive

detrimental to

in a

namely

way that

of the multireligious legal order.

collective identity

and

to national integration rather than

it.

This proposed Islamic reformation

is

similar to the Christian

reformation in one respect and different from

two

be

sense of collect-

and the appropriate constitutional and

Such a modern conception of an "Islamic" public law

new

may

can be rede-

are similar in that the

it

in another.

proposed Islamic reformation

is

The

now

being prompted by certain contextual intellectual and practical

developments in the same way that several centuries ago.

tion relied

They

its

Christian counter part was

differ in that the Christian reforma-

on the perceived dissociation of religion and politics dur-

ing the founding stage of Christianity i3

itself,

whereas the Muslim

lABDULLAHI

^AN-NA'IM

Lsf.

reformation cannot help but address and

work with

the

commonly

perceived association of religion and politics. I

will

now develop

these general remarks with specific reference

to the Sudan. After a brief explanation of the concept of national integration,

I

will outline the process

of islamization in the north-

ern Sudan and highlight the generally moderate and tolerant nature of the northern Sudanese see,

Muslim population. As we

Sudanese Muslims have not in the past pursued the

model of the Muslim

umma under

Mahdist

late

in the

state

of the

was

nineteenth century. Nevertheless, rule in 1956

an imme-

raised for adoption of an Islamic constitution

application of Sharia.

of the main

historical

Sharia except perhaps briefly

upon independence from Anglo-Egyptian diate call

shall

I

will

and

continue by explaining the positions

political forces in the

country and the implications of

those positions.

Although the rule in 1969

May regime of former President Nimeiri began its

on the

left

of Sudanese

the center by the mid-1970s, Sharia and attempted

politics

was

it

regime that imposed

an Islamic

to establish

background and impact of this

this

and gravitated toward

legislative

state

coup

by

1983.

d'etat will

be

The dis-

cussed in the next section of the paper, followed by a review of the positions of the

main

political forces in the

country in light of

recent developments, after the overthrow of Nimeiri 1985 al

and the country's return

transition

to

its

earlier state

and debate over the public

role

on 6 April

of constitution-

of Islam.

I

will close

with a reflection on the experiences of over thirty years of inde-

pendence and

assess the prospects for a positive or negative

impact of Islam on national integration in the Sudan. script" casts a glance at the situation in light

A

"post-

of the coup d'etat of

June 1989.

Of

National Integration

The term

national integration as

I

use

it

raises

questions about

the nature of nationhood and the form and degree of integration contemplated in the Sudan.

points out, there

14

is

much that we

As Rupert Emerson

correctly

unjustifiably take for granted in

and Rational Integration

Islam

6 relation to nationalism. In fact, there

what

a nation

is

J

is

in the

no

agreement

real

Despite this lack of consensus,

assumed, "often implicitly, that each nation

is

Sudan as to

sometimes

it is

a preordained enti-

ty which, like Sleeping Beauty, needs only the appropriate kiss to

bring

it

to sleep

to vibrant

by some

the fact that the

—and perhaps even

life

evil genius." first

8

that

it

This assumption

nations to

was

is

make themselves

willfully

put

based partly on

mod-

evident in

France, embraced peoples who had already

ern history, such as

achieved a large measure of internal unity. Yet even in the case of France, the further back the inquiry it

seems that

this particular

long course of history. 9 other

modern

pressed, the less inevitable

is

France should have emerged from the

The same

is

even more true of almost

all

"nations."

Moreover, while even the best-established nations were at some point a congeries of stocks and tribes, those peoples were welded together into nations before the general populace

became aware

of their rights and powers. In contrast, the modern African nationalist

is

confronted with the complex task of welding diverse

peoples into a nation at a time

when

the masses are

increasingly aware of their political rights

the right be.

and power

to affect the scope

and nature of the nation

to

Consequently, to establish a political entity that controls the

territory designated as a "nation" does is

becoming

and powers, including

inhabited by people

not necessarily

mean

that

it

who conceive of themselves as such.

This sense of affinity, a feeling that one shares deeply significant elements of a

makes

common

of ones nation,

and

heritage

and

a

common

a nation. 10 Moreover, since generally

state,

enabling

it is

one

destiny, lives

is

what

the destiny

important to secure a coincidence of nation

thus enabling the nation to protect and assert itself and its

citizens, at least in theory, to control their destiny.

Nationalism, then, has become the basis of legitimacy for the

modern

state.

nation, the

11

The

state

is

supposed to be the vehicle of the

means of achieving its

integrity

and well-being.

Nevertheless, despite the preeminence of the nation-state, other

forms of community are possible. Family, tribe or ethnicity, gion or conscience, economic interests, and 15

many other

reli-

senses of

^ABDULLAHI identity

may claim people's allegiance. Whenever such

allegiance

supposed to

is

the supreme coercive

legitimacy of the

demands

and accepting the nation

its

will

on

its

state.

in the

That power, however,

mass acknowledging the

makes upon them,

the nation-state as the

aspects of their lives.

all

impose

presumably through

prevail,

power of the

on men and women

itself depends

embraces

"narrower"

seen as inconsistent with the "broader" allegiance to

is

the nation, the latter

to

lAN-NA'IM

lA.

community

No

12

state

that

is

most nearly

powerful enough

population without the willing coopera-

tion of that population. It

would

therefore

seem desirable

allegiance to the nation

to

and other forms of allegiance. This brings

into focus the question of the degree is

necessary for peoples to

become

degree of national integration

numerous

identities

is

and form of integration

a nation.

ful

it

may be,

is

nei-

beings need and in fact expe-

and

not abandon them in favor of

will

Any state, however power-

needs popular acceptance of the validity and reason-

its

forthcoming

that

suggest that while a

necessary, total integration

a single, monolithic national identity.

ableness of

I

Human

ther possible nor desirable. rience

minimize conflict between

claims

if

on the population

at large; this will

the state asks people to give

up

not be

their ethnic, reli-

gious, or other essential bases of identity.

Coercive power, moreover, to the extent that

impose

it

on a minority of the population,

very notion of national integration. fied

by

ethnicity, religion, or

some

successfully integrated into the their will.

It

will just

No

is

it is

possible to

antithetical to the

people, whether identi-

similar factor, are likely to be

body of a

larger "nation" against

be a matter of time before such a group finds integration

and of assert-

ing a separate identity. Countless examples of this

phenomenon

a

means of challenging forced national

can be cited from around the world today.

A

balanced approach to the manner and degree of national

integration

must be maintained. Not only must the process be

voluntary and gradual, but

it

must

population for other forms and to be voluntary,

16

all

also

levels

concede the need of the

of identity. For the process

segments of the population must see that

it is

Islam

and

l^ational Integration in the

in their best interest to if people are

Because

be part of the nation. This will occur only

not rushed into a single whole

and hold

values they cherish

at the

expense of other

essential for their dignified existence.

not possible to address

it is

Sudan

all

aspects of the process of

national integration in the Sudan, the rest of this paper will focus

on the central theme of equality among nation-to-be. In particular,

of

ity

it

all

members of

the

will address the threat to legal equal-

Sudanese posed by the recent application of Islamic

all

Sharia law. Obviously, legal equality does not necessarily lead to

among

substantive equality

more and

effort

is

all

needed to achieve

groups and individuals; all

forms of economic,

social equality. Nevertheless, legal equality

is

much

political,

essential to

achieving other types of equality. In other words, legal equality

is

a

necessary but insufficient condition for achieving broad equality. I

believe that this necessary but insufficient condition has

seriously challenged

out the Sudan;

I

rectified. In fact,

surprising

by the recent application of Sharia through-

also believe, however, that the situation

find

I

and not

some of

reflective

of the thinking of the vast majority of

among northern Sudanese Muslims,

that they

would

really

can be

the recent developments rather

the population. Given the history of religious attitudes tices

been

it

and prac-

seems implausible

wish to impose their will on the non-Mus-

lim Sudanese, thereby threatening the process of national integra-

and repudiating the prospects

tion

nomic and

The Islam

social

for political stability

Islamization of Northern

came

and eco-

development.

to the northern

Sudan

Sudan through the gradual migration

of Muslim tribes from Egypt and North Africa and their integration with the local Christian population of the ley,

Middle Nile Val-

rather than through military conquest. Following the estab-

lishment of an Islamic regime in Egypt in the second quarter

of the seventh century, the Christian kingdoms of northern

Sudan maintained

their political

turies until finally they local

independence for seven cen-

were taken from within by an islamized

population.^ As the nature and duration of the process of 17

^ABDULLAHI islamization indicate,

^AN-NA'IM

Muslims and non-Muslims have coexisted

peacefully in northern

and then Muslim

lA.

Sudan

for centuries,

under both Christian

rule.

Moreover, there was an early and significant Sufi influence on

Muslim

the northern Sudanese.

Sufi masters have generally

accepted the authenticity of non-Muslim religious experience 1 *

and encouraged introspective

reflection

on the

part of their fol-

lowers, thus synthesizing local elements of the people s culture

and

"external" Islamic elements. I 5 Hence, although several factors

may

have contributed to the atmosphere of mutual toleration in

the islamized northern Sudan, the Sufi influence was especially significant in fostering a spirit

During the -1821), the

of moderation and tolerance.

era of the Funj sultanate of the Nile Valley (1517

Dar Fur

sultanate (ca. 1650-1916),

and other Muslim

kingdoms and polities of present-day western Sudan, Islam became the dominant religion. While this political consolidation introduced an element of Islamic ture began to reflect

some

officiality, in that

the state struc-

Islamic features, strict Sharia was never

applied systematically during that period. 16

The Turco-Egyptian

administration of 1821-84 continued the same policy of limited

enforcement of Sharia in private and personal law but not in public life, as

was the trend

Ottoman Empire was

left

in

Egypt

1 at the time. ?

itself

By and

to fend for itself through

and throughout the

large, the local

population

customary law and

practices,

which comprised both Islamic and non-Islamic components. Yet the puritanical these

Muhammad Ahmad

same elements of Sufi and

and moderation

Announcing himself Mahdi,

as adulteration

of the

divinely chosen

and guided one,

faith.

ibn Abdullahi saw

official tolerance

Muhammad Ahmad

set

the

out to

purify the faith and rectify the believers through his religiopolitical revolution

capturing

of 1881-84. 18 By January 1885 he had succeeded in

Khartoum and

establishing the

Mahdist

state

through-

out most of present-day northern Sudan. Following his death

months

later, his

successor, the Khalifa Abdullahi, extended

six

and

consolidated Mahdist rule to most parts of southern Sudan.

Although the Mahdi, and the Khalifa Abdullahi purported to apply 18

strict

after

him,

Sharia in establishing a truly Islamic

Islam

and lS(ational Integration

in the

Sudan

state, in practice it

was the Mahdi's own version of Sharia and the

Khalifa's political

expediency that prevailed. Remaining true to

their traditions

of moderation and tolerance,

many Sudanese

Muslims found the Mahdist state oppressive and repugnant. fact is evidenced by two main features of the period: contin-

This

ued domestic dissent leading to the execution and imprislarge numbers of Sudanese community and tribal

onment of leaders,

and northern Sudanese collaboration

efforts to recapture the

Sudan.

When

in

Anglo-Egyptian

these latter efforts finally

succeeded in 1898, the Sudan was placed under the Anglo-Egyptian

Condominium

administration.

This administration, having reconquered the Sudan on behalf of Egypt

after the violent

gious revolt, was at

danese

politics.

first

and temporarily successful Mahdist

reli-

worried about the role of Islam in Su-

Hence, Islam was rigorously excluded from playlife. By the late 1920s, however, the Condominium began to work with Abd al-

ing a role in Sudanese public British faction

of the

Rahman, the son of

the Mahdi,

and

encouraging him to assume a modest

his

Ansar community,

political role in order to

counterbalance the growing influence of Egypt in the country.

For their part, the Egyptians adopted al-Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani

and

his

Khatmiya order

champions

as their

in the

Sudan. Thus,

despite initial suspicions about the role of Islam in Sudanese politics,

both partners in the

a role as a

Condominium came

means of bolstering

to encourage such

their respective positions in the

country.

This colonial policy,

I

suggest, has

had a long-term negative

impact on national integration in the independent Sudan because it

helped cast national politics in terms of religious allegiance to

the two

main Islamic groupings

in the country, the

Ansar and

Khatmiya. By co-opting the intellectual leaders of the modern nationalist struggle for independence, the Islamic religious leaders

of these two

sects

have succeeded, in

my view,

national parties to a narrow Islamic platform.

in

committing the

The Condominium

administration also retarded national integration through

its

"closed district policy," which, by denying Sudanese freedom of

movement between northern and southern Sudan, deepened 19

the

i^ABDULLAHI rift

^AN-NA'IM

of.

between the two parts of the country and retarded natural

tural

and

cul-

racial integration.

The Debate

over the Role of Religion Since

Independence

Owing

to the politically active nature of Islam

nance in the country gion in public Islam.

life

and

its

predomi-

as a whole, the debate over the role of reli-

on

since independence has always focused

To understand we need

integration,

debate and

this

few

to recall a

aspects of Sharia, because

it is

its

implications for national

facts

about the public-law

how these aspects are applied that is

supported by some and opposed by others. (Private-law aspects of Sharia, such as family law

only Muslims and

The

Muslims.)

and

inheritance, have always affected

are, generally

status

and

speaking, of no concern to non-

rights

of non-Muslims under Sharia,

however, have peculiarly important implications for national integration.

Sharia

and Non-Muslims

Sharia, as a

comprehensive and systematic

oped by the founding Muslim turies; yet

be the et

literal

jurists

and

final

—

believed by

Muslims

—

Although parts of the Qur'an were recorded during the the Prophet, the complete text (al-Mushaf) was

caliph.

to

word of God as revealed to the Prophand the Sunna of the Prophet. *9

between 610 and 632

officially

was devel-

of the eighth and ninth cen-

derived from the Qur'an

it is

legal system,

lifetime of

and

collected

promulgated during the reign of Uthman, the third

Sunna, however, remained an oral tradition for nearly two

centuries until in the eighth

it

was collected and recorded by specialized

and ninth

centuries.

cant disagreement prevails

Whereas

little, if

among modern Muslims

jurists

any, signifi-

over the text

of the Qur'an, strong controversy continues over the authenticity

of many

texts

of Sunna and their relationship to the Qur'an. 20

Because of these controversies over Sunna and differences over the interpretation of the Qur'an,

Muslim

jurists disagree

almost every general principle or detailed rule of Sharia.

20

21

on For

Islam

and T^ational Integration

in the

almost every position held by an individual jurisprudence, one can find a different, tion held

by another

jurist or

school of

not the opposite, posi-

if

jurist

or school of jurisprudence. Such a wide

may

have been both unavoidable and even

diversity of opinion

and adaptability of Sharia

useful for the flexibility

and changing circumstances

localities

Sudan

serious problems for the

modern

in the past,

applicability

to different

but

raises

it

of Sharia. Whereas

previous conditions of transportation and communication per-

mitted the application of different, context-specific opinions on the rule of Sharia,

and

modern conditions

require greater certainty

predictability in the law for domestic

and international pur-

poses.

Here,

let

on those

us focus

aspects of Sharia that enjoy the

widest acceptance by the most authoritative and best established jurists

and schools of jurisprudence.

ever, that

we

of Sharia

as historically

are

concerned with the relevant principles and rules

determined by the founding

accepted by the majority of Muslims. ty

must be emphasized, how-

It

fully

I

jurists

concede the

and

possibili-

of an alternative interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunna on

public-law issues; in

fact,

I

propose such an alternative

will later

interpretation for the issues raised in the following discussion. First,

though,

we must identify the

relevant principles

Sharia as they already exist. In other words,

what Sharia

is

before

Constitutional Status

we can and

discuss

what

lim and

non-Muslim

its

subjects, the

rules

to be clear

ought to or can

of

on

be.

Regarding the structure

Civil Rights.

of an Islamic state under Sharia and

it

we have

and

provisions for both

Mus-

most authoritative model

remains the one established by the Prophet in Medina after his migration from Mecca in 622. In fact, though, the

vide for

model Sharia

state

of Medina did not pro-

many of the constitutional mechanisms and limitations we take for granted today. 22 For example, selection

of power that

of the ruler can hardly be described

modern

as

popular election in the

sense of the term. 2 3 Moreover, the extent of the ruler's

powers and the mechanisms for holding him to such limitations as existed

21

under Sharia are clearly unsatisfactory by modern

lABDULLAHI

lA.

lAN-NA'IM

constitutional standards. 2 4 Nevertheless, let us for the sake of

argument assume that such problems can be resolved through imaginative reading of the earlier formulations of the relevant principles of Sharia

and instead focus on the most

and

definite

problematic aspects of Sharia as they apply to national integration in a multireligious

Under

fied in terms

are

modern

nation-state.

Sharia, the subjects of an Islamic state are strictly classi-

of religion or

Muslims who enjoy

complete access to any public

The

God

belief.

At the top of the hierarchy

full legal status

under Sharia; they have

office in the state.

next class comprises the ahl al-kitab, those

in accordance

the

believe in

with a divinely revealed scripture (primarily

may

Jews and Christians). This group

dhimma with

who

Muslim

security of their persons their religion, as well as

state

be offered a compact of

under Sharia, which guarantees

and property and freedom

some freedom

to apply their

to practice

own law

personal matters. 2 5 In return, dhimmis must submit to sovereignty and pay jizya, a poll tax, to the

Muslim

in

Muslim

state as a

token

of that submission. As subjects rather than citizens of the

state,

dhimmis have no

communal

affairs.

cial

Moreover, dhimmis are subject to other

While other non-Muslims were not

receive

enter

26

under Sharia, some of which

disqualifications

below.

government of the

whole, although they enjoy a degree of autonomy in

state as a

their

right to participate in the

dhimma

status

and remain

aman

(safe

will

be indicated

originally entitled to

under Sharia, they might be permitted to

in the territory

of the Muslim

state

through spe-

more

conduct). If they were allowed to stay for

than one year, they may be treated

as

ded to the benefits and subject to the

dhimmis, and as such be

limitations

of that

status.

enti-

2^

Criminal Justice. Criminal offenses under Sharia are divided into three classes: hudud, qisas, view,

hudud (sing, hadd)

and

1 tazir. *

According to the majority

are those offenses for

which

strict

pun-

ishments are specified by either the Qur'an or Sunna: sariqa, theft;

qat al-tariq, highway robbery; zina, fornication; qadhfi '

unproven accusation ofzina; and shurb al-khamr, drinking wine. 22

Islam

Some

jurists

and l^ational Integration

in the

would add two more hudud.

Muslim; and baghy,

rebellion. In

all

hudud

Sudan

ridda, apostasy

by a

neither the victim nor

the authorities have any choice but to inflict the specified punish-

ment once the offense

proven.

is

Qisas covers homicide and other forms of bodily injury, acts punishable either by direct retaliation on the culprit or by pay-

ment of diya, monetary compensation. Although ciple

and

is

provided for in the Qur'an

5:45), these offenses are not

itself (for

this penal prin-

example, verses 2:178

hudud because

the Qur'an allows

the victim or his or her surviving kin to enjoy complete discretion

choosing whether to forgive the culprit altogether, to exact

in

retaliation, or to accept

compensation.

Taziris in fact the discretionary sentative to punish offense. In

an attempt to

trary nature of this power, as to just

what

acts

power of the

ruler or his repre-

any type of conduct other than a hadd or qisas

may

restrict the excessively

some

jurists

vague and arbi-

have suggested guidelines

be punished under the power of

tdzlr. 2-^

Nevertheless, as a matter of Sharia, the ruler has very broad discretion in deciding both

ment

what conduct

to penalize

to impose.3°

According to Sharia,

this

scheme of penal measures applies

throughout the territory of the Islamic its

subjects,

hadd offense

and

is

binding on

alike, unless

all

Sharia itself

non-Muslims. (The only general excep-

for

tion in favor of non-Muslim subjects

is

that they

may drink alco-

for Muslims.)

The enforcement of this ment of an

state

Muslims and non-Muslims

makes an exception

hol, a

and what punish-

Islamic state

is

penal law consequent on the establishthus problematic as regards non-Mus-

lim subjects. For one thing, Sharia punishments for hududzxe as a rule extremely harsh.

example,

is

The

required punishment for theft, for

amputation of the right hand; that for highway rob-

bery, cross-amputation

of the right hand and

unmarried person convicted of fornication

hundred lims

may

lashes, a

married person

is

is

left foot.

While an

punishable by one

to be stoned to death.

Mus-

accept such harsh punishments not only because their

religion clearly specifies penalties for specific acts, but also

23

3

lABDULLAHI

lAN-NA'IM

lA.

because enduring such punishment in this absolve the culprit in the next

life is

believed to

Neither of these grounds

life.

is

applicable to non-Muslims.

Other aspects of the penal law of Sharia would be unacceptable to

non-Muslims

as well.

For example, most

allow the

Muslim murderer of

Moreover,

if

the surviving kin

jurists

non-Muslim

a

wanted

to accept

pensation for an offense, diya for a non-Muslim

Muslim.

for a

Non-Muslims would

1

Muslim

a

charge, whereas the reverse

not the

is

The Nature and Terms of the Debate

would advocate

much

less

is

than

of evi-

not considered a

facing a

hadd and

qisas

case.3 2

in the

Given these and other aspects of Sharia, responsible leader

monetary com-

is

also find Sharia rules

dence objectionable, in that a non-Muslim

competent witness against

would not

to be executed.

its

Sudan incredible that any

it is

application in a

modern

multireligious nation-state like the Sudan. Yet this has been the

declared position of the major northern political parties, subject to the following qualifications.

Although the

Khatmiya

pressed their there

on

is

this

ties

Umma and Unionist parties

(with the Ansar and

as their respective political constituencies)

commitment

good reason fundamental

to the full

implementation of Sharia,

to believe that their leadership issue.

have ex-

is

ambivalent

For one thing, whereas these two par-

have ruled the Sudan, in a variety of coalition combinations,

during

the nations "democratic" phases

all

and 1986-89

—

their record in

tution and applying Sharia has never lived intentions.

Then

too, these

—

1956-58, 1964-69,

implementing an "Islamic" consti-

two

parties

up

to their declared

were the main

political

force behind the three transitional constitutions of 1956, 1964,

and

1985,

all

of which have guaranteed equality before the law

and freedom from discrimination on grounds of

religion

—

pro-

visions clearly inconsistent with the above-noted aspects of Sharia. Significantly, though,

constitutions of 1958

both parties also supported the draft

and 1968, which

ment to implementing Sharia. 24

reflected a strong

commit-

Islam

Thus,

and Rational Integration

difficult to assess the

it is

whether the leadership of these

able

Sudan

commitment of the two main

implementation of a Sharia

parties to the

in the

state.

parties

is

In

fact,

it is

debat-

really familiar

with

the constitutional implications of their declared positions. In any

of a clear statement of the exact Sharia model they

case, instead

envisage, these leaders

make

contradictory statements

For example, they declare their commitment

ject.

on the sub-

to apply Sharia

while fully safeguarding the citizenship rights of non-Muslim Sudanese. Since Sharia does not recognize full rights of citizenship for

non-Muslims, one part of that statement

to the other. utive,

It

will

have to give way

should be emphasized that so long as judicial, exec-

and administrative organs interpret and apply Sharia

was established by Muslim equality between

jurists in the past, there

as

it

cannot be

Muslim and non-Muslim Sudanese.

In other

words, unless party leaders follow their pledge to achieve equality

with the enactment of specific laws that guarantee such equality in practice, their

promise will remain an

Whereas the leadership of the

illusion.

Umma and Unionist parties may

be seen as having been forced into their positions by Islamic political

constituencies, the National Islamic Front (NIF) has actively

itself. A commitment to implement Sharia has always been the primary goal of the Muslim

created such a constituency for

Brothers, the

NIF hard

core,

and

the clear message of

it is

all

public documents issued by the front. Even so, an element of

ambiguity marks the position of the National Islamic Front.

While openly committed

to the

implementation of Sharia, the

front continues to misrepresent Sharia in order to

negative impact

minimize

its

on non-Muslim Sudanese.33

Both the ambivalence of the

Umma

and Unionist

parties

and

the ambiguity of the National Islamic Front can be understood in light

of the existence of a

politically strong

and militant non-Mus-

lim minority in the Sudan, which has always opposed the imposition of Sharia

of

this

on non-Muslim Sudanese

—even though members

non-Muslim minority do not appear

the extent of their loss under Sharia.34 For the the opposition of

*5

non-Muslim Sudanese

is

to be fully aware of

most

in

part,

I

believe,

an emotional and

^ABDULLAHI

^AN-NA'IM

lA.

psychological reaction against domination by the north. If their leaders

had educated themselves

able to

make

a

in Sharia, they

more coherent and

would have been

rational case against the appli-

cation of Sharia in a country like the Sudan.

Other minor opposed

to the

and

political parties

forces in the north are

implementation of Sharia

as well,

including the

Sudanese Communist party and professional and trade unions,

whose

leaders favor a secular state.

these northern Sudanese

may

Although

as

educated Muslims

be knowledgeable about the prob-

lems that accompany the modern application of Sharia, they find it

difficult to criticize Sharia,

which

is

believed to be a divinely

ordained constitutional and legal system. Moreover, because their political constituency in the

north

at least

is

nominally Muslim,

these organizations fear the political consequences of openly

opposing the application of Sharia. As a

and

sensitive

Muslim Sudanese

result, these intelligent

behind the

are reduced to hiding

concerns and opposition of non-Muslim Sudanese instead of

making

their

own

original

and credible challenge

to the propo-

nents of Sharia.

This complex and volatile situation was further complicated by

and

the sudden

arbitrary imposition of Sharia in 1983

by former

President Nimeiri. Let us therefore briefly review the background to this

move and

its

impact on the national debate before resum-

ing our discussion of the role of Islam in the Sudan.

Nimeiris Legislative

Coup

of 1983

To understand why Nimeiri may have been prompted drastic step

of imposing Sharia

September

1983,

ment of d'etat

on

we need

his regime,

25

this

to

and develop-

power by means of

a

coup

May 1969.35 One of the first steps that the new regime

took was to seek a

Sudan;

to recall the beginnings

which came

to take the

public law of the Sudan in

as the

political settlement

of the

civil

war

in southern

was eventually achieved through the Addis Ababa

Agreement of 1972 and the establishment of regional autonomy for the southern region. Although the May regime had the initial 16

Islam

and lS(ational Integration

support of the Sudanese

Communist

in the

party, a

power struggle soon

ensued, ending in the defeat of the communists.

now shifted by 1973

it

its

Sudan

The May regime

orientation to the center of Sudanese politics,

had enacted

its

own

constitution

and established a

and sin-

gle-party state in the Sudan.

Because the traditional political forces in the country continued to

oppose and actively sought to overthrow the

Nimeiri attempted to develop his in the country.

May

own independent

regime,

political base

He succeeded in gaining the political support both

of southern Sudanese, whose confidence he had gained through his efforts to

autonomous

rule,

war and grant the southern region

civil

and of a number of able

intellectuals

who were

with the traditional political parties. Nevertheless,

dissatisfied

Nimeiri

end the

still felt

insecure because of the continued political

military opposition to his regime

by Sudanese

operating from outside the Sudan.

To

and

political leaders

neutralize that opposition,

Nimeiri offered his adversaries, leaders of the Unionist and

Umma in

parties

what

is

and the Muslim Brothers, a chance

known

Unionists refused the

offer,

and the

to join

of 1977.

as the national reconciliation

him The

Umma party went along half-

Muslim Brothers took full and managed to infiltrate all the politi-

heartedly for a few months; but the

advantage of the situation cal, legislative,

and executive organs of the

thus found himself pressed fronts,

on both the

with the Unionists and

May

regime. Nimeiri

internal

and external

Umma forces opposing him

from

without and the Muslim Brothers undermining his authority

from within

his regime.

During the same period, Nimeiri

is

said to have

had a personal

prompted him toward an Islamic government. By the late 1970s, then, he started to

religious experience that

approach to

express his preference for Islamic legislation

and

to introduce

Islamic financial institutions throughout the country.

lim Brothers in the regime

managed

to manipulate this official

Islamic policy as well, thereby consolidating their

and economic 17

positions.

The Mus-

own

political

^ABDULLAHI o* ^AN-NA'IM In the meantime, political developments in the southern region

were creating further problems for Nimeiri. 36 Some forces there

political

were demanding that the region be divided into three

smaller regions, while others opposed such a move.

At

this point,

initiative

of dividing the southern region by

presidential decree, without

complying with the requirements of

Nimeiri took the

the constitution

months of

and the Addis Ababa Agreement. Within a few

which

that decision,

cost

him

the support of

most

southern Sudanese, Nimeiri took the other drastic step of imposing Sharia, again by presidential decree, throughout the Sudan. It is

and per-

difficult to disentangle all these national, regional,

sonal factors and place

them

in a

scheme of cause and

effect; in

any case, they probably interacted with and reinforced one another in creating a severe crisis situation. particular,

The

imposition of Sharia, in

seems to have been a desperate measure intended to

gain political support from northern Muslims in order to counterbalance

gamble

on an

mounting

failed,

political

opposition from the south.

The

and Nimeiri was overthrown on 6 April 1985 while United

official visit to the

States.

Whatever Nimeiri's motives were decree, that act introduced a wholly tical situation.

For the

first

for

imposing Sharia by

new element

into the poli-

time in the history of the mo-

dern Sudan, Sharia was the formal public law of the country. Overnight, the debate over the public role of Islam was trans-

formed: the question

but whether to repeal

now was it.

This

not whether to implement Sharia, is

the situation the Sudanese con-

fronted during their third transitional stage.

Another consequence of Nimeiri's was that

it

legislative action

of 1983

gave many Sudanese, Muslims and non-Muslims

a practical sense of what

it

means

to live

law of the land. While admittedly

and abuses that followed were due

under Sharia

many of the

alike,

as the public

judicial excesses

to the corruption

and oppres-

sion of Nimeiri's regime as a whole, the experience has also

demonstrated that Sharia

itself is susceptible to

manipulation

and abuse. Indeed, the sweeping powers that Sharia allows the ruler and his representatives and its lack of constitutional and 28

Islam

and

T^ational Integration in the

procedural safeguards

Sudan

make abuse and corruption unavoidable

consequences of the modern application of Sharia.

With the

tics,

these

two

factors

Sudan found

now

itself in

firmly established in national poli-

another transitional stage. Will

transitional stage lead to the evolution

this

of a just and workable con-

stitution as the essential framework for national integration?

The Sudan

in Transition,

The overthrow of Nimeiri

Again

in 1985 demonstrated,

once again, the

capacity of the Sudanese people to revolt, spontaneously little

violence, against organized

ruption.

More

significantly,

and with

and armed oppression and

and despite

cor-

(or perhaps because of)

the existence of Sharia as the formal public law of the land, the transitional constitution

sary principles of

of October 1985 embodied

modern

the neces-

constitutionalism. In particular, the

complete freedom of religion

transitional constitution guaranteed

and equality of all

all

citizens before the law.37

Unfortunately, the transitional constitution also reflected the

same old ambivalence toward

While providing

Sharia.

for

many

principles that were either lacking in or openly inconsistent with Sharia, the transitional constitution 8

legislation.

Of

made

main source of

Sharia a

course, provided that any legislation derived

from Sharia was consistent with those constitutional provisions that guarantee equality before the law

and nondiscrimination on

grounds of religion, no serious objections could have been raised to this aspect of the constitution.

Moreover, the transitional stage was beset by other formidable

problems for national integration. For one thing, the Sharia laws of 1983 remain the law of the land,

which

still

implement them

coalition parties in

still

binding on the courts,

in their daily practice.

government

failed to

honor

Although the

their

campaign

pledge to repeal those laws, they at least refused to execute any

punishment of amputation. This particular executive

policy,

however, could be reversed at any time, in which case dozens of convicted persons will suffer amputations immediately. 2-9

— ^ABDULLAHI

^AN-NA'IM

^A.

A second major problem, clearly,

is

the continuation of the

civil

war

in the south. Unlike the first cycle of the 1955-72 civil war,

this

time the declared objectives of the rebels are broader and their

tactics

and methods much more

to speak for

all

sophisticated.

They are claiming

the disadvantaged peoples of the

ing to establish a

new order throughout

Sudan and

seek-

the country. 39 In pursuit

of their objectives, the rebels are organized politically

as the

Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and militarily

as

Army (SPLA). It remains to be how successfully these objectives can be achieved by the SPLM/SPLA through the available resources and whether those in charge will accept a transitional framework that may offer longthe Sudanese Peoples Liberation

seen

term rather than immediate achievement of their time being, however, the

Sudanese

in

For the

goals.

SPLM/SPLA remains a formidable force

politics.

For the purposes of the present discussion, the essential features

of the transitional stage can be summarized

no

political party

as follows. First

can claim genuine representation of

all

ments of the population throughout the country. Even the parties,

namely the

of all, seg-

larger

Umma and Unionist parties, and possibly the

National Islamic Front, draw almost

all

their support

from the

northern Muslim population. Moreover, none of these parties can achieve

enough parliamentary

Finally,

even

if any

or

all

force to govern the country alone.

of these parties should unite, they cannot

rule the whole country without the participation of the

SPLM/SPLA

in the south; conversely, the

SPLM/SPLA

the participation of the northern parties if

it is

requires

to gain a ruling

role.

When we look closely at the essential positions, rhetoric,

rather than the

of both sides to the national debate, we find that the

northern parties are committed to Islam, while the southern forces are not necessarily opposed, provided the application

of

Islam does not violate the fundamental constitutional rights of

non-Muslims problem

is

as equal citizens

of their

own

country.

that the generally held conception of Islam

the public law of Sharia outlined above

30

The

real

—namely,

would certainly

violate

Islam

their

and lS[ational Integration

fundamental constitutional

the northern parties remain

rights. In

committed

in the

Sudan

other words, so long as to Sharia, there

no

is

prospect for a resolution to the conflict and no chance for national

integration.

Another, at try,

least potential, political force

which may

act to bring

is

at

work in

the coun-

about a solution to the problem:

namely, the educated and enlightened Sudanese from both parts

of the country. At present, these individuals either are organized in small political parties

Communist

and loose organizations, such

party and the Alliance of the Forces of the Uprising,

or remain in the major parties but without true the fundamental nature

and positions of those

sides

Reflections

As

I

see

Should

may be worked out.

it,

and Prospects

the present deadlock

political parties are

is

is

to the fact that the

main

to Sharia as the only valid

non-Muslim

political parties

opposed to Sharia because they know, or

are

least suspect, that its application

them. But

due

committed

interpretation of Islam, whereas the

and organizations

for

parties.

to

of the national debate, a solution to the problem of

national integration

Muslim

commitment

ground between the two

these forces unite in pursuing a middle

main

as the

at

would have drastic consequences

Sharia the only valid interpretation of Islam

today?

To begin answering this question, let us recall two general made in the opening paragraphs of this paper. First,

points

because a monotheistic creed excludes nonbelievers, the basis of a constitutional lievers will

efforts to legal

become

make

and

if it is

legal system, as in Sharia,

made

nonbe-

subject peoples rather than citizens. Second,

a monotheistic creed the basis of the political

and

order have only succeeded in producing untold suffering

throughout

history.

Both of these points have been amply

demonstrated by the recent history of and present situation in the Sudan. Paradoxically, the

the articulation 3i

Sudan may

also be the best candidate for

and implementation of the Islamic reformation,

^ABDULLAHI

^AN-NA'IM

lA.

main reasons. First, islamization in the now predomiMuslim northern Sudan has always emphasized the values of toleration and peaceful coexistence. Despite recent tragic for three

nantly

developments, a monotheistic Islamic state under

Sharia has

strict

been an aberration and exception to the norm of moderation and tolerance in the Sudan.

Second, the country's current religious composition creates a

good balance between the push toward the

of the

ideal

umma

under Sharia and the pull toward multireligious coexistence. In

Muslim population of maintain its commitment to an

other words, whereas the strong enough to the

non-Muslim population

tion of Sharia in

Muslims

The

its

abandon

to

is

strong enough to

historical formulation

Sudan

is

Islamic ideal,

resist

the applica-

without forcing the

their Islamic ideal altogether.

third reason for the suitability of the

Islamic reformation

the

is

Sudan

as a

pioneer in

the fact that such reformation has already

been proposed and advocated by a Sudanese Muslim, namely the late

Ustadh

Mahmoud Mohamed

Taha. Despite strong

resist-

ance by some traditional and "fundamentalist" Islamic groups in

Mahmoud

the country, the ideas of Ustadh

throughout the country and respected by

are widely

many

known

Sudanese. In-

deed, the current deadlock over the public role of Islam in

Sudanese

life

by Ustadh

may eventually recommend

Mahmoud

the approach proposed

for redefining the Islamic ideal, thereby

opening the way for genuine and

lasting national integration in

the country.

According to Ustadh

Mahmoud,

Islam consists of two overlap-

ping messages, an eternal and universal one of complete justice

and equality

for

all

creed, or gender,

among

human

and

beings without distinction as to race,

a transitional message of relative justice

believers in terms of the quality of their belief. 4°

argued that the public law of Sharia

which by now has served eternal

its

purpose;

and universal message, the

of which has, thus

far,

is it

He

the transitional message,

must be superseded by the

practical

been precluded by the

implementation

realities

of human

existence. Whereas the public law of Sharia was appropriate for

32

Islam

and

lS(ational Integration in the

the previous stages of

human

society,

it is

Sudan

no longer appropriate

and must make way for another version of the public law of Islam. Although Ustadh Mahmoud was a Sudanese intellectual of impeccable character and integrity who advocated his views open-

and peacefully

ly

Sudan on

for over thirty years,

he was executed in the

January 1985 for maintaining that position.4 1 More-

18

over, despite active

was of limited

advocacy of his

ideas, his hard-core following

extent.

Neither of these facts

is

surprising, nor should they inspire

despondence and despair over the success of his posed a major threat to the vested

Muslim population, he was bound

And

reaction.

interests

cause. Because he

of forces within the

to arouse hostility

and violent

given the extraordinary nature of his views,

would have been surprising

if

it

he had gained a wide following in

the short term.

Furthermore, despair

is

inappropriate for two reasons.

First, his

novel interpretation of Islam offers a perfect solution to the present crisis, its

in that

gives a

it

gives

both sides what they want. To the Muslims,

workable Islamic model that would

satisfy their reli-

gious duty to live in accordance with the dictates of the Qur'an

and Sunna;

to

non-Muslims,

it

gives a version of Islamic public

law that would fully guarantee their fundamental constitutional rights as equal citizens

of their

his hard-core following

pathy

Second, even though

was limited, he did enjoy very wide sym-

among educated and enlightened Sudanese.

In the end, any realistic

Sudan

own country.

hope

requires that educated

for national integration in the

and enlightened Sudanese

rise to

the

challenge of not only facing the proponents of Sharia with the

unworkability of their model, but also proposing a viable Islamic alternative,

such as that proposed by Ustadh

Mahmoud.

imperative to provide an Islamic alternative for the

Muslim

majority because, for them, Islam must have a role in public It is

It is

life.

equally imperative to confront the proponents of Sharia with

model because it will never permit which is the essential prerequisite for

the inadequacy of their

national integration,

political stability, national security,

33

and

social

and economic

^ABDULLAHI

LsfN-NA'IM

L/f.

This paper does not purport to address

development.

all

the

questions and issues of national integration in the Sudan; rather, the objective

is

to address the specific issue of the application of

historical Islamic Sharia as the public

Islam

is

one of the most important

the Sudan, the role of this religion as to increase the prospects

Needless to

say,

many

law of the Sudan. Because

forces affecting public

must be defined

such a way

in

other problems, such as gross disparities in

components, must be resolved

to be achieved. National integration

requires visionary statesmanship will

in

of national integration in that country.

economic development, education, and other tural

life

essential infrastruc-

if

true national integration

is

a long, delicate process that

on the

part of leaders

is

and good-

and patience on the part of the general population. Yet

if any

of these and other efforts and requirements are to have their desired effect of enhancing national integration, an appropriate constitutional

and

legal

the country as a whole.

framework It is

will

my hope

have to be established in

that this paper

would con-

tribute to the establishment of such a framework.

Postscript

As

this

paper was being prepared for publication, the military

again seized power in the Sudan on 30 June 1989.

The new

mili-

tary junta has abrogated the 1985 transitional constitution, dis-

solved the Constituent Assembly and the broad coalition headed

by former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, and banned cal parties

and trade unions.

It

newspapers, partisan and "independent" control of the media.

What

alike,

all

of these recent

?

The declared objectives of the new regime

include a final peace-

of the security situation, especially in the western

Sudan, the eradication of the

of

and took complete

are the implications

developments for the preceding discussion

ful resolution

all politi-

also canceled the licenses

civil service,

and so

all

forth.

life

and

need not elaborate on the

rea-

corruption in political

We

sons behind the coup, except to note that the Sudanese public

seems generally to agree on the

total failure

of

civilian

govern-

ments since 1956 to address any of the country's economic and I was in the Sudan during the several weeks

politicaproblems.

34

Islam

and T^ational Integration

Sudan

in the

immediately following the coup and found that most Sudanese, including professional and trade union leaders, perceive this

development

relief from the utter

an urgently needed

as

incompe-

tence and corruption of the leaders of the traditional political parties.

Nevertheless, there seems to be general skepticism as to the ability

of the

new junta to

ular, it is said that

the

achieve their declared objectives. In partic-

new regime cannot end

the

civil

war

in the

south and provide a lasting peaceful settlement of the southern

my view,

problem. In

good grounds

there are

especially in relation to the civil

for this skepticism,

war and the

so-called southern

problem. In regard to the thorny issue of the role to be played by Sharia,

which

I

believe to be the inevitable

first

step in

new regime have

tion process, the leaders of the

would be solved through negotiations

any

resolu-

declared that

or, failing that,

it

through a

national referendum.

This able. It

latter solution, is

however,

is

neither practicable nor accept-

not practicable because the security situation, especially

would not permit the conduct of a national

in the south,

dum. More importantly,

new regime and

referen-

the state of emergency imposed by the

the absence of guarantees

genuinely free debate over the issue would

conduct a valid referendum. In any

and mechanics

make

case, the

it

for a

impossible to

matter

is

too funda-

mental to be settled by the will of the majority. Given the clear

preponderance of Muslims in the Sudan and their strong reverence for the Sharia, the vote in a referendum would most probably be in favor of upholding the application of Sharia throughout the country. Yet likely

on

this matter, the

not submit to the will of the majority.

regardless of the size

How can

Unless the at best,

peaceful

it

and 35

deny the minority

as equal citizens in their

own country ?

new regime changes

they,

position

its

on

their funda-

these issues,

it

succeed in introducing an element of temporary

relief in the security

Sudan, but

Nor should

of the majority supporting such a policy.

the will of the majority

mental rights

may,

non-Muslim minority would

will

and supply of essential goods

be unlikely to end the

lasting settlement

civil

situations in the

war and achieve a

of the southern problem. Without

^ABDULLAHI

^AN-NA'IM

LA.

that essential precondition, political stability,

economic develop-

ment, and the pursuit of national unity and integration are simply unattainable.

Notes i

Noel J. Coulson,

2 Joseph Schacht,

A History ofIslamic Law (Edinburgh,

1964), 120.

The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford,

1959), 84. 3

S.G. Vesey- Fitzgerald, "Nature and Sources of the Shari'a," in Majid

Khadduri and Herbert

D.C,

J.

Liebesny

(eds.),

Law

in the

Middle East (Washington,

1955), 91.

4 See, generally, James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge, 1986). 5

Fazlur

Rahman, Islam (Chicago,

6 Rupert Emerson, From Empire

1979), 229. to

Nation: The Rise

ofAsian and African Peoples (Cambridge, Mass., i960), 7 See, generally,

York, 8

Boyd C.

Shafer, Nationalism:

to

Self Determination

89.

Myth and

Reality

(New

1955).

Emerson, From Empire

to

Nation,

91.

9 Ibid., 90-91. 10

Ibid., 95.

11

Ibid., 96.

12

Ibid. ,97.

Yusuf Fadl Hassan, "Sudan Between the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Yusuf Fadl Hassan (ed.), Sudan in Africa (Khartoum, 1971), 76. 14 John Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah," in John L. Esposito (ed.), Voices ofResurgent Islam (Oxford, 1983), 41. 15 R.S. O'Fahey and J.L. Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan (London, 1974), 13

17-

16

See, generally, Jay Spaulding,

Michigan, 1985), 17 the

On

this

pt.

period of Sudanese history,

Sudan (London,

18

The Heroic Age in Sinnar (Lansing,

1.

See, generally,

see, generally,

Richard

P.M. Holt, The Mahdist

Egypt in

State in the Sudan, 1881-1898

(Oxford, 1958); and A.B. Theobold, The Mahdiyya (London, 19

Hill,

1959).

See, generally, Coulson, History

1951).

of Islamic Law; and Schacht, Origins of

Muhammadan Jurisprudence. 20 Al-Mushaf

is

generally accepted by

the Qur'an, though there

may be room

Muslims

for debate

as the accurate record

on the

subject; see

Burton, The Collection of the Qur'an (Cambridge, 1977), chap. Islam, 59-63; Vesey-Fitzgerald, 21

"Nature and Sources of the Shari'a,"

On

5.

controversy over the Sunna, see Coulson, History of Islamic Law, 42;

of

John the

Rahman,

93.

Coulson, History of Islamic Law, 47-51; Kemal Faruki, Islamic

Jurisprudence (Karachi, 1975), 166-94.

22 See, generally, H.A.R. Gibb,"Constitutional Organization," in Khadduri

and Liebesny, Law

36

in the

Middle East; K. Faruki, The Evolution of Islamic

Islam

and Rational Integration

in the

Sudan

and Practice from 610 to 1926 (Karachi, 1971), 16-23. For an account of the selection and appointment of the caliphs of

Constitutional Theory 23

Medina,

see

T.W. Arnold, The

Caliphate

(New York,

1966), 19-22.

24 Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," 17; Noel Coulson, "The State and the Individual in Islamic Law," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 6 (1957): 50-52, 57.

25 177,

Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, 195-199; Encyclopedia ofIslam (new ed.)(Leiden, underway), 2:227.

26 Khadduri,

War and

Peace in the

"Minority Self-Rule and Government

Law of Islam,

1955),

198; S.D. Goitein,

in Islam," Studia Islamica 31 (1970):

of Islam 2: 228-29, however, this was not always maintained in practice because the administrative and bureaucratic abilities of dhimmls were often needed by 101-16.

As pointed out

in the Encyclopedia

doctrinal view of Sharia

Muslim

rulers.

27 Khadduri,

On

28

War and Peace

in the

Law ofIslam,

i6^-6 57i> 618, 637.

33

Examples can be found

in the writings

of Dr. Hassan Aballa al-Turabi,

the leader of the Islamic Front since 1964. See, too, Hassan al-Turabi,

"The

Islamic State," in Esposito, Voices ofResurgent Islam, 241-51.

34 Such opposition was voiced strongly in 1983 and 1984

when former

President Nimeiri imposed Sharia throughout the country. See, for example, the statement of Sudanese Christian leaders published in Origins 14 (1986): 180-81 (National Catholic

News

Service,

Washington, D.C.); and Mashrek

International, February 1985, 28-30. 35 See, generally, John L. Esposito, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment," Muslim World 76 (1986): 181; and Khalid Duran, "The Centrifugal Forces of Religion in Sudanese Politics," Orient 26 (1985): 572.

36

On

this

dimension, see

Ann Mosely

Lesch, "Rebellion in the Southern

Sudan," Universities Field Staff International Reports

12,

no. 8 (Africa [AML-i-

1985]).

37 Arts. 17 and 18 of the transitional constitution of 1985. 38 Art. 4 of the transitional constitution

39

of 1985.

Lesch, "Rebellion in the Southern Sudan," 11-14.

40 For

a

good statement of Ustadh Mahmoud's position and arguments, see Taha, The Second Message of Islam (Syracuse, N.Y.,

Mahmoud Mohamed 1987).

41

On

trial and execution of Ustadh Mahmoud, An-Na'im, "The Islamic Law of Apostasy and Its Modern

the circumstances of the

see Abdullahi A.

Applicability:

37

A Case

from the Sudan," Religion 16

(1986): 197.

A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Conflict in the

This paper

is

francism. deng

Sudan

a short account of some of the

work I have done over

the last several years with respect to the current conflict in the

Sudan, centering largely on three interrelated

One

sets

of

activities.

concerns a sociohistorical analysis of Sudan's identity

behind the

which

I

conflict;

crisis

the second covers two works of fiction in

try to substantiate the

theme of identity crisis

in narrative

form; and the third relates to the role of participant-observer in a peace process that

I

initiated jointly

with Gen. Olusegun

Obasanjo, former head of state of Nigeria, in 1987, a role that

communication between the conflicting par-

entailed facilitating ties,

learning

more about the

the differences.

To

conflict,

and attempting

to bridge

place these concerns in perspective, let us

and

briefly consider the conflict

its

geopolitical context.

Background As the Sudan approached there

was destined to the

its

independence on

i

January 1956,

was considerable international optimism about the play,

role

it

not only in linking sub-Saharan Africa with

Arab Muslim countries

to the north, but also in

forming a

bridge between Africa and the Middle East. Geographically the largest

country in Africa, the Sudan abuts eight sub-Saharan and

north African countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire,

The

original version

Peace as

"Work

tinguished Fellow.

39

of this paper was

in Progress"

during

my

first

presented at the U.S. Institute of

term there

as

Jennings Randolph Dis-

"FRANCIS CM. T>ENG Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya. Because

and cultural

the ethnic

of these countries are reflected with-

diversities

country

in Sudan's borders, the

all

is

an Afro-Arab microcosm. Pos-

tulating the international role of his country in Arab-African

terms, the foreign minister of the newly independent observed:

"The Sudan

world and

this

on the

diately

is

is,

of affinity.

to join the

Arab League imme-

declaration of our independence. will

Sudan

main, a cognate part of the Arab

why we hastened

with the Arab countries ties

in the

.

.

.

Our

relations

not make us lose sight of our African

We will always look south to Africa, strengthening

our relations with the different African peoples and trying to help

them

in their progress

ter life."

and evolution towards freedom and a

Outsiders echoed the same views.

The

bet-

U.S. Department

of State welcomed the Sudanese aspiration for intermediacy: "As a

new

African nation, the Sudan will be deeply involved in [the]

future cause of Africa. But as a

Sudan

will also

Middle Eastern nation,

be a bridge to Africa, imparting to

philosophies, and forces which Africa's decisions

and on

Since 1955, several

its

may have

too, the it

ideas,

great influence

on

future."

months before the

declaration of indepen-

dence, however, the Sudan has suffered a chronic domestic conflict,

punctuated between 1972 and 1983 by a precarious peace

accord.

While the

the central racial,

and

theme

issues involved are

in the conflict

inequities in the shaping values.

The

tion,

Islamic

is

is

cultural dichotomy, with

complex and multifaceted, the north-south religious, its

attendant disparities or

and sharing of power, wealth, and other

north, two-thirds of the country in land

and

arabized. Generally speaking,

ed more than the south from opportunities for social,

has also benefit-

political,

economic,

and cultural development, especially through colonial

intervention. in

it

and popula-

The

south,

which constitutes the remaining third

both land and population,

is

more indigenously African

in

religion, race, and culture and, except for a small, educated, predominantly Christian minority, has hardly benefited from

socioeconomic development. These inequities and the resulting fears

of northern domination in an independent Sudan triggered

40

L/f" Three-^Dimensional

the

mutiny of

seventeen-year

The

^Approach

a southern battalion that later escalated into the civil

conflict has

war.

been the principal source of instability in post-

colonial Sudan, leading to a succession of civilian governments,

two military

dictatorships,

and two popular uprisings that over-

threw those military governments and restored parliamentary democracy. Paradoxically, the conflict continues to threaten the

which the Sudanese people have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment. democracy

for

Identity

Although the war that has raged since the

in the southern part

dawn of independence

of the Sudan

has several interacting dimen-

sions, the issue of national identity has perhaps emerged as the

pivotal factor, with the north perceived as striving to structure the

country in

its

Arab Islamic image and the south seen

the northern attempt to dominate

and

as resisting

assimilate the south.

identity factor raises several sets of interrelated questions: are the identities

the

war

in fact a conflict

and

flict all

ty

is

of identities between the Arab north and

How justified is the south-north dichotomy on

cultural grounds?

More

what

substantially,

is

the con-

about? In particular, what are the complications of identi-

demarcation in terms of who gets what from the system, and

why has ly,

What

of the parties in the conflict? To what extent

the African south? racial

The

what

religion

become

a

dominant

factor in the conflict? Final-

alternative avenues exist given the identity

the conflict

and

its

dimension of

implications for the shaping and sharing of

values?

To appreciate the pivotal role of religion in the conflict, it should be remembered that Islam welds together all aspects of life, public and private, into a composite whole that

is

ideally regulat-

ed by Sharia. Although traditional religions of the south also

low an integrated approach to

autonomous hierarchy al

in

life,

their system

is

fol-

based on an

which the sanctions of God and

spiritu-

powers are exercised through a segmentary lineage system

that ensures

4i

some form of contextual

relativity

and freedom

in

TRANCIS religious matters.

The

T>ENG

CM.

Christianized southerners, being the prod-

ucts of an educational system oriented to the West, not only are

alienated

from the

predisposed to

resist

of religion and the

A

religious traditions

of their people, but are also

an Islamic theocracy and favor the separation

state.

of the

close examination

historical process

competing and now conflicting

identities

by which these

were shaped, the man-

ner in which power and national resources have been dispropor-

and the reaction

tionately allocated along these identity lines,

these inequities

among

about the identity issue underlying the cal process that

conflict. First, the histori-

shaped the contemporary Sudanese scene has

given communities in identities that defy

and south

to

the disadvantaged highlight several points

regions of the country layers of multiple

all

monolithic

labels.

The Sudan

—has been influenced over the

—both north

centuries both by

indigenous African religions and by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

These composite

identities

tend to be oversimplified by

claims of allegedly "pure" religious,

racial,

and

cultural identities,

misperceptions that clearly misrepresent and distort the

realities

of the Sudan. Second, judging from the history of islamization and arabization in the north and of southern resistance to Arab-Islamic assimilation,

it

would seem

that the prospects for integration are

considerably enhanced by persuasion rather than by coercion.

When

the environment

between

religions, races,

occurs in which what

is

is

and

conducive to peaceful interaction cultures, a process

accepted or rejected

is

of give-and-take

likely to

be deter-

mined by the objective advantages or disadvantages accruing from affiliation into a given identity. It

could indeed be argued that

resistance to assimilation increases in direct proportion to the level

of coercion applied.

Third, unlike other black African countries such as Mali, Nigeria,

Senegal, or Sierra Leone, where

the population, in the

and geographical racial

and

Muslims

Sudan Islamic

are the majority of

identity has, for historical

reasons, been intimately associated with

Arab

cultural identification. This association has in turn

42

K_A Three-Dimensional (^Approach deepened the

and

racial

dichotomy between the north

cultural

and the south. Several policy questions

emanate from these points.

that misperceptions about identity have

and

that obscure the racial

produced

First,

divisive

given

myths

cultural realities of the Sudan, could

removing the myths and revealing the

provide a

realities

common

denominator on which to build a more uniting sense of national identity it

and

collective purpose?

Assuming an

affirmative answer,

could be argued that quite apart from any constitutional,

cal,

politi-

and administrative arrangements that might be adopted

to

expedite realization of this goal, the process of national self-dis-

covery

Thus,

essentially a function

is

of education, broadly defined.

could also be argued that while the leadership might

it

accelerate the speed of progress, there can be

and

cuts,

would

it

no

significant short-

inevitably take a considerable

to correct the mistakes of the past. Conversely,

it

amount of time could be argued

is what people believe they are, not what To attempt to deny the majority their perceived identity may be as objectionable as attempting to impose on the minority the majority perceptions of national identity. Viewed

that

what should count

they are in

fact.

from the opposite

why

side,

should the minority be expected to

invest valuable time in attempting to

those

who

change the perceptions of

believe in a particular identity?

Should they not deal

with the majority group on the basis of that perceived identity?

A second policy question arising from the history of arabization and islamization

Sudan, including resistance to Arab-

in the

Islamic assimilation in the south, cess

is

whether the chances of suc-

might be maximized by persuasion rather than coercion, no

matter what religious,

racial,

or cultural

mold one

favors in the

formulation of a national identity.

The ly,

and

third question

dent or even

whether in a country

realistic to

identity of any If

is

culturally diverse as the

my

Sudan

it

as religiously, racial-

would be

politically pru-

build the national character around the

one group.

assumptions about the identity factor in the conflict

are correct,

43

how

is

the problem of competing and conflicting

TRANCIS identities,

CM.

T>ENG

with their religious overtones,

likely to

be resolved?

Three possible options could be speculated upon. The are rather extreme and, in

more

believe,

The

practical

option

first

my opinion,

first

undesirable; the third

two is, I

and appealing. for the Arab-Islamic position to prevail

is

through decisive military victory that would permit the north to fashion the country along theocratic lines. Despite the proselytiz-

ing zeal of the

Muslim fundamentalists,

the vast financial re-

sources of the Arab-Islamic world, and the Arab global influence, it is

highly unlikely that this scenario could succeed.

Should the Islamic faction the second option

ly,

of,

the north

by southern might

on the

favor.

to achieve

objectives militari-

its

separation. If the south were simply let go

is

would be

fail

free to build

resistance

—

an Islamic

state

unhampered

a course the Islamic fundamentalists

This option presupposes a separatist predisposition

part of the south, something that can

on the

for granted, for the southern position

no longer be taken issues

of unity and

separatism has over time grown increasingly complex. ship of the cal

The leader-

Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and

wing, the Sudan Peoples Liberation

Movement (SPLM), have

stipulated as their goal the liberation of the

any form of discrimination. Nevertheless, edge that the aspiration of the fighting

its politi-

men

whole country from

it is is

common

knowl-

largely regional

and

at ridding the

south of northern Arab-Islamic domina-

tion, real or perceived.

While the SPLM/SPLA leadership may

is

aimed

view the liberation of the south the national identity and

the rank and

file

—

power structure

at the center, the

view of

a view discreetly shared by the overwhelming

majority of the educated civilian achievable,

changing

as inextricably tied to

would be the simplest

elite

—

is

that separatism, if

solution. Quite apart

objective merits of unity, however, the regional African

national climate simply realizes.

Indeed, the

by some

as a clever

would not

SPLM/SPLA

from the

and

inter-

favor separatism, as everyone

position

is

cynically viewed

ploy to conceal their separatist intentions in

order to neutralize opposition to separatism and

facilitate the

attainment of their hidden agenda. If the north were sincerely to

44

x^A Three-dimensional {^Approach want separatism, then the

obstacles to that

end would be consid-

erably reduced.

But what tive

if the

SPLM/SPLA is serious about

its

declared objec-

of pursuing national unity and liberating the whole country

from

all

forms of discrimination?

they cannot impose tion; the

their will

generally recognized that

most they can be expected

to do, then,

is resist

the impo-

of Islamic theocracy on the nation and block partition.

sition

The

third option,

which

prevailing circumstances, that

It is

by military means on the whole na-

would apply the

strikes

me as most practical

under the

would be some form of compromise

three policy implications of the identity

themes: remove the divisive myths from the debate on national identity, establish a peaceful national

environment, and build the

nation on institutionalized unity in diversity. In other words,

what

is

likely to

work

is

a system that

would accommodate

ratism within unity through a confederation or federation.

system would,

it is

to be hoped, create an

sepa-

Such a

atmosphere of harmo-

nious coexistence and interaction that could permit a gradual process

of integration and an evolution of a genuinely uniting

national identity.

The

result

might be appropriately called

Sudanese, Afro-Arab, or Arab-African rather than either Arab or African.

The question of which alternative will eventually prevail depends on a number of unpredictable regional and international variables. It

however obvious that while the challenges of unity

is

are formidable, the

problems of separatism for both north and

south are even more overwhelming. Unity thus becomes not only a desirable goal, but a national imperative.

The

forces of moderation in

the only

hope

do not favor

a theocratic state, are

national unity to postulate

along those

both parts of the country, thus, are

in shaping a unifying national character: forces that

on the

and

lines.

basis

committed

of equitable

diversity,

to a concept

and

foster a radical transformation

An enlightened,

ship with the vision

are prepared

of the country

progressive, charismatic leader-

and the persuasive power

to

win popular

support through the democratic process holds the key. But 45

of

if

TRANCIS democracy

fails

CM.

T>ENG

to accomplish this pressing national goal, yet

another military takeover could, paradoxically, ensue.

Narrative If I it

am correct about what underlies much of the conflict and how

might be

flict

resolved, then

one of the ways of approaching the con-

and the problem of its resolution

ness of the people. After leaving public practical terms

might do,

I

is

to

life

change the conscious-

and pondering what

in addition to scholarly study, to

address the pressing problems of my country, ter

I

thought that a bet-

means of reaching the popular consciousness where the myths

of identity tend to take hold might be a ical

in

story, rather

or political analysis aimed at an intellectual

my

context that

two

novels, Seed

than a histor-

elite. It is

in this

of Redemption and Cry of the

Owl, should be viewed. These stories are in effect attempts to

communicate the themes of

identity formation, their mythical

foundations, and their policy implications to the Sudanese readership so as to neutralize divisive realities.

Although they

didactic nature

and

myths and shed

light

on unifying

are loosely described as novels, their

analytical orientation distinguish

them from

the standard Western novel form.

Seed ofRedemption (New York, 1986) was well received in scholarly circles

abroad and,

as

I

of controversy in the Sudan. Seed of Redemption

how

.

Arab identity

gular

One American anthropologist wrote:

exposes and thus explodes the

myth of a

many Sudanese communities by show-

sin-

ing

have created a northern or "Arab" population ever conscious

of denying

real history.

turally a northerner

the

.

great deal

centuries of intermarriage (in the midst of perennial confronta-

tions)

ing

.

in

had hoped, has provoked a

The

central character of the novel, Faris-cul-

but representing a southern heritage-is the

embodiment of each tradition. He emerges in the second novel as the hope and promise of true unity and peace

liv-

half of in the

country.

A

Sudanese historian and student of African

captured the

spirit

home and abroad: 46

literature cogently

of the novel in a review that was published

at

Cxf Three-^Dimensional {^Approach The hero of and

officer

this intriguing novel

is

Faris Khalifa, a

woman who had

grandson of a southern

a great

Sudanese army

been

taken slave late in the nineteenth century and spent the rest of her life

His father was from Dar Fur in Western Sudan,

in the North.

while one of his grandfathers was an Egyptian. In Faris's veins, therefore, runs as

much

African blood as Arab. Culturally he

the personification of the Sudanese

society; the natural

and the

centuries of intermarriage, intermixing

action between Arabs

and Africans

is

product of

cross-cultural inter-

that give the Sudanese people

those distinctive characteristics of which they are proud. Because of

mixed

his

and above

heritage, his patriotism,

ancestral prophecy, Faris

is

tory of the Sudan, to salvage in the south the causes

all,

in fulfillment

of an

destined to play a pivotal role in the hisits

unity after years of bloody

wars

civil

of which go back to the early contacts

between Northerners and Southerners. Convinced in the end that the policies of his unstable, born-again

Munir,

will ruin the

new

the stage for a

Muslim

President, Jabir

Sudan, Faris ousts Munir from power and beginning, a

new

society free of prejudice

sets

and

discrimination.

The

potential of the novel in practical terms

the reviewer

who

wrote

was underscored by

that, "as political-historical polemic,"

Seed of Redemption "must be taken very seriously indeed." another reviewer wrote,

"Deng

And

has written a highly provocative

novel and a valuable and unique addition to Sudanese literature.

However, unless will

this

important work

is

translated into Arabic,

it

remain beyond the reach of the majority of the people about

whom it has been written." Owl (New York, 1989) pursues that theme of identity more genuinely fictional form, and although it is still in

Cry ofthe crises in a

press,

it

has received positive responses from readers.

began working on the

story,

I

was

still

exploding the myths of identity that into

When I

first

driven by the objective of

artificially

divide the

Sudan

Arab north and African south. As the story unfolded, howev-

found myself substantiating other phenomena, which, rather than detracting from the main theme or thesis, indicated a

er, I

deepening of perspectives on the dynamics of Sudanese For example,

J

being a Dinka,

47

began to

much

like

realize,

perhaps for the

being an Arab,

is

first

identity.

time, that

a function not only of

TRANCIS

DENG

CM.

more importantly, of culture.

blood, but also, and perhaps

blood Dinka, or someone with no Dinka blood a Dinka, could be as

much Dinka

of the group. The converse could be culturally and even

is

at all

but raised

as a full-blooded

from

Once

me

the fiction exposed

had only casually observed

realities that I

Dinka Dinka

his

environment and assimilated into another supposedly foreign identity.

member

also true: a full-blooded

racially disaffiliated

A half-

alien or

to these dynamics,

in

some

individuals

from both the Dinka and the northern Arab contexts suddenly

had

a greater

racial

and

impact on

my

thinking.

cultural dividing lines

The

became

criss-crossing

on the

clearer as elements

of the

ongoing process of shaping and institutionalizing personal and collective identities.

Another phenomenon that the story

is

I

fortuitously discovered through

power of human interaction and

the

its

potential in

reshaping and changing perceptions, including prejudices. One's

outlook

initial

is

of course shaped by the environment in which

one finds oneself and the people with formative period in one's

life.

One

whom

one

interacts at the

therefore begins with precon-

ceived ideas about others and shares collective prejudices with the

group

which one

in

is first

socialized.

As

a result of exposure to

individuals from "other" groups, however, one begins to recognize

elements that belie the patterns assumed to define collective idenAgain, once the process of writing Cry of the

tities.

Owl opened

my eyes and sensitized me to this human phenomenon, I began to recall

and

see

many instances of individual

exceptions to the oth-

Of course,

excep-

tions are so often personalized that they can challenge the

norms

erwise established perceptions and prejudices.

only on a very limited

scale;

what matters

is

how aware people

are

of these exceptions and their cumulative significance. Within the Sudanese context, such awareness, to the extent that

minimal and

is

The

result

48

exists, is

relegated to a subconscious level that does not

impact on relations across the dividing

al rigidities

it

lines.

of these two contradictory phenomena of societ-

and individual

flexibilities is

a situation of extreme

C/jf Three-lDimensional (^Approach

Myths

volatility.

can, of course, continue to be generated

and

transfused to reinforce

and consolidate

As part of that

mutual assimilation of individuals on both

sides

process,

collective preconceptions.

accepted and sometimes encouraged, with successes and

is

depending on the advantages and

failures in assimilating largely

disadvantages associated with the identity concerned.

The

side

that offers the greatest prospects for self-enhancement in terms of

or economic standing naturally enjoys a

political, social, cultural,

better chance of assimilating.

tages

Whatever the equations of advan-

and disadvantages across the dividing

heightened competition between identities polarization with a hardening of positions

and

realities that

The

is

now loom

the result of

line,

likely to

be greater

and increased tensions

of the Sudan, the tragic irony

conflicts. In the case

current confrontation

is

is

that the

based largely on illusions translated into

larger

positive alternative

is

than

life.

for people to

become

increasingly

aware of the deeper truth, unraveled through close examination of situations involving people less caught

types of the collective identity.

experience are

may

While

group

multiply they are

as a

whole remaining unaffected,

bound

to

and

The

narrative

process, although subtle, will, its

I

impact.

and help promote the cause of peace

in the

Sudan.

was considerably enhanced by a personal

received from Professor Abdullahi

An-Na'im, a highly

respected Sudanese scholar of Islamic jurisprudence

member of the Republican is

of common-

form of communication could, indeed, make an

faith in this regard I

The

of internal and cross-cultural

reliable appreciation

broad-based contribution to a better understanding of

social issues

letter

more

be unavoidably moderating in

effective,

My

differences.

as exceptions

push more people from a stereotyped

to a contextualized understanding

believe,

initially this sensitizing

to the rule, with the basis for the prejudice

complexities, including a alities

in the distorted stereo-

be rationalized on the grounds that individuals

mere exceptions

against the

up

and

a senior

Brothers, an elite religious group that

endeavoring to reinterpret the message of Islam to be more in

49

TRANCIS

DENG

CM.

tune with the pluralism of the modern nation-state. This lofty

Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, his life:

goal cost their leader, Ustadh

he was condemned and executed for apostasy under the so-called

September Islamic laws of former President Gaafar

Mohammed

Nimeiri. Professor An-Na'im, the foremost disciple of the saintly

Ustadh, has continued the message with the combined zest of scholar

and

Na'im s

letter

It

My publisher and

activist.

I

agreed that Professor An-

should form a preface to Cry ofthe Owl:

was an extremely enjoyable and instructive experience

read the manuscript of your novel, Cry of the Owl,

last

found the manuscript so fascinating and provocative that put

it

down

Your

or do anything else until

earlier novel,

to the potential

and

I

for

me

to

week-end. I

had finished reading

I

couldn't it.

Seed of Redemption, had already introduced

me

of the fiction form in addressing the complicated

sensitive issues

of national unity and

social transformation in the

have found Cry of the Owl much more effective as a tool for exposing and discussing the most sensitive and

Sudan.

I

must admit

that

I

deep-rooted issues in our individual and collective psyche. In

can

now

fiction

see a far-reaching

fact,

I

and even revolutionary potential of the

method.

Coming from the Jaaliyn tribe of the northern central Sudan, known for their strong prejudice and shameful commercial exploitation of southern Sudanese since the days of the "institutionalized" slave trade,

and

Cry of the

reflections

Owl has

my

on

part.

succeeded in provoking deep emotions

As you probably know from

piece in The Search for Peace

view that ficial

all

and Unity

in the Sudan,

I

my short am of the

Sudanese must undergo the painful but extremely bene-

process of exposing deep-rooted prejudice and social discrimi-

nation before they can hope to evolve a genuine sense of national identity

and achieve

Cry of the Owl, practicing

what

I

For example,

lasting peace

and

justice in the

Sudan. Through

have had a most revealing personal experience in

I

preach. I

have found that the most moving parts of the

manuscript were those explaining and exploring Dinka culture. Besides confronting

me

with

my

found cultural tradition so close onating with

many

shameful ignorance about to

home,

I

I

came 50

res-

aspects of that tradition. In reading your skillful

exposition and illustration of that extremely rich and tion,

this pro-

found myself deeply

to a greater appreciation

humane

tradi-

of what you mean when you

^A T^hree-^Dimensional ^Approach say that the so-called "animists" of the

more

so, as the

In terms of

Sudan

are as religious, if not

adherents of Islam and Christianity. its

immediate and profound contribution to

re- solv-

ing our country's chronic state of instability and insecurity, particularly struck

The

ty.

and

by the manuscript's

skillful

of the subtle elements of individual and collective

analysis

was

I

and very convincing self-identi-

manuscript's very clear exposition and analysis of the shifting

intricate ingredients

and processes of

identity,

with their

far-

reaching practical implications, offer both diagnosis and treatment

some of

for

and tension

the deep-rooted causes of conflict

in the

Sudan.

For

novel to achieve

this

its full

potential,

it

must be

translated

and widely distributed throughout the Sudan. As you

into Arabic

know, the majority of our educated compatriots cannot read English well enough,

and

ful

and cannot afford novels published

artistic

personal guidance and published locally in the Sudan, this

wonderful novel available to people

Moreover,

I

some form,

A skill-

in English.

Arabic translation, preferably prepared under your

wonder whether

it is

who need

its

production

it

most.

possible for this novel to reach, in

the vast majority of our population

even dreamed of

would make

to read

as a

movie or

who

are illiterate.

television

drama

I

for

broadcast in rural Sudan.

Peace Initiative

Another

level at

addressed

— one

which the Sudan

conflict can

and

is

being

that could contribute, if only in a small way,

toward education and changing the perceptions of the leaders in trying to foster

groups and

assist

—

is

mutual understanding between the conflicting

them

in achieving

an end to the war.

Since the popular uprising that overthrew the regime of Nimeiri in April 1985, the search for peace and unity has been a national preoccupation. Despite an apparently sincere yearning to

end the war that has intermittently bedeviled the country since the

dawn of independence, peace has continued to elude the The transitional government that coached the country

Sudan.

back to parliamentary democracy and the elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi both made several overtures and approaches to the

SPLM/SPLA, which

in turn has consistently

TRANCIS asserted inside

its

T>ENG

CM.

commitment

Groups

to a negotiated settlement.

and outside the country, governments and

have offered their good offices to

facilitate

individuals,

the parties' desire for a

peaceful settlement of the conflict. Important meetings and talks

have taken place between representative groups and leaders of

both

sides. Nevertheless,

no appreciable

toward peace; the need for continued

was against

It

and

I

this

efforts

made

remains compelling.

background that Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo

ventured a personal peace

that year, in February, a at the

progress has been

Woodrow Wilson

initiative in

August 1987.

workshop on the

Earlier

was held

conflict

International Center for Scholars in

Washington, D.C., which, in addition to independent scholars, Sudanese representatives from both sides attended and to which

we

invited General Obasanjo.

for foreign affairs,

I

Obasanjo on matters pertaining Africa

had

already, as minister

of

state

had the good fortune of working with General to regional peace

and

security in

and had been very much impressed by his dedication

to the

cause of peace, demonstrated by his placing substantive achieve-

ments above protocol

formalities.

were published several months

The

results

later in a

of the workshop

book, produced in con-

junction with the U.S. Institute of Peace, called The Search for Peace and Unity in the Sudan. General Obasanjo and

book and the

to use the

was to

try to

on both

and explore potential grounds

tive has entailed several visits to the tries

and has

sides.

understand better the underlying

any misconceptions that might adversely peace,

resulted in

then agreed

by the workshop

ideas generated

for exploratory discussions with leaders tive

I

as a basis

The

objec-

issues, identify

affect the prospects for

for a settlement.

Our

initia-

Sudan and neighboring coun-

two substantive

reports that have received

encouraging responses from concerned governments, organizations,

and individuals worldwide.

General Obasanjo brought our

efforts to the attention

leagues in the InterAction Council of

ment and

State,

issues

who remain

and have continued

considerable influence, despite having

5*

Former Heads of Govern-

a group of eminent world leaders

concerned with major world

of his col-

to wield

relinquished active

power

ON OHADIKE automobiles, and business properties in certain parts of Nigeria.

The

1987 upheavals in

Kaduna

State

were unnecessary and could

have been avoided. Yet the danger of another outbreak still looms,

and

it

requires

no

gift

of prophecy to predict that the country may

not survive further widespread religious disturbances.

was fortunate that the 1987

Had

alone.

riots

The

nation

were confined to Kaduna State

they spread into other states or into the armed forces

(which are almost evenly divided between the two major gions), or

had they occurred during a

would have been too dreadful This paper

will identify

reli-

civilian regime, the story

to recount.

some of the

causes of the current

lim-Christian tension in Nigeria and suggest

how

Mus-

might be

it

We

halted for the sake of national survival and stability.

must

begin by recognizing that Islam and Christianity were founded

on two

distinct

and opposing

the prophethood of Christ, state

is

and

that the

religious ideologies,

Muhammad,

the other

mere declaration

not enough to bridge

on the

that Nigeria

whom

state

mous with

an "irreligious society" or "Godless

people, for

truly multireligious nation, therefore,

declarations

a secular

it is

it is

state."

very

synony-

To build

a

necessary to go beyond

and definitions and counteract those sentiments

that breed religious arrogance

cide whether they state,

divinity of is

this ideological gulf. In fact, the

some

term secular

offends

one based on

want

and

bigotry. Nigerians

a theocratic state or a

whether they prefer

must de-

modern

nation-

religious revivalism to scientific

and

modern world, and, above all, independent countries, some Islamic

technological advancement in a

whether they prefer

several

and others Christian,

The The

to

one strong multireligious nation.

Polarization of Nigeria

current religious

crisis in

religious polarization,

the Fulani,

Nigeria derives from the country's

which has strong

was introduced into Nigeria the nineteenth century,

Along Religious Lines

it

historical roots. Islam

in the eleventh century,

had become the

and by

religion of the Hausa,

and the Kanuri. Starting from about 1804 the Fulani

102

CMuslim-Christian Conflict and

^Political Instability

succeeded in extending Islam into the so-called pagan strongholds, as far south as the Niger River into

As

Kwara and Afenmai.

for Christianity, foreign missionaries

began working

southern Nigeria in the mid-nineteenth century, but

it

in

was only

after the effective establishment of British colonial rule in the

twentieth century that the religion gained a real footing.

new motor

coastal towns Christianity followed the

way lines

From

roads and

Although some missionaries had

into the interior.

ed to establish churches in northern Nigeria

the

rail-

start-

as early as 1909,

they

were strongly opposed by the Muslim emirs and British colonial officials.

Thus, the missionaries contented themselves with evan-

gelizing the

non-Muslim communities

in southern Zaria, Plateau,

Benue, and Gongola. After the British colonial adventurers overran the Sokoto caliphate between 1900

and 1903,

Sir Frederick (later

Lord)

Lugard went about reorganizing the region under the indirect rule system.

From northern Nigeria Muslim

clerics, traders,

and

craftsmen carried Islam southward, using Ilorin as an important

outpost for islamizing Yorubaland. At the same time, some Muslim ex-slaves from Brazil and Sierra Leone began to spread Islam in the

Lagos

area, to

be joined in the 1920s by the Ahmadiyya mis-

Why these Muslims did not consider it nec-

sionaries

from

India. 2

essary to

work

in southeastern Nigeria

zle;

had they worked there

and the

as well as in

delta

is still

British officials allowed the Christian missionaries a free

the north as they allowed

would have developed

them

hand

into a healthy multireligious nation

are

among

in

in the south, certainly Nigeria

people been spared the present religious

Today the Yoruba

a puz-

western Nigeria, and had

and

its

crisis.

the very few multireligious ethnic

groups in Nigeria because both Islam and Christianity were allowed to spread freely

among them.

Indeed, the Yoruba have

almost bridged the ideological gulf that separates the two gions,

making

it

possible for individual

or extended families to practice both.

minded

us, the

103

Yoruba have not

reli-

members of households As David

Laitin has re-

politicized their religions;3 their

DON OH AD IKE moderate stand

'

in heated national issues, like the Sharia debate of

1976-78, has thus helped to diffuse religious and political tensions in the country. Furthermore, the

Yoruba have benefited from the

innovations brought to Nigeria by Islam and Christianity.

have produced more

alhajis

They

and imams than any other ethnic

group in southern Nigeria, and likewise more doctors, lawyers,

and accountants. The Yoruba, unlike most Hausa and Igbo, feel as at home in Mecca or Jeddah as they would in Lon-

would

don or Washington. think of themselves

It is

equally praiseworthy that the Yoruba

first as

Yoruba, rather than as Muslims or

Christians. For the sake of national stability, however, they should

be encouraged to think of themselves

as

Nigerians

first,

rather

than as Yoruba.

The

Rise of the Muslim-Christian Conflict in Nigeria

The Spread of Christianity and Western Education in Northern Nigeria

Muslim

leaders in northern Nigeria used well the initial political

advantage given them by the British, thus assuming political

domination of the country. They instrument for

also used Islam as a

political expansion, in

tradition of fusing politics with religion.

an Republic, they pursued the policy

powerful

accordance with the Islamic

During the

known

as

First Nigeri-

"One North, One

Islam," sometimes simply called "the northernization policy,"

which aimed cies

at unifying all

northern Muslims through the agen-

of the Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI

Islam)

—

Society for the Victory of

and the Kaduna Council of Malams. Ahmadu

Bello, the

sardauna of Sokoto and leader of the Northern Peoples Congress

(NPC), personally

led a strong "islamization

campaign" that

earned for Islam hundreds of thousands of new converts.4

But the northernization policy and the vision of "One North,

One

People,

and One Destiny" suffered

a

major setback with the

military intervention of 1966, the abolition of the regional system,

and the subsequent creation of states out of the former

regions.

This process was followed by the rapid spread of Christianity and

Western education

in the north, particularly in

Benue, and Gongola

104

states.

Kaduna, Plateau,

CMuslim-Christian Conflict and

One must

recognize that Islam

way of life. The spread of a society

is

^Political Instability

not just a religion;

is

rival faith in a

it

is

a

predominantly Muslim

therefore perceived as a serious threat to Islamic culture,

including

its politics,

economics, and education. For instance,

Nigerian Muslims have complained endlessly about what they regard as the corrupting influence of Western education

on Mus-

Most Christians hardly realize that Islam places great emphasis on education, nor do they recognize the high level of litlim society.

eracy that prevails

Paden,

"is

tion. "5 Yet

ward and

among Muslims.

"Literacy," according to

John

regarded as a primary means of religious communica-

many Nigerian Muslims

illiterate

as

back-

simply because they were not brought up in the

English educational tradition observes, these

have been described

—even though,

same people "may be able

as

to read

John Hunwick

and write Arabic

with ease and perhaps also express their mother tongue with the help of Arabic characters and since childhood in a system a

may have been

which had

thousand years ago." Before the

its

arrival

receiving instruction

origins in Fez

he goes on, Muslims represented the educated

elite

—

they possessed a technological instrument

Muslims coveted, and they belonged and theological

The

sensibilities

of the society;

—

writing

that

non-

to "an intellectual tradition

of West Africa which studied Logic and Prosody legal

and Cairo

of Europeans in Africa,

as well as the

sciences." 6

of many Nigerian Muslims are offended

when

they find themselves marginalized and discriminated against because they have not acquired sufficient

skills in

the English lan-

guage, the official language of Nigeria. Their protest against this

discrimination and the disruptiveness of Western education and

morality on the Islamic attack

on the

community is

illustrated

universal primary education

by their ongoing

(UPE) scheme, which

was intended to "bridge the gap between the north and the south." This scheme, they declare, Islamic education

is

and disorganize the

of Nigeria by producing children with morality,

UPE

who would wear

scheme, they 105

say, is

trousers,

a conspiracy to destroy

entire little

Muslim community

knowledge of Islamic

smoke, and even drink. The

draining Qur'anic schools of pupils,

DON OHADIKE depriving Qur'anic teachers of their means of livelihood, robbing

women

in kulle (seclusion) of their errand boys

What

depriving blind beggars of guides.

UPE

schools, they have

no doubt,

is

and

girls,

being imparted

is

and

at the

but a subtle form of Chris-

tian indoctrination.7

The Resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism Perhaps more disruptive of Christian-Muslim accord in Nigeria the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, which in turn

is

related to the

spread of Saudi Arabian imperialism, the recent world Nigeria's

the

membership

Muslim

OPEC,

in

spread of Western influences.

oil crisis,

and, generally, the reaction of

Gulf and the Middle East

states in the Persian

is

An

to the

important landmark in

this

Islamic reaction to westernization was the removal of the pro-

American shah of

Iran by a Shi'ite-inspired

movement and

the subsequent installation of the fundamentalist Ayatollah

Khomeini. The success achieved by the Ayatollah's revolution

is

regarded as a standard to be emulated in other parts of the Islamic

world. Since the 1970s, consequently, fundamentalist

Muslim

sects have intensified their opposition, not only to westernization,

but also to leaders they consider errant Muslims, such el-Sadat, the president

members of

of Egypt,

who was

as

Anwar

assassinated in 1981

by

a fundamentalist group. Since then Islamic funda-

mentalist agitations have occurred throughout

much

of the Mus-

lim world, with not even the holy places of Saudi Arabia having

been spared. These groups are convinced that there attack

on Islam and they

are

Palestinian-Israeli conflict

and counterviolence

are

determined to

resist

it.

is

a global

The ongoing

and the emergence of global terrorism

two current expressions of this sense of

being under attack.

Although Nigerian Muslims have been performing the grimage to Mecca for is

and

Nigeria's

many

membership

centuries, the recent in

to Saudi Arabia. Following the

unwelcome drop

revenues in 1980-82, Saudi Arabia and

106

world

OPEC have brought

pil-

oil cris-

them

closer

in Nigerian oil

some Gulf states signed

a

CMuslim-Christian Conflict and

^Political Instability

loan agreement for $i billion for Nigeria. Although this loan was

intended

as assistance to a "sister

Muslim

country,"

its

underlying

reason was to stop Nigeria from reducing the price of oil,

which would have resulted

As

countries.

out, "the loan tied Nigeria

Muslim

in a price

more

universe, Saudi Arabia,

crude

OPEC

war among the

and Ian Linden have

Peter Clarke

its

rightly pointed

firmly to the epicentre of the

and had an important symbolic

dimension." 8

Over the

past few years Nigerian

sciously tried to

Arabia

at a

promote stronger

governmental

ties

level. It is

Muslim

leaders have con-

between Nigeria and Saudi

believed that Saudi Arabia has

responded favorably by sending large sums of money for the pro-

motion of Islam:

large

amounts of Islamic literature have been

culating freely in Nigeria; built

cir-

mosques and Muslim schools have been

and scholarships awarded with Saudi funds; and Muslim

teachers have been recruited

and supported with funds from

Saudi Arabia. (Most of these charges, however, have been denied. )9

The most

active agents of Saudi imperialism in Nigeria are the

members of Yan Izala. Working

various Islamic fundamentalist groups, notably the the

Muslim Students Society (MSS) and the

largely at the institutions

committed

to the

of higher learning, these

complete islamization of Nigeria and

poration into the Islamic world. barrier created

the South

activitists are

With

talk

its

incor-

of "dismantling the

by the geographical factor between the Muslims

and the North," they are poised

for

in

open confrontation

with Nigerian Christians in their desire to forge "a united front against Christian missionary expansion." 10

The Muslim Students Although was

it is

in fact

it

today most active in northern Nigeria, the society

born

organization,

it

in the south.

was founded

became centered

later

opened

at

At

first

a predominantly

in 1954 in Lagos,

at the University

Ahmadu

ahi Bayero College in

107

Society has an interesting history.

Yoruba

and two years

later

of Ibadan, with branches

Bello University in Zaria

and Abdull-

Kano. In September 1969, the national

DON OHADIKE convention of the society elected

Bayero College

— the

first

as president a

Hausa student

at

non-Yoruba national president. By

1970 the society had four hundred branches throughout Nigeria, based in postprimary schools and universities, with the for steering society affairs

dents.

Today the

society

initiative

now firmly placed among northern

is

so strong that virtually

all

stu-

the students

of Bayero University in Kano are said to be members. 11

Some

MSS

Nigerian political leaders have advised members of the

to be tolerant

Christians.

and understanding

with

in their dealings

Aminu Kano once reminded them

much of the

that

modernization that has taken place in the Christian world was

due

and advised them

to education

to

work hand

Christians to modernize Nigeria. Even the sense to dissociate itself

and

.

.

northern for

states."

12

Perhaps no

its

JNI has had the good

"from an emotional approach to religion

The MSS, however,

compromises or cooperation;

frontation in

hand with

importance of modern education in the

stressed the

.

in

apparently has no patience

rather,

it

prefers violent con-

dealings with Christians.

less

militant than the

MSS

is

the

Yan

Izala,

created

around 1980 by followers of Alhaji Abubakar Gummi. Like

Gummi, more

the Izala believe in the transformation of Nigeria (or

accurately, certain parts

Gummi religion

of Nigeria) into an Islamic

and greater governmental interference

because, in his opinion, "people should not be tual guidance."

The

Izala

and the Nigerian coat of arms, Islam; moreover, like believe that

is

as

flag,

in religion

without

spiri-

the national anthem,

contrary to the teachings of

many orthodox Muslims,

one should bow down

tice at the courts

left

oppose the use or display of certain

national symbols, such as the national

Gummi,

state.

himself has called for the establishment of a ministry of

they do not

to a mortal being as

of Muslim emirs.

The

Izala,

is

the prac-

according to

who among

not an Islamic sect but simply a group of people

wish to educate others, purify Islam, and fight ignorance

Muslims.^ If the activities

of Muslim fundamentalists on the campuses

were restricted to nonviolent promotion of scholarship and religion,

perhaps Nigerians would have been spared a great deal of

108

CMuslim-Christian Conflict and

^Political Instability

trouble. In fact, however, their religious intolerance

them

placed radicalism have earned the illusion that Nigeria find

it

difficult to see the

and mis-

bad name. Obsessed with

a

or should be, an Islamic state, they

is,

viewpoint of non-Muslims. Their

spirit

of defiance, even against constituted authorities, was demonstrat-

ed in 1986 when some University

mosque

the Nigerian

activists

decided to seize the

in Zaria; they

That same

police. *4

Ahmadu

Bello

were subsequently removed by

year,

some

MSS members at the

University of Ibadan insisted that the cross of a Christian church built over thirty years earlier be

removed because

it

obstructed

their

view when they looked toward Mecca, though they prayed

in a

mosque

built only in 1986. "This flagrant

rassed the nation," lamented A.

the matter been settled than

I.

Asiwaju 1 *

demand embar-

—but no sooner had

some unknown persons

set fire to the

wooden sculpture of chapel on the campus.

the risen Christ in the Protestant Christian

Christian Fundamentalism in Nigeria

The

unity of Nigeria has been disturbed equally by the activities

of Christian fundamentalists. There are

independent Christian

sects in Nigeria,

certain fundamentalist traits. 16

Roman

The

older churches, especially the

Catholic, Anglican, Baptist,

their flock to

now over one thousand many of them exhibiting

and Methodist,

new fundamentalist movements. To

are losing

arrest this drift,

some of these older denominations have introduced elements of fundamentalism or charismatism into their

mode of worship and

evangelicalism. Speaking in tongues, belief in spiritual healing,

on baptism by immersion, and heated disputes over

insistence

minutiae of Christian doctrines are but some of the

traits

that set

the fundamentalists apart from other Christians.

Christian fundamentalism nic groups, mainly in the states.

While there

do know

is

no

is

widespread

Middle

Belt,

among minority

eth-

Cross River, and Bendel

clear explanation for this trend,

we

that Nigerian fundamentalist groups, generally called

born-again Christians, campus crusaders, and Jesus people, have their roots

not in Nigeria, but in the United States and Britain;

therefore, they could be regarded as belonging to the

109

broad

— T>ON OHADIKE Euro-American fundamentalist movement and, indeed,

as the

agents of Western cultural imperialism in Nigeria.

As Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman remind mentalism,

movement

and

as "reactionary evangelicalism

against secularism,

us,

Christian funda-

an organized

as

a twentieth-century

is

American

invention, different from the non-conformist European sects

the old-world breakaway groups

—and

the Pentecostals,

were born of theological disputes over such rules

and infant baptism." 1

which

issues as ecclesiastical

Believing that Americans are God's

/'

modern-day "chosen people," militant American fundamentalists have been invading the world with their propaganda since the 1960s, with the weaker nations of Africa

most from

plenty, of the

American "good

suffering the

life" as

portrayed in motion pic-

and magazines, some Third World

tures, television, radio, books,

people easily

and Asia

Captivated by the image of material

this onslaught.

prey to fundamentalist propaganda. 18 Millions

fall

of Nigerians watch the television program sponsored by Club 700 of America, for example, and large amounts of gospel

pamphlets from the United States circulate

in Nigeria because of the present

culties. Believing that "Jesus

lives to

the answer" to

United States

become born-again

Christians and

to win

propaganda strategy developed

converts.

Christian fundamentalist

Nigeria and their political ideologies is

diffi-

him. They then join the conversion "cru-

Our knowledge of the known, however,

economic

their problems,

sades," using the fundamentalists' in the

has gained

all

is

millions of Nigerian youths

surrender their

and

freely in Nigeria.

The American brand of Christian fundamentalism wide acceptance

tracts

the

is

limited.

movement known

movements

One

as the

in

of the best

Fellowship of

Christian Students (FCS), which Paul Lubeck describes as a "fun-

damentalist Christian

movement among

groups of Nigeria's Middle Belt."

1

?

the minority ethnic

Although

this description

Raymond Hickey has noted that after its formation in 1957 the FCS spread quickly throughout the entire old Northern Region. 20 Just how widely spread is the movement? And what are its dominant politisuggests that the association

cal

and

religious ideologies?

no

is

a

Middle Belt

affair,

CMuslim-Christian Conflict and Political Instability Like the gins. It

Muslim Students

Society, the

was founded in Gindiri, near Jos

FCS

—

dominantly Christian south of Nigeria, but staff

is,

not in the pre-

in the north

—by

the

of the Sudan United Mission schools, most of whom were

expatriates

from Europe and America. From there the

the society spread to other parts of the north, it

has interesting ori-

that

had

fifty active

activities

and within

of

five years

branches and a full-time traveling secretary. By

1967 the society had over one hundred branches and a Nigerian full-time general secretary. In lished, the society "kept

the areas where

all

it

was estab-

pace with the rapid development of

schools and, with the cooperation of Christian staff members,

has proved to be an effective

means of protecting the

Muslim environment.

Christian students in a

It is

also

faith

it

of

an active

among staff and students." 21 Nurtured in a hostile environment, the FCS soon became the vanguard of Middle Belt nationalism. As we have seen, the introapostolic force

duction of Christianity in northern Nigeria was opposed by Muslim rulers and colonial administrators. "That the emirs and holy

men of Islam would

not welcome the establishment of a Christian

mission in their area

noted Hickey. "What

wholly understandable and normal,"

is is

much

harder to understand

is

the blind

opposition of many senior officers of the British colonial administration to the establishment

of missions, even

among

the non-

Muslim communities of the

region." Perhaps,

Hickey

suggests,

the hostility of British officials toward Christian missionaries

derived from their "almost mystical veneration ... for both the

Sokoto caliphate and the sacrosanct system of Indirect Rule

which helped attitude that

north"

to perpetuate

was often

or, as Sir

and

fossilize a feudal society"

summed up

Rex Niven puts

it

in the expression "the

in his recent

—an

Muslim

memoirs, "the holy

and undivided North." 22 Christian missionaries struggled against these odds and eventually

became established

in

many

parts of the north, but they

were never able to free themselves of Muslim

hostility.

a consequence, the greatest areas of religious tension

Muslims and Christians states as

are not such

Today, as

between

predominantly Muslim

Sokoto, Kano, and Bornu, but the Middle Belt, which

in

"DON OHADIKE Paul Lubeck has described as "one of the salistic religious

last frontiers

competition for converts."

Besides religion, two other sources of tension Belt,

one economic, the other

nant economic

class:

owners of the major

political.

of univer-

23

mark

Muslims

the

Middle

are the

domi-

they are well-to-do cattle keepers and

retail outlets,

road haulage companies, and

contracting firms, whereas Christians are mostly peasant farmers

and

The

laborers. Politically, too,

Muslims constitute the ruling

class.

Muslim emirs on both Muslim and

practice of imposing

non-Muslim communities, which had

its

origins in the days of

the nineteenth-century jihads and continued into the early colonial period, has

remained

in force despite protests

by many com-

munities and even by well-meaning Muslims. Alhaji Abubakar

Gummi,

for instance, has described the emirate system as a politi-

cal-religious dynastic system that has

Nigeria:

"The emirs

no relevance

can't continue. In fact the

for

modern

system has already

ended." 2 4 Likewise, the members of the Muslim Committee for Progressive Nigeria

and other

socialist associations

have attacked

the emirate system, describing the emirs as feudal lords

who

"keep

and oppressed peasants and workers

the majority of the poor

down." 2 * It is

not surprising that Kaduna should be the most religiously

and

politically troubled state

and

political cleavages are

The

Hausa-Fulani,

nant

political

of Nigeria, for here

religious, class,

manifested largely along ethnic

lines.

who are mostly Muslims, constitute the domi-

and economic

classes,

while the Kaje and a host of

other ethnic groups are mainly Christians and the subdominant classes.

Note

that although

Kaduna

regarded as a part of the Middle Belt,

State proper its

is

not normally

southern parts (known as

Southern Zaria) are so considered; indeed, they share a historical experience

common

with the other peoples of the Middle

Belt,

being, for instance, the victims of Fulani military imperialism in

the nineteenth century

and of Hausa-Fulani

and economic exploitation in

Kaduna

State that the

12

twentieth. 26

domination

Furthermore,

it is

members of the fundamentalist Muslim

and Christian groups, the active.

in the

political

MSS and the FCS respectively, are most

CMuslim-Christian Conflict and

The bloody

between these two militant

conflicts

They had

1987 were not entirely unexpected.

and

have continued to clash in almost

learning in

Kaduna

conflicts are ally

now

^Political Instability

State.

all

previously clashed

the institutions of higher

Ahmadu

At the

societies in

Bello University their

endemic, with the student union elections usu-

regarded as occasions for physical combat between these two

mutually antagonistic groups.

The Kaduna

State religious riots of

1987 started at the College of Education in Kafanchan,

some members of the

MSS

when

argued that a Christian preacher, Rev.

A. Bako, himself a recent convert from Islam, had no authority to translate verses

from the

gious meeting.

They

the Qur'an,

Quran

into English at a Christian

preacher personally

testified, "the

come near enough,

started hitting

were using stones to

hit

me.

were tightly held down." 28 ly

Bako of misrepresenting

also accused Rev.

on account of which they

I

reli-

tried to kill

him. 2 7 As the

MSS members who had already me with clubs,

just closed

He was,

sticks,

and some

my eyes, since my hands

however, rescued by the time-

intervention of the Christian students,

who

beat off the

Mus-

lim attackers.

The

fight over Rev. Bako's right to

turned into a

ing,

riot that spilled into the

A few days

township and adjoining vil-

Kaduna State was gripped with and panic as armed Muslims roamed the streets, killing, lootand burning. About twenty-five people were reported killed,

lages.

fear

quote from the Qur'an soon

later,

the entire

and properties totaling millions of naira were destroyed, mostly Christian churches and schools, hotels, private homes, and auto-

mobiles. 2 9

The Christians managed to damage only about six mosques. The greatest destruction took place in Zaria, where, according to one source, as many as 102 churches were razed to the ground.3°

Islamic Millenarianism as a Factor in the Political

Instability

of Nigeria: The Case of the

Maitatsine Religious Riot Equally disruptive of the peace and stability of Nigeria are the activities

of a long

reformists, the

113

list

of self-proclaimed Muslim prophets and

most recent being Malam

Muhammadu Marwa,

DON OH AD IKE known

1980 in Kano, in the very heart of

as Maitatsine. In

Muslim north, Nigerians of all religious affiliations were made to taste the bitter pills of religious intolerance and fanaticism when the followers of Maitatsine caused the deaths of the

between four thousand and

six

thousand people. Maitatsine was a

Cameroonian who, under unknown circumstances, himself in followers

established

Kano and surrounded himself with a large number of over ten thousand in Kano alone before the 1980 out-

—

break, reportedly.

He was also

believed to have followers in

major towns of the north and, strangely, Although Maitatsine died during the Kano

in

Lagos

all

the

as well.

religious riots

of 1980,

his organization survived.

In 1982, his followers struck in

Maiduguri and

Many

lives.

but

forces,

later

did not check the

Barely two years

sect's activities.

and imaginary ene-

in 1985, they attacked their real

Gombe, Bauchi

State, causing the deaths

of over 100 peo-

Later that same year the fanatics assembled in Lagos to

unleash their terror on that arrived in time

1960s.

city,

but members of the armed forces

and rounded up over

Muhammadu Marwa Although very

six

thousand of them.

started preaching in

little is

ideologies of his sect,

known about

Kano

secular

and

"condemned

the religious

and

religious elites

goods

—automobiles,

Marwa also

facing toward

of Hadith.

and

both secular

who

it

polit-

can be

As Paul Lubeck

especially the orgy of

but socially disruptive petroleum

criticized all those

and

the widespread corruption of existing

consumption enjoyed by Kano's privileged

condemning

in the early

from Marwa's own utterances

inferred that the organization was reformist. explains, he

Yet

of about 400

of the fanatics were rounded up by government

this

Again

mies in

ical

the outskirts of

loss

they struck again in Jimeta in Gongola State; 760 were

killed.

ple.

Bulumkutu on

Kaduna, causing the

also in

boom

class

Western

during the brief

(1974-81)." Besides

religious authorities, Maitatsine

enjoyed modern Western consumer

radios, watches, televisions, even buttons.

rejected

some orthodox Muslim

Mecca when

praying,

and he

practices,

such

as

rejected the authority

Finally, the sect believed in "violent social protest dur-

ing periods of social

114

crisis.'^

1

CMuslim-Christian Conflict and

^Political Instability

Regarding recruitment for his organization, the Justice Aniogolu Commission of Inquiry, set up by the federal government to

look into the

Marwa

Kano

disturbances, stated that the followers of

who remained unemployed

were rural youths

after the

harvest. Paul Lubeck, however, rejected this verdict

grounds that gins, its

it

failed to

on the

account for the movement s historical

changing material circumstances, and the cultural

ori-

frustra-

who were essentially Qur'anic malams who wandered through Muslim communities with

tions of Marwa's followers,

(teachers)

their students seeking

and

alms and sometimes performing practical

spiritual tasks for the host

came with the Nigerian

oil

communities. The wealth that

boom

depressed the condition of the

Qur'anic malams and their students and at the same time distanced them from their host communities. shelter, starved

as

They were deprived of

of alms and charity, and their status was redefined

"vagabonds and

street urchins" rather

community.

bers of an Islamic

It

than as respectable

mem-

was from such a "displaced yet

morally self-conscious group" that Maitatsine recruited his

fol-

lowers, concluded Lubeck.3 2 It is

true that the oil

Nigerians, but

boom

why would

Muslim north? To

provoke religious

riots

only in the

attribute the Maitatsine riots entirely to the

postboom depression history; as Clarke

it

created great social problems for

is

to

throw away a

and Linden have

large portion

of Nigerian

rightly observed, the roots of

the Maitatsine uprising "lie in the history of northern Nigeria itself.

The

sect

showed many of the

lenarian tradition,

features

of an Islamic mil-

and of the Mahdist movement, which was an

important factor in the nineteenth century history of Islam in the region. Although disclaimed as an authentic expression of

Muslim

practice

by the Muslim community, the Maitatsine phe-

nomenon grew out of a Muslim tradition."33 What is the Islamic millenarian tradition? What

is its

relevance

to the Maitatsine religious riots? Just as Christians believe in the

second coming of Christ, so most Muslims believe in the coming of a Mahdi (God-guided One)

who will bring about the victory of Day of Judg-

Islam for a millennium (thousand years) up to the

ment. Ibn Khaldun, a great fourteenth-century writer, wrote: 115

9-

7 Clark and Linden, Islam in 8

Modern

Nigeria, 151-54.

Ibid., 62.

9 Ibid., 65-66. 10 11

12

Ibid., 50.

Paden, Religion and Culture, 206. Ibid., 207.

On

Yan Izala generally, Abubakar Gummi." 13

3

14

Ibid., 13.

15

A.

I.

see

Newswatch, 30 March 1987,

Asiwaju, Review of Laitin's Hegemony

August 1987, 1489. 16 See Rosalind

I.

J.

Hackett,

New

(Lewiston, [N.Y.]: E. Mellen Press, [1987]).

121

and

Religious

17,

box "Sheikh

Culture, West Africa,

Movements

in Nigeria

T>ON OHADIKE 17

Flo

Conway and Jim

War (New York: with Ed Dobson and Ed

Siegelman, Holy Terror: The Fundamentalist

on American Freedoms in Religion,

Politics,

and

Private Lives

Doubleday, 1982), 199. See also Jerry Falwell Hinson, The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative 18

(New York: Doubleday, 1981). Conway and Siegelman, Holy Terror,

19

Paul Lubeck, "Populism, Islamization, and Political Realignment in

Christianity

202.

Nigeria," Paper presented at a seminar organized by the Humanities Center,

Stanford University, Stanford,

20

Raymond

18

May

1988,

15.

Hickey, Christianity in Borno State and Northern Gongola

(Aachen, Ger., 1984), 45. 21

Ibid.

22

Quoted

23

Lubeck, "Populism, Islamization, and

in ibid., v. Political

Realignment,"

15.

24 Lee Lescaze, "Nigerian Stability Threatened by Schism Moslems," Wall Street Journal, 13 March 1987, 16. 25

As quoted

in

Among

Clarke and Linden, Islam in Modern Nigeria, 88-89.

how the labor force of the Middle Belt communities was plundered by northern emirs acting as agents of European colonial officials and investors, see, for instance, Bill Freund, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines (London: Longman, 1981); and Michael Mason, "Working on the Railway: Forced Labour in Northern Nigeria, 1907-1911," in Peter C. W. Gutkind, Robin Cohen, and Jean Copans (eds.), African Labor History 26 For an account of

(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978), 56-79.

27 Christian Association of Nigeria, Catalogue ofEvents (Kaduna, n.d.), 28

Ibid.,

Kaduna

Religious Riot, ip8/:

A

21, 18.

11.

29 Newswatch, 30

March

1987, 20.

30 Christian Association of Nigeria, Kaduna Religious Riot, 67. 31 Paul Lubeck, "Islamic Protest Under Semi-industrial Capitalism: Yan Tatsine Explained," Africa

55 (1985): 370.

32 Ibid., 371, 377-85. 33

Clarke and Linden, Islam in Modern Nigeria, 109.

34

Quoted

35

Ibid., 109.

in ibid., 109.

36 For an interesting account and dramatization of the relationships between the Nigerian oil boom and armed robbery, see Karin Barber, "Popular Reaction to the Petro-Naira," Journal of Modern African Studies 20 (1982): 431-50.

37 David Laitin, "The Sharia Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second Republic," Journal of Modern African Studies 20 (1982): 418. See also W. I.

Ofonagoro

et al. (eds.),

The Great Debate: Nigerian Viewpoints on the Draft Times of Nigeria, n.d.).

Constitution, 1976-1977 (Lagos: Daily 38

Laitin, "Sharia Debate," 418.

39

Clarke and Linden, Islam in Modern Nigeria,

40

Laitin, "Sharia Debate," 417.

122

57.

CMuslim-Christian Conflict and Political Instability 429-30.

41

Ibid.,

42

West Africa,

43

West Africa, 16

3

August 1987, 1489-90.

November

1987, 2245.

44 United Christian Association of (n.p., n.d.),

45

1.

West Africa, 30 March 1987, 599.

123

Oyo

State,

The Christian and the

OIC

Commentary on

the Papers of Ibrahim

Gambari and Don Ohadike, Followed by General Discussion

Commentary by David In terms of the

Laitin

of this conference,

title

I

am not comfortable with

Nor do I know if it is a good thing. Mr. Gambari in his final comments suggested that national integration seems to mean that we all become something like each other. That may not be a good thing. The question that interests me is the symbolic basis of political the concept of "national integration."

On

conflict:

what

are the

what

cultural dimensions will people divide,

consequences

assuming people

for those types

will divide

on the

basis

purposes of political action and that that cal life.) In regard to this is

not something that

plexity

is

more

it

own country Not only

ance and intolerance. are

more

In fact,

I

tolerant

I

and

a

normal part of politi-

is

is

of societies and

complex

and one

is

states.

To point

merely to say that one

sees the divisions within

complexity universal, but so are

do not

it

toler-

believe that there are societies that

societies that are less tolerant

believe, people are tolerant

and intolerant about

of their differences for

unique to the Sudan or Nigeria, but com-

better than others

clearly.

is

is,

my first point is that complexity

a universal characteristic

out that one's

knows

is

theme,

and

of divisions? (That

others. In

than others.

about some sorts of things

my own

research in Nigeria

remember interviewing the chief imam of a Friday mosque and telling him about my views on religious conflict. He said, I

"Well, those people

125

who

engage in religious conflict are morally

"DAVID /A I TIN intolerant people. Islam teaches us to be tolerant."

then asked

I

him about what was going on at another Friday mosque that was patronized by Muslims who came from a different, you might say, from the ancestral

ancestral city

city

imam

of the chief

with

whom I was speaking. Suddenly his blood began to boil telling me that those people at the other

mosque had no

sense of honor

that they were thoroughly reprehensible people.

was more tolerant than people

in the

not that he

It is

Middle East

and

in seeing a role

he was tolerant about a

for Christianity in Nigeria. Rather,

reli-

gious division, but intolerant about an ancestral city division. So

want

the point

I

tapestries

and

sorts

make

to

that in

is

that

all

societies

have complex cultural

people are tolerant about some

societies

all

of divisions and intolerant about others, and that the conse-

quences of those choices between what you are tolerant and intolerant about is

what

them,

As

I

political scientists

and

have some thoughts on

sociologists study.

As

I

am

one of

this.

power, they need to in some

base.

way connect with

own

their

We know from our studies of leadership and their folhow

lowership and

easy to appeal to a

this

dynamic interaction works

common

feeling

whether

ry, or skin color.

it

You

in

it is

and

follower,

which you have some com-

be religion, region, language, try to

very

that

identity between leader

and you emphasize those aspects

mon

society divides itself politically

political leaders or putative political leaders seek to gain

political

mass

and how the complex

tribe, histo-

connect in some way with the

constituency that you want to build. That

is

in a sense

an instru-

ment for mobilization by leaders, but leaders are not completely free to use

Once

we say in America,

a leader develops

common

complex and,

as

all

sorts

that. Virtually

126

is

a problem because, as

Everyone

I

this

said,

earlier,

sees himself as a layered

of connections, going back to your grandfa-

ther, great-grandfather, or

and why one

has to play in Peoria.

Mr. Abu-Lughod was saying

sees himself so clearly.

person with

it

some kind of followership based on

sense of identity, there

societies are

no one

as

it;

your mother's family, or something

like

anyone can think of a number of identities one has

is

connected to the group that one

is

supposed to

Commentary oppose in some way.

What

leaders try to do, in the

a

of Washington, Paul Brass, in

political scientist at the University

his magnificent study

words of

of language and religion in north India,

is

some degree of "symbolic congruence." Once you have it seem that the boundaries between you and your opposition are far more solid than they to create

your following, you try to make

So when

really are sociologically.

the

Sudan

this

rather a

is

when

common

that the group has coherence

notion of what you

are.

So

if your

based on language you try to

ant about religion, but

it is

is

of

more

phenomenon and an creating some congruence to

—

trying to develop a coherent

dominant symbolic message

make

among your language group appear our

in fact

clarity

the world

political

incentive for leadership to engage in

show

earlier, especially in

emphasizes the

lectures, that the leadership

the boundaries between groups

complex,

was said

it

is

the religious differences

irrelevant.

"We are very toler-

our language group which

is

central to

political claims."

If there

is

success by leadership (not

all

leaders succeed in creat-

ing a followership with clear boundaries and devotion to that

scheme of things from the has developed),

if there is

cultural point of

view that the leader

success in this project of leaders

lowers to create a political group, in

some

sense

we can

and

fol-

say there

has been established in the society, using Marshall Sahlins's phrase, a al

"dominant cultural framework." That dominant cultur-

framework we

economic power

will call

hegemonic

if

behind

it is

political

and

in the process of state formation.

In Nigeria, Lord Lugard was instrumental in bringing about this

kind of symbolic congruence,

framework.

It

looked something

Muslim, that was what ferences

up

this

kind of dominant cultural

like this: the

north was basically

their real identity was. All those other dif-

there were differences to be sure

—economic and

guage, historical differences. Middle Belt people did not that at

all,

but we will just sort of forget about

identification in the north

differentiated

acted

on these 127

was that they

them from the

are

that. all

fit

into

The dominant

Muslims, which

south. Lord Lugard also wrote,

writings, that the south

lan-

and

was not advanced enough

DAVID to

make

still

religion

JjilTIN dominant symbolic framework. They were

its

at the historical evolutionary stage

Therefore, people

of being based on the

making claims based on

tribe.

religion in the south

were in some way socially jumping and those kinds of claims were not to be heard or

That

officially recognized.

is

overstating

some, but the image of the Muslim north and the

tribal

one that Lugard

it

because

tried to

promote not because

was plausible enough

it

it

south was

was

real,

but

for people to act strategically

and

think and organize according to the dimensions set up by the British imperial state.

As Mr. Gambari pointed

out, there

was a

set

of historical com-

promises in the postindependence Nigerian state that in a sense challenged the colonial hegemony.

Gowan period broke up into

more than one and

cially,

Middle

also

state,

the fissures between northerners espe-

between the northerners and the people of the

lim north. Second, the three-tribe Nigeria

civil

war ended the view

of the west, the Ibo the central tribe in the

tral tribe in

—whatever

was

a

that

means

east,

—

and

the cen-

the north.

can say that in the post-civil war period there has been a

punctured hegemony in Nigeria. By that is

that there

and the notion that the Yoruba were the cen-

something called Hausa-Fulani

We

The twelve-state system of the Once the north was broken up

broke the ideology of the sardauna of a united Mus-

Belt,

tral tribe

the north.

no form of cultural

identification

purposes of political action. In a sense,

mean

I

which

is

this

to say that there

the obvious form for

punctured hegemony

works to the interest of the regime in Nigeria because the available frameworks

may

prove insufficient for leadership to develop an

effective followership.

work on which will

be

ficult.

difficult

Why?

contemporary Nigeria

because organizing on the basis of tribe

Because the number of people

selves as different tribes

coalition of tribes. tribes,

Developing a dominant cultural frame-

to base political action in

is

so high

Once you

you have

who

is

to build

an enormous

build an enormous coalition of

the notion of what they share

is

so loose that

it is

get that kind of symbolic attachment with the people.

128

very dif-

recognize them-

hard to

So

tribe

Commentary becomes a very weak form of countering the dominance of the ruling group. How about class? Class is also a tremendous problem, in large part because of the, you might

petty bourgeois

say,

aspiration of virtually every social group in Nigeria or every

region in Nigeria. If people saw themselves as permanent workers, as

—

Europeans did in the nineteenth century

working that

be working

class likely to

you have working-class

—then

the idea

for purposes of

political

turn

class in

interests

the children of the

identification seems plausible. In Nigeria, after

one or two genera-

tions of working class everyone sees himself breaking out of that

and owning something, getting the Mercedes Benz ship.

Then

the effort to bring about

consciousness will have

Religion has

become

attempt because,

tremendous

all

gone

some form of working-class

in vain.

a new,

as has

distributor-

you might

say,

ploy or a

new

been recognized by Mr. Gambari, the

urban

social inequalities, especially in

areas, are so

some mechanism to come along and have been so far, in the last few years, much more successful, especially Mai Tatsine in the north, much more successful than tribal leaders in great

and so egregious that there has

to be

mobilize discontent. Religious leaders

mobilizing this urban discontent. However, here agree with the earlier speakers just a bit. This

you think about tent that

it

it,

is

is

where

I

dis-

not so ominous. If

religious differences so cross-cut the discon-

would be very difficult

tion of the discontent based

to build

on some

up

a massive organiza-

religious symbols. In the

north, the discontent are basically Muslim; in the south, they are

both Muslim and Christian. The question of the Aladura groups with the discontent

in the south coalescing is

the Anglicans

very low probability. So the chance of building a religious-based

movement

that transcends

very low and seems to

me

one

locality in Nigeria

to explain

contained within Kaduna State content cross-cutting religion. I

among

have to support

been used

my

—and more

me

these last riots were

—because of the

The one

fact

of

dis-

piece of evidence that

view here, that even though religion has successfully than tribe,

purposes of mobilizing discontent,

29

why

seems to

it is

I

do admit

—

for

not likely to become the

JOHN

tfUNWICK

O.

dominant symbolic framework, Friday mosques during the find that there was

no

that if

is

Mai

Tatsine

you looked

at

Yoruba

movement, you would

talk there along the lines

of "Look what

they are doing up north and look what they are getting away with!

How come we are

not doing

it

when we

are suffering as

much

as

our brethren in the north, we Muslims in the south." So that even

though

religion has

ing discontent,

I

had some

local successes in terms

of mobiliz-

tend to think that in Nigeria as a whole, religion

dominant symbolic framework will not sell.

as a basis for a

Our second

speaker's idea of a Christian democratic

kind of a Muslim party

as a bipolar

outcome

and some

in Nigeria

I

hold

as

highly unlikely, given the nature of social cleavages in Nigeria. So in conclusion,

I

think Mr. Gambari

is

correct in fearing the vio-

lent mobilization of discontent in Nigeria.

who has been

think that anyone

I

in Nigeria for a while, seeing the seething anger

and

the tremendous change in the urban areas, has to be worried

about

that, especially as the ruling classes

seem

to be so inured to

the difficulties that these poor are suffering. But basis will

what

be and the consequence of that choice,

its

symbolic

I

contend,

remains unknown.

Commentary by John O. Hunwick It

now

falls

in Nigeria It is

to

and

my

lot to

make some remarks about the situation two papers we have heard.

particularly about the

very difficult to

many complex and

know

quite where to start

cross-cutting factors. But

a saying attributed to the Prophet

we should

—

want

Muhammad:

rahma, "Difference of opinion within of] divine mercy." Perhaps

I

Ikhtildf ummatl

my community we

both of the pluriconfessional

the

Sudan and Nigeria. Differences of opinion and

fact a source

building a

on the

states

and linguistic diversity

—

state,

sign

are discussing today, cultural, reli-

as positive

elements in

and indeed, although they do not appear

surface to be forces of integration,

130

[a

these kinds of things are in

of blessing. They can be used

modern

is

take this as a kind of motto

for

gious, ethnic,

there are so to start with

I

believe that ultimately

Commentary an honest recognition of those differences can

assist in

national

integration. I

want

to start

by saying a word about that term that has been

Sharia?

me,

I

Whatever

—

much

bandied about so I

today

say about

it,

What do we mean by

Sharia.

somebody

else will disagree

many different

can be pretty sure of that. There are

interpretations of that term. Sharia, as far as tially a

way of life,

a path, a

way of Muslim

One

being and expressing themselves. sions of Sharia has been through

jurisprudence

—

enormously complicated.

many

First

itself

among

called legal schools, the

a

way of Muslims

of the particular expres-

what we

call in

Arabic fiqh, or

of

all,

there

the fact that law

many centuries in Islam with with many differing views, coa-

the Sunni majority into the four so-

madhhabs, which

one from another. Beyond

is

is

over

different interpretations,

lescing eventually

know, means essen-

life,

word. But there again, the situation

law, in a

grew up and established

I

with

possible

this,

all

have their differences

of course, there has been continu-

ing growth of Islamic law through the fatwa, the legal opinion,

through the commentaries that have been made on the

works of jurisprudence and so on. There tangled field that by itself

we

call

is

earlier

an immense sort of

Islamic law, not to speak of

Sharia.

When we

refer to Sharia in, say, Nigeria, again

with something different from "Sharia"

as

we

are dealing

was proclaimed by

Nimeiri in the Sudan. There has always been Sharia in Nigeria of a certain kind.

The Muslims have been

always able to follow

Islamic law of the Maliki school in their personal affairs, in matters

of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and so on. Prior to the colo-

nial period,

though

I

of course, Maliki law was applied more universally,

think probably far

pose; in other words,

I

less universally

than most people sup-

think local custom played a great role in

many areas. But prior to the colonial period Sharia was dominant in many areas in the fields of criminal and commercial law as well as personal status.

in

However, in the colonial period

its

jurisdiction

commercial and criminal matters was declared "null and void," 131

JOHN

HUN WICK

O.

and a form of law based ultimately on

British law

was introduced

in these fields, while the Islamic personal-status law continued.

when people talked about

in Nigeria talk

So

about Sharia law, and when they

during the discussions for the constitution of the

it

Second Republic,

basically

what they were talking about was not

the kind of Sharia that was introduced into the Sudan, which

is

hudud that punishments. They are

across the board including criminal law, including the

Mr. An-Na'im referred to really talking

—

the specified

only about Muslims having the right to have their

personal affairs directed by Islamic law and there being an appeals

system over and above

Beyond

some

this there

that.

is

another kind of problem. Islamic law in

senses has never been

modernized or updated.

If you

go to

northern Nigeria, the law books, the manuals of Maliki law that

and that

are studied there in traditional circles

are studied in

places like the former School of Arabic Studies in

Kano and

so

on, are the law books that were written in the tenth century

perhaps

—

—

or the four-

so on,

which con-

import, including what Mr.

An-Na'im

the Risala of Ibn Abi

teenth century

—

was referring

the Mukhtasar of Khalil

of

tain everything to

Zayd al-Qayrawani

legal

—and

about the status of non-Muslims, including

the legislation concerning slavery, et cetera.

Now, some of English as

It is all

all

there.

these books have recently been translated into

if this is

want

the form of Islamic law one might

to

apply in Nigeria. So you have that kind of medieval legacy of Islamic law. a

new

Nobody has yet

really

come up

modern times with

in

interpretation of Islamic law, going back to the original

sources of Islamic law and saying,

"We want

Islamic law, but

we

want an Islamic law that suits the conditions of the twentieth century.

We

want

a

new

want an Islamic law

interpretation of

it.

We

that really reflects the

do not

necessarily

economic and

conditions of the tenth century or the twelfth century." that the kind of interpretation that the late

Ustadh

I

social

suspect

Mahmoud

Muhammad Taha in

The Second Message ofIslam, which Mr. AnNa'im has translated, attempts to solve that problem by saying essentially that

132

much

of the

social legislation

of the Qur'an was

Commentary specific

only to the time of the Prophet and

nal message that

Muslims must

all

is

not part of the

That was

follow.

eter-

a very bold

kind of statement, which was declared a "heresy" and for which of course the late ustadh paid with his

attempt are not very talk

common

now. So the question

is:

When we

about Sharia, what kind of Sharia are we talking about and

how would

that be interpreted?

Are we going back

legacy? Are we trying to reinterpret?

Nobody can across the

really

make up

board and

it

certainly

became

What

are

we

to a medieval

trying to do?

minds, so people use

their

—

becomes a kind of bogey word

nobody

thing called Sharia which It

Those kinds of bold

life.

a sort of

term

this

this

awful

really ever very clearly defines.

bogey word

in Nigeria: every time

people heard the word Sharia they had visions of people being

stoned to death or having their hands cut

One

question, and

whether interreligious

lem

I

rivalry or tension

There are

in Nigeria.

off,

and so on.

think this has already been raised,

all

is

a real

is

and major prob-

kinds of tensions,

it

seems to me,

going on in Nigeria, and religion sometimes merely serves as a reflection

of these. For example,

divisions there are not

Yoruba,

There

as far as

I

can see

are other kinds

if you

take the Yoruba people, the

between Muslim Yoruba and Christian

of

—and

stand to be corrected on

I

political division

among

other kinds of divisions other than

Muslim Yoruba

tian Yoruba. If we look at the kinds

of tension that

some Muslim communities

in Nigeria, again

dealing with a sort of monolithic block of people

"The Muslims of Nigeria." There

is

the Yoruba,

versus Chrisexist

not

it is

this.

between

as if we are

who

are called

plenty of tension and unease

very often between Yoruba Muslims and

Hausa Muslims. This

has been written about by one of the Yoruba scholars extensively, a

man

called

that the

Adam Abdullahi

al-Iluri,

Hausa Muslims do not

who

treat the

has complained bitterly

Yoruba Muslims

as seri-

ous or genuine Muslims. So there are these kinds of tension there too.

There are plenty of other kinds of tension between Muslim

groups in Nigeria. For example, the sorts of tension that

between those

who

notably the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya, 133

exist

are adherents of the various Sufi orders,

who

have their

own

john

o.

inter-Sufi rivalries

who

Hun wick

and then,

as

were, jointly against those

it

follow what has been loosely called the "Izala line." This

shorthand for a movement called

al-

the Establishment of the

sense reflects a kind of Saudi Arabian

in a

"

that places a great deal of emphasis

the law, to

wa-iqamat

Izalat al-bida

— "Removing of Innovation and Sunna" —which broad Wahhabi" point of view on —however be

sunna

is

Sharia

that

deny the claims of the There

is

to

interpreted

—and

on

tends

Sufis, the mystics.

are tensions again

between most Muslims in Nigeria and

the minority group called the Ahmadiyya, a sect introduced from

India/Pakistan earlier in the century that caught

who would

socialist-oriented

call

to a consider-

There

able extent particularly in western Nigeria.

between those

on

are tensions

themselves progressive Muslims or

Muslims and the more

traditional Muslims.

These, of course, have been reflected in various kinds of political parties

and

political debates

for example,

—

the

which has become

Muslim Students

tion where there are pro-Iranian factions

and so on. There again there

are

and pro-Libyan

what we might

NPC

calized as the

factions

the middle-

represent the

[Northern Peoples Congress], the sardau-

and those who

na's party,

NEPU

old

call

who

of-the-road Muslims in political terms, those

rump of the

Association,

a very militant sort of organiza-

are

more

Muslim Students

radicalized but

Association, the

still

not

as radi-

ex-Aminu Kano

[Northern Elements Progressive Union] group. So again,

and various

there are various levels of difference of opinion

of tension

There

levels

among the Muslims themselves.

are also tensions, as has

been mentioned in

throughout Nigeria that cut across

several cases,

religion, region, or ethnic

group, between the rural and the increasingly urban population

We have had sever-

and between the underprivileged and the elite. al

references to the

Mai Tatsine movement

underprivileged against the overprivileged.

as a revolt

There

are,

of the

of course,

plenty of economic grievances, particularly in the post-oil period.

I

have heard

it

said that the oil

boom

worst thing that ever happened to Nigeria.

problems than

134

it

solved.

One

of the things

I

It

boom

was probably the created far

think

it

more

did was to

Commentary bring Nigeria, at a certain

level,

much

closer to the great oil

powers of the Middle East, particularly to Saudi Arabia,

and the Gulf

states.

Iran,

Perhaps some of the religious tensions in

Nigeria are not unconnected with this kind of closeness that Nigeria achieved at a certain level with these countries.

One exist

many

could go on to the

—

the political

other forms of tension that

and constitutional tension. Should Nigeria be

What do we mean by secular? Many Nigerians the constitutional debate when people started

secular or Islamic?

objected during

Muslims and Christians

talking about a secular state.

"We As

are

How can you tell

are secular?"

it is

not.

But there was a

sensitivity

which

toward the use of the

secularist.

There

are other kinds

sion, states/federal

problems

is

states

Then you

How

far

democracy when

One

it

many

notes, however,

that

party.

Two

it

parties?

is

none of these

an ideological party.

party.

One

firm root in Nigeria. Perhaps

of the things one

parties has ever

been what

I

There has never been a Nigerian

There has never been

These kind of broader

many dif-

different kinds of coalition, the

of power that goes on.

Communist

party?

has been a democracy, reflecting the

careful balancing

call

to

course, Nigeria has always been a multiparty

ferent points of view, the

would

is

do you go on breaking

get back to party politics.

Of

government

federal

should there be? Twelve, nineteen,

twenty-one, or twenty-seven?

Multiparties?

as civilian/military ten-

One of the continuing how much power the states

determining

and how much power the

Or how many

have.

of tension, such

government tension.

in Nigeria

are to have,

up?

we

us

secular state were the equivalent of an atheistic state,

if a

of course term

religious people!

all

alike said,

really

political ideologies it is

even a Socialist have never taken

that people are using religion in

the absence of any obvious political ideology. In

my view,

and,

I

think, in the view of a

speakers, the differences

which

exist

going to be resolved on a religious differences not only

ences

I

among

between these people are not

basis.

There

are just too

many

which

are the differ-

among

the Christians.

the Muslims,

have highlighted, but also equally

135

number of the other

JOHN There

are too

HUN WICK

O.

many other

cross-cutting factors to get any kind of

monolithic Christian-versus-Muslim factionalism

as a

means of

political expression.

problems that Nigeria has are no

Clearly, the

acute than

less

They are, I think, perhaps more easily capable than some of those that exist in the Sudan in the sense

those of the Sudan.

of solution

that Nigeria

is

not currently locked into a

war.

civil

That does

make a great difference. Nigeria has been through a civil war, one that some interpreted as having some kind of religious overtones. I

think that interpretation was often overblown.

Abubakar Gummi's name has been mentioned. Certainly some of the statements he has made recently have sounded somewhat alarming, indicating that

of

state

if

non-Muslim head

there were to be a

then Muslims would never agree to that or they would

separate

off.

But

as others

have pointed out, Nigerians are often

long on rhetoric and short on actual follow-through.

heard

this

kind of saber- rattling before. There

We have all

no way one can

is

—

imagine the Muslims of Nigeria withdrawing from anything

or

even just the north. In July 1966 there was some suggestion that the [then] Northern Region should secede, but that talk did not last

very long.

cations of

it,

The

sheer logistics of it, the sheer economic impli-

militated against that.

learned that despite future

lies

all

I

think that Nigerians have

their differences, their better long-term

in staying together

and working out some kind of com-

promise. Before closing

I

will

tensions in Nigeria.

known, but

there

is

mention

The

briefly

what

I

call

the educational

love of Nigerians for education

of course in Nigeria,

African countries, an educational

crisis.

as there

This

is

most

dent in the present state of universities in Nigeria. are being half educated. People are graduating jobs. People are

many

many

Many

people

and not finding

real

needs of Nigeria.

rele-

A spinoff of this

is

students have gone to the Arab countries, particularly

to Saudi Arabia,

arships to

in

well

clearly evi-

going anywhere to get qualifications whether

vant or irrelevant to the that

is

is

which has been very generous

many West Africans. So one

136

is

in granting schol-

getting a generation of

discussion

Muslims

in Nigeria

and other West African countries who have

Of course,

received their higher education in Saudi Arabia.

in

any

country you go to for higher education you are bound to imbibe

some of the ideology and

culture of that country.

I

think that in

the case of Saudi Arabia's tremendous emphasis on the

"legal

some of this has obviously worn off. People come back and they become secondary dispersion centers for ideas picked up in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps one should say thankfully that not too many went to Iran, otherwise the ideas of the Ayatollah Khomeini, which are still popular among some of the radical Muslim students, might be still more widespread.

way," the Sharia way,

Having mentioned the Ayatollah Khomeini, he

is

one of the

rare

I

should note that

examples one can find in Islamic history of a

religious leader actually

becoming a head of state. This

is

extreme-

uncommon in Islamic history. One can hardly find examples of men of religion becoming heads of state. They may guide the ruler, may provide an ideology, as Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahly

hab did

for the

Saud

family, or as in [eleventh-century]

North

Africa Abdullah ibn Yasin provided the ideology for the

Almoravids while of

politics.

Nigeria.

One

political

power remained

in the

of the few examples one can

The movement

led

hands of men

name comes from

by Usman dan Fodio

at the begin-

ning of the nineteenth century was one of those rare movements in

which the ideologue behind the revolution and behind the gov-

ernment became the head of

state.

direction relatively few Nigerians

I

suspect, however, that

would

see as

is

a

worthwhile to go

in in the twentieth century.

DISCUSSION MR. GAMBARI:

I

want

some of the points made by Concerning Gummi and his

to respond to

Mr. Hunwick and Mr. Laitin.

statement that Muslims would not accept a Christian leader

of Nigeria: one,

this

should be taken with a pinch of salt.

we have had

three Christian rulers in Nigeria,

and others did not disappear. So establishment malam.

137

He

Gummi

and

Number

Gummi

should be seen

as

an

has been with every conceivable

DISCUSSION government

in Nigeria.

He

has no interest really in a situation

where there would be chaos and no government. As a matter of he has joined the Religious Affairs Council and has

fact,

become

a moderating influence there.

He

quoted

is

as

having

said that Christian organizations should join the Religious

Council and

Affairs

Muslims would not mind

[that] the

if a

Christian became the chairman. Finally,

Mr. Laitin suggested that

we

integration because like

each other.

want

I

—

I

do

thing

at least if we is

look at

boundary I

was in favor of

become something

to be recognized that

not a good thing

development and

I

I

respect differ-

we establish a regime of unity

believe that national integration

gration

civil strife,

said that

in Nigeria should

it

ences and can take conflict so that

and diversity.

I

good

a

negatively, that national disinte-

it

.

is

.

.

[Laughter]

I

mean,

civil

wars,

conflicts within states, obviously retard

would

certainly be in favor of national inte-

gration that implies national unity even beyond the panAfrican

level.

Mr. Laitin

also suggests that religious discontent in Nigeria

not so ominous.

I

think this can be underplayed

religious discontent

—because

right there

—

is

the role of

what you have

is

behind-the-scenes efforts, the bureaucrats, the intellectuals, the trade unions, the military

itself,

trying to see that religious dis-

content does not get out of hand. If they do not continue in

such a role and they abandon the role of moderation, then you

may

not be able to contain religious

Ohadike

said

it

riots territorially.

was a lucky thing that the

religious riots

Mr. were

contained within Kaduna State. Suppose they could not have

been contained; suppose Christians began to attack Muslims in other parts of Nigeria. This might then polarize Nigeria in a

north-south divide, which

I

think would be very dangerous for

the continued existence of Nigeria. So you are right that

reli-

when it is mixed with other factors and is not contained and those who play moderating roles do not continue to do so, then we will gious discontent

is

not enough to destroy Nigeria, but

have very serious problems. 138

'Discussion

Regarding Mr. Hunwick's points: Sharia issue

is

not

as

ominous

I

agree with

in Nigeria as

you

that the

often portrayed,

is

particularly by Christians. Sharia has been present in northern

Nigeria for a long time, and

were discontent when

"Why

it is

limited to private law.

Muslims

of Sharia was overblown.

this issue

I

said,

cannot Muslims in the southern part of Nigeria be

allowed to

problems of personal status

settle legal

courts in the south?" But this

is

strongly opposed,

in Sharia

and the

issue

has not been resolved. Further, yes, there has not been an ideological party in Ni-

but there have been some that have come

geria,

think that the

more

in Nigeria, the ies in

difficult the

economic

situation

more you might have more

And

close.

I

becomes

ideological part-

Nigeria in the future.

terms of training in Iran, Mr.

Finally, in

Hunwick said

that

was a good thing that many Nigerian students have not gone

it

to

Iran and thereby taken up the Ayatollah Khomeini's religious

fundamentalism.

where there

.

.

quite right that Nigerians will go any-

an education, and an increasing number are going

to get

.

It is

going to Iran, and they are returning.

MR. BESHIR:

would

I

like to

ing religion, whether

it is

make two major comments. Regardin Nigeria or the Sudan, we seem not

to have discussed this aspect very clearly. In religions, Islam

Christianity,

tion

is,

both have

extraterritorial

what has been the

in the rise

whether

of

role

dimensions.

The

and influence of outside

and

ques-

factors

movement of fundamentalism, Sudan? In the Sudan we know that

this religious

in Nigeria or in the

the international Christian organizations have played a role

both in promoting conflict and in containing say this, they

conflict.

I

must

role. They have helped in manThe World Council of Churches, the Vati-

had a very positive

aging the conflict.

can in 1972, played a positive constructive role for the Addis

Ababa agreement, and even the Emperor Haile

Selassie, a

Christian, played a positive role in bringing peace to the Sudan. I

am

saying this because the outside factor

139

is

a reality in the

DISCUSSION promotion of peace. In the present situation

who

doing what? Egypt has a

is

playing a

Libya has a role in Chad, so

role.

Ethiopia has got problems, so ing a role, definitely

—

there

is

in the

Sudan,

role in the Nile Valley, so

it is

it is

playing a

playing a

it is

role.

role. Iran is play-

no doubt about

it.

Iraq

is

playing

a role. Out-side conflicts are fanning the religious or ethnic

Whatever we

conflicts inside the country.

then,

we have

zations

remember

Ten

—among

moting them, not

My

other

—

we did not have groups associaKhartoum students; now we have

years ago

University of

Of course,

them.

these things. Also, religious organi-

and fanaticism have created Islamic and Christian orga-

nizations. tions

to

are talking about,

there are outside inputs for

Sudanese

comment

Sudan or Nigeria, can

interests,

and

injections pro-

but for other

on the question, In the

is

As

it

is

Of course, Mr. An-Na'im said this morn-

can, providing

it

fanaticism

is

Let us ask one

presented today, can religion play a role in

solving the problems?

ing that

case of the

religion play a role in conflict solving?

We have been talking about conflict promoting. question:

interests.

excluded.

I

it

rightly interpreted, provided

is

agree, but others in other cases have

answered the question negatively, saying that no conflict with extremist dimensions, whether religious or nationalistic, can be

burn themselves

solved. People have answered: "Let conflicts

out

—

said

is

there

is

no way

to solve religious conflicts." Here,

that to solve the question

—the structure of the

itself

you redraw the boundaries, create

new autonomies and

sovereignty.

Burn out

gious boundaries

MR. DENG:

I

—

you have

state,

this

is

to look into the state

might contain the problems:

dismiss

all this

nonsense about

by redrawing reli-

one way of looking at

was quite interested

is

the boundaries of the state. If

these religious conflicts

this

what

in

what Mr.

it.

Laitin

Mr. Gambari made of the balance of power

and

also

in Nigeria in

terms of one region having the political power, another region the economic power, and

140

maybe even

a third area having the

^Discussion

bureaucratic power.

The

correctly earlier, this in the case

on the

all

The south

the minority. Therefore, there

What

I

they hinted very

the deprivations are

other.

minority, economically disadvantaged,

a balance.

as

is,

from the Sudan, because

in distinction

is

of the Sudan

the benefits

interesting thing

is

no way

is

on one

and even at all

find quite interesting here

religiously in

of bringing about is

the implication

that Nigeria has found a kind of balance with which

comfortable.

You do not and

There

is

MR. GAMBARJ:

It is

You seem

to indi-

are not that

keen on

between being content and

a difference state

because you are discontent.

a tentative, very uneasy balance.

MR. DENG: As to the external situation, a point that Mr.

power

to solve

our problems within our

Omer

Have we

Beshir has underscored but that needs to be stressed: lost the

seiz-

How stable is this in the long run?

ing the political power.

wanting to destroy the

very

easterners are quite content with their

economic and bureaucratic power and

MR. LAITIN:

it is

see the northerners aspiring very con-

spicuously toward gaining economic power. cate that southerners

side, all

numerically in the

own

national

boundaries because of these external factors, and does one then say,

"Let us involve anybody

practical?

Or do we work

who

has any role at

to discard

them and

all"

—

is

that

solve the prob-

lems within the boundaries?

Now,

the interesting thing also

is

this question:

play a role in solving problems? This brings

me to

Can this

religion

question

of discourse. All the Sudanese, even the very scholarly, academically oriented

would seem

people to

—he

talked to

is

assume that

ated by his

141

normally invite discussions,

[Dr.

a fundamentalist!

ened northern leaders see Turabi.

who would

who

Hasan] Turabi cannot be I

have seen

many

are secularists not even

enlight-

wanting

to

Whereas when you see Turabi you are fascinreasoning and by the degree of what seems like

"DISCUSSION flexibility if

tion really

come

The

ques-

there really meaningful discourse going

on or

only the other side would

is:

Is

we complaining in isolation? The question of leadership in

to him.

are

ian

a very

is

ly ..

good one.

Sudan going

would recommend

I

whom

[about]

southerner ...

everybody agreed that

many

state for

he had run in the

if

came and went.

years,

and

I

I

mean

affairs,

my

retained

saw many ministers come and

.

tell

me

becoming

go.

before the the minister

and then when the announcement came

position as minister of state. Although

to say that .

a

myself was minister of

reshuffle to get prepared for the task of

of foreign

elec-

would have won, but because he was

There were times when Nimeiri would

.

very strong-

it

He was vice-president over and over again while

vice-presidents

tion

to a Christ-

[Laughter] There was a vice-president from the south

.

tions with Nimeiri he

first

the

[Laughter]

had nothing to do with

it I

I

do not

I

qualifica-

was told by many people that Nimeiri

could not take the idea of a southerner, a Christian, going to the

Arab world and Islamic conferences affairs

of the Sudan, and being minister of state

job while somebody

MR. GAMBARI: although

I

me add

who was

It is

I

could do the

represented the Sudan.

did not realize

only Muslim

pendence.

Let

else

of foreign

as the minister

for the it,

I

purpose of comparison that

was the

first

and probably the

foreign minister of Nigeria since inde-

the opposite in Nigeria,

it is

the Christians that

have been foreign ministers since independence.

MR. JOHNSON:

It is

interesting that the discussion

direction this afternoon

—toward

even indeed up

have

we have been making

out

this

mornwhich

now been clarified in some finer detail.

Just very briefly, there has been this overriding, call

in that

to the afternoon's opening speeches,

of a number of assumptions ing,

moved

clarifying, a finer teasing

deficit-model approach toward religion.

the discussions thus far

142

it

what

By and

I

would

large, in all

has always been articulated in terms of

'Discussion off. The question has now been raised we ought to have emphasized so exclusively the

alarms" going

"fire

whether, in

fact,

deficit-model analysis of religious activity. This has been

opened up somewhat.

I

know the title of the symposium is Reli-

gion and National Integration in Africa, but one of here

is

the question:

integration nificantly,

from

it

its

To what

lost control

of so

to solve our problems.

there

is

up

in terms

of the international-

of issues that we have been

Mr. Deng raised a question have

notes

international dimension? Rather, very sig-

has been brought

ization of the kinds

my

extent can one separate national

as to

whether perhaps

much of our own

A partial

raising.

in Africa

we

context as to be unable

response to that might be that

something incongruous between the articulation of the

view that Islam and Christianity are "world religions" and then not to expect such "world religions"

to,

by definition, bring

for better or worse, a larger constituency. In this case,

we

be very interesting to watch, as

way

in

which

the Nigerian a

Biafra's Christianity civil

war.

It

seems to

by definition to tap into

tions

—good,

all

in,

might

probably have done, the

all

was internationalized during

me

that to tap into Islam as

world religion and to tap into Christianity

is

it

world religion

as a

of the international implica-

bad, and indifferent

—of

that particular

dimen-

sion.

We

have also talked in terms of sects and about divisions of

these categories of religions into sects. ly disturbed,

ments

—

gether as

by the way

take, for if

in

which

I

was partly pleased,

—were

example, Christianity

same way

as

purely a

Catholicism or Methodism.

It

seems to

mentally different

of put to-

am

is

sect, in

me

the

something funda-

going on there in terms of class formation,

seems to me, elide for a

formation.

143

I

not sure

manner of

terms of gender formation, et cetera. By and large,

been talking about religion and religious it

I

and what that phenomenon represents can be

articulated in the

in

sort

they were straight-line developments.

that Aladura

part-

certain kinds of develop-

think

moment

activities in

we have

ways

that,

the question of gender

we have been developing

categories of civil

DISCUSSION society, categories

of governments, categories of public

that essentially privilege males for example, if we break

it

and male

roles.

down, whether the

I

activity,

am wondering,

rate

of conversion

to these various sects of the various denominations are in terms

Which gender

of gender.

enters

much more

quickly into political society or into negotiation for power?

Is it

civil

quickly or

less

society or into the

possible that in terms of certain

kinds of newer movements developing in the urban areas in Nigeria and Sierra Leone you will tend to have demographically proportionately greater numbers of women between the ages of forty- five

and

fifty- five

kind of mass that

ticular

terms of the fact that

whether we have

women

A

we

I

are talking

about

—whether

in

we have men specifically in there or in there? Or if we do not have enough

of constructions, what are the implica-

power formations or

final issue

wish to

for the evolution

which

raise,

is

of that area?

ultimately

my

major

that although the discussion has invoked three cate-

is

gories of religion in Africa, fact that

are the impli-

women

in these kinds

tions for

What

demographic and gender formation of the par-

cations for the

point,

being "converted"?

we

I

have been

have discussed with

really quite struck

by the

enormous fluency the Islamic

dimension and the Christian dimension. The interesting part that with virtually every speaker

who

noticed that the third dimension a

is

cough or with an apology. That

thing

like,

"There

is

has spoken thus

far, I

is

have

always preceded either with is, it

Islam, there

is

has always been someChristianity,

and then

[coughs] traditional religion or so-called paganism or so-called

custom,

et cetera." [Laughter]

of

I

this?

am

Now, what

are the implications

curious as to whether national integration or

national consciousness or patterns of cognition or of language

have some significant role to play in those particular areas? likely, for

Is it

example, that at election time in Yorubaland the

Ifa

oracle plays a far greater role in terms of national integration

than Christianity or Islam? This

and

it

seems to

144

me rather critical.

we have really not discussed, It may be at some point useful

^Discussion

when we

not to merely cough or apologize anthropologically talk

about

this other thing.

What has come up repeatedly,

MR. DEMOZ: religion

part of a

is

complex

of identity that in some with, the Sudanese one

structure, a

cases overlaps.

lify

is

a situation

each other's

been said

do help

Sudanese

we

I

think that what

dealt inter-

we have

sort of nul-

fall

on top of each other and

some of the

aspects of the intractabili-

case.

country nearby that provides an interesting contrast, also

the

not

of factors

set

cases

while in the Sudan, although this has not

they seem to

about which nothing has been all

complex

The two

the fact that

where they do cross-cut and

to explain at least

ty of the

A

effect,

explicitly,

is

and the Nigerian one, provide an

esting contrast in this respect, because in Nigeria

think,

I

same

on top of each

fall

said,

factors, except there too

is

Ethiopia, where

they do cross-cut

other. Specifically

I

am

we have

—they do

speaking of lan-

guage, territorial aggregation, and perhaps the state of economic

development.

far better

than

I

will

speak about Ethiopia because

know the situation

I

in Nigeria,

I

know

although

I

it

think

they are similar. In the case of Ethiopia, neither Islam nor Christianity

really territorially aggregated.

is

spread, especially Islam, in

More

little

clumps

all

Both tend

importantly, neither Islam nor Christianity

nous with a language group. Christianity

is

to be

over the country. is

cotermi-

practiced by several

major language groups: Tigrean speakers, Amharic speakers,

and many others not have sense in as a

I

could name. Similarly with Islam. So you do

this self-intensifying factor there either.

There

is

no

which you could say that economically the Christians

whole

are

more advantaged or

the

Muslims

are less advan-

taged.

Because of this in Ethiopia, despite the tremendous fragmentation that

it is

now

around religion spicuous by

145

its

experiencing,

none of that has been done

as a rallying point.

Religion has been con-

absence in the Ethiopian fragmentation. Perhaps

"DISCUSSION it is

somewhat

very

much

background

in the

in the background.

in the Eritrean case, but

Whereas

in the

Sudan we have

the territorial aggregation largely between the south and the

—although —and we have

north sure

there are

some exceptions

the fact that Islam

is

with speakers of Arabic. Since language

to this,

I

am

coterminous

largely

one of the most

is

important defmers of ethnicity, when you have religion on top of that, and

aggregation

territorial

on top of that, the tendency

for the cleavage to be far stronger than

is

it

would be

if these

were not coterminous with each other.

Now, what

lessons can

academic point of view,

I

we draw from

this?

At

least

from an

think this strongly argues for a highly

interdisciplinary approach to the question of integration.

Rather than speaking about religion and national integration

we perhaps ought

to speak

about language and religion and

aggregation and national integration, which

territorial

awkward and very long

[Laughter], but

I

think

enough

have to pull together whoever can look

from

tion

are the

all

to find

these different perspectives

way they

we

and

see

rather

are re-

some appropriate abbreviation

sourceful

We

really

is

for

why

things

and what may be the way out of

are

it.

at the ques-

this

grave difficulty. I

am also

interested in

what Mr.

Omer Beshir said concerning

the question of whether the issue can really be solved within the one-state framework, because this does relate to the fact that

each of those religions in our part of the world does very cut across state lines.

lines, as

But from a

practical political point

much more difficult to lines

much

do indeed languages cut across of view,

it is

state

of course

bring any kind of agreement across state

than within. Nevertheless,

it is

something which we

should not consider impossible.

MR. AN-NA'lM: this

It

seems to

morning about the

not be as historical or cally

as

me

that

what Mr. Gambari was saying

historical

compromise

compromised

may

in the sense that histori-

you did have those tensions and 146

in Nigeria

conflicts

and

that the

^Discussion

compromise already.

is

What

not working

seems to be

here

Muslims and non-Muslims (whatever

may

tion

be)

who

have

seems to be flagging

as well or

at issue

that

is

when you have

their sense

of identifica-

independence for a long

lost political

time and then have regained that independence, within a short

time they will

thinking in terms of self-determination

start

for their particular religious identity or other type

So what seems to be the case in Nigeria

ity.

that

—although

I

of ident-

Sudan

as in the

is

would not of course deny the economic and

the social dimensions of the issue

—

it

just takes

some time

the issue to be cast in terms of self-determination for

and a stronger association with Islamic

for

Muslims

identity, including the

application of Sharia. In this respect, it is

I

would like

to disagree with

not a question of what type of Sharia, but of what degree of

Sharia you implement.

which

is

What you

indicate in terms of Nigeria,

Sudan,

that Sharia has always been

also true in the

the personal law of Muslims.

you go

There

are

of course differences of in the

inter-

Sudan and Nige-

not a difference of what type of Sharia, but what degree of

The

application of Sharia.

allusion to

Muslims

Sharia point of view,

non-Muslim. In

Muslim

secession in

non-Muslim becoming head of state

Nigeria in the event of a

of course a manifestation of Sharia,

ity

comes when

the question

and so on, but the difference

pretation is

is

Now,

of reintroducing Sharia into the public

to the next stage,

sphere, in public law.

ria

Mr. Hunwick that

as

are not

you know. That is, from

non-Muslim should not exercise author-

fact, a

it

a

supposed to be ruled by a

over non-Muslims. So this sentiment, though

and though we take

is

with a grain of salt,

is

muted now

indicative,

I

think,

of an underlying current of a stronger association with Islamic identity.

Now,

would

I

cannot say society

like to refer to is

more

Mr.

Laitin's

point that one

tolerant or less tolerant, but rather

tolerant in relation to various aspect of society.

very true. I

am

What seems

sure of

M7

to be the purpose of

most of you

here,

is

to

make

I

my

think this exercise,

is

and

societies tolerant in

"DISCUSSION most conducive

respect to those aspects that are

integration

—and

if societies

to national

need to be in tolerant, to be

intol-

erant in ways that will not repudiate these basic understandings.

In other words, the link between religion and national integra-

my

from

tion

perspective

is

a

promotion of tolerance of those

aspects that will further national integration

and suppress

ten-

dencies toward disintegration. Finally, in response to

Mr.

Beshir's point that religion has

a role in crisis creation or conflict creation but that that

it

may

not have a role in conflict resolution,

we can

start

we do not have

That

would say not

as

with no religion in the formula. Religion

is

that, to start with, if

possible

it is I

had

a choice.

is, it is

already a part, a very integral part, of the complex situation itself.

So

a situation

it is

where we have

to deal with religion:

have no choice in that respect. To the extent that religion

of the issue

it

has to be dealt with as such.

question of overlooking religion. is

we work with

religion,

which

is

way I have

MR. HUNWICK: [Laughter]

I

would

part

make

it

rather suggest

an integral part of the

ation, and develop those aspects that

significant

is

not simply a

We cannot afford to because

part of the situation. In this respect,

that

It is

we

situ-

for tolerance in the

indicated.

In short, religion

is

not just going to go away.

Some questions or comments from

FROM THE FLOOR: Concerning Mr. Gambari's

the floor

.

point that

.

.

?

if reli-

gious disagreements continue to be within a particular religion

and do not spread they did in

March

to

become one

1987, there

religion against another as

may not

be another

civil

war, but

may be in for some trouble in the future; and then his comment that there are some Nigerians studying in Saudi Arabia, there are some Nigerians now studying in if it

happens again we

Iran,

and

that they are

coming back.

what he thinks about the future crisis

that

may be perpetuated

148

in

I

would

in terms of a

like to ask

major

him

religious

one way or another by outside

^Discussion

by Nigerian

influences, either

from

different parts of the

terpretations, or otherwise;

come from

conflict,

FROM THE FLOOR: Mine in the

Sudan never

is

are

coming back in-

whether that kind of conflict would

the outside; or whether,

through a religious

who

citizens

world where Islam has different

will

it

just a

if

Nigeria disintegrates

come from within?

comment. Christian southerners

forget that the northern

Sudan was

at

one

time a Christian kingdom. Northern Sudanese think that Islam

was the only power

in the

Sudan and

that Christianity

is

some-

thing new, forgetting the fact that there was a Christian king-

dom there that actually contributed to the Sudan culturally and become

has actually

Sudan. So this

not

is

this a

part of the character

and

identity of the

problem of Christianity and Islam,

really a political

problem rather than a

[or]

is

religious prob-

lem? Christianity and Islam are used for political gains by a few in the

Sudan who

are

dominating the scene. The majority of

enough

the Sudanese unfortuately are not educated

to realize

the differences between them.

MR. GAMBARI:

What I am

trying to say

gious riots in Nigeria are not strong

is

that as of now the reli-

enough by themselves

cause the country to go into another

civil

war, but that

should not be complacent about the situation strengthen those larity

of the

state.

who

are

committed

at

all.

to

we

We should

to maintaining the secu-

This would be a function of addressing some

of the socioeconomic issues within regions in Nigeria and between regions in Nigeria.

My

fear

is

that with the return

of these people trained in Iran, the increasing radicalization of youth, particularly in the northern universities,

and army of unemployed people ... if the religious dimension then makes the interethnic, interregional situation worse and you have a north-south division, that is what can threaten the the

stability

of Nigeria.

149

Religion, Politics,

A Comparative African

Integration:

laminsanneh

Perspective

Western

and National

political thought, particularly since Machiavelli

and

Bodin, has assumed an absolute autonomy for political institutions, to

be judged by independent

and with the nation-

criteria

supreme embodiment. Western

state as their

political thought,

however, was not confined to Western society but penetrated soci-

South America, and elsewhere,

eties in Africa, Asia,

1

Barker observed with reference to India.

have become offshoots of the Western

though our roots our

lie

in a different soil.

we

relatively recent assimilation,

Thus we

two things

But

feel

that the sovereign state

ment that

its

defenders claim

is

much

religious

Under each of these

I

even

precisely because of

constrained to take a

and

ideas, a process

which Muslims have eagerly joined.

in this short presentation.

in Africa, too,

political heritage,

fresh look at inherited political institutions

reappraisal in

as Sir Ernest

would

I

of

propose to do

like to suggest, first,

not the absolute, all-sufficient instru-

it is

thought

and, second and more importantly, the source of the secular state.

lies at

interrelated

themes

I

shall suggest

about the issue of national integration. Clearly, the

something

state regards

national integration as an overriding goal, whereas in terms of religious loyalty loyalty.

The

it is

political issue,

and

in the

scheme of

ery of

some of 5*

but a by-product of a

religious factor

is

thus

for that reason

things.

we need

My basic

this religious

larger,

transcendent

critical to a reappraisal

to determine

assumption

thought

is

is

of the

its

place

that the recov-

a precondition for the

CAM IN SANNEH revitalization of

contemporary

and

social

Christians and Muslims have to say

on

political

life.

What and

this matter, separately

any reasonable account of the

together, needs to be included in

modern ferment. It

seems to

me

that

two major

from the impact of the secular

areas of concern have

state.

One

is

emerged

the insufficiency of

national, racial, or ethnic identity as a justification for the exis-

tence or function of the state, because national sovereignty alone

demands of a complex political, economic, and military order. Hence the significance of coalitions, alliances, and pacts between and across nations and the is

incapable of coping with the

need for structures

for international arbitration.

precise role that religion plays in

The

other

contemporary life, with

is

the

religious

questions often having ramifications that extend far beyond the jurisdiction of the state.

The

evolution of the secular state from

its

origins in the eigh-

teenth century has followed a path of articulate opposition to

by the fundamental assumption that human

gion, fueled lived in

two

different spheres, the public

public sphere in absolute

is

them

private; that the

superior in will to the private; and that the state

command

is

of the public sphere. This view brings the

state into potential conflict

lead

and the

reli-

life is

may

with persons whose conscience

to decline the authority

of the

state.

The

self-confident

claims of (and for) the state represent in this sense a correspond-

ing downgrading of both the private sphere and the religious structures charged with

its

maintenance.

My thesis in this presentation may be simply stated thus: concede the absolutist claims of the secular

make

challenged the right of religion to It

may be

state,

then

If we

we have

absolute claims for God.

put another way: If you absolutize the secular you must

By proceeding on one front, the other, much in the manner

necessarily relativize the religious.

you must

in fact

proceed against

of the traditional square dance: moving three steps to the anticipates as

many

to the right.

I

need not belabor the point

that the absolutized state incurs a double jeopardy:

instrumental function of authority and infects

152

left

it

all

cripples the

of religious

^Religion, ^Politics,

and T^ational Integration

motivation with hypocrisy. Such a state demands absolute submission from

its

when

citizens; yet

people's temporal interests

preclude that kind of absolute obligation, the goal of national integration

Perhaps ical

is

it

hindered.

could not have been foreseen, but the theory of polit-

sovereignty in

its

developed sense created the atmo-

fully

sphere for the absolutization of political norms. For example, Marsiglio of Padua, a medieval writer

who

straddled the Middle

Ages and early modern Europe, "asserted the primacy of law-making over

all

other expressions of state power; he insisted on

the indivisibility of ultimate legislative authority." 2

Although

Marsiglio did not develop his ideas into a coherent theory of sovereignty,

by stressing the formal right of the

he provided

grist for the mill

of theoreticians.

ments characterize medieval writings about the

the role assigned to reason

first is

second

is

concern for ed

on

the emphasis placed

ruler to

Two

make

laws

important

ele-

political authority:

and natural

law,

political obligation,

and the

with

little

how some forms of political behavior could be acceptobedience.

as alternatives to

en to norms of reason and

The

justice,

ruler

is

assumed

but in

to be behold-

fact the circularity

of

thought involved makes those norms themselves attributes of the

What you give with the right hand you take with the left. There are many reasons why politics and religion are inter-

ruler.

linked, but nothing better illustrates their problematic relation-

ship than the issue of authority. political

We have inherited from medieval

thought a formidable problem of the nature and limits of

political obligation,

of how

tion to the right of the

human beings may give due recognistate to command their loyalty while

retaining the inalienable right to recognize

than God.

How the state can make ultimate claims on our loyalty

and not come into

no higher law than Perhaps one

conflict with

153

human

this

is

to argue that the secular state

reached the limits of its development

that henceforth our task

terms of basic

our ultimate right to recognize

God inflames much of the anxiety today.

way of saying

as presently constituted has

and

no higher authority

is

to define those limits,

rights or the

new

whether in

international order.

£AMIN SANNEH Indeed,

would argue

I

of

reflection

that the current religious ferment

is

a

with religious people determined to

this situation,

demonstrate their version of the limited applicability of political sovereignty. their

The widespread phenomenon of citizens confronting

governments and challenging

private spheres vis-a-vis the

The

policies in

both the public and

shows a remarkable awakening of popular

omnipotent

secular liberal prescription of the activist, welfare state, so

strong in the generation since the end of World

abandoned

in the face

underpinnings for the firmly in place. That state,

War

has been

II,

of disenchantment. Yet the theoretical

state as

fact,

both means and end have remained

plus the extended range of the

has incited a countermovement

Africa

distrust

state.

among

modern

religious groups, in

and elsewhere.

We have assumed that the state is a rational institution and that as

such

it

Beyond

the bounds necessary for rational conduct in society.

sets

we have

that

which justifies

rules

ascribed to the state exclusive authority,

of ethics and morality that obtain their coher-

ence from the rational

state.

But despite such assumptions we find

instances of people resisting the will of the state

preponderant that larly,

will,

the

more implacable the

—and

resistance. Simi-

at least in theory, seriously qualify the sovereign status

power

we have seldom

of the state

we can

scarcely

do otherwise. The

just to organize life

men and women

but to be

secular state it is

form of faith: the henotheist from

faith

the perpe-

claims the

calls

whole enterprise with a new

of national is

loyalty. 3 It

"the

is

a short

shadow of God

by the third step of making obligation and

loyalty matters exclusively of state control.

154

not just

what H. Richard Niebuhr

this to saying that the state in fact

earth," followed

itself

itself it

is

and command the obedience of

itself

"the value-center," consecrating the

on

and

included the idea of curtailing the

of that controversy, for by absolutizing

power not

states.

life

itself.

the innocent victim of religious controversy;

step

of

have spoken of reform and renewal of public

institutions,

trator

more

in the international arena claims for rights are pressed that,

When we

Yet

the