Power Politics in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa in Comparative Perspective [1 ed.] 1527560260, 9781527560260

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Power Politics in Africa

Power Politics in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa in Comparative Perspective Edited by

Olusola Ogunnubi and Samuel Oyewole

Power Politics in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa in Comparative Perspective Edited by Olusola Ogunnubi and Samuel Oyewole This book first published 2020 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2020 by Olusola Ogunnubi, Samuel Oyewole and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-6026-0 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-6026-0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword .................................................................................................. vii Acknowledgements ................................................................................... ix Contributors ................................................................................................ x Chapter One ................................................................................................ 1 Africanism, Power Politics and International Relations in Africa Olusola Ogunnubi and Samuel Oyewole Chapter Two ............................................................................................... 8 Afrocentric Examination of South Africa-Nigeria relations since 1999 Kanego Mokgosi and Kgothatso Shai Chapter Three ........................................................................................... 33 Power and Hegemony (in Africa): An African Perspective Confidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna and Afamefune Patrick Ikem Chapter Four ............................................................................................. 57 Military Capabilities of Regional Powers in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa in Comparative Perspective Samuel Oyewole Chapter Five ............................................................................................. 86 Hegemonic Rivalry in a Peripheral Region: An Assessment of NigeriaSouth Africa’s Role in African Politics John. S Olanrewaju and O. Joseph IseOlorunkanmi Chapter Six ............................................................................................. 109 Soft Power and the State of Nigeria’s Economic Diplomacy Opeyemi Idowu Aluko

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Chapter Seven......................................................................................... 130 Nigeria – South Africa Bilateral Economic Relations: A Comparative Assessment Adesina Abdulfattah Raji Chapter Eight .......................................................................................... 153 Hegemons and Rivals: Assessment of Nigeria’s and South Africa’s Vanguard Role for Peace and Security in ECOWAS and SADC Luqman Saka, Hassan A. Saliu, and Lere Amusan. Chapter Nine........................................................................................... 186 Nigeria-South Africa Diplomatic Relations and the Struggle for Power and Influence in Africa: A View from Nigeria Idowu Johnson Chapter Ten ............................................................................................ 203 Soft Power: Nigeria’s Emerging Strategy in Africa’s Geopolitics Olusola Ogunnubi Chapter Eleven ....................................................................................... 229 Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: A Prognosis of Nigeria-South Africa Relations Michael B. Aleyomi Chapter Twelve ...................................................................................... 254 Concluding Thought: An Afrocentric Perspective on Regionalism, Hegemony and Geopolitics Samuel Oyewole and Olusola Ogunnubi

FOREWORD

The study of African politics and its international relations both within and outside the continent has, since the post-independence era, come under immense scrutiny in terms of its relevance and applicability to the lived experiences of Africans. It is argued, for instance, that over 60 years of postcolonial African university education has not produced African epistemologies that inform research and knowledge creation from its higher education institutions. The curriculum of post-colonial African education still reflects the legacy of colonial education, which was hegemonic and disruptive of African cultural practices, indigenous epistemologies, and ways of knowing and doing. This partly explains why the continent remains at the margins of world affairs given the nexus between knowledge creation and power, and this is where this edited book on power politics in Africa is pertinent and welcomed. The book sought to and effectively engaged the competing existence of Realist power politics and Africanist idealism in Africa’s international relations to provide refreshing insights on African Studies and the field of International Relations and address the epistemological marginalisation of Africa in the field of International Relations. The third objective which the book achieved was to attempt to bridge the theory/praxis gap for African students and emerging scholars of International Relations with rich evidence from mostly Nigeria and South Africa, two dominant regional powers in the continent. Apart from the well-researched and clearly articulated chapters of the book which align well with its stated goals and objectives, its intellectual engagement with and neat tailoring of realism and Africanism to explain Africa’s international relations is compelling. For example, it argues amongst others that although Nigeria and South Africa project hard power that fall within the realm of regional hegemonic prescriptions in spite of internal challenges/weaknesses that subtract from their hegemonic capabilities, they also both act in ways that show an Afrocentric commitment to Africa’s decolonial interests that could be described as idealistic by liberal thinking, but realist by Africanist thought. As the editors put it, “this alternative approach/lens offers a more useful account of the interests, value, and culture of Africans in the explanation and contribution of Africa’s contexts to International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis” (page 279). It foregrounds the clarion call to move the

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analysis of the geopolitics in Africa beyond the realist notions of power politics and into more empirically rewarding aspects of global/regional governance, security, integration, and cooperation among regional powers in the world. Impliedly, a shared hegemonic posture exists in Africa secured with the joint participation of both Nigeria and South Africa where they both project their hard and soft power resources in the common interest of Africa. Yet another compelling contribution this edited book makes is its incisive analysis of the geopolitical implications of its findings on the foreign policy behaviors of both Nigeria and South Africa for hegemonic contention in Africa, and its significance for future studies on the subject. Amongst others, it contends that the military and economic dimensions of power politics require further scrutiny in the study of International Relations in Africa. Also, underscoring the utility of soft power for the mutual benefits of African states, the book suggests that “future studies need to examine the nexus between soft power and regional governance in Africa to see how its deployment could help to facilitate developmental issues of the African region while also promoting the influence and status of a state in its possession” (page 282). Read together, the thirteen chapters in this book form a good compendium of readings which contextualise key international relations subjects in realworld students and scholars in Africa can relate to, and for this, the editors and contributors deserve commendation. I thus have no reservation in commending the book to everyone who truly thirsts to know and have more nuanced knowledge of Africa’s international relations by Africans and for Africa. Prof Christopher Isike Professor of African Politics and International Relations University of Pretoria South Africa

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors of this book would like to thank all the authors in this volume for their scholarly contribution and patience in ensuring the final publication of the book. We would equally like to acknowledge the reviewers who offered their generous assistance to ensure a better quality of the manuscript. Our thanks also go to Laurence Fenton, Barbara Dupont and Funmilayo Gaji who provided painstaking proof editing at different stages of the manuscript preparation. We also thank Prof Christopher Isike for writing the Foreword after reading through the entire manuscript and providing valuable comments that greatly assisted the review process. We would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the University of the Free State and the National Research Foundation, South Africa. We equally appreciate the cooperation of Adam Rummens and his Cambridge Scholars Publishing team in making the publication of this book a reality. The support of our families and friends is also appreciated.

CONTRIBUTORS

Aleyomi, Michael B. had his Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) and Master of Science (M.Sc.) degrees in Political Science from the University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia. He is currently a senior lecturer and Head, Department of Political Science, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria. He is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) and the Nigerian Institute of Management (NIM). Aleyomi’s research interest covers Comparative Politics, Psephology, International Relations (Diplomacy and Image Building), and Environmental Politics. His research works have been published and presented locally and internationally. Aluko, Opeyemi is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Ajayi Crowther University, Oyo, Nigeria. He specialises on Comparative Politics, peace and conflict studies, election, judiciary and foreign policy among others. His research works have appeared in many local and international outlets. Amusan, Lere is a Professor of International Relations and Head, Department of Political Studies and International Relations, North West University, South Africa. He specialises in foreign policy analysis, food politics and policies, and development studies. He is a member of BRICS Think Tank, Nigeria Political Science Association, South African Association of Public Administration and Management, Nigerian Society of International Affairs, and International Political Science Association. He has published and presented about hundred research works globally. He is currently working on two book projects that focus on food and gender development in Africa. Hassan A. Saliu, Ph.D. is a Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He was a former Head of Department and former Dean of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Ilorin. He is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Association and the current Deputy National President of the Association. He has published numerous articles and books especially in the area of Nigerian Foreign Policy. His works have appeared in reputable international journal outlets, including The Roundtable-Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs;

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South African Journal of International Affairs; and International Peacekeeping among others. Idowu Johnson received his B.Sc, M.Sc and Ph.D degrees in Political Science at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He is currently a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, specializing in International Relations. His research interests cover Foreign Policy, African Politics, Peace and Conflict Resolution, Identity Politics, Strategic and Development Studies. He is the author of Diplomacy, Conflicts, Bargaining and Peacebuilding in International Relations (Gratia Associates International Press, 2015). He has chapter contributions in Africa After Fifty Years: Retrospections and Reflections (Africa World Press, New Jessey, 2013), Nationalities, Identities and Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience (John Archers, 2013) and Global Peace Leadership Summit 2007: Africa and the Diaspora (Theological Seminary Press, USA, 2008). He also has Journal Publications both at national and international levels. He is an honorary Research Fellow at the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA), University of Ibadan; Member of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), Nigerian Society for International Affairs (NSIA) and Society for Peace Studies and Practice (SPSP). Ikem, Afamefune Patrick is a graduate of Political/Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, where he earned BSc and MSc in International Relations. He is presently pursuing a PhD in International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His research interest revolves around religious fundamentalism, diplomacy, and international security. His research works have been published and presented locally and internationally. Joseph O. IseOlorunkanmi is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Omu-Aran. He obtained his PhD degree from the Department of Political Science, University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, South Africa. His areas of interest include: Peace and conflict studies, International Relations and Comparative Politics. Mokgosi, Kanego. was a Masters candidate in International Politics at the University of Limpopo. Ogbonna, Confidence Nwachinemere is a doctoral candidate, department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He specializes on Comparative Politics, with more research focus on Power (soft power),

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Hegemony, Terrorism, Pentecostalism, Democratic Consolidation, among others. Ogunnubi, Olusola is a Research Fellow with the University of the Free State, South Africa and a Visiting Scholar at Carleton University, Canada. He was recently appointed as Associate Professor at Covenant University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. His research interest is mainly concerned with the power dynamics of Africa’s regional hegemons. His current research focuses on the intersection between religion, foreign policy, and the state with specific attention to Nigeria’s religious soft power. Olanrewaju John Shola obtained BSc and MSc Political Science from the University of Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria. He recently completed his PhD at the Kwara State University, Molete, Nigeria. He teaches Political Science and International Relations at Landmark University, Omu-aran, Kwara State, Nigeria. His research work has appeared in different local and international journals. His recent articles were published in the Romanian Journal of Political Science and Springer. His major area of interest is Peace and Conflict Studies. Oyewole, Samuel is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria, and a PhD candidate in North West University, South Africa. His research interests cover African affairs, military and strategic studies, crisis management, and political economy of developing societies. His articles have appeared in many journals, including Astropolitics, Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs, African Security Review, African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, Defense and Security Analysis, Defence Studies, Journal of Asian and African Studies, New Zealand International Review, Politikon, Politeia, South African Journal of International Affairs, Strategic Analysis, and Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Raji, Adesina Abdulfattah, teaches political science at the Fountain University, Osogbo, Osun State, Nigeria. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. He has written several books on wide-ranging of subjects, including International Relations, Human Rights, Middle East Politics, African Political History, African Economic History and Islamic Political Thought. While his articles have been published in several local and international journals, he has also contributed chapters to several books.

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Saka, Luqman PhD., is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He has his first and second degree in Political Science at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and his doctoral degree in International Studies at the Universiti Utara Malaysia (the Northern University of Malaysia). He is an alumnus of the America Political Science Association APSA, Africa Fellows Programme, 2013; the Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, 2011, and CODESRIA Governance Institute, 2007. He is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA). Dr. Saka’s published works have appeared in the Journal of Developing Areas, Journal of Administrative Sciences, Africa Security Review, and Hemispheres: Studies on Culture and Societies among other outlets. Shai, Kgothatso is an Associate Professor and Head of Department of Cultural and Political Studies at the University of Limpopo.

CHAPTER ONE AFRICANISM, POWER POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN AFRICA OLUSOLA OGUNNUBI AND SAMUEL OYEWOLE

Africanism vs. Power Politics in International Relations Africa – and sub-Saharan Africa specifically – has been largely marginalised in knowledge production on International Relations. Among other things, traditional theoretical establishments such as realism and its power politics offshoot can be blamed. Realists generally assume that the state is a unitary actor, and the most important unit of analysis, in the international system. Despite decades of self-governance, most African states still fall short of the quality that is required of a state in realist conception. They are mostly pluralistic, with several subnational ethnocentric actors that are competing with the state and its capacity to act as a unitary and important actor in international relations. In this way, the ability of big African states, such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Nigeria, to act decisively and “rationally” in the realist sense, or bring their power potentials to bear in the international system, has been affected by internal crises. Accordingly, many studies that intended to provide or promote an African agenda or experience in international relations have ended up bypassing realism for other theoretical frameworks that allow them to focus more on sub-national actors in local and regional political dynamics than nation-state actors in regional or global political dynamics (Clapham, 1996; Cornelissen et al., 2015). Constructivism and critical theories, such as Marxism, dependency school, feminism, and green theory, as well as pluralism and localised democratic peace theory, have gained more adherence in African international relations than realism. Conflicts in Africa are more subnational than national, intrastate than inter-state, and unconventional than conventional. Hence, they are better explained as by-products of poverty, inequality, unemployment,

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ethnic rivalry, state-failure, and environmental crises, among other things that fall outside the power politics framework. The attention of students of international relations is therefore widely spread and scattered from local to state, regional, and global levels as well as across multiple subjects of concern, including politics, economics, and socio-cultural issues, among others. Amidst these concerns, the importance of power politics among nations has been largely de-emphasised in studies on regionalism and regional dynamics in the continent. This is largely responsible for the limit of African experiences and perspectives that are available to students of international relations, with emphasis on realism and power politics, in the region. For African students that still care about realism and power politics among nations, the field of International Relations is nothing more than intellectual imperialism (Ake, 1982; Cornelissen et al., 2015), where they mainly learn about Europe, America, the Soviet Union/Russia, and, recently, China. Neorealists, who are interested in the structural arrangement of states according to their powers, encouraged students of international relations to pay more attention to powerful states that are the central determinants of order and disorder in the system. As Waltz (1979) observed, structures are defined not by all the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones. In this case, African states are rarely seen as any of such major powers, perhaps until recently. The decline and eventual collapse of globalised superpower politics has, however, raised the importance of regional powers and their politics to a global level since the end of the Cold War (Amusan and Oyewole, 2017; Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Nolte, 2010). In view of these developments, African students can now learn, unlearn, and relearn some of the past and currently unfolding experiences of the continent and associated realism and power politics undertone. In this case, the proper place of regional powers such as Nigeria and South Africa and their interactions in the power politics framework continue to beg for attention (Adebajo, 2006; 2010; 2017; Mazuri, 2006; Scholvin, 2016). The “A, B, C” of power politics entails the assumption that power and influence are important determinants of states’ behaviour in international relations. Power is the ability to control, change, or influence the course of action of others, sometimes against their will (Kegley and Raymond, 2010). It can assume a hard and soft dimension in international politics. Hard power involves the wielding of “carrot” and “stick”, while soft power involves the appeal of one’s ideas or the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preference of others (Nye and Welch, 2013). Power politics is an approach to the practice and understanding of relations among states that is

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rooted in realism. As a practice, power politics involves defining the national interest of a state as rationally as possible, as well as devising and deploying appropriate means to defend it in the international arena. The power politics approach explains the international system as an arena where states are self-centred, as they engage each other in competition for power, influence, scarce resources, and survival. Security is the principal interest of a state, which it always seeks in competition, conflict, and cooperation (Booth, 2011; Waltz, 1979). Students and scholars of power politics in Africa are bound to confront the reality of what realists considered as idealism in their studies of the continent. It is important to note that African studies are largely critical of established approaches, such as power politics and its relevance to understanding International Relations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. This framework of analysis is sometimes considered as un-African, uncritical, Eurocentric, imperialistic, and irrelevant. The field of International Relations in sub-Saharan Africa is mostly dominated by an Afrocentric perspective, which pays more attention to the subject and spirit of panAfricanism with its attendant elements such as equality, justice, egalitarianism, solidarity, brotherhood, collectivism, consensus, cooperation, regionalism, and integration. Beyond the interests of African states, the available, devised, and deployed means and capabilities to defend them in the international arena have continued to beg for research attention. Besides, the relevance of regional hegemonic powers and the associated quest, stability, competition, and resistance are sometimes underestimated in Africa. Accordingly, an enquiry into the enduring realism of power politics amidst Africanist idealism is likely to provide refreshing insights into African Studies and the field of International Relations. Against this background, this volume is interested in the subject of power politics and Africanism. The objective is to examine the vested interests of African regional powers and their capabilities to defend them as well as the means available, devised, and deployed to achieve these ends in the international arena. The book seeks to provide a theoretical background that can conveniently accommodate major powers in Africa, but with most emphasis on Nigeria and South Africa. The objective of this book is to contribute to the experience of African states in the field of International Relations, with an emphasis on power capability and politics. This is significant in the light of the growing calls to raise African perspectives to a fountain of hope, and reduce the intellectual marginalisation of the continent in this field. It is also essential to contribute to the growing efforts to bridge the disconnection of African students and the field of study.

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Essentially, the volume aims to introduce students to the subject matter by bridging theoretical understanding and evidence from African experiences.

Contributions in this Volume Beyond this introduction, this volume contains a rich collection of essays on African experiences and perspectives on power politics and International Relations generally, with most emphasis on Nigeria and South Africa. In Chapter Two, Kanego Mokgosi and Kgothatso Shai employ an Afrocentric perspective and discourse analysis to scrutinise South Africa-Nigeria relations since 1999, and observe that these countries did not live up to their shared commitment to Afrocentric causes in international relations. Despite their mutual efforts to address security challenges in Africa, the obvious competition for power and influence between the two countries came in contrast to the Africanist expectation of a vision of international affairs dominated by brotherhood and cooperation. In Chapter Three, Ogbonna Confidence Nwachinemere and Ikem Afamefune Patrick interrogate the concepts of power and hegemony in global and regional contexts, and also find the nexus between this understanding and the claimed status of Nigeria and South Africa in Africa. As such, the hegemonic credentials of these countries are made evident with the seeming unwillingness of the West to intervene in conflicts within the continent, and the resultant frequent calls for African solutions to African problems. Amidst a series of armed conflicts and demand for regional conflict resolution mechanisms, South Africa and Nigeria have become bright shining lights in Africa. In Chapter Four, Samuel Oyewole examines the enduring relevance of the military dimension of power and associated security in International Relations, and even in Africa, where the growing advocacy for human security constitutes a challenge to this position. On this basis, the contribution assesses the military capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa in comparative perspective with other regional military powers in Africa and some of the associated geopolitical and strategic dynamics. Using both realist and Africanist rationalism, it becomes evident from this assessment that the military capabilities of these two regional powers are not suitable for reckless power projections, although they offer enough latitude for responsible military power projection in their respective spheres of influence and beyond. It is, therefore, important to put public opinion formation, policy advocacy, politics, policymaking, and strategic planning in the right perspectives on the subject matter.

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In Chapter Five, Olanrewaju John and Ise Olorunkanmi Joseph interrogate the leadership roles of Nigeria and South Africa in a peripheral region of Africa. It is observed that Nigeria’s claim as the giant of Africa has become more contested with the growing importance of other countries in the continent, and particularly South Africa in the post-apartheid era. Despite the realist orientation of the contribution, an Africanist current is evident in the final analysis, with its desire for concerted efforts between Nigeria and South Africa in addressing socio-economic challenges in the continent. In Chapter Six, Opeyemi Idowu Aluko looks into the strategic importance of economic diplomacy in international relations, most notably its relevance as a currency for soft power, and how Nigeria’s engagements in Africa can be assessed using this framework. In connection to these, Raji Adesina Abdulfattah examines the nature of bilateral economic relations between Nigeria and South Africa in Chapter Seven. It is observed that both countries have the potential and onerous responsibility to lead the continent, from poverty to the path of socio-economic development, through shared experiences and joint regional actions that can facilitate and guarantee better collaborations and encourage other African states to support one another for progress. In Chapter Eight, Luqman Saka, Lere Amusan, and Hassan A. Saliu examine the leading roles of Nigeria and South Africa in promoting stability and security in Africa and how they are relevant to understanding the power tussle between the two ‘giants’ in the continent. This entails accounts of Nigeria’s leading contributions to United Nations (UN) peace missions, African Union (AU) peace processes, and the Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), as well as how postapartheid South Africa has switched from an aggressive posture against its neighbours to a vanguard of peace and stability in the immediate region and the continent at large. In Chapter Nine, Idowu Johnson utilises hegemonic power stability as a theoretical guide to examine Nigeria-South Africa diplomatic relations within the framework of their struggle for power and influence in Africa. Besides the well-known spheres of influence of these countries in West and Southern Africa respectively, this chapter draws a contrasting scenario of South Africa with impressive soft power projection that cannot alone drive the hegemonic project and Nigeria with an impressive military power projection that is not enough to consolidate its hegemonic power and influence.

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In Chapter Ten, Olusola Ogunnubi examines the soft power capacity and potentials of Nigeria, with most emphasis on its movie industry (Nollywood), international mega-churches, and contribution to literature, most especially in Africa. The analysis probes the extent to which Nigeria has developed the aforementioned “soft powered” sources and potentials as a geopolitical strategy within Africa. Notwithstanding a series of domestic constraints, Nigeria is observed to possess the potential to enhance its regional power capabilities and play a more strategic international role than its traditional state capacity allows for through a carefully articulated soft power strategy. In Chapter Eleven, Michael B. Aleyomi advocates more policy attention for soft power resources, most especially public diplomacy in sustaining the regional power status of Nigeria and South Africa in the continent and to earn global respect and project African interests internationally. This position is premised on the notion that possession of material capabilities without a legitimate and diplomatic means of “appealing” to other states is not enough in the pursuit of hegemonic status or achieving some other strategic national or regional interest in international affairs. It is against this background that Chapter Twelve concludes this volume with a special focus on an admixture of soft and hard powers (smart power potentials and capabilities) of regional powers in Africa.

References Adebajo, A. 2006. Prophets of Africa’s Renaissance: Nigeria and South Africa as Regional Hegemons. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Adebajo, A. 2010. The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Adebajo, A. 2017. The Eagle and the Springbok: Essay on Nigeria and South Africa. Johannesburg: Fenele. Ake, C. 1982. Social Science as Imperialism: The Theory of Political Development. 2nd ed. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Amusan, L. and Oyewole, S. 2017. The Quest for Hegemony and the Future of African Solution to African Development Problems: Lessons from Headways in African Security Sector. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 52(1), 21-33. Booth, K. ed. 2011. Realism and World Politics. New York: Routledge. Buzan, B and Wæver, O. 2003. Regions and powers: The structure of international security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Clapham, C. 1996. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cornelissen, S., Cheru, F., and Shaw, T.M. 2015. Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan. Mazuri, A. 2006. A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa as Contrasting Vision. Adonis and Abbey. Nolte, D. 2010. How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics. Review of International Studies, 36, 881-901. Nye, J.S. and Welch, D.A. 2013. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. 9th ed. Boston: Pearson. Scholvin, S. 2016. The Geopolitics of Regional Power: Geography, Economics and Politics in South Africa. Ashgate. Waltz, K.N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill.

CHAPTER TWO AFROCENTRIC EXAMINATION OF SOUTH AFRICA-NIGERIA RELATIONS SINCE 1999 KANEGO MOKGOSI AND KGOTHATSO SHAI

Abstract Based on the blend of Afrocentric theory and discourse analysis, this chapter seeks to examine the relations between South Africa and Nigeria since the year 1999. It is argued that post-1999 relations between South Africa and Nigeria can best be understood when located within the historical and Africa context. A closer scrutiny of the multi-faceted relations between the two countries during the period under review reflects that they have not always been smooth. One can observe many cases where both Nigeria and South Africa did not live up to their shared commitment to the Afrocentric cause in international relations. Some of these cases are apparently underscored by competition for power and influence by the two countries, in contrast to Africanist expectations of cooperation. Regardless of this, the mutual effort by both countries to address security challenges in Africa is an undeniable fact. Keywords: Afrocentricity; Nigeria; Relations; South Africa; Foreign Policy

Introduction The nature of South Africa-Nigeria relations is a subject of debate and interest in policy as well as in academic circles. There is no gainsaying that these debates are impelled by the fact that South Africa and Nigeria remain, by far, the most powerful states in Africa in terms of their economic, military, and political position (Alden and Schoeman, 2003; Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003; Adebajo, 2007; Chidozie, 2014). With a population of over 190 million people, Nigeria is not only the most populated country but also the largest economy in Africa in terms of Gross Domestic Product

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(GDP). Though South Africa had generally enjoyed the position of Africa’s largest economy, the rebasing of the Nigerian economy in 2014 resulted in Nigeria surpassing it as the continent’s largest economy. (This was a decade earlier than initially forecasted by the World Bank.) Nigeria’s GDP now sits at $405.4 billion against South Africa’s $294.9 billion. In terms of natural resources, Nigeria is heavily endowed, amongst others, with natural gas and oil, which are the mainstays of its economy (Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, 2016). South Africa, on the other hand, with a population of over 55 million people, is the second-largest economy in Africa in terms of its GDP (Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, 2016). Although South Africa’s economy is growing at a pedestrian pace, it is considered the most diversified and technologically advanced economy in Africa. Nigeria thus lags far behind South Africa in this area (Chidozie, 2014). In terms of natural resources, South Africa is endowed with minerals such as gold, platinum, diamonds, manganese, and iron ore (Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, 2016). Hence, even though Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa, its economy does not come close to South Africa’s in terms of technological advancement, infrastructural development, and diversity. Bilateral trade relations between South Africa and Nigeria have exponentially increased since the advent of democracy in South Africa during the year 1994 (Obi, 2015). These trade relations are dominated by South Africa’s crude oil imports from Nigeria (Chidozie, 2014). However, the jury is still out on whether these trade relations are skewed in favour of South Africa or Nigeria. Some scholars (such as Adebajo and Paterson, 2012 and Obi, 2015) believe these relations are skewed in favour of South Africa. Whilst others (Qobo, 2014 and Cameron, 2014, quoted by Chidozie, 2014) believe these relations are skewed in favour of Nigeria. They agree that Nigeria imports many diverse products from South Africa, but the volume of crude oil imported by South Africa from Nigeria is huge and therefore tilts these relations in favour of Nigeria. Currently, there are a lot of South African businesses operating in Nigeria. For instance, Obi (2015) states that over 100 South African corporations such as MTN, Multichoice (DSTV), Shoprite, PEP, Nando’s, and Tiger Brands, amongst others, are operating in Nigeria. However, major Nigerian corporations (such as Oando PLC and Dangote Cement PLC) are in South Africa (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012; Mokgosi, 2018). However, there are many Nigerians in South Africa operating in the informal economic sector in South Africa (Akintola and Akintola, 2015). Furthermore, virtually all

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South African universities in South Africa employ Nigerian intellectuals across all fields of study (Muhwava and Chiroro, 2014). A report by Statistics South Africa (2017) on migration and tourism places the number of Nigerians travelling to South Africa as higher than the rest of the African continent outside the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. The number is also equally high for South Africans travelling to and doing business in Nigeria (Games, 2013). Militarily, South Africa and Nigeria have contributed immensely towards Africa’s peacekeeping missions (Tetenyi, 2014; Firsing, 2014; Vines, 2010). Despite having disagreements, they have always acted in concert to mitigate Africa’s security challenges (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012). Politically, they have been at the forefront of mediating conflicts in Africa and championing the cause of the continent in multilateral fora (Landsberg, 2012; Obasanjo, 2016; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). In tandem, both countries have placed as central pillars of their foreign policies, the primacy of the African continent (Khadiagala and Lyons, 2001). South Africa’s white paper on foreign policy spells out Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity as pivotal principles for the country’s international engagements (White Paper, 2011). Chapter 2, Section 19 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution stresses the promotion of African integration and support for African unity (Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution). Despite the commonalities and the destinies they both share towards Africa’s peace, security, and development, South African and Nigerian diplomatic relations have been afflicted by repeated incidences of competition and bitter rivalry. It is on this premise that scholars such as Landsberg (2012) have called for a detente in South Africa-Nigeria relations if the two countries are to realise their important and inescapable obligations of contributing qualitatively towards peace, security, and development in Africa. It is against this background that this chapter employs Afrocentricity as a theoretical conduit for examining South Africa-Nigeria relations since 1999. The year 1999 is used as a starting point in this study because of its historical significance in both countries. It was in the year 1999 that Thabo Mbeki was elected as the second president of democratic South Africa following the electoral victory of his political party, the African National Congress (ANC). The year 1999 has also served as a watershed moment in Nigeria as it signalled the country’s return to civilian rule under Olusegun Obasanjo. Both Mbeki and Obasanjo were self-confessed pioneers of panAfricanism and the African Renaissance, and their terms of office heralded

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strengthened relations between South Africa and Nigeria. It is important to note that, except for a mere mentioning of South Africa and Nigeria’s foreign policies as Afrocentric (Obi, 2015; Le Pere, 2017; Egedo, 1987), there has not been an attempt to measure these against attributes that make up an Afrocentric foreign policy. This chapter, therefore, attempts to do this by drawing on such Afrocentric attributes as the historical liberation struggle solidarity amongst African states, personal acquaintances between leaders, attitudes of senior government officials, constructive engagement, humility and treatment of others as equals (Ubuntu), as well as the practice of drawing from commonalities with African states in order to advance relations. Due to the pervasive nature of Eurocentrism in international relations, this chapter attempts to push further theoretical debates about the inclusion of non-western theories in the field of International Relations and other cognate disciplines. In the final analysis, the Afrocentric experiences and conduct of South Africa-Nigeria relations, though defying the understanding of mainstream International Relations theories, can be used to account for Africa’s contribution to international relations theory and/or foreign policy analysis.

Conceptualising and Contextualising Afrocentricity Over the years, the discipline of International Relations has always been dominated by the three mainstream theories of realism, liberalism, and Marxism. This dominance has generally shaped the modalities of analysis in International Relations. In turn, the perspectives which are rooted within a Eurocentric worldview have also altered the content and direction of intraAfrican relations in such a way that continues to benefit the Western powers. However, there is a case for the inclusion of other theories in International Relations. It is in this context that Afrocentricity, as articulated by Asante (2003), is presented in this chapter as a theoretical lens for unpacking the relations between post-apartheid South Africa and Nigeria. The foregoing assertion does not in any way suggest that South Africa and Nigeria did not have relations during the apartheid era. Contextually, Asante (2003) defined “Afrocentricity as a mode of thought and action in which the centrality of African interests, values and perspectives predominate.” This simply means that in the study of African phenomena, there should be a predomination of African interests, values, and culture. It is, therefore, an undeniable fact that Africans cannot be properly studied outside of their interests, values, and culture.

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Afrocentricity has become one of the emerging theoretical paradigms in the study of African affairs. Asante (2003) asserted that Afrocentricity values the importance of other opinions. Hence, it also draws from the progressive ideas of Asia-centred, America-centred and even Eurocentric perspectives in its non-hegemonic form (Oyebade, 1990). It is important to note that Afrocentricity as an emerging school of thought in International Relations is not intended at displacing the Western worldviews in the study of African international relations but to complement them (Oyebade, 1990). The application of Afrocentricity in this work should be understood within the context of the decolonial African scholars’ quest for epistemic justice. In this context, this chapter contributes to the broader cause of unmuting Afrocentric theories, philosophies, and ideas in the midst of the false universal applicability of their Western counterparts. At the same time, Afrocentricity should not be viewed as an ersatz version of a dominant Western worldview, since it is a crucial paradigm armed with handles to apprehend Africa’s international relations. Essentially, the emergence and use of Afrocentricity is intended to rescue Africa and Africans from totally succumbing to the tyranny of Western worldviews. As Mazama (2001) argued, some of the problems of African people lie in the unconscious adoption of the Western worldview and perspective and their attendant conceptual frameworks. However, this Western worldview (traditional international relations theories), as argued by Dunn and Shaw (2001), is inadequate in helping us understand African international relations. Some of the other problems that arise with these theories are not only that they have been overhashed, but that they are also inadequate in terms of totally apprehending the nature of Africa’s international relations and foreign policy discourse and praxis (Lushaba, 2005). Hence, their uncritical adoption raises fundamental challenges since they are inadequate in helping us understand the nature of Africa’s international relations wholly and, by extension, its foreign policy discourse (Mazama, Dunn, and Shaw, 2011). Nevertheless, all is not lost since there has been great scholarly activities directed towards accounting for Africa’s contribution to international relations (Shai, Molapo and Sodi, 2017; Moloi, 2016; Tieku, 2013). Though these theories may not be readily accepted as theories of international relations given the Euro-American centredness of the discipline, they are, however, very useful in accounting and making up for what accepted and dominant international relations theories lack. Moreover, as Moloi (2016) argued that it is only the proliferation and spillover of Afrocentric contribution to scholarship that would allow Afrocentricity to claim its place

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as an International Relations theory, this work is an attempt to proliferate and expose Afrocentricity to International Relations. South Africa has succeeded in conceptualising and implementing a foreign policy that is entirely Afrocentric. Its White Paper (2011) on foreign policy, titled “Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu”, is premised upon the African value system of Ubuntu (humanity). It builds strongly on the value-laden and longstanding South African cultural precept that states that none of us can be fully human if we do not depend on the humanity of the next person (White Paper, 2011: 4). Ubuntu is embedded in the African culture and is an important instrument of building relations on the basis of treating people with dignity and respect. Apart from underscoring the need for South Africa to play a role in championing human rights and reconciliation (an effort at humanising) - the diplomacy of Ubuntu enjoins South Africa to relate with other states as equals and to act at all material times as part of the collective and not as an individual. It is, therefore, telling that the White Paper further stresses Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity as longstanding principles that guide South Africa’s international affairs (White Paper, 2011). There can be no denying the fact that the solidarity imperative is an immanent feature of African diplomacy. Solidarity in this regard also takes into account the liberation struggle solidarity. It is against this understanding that the solidarity imperative was prevalent in South Africa-Nigeria relations, especially during the presidencies of Mbeki and Obasanjo in South Africa and Nigeria, respectively. Coursing through the veins of both countries’ foreign policies, was the need to assert Africa’s position in international affairs as well as to seek a place for Africa in multilateral forums, as evidenced by Africa-owned initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as well as the push for the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Adebajo, 2007; Landsberg and Kondlo, 2007). Further, Africans have always sought to take charge in terms of advancing their own interests without external tutelage. The coinage of the maxim of “African Solutions to African Problems” is an important injunction that calls on African agency in resolving African problems. It is also a clarion call for Africans to assert themselves in international relations, as champions of their own destiny and not spectators in the quest to resolve African problems. It is meant to engender notions of self-dependence in African politics, and South Africa and Nigeria as leading African Union (AU) member states have been instrumental in that (Nathan, 2013). As Mazama (2001) avers, Afrocentricity displaces over-reliance on European

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ways of thinking, being, feeling, and so forth, and replaces them with ways that are germane to African cultural experiences. More importantly, since the idea of African solutions to African problems is an example of “quiet diplomacy” (Landsberg, 2012), a deduction can be made therefore that “quiet diplomacy” is an apt example of African diplomacy. Graham (2016) listed six characteristics embedded in “quiet diplomacy”. Largely, these characteristics generally apply to African and/or Afrocentric diplomacy. 1. Personal or direct diplomacy between heads of state or government or senior officials; 2. Little (or no) media involvement; 3. The appearance of limited action or even inaction; 4. Calm and tactful but persistent negotiation or dialogue in a nonthreatening atmosphere; 5. Constructive engagement with the target country in an effort to help solve the problems as quietly as possible; 6. Can be carried out in the context of bilateral or multilateral efforts. Three more characteristics can be added to those provided by Graham. 1. Solidarity that draws on the liberation struggle history; 2. Pan-African solidarity; 3. Interaction with other African states as equals. All these are important characteristics to an Afrocentric examination of South Africa-Nigeria relations. It is against these characteristics that South Africa-Nigeria relations are examined. Afrocentricity provides a novel experience in understanding the South Africa-Nigeria relations since most studies in this subject are based on Eurocentric paradigms, which do not fully explain African international affairs and, by extension, African foreign policies. Hence, the use of Afrocentric characteristics to examine South Africa-Nigeria relations from an African traditional foreign policy-making perspective as well as other central Afrocentric tenets.

Historical Context of South Africa-Nigeria Relations An Afrocentric examination of South Africa-Nigeria relations cannot be fully undertaken outside of a cursory engagement with the historical dynamics

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that have underpinned both countries’ relations. As it shall be seen, these historical dynamics are very important in terms of situating an Afrocentric examination of South Africa-Nigeria relations in a contemporary locus. As argued by Shai, Molapo, and Sodi (2017), to understand the past and future it is important to draw on history. Adebajo (2010) interestingly concurs when he asserts that “in order to understand contemporary events and for a better future one must inevitably understand the past”. It is to this history that South Africa and Nigeria look to inform the trajectory of their relations. Of particular importance in the history of South Africa-Nigeria relations is the contribution made by Nigeria towards the liberation of South Africa. Nigeria was amongst the first batch of African states to gain independence in 1960 (Ogunnubi, 2013). African countries that gained their independence at the earliest stage were seized with the immediate responsibility of championing the cause of liberation for the rest of the African countries that were still under colonial rule, over and above their domestic responsibilities of internal peace, security, development, stability, and unity (Shai, 2016). It goes without saying that at the occasion of Nigeria’s independence, South Africa was under the ignominious apartheid rule. Egedo (1987) noted that due to the size of its population, economy, and military capacity, Nigeria was therefore expected to play a leadership role in Africa during its independence. To this end, the independence of Nigeria dovetailed with three major historical developments in South Africa’s political milieu. First, the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 in which unarmed black protestors were brutally murdered by the apartheid regime (Chidozie, 2014; Ogunnubi, 2013). This massacre served to dramatise and expose the brutality of the apartheid regime to the wider international community. Secondly, in the 1960s, the liberation movements in South Africa had started calling into question the effectiveness of the non-violent struggle against apartheid. This led to the adoption of the military approach to the apartheid question. To this end, military wings of liberation movements (i.e. the ANC) in South Africa looked to newly independent African states like Nigeria and others for military training and access to weaponry in order to wage a liberation war (Simpson, 2016). All these brought greater impetus and agency to the fight against apartheid. Thirdly, liberation movements, such as the ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA and now SACP) were banned. These liberation movements found refuge in other African states and set out to galvanise international solidarity and support

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against apartheid (Mandela, 1994). This led to the declaration of apartheid as a crime against humanity in 1973 by the United Nations General Assembly (GA Res 3068 (XXVIII), 30 November 1973). In addition, Nigeria and other African countries were instrumental in voting for the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations. As Egedo (1987) avers, despite internal contradictions that have seen Nigeria hopping from one military regime to another, Nigeria’s commitment to the liberation of South Africa cannot be questioned. According to Egedo, this commitment gained even more traction in the 1970s during MurtalaObasanjo’s regime. Hence, it was as a result of the strategic importance of Nigeria towards South Africa’s liberation that the ANC moved to establish its representative office in Nigeria (Gevisser, 2007; Egedo, 1987; Adebajo, 2007). Nigeria further played a pivotal role in the UN’s anti-apartheid Eminent Persons Group. Overall, as Chidozie (2014) argues, Nigeria’s foreign policy towards South Africa during the occasion of its independence and after was driven by its hatred of apartheid and the need for its total abolition. It was therefore unsurprising when, despite its avowed human rights-based foreign policy under the iconic leadership of Nelson Mandela, South Africa established formal diplomatic relations with Nigeria in 1994 – notwithstanding the fact that Nigeria was under the military dictatorship of Sani Abacha. These overtures from South Africa should be understood as a token of appreciation for the role played by Nigeria towards the putative liberation of South Africa from apartheid (Khadiagala and Nganje, 2016). It is against this background that, when called upon to help resolve what became characteristically known as the Ogoni nine debacle (the arrest and execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his fellow anti-oil activists), South Africa elected to use “quiet diplomacy” (Mail and Guardian, 1995; Shai, 2010). Quiet diplomacy, as argued by Landsberg, is an example of African solutions to African problems. Landsberg further notes that this notion of African solutions to African problems is meant to ensure that Africans are afforded the responsibility to solve their own problems without being dictated to by external forces (Landsberg, 2016). It is not hard to understand that South Africa was still inexperienced during the Ogoni nine debacle in the machinations of African diplomacy. To this end, Adebajo (2007) noted that it was through the Ogoni nine debacle that South Africa was to learn the “dismaying intricacies of African diplomacy”. Truly, diplomatic practice in Africa was not so simplistic, and the Ogoni

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nine debacle was a rude awakening to South Africa’s foray into African diplomacy. To that extent, when Mandela thought that South Africa had successfully negotiated for clemency for the Ogoni nine, the Nigerian military regime went ahead and executed them (Adebajo, 2016). Thus, Mandela was left humiliated since the Commonwealth nations had put their hopes on South Africa to resolve the situation (Nene, 2016). Feeling dejected, Mandela canvassed for the isolation of Nigeria in the Commonwealth and even pushed for its ostracisation by the SADC countries (Adebajo, 2007). Such a move did not receive support from either the Commonwealth of Nations or the SADC countries. The Nigerian military regime, on the other hand, did not take kindly to South Africa’s actions and retaliated by withdrawing its national football team from participating in the Africa Cup of Nations tournament in South Africa in 1996 (Adebajo, 2010). Apart from the retaliation by the Nigerian government, Mandela failed to successfully rally African states behind his call to isolate Nigeria (Adebajo, 2007). This was a painful lesson for Mandela, for he was still inexperienced in the conduct of diplomacy in Africa (Adebajo, 2007). It was after this debacle that Mbeki took charge of the South African foreign policy machinery and indelibly imprinted it with an Afrocentric streak. Mbeki’s experience as a representative of the ANC in Nigeria would come in handy in this regard (Gevisser, 2007).

Situating and Dynamising Nigeria-South Africa Relations from 1999 to 2008 The year 1999 represented a significant and historical watershed moment for South Africa-Nigeria relations. Emphatically, the respective elections of Mbeki as president of South Africa and Obasanjo as president of Nigeria in that year heralded a new dawn for South Africa-Nigeria relations (Adebajo, 2007; Landsberg, 2012). It should be noted that during apartheid, Mbeki served as a representative of the newly established office of the ANC in Nigeria in 1977 when Obasanjo was a military ruler of Nigeria (Gevisser, 2007; Egedo, 1987). As such, Mbeki had intimate knowledge of the strategic role played by Nigeria towards South Africa’s liberation and its importance in Africa. Moreover, by virtue of having stayed in Nigeria, Mbeki understood the political landscape and dynamics of the country. Obasanjo, on the other hand, had always been a staunch supporter of liberation movements in South Africa. To this end, Egedo (1987) argues that it was during the time when General Obasanjo was the Nigerian Head

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of State in the 1970s that the Nigerian government pledged massive financial resources to the South African liberation movements and the frontline states. Furthermore, it was during the Obasanjo era that the ANC opened its representative office in Nigeria after realising the strategic importance and impetus given by the Nigerian government towards the liberation of South Africa (Gevisser, 2007). Thence, after handing over power to a democratically elected government a few years later in the 1970s, Obasanjo further played a role in the Commonwealth’s Eminent Persons Group mission against apartheid. Therefore, Obasanjo was not only a staunch supporter of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa but understood as well the importance of the liberation for South Africa but also about how such liberation could help the cause of the renewal of the African continent as a whole (Obasanjo, 2016). Hence, it was unsurprising that when they came into office in 1999, Mbeki and Obasanjo presided over what is referred to by Chris Landsberg as the “zenith” of South Africa-Nigeria relations (Landsberg, 2012). Mbeki and Obasanjo drew not only on the personal and historical ties that bound them but also on their aspirations for a peaceful, secure, and developed Africa. Thus, in 1999, the two countries inaugurated their Bi-National Commission (BNC) to set the trend for cooperation in various areas between South Africa and Nigeria. Amongst others, the BNC was instrumental in strengthening ties between these two countries in areas of trade, industry, agriculture, and socio-economic development. Furthermore, the BNC sat for eight years during the Mbeki-Obasanjo era, alternatively, in South Africa and in Nigeria (Adebajo, 2010). Also, reliant on the good personal relations and camaraderie between Mbeki and Obasanjo, South Africa and Nigeria aligned to articulate continental projects such as NEPAD as well as the reform of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Combined, Mbeki and Obasanjo argued against the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of OAU member states and the unconstitutional military takeovers of power in Africa. Successfully, this led to the reformation of longstanding OAU principles along with the OAU itself. To this end, the AU was created. The creation of the AU was aimed at bringing stability, peace, and development to the African continent (Landsberg, 2012). It is important to note that the Mbeki-Obasanjo era was not without its fair share of challenges. As argued by Adebajo (2007), tensions became apparent as both countries differed on crucial issues. South Africa and Nigeria differed on how to respond to the Zimbabwean crisis between 2003

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and 2004. Though they differed, Obasanjo (2016) himself argued that he deferred to Mbeki the responsibility to help resolve the Zimbabwean crisis due to the proximity of South Africa to the situation whilst he focused on the resolution of the Côte d’Ivoire crisis. This shows that even when there have been disagreements between South Africa and Nigeria, there was a sense of mutual respect and trust that understood that the division of labour between South Africa and Nigeria would go a long way in helping to solve problems in the African continent. In late 2008, Mbeki was recalled as president of South Africa, whilst Obasanjo’s term of office ended in 2007 (Shai, 2017). It is believed that after Mbeki and Obasanjo left office, South Africa-Nigeria relations became worse (Landsberg, 2012).

Xenophobia: A Thorn in the Side for South Africa-Nigeria Relations Signs that the South Africa-Nigeria relations would experience some turmoil became apparent a few months before the unceremonious removal of Mbeki as president of South Africa in 2008 (Shai, 2017). The sporadic outbreak of the first xenophobic attacks that occurred in 2008 in South Africa strongly pointed in that direction. Causes of these xenophobic attacks have been well documented (HSRC, 2016; Ogunnubi and Tella, 2014). Amongst others, and due to the fact that these outbreaks of xenophobic attacks targeted mainly African migrants from such countries as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Nigeria, it inevitably placed a serious challenge on South Africa-Nigeria relations (Shai and Mothibi, 2015). However, South Africa and Nigeria had a veritable platform in the BNC to help address problems of this nature (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012). Though South Africa and Nigeria had this important platform at their disposal, it is submitted that an opportunity for containing these relations from spiraling further downward as a result of xenophobic attacks was slowly but surely getting lost with successive BNC failures to convene after Mbeki and Obasanjo left office. The fact that the BNC, a platform for resolving contentious issues as they arose between South Africa and Nigeria, did not sit before the 2012 deportations of Nigerians over the authenticity of their yellow fever vaccination cards, pointed not only to a strain in South AfricaNigeria relations but also to the reluctance between these countries to revive the BNC and their relations (Games, 2013; Adebajo, 2012). The reactive convention of the BNC in 2012 in the immediate aftermath of the yellow fever saga was too little too late since the damage had already been done.

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It is instructive to note that xenophobia and xenophobic sentiments are not uniquely a South African problem. Fayomi, Chidozie, and Ayo (2015) pointed out that from Kenya to the Maghreb and across Southern Africa, discrimination, especially against African migrants, is rampant. Even South Africans in exile during the liberation struggle period had been at the receiving end of xenophobia. Serote (2016) noted that during the liberation struggle, South Africans in exile, especially in Botswana, were called all sorts of names, stereotyped and even reported to authorities so they could be deported back to South Africa. Gevisser (2007) noted that those in exile in Nigeria were not given the latitude by the host government to interact with locals and often were in their own designated camps. If true, this would suggest that an opportunity was lost by South African exiles to learn and familiarise themselves with the cultures of their host countries. Although this may not have helped to guarantee the change in xenophobic attitudes amongst many South Africans, it would have at least helped to engender a sense of awareness and understanding of other cultures and people amongst exiled South Africans. The simple and inalienable fact that xenophobic sentiments are a feature of African society means that xenophobia is not a distinctly South African problem. However, what is distinct about xenophobia in South Africa, as opposed to elsewhere in the African continent, is that it does not only entail the “fear of others” but also manifest itself in deadly violence against those who are “feared” (Ogunnubi and Tella, 2014). This sorry state of affairs is not helped by the perceptions that many South Africans harbour towards other Africans, especially Nigerians (Adebajo, 2010). Adebajo (2010) stresses that these xenophobic attitudes towards Nigerians in South Africa are also fueled by press reports and xenophobic stereotypes against Nigerians as drug-traffickers and criminals. Embarrassingly, as if the first large-scale xenophobic attacks of the year 2008 were not enough, seven years later, South Africa and Nigeria faced off again due to xenophobic attacks against mainly African migrants in South Africa in 2015. This time, it is believed that the xenophobic attacks were fueled by the utterances of the King of the Zulu nation, King Goodwill Zwelithini (News24, 2016). These attacks elicited public outcry and condemnation from South African social media users as well as the South African government. However, the issue was not helped by South African president Jacob Zuma when he opined that African countries contributed to the problem because of poor governance in their respective countries. As such, Zuma believed

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that if it were not for the reasons of poor governance, the majority of African people being targeted during these attacks would not have been in South Africa (Mail and Guardian, 2015). While President Zuma may have had a point on the issue of poor governance in Africa, such a statement was very crude when used in defence of xenophobia in South Africa. Given the history of South Africa and the support enjoyed by the liberation movements to bring about change and democracy in South Africa, such a statement was ill-informed. Rather than denying accusations that South Africa was xenophobic, the president should have taken the lead to unequivocally and unreservedly condemn the xenophobic attacks. On the other hand, the threat by Nigerian youths to launch retaliatory attacks against South African businesses in Nigeria and to give an ultimatum to South Africans in Nigeria to leave the country was misguided youthful exuberance (Ogunnubi and Tella, 2015). Such retaliatory attacks would not go anywhere in terms of altering the behaviour and attitudes of South Africans in the townships where the original xenophobic attacks occured. The fact of the matter is, the perpetrators of these senseless attacks were unemployed, less-educated, and destitute people in South Africa who could never be deterred by the threat of retaliatory attacks on big South African businesses operating in Nigeria. What was necessary were constructive engagements between South Africa and Nigeria on how to educate the perspectives of the people on the ground about not only the commonalities, destiny, and history shared by South Africans and Nigerians as Africans, but also about why it was wrong to target and attack people on account of their being “different” from the locals. In the same breath, it is our wellconsidered view that it was irresponsible for the Nigerian government to recall its High Commissioner to South Africa as a form of protest against the xenophobic attacks in South Africa (News24, 2016). Regardless of the differences, it is in the shared interests of both countries to retain sound diplomatic ties so that the communication between them is not negatively impaired.

The Yellow Fever Vaccination Saga The deportations of 125 Nigerians in 2012 over the authenticity of their yellow fever vaccination cards by the South African government brought South Africa-Nigeria relations to the precipice of collapse (Ogunnubi, 2013). The Nigerian government retaliated to the deportations of Nigerian citizens from South Africa by arbitrarily refusing entry to South Africans who were travelling to Nigeria, citing failure to meet travel requirements

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(Adebajo, 2012; Landsberg, 2012; Games, 2013). However, such (that South Africans were refused entry to Nigeria due to faulty travel requirements) was just an excuse and a smokescreen for retaliation as the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs reported in parliament that further retaliatory actions would follow. This action by Nigeria was not only overboard but was completely irrational and downright malicious. It revealed a bit of a “don’t-care attitude” from Nigeria about the kind of response this would have triggered from South Africa. According to Fayomi, Chidozie, and Ayo (2015), Nigeria’s actions were an affront to diplomatic norms. Indeed, it would have behoved the Nigerian government to seek answers from South Africa about the deportations before taking any actions. This would have augured well for the cooperation and mutual respect between these two countries. Furthermore, this would have saved both governments from embarrassment. The yellow fever saga meant that, on the face of it, Nigeria assumed that the deportations were not about the fact that the 125 deported Nigerians were deported on account of not fulfilling the necessary health requirements for their travel but because they were Nigerians, and therefore, the South African government acted with nefarious xenophobic intent. Moreover, the Nigerian reading of the whole saga was that it was an immigration issue as opposed to being a public health issue (Patel, 2012). As Patel (2012) puts it, Nigeria felt slighted because of the assertion by the South African immigration authorities that the yellow fever vaccination cards of the deported Nigerians were fake. Taken as it is, this may have further reinforced the rumour that yellow fever certificates were sold at a lower price in Nigerian airports. This may imply that corruption was so rampant in Nigeria that even serious health infringements were neglected. Hence, the Nigerian government did not take this lying down. Despite the fact that Nigeria is listed by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as being at risk of the yellow fever virus transmission, the Nigerian government insists that the country is not at risk. In the end, South Africa sent a delegation to Nigeria to attempt to calm the situation. To this end, the situation was restored before it had the potential to escalate further. Important to note has been the humility of the South African authorities, especially at the highest level, to withdraw from engaging publicly in visceral exchanges on this matter. This is in spite of the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olugbenga Ashiru, openly accusing South Africa of being xenophobic towards Nigerians (Landsberg, 2012). Instead, the South African government elected to send an envoy to Nigeria to

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apologise for the misunderstanding caused by the deportations. This single incident was important in demonstrating the commitment of South Africa towards salvaging its relations with Nigeria. Moreover, it was demonstrably a perfect example of constructive engagement between disagreeing partners.

South Africa-Nigeria: Competition for Leadership Positions Tensions have always been an ubiquitous feature of South Africa-Nigeria relations. Expectedly, the putative advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 and the peaceful transition thereof placed on South Africa the obligation to play a leadership role in Africa drawing from its own experience and resources (Landsberg and Kondlo, 2007). Before this period, Nigeria had always enjoyed the monopoly of playing a leadership role in Africa (Ogunnubi, 2013). But the military takeover of power in Nigeria in 1993 and the annulment of general election results by the military regime meant that Nigeria temporarily ceded the responsibility to act as a responsible leader in Africa (Obi, 2015). This responsibility fell to South Africa because of the moral authority it enjoyed as a result of its own generally accepted leadership and widely-celebrated democratic dispensation. Immediately after 1994, South Africa took this leadership role in its stride by venturing to resolve the situation in Nigeria (Adebajo, 2007). Even though South Africa spectacularly failed to reverse the execution of the Ogoni nine by the Abacha regime, it is believed that it played an important role in ensuring that, though sentenced to death, Obasanjo and Moshood Abiola, the winner of the 1993 Nigerian general election, were not executed. Further, it is believed that South Africa played a decisive role towards the return of democracy in Nigeria in the late 1990s. In 1999, Mbeki and Obasanjo assumed leadership positions in their respective countries. Drawing on their personal relationship, the two presided over what is regarded, generally, as the “golden age” of South Africa-Nigeria relations. However, such was not without its own challenges. Adebajo (2007) noted that during the Mbeki-Obasanjo era, Obasanjo tended to defer much of the leadership responsibility to South Africa. He adds that this did not sit well with the majority of Nigerian senior officials who felt that South Africa was still a new kid on the block and lacked experience in conducting diplomacy in Africa (Adebajo, 2007). Games (2013) places the bigger problems in South Africa-Nigeria relations at the level of the citizenry. She

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views the behaviour of people towards each other and the bureaucracy at a much lower level as influencing the political attitudes at the top. This attitude from Nigerian senior officials exposes a great resentment that some in the Nigerian government harboured against South Africa taking leadership responsibilities in Africa. It shows the reluctance of the Nigerian officials to work with South Africa and to cooperate with it on the basis of mutual respect and equality because South Africa was perceived as inexperienced in African diplomacy. This attitude may also help to explain the weakness of the South Africa-Nigeria BNC, which was downgraded from the presidential level during the Mbeki-Obasanjo regime to the level of senior government officials. On South Africa’s side, Nigerian officials were perceived as pedantic and insufferable. Nigerians were accused of reducing the BNC from a vibrant platform for engagement between the two countries to a festival of complaints about mundane issues. For instance, it is believed that Nigerians would come to the BNC and complain about why certain Nigerian citizens were arrested and imprisoned in South Africa while insisting they were innocent. The perception, therefore, is that Nigerian officials preferred to behave as if Nigerians in South Africa were immune from the laws of the country and should be treated as thus. Further, Adebajo (2012) stated that a longstanding issue of contention in South Africa-Nigeria relations has been the question of African representation on a potentially reformed UNSC. The issue of African representation in a reformed UNSC – one that would include a permanent seat for an African nation – has transcended the leadership of Mbeki and Obasanjo and is still one of the contentious issues bedeviling South Africa-Nigeria relations. Despite the Ezulwini Consensus (AU, 2005) – the common African position on the reform of the UNSC – which stated that Africa should get at least two permanent seats in the UNSC and that the AU would choose which governments got the seats, such has not stopped South Africa and Nigeria have not ceased from jockeying for position on the matter (Dauda and Ameen, 2017; Maseng and Lekaba, 2014). Since South Africa is the only African country in strategic international groupings such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), and the G20, it goes without saying that its membership of these groups further increases its chances of being internationally recognised as a leader in Africa. Therefore, getting a seat on the reformed UNSC would not only entrench South Africa’s position but

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also further cement it as Africa’s leader. This turn of events is, therefore, unfathomable to Nigeria (Molele, 2012).

South Africa-Nigeria: Major Disagreements Obi (2015) has described South Africa-Nigeria relations after the departure of Mbeki and Obasanjo as only consisting of “ad hoc responses to particular events”. This is even true as both countries failed to convene their BNC for three years before the repugnant yellow fever saga (Games, 2013). Even the BNC held immediately after the yellow fever saga was not enough to salvage the quickly deteriorating relations between South Africa and Nigeria. From 2011 onwards, it was clear that the two African powerhouses were not drinking from the same well. South Africa and Nigeria took antagonistic positions following the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) war against the Libyan regime of Colonel Muammar Gadhafi. South Africa and Nigeria were acting in their capacity as non-permanent members of the UNSC at the time. When the UNSC instituted resolutions 1970 and 1973, which amongst others things imposed an arms embargo on and a no-fly zone over Libya, South Africa and Nigeria voted in favour of these resolutions. Even though South African President Zuma did raise concerns about the modalities of implementing such resolutions, eventually, South Africa went ahead and voted in favour of the resolutions (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012). Tensions arose when, soon afterward, South Africa accused NATO of using the UN mandate for the purposes of effecting regime change in Libya. To this end, South Africa initially refused to recognise the National Transition Council in Libya (NTC) legitimately carrying the mandate of the Libyan people. Moreover, South Africa refused to unfreeze assets for the NTC. Nigeria, on the other hand, recognised the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. In addition to unfreezing the assets of the NTC, Landsberg (2012) notes that Nigeria encouraged other African states to follow its example. Subsequent to the Libyan crisis, South Africa and Nigeria differed on how to respond to the post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. Nigeria took a belligerent stance towards Laurent Gbagbo, the loser of the elections in Côte d’Ivoire. South Africa, having learnt the lessons of Libya, refused to take any position against Gbagbo (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012). There were further disagreements between South Africa and Nigeria during the election of the AU Commission Chairperson during the year 2012. South Africa went contrary to the unwritten rule that has always guided the workings of

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African politics - that big countries should not contest for leadership positions in the AU (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012). Again, South Africa and Nigeria were at loggerheads after the collapse of a Nigerian church that killed more than 80 South Africans. Ogunnubi (2016) contends that tensions became apparent when the Nigerian authorities refused South Africans permission to visit South Africans who were injured in hospitals. Furthermore, Nigeria refused the offer from South Africa to help with the identification of those who perished during the church building collapse. It took an envoy from South Africa to go to Nigeria to negotiate for the repatriation of bodies to South Africa. The repatriation took such a long time that those repatriated bodies were already decomposed. This one issue is still very painful and bitter in the memory of many South Africans and the families affected by this tragedy. To this day, it still boggles the mind why the Nigerian government chose to play politics by using dead people to get back at South Africa in order to make a statement that South Africa cannot order Nigeria around. Agbu (2012) buttressed this point when he posited Nigeria had been prone to adopting a foreign policy that undermined South Africa, and thereby benefited from South Africa’s discomfort.

Conclusion This chapter has sought to employ Afrocentricity as an alternative theoretical lens to examine the relations between Nigeria and post-apartheid South Africa. While the primary focus of the study was the period between 1999 to date, it was unavoidable to briefly reflect on historical moments that have laid a solid foundation for future relations between Nigeria and South Africa. It has been observed that the relations between South Africa and Nigeria have undergone notable ups and downs depending on the leaderships that presided over these countries at a particular moment. Overall, Nigeria and South Africa have sound relations at both bilateral and multilateral levels; and their relations transcend issues of trade, peacekeeping, diplomacy, liberation heritage, and skills transfer, but the soundness of their relations has not been without challenges. However, the shared appreciation by both South Africa and Nigeria about their mutual responsibility to advance regional and continental peace, security, stability, and development has enabled them to salvage their relations over time from being permanently spoiled by narrow, short-term interests.

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http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/4666/1/Xenophobia%20and% 20Nigeria-South%20Africa%20%20revised%20version%20for%20 submission%202015.pdf. [Accessed 13 February 2016]. Firsing, S. 2014. Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda. South African Journal of International Affairs, 21(1), 45-67. DOI: 10.1080/10220461.2014.894685. Games, D. 2013. Nigeria-South Africa Baseline Study, South African Foreign Policy Initiative. SAFPI Policy Brief No 44, 1-29. Available at: http://osf.org.za/E05F370E-EB74-4726-8E8E-B1326212ED82/Final Download/DownloadId-FAA450F2D3F19627C8CA39BB 495FE274/E05F370E-EB74-4726-8E8E-B1326212ED82/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/Nigeria-South-Africa-baseline-study.pdf. [Accessed 13 February 2016]. General Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII). 30 November 1973. International Convention on The Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. Available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/28/ares28.htm. [Accessed on 09 October 2016]. Gevisser, M. 2007. Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers. Graham, V. 2006. How firm the handshake? South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006. African Security Review, 15(4), 114-127. Khadiagala, G. and Lyons, T. eds. 2001. African Foreign Policies: Power and Processes. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Khadiagala, G. and Nganje, F. 2016. The evolution of South Africa's democracy promotion in Africa: from idealism to pragmatism. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29:4, 1561-1581. DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2015.1058655. Landsberg, C. 2016. African Solutions for African Problems: Quiet Diplomacy and South Africa’s Diplomatic Strategy. Journal of Contemporary History. DOI: 10.18820/24150509/jch.v41i1.7. Landsberg, C. 2007. South Africa and the Making of the African Union and NEPAD: Mbeki’s Progressive African Agenda. In: Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A, and Landsberg, C. eds. South Africa in Africa: The PostApartheid Era. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu Natal press. Landsberg, C. 2012. South Africa and Nigeria tensions leave Africa Leadership Gap. http://ww.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11857/nigeria-south-africatensions-leave-african-leadership-gap. [Accessed 25 January 2016].

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South African Institute of International Affairs, SAIIA Policy Insights, 11 March 2015. Available at: http://www.saiia.org.za/policyinsights/recalibrating-south-africas-role-in-global-economicgovernance-a-nigerian-perspective-on-some-strategic-challenges. [Accessed 08 February 2016]. Ogunnubi, O. 2013. Hegemonic order and regional stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: A comparative study of Nigeria and South Africa. Unpublished thesis (PhD). University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Ogunnubi, O. and Isike, C. 2017. Nigeria’s Soft Power Sources: Between Potential and Illusion? International Journal of Politics Culture and Society. DOI: 10.1007/s10767-017-9258-6. Ogunnubi, O. and Tella, O. 2014. Hegemony or Survival South Africa’s Soft Power and the Challenge of Xenophobia. Africa Insight. 44(3). Oyebade, B. 1990. African Studies and the Afrocentric Paradigm: A critique. Journal of Black Studies, December 1990, 21(2), 233-238. Patel, K. 2012. Gloves come off in SA Nigeria relations diplomatic feud. Available at: http://dailymaverick.co.za. [Accessed 6 April 2016]. Serote, M.W. 2016. In: Ndlovu, S.M. and Strydom, M. 2016. The Thabo Mbeki I know. Johannesburg: Picador Africa. Shai, K.B. 2010. The United States of America’s Foreign Policy Towards Africa: The Case Studies of Kenya and Nigeria, 1990-2008. Unpublished dissertation (MA). Thohoyandou: University of Venda. Shai, K.B. and Mothibi, K.A. 2015. Describing pre-2009 Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: A Human right Perspective. In: Sebola, M.P., Tsheola, J.P., and Mafunisa, M.J. eds. African Governance: Society, Human Migration, State, Xenophobia and Business Contestations. Conference Proceedings. 4th SAAPAM Limpopo Chapter Annual Conference, 28-30 October 2015. Shai, K.B. 2016. An Afrocentric critique of the United States of America’s foreign policy towards Africa: The case studies of Ghana and Tanzania, 1990-2014. PhD, University of Limpopo. Shai, K.B. 2017. South African state capture: A symbiotic affair between business and state going bad(?). Insight on Africa, 9(1), 1-14 January. Shai, K.B., Molapo, R.R., and Sodi, T. 2017. The USA’s post-1990 foreign policy towards West Africa. Journal for Contemporary History, 42(1), 154-173. DOI: https://dx.doi. org/10.18820/24150509/ JCH42.v1. Simpson, T. 2016. Umkhonto We Sizwe. Johannesburg: The Penguin Group (SA). Tétényi, A. 2014. South Africa vs. Nigeria: competing countries for leadership position in Sub-Saharan Africa. Paper presented at the ISA/FLACSO conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 24 July 2014.

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Tieku, T. and Murithi, T. eds. 2013. Handbook of Africa's International Relations. London: Routledge Publication. Vines, A. 2010. South Africa's politics of peace and security in Africa. South African Journal of International Affairs, 17(1), 53-63.

CHAPTER THREE POWER AND HEGEMONY (IN AFRICA): AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE CONFIDENCE NWACHINEMERE OGBONNA AND AFAMEFUNE PATRICK IKEM

Abstract The concepts of power and hegemony have been extensively interrogated by scholars, both globally and within regional contexts. However, there seems to be an ambivalent debate about power and hegemony in Africa that has continued for some time and has generated various shades of assumptions which remain largely unsettled. Therefore, this piece is a modest contribution to the power and hegemony debate in Africa, specifically as regards Nigeria’s and South Africa’s claims to this status. This study affirms the views of scholars about the presence of states with hegemonic credentials, which are activated with the seeming unwillingness of the West to intervene in conflicts within the continent and resulted in the frequent call for African solutions to African problems. However, it was observed that in terms of hegemonic responsibility, specific policy focus such as the resolution of regional conflicts have been more pronounced than other areas deployed by both South Africa and Nigeria. Keywords: Power; Hegemony; Africa; Political Science; Foreign Policy

Introduction The discipline of Political Science and its sub-discipline of International Relations have grappled with the constant surge of scholarly investigations on the phenomena of “power” “hegemony”, and “Africa”, yet their interrelatedness is yet to receive adequate and comprehensive systematic scholarly attention (Ogunnubi, 2013). This is despite the fact that these

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concepts are among the predominantly interrogated and yet frequently contested concepts in Political Science and the fact that from antiquity to the contemporary era, different paradigmatic postulations on these three phenomena have generated a gigantic body of literature in the discipline (Baldwin, 2012; Animashaun, 2009; Cox, 1993). Thus, at the end of the Cold War, focus on Africa, power, and hegemony in international relations assumed a prominent place, though an ambivalent one in intellectual discourse, given the central role they play in understanding the global configurations in world politics (Wheatley, 2011; Antioniades, 2008; Bernett and Duvall, 2005). The consequences of the ambivalent nature of the debate on power, hegemony, and Africa, especially by scholars of Political Science and International Relations, diplomats, and foreign policymakers, have led to bitter accusations and constant contestations between and among them, so much that discourse on these concepts are intellectually chaotic and therefore are labelled intellectual minefields and navigating them seems a herculean task. Although these concepts are equally rich in meaning, they are beset with academic controversies (Nolte, 2010; Kawabata, 2006; Jha, 1977). Hence, the global storehouse of information on power, hegemony, and Africa continues to increase given the profundity and efflorescence of writings on these concepts (Petersen, 2012; Bayer, 2012; Wheatley, 2011). However, despite the abundance of assumptions, conclusions, and prescriptions about power, hegemony, and Africa, the myriads of academic discourse on rightful claims to regional hegemony remain relatively few. In fact, hitherto, it has been argued that the study of international relations and all the phenomenon associated with it have not fared well in the continent (Dunn and Shaw, 2001). As Smith (2009: 270) explains thus: If one considers the interest in indigenous knowledge from Africa and the rest of the developing world in relation to fields such as natural medicine or eastern religion and art, it becomes clear that it is not a novel idea that knowledge from the non-Western world can influence the west. Regrettably this interest in how existing (Western) knowledge could be enriched by indigenous knowledge and practices has not extended to the field of IR. Mainstream scholars in particular see little value in making an effort to draw on lessons from the periphery. The idea that scholars in the core of the field (mainly the US and UK) are the innovators of theory, while scholars in the periphery … are mere consumers of theory, has been widespread in the field.

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The above statement shows that Africa has been excluded from rigorous theoretical postulations and empirical explanations in the discipline of International Relations. Therefore, it is a well-established fact in the literature that either International Relations may have under-represented Africa or the reverse is the case (Van Wyk, 2015; Falaye, 2014; Erforth, 2014; Smith, 2013; Nkiwane, 2001; Shaw, 1975). In this regard, Nkiwane (2001: 280-81) noted that: Case studies, theories, and examples from Africa are exceedingly rare in international relations. Indeed, examples from Africa are, at best, valued for their nuisance potential … The African continent typically is ignored in mainstream International Relations studies. Phrases such as “off the radar” and “Afro-pessimism” have come to depict the relationship of the African continent to international relations. Is this because Africa has little to contribute to IR, or because the power dynamics of the discipline are such that African voices are not heard?

Moreover, this probing question or better still academic apprehension, which centres largely on the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the matrimony between International Relations and Africa, sparked widespread and serious academic concerns among scholars. Hence, the present gold rush by scholars to apply theories and frameworks of International Relations to study Africa and make inferences (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). Concerted intellectual efforts are being made to utilise concepts and constructs such as power, hegemony, regional power, and regionalism rooted in International Relations to interrogate Africa. Evidently, there are few innovative and progressive scholars of African extractions and/or inclinations whose works have illuminated the dark and barren field of power and hegemony in the continent (Ogunnubi, 2014; 2016; Sidiropoulos, 2014; Alden and Schoeman, 2015). Yet, apart from being few, one may observe a progressing debate in this regard. Thus, Wheatley (2011) notes that though most of these studies attempted comprehensive descriptions, they achieve partial explanations granting an incomplete representation of the empirical realities of states in Africa and their relations with the outside world. Further, they are not totally sufficient as diagnostic and descriptive tools because they are mostly rooted on narrow assumptions housed under realism and liberalism paradigms (Antwi-Boasiako, 2014). Hence, more academic inquiry is needed to understand better the trajectories, dynamics, and manifestations of power and hegemony in the continent. The research directions on both concepts within Africa is, at worst, embryonic, and, at its best, fertile (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015).

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This intellectual oversight or academic inadequacy is quite worrisome on three fronts, and these concerns necessitated this section of the book. First, there is the presence of powerful countries (Nigeria and South Africa) with hegemonic credentials on the continent; yet, they are largely understudied (Ogunnubi, 2013; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). These are states with the right set of power capabilities and ambitions that are/can be beacons of example and a shining light for others within their spheres of influence to look up to and emulate. Moreso, they have a rich history, concrete antecedents, and power potentials to calibrate their foreign policies to achieve hegemonic status within the continent. Regrettably, it seems that only in specific policy matters has this hegemonic wherewithal (resource) been brought to bear. Secondly, the globalising effects of conflicts and the gradual withdrawal or constant foot-dragging of the West to intervene in conflicts within the continent have opened up space for the above-mentioned states to mediate and, by doing so, assume leadership and a hegemonic position in the continent. Lastly, given the propensity of the continent to be enmeshed in conflicts and crisis, it is now being bandied that African solutions should be applied to solve African problems, especially by powerful states in the continent (Smith, 2009). Based on the foregoing, it is necessary to examine the nexus between power and hegemony, and their manifestations in Africa. To this end, this chapter sets out to fulfil this task. First, it attempts to proffer a sharper understanding of both power and hegemony by distilling their very meaning and essence in application to Africa. Secondly, it introduces and situates Africa properly in the power and hegemonic discourse, arguing that the narrative is incomplete without a rounded description and understanding of the power brokers and hegemonic blocs in the continent. Finally, it advocates and puts forth charges to scholars, especially of African origin, to embrace and adopt fully diverse methodological orientations and theoretical assumptions towards enhancing the research traditions and directions as regards both concepts in Africa.

Interrogating the Power and Hegemony Discourse The concept of power has been explored in a huge body of literature not just within the gamut of Political Science but the whole extent of the Social Sciences. Prominent scholars in this area, from ancient times to the contemporary era, have expended considerable energy on the concept of power and all that it concerns. They include Aristotle, Machiavelli, Weber, Hobbes, and Morgenthau, who, through the instrumentality of their works,

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have developed a rich body of scholarship on the concept of power (Dahl, 1957). This great attention and devotion by both old prophets and new disciples of Social Science and Political Science extraction to power has led to the accusation that the concept suffers from intellectual favouritism (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Though these condemnations and adulations of power by the masses of its staunch critics (William H. Riker, 1964; Stanley Hoffman, 1964; Charles A. McClelland, 1966; David Easton, 1971) and faithful adherents (Hans J. Morgenthau, 1960; E. H. Carr, 1964; Dahl, 1965; K. J. Holsti, 1967), respectively, have over the years greatly enriched and stretched the concept, yet, the side effects are that, it now suffers from analytical and conceptual fuzziness (Nye, 1990). In this context, Hayes (1968: 155) writing about the conceptual fuzziness of power, sounded the alarm bell that: For any concept to have analytical utility, it is necessary that the precise meaning of that concept be clearly defined. Lack of conceptual clarity, obviously, can only lead to confusion in the conduct of inquiry.

More so, this great deal of attention on power has, more often than not, led to bitter contestations and constant accusations among scholars, so much so, that intellectual battles have been fought and lost. To this end, power is regarded as generally and essentially a contested concept (Gallie, 1956). In fact, the huge attention given to the study of power led Hoffman (1964) to aver that Political Science vacillates under power monism, which for him, is not just unacceptable but highly deplorable because the discipline is much more than the concept of power. Perhaps, this motivated Riker (1964) to deduce that students and scholars of political science are not sure of what they are discussing when they use the concept of power and that it is not out of place to ponder if it means so much as to be meaningless. Even in the international arena, confusion exists over the application and usage of the term. In this context, McClelland (1966) inferred that only a few scholars of power orientation in international politics have a sound grasp of the concept, while others are perambulating in the intellectual minefield of power. Despite the above reservations about power, it still commands a central position in Political Science, especially in International Relations where it still holds much sway. Corroborating this assertion, McClelland (1966, cited in Jha, 1977: 358) noted that:

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Chapter Three It has been accepted for several decades by many scholars that power is the organizing idea for the whole discipline of political science … The power concept figures prominently in international theory … Power is the motive force in the international system.

In the same vein, Hayes (1969) noted that power occupies a central position of importance in the discipline of Political Science. In fact, it has been argued elsewhere (Baldwin, 2012) that of the tons of definitions on politics that exist, myriads of them (Lasswell, 1965; Easton, 1971; Nnoli, 1989) are anchored on power. For Morgenthau (1966, cited in Jha, 1977), if politics is the struggle for power, then international politics is the struggle for power at the international scene. He noted that no matter how people and politicians define their goals within the ambit of international politics, it is done with the overriding intention to compete for power. More so, he argued that it is human to seek power, and all politics, either domestic or international, essentially consist of three perspectives, which are the acquisition, demonstration, and consolidation of power (Nnoli, 1989). In fact, the study of Political Science and International Relations is condemned to revolve around the struggle for power (Crawford, 2000). In this regard, Barnett and Duvall (2005) argued that the concept of power in International Relations is how one state uses its material resources to compel another state to do something it does not want to do. However, the above depictions of power litter most standard textbooks of an international relations disposition; they see the formulation of power as how one state uses its material resources to compel another state to do something it does not want to do. This depiction has created a disciplinary attachment to the concept of power that is largely and centrally within the realm of realism (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). However, this characterisation of power is tainted with analytical impurities and, as such, has come under serious intellectual attack, especially since it failed to take into cognisance the importance of social relations between state A and state B (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Critics of this definition argue that power does not exist in a vacuum because it is anchored in a form of social relations process, which this particular definition ignores (Rasheed, 1995). The situating of power discourse within the social relations process of production has many advantages: first, it de-emphasises the overwhelming attachment to the realist conception of power in the international arena; and secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it offers scholars fresh analytical insight and tools to interrogate the concept of power (Baldwin, 2012). This approach in the conceptualisation of power is tinted with Marxian flavour

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despite the attempt by these scholars to detach and separate it from Marxian colouration. And like all Marxian approaches, it does suffer from economic determinism (Resnick and Wolff, 1982). The longevity of power in the discipline of Political Science and subdiscipline of International Relations has resulted in a plethora of classifications and faces of power. For example, Petersen (2012) noted that we have Coercive Power, Bargaining Power, Concerted Power, and Institutionalised Power. In the same vein, Baldwin (2012) discussed relational power, national power, military power, and structural power. In the same regard, Nye (2009) and Pallaver (2011) state there are different forms, dimensions, and manifestations of power with different degrees of intensity: force and violence (Hard Power) or kindness and politeness (Soft Power) and even a combination of both (Smart Power). Paradoxically, it is the realist conception of power that cuts across most of the definitions of power in International Relations. In fact, this approach, even with its inherent shortcomings, commands the support of most International Relations experts and for ages has dominated this sub-field of study in Political Science (Baldwin, 2012). In fact, realism towers above every other approach in understanding the power discourse in International Relations. More so, scholars of realist orientation see power as the currency of international politics (Walker and Morton, 2005; Mearsheimer, 2006). To this end, power is a sine qua non for any actor in the international system. In fact, power is the distinguishing attribute that acts as an organising principle in the international arena. To a very large extent, it determines not just the location of states in the international system but the influence they wield. The international system is hierarchically structured in a way that the most powerful states are strategically placed at the top while the less powerful states are at the lower rung of the ladder. This categorisation is anchored in the power levels of states. However, basically, it is the most powerful state/s or otherwise that is known as the hegemon that determines and upholds the rules of the game among states in the international arena (Mearsheimer, 2007). For instance, since the end of World War II, the United States (US) assumed the role of a hegemon in the international system. This is evident by not just its instrumentality in the creation of international organisation such as League of Nations (10 January 1920) and later the United Nations (24 October 1945), World Bank (4 July 1945), International Monetary Fund (27 December 1945), among others, but also in shaping their actions and inactions (Rather and Jose, 2015). Although,

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this dominance has come under challenge by revisionist states like China, Iran, and Russia, among others. It is a fact that the concept of hegemony is not recent in Political Science or International Relations (Antoniades, 2008). In fact, narratives on hegemony have attracted extensive and expansive academic attention from scholars; as a result, the term is labelled an intellectual battlefield and traversing it seems a staggering assignment (Kurtz, 1996; Antoniades 2008; Nolte, 2010; Destradi, 2010; Ogunnubi, 2013). Etymologically, the term “Hegemony” has its origin in the ancient Greek word “Hegemonia”, which means the dominant and coercive position of an individual in the system over others (Yilmaz, 2010). However, it was the seminal Prison Notebooks of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci that popularised the concept (Destradi, 2010; Ogunnubi, 2013). His articulation of the concept of hegemon greatly enhanced the understanding of the dynamics of International Relations and the intricacies of power relations among individual states and international organisations (Bayer, 2012). Although Gramsci’s discourse on the concept of hegemon is hard to decipher and gather, nonetheless, it is evident by the huge body of literature that runs the entire gamut of the social sciences interrogating Gramsci and his thought-provoking discourse on hegemony. However, his contribution to the understanding and application of the concept stands tall among other writers (Kurts, 1996). According to Bates (1975), Destradi (2010), and Ogunnubi (2013), Gramsci argued that the term hegemony connotes political leadership that is anchored on the agreement of the led, an accord which is tenable by the diffusion and popularisation of the worldview of the ruling class. His view rests on the fact that a social class can establish a new order by propagating a world view which arranges the interests of others in line with their own interests. As a concept, he argued that it can be used by the proletariat, especially its intellectuals, to institute and propagate ideologies that can subvert capitalism, or that it can be applied by the ruling class using ideologies towards the entrenchment of the status quo (Hegemony of the bourgeoisie and Hegemony of the working class) (Bayer, 2012). Be it as it may, hegemony is always aimed at obtaining consent and establishing legitimacy through consensus building (Kurtz, 1996). Furthermore, Gramsci noted that hegemony entails the capacity of the hegemon to let subordinates believe that power rests upon the consensus of the majority while projecting its own view without the use of force (Destradi, 2010). In the final analysis, it is assumed that this consensus is anchored and motorised by shared understanding and mutual priorities

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among actors. Although Gramsci’s idea of hegemony was within the boundaries of the nation-states (Bayer, 2012), it was scholars such as Gilpin (1981), Nye (1990), and Cox (1996), amongst others, that moved the concept of hegemon beyond the narrow confines of nation-states and applied it to the study of international relations. Basically, a hegemonic power has the resources to provide public goods and services that can enhance its dominance, which is possible because of its unique positional strength in politics, economics, and military in the international system (Yazid, 2015). According to Keohane (1984, cited in Liu and Ming-Te, 2011: 218): “A hegemony must have dominion over raw materials, sources of capital, control over markets and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods.” Hence, it is the domination and supremacy in these categories that gives the hegemon the capacity to apply vital control over the arrangements of the international arena, as well as the (international) actions of its component units. Although, the above narrative of domination as the organising idea of hegemony is replete in International Relations, yet it has not gone down well with some scholars (Krasner, 1982; 1983; Cox, 1993). These writers mounted sophisticated and serious challenges against the knitting of hegemony with domination in international relations. In this context, William (n.d) noted that: Hegemony does not just passively exist as a form of dominance; it must be continually renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, and challenged by pressures that are counter-hegemonic.

Moreso, a summary of the criticism of domination hegemonic narrative unearths two schools of thought. The first group, mainly represented by Krasner (1982; 1983) and Koehane (1984), argued that though a hegemon is a necessary condition for establishing hegemony in the international arena, a hegemony might outlive the life span of a hegemon. Therefore, attention should not be on the hegemon, but the mechanism and process of maintaining the hegemony. The logic and force of their arguments helped created a paradigm shift in the study of hegemony and hegemon in International Relations because it unearthed new frontiers; perhaps due to the increased attention it brough to the conditions, processes, and mechanisms for establishing and maintaining hegemony. However, there

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cannot be a hegemony without a hegemon or a hegemon without a hegemony. The second criticism of the domination-led narrative of hegemony, as firmly represented by Cox (1993), is that it neglects the place of social forces such as culture and ideology in the formation of hegemony. Toeing the line of Gramsci, proponents of this argument forcefully pushed for the understanding and analysis of hegemony beyond state-centric perspectives of domination to include social forces. According to Antoniades (2008: 4), they argued that: World hegemony … is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries rules which support the dominant mode of production. The Gramscian approach locates the subject of hegemony not in a powerful state but in transnational social forces that dominate in the mode of production.

Although the above submission brought Marxian flavour to hegemonic discourse in International Relations, its analysis still does not proffer a coherent and empirical understanding of current happenings in International Relations. By always locating the understanding of hegemon and hegemony in the social forces of production, it naturally suffers from economic determinism. Despite these sustained challenges to the domination-led narrative of hegemony, it is still the prevailing narrative towards the understanding and application of the concept in International Relations. This particular line of argument has commandeered and dominated the discourse on hegemony not because of its infallibility but due to its analytical usefulness in the understanding of global politics (Yazid, 2015). Also, this strand of argument has greatly enhanced the understanding of happenings in the various regions in international politics. In fact, most discourse on regional hegemony stems from this standpoint (Nolte, 2010). Moreover, regional hegemony as a concept in International Relations is nascent and this is because robust intellectual attention on regional power started in the last three decades (Destradi, 2010; Nolte, 2010; Prys, 2008; Buzan, 1998). The consequences of this intellectual ferment are that the concept of regional power is widely used today but very difficult to define (Buzan, 1998). In the literature, there is widespread disagreement as to the right nomenclature to apply to the concept. Terms like regional hegemony, middle power, and regional powers are used so interchangeably that the

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concept does not just suffer from conceptual fuzziness but risks becoming an empty idea (Vayryen, 2003). Corroborating this view, Nolte (2010) noted that there is still an absence of diagnostic tools and experimental research with regard to the what, when, where, and how of regional powers. Yet, the study of regions and all that concerns it are quite central to our understanding of global politics. In this regard, Acharya (2007: 630) agrees that: The study of regional orders including the construction and organisation of regions, the cultural, political, economic, and strategic interactions that occur both within and between regions and the relationship between these interactions and the international system at large is vital to our understanding of how the world works.

This charge was answered by many scholars and the study of regions quickly became the buzzword in International Relations, to the point that its apologists equated regions and all that concerned them with the study of International Relations (Fawn, 2009). In fact, according to Osterud (1992, cited in Ogunnubi, Onapajo, and Isike, 2016: 3) a regional power is conceptualised as: A state that is (1) a geographical part of a delineated region; (2) able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the region; (3) highly influential in regional affairs; and (4) in contrast to a middle power, might also be a great power at the world scale in addition to its regional standing.

Regional powers are seen as beacons of examples and a shining light within a given region because other states within that region look up to them for leadership (Schrim, 2005). Leadership in much of the literature has become a major criterion amidst other capabilities to be recognised as a regional power, particularly with the rise of new regional powers (Hulse, 2016). As Hulse (2016) further notes that in terms of regional powerhood, apart from possessing superior material dominance, the willingness to act is essential, which in its absence, any secondary power with no such material dominance could step-in to fill the vacuum. In general terms, a regional power should be able to construct its incontestable leadership role, as well as drive and sustain a common regional identity, possess the ability to provide collective goods, and also be seen to be an eligible representative of regional interests in international gatherings and platforms (Nolte, 2010, cited in Hulse, 2016). The above qualities do not necessarily translate into a regional power as a hegemon as may have been erroneously attributed, because, in most cases, there is an observed achievement-expectation gap (Prys, 2010). As a result, a regional power might assume any of these three roles: a regional dominator which “commands and extracts involuntary tributes from the

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secondary states under a constant threat of force”; a regional hegemon which “carries most of the burdens in the region and, at most, collects contributions from secondary states, which are mostly used for the production of common goods”; or a detached regional power “induced either by insufficient resources or, for instance, by a lack of identification with the region. Such an actor will focus largely on domestic and/or on global politics, instead of on its regional role” (Prys, 2010: 489). Thus, given these variegated roles, it is abnormal to give a blanket status to recognised regional powers because of the inherent dynamics. From the foregoing, therefore, it may seem that no regional powers such as Brazil, China, India, Saudi Arabia or – in Africa – South Africa and Nigeria can be said to be dominators or hegemons at the same time. There seems to be a dearth of African literature on regions and regional power. Up until recently, little or no attention was paid to investigate the presence, roles, prospects, and even problems of a regional hegemon within the African landscape. This, according to Vayryren (2003), was because the fragmented nature of politics in African states and the hydra-headed problem of state-building did not create room for the emergence and manifestation of regional hegemony. Although, he acknowledged the presence of South Africa, Nigeria, and Senegal as having the potentials of regional hegemony. Yet, he did not cherry-pick any as a force to be reckoned with in the enterprise of regional hegemony. But in the next section of this piece, this claim will be examined. Though there are recent attempts to interrogate and capture the dynamics and manifestations of the regional power architecture of the African continent, scholars such as Borzel and Risse (2017), Mcnamee (2016), Talibu and Ahamed (2016), Ogunnubi, Onapajo, and Isike (2016), Ogunnubi and Uzodike (2015), Odigbo, Udaw, and Igwe (2014), Tella and Ogunnubi (2014), Sidiropoulos (2014), Smith (2013), Ogunnubi (2013), Bach (2012; 2007), and Landsberg (2009), among others, have made a concerted effort to proffer keen insight and provide fresh understanding to the discourse on middle power, pivotal states, and regional hegemonic structures in Africa. Yet, more clarifications are needed to understand the how, where, and what of regional powers such as South Africa and Nigeria, and their hegemonic hold in the African continent (Ogunnubi, 2013).

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One Dream, Two Actors: Nigeria and South Africa Compared Power and hegemonic discourse in Africa may be seemingly ongoing, given the marginalised status or underrepresentation of events in Africa in mainstream International Relations. It is no longer news that the African continent is either understudied or not brought to the fore in International Relations (Niang, 2016; Falaye, 2014; Smith, 2009). Though this view has been contested by scholars who argued that such marginalisation is more imagined than real (Erforth, 2014; Harman and Brown, n.d). Be it as it may, Africa is too important to be ignored in International Relations (Smith, 2009), especially in hegemonic and power discourse due to the fact that one out of every ten persons in the world is an African and that one out of every four nations on earth are located in Africa (Murphy, 2001, in Falaye, 2014). Again, the continent has had an inglorious past and present, that houses interactions and relations such as slavery trade, colonialism, AIDS, debt, and a host of other issues between itself and global powers. Also, Africa being part of the global South, is more often regarded as a lab rat for theoretical and empirical testing of concepts such as state, regime change, democracy, and ethnicity, among others. But more importantly, it is also the home of emerging new power structures and a site where old powers do play (Harman and Brown, n.d). Moreover, at the heart of power and hegemonic discourse in Africa is the question of “if”, “what”, and “how”. The first question of “if” largely focuses on the possibility of any countries within the continent that have the right set of power capabilities and hegemonic influence. This narrative is a contested terrain because scholars such as Borzel and Risse (2017) and Mcnamee (2016) argue that there is a clear-cut absence of a regional hegemon in the continent. Scholars from this orientation do not believe that any country within Africa possesses enough credentials to be respected and regarded as a regional hegemon. For instance, Borzel and Risse (2017) note that at best, what we have are emerging economies and not regional hegemons, because they only have economic resources and sometimes military capabilities, which have earned them some measure of influence in their region. In the same vein, Mcnamee (2016) notes that if at all there was any regional hegemon in Africa, it would be among South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria. However, the ambivalence around this debate seems to brew negative externalities since this perspective is anchored in the fact that most if not all African countries are troubled by weak economies, persistent poverty, endemic corruption, and chronic dependency. Put differently, resource-rich

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Africa is populated by countries with disarticulated and dependent economic structures, fussy foreign policy, and mutual distrust between and among themselves. Unfortunately, this has, over the years, prevented the ossification of a scholarly consensus recognising regional hegemons within the African continent. The empirical correctness and logical coherence of the above argument are flawed because the criteria and conditions for regional hegemony such as clearly postulated by Prys (2008; 2010), Nolte (2007), and others is somewhat if not sufficiently met by Nigeria and South Africa (Ogunnubi, 2013). According to Nolte (2007), as cited in Odigbo, Udaw, and Igwe (2014: 93), these indices include but are not restricted to a state: which exerts … influence also (and more and more) by means of regional governance structures; which defines the regional security agenda in a significant way; whose leading position in the region is recognised or at least respected by other states inside and outside of the region, especially by other regional powers; which is integrated in interregional and global forums and institutions where it articulates not only its own interests but acts as well, at least rudimentarily, as a representative of regional interests.

It is interesting to note that South Africa, as the most developed economy in Africa, accounts for 20 percent of the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP). As a result, it has continued to use her position in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and the G20 group of countries to push for initiatives to further expand opportunities for developing nations (Yong, 2012). Furthermore, its effort to promote South-South co-operation through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and its advocacy for the reform of global institutions to reflect the interest of developing countries. Finally, South Africa is pushing for the establishment of an African Rapid Response Squad called the Africa Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) (Brosig and Sempijja, 2015). According to this arrangement, it will cover the “capacity gap” which seemingly the AU African Standby Force (ASF) has been incapable of doing. Remarkably, South Africa has to a great extent ensured peace in Burundi, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). On the other hand, Nigeria being the largest country on the continent, it has recorded several important regional feats, playing a prominent role in the transformation of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) and the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in collaboration with South Africa to proffer solutions to the problems plaguing the continent. Moreover, through the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), Nigeria has been able to “successfully use the subregional body’s

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ECOMOG as an instrument to perpetuate its power politics within the subregion” (Ogunnubi and Uzodike, 2016), thereby stamping its authority in West Africa. Though its foreign policy is an Afrocentric one, its reach has gone beyond the continent. Ogunnubi and Uzodike (2016) further noted that Nigeria through its foreign policy initiatives has used the Technical Aid Corp Scheme (TACS) to give technical and developmental support to both African and Caribbean countries. However, we can glean from these two regional powers in terms of hegemonic displays that fall within the remit of specific policy pursuits, mostly and actively in conflict resolution of regional crises, and heavily bankrolled by structural mechanisms it sanctions. While both Nigeria and South Africa possess the hegemonic capabilities, it may arguably seem that it is mainly in the resolution of conflicts that they have actively exercised their claims compared to other areas, as may be illustrated by the examples cited above. The second question revolves around “what” country possesses the power capabilities and hegemonic influence. If there is a hegemon in Africa, it is either Nigeria or South Africa, as both countries based on strategic positions and capabilities compete and vie for dominance within the continent. In this regard, Ogunnubi and Isike (2015: 152-153) posited that: In the past couple of years, there have been rigorous attempts by scholars to examine the power architecture within Africa, drawing largely from general international relations theories and frameworks to make inferences about the location and exercise of power and influence … Specific attention (is being paid) to dissecting the increasing role of pivotal states such as South Africa and Nigeria within Africa and the global South.

The roles played by both states within the African continent range from peacekeeping missions in conflict and war-torn countries, mediating between warring countries and parties, to providing the right sense of leadership and exuding the correct sense of democratic values for other African countries to emulate (Bach, 2012; Landsberg, 2009). For instance, prior to and after independence, Nigerian leaders and successive governments have seen the salvation of Africa as its manifest destiny, demonstrating long years of Afrocentric foreign policies such as the fighting of oppressive white rule in Southern Africa especially in Angola and South Africa, instituting programs such as TACS to galvanise development in countries with the African diaspora around the world, organising and creating regional organisations such as the AU and the ECOWAS to promote political, social, and economic co-operation among member states, embarking on

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peacekeeping missions in war-torn African countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, resolving political crises in African countries such as Ivory Coast and Liberia, to mention a few (Amao and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). In the same vein, South Africa since the end of apartheid rule in 1994 has also played regional hegemonic roles, especially through its robust economy and presence of its multinational corporations within the continent, leadership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), intervention in conflicts within its region such as in the DRC, and active participation in the transformation of the OAU to the AU. These roles and many others have fetched and earned both countries the mandate to contend for the pole position to be adjudged a regional hegemon. Both countries have tried over the years to intervene and resolve socioeconomic and political conflicts within the continent in the bid to provide African solutions to African problems. Yet the questions remain, can there be two regional hegemons in Africa? This debate featured prominently in the works of scholars such as Ogunnubi (2013) Odigbo, Udaw, and Igwe (2014), Tella and Ogunnubi (2014), Sidiropoulos (2014), Ogunnubi and Uzodike (2015), Ogunnubi, Onapajo, and Isike (2016), and Talibu and Ahamed (2016), amongst others. A thorough analysis of their works shows that it is a mixed bag of arguments on the potentials of South Africa and Nigeria to be a regional hegemon. One angle to this argument believes that if there exists any hegemon in Africa, then it is South Africa and not Nigeria that has such calling and potential. Scholars of this persuasion (Ogunnubi, 2013; Sidiropoulos, 2014) argue that South Africa is at the pole position of any hegemonic discourse in the Africa continent, given its robust economy, democratic values, and iconic leaders. According to Ogunnubi and Isike (2015: 170): South Africa has been able to attract a greater degree of legitimacy, recognition and acceptance from its regional neighbours than Nigeria … South Africa since 1994 has come into its own as a benign regional hegemonic power on the strength of its willingness to cooperate with other regional actors in forging solutions both for Africa and the global South.

The central thesis of their argument is that South Africa may be the only hegemon on the continent because it has what it takes to be seen and considered as one. Within this perspective is the reasoning that South Africa has what it takes, more so than Nigeria to project its power, consolidate or reify its hegemonic status in the continent (Ogunnubi, 2013). Further, of late, there is a concerted effort by South Africa to fulfil and rise to the expectations of the West and the international community as Africa’s leader and a beacon of example (Sidiropoulos, 2014).

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Despite the forceful and convincing nature of their argument, it has also attracted a number of criticisms. For instance, Alden and Schoeman (2016) argue otherwise, noting that South Africa’s claim to hegemonic status is not just bogus but equally built on a false premise, given the fact that South Africa’s hegemonic dominance in Africa is limited to a few neighbouring states, its economic successes cannot be replicated in other African states, and its hard power base is relatively weak. And therefore, such hegemonic claims by South Africa cannot stand on the pedestal of empirical scrutiny. Also, another angle to the strand of argument on the presence of a sole hegemon in Africa is the view that Nigeria is the only one that has the credentials of a regional power with hegemonic influence. Scholars of this orientation (Talibu and Ahamed, 2016; Odigbo, Udaw, and Igwe, 2014; Bach, 2012; 2007) accept the fact that over the years, Nigeria has played serious leadership roles within the continent. The Nigerian state, since its independence and under successive governments and regimes, has clearly adopted Africa as the epicentre of its foreign policy thrust. In fact, it is the manifest destiny of Nigeria to save Africa. Nigeria, more than any other African country has contributed more in terms of human and material resources to United Nations peacekeeping efforts in the continent, created and funded regional organisations such as the AU, the ECOWAS, and the African Development Bank, among others, to promote and foster political, social, and economic cooperation among member states. Also, Nigeria has a long history of fighting oppressive white domination on the continent like in Southern Africa and is largely involved in the settling of disputes and conflicts among African countries like in Ivory Coast and Liberia. And more recently, it has assumed the bulwark of democratic rule with its intervention in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau to restore democratic governance. In this regard, General Agwai (2010), the head of the UN/AU joint force in Darfur, cited in Talibu and Ahamed (2016: 9) noted that: The commitment to global peace in the UN has continued to define Nigeria’s foreign policy since her independence in 1960. And nowhere is it more evident than in Africa which has remained the cornerstone of her foreign policy. Today, Nigeria is the leading peace-keeping nation in Africa and has shown tremendous leadership in all regional and continental efforts in conflict management.

Although these scholars are also quick to point out and accept the fact that there are internal and external challenges that stand against Nigeria’s hegemonic status in Africa, which includes but are not restricted to corruption, vague foreign policies, and Boko Haram insurgency, amongst others. In the same vein, Ogunnubi and Uzodike (2016) argued that factors

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such as economic capacity, the texture of polity, foreign policy articulation, international public image, and external contexts are crucial in understanding Nigeria’s hegemonic contention in Africa because they make or mar the projection of Nigeria’s hegemonic aura. It is an incontestable fact that the Nigerian state is besieged by factors such as the federation's systemic instability, dependent economic structures, weak institutionalisation, and weak territorial control over borderlands and entry points. In fact, these factors have caused Nigeria’s contribution to regionalism and regional integration not to produce tangible results (Bach, 2007). Arising from the above discourse, it is pertinent, therefore, to deduce that there are powerful states with hegemonic influence in Africa, which is evident by the presence and antecedent of countries such as South Africa and Nigeria. Then why is there limited academic inquiry in understanding how these states apply their power capabilities to further or strengthen their hegemonic hold on the continent? Why is there hesitation by foreign policymakers of these countries to incorporate fully, their power resources in foreign policy to enhance their dominance in Africa? To this end, there is an urgent need for scholars of African extraction and persuasion to interrogate this academic lacuna.

Conclusion It has been noted that for Africa to remain relevant to International Relations discourses and for International Relations to remain useful to various contexts in Africa, scholars of African extraction or persuasion should start applying theoretical frameworks and methodological assumptions of International Relations to study Africa. Further, studies and empirical realities from Africa useful to the study of International Relations should be investigated. In line with the above, International Relations concepts and constructs such as region, power, hegemony, and all the theoretical assumptions and diverse methodological orientations associated with them should be applied to understand their dynamics and manifestations in Africa. However, much needs to be done. Their analytical usefulness and empirical accuracy should be tested. Their assumptions, conclusions, and prescriptions should be empirically verified using case studies such as Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria and South Africa, being useful case studies to the interrogation of power and hegemony in Africa, should be systematically studied to better understand their capabilities and influence. Concerted academic efforts should be made using International Relations concepts and constructs to

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offer fresh intellectual light to unravel their power attributes and hegemonic influence within the African region. This should be done using academic analogies, analytical tools, and empirical realities from the continent. More so, foreign policymakers and practitioners in Africa, especially in Nigeria and South Africa, should calibrate the assumptions, conclusions, and prescriptions about power and hegemony in their foreign policy. There should be a nexus between theory and practice. Foreign policymakers should readily apply domesticated and indigenous theoretical assumptions of International Relations in Africa. Theory should meet praxis in the study of International Relations in Africa.

References Acharya, A. 2007. The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics. World Politics, 59(4), 629-52. Alden, C. and Schoeman, M. 2015. South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony in Africa. International Politics, 52(2), 239-254. Amao, O.L. and Okeke-Uzodike, U. 2015. Nigeria, Afrocentrism, and Conflict Resolution: After Five Decades-How Far, How Well? African Studies Quarterly, 15(4), 1-24. Animashaun, M.A. 2009. State failure, Crisis of Governance and Disengagement from the State in Africa. Africa Development, 34, 3-4. Antoniades, A. 2008. From Theories of Hegemony to Hegemony Analysis in International Relations. In: 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), 26-30 March 2008. San Francisco, USA. Antwi-Boasiako, K.B. 2014. Rethinking Utopianism, International Relations Theory, and Marginalisation of Africa in Global Politics. Journal of Comparative Politics, 7(2), 34. Bach, D. 2012. The Dilemmas of Regionalization. In: Adebajo, A. and Rashid, I. eds. West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner. Bach, D.C. 2007. Nigeria’s “Manifest Destiny” in West Africa: Dominance Without Power. Africa Spectrum, 42(2), 301-321. Baldwin, D. 2002. Power and International Relations. In: Risse C.T. and Simmons B.A. eds. Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage Publishers. Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. 2005. Power in International Politics. International Organisation, 59(1), 39-75.

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Nye, J.S. 1990. Soft power. Foreign policy, 80, 153-171. Nye, J.S. 2004. The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry. Foreign Affairs, 83(3), 16-20. Nye, J.S. 2009. Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power. Foreign Affairs, 88(4), 160-163. Odigbo, J., Udaw, J.E., and Igwe, A.F. 2014. Regional Hegemony and Leadership Space in Africa: Assessing Nigeria’s Prospects and Challenges. Review of History and Political Science, 2(1), 89-105. Ogunnubi, O.R. 2013. Hegemonic Order and Regional Stability in SubSaharan Africa: A Comparative Study of Nigeria and South Africa. Doctoral dissertation. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg. Ogunnubi, O. and Isike, C. 2015. Regional Hegemonic Contention and the Asymmetry of Soft Power: A Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Nigeria. Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 37(1), 152. Ogunnubi, O. and Okeke-Uzodike, U. 2016. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? African Security Review, 25(2), 110-128. Ogunnubi, O., Onapajo, H., and Isike, C. 2016. A Failing Regional Power? Nigeria’s International Status in the Age of Boko Haram. Politikon, 120. Østerud, O. 1992. Regional Great Powers. In: Regional Great Powers and International Politics. Neuman, I.B. ed. Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press. Pallaver, M. 2011. Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart. A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Master of Philosophy. London, October 2011 Petersen, K. 2012. Four Types of Power in International Relations; Coercive Power, Bargaining Power, Concerted Power, and Institutionalized Power. In: A Paper for IPSA, XXIInd World Congress of Political Science, Madrid. Prys, M. 2010. The Variability of Regional Powers. Paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR, Stockholm, Sweden. Rasheed, M.F. 1995. The Concept of Power in International Relations. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 48(1), 95-99. Rather, A. and Jose, K. 2015. United Nations and the U.S Hegemony in the Post-Cold War World Order. International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2(4), 53-60. Resnick, S.A and Wolff R.D. 1982. Marxist Epistemology: The Critique of Economic Determinis. Social Text, 6(3), 31-72. Riker, W.H. 1964. Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power. American Political Science Review, 58(2), 341-349.

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Schoeman, M. 2015. South Africa as an Emerging Power: From Label to ‘Status Consistency’? South African Journal of International Affairs, 22(4), 429-445. Schrim, A.S. 2006. Leadership in Regional and Global Politics: Why do Emerging Powers (Sometimes) Fail to Reach Their Goals? A paper presented at the Workshop for The Rise of (New) Regional Powers in Global and Regional Politics. German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, 11-12 December 2006. Sidiropoulos, E. 2014. South Africa’s Emerging Soft Power. Current History, 133(763), 197-202. Smith P.H. 2007. The Hard Road Back to Soft Power. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 8(1), 15-123. Smith, K. 2012. Soft Power: the Essence of South Africa’s Foreign Policy. South African Foreign Policy Review, 1, 68-83. Smith, K. 2012. Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International Relations. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 98(402), 269-284. Talibu, O. and Ahmed, M.Z. 2016. Empiricising Regional Hegemony in the Periphery: A Case Study of Nigeria. Journal of International Affairs and Global Strategy, 48, 8-18. Tella, O. and Ogunnubi, O. 2014. Hegemony or survival: South Africa's Soft Power and the Challenge of Xenophobia. Africa Insight, 44(3), 145163. Van Wyk, J.A. 2016. Africa in International Relations: Agent, Bystander or Victim? In: Africa in Global International Relations, 126-138. London: Routledge. Väyrynen, R. 2003. Regionalism: Old and New. International Studies Review, 5(1), 25-51. Victor, A.O.A. 2014 Nigeria’s rebased Economy and its Role in Regional and Global Politics. Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/13/ nigerias-rebased-economy-and-its-role-in-regional-and-global-politics/. Walker, T.C. and Morton, J.S. 2005. Re-assessing the “Power of Power Politics.” Thesis: Is Realism Still Dominant? International Studies Review, 7(2), 341-356. Wheatley, R. 2009. Contemporary Re-examination of African International Relations. Thesis (MA) submitted to Clark University Atlanta. [Accessed 23 August 2017]. Yilmaz, S.E. 2010. State, Power and Hegemony. Centre for Promoting Ideas, USA, 1(3), 192-205.

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Yong, Wang 2012. South Africa’s Role in the BRICS and G20: China’s View. South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Occasional Paper, No. 127.

CHAPTER FOUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF REGIONAL POWERS IN AFRICA: NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE SAMUEL OYEWOLE

Abstract Military is a dimension of power that has received insufficient attention and mixed reactions from students of International Relations in Africa. Given the non-lethal orientation of the Africanist school of International Relations and the growing advocacy for human security in place of national security, military capabilities, power, and, by association, security, are viewed with scepticism in African studies. This is, however, detrimental to the politics of military policy and strategic planning in the region. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to bridge the gap between Africanism and the associated desire for human security and realism and its national security focus, to appraise military power and its relevance in Africa. The aim is to assess the military capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa in comparative perspective with other regional military powers in Africa and associated geostrategic dynamics. Both realist and Africanist rationalisms indicate that the military capabilities of these two regional powers are not suitable for reckless power projections, although they offer enough latitudes for responsible military power projection, most especially in their respective spheres of influence. Keywords: Africa; Capability; Military; Nigeria; Regional Power; Security; South Africa

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Introduction Despite some reservations, which mainly revolve around the internal political economy, Nigeria and South Africa are considerable giants and regional powers in Africa (Alao, 2011; Bach, 2007; Ogunnubi, 2015; Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). This is most evident through notable indicators of power and influence such as economic, political/diplomatic, and military capabilities. These two countries account for 20 percent of the population of the 54 African countries (AfDB, 2017). As the two largest economies on the continent, they accounted for 35 percent of the region’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2015 (AfDB, 2017). The diplomatic prowess of the two countries is also evident in their status as the dominant players in their respective sub-regions (Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa) and in sponsorship of the most efficient subregional institutions in the continent, and their frequent elections, selections, and undertakings to lead or represent Africa in the international forum or community generally (Scholvin, 2016; Adebajo, 2010; 2017). Equally, their status and power in the continent are not without a military dimension. The two countries are among the leading African nations in military expenditure and have displayed the capabilities of their armed forces through a considerable record of military engagements with varying degrees of success. Although there are many (not necessarily adequate) single case studies on the military capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa, there are few comparative analyses of the subject matter (Alli, 2012; Bassey and Dokubo, 2011; Imobighe, 2003; Ogunnubi, 2013; Polhemus, 1977; Stapleton, 2010). Besides, the majority of the available comparative analyses on Nigerian and South African military power focus on the general context of assessing the regional power potentials or positions of the two countries. In this manner, military power is often assessed using simple limited indicators on resources, most especially military spending and records of deployment, without adequate attention being paid the strategic posture and capabilities of the two powers. The relational dynamics of these indicators in regional power politics and associated strategic calculations at national and regional levels have also failed to receive adequate academic attention. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to examine military capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa in comparative perspective with other regional military powers in Africa and some of the associated geopolitical and strategic dynamics. This is vital to putting public opinion formation, policy advocacy, politics and policymaking, and strategic planning in their right perspectives.

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Military Capabilities of Regional Powers: A Conceptual Framework Power is an essential component and element that often features in social relations. This concept can be generally described to mean the ability to do something. It is the ability to make someone continue a course of action, change what he or she is doing, or refrain from acting (Kegley and Raymond, 2010). Beyond the general social importance of power, it is the central concept and subject of concern in the field of political science, and its sub-field of international relations. In international politics, which is the central focus of this discussion, power can be defined, accessed, or measured as control over resources, actors, or events and outcomes (Hart, 1976; Holsti, 1964). It is simply the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Realism, which is often considered to be the dominant paradigm in International Politics, is premised on the assumption that survival is a core interest of a state, and the pursuit of power is the only means to achieve this end (Dunne and Schmidt, 2014; William, 2005). Classical realism sees the international system as anarchical and power as primary to behaviours of state, which has survival or security as its primary or core interest (Bull, 1977; Morgenthau, 1991). In neorealism, order in the international system is considered a function of the structural arrangement of states based on their power capabilities (Waltz, 1979; Booth, 2011). Waltz (1979) argued that structures are defined not by all the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones. A state is attributed major power status if it is perceived by policymakers of other states within the international community as being unusually powerful and willing to influence the course of global affairs, and if they act toward it consistent with that perception (Volgy et al., 2011). Most analyses of structures of international politics give priority to power arrangement from the rank of superpowers to great powers, medium or middle powers, regional powers, and small powers (Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Calvocoressi, 2001; Huntington, 1999; Hurrell, 2006; Kissinger, 1994; Little, 2007; Waltz, 1993; 2000; Zakaria, 2008). Superpower is a status that requires global interests as well as sophisticated and broadspectrum capabilities, such as first-class military, political, and economic capabilities that are exercised, together with a self-constructed image that is substantially accepted across the whole of the international system. It also requires playing an active role in virtually every region of the world (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Great power requires interests and active roles in more

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than one region, with one or few elements of power as the basis for status and recognition globally. Regional power is a status that allows an actor to concentrate its interests and play major roles in a definite region. Regional power is a state which displays the material (military, economic, demographic), organisational (political), and ideological resources for regional power projection (Nolte, 2010). Despite their strategic relevance across time, regional powers largely started to receive serious academic attention recently, most especially after the end of Cold War and with the relative decline of the superpowers (Amusan and Oyewole, 2016; Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997; Østerud, 1992; Montgomery, 2016; Plagemann, 2015; Scholvin, 2016). Power has hard, soft, and smart dimensions in international politics. Hard power involves carrot and stick, whereas soft power entails the appeal inherent in one’s ideas or the ability to set political agendas in a way that shapes the preferences others express (Nye and Welch, 2013). Smart power involves a proportionate combination of both hard and soft power to achieve targeted goals. Elements of national power in international politics include geography, natural resources, industrial capacity and economic development, military preparedness, population, political legitimacy, national morale, access to information and quality of governance, culture and diplomacy, among others (Jablonsky, 2008; Tellis et al., 2000). These are important in assessing or measuring national power capabilities, and specific resources that are available for a state to influence or affect the behaviours of others. In this manner, there are cautions against reducing the essence of national power to one or a few elements (Tellis et al., 2000; Morgenthau, 1991). Nevertheless, the military capabilities of major powers remain a core element of national power that deserve careful attention in the analysis of the international balance of power (Posen, 2003). Military power can be defined as the construction, deployment, and use of organised armed forces to attain political objectives (Dorman et al., 2002). Ng (2005) also described military power as military readiness, that is, capacity, speed, and effectiveness required in warfare. Biddle (2004) divided military capability by ends: offensive and defensive. He defined offensive military capability as the capacity to destroy the largest possible defensive force over the largest possible territory with the smallest attacker casualties in the least time; defensive military capability is conversely the ability to preserve the largest possible defensive force over the largest possible territory with the greatest attacker casualties for the longest time (Biddle, 2004). In view of ends, means, and outcomes, Tellis et al. (2000) also divided military capability into three components: strategic resources,

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conversion capability, and combat proficiency. The strategic resources include the financial, human, physical, and technological resources that are available to the armed forces. The ability of the military to convert these resources depends on strategy vis-à-vis the threats, civil-military relations, relations with foreign forces, doctrine, training and organisation, and capacity for innovation. Combat proficiency is largely sensitive to variation in operations and its complexity, their realms—ground, naval, air, and space—and the required thresholds of technology and integrative capacity (Tellis et al., 2000; Ng, 2005).

Why Military Capabilities of Regional Power Matters in Africa With the academic and political attention on human security in Africa, there has been a growing concern against, and significant decline in, focus on military and associated power or security in the international politics of the region. This should not come as a surprise. Africa is known for poor human security indicators, with enduring threats of poverty, inequality, youth unemployment, illiteracy, brain drain, famine, starvation, malnutrition, diseases, crude death, environmental degradation, and poor governance (World Bank, 2018; UNDP, 2016). These and other factors, are contributing to security crises in Africa (Nnoli, 2008; World Bank, 2011). Hence, there is growing advocacy for investment in human development and security, and pacific settlement of disputes in the region. In some cases, the situation is described as human vs. state security conceptions, defence spending vs. health or education spending, among others. It is, therefore, crucial to examine the continuous academic interests in military power in Africa. Military is primarily required to advance national security interests. Huntington (1957) divided national security policy into three: military, internal, and situational security policies. Military security policy is the programme of activities designed to minimise or neutralise efforts to weaken or destroy the nation by armed forces operating from outside its institutional and territorial confines. Internal security policy deals with the threat of subversion, the efforts to weaken or destroy the state by forces operating from within its territorial and institutional confines (Huntington, 1957:1). Internal law and order are the primary responsibility of the police and other law enforcement agencies, of which their inadequate capacity often lead to or justify the deployment of the military. Situational security policy is mostly concerned with the threat of erosion resulting from longterm changes in social, economic, demographic, and political conditions

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tending to reduce the relative power of the state (Huntington, 1957:1). The prospects and challenges of the military and its involvement in these considerations are subject to debate. There is a general scepticism against military and associated power in Africa, particularly in social science research. First, in this consideration, the military is primarily required to defend the territorial integrity of a state against external aggression from another state. In some cases, the principle of pan-Africanism and associated regional mechanisms are often considered to have neutralised this threat, because it forbids war as a means of settling disputes and encourages states to live together as brothers and sisters (Tieku, 2015; see also Chapter Two of this book). Despite several enduring border disputes across Africa therefore, major interstate wars have been avoided recently. Second, there is a series of campaigns against military deployments and solutions amidst internal law enforcement challenges (Nnoli, 2008). This is often related to years of scepticism on the insubordination of the military to civil authority and extant laws, as evident with the record of coups and human rights abuses across Africa (Omotola, 2011; Carbone, 2013). There were 85 cases of military coups across Africa between 1960 and 2012 (Carbone, 2013). Third, the role of the armed forces in addressing social, economic, demographic, and political crises is largely unwelcome, given the experiences with military intervention and rules in Africa (Adekanye, 2008; Houngnikpo, 2016; Meredith, 2005). Despite the foregoing, there are notable misconceptions about military power, and deliberate attempts to ignore, overlook, or underestimate its relevance in Africa. Although this trend has declined drastically, Africa, however, has its own record of interstate wars and secessionist or rebel wars backed by foreign powers, where some of its armed forces have sacrificed so much to return stability (Clapham, 1996; Meredith, 2005). Moreover, it is erroneous to reduce military security policy to state-centric defence of a state against another state. This conception overlooks the existence and threats from armed non-state actors, which have increasingly become transnational in their ideological motivations, strategic doctrines, operational targets and geography, procurement, recruitment, funding, and training and support bases (Bobbitt, 2008; Okumu and Ikelegbe, 2010; Norwitz, 2009; Gumedze, 2011; Oyewole, 2018a). There is a growing threat of violence by armed non-state groups like organised bandits, pirates, terrorists, militias, militants, warlords, gunrunners, drug barons, and insurgents in Africa. These are responsible for the murder and injury of millions of people, displacement and psychological trauma and social disintegrations of

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communities, billions of dollars in financial cost, and unquantifiable socioeconomic loss in affected countries. Global Terrorism Data (GTD) records 10,266 terrorist attacks and 45,903 fatalities in 50 African countries between 1970 and 2011 and 9,466 terrorist attacks, which resulted in the death of 16,987 people, between 2012 and 2015. This shows an increasing trend in terrorism and demand for more protection of civilians in Africa. The Somali pirates on the east coast of Africa were responsible for 30 percent (939 of the 3,093) of the attacks recorded by pirates globally between 2007 and 2016. They are estimated to have received between US $339 million and US $413 million as ransom for hijacked ships and/or kidnapped seafarers between 2005 and 2012 and estimated to cost US $3,153 billion between 2012 and 2015 in economic loss (Oyewole, 2017a). On the west coast of Africa, the pirates of the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) are responsible for about 747 attacks between 2000 and 2015. This hotspot is responsible for the most notorious and deadliest record of piracy and the most alarming record of kidnapping globally, with 100 percent of reported cases in 2013 (Oyewole, 2015; 2016a). The pirate groups in the region were estimated to have made US$10 million to US $30 million over the attack and theft of products of five oil tankers in 2013 and US $14 million to US$42 million on seven similar cases in 2012 (Oyewole, 2015; 2016b). Between 1997 and 2015, 117,822 incidents of armed conflicts were recorded across Africa, from which as many as 635,677 people lost their lives (ACLED, 2016). Amidst the emerging threats of armed non-state actors, weak institutional capacity and political fragility of many African countries have undermined soft approaches to crisis management such as dialogue, political solutions, and internal law enforcement systems. Hence, as these countries struggle to build necessary capacities, the immediate need for stability mostly favours military deployment to maintain the quantity and quality of the security presence to protect lives and properties. It is important to note that the majority of the population that are trapped in conflict are more interested in the quantity and quality of security presence, and not the deadlocked debate on the rationales for military deployment among elites (Adeshina, 2002; Oyewole, 2013; 2017b). No matter the level of stability of a country, however, the need to maintain a sort of monopoly, maintain control over the use of force or violence, deter or prepare for the eventuality of armed insurrection, and to protect citizens from (actual or potential) threats emanating from armed non-state actors continued to necessitate the formation and maintenance of standing forces (see Churter, 2011).

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Although the question of effective control of the armed forces by civil authorities in Africa is enduring, it is important to note that there is a declining trend of military insurrection, as evident in the insignificant record of coups reported in the region in the last decade. Moreover, the utility that is derived from the unique capabilities of the military in situational security crises globally cannot be ignored and are largely desirable in Africa. The armed forces are increasingly playing important roles in disaster management, such as massive evacuations when there is an early warning of a disaster, as well as search and rescue missions during earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, and floods, among others (Chand, 2010; Oyewole, 2018b; Wiharta, 2008). When it comes to protecting critical infrastructure such as power grids, nuclear facilities, and transport systems (rail, airports, waterways, and major bridges) that are central to the economic interests of the state and its citizens amidst the threats of socio-political forces (like rioters and armed groups), the armed forces are well placed to support law enforcement agencies. Their unique capabilities can also provide invaluable support to the authorities in prompt response to medical emergencies such as the outbreak of diseases like Ebola and in cases of famine in affected regions. Despite the notable prospects of military power as highlighted above, many armed forces in Africa are as weak as their state sponsors. These, among others, has raised the importance of regional military power. Should all African states turn themselves into observers while one or a number of them are collapsing under the pressure of armed conflicts with non-state actors? If yes, what is the essence of the pan-Africanist spirit and its principle of “Africa first”, otherwise known as “African solutions to African problems”? (Amusan and Oyewole, 2017). Besides, if African states always have to wait for foreign powers to intervene, they should be ready to live with the consequences (Miller, 2007). Hence, the continent has to endure the dominant narrative in the West that Africa does not matter (Bolton, 2008). Although this narrative has been challenged based on the abundant resources in the region and the way other regions of the world rely on their supply, the geopolitical positions of the region and its leading states are more important in this consideration. If Africa must do something, however, there is the question of who should respond, when, and how. Although there are always several options, urgent security situations always require urgent stability measures where the military is mostly required. The preferred option in Africa is for regional institutions to initiate, approve, and oversee any military interventions required in hotspots in the region. However, there is a limit to the initiative that less militarily powerful states can advance and

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support in this consideration. In essence, regional powers are mostly expected to initiate, engage, and bankroll such initiatives.

Methodological Challenges Before the attention of this chapter is turned to military powers in Africa, with a special focus on Nigeria and South Africa, there is a need to consider mythological challenges in assessing the military capabilities of a state. The foremost concern here is that information about the military capabilities of every country is always classified. This is privileged information that most of the few people that have access to it are not at liberty to divulge. Contrary action to this tenet will contravene the oath of office that allows them access to such information which could amount to treason and attract varying degrees of punishment across countries. This is not farfetched, keeping certain capabilities of the state away from other states, particularly actual or potential enemies or rivals, is essential in strategic calculation and, most especially, to maintain the element of surprise in either defensive or offensive warfare. Similarly, keeping certain military interests and capabilities away from the public reduces ethical questions and public scrutiny that may delay, obstruct, or reverse their development as well as intended strategic and tactical benefits. Despite the foregoing, there is growing advocacy for transparency in military capabilities and interests globally, with some commendable progress in terms of results. The search for peace against the menace of war and security assurance amidst distrust and rivalry have encouraged nations to considerably adopt a tradition of declaring their capabilities and their increases to place their intentions in the right perspective and avoid miscalculations by other nations, which could result in unwanted war. Besides, declared military capabilities have deterrence value on other states so that they do not overestimate their chances in battle with the state in question. This practice is also central to the principle of balance of power since the Concert of Europe and the so-called balance of terror during the Cold War, which considerably helped to maintain peace among the powers. The United Nations, especially its office on disarmament, among other international organisations are playing a notable role in assessing the capabilities of member states. Equally, the global waves of democratisation have increasingly opened government, its military establishment, and activities to public scrutiny. These among others provide policy analysts with considerable data to assess the military capabilities of a state and compare them.

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Military capability is not as absolute as it is always presented in terms of resources, but relative and relational. In essence, its value is determined relatively or in relation to threats or other states. Military capability can be assessed using qualitative and quantitative methods or a combination thereof. Although comparative analysis is increasingly becoming quantitatively biased, a mixed method of analysis often gives a better picture. As it can be deduced from the conceptual framework, there is no consensus on what constitutes military capability or power and how to measure it, nor a perfect dataset or estimation on the subject. However, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) databases, the Military Balance by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), and Global Firepower are prominent among publicly available datasets. Arms Transfers Databases (since 1950), Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, Arms Industry Database (100 largest arms-producing and military services corporations), Multinational Peace Operations Database (since 2000), and Military Expenditure Database (since 1949) by SIPRI provide invaluable resources to military analysts globally. Military Balance provides an annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics of 171 countries worldwide. It is a comprehensive, concise, and detailed publicly available data on the organisation, personnel, (conventional and non-conventional) equipment (by types and specifications), and deployment of state military and, to an extent, paramilitary and in some cases armed non-state groups globally. Global Firepower ranks 135 countries globally based on the general overview of data on military budget, personnel, conventional equipment (by types), and logistics support. Since 1997, Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED-P) with most focus on Africa and Middle East, provides relatively detailed data on state and non-state actors’ involvement in armed conflicts, from where the performance of military can also be assessed. There are many other related databases. While there are unique criticisms of each of these databases, and none of them is perfect, yet they provide us varying degrees of qualitative and quantitative data that are required to assess and compare military capabilities and powers.

Military Powers in Africa This section seeks to examine the capabilities of leading military powers in Africa and the unique nature of Nigeria and South Africa in this context. In this consideration, data is adapted from Global Firepower, mainly because

Egypt Algeria South Africa Nigeria Angola Ethiopia Morocco Sudan Libya DR Congo

1 2 3

43 48 51 55 70 74 75

Global rank of 136 12 23 33

124,000 175,500 162,000 373,000 282,150 100,000 144,625

Total military personnel 1,329,250 792,350 94,050 124 283 80 284 186 118 40

Total aircraft strength 1,132 528 209 148 244 800 1,276 360 340 200

4,946 2,405 195

Combat tanks

1,420 538 800 2,348 415 699 210

Armoured fighting vehicles 15,695 6,754 2,265 364 360 785 640 766 200 100

3,328 490 140

Artillery

30 115 183 72 25 100 0

1,216 176 50

Rocket projectors

Note: Total military personnel includes both active and reserve; artillery includes both self-propelled and towed. Source: Compiled from Global Firepower (2018).

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Countries

No

Table 1: Military Powers in Africa and some of their assets as at 2018

Military Capabilities of Regional Powers in Africa

75 57 0 121 18 5 20

Total naval assets 319 85 30

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it is convenient with its readymade ranking of military powers. Given the multiple indicators that are involved in this case, the ranking is considered to be more comprehensive when compared with studies that rank military powers in Africa on the basis of their military expenditure. While Military Balance also provides more details than Global Firepower, this section is more interested in a general overview of military capabilities of leading powers in Africa. As evident in Table 1, the ten leading military powers in Global Firepower ranking in Africa are Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Morocco, Sudan, Libya, and DR Congo in their descending order. It is important to note that Military Balance provides a relatively lower figure for the total number of military personnel of these countries and a considerably higher figure for their equipment. On the surface, however, Table 1 can be loosely interpreted to mean that Egypt and Algeria are the dominant or super-powers in Africa, with capabilities that surpass eight countries, which appear to be medium powers to them in the regional power structure. To an extent, this will amount to a strategic miscalculation. Geopolitically, Egyptian military power was designed to respond to threats to its territorial integrity, mainly from Israel. Besides the enduring efforts to suppress domestic insurrection, Egyptian military power projection is largely concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa, where there is relative balance of powers with closely comparable military powers like Algeria, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia as well as Iraq and Libya until recently (IISS, 2018; Global Firepower, 2018). North African powers - with the exception of Libya - have displayed little military interest and power projection in Sub-Saharan Africa, beyond their immediate neighbourhood. In this manner, the Egyptian naval power has made little or no international headlines in the war against Somali-based piracy beyond the Red Sea. This contrasts with the roles of the Nigerian navy in the Gulf of Guinea and the increasing roles of the South African navy in the western Indian Ocean. Despite the foregoing, one cannot totally ignore the Africanity of the Egyptian foreign policy and geopolitical interests. Table 2 shows that Egypt has contributed significantly to peacekeeping in Africa. About 96 percent of Egyptian troops deployed for peacekeeping between 1990 and 2018 were deployed to Africa. In this way, Egypt was responsible for more than 7 percent of African troops deployed for peacekeeping in Africa within this period. Morocco also deployed 99 percent of its peacekeeping troops to Africa, which was approximately 5.6 percent of the total African troops deployed for peacekeeping in the continent within this period. However, the same thing cannot be said of other military powers in North Africa, most

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especially Algeria and Libya, who, despite their enormous military strength in the continent, have contributed little to peacekeeping globally or regionally. Angola, DR Congo, and Sudan also fall into a similar category of military powers that have contributed little to peacekeeping regionally or globally. Table 2: Peacekeeping Personnel Deployed by Major African Powers, 1990-2018 Total Deployment Globally

Total Military Deployment Globally

Total deployment in Africa

Total Military Deployment in Africa

Algeria

5,253

612

2,870

466

Angola

0

0

0

0

DR Congo

18,176

13,977

18,128

13,977

Egypt

520,027

432,516

485,438

413,597

Ethiopia

862,143

847,857

861,989

847,857

Libya

205

21

205

21

Morocco

321,513

319,161

317,564

316,451

Nigeria

858,010

741,398

822,485

732,305

South Africa Sudan

348,273

334,176

348,190

334,176

0

0

0

0

Africa 7,106,584 6,057,027 6,518,559 5,675,758 total Source: Compiled from SIPRI Multinational Peace Operations Database (2019).

As evident in Table 2, Nigeria deployed close to 99 percent of its peacekeeping troops within Africa, which made the country the source of approximately 13 percent of the total African troops deployed for peacekeeping in the continent between 1990 and 2018. All (100 percent) of the peacekeeping troops from South Africa were deployed to Africa, where the country was the source of close to 6 percent of the African troops deployed for peacekeeping in the continent within the period under consideration. While the commitments of Nigeria and South Africa to peacekeeping in Africa are notable and commendable, they are not totally unique among other regional military powers, most especially on the quantity of troops deployed to hotspots across the continent. It is notable that all (100 percent) of the Ethiopian military personnel commissioned for

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peacekeeping were deployed to Africa, and the country was responsible for close to 15 percent of the total African troops deployed for peacekeeping in the continent from 1990 to 2018. Despite the foregoing, the issue of military capabilities transcends the quantity of personnel that are deployed for peacekeeping. It covers the totality of human and material resources that are available to a country and the ability to mobilise them for military purposes when required. Besides, military capability or power is not permanent, fixed, or absolute. For instance, a quick glance at total (active and reserve) military personnel of Egypt and Algeria in Global Firepower (2019) shows that they are estimated to be 920,000 and 280,000, respectively. Moreover, Nigeria is the largest economy, the largest oil-producing country, and the most populous country in Africa. South Africa is equally the second-largest economy and the most industrialised country in the continent. More importantly, Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are geographically contiguous, which relatively creates a balance of power among them with little or no place to call a buffer zone and sphere of influence for any of them, perhaps with the exception of Egypt. This is evident in Figure 1. In contrast, Nigeria and South Africa have a whole sub-region each (West Africa and Southern Africa respectively), which they can significantly refer to as their spheres of influence and where there are no sophisticated and consistent challengers with comparable military power. The challenges of Angola and DR Congo in power projection have further advanced the influence of Nigeria and South Africa. These among other things have given them more breathing space to play regional power roles in their respective sub-regions and beyond.

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Figure 1: Geographical Location of the Ten Leading African Military Powers

Source: Designed by the author with Google Map Marker.

Military Capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa in Comparative Perspective Comparative assessment of the military capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa in most analyses often reflects Cold War dogma, with interests in military preparedness in a balance of power or terror context. However, this section takes a different turn. Both Nigeria and South Africa are not considered in this chapter as competitors that seek to achieve incompatible objectives. The two countries are rather involved in cooperation and competition to achieve often compatible goals, to help fellow Africans as

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champions of African solutions to African problems (Adebajo, 2010; Amusan and Oyewole, 2017). Accordingly, this section is mostly interested in the resources available to both Nigeria and South Africa, their abilities to mobilise them to achieve this objective, and perhaps the smartest options that are available to each of them in comparative analysis. In doing these, and as earlier recognised, there are no universal criteria to assess the military capabilities of the two countries. Nevertheless, the focus of this section is restricted to the military budget, personnel strength, equipment, and the military-industrial base due to space constraints.

1. Military Spending The SIPRI military expenditure database offers a good insight into the subject matter. There are approximately eight countries in Africa that spend more than US$1 billion on their militaries annually over decades now at a constant value of US$ in 2016. These include Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya (except during its political crisis), Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan. Between 2015 and 2017, all these countries, excluding Libya, accounted for 65 percent of the military expenditure of the continent in this database, which includes 52 African countries except for Eritrea and Somalia. Amidst these, the military expenditures of Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa have surpassed US1$ billion as far back as the 1960s, and largely remain above this to date except for Nigeria between the 1980s and 1990s. Available records also show that Libya and Sudan were inconsistent in this category between 1969 and 1990s. Morocco joined the league in the middle of the 1970s, as well as Algeria and Angola in the 1990s. From the foregoing or available data, it is notable that Nigeria and South Africa are not the only countries in Africa that spend enough on their armed forces to be considered as the only military powers in the continent. In fact, in most cases, South Africa can be found between the 3rd and 6th positions, while Nigeria can be found between 5th and 8th positions in terms of military expenditure in the continent since the turn of 21st century. Although Nigeria has moved from the second-largest economy in Africa to the first when its economic rebasing showed that it outpaced South Africa in 2013, its military spending has been less than 1 percent of its GDP since 1987 (except in 2001 and 2002) and between 2 and 5 percent of government spending since 2000. However, since 2000, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco have spent between 2 and 7 percent of their GDP on military, save for some exceptions where Egypt and Libya spent above 1 percent, just like South Africa. Some of these countries also spend double digits of their government expenditure on military. Yet, the militaristic tendency of

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Nigeria cannot be totally underestimated, given how the country was able to raise its military spending by over 15-fold between 1965 and 1975 in response to the civil war (1967-1970) and double the same between 2006 and 2010 in response to insurgencies. As evident in Figure 1, however, Nigeria and South Africa arguably have geopolitical advantage over other military powers in Africa. The military spending of Nigeria and South Africa is still significant in geopolitical terms. Their combined military expenditure between 2008 and 2017 was about 24 percent of the Sub-Saharan African total (see Figure 2). Amidst these, Nigeria is responsible for more than 9 percent of the region’s total military expenditure, while South Africa accounted for close to 15 percent. In its immediate sphere of influence, Nigeria is responsible for about 54 percent of military spending of West Africa, and 20 percent of that of the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) (Central and West Africa combined) between 2008 and 2017. South Africa equally accounted for 67 percent of the military spending of Southern Africa, and about 30 percent of that of Central and Southern Africa combined.1 These figures show that the two countries have some latitude to play a regional military power role in accordance with their geostrategic expedience. At the same time, however, the available data also calls for restraint. The existence of other comparable regional military powers means that the two countries should pay attention to their interests and avoid direct and proxy engagement with them, unless they are ready to go out of their way to raise their defence budget, perhaps with little support from the domestic public. Similar geostrategic calculation should guide Nigeria and South Africa in relation to external powers and their interests in Africa. This is expedient in light of the fact that the total military spending of the whole sub-Saharan African region in 2017 is just 1.1 percent of the world total (IISS, 2018).

1 Data for Central Africa include nine countries: Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon; West Africa include 16 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo; Southern Africa include 10 countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Note that Cape Verde appeared in Central and West Africa, but is treated as 1 in GoG, which is broadly defined to cover 25 countries in the two sub-regions. In addition to these 34 countries, data for sub-Saharan Africa further cover 11 other countries in Eastern part of the continent, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Burundi, Seychelles, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

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Figure 2: Nigerian and South African Military Expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa (billion US$) 25 21.1

21.2

21.8

21.7

21.4

22.6

22.8 20.2

20

19.4

19.6

15 10 5

3.89 3.22 3.19 3.17 3.11 3.12 2.99 2.98 2.378 2.88 2.85 2.13 2.09 2 1.8 1.78 1.733 1.818 1.7 1.65 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 West Africa (16)

Southern Africa (10)

Central Africa (9)

Gulf of Guinea (24)

Sub-Saharan Africa (47)

Nigeria

South Africa Source: Compiled from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2018).

2. Force Strength: Military Personnel Global Firepower offers an insight into the military strength of 34 African countries. Table 1 shows the military personnel strength of Nigeria and South Africa among other regional military powers. Military Balance data covers 49 African countries. Amidst these, only ten African countries have more than 100,000 troops in 2018. These are Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Eritrea, South Sudan, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Nigeria, Angola, and Sudan in descending order of ranking. After their wars of independence from Ethiopia and Sudan, Eritrea and South Sudan respectively maintain standing military personnel that is larger than their parent states. It is notable, however, that South Africa cannot be found on this list. Most of the available data shows that South Africa has maintained between 60,000 and 99,000 active and reserve personnel combined at least in the last decade (IISS, 2010-2019). World Bank (2018) shows that this trend started in 1999.

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South Africa embarked on demilitarisation after 1996 when its troops reached 277,900 under the post-apartheid government. Nigeria was stuck between demilitarisation and remilitarisation since the end of the civil war in 1970 and the military regime in 1999. Figure 3: Nigerian and South African Military Personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa 2500000

1916310

2000000 1698300 1725200

1677181 1534250

1500000 1256000 1000000

950830

500000

0

106400 94000

85000 94000

1985

1990 Nigeria

89100

71600 106500

56000 161000

77153 162000

82150 200000

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

276900

South Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: World Bank (2018).

As evident in Figure 3, both Nigeria and South Africa only accounted for over 14 percent of military personnel of Sub-Saharan African countries in 2015 and 2005. This is a decline from their combined share of military personnel of the region that was over 21 percent in 1995 and 1998. Between 1989 and 2016, both were responsible for approximately 15 percent of the average total military personnel of the region. In four decades, South Africa’s share of military personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 11.2 percent in 1985 to 16.3 percent in 1995 and then declined to 3.6 percent in 2005, before its slight rose to 4.3 percent in 2015. At the same time, Nigeria’s share of military personnel in the region declined from 9.9 percent in 1985 to 5.2 percent in 1995, and then rose to 10.5 percent in 2005, and

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was relatively stagnant at 10.4 percent in 2015. While both countries have geopolitical advantage for military power roles in Sub-Saharan Africa, they cannot afford to be idealistic in deployment; attention must be paid to their relative capabilities in terms of personnel. This is more pronounced in the case of South Africa.

3. Military Equipment, Industrial Base, and Export Global Firepower offers an insight into military equipment of 34 countries in Africa. Table 1 shows some of the major equipment that is available to the ten leading regional military powers. In this case, Nigeria and South Africa appear to fall behind Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco in North Africa and have little or no edge against Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, and DR Congo. However, Military Balance data further show variations in the equipment that is available to the regional military powers in Sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of equipment for land and airpower, Angola, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa are relatively close in capabilities, with each of them having its own comparative advantage. However, only Nigeria and South Africa currently have Unmanned Area Vehicles (UAVs), and only the former has employed Unmanned Combat Area Vehicles (UCAVs) in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is only these two countries that also have guided air-launched missiles in their inventories. The Nigerian Air Force is equipped with missiles guided by an Inertial Navigation System (INS) and Global Position System (GPS), while its South African counterpart stocked laser-guided missiles (IISS, 2018). In terms of assets for sea and space powers, other Sub-Saharan military powers lagged behind Nigeria and South Africa. While Ethiopia does not appear to have naval capabilities, the naval personnel and equipment that are available to Angola and DR Congo in Central Africa, as well as Sudan in East Africa, are unsuitable to play sea power roles in their respective regions. Their naval assets are largely limited in relevance to coastal patrol (IISS, 2018). These explain the increasingly expanding perimeter of Nigeria’s naval patrols and campaigns from West to Central Africa, and that of South Africa from Southern to Eastern Africa (Oyewole, 2016b; 2017a). Besides, Nigeria and South Africa are the only countries with frigates, corvettes, and mine countermeasures in their naval inventories in SubSaharan Africa. South Africa is equally the only country with submarines in the region. It is also the only country that ever succeeded in building nuclear weapons in Africa before its unilateral denuclearisation in the late 1980s (Albright and Stricker, 2016; van Wyk, 2014). Moreover, Nigeria and South Africa account for 38 percent of all African satellites in orbit and 80

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percent of Sub-Saharan satellites as of 2019. Nigeria launched six satellites between 2001 and 2018, and South Africa made similar record between 1999 and 2019. Besides, Ghana and Kenya launched one research satellite each in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The only satellite launched by Angola in 2018 failed in orbit shortly after it was launched. DR Congo’s satellite has been in production since 2012, while Ethiopia and Sudan just announced the initiative to have their own satellite (Oyewole, 2017c). Both Nigeria and South Africa have military space programmes and substantial capabilities in this consideration (Oyewole, 2020) The foregoing shows those assets that are available to Nigeria and South Africa in pursuit of military interests in the region in comparative analysis. These shows both countries have limited resources that they can part with for peacekeeping or aid to another African country in need. In some cases, they may have to allow another regional military power to supply part of or contribute to the equipment required for peacekeeping and avoid overambitious bearing of costs. However, data on military equipment in the inventories do not say it all. Military-industrial bases are important for the production of basic weapon systems and their maintenance. In this case, it is somewhat pathetic to note that no African company has ever made it to the list of first 100 military industries in the world since the inception of the SIPRI Arms Industry Database in 2002. Military industries constitute one of the sources of military power and is one of the essential capabilities for effective and reliable national defence, security, and power projection. Weapon exports are also strategic as a form of power projection and can stimulate economic growth and employment opportunities locally. Beyond these realist cases, however, the fact that most African countries struggle to access foreign weapons in times of dire need under harsh conditionalities makes military industries and exports by African nations important to the ideation of pan-Africanism and “African solutions to African problems”. Table 3 offers considerable insight into arms exports by leading regional military powers in Africa between 1950 and 2018.

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103 1421

Ethiopia

Libya

16

2442

Total no. of recipient countries

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (1950-2018).

Sudan

South Africa

5

941

Egypt

Nigeria

23

DR Congo

14

13

Angola

Morocco

12

Algeria

Total amount of exports (US$ million)

31 2

3

1

1

17

1

12

0

3

3

68

1

3

25

3

25

2

4

3

Total no. of African state buyers

No. of buyers that are international organisations

Table 3: Weapons Sales (Export) by Leading Military Powers in Africa, 1950-2018.

78

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

No of buyers that are liberation movements

0

1

0

0

3

0

2

0

0

0

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As evident in Table 3, South Africa, Libya, and Egypt are responsible for 96 percent of arms exports of the ten leading African military powers between 1950 and 2018. Amidst these, South Africa accounted for 49 percent of weapons sales of the ten leading regional military powers in Africa, while Libya and Egypt with the closest records accounted for 28.5 and 19 percent respectively. South Africa also possesses the largest arms market of any African state within and outside the continent. The country has sold weapons to African powers like Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Nigeria, and foreign powers like the US, the UK, Australia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Israel. The African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) have also purchased weapons from South Africa. As evident from the trade register of SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, South Africa is the only country that sells brand new weapon systems in Africa; other military powers in the continent trade or only dispose of some of their second-hand weapons. South Africa produces and exports aircraft, ships, artillery, armoured vehicles, missiles, and sensors, and it has a growing capacity in satellites among other systems. Arms production and export, therefore, appears to be one of the major areas of South African military power that should be nurtured. Nigeria had the smallest record of arms exports by regional military powers in Africa between 1950 and 2018. Nigeria’s military industry has experienced years of neglect and underdevelopment by inconsistent government policy commitments in terms of priority and investment. This caused Nigeria to lag behind South Africa and, to some extent, Egypt and perhaps Algeria on military research and development (R&D). However, the Nigerian military industry is currently experiencing some revival. In recent years, Nigeria has developed capacity for the production and maintenance of weapon systems like warships, UAVs, guided missiles, armoured tanks, patrol vehicles, and boats, as well as sub-systems like spare parts for warplanes, ships, and battle tanks. Nevertheless, there is a need to pay more attention to the commercialisation and export of weapons in the recent attempt to revive Nigeria’s military industrial base.

Conclusion There is an overriding need for policymakers, policy analysts, and the domestic or general public in both Nigeria and South Africa to appreciate the following points. The military capabilities (based on spending, personnel, and equipment) of the two countries do not really support reckless military power projects or suggest that their acclaimed status as hegemons can be

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overemphasised in Africa, given the existence of comparable military powers with similar or better capabilities. The military capabilities of these two regional powers, as they stand currently, are not suitable for reckless power projections even in the Sub-Saharan African region as some nationalist-idealists occasionally brag. However, the two countries have some latitude for responsible military power projection in their sphere of influence and beyond. In this case, realism corroborates or is in support of the pan-Africanism ideation and idealism. The realism that underscored some of the reviewed indicators of military capabilities suggests that both Nigeria and South Africa must avoid direct or proxy military confrontations between themselves and with other military powers on the continent. The same realism should guide any efforts or attempts to check the excesses of external military powers in the continent. However, the two countries should responsibly utilise the latitudes of their sphere of influence to play legitimate military power projection roles. Amidst these, their military interests and engagement in Central Africa need to be sensitively attentive to the interests of Angola and DR Congo as geopolitically required. Equally, it is not expedient for Nigeria to ignore the military interests of North African military powers in its geostrategic calculation in the Sahel. Both Nigeria and South Africa should push for more intra-African military exchange, most especially in weapons exports. They will gain more from sharing their military-industrial products.

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Oyewole, S. 2018b. Flying and Bombing: The Contributions of Air Power to Security and Crisis Management in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Defence Studies, 18(4), 514-537. Oyewole, S. 2020. The Quest for Space Capabilities and Military Security in Africa. South African Journal of International Affairs, 27(2), 147172. Oyewole, S. Defence Industry and National Security Policy in Nigeria. (forthcoming). Plagemann, J. 2015. Cosmopolitanism in a Multipolar World Soft Sovereignty in Democratic Regional Powers. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Polhemus, J.H. 1977. Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy, and Means. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 11(1), 43-66. Posen, B.R. 2003. Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony. International Security, 8(1), 5-46. Scholvin, S. 2016. The Geopolitics of Regional Power: Geography, Economics and Politics in South Africa. Ashgate. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (1950-2018). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2018). SIPRI Multinational Peace Operations Database (2019) Stapleton, T.J. 2010. A Military History of South Africa: From the DutchKhoi Wars to the End of Apartheid. Santa Barbara: Praeger. Tellis, A. et al. 2000. Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age: Analyst’s Handbook. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000. Tieku, T.K. 2015. Collectivist Worldview: Its Challenge to International Relations. In: Cornelissen, S. et al. eds. Africa and International Relations in the 21st century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. UNDP. 2016. Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone. New York: United Nations Human Development Report (UNDP). van Wyk, J.A. 2014. Apartheid South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme and Its Impact on Southern Africa. Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations, 3(6), 119-140. Volgy, T.J., Corbetta, R., Grant, K.A., and Baird, R.G. 2011. Major Power Status in International Politics. In: Volgy, T.J., Corbetta, R., Grant, K.A., and Baird, R.G. eds. Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives. New York: Macmillan. W.O. Alli, 2012. The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy. Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Waltz, K.N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill.

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Waltz, K.N. 1993. The Emerging Structure of International Politics. International Security, 18(2), 44-79. Waltz, K.N. 2000. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(1), 5-41. Wiharta, S., 2008. The effectiveness of foreign military assets in natural disaster response. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. William, M.C. 2005. The Realist Tradition and Limits of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. World Bank. 2011. Conflict, Security, and Development. Washington, D.C: The World Banks. World Bank. 2018. World Development Indicators. 1960-2017. Zakaria, F. 2008. The Post-America World. New York: W. W. Norton.

CHAPTER FIVE HEGEMONIC RIVALRY IN A PERIPHERAL REGION: AN ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIASOUTH AFRICA’S ROLE IN AFRICAN POLITICS JOHN. S OLANREWAJU AND O. JOSEPH ISEOLORUNKANMI .

Abstract Nigeria’s claim to being the giant of Africa is evident in her foreign policy articulation of Africa as centrepiece. From 1960, Nigeria has championed the project of Africa through different diplomatic engagements across the continent of Africa, most especially under President Olusegun Obasanjo’s civilian administration. Nigeria’s unwavering opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa eventually led to the termination of the apartheid government in 1994. However, the post-apartheid politics in Africa, as well as the post-Cold War politics, changed the dynamics of African politics. Nigeria’s claim as the giant of Africa became more contested and hypothetical with the emergence of notable countries like Ethiopia and South Africa posing serious challenges to Nigeria’s hegemony in the continent. The most viable and notable threats came from South Africa following the end of the apartheid regime in that country and coupled with its good governance rating, which had heightened the status of the country as a notable continental leader. This paper attempts to explain the leadership roles of Nigeria and South Africa in a peripheral region of Africa with the view to analysing who has the potential to steer the affairs of Africa to the path of prosperity. Through the secondary method of data collection and the qualitative method of data analysis (thematic analysis), the study concludes that Nigeria and South Africa’s roles in Africa should be motivated by the Africanist critique of realist theory because of the Westernisation of international relations by the traditional realist theory. The study recommends

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concerted efforts between Nigeria and South Africa in addressing socioeconomic challenges in the African continent. Keywords: Hegemony; Power; African Centre Piece; Foreign Policy; Nigeria; South Africa; Africa

Introduction The debates on hegemonic rivalry between Nigeria and South Africa have become a blistering issue on the African continent. The hypothetical claim by Nigeria to being the giant of Africa has been challenged on several occasions by South Africa through different diplomatic engagements both within the continent and on the global scale, most especially following the end of the apartheid regime. It was a serious diplomatic error for Nigeria to assume the validity of its status in Africa after the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. It was widely believed that the unquantifiable support rendered by Nigeria during the South African apartheid was a license for Nigeria to continue its hegemonic influence in African politics and parade itself as the unilateral leader in the region. However, the hegemonic reality goes beyond the historical records in Africa and the popularisation of the Afrocentric theme of the Nigerian foreign policy under the Murtala/Obasanjo military regime. The hands of camaraderie extended by Nigeria during the apartheid struggles in South Africa gave South Africa a leeway to end the apartheid regime in the country. The magnitude of South Africa’s influence in African and global politics was comparatively low compared to Nigeria’s during the apartheid regime. The post-apartheid regime in South Africa was greeted with much euphoria as the country was launched into the new dimension of opportunities that were non-existent when the country was a pariah state. The loathsome policy had been in place for over four decades. It remained in existence until the early 1990s when a process of democratisation was initiated by the last apartheid president, Fredrick W. de Klerk, and the country began to parley with other states in the global system (Akinboye, 2005: 10). However, since the dismantling of apartheid and entrenchment of a democratic setting in 1994, South Africa has been fully engaged in African and global affairs (Chidoze, Agbude, and Oni, 2013: 5). It is to be noted that the hegemonic rivalry that took place on the global scale between the United States of America and the former USSR, and which eventually confirmed the US superiority, was an indication that hegemonic power cannot fall from the sky. There are peculiar criteria that a

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state must possess to achieve this status both at the regional and international levels. The question of the rivalry between the two potential dominant powers in Africa has intensified the debates in different quarters. Interestingly, the recent debates in the United Nations on the extension of Permanent Security Council membership to Africa brought Nigeria and South Africa to another brink in diplomatic rivalry. The long-awaited United Nations Reforms which proposed new permanent seats and its extension to the African continent in the reformed United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has also opened age-old historical wounds and heightened regional rivalries in Africa. The African Union has been sceptical and flummoxed as to which of its member states to consider and is yet to establish the criteria to be used for qualifying and selecting African countries to represent the continent in the reformed Security Council, leaving the countries involved at the mercy of other African countries. Considering the hegemonic positions and African Centre Piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy and South Africa, it has, therefore, become imperative to examine the leadership roles that Nigeria and South Africa play in the socioeconomic and political developments of Africa. However, the thrust of this paper is to examine the roles of Nigeria and South Africa in African politics with a view to analysing which of them has the sway to lead the affairs of Africa on a path of prosperity and global reckoning. The study raises some fundamental questions as to whether South Africa, with its record of hostility against its neighbouring countries, can champion the course of Africa. On the other hand, can Nigeria, with the numerous records of coups, political instability, internal insecurity, and corruption provide political leadership in Africa? The paper is divided into five sections. After this introduction, the first section focuses on the conceptualisation of regional hegemony. The second section historicises Nigeria-South Africa’s roles in Africa and global politics, the role of Nigeria during the apartheid struggles, and the Afrocentric view of Nigerian foreign policy. The third section provides a theoretical basis for the study, while the fourth section examines the roles of Nigeria and South Africa in global politics on a comparative basis. The fifth and final section gives a recapitulation of all the sections in the study with recommendations on how to enhance the influence of Africa in global affairs.

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Contextualising Hegemonic Power in the Peripheral Region of Africa Hegemony became a popular and highly contested concept after the Cold War between the United States of America and the former Soviet Union. The international politics of the Cold War was characterised by ideological and hegemonic rivalries on a global scale. Immediately after the Cold War, the quest for hegemonic power and control replicated itself in different continents, most especially in Africa, coupled with the dynamic of postapartheid politics in South Africa. Despite the popularity of hegemony as a concept, it lacks a universally acceptable definition. In the midst of the academic obscurity and definitional dilemma that characterises the concept of regional hegemony, Sterud (1992: 12), observes regional hegemony to be “that regional great power being a state which is geographically part of a delineated region; able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the region; highly influential in regional affairs”. Similarly, Lemke (2002: 49), in his insightful power transition theory, conceptualises regional hegemons as local dominant states at regional level with the power to stabilise regional political systems coupled with the acceptance by other neighbouring states or semi-peripheral countries. Schmidt (2018: 1) also provides theoretical clarity on the concept of regional hegemony as overwhelming power and, on the other hand, the exercise of some form of leadership at the regional level. The meaning and interpretation of regional hegemony is often in the eyes of the beholder (Jesse, Lobell, Barnathan, and Williams, 2012: 7). Basically, in the context of international relations, hegemony connotes the ability of an actor with overwhelming capability to shape the international system through both coercive and non-coercive means (Narrlof, 2015). For a regional hegemonic power to be effective, there must be a distinction and clarification between primacy and hegemony. Clark (2009: 12) observes that legitimacy and acceptability are the core values of hegemony. Hegemony is an act of providing an acceptable leadership; hegemonic power is not practicable without followers; regional hegemony functions in a manner that is akin to that of great powers. Primacy, on the other hand, depicts nothing beyond a distribution of power in which one state enjoys predominance. Corroborating the assertion of Clark (2009), power is central to international relations, and it is the key determinant which verifies hegemonic power both at the regional and global levels. The consonant of his assertion to the current reality of the contemporary international politics can be questioned for one major reason; a hegemon may not necessarily emerge through legitimacy

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but through the provision of leadership coupled with a display of force, where followers are left with no option; as evident in the post-Cold War international politics. Regional hegemonic power is not static and is open to competition on an almost daily basis. With Nigeria’s attainment of independence in 1960 and her foreign policy articulation of African Centre Piece, which snowballed into the emergence of Nigeria as a notable continental leader in the peripheral region of Africa, the country enjoyed a monopoly of regional hegemonic power. Nigeria’s hegemonic position became more contested with the emergence of South Africa as a continental leader after the termination of the apartheid regime. These two notable countries have made different sacrifices and diplomatic efforts both at the regional and on a global scale with the intention of fulfilling the minimum requirements for the contested nature of regional hegemonic power as a way of aspiring to become the notable continental leader in Africa. The onus, therefore, is on African countries to designate the regional hegemon by leveraging on the continental sacrifices and diplomatic efforts of these two notable countries, coupled with the containment strategies from the countries involved. Besides, the competition for the United Nations Permanent Security Council Seat between Nigeria and South Africa would have settled the scores if the African Union made a transparent decision from the hegemonic footprints of Nigeria and South Africa. However, the subsequent sections will focus on the evolutionary trends in Nigeria-South Africa's roles in African affairs.

Historicising Nigeria-South Africa’s Roles in Africa and Global Politics Until the late 1950s most African nations were under colonial rule, and except in a negative sense, were not a significant factor in world affairs (Palmer, 2010: 502). Within a few years, Africa experienced a momentous and historic awakening. In the 1960s, more than 35 countries emerged as independent states in all parts of the continent, and these new states started making profound impacts in global politics. The first wave of independence started in North Africa, followed by West African countries. The postapartheid independence in South Africa took place during the third wave because of the prolonged apartheid regime. Africa is one of the largest continents in the world. It covers one-fifth of the land area of the globe. As pointed out by Palmer (2010), the continent accounts for 12 percent of the world population with abundant human and material resources.

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1960 was greeted with much euphoria in Nigeria when the country attained political independence. On 7 October 1960, Nigeria declared her readiness to join the United Nations and to promote the course of Africa in global affairs. Nigeria’s momentous role in several African affairs has been amazing. Since 1960, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been tailored to promoting the interests of Africa and by adhering to several fundamental principles such as African unity and independence in most African countries. Nigeria has also been committed to other significant issues in Africa, such as peaceful settlement of disputes, non-alignment and noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, and regional economic co-operation and development. After three years of independence in Nigeria, the idea of African unity was conceived by the Nigerian leaders, which eventually dovetailed into the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which later became the African Union. It was through this multilateral diplomacy that Nigeria channeled its major foreign policy objectives. It was an organisation that was formed to promote African unity and solidarity among African states, defend the independence and territorial integrity of member states, and eliminate colonialism. Since the formation of the OAU, Nigeria has become a pillar with a strong influence within the Africa Union. For example, Nigeria’s former president Olusegun Obasanjo was the chairman of the African Union from May 2004 to September 2005. The military capability of Nigeria also allowed a Nigerian officer to emerge as the Force Commander of the African Union in different peacekeeping operations in African countries. The commitment of Nigeria in African affairs was also demonstrated during the anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa. Nigeria was at the forefront in providing financial assistance for the African National Congress (ANC) that fought the apartheid regime in South Africa. In a brotherly show of love to South Africa, Nigerians made tremendous sacrifices contributing to the destruction of apartheid in South Africa. Students in Nigeria skipped their lunch to make donations, and in just 6 months, by June 1977, the contribution to the Southern African Relief Fund (SARF) reached $10.5 million. These donations were widely known in Nigeria as the Mandela tax. As a result of the fund, the first group of 86 South African students arrived in Nigeria in 1976, following the disruption of the education system in South Africa. It happened after the massacre of 700 students by the white (apartheid) police, while the former were protesting against the decision by the apartheid regime to change their

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education language to Afrikaans. Hundreds of South African students have benefited from the fund’s activity, having come to study in Nigeria for free. Beyond welcoming students and exiles, Nigeria had also welcomed many renowned South Africans like Thabo Mbeki, the South African president from 1999 to 2008. Nigeria also refused to sell oil to South Africa for decades in protest against white minority rule. Nigeria lost approximately $41 billion during the period. Nigeria was also the only country to set up the National Committee against Apartheid (NACAP) as early as 1960 (Oshin, 2017: 1). The various domestic efforts against the apartheid regime in South Africa were not yielding meaningful results until the 1960s, when Nigeria was actively involved in anti-apartheid struggles, and despite the level of political instability that engulfed Nigeria for many decades as well as the passage of numerous military and civil leaders, Nigeria never abandoned its unwavering commitment to African policy. From 1960 to 1995, it was revealed that Nigeria provided over $61 billion to support the end of apartheid (Oshin, 2017: 1). Nigeria also boycotted the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Games as well as nationalising British Petroleum assets in 1979 because of the apartheid government in South Africa. Conversely, Nigeria provided tremendous assistance for South Africa during the apartheid struggle. Nigeria also participated in the different multilateral diplomatic shuttles across the globe and provided the bulk of troops for the United Nations peacekeeping missions in countries both within and outside the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). For example, Nigeria sent peacekeeping troops to war-torn nations such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Western Sahara. Similarly, Nigeria contributes a significant number of troops to the African Union. As pointed out by the United Nations (2015), Nigeria made a commitment of 2,462 soldiers to United Nations missions across the globe. During the 1970s global oil crisis, Nigeria subsidised oil supplies to African countries. This subsidy enhanced Nigeria’s influence in Africa (Coutsoukis, 2005). Nigeria also played a key role during the formation of ECOWAS in 1975. On the other hand, with the end of apartheid in South Africa and coupled with the democratic election in the country in 1994, South Africa started to parley with other African and western countries, without reckoning with Nigeria as the giant of Africa. Although, South Africa got her pre-apartheid independence in 1910, with some level of influence in global affairs before the United Nations imposed sanctions. Unlike Nigeria,

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which joined the United Nations 25 years after its formation, South Africa was a founding member of the United Nations under her Prime Minister, Jan Smuts. However, the role of South Africa in global politics, most especially in the United Nations, was impaired because of the prolonged apartheid regime in the country. South Africa was suspended from the United Nations until 1994 when the country reactivated its membership following the end of apartheid. The core interest of South African policy after the collapse of apartheid was the promotion of increased trade and investment flows from South Africa to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2002, South Africa played a key role during the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU); indeed, the country once chaired the African Union (Gelb, 2001). Besides, South Africa also played a collaborative role during the formation of the new partnership for African Development and other multilateral frameworks in Africa. Recently, South Africa has established economic empires in most of the African countries, especially in the SADC region, where the country is the biggest exporter of commodities.

Theoretical Approaches to Nigeria’s and South Africa’s Hegemonic Rivalry in Africa The hegemonic rivalry between Nigeria and South Africa has generated a number of contending theoretical postulations in the extant literature of foreign policy, which are aimed at providing illumination and academic lighting for the causes of hegemonic rivalry in Africa. Scholars have looked at the rivalry in the African continent from different perspectives. Some scholars look at the rivalry from the perspective of game theory, while other scholars deployed systemic theory as well as the balance of power to provide theoretical generalisations for the international politics of Africa (Donnelly, 2000; Mugambi, 2015). Because of the Westernisation and Europeanisation of international relations by the traditional realist theory, this section utilises Africanist critique of realist theory in its attempt to explain the hegemonic rivalry in Africa. Africanist critiques of the traditional realist theory and its offshoots are predicated upon certain factors. The traditional adherence to mainstream international relations theories such as realist theory and its offshoots has led to the marginalisation of Sub-Saharan Africa in world politics (Hobson, 2007: 91). It also considered traditional realist theory as Westernisation and

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Europeanisation of global politics, with the argument that the traditional realist cannot explain the political realities of the African states (Nueman, 1998: 2). Africanists further argue that the prospect should not be discounted that more than one international system characterised by unique practices and norms can exist (Acharya and Buzan, 2007: 300; Neuman, 1998: 2). From the standpoint of Africanists, it is evident that the state-centric model by the classical realists is an aberration to the international politics of Africa. Nevertheless, the traditional realist theory and its offshoots cannot be regarded as castoffs because of their theoretical bedrock (Casper, 2011: 5). The dynamic nature of contemporary African politics appears to be more compatible with power politics as well as the struggles for power, which was clearly articulated by Morgenthau (1975), in his book Politics among nations: struggle for power and peace. It is, however, crucial to note that realism is not a single theory but a unification of theories with considerable explanatory assortments (Donnelly, 2000). Thus, from the standpoint of classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, John H. Herz, Raymond Aron, George Kennan, and Reinhold Niebuhr to neo-realists like Robert Jervis, George Quester, Stephen Van Evera, and Kenneth Waltz, the basic suppositions of realism have been enriched to account for more variables that bolstered state interactions in the international system. In definite terms, realist theory, in its myriad forms, has provided ample explanations for the prominence of power in international politics within the framework of competition defined in terms of the struggle for power among the competing and self-interested states (Waltz, 1998: 31). As a theoretical tool of analysis in International Relations, realism is anchored on a number of propositions. The first proposition of realist theory is that states are the major actors in the international system. In this context, states are the principal actors in the international arena whose major concern is their own security and who act accordingly in this regard by struggling for power and pursuing their own national interests. The first proposition of realism, also known as “Realpolitik”, is that states are the most important actors in global politics (Juliet and James, 2010:4). States are governments that exercise supreme or sovereign authority over a defined territory. Unlike other states in the Western world, the majority of African states emerged castrated because of their peculiar colonial experience. Nigeria was under colonial encumbrances for many decades, while South Africa confronted the yoke of a prolonged apartheid regime.

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Despite the controversies that surrounded the decolonisation process in Africa, Nigeria and South Africa gained international recognition as entities in 1960 and 1994, respectively. The first major international distraction that confronted most African countries after independence was the international politics of the Cold War. Despite the adoption of the Non-Aligned Movement in most African countries, Africa automatically succumbed to the global political wave in the post-Cold War era. As Cold War politics ebbed away, coupled with the decline of bi-polar international politics, the quest for regional powers gained prominence in Africa and eventually became a blistering issue among the competing and self-interested states. The Westernisation of international relations by classical realist theory and its offshoots is also evident in its articulation of the Westphalia state system, which gives primacy to states as the only recognisable actors in the international system (Hobson, 2007: 91). The state-centric model of realists suffers a dearth of theoretical generalisation in the context of African politics for a plethora of reasons. The dwindling fortunes of African economies and the rising influence of non-state actors in the region paved the way for mixed actors in Africa. As the apartheid regime ebbed in South Africa, the country leveraged its development potentials to advance its quest as a regional leader in Africa while using different multilateral corporations as the media to absorb the surpluses of other states in the region. Nigeria, on the other hand, was confronted with political instability and internal contradictions, which have weakened Nigerian influence in African affairs. Also, realisms state-centric model could be seen as a deliberate attempt to promote globalisation that would lead to African relegation. It is argued that approaches to international relations such as realism, liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, and postmodernism were originated in the West and hence unavoidably Eurocentric in nature (Acharya and Buzan, 2007: 300; Hobson, 2007: 93). The second proposition of realism answers the question, ‘why do states act the way they do in international politics?’ States, according to realism, pursue their interests, defined as power (See Julliet and James, 2010:4). Realist theory is a power-driven theory that seeks to provide a theoretical generalisation for state behaviour in the international system. There are different dimensions of power in Africa; there are tangible and intangible elements of power. The former focuses on the elements of power that can be quantified and measured, such as the military capability of the state, size of the economy, population, among others. The latter emphasises the elements of power that cannot be quantified, such as the morale of the military and the cultural value of any given state. Power and its variegated

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forms are central to the international politics of Africa. There is a general consensus among African scholars that both the tangible and intangible elements of power are key indicators for the emergence of regional powers and its hegemon (Sterud, 1992; Lemke, 2002; Ogunnubi, 2013). With the military capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa coupled with their economic strengths in their respective sub-regions in West Africa and Southern Africa, the two countries unavoidably qualify and possess the needed perquisites to lay claim to regional power and compete vigorously as the continental leader (Adebajo, 2018: 1). The levels of regional stability and economic accomplishments in Africa rest heavily on these two regional powers that have both collaborated and competed in Africa’s most indispensable relationships. Unlike Nigeria’s foreign policy that was tailored to make a rumpus in Africa or what scholars called megaphone diplomacy, South Africa maintains quiet diplomacy through tangible and intangible elements of power to contain other African states (Chidozie, Agbude, and Oni, 2013: 12). This has enhanced the position of South Africa as the notable regional leader in Africa. This further explains the international behaviours of Nigeria and South Africa. South Africa refused to relax its foreign policy to prevent Nigeria from maintaining unilateral influence in regional politics. As argued by Oshewolo (2018), the success or otherwise of state foreign policy largely depends on its ability to strike a balance between its national interests and its capability for achieving them. The Afrocentric policy of Nigeria was not properly articulated in a way that allowed Nigeria to sustain its hegemonic influence in Africa; these scenarios have portrayed Nigeria as a “Father Christmas”. Nigeria is a country that is “beautiful abroad and ugly at home”. Nigeria was busy pursuing the interests of African countries to the detriment of her national interests. South Africa took advantage of Nigeria’s slipshod foreign policy to enhance its influence in Africa. Today, South Africa has numerous investments in Nigeria. Despite the inherent lacuna in realist propositions and its Western ingredients, its basic foundation provides a lucid explanation of regional and global politics across centuries of state interactions. Indeed, the focus in realism is on continuity, because all rational states, no matter when, no matter where, are all motivated by the same drive to protect their interests by maximising their power to the detriment of others. Realism harps on the fact that every state strives for dominance, either continentally or globally. Whatever a state does in the international system, the underlying consideration is usually to gain influence and dominance (Oshewolo, 2018: 4). The quest for regional influential power between Nigeria and South

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Africa has undoubtedly validated the importance of Africanist critiques of realist theory and explains why the African regional powers need to rejig their foreign policies within the purview of the Africanist model of international politics.

Hegemonic Rivalry in Africa: A Comparative Assessment of Nigeria-South Africa’s Role in African Politics Africa has become the outer periphery of the world economy, the poorest continental region of the world, with Nigeria and other notable countries such as South Africa competing for hegemonic control in the region. African leadership is currently in a vacuum, leaving the region exposed in an increasingly competitive and often uncompromising global system (Mugambi, 2015: 2). Nigeria, the acclaimed giant of Africa, based on population and the size of her economy, has been burdened by internal structural and institutional weakness since 1960. However, the postapartheid politics in Africa, as well as the post-Cold War politics, changed the dynamics of African politics. Nigeria’s claim as the giant of Africa became more contested and hypothetical with the emergence of notable countries like Ethiopia and South Africa, posing serious challenges to Nigeria’s hegemony in the continent. The most viable and notable threat came from South Africa following the end of the apartheid regime in that country. As rightly observed by Adebajo (2018: 1), Nigeria and South Africa have championed the project of conflict management initiatives in Africa over the years, and both account for at least 60 percent of the economy of their respective sub-regions in West and Southern Africa. The levels of political and economic accomplishments in Africa rest heavily on these two regional powers that have both collaborated and competed in Africa’s most indispensable relationships. Conversely, the provision of a leadership role in Africa has dominated Nigeria’s foreign policy over the years, while the prolonged period of military dictatorship in the country threatened Nigeria’s role in Africa (Oshewolo, 2018: 5). As pointed out by Omotola (2008), Nigeria’s leadership position was later challenged following the rise of South Africa and other prominent countries in Africa. The most viable threat came from South Africa following the end of apartheid regime in that country and coupled with its good governance rating, which had heightened the status of the country as a notable aspiring continental leader (Omotola, 2008: 12). Without doubt, Nigeria may have felt threatened and disappointed in its intention to maintain the status quo as the giant of Africa. These threats and

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the desperation of Nigeria to maintain the status quo led to the commitment of Nigeria to the African project, most especially under President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administrations. However, the political transformation in Nigeria in 1999 was greeted with much euphoria because it accorded the country an opportunity to participate in different multilateral diplomacies both within and outside the continent. The first president of the Fourth Republic, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, considered peacekeeping operations in achieving Nigeria’s quest for leadership in Africa. Through the efforts of President Obasanjo’s peace initiative in Africa, more Africa countries, and indeed, the outside world came to appreciate the critical role of Nigeria in Africa. The effort of Nigeria in peacekeeping under Obasanjo was highly productive and fundamental, especially in Sao Tome and Principe and the Republic of Togo. Also, Nigeria spent $12 billion to bankroll the peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Oshewolo, 2018: 11). The effort of Nigeria in installing democratic norms and values in Africa cannot be ignored, most especially under Obasanjo, according to Omotola (2008). Since its successful transition to democracy in 1999, promoting democratic values has become a prominent feature of Nigeria’s foreign policy, especially in Africa. From 1999 to date, Nigeria has committed a lot of resources to combat anti-democratic, unconstitutional mechanisms and forceful seizures of power and has entrenched stabilities using dialogue in most cases to effect peaceful conflict management throughout the continent. While this trend may not be entirely new and has cost a small fraction of what the preceding military regimes spent in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it is a reflection of the country’s continuing commitment to its age-long ‘Afrocentric Peace’ policy. In addition, the current wave of Nigeria’s democracy promotion is obviously unprecedented. This is more so as Nigeria is now a democracy where the due process is expected to be followed before the appropriation of public funds. The legislature enjoys substantial power over the national purse and must ratify the budget before any expenditure can be made. Nigeria’s commitment to promoting democracy in Africa has been predicated upon particular mechanisms. Notable among them is a strong rejection of the unconventional overthrow of democratically elected governments as well as the provision of financial support for African states. Nigeria also partnered with other African countries, particularly South Africa, in ensuring sustainable peace, democracy, and development in

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African countries. Nigeria provided strong support for the criminalisation and condemnation of the forceful seizure of power in Africa at the 35th Summit of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) hosted in Algiers in 1999. There was a declaration at the summit that any government that comes to power in defiance of the democratic process would be isolated and dislodged (Omotola, 2008: 12). Nigeria also plays a fundamental role in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as well as providing leadership for the implementation committee of NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). However, the first major challenge that confronted Nigeria under President Obasanjo was the Ivorian case, which culminated in a presidential election in October 2000. Nigeria did not relent in restoring post-election peace in Côte d’Ivoire coupled with the promotion of peace talks among Ivorian factions through the Economic Communities of West African States (ECOWAS), which eventually led to the deployment of an ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which by June 2003 had 1,300 peacekeepers in Côte d’Ivoire (See Omotola, 2008: 13). Nigeria also played a significant role in restoring democracy in Sao Tome and Principe (STP). Nigeria was applauded for its leadership role in Togo, where the military seized power following the death of President Eyadema in February 2005, which later led to the conduct of an election through the efforts of President Olusegun Obasanjo. Further, Nigeria did not only contribute to the bulk of the costs of the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, it also championed the reconciliation processes that led to the return of peace in the war-torn country. The late President Yar’Adua succeeded President Olusegun Obasanjo, and came up with a new foreign policy thrust coined “Citizen Diplomacy” with the intention of protecting the interests of Nigerians both at home and in the diaspora. The idea of citizen diplomacy under Yar’Adua was articulated to promote national interest, unlike his predecessors that focused more on an Afrocentric view of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The Yar’Adua policy would have changed the image of Nigeria from her age-long “Father Christmas” strategy to a better foreign policy which aimed at developing internal mechanisms, with little attention given to the external environment, although it was assumed that Africa would continue to remain part of its foreign policy agenda. It was not perplexing that Yar’Adua’s intention was preconceived to restructure Nigeria’s ailing economy by reinforcing its leadership role in Africa and establishing itself as a major actor in the global economy and political arena.

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The demise of Yar’Adua cut short his Vision 20:2020 goals, which were aimed at making Nigeria one of the largest economies in the world. The untimely death of President Yar’Adua eventually paved the way for his deputy. President Goodluck Jonathan was formerly the acting president before he became the substantive president after the death of Yar’Adua in 2010. President Jonathan’s foreign policy was tailored through economic diplomacy based on investment and co-operation. This was clearly articulated in his Transformation Agenda. President Goodluck Jonathan became the substantive president based on the circumstances that surrounded the health of his predecessor. Analysts in different quarters gave a low rating for President Jonathan’s foreign policy. However, he was able to demonstrate his support for the African Union (AU) and the ECOWAS policy of zero tolerance for unconstitutional and undemocratic change of government, which was demonstrated in Mali and Guinea-Bissau (Ogunnubi, 2013: 146). It will be recalled that it was President Goodluck Jonathan who negotiated a peaceful resolution of the crises in GuineaBissau, Côte d’ Ivoire, and Mali. According to Campell (2013), Nigeria committed about 1,200 troops to the intervention in Mali. Also, in the African Development Bank (AfDB), Nigeria had the largest share as of 2014 with 9 percent of the vote. Nigeria Trust Fund, which is a special AfDB fund, was created in 1976 and endowed until 1981 with $151 million with the aim of providing loans at a 2-4 percent interest rate for 25 years. Another notable initiative of Nigeria is the Nigerian Technical Co-operation Fund, which was used as a pair to complement the Nigeria Trust Fund with the aim of rebuilding war-torn countries (Tetenye, 2014: 16). A new administration assumed power in Nigeria on 29 May 2015, following the defeat of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP)-led Federal Government in the general election that year. The new Buhari administration inherited different challenges ranging from insecurity to corruption and volatile foreign exchange. The first foreign policy approach of the Buhari administration was demonstrated through shuttle diplomacy. Immediately after his swearing-in, Buhari visited the United States of America and other friendly states, seeking their international support and co-operation. Also, President Buhari attended the meeting of the Lake Chad Basin in an attempt to proffer a solution to the Boko Haram crisis in the Lake Chad Basin. The administration, just like its predecessors, was primed to utilise economic diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy through the instrumentality of the National Economic and Recovery Growth Plan. President Buhari has also demonstrated Nigeria’s commitment to African affairs. Recently, Buhari led an ECOWAS delegation to the Gambia to ensure peace in the

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country after the controversial democratic elections that ousted Yahya Jammeh. Further, the enviable economic resources of Nigeria are major factors in her quest for dominance in Africa. Apart from being the first oil-producing state in Africa with the discovery of oil in Nigeria in 1958, the country is also the largest producer of oil in Africa and the home to the second-largest proven oil reserves in the continent (James, 2020:4). Unfortunately, the enviable economic resources have not heightened the fortune of Nigerians because of some inherent contradictions in the country, while its poorly developed and integrated economic structure is largely dependent on the export of raw materials, especially crude oil, most of which comes from the South-South area. In terms of economic capacity, apart from the crude oil, Nigeria is also endowed with a lot of other resources such as hides and skins, cement, coal, columbite, cotton, palm oil, natural gas, peanuts, rubber, textiles, tin, and wood among others, as pointed out by the CIA Factbook, (2014). Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) purchasing power parity is put at $478.5 billion (2013 est.) while its real growth rate is at 6.2 percent (2013 est.). Its per capita purchasing power parity stands at $2,800 (2013 est.). The size of the Lagos economy, according to The Economist (2011) at $45bn, is equivalent to the entire Kenyan economy and larger than Ethiopia’s. On the other hand, South Africa’s GDP purchasing power parity is put at $595.7 billion (2013 est.) while its real growth rate is recorded as 2 percent (2013 est.). Also, its per capita purchasing power parity stands at $11,500 (2013 est.) (cited in Ogunnubi, 2013: 222). Despite all the efforts of Nigeria in sustaining an Afrocentric policy through her economy and other mechanisms, Nigerian leaders have felt threatened and intimidated in their aspirations to continue to provide leadership for Africa, having been popularly known as the “giant” of Africa most especially after the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. It is now obvious that the struggle to reclaim and retain its leadership position in Africa could, therefore, be seen as another major motivation for Nigeria’s changing role in the promotion of democratic values in Africa. However, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa birthed another dominant and influential country on the continent. South Africa has become an important global actor in the post-apartheid era. As pointed out by Omotola (2008), South Africa was actively involved in exporting democracy to Nigeria when the country stood against the military regime in Nigeria, particularly under Abacha, and acted as a leading voice clamouring

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for sanctions against Nigeria in the Commonwealth of Nations after the extrajudicial killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa. South African foreign policy on Africa began to blossom after the apartheid regime which kicked off with the commencement of the democratic dispensation of Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) and continued under the subsequent leadership of Mbeki (1999-08), Motlanthe (2008-2009), and Jacob Zuma (Ogunnubi, 2013: 212). Having been shackled by racial policies for many decades until 1994, the end of apartheid led to the end of South Africa’s international isolation and sanctions from the international community. The end of apartheid and the beginning of a fresh democratic dispensation birthed the new form of external relations in South Africa. The first major challenge that confronted Nelson Mandela was how to tailor the foreign policy of South Africa in line with the realities of the post-Cold War era while the expectation was high within the international community on the emergence of South Africa as a new regional actor. Conversely, the emergence of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected president of South Africa led to the institutionalisation of project “African destiny”. This was clearly articulated in his article titled “South Africa’s future foreign policy” which clearly spelt out the guiding principles or core concerns of foreign policy conduct under an ANC-led government (Mandela, 1993: 86). Meanwhile, Mandela sought to promote issues of human rights, ranging from economic, social, environmental, and political rights to respect for democracy, international law, support for peace, disarmament, and universality. According to Nelson Mandela: “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny, if we do not devote our energy to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts” (Mandela, 1993: 86). It is therefore evident from the declaration that Mandela prioritised Africa in his foreign policy formulation. During the leadership of Nelson Mandela, South Africa sought to improve political and economic ties with other African countries coupled with a substantial increase in its foreign direct investment into Africa since 1994. Former President Mandela also took a unilateral decision to write-off Namibia’s debt to South Africa. Other notable events include his support for the imposition of sanctions on the Nigerian government following the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his backing for the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth (Tjemolane, 2011: 5). Mbeki succeeded Mandela, and he was able to champion an African course in his foreign policy formulation although with some elements of hostility

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as demonstrated in Angola. During this period, the developments in South Africa played notable roles in the transformation of the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as the country became a full member of the latter in 1994. South Africa, under Mbeki, with the cooperation of the Nigerian government under Olusegun Obasanjo, played a fundamental role during the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union as well as the formation of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) coupled with her involvement in peacekeeping operations in Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. With the concerted efforts of Nigeria and South Africa, an African governance structure was formed, which led to the establishment of the African Union and the Pan African Parliament, coupled with the creation of the African Peer Group Review Mechanism for NEPAD (Habib, 2009). Throughout his terms as president, Mbeki advocated multilateral solutions to regional conflicts and further deployed peacekeepers abroad. Jacob Zuma took over the mantle of leadership in 2009 and he was able to record monumental achievements through the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency, which was similar in policy to Mbeki’s African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund. In addition, South Africa has hosted important international summits; for instance, it hosted the 17th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Durban. South Africa was also a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council between 2011 and 2012. It also hosted the first BRICS Leaders-Africa forum in Durban in 2013, where the leaders of the BRICS countries declared their readiness to provide support for African development, which eventually snowballed into the establishment of the BRICS Development Bank. Besides, South Africa has been able to transform itself into the strongest economy in Africa as the largest investor on the continent, with her business presence, corporate expansion of multinational corporations, and parastatal investments in many parts of Africa. In 2010, South Africa was the 26th largest economy in the world and the largest in Africa (Boulle, 2011: 135). South Africa, today, plays a major role in trade relations in Africa, most especially the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2007: 213). South Africa’s economic presence in Africa, in the post-apartheid period, is not only driven and supported by coordinated public sector support but was facilitated by the private sector with a significant number

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of corporate ventures of South African businesses into African markets, ranging from retail, food, banking, telecommunications, tourism, infrastructure, power, franchise, construction, and mining to name a few. However, there are socio-economic and military indicators for Nigeria and South Africa which can be used to validate the economic and military status of the two countries in Africa. Table 1: Comparative Socio-Economic and Military Indicators for Nigeria and South Africa Indicator GDP Foreign Reserve Oil Production Per Day Oil Reserve External Debt Electricity Production Strength of the Armed Forces Transparency International Index (Corruption) GTI Index FDI

Nigeria 405.1 Billion USD/2016 45 Billion USD/2019 2.08m bbl/per day/2018 37.2 Billion barrels/2011 18.91 Billion USD/2017 6,803 MW

South Africa 294.8 Billion USD/2016 43.115 Billion USD/2018 190,000 bbl/per day/2018 15 Million barrels/2011 144.1 Billion USD/2017 34,000 MW

194,000/2017

94,050/2017

148 out of 180 countries/2017

71 out of 180 countries/2017

No 1 in Africa/GTI 2017 4.565.09 Million USD/2018

No 16 in Africa/GTI 2017 4.2 Billion USD/2019

Source: Compiled by authors from the AFED (African Financial and Economic Data).

Concluding Reflections The preceding analysis has discussed the hegemonic rivalry in Africa with a focus on Nigeria vs. South Africa’s role in African politics. It was revealed that Nigeria and South Africa are both dominant powers in Africa. Nigeria has maintained this dominance through an Afrocentric foreign policy that

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was initiated after independence. Nigeria was apparently considered a giant of Africa in the apartheid period for four decades. There is no doubt that Nigeria has been actively involved in African affairs including the struggle against apartheid in South Africa as well as multilateral diplomacies. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s generosity in Africa has not given Nigeria an advantageous chance to maintain the status quo in the contemporary international politics of Africa. Evidence from the above analysis suggests that the magnitude of South Africa’s influence and her involvement in Africa and global politics was comparatively low compared to Nigeria’s during the apartheid regime. In fact, South Africa was a product of Nigeria’s generosity during the struggle against apartheid but unfortunately, Nigeria’s leading role in Africa has been challenged in the post-apartheid period. The most viable and notable threat came from South Africa itself, following the end of apartheid and coupled with its good governance rating. Nigeria’s foreign policy was not properly articulated in a way that allowed Nigeria to maintain its dominant position in Africa because of some inherent contradictions such as corruption, poverty, political instability, among others. As Omotola (2014) has argued, the attainment of political independence in 1960 was greeted with much optimism. Nigeria emerged as a missing giant in 1960 both at regional and global levels as a result of its huge resource endowment, both human and material. Despite the level of human and material resources in the country, Nigerian leaders, right from the independence period, have not only failed to its potentials but also appear to have effectively squandered its opportunities for greatness, ignominiously seated at the very nadir of development (Olanrewaju, 2015: 1). This was what prompted the late President Yar’Adua to take a review of Nigeria’s foreign policy with a view to addressing the internal mechanism by prioritising domestic policy. Despite the recent record of South African hostility and Afrophobia in the region, it has emerged as a major threat to Nigeria in Africa because of its good governance rating. Today, South Africa is rated better in all indices of development compared to Nigeria because of the effective utilisation of her limited resources. Presently, there are more Nigerians in South Africa than South Africans in Nigeria: “Bad governance at the domestic level is partly responsible for the massive exodus of Nigerians to other countries in search of greener pastures, who are sometimes caught in wrongdoings and giving the country a bad image” (Uhomoihbi, 2011). Unless Nigeria addresses its internal contradictions, the aim of leading Africa may be a mirage. As posited by Yusuf and Abubakar (2017), Nigeria’s claim as the “Giant of Africa” is highly contestable and hypothetical with the emergence of countries like Ethiopia and South Africa posing serious challenges to

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Nigeria’s hegemony in the continent. There must be a strong internally institutionalised framework and good governance for Nigeria to reclaim her hegemonic control in the continent. Also, the two countries should not prioritise hegemonic control; rather there should be strong collaborative efforts between Nigeria and South Africa towards addressing the socioeconomic challenges in the continent to enhance the influence of Africa in the global setting. The stigmatisation of Africa as a peripheral region is enough for the regional powers to rethink and rejig their foreign policies to unbind the African region from being a centre of underdevelopment and playground of Western forces.

References Abubakar, A. and Yusuf, A. 2017. Buhari’s foreign policy challenges in an emerging New Economic Order. Journal of Social Sciences, University of Maiduguri, 2(3). Acharya, A. and Buzan, B. 2007. Why is there no non-Western International Relations Theory? An introduction. International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 7(3). Adebajo, A. 1996. South Africa and Africa: Within or apart? Southern Africa Development Research Institute. Cape Town: Zed Books. Adebajo, A. and Landsberg, C. 2007. South Africa in Africa: The postapartheid era. Scottsville, RSA: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Adebajo, A. 2018. The Eagle and the springbok: essays on Nigeria and South Africa. Jacana Media: Johannesburg, South Africa. Akinboye, O.S. 2005. From confrontation to strategic partnership: Nigeria’s relations with South Africa:1960-2000. In: Joy Ogwu, U. ed. New horizon for Nigeria in World affairs. Lagos: N.I.I.A. Compell, J. 2013. What’s happening with the ECOWAS force in Mali? Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/whats-happening-ecowasforce-mali. Casper, H.C. 2011. The Africanist delusion: In defense of the realist tradition and the neo-neo synthesis. Journal of Politics and Law, 4(1), 181-186. Chidozie, F.C., Agbude, G.A., and Oni, S. 2013. Nigeria’s megaphone diplomacy and South Africa’s quiet diplomacy: A tale of two eras. Covenant University, Journal of Politics and International Affairs, 1(2), 235-255. Clark, I. 2009. Bringing hegemony back in; the United States and International Order. International Affairs, 85(1).

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Coutsoukis, P. 2005. US Foreign Policy in perspective-clients, enemies and empire. Retrieved from: https://books.google.com.ng/books. [Accessed 14 June 2018]. Donnelly, J. 2000. Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gelb, S. 2001. South African role and importance in Africa. The EDGE Institute. Habib, A. 2009. South Africa’s foreign policy: Hegemonic aspirations, neoliberal orientations and global transformation. South African Journal of International Affairs, 16(2). Hobson, J.M. 2007. Is critical theory always for the white west and for western imperialism? beyond Westphalia, towards a post-racist critical international relations. Review of International Studies, 33(4). James, C. 2020. Oil Reserves. Retrieved from https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/oil-reserves.asp. Jesse, N.G. et al. 2012. The leader can’t lead when the followers won’t follow: The limitations of hegemony. In: K. P. William, Lobell S.E., and Jesse N.G. eds. Beyond the great powers and hegemons: Why secondary states support, follow or challenge. Stanford University Press. Jullit, K and James, R. 2010. Global Politics. Gadsworth Cengage Learning. Lemke, D. 2002. Regions of war and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mandela, N. 1993. “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy”. Foreign Affairs. 72(5) Mogenthau, H. 1975. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York. Mugambi, L.M. 2015. Hegemony and regional stability in Africa: A critical analysis of Kenya Nigeria and South Africa as regional hegemons. Kenya Institute of Diplomacy. Narrlof, C. 2015. Hegemony Oxford Bibliographies. Available at: http://www.oxfordbibliography.com/View/document/obo9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0112.xml. [Accessed 17 June 2019]. Nueman, S.G. 1998. International relations theory and the third world. London: Macmillan. Ogunnubi, R. 2013. Hegemonic order and regional stability in Sub-Sahara Africa: A comparative study of Nigeria and South Africa. Ph.D Thesis. University of Kwazulu-Natal: Pietermaritzburg. Olanrewaju, J. S. 2015. Understanding Nigerian developmental crisis. Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences, 6(1).

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Omotola, S.J. 2008. From importer to exporter: The changing role of Nigeria in promoting democratic values in Africa. In: Pretorious. ed. African politics: Beyond the third wave of democratization, 33-51. Cape Town: Juta Academic Press. Omotola, J.S. 2014. The more you see, the less you understand: Reflections. The Guardian. Oshewolo, S. 2018. Nigeria’s peace intervention in Sao Tome and Precipe and the Republic of Togo, under President Olusegun Obasanjo. African Identity, 29(1-3). Oshin, F. 2017. How Nigeria Spent $61 Billion for Black South Africans to fight Apartheid. Available at: Nigerianinsouthafrica.co.za. [Accessed 27 June 2018]. Palmer, D.H. 2010. International Relations. AITBS Publishers: India. Schmidt, B. 2018. Governance and diplomacy, policies, institutions and progress for global inclusive development, reconstructing hegemonies. Available at: http://doc-research.org>category2. [Accessed 20 July 20 2018]. Schraeder, P.J. 2001. South Africa’s foreign policy: from international pariah to leader of African renaissance. The Round Table, 90(359), 229243. Sterud, O. 1992. Regional great powers. In: Neumann. I. ed. Regional great powers in International Politics. Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press. Tetenye, A. 2014. South Africa vs. Nigeria: Competing countries for leadership position in Sub-Sahara Africa. In: 2014 ISA/FLACSO Conference, 24 July 2015, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Tjemolane, T. 2011. South African foreign policy towards Africa, 19942004: Partner or Hegemon. Thesis (PhD), University of Free Town. Uhomoihbi, M. 2011. Nigeria’s foreign policy: current features, enduring challenges and prospective solutions. In: Ikoro, C.C. ed. Nigeria: Half a century of progress and challenges. True Expression Press. United Nations 2015. United Nations Peace Keeping. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en. [Accessed 10 July 2018]. Walt, S.M. 1998. International Relations: One world, many theories. Foreign Policy, 110, 29-46.

CHAPTER SIX SOFT POWER AND THE STATE OF NIGERIA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY OPEYEMI IDOWU ALUKO

Abstract Economic diplomacy is an important strategy in the interrelationship among countries in the comity of states. Several developed countries of the world have used this platform to establish the indisputable relevance and significance of their country in the world. This is done by establishing largescale strategic trade and “compelling” economic relationships with their host countries. This is a form of soft power. The economic relations of Nigeria in Africa cannot be undermined. The Nigerian government has economic engagements in many African countries. This study examines whether Nigeria has economic diplomacy and soft powers and how viable it is within Africa. How does the influx of Nigerians to other African states translate into soft power? The study concludes that Nigeria should conduct more robust economic interactions based on strategic areas such as military hardware and software, telecommunications, and manufacturing sectors. This will improve the country’s negotiating and soft power within its sphere of influence in Africa. Keywords: Development; Diplomacy; Economy; Governance; Soft Power; Nigeria

Introduction Every country in the world relates with others in one form or another. This could be in terms of political relations, economic relations, socio-cultural relations, and military relations. The relationships have their gains and pains, but the most prominent of the relationships which link all the other forms is the economic relationship. This implies that if a country relates

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with another on the platform of political, geographical, social and/or military, the central connecting factor on either short-term focus or longterm benefits is to achieve mutual economic gains from such relationships. This, therefore, makes economic diplomacy the hallmark of international relations (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016; Aluko, 2019). Economic diplomacy is a state’s full use of its economic tools to achieve its national interests. It includes all the economic activities, ranging from the export of economically viable goods and services and the importation of profitable goods and services to investments, lending, aid, donating, and free trade agreements, among others (Obi, 2001; Meagher, 2010). It requires the application of technical expertise, which analyses the effects of a country’s economic situation on its political environment and economic interests. A critical analysis of Nigeria’s political environment and her foreign policy since independence clearly shows that Africa has been the main focus of the country’s external relations. Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world, with over 160 million people. (Alden and Soko, 2005; Babayo, 2015; Poulsen, 2015). The length of years of Nigeria’s activist foreign policy on the platform of the Non-Align Movement (NAM), peacekeeping roles in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, though consistent with the foreign policy objectives enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 and 1999, did not result in any tangible benefits to Nigeria’s domestic economy, nor strengthen her negotiating and soft power prowess in Africa (Kalu, 1996; Dickson, 2010; Ogunnubi, and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). Political leaders failed to highlight Nigeria’s domestic economic objectives as a nexus to her international co-operation and global peace commitments. While Nigeria struggled to end wars and participated in peacekeeping everywhere, it forgot to harness the soft power largesse that should follow after securing peace across Africa in, for example, Congo, Mali, South Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan among others. Onoh (2017) posited that the interventionist role played by Nigeria in South Africa and other African states - with, for example, Nigeria’s oil revenue diverted to aid the African National Congress in its struggles against apartheid and other domestic civil wars - has yielded no long-term gains. However, no attempt was made either to engage the anti-apartheid Congress at the cultural and economic level beyond the “vain glory” that support for anti-apartheid struggles brought (Onoh, 2017). In spite of Nigeria’s extensive history of commitment to the African Renaissance and Pan Africanism, there are horrendous xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South

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Africa and the incessant harassments of Nigerians in Ghana, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea among others (Adeniyi, 2015). Why is this so? Why is Nigeria increasingly losing her global respect and prestige despite her “free economic welfarism” towards other African countries? What should Nigeria do to exploit her soft power prowess to make better economic gains from her international relations? Economic diplomacy as a policy instrument is expected to promote economic growth through non-oil exports and attract foreign investment into the Nigerian economy. Growth can only be achieved through domestic economic reforms. Akinterinwa (2004) and Adeniyi (2015) noted that foreign policy is determined in large part by the stability and cohesion of domestic policy, particularly in fields which generate increased power for the state. Economic diplomacy is relatively difficult to sustain in a chaotic domestic policy environment and uncertain internal political situations. An enabling environment is critical to economic growth among other factors. However, some scholars opined that the fate of economic diplomacy does not change either in stable or an unstable democracy as it is possible to make small gains even in an unstable democracy (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003; Babayo 2015; Aluko, 2020a). This study focuses on the analysis of economic diplomacy in Nigeria, the current state of Nigeria’s economic diplomacy, its practice, and how it can use her economic diplomacy as a form of soft power.

Soft Power and Economic Diplomacy: Conceptual Clarification The soft power concept was first defined by Nye (1990). It implies the ability to achieve your goals through attraction rather than coercion or payment, which includes “culture, values and foreign policies” (Nye, 2004). Nye extended this definition to the ability to affect others through a cooptive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction to obtain preferred outcomes (Nye, 2011). These definitions of soft power focus on the outcome of the event. Nye opined that the power that a state exercises can be divided into two categories: hard power and soft power. Hard power is mainly composed of the military capability of a country and economic might. Soft power refers to the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Soft power also rests primarily on four resources: culture, political values, ideas, and foreign policies. Soft power has become increasingly

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important as a sphere of power to influence other countries’ actions without coercion (Aluko and Ogunnubi, 2018). Soft power is more difficult, because many of its crucial resources are outside the control of governments, and their effects depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audience. Moreover, soft power resources often work indirectly by shaping the environment and sometimes take years to produce the desired outcomes. Soft power resources are slower, more diffuse, and more cumbersome to wield than hard power resources. The appeal of soft power rests in its promise to deliver key international objectives without the high costs associated with the exercise of hard power (Aluko and Ogunnubi, 2018). As a result, governments across the globe have latched onto the concept, hoping to use it to achieve foreign policy goals. Mcclory (2015) noted that soft power can be categorised using six indices that aid a country’s visibility and manifestation in the global politics. They are the Government, Culture, Engagement, Education, Digital, and Enterprise indices. The Government index is designed to assess a state’s public institutions, political values, and major public policy outcomes. A successful model of domestic government is an important feature of a nation’s overall attractiveness. The Cultural index, on the other hand, should promote universal values that other nations can readily identify with; it makes them naturally attractive to others. The reach and volume of cultural output is important in building soft power. It measures facts like the annual number of visiting international tourists, the success of a country’s movie and music industry, and the nation’s international sporting prowess. The Engagement index aims to measure a country’s diplomatic resources, global achievements, and contribution to the international community. It captures the ability of states to engage with international audiences and shape global outcomes. The Education Index is a necessary tool for soft power dissemination. The ability of a country to attract international students, or facilitate exchanges, is a powerful tool of public and economic diplomacy, even between countries with a history of animosity. The number of international students in a country, the relative quality of its universities, and the academic outputs of higher education institutions are the indicators. The economy index is of both hard power and soft power concern. It concerns the extent of a country’s productivity and acceptability of its goods and services across the globe. The Enterprise index aims to capture the relative attractiveness of a country’s economic model in terms of its competitiveness, capacity for innovation, and ability to foster enterprise and commerce. The Digital index

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aims to capture the extent to which countries have embraced technology, how well they are connected to the digital world, and their use of digital diplomacy through social media platforms. The top ten rankings of global soft power, according to the Soft Power 30 Index (2015), are, in order, the United Kingdom, Germany, the USA, France, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Japan, Sweden, and the Netherlands. In relation to hard power, Ying F. (2008) opined that soft power is an integral part of hard power. It is the “soft” or tactical part of power. It is an extension of hard power. It is linked with hard power and can only work with the support of hard power, and it is yet independent of hard power. It has the capability to shape the preferences of others and attract, which often leads to acquiescence. It also has the ability to get others to desire the outcome you want because of your cultural or ideological appeal. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries are admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness, or want to follow it. It is also a key element of leadership and the extent of political strength and economic diplomacy. The concept of economic diplomacy will be well entrenched if the meaning of diplomacy is unravelled. From a common point of view, diplomacy is the art of managing a relationship for a beneficial outcome (Asobie, 2002). Edmund Burke used the word diplomacy in 1796 to indicate a skilful and effective conduct of international discourse and negotiation. This implies that diplomacy becomes relevant when transactions become international in outlook; that it entails conducting business and managing a relationship for a particular beneficial outcome between two or more countries. Therefore, based on this lucid term, economic diplomacy entails the art of conducting and managing international economic relations. It essentially involves bargaining, balancing, and reconciliation of economic interests of concerned parties who ordinarily are made up of nation-states. The practical constant preoccupation of economic diplomacy is to achieve, project, and sustain the economic and political objectives of a country with a view to attracting foreign investors to the country. In the view of Asobie (2002) and Brown (2016), economic diplomacy is the management of international relations in a manner that places emphasis on the economic dimensions of a country’s external relations. In light of this, one may conclude that the conduct of economic diplomacy in whatsoever form actively involves the participation of a country’s diplomatic agent, foreign ministry, and its ministry of finance to arrange negotiations among the representatives of countries. This is to adequately define the terms for

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mutual and beneficial economic cooperation, and the diplomatic actors will possibly iron out the conflicting economic interest of the parties involved. An important dimension of economic diplomacy is in the form of foreign aid from rich countries to poor countries (Flemes, 2009). The danger in this form of economic diplomacy is that the donor country does have a dominant posture on the receiving country’s domestic and foreign decisions. The rich country merely dictates what policy the poor receiving country should implement (Cooper, 1997; Onuoha, 2008). This, to some extent, is a form of colonialism. This phenomenon in modern terms is called neo-colonialism (Cooper, 1997). This is also the phenomenon of soft power usage, which gives the rich donor country the unilateral will to persuade or compel the receiving countries and sometimes impose certain economic sanctions on poor countries in order to extract some measures of political and economic concessions from them. Figure 1: Nigeria’s Soft Power

Source: Aluko and Ogunnubi (2018).

Yakopand Van Bergeijk (2009) opined that economic diplomacy and commercial policy remain relevant in real-world phenomena. Economic

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diplomacy involves a transfer of what used to be public services to commercial activities, although private benefits often exceed the cost of providing the public service. This means that government service delivery is not only a public service but that the government should be expecting a corresponding return from the service delivered. This is also the commercialisation of government service so as to enhance commercial and economic gains and lead to a greater prospect of reinvesting in such public gestures. Figure 1 shows the combinations of what potentially makes up Nigeria’s soft power.

Nigeria’s Soft Power and Economic Diplomacy Nigeria’s sphere of influence is linked to its economic diplomacy and foreign policies. The economic diplomacy as a foreign policy objective in Nigeria dates back to the independence period. However, its utility as a medium of international relations in Nigeria is largely credited to the General Babangida regime (1985-1993). It was utilised as a response to Nigeria’s domestic debt crisis. The soft power utility during Babangida’s regime also has a silent emphasis on the political diplomacy prospects of Nigeria. It is, therefore, significant to stress that Babangida’s regime showed vigour in the pursuit of Nigeria’s economic diplomacy. It is also important to draw attention to President Obasanjo, who, in his civilian rule (1999-2007), pursued economic diplomacy with much gesturetravelling around the world in search of debt forgiveness everywhere. He was able to use shuttle diplomacy in exercising soft power on other nations in seeking a soft landing and debt relief. There were several compromises based on the economic strength of Nigeria and the population strength amidst the black population of the world and indeed in Africa. The proof of Nigeria’s soft power was recognised by the financial organisations such as the World Bank, among others, during the negotiations, persuasions, and compromises to achieve Nigeria’s debt cancelation. In recent times (2011-2018), Nigeria’s economic diplomacy and soft power manoeuvring have not been strongly felt as being professed in her foreign policy statements in that the presence of Nigerian industrialists and investors in other African countries has been so meagre (Obuah, Ndubuisi, and Dappa 2017). There are high presences of informal trading ventures in many African states on a small-scale. This level of acceptability and economic activity has no significant correlation on the host country’s economic welfare. In some countries across Africa, these small businesses and trade ventures operate illegally, and the host countries are not able to

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properly document and recognise such businesses or trading ventures as part of Nigeria’s positive impact on their homeland or as international economic, diplomatic relations with Nigeria. Also, the petty investments in pockets of places by Nigerians in other African countries have little or no economic relevance to the growth of the host economies. This lack of huge investments in multiple places has created a considerable vacuum in the economic diplomatic record between Nigeria and other African countries (Obi, 2018). The presence of Nigerians in most African markets is not as visible as expected in relation to the potential of the wealth of Nigeria in Africa. This invisible presence and poor utilisation of the potential soft power within Africa in such interactions is due to the inadequacies of the leaders in the Nigerian government to channel such potentials appropriately. A few economic and diplomatic agreements in terms of bilateral and multilateral relations have been signed in the Nigerian Fourth Republic (since 1999) with other countries in Africa and beyond. These have allowed huge investors such as the Dangote group of companies, Globacom telecommunications, and other private investors to move freely into other African countries to set up multinational industries, notably cement factories, sugar and other consumable companies, and oil refineries among others. Although they are limited in the range of commodities, the production and distribution channels have to some extent been able to compete with goods from other countries in the African market. However, the extent of competition and influence of Nigerian goods in African market lags behind non-African investors/companies and products from China, America, and European countries. Therefore, the pockets of small ventures owned by Nigerian businessmen, which in many cases are small-scale and in the informal sector without proper registration in the host countries, have little economic influence, visibility, and impression of Nigeria’s presence on the economic landscape of the affected countries. This shows that the economic relations embarked on by Nigerians are not that strong or widely dispersed across African countries. This does not enhance the real economic effects of Nigeria on other states in Africa. The dominance of the Europeans, Americans, and Asians in the African market is more entrenched than Nigeria’s.

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Antecedents of Nigeria’s Economic Diplomacy in Africa Nigerian economic diplomacy during the late General Ironsi’s regime was energised by the Ambassadors’ Conference held in Lagos in June 1966 to examine the premises and directions of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The conference dedicated Nigeria’s economic resources to the total emancipation of all African territories still under colonial tutelage and racial discrimination. Adeleke (1995) noted that this position was further reinforced when General Ironsi stated that, in the whole sphere of external relations, the government attached the greatest importance to its African policy. However, Nigerian economic diplomacy over the years has undulated from bad to good, particularly in the years postdating Nigeria’s intervention to restore peace and stability in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Dickson, 2010). This is because the underlying foreign policy thrust of Nigeria was shrouded in Afrocentric political, diplomatic policy, which lays little emphasis on economic diplomacy. It was the backbone of the armed struggle that finally rid the continent of the remnants of colonialism and apartheid. Angola, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, among other African nations, were beneficiaries of such diplomatic benevolence from Nigeria. Nigeria was in the forefront of the establishment and sustaining of various continental and regional organisations. For instance, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now the African Union (AU) established on 25 May 1963 was primarily aimed at achieving two important objectives: to ensure the quick decolonisation of the remaining colonies in Africa and to facilitate the rapid socio-economic growth and development of African states. In this respect, Nigeria dedicated her oil-rich economy to ensuring the implementation of the primary objectives upon which the OAU was founded. In 1975, Nigeria granted the sum of Naira 13.5 million and military assistance to Angola’s MPLA and also enlisted diplomatic support for the Angolan government within the OAU. This had greatly accorded recognition to the Angolan government by many African states who were hitherto unwilling to give such recognition. It is noteworthy to point out that Nigeria has no meaningful economic presence in these countries to compensate for her sacrifices. In the Sierra Leone and Liberian civil wars, for example, Nigeria sacrificed enormous amounts of human and material resources, with the latter running into billions of Naira to rescue the countries from near disintegration and the grip of rebel insurgents. Nigeria deployed battalions to help these countries in distress. In the opinion of the Conteh (2017), the Nigerian government supported Liberia in such a way as to ensure adequate peace and stability in

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Liberia and is the only country that has devoted considerable resources to it. Also, Nigeria’s involvement in the ECOWAS military intervention group (ECOMOG) aimed to bring peace and stability to the West African subregion. The venture cost the nation enormous financial resources, and a lot of troops also lost their lives. Adeniyi (2015) and Oni and Taiwo (2016) noted that Nigeria has participated in peacekeeping operations in many African countries, including Angola, Somalia, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Mali, Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau. The historic contributions of Nigeria to regional peace missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone cost the country the whopping sum of around $10 billion, not to mention the gallant men and women of the Nigerian Armed Forces who paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of peace, but they are hardly acknowledged by the international community. Nigeria further emphasised her desire for a peaceful Africa by also spending around $90 million in the OAU peacekeeping force that was deployed to Chad in 1980s. This is in addition to the sum of the $800 million the Nigeria Trust Fund established under the African Development Bank (ADB) to assist African countries to obtain soft loans to execute vital projects. However, this kind gesture to Africa was slighted by other African states when Nigeria was denied the presidency of ADB in an election that was held right on Nigerian soil. To a large extent, the Afrocentric foreign relations and economic diplomacy of Nigeria have not yielded optimum benefits for the country. African nations have not given Nigeria the necessary recognition and respect to justify their spending on the continent (Ogbonna and Ogunnubi, 2018). For instance, the Nigerian President in December 2013 was not given the recognition to make a speech during the Mandela burial despite the role the country played to stop the apartheid regime in South Africa. Some African countries still work against the interests of Nigeria in the United Nations and other international arenas. For instance, the quest of Nigeria to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council has not enjoyed wide support from other African countries such as Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, and Ethiopia, among others. The inadequacies and weaknesses in Nigeria’s economic diplomacy in terms of strength and the extent of economic domination of Nigerian economic enterprises in other countries are further exposed with the emergence of South African business interests including MTN, DSTV, SHOPRITE, and Standard Bank dominating the Nigerian economic landscape, especially in the banking, retail, entertainment, and telecommunication industries.

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However, it is fair to note that a few Nigerian businesses have been set up in Liberia. Such companies include United Bank for Africa, Guarantee Trust Bank, Emzor Pharmaceuticals, and Mutual Benefits Assurance, among other companies. But on the whole, the presence of Europe and the United States of America firms are more prominent there. Therefore, the 2013 new emphasis on economic diplomacy by President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration witnessed some positive changes in economic diplomacy. Nigeria continues to uphold the democratic imperative and leadership role in Africa but with a redefined foreign policy and economic motive combined with diplomatic strength to enhance the support of domestic programmes of the government in order to propel Nigeria’s domestic economy and by implication promote Africa’s economic and industrial growth. However, in attracting economic largesse into the African continent from European and American countries, Nigeria’s economic diplomacy has proved some worth. It is important to note the 2011 signing of a Bilateral Agreement with Germany where Siemens was secured to establish a local manufacturing facility in Lagos for the production of small and mediumscale gas turbines for the country’s power sector. Nigeria’s soft power and economic diplomacy with other countries brought into the African continent foreign direct investment of €65 million meant for the construction of the 30 megawatt Kiri Dam Project in Adamawa State, €50 million for the 20 megawatt Yola Solar Power Station, and €1.5 billion for the construction of the 450 megawatt National Integrated Power Project Geregu Power Station Phase Two in Ajaokuta, Kogi State. Also, another grant of €8.2 million had been secured for the construction of 5- to 10-megawatt solar power plants for universities in Ibadan, Sokoto, Bayelsa, and Yola. These were areas other countries regarded as necessities in Nigeria’s economy and had capitalised on it for bilateral economic relations and agreements. The Nigeria-China relationship also yielded a soft loan of $500 million to Nigeria for the construction of a light rail system in and around Abuja. On bilateral relations with Mexico, an investment of $54 million was secured for the development of agricultural plantations for the cultivation of pineapple and other crops for export to the European Union market. Nigeria’s Federal Government Annual Report (2015) noted that its economic diplomacy has also attracted some foreign direct investments that will create job opportunities for Nigerians. The economic diplomacy also resulted in inviting General Electric of the United States to invest $1 billion in the construction of a factory in Calabar to manufacture gas turbines for the power sector in Africa. It also yielded to the construction of a factory in

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Agbara, Ogun State, to manufacture health materials with the potential to create over 1,000 skilled jobs. The foreign direct investment in the country in the past had not been too stable. However, in 2012 Nigeria also received a foreign direct investment of $8.9 billion, as noted by the United Nations World Investment Report (2015). This kind of fiscal largesse is expected to translate into rapid economic development in Nigeria if economic diplomacy policies are effectively deployed and less prebendal politics and egocentric motives are involved (Lewis, 1996). The antecedents of Nigeria’s economic roles in ECOWAS are important indicators of the country’s economic diplomacy in the region. Between 2003 and 2011, Nigeria contributed $918.7 million (N138 billion) to the running of the ECOWAS, followed at a distance is Ghana with $225.7 million (N34 billion) and Côte d’Ivoire with $107.5 million (N16.1 billion). For years, Nigeria’s funding of the 15-member body stood at three to six times what other nations contributed. That ratio rose recently to over 60 percent of the ECOWAS total revenues, with the introduction of community levies. Nigeria hosts three of the ECOWAS institutions—the commission, the court, and the parliament. These contributions are expected in addition to the lead in funding to translate at a minimum to relative privileges in decision-making and staffing. However, in reality, Nigeria receives little privilege on any matter requiring voting; Nigeria’s opinions are often discarded (Ogbonna and Ogunnubi, 2018). Yet about 2 percent (2.36 percent) and 3 percent (2.85 percent) of Nigeria’s export in the years 2010 and 2011 respectively went to ECOWAS member states as against about 98 percent (97.64 percent) that went to the rest of the world (International Trade Centre (ITC) and Trade Map Statistic 2017). The economic diplomatic relations of Nigeria with Ghana in West Africa in terms of volume of trade between Ghana and Nigeria increased from $64 million in 2000 to $2.6 billion in 2006, with the balance of trade skewed in favour of Nigeria (Oni and Taiwo, 2016). International Trade Centre (ITC) and Trade Map Statistic (2017) data showed that bilateral non-oil trade between Nigeria and Ghana increased from less than $15 million before 2000 to more than $130 million in 2010, while non-oil exports from Ghana to Nigeria increased from less than 0.5 percent in the late 1990s to approximately 1.9 percent of its global exports in 2010. In the years 2013 to 2016, the trade volume between Nigeria and Ghana increased by 5 percent from the 2010 trade and exchange figures. This shows that the concentration of Nigeria’s economic diplomatic relations with Ghana in West Africa pulls a significant string in terms of economic largesse to both countries and a

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larger extent than the dissipation of efforts in many other African countries without significant outputs. Similarly, South Africa, over the review period of 2007-2016, has maintained a trade deficit with Nigeria, mainly attributed to the large imports of crude oil, which have consistently accounted for 99 percent of South Africa’s imports from Nigeria (Tralac Trade Law Centre, 2018; The Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce, 2018). Exports however, despite being low, are relatively diverse. From a global perspective, Nigeria is ranked 32nd amongst South Africa’s export destinations, accounting for less than 1 percent of South Africa’s total exports. In terms of imports, Nigeria is ranked 10th import supplier to the South African market. However, when considering the African market, Nigeria is ranked the 12th export destination for South Africa’s goods and is ranked first most important import source from Africa. Also, the International Trade Centre (ITC) and Trade Map Statistic (2017) in the view of South Africa’s Ministry of Trade and Industry noted that the trade between Nigeria and South Africa increased steadily from N488 billion (R20.6 billion) in 2010 to N1.5 trillion (R62 billion) in 2015. It, however, decreased by 11.29 percent from N1.5 trillion (R62 billion) in 2015. Notwithstanding the two countries continuously traded goods at high capacity and Nigeria’s exports to South Africa were N552.2 billion (R23 billion) in 2016, while South Africa’s exports to Nigeria slightly declined to about N153.7 billion (R6.4 billion) in 2016. This is a trade volume drop to about N1.3 trillion (R55 billion) in 2016 between the two countries. The gradual movement was attributed to Nigeria’s demand for automotive parts, South Africa’s export cars, vehicles, structures and parts of the structure, uncoated paper, and paperboard. Table 1 shows the trade volume secured by Nigeria in relation to other African states and the world at large in 2016 using her economic diplomacy and soft power tendencies.

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Table 1: Nigeria’s Trade Volume with Eleven Selected Africa States in 2016 SN

COUNTRY

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

South Africa Ghana Cameroon Mali Liberia Egypt Senegal Côte d’Ivoire Tunisia Kenya Ethiopia Total Africa World Total

EXPORT (1000 USD) 1,800,925 399,115 4,75,784 2,341 1,707 225,970 468,751 807,201 12,068 4,416 1,719 4,674,200 32,883,045

IMPORT (1000 USD) 544,638 68,925 3,362 82 2,355 89,038 3,678 284,953 18,880 3,1603 447 1,498,343 35,194,301

Sources: International Trade Centre (ITC) and Trade Map Statistic (2017).

From Table 1, it is evident that Nigeria has benefited less significantly from the economic diplomacy of trade and relationships in Africa regarding her potentials and economic prowess. In many of the trade volume relationships, Nigeria has more (official) exports than the (official) import volumes. This implies that Nigeria’s goods and services are in high demand in other African countries. If Nigeria could capitalise on this, there would be a higher presence of Nigerian firms in Africa than from other non-African countries such as China, the United States of America, and India, among others. The gross total in Africa indicates that many Africa states are benefiting from Nigeria’s large economy and terms of trade to enhance their economy by importing more from Nigeria. Thus, to a large extent, the balance of trade is in favour of Nigeria. In relation to the rest of the world, Nigeria’s economic diplomacy promotes higher exports and a corresponding higher import value. Although regionally significant, the level and impact of Nigerian economic diplomacy in the world at large is limited. Nigeria still relies to a large extent on the developed countries of the world for economic support. On the use of human resources to enhance soft power drives and economic diplomacy, Nigeria has represented the African continent on the global front using her human and economic resources to contribute her quota to world

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peace. Nigeria has the fourth-largest contingent in the United Nations peacekeeping operations since 1960, having committed 250,000 men and women, losing about 2,000 troops in the process and expending over $10 billion. Presently, Nigeria has more than 17, 000 troops serving under the United Nations military operations. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s contribution so far has not been anchored on solid economic diplomacy that could ensure rewards for invested funds. It seems to have been paying lip service and have little concern for her economic diplomacy. The use of economic diplomacy and soft power by Nigeria is negligible, compared to the potential the country has among the comity of nations. The economic diplomacy and soft power usage by Nigeria present an insignificant influence in Africa and the entire world. The primary reason for this is the issue of bad leadership that is not willing to utilise the resources of Nigeria to enhance good governance and development and a weak civil society that cannot make the government accountable for their actions. Nigeria’s operations in Africa are not sufficient to portray a dominant role in the economic whims and caprices of its host country. In such countries, fragments of symbols of Nigeria’s economic diplomacy are seen but outshone by some other Western countries and other competitors in Africa such as South Africa and Egypt. Therefore, the significance of Nigeria’s economic diplomacy has not been fully harnessed by Nigeria in terms of focusing on a few aspects of the economy of the recipient country and dominating those market spheres. However, the significance of Nigeria’s economic diplomacy is also undermined because of the unregistered influx of Nigerian businesses in other Africans countries. Because so many are unregistered, they cannot be captured for proper taxation and be recognised as Nigerian products in those countries. Therefore, it still appears as if Nigeria’s presence in many African countries is undercover or camouflaged, as citizens of such countries so as to enjoy some benefits but in the long run delimit the economic diplomacy strength of Nigeria (Ugwu and Olukoshi, 2002). Considering the influx of Nigerians into many African countries and how they participate in informal businesses, it is of note that a large chunk of the products traded or manufactured by Nigerians in other African countries are not on a large scale, they are mainly retail trade and sole proprietorships with limited visibility. The products do not provide tangible economic outcomes that can boost a diplomatic relationship. Therefore, the outcome of Nigeria’s economic diplomacy provides a blurred image with limited visibility.

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The record of economic interactions of Nigerians in African countries also has no proper documentation due to the nature of their business ventures and interactions, which are mostly in retail and on a small scale with very low or insignificant levels over the years in comparative analysis with the extent of financial and human resource capability. In comparison, a few other African countries, such as South Africa, have a strategic presence in their host countries in areas like telecommunication, military software, and large-scale manufacturing investments (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015; Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). Therefore, soft power usage and Nigeria’s economic diplomacy problems can be attributed to the large presence of corruption in the foreign policy implementing sectors, less significant will power to drive economic diplomacy rather than political “vainglory” diplomacy and the unending insecurity crises which scare off potential investors (Aluko, 2018; 2020b). The availability of substance (or lack of it) in Nigeria’s economic diplomacy and the use of soft power can be revitalised if Nigeria would focus on largescale production of high-quality economic goods and services both within and outside the country. Also, the location of countries to be engaged with should be aligned strategically with the best economies of scale, comparative advantage, and favourable terms of trade so as to enhance maximum outputs. The agencies in Nigeria in charge of foreign trade should also encourage Nigerians to register their trade and manufacturing industries legally in their host countries so as to become a recognised social and corporate sector that has the right to influence public policies.

Conclusion Economic diplomacy policy and soft power usage are tools to ensure adequate economic reward for the government’s goal of economic revival and sustainable development in all international relations. Nigeria has economic diplomacy towards Africa and indeed the rest of the world. However, the economic diplomacy of the Nigerian government in Africa has not been very significant when compared with the level of economic potential and impact Nigeria can have on the continent of Africa as a whole. The level of economic investment by Nigerians in many African countries is very small, trading and manufacturing are mostly on a small scale, and some are not registered for proper taxation in their host countries. This, therefore, renders Nigeria’s economic diplomacy impact to be insignificant and not well recognised by the host country and the international community.

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This partly explains the poor economic gains attained from Nigeria’s economic diplomacy and foreign policy relations. The account of the economic interactions of Nigerians within other African countries has no proper record due to the informal nature of their business and interactions. The nature in comparative analysis with the extent of financial and human resource capability is predominantly on a retail or small scale with little, very low, or insignificant rate of return over the years. This can be attributed to the large presence of corruption in the foreign policy implementing sectors, poor willpower to drive economic diplomacy rather than political “vainglory” diplomacy, and the unending insecurity crises which scare off potential investors (Aremu, Isiaq, and Aluko, 2018). Nigeria can learn some economic diplomacy clues from the United States of America, Great Britain, South Africa, or even China (Alden and Davies, 2006). All of these countries, in their recent trends in Africa, have gained substantial soft power and economic ground by taking advantage of their economic strengths and large skilled labour forces to massively produce and export goods to African countries. The efficacy of such soft power displays is more appreciated in regions suffering from acute poverty in vast parts of its territory and whose populaces thus enjoy the low-price import of goods such as textiles and clothing, electronic devices, and machinery for the manufacturing sectors. It is a duty and still a challenge for Nigeria to construct a common identity with other African states in a mutually beneficial economic relationship that is commensurate with Nigeria’s economic potential in Africa. Nigeria also needs to formulate a new foreign policy framework which must have economic diplomacy as its principal tool of operation. Such an effort requires the recognition of the Nigerian citizen as the ultimate beneficiary of Nigeria’s foreign policy endeavours, with the bulk of the benefits not going to other Africans countries at the expense of Nigeria. To achieve this, Nigeria’s national interest must be cleverly and robustly articulated in a way that economic interests are embedded in financial and human capital investments that simultaneously promote peace and stability in the West African sub-region and on the African continent. It is, therefore, necessary for Nigeria to formulate an economic diplomacy framework tailored towards economic enhancement and the development of the country. Nigeria should specifically emulate the United States of America, which makes economic and political interests the major determinant of its foreign policy. This implies that the personnel prosecuting the economic diplomacy of Nigeria must have the political will and the

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technical capability to execute the plan and use the economic prowess of Nigeria to attract more investors into the country. There is a need for transparency in transaction implementation so as to eliminate the political and economic corruption prominent in many of Nigeria’s bilateral and multilateral transactions. Nigerians engaging in other African countries' economies should be registered in a legal and acceptable way in their host country so as to properly record their legal presence in the country. The host country would gain from customer patronage and taxation while Nigeria would also have its prestige and economic repatriation and remittance gains. Also, the bulk of the Nigerian influx into many African countries is engaged in small-scale manufacturing, retail trading, and others. This places the country at a disadvantage because the impact of their economic activities is relatively insignificant. This should be addressed by encouraging large-scale investments by Nigerians in other countries. Nigeria should engage in a more robust economic interaction in strategic areas such as in military hardware and software, telecommunications, and manufacturing sectors, among others. This would translate the current rudimentary economic diplomacy of Nigeria into a robust mutual economic venture. Loans could be acquired from the host countries’ financial institutions or the homeland financial institutions to support large-scale economic activities as a result of Nigeria’s soft power negotiations. This could serve to transform the infant economic diplomacy of Nigeria to its rightful status and an economic force to be reckoned with as a “giant” in Africa and other parts of the world.

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Obi, C.I. 2001. The changing forms of identity politics in Nigeria under economic adjustment: The case of the oil minorities movement of the Niger Delta (No. 119). Nordic Africa Institute. Obi, C. 2018. Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in Relation to the Economic Community of West African States. In: African Foreign Policies in International Institutions, 311-325. Palgrave Macmillan: New York. Obuah, E.E., Ndubuisi, J. O., and Dappa, G. T. 2017. Trade as an instrument of diplomacy: an assessment of Nigeria’s version of protectionist trade. Journal of African Foreign Affairs, 4(1-2), 5-22. Ogunnubi, O. and Isike, C. 2015. Regional hegemonic contention and the asymmetry of soft power: A comparative analysis of South Africa and Nigeria. Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 37(1), 152. Ogunnubi, O. and Okeke-Uzodike, U. 2015. South Africa's foreign policy and the strategy of soft power. South African Journal of International Affairs, 22(1), 23-41. Ogunnubi, O. and Okeke-Uzodike, U. 2016. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? African Security Review, 25(2), 110-128. Onoh, J. K. 2017. The Nigerian oil economy: From prosperity to glut. Routledge. Oni, E.O. and Taiwo, A. M. 2016. Re-Thinking Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Beyond “Big Brotherism” Towards Economic Diplomacy. Canadian Social Science, 12(10), 62-71. Onuoha, J. 2008. The state and economic reforms in Nigeria: An exploratory note on the capture theory of politics. African Renaissance, 5(2), 35-56. Poulsen, L.N.S. 2015. Bounded rationality and economic diplomacy: The politics of investment treaties in developing countries. Cambridge University Press. Tralac Trade Law Centre. 2018. South Africa trade with Nigeria. Available from: www.tralac.org. [Accessed 2 August 2018]. Ugwu, J. and Olukoshi, A. 2002. Nigeria's Economic Diplomacy: Some contending Issues. Economic Diplomacy and the Nigerian State. Lagos: NIIA. Yakop, M. and Van Bergeijk, P. 2009. The Weight of Economic and Commercial Diplomacy. The Institute of Social Studies. Working Paper No. 478. Ying, F. 2008. Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion? Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 4(2).

CHAPTER SEVEN NIGERIA - SOUTH AFRICA BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT ADESINA ABDULFATTAH RAJI, PH.D.

Abstract Nigeria and South Africa are two of Africa’s most strategic countries, regarded as economic powerhouses for their respective regional economic communities. This study, therefore, examines the nature of bilateral economic relations between the two countries. It looks at how the relationship could be strengthened in order to yield mutual benefits and place both countries on the path of economic recovery in the face of the current global economic crisis. The study argues that both countries are driven by a similar strategy of a private sector-led development paradigm. It observes that both countries have the onerous responsibility to lead the continent from poverty and repression onto a path of socio-economic development. The study recommends that the study of bilateral relations should be critically addressed so that the ensuing gains for the economies of both countries can translate to the development and greater good of the people. It concludes that Nigeria and South Africa are at the crossroads of history. Both countries need to justify their leadership positions in their respective regions. They need to share experiences and promote joint regional actions that can facilitate and guarantee better collaborations and encourage other African states to support one another for progress, growth, and development. Keywords: Development; Economic; Nigeria; Poverty; South Africa Relations

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Introduction Nigeria and South Africa`s long history of engagement dates back to Nigeria`s independence in 1960. Mandela first visited Lagos in 1962 to seek support for the African National Congress (ANC), shortly before he was arrested and jailed on treason charges back home. In the following years, Nigeria placed itself at the forefront of the struggle against apartheid, alongside many other nations, providing extensive financial and logistical support and chairing the UN special committee against apartheid for 25 years until 1994, when apartheid was abolished. Its enduring support for South Africa`s struggle was echoed in its support for other liberation struggles in Southern Africa, including those in Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe. Unlike Nigeria, which was able to aggressively and proactively help other countries after independence in 1960 in line with its foreign policy focus on Africa, the democratic South African government in 1994 was indebted to many states because of their support in fighting apartheid. Nigeria believed this debt needed to be repaid not financially but through the forging of close political, trade, and people-to-people ties. The fact that Pretoria did not meet this expectation laid the ground for later issues in the relationship (Games, 2013: 2). However, the prospects for relations between the two countries cannot be understood outside the context of their political economies, histories, and positions in the international system (Obi, 2015: 3-4). With a democratic government in place in Nigeria in 1999, NigeriaSouth Africa relations became less confrontational. Prior to 1999, South Africa had a poor political relationship with Nigeria. At the time, Nigeria was ruled by a military junta that was politically hostile to South Africa. This, however, dramatically changed with the end of the military government and the return of democracy in 1999. From that point on, the South African state built a strong relationship with the Nigerian government under the leadership of Obasanjo and Yar’Adua. This relationship was also helped by the fact that Thabo Mbeki had formed a strong friendship with Obasanjo and Yar’Adua when he was in exile in Nigeria from 1976 to 1979 (Dubow, 2000). Some commentators have gone as far as suggesting that the future of the entire continent rests on the fate of Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria`s former foreign minister, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, stated in 2000 that: “Nigeria and South Africa have always been considered as the two countries that should propel Africa, south of the Sahara into the contemporary economic level” (Adeniji, 2000: 79). In the same vein, Professor Adebajo, the Nigerian head of South Africa`s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process, noted: “South Africa and Nigeria … constitute SubSaharan Africa`s two economic colossuses” (Adedeji, 1999: 5).

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In a more critical view, Ali Mazrui (2006) comments that the diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa, if well-coordinated and managed, could deliver important dividends with regard to the continent’s development and stability. He observes, however, that contradictions are underpinning the diplomatic relations between the two countries that need to be reconciled, stating that: Nigeria is indeed the Africa of human resources; South Africa is a land of mineral resources. Nigeria’s climate and mosquito-ridden habitation had repelled Europeans from settling there; South Africa`s more moderate climate and spectacular natural endowments had, in contrast, attracted the largest concentration of white folks on the African continent. While Nigeria, therefore, remained a racially homogeneous country (overwhelmingly black), South Africa manifested the politics of contending ideologies. After its civil war of 1967-1970, Nigeria became Africa`s largest exporter of oil. In the wake of its industrialisation, South Africa became Africa`s greatest consumer of oil.

It is in the context of these contradictions that Nigeria’s economic boom should be understood. It can be argued that there has been progress in these countries despite their domestic affairs, which poses the biggest barrier to their own development. South Africa faces domestic challenges in the form of high levels of unemployment (especially among the youth), poverty, and inequality. The ruling party, the ANC, has characterised these as triple challenges that need to be quickly addressed for the sake of the stability of the country. Nigeria`s greatest domestic challenges are Boko Haram and its large educated population that requires an expansion of private investment to create more jobs for it. These countries have the capacity to help address each other’s domestic challenges. South Africa has a strong state security cluster on the continent, demonstrated, for instance, by its training of Central African Republic soldiers to withstand and manage insurgency within its borders. Nigeria is in dire need of this essential service that South Africa can offer, and for South Africa to do so, it would exemplify the endeavour towards “African solutions for African problems” (Sega and Lekaba, 2014: 2). Nigeria and South Africa have been carefully selected for comparative analysis, based on their evident power status and leadership position in Africa, which inform their claims to being the giant of Africa and Africa’s big brother. More specifically, the focus is on both countries for several other reasons. First, both Nigeria and South Africa are the two largest economies in Africa and thus share a huge chunk of the African economic market (Adebajo, 2007). Secondly, both countries are perceived internationally

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as major African leaders with their extensive, robust foreign policy involvement in Africa, coupled with their expressed desire towards African solutions to African problems (Smith, 2013). South Africa, as the most industrialised and technologically advanced country in sub-Sahara Africa, requires a market such as Nigeria’s for its goods. With a consumer population of over 180 million, Nigeria remains a most fertile market for South Africa to invest in and to which she can export her products. Nigeria is blessed with both human and mineral resources that await potential South African investors to exploit for mutual development. For example, Nigeria is endowed with many minerals - other than the obviously well-known oil and gas - including gold, coal, iron ore, aluminum, lead, and zinc. She is equally rich in agro-allied resources such as livestock, fisheries, root crops, cereals, fruits, and vegetables. All of these are awaiting the technological know-how expertise and experience of South African investors (Olagunju, 2000: 58). Overall, the reference to Nigeria and South Africa in the literature as an “axis of virtue” is no doubt a reflection of their comparative power advantage as well as a commitment to playing increasing leadership roles within the African continent (Adebajo, 2007). As Ogwu (1999) submits, the relationship is indeed as important as it is unique: It is important because each bears an immense burden of leadership in its region and in the world. It is unique because the new geopolitics and our African Kinship demands that we cooperate, despite our unequal levels of development in a joint responsibility to promote the development of the economy of Africa.

In view of this, the study establishes the fact that the agenda of a NigerianSouth Africa partnership is a matter of necessity and should prioritise the developmental spin-offs of a mutually beneficial relationship. An African bloc in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) or a BRICS-aligned Nigerian-South African partnership will be a much stronger prospect for projecting Africa’s interests on global economic governance. Leaders in both countries should communicate a clear vision, demonstrable political will, and a capacity to craft the connections between national, regional, and global interests and aspirations as steps towards aligning national interests with a more equitable developmental engagement with the processes and institutions of global economic governance (Obi, 2015: 10). In a critical observation, Ogwu (1999) submits that: Given Nigeria’s and South Africa’s commitment to regional integration, their strategic partnership in fostering economic ties, cooperation, trade,

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In reality, Nigeria and South Africa are most significant for Africa in terms of economic muscle and population (Africa Confidential, 1992: 2). The former South African president F. W. de Klerk visited Nigeria in 1991, and Nigeria relaxed its embargo on trading with South Africa. The Nigerian government planned to offer “African discounts” in order to lure South Africa into a long-term crude oil supply agreement. However, the South Africans preferred a quasi-barter deal in which Nigeria would buy South Africa’s manufactured or capital goods equivalent to the value of Nigeria’s oil exports to South Africa (Ibeanu, 2010: 31). Indeed, Nigeria and South Africa are similar in that they are the powerhouse countries of Africa. Nigeria is the most populous; and it is an influential hegemonic power in West Africa and a global player as a leading African state, particularly as the worlds eighth-largest oil exporter (40 percent of which goes to the United States). South Africa was the continent’s largest economy until 2013 when Nigeria surpassed it, and it is both a political leader of Southern Africa and the economic centre for much of the continent’s southern region. Both countries had a troubled transition to democracy in the 1990s, and moving into the second decade of the 21st century, in neither country can it be said that democracy is fully developed (Sisk, 2014: 494).

Theoretical Perspective The theory of comparative advantage belongs to the field of normative economics and states that a country will benefit if it specialises in the production of goods whose manufacture is intensive in using its abundant resources. Thus, in developing countries where the reserve labour force is very large owing to open or disguised unemployment (Myrdal, 1956; Prebisch, 1959: 49), the best results can be achieved by specialising in the production of labour-intensive goods. In economics, the law of comparative advantage refers to the ability of a party (an individual, a firm, or a country) to produce a particular good or service at a lower marginal cost and opportunity cost than another party. It can be contrasted with the absolute advantage, which refers to the ability of a party to produce a particular good at a lower absolute cost than another. Comparative advantage explains how trade can create value for both parties even when one can produce all goods with fewer resources than the other. The net benefits of such an outcome are called gains from trade. Comparative advantage, whether driven by technology or factor endowment, is at the core of neoclassical trade theory. The theory offers a simple, yet unifying perspective on the fundamental

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forces that shape comparative advantage in economies with an arbitrarily large number of goods and other factors. This theory is essential because it allows for consideration of both sources of comparative advantage, technology and factor endowment, within a unifying, yet highly tractable framework (Costinot, 2008: 4). The trade theory that first indicated the importance of specialisation in production and division of labour is based on the idea of Theory of Absolute Advantage, which was developed first by Adam Smith in his famous book The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776. Later on, David Ricardo, in his book titled On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, published in 1817, extended it to incorporate the theory of comparative advantage and showed that it is the basis for nations need to trade and why trade is mutually beneficial to countries (Yanikkaya, 2003: 57). David Ricardo explained comparative advantage in an example involving England and Portugal. In Portugal, it is possible to produce both wine and cloth with less labour than it would take to produce the same quantities in England. However, the relative costs of producing those two goods are different in the two countries. In England, it is very hard to produce wine and only moderately difficult to produce cloth. In Portugal, both are easy to produce. Therefore, while it is cheaper to produce cloth in Portugal than England, it is cheaper still for Portugal to produce excess wine and trade that for English cloth. Conversely, England benefits from this trade because its cost for producing cloth has not changed, but it can now get wine at a lower price, closer to the cost of cloth. The conclusion drawn is that each country can gain by specialising in the good where it has comparative advantage (Samuelson, 1995: 22). To bring Ricardo’s ideas to the data, one must overcome a key empirical challenge. Suppose, as Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage predicts that different factors of production specialise in different economic activities based on their relative productivity differences, then, following Ricardo’s famous example, if English workers are relatively better at producing cloth than wine compared to Portuguese workers, England will produce cloth, Portugal will produce wine, and at least one of these two countries will be completely specialised in one of these two sectors (Costinot and Donaldson, 2012: 453). Specialisation, according to comparative advantage, would allow a country to reduce its average capitaloutput ratio, which would open up the possibility of a higher rate of growth of output for any given rate of investment. Alternatively, specialisation in labour-intensive commodities will require a smaller share of investment and will result in a higher rate of growth of consumption for a given rate of

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growth of output. In both cases, increased employment and consumption in the short term are favoured, without medium- and long-term employment and consumption being jeopardised. It is true that in order to achieve these favourable effects, employment growth would have to be higher. But this is not an important cost for a developing economy having a large surplus of unemployed labour (Gallardo, 2005: 331). The theory is quite relevant to interrogating the discourse on the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa. This is because in the economic relationship with South Africa, Nigeria is a developing economy where unemployment is widespread, and her comparative advantage lies in the production of labour-intensive and low capital-intensive commodities. The bilateral comparison of comparative advantage is necessary; however, it does not provide sufficient conditions for continental optimality to be met. It will clearly show the areas of strengths and weaknesses to be able to determine the required level and magnitude of dependence.

Nigeria-South Africa Relations Given the antecedents of the latter half of 1999 up to the end of 2000, there is every conceivable reason to aver that Nigeria and South Africa had no doubt created a good basis for establishing strategic partnerships at the turn of the new millennium. This is a significant achievement because, over a sufficiently long period, relations between the two countries have been marked by a high degree of suspicion, mistrust, alienation, and confrontation (Akinboye, 2005: 222). Nigeria’s relations with South Africa predated the country’s independence as a British colony. The colonial administration in Nigeria accommodated apartheid and even endorsed the white minority regime rule. Being a colonial state, she could not criticise South Africa’s white regime. But, after independence, Nigeria could no longer tolerate British duplicity on the South African situation, and the liquidation of the apartheid system became her priority (Minter, 1968: 38). Nigeria’s relations with South Africa, particularly from 1960 to 2000, have undergone dramatic changes in landmark dimensions. Between 1960 and 1990, Nigeria-South Africa relations had been extremely hostile, chilly, and confrontational. This was informed by South Africa’s obnoxious apartheid system, which Nigeria considered as repugnant and antithetical to its articulated foreign policy objectives. The tremendous phenomenal changes that started evolving in the global system since the beginning of the 1990s, including the democratisation process that commenced in the South African racist enclave, have had a significant bearing on relations between the two

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countries and constitute a watershed for liberal relations between them. The latter part of the 1990s marked a distinctive period in Nigeria-South Africa relations particularly. Mandela’s retirement and Mbeki’s ascension to power as South Africa’s second democratic president and Obasanjo’s assumption of office as Nigeria’s third civilian president, both in mid-1999, ushered in a peculiar era of bilateral dealings between the two countries. This, in turn, led to the evolution of a strategic partnership under the instrumentality of a Joint Bi-National Commission that was firmly put in place by the two at the turn of the new century (Akinboye, 2005: 211-212). Thus, the basis for mutually beneficial interaction and interdependence does exist between Nigeria and South Africa. Given the existing cordial relations between them, they stand to benefit tremendously from interaction with each other. South Africa, for instance, cannot responsibly ignore Nigeria’s huge market and enormous oil resources, which its industrial and technological establishments require, while Nigeria cannot reasonably afford to ignore the South African industrial and technological expertise in the development of its agricultural and industrial sectors. It is in this regard that the Nigeria-South Africa strategic partnership is of paramount importance and should, therefore, be sustained particularly now, and indeed in future irrespective of any government that is in power (Akinboye, 2005: 226). In comparative terms, Nigeria and South Africa remain Africa’s regional economic and military powerhouses. Together, they account for 55 percent of the total Gross National Product (GNP) of the African continent and represent 25 percent of the population of the continent. As centres of political, economic, military, and diplomatic gravity in West and Southern Africa, Nigeria and South Africa respectively have risen to and fulfilled the popular expectation that both working together and sharing broadly the same goals for Africa are capable of positively influencing developments in Africa in the image of their political preferences (Akindele, 2007: 317).

The Nigeria-South Africa Economic Matter Bilateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa date back to the 1960s when an apartheid regime still ruled South Africa. By that time, most African countries had gained their independence from the colonial powers, and as one of Africa’s independent countries, Nigeria fought against the apartheid regime and contributed greatly to the emancipation of South Africa. Thus, the transition from apartheid (white minority rule and strict racial segregation) to democracy in 1990-1996 (Sisk, 2014: 494) sent a signal of the expected rapid transformation in African economic development.

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Thus, Nigeria-South Africa bilateral relations are shaped by the fact that South Africa is the continent’s strongest and most versatile economy, while Nigeria is Africa’s largest consumer market (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003; Agbu, 2010; Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). In other words, while South Africa has an advantage over Nigeria in areas of technology and infrastructure, Nigeria has the advantage of large market potentials for investment and a large pool of human resources. Bilateral political relations between South Africa and Nigeria are strong, with Nigeria considered as one of South Africa’s important partners on the African continent in advancing the vision of Africa’s political and economic renewal. The leaders of both countries have traversed the globe spreading the idea of an African renaissance focusing largely on democracy, development, and security, and seeking foreign investments to revive Africa’s ailing economies. They have called for greater international burden-sharing in peacekeeping missions and in campaigns for the annulment of Africa’s external debt. They have also championed better access for African goods entering Western markets and called for Africa’s integration into the global economy on fairer terms (Ebegbulem, 2013: 32). The two countries have the two largest economies in Africa, South Africa taking the lead because of her more capitalised economy with advantages in infrastructure, science, and technology, while Nigeria is now the largest economy in Africa owing to her population and the blessings this most populous black nation in the world enjoys in oil as well as human resources (Marwa, 2010). Thus, Nigeria is South Africa’s largest trading partner in West Africa, and fourth on the continent after Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique. The trade relations between the two states grew from R730 million in 1998 to R1.7 billion in 2000. South Africa’s exports to Nigeria grew from R3.612 billion in 1999 to R20.3 billion in 2005, whereas Nigeria’s exports to South Africa’s jumped from R8.4 billion to R35.7 billion during the same period. South Africa began to import crude oil from Nigeria in large quantities but at concessionary prices. Other areas of interest for South African business people are telecommunications, aviation, electricity, and mining. The South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) created a unit to deal specifically with export and import trade, focusing on sectors of the economy (Daya, 2005: 2). The contemporary events patently indicate that Nigeria’s hitherto preeminent power and leadership position in Africa can no longer be maintained without the support and cooperation of South Africa, which equally exhibits enormous power and exemplary leadership qualities in the continent. Hence, forging a consensus on bilateral mutual relations is the

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fundamental challenge confronting the two countries. Similarly, they need to define their economic relations in terms of their relative economic positions. Nigeria, for instance, stands a good chance to benefit immensely from South Africa’s high technology in the areas of computers, energy, electronics, and telecommunications. South Africa, on the other hand, will certainly benefit from Nigeria’s enormous oil resources and the country’s robust market, which could serve as a disposable avenue for South African goods. Hence, each stands to benefit from the other in terms of the budding relationship being fostered (Akinboye, 2005: 224). Essentially, South Africa, supported by others, mainly Nigeria, has become the key driver and competitor in the reconstruction of Africa’s institutional architecture. This specifically pertains to the creation of the Africa Union (AU) and the hosting of the African Parliament in South Africa. In July 2001, the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, Zambia, also decided on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as an overarching vision and policy framework for accelerating economic cooperation and integration among African countries (Esterhuyse, 2006: 376). A specific critical area in which the bilateral relationship is yielding positive results is that of trade. The summary of trade statistics between the two countries shows that the total volume of trade between them for the year ended 1999 stood at $150 million. Within the same period, Nigeria’s exports to South Africa totalled $84 million, while South Africa’s total exports to Nigeria equalled $66 million. While Nigeria’s exports were almost entirely petroleum and related products, South Africa’s exports include such items as chemicals, pulp, paper, tools, food and, base metals (The Vanguard, 11 May 2000). In fact, the growing rapprochement between Nigeria and South Africa increased trade relations between the two countries. South Africa’s former Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Welile Nhlapo, observed that Nigeria had become South Africa’s largest trading partner in West Africa, with the trade volume rising to $234 million in 2000 from about $100 million in 1998. About 90 percent of the trade is crude oil imports from Nigeria (The Guardian, 7 March 2001). Nigeria and South Africa are two powerful states in Africa that share some common features. Both states recognise the need for consolidated economic cooperation - something which could have an impact on the culture, politics, and psychology of Africans. The establishment of the Nigeria-South Africa BNC in October 1999 was a starting point in this regard. The coming together of the two, in South Africa’s view, would lead to the “underdog ideology of African Renaissance” - the much aspired to approach to the

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rebirth of the African continent (Oliver, 2006: 171). The two governments entered into a strategic partnership leading to the inauguration of the Nigeria-South Africa BNC in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 1999. The inaugural session, co-chaired by Nigeria’s former Vice President Atiku Abubakar and his South African counterpart, Jacob Zuma, acted as the locomotive for socio-economic cooperation between the two countries to identify various areas of comparative advantage. The second session of the BNC took place in Pretoria, South Africa, in April 2000. Co-chaired by Zuma and Abubakar, it paved the way to forging a closer bilateral economic partnership by creating the enabling environment with the signing of six agreements that set the tone for close bilateral cooperation (Mordi, 2007). These were: • • • • • •

Agreement on the establishment of a Bi-National Commission of Cooperation; Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital gains; Agreement on the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments; Trade agreement; Agreement on cooperation in the fields of mining, geology, exploration, and beneficiation of minerals and energy; Agreement on educational cooperation (Olagunju, 2000).

Following the signing of these agreements, South African companies from various sectors such as financial services, tourism, retail, and telecommunications soon proliferated in the Nigerian market. Mobile Telephone Network (MTN), Digital Satellite Television (DSTV), Stanbic, Shoprite, and PEP are some of the companies that have greatly contributed to the Nigerian economy (SA-NCC, 2012). These companies tapped into Nigeria’s economic potential, creating synergies to the advantage of the country’s socio-economic growth. In 2003, it was estimated that over 50 South African companies were doing business in Nigeria, with the single largest investor, according to Jonah Onuoha, being MTN (Onuoha, 2005: 65). By contrast, not much can be said of the participation of Nigerian companies in the South African economic market. Statistics have shown that there are only a few Nigerian companies in South Africa. These include several consulting firms (Anaebonam, 2014). In addition, statistics available to the Weekly Trust on the number of Nigerian companies in South Africa show that there are only a few, like Union Bank, First Bank, Philips Consulting, News Media, and the Financial Standard and ThisDay

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newspapers. There are other small-scale Nigerian firms in South Africa, which are not significant (Muhammad, 2003: 14). A bi-national investment forum was established by the two countries, in order to facilitate investment by private investors. A lack of knowledge about trade opportunities in both countries continues to affect the free flow and improvement in trade transactions. This accounts for the performance of organised private sectors (OPS) in the political relationship between the two countries. According to Adebajo (2007), Nigeria and South Africa held six BNC meetings, alternating them between the two countries. Those meetings were held in October 1999, April 2000, March 2001, March 2002, December 2003, and September 2004. The BNC intended to address some issues that have negatively affected the relationship between Pretoria and Abuja. The BNC had major objectives which he highlighted as being to provide a framework for joint efforts to bring Africa into the mainstream of global political, social, and economic developments; provide the basis for the government and private sectors of both countries to consult with each other to promote bilateral trade and industry; improve bilateral relations in the fields of technology, education, health, culture, youth, and sports; use both countries’ human and natural resources to maximise socio-economic development through collaborative efforts; and establish the mechanisms to promote peace, stability, and socioeconomic integration in Africa (Adebajo, 2007). Be that as it may, in March 2007, the Technical Export Teams from both states met in Nigeria to discuss important issues that would establish a common economic policy approach to the development of the two states. The teams comprised officials from different government departments and parastatals, such as Foreign Affairs; Commerce and Industry; Arts, Culture, Science and Technology; Minerals and Energy; Public Enterprise; Defence; Internal Affairs; and Police Services. In the arms manufacturing sector, Denel (South Africa) and Dispense Industry Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) (Nigeria) also met to forge a unified policy regarding their production and market. In the field of electricity supply, state-owned power utilities Eskom (South Africa) and Power Holding (Nigeria) met to resolve Nigeria’s unstable power supply. The meeting of the technical committee was co-chaired by the then Nigerian Ambassador, Ibrahim B. Mohammed, the Director of International Economic Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the South African High Commissioner to Nigeria, Bangumzi Sifingo (Amusan and Van Wyk, 2011: 40).

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However, again, after Jacob Zuma became the South African president, he visited Nigeria on 8 March 2016 on a delicate mission to mend rifts between the continent’s two economic powerhouses. From economic rivalry to political friction, relations between South Africa and Nigeria have been strained in recent years (Thisday, 14 March 2016). The state visit by President Jacob Zuma, accompanied by a powerful ministerial delegation, to Nigeria was significant and could represent a thaw in relations between Africa’s largest economies. Relations had become strained under the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan between 2010 and 2015: there was the expulsion of nationals from both countries on visa charges in 2012; South Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma’s winning of the Africa Union (AU) Commission chair in 2012; the delayed repatriation of the bodies of 84 South Africans killed in a church collapse in Lagos in 2014; South Africa’s impounding of $9.3 million in cash brought into the country on a Nigerian pastor’s private plane to purchase arms in 2014; and diplomatic disagreements over Côte d’Ivoire and Libya (Adebajo, 2016: 17). The fact that President Jacob Zuma was the first foreign leader to have been hosted on a state visit by new Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari was significant. Both countries agreed to upgrade the BNC founded in 1999 from the vice-presidential to the presidential level (Adebajo, 2016: 17). In other words, the state visit to Nigeria by President Jacob Zuma marked the beginning of a new chapter in relations between Nigeria and South Africa. During the visit, both President Zuma and his host President Muhammadu Buhari made it a point of duty to strengthen the historical bonds of friendship between the people of Africa’s two largest economies. The rapprochement between both countries is one of the results of President Buhari’s economic diplomacy, which has focused on rebuilding Nigeria’s image and relationship in the comity of nations. The visit also offered the opportunity for Nigeria and South Africa to renew the pledge of partnership on many key issues, including mining. An existing 2013 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlining areas of partnership in the fields of geology, mining, mineral processing, and metallurgy which had not been implemented, was resuscitated (Fayemi, 2016: 17).

Nigeria-South Africa Bilateral Economic Relations On the public platforms, officials have said that Nigeria regards South Africa as a partner in Nigeria’s development, not just another investor, and there seems to be a realistic expectation that this can work. However, the size and extent of South African investment in Nigeria has been regarded

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with some suspicion and hostility. In the early days, local newspapers set the tone for engagement by regularly complaining that South Africa was trying to “buy” Nigeria. The fact that South Africa’s imports are almost entirely oil has also been an issue for Nigerians, even though this reflects the country’s global trade patterns as well. In 2011, Nigeria was South Africa’s 9th biggest source of imports - the highest in Africa, comprising 38.49 percent of total imports from Africa in 2012, followed by Angola at 29 percent of total imports in that year. However, oil makes up almost the entire trade basket to South Africa and the imports have been growing as South Africa moves away from a dependence on Iranian exports in the wake of US sanctions against that country. There is much to celebrate, including the fact that two-way trade has risen from R1.7 billion in 1999 to R22.8 billionn in 2008 and about R30 billion in 2011. More than 30 agreements have been signed, and investment continues to grow. The South African investments have been particularly positive as it is multi-sectoral, focused on the non-oil sector in line with the Nigerian government’s policy to diversify the economy (Games, 2013: 17). The South African telecommunications giants Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) and M-Net/SuperSport blazed the trail and became listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. MTN spent $340 million launching its mobile telephone network in Nigeria in August 2001 (Lamont, 2001: 7), with plans to spend $1.4 billion in the country over a decade. In 2003-2004, MTN Nigeria’s post-tax profit of R2.36 billion surpassed MTN South Africa’s R2.24 billion profit (Games, 2013: 57). By June 2004, MTN had 1.65 million subscribers in Nigeria (Daniel, Lutchman, and Naidu 2005: 559560). Other South African “blue-chip” companies that followed MTN included: Stanbic, Rand Merchant Bank, and Protea Hotels. Sasol, the world’s largest producer of petrol from coal, made a $1.2 billion investment in Nigeria to export natural gas. The South African government-funded Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) invested in Nigerian oil, gas, infrastructure, tourism, and telecommunications. South Africa’s Spoornet is working with the Nigerian Railway Corporation to revive Nigeria’s railways. South Africa’s Portnet is rehabilitating port facilities in Lagos. Chicken Licken, Steers, Nando’s, and Debonairs established franchises in Nigeria, while NuMetro and Shoprite also set up shop. A Nigeria/South Africa Chamber of Commerce was established in 2001. By 2003, Nigeria had become South Africa’s third-largest trading partner and largest single continental importer in Africa after Zimbabwe and Mozambique. People doing business from South Africa and Nigeria frequently visit each other’s countries, with 55 South African firms working in Nigeria. The potential for

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trade between the two countries is enormous, growing from R730 million in 1998 to R4.9 billion in 2003 (Adebajo, 2006: 21). Clearly, South Africa and Nigeria account for more than half of Africa’s GDP. South Africa, with a GDP of $422 billion in 2011, was the biggest economy in Africa, although its economic growth is less than half of Nigeria’s annual growth of approximately 7 percent a year. The per capita income of South Africa in 2011 was $8,070, compared to Nigeria’s $1,502 (World Bank Website). The rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP shows that the economy was approximately 40 percent bigger than estimated (Ohuocha, 2012). Nigeria’s economic boom in April 2014 is a progressive and concrete example of what could be achieved if intra-Africa trade was promoted on the continent. The GDP of a country is the currency value of all the final goods and services produced within its borders for a defined period. If boosted, intra-Africa trade has great potential to create employment, catalyse investments, and foster continental growth. Nigeria’s phenomenal achievement can be viewed from various angles. Firstly, it signifies the importance of South Africa as a gateway to the continent in terms of investment. South African companies are the main African investors in the continent, African in terms of their origin. Thus, this infiltration of the African economies by South African companies makes South Africa a gateway into the continent. The outcome of the economic boom was highly influenced by the presence of South African companies in the Nigerian economy. Secondly, it represents the realisation of the objectives set by NEPAD, which are essentially focused on placing African countries on a path of sustainable and positive economic growth so it can reach the desired level of development and minimise the influence and interference of external countries such as France on and in its domestic affairs (Sega and Lekaba, 2014). In April 2014, it was revealed that Nigeria’s economy was the largest in Africa after a rebasing exercise nearly doubled its GDP. Prior to this, South Africa was regarded as having the largest economy, but the rebasing exercise put Nigeria’s economy at about 30 percent larger than South Africa’s, with the 2013 Nigerian GDP valued at $509.9 billion while that of South Africa was valued at $372 billion. However, reports of South Africa briefly overtaking Nigeria on the GDP rating again due to devaluation of the naira hardly came as a surprise. Though it was indicated that both countries had recorded drops in GDP in the last year, Nigeria’s case was a huge crash compared to South Africa’s. Nigeria’s GDP was put at $296 billion, a 43.2 percent drop from $521 billion in 2015 while South Africa’s clocked in at $301 billion, about a 14.7 percent drop from the 2015 figure

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of $353 billion. The rebasing had pushed the statistics above South Africa, making Nigeria nominally the largest economy in the continent. The report was too good for Nigeria, as grey areas in the economic statistics were not fully reflected. Just a glance at what has happened across Africa’s top five economies will reveal where the country stands comparatively. Even as at 2015, when Nigeria’s GDP out-did South Africa, Nigerians were still almost four times poorer. South Africa’s GDP per capita was $11,035, while Nigeria’s was a paltry $2,700 (The Vanguard, 2016: 16). This reflected the negative impact of the population on Nigeria’s economy. However, the irony is that most advanced economies have always, in consideration of market size, put Nigeria first, but the country has not been able to translate market size into an upside impact in economic performance due to internal low production capacity. Consumption is high, but it is mostly imported goods (The Vanguard, 2016: 16). According to the World Bank, Nigeria’s GDP per capita in 2015 was $2.640.3, while South Africa’s was $5,691.7. The former’s GDP would, therefore, need to be substantially larger before the average citizen could be as prosperous as the average South African, even if Nigeria was ranked as the largest economy in Africa. While the 2014 rebasing exercise gave some insight into the magnitude and increasing diversity of Nigeria’s economy, the country still has a long way to go to reach South Africa’s level of economic maturity. This explains why South Africa has always attracted more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) projects than Nigeria. According to the EY 2015 Africa Attractiveness Survey, in the last five years, South Africa received twice as many FDI projects as any other African country as investors are attracted by a diverse economy, solid infrastructure, and cases of doing business. In addition, the World Economic Forum ranked South Africa and Nigeria 49th and 124th respectively out of 144 countries in the competitiveness index (The Vanguard, 2016: 15). Suffice it to say, it is not hard to see why Nigeria’s economy lags behind that of South Africa when one considers the fact that the former is more reliant on commodity exports than the latter. Nigeria receives more than 90 percent of its foreign income from oil exports, while South Africa has only 65 percent of total exports as commodities, which are diversified through its manufacturing and service industries. In addition, South Africa surpasses Nigeria in terms of the quality of regulation and supervision of the financial services sector, which enhances the ease of doing business in the country. Although there have been recent improvements in the regulation of the Nigerian banking sector, it is still very much a cash-based economy as less than 35 percent of Nigerians have a formal bank account compared to 70

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percent in South Africa. The fact that Nigeria is less developed than South Africa means that there are more growth prospects in it. Minor investments can lead to substantial economic gains and growth in Nigeria compared to South Africa that already has lots of economic infrastructure in place. Similarly, Nigeria’s significantly higher population size can be harnessed to contribute positively to economic growth. While Nigeria is likely to regain its position as the largest economy in Africa due to its population advantage in the medium to long term, the ranking of African economies is likely to be determined by exchange rate movements in the short term (The Vanguard, 2016: 15). In West Africa, Nigeria is already South Africa’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade increasing from $100 million in 1999 to reach $5 billion in 2012 (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012: 397). However, the volume of trade between Nigeria and South Africa has fallen from N197 million as of December 2004 to N169 billion in December 2015. This represents a drop of 16.6 percent. The volume of Nigeria’s exports to South Africa stood at N92.887 billion in December 2005 as against N125.555 billion recorded in 2004, while Nigeria’s imports stood at N75.661 billion in December 2005 against N71.543 billion on 2004. There had been a significant increase from the N53 billion recorded in 2002, as the country’s exports to South Africa increased to N62 billion in December 2003. Nigerian imports from South Africa also witnessed improvement from the N39.556 billion recorded in 2002 to N56.8 billion in 2003 (Okere, 2006: 50). Indeed, South Africa, with huge capital, remains the most developed economy in Africa. However, leading South African entrepreneurs know that the future lies in the potentially vast Nigerian market. It is generally believed that the big fruits of investments are hanging over Nigeria’s head. The total exports from South Africa to Nigeria between 1999 to the end of 2005 rose from $520 million to $2.9 billion, while exports flowing from Nigeria into the South African market increased from $1.2 billion to $5.6 billion over the same period. Straight trade volume favours Nigeria, but the huge imbalance in trade has to do with the fact that imports from Nigeria consist mainly of oil (75 percent) and small quantities of rubber and palm oil. In contrast, South African exports show greater diversification ranging from investment in the petroleum sector, packaging, packaging material, plastics, and other newer consumer goods aside from telecommunications towers, aluminum structures, etc. (Obayuwana, 2006: 15). There is another area of competition, and that is in FDI figures. In 2011, Nigeria was Africa’s biggest destination for foreign direct investment with inflows of $8.92 billion ($6.10 billion in 2010) with South Africa second at

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$5.81 billion during the period under review ($1.23 billion in 2010) (UNCTAD, 2012). Nevertheless, many analysts rate South Africa as the most attractive investment destination in Africa because of its diversified and industrialised economy, closely followed by Nigeria because of the sheer size of its market and its relative underdevelopment and obvious market gaps (Games, 2013: 16). Nevertheless, despite impressive growth in bilateral trade between Nigeria and South Africa, there have also been some spectacular disappointments. South African Airways (SAA) agreed on a deal with Nigeria Airways in December 2000 to take over its routes through New York and Johannesburg. The New York route was cancelled in March 2002 after R54 million of losses in six months (Games, 2013: 58). Though SAA still flies to Nigeria, the relationship with Nigeria Airways ended within three years after the Nigerian government (which owns the airline) insisted on obtaining a 10 percent stake in a privatised SAA in exchange for the South Africans obtaining a 30 percent share in Nigeria Airways. Virgin Atlantic eventually stepped in to agree to partnership deal with Nigeria Airways. Vodacom also left Nigeria in May 2004, two months after agreeing to a five-year contract with a South African-based partner, Econet Wireless International. Corruption allegations against two Vodacom executives had reportedly contributed to its decision (Daniel, Lutchman, and Naidu, 2006: 56). The final example of a spectacular failure was the early death, after less than a year, of ThisDay, a Nigerian-owned newspaper launched in South Africa in October 2003 with an eventual R120 million worth of investment (Adebajo, 2006: 22-23). Presently, it is quite unfortunate that the current economic growth prospects of both South Africa and Nigeria are poor, with both countries facing the risk of a recession after their economies contracted in the first quarter of 2016. While Nigeria’s economy contracted by 0.4 percent South Africa’s contracted by 0.2 percent. The South African Reserve Bank has forecast that there would be no economic growth in the country in 2016 and that the economy would grow at a rate lower than the population growth rate in 2017 and 2018. The implication was that the country’s standard of living was expected to worsen over the next two years. Nigeria’s economic prospects also remained dim due to the country’s over-dependence on oil whose price in the international market has remained under intense pressure. Hence, it is a bit unrealistic to compare the Nigerian GDP produced by a population of approximately 187 million people with that of South Africa generated by just about 54.9 million people. While Nigeria’s larger potential workforce and consumer base increase its attractiveness as an investment destination,

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with the likelihood of producing a larger GDP, it also means that the country has a long way to go in order to reach the standard of living that obtains in South Africa (ThisDay, 28 August 2016).

Summary and Conclusion South Africa and Nigeria are pivotal states in Africa. In this sense, their relationship is of significance in the region. Their combined efforts will better position the continent in the competitive world where the influence of the big economies matters. The two countries are blessed, endowed, and powerful forces in Africa. Indeed, both are uniquely located within Africa. To maximally benefit from one another, both countries revived their moribund economic and trade relations with the institution of democracy in place. The climax of this was the signing of the BNC in October 1999 by both countries in Abuja, Nigeria. The significance of the commission brought about the meeting of the then vice-presidents of the two states twice a year, in order to discuss the various sectors in which they could cooperate as the prototype of the African Economic Community. The study, therefore, shows that this unique economic bilateral relations effort was designed and packaged to champion the cause of Africa’s revival and put an end to the endemic poverty confronting the African continent. The presence of many South African investors in Nigeria has boosted the economies of both countries. Similarly, with Nigeria exporting her oil and brains to South Africa in exchange for manufactured goods and technology, Nigeria has already become South Africa’s fourth-largest trading partner in Africa. South Africa has been the largest investor in Nigeria outside the oil industry since the late 1990s, with many of the country’s biggest listed companies setting up operations there or entering the market through mergers and acquisitions. South Africa has assisted Nigeria by taking care of some unemployed graduates who would have been out of job by now if not for MTN, Multi-choice, and others. Apart from job creation, there is also the inflow of foreign currency, quality products, new technology, and expertise. Again, some of these companies engage in building schools, sponsoring programmes on television stations, building hospitals, or purchasing drugs and donating them for the use of Nigerians (Mohammed, 2003). Contrarily, Nigerian companies have argued that trade restrictions in the form of permits make it hard for them to bring their products into South Africa. This could also be because Nigeria`s economy is not as comparatively diversified as that of South Africa; Nigeria is largely importdependent.

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Nigeria and South Africa need to justify their leadership position in the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and South African Development Community (SADC), respectively, by ensuring that the two regional economic organisations wax stronger and become more relevant to the challenge and forces of globalisation. In other words, the attempt between Nigeria and South Africa must reassure other African states that their intentions and actions are genuine, noble, and sincere and that it is not meant to dominate, suppress, exploit, and dictate the affairs of the continent indiscriminately in pursuit of their parochial interests. Rather, it is in the interests of all African countries to open doors of opportunities for all without discrimination. It is only then that Nigeria and South Africa will be able to be a continental voice that will engender growth, progress, stability, and development.

References Adebajo, A. 2016. Revival of Nigeria/South Africa Relations. The Guardian, 22 March 2016. Adebajo, A. and Landsberg, C. 2003. South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemony. In: Baregu, M. and Landsberg, C. eds. From cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s evolving security challenges. London: Lynne Rienner’s Publishers. Adebajo, A. 2006. Prophets of Africa’s renaissance: Nigeria and South Africa as regional hegemons. Occasional Paper Series No. 3. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Adebajo, A. 2007. South Africa and Nigeria: An Axis of Virtue? A paper presented for the Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust Open Dialogue, Leslie Social Science Building. Adedeji, A. 1999. Democratic Transformation in South Africa and Nigeria: Prospect for a strategic partnership. Keynote Address at the Second Nigeria/South Africa Dialogue Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26-27 August 1999. Adeniji, O. 2000. The emergence of South Africa into the global economy and its consequences for Nigeria and Africa. In: Adeniyi, O. ed. Essay on Nigerian Foreign Policy, Governance and International Security. Ibadan: Dokun Publishing House. Agbu, O. 2010. Nigeria and South Africa: The future of strategic partnership. In: Eze, O.C. ed. Beyond 50 Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and Prospects. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

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Aidelokhai, D.I. 2012. Resolving the xenophobic crisis in South Africa through the diplomacy: Nigeria’s option for fostering African integration. Ife Psychology, 6(4), 79-91. Akinboye, S.O. 2005. From confrontation to strategic partnership: Nigeria’s relations with South Africa, 1960-2000. In: Ogwu, U.J. ed. New Horizons for Nigeria in World Affairs. Lagos: The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Amebonam, W. 2014. South African companies overtaking Nigerian economy. Available at: http://www.mydailynewswatch.ng.com/southafrican-companies-overtaking-nigerian-economy. [Accessed April 2017]. Amusan, L. and Van Wyk, J. 2011. The complexities of bilateral relations: The Nigerian-South Africa relationship (2000-2006). Politeia, 30(1), 105-117. Car, O. 2012. The eagle and the springbok: Strengthening the Nigeria/South Africa relationship. Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report. The Moor House, Lagos, Nigeria, 9-10 June 2012. Chima, O. 2016. South Africa overtakes Nigeria as Africa biggest economy. ThisDay, 11 August 2016. Costinot, A. and Donaldson, D. 2012. Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage: Old idea, new evidence. American Economic Review in Papers and Proceeding, 2012, 102(3). Costinot, A. 2005. An elementary theory of comparative advantage. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Daniel, J., Lutchman, J., and Maidu, S. 2005. South Africa and Nigeria: Two unequal centres in a periphery. In: Daniel, J., Lutchman, J., and Naidu, S. eds. State of the nation: South Africa 2004-2005. Cape Town, South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council Press. Daya, Y. 2005. Directorate of international trade: Trade research desk. Pretoria: Department of Agriculture. Ebegbulam, J. C. 2013. An evaluation of Nigeria-South Africa bilateral relations. Journal of International relations and Foreign Policy, (1), June 2013. Editorial. 2016. Nigeria’s GDP loss to South Africa. The Vanguard, 22 August 2016. Esterhuysa, A. 2013. U.S. Grand strategy and the search for partners: South Africa as a key partner in Africa. In: Frank, V.C. and Dorff, R.H. eds. Conflict Management and Peace Building: Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy. US: United States Army War College. Fayemi, K. 2016. Nigeria and South Africa in search for prosperity in mining. The Guardian Newspaper, 4 July 2016.

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Games, D. 2013. Nigeria-South Africa baseline study: Key findings. In: South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI), Policy Brief No. 44, September 2013. Ibeanu, O. 2010. Nigeria’s role in the promotion of the OAU/AU and membership of the frontline states. In: Jega A.M and Farris, J.W. eds. Nigeria at Fifty: Contributions to Peace, Democracy and Development. Abuja, Nigeria: The Shehu Musa Yar’adua Foundation. Marwa, M.B. 2014. Nigeria/South Africa Relations. A Paper Presented by the High Commissioner of Nigeria to South Africa at the occasion of Nigeria’s 50th Independent Day Anniversary at the Human Science Research Council, Pretoria: http://www.hrsc.ac.39./uoploads/pagecontent/225/paperseminarnigeria 50. Mazrui, A. 2006. A tale of two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa as constrasting visions. London: Adonis and Abbey. Minter, W. 1968. Action against Apartheid. In: Bounce, D. ed. Reflections on Protest Student Presence in Political Conflict. London: John Knox. Mohammed, A. 2003. Nigerian economy: The South African invasion. Weekly Trust Newspaper, 13 September 2003. Mordi, F. 2001. Another milestone in Nigeria-South Africa ties. The Comet Newspaper, 12 March 2001. Myrdal, G. 1956. An international economy. New York: Harper and Row Publishers. Niyi-Akinmade, T. 2014. What manner of growth? A rebased Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Nigeria provokes skepticism among the citizens. The News Watch Magazine, 29 May 2014. Nwachukwu, T. 2016. The gulf between Nigeria and South Africa. ThisDay. The Sunday Newspaper, 28 August 2016. Obayuwana, O. 2006. South Africa Nigeria and the hanging fruits of investment. The Guardian Newspaper, 6 September 2006. Obi, C. 2015. Recalibrating South Africa’s Role in global economic governance: A Nigerian perspective on some strategic challenges. Economic Diplomacy Programme Policy Insights, 11 March 2015. Ogwu, U.J. 1999. South Africa and Nigeria’s relations with the World. Paper presented at the Nigerian-South African Dialogue Conference, held at Rosebank Hotel, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26-27 August 1999. Ohuocha, C. 2012. Rebase to boost Nigeria’s economy 40%. Reuters, 25 April 2012. Okere, R. 2006. Trade volume between Nigeria and South Africa drops by N28b. The Guardian Newspaper, 12 June 2006.

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Olagunju, T. 2000. Exploring Nigeria-South Africa bilateral relations. ThisDay, 2 October 2000. Onu, E. 2010. Nigeria to emerge Africa’s biggest economy. ThisDay, 9 June 2010. Onuoha, J. 2005. The emerging giants of Africa: A study of Nigeria-South Africa relations in the post-apartheid era. African Renaissance, 2(6). Pedro, I.D. 2000. Renaissance Lessons from South Africa. The Guardian Newspaper, 4 August 2000. Prebisch, R. 1959. Commercial policy in underdeveloped countries. American Economic Review, Proceedings, May 1959. Sega, D and Lebaka, F. 2014. Nigeria’s economic boom: A positive outcome of intra-Africa trade. Policy Brief. Africa Institute of South Africa. Briefing No.111, October 2014. Sisk, T.D. 2014. Nigeria and South Africa. In: Klesner, J.L. ed. Comparative politics: An introduction. New York: McGraw-Hill Education. South Africa and Nigeria: African Giants Battle for Economic Supremacy. ThisDay, 14 March 2016. South African Businessmen Target Nigeria. The Vanguard, 7 October 1999. South Africa-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce. 2012. South African firms succeed in Nigeria. Available at: http://www.sa.nccza/news/143-south African-firms-succeed-in-Nigeria. [Accessed May 2017]. UNCTAD. 2012. World investment report UNCTAD. Press Release, 5 July 2012. World Bank Website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/Newyork.GDP.PCAP.CD. Yanikkaya, H. 2003. Trade openness and economic growth: A cross country empirical investigation. Journal of Development Economics, 72. Zabadi, I.S. and Onuoha, F.C. 2012. Nigeria and South Africa: Competition or cooperation. In: Imobighe, T.A and Alli, W.O. eds. Perspectives on Nigeria’s National Politics and External Relations: Essay in Honour of Professor A Bolaji Akinyemi. Ibadan: University Press plc.

CHAPTER EIGHT HEGEMONS AND RIVALS: ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA’S AND SOUTH AFRICA’S VANGUARD ROLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN ECOWAS AND SADC LUQMAN SAKA, HASSAN A. SALIU, AND LERE AMUSAN

Abstract Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has demonstrated a strong commitment to the course of peace in Africa. Nigeria remains a leading contributor of combat and civilian personnel to the United Nations peace missions and remains at the vanguard of African Union peace processes and was a key driver of the Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peace missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, among others. From the political destabilisation of neighbouring states under apartheid, South Africa’s foreign policy has switched to constructive engagement since the conduct of multi-party elections in 1994. South Africa has committed resources to the advancement of peace, notably in Southern Africa through the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). South Africa was also actively engaged in resolving the 2008 post-election crisis in Zimbabwe and sent a peace mission to Lesotho, among others. Given the two nations’ leading role at promoting stability and security in Africa, an appraisal of their efforts becomes imperative, most essentially as it relates to the power tussle between the two giants of the African continent. This chapter, therefore, engages in a comparative assessment of the capability of Nigeria and South Africa with regards to power politics in SubSaharan Africa. Keywords: Nigeria; South Africa; Peace and Security; ECOMOG; SADC

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Introduction Political leaders in Africa have long understood the importance of integration to the attainment of development of states on the continent (Mkandawire, Nyantakyi-Frimpong, Armah, and Arky, 2014). Giving credence to this position, Boas (2001) notes that Africa had experienced two great epochs of regionalisation. The first of the waves started immediately after independence, when newly independent African states tried to advance the depth of regional schemes put in place by colonial powers. Efforts at advancing the structures of the former East African Community provide vivid illustrations. The period also saw the growth of Pan-Africanism and the fruition of efforts at establishing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Globalisation and the growth of other integration platforms, especially the European Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, spurred renewed efforts at promoting regional integration platforms in Africa with the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) being the main instigators through the frameworks of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty (Boas, 2001: 29-30). Following the drafting and adoption of the 1991 Abuja Treaty, renewed efforts at promoting integration gained traction in Africa. The main thrust of the Abuja Treaty was the reification of the centrality of sub-regional integration structures as instruments for pushing the depth of integration at the sub-regional level and for achieving the overall objective of creating an African Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2025. Likewise, the eight established Regional Economic Communities recognised by the OAU were to serve as the foundation pillars that would provide the framework for the creation of the AEC by building on their respective successes and leveraging on their institutional structures (Mkandawire et al., 2014: 1; Boas, 2001: 30).1 Notwithstanding sustained efforts, scepticism remains among analysts and observers as to the value of and sincerity to drive the course of integration in Africa. This has to do with the willingness of African states and their 1

The eight Regional Economic Communities recognised by the-then OAU are: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

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leaders to deliver on the expectation of integration, the unrealistic ambitions that the integration mechanism is expected to deliver, and the lack of political will among Africa’s political leaders to forgo certain sovereign rights for greater integration benefits (Thonke and Spliid, 2012: 42-43). Aside from the aforementioned issues, there are also other institutional and structural challenges that have constituted impediments to the process of integration on the continent. Despite these impediments, regional integration remains the dominant process in Africa’s efforts at building multilateral institutions that will aid the achievement of development and security through economic cooperation and political coordination (Khadiagala, 2011: 1; Ogwu, 2009: 7). While the objective of achieving an integrated economy looms large in the creation of regional economic communities across Africa, as Adebajo (2012: 98) has noted, economic integration being promoted in Africa is more than trade liberalisation and custom unions. As stipulated in the Lagos Plan of Action, regionalism sought by African states involved six interconnected processes. These are the integration of physical, institutional, and social infrastructures; integration of production structures; market integration; resolution of inter-state conflicts; ensuring inter-state and intrastate stability and security; and creating an enabling environment for initiatives and enterprises within states and across national borders (Adebajo, 2012: 99). Thus, the objective of enhancing the coordination of political policies that will advance the promotion of peace, stability, and security is also expected to be a cardinal focus of regional integration institutions and processes in Africa. Without doubt, the need to promote economic cooperation was the overriding objective that informed the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, given increasing political instability and incidence of conflicts, the organisation has evolved political and security architectures to deal with the sub-region’s security crises. The most notable of these is the deployment of peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions, (Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s) through the platform of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Adebajo, 2008; Olonisakin, 2011). In Southern Africa, efforts at integration under the auspices of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) was a function of political construction and a reaction to apartheid South Africa’s policy of destabilisation in the sub-region (Qobo, 2007: 4; Lee, 2002: 10). Although the promotion of economic cooperation remains the core objective of a reincarnated Southern Africa Development

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Community (SADC) the organisation has also devoted resources to the promotion of peace, security, and stability. Within ECOWAS and SADC, Nigeria and South Africa are at the vanguard of the sub-regions’ efforts at promoting peace and security. As regional heavyweights or what can be termed hegemons, the two countries had invested resources and political goodwill on efforts at enhancing security and stability (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). They have both led efforts at resolving political disputes and constitute the vanguard of peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions in their respective sub-regions. Nigeria and South Africa played pivotal roles in shaping the evolution of the structures, objectives, principles, and values of peace that the African Union (AU) has come to champion through the auspices of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In specific terms, both countries are important members of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and vanguards that push for the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF).2 As promoters of the ASF, the two countries using the platforms of their sub-regional organisations (ECOWAS and SADC) had worked assiduously to give effect to the realisation of the Standby Brigades in West Africa and Southern Africa. Much as the two nations had worked on numerous occasions to advance the cause of peace on the continent, notably within the context of their respective sub-regional organisations and collaboratively at the continental level through the platform of the AU, there have been occasions in which they had also worked at cross purposes and, by so doing, undermined the promotion of peace and stability on the continent. The lack of consensus between the two leading nations as to what should constitute the AU position on the Libyan Crisis in 2011 and their face-off on Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 are important points of reference. To this extent, it can be argued that as regional hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa have had cause to collaborate on issues as it relates to the promotion of peace, security, and stability within Africa, especially using the platforms of the AU. That said, it is also important to highlight the fact that they have acted at cross purposes, taken antagonistic positions, acted as rivals, and engaged in 2 The African Standby Force (ASF) is intended to be a multidimensional force and pivotal to the whole idea of the AU Africa Peace and Security Architecture. As a multidimensional force, the ASF is expected to comprise of Police, Military, and Civilian components. The ASF was given effect to through Article 13 of the AU Peace and Security Council Protocol. The Force is made up of five regional and multidisciplinary brigades.

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unbridled rivalry when circumstances dictated. To this end, it can thus safely be argued that Nigeria and South Africa’s relationship especially at the continental level has largely been conditioned by the struggle for hegemonic power and position. It has been characterised by palpable tension and an “unspoken rivalry” that was largely informed by power politics. This is without prejudice to instances wherein the two have had the cause to collaborate (Odubajo and Akinboye, 2017). The cat and mouse antics that characterise the relationship between the two countries has made it important to assess their contributions to the cause of peace using the platforms of the AU as well as their respective sub-regional organisations (ECOWAS and SADC), the cost of their peace vanguard role, and the expression of acts of rivalry that characterised the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa on specific issues in particular and as it relates to the leadership position and role within the context of the AU power matrix.

Regional Hegemons and Political Stability The term hegemony, which takes its root from the Greek word hegemonia, literally denotes the dominant status of a state over others within the context of power relations in a system (Yilmaz, 2010: 194). Discussions revolving around the concepts of hegemon and hegemony are rooted in international relations theory and practice. The classic usage of the concepts of hegemon and hegemony to characterise power relations between and among sovereign entities dates back to the exposition of Thucydides in his discussion on the Peloponnesian war and the analysis of Athenian hegemony and the implications it held for the Greek City-State system. As Antoniades notes, the concept of hegemony can be taken to mean a sovereign state’s possession of the means to exert compliance, influence, or control of the structures of the international system and the actions of other states within it (Antoniades, 2008). However, the control should not be situated within the context of direct political domination of foreign governments and/or territories that take the shape of implanting formal colonialisation. In discussing the concept and theory of hegemony, credit must be given to Gramsci as one of the early proponents of hegemony theory. For Gramsci, hegemony relates to the position of the most powerful country in the international system or the status of a dominant state within the context of power relations in a specific region or sub-region. As Gramsci notes, hegemony can denote cooperation extracted by coercion and/or force (Barrett, 1997: 239; Cox, 1996; 1983) The fact that hegemony tends to be

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discussed within the context of the global political economy means that in theory and practice the concept denotes the role of a powerful state in ensuring the provision of stability and openness of the subsisting economic order (Krasner, 1976). If understood within this context, it then means that to exert influence and provide stability (political and economic), a hegemon should possess a sufficiently large material resource base and must be willing to take policy decisions necessary for a stable and open economic system (Ipek, 2013; Gilipin, 2000). In explaining the attributes of a hegemonic power, Yazid (2015: 71) avers that a state becomes a hegemon when there is a stable and strong convergence of military, economic, political, institutional, and ideological power. Against the convergence of a number of attributes, Keohane gives primacy of importance to economic indices in consideration of the hegemonic state in international political-economic relations (Keohane, 1984). According to Keohane, a hegemonic state must have unhindered access to important raw materials, control major sources of capital, have a large market for imports, have comparative advantages in the industrial production of goods, and comparative high wages and profit margins than other countries within the global political economy (Keohane, 1984: 33-34). By emphasising economic indices alone, Keohane’s description of a hegemon failed to appreciate the importance of political and diplomatic influence, military capability, and other arrays of soft power attributes that when combined gives hegemonic power the political and economic leverage over the global or regional system as the case may be (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). Rather than focusing on a single attribute, Strange highlights four elements of structural power in the discussion of the core attributes of hegemonic power (Strange, 1987). The four structural elements that a hegemon must possess as highlighted by Strange includes: capacity to threaten and/or offer protection to other countries through the force of arms; the power to exert control over the production of goods and services; the ability to shape and determine the direction of international finance; and lastly the resources to direct the development, accumulation, and transfer of knowledge (Strange, 1987: 565). For Nye, the sources of hegemonic power include leadership in the field of technology, military and economic superiority, possession of requisite soft power attributes, and control of the international communication system (Nye, 2011: 157; 2003: 30). Thus, for Strange and Nye, security, production/industrial capacity, finance, and knowledge production are critical for the construction and consolidation of the hegemonic position of a state in the international system. These also hold for the projection of

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influence for hegemonic powers like Nigeria and South Africa at the regional and/or sub-regional levels. Since its return to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria’s role as a pivotal power base in Africa has gained traction. This was evidenced by the leading role that Nigeria played in the transition of the OAU to the AU, the institution of the New Economic Partnership for Africa (NEPAD), the institution of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and the evolution of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), all during the reign of former President Obasanjo (1999-2007). It is instructive to note that the return of civil rule and the committed efforts under the Obasanjo presidency breathed life into the downward spiral of Nigeria’s foreign policy position and conduct, although succeeding administrations have found it challenging to sustain the high tempo since 2007 (Adebajo and Mustapha, 2008). In contrast, South Africa’s role as a powerhouse in the continent has gained ascendance since the conduct of the 1994 multiparty elections and the end of apartheid (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). While there might be occasional hiccups, South Africa’s foreign policy and diplomacy in Africa have remained vibrant, and the country’s influence on continental affairs remains strong. The characterisation of Nigeria and South Africa as regional hegemonic powers within their respective sub-regions and the continent at large is anchored on the strength of both nations’ economies and military capabilities when compared with other countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Before it entered a recession, the Nigerian economy was touted as the largest on the continent, followed by South Africa. With a GDP of $376.3 billion, Nigeria still retains its position as the largest economy on the continent closely followed by South Africa at $349.3 billion in GDP (IMF, 2017). Undoubtedly, both nations’ military capability is unrivalled within their sub-regions and the continent, with the exception of the Egyptian and Algerian militaries. According to the ranking of military capability and strength, as provided by Global Fire Power (GFP), South Africa and Nigeria ranked third and fourth in Africa with power indices of 0.6445 and 0.7509, respectively. Leading the pack was Egypt, which was ranked the first with an index of 0.2751 and Algeria ranked second with an index of 0.4296 (GFP, 2018). As Ogunnubi and Isike (2015: 159-170) note, both countries also possess and project elements of soft power capability that imbue them with the ability to wield influence in their respective sub-regions and across Africa especially on issues that affect the continent and its people.

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However, the hegemonic stature of South Africa and Nigeria in their respective sub-regions transcends the regions and is based on the power play between the two competing powers south of the Sahara. While there may be a claim to friendly ties between the two countries, the struggle for hegemonic power in Africa between the two nations has led scholars to give various connotations to the nature of the relationship between the two countries. While Seteolu and Okuneye (2017: 58) described it as an “omnium-gatherum of good and evil”, Agbu (2010: 437) described it as a “love-hate relationship”. Games (2013: 1), however, described it as “unspoken rivalry”. Such connotations given to the nature of the relationship is derivable from the fact that the two nations are in constant competition and rivalry with each other for leadership positions on the continent. The rivalry is often played out and visible in the context of the politics of the AU. While the two countries have competed in power projections and hegemonic aspirations, studies have shown that they have many opportunities and some mutual motivations to collaborate in promoting the general interests of the African continent in the international system (Odubajo and Akinboye, 2017; Tetenyi, 2014). In explaining the ebb and flow that characterised the relationship between the two regional hegemons, Landsberg (2010) notes that the acts, actions, and policy decisions of both nations are conducted in the context of volatility and tension in the quest to project and/or advance leadership roles by the two countries. Hence, the characteristic features of Nigerian and South African relations largely revolve around cooperation and competition (Games, 2013). It was observed that the level of bilateral relations between the two countries had been determined largely by leadership and hegemonic issues as well as the differences in each country’s strategy in finding solutions to continental issues and challenges. This was exemplified in the democratic nature of Nelson Mandela and the dictatorial position of General Sani Abacha from 1995 to 1999, the apparent cooperative dispositions between Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo, and the competition that characterised the years of Presidents Jacob Zuma and Goodluck Jonathan. The cooperative engagements between Mbeki and Obasanjo aided efforts that resulted in the transformation of the OAU to the AU and the initiation of the NEPAD. The competition and rivalry between the two hegemons that characterised the Zuma and Jonathan years manifested in the divergent positions of the two regional powers on the Côte d’Iviore crisis (2002-2011), the crisis in Libya in 2011, and the election of the AU chairperson in 2012 (Agbu, Okereke, Wapmuk, and Adeniyi, 2013: 8-9; Games, 2013).

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The Evolution of Peace and Security Architectures in Africa From a principle of “Non-Interference” to the principle of “Non-Indifference”, Africa’s principles and values as it relates to the manner and approach for addressing instances of violent conflict and threats to peace are evolving. The horrific nature of the 1994 Rwanda genocide among other instances of violent conflict that ravaged the continent especially in the 1990s, and the nature of the international community’s response partly informed the call to action on the need to re-assess the African approach to breaches of peace and conflict situations in Africa. It is in this context that one can better appreciate the call for African states to adhere to the principle of nonindifference to breaches of peace by the international panel of eminent personalities empowered by the then OAU to investigate the genocide in Rwanda. The idea of “Non-Indifference”, which informed Article 4h of the Constitutive Act of the AU, calls for a commitment to African solutions for African conflicts. It also codifies the responsibility for collective action by member states of the AU in the gravest circumstances (Berhe, 2016). The evolution of structures that advance the promotion of peace was given greater attention in the process leading to the transformation of the OAU to the AU. As stated earlier, this was largely informed by numerous conflicts that raged simultaneously in different parts of Africa, the challenge they posed to security and development, and the need to find lasting Africainspired solutions to these conflicts. Informed by this realisation, the promotion of the idea of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was given prominence in the formation of the AU. The APSA consists of norms and mechanisms that evolved rapidly after the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the AU in 2000 (Desmidt and Hauck, 2017: 1-2; Berhe, 2016: 2). It is important to note that the emergent AU security regime was anchored on old norms carried over from the OAU Charter and new norms enshrined in the 2000 Constitutive Act. The core norms that formed the planks of the AU’s peace and security architecture include: sovereign equality of member states (Art 4a); non-intervention by member states (Art 4g); African solutions to African problems; the principle of Uti possidetis (Art 4b); non-use of force/peaceful settlement of disputes (Art 4e, f and i); condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government (Art 4p); and the AU’s right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances (Art 4h). The combination of these core values, norms, and principles in conjunction with the institutional mechanisms put in place by the AU under the 2000 Constitutive Act has given the organisation the vibrancy that engenders

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opportunities for proactive responses to Africa’s conflicts and other security challenges (Aning, 2008a: 2-3). The core institutional plank on which the African Peace and Security Architecture revolves is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). The AU PSC came into effect in December 2003 when the protocol establishing the Council secured the necessary numbers of ratification of member states essential for its activation. The PSC consisted of 15 member states of the AU and it is the collective security and early warning mechanism of the AU for timely responses to conflict and crisis on the continent. Given the central role it is designed to play within the context, it has evolved to become the single most powerful institution within the AU peace and security architecture (Aning, 2008a; 2008b). Highlighting its centrality, the Council is empowered by the protocol establishing it to, among other things: undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions to resolve conflicts where they have occurred; authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions; and recommend to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government intervention within a member state in respect of severe circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (AU, 2002).3 The first three of the powers/functions of the Council clearly highlights its centrality to the cause of peace, security, and stability in Africa. Other institutional mechanisms that work to complement the AU PSC are the five-member Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force, and the Special Peace Fund. All of these are to be coordinated by the AU Commission for effective synergy. While the AU PSC is empowered to make a decision as it relates to the determination of where there are grave circumstances that can constitute a breach of peace and authorise the raising of peacekeeping missions, the AU still relies on the sub-regional organisations to give effect to such missions, especially through the contribution of troops and equipment. The reliance was informed by the fact that it is the Regional Economic Commissions (REC) that was expected to give effect to the establishment of the five Regional Brigades that constitute the ASF. It is in this context that the REC becomes an important vehicle for the realisation of the AU peace and security agenda. The role as mandated by the AU is not altogether a new

3

For detailed information on the functions and power of the AU Peace and Security Council, see Art. 3 of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

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one for organisations such as the ECOWAS and SADC as they had been performing such tasks before the AU Constitutive Act came into effect. Indeed, it is important to note that African sub-regional organisations have continued to play prominent roles in the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent (Berman and Sams, 2000). The increasing role that Africa’s regional and sub-regional organisations are playing in the area of peace and security promotion can be contextualised within the important role that regional organisations are expected to play as contained in Article VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.4 That said, it is important to note that there has been a noticeable over-reliance on regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa by the United Nations in the areas of raising peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions starting from the 1990s (Bermans and Sams, 1998). The reliance, as Berman and Sams note, is informed by the reluctance of the United Nations Security Council to authorize UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (Berman and Sams, 2000: 3). The reluctance is informed by several factors of which the issue of fatigue of Western countries that often bear a disproportionate cost of UN peacekeeping missions and the fear of the Somalia debacle ranked prominent (Gowan, 2009: 3). To this end, sub-regional organisations in Africa have had to respond to incidences of conflict through the authorization of ceasefire monitoring, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping missions (Bamidele, 2013: 119). Thus, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) among other sub-regional organisations in Africa have evolved peace and security architectures that serve as first-line mechanisms directed at enhancing the prospect for peace in their respective sub-regions (Wallensteen and Bjurner, 2015: 4). ECOWAS officially came into existence on 28 May 1975 with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. The overriding objective of the organisation at inception was to promote and facilitate the integration of the member states' economies. The organisation is expected to achieve these objectives through the enactment of laws and rules that will aid the harmonisation of economic policies, encourage the removal of customs duties and taxes, enhance the realisation of common external tariffs, and encourage the establishment of a single monetary zone and a common currency, among other ambitious 4 For detailed discussion on the centrality of regional and sub-regional organisations to the maintenance of peace and security, see Boutros-Ghali, B., ‘Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peace-keeping in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, 1 November. UN Document A/50/711 and S/1995/911, para 4.

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economic targets (Jaye and Amadi, 2011: 3). Without doubt, the transformation of ECOWAS from an economic to an integrative political mechanism is aided by the signing of some protocols of which the Non-Aggression Protocol (1978) and the protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981) are preeminent (Jaye and Amadi, 2011: 4). What is, however, clear, is that the ECOWAS conflict management framework/security architecture emerged out of the organisation’s peacekeeping experience in Liberia in the 1990s (Olonisakin, 2011: 13). Arising from the organisation’s experience from the first mission in Liberia, ECOWAS embarked on a process directed at formalising its peace and security instruments. In a bid to realise this objective, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security in 1999. The protocol mandated the establishment of several institutions of which the Defence and Security Commission and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) are notable. To further strengthen the sub-regional peace and security architecture, ECOWAS adopted the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001. This was followed by the adoption of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in 2007. Through the framework, ECOWAS intends to harmonise all the organisation’s normative instruments on peace, security, and development, and provide a solid foundation for a comprehensive peace-building agenda for West Africa going into the future (Olonisakin, 2011: 27-29). In its case, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) emerged from the transformation of the structure of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) formed by nine anti-apartheid Southern Africa frontline states in 1980. The central objective that informed the formation of SADCC was to harmonise policies directed at enhancing cooperation on common regional projects, programmes, and initiatives that were aimed at reducing members’ dependence on apartheid South Africa (Thonke and Spliid, 2012: 47; Maruping, 2005: 140; Lee, 2003: 44-46). To this end, the need to ameliorate the over-bearing influence of apartheid South Africa on countries within the sub-region was central to the formation of SADCC. The sense of collective fear of South Africa under apartheid continued to underline policy actions and decisions taken within the platform of SADCC until it was transformed into the Southern Africa Development Community via the 1992 Treaty of Windhoek (Qobo, 2007: 11-12).

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Following the ascension of South Africa and Namibia, SADC has gone through an extensive transformation process. At present, SADC’s key objectives entail the promotion of equitable, self-sustaining economic growth and socio-economic development directed at alleviating poverty; the cultivation of common cultural, social, and political values; the promotion of democracy, peace, security, and stability; and the sustainable environmental and resource utilisation within the community (Maruping, 2005: 140; Lee, 2003: 47). Given the nature of political and security issues in the sub-region, especially as it relates to the history of political destabilisation by South Africa under apartheid, the need for security cooperation was given prominence in SADC. Underlying the centrality of security cooperation, the 1992 Windhoek Treaty explicitly stipulates that SADC should: promote common political values, systems and other shared values, which are transmitted through institutions that are democratic, legitimate and effective; consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability (SADC, 1992: Art 5-1a-c).

In this context, the creation of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in 1996, the signing of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, in 2001, the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003 and the formation of the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG) in 2007 are of significant importance.

Regional Vanguards of Peace: Assessment of Nigerian and South African Efforts in ECOWAS and SADC Nigeria and South Africa occupy the position of pre-eminence in the context of politics and diplomacy within Africa. The centrality of the two nations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is informed by the strength of their economies; political and diplomatic influence; military capability; commitment to the cause of peace and stability in their sub-region and the continent; and commitment to the advancement of cooperation through sub-regional and continental organisations (AU, ECOWAS, and SADC) (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015: 153-155; Schoeman, 2015: 432; Bamidele, 2013; Dunderdale, 2013; Alli, 2012; Neethling, 2011; Cawthra, 2010). Both nations were instrumental to the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) and in the institution of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016: 122-123; Solomon, 2010: 133). In the context of the sub-regional organisations, both countries continue to drive the process of integration within ECOWAS and

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SADC. Aside from these, both remain central to the formulation and operationalisation of peace and security architecture in West Africa and Southern Africa. Through the platform of the two sub-regional organisations, both have been instrumental to the raising of negotiations and mediation missions and spearheaded the deployment of peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions wherever it becomes necessary (Berman and Sams, 2000: 8). Since the end of apartheid and the conduct of multiparty elections in 1994, South Africa has devoted resources to the promotion of economic development through functional cooperation and the advancement of peace and security by serving as mediators in conflict spots and through troop contributions to peacekeeping missions especially within the platforms of the South African Custom Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Tetenyi, 2014: 5). In the case of Nigeria, a key foreign policy concern since independence has been the promotion of economic development in Africa and the advancement of peace and security. Nigeria has used the platforms of OAU/AU and ECOWAS to give effect to this central objective. The establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 and the associated evolution of a sub-regional peace and security architecture of which ECOMOG is preeminent are among the achievements of Nigeria’s diplomacy within West Africa in the 1990s (Alli, 2012: 20; Adebajo, 2008: 1). Thus, given Nigeria’s and South Africa’s prioritisation of the promotion of peace and security within their respective sub-regions and the continent at large, the next section of the chapter assesses the performance of both nations to the cause of advancing peace and security with attention on their roles as mediators and vanguards of peacekeeping missions on the continent.

Nigeria as Vanguard of Peace and Security in ECOWAS Among Africa’s sub-regional organisations, the most prominent in the area of conflict resolution, mediation, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping initiatives so far has been ECOWAS. The organisation’s peacekeeping arm, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) has been deployed for peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Mali among other conflict spots in West Africa. The formation of the sub-regional peacekeeping outfit emanated from the perceived need to resolve the civil war that engulfed Liberia starting from 1989 (Neethling, 1999: 472). To this end, and drawing upon the ECOWAS’s Mutual Assistance on Defence Protocol, Nigeria pushed for sub-regional mediation in the Liberian conflict

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at the 1990 ECOWAS meeting held in Banjul, the Gambia. In consultation with mediation committee members comprising Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Togo, Nigeria canvassed for the deployment of a sub-regional intervention force christened ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group. The core objective of the intervention force was to effect a ceasefire among warring factions in the Liberia conflict and thus facilitate the resolution of the civil war (Alli, 2012: 8; Obi, 2008: 189-190; Ate, 2001: 118-119). The push by Nigeria for a military intervention to end the civil strife in Liberia was informed by the belief that the crisis in the country had the potential to become a sub-regional conflagration with devastating consequences for regimes, national security, and human security (Okolie, 2010: 102-104; Osaghae, 2010: 65). Despite the initial foot-dragging and opposition to idea emanating from within ECOWAS member states, notably from the Francophone cluster, the deployment of the ECOMOG force later came to fruition. There was an apparent lack of coordination among troop-contributing nations, and thus, the intervention force resembled “an arrangement more than anything else” in the words of the Ghanaian General Quainoo, the mission’s first Force Commander (Berman and Sams, 2000: 91-92). Given this context, the mission, when eventually deployed, had to contend not only with logistic challenges and operational uncertainties but also with a lack of precision with regard to the mission’s core objectives, procedures, and rules of engagement (Ate, 2001: 119). There was also the problem of a hostile landing and operation environment arising from the Charles Taylor-led National Patriotic Front of Liberia’s (NPFL) hostility to the deployment of the sub-regional intervention force. The hostility was informed by Taylor’s NPFL perception of bias by the Nigeria-led ECOMOG and belief that the intervention force would prevent the NPFL from achieving its objective of dislodging the President Doe regime and the take-over of power in Monrovia on 9 September 1990 (Berman and Sams, 2000). Given the intricate and complex nature of the Liberian civil war and the apparent lack of a clear mission mandate, objectives, and coordination, ECOMOG troops had to alternate between self-defence, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance in the course of their deployment in Liberia between 1990-1997. With political will from member states, especially Nigeria, and the trial and error tactics in uncharted waters of peacekeeping, ECOMOG was eventually able to emerge with some degree of credibility and accomplishment from its first outing in Liberia. In the end, though, the economic and human toll of the intervention on ECOMOG forced the regional organisation to de-facto relinquish the

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control of Liberia to Charles Taylor after the conduct of the 1997 elections (Musah, 2011: 193). By 1999, new rebel movements had sprung up, and their emergence signified the resumption of hostilities in Liberia. ECOWAS, therefore, made a return to the country, deploying a new peacekeeping mission and engaged in mediation between factions which resulted in the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement in August 2003, the institution of an Interim Government, and the eventual conduct of general elections that ushered in the Presidency of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in 2005. Although ad-hoc at best at the beginning, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group under Nigeria’s direction was instrumental in the resolution of the crisis in Liberia. Following the Liberia experience, ECOMOG was deployed in Sierra Leone to reinstate President Tejjan Kabbah back to power in 1997 (Saliu, 2006: 29-31). There has been the subsequent deployment of ECOMOG forces in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. The operation in Northern Mali becomes especially crucial, given the implications of the insurrections by Tuareg rebel groups and Islamist movements on security and stability in the Sahel. Following the insurgents’ take-over of Northern Mali and the threats of imminent attack southward, the government in Bamako called for help from ECOWAS and the international community. Informed by the threats that insurgents posed to stability and security in the whole of the Sahel and the called for assistance from Bamako, ECOWAS was compelled to authorise the deployment of the African Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The mission was backed by UN Security Council Resolution 2085 passed on 20 December 2012. As part of its contribution to AFISMA, Nigeria deployed a 1,200-strong contingent and air assets that included Alpha Jets and Mi-35 Helicopters to support the regional force in Mali (Isiguzo and Oyedele, 2013; Will, 2013). ECOWAS also deployed a mission to the Gambia to compel former President Yahya Jammeh to relinquish power after his defeat at the poll. By virtue of Nigeria’s economic strength in the sub-region, the nation has had to bear a disproportionate burden for most of ECOMOG’s missions (Alli, 2012: 9). While the cost of Nigeria’s vanguard roles in ECOMOG might be difficult to ascertain, it is, however, touted that in all Nigeria has spent more than $12 billion on peace operations since the first ECOMOG operation in Liberia in 1990. The former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo in 2001 stated that Nigeria had spent $13 billion on peacekeeping operations over 12 years (Afaha, 2013: 18; Olonisakin, 2000: 24). The country was also reported to have lost upward of more than 500 men, excluding the wounded and those declared as missing in action (Obi, 2008:

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190; Ate, 2001: 111). In general terms, it was estimated that by 1999, Nigeria had committed over $13 billion to peacekeeping operations in West Africa (Bamali, 2007: 100). In the course of ECOWAS peace operations in West Africa, Nigeria has been noted to have contributed more than 70 percent of ECOMOG troops and 80 percent of funds (Abubakar, 2009: 195). Thus, it would not be out of place to aver that Nigeria’s immense contribution in men, funds, and material (military and non-military) was not only essential to, but formed the foundation of the relative successes of the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, through to the platform of ECOMOG and other missions thereafter for which Nigeria has participated in the sub-region (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, 2012: 51).

South Africa and Peace Support Operations in SADC The Southern African Development Commission has come a long way in promoting and advancing the cause of economic integration and enhancing the peaceful resolution of conflicts. To this end, states in the sub-region are devoting greater attention to the politics, institutions, and structures that can aid the promotion of peace, security, and overall development (Berman and Sams, 2000: 151). As it relates to mediation and peace support operations, SADC’s Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security, and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee are the veritable instruments through which SADC’s mediation and peace support operations have been crafted (Neethling, 1999: 473). The adoption of the Protocol establishing the Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in 2001 came after exhaustive deliberations and harmonisation of opposing positions, notably those that were held by South Africa and which totally differed from those of Zimbabwe on how to address the institutionalisation of instruments for addressing political and security matters within SADC (Cawthra, 2010: 10-11). With the reincarnation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference as the SADC in 1992 and the admission of South Africa and Namibia into the organisation, the SADC has demonstrated growing concern for security coordination, conflict prevention, mediation, and resolution. The SADC has also paid attention to the development of its capacity for the deployment of peacekeeping missions in conflict spots within the sub-region (Berman and Sams, 2000: 151). To this end, and through the platform of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of SADC, contingents from member states’ Armed Forces participated in their first joint multinational peace-support exercise, code-

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named Operation Blue Hungwe (Fish Eagle), in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1997. This was followed by the staging of Exercise Blue Crane hosted by South Africa in 1999 and Exercise Tulipe in Madagascar in May 1999 (SADC, 1999: 5-6). Since its re-integration back into the comity of nations in 1994, South Africa has demonstrated an unflinching commitment to and engagement with Africa’s issues within Southern Africa, Africa, and outside of the continent. Africa is an important element in post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy. This is largely informed by the country’s political history and the reality that the nation’s political, economic, and security interests are tied to the fate of the continent in general and Southern Africa in particular. By far the largest and most advanced economy in Southern Africa and one of the two leading in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa’s image looms large as a continental powerhouse and driver of economic integration and security cooperation more importantly within SADC and by extension the African Union (Solomon, 2010: 132). To this end, South Africa has played and continues to play a prominent role in the evolution and institutionalisation of the security architecture within Southern Africa under the guidance of the SADC and in the continent through the African Union (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 2-3). Using the institutional platform of SADC, South Africa has worked assiduously to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts. South Africa’s passionate commitment to mediating political conflicts as they spring up in SADC’s member states was informed by the country’s particular experience of internal negotiation and the belief that this experience could serve as an example for other conflicts, especially within SADC (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 3). To this end, South Africa played a leading role in mediation efforts in Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as in Kenya following the 2007-2008 post-election violence and in Zimbabwe starting from 2000. The South Africa National Defence Force has been on peacekeeping missions in Burundi, the DRC, Central Africa Republic (CAR), and other conflict spots on the continent (Cawthra, 2010: 24-26; Solomon, 2010: 132). Aside from being central to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), South African troops also formed the bedrock of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) deployed to combat the M23 rebellion in Eastern DRC. While the peace in the Eastern DRC and the country at large remains tenuous at best, it is to the credit of the South African forces in conjunction with troops from Malawi and Tanzania that the M23 rebellion was neutralised (Mapisa-Nqakula, 2015: 10). The missions in Burundi and the

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DRC are complementary to the mediatory efforts and roles of the South African state and are instrumental to the restoration of civil rule in both countries (Hendricks, 2015: 11; Williams, 2015: 367-372). Nowhere has South Africa demonstrated its willingness to use the military option as an instrument to enforce peace than in the Kingdom of Lesotho. South Africa’s engagement with the Lesotho problem started right from the inception of a political face-off between King Letsie III and the democratically elected Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, in 1994. In concert with Botswana and Zimbabwe, South Africa hosted mediation meetings between the parties in Pretoria in 1994. Following the monarch’s attempt at backtracking on the agreement to restore constitutional order, South Africa engaged in a “show of force” as the country’s armed forces conducted military exercises close to Lesotho’s borders. The military deployment and exercise served as the stick that complemented the carrot that diplomatic engagements stood for and was instrumental to the restoration of constituted authority in Lesotho in 1994 (Williams, 2015: 367-368; Berman and Sams, 2000: 173-175). The political turmoil in Lesotho resurfaced after the disputed 1998 elections. Parties in Lesotho sought mediation from South Africa, and in conjunction with Botswana and Zimbabwe, the Langa Commission was set up to verify claims and produce a report on the disputed election results. As mediation efforts were on-going, a mutiny by elements from the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) broke out in Maseru. As a response to the ensuing instability, Prime Minister Mosisili requested military intervention through communications to leaders of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (Likoti, 2007: 252-253). Acting on the request, South Africa deployed the South African National Defence Force to intervene in Lesotho. South African troops were joined in “Operation Boleas” by a detachment from the Botswana Defence Force (Vhumbunu, 2015: 5; Likoti, 2007: 253). No doubt, the South African military intervention raised some dust especially in relation to its legitimacy, authorisation by SADC and UNSC, the motive of South Africa especially given the prominence of the Katse Dam in Lesotho-South Africa relations, and the constitutionality of Prime Minister Mosisili’s request without consent from the monarchy as dictated by Lesotho Constitution. All these notwithstanding, the intervention was instrumental in the restoration of relative calm in Maseru and the rest of the Kingdom and it facilitated a basis for further dialogue and the resolution of the political impasse.

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In the course of participating in peacekeeping and enforcement missions in Southern Africa and other conflict spots on the continent, South Africa has incurred huge financial, material, and human cost. For example, South Africa had to cover the cost of deployment for the mission in Burundi before the UN takeover, with operational costs for 2002 alone estimated at around R130 million (Dunderdale, 2013: 2). South Africa’s logistics capability, especially in combat helicopters proved particularly important to the mission in Eastern DRC. The men of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) deployed in peacekeeping missions have paid the ultimate price as highlighted by the death of 13 South African soldiers in the Central African Republic in 2013 (Allison, 2017).

Hegemons, Regional Rivalry, and the Cost of Security Since the 1960s, states in Africa have found themselves in the throes of political instability and conflict. In response to these incidences of conflict, the international community through the platform of the United Nations has had the cause to deploy enforcement and peacekeeping missions of which the UN Mission in the Congo serves as a pacesetter (Bamidele, 2015; Saliu, 2006). There is no denying the fact that undertaking peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace-building missions in Africa is a complex, delicate, and complicated venture given the nature and dynamics of Africa’s conflicts. Thus, mediating, enforcing, and keeping peace in Africa’s conflict spots have taxed the organisational ingenuity and creativity of the United Nations. By the early 1990s, the UN began to show increasing reluctance to deploy peacekeeping missions in Africa even in the face of clearer indications of imminent threats to peace and security as the Rwanda case attests. The withdrawal is blamed on several factors of which donor fatigue and the Somalia debacle ranked prominent (Saliu, 2016: 179-181). Informed by the UN’s lack of commitment and the mantra of finding African solutions to Africa’s problems, regional organisations on the continent have taken on increasing roles in mediating and peacekeeping in Africa’s conflicts. The missions in Chad, Darfur, and Somalia by the then OAU, now AU, and in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia by ECOWAS and in DR Congo and Lesotho by SADC were pointers to Africa’s sub-regional organisations’ attempts at advancing peace and stability in the continent. Experience, as it relates to peacekeeping in Africa, has shown the centrality of regional hegemons to the success of peacekeeping missions (Saliu, 2016: 178). Not only is a regional hegemonic state necessary to provide the political will and diplomatic push that will facilitate

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mediation, intervention, and peacekeeping missions in troubled spots within its sphere of influence, such a hegemon will also be expected to shoulder a greater proportion of the financial and logistical burden of peace missions. To this end, Aning notes that benevolent hegemonic leadership has contributed to designing and finding solutions to some of Africa’s political challenges (Aning, 2007: 7). In specific terms and as it relates to Africa, the roles of Nigeria within ECOWAS and South Africa within SADC and both nations through the AU to the course of peace, security, and stability are key (Saliu, 2016; Osaghae, 2010; Aning, 2007). Looking at the nature of intervention of both countries in trouble spots in Africa, the expressed objectives that always revolved around the need to advance peace and security and the lack of clearly expressed national interest that such interventions is geared towards advancing, it can be argued that Nigeria and South Africa have acted as benevolent hegemons. This is particularly as it relates to their mediations and peacekeeping missions within the platforms of their respective regional bodies (ECOWAS and SADC) and of course within the AU. Categorising their action as benevolent is informed by the explanation that in an attempt at creating a stable environment for its own development, hegemons invest resources to stabilise the system and – in the case of Nigeria and South Africa – their sub-region and by extension Africa. The stabilisation efforts often approximate the provision of public goods to other states that acted as freeriders and took advantage of the stability created by the hegemon bearing little or no burden incurred in the creation of such a stable environment. Such behaviour that resulted in advantages for all states within the system is taken to be benevolent, especially by one strand of hegemonic stability theory. Benevolent hegemons employed the use of soft power strategies to advance their leadership position within the system. This contrasts with coercive hegemons that often deploy hard power strategies (coercion, military intervention, economic sanctions) to advance their position within the system (Destradi, 2010: 194; Snidal, 1985: 581). For Nigeria and South Africa, attempts at promoting stability in their respective sub-regions and Africa using the platforms of multilateral institutions (AU, ECOWAS, and SADC) mark them out as benevolent hegemons. While there are allegations that interventions by the two nations (Nigeria in Liberia and South Africa in Lesotho) are often informed by other interests, aside from the much touted altruistic objectives anchored on the promotion of peace and security, this notwithstanding, both have been more ideational in the conduct of their foreign policy and diplomacy and in the pursuit of their national interests within their respective sub-regions and in Africa.

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Nigeria’s contribution to funds, logistics, men, and materials to ECOMOG missions was crucial and showed how hegemonic state contributions could serve as the fulcrum of collective security. In the Nigerian case, especially in Liberia and Serra Leone, the contributions came at a time when most economies on the continent were reeling from the pains of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Okolie, 2010: 106). Like Nigeria, the hegemonic role of South Africa has been critical to the determination of collective responses to conflict and security challenges within Southern Africa on the platform of SADC (Aning, 2007: 7). It is on record that both countries are at the vanguard of peace-making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding processes in conflicts within their sub-regions and at the continental levels. They are instrumental to the institutionalisation of peace and security architecture on the continent, bear a disproportionate burden of peace missions, and form the pillars of Africa Standby Brigades. Notwithstanding their internal political contradictions and constraints, Nigeria and South Africa are the vortex that efforts at crafting peace and stability within ECOWAS, SADC, and indeed the AU revolve around. Despite this, the two countries have been in constant competition and rivalry for the leadership role in Africa. The rivalry and quest for hegemony in the African continent have highly characterised the relationship between the two nations. The power play that characterised the relationship between the two countries has been examined from four major perspectives by Musawa (2013). The first has to do with what can be described as the “wind of independence” which swept across Africa from the 1960 to the end of apartheid rule in 1993. In this period, it was asserted that Nigeria played a dominant role in bringing to an end apartheid rule not only in South Africa but in the Southern African countries. The second period from 1994 to 1998 saw the relationship between the two countries spearheaded by Nigeria’s General Sani Abacha and South Africa’s Nelson Mandela. The relationship of the two countries in this period was somewhat hostile. The third from 1997 to 2007 under Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki was characterised by an improved but unbalanced relationship between the two countries. The fourth being the period from 2008 to 2015 under South Africa’s Jacob Zuma and Goodluck Jonathan is bedevilled with a combination of co-operation and competition (Odubajo and Akinboye, 2017; Musawa, 2013). The hegemonic and power rivalry between the two countries can arguably be traced to the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Nations in

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1995 after the intense criticisms which trailed the execution of human rights campaigner/activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his followers – tagged the “Ogoni nine” – despite intense pleas for clemency by the international community spearheaded by the late Nelson Mandela’s South African government. After the eventual execution of the “Ogoni nine”, the South African government called for stiff sanctions on Nigeria, which included expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations. The Nigerian government responded by boycotting the 1996 African Cup of Nations, which was held in South Africa, claiming that the government could not guarantee the security of the Nigeria contingent to the competition (Agbu, Okereke, Wapmuk, and Adeniyi, 2013: 8-9). Evidence of the power feud between the two African powers can also be found in the dissenting positions the two countries held during the Libyan crisis under Muammar Gaddafi and the support for the government of Guinea-Bissau. The Nigerian government supported the Transitional National Council (TNC), which was a rebel group against the then embattled Libyan leader based on a principle listed in Article 4 (m and o) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.5 The act, which cannot be implemented without adherence to governance principles such as democracy, good governance, fundamental human rights, and justice was found not applicable to Libya. The Nigerian government claimed that Libya under Gaddafi has not been subjected to any form of constitutional rule since Gaddafi took over power. Therefore, it maintained that the Constitutive Act could not apply to Gaddafi, who had never run a constitutional government. This position was backed by 34 member states of the African Union (Musawa, 2013). On the contrary, the South African government claimed that the African Union Constitutive Act did not allow the Union to recognise the TNC because it was considered to be an illegal force. It claimed that the government could only be removed by constitutional means. This stance was backed by the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, both of whom had been in power for 32 and 26 years 5 The two principles applicable as it relates to the Libya crisis are: Art 4m, o and p. The principles as stated in the Article are as follow: Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance; Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments. See the African Union Constitutive Act.

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respectively (Musawa, 2013). A dispute also arose between the two nations over the support for the government of Guinea-Bissau. This resulted in a diplomatic row between the two countries at the African Union summit in January 2012. The aftermath of the rivalry exhibited by the two regional hegemons manifested in the deportation of 125 Nigerians by the South African government at Oliver Thambo International Airport in March 2012 on the basis that the yellow fever vaccination cards presented to airport authorities by the Nigerians were fakes in March 2012. The Nigerian government retaliated by deporting 84 South Africans within 48 hours, forcing the South African government to show remorse for its actions (Eze, 2012). It can be observed from the foregoing that what defines Nigeria-South Africa relations is a superiority feud as exemplified in the tussle for hegemony in the continent. However, determining regional hegemon entails a comparative analysis of the two countries in relation to the quality of their foreign policies vis-a-vis regional and global governance, economy, and leadership. Comparing the efficacy of Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policies, Tetenyi noted that in terms of foreign policy, South Africa is more active than Nigeria in global and regional governance (Tetenyi, 2014). The achievement in relation to foreign policy can be located in the former’s successful agitation for a United Nations Security Council resolution and with the BRICS countries where they have been able to bring attention to challenges facing the African continent. It was also notable that with the establishment of a BRICS development bank and quasi “BRICS-IMFWorld Bank”, South Africa is seizing the opportunity of the manoeuverings of China to establish a global governance structure which has the likelihood of boosting the influence of South Africa in Africa by being able to serve as an intermediary for smaller states on the continent (Tetenyi, 2014). Given the experience that Nigeria and South Africa have accumulated within and outside the continent, the two can be said to have come of age as promoters of peace and security and with the linchpin of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). However, it is important to note that their roles in advancing peace and security on the continent have come with challenges. One major issue, especially as it relates to earlier missions in which Nigeria and South Africa played the vanguard role, was the lack of adequate consultations with neighbouring countries. In West Africa, for instance, the establishment of ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Banjul, the Gambia in August 1990 and the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia civil war (1989-1996) did not conform to the constitutional requirement of ECOWAS and was grounded more in politics than in law (Adebajo, 2002:

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64-65). Aside from this, some Francophone members of ECOWAS strongly opposed the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia under Nigeria’s leadership (Tuck, 2000: 4-5). South Africa’s mission in Lesotho in September 1998 (Operation Boleas) was also characterised by a lack of consultation and coordination with SADC under whose authority South Africa claimed to have acted. Although participation by Botswana tended to give a semblance of multilateralism to Operation Boleas, yet it did not reduce the perception that the Lesotho intervention was largely a South African show (Saunders, 2013: 154). Indeed, there is the argument that the intervention was informed first by South Africa’s interest in protecting the Katse Dam, followed by the need to restore law and constitutional order (Likoti, 2007: 253-254; Molomo, 1999: 144). That said, it is important to note that learning from earlier experiences the two nations had assiduously worked at enhancing consultation and collaboration, especially with neighbouring states in new missions within the context of ECOWAS and SADC deployments in recent times as the ECOMIG mission in the Gambia showed. There is also the challenge of poor preparation, especially as it relates to intelligence gathering, a better understanding of the dynamics of internal politics, and an appreciation of ethno-social fault-lines and the dynamics driving conflict before deployment of peacekeeping missions. Nigeria’s experiences in Liberia and South Africa’s in Lesotho especially as relates to the stiff resistance they met from factions to the conflicts demonstrated a lack of adequate/appropriate information with regards to the logic and dynamics of conflict on the ground before troop deployment (Molomo, 1999: 148; Ero, 1995). A related issue revolves around the neutrality, impartiality, and motive of Nigeria and South Africa in peacekeeping and enforcement missions, especially the earlier ones (Liberia and Sierra Leone for Nigeria and DR Congo and Lesotho for South Africa) in which their roles as a vanguard was undeniable. Of course, the challenge of proper kitting, provision of equipment, and logistic support for peace missions within ECOWAS and SADC continue to be a vexing issue. Therein arises the roles of extra-African forces, notably those of France and the United States of America, and the influence they are able to wield given their roles as financial backers and providers of logistical support. (Tuck, 2000: 9). Then there is the problem of unsavoury behaviour and misconduct of troops from both countries in mission areas. Without doubt most peacekeeping missions are beset with the vexing issue of troop misconduct. To this end, the ECOWAS mission in Liberia under Nigerian leadership was characterised by misconduct that included looting, resource plundering, rape, and other untoward sexual misconducts carried out against the local population

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(Bamidele, 2013: 120). The aphorism “Every Car or Movable Object Gone” used by Liberians to refer to West African troop’s behaviour offered a better insight into the view of the locals as it relates to ECOMOG troop behaviour (Tuck, 2000: 9). The situation is not as markedly different for South Africa’s troops in peacekeeping missions. Indeed, a series of allegations of sexual exploitation, rape, and other acts of sexual misconduct have been levelled against South African troops in mission areas (Neethling, 2011: 147). Highlighting the extent of incidences of sexual misconduct by South African troops, the United Nations commission set up to investigate incidences of sexual misconduct noted that South African peacekeepers were the worst sex offenders on UN peacekeeping missions (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 2005). The report highlighted that South African peacekeepers faced nine allegations, followed by Uruguay with eight allegations and Nigeria with seven allegations of sexual misconducts levelled against them and under investigation (News24, 2015; Strydom, 2015). These, among other issues, constitute the challenges that Nigeria and South Africa have had to contend with, as it relates to their vanguard roles in promoting peace and security in their respective sub-regions and by extension the continent. The allegations of resource plundering and sexual exploitation amongst others has tainted the image and undermined the reputation of Nigeria and South African peacekeepers within and outside the continent. The challenges identified have the potential to weaken both countries’ claims to leadership positions and hegemonic aspirations. Addressing these challenges in a holistic manner is essential for boosting their image and credibility as dependable interlocutors for the course of peace in Africa for the foreseeable future.

Conclusion Africa’s regional organisations have continued to play prominent roles in the promotion of peace, security, and development within the continent. Their role and prominence have gained increased traction since the early 1990s, especially in the context of two developments. First was the perceived loss of interest in mediating in Africa’s numerous conflicts by the United States and its allies in Western Europe (Saliu, 2016: 179). The second has to do with the new norm of burden-sharing on peace and security concerns between the United Nations and regional/sub-regional organisations. Indeed, Africa is the first region where extensive efforts have been recorded between the United Nations, regional organisation (then OAU, and currently AU), and sub-regional organisations (ECOWAS) specifically directed at enhancing the management of conflicts through numerous mechanisms of

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which the sending of observer missions, intervention forces, and peacekeeping missions are prominent (Neethling, 1999: 465-487). Africa’s regional and sub-regional organisations’ increased involvement in mediating conflicts and in peace support operations since the 1990s is illustrative of a changing political environment. It marked a policy shift away from the idea of strict non-intervention that had been a cardinal issue in inter-state relations on the continent. The precedent set by ECOWAS in Liberia had helped to develop a collective African acceptance of Africanled intervention as a response to intra-state crises. Much as sub-regional organisations, notably ECOWAS and SADC, have been prominent in the development of security architecture, the successes of their efforts were largely anchored in the vanguard roles played by regional hegemons within each organisation. To this end, one cannot discountenance the central roles that Nigeria and South Africa (after apartheid) are playing in ECOWAS and SADC efforts at crafting peace and security in West Africa and Southern Africa. It is on record that Nigeria and South Africa have been instrumental to the resolution of conflicts in Africa through their commitment in pushing through mediating processes and both have been central to the deployment of observer missions, intervention forces and peacekeeping missions within ECOWAS and SADC and through the platform of the African Union. Both nations have been instrumental to the protection of constitutional order and the advancement of democratisation processes in their sub-regions and the continent. While the rationale that informed their vanguard roles have been called into question a number of times, it remains clear that both nations’ contributions are essential to the relative successes that regional organisations (ECOWAS and SADC) have achieved as it relates to the construction of peace and stability in their respective sub-regions. As the vanguard of integration in their respective sub-regions and an important voice for Africa within and outside the continent, Nigeria and South Africa have had cause to collaborate on a number of issues as it affects the continent. While not undermining the significance of their collaborative engagements in instances where it has happened, this study has also highlighted the fact that both had engaged in competitive actions and acts as rivals. The explanation of the rivalry between the duo is best expressed within the context of power politics, aspirations for a leadership position within the continent, and about which one can better serve as a credible voice for Africa within the international system.

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CHAPTER NINE NIGERIA-SOUTH AFRICA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND INFLUENCE IN AFRICA: A VIEW FROM NIGERIA IDOWU JOHNSON, PH.D.

Abstract This chapter examines Nigeria-South Africa diplomatic relations and the struggle for power and influence. It utilises hegemonic power stability as a theoretical guide. The chapter argues that Nigeria-South Africa diplomatic relations can be understood within the context of cooperation and competition. To be sure, Nigeria’s hegemonic influence in the West Africa sub-region is well established, and South Africa’s sphere of influence in Southern Africa is unquestionable. However, the extent to which the two countries can lay claim to being regional hegemons can be questioned. The main positional dimension of this paper is that the assertion of power and influence by any single country in African affairs must be widely acceptable across the continent. Clearly, South Africa’s possession of superior soft power capabilities is evident, but this alone cannot sustain a potential hegemonic project. Nigeria’s contribution to African affairs in line with its foreign policy initiatives, international legitimacy, and the country’s global recognition in the maintenance of international peace and security are the bases for Nigeria to attain regional hegemonic status. Nigeria is the only country that has capabilities in terms of its potential to emerge not only as a powerful force in Africa, but also a significant player in global affairs. The paper concludes that for Nigeria to maintain and consolidate its regional hegemonic power and influence, it must improve on its governance capacity, domestic security, and economic development.

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Keywords: Hegemony, power, influence, Nigeria, South Africa, diplomatic relations

Introduction The ongoing debate about Nigeria and South Africa’s struggle for power and influence in Africa instigated a new approach in understanding NigeriaSouth Africa relations. Many studies have been done on the influence and power exercised by both countries within the context of regional hegemonic power (Seteolu and Okuneye, 2017; Cilliers et al., 2015; Alden and Schoeman, 2015; Ogunnubi, 2013). This study will add to the literature by analysing and assessing Nigeria and South Africa’s hegemonic influence in the continent. Assessing a country’s influence is as complex as measuring its capabilities. Indicators for a country’s influence can only be proxies, and any analysis is subject to a considerable degree of subjectivity. Two potential ways of assessing influence in the foreign policy domain in the African context may be, firstly, to look at a country’s commitment to peacekeeping missions, and secondly, its membership in the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) (Cilliers et al., 2015: 20). Within the context of diplomatic currency of power, such a country must possess military strength, resources, and a strategic position in order to enforce rule through dominance. While previous studies on Nigeria and South Africa’s jostling for regional hegemony were comparative, this study will dig deeper in trying to ascertain whether the two countries qualify to be regional hegemons; as earlier pointed out with the indicators above. To be sure, the fact of Nigeria being a hegemon in the West African sub-region is firmly established based on economic and demographic factors. There are other factors that add to the weight of Nigeria as a hegemon in the West African sub-region. Its location in the mid-Atlantic and also at the geographical heart of the continent guarding the waters of the West Atlantic and the South Atlantic adds to the country’s importance (Osuntokun, 2013). On the other hand, South Africa creates a sphere of influence in Southern Africa. It is a truism that South Africa’s power and influence have grown tremendously since the end of the apartheid regime in 1994. But the question is: Can South Africa maintain regional hegemony given the fact that Nigeria’s leadership role in continental affairs cannot be underestimated? The main objective of this paper is to examine the potentials of Nigeria and South Africa to be hegemonic powers in Africa with global significance. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it examines hegemonic power stability as a theoretical

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underpinning of the paper. The second section presents the basic facts about Nigeria and South Africa. The third section explores the historical overview of Nigeria and South Africa relations. The fourth section analyses the power capabilities of both Nigeria and South Africa as a regional hegemon. The fifth section provides an insight into the battle for supremacy between Nigeria and South Africa at a regional level. The concluding section critically examines the potentials of Nigeria and South Africa to be hegemonic powers and assert influence at a regional level.

Theoretical Discourse Hegemony, as a concept, suggests a system of power-play where the state that wields the most power dictates the affairs of international politics. Hegemony traditionally connotes the dominant state that has the capacity to wield unchallenged influence and power on other states within the system of states. For Mansfield (1992), hegemony is the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system or a regional sub-system to the extent it single-handedly dominates the rules and arrangements through which international and regional political systems are organised. There are variations in the interpretation and application of the theory by scholars of international relations. Scholars like Robert Gilpin, Robert Baldwin, Bruno Frey, and Robert Mundell have pointed at the importance of hegemony theory for a progressive order in the international system (Seteolu and Okuneye, 2017). Further, Landsberg (2007) has argued about hegemony in a regional context and upheld the domineering tendencies of a hegemon as major characteristics. According to Landsberg, the regional hegemon is the “pivotal state”, or the “middle power state” in the hierarchy of global power. Landsberg (2007: 4) further argued that while a regional hegemon is a powerful state that enforces rules through dominance, the pivotal state is one that acts in the regional interest in collaboration with others. Irrespective of what formed the central arguments of these scholars, the hegemonic stability theory might not have gained prominence without the scholarly works of Kindleberger (1973), who postulated it on the grounds that a stabilised state is essential for the stabilisation of the world economy. The theory was founded on six major foundation pillars: i. The state is seen as a rational and selfish actor in search of the greatest achievement of national interest. The quest by the state to realise its national interest obviously shapes its policy choices and decisions (i.e. the decision to recognise a state with requisite means as a hegemon in a given system).

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ii. In an anarchic system where states are assumed to pursue selfinterest, the situation may give rise to bandwagoning. It implies that the weak states will readily submit to a regime of a single dominating state, otherwise referred to as a hegemon, in order to realise its national interest. iii. The dominating state must provide public goods (economic, military, and political) in order to maintain stability in the international system and guarantee a sustained regime for the weak states, which depend on the leadership that the hegemon will provide to realise their defined national interests. iv. The hegemonic structures of power are more conducive to the development of strong international regimes, whose rules are relatively precise and largely obeyed. Such hegemonic structures of power are dominated by a single country often referred to as a hegemonic (dominating) power. v. The hegemonic power must be able and willing to maintain a stable political economy. It implies that liberal economic hegemony promotes peace. Apparently, dominance by one country (hegemonic power) is needed to ensure the smooth functioning of international regimes. vi. The existence of a liberal economic state in a hegemonic position is a necessary condition for the continued development of international market economies. The consolidation, maintenance, and successful functioning of liberal international economies require political leadership. A comprehensive list of Kindleberger’s assumptions of hegemonic stability theory is necessary in order to objectively analyse the potentials and possibilities of Nigeria and South Africa attaining the status of regional hegemons. Applying this theory for regional hegemon, Ogunnubi and Uzodike (2015) argued that operating within a regional hegemonic system, a regional hegemonic power is considered a powerful actor that wields a superior level of influence within the delimited region in which it belongs. Thus, Nigeria and South Africa are locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power and influence at the regional level. This study adopts Landsberg’s (2007) concept of hegemony within the context of power capability to influence other states, events, and regions. The pertinent question to ask at this juncture is to what extent can both countries be regarded as a regional hegemon? The analysis in this chapter will provide an insight on who among Nigeria and South Africa can claim the status of Africa’s hegemon.

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Basic Facts about Nigeria and South Africa Nigeria and South Africa are the two countries in Africa that are struggling for power and influence to shape regional politics. Both countries face their own set of unique challenges. It is very necessary to provide some features of these two countries in order to ascertain their claim and struggle for regional hegemony.

Nigeria Located in the Gulf of Guinea on the west coast of Africa, Nigeria covers an area of 923,768 square kilometres, making her the tenth largest country in Africa in terms of landmass. With an estimated population of about 170 million, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and is one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse societies in the world. Nigeria has over 230 ethnic groups and approximately 400 languages (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). Although Nigeria attained independence in 1960, her economic, political, social, and educational institutions and activities were already strongly tied to similar institutions and activities in Britain, the U.S.A., and other developed nations of the Western world. With an estimated Gross Domestic Product of $413.4 billion, Nigeria is one of the four largest economies in Africa and, by far, the continent’s largest market (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012: 389). According to Cilliers et al. (2015), in terms of economic potential, no African country can compete with Nigeria. This is because Nigeria’s GDP is forecast to grow from slightly over $525 billion in 2014 to slightly over $4.2 trillion by 2040. The economic potential of Nigeria is driven by petroleum, to the extent that Nigeria is Africa’s largest producer of petroleum. The country is also blessed with a wide variety of mineral resources, including coal, natural gas, tin, iron ore, lead, zinc, columbite, uranium, gold, phosphate, limestone, and marble. However, Nigeria’s economy is highly dependent on the oil and gas industry, which is based principally in the Niger Delta. The oil industry is today the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy, accounting for some 80 percent of government revenue, 40 percent contribution to GDP and 4 percent of employment (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012: 390). Nigeria, a power potential on the continent, faces different challenges. Politics in Nigeria is particularly complex and violent, with many ethnic, religious, and social fault lines across society. Despite her abundant human

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and natural resource endowments, the Nigerian economy is characterised by weak institutions, decaying infrastructure, a weak manufacturing base, and very poor electricity generation. Other challenges include internal security problems, high levels of corruption, wasteful government spending, and low rates of ICT penetration that is critical to harnessing the latest technologies for productivity enhancements (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). But the most challenging problem the country now faces is the terrorism of religious fundamentalism in certain parts of Northern Nigeria.

South Africa South Africa is located at the southern tip of the African continent. South Africa covers an area of 1,219,090 kilometres, making it the sixth largest country in Africa in terms of landmass. South Africa is ethnically diverse. Approximately 79.5 percent of the South African population is of black African ancestry, divided among a variety of ethnic groups speaking different Bantu languages, nine of which have official status (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). The country was, for many years, under colonial rule and apartheid powers, until the country held its first non-racial democratic election in 1994. With an estimated 52 million people, South Africa is one of Africa’s wealthiest economies. In the same vein, the country produces more gold, diamond, and chromate than any other country in the world. Also, prior to the end of apartheid, South Africa was the only African country with nuclear warheads (Mazrui, 2006). The South African economy, which is highly diversified and technologically advanced, has its foundation in an industrialised infrastructure. This undoubtedly elevated South Africa as the most industrialised country in the continent. In addition, South Africa is the only African country that is a member of the G20 and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa grouping) and the only African country to be one of the EU’s ten global strategic partners (Cilliers et al., 2015). Like any other developing democracy, South Africa is facing some challenges, ranging from poverty, unemployment, and inequitable distribution of wealth and income to unequal access to basic services and economic opportunities as well as a high rate of crime. More importantly, it is imperative to examine the power capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa. According to Ogunnubi and Isike (2016), both Nigeria and South Africa can be said to be aspiring to regional hegemonic roles on the strength of their comparative material capabilities as well as robust foreign policy postures towards Africa, which are largely perceived

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to be representing the continental interests. The indices to measure their power capabilities include: Population The size of a country’s population can be a positive factor for its leadership posture at the regional level. Population constitutes an important indicator of a country’s power potential and thus influences its foreign policy. With an estimated population of 183.1 million people (Cilliers et al., 2015: 15), Nigeria remains a country with the largest concentration of black people in the world. South Africa, on the other hand, has approximately 52 million people. Economy In comparative terms, Nigeria and South Africa remain Africa’s regional economic powerhouses. To be sure, South Africa is an emerging market with an abundant supply of natural resources and well-developed financial, legal, communications, and energy and transport sectors. Thus, South Africa has been able to mobilise its economic capability as a soft power resource for attraction and influence. However, Nigeria is regarded as having the largest economy in Africa, representing over 1.5 percent of the global economy; it has been predicted that Nigeria’s economy will represent nearly 3 percent of the global economy by 2040 (Cilliers et al., 2015: 14). Technology Technology is a central component of the projection of power for any state in the international system. When general economic production is compared with per capita production, South Africa stands out as a large, highly technical country compared with Nigeria (Cilliers et al., 2015). South Africa’s strong techno-industrial base has been attributed to the apartheid era, when several American, British, and Israeli companies invested in South Africa under the free economic zone agreement. This allowed South Africa to firm up its technological base, which has sustained its industrial and economic growth even in the post-apartheid era (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). Nigeria, on the other hand, possesses a low technological base and generally underdeveloped and decaying infrastructure.

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Military Spending and Contribution to International Peace and Security The size and quality of a country’s military force is a traditional indicator for measuring national power. Nigeria’s absolute military expenditures have increased modestly in recent years, whereas South Africa’s have remained relatively flat. In 2014 Nigeria’s military budget increased substantially with an additional $1 billion allocated to the military in response to the growing threat of Boko Haram (Cilliers et al., 2015). South Africa is not facing any threat to peace, and this is reflected by the dramatic decline in defence expenditure since 1994. At the sub-regional level, Nigeria possesses an overwhelming military strength. Her sizeable and relatively well-equipped armed forces are capable of defending the country against any likely external threat and of projecting power in the region (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). Nigeria’s role as an important member of the United Nations is epitomised by its large contribution to peacekeeping operations globally. It is these facts that have sometimes made Nigeria and others suggest the pre-eminent black African country, Nigeria, should have a permanent seat in a reformed and representative United Nations Security Council (Osuntokun, 2013). While South Africa is not perceived to be a global military power in Africa, it has major international commitments to Africa in the form of peace support operations, most notably in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and has also recently begun military operations to support Mozambique in fighting piracy off its coast (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012).

Historical Exploration of Nigeria and South Africa Relations Nigerian and South African historical ties date back to 1960, immediately after Nigeria gained formal independence from the British colonial government. Immediately after independence, Nigeria made it clear that it was not going to accept anything short of the total liberation of all countries in Africa from all forms of foreign domination and racial discrimination. However, the first opportunity for Nigeria to implement her foreign policy on anti-colonialism was provided by the Sharpeville massacre of 21 March 1960. During the incident, the white South African police attacked South African blacks protesting against racial discrimination and domination. This incident, which led to the death of 72 blacks, with many more wounded, marked the beginning of Nigeria’s diplomatic confrontations with South Africa (Agbu, 2010; Ebegbulem, 2013). The then Prime Minister, Sir

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Tafawa Balewa, condemned the killings, and the Nigerian government intervened through the ban on the importation of South African goods into the country. Nigeria became a leading voice on sanctions on South Africa in the international community. The expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961, the expulsion of the South African Dutch Reform Church from Nigeria, and the cancellation of contracts awarded to South African companies demonstrated how deeply the Nigerian government despised the inhuman apartheid regime (Agbu et al., 2013: 1). However, successive governments in Nigeria condemned apartheid and saw it as a crime against humanity. Speaking at the OAU extraordinary summit in January 1975 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, former Head of State General Murtala Muhammed declared: First, we call attention to the diabolical role of apartheid. The main elements of that criminal doctrine are too well known to this Assembly to necessitate any detailed analysis. Suffice it to say that the whole rationale behind this doctrine, which the United Nations had aptly condemned as a crime against humanity, is the perpetual subjugation of the African in order to create a paradise on earth for the white. When I contemplate on the evils of apartheid, my heart bleeds and I am sure the heart of every true blooded African bleeds (Garba, 1987: 102).

It is evident that Nigeria is more committed to African affairs within the context of her foreign policy objective, as witnessed between 1976 and 1979. The Nigerian state exploited sports to achieve the political aim of bringing apartheid to an end. Nigeria mobilised 26 African countries to boycott the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada. The boycott was occasioned by the participation of South Africa and the reluctance of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to impose an embargo on New Zealand for its sports links to the apartheid enclave. The military administration of Olusegun Obasanjo further radicalised the anti-apartheid struggle when British Petroleum (BP) and Barclays Bank were nationalised for Britain’s support of the apartheid regime in South Africa (Ochanja, Esebonu, and Ayabam, 2013: 78). In addition, foreign contractors who were known to have links with South Africa were barred from taking part in any tenders of any kind, either for sale, auction, or purchase of goods or for any transactions of construction work in Nigeria. Meanwhile, Nigeria took measures to identify Nigerian-based companies maintaining links with South Africa for necessary action (Garba, 1987). The Babangida regime (1985-1993) maintained the momentum started by its predecessors. In 1986, the government donated 10 million Naira in aid

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to the Frontline States and the Liberation Movements (The Guardian, 18 June 1986). Thus, Nigeria’s consistent opposition to apartheid in South Africa was clearly demonstrated going by Nigeria’s record at the United Nations on this issue. Nigeria, no doubt, accelerated the pace of South Africa’s transition to democracy. The transformation of South Africa from apartheid rule to plural democracy is an event that had profound significance not only for Africa but also for the world in general. Although Nigeria betrayed its anti-apartheid posture when it invited the then President of South Africa, Frederick De Klerk, to Nigeria in 1992, it nonetheless sustained financial and moral support of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC); and called for unity of the revolutionary parties (Seteolu and Okuneye, 2017). The rehabilitation of South Africa and the lifting of economic and other sanctions released a new vibrancy into the country’s relationship with Nigeria. South Africa became ideally placed, under an astute leadership of President Nelson Mandela, to realise its immense potentials, and along with Nigeria, play a leadership role in Africa. However, the optimism expressed by the Nigerian leadership that Nigeria and South Africa would become role models to other African countries in the art of inter-state cooperation in the aftermath of apartheid could not be realised. It was clear that South Africa would not reciprocate the enormous sacrifices that Nigeria made in support of the struggle against apartheid. The inimical relationship between Nigeria and South Africa is a product of South Africa’s reaction to political developments in Nigeria. South Africa had challenged Nigeria’s resistance to liberal political reform, in the form of transition towards plural democracy. The period between 1994 and 1998 of the Mandela Presidency could be described as one of hostility towards Nigeria. The annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election by the military regime of President Babangida seemed to harden South Africa against Nigeria. Also, when the regime of General Sani Abacha hanged Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his fellow Ogoni activists on the eve of the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting in New Zealand in 1995, not only did South Africa vote to expel Nigeria from the Commonwealth, President Mandela threatened to impose sanctions on her (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). This led General Abacha to withdraw Nigeria’s Super Eagles from the African Cup of Nations held in South Africa. Nonetheless, the frosty relationship between the two countries was amended by the military regime of Abdusallam Abubakar whose reconciliatory trip to South Africa marked the beginning of a relatively new relationship between the two countries. Thus, the political death of apartheid in South

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Africa and authoritarian military rule in Nigeria, as well as the successful transition into, and gradual consolidation of, democracy in both countries created the fertile and enabling environment for a new mutually rewarding phase of bilateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa, beginning from 1999 (Akindele, 2007: 343). With the emergence of President Obasanjo as the leader of Nigeria in 1999, the two countries began to redefine their bilateral and multilateral relationships. The period since 1999 has ushered in an era of strategic bilateral dealings that heralded the formation of the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission, inaugurated in October 1999. Indeed, the period between 2000 and 2005 witnessed a more focused and active articulation of a strategic partnership between Nigeria and South Africa due largely to the perceived challenges of Africa in a globalising world. The Obasanjo and Mbeki administrations opted for economic diplomacy and African renaissance, respectively, to mediate development concerns in their countries. These leaders sought to place Africa as an indispensable actor in global development by bridging the gap between the developed and underdeveloped countries in Africa. Nigeria and South Africa advocated for debt cancelation and the transfer of technology from the developed economies to Africa (Seteolu and Okuneye, 2017: 63). Furthermore, Nigeria and South Africa facilitated the diplomatic process of transforming the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 1999. It is arguable that “the formation of the AU and its adopted programme, the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), may have been more difficult, if not impossible, without the purposive involvement of Abuja and Pretoria” (Akindele, 2007: 319). The creation of NEPAD was predicated on the belief by South African and Nigerian leaders that the regional document would reposition Africa on the path of long-term development and reduce her marginalisation in international economic relations. Beyond bilateral political engagements, Nigeria and South Africa cooperated in bilateral economic relations. South African corporations and firms have now become big players in the Nigerian economy, visible in the different sectors like construction, telecommunication, banking, tourism and leisure, retail, media, and entertainment. The South African firms operating in Nigeria include the Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN), Shoprite, Stanbic Bank, and Digital Satellite Television (DSTV). Similarly, the Dangote Group of Companies, with headquarters in Nigeria, has an investment portfolio of nearly $400 million in cement production in South Africa; Nigeria’s Oando Oil Company is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Seteolu and Okuneye, 2017: 62).

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Nigeria and South Africa’s Struggle for Power and Influence at the Regional Level By virtue of their hegemonic powers in their respective sub-regions, Nigeria and South Africa have been struggling for power and influence in regional affairs. What appears as a diplomatic rivalry between Nigeria and South Africa has become visible, since the end of Obasanjo-Mbeki eras as presidents of both countries, respectively. As opposed to the collaborative engagement in attending to African issues under the Obasanjo-Mbeki era, the trend in Nigeria-South African engagements at a continental level has become more pronounced in the different approaches adopted by former President Jonathan of Nigeria and President Zuma’s administration of South Africa to addressing African affairs. This became manifest during the Côte d’Ivoire crises (2002-2011), the Libyan crisis of 2011, and the election of the African Union Chairperson in 2012 (Agbu et al., 2013). Both countries disagreed based on disparate approaches to tackling the post-election conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire in late 2010. Nigeria adopted a belligerent posture towards Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to concede defeat after losing the country’s election. In fact, the African Union suspended Côte d’Ivoire from its fold until Alassane Quattara, who was internationally acclaimed as the winner of the election, was sworn in as President. Nigeria and Burkina Faso supported AU’s action on Côte d’Ivoire, while Angola and South Africa advocated for a peaceful resolution of the dispute through recounting. South Africa provocatively sent a warship to the Gulf of Guinea in Nigeria’s traditional domain and stronghold, where Nigeria is the hegemonic power (Sampkens, 2011; Musawa, 2013). Nigeria saw this action by South Africa as a show of power in her sphere of influence and a challenge to Nigeria (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). Similarly, Nigeria and South Africa displayed their power and influence during the Libyan crisis. During the Libyan crisis in 2011, South Africa under President Zuma appeared at the forefront of the African Union effort to find an African solution to the crisis. Since Egypt and Algeria were also engulfed in the Arab Spring (but at a different tempo), only Nigeria and South Africa appeared to be spared the political tensions, and were therefore expected to give some direction to the African Union and her members. The African Union excluded Nigeria from the ad hoc committee on Libya which comprised of the following Heads of States: President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, Amadou Toure of Mali, Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo, Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania, and Chairperson of African Union Commission, Jean Ping (Agbu et al., 2013: 9). Nigeria had backed

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the Transitional National Council (TNC) rebel-controlled Libya, based on the African Union’s Constitutive Principle listed in Section 14 of the Constitutive Act. The Act cannot be implemented in isolation from other principles like democracy, good governance, respect for human rights, and social justice, among others. South Africa condemned Nigeria’s recognition of the TNC. Despite South Africa’s protest, Nigeria’s position on the TNC prevailed and eventually became the official response of the African Union (Agbu et al., 2013). Evidence of struggling for power and influence between Nigeria and South Africa at the regional level was also displayed in 2012. In that year, there was a salient diplomatic clash between both countries at the AU summit in January, over the recognition of the government in Guinea-Bissau, which Nigeria was supporting and South Africa opposing. Again, the contest for the AU chair position in 2012 also led to rivalry when the Nigerian government opposed the nomination of the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and supported the incumbent chairperson, Jean Ping. Some analysts perceive Dlamini-Zuma’s victory over Jean Ping as a demonstration of South Africa’s growing posture in African affairs under the Jacob Zuma presidency (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2016; Agbu et al., 2013). Thus, the emergence of Dlamini-Zuma created the perception that South Africa’s movement to a regional hegemon had been established, and Nigeria’s leadership role in Africa declined. Finally, the battle for regional hegemonic power between the two countries is evident in the jostle for a permanent seat in the United Nation’s Security Council. The planned permanent seat allotted to Africa in the UNSC unites Nigeria and South Africa as it also divides them. While both are staunchly united on the importance of Africa having a permanent seat in the proposed UNSC reforms, they are sharply divided over who will sit on the single African seat if eventually approved. Nigeria claimed it was qualified for the seat in the light of its historical role in maintaining international peace and security amid its status as the most populous black nation in Africa. South Africa equally claims it is qualified for the seat, citing its economic strength. However, securing the African slot in the proposed reformed UNSC has led to unhealthy competition between Nigeria and South Africa, and every strategic international forum is being used by either or both of them to take actions and positions that would leverage their prospects of clinching the one slot for Africa. While Nigeria was usually invited to the G8, South Africa commenced a subtle move to gain more international goodwill by exploiting all international fora within its reach. Now, South Africa is not

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only being invited to the G8, she has also become a member of the G20 and the BRICS (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012: 403). In this regard, South Africa is using this platform to lay claim to being the giant of Africa and a leading voice in regional affairs. This unhealthy competition between the two countries affects their bilateral relations and is not good for the development of the continent.

Concluding Remarks From the above analysis, it is very clear that Nigeria and South Africa are struggling for power and influence in Africa. However, to what extent can the two countries lay claim to being regional hegemons? Without doubt, the two countries assert their power and influence in their domain. That is, Nigeria is a hegemon in West Africa, while South Africa’s hegemonic influence is exercised at the Southern Africa sub-regional level. However, a clearer definition of regional hegemonic status, according to Ogunnubi and Isike (2016: 171), must be understood by the following prerequisites: “the willingness of a regional power to play a hegemonic role within the region it belongs to; ability to wield sufficient levels of material capabilities on other regional actors; and more importantly the possession of superior soft power capabilities to attract international acceptance as well as regional legitimacy as credible regional leader”. Undoubtedly, South Africa has helped to advance its hegemonic aspiration on the continent within the context of soft power attributes. However, South African hegemony is neither complete in its material form, nor has it demonstrated consistent ability to exercise leadership even where it has the means available (Alden and Schoeman, 2015). In the same vein, as far as the material basis for its hegemonic position on the continent is concerned, South Africa’s economic position vis-à-vis the rest of the continent is also weakening. For instance, Nigeria’s GDP has been projected to grow from slightly over $525 billion in 2014 to slightly over $4.2 trillion by 2040. By 2040, it has been projected that Nigeria will constitute slightly less than 2 percent of the global economy, up from 0.7 percent in 2014. (Cilliers et al., 2015: 7). To a large extent, the increase in Africa’s role globally will, therefore, be driven by the future weight of Nigeria, a country that by 2040 will have the fourth largest population in the world after India, China, and the US (Cilliers et al., 2015). Moreover, South African expansion into Africa is not necessarily a meaningful expression of hegemony, even if it is a component of it. As

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African economies began to experience accelerating growth from 2002 onwards, South Africa’s outward expansion was complemented by a steady movement of African firms into the South African economy. Ghana’s international agriculture firm purchased land in Mpumalanga province and marketed its products in South Africa, while Nigerian banks EcoBank and Guaranty Trust Bank opened up branches across South Africa (Alden and Schoeman, 2015: 250). Similarly, Nigeria is often accused of being unable to project power because of a profound domestic governance deficit. Amuwo (2014) observed that Nigeria has effectively lost its pre-eminence in Africa and, more specifically, ECOWAS and that the country does not have a coherent foreign policy. On the other hand, if we examine South Africa’s decreasing capabilities, its inconsistencies about its foreign policy as well as the legitimacy problems it faces on the continent, it is very clear that South Africa cannot lay claim to being the African hegemon. Although South Africa has done better as a regional hegemonic power in Africa compared to Nigeria, this is premised on the substance of the country’s soft power attributes (Ogunnubi, 2013). In the same vein, soft power alone cannot sustain a would-be hegemonic project. Consequently, Nigeria would be a great power on the continent by asserting more influence than South Africa. Nigeria’s dominance in continental institutions is accepted with equanimity by other African states. This primacy or dominance in continental matters is also recognised by non-African powers who consider Nigeria as the voice of Africa without whose consent solutions are sometimes not possible for the myriad problems the continent faces (Ogunsanwo, 2015). In conclusion, South Africa’s possession of superior soft power capabilities is evident and feasible, but Nigeria has the potential to be a hegemonic leader in Africa with global significance. However, for Nigeria to remain and consolidate its regional hegemonic power and influence, it must improve on its governance capacity, domestic security, and economic development. Nonetheless, rather than struggling for regional power and influence, the two countries should cooperate at all levels for the progress and development of Africa.

References Agbu, O. 2013. Nigeria and South Africa. The Future of a Strategic Partnership. In: Eze. O. ed. Beyond, 50 Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and Prospects. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

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Agbu, O. et al. 2013. The Foreign Policy Environment in Nigeria and Implications for Nigeria-South Africa Relations: Baseline Study. Cape Town, South Africa: South African Foreign Policy Initiative. Akindele, R.A. 2007. Nigeria’s national Interests and her Diplomatic Relations with South Africa. In: Akinyemi, B. ed. Nigeria’s National Interests in a Globalising World: Further Reflections on Constructive and Beneficial Concetricism. Vol. 3. Ibadan: Bolytag International Publishers. Alden, C. and Schoeman, M. 2015. South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony in Africa. International Politics, 52(2), 239-254. Amuwo, K. 2014. Nigeria’s Continental Diplomatic Thrusts: The Limit of Africa’s Nominally Biggest Economy. Policy Briefing No. 111. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. Cilliers, J. et al. 2015. Power and Influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute of Security Studies. Ebegbulen, J.C. 2013. An Evaluation of Nigeria-South Africa Relations. Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, 1(1), 32-40. Garba, J. 1987. Diplomatic Soldiering. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. Kindleberger, C. 1973. The World in Depression 1929-1939. Berkeley: University of California Press. Landsberg, 2007. South Africa, the Pivotal State, In: Habib, A. and Landsberg, C. eds. Hegemon or Pivotal? Debating South Africa’s Role in Africa. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies. Mansfield, E. 1992. The Concentration of Capabilities and the Onset of War. Conflict Resolution, 36(1), 3-24. Mazrui, A. 2006. A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and Africa as Contrasting Vision. London: Adonis and Abbey Publishers. Musawa, H. 2013. The Battle for Supremacy Between Nigeria and South Africa. Available at: www.hannatumusawa.com. Ochanja, N. et al. 2013. Personality and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: A Comparative Analysis of Obasanjo’s Foreign Policy as Military Head of State and Civilian President. Int. J. Hum. Soc. Sci., 3(78), 74-83. Ogunnubi, O. 2013. Hegemonic Order and Regional Stability in SubSaharan Africa: A Comparative Study of Nigeria and South Africa. Doctoral Thesis, University of Kwa Zulu-Natal, South Africa. Ogunnubi, O. and Isike, C. 2016. Regional Hegemonic Contention and the Asymmetry of Soft Power: A Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Nigeria. Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 37(1), 152-177.

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Ogunnubi, O. and Uzodike, 2015. South Africa’s Foreign Policy and the Strategy of Soft Power. South African Journal of International Affairs, 22(1), 23-24. Ogunsanwo, A. 2015. Selected Essays on Politics and International Relations. Lagos: Concept Publications Limited. Osuntokun, J. 2013. A Hegemon in a Peripheral Region: The Future of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy. The Nation, 11 April 2013. Seteolu, B. and Okuneye, J. 2017. The Struggle for Hegemony in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa Relations in Perspectives, 1999-2014. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 11(3), 57-67. Simpkins, G. 2011. Côte d’Ivoire Impasse Threatens African Unity. Africarising 2012. Available at: http://africarising2010.blogspot.com. The Guardian, 18 June 1986. Zabadi, I.S. and Onuoha, F.C. 2012. Nigeria and South Africa: Competition or Cooperation. In: Imobighe, T.A. and Alli, W.O. eds. Perspectives on Nigeria’s National and External Relations: Essays in Honour of Professor Bolaji Akinyemi. Ibadan: University Press.

CHAPTER TEN SOFT POWER: NIGERIA’S EMERGING STRATEGY IN AFRICA’S GEOPOLITICS OLUSOLA OGUNNUBI

Abstract After it returned to constitutional democracy in 1999, Nigeria made significant efforts to (re)build its international reputation following decades of military rule. Labelled in many circles as a failed state at the start of the twenty-first century, the Nigerian state, conceivably, has undergone a remarkable transformation in terms of repositioning itself as a legitimate global player. Although much of its regional power identity straddles mainly from its structural power and material capacity, an important aspect of Nigeria’s power profile, which receives almost no attention in the literature, stems from ideational aspects of its reputation, prestige, attraction, and moral authority – soft power. Nye’s soft power thesis posits that a significant component of a state’s national power is derived from its attractive instruments of culture, political values, and foreign policy. This chapter contributes to the incipient scholarship on Nigeria’s soft power capacity with a nuanced and critical assessment of three main soft power sources: Nollywood, international mega-churches, and contribution to (African) literature. The analysis probes the extent to which Nigeria has developed these three “soft powered” sources successfully and as a geopolitical strategy within Africa. The author affirms that, notwithstanding debilitating domestic constraints, Nigeria has the potential (if not capacity) to punch above its weight through a carefully articulated soft power diplomacy, and by playing an increasing regional role, which is more than its traditional state capacity allows.

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Keywords: International Mega-churches; Pastorpreneurs; Nigeria; Nollywood; Regional Power; Soft Power

Introduction After its return to majoritarian electoral democracy in 1999, Nigeria has made some efforts to transform its international image, following decades of loathsome military rule. Labelled a failing state at the start of the twentyfirst century (Kinnan et al., 2011)1, the Republic has transformed remarkably with significant progress in terms of repositioning itself as a legitimate global player. As a result, in the past couple of years, Nigeria has witnessed unprecedented global attention which has led to improved politicaleconomic status for the country in terms of capital inflows of foreign direct investments, consecutive representation of a non-permanent seat for Africa at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), proposed membership of the MINT group (including Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Thailand), high profile international political appointments in the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These have cemented its status as Africa’s biggest economy and 39th in the world (Adibe, 2017). Despite inherent debilitating weaknesses resulting in poor socio-development indices in some cases, the changing global perception of Nigeria ostensibly accounts for the country’s position of 57th in the Best Countries Ranking 2015. As Smith and Westhuizen (2015: 18) affirm, “Traditionally, international relations and foreign policy have been framed in terms of a realist discourse, with a focus on states and hard (economic and military) power.” In the same vein, the literature on Nigerian foreign policy is replete with studies on its material capacity (Eze, 2010; Adebajo and Mustapha, 2008; Oyewole, 2017). Although much of its national identity as a regional power originates mainly from its structural power and material capacity, an essential aspect of Nigeria’s power profile, which remains largely under-examined, hinges on its reputation, prestige, attraction, and moral authority – “soft power”. In his soft power thesis, renowned American political scientist Joseph Nye submits that a major component of a state’s national power is in its soft power instruments of culture, political values, and foreign policy (Nye 1990). Therefore, the sum of a state’s power includes its soft power capabilities. According to Nye (2008), soft power is the “ability to get what 1

The infamous US think tank the National Intelligence Council predicted that by 2015 the Nigerian state would cease to be a single nation.

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you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment” as well as the “ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment”. He contends that states deploy soft power in three dimensions: culture, political values, and foreign policy principles. Nye (2004; 2008) and other scholars such as Gill and Huang (2006), Meng (2007), and Chiroro (2012) identify common denominators in their conceptualisation of soft power components which include culture, political values (ideas, civilisations), and foreign policy principles, actions, and institutions. While scholarship on soft power is still very much missing in current foreign policy studies on Nigeria, Nye’s dimensions of soft power present a useful analytical framework to explain Nigeria’s soft power potential in realising its leadership aspirations in Africa. This chapter aims to contribute to the inchoate conversations on Nigeria’s soft power by offering a nuanced and critical assessment of three primary soft power sources: Nollywood, international mega-churches, and the contribution to African scholarship (literature). Nollywood – Nigeria’s film industry – arguably provides the richest tapestry of Abuja’s soft power potential and can serve as a major instrument for cultural and public diplomacy (Kanayo, 2014).2 Regrettably, little analysis is available on the potential and impact of soft power diplomacy for (re)positioning Nigeria’s interests globally and building a positive image for the state. Also, in recent years, the global proliferation of Nigerian churches and the “informal diplomatic” influence of its pastorpreneurs makes for a critical assessment of the possibilities and opportunities, especially in terms of its effect on Nigeria and Nigerians on the international stage. Similarly, scholarly contributions particularly towards decolonising knowledge emanating from Nigerians (at home and in the diaspora) across the world can be perceived to have some implication for the country’s global reputation in ways which remain under-assessed. In Bazzicalupo’s (2014) assertion, “Only by considering power in its complexity, rationality, and productivity, we will be able to grasp the meaning of ongoing political transformations.” The major focus of this paper is, therefore, to assess the extent to which Nigeria has developed these three sources of potential soft power successfully. Although there is some evidence of Nigeria’s soft power potential and perhaps capability (Ogunnubi, 2013), there is little scholarly engagement that interrogates 2

Some scholars have, however, argued that Nigeria’s Afrocentric foreign policy posture has waned significantly, especially in the past decade or so (Amuwo, 2014).

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these selected contexts within the realm of soft power. The analysis presented in this study hopes to improve our understanding of the dynamics and complexity of not only Nigeria’s soft power profile but also the regional context of soft power. The study builds on Hagher’s (2015) premise that “Nigeria has all it takes to lead the world by asserting her soft power capability, which is enormous and available to be strategically deployed for maximum effect.” Delimiting Nigeria’s soft power to include its music, movies, fashion, comedy, culture, art, visual art, cuisine, urban slang, and sports, Obi Asika, CEO of Storm 360, shared similar views which suggest that despite minimal government support, “Nigerian Soft Power is running Africa and will invade the world” (Arinze, 2013). According to him, this is visible through its entertainment products such as Basketmouth, Iyanya, Wizkid, Davido, Flavor, Jewel by Lisa, and Deola Sagoe, who continue to ply their trade across the world. Inferably, it is on this basis that Prentice (2014) claims that Nigeria has the most considerable soft power resources of any African country. Pointedly, an evidence-based assessment of Nigeria’s soft power enables foreign policy scholars, practitioners, and students to carefully consider the extent to which the Nigerian state can use these soft power templates to shape its international diplomacy while at the same time pursuing its national priorities. Similarly, this analysis is also useful to unpacking the dimensions of soft power application not only from an African context but also within the perspective of an African regional power: What are the primary sources of Nigeria’s soft power? To what extent has Nigeria successfully developed its soft power resources? How does the accurate estimation of Nigeria’s soft power profile assist in the understanding of regional power dynamics in Africa? In what ways does Nigeria offer alternative perspectives on soft power? For this study, the qualitative approach is adopted, with the author relying mainly on the theoretical prescription on soft power developed by Joseph Nye. The study utilises mostly secondary data supplemented with primary data from key in-depth interviews (KIIs). The interviews were conducted using purposive sampling with a carefully selected group of stakeholders directly related to the thematic issues of the research. The motivation for this cross-section of interviewees was driven by the fact that the complexity and dimension of soft power are situated within both traditional institutional frameworks as well as non-institutional platforms. Data gathered is thematically analysed through the lens of Nye’s framework of soft power and from the three contexts of soft power on which this study focuses.

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The chapter begins with a conceptual overview of Nye’s soft power argument foregrounded within similar scholarly positions on the theme. In the second section, a contextual survey of a related scholarship on Nigeria’s soft power is considered with the aim of demonstrating the paucity of this strand of literature and thereby providing a nuanced justification for the study. The third part examines critically three selected soft power themes (sources) and interrogates the extent to which Nigeria has successfully deployed these subtle platforms to leverage its foreign policy. The final section concludes with the perspectives that Nigeria’s variety of soft power offers for the estimation of regional hegemony in Africa.

Understanding the “Soft” Side of Power Soft power “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” (Nye, 2008: 95) and invariably involves getting others to willingly choose your preference through co-option rather than coercion. In Nye’s (2008) proposition, it is “the ability to entice and attract” others without having to deploy hard power threats because “if I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do” (Nye, 2002: 549). Soft power, therefore, requires being able to determine and shape the agenda and preferences of others with the ultimate objective of making them see the value of cooperation rather than confrontation, thus reducing the necessity for and cost of mobilising hard power. According to Nye, states mobilise this non-physical, abstract, subjective, and often subtle attribute of power in three dimensions, which include culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye, 2004: 11). A more recent conceptualisation of soft power by Nye (2011: 20-21) regards the notion of soft power as “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes”. Essentially, although Nye’s understanding of soft power has been modified from one definition to the other, his central argument remains premised on a state’s ability to shape the preferences of other actors armed by the attractiveness of its ideas. Moreover, this fundamentally implies getting others to willingly choose your preference through co-option rather than coercion (Nye, 1990). These sources of soft power represent the social accomplishments, values, and standards of a people as they “symbolize a greater society built on personal freedom” (Hackbarth, 2009). On the other hand, political values

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are values and ideals such as respect for fundamental human rights, freedom of the press, and popular participation in government. These values have the capacity to inspire confidence and build attraction from others (Nye, 2008). Thirdly, well-designed foreign policies are also an important aspect of a country’s soft power as they are able to use their foreign policy to set international moral standards for all to emulate. Table 1 articulates a number of these soft power currencies in the abovementioned three dimensions. Table 1: Soft Power Currencies Attractive Culture

Political Values (ideology)

Foreign Policies (diplomacy)

Popular culture in the form of literature, art, music, entertainment, education, tourism and hospitality, media, indigenous products, etc.; hosting of mediaattracting events; global sports competitions.

Liberal democratic ideals; constitutionalism; political goodwill and international status of political leaders; transition process and national struggle history; domestic policies; constitutionally enshrined human rights; equality for all.

Immigration; peacekeeping; environmental technology; multinational corporations; peacemaking; poverty alleviation; bilateral and multilateral treaties; support and resources for neighbouring states; rule-based multilateralism; procontinent; goodneighbourliness; norm entrepreneur; provision of public goods.

Source: Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015).

Similarly, Honghua (2007: 15-26) identifies five fundamental elements that make up soft power: culture, ideas, a development model, international institutions, and international image. Soft power may, therefore, be derived from the thoughts, ideas, and principles advocated by a state and accepted and identified by people or institutions, especially those engaged in building international regimes. Domestic institutions could also be relevant (Yu, 2007: 114). On the other hand, Chiroro (2012) argues that a state’s soft

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power is based on two core elements: international sources (foreign policy and actions) and domestic sources (domestic policies and actions). States thus need to find creative means to convert both forms of soft power resources into manifest political advantages and influence. In Chiroro’s assertion, ‘[a] positive image in world affairs that endears a nation to other nations generates respect and admiration, which in turn renders nations that have soft power more endearing to the eyes of other nations’ (Chiroro, 2012: 2). More recently, there has been increasing evidence of the recognition of the potency of soft power as an essential component of power status (Gill and Huang, 2006), and it is passing the measurability test (see RGM, 2012). Countries are also beginning to pay closer attention to the intricacies of culture, political ideology, and diplomacy (soft power) as an alternative and subtle weapon in the changing international relations landscape. It is undeniable that “various forms of soft power, including a positive reputation, have become relatively more important in relation to traditional forms of military and economic power” (Smith and van Westhuizen, 2015: 18). For instance, global powers such as the USA, the United Kingdom3, and China, as well as major middle powers including Canada and Australia, acknowledge the potency of soft power instruments in building a positive image in world affairs (Nye, 2004; 2011; Kurlantzick, 2007; Potter, 2009). This enables them to wield greater levels of respect and admiration from other nations. There is, however, the aspect of blurred explanation about how exactly soft power produces the anticipated results for the agent seeking influence. Understanding the vehicles (instruments), capacities (resources), and the communicative context in which soft power operates is critical for the justificatory arguments of soft power. Hayden (2012), for instance, questions the logic of how soft power resources can be translated into outcomes and what audiences are deemed significant within a strategic foreign policy strategy. He also poses critical questions of “how particular communication forms are expected to contribute to influence, and how messages, formed as either contingent argument or symbolic action, are purported as viable to achieve outcomes”. Viewed in this light, soft power, according to Hayden (2012: 28), must be determined as a “necessity for non-coercive influence, derived from attributes of the nation-state (and other

3

An ad-hoc committee on Soft Power was set up by the UK Parliament to propose ways to enhance the efficacy of its use.

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non-state actors) that can facilitate foreign policy objectives without recourse to material, ‘hard’ power or economic incentives”. Nye’s soft power thesis rests on the supposition that “certain qualities of an international actor can be translated into tangible international influences that do not involve traditional material components of coercive power behaviours” (See Hayden, 2012: 39). This argument is further underlined by Smith and Westhuizen’s (2015: 18) position that, “In the context where international relations have increasingly become a multi-actor environment, and ideational factors have become more important, constructivism has come to the fore.” The ongoing debate on soft power revolves around its substance as a power resource, strategy, instrument, or outcome, its diverse representation by countries in the West, as well as by democratic and authoritarian regimes across the world. However, it is important to observe that despite widespread misinterpretation of the concept of soft power, the idea continues to be a significant element of states’ power and foreign policy, given the changing reality of international relations and varied discourse and praxis across geopolitical zones.4 For example, insecurity from non-traditional sources (human security) is becoming more prominent globally and especially in the developing world. It is also true that the metageography of terrorism has redefined geopolitics globally as the struggle is no longer over territories and on territories but a clash of civilisations which crisscrosses territories through social and technological networks. Therefore, intelligence gathering, technological prowess, and the ability to build consensus and coalitions through attractive ideas which are all elements of soft power, will be vital to exercising power and influence in the twenty-first century.

Delineating Nigeria’s Soft Power Credentials Nigeria is celebrated globally, among other things, through the popularity and contributions of its film and music industry, sportspeople, literary icons, and the international popularity of its local Pentecostal churches. In this regard, Nigeria’s Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Mohammed notes that deploying the country’s soft power requires effectively promoting international cultural diplomacy and leveraging the potential that culture affords to drive tourism and resuscitate economic development (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2018). Very similar to the rising prevalence of international 4

In recent years, Chinese scholars introduced the term “Discourse Power” – huayu quan (Hung-jen, 2015), while in South Africa, Ubuntu seems a better representation of soft power (Qobo and Nyathi, 2016).

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mega-churches, the Nollywood industry represents an authentic and truly indigenous source of cultural attraction for Nigeria. In the same vein, the global proliferation of Nigeria’s Pentecostal faith-based organisations demonstrates a valuable form of religious soft power that is unique to the country and can be hooked up with Nigeria’s foreign policy mechanisms if adequately harnessed. Similarly, achievements from its contribution to African literature through the works of celebrated old and new school writers, such as Chimamanda Adichie, Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, Ben Okri, and Amos Tutuola among others, have helped to highlight the vital role of Nigeria to global knowledge production significantly. In many ways, these soft power resources can be effectively utilised as transformative agents to restore Nigeria’s global status through the widening of the corridors of foreign policy making to include an array of non-state actors. Olukotun (2013), for instance, asserts that “any rethinking and reforming of Nigeria’s foreign policy must begin with an earnest effort to clean up our act domestically by creating an exportable Brand Nigeria as well as undertaking a harnessing of our soft power indices”. One major analytical effort to establish the enormous potential of Nigeria’s soft power attributes was made by Ogunnubi (2013). The study locates Nigeria’s soft power within the ambits of Nye’s three prescriptions of culture, foreign policy, and public diplomacy. According to him, Nigeria’s soft power assets may be extracted from attributes such as its cultural exports (especially Nollywood); its political and iconic personalities (official and unofficial); sporting accomplishments (especially soccer); its international peacekeeping record and role; international mega-churches; delivery of public goods through agencies such as the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS); and its Afrocentric foreign policy as well as its policy of good neighbourliness. For the purpose of this study, three main sources of Nigeria’s soft power are selected: “Nollywood”, international megachurches, and the contribution to African literature.

Nollywood – Africa’s Cultural Superpower and Media Capital Reputation plays an essential role in a country’s foreign policy and can be an enabling or disabling factor in the conduct of its international relations (Smith and van der Westhuizen, 2015). Arguably, Nigeria’s film industry remains the most powerful platform to launder its international image and draw attention to the possibilities inherent in the country. Despite its historical credentials of Afrocentric foreign policy and its immense cost in both human and material resources, Nigeria’s reputation has, over the years been battered by stereotypes of corruption, drug trafficking, advanced fee

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fraud, and Boko Haram insurgency among other vices (Ogunnubi, Onapajo and Isike, 2018). Christened after America’s Hollywood, Nigeria’s film industry – dubbed “Nollywood” – is arguably the country’s most influential cultural product since the turn of the democratic dispensation (Haynes, 2007; Onyenankeya et al., 2017). It is in this context that I examine the role of Nollywood not only as a promoter and exporter of Nigeria’s global reputation but also its potency as a soft power instrument. Seventeen years after its first movie, Living in Bondage, was produced, Nollywood surpassed US Hollywood as the second-largest movie industry in terms of production volume and was only behind India’s Bollywood5 (UN News 5 May 2009). Another report ranks Nollywood third in terms of production value (UN Report 5 May 2009). According to figures released by the Nigerian government, in 2013 alone, the Nollywood industry produced 1844 movies and was valued at over $3.3 billion (Bright, 2015). The growing popularity of Nollywood makes it perhaps Nigeria’s strongest soft power fountain (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). Therefore, by showcasing an array of its cultural ambiance through film wrapped in entertainment, Nollywood represents a strong force for reframing Nigeria’s reputation. Kanayo (2014) suggests that Nollywood “has the immense potential of serving as a dynamic tool for the promotion and achievement of Nigeria’s cultural diplomacy goals”. Popular Nollywood actors and actresses, including Stephanie Okereke, Nkem Owoh (Osuofia), Omotola Jalade-Ekeinde (Omo Sexy), Rita Dominic, Genevieve Nnaji, Patience Ozokwor (Mama Gee), John Okafor (Mr. Ibu), Osita Iheme, and Chinedu Ikedezie (Aki and Pawpaw), OC Ukeje, Pete Edoche, Mercy Johnson, Richard Mofe Damijo, Funke Akindele (Jenifer), and many others have gained celebrity status in Africa and the diaspora for their acting prowess with numerous global accolades to their credit. For instance, a famous Nollywood star, Omo Sexy, is widely acknowledged as Africa’s first celebrity personality to exceed over 1 million followers on her official Facebook page. In 2013, alongside global icons such as Beyoncé, Barack and Michelle Obama, and Pope Benedict, she was featured in Time magazine's top 100 most influential people (All Africa, 16 February 2013; TIME 100, London; 2013). On the other hand, Nigeria’s soap operas including Jacob’s Cross, Jenifer’s Diary, and Tinsel are quite popular and watched by millions of viewers within the African continent 5

According to a 2006 survey by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), Nollywood produced 872 feature-length movies to come second behind India’s Bollywood which produced 1,091. The United States was a distant third with 485 films.

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and the diaspora. Thanks to South African-owned extra-terrestrial pay TV platform DStv/MultiChoice, eight dedicated “Africa Magic” channels offer a variety of daily broadcasts of mainly Nigerian films and TV series. These platforms, which include AMSho 150, AMEpi 152, AMUrb 153, AMFam 154, AMWld 155, AMYor, AMIgb, and AMHau offer millions of viewers across Africa uninterrupted visual entertainment of Nigeria’s rich culture and the societal contexts of its people. Another obvious inference that can be drawn to demonstrate the influence of Nigeria’s movie industry is in the fact that the first-ever MultiChoice organised Annual Africa Magic Viewers’ Choice Awards (AMVCA) was held in Lagos, in 2013. The Oscar-styled award ceremony recognises and rewards talented artists in the film and television industry on the continent. Interestingly, since the award’s first instalment, Nigeria has gone on to host all five consecutive episodes. Although South Africa’s Otelo Burning won the best overall film at the inception of the awards, Nigerian blockbuster movies October 1, Dry, 76, and Potato Potahto have garnered this ultimate prize since 2015. Funke Akindele and Rita Dominic are among the most decorated in the history of the awards. Nigeria has also hosted the now popular Africa Movie Academy Awards since its inception in 2005, except for 2015 and 2018, which were hosted in Rwanda and South Africa, respectively. On the other hand, Nollywood movies have won the coveted “Best Film” award category for a record five times. Haynes (2000: 4) posits that Nollywood gives viewers “an image of the Nigerian nation, not necessarily in the sense of delivering a full, accurate, and analytical description of social reality, but in the sense of reflecting the productive forces of the nation, economic and cultural”. As a dominant force, Nollywood, therefore, plays an influential role in endearing Nigerians and Nigeria among Africans and beyond the continent (Miller 2012). Its popularity and cultural influence in changing perceptions about Nigeria are corroborated in some scholarly literature. For example, Isike and Isike’s (2012) survey of 92 Africans across three cities in South Africa showed that 83 percent of the respondents view Nigeria more positively from watching Nollywood movies. In their responses, this is partly due to existent similarities in cultures/worldviews, and the fact that it provides more knowledge about Nigeria beyond the popular stereotypes and narrow views about the people (Isike and Isike, 2012). Another field study conducted in Tanzania suggests that among 40 participants surveyed, 91 percent of them viewed Nigeria and Nigerians favourably as a result of “positive impressions formed from watching Nigerian movies” (see Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). In other words, participants affirmed that Nollywood provided them with

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valuable interaction with Nigeria’s cultural products, an appreciation of its industrious, hardworking spirit, religion, awareness of its engrained family values, and their entrepreneurial mindset. Also, drawing from a sample size of 370 registered students at the University of Fort Hare, Onyenankeya et al. (2017: 309) examined the popularity and expansion in viewership of Nollywood in African and Western cities within the context of the social learning theory. The authors concluded that “watching Nollywood films was statistically significant in transmitting Nigerian language, music, dance, and ways of greeting to participants” and correlated with a noticeable effect on viewers’ perception and lifestyle. In Tella’s (2019) assessment, Nigeria’s creative industry, mainly Nollywood, provides a rich platform for not only communicating Africa’s stories to the world but also promoting the continent’s culture globally. Put differently, the widespread projection and prominence of Nollywood movies conveyed through DStv/MultiChoice and other social media platforms such as YouTube as well as from affordable online subscription channels, including IrokoTV and IbakaTV deepens Nigeria and indeed Africa’s place in the global movie industry. In effect, Nigeria leads the pack in possibilities for using culture and media to change negative perceptions about Africa and its people. To this end, UNESCO’s Director-General Koïchiro Matsuura inferred the role of Nigeria’s movie industry as “shining examples of how cultural industries, as vehicles of identity, values, and meanings, can open the door to dialogue and understanding between peoples, but also to economic growth and development” (UN News, 5 May 2009). The endless opportunities in Nollywood offer Nigeria an alternative non-traditional diplomatic option through the film and video production value chain to use culture as an instrument to not only further the country’s international agenda but also lead the promotion of regional governance, gender equality, development, peace, conflict resolution, and ultimately continental renewal. One way that this possibility has been explored has been through the appointment of Nollywood celebrities as UNESCO/UNICEF role models to champion the transformation of cultural norms on gender stereotypes, for instance. Regrettably, while Nollywood’s potential for transforming Nigeria’s image is not in doubt, the Nigerian government has made little effort to distil the diplomatic and strategic value of its movie industry, thereby losing longterm soft power rewards in the international system. This is despite the grants of $200 million announced in November 2010 by the President Goodluck Jonathan administration under “Project Nollywood”. This was followed by another loan scheme of N3 billion in March 2013 (Höije, 2015;

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Punch News, 17 February 2019). Although both grants initiated the government’s commitment towards boosting Nollywood’s film production and distribution within and outside Nigeria, these efforts have been largely uncoordinated and mired in controversy. Compared to Nollywood’s value and contribution to Nigeria’s GDP, the piecemeal grant allocations are hardly enough to demonstrate the government’s seriousness to invest in the creative industry (Tella, 2019). Moreover, with the failed re-election bid of President Jonathan, not much has happened afterward. The main point here is that the Nigerian government is well placed on inculcating the rich tapestry of Nollywood to project a cultural penetration and acceptance of its foreign policies. Film production emanating from Nollywood can be used to promote Nigeria’s image in the international arena, its societal standards, and values that echo the nuances of the African people. According to Miller (2012: 7), through Nollywood, “Nigerian cultural influence has been extended far and wide through black market networks of distribution and informal links to the diaspora, both extremely powerful and far-reaching alternative networks, the importance of which cannot be overemphasized.” Thus, while serving as an end in itself, Nollywood can also be an instrument for promoting Nigeria’s public and cultural diplomacy ambitions. Global celebrities of the Nollywood stable are perfectly positioned to serve as cultural ambassadors for promoting the “Naija” brand6 in ways that eliminate negative biases against the country and ultimately projects its soft power profile and leadership aspiration in Africa. Furthermore, recent Nollywood movies have been used as avenues to bring to the fore socio-economic conditions bedevilling the continent of Africa, including poverty, discrimination, poor governance, and human rights abuses. As a cultural superpower in Africa, championing these issues on the international front, the Nigerian government can sponsor the permanent broadcast of the eight Africa Magic channels, which would allow for nonpaying subscribers on the DStv platform to enjoy the entertainment value of Nollywood. Doing this would play the dual role of facilitating Nigeria’s public and diplomacy drawn from the transformative value that the Africa channels provide for shaping positive attitudes towards Nigeria. Also, as part of a purposive investment in cultural diplomacy, a focus on the international distribution of the cultural products of Nollywood both in

6

The word “Naija”, sometimes written as 29ja”, is a popular colloquial reference to Nigeria and the cultural varieties of its people.

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Africa and overseas could help to cushion the often negative perception of the country. Within the geopolitical context of “other diplomacy”, Nollywood represents an opportunity to stretch further the wider reach of Nigeria’s regional power influence through a formally articulated policy nested with the increasing role of non-state actors. Indeed, the soft power of a state is not enough to gain international influence, as this must be complemented by sufficient hard power resources. The main point is that Nigeria’s soft power resources, such as its Nollywood and affiliated entertainment industries, could contribute to the achievement of its foreign policy objectives and the military dimension of the country’s power. This is what Nye called “smart power”, which is the combination of both hard and soft power. Some of the potential value of Nollywood is its capacity to improve cultural tourism through the establishment of a repertoire of filmmaking centres and creative zones where visitors can enjoy first-hand the different aspects of the Nollywood film-making experience. Evidence from field research suggests that viewers of Nollywood are usually keen to mimic the Nigerian accent and the Nigerian Pidgin English and explore its fashion styles. For instance, Yandzi, a Nollywood enthusiast from Eswatini (Swaziland), suggests that the Nigerian movie industry may have had a major influence in her country’s fashion industry in the creative use of local Swazi fabrics like “Lihiya” which was mainly worn for only traditional and ceremonial purposes. According to her, appreciating the variety of ways that the Nigerian local Ankara fabrics are used in Nollywood movies highlights the popularity of this fabric in the country for weddings and special occasions (personal communication, 15 April 2019).7

Pastorpreneurs and International Mega-Churches Another crucial soft power resource for Nigeria can be gleaned from its religious soft power evident through the transnational prominence of its international mega-churches and the popularity of its general overseers. Although this aspect of soft power has received minimal mention in literature and conversations on Nigeria’s soft power remits (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2018), it is impossible to deny the geopolitical value to the Nigerian state. To be sure, its Muslim population of over 90 million is the fifth largest in the world, while the country’s estimated Christian population of over 86 7

The subject of Nollywood’s effect on the dress style of some African cultures is extensively discussed in Adejunmobi (2007), Onuzulike (2007), and Omoera (2009).

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million is ranked sixth highest globally. According to the Pew Research Centre, the two population groups are projected to be the third-largest in the world by 2060 (Diamant 2019). The unique religious mix of Nigeria’s Christian-Muslim population represents an undeniable soft power remit. However, in this section, the focus is on the ideational value of the Christian population. Nigeria’s Christian community produces clergies that are renowned globally for their ministries and thereby attract millions of adherents from across the continent and the diaspora. Tagged as Pastorpreneurs for their mastery in successfully combining the ethos of Christian faith and entrepreneurship, these celebrity pastors, televangelists, and faith healers have multi-million-dollar church organisations with net values worth more than some African states (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2018). Some of the church buildings in Nigeria are characterised by massive edifices reputed to hold the largest single gathering in the world. For instance, until recently, the Winners Chapel, named “Canaan Land” located in Otta, Ogun State, was adjudged to be the largest church auditorium in the world with its 50,000-seater “Faith Tabernacle” main auditorium (Ogunnubi and Ogbonna, forthcoming). The 100,000 capacity “Glory Dome” of the Abuja-based Dunamis Church now boasts the highest single auditorium in the world. Leading the pack among popular Nigerian pastorpreneurs include Bishop David Oyedepo of the Living Faith Church Worldwide (Winners Chapel), Pastor Chris Oyakilome’s Believers Love World Inc. (Christ Embassy), Pastor Enoch Adeboye of the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), and Prophet Temitope Joshua, senior pastor of The Synagogue Church of All Nations. Other popular pastors but perhaps with lesser global influence include diaspora pastors like Sunday Adelaja of the Embassy of God in Ukraine and Pastor Mathew Ashimolowo, who oversees the Kingsway International Christian Centre (KICC) based in London. Through strong global followership made popular via attractive sermons, claims of miracles, healing powers, sale of books, tapes, and other religious symbols among others and facilitated via an aggressive media presence, these pastorpreneurs have grown in popularity in Africa and almost every part of the globe. Ogunnubi and Isike (2018) suggest that their activities “connect other Africans to Nigerians and Nigeria beyond territorial limitations”. In the same vein, Nigeria’s international firebrand pastors have promoted religious tourism8 for the country, with Lagos and Ogun State being the 8

Religious tourism is used to depict the visitation of other countries purely for spiritual lifting and the enjoyment of religious products of art, culture, traditions, and architecture.

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global headquarters of these churches, continuing to attract visitors from many countries, especially during major spiritual events. In an interview with Yandzi, she recalls an occasion on one of her trips to Nigeria in 2012, where the Arik Air flight was full of chorusing worshippers of Prophet Joshua on their way for a religious pilgrimage to the Synagogue (personal communication, 15 April 2019). Table 2 demonstrates the estimated net worth of the most influential pastors worldwide in 2018, of which Nigeria’s Bishop Oyedepo is in the first position with an estimated worth of $150 million while three others (Oyakhilome, Adeboye, and Joshua) are listed in third, fifth, and ninth positions respectively (Forbes Magazine, 2018). Table 2: Top Ten Most Influential Pastors Worldwide S/N

Names

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Bishop David Oyedepo Bishop TD Jakes Chris Oyakhilome Benny Hinn Joel Osteen Pastor Enoch Adeboye Creflo Dollar Kenneth Copeland Billy Graham Prophet TB Joshua Pastor Joseph Prince

Estimate of Value $ 150 Million $ 147 Million $ 50 Million $ 42 Million $ 39 Million $ 27 Million $ 25 Million $ 25 Million $ 10 Million $ 5 Million

Country Nigeria United States Nigeria United States Nigeria United States United States United States Nigeria Malaysia

Source: Forbes Magazine (2018) World Richest and Influential Pastors.

With a membership reputed to spread across all continents and a financial muscle that exceeds the external reserve of some African states, there is no denying the influence that Nigeria’s pastorpreneurs and international megachurches wield on the international front. Given its poor international reputation in certain aspects referred to earlier and Abuja’s lauded leadership commitments to Africa, it is difficult to ignore the possible foreign policy role of Nigeria’s community of religious leaders in contemporary global affairs. Emoruwa’s (2015) assertion is apt in illustrating the value of leveraging Nigerian Pentecostalism as soft power. He states that Nigeria and its government: must be obsessed about the Nigerian Faith – not juju, our unique form of religion that is attracting adherents from all over the world – The Adeboyes,

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Oyedepos, Oyakhilomes of this world. He must work directly with them to leverage their influence and presence on the continent. I believe with such followership they can drive the adoption of Nigerian food, fashion and style, ideas and taste, writings and art etcetera. We all can imagine what potentials this holds for Nigerian businesses and our “imperialism”. You can start to imagine the Nigerianisation of our Products.

Arguably, the global acceptance of the ministries of Nigeria’s pastorpreneurs expresses a form of acceptance of the country, its spiritual authority in the global Pentecostal movement (outside of the United States), and perhaps the Nigerian people. This submission is demonstrable in a few instances, one of which included the aftermaths of the catastrophic collapse of a guest house owned by Prophet T.B Joshua’s Synagogue in 2014, which resulted in the death of 89 visitors from South African, including at least 11 members from other countries. Due to the Prophet Joshua’s popularity in southern Africa and the countless visits by politicians, celebrities, and royalties from the region, the diplomatic embarrassment that the unfortunate collapse would have caused to the Nigerian government was considerably reduced (see Ogunnubi and Isike, 2018). As a result, the expected open criticism by South Africa of Nigeria was averted, despite outrage at the home front, particularly over the way and manner the Nigerian government handled the identification and repatriation of the deceased. Essentially, what would have led to the typical diplomatic row between Nigeria and South Africa was promptly resolved through the positive attraction of the latter to Prophet Joshua’s ministry. In previous years, both countries had wrestled each other over trivial incidences such as the ‘Yellow Fever’ saga in 2013, leading to wrongful deportation on both sides, seized currency belonging to the Nigerian government meant for purchase of ammunition to fight Boko Haram in 2014, tax avoidance issues that erupted in 2018, and accusations of xenophobia. While it is possible to argue to the contrary that other factors such as oil and favourable bilateral relations may have inhibited the said incidence from degenerating into a diplomatic row, it must be recalled that none of the previous issues have stopped South Africa from dealing harshly with Nigeria in the past (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2018). Thus, the quiet posture of South Africa in the event of the loss of dozens of its citizens could only have been linked to the favourable disposition its government and people had for Prophet Joshua. Tens of thousands of parishes of the RCCG and Winners Chapel, among others, represent informal diplomatic missions to showcase the values that Nigeria represents. To this end, given their popularity and transnational influence, Nigeria’s Christian Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) can

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indeed transform the perception and negative stereotype that bedevils the country and its citizens. In this era of globalisation and technologically driven innovations, the influence that any nation commands will depend in part on how it is able to wield its hard and soft power in a smart way to achieve global and regional objectives (Haiming, 2019). Therefore, to spread its influence, particularly within its geopolitical sphere, Africa, Nigeria must pay serious attention to its culture, which includes its religion.

Contribution to Literature It is an incontestable fact that a country’s literary exports, especially by award-winning writers, can be an important soft power instrument to win the hearts and minds of readers who are spread all over the world. Popular rankings of major soft power states include contributions to arts and literature in the calculation of a country’s soft power of attraction. Frances Stonor Saunders’s book Who Paid the Piper? provides an account of the covert activities of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through a books programme initiated during the Cold War era. According to Saunders, the CIA distributed over 10 million books in the Soviet Union between the 1950s and the 1990s (Saunders, 2005). Therefore, beyond Nollywood and Pastorpreneurs, Nigeria’s soft power can also be gleaned from the intellectual strength of its populace. As Peter (2007), notes “Nigeria boasts one of the most educated populations in the African continent”, and Nigerians rank among the most qualified professionals in Africa (cited in Akinyeye, 2007: 44). Abuja’s soft power potential is thus derived from the academic strength of its people, which implies that Nigeria is not only regarded as the economic and demographic giant in Africa, but also the continent’s “intellectual capital”. This is because the country has perhaps the most educated population and a huge percentage of qualified professionals in Africa and the black diaspora (Akinyeye, 2007; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). Specifically, the iconic status of acclaimed Nigerian authors across generations has earned the country some literary soft power scores. Worthy of mention among Nigerian literature giants are the late Chinua Achebe9, Wole Soyinka, who was awarded Africa’s first Nobel Laureate for Literature in 1986, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, the celebrated author of 9

Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, published years before Nigeria’s independence, remains perhaps the most translated and relevant post-colonial literature. The book has been translated into over 57 languages and has sold more than 20 million copies since its publication in 1958.

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award-winning Half of a Yellow Sun, Purple Hibiscus, and Americana, and Ben Okri, whose acclaimed book The Famished Road won the coveted Man Booker Prize in 1991. Other popular contemporary Nigerian writers, including Chigozie Obioma, Helon Habila, Chibundu Onuzo, Sefi Atta, and Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani, are keeping up the tradition of Nigeria’s status as a literary reference. To a large extent, the country’s international status has improved considerably by virtue of these authors’ study of post-colonial Africa and the values of the Nigerian socio-cultural life. The creative utilisation of Nigeria’s place in African literature can be channelled to attract soft power gains and by deliberately promoting the export of its literature. In this way, the country is able to present better imageries of its people and replace the tainted stereotypes of corruption, drug trafficking, and fraud. In other words, Nigeria is well placed to use literature as a creative industry to drive its soft power. One way it can do this is through collaborations between Nollywood and writers to tell positive aspects of the Nigerian story. What is further needed is a consistent budgetary allocation to the creative industry through grants and loans to improve the capacity of writers and increase the global accessibility of Nigerian books. There is also a role for the Ministry of Culture to play in establishing platforms for the export of acclaimed books of Nigeria to thrive through book fairs and institutes. Nigerian writers are no doubt cultural ambassadors and, in turn, form a soft power embodiment for the country and its people. In China, for instance, a country that holds about a quarter of the world’s population, books by major Nigerian writers are being translated to Mandarin, drawing popular interest in Africa and African literature. This is illustrative of how non-government actors can play informal diplomatic roles. For a country such as Nigeria, battling to assert its influence as a regional power in Africa, recognising the literary potential of the country is a good start to building its soft power. This will allow for it to punch above its weight, especially in areas where its economic and military capacity is deficient. By looking beyond the traditional and official realms of foreign policy interaction and by including the potency of commercial literature in this realm, Nigeria can attain greater status in continental and global affairs. There is no doubt that much can be gained in terms of national prestige for Nigeria when the stock of its acclaimed books gain traction globally. The thesis here is that commercial literature from Nigeria can be a platform for nation branding and for projecting an image that the country wants for itself.

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Building a Nigerian Soft Power Approach Given the perceived leadership vacuum in Africa and the dwindling status of South Africa both regionally and globally (Okeke-Uzodike, 2016), a firm assessment of the soft power profiles of Africa’s biggest economy, Nigeria, is critical for understanding regional power dynamics in Africa. In the estimation of power status within a regional order, soft power is evidently an important fulcrum for the recognition and acceptance of such regional leadership. Focusing on these three main soft power sources, the evidence shows that Nigeria indeed has the potential to punch above its weight by playing an increasing regional role, which is more than its traditional state capacity (military and economic) allows for. The important point raised in this chapter is that by focusing on its soft power opportunities, Nigeria can reduce the implication of pervasive negative perceptions of its regional power status within Africa and globally, in a way that does not jeopardise its foreign policy ambitions. Nigeria’s regional hegemonic status has often been advanced based on its superior economic and comparatively advanced military capabilities within Africa. However, any meaningful assessment of regional hegemonic power must necessarily include both the hard and soft power competencies of a state in what is often referred to as “smart power” (see Nye, 2004). For Nigeria, there has been no serious attempt to capture the soft power nuances of Abuja, despite the fact that there are trickles of its potentials evidenced particularly in the official and unofficial exuberance of state and non-state actors. Admittedly, scholars of Nigeria’s foreign policy analysis are yet to pay adequate attention to the soft power resources of the Republic and how these can be adjusted with the country’s foreign policy to mitigate the inherent dilemma and constraints of its regional hegemonic prospects. Indeed, by wielding its soft power, a state like Nigeria, with enormous soft power potential, is able to appropriate legitimacy and recognition as a benign regional hegemon among other possible contenders. In essence, the paucity of literature on the subject matter should not insinuate that the country’s soft power repertoire is non-existent. Although the remit of Nigeria’s potential soft power resources spans beyond its Nollywood industry and international mega-churches, this chapter deliberately focused on these two areas because they are obvious but yet underutilised soft power assets for the country. Of course, other areas such as Nigeria’s literary contribution might have had a far greater impact than its churches for example, in permeating reading cultures, education systems, theatre, and the arts across the globe. As Adibe (2017: 516) affirms,

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“Converting this soft power to economic benefits will depend on the character of the country’s political leadership, the cohesiveness of its elite and the level of development of its productive forces.” The Nigerian government has a bigger role to play in ensuring the positive expression of Nigeria’s soft power. Part of these responsibilities will include adequate investment and establishing appropriate infrastructure for the flourishing of the Nollywood industry and for other aspects of its religious soft power to prosper. Introducing tax reliefs for companies willing to invest in Nigeria’s creative industry is also another way to encourage investors. There is also the need for steady and transparent support for the creative and cultural industry in the form of grants and loans. Some specific actions would also include setting up Nollywood creative centres across Africa that will give Africans the opportunity to directly interact with the different creative resources and actors of Nollywood and other aspects of Nigeria’s creative industry. With this in mind, it is impossible to secure a greater commitment from the government in the absence of an enabling policy for the creative industry. This policy is lacking and is responsible for the inability of the country to effectively take advantage of Nollywood as an agent of nation branding and image building. The Nigerian government can take advantage of the South African Multichoice/DStv to negotiate free-toair channels that will broadcast Nollywood movies across Africa. The longterm effect of this is that it will ensure that more people in Africa come under the unrestricted influence of Nigeria’s biggest cultural brand, which will facilitate stronger diplomatic connectedness through non-formal sources. Another important aspect that is critical to transforming Nigeria’s soft power potential to practical payoffs would involve forging more collaboration between Nollywood and its Hollywood and Bollywood counterparts. Doing this would improve the quality and international standards of Nollywood movies, thus making it a vibrant brand to express Nigeria’s cultural and public diplomacy.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the extent to which Nigeria has developed its soft power sources for international leverage and enabled its foreign policy projections. The analysis has offered a contribution to a missing part of the debate on Nigeria’s foreign policy strategy by focusing on each of the three sources of soft power and its usefulness for projecting the country’s foreign policy. In this paper, the author investigated whether this often-neglected part of Nigeria’s global outlook presents the Republic as a regional soft

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power state capable of wielding significant influence regionally and globally? It investigated the extent to which Nigeria’s soft power resources have helped shape its international status. The analysis and evidence presented show that Nigeria’s soft power assets may be distilled from attributes such as its cultural exports (especially Nollywood), international mega-churches, and contribution to African scholarship. As the cases cited have shown, the potential and popularity of Nollywood give an unusual platform for Nigeria to cement its influence and extend this perception further through the media channels offered by different films and videos. Similarly, Christian FBOs create an opportunity for Nigeria to get what it wants on the international stage through its religious soft power while its contribution to the literature through its internationally celebrated literary icons earns it some advantages that are perhaps yet to be fully maximised. In Africa, therefore, regional hegemonic influence is secured primarily through smart power, which includes the successful deployment of both hard and soft power. More importantly, there is the necessity to link the output from Nollywood to the achievement of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially in Africa and the Global South. There is no doubt that the Nollywood industry has a role to play in ensuring the actualisation of each of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, the question remains: Does this new global outlook present Nigeria as a regional soft power state?

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CHAPTER ELEVEN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER: A PROGNOSIS OF NIGERIA-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS MICHAEL B. ALEYOMI

Abstract This chapter advocates the deployment of soft power resources by Nigeria and South Africa in sustaining their regional power status. Most sociopolitical analysts believe that “power” plays a prominent role in determining a state’s image and behaviour in international politics; hence, the study investigates this position. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and power was adopted as a framework, and secondary sources of data collection were used. Findings from the study show that the possession of material capabilities without legitimate and diplomatic means of “appealing” to other states is not enough in the pursuit of hegemonic status. This chapter contributes to the study on Nigeria and South Africa relations by proposing a vigorous public diplomatic collaboration, which the study posits will enhance legitimacy and positive image-making towards Africa's rebirth in global power politics. In the long term, the pay-off of public diplomacy and soft power may be slow and not readily measurable. However, the study projects that pious application of soft power via effective public diplomacy by these two hegemonic powers will propel legitimacy in Africa towards earning global respect. This will thereby engender an emerging paradigm of collaborative and dialogue-based diplomatic measures because the potentials of defending Africa’s interests in the international arena and contributing to global stability cannot be underestimated. Keywords: Public Diplomacy; Soft Power; Capabilities; Nigeria; South Africa

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Introduction The ability of a nation to interact effectively with other nations reflects in its acceptability. This comprises a couple of evaluations, which include, among other things, external image, national development, and its level of civility in terms of behavioural conformity with legal principles codified in both domestic and international laws (Akinterinwa, 2013; Sampson, 2016). Undisputedly, however, power and influence are important elements that determine states’ behaviour in international politics. Politics itself is the most encompassing of all human activities which requires the exercise of power to influence or change the course of action of others either in favour or against their will. As such, political activity covers a broad spectrum of human endeavours, as two or more states interact with each other and are constantly involved in political relationships. This suggests therefore that the conduct and management of states’ relations must recognise that international politics is a struggle for power. Indeed, the application of power in international affairs has raised an endless debate between the direct use of military power and diplomacy. Human interaction is characterised by the interplay of power, which could be hard, soft, or the combination of both hard and soft power resources (smart power). Soft power is diametrically opposed to hard power. The former advocates for the appeal of a state’s ideas or abilities to set political agendas and affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants or shape the preference of others by the use of attraction. The latter involves the application of coercion and payments/inducements, which Joseph Nye refers to as “sticks” and “carrots” respectively (Nye, 2008). Every state or region tries to create positive perceptions and modulate its reputations in order to achieve loyalty at home and influence abroad, although there are areas in which nations overtly and covertly compete. Nigeria and South Africa have superior power advantages, with their combined capacity for considerable influence over other African States in terms of political, economic, and military capabilities and ideational membership with the continent (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). There are quite a number of opportunities for Nigeria and South Africa to be positioned as important players in the global role and power shift. Hence, there is a need for careful articulation of soft power resources in both countries. Indeed, Nigeria and South Africa possess power status as African leaders and giants. However, despite the vast literature on the comparative studies of regional powers and leadership (Chiroro, 2012; Giboa, 2008; Ogunnubi

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and Isike, 2015; Olupohunda, 2013; Sega and Lekaba, 2014; Uduma and Nwosu, 2015; White and Radic, 2014), what seems to be missing in the literature, is the quest for these regional powers (Nigeria and South Africa) to provide order and stability of the continent and effectively influence the behaviour of other states in the region toward raising the African perspective and reducing the intellectual marginalisation of the continent. In fact, this inability of the potential regional hegemons to maintain order and stability in the study of regions of the world is what Prys (2010) describes as an achievement-expectations gap. The debate over the apparent incapability of African states – and, in particular, the regional hegemons – to defend Africa’s interests in the international arena chiefly centres on legitimacy and image-making. Thus, it is important for Africa to be properly positioned in the field of International Relations in order to increase African perspectives and reduce the intellectual marginalisation of the continent in the international arena (Aleyomi, 2017; Olupohunda, 2013). Consequently, among other objectives, this chapter is designed to reveal the behaviour and potential capabilities of African states in influencing the global power politics. In addition, the driving impulse of this study is to seek a mechanism for positioning the “regional hegemonic powers”1 in the continent to contest, achieve, and defend the vested interests of African states in the international arena. It is, therefore, legitimate to advocate the application of soft power through public diplomacy in the quest for power and influence in Africa and in the scheme of power politics and relevance of African states in the international system. In view of this, there is much sentiment in the field of International Relations that sub-Saharan Africa is flawed in the framework of analysis of the Afrocentric perspective. This sentiment is focused on Nigeria and South Africa, which are widely perceived as Africa’s giants, wielding significant influence within Africa and beyond (Kanji, 2016; Obi, 2015; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015; Sega and Lekaba, 2014). From the start, the issue of who 1

The overall assumption tied to the Regional Hegemonic Powers is the trust (as a result of collections from a measure of acceptance and to some extent a prerequisite for the exercise of influence) to often take care of conflicts, economic deprivation, and political instabilities in their regions. Categorised under this assumption within the Africa region, are Nigeria and South Africa, having the capabilities of power resources to influence or shape the region in economic, ideological, and military terms of positioning and defending the Africa continent in the global politics/international arena (Bach, 2007; Prys, 2010; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2018).

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possesses more relevance and regional hegemonic power in Africa between Nigeria and South Africa has elicited much scholarly and journalistic debate. Without trivialising the concerns raised by these scholars and displaying total indifference to the debates, the purpose of this chapter is to critically underscore the potential capabilities in terms of resources and behavioural outcomes of the two countries towards influencing the global politics for the betterment of the entire continent of Africa. It is against this background, that the chapter proposes that effective application of soft power through public diplomacy and pious synergy between the two leading powers of Africa in their bilateral ties would place the continent in better stead and relevance in global power play. This will help to assess the importance of Africa (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) in the conduct of transnational relations and, by so doing, contribute to a wider academic debate on power politics in African studies and recent trends in diplomacy. Thus, the chapter is divided into five sections. The section immediately after the introduction provides the conceptual and theoretical backgrounds for the study, attempting to survey and situate the regional power dynamics and image question in Africa. The succeeding sections give a brief account of the material capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa towards effective regional diplomatic links, highlighting the place and models of the two countries in the international power equations and leadership scheme in subSaharan Africa. The core of the chapter is highlighted in the fourth section, which examines the changing patterns in Nigeria-South Africa relations and identifies the need for image-building in their relations as a legitimate means of “appealing” to other states in Africa’s quest for global respect. The last section provides concluding reflections of the study.

Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Outline a. The Concept of Hegemony In an attempt to properly situate the theoretical perspective of the paucity of the analytical lens of the constructivist value of soft power and public diplomacy in the estimation of the regional power status of Nigeria and South Africa, it is pertinent to briefly survey literature on regional power dynamics and the question of image as they relate to Africa, especially Nigeria and South Africa. The end of the ideological war (Cold War) between the West and the East, in which African countries were a proxy battlefield, has bolstered the academic attention in the regions and regional

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orders/powers of the world (Fawn, 2009; Prys, 2010). Thus, as one of the global regions, Africa is not left out in this academic discussion of the emergence of regional powers as key actors of regional and global governance (Nolte, 2007; Prys, 2010). Whether global or regional, the consensus view among the various approaches to hegemony is that hegemony is a political order. It is an act where a state or a group of states dominate the affairs of others within the global or regional level without recourse to regular reference to violence (Katzenstein, 2005). This suggests that the clear indicator, among others, for a state to acquire the status of hegemon without violence is acceptance and recognition of such state by the collaborating states. Meanwhile, Prys (2010) attempts a critique of Katzenstein’s view of the conceptualisation of hegemony. She opines that the definition given by Katzenstein lacks direct empirical application of a clear contributing factor to the transformation of a regional power into regional hegemon. Hence, Prys (2010: 484) explicitly demonstrates regions as open systems, through constitutive dimensions and the indicators of regional hegemony and suggests that “this regional openness impacts the role a regionally preponderant state assumes”. Operating within a regional hegemonic system, Ogunnubi and Isike (2015) observed that a regional hegemon is a powerful player that wields a superior level of influence within a defined region. Thus, a regional hegemonic power enjoys some measure of acceptance of leadership within the delimited region that it belongs to as a result of its capabilities and for the exercise of considerable influence on its regional neighbours. Consequently, from the above, without prejudices to some domestic intrigues and as it would be properly presented in the subsequent sections, Nigeria and South Africa can be said to have the requisite capacities and influence as the major hegemonic powers in the subSahara Africa region. Some scholars like Nolte (2007), Fawn (2009), Prys (2010), and Ogunnubi and Isike (2015) have specifically emphasised the role of potential regional hegemons and remained undecided about the utility of synergies between realism, liberalism, and constructivism. However, the important and required variables towards the application of soft power to describe the influence of Nigeria and South Africa, for instance, are the need to comparatively examine the material realities of an asymmetric distribution of capabilities and positive image vis-à-vis the meanings given to these preponderances both by the regional power itself as well as its regional neighbours-cum-external actors. While this chapter clearly identifies

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Nigeria and South Africa as meaningful typologies of regional powers of Africa, it focuses on a more nuanced application of soft power through a conditional variable of “image building” that impacts how states will relate to both their regional and global-level politics.

b. Conceptualising Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Specifically, while conceptualising soft power, Nye (2004: 5) observes that "a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries - admiring values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness - want to follow it". This suggests that soft power can only be used if others acknowledge this power and if those who wish to use it can shape it as a means of achieving their goals. For example, a conservative Muslim country will repulse, by all diplomatic means, a country from exporting violent films that are full of nudity rather than embracing it (Nye, 2008). Therefore, the contents of a country’s culture, values, and policies must be sufficiently attractive for public diplomacy to produce soft power. Consequently, in the estimation of global power, soft power is increasingly acquiring an important status as a significant component and a necessity for regional hegemony by co-opting states through attraction and seduction rather than coercion (Nye, 2008). Consequently, public diplomacy is increasingly a prime indicator and essential requirement of soft power (see Brown, 2012; Gilboa, 2008; Kanji, 2016; Lam, 2007). Indeed, public diplomacy is about valuable ideas and essentially a diplomatic thrust in promoting and developing the arsenal of soft power (Hemery, 2005; White and Radic, 2014). For example, military power resources did not determine the outcome of the battle between Germany and France in 1940 despite the latter’s military advantage over the former. Undeniably, the US public diplomacy has a long history in the country’s application of soft power, which rests on the resources of culture, values, and policies (Nye, 2008). In the international arena, public diplomacy involves, in some cases, non-governmental agents and requires an understanding of the roles of legitimacy/credibility and selfassessment in the making of soft power (Brown, 2012; Chiroro, 2012; Kanji, 2016; Tella, 2016). In his contribution (in The New Public Diplomacy edited by Jan Melissen), Hemery (2005) observes the inevitability of public diplomacy in the current global diplomatic settings and opines that there are a very limited number

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of foreign ministries to train states’ diplomats to be players in “amorphous transnational networks”, which hampers the effective utilisation of the traditional diplomacy. Thus, he sees public diplomacy as a profession in many countries, which could potentially be involved in training programmes that comprise different developmental skills for operating in the changed architecture of International Relations (Hemery, 2005). In essence, public diplomacy is a nation state’s attempt to favourably influence public opinion in other countries, which rely on and help build national reputations. This is true because the perception of national reputation is a collective judgment based on a number of factors, including foreign policies, responsible and responsive government, people and culture, economic policies, and economic strength among others (Passow, Fehlmann, and Grahlow, 2005; Wang, 2017; White and Radic, 2014). Therefore, the relationship between public diplomacy and soft power in this context is the difference between power measured in terms of resources and power measured in behavioural outcomes. While a country’s soft power rests on its potential resources of culture, values, and foreign policies, public diplomacy attracts the attention of other countries to these potential resources of a country by every available legal means of communication and attraction (Nye, 2008). Overreliance on hard power (coercion/payment) is not a civilised path to success in the contemporary world (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). If a country lacks the attractiveness of potential resources, it would be difficult for public diplomacy to produce soft power and it then becomes peripheral to the real issues of policy and power reality.

c. The Concept of Image Indeed, the image of any country is an important determinant of how well the country is doing at home and abroad (Cotîrlea, 2015). Depending on what factors are considered, an image can be perceived to be good or bad, negative or positive. There is no disputing the fact that a good/positive image constitutes a source of goodwill, respect, influence, prestige, and patronage for a country whereas a bad/negative image shows the exact opposite of all these attributes. Image shows the picture, ideas, values, or qualities that render a country desirable within and outside its borders. Scholars have extensively tried to rationalise the concept of image building or image branding. For instance, Simon Anholt posits on the effect and the impact a country’s image could have on national politico-security and socioeconomics (Anholt, 2007). On the other hand, Frost (2004: 9) makes a strong case for nation-branding campaigns when he remarked that: "There's

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no arguing that the image we have of another country says a lot about how we view it as a tourist destination, a place to invest or a source of consumer goods." However, image building through public diplomacy has to do with the acceptability of states’ visual symbols, values, sociocultural, political and sport, among other legitimate activities, for promoting and consolidating a nation’s image branding (Brown, 2012; Kanji, 2016; Wang, 2017; White and Radic, 2014; Melissen, 2005). Kanji (2016), in Harvard International Review, illustrates the soft diplomacy (public diplomacy) and nation branding through popular culture as a diplomatic strategy which stands warm, humane and in appealing ways rather than the coercive military power. Hence, the nature of citizen/public diplomacy is ever-evolving, and the variables that impact it are different in different countries (Passow, Fehlmann, and Grahlow, 2005). For instance, through anime and manga, Japan was able to achieve a foreign policy goal when both art forms enjoyed a broad audience, inside and outside of Japan. The promotion of anime and manga through competitions and festivals serves the purpose of furthering “understanding of and trust in” Japan, which harnessed the popular culture to polish Tokyo’s international image (Lam, 2007; Wang, 2017). More so, the British Council heads up several arts and education-based initiatives to lay the foundation for prosperity and security around the world with the hope of strengthening the connections with all countries in order to build international stability (Melissen, 2005; Kanji, 2016). Turkish citizens also promote popular traditions to attract the global crowd to view Turkey favourably through a website called Turkayfe – a blog-like interface that relies on articles written by citizens to counter the world news that only focuses on negative aspects of the country. The site takes issue with the positive aspects of Turkey’s international image (Kanji, 2016; White and Radic, 2014). While the US uses the sports diplomacy program with the universal passion for sports to transcend socio-cultural differences, Finland with the concept of “Mission for Finland” established in 2010 leverages on the strategic activities (tourism, business, investments) involving 72 organisations worldwide and public/citizens participation in the creation and realisation of the Finland national “project” (Parmar and Cox, 2010). In summary, as democratic states, Nigeria and South Africa’s bilateral relations should not be mere international communication but should increasingly engage in ideas and values and involve nongovernmental agents as one of the most effective ways of development.

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d. Hegemony and Power Theory The theoretical perspective of this chapter, taking into consideration its involvement in a state’s behaviour and the intricacies of the use of power, is anchored on Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony and power (Gramsci, 1971). The Italian Marxist posits that power does not depend solely on coercion or strength but hinges on approval. This suggests that a state’s power is drawn from the ability to appeal, and not necessarily through the traditional hard power. In fact, power waxes and wanes based on the world’s perception, rightly or wrongly, of the country in question (Landsberg, 2008; Gallarotti, 2011). However, the power politics approach explains that the international system focuses on self-help; an arena where self-centred states compete for power, influence, resources, and survival in conflict and cooperation. Therefore, not every country will acknowledge the role of soft power, most especially in a free society. The influence of some powerful countries might not be shaped by those who wish to use it. Notwithstanding the above position, Mearsheimer (2001) maintains that a country cannot possibly be designated with hegemonic status possessing the entire wherewithal and paraphernalia of military, socio-political, and economic powers without the existence of other powerful states to compete with. With the proliferation of multi-polar powers within the regional context and conceptual controversy in the categorisations of power, Landsberg (2008) argues that regional hegemon is the “pivotal state” or “middle power state” in the hierarchy of global power with the ability to influence other states within and outside the region. What this suggests is that there is a need for deliberate collaboration of other states (within the region) with the regional powers, especially at the regional levels, to compete in the global power interplay. Hence, in the sub-consciousness of sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria and South Africa are two leading countries that fall within Landsberg’s context of a pivotal state that can positively or negatively influence the region. Thus, there is a need for effective cooperation rather than separation or conflict, irrespective of the differences between Nigeria and South Africa and building of partnerships within the international community, in the pursuit of African interests in global politics. The use of Gramsci’s and Landsberg’s conceptions of power and hegemony as theoretical contributions to this chapter suggests a synergy between Nigeria and South Africa relations with a view to regional leadership that is able to spread an ideological basis, either by covert or overt consensus, for other countries within its sphere of

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influence and possesses the capacity to maintain peace and cooperation, which will ensure corporate social responsibility and a genuine means of image building.

Material Capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa Scholars in the academic circle, especially in the field of Political Science and International Relations, have come up with divergent views on the concept of power and drawn up sentiments on which nations have power in the international arena (Gilboa, 2008; Landsberg, 2008; Nye, 2014; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015; Wang, 2017; Dahl, 1957). Beyond the realm of International Relations, power has been traditionally defined in Political Science “as the ability to realise wishes and produce the effects one wants to produce” (Baylis and Smith, 1997). This definition suggests that power is exercised in order to cause those who are subject to it to follow the private preference of those who possess power. Indeed, power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. Consequently, Nigeria and South Africa have secured a place in the international power equations and leadership scheme in sub-Sahara Africa, which is capable of continental development and archetypes of regional diplomatic links. Thus, the discussion here is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise on the might of Nigeria and South Africa within the African region; rather, the ultimate purpose of this study is to examine very specific notions of power, which is mainly “soft power” and its deployment as a major requirement for hegemonic status in the continent. This is because the most effective type of power is the ability to influence and manage people’s thoughts and desires in order to pre-empt future conflict. This aspect of power (soft power) can be viewed in the context of a state’s cultural socialisation with others and its ability to manage the control of information and mass media in order to maintain positive belief systems and the legitimacy of its foreign policy. Be that as it may, Nigeria and South Africa were indeed selected based on, first and foremost, the strength of their respective claims to being the giants of Africa and the international perception of each of them as African leaders (Mazrui, 2006; Bach, 2007; Adebajo and Mustapha, 2008); secondly, it is also based on the structure of their external influence in Africa’s security crises, peacekeeping operations, and conflict resolution (Akujuru and Ruddock, 2016; Bamidele, 2015; Sampson, 2016); and thirdly, the two

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countries have the largest economies in Africa with robust foreign policy involvement in Africa and a healthy portion of regional hegemonic power (Adebajo, 2007; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). In summary, scholars’ views on the characters of Nigeria and South Africa are directly proportional to both countries’ commitment to playing leadership roles in the continent. Nigeria began relations with South Africa in the 1960s, against the backdrop of her Afrocentric posture. The concerted efforts made by these countries, to position Africa in the global space and peacebuilding cannot be compared with any efforts by other African states. The relations of these major powers of Africa have been strengthened by their efforts to resuscitate Africa’s ailing economy and mediate the consequences of imperialism. In fact, there are discussions and much anticipation concerning the potential of Nigeria and South Africa as regional powers, capable of taking care of conflicts, economic deprivation, and political instabilities (Bach, 2007; Bamidele, 2015; Prys, 2009; 2010). Indeed, the predominant components of Nigeria and South Africa’s external relations have received ample attention in the literature and the basis on which actions and rhetoric have been deployed. For instance, there is a general agreement among scholars that the global perception of Nigeria, immediately after independence was that of a nation that had been destined to lead Africa and the entire black race, hence, necessitating Afrocentric posture (Agbu et al., 2013; Akinterinwa, 2013; Amao and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Bach, 2007; Effiong, 2012; Saliu, 2014). Undoubtedly, this Afrocentric thrust has oscillated between activism and docility (Aleyomi, 2017). Significantly, Nigeria is a regional peacekeeper, ranking as Africa’s largest economy in 2014, a generator of business and investment, and a key interlocutor on debt and continent-wide initiatives such as the African Union-led negotiations and peacekeeping operation in the Darfur region of Sudan among other places. Pointedly, Nigeria’s strategic position in Africa, coupled with its teeming population and a rich endowment of mineral resources including oil and gas have all contributed to the notion of its power and manifest destiny in Africa and beyond (Bach, 2007; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). Since independence, Nigeria's objectives in its relations with the rest of the international community reflect the determinations of promoting and defending Africa's interests (for example, the struggle for the emancipation of the rest of Africa through the full use of its intellectual, moral, and material resources) while at the same time ensuring the defence of its national interest (Agbu et al., 2013). These foreign policy objectives, as highlighted by Sir Tafawa Balewa, which were eloquently declared by the former Minister of External

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Affairs – Mr. Jaja Wachukwu – are predicated on the national interest and enlightened self-interest of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Alao, 2011; Amao and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). On the scales of cultural attraction, political values and foreign policy instrument, Nigeria’s soft power attributes and potentials include the cultural reach of Nigeria’s film industry (Nollywood); its sporting accomplishments (e.g., the Super Eagles and Super Falcons national football teams); the country’s Afrocentric foreign policy articulation and policy of good neighbourliness; the admirable image and strength of some of the country’s political, business/industrialist, religious, and academic personalities; and other indigenous exports such as food, media, music, mode of dressing, and language (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2018). Unfortunately, these have not been seen to provide the needed order and stability to the continent, let alone influence the behaviour of other states in Africa to raising Africa’s perspective and reducing the intellectual marginalisation of the continent. However, to briefly situate its role in the international environment, on the one hand, Nigeria had championed, led, and participated in many interventions of some countries that were majorly under the ravages of conflicts, colonialism, racial discrimination (apartheid), and, in fact, internecine wars that happened in various countries in the West African subregion, Africa, and other parts of the world by sending its troops for peacekeeping missions to various war-zones (Uduma and Nwosu, 2015). Nigeria led the challenge against the obnoxious system of apartheid in South Africa and helped to decolonise many countries like Congo, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in achieving independence. Nigeria also engaged in the contributions of financial and material largesse to the wellbeing of fellow African as well as Caribbean countries. This impactful role and orientation earned Nigeria a significant image of a responsible and well-respected member among the global comity of nations. On the other hand, there are also quite a number of opportunities for South Africa to position itself in Africa’s leadership and as a powerful player in regional and global politics, in order to leverage its influence in the international arena. In line with the rapid growth market of soft power index, South Africa leads other African countries in possession of soft power resources, which it wields to gain international benefits (Ogunnubi, 2015; Ogunnubi and Tella, 2017). More so, the country has the largest concentration of diaspora whites outside Europe and America (Mazrui, 2006; Chiroro, 2012) and is the only African country in the G20, an informal

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forum of a global steering committee that discusses economic and financial cooperation. South Africa is classified as the most industrialised and advanced African country (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). Indeed, South Africa is a member of the BRICS nations, which also include Brazil, Russia, India, and China (Chiroro, 2012). The country provides an increased supply of public goods in the form of a stable currency through a reliable monetary policy and development assistance. Considering its material capabilities at the regional level, South Africa plays an important role in trade within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the continent (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). The country is taking on a growing role in the governance of the Southern African strongholds, particularly with respect to regional cooperation agreements and uses its network power to influence development on a global and regional scale. For instance, South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy shows the concerted interest of the South African government in upholding democracy and good governance not only in Zimbabwe but also in its neighbouring countries. This indicates that South Africa’s regional policy generates regional solidarity to avoid a spillover of destabilising tendencies from Zimbabwe to the rest of Southern Africa (Prys, 2009; 2010). Indeed, the US National Security Strategy outline of 17 September 2002 singled out South Africa as one of the key countries (alongside Nigeria, Egypt, and Angola) in Africa that have a major impact on their neighbourhood in generating regional solidarity (Prys, 2010). Also, the European Union pushed for a free trade agreement (FTA) with South Africa and upgraded its bilateral relationship to a strategic partnership in 2006. This suggests that the South African economy has created a larger than life image for itself, with much ado and anticipation to pull along other countries in the continent, as a growth engine, to bring stability, strength to the African Union and some other regional organisations, and take a leading role in solving Africa’s developmental woes. Sparks (2003, cited in Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015: 156), observes that South Africa is “a regional superpower in the world’s most marginalized continent, the one country that could perhaps provide the engine to pull Africa out of its mire of poverty and desperation”. Therefore, South Africa, just like Nigeria, is well placed as a regional power with the potential of projecting a positive African image. According to the Economist of 3 December 2011, Nigeria and South Africa have a combined GDP of over 1 trillion dollars, which, if they were to be

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one country, would make them the 12th largest economy in the world. Trade between Africa and the rest of the world continues to increase at a much higher rate than what was achieved about two decades ago. Nigeria and South Africa boast sophisticated financial infrastructures like well capitalised banks and emerging capital markets. South Africa’s telecommunication giant MTN, among other giant African companies, has made the telecommunication sector one of the most profitable sectors on the continent, with high mobile penetration growing at an increasing rate, with an estimated over 150 million phones in use in both Nigeria and South Africa (Aleyomi, 2017). On the strength of the foregoing, Nigeria and South Africa are the beacons of hope for the continent and engine rooms to halt Africa’s poverty and unwarranted desperation, reducing the intellectual marginalisation, and, thereby, raising Africa's perspective among the comity of nations. Unfortunately, the reverse is the case due to internal exigencies of bad governance, unhealthy rivalry, and pull-down syndrome upon which other factors, including external pressures of globalisation, are built. Consequently, the discussions about African leadership have ensued familiar contours of whether Nigeria or its “brother”, South Africa, is the giant of Africa. The bid of some contestations and the latest wave of attacks on Nigerians residing in South Africa, which has been described as a power/leadership tussle between the two countries, attracted international condemnation (see Tella, 2016). Some interested discussants and analysts alike (especially Nigerians) have questioned whether South Africa is a friend or foe, rival or ally (Olupohunda, 2013; Ogunnubi and Tella, 2017). In fact, some analysts have tagged South Africa as an unappreciative country, considering the role Nigeria played during the South Africa apartheid struggle. They have also analysed what such competition portends for the development of subSaharan African relations. Importantly, however, the reference to Nigeria and South Africa in academic discourse (as countries to reckon with in Africa), reflects the comparative power advantage and their commitment to play leadership roles within the continent and beyond. Hence, it is for these reasons that, despite the availability of material capabilities, the effective mobilisation of soft power attributes through the public (which are strategically attuned within their foreign policy goals) are essential requirements in solving the internal weaknesses and maintaining attractive images for both Nigeria and South Africa through the content of their culture, values, and policies. Undoubtedly, it would afford the two countries the ability to establish preferences that tend to be associated with

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intangible assets such as an attractive personality and culture; political values and institutions; and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority, which are all imports of public diplomacy, towards a reputable hegemonic status.

Beyond Material Capabilities: The Need for Image Building for Nigeria and South Africa Indeed, in the modern world of states, regional hegemon is largely determined by its power, either in terms of economic resources or military capabilities, or both. The presence of viable natural resources, raw materials and economic capacity in a state, are not only crucial tripartite elements of industrialisation and technological development but also a prominent incontrovertible index of hegemony. Economic capacity is the “backbone” of any state in the contemporary world. Though, one paradox of economic capacity is the fact that quite a few states that have developed economies, like Singapore, tend to have little or no raw materials and minerals (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010). From the preceding section, Nigeria and South Africa have economic capacities in their respective sub-regions. Unfortunately, on a global scale, the potentials available in these African countries have not created a positive image, especially to massive development in the world of science and technology towards becoming acceptable regional hegemons. This development (which is majorly affected by domestic challenges) carries with it other socio-political and economic implications of proportional concern while discussing power politics in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa has strong structures and paraphernalia of soft power attributes, which include: democracy and constitutionalism; respect for international laws, norms, and institutions; fundamental reliance on bilateral and multilateral cooperation; willingness to sacrifice short-term national interests in order to contribute towards the collective good; and liberal foreign economic policies (Effiong, 2012; Saliu, 2014; Sidiropoulos, 2014). But the internal problems, such as bad governance, the issues of social cohesion and the inability to create conducive economic environments to facilitate abundant opportunities for individuals, sociocultural and politicoeconomic intolerance in the domestic sphere, and the external problem of globalisation, are indispensable areas to address. Thus, the issue of image or perception is very crucial in every interaction (Aleyomi, 2017). Undoubtedly, the exercise of soft power may affect a nation’s image either negatively or positively. As Chiroro (2012) notes, giving international aid

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may positively enhance a nation’s image, but some critics might condemn philanthropic action and see such a step as a way of supporting certain regimes. For instance, Nigeria engages, as an instrument of its foreign policy, in consolidating its hegemonic roles by sharing the country’s knowhow and expertise with other African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries; giving assistance on the basis of assessed and perceived needs of the recipient countries; promoting cooperation and understanding between Nigerian and beneficiary countries; and facilitating meaningful contacts between the youths of Nigeria and those of the recipient countries, among other objectives of the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS), evidence of soft power use by Nigeria through the public forum. Indeed, the TACS programme is framed as people-oriented and peoplecentred assistance geared towards the development of recipient countries. The international goodwill generated, especially from the USA, Germany, Britain, and Cuba, as a result of the positive contributions of the TACS, could be translated into firm support for Nigeria’s perceived interest in the international arena by both states and many others. Another example of Nigeria’s display of soft power is the supply of energy to neighbouring states in West Africa. Nigeria supplies power to (among other countries), her neighbours of Togo, Benin Republic, and Niger, and, by extension, to Ghana in the West Africa sub-region. This enables Nigeria to consolidate its soft power use and to respect the bilateral relations on existing agreements to supply electricity and tackle the energy problems in her neighbouring countries. Ironically, these neighbouring countries do not only enjoy better power supply than Nigeria, but the donor is ranked second worst electricity supply nation by the Spectator index of the world’s worst electricity in 2017 (Okafor, 2018). Indeed, one of the biggest challenges Nigeria has faced since it gained independence on 1 October 1960 is the problem of power supply. This is not unconnected to bad governance and ill-fated political values, which have been identified as the most critical factors responsible for hindering the culture of growth and development, and for poverty and insecurity and illegitimacy, especially in promoting legitimacy of its foreign policy and recognition by others as exemplified in the conceptualisation of soft power by its proponent (Nye, 2008; 2014). Consequently, the quest for power and influence by Nigeria and South Africa on the continent requires genuine acceptability and positive image among the member states. Possessing good image by Nigeria and South Africa, which should be reflective on their bilateral ties towards the

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achievement of African rebirth, is a fulcrum of hope for raising African perspectives in the field of international politics and thus, endears both countries to many countries as facilitators of effective cooperation in sociocultural, politico-economic values, and foreign policy development among other countries within and outside the region of Africa. With the possession of soft power and the abundant availability of raw materials and mineral resources in Nigeria and South Africa, the critical issue hampering the good image of the two leading countries to reinforce their regional leadership in sub-Sahara Africa is corruption and unattractive leadership styles. In consequence, bad image, largely as a result of domestic factors, limits the level of Nigeria’s acceptability among the comity of nations notwithstanding the country’s material capability. Although, a review of the potential and illusion of Nigeria’s soft power sources by Ogunnubi and Isike (2017) reveals that the Nigerian government has intentionally attempted to create a special approach in terms of gaining soft power and making it a factor in its diplomatic strategy in Africa and beyond (e.g., TACS, electricity supply to neighbouring countries, building a Nigerian cultural diplomacy and so forth), but the internal dynamics, such as bad governance, canonisation of corruption, internal insurrections and security challenges, widely prevalent perception of criminality and so forth have grievously impacted negatively on the uses of soft power for the transformation of global perceptions of Nigeria and Nigerians. Undeniably, however, the international and domestic sources of soft power that act as a catalyst for peace, progress, and development are, amongst others, the reflection of policies and actions that exemplify justice, collective concern, and security, and the rules of fair play and good governance. These key indicators of soft power use are not genuinely pursued in Nigeria and by Nigerians, and this hampers the use of soft power through members of the public in the country and hence impacts negatively on how Nigeria is perceived among the comity of nations. Because the direction of a country’s image, which could be internal (self) or external (mirror), is a multidimensional picture description and inferential beliefs that give information about any country and not necessarily the measure of material capabilities which such a state has acquired. Since the return to uninterrupted civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria continues to face immense challenges, including insecurity, corruption, and election malpractices, among other resonating factors that hinder the culture of civility in making a good image at the global level. Nigeria is currently operating an “insecurity-based democracy” which could be literally known

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according to Dukor (2011), as “bunker democracy”. The political landscape is not free but rather filled with valleys, gutters, gullies, and booby-traps. Nigeria’s bunker democracy is a harvest of freedom without human value, liberty, or equity. As Nigeria grapples with persistent corruption, bad governance, and insecurity challenges, including the menace of Boko Haram and the herders/farmers crisis, there is the poor dispensation of soft power through the engagement of the public. Also, South Africa is recognised as a country that possesses great assets with the best use and exercise of soft power in comparison with other African countries through its culture, political values, and legitimacy in its foreign policy thrusts, especially with other Southern African nations (Chiroro, 2012; Sidiropoulos, 2014; Ogunnubi, 2015; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). However, the conscious and general acquiescence and glorification of xenophobic attacks by the people and government of South Africa hampers the bilateral ties with some African countries, especially with Nigeria. This heinous act has not only outraged the conscience of the Nigerian public, but created a gap in the claim that South Africa has the best use of soft power, resulting in the country’s external image and continental leadership doldrums (Tella, 2016). It is important to note that people migrating in search of safer and more prosperous living conditions is as old as man. Besides, the right of any person to reside in any country is enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. While it is practically impossible to eradicate social tensions in any country, the “unfriendly” attitude of the government and nationals of South Africa to respect universal and regional treaties that they are signatory to, as well as other complexities and social infractions of national laws, impede the reality of South Africa’s use of soft power and their ambitions of a positive image in Africa. Besides the above, the heavyweight allegations of corruption on the immediate past leader of South Africa, President Jacob Zuma, has contributed to the culture of bad leadership and governance and dampened the positive image perception of the country among the comity of nations. Indeed, lack of political will and reputation for corruption in both states, xenophobic attacks in South Africa, and bad leadership, among other social menaces, have a harmful influence on Africa’s image projection and development. For instance, the pathetic aspect of corruption in Nigeria and the culture of xenophobia in South Africa, result in negative impressions of these countries and their citizens (soft power currencies) outside the shores

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of their countries, especially in Europe, America, and Asia (Carmody, 2012; Tella and Ogunnubi, 2013; Alden and Schoeman, 2015). Hence, there is a high tendency of the foregoing to erode the efficacy of their rising soft powers and constrain the two countries’ capacity to play a hegemonic role within Africa. Therefore, the ability to influence any country (acceptably) goes beyond socioeconomic and politico-military jingoism; rather it hinges on effective image building and the issue of legitimacy. In fact, it extends well beyond designing a fancy logo and slogans or insertion of the media. The actions or inactions of a country both at the domestic and international levels are the key elements of a country's image, which serves as reflections of perceptions and acceptability. Thus, in this era of globalisation, countries are competing against each other in the same way as brands do. As we have noted in the previous section, Nigeria and South Africa have a huge competitive advantage. However, the contemporary global trend is tilted to global stability, which can only be achieved through complementary actions rather than competition. The competitive nature between Nigeria and South Africa is part of the major catastrophe that reduces the attraction of Africa and places the region’s interest in a low position among the international community.

Concluding Remarks Nigeria and South Africa have credible foreign policy records, especially in Africa. Substantial material capabilities also justify their regional hegemonic status. These have contributed to the spirit of pan-African solidarity, brotherhood, collectivism, consensus, cooperation, regionalism, and integration (under the Afrocentric thrust). Thus, the collective mobilisation of soft power through public diplomacy as an integral instrument for soft power attributes will not only position Nigeria and South Africa as pivotal states but also place the two leading countries as the defenders of the interests of African states having the capacities and capabilities of regional hegemonic powers to do so. A conscious and steady attention to the attributes of soft power will enable Nigeria and South Africa to push through a sub-Saharan region, an African, and a more humane global agenda of immense magnitude in the overall international arena. However, as the study notes, effective and acceptable communication (public diplomacy) is critical for the maximisation of softpower features, as there is a symbiotic relationship between domestic and foreign policy. Material capabilities in terms of any form of resources

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cannot be enough as the only source of power without the internal cultural ability, policies, and practices of setting the pace in the way a country handles its relations with others and seduces them to believe, accept, and perhaps follow it. Thus, in achieving these behavioural outcomes, a positive image and a high level of legitimacy are indispensable. Consequently, public diplomacy is quite instrumental as it involves a people-to-people, rather than a government-to-government approach to communication. Indeed, public diplomacy is an instrument deployed by governments to mobilise the resources of culture, values, and policies to communicate with and attract the public of other countries. Hence, image building is a subset of NigeriaSouth Africa relations and should be projected towards leading the other African states, especially the sub-Saharan region, in the international arena. Any country that wants global respect must, as a matter of paramount importance, establish a favourable reputation of being politically responsible and responsive, be security conscious and cooperative, and have an economically stable nation state. On one hand, South Africa seems to be working in line with the paraphernalia of soft power but lacks the engagement of the people in its diplomatic affairs with other African citizens, especially with Nigeria. On the other hand, Nigeria’s influence in Africa has been radically and continuously reduced with limited attempts to demonstrate its soft power influence in Africa, as South Africa is currently demonstrating. The way in which Nigeria’s policymakers view this situation towards the effective application of soft power through the involvement of the people will enhance its global image and acceptability. In the current situation, if Nigeria continues to expend efforts only on the hard power of cooperation and its current diplomatic policy remains unchanged, its influence in Africa as a pivotal state will soon be eroded and overtaken by others. It must be noted that Nigeria is no longer the eminent economic power in Africa. South Africa is a major force and contender in this regard. Thus, Nigeria should find an alternative approach to achieve its diplomatic purpose and to contribute to the development of the continent. Soft power might be one tool to diversify and reanimate Nigeria’s diplomatic relations with South Africa. More importantly, the deliberate collaboration of Nigeria with South Africa will significantly influence the stand of Africa, especially sub-Saharans, in the global politics of power play.

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Thus, it is hoped that the application of soft power through public diplomacy will promote viable diplomatic ties between Nigeria and South Africa, which will further enhance the fulfilment of the growing calls to raise Africa's perspectives in the field of International Relations. Soft power will only be effective when a country is less parochial and becomes more sensitive to foreign perceptions. Therefore, for Africa to be perceived as a significant force in the power mix of international affairs, the policymakers of both Nigeria and South Africa must be sensitive to how these countries are perceived among the comity of nations. Feedback on the policies of the country is an indispensable mechanism for a satisfactory acceptability level in the international arena. In fact, there must be a social responsibility between the two countries. Be that as it may, the unwholesome politicisation of migration as an excuse for xenophobia in South Africa can be addressed by the effective utilisation of public diplomacy as a diplomatic means of the application of soft power by both countries. The issues and factors of migration that include increased unemployment, poverty, and greed must be paramount in retooling the new Nigeria-South Africa relationship. Both countries must promote and sustain protection mechanisms for human rights with the creation of environments that are conducive and decent to work under for migrant workers. Besides, there must be mutual diplomatic and tactful reciprocity on the part of the South Africa government with Nigeria. Although the long-term pay-off of public diplomacy and soft power in Nigeria and South Africa ties may be slow and not readily measurable, there is no doubting the fact that the diplomatic means will facilitate collaboration towards Africa’s rebirth, and thus propel legitimacy and acceptability. Conclusively, as a result of the above analysis of the power equation between Nigeria and South Africa, the vested interests of African regional powers and their capabilities to defend them as well as the means available, devised, and deployed to achieve these ends in the international arena are selfish, primitive, divisive, and garrulous. There is a negative perception of the two leading powers of Africa by the international community. Until, and unless, the soft power of the two leading countries attracts legitimacy, which is a prime necessity of synergy and acceptability, and both nations jettison the loquacious and selfish bids of traditional hard power, defending the interest of African states and making Africa relevant and powerful in the international power politics will be a mirage.

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CHAPTER TWELVE CONCLUDING THOUGHT: AN AFROCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE ON REGIONALISM, HEGEMONY, AND GEOPOLITICS SAMUEL OYEWOLE AND OLUSOLA OGUNNUBI

Harvesting Smart Power in Africa This edited volume initiated to offer a contemporary analysis of geopolitical calculations in Africa, focusing mainly on Nigeria and South Africa, was intended to provide an opportunity for emerging scholars from Africa to contribute to the debate on regionalism and power politics in the African region, and to reflect more critically from a wide variety of empirical sources that may not have been available in extant literature. No doubt, there have been several studies on the rivalry and political contestation between the two countries, and more will yet emerge after our contribution. However, contributions in this volume were guided by three or four main objectives. First, it was important to insert alternative voices and discourses, especially from Africa, into the mainstream scholarship on regionalism and hegemony, which perhaps takes away the focus from a state-centric and realist-based assessment of power politics in the continent. Because of the internal weaknesses of many states in Africa and the difficulty this poses in the analysis of geopolitical realities in the region (Destradi et al., 2018; Ogunnubi, 2014), it was necessary to provide a multi-level and multi-actor approach that transcends the limited lens offered through realism and other Western perspectives. It was, therefore, necessary to provide a robust account of African experiences and perspectives to illustrate the importance of power politics in the region. Part of this task was to address the presumed overemphasis on International Relations and International Studies contexts that are

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sometimes alien to Africa or privileged Western and Eurocentric scholarships (Dunn and Shaw, 2001). Perspectives from Africa are important to fully understanding and appreciating the global contexts of international relations, both as a field of study and discipline, while also offering alternative theoretical insights into the dynamics and limitations of regional hegemony both as concept and practice. For instance, as evidenced by the foreign policy analysis of major powers in Africa, the realist framework of power politics is insufficient as an approach to fully understanding the dynamics of international relations and power politics among states. As Saka et al. in this volume submit, in some cases, the ideational value of altruism, rather than self-interest proposed by realism, has underscored the Afrocentric foreign policies of both Nigeria and South Africa (see also Ogunnubi, 2019 and Oshewolo, 2018). Therefore, assessing the interests of regional powers in Africa must call for a multipronged approach and take into consideration an Africanist approach that foregrounds the experiences of these big states. Secondly, what we also sought to achieve was to introduce the concept of soft power in the studies on hegemony and regionalism in Africa, and, perhaps, initiate a new direction of conversation on the arrangement of a cooperative hegemonic order championed by both Nigeria and South Africa through the complementary efforts of their hard and soft power. Too many studies on regional powerhood in Africa have centred on an assessment of the hard power components of Nigeria and South Africa, particularly in terms of their material preponderance of economic and military resources. Whereas, despite reasonable material capabilities relative to other African states, neither Nigeria nor South Africa wields enough power to lay claim to regional hegemony, although the Afrocentric trajectory of their foreign policies scores both countries' significant leverage over and above other regional power contenders (Ogunnubi, 2019). Also, the available soft power resources of the two countries, which are almost on a par in measurement, appear to convey a symbolic acceptance of their regional hegemonic status in Africa (Alden and Schoeman, 2015; Ogunnubi, 2015; 2019). As scholars and students of power politics in Africa try to make sense of the experiences of the interaction and expectations of regional powers in the continent, we can look further into the extent to which internal factors limit the recognition of regional hegemony/powerhood and how legitimisation is secured through a nuanced official and unofficial deployment of soft power. Thirdly, while the discourse on power distribution in Africa has often centred on episodic competition and confrontation between both countries, we hope to use this volume to establish a new path that examines regional

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hegemonic stability in Africa wherein cooperation takes centre stage for the collective benefits of members in the region. In other words, the two countries must use not only their economic and military resources but also their available beauty, brilliance, and benignity for the enrichment of Africa and its people. It is within this context that future studies need to delve more into the nexus between regional hegemony and regional governance and security. Therefore, the task ahead of Nigeria and South Africa should be that of harnessing their smart power capabilities, which will involve the deliberate combination and mobilisation of both hard and soft power to actualise desired goals. Another stronger motivation for this volume was the urge to give a platform to younger and emerging scholars of African foreign policy analysis to contribute to the topic of Nigeria-South Africa relations. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of analysis on regional hegemony in Africa by a new generation of African scholars. This book was, therefore, a unique avenue for younger African scholars to contribute their perspective to a conversation that is perhaps largely dominated by Western scholars and some established ones from Nigeria and South Africa. This is in response to the challenge from Masters et al. (2015) to nurture and develop new African scholars of foreign policy analysis in order to achieve a clearer nuance of contributions coming from the region and to give room for marginalised perspectives such as Afrocentrism. To this end, many of the authors in this volume, both Nigerian and South African, are already leading the debate on various themes of regionalism and hegemonic discourses from sub-regional, regional, and global contexts. Afrocentrism, therefore, presents a significant theoretical lens to appreciate and understand the multiple contexts of power politics and influence in Africa. There is no debate about the influence of Nigeria and South Africa on the continent both in terms of hard and soft power. With a combined economic size that is almost a quarter of the rest of the continent, huge military expenditure and capabilities, and unrivalled soft power endowment, the two countries have put Africa at the forefront of their foreign policies. Clearly, both countries share common themes in their material and ideational capabilities that unarguably recognise them as regional powers in Africa. Importantly, beyond this hegemonic appellation that may not necessarily fit Western and Eurocentric prescriptions, the chapters by Mokgosi and Shai emphasise the point that Nigeria-South Africa relations must focus more on their “manifest destiny” of contributing meaningfully towards regional peace, security, and development in Africa. And as the volumes in the book have shown, the pattern of Afrocentric experiences of

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the foreign policies of Nigeria and South Africa deviate from mainstream analysis of International Relations, which are dominated by realism, liberalism, and Marxism. The Afrocentric theoretical standpoint is an attempt to address the exclusion of indigenous African contexts from theoretical postulations and empirical explanations in the discipline of International Relations. This alternative approach lends itself to a more useful account of the interests, value, and culture of Africans in the explanation and contribution of Africa’s contexts to international relations and foreign policy analysis. This collection of essays is perhaps the first attempt by African scholars in Africa to include their voice in the discourse on hegemony and regionalism in Africa. Introducing Afrocentric theoretical paradigms to international relations scholarship is, therefore, necessary to give meaning to the strong Afrocentric tune of foreign policy analysis in Africa with reference to Nigeria and South Africa where the themes of Pan-Africanism, altruism, Ubuntu, “quiet diplomacy”, “Africa first”, Afro-optimism, African Agenda, African solutions to African problems, and African agency continue to dominate ongoing discourses. It is, therefore, important for more perspectives from Africa to address the continued dislocation of Africa’s contexts from theoretical postulations and empirical realities on International Relations. For instance, what are the basics of hegemonic credentials in Africa, and how does this fit mainstream Western and Eurocentric prescriptions on the subject? This led us to ask further questions about the meaning of hegemony and power in the African context. Ogbonna and Ikem, in Chapter Three of this volume, address some of these questions.

Implications for Geopolitics in Africa and Prospects for Future Studies This study has unravelled a few implications for geopolitical realities in Africa and, specifically, for the understanding of foreign policy analysis of Nigeria-South Africa relations. Firstly, Africa remains relevant to any global understanding of International Relations, and vice-versa International Relations is indeed useful to appreciating Africa’s contexts of foreign policy behaviour. Undertaking more rigorous studies on African foreign policy such as this is therefore important for including alternative scholarly voices from African extraction to apply non-Western theoretical and methodological insights of International Relations in the study of Africa.

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Secondly, the immediate geopolitical realities in Africa would suggest that a shared hegemonic posture exists in Africa secured with the joint participation of both Nigeria and South Africa. This compelling turn of narrative deviates sharply from what is prominent in extant literature about the prevalence of dominant hegemonic power in a specific regional sphere. This might have been the case prior to post-apartheid South Africa wherein Nigeria enjoyed considerable global attention as a result of its Afrocentric foreign policy and “big-brother” status and the non-participation of Pretoria due to imposed apartheid sanctions (Ogunnubi, 2019). The same can be said when South Africa emerged from apartheid under the inspirational leadership of Nelson Mandela and Nigeria, on the other hand, slipped into international isolation as a result of the dictatorial military government of Sani Abacha until President Obasanjo took over in 1999 (Ogunnubi, 2013; Oshewolo, 2018; Omotola, 2008). Safe to say that since the start of this millennium, a cooperative hegemony shared between Nigeria and South Africa appeared to have emerged in what has been termed a “concert of powers” and an “axis of virtue” demonstrating both countries’ ability to play leadership roles in Africa (Landsberg, 2008; Adebajo, 2007). Another implication that can be drawn from this study is that the hard power features of military and economic capabilities of regional powers are insufficient to make conclusive arguments about the location of hegemony in Africa. Also, there is an increasing call to move the analysis of the geopolitics in Africa beyond the realist notions of power politics and into more empirically rewarding aspects of global/regional governance, security, integration, and cooperation among regional powers. The military and economic dimensions of power politics require further scrutiny in the study of International Relations in Africa. In this volume, Oyewole (Chapter Four) has argued that the appraisal of the relevance of military power in Africa, for instance, is necessary to bridge the evident lacuna between Africanist theoretical lenses and the quest for human security on the one hand and for addressing the limited focus of realism on national security on the other. A comparative assessment of the power capabilities of major powers in Africa, including Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, and South Africa, demonstrates the geostrategic limitations of any regional hegemon or power in Africa. This is because no state on the continent wields preponderant power capability sufficient to project power beyond their sub-region recklessly. In other words, the geospatial and asymmetric spread of hard power competences for both Nigeria and South Africa in the region makes the

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theoretical and empirical unravelling of hegemony very difficult. For instance, while Algeria ranks highest in Africa in terms of military expenditures over the last ten years, its military engagement in the region is suspect. Therefore, what this volume has shown is the enduring relevance of military capabilities and capacity in the discourse of hegemony and regionalism in Africa. However, the context to which comparative military power assessment should be done must be one that sees Nigeria and South Africa not as competing actors but cooperative agents in the achievement of mutually compatible goals of championing the cause of Africa and Africans (Ogunnubi and Amusan, 2018; Amusan and Oyewole, 2017; Landsberg, 2008). It was for this purpose that the South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission (BNC) was established in 1999 to strengthen relations between both countries by exploring trade opportunities for private investors for both parties (Adebajo, 2007). As Raji (Chapter Seven) indicates, the BNC was followed by the Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce in 2001 to increase trade potentials and increase FDI inflow between both countries. Indeed, both countries need to do more to maximise the prospects of the BNC in order to open more opportunities and consequently improve the economic standing of Africa. There is no denying the fact that the slow progress of Nigeria and South Africa will ultimately impact negatively on the rest of the continent. It is also important to stress that a careful analysis of the foreign policies of both Nigeria and South Africa revealed common themes that overlap. For example, both countries reflect an idealistic and moralist view, which can be termed altruistic in nature while they have also served as shining examples of global peace through their contribution to peacekeeping in Africa and further afield. Also, Pan-Africanism is a typical signature of the two countries’ foreign policy, and it is for this reason that the toga of “bigbrother” is common to Nigeria and South Africa. Another noticeable theme is the Afro-modernity substance of South Africa and the Afro-sentimentalism of Nigeria which dovetails into the central theme of Afrocentrism. Furthermore, while South Africa has sought to promote the values of human rights and democracy within the continent, Nigeria, on the other hand, has historically led the campaign against colonialism and racial discrimination in black Africa. Its development assistance through the TACs is another evidence of its deep interest in Africa’s welfare. Above all, both countries share substantial resources in terms of soft power capabilities and potential over and above the rest of Africa. Overall, all these features have helped to advance the perception of a regional hegemonic status for both countries and explain their influence and leadership role in Africa.

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Again, it is evident that domestic factors remain a serious impediment for states seeking hegemonic influence. In effect, Nigeria and South Africa are bedevilled by debilitating internal issues that detract from their capacity to project hegemonic influence (Ogunnubi, 2019; Aleyomi, 2017). Furthermore, the soft power theme in the analysis of hegemony and regionalism in Africa has gained traction in some early works on South Africa, but less interest has been focused on Nigeria. The contributions from Aluko, Ogunnubi, and Aleyomi in Chapters Six, Eleven, and Twelve respectively, provide brilliant attempts to address this gap from the angles of Nigeria’s economic diplomacy, public diplomacy, and three other sources of its soft power including Nollywood, international megachurches, and its contribution to literature. These authors have underscored the imperative of soft power as a critical component in the calibration of states’ power capabilities and the identification of regional hegemony. While there is no doubting the effect and relevance of hard power; however, soft power features a country’s beauty, brilliance, and benignity, conveying a symbolic power status on the countries that possess it. As this volume suggests, Nigeria and South Africa possess unrivalled soft power potentials, resources, and capabilities more than any African country. More so, both states have found ways to use their material capabilities to achieve soft power benefits through development assistance, peacekeeping, and economic diplomacy. Soft power is thus increasingly becoming important to conversations on geopolitics in Africa. No doubt, the absence of a clear policy blueprint on how to cultivate the benefits of soft power remains missing in the design of both countries’ foreign policies, although in rhetoric, the South African National Development Plans seems to hint on this point (see Isike and Ogunnubi, 2017). The analysis of soft power in African foreign policy demonstrates that the former can be used for the mutual benefit of states in the region. It is for this reason that future studies need to examine the nexus between soft power and regional governance in Africa to see how its deployment could help to facilitate developmental issues of the African region while also promoting the influence and status of a state in its possession. For scholars, students, and policymakers interested in a robust and contemporary account of the nature and dynamics of Nigeria-South Africa relations, this volume, therefore, addresses this search. The authors have reflected from a variety of perspectives and methodologies using mainly an Afrocentric lens to discuss and analyse regional hegemony, regionalism, and foreign policy in Africa.

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