National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria: Setting the 'Rules' of Integration in a Plural State 3031412400, 9783031412400

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National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria Setting the ‘Rules’ of Integration in a Plural State Olumuyiwa Temitope Faluyi

National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria

Olumuyiwa Temitope Faluyi

National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria Setting the ‘Rules’ of Integration in a Plural State

Olumuyiwa Temitope Faluyi Independent Institute of Education Varsity College Pietermaritzburg Campus South Africa

ISBN 978-3-031-41240-0 ISBN 978-3-031-41241-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch/shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

The idea for this book was hatched when I was a student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. At the moment, I do not have any affiliation with UKZN. The work has been revised and updated. The revision and updates to this work were done while affiliated with the Independent Institute of Education, Varsity College, Pietermaritzburg Campus, South Africa. This book explored measures that have been put in place to foster national integration in Nigeria. The crux of the monograph is the role of elites in engendering national integration in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic especially through the instrumentality of rotational presidency. It began by acknowledging that despite several measures in place, federal instability still persists in Nigeria. It gave insight into the various indicators that show that there are cracks in the Nigerian federal system. These have been the reasons for the various integration measures put in place by successive governments. The book was analysed through the lenses of elite and relative deprivation theories. These were crucial to explain the roles played by elites in ethnic and religious instability, how they coordinate national integration measures and how they dominate political power. The book adopted interpretive school of thought which is suited to understanding the experiences of people. It made it possible to comprehend the actions of people in their social and political environments. Participants who are versatile with the Nigerian political and federal systems were interviewed. For the analysis of the book, data were sought from key informants, extant literature, government documents, international v

vi

PREFACE

organisations’ documents, newspapers and credible internet sources. The views of scholars on national integration, power sharing, federalism and identity politics were explored to have robust literature review and theoretical framework. Through the dual stand of these secondary and primary sources, the book explored the roles of elites in measures like revenue allocation, the federal character principle, the National Youth Service Corps, operations of political parties, creation of states and local governments and constitutional conferences. Thus, inferences were drawn that implementation remains a major challenge to these measures and there is no one-bullet approach to national integration and there cannot be full integration in any society. The threat that power sharing has posed to the stability of the country, especially rotational presidency orchestrated the choice of the latter as the crux of this book. Power rotation is mainly an elite game but the masses come into the scene to secure numbers for elections and use them as foot soldiers for violence. The findings made is that rotational presidency cannot solely solve Nigeria’s integration issues just like other measures, but, it can bring belonging and stability to some extent. Rotational presidency is a very good idea but merit and good leadership can be combined with it. Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Olumuyiwa Temitope Faluyi

Acknowledgements

I acknowledge the priceless roles played by friends and colleagues in making this book a success. Your encouragements, constructive criticisms and suggestions went a long way at every stage while writing this book. This project would not have been a success without the professional guidance given by Palgrave Macmillan’s editorial staff. This assisted me in adhering to the general and specific rules guiding this publication. To my family, I appreciate your patience, commitment and understanding which allowed you to cope with my divided attention while writing this book.

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Contents

1

A ‘Giant’ in Perspective Introduction From Africa to Nigeria The Nigerian State in Perspective Geography and Population Politics and Systems of Government Resources and Economy Issues Identified Conclusion References

1 1 2 4 5 8 10 16 22 23

2

Federalism and Plurality Unpacked Introduction Federal System Chronology of Federalism and Reasons Why Countries Make Federalism an Option Characteristics of a Federal System Supporting and Opposing Views on Federalism Models of Federalism Plurality from the Prisms of Ethnicity and Religious Diversity and Links with Indirect Rule in Nigeria Ethnic Group and Ethnicity Explained

29 29 30 34 39 43 46 49 52

ix

x

CONTENTS

Religion Conceptualised Conclusion References

56 59 59

3

National Integration in Perspective Introduction Dynamics of Ethnoreligious Violence Ethnic and Religious Violence Across Countries Sudan National Integration Explained National Integration Measures Across States Integration in Sudan Integration in India Conclusion References

67 67 68 73 74 79 83 87 91 93 93

4

Models of Power Sharing and Rotational Presidency Demystified Introduction Power Sharing Consociationalism Principles of Consociationalism Consociationalism Explained Further Centripetalism Rotational Presidency as a Power Sharing Platform Power Sharing with Case Studies from Africa, Europe and the Middle East Kenya Zimbabwe Switzerland Lebanon Conclusion References

5

Superintendents of Power in Nigeria: A Theoretical Approach Introduction Theory Explained Elite Theory The Evolution of the Nigerian Political Elites

101 101 102 104 106 112 113 115 116 117 120 122 124 125 125 131 131 132 133 139

CONTENTS

6

7

xi

Features of Nigerian Political Elites Political Elites’ Activities Since 1960 Relative Deprivation Theory Elites, National Integration and Relative Deprivation in Nigeria Conclusion References

146 149 152

The Nigerian Federal System on the Historical Scale Introduction Metamorphosis of One of the Federal States in Africa Pre-independence Epoch Independence and Post-independence Epochs Military Governments, Second and Third Republics The Fourth Republic Marginalisation and Agitations as Upshots of the Flaws of the Nigerian Federal System Cracks in the Nigerian Federal System Independence and Hegemony Issues Population Religion Ethnicity and Communal Clashes Resources Threats of Secession and the Civil War Military Coups Annulment of June 12, 1993, Presidential Election and Elections in the Fourth Republic Implications of These Issues on Peace Conclusion References

163 163 164 164 170 171 174

Pre-civil War National Integration Measures in Nigeria Introduction National Integration in Nigeria Constitutional Conferences Constitutional Conferences/Constitution Drafting Committee Before the Fourth Republic The Political Bureau, the Constitution Review Committee and the Constituent Assembly The 1994/1995 Constitutional Conference

219 219 220 223

156 157 157

178 181 181 183 186 190 192 197 200 202 207 208 209

226 230 231

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CONTENTS

Constitutional Conferences in the Fourth Republic Revenue Allocation Revenue Allocation Defined Nigerian Constitution and Revenue Allocation Vertical Revenue Allocation Horizontal Revenue Allocation Horizontal and Vertical Revenue Sharing Formulas Analysed States and Local Governments’ Creation From Province to Region Willink Commission Creation of the Mid-West Region Creation of States—1967 to 1996 Implications of State Creation Exercises in Nigeria Conclusion References

234 239 239 239 246 246

8

Post-Civil War National Integration Measures in Nigeria Introduction The NYSC Benefits of the NYSC The Challenges of the NYSC The Federal Character Principle Political Parties with National Spread Conclusion References

281 281 282 283 285 288 302 309 309

9

National Integration Within the Spectrum of Rotational Presidency Introduction Rotational Presidency: An Elitist Arrangement Is Zoning Constitutional? Rotational Presidency in Nigeria from First Republic Until 2023 Rotational Presidency as a Conduit for Belonging and Stability Rotational Presidency: Merit and Development Jeopardised? Are the Masses Manipulated? Conclusion References

252 260 260 261 262 262 265 272 273

315 315 316 318 322 333 336 344 352 354

CONTENTS

10

Bolstering Integration in a Diverse Country Introduction Value Re-Orientation and Patriotism Good Leadership Emergence Process Corruption Should Be Fought with Sincerity Accountability Through the Involvement of the Masses and State Institutions Good Institutions that Are More Powerful Than Individuals or A Group of People Provision of Infrastructure by Involving the Citizens Restructuring, Healthy Fiscal Federalism and Resource Control A More Transparent Federal Character Blurring of Indigenship and Non-Indigenship Dichotomies and Avoiding Ethnoreligious Biodata Rotational Presidency and Other Zoning Arrangements Should Be Made Constitutional Other Actions That Can Be Taken by the Citizens Conclusion References

Index

xiii

359 359 360 363 365 367 368 368 370 371 373 374 374 375 376 379

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2

The map of Nigeria showing the geo-political zones The map of Nigeria showing some of the ethnic groups

6 7

xv

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table

1.1 1.2 7.1 7.2 7.3

Table 7.4 Table 8.1 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 9.3

Agricultural products distribution across states in Nigeria Solid minerals distribution across states in Nigeria Responsibilities of the three tiers of government in Nigeria Revenues of the three tiers of government in Nigeria Vertical revenue allocation formulas from 1946 to the Fourth Republic Horizontal revenue allocation formulas from 1946 to the Fourth Republic Heads of military, security, anti-corruption and allied agencies based on geo-political zones as of May 2023 Heads of State/Presidents and their deputies since 1959 Presidents of the Senate from 1999 to June 2023 House of Representatives Speakers from 1999 to June 2023

12 13 240 241 247 253 295 324 330 331

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CHAPTER 1

A ‘Giant’ in Perspective

Introduction The chapter is divided into sections. These include the section on Africa and Nigeria from the diversity and integration perspectives. The Nigerian state will be explored within the spectrums of geography and population, politics and systems of government as well as resources and economy. The identified issues touch the weak integration in the country, agitations, and the response of the political class to these. This chapter starts by identifying some countries that have challenges with national integration in Africa. The root causes of these conflicts include poor management of their diversities, issues surrounding control of power and allocation of resources. It points out that the plurality of the Nigerian state and resources have not been well managed and responsible for the age-long instability in the country. These have attracted the attention of government through some integration measures that have been put in place. The chapter explains the geographical and population distributions of the country. The knowledge about the plurality of the Nigerian state can be enhanced through an understanding of the geographical and population distributions of the country. The section on the politics and systems of government is vital to comprehend the structure of the Nigerian government and the position of the president. This is important because the crux of this book is rotating the office of the president as an integration measure. The section on resources and economy is © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. T. Faluyi, National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7_1

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necessary because resource control has been one of the reasons for instability and corruption in the country. The poor state of the economy is a consequence of weak state institutions, poor infrastructure and poor development of the country. Hence, the state of the economy has a link with the poverty level in Nigeria. Poverty makes the populace vulnerable to political manipulation. The measures put in place by successive governments to promote integration in Nigeria have not mitigated federal instability. These are evident in the calls for secession, insecurity, resource control issues and access to power, among others. The issues surrounding access to power have also marginally contributed to the instability in the country. Political elites introduced rotational presidency to mitigate the problems associated with power sharing at the presidency level.

From Africa to Nigeria Diversity in countries exists in the form of ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural, and economic strata, among others. These dynamics are what make societies plural. The manner in which this plurality is managed determines if it is going to result in peace or otherwise. A lot of countries are plural and their challenges with national integration are to various degrees. In Africa, some countries that have been hotbeds of conflicts owing to challenges with national integration include Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville, Sierra Leone, Sudan (North and South), Uganda, and Chad, among others (Ojie & Ewhrudjakpor, 2009). Congo Democratic Republic also experiences threats to its peace. Instability in Northern Mali has also been on for some years. There has equally been tension in Cameroon between the national government and the Southern Anglophone regions. The expedition to control state power and allocate resources has led to deprivation and winner-take-all conditions, which have in some cases spiralled into agitations by minorities, civil war, secession and other forms of conflict (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). These have culminated in the emergence of violent non-state actors that have continued to spice unrest in some countries. National integration is crucial to manage the identity differences in societies and to salvage the situation if it has degenerated into violence (Imhonopi & Onifade, 2013). Integration entails relegating ethnic or religious or any other affiliated loyalty behind the identity of being a citizen of a country. For integration to receive a boost, it may encompass cultural,

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3

economic, political and/or social measures taken by the government and other stakeholders. The Nigerian state is one of the most plural in the world. The country has been on the negative side of integration as reflected in the ethnoreligious crises that have displaced many and claimed several lives and property for years. This assertion echoes Osaghae and Suberu’s (2005) view that ‘by virtue of its complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability, Nigeria can be rightly described as one of the most deeply divided states in Africa’. The major ethnic groups in Nigeria are Hausa, Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba. However, each of these does not make the majority with respect to population. There is proximity in proportion of Muslims and Christians while traditional adherents are a very small fraction of the population (US Department of State, 2018). Therefore, the country is ethnically and religiously diverse based on the North-South and Christian-Muslim divide, respectively. The symbols of national integration in Nigeria include the national flag, national anthem, coat of arms, the currency, national monuments, national buildings and public arenas, among others. Nigeria’s successive governments in a bid to ensure the sense of national community have embraced some national integration strategies. These comprise the federal system of government, constitutional conferences, state creation, revenue allocation formulas, National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), establishment of unity schools, federal character principle, quota system, strong recommendation for political parties to be national in outlook, among others. Some were put in place before the civil war while some came on board after the war. These measures have not stemmed the tide of federal instability as these ethnic and religious differences still snowball into tensions in the country (Falade & Falade, 2013). The quest for power has marginal effects on instability. The concentration of the most power in the central government means overwhelming power in the presidency. Consequently, political parties, ethnic and religious groups deploy their attention to this office. Ethnic and religious groups hope that they will benefit if a president comes from their group. Nigeria has been divided into geo-political zones to minimise conflicts among ethnic and religious groups. One of the cardinals of this arrangement is that the top public offices including the presidency, would alternate among these zones. Accordingly, since the inauguration of the

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Fourth Republic in May 1999, the office of the president and five other top political positions have been rotated on an ethnoreligious pedestal. Political elites give the masses the narratives that rotational presidency will mitigate the challenges that come with political exclusion and enhance national integration. The idea of rotating the presidency has become a very sensitive matter in the Nigerian political landscape. Some events chronicled this stance. The June 12, 1993 Presidential Election results adjudged to have been won by the late Moshood Kashimawo Abiola (MKO Abiola), a politician from the South Western part of the country, were annulled. MKO Abiola had more than 58% majority of votes in the election and even had victory in Kano, the state of his opponent (African Elections Database, 2011; Falola & Heaton, 2008; Ibrahim, 2018). The general opinion then was that the military President, General Ibrahim Babangida, took this path to deny anyone from any other region aside from the North to become the country’s leader. Since the commencement of the Fourth Republic, power rotation has culminated into three geo-political zones producing the president. South West, Olusegun Obasanjo; North West, Umaru Yar’Adua and Muhammadu Buhari; and South South, Goodluck Jonathan. President Yar’Adua could not complete his term due to his death in 2010. However, this rotation arrangement has not curtailed the agitations for equal and balanced ethnic representation in the political system. Some sections of the country’s demand for secession have remained a political nightmare. Acts of political violence orchestrated by reactions to deprivation have not ceased. A very good instance was the killings and destructions that followed the emergence of a Southerner as the successful candidate of the 2011 Presidential Election (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Therefore, this book seeks to catechise the viability of power rotation as a political panacea to the national integration and unity crises in Nigeria.

The Nigerian State in Perspective There are ethnic, cultural, religious, geographical, demographic, economic, systems of government and other features that form the building blocks that make up the Nigerian state. The coagulation of these makes Nigeria a major stakeholder in Africa. Hence, the Nigerian, government media and citizens call the country ‘the giant of Africa’. Population, role played in liberation and peace in Africa, size of the economy, and

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A ‘GIANT’ IN PERSPECTIVE

5

natural resources are among the reasons Nigerians tag their country ‘the giant of Africa’. Hence, geography/population, politics and systems as well as resources and economy will be explored. Geography and Population Nigeria has a land area of 923,768 square kilometres (Sanusi, 2010). It shares borders with Niger Republic in the North, Cameroon and Lake Chad in the East, Benin Republic in the West and the Atlantic Ocean in the South. As of August 2022, the population was 206.1 million.1 The country has over 350 ethnic groups (National Conference, 2014). It transmuted from two protectorates in 1914 to 36 states in 1996. The 1994/95 Constitutional Conference recommended that the 36 states should be organised into six geo-political zones. These may also be called regions. Figure 1.1 gives details. The 1999 Constitution does not recognise these zones but successive governments and political actors have recognised them since 1999 for public positions and distribution of resources. The defunct Northern region is now broken into the North West, North East and North Central geo-political zones, while the Southern region includes the South West, South South and South East geo-political zones. The North West comprises Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara and Jigawa States. The North Central is made up of Niger, Kogi, Nasarawa, Benue, Plateau and Kwara States while the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is located within the zone. The North East includes Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe States. The South West states are Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo. The South South encompasses Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Cross River, Akwa-Ibom and Rivers States. The South East states are Anambra, Abia, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo. The North has 19 states while the South has 17. There has always been the majority group(s) and minority groups within each territory from the regional arrangement to the state structure (Anugwom, 2000). The North West is dominated by the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, but the zone has few minorities and they are predominantly Muslims. The North East is a conglomeration of several minority groups, some Hausa and Fulani and a blend of Christians and Muslims. The North Central

1 https://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/nigeria/.

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O. T. FALUYI

Fig. 1.1 The map of Nigeria showing the geo-political zones (Source https:// www.nimc.gov.ng/nimc-enrolment-centres/)

has a lot of minority groups with some Hausa, Yorubas and Fulanis. It is difficult to establish which of the two major religions in the country is the majority in the North Central. The South South has the Ijaws, Ibibios, Itsekiris, Ogonis, Bini and other minority groups and a Christian majority. The South West is a Yoruba zone with a blend of Christians and Muslims but it is difficult to ascertain the population of each while the South East is an Igbo zone with Christian majority. Figure 1.2 is the Nigerian map with some of these ethnic groups. The Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Fulani ethnic groups form the highest fraction of the population compared to other minority ethnic groups.

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Fig. 1.2 The map of Nigeria showing some of the ethnic groups (Source American Historical Association2 )

American government’s Central Intelligence Agency’s World Fact Book3 gave the 2018 estimated population of some of the ethnic groups. Hausa, 30%; Yoruba, 15.5%; Igbo, 15.2%; Fulani, 6%; Tiv, 2.4%; Kanuri/Beriberi, 2.4%; Ibibio, 1.8%; Ijaw/Izon, 1.8%; others 24.9%. The North expanses more than half of the landmass (Abah & Okwori, 2002). The Central Intelligence Agency’s World Fact Book gave the 2018 estimated Muslim population at 53.5%, Christians at 45.9% while other religious beliefs represent 0.6%.

2 https://www.historians.org/teaching-and-learning/teaching-resources-for-historians/ teaching-and-learning-in-the-digital-age/through-the-lens-of-history-biafra-nigeria-thewest-and-the-world/the-republic-of-biafra/location-of-nigerian-ethnic-groups. 3 https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/nigeria/#people-and-society.

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Uzoma (2004) gives a narrative of religion in the country. Southern Nigeria’s exposure to Western education was earlier than that of the North with an implication of influx of Christian missionaries into the South. The colonialists decelerated the movement of Christian missionaries upward into the North. However, Christianity still found its way to present-day Northern Nigeria states like Bauchi, Borno, Adamawa, Taraba, Plateau, Niger, Benue, Gombe, Kogi, Kwara, Kebbi, Bauchi, Nasarawa and Kaduna. Islam had existed in Nigeria for decades before the advent of Christianity. North African traders introduced Islam into the North but the spread of the religion across the region was made easy through the efforts of the Fulanis, Wangara, Kanuris and Nupes. Traditional adherents are few and they are mostly in Southern Nigeria. The preservation of the people’s culture is one of the cardinals of indigenous religion. The adoption of a secular state status becomes germane because of the religious plurality of the Nigerian state (Oduwole & Fadeyi, 2013). Section 10 of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions make provision for this status and state that ‘the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion’ (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1979, 1999). Politics and Systems of Government The colonial power, the British, discovered that each ethnic group had its own way of operating its government. The indirect rule system was introduced in response. This was an assortment of the British and the local systems of administration. African elites were used as native rulers who represented the colonial state in their respective territories (Abah & Okwori, 2002). The British aimed to fortify its traction in the territory that later became Nigeria with less interest in developing it economically, socially and politically (Duruji, 2008). The indirect rule system created ethnicity in Africa and Nigeria because it was a divide and rule approach meant to sustain colonial rule because different groups were administered separately (Osaghae, 2006). This regionalisation of the North and South after the amalgamation of 1914 and restrictions of Southerners to certain parts in Northern cities consolidated this divide-and-rule approach (Osaghae, 2006). The country embraced the federal system in 1954 to take care of the tensions bred by regional, ethnic and religious differences (Kirsten, 1996). However, the attainment of independence came after the adoption

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of federalism and it was done in stages. Self-government was attained by the East and West in 1957 while that of the North was in 1959 (Meredith, 2011). ‘By the time East and West got self-government, North was still in the full colonial state because they believed they were not ready and they recognised that those who are ready, let them go’ (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer One, December 2018). The country attained independence in 1960. From independence in 1960 (in 1959, Tafawa Balewa emerged as the Prime Minister) until January 15, 1966, the country practised a parliamentary system, but it converted to a presidential system of government on October 1, 1979. It has been under both military and civil leadership since independence. Successful and unsuccessful military coups d’état have been staged in the country. The transition to civil rule on May 29, 1999 was the beginning of the present Fourth Republic. The 1999 Constitution is the major guiding document for the operation of the Republic. The legislative systems the country operates at all levels are derivatives of the federal and presidential systems. Legislators do not hold dual executive and legislative membership at the federal and state levels. At the federal level, the parliament is called the National Assembly, which is a bicameral system. It comprises the Senate and the House of Representatives with 109 and 360 members, respectively. At the state level, the parliament which is a unicameral system is called the State House of Assembly. Local governments have their respective executive and legislative arms. The executive arm at the federal level is headed by the president, assisted by the vice president, ministers and other public servants. The governor heads the executive at the state level and he is assisted by the deputy governor, commissioners and other public servants. The local government is headed by a chairman and assisted (by a vice chairman), supervisory counsellors and other public servants. The federal and state governments have judicial arms. The highest court is the Supreme Court, followed by the Court of Appeal, Federal High Court, High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory and Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory (Ayua & Dakas, 2005; Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). States have the State High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal of a State and Customary Court of Appeal of a State (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). There are also specialised and lower courts at different levels.

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These arms and tiers of government, especially the executive and legislative arms are directly and indirectly involved in the management of the economy, control of the country’s resources and provision of infrastructure. Separation of powers allows these three arms of government to operate separately and through checks and balances, they are able to check the excesses of one another. They are also avenues to have the different ethnic and religious groups represented in government. Resources and Economy The Nigerian economy is broadly grouped into three sectors. The primary sector encompasses agriculture and natural resources, the secondary sector is made up of processing and manufacturing while the tertiary sector is the service sector. Marginally, the primary and to some extent, service sectors contribute more to the economy than the secondary sector (Sanusi, 2010). Historically, the Nigerian economy has been rarely diversified. The pre- and post-independence eras were agricultural-based, but since the 1970s, the country has mainly depended on oil and gas (Adenugba & Dipo, 2013). Over 70% of Nigeria’s total export in the 1960s was from the agricultural sector, but it has waned due to the shift to oil production (Obadina, 1999). The neglect of agriculture was engineered by the massive generation of revenue from oil due to the early 1970s global oil boom. Groundnut, sorghum, beans, cucumber, watermelon, millet, and potatoes, among other agricultural products are produced in the Northern region. The Eastern region has oil palm as its major crop while the Western region produces cocoa, rubber (later Mid-West), kola nut and timber. However, the high demand for cocoa and groundnut meant disparity in revenue with the Western and Northern regions being more fiscally buoyant than the Eastern region (Odeyemi, 2014). Crude oil was discovered in the country in 1956 in the old Eastern region. This is in the present day Bayelsa State, precisely Oloibiri. This afforded the region the privilege of being richer than the other regions because the revenue generated from crude oil exceeded those of agriculture (Odeyemi, 2014). Nevertheless, the North has remained more agrarian than other regions. Overall, the challenges with the agricultural sector in contemporary Nigeria are land ownership, poor infrastructure, insufficient funding, low quality seeds and poor mechanisation (Okojie,

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2020). Insecurity caused by clashes between farmers and herders, insurgency, banditry and cattle rustling have also posed threat to the sector. Notwithstanding, the sector has the potential. Table 1.1 describes the agricultural prowess of each state in Nigeria. If these agricultural products are well harnessed, they have the prospects to boost the economy. They may be sold internally or exported. These potential notwithstanding, reality portrays the dominance of oil and gas. The Nigerian Investment Promotion Council (NEPC) on its website4 states that oil, gas and associated products make up about 90% of the country’s total exports (ranks 8th in oil export volume globally) and over 80% of government revenues. According to the NEPC, Nigeria is number one in crude oil production in Africa, the sixth largest in the world and the country with the largest reserves of natural gas in Africa and seventh in the world. These oil and gas are mainly located in the South South geo-political zone. The government at the centre controls crude oil production and this makes it fiscally privileged than the states. All states in Nigeria have mineral resources they are endowed with but the federal government has given primacy to some which are coal, iron ore, tin ore (cassiterite), manganese, lead, zinc, gold, columbite, bitumen and barite (UNDP,5 2014). Table 1.2 itemises these resources found in different states. The proper harnessing of these resources would place them as good sources of revenue for the country, but oil and gas have continued to dominate the natural resources space in the country. The proceeds that come from oil have not metamorphosed into fortune for the citizens as a result of corruption, bulged external debts, unfavourable government policies (Akoni, 2020; Lewis, 1999; Ojukwu & Shopeju, 2010; Ukpong, 2020) and nepotism. There has been inconsistency in the price of crude oil (Ajakaiye et al., 2015). The economic management, dependence on oil and fluctuating oil prices have severe effects on the economy (BelloSchünemann & Porter, 2017). These effects started taking a toll on the economy since the mid-1980s, and its consequences became obvious through swelling debts and inflation. Consequently, the country officially embraced the Bretton Woods’ originated and sponsored Structural

4 https://nipc.gov.ng/opportunities/industry/. 5 United Nations Development Programme.

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Table 1.1 Agricultural products distribution across states in Nigeria S/ N

Agricultural products

States founda

1

Cashew

2

Cassava

3 4

Cocoa Cotton

5 6

Cowpea Garlic

7 8

Ginger Groundnut

9

Gum arabic

10 11 12 13

Hibiscus Hides and skin Maize Oil palm

14 15

Pepper Plantain

16 17

Rice Rubber

18

Sesame seed

19

Sorghum

20

Soybean

21 22 23

Sugar cane Timber Tomato

24

Wheat

25

Yam

Enugu, Oyo, Anambra, Kogi, Osun, Abia, Ondo, Benue, Cross River, Imo, Ekiti, Ebonyi, Kwara, and Nassarawa Imo, Ondo, Anambra, Kogi, Taraba, Cross River, Enugu, Ogun, Benue, Delta, and Edo Ondo, Osun, Cross River, Ekiti, Oyo, and Edo Kaduna, Ondo, Kano, Katsina, Oyo, Kwara, Ogun, Zamfara, Jigawa, Sokoto, and Kebbi Borno, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Gombe, and Yobe Kano, Kaduna, Kebbi, Sokoto, Jigawa, Bauchi, Katsina and Zamfara Kaduna, Gombe, Bauchi, Benue, and Nassarawa Niger, Kano, Jigawa, Zamfara, Kebbi, Sokoto, Katsina, Kaduna, Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa, Bauchi, and Gombe Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, Jigawa, Gombe, Taraba, Plateau, Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina, Nasarawa, Niger, and Zamfara Jigawa, Kano, Bauchi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, and Borno Kano, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Niger, Kaduna, Zamfara, Borno, Taraba, Jigawa, Kebbi, Oyo, Kwara, and Nasarawa Niger, Kaduna, Taraba, Plateau, and Adamawa Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Ekiti, Delta, Bayelsa, Ogun, Rivers, Anambra, Ondo, Enugu, Imo, Oyo, Abia, Edo, and Ogun Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, Sokoto, Plateau, and Bauchi Lagos, Ondo, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ekiti, Edo, Delta, Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Imo, Bayelsa, Abia, and Ebonyi Kebbi, Kano, Ebonyi, Anambra, Niger, and Taraba Edo, Delta, Ondo, Ogun, Abia, Anambra, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Rivers, Ebonyi, and Bayelsa Kano, Nasarawa, Jigawa, Benue, Yobe, Katsina, Kogi, Gombe, Kwara, Niger, Bauchi, and Plateau Zamfara, Niger, Plateau, Katsina, Kaduna, Benue, Kano, Bauchi, and Borno Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Kebbi, Kwara, Oyo, Jigawa, Borno, Bauchi, Lagos, Sokoto, Zamfara, and FCT Sokoto, Taraba, Niger, Kogi, Kwara, and most Northern states Ondo, Cross River, Ogun, Edo, Delta Ekiti, Osun, and Oyo Grown in most states in the country but Jigawa, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, and Kano lead in commercial production Borno, Yobe, Jigawa, Kano, Zamfara, Katsina, Adamawa, Sokoto, and Kebbi Taraba, Benue, Niger, and Nasarawa

a Most of the states are major producers of the products associated with them, but some states have

some products that are not in the table because, comparatively, they produce them in low quantities. Hence, some minor producers of some products are not included. The table does not include the livestock distribution of different parts of the country Compiled by author from http://agronewsng.com/nigerian-states-and-their-agricultural-products/

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Table 1.2 Solid minerals distribution across states in Nigeria S/N

Minerals

1 2 3 4 5

Barite Bentonite Bismuth Bitumen Cassiterite

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

States found

Benue, Cross River, Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba, and Zamfara Borno, Edo, Kogi, Ogun, and Ondo Kaduna Edo, Lagos, Ondo, and Ogun Bauchi, Cross River, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Nasarawa, and Plateau Clay In all the States of the Federation Coal and lignite Abia, Adamawa, Anambra, Bauchi, Benue, Cross-River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Gombe, Imo, Kogi, Nasarawa, and Plateau Columbite Bauchi, Cross River, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Nasarawa, and Plateau Diatomite Borno and Yobe Dolomite Kogi, Oyo, Edo, Kwara, and the FCT Feldspar Bauchi, Borno, FCT, Kaduna, and Kogi Fluorite Bauchi, Ebonyi, Plateau, and Taraba Gemstones Bauchi, Kaduna, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Oyo, Plateau, and Taraba Gold FCT, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Osun, and Zamfara Gypsum Adamawa, Edo, Gombe, Ogun, Sokoto, and Yobe Ilmenite Benue, Cross River, Kaduna, and Plateau Iron—ore Enugu, FCT, Kaduna, Kogi, Nasarawa, and Zamfara Kaolin Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Ekiti, Imo, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Ogun, Ondo, Plateau, and Rivers Kyanite Kaduna and Niger Lead Cross -River, Ebonyi, FCT, Plateau, and Zamfara Limestone Benue, Cross River, Ebonyi, Edo, Gombe, Kogi, Ogun, and Sokoto Lithium Kaduna, Nasarawa, Niger, Oyo, Plateau and Zamfara Manganese Katsina, Kebbi, and Zamfara Marble Edo, FCT, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, and Oyo Mica Ekiti, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, and Oyo Molybdenite Plateau Phosphate Ogun and Sokoto Rutile Bauchi, Cross River, Kaduna, and Plateau Silica sand Delta, Jigawa, Kano, Lagos, Ondo, and Rivers Silver Ebonyi and Kano Talc Ekiti, Kaduna, Kogi, and Niger Tantalite Cross River, Ekiti, Kogi, Kwara, and Nasarawa Wolframite Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and Zamfara Zinc Cross -River, Ebonyi, FCT, Plateau, and Zamfara

Sources: Anyaogu (2023); UNDP (2014)

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Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 (Attah, 2011; Osaghae, 1995). In December 1993, the programme ended (Osaghae, 1995). The SAP was branded in International Monetary Fund/World Bank initiatives like currency devaluation, subsidy removal, reduction of tariff barriers, increase in prices of agricultural produce, downsizing the bloated bureaucracy, privatisation or closure of public enterprises, price deregulation, budget deficit reduction and removal of limitations on foreign investments (Meredith, 2011). SAP has its shortcomings. Case in point, four-fifths of shares in the 100 state-owned companies privatised were acquired by elites close to the corridors of power, one-fourth of earnings from exports was used to service debts, price of cocoa fell by 48% between 1986 and 1989, among others (Meredith, 2011). The knockon-effects of SAP had become so glaring by 1992 and these included the perpetual trend of rising budget deficit and inflation, growing arrears on external debt, corruption, poor infrastructure and escalating crime (Egbefo, 2015; Lewis, 1999). Consequently, the middle class has almost gone into oblivion and replaced with mostly low-income earners and very few wealthy. The situation has taken a pitiable dimension in the Fourth Republic. For instance, the country ranked 150th out of 180 with respect to least public sector corruption in the 2022 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.6 The same index has it that in the same year, the country scored 24 out of 100 which is below half. A score of a minimum of 50 shows that public sector corruption is not at an alarming rate. Corruption weakens solid infrastructural base. With respect to development, the country’s performance has been dismal. The UNDP 2020 Human Development Index (HDI7 ), ranked Nigeria 161 globally. The HDI stands on the tripod of a long and healthy life, expected years of living and a good standard of living (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018a). The country is behind in infrastructure, and this whittles the potential for economic growth and development, coupled with the rate of population growth8 which far exceeds access to good health, good education, viable electricity, water, roads, and sanitation,

6 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/nga. 7 https://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. 8 The 2022 estimated population growth rate of Nigeria according to the CIA World Fact Book is 2.53%. Check https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/nigeria/.

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among others (Bello-Schünemann & Porter, 2017). The Global Competitiveness Report (2019) for infrastructure gave the country’s position in infrastructure. Generally, the country ranked 116th out of 141 countries. In the transport infrastructure, which is made up of road connectivity, quality of road infrastructure, railroad density, efficiency of train services, airport connectivity, efficiency of air transport services, liner shipping connectivity and efficiency of seaport services, the country ranked 130th. It ranked 124th in utility infrastructure. This is scaled on the percentage of the population with access to electricity, quality of electricity supply, percentage of the population exposed to unsafe drinking water and reliability of water supply. Good water and sanitation systems are pivotal to a healthy population. Nigeria ranked 127th in health. Life expectancy, maternal mortality, and modern medical equipment, among others are yardsticks for gauging the health sector. The state of infrastructure impacts the socioeconomic status and political independence of Nigerians. The private sector which is a high employer of labour operates in unfavourable condition if infrastructure is dismal. This is evident in the unemployment rate in the country. In quarters one, two and three of 2018, the unemployment rates in the country were 21.83%, 22.73% and 23.13%, respectively (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). This has skyrocketed to 33.3%9 as of October 2022. The unemployment rates have effects on the number of Nigerians who are poor. The incidence of poverty which is the percentage of the poor in the country is 53.7% with Sokoto topping at 89.9% and Osun ranking the lowest at 17.5% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018a). Poverty line is $1.90 per day (UNDP, 2019). The average geo-political poverty distribution is given thus. The average poverty rate in the North Central is 53.3%; North East is 70.7%; North West is 76.5%; South East is 42.8%; South-South is 47%; South West is 29.4%; and the FCT is 43.5% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018a). The situation has not improved in 2021 and 2022. Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index shows that 62.9% of Nigerians are poor (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022a). This is premised on four dimensions which are health, education, living standards and work and shocks. These are further broken down as health—nutrition, food insecurity, time to healthcare; Education—school attendance, years of schooling, school lag; Living Standards—assets, cooking fuel, housing

9 https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/.

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materials, sanitation, water reliability, water; Work and Shocks—unemployment, underemployment and security shock (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022b). The incidence of this multidimensional poverty index is geo-politically broken down. The North Central is 0.272 which is 66.3%; North East is 0.324 which is 76.5%; North West is 0.324 which is 75.8%; South East is 0.183 which is 49%; South South is 0.250 which is 62.6%; South West is 0.151 which is 40% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022a). The North comes behind the South educationally, socially and economically, but the former has ruled the country more than the South since independence (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022a, 2022b; Okpanachi, 2009). These infrastructural, unemployment and poverty indicators make it easy for the electorates to be subjects of manipulation by the elites for parochial electoral interests through the tools of ethnic and religious division. If people are not empowered, they can easily accept any incentives to ‘catalyse’ the parochial interest of the political elites. It also means that accessing power by political elites through ethnic or religious sentiments may not necessarily translate to improved economic and social life either for the entire country or some sections of the country.

Issues Identified The book reconnoitres the activities of those who call the shots on national integration in Nigeria, especially in the Fourth Republic. It looks at this from the perspectives of measures put in place by successive governments and rotational presidency. This is orchestrated by events that have threatened the federal stability of the country to the extent that some parts of the country have threatened to exit Nigeria and have their own country. The Eastern region under the auspices of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has been a ground for military deployment due to agitations by Igbo people threatening to declare an Independent Biafra (Isiguzo & Obi, 2017; Njoku & Egenuka, 2020). The region has been the haven of unknown gunmen who attack security agents and lawabiding citizens. Patrick Utomi states that feelings of deprivation and the dearth of federal presence in the geo-political zone are responsible for the demand of the people (Ojoye, 2017). There have also been growing agitations for the Oduduwa Republic by the Yoruba ethnic group. This has been elicited by the kidnappings, killings and general state of poor security in the Yoruba states (Johnson, 2021). The Yoruba secession issue

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has been exacerbated because of the alleged ethnic affiliation of those who carry out some of the kidnappings and killings in the South West. They want to seek exit because they are not confident in the leadership, they are feeling left out, and they do not believe in the system (South South Politician, January 2019). These threats and agitations by the Igbos and Yorubas, are parts of the indications that Nigeria is still enmeshed in weak national integration. There are killings in Southern Kaduna, Plateau, Taraba and Benue States, which are allegedly connected to ethnic and religious dynamics. These and other crises that have threatened the peace of the country have spawned reactions. Political elites, especially from the three geopolitical zones of the South have been advocating for the restructuring of the country’s federal structure while their Northern counterparts are less interested in this (Abu et al., 2017; Adeseri & Olowoopejo, 2017; Tauna, 2017). The debate over this issue has remained an ongoing exercise among the political elites. Restructuring in this sense includes the need to devolve the central power to the component units with its attendant fiscal implications to reduce the sprawling power of the central government. The bulk of the national revenues come from oil from the South. Attempts to include the need for devolution in the constitutional amendment exercise failed, and the National Assembly is still battling with the consequence of its rejection of the amendment to include power devolution. Although some functions in the exclusive list have been moved to the concurrent list in the constitutional amendment, the federal government is still very powerful. These developments are indications of a larger political problem beyond the issue of alternation of the political positions among the geopolitical zones. The adoption of the federal system of government in Nigeria was considered a panacea to cater for the consequences of its heterogeneous composition. Federalism notwithstanding, Nigeria has had its shares of ethnic, religious and political violence, which has claimed several lives and has tampered with the peace of the country (Babatola, 2015; Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). Nigerians prefer to show affiliation to their primary ethnic and religious groups first before national identity. Agitations in reaction to marginalisation have persisted since independence (Frank & Ukpere, 2013; Tamuno, 1970). Successive Nigerian governments have considered a series of both constitutional and ad hoc integrative measures to enhance national unity and reduce exclusionary claims by various groups (Imhonopi & Onifade,

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2013; Suberu, 1993). These notwithstanding, instability and violence associated with agitations persist. The Nigerian political environment has also been characterised by political violence often orchestrated by the elites. This is usually the fallout of elites’ discontentment against certain political developments such as electoral outcomes and appointments into political offices. Thus, claims of marginalisation often become an instrument of elite mobilisation of the people against the government (Nwozor, 2013). For instance, the threat by some Northern elites that they would make Jonathan’s administration herculean should Jonathan win the 2011 Presidential Election was seen from some quarters as the main reason for the post-election violence (Aziken, 2013; Ndujihe & Idonor, 2011). Consequently, the post-election violence in 2011 was the fallout of Buhari and his party, the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), losing the presidential election (Human Rights Watch, 2011; Simon, 2014). This was the consequence of the perceived refusal to honour the zoning system for the presidency. The resort to mitigate violence over political offices has culminated in an informal arrangement of power sharing which has become part of Nigeria’s political permutation since 1999. Consequently, the six major political positions: President, Vice President, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy President of the Senate and the Deputy Speaker, House of Representatives are rotated on a geopolitical basis (Aiyede, 2012). The rationale for this political arrangement is to surmount violence often related to the issue of political positions. Political elites believe that this move will give ethnic groups in the country a sense of national community. This arrangement has been in place since 1999 but violence and tensions that spring from feelings of exclusion still exist. These developments depict a bigger political problem beyond alternating political positions on a geo-political grounds. Notwithstanding the informal but widely acceptable arrangement of rotating the six top political positions on geo-political basis, political elites still clamour for some issues. The cries of marginalisation are still on their lips. They are still clamouring that the Nigerian federal structure be restructured notwithstanding the different integrative measures that operate in the country. Some sections of the political elites frown at the devolution of the central powers to the component units. To have a flow and address the necessary matters in a well arranged manner, the book has been arranged in chapters. The major focus of this chapter is a glimpse of Nigeria from the historical, diversity, conflicts,

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geographical, demographic, economic and natural endowment perspectives. The first section is on diversity in African countries and Nigeria and the threats faced because of these. The next part of this chapter covers the Nigerian state in perspective. It has three subsections. The Nigerian state from the spectrums of its geography and population is the first subsection. It breaks down the borders, population, geo-political zones and their ethnic and religious distribution. It also includes states as well as ethnic groups in each geo-political zone. These consolidate an understanding of the diversity of the country in subsequent chapters. The second subsection explains the politics and systems of government in Nigeria. It gives insight into the indirect rule system, separate independence dates for the Northern, Eastern and Western regions, the independence of the country, the adoption of parliamentary system and the switch to the presidential system. It also reveals the structures of the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government at the state and national levels. The economy of a country is crucial for its survival. The resources and economy of the country are an integral part of this section. It explains how the country moved from an agro-based economy to oil and gas powered. It also covers the effects of the SAP on the economy and how the country has continued to dwindle in economy, infrastructure and employment opportunities. The final section explores the threats to secede, killings in different parts of Nigeria, the differences between the North and the South on the issue of restructuring and instability despite rotational presidency as signs that all is not well with the stability of the country. Chapter 2 focuses on federalism and what plurality implies within the circumference of this book. The first section covers federal system. This is crucial because Nigeria practises a federal system of government. Therefore, it explores the system from the historical and comparative perspectives. It also explains why countries practise the system, its characteristics and pros and cons as well as models of federalism. The next section clarifies plurality from the perspectives of ethnicity and religious diversity and how this is related to the adoption and practice of indirect rule in Nigeria. It equally conceptualises ethnic groups, ethnicity and religion. It portrays realities about how these play out in some African countries. Chapter 3 centres on national integration. The first section is on the dynamics of ethnoreligious violence. This section is necessary because ethnic and religious violence threatens national integration in any country. Ethnicity has been the centrepiece of most conflicts in post-colonial

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Africa. Ethnicity has crept into politics and conflicts and is often associated with economy, resources, poor infrastructure, political exclusion, identity conflicts, wars, and land issues, among others. The second section is on ethnic and political violence across countries. However, it gives the most attention to Sudan before South Sudan seceded from the country. This is because the age-long conflicts in the country have religious and ethnic/ racial factors associated with them. Section two explains national integration. The last section establishes that national integration measures may be constitutional, institutional, informal and semi-formal. It takes any of these forms subject to elites’ interest and situations being handled at any point in time. It gives special attention to national integration in Sudan and India. The models of power sharing and explanation of rotational presidency in the Nigerian parlance is what Chapter 4 touches on. The first section portrays power sharing as an avenue to involve various groups in power calculation because majoritarian democracy has the propensity to shut some groups out of power. Consociational model with its four principles of grand coalition, group autonomy, proportionality and minority veto forms part of the section. It equally considers centripetal model of power sharing. Rotational presidency and how it relates to consociationalism and centripetalism forms the crux of the second section. The last section focuses on the dynamics of power sharing in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Switzerland and Lebanon. It covers how the situations in these countries are similar and different to those of Nigeria and the lessons Nigeria can take from their experiences. Chapter 5 sheds light on those who dominate the political power scene in Nigeria from the theoretical perspective. The first section explains what a theory entails and why elite and relative deprivation theories have been used to explain the actions of those that place people in positions of authority in Nigeria, why they do so and the circumstances that make these possible for them. The second section encapsulates elite theory and the characteristics of an elite. The section has a subsection that sheds light on how Nigerian political elites have evolved. Peculiar features associated with Nigerian elites also form part of this section. It explores the activities of political elites from 1960 until the Fourth Republic. The penultimate section covers relative deprivation theory. The last section justifies the use of elites and relative deprivation theories and links them with national integration. Chapter 6 explores the Nigerian federal system on a historical pedestal.

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The first section encompasses a subsection on what operated before Nigeria adopted a federal system in 1954. It touches on how federalism was practised from 1960 to post-1960. This sprouts into how it operated in military administrations, the Second and Third Republics. It equally covers the practice of federalism in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The second section dwells on marginalisation and agitations in Nigeria. Some events that have occurred in Nigeria indicate that the federal stability of the country has been threatened. The penultimate section treats these. The subsections under this section include independence and hegemony issues, population census challenges, religious differences, ethnicity and communal clashes, management and ownership of resources, threats of secession and civil war, military coups and the annulment of the June 12, 1993, Presidential Election and elections in the Fourth Republic. The implications of these on peace through the barometer of Nigeria’s ranking in the Global Peace Index for over a decade is the last section of this chapter. National integration measures that have been in practice before the Civil War and those that are still relevant are the focus of Chapter 7. It explores the various constitutional conferences in the first section. The next section on revenue allocation elucidates the politics of revenue in Nigeria regarding how the federal government dominates the scene. It explains how revenue is allocated through the horizontal and vertical arrangements. This section is so crucial because the issue of revenue is tied to access to state wealth and the major reason why the different ethnic groups want the President of Nigeria to emerge from their group. The final section on the creation of states and local governments tests the assertions that such exercises increase sense of belonging and aid development. Chapter 8 focuses on measures that were put in place after the Nigerian Civil War which is still being utilised in contemporary Nigeria. The section on the NYSC assesses the performance of the scheme. The second section examines the successes and failures of the federal character principle. This last section explores the implications of the formation of political parties with offices located all over the country and its executives spread across the geo-political zones on national integration. The penultimate chapter focuses on rotational presidency as a conduit for national integration. The first section x-rays how political elites fabricated rotational presidency following some historical events in Nigeria. The next section ascertains the legality or otherwise of zoning (rotational

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presidency) in Nigeria. A third section touches on rotational presidency from the First Republic until 2023. Although the tradition started in 1999, it has been passively practised since the First Republic. The fourth section explores rotational presidency in the prisms of belonging and stability of Nigeria. The next section covers rotational presidency and the need to embrace merit and development despite its operation. The fact that political elites call the shots when it comes to rotational presidency warrants the devotion of the last section to examine if the masses are manipulated in the process of selling the idea of rotational presidency to them. Chapter 10 encompasses ways that some of the measures put in place to boost national integration can work better and new ways to improve national integration in Nigeria. These suggestions divided into sections include value re-orientation and patriotism, good leadership emergence process, corruption should be fought with sincerity, accountability through the involvement of the masses and state institutions, good institutions that are more powerful than individuals or group of people and provision of infrastructure by involving the citizens. Others are restructuring, healthy fiscal federalism and resource control, a more transparent federal character, blurring of indigenship and non-indigenship and non-indigenship/settler dichotomies and avoid ethnoreligious biodata, rotational presidency and other zoning arrangements should be made constitutional as well as other actions than can be taken by the citizens.

Conclusion The chapter explored the diversity of the Nigerian state and how its poor management has resulted in instability. The section on the Nigerian state in perspective explained why Nigeria has been tagged as a giant in this book. The section also touched on its geography and population, politics and systems of government as well as economy and resources. The first one was a pedestal to breakdown the geographical, ethnic and religious distribution of the country. The politics and systems of government gave a historical view of the systems of government in the country and the structure of the three arms of government. The section on resources and economy served as the bedrock to understand the resource distribution of the country and why political elites give it all it takes to hold public offices. The economic aspect of the subsection explained the reasons why the poverty level in the country is high. The next chapter is dedicated to

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federalism and plurality to give more insight into why and how countries are not homogeneous.

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Isiguzo, C., & Obi, P. (2017). Leave South-east Within 48 Hours, Biafra, Zionist Federation Orders Military. Accessed from https://www.thisdaylive.com/ index.php/2017/09/13/leave-south-east-within-48-hours-biafra-zionist-fed eration-orders-military/ on 8 November 2017. Johnson, D. (2021). Self-determination: Yoruba Divided as Afenifere, YCE Declare Stand. Accessed from https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/03/selfdetermination-yoruba-divided-as-afenifere-yce-declare-stand/ on 9 February 2022. Lewis, P. (1999). Nigeria’s Economy: Opportunity and Challenge. A Journal of Opinion, 27 (1), 50–53. Meredith, M. (2011). The State of Africa. A History of the Continent Since Independence. Simon and Schuster. National Bureau of Statistics. (2018a). Labour Force Statistics—Volume 2: Employment by Sector Report (Q3 2017). National Bureau of Statistics. (2018b). Computation of Human Development Indices for the UNDP Nigeria Human Development Report (2016). National Bureau of Statistics. (2022a). 2021 Nigeria’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Statistical Snapshots. Accessed from https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/ elibrary/read/1241254 on 18 November 2022. National Bureau of Statistics. (2022b). Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (2022). Accessed from https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary/read/1241254 on 18 November 2022. National Conference. (2014). The National Conference 2014. Final Draft of Conference Report. Ndujihe, C., & Idonor. D. (2011, October 11). Post-election Violence: FG Panel Report Indicts Buhari. Vanguard. Accessed from https://www.vanguardngr. com/2011/10/post-election-violence-fg-panel-report-indicts-buhari/ on 7 November 2017. Njoku, L. & Egenuka, N. (2020). Enugu Killing will not Deter us from Restoring Biafra, says Nnamdi Kanu Accessed from https://guardian. ng/news/enugu-killing-will-not-deter-us-from-restoring-biafra-says-nnamdikanu/ on 27 August 2020. Nwozor, A. (2013). Constructed Marginalisation and the Mobilisation of Ethnic Hatred: Political Contestation and Power Shift in Democratic Nigeria. African Renaissance, 10(3–4), 37–57. Obadina, T. (1999). Nigeria’s Economy at the Crossroads: New Government Faces a Legacy of Mismanagement and Decay. Africa Recovery, 13(1), 8–17. Odeyemi, J. O. (2014). A Political History of Nigeria and the Crisis of Ethnicity in Nation-Building. International Journal of Developing Societies, 3(1), 1–12. Oduwole, T. A. & Fadeyi, A. O. (2013). Religious Fanaticism and National Security in Nigeria. Journal of Sociological Research, 4(1), 49–60.

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Ojie, A. E., & Ewhrudjakpor, C. (2009). Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies in Nigeria. Anthropologist, 11(1), 7–14. Ojukwu, C. C., & Shopeju, J. O. (2010). Elite Corruption and the Culture of Primitive Accumulation in 21st Century Nigeria. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 1(2), 15–24. Okojie, J. (2020, January 8). Prospects, Challenges of Nigeria’s Agriculture in 2020. Business Day. Accessed from https://businessday.ng/agriculture/ article/prospects-challenges-of-nigerias-agriculture-in-2020/ on 8 February 2022. Okpanachi, O. (2009, June 4–6). Building Peace in a Divided Society: The Role of Civil Society in Muslim-Christian Relations in Nigeria. SHUR International Conference on “Human Rights in Conflict: The Role of Civil Society”, Luiss University, Rome. Osaghae, E. E. (1995). Structural Adjustment and Ethnicity in Nigeria (Research Report No. 98). Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Institute. Osaghae, E. E. (2006). Ethnicity and the State in Africa (Working Paper Series No. 7). Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies. Ryukoku University. Osaghae, E. E., & Suberu, T. (2005). A History of Identities, Violence and Stability in Nigeria. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford. Ojoye, T. (2017). What Kanu told us in prisons-Utomi. Accessed from http:// punchng.com/what-nnamdi-kanu-told-us-in-prison-utomi/ on 8 November 2017. Sanusi, S. L. (2010, November 26). Growth Prospects for the Nigerian Economy. Convocation Lecture delivered at the Igbinedion University Eighth Convocation Ceremony, Okada, Edo State. Prepared by the Research Department of the Central Bank of Nigeria. Simon, O. B. (2014). 2015 and the Survival of the Nigerian State. African Security Review, 23(2), 161–171. Suberu, R. T. (1993). The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria. Journal of Democracy, 4(4), 39–53. Tamuno, T. N. (1970). Separatist Agitations in Nigeria Since 1914. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 8(4), 563–584. Tauna, A. (2017). The North wants restructuring like any other part of Nigeria-Go. Tambuwal. Accessed from http://dailypost.ng/2017/10/11/ north-wants-restructuring-like-part-nigeria-gov-tambuwal/ on 8 November 2017. The Global Competitiveness Report 2019. (2019). Insight Report. The Global Competitiveness Report (2019) (Fact Sheet). World Economic Forum.

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Ukpong, C. (2020). Nigerian Students on NDDC Scholarship ‘Stranded’ in Europe. Accessed from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/southsouth-regional/393509-nigerian-students-on-nddc-scholarship-stranded-ineurope.html on 27 October 2020. UNDP. (2014). Framework for Harnessing the Extractive Industries for Inclusive Growth and Development in Nigeria. United Nations Development Programme. UNDP. (2019). Human Development Report 2019. Beyond Income, Beyond Averages, Beyond Today: Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century. United Nations Development Programme. US Department of State. (2018). 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria. Accessed from https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-rep ort-on-international-religious-freedom/nigeria/ on 8 February 2022. Uzoma, R. C. (2004). Religious Pluralism, Cultural differences, and Social Stability in Nigeria. BYU L. Rev., 651–664.

CHAPTER 2

Federalism and Plurality Unpacked

Introduction This chapter examines the federal system, the chronological unveiling of the system and factors necessitating its practice by countries. The chapter also explores its features as well as the pros and cons. This becomes essential because Nigeria runs a federal system. Countries that have adopted the federal system saw it as one of the options that can be used to manage their diversity. Therefore, the chapter dwells on plurality from the twin perspectives of ethnicity and religion. This is because most of the security issues in the world have ethnic and religious linings. This chapter is in two main sections. The first section touches on the federal system. It examines the views of scholars on the concept of federalism and arrives at conceptualising it. The section further delves into the chronology of the federal system concerning how countries adopted it by sequence, and how some countries/territories started with federalism but later dropped the idea. The section provides the reasons why countries embrace federalism which includes internal and external influences that are encapsulated in security, economic, geographical and demographic factors. The section also looks at the federal system from the perspectives of proponents and opponents but stresses that the opposition to its practice does not negate the desire of more countries to consider the system as an option to run their governments. Since federalism epitomises the existence of more than one level of government, the section sheds light © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. T. Faluyi, National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7_2

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on the models of federalism. These models explain power relations among the levels of government in federal states. These include dual federalism, cooperative federalism, asymmetric federalism and competitive federalism. The second section covers plurality from the angles of ethnicity and religion and how these are linked to the indirect rule system practised under the colonial administration. Aside from establishing the fact that ethnicity and religion are strong pillars of plurality, the chapter gives a historical account of how colonialism bolstered the consciousness about ethnic and religious differences in African societies. The chapter conceptualises ethnic group, ethnicity and religion and how the poor management of these diversity features of societies can threaten the peace and stability of any state.

Federal System The term “federal” has a Latin source, foedus, which signifies, “covenant” (Elazar, 1987: 5). Authors on the concept of federalism like McMahon, Riker, etc. identify the synergetic interaction between, and direct interaction with, at least two levels of government in a federal system (Daniel, 2015). K. C. Wheare in his classic work, Federal Government defines a federal system. Wheare (1953: 2) defines a federal system as one in which there exists a division of authority ‘between a general authority and regional authorities which are not subordinate one to another but coordinate with each other’. This definition takes its root from the 1787 Constitution of the United States of America (USA). He views federalism from the legal and constitutional perspectives and he used the Constitution of the USA as a gauge for constitutional provision for the division of power between the government at the centre and component units (Hassan, 2014). He posits that federalism connotes a legal division of powers and functions between two equal or more levels of government who act directly on the citizens in their jurisdiction through their respective laws within the model of a written constitution (Aliff, 2015; Daniel, 2015; Omololu, 2012). This reinforces the submission that federal states have more than one level of government. Wheare’s study accentuates how central and regional governments can have the twofold relationship of being coordinate and independent in resource allocation, matters of exercise of authority, service provisions and administration of government programmes (Tarlton, 1965).

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The reference point of federal systems is Wheare’s definition, and the lens through which scholars view federalism by modifying or criticising his view. Wheare advocates a financially autonomous central government and component units (Daniel, 2015). Absolute independence of each level of government is a mirage in real sense. Leo Dare differs from Wheare on the independence of each tier of government. He submits that in actual sense, the subnational units do not have financial autonomy because the federal government intervenes in fiscal matters of the former with respect to monetary policies, and grants-in-aid, among others (Dare, 1979 cited in Omololu, 2012). Dare’s assertion describes the case of Nigeria where the federal government’s revenue prowess which is situated in the exclusive list, translates to the chunk of the revenue for that level of government and ‘apportions’ monthly allocation to other levels of government. This federal financial might accounts for why the office of the president has become a position of attraction for political elites. Wheare’s definition reflects a constitutional approach to federalism; the flaw of the definition is that informal intricacies of how government operates are not given consideration (Thorlakson, 2003). The rigidity, legalistic nature and inflexibility of Wheare’s approach are the basis for criticism (Hassan, 2014). In addition, Wheare’s definition hardly reflects how federal systems operate in different countries other than the USA (Thorlakson, 2003). Succinctly, other variables are associated with the practice of federalism. The socio-cultural theory of federalism was introduced by Livingston. Livingston submits that federalism supersedes institutional and constitutional fabrics, which confines it to power relations. He opines that economic, social, historical, political and cultural factors, which are integral for the relationship among groups in the society are germane, but the protection of the societies in a federal state through the federal constitution should not be jettisoned (Livingston, 1969 cited in Omololu, 2012). Livingston’s assertion justifies why federal practice differs in each society (Elazar, 1987). He sees the federal society as a plural society with ethnic groups of distinct histories, cultures, languages, locations and boundaries (Omololu, 2012). Society is the central focus rather than mainly based on constitutionality. Livingston claims that the understanding of social and geographical divisions enhances the understanding of a how a federal system functions (Osaghae, 1990). Osaghae juxtaposes Livingston’s position and asserts that emphasis on diversity is an assumption that all states are federal, hence there is a need

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to put diversity of societies into consideration and recognition of the existence of a federal constitution that supports the division of power without jeopardising autonomy (Osaghae, 1990). Similarly, Omololu synergises the constitutionality of federalism with the socio-cultural dimension and submits that this snowballs into a compact federal system (Omololu, 2012). These make a state federal. From a slightly different perspective, Carl Friedrich contends that unity with diversity combined represents federalism (Friedrich, 1956 cited in Omololu, 2012). Friedrich identifies the existence of two levels of government that will accommodate decentralisation and balance of power between the federal government, component units and the communities (Friedrich, 1956 cited in Omololu, 2012). Hence, Wheare’s definition cannot be discarded even though authors have looked at the phenomenon from the purviews of diversity and unity. Riker opposes Livingston by faulting his non-recognition of the jurisdictional component of federalism. Riker views the need to have two levels of government with each having some scope where it can independently take decisions as sacrosanct (Osaghae, 1990). He pictures federalism as a progeny of bargain which comes to light because of the need to expand territory, meet external military or diplomatic threats (Riker, 1964 cited in Omololu, 2012). Riker also argues that levels of government may not have total independence as the two levels may sometimes have an overlap of functions (Riker, 1964 cited in Omololu, 2012). This explains the situation in the concurrent list as seen in the Nigerian 1999 Constitution. Conversely, Ostrom postulates that overlap must not be restricted to only two levels of government and that conflict among the people may be mitigated by more than one level of government, hence, overlap may exceed two levels of government with variations (Ostrom, 1973). The variations reinforce the assertion that the cases in states are different. According to Elazar, no identical federal system exists; each has its means of dividing and sharing power (Elazar, 1993). It is almost impossible to transfer the exact pattern of operations of a federal system in one state to another state without some modifications to suit the peculiarities of the receiving state (Elazar, 1993). For instance, each of the component units (especially states) of Nigeria’s federal structure has at least one or two dominant ethnic groups. Whereas in the United States, each state can have a conglomeration of different races. The Swiss and Canadian models are examples of contemporary models of federalism (Elazar, 1987). The

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Swiss model is weaved around indigenous ethnic and linguistic differences and the accommodation of such diversities, while the Canadian model encapsulates multicultural society with a federal structure grafted with a parliamentary Westminster model (Elazar, 1987). Consequently, these may affect how societal differences are managed. It also echoes the claim that federalism is beyond constitutionalism and operates differently in different countries. Elaigwu (2006) supports Elazar’s assertion when he opines that no country has been able to reflect Wheare’s definition in actual practice and that federal practice varies from country to country, subject to historical, political, environmental, cultural, and social factors and time. Also, the USA which seems to reflect Wheare’s definition to a great extent has even co-opted intergovernmental relations into its system where there is interdependence and cooperation between the centre and the component units as against the coordinate and independent relationship hitherto recommended (Omololu, 2012). Elazar advocates levels of government within a territory that serve the same people, and common goals and respond to the same demands (Elazar, 1965 cited in Omololu, 2012). Elazar echoes his earlier assertion that: As a political principle, federalism has to do with the constitutional diffusion of power so that the constituting elements in a federal arrangement share in the processes of common policy making and administration by right, while the activities of the common government are conducted in such a way as to maintain their respective integrities. (Elazar, 1987: 5–6)

In a deeper sense, it resonates with intergovernmental relations, but the bigger picture paints a combination of self-rule and shared rule through decentralised constitutional power sharing (Elazar, 1987; Pokharel, 2017). ‘While self-rule describes the scope, nature and extent of regional autonomy, shared rule subsumes types and areas of regional influence over central decision-making’ (Mueller & Mazzoleni, 2016: 46). In federal systems, the existence and authority of each level of government is preserved through the constitutional distribution of power between the central and subnational governments (Elazar, 1987). Aliff (2015) posits that federalism seeks to establish that the relationship among the tiers of government is in order. The author further submits that all the tiers of government in a federal state ought to have independent and joint decision-making responsibilities (Aliff, 2015). An instance

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of joint decision-making is in Germany, where the other two subnational units implement federal policies (Kincaid, 2017). In Nigeria, the appointment of the Chief Judge of a State involves the concerned state and the National Judicial Council, headed by the Chief Justice of the federation. Despite Wheare’s criticisms and support, virtually all federal systems have some level of division of powers, written and rigid constitution and the existence of an independent court to arbitrate on power jurisdiction among levels of government (Hassan, 2014). Furthermore, the fact remains that there is a plethora of views on the definition of federalism, but areas of convergence are that a federal system should epitomise unity in diversity and the existence of more than one level of government (Ikeji, 2011; Ogunnoiki, 2017; Omoleke, 2010; Omololu, 2012; Omoregie, 2015; Tsuwa & Asongo, 2013). Consequently, federalism is conceptualised as a political system comprising more than one level of government; they independently and collectively have revenue generation power and responsibilities; the various groups in the country fall within territorial jurisdictions as well as have primary and secondary levels of government that represent their interests. This to a great extent resonates with the Nigerian situation where there exist exclusive and concurrent legislative lists in the constitution and some functions of the local governments, and each ethnic group can identify with the country, one or more state and local governments. However, the federal government in Nigeria dominates the constitutional and legal spectrums of revenue generation power (Ngwu & Anih, 2020). The peculiarities with federalism in each society is responsible for some factors that necessitate why some countries embrace federalism. Chronology of Federalism and Reasons Why Countries Make Federalism an Option The dynamism of federalism means federal states are of different geographical and population sizes and countries have espoused the system at different times. Some federal states like Canada, Russia, Australia and the USA are very big in size, an example of those with large populations are India, the USA, Brazil and Nigeria while Comoros and Nepal are small in size and population (see Aliff, 2015). The dawn of modern federalism is linked to the USA in the 1780s (Fenna, 2007). At the outset, the USA was a confederal state but it metamorphosed to federalism between 1781 and 1789 (Aliff, 2015). More

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countries have found ‘solace’ in the system. Fenna (2007: 300) and Ogunnoiki (2017: 57) label the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries as the ‘Age of Federalism’ because this period in history was significant to the emergence of federations around the world. The emergence of federalism in different countries also took place at different periods (Switzerland, 1848; Canada, 1867; Australia, 1901; Nigeria, 1954) (Aliff, 2015; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008; Fenna, 2007; Glass, 1977; Ikeji, 2011). Successful federal states like the USA, Switzerland and Canada faced several challenges like threats of secession and civil war, but these did not mark the demise of their existence (Cameron, 2009). Some European countries like Spain (1978: a quasi-federal system), Belgium (1980) and Bosnia (1995) embraced features of federalism after the first half of the twentieth century (Roeder, 2009). From 1901 to mid-2008, some states had diverse transformations in their federal systems (Roeder, 2009). Some federal systems have fragmented while some have been more unified through the tools of foreign interference and dictatorship (McGarry & O’Leary, 2009). Federal systems in Cameroon, Zaire, Uganda and Kenya were shortlived courtesy of their respective democratic transition processes (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008; McGarry & O’Leary, 2009; Suberu, 2009). Some like Austro-Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Malaysia, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Serbia-Montenegro, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Yugoslavia have experienced secessions (Roeder, 2009; Osaghae, 2003a). In a quest to integrate Anglo-Franco territories, Cameroon’s federal system was abolished in 1972 (Suberu, 2009). The Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon were administered by Britain and France, respectively separately for forty years, but these dual territories were amalgamated in 1961 to become a country (Awasom, 2002). Federal systems in Cameroon, Zaire, Uganda and Kenya were short-lived courtesy of their respective democratic transition processes (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008; McGarry & O’Leary, 2009; Suberu, 2009). Proposals to have some federal systems emerge did not come to fulfilment. These include the East African Federation (Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Kenya and Uganda), the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Federation, the LibyaTunisia Union and Kwame Nkrumah’s efforts for the United States of Africa (Adamolekun & Kincaid, 1991). Perhaps, this among other factors is responsible for the concentration of power in a central government or an individual in African countries. There is grave over-centralisation of

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power in Nigeria, but in Ethiopia, there is better devolution of powers (Okojie, 2013). Currently, in Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria operate federal constitutions, while in practice, South Africa runs a blend of federal and unitary systems (Osaghae, 2003a). Nonetheless, the South African Constitution does not indicate that the country is a federal state (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Belgium, Canada and India’s Federal systems have remained functional, autonomous and democratic (Roeder, 2009). Nigeria, India and Malaysia make the list of developing countries where federalism survived within their first few years of independence (Tsuwa & Asongo, 2013). Nigerian federalism has survived against all odds due to the country’s civilian support for the system and the nature of the country’s ethnic diversity and political landscape (Suberu, 2009). In contrast, Tsuwa and Asongo (2013) submit that the activities of elites have punctured the success of federalism in Nigeria. The authors aver that the elites annihilated the significance of federalism in Nigeria and Africa through the tools of ethnic mobilisation for political competition and resource allocation (Tsuwa & Asongo, 2013). Disintegration and threats of disintegration are progenies of the challenges that have threatened the Nigerian federal experiment (Tsuwa & Asongo, 2013). It can be established that the Nigerian federal system has survived but continues to face the storm of instability. The Nigerian situation is so because the Nigerian political elites have not piloted the country’s federal system with full consideration of the dynamic nature of Nigeria. It has been established that countries have unique features that shape how their federalism is practised, but these have historical links. There are peculiar historical and political processes that form the building blocks for the adoption of a federal system in each country (Hassan, 2014). Real situations in each country are taken into consideration (Elazar, 1987). Hence, compromise and bargain are not the only pedigrees of all federal systems (Ross, 2010). Federal states like the USA, Canada, Australia and Belgium are federal states not formed through only negotiation; they were products of progressive processes where their constitutions did not relegate existing divisions but mirrored the realities concerning each state (Aziegbe, 2014). Some factors account for the emergence of federalism in different countries; however, Stepan (2005) recognises three basic root causes of federalism and uses this to distinguish types of federations. These are

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the coming together, holding together and putting together federations. The coming together federation emanates from the coagulation or coming together of states that hitherto existed. Tsuwa and Asongo (2013: 39) assert that a ‘federal system of government is the coming together of independent or autonomous states (countries) who by agreement, want to stay together as a nation-state’. The geographical proximity of the territories is a catalyst for this. The early federal systems came into existence because of the willingness of autonomous communities to give up parts of their sovereignty and their joining together to form a state that will benefit all and will be bound together through a social contract (Cameron, 2009; Stepan, 1999). Their purpose of coming together is to have comparative security and economic advantages (Stepan, 1999). The USA, Australia, Canada and Switzerland are countries that fall within the domain of coming together (Aliff, 2015; Stepan, 2005). The holding together federations are progenies of hitherto unitary states that decentralised (Stepan, 1999). Holding together is also referred to as ‘new federalism’, which seeks to neutralise groups’ dissatisfaction with central policies through decentralising responsibilities to subnational units (Aliff, 2015: 73). This aligns with the possible adoption of a federal system in unitary states like Sri Lanka and Britain and how federalism operates in Brazil and India as well as evolving federation like Spain (Aliff, 2015; Stepan, 2005). To absorb the pressure that comes with ethnic pluralism, Nigeria and Ethiopia opted for a federal system on the platform of holding together federalism (Dickovick, 2014). This resonates with Cameron’s (2009) view that in modern-day federalism, the inexorableness of warring societies to knit a political relationship gave rise to state formation, as a viable choice of the parties concerned. It is most unlikely that a democratic unitary state will be able to build a national identity meant to douse tensions in an ethnically diverse country, hence the need for federal restructuring (Weinstock, 2001). However, Cameron’s opinion can also apply to putting together, and a good example is the case of Nigeria which is a federal state and has multiple ethnic and religious groups, but the country is still a product of putting together. Federations that emerge from elites’ bargaining either by coming together or holding together tend to be more acceptable by the people and are more durable than federal systems that emerge through putting together (McGarry & O’Leary, 2009). This is why Canadian, Swiss and Belgian federations are epitomes of success (McGarry & O’Leary, 2009).

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Putting together federations emerge through a deeply forceful effort by a non-democratic centralising power to put together a multinational state, some of the components of which hitherto had some form of autonomy. It also portrays the affairs in Africa where the imperialists downplayed ethnic and religious differences and brought together (unwilling) independent territories to form states (Ross, 2010). Federalism gained more acceptance because of the crumble of European empires and opposition to colonialism after World War II, and these account for why some states in post-colonial Africa and Asia adopted federalism (Aliff, 2015). The aftermath of World War II was the need to merge previously autonomous territories, the colonialists settled for the establishment of the federal system in such colonies (Roeder, 2009). This culminated in the emergence of federalism in Burma (1948), Indonesia (1949), India (1950), Ethiopia (1952), Pakistan (1956), Nigeria (1954), Malaysia (1963) and Tanzania (1964) (Roeder, 2009). The raison d’être of federalism in a country may be one, two or all of the factors highlighted. There are conditions for different territories to coalesce to form a federal state. These reasons are military drive and defence, the need to be independent of external influence, comparative economic advantage and the relationship between the political communities before concluding to form a federation, the resemblance of political institutions, geographical proximity, and likeness in political matters (Wheare, 1963 cited in Babalola, 2013; Obidimma & Obidimma, 2015). Therefore, federalism may be utilised to integrate societies while preserving existing internal diversities and to link the component units for economic gains and better security (Elazar, 1987). Babalola (2013) echoes this and submits that these factors led to the emergence of federal states like the USA, Switzerland, Canada and Australia. On political basis, Obidimma and Obidimma (2015) submit that the minimum criteria for a federal system to be considered are the existence of a political system with more than one level of government, a written constitution and a power sharing arrangement. The size of the country or (and features of) the population may also be a justification for federalism and a case in point is Canada, where these factors account for the existence of subnational units which culminates in building a sense of inclusion (Weinstock, 2001). A proof to show that factors that necessitate federalism may be fluid is the case of Indonesia. The country is over 200 million, has over 2000 Islands and linguistically, ethnically and religiously diverse, but it is still not a federal state (Stepan, 1999).

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Globalisation has been pivot to the adoption of federalism in some states. International organisations and other countries’ involvement in the domestic affairs of some countries have been part of the reasons for the adoption of the federal system in the intervened countries. Historically, authoritarian, conflict-ridden and centralist states like BosniaHerzegovina, Russia, Ethiopia (in 1991) and Iraq ‘considered’ federalism either by international imposition or internal factors (Aliff, 2015). The international community was instrumental in an arrangement to decentralise Bosnia such that each ethnic/religious group could have some form of autonomy (Roeder, 2009). Bosnia-Herzegovina was repackaged as a federation in 1995, and this continued with the help of international forces (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009). Sri Lanka and Somalia which have been affected by wars are also considering the adoption of a federal system (Aliff, 2015). In the case of Africa and Nigeria as a case in point, the plurality of the Nigerian state as well as colonial and elites’ arrangements contributed to the adoption of a federal system (Graham et al., 2017; Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). The political actors have since continued to call the shots on what direction the Nigerian federal system takes. Constitutional conferences, the emergence of geo-political zones and power rotation are corresponding steps that have been taken by political elites in response to ethnic and religious plurality and the federal nature of Nigeria. Characteristics of a Federal System A federation is an institutional framework designed to accommodate subnational units in a union in the decision-making process of a central government through a constitutional provision (Aliff, 2015). Federalism promotes having an organised relationship among the tiers of government (Aliff, 2015). Federation is the reason for federalism and vice versa: federalism is a system of government practised in a federation (Aliff, 2015). Federalism is about dividing powers among levels of government, while federation represents an institutional provision (Hassan, 2014). The author went further to distinguish between national and ethnic federations. National federations do not give much recognition to ethnic and linguistic factors in political mobilisation and within this category are the USA, Australia and Germany (Hassan, 2014). Ethnic federations consider ethnicity and religion in political mobilisation, and Ethiopia and Nigeria

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fall into this category (Hassan, 2014). These are multinational federalism but countries like Canada and Switzerland, which have more than one ethno-linguistic group give less importance to ethnicity in political mobilisation (Hassan, 2014). On the administrative structure, the subnational levels of government equally have their own executive. The President is the head of the executive branch of the national government in countries like Nigeria and the USA, while the head of the government in Canada and Australia is the Prime Minister. The subnational levels have different names in different countries and each one has its head. In Argentina, Australia, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela and the USA, they are states; they are referred to as provinces in Canada, länder in Austria and Germany and cantons in Switzerland (Elazar, 1987). The heads of these levels of government in Nigeria and the USA is the governor. There also exist local governments in Nigeria. Ethiopia is a federal state, structured into federal and regional governments as well as zone, district and village levels (Smith, 2008). The multi-layered level and federal/subnational unit relations give room for each diverse group to have a government (Omoregie, 2015). The division of power between levels of government, allowing groups to have control over their political, social and economic matters breed a federal state with feelings of less exploitations by different groups, less conflict and promote political stability (Brancati, 2004). Belgium, Canada, Switzerland and India have ethnic diversities, but they have been able to maintain a stable democracy through the instrument of federalism (Brancati, 2004). The multi-layered level of government achieves this purpose better where there exists government at the grassroots in some federal states, and this may assume the nomenclature of local governments, municipals or counties. One unifying thing about federal systems is that there is always a form of diversity, but these groups are governed within the same territory in which they still maintain their identity (Ikeji, 2011). This explains why federalism is a system that reflects the diverse political, social, cultural and economic interests within the larger spectrum of unity (Tsuwa & Asongo, 2013). A federal system of government differs from other forms of government because of the nature and extent of power distribution among levels of government. Countries practise federalism in peculiar ways because they have their respective ways of managing intergovernmental relations, and fiscal relations, among others. Federalism involves legal/

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constitutional settings, which describe the legal or jurisdictional and political aptitude of the levels of government (Omoleke, 2010). The levels of government in a federal state exceed one. Horowitz (2007) submits that a federal state must have an appreciable number of component units which must have equal powers, size and existing boundaries. However, reality does not completely portray this because in Nigeria, the federal government is so powerful compared to the states. Also, the states in Nigeria and the USA are not of equal sizes. Therefore, Thorlakson (2003) views federalism as a system where a minimum of two levels of autonomous governments exist and connect the people to at least two political authorities where the people are represented. This epitomises power sharing architecture between tiers of government. The same set of people are under the authority of more than one level of government and each has an area of jurisdictional autonomy (Riker, 1964 cited in Ostrom, 1973). However, some unitary states have some striking resemblances to federalism in their modus operandi. For instance, some unitary states maintain a kind of relationship with some territories, and this makes such as a de facto federal state, for example, the relationship of Denmark with Greenland (Horowitz, 2007). A federal system differs from a unitary system because of the autonomy granted to each level of government in the former (Ogoma, 2018; Thorlakson, 2003). Ogoma (2018) and Osaghae (1990) purport that in a unitary system, subnational units are subservient to central authority and the power the latter gives the former can be withdrawn, there is a more structured division of power between the central and subnational units in a federal state. Federalism exemplifies decentralising power and it is a denunciation of the centralisation of power (Tsuwa & Asongo, 2013). This centralisation often manifests in terms of fiscal centralisation and this whittles fiscal independence and service delivery of subnational units (Ross, 2010). In a federal system, one level of government should not operate as a subsidiary of the other, and there should be a division of power with some level of financial independence for each level (Sunday et al., 2014). In every federal state, each level of government has its areas of authority. The federal government is majorly preoccupied with what affects the whole country like defence, currency, foreign matters, and signing of international treaties, among others while the component units have control over local government creation, issuing drivers’ licence, public health, and agriculture, among others (Obidimma & Obidimma,

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2015). Nevertheless, in federal states, there are areas where both levels of government exercise authority. These levels of relationship between the levels of government are examples that show how territories can be bound together within the structure of a federation and serve as a platform for intergovernmental and intergroup relations. Inequality in power and resources between the federal and regional governments cannot be ruled out in a federal state but there should be financial autonomy (resources) at the disposal of each tier of government that will be commensurate with their constitutional responsibilities (Obidimma & Obidimma, 2015; Omotoso & Abe, 2014). However, in the case of Nigeria, this seems not to be the case because the federal government is more powerful than the states courtesy of the former’s control of resources. To compound the issue, states are reluctant to generate adequate revenue internally, and this makes them subservient to federal authorities because most of them depend on the government at the centre to ‘survive’ monthly. The autonomy of each level of government is beyond legal and geographical factors but entails separate legislature, head of executive, courts, ministries, departments, agencies, etc. (Obidimma & Obidimma, 2015). The activities of these separate bodies are guided by a set of fundamental laws enacted by the parliament. Most federal states have a bicameral legislature, as they may practise presidential or parliamentary systems or a blend of the two (Ogunnoiki, 2017). Nigeria and the USA have bicameral parliament at the national level. Nigeria has a unicameral legislature at the state level, states in the United States of America, with the exception of Nebraska, have two legislative houses, House of Representatives (few states use a different name) and the Senate (Fagbadebo, 2016; Yagboyaju et al., 2019). The umpire in a federal system is the judiciary (Horowitz, 2007). In most federal states, there exist courts at the federal and state levels, the Supreme Court is the highest, and this court mediates disputes among the levels of government (Osaghae, 1990; Suberu, 2008). For instance, the dispute between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Lagos State government on the release of funds meant for the latter’s local governments was decided by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in 2004 (Suberu, 2008). The authority of the Supreme Court in some federal states like Nigeria, the USA, Canada and India may not be absolute on some matters but may be subject to democratic factors (Suberu, 2009). For instance, the Supreme Court in Nigeria refused to make a pronouncement on the

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legality or otherwise of the Sharia implementing police, Hisbah, in March 2007 (Suberu, 2008, 2009). This decision cannot be detached from the controversies generated by the introduction of the Sharia legal system in the early days of the Fourth Republic. The matter is religiously sensitive. In addition, the executive has sometimes disobeyed the decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts in Nigeria, especially during Obasanjo’s tenure between 1999 and 2007 (Suberu, 2008, 2009). This was also the disposition of governments at the national and state levels from 2015– 2023 (Punch Newspaper, 21 February 2023). These features with their attendant integrating tendencies and shortcomings affirm that federalism has advantages and disadvantages. Supporting and Opposing Views on Federalism The diverse positions of early scholars on federalism do not negate the common denominator of a federal system, which is to promote unity and preserve diversity (Aliff, 2015; Omoleke, 2010; Omoregie, 2015; Tsuwa & Asongo, 2013). It is a system that has been advocated as one of the catalysts for cordiality in a heterogeneous society (Adamu & Ocheni, 2016; Daniel, 2015; Fagbadebo, 2010). Omoregie (2015: 6) perceives federalism as being ‘popular for its elastic capacity to provide solutions to the numerous challenges of keeping people of diverse ethnicity, religious affiliation as well as social and racial differences together’. Hence, it is one of the solutions to the challenges associated with a plural state. Federalism encourages the division of power between the centre and the constituent units without preventing the groups in the subnational units from retaining their identities and promoting identifying with the country as an entity (Aziegbe, 2014). Healthy relationships have been fostered in plural states through federal arrangements. The USA through federalism sustains group pluralism and individual rights, Switzerland through it promotes local liberties, India accommodates linguistic dissimilarities while Venezuela is decentralised to an appreciable extent (Elazar, 1987). The author further posits that federal arrangements have been used as a framework to manage ethnic differences in Canada, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Nigeria. This affirms the claim made earlier that countries that are not legally federal borrow some federal principles to manage their countries. In a democracy, federalism gives more room for the representation of minority groups in the decision-making process because of

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decentralisation and autonomy of the subnational units (Aliff, 2015). In Nigeria, there are representatives of states in the National Assembly, groups and local governments in the state Houses of Assembly, Councillors at ward levels, federal character principle, among others. These make it possible for minority groups who by account of simple majority may never participate in decision-making to be represented. To be a viable response to the challenges of plurality, a federal system should be positioned to manage the centrifugal forces with the aid of centripetal forces that exist in a country. Centripetal forces are dynamics that can unite a country while centrifugal forces are factors that have the tendency to set the various groups apart (McLoughlin & Bouchat, 2013). National integration in a federation is a product of well harnessed centripetal forces (Fakanbi & Raji, 2013). Federalism as a solution to the challenges with governance in Africa has faced the dual hiccups of the central government not being adequately able to mitigate potential centrifugal forces and the continued usurpation of subnational units’ power by the government at the centre (Suberu, 2009). Ethnic and religious conflicts are still occurrences in Nigeria despite its adoption of a federal system. These conflicts cannot be dissociated from the weakness of the subnational units in providing infrastructure; hence, the competition for federal resources generates ethnoreligious violence. However, scholars (Kymlicka, 1998; McGarry & O’Leary, 1993; Nordlinger, 1972; Watts, 1999) contend that federalism does not have a convincing record of managing conflicts, may stimulate territorial divisions along ethnic, cultural, language and religious lines as well as encourage the pursuit to secede by minorities (Roeder, 2009). It may not completely guarantee the representation of interest groups in a democracy, and that may make some minority groups completely shut out of power (Aliff, 2015). Shut out in the sense that some groups may be represented at ‘lower’ levels but it may almost be impossible to be in high positions like the presidency. Categorically, it may mean that some groups may never participate in decision-making at any level. In their opinion, Linder and Vatter (2001) criticise federalism from the perspective of no guarantee to protect minorities. The authors cite the example of Switzerland where the German speakers in Geneva are minorities. However, despite the recognition of German as a national language, the speakers of the language will have to address the authorities in French. In the case of Nigeria, Omololu Olunloyo, a delegate of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference preached ethnic equity and not majoritarian

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rule (Omololu, 2012). The author asserts that in a country like Nigeria, if majority rule was to be stuck to, the major ethnic groups may dominate the political landscape while the minority groups on account of the low population may be left out in decision-making. This assertion provides further justification for this book. However, considering the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria and the stark reality, not all groups can produce the president or be represented at various levels of decision-making. In addition, if a sub-unit is homogeneous in ethnicity, there will be discrimination against non-indigenes who are not members of such ethnic groups (Horowitz, 2007). This is rampant in Nigeria and India (Horowitz, 2007). For instance, a Hausa man may be discriminated against in a Yoruba state and vice versa. Federalism may spawn secessionist agitations by the minorities because of a relegated or no stake in decision-making (Aliff, 2015). For instance, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia suggests that federalism is yet to be the best solution to the bane of diversified societies (Fagbadebo, 2010). The secession attempt of the Tigray people from Ethiopia also puts a caveat on federalism as a pedestal for accommodation. However, a peace agreement facilitated by the African Union was signed between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in November 2022. Secessionist movements in Nigeria affirm that federalism in the country has not matured to manage the grievances of the various groups. In these instances, however, different societies have their peculiarities. The flop of the socialist federations of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia brings to question the relevance of federalism in multiethnic societies (Aliff, 2015). Hence, federalism may not always be the answer. Tanzania is a diverse state and it is not as problematic and susceptible to violence as least diverse states like Rwanda and Burundi (Osaghae, 2006). The three are not federal states. Finally, federalism is expensive. Federalism brings about duplication of facilities, personnel, functions and infrastructure, and this increases the cost of running the government (Horowitz, 2007; Ogunnoiki, 2017). For instance, in Nigeria, there are ministers from each state, commissioners, chairmen and members of government parastatals at state and national levels and other appointees. These offices require operation costs which add to the fiscal burden of the government. Mangut and Egbefo (2010) view federalism from two sides of the coin and purport that it is a remedy for fragile integration, but its potential may be weakened through the disproportionate balance of power between the

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government at the centre and federating units. The awakened debates on the possibility of federalism in Kenya and Uganda coupled with the likelihood of embracing the system in South Sudan are signs that federalism still has what it takes to marginally integrate a plural society (Tsuwa & Asongo, 2013). These reservations nevertheless, federalism has been practised in countries for decades and some countries are considering to parley with the system. The peculiarity of societies accounts for why there are models of federalism and some countries have systems that mirror one or more models concurrently. Models of Federalism For federalism to withstand the tensions that come with diversity, each country needs to be flexible in its practice of federalism so that it suits its situation, and this is why we have models of federalism. This also represents how powers are distributed among the levels of government. Some of these models will be examined. Dual Federalism Historically, federalism shared meaning with dual federalism, which is dividing authority between the central government and the states (Ablavsky, 2018). It is in line with Wheare’s definition of federalism. Dual federalism operated at the inception of American federalism (Obi, 2019). It is a system where the state and federal governments exercise power independently, and function within distinctive jurisdictional boundaries (Aliff, 2015; Kincaid, 2017; Young, 2001). The central government cannot exercise powers on issues specified for the state to exercise its power and vice versa (Pokharel, 2017). However, Young (2001) submits that this is far from reality now because, during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, there was an overlap of functions among the levels of government. Corwin (1950) sees dual federalism as the two levels of government being sovereign and equal as well as involved in tensions rather than collaboration. However, Kincaid (2017) submits that dual federalism may not necessarily produce tension between the two governments but can still accommodate some level of concurrency, which may breed collaboration and cooperation. Examples of countries that have practised dual federalism at different times are Canada, Australia, the USA, India, Pakistan, Mexico, Malaysia and Russia (Aliff, 2015). The totality of these

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features has not been incorporated in the practice of federalism in contemporary Nigeria, even though in the First Republic, the regions controlled most of their resources. For instance, agriculture and education (apart from post-secondary) were on the residual list. Local governments (or native authorities in Northern Nigeria) had their local police, apart from the Eastern Region, which continued engaging the services of the Nigerian Police (Elaigwu, 2006). Hence, law and order maintenance were on the concurrent list. Regional constitutions operated at the same time the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions were in operation (Elaigwu, 2006). Cooperative Federalism The fact that dual federalism is not realistic any longer gave room for the emergence of cooperative federalism in the 1930s (Obi, 2019). This entails the functions of the tiers of government, mostly being intertwined (Aliff, 2015). It depicts the cooperation and interdependency of the federal, state and local governments in governing the populace: making and implementing policies (Obi, 2019; Pokharel, 2017; Sturm, 2018). An example is Germany, where the federal government draws out policies, but the state and local government officials implement such policies (Kincaid, 2017). Other countries that have adopted the model are Austria, and Switzerland, among others (Pokharel, 2017; Thorlakson, 2003). The reasons for cooperation among tiers of government are an increase in government activities, the emergence of new policy areas (like energy and environment) not factored into constitutions earlier drafted and the functions of government that need interdependence, especially in the areas of tax powers and expenditure responsibilities (Watts, 2006). An advantage of cooperative federalism is the exchange of information, which results in reconciling policy differences and arriving at good decisions (Watts, 2006). This operates in Nigeria when there is need for the constitution to be amended; there will be input from the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly. It portends the capacity to allow cooperation along ethnic, religious and party lines. Asymmetric Federalism The states enjoy the same constitutional status but derive different levels of power from the constitution (Pokharel, 2017). It is characterised by the unequal distribution of political, administrative and fiscal powers among the component units (Aliff, 2015). It manifests if the constituent

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units have different sizes and economic strengths (Beyme, 2005). This is evident in countries like the USA, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, India and Germany, where some states have very small population of between 0.2% and 2.8% of the total population (Beyme, 2005). Although, it is not in all cases that less populated states are fiscally weak. Asymmetric arrangements can take two forms as explained below in the next sentences, respectively (Aliff, 2015). Asymmetric federalism may occur where a subnational unit’s capacity to exercise its authority is still weak, and the federal government takes over such responsibility for such period, like in the case of India when in the first few years of the union, the central government performed such responsibilities for some weak states (Auclair, 2005). It may also take the form of giving one or more subnational units more autonomy to protect their interest, like the case of the states of Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia (Auclair, 2005). Competitive Federalism Cooperative federalism has been criticised for jeopardising accountability and discouraging government initiatives (Watts, 2006). It focuses more on the executive because the legislature of a level of government ratifies decisions made between its executive and executives of other governments and lastly, it jettisons the autonomy of constituent units (Watts, 2006). These criticisms justify the advocacy for competitive federalism (Watts, 2006). Competitive federalism is yet to be fully practised (Aliff, 2015). It has overlapping responsibilities for the levels of government, and they vertically and horizontally compete to discharge their duties to the people (Aliff, 2015). Each government within the same political territory strive to provide for and gain the support of the same people (Watts, 2006). This type of government, according to Aliff (2015), will create a competitive platform that would be responsive and accountable to the people. Such competition may exist among constituent units, in matters like labour and capital attraction (Aliff, 2015). This system may reduce waste, fraud and abuse because the people may use a level of government to check some excesses or weaknesses of the other (Roesler, 2019; Volden, 2002). The challenges that competitive federalism may face in a country like Nigeria are that of indigenship and non-indigenship dichotomies where opportunities are shut against people who are not indigenes of a state and the weak fiscal strength of the states. The criticisms of competitive federalism

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are that it can lead to divisions, acrimony and conflicts within a federal system (Watts, 2006).

Plurality from the Prisms of Ethnicity and Religious Diversity and Links with Indirect Rule in Nigeria Scholars (Alapiki, 2005; Dahl, 1978; Fearon, 2003; Jinadu, 1994; Okpanachi, 2009; Tholand, 1993) have given their views on the plurality of societies, especially from the perspectives of ethnicity and religion. Plurality epitomises diversity (Dahl, 1978). Most societies in the world are diverse but the form and origin may differ. As individuals, human beings are subsets of family, lineage, kinship and clan backgrounds (Duruji, 2008). Diversity may signify variances in language, religion, culture, ideology, region, ethnic group, race, and national identity, among others (Dahl, 1978; Okpanachi, 2009). Culture may be enveloped within a territory while religion may have adherents across territories (Jiménez et al., 2019). Human beings may belong to social, political, economic, professional, religious and ethnic groups, but the group that kindles feelings the most is ethnic groups (Adamu & Ocheni, 2016). Plurality in most states is always seen within the purview of ethnic and/ or racial and/or religious plurality. Members of each group sometimes see themselves as different from those of other groups. Hence, the state has always been plural, but the way each state has carried out its building process determines how diversity affects integration in individual states (Tholand, 1993). For over 5000 years, grappling with cultural diversity took prominence, and this complexity evolved due to colonialism, redefinition of boundaries and migration (Tholand, 1993). The chunk of the present-day African territories are products of European colonisation. Prior to colonialism, some parts of Africa possessed what may be labelled as ethnic communities which are societies where each had its institutions and ethnic societies hardly overlapped (Ake, 1993). Between 1881 and the First World War in 1914, Europeans made their way into Africa, occupied the continent and amalgamated unwilling parties into states (Olaiya, 2014). In summary, many unwilling groups with a plethora of institutions, history and culture were forcefully coagulated into territorial units called states (Ake, 1993; Alapiki, 2005).

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Pre-colonial African communities recognised ties beyond families and had the knowledge of a common origin, blood relationship, language and culture. This presupposes the fact that ethnicity had been existing prior to colonialism (Azarya, 2003). However, the contemporary ethnic groupings and boundaries in Africa are not as they were in the pre-colonial period (Azarya, 2003). This is because general identity was fragmented along with age and lineage and was never coalesced into large ethnic groups (Azarya, 2003). During the colonial era, ethnicity existed but was less significant because intergroup relations were lubricated by the agents of migration and the exercise of force by non-African rulers to bind the territories that make up individual states (Odeyemi, 2014). Ake describes that to some extent, ethnic groups are derivatives of inventions and constructions, but he did not discard the reality that ethnic groups existed, but ethnicity was less conspicuous (Ake, 1993). In these years, the colonial powers formed armies, appointed diplomats and gained more territories through treaties and violence (Aziegbe, 2014). In a nutshell, Africa was packaged and fabricated through the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference and not built or formed with the consent of its people (Odeyemi, 2014). Africa is a conglomeration of different nations that have no national/ hegemonic leadership, and the problem produces sectional identities exclusively in the form of tribe, ethnicity or religion (Fadakinte & Amolegbe, 2017). This ‘distinct’ path to state formation in Africa meant that some groups precipitously found themselves as minorities, while some took the dominant position as majorities (Odeyemi, 2014). The author avers that these groups saw themselves as competitors. The groups in these ‘embryonic’ states were unenthusiastic to identify with the states neither were they comfortable with collective identities but only cooperated temporarily because of the struggle for independence (Alapiki, 2005). Hence, the plurality in these states has been historically characterised by seasonal unity. Nigeria was also a partaker in these activities. The need to commit few administrative staff to pursue the large colonial project and be costeffective made the British depend on existing traditional institutions and arrangements called the indirect rule to administer the colonies (Ake, 1993). The colonies had well-established administrative structures and the indirect rule made use of these to govern these territories peacefully and actualise the desires of the colonialists (Okojie, 2013). The colonialists discovered the extent to which they were foreign and had to put in place

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a dual system that embodied the use of indigenous rule to mediate their relationship with the locals (Azarya, 2003). However, this changed power relations within existing traditional structures and brought powerful competition among the various ethnic groups (Adamu & Ocheni, 2016; Ake, 1993). This British colonial policy bolstered ethnicity in Nigeria. The North was administratively governed separately from the South from 1900 to 1951 as the North, which was predominantly Muslim, was ostracized from the Christian dominated South (Ikpe, 2009). Nevertheless, the indirect rule system granted some autonomy to each ethnic group within its jurisdiction so far any of its actions was not a cog in the wheel of progress of the colonial administration (Osaghae, 2003a). The indirect rule was very successful in the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria but less successful in the Southern Protectorate because the democratic traditional system was substituted with an autocratic design through the appointment of warrant chiefs (Malachy & Nwobi, 2014). Adamu and Ocheni (2016), in support of this assertion, opine that the European colonial regime engendered intra-African conflicts through its indirect rule system, which necessitated selecting a few stooges as proxies, without the consent of the majority of the population. The visible consequences of these were the Abeokuta riots of 1918 and the Aba riots of 1929 (McLoughlin & Bouchat, 2013). The Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was more economically buoyant than the Northern Protectorate, hence a more justification to amalgamate these territories in 1914 to become Nigeria (Malachy & Nwobi, 2014; McLoughlin & Bouchat, 2013). Amalgamation notwithstanding, the North and South still had dichotomies socially, politically and economically (McLoughlin & Bouchat, 2013). The nationalists hitherto united to gain independence but started to disintegrate after independence due to parochial quest for power and the leaders of the large ethnic groups began to utilise ethnic affiliation to pursue their ambitions (Ake, 1993). After independence, groups were against themselves on who would occupy the positions vacated by the Europeans (Azarya, 2003). This brought disparities not in terms of class, ideology, economic or professions but ethno-regional and ethnoreligious basis (Azarya, 2003). Thus, ethnic identity metamorphosed into a support base for larger groups beyond the political elites, and consequently voting along ethnic lines became a significant factor (Azarya, 2003). These factors are responsible for the plurality of the Nigerian state. Jinadu (1994: 165) describes

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Nigeria as a plural society, and on this basis, he designates a plural state as one that is ‘deeply divided’ and ‘ethnically split’. Stakeholders in a state cannot claim that plurality does not exist (Anugwom, 2000). Therefore, some iotas of ethnic rivalries and conflicts are expected in plural societies but if well managed, the diversity may be a facilitator for the development of such societies (Anugwom, 2000). One of the ways to achieve this is by espousing a political culture that significantly respects all the interests and groups in a society (Anugwom, 2000). Aside from Nigeria, plural societies include Sri Lanka, Belgium, the Netherlands, India and former Yugoslavia, among others (Jinadu, 1994). Multicultural and plural states in Africa are Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Congo Brazzaville, Mali, Ivory Coast, Libya, Kenya, Ethiopia, Burkina-Faso (Fadakinte & Amolegbe, 2017; Maurice & Oluseyi, 2016), Tanzania, among others. Although, the fact remains that all states are plural but the level and nature of plurality varies. The poor management of Nigeria’s ethnic and religious diversity has threatened the country’s federal stability. Hence, this book lays more emphasis on ethnic and religious diversities. Ethnic Group and Ethnicity Explained Members of an ethnic group are conscious that they have common interests that bind them together (Peterson et al., 1982). De Vos (2006: 4) projects an ethnic group as ‘a self-perceived inclusion of those who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by others with whom they are in contrast’. The author submits that the components that distinguish an ethnic group from others are religious beliefs and practices, a feeling of historical continuity, as well as collective extraction or place of origin. Ethnic groups can be perceived as a culture-bearing unit that shares a common culture, a social organisation and a certain classification of people with a basic identity (Yusoff & Sarjoon, 2016). Clothing, language and behaviour make boundaries that distinguish an ethnic group from another (Salamone, 1997). Ukiwo (2005) concurs that the shared common identity of an ethnic group differentiates them from others. Thus, conflicts and competitions are sometimes inevitable among ethnic groups (Ojo, 2009). Similarly, on the dichotomy between an ethnic group and those who do not belong to the group, an ethnic group is ‘a group whose members share a common

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identity and affinity based on common language and culture, myth of common origin and a territorial homeland, which become the basis for differentiating “us” from “them”, and upon which people act’ (Osaghae, 1995: 13). This definition will be the point of reference for this book for what an ethic group depicts because it portrays the intricacies of ethnic groups in Nigeria. Nigerians identify with their ethnic groups, place national identity after that and portray their ethnic groups as being superior to other ethnic groups. This justifies why it is germane to explore the country’s national integration. Members of an ethnic group possess conscious unity about their ethnic identity (Ake, 1993). This separates them from other groups even though interaction among the different ethnic groups is inevitable. The interactions that emanate between the ethnic groups in a diverse society result in ethnicity (Ikpe, 2009). Thus, if the number of ethnic groups in a state exceeds one, ethnicity becomes a possibility (Adamu & Ocheni, 2016; Ikpe, 2009; Onwuzuruigbo, 2010). Since 1960, there has been widespread use of the term ‘ethnicity’ to refer to human variation in culture, traditions, language, social arrangements and ancestral lineage (Yusoff & Sarjoon, 2016). Ethnicity is not stagnant, but it has an element of dynamism. Ethnicity historically snowballs because past wrongs, inequalities and conflicts offer the pedestal that determines how the members of an ethnic group associate with the state or other ethnic groups (Osaghae, 2003b). Thus, people’s entry and exit, historical changes, and change in social and cultural settings may change the membership of an ethnic group (Salamone, 1997). ‘Ethnic groups come into being, mutate, split, merge, and, even, disappear’ (Salamone, 1997: 304). In essence, one cannot migrate to another ethnic group but the way members of an ethnic group relate with members of other ethnic groups may change. For instance, in Nigeria, before the creation of the Mid-West region in 1963, the Binis had cordial relations with the Yorubas, but after the creation, the former became more conscious that the latter is a different ethnic group and distinguished itself from it (Osaghae, 2003b). Also, the creation of states from the Eastern region in 1967 altered the manner the non-Igbos in the old Eastern region related to the Igbos. Osaghae painted the nexus between ethnicity and economic programmes because the implementation of the latter affects social, political and economic relations among the ethnic groups (Osaghae, 1995). He postulates that if economic reforms become unfavourable, people see

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their ethnic groups as a means to get scarce resources through the formation of ethnic unions (Osaghae, 1995). For instance, the SAP brought economic hardship, and this exacerbated ethnic identity politics (Obianyo, 2007). However, political elites have used this loophole to promote parochial and not national interest. They are a strong force in ethnic/ communal voices, and they compete with other communal political elites for the shares of their communities from the ‘national cake’ and for their recompenses as patrons (Ikpe, 2009). This disposition of elites serves as bait to gain the support of the communities even though the latter know that the former is there for selfish interest (Ikpe, 2009). Therefore, membership of an ethnic group has been seen as being a miniature of political, economic and social groups licensed to some privileges for being members of the group (Salamone, 1997). In a country like Nigeria, ethnicity appears as the most viable means to achieve individual and common interests (Osaghae, 2003b). Those who enjoy the opportunistic benefits hardly link it with nepotism, tribalism or corruption (Igwara, 2001). However, subscribing to the ideology of such an ethnic group and not being a member does not qualify an individual for the largesse that may come from belonging to the ethnic group (Salamone, 1997). In essence, if a leader is accused of nepotism with respect to providing infrastructure for his ethnic group alone, he may not bother about members of another ethnic group who have similar beliefs as that of his ethnic group. This ideology takes the form of a common ancestor, set of values, culture and attitude (Salamone, 1997). Mahoney (2018) supports this assertion and opines that an ethnic group may support some political points of view, tagged as political tribalism. The stability of a state may be threatened through the political mobilisation of ethnic groups in a plural state (Ibrahim, 1994). In a bid to be politically, economically, religiously and culturally supreme, different groups try to outwit other competing groups in such diverse societies (Kalu & Oguntoyinbo, 2012). In a nutshell, the competition for state power, economic and social benefits may orchestrate conflict and the strength of state institutions may be challenged through such conflict (Osaghae, 2003b). Adamu and Ocheni (2016), Appiah et al. (2018) and Mahoney (2018) echo this view that in some African states, different ethnic groups were plunged into conflict due to the struggle for political power as it is seen that having access to power, secures access to the nation’s resources. Many African countries had similar ethnic situations

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after independence. For instance, Nigeria, Liberia, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, Zaire, Sudan and Ethiopia (Ikpe, 2009). Population size and other permutations account for the existence of majority and minority ethnic groups. Most countries of the world have a minimum of one ethnic group that is being discriminated and such groups at the receiving end have evolved to channel, promote and defend their interest (Yusoff & Sarjoon, 2016). These discrimination and domination are occasioned by the numerical strengths of the majority groups, inferiority and some historical and sociological factors (Osaghae, 1998). These minority or disadvantaged groups in a state face several problems. For example, in Sri Lanka, the system of university admission against discriminates the Tamil people (Yusoff & Sarjoon, 2016). However, there are exceptions to this in the sense that some minorities are not dominated, but they dominate others. White Afrikaans in South Africa (during apartheid), and the Fulanis in Northern Nigeria, among others (Osaghae, 1998). Although that of white South Africans is more of a racial dimension. Aside from considering majority-minority dichotomy, ethnicity may assume other hierarchical forms. Osaghae suggests three levels at which ethnicity may occur. Ethnicity can be considered at three interconnected echelons which are intergroup, intra-group and interpersonal (Osaghae, 1995). The first two echelons are captured by Ibrahim (1994) who argues that groups might concurrently be identified as local (sub ethnic), culturally/linguistically (pan-ethnic) or at a regional level. Inter-group is broader, and it is the utilisation of the most general ethnic identities and other forms of identities closely related: regions and religion (Osaghae, 1995). The ethnic and religious distribution in the geo-political zones in Nigeria outlined in Chapter 1 explain this. Intra-group ethnicity has to do with subgroups, which have members that speak dialects, which are subsets of a general language group or subgroups and are differentiated from their acquaintances courtesy of administrative arrangement and natural barriers (Osaghae, 1995). For instance, among the Yorubas, we have Ijesa, Ijebu, Ekiti, Awori, Egbado, Yewa, etc. Interpersonal ethnicity connotes the application subethnic of ethnic and other forms of differentiation in relationships among persons or small groups of individuals (Osaghae, 1995). The individual has the option of choosing from class, gender, professional, political and ethnic identities, and he applies whichever depending on the situation at any point in time (Osaghae, 1995). This shows that not only elites apply

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ethnicity to achieve some desires, but members of the non-elite class also do so (Osaghae, 1995). Ethnicity is like two sides of a coin that signifies alienation and branding of identity and these call for situations where rights, opportunities and privileges are offshoots of who you are and where you come from (Mahoney, 2018; Odeyemi, 2014). This assertion aligns with (Osaghae, 1995) who defines ethnicity ‘as the employment or mobilization of ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict, or cooperation’. For this book, this definition is relevant. This is because ethnicity has been the basis for antagonism, dispute and cooperation in Nigeria. The conflictual and competitive aspects of ethnicity are always conspicuous, but cooperation among members of different ethnic groups cannot be ruled out (Osaghae, 1995). Ukiwo (2005) echoes Osaghae’s definition in two ways. Firstly, ethnicity is neither natural nor unintentional but is the creation of a cognisant exertion by social players. Secondly, ethnicity does not only evolve into relations coated with conflicts but also manifests in cooperation in the forms of community service and voting, respectively. The masses identify with an ethnic group, and even though ethnicity is an instrument by the elites, it is the bridge between the two classes (Igwara, 2001). The nexus between being a member of an ethnic group and access to state power and resources has been established through the review of the above literature. This further justifies why it is necessary to carry out the study on national integration and rotational presidency in a multiethnic society like Nigeria. However, giving attention to only ethnicity makes the review of literature on pluralism inchoate; hence, review of studies on religion becomes imperative. Religion Conceptualised Religion is one of the germane forms of identity such that there are different religious affiliations (Johnstone, 2016). The author posits that in most human settlements, there is always a place of worship, monument or symbol linked with a specific religion (Johnstone, 2016). There are several religions around the globe. These encompass Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism, among others (Bader, 2007; Jong, 2015). An elementary feature of religion is that it is a belief system, held by a group of people who openly share

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its doctrine(s) (Babatola, 2015). Each religion is structured such that it influences its members, other groups and institutions (Johnstone, 2016). Johnstone gives comprehensive features of religion as: a) a group phenomenon because it is a composition of two or more people who interact with one another, have shared norms, members have roles, there is hierarchy and its members identify with the group. b) It includes a body of beliefs and moral prescriptions that have been passed through generations of the adherents of such religion. Such beliefs are enshrined in books like the Holy Bible, for Christians, the Qu’ran for Muslims, Book of Mormon among others c) It includes a set of practices like gathering to worship, sacrifices, feasts and so on. d) they have sacred attributes which include the supernatural personified by Jesus, Allah, Vishnu; place or situation personified as churches, Mecca in Saudi Arabia, Mosques, Hindus giving right of way to cows. (Johnstone, 2016: 8–14)

The author amalgamates these features and submits that religion is a ‘set of beliefs and rituals by which a group of people seeks to understand, explain, and deal with a world of complexity, uncertainty, and mystery, by identifying a sacred canopy of explanation and reassurance under which to live’ (Johnstone, 2016: 14). This definition centres on the belief systems and relationships but did not touch religion as a group, and how it influences the behaviour of the members. This void was filled by Fox (2018) who submits that religion has a connection with human behaviour and that politics is about the study of the political behaviour of people, hence, there is interconnection between religion and politics. The author gives an explicit definition of religion from the standpoint of how it affects human behaviour in society as highlighted below. Religion seeks to understand the origins and nature of reality using a set of answers that include the supernatural. Religion is also a social phenomenon and institution, which influences the behavior [sic] of human beings both as individuals and in groups. These influences on behavior [sic] manifest through the influences of religious identity, religious institutions, religious legitimacy, religious beliefs, and the codification of these beliefs into authoritative dogma, among other avenues of influence. (Fox, 2018: 4)

This definition incorporates the spirituality of religion, as well as its impact on human behaviour, and recognition as an institution. This definition aligns with this book because it has components that indirectly link the

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phenomenon with politics. This view is in tandem with Haynes’ (1999) perspective which views religion from two perspectives. These are religion as a spiritual phenomenon, which serves as a model for social and individual behaviour that shape believers’ everyday life, as well as religion as an establishment, group and movement that shows concern for social and political issues. Religion does not have a stereotyped influence on human behaviour everywhere. Thus, religious diversity is not alien to most countries in the world (Zavala-Pelayo & Góngora-Mera, 2016). There are different shades of religious diversity. It may take the form of diversity within the same country, diversity within the family (like members of different religions coming from the same nuclear or extended family) or diversity within the same religion (like Greek or Russian Catholics) (Jiménez et al., 2019). The consciousness of the existence of home and alien religions balloons this diversity. Religious adherents view their religion as home religion while those who practise outside their fold are said to be members of an alien religion (Griffiths, 2015). The former is christened as religious kin while the latter is tagged as religious aliens (Griffiths, 2015). Therefore, events in the political and economic spaces may affect people of different religions in different manners (Jiménez et al., 2019). This explains why different religious stakeholders represent the interests of their religious constituency which may conflict with those of others (Jiménez et al., 2019). This has brought religion into politics and vice versa. In some Third World countries, the nexus that exists between religion and politics is conspicuous. This has become noticeable since the 1970s (Haynes, 1999). Cases include the Iranian Revolution of 1978/ 79, strong Islamic influence in the political activities in the Middle East, the social and political effects of the rising protestant evangelical groups in Africa and Latin America. Others include the political forte of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which in the 1996 general elections won the majority of seats and is among the Hindu Nationalist Parties in India and the growth of New Buddhist movements in Thailand and other parts of South East Asia (Haynes, 1999). Another example is the introduction and practice of the Sharia legal system in some states in Northern Nigeria. Third World countries are confronted with political instability, economic problems, insecurity and fragile social integration which make the poor/marginalised take solace in religious groups as a last resort to being relieved from these problems while those who are economically advantaged also identify with their religion (Haynes, 1999). The

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latter (precisely political elites) do that for vote seeking, rent seeking and parochial interests. These drag religion into political violence in different parts of the world. These features and niceties that surround religion in politics and politics in religion have a striking resemblance with how religion has become a key factor in making key political and national decisions in Nigeria. This is evident in the keen interest Nigerians have taken in the religions of the president and vice president of the parties that won presidential elections since the commencement of the Fourth Republic.

Conclusion This chapter explored the federal system of government. The history of countries concerning the system was given consideration. This spiralled into why countries practise the system. The coalescing thing about federalism is that it seeks to promote unity in diversity. Consequently, pluralism from ethnic and religious scopes was considered. The discovery made was that ethnic and religious diversity if poorly managed may make stability a mirage in any society. Hence, federalism is one of the antidotes to this poor management. However, it is not a perfect response as some federal states are having their peace threatened because of the continued feelings of deprivation. This assertion is scholarly backed by Mill’s law of federal instability which postulates that instability in a federal state is a consequence of inequality (Omololu, 2012; Peter, 2014; Porter, 1977). Hence, inequality is inevitable in most societies and different approaches may be needed to address these. The next chapter focuses on national integration as a concept and measures that have been taken by countries to manage their diversities. However, a glimpse into how ethnic and religious diversity have bred instability in some states will first be put into the limelight.

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CHAPTER 3

National Integration in Perspective

Introduction This chapter explains the concept of national integration and delves into how national integration measures that suit peculiar cases of countries have been adopted by them. The chapter touches on ethnic and religious violence because these and violence in any form are indications that the integration of any state is threatened. Therefore, the chapter first delves into ethnicity and religion as two major root causes of violence in different countries. These two causes became necessary because most conflicts in Nigeria have remote and/or immediate causes rooted in them and rotational presidency is rotated on ethnic and religious bases and failure to respect zoning arrangement may trigger ethnic/religious conflict and violence. This chapter encompasses two parts, dynamics of ethnic and religious violence as well as national integration. The first part identifies ethnicity and religion as two major causes of conflicts and violence in African and Asian countries but points out that these may be the avenues to express issues like linguistic differences, land matters, economic problems and struggle for state resources. This has evolved into the rise of violent non-state actors who have devised violence as the means to project their grievances. This part also establishes that these violent groups operate better in democratic governments than in autocratic systems because of the freedom associated with the former. Ethnic and religious violence in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. T. Faluyi, National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7_3

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different countries were brought to the fore but more attention was given to Sudan because of the ethnic and religious dimensions of the violence experienced in the country. The second part of the chapter starts with a review of literature on national integration and definition of the concept. The part also explores different integration measures in countries. It explores the cases of Sudan and India more deeply because conflicts in Sudan were explored in the subsection on ethnic conflicts across countries. Also, India is a very diverse country. Similarities and differences were drawn between Nigeria and these two countries within the circumferences of ethnic and religious violence and national integration.

Dynamics of Ethnoreligious Violence The 1940s through to the second half of the twentieth century marked the period of political independence for various African and Asian countries. The linguistic, religious, ethnic and cultural diversity of these countries signified that it was necessary to put in place national integration measures to prevent the poor management of these pluralities. National integration comes under the spotlight when the peace of a state is threatened. It is seen as a preventive mechanism, mitigating tool and antidote to violence in any state. Ethnic and religious conflicts are the fulcrums of threats to federal stability of Nigeria as touching this book. Hence, the need to explore the dynamics of ethnic and religious violence. War and violence are not alien to mankind, but they have taken different dimensions in history (Allen, 1999). These have been projected through the targeting of civilians, extreme brutality, states instigating and sponsoring violence, commercialising wars as well as the advent of warlords (Allen, 1999). Among the violence experienced in developing states, those with ethnic and/or religious linings are the core (Burger, 1993). Political conflicts and violence most times manifest on the pedestals of ethnicity and religion. Political violence represents a collection of attacks within a political society against the government in power and its policies and it may also be against opposing groups in any form (Gurr, 2016). It may take the form of real or threatened use of violence, and it may be used to realise socio-political change through violence which may take the forms of limited violence or guerrilla wars, coup d’état, rebellions, terrorism and riots (Gurr, 2016). Violence has taken most of these forms in Nigeria from pre-independence till date

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(Ekwealor & Faluyi, 2020) with most of these acts tied to ethnic and religious factors. In plural states, potential catalysts of conflicts are ethnic, language and religious diversities but ethnicity could cause the most stir (Bove & Elia, 2017; Jinadu, 1994; Mushtaq et al., 2011). Ethnic conflict which is a form of identity-based conflict sprouts from human conflicts which could hardly be differentiated from racial, regional, religious or communal bonds (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999). Hence, ethnic and religious violence could concurrently occur in a society. Ethnic conflicts are not confined to conflicts between ethnic groups but they may be within an ethnic group. Onwuzuruigbo (2010) submits that the size of an ethnic group notwithstanding, it is rarely homogeneous or united because there is a tendency of conflicts among its subgroups which is intra-ethnic conflict. An instance is the Ife/Modakeke as well as the Offa/Erin-Ile crises which snowballed from conflicts to violence. These are Yoruba ethnic groups. Conflicts cannot be completely obscure in most societies but can only be mitigated or managed so that it does not escalate into violence (Azarya, 2003). The wave of bloody conflicts is not a Nigerian menace alone but an African and global phenomenon (Onwuzuruigbo, 2010). One of the root causes of these conflicts aside from those mentioned is colonialism. Colonialism has created countries’ territories with different nationalities in Africa, and this has jettisoned national identity (Fadakinte & Amolegbe, 2017). There is no country in Africa made up of one nation (comprising of one people) (Fadakinte & Amolegbe, 2017). From a historical perspective and by utilising the modernisation theory, Ukiwo (2005) clarifies that the theory assumes that differences in the pre-colonial era among the various groups that make up the new states are responsible for the various ethno-linguistic conflicts being experienced now. The colonial state was majorly authoritarian, and it operated more on force and violence. The colonised confronted the colonial governments with hard opposition and resistance, violence and conflicts occurred between them and between ethnic groups (Onwuzuruigbo, 2010). Ethnicity has been the fulcrum of post-colonial African conflicts (Azarya, 2003). The global spread of conflicts has received a boost through a chain of events that encompass economic reforms of the 1980s; the split of the Soviet Republic; the end of the Cold War; and the spread of liberal democracy (Onwuzuruigbo, 2010). The economic conditions of African countries depreciated from the 1980s due to waning oil prices,

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inauspicious international trade, mounting external debts and capital flight coupled with the proliferation of arms made youth readily accessible for enlistment by warlords for the perpetration of ethnic violence (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999; Osaghae, 2006). Other factors that exacerbated the situation are the privatisation of state-owned assets (which affected service delivery) and falling short of democratic and economic expectations of the people which have weakened democracy and good governance (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999). Furthermore, poor and lopsided infrastructural provision and feelings of low political representation may prompt an ethnic group to see violence as a last resort (Kifordu, 2011). Politics in Africa in the last decade of the twentieth century was stained with violence (Allen, 1999). Thus, the continent has witnessed conflicts in the form of ethnic/religious conflicts, border conflicts, civil strife, civil wars and genocides (Ezeibe & Oguonu, 2014). Similarly, NzongolaNtalaja (1999) identifies three types of ethnic conflicts in Africa which are inter-communal violence regarding economic and social space (Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville and Somalia), rebellious acts by oppressed minorities as well as ethnic cleansing and genocide. Religious violence has also been a problem in Africa, and in some cases, they are inseparable from ethnic violence. For instance, the conflicts that occur in Southern Kaduna, Nigeria have ethnic, religious and economic dimensions. This assertion points to the direction that ethnicity and religion are the prisms of expressing disaffection but economic and political undertones may be the remote causes of conflicts. Feelings of exclusion from access to economic, religious, commercial, and linguistic rights, among others, could result in ethnic conflicts (Ibrahim, 1994). The struggle for food, clothing, shelter, security, recognition, and psychological needs for identity and autonomy may generate such conflicts (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999). In post-colonial Africa, variances in character, attitudes, way of life, habits and feelings lead to antagonism and vicious hostility to one another mainly in power struggle and resource control (Fadakinte & Amolegbe, 2017). Countries like Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia, among others were brought to their knees and almost consumed by struggle for resources, identity conflicts and wars (Ezeibe & Oguonu, 2014; Onwuzuruigbo, 2010). The struggle for resources aligns with Azarya’s (2003) view that conflict is an inevitable occurrence to the natural man but scarce resources make it persist. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1999) links the root cause of the struggle for resources to colonialism. The author submits that ethnic and identity conflicts have links with the colonial strategy of divide-and-rule

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which birthed African elites’ competition for power and resources. The author cited Rwanda and Burundi as examples. Resources also include one of the factors of production-land. Land was the raison d’être of conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Arab Nomads and other ethnic groups in Sudan, Cote D’Ivoire, Angola and other African countries (Arowosegbe, 2016). That of Sudan is coated in ethnicity (Arowosegbe, 2016). In Nigeria, land for grazing is responsible for the clashes between herdsmen and local farmers (Abbass, 2012; Adisa & Adekunle, 2010; Omilusi, 2016). Violence keeps erupting over land ownership between communities within and between states in Nigeria. The herdsmen instances have taken ethnic and in some situations religious dimensions and the local communities have been dragged into the issue. Aside herdsmen crisis in Nigeria, there are rebellious groups that threaten stability in Nigeria, Africa and Asia. In developing countries, there has been the emergence of dissident groups. The transitions from electoral democracy to democratic consolidation in Africa and Asia have snowballed into an upsurge in the number of militias (Agbu, 2004). These militias may have ethnic, religious and/ or economic goals. In some of the autocratic regimes that these countries hitherto got administered through, these militia groups were in hibernation. Examples of countries that have witnessed/witnessing ethnic militia groups are the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, and Myanmar, among others. Although, some of these groups operated during military regimes. Since the commencement of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, militia groups’ activities have become noticeable. This assertion echoes Adamolekun and Kincaid’s (1991) view that group competition where militia groups play active role is a key component of a plural society, but this may be made less or non-conspicuous by an authoritarian government but democracy owing to its liberal nature may accommodate such. Democratic and ethnically plural states give room for deep competitions, rivalries and struggles for power and resources because the liberty to choose where ethnic groups slug it out on who gets what, how and when may be taken to the extreme (Anugwom, 2000). Competition is an integral part of democracy but ethnicity may be a factor that will threaten democracy (Anugwom, 2000). Being extreme comes into play when ethnic agitations transmute into the emergence of ethnic militia movements which identify with ethnic groups and the activities of the militia groups become the conduits to pursue the desires of the ethnic groups (Badmus, 2006).

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The political, social and economic challenges in post-colonial African states aggravate the situation. For instance, where the number of people educated has increased but the economic wherewithal to absorb them is not strong; there may be a political disorder or decay (Agbu, 2004). In essence, infrastructural provision is at its lowest compared to other continents (Calderón et al., 2018) and this affects investment which reduces the capacity of the state and private sector to employ. For instance, where the population of youth keeps increasing but the economic structure to engage them is weak; there may be a political disorder or decay (Agbu, 2004). These, among others, erode state autonomy and legitimacy; people would rather transfer their allegiance to non-state actors, and this leads to conflict (Osaghae, 1999). Conflicts in the sense that in competing for state resources, best practices that require adherence to some rules are jettisoned and conflicts or violence may be the ‘recognised’ means of actualisation. In Nigeria, the inability of the government at all levels to effectively discharge their basic responsibilities and the poor handling of concerns peacefully raised by various ethnic groups have ‘authorised’ ethnic militias to represent and protect the interests of their ethnic groups (Agbu, 2004). This representation and protection have involved the acquisition of arms and ammunition. The porosity of our borders which is a sign of weak state institutions, has been a catalyst for the free movement of arms by ethnic militia groups and other non-state actors. The proliferation of small arms and prior military experience of some members enhance the activities of ethnic militia groups (Agbu, 2004). The proliferation of arms engendered violence in Angola, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (Agbu, 2004). Thus, groups that feel threatened or deprived resort to arms and may become warlords (Allen, 1999). The upswing of militia groups and proliferation of arms are tantamount to the availability of foot soldiers and tools, respectively to perpetrate ethnic and religious violence. Violent conflicts have culminated in the loss of lives and property, additional financial burden in arresting the situation, hardship on law-abiding citizens and negative multiplier effects on neighbouring countries due to surging refugees (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999). It also increases the number of internally displaced. Holistically, Osaghae (2006) purports that these conflicts are effects of economic challenges due to structural adjustments, weak power sharing format and weak accountability, justice, equity and conflict management mechanisms. Hence, it is germane to explore ethnic and religious conflicts across countries

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regarding their root causes which range from ethnic, religious, cultural and other differences and which are fuelled by some of the points raised by Osaghae (2006). Aside from root causes, other intricacies surrounding some of these conflicts will be given attention.

Ethnic and Religious Violence Across Countries Some countries have witnessed ethnic and religious conflicts in the twentieth century. Ethnic conflicts and tribal antipathies were two key factors that accounted for civil wars in Somalia, Liberia, Angola and the massacre in Burundi (Samatar, 1997). Nigeria witnessed a civil war between 1967 and 1970 and there were ethnic and religious violence in the pre- and post-civil war eras. Massive political violence in Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia were due to failing states (Clapham, 2001). This situation is holistically captured by Allen that: Extensive violence and warfare became seemingly commonplace in Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s, marking........................Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, Algeria, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Zaire. (Allen, 1999: 368)

Ghana has also witnessed ethnic violence. Northern Ghana has been at the receiving end of inter-ethnic conflicts over the years because of land rights, chieftaincy disputes and competition for power which have resulted in the loss of lives and property, displacement of people and damaging consequences on social and economic activities (Mbowura, 2014). Northern Ghana has about 16 ethnic groups and it is culturally, ethnically, historically and religiously diverse (Mbowura, 2014). Ethnic and religious diversity has also deteriorated into violence outside Africa. The Kurds are not ethnically united with other ethnic groups in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. For instance, in Iraq, the Arabs constitute about 75% of the population while the Kurds make up about 20% (Brancati, 2004; McGarry, 2017). The Arabs are mainly Muslims with over 50% being Shi’a while 30–40% are Sunnis (Brancati, 2004; McGarry & O’Leary, 2007; Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Some Kurds are Muslims while some practise Christianity and Judaism (Brancati, 2004). Saddam Hussein did not like the Kurds and he tried to turn them into Arabs by making it obligatory for them to speak Arabic as the official

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language and answer Arabic names (Brancati, 2004). His hatred for the Kurds made him responsible for the death of over 100,000 Kurds through a chemical weapon attack in 1988 (Brancati, 2004). This represents state coordinated violence coated in ethnicity. His discrimination also has a religious dimension. He attempted to convert all Shi’a Muslims to Sunnis (Brancati, 2004). Political confrontation and conflict in Northern Ireland, Belgium, France and Spain in the nineteenth century were consequences of ethnic division (Glass, 1977). In these countries, minority groups played second fiddle and this snowballed into political dissatisfaction and deprivation, and as a result, many of these ethnic groups expressed their displeasure through different forceful political means including violence (Glass, 1977). Sudan experienced ethnic and religious violence with many casualties. The country also operated power sharing agreements at different times in its history. It is salient to consider these and emphasise the political dimension of the crises in this country. Sudan This analysis is based on the ethnoreligious violence that took place before the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011. The country is a product of the conquest of the Turco-Egyptian, the Mahdi and the British from the 1820s but it finally came under Anglo-Egyptian administration in 1898 (Salman, 2013; Sarkesian, 1973). Sudan was a miniature of Africa because before the separation of Sudan from South Sudan, the country was the largest in Africa and religiously, culturally, ethnically and linguistically diverse (Al-Rahim, 1970; Verney et al., 1995). It contained a mixture of Arabic and African cultures as well as Islamic, Christian and African traditional religions. The Northerners are Muslims and Arab speaking, and they identify with the Middle East, Arabic and Islamic culture (Sarkesian, 1973). The Arab culture, however, dominated the country even though the population of the Arabs is about 40% of the country’s population (Salman, 2013). Sandwiched between the North and the South are ethnic groups that are either Arabs or Southerners (AlRahim, 1970; Poggo, 2009; Verney et al., 1995). The people of South Sudan are Black Africans, and they have three broad groups and 572 subgroups (Salman, 2013; Sarkesian, 1973). The religion in the South is mainly indigenous and to a lesser extent Christianity and Islam while the

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languages spoken are majorly English and an abridged version of Arabic and some indigenous languages (Al-Rahim, 1970; Salman, 2013). The government of Omar Hassan al-Bashir (1989–2019) like colonial and previous governments hardly tolerated ethnic, religious and political diversity through its policies that discriminated against non-Arabs and non-Muslims (Salman, 2013; Verney et al., 1995). The two regions were governed separately for several years during colonialism, but they were later merged (Salman, 2013; Verney et al., 1995). The British were in Sudan from 1898 to 1956 and did prefer to demarcate the North from the South for administrative reasons (Poggo, 2009). The British were not keen on integrating the North with the South, but there was a higher level of unity within the North because of common culture (Sarkesian, 1973). Alien administration, traders, missionaries and Mahdi invaders destabilised the existing tribal systems in the South and jettisoned the region’s cultural integration (Sarkesian, 1973). The segregation between the two regions did not stop at this. During colonialism, the British introduced permit to allow Northerners to come to the South as this was to restrict the spread of Islam to the latter (Salman, 2013). This arrangement aligned the South the more with Christianity and the missionaries saw it as a tool to liberate the South from Northern Arab supremacy, but the other side of the coin was that some traditional Southern chiefs saw Christianity as anti-traditional religion (Poggo, 2009). Consequently, the North had always viewed the South as an illicit land occupied by violent people and preferred to associate with Egypt and other northern countries instead of the South while the South saw the North as Arab exploiters who wanted to impose Islam on the former (Sarkesian, 1973). These differences paint the negative stereotypes that poorly managed diversity portends. Economic disparity existed between the two regions right from colonialism. The Anglo-Egyptian administration concentrated much on putting infrastructure in the North but saw the South as a location not profitably poised for infrastructural development (Poggo, 2009). Administrative and financial excuses, in terms of education funding, exacerbated this disparity further, as the British rather than fund education in the South preferred to introduce Christian missionaries to handle educational matters (Poggo, 2009). The South as of independence in 1956 had only one secondary school, no university, and this was a far cry from what obtained in the North (Poggo, 2009). This widened the gulf between the two regions in terms of development. This bolstered the fears of the South

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that if the country was granted independence as a unitary state, the North would be at an advantage and starve the former of infrastructure (Poggo, 2009). The discovery of oil increased the suspicion of the South. Crude oil was discovered in the Southern part, but refineries were built in the North (Salman, 2013). This meant the oil wealth of the nation belonged to the South, but the North became the main beneficiary (Salman, 2013). The journey to the political disparity between the North and the South began in 1948 after the legislative election. The North had 52 members in the parliament while the South had 13 (Salman, 2013). This was was an indication of political inequality between the two regions. The Southern Sudan leaders under the auspices of the Southern Party accused the Egyptians of leaving them out of the discussion on the future of Sudan (Salman, 2013). Talks about the independence of Sudan started in Cairo in 1953, but only Northern representatives were present in the discussion, and the South was excluded in deciding the future of Sudan (Poggo, 2009). This also exacerbated the feud between these regions. A new government was formed in 1953 after the elections, and this led to the emergence of Ismail al-Azhari, a Northerner and leader of the National Unity Party as the Prime Minister. He only appointed three Southern Sudanese as junior cabinet members (Salman, 2013). The Egyptians and English occupied civil service positions, and after their departure, only six Southern Sudanese could occupy about 800 positions left (Salman, 2013). Southern leaders met with their counterparts from the North and tabled their plights before the Northern-led government and also discussed what the future relations held between the two regions, but these were not taken seriously by the latter (Salman, 2013). The situation worsened in 1955 when Southern soldiers within the armed forces refused Northern postings due to distrust, and this was treated as mutiny and subsequent punishment and death of some of these ‘erring’ soldiers (Poggo, 2009; Salman, 2013). The Torit violence is beyond mutiny as it was seen as a protest against the injustice from the North towards the South (Poggo, 2009). Concisely, the Southerners were marginalised, and their autonomy was jeopardised. Kalpakian (2017) posits that in the case of Sudan, wars are the consequences of power imbalance, and these cannot be separated from economic factors. All these coupled with the conglomeration of racial, ethnic, religious, economic, and political problems that had confronted the country since nineteenth century resulted in the country’s first civil war between 1955 and 1972 (Poggo, 2009).

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In 1956, the government in power was voted out, and the new government continued with the suppression of the South. Even when the military ruled between 1958 and 1964, only one Southern Sudanese was a minister and the military was also swift to entrench Arabic and Islamic tenets in the South among which was making Arabic the official language in the South to replace English and local languages in educational institutions and offices (Poggo, 2009; Salman, 2013). The Southern part of the country was made so inconsequential that some Northern leaders assumed the South had no culture, languages and religion but concluded that Arabic culture and Islam were for the entire country (Salman, 2013). Southerners who could not speak Arabic were prevented from being employed in government institutions and enlisted into the army (Poggo, 2009). Between 1960 and 1961, knowledge of Islam and the Arabic language became the yardstick for admitting applicants to Southern schools (Poggo, 2009). The president later introduced Sharia law (Salman, 2013). The same government expelled Christian Missionaries from Sudan between 1962 and 1964 (Poggo, 2009). The feelings of divisions in the military, which were products of racial, religious, economic and linguistic hegemony over the South, culminated in a militant approach by South Sudan. There were divisions in the army because the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s soldiers who were an integral part of the Sudanese military felt they were short-changed in promotion and this resulted in mutinies and deaths in some military barracks (Salman, 2013). These led to the formation in 1983 of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political arm, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and they aimed to establish a secular democratic system in Sudan (Salman, 2013). The SPLA attacked refineries and water installations (Salman, 2013). Ironically, some Northerners joined the SPLM (Salman, 2013). Hence, the second Sudanese civil war between the Sudanese government and SPLA started in 1983 and ended in 2005. Considering the preceding paragraphs, the crises experienced by the country within the period covered no doubt had ethnic/racial and religious linings. The war was beyond the North-South feud alone as there were interest wars among the Southern Sudanese ethnic groups and within the liberation movements (Poggo, 2009). Beyond these, there was also war in the Western part of the country, Darfur despite sharing religious similarities with the North- Islam. The majority of its population are Muslims, so its conflict has nothing to do with religious differences

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unlike Southern Sudan, but its major divisions lie in those who speak Arabic and other languages and those who are into farming and animal husbandry (Kalpakian, 2017). This was a crisis between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel groups over non-Arabs being dominated in the Darfur region. The government had the security forces, and the government backed Janjaweed ethnic group on its side while the SLM and JEM engaged non-Arab ethnic groups to prosecute the war. The full-blown conflict started in 2003. However, there have always been conflicts between pastoralists and local communities over water, grazing and local politics but the government has always taken sides with the Arab pastoralists (Brosché & Duursma, 2018). Three other regions that are being marginalised are the Blue Nile State, Southern Kordofan and the Eastern Region (Kalpakian, 2017). These conflicts in different parts of the country have resulted in the death and displacement of many since the country’s independence (Kalpakian, 2017). The case of Sudan resembles and differs from that of Nigeria in some spheres. Both countries are religiously, culturally, ethnically, racially (Sudan) and linguistically diverse. The diversity was poorly managed in Sudan just as it has not been managed very well in Nigeria. One of the root causes of the poor management was the segregation of the North and the South in both countries in the colonial period. For instance, the British made it difficult for the Christian missionaries to go to the Muslim-dominated North in both countries. Politically, the North was more favoured than the South in both countries as the region ruled the most in both countries. Hence, there is distrust between the North and the South. There was division in the military. In Sudan, the Northern officers dominated the military. In Nigeria, the preference given to the North in the military was one of the arguments Ojukwu put forward as a reason for his non-acceptance of Gowon as the Head of State. This led to the killing of Igbo soldiers in the North and the Civil War. The Nigerian Civil War lasted for 30 months while that of Sudan lasted longer. In the Darfur region of Sudan, there is quarrel between non-Arab groups and Arabs over grazing land just like the herders-farmers issue in Nigeria. Sharia law was introduced in some Northern states in Nigeria while it was introduced all over the country in Sudan. This shows that religious liberty is respected more in Nigeria. Conflicts are inevitable in societies, but being able to mitigate their attendant effects is what distinguishes peaceful from violent societies. If a

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country strengthens its national integration, it will not be overwhelmed by conflicts and violence. This brings to the fore the need to have a glimpse into national integration and the measures taken by countries to manage their diversities.

National Integration Explained No society is fully homogeneous. In other words, no society can be integrated completely. National integration measures should be designed to prevent violence or ‘repair’ the consequences of poorly managed conflict. Nevertheless, the extent of success in integration varies, depending on how each society manages the challenges associated with its diversity. Chapter 2 and the preceding sections in this chapter have highlighted the forms diversity may take and how its poor management can result in violence. Proper integration may be a violence mitigating tool. Therefore, a historical journey on national integration in Africa will be salient. Globalisation and development have allowed the migration of people to different places, and this has produced ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse states (Folarin et al., 2014). Among these states, ethnoreligious violence has occurred more in Africa. Historically, some states have ethnically and culturally diverse groups locked within the same territory. African countries except for Liberia and Ethiopia were created because of the forceful merger of different groups into different territories (Odeyemi, 2014). The relative peace that existed among the various groups during colonialism became shattered when Africans were left to govern themselves. The differences among the groups became obvious as they no longer had common enemies, but they became their own enemies. Groups had to partially or fully surrender their respective systems of governance and opt for colonial imposed systems of government that governed diverse groups almost the same way with little reference to the peculiarities of different societies. An example is the indirect rule system in some colonies. Upon handing over, the democratic system of governance was introduced to most of the erstwhile colonial territories in Africa. Democracy is widely seen as a platform to include seemingly disadvantaged groups like ethnic and religious minorities, immigrants, and women, among others, in governance and to ensure some level of equality (Dryzek, 1996). However, equality may not be absolute because of the disparity in the population of ethnic, racial and religious groups. Hence, democracy is not all inclusive.

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Inclusion can be facilitated through membership of interest groups, involvement in the policy process through negotiations between groups and government, and participation in party activities and electoral matters (Dryzek, 1996). Democracy is not synonymous with the non-existence of conflicts; it is a design to manage conflicts (Azarya, 2003). Democracy recognises the existence of different opinions and values, but it provides the mechanisms that will mitigate the tendencies of conflict to result in violence (Azarya, 2003). Ironically, democratisation in most African states has been historically characterised by national disintegration (Imhonopi & Onifade, 2013). In most African states, the problem of national integration became acute after independence (Zolberg, 1967). Scarcity of resources and economic challenges promote ethnicity, interethnic competition and ethnocentrism (Onyibor, 2016). Consequently, each ethnic group does not want to fall within the lower echelon of the socioeconomic configuration, and this fear generates conflict (Onyibor, 2016). The major threat to national integration lies in resource allocation as this is seen as a platform for inclusion or exclusion and any ethnic group does not want to be excluded from access to state resources (Alapiki, 2005; Frank & Ukpere, 2013). These culminated in the ethnic domination of majority groups and the emergence of minority groups. In Africa, the demands for minority rights result in conflicts, and this has always been a setback to national integration (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999). A democracy that hinges on ethnic domination is a threat to national cohesion (Osaghae, 1999). The activities of ethnic-based political parties and ethnic associations bolstered the snowballing of ethnic politics. Ethnic associations cannot be eradicated by emphasising less on ethnicity, and a political party that embraces exclusion on ethnic, religious, racial or regional basis jeopardises democracy and national cohesion (Osaghae, 1999). Ethnic politics builds parochial attitude and identifying with the nation becomes almost a mirage. National integration can become a reality in a democratic system only when the political leadership jettisons parochial interests and embraces policies that encompass compromise, justice and fair play (Badmus, 2006). The need to have national integration in Africa has become germane. However, Africa is not the only continent that has plural states. The various nomenclatures being ascribed to the term national integration have evolved into interpreting the concept in different ways (Maurice & Oluseyi, 2016). It is also referred to as national cohesion

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(Ojo, 2009). Political, national or international integration are indications that plurality and differences exist (Adetoye, 2016). Integration has been given several interpretations, but the common factor is ‘bringing together of different parts into a whole’ (Frank & Ukpere, 2013: 482). Ironically, the quest for integration signifies that there exists plurality, in which each group possesses its own language or cultural qualities (Omoleke, 2010). Thus, integration process identifies the differences among the groups that come together, reconcile such differences and reach an acceptable consensus (Folarin et al., 2014). Integration brings together culturally isolated groups into a territory and establishes national identity (Omoleke, 2010). To achieve integration, the stakeholders should be willing to transfer their parochial loyalties to that of national (Adetoye, 2016). The focus of this book is, however, on national integration. The essence of national integration is to ensure unity and a strong nation (Falade & Falade, 2013). National integration seeks to produce an overbearing national community that eliminates parochial loyalties in the form of ethnic, religious, racial and regional allegiance (Omoleke, 2010; Osaghae, 1999). One of the cardinals of national integration is to make citizens view themselves as pursuing common national goals and objectives (Akinyele, 2013). It is about integrating diverse and isolated cultural and social loyalties to cultivate a sense of nationality (Daniel, 2015). If national integration is very weak, the peace and development of a state are threatened. Development can be achieved easily, in a wellintegrated and secured society, but insecurity is a cog in the wheel of progress of the sovereignty of a state and the legitimacy of its political leaders (Maurice & Oluseyi, 2016). Hence, the progenies of punctured integration are unpopular and weak government as well as instability. Ojo (2009) sees national integration as a binding measure in a plural society where its components are convincingly comfortable in the polity concerning equity and justice in resource allocation and access to equal opportunities. This cannot be perfectly achieved in states. For national integration not to be dissipated, people are not expected to see themselves only as members of a family, ethnic group, religion or component unit within a country but should rather wear national identity and as a member of a country (Onyibor, 2016). The author went further to define national integration as the development of an integrated and coherent national identity and consciousness in a multiethnic society in which all citizens is [sic] given a

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fair opportunity to achieve his/her maximum potential. Members are given sense of belonging irrespective of where he/she comes from. National integration enhances the chances of creating higher loyalties that supersede parochial loyalties to ethnic cleavages. (Onyibor, 2016: 3)

This definition aligns with the focus of this book. It is however not specific on the role of the state. Danjibo and Ashindorbe (2018) emphasise the role of the state in national integration when they opine that it is ‘a process, strategy and method of constructing a national identity and a sense of shared consciousness and national consensus among disparate groups using the power of the state’. This book seeks to suggest how unity can receive a boost and can be consolidated in Nigeria despite its diverse nature. The roles of state and non-state actors in the person of politicians behind the scenes were mentioned by, Imhonopi and Onifade. They define national integration as: a process that produces an omnibus of initiatives put in place by a state, its representatives or institutions guided by respect for the unique traditions and cultural backgrounds of ethnicities sharing the same polity with the goal of harmonising all interests through a form of dialogue and representation and addressing differences that may be divisive and conflictual using the instruments of fairness, justice and equity in the sharing of resources, benefits, opportunities and responsibilities in order to guarantee stability, longevity and prosperity of the polity as long as the inhabitants decide to remain within the polity. (Imhonopi & Onifade, 2013: 76)

This definition emphasises representation, dialogue and equity. Although the authors did not mention the roles of elites, the institutions involved have elites as major stakeholders. All these promote inclusiveness and discourage exclusionary politics, which are the hallmarks of federalism and national integration. The definitions portray that integration brings out the good in plurality. Integration is necessary to enjoy the major dual benefits (productivity and efficiency) of diversity, which are encapsulated as a competitive advantage, which is realised through inclusion (Appiah et al., 2018). These three definitions cover the scope of this book. However, to have a perspective that will project national integration as a tool of unity, it encompasses promoting allegiance to the country through the bridging of societal gaps among the various groups to ensure peace, stability and sustainable social order (Peter, 2014). Nevertheless, societal

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gaps cannot be completely closed but the sense of belonging to a country should not be respecter of social status. The fact remains that in an ethnically and religiously diverse society, national integration should not collapse the recognition and respect for cultural diversity. Dutta (2017) opposes the American nomenclature of ‘melting point’, which views viewing national integration as collapsing individual cultures, languages and religions into a single national entity but rather, there should be respect for individual differences. He is against a national integration that jettisons cultural diversity but supports that which respects and recognises cultural diversity. An understanding of the cultural values of different groups is a catalyst for national integration (Wende, 2018). The diversities in countries, among other factors have been the determinants for the integration measures they have adopted, respectively. This brings to the fore the need to explore national integration measures in some countries.

National Integration Measures Across States States have mechanisms in the form of constitutional and institutional arrangements that have been developed to stem the tide of political conflicts and manage the extent of political dominance within their territories (Jinadu, 1985). There may also be informal/semi-formal arrangements which are fabricated by elites. For instance, rotational presidency which the Nigerian Constitution or any Act of Parliament does not provide for its practice. These arrangements cumulate into national integration. National integration seeks to make citizens view themselves as pursuing a common national goal and objectives (Akinyele, 2013). Osaghae echoes Jinadu’s (1985) position and submits that this usually involves one or more of the following: a broad ruling coalition (or government of national unity) which is representative of all major segments; rotational or multiple presidency; a quota system, proportionality and arithmetic balance in the composition of the legislature, cabinets, public service, police, military, universities and other public institutions; balanced distribution of resources; and consensual decision making, including concurrent majority or minority veto. The objective is to prevent ethnic capture of the state, which cannot otherwise be assured. (Osaghae, 1999: 265)

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Different societies may not necessarily adopt all these measures at the same time but in phases. The adoption of these programmes does not necessarily mean the existence of major conflict in all cases, but they serve preventive purposes. Some have recorded success; some have performed average; and some have failed. These outcomes are determined by the histories, level of diversity, as well as economic prowess of countries. Subsequent paragraphs explain some of these national integration measures adopted by countries. Several countries have relocated capital cities while over 40 countries are still having debates on the possibility of relocating their capital cities (Rossman, 2018). Examples are Australia and the USA, Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia in 1960 for Brazil, Dar es Salaam to Dodoma in 1974, for Malawi, Zomba to Lilongwe in 1965, Lagos to Abuja in 1976; Almaty to Astana, 1997; Mafikeng to Gaborone (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008; Moore, 1984; Schatz, 2004). Mayer et al. (2018) and Rossman (2018) explain that the location of a capital city as either an initial location or relocation has economic or political implications. Economic factors are for the running and effectiveness of the public service while political factors are branched in equality, social accord, conflict resolution and attaining civil peace (Rossman, 2018). Countries like Brazil, Nigeria, Botswana, Mauritania, Tanzania and Pakistan, have over the years relocated their capital cities because the hitherto capitals were for the economic benefits of the colonialists and also the need to have a capital that is less identified with a section of the country but more central (Abubakar & Doan, 2017; Potts, 1985). Politically, Schatz (2004) submits that relocating capitals are attempts by the elites to address the challenges that come with poor nation building. Nation building within this context entails having institutions and symbols that promote healthy interaction among groups in a state and political fairness (Rossman, 2018). Merging political and economic factors, Abubakar and Doan (2017) and Gottmann (1977) posit that capital cities serve as an avenue for people from different groups in the country to converge on a central place where everybody will have almost equal opportunities and share the privileges of power. Equal opportunities where they can search for jobs, and purchase property, among others without indigene/ non-indigene discrimination. Furthermore, the reasons for the relocation are the security vulnerability of the hitherto capitals, the need to promote national pride, reduce regional or ethnic disaffections, foster regional development and the need

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to centrally locate the capitals geographically (Moore, 1984; Potts, 1985). Some of these steps explain why capital cities were changed from coastal cities to more centralised inland sites (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008). Most of the submissions of these authors point to achieving national integration because a capital city should be an enclave of all groups in the country and not that of a group or a few groups. However, Schatz (2004) opines that leaders of some countries for parochial reasons relocate capital cities either to favour their ethnic groups or to move against another ethnic group. The author gives instances of the relocation of capital cities in Ivory Coast and Malawi. In a similar vein, national integration policies across the world include changing the names of states, as in the case of Dahomey to Benin Republic in 1975, Ceylon and Burma to Sri Lanka and Myanmar in 1972 and 1989, respectively (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008). Democratic Republic of Congo changed to Zaire in 1971, Gold Coast changed to Ghana, Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, Nyasaland to Malawi and Upper Volta to Burkina-Faso in 1984 (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008). The names of some cities (both capital and non-capitals) were also changed. Bangalore changed to Bengaluru, Calcutta to Kolkata and Cochin to Kochi in India as well as Campbellpur to Attock, and Fort Sandeman to Zhob in Pakistan (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008). In Chad, Fort-Lamy was renamed N’Djamena in 1973; in Mozambique, Lourenço Marques was changed to Maputo in 1975 (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008). Some of these changes were done to remove colonial traces or probably boost unity. Citizens see their currency as a symbol of the nation (Hawkins, 2010). Changing the national currency or the image(s) on it can foster national integration (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008). Ghanaian Pound was replaced with Cedi in 1965; Malawi and Zambia changed their Pound to Kwacha in 1968 and 1971, respectively; Escudo was replaced with Kwanza in Angola (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008). In Tunisia, the currency has over the years metamorphosed concurrently into the faces of Arab Muslims and European-centered Mediterranean (Hawkins, 2010). The Nigerian Pound was replaced with the Naira in 1973. These currencies were colonial inventions. Hence, the adoption of new currencies and the logo(s) were seen by various governments as indigenous and integration measures. These, no doubt, are economic tools to foster national integration.

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Governments have equally promoted demographic measures. Nonethnic census held by not including ethnic origin in census data during counting is also a means of national integration. This was applied in Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania in the late 1960s (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008). This was also the case in the Central African Republic in 1961 and 1975 censuses (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2008). In South Africa’s apartheid era, parties with ethnic and racial affiliations were suitable for the circumstances as at then, but the post-apartheid preferred to capture state power by mobilising support across different ethnic and cultural groups (Osaghae, 1999). However, in contemporary South Africa, some political parties are more inclined towards some races. For instance, the Economic Freedom Fighters champion the course of the Blacks (Mbete, 2015). The Democratic Alliance is a party that has people from different races, but the white minorities are more comfortable in the party because they see it as a party that will respect their views. Tanzania is also among countries that have embraced measures to jettison ethnic affiliation and promote national integration. A research carried out some years ago gave empirical credence to this. When asked the open-ended question, “Which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost,” only 3 percent of Tanzanians responded in terms of an ethnic, language, or tribal affiliation, the lowest of the twelve countries in the sample with the exception of small and homogeneous Lesotho (at 2 percent). Instead, 76 percent of Tanzanians answered in terms of an occupational category (for example, farmer). This low rate of attachment to ethnic identity stands in sharp contrast to other countries— Nigeria (48 percent), Namibia (46 percent), Mali (39 percent), Malawi (38 percent), and Zimbabwe (36 percent)—where, as in Kenya, ethnic divisions have been politicized. (Miguel, 2004: 338)

From the survey, countries that may not have fared better than Tanzania have equally experienced peace except for Nigeria, Mali and Kenya (during the election violence from 2007 to 2008). Tanzania achieved this feat owing to some measures taken. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania deemphasised ethnic affiliation at the national level but rather advocated for a sole Tanzanian national identity (Miguel, 2004). In the real sense, this does not mean members of an ethnic group will completely take no cognisance of their ethnic and religious foundation; neither does it mean taking another identity. Concurring with this, national integration does not mean members of a group should change their identity and fully take

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another identity, but it bolsters identifying with the country rather than giving priority to sectional identity (Ray & Satpathy, 2013). It fosters tolerance and respect for the views of others irrespective of their ethnic or religious groups (Ray & Satpathy, 2013). To foster national integration, Tanzania encouraged Swahili as a national language, put in place political and civic education in educational institutions, disassembled tribal authorities and had a relative equal distribution of resources across the regions (Miguel, 2004). A deeper look into integration measures of Sudan and India is germane. This is because conflicts in Sudan have been explored in this chapter and there is a need to shed light on the response of the state to managing the issues. India has also been considered because it does not only have a large population but it is one of the most diverse states in the world. Integration in Sudan Sudan’s national integration programmes before the emergence of South Sudan from the old Sudan will be examined. The measures included meetings between the North and the South, signing of agreements, and recognising the religious and racial differences in the country, among others. Different administrations signed these agreements, using terminologies like agreements, resolutions and declarations. These include Torit Resolutions of 1991, Koko dam Declarations, Frankfurt Agreement/Declaration, Cairo Agreement, Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 and the Addis Ababa Agreement (Young, 2005). These measures were one-sided and only reactionary, temporary and not preventive. The first official meeting between the North and the South was at the Juba Conference of 1948, where the two sides had different interpretations of the outcomes. The North interpreted the outcome to mean fostering the unity of the country, while the South’s understanding of the meeting was the need for more time to consider if the North meant what it proposed while some saw it as a move towards the adoption of a federal system of government (Salman, 2013). Al-Rahim (1970) opines that some Northerners and Southerners preferred that the South should be made an independent state from the North, but if this seems not to be realised, the South will opt for a federal or confederal state. The federal debate also continued after a new government took over in 1956. However, there seemed to be a measure of insincerity. For instance, the government set up a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC 1) of 46

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members, which had only three South Sudanese as members (Salman, 2013; Sarkesian, 1973). The CDC 1 suffocated the demand for a federal system of government that would grant the South autonomy, accommodate social, economic and cultural differences. Rather, the government was pursuing the draft of an Arab-Islamic constitution that would promote the Sharia legal system and adopt Arabic as the official language throughout the country (Salman, 2013). The military government that ruled between 1958 and 1964 also killed the federation dream that would have granted the South some level of autonomy. The military head, General Abboud, ordered his three governors in the South to ‘silent’ any Southerner that demanded a federation and these governors believed that the South must be Islamised and Arabised to unite Sudan (Poggo, 2009). The expulsion of all Christian missionaries from the South in 1962 brought insinuations that the government wanted to Islamise the country and impose Arabic culture (Sarkesian, 1973). Hence, value integration, which entailed integrating the Arab and Islamic cultures with those of Black Africans, became a mirage (Sarkesian, 1973). The military government around the same time tried to integrate the North and the South through military suppression in the South, but this led to the exodus of thousands of Southerners to adjoining Black African countries (Sarkesian, 1973). These were forceful strategies to integrate the country. The struggle for Southern autonomy continued in 1965, a conference between the two regions was held in March 1965, and it had observers from some African countries (Salman, 2013). The South demanded a federal system and separation from the rest of the country (Salman, 2013). These demands appeared as if they were not specific about what they wanted. Salman (2013) submits that this was a calculated move to raise the bar so that the North would agree to the adoption of a federal system. The government also rejected these demands, and the civil war continued. The government of Jaafar Nimeiry took over power and ruled from 1969 to 1985. He signed the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. This agreement was signed between the representatives of Nimeiry’s government and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (Poggo, 2009). Foreign representatives were also involved in the peace talks that led to the signing of this agreement (Poggo, 2009). This was a future-based relationship eighteen-month interim agreement, which was from February 1972 to

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June 1973 and signified an end to the seventeen-year-old insurgent activities in the South but neither side clearly achieved its objectives (Sarkesian, 1973). The agreement granted the Southern Regional Assembly power to legislate on a few areas but most of the other powers were granted to the national government, nevertheless, the South did not have enough funds to discharge its duties (Poggo, 2009). Other measures taken include recognising the dichotomy between the culture and language of the two regions, the appointment of two South Sudanese as ministers, and meetings and negotiations between the two parties. Others are regional autonomy for Southern provinces over local matters as well as the appointment of a Southern Sudanese Major General as a commander of the Sudanese army in the Southern part (Poggo, 2009; Salman, 2013). However, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement’s Military arm did not cease to exist nor did the movement achieve a separate state or federation (Sarkesian, 1973). A major setback to the peace talks was that the Northern delegates were more educated, sophisticated and experienced while the Southern delegates were less educated and inexperienced in peace talks; hence, it was not a surprise that the Southern delegates felt manipulated and cheated (Poggo, 2009). The challenge with the administration of Nimeiry was that the North felt he was not promoting the Arab-Islam agenda for the entire country and the South and some Southerners ironically believed that the moves he made were just propaganda that lacked substance (Poggo, 2009). Hence, despite efforts to correct the disaffection of the South towards the country, there were still opposition to this. However, the good deeds towards the South began to reduce around 1983 as the president divided the Southern part into three regions, thereby whittling the power of the region while that of the North was not diminished. Hence, as a result of structural fractures in the agreement, it only allowed relative peace for about ten years after which the Sudanese Second Civil War broke out in 1983 (Poggo, 2009; Young, 2005). The gulf between the North and the South widened more after the president began to retrace his steps back to the North, and he ignored earlier peace agreement with the South (Salman, 2013). He imposed Sharia law in the entire Sudan in 1983. After the overthrow of the president in 1985, a transitional government was instituted, and the peace talks with the SPLM proved abortive because the new government still promoted the Northern and Islamic hegemony (Salman, 2013). The civilian government that came in after the election did not change the

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situation either (Salman, 2013). There was another military rule (who later became civilian president through self-succession) between 1989 and 2019. As a result of the location of oil in the South, and isolation from Western countries as well as the need to have security to attract investors in the oil sector, the government went into an agreement with the South on the need to see the South as distinct culturally and religiously form the Arab-Islamic North (Salman, 2013). These measures, nonetheless, peace was still far from being realised in the country. Consequently, some agreements were signed. These are The Machakos Protocol, The Protocol on Power Sharing 2004, The Agreement on Wealth Sharing 2004, the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States. Others are the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices, the Implementation Modalities and Global Implementation Matrix and Appendices. These processes culminated in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/ A) and the Sudanese government (Brosché & Duursma, 2018). The second civil war (North–South War) that began in 1983 ended in 2005 through the signing of the CPA (Brosché & Duursma, 2018; Kalpakian, 2017; Salman, 2013). Consequently, the self-government struggle of South Sudan received recognition in 2005 and was actualised through the secession of South Sudan on July 9, 2011(Okojie, 2013; Wolff, 2007). Hence, it was implemented between 2005 and 2011. This is because the CPA recognised the right of the people of South Sudan to enjoy autonomy with the opportunity to secede (Salman, 2013; Wolff, 2007). Although, the CPA had the dual option of a continued power sharing agreement between the North and the South or secession by the South, the South opted for the latter. The resolution of intra Southern Sudan conflict, unity in the SPLM/ A, maturity demonstrated by the Sudanese leaders and restoration of the hitherto strange relationship with neighbouring and some Western countries all contributed to the success of the CPA (Brosché & Duursma, 2018). The secession of South Sudan meant Sudan could no longer pride itself as the largest country in Africa and the gains that should come from cultural, racial, religious and linguistic diversity have been lost (Salman, 2013). The raison d’être for the independence of South Sudan was to stop

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exploitation by the North and allow the people to enjoy their resources free of diversion by Khartoum and the North (Kalpakian, 2017). Another agreement, The Darfur Peace Agreement was signed on May 5, 2006 between the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/AMini Minawi purposely to end the crisis in Darfur (Brosché & Duursma, 2018). The agreement was silent on self-determination, which is if Darfur should be administered as a single or numerous unit (Kalpakian, 2017). The two agreements (CPA and Darfur Peace Agreement) touch on the areas of economic resource allocation, police, military, elections and security reforms (Brosché & Duursma, 2018). The core values of the CPA have the components of autonomy, secularism, federalism and referendum on secession as well as wealth and power sharing which are the root causes of the country’s problems (Kalpakian, 2017). The Darfur Peace Agreement did not end the fighting in Darfur (Brosché & Duursma, 2018). The Sudanese peace and integration moves were soiled in insincerity on the part of the government, especially the reluctance to recognise the rights of non-Muslims and non-Arabs. This pushed the country to experience more than one civil war. In the case of Nigeria, the country has experienced one civil war and for it not to have been thrown into another civil war since the war ended in 1970 shows that successive governments have given recognition to the diverse nature of the country. The persistence of the Darfur crisis represents a post secession disregard for non-Arabs by the government of Sudan and shows that the peace agreement on the region’s matter signed in 2006 has not been successful. Similarly, the failure of successive governments in Nigeria to resolve the clashes between herdsmen and farmers has marginal effects on the instability of the country. Integration in India India is one of the most culturally diverse countries, which has been able to maintain its democracy (Lijphart, 1996, 2008). The country has about 800 dialects, several religions that include Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Jainism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism and Judaism as well as diverse culture; therefore, the country is the epitome of diversity (Ray & Satpathy, 2013). The Hindu majority make up about 83% of the population, but they are divided along the lines of culture, caste and sect, and these do not make them form the political majority (Lijphart, 2008).

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In 1948, shortly after independence, the Indian state was concerned with building nationalism and national identity (Deprez, 2017). The state does not deny the existence of diversity coupled with intergroup hostility and violence but has made some efforts to fabricate a robust all-India loyalty (Lijphart, 2008; Varshney, 2013). The country recognises the existence of different religions but does not allow any to be adopted as a state religion (Varshney, 2013). The state utilised documentaries, specifically short films to circulate information on the progress of the new state, social-economic development, democracy and national unity which were meant to get support for the nation building project from the Indian public (Deprez, 2017). The former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1961 accepted that religious, linguistic and communal conflicts affecting his country needed to be taken care of through the building of a national mind (Ray & Satpathy, 2013). In response, one of the measures taken was to produce adequate manpower to facilitate development midwife development through education, and 31 National Institutes of Technology were established in different regions of the country, with English used as the language of teaching and learning (Gupta & Gupta, 2012; Ray & Satpathy, 2013; Verma & Brahma, 2017). These institutions are funded by the national government, and they are established through the National Institutes of Technology Act 2007, and they are categorised as institutions of national importance (Devi & Verma, 2017; Verma & Brahma, 2017). These institutes are spread all over the country, and each one in a state admits and appoints staff not more than 50% from the state the institute is located, and the remaining 50% are from other states and union territories of the Indian Union (Ray & Satpathy, 2013). Hence, each state and union territory has a student in every National Institute of Technology, but merit is not jettisoned in the selection process (Ray & Satpathy, 2013). Some programmes are residential and last for four years; hence, each student learns about the culture, values and diversity in India (Ray & Satpathy, 2013). Other institutions that have played key roles in bolstering an all-India perception include Indian Administrative Services, Indian Institutes of Management, Central High Schools, the Supreme Court and the Electoral Commission as well as sports (Varshney, 2013). The Indian experience reviewed are institutional measures towards national integration. The Indian system is like the federal character principle and quota system in Nigeria. It also stereotypes admission into federal institutions

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where the admission of students is not restricted to those from the state the institution is located. Also, the staff composition of these institutions is not restricted to the state they are located. These serve as converging places to learn different languages and cultures.

Conclusion In this chapter, ethnic and religious violence from the perspectives of root causes and other dimensions were discussed. The nature of occurrences in African and Asian countries was explored. Sudan was expansively explored because of the ethnic/racial and religious connotations of the civil wars in the country. The Darfur crisis was also considered because of its ethnic/ racial colouration. Sudan and some African countries have not managed their diversity very well such that rather than the comparative advantage that comes with plurality, some states in Africa are polarised along ethnic/racial and religious lines and these divisions come with the price of violence. These necessitated why national integration was explored. It was established that integration cannot be absolute but countries should attain it at such a level to prevent violence and correct situations that have evolved into violence. Countries adopt several integration measures either as a preventive or responsive mechanism and these take political, economic, and geographical forms, among others. Hence, national integration measures in different countries were explored but more attention was given to Sudan and India. National integration approaches in these countries were compared with those of Nigeria. The next chapter is dedicated to power sharing. This will bring to the fore how power sharing can bring inclusiveness and foster unity. Hence, if well structured, it may be a platform to foster integration.

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CHAPTER 4

Models of Power Sharing and Rotational Presidency Demystified

Introduction Majoritarian electoral democracy may exclude minority groups from clinching power in plural states. This chapter argues that exclusion from power may snowball into conflict. Power sharing models are seen as part of the panacea to the attendant negative effects of power exclusion. This chapter focuses on two power sharing models—consociationalism and centripetalism. The chapter will be divided into different sections. The chapter begins with a clarification of the concept and a general discussion on power sharing. The chapter explains consociationalism and further expatiates it through its four principles. These are government by grand coalition, group autonomy, proportionality and minority veto. These principles span rotating power, representation of groups in the parliament, autonomy of minority groups and capacity of minority groups to determine key decisions despite their low population. Heterogeneous states may apply one or more of these principles to play the role of insulation or mitigation of grievances that emanate from exclusion. The chapter also dwells on the arguments for and against consociationalism. This chapter discusses centripetalism. It also covers rotational presidency as a power sharing pedestal. Rotational presidency falls more within the consociational model of power sharing while centripetalism gives room for elections that require support from different ethnic, religious and geographical groups for © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. T. Faluyi, National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7_4

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winners to emerge. To stimulate lessons for Nigeria, these models were discussed concerning their applications in different countries. However, the chapter devotes more attention to Kenya, Zimbabwe, Switzerland and Lebanon.

Power Sharing Within the spectrum of this book, power sharing is viewed within the political space. Power sharing encompasses ‘political arrangements that aim to produce joint government between groups, and the label attaches to attempts to move beyond straightforward majoritarian governments towards some form of group accommodation’ (Bell, 2018: 7). This topic encapsulates how political inclusion can be accomplished and consolidated to engender national integration. Ordinarily, the ethnic configuration of Nigeria will give the most populous ethnic groups—Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Fulani—the wherewithal to dominate governance but power sharing is a tool to checkmate this. Liberal democratic system of first-past-the-post electoral system may be difficult to practise in multi-ethnic societies (Ukiwo, 2005). The author substantiates this claim that ethnic disaffection and conflicts may emanate if certain ethnic groups are excluded from governance (Ukiwo, 2005). This is the outcome of majority groups having their way all the time. Continuous claims by minorities about being deprived may jeopardise majority rule (Khidasheli, 1999). However, power sharing can still be the order of the day in a democratic state without hindering the smooth running of democracy. Protagonists of power sharing as a catalyst for strengthening democracy argue that a government that has political inclusiveness across many groups has more acceptance than government by majority rule (Ulu¸sahin, 2007). This explains why political elites sometimes bury their differences and cooperate to expand representation. Thus, Agbu (2004) recommends democracy, devolution of power and power sharing as the main structures of ethnic conflict management. Political parties serve as one of the platforms for elites to collaborate in a democratic state. The internal arrangement of political parties should allow its membership to cut across ethnic lines to epitomise diversity and mitigate domination by majority ethnic groups (Osaghae, 1999). This is crucial because to attain elective positions in democracies, political parties are

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one of the key institutions. Hence, if political parties place their diversity card very well, they may produce a government that will enjoy public acceptance. Democracy is the foundation of legitimacy and this combination helps to develop and maintain consensus: the end product of these if well harnessed is national integration (Osaghae, 1999). Therefore, democracy may engender inclusiveness but cannot avert conflict. Democracy can spur national integration if it can address the conflicts that evolve from ethnic grievances, inequality and marginalisation, and it offers representative opportunities for various groups through a competitive multi-party system, but it does not signify completely ending conflicts (Agbu, 2004; Osaghae, 1999). Hence, power sharing is meant to pacify hitherto unhappy or potentially discontented groups in society, and elites call the shots. In a deeper sense, for democracy to play its role, there needs to be a functional system of power distribution between the government at the centre and the periphery and among the various existing groups in society (Agbu, 2004). Hence, power sharing is meant to appease hitherto unhappy or potentially dissatisfied groups in a society. Power sharing may be fabricated through structural and legal institutional frameworks and can also be made through informal/semi-formal arrangements made by elites. Power sharing institutions formalise power sharing while power sharing arrangements may be formalised through some efforts or to some extent partially formal (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). For instance, rotating political positions in Nigeria is an elitist arranged practice that is not formal or institutional but ad hoc and some political parties have internally formalised it. Power sharing has been given institutional face in some states such as The 1917 Pacification in the Netherlands, The National Pact of 1943 in Lebanon, The Grand Coalition Accord of 1945 in Austria and The Malayan Alliance of the early 1950s (Lijphart, 1996, 2008). Power sharing may encompass how executive power sharing will play out; the legislative design, which may be attained through the type of electoral system; and inclusiveness and diversity considerations in the appointment of judges (Wolff, 2010). Ensuring representativeness in constituting the judiciary may be herculean because it is not dependent on the electoral system (Wolff, 2010). Rothchild and Roeder (2005: 19) give a comprehensive list of power sharing avenues which are ‘federalism, collective executives, communal legislative chambers, reserved seats in legislatures, the list system of proportional representation with a low threshold, and formal rules mandating proportional resource allocation’. Likewise, O’Flynn and Russell (2005) opine

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that power sharing may be actualised through institutions and strategies like a coalition government, legislative vetoes, guaranteed representation, federalism, devolution, functional autonomy and international moves through treaties between countries. Rothchild and Roeder (2005) submit that other forms of power sharing comprise rotational presidency and schemes of non-territorial federalism—examples are the communal councils projected for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Power sharing initiatives that (have) endured for years are those in Bosnia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Djibouti, Indonesia, Macedonia, Nigeria, Nepal and Suriname (Bieber, 2005; Horowitz, 2014). In a nutshell, most power sharing initiatives in deeply divided societies are wrapped in consociational or centripetal power sharing models (McGarry & O’Leary, 2016; Wolff, 2010). Striving to arrive at a formula acceptable to all stakeholders, difficulty in implementation and if implementation scales through, probability to stand the test of time are the challenges associated with power sharing (Spears, 2000). The author posits that Power sharing in Ethiopia and Angola in the last decade of the twentieth century did not last (Spears, 2000). Power sharing in Nigeria has operated at all levels and arms of government through institutional provisions and arrangements. For example, constitutional provisions for the appointment of at least one minister from each state and the election of three senators from each state are structured, legal and institutional. Arrangements may cut across executive and legislative arms. These include power sharing for presidential and governorship positions, and sharing key legislative positions based on agreement by political elites. These modes of power sharing may manifest before or after elections and the period of manifestation explains if it is a consociational or centripetal form of power sharing. Consociationalism Consociational democracy is remotely linked to Arend Lijphart (2018). Sharing, dispersing and limiting power is what consociationalism preaches (Lijphart, 2012). Arend Lijphart notes that ‘consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy’. This is accomplished through consensus. It proposes how power will be shared, especially in a plural society and those that will benefit from the sharing. Political elites set the ‘rules’ in consociationalism and they are the

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principal beneficiaries. They take this exalted position because of their economic strength and the ethnic and religious followership they have. Lijphart is fluid in his choice of nomenclatures and has used concepts like accommodation, consociation, power sharing and consensus, but what remains fixed is that consensus among groups in a divided society requires four basic characteristics (Lijphart, 2018). These characteristics are grand coalition, group autonomy, proportionality and minority veto. These quadruple features are the principles of consociationalism. Consociationalism endorses a grand coalition of majorities and minorities through the putting in place of agreed guarantees, containing proportional group participation in government and minority vetoes of government decisions (Horowitz, 2014). For a detailed overview of consociational democracy, its four basic principles as presented by Lijphart are crucial (Lijphart, 1977, 1996, 2008). These are: 1. Government by ‘grand coalition’, in other words, by a broadly representative coalition of all significant ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. 2. Group autonomy via territorial and/or non-territorial federalism and decentralisation. 3. Proportionality, mainly in political representation and civil service. 4. Minority veto power regarding issues of vital and fundamental significance to minority rights and autonomy. These principles of consociationalism are intended to engender the emergence of a government with a wide-ranging multi-ethnic alliance (Duruji, 2008). Executive power sharing, distinctive veto rights and joint autonomy help to prevent a group from becoming so powerful to the extent that it becomes a threat to the fundamental interests of other group(s) (Deets, 2018). This is attained through the cooperative attitude of the elites, and this captures these four principles. Consociationalism has come to reality in Nigeria through the unofficial sharing of political offices among ethnic and religious groups. Allocation of positions of key officers of political parties and federal character principle for determining occupiers of offices in the public service have also been based on equity format and less on merit (Mustapha, 2009). Rotating the office of the president and vice president on ethnic and religious bases and the appointment of a minimum of one Minister from

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each state in Nigeria are classic examples. Other measures that the Nigerian state has embraced to enhance inclusive participation are the NYSC scheme, the quota system, state creation, the establishment of unity schools, the establishment of federal universities, among others. Consociationalism in the documented agreements, institutionalisation and constitutions has been espoused in different states at different periods. These are Switzerland (1943), Belgium (1970), Malaysia (1971), South Tyrol (1972), Lebanon (1989), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Northern Ireland (1998), Burundi (2000 and 2005), Macedonia (2001), Afghanistan (2004), Iraq (2005) and Kenya (2008) (McCulloch, 2014; McGarry & O’Leary, 2007; O’Flynn & Russell, 2005). Other states are South Africa, Uruguay, Colombia, and Malaysia, among others (Deschouwer, 2006; Hazan, 1999; Lijphart, 2008; Loizides, 2018; Mushtaq et al., 2011; Qvortrup, 2018). Consociational democratic experiment has been successful in Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium, but recorded failure in Cyprus, Fiji and Malaysia (Jarrett, 2018; Wolff, 2010). It became a crucial approach for international intervention in conflict-ridden countries like Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq (McCulloch, 2014). Northern Ireland romanced centripetalism in 1974, and since 1998 (though irregularly), Northern Ireland has experimented with a consociational coalition government branded in the chronological and proportional allocation of rules (McGarry & O’Leary, 2016). India has given recognition to diversity in religion, language and ethnicity in the civil service and cabinet appointments (McGarry & O’Leary, 2009). Underestimation of consociationalism, was critically responsible for the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation because Serbians dominated the army and the federal executive (McGarry & O’Leary, 2009). Principles of Consociationalism Government by Grand Coalition The crux of Lijphart’s idea is elites’ cooperation and grand coalition among ethnic representatives (Spears, 2000). Grand coalition facilitates greater security and gives room for the input of minorities in decisionmaking (Traniello, 2008). It is an elite cartel’s design put in place to respond to the problems that may emanate from unfriendly subgroups being fragmented (Lijphart, 2008). Elites’ cooperation is a catalyst for ensuring security for smaller groups and fostering peace (Sullivan, 2005).

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Grand coalition may be in the form of a large representative and multi-party coalition cabinet, informal advisory structure and rotating presidency (Lijphart, 2008). Grand coalitions are connected with ethnic, linguistic, religious, partisan and sectarian dynamics. These culminated in formal or informal agreements in allocating the occupiers of the President’s Office, Office of the Prime Minister, Presiding officer of the Parliament and other top government positions (Deschouwer, 2006; Khidasheli, 1999; Lijphart, 1998, 2008). This resonates with rotational presidency in Nigeria because political elites have ethnic and/or religious benchmarks to back or oppose the emergence of some candidates for the positions of president and vice president since the commencement of the Fourth Republic. For instance, having two Yoruba political elites as the presidential candidates in the 1999 Presidential Election was ethnically orchestrated. This was because of political elites’ feelings that Yoruba elites were short-changed as a result of the annulment of the 1993 Presidential Election. Grand coalition has operated in diverse magnitudes in Belgium, Colombia, Lebanon, Switzerland, Germany, Cyprus, Burundi (1999), Fiji (1997), Kenya (2008) and Zimbabwe (2009) (Deschouwer, 2006; McGarry & O’Leary, 2016; Lijphart, 2008). It has also been courted in Austria, Malaysia and South Africa (Lijphart, 1996). Other forms comprise the Dutch design of permanent/makeshift ‘grand’ councils or committees with better impact than advisory roles (Lijphart, 1996: 259). India’s experience of grand coalition is the cabinet, but the unique thing about India is that the cabinet is majorly made up of a single dominant political party (Lijphart, 2008). However, The Indian Congress Party which was in power1 at the country’s independence was for some years inclusive and had a grand coalition in its intra-party framework because the ministers it appointed belonged to all the foremost ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional groups (Lijphart, 1996; Lijphart, 2008). Group Autonomy The existence of autonomous administrations within a state makes it possible for ethnic, religious and linguistic groups to have their own (autonomous) government (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). This is because 1 The party has held sway more than once since then, and it ruled until 2014. The ruling party in the country is the Bharatiya Janata Party which has been in power since 2014.

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it may be difficult to run such states through only one level of government as the central government alone may not accommodate all groups. Hence, the need to have a federal or quasi-unitary system in plural states. For geographically concentrated groups in a divided society, one of the ways to promote group autonomy is through federalism (Lijphart, 2008). In consociationalism, segmental autonomy may take the form of territorial self-government where plural societies are represented in geographically concentrated territories—this is sort of a federal system (McGarry, 2017; Sullivan, 2005). One of the ways to consolidate the autonomy of a constituent unit in a federal state is that the former has its own constitution (Lijphart, 2012). However, in a federal state like contemporary Nigeria, the constituent units do not have their constitution but the federal constitution guides their operations. Nevertheless, the existence or otherwise of subnational constitutions should not hinder the atmosphere for group autonomy where inequalities experienced by minorities are cushioned. Segmental/group autonomy may signify some form of ethnic, religious or cultural control over their institutions, educational or cultural. Cultural autonomy thrives very well on the anchors of religion and language (Lijphart, 2008). In essence, this incorporates creating agencies or institutions to engender minority languages, cultures, religions, legal systems and a very good case is the granting of linguistic and educational functional autonomy for the two core groups in Belgium (Hadden, 2005). In Switzerland, federalism has been the framework of power sharing that has afforded the societies of the cantons the greatest autonomy for keeping their government, sufficient prospects to live differently and to sustain their regional tradition and culture (Linder & Vatter, 2001). Hence, cantons play key roles along with the federal government in language and cultural policies (Thorlakson, 2003). In Switzerland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia, power sharing in the light of group autonomy created a federal arrangement with linguistic boundaries and autonomy (Lijphart, 2008). Relatively similar is the establishment and administration of independent schools by ethnic and religious minorities, as it occurs in Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as permitting religious minorities to separately promulgate their laws on marriage, divorce, child adoption and inheritance, with Cyprus and Lebanon as typical cases (Lijphart, 2008). This has a striking resemblance with India. Relating to cultural/group autonomy, there was linguistic and religious

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autonomy as religious and linguistic minorities were given autonomy to establish their schools, and groups had the privilege to have their laws concerning marriage, divorce, custody, child adoption and inheritance (Lijphart, 1996). In Nigeria, some Northern states have factored in religion as one of the basis for autonomy. This is evident in the introduction of the Sharia legal system in some Northern states despite the country being a secular state. The subnational levels and the federal government have control over the educational system but the authority of the latter is more. Each ethnic group has cultural practices that are respected by other groups but such cultures are not to operate outside the confines of the law. Group autonomy may also have to do with geographical location. The five groups of elites (check Chapter five) are domiciled within ethnic, linguistic and to some degree, religious territories in the form of geopolitical zones, states and local governments. These geographical spaces may serve as platforms to negotiate for respective group autonomy by these elites. Proportionality Proportional representation encourages minority, a multi-party system and a coalition government, of which the last one is a progeny of compromise among groups (Lijphart, 2008). Nevertheless, proportional representation is a form of proportionality. Thus, proportionality may encompass different forms of representation and not be restricted to the electoral process. Proportionality represents proportionality in legislative representation, proportional distribution in the civil service and proportional allocation of funds, among others (Lijphart, 2008). It allows for laid out avenues of allocating government resources and it facilitates all segments of society to have a proportional influence on political issues (Sullivan, 2005). In power sharing, proportionality is behind the scenes in allocating state resources such as military and public service positions, constitutional or essential laws that offer positions and budgetary funds allocation (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Proportionality promotes inclusivity because it lessens being marginalised in access to representation, positions and resources (Traniello, 2008). An example of proportionality is the South African 1994 interim Constitution which provided a Government of National Unity, and gave room for all political parties with a minimum of 5% of seats in the National Assembly to participate; this system was in operation between 1994

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and 1999 (Lijphart, 2008; Traniello, 2008). This depicts proportional representation. Lijphart (2012), gives credence to the South African system that ‘the basic aim of proportional representation is to divide the parliamentary seats among the parties in proportion to the votes they receive’. During the same period, elections into the South African National Assembly and Provincial legislatures and representation in the Government of National Unity were centred on proportionality (Lijphart, 1998). This is different from contemporary South Africa where the party with the majority of seats in the National Assembly produces the president and members of the cabinet except the party forms a coalition due to its inability to have the majority of votes in the election. The method adopted by the Indian Congress Party in the first few years of its rule also resonates with proportionality because cabinet and parliamentary seats were proportionally allocated among linguistic and tribal groups (Lijphart, 1996). Still in India, proportionality has allowed majority and minority groups to have access to ministerial posts, legislative seats and public service admission into higher institutions grounded on quota systems (Lijphart, 2008). Using the population of a state to determine the number of seats per state in the Nigerian House of Representatives is a form of proportionality. The more populated a state is the more representatives it has in that chamber of the National Assembly. The quota system in determining admission into federal educational institutions and security training institutions as well as the federal character principle epitomise proportionality. Minority Veto Minority veto is an avenue for minorities to safeguard their autonomy by impeding any attempts to exterminate or weaken it (Lijphart, 2008). It provides minority groups with power to hinder or determine a policy change and condense the power of the majority (Traniello, 2008). Minority veto is a platform for the minority to be part of government, and partake in the decisions of the grand coalition and make the parties in the coalition and their decisions gain acceptance and guarantee political security (Sullivan, 2005). However, in some cases, there may not be clearcut majority and minority groups; this means that no group claims to be in the majority (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995), or it may be a situation when two communities are almost equal in population size (Northern Ireland, 1998) (McGarry, 2017).

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In some states, amending the constitution may not be actualised by the majority alone, the support of the minority may be needed and if such support is not sought, it may evolve into minority veto (Lijphart, 2008). For instance, in South Africa, should there be a need to amend the constitution and address other national issues, there is a need to have a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly to get these done (Lijphart, 1998). Minority veto in this sphere may be relative. Two-thirds may mean other political parties apart from the ruling party may form part of the two-thirds. It may also mean the two-thirds may cut across racial strata, depending on the racial representation in the political parties. The ethnic composition of Nigeria where the states that house the majority ethnic groups do not make up two-third of the states makes it easy for minorities to exercise their veto on constitutional amendment. To amend the Nigerian Constitution, votes from the National Assembly are required and two-thirds of State Houses of Assembly consents are needed (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). The implication of this is that without input from states dominated by minority ethnic groups, the constitution cannot be amended. India is another country where minority veto is operational. Majority speak Hindi but in 1965, there was an informal agreement that the language would not be made the sole official language without the concurrent endorsement by the major non-Hindi speaking territories (Lijphart, 1996, 2008). Also, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Shah Bano case was seen by the Muslim minority as unfavourable for Muslim personal law, and it succeeded in influencing the government to propose, and ratify a law to reverse the court’s judgement (Lijphart, 2008). Swiss elites with time gave recognition to minority influence in all spheres of Swiss politics in their effort to prevent the development of minority discontent (Glass, 1977). Also, in Switzerland, those living in the smallest cantons, which make up about 9% of the population, may block the votes of the remaining 91% (Linder & Vatter, 2001; Loizides et al., 2011; Vatter, 2005). Countries like Belgium, Cyprus and former Czechoslovakia have some form of minority veto which are constitutionally backed (Lijphart, 1996).

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Consociationalism Explained Further Consociationalism is aimed at solving the conundrum of instability in deeply divided democratic states (Deschouwer, 2006). It implies ‘association between equals’. It promotes equal partnership politically, irrespective of ethnic or religious supremacy (Mushtaq et al., 2011). Majoritarianism is assuaged, and inclusion, as well as equity of the different groups, is promoted (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). Liberal democracy has been criticised as not to reflecting representation in a heterogeneous state, but consociationalism has been a good representation and power sharing framework (Kifordu, 2011). Put differently, majoritarian democracy gives credence to the concentration of power while consensus alludes importance to power sharing (Doorenspleet & Maleki, 2018). Consequently, grafting consociationalism in a democratic state may negate this criticism of liberal democracy. In ethnically diverse societies, consociational democracy has a positive effect on national integration (Kifordu, 2011). Consociationalism exists to address the security loopholes that are associated with ethnicity (Deets, 2018). It is essential to have ‘provisions’ that will make political elites know that violence is not the conduit to achieve political power and one of such ways to avert violence is power sharing (White, 2018). This consciousness receives a boost through consociationalism. Consociational democracy culminates in the emergence of leaders through consensus internal mechanisms by ethnic groups (Enloe, 1977). It depicts elite fashioned power sharing mechanism, which requires negotiation to accommodate different segments of society (Enloe, 1977; Jinadu, 1985; Thorlakson, 2003). It gives voice to minorities through power sharing (Lemarchand, 2006). Ideally, it should be a calculated cooperative effort by elites to stabilise a political system (Hazan, 1999). The existence of consociational institutions in plural societies may engender a peaceful political environment, but in reality, it may not completely mop up centrifugal tendencies (De Briey, 2005). Consociationalism can record success if conflicting groups utilise it to pursue their agendas in an atmosphere of peaceful and cordial arrangements (White, 2018). However, consociationalism has been criticised. Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro are among the scholars who oppose it by submitting that it does encourage strong opposition which is one of the fulcrums of democracy because opposition is a catalyst for healthy debate and elite competition (Traniello, 2008). Similarly, Donald Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder

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opine that two elements of democracy—competition and accountability— are limited by consociationalism (Traniello, 2008). Dixon (2018) submits that consociationalism breeds segregation, encourages rule by elite cartels, places one’s ethnic group above others, does not promote integration, is less democratic and is in congruence with authoritarianism. Consociationalism focuses on elites’ bargaining and mutual veto; it impedes the growth of a steady culture of compromise at the grassroots level (Loizides et al., 2011: 3). Hence, it is an elite affair and the masses are hardly involved. They are only involved when the political elites want to canvass for votes. These criticisms do not take away the capability of consociationalism to ensure peace in a diverse society. Consociational principles manifest in different forms in Nigeria. Some have been highlighted in this chapter while some are expatiated in other chapters. However, it plays out most times before or after elections. A model is ‘infused’ in the electoral process and it has constitutional backing. It has made it impossible for the majority ethnic groups to dominate elections and made the minorities major stakeholders in the electoral process, thereby giving them a sense of belonging and greasing the integration of the country. This makes it necessary to explore centripetalism. Centripetalism Centripetal school of thought of power sharing is typically linked with the work of Donald Horowitz (1985; 1990; 1991; 2002), and subsequently that of Timothy D. Sisk (1996) as well as Reilly (2001) (De Briey, 2005; Wolff, 2010). Horowitz and scholars who share his view contest that in consociationalism, ethnic elites may find it herculean to reach a consensus on power sharing (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006). Political elites should be encouraged to have acceptance across ethnic lines through political institutions (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006). Centripetalism is germane in diverse societies. In such societies, the majority want to hold on to the accolade of ‘majority rule’ while minorities want to be immune to the negative tendencies of majority rule (Horowitz, 2014). Majority groups would have preferred to avoid centripetalism and would have opted for unhampered sole determination of election rules and results (Horowitz, 2014). Thus, the depletion of centripetal structures is tantamount to an increase in minorities’ disaffection (Horowitz, 2014).

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The nub of Centripetalism is that it is a deviation from inflexible political arrangements, but it tilts more towards an electoral system that encourages parties to form coalitions that traverse groups to spread the ethnic acceptability of political parties (Horowitz, 2014). It is a conduit for politicians to engender cooperation among different groups through the instrumentality of the electoral system to harvest support outside their ethnic strongholds (De Briey, 2005). To secure victory, political parties depend on the votes from their stronghold territories in addition to the support of other ethnic groups’ votes so that such victory will be a reflection of votes from more than one ethnic group either in direct or indirect elections (McGarry & O’Leary, 2016; Wolff, 2010). Centripetalists support dividing the country into more sub-units so that no group can have a dominating and vast territory but require the votes of other regions and other ethnic and religious groups to coast to electoral victory (McGarry, 2017). Constitutional and legal provisions are made to prevent ethnic and regional dominance, and to avoid the determination of election results based on the large population of an ethnic group or the size of a region. Centripetalism mitigates conflicts through inter-ethnic cooperation before and during elections and not after the elections (Wolff, 2010). A centripetal arrangement achieves its purpose if the votes of the majority are fragmented among parties and the votes of the minorities are essential to make the votes of the majority meet electoral requirements (Horowitz, 2014). In a society where political affiliations are anchored on ethnicity, race, religion and/or language, candidates who cooperate with people from other groups may be compensated with electoral victory (Reilly, 2003). Therefore, such a candidate will enjoy legitimacy and embody a national and not sectional choice. Having a candidate that has appeal across groups emerge as the winner is a catalyst to national integration. To be declared the winner of the presidential election in Nigeria, you must have scored majority votes in not less than two-thirds of the states, and something similar was adopted in Indonesia in 2002 and Kenya in 2010 (Horowitz, 2014). Provisions that are centripetal in nature are in the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions of Nigeria. Sections 125 and 126 of the 1979 Constitution stated that for a person to be declared as the president, he must have not less than one-quarter of votes cast in at the minimum two-thirds of all the states (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1979; Mustapha, 2009). Section 134 of the 1999 Constitution has it that a person could be declared the winner of a presidential election not only

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if he wins with the majority of votes nationally but should also have not less than one-quarter of votes in at least 24 out of the 36 states and the FCT (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999; Suberu, 2009). Section 179 of the 1999 Constitution provides for that of the election of a state governor. For a candidate to be declared the winner, he must have the highest number of votes and at least 25% of votes cast in two-thirds of local governments in a state. This approach has been beneficial to Nigeria because it has ‘forced’ elites from the North and the South and from different parts of a state to secure victories for presidential and governorship candidates, respectively. This might have been a mirage if winning is solely by a simple majority. Also, political elites would have been complacent with operating from their regions only. However, not all political elite groups have experienced the positive side of centripetalism. Hence, it may threaten the stability of the country because some ethnic groups may feel alienated. Also, the way Nigeria is structured, some ethnic groups are so small in population that their votes may be inconsequential despite the inclusive nature of centripetalism. Rotational Presidency as a Power Sharing Platform Rotational presidency is a form of power sharing. In this case, it focuses mainly on the occupier of the seat of the president. As earlier emphasised, rotational presidency is one of the forms consociationalism may take. It is a grand coalition that allows political elites from different groups to flex their bargaining power in sharing executive power. Centripetalism also supports rotational presidency because the requirement for having votes spread across zones is tantamount to the acceptance of the candidate presented by political elites to the people. This means if the candidate wins and he is a product of rotational presidency, the electorates would have indirectly endorsed rotational presidency. Rotational presidency has been engrafted into the Nigerian political system. Eborka defines rotational presidency as. a situation where people from the different regions that constitute a particular socio-political formation shall in the course of time alternate the position of the president in an ordered sequence among themselves. (Eborka, 2016: 35)

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This definition is general and may be applied to several societies. However, it is not so specific about the Nigerian situation. Rotational presidency is a form of elite fabricated power sharing arrangement that encompasses, rotating the positions of the president and vice president on ethnic, religious, geo-political and regional bases such that these factors become the yardsticks in preparation for a new term in office to prevent the domination of the office of the president by an ethnic group, religion and region. The term of office is four years for a single term and eight years for two terms. This definition suits the Nigerian situation considering the geographical, ethnic and religious strata of the country. In the Nigerian parlance, it is also called zoning. However, zoning may be made beyond the position of the president. This explains why rotating or zoning the offices of the president and his deputy trickle down to other positions at the federal level. These factors that are considered in rotating the first two executive seats in the country are also taken into consideration when determining the first four presiding officers of the National Assembly—the President of the Senate, The Speaker of the House of Representatives and their deputies. Thus, within the executive arm of government, power sharing in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic means rotating/ zoning the presidential, governorship, and ministerial positions, and it is beyond ethnic fairness but also involves regional balancing (Asogwa, 2018). Key positions encompass Chief of Staff to the President, Secretary to the Government of the Federation as well as (board members, permanent secretaries, heads of parastatals, and directors, among others) in government ministries and departments and these are also determined through zoning of positions based on ethnic, religious, geo-political and regional bases.

Power Sharing with Case Studies from Africa, Europe and the Middle East Countries have embraced power sharing in different facets and with different yardsticks. However, a glimpse into power sharing in countries that have practised democracy for years and those that are relatively ‘new’ in their democratic experiments will be essential. This will also touch on power sharing that emerged as a result of diversity, post-election disagreements and post-election violence. Hence, the cases of Kenya, Zimbabwe, Switzerland and Lebanon will be explored.

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Kenya Ethnicity/ethnic politics have been one of the challenges confronting Kenya (Adamu & Ocheni, 2016). Voting in the country takes an ethnic dimension because of the fear of exclusion from the government by ethnic groups (Mueller, 2011). Aside from the 2002 election, elections in Kenya since 1992 have always been characterised by some level of violence (Cheeseman et al., 2014). The Kenyan 2022 election was far more peaceful than that of 2007 and comparatively, one can conclude that it was successful. The post-2007 election crisis was preceded by some events. The skirmish between Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) in the post-2007 elections culminated in a power sharing arrangement in Kenya (Cheeseman, 2011). The ODM mistrusted the ruling PNU about the latter rigging the election and this led to violence that resulted in the death of over 1,000 and displacement of about 300,000 (Cheeseman, 2011). The PNU wanted to persist in power, but the ODM consolidating on its strength in the legislature demanded that the office of the prime minister should be created with Raila Odinga being the occupier of the office and that the ODM should also be given some portfolios in the cabinet (Cheeseman, 2008). Kofi Annan spearheaded talks to end the quagmire through the conduit of a coalition government that would be acceptable to both sides (Cheeseman, 2008). Thabo Mbeki, former South African President played a critical role in the post-election power sharing arrangement in Kenya, the light at the end of the tunnel made him and his associates domesticate almost the same thing in Zimbabwe (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010). The African Union with the cooperation of African leaders and renowned African elders, played a crucial role in the peace process, which climaxed in the signing of the National Accord and the emergence of a Grand Coalition Government (Juma, 2009). In March 2008, the National Accord was inputted into the constitution through an amendment passed by the parliament (Juma, 2009). The power sharing arrangement commenced in 2008, and it encompassed the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki emerging as the President with the head of the opposition, Raila Odinga, becoming the Prime Minister (Cheeseman, 2011; Cheeseman et al., 2014). This accord facilitated the creation of the Prime Minister’s office, his two deputies and a coalition government of cabinet appointees composed of members of the two political parties (Juma,

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2009). The coordination and supervision of government functions were under the jurisdiction of the prime minister and the parliament could remove him and his deputy through a vote of no confidence (Juma, 2009). Kenya’s case depicts weak state institutions. They could not avert the ‘stalemate’ that culminated from the election. It also implied that the country had to switch from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government basically to placate political elites. Nevertheless, the positives are that peace was ultimately achieved and electoral violence of such scale has not been experienced in the country since then. The 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria was a consequence of weak state institutions and the susceptibility of the electoral process to elite manipulation. Although, the Nigerian cases in 1993 and 2011 did not result in the transition of the system of government. Following the violence that erupted due to the 2007 election, the government established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) (Cheeseman et al., 2014). It is not a power sharing institution but it exists as a political violence preventive structure. It also exists to sustain peace. The NCIC in collaboration with administrators, organisations and different bodies is to monitor hate speeches (Cheeseman et al., 2014: 10). This will mitigate the use of derogatory statements to whittle the influence of political opponents. Other functions of the commission are promoting national identity and values, eliminating racial, ethnic or religious discrimination and fostering national reconciliation and healing.2 These roles are of significance to engendering peace in elections. It embarked on campaigns towards a peaceful 2022 election and organised the signing of an election peace pledge by relevant stakeholders. The peaceful outcome of the 2022 election attests to the success of the commission and its campaigns. Nigeria can take a cue from the Kenyan approach. One of the organisations that can play a similar role in Nigeria is the National Orientation Agency (NOA). This is an organisation that has a presence in all 36 states and 774 local governments. Its mission is to constantly raise awareness, provide apt and dependable feedback; positively change attitudes, values and behaviours; accurately and amply inform; and sufficiently mobilise

2 Check NCIC website: https://www.cohesion.or.ke/index.php/about-us/ncic-at-aglance).

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citizens to act in ways that uphold peace, harmony and national development.3 The activities of this agency can serve as a preventive measure against violence and the political class and masses can be orientated on engendering peaceful co-existence. Hence, hate speeches which can dissipate peace in the country will be reduced to the minimum. However, the government is responsive and not proactive when it comes to hate speeches. This is evident in the arrest of Nigerians by security agencies, especially on allegations of ‘insulting’ members of the political class and ‘inciting violence’. What has been defined as hate speech has become subject to interpretation by those in power as politicians can use that as a pedestal to come after critics and opposition using the apparatus of the state. A known peace treaty to facilitate peaceful election in Nigeria is the National Peace Committee which is chaired by Abdulsalami Abubakar. The Committee facilitates the signing of peace agreements by politicians for the latter to respect the tenets of free and fair elections and violencefree electoral process. The terms of such agreements are hardly respected by political actors. In addition, educational institutions which ought to have marginal contributions to peace in the country are not helping matters. South East politician explained that the kind of education we are receiving now is not actually helping anybody. We are receiving what I choose to call more of a combat education. The education you receive limits you to your own ethnic nationality. If you have an education that opens up your mind, you now begin to realise that everything that challenges all human beings is related, is common factor. Your pursuit of peace or joy or happiness will also be similar. (Personal Interview South East Politician, January 2019)

Educational institutions should educate students on the need to promote unity in the country. However, this is not absolutely the case. With the introduction of civic education and history into the curriculum, there should be a boost in the spirit of patriotism and peace among the young folks.

3 https://www.noa.gov.ng/about/.

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Zimbabwe Elections in Zimbabwe have drawn the attention of relevant stakeholders. Just before the 2008 elections, the ruling government in the country, with the backing of the Zimbabwe African National UnionPatriotic Front (ZANU-PF), military, police and war veterans, attacked members of the opposition (Cheeseman, 2011). An outright winner did not emerge from the June 2008 election in Zimbabwe (Chigora & Guzura, 2011). Consequently, a rerun became necessary, but the opposition party, Morgan Tsvangirai’s led opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) boycotted it because of zero confidence in the system and as a result, the incumbent, Robert Mugabe ‘emerged’ the winner (Cheeseman, 2011; Kriger, 2012). Consequently, a Global Peace Agreement between the ZANU-PF and MDC surfaced and this was the bedrock of the power sharing arrangement (Kriger, 2012). In February 2009, a power sharing agreement called inclusive government/Government of National Unity was signed between ZANU-PF and MDC (Chigora & Guzura, 2011; Kriger, 2012). To involve Tsvangirai in government, the new office of the prime minister was created (Cheeseman, 2011; Chigora & Guzura, 2011). The indication of this was that the prime minister would share executive power with the president. This was a deviation from a conventional parliamentary system where the president and prime minister have ceremonial and executive positions, respectively. In practice, Mugabe dominated the exercise of executive power because he still controlled the security services, police and intelligence agencies, assenting to bills passed by the parliament, appointing and defining the roles ministers played concerning specific acts of parliament, among other powers (Kriger, 2012). In essence, a power sharing government with ministerial slots shared among ZANU-PF and the two factions of MDC was operational (Cheeseman, 2011). The ZANU-PF allocated significant portfolios like foreign affairs, home affairs, defence and internal security to itself while the less important offices like health, and education, among others, were left for the MDC (Cheeseman, 2011). The Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe faced some challenges. Firstly, the GNU emerged through accord from leaders of the major political parties while civil societies, leaders of small political parties and other leaders were excluded from the process (Chigora & Guzura,

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2011). In addition, a parliamentary system requires a viable opposition in parliament, but that was not the case (Chigora & Guzura, 2011). The common thing about the power sharing arrangements in Kenya and Zimbabwe was that the incumbents retained their positions in the face of imminent deposition (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010). This attests to two features of political elites which are domination of the political game and perpetuation of themselves in power. There are dissimilarities between the power sharing deals in the two post-election crises in the two countries. ZANU-PF, with the support of the military, were less receptive to the power sharing agreement with the MDC and this accounted for why the agreement did not last long (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010). In Kenya, military elites were not involved, and there was understanding among political elites, these accounted for why it was more successful than that of Zimbabwe (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010). Political leaders in Kenya saw the unity government as a means to protect their places in government, while in Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF saw the power sharing as a risk to its continued stay in power (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010). Nigeria has experienced post-election violence like Kenya and Zimbabwe, but that of Nigeria did not result in power sharing like those of the two countries. In Nigeria, there were post-elections violence after the 1993 and 2011 elections. That of 1993 was due to the annulment of the 1993 Presidential Election which many adjudged as the freest and fairest in the country. The upshot of the annulment was the ‘stepping aside’ of the military president and setting up an Interim National Government (ING). However, the winner of the election was not part of the ING. To appease the members of the winner’s ethnic group, someone of his ethnic extraction and state of origin was made the chairman of the ING. Perhaps, if the winner of the election had participated in the ING and probably assured that his mandate would be given to him, the trust that Yoruba elites have in Northern elites might have been less wrinkled. The inclusion of the two sides in the Kenyan case boosted the success of the power sharing in the country. Although, that of Nigeria was not power sharing. However, like the case of Zimbabwe, the military was much involved in the composition of the ING with the secretary of defence being a military man. Nevertheless, the military and war veterans were acting behind the scenes in Zimbabwe. That of 2011 was dissatisfaction by some Northern elites about the victory of a Southerner in the year’s election. The Northern elites felt their region was robbed of the presidency because they felt

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that the president should emerge from the North following the death of President Yar’Adua, who could not complete his term of office of four years. This did not transform into any power sharing deal but resulted in violence in some parts of the country. Switzerland Switzerland has linguistic and religious diversities. The language plurality encompasses German, French, Italian and Romansh languages while the religious plurality projects as Protestants and Catholics (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008; McGarry, 2017). The population is made up of Germans, 64%; French, 20%; Italian, 6%; Romansh, 1% and other languages, 9% (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The German language is made up of Alemmanic dialects which are collectively called Swiss German.4 The same source has it that the Romansh is a Rhaeto-Romanic language which is a derivative of Latin. Although the Swiss Federal Statistical Office5 has it that as of 2020, German and Romansh speakers have reduced to 62.3% and 0.5%, respectively while speakers of French and other languages have appreciated with the former appreciating more. Religious distribution illustrates Roman Catholic to be about 44.1%; Protestants 36.6%; Muslims, 4.5%; no religious adherence, 11.7% and others are 3.1% (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The country is made up of 26 cantons, of which 20 are cantons, and six are half cantons, and these cantons have municipalities (Bolleyer, 2006; Church & Dardanelli, 2005; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Switzerland practises neither a presidential nor a parliamentary system. Government institutions are structured to mirror the diversity that exists in the country. The country has a two-chamber parliament (Federal Assembly), and both chambers have equal powers which have inexorably made cantons influence federal decision-making (Church & Dardanelli, 2005; Di Donato & Mahon, 2009; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008; Vatter, 2005).

4 https://www.eda.admin.ch/aboutswitzerland/en/home/gesellschaft/sprachen/diesprachen---fakten-und-zahlen.html. 5 https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/languages-religions/ languages.html.

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Switzerland is one of the longest-running federal systems and after the nineteenth century, it has avoided civil conflicts and wars, and it has a representative seven-member presidential council that rotates (McGarry & O’Leary, 2007). The country’s collective presidency depicts left–right ideological balance and cantonal, religious, ethnic and linguistic representations (Roeder, 2012). Switzerland practises federalism and power is divided among the central government, twenty cantons and six half-cantons (Lijphart, 2012). It has a National Council which is based on proportional representation, and it represents the general Swiss people whereas the Council of States has two representatives from each canton and one from each half canton (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008; Linder & Vatter, 2001; Mueller & Mazzoleni, 2016). Power sharing is not restricted to political offices but other offices in the state may adopt it (Khidasheli, 1999). Classic examples are the criteria for the selection of seven three-star generals of the Swiss Army, and the three directors heading the Swiss federal postal service whose positions are allocated according to their linguistic attachments (Khidasheli, 1999). The Federal Council is a seven-member executive government which is also a joint executive government collectively elected by both chambers of the legislature and it is organised in a way that it mirrors the different regions and language groups in the country (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008; Lijphart, 2012). There is an annual rotation of the position of the president among the seven Federal Councillors (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The country has cantonal courts and a federal court in the judicial arm (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The parliament selects the members of the federal court judges and it is an imitation of the Federal Council in terms of equity (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). German, French, Italian or Romansh are the languages in which the decisions of the Federal Court are published (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008; Glass, 1977). The Swiss system has some striking resemblance with what obtains in Nigeria. Case in point, both countries have bicameral parliament which represents different groups—linguistic and ethnic. The remote decisions on who becomes the president in both countries are taken by political elites. However, that of the Swiss President is a structured institutional framework which is not violated by the political elites. Therefore, conflict does not emanate among the seven Federal Councillors on who should become the president. That of Nigeria has been informal because it has

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not been legalised. Hence, it is exposed to elites’ manipulation which could threaten the country’s stability like that of 2011. Lebanon Lebanon is religiously stratified mainly between Christian and Islamic groups (Deets, 2018). To encourage peace among these groups, an agreement became necessary, The National Pact between 1943 and 1975 (Lijphart, 2008; McCulloch, 2014). The Maronite Christian held the position of the Presidency, the Premier’s position was zoned to Sunni Muslims, the Greek Orthodox were allotted the position of the Deputy Premier while the Speaker of the Parliament’s position was assigned to Shi’a Muslims (Lijphart, 2008; McGarry & O’Leary, 2007; Zahar, 2005). This arrangement was not constitutionalised but a gentleman’s agreement (Bogaards, 2019). This sharing of key positions connotes the representation of sub-religious groups. The Ta’if Agreement was another peace agreement signed in 1989 (also known as the National Accord of 1989) to end the four-year civil war, but this agreement did not affect the standing power sharing arrangement (Bogaards, 2019; Zahar, 2005). It provided for equal representation between Christians and Muslims and proportional representation on religious and geographic bases. Hence, the informal agreement on the proportion of Christians to Muslims in the National Pact was reformed and constitutionalised (Bogaards, 2019). Nevertheless, the powers of the president were reduced, while those of the council of ministers (including the prime minister) increased, and parity in legislative composition was welcomed (McCulloch, 2014). Power sharing in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has a resemblance with that of Lebanon. The Lebanese style is similar to the distribution of the offices of the President, Vice President, President of the Senate and his Deputy, Speaker of the House of Representatives and his Deputy. Although, that of Nigeria depicts more of ethnic and geo-political calculations, religion is also a determining factor. The rotational arrangement of Nigeria is fluid. A zone may produce the president for four or eight years while the successor may come from another zone. The chain effect of this is fluidity in the zone and/or religion that produces the occupiers of the other top five executive and legislative positions. Nigeria can learn from the Lebanese experience. When it was not yet formalised, it was respected by elites and the formalisation through the National Accord

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of 1989 strengthened the respect the elites had for the consociational arrangement. If Nigerian elites borrow a leaf from Lebanese elites, power sharing will be less subject to manipulation by Nigerian elites and will increase the propensity of the practice to foster unity.

Conclusion This chapter elicited power sharing models. Consociationalism and centripetalism were the two power sharing models that were discussed. The chapter reviewed case studies of countries but more attention was given to Kenya, Zimbabwe, Switzerland and Lebanon. These countries created the conduit to explore power sharing in Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Weak elites’ cooperation accounted for weak electoral outcomes in Zimbabwe and Kenya. Although, the power sharing structures put in place after the elections in both countries recorded more success in Kenya. In Switzerland, the various forms of power sharing that the country has embraced have been respected by political elites. That of Lebanon has been legitimised through constitutional backing. The chapter revealed the similarities and differences in the cases in these countries with that of Nigeria. Political elites play crucial roles in power sharing in these countries and it is the same with most countries. This is why the next chapter focuses on those who preside over power sharing in countries from the theoretical perspective.

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CHAPTER 5

Superintendents of Power in Nigeria: A Theoretical Approach

Introduction This chapter dwells on the theoretical underpinnings of this book. The relevance of this chapter is that it will make the analysis more robust. It will begin with an explanation of theory. It will elucidate on elite and relative deprivation theories which are the theoretical prisms of the book. Elite theory describes the activities of elites and relative deprivation is a form of deprivation. Hence, the chapter explores how the activities of elites and deprivation are interconnected in the Nigerian political space. The chapter will be divided into parts. The chapter will begin with an explanation of what theory is and its dynamism in the sense that it is used to explain a phenomenon, and can be repackaged and criticised. Two theories have been utilised in this book. The section on elite theory will begin from the lens of the origin of the theory. The section will also explain who an elite is and what elite theory encompasses. The building blocks of what depicts elite theory in the form of its features will be outlined. The chapter will also point out elite cooperation and differentiation. These two contrasting attributes are healthy for a country because they transmute into making crucial decisions and checkmating the excesses of the elitist class, respectively. The criticisms and the positive sides of the theory will also be an integral part of the chapter. The application of elite theory in the study of different societies will also be delved into. The chapter will focus on the evolution of Nigerian political elites: © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. T. Faluyi, National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7_5

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how we came about Northern, Yoruba, Igbo, Niger Delta and Middle Belt elites. The next section will cover the activities of elites in Nigeria from 1960 till date. The second theory is relative deprivation theory. The journey into the theory will begin with how it came about. The forms of relative deprivation which are individual, group or intrapersonal will also be explained. Although, the three are not strange to Nigerians, the most obvious one is that of the group. The positive presentations about relative deprivation, including how it has been utilised in various studies will be given attention. The nexus between relative deprivation and frustrationaggression theories will be drawn. This is because feelings of deprivation may breed frustration and aggression. The section on relative deprivation will close with criticism of the theory. The last section before the conclusion of the chapter will establish the connection among elites, national integration and relative deprivation with respect to Nigeria.

Theory Explained A theory provides a sketch for organising knowledge about a phenomenon. ‘A theory is a statement or set of statements describing the relationship among concepts’ (Babbie et al., 2019: 6). A researcher can propose new theories to explain a phenomenon, theories are people’s making, can be reformulated and criticised (Bezuidenhout, 2014). Future findings may validate and build on a theory, and hence a theory may grow or be modified. It helps to understand, analyse and design ways to investigate a problem (Grant & Osanloo, 2016). Patterns that exist in human social life can be used to explain theories (Babbie et al., 2019). A theory may not fully capture the explanation of a phenomenon (Bezuidenhout, 2014). Therefore, to have a holistic view of a phenomenon, more than one theory may be required. It is for this reason that two theories will be utilised in this book. Elite and relative deprivation theories are the theoretical approaches to explain the activities of the setters of the ‘rules’ and the reasons why the integration of the various groups in Nigeria has been dismal. Political elites hold the aces when it comes to power allocation. Nigeria is not an exception because they call the shots when it comes to power and the allocation of resources. Elite theory depicts that the elites constitute a minority that controls key social resources, and play lead roles in social, economic and political decision-making. Elite theory will be used to explain the focal roles of elites in politics, conflicts and violence in

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Nigeria. Given that national integration is one of the key areas this book covers, elites also play crucial roles in promoting integration. Integration measures are mainly elite-driven in post-colonial heterogeneous societies. However, African and Nigerian elites have winner-takes-all dispositions towards some of their integration approaches, and such dispositions make some groups have some feelings of relative deprivation, which may result in conflict and violence. This assertion necessitates relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation creates an atmosphere where a group feels it has been deprived of some benefits in comparison with other groups. The theory elucidates why different ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria seek to have one of their own be in the seat of the president and why they feel that this exalted position puts their own in a position to control state resources. The theory also explains why marginalisation results in agitation and, finally, ethnic and religious violence in Nigeria.

Elite Theory Elite theory can be traced to the field of sociology, where it was used to explain the behaviour of individuals in social settings. Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), two Italian sociology scholars, applied elite theory to politics (Domhoff, 2005). The seminal works of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels (1875– 1936) brought to the fore the consciousness that the exercise of power in organisations lies with a minority, the elites (Domhoff, 2005; Leite, 2016). Aside from these contributors, other early contributors to the elite theory are James Burnham and Wright Mills’ The Power Elite (1956), while recent proponents are Joseph Schumpeter, and Robert Dahl, among others (Duru, 2012; Gel’man & Tarusina, 2000). Pareto opines that in societies with open social mobility, elites should be made up of the most talented and worthy individuals, nonetheless, in actual societies, elites are individuals who can apply force and/or persuasion and have backgrounds in wealthy and connected families (Higley, 2010). Michels submits that elites are coteries who are leaders and experts looked for by large organisations and accordingly control funds, the flow of information and other aspects of organisational functions, which give them the baton of power (Higley, 2010). Mosca postulates that small minorities are better organised than the majority, and he designated the former as political elites who own material, intellectual or moral privileges over those they govern (Higley, 2010). Weber opines

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that small numbers/groups exercise superior political power to define political actions (Higley, 2010). The views of Michels (1911), Mosca (1939) and Weber (1978), which underscore the minority status of elites support Ojukwu and Shopeju’s (2010) submission that elites epitomise a privileged minority with organisational skills, leadership prowess, knowledge, information, drive and ambition. The positions of these scholars demonstrate that elites can assume multiple roles, including economic, religious, political, military, and educational, among others. Elite theory recognises that elites can emerge from anywhere so far they discover the essential tools to exercise power (López, 2013). Members of an elite group can exert influence on the members of another elite group. For example, the political activities in the country from the 1960s until the 1990s were influenced by the Kaduna ‘Mafia’, a small group of Northern Muslims (Falola & Heaton, 2008). They comprised top civil servants, businessmen, military and police officers, members of the academia and captains of industries (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985). The mobilising factor in the pursuit of their objectives was the assassination of Ahmadu Bello in the first military coup and these objectives were protecting the interest of the North and making the region control power at the centre. The activities of the Kaduna ‘Mafia’ epitomise the definition of elites given by Etzioni-Halevy who opines that an elite is simply a group of persons who wield power and influence —and thus have a substantial socio-political processes— on the basis of having control of proportionate share of resources, including coercive, and/or material, and/or organizational, and/or political (e.g. popular support), symbolic, as well as combined resources (such as control of appointments and promotions in powerful and prestigious organizations). (Etzioni-Halevy, 1990: 323)

This definition projects the elites as possessing some form of privilege and the possibility of an elite belonging to more than one group of elites. Drawing from the views of different scholars, some salient features of elite theory are highlighted below: • The existence of minorities who control power in a society. This aligns with the views of Mosca and Weber. • The possession of wealth is the major source of power of elites. This aligns with Pareto and Michels’ views. Force is also a key source of

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power. This is seen in the way the military ascends to power and how an autocratic government operates. • Elites replace themselves. They may ‘empower’ non-elites into the elitist group, and it may be moving from one elite class to another. This may be through peaceful or violent means (López, 2013). Therefore, elite composition is so dynamic that those in a class may evolve over a period. Elites also do all it takes to retain their positions and status. This is more peculiar to modern elites who are bent on holding on to power through their continued rule or recruitment of elites. Continuity may take the form of reaching a consensus on some matters to remain relevant. • An elite may have membership across groups, and that is why a political elite may also be an economic elite. However, most elites relate with political elites because cooperating with this group promotes the influence of the former on government decisions. Their relationship with political elites may also be to have policies made by the latter to be in their favour. ‘A political elite is a group of people, corporations, political parties and/or any other kind of civil society organization [sic] who manage and organize [sic] government and all the manifestations of political power’ (Vergara, 2013: 33). They significantly influence political decisions because of their positions (Higley & Moore, 2001). This is because the political environment is key to what happens in other parts of a system. Succinctly, elite theory specifies that decisions on societal issues affecting a society cannot be made by everyone but a ‘selected’ few make decisions on behalf of the society. Access to material and/or intellectual resources, and sometimes force put these minorities in the exalted position of making decisions. However, these decisions are primarily to drive the interests of the elites while the secondary purpose is for the society at large. Depending on the circumstances, different elite groups cooperate and at other times, compete. Elite competition within this context also means elite differentiation. The unity or otherwise of elites (mainly in developing societies) springs from interests connected to access to state wealth. The connection between state power and wealth denotes a vicious circle because access to state power indicates access to wealth, and the possessor of wealth finds it less herculean to possess state power (Adetoye & Omilusi, 2016).

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Elites’ differentiation mitigates a monolithic situation, stimulates plurality, and solidifies checks and balances (Burton & Higley, 2001). Thus, elite differentiation may engender accountability. The political elite that faces less competition from opponents contends with insignificant demand for accountability and easily manipulates the political process for parochial economic gains (Johnston, 1997). If elites’ differentiation is poorly managed, it may escalate into conflict among their supporters. Elites may intensify conflict situations by fuelling the anxieties of their supporters (Azarya, 2003). The author further avers that groups engage in conflicts, and elites may lend their support to such moves. So, settling differences has marginal effects on societal peace. Elites’ cooperation infers elites’ accommodating themselves, which is transmuting from divided into consensual elites (Burton & Higley, 2001). This is in alignment with consociationalism. A classic example is power sharing, as it plays out in different countries, including Nigeria. Rather than make all groups slog it out in polls, elites sometimes give preference to rotate positions among groups. This rotation may encompass majority elite groups seeking alignment with minority groups to create better chances for the former or rotating power between majority and minority groups. However, elite differentiation and cooperation are fluid as elites may be on any side depending on where their interests are realised. This is elucidated by Researcher One. They do not see themselves as enemies until some embers of ethnicity are driven and people begin to fight one another but you see the elite class too, they interact up there, they are business partners, they are political partners and so on and so forth but despite that, those stretches of divisions are appealed to when they disagree up there on the basis of contentions for power. (Personal Interview Researcher One, December 2018)

From the aforementioned and the view of Researcher one, elite theory can be used to explain why peace and conflicts may occur in societies, but it has been subjected to criticism. Elite theory is not in congruence with democratic process because the interests of the few are placed above the interests and opinions of the majority/masses (Azeez & Adenuga, 2015). The authors submit that the masses play passive roles in politics. Whoever emerges the winner in an election is subject to the whims and caprices of the elites, this negates the

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principle of majority vote. Put differently, most decisions are made in the interest of the elites with less input or consideration of the masses. This criticism does not hinder the positive perceptions of elite theory. The utilisation of the theory by some scholars has strengthened its relevance. Leite (2016) posits that elite theory can be used as a theoretical lens to explore the activities of political stakeholders like candidates, elected politicians and political parties. The activities of these actors depict elites’ participation; conspicuously, elite theory is very suitable to understand them better. Duru (2012) argues that elites integrate society and prevent it from falling apart as well as safeguard democracy through choking authoritarian rule. Binder (1964) submits that sociologically, the features of elites are not only about defining who gets what but also in fashioning a model for political formula and the potential for national integration. The use of this theory to explain salient political phenomena makes it relevant to explain the activities of superintendents of power in Nigeria. Societies are increasing in population size. Hence, all members of the society cannot directly take part in decision-making. This is why political elites in the form of their representatives are needed to table the views of their constituents at the governmental level. Thus, elite theory is useful to explain the activities of political elites within this spectrum. Additionally, it is appropriate to consider explicit cases where elite theory has been applied. A comparative study on political elites in the Middle East and North Africa was carried out by Henry (2018) on how they have evolved through the influences of colonialism, Islam as well as internal and external politics. The author gave the case of Tunisia where elites emerged out of the mass struggle for independence, unlike some of the countries under study where elites excluded the masses in the struggles for independence. The author further submits that the invasion of Iraq by the USA and the Arab Spring divided elites in Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Regarding one of the countries in North Africa, Egypt, Blaydes (2008) carried out a study on how competitive parliamentary election in the country has been used as an instrument of elites’ management. The author asserts that such elections make it feasible for more state resources to be distributed among elites because being in parliamentary positions makes it possible for these elites to have access to some level of immunity despite securing state wealth through corruption. Therefore, the regime has the backing of the elites.

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Elite theory has also been used to study political matters in SubSaharan Africa. Osei (2018) utilised elite theory to study the relationship between elite configuration and regime outcomes in Ghana and Togo. The author submits that elite relations shape the structure and level of democracy. The roles of elites in the power sharing deals in Kenya and Zimbabwe have been explored in Chapter 4. The cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe substantiate contemporary scholars’ assertions about elite theory that there is a link between elites’ behaviour and regime change (Higley & Burton, 2006; López, 2013). These studies indicate that SubSaharan Africa is not an exception in elites’ crucial roles in political calculations. Nigerian politics have been explored through the spectrum of elite theory. Ambali and Mohammed (2016) elucidate rotational presidency among ethnic groups in Nigeria and contends that the concentration of excessive power in the centre accounts for the political elites’ struggle for their portion of the ‘national cake’ through clinching power at the federal level. Ekundayo (2017) expatiates on political elites’ recruitment in Nigeria through the use of elite theory. Musa et al. (2020) through the use of elite theory explain the roles of political parties in democratic consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Monday et al. (2020) applied elite theory to explicate leadership questions and national development in Nigeria. The modus operandi of elites are not strange to governance in Nigeria. They have been those behind policy formulation and implementation in the country with the chief aim of promoting their interest. Nigerian political elites evolved over the years, and they are stratified along ethnic/regional lines. Economic and religious elites are also key actors when it comes to decision-making and determining who leads the country or other levels of government. However, attention will be given to political elites because they fall within the circumference of this book. These political elites were offshoots of the creation of regions, but their evolution will be comprehensively considered in the next section. It is also crucial to consider the characteristics of Nigerian elites. These features metamorphosed with the evolution of political elites’ configuration in the country. Though the features of elites earlier outlined also depict Nigerian elites, some features that are ‘peculiar’ to Nigerian political elites need to be expatiated.

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The Evolution of the Nigerian Political Elites Political, religious and economic elites are stakeholders in power sharing and stability in Nigeria. This section will serve as a platform to historically illuminate how the features of elites apply to the Nigerian case, especially with regard to the issue of rotating the presidency and sharing power at all levels. Political elites are major actors in the power sharing continuum. It is germane to give a brief explanation of these elites within the Nigerian spectrum. Religious leaders also wield strong political influence. In Nigeria, a religious leader could influence voters’ preferences. For instance, during campaigns, politicians usually parley with religious leaders and sometimes visit religious centres to solicit support. In addition, statements by prominent religious figures could make or mar peace in a society. Hence, they play crucial roles in power rotation and federal stability. Economic elites pull every string to ensure that there is political stability so that their businesses can thrive. They may also support an individual or party who they feel may promote the growth and stability of their investments. For instance, in 2008, some economic elites pledged Billions of Naira and in kind towards the construction of the national secretariat of the then-ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) (Owete & Tukur, 2017). Another example is the meeting organised by some businessmen with some #EndSARS1 protesters on the protest against police brutality. The former might have organised the meeting on the grounds that the protest might threaten the peace of the country, which may affect their businesses negatively (Akinkuotu, 2020). These elites’ composition, structure and roles have transmuted over the years, and they have cooperated and disagreed in the pursuit of their agendas. Their cooperation or otherwise have become fluid over the years subject to the interests they are pursuing at any point in time. In essence, this categorisation of political elites will serve as the foundation to give robust features of Nigerian political elites. Orji recognises five categories

1 This agitation began in October 2020. Its aim was against the brutality perpetrated by a police special unit, Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Nigeria. This unit was responsible for the extra-judicial killing of several youths. The protesters also clamoured for good governance and the need for political elites to be sensitive to the plight of the masses. It started as a peaceful protest and was later hijacked by hoodlums. A unique feature of the group is that it is difficult to identify its leaders. The members of the movement involved in that meeting were just those known to the public and not the ‘official’ leaders.

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of Nigerian political elites which are Northern, Yoruba, Igbo, Niger Delta and Middle Belt elites (Orji, 2008). The Northern and Middle Belt elites emanate from the Northern region, while the Yoruba, Igbo and Niger Delta elites are from the Southern region. The cooperation and differences among these groups of elites have defined the level of integration in the country and informed the politics of power sharing. A chronological view will aid in exploring their activities. The territory known as Nigeria was run through different African political systems before colonialism. The Hausa/Fulani, Yorubas, Igbos and other minority groups operated their systems and the influence of elites varied across the territories each group controlled. The Sultan of Sokoto was the leader of the Hausa/Fulani and the system was structured based on traditional theocratic rulership which made religion their source of power (Okonofua, 2013). The Islamic doctrines make it difficult for the people to challenge their leaders. The powers of the political elites among the Yorubas could be checkmated. For example, if the Alaafin of Oyo acts in excess, the Oyo Mesi could put him in check (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The Oyo Mesi are the seven principal councillors of the kingdom, and the Basorun is their head. The elites derive their powers from an organised traditional system that operates based on the instructions of deities, and these also shape the interests of these elites (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Succinctly, the dictates of the deities supersede parochial political interests. The Igbo system was egalitarian as no group could clearly exert authority over others (Falola & Genova, 2009). They operated on an age-grade system, and individuals in the society had the liberty to express their opinions. Though highly decentralised, some measure of authority still existed. The powers in the system were derived from the council of elders, agegrade associations, oracles, secret societies, and ancestral spirits, among others (Onyeozili & Ebbe, 2012). Hence, power is hardly domiciled in the hands of a few with the attendant effect of difficulties in pursuing any personal or group political interests. Colonialism resulted in the shift from absolute traditional systems of governance in different parts of the country (Falola & Genova, 2009). This climaxed in the introduction of the indirect rule policy. The indigenous leaders that the colonial power used to run this system represented the political elites of that time, but their activities were limited to their ethnic strongholds. The indirect rule was more successful in the North than in the South (Kew & Lewis, 2016). The system had more acceptability in the North because the system was more centralised, the British

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found it easier to control the Sultan and he was given the freedom to have religious control over the North (Okonofua, 2013). On the contrary, the South had a dispersed traditional system with this being deeper in the East. Nevertheless, the British still operated through traditional rulers in the West while strengthening the few traditional institutions in the East or appointed warrant chiefs (Kew & Lewis, 2016). The pursuit by the British to have access to the resources of the country and finance the administration of the North with resources explored from the South led to the amalgamation of the North and the South (Okonofua, 2013). The British were not unaware that they merged ethnically, culturally and religiously incompatible people, but the colonial power placed economic interests above the future problems ethnicity may pose to the country. Although the North and the South were governed separately. The British perceived the leaders in the South as those that could challenge the colonial authorities while the Northern leaders were more acquiescent. Thus, to weaken the South and give the North an edge, the South was divided into the East and West to fragment the unity of a more enlightened and aggressive South (Okonofua, 2013). Furthermore, the British ensured that the census outcomes of 1931 and 1952 were rigged in favour of the North, and this with the fragmentation of the South resulted in the North (68) edging the East (34) and West (34) in the number of seats in national parliament (Okonofua, 2013). All these climaxed in a sort of elites’ differentiation as touching views about the British. These had spillover effects on the perception of these elites about independence. Some nationalists were at the vanguard of the struggle for independence. These were the first set of political elites that functioned under a purely Western system. They attained this status because they were educated and had a flair for politics. The created provinces were geographically delineated on major ethnic bases of North-Hausa and Fulani, West-Yoruba and East-Igbo and this bolstered the ethnic consciousness of the political elites as they were more comfortable operating on provincial (later regional) levels. This was a consequence of the British approach and it was a divide-and-rule gimmick that placed ethnicity as the pedestal for identification and mobilisation (Kew & Lewis, 2016). This was a calculated move to break the ranks of the elites so that the dissenting views against the colonial government would not be unified and consolidated. These resulted in the emergence of the Northern, Yoruba and Igbo elites from the majority ethnic groups.

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The Southern elites (Yoruba, Igbo and other minority groups in the South) were less disposed to cooperating with their Northern contemporaries because the interest of the former lay in making Nigeria attain independent status and become, at a minimum, post-independence leaders in their respective regions. The Northern elites felt they would be shortchanged after independence because the region was less educationally advantaged than the other regions (Peter, 2014). Hence, they had fears that early independence would imply domination by Southern elites in the country’s political system (Falola & Heaton, 2008). This led to unsynchronised years of self-government for the regions (Elaigwu, 2002). The North only bought into the idea of independence when they were given assurance by the British that political power and population advantage would be to the credit of the region. Political elites that evolved from independence gave less consideration to truly uniting the different groups to achieve nation building, national integration and development (Olukayode, 2015). The elites in an attempt to ensure a unified political front, conjured to have resolved their differences shortly before independence. This cooperation did not last as divisions between the majority elite groups in the regions amplified in the pursuit to control federal power, which was seen as a pedestal for wealth accumulation. The sensation that ‘our’ region is in control of the centre created a form of euphoria for the elites. Hence, the assumption of Southern leaders that the North had been positioned to dominate the central government was fuelled by the geographical, demographic and political (having most seats in the House of Representatives) advantages of the North. Thus, the North was pitched against the South, and the political parties that took part in the 1959 general elections were conduits for each region to project their regional elites for federal offices. Put differently, these political parties were regional-based. Although, this was not absolute because the North dominated Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the Igbo dominated National Council of Nigerian Citizens2 (NCNC) later came together to form a coalition government to produce the Prime Minister in 1959. These activities were shortly before independence and this coalition epitomised elites’ cooperation. Nonetheless, the incongruences with attendant acrimonies reappeared immediately after independence (Aziegbe, 2014). The struggle for power among the

2 It was formerly called National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons.

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members of the dominant classes in post-independence Nigeria became evident (Fadakinte & Amolegbe, 2017). These elite groups have evolved in present-day Nigeria. Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and some minority ethnic groups constitute the Northern elites. Their sources of power encompass religion, ethnicity, geographical size, military profession and population. They are geographically situated in the present-day North West and North East geo-political zones. Islamic doctrines are to a great extent pivotal in the activities of these elites. Hence, Northern elites are hardly divided on an anti-Islam basis. However, they still have heterogeneous traits. The initial belief was that Northern elites have homogeneous political interest and affiliation, but this is not the reality. In the First and Second Republics, some championed the course of the aristocrats (the NPC in the First Republic with the National Party of Nigeria [NPN] as its miniature in the Second Republic) and those that mirrored the voice of the poor (the People’s Redemption Party [PRP] in the Second Republic which reflected the ideologies of the Northern Elements Progressive Union [NEPU] in the First Republic) (Ezonbi, 2014). Those who identify with the poor are more focused on mass literacy, peasant participation in politics, reduction in feudal powers and healthcare facilities’ provision (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985). In modern Nigeria, there are instances where some Northern elites hold dissenting views from those of the majority of Northern elites. For example, Shehu Sanni, a human rights activist and some Northern elites are strong critics of some policies of the Buhari-led government. However, Northern elites easily drop their differences when the need arises to substitute personal interests for the unity of the North. The Yoruba elites have hardly transformed in composition. They include Ijebus, Ijeshas, Egbas, Awori, Ekiti, Ondo, Oyo, and Ibarapas, among others. Yorubas occupy the South West of Nigeria. They have most times spoken with one voice on national issues (Nwala, 1997). Although we have Yoruba people in Edo, Kwara and Kogi States, they would most times prefer to pitch their tents with elites in their zones and not the South West. For instance, the NPC dominated the spaces that are now Kwara and Kogi States in the First Republic because they were located in the Northern region, but the AG which was a majority Yoruba party was not popular in these territories (Obiyan, 2010; Onoja, 2014). In 1999, the All People’s Party (APP) won the governorship elections in Kwara and Kogi, and the winner of the election in Kwara was Yoruba

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by ethnicity. Hence, the Alliance for Democracy (AD), a South Westdominated party hardly made inroads into these two states. The Yoruba elites have education and holding key positions in the corporate world as their sources of power (Peter, 2014). The Igbo elites derive their power from education and commerce (Peter, 2014). They are from the South East while a few of them are from the South South. The creation of states led to slight disintegration of Igbo elites and this was due to the creation of two states for the minorities’ dominated part of the Eastern region in the 1967 state creation exercise and the creation of Delta State in 1991 (Egbefo, 2014; Odey, 2014). Although, this did not dissipate the identity of the Igbo speaking people in the present-day South South. Nonetheless, the effects of the Civil War and the continuous agitation for Biafra have always made it difficult for the Igbo elites to unite and display appreciable strength in bargaining on national matters (Obuseh, 2021). Hence, other elite groups have less trust in Igbo elites. The common interest among these three major elites has been the attainment of political power, and the two major tools they have always deployed are ethnicity and religion to secure votes from the masses from their blocs and probably other blocs inclusive. Some pre- and post-independence activities ballooned some differences among the Northern elites and this metamorphosed into the emergence of Middle Belt elites. These differences are summed up in resistance to Hausa and Fulani hegemony and the exigency to have the Middle Belt elites being fronted by the Tiv (Ukase, 2014). In essence, these elites who are made up of some minority groups in the North saw the need to have a collective voice to resist Northern political supremacy (Sambo, 2002). They oppose the imposition of the Northern Islamic Emirate system. The reason for this is that these minority groups have existing traditional institutions that are not moulded after the Northern theocratic system (Kew & Lewis, 2016). Their inspiration is premised on the fact that their non-Islamic traditional institutions will be strengthened by breaking from the Northern grip. Political and economic differences also make the elites from the North and groups in the Middle Belt classify those in the Middle geographical space as the people of the Middle Belt. North Central politician expatiates on this. Are we truly part of the North in practical terms? When it comes to politics, they say we are Northerners, when it comes to economic benefits, they say we are Middle Belters. We ourselves say we are Middle Belters.

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We have since realised that being part of the North has not done us any good. (Personal Interview North Central Politician, January 2019)

This perception, especially by the Middle Belters, has been shaped by state creation exercises. Over the years, the creation of states has brought dynamism to the composition of the Middle Belt elites. More ethnic groups have identified with their course. Thus, more groups in the North Central and some in the North East and North West are members of this elitist group. These elites have become a force to reckon with in the North to the extent that they may decide not to be on the same page with the Northern elites on some matters regarding the region and the country. For instance, they sometimes agree with the South on some matters, especially through the South and Middle Belt Leaders Forum (SMBLF) (Olatunji & Nwachukwu, 2019). Elites from the South and Middle Belt derive their inspiration from curtailing the dominance of Northern elites, but the Middle Belt elites’ primary purpose is the attainment of political powers at the minimum in their respective territorial strongholds. Three major historical factors led to the emergence of Niger Delta elites. These are the discovery of crude oil and its associated environmental challenges and poverty, the creation of the Mid-West region and creation of states and the existence of the de facto sub-region of South South. The discovery of oil in the Niger Delta created environmental and economic challenges. These issues accounted for the Adaka Boro-led uprising in the mid-1960s and these issues have persisted in contemporary Nigeria. The Mid-West was created from the Western Region in 1963. Preceding this creation was the domination of the minority groups in the old Western Region by the Yorubas. The ethnic groups in the MidWest were Bini, Ijaw, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Igbanke, Esan, Isoko, and Igbo, among others. Thus, new elites evolved from the newly created region. The state creation exercise during the Civil War implied that the domination of the minority groups clustered in the South East was checked. Thus, the Eastern region was divided into three states, two of which had minority groups in the majority. In other words, non-Igbo minority groups had two out of the three states. The two minority-dominated states have ethnic groups like Ijaw, Efik, Ibibio, Ikwerre, Ogoni, Annang, Oron, Ejagham, and Bekwarra, among others. Finally, the emergence of the South South as a geo-political zone and the ‘identification’ of that part of the country as a major oil-producing zone played a major role in elites’ evolution in the Niger Delta. The economic and environmental issues that

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came with oil exploration in the region coupled with the lackadaisical attitude of the government and oil companies led to the emergence of militants in the Niger Delta. These led to activities such as vandalisation of oil installations, kidnappings, and bunkering, among others. To give political and elitist faces to the predicaments of these minority oilproducing areas, Niger Delta elites emerged but these elites have been in existence for decades, their composition and influence had always evolved (Ojakorotu, 2006; Osaghae, 2001). Their activities are not restricted to making right the wrongs of economic and environmental issues in the zone, but they have also become a strong partner in bargaining on power sharing matters in Nigeria. Therefore, Niger Delta elites’ interests encompass liberating their groups from Igbo hegemony, fighting environmental degradation, resource control, and attainment of political power, among others. The abundance of crude oil and natural gas in the region has been power sources that position Niger Delta elites as a force to reckon with in Nigeria’s political landscape. Features of Nigerian Political Elites There are general features of elites as revealed in the section on elite theory. However, there are some features associated with Nigerian political elites. The first is that they use ethnicity and religion to promote their interests. In most instances, when they observe that the attainment of their interests is in danger, they switch to ethnicity and religion to actualise their interests. They seek the support of their ethnic and other ethnic groups for the promotion of personal interests. Nigerian political elites exploit ethnoreligious differences to promote personal political interests through violent activities. For example, the post-2011 election violence was an avenue for Northern elites to control power at all costs. The protests that ensued were not in response to the nature of the election but the outcome of the election, which retained power in the South against the intention of the Northern elites to have power return to their region. Northern elites were able to deploy ethnicity in some Northern cities to frustrate Southern interests. Low accountability is a second feature of Nigerian political elites. The long years of military rule and weak state institutions aid this attitude. The manner of operation of military governments made it difficult for Nigerians to ask for accountability because the military feels they do not owe anyone any explanation (Kifordu, 2010). Demands for accountability by

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the populace/civil society organisations are often met with force. Civilian administrations have taken after this political culture and this has made successive governments feel that they may choose not to be accountable to anyone. Political elites have annexed state institutions to ensure that these institutions operate at their beck and call. Hence, these institutions hardly check the excesses of the political class. They are used to sustain the actualisation of the selfish interests of the political elites (Kifordu, 2010). Generally, these institutions are not given a conducive environment to operate effectively. The third feature is that the executive arm has been ascribed the most power among the arms of government. Thus, it is executive-centric. This substantiates Kifordu’s (2011) claim that the executive arm has dominated governance, and this has been made possible through the weakening of the legislative and judicial arms. The checks that the legislative and judicial arms ought to always apply to tame the excesses of the executive arm have become less effective. The overbearing nature of the executive has its roots in the long years of military rule. In a military junta, the legislative arm is suspended while the judiciary is retained but may be handicapped by the military who whittle down the independence of the judicial arm in discharging its duties. Thus, the military ruling body headed by the ruler hijacks the law making and implementation duties, and the judiciary may hardly have the courage to declare the actions of the military government ultra vires. Civilian administrations are not exonerated from trimming legislative and judicial functions. Two major causes for this undemocratic attitude of civilian governments are the transmission of the military culture of usurpation/abuse of legislative and judicial roles to civil rule and the participation of some former military personnel in civil administration. The weakness of the legislative arm has manifested in the coercion of that arm of government in the impeachment of some governors and deputy governors (Fagbadebo, 2020). The author further states that the faces behind the curtain, in most cases, are the presidency, the governors of the concerned states and political godfathers. This implies a gap in Nigeria’s 1979 and 1999 Constitutions which did not clarify what gross misconduct means in impeachment. Hence, the sponsors of such moves and their legislative stooges manufacture offences and proclaim such as ‘gross misconducts’ to rationalise the impeachments. Also, the judicial arm has been drawn into the politics of impeachment because the constitutional requirement of setting up panels to investigate gross misconduct allegations made against governors

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and deputy governors are often compromised. Those ‘overseeing’ such impeachment moves interfere in the activities of state chief judges to independently discharge this duty (Fagbadebo, 2020). Another is the approval of most of the executive requests like approval of loans and appointments without proper engagement of the executive arm on the reasons for such requests despite the unfavourable consequences that may come with these approvals. Nigerian political elites are not guided by political ideologies. They lack ideologies or their ideologies are weak or unsustainable. Achieving their selfish interests is paramount to them and they locate themselves where the largesse flows. This is why politicians are in the habit of crossing across parties. Political elites cross to parties that have the best chance of winning elections so that they or their associates will have access to power and state wealth. For example, during the 16-year PDP rule, politicians from opposition political parties were accustomed to crossing to the ruling party. However, since the All Progressives Congress (APC) took over in 2015, politicians from opposition parties have been flocking to the ruling party. For politicians in the ruling party who feel that they cannot secure the ticket of their party to run for elective posts, they may cross to an opposition party. For instance, the former governor of Borno State, Mala Kachalla of the ruling APP in the state moved to the AD. Also, Edo State governor, Godwin Obaseki crossed from the ruling APC to the PDP when he was not given the chance to secure the former’s ticket as its governorship candidate (Ayitogo, 2020). Peter Obi could not secure the PDP ticket in the activities towards the selection of the party’s presidential candidate for the 2023 Presidential Election, so he moved to the Labour Party (LP) and secured the party’s presidential ticket. These typify immature management of elites’ cooperation and differentiation because cross-carpeting to another party in this manner shows that they are not guided by ideologies and they want to actualise parochial interests. Also, refusal to remain in the opposition means constructive criticisms that would lead to the good performance of those in power and the development of the country become weak. The last characteristic of Nigerian political elites is that their friendship and enmity are not permanent. Those who belong to the same political camp may be in opposing camps in the near future and vice versa. This assertion is substantiated by their act of crossing from one party to the other. These political elites are after having relationships with associates that will assist them to realise their parochial interests. The fluid

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relationship among the political elites is linked to their lack of, weak or unsustainable political ideologies. Thus, they jump from one party to the other.

Political Elites’ Activities Since 1960 It is crucial to explore the activities of these elites in Nigeria from 1960 till date. This will be done from the standpoints of their cooperation, differentiation and intra-group disagreements. The activities culminating in the 1964 federal elections were a watershed in elites’ cooperation in Nigeria. This was because elites from these five elite groups cooperated across ethnic and religious lines to form the two political parties that took part in the election (Ezonbi, 2014). This action led to the formation of the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). Although, these political parties practised politics of bitterness with low tolerance for each other’s members. Disagreement among these elites was part of the events that resulted in the first military coup. For example, intra-group disagreement between Obafemi Awolowo and Ladoke Akintola’s faction in the Yoruba elites’ caucus with Akintola backed by the aristocratic Northern elites. The military coup created military/political elites. The military assumed this double role because the first military coup in 1966 culminated in a military general emerging as the Head of State. Another implication of military involvement in politics was the transplant of ethnicity to the military. Although the ethnicisation could have started during the colonial days, but it was not conspicuous. Ethnicity became more apparent due to the first military coup and the counter-coup of 1966. The first coup was viewed as pro-Igbo and this led to ethnic disunity in the military because the Northern-dominated Hausa/Fulani saw it as a conspiracy against them. The 1966 counter-coup was veiled in ethnicity because it was pro-North and anti-Igbo. The Northern and Middle Belt elites united to dethrone the Ironsi-led government and also instal a Middle Belt military/political elite and Christian as Head of State. This coup further polarised the military along ethnic lines. This ethnic game was very instrumental to the break out of the Civil War. Shortly before the war, Ojukwu felt that the position of the Head of State should not have gone to Gowon because he was ahead of the latter in the military, and hence would not take orders from him and that there were other officers who were Gowon’s seniors (Venter, 2015). Brigadier

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General Ogundipe and Commodore Joseph Wey were these officers and Southerners (Venter, 2015). These activities depict elites’ cooperation and differentiation. Subsequent military rules epitomised less divided military elites and a deeper romance with civilians through appointments given to the latter. On the contrary, some political elites were against military rule. Nevertheless, Northern elites were more disposed to the perpetuation of the military in power. The reason for this was that most of the military rulers that have ruled Nigeria are from the North. Although, some of these military rulers are from the Middle Belt, they identified more with Northern elites to garner support to consolidate their stay in power. The Northern elites saw military rule as an avenue to elongate their stay in power because a civil option might require power rotation with other elites, which could have shortened the North’s stay in power. For the Igbo elites, the Civil War withered the trust in Igbos, and for most of the period the military ruled (1966–1979 and 1983–1998), they were given the least federal appointments (Kifordu, 2011). The almost three decades of military rule were sandwiched by short civil rules, the Second Republic and the ING. The willingness of the Murtala/Obasanjo government to hand over to a democratic government renewed the direct involvement of the five elite groups in politics, reminiscent of the First Republic. These five elite groups cooperated and formed organisations which became political parties to promote their interests. From the ethnic dimension, the political parties in the First Republic were different from those of the Second Republic because those of the former were more ethnically inclined than the parties in the latter. Case in point, the NPN still promoted the interests of the Northern aristocrats, but structurally, Northern elites cleverly attracted more elite groups in comparison to other political parties (Kifordu, 2011). Hence, the party had more national spread. Generally, the outcome of the 1979 election implied that there was elites’ integration because some parties won beyond their ethnic strongholds. For instance, the NPN won in non-Northern elites’ states like Benue, Kwara, Cross Rivers and Rivers (Akinsanya, 2002). The author further submits that the Nigerian Peoples Party linked more to the Igbos won the Plateau governorship seat. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), a party with strong Yoruba affiliation

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won the four Yoruba states and also emerged victorious in Bendel State,3 a Niger Delta enclave. These portray elites’ cooperation across groups. However disagreements were not ruled out, especially between the NPN and UPN elites, but such were less of ethnic tension and more on policy issues. Democracy was embraced again in 1999. The Northern and Yoruba elites cooperated in the build up to the return of democracy in 1999. This courtship was due to the intricacies around the annulment of the June 12 Presidential Election. The setting up of the ING might be perceived from the surface as a cooperation between Northern and Yoruba elites, but in actual sense, Ernest Shonekan was like a lone ranger in that arrangement because most Yoruba elites preferred that the military government reckon with the June 12 election and hand over to MKO Abiola. The areas of cooperation or differentiation of elites in this Fourth Republic are rotating the presidency and other positions, resource control and other intra-elite issues. The issue at hand at any point in time determines if these elite groups will cooperate or otherwise. An example is the Southern (which is a conglomeration of some Yoruba, Ibo and Niger Delta elites) and Middle Belt Leaders Forum. This forum has always lent its support for restructuring the country because it feels that Northern elites benefit most from the present structure. The Forum also endorsed Peter Obi as its presidential candidate in the 2023 election (Ukaibe, 2023). Also, against the interest of the North and with respect to rotational presidency in 2011, Middle Belt, Yoruba, Igbo and Niger Delta elites gave their support to ensure that Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw and Niger Delta political elite became the President. However, in the 2015 election, Yoruba elites joined hands with Middle Belt and Northern elites to ensure that Buhari, a quintessence of Northern elites won the election. These actions portray the dynamism that comes with elites’ cooperation and differentiation. Elites’ relationships which may be characterised by cooperation or otherwise can ironically manifest in intra-elites’ conflicts. A typical example is in impeachment process. This has been expatiated above. The actors involved in impeachment are most times of the same ethnic elite group

3 The Mid-West region became Bendel State after a state creation exercise. Prior to the creation of the Mid-West in 1963, it was part of the Western Region. The old Western Region later metamorphosed into Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Lagos and Bendel States. Perhaps, the old Western region synergy might have influenced the victory of the UPN in Bendel State.

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because impeachment is always internal to states. The involvement of forces external to the states, like federal institutions and the presidency, hardly have ethnic linings. These explanations that have been offered about Nigerian political elites reflect the general features of elites but some are more peculiar to Nigeria with regard to how elites have evolved over the years. These features will serve as the bedrock to analyse the involvement of elites in national integration and rotational presidency in Nigeria. The disposition of elites in Nigeria depicts a feeling that they are not getting what they ought to get in comparison to other elites. Hence, relative deprivation theory will be essential for a balanced scholarly and theoretical analysis of this book.

Relative Deprivation Theory Samuel Stouffer and other authors fabricated relative deprivation to describe the complaints that emanated from the relationships between two arms of the United States military (Pettigrew, 2016). Some personnel in the Air Corpsmen claimed that their military police colleagues got promoted faster than them (Grasso et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2012). Nevertheless, Stouffer maintains that the promotions of military police personnel should not be the basis for comparison because some Air Corpsmen had been promoted (Smith et al., 2012). Relative deprivation is linked to the works of Ted Gurr, Psychological Factors in Civil Violence (1968) and Why Men Rebel (1970) (Borum, 2004; Richardson, 2011). In defining relative deprivation, three steps are critical. The first is that comparisons must be made by individuals or groups. The second is that an individual or group must mentally appraise the situation before concluding that he/she/they are being deprived of some things (Smith et al., 2012). Thirdly, such disadvantages must perceived by the person/ group appraising such as unfair. The affected group must come to terms that it deserves better, and this conclusion breeds anger and resentment (Smith et al., 2012). Therefore, relative deprivation advocates that someone perceives his group as worse in comparison with some other groups (Smith & Pettigrew, 2015). Relative deprivation may be in the form of individual or group relative deprivation. The former depicts a situation where an individual makes a comparison of his or her condition with those of others that surround him/her while the latter represents a comparison made by a group about its conditions in relation to those of

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another group (Asingo, 2018; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015). Group relative deprivation may entail a group examining if it has been discriminatorily treated or deprived of its privileges compared to other regions or with other ethnic, religious and/or linguistic groups (Asingo, 2018). Case in point, Black South Africans feel more aggrieved individually while at the group level, White South Africans feel more aggrieved (Smith & Pettigrew, 2015). Group relative deprivation illustrates the situation in Nigeria where an ethnic group feels deprived in comparison to other ethnic groups. The third form of relative deprivation is intrapersonal, in which an individual feels deprived based on a comparison with that person’s previous living condition (Asingo, 2018). Relative deprivation theory represents the idea that feelings of deprivation and discontent are connected to a desired point of reference (Flynn, 2011). Relative deprivation describes the variance between what people desire and what they obtain (Saleh, 2013). The reality of relative deprivation theory is that individuals or groups feel short-changed when they sense or discover their situations or entitlements as inferior compared to those of others (Flynn, 2011). The purpose of relative deprivation is the sensation that the present condition could be better when compared to an existing or perceived more suitable situation. Thus, until there is a feeling of relativity, the existence of deprivation may be unknown and there may not be any need to attend to the root causes of such deprivation. Hence, elites play a crucial role in projecting and articulating this feeling of relativity. In the Nigerian case, political elites in a bid to actualise their interests, prompt their followers to engage in political, ethnic and religious protests to bring awareness regarding the deprivations relating to their socioeconomic entitlements (Omololu, 2012). This has snowballed into the proliferation of ethnic organisations and culminated in ethnic and religious crises. Relative deprivation theory has its positive sides. Pettigrew submits that relative deprivation is important because absolute deprivation alone cannot explain deprivation in the real sense (Pettigrew, 2016). This is because it accommodates the subjective state encapsulated in emotions, cognition and behaviour as well as creates a nexus between interpersonal and intergroup levels of analysis (Pettigrew, 2016). Richardson (2011) utilises relative deprivation theory to explain that relative deprivation is different from absolute deprivation in that the former is the lacuna between expected and achieved welfare. The theory has been applied in several studies. Relative deprivation theory has been used to illuminate

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matters like poor physical health (Adler et al., 2000 cited in Smith et al., 2012) and collective protest participation (Newton et al., 1980 cited in Smith et al., 2012). It has also been used to explain voting (Asingo, 2018 and Grasso et al., 2017). Guimond and Dubé-Simard (1983) applied it in their study of the Quebec nationalist movement. In their study on unemployment and social protest, Walker and Mann (1987) utilised the theory. Stark and Taylor (1991), used relative deprivation theory as a framework in their study on migration incentives. Farooq et al. (2017) similarly made use of the theory concerning the Arab Spring. The theory has been applied to studies of Nigeria. It has been used as a prism to study insurgency in Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013; Agyemang & Lukman, 2018; Akinyetun, 2020). The theory has been applied as a parameter to study how the different ethnic groups claim dominance over other ethnic groups and identity politics in Nigeria (Okeke, 2016; Yakubu, 2019). Ezemenaka (2021) establishes that failure in governance bred feelings of deprivation which have culminated in youth violence and threat to national security in Nigeria. The shared trend among these studies is that if a group is relatively deprived and the situation is not properly managed, the group may resort to some iota of aggressiveness. Thus, frustration-aggression is germane to the analysis of relative deprivation theory. In essence, relative deprivation may result in frustration and, consequently, aggression. The connection between the two theories was established by Gurr (2016), who submits that ‘Relative deprivation denote [sic] the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence’ (Gurr, 2016: 23). Frustration-aggression theory is strongly associated with Dollard and his colleagues at Yale University in 1939 (Gurr, 2016). Aggression is the consequence of frustration and anger, especially when a group is frustrated in getting what it feels is due to it (Agbu, 2004). In essence, frustration may emanate into aggression and vice versa. ‘The occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression’ (Gurr, 2016: 33). The anger that originates from frustration, particularly prolonged or sharply felt, leads men to aggression, and these promote political violence (Gurr, 2016). Relative deprivation and frustration and aggression theories describe some issues in Nigeria. Groups in the oil-producing states of Nigeria have embraced violence as a means of expressing their marginalisation in

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the share of the oil revenues. Crude oil, which is the main source of the country’s revenue, is from the region but the people suffer from underdevelopment, poverty as well as environmental degradation and they do not control the resources. Some other parts of the country not producing oil are more developed than the Niger Delta region. These groups have devised militancy as a strategy to get the attention of the government for decades. In the 1960s, Isaac Adaka Boro-led an uprising agitating for the region, and various groups sprang up to sustain this until the twenty-first century. The Niger Delta situation depicts relative deprivation which has culminated in frustration and aggression. The dependence on crude oil has drawn more attention to political offices at the federal level, especially that of the president. This is because the federal government takes the bulk of the proceeds from crude oil. Access to state resources is a major reason why political elites want to attain different political positions. They believe that occupying a public office gives them access to state resources. Thus, the other side of the coin with respect to resources, relative deprivation and frustration-aggression is that political elites in the quest to have access to state resources support or oppose rotational presidency. They also fan the embers of deprivation on the pedestals of ethnicity and religion with the ultimate desire to achieve their apex parochial interest— access to state resources. This perception has rubbed on the masses at a peripheral level. It explains why various groups want to produce the President of Nigeria because they feel deprived if the president does not come from their enclave. This book utilises elite theory to explicate how the effects of failed integration approaches have spurred political elites to deploy ethnic and religious strategies to instigate the citizens to protest based on ideas of deprivation sold to them by the former. This has remained a handy tool for the Nigerian political elites to advance their interests. They balloon the claims of deprivation to inspire violence, using the country’s ethnoreligious differences. They use this to stimulate the awareness of most citizens within their ethnoreligious groups on the ‘alleged’ inequality in the economy (Carment, 2003; Richardson, 2011). Though there may be economic flaws, the elites shift the attention of the masses away from the failures of the elite class as the root cause of the economic challenges. They rather blame opposition political elites using ethnic and religious instruments. They justify the failures in the social and economic spaces like unemployment, poverty, and poor education, among others, catapulted by the diversity that exists in societies (Richardson, 2011).

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Reality portrays inadequate basic infrastructure that affects many citizens notwithstanding their ethnic groups or religious affiliation, while the few elites enjoy some of these basic facilities through self-created comfort. Relative deprivation has been criticised on the premise that it disregards actual deprivation and utilises perceived deprivation (Asingo, 2018). These criticisms, notwithstanding, from the aforemenioned, it is a theory that can be used to explain why acts of violence occur in societies, including Nigeria. The next section explains how national integration which is one of the cardinals of this book relates to elite and relative deprivation theories.

Elites, National Integration and Relative Deprivation in Nigeria Federal stability is crucial in a diverse federal state. It may come to reality through the sincerity of political elites in the implementation of the various legislative and executive frameworks as well as ad hoc approaches essential to encourage national unity among the various groups and component units in the state. Hence, advocating for national integration in a diverse society suggests the implementation of policies that would lead to the fair distribution of amenities among the federating units to mitigate a sense of deprivation. This explains the essence of analysing the Nigerian federal system through elite and relative deprivation theories and why national integration is an integral part of this book. The originality of this book is partly attributed to the combination of these two theories to expatiate national integration. The use of the theories is so germane because they support each other, and spice the analysis. Proponents of elite theory postulate that the elites play key roles in social, political and economic decision-making. In the African context, and Nigeria to be precise, elites played significant roles in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. Colonialism produced divided indigenous elites that competed among themselves. Since independence, Nigeria has been facing weak national integration and as indicated earlier, elites have been the ones orchestrating and superintending the various national integration strategies. Some of these policies and programmes depict a zero-sum game. This justifies the relationship between national integration and elite theory. Hence, the consequences of some of these policies and programmes are feelings of relative deprivation and the reason why this book adopts relative deprivation as one of its theoretical lenses.

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Conclusion The chapter expatiated on the theoretical prisms of the book. Elite theory was utilised because this book focuses on the activities of political elites. The theory was used to explain how elites dominate the political space and decision-making. The feelings of political elites and their followers that they are being deprived of some benefits in comparison to other groups necessitated the inclusion of relative deprivation theory as a theoretical lens for the book. This theory explains how the quest for state resources has instigated political elites to pitch their followers against themselves. The last part of the chapter established the historical roles of elites in national integration and how the poor management of integration in the country continues to bolster feelings of deprivation. This chapter forms the bedrock of the succeeding chapters where some issues about the Nigerian state will be analysed. This brings to the fore the next chapter which historically elucidates federalism in Nigeria.

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CHAPTER 6

The Nigerian Federal System on the Historical Scale

Introduction This chapter centres on the operations and challenges of the Nigerian federal system from a historical perspective. The conglomeration of unwilling ethnic nationalities to form the Nigerian state is one of the rationales behind the adoption of the federal system. However, the practice of federalism has not stemmed the tide of instability. The country still contends with recurrent ethnic and religious crises. Therefore, the chapter puts the evolution of federalism in Nigeria in the spotlight. The chapter is presented in three major sections and various subsections. The first section interrogates how federalism evolved in Nigeria. This will be explored from the pre-independence, independence and post-independence eras; under military governments as well as from the Second to the Fourth Republics. The roles of the political actors that shaped federalism under these periods and how ‘federal’ Nigeria was under each dispensation will be explored. The second section will illuminate the cracks in the Nigerian federal system. The book posits that the structural issues of the Nigerian federal system are exploited by political elites to stir feelings of marginalisation and deprivation which lead to agitations. Thus, the masses have been drawn into the scene which has resulted in crises in different parts of the country. These cracks include independence and hegemony issues, population census, religion, ethnicity and communal clashes, resources, threats of secession and the Civil War, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. T. Faluyi, National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7_6

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military coups, as well as the annulment of June 12, 1993, Presidential Election and issues with elections in the Fourth Republic. The final section explores the implications of these cracks on peace in the country and how the country has not fared well in comparison with other countries. The section further substantiates the country’s peace index with the perpetual ethnic, religious and political crises that the country has been facing for decades.

Metamorphosis of One of the Federal States in Africa Nigeria is one of the surviving federal states in Africa. The country’s federal system has journeyed through thick and thin from 1954 till date. This has been characterised by the introduction of different strategies which have defined the country’s federal stability or otherwise. Some of these activities are the foundation of the weak state of integration in the country, while some of these events consolidated this unpleasant situation. Thus, the transition of the Nigerian federal system from pre-independence till date will be explored. Pre-independence Epoch The existence of more than one level of government is one of the features of a federal state. In a diverse state like Nigeria, the plural nature informs the existence of more than one level of government. It may become almost impossible for a unitary system to accommodate the different groups in the state. Hence, the need to have different levels of government for administrative convenience and political expediency. The decision to embrace a federal system of government was reached between 1946 and 1954 (Afigbo, 1991). Nigeria practised a unitary system until 1947 (Richards Constitution of 1946) and from this period, the country witnessed federalism in structure and not constitutionally. The existence of legislative councils for the Eastern, Northern and Western regions epitomised this (Ayua & Dakas, 2005; Kirsten, 1996). In essence, Nigeria practised a unitary system of government from 1914 until 1947, but the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 constitutionally recognised the federal system of government. By implication, the three regions assumed autonomous status as the federating units of the tripartite federal structure

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(Kifordu, 2011). However, some events unfolded before the transition from a unitary system to federal system. Prior to colonialism, the territories that make up contemporary Nigeria comprised several politically independent ethnic groups/ kingdoms (Alapiki, 2005). These include the Kanem-Bornu, Oyo, Benin empires, Hausas, Fulanis, Igbos, Jukun, Idomas, Urhobo, Tivs, and Ijaws, among others (Adamu & Ocheni, 2016; Attah, 1987). Each of these groups/kingdoms/empires had its governmental structures and procedures for selecting leaders. These ethnic groups had diverse administrative, political, historical, religious, cultural and legal foundations (Muhammad, 2007). Some of these groups established a web of socioeconomic interactions and networks of relationships but rarely on political grounds (Attah, 2011). The political relations were branded in conflicts, diplomacy and mild cooperation (Attah, 2011; Uhunmwuangho and Ekpu, 2012). Colonialism altered the existing structures and the relationships, as the British coerced these independent political systems into one entity without putting into consideration ethnic compatibility (Isumonah, 2004). These territories were officially colonised by Britain in 1861 with the establishment of the Colony of Lagos (Ayua & Dakas, 2005). The British in 1900 established the Protectorates of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria (Alapiki, 2005). The Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria came about through the merger of The Colony of Lagos with the Southern Nigeria Protectorate in 1906. These entities which were made up of different ethnic groups became a single political entity in 1914 through amalgamation. The indigenous people in the different ethnic groups neither demanded nor were consulted by the British before they were brought together to form a country. The assertion of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa corroborates this submission: Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite… Nigerian unity is only a British invention. (in Meredith, 2011: 8)

Likewise, Obafemi Awolowo postulates:

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Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the same sense as there are “English”, “Welsh”, or “French”. The word “Nigerian” is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not. (in Meredith, 2011: 8)

The British gave less attention to the existing natural boundaries in the course of the unification because of their excessive ambition (Anugwom, 2000). They were driven by economic benefits. Their operations through companies such as Royal Niger Company and United African Company were an indication that they were more disposed to what they stood to gain economically. Thus, the unity of these groups was secondary. Administration was also a determining factor in bringing together unwilling groups. Adamu and Ocheni (2016) opine that the colonialists gave relevance to administrative convenience than the negative effects of bringing unenthusiastic groups together. This is captured by Researcher Two. The colonial beginning of the Nigerian state is a critical factor no doubt about it. What that simply means is that if not for colonial factor, a country called Nigeria couldn’t have emerged or couldn’t have emerged in the form it is today. Nigeria did not come about as a result of the request by the indigenous people. The indigenous people did not request for Nigeria as we have it today. It was foisted on the indigenous people by the British powers. The imperialist power of the United Kingdom, Britain. So, the colonial factor is a critical one no doubt about it. Number two, I think the colonial factor came with mutual suspicion from all the ethnic nationalities that were amalgamated in 1914. They were forced to come together. (Personal Interview Researcher Two, December 2018)

Hence, the Amalgamation Proclamation of 1914 was structured to govern separate protectorates under one administration for economic and administrative reasons. Thus, the ideal requirement, which should be willingness on the part of the different groups to come together, was lacking in the case of Nigeria (Aziegbe, 2014). The British in a bid to have a more democratic, inclusive government and better structure gave constitutional backing to their administration. These assertions have been made because of the manner the Constitutions operated. The Clifford Constitution of 1922 was a framework for a unitary system. With this Constitution, the country had the Southern and Northern provinces, and electorally, the South was put ahead of the North

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because elective positions were zoned to the South only. The elective principle which is an integral part of the 1922 Clifford Constitution was the legal backing for the elective positions. Four legislative seats were to be occupied and political parties were encouraged to field candidates to take these seats (Obiyan, 2010). A Nigerian Legislative Council was created in 1922 (Fagbadebo, 2020). This had a membership of 46, with most of them being British. Only four of these members were elected. These four emanated through the four elective positions created. Three from Lagos and one from Calabar. The Nigerian National Democratic Party secured all three seats in Lagos while an independent candidate won that of Calabar. Thus, from the protectorate level, the North did not have an elected legislative representative. This approach was not democratic because less than 10% of the members were elected. This move by the British marginally increased the distrust between the North and the South. This means that the purpose of involving more Nigerians in governance which should have brought a sense of inclusiveness and by extension, integration was defeated. Under the 1946 Richards Constitution, Nigeria had three regions and Lagos (Onoja, 2014). Aside from the existence of more levels of government, some provisions of the Constitution have a striking resemblance with the federal system. The three regions had Regional Councils and Houses of Assembly, but the North and West had a House of Chiefs while the North was now incorporated into the central legislature (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Genyi, 2014; Onoja, 2014). A Central Legislative Council was created in 1946, which made it possible for the representatives of the three regions to meet and discuss national issues (Ukase, 2014). Nationalists criticised Sir Arthur Richards on the grounds that he did not consult Nigerians on his constitutional proposals (National Conference, 2014). The colonial administration appointed regional legislative assemblies and the latter operated with no legislative powers but mere advisory roles (Fagbadebo, 2020). Additionally, the regional assemblies also operated like appendages of the central legislature because the latter sanctioned the former’s decisions (Fagbadebo, 2020). This was fixed under the Lyttleton Constitution. MacPherson Constitution of 1951 came on board because of the weaknesses of the Richards Constitution of 1946 (Elaigwu, 2006). John MacPherson consulted stakeholders at the village, district, provincial, regional and national levels (National Conference, 2014). The Ibadan General Conference of 1950 was also held. These activities led to the

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emergence of the MacPherson Constitution. The Constitution had provision for a Council of Ministers; 12 Nigerian Ministers, four from each region and six official members (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The House of Representatives became the central legislative body with half of the members from the North, and the other half shared between the East and West (Falola & Heaton, 2008). This action epitomised relative deprivation because of the structure of the central legislature, which skewed in favour of the North. The legislative arms in the North and West were still bicameral while that of the East retained its unicameral status (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The Constitution also ascribed more legislative and financial powers to the regional legislative bodies (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The outcomes of The London Constitutional Conference of July 1953 and the Lagos Conference of February 1954 were instrumental to the promulgation of the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Nwala, 1997). The Constitution gave legal recognition to the federal system of government because Nigeria had three regions and Lagos had the status of a federal territory administered by the central government (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The British and the nationalists saw federalism as an option to contain the upshot of the elasticity that comes with the heterogeneity of the country and the need to accommodate the interests of the various groups (Muhammad, 2007; Omoregie, 2015). In his view, Aziegbe (2014) submits that the political elites embraced federalism principally as one of the channels for attaining selfgovernment and far less than economic or military reasons. To consolidate federalism, the Constitution granted autonomy to the regions so that they could operate with an appreciable level of independence. The central government operated within the purview of the exclusive legislative list, both tiers of government had jurisdictions over the concurrent legislative list while the residual list was reserved for the regions (Elaigwu, 2006). The House of Representatives was composed of 184 members of which 92 were from the North, 42 each from the East and West, six from Southern Cameroon and two from Lagos. The Senate was established as the second legislative house in the late 1950s. The structure of these legislative houses at the central and regional levels increased inclusiveness in governance because different groups that constitute Nigeria were comparatively represented unlike the previous constitutions. The public service and the judiciary became replicated in the regions. The Privy Council was the apex court at the national level. Financial powers were

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devolved to the regional governments in 1954 but the negative narrative that followed the creation of the regions earlier in 1946 was that some ethnic groups assumed core majority status (Luqman, 2014). Hence, the creation of the regions brought ethnic consciousness which epitomised ethnicity in the system. There were inter-majority ethnic sentiments as well as majority-minority ethnic reservations. However, this made the regional elites sit back in their regions and make the best use of the financial power devolution to boost their regional autonomy as obvious by their financial buoyancies. The Nigerian Marketing Board became regionalised in 1954 (Elaigwu, 2006). These features align with the principles of true federalism. Nevertheless, the Nigerian federal system did not emanate from social contract or referendum but was a product of a resolution by a few political elites at pre-independence constitutional conferences (Majekodunmi, 2015). This elite domination has continued in contemporary Nigeria. One of the effects of the creation of regions and the manner the federal system originated was the stimulation of the minority fears of being dominated by the majority. The former demanded their regions. This resulted in the setting up of the 1957 Willink Commission on the Fears of the Minorities and Means of Allaying them (Egwu, 2014). Henry Willink Commission resolved that the creation of regions would not proffer a solution to the fears of minorities (Luqman, 2014). The Commission recommended putting in place a unified police, a central prisons system, and elevation of minorities into positions of authority to balance unfairness in power control (Abdussalam, 2014). It also recommended that to mitigate the fears of oppression and of being maltreated, fundamental human rights to protect citizens should be enshrined in the Independence Constitution (Onoja, 2014). These recommendations were meant to check domination by majority groups. Concerns that aggravate the fears of minorities have not ceased in contemporary Nigeria despite the creation of dozens of states. Resource control, rotational presidency, and low involvement in governance, among others have been added to the list. These are signs that the country still grapples with federal instability and weak integration. The report of the Willink Commission and the Constitutional Conferences of London in 1957 and Lagos in 1958 were pivotal to the creation of the 1960 Independence Constitution.

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Independence and Post-independence Epochs The conferences and report indicated in the previous section notwithstanding, those behind the scenes were political elites. The 1960 Constitution was a creation of bargaining and negotiation by political elites from different regions and ethnic groups. In response to minority challenges and fears of domination, the 1960 Independence Constitution has entrenched in it fundamental human rights (Azelama & Oarhe, 2010). The guarantee of the rights of the minorities was what they got in the Constitution and not the creation of more regions (Vande, 2012). The Independence Constitution gave the regions extensive powers, which enhanced their autonomy, and this allowed them to control revenue sources that made them discharge their duties (National Conference, 2014). Also, each region had its constitution, which epitomised their respective historical, cultural and future aspirations (Egwu, 2014). However, the Constitution still had some touches of colonialism. For instance, the highest place to appeal court decisions was the Privy Council in England (Azelama & Oarhe, 2010). The Queen of England retained her position as the Head of State but was represented by a Governor-General. The 1963 Republican Constitution came into operation on October 1, 1963, and it substituted the 1960 Independence Constitution. Most of the provisions of the 1960 Constitution were retained which means federalism was still practised. The good thing about the Republican Constitution was that the Queen of England stopped being the ceremonial President and Head of State and the highest legal appeal was institutionalised to be the Supreme Court rather than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (National Conference, 2014). There are similarities between the 1960 Independence and 1963 Republican Constitutions. These federal constitutions existed alongside those of each region. Each region had its coat of arms and motto, apart from that of the country, each region operated its mission in the UK headed by an Agent General and any power not allocated to the federal or both federal and regional governments was placed on the residual list, and conferred to the regions (National Conference, 2014). The regions were given free hands on import and export taxes as well as controlled the produce marketing boards (Falola & Heaton, 2008). These explain the financial prowess and capacity of the regions. The 1954 Lyttleton

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Constitution established Nigeria’s federal status and the 1960 independence Constitution consolidated the federal system (Elaigwu, 2006). The 1963 Constitution is also federal friendly but the creation of the MidWest shortly before the Constitution came into operation meant weaker geographical and population bargaining strength for the Western region from where the new one was carved out. It was true that to a great extent, the country practised true federalism from 1954 until the military takeover in 1966, but integration was still weak in the country. The political acts of violence that erupted in the country during these years substantiate this. Apart from the civil war, the country witnessed some incidences of political unrest which were indications that some ethnic groups were displeased with the Nigerian federation (Orngu, 2014). These include the Kano riot of 1953 (though before 1954, it threatened the stability of the country), 1960s Tiv revolts against the Northern Hausa and Fulani domination which had been since the 1920s, the 1962/1963 Census matters, the 1965 Western Region crisis and the Adaka Boro uprising. Relative deprivation is occasioned by the feelings of some groups that some privileges which should be their own or should be enjoyed with other groups are restricted to certain ethnic groups/classes. Military Governments, Second and Third Republics Preceding the 1966 coup, the Nigerian federal system had features that relatively resembled Wheare’s model where each of the four regions had its independent government and constitution while the federal constitution still operated (Fagbadebo, 2010). The government at the centre and the regions shared functions and powers (Fagbadebo, 2010). The actions of the military governments that ruled from 1966 to 1999 degraded the tenets of federalism (Oni & Faluyi, 2018). The military takeover of power in January 1966 ushered in Decree 1 of 1966 which abolished the offices of the President, Prime Minister, National Assembly, Regional Governors, Premiers and Regional Parliaments (Akinsanya, 2002b). This Decree not only suspended the 1963 Republican Constitution, but also made the Supreme Military Council the highest law-making body in the country (Isijola, 2002). Nevertheless, the military government left the office of the Chief Justice and all other judicial appointments untouched but brought the Local Government Police and Native Authority Police under the command of the Inspector General (Akinsanya, 2002b). The

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Decree provided that a regional military government needs the authorisation of the Federal Military Government to legislate on any element in the concurrent list (Akinsanya, 2002b). Considering the command structure and the centralised nature of the military, the regime preferred a unitary system to a federal system. Decree 34 of May 24, 1966, obliterated the federal structure and settled for a unitary system but chose to call the regions ‘group of provinces’ (Falola & Heaton, 2008: 173). The Decree also encompassed provisions for a National Public Service and a National Public Service Commission (Akinsanya, 2002a). The aim was to shift the loyalty of Nigerians more to the country than their ethnic groups, but this was construed as a means to entrench Igbo domination on the country because of the Head of State being Igbo, among other factors (Akinyele, 2013). The Northern civil servants felt vulnerable by the Unification Decree because they felt that the South was educationally advantaged (Akinsanya, 2002b). Decree 34 of 1966 was replaced with Decree 9 of 1966 and the latter restored the federal system of government, though the country operated a centralised military structure (Nwala, 1997). The civil service was again decentralised. Gowon’s administration promulgated this Decree, but the regions were reorganised to become 12 states. The military style of governance, the creation of more states and the attendant leaned fiscal autonomy of the subnational units implied a more centralised federal system. The Murtala/Obasanjo administrations were not so different except for the creation of more states to make the number of states 19. The military experimented with federalism in their ways until October 1, 1979. The Second Republic commenced on the same day the military rule ended. The activities that culminated in the 1979 Constitution were supervised by the military regime. The fact that federalism operated with a constitutional framework and under a civil rule made the practice of the system better compared to the military rules. The Constitution has provisions for legislative and judicial arms of government, fundamental human rights, federal and state civil services and a Nigeria Police Force, institutions which had federal and state officials as members; 66 items were exclusively under the control of the federal government while the federal and state governments shared powers on 28 items (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1979). Mining and control of mineral resources fall among the exclusive list. The allocation of more items to the federal government meant the federal government was in a position to access more revenue. This shrank

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the autonomy of state governments. Thus, to discharge their duties, financial dependence on the federal government was required. The federal government had the upper hand on matters in the concurrent list. Whenever there was any clash on any of the items in this list, the position of the federal government would stand. An exploration of the federal system in the Second Republic cannot be complete without the 1976 local government reforms. The 1976 local government reforms put a stop to the status of local governments as mere administrative units by recognising them as the third tier of government (Elaigwu, 2006). However, this did not result in the possession of more powers by the subnational units because reality portrayed the federal government wielding the most powers because of the resources it controlled. Thus, the inability of the states and local governments to control their mineral resources placed them in vulnerable positions in fiscal federalism. Another contributing factor to a powerful federal government in the 1979 Constitution was that in a situation of crisis in a state, the federal legislature could take over the legislative functions of that state and the federal government could declare a state of emergency in such a state with less hurdles (Elaigwu, 2006). This implies that the State House of Assembly will be suspended and the president will appoint a sole administrator to take over the executive affairs of the state. This means that the president may sometimes be vindictive in exercising this power against a perceived ‘unfriendly’ state governor. The military governments of Buhari, Babangida and Abacha still maintained the federal system on paper but in practice and structure, their styles of administration still tilted more towards a unitary system. The Babangida junta in a bid to transit the country to the aborted Third Republic supervised the activities that culminated in the promulgation of the 1989 Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution were very similar to that of 1979. For instance, the federal system of government was retained in the 1989 Constitution. The regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar equally operated through Decrees, but it laid the foundation for the Fourth Republic through the draft of the 1999 Constitution. The inability to have true federalism between 1966 and 1999 accounts for the political, ethnic and religious challenges that occurred in the country in these over thirty years. The weak federal structure is responsible for weak national integration in the country.

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The Fourth Republic The 1999 Constitution has been the major guideline for the practice of the federal system from 1999 until date. The Constitution has a lot of provisions that imitate the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions. There are 68 items in the exclusive list while the concurrent list has 30 items. Although, amendments to the Constitution have altered these lists. The federal government still dominates fiscal federalism mainly due to the control it has over mining and mineral resources. Remarkable revenue and resource control issues that generated attention in the early years of the Republic are the agitations for states to control their resources and the onshore-offshore dichotomy between the oil-producing states and the federal government. Paradoxically, state control of mineral resources ‘started’ few years ago in Nigeria but with contentions, threats to stability and perceptions of double standard. The abundance of gold in Zamfara state and its control by the state has generated some heat on the issue of resource control. The federal government has ‘empowered’ the state government with the power to control the gold found in the territory of the latter. The state sold gold worth N5billion to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (Amaize, 2020; Godwin, 2020; Onogu & Odiegwu, 2020). The immediate past Deputy President of the Senate and a Niger Delta group, Coalition of Riverine Deltans argued that apart from the constitutional breach of the state controlling gold, the proceeds ought to go to the Federation Account and not to the state (Onogu & Odiegwu, 2020). Their argument is from the viewpoint that proceeds from oil being sold in the Niger Delta go to the Federation Account and not Niger Delta states (Amaize, 2020; Godwin, 2020). Their position is further substantiated by the fact that the proceeds from gold, just like oil, ought to go to the Federation Account and be shared among the three tiers of government. The actions of the federal and the Zamfara state governments as well as the CBN contradict item 39 of the exclusive list of the 1999 Constitution which assigns the control of mineral resources to the federal government. The control of gold by the state if reciprocated in all states means that states would be allowed to control their mineral resources. Thus, handling the matter based on equity would have reflected true federalism. However, giving this privilege to a Northern state despite the diversity of the country is a threat to the stability of Nigeria. This may breed distrust between the North and the South. This renews the calls for restructuring

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where the different groups and stakeholders in the country would come to a round table to discuss how the country can work towards true federalism such that each at least, each geo-political zone will not feel cheated in the federal arrangement. However, it is crucial to explore some events that preceded the Zamfara matter. The autonomy of the states in the Fourth Republic has been weakened by some actions of the federal government. A good example is the creation of local governments by some states. Although, the federal government’s position is that the states should not exercise this power. This is despite the provisions of Sections 7 (1) and 8 (3) of the 1999 Constitution. However, the federal government made efforts to starve the created local governments of funds from the Federation Account. It insisted that it only recognises the existing local governments in the Constitution. Commencing from May 2004, statutory allocations meant for local governments in Niger, Nasarawa, Ebonyi and Lagos were withheld by former President Obasanjo on the allegations that these states created new local governments and conducted elections there (Elaigwu, 2006). The affected states challenged the federal government at the Supreme Court that they are only asking for the statutory allocations for the old local governments until the National Assembly amends Section 8 (3) of the 1999 Constitution (Elaigwu, 2006). However, that of Lagos state was withheld for a longer period. The states are not free from being guilty when it comes to intergovernmental relations with local governments. Local governments have also accused states of illegal deductions from their allocations and shortening their three-year tenure (Elaigwu, 2006). These actions portray the assertion that local government as a tier of government in Nigeria is a mirage. Impeachments and declarations of state of emergency in states also portray a mighty federal government and weak states. The impeachment of some state governors allegedly came under the supervision of the federal government (Fagbadebo, 2020). The declaration of state of emergency in two states somewhat reflects that states are appendages of the federal government. Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution empowers the federal government to declare a state of emergency in a state on the grounds of imminent danger of invasion, breakdown of public order or natural calamity. The issues in Ekiti and Plateau could have been managed better than considering state of emergency as an option. That of Ekiti was more of a constitutional crisis about who should become the state governor after the impeachment issue in the state. That of Plateau which

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was more of ethnic unrest could have been better managed because the security challenges in some states from 2009 till date far exceed the acts of violence in Plateau State in 2004 and this brings scepticism about what ‘necessitated’ the declaration of state of emergency in the state in 2004. This historical comparison calls to suspicion the motives behind the declaration of the state of emergency in these states. From 1999 till date, Nigerian federal stability has been negatively affected by ethnic and religious crises. These include riots as a result of the introduction of the Sharia legal system in some Northern states, Jos riots, Ijaw and Itsekiri crisis, violence between Hausas and Yorubas in Shagamu, Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province, recurring herdsmen/ farmers’ crises, among others. The root causes of these will be identified in the next section but the challenge with policing is also a contributing factor in prevention and response to these issues. The failure of the security architecture to prevent or respond to these ethnic and religious crises attests to the absence of state police. Section 215 of the 1999 Constitution makes provision for a Nigeria Police Force, controlled by the federal government. Hence, a federal police officer in a state may not understand the ethnic and religious dynamics, cultural underpinning, local languages and dialects and geographical design of villages, towns and cities in a state. For instance, a police officer who is an indigene of Jigawa State posted to Enugu state may face cultural, language and geographical barriers which may limit the proper discharge of his duties. Thus, the federal government runs the police as if the country is a unitary state with no consideration of the heterogeneous nature of Nigeria. A participant explained that running the country as though Nigeria is a unitary state contributes to the current security challenges in the country. He submitted that ‘you have instances where state governments for instance in Zamfara with all the killings carried out by bandits on innocent citizens, the governor is incapacitated to take the necessary measures because he does not command the security apparatus’ (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer Two, January 2019). This assertion aligns with the view of Suberu (2019) that one of the tenets of true federalism is for the police not to be on the federal (exclusive) list. The situation in Nigeria is such that the governor is the chief security officer of his state, but the commissioner of police takes most of his orders from the Inspector General of Police. Hence, cases that require urgent actions may be subject to scrutiny by the Inspector General of Police who may for reasons of influence from federal officials delay or subject the instructions given to political influence.

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Another abuse perpetrated by the federal police to justify why the advocates for state police may have good reasons was the abduction of a governor. The ‘abduction’ of the former Governor of Anambra State, Chris Ngige by some policemen led by an Assistant Inspector General of Police was a symptom of the formidable power of the central government over police deployment (Fagbadebo 2020). In general, it shows a very powerful federal government which could deploy its institutions to intimidate state officials. For a governor who has immunity to be adopted, state and local government officials may be objects of intimidation by federal officials to settle personal or political differences or any alleged grievance. This might not have been the case if state police exists. However, some states have established security outfits to handle the challenges that come with insecurity in their states. The state governments took this path because of the inability to have state police which they felt could better tackle or complement the efforts of the federal security agents in addressing insecurity. The federal government is not too comfortable with the floating of these security outfits. An example was the opposition of the immediate past Attorney General of the Federation to the establishment of Amotekun on the basis that it is not constitutional (Erezi, 2020). This is the Western Nigeria Security Network which was established to address insecurity in the zone but each state in the geopolitical zone controls its own Amotekun within its territory. The South West governors justified their action that the outfit is meant to complement the activities of the police and other security institutions (Erezi, 2020). Nonetheless, if states are allowed to have their own police, governors may use the institution to intimidate. This assertion is substantiated by the actions of some state governors who have used the Nigeria Police Force to promote their parochial political interests. For instance, in 2000, in a bid to truncate his impeachment process, former Osun State Governor, Chief Adebisi Akande, used policemen to disrupt the proceedings of the House of Assembly. The legislators were manhandled by policemen who were led by the Aide de camp to the governor and the Chief Security Officer in the government house (Fagbadebo, 2020). State police would be an easier tool in the hands of the incumbent to intimidate opposition political groups and individuals. Summarily, federalism does not mean that diversity does not exist, but it should be arranged to promote unity in diversity. However, the Nigerian federal system has not been able to mitigate the perpetual linings of

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ethnicity and religion that have threatened the stability of the country. A participant shared this opinion by submitting that ‘ethnicity and religion have emerged as the major fault lines in the Nigerian federal politics today. Even issues that had no ethnic or religious bearing, once they get politicised, they become interpreted as ethnic and religious and that divides the country immediately’ (Personal Interview South South Opinion Leader, December 2018). Usman (2014a) outlines the challenges of the Nigerian federal system as fiscal federalism, resource control, activities of ethnic militias, ethnic and religious conflicts, census politics, state creation demands, and claims of inequality, among others. The author further avers that the Nigerian federal system has been threatened with coup d’états, threats of secession, the Civil War, several ethnic and religious conflicts, and the springing up of ethnic militias (Usman, 2014a). Additionally, fiscal federalism characterised by federally skewed formulas has been a bane of the Nigerian federal system (Usman, 2014a).

Marginalisation and Agitations as Upshots of the Flaws of the Nigerian Federal System The level of patriotism of Nigerians is very low. Nigerians do not see themselves as Nigerians first but they are more comfortable describing themselves as Christians or Muslims or Northerners or Southerners and so on. This value is promoted by political elites and it is a good atmosphere for federal instability. Several factors aggravate instability in the Nigerian Federal system. These include population, religion, ethnicity, and resources. The poor management of these factors breeds feelings of relative deprivation and conflict. This book posits that the elites articulate these grievances and ‘brand’ them as those of certain groups be they ethnic or religious. These are expressed through allegations of marginalisation and ultimately agitations. Marginalisation is not a new thing in Nigeria and spreading its gospel across groups has made agitations for different issues to become a common thing in Nigeria. These agitations have sometimes led to political, ethnic, and religious acts of violence, which have led to the loss of lives as well as the destruction of lives and property in Nigeria (Sarumi et al., 2019). The elites are always quick to portray their religious or ethnic groups as being at the receiving end of marginalisation. This is explained by North Central opinion leader from the perspective of integration. He posited that ‘I still don’t know how Nigeria is going to be integrated with pockets

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of crises we have both at the national and at the local level. We have a lot of problems which are self-inflicted. When I say self-inflicted, I mean it is put up by the elites’ (Personal Interview North Central Opinion Leader, January 2019). This is supported by the fact that people naturally feel bad when they feel that another set of people has been given preference above them. This is captured in the submission of a participant. ‘Marginalisation means you were equal before and suddenly you are now less, or you were both winning before and suddenly, you have been shut out of winning or you could do something, and they have refused you the opportunity to do that thing’ (Personal Interview South South Politician, January 2019). This description aligns with the theoretical positions of relative deprivation (Asingo, 2018; Flynn, 2011; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015) where a group assesses its position primarily based on comparison with those of other groups. Elites are instrumental in fuelling marginalisation. There is the view that without elites ‘sensitising’ the masses about issues of marginalisation, the feelings of being denied and the consequences would not have threatened the stability of Nigeria. Some of the participants stand on this premise. One submitted that it is not the average man on the street or the poor man that talks about marginalisation the average Nigerian political elite has become master of some of these manipulations because it is only by manipulating some of these tendencies, divides, and cleavages that he could really get what he wants. The elites are the ones accentuating, bringing some of these issues to the fore more and more because it serves them. If you allow the average man on the street to understand that whether you are a Christian, you are a Muslim, you are Hausa, you are this and that, you have a common problem. Allowing them to understand this would be dangerous to the interest of the elites so the best they could do is to make the masses ‘realise’ things like….look, this thing has been given to the Yorubas if you allow it…this and the average man because of absence of education, poverty and the rest of the things, he gladly accepts the narrative. (Personal Interview North East Opinion Leader, January 2019)

In a related vein, another participant said that ‘the elites exacerbate ethnic and religious sentiments. The elites create consciousness about marginalisation to whip up sentiments for their selfish interest, and most times, the masses are ignorant’ (Personal Interview South East Opinion Leader, January 2019). A similar opinion is shared by Researcher Two who simply

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said ‘marginalisation is a relative term’ (Personal Interview Researcher Two, December 2018). However, another participant gave a holistic view of marginalisation within the Nigerian context; ‘We are on a different level of marginalisation, not in the context of religion alone but the context of tribe, economic sharing, political power and every other thing’ (Personal Interview Christian Cleric, January 2019). South South politician submitted that, ‘Every region of this country has a peculiar problem tied to each of these states as….ethnic groups suffer from marginalisation’ (Personal Interview South South Politician, January 2019). North West politician one concluded that marginalisation is imaginary. ‘The question of marginalisation does not even exist. It only exists in the imaginary. I do not think there is any ethnic group that is marginalised’ (Personal Interview North West Politician One, January 2019). The participant’s view is interpreted to mean that these claims are being fabricated to engender divisions. This assertion aligns with the position of Odeyemi (2014) that in circumstances where political elites underperform in office in Nigeria, rather than acknowledging their faults, they would whip up ethnic sentiments by claiming that their ethnic groups were the subject of marginalisation. A participant’s standpoint is similar. ‘I think the whole idea of marginalisation………is a hoax and the elites have always used it as an instrument to cover their poor governance or localising governance or should I say personalising governance’ (Personal Interview South West Opinion Leader, December 2018). This opinion reverberates with the position of Ojukwu and Shopeju (2010) that the patrons provide the supporters with jobs and other resources in exchange for political support from the latter. The roles of the elites in promoting marginalisation cannot be ignored, and that is why elite theory is relevant to this book. Irrespective of the opinions, marginalisation has not ceased to be on the lips of Nigerians even before independence. It is a phenomenon, which has not only shaped the extent of peace in the country but also moulded government policies over the years. Marginalisation and agitations depict that there are cracks in the Nigerian federal system. The issues that have been poorly managed and have led to the emergence of these cracks will be explored.

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Cracks in the Nigerian Federal System These cracks are rooted in ethnicity and religion but other social issues serve as catalysts that make these two result in civil conflicts. Kalu and Oguntoyinbo (2012) capture that the root causes of civil conflicts in Nigeria are linked to ethnicity and religion, but there also exist other factors like poverty, low level of education, and presence of mineral resources, among others. Others are the agitation for resource control by the oil-producing communities, underdevelopment of the Niger Delta even though the region produces the bulk of the country’s resources, corruption, ethnic and religious tensions, small arms and light weapons proliferation (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). The symptoms of these cracks manifest mainly through crises and other social ills. Nigeria has witnessed a series of crises caused by ethnic and religious factors from the First Republic until the end of military rule in 1999. These include the Kano riot of 1953, the Nigerian Civil War, the Tiv revolts in the 1960s, the 1962/1963 Census matters, the 1964 federal election crisis, the 1965 Western region crisis, Adaka Boro-led revolt in the 1960s. Others are the Maitatsine riots from 1980 to 1985 in some spots in Northern Nigeria, the SAP riots, Kasuwan Magani riots in 1980, the Gure/Kaugu riots in 1984, the Lere riots in 1986, the Kafanchan riots in 1987, the Zangon Kataf riots in February and May 1992, among others. The country has also experienced unrest in different parts of the country from the beginning of the Fourth Republic until date. A glimpse into the dynamics of these cracks will be essential. Independence and Hegemony Issues The North and the South were not on the same page concerning preparedness for independence but the climax of these differences was the Kano riot. Anthony Enahoro, a member of the House of Representatives from the South, moved a motion in 1953 that Nigeria should attain self-government in 1956, but the Northern members opposed this move. The North rather preferred to have it ‘as soon as practicable’. The reasons the North did not support the move was that they felt they would be dominated by the more educated South if the country attained self-government status by 1956. An unfriendly Lagos crowd met the Northern members after the House session. They left for the North disappointed. In response, some Southern leaders headed to the North.

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The purpose of the visit was to educate Northern leaders on the benefits of self-government. The delegates included Samuel Akintola and some Southern leaders, and their visit was repulsed by the Northerners, which led to a four-day riot—the Kano riot of 1953 (Falola & Heaton, 2008). This led to the loss of lives and property and casualties included both Southerners living in Kano and Northerners. This led to strained relations between the North and the South. The effect of this was granting regional autonomy. There were also intra-regional differences in the North. Agitation against marginalisation orchestrated by feelings of relative deprivation moved to the Middle Belt and they responded with civil unrest from the 1920s. Because of the Hausa/Fulani hegemony, the Tiv people engaged in civil disturbances in 1929, 1939, 1945, 1948, 1960 and 1964 (Tamuno, 1970). The Tiv riots of 1960 and 1964 were reactions to the Northern NPC to force the Tiv people to conform to some imposed tenets (Sambo, 2002). Coincidentally, a political party, the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), was at the forefront of the agitation for the interests of the minority ethnic groups in the Northern region. The Tiv led the UMBC, and it relentlessly demanded the creation of Middle Belt State, this led to riots, but force was used to suppress them, and this struggle continued until the military took over in 1966 (Yongo, 2015). The Middle Belt remains part of the North but there remains the dichotomy between them and the Hausa/Fulani North. Most Nigerians christen the latter as core North while the former is seen as Middle Belt. This has also played out in contemporary interactions of Middle Belt elites with Southern elites. SMBLF has emerged to promote the interests of both elite groups. The Middle Belt seems to find a more comfortable partnership with the South. This has been exacerbated by the continued attacks on Middle Belt communities allegedly by herdsmen (Alozie, 2022; Barkindo, 2016; Nanlong, 2016). There are unconfirmed reports that these herdsmen are of Fulani ethnic extraction. Thus, the Middle Belt continues to see itself as not being part of the North. This was conspicuous in the insistence of the SMBLF and some Southern socio-cultural groups that power must shift to the South in 2023 (Abati, 2022; Adonu, 2021). Although, some Northern elites shared similar opinion on power sharing but that is not the focus of this chapter. The dichotomy in population has also been of concern in the country for decades.

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Population The population of diverse groups in a state is one of the yardsticks for embracing federalism. Population plays a crucial role in any state because human resources superintends economic activities and politics. The population of a section of a country has effects on its political bargaining prowess and the economic fortunes that accrue to that part of the country. In Nigeria, population density is a determinant of the number of seats in parliament, the number of local governments that exist in a state and access to federal allocation. Census is the main exercise to know the population of a country and this should be done at intervals. The history of census in Nigeria dates back to 1866 with other censuses held in 1871, 1881, 1891 and 1901 with all these restricted to the Colony of Lagos and its environment.1 Upon the amalgamation of the Colony of Lagos and the Southern Protectorate in 1906, the 1911 Census took place in other parts of the South.2 Census was given wider coverage in 1921 due to the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914.3 Another one was held in 1931. The 1952/1953 Census covered the entire country with the exercise commencing in the North in May 1952 and ending in the East in August 1953.4 The 1952/1953 Census result was the basis for allocating the number of seats to represent each region in the House of Representatives and revenue sharing, and this was in the North’s favour (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Initially, Nigerians, especially the South were not enthusiastic about the exercise because the people became sceptical about its intentions and many people refused to submit themselves for enumeration due to disruptions caused by the Second World War.5 However, with the outcome of the exercise, the South saw the significance and alleged that the British sided with the North in the 1952/1953 Census result (Diamond, 1988). The author avers that upon discovering what population advantage can accrue to a region, the Southern politicians enthusiastically embarked on propaganda campaigns by visiting every constituency in the South to enlighten and prepare the people for another census. 1 https://nationalpopulation.gov.ng/history.html. 2 https://nationalpopulation.gov.ng/history.html. 3 https://nationalpopulation.gov.ng/history.html. 4 https://nationalpopulation.gov.ng/history.html. 5 https://nationalpopulation.gov.ng/history.html and Diamond (1988).

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The 1962 Census which had a preliminary result of 45.26 million gave the three regions in the South a combined result of 23.25 million while the North had 22.01 million.6 Thus, in 1962, the South had a 70% increase while the North had a 30% increase and this was not appealing to the NPC-led government and that led to the cancellation of the result and the carrying out of another enumeration in the following year (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Iwara, 2010). The reaction of the South to the 1952/ 1953 and 1962 Census results as well as the rejection of the 1962 result bred suspicion between the two regions which weakened the integration of the country. The 1963 Census result was the pedestal for development planning and resource allocation7 . The North was 53.5%, the East was 22.3%, the Western region was 18.4% while the Mid-West was 4.6% of the country’s population (Elaigwu, 2002). The results of the 1963 Census and the immediate one that preceded it brewed ethnic and regional tensions in the country (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). During this period, religion generated less tension. Although, religions have not been included as one of the demographics since the 1963 Census (Odubajo, 2011). Another exercise was carried out in 1973 which arrived at a population of 79.76 million for Nigeria but it was not published and cancelled with one of the major reasons being the inflation of figures by states.8 The implication of this is that Nigeria had changed from regions to states before the exercise and these states were much in tune with the ‘benefits’ of a high population. It also illustrates how the outcome of an enumeration exercise can polarise a country. The North’s population has since exceeded that of the South, and this has produced a sense of deprivation for the South despite not giving religion and ethnicity recognition. Religious and ethnic questions were not in the demographics of the 1991 Population Census, but the outcome reflected a Northern majority of 53% (Suberu, 1993). The country’s population was 88.5 million in that census. The result of the 2006 population and housing exercise was 140,003,542 million. It came with its controversies especially between the federal government and Lagos State government. The result of the

6 https://nationalpopulation.gov.ng/census-enumeration.html. 7 https://nationalpopulation.gov.ng/census-enumeration.html. 8 https://nationalpopulation.gov.ng/census-enumeration.html.

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National Population Commission (NPC) showed that the state had a population of 9,113,605 while a shadow survey carried out by the state in the same period gave the population to be minimum of 17,553,924 (Odunsi, 2013). Again, this is an indication of the importance of more population to access resources and political advantage. The same result from the NPC indicated that Kano was more populated than Lagos with a population of 9.4 million and that the North had around 75 million while the South had around 65 million (Yin, 2007). Constitutional lawyer one described the pro-North nature of census in the country and the implications it has on the country’s integration. See there has been that demographic disparity between the North and the South which defines all the economic development within the country, defines the geographical situation within the country. It is only in Nigeria where you have the arid areas have more population than the forest areas. It doesn’t make sense but it makes sense to our census and when people from the other side look at that, you know somebody is short changing their interest. They won’t believe in the Nigerian project because of this. (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer One, December 2018)

Population has generated controversies for decades in Nigeria and political elites are willing to give it all to ensure that statistics reflect a high population for their state, ethnic group, geo-political zone and region. The root cause of these are access to resources from the federal government and development partners as well as political gains like seats in the parliament, more legislative constituencies and votes. Elites that are displeased with the North-centric nature of the population may express feelings of deprivation and they may instigate their followers to take actions that may threaten the stability of the country. Population game plays out in elections in Nigeria. For instance, a presidential candidate will hardly choose a running mate from his region so that he can get votes from other regions other than his own. This also played out in the build up to the 2023 election. The APC chose a Muslim from the North East as the running mate of a Muslim presidential candidate not because the party is not sensitive to the implications of a Muslim/Muslim ticket in a religiously diverse country like Nigeria. However, the party settled for this because of the large population and registered voters in the North West. The North West and North East have a high Muslim population. Thus, a religious card was played to get

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more votes from the North considering the population of the region. Although, the action of the party did not generate crises, except for the cross-carpeting of some of its aggrieved members who opposed the Muslim/Muslim ticket. Religion Crises emanating from religious differences have reduced the level of integration in Nigeria. Some factors have bolstered religious sensitivity and religious disturbances in Nigeria. These include debates over its membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the extent of Sharia law contents in the constitution, the role the government plays in pilgrimage, the religious attachment of political office holders, construction of religious centres with government fund, apportionment of public land to religious institutions, among others (Suberu, 1993). The fear of losing Northern Muslim support made Babangida join the OIC, and this was not in tangent with Nigeria’s Christians’ understanding of the country’s secularity; Christians pressurised the government not to join but Nigeria eventually became a member of the OIC (Falola & Heaton, 2008; The Nation, July 13, 2018). The OIC is now called Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. A contemporary reason for the religious polarisation of Muslims and Christians has also been exacerbated due to power rotation. It has become so sensitive at the federal level and in some states to the extent that the competency of candidates is sometimes placed behind the religious mix of the candidates and their running mates. These factors mentioned are not the crises that have erupted due to religious intolerance in the country. Due to space, only some of these crises will be explored. The Maitatsine religious group’s leader was Muhammadu Marwa. The unrests of the 1980s were mainly an Islamic affair and not an interreligious matter. Marwa and his followers had always maintained their religious stance years before the 1980 uprisings. The primary goal was to target Muslims on ideological issues. The group was opposed to some Islamic doctrines and Western influence on Muslims and it sought to make Muslims ‘pure’ (Brinkel & Ait-Hida, 2012). The economically disadvantaged formed the bulk of Marwa’s followership (Danjibo, 2009; Kenny, 1996). This shows the influence of poverty and how elites, including religious elites, latch on this to achieve their parochial interests. The first major crisis which included the group’s serious confrontation

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with security forces took place in Kano State in 1980 while the ripple violence took place in Bulumkutu in 1982, Jimeta in 1984 and Gombe in 1985. Although the victims of its violence are not only Muslims. These violence under review took place during the administrations of Shagari and Buhari. Most of the riots that ensued during Babangida’s regime centred on religion in the form of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims with people from both sides paying the supreme price and destruction of property (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Non-Muslims in some Northern states revolted against the economic and cultural dominance of the Hausas and Fulanis in the late 1980s (Suberu, 1993). These religious crises comprise those of Ilorin in 1986, Kafanchan, Kaduna, Katsina, Funtua, Kano and Zaria in 1987; Bauchi in 1991; and Zaria in 1992 (Falola & Heaton, 2008). That of Zangon Kataf was notable among the crises. Zangon Kataf is a town occupied by the People of Kataf (Atyap) and Hausas, and both have existed in tension for years over land ownership and the location of market. In February and May 1992, there were clashes between the Hausas (mainly Muslims) and Kataf (mostly Christians) which resulted in the killing of many and later ballooned into a broader Muslim-Christian clash (Falola & Genova, 2009). This and other religious crises in the North generated a sharp ideological and religious divide, especially between the Muslim majority and Christian minority in Northern Nigeria. Thus, there has been distrust among the two major religions in the region and Nigeria and some events in the years that followed have continued to widen the gulf between Muslims and Christians in the country. In the early months of the Fourth Republic, religion threatened the stability of the country as a result of the introduction of the Sharia legal system in some Northern states. The Nigerian legal system rests on the trivet of English Common, Sharia and Customary laws (Elaigwu, 2006). Controversies surrounding Sharia have been on for decades. In the late 1970s, Northern Muslims advocated for a Sharia Court of Appeal to be one of the provisions in the 1979 Constitution so that Muslims could be tried at the federal level through Islamic law (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Oloso, 2010). Christians were not disposed to this but the compromise reached was that Muslim judges could sit to hear appeals from higher courts on cases brought from local Sharia courts (Falola & Heaton, 2008).

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Zamfara state put in place the Sharia legal system in 1999 (but it became effective in 2000), and it was the first state to include criminal matters in the Sharia legal system. Although, it applied to Muslims, nonMuslims were sceptical on the basis that it was an attempt to Islamise the country (Falola & Genova, 2009). Eleven Northern states emulated Zamfara state but with varying degrees of implementation. Southerners saw the move by the Northern states as an effort to play the religious card to frustrate the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo, a Southern Christian. The Muslims in the Northern states were more comfortable with the practice of the Sharia Legal System, while Southern Muslims welcomed it with mixed feelings (Oloso, 2010). These reactions are not far-fetched from the almost equal population of Christians and Muslims in the South West which has probably made South West Muslims more liberal than those in the North. There is also a Christian majority in the South South and South East. The introduction in Kaduna took a violent dimension. Southerners were killed in the state and there were reprisal killings of Hausa and Fulani in Abia and Imo states (Elaigwu, 2002). The doubts persisted and acts of violence was not abated despite the ‘respect’ Sahria laws in these states accord to Christians. The Nigerian legal system provides that Sharia law only applies to Muslims (Elaigwu, 2002). However, Christians living in states that practise the Sharia legal system may have to abide by some ‘rules’ that have been put in place due to Sharia. Christians perceive this as residing in religious states. The Sharia legal system projects states that have adopted it as an ‘adoption’ of state religion which contradicts Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution. It can be argued that these states have not become religious states because the legal system applies to only Muslims. Religious challenges in the country have gone beyond having a legal system alone but it has taken an ideological dimension which has snowballed into insurgency, especially in the North East. The Boko Haram crisis is ongoing, but the insurgent group mostly operate in the North Eastern part of the country where it unleashes its attacks. The group has religion as the nucleus of its ideology and it abhors Western education. This hatred for education has a striking resemblance with the perspective of Maitatsine about Western education. Poor governance and unemployment are also components of marginalisation, and these largely contribute to manipulating youths to be members of the sect (Faluyi, 2017, Faluyi et al., 2019a, 2019b). Most of its foot soldiers are lured into the group with financial incentives or conscripted (Faluyi

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et al., 2019a). The group is also political in its approach. The first reason is that it romanced with former Governor of Borno State, Ali Modu Sheriff, and there was a time when it was in control of territories that were hitherto under government control (Thurston, 2018). In addition, after a Northern candidate did not win elections in 2011, Boko Haram intensified its attacks in the North East and some other parts of the North (Chukwuemeka, 2013). There were suspicions that the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan as President in 2011 might be partly responsible for the growing fierceness of the sect between 2011 and 2015 because some Northern elites felt marginalised that a Northerner did not emerge president. This remains unproven, but there might have been some form of elite manipulation. The Boko Haram sect is against Christians, and moderate Muslims being in power and prefers that the country is Islamised (Chukwuemeka, 2013). Hence, those who refuse to embrace its style of Islam are more susceptible to its attacks (Thurston, 2018). Surprisingly, the sect continued to unleash terror even when Buhari, a Muslim, was the President (Faluyi, 2017; Faluyi et al., 2019a). This calls to question the assumption that the group is an instrument of regime change to frustrate a Christian president. The response of the government to the activities of the terrorist group has also brought relative discontent among political elites. The response of the government to the Boko Haram issue includes military and non-military. The non-military includes making laws one of which led to the establishment of North East Development Commission (NEDC), negotiations, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation of arrested terrorists, among others (Faluyi et al., 2019a, 2019b). The commission’s website9 has it that its major focus is to access, coordinate, harmonise and report all programmes and initiatives put in place for the geo-political zone by the federal government and its institutions, states and development partners. However, the establishment of the NEDC has been interpreted by some geo-political zones that they are relatively deprived despite not having similar challenges as the North East where Boko Haram operates (Faluyi et al., 2019a). This is captured by a participant. To me, the issue of marginalisation, everybody is looking for opportunity. Let me mention a case study, because of the ravage and damage done by Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, North East Development 9 https://nedc.gov.ng.

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Commission was established. Immediately after the President signed it, another person sponsored a bill for South East Development Commission. From this, we do not have sympathy for ourselves. There is a bill for South West Development Commission now. Because your house was burnt, the government decided to give you relief material. So, I should be vexed that I did not receive my own? Now if that bill comes and scales the first, second and third reading, taken to the President and the President refuses to sign that bill, it becomes an issue. But objectively, if I am the President, I will not sign it. Even the North East Development Commission has time. The moment everything normalises, there is no need for it, it ceases to exist, it will be overtaken by events. (Personal Interview North East Politician, January 2019)

Political elites from other zones are also demanding the establishment of development commissions for their zones. If infrastructure in the country is in good condition and well prioritised, the call for the establishment of other regional development commissions may not be a tool for elite manipulation. These activities of elites and the calls for these commissions support what elite and relative deprivation theories postulate. The submission of the North East politician echoes the view of Agbu with the former explaining why elites outside the North East geo-political zone have sectionalised the calls for the commissions. The inability of governments in countries bewildered with ethnic conflicts to provide the basic needs and security for their citizens makes elites play the ethnic card to get the attention of government (Agbu, 2004). The aforementioned about religion in Nigeria is that religious issues are linked to ethnicity, poverty and politics. Thus, in a plural state like Nigeria, it has not only threatened the peace of the country; it has also been a tool to manipulate the masses to promote the interest of the manipulators. Ethnicity and Communal Clashes The major ethnic clashes in Nigeria include the Kano riot of 1953, the Tiv revolts of the 1960s, and the aftermath of the military coups, among others. These clashes have in some instances been encapsulated in communal issues. Communal matters, especially indigene/non-indigene issues based on land and resources, also have religious angles. These include the 2001 Jos riots; and 2002/2003 Tarok farmers versus Fulani herdsmen in Plateau State (Omede, 2010). Jos crisis of 2001 was

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because of a Hausa politician being appointed to a state-wide position of a federal poverty alleviation programme, and this claimed about 1,000 lives (Luqman, 2014). The Jos crisis of 2002/2003 was between Tarok Christian farmers and Muslim Hausa and Fulani settlers with the farmers accusing the latter as intruders who want to seize political power (Luqman, 2014). There was also fighting between the Tarok and Hausas over local government elections, and this claimed some lives (Luqman, 2014). Clashes between minority ethnic groups are Ugep-Idoma in 1992; Tiv-Jukun from 1990 to 1992 and Mangu-Bokkos in 1992. In July 1999, there was fighting between Yorubas and Hausas in Shagamu, Ogun State over the killing of a Hausa woman by ‘Oro’, a Yoruba masquerade and killings ensued in Kano as a reprisal of that in Shagamu (Santas, 2014). In 1998, there was a clash between Ijaw and Ilaje in Ondo State on the issue of land. In August 1999, there was conflict between Kuteb and Chamba people where more than 200 lost their lives (Santas, 2014). Others are the clash between Yorubas and Hausas over the control of Mile 12 Market in Lagos in November 1999, and on May 27, 2000, violence between Urhobo and Itsekiri near Warri (Falola & Genova, 2009; Santas, 2014; Suberu, 2010). The authors further gave an account of ethnic conflict between Tiv and Hausa in Benue State on June 25, 2000 which led to the death of several people and on October 15, 2000, four-day violence between the people of Epe and Hausa and Fulani in Lagos led to the death of about 100 people. They also explained that there was the Tiv and Jukun violent conflict in 2001 which led to the death of 19 soldiers and more than 200 civilians; in 2001, there was also the Jukun and Chamba ethnic brouhaha in Taraba state. A perennial ethnic problem in Nigeria is the Fulani herdsmen/ farmers clashes. The Fulanis are nomads who move around with their cattle. Host communities have farmers who farm, and the situation has always come with allegations of cattle eating crops. This has led to conflicts between herdsmen and host communities/farmers, and several lives have been lost. These have affected the Middle Belt part of the country, and recently, the clashes have spread to some states in the Southern part. Some states in the North West and North East have not been spared as well.

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Resources The tier of government that controls resources and how its proceeds are distributed are essential in a federal system. This is because the availability of funds is required for a government to discharge its responsibilities. The component units where resources are located in a federal state explore all legal and political avenues to control resources and take the bulk of its proceeds. This may sometimes result in intergovernmental disagreements. The control and distribution of oil revenue have become a perpetual issue that has threatened the stability of the country and affected political calculations by the political elites. The Niger Delta region in Southern Nigeria produces the bulk of Nigeria’s crude oil and natural gas. This region is a conglomeration of minority ethnic groups. Some states in the South East and a state in the South West have crude oil and of recent, in Northern Eastern Nigeria, the drilling of crude oil has started. This book will focus on the challenges that come with crude oil in the Niger Delta because of the furore it has generated for decades. The Niger Delta issue was among those raised that led to constituting the Willink Commission. The domination of political parties by majority groups and the fear that the majority groups would be dominant partners in each region climaxed in the setting up of the Commission. The Niger Delta people raised concerns about their minority status (Egwu, 2014). The Niger Delta Development Board was established in 1958 sequel to the recommendation of the Willink Commission, due to the neglect and ecological challenges witnessed by the region (Osaghae, 2001). However, this action was enveloped in politics because of the establishment of similar basin authorities in some parts of the country (Ama-Ogbari, 2010). Years of exploration of oil in the region led to serious economic impoverishment, social problems and environmental degradation and these ‘inspired’ Isaac Adaka Boro to spearhead the Niger Delta agitation (Ama-Ogbari, 2010). The main points of Boro’s agitation were social, economic and political exclusion, neglect and deprivation of the Niger Delta region by the Nigerian State (Fagbadebo, 2010). This culminated in the establishment of the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (Fagbadebo, 2010). On February 23, 1966, Isaac Adaka Boko declared the Niger Delta People’s Republic which transpired in a twelve-day revolution against the Nigerian state (Ama-Ogbari, 2010; Fagbadebo, 2010; Omede, 2010). The uprising was suppressed by the Nigerian government, but it was the

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foundation of political awareness on the predicament of the Niger Delta people which has shaken the integration of the country. Except for petitions, the Niger Delta issue generated less political tension from the Civil War until the Babangida administration (Nyityo, 2010). Thus, the problems persisted. However, in the Second Republic, the government set up a Presidential Task Force referred to as the 15% committee in 1980. This action did not address the challenges of the region. After this period, agitations by the Niger Delta did not stop but it did not take the form of violence but soft approaches were applied. These comprise petitions to the government, sponsoring motions in parliament, media publicity, and the creation of a mass movement group, which drew up the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) (Nyityo, 2010). Ken Saro Wiwa-led activities for the Niger Delta from the 1980s to the mid-1990s heralded the transition from peaceful agitations (Larab, 2010). In the 1990s, the Ogonis of the Niger Delta demanded for more favourable resource allocation to the region and environmental protection in response to the activities of the multinational oil companies (Usman, 2014b). Therefore, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) came into existence in 1992 (Falola & Genova, 2009). In response to these actions, the government created the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission in 1992, but the challenges of the region were not mitigated. The concerns of the Niger Delta have been documented by the agitators through the OBR (1990), Ijaw Youth Congress Kaima Declaration (1998), Ogbia Declaration (1999) and the Ikwere Rescue Charter (1999) (Osaghae, 2001). These demands are swathed in three main points: improved political autonomy and resource control as well as inclusiveness and equality in the structure of the government at the centre (Osaghae, 2001); the second one was the need for the multinational corporations to give large financial compensation for environmental damages, develop host communities and employ the youths of the region (Osaghae, 2001). The last demand made as the author submits is to restructure revenue allocation to allow oil-producing states beneficiaries of increased derivation. Aside from the Adaka Boro revolution of 1966, the people of the Niger Delta made demands without much violence. The military government ascribed little importance to derivation (Nyityo, 2010). For example, in 1970, derivation was 45% and it was later reduced to 20%, but by 1979 it was removed in favour of the federal government (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The killing of Ken Saro Wiwa, and eight others and the persistent

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forceful response of the Nigerian state to protests of the oil-producing communities made militancy the only option to make their grievances known (Walter & Uhunmwuangho, 2010). In 1998, the federal government deployed officials of the Nigerian Army and Navy and two warships to Delta and Bayelsa states (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). The response to this action was protests of more than 2000 youths in the state capitals of which soldiers responded by opening fire on them (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). The complications with the region became severe in the Fourth Republic, and this led to the emergence of several groups some of whom took to militancy. The response of the government to these groups and the region made the region feel ostracised more. The Odi massacre, the onshore-offshore dichotomy case that was in favour of the federal government, the forfeiture of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon and the failure of the government to appropriately settle the indigenes of Bakassi (Nyityo, 2010) all contributed to this feeling. The Odi massacre was as a result of the killing of some policemen by Ijaw people on November 21, 1999, and the reciprocal killing of over 60 civilians in Odi by the Nigerian military (Santas, 2014). Aside from these, there are factors responsible for conflicts in the region. Ojakorotu (2006) submits that conflicts in the Niger Delta are caused by the structure of the Nigerian federal system, perceived/ real marginalisation of the region, activities of oil and gas firms, and ethnicity/nationalism. Others are the non-commitment to repeal or amend perceived obnoxious legislations, the romance of the government with the oil companies at the detriment of the oil-producing communities, violent military response and proliferation of arms. These caused and enhanced the activities of the militants coupled with other historical discontentment to justify their actions. One of the participants gave reasons for militancy in the Niger Delta below: Marginalisation is in terms of degrees as an ordinary citizen of Nigeria from whatever part of the country you come from. You have certain entitlements as a citizen, and you do not get that, you may well feel marginalised. If it becomes part of a group, then the group is marginalised. That is at the first level, but the greater part of marginalisation is the type being cloned by the people of Niger Delta. Is not just that you have certain entitlements for being citizens of Nigeria, the resources are derived from your territory, yet you do not have access to……the bulk of it is being

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taken elsewhere, controlled by other people, used in developing other parts of the country whereas your own part of the country stagnates in misery, despoliation, and poverty. So, that is like a double tragedy, and then when the resources we are talking about happen to be oil and gas, the tragedy becomes triple because in collecting these resources, further damage is done to the environment. You cannot even maintain your prestyle level of existence, peasant farming, fishing, artisanal vocation and so on. So you are not benefiting from the resources derived from your area, you are not compensated as a citizen of Nigeria, and your environment/ source of living is despoiled, and that is the worst form of marginalisation. Yes, for me, where I come from, the Niger Delta, I experience it first-hand. (Personal Interview South South Opinion Leader, December 2018)

The position of South South opinion leader aligns with Nyityo’s (2010) submission that the Niger Delta is the backbone of the country’s revenue and the groups in the region feel they are being denied the full benefits of the wealth that emanates from their territory. Likewise, Akai (2010) posits that the Niger Delta region struggles with environmental degradation, unemployment, poverty, abuse of rights by security agents, unfair share and management of oil revenue. These problems with the region compared to how other regions that have mineral resources do not experience challenges of such magnitude portray relative deprivation. The poverty in the Niger Delta just like other parts of the country makes the masses vulnerable to being ‘enlisted’ as foot soldiers for promoting and executing elites’ fabricated marginalisation propaganda. The unpleasant situation in the region warranted some socio-cultural groups to fight the course of the various ethnic groups in the Niger Delta. These groups include the Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta, the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Itsekiri General Assembly, The Chikoko Movement and MOSOP (Luqman, 2014). The hostility in the region later came with hostage taking, kidnappings, killings and clashes between security agents and militants (Akinola, 2010). Therefore, militancy dominated the agitations in the region since the start of the Fourth Republic. More salt was added to the wound with the formation of The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo in 2004 and the organisation was all out against oil companies in the Niger Delta and the Nigerian state (Luqman, 2014). Dokubo was arrested in 2005 and charged with treason, but this did not abate the operations of militant groups in the Niger Delta (Luqman, 2014).

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Prior to the formation of the NPDVF, the government had responded to the issues of the Niger Delta by setting up the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in early 2000. This was put in place alongside military intervention. These did not end the agitations in the region. The steps taken by President Yar’Adua to end the violence in the region include reorganising NDDC, putting in place a Niger Delta Master Plan, formation of a Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and granting amnesty to militants (Odoemelan et al., 2014). The last one directly addressed the rate of violence in the region by doing the magic to reduce the rate of militancy (Odoemelan et al., 2014). However, it did not completely put an end to the existence of armed groups in the Niger Delta. Hence, the perpetuation of issues that require negotiations among relevant stakeholders in the region. Hitherto, negotiations were not coordinated. The armed groups in the Niger Delta had always made separate negotiations with the government and oil companies. This made resolving issues difficult. Consequently, Pan Niger Delta Elders Forum (PANDEF) came into existence to harmonise these complaints and engage in talks with the government (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). This has fostered peace in the region since the end of 2016 (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) came into existence in 2016 and its activities interrupted the peace the region recorded from 2009 to 2015 (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). Negotiations between PANDEF and the government yielded a reduction in the attacks of the NDA on oil installations and this culminated in the emergence of Reformed Niger Delta Avengers, which is dedicated to guaranteeing that government accomplishes its developmental promises to the region (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). The challenges of the Niger Delta and the activities of militants are integral to the issues of national integration in Nigeria. The issues with the region might have been instrumental to the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan as Vice President in 2007. Politically, the North was to produce the president because the South ruled from 1999 to 2007. Hence, the PDP settled for a vice president from the South South. The choice of the South South over the South East makes this assertion a bit tenable. The choice was probably made to give the oil-producing region a sense of belonging in the political sphere of the country. Except for the steps taken by President Yar’Adua, this political approach of selecting the vice president could not douse the tension in the Niger Delta.

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Threats of Secession and the Civil War Aside from the Adaka Boro-led secession threat on issues affecting the Niger Delta, different parts of the country have threatened and still threatening to secede. These are signs that Nigeria’s federal system is far from promoting unity in diversity. The North threatened to secede from the country in 1950 if the region did not have up to 50% representation of the Legislative Council in Lagos (Elaigwu, 2006). The West followed suit in secession threat by threatening to secede in 1953 if Lagos was not merged with the region (Elaigwu, 2006). The Eastern region threatened to secede in 1964 as a result of the manner the 1964 election was conducted (Tamuno, 1970). The Tiv people threatened to secede in 1965 because of the maladministration of their territory from the colonial period to independence (Tamuno, 1970). The North made a second threat to secede in 1966 when General Aguiyi Ironsi changed the country to a unitary system (Elaigwu, 2006). The Eastern region made a second attempt to secede and become the Republic of Biafra in 1967 and this led to a 30-month Civil War which threatened the peace of the country. One of the activities that preceded the Civil War was the Unification Decree of Ironsi’s administration. The purpose of the decree was to whittle down regionalism, tribal loyalty and consciousness (Teniola, 2017). This approach was in contradiction with the federal principle of unity in diversity because no matter the desire to be united, people are still conscious they belong to an ethnic group. Furthermore, he centralised the public service, and the major element of this was to tone down the quota system and embrace merit (Teniola, 2017). The author avers that the North was not favoured by these decisions because the South, especially the East, possessed more qualified personnel than the North. The author posits that the Eastern Region Governor, Odumegwu Ojukwu, was comfortable with the decree, the governors of the Mid-West and North were not disposed to it while the governor of the Western region was neutral. Aguiyi Ironsi was an Igbo man. The promulgation of the decree resulted in the pogrom of tens of thousands of Igbos resident in Northern Nigeria between May and September 1966 (Hill, 2012). The July 1966 coup was carried out by officers of Northern extraction where Ironsi was killed and his death heightened the fears of the Igbos in the North. Gowon, a Northerner emerged as the Head of State but Ojukwu, the Governor of the Eastern Region rejected the former’s leadership because he was not the most senior military officer in the country

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and should not have been installed as the Head of State (Falola & Heaton, 2008). In September 1966, Ojukwu asked Igbos living in other parts of the country to return to the East. In January 1967, the Supreme Military Council and Ojukwu met to avert the looming crisis but the outcome was not fruitful. Ojukwu affirmed that the Eastern region was going to take over federal government departments and agencies situated in the Eastern Region, but the federal government declared such a proposition as illegal (Hill, 2012). On May 30, 1967, Ojukwu declared the independent state of Biafra, and by July 6, 1967, war commenced between the Nigerian and Biafran forces (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Hill, 2012). The war came to an end on January 12, 1970. It is assumed that the key reason the federal government vehemently resisted the secession is the abundance of crude oil in the Biafran territory (Hill, 2012). After the war, Biafra was reincorporated back into the country (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The death recorded due to the 30-month war was between 1 and 3 million people (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The circumstances around the Civil War and the unrelenting secession bid of the IPOB have reduced the trust other Nigerians bestow on Igbos as stakeholders in Nigeria’s national integration. Thus, Nigerians have scepticism about an Igbo man emerging as the president. There is the assertion that Igbos are being marginalised with respect to frustrating moves for an Igbo elite to become the president of the country and deliberate moves in trimming the number of Igbos that hold key public positions. South East politician gave a comprehensive submission on this below: Yes, mine has been marginalised, and there is a historical argument for it. I am of the Igbo stock. Prior to the Biafran crisis or the Nigerian Civil War, there has always been this suspicion of the Igbos trying to dominate the other parts of the country. Then of course when the Civil War occurred, the Igbos were like defeated. Certain amnesties were reached, certain structural arrangements were equally put in place, then you now talk about re-integration of the people that supposedly broke away from the federation, and now you started noticing certain levels of limitation of people. The public service, military institutions and stuff of that nature which is what you hear reverberating up till this moment. People will tell you that they do not have any senior military officer in any command position or even within the security apparatus of the country. These are all issues that you look at from the political angle and now say okay there could be marginalisation (Personal Interview South East Politician, January 2019)

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Most of these indicators of marginalisation outlined by South East politician portray what a typical Nigerian elite tags as marginalisation. Political and public positions have been given as the nucleus of marginalisation. Thus, elites in the South East just like any other zone are more comfortable filling these positions and less concerned about the development that should come to their enclaves. In circumstances where they ‘ensure’ development projects are sited in their geo-political zones, the ultimate aim is to score political points and perpetuate themselves or their anointed disciples in office (Faluyi, 2023). Nevertheless, South West politician one thought that the South East has not been short-changed in the Fourth Republic. He emphasised that: For the Igbos, to them, their marginalisation is that they have never been able to head the federal government and they hope that by 2023 they will be able to achieve their ambition, but the South East will not look at appointment structure even from 1999. They dominated the Obasanjo administration if you check. The key offices, the key positions. They did the same thing with Jonathan but as far as they are concerned, even when you look at the National Assembly, how many Igbos have been President of the Senate? Not less than five of them. (Personal Interview South West Politician One, December 2018)

This echoes the fact that deprivation is not always absolute but may be relative. However, South West opinion leader ascribed less importance to the demands of the region. He gave his opinion below: Now let us take a case of the Igbos. The Igbos are saying that since the Civil War, they have not been president of this country…. this and that. That is correct, that is a fact. Now before the Civil War, you said you did not want Nigeria. Do you really have legitimacy in asking to be president of a country you said you do not want? They are yet to provide answers to that question; we want to build; we do not want to destroy. We should ask that question then. The second question is there are still clamours for Biafra, IPOB, and all that is all over the place and none of the leaders is speaking against it, and at the same time, you say you want to be President of Nigeria. You cannot be here and there, let us know where you are. Then you now say we are being marginalised; you marginalised yourself because you have shown insincerity, you have shown a lack of patriotism, lack of support for this nation. You cannot lead a nation that you are fighting. (Personal Interview South West Opinion Leader, December 2018)

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The Biafra agitations, nevertheless, the performance of Peter Obi (who came third) in the 2023 Presidential Election might be an indication that the distrust in the Igbo ethnic group may be on the decline. However, the performance may also not be far from the quest of Nigerians to try another political party aside from PDP and APC. This feat notwithstanding, the continued demand for secession by the South East and the entrance of the Yorubas into this secession race are indications that national integration is still a serious issue in Nigeria and rotational presidency may not be the only tool to boost the integration profile of Nigeria. The emphasis laid on the presidency means that the process of selecting who becomes the president of the country and other political positions has threatened the peace of the country more than once. This quest for the presidency has historical antecedents such that ethnicity was imported into the military profession. This among other factors was responsible for the military’s incursion into politics. Military Coups The way the British designed their handover was such that the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups were saddled with the political control of the country (Wara, 2014). This created suspicion among other ethnic groups and fear of being dominated by the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, and it became a conducive atmosphere to support the activities of the coup plotters, especially in the South (Wara, 2014). Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of Northern Region, also alleged that the Igbos like to dominate wherever they are. These passive factors marginally snowballed into the first military coup of January 15, 1966. Some officers in the Nigerian Army of which all except one were from the Eastern region carried it out. However, the obvious reasons for the coup include the Tiv riots of the 1960s and the military response of the Northern region government to quench it, the Action Group (AG) crisis of 1962, the 1964 General Election issues, the 1965 Western region election brouhaha, corruption and nepotism. These had multiplier effects on peace and governance in the entire country. The coup plotters interpreted this as the incapacity of the political class to manage the country. However, the fact that most of the executors of the coup were of Eastern extraction enveloped their intent in ethnicity. The ethnic dimension of the coup became conspicuous because most of the victims were Northern and Western politicians and military officers.

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The North was not happy with the way the Sardauna (the Premier) was killed. Although the coup was not successful, Ironsi, the most senior military officer who was also Igbo and Easterner became the Head of State. What added salt to the wound apart from the Unification Decree earlier mentioned was that most of Ironsi’s officials were Igbos and this sent a continued Igbo domination signal to the North (Heerten & Moses, 2014). In addition, the plotters of the January 1966 coup did not face trial but were just detained and were still receiving their salaries (Akinsanya, 2002b). All these events caused dissent between the North and the East and were some of the major causes of the Civil War. A countercoup was carried out in July 1966, and mostly Northern military officers executed it. This cost the lives of Aguiyi Ironsi and Adekunle Fajuyi, the military governor of the Western Region. This was seen as revenge against the Igbos over the first coup. This no doubt widened the divisions between the North and the Igbos and was one of the immediate events that led to the Civil War. Thus, apart from the difficulty of having true federalism in a military system, unity in diversity was very far from being achieved at this time. Apart from the two coups explained above, there were coups in 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1995 and 1997. Some were successful, some were not, and some were alleged. Among these, that of 1990 was conspicuously ethnically inclined and threatened federal stability in the country. The April 22, 1990, Coup was an ethnically lined coup because it was carried out by officers from the Middle Belt and the Southern part of the country against Northern officers. Major Gideon Orkar, a Tiv man from the North Central, led the coup. The announcement that the Hausa, Fulani and Islamic states of Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto were to be excised from the rest of the country exposed the ethnic undertone of the plotters (Wara, 2014). His statement further established the ethnic paintings of the coup as Mordi quoted a statement during the coup. We wish to emphasize that this is not just another coup, but a well-conceived, planned and executed revolution for the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples [sic] of the Middle Belt and the South with a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation by a clique of this country. (Mordi, 2015)

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This Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar-led coup against the Babangida administration was another confirmation of minorities’ frustration (Genyi, 2014). Their actions were mostly in support of the people of the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta. This was history in action like the agitations of the Middle Belt and Niger Delta in the First Republic. It was a sign that some parts of the country were still not satisfied with the Nigerian project. The country’s experiment with civil rule shows that civilians are not better managers of the country’s diversity. Elections have been the means to transition to civil rule but poorly managed electoral processes and outcomes have threatened the stability of Nigeria. Annulment of June 12, 1993, Presidential Election and Elections in the Fourth Republic There had been pre-election, election and post-election violence in the history of Nigeria. Those of 1964 and 1965 were some of the factors responsible for the first military coup. The political parties of the Second Republic that participated in the 1979 and 1983 elections were just a little more national than the First Republic political parties. The former were more ethnic based. The formation, membership and ethnic affiliations of these political parties affected elections in the First and Second Republics. The 1993 Presidential Election was widely known as the freest and fairest in the country even though the known winner had a MuslimMuslim joint ticket. Nigerians jettisoned religious and ethnic sentiments to vote. After the victory of the presidential candidates of the National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the primaries and after it became obvious that the duo were Muslims, Christian leaders advocated for a Christian vice presidential candidate (Suberu, 1993). However, the SDP still settled for a Muslim running mate, Babagana Kingibe. Regrettably, the election was annulled. The Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) spearheaded by Arthur Nzeribe and which seemed to work for the government challenged the election in court on June 1, 1993, and the court on some grounds ruled that the election could not hold on June 12, 1993 (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Obi-Ani & Obi-Ani, 2010). The stance of the ABN was not strange because it was formed with the primary aim of perpetuating Babangida in power (Abidoye, 2022). Allegations against Abiola included his plans to retire some military officers, his love for chieftaincy titles, and his feelings that he could deal with the military after his household had clashes with some Air Force

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officers. Others are his opposition to posting Christian military officers to majorly Muslim Northern states and allegations of delegates being induced with money (Obi-Ani & Obi-Ani, 2010). Arthur Nzeribe also urged Abiola to pick Igbo as running mate, or if that was not possible, he should make a commitment to appoint some Igbos to key positions; he declined and boasted that he was fine without Igbos (Obi-Ani & Obi-Ani, 2010). In addition, during the campaign in Imo State, Abiola did not pay Nzeribe a courtesy visit despite being in the latter’s state and member of the same party (Obi-Ani & Obi-Ani, 2010). Another account has it that Abiola’s problem with the government in power was his choice of Babagana Kingibe as running mate instead of Paschal Bafyau (Abidoye, 2022). The source has it that for the party to impose a running mate on him, he will be a weak president. These assertions indicate that Nzeribe could not have been the only one opposed to Abiola’s Presidency, but some elites might have used him as their ‘voice’. These actions also strengthen the argument of this book that elites could cross ethnic lines to accomplish a purpose. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) still went on with the election citing Decree 13 of 1993, which prevents courts from stopping the election. However, after the announcement of results in some states, ABN sought another injunction to prevent the announcement of the remaining states and following this were different court judgments in support or opposing the full announcement (Obi-Ani & Obi-Ani, 2010). Ab initio, the ethnic factor did not come in the electoral process, but the judgements of the judges illuminated their ethnic biases (Obi-Ani & Obi-Ani, 2010) The NEC was coerced by Babangida’s regime to suspend the final tallying of results (Abidoye, 2022). The results showed that Abiola’s victory was beyond ethnic or religious undertones. As of 14 July 1993, the NEC had published results from 15 states with Abiola leading convincingly, and regionalism was jettisoned because Abiola’s lead spread across regions beyond the South West (News from Africa Watch, August 27 1993). The announcement of the result was suspended on June 16, 1993. Results later released showed that SDP had 58.36% (8,341,309) while the NRC had 41.64% (5,952,087) votes in the presidential election (African Elections Database, 2011; Falola & Heaton, 2008; Ibrahim, 2018). However, Babangida annulled the election with the excuses that Abiola emerged victorious on a platform that brewed ethnic dissension,

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that the two parties bought votes with funds and that the national election apparatus was not that secure to stop electoral malpractices (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Babangida carried out this act on June 23, 1993, and it led to turmoil in different parts of the country and about 100 people were killed (Babalola, 2016). There were protests from civil society groups, Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) (although Northern branches were unwilling to participate) and National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The dichotomy in the positions of the NLC in the North and the South affirmed the ethnic colouration given to the 1993 Presidential Election as a post-election action. Movement for the Advancement of Democracy hijacked a Nigerian Airways plane in protest against the annulment, and military installations were equally attacked (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Ethnic narrative became dominant. Thugs also hijacked the protests, especially in Lagos and later snowballed into ethnic conflict as members of the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups were attacked in Lagos (News From Africa Watch, August 27, 1993). The Yorubas also felt deprived because the June 12, 1993, election was annulled by a Northern military leader (Peter, 2014). Some Yoruba leaders even threatened that the South West was going to secede while there were fears that the Igbos may resuscitate calls for Biafra again (Falola & Heaton, 2008). All these no doubt threatened federal stability and national integration in Nigeria. Aside from the First Republic, this period marked the beginning of a deeper polarisation of Nigeria along ethnic lines, especially the North and South dichotomy. Humphrey Nwosu, the chairman of the NEC when the 1993 election was conducted, gave an account regarding the strong opposition against the declaration of Abiola as the President below: [F]ollowing the peaceful and successful conduct of June 12, 1993 presidential election, which Alhaji M.K.O. Abiola won, and given the National Electoral Commission’s appeal which was pending at the Court of Appeal, Kaduna against the rulings of Hon. Justice Bassey Ikpeme and Dahiru Saleh Chief Judge of Abuja High Court in [S]uit No. FCT/H/CV/ 165/93 and taking into account that the presiding judge of the Court of Appeal – Justice Okey Achike – could in all probability rule in favour of NEC and Alhaji M.K.O. Abiola, and he would then be pronounced by NEC as the winner of June 12, 1993 presidential election, those who opposed the election felt highly threatened. They in my view rallied round and caused the election to be annulled on June 23, 1993 and dissolved

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the National Electoral Commission. Their action was in a sense to prevent the Federal Court of Appeal from sitting on June 25, 1993 as scheduled, since NEC has been dissolved. NEC’s appeal before the court became untenable (in Udombana, 2017: 13)

This was the connivance of military elites with the judiciary to truncate the process. Nwosu also gave the implications of the government’s actions on democracy below: This was how our journey to democracy in Nigeria came to an abrupt end. It happened after the expectations of Nigerians had been raised to the highest level, which never had been witnessed in the constitutional history of the country. This took place after the generality of Nigerians had internalised the spirit of democracy. They had developed “we” consciousness, they eschewed ethnicity, regional and religious divide, shunned other primordial loyalties and made their sacred choices in a free, fair and peaceful atmosphere. Nigerians saw a window of opportunity for real and genuine democracy. They grabbed it on June 12, 1993. They tasted it and liked it. The annulment of June 23, 1993 snatched the priceless prize from the people. The June 12, 1993 Presidential election had laid a strong foundation for democracy in Nigeria. In my own view June 12, 1993 is indeed the real democracy day in Nigeria. (in Udombana, 2017: 13)

Had this election not been annulled, the ethnic intolerance in the country may not have been this much. Political elites could not have found it easy to manipulate the masses to ‘scoop’ votes from them and political campaigns would have been issue based and development focused and not ethnic profiling jamborees. Chief MKO Abiola declared himself president on June 11, 1994 and was arrested on June 24, 1994 (Nwala, 1997). The Yorubas perceived Abiola’s arrest as the perpetuation of Northern domination. However, the positive side of it for the South West was the ‘consensus’ that the region should produce the president at the commencement of the Fourth Republic. Before the 2003 elections, there were political killings in different parts of the country (Bamgbose, 2012). The 2007 elections were also violent as there was confrontation between party supporters, hijack of ballot boxes, voters were disenfranchised and faulty collation of results (Bamgbose, 2012). The 2011 election divided Nigeria along ethnic and religious lines. The two leading candidates, Goodluck Jonathan of the

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PDP, a Christian from the South South and Muhammadu Buhari of the CPC, a Muslim from the North West, polarised the country along ethnic and religious lines. The announcement of the result sparked violent protests in the North, and about 800 people were killed while about 65,000 were displaced (Bamgbose, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2011). The Northern states affected include Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The basis for this crisis was the expectation of the CPC’s candidate, who hailed from the North to be victorious in the election. The election aroused more sentiment on the propriety of rotating the presidency between the North and South. This has made major political parties to be more cautious in presenting candidates for elections in subsequent elections. The failure of the PDP to produce a Northern candidate in the 2015 election cost PDP its victory. The North with the support of the South West were against Jonathan’s Presidency perhaps because the then opposition APC presented presidential and vice presidential candidates from the North West and South West, respectively. The North never wanted a Southern candidate in that election. The position of the region also reflected in pre-election activities. For instance, in January 2015, President Jonathan was attacked in his campaigns in Bauchi and Katsina (Animashaun, 2015). The 2019 election was a two-horse race between two Northern Muslims. Hence, it generated less of ethnic and religious divisions. Although, if Atiku Abubakar of the PDP had won, it would have meant a fresh tenure for the North East which ruled the country last in 1966. Another implication was that it would have meant another four years for the North after Buhari, and if he decided to seek a second term and win, it would have implied a Northern twelve-year reign (Faluyi, 2022). This would have generated a negative reaction from Southern elites and probably some Christian elites because of Atiku Abubakar’s faith. The 2023 elections had ethnic and religious linings. Atiku Abubakar contested and this did not go down well with the South because they felt that it was not the turn of the North to rule again. This caused divisions in the PDP which orchestrated the refusal of four Southern and a Middle Belt governor in his party to publicly refuse to support him. They were more disposed to Southern presidency. The fielding of a Muslim/ Muslim ticket by the APC made the party less popular among the Christians. Christians were more comfortable with Peter Obi of the LP from

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the South East because he is a Christian. The fact that he is from the South also made him acceptable in the Southern region. However, Bola Tinubu of the APC is from the South West and this split the loyalty of the Southern region between the APC and LP. The negative effect was the post-presidential election ethnic profiling of the Igbos in the South West on the premise that the former wanted to take over Lagos. This affected the popularity of the LP in Lagos and some South West states. During the governorship elections and post-elections, negative comments were made by Igbo and Yoruba elites which could have derailed the relative peace in the South. The ethnic and religious roller coasters in the 2023 elections were all midwifed by political elites with the sole aim of attaining political power. Thus, elections and the outcome of elections, especially when ethnic profiling and bigotry surround the process, breed distrust in the country.

Implications of These Issues on Peace These cracks in the Nigerian federal system have implications for the peace of the country. Although some of the events reviewed occurred decades ago, they have marginal effects on the state of peace in contemporary Nigeria. These historical and contemporary centrifugal forces have multiplier effects which have affected the social and economic activities of the masses. These have also affected government expenditure such that funds that would have been deployed for the provision of infrastructure are used to respond to violence. The military which should primarily be involved in defending the country against external aggression is now involved in internal security in most states. Internal security should be the primary function of the police but the magnitude of the threat to the peace of the country and the incapacity of the police as an institution are responsible for the engagement of the military. The Institute for Economics and Peace10 Global Peace Index reveals how the country has fared for over a decade and this is presented in comparison with other countries. In 2010, Nigeria ranked 137 out of 149 countries; 142 out of 153 countries in 2011; 146 out of 158 countries in 2012. Ranked 148 out of 162 countries in 2013. It ranked 151 in 2014 and 2015 out of 162 countries. The country ranked 149 out of 163 countries in 2016 and 2017; 148

10 http://economicsandpeace.org/.

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out of 163 countries in 2018 and 2019. Finally, Nigeria ranked 147, 146 and 143 out of 163 countries in 2020, 2021 and 2022, respectively. These rankings came about as a result of some indicators. These are ongoing domestic and international conflicts which are broken down into the number and duration of internal conflicts; number of deaths from external organised conflicts; number of deaths from internal organised conflicts; number, duration and role in external conflicts; intensity of organised internal conflict and relations with neighbouring countries. The second one is societal safety and security. This is split into the level of perceived criminality in the society; number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population; political instability; political terror scale; impact of terrorism; number of homicides per 100,000 people; level of violent crime; violent demonstrations; number of jailed population per 100,000 people and ease of access to small arms and light weapons. The third one is militarisation and the building blocks are military expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product; the number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people, among others. These indicators manifest in Nigeria through the proliferation of small and light arms, electoral violence, militancy in the Niger Delta, terrorism in the Northern part of the country, banditry, kidnappings, clashes between herdsmen and farmers/host communities, communal violence, boundary disputes, among others. The positions Nigeria has taken for the past 13 years reflects a weak federal system and low national integration. The diversity of the country has not been well managed.

Conclusion The Nigerian federal system is structured to concentrate more power on the government at the centre. The subnational units are left to pick the crumbs in terms of power allocation. Factors, like colonialism, long years of military rule and control of resources by the federal government account for this unhealthy federal practice. Thus, the subnational units that are closer to the masses have fewer resources at their disposal to effectively discharge their duties. Therefore, different sections of the country do not satisfactorily feel the impact of the government. This weak federal arrangement is a catalyst to indoctrinate the masses into marginalisation and agitation contentions. These breed disunity in the country and the reason for the low integration base of the country.

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Successive governments have responded through different measures to mitigate the attendant instability in Nigeria. The next chapter explores the different approaches being employed by successive governments before the Nigeria Civil War to address the shaky integration in the country. These measures are still in operation and have evolved over the years. Circumstances and the style of government in power have determined the manner of implementation and success.

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CHAPTER 7

Pre-civil War National Integration Measures in Nigeria

Introduction There are different approaches to improving national integration in a country. The approach to take in each country depends on factors like history, level of diversity, resources, among others. All of them continued till after the war but in other forms. The focus of this chapter is on national integration measures that have been in place prior to the civil war. These include constitutional conferences, revenue allocation formulas, and creation of regions/states and local governments. These measures continued till after the war but with different nomenclatures. Different Nigerian governments have constituted conferences/ committees to look into how the different ethnic and religious groups can live in peace. Some of them were also set up to design new constitutions. Some were set up before independence and most of them were instrumental to the constitutions that existed until 1960. Constitutional conferences/constitution drafting committee were also put in place before the Fourth Republic. Revenue allocation is a national integration measure because if revenue allocation is not well managed, it may threaten the peace of a country. Consequently, the chapter explores revenue allocation formulas in the country from 1946 till date. These include vertical and horizontal principles.

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Created regions/states and local governments and the rationale behind their creation have been subjects of debate in Nigeria. These created states house majority and minority ethnic groups as well as indigenes and nonindigenes. These stratifications have been poorly managed in some states and resulted in conflicts even though many advocates of state creation believe it should foster group autonomy and peace.

National Integration in Nigeria It is crucial to have a glimpse into national integration in Nigeria. This will serve as the bedrock to explore the various integration measures that have been put in place in the country. There is no perfectly homogeneous society. Plurality may exist in the form of religion, ethnicity, race, class, culture, language, among others. These differences cannot be avoided but can only be managed to promote unity amidst diversity. So far diversity exists, national integration cannot be achieved fully, but it can be achieved to the extent that the country will be prioritised above other affiliations. This resonates with the point made by Researcher Two. In the first place, national integration is a relative term. Relative in the sense that I am not so sure whether there is any place in the world where 100% national integration exists except for nation-states and you and I know very well that nation-states are difficult to come by wherein a state is made up of just one nation- homogeneous. That is rare. The common thing is states are made up of different ethnic nationalities. So, it will be a matter of self-delusion if we assume that one day, Nigeria will have a 100% national integration. (Personal Interview Researcher Two, December 2018)

Researcher Three shared similar views. Their views resonate with what Folarin et al. (2014) posit that integration is about consensus. In a consensus, you win some and lose some, so national integration cannot be absolute. It cannot thrive where a section of the country always has its way to the detriment of others. National integration has been at a very low level in Nigeria. The ethnic and religious distrust among Nigerians substantiates this fact. North East opinion leader outlined this below, and constitutional lawyer one and the Christian cleric share similar views with him.

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The problem of national integration is not peculiar to the Nigerian setting. It is an issue with most Third World economies. In the Nigerian context, I would love to look at the problem revolving around the factor of ethnicity and the factor of religion. Fundamentally, I would want to see these as the hindrance to the processes of national integration in Nigeria. If you remove these two factors together, I think by and large, I believe the issue of integration would not be much of an issue because most of the things in Nigeria in terms of positions, resource-wise and what have you...........the persons occupying these positions are not looked at as Nigerians. They are being looked at through the prism of tribe, and which religion. So, basically, this is a major challenge. (Personal Interview North East Opinion Leader, January 2019)

Affiliation with ethnicity or religion in Nigeria has been the major reason for violence at different times in the country’s history (Sarumi et al., 2019). This is because a group sees itself or its values as being superior to those of others. This falls in place with the view of Anugwom (2000) that ethnicity makes a group see other groups as somehow inferior and as present or potential rivals and this generates distortion and subjectivity in relating with other groups. Religious affiliation is no exception to this. This culture has been transplanted and used in resource allocation by political elites (Tsuwa & Asongo, 2013), and it decimates national integration. In other words, the ethnoreligious attitude of elites in allocating resources is sold to the public as the norm when elites, and the public tends to see no fault in these elitist dispositions, suggesting therefore that the society is elite directed (Ojukwu & Shopeju, 2010). These highlighted issues are rooted in the lackadaisical attitude of the colonial powers about the diversity of the country. The ethnic and religious discord that is rife in the country is traced to colonialism. Researcher One emphasised this. So, the colonial factor is a critical one, no doubt about it. Number two, I think the colonial factor came with mutual suspicion from all the ethnic nationalities that were amalgamated in 1914. They were forced to come together. Again, I said probably a country called Nigeria in its current form probably wouldn’t have emerged. The root of division or difficulty to achieve national integration in Nigeria started from the colonial period, and there is no way we can talk about the difficulty in achieving national integration in Nigeria without going back to the colonial period. All the

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different ethnicities that we now have in Nigeria were more or less independent nations before the colonial time. (Personal Interview Researcher One, December 2018)

This resonates with Alapiki’s (2005) stand that territories with varied cultures and traditions were forcefully merged. It is also an attestation to the fact that the colonialists did not carry the masses along and this culture of masses’ exclusion has been retained by the elites that took over. So it goes back to the history of our coming together, the history of colonialism and what Nigeria has experienced after colonialism. The colonial administrators represented elites who were interested in exploiting the people and the country, and the modus operandi of the post-colonial Nigerian elites has been the same (Ojukwu & Shopeju, 2010). The elites have sustained the division, suspicion, economic exploitation, and political domination all for their benefit. The colonial administrators represented elites who were interested in exploiting the people and the country, and the modus operandi of the post-colonial Nigerian elites has been the same (Ojukwu & Shopeju, 2010). South South opinion leader substantiated this as perhaps the fundamental factors are in the heterogeneous nature of the country, and when we say heterogeneous we want to think in terms of ethnic heterogeneity, religious heterogeneity and cultural heterogeneity and these issues by themselves would not have been a problem for national integration, but it is the way the elites have used them (quote and unquote) in playing politics that have made them problematic. (Personal Interview South South Opinion Leader, December 2018)

However, Researcher Three submitted that the manner Nigeria was amalgamated will no doubt bring challenges, but we should be looking towards managing the situation positively. He posited that it is not unexpected that in this kind of arrangement, this kind of amalgamation of ethnic groups, religious nationalities and what have you that countries with such characteristics are not too far away from challenges of national integration. It is not something that should bother us so much. What should bother us is our inability not to effect, to evolve a viable or workable option for ethnic management. (Personal Interview Researcher Three, January 2019)

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Successive governments have introduced various programmes to boost national integration in the country. It has become a challenge that a series of attempts, reforms and solutions to ensure a harmonious relationship among ethnic configurations and religious groupings have not done the magic to unite Nigerians. ‘National integration issue in Nigeria is not a one-bullet problem, so it cannot have a one-bullet solution’ (Personal Interview Researcher Two, December 2018). This explains why various administrations keep introducing different measures and modifying existing ones. However, the perpetual marginalisation and agitations by various groups coupled with the rise of various ethnic-based organisations point to the fact that national integration is still at its lowest level in the country (Onwuegbuchulam & Mtshali, 2017). These groups include the Arewa Consultative Forum, Middle Belt Forum (MBF), Northern Elders Forum, Oodua People’s Congress, MOSOP, Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra, INC, Egbesu Boys, NDPVF, and IPOB, among others. Ironically, the implementation of these programmes has even been the basis for alleged marginalisation. Researcher Three captured this as ‘each of the measures has been given ethnic and religious colouration’ (Personal Interview Researcher Three, January 2019). This view is supported by North Central opinion leader from the perspective of the implementing agencies. ‘If these agencies have fostered integration in Nigeria, by now, I think we should not have any cause for crises. We should not have any cause to attack one another. That is to tell you that there has been the failure of these agencies to integrate Nigerians’ (Personal Interview North Central Opinion Leader, January 2019). It is salient to analyse these measures to ascertain their level of success.

Constitutional Conferences There have been gatherings of the different groups in Nigeria to discuss what the future holds for the country. Some of these were in the preindependence period while those of the post-independence have been organised by both military and civilian administrations. All these were constituted to integrate the country. They are seen mainly as restructuring platforms to discuss matters that have whittled down Nigeria’s integration and suggest ways out. Issues discussed include resource control,

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revenue allocation, tenure of political officeholders, and the federal structure, among others. However, national integration is still weak in Nigeria. Some of these conferences laid the foundations for some of the pre and post-independence constitutions. They have also been given different names by the governments that constituted them. However, no matter the name it is given, the structure and modus operandi will determine if it is a national/constitutional conference or a Sovereign National Conference (SNC). A national conference is the formal convergence of interest groups— representatives of different sections of a state tasked with responsibilities, which may include midwifing a new constitution, and designing common solutions to pressing national problems (Ajayi, 2006). A national conference is a formal platform for dialogue by constituent units of the nation convened by the national government of a country to discuss issues or problems that inhibit national progress or challenge national cohesion (National Conference, 2014). These definitions do not include ‘sovereign’, so it is easier for the government to determine its course or choose not to implement all its recommendations. A SNC is a convened supreme conference of the citizens that possesses legislative and executive authorities which may set up a government or executive authority, promulgate a new constitution and outline a new direction for the country (Nwala, 1997). A SNC should enjoy autonomy. It should be able to set its own agenda and exercise authority to decide on any issue before it (Osaghae, 2001). The delegates to such conference should not be nominated by the government but should be representatives of groups like civil societies, political parties, ethnic groups, labour unions, students, farmers, religious groups, women groups and even the government, and it should be in such a way that electorates can elect the delegates (Ajayi, 2006). The differences between the two are while the national conference may still maintain the status quo, SNC may change the status quo because its decision supersedes the legislature and executive, and it may create a new political order, and its outcome may substitute the existing system of government (Ajayi, 2006; Osaghae, 2001). A SNC is the most suitable atmosphere for healthy restructuring discussion in Nigeria. However, a government may not be willing to give room for a SNC to be constituted and operate. This book posits that it may not necessarily be a SNC that will do the magic but if it is a national/constitutional conference, what will foster unity and a sense of belonging could still be achieved.

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Hence, restructuring can still be actualised on the pedestal of a national/ constitutional conference. More centrifugal forces and less of centripetal-based ideologies and allegiances still form the bases for social and political relations in Nigeria (Udombana, 2017). National consciousness has remained a challenge in Nigeria because Nigerians are more comfortable with tribal affiliations (Udombana, 2017). These unpleasant situations can be addressed through restructuring. The essence of restructuring is to have a groundwork for fair and equitable allotment of the political space by the numerous ethnic groups that constitute a federal state (Lanre, 2017). It means no group would be able to dominate other groups geographically or demographically, and both the majority and minority groups would have access to the resources of the state (Lanre, 2017). Restructuring in Nigeria entails devolving powers from the central government to the component units, balancing states per region, reverence to resource control, and state police matters, among others which will allow each tier of government to function as coordinate and with a great level of autonomy (Lanre, 2017). These will foster more cordial intergovernmental relations. If political and economic relationships exist in a considerate and equitable way, the unions in a federal state will enjoy harmony (Lanre, 2017). Suberu (2010) suggests that federal restructuring in Nigeria should encompass electoral matters, local government structure, rights of non-indigenes and residency, revenue sharing as well as fiscal responsibility and transparency. The submission of these scholars on restructuring should form integral parts of subjects to be discussed at national/constitutional conferences in the case of Nigeria. The sincerity of the government in constituting these conferences and allowing them to discuss issues matters. Although some of them have been covered in past conferences, ‘sincere’ implementation remains hanging in the balance. It is worthy of note that the implementation of some of the outcomes of these conferences resulted in the promulgation of constitutions. However, the conferences are dominated by elites and this has affected the types of constitutions that evolved from them. Two major problems with constitution making in Nigeria are people are alienated from the process, and people’s well-being is not given adequate consideration in the working of the constitution (Odubajo, 2011). Constitution making in Nigeria since independence has mostly been devoid of popular participation and more of a non-democratic process to serve the interest of the political elites (Azelama & Oarhe, 2010). This is evident in the selection

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process of conference members. It also affirms the elite hegemony on the political process as propounded by elite theory. Although, the ongoing constitution amendment is being carried out by the National and State legislators who are elected representatives of the people. This does not foreclose the promotion of elites’ interests. The focus of this book is on the conferences but the issues of constitution have been brought to the fore because of the nexus between the conferences and constitution making. Constitutional conferences in Nigeria chronologically include the Ibadan General Conference of 1950, the London Conference of 1953, the Lagos Conference of 1954 and Constitutional Conferences of 1957– 1958 (Hill, 2012; National Conference, 2014; Nwala, 1997; Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). These were all held before independence. The same sources give among others post-independence conferences such as the Lagos Constitutional Review Conference of July 1963, the ad hoc Constitutional Conference of 1966, Constitution Drafting Committee of 1975, the Constitution Review Committee of 1987 and the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference. There was also the Constitution Debate Coordinating Committee of 1998 that came up with the 1999 Constitution. Those that have been held in the Fourth Republic are those of 2005 and 2014. These conferences from 1966 are explained below. Constitutional Conferences/Constitution Drafting Committee Before the Fourth Republic The military coup of January 1966 and the countercoup of July 1966 heralded the first post-independent challenge to Nigeria’s federal system (Akinsanya, 2002b). Some Southern elites were comfortable with Decree 34 of 1966 which was promulgated by the Ironsi administration but it was vehemently opposed by the Northern elites. The consequence was the countercoup of July 1966. General Gowon constituted an ad hoc Constitutional Conference in September 1966 with the mandate that it should come up with a political framework that would be acceptable to all stakeholders and prevent the breaking apart of the country (Hill, 2012). The Northern and Eastern delegates proposed a confederal system of government. The Northern delegates proposed that each region should be autonomous and have the right to unilaterally secede, and have its own police, army and air

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force but that the country should have a joint navy (Akinsanya, 2002b). The East was comfortable with a loose association of states and retention of the existing regions while the Northerners were content with strong autonomous states that could delegate powers to a central entity for common services (National Conference, 2014). The Eastern region also advocated for the right of any region to secede and that each region could issue its currency (Akinsanya, 2002b). The North later changed its position by demanding an effective central government which encompasses changing regions to states, creating more states to avoid domination and avoiding secession (Akinsanya, 2002b). The Western delegates proposed similar things to those of the East, but the difference is that the former advocated for the creation of more states to reflect the linguistic and ethnic affinities of groups as well as recognise Lagos as part of the Western region (Akinsanya, 2002b). The West later preferred federalism with more states created on linguistic criteria, and Lagos should be a separate state (National Conference, 2014). The Mid-West supported a federal system with the current four regions but advocated for more regions in the future and that the status of Lagos should be either as a Federal Territory or a separate state (National Conference, 2014). Probably the comparative geographical small size of the Mid-Western Region orchestrated this position. On the other hand, the concern of the elites in the other three regions was typically about the political environment that would place them in the exalted positions of steering political power in their respective autonomous regions (National Conference, 2014; Omololu, 2012). However, the conference was adjourned sine die as a result of killings of Ibos in the North and the presence of Northern troops in the West which led to Eastern delegates not attending again and the withdrawal of Chief Obafemi Awolowo from the Western delegation (Akinsanya, 2002b). Therefore, the Conference was suspended, sine die (Akinsanya, 2002b). This development was a sign that there was no cordial relationship between Gowon and Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Eastern Region Military Governor. The killings among other catalysts prompted the latter to order the Easterners to move back home (Hill, 2012). The events reached the pinnacle when the region declared the secession of the Eastern Region from Nigeria, under the appellation, Republic of Biafra in 1967 (Hill, 2012). Consequently, the Civil War broke out on July 6, 1967, and it lasted for 30 months.

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The aftermath of the Civil War that ended in January 1970 was the need to stabilise a divided country and institute a united national consciousness. The Murtala/Obasanjo administration announced the composition of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC 2) in 1975 under the leadership of Rotimi Williams, and the committee was charged to mitigate through constitutional measures, the centrifugal forces in Nigeria’s federal system and to draft a constitution for Nigeria (Nwabueze, 2013; Phillips, 1980). The 50-member CDC 2 had two delegates from each state (Phillips, 1980). Chief Obafemi Awolowo refused to serve in the CDC 2, so this made it a 49-member committee (Nwabueze, 2013). Awolowo’s refusal to serve in the CDC 2 was almost a replication of his withdrawal from the ad hoc Constitutional Conference of 1966. This epitomised elite differentiation in a political system. The CDC 2 was to produce a draft constitution, and the Constituent Assembly (CA 1), which was constituted in 1977 headed by Justice Udo Udoma, was to debate on the propositions of the CDC 2 (Azelama, & Oarhe, 2010). The CA 1 was made up of 230 members of which 20 were appointed by the military government, seven were key members of the CDC 2, while the remaining 203 members were elected indirectly through electoral colleges on the pedestal of local government councils (Nwabueze, 2013). The elites in the CDC 2 and the CA 1 were unanimous in their firmness to ensure that the country is united. They wanted a united Nigeria because the CDC 2 and CA 1 were used as litmus to test their political popularity in preparation for the national elections (Suberu, 2019). Thus, there were alignments and realignments of political forces to project their political interests. The military government had a great influence on the final provisions of the 1979 Constitution despite the mandates of the CDC 2 and CA 1. In essence, the military government could remove provisions to be included in the Constitution already approved by the CA 1 and introduce others rejected by the CA 1 (Sambo, 2002). The CDC 2 report was submitted to the CA 1 and the final output was the 1979 Constitution. The major provisions of the 1979 Constitution were determined by issues like the 1964 and 1965 electoral crises, ethnic-based political parties, structure and division of power, civil war, minority questions, among others (Azelama & Oarhe, 2010). The 1979 Constitution marked a remarkable departure from the style of federalism as entrenched in the 1963 Constitution. For instance, 16 items that were on the concurrent list in the 1963 Constitution were moved to the exclusive list in the 1979

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Constitution and new items were also added to the federal list in the latter (Suberu, 2019). The changes in the allocation of functions among the levels of government coupled with the creation of 12 states out of the four regions further enfeebled the autonomy of the component units in the country’s federal system. The constitution also recommended a presidential style of government which accorded the president and the governors, executive powers in their respective domains. In a nutshell, the federal government garnered more powers with the president exercising executive power in a manner that the powers of the component units are contracted (Sambo, 2002). The 1979 Constitution is a negotiated document among the political and military elites that strengthened the quest for political powers at the various levels of government. However, the federal offices were still more ‘lucrative’ because the component units’ powers were weakened against the federal might. This marked the ‘launch’ of a centralised federal system under a civil rule that shifted the focus of the political elites to the control of the central government. Debates on the inclusion of Sharia law in the constitution were a major issue that polarised the elites at the CDC 2 and the CA 1. However, the secular status of the country settled the differences regarding the application of Sharia law and its inclusion in the Constitution (Hassan-Bello, 2019). Thus, the Constitution made provision for the Sharia Courts of Appeal of States principally to entertain issues of interpretation of laws and litigations on Sharia laws in states. Another concession reached was that Muslim judges could sit to hear appeals from higher courts on cases from local Sharia courts (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The 1979 Constitution was the compass for the Second Republic. It operated between October 1, 1979, and December 31, 1983. It ceased to operate as a result of the military coup that ended the Second Republic. This military putsch was elicited by the greed of political elites and their penchant for controlling power to advance their parochial interests. The attitude of the politicians manifested in the governance crises that characterised the Second Republic and the violence that ensued courtesy of the conduct of the 1983 general elections.

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The Political Bureau, the Constitution Review Committee and the Constituent Assembly Another coup in August 1985 toppled the military leadership and culminated in the emergence of General Ibrahim Babangida to take the leadership mantle. The demands by political elites and civil societies for a return to civil administration prompted the military government to initiate a transition programme. The first step taken towards transition was the composition of the Political Bureau, commissioned with the task of looking into the history of political and federal instability in the country (Nwala, 1997; Omololu, 2012; Report of the Political Bureau, 1987). The military government selected intellectuals and constitutional experts who made up the 17-member Political Bureau. The Political Bureau established in 1986 submitted its report in 1987 (National Conference, 2014). The Bureau was to collate submissions from citizens and groups on their desired structure and system of government that would be more appropriate for the country’s future stability (Report of the Political Bureau, 1987). This first phase of the transition ironically consolidated the power of the military government while the political elites began to seek alignments in preparation for political transition and ultimately, attainment of political office. The Political Bureau in its report recommended the presidential system and retained the centralised federal structure. A 46-member Constitution Review Committee (CRC) and a Constituent Assembly (CA 2) to consider the report of the Political Bureau were inaugurated by the military government in September 1987 (Suberu, 2019). The CRC and CA 2 were also signals for the political elites to consolidate their political networks in preparation for the transition to civil rule. The debates at the two fora were guided by the military and centred on the need for a new political orientation that would encompass the participation of citizens from the grassroots (Suberu, 2019). Thus, grassroots politics dominated this era. However, as brilliant as this idea appeared, the political elites whose associates were members of the CRC and CA 2 used the fora to strengthen their political alignments (Azelama & Oarhe, 2010). The outcome of the activities of the Political Bureau, the CRC and the CA 2 was the drafting of the 1989 Constitution designated to be the framework for the Third Republic. In addition, the review of the 1979 Constitution and other important documents snowballed into the 1989

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Constitution (Azelama & Oarhe, 2010). One of the features that distinguished the 1989 Constitution was the creation of two political parties by the military government: the SDP and the NRC (Falola & Heaton, 2008). This act negates democratic values because the government should only register political associations to make them political parties and not form political parties and impose such on people. However, this did not stop the holding of elections, including the presidential election. The 1993 Presidential Election, won by the SDP candidate, Moshood Abiola (a Yoruba elite), was annulled. This rekindled the ethnic crises that characterised the previous civilian regimes. The ethnic dissension created by the annulment was inconsistent with the mandate of the Political Bureau for the stability of the country. The outcome of the election marked a watershed in the country’s political landscape, however, its annulment sought to establish the perception that the Northern political and military elites were not willing to cede political power to Southern political elites (Omololu, 2012). This fear of a lopsided view of political power and marginalisation has remained a feature of the Nigerian federal system and orchestrated the demand for a decentralised federal structure. The way the outcome of the election was handled culminated in the exit of Babangida from power, putting in place of an ING and the coming on board of General Sani Abacha as the military Head of State. The 1994/1995 Constitutional Conference The political instability that emanated through the annulment of the 1993 Presidential Election culminated in the demand for the restructuring of the Nigerian federal system through a national conference (Fagbadebo, 2000; Omololu, 2012). The continued demand by the people and the attendant political crisis resulted in the government announcing the inauguration of a National Constitutional Conference in 1994 (Nwala, 1997; Omololu, 2012; Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). The 1994/95 Constitutional Conference was made up of 369 members. A total of 273 were elected from the 273 conference districts while the remaining 96 were selected by the government (three from each state and representatives from the NLC, Nigeria Union of Teachers and NANS) (Nwala, 1997; Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). The composition of the delegates was a reflection of all geographical areas, ethnic groups, religions, and parties (Freeman & Friesecke, 1994). Diversity in the composition and the demand by the people for

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a conference notwithstanding, major political elites in the South West, who were reputable in the country’s political landscape, kicked against the participation of the region in the Conference. Thus, the elected and selected delegates from the South West at the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference were regarded as the second best (Fagbadebo, 2000). The debates on the issues at the Conference projected the divisive characteristics of Northern and Southern elites. Delegates from the South were united in their demands for a restructured federal system of government that would encompass the power sharing formula in the constitution, devolution of powers to the subnational units by the central government, and fair representation of all the six geo-political zones in political and bureaucratic appointments (Fagbadebo, 2000; Omololu, 2012). The delegates from the North had divergent views from those of the South and sought that the status quo be maintained. For the South, devolution of power to the subnational units was an indication of stronger subnational units that would allow them to pursue their political interests within their geo-political zones (Fagbadebo, 2000). The North took its position because it wanted to consolidate domination of power control in a more central federal structure and its attendant principles of the quota system, which was more to its advantage with respect to federal appointments. Essentially, stronger federating units would decimate the sprawling sway of the Northern political elites on the central government. The key decisions the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference took centred around rotational presidency/power rotation, a five-year term for governors and president, devolution of the federal system, revenue sharing, equitable power sharing through federal character, arrangement of six zones, a stop to the winner-takes-all electoral system and constitutional provision for the government of national unity. Others are tribunal for recovering ill-gotten wealth, reducing the size of the legislature, and constitutional court establishment, among others (Nwala, 1997; Omololu, 2012). On the country’s federal structure, the Conference recommended federalism as the system of government for the country. It recommended that each level of government should have its autonomous powers and functions, there should be equal distribution of economic and political powers between the centre and component units, a strong and independent judiciary, economically viable federating units and promotion of peace, justice and growth concerning complexities of the units of government (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). The 1994/95 Constitutional Conference recommended that the power of the

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federal government on education, agriculture, and health, among others should be reduced in favour of the subnational units (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). The 1994/95 Constitutional Conference endorsed that the presidency should be rotated between the North and the South and for the office of the governor, it should be among the three senatorial districts while for the local government chairman, it should be among the three sections the local government authority is divided to by the state electoral commission (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). It made provision for three vice presidents of which two are not to come from the geographical area of the president, and one is to come from the president’s geographical area (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). The rotational presidency provision in the report was an achievement of the Conference (Fagbadebo, 2000; Omololu, 2012). The Conference brought more awareness on the need to rotate the presidency in the country. It gave some hope to the Southern elites on the possibility of clinching the North-dominated office. It has since then served as the basis for selecting candidates by political parties since 1999. This also explains why political parties in the Fourth Republic choose a presidential candidate from the North and a deputy from the South and vice versa. The tenure of office of the president and governors was made five years without self-succession (Nwala, 1997: 82; Report of the 1994/ 95 Constitutional Conference: 65). This means after the five-year tenure, the holder of the office will not be able to seek re-election immediately (Nwala, 1997; Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). It recommended an ad hoc division of the country into six geo-political zones to aid power sharing among these zones and limiting the zoning of the presidency to a test period of three decades (Azelama & Oarhe, 2010). This means that after 30 years, each geo-political zone would have produced the president. Chairmen of councils could also be elected for three years without self-succession (Nwala, 1997; Report of the 1994/ 95 Constitutional Conference). Winner-takes-all that favours the party that has the majority in the legislature was rejected in favour of proportional representation at all tiers of government (Nwala, 1997; Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). A major flaw of the Conference is that it did not specify when the military should hand over power (Nwala, 1997). The Constitutional Conferences in the Fourth Republic and some issues discussed pitched Northern elites against Southern elites. The Conferences also touched on matters of national integration.

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Constitutional Conferences in the Fourth Republic The National Political Reforms Conference 2005, also referred to as Confab 2005, was inaugurated by former President Obasanjo in February 2005, and its members were essentially picked by the president and state governors (Nwabueze, 2013). The Confab 2005 was not constitutionally backed, and neither did the National Assembly approve to finance it (Ajayi, 2006). It was mandated to look into issues like the political party system, electoral and legal matters, civil society, police/ prison reforms, intergovernmental relations and the structure of government (Ajayi, 2006). The country’s unity, federal character, federalism, religious diversity, separation of powers, essential objectives and principles of state policy were the areas the government charged the Confab not to discuss (Ajayi, 2006). The purpose of the Conference, as indicated by former Attorney General, Akinlolu Olujimi was part of the consultation process to aid the executive and National Assembly in addressing salient national issues (Nwabueze, 2013). This contradicted the attitude of the National Assembly towards the Conference. It is also an indication that elite differentiation can occur between arms of government irrespective of party affiliation. At that time, the PDP was the ruling party and had the majority in the National Assembly. Niger Delta delegates (Niger Delta elites) initially demanded 25% derivation for the short term and that it should increase to 50% in the long run, but the Northern delegates (Northern elites) objected and put forth 17% which oil-producing areas’ delegates spurned (Okpanachi & Garba, 2010; Usman, 2014a). Consequently, delegates from the South South and South West (Niger Delta and Yoruba Elites, respectively) walked out and demanded ‘more favourable’ fiscal federalism (Usman, 2014a). The Confab ended abruptly due to the failure to decide on certain issues, particularly that of derivation (Nwabueze, 2013). The distribution of resources was the heart of the interests of elites during the Conference. However, Northern elites got a favourable part of the bargain because the 13% derivation principle that had been in use before the Confab is still applied. The Confab 2005 could not fill the cracks in the relationship between Northern and Southern elites. Former President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration convened a constitutional conference in March 2014. It comprised 492 delegates and a six-member conference management (National Conference, 2014). The Conference was not religiously balanced because out of the 492 delegates,

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198 were Muslims; the non-legislative backing of its establishment by the National Assembly was seen by the legislators as trying to hijack their duties (Suberu, 2019). The mandate given to the Conference was to proffer solutions to the issues surrounding national unity and development and the sole ‘no-goarea’ is any discussion on the geographical disintegration of the country (National Conference, 2014). The removal of police from the exclusive list to the concurrent list as well as independent candidacy, minority rights, recognition of traditional rulers in the constitution, and devolution of political and fiscal powers, among others were the recommendations made in the conference (National Conference, 2014). It equally recommended rotating offices at the three tiers of government. That of the president should be between the North and the South and among the six geo-political zones, the office of the governor should be rotated among the three senatorial districts in the state and to rotate chairmanship seat of a local government, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should divide each local government into two or three areas (National Conference, 2014). The conference also recommended that women, youth and the physically challenged should freely participate in the political process (National Conference, 2014). The South South (Niger Delta elites) delegates demanded that the 13% derivation should increase and threatened that failure to accede to this meant there will be no peace in the geo-political zone (Nwabughiogu, 2014). The Northern elites as usual were not comfortable with this proposal. This was a renewal of the Northern and Southern elites’ differences in revenue and federal matters (Suberu, 2019). Although it is difficult to determine if the North or the South had the upper hand in the decisions or if it was ‘balanced’ because the resolutions of the Conference are yet to be implemented. The resolutions of the Conference (on pages 78 to 527 of the report) if implemented can be the bedrock for true federalism, but Jonathan’s government was short-changed with time to implement them, and Buhari’s government did not give the report consideration. This assertion aligns with that of South South opinion leader, but he also referred to the Constitutional Conference of 94/95. He submitted that ‘the 1995 Conference, the 2014 Conference, those volumes contain lofty ideas on how Nigeria can wax stronger as a federation and as a presidential government and as a democracy’ (Personal Interview South South Opinion Leader, December 2018). Although it is not expected that all the resolutions be implemented, if some of them

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had been considered, the national integration profile of Nigeria would have improved. This cold attitude towards implementation and the ‘no-go areas’ syndrome have implications for the country’s integration. The ‘no-go areas’ specified in National Conferences moderate the actualisation of national unity. Although, a no-go area like the break-up of the country appears justifiable but if political elites are willing to give concessions on greater autonomy, equity and resource control, secession may not be in the spotlight. North Central politician explained thus: What makes a Hausa man afraid of the Igbo man and why is the Igbo man afraid of the Yoruba person? These are issues we need to look at for us to have national integration. Until we look at that and agree because each time, we have national conferences, we are told, not to deliberate on these areas. These areas are precluded from deliberations. We must come together, our hands on the table, face up and agree as to what we need to address as a nation. Then we can move forward and begin to talk about national integration. (Personal Interview North Central Politician, January 2019)

The Christian cleric agreed with his opinion but rather used the word ‘restructuring’. He simply opined that ‘we must all get down to the table for a proper restructuring of this country’ (Personal Interview Christian Cleric, January 2019). Various elites that cut across political, religious, and ethnic leaders, among others have supported restructuring to boost the country’s federal stability. Kayode Fayemi, former Governor of Ekiti State and a Yoruba elite, advocated for restructuring to boost the unity of Nigeria irrespective of ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic disparities (Tauna, 2020a). He proposed that this can be achieved through the states having the largest revenue shared among the three tiers of government. On his part, Shettima Yerima, the President of Arewa Youth Consultative Forum and a Northern elite, advocated for decentralising the powers of the federal government (Tauna, 2020b). He emphasised that this would allow the states to harness their resources for the development of their territories. He concluded that this would allow the states to tackle their economic and security challenges (through community policing). Chief Ayo Adebanjo, Pastor Tunde Bakare, Pat Utomi, Gani Adams, Akin Osuntokun, Onyeka Onwenu and Eedris Abdulkareem advocated for regional autonomy through a decentralised approach, and they suggested

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the United Arab Emirates approach where each emirate utilises its resources to develop (Aluko, 2020). They also advocated for good leadership and protection of the rights of citizens. Pastor E. A Adeboye of the Redeemed Christian Church of God has also called for restructuring. He clamoured for a system where we have the president and prime minister at the federal level with each office having its autonomy (Ishiekwene, 2020). According to him, the president can control the army, as well as oil and mining while the prime minister can control the police, finance and inland revenue, taxes and customs. Also, at the state level, he recommended the positions of the governor and the premier where responsibilities will be divided between the two such that one cannot unilaterally make all decisions. He advocated for the restoration of the House of Chiefs, which would include traditional rulers and religious leaders who would be able to shape the opinions of the people. Traditional rulers and religious leaders will play key roles because they are known and respected by their subjects. He thought that the people would listen to the traditional rulers more than they would do to most politicians. South West politician two opined that to have proper restructuring, we still need to have a national conference that will involve participants across all generations. He submitted that: a real and true national conference one more time needs to be held, and this time around, we need to look at all the sectors of the nation. We need to bring in every generation available that understands the history of this country and have an idea of where they want us to go and in saying that, I think in that national confab, we need to have people in their 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s. The generations that will spread across male and female youth and the older generation. So, in my true sense, I will say five people from each state. Male/Female adult; Male/Female youth…you know. …. (Personal Interview South West Politician Two, December 2018)

These perceptions about restructuring as propounded by Lanre (2017) and Suberu (2010), the elites and South West politician two suit the Nigerian situation if well applied, can solve most of the political, cultural and security problems in the country. However, the political will is not there because the present system encourages federal hegemony. This explains why the struggle for the presidency has remained a contentious issue among the various groups in the country. In addition, the system operating provides for less accountability, and that is why elites talk from two

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sides of the mouth. If they need the support of the masses or those disposed to restructuring, they support restructuring, but if they need the support of other elites or groups not in support of restructuring, they oppose the restructuring agenda. For instance, the APC in 2017 set up a committee on the possibility of restructuring headed by former Kaduna State Governor, El-Rufai, just to get the nod of the masses for election (Ugbede, 2017). The same source has it that the party was diplomatic in its coinage of word. It preferred to emphasise that it desired to address the increasing agitations for restructuring. Also, from the same source, the former national chairman of the party surprisingly stated that the party in its manifesto did not promise restructuring but true federalism where more power is devolved to the states. However, after the party’s victory in the 2019 election, most of its leaders, especially from the North, have vigorously opposed restructuring. The reason for the opposition is hinged on resource control. The region feels if each state controls its resources, the Northern states will not benefit from the proceeds that come from oil again. In addition, the Northern Governors’ Forum and some government officials at the federal level from the region met in November 2020. They endorsed the unity of the country (Erezi, 2020). However, they have been reluctant towards having a round table meeting with their Southern counterparts to discuss the unity of the country (HassanWuyo, 2020). This has been the case because successive governments at the centre and the North have always developed cold feet about this because of the fears that the aftermath of such a conference may lead to the breakup of Nigeria (HassanWuyo, 2020; Osaghae, 2001). However, with the discovery and exploration of oil in the North, perhaps the elites from the region may change their views on resource control and restructuring. The position of the ruling party and Northern elites, nevertheless, a combination of the opinions of the respondents, the scholars and the elites will go a long way in having a conference where past conferences will be reviewed (utilise some of the recommendations and agree on new things). To achieve this, all stakeholders need to be committed to the integration of Nigeria. The main thing remains that if states control their resources, most of the issues that are drawing back national integration are secondary because states will be able to discharge their responsibilities effectively. This will boost economic development and security.

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Revenue Allocation Revenue Allocation Defined In a federal state, revenue allocation describes how revenue is shared among the levels of government. It also encompasses how funds are generated. Thus, in a federal state, we have fiscal federalism. Fiscal federalism means the allocation of tax/revenue and expenditure roles or the sharing of a federal state’s fiscal resources among the levels of government (Babalola & Okafor, 2019). It is meant to correct the imbalance between the duties of a level of government and its revenue-raising capacity through an arrangement of intergovernmental fiscal transfer (Suberu, 2003). One of the cardinals of fiscal federalism is revenue allocation. Revenue allocation arrangement in the Nigerian federal system is one of the policies on national integration that has taken centre stage. Revenue allocation can be a tool for integration or disintegration depending on if certain developmental challenges are put into consideration or not and putting the revenue potential of each unit into consideration (Abubakar, 2005). Apart from elections, census and state creation, revenue allocation is an issue that its management has affected the stability of the country (Report of 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). Revenue allocation in Nigeria predates independence. If resource transfer is well managed in a plural and federal country like Nigeria, it will help foster national integration (Abubakar, 2005). In Nigeria, revenue allocation has constitutional backing. Nigerian Constitution and Revenue Allocation Oil takes centre stage in fiscal federalism, revenue allocation, resource control, and derivation in Nigeria because it is the country’s main source of revenue. This revenue source is controlled by the federal government. Although, the government at the centre derives revenue from other sources. Revenues collected by the federal government include petroleum and gas profit tax, royalties from oil, mining rent, corporate tax as well as customs and excise duties, among others (Suberu, 2003). The focus given to oil has made less attention to be given to other sources of income, especially agriculture. This has negatively affected the revenue of states because each state has agricultural potential as shown in Table 1.2. Personal income tax, vehicle licence fee, and land tax, among others are sources of revenue for state governments while local governments

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generate income from tenement rates, environmental violations fines, and motor park fees, among others (Babalola & Okafor, 2019; Suberu, 2003). Considering the expenditure responsibilities of each tier of government as shown in Table 7.1, the federal government is the best positioned in comparison to the other two levels of government in terms of revenues that match expenditure responsibilities. This is in contrast to the First Republic where the regions had expenditure and revenue responsibilities that placed them as fiscally eligible stakeholders in the Nigerian federal system. Table 7.1 Responsibilities of the three tiers of government in Nigeria Federal Government

State Government

Local Government

Defence Foreign affairs Currency and insurance Citizenship Customs Immigration Police and *prisons (correctional services) Mines and minerals Aviation Shipping and interstate water resources Post and telecommunications **Railways Federal roads Nuclear energy ***Generation, transmission and distribution of electricity Commercial and industrial Monopolies, patents and, trade marks Minimum national education standard at all levels

Education Health State roads Agriculture Water supply Social welfare Housing

Primary education Markets Cemeteries Sewage, public conveniences, and refuse disposal Local Roads Homes for the destitute and infirm Establishment and maintenance of slaughter houses

Compiled by the author from Federal Government of Nigeria (1999); Suberu (2003) and Majeed (2023) *The president has signed a bill to delete ‘prisons’ from the exclusive list and rename it as ‘correctional services’ in the concurrent list. This has been done to reflect in the amendment of the 1999 Constitution **The president has signed a bill to remove it from the exclusive list to the concurrent list ***The president has signed a bill to allow states to generate, transmit and distribute electricity in areas covered by the national grid

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Since the first military coup in 1966, the permutation has been so skewed in favour of the centre. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the revenue and expenditure duties of the central, state and local governments during the Fourth Republic. The revenue sources as shown in Table 7.2 reveal that the federal government has more financial strength than the other tiers of government. This makes it easier for the federal government to discharge its functions better than the other tiers of government. In a real sense, revenue allocation encompasses allocating actual or prospective revenue to each level of government such that each has the financial means to perform its constitutionally assigned roles (Abubakar, 2005). However, in Nigeria, most states and local governments can hardly survive without federal allocation. The situation is like this because of the provisions in the 1999 Constitution. The Constitution provides for the functions of the three tiers of government. Some of them are shown in Table 7.1. They are referred to as expenditure responsibilities. The exclusive list is a purely federal affair. The concurrent list is shared by the federal and state governments. Some expenditure functions listed under states in Table 7.1 are Table 7.2 Revenues of the three tiers of government in Nigeria Federal Government

State Government

Local Government

Company income (and associated) tax Personal income tax* for personnel of the armed forces, police, staff of the ministry of foreign affairs and residents of the FCT Petroleum and gas profit tax Mining rents and royalties Value Added Tax (VAT) Capital gains tax and stamp duties on corporate entities Import, export, and excise duties

Personal income tax (regulated by national legislation) Capital gains tax and stamp duties on corporate entities (regulated by national legislation) Road or vehicle licenses fees Business registration fees Land tax

Tenement rates for property Shop, kiosk, and motor park fees Radio, television, bicycle, cart, and domestic animals’ licences Naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses Marriage, birth, and death registration fees Cattle tax Signboard/billboard advertisement fees

Compiled by the author from Federal Government of Nigeria (1999) and Suberu (2003) *This is not paid into the federation account. It is exclusively taken by the federal government and not shared with the state and local governments

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carried out by both the federal and state governments. Hence, they are on the concurrent list. Some functions are solely state and local governments’ affairs. Before the amendments made to the 1999 Constitution, the exclusive list was 68 items while the concurrent list had 30 items. Hence, more powers have been given to the states but reality portrays a sprawling federal might. This is exacerbated by the control of resources by the federal government among which oil and gas generate the most revenue. The control of its gold by Zamfara state epitomises true federalism but this is not in line with the constitution. Thus, if it had been replicated in all states and given constitutional backing, it would have reduced agitations by groups over resources, improved the economies of states, bolstered the country’s integration, and reduced the aggressive approach of political elites towards attaining positions at the centre. Apart from the oil factor, the federal government has been given more access to taxation which positions it in a good revenue position. Some taxation responsibilities in the concurrent list are structured such that except the National Assembly authorises a state, it cannot utilise such avenue to generate profit. The responsibilities of the three tiers of government come with some measure of revenue generation. For instance, customs and telecommunications are under the control of the federal government and the agencies in charge of these generate substantial revenue. States and local governments hardly share in the success story of revenue. Most of the functions that fall under the concurrent list like agriculture, education, health, and some road construction, among others are capital intensive and the incomes the states generate through these functions are not commensurate with the requirements to discharge the corresponding duties. They generate lesser income considering the over-reliance on oil. Also, these duties are arranged in such a way that if there is a clash of responsibilities, the federal government will have its way. The functions left solely for state governments attract very low revenue. The 1999 Constitution stipulates the functions of the local governments. These are assisting the state it falls under its territory in economic development, collection of rates, issuing of television and radio licences, establishing and maintaining cemeteries and homes of the destitute, licensing bicycles, canoes, wheelbarrows, and carts, naming of streets, among others. Most of these functions are not carried out except approved by the State Houses of Assembly. These responsibilities come with less revenue potential. This is responsible for why we have less

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impactful local governments in Nigeria. The effects of a less effective local government are poor infrastructure, struggling small-scale businesses and an economically disadvantaged populace. For instance, infrastructure like trunk C roads are in terrible condition. The assertion above about the lopsided fiscal federalism aligns with the submission of Suberu (2003) that most federal systems apportion the most lucrative revenue generating duties to the central government with the justification that it is best positioned to manage, modify and develop macroeconomic matters. In Nigeria, placing the federal government above the component units in the control of resources and revenue access has bred displeasure, especially from the oil-producing states. These states want to be in control of their resources. These people feel that other parts of Nigeria are being developed mainly with proceeds from resources extracted from the Niger Delta while the oil states continue to struggle with underdevelopment and environmental challenges. This submission aligns with relative deprivation theory. South West politician two reverberated this. ‘But from my point of view, the South South based on the abundance of oil and the poor level of development in the geopolitical zone, has been marginalised’ (Personal Interview South West Politician Two, December 2018). These perceived problems culminated in militancy in the Niger Delta and the other issues that surfaced due to these problems. It is also anathema to true federalism. An interviewee elucidated below. You mentioned the issue of sharing revenue. That is talking about resource control if you share what belongs to the whole country. Federating unit is a crucial point in our political system because you share what you have, but it appears we are sharing what belongs to others. If you must aggregate all the resources of the country into one pool and share it, without taking cognisance of the ratio of contribution to that pool, then the question of equity and justice will come into play, and that is the bedrock of our political upheaval. So, when you talk of true federalism, you cannot have a resource without generating that resource. If you are federating the revenue, you also must federate the generation of that revenue, so that is where you have a discordance. (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer One, December 2018)

The 13% derivation is tantamount to allocating more revenue generated from oil to oil-producing states. The weak contribution of most states to the Federation Account and the fact that they still get monthly

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allocation indicates inequality. There would be setbacks to economic development, ethnic rivalry and less efficient government if a system gives more attention to revenue sharing than revenue generation (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). Nigeria earlier had a situation where subnational units could raise revenues to match their expenditures. However, most states in contemporary Nigeria can hardly survive without federal allocation. In both situations, there was the movement of revenues among levels of government which manifests through vertical and horizontal revenue allocation formulas. The vertical and horizontal criteria have been subjected to the whims and caprices of elites with military elites being the most culpable. The military thwarted the revenue sharing formula without parliamentary scrutiny but such ‘reforms’ were approved by the highest military ruling bodies, Armed Forces Ruling Council, Supreme Military Council or Provisional Ruling Council (Elaigwu, 2002). The committees set up and decrees put in place nevertheless, they did not transform into formulas that symbolise symbiotic and healthy fiscal federalism. The military juntas from 1966 to 1979 superintended over a fiscally boisterous federal government and shrinking subnational governments courtesy of good revenue sources like offshore mining rents and royalties, and export and import duties on tobacco and motor fuel (Suberu, 2003). The financial viability of the states was also withered through centralising agricultural marketing boards, abolishing taxes and duties on domestic agricultural produce, and restricting or abolishing the powers of the states to levy petroleum sales, betting and gaming taxes (Suberu, 2003). The entrance and stay of the military in government from 1983 to 1999 worsened the poor fiscal federalism situation in the country. These events were some of the contributing factors that killed the spirit of true federalism in Nigeria. Most states could hardly carry out developmental projects because of their financial weakness. This assertion resonates the view of Akujuru (2015) that the major problem with fiscal federalism in Nigeria is the discrepancies between the functions and revenue-raising capabilities of component units. The subnational units are financially subordinated due to the absence of making them control their resources and this negates the principle of true federalism because levels of government other than that at the centre operate with low financial capacity for developmental adventures (Usman, 2014a). It was assumed that the poor fiscal history was because there was no statutory body

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to manage revenue allocation in Nigeria. Consequently, a legally backed statutory body was set up. As a result of challenges with accepting existing revenue allocation formulas, the military administration of General Babangida set up The National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC) (Abubakar, 2005). It was established by Decree No. 49 of 1989 and later modified by Decree 98 of 1993 (now RMAFC Act CAP R7 LFN 2004) (RMAFC Website).1 Hence, its appellation has changed to Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). It cooperates with other statutory bodies and government agencies to discharge its functions. Below are some of its functions sourced from the RMAFC website: a) monitor the additions to and distribution of revenue from the Federation Account; b) regularly review the revenue allocation formulas and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing conditions; provided that any revenue formula that had been accepted by an Act of the National Assembly shall be utilised for not less than five years from the date of instigation of the Act; c) advise the Federal and State Governments on best fiscal practices that can increase their revenue; d) carry out such other functions as are bestowed on the Commission by the Constitution or any Act of the National Parliament. The RMAFC has been a major player in revenue allocation in the Fourth Republic. Revenue allocation in Nigeria from 1946 till date has taken the patterns of vertical and horizontal formulas. Hence, explanations of vertical and horizontal formulas as well as historical insights into how they have played out in Nigeria will be salient. This will illuminate how states were favoured until 1966 and how the pendulum swung in favour of the federal government since the military overthrow of 1966. This analysis will be illustrated with the aid of tables.

1 https://rmafc.gov.ng/establishing-law/

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Vertical Revenue Allocation There is a vertical sharing of revenue between the federal government and the subnational units in a federal state (Akujuru, 2015). In Nigeria, vertical revenue allocation represents how revenue is being shared among the federal, state, and local governments (Lukpata, 2013). Table 7.3 gives a chronological outline of vertical revenue allocation from 1946 to date. The VAT became a subject of controversy recently when Lagos and Rivers states headed to court. The states claimed that they generate the chunk of VAT in the country and after all VAT has been collected in all states in the country, the sharing formula does not give preference to the states that generate the most. The states asked the court to permit them to begin to collect VAT instead of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). Southern Governors Forum at a meeting held in Enugu in 2021 unanimously agreed that states should collect VAT (Majeed, 2021). However, Northern states kicked against the move of Lagos and Rivers (Abuh et al., 2021). These Northern governors felt that if the status quo changed, they would receive leaner revenue from VAT. This is a contemporary example of the imbalance in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism. The move by these states also had a regional dimension and polarised elites from the two regions. Conspicuously, the revenue sharing formulas from 1946 until 1966 depicted true federalism. The federal government attained a mighty role after the military’s incursion into politics. However, the civilian administrations we have had from 1979 until date have not fared better. The revenue sharing formulas during civilian eras have only consolidated the military approach of a federal-dominated fiscal game. The analysis on revenue allocation will be inchoate without a horizontal allocation formula and how it has operated from 1946 until date. Horizontal Revenue Allocation Horizontal sharing among component units is a conglomeration of some related or unique features that make each component unit eligible for revenue from a common pool (Akujuru, 2015). Horizontal revenue allocation represents how each state and local government gets its share of the total apportioned to states and local governments from the centre (Lukpata, 2013). The benchmarks that have been used in horizontal revenue allocation in Nigeria are basic needs, minimum material

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Table 7.3 Vertical revenue allocation formulas from 1946 to the Fourth Republic Commission/Committee/Decree

Formulas

The Philipson Commission (1946–1951)

Northern Region—46%, Western Region—30% and Eastern Region24% Northern Region—38%, Western Region—27.2% and Eastern Region—34.8% Northern Region—38%, Western Region—27.2% and Eastern Region—34.8% Northern Region—40%, Western Region—24% Eastern Region—31% and Southern Cameroon—5% Midwest—8% out of the 24% allocated to the West Northern Region—42%, Western Region—20% Eastern Region—30% and Mid-Western Region—8% It recommended that a planning and fiscal commission be established Export duty revenue allocated to the states was dropped to 60% from 100%, duty on motor fuel and excise duty accruing to the states also fell from 100 to 50% Transferred rents and royalties of offshore petroleum mines to the federal government from the states 20% of onshore mining rents and royalties went directly to the state of origin, while all other revenues to be shared among the states had to pass through the Distributable Pool Account (DPA) Federal government—57%, state governments—30%, local governments—10%, Special Grants Account—3%

The Hicks-Philipson Commission (1952–1954)

Chick Commission (1953–1957)

Raisman Commission of 1958

The Binns Commission of 1964

The Dina Interim Revenue Allocation Review Committee Report of 1968 Decree 13 of 1970

Decree 9 of 1971

Decree 6 of 1975

The Aboyade Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation of 1977

(continued)

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Table 7.3 (continued) Commission/Committee/Decree

Formulas

The Okigbo Commission of 1980

Federal Government—53%, State Government—30%, Local Government—10%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation—2%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja—2.5%, General Ecological Problems—1%, Revenue Equalisation Fund—1.5%) Federal Government—55%, State Government—26.5%, Local Government—10%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation—2%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development—3%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja—2.5%, General Ecological Problems—1%) Federal Government—55%, State Government—30.5%, Local Government—10%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation—2%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development—1.5%, General Ecological Problems—1%) Federal Government—47%, State Government—30%, Local Government—15%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation—2%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development—2%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja—1%, General Ecological Problems—0.5%, Destabilisation—0.5%, Savings—2%)

Equity Act of 1981 (nullified by the Supreme Court)

Revised 1981 Act

1989 (NRMAFC)

(continued)

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Table 7.3 (continued) Commission/Committee/Decree

Formulas

1990 (NRMAFC)

Federal Government—50%, State Government—30%, Local Government—15%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation—1%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development—1.5%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja—1%, General Ecological Problems—1%, Destabilisation—0.5%) Federal Government—48.5%, State Government—24%, Local Government—20%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation—1%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development—3%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja—1%, General Ecological Problems—2%, Destabilisation—0.5%) Federal Government—33%, State Government—32.5%, Local Government—20%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing Areas-Development—6.5%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja—2%, General Ecological Problems—2.5%, Destabilisation—0.5%) Federal Government—52.68%**, State Government—26.72%, Local Government—20.60%

1992 (NRMAFC)

Proposal of the 1994/95 NCC Committee on Revenue Allocation

RMAFC in the Fourth Republic* (Current as at 2020)

Compiled by author from National Bureau of Statistics, 2021; Babalola & Okafor, 2019; Suberu, 2003; Adedokun, 2002 * The current vertical formula is on the net Federation Account revenue distributable. This means that after necessary deductions like 13% derivation and other charges and costs and excluding VAT (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021) ** This is broken down as general ecological problem—1%, FCT—1%, natural resources development—1.68%, statutory stabilisation—0.5% while the balance of 48.5% goes to the federal government. Aside from the Federation Account revenue distributable, VAT also has a different sharing ratio which is federal—15%, states—50%, and local governments—35% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021)

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standards, balanced development, derivation, equality of access to development opportunities, absorptive capacity, fiscal efficiency, minimum responsibility of government, population, social development factor, equality of states, landmass, and terrain and internal revenue generation effort (Lukpata, 2013). Historically, these have evolved and different terminologies have been used. Six of them will be explained further. Equality of states indicates that all states in the country are equal (Babalola & Okafor, 2019). This principle allows all states and local governments equal access to revenue (Akuul, 2017). Hence, equality gives a state access to revenue irrespective of its comparative disadvantage in terms of population, need, and landmass, among other factors. The pro is that states are treated equally while the con is that it makes states less interested in boosting their Internally Generated Revenue (IGR). Population as a principle means that the allocation of funds is related to each state’s share of the total population as determined by the National Population Commission (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021). The idea is that the needs of states are related to their population size, the larger the population, the more the needs (Babalola & Okafor, 2019). This challenge with population as a basis is that elites have always made efforts to turn the table to the side of the region or state they represent. This explains why from the 1950s, census figures have mostly favoured the North with the region having the higher population (Iwara, 2010; Suberu, 1993). Southern elites have always alleged that the figures were manipulated to favour the North. The advantage of this principle is that if the census figures reflect reality, different levels of government will get fair revenue for their respective needs. Landmass implies that the size of a state in proportion to the total size of Nigeria determines the revenue it receives from the centre. This also applies to the size of each local government in proportion to the size of the country (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021). The larger the geographical space occupied by a state, the more it receives from the Federation Account based on this benchmark. The North is larger than the South. The size of the North was a subject of contestation in the First Republic because the region due to its size, rivalled the central government (Suberu, 2019). The North due to its large size has this as an advantage even though most of the revenues that accrue to the Federation Account come from the South. Thus, given that the South is more

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economically buoyant and developed than the North, sentiments of relative deprivation continue to grow due to the South feeling that its size continues to short-change it. Social development used to be primarily based on primary school enrolment. However, other yardsticks have been added. These include secondary school enrolment, number of beds in state hospitals, water supply and average rainfall (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021; Salami, 2011). Social Development entails how to make the existing infrastructure meet the social needs. Its advantage is that states and local governments are encouraged to increase primary and secondary enrolment and to improve health and encourage environmental sustainability. The weakness is that the fund from federal allocation meant for this may not meet the infrastructural gaps, and states may not be willing to look inward to raise revenue to fill the gaps. Internal revenue implies that states that generate more internally have the propensity to have a more financially buoyant local government. Each state is expected to contribute 10% of its IGR to the joint state and local government account (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021). The positive side of this is that states will be enthusiastic about improving the revenues they internally generate. The drawback is that some states have factors like population, and geographical advantage, among others that best position them to have comparatively better IGR. Derivation represents revenue accruing to a state from the proceeds of the mineral resources located and extracted within its territory. In Nigeria, it is paid to states whose resources generate income for the country. Derivation of 13% is paid to oil-producing states (Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Rivers, Cross Rivers,2 Akwa Ibom, Abia, Imo, and Ondo) from the earnings of onshore oil production (Salami, 2011). Constitutionally, it is 13% of revenue accruing to the Federation Account from earnings from any natural resources (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). Derivation percentage shrank due to military in politics and political elites’ usurpation of power. It has fluctuated at different times in the country’s history. Derivation has been an integral part of revenue since the

2 Cross Rivers has ceased to be an oil-producing state due to ceding some of its territory (Bakassi) to Cameroon in 2008 and the Supreme Court judgment between the state and Akwa Ibom state in 2012 over some oil wells. The court ruled that these oil wells be ceded to Akwa Ibom State.

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1950s and the regions were favoured by the arrangement but the centralisation of political power from 1966 has shrunk the derivation principle (Abubakar, 2005). Power became more concentrated in the centre in post-Civil War Nigeria (Luqman, 2014). The increase in world oil price and the global fall in the price of cocoa, groundnut, and oil palm also contributed to the power shift to the centre and competition for state resources from the regions/states to the federal level (Omitola, 2016). Thus, in the history of Nigeria, derivation has been as low as 1%. Table 7.4 below gives a chronological description of horizontal revenue allocation formulas from 1946 till date. Analysis of the vertical and horizontal formulas through the instrumentalities of Tables 7.3 and 7.4 will be done in the next section. Horizontal and Vertical Revenue Sharing Formulas Analysed Successive governments have over the years set different instruments to concoct the formulas for revenue allocation in Nigeria. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 give a breakdown of these from 1946 to date. The first columns in the two tables shows the names of the formulas and the nomenclatures used which vary from commissions to decrees and committees. The second column of Table 7.3 outlines the principles of vertical allocation while that of Table 7.4 summarises horizontal allocation. From 1946 to 1964, the regions had substantial benefits from the resources domiciled in their territories. The comparative advantage of each region contributed to its prowess in attracting good revenue sources. Thus, they were granted control over some taxation functions that strengthened their revenue and the derivation principles during this period were pro-regional. Some of their revenue sources were personal income tax, licences, fees, mining rents, property rates, Jangali (cattle tax), tobacco import and excise duties and motor fuel duty (Abubakar, 2005; Elekwa et al., 2011). Furthermore, between 1958 and 1964, tobacco import and export duties as well as motor fuel import and export duties were to be remitted in 100% to the regions where they were generated while mining rents and royalties had 50% allocated to the regions, 20% to the federal government and the remaining 30% to the DPA3 (Abubakar, 2005). The pro-regional revenue structure explains why political elites 3 Each revenue became structured such that a portion went to the regions, based on derivation, a portion went to the Distributable Pool Account, another one to the centre

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Table 7.4 Horizontal revenue allocation formulas from 1946 to the Fourth Republic Commission/Committee/Decree

Formulas

The Philipson Commission (1946–1951) The Hicks-Philipson Commission (1952–1954) Chick Commission (1953–1957) Raisman Commission of 1958

Derivation and even progress Derivation, needs, national interest, fiscal autonomy and even progress Derivation and fiscal autonomy Derivation, fiscal autonomy, need and balanced development Derivation, fiscal autonomy, need, balanced development and financial comparability Need, even development, derivation, and minimum responsibility of government Polulatuion-50%, Equality of States-50% Same as that of Decree 13 of 1970 Same as that of Decree 13 of 1970 Equality of access to development opportunities—25%, national minimum standard—22%, absorptive capacity—20%, independent revenue and tax effort—18%, fiscal efficiency—15% Minimum responsibility of government—40%, population—40%, social development factor—15%, Internal Revenue effort—5% Equality of States—50%, population—40%, landmass and terrain—10% Equality of states—40%, population—40%, social development factor—15%, internal revenue—5% Equality of states—40%, population—30%, social development factor—10%, internal revenue—20% Equality of states—40%, population—30%, social development—10%, landmass—10%, internal revenue—10% Equality of states—40%, population—30%, social development—10%, landmass—10%, internal revenue—10%

The Binns Commission of 1964

The Dina Interim Revenue Allocation Review Committee Report of 1968 Decree 13 of 1970 Decree 9 of 1971 Decree 6 of 1975 The Aboyade Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation of 1977

The Okigbo Commission of 1980

Equity Act of 1981 (nullified by the Supreme Court) Revised 1981 Act

1989 (NRMAFC)

1990 (NRMAFC)

1992 (NRMAFC)

(continued)

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Table 7.4 (continued) Commission/Committee/Decree

Formulas

Proposal of the 1994/95 NCC Committee on Revenue Allocation

Equality of states (minimum responsibility of government)—30%, population—40%, internal revenue effort—10%, landmass and terrain—10%, population density—10% Equality of states—40%, population—30%, social development—10%, landmass—10%, internal revenue—10%

RMAFC in the Fourth Republic (Current as of 2020)

Compiled by author from Babalola and Okafor (2019); National Bureau of Statistics (2020); Suberu (2003)

were more at ease operating from the regions to develop the regions. The fiscal nature of this period epitomised true federalism because each level of government had the revenue base to finance its responsibilities and development projects. However, the elites had a fluid stance on which formula to use because their submissions were based on which resources attracted the most income at every point in time. Some of the formulas also came with their pros and cons. For the Philipson Commission, elites from the West and North were comfortable with derivation because cocoa and groundnut, respectively, are cash crops grown in these regions and were key sources of revenue for the country (Ovwasa, 1995). The elites from the East were displeased with derivation because these cash crops were not identified with their region (Ovwasa, 1995). Elites’ differences also played out in The Hicks-Philipson Commission. The elites from the West stuck to the derivation principle, elites from the North advocated for the promotion of the principle of need while the elites from the East preferred national interest above other principles (Elekwa et al., 2011). The Chicks Commission widened the fiscal gap among the regions because of the regions that possessed more resources got more revenue (Elekwa et al., 2011). Thus, elites from the regions that had comparatively lesser income backed equality of states, needs and national interest (Ovwasa, 1995). However,

while the one that went to the Distributable Pool Account was to be divided among the regions (Elekwa, et al., 2011).

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since oil was discovered in 1956, Southern elites, mainly those of oilproducing parts, preferred derivation as the predominant principle, but the North became less interested in throwing its weight behind derivation (Abubakar, 2005). Although, crude oil had not become the major source of revenue. Raisman Commission, in a bid to boost regional autonomy, recommended that the regions should have absolute jurisdiction over marketing boards, personal income tax and product sales tax (Elekwa et al., 2011). The North was not comfortable with the arrangement on the excuse that the federal government had all the juicy revenue sources and that as a region, it could not meet its financial needs (Abubakar, 2005). Relatively, the concern of the North was not as bad as the situation after the military takeover where the fiscal powers of the regions were greatly usurped by the federal government. The second phase from 1968 to 1977 was symbolic with transformation from regional to state structure and military rule. The command structure of the military which barely entertains subordinate autonomy trickled down to how military governments managed fiscal federalism. Hence, the federal government became more powerful fiscally while the states became fiscally weak. In a nutshell, the centralised nature of the military encouraged the revenue weakness of the states (Ovwasa, 1995). The creation of states by the military also fractionalised the capacity the regions hitherto possessed which enabled them to actively pursue revenue generation. Finally, the central government under the leadership of Yakubu Gowon had no choice but to dictate the country’s fiscal activities because of the need to finance the Civil War and restructure the country after the war. The third period covers the Second Republic up to the Fourth Republic. The country transitioned from pre-NRMAFC/RMAFC to the NRMAFC/RMAFC during this period. Due to the challenges of accepting ad hoc revenue allocation formulas, the military government of Ibrahim Babangida put in place a statutory commission to handle revenue allocation matters (Abubakar, 2005). It was established so that the country could have a statutory body responsible for developing revenue allocation formulas. Thus, the NRMAFC was inaugurated under the chairmanship of Retired Lieutenant General T.Y Danjuma in 1988 (Suberu, 2003). However, its name has changed to RMAFC. Regarding the intricacies of revenue allocation under RMAFC, more attention will be given to the Fourth Republic because it is the focus of this

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book. Federally earned revenue is paid into the Federation Account and disbursed based on a law proposed by the president and the RMAFC, which is ratified by the National Assembly (Suberu, 2003). The Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) is chaired by the Minister of Finance and the secretary is the Permanent Secretary, the Federal Ministry of Finance. Other members are state Commissioners of Finance, Accountant General of the Federation and Accountants General of states. Vertical and horizontal formulas exist in the Fourth Republic and the FAAC factor these in its activities. The existing vertical formula is on the net Federation Account revenue distributable, that is after required deductions like 13% derivation and other charges and costs and excluding VAT (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). In essence, the FAAC disburses total revenue generated to the three tiers of government. Reality portrays a monocultural economy and an over-reliance on federally allocated revenue by the states and local governments. In 2019, FAAC disbursed ₦2.93trn to the federal government, ₦2.47trn to the state governments, and ₦1.67trn to the local governments (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). Delta and Akwa Ibom got the highest, ₦219.28bn and ₦171.98bn, respectively, while Osun received the lowest ₦24.22b (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 82). In 2020, it disbursed ₦2.47trn to the federal government and ₦2.30trn to the states (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021). For the same year, Delta and Akwa Ibom states received the highest with ₦186.83bn and ₦146.27bn, respectively, while the states that got the least were Osun, ₦ 30.63bn and Cross River States ₦32.89bn, respectively (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021). The states that got the highest allocation are oil-producing states. This represents inequality of states and situations where they struggle to meet their developmental responsibilities. This is exacerbated by the poor attitude of states and local governments to IGR. Aside from Lagos and two states that have performed fairly, most states have not been on top of their games in IGR (Asimiyu & Kizito, 2014; Central Bank of Nigeria, 2021; Osinbajo, 2018). In 2020, the sources of revenue for states were Federation Account, 52.8 g%; excess oil revenue, 2.2%; excess non-oil revenue, 0.6%; VAT, 19.1%; IGR, 20.9%; exchange gain, 2.2%; grants and others, 2.2% (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2021). These depict that states have not optimally tapped into their potential to increase internal revenue and a country that has not welcomed resource control by states. For local governments in 2020, it was Federation Account, 61.1%; excess oil revenue, 2.9%; excess non-oil revenue,

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0.7%; VAT, 29.3%; IGR, 1.8%; exchange gain, 2.1%; grants and others, 2.1% (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2021). These portray local governments that are not autonomous. Despite being the closest to the masses, with this fiscal distribution, local governments find it extremely difficult to perform their functions, especially those that are developmental. North West Politician two paints a picture of the situation of states that ‘gradually, we came to a situation whereby most of the states are just states by name because they cannot even exist without federal allocation’ (Personal Interview North West Politician two, January 2019). Constitutional lawyers one and two, and South East politician concurred with this. Their views align with the submission of Abubakar (2005) that most states and local governments in Nigeria generate low IGR which makes them financially weak. Over-reliance on oil greatly contributes to this situation. Budget planning at all levels of government in Nigeria is subject to the global oil market (Babalola & Okafor, 2019). Reliance on oil might not have been a problem if proceeds from oil have been used appropriately. Oil revenue is not invested in productive sectors of the Nigerian economy and public officials have diverted such for personal use (Babalola & Okafor, 2019). The failure to channel oil proceeds into productive sectors is one of the reasons why other sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and manufacturing, among others which should have been good sources of revenue have not developed. Government officials directly and indirectly linked to the oil industry or oil-producing states have been involved in corruption. These corrupt practices have drained the purse of the country and starved the levels of government of the funds to put in place good infrastructure and empower the people. Corruption cases include those of the former National Security Adviser and others, former chairman of the Pension Reform Task Team, Abdulrasheed Maina, and suspended Accountant General of the Federation (later replaced by another person), Ahmed Idris, among other corruption cases. At the state level, a lot of former governors have faced and are facing trials but convicting them of corruption has always been difficult. Although former governors Joshua Dariye of Plateau and Jolly Nyame of Taraba were convicted and sent to jail, they were surprisingly granted state pardon by the federal government. Corruption has also been deep in oil-producing states despite receiving 13% derivation every month.

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The essence of derivation especially for oil-producing states is to address environmental pollution and degradation, provide basic amenities like healthcare, potable water and paved roads, and economically empower people in oil-producing communities (Adebowale, 2021). However, Niger Delta states have failed to address these issues despite the monthly allocations to the state governments. A participant submitted that: When I went to the South South, I saw how people are suffering, with no pipe-borne water. Where is the 13% derivation? Where is the royalty? Where is the development levy from the multinational companies? Is it not the federal government that is responsible? You are given your share; you are given your 13% derivation. So, who is responsible for not developing the South-South? Ondo is part of the oil-producing areas, which is South West, so who is responsible for not developing this place?. (Personal Interview North East Politician, January 2019)

Babalola and Okafor (2019) assert that despite the enormous amount that has been received by the Niger Delta region, corruption has made it futile as there are poor basic social services there. Between 2009 and 2019, Niger Delta states received ₦6.589trn in derivation (Jeremiah, 2021). If there are infrastructure and the youth are employed, there will not be militancy, and if the environment is well taken care of, there will be peace in the region. All these flaws have corruption as the root cause. For instance, former governors Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State, James Ibori of Delta State, and Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State were all charged with corruption. The NDDC which was established by the federal government to address social and economic issues and promote sustainable development in the region has equally been the harbour of corrupt practices. For instance, on corruption issues in the NDDC, a total of ₦81.5 billion was spent between January and May 2020 on questionable projects wrapped in ‘travels’, ‘condolences’, ‘consultancy’ and ‘public communication’ despite the COVID-19 lockdown (Akoni, 2020). He further averred that the management claimed to have travelled to the United Kingdom (UK) within the same period despite the lockdown. There are also allegations that National Assembly members do hijack contracts in the Commission which may make oversight difficult because of conflict of interest. In addition, some students of Niger Delta origin studying abroad

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(especially in the UK) on account of NDDC scholarship complained in May 2020 that the commission did not provide them a stipend to pay their bills in their respective countries of study (Ukpong, 2020a). These include money for tuition fees, rent and feeding. These no doubt relegate development (projects) and consequently increase poverty in the region. The challenges with the region explain why agitations have continued. The instability in the Niger Delta has threatened the stability of the country. However, the relative peace being experienced in the region is due to the amnesty programme introduced by former President Yar’Adua. The amnesty programme nevertheless, the region still struggles with economic, social and environmental challenges. Over-reliance on oil is responsible for the country’s revenue problems and also contributes to the high level of corruption in the sector. It is important to explore other resources and harness them for revenue boost and development of the country. Thus, the country will align with true federalism. The distribution of mineral and agricultural resources as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, respectively, attest to the fact that every state has the requirements to have financial independence to discharge its duties and promote development. Agriculture is not as susceptible to federal control as mineral resources. Agriculture falls under the concurrent list. However, the federal government should cooperate with states and not edge them out in agriculture. In addition, security has been a challenge to the agricultural sector due to farmers and herders’ clashes, banditry, insurgency, and cattle rustling, among others. These discourage investors. Also, poor infrastructure in the country negatively affects agriculture in all stages, including transportation and storage. The control of mineral resources by the federal government has affected revenue generation through the sector. States are less worried about encouraging the federal government to take the sector seriously. If states are allowed to control their resources, they will take the extraction seriously and this will translate to a boost in their fiscal profiles. In the case of the Niger Delta, controversies around who controls crude oil and natural gas and the percentage of derivation that will accrue to oil-producing states have always pitched Niger Delta and Yoruba elites mostly against their Northern counterparts. This subject of disagreement has been exacerbated by the double standard in the matter of Zamfara controlling the gold extracted in the state. Niger Delta elites feel deprived because Buhari is from the Northern elites’ block and by this action, he has favoured his ‘constituency’. Favour in the sense that Zamfara enjoys

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the revenue from gold and also shares the proceeds of oil extracted from the Niger Delta. However, if every state is treated equally and allowed to control its resources, friction among elites on resource control would be reduced. Hence, such control would transform into development, poverty alleviation and peace. If there is development and the poverty level drastically drops, it will not be easy for political elites to manipulate the masses to participate in violence for the promotion of the parochial interest of the former.

States and Local Governments’ Creation Since the formation of the geographical area known as the Nigerian state in 1914, the country has been divided into subnational units. The rationales for the divisions have been given different interpretations by different stakeholders in the country. Political elites are the major actors in determining the direction of state creation exercises. An analysis of the history of state creation in Nigeria will be explored in this section. From Province to Region Bringing territories hitherto separately administered in a simple term implied the amalgamation of the country Nigeria. The amalgamated entity has since 1939 been divided into ‘autonomous’ territories. The assumption was that the division would give the different ethnic groups some measure of autonomy, and access to resources and stimulate development, all to encourage peace and unity. Sir Bernard Bourdillon left the Northern Protectorate intact but divided the Southern Protectorate into Eastern and Western provinces and the three provinces were renamed regions in 1947 (Falola & Genova, 2009; Genyi, 2014). The Northern region was geographically bigger than the East and West combined and the imbalance common among the three regions was that each of them had majority ethnic groups controlling their governments (Egbefo, 2014). The minorities in each of the regions were not considered in the processes that led to the emergence of the regions (Udo, 2014). Consequently, the minorities expressed fears of being sidelined. Hence, a commission was put in place to investigate the fears of the minorities.

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Willink Commission Minority question is one of the major challenges of the Nigerian federal system (Udo, 2014). The Richards and Macpherson Constitutions did not take into consideration the status of the minorities and by institutionalising the autonomy of the three regions, the Lyttleton Constitution consolidated the hold of the ethnic majorities over the minorities (Udo, 2014). Before the attainment of independence, minority groups realised that they were deprived because the three major ethnic groups were in charge of the regions and the centre. Therefore, the minorities became sceptical about independence because of the fear that they would be relegated and accordingly, they wanted a redraw of the map of the country. This bred agitations for self-determination and calls for separate regions for the minorities (Ukase, 2014). The non-Yorubas in the West feared that after independence, they would be dominated by the Yorubas; the minority groups in the North expressed concerns over emirs appointing district heads in non-Muslim parts (Fagbadebo et al., 2014). The nonIgbos in the Eastern region feared the Igbos might subjugate them politically and commercially (Fagbadebo et al., 2014). These culminated in constituting the Henry Willink Commission of 1957. The Commission was set up to address the fears of the minorities. It recommended that to attain unity in the country; power should be balanced in the Nigerian state so that the majority would be less interested in utilising power for their benefit (Ukase, 2014). Therefore, its submission was that creating more states would generate problems rather than solve minority problems (Ukase, 2014). One of the reasons the Commission did not accede to the request of the minorities for state creation was because embarking on such an exercise a few years to independence appeared undesirable (Odey, 2014). Thus, no state was created despite the setting up of the Commission. One of the implications of this was the Tiv Riots of the 1960s. The fears of the minorities have not ceased in contemporary Nigeria despite state creation exercises. The demands of the minorities in contemporary Nigeria encompass being free from majority domination, becoming significant within the Nigeria’s political spectrum, and benefiting from the country’s wealth (Adetoye, 2016b). After the granting of independence, a region and more states have been created.

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Creation of the Mid-West Region After independence in 1960, the minorities made demands for fifteen states of which the noteworthy ones were Middle Belt from the North, Mid-West from the West and Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers from the East (Adeyemi, 2013; Egbefo, 2014). The NPC stifled the agitation for the Middle Belt region demand and the NCNC perceived the demand for Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers as anti-Igbo and kicked against it (Adeyemi, 2013). The Mid-West was carved out of the Western Region. Some stakeholders believed that listening to the yearnings of the minorities was not the major rationale behind the creation of the MidWest but the crux of the matter was to weaken the major opposition party, the AG (Egbefo, 2014; Fagbadebo et al., 2014). The Mid-West was created to trim the national spread of the AG, make it less significant in Nigeria and encourage the penetration of other parties, mainly the NCNC into the region (Udo, 2014). Thus, the new region chose to align with the NCNC (Egbefo, 2014). It was also believed that the NPC/NCNC-led federal government created the Mid-West as a punitive measure against the AG for supporting the UMBC, a party against the Northern elites’ party—NPC (Eze et al., 2015; Yongo, 2015). The intricacies surrounding the creation of the Mid-West describe that the elites acted less based on the interest of the minorities but more to settle the score among political elites. This assertion resonates with Vande’s (2012) position that state creation in Nigeria is about elites’ interest. Creation of States—1967 to 1996 The 1967 state creation exercise was synonymous with switching from region to state. State creation was one of the reactions of the Nigerian government to the 30-month Civil War between Nigeria and the Eastern Region. This was a general belief among the Igbos. The split of the Eastern region into three states tilted the loyalty of minorities in the East more to Nigeria than Biafra Republic (Odey, 2014). The creation of states by military governments, especially Yakubu Gowon, cannot solely be ascribed to the selfish reasons of Northern military officers, but the tenacious demands by ethnic minorities for state creation was also a key factor (Yongo, 2015). The first part of Yongo’s assertion is a response to the assumption of Igbos, but the historical demands for state creation also vindicated the actions of the military government. Thus, it can also be

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concluded that the states created by the military in 1967 were ‘response’ to agitations (Yongo, 2015). This was because states were also carved out from the other regions apart from the Eastern Region. The creation of six states from the North and six from the South was a respite to the South from the dissatisfaction related to the size of the North (Odey, 2014). Nevertheless, parity in the number of states did not affect the historical and actual size of the Northern region. Agitations for more states persist. North West politician two avowed that: So, if you say the creation of states in Nigeria addresses the issue of minorities, and the issue of nationality, the answer is factually it has not, it has even further divided because each time in Nigeria’s political history when the states were first created in 1967, the next state creation, you had more agitations from other sections, and we saw constant creation of states. The more states you create, the more administrative units you set up, the more you have minority groups. So, it has not addressed that. If not for anything, it has even increased the agitations. (Personal Interview North West Politician two, January 2019)

The creation of 12 states in 1967 implied that some minority groups that struggled for their states became majority groups in the new states and other groups emerged as minority groups (Egbefo, 2014). Subsequently, state creation in Nigeria has continued to have a snowball effect because new minorities have not ceased their demands for states so that they too would assume majority positions. For instance, some Middle Belt minorities in Northern Nigeria complained of domination by the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups. The creation of more states in the North, especially Benue-Plateau, led to the emergence of majority ethnic groups in the new state but new minority groups also emerged in the new state, and agitations for state creation have continued in the states that have been carved out of Benue-Plateau. This is not peculiar to Benue-Plateau but all the states created in 1967 and the states that have been carved out from each of them. Justice Ayo Irikefe’s Panel on state creation was set up by General Murtala’s administration and the Panel received 32 demands for state creation (Babalola, 2016). The Panel noted in 1975 that the creation of 12 states culminated in the emergence of more minorities (Egbefo, 2014). Consequently, seven more states were created in 1976 sequel to the recommendation of the Panel (Odey, 2014).

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However, there was still unevenness. The North had ten states while the South had nine. The East was affected most by the exercise. After the 1976 state creation exercise, the core Igbo territories only had two states (Anambra and Imo), the least compared to the number of states that accrued to other majority groups (Vande, 2012). Igbo elites felt short-changed politically and economically. For instance, they had the least Houses of Assembly, members in the Senate and House of Representatives in the Second Republic. The revenue the core Igbo states got from the federal government was equally affected because only two states received from the common pool. These comparisons have been made about the benefits received from states each from the North and Yoruba ethnic groups and present-day South South which were more in number. The Political Bureau set up by the Babangida administration recommended the creation of six additional states to be effected in 1991, but the Babangida regime created two additional states on September 23, 1987 (Odey, 2014). These states are Akwa Ibom and Katsina. The number of states in Nigeria became 30 in August 1991 with the creation of nine additional states. In the 1991 exercise, five more states were added to the North while four were added to the South making the North have 16 while the South had 14. The implication of the North-South disparity in the number of states is that Northern elites benefited more than the South, especially politically. However, the Northern elites within this context include Middle Belt elites. Concerning revenue allocation, the North had the upper hand based on the equality of states principle because the region had more states. General Abacha created six more states in 1996 (Odey, 2014). A new state was created in each geo-political zone. All the zones now have six states with the exceptions of the North West which has seven and the South East which has five. Thus, the North has 19 states while the South has 17 states. Local governments in Nigeria increased from 301 in 1976 to 774 in 1996. The North surpasses the South in the number of local governments. The FCT has six local councils (it is still geographically located in the North). This gives the North some privileges over the South in access to resources, federal employment and appointment. South West opinion leader illustrated the implications of the lopsided number of states and local governments in favour of the North. ‘In revenue, they have divided up themselves to be much more than the South—more local governments, so when revenue is going to be divided, a place like Kano with 40 something local governments will take more’ (Personal Interview

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South West Opinion Leader, December 2018). This assertion is tenable because the equality of states is one of the benchmarks for revenue allocation. Thus, having more states and local governments qualifies the North for larger revenues within the equality of states’ spectrum of revenue allocation. Also, the North has more seats in the National Assembly than the South. Three senators represent each state. That means the North has 57 senators while the South has 51 and the FCT has one. Hence, if certain national decisions require a simple majority in the National Assembly, the North has the upper hand except the Middle Belt elites decide to throw their weight behind their Southern counterparts. Finally, the North has more ministers, federal appointments and positions than the South due to having more subnational units. Implications of State Creation Exercises in Nigeria The creation of regions and states in Nigeria has attendant positive and negative effects on the country’s social, economic and political systems. Past governments have created states and local governments in response to the desires of ethnic minorities to give them some measure of jurisdictional power and a sense of belonging (Peter, 2014). Minorities have always feared domination and that is why steps like federal character and creation of states have served as platforms for them to have access to the country’s wealth and enjoy some degree of autonomy (Ukase, 2014). These succours may not completely mean a perfect approach because of claims of marginalisation by some groups that have persisted. States were created from the Northern region to bring about some level of autonomy for ethnic minorities in the region. However, the historical complaints of domination of Middle Belt elites by Northern elites have not ceased. For instance, the continuous attacks on communities in Benue and Plateau states allegedly by Fulani Herdsmen. These attacks are perceived as moves by the Northern Fulani to subdue the Northern minority groups (Ejekwonyilo, 2023). Nigerian federalism has reduced ethnic and regional loyalty through state creation, which has also reduced over-reliance on sectarianism. During the Civil War, the creation of states reduced the support the minority groups in the Eastern region had for Biafra (Odey, 2014). Thus, loyalty to Nigeria from that side of the country was secured to some extent. Also, the creation of states has concentrated ethnic conflicts in the states rather than national based ethnic issues (Suberu, 2010). Therefore,

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it has weakened the propensity of secession in Nigeria because of the ‘disintegration’ of hitherto unified ethnic groups. To emerge victorious in a presidential election, a candidate is required to win in two-thirds of the states and the FCT, a system that has reduced sectarianism (Hill, 2012). This constitutional provision has also made more states have feelings of relevance. This means that a candidate would require votes from beyond his/her ethnic group and sometimes religious affiliation to emerge as the president. This produces a national leader whose emergence is due to securing votes from majority and minority ethnic groups. This is also tantamount to elites’ cooperation. Two or more groups cooperate across the five elite groups during elections to ensure that they secure majority votes from different sections of the country. On the flip side, state creation has its flaws. It promotes the interest of some elites, and this is corroborated by poor infrastructure, poverty and corruption among political office holders in the states (Vande, 2012). The primary purposes of bringing the government closer to the people and development are far from being accomplished (Vande, 2012). Political elites, mainly from the majority bloc, perceive state creation as a path to have access to more government revenues rather than promoting minority autonomy and security (Odey, 2014). Elites in the minority bloc who advocate for states to be created also have the primary purpose of promoting their parochial interest to access states’ resources. Political elites in the minority circle have used state creation as a conduit to attain selfish political and economic gains (Ukase, 2014). Nevertheless, on the surface, elites from the minority fold give the excuse that they want states to promote autonomy and development. The problems of the ethnic minorities have not been solved through state creation but it has drawn back the realisation of true federalism (Agboola, 2016). The narrative is not different for local government creation because it remains an elites’ business meant to satisfy their craving for power and make them more relevant (Agboola, 2016). Eze et al. (2015) submit that the creation of states serves the parochial interest of some groups and further polarises the country rather than integrate it. Political elites have taken states as money-making platforms either to perpetrate such acts at the state level or through federal seats apportioned to a state to have access to the government at the centre to access national resources. They focus less on boosting the IGR, receive more from the centre and ultimately satisfy the selfish desires of the political elites. Advocating for the creation of more states in Nigeria would continue to thrive because oil is

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the major source of revenue and the drive to improve IGR has been low (Kraxberger, 2005). Political elites are so comfortable going cap in hand monthly for federal allocation. Therefore, they do not see governing a state and revenue generation as responsibilities but rather take states as money-making enterprises. This is evident in the cost of remunerating appointed and elected politicians in the states. North West politician two gave a description below. It has increased the cost of governance because if in the First Republic, we had just one set of ministers for the entire Northern region, regional ministers. In this same Northern region, you now have 19 states, you now have commissioners in every state, about 15 or 20, so that is why the bulk of the resources go towards maintaining a few because if you look at the budget both of the Federal Government and the State Governments in Nigeria, recurrent expenditure is more than the capital (Personal Interview North West Politician two, January 2019).

Researcher Three also aligned with this view. The root cause of this situation is in congruence with Ikpe’s (2009) submission that in Nigeria, the interests of the elites, most times, define state policies. Among these interests are the creation of new states and local governments. The funds that would have been allocated for capital projects are being used for the remuneration of oversized political appointees and civil servants. A Central Bank of Nigeria 2019 Public Finance Statistics,4 which encompassed the year 2009 to 2019, indicated that recurrent expenditure of states was 60.7% while capital expenditure was 39.3%. This does not include extra-budgetary expenditure. Although, there may be exceptions at certain times where capital expenditure surpasses recurrent but if political offices are fewer, it would have been a better ratio in favour of capital expenditure. This would have had multiplier effects on infrastructure, development and reduction of poverty. Fiscal prowess in a federal state is an indication of symbiotic intergovernmental relations. The creation of more states has appropriated more powers to the federal government in comparison to the states. Some states have become small in geographical size, resources and population and these have evolved in them being financially feeble while the federal government has waxed stronger courtesy of the resources at its disposal. 4 https://www.cbn.gov.ng/documents/statbulletin.asp

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North West politician two explained that ‘now in 1966 after the coup when Gowon came to power, they created the states and decimated their powers. So gradually, we had states which are smaller in terms of size, in terms of resources, with federal government leaving most of the powers to itself’ (Personal Interview North West Politician two, January 2019). This is a departure from Wheare’s postulation of federalism that each level of government has to be coordinate and independent in resources and the attendant functions (Tarlton, 1965). Thus, the states do not play the role of partners in the Nigerian federal system but they are second fiddle. The overarching influence of the federal government makes it appear that the states are far from the people. Most states in Nigeria are not financially capable; hence, putting smiles on the faces of the people economically has almost become a mirage (Ukase, 2014). The weak fiscal situation explains why states find it difficult to put in place the necessary infrastructure meant for the development of the states. Most states also struggle to regularly pay the salaries of staff while some pay a fraction of salaries (Fagbadebo & Faluyi, 2022). Hence, most states are civil service states and if salaries are not regular, poverty exacerbates, other sectors are affected and the economy of the state slows down. Aside from the fiscal angle, there is also the issue of polarising Nigerians. Creating more states has divided the country and this reinforced statism and relegation of national unity (Odey, 2014). Nigerians who have resided in a place within the country earlier discriminate against those who begin to reside in such places after them. This can be traced to the colonial days. The British encouraged ethnic segregation. An example was the structure in Northern cities like Kano, Zaria, Jos, Sokoto and Kaduna where indigenes live in ‘Birni’, which is the city proper, migrants from other Northern cities reside in ‘Tudun Wada’ while Southerners live in ‘Sabon Gari’ (Azaigba & Yio, 2014: 390). In present-day Nigeria, migrants into other states are now referred to as non-indigenes while those that have been living there before the migrants came are called indigenes. Kraxberger summarises below that the status as an indigene is based on biological and ascriptive characteristics, and a person can only be an indigene of one area (often operationalised through local government or state boundaries). Whenever a person is resident outside his or her area of patrilocal ancestry, that person is regarded

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as a ‘non-indigene,’, even if the person was born in that area or has lived there for an extended period of time. (Kraxberger, 2005: 18)

This stratification has been a bane to the integration. The author gives more detailed explanations. The definitions are based on contemporary usage in mainstream Nigerian society. An ‘indigene’ is a person tracing patrilocal ancestry through a particular area of Nigeria (i.e., local government, state, traditional political domain). A ‘non-indigene’ is anyone resident outside his or her area of patrilocal ancestry. Non-indigenes are further sub-divided into ‘strangers’ and ‘settlers’. ‘Settlers’ are non-indigenes who have lived in an area for a long period of time (for example, five years or more). ‘Strangers’ are those with shorter periods of residence in a place. (Kraxberger, 2005: 18–21)

Nigerians should enjoy freedom everywhere in the country provided they are law-abiding, but this is not so. North West opinion leader elucidated on these definitions below. And again, why should we at this point in our national history, almost sixty years of turning independent begin to identify or promote indigenship over citizenship? And almost every state does it. So, these are hindrances. So, if you, for example, migrate to a particular place and stay there for ten years, twenty years, and thirty years and still be considered as a settler, then there is a problem with national integration. So, this does not come from the elites. It comes from the people around you. They remind you where you are coming from. (Personal Interview North West Opinion Leader, December 2018)

Segregating is not an elites’ matter alone, but the masses should also be blamed. South West politician one has a similar opinion but fingered the elites as those that promote such divisions. He stated thus: So, where every region or now state lays emphasis on indigenship. An indigenship concept is another problem that is really ravaging the political space now, you are not one of us, you are just a settler. Even though that ethnic group might have settled there for 100 years, they do not regard them as sons of the soil, and that is playing out very very negatively in the North. That is the basis of the problem in Plateau State between those who call themselves indigenes, the Biroms are mostly in Jos, the Fulanis are regarded as settlers, the same problem in Southern Kaduna, especially

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Zangon Kataf area, the Fulanis there are regarded as settlers and is always a problem. So, our political leaders have really not done enough to integrate the country. That is the major problem……they make everybody feel that when the chips are down, to thy tent o ye Israel. So that is one of the major problems we have. (Personal Interview South West Politician One, December 2018)

The cases of Kaduna, Plateau and other states where we have cases of violence between indigenes and non-indigenes could have been a healthy and symbiotic situation if they had been well managed. However, the indigenes keep accusing the non-indigenes of ethnic cleansing and taking over their communities while the the non-indigenes keep alleging violence on the part of the indigenes. In some states, indigenes may also assume a similar status as that of a non-indigene. In a state, an indigene may also be a minority just as a nonindigene is a minority. Classifying ethnic groups in Nigeria into majority and minority is fluid because some who are minorities at the national level may be majorities in some states (Azaigba & Yio, 2014). Thus, we have some ethnic groups who dominate in some states but at the national level, they do not have the population to pull strings. Also, state creation has created a situation where some indigenes of a state are referred to as non-indigenes. For example, the Tiv ethnic group in Plateau, Nasarawa and Taraba States are seen as non-indigenes despite being indigenes and are even majority in Benue State (Eze et al., 2015). Likewise, the Jukuns are in Nasarawa, Benue and Plateau States, but it is only in Taraba State that they are referred to as indigenes (Eze et al., 2015). The Jukuns have claimed proprietorship of Taraba State and requested the Tiv to leave their state. This has resulted in conflicts between the two groups. Thus, the creation of states has exposed the ‘differences’ within these states (ethnic groups) and has made the people tagged minorities to be susceptible to discrimination and attacks. These differences are building blocks of some of the crises in the country. These include conflicts like those of Uhrobo-Itsekiri, IjawItsekiri, Azare-Tiv, Hausa-Kataf, and Hausa-Bachama people, among others (Santas, 2014). The cordial relationship between the Hausa and Fulani and the Tarok, Birom, and Anaguta, among others for years was meddled with due to the creation of Jos North and Jos South Local Governments because the two local government areas favour the Hausa and Fulani people (Eze et al., 2015). The non-indigenes are sometimes

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more economically successful than the indigenes, and the host communities have sometimes developed antipathy and resistance which have turned into conflicts like the cases of Zangon Kataf-Hausa conflicts of 1984 and 1992, Tiv/Jukun-Fulani conflict of 2001, among others (Salahu, 2014). From a less violent viewpoint, non-indigenes have been denied privileges. Some states have denied non-indigenes of some benefits and services, including those provided by the federal government but located in these states (Odey, 2014). Researcher One explained below. Even till now, for those of us who are Yoruba, you were born in Ibadan, but your parents are from Osun or your parents are from Ogun State, but you were born in Oyo State, and you have lived all your life, 40 years, 50 years of your life in Oyo State, you work in Oyo State, you pay your tax here, you will still be reminded that you are not from Oyo State, that you are a settler. You can build your house, you can do all that, but you may not be able to work in the state public service, and you cannot contest for positions here, you will be reminded of that. (Personal Interview Researcher One, December 2018)

The submission of Researcher One resonates with the views of Kraxberger (2005) and Suberu (2010) that discrimination against non-indigenes arises in employment opportunities, admission to schools, access to social services, access to land, running for political offices and federal projects. In Nigeria, there is discrimination against non-indigenes in states’ civil services and generally in states (Kraxberger, 2005). Nigerians have been denied employment opportunities in other places because they are indigenes of a particular place (Azaigba & Yio, 2014). The competition for scarce resources has also been a contributing factor to this. The deterioration of the country’s economy has led to competition for state resources and indigenes ‘preventing’ non-indigenes from competing for limited resources with them (Kraxberger, 2005). South East politician gave a demonstration of this below. As a Yoruba man, if you were raised in Kano, you probably have not been to Ogun State where your father is from, you did your education, everything in Kano, probably you even got married to a Hausa girl, and you pay your taxes. In fact, you speak fluent Hausa. If not that they ask you to identify where you are from, you pass off as a Hausa person. But when politics now requires you to identify, you say you are from Ogun State. Already your discrimination starts. The solution here is wherever you are born, if

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you have lived there for a period of time, you say 10, 12, 15 years or more, that makes you part and parcel of that place. You are entitled to every rights and responsibilities of that place. We have this concept of citizenship and indigenship. Is not in the constitution that some are settlers and owners of the land, but the constitution says you are a citizen. Now which is higher in terms of content? Is it the discrepancy between citizenship or that between indigenship and settler? The composition of who a citizen is what we should be looking at now. What entitles you as a citizen? Do not forget, you have fundamental rights that you are supposed to live anywhere you want, and move around wherever you want. Of course, within the law. (Personal Interview South East Politician, January 2019)

The indigene/non-indigene dichotomy has also manifested in the area of marriage. Some women who are married to men from other states are treated as non-indigenes in their matrimonial states (Eze et al., 2015). For instance, Justice Ifeoma Jumbo-Ofo who is Anambra by birth but married an Abia man could not be sworn in to represent Abia State at the Federal Court of Appeal (Eze et al., 2015). The inability to realise the scenarios painted by South East politician and the instances cited on the challenges with the creation of more states in Nigeria do not veil the achievements that Nigeria has attained as a result of creating states.

Conclusion Ethnic, political and religious crises that have engulfed Nigeria for years are signs of weak national integration. The country has battled with these before 1960. The responses of successive governments through national integration measures has come with successes and failures. Some of the recommendations of these conferences/committees have translated into decisions about some national issues in the country. Some recommendations have been partly implemented while some have not been implemented despite some novel submissions made. Political factors and elites’ interests shape the manner and probability of implementation. The outcomes of some of the conferences has resulted in the drafting of constitutions, the creation of states, and power sharing, among others. Some did not officially close due to elites’ contestations. Revenue allocation has evolved through colonial, military and civilian administrations. The colonial era was characterised by more than average healthy fiscal relations between the central government and the regions. This continued into the First Republic. The entry of the military into

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politics tilted the fiscal balance more to the government at the centre. This coupled with oil and gas being the mainstay of the economy made the federal government the dominant partner in fiscal relations. This fiscal nature also manifested in the federal government controlling mineral resources despite being located in states and most states operating with very low IGR. Consequently, economic, social, environmental and developmental issues persist in the country. Thus, agitations, and ethnic, religious and political violence are the means through which the populace reacts to these unpleasant situations. In addition, the possession of fiscal might by the federal government has drawn the attraction of political elites to federal positions, with that of the president taking the number one spot. To attain this position, political elites have cooperated and also disagreed to the extent that the stability of the country has been threatened. The creation of more states has exacerbated the weak financial status of states. It has also been an avenue for political elites to compensate themselves with positions. Political and public service positions have increased. Consequently, the overhead costs of states have increased. It has brought consciousness about the status of indigenes and non-indigenes of states such that opportunities have become selective. On the positive side, the creation of states has made it difficult for secession due to the split loyalty of ethnic groups. The next chapter explores the measures that were put in place after the Civil War.

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CHAPTER 8

Post-Civil War National Integration Measures in Nigeria

Introduction The quest for national integration is responsible for the rolling out of measures to foster and consolidate unity in Nigeria. Some measures were put in place after the Civil War in reaction to the war and other issues bothering around disunity. These include the NYSC, the federal character principle and the establishment of political parties that are national in operations. The NYSC was established to allow graduates to serve the country outside their state of origin. Its essence is to encourage common ties and unity among Nigerian youth. This was seen as a means to understand and tolerate the ways of life of other Nigerians to counter misconceptions about ethnic groups in Nigeria. The federal character principle was designed to ensure that all states in Nigeria have representation in government appointments such that each state is given a minimum and maximum quota. In the First Republic, political parties were ethnically inclined. This was a setback to their national appeal and the integration of the country. Hence, through legislation, successive governments have promoted the idea of political parties that have a national spread in their structure and presence in the country.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. T. Faluyi, National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7_8

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The NYSC The 30-month Civil War, which tainted national unity in Nigeria generated reactions from the government in the form of policies. One of these is the NYSC. Immediately after the Civil War, one of the measures that the then government took was the establishment of the National Youth Service Corps. As a graduate, you are sent to other states other than your own to serve. So you get closer to the culture of those people that you never even imagined to integrate with, it led to inter-marriages and it led to understanding of cultural diversity of Nigeria. (Personal Interview North West Politician One, January 2019)

The NYSC was established through Decree No. 24 of May 22, 1973 which has since been replaced by Decree No. 51 of June 16, 1993. A 2004 Act of the National Assembly has amended the decree. The NYSC was one of the instruments put in place to reconstruct, reconcile and rebuild Nigeria after the war. The Website1 of the NYSC states that the scheme was established ‘with a view to the proper encouragement and development of common ties among the youths of Nigeria and the promotion of national unity’. It is an approach aimed at indoctrinating the spirit of national unity into the young ones. The same website summarily spells out the objectives of the scheme as engraving into Nigerian youths the attitude of selfless community service and to accentuate unanimity and brotherhood of all Nigerians notwithstanding, cultural and social background. The purpose of the scheme aligns with national integration. University or polytechnic graduates not more than 30 years old or who graduate at such age are entitled to the service except if they are members of the armed forces or police. They are expected to have a one-year service outside their state of origin. The postings most times are outside the candidates’ ethnic enclave. South West politician one posited that the idea of National Youth Service is directed towards national unity that a young Nigerian will go and do one-year national service in other parts of Nigeria. You do it outside your linguistic zone, outside your ethnic zone. For example, somebody from South West which is essentially a Yoruba zone to go and serve outside of South West. The whole idea is that young minds will come across another culture…say you go to the East which 1 https://www.nysc.gov.ng/aboutscheme.html.

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essentially is Igbo dominated area, essentially Igbo ethnic group, you learn about their culture, and you confirm prejudices you have before getting there. You either confirm it or erase it having interacted with them. So, by and by there is better understanding, we know ourselves better, and we will be able to relate better. Ultimately, we will feel drawn to such people in the form of national unity. (Personal Interview South West Politician One, December 2018)

Although, some could be posted within their geo-political zone but hardly in their state of origin except on marital grounds. The scheme enables inter-ethnic understanding outside the state of origin and engenders the country’s development (Raimi & Alao, 2011). They are expected to have a three-week orientation programme after which they will be posted to their places of primary assignment. They are often posted to schools, hospitals, local governments and other sectors of the economy in both private and public organisations (Raimi & Alao, 2011). During the orientation, they are taught various norms that will foster unity and skills that can make them economically productive. The NYSC remunerates the members and the employers most times do so as well as state governments. Benefits of the NYSC The success of NYSC is within the spectrum of making friends, dislocating old prejudices and very crucial, inter-marriages (Oluwalogbon, 2019). This enables one to erase negative perceptions about a group. It becomes possible because of the privilege to mix with people from different parts of the country and even mix with the local community. Through the scheme, marriage has taken place between corps members and between corps members and indigenes, and this has, to some extent, mitigated hostility among Nigerians (Aremu, 2018). The North East Politician’s opinion is in line with these. Initially, it helped. I have a friend; we met in the service, he is from the North Central. I am still looking for him. A very nice man. I am a Muslim from the core North, he is a Christian from the North Central. I don’t know how to cook, he will cook for us. If it is time for prayer, he will leave the food and say go and pray first. If we are to go out around 3 pm, he will say no, let us wait until 4 O’clock and go out. I still remember this. That is togetherness brought as a result of NYSC. He respects my

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religion, and I have respect for his. I can still remember that I stayed in one compound with a Yoruba man, he can’t speak Hausa, I can’t speak Yoruba, but we lived together in love. Some have even married, whether they married as corpers2 or they married where they are posted. (Personal Interview North East Politician, January 2019)

Personal Interview North West Opinion Leader has a similar opinion as: NYSC, Yes, but don’t forget that the philosophy of NYSC came right after the Civil War. After the Civil War, we decided that okay, look, we should promote nation building through national integration and then the NYSC came and people were encouraged to move out of their cultural settlements and go far and then integrate with other people, it is a form of education itself. For you to move, maybe if you are from the South West and they send you to Maiduguri to be part of the Kanuri people, and then you will be able to know okay I thought…..so that perception, that misgiving is taken away. Then they talked about intermarriages….whatever is trying to bridge the gap so that Nigerians will no longer see themselves as Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba, Kanuri, Efik and whatever makes us first think as Nigerians are good. That was a national philosophy, and that was okay. (Personal Interview North West Opinion Leader, January 2019)

The South East opinion leader shares similar opinions with the North East politician and North West opinion leader on how the scheme has fostered inter-tribal and inter-religious marriages while the North Central opinion leader agrees with them on the basis that leaving one’s place of birth exposes an individual to have experience about other places. Holistically, NYSC has been beneficial to graduates because it promotes discipline, makes them understand dynamism in cultures and prepares them for the pressure that comes with the industry (Raimi & Alao, 2011). It has been the bridge between school and industry. This is because they can get acquainted with the world of work during service. As a result of relating with people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds during the orientation camps, places of primary assignments, weekly community development meetings and living with the local communities, youths may not find it difficult to relate and cope with different people in their respective places of work and businesses. It cushions the effects that might have come with unemployment immediately after graduation. 2 These are those undergoing the NYSC.

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In essence, the monthly allowance paid are a source of income that could make these youths survive before securing a job offer or starting their own business. Some of them are retained for employment in their places of primary assignment. Thus, the service reduces unemployment and makes it easy for employers to source for labour. In addition, as a result of skills learnt during the service year, some youths may pick interest in setting up their own small-scale business which will reduce unemployment. The Challenges of the NYSC NYSC has challenges which have negatively affected the success of the programme. Favouritism is a strong factor that makes the implementation of the programme poorly executed (Oluwalogbon, 2019). There have been cases where some graduates report to camp, strike agreements with NYSC officials and disappear at the end of the day only to be issued completion certificates at the end of the service year (Raimi & Alao, 2011). South West opinion leader’s view corroborates this. NYSC is good, but the way we operate NYSC has also become problematic. First, we must look at the corruption that is involved in it. If you want a good posting; you can buy it, you don’t want to serve at all, you can also buy it. Some people are in Britain, the USA and in Japan now who are supposed to be serving NYSC, and the certificate will be offered to them. What we are told is that some people just tell the officers, you take all the pay, just let me go and as soon as the thing is complete, make sure I get the certificate. Now a situation where you build something on fraud, you are not getting people to become nationalistic and patriotic through that system. (Personal Interview South West Opinion Leader, December 2018)

This apathy towards service became more pronounced due to violence, especially in the Northern part of the country. Security challenge has been a major threat to NYSC, and there have been concerns if it is worth it for NYSC to post graduates to dangerous zones (Aremu, 2018). Political, ethnic and religious conflicts that have been taking place in Nigeria have claimed the lives of corps members, and this has produced apathy towards being posted to the North (Oluwalogbon, 2019). Grace Ushagi was raped and killed in Maiduguri on the allegation that she wore NYSC official “khaki trouser”, and during the 2008 Jos crisis, Messrs Ibukun Oluwatosin Akinjogbin, Tola Odusola and Leke Akande lost their lives (Oluwalogbon, 2019). After the declaration of Goodluck Jonathan as the

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winner of the 2011 Presidential Election, some youth corps members were killed, and some were raped in some states in Northern Nigeria (Aremu, 2018). Boko Haram’s activities, militancy and kidnapping have also threatened the programme (Aremu, 2018). Also, in 2011, the Nigerian Christian Corpers’ Fellowship secretariat in Niger State, which had 50 corps members was set ablaze, but some escaped (Bamgbose, 2012). North East politician gave an explanation to this effect. All these systems were good when they were established, they were with good intentions, but gradually, the integrity of the system is degrading, and that is what is affecting the insecurity. For one, if my son is posted to Borno, I will definitely seek redeployment. Zamfara is insecure despite being close, but there is insecurity there. (Personal Interview North East Politician, January 2019)

Of recent, there have been bandits, terrorists and suspected herdsmen attacks in Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Niger, Nasarawa, Benue, Plateau and Kaduna States. Similarly, North Central opinion leader opined. Look at NYSC, it was set up to integrate Nigerians that after your university or polytechnic education, you will be taken outside your domain. When I say outside your domain, I mean in the present dispensation, outside your geo-political zone. To me, geo-political zone is a fallacy, it is not in the constitution, and it is another ploy by the political elites to deceive us. Since the introduction of these geo-political zones, have we really interacted? No, rather, serious fights between North and South, between religious faiths and so on have been going on. This NYSC of a thing has not really helped us. Now you will see a corps member from the South West deployed to the North East. We have heard so many bad stories about this NYSC of a thing. Some members will be attacked simply because they do not belong to that…. this thing…. Then what integration are we talking about? (Personal Interview North Central Opinion Leader, January 2019)

Relatively, North Central politician concluded that For instance, when I said I was posted to the East, I will not alter, I will go, it doesn’t matter where I am posted to, though I have not been there before, let me go and see what it is like. That is the idea behind the NYSC but today how many of our persons want to go to the North,

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especially the troubled parts of the North? Because if you go there and you profess a different faith,… there have been killings in Nigeria where people have decided to establish outside of their jurisdiction/locality, and they are either killed, or manhandled…….youth corps members have been killed just because they profess a different faith from the one their host community professes. So, it hasn’t worked by a large margin. (Personal Interview North Central Politician, January 2019)

As a result of the challenges with peace, in 2012, corps members posted to volatile states in the North were redeployed while those posted to Yobe and Borno did their orientation in Nasarawa and Benue states, respectively (Aremu, 2018). Postings are influenced because of insecurity and job placement (Oluwalogbon, 2019). These are further clarified by South East politician. Let me draw your attention now to the NYSC programme. We are in the National Assembly, for NYSC you are supposed to be sent to any part of the country where you can serve. But we receive applications on a regular basis each time there is a call-up. People are afraid to leave the South and go up North, and then you now get recommendations for them to remain in a place they feel safe, which is basically their own ethnic enclave. So, you see the purpose of NYSC has been defeated because it is integrating in nature but when we now give recommendation, the NYSC Director-General for political reasons will decide to respect members of the National Assembly and will now post them to the place of their choice. You see, it has defeated the purpose. (Personal Interview South East Politician, January 2019)

The job placement reasons are caused by some factors. As a result of the increase in the number of graduates compared to when the scheme started, governments have not been able to adequately take care of corps members and provide good accommodation as well as employers under-employing corps members and poorly remunerating them (Aremu, 2018). Hence, corps members sometimes lobby to do their service year in ‘juicy’ government parastatals or flourishing private firms. This serves the purpose of good remuneration during the service year and may eventually lead to corps members being offered employment in these organisations. The NYSC no doubt is a good programme, but from the challenges mentioned, the problems faced by the programme still revolve around implementation and corruption.

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The Federal Character Principle Southern Nigeria is more educationally progressed than the North. Thus, in filling positions in public service, the South is better positioned than the North. Some states have more federal infrastructure than others and some are more infrastructurally advanced than others and this gap may be far from being closed if there is no pedestal for balancing. The attention of the government has been drawn to these discrepancies in appointments and infrastructure before independence (Falola & Heaton, 2008) but the entrenchment of the federal character principle in the 1979 Constitution was a watershed in its recognition. This was a legal backing that had a national widespread covering all aspects of public service appointments. Thus, the consciousness of Nigerians about it increased. The Federal Character Principle has been designed to deal with ethnic and geographical imbalances in public offices. The federal character principle stipulates that the composition of public institutions at each tier of government should imitate diversity (Suberu, 2009). Initially, the quota system was designed to address the imbalance in the composition of public institutions. From 1958, the quota system was used for recruits’ intake into the military to reflect 50% from the North and 25% each from the West and East (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The NPC-led government in 1961 extended this gesture to the officers’ cadre as 50% was given to the North to be admitted into the officers’ cadre while the South took the remaining 50% (Falola & Heaton, 2008). However, not all public offices were incorporated into the quota system. The Federal Character Commission (FCC) official explained the transition from pre federal character principle to federal character principle that before independence and after independence there was this thing we called quota system whereby people are enlisted in the military. But we now found out that since the quota system is working, it showed that it is apposite for them to extend it to other facets of the Nigerian system, into employment and all that stuff. So, things were not well carried out because you will find out that some states are being short-changed. We did not give the same number of representations. You can find out a situation whereby maybe you have 20 slots to be taken care of. Maybe the state where the Head of State comes from will want to take ten and want the rest of the country to share the remaining ten. But with the coming of federal character, they ensured that every state was represented fairly. (Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Official, December 2018)

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The documentation of the federal character principle can be traced to the activities that culminated in the drafting of the 1979 Constitution (Peter, 2014). The principle was incorporated into the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions. The need to uphold Federal Character was also reiterated during The 1994/95 Constitutional Conference (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). Consequently, Decree No. 34 of 1996 was promulgated to set up the FCC (Federal Character Commission Handbook, not dated). The FCC is one of the federal executive bodies as provided in Section 153(1) of the 1999 Constitution. Its functions and powers are spelt out in the 1999 Constitution and the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act 2004 (Federal Character Commission Handbook, not dated). Section 14 (3 and 4) of the 1999 Constitution provides that the composition of federal, state and local governments, their agencies and their conducts should promote national loyalty and unity by recognising diversity so that no ethnic or sectional groups will dominate the governments or their agencies. The FCC has the mandate ‘to enforce the Federal Character Principles which is aimed at ensuring fair and equitable distribution of posts and socio-economic amenities, infrastructural facilities among the federating units nationwide’ (Federal Character Commission Handbook: 1, not dated). This implies that each state shall not produce below 2.75% and not above 3% of the total workforce in any federal establishment, while the FCT shall produce 1% (Adieme, 2012; Federal Character Commission Handbook, not dated). The second part of the mandate of the Commission indicates that federal infrastructure should be well distributed to states. The principle is mostly used in recruitment and promotion in the public service, as well as those of security agencies. The FCC gets involved in the entire process. The FCC official explained. Basically, at the national level, there is compliance because you cannot see an organisation trying to recruit without seeking clearance from the Federal Character Commission. There is this thing they call certificate of compliance that the federal character issues out at the end of the exercise. The certificate is tantamount to telling the whole Nigeria or those concerned that in carrying out the exercise, you have put the federal character principle into consideration. They contact us before they start the exercise and brief us on what they want to do. We have the right to prosecute, but in

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most cases, we do not do that. We try to appeal, maybe there is lopsidedness in the appointment, for example in a particular organisation and when we feel that some communities, some areas have been cheated. What we try to do is to talk to the people at the helm of affairs to balance up by considering those areas that are short-changed. (Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Official, December 2018)

The commission has the power to take necessary actions against erring agencies and their management teams, but it hardly wields such authority. This is regardless of being empowered to take such action under Section 14 of its Establishment Act 2004 (Federal Character Commission Handbook, not dated). This does not mean it cannot abort an interview process if the situation arises, especially if it has spawned a national embarrassment as one of the participants explained below. We do not really sanction or punish; we try to appeal. If we find out that such an organisation is, recalcitrant, we have the right to call off the interview process, the employment process. For example, about four or five years ago, Nigerian Immigration did a recruitment exercise in which a lot of people died, because of what happened, the Federal Character Commission was forced to call it off. So, we can call off or cancel, and that is one of the ways to sanction. (Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Official, December 2018)

There were deaths in at least two states due to poor organisation. A lot of applicants sustained injuries and fainted. This challenge nevertheless, the FCC still strives to ensure equity in the discharge of its responsibilities. This is further revealed by the FCC official that: These days when you want to employ people, they make sure that the employment is centralised, the information is made available to everybody no matter where you are in the country, at least two or three newspapers will carry the advert. So, when that one is done, the interview process will be well publicised too. Positions are shared in a way that the states will be fairly represented, and if they cannot go around the states, we use geopolitical zones. You know Nigeria is divided into six geo-political zones. We will make sure those positions go around the geo-political zones in a very fair manner, and if they cannot go around the geo-political zones, we make it North and South. (Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Official, December 2018)

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This is meant to ensure accountability and geographical spread at any level possible. The FCC official further explained that it has become part of the Nigerian system. ‘I think it is in our national life, anytime you want to make any recruitment, any selection, people will be talking about fair sharing, fair representation and when they talk about these, they are talking about federal character’ (Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Official, December 2018). Thus, the diversity of the country is not restricted to geographical spread and federal character in Nigeria hardly covers these other areas. Femi Gbajabiamila, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, observed that age, religious and sexual diversities are not taken into consideration in federal character (Orizu, 2020). If these demographic features are taken into consideration, concerns of youth, religious and women organisations about being excluded from governance might be reduced. This lacuna notwithstanding, it will be examined based on how it operates on a geographical basis. Federal character is relatively applied by the political class in the election of the president and the appointment of top political positions in the executive and principal officers in the federal legislative chambers, but this pattern is not enshrined in the constitution. This arrangement also determines political party formation and composition (Suberu, 2009). That of federal ministers is in the constitution. There is a provision for the appointment of ministers to reflect federal character principle. Section 147 (3) of the 1999 Constitution provides that ministers in the federal cabinet should be appointed from each state in Nigeria and that such appointees should be an indigene of the state. Thus, each state has at least a representative at the Federal Executive Council. South South politician submitted that ‘because all the states and the FCT are represented, it brings a great level of trust because there is the feeling that some level of interest have been accommodated’ (Personal Interview South South Politician, January 2019). That of the president takes the form of rotational presidency. Just like other top executive and legislative positions, the distribution of the positions is based on party/elite arrangement. However, the personality placed in a position and the demands of the position matters. North Central politician reinforced this and highlighted that: For instance, you talked about ministers. Each state produces a minister, then you ask yourself, what portfolio is the minister given at the end of the day not minding what their qualification is? You get somebody who is

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old and redundant, somebody who has lost touch with modern realities of events and make him handle a very sensitive portfolio. What he will give to us are outdated policies that will not take us anywhere. (North Central Politician, January 2019)

Some ministers’ academic and professional experience do not align with the portfolios they are given. There are examples of ministers that were given portfolios that they have little or no experience about. For instance, the immediate past Ministers of Science and Technology and Labour and Employment are medical doctors; the Minister of Interior is an engineer. These do not have qualifications and probably experience in science and technology, labour matters and internal security, respectively. Nevertheless, the federal character principle is designed to create a sense of belonging, which is to bolster unity, but it has bred animosity among public servants. Constitutional lawyer two elucidated that: One of the impediments to federal character in Nigeria is that regardless of the capacity and competence of an individual, you know, federal character will apply, and you often see a competent person being relegated to the background. The competent person will feel shut out, and this could be an impediment to national integration. (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer Two, January 2019)

North East politician shares a similar opinion. He explained. You are not presenting your ability, capability, and educational background. In fact, whatever you may think of. You will instead…I am from the South, he is from the North. And when you happen to get that, for me that is from the North that I have all that it entails, maybe I will be opportune to see your CV. I will find it difficult to know what criteria they followed to pick you, not me. From that, I will start to nurse something at the back of my mind against someone outside my region. So this is the main problem in Nigeria. (Personal Interview North East Politician, January 2019)

In a similar vein, Researcher One explained that in situations where a state has a vacant slot to fill a higher position, and an employee’s junior is from that state, the junior might be promoted ahead of the superior not based exclusively on merit but because of the expediency of filling the vacant position meant for his/her state in that government agency/ministry. South West opinion leader dwelt on division and opined that the federal

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character principle divides the country through group representation. He explained below. For example, you have a policy like federal character. Federal Character implies that you want people to be involved in their government, and that is fine, but when you now decide that federal character must have an arithmetic meaning in terms of representing all groups, all shades, and conditions of people and so on. Then you might have a problem of overemphasising the division. If you emphasise division, then you cannot gain unity out of it. (Personal Interview South West Opinion Leader, December 2018)

In a related submission, Researcher One highlighted how it causes nepotism but emphasised that it has prevented lopsided appointments. He explained below. So the way it is in Nigeria when somebody is in either the civil or public service, he is not representing the country, he is representing his state, he is representing his ethnic group, he is representing his village, and you now see in practice when people get to the position of power, they want to satisfy their state, their ethnic group, their villages and not national interest and that is why we talk about nepotism and so on. So, it is as if in the process of trying to achieve national integration through the federal character, the system also promotes nepotism officially in Nigeria but I cannot put all the blame on federal character because….but for federal character, development would have been lopsided; but for federal character, appointments would have been lopsided. (Personal Interview Researcher One, December 2018)

There are allegations that the appointments made by former President Buhari since 2015 have been lopsided, especially those of the service chiefs, and heads of paramilitary and allied agencies. Most of the heads of these security and allied agencies are from the North just like the former president. The National Security Adviser, Minister of Defence, Minister of Police Affairs, Inspector General of Police and two of the service chiefs are all from the North. Although the immediate past Minister of Interior is from the South West, the heads of key security institutions under the supervision of his ministry are from the North. The intelligence agencies are headed by Northerners. Some Southerners that hitherto headed these agencies were replaced with

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Northerners due to the retirement of the former or other ‘excuses’. The implications are that the North dominated some decision-making activities and implementation on security matters. The most affected was the South East which headed none of the institutions as shown in Table 8.1. This meant that the South East might have been excluded from taking some security decisions and denied the headship of an organisation that implements such decisions. Southern elite groups and some elite groups from the North perceived the actions of the former president as an attempt at Northern domination. The president might have been motivated by trust and safety. However, Southerners who are qualified for these positions may feel that the former president could not entrust them with security and related matters. This may bring about distrust between the North and the South even within these government institutions. The sorry state of security in the country and the level of corruption indicate that these agencies have performed below expectations despite the trust the former president vested in their heads. The former president’s action is one of the challenges confronting the FCC if an appointment does not require the confirmation of the National Assembly. Even if appointments require approval by the Senate, the North still received special attention over the South. Colonel Abubakar Umar, a former Military Administrator of Kaduna State, narrated the case of Justice Walter Onnoghen, from the South South who was appointed as the Acting Chief Justice of the Federation on November 10, 2016 but his name was not put forward to the Senate for approval by former President Buhari after the expiration of the former’s tenure in acting capacity for three months (Ukpong, 2020). In 2017, the then Acting President, Yemi Osinbajo forwarded his name to the Senate for approval and he was sworn in as the substantive Chief Justice on March 7, 2017 (Ukpong, 2020). Justice Onnoghen was suspended and removed questionably on corruption charges, a Northern Muslim was sworn in as acting Chief Justice, and the former president did not delay like the case of Onnoghen in forwarding his name to the Senate for confirmation as the substantive Chief Justice. Onnoghen is a Southern Christian. Although Tanko acted from January 2019 before his confirmation in July 2019, Onnoghen officially resigned in April 2019. However, it can be argued that Tanko acted for about six months compared to Onnoghen’s acting for about five months. A similar thing played out in the appointment of the president of the Court of Appeal but it took a religious dimension. Justice Monica

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Table 8.1 Heads of military, security, anti-corruption and allied agencies based on geo-political zones as of May 2023 S/ N

Heads of organisation

Geo-political zone

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

National Security Adviser Chief of Defence Staff Chief of Army Staff Chief of the Air Staff Chief of Naval Staff Inspector General of Police Director-General of the Department of State Services Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency Controller General of Immigration Controller General of Correctional Services Controller General of Customs Chairman/Chief Executive of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Corps Marshal of the Federal Road Safety Corps Commandant General of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Controller General of the Federal Fire Service

North East South South North West South West North West North East North West North West North West North West North East North East

13 14 15 16 17 18

Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission Chairman of the Code of Conduct Bureau

North East North Central North Central North West South West North West

Source Compiled by author

Dongban-Mensem, a Northern Christian was initially appointed on March 6, 2020 in an acting capacity for three months, and there were speculations that she could act in that position for another three months. Expectations were that she should have been confirmed and made the substantive President of the Court after the first three months. The next in position to her is a Northern Muslim and there were speculations that she may not be confirmed and replaced by the next to her (Iriekpen, 2020). In the federal judicial system, the most senior judge at the level of the court he/she operates is expected to take the mantle of leadership irrespective of the ethnic, religious or geo-political affiliation of the judge. Nevertheless, the Senate confirmed her appointment on June 11, 2020, but the delay came with concerns from some stakeholders. The tension surrounding her confirmation was because Christians hardly trust the

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former president when it comes to the appointment of key officials. The case of Onnoghen was a mixture of ethnicity and religious linings while that of Justice Monica had religious coatings. Actions like these polarise the country along ethnic and religious lines and make some citizens feel like they are second-class. However, the former president demonstrated some level of religious tolerance, especially with the appointment of the former Secretaries to the Government of the Federation: Babachir Lawal and Boss Mustapha, respectively. On geo-political grounds, a reference was made by North Central Politician regarding the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC3 ), and he probed why personnel from the oil-producing states had not been allowed to head the corporation and take key positions there. He clarified below. Oil comes from the South, and NNPC regulates the sector, yet the key positions are held by the Northerners. My statements are verifiable, you can check them. The GMD is from the North, the region does not produce oil. So how will the people themselves who have suffered from oil spillage and the others benefit? It is only the person who knows where it pinches that know their problems better and will say let us pay back. There are no fishes in their rivers, they cannot drink the waters and the greatest ill-luck that they ever have was to have a president who did not know how to maximise his office to the betterment of his people. (Personal Interview North Central Politician, January 2019)

The Group Managing Director is Mele Kolo Kyari, and is a Northerner. The oil-producing communities may feel they have been edged out in the running of the affairs of the now commercialised state-owned oil firm, despite the immediate past Minister of State being from the South South and some board members and executive management team being from the oil-producing states in the Niger Delta. This aligns with the submission of Peter (2014) that the federal character, instead of being a tool of national integration, has not stemmed the tide of disagreement between the North and the South over issues of public positions.

3 This assertion is before the restructuring of the NNPC. The Group Managing Director is now called the Group Chief Executive Officer. The NNPC is now called the NNPC Limited. Mele Kolo Kyari was the Group Managing Director. He is also the Group Chief Executive Officer after the restructuring.

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On skewed appointments, it would be fair enough to look at the reverse side. Distribution of presidential aides which includes ministers, special assistants, senior special assistants, special advisers, personal assistants and others will also be brought to the spotlight. Of these positions, as of June 2020 South West had 64, North West had 37, North East had 29, South-South had 24, North Central had 21 and South East had 15 (Owete, 2020). The South West had the highest, despite the former president being from the North West. Thus, it cannot be concluded that he fully embraced nepotism. These appointments do not give a holistic representation of those made by the president. Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution outlines that some appointments must reflect the federal character principle. The Constitution stipulates the positions as: Permanent Secretaries, Directors-General in Extra-Ministerial Departments and parastatals, Directors in Ministries and Extra-Ministerial Departments, senior military officers, senior diplomatic posts and managerial cadres in the Federal and State parastatals, bodies, agencies, and institutions. (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999)

Although appointments into the lower positions do not directly involve the president. However, using the management positions of these security agencies, ministries and organisations to judge does not give room for holistic assessment. The North East politician described this from the perspective of the composition of the staff of these establishments that are not political appointees. He explained. As far as I am concerned, it depends on the way you take it. Let us take the present administration, 2015 to date. Most of the appointments of the heads of parastatals particularly the security are from the North. But go and check the statistics of the manpower of these agencies and check whether it is the North that dominates the staff strength despite having Northerners as the heads. (Personal Interview North East Politician, January 2019)

The use of the federal character principle for the geographical distribution of employment of staff of all categories substantiates this claim. Allegations of recruitment exercises skewed in favour of the North carried out by the Department of State Services in 2017 and 2020 raised concerns about the commitment of the organisation to federal character in the recruitment of staff. More candidates were recruited from the

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North in both recruitments (Ogundipe, 2017; Sahara Reporters, October 30, 2020; This Day Newspaper, October 7, 2020). Clarification by the presidency that the 2017 exercise was meant to fill Northern vacant slots and balance regional composition was widely rejected, especially by Southerners. Also, does it mean that the North was yet to fill its quota before the 2020 recruitment? The manner the recruitment was done to many was that federal character was not observed and represented a more privileged Northern region. Thus, the task lies with the FCC to constantly publish the distribution of all categories of staff of ministries and government agencies so that the states whose slots have not been filled will be known. These actions including those of the president that have been viewed by some as Northern-centric may have ripple effects. Other elite groups may decide to ‘replicate’ the actions of the president in having lopsided appointments to favour their elite bloc if any of them produces the president. For instance, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu was sworn in on May 29, 2023. Most of his appointees so far are from the South West, his geopolitical zone. Such lopsided and ‘vindictive’ actions may threaten federal stability and national integration in the country. Another challenge with federal character is that the individual given employment or appointed tends to be more loyal to the geographical space he is representing than the country. The person sometimes discharges his responsibilities to his geographical group and not the country. South West opinion leader explained. For example, if we take the federal character. Federal character is good in terms of creating inclusiveness, but there could also be a federal character in terms of division. So, our federal character is not geared towards inclusiveness, and because of this, it cannot achieve the goal of inclusiveness. That is one. Two, federal character has also been implemented in a way to show some people that what matters is not the level of development but the fact that somebody belongs to an area and so those issues continue to manifest even in the behaviour of those who are appointed. Once you create a feeling of belonging to a micro area because that is the qualification of getting there, the person that gets there will continue to perpetuate that micro area that sponsored him, that elevated him to that area. (Personal Interview South West Opinion Leader, December 2018)

The FCC is also confronted with the challenge of non-compliance by states and local governments. A participant highlighted that:

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The politicians and the civil servants see the federal character as a federal thing. They feel reluctant to supply information, and when they make their employment/appointments, they do not carry us along. Ordinarily, they should submit to that effect. These are the number of people we want to employ, and we employed this number of people. That affects their compliance. (Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Official, December 2018)

This assertion brings to light the unhealthy intergovernmental relations in the country’s federal system, but it also reflects true federalism that a federal agency need not interfere in employment and promotion exercises at the state and local government levels. The majority-minority dichotomy is another challenge with the federal character principle. One of the cardinals of federal character is to protect minority groups by making it possible for them to attain public office and enjoy the privileges that come with being in a federal state (Azaigba & Yio, 2014). However, considering the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria, all groups may not be represented in the public service. North West opinion leader is from one of the minority ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria and he explained how representation may breed disloyalty due to some groups being privileged to represent the larger group. He explained below. So, if you are looking at it in terms of zones because even if you say okay the North West, the North Central, the North East………in terms of federal character principle, I will say my group was not represented because if you are bringing a Fulani person or a Hausa person, that one is not representing my group. So, at what point do we put a limit to the expectations of federal character? These are the complexities, and then people do not look at them critically because this country is not just meant for the three dominant groups or the six dominant groups because in each geopolitical zone, you have a dominant group. Those kinds of agitations and demands do not foster the principles of integration. They further polarise us because politically, people have the consciousness that we are not in charge, and those ones are not representing us because we are different. That is what integration should address. (Personal Interview North West Opinion Leader, December 2018)

One of the things that can be drawn from his submission is that the federal character system may not contribute to national integration. However,

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North West politician two shares partially similar opinion. He explained that all the ethnic groups cannot be represented but making it based on states and/or geo-political has to some extent brought some belonging. ‘You cannot have total satisfaction from every nook and cranny in terms of the ethnic configuration. Nigeria is a country with over 300 and something ethnic groups. What has been achieved is to at least ensure that states and geo-political zones are considered’ (Personal Interview North West Politician Two, January 2019). These aforementioned indicate that federal character has its pros and cons. Researchers Two and Three attributed the failures to not engage the best from each region and relegating merit because there is a need for spread. North Central opinion leader simply captured these as ‘talk of Federal Character, of course, we have to understand our heterogeneity as a country, but despite that, we should not lose merit. Do we play meritocracy out of the game because we want stability?’ (Personal Interview North Central Opinion Leader, January 2019). However, merit can still be coupled with geographical spread to avoid skewed employment and promotion. North Central opinion leader further explained that ‘I am not saying we should not recognise even development, equality and all that but the federal character must take cognisance of merit because otherwise, if you put a man who does not know anything about governance at the helm of affairs, then you cannot have good governance4 ’ (Personal Interview North Central Opinion Leader, January 2019). Federal character also reflects in the distribution of infrastructure. The FCC handbook provides for the distribution of infrastructure to reflect geographical spread, its implementation is yet to officially commence as at 2018. The FCC official highlighted that ‘the second aspect is this socioeconomic thing. We are just trying to go into it gradually. In fact, it may start on a full scale next year. That one tends to look at situations whereby amenities are shared out into communities’ (Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Official, December 2018). Successive governments have implemented the infrastructure aspect but not without 4 Good governance within the context of this book means ‘the provision of political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their government, and that a government has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens’ (https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag). These describe the basic responsibilities of government which are welfare and security and any government offering good governance must do so with transparency and accountability. The indicators that a country is experiencing good governance have been highlighted in Chapter 1 under the HDI.

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some measure of nepotism. Some states would not have had some federal infrastructure sited in them if not for the spirit of equality, but some infrastructure or parastatals are sited where they are not needed or less needed. For instance, when the Kaduna Refinery was established, oil was not being explored in the North. Even if it is argued that oil has been discovered in the North, it is not in Kaduna State. Thus, refining oil in a region that does not produce oil raises some questions about the motives behind such. During the administration of Former President Jonathan federal universities were established in some states. One of them was established in his home town. The good thing about this is that states hitherto without federal universities now have at least one. The same applies to the establishment of universities for the arms of the military despite the existence of the Nigerian Defence Academy, National Defence College, Armed Forces Command and Staff College and other military training institutions. The Nigerian Army University was established in Biu, the local government of the former Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai. However, these states may have other pressing infrastructural needs aside from universities but it is a sign that political elites hardly factor in the infrastructural gaps of communities and states before siting infrastructure/institutions and projects for political reasons (Faluyi, 2023). The establishment of some military and paramilitary institutions in some towns and states also brings the intentions to scrutiny. Do these towns and states need these security outfits or other infrastructure? The hometowns or states of a serving president and some heads of these institutions have these institutions located in them. These include Nigerian Air Force Special Operations Command, Bauchi; Nigerian Air Force Mobility Command, Yenagoa; Air Force Reference Hospital, Daura; Nigerian Air Force Quick Response Wing, Daura; Central Naval Command, Brass; 17 Brigade of the Nigerian Army, Katsina; 171 Battalion Nigerian Army, Daura; and Police Mobile Training Schools, Ila Orangun and Nasarawa, among others. From some of these examples, it is obvious that military elites also seek to promote parochial interests just like political elites in the five elite groups. The insecurity in the country sprouts some concerns about the essence of these institutions. In essence, some of the states where these institutions are located have severe security problems.

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The communities where these institutions are located are quick to conclude that their sons have given them great benefits through the establishment of such institutions. These draw their attention away from the basic infrastructure needed by these communities. The major benefit they may get is that more businesses may open in the communities and if possible very few of the community members will be offered employment in these institutions. Such opportunities may just be like a drop in the ocean. Thus, the hardship in these communities continues because basic amenities like good roads, water, and electricity, among others, are not in good condition. The availability of functional infrastructure promotes a thriving private sector which will reduce unemployment, poverty and insecurity. This is why despite embracing democracy since 1999, unemployment and poverty have been on the high side and insecurity continues to take more dangerous dimensions. Prioritising the needs of communities is important as explained by a participant that ‘may be in a community, they need school, and in another one, they need a hospital. It entails that each community be given amenities based on what it needs, but the value should be almost the same’ (Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Official, December 2018). South South and South East opinion leaders submitted that the federal character principle is a fantastic thing, but the implementation is the problem.

Political Parties with National Spread Political parties are platforms through which people aspire for political positions and contest elections in a democratic setting like that of Nigeria. Different administrations have embraced having political parties that have a national spread in terms of membership to foster national integration. This became necessary because the ethnic politicking in the First Republic was partly responsible for the first military coup. The colonial state made ethnic nationalities suspicious of one another and bolstered the fear of domination, and that is why the political parties that sprang up before independence were ethnic-based (Abdussalam, 2014). There were three major political parties in the First Republic, and they were formed along ethnic/regional lines. These parties are the NPC, which was the major party in the North, AG, which was the key party in the West and the NCNC was the major party in the East. In the First Republic, smaller political parties that existed were splinter groups of the larger parties, and they include UMBC, the Dynamic Party, Midwest Democratic Front

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(MDF), NEPU, Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) (Obiyan, 2010; Onoja, 2014). UMBC was another ethnic-based political party which demanded a Middle Belt region out of Northern Nigeria (Ukase, 2014). In the 1959 general election, ethnicity and religion played a major role (Yongo, 2015). However, elites across ethnic lines cooperated not only for the advancement of the country but also to get at rival elites in other ethnic groups. For instance, the AG during the 1959 general election worked closely with the UMBC, and this was against the agenda of the NPC which is to have a united North irrespective of religious or tribal affiliation (Yongo, 2015). An ethnic outlook of the political parties in the First Republic meant outright victory for a political party was the same as a victory for the ethnic group it represents (Omoleke, 2010). In the 1959 election, none of the three major parties could form the majority, so NPC and NCNC formed a coalition while AG became the major opposition party (Ogbeidi, 2010). This created more suspicions and distrust among the ethnic groups. This was because Nigerians now saw political parties as ethnic and not national interest-promoting organisations. In the First Republic, the South feared that the North through the NPC would divert resources to the North, remove Southerners from government positions, and the military and eventually Islamise the country (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The fear of the North within the same period was that if the AG and NCNC controlled the government, they would develop the South more and dominate the civil service and the educational institutions located in the North (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The NPC was interested in ensuring peace does not reign in the West. Hence, they pitched Awolowo, the former Premier against the present Premier, Akintola. They courted Akintola to support the NPCled federal government which Awolowo was against. This crisis eventually led to the arrest of Awolowo and his close associates; they were given treason charges and sentenced to jail (Nwala, 1997). The Westerners interpreted this to mean an ethnic tool by Northern elites to prevent strong opposition against the Northern-led federal government. Following the 1959 election issue, the major political parties formed a coalition with the small parties to form two parties which contested the 1964 general election. Although this may be interpreted as an attempt to have political parties with national spread, the election and its outcome indicate that these parties were still polarised along regional lines. In the 1964 general elections, the political parties that emerged from the

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mergers were NNA and the UPGA (Ezonbi, 2014). The UPGA was a conglomeration of NCNC, AG, Northern Progressive Front, NEPU, UMBC, the Kano People’s Party and the Zamfara Commoners Party while the NNA was a product of clustering of NPC, NNDP, Niger Delta Congress, MDF and Dynamic National Alliance, the Lagos State United Front and the Republican party (Adekola, 2010; Falola & Genova, 2009; Hill, 2012). The NNA had the majority of seats and formed the government in 1964 (Adekola, 2010). However, ethnicity through the instrumentality of electoral malpractices still played out especially in the North while the election was not peaceful in the West. During the 1964 federal elections, legal and political tools were used by the government to suppress the opposition, especially in the Northern and Western regions, and this was an implication of political intolerance and election violence (Diamond, 2002). Also, opposition members were prevented from campaigning, holding rallies and giving speeches within their regions and also, local and regional police were used to intimidate members of the opposition (Diamond, 2002). In the 1964 federal election, some candidates of UPGA were not allowed to file their nomination papers in the North, and consequently, before the election, sixty-seven NNA members were returned unopposed (Iwara, 2010). The UPGA was not allowed to produce candidates in more than a third of the constituencies in the North (Diamond, 2002). UPGA polling agents were prevented from observing the election while those of NNDP were allowed, there was the disappearance of ballot papers which were later used by ruling party supporters to ‘cast’ votes, and opposition candidates and parties were not granted access to where votes were being counted (Diamond, 2002). There was a massive and partial boycott of the election in the East and West, respectively (Iwara, 2010). In the Western region elections of 1965, Akintola’s NNDP with the support of the federal government made it difficult for the opposition UPGA to nominate candidates in more than 12 constituencies (Diamond, 2002). The 1965 Western region election was not peaceful to the extent that apart from the disappearance of ballot boxes and loss of lives, two results were announced with both Akintola of the NNDP and Dauda Adegbenro of the UPGA(AG) being announced as winners (Bamgbose, 2012). The 1965 regional election was not smooth in the Western region as both the UPGA (AG) and NNA (NNDP) claimed victory, and this led to the operation wet’ e quagmire which continued until the first military coup on January 15, 1966 (Iwara, 2010).

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To avoid domination by a certain group, political parties need to cut across ethnic lines and represent diversity (Osaghae, 1999). Efforts were made to ensure that the parties in the Second and Fourth Republics had a national spread. The 1979 and 1999 Constitutions provide that for political associations to be licensed, the names, ideology, leadership, membership and where they are located should not have sectional but national reflections (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999; Suberu, 2019). Section 202(b) of the 1979 Constitution provides for membership of political parties to be open to every citizen irrespective of place of origin, sex, religion or ethnic group. However, the ways the parties operated in the Second Republic were not national in outlook. These political parties had striking regional and ethnic outlooks like those of the First Republic. The NPN was a miniature NPC; the UPN mirrored the AG; the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) was like NCNC while the PRP was similar to NEPU (Ezonbi, 2014). The Great Nigerian People’s Party (GNPP) represented minority interests as it was in the First Republic (Ezonbi, 2014). Most of the major actors in the Second Republic were the major actors in the First Republic. Hence, the political thespians still played ethnic politics but not as deeply as that of the First Republic. However, the NPN was still national to some extent. Researcher Two submitted that: it was not until 1979 that we had for the first time a party that had a national outlook. One was distinctively national in its outlook, the National Party of Nigeria followed in that order by NPP, Nigeria Peoples Party and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe was the flagbearer, but it had its presence in other parts of the country at least to the best of my knowledge, it was very strong in the South East and had some presence in the South West. I don’t know how strong it was in the North. Again in that order, the Unity Party of Nigeria, strong in the South West and with some elements of prominence in some other parts of the country, especially the Mid-West and don’t forget that the Mid-West was part of the Western Region. To that extent, the Unity Party will not be completely classified as a national party, So, ditto for GNPP and PRP and later NAP. So, again in that sequence, you will notice that we have gradually improved over time. (Personal Interview Researcher Two, December 2018)

This assertion is almost completely reflected in the percentage each party got from the states they least performed in the 1979 Presidential Election result. The least NPN got was 4.19% while the GNPP got as low as 0.26%,

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UPN got 0.64%, PRP got 0.18% while the NPP got 0.32% (Akinsanya, 2002). They got the least votes in the states where they were less popular. The ethnic dimension played out more in the 1983 election. At the national level, the victory of Shehu Shagari in the 1983 election was not impossible because it latched on ethnic and religious cleavages to the North and the failure of the opposition to present one joint candidate (Diamond, 2002). However, that he got more votes than he got in 1979 was questionable (Diamond, 2002). There were also surprises with the emergence of opposition parties in states where some parties had ethnic majority support. These portray federal might from the NPN-controlled federal government. Ironically, Awolowo and Azikiwe’s percentage votes declined in Oyo and Ondo as well as Anambra and Imo States, respectively (Diamond, 2002) despite being their respective strongholds. The outcome of the 1983 election was that the NPN won 13 out of the 19 states and this generated negative reactions in states like Oyo, Ondo, Anambra and Niger which led to death, injuries and destruction of property including Federal Electoral Commission offices (Diamond, 2002; Ojo, 2017). In a bid to address the challenges of the First and Second Republics, one of the things put in place by the Babangida Administration was a two-party system to prevent ethnic and religious factors in the activities of political parties (Azelama & Oarhe, 2010). After lifting the ban on politics in 1989, 13 political organisations applied but six were shortlisted by the NEC (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The Armed Forces Ruling Council disapproved of them because they were not national in character and were linked to banned politicians (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Consequently, NRC and SDP were formed by the government (Falola & Heaton, 2008). SDP and NRC, which were the parties of the aborted Third Republic cut across ethnic lines, unlike the parties of the previous Republics (Ezonbi, 2014). ‘For the ill-fated Third Republic, we did not even have a choice in quote because there were two parties that were imposed on us and those two parties had at least a fairer spread in terms of national outlook, the SDP and the NRC’ (Personal Interview Researcher Two, December 2018). This resonates with the view of Obiyan (2010) that as a result of being a two-party system, it was difficult for the parties to be monopolised along ethnic and religious lines. These parties integrated Nigerians to a great extent because their membership cut across the entire country. This was evident in the victory of Chief MKO Abiola

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in the 1993 election because ethnic and religious differences determined less. In June 1996, Abacha lifted the ban on political associations to make way for the formation of political parties (Falola & Genova, 2009). In a bid to succeed himself, the Abacha administration formed five political parties which are the Congress for National Consensus, the Democratic Party of Nigeria, the Grassroots Democratic Movement, the National Centre Party of Nigeria, and the United Nigerian Congress Party. However, the people had no choice because the parties were ‘created’ by the government and not political associations approved by the government. Nevertheless, the parties were short-lived because of Abacha’s death, so it is difficult to determine their ethnic or religious inclinations and how they could have integrated the country or otherwise. In 1998, a transition to civil rule was put in place, nine political parties were granted provisional approval, and they were also allowed to present candidates for the December 1998 local government election (Falola & Genova, 2009; Obiyan, 2010). Their performance in this election was the basis for giving final registration to the trio of PDP, AD and APP (Obiyan, 2010). The PDP was the one that had the widest national coverage among the parties. It also had membership across ethnic and religious lines but was not popular in the South West. The APP was popular in some Northern States because it had at least two governors from each of the geo-political zones in the North but none from the South. The AD clinched all the South West States while the PDP won all the States in the South South and South East. All these were in the 1999 elections. However, before the 2003 elections, more parties were added to the existing three, but the PDP was the one that had national spread the most. The APP was renamed All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). Among the new parties, the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) was affiliated with the South East. The number of political parties in 2007 and 2011 increased. The main parties that contested the 2015 and 2019 elections are the APC and PDP. The APC is a merger of the Action Congress of Nigeria, CPC, ANPP and factions of PDP and APGA. This gave the party an ethnic and religious spread. The PDP still has its national spread following the 2019 governorship elections as it had at least one state governor in each of the geo-political zones. This is expected of all parties. South East opinion leader submitted that ‘what I like is that parties are not established along ethnic lines again based on INEC’s guideline’ (Personal Interview South

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East Opinion Leader, January 2019). This is in line with Section 223 of the 1999 Constitution which provides for executives and other governing bodies of political parties to reflect federal character and that its members should come from not less than two-thirds of the states and the FCT. This is evident in the composition of the executives of political parties where positions are distributed based on geo-political zones. For instance, the chairman, deputy national chairmen and secretary of a party are always from different geo-political zones. They also have national vice chairmen for each of the geo-political zones. Aside from having a national spread, it is also important for parties to present candidates that will be acceptable across ethnic and religious lines (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer One, December 2018). This explains why parties are sensitive to the ethnic and religious affiliations of their candidates. The build up to the 2023 elections saw the emergence of the LP as a major political party. Hence, the APC, PDP and LP are the major political parties in the country. However, ethnic and religious cards were played in the build up to the election The Muslim-Muslim ticket of the APC made the Christians in the country perceive the party as not being national in its disposition but more of an advocate of a religion. The inability of the South East to produce a president since the death of Aguiyi Ironsi made Igbos see the emergence of Peter Obi as the LP candidate as their opportunity. Hence, the LP was seen as an Igbo party and not a national party. This culminated in the ethnic profiling of Igbos, especially in Lagos before and during the 2023 election. Locations in Lagos where non-indigenes, especially Igbos are in the majority were targeted. Some of them were threatened and prevented from registering and collecting their permanent voter cards and prevented from voting (Nwaokolo, 2023; Vanguard Newspaper March 29, 2023). These actions pitched the Yorubas against the Igbos. However, the victory of the LP in states like Lagos, Delta, Cross River, Edo, Plateau, Nasarawa and the FCT suggest that the party is to some extent national. These states are not Igbo states. The victories recorded by the APC and the PDP in states across most geo-political zones indicated that these parties still have national spread. Furthermore, in a bid to have parties that have a national outlook, INEC has more than once in the Fourth Republic deregistered some political parties because they poorly performed in elections at all levels. The Commission did this because their memberships do not appeal to various ethnic and religious groups. However, this exercise is always challenged in court.

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Conclusion The Nigerian Civil War as well as ethnic and religious conflicts that have continued to stare at the country are signs that national integration is still at its rudimentary stage. Some national integration measures were put in place after the Civil War. The NYSC has its benefits such as inter-tribal marriages, understanding people from different backgrounds, bridging the gaps between school and industry and learning vocational skills. Its challenges include favouritism and nepotism to influence postings, insecurity and poor welfare. The federal character principle has made it possible for all states to have their indigenes in federal government ministries, departments and agencies. However, the challenges facing the practice are non-compliance by federal and state politicians. It also has the challenge of downplaying merit and negative morale due to subordinates being promoted sometimes above superiors. Political parties have been a means of expressing ethnic politics. Although, this was severe in the First Republic, the situation improved in the Second Republic. In the aborted Third Republic, the two political parties were more national in their operations. The Fourth Republic in its early days had the PDP as the most national party. This was sustained for some years and the APC which emerged over a decade later is also national in its operations. However, ethnic profiling that characterised the 2023 Presidential Election indicates that political parties are becoming ethnic-based. Finally, these pre- and post-civil war measures are laudable but the hindrances to getting the best out of them are poor implementation, corruption, hijacking the processes by political elites and nepotistic attitudes. The next chapter will explore another post-civil war measure—rotational presidency.

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CHAPTER 9

National Integration Within the Spectrum of Rotational Presidency

Introduction This chapter focuses on rotational presidency in Nigeria. It is also called zoning within the Nigerian context. In essence, zoning the presidency. It reveals how zoning has been practised in the country and the political niceties surrounding it. This is crucial because the issue of who becomes the president has at different times drawn the attention of different groups in the country. Succinctly, the chapter explores the extent to which rotational presidency has fostered national integration in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The chapter argues that rotational presidency has positive and negative effects on the Nigerian political and economic systems. This chapter is presented in sections. The first section focuses on rotational presidency as an elites’ arrangement and why it has become an important subject in contemporary Nigeria. The second section demystifies the puzzle on the constitutionality of zoning and argues that though the practice is not provided for in the constitution, it has not restricted the presidency to only majority ethnic groups and it has not been set aside by any court. The third section gives a historical perspective on the politics of rotational presidency from 1959 till the Fourth Republic. The fourth section argues that rotational presidency has given minority ethnic groups a sense of belonging in the country. The second part of this section explains that rotational presidency has enhanced stability in the country. The fifth section establishes that rotational presidency may © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. T. Faluyi, National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7_9

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prevent the emergence of a leader through popular vote and may truncate the emergence of leaders with good leadership skills who will promote development. How rotational presidency is used as a tool to manipulate the masses is the focus of the sixth section. This section also covers rotational presidency as a tool for ethnic and religious manipulations, which makes political elites fabricate ethnic and religious sentiments to secure the support of the masses. The chapter concludes with the identification of poor leadership, weak institutions, and poor development as the challenges of the country. If these three are addressed, rotational presidency may still be practised, but it will no longer be easy for elites to use it to manipulate the masses.

Rotational Presidency: An Elitist Arrangement Rotational presidency is a form of power sharing. Some factors made rotational presidency an important pillar in Nigerian politics. The first is that the presidency was dominated by the North from independence until June 1993. The annulment of the 1993 Presidential Election also sparked consciousness in Southerners on the need to rotate the presidency. Some Northern elites through their statements frequently proclaimed that the region will always rule Nigeria. From independence, the North had always courted the slogan ‘born to rule’, but ironically, the region is less developed than the South (Ademiluyi, 2019). This indicates that being at the helm of affairs is not sufficient but being visionary translates to development. The issues of resources have also been the reason to advocate for rotational presidency. Therefore, the push for rotational presidency used to be mainly a Southern agenda (Yoruba, Igbo, and some Niger Delta elites). Elites from the South feel that as the goose that lays the golden egg, they should equally occupy the seat of the president. However, outside the North-South dichotomy regarding rotating the presidency, elites from minority constituencies (Niger Delta and Middle Belt) back power sharing at different levels. They support rotational presidency and zoning of other major positions at the state and local government levels (Egbefo, 2014). This is to ensure that they are not short-changed due to their small population. Through its recommendation of rotating key political positions, the 1994/95 Conference increased the popularity of rotational presidency. The elites believe that rotating the presidency would bring succour to electorally disadvantaged minorities because of the majority takes all feature of majoritarian democracy (Omololu, 2012).

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Rotational presidency is in congruence with Lijphart’s (2012, 2018) view on consociational democracy that it is essential to share power through consensus. In the case of Nigeria, political elites agree on presenting candidates by taking into consideration factors like ethnicity and religion. South South opinion leader described rotational presidency as elites’ cohabitation. The participant felt that it is an elites’ instrument of appeasing themselves with less interest in national integration as stated below. The issue of arrangement for national integration goes beyond just rotational presidency. Rotational presidency is an elites’ phenomenon. I mean elites’ arrangement for political accommodation. If you pose the question that rotational presidency is elites’ arrangement for elites’ integration, not national integration, we could nod and say somehow it helps, at least there is peace, relative peace among the elites. They can organise themselves hoping that the next time it will come to the South, the next time it will go to the North and so on. This is a very important point because you cannot simply say rotational presidency will help in national integration; it may help in elites’ integration. I even doubt that it will help in elites’ integration. It will help in elites’ cohabitation, elites’ political accommodation; they are able to accommodate themselves and manage themselves, bury some of their differences because of their joint interest of sharing political power over a time horizon. (Personal Interview South South Opinion Leader, December 2018)

Ordinary citizens hardly benefit from this arrangement. Furthermore, producing the president from a region/zone which is the desire of elites from the region/zone rarely translates to the social and economic development of the region/zone. The roads in the South West and other parts of the country are still in terrible situation. The poverty level in Northern Nigeria is far higher than that of the South and environmental issues have remained a serious issue in the South South despite political elites from the Yoruba, Northern and Niger Delta having ruled the country from 1999. The multidimensional poverty index and poor infrastructural level in the country as highlighted in Chapter 1 substantiate these claims. These indicate that the economic conditions of the masses remain unpleasant.

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Is Zoning Constitutional? Zoning (rotational presidency) and previous measures like the quota system and federal character principle were designed to mitigate the attendant crises of federal instability. In a federal state like Nigeria, the constitution plays a crucial role in fostering stability through its provisions. It is a formal document that outlines how a society would be governed. Thus, the inclusion of zoning the presidency in the constitution will consolidate its legality. Its non-inclusion does not stop its practice. This explains why informal consociational institutions are in place to strengthen formal institutions, but the former are creations of elites’ imposition (Bogaards, 2019). Therefore, making the zoning of the position of the president part of the constitution makes it formal and constitutional. However, in Nigeria, it is an informal consociational arrangement because it is not entrenched in the constitution or an act of parliament. If rotational presidency is not accorded constitutional status and if the method of deciding the president is strictly through majoritarian democratic principles, the president would always emerge from the North due to its larger population (Nwozor, 2013). This supports Omololu’s (2012) position that without zoning, some groups would be exempted from assuming the presidential position. This is why some keep advocating for the zoning of the presidency to be incorporated into the constitution. Its ‘non-constitutional’ status nonetheless, three participants posit that it has some degree of legality. Constitutional lawyer one explained thus. So if you talk of the constitutional provision, there is nothing specifically in the constitution that says the President must come from the North or must come from anywhere……what is unconstitutional is what the constitution says is unconstitutional. If the law says it is unconstitutional, it is unlawful; then it is unconstitutional. When the Constitution is silent on it, then nothing makes it unconstitutional. It is a political arrangement……..balancing of interests in the country. (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer One, December 2018)

Constitutional lawyer one did not affirm its constitutionality but was clear that because the law of the country has not made provision for it, it does not make it unconstitutional and being a political arrangement, the interests of some political elites that would have been jettisoned have the propensity to be actualised through rotational presidency. However,

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the interests of political elites are not the same as those of the masses (Osaghae, 2003). The former pursue access to power and ultimately state wealth while the latter are interested in at least meeting the basic needs of life which are clothing, shelter and housing. Nevertheless, balancing interests in the country, especially those of political elites, is a booster to federal stability. Hence, political elites ‘legalise’ rotational presidency anytime it benefits them. Constitutional lawyer two supported the practice because, being a political arrangement, it is connected to political parties and the activities of political parties are recognised by law. However, he did not disclose that it is constitutional. He elucidated. So, to that extent, I will not call it unconstitutional because the same constitution allows the political parties to undergo primaries. The Electoral Act gives the political parties leeway to change their candidates after the primary elections. So, it is a kind of internal arrangement of a political party to determine how it can appeal to voters. So, for us to say it is unconstitutional which means it is illegal…….and the same constitution gives the National Assembly and the Independent National Electoral Commission the power to issue guidelines for elections, and it gave the political parties the power to determine that, so we cannot outrightly say that it is illegal because they exercise those powers legitimately. (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer Two, January 2019)

Researcher Two clarified that not being infused into the Constitution is not a challenge because all practices cannot be in the Constitution, but he did emphasise that it would not be a bad idea if it is included in the Constitution in the future. He stressed. Rotational presidency is not in the Constitution, but it is implied. The Constitution cannot be overloaded with every item or every element, but rotational presidency is implied, political parties are recognised by the Constitution, and whatever they have as their internal arrangement should be recognised by the Constitution. (Personal Interview Researcher Two, December 2018)

This resonates with the position of Bogaards (2019) that formal consociational institutions may be too inflexible to acclimate to the dynamism and uncertainties in societies and this rationalises why informal consociational institutions are embraced. The FCC official has a similar opinion to Researcher Two. He submitted that ‘it is not in the constitution, but

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it has become part of our national life because we know which zone to produce the President at every point in time’ (Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Official, December 2018). However, South East opinion leader partially differed with the FCC official by advocating that it should be included in the constitution to prevent it from causing arguments in the future. He posited that: Yes, I think so. But if we want to do this, under what platform? Is it in our constitution? Let us study how successful countries did it and put something about it in our constitution. Let it be part of our constitution; let it be embedded in our constitution. It should be that if it is not your turn if you try to contest, they will push you away. It should be that it will rotate among the zones. A zone will do, followed by another until the last zone gets it, and we start again, then there will be peace. Let the order on how it will go around be entrenched in the Constitution. You know the way we behave in Nigeria; confusion may come up. If confusion arises, no zone will be able to go against the Constitution. It will not lead to any issue of marginalisation because you are waiting for your own time. (Personal Interview South East Opinion Leader, January 2019)

Without constitutional backing, it may be difficult to sustain rotational presidency in Nigeria (Eborka, 2016). Elites may continue to take advantage of this to run for the position of the president or support another elite despite not being the turn of that elite group to produce the president. The expression of interest to run for the office of the president by Peter Odili, Obong Victor Attah, Donald Duke and some Southern elites was seen by Northerners as an attempt by the South to extend its stay in power. Obasanjo had ruled for eight years from 1999 to 2007. Hence, the intention of these Southern elites to run for the Presidency in 2007 substantiates this. The emergence of Jonathan as the winner of the 2011 election was also seen by the North as a hijack of their turn for the presidency. The table turned for the North to start advocating for extension as the region felt it could hold on to power beyond 2023 because it has ruled the country for fewer years than the South since 1999. Professor Ango Abdullahi argued that there is no constitutional provision for zoning the presidency and that the North could still produce the president in 2023. He supported his claim that zoning was a PDP arrangement but the rule was flouted when President Jonathan contested the 2011 Presidential Election (Akasike et al., 2019). He was criticised by socio-cultural groups like Afenifere, MBF, Ohaneze and the IYC for his position. Towards the

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twilight of former President Buhari’s administration, in his capacity in the Northern Elders Forum, Professor Ango Abdullahi still held firm to his belief that the presidency should go to the North in the 2023 elections because the region has a four-year deficit (Eromosele, 2023). Four-year deficit in the sense that Goodluck Jonathan completed the eight-year tenure of late President Yar’Adua and consequently, a Northerner should have completed his tenure with effect from 2011. Nevertheless, the forum promised to stand by any presidential candidate who wins the election. Aside from Ango Abdullahi and NEF, some Northerners across social classes felt that the North should rule after Buhari (Agwan et al., 2023). The reason given was simply for the North to continue to have its hold on power and no basis for power to shift to the South. One of the Northern elites justified their position on the premise of the Muslim-Muslim ticket fielded by the APC. Ideally, his submission sounds logical but the primary reason is that the party had a Southerner as its candidate. He justified a Northerner on the basis that the PDP has a Muslim-Christian ticket combination (Agwan et al., 2023). North East opinion leader explained the fluidity of elites when it comes to the distribution of offices, of which that of the president is not an exception and linked this to marginalisation. In essence, he explained why political elites are in the habit of shifting the goal post. He expatiated thus. ‘The elites talk about being marginalised in terms of what…..distribution of offices and what have you. If he is comfortably accommodated, he won’t talk about marginalisation. He talks about marginalisation when he is left out’ (Personal Interview North East Opinion Leader, January 2019). These actions and positions of political elites are so because rotational presidency is not in the Constitution. Nevertheless, South South politician feels that the inclusion of rotational presidency in the constitution is not sufficient and that the value system of Nigerians which has been dented needs to be repaired. The participant postulated that ‘we need to redefine our value system because even if it is enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that there is a need for rotational presidency, it will not address our problem’ (Personal Interview South South Politician, January 2019). The value system has been stained with elites’ corruption, which rests on the trivet of prebendalism, clientelism and rent-seeking (Ojukwu & Shopeju, 2010). The ripple effects of these are corruption at all levels and poverty.

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Finally, because rotational presidency is informal, it will always be applied or set aside, depending on what benefits political elites. Thus, the major flaw is that political elites will always make attempts to frustrate the gentleman’s agreement to promote their parochial interests if rotation is not to their advantage at that moment. It has been established that rotational presidency is not part of the constitution, its legality has not been set aside by any law court, so it subsists, though informal. The next section is rotational presidency from a historical perspective.

Rotational Presidency in Nigeria from First Republic Until 2023 The plurality of the Nigerian state has a direct impact on who emerges as the country’s president. Consequently, since independence, several groups have produced the president. The plum job has not been restricted to an ethnic group or a religion. This has been the case in both civil and military rules. It has equally not been a different story on who emerges as the deputy to the president and those who hold other high political positions. This has been the case since the First Republic till the present Fourth Republic, and it spreads across a lot of political positions. Thus, this section explores power sharing among top offices, that is, the President, Vice President, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives. Constitutional lawyer two gave a chronological description. So, the zoning arrangement right from the First Republic is a kind of mechanism developed by the political parties to address some peculiar possible conflicts that might arise as a result of political victory. You have a situation where you have a lot of positions you have to distribute among party loyalists, and among citizens, there are lots of appointments to be made. So, the political parties devise these means of rotation and zoning. Although they started mentioning this officially in 1999. (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer Two, January 2019)

This echoes elite theory because it is the political elites that determine such distribution for their benefit. They claim that they are representing their ethnic or national interest, but in fact, the elites’ interests are represented. Ethnic interests in most cases do not represent a consensus from

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the members of an ethnic group but usually the views of those at the forefront of ethnic movements: mostly elites (Osaghae, 2003). The ethnic and religious backgrounds of those who occupy the number one sit had threatened the peace of the country at certain times and generated fewer storms at other times. The transition from one government to another also had ethnic and religious undertones at some times in Nigeria’s history. Table 9.1 shows the names and zones of the heads of the country and their deputies from 1959 to date. *The position of the vice president during military regimes was called Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Chief of General Staff or Vice President. Table 9.1 also displays the evolution of rotational presidency in Nigeria. Except for the Ironsi and Buhari/Idiagbon regimes, the top two executive offices in the other administrations were from different regions. It is also conspicuous that the pre-Fourth Republic period witnessed the domination of the office of the president by the North. The region ruled for 29 years and some months from January 1966 until May 1999, while the South ruled for four years and some months within the same period. This unevenness also fuelled the call for rotating the office in the Fourth Republic, especially by Southern elites. Balewa was the first Prime Minister of the country while Azikiwe was the Governor-General and later the President. Both represented Northern and Igbo elites, respectively. Balewa’s party, the NPC did not meet the requirements to form the government. His party played the ethnic card by forming a coalition with the Igbo-dominated NCNC to form the government in 1959. The First Republic ended abruptly through a coup carried out by some Army officers of which all except one were from the Eastern region. The coup was not a success. The prime minister, some politicians and military officers were killed, but the President and Premier of the Eastern region were not killed. Expectedly, the North mistrusted the Igbos because they alleged that the coup was a target against the North. Nwafor Orizu, the President of the Senate, acted as the President because Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe was on vacation. Orizu acted in that capacity from October 1965 to January 16, 1966. He handed over to the most senior army officer, Aguiyi Ironsi who became the Head of State in January 1966. The trio of Azikiwe, Orizu and Ironsi being Igbo might have generated some suspicions from the North of an Igbo conspiracy. Though not proven, the fact that Azikiwe was not in the country when the coup took place and that Orizu was the acting President who handed

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Table 9.1 Heads of State/Presidents and their deputies since 1959 S/N

Heads of state/President and deputies

Region, zone and type of government

1

Nnamdi Azikiwe (President)/Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Prime Minister) J.T.U Aguiyi Ironsi/ Babafemi Ogundipe

South (South October 1, 1959 to January 15, East)/North (North 1966 East)—Civilian

2

3

Yakubu Gowon/J.E Akinwale Wey

4

Murtala Mohammed/ Olusegun Obasanjo

5

Olusegun Obasanjo/ Shehu Musa Yar’Adua

6

Shehu Shagari/Alex Ekwueme

7

Muhammadu Buhari/ Tunde Idiagbon

8

Ibrahim Babangida/ Ebitu Ukiwe

9

Ibrahim Babangida/ Augustus Aikhomu

10

Ernest Shonekan

11

Sani Abacha/Oladipo Diya

12

Abdulsalami Abubakar/ Michael Akhigbe

South (South East)/South (South West)—Military North (North Central)/South (South West)—Military North (North West)/South (South West)—Military South (South West)/North (North West)—Military North (North West)/South (South East)—Civilian North (North West)/North (North Central)—Military North (North Central)/South (South East)—Military North (North Central)/South (South South)—Military South (South West)—Civilian North (North West)/South (South West)—Military North (North West)/South (South South)—Military

Duration

January 16, 1966 to July 29, 1966 July 29, 1966 to July 29, 1975

July 29, 1975 to February 13, 1976 February 13, 1976 to October 1, 1979

October 1, 1979 to December 31, 1983 December 31, 1983 to August 27, 1985

August 27, 1985 to October 6, 1986

October 6, 1986, to August 27, 1993

August 27, 1993 to November 17, 1993 November 17, 1993 to June 8, 1998 but his deputy left office December 21, 1997 June 8, 1998 to May 29, 1999

(continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued) S/N

Heads of state/President and deputies

Region, zone and type of government

Duration

13

Olusegun Obasanjo/ Atiku Abubakar

May 29, 1999 to May 29, 2007

14

Umar Musa Yar’Adua/ Goodluck Jonathan

15

Goodluck Jonathan/ Namadi Sambo

16

Muhammadu Buhari/ Oluyemi Osinbajo

South (South West)/North (North East)—Civilian North (North West)/South (South South)—Civilian South (South South)/North (North West)—Civilian North (North West)/South (South West)—Civilian

May 29, 2007 to May 5, 2010

May 10, 2010 to May 29, 2015 but Namadi Sambo became Vice President on May 19, 2010 May 29, 2015 till date

Source Compiled by author

over to an Igbo army officer snowballed into feelings of ‘planned’ work against the North by Igbos. The Northern military elites had issues with Ironsi’s ascendancy to power. This Northern opposition was bolstered by Ironsi’s, refusal to prosecute the coup plotters as well as the unification of the country which the region saw as a target against them. Having a deputy from the South might have also strengthened the Northern disapproval of Ironsi’s government. These threatened the peaceful existence of the country. These brought some ethnic suspicions, especially from the North. By July, there was another coup by some Northern officers, and it was equally suspected to be ethnical. Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon became the Head of State. He is from the Middle Belt, but politically one can say the North. The ethnic card was again played. Brigadier Ogundipe was the most senior military officer, but because he was from the South, the coup plotters preferred to give the baton of leadership to a far junior Northerner, Yakubu Gowon. However, they were smart in their approach. They chose a Northern Christian perhaps to pacify both the South and the North. To further pacify the South, his deputy was from the South. However, the table turned as the Igbos also felt insecure, and this culminated in the 30-month Civil War. This war threatened the integration of the country.

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General Gowon was ousted in 1975, and the reasons for the overthrow were that he failed to return the country to civil rule as promised and there was corruption in his administration (Babalola, 2016). There was no ethnic or religious interpretation given to this change of government nor did it threaten the peace of the country. Brigadier General (later General) Murtala Mohammed, a core Northerner, emerged as his successor. Making a Southerner his deputy probably did the magic of dousing ethnic tension. Even when he was killed in a failed coup attempt, and Lieutenant General (later General), Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian became the Head of State in February 1976, other ethnic groups did not express concerns. According to a former military Governor of Kaduna State, Abubakar Umar, the next in line to Obasanjo was Lieutenant General T.Y Danjuma, but he had to waive the opportunity to become the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters because he is a Northern Christian (Ukpong, 2020). Hence, a far junior officer who was a Northern Muslim, Lieutenant Colonel Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, was promoted and made the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters. While the face of regime change may be ethnic or religious, there are other factors responsible for change. Ekwe-Ekwe (1985) contends that the Kaduna ‘Mafia’ played a decisive role in Obasanjo’s ascension to power. The author further argues that one of the conditions that the Kaduna ‘Mafia’ gave to support Obasanjo was that he chose a Northern Muslim officer, Shehu Yar’Adua, to become his deputy (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985). Obasanjo completed the process of handover to civil rule that Murtala started. Shagari came on board on October 1, 1979, but ethnic-based political parties contested. However, their ethnic affiliations were not made obvious as the situation was in the First Republic. Also, religion was not a major issue. However, zoning was introduced. North West politician two explained this. ‘If you come to the Second Republic, it was also the same thing, the NPN zoned the position of the vice presidency to the South East’ (Personal Interview North West Politician two, January 2019). Having an Igbo elite as the Vice President, a Niger Delta elite as the President of the Senate, and a House of Representatives Speaker from the present South East (in 1983, the speaker emerged from among the Middle Belt elites) might have done the magic in neutralising ethnic and religious agitations that elites may hijack to promote distrust in the country. On December 31, 1983, another military officer, Major General Muhammadu Buhari, emerged as the Head of State after a coup that

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toppled the civilian government. Surprisingly, his deputy, Major General Tunde Idiagbon, was from the North Central, and both are Muslims. This might have worked because the corruption that dominated the Second Republic made it difficult for both the political and military elites to whip ethnic sentiments despite the occupiers of these offices coming from the same region and religion. The anti-corruption and discipline stance of the regime relegated ethnicity on power-related matters. The same can be said about Major General (later General) Ibrahim Babangida. His coming to power was not orchestrated by ethnic or religious factors. Despite coming in on neutral ground ethnically and religiously, he ensured his first deputy came from the present South East and was later replaced by someone from the present South South. The regime’s religious neutrality was contaminated by the intricacies surrounding the membership of the OIC. Although this was not the basis for political and military elites to whip religious sentiments to topple his government. However, during Babangida’s regime, Nigeria had transition to democracy programmes from 1987, but these were suffocated through changes in the timetable and annulment of the 1993 Presidential Election (Olarinmoye, 2010). In other words, Babangida promised to hand over in 1990, but this was later changed to 1993 (Babalola, 2016). An integral part of the transition was the formation of two political parties by the government, SDP and NRC. The two political parties that contested the election took cognisance of the ethnic sensitivity of Nigerian politics and zoned their offices. SDP and NRC in 1993 allocated their political offices based on zones in the country. The SDP zoned the office of the president and vice president to the South West and North East, respectively (Suberu, 1993). The positions of the party’s national chairmanship and that of the Deputy President of the Senate were zoned to Southern minorities, that of the President of the Senate was zoned to the Middle Belt/lower Northern Christians, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and treasurer of the party were left for the Igbos while Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives and party secretary were zoned to North West (Suberu, 1993). The NRC zoned the office of the president to Muslim/North (North West) and that of the vice president to the East (South East) while those of the party chairmanship and secretary were zoned to the West (South West) and Middle Belt, respectively (Suberu, 1993).

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Chief MKO Abiola won the election, but it was annulled. Abiola was a Muslim and his running mate, Babagana Kingibe is also a Muslim. Nigerians put religion in the background and voted for them. The support even traversed Northern and Southern regions probably due to the structure of the SDP (Agbaje et al., 2007). However, ethnicity came into the spotlight due to the annulment. While Abiola enjoyed widespread support, he seemed disliked by some of the elites. The Northern elites through the Sultanate collaborated with the military such that the Sultanate advised the military government to annul the 1993 election (Okonofua, 2013). Although Babangida is from the Middle Belt, he carried out the wishes of the Northern elites. Consequently, some political elites construed this as ethnic hegemony. Various ethnic groups (Nwozor, 2013). The Igbo elites were not happy that he did not choose one of them as his running mate. The Yorubas felt their opportunity to produce the president was wasted. In August 1993, in an attempt to pacify the Yoruba elites, Babangida handed over power to an ING under the headship of Chief Ernest Shonekan, from Ogun State, Abiola’s state. Ernest Shonekan was the chairman and chief executive of United African Company, and he had not been in politics before he was picked to head the ING (Detheridge & Pepple, 1998). This was a ‘parley’ among Northern/Middle Belt and military elites and an economic and Yoruba elite. The sudden bond remains a subject of debate as Babangida did not explain Shonekan’s selection. However, Akeem (2014) gave two likely reasons: Babangida saw Shonekan as a trusted ally and felt his appointment could make it look like the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy was not marginalising the Yorubas. The author further asserts that the span of the ING was not given. Hence, the motive behind the ING was probably tilted towards the sustenance of the North in power. General Sani Abacha, who was the Secretary of Defence in the ING, unseated Chief Shonekan and became the Head of State. Notable human rights activists like Chief Gani Fawehinmi, Dr Beko Ransome-Kuti, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, including Chief MKO Abiola, the winner of the annulled election, had called on Abacha to take over from the ING (Nwala, 1997). These Yoruba elites had hoped that Abacha would hand over to Chief MKO Abiola within a short time. Abacha enjoyed the support of those who facilitated his installation from November 1993 until March 1994, but this support ceased over his refusal to hand over to Abiola after few months (Nwala, 1997). He was also smart to make a Yoruba man from

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Abiola’s state his deputy. He did this to ‘pacify’ the Yorubas. Abacha’s refusal to renounce leadership further strained the relationship between Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba elites. Babangida and Abacha’s actions incited the militarisation of various ethnic groups (Nwozor, 2013). This led to the spring up of a group like the O’odua People’s Congress to fight the course of the Yorubas. This group and other ethnic militia groups have become active in the Fourth Republic. Their actions also confirmed the suspicion of continued Northern hold of political power and suffocation of any effort by any Southerner to assume political power. Abacha’s administration proposed a thirty-year rotational presidency plan to start in 1998 and end in 2028 (Uwazurike, 1997). This was one of the effects of the 1994/95 Conference. Abacha died in office in June 1998. When Abacha died in 1998, he was replaced by General Abdulsalami Abubakar who was the Chief of Defence Staff during Abacha’s regime. In addition to sharing the home state of Niger with Babangida, Abubakar was supported by retired military officers who were pioneer members of the PDP and loyal to Babangida (Agbaje et al., 2007). Nevertheless, he was accepted across ethnic and religious lines. His acceptance was almost shattered because of Chief MKO Abiola died in detention on July 7, 1998. The belief was that General Abdulsalami Abubakar should have restored Abiola’s mandate and that the delay was responsible for the latter’s death. His image was redeemed by handing over to civil rule in less than a year. This marked the beginning of rotational presidency in the Fourth Republic. Ethnicity was put into consideration in the activities that led to the Fourth Republic. Either by coincidence or it was deliberate, the two presidential candidates for the 1999 Presidential Election are Yorubas. They are Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP and Samuel Oluyemisi Falae on the joint platform of the AD and APP. This was seen as a move to appease the Yoruba elites who were denied the presidency almost six years earlier. Olusegun Obasanjo won the election. The emergence of Obasanjo had its root cause in the cooperation between Northern and Yoruba elites, with the former pursuing the protection of its interests. The military background of Obasanjo and his history of cordial relationship with the North made the Northern elites more comfortable with his choice. This substantiates the assertion of Ekwe-Ekwe (1985) that Obasanjo effected the desires of the Kaduna ‘Mafia’ when he became a military Head of State. Apart from military and Northern factors, economic

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interest was also significant because some economic elites financed the PDP and its campaign in 1998/99 (Agbaje et al., 2007). The authors listed some sponsors among others as Atiku Abubakar (Northern elite), Orji Uzor Kalu (Igbo elite), Aliko Dangote (Northern elite) and Mike Adenuga (Yoruba elite). The first two got involved to protect their political and economic interests, while the last two exhibited such gestures for economic reasons. However, Yoruba elites saw Obasanjo as a Northern elites’ puppet. Consequently, the result of the election indicated that Obasanjo had fewer votes from the Yorubas and more votes from the North and other parts of the country. The Yorubas were more pleased with Chief Oluyemisi Falae because they felt he would protect their interest. Obasanjo’s party, the PDP, engraved rotational presidency in their constitution. By extension, they rotated key positions in the country on the basis that the office of the president and these key positions will not be dominated by a few geo-political zones. This also affected the office of the vice president, as shown in Table 9.1. This arrangement has always affected the positions of the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives even though the PDP is no longer in power (see Tables 9.2 and 9.3). Tables 9.2 and 9.3 show that the offices of the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives were concurrently occupied by individuals from different geo-political zones. Political elites agreed to distribute these positions among different regions (Owete, 2019). The distribution is meant to pacify elites from different zones and give them access to power at the federal level. Political elites decide who occupy Table 9.2 Presidents of the Senate from 1999 to June 2023 S/N

Name

Region

Years in office

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Evan Enwerem Chuba Okadigbo Anyim Pius Anyim Adolphus Wabara Ken Nnamani David Mark Bukola Saraki Ahmed Lawan

South (South East) South (South East) South (South East) South (South East) South (South East) North (North Central) North (North Central) North (North East)

1999 1999 2000 2003 2005 2007 2015 2019

Source Compiled by author

to to to to to to to

2000 2003 2005 2007 2015 2019 2023

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Table 9.3 House of Representatives Speakers from 1999 to June 2023 S/N

Name

Region

Years in office

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Salisu Buhari Ghali Umar Na’Abba Aminu Bello Masari Patricia Etteh Oladimeji Bankole Aminu Tambuwal Yakubu Dogara Olufemi Gbajabiamila

North (North West) North (North West) North (North West) South (South West) South (South West) North (North West) North (North East) South (South West)

1999 1999 2003 2007 2007 2011 2015 2019

to 2003 to 2007 to to to to

2011 2015 2019 2023

Source Compiled by author

the first four political positions in the country which are the President, Vice President, President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This arrangement has also been designed such that the geo-political zones that the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives are not the same as those of their respective deputies. The tables also resonate with the assertion of Owete (2019) that elites from the five elite groups, despite their differences, pursue a common agenda—the acquisition of power. Ethnic politics still played out in the build-up to Obasanjo’s second term. In a bid to run in the 2003 Presidential Election, other ethnic groups showed interest. Alex Ekwueme (Igbo elite), Alhaji Abubakar Rimi (Northern elite) and Chief Barnabas Gemade (Middle Belt elite) contested the primaries of the PDP presidential ticket with Obasanjo (Genyi, 2014). The actions of these elites attest to the fact that despite rotational presidency, other geo-political zones still attempted to make their zone produce the president. Also, elites made attempts to ditch a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ in the pursuit of their interests. For the general election, Obasanjo’s main challenger was General Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani who contested under the platform of the ANPP. The Yorubas exercised ethnic solidarity by voting massively for Obasanjo. Ironically, the election was not ethnically and religiously sensitive for political elites to utilise to cause disunity. Power was supposed to shift to the North in 2007. However, aspirants, from the South, indicated their intention to run on the platform of the PDP but Obasanjo did not support them despite being Southern elites and Christians like him. He threw his weight behind a Northern Muslim

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probably for two reasons. The first was the need to have power shift to the North in 2007 while the second might be because of his relationship with the Yar’adua family dated back to decades. The victory of Yar’Adua in 2007 did not generate ethnic and religious rancour because most of the political elites knew it was proper for the North and a Muslim to be in power. His major contender, Muhammadu Buhari of the ANPP, is from the North, his state and the same religion. Ethnicity reared its head after the death of Yar’Adua on May 5, 2010. The North felt its tenure was not over to the extent that some Northern elites were not comfortable with the Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan to act when the president was sick. Jonathan completed the Yar’Adua/ Jonathan joint ticket in May 2011, but he sought re-election. Northern elites were not pleased with his victory in the election. The North felt cheated ethnically and religiously. Northern elites were able to ‘convince’ the Northern populace that the region had been short-changed. This resulted in post-election violence in some Northern states. The situation warranted Northern elites to value rotational presidency just like Yoruba elites did before the 1999 Presidential Election. The 2015 Presidential Election also had an ethnic undertone. Northern, Yoruba and Middle Belt elites teamed up to ensure Buhari became the President. South South and Igbo elites supported Jonathan’s candidacy. The activities towards the election were wrapped in ethnic tensions. Jonathan became a persona non grata in some Northern states. The attack on President Goodluck Jonathan in the North during his pre-election campaign substantiates his rejection in that part of the country. The candidate of the APC, Buhari, won the election. Rotational presidency is a PDP innovation, but the APC has equally embraced it. Ethnicity was not an issue in the 2019 election because the two major contenders, Buhari and Atiku are Northern Muslims. Thus, it was difficult for the elites from the North and South to exploit ethnic and religious keys to open the doors of agitation and violence. The activities in the 2019 election also indicate that the North has embraced rotational presidency. However, as pointed out earlier, political elites only accept and embrace rotational presidency for parochial interests. The ethnic issues that surfaced in the 2023 election have been explained earlier in this book. The ups and downs of the views of elites on rotational presidency make it crucial to explore if it promotes stability and belonging.

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Rotational Presidency as a Conduit for Belonging and Stability The extent to which rotational presidency encourages a sense of belonging and stability determines the extent to which it can be a catalyst for national integration. Belonging within this context means that the minority status of an ethnic or religious group does not make them have the feelings of being alienated or threatened. This ricochets Osaghae’s (1999) assertion that ethnic domination subverts unity. Succinctly, if all the ethnic groups in a country see themselves as relevant stakeholders in national affairs, it is a strong sign of national integration. One of the challenges of rotational presidency in a society divided along ethnic lines is that one or more ethnic groups feel they are superior while also alienating others. In essence, it may bring a sense of belonging but may not accumulate into integration. This sense of belonging may be temporary. Researcher One explained thus: There is something we need to emphasise about rotational presidency; it is not constitutional, it is not in the Nigerian constitution, it is a de facto arrangement that came out of necessity to ensure some balance, some political stability in the country. So, we have practised it since 1999, and in terms of having symbolism of belongingness within the Nigerian state, it has worked, but in terms of integration, it has not really worked. (Personal Interview Researcher One, December 2018)

North West opinion leader, Researcher Two and South South politician concur with Researcher One that rotational presidency brought a sense of belonging. North West politician one was more of the opinion that it has the propensity to bring stability. Specifically, South South politician concluded that ‘it is a show of inclusiveness, is a show of oneness, it still does not guarantee stability, it does not guarantee national integration’ (Personal Interview South South Politician, January 2019). Researcher Two postulated that ‘if it is well implemented, it may graduate from creating belonging to fostering national integration’. South West politician two gave its efficacy a span and submitted that: The reality is that the adoption of rotational presidency in Nigeria will cease at a particular point in time. Maybe in 20 years, but the reality is until every region has been pacified due to the mishap of the ‘60s to the ‘70s, the Civil War. Until every region has been pacified, North East;

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North West……now the North West is there. Atiku is from the North East; we have had the South South, and we have had the South West. Trust me, the North Central is going to come around and say it is our turn and until it has fully gone around, then maybe a leader can rise and unite the entire nation. (Personal Interview South West Politician Two, December 2018)

This reflects Abacha’s proposition of a 30-year rotational presidency plan (Azelama & Oarhe, 2010). North West Politician one is in support of the way zoning runs now and has the view that it is beneficial to the country as it brings stability. He clarified thus: Yes, I will absolutely agree with that because you cannot concentrate power on only one people. We need to stabilise the country by rotating the presidency between the North and South. So, it is left for the three geo-political zones in the South to present a candidate from any of the political parties. The issue is it is good even though it is not written; it is just an acceptable norm, so this is the issue, and it works for the country. (Personal Interview North West Politician One, January 2019)

Rotational presidency either as an instrument of fostering belonging or a potential tool of integration may help shrink the feelings of deprivation. A sense of belonging may only create the euphoria of being among, but the deeper importance of rotational presidency incorporates how it has embedded stability in the Nigerian federal system. Thus, if well managed and respected by political elites, rotational presidency may not be restricted to bringing a sense of belonging but advance to being one of the elements of federal stability. North East politician supported zoning the presidency and claimed that ‘if there are justice and equity in the implementation of rotational presidency, it will aid federal stability’ (Personal Interview North East Politician, January 2019). Researcher Three offered a similar opinion but went further to suggest that its appropriate implementation is crucial, that it has given a minority the privilege to lead the country, and that minorities can still be accommodated to some extent, if not for the presidency but for other strategic positions. He expatiated thus: I think it has the potential to ensure federal stability in Nigeria. It is a well-thought-out policy. It is not as if Nigeria lacks policies, it is the

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effective implementation of policies that is problematic. The idea of rotational presidency is a wonderful idea and is a recognition of the likelihood of marginalisation of some sections. If you do not have rotational presidency, democracy being a game of numbers, you can rest assured that some regions will not be able to have a shot at the presidency forever. If not for rotational presidency, how will South South get to power? Which political muscle will they muster together? One of the states in the South South has only eight local governments. So, if you go by number, by electoral strength, some states will be permanently shut out, and that was the thinking. You see, we have leaders who have really done a lot of thinking, and that is why it is a consociation arrangement. Let us try to rotate, and when you do that, you have a formula. Formula that is beyond rotational presidency; many other things are rotated with it. You have the first few important positions in the country. Presidency, Vice Presidency, Secretary to the Government of the Federation, President of the Senate, his deputy, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, among others. All these key positions are simultaneously rotated. (Personal Interview Researcher Three, January 2019)

The submission of Researcher Three is important because the majority ethnic groups have the population to dominate minority groups. Political elites from the major groups of Hausa, Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba form the bulk of political elites in Nigeria (Kifordu, 2011). As a way out, Azaigba and Yio (2014) suggest that rotational presidency should not be limited to zonal but also between majority and minority groups in each zone. This is in tune with Osaghae’s (1998) view that the pillar of minority politics is the relentless efforts of minority elites and movements to recompense the imbalance and ensure the enhancement of minority opportunities in the power equation and resource allocation. Similarly, Lijphart (2008) contends that consociational democracy is designed to turn a democratic state with an uneven political culture into a stable democracy. A relevant example is that if not for zoning, Goodluck Jonathan would not have become the Vice President and ultimately the President because he is from the Ijaw ethnic group. Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, if not for zoning arrangement that made him Vice President, he wouldn’t have been able to get a taste of the presidency and by extension people of the Niger Delta where he comes from. If you look at their population, very low. But because of the issue of zoning, rotation, at least they were able to have a sense of belonging and they were able to ascend to the presidency so somehow if you ask them there, they will tell

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you it has been a sort of succour to them. (Personal Interview North West Politician two, January 2019)

The emergence of Goodluck Jonathan as the President consolidated the peace that sprang from the amnesty extended to Niger Delta militants by former President Yar’Adua. This was because the militants probably felt it was going to be counterproductive to engage in violence when one of their elites was president. Having acknowledged a sense of belonging and stability as rationalisations for rotational presidency, there are other consequences of rotating the presidency.

Rotational Presidency: Merit and Development Jeopardised? The essence of merit is to have leaders that drive development. This is because irrespective of the religious or ethnic affiliation of the masses, they share common problems associated with bad governance. North East opinion leader explained that by having leaders with merit and who are development-oriented as well as enlightened masses who understand what good leadership is about, national integration will receive a boost. This is captured below. until and unless we have development-oriented people, then we are not near and we will never be near having an integrated country called Nigeria. The problem with an Igbo man is the same problem with a Hausa man, is the same problem the Yoruba man faces. We all have common problems and are all about good governance but so long you allow these elites to come in between, then we will never realise this is a common problem and so long they will continue to divide us along these trajectories and so long there is no good governance, national integration becomes what you call more like a mirage. (Personal Interview North East Opinion Leader, January 2019)

North East opinion leader’s position, nevertheless, rotational presidency remains a key factor in a diverse country like Nigeria. Merit should be a key factor in determining the president of the country and rotational presidency should not mean that merit should be set aside. North Central politician explained the essence of merit being merged with rotational presidency. He explained.

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The best person from that group/from that region that is going to produce the president must be made available, not just anybody. So by the time we now begin to compare what the person from the North did and what the person from the South did when he was there, then there is a need for us to say that next time, we will not send anybody who is not ‘qualified’ to do the work there. That should probably solve the problem. (Personal Interview North Central Politician, January 2019)

Within this context, the best person and being qualified are within the purview of merit. Merit in this context is within the gamut of leadership skills. A leader should have good visions, translate such visions into strategies that will inform actions that should be taken or otherwise, work with people to implement such strategies, have a good monitoring and evaluation mechanism and capacity to groom new leaders and improve as a leader (Ashkenas & Manville, 2018). Bass (1999) categorises leaders into two: transformational and transactional. The author asserts that transformational leaders pursue what can be done for the country, and in trying to accomplish this, they lift the morale, motivation and morals of their followers. Researcher Three described such as the leader who will make use of the resources, he will be the one to put the resources together for development. You must have leaders who are development-minded. A good leader we are talking about will not be personalistic, not be involved in graft, will not be the one that will be more self-interested or will make the only concern for him being in government to enrich himself and his cronies. (Personal Interview Researcher Three, December 2018)

Transactional leaders are concerned about what the country can do for them. It is about the relationship between the leaders and the followers to meet the formers’ self-interest. However, a leader can have the traits of both, but it is better to be more transformational. Leadership in Nigeria is more transactional because integration measures (including rotational presidency) put in place by leaders appeal to ethnicity, religion and political patronage. Thus, merit and development are not given adequate priority. This is responsible for situations where integration programmes have also bred feelings of deprivation. The integration process has thus appeared as a zero-sum game with the losers feeling that they were

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unfairly at a disadvantage. If leaders handle national integration and rotational presidency from the transformational perspective, good governance will be easier to accomplish. However, in Nigeria, rotational presidency prunes competitiveness because a candidate who is more qualified on the bases of good leadership skills and more transformational in orientation may not emerge as the president. ‘We must stop parading people as president and leaders who do not have the knowledge and what it takes to grow the economy of the nation’ (Personal Interview Christian Cleric, January 2019). Historically, the poor state of the economy and the low infrastructural base of the country which have stared at Nigeria before 1999 substantiate the fact that the challenge with selecting good leaders is an age long issue. This leadership issue is captured by North West politician two. ‘Nigeria has failed to kind of establish a clear-cut means of leadership recruitment. The leadership recruitment system is faulty’ (Personal Interview North West Politician Two, January 2019). The emergence of good leaders through the right process applies to purely democratic and rotational methods. Thus, transformational leaders with good leadership skills are the best either in a majoritarian democracy or power rotation structure. Nevertheless, the masses are not privileged to choose the best leaders in Nigeria. This is because either in majoritarian democracy or power rotation structure, the political elites still determine who will be fielded as candidates, and they set their yardsticks of good leadership. The economic and political interests of these elites make the selection process less objective. Rotation may result in a more complex process. Rotating the presidency may box the country into a corner of being deprived of a good leader but this does not mean that rotation cannot be combined with the choice of a good leader. Rotation confines the emergence of the president to a particular zone/region, and a candidate that has better transformational and good leadership skills at that time may be from another zone/region. Weak party structure which may culminate into poor internal democracy, weak ideologies and programmes tend to suffocate the emergence of competent candidates, and skilful leaders (Eborka, 2016). Parties would rather consider political expediency, ethnic interest of political elites and zoning to choose candidates. These aforementioned are how rotational presidency could retard the choice of the best candidate to assume the position of the president. However, if things are done appropriately, rotational presidency can be simultaneously achieved with the choice of a good leader.

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North East opinion leader acknowledged that merit is being played down in zoning the presidency because Nigeria is a diverse and Third World country, but the participant did not neglect the good side of the arrangement and clarified. Rotational presidency should not have been an issue, but for a Third World developing economy like Nigeria, it is an issue given our diversity. It should not have been an issue because we want to have the best, but while we allow the so-called rotation and what you have to come in, we are ignoring the factor of merit. We are fielding ABC because of the factor of diversity, and so that deprives us of the privilege of bringing up the best. What we have largely is a situation in which…. yes, it serves our interest for the purpose of national integration by saying allow this office to rotate around. But how has that been able to douse the tension? That has not been addressed. (Personal Interview North East Opinion Leader, January 2019)

This assertion describes the role of elites in deciding who becomes the president with little or no regard for merit. North Central opinion leader argued that rotational presidency can promote peace and boost nationwide development and good governance should be of importance. This is because part of the problems common to the masses are poor governance and lack of development and these are some of the things that make it difficult for Nigeria to attain national integration. He further argued that a candidate can come from any part of the country so far such can promote development and peace. He clarified below. Peace and development go simultaneously. If you say you want stability in the country and you promote mediocre people to administration, then what are we saying? For me, I do not care whether my president is a Northerner or a Southerner; what I want is to run government effectively. Look at countries that do not put sentiments in choosing leaders like us but rather consider merit. They are governing themselves effectively; the institutions and programmes of government are being run effectively. Because you want to promote even development, you now put someone who does not know anything about administration, who would rather, instead of governing well, introduce bad governance into the system. (Personal Interview North Central Opinion Leader, January 2019)

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Merit within this continuum are seen as applying good leadership skills to promote good governance, which will evolve into peace and development. This affirms the significance of leadership skills by Ashkenas and Manville (2018). South East politician explained that Nigeria is not so economically developed, and that is why rotational presidency has gained prominence. The participant established that good leadership should be given priority because power sharing for the office of the president promotes mediocrity. He further posited that power sharing can only nurture national integration for a short period and is not a long-run solution. He clarified. Other parts of the world are advancing with speed, and we are just retrogressing. You do not talk about rotating presidency in the developed world now; you talk about getting the best. Currently, we have presidents at the age of 30, 40, and the rest, and these are young men who are acquitting themselves creditably. The truth of the matter is that in the interim, you could make the argument that let the presidency rotate, but I am not a believer in that because it gives rise to mediocrity, and the challenge of leadership goes beyond where you are from. If we are faithful to policies that give a level playing field for you to aspire to your God-given talent, where the President is from will become irrelevant. The fear of why people talk about rotational presidency is because they feel it guarantees that the moment it is my brother, I have this sense of belonging, but we do not really need that. So, to answer the question more directly, in the interim, it could be like a solution to the problem, but to me, in the long term view, of it, it is not really a solution. (Personal Interview South East Politician, January 2019)

South East politician’s view aligns with the recommendation of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference on rotational presidency. Lastly, because merit is downplayed, it has ripple effects on the activities of political parties. South West politician one explained how zoning arrangement in a party has effects on the choice of another party’s candidate and how this may affect merit. He expatiated. The idea of rotational presidency limits the quality of the candidate that can emerge, you know…, so PDP probably would not have looked up to the North, but for the fact that the person they are competing with is from the North, they have no choice. Why not decide to take somebody from the South East? The first thing is that this principle is not

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a constitutional provision, it is not a statutorily endorsed principle, it is strictly a PDP arrangement, and the possible disadvantage of it is that a candidate….candidacy choice is limited to a particular zone and that limits the national spread, a national search for the best candidate. (Personal Interview South West Politician One, December 2018)

Nigeria’s multi-party system may not solve the problem of choosing the best candidate. Political parties in the bid to field candidates that match who other parties have chosen tend to jettison merit and embrace ethnic and religious factors. South West politician two opined that ‘for a long time to come, we may never get our best hand to rule this country, and that is what rotational presidency/rotational governance brings. It is hard for us to ever get the best capable hands to do it’ (Personal Interview South West Politician Two, December 2018). These echo Ololajulo’s (2016) claim that zoning the presidency encourages nepotism and favouritism because elites and the masses throw their weight behind the people of their ethnic extraction while relegating leadership qualities to the background. Therefore, elites have made Nigerians support leaders of their respective ethnic extraction with little or no consideration for visionary leaders who will encourage economic development. This may breed sectional leaders instead of national leaders. Researcher Two explained this. Leaders have not been able to rise beyond ethnic and primordial sentiments to have a nationalistic agenda or nationalistic outlook such that the leader of the Yoruba nation would see himself as first and foremost a Nigerian before he sees himself as Yoruba. If leaders had done that right from the beginning, we would have had examples, we would have had models to copy and follow. (Personal Interview Researcher Two, December 2018)

The nepotistic disposition of former President Buhari especially in appointing heads of security and allied institutions and some federal parastatals portrays this. Locating government institutions in the states of those in leadership positions illustrates a sectional attitude. Thus, the failure of leaders to operate within developmental frameworks that will engender purposeful development coated in equity exacerbates the parochial attitude of these leaders. These justify the need to focus on the influence of development on the system.

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South West opinion leader feels development is more imperative than zoning. Hence, if the former is given more significance, the clamour for zoning may not be necessary. He illustrated. When we talk about the problem of ethnicity and so on, that is one problem. The other problem which we have to look at is the problem of development. Would rotational presidency, which is supposed to cure ethnicity, would it also now generate development? It would not or let us say it may not because the requirements for both are different. But it is easier to cure ethnicity through development. You cannot cure development through ethnicity, is not possible. Now, if there is development, society is developed. One thing that we know about ethnicity is that it results from competition. (Personal Interview South West Opinion Leader, December 2018)

Development has been given less attention. For example, a leader will prefer to commence a new project rather than continue with ongoing or uncompleted projects of the predecessor. Such action is taken because they feel that if they complete such ongoing/uncompleted projects, they will not get the full accolade. This amounts to a waste of resources because the abandoned projects did cost some amount of money, and such projects will not serve their purposes. There are also cases where projects have not been completed but politicians hurriedly commission them for use probably because their tenure is almost over and they need to take the praise for the projects or they want to portray their political party or zone as a working one. The reasons for their actions are captured in this imaginary statement that if I start and complete a project, myself and if not me, my zone will be considered in the next election. In the long run, zoning and the quest for political praise singing may negatively affect the provision of infrastructure. North Central opinion leader argued that if necessary infrastructure is provided, people will not be easily sweet-talked to see rotational presidency as the solution to their problems. The interviewee posited. Is it constitutional to say we have rotational presidency? It is a ploy to deceive us. I do not think we should promote rotational presidency. What I am asking for is let there be good governance. An average Nigerian does not care who governs him or her; what he cares about is his stomach. He does not want to know who the President is, either Buhari or Atiku. That is why some elites are using the slogan stomach infrastructure to deceive

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people because they know that people are poor, people are looking for what to eat, so they use that as another ploy to deceive them. One needs to be careful about how these people deceive us; of course, they cannot deceive you and me. They can deceive other people because they know that these people are poor. To me, your economic well-being determines your social, political, and environmental well-being. To me, rotational presidency is not a solution to the problem of national integration in Nigeria. (Personal Interview North Central Opinion Leader, January 2019)

In addition, if the right and adequate infrastructure are not put in place, people become susceptible to being engaged in perpetrating violence through the conduit of marginalisation. The inability of governments in countries having challenges with ethnic conflicts to deliver the basic needs and security for their populace makes the latter seek welfare and security in their ethnic organisations (Agbu, 2004). This implies that ethnicity is a handy tool for politicians. In Nigeria, political elites utilise religious, cultural or regional sentiments to promote their political and economic aspirations (Kifordu, 2011). If the right and qualified leaders are in leadership positions, there will be strong state institutions, development will be accomplished, and poverty will be reduced. The nexus between good state institutions and development is captured by North Central opinion leader. ‘If a country wants to develop, it has to do this via an instrument which I call institutions. Institutions are to be used for national integration’ (Personal Interview North Central Opinion Leader, January 2019). These will culminate in a population that is united, economically and socially empowered. An empowered populace will not be easily manipulated by the elites and enlisted as foot soldiers to agitate for zoning and ultimately promote elites’ parochial interests. Thus, people will care less about where the leader comes from but will support whoever will display good leadership skills and work towards development. This analysis is essential because the high poverty level in Nigeria makes the masses susceptible as a tool for the elites to actualise their selfish ambitions (Ngara et al., 2014). Likewise, North West politician two placed good leadership ahead of zoning. He posited that ‘if the institutions are working, at times, it does not matter who the political head is, but ours is a peculiar situation because we have a kind of deficit in terms of the calibre of leaders and

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in terms of people manning the institutions’ (Personal Interview North West Politician two, January 2019). Researcher Three did not completely reject zoning but recognised that the problem of rotational presidency has been bad leadership. The participant preferred the option of merging good leadership that is nationalistic with zoning. The participant illuminated. For me, it has potential if it is well implemented to ensure the stability of the federation and to even ensure you have good leaders to really ensure national integration. A good leader would not be concerned more about the region or his own ethnic or religious connotation, he will be nationalistic, and he will have a development mindset. He will see what he can do to bring development to the country and all the parts thereof. So, it is a good policy, but its implementation must be strengthened. (Personal Interview Researcher Three, January 2019)

Yahaya and Bello (2019) opine that we need leaders that are acquainted with the economic and socio-political dynamics of the country and those that are national and not ethnic/segmental in their leadership style. Such leaders are needed in the Fourth Republic because ethnicity has become an avenue to garner votes from the electorates. Thus, elites have the attitude of not fielding suitable candidates because of their selfish interests. This brings to the fore the need to explore the manipulation of the masses.

Are the Masses Manipulated? Ethnicity, religion, poverty and illiteracy are tools political elites use to manipulate the masses in Nigeria. These four tools relegate the masses to play passive roles in the political process in democratic plural societies (Lijphart, 1977). These have become the platforms for rallying support for election and actualising zoning the presidency. The masses have a low level of freedom to decide on which candidate to support. Hence, ethnicity and geo-political affiliation fuel the low esteem of the masses. North East politician submitted that ‘this rotation, to me, is even adding more problems. Is our turn, our son, our brother. And no matter how bad he is, he is our own’ (Personal Interview North East Politician, January 2019). Researcher One shared a similar but more comprehensive opinion. He submitted.

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Well, rotational presidency might not necessarily address ethnic diversity in Nigeria. Rotational presidency is more of the elites’ creation to allow access to the central power by different members of the ethnic groups who will represent their ethnicities. That is it. So, rotational presidency may not necessarily integrate Nigeria, but you know the way Nigerians see people in positions of power, he is our own. So, if an Igbo, Hausa, or Yoruba man becomes president, members of his ethnic group see him as their brother, and they will support him. (Personal Interview Researcher One, December 2018)

Political elites superintend the misuse of ethnic affiliation. They apply ethnicity provided they see that it benefits them more than it costs them (Duruji, 2010). These political patrons provide their followers with jobs and other resources in exchange for political support (Ojukwu & Shopeju, 2010). This suggests that irrespective of the pedigree or capacity of a candidate, they still get the support of the masses. Poverty is a catalyst for this. Therefore, ethnicity has been exploited by the elites in Nigeria to preserve their positions as elected and appointed political officials by playing on the level of poverty in the country and making claims of representing the interests of their respective ethnic groups (Odeyemi, 2014). Religion is also a major factor in zoning the presidency in the country. In 1993, the SDP Muslim-Muslim ticket did not deter the people from voting for the party. However, religion has become an elitist tool to sway voters’ preferences. The Muslim-Muslim ticket of the APC in the 2023 election did not go down well with many stakeholders in the country considering Nigeria’s history of religious conflicts and terrorism linked with religious extremism. Religion has been a determinant of those who emerge as the governors and deputy governors and other political appointees at state levels, mainly in the South West, Kaduna, some North Central and North Eastern states. At the federal level, the religion practised by candidates for the offices of the president and the vice president, the first four principal officers of the National Assembly, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation and other positions have become a sensitive matter and used in determining who occupies these offices. However, religious leaders interviewed do not buy into the use of religion as a yardstick. Thus, the Islamic cleric itemised. That is part of the lack of fairness and equity which God detests. When you are a leader, you are a leader not only in your house, not only in your own

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family, not only in your religion, not only in your own town. You are a leader of the geographical entity of the place you are leading. Nigeria from Calabar to Sokoto, from Lagos to Maiduguri is all Nigeria, from Kano to Port Harcourt. So, as leaders, there is only one seat for leadership, only one seat for President and only one seat for Vice President. A leader will definitely come from one of those towns. And so, he is a leader not for his own people, not for his town but for the entire country. (Personal Interview Islamic Cleric, January 2019)

Similarly, the Christian cleric offered his view on the need for a nationalistic leader. As a leader, yes, you can belong to any religion, but it does not matter what religion you belong to. Once you become a leader, you are a leader for all. This country has had past Christian presidents, and yet nothing much happened to the Church, and we have had Muslim presidents and nothing much happened to Islam or Muslims. So, if we have a Christian president, I will not expect him to favour Christians as against Muslims but expect him to have the fear of God with a national sense of responsibility, be just and fair in leadership to all cultures and all religions. (Personal Interview Christian Cleric, January 2019)

These religious leaders are not in support of the use of religion to determine political offices. However, the different crises that have engulfed the country, especially those with religious undertones have effects on the disposition of different stakeholders on religion and political offices. For instance, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and some Nigerians did not support the Muslim-Muslim ticket of the APC in the 2023 election (Abati, 2022; Eyoboka et al., 2022; Nnabuife, 2022). Irrespective of the views of religious stakeholders, political elites find religion as an easy tool to get support from the masses. They have hijacked religion and sometimes use it to cause division to secure the support of the masses. For example, in Niger and Jigawa States, during the 2015 general elections campaigns, former Vice President Namadi Sambo stated that the PDP is an Islamic party considering the important positions held by Muslims in the then PDP government and he also alleged that most of APC’s key party officials are Christians and their Vice Presidential candidate is a Pastor (NewsWireNGR, 2014, 2015). Considering the high population of Muslims in Niger and Jigawa states, his attack on Christians was in a bid to appeal for the support

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of Muslims in these states. Another example was the allegation of fake bishops who attended the unveiling of Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s running mate, Senator Kashim Shettima in July 2022 (Jimoh & Abuh, 2022). The CAN disowned these bishops by clarifying that they are not bishops. The party was aware that its Muslim-Muslim ticket could have implications on the support they could get from Christians in the election. This was another form of religious abuse to gain political support. Another tool of elite manipulation is illiteracy. Illiteracy is almost inseparable from poverty. This is captured by North West politician two. We do not have independent candidature, and if you are privileged to have participated or had been at a place where the primary election of a political party is taking place, you would have seen illiteracy in practice. This is an issue you see in all the political parties, not only APC or PDP but almost all the political parties. If you look at who the delegates are, those who will be the one to elect the people who will fly the flags of those parties, who becomes the candidates, you will realise that most of them are semi-illiterates or illiterates. As such, the governors are given a kind of blanket or blank cheque to fill in the names of the delegates, and they prefer the illiterates whom they can easily buy off and manipulate. This is a problem that is not just peculiar to the Northern part, even the Southern part because if it comes to the recruitment system, the same delegates, the same party excos and if you look at them you notice they are not the best in the society. So, they are the ones who have been tasked with the responsibility of the selection of leadership. So, fundamentally, a competent person who has the capacity can lose out in an election because the only language that the delegates understand is who gives them material things to emerge as the candidate of the political party. Going forward, we can now ask ourselves, we have talked about the problem, the hindrance, then what could be the solution? I have witnessed instances during the primary elections in my home state of Katsina. Usually, what they do, they send a leader to lead the primary process, a person who is not from the state. In our instance, they sent a former Senator, Senator Olorunnimbe Mamora. He was there. When the voting was about to commence, people met him and said each group/candidate needed to nominate someone who would write for the delegates. He said how? Asking what business, do we have by having illiterates coming to vote for who becomes the flagbearer of the political party? I have also witnessed instances whereby we will come for meetings here in Abuja or the national, they will send people from the national headquarters of the party to Katsina State, which is the state headquarters. They will invite the chairmen of the party from the 34 local

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governments, and the delegation from the national would come to speak to them, but they do not even understand English. So, at the end of the day, whatever you discussed there, they would not be able to communicate it down to the respective members of the political party. They do not have an independent mind of their own. (Personal Interview North West Politician two, January 2019)

In Nigeria, illiteracy and poverty among the masses make them vulnerable for elites to present ethnicity as a succour to alleviate the pathetic conditions of the masses (Duruji, 2010). These two societal problems, illiteracy and poverty, make delegates at party primaries victims of brainwashing such that they are easily bought over and consequently unable to vote for a candidate that can push for development (Yagboyaju, 2015). Therefore, elites manipulate at the party level and during elections. The modus operandi of political parties contributes to the vulnerability of the party members. The vulnerability of these party delegates affects the choice of competent candidates, who may later hold political positions at various levels. As a result of poverty, political elites are also in the habit of vote buying such that they induce voters to vote for a candidate (Faluyi, 2022). This assertion corroborates that of Researcher Three. ‘We authored an article in 2006 on vote buying. That was when the thing started but it has taken a new dimension now because they know that people are made poor deliberately, time for election they now tip……tokenism and after that another four years of suffering’ (Personal Interview Researcher Three, December 2018). The masses may find themselves in a situation where they are financially arm-twisted to vote for candidates who may not be their choice. After all, whether they vote for their choice or not, whoever wins may not perform in office. South South opinion leader gave a description. You mortgage your interest when you collect that money from a politician and at the end of the day, he wins and doesn’t come back to you until four years and so on. Good message but what does the recipient of that message say in reply? Is it not better for me to collect this rice now, whether I collect, I don’t collect, he will not come back until four years and he will not do this road to my community, he will not….In other words, he will deliver bad governance whether I collect or I don’t collect. So is it not better for me to collect? (Personal Interview South South Opinion Leader, December 2018)

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Therefore, the masses prefer to get ‘incentives’ from these elites and vote so that they do not lose on both sides—incentives and leadership performance. These narratives snowball to favour Nigerian political elites. Researcher Two expatiated on how the weak system has favoured elites. And I must tell you that no doubt about it, the system has its inadequacies because it has also been exploited by the elites. Just like the elites do in most parts of the world. We should not forget the fact that the elites are human beings, and for the average human being, it is self-first. It has its shortcomings and inadequacies. The system of rotation favours the elites and of course, it must favour the elites because the elites are in charge, and we have agreed that this applies to many other governmental levels. (Personal Interview Researcher Two, December 2018)

This view substantiates the fact that the major reason why elites advocate for zoning of the presidency is parochial. This has become aggravated because of the revenue might of the federal government which is seen as a ground to have more access to state wealth. Even if they would not be direct beneficiaries, they support candidates to become the president, so that they can have access to state resources through their anointed candidates. In a state like Nigeria where accountability is low, political elites strive to grab power to superintend over oil revenue rather than utilising such income to develop the country (Shkaeva, 2014). Nigeria’s elites are greatly corrupt with a narrow desire for nationhood, and they use the state as the pedestal for wealth accumulation (Ojukwu & Shopeju, 2010). The political elites have balkanised the economy, and they get their share by identifying with and mobilising their ethnic and religious groups, as well as regions but the masses benefit less or not at all (McLoughlin & Bouchat, 2013). The authors’ views are further corroborated by North East opinion leader’s view. In a way, it has served but, like I said go back to the elite-masses dichotomy. Who is talking about rotational presidency? What is the desire of the average man on the street? Good governance. He is desirous of having a person no matter where he comes from so long as he can deliver good governance. It is the elites that hijacked this concept to further divide…. that is my view. (Personal Interview North East Opinion Leader, January 2019)

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Elites further manipulate the process by playing hide and seek with zoning. North Central politician elucidated below. You will find out that some of the elites not in government will be crying foul of marginalisation. You can hardly find a poor man who says he is marginalised because he does not know the difference between marginalisation and when he is not marginalised. In an actual sense, what we find in the Nigerian case is a lack of good leadership. They tend to take care of their selfish interest as against those of the electorate. (Personal Interview North Central Politician, January 2019)

Elites through their selfish attitude easily inflame anxiety in situations and then they douse tensions (Azarya, 2003). Whenever political elites, either from the North or South feel left out of the ruling bourgeoises’ group, they support rotational presidency, but if they are within the ruling caucus, they jettison the idea (Ambali & Mohammed, 2016). South South opinion leader asserted the authors’ claim based on what arose after the death of President Yar’Adua. The participant established that zoning would continue to divide the country because of elites’ selfishness. His assertion thus: I doubt rotational presidency is an answer to national integration in Nigeria or an answer to political stability. We have rotated for some time, has it brought stability? Has it brought integration? PDP rotated when the unforeseen happened, and the President died, and by constitutional imperative, the vice should take over. The North wanted to substitute political imperative for rotation. They insisted that it was still their turn. Was there any element of national integration in there? There was not even an element of elites’ integration, and these are the elites of the same political party. From these instances, it became obvious that from where we started this interview, religious and regional imperative superseded this arrangement for so-called national integration. The Northern elites in PDP were willing to fraternise with their Co-Northern elites in other political parties to oust the Southern interest. So, it has not helped at all. The rotation has aggravated…. the regional blocs are still the same, and the elites’ bloc remains the same. It is just a matter of political accommodation. You maintain your identity, and I maintain my identity, when our interests diverge, we go our separate ways. So, I am critical of rotational presidency as a tool for national integration. It is not. (Personal Interview South South Opinion Leader, December 2018)

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There are other instances to substantiate the views of the authors, North Central Politician and South South opinion Leader. Before the Fourth Republic, Northern elites did not support rotational presidency because the region had ruled the country most while the South due to its shorter period at the helm of affairs was more disposed to the practice. If rotation has not been in the mix, the North would benefit most because it has more states and population. However, the positions of the two regions on zoning the presidency have become unstable. Their stance is subject to which region is in power at any point in time. For instance, the North was in support of zoning in the 2011 Presidential Election because the region was not in power and it felt it was its turn to get the presidency. Nwaneri (2019) explains that during the campaign for the 2019 Presidential Election, Babatunde Fashola and Vice President Yemi Osinbajo advised Yorubas to vote for Buhari so that the South West would stand the chance of producing the president in 2023. Also, the immediate past Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), Boss Mustapha, in two separate functions that had to do with Ebonyi and Abia States counselled the Igbos to vote for Buhari in 2019 so that the South East which had been clamouring for the presidency for a long time will be the zone to produce the president in 2023. The participation of former Vice President Osinbajo in the APC primaries to determine the party’s candidate for the 2023 Presidential Election could mean that his statement was to pave way for his candidacy. For Babatunde Fashola, although he did not show interest in becoming the President of the country, a Yoruba elite in the person of his strong ally, Bola Tinubu, emerged as the party’s candidate and won the election. That of the former SGF has turned out to be a mere statement to secure votes from Igbos. This submission has been made because an Igbo man did not emerge as the party’s candidate or running mate in the 2023 Presidential Election. Nwaneri (2019) also reports that the North desired to hold power beyond 2023. For example, the President of the Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (AYCF) Yerima Shettima said his organisation was considering supporting Northern presidency in 2023. Likewise, the late Junaid Mohammed, a Second Republic lawmaker advised the South not to put so much hope in producing the president in 2023 and that zoning the presidency has denied Nigeria of good leadership. He further concluded that if the president did not come from the North, he would rather give his support to Bola Tinubu from the South West than support any South Easterner. The same source has it that the former SGF, Babachir Lawal,

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claimed that it is not compulsory that Buhari’s successor should be from the South but the president can come from any section of the country. However, towards the 2023 election, he withdrew his support for the candidate of his party, Bola Ahmed Tinubu and supported Peter Obi because of the Muslim-Muslim ticket of the APC. Former Kaduna State Governor, El-Rufai, did not support zoning but clamoured for qualification, competence and character. Nevertheless, he later threw his weight behind a Southern presidency. Former Abia Governor, Orji Uzor Kalu, felt that zoning should not stop until the South East and North East had produced the president. However, he later supported the candidature of Bola Ahmed Tinubu from the South West. In a relatively different twist, Northern governors and some stakeholders from the region met in November 2020, and they did not support any form of ‘premature’ zoning of power to the South. They criticised the #EndSARS protest and other superlative agitations and purported that they were indirect ways to regime change without the ballot (Erezi, 2020; HassanWuyo, 2020). Superlative agitations could refer to issues like restructuring, power sharing, resource control and lopsided appointments in favour of the North. In addition, if the president is from the South, Southern leaders could have made similar allegations, and Northern leaders might have backed the #EndSARS protest and the perennial agitations. From the above examples, it is apparent that political elites are inconsistent in their support for zoning and they also use it as a tool to cause divisions among the zones. In summary, elites devise any means, including the weakness of the electorates or state institutions to gain power. Politics in Nigeria is an elites-controlled game, and these groups of people have a sit-tight perspective about power because they apply any tool to retain and not relinquish power (Egbefo, 2015). The manipulating nature of elites trims the integration potential of rotational presidency.

Conclusion This chapter clarified that rotational presidency is also known as zoning or zoning the presidency in Nigeria. The inconsistent ways political elites have handled rotational presidency made it imperative to explore the constitutionality of the arrangement. Rotational presidency is not one of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution. However, its absence in the constitution does not make it unlawful. It was proposed that if it is

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engraved in the Constitution, there will be less rancour around rotational presidency. This is to prevent a repeat of what happened after the death of former President Umar Yar’Adua. This can be attained if political elites adhere to the provisions of the Constitution. Rotational presidency has been subtly practised before the Fourth Republic. It has been observed in some cases during regime change in both civil and military rules, especially in determining who deputises President/Head of State. In both forms of government, it has never been legalised but has always been done through elites’ consensus. Thus, a sequential view of regime change especially with the choice of presidents/ heads of state and their deputies was part of this chapter. However, the public became more aware and sensitive to the practice in the Fourth Republic due to PDP’s invented zoning arrangement which is a consequence of other factors. It has filtered into the composition of the principal officers of the National Assembly. Rotational presidency was also explored from the integrating purview. Rotational presidency has brought a sense of belonging, especially to minority groups and to some extent, improved federal stability. The fact that an elite from an ethnic group emerges as the president makes the group feel important and identify with Nigeria. Federal stability has received a boost because, if not for zoning, the deprivation that springs from the denial of power might have created a threat to the country’s peace. The chapter also explored the flaws of rotational presidency. It identified that relegating merit in choosing candidates may culminate in the emergence of ineffectual candidates as winners. This balloons into having leaders that will not promote good governance. Good governance and development are linked. If there is development in the country, the people will be empowered economically and socially, and they will be less susceptible to being easily cajoled to promote the selfish interest of political elites. Therefore, the clamour for rotational presidency will not be given much preference because people will be more concerned with electing good leaders without being veiled by ethnic or religious reasons. The chapter examined elites’ manipulation in the course of rooting for or opposing rotational presidency. The roles elites play in rotating the presidency are important, but personal aggrandisement being the basis for their actions does pose some threats. Elites capitalise on the poor

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economic status, low educational exposure of the masses and ethnoreligious sentiments to present candidates that hardly deliver good governance. Such sentiments may pose threats to federal stability. In essence, these breed mediocrity and nepotism. This has resulted in overlooking the essence of good governance which is to have viable institutions which will provide infrastructure to catalyse development. Finally, zoning the presidency only creates a brief euphoria for the ethnic or religious group ruling at any point in time while good governance that positively affects the nooks and crannies of the country is given less attention. However, a germane view in this chapter is that if zoning is amalgamated with good leadership, it will enhance integration and bring development.

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Osaghae, E. E. (2003). Explaining the Changing Patterns of Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 9(3), 54–73. Owete, F. (2019). SPECIAL REPORT: Inside National Assembly’s Two Decades of Lawmaking, Scandals and Looting. Accessed from https://www.premiu mtimesng.com/investigationspecial-reports/356847-special-report-inside-nat ional-assemblys-two-decades-of-lawmaking-scandals-and-looting.html on 30 December 2021. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/investigationspecialreports/356847-special-report-inside-national-assemblys-two-decades-of-law making-scandals-and-looting.html on 30 December 2021 Shkaeva, N. (2014). The Resource Curse Magnitude in Federal Sates: A Study of Russia and Nigeria (MA Dissertation). Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest Hungary. Suberu, R. T. (1993). The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria. Journal of Democracy, 4(4), 39–53. Ukpong, C. (2020). Umar to Buhari: You Will Destroy Nigeria with Lopsided Appointments. Accessed from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/ headlines/395471-umar-to-buhari-youll-destroy-nigeria-with-lopsided-appoin tments.html on 1 June 2020 Uwazurike, C. (1997). The Search for Stability in Post Civil War Nigeria: On the Prospects of the Rotational Presidency Idea. Dialectical Anthropology, 22(3/ 4), 265–302. Yagboyaju, D. A. (2015). Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999–2015) and Electoral Outcomes: How Long Can Patronage or ‘Politics of the Belly’ Last? Journal of African Elections, 14(2), 162–185. Yahaya, J. U., & Bello, M. M. (2019). An Overview of the Challenges of Peace and National Integration in Nigeria Politics. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research, 3(8), 20–28.

CHAPTER 10

Bolstering Integration in a Diverse Country

Introduction This chapter suggests ways to add to the national integration profile of Nigeria. Having identified the reasons why there is low integration in the country, the measures put in place and the areas of success, there is a need to find ways to strengthen the institutions that are directly or indirectly in charge of engendering national integration in Nigeria. Aside from the existing steps taken, it is germane to identify more actions that can be taken to promote peaceful co-existence in Nigeria. The chapter is structured into sections which are value re-orientation and patriotism, good leadership emergence process, corruption should be fought with sincerity, accountability through the involvement of the masses and state institutions, good institutions that are more powerful than individuals or a group of people and provision of infrastructure by involving the citizens. Others are restructuring, healthy fiscal federalism and resource control, a more transparent federal character, blurring of indigenship and non-indigenship dichotomies and avoiding ethnoreligious biodata, rotational presidency and other zoning arrangements should be made constitutional as well as other actions that can be taken by the citizens.

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Value Re-Orientation and Patriotism A value is a belief system that attempts to guide a person’s actions in life (Ofor-Douglas, 2021). Value means suitable or appropriate standards, and proper way of doing things (Ibara & Okogbaa, not dated). ‘The hitherto good values displayed by many ethnic groups in Nigeria are dwindling’ (Personal Interview South South Opinion Leader, December 2018). Colonialism which resulted in the amalgamation of different entities into one culminated in divided loyalty to an entity—Nigeria. In other words, some Nigerians still inculcate good values at their ethnic/ community levels but not in the country because of the existence of different cultures. Values could operate at personal, group or political levels and they are integral parts of every culture (Ofor-Douglas, 2021). However, culture is inherited and value is imbibed. This means that values could be inculcated into a personality. Good values encompass honesty, integrity, truth, obedience, loyalty, kindness and decency and they are crucial in encouraging group existence, harmony, social integration, development and transformation (Ofor-Douglas, 2021). Some of the value systems displayed by Nigerians, especially leaders are setbacks to development and national unity (Nwenearizi, 2012). The good values are not displayed at encouraging levels at the national, state and sometimes community levels which explains why nationalism and patriotism are low in the country. Patriotism encompasses respect for national symbols, obeying the country’s rules and regulations, selflessness in services to the country, love and a loyal attitude towards the country (Muhammad, 2022). Unpatriotic acts which include bribery and corruption, bad leadership, ethnicity, religious intolerance, impunity and indiscipline, among others (Muhammad, 2022) have been displayed by the leaders and followers in Nigeria. The poor state of the economy, human rights abuses, corruption and other social vices have made Nigerians less hopeful in the system and less patriotic and nationalistic. Furthermore, pro-ethnic activities and those of ethnic militia groups are signs that nationalism and patriotism are low in Nigeria (Negedu & Atabor, 2015). Patriotism is an elementary tool for the socioeconomic and political transformation of any country, which provides an important basis for commitment to the state (Muhammad, 2022). Therefore, getting Nigerians who are patriotic and nationalistic is crucial to boosting integration in Nigeria. This can be achieved through educating the young

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ones on good values and patriotism as well as inculcating into the adults’ value re-orientation which may improve their patriotism. Weak political and civic education have widened the gulf between the government and the governed thereby jeopardising the country. Good political and civic education is essential to make the people believe in the system, have a better value system and become more patriotic. Political and civic education link the masses to governmental procedures and utilise their competencies towards building a vibrant, durable and stable political entity that engenders development (Ugwuja et al., 2015). However, catching them young is suitable. No one is born patriotic, and it is difficult to inculcate in adulthood but its inculcation starts at an individual’s early formation stage. Patriotism and nationalism are best inculcated into the education of students at the early childhood stage (Negedu & Atabor, 2015). The educational system at all levels should be designed to foster national consciousness, good values, patriotism and nationalism. The curriculum of formal educational institutions should be reviewed to educate students at all levels on patriotism and inter-cultural relations. Constitutional lawyer one explained that. The Ministry of Education, need to ensure that we review the curriculum of primary, secondary and tertiary education in Nigeria to include nationalism and we need to promote it. If we put it in the curriculum, if it is clearly stated, I believe we will kind of start the propagation of the love for the country right from the time when Nigerian citizens are in primary school, secondary school, and then the university. We will continue promoting that. (Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer One, December 2018)

It is a good thing that Civic Education has been introduced as a subject and History has been re-introduced as these will go a long way in cultivating these good virtues. For instance, History will enable a student to know where he is coming from, the realities around him, and his current situation and to project the future. Through educational institutions, languages and cultures of another geo-political zone outside where the institution is domiciled should be encouraged. This will boost understanding of other languages and cultures and correct misconceptions which will ultimately aid national unity. Finally, there should be development and adoption of a national language and a very good one is Pidgin English. This will foster communication, understanding and unity.

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The use of the national anthem, pledge and other national symbols at educational institutions will also be conveyors of national unity. However, for those who are out of school, adults and the political class, value reorientation will be germane to build good value system, patriotism and nationalism in them. Re-orientation encompasses actions to change, renew or transform people’s beliefs to another (Ofor-Douglas, 2021). The process of value reorientation implies changing direction from an erstwhile course of action or idea to new and better ways of doing things. This can be achieved through civic and political education. South West opinion leader elucidated. ‘This is the kind of thing and I think that until we get to a situation where we embark on more civic education to let people know, what is the goal of this nation? What is the responsibility of the individual? How do we get there?’ (Personal Interview South West Opinion Leader, December 2018). Re-orientation can be done at the family and community levels. The government can take an active part in re-orientation in collaboration with civil society organisations. An agency like the NOA should be made more independent by not being a parastatal of the Federal Ministry of Information so that it can roll out more objective information and enlighten the people about governance and nation building. The NOA through enlightenments can also organise town hall meetings to get the views of the people about government so that the information gap that exists between the people and the government can be filled. To achieve these and be more objective, the NOA should work in conjunction with civil societies, traditional rulers and community development associations to ensure these campaigns reach the nooks and crannies of the country. Thus, they should not restrict their campaigns to only media platforms. Value re-orientation, patriotism and nationalism are not restricted to the masses as leaders also need these as catalysts for good leadership qualities. Thus, the political class and those in public offices hardly think and perform as Nigerians. They have to think as Nigerians rather than regional/ethnic/religious leaders, champions and heroes. Although the masses have to carry out their civic responsibilities, leaders need to discharge their duties in honesty and not with a parochial attitude. National integration should not be left to elites alone but the masses should be socially and culturally involved through mutual responsibility and love for the country (Muhammad, 2022). So the citizens need to also love their country more, but the state in this instance needs to show

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examples via its officials and the institutions of the state, let them show that they love Nigeria, let them show that they love the citizenry, then the citizenry will be in a position to reciprocate. Therefore, good leadership is crucial to boost national integration.

Good Leadership Emergence Process Aside from the qualities mentioned in Chapter 9, other qualities of a good leader in a plural state like Nigeria are not being ethnic/regionally/ religiously sectional, and having no tolerance for corruption. If these good traits are present, it is possible to have good state institutions, development, increased employment and reduction of poverty in Nigeria. Good leaders harness the resources of a country very well which is a catalyst for development. Development is a platform for employment opportunities, poverty alleviation and mass literacy. These reduce the vulnerability of a country to ethnic, religious and political violence. There should be a template that should be developed by political parties, civil society organisations, those in the informal sectors and other relevant stakeholders which should describe the qualities expected from a leader and how he will operate if elected. The governance system must be able to identify expertise, competence and morality which means that when leaders get into office, they have a template with which to work (Faluyi, 2022, 2023). These can be designed to screen out manifestoes that are not development-oriented or masses-friendly. In addition, Nigeria also needs a system for educating its leaders and to spell out the requirements for the positions they are contesting for. The antecedents of leaders must indicate a good track record which should include good performance, honesty, good human relations and not just education. Those being paraded and sometimes emerging as leaders in Nigeria do not possess what it takes to grow and develop the economy of the country. Thus, the process of choosing these leaders will be a very good avenue to nip bad leadership in the bud. Political parties, INEC, the masses, security agents and other stakeholders play active roles in determining good leaders. Zoning and rotational presidency nevertheless, good leaders can still emerge. Political elites emerge to run for political offices or support their associates to run on the platforms of political parties with the first stage being party primaries. However, the primaries are abused through the manipulation of party delegates and corruption. Party delegates range across

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literates, semi-literates, and illiterates while some are less exposed to the benefits of choosing good leaders and putting sentiments aside. Therefore, the educational level of party executives and delegates should be raised to at least a diploma. Such delegates should also be enlightened on the implications of electing incompetent aspirants as candidates. If these requirements are put in place, it will eliminate the era of illiterates who are susceptible to undue influence and overall, we will be able to improve the quality of leadership, we will be able to have a group of people that you can sit down in the same hall and talk about national unity. This means that elites’ influence on the choice of aspirants and candidates notwithstanding, party executives and delegates will be able to push for the right political leadership. Party delegates should not allow themselves to be induced financially. Delegates are induced to vote for the highest bidders (Adepegba, 2022; Jimoh & Omolaoye, 2022; Majeed, 2022). The Electoral Act 2022 has provisions that forbid vote buying, bribery and conspiracy, and undue influence, among others and there are provisions to punish offenders (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2022). It is disheartening that politicians came out boldly after party primaries to demand the refund of financial inducements from party delegates due to the loss of the former in the primaries (Daily Trust, 29 May 2022; Sunday, 2022). No one has been convicted. The masses constitute the electorate. The challenges in the country affect the electorate and they need to ensure that they use the weapon they have as citizens which is their vote. They have to exercise it judiciously and ensure that they vote for the right leaders and hold such leaders to account. If at the party level, the politicians have chosen the good candidates through transparent primary processes, the responsibility lies on the electorate to vote for the best among the candidates. However, poverty, illiteracy and the violent attitude of the political class make it difficult for the electorates to autonomously exercise their voting power in Nigeria. Voters are induced through vote buying and if they are not induced, they are intimated from casting their votes or the voting process is disrupted. Thus, the candidates that are not the choice of the people may emerge as winners. Weak state institutions, the poor attitude of the political class and the poor independence of the INEC are responsible for these. Measures should be put in place to enhance the independence of INEC. The chairman and national and state commissioners should no longer be appointed by the President with the approval of the Senate.

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They should be appointed by a joint committee of the National Judicial Council and civil society organisations. The commission should collaborate with other institutions to investigate and prosecute electoral offenders. Finally, INEC should improve its communication and advocacy efforts. This can be actualised through seminars, trainings, town hall meetings and other means of reaching the public. These will aid good electoral and democratic culture and culminate in the emergence of good leaders. If the relevant stakeholders play their roles, good leaders will emerge. North West politician one encapsulated these. We all have to ensure that we select the right leadership, elect the right leadership and embark on massive public enlightenment which can only be achieved if we have the right crop of leaders by emphasising capacity and competence in terms of the selection or voting of leadership and we have to go down and reform the selection process. (Personal Interview North West Politician One, January 2019)

If these identified problems are addressed and the suggestions are put into practice with the cooperation of the political class and the masses, the deviants will become the minority while those interested in a credible electoral system, good leadership and good governance will become the majority. Good values, value re-orientation and patriotism will be catalysts for these. These will transform into national consciousness, good national philosophy and ethical standards for the leaders and the masses. Once these are achieved, good leaders will emerge. If good leaders emerge, their performance should be reviewed to ensure that their excesses are checked and they are replaced or prevented from seeking another term.

Corruption Should Be Fought with Sincerity The positions Nigeria has always occupied in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index indicate that corruption has been a major problem in the country (Faluyi, 2022). That of 2022 has been highlighted in Chapter 1. Corruption in the country has led to the diversion of funds meant for the provision of infrastructure to be diverted for personal use. The implication of this is poor infrastructure and poverty which have contributed to violence and insecurity in the country. Therefore, if corruption is reduced in Nigeria, the masses will be less susceptible

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to being given stipends in exchange for illegality or cajoled to support societal vices like rigging of elections and participating in ethnic, religious and political violence. Thus, very low corruption in a society marginally contributes to national integration. Aside from the corruption cases mentioned in Chapter 7, there are other issues surrounding corruption in Nigeria. Public corruption in Nigeria encompasses those perpetrated in the defence sector, most recently in the fight against insurgency, oil and gas sector, inflated contracts, kickbacks, transfer from government coffers, budget padding, and bribes paid to and received by public officials, among others (Suberu, 2018). So, the system that the country operates that allows individuals to control the movement of these funds needs to be changed. For instance, the president and state governors are so powerful and have access to funds beyond what an individual should control. The executive-centric nature of the system has made it difficult for the legislative and judicial arms to play their oversight roles to prevent and investigate corrupt practices as well as successfully prosecute all corruption allegations. Separation of powers and the independence of the legislative and judicial arms of government have not stopped the sprawling powers of the executive, especially at the federal and state levels. This has made it easy for politicians and their appointees to engage in looting spree. The executive and legislative arms need to earn the trust of Nigerians by not being involved in corruption. The three arms of government should be given constitutional roles such that each will be allotted responsibilities to reduce the domineering power of the executive arm of government. This will make it possible for the three arms of government to checkmate one another’s excesses and reduce corruption. The government has set up anti-corruption agencies but their performance has not been encouraging. A lot of anti-corruption cases against public officials have been pursued by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission and Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) but they have been accused of selective prosecution and very low conviction rate (Ekwealor & Faluyi, 2020; Onuigbo & Eme, 2015; Suberu, 2018). This is corroborated by the inability of most of the past chairmen of the EFCC to complete their terms of office. They have been removed by the president with different ‘justifications’. Politicians are in the habit of getting

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court injunctions to restrain the anti-corruption institutions from prosecuting them. These agencies need to be empowered to discharge their responsibilities without fear or favour. If the necessary institutions are well structured and function very well, coupled with good values and value re-orientation, anti-corruption will be more of prevention than response and prosecution. The resources exerted on fighting corruption will be reduced. Then these resources can be channelled towards developmental issues. Nevertheless, this does not rule out instances where there will still be a need to prosecute those alleged to have been involved in corrupt practices. Finally, the largesse that comes with political positions should be reduced so much that the financial attraction will not be the drive for going for such positions but the desire to serve the entire country. Related to corruption is to have a good system of accountability which will reduce corruption.

Accountability Through the Involvement of the Masses and State Institutions The template for good leadership should also include a performance template attached to the office. One of the requirements is checking the background of the prospective leader and their very close associates to know if they have corrupt characters. The second is the declaration of assets by elected and appointed officials before assuming office. There should be vetting of the assets of the leader on an annual basis and if it exceeds the proceeds from his investment and/or the remuneration attached to the office and inheritance, such an official should be removed from that position after a detailed investigation. This is where the CCB comes in. The third is that performance and expectations should be given a timeline. This should be drawn by a combination of civil society organisations, political parties, members of socio-cultural groups and other relevant stakeholders. It should also be legalised and room should be given for amendment if the need arises. However, economic realities should be taken into consideration in assessing the level of performance. With the cooperation of the legislative arm, any leader who fails to perform should be removed. The immunity provision in the 1999 Constitution could make this suggestion difficult to actualise. Hence, a constitution born out of widespread consultation will reduce the shield immunity gives to low or non-performing leaders. Appointed leaders

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should equally be removed from office if they are corrupt or fail to perform. These can be attained through strong state institutions.

Good Institutions that Are More Powerful Than Individuals or A Group of People The weakness of state institutions is responsible for the excesses displayed by the political class. Most of our institutions are orphans because they are rarely cared about, the political class and corrupt public servants seek to manipulate them to their advantage. They have made themselves superior to these institutions such that they use them to promote and actualise their parochial interests. These are the reasons why corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, human rights abuses and poor infrastructure have been challenges facing the country. In an ideal setting, these institutions should check the excesses of the political class, and public servants and make the citizens fulfil their obligations and exercise their rights. However, the elites control institutions like the judiciary, police, and anti-corruption agencies, among others. Hence, asking them to strengthen them is like requesting the elites to commit class suicide. The way to strengthen the institutions is to involve civil society organisations. The tripartite bond of civil society groups and labour unions in conjunction with the people should hold the leaders to account. If such a mechanism is put in place, politicians will begin to deliver good governance. If they deliver good governance and there is the encouragement of value re-orientation, the masses will benefit. This is the logic to pursue as a way to foster national integration. The existence of good institutions translates to the provision of good and appropriate infrastructure.

Provision of Infrastructure by Involving the Citizens Good and strong state institutions make it possible for leaders to deploy resources for the provision of good infrastructure. The existence of good infrastructure in a country is one of the consequences of good governance. The lack of good governance and the challenge of development are the main reasons why Nigerians are so severely divided on national issues. If there is good governance, development and good infrastructure exist to make daily living and the operations of small-scale businesses

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easier, the masses have food on their tables whether they are from the North or the South, and nobody talks of religious or ethnic differences. Therefore, if there is good governance, irrespective of who is giving the good governance, everybody is happy, and the country will be united. National integration is something that develops on its own based on the good performance of the government. It is not something that can be imposed on the people. The two main challenges to providing good infrastructure in Nigeria are corruption and nepotism. Corruption has been the major reason why the funds meant for the provision of good infrastructure are diverted for personal use. The quest to be popular in their respective constituencies makes elected and appointed leaders at all levels site infrastructure in their states or hometowns or places where they are not needed at all. The major reason for this is that the citizens are hardly involved in the planning and implementation stage in the provision of infrastructure (Faluyi, 2023). These are responsible for the dearth of infrastructure in some areas while some are duplicated in other areas. Corruption should be checked through strengthened state institutions so that funds meant for infrastructure will be deployed to the right places. The citizens should be involved in determining the infrastructure that each community requires. This can occur through town hall meetings, public hearings, peaceful protests, the media, social media, pressure groups, labour unions and traditional institutions (Faluyi, 2023). This is necessary because government may not have the resources to provide everything needed. Thus, the involvement of the concerned communities makes it easy for the government to apply the scale of preference. If citizens do not make demands or presentations for infrastructure, the government should provide basic infrastructure like good roads, water, electricity, and sanitation, among others. However, for these to be accomplished, there has to be restructuring which will grant the subnational units more autonomy. If the subnational units have fiscal buoyancy, they will be able to provide these infrastructure because the local governments are the closest to the populace, followed by the state governments.

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Restructuring, Healthy Fiscal Federalism and Resource Control Nigerians do not see their country as a pride to associate with. In fact, outside the country sometimes, they rarely want people to ask them which country they come from. Hence, the country should be transformed to that which its citizens are proud of. This can be aided if the people are given a say to determine their cohabitation through a national conference. Nevertheless, some recommendations of past conferences should be considered for implementation subject to sincerity on the part of the government. Regarding the conference that should be organised, the government should not restrict the areas to discuss. The North and South need to cooperate on this. This will give room for redefinition: redefine not geographically, but who and where Nigerians are and where they want to be. All groups need to come together to discuss issues like fiscal federalism, resource control, service delivery, anti-corruption, power sharing, among others. If all these are done in unity and respect for the opinions and views of others, Nigerians will be proud of their country. Consequently, the spirit of patriotism will begin to increase and national integration will receive a boost. National integration should be beyond the issues of alternating power, but the values of love, respect and nationality must erode ethnic, religious or political factors. Therefore, there should be the political will to embark on restructuring by stakeholders from all the geo-political zones. These will reduce the suspicions the various groups have about one another, boost economic and political cooperation and reduce the security challenges in the country. For instance, Southern leaders should advise their Northern counterparts on the potential (with respect to resources) the North possess in having fiscal independence. Thus, the states in the country should be made to realise the resources they possess as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. This will go a long way in cooperation between the two regions on restructuring. Hence, the over-reliance on oil will drop. This will make states look inward and explore avenues to make revenue. This can be achieved if the federal government allows the states to control their resources. More powerful sub-units that can control and use their resources to boost development in their territories will be in the best interest of the country.

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Devolution will be achieved through these steps such that the grassroots will have more resources and power to discharge their responsibilities. It is because the people are not feeling the impact of government that is why they feel like, ‘let my person be there so that I can enjoy some government goodies’. The case of Zamfara can be duplicated in all states concerning all resources. Resource control does not necessarily mean that you collect the 100% revenue. For instance, as much as 90% of taxation from the resource may go to the federal government but the state will be in control of the resources. However, the federal government should from these proceeds provide good federal roads that are directly or indirectly linked to the mining or processing sites of these resources, make good laws that support local production, provide security, and play active roles in favourable international cooperation in conjunction with states, among others. States where resources are domiciled should also be given the highest employment quota across all staff categories even if the private sector runs the exploration and processing of these resources. The advantage of states and communities being in control is that since it is their resource, they would not want any form of sabotage like pipeline vandalisation, bunkering, or illegal mining, among others. They would safeguard their resources because they are in control and what comes as proceeds from the resources will be used meaningfully to provide infrastructure and develop their territories. This will also reduce poverty, and once poverty reduces, zoning may continue but people will have the effrontery to operate as major stakeholders in choosing the best leaders and checkmating the excesses of bad leaders.

A More Transparent Federal Character Having federal character in the allocation of federal and state public positions as well as the distribution of projects is good. The failure of successive governments to make public the distribution of public employment positions in federal institutions per state is an avenue to insinuate marginalisation and for the political elites to hijack available vacancies to reward their loyalists with employment. The actions of the government in placing advertisements for government positions in newspapers are good but more information needs to be shared about the states that the employment quotas are yet to be fully filled for each ministry, parastatal and government institution. If such information is objectively managed, peace and development will improve.

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States and local governments should be mandated to comply with the principle, such that each of the divisions in the states and local governments will be represented in state institutions. The rate of compliance of these states and local governments should be published. However, before the publications on compliance at the federal, state and local levels are made public, labour unions and civil society organisations should be allowed to vet the report and compare it with the realities of staff distribution. In addition, the federal character principle should be respected concerning political appointments that do not legally require legislative approval. In all, government appointments should be based on merit. The fact that each state/geo-political zone/region is to be represented in government institutions does not mean that the best cannot be selected to fill the slots for each geographical space. Employing competent hands has multiplier effects on good performance and good output which will translate to good institutions and development. The same should be done about the distribution of projects but it has to be with caution. As stated earlier, a needs assessment in collaboration with local communities should be carried out to know what each one requires. Hence, just because a certain project has been carried out in a community or state does not mean that it should be repeated in other communities. Finally, projects should not be done or otherwise for vindictive or popular purposes. A new administration should complete the projects of a past administration and the basis for refusal to complete it should be subject to reports from independent project managers and auditors to determine if the projects are worth completion or not. The political game where projects are not complete and commissioned for use should stop. Information about proposed, ongoing and completed projects should be in the public domain so that the people can hold the government responsible for how they handle projects. Finally, the tradition of commissioning projects has to stop. The resources deployed towards the commissioning ceremonies could be used for the provision of other infrastructure. Hence, the performance will publicise a performing government and not the jamboree around the inauguration ceremonies.

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Blurring of Indigenship and Non-Indigenship Dichotomies and Avoiding Ethnoreligious Biodata The roles of traditional institutions have so much reduced in Nigeria that they do not have any responsibility spelt out in the Constitution but they play mere pseudo-advisory roles of which public officials are not bound to take such advice (Babalola, 2020; Garba et al., 2020). They could be used in land management to solve land disputes, and management of information at the grassroots, and through their primary role of preserving tradition and culture, they can be engaged by state governments to promote peaceful co-existence, political stability and security. Traditional rulers can be empowered to address the indigene and non-indigene dichotomies. The government should give traditional rulers a constitutional role to empower traditional rulers to discipline anyone who discriminates based on ethnic identity within their domain. The sanction should also encompass punitive measures for any traditional ruler that encourages discrimination against non-indigenes. However, the case in the Middle Belt of disputes between indigenes and herdsmen may question the justification of blurring the discrimination line. This is because of the acts of violence that characterise the disputes. The indigenes allege that the herdsmen want to forcefully take over their ancestral land. Hence, the ones that come with violence ought to be addressed with caution and objectivity by the government. The country needs to do away with the christening ‘state of origin’ but embrace ‘place of residence’. If a Nigerian citizen has lived in a state for a specific number of years, he should be able to access the benefits that accrue to people from that state. This can be taken further to allow Nigerians to access opportunities first as a Nigerian. This can be consolidated through legislation that ascribes more importance to national identity than group identity. There should be a prohibition of indicating ethnic or religious identities in any official situation. Rather, national identity should be celebrated. For example, contents like ethnicity, religion, state of origin and local government should be discouraged in filling out some official forms. Married women should be categorised as the indigenes of their husbands’ states and vice versa. A laudable move that should see the light of the day is the bill at the National Assembly which seeks to amend the 1999 Constitution to allow married women to contest elections to federal

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and state parliaments in their husbands’ states. However, steps should be taken further to make place of residence a parameter to run for political offices and access opportunities. Lagos State has attained some level of success such that those who are not indigenes have represented the state in the parliament, offered political appointments and employed in the public service. Other states can adopt the Lagos style. Finally, these are good ideas but domination by certain groups, especially those that are not originally indigenes should be avoided. This can be avoided if there is good governance that will foster the proper distribution of resources and infrastructure to engender the operations of businesses and daily life such that one group will not have it as an agenda to dominate other groups.

Rotational Presidency and Other Zoning Arrangements Should Be Made Constitutional To avoid rancour among political elites, which may engulf the country in violence, the zoning of political offices should be made constitutional. Elites will not be able to change the rules when it favours them or otherwise. This will also bring healthy competition as the group/zone whose turn it is to run for any office will want to perform very well so that the societal blame of non-performance will not be attributed to the group/ zone. However, whoever will represent any group/zone should be the best and be subjected to a thorough leadership test before being given the slot.

Other Actions That Can Be Taken by the Citizens The masses should not allow political elites to come between them. Irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliation, the common problems the masses have are poor governance and poverty, and these affect all the same way. Hence, they should deny immediate ‘incentives’ and vote for good leaders. The masses should not allow ethnic and religious sentiments used by elites to pursue their parochial interests to divide them. There should be a united voice for good leadership and good governance. Intermarriages among ethnic groups and religions should be encouraged. This will build trust and unity. It is easier for families to be more united. This unity can translate to positive perceptions about the ethnic or religious groups from which a person marries from.

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The masses should cooperate with pro-masses civil society groups to make the government strengthen public institutions and deliver good governance. It will also be a platform to make politicians accountable. People should stop supporting corrupt politicians. They should not be welcomed in their constituencies and should not be praised for their corrupt practices because they belong to certain ethnic groups. The masses should not also tag anti-corruption activities with ethnic victimisation.

Conclusion Ways to inculcate good values into the young ones and re-orientate the values of the adults were outlined in this chapter. These are pathways to patriotism on the part of the masses and the political class. Ways to have good leaders who possess leadership qualities were given. The masses, government institutions and civil society organisations are key actors in actualising these. Thus, leadership and performance templates which will serve as yardsticks for any personality aspiring to take leadership positions are crucial. It was also suggested that the electoral process should be transparent and devoid of manipulation and corruption. A sincere anti-corruption drive which should encompass prevention and responsive actions was suggested. This should include the citizens and ‘independent’ anti-corruption agencies. Accountability of public officials through good leadership and performance templates, asset declaration and a more relaxed immunity for public officials were advocated. Strong institutions were also suggested. Through the involvement of the masses, civil society organisations and labour unions, the political class can be mandated to make state institutions move from being toothless bulldogs to vibrant and effective ones that serve the interest of all and not the elites. Restructuring has been on the lips of Nigerians for decades. Restructuring which is devoid of insincerity to aid peaceful co-existence among the various groups in the country and engender good fiscal federalism and resource control formed part of the ways forward for a more integrated Nigeria. Federal character though has always been rated with mixed reactions, it is a good tool for integrating Nigerians. However, it was suggested that it has to be done with transparency and merit should not be jettisoned as well as states and local governments should fully embrace it. The traditional institutions strengthened through proper legislation were

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proposed as the conduits to make Nigerians see themselves as Nigerians first before identifying with any ethnic group. However, caution was made on the need to tame those with hidden agendas and promote such through violence and domination. The penultimate proposal is that zoning political positions should be legally backed through legislation. This will reduce the propensity of political elites to shift the goalpost if zoning does not favour them. However, zoning should be merged with merit and good performance. Finally, the masses should not allow the elites to manipulate them, encourage intermarriages among ethnic and religious groups, cooperate with civil society groups and desist from supporting corrupt politicians.

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Ibara, E. C., & Okogbaa, V. E. (not dated). Improving the Quality of Nomadic Education in Nigeria for Value Re-orientation and National Development. Port Harcourt Journal of History and Diplomatic Studies, 149–158. Jimoh, A.M., & Omolaoye, S. (2022). Jonathan Condemns Monetary Inducement for Delegates at Primaries. https://guardian.ng/news/jonathan-con demns-monetary-inducement-for-delegates-at-primaries/ on 29 June 2023. Majeed, B. (2022). 2023: Delegates Bribed to Vote at APC Presidential Primary, Amaechi Alleges. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/544 781-2023-delegates-bribed-to-vote-at-apc-presidential-primary-amaechi-all eges.html?tztc=1 on 29 June 2023. Muhammad, A. A. (2022). Enhancing Patriotism Education for Nation Building. African Journal of Humanities and Contemporary Education Research, 3(1), 21–28. Negedu, I., & Atabor, A. (2015). Nationalism in Nigeria: A Case for Patriotic Citizenship. American International Journal of Contemporary Research, 5(3), 74–79. Nwenearizi, O. F. (2012). Reinforcing Value Re-Orientation for National Development. The Nigerian Academic Forum, 23(1), 1–9. Ofor-Douglas, S. (2021). University Education and Values Re-Orientation for Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. East African Journal of Education Studies, 3(1), 211–222. Onuigbo, R. A., & Eme, O. I. (2015). Analyses of legal frameworks for fighting corruption in Nigeria: Problems and challenges. Kuwait Chapter of the Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 5(3), 1–33. Suberu, R. T. (2018). Strategies for Advancing Anticorruption Reform in Nigeria. Daedalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 147 (3), 184–201. Sunday, O. (2022). 2023: Aspirant confirms receiving refund from delegates after losing ticket. Accessed from https://dailypost.ng/2022/05/25/2023-asp irant-confirms-receiving-refund-from-delegates-after-losing-ticket/ on June 29 2023. Ugwuja, A. M., Rotimi, N. C., & Onwuasoanya, S. C. (2015). The National Orientation Agency in the Task of Political and Civic Education in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects 1999–2013. Ideal International Journal, 1(2), 1– 15.

Index

A Accountability, 22, 48, 72, 113, 136, 146, 237, 291, 300, 349, 359, 367, 375 Agitations, 2, 4, 16–18, 21, 45, 71, 133, 144, 174, 178, 180–182, 192, 193, 195, 196, 200, 202, 208, 223, 238, 242, 259, 261–263, 273, 299, 326, 332, 352 Annulment, 21, 107, 121, 151, 164, 204, 205, 231, 316, 327, 328

Civil war, 2, 3, 21, 35, 73, 76–78, 88, 90, 91, 124, 144, 145, 149, 150, 163, 171, 178, 193, 197–199, 201, 219, 227, 228, 255, 262, 265, 273, 281, 282, 284, 309, 325, 333 Colonial, 8, 9, 30, 39, 50, 51, 69, 70, 75, 78, 79, 85, 140, 141, 149, 156, 166, 167, 197, 221, 222, 268, 272, 302 Consociationalism, 20, 101, 104–106, 108, 112, 113, 115, 125, 136 Constituent Assembly (CA), 228, 230

B Belonging, 21, 22, 54, 82, 83, 113, 134, 196, 224, 265, 292, 298, 300, 315, 332–336, 340, 353

C Census, 21, 86, 141, 163, 171, 178, 181, 183–185, 239, 250 Centripetalism, 20, 101, 106, 113–115, 125

Constitution, 5, 8, 9, 30–32, 34, 36, 38, 47, 83, 88, 106, 108, 109, 111, 114, 117, 147, 167–176, 186–188, 219, 224–226, 228–230, 232, 235, 240–242, 261, 272, 286, 288, 289, 291, 305, 308, 315, 318–322, 330, 352, 367 Constitutional conference, 3, 5, 21, 39, 44, 168, 169, 219, 224–226,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. T. Faluyi, National Integration and Rotational Presidency in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41241-7

379

380

INDEX

228, 231–235, 239, 244, 289, 340 Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), 87, 226, 228, 289 Corruption, 2, 11, 14, 22, 54, 137, 181, 200, 257–259, 266, 285, 287, 294, 309, 321, 326, 327, 359, 360, 363, 365–369, 375 D Derivation, 193, 234, 235, 239, 249–252, 254–259 Development, 2, 14, 18, 22, 52, 75, 79, 81, 84, 92, 111, 119, 138, 148, 184, 185, 189, 190, 199, 205, 227, 235, 236, 238, 242–244, 250, 251, 258–260, 266, 268, 282, 283, 293, 300, 316, 317, 336, 337, 339, 341–344, 348, 353, 354, 360–363, 368, 371 Diversity, 1, 18, 19, 22, 29–34, 36, 38, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 58, 59, 68, 69, 73, 75, 78, 79, 82–84, 90–93, 102, 103, 106, 116, 122, 155, 174, 177, 197, 201, 202, 208, 219–221, 234, 282, 288, 289, 291, 305, 339, 345 E Election, 4, 18, 58, 59, 76, 86, 89, 91, 101, 104, 107, 110, 113–115, 117–121, 125, 136, 137, 142, 143, 146, 148–151, 164, 175, 185, 197, 200, 202–207, 229, 231, 238, 266, 286, 291, 302–309, 316, 319–321, 327–332, 344–348, 351, 352, 366 Elites, 8, 16, 18, 20, 36, 37, 54, 56, 71, 82, 83, 102–106, 109,

111–113, 115, 116, 118, 124, 125, 131–145, 148–152, 155–157, 169, 179, 180, 186, 190, 203, 221, 222, 225, 226, 229, 231, 234, 236–238, 244, 254, 262, 266, 267, 269, 298, 303, 316–318, 320, 321, 323, 325, 327, 328, 330–332, 335, 339, 342, 343, 345, 347, 349, 350, 352, 353, 362, 364, 368, 374–376 Elite theory, 20, 131–138, 146, 155–157, 180, 226, 322 Ethnic, 2–8, 10, 16–22, 29–34, 36–40, 43–45, 47, 49–56, 59, 67–87, 93, 101–103, 105–109, 111–119, 121, 123, 124, 133, 138, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 149–156, 163–166, 169–173, 176, 178–182, 184, 185, 190–192, 195, 197, 200–207, 219–225, 227, 228, 231, 236, 244, 260–266, 268–270, 273, 281–285, 287, 288, 293, 295, 296, 299, 300, 302, 303, 305–309, 315, 316, 322, 323, 325–329, 331–333, 335, 336, 338, 341, 343–345, 349, 353, 354, 360, 362, 363, 366, 369, 370, 373–376 Ethnicity, 8, 19–21, 29, 30, 39, 40, 43, 45, 49–51, 53–56, 67–71, 74, 80, 106, 112, 114, 136, 141, 143, 144, 146, 149, 155, 163, 169, 178, 181, 184, 190, 194, 200, 205, 220, 221, 296, 303, 304, 317, 327, 328, 337, 342–345, 348, 360 Ethnoreligious, 3, 4, 19, 22, 44, 51, 74, 79, 146, 155, 354, 373

INDEX

F Federal character, 3, 21, 22, 44, 92, 105, 110, 232, 234, 265, 281, 288–293, 296–300, 302, 308, 309, 318, 371 Federal instability, 3, 59, 169, 178, 230, 318 Federal system, 3, 8, 17, 19–21, 29–44, 49, 59, 87, 88, 108, 156, 163–165, 167–169, 171–174, 177, 178, 180, 192, 194, 197, 207, 208, 226–229, 231, 232, 239, 240, 243, 261, 268, 299, 334 Fiscal federalism, 22, 173, 174, 178, 234, 239, 243, 244, 246, 255, 370, 375 Fourth Republic, 4, 9, 14, 16, 20, 21, 43, 59, 71, 107, 116, 124, 138, 151, 163, 164, 173, 181, 187, 194, 195, 199, 205, 219, 226, 233, 241, 245, 255, 256, 305, 308, 309, 315, 322, 323, 329, 344, 351, 353

G Geo-political zone, 3–6, 11, 16, 17, 19, 21, 39, 55, 109, 143, 145, 175, 177, 185, 189, 190, 199, 232, 233, 235, 264, 283, 286, 290, 299, 300, 307, 308, 330, 331, 334, 361, 370, 372

H Human Development Index (HDI), 14, 300

I Igbo elites, 141, 144, 150, 198, 264, 323, 326, 330–332

381

Indigenes, 84, 176, 194, 220, 268–271, 273, 283, 309, 373, 374 Indirect rule, 8, 19, 30, 50, 51, 79, 140 Infrastructure, 2, 10, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 44, 45, 54, 75, 76, 156, 190, 207, 243, 251, 257–259, 266–268, 288, 289, 300–302, 342, 343, 354, 359, 365, 368, 369, 371, 372

K Kaduna ‘mafia’, 134, 326, 329

L Leadership skills, 316, 337, 338, 340, 343 Liberal democracy, 69, 112

M Majority, 3–6, 44, 45, 50, 51, 55, 58, 80, 83, 91, 102, 105, 110, 111, 113–115, 133, 136, 137, 141–143, 145, 169, 187, 188, 192, 220, 225, 233, 234, 260, 261, 263–266, 270, 299, 303, 304, 306, 308, 315, 316, 335, 365 Marginalisation, 17, 18, 21, 103, 133, 154, 163, 178–180, 182, 188, 189, 194, 195, 198, 199, 208, 223, 231, 265, 320, 321, 335, 343, 350, 371 Middle belt elites, 132, 140, 144, 145, 149, 182, 264, 265, 326, 332 Mid-west, 10, 53, 145, 151, 171, 184, 197, 227, 262, 305

382

INDEX

Military coups, 9, 21, 134, 149, 164, 190, 200, 202, 226, 229, 241, 302, 304 Minority, 2, 5, 6, 20, 43–45, 50, 55, 70, 74, 79, 80, 83, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108–114, 132–136, 140, 142–146, 169, 170, 182, 187, 191, 192, 202, 220, 225, 228, 235, 260–263, 265, 266, 270, 299, 305, 315, 316, 327, 333–335, 353, 365 N National integration, 1–4, 16, 17, 19–22, 44, 53, 56, 59, 67, 68, 79–87, 92, 93, 102, 103, 112, 114, 132, 133, 137, 142, 152, 156, 157, 173, 196, 198, 200, 204, 208, 219–224, 233, 236, 238, 239, 269, 272, 281, 282, 284, 292, 293, 296, 298, 299, 302, 309, 315, 317, 333, 336, 338–340, 343, 344, 350, 359, 363, 366, 368, 370 Nepotism, 11, 54, 200, 293, 297, 301, 309, 341, 354, 368, 369 Niger Delta elites, 140, 145, 146, 151, 234, 235, 259, 316, 326 Non-indigenes, 45, 84, 220, 225, 269–273, 308 North Central, 5, 15, 144, 145, 178, 201, 223, 236, 283, 284, 286, 287, 291, 292, 296, 297, 299, 300, 327, 334, 336, 337, 339, 342, 343, 345, 350 North East, 5, 15, 143, 145, 179, 185, 188–191, 206, 220, 221, 258, 283, 284, 286, 292, 297, 299, 321, 327, 333, 334, 336, 339, 344, 349, 352 Northern, 2, 8, 10, 17, 47, 51, 55, 73, 75–78, 89, 106, 109, 110,

132, 140, 142–144, 149, 151, 165, 166, 172, 176, 181–184, 187, 188, 192, 197, 200, 201, 203, 205, 206, 208, 226, 227, 232, 234, 235, 238, 246, 263, 267, 268, 285, 286, 294, 298, 299, 304, 325, 328, 329, 332, 347, 351, 352, 370 Northern Christian, 295, 325–327 Northern elites, 18, 121, 142–146, 149–151, 182, 189, 226, 233–236, 238, 259, 262, 264, 265, 303, 316, 321, 328–330, 332, 350, 351 Northern Muslim, 134, 186, 187, 206, 294, 295, 326, 331, 332 North West, 4, 5, 15, 143, 145, 180, 185, 191, 206, 257, 263, 264, 267–269, 282, 284, 297, 299, 300, 326, 327, 333, 334, 336, 338, 343, 347, 348, 365 O Oil and gas, 10, 11, 19, 194, 195, 242, 273, 366 P Patriotism, 22, 119, 178, 199, 359–362, 365, 370, 375 Plural, 2, 3, 31, 43, 46, 49, 52, 54, 69, 71, 80, 81, 101, 104, 108, 112, 164, 190, 239, 344, 363 Political elites, 4, 16–18, 20–22, 31, 39, 54, 59, 102, 104, 107, 112, 113, 115, 118, 123, 125, 131, 135–142, 146–150, 153, 155–157, 163, 169, 170, 179, 185, 190, 205, 207, 221, 229–232, 242, 252, 260, 266, 267, 273, 286, 301, 316, 317, 319, 321, 322, 328, 330, 332,

INDEX

334, 338, 343, 345, 348–350, 352, 353, 363, 374, 376 Political party, 80, 107, 182, 200, 234, 291, 303, 308, 319, 342, 347, 348, 350 Post-colonial, 19, 38, 69, 70, 72, 133, 156, 222 Post-election, 18, 116–118, 121, 202, 204, 207 Post-independence, 10, 142–144, 163, 223, 224, 226 Poverty, 2, 15, 16, 22, 145, 155, 179, 181, 186, 190, 191, 195, 259, 260, 266–268, 302, 317, 321, 343–345, 347, 348, 363, 365, 371, 374 Power sharing, 18, 20, 33, 38, 41, 72, 74, 90, 91, 93, 101–105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 115–118, 120, 121, 123–125, 136, 139, 140, 182, 232, 233, 316, 322, 340, 370 Pre-colonial, 50, 69, 156 President, 1, 3, 4, 9, 18, 21, 31, 40, 45, 59, 77, 89, 90, 105, 107, 110, 114–117, 120–124, 133, 151, 155, 170, 171, 173, 175, 189, 190, 196, 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 229, 232–235, 237, 240, 259, 273, 291, 293–298, 301, 315, 318, 320–323, 326–328, 330–332, 335–340, 342, 345, 346, 349–353, 364, 366

R Region, 2, 4, 5, 10, 16, 53, 78, 89, 134, 142, 144–146, 151, 168, 170, 171, 180, 181, 183, 185, 192–198, 200, 226, 227, 238, 250, 254, 259, 261, 262, 265,

383

296, 303, 304, 316, 323, 327, 333, 337, 351, 372 Relative deprivation, 20, 131–133, 152–157, 168, 178, 182, 195, 243, 251 Religion, 6, 8, 29, 30, 39, 49, 50, 56–59, 68, 74, 75, 77, 91, 92, 108, 109, 114, 124, 144, 146, 163, 178, 180, 181, 184, 187, 188, 190, 220, 221, 231, 284, 305, 317, 327, 332, 345, 346, 374 Resource control, 2, 22, 70, 146, 151, 169, 174, 178, 181, 193, 223, 225, 236, 238, 239, 243, 260, 352, 370, 371, 375 Resources, 1, 5, 10, 11, 19, 22, 30, 36, 42, 54, 56, 70, 71, 80, 81, 91, 103, 109, 172, 174, 184, 185, 192, 195, 221, 225, 237, 239, 243, 244, 251, 254, 259, 267, 271, 303, 335, 342, 367, 370–372 Restructure, 193, 255 Restructuring, 17, 19, 22, 37, 151, 174, 223–225, 231, 236–238, 296, 352, 369, 370, 375 Revenue allocation, 3, 21, 193, 219, 224, 239, 241, 244–246, 252, 255, 264, 265 Rotational presidency, 4, 16, 19–22, 56, 67, 83, 101, 104, 107, 115, 116, 138, 151, 152, 155, 169, 200, 232, 233, 291, 309, 315–323, 329–345, 349–353, 363, 374 S Secession, 2, 4, 21, 35, 45, 74, 90, 91, 163, 178, 197, 198, 200, 227, 236, 266, 273 Settlers, 22, 191, 269–271

384

INDEX

South East, 5, 6, 15, 16, 58, 119, 144, 145, 179, 188, 190, 192, 196, 198–200, 207, 257, 264, 271, 272, 284, 287, 294, 297, 302, 305, 307, 308, 320, 326, 327, 340, 351, 352 Southern, 2, 5, 8, 17, 51, 70, 75–78, 88–90, 140, 142, 165, 168, 181, 183, 191, 201, 206, 207, 231, 238, 260, 265, 269, 288, 316, 328, 347, 350, 352, 370 Southern Christian, 188, 294 Southern elites, 142, 182, 206, 226, 232–235, 250, 255, 294, 320, 323, 331 Southern Muslims, 188 South South, 4, 5, 11, 15, 16, 144, 145, 178, 180, 188, 195, 196, 222, 234, 235, 243, 264, 294, 297, 302, 307, 317, 321, 332–335, 348, 350, 351, 360 South West, 4–6, 15, 16, 143, 144, 177, 180, 188, 190, 192, 199, 203–207, 232, 234, 237, 243, 258, 264, 265, 269, 270, 282–286, 292, 293, 297, 298, 305, 307, 317, 327, 333, 334, 340–342, 345, 351, 352, 362 Stability, 16, 19, 21, 22, 40, 54, 68, 71, 82, 115, 139, 156, 164, 174, 176, 179, 187, 201, 204, 230, 236, 259, 298, 315, 318, 319, 333, 334, 339, 350, 353, 354, 373

State creation, 3, 106, 144, 145, 151, 178, 220, 239, 260–266, 270 State institutions, 2, 22, 54, 72, 118, 146, 147, 343, 352, 359, 363, 364, 368, 369, 372, 375 State resources, 67, 72, 80, 109, 133, 137, 155, 157, 252, 271, 349 Strong state institutions, 343, 368 T Tier of government, 31, 42, 173, 175, 192, 225, 240, 288 V Value added tax (VAT), 246, 249, 256, 257 Value system, 321, 360–362 Vice President, 9, 18, 59, 105, 107, 116, 124, 196, 322, 323, 326, 327, 330–332, 335, 345, 346, 351 Y Yoruba elites, 107, 121, 143, 144, 149, 151, 207, 231, 234, 236, 259, 328–330, 332, 351 Z Zoning, 18, 21, 22, 67, 116, 233, 315, 316, 318, 320, 322, 326, 334, 335, 338–345, 349–354, 371, 374, 376