Religion and Global Politics: Soft Power in Nigeria and Beyond 1793645612, 9781793645616

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Religion and Global Politics

Religion and Global Politics Soft Power in Nigeria and Beyond

Edited by Olusola Ogunnubi and Sheriff Folarin Foreword by Jeffrey Haynes

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2022 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Ogunnubi, Olusola, editor. | Folarin, Sheriff F., editor. Title: Religion and global politics : soft power in Nigeria and beyond / edited by Olusola Ogunnubi and Sheriff Folarin ; foreword by Jeffrey Haynes. Description: Lanham, Maryland : Lexington Books, 2022. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022001804 (print) | LCCN 2022001805 (ebook) | ISBN 9781793645616 (cloth) | ISBN 9781793645623 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Religion and international relations—Africa. | Religion and international relations—Nigeria. | Religion and politics—Africa. | Religion and politics—Nigeria. | Diplomacy—Religious aspects. Classification: LCC BL65.I55 R445 2022 (print) | LCC BL65.I55 (ebook) | DDC 201.727096—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022001804 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022001805 ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

Foreword: Religious Soft Power in Nigeria and Africa Jeffrey Haynes

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Acknowledgementsix 1 Religion and Global Politics: Soft Power in Nigeria and Beyond Olusola Ogunnubi and Sheriff Folarin PART I: AFRICA AND THE WORLD

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2 Integrating Religion as a Tool for Public Diplomacy in Twenty-First-Century Africa Toyin Cotties Adetiba

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3 Post-Colonial Relations in Africa and the Emergence of Religion as an Instrument for Inter-State Diplomacy Victor H. Mlambo and Olusola Ogunnubi

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4 Faith-Based Organizations as Soft Power for Social Development in Africa Michael Ihuoma Ogu

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5 Forty Years and Still Counting: Shia Exportation and the Character of the Nigeria–Iran Relations, 1979–2019 Charles E. Ekpo and Ekwutosi E. Offiong

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PART II: OTHER COUNTRIES WITHIN AFRICA 6 How Many Divisions? Soft Power, Personal Diplomacy and the Holy See Hendrik W. Ohnesorge v

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7 Religion and Soft Power in African Foreign Policy: Morocco’s New Religious Diplomacy towards Nigeria Mathieu Rowsell

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8 Nye, Soft Power and Conflict Resolution: Centring Trado-Religious Soft Power in Conflict Processes in Africa Surulola Eke

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PART III: PERSPECTIVES FROM NIGERIA

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9 Determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Making a Case for Religion Oladotun E. Awosusi and Charles E. Ekpo

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10 Nigeria’s Religious Soft Power: Turning the Tide of a Declining Image Olusola Ogunnubi, Sheriff Folarin, and Confidence Ogbonna

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11 Islam and Nigerian Foreign Policy: Processes, Procedures and Personalities Abubakar A. Usman, Elfatih A. Abdelsalam, and Hakeem Onapajo

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12 Anglicanism and Soft Power in Nigeria: Dimensions and Prospects Opeyemi Idowu Aluko

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13 Pentecostal Mega Churches and Religious Diplomacy in Nigeria Irene Pogoson and Maduabuchi Ogidi

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14 Music Diplomacy: The Soft Power of Nigerian Gospel Melody Olusola Ogunnubi and Dare Leke Idowu 15 Gospel Music Cosmopolitanism in Lagos, Nigeria, and the Soft Power Potential of Its Iconic Practitioners Joseph Kunnuji 16 Religious Soft Power Influence on Nigeria’s Major Pentecostal Leaders: Sources and Implications for Nigeria and Its Regional Power Status Dare Leke Idowu

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Index291 About the Contributors

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Foreword Religious Soft Power in Nigeria and Africa Jeffrey Haynes, London Metropolitan University

The concept of ‘soft’ power refers to a particular means to achieve objectives. When Joseph Nye (1990) introduced the idea of soft power into politics and international relations three decades ago, it was a useful reminder that ‘hard’ power – that is, the use of coercion or threats, often linked to arms, money or diplomacy – is not necessarily the only tool available for power holders to achieve goals. It is useful to start with the concept of ‘power’. Power is the ability to influence others in order to get them to do what you want. We can try and do this in three main ways: (1) threaten with ‘sticks’; (2) pay with ‘carrots’; or (3) attract or co-opt. All three are potential ways to achieve what we want: the object of our power agrees to do what we want. Why try and use soft rather than hard power? It is because if we can get others to do what we want by encouraging them not forcing them, then it is preferable because it is likely the cheapest option: less costly than ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’. Thus, soft power ‘is the ability to get what we want through attraction rather than coercion or payment’. When our wants are seen as legitimate and/or necessary in the eyes of others, then they are likely to do what we want and, as a result, our soft power enables us to achieve our goals. Thirty years ago, Nye’s main focus was on the rise and fall of American soft power. It arose from the circumstances of the post–World War II world, when American political ideals influenced much of Europe in the direction of both democratization and market economies. During the Cold War, that is, the 1950s to the 1980s, an American radio station, Radio Free Europe, sought to build support for both democracy and improved human rights in communist Central and Eastern Europe. In 1989, Chinese students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square used a replica of the Statue of Liberty as a symbol. Today, satellite television is used to try to build support in Iran for Western political and economic ideals. vii

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Originally, ‘soft’ power referred to secular goals. Later, the term ‘religious soft power’ was brought into the analytical frame. But transnational religious soft power is not new. For example, Christian and Muslim religious missions have for centuries been key expressions of transnational religious soft power. Their shared aim was and is to seek to change people’s religious norms, values and beliefs from one set of views to another. The goal is that individuals and then communities in foreign countries eventually behave religiously like the original proselytizers. Put another way, some transnational religious movements have possessed soft power for centuries. However, in recent years, especially since 9/11, rival conceptions of soft power compete with each other within the context of the ‘war on terror’. The secular government of the United States seeks to project its soft power, but it has not been able to convince most Muslims that American objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the Muslim world are not primarily selfserving. Instead, the government of the United States finds itself competing for Muslim hearts and minds with ‘extremist’ Islamist soft power. Focusing on extremist Islamist transnational networks, it is clear that some Islamist extremist movements—notably al-Qaeda and Islamic State — impact significantly on the world stage, receiving more policy attention than many ‘weak’ states in the international system. In Nigeria, for example, the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram has been a thorn in the side of the government for several decades. What al-Qaeda, Islamic State and Boko Haram have in common is that they project a future ‘utopia’ of an Islamic state which can only be achieved by killing or converting enemies. While such actors are extremists and murderers, their visions encompass a ‘perfect’ Islamic state which is used to encourage followers and sympathizers to adopt their norms, values and beliefs, that is, to encourage them to act in certain ways and not others. This book is an interesting attempt to use the concept of religious soft power and apply it to the politics and international relations of both Nigeria and, more widely, Africa. The editors of the volume have enlisted a notable group of contributors and their combined efforts have resulted in a number of novel, informative and innovative approaches to the concept of religious soft power in relation both to Nigeria and Africa. Such a comprehensive attempt has not hitherto been made. The publication of this book is to be especially welcomed as it brings new and expert attentiveness to religious soft power’s impact on politics and international relations in a region, Africa, which has until now not been the focus of such attention. REFERENCE Nye, Joseph. 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books.

Acknowledgements

The ideas for the book project were incubated during a short conversation with Professor Nimi Wariboko at the 2019 African Studies Association (ASA) Annual Conference hosted in Boston. He encouraged us to consider expanding into book form a research paper on Nigeria’s religious soft power which was presented at the ASA Conference. Subsequently, a meeting together with Professors Wariboko and Toyin Falola helped to develop the scope for the book. This project is thus the product of their encouragements and motivation for which we owe them great thanks. We want to thank both of them for having believed that the book project could be accomplished. The editors will also like to thank all the authors who have contributed to this volume for their hard work and patience in ensuring the final publication of the book. We would also like to acknowledge the assistance from reviewers who provided their generous scholarly expertise to ensure that the publication is of a high standard. Our thanks also go to Professor Jeffery Haynes for his generous time with writing the foreword and to the editors at Lexington Books for their painstaking work in the production process.

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Chapter 1

Religion and Global Politics Soft Power in Nigeria and Beyond Olusola Ogunnubi and Sheriff Folarin

HISTORICAL SETTING OF RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER Africa has often been portrayed on the premise of ugly historical experiences of the past. The exploitation of slavery and colonialism are no doubt two main episodes that have shaped the historical realities of the African people and their interaction with the rest of the world. In both instances, the ecology of Africa appraised from these historical sources continues to dictate how Africa is understood, whether it is from the context of language (Mufwene, 2015), education, religion, social transformation, economy or even culture. Before and even after independence in post-colonial Africa, religion played an important role in state formations, and the effect of this role was sometimes also obvious in external relations. It was therefore impossible to expect that in the modern era, religion would be relegated or excluded from the fabric of the African society (Agbiji and Swart, 2015). Although much of the religious practices in the continent were inherited from its colonial past and continue to shape many aspects of its public life, Christianity and Islam as the two major religious backgrounds in Africa have increased in followership and their influence is visible in virtually all aspects of public life (Aderibigbe and Medine, 2015). Africa is now home to perhaps the most religious population on the earth and the foreign policy of many of its states are covertly or overtly conditioned by official and unofficial religious innuendoes. What is religion to international politics and why is religion missing in the intellectual conversations on Africa’s international relations and politics? Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, and more prominently from the first two decades of twenty-first century, religion has witnessed a resurgence in interest among scholars and practitioners across fields. Today, religion continues to play an undeniable role both in public life and in international 1

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relations. Contrary to the arguments of the Secularization School and Modernization theory of its dearth (Appleby, 1994; Connolly, 1988; Hadden, 1987), the global focus on religion has experienced the emergence of transnational religious actors with significant influence on states’ national identity, diplomacy and foreign policy in the international system. The argument of the Secularization School is that modernization extinguishes the relevance of religion and it is for this reason that the social sciences field and international relations scholarship more specifically have focused less on the role of religion (Philpott, 2009; Luoma-aho, 2012). Before the 11 September 2001 attack on U.S. soil by Osama Bin Laden’s religiously inspired Al-Qaeda terrorists, little attention was paid to the potential impact of religious phenomena in the West (Reus-Smit, 2005). Despite the surge in religiously motivated global conflicts before this period,1 both policy makers and scholars of international relations ignored religious variables in the understanding of international politics. The studies by Huntington (1993, 1998) and Thomas (2005) helped to shape the interest in religion and international relations. Making a case for the introduction of religion into international relations scholarship, Fox and Sanders (2005: 1–2) argue for the inclusion of ‘the various manifestations of religion and their influence on the range of social and political phenomena that the discipline of international relations seeks to explain’. Both authors rightly provide three reasons why religion has been largely excluded from mainstream international relations scholarship. First was that the discipline itself developed from Western-oriented social sciences and international relations influenced by the Behavioural School that emphasized the use of quantitative methodology which for the most part also rejected religion as an explanatory variable. As Fox and Sanders (2005) note, this lack of interest is explainable by the fact that in the West, the influence of religion was very minimal, while in non-Western societies, religion was considered a primordial remnant that would disappear as these societies modernize. They also point out that major Western-centric theories of international relations proceed from the assumptions that emphasize the centrality of material power, economics, the state and the nation while excluding religion as a factor. So, while religion may be considered out of fashion in many parts of the world, in Africa, it remains vibrant and still maintains a stronghold in almost every aspect of public life (Aderibigbe and Medine, 2015). Citing the example of U.S. support for international religious freedom from the time of Clinton’s presidency, Haynes (2021) suggests that it is not unusual for states to link policies to certain religious concerns in a bid to rationalize or validate their foreign policies and actions. Although there are several studies that have examined the intersection of religion with other aspects of the public life, the attention to African

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international relations and politics is almost non-existent. For instance, Obadare’s (2020) brilliant study on ‘Pentecostal Republic’ examined the role and influence of religion in the domestic politics of a state. However, within Nigeria and Africa’s context, the linkage between religion and international relations in terms of theory and practice is still not very clear. And most of the studies that have established this linkage focus overwhelmingly on the realm of the internationalization of religious conflict, that is, how religious conflict transcend national borders and how local disputes take on an international outlook. CONTEXTUALIZING THE BOOK The book Religion and Global Politics: Soft Power in Nigeria and Beyond is the first attempt to refocus the attention on religion away from the ‘misery’ discourse of conflict and violence but towards the domain of international relations, diplomacy and foreign policy in Africa by looking at the themes that enable us to think positively or more critically about the ways in which religion has impacted external relations of African states. It is true that there have been several studies on the intersection between religion and international relations or foreign policy (Hatzopoulos and Petito, 2003; Fox and Shmuel Sandler, 2004; Thomas, 2005; Seib, 2013; Haynes, 2014) and some of these have touched on the theme of religious soft power (Haynes, 2012) but what is more surprising is that not many of these studies have introduced the African context despite the fact that Africa hosts the largest population of religiously inclined people (Pew XX). And in order to deepen the explanatory power of theories on religion and international relations, it is therefore important to include contexts of religious soft power that are peculiar to Africa. Focusing mainly on the idea of religious soft power, the editors of the book were interested in the empirical realities from Africa that may assist international relations scholars to enrich the development of theories that introduce religion as a variable. Therefore, our purpose in this book is to introduce the theme of religion to the discourse of African international relations/politics. This edited volume was inspired by a brief conversation with Prof Nimi Wariboko (an eminent professor of religion at Boston University, USA) during the 2019 African Studies Association (ASA) conference in Boston, USA. Initially, one of the editors had put together a conference paper (with Confidence Ogbonna) which was to be presented at the 2019 ASA conference, but during a meeting with Prof Wariboko, he suggested an expansion of the study into a full book project that will fill an important gap in the literature on religion and international relations, specifically relating to Pentecostalism and soft power

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in Africa. Further conversations with Prof Toyin Falola and Prof Wariboko helped to solidify the analytical context of the book. We, therefore, set about this ambitious task of expanding the manuscript into an edited book understanding fully some of our limitations, especially in the field of religious studies. Coming from a political science and international relations background, it was necessary to first deepen our familiarity with the literature in order to fully grasp the intersectionality between religion, politics and international relations and to find the precise methodological and theoretical tools to explain the unfolding phenomenon of Pentecostalism and soft power in Africa. Although the studies on religion and international relations have covered some parts of this phenomenon, particularly on the United States, Catholic Church and Middle East countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, no known study has investigated the religious soft power of sub-Saharan African states or how well religious actors in the continent have used religion as an instrument of persuasion (soft power) and particularly from a social context which criss-crosses the disciplines of political science and religion. The edited book therefore provides a thorough examination of the context of religion and its influences beyond the usual theological purview and more into its political and diplomatic influences in the daily lives of African people. We believe that the topic of religious soft power in Africa will help scholars interested in the field to unpack the role of religion in contemporary international relations. While the book’s focus is on Nigeria’s religious soft power, some of the chapters introduce themes related to countries within and outside Africa. Conceptually, religious soft power is a broad term referring to the different aspects of attraction, beauty and benignity that accrue to states and other transnational actors as a result of the values, principles and aspirations exhibited by key religious actors or edifices in the state. The concept can be used to understand how states and non-state actors use religion as a diplomatic instrument to secure their interest in global affairs (Haynes, 2012). In essence, religious soft power derives from global admiration for highly revered episcopal personalities, clergy or institutions that have the potential to play significant roles in the foreign policy execution of their state. Does religion and religious practices influence the behaviour of states in Africa, and if so, in what forms do these external relations take place? While religious soft power has been applied to a variety of states and religious actors, no such study is available on Nigeria, despite the evidence of influential transnational religious actors in the country. This book’s main interest is first to bring Africa’s context into the discourse on religious soft power and second to unpack how Nigeria’s example can be used to better understand the intersectionality between diplomacy (international relations) and religion. The chapters in the book attempt to unpack the empirical patterns and

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trends of religious soft power in Africa and its significance for the conduct of new forms of diplomacy. Therefore, the book covers mainly Nigeria, with an inclusion of other African countries where possible and identifies some of the sources, instruments, recipients, actors (agents) and outcomes of religious soft power in Africa and in order to appreciate the originality of the phenomenon and the epistemic convictions it serves. To achieve this, we first recognize that the deployment of religious soft power as it relates to Africa may, in fact, differ in form and nature from the characterization in popular literature (Haynes, 2012), especially as it relates to the religious and sociopolitical realities of the continent. For this reason, it is possible, for instance, to investigate the dimension of soft power that major Pentecostal pastors produce or deduct from Nigeria’s global standing. Interestingly, both intellectual fields of soft power and Pentecostalism in Africa’s context are only beginning to receive attention from scholars both from and outside the region.2 It is hoped that this book will steer more intellectual debate away from the common ‘misery research’ on the topic of Pentecostalism and religion in Africa and more towards its usefulness as a critical instrument of analysis, realpolitik and diplomacy to better understand the dynamics of African nation-states. While previous studies may have focused on negative aspects of religion and more specifically on being an enabler of insecurity, conflict and underdevelopment in Africa, this book takes a different approach to explore the diverse possibilities of religion for the foreign policies of African states and how it facilitates the expression and acceptance of global and regional interests or even the positive acceptance or perception of a state and its people. Against this background, this edited book introduces the subject of religion and soft power in Africa. The chapters in the book examine the deployment of religious soft power in African states and the potential this has for transforming perceptions about the continent. Religion, when deployed without the direction of states or government, may achieve the goal of transforming perceptions as we see in the example of the Obama government’s invitation to RCCG (North America) to the White House in a bid to encourage positive behaviour in black neigbourhoods. The book introduces conceptual, theoretical, empirical and historical case studies that accommodate perspectives from Africa on the topic of religious soft power. In doing so, the contributors provide a rich analysis of the experiences of African states in the examination of the nexus between soft power and religion. We observe that Africa is relegated to the background in many of the conversations and discourses on this field of study, and it is important that theoretical propositions on the theme reflect the diversity of experiences including from Africa. It is also necessary for African and Africa-based authors to contribute to the growing efforts

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to bridge the disconnection of the field of international relations to African students and scholars (Ogunnubi and Oyewole, 2020). Also, this book is prompted by the exclusion of Christian Churches in many of the discussions wherein themes of fundamentalism and conflict have received more attention in the study of religion. In view of these, the book’s contribution is in providing an account of Africa’s theoretical and empirical references to the study of religion and international relations, on Pentecostalism and the emergence of Global Pastorpreneurs from Africa, as well as faith and music diplomacy as soft power. Other themes covered in the book include ways of gathering influence through religious actors, religion as a tool for public diplomacy in Africa and case studies of the soft power of religious transnational actors in Africa. This is perhaps the first comprehensive study to explore the role of religion in the foreign policy of African states with other studies having focused more narrowly on the role of religious intolerance to conflict or state collapse. As expected, one major challenge that writing on the subject of religious soft power in Africa would face is the absence of literature and that is because there is scarcely any material that interrogates the role of religion in Africa’s international relations. The book hopes to have provided a rich literature that scholars and students interested in the subject of religious soft power in Africa can draw from. We believe that by introducing the theme of religion into the studies on African international relations, we can enrich analytical discussions in the field and also contribute to expanding the existing scholarship on religious soft power. STRUCTURE The book is divided into three parts with the first looking at ‘Africa and the World’. This section is interested in interrogating the role of religion and religious institutions in Africa’s diplomacy. The four chapters in this first part of the book examine the theme of religious soft power in African diplomacy from existing global contexts. The chapters provide a series of reflections on the role of religion in inter-state and public diplomacy and also that of faithbased institutions as a social development tool in Africa. By introducing the often-neglected subject of religion into international relations, the authors provide more empirical literature from Africa that will hopefully empower the theory development of the relationship between religion and international relations. As Fox and Randall (2016: 2) points out, ‘no understanding of international relations can be complete without bringing religion into the discipline’. The second part of the book dwells on case studies of religious soft power in Africa with specific reference to Morocco, Kenya and the Holy See. The example of the two countries is interesting because they provide

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new information about a gender context to prophetic soft power and new patterns of diplomacy between African states that is far from the regular official state-to-state diplomacy. The chapters contribute to the literature of religious soft power by examining a variety of contexts and actors including the soft power of the Papacy in Africa, gender and Pentecostal prophecy as soft power and the influence of religious diplomacy in Africa. The third and last section of the book addresses the theme of religious soft power in Nigeria. All of the chapters collectively unpack the overall argument that the book hopes to make, which is that Africa’s context of religious soft power presents fresh insights into the theoretical and empirical dynamics of the impact of religion in international relations. In chapter 2, Toyin Cotties Adetiba examines the role of religion as a tool for public diplomacy in Africa. Focusing on Nigeria, he argues that because religion constitutes a complex part of the most African societies, the communicative power of religious bodies allows them to play a collaborative role to support the diplomatic agenda of the Nigerian government. According to him, by opening up the opportunities for public diplomacy engagement, religious institutions can play important roles in addressing threats posed by insecurity and economic deprivation. He suggests that the starting point for embracing the role of religion in Nigeria’s public diplomacy is to recognize the need for significant reform in the country’s foreign relations and to design a public diplomacy strategy that inculcates religion in its plans. Victor Mlambo and Olusola Ogunnubi, in chapter 3, offer a critical reflection on post-colonial relations in Africa and how religion has emerged as an instrument of subtle diplomacy. Religion is a crucial part of the history and public life of African people and influences the foreign policy of states in the continent. The authors use this insight to unpack how religion has shaped diplomacy in Africa and to suggest that the associated problems with religious practice need to be carefully considered in order for religion to play a more constructive role. Mlambo and Ogunnubi contend that the increasing role of religion in Africa’s inter-state diplomacy has transformed the traditional modes of diplomacy but have at the same time infused religion as a tool of soft power. In chapter 4, Michael Ogu examines the soft power of faith-based organizations in Africa. His chapter focuses on their contribution to social development in the continent and argues that faith-based organizations are a catalyst for social and economic development and hence the importance of more studies that explore the implication of this role in contemporary international politics. Ogu believes that the involvement of religious institutions in the social development process in Africa can be enhanced when concrete steps are taken to ‘mend the fence’ of misconceived perceptions that associate religious institutions with ambiguous governance devoid of satisfactory checks

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and balance systems, unregulated proselytization, lack of collaboration, discrimination and a catalyst for conflict. In chapter 5, Charles E. Ekpo and Ekwutosi E. Offiong provide another rich assessment of the increasing role of religion in international politics with a focus on the exportation of Iran’s Shai Islamic sect into Nigeria and the pushback from the latter to resist this subtle soft power incursion visible in over forty years of relationship between both countries. Both authors establish that Shia soft power is visible through direct and indirect influence over citizens of other countries that accept to propagate the Shia creed and as a result cede their allegiance to Iran. Nigeria’s strategy to contain Iranian soft power ‘threat’ has been multidimensional and eclectic including denial, confrontation, demonization, joint resolution of conflicts and the use of third parties with the overall aim to establish peaceful relations with Iran. Hendrik W. Ohnesorge, in chapter 6, addresses the lack of scholarly focus on the conceptualization of papal diplomacy and his influence in global affairs. Focusing on the theme of personal diplomacy of Pope Francis, he investigates the sources and instruments of papal soft power in international relations. The chapter examines the major historical and contemporary development of the religious soft power of the Holy See towards Africa where the issues of climate change, social inequality and peace building and reconciliation are at the forefront of the Pope’s personal diplomacy. Ohnesorge argues that the attractiveness of the Pope’s personal diplomacy remains a potent expression of soft power in Africa through his commitment to these three agendas. In chapter 7, Mathieu Rowsell examines the role of religion as a diplomatic instrument of soft power between Morocco and Nigeria in a bid to address the apparent lack of scholarship on hierarchical relations between ‘small’ or ‘weak’ states, and particularly African states. The chapter focuses on the Kingdom of Morocco’s new religious diplomacy in Africa through the deployment of material and symbolic resources to rebrand itself as an exporter of a ‘moderate vision of Islam’ and champion against religious extremism. The kingdom uses this strategy to gain an ally in Nigeria and establish a hierarchical relationship with some African countries. This chapter finds that many African countries have accepted Morocco’s leadership by sending their imams to undertake Islamic training in Morocco. Roswell’s fieldwork in Morocco demonstrates that this new pattern of relationship in Africa can be understood through the lens of faith-based diplomacy that explains the ideational and material influence of Morocco in Africa. Through a successful faith-based diplomacy, Morocco promotes the idea that ‘it has a superior religious status vis-à-vis other African states, in order to improve its political and diplomatic standing on the continent and in the international community’. Through Islamic education, Morocco uses its propagation of

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moderate Islamic practice to positively change the views of Nigerian nonstate actors concerning their understanding and practice of Islam. In chapter 8, Surulola Eke examines the need to introduce the idea of soft power into the dynamics of conflict resolution in Africa. His study explored how highly revered trado-religious leaders in African communities leverage their influence as agents of peace. Extending the literature that establishes trado-religious leaders as effective influencers in local communities, Surulola submits that such leaders wield soft power that can become active in resolving local conflicts. His fieldwork based in Jos, North central Nigeria, shows that some of these leaders are able to mobilize their social capital for positive influence within their communities. His study established ‘how a group of leaders in a Nigerian city, Jos, ensured conflict avoidance in their community even as conflict ravaged other communities’. The importance of this is that it enhances our understanding of conflict processes in Africa and the role of powerful religious actors in these processes. Oladotun E. Awosusi and Charles E. Ekpo, in chapter 9, begin the third part of the book with an exploration of the role of religion in the foreign policy options available for Nigeria. Arguing that despite being conspicuous in Nigeria’s domestic politics, development and international relations, the variable of religion has often been overlooked in the design of the country’s foreign policy, the authors submit that deliberate attention needs to be paid to faith-based sources of its two predominant religions: Christianity and Islam. According to them, Nigeria is in self-denial of the influential role of religion in its foreign policy decisions as it is obvious that religion has been employed as a tool to advance its national interest. They argue further that the soft power diplomacy of Nigeria’s religious clerics can be used to consolidate Nigeria’s moralist and idealistic foreign policy approach. In chapter 10, Olusola Ogunnubi, Sheriff Folarin and Confidence Ogbonna focus on the religious soft power of Nigeria’s Pentecostal movements to appraise their possible influence in Nigeria and abroad. The chapter examines the soft power disposition of Nigeria’s mega-churches and the influence generated by their superintendents in the expression of the country’s foreign policy. Ogunnubi et al. argue that the ‘global prominence of Nigeria’s pastorpreneurs and FBOs rests at the base of the country’s religious soft power identity and perhaps represents its strongest instrument to repackage and leverage Abuja’s influence in Africa’. Nigeria’s Theme of Its Religious Soft Power Abubakar A. Usman, Elfatih A Abdelsalam and Hakeem Onapajo examine in chapter 11 the role of Islam in Nigeria’s foreign policy. They argue that for Nigeria with a significant Muslim population, Islam has the potential to

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play a role in the implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy although it is unclear the extent to which its Muslim population has influenced foreign policy outcomes. By examining the personalities, processes and procedures of Nigeria’s foreign policy making, the chapter finds that Nigerian Muslim elites who have occupied leadership positions in the past have manifested a moderate, conservative and secular outlook in their approach. According to them, the limitation that the religion of Islam has on Nigeria’s foreign policy is caused by the complex nature of domestic religious politics in the country as well as the conservative personalities of Muslim elites. In chapter 12, Opeyemi Idowu Aluko assesses the soft power dimension and prospect of the Church of Nigeria, Anglican Communion. He argues that the Anglican Church was responsible for developments in education, health, social justice, culture, political economy, leadership and moral uplift of Nigeria which can be regarded as the display of its soft power. Aluko suggests that Nigeria’s development owes a lot to the support of the Anglican Church which can be seen as potent soft power. He further points to the need for the Anglican Church to have more soft power influence in the domestic politics in Nigeria, particularly in the breeding of well-groomed politicians that are concerned about the development issues of the country. In chapter 13, Irene Pogoson and Maduabuchi Ogidi unpack the theme of religious diplomacy in Nigeria and the role of Pentecostal mega-churches. Specifically, their study explores the foreign policy prospects of Nigeria’s new generation Pentecostal churches to argue that the religious soft power inherent in these ministries with impressive global outreach and influence affords Nigeria the opportunity to strengthen its foreign policy reach through religious diplomacy, especially in the areas of peace making and reconciliation and political stability. Olusola Ogunnubi and Dare Leke Idowu, in chapter 14, turn to the creative possibilities that (gospel) music offers as an instrument of diplomacy for Nigeria. Their study examined the linkage between music and international relations by drawing inferences from the Cold War period when major powers including the United States and Soviet Union turned to their music culture in the pursuit of their national interest abroad by sponsoring tours. Ogunnubi and Idowu suggest that music diplomacy embedded in Nigeria’s celebrated gospel musicians may be appropriated as a foreign policy tool to counter negative stereotypes about Nigeria. In chapter 15, Joseph Kunnuji, a jazz musician and scholar, builds on the same music theme to reflect on the attractiveness and potential soft power of Nigeria’s gospel music. In his study, he deploys autoethnographic data and Feld’s idea of jazz cosmopolitanism to highlight the call for the appropriation of gospel music to advance Nigeria’s foreign policy goals. The urgency to

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reconfigure Nigeria’s diplomatic strategies to include the role of soft power will require placing Nigeria at the cultural epicentre of Africa by leveraging the international profile of its iconic musicians to rebrand its image and reputation. Finally, Dare Leke Idowu, in chapter 16, concludes the book with an assessment of the enormous religious soft power resources wielded by Nigerian Pentecostal leaders. He argues that the religious soft power influence of Nigerian Pentecostal leaders is rooted in their ability to contribute significantly to development amidst state failure and government ineptitude, the overbearing demographical efforts of their church membership, enormous contributions to Nigerian religious tourism, the globalization of Nigerian Pentecostal Church, their proven power of healing and electoral prophetism. The study concludes that the transnational acceptance of Nigeria’s Pentecostalism offers non-state medium for projecting a positive image of Nigeria and countering negative stereotypes about Nigeria. NOTES 1. According to Haynes (2021: 1), ‘Iran’s Islamic Revolution led to widespread apprehension that the new revolutionary government would seek to spread its radical agenda to the Muslim ummah via Iran’s foreign policy, much as the post-revolutionary government in the Soviet Union had sought to spread its revolution six decades earlier to those it believed would respond favourably to its appeals’. 2. Ikem, A. P., Ogbonna, C. N., & Ogunnubi, O. (2020): Pentecostalism, Electoral Prophetism and National Security Challenges in Nigeria, African Security, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 28-53. Obadare, E. (2018). Pentecostal Republic: Religion and the Struggle for State Power in Nigeria. London: Zed Books; See also Nimi Wariboko, Nigerian Pentecostalism (2014) chapters 5-6 for analysis of Pentecostalism and politics in Nigeria, or a theorization of the political in Nigerian Pentecostalism.

REFERENCES Aderibigbe, Ibigbolade S., and Carolyn M. Jones Medine. 2015. Contemporary Perspectives on Religions in Africa and the African Diaspora. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Dark, R. Ken. 2000. Religion and International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hadden, Jeffrey K. 1987. “Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory.” Social Forces 65(3): 587–611. Haynes, Jeffery. 2012. Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power. Farnham: Ashgate.

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Obadare, Ebenezer. 2018. Pentecostal Republic: Religion and the Struggle for State Power in Nigeria. London: Zed Books. Reus-Smit, Christian. 2005. Constructivism. In Theories of International Relations, 3rd ed., edited by Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Mark Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jaqui True. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 161–187. Seib, Philip, ed. 2013. Religion and Public Diplomacy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Part I

AFRICA AND THE WORLD

Chapter 2

Integrating Religion as a Tool for Public Diplomacy in Twenty-First-Century Africa Toyin Cotties Adetiba

Post-colonial African states, somewhat, owe some of their past political leaders, including, inter alia, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Sir Ahmadu Bello (Nigeria), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Leopold Senghor (Senegal) and Nelson Mandela (South Africa), for their selfless struggles against colonialism. Their efforts no doubt have had a major positive impact to a large extent and have also influenced the entire African continent. The former U.S. president Barack Obama, in his speech ‘On a New Beginning’, in June 2009 at the University of Cairo opines that ‘human history has often been a record of nations and tribes, and yes, religions, subjugating one another in pursuit of their interests. Yet in this new age, such attitudes are self-defeating. Given our interdependence, any world order that elevates one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. Our problems must be dealt with through partnership; our progress must be shared’. Globally, there are two forms of arms races: one for military capabilities while the second is built of the weapons of soft power (Hall and Smith, 2013). Soft power refers to the power of attraction (Nye, 2008), and public diplomacy, though not new, has received increased academic and political attention in the past decade. Incontrovertibly, the majority of Africans are adherents of Christianity or Islam. However, Olupona (2014) opines that in Africa, scholars while addressing religion often speak of the triple legacy of indigenous religion, Christianity and Islam. These are often found side by side in many African societies. Hence the question, whether religion can be a logical tool of choice for engaging in diplomacy in Africa? The political history and narratives of post-independent African states revolve around her former colonial masters 15

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whose religious themes and doctrines shaped and linked her relationships. Globally, religion has become a dominant element in the lives of individuals, and somewhat the political communities (Seib, 2011), thus making an understanding of the role of religion in the conduct and success of public diplomacy a plus. The use of religion to communicate with the global public and its incorporation into foreign policy is an element of international engagement that cannot be dismissed. Mutual understanding to Sevlian (2011) is a key pillar of public diplomacy, and religion is often the fundamental of national identity. At the core of some of the greatest diplomatic puzzles after 9/11 is religion, thus making religious ideas and actors an indispensable tool in the pursuit of peace and justice that must be commonly constructed. Notwithstanding, the reluctance of policymakers to address religious issues owing to domestic standards related to the secularity of some African states, the influence of religious beliefs is somewhat heightened by new communication technologies, hence the assertion that the world is gradually becoming more religious, a reflection of which must be seen through public diplomacy. Religion constitutes a complex part of African society. Nevertheless, it is still a flourishing aspect of its life. Hence, the assertion that the more Africa understands the place of religion and engages its actors in policy formulation, the more the effectiveness of its [public] diplomacy in advancing the socio-economic interests and values of people (Kerry, 2014). Quoted by NewsWireNGR (2020) Adeboye, a renowned Nigerian preacher, advise the Nigeria government that ‘in the future, men of God should be included . . . the chief imams, archbishops . . . when they are setting up their committees’. Baker (2016: 255) advocates for a need for – African – government to pay attention to and understand the role of religion in human communities as a way to run effective internal and foreign activities. Indisputably, religious differences in non-Islamic Denominational African states, such as Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon, Tunisia, Guinea, Bissau, Uganda, Morocco, Senegal, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Niger and Tanzania, except for Northern African states that are denominationally and constitutionally Islamic; have and still causing conflict with grave consequences on social engagement and human development, and therefore instrumentalizing religion instead of practising it. Keiswetter and Chane (2013) convincingly state that the role of religion in—public—diplomacy overlaps the realist and idealist traditions and fundamentally, what religion can contribute to public diplomacy is that, we share a kinship and are created in the image of God. This work examines religion as a tool for public diplomacy in Africa, with a view that non-state actors can be injected into the practice of public diplomacy while exploring their potentials and diplomatic perspectives to enhance

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a working relationship in the polity, as well as boost their public diplomacy potentials. Within the context of this work, the most common classification of research methods is qualitative and quantitative. This work however adopted a qualitative research approach with the intention of gathering a robust viewpoint about human behaviour and the rationale behind it. The data retrieved and analysed in this study were largely drawn from selected relevant published works from books and journal articles to evaluate how religion can be integrated as a tool for public diplomacy in Africa. NEXUS BETWEEN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND RELIGION Public diplomacy has a long history and it is a means of promoting a country’s soft power (Nye, 2008). Soft power rests on the ability of a state to shape the preferences of other states to do what it wants without strong-arming hence an indispensable characteristic of democratic politics. One of such soft powers is religion. In a public diplomacy context, religion-cum-diplomacy connotes the use of religion to communicate with the global publics. For the purpose of peace-making, religion incorporates its perceptions and influence with traditional diplomatic practices (Deloia, 2011). However, the possibility that religion can contribute either negatively or positively to nations’ public diplomacy depends on its interpretation and implementation by state/nonstate actors. In the twenty-first-century Africa, religion can be a force for group reconciliation that breeds political strength, if exploited as a policy tool on major policy issues in its public diplomacy. However, Gilboa (2008: 55) believes that public diplomacy is a new field of practice and scholarship that only attracted attention in the previous century when diplomacy fell under the scrutiny of the media and public opinion, claiming that public diplomacy became more notable during the Cold War where it was dominated by the U.S. campaigns and the former Soviet Union while trying to gather support for the elusive balance of power and the ideological battle for the hearts and minds of states around the world. The role that religious ideology played in the conflicts that defined the Cold War though not too clear but the beliefs held by some became tools to motivate action or create friction, hence Harry Truman’s, then U.S. president, statement that if the enlightened world as we know it is to survive, Americans must have a spiritual/religious strength of greater magnitude than the gigantic power of atomic energy (Wallace, 2013; Muehlenbeck, 2012). Thus, if African states must survive, some sort of diplomatic strength must be drawn from religion while curtailing the magnitude of ethno-religious-cum-political crisis trailing African states.

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To better understand the nexus between public diplomacy and religion, we would first look at diplomacy, and for this work, we would refer to diplomacy as the relations between independent states. Pehmoeller and Smelser (2013: 8) opine that states interact in many different ways and that these various methods are called tracks. They argued that track 1 diplomacy refers to an official, state-to-state diplomatic efforts such as peace talks and treaties, while track 2 diplomacy connotes those unofficial dialogues and problemsolving diplomatic activities that aimed at building a lasting diplomatic relationship while encouraging new diplomatic thinking that can inform the implementation of the efforts made at track 1 level. At track 2, the various non-government organizations and leaders in religious cycles whose actions are validated through their involvement in diplomatic activities are all involved. Hence, there is a possibility of engaging religious leaders in nongovernmental diplomacy. Nongovernmental diplomacy is useful to do what traditional public diplomacy cannot do. It is a means of informally passing insights and messages to the other side as well as receiving them in return, and the interaction of nongovernmental diplomacy participants can produce ideas and initiatives that are then available to policy makers for exploration or implementation. The United States Institute of Peace (2011) refers to track 3 diplomacy as people-to-people diplomacy, undertaken by individuals, scholars, journalists, lawyers, religious and private groups while encouraging interaction and understanding between communities that have hitherto been hostile to one another, as well as empowering members of these communities. Notter and Diamond (1996) describe multi-track diplomacy as the process of breaking down diplomatic tracks that recognize official and unofficial efforts in addition to state and non-state actors. This process involves moving from conflict-accustomed systems to systemic transformation where both state and non-state actors are fully involved. Referring to this, Loskota and Flory (2013) opine that public diplomats’ interest in religion would be a welcome development, if it can be matched with the necessary diplomatic skills, competency, as well as better understanding of the variety of religious forms and the ways they shape the world. Thus, public diplomat in Africa must re-conceptualize their notions of operationalization of religion, and how it influences sociopolitical actions at the personal and individual levels, as well as at communal levels. As it is, none of the tracks is considered more important than the other, and hence their interdependency. Therefore, state actors who use multi-track diplomacy focus on three key areas: bridge building, capacity building and institutional building. The nine tracks are government; professional conflict resolution; business; private citizens; research, training and education; activism; religion; funding; and public opinion (McDonald, 2003).

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Understanding public diplomacy and religion is tantamount to recognizing the reality of diplomatic changes in the twenty-first century, vis-à-vis, the role of non-state actors (Pehmoeller and Smelser (2013), such as religious bodies, multinational corporations, civil society organizations and media, as well as the average citizen who have the potential to effect the outcomes of decisions while also altering transnational events and interactions. For example, Jimmy Carter, former U.S. president, affirmed that he wouldn’t have achieved his 1979 breakthrough at Camp David – peace treaty accord – if he had not explored the religious convictions of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. In reality, the practice of public diplomacy should reflect this. A wellmanaged collaboration between religious body and the government has the capability to foster a national and international capacity to guide public diplomacy. Granting that may be difficult for policy makers to engage in religious issues regardless of its importance to state’s interests, there are some productive ways faith-based leaders can be engaged. To some extent, every good policy maker listens carefully to religious points of view. Therefore, religion is a form of situational intelligence that gives context and supplements other information where opportunity for mutual counsel and collaboration is established. According to the context of this work, public diplomacy is all about changing minds. The objective of public diplomacy is focused on communicating and negotiating with foreign nationals without resorting to threats. It can be as simple as propaganda but can be more successful if it aims at building lasting relationships of mutual trust between a government and foreign nationals (Hall, 2012: 1092). Hence, religion and religious leaders should not be underrated by policy makers, in the area of public diplomacy, they should not be seen as unfocussed and unreliable players in public diplomacy and neither should they be seen as unhealthy intrusion into the traditional discipline of public diplomacy engagement. Just as public diplomacy is an instrument of statecraft that aims to mould foreign public opinion and, through it, diplomatically influence the policy decisions made by other states to suit the opinion of the initiator, religious leaders and activists have a significant track record in the rule of engagement with the public and as a result they can effectively partner in the diplomatic process. The only prerequisite is that religious figures should be given access to national leaders and foreign policy experts not only in times of peace but also in times of crisis. This is because they can offer diplomatic initiatives that seek to use shared faith concepts as a means to build a sense of common humanity. Practically, all religion embraces the spirit of friendship, reconciliation, tolerance, peaceful coexistence among tribes, cultures and states, respect for differences and forgiveness, which is not a diplomatic principle,

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where the mindset cannot be predicted. Thus, the manipulated image of the state should ultimately translate primarily through its effects on foreign public opinion into political outcomes that are more favourable to the state (Mor, 2006). There are various forms of public diplomacy; these include several forms of media management, public relations, information campaigns, focused communication, promotion of the society’s cultural values, through educational exchanges and scholarships to students – aimed at shaping the goals and choices pursued by state actors in another country. The strength of this approach is that domestic actors within a particular target country embrace the underlying values, a subset of activities associated with cultural diplomacy which becomes the basis for the choice of diplomatic move that unconsciously conforms to the interests of the promoter state. Hence, Manheim (1994) defines public diplomacy as all forms of strategic political communication designed by the promoter state to shape the opinion of the public or the elites in the recipient nation to turn the foreign policy of the target nation to advantage. Overtly, this includes short-range, mediumrange and long-range objectives alike. Thus, suggesting that public diplomacy efforts are very crucial to the success of the promoter’s foreign policy, and they must be integral to its conduct. Tuch (1990) and Frederick (1993) however explain that public diplomacy can be seen in the light of a government’s method of communicating with foreign publics in the fields of information, education, religion and culture, to influence a foreign government, while promoting the understanding of its national goals and policies and objectives, its institutions and culture. Tuch and Frederick’s attempt at putting public diplomacy in perspective shows the importance of non-state actors, thus reflecting the ever-increasing interdependence among all actors in international relations. Therefore, the religionization of public diplomacy and the politicization of religion, especially in the current dynamic international environment, means that increasingly religion plays a role in public diplomacy both as an opportunity for engagement and as a motivation inspiring state actors (Keiswetter and Chane, 2013). Djerejian (2007) posits that an effective public diplomacy campaign requires well-trained staff with an in-depth knowledge of the religion and culture in target countries and fluency in local languages. Following the experience of the September, 11/2001 terrorists attack, the American government has since considered this as prerequisite of effective public diplomacy. Thus, public diplomacy can be considered as an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, nonetheless, smart, public diplomacy requires an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism and civil society because it attracts potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing sociocultural and religious exports, and also arranging exchanges (Nye, 2008). However, if the

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content of a country’s culture, values and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that broadcasts them cannot produce soft power. Democratic theorists Hourdequin et al. (2012) had argued that public participation in policy-making finds deep roots in the ideals of democratic theory which are central to the governance of most democracies around the world, thus embracing the ideal of popular sovereignty or rule of the people. Democratic decisions typically reflect and incorporate the political philosophy of liberalism, which emphasizes the ideals of equality and autonomy. Public diplomacy, if opened to public participation, is therefore considered an avenue to holistically address the threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation and extremism, especially diplomatic issues that can easily be resolved through the instrument of religion. Significantly, religious institutions, its leaders, and adherents represent an important segment of the global publics that public diplomacy seeks to influence and partner with. Therefore, the renewed attention that has been given to the power of religion by state actors may not be the result of religion having drastically changed, instead it is a result of a heightened awareness of what has always existed (Loskota and Flory, 2013). Hence, Spies (2018: 1) argues that it is this idea of imagined human interaction that shows the relationship of the long-term value of diplomacy at the international level that exists because of the continuous and constant need for intermediation and negotiation among human groups. Public diplomacy differs from traditional diplomacy where diplomacy consists of high-level communications between states, while public diplomacy is how states and communities communicate their policies, culture and values to the outside while ensuring conflict-free interactions. It represents the intersection of policy and communication and can be conducted internationally and domestically through various means. Therefore, public diplomacy is a means of reaching out to the global public directly rather than through their governments. In essence, public diplomacy can be done in various ways. At the microlevel, it involves Peace Corps projects in an individual village, and at the macro-level, it relies on various forms of bodies which include different religious organizations, the mass media and civil society. The latter approach has long been at the heart of public diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East where America has been trying to find common rules of engagement in tackling international problems through the instrument of religion. For example, America has sought to find a level ground both religiously and diplomatically for cooperation on major foreign policy matters affecting the United States and Islamic world. In that case, effective global engagement requires an understanding of the dynamics of religion, vis-à-vis, foreign policy. Thus, the success of public

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diplomacy, in Africa, in the nearest future will be determined by its ability to diplomatically connect with the hundreds of millions of people throughout the world whose identity is defined by religion. Justifying the place of religion in the life of Africans, Kanu (2010: 157) argued that Africans are highly religious; for them, life is religion and religion is life. In all that Africans does or say and permit are impregnated with a vision of the divine and reality of the supernatural. Therefore, one can motivate for religion as an invaluable diplomatic tool for nations that can use it wisely. GRAND STRATEGY AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY The use of the grand strategy by scholars of IR has greatly increased from the time when the Cold War ended. Silove (2018) believes the term has become a lodestone that naturally attracts other elements in policy circles. Hence, its flexibility to adapt to any policy environment. King’s (2016) assertion concurred that grand strategy can be couched as a deliberate or detailed plan conceived by individuals, a principle that is wilfully held and used by individuals while guiding their decisions or a pattern in a state’s behaviour. It is a conceptual roadmap that imagines a series of successive diplomatic actions that could potentially improve the relations existing between the different states involved while looking forward to a desired peaceful future and how to reach it (Layton, 2018). It involves coupling diplomatic and non-diplomatic resources needed for implementation and once developed are allocated to the subordinate strategies that individually direct each instrument of national power in accordance with the all-encompassing diplomatic principles (Layton, 2018: 2). Hence, Colin’s (2010) assumption that all strategy is striking. Moltke (cited in Lin, 2019: 209) sees strategy as a system of manoeuvres, a transfer of diplomatic knowledge to practical life, the continued development of the original leading thought by the constantly changing circumstances. Bernstein et al. (cited in Lin, 2019) express the opinion that the idea of strategy can be seen in three ways, which include diplomatic, financial, economic, informational means; examining internal forces along with external forces, taking into account both the instruments of power and the internal policies that are necessary for their implementation and including consideration of periods of peacetime in addition to wartimes. Silove (2018) points out that scholars agree that grand strategy covers a wide range of diplomatic areas including public diplomacy that is long-term in scope, it is also concerned with the state’s most important diplomatic priorities, which include all spheres of statecraft such as military-diplomatic and economic. Thus, grand strategy in IR is a means to an end, justifying Seiple’s

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(2013) submission that state must use all available diplomatic means to pursue peace. Therefore, if one must think about grand strategy correctly, one must look at all the elements of national power, including the non-partisan ideas we all share such as religion. Grand strategy is used by states to improve their relations with other states, where the instruments of national power, diplomatic, religious, informational, military and economic measures are purposefully applied to shape tomorrow. The reason why Luttwak (2009) sees grand strategy as the employment of the state’s diplomatic resources, including non-military strength, and intelligence, which interact with the employment of these resources by other states, where the bridging word cum the employment of the resources of other states is interaction. Within the African society, it is believed that religion can act as a catalyst for peace in its affairs. Therefore, grand strategy is a means by which states effectively build and utilize diverse forms of power within the public domain while purposefully changing the existing order between two or more intelligent and adaptive entities (Layton, 2018). For that reason, the level at which a systemic and unit-level factors congregate, where matters of national security are mediated through public diplomacy can be couched as the level of grand strategy (Mor, 2006; Kitchen, 2010). Rational choice models are often conceived as how states should think about problems while assuming that actors have extensive knowledge of the situation, well-defined objectives hence, readily calculating the optimal choice (Layton, 2018; Kristen, 2001). In reality, people attempt to simplify complex issues instead of being rational in their actions; they have difficulty coping with the ambivalent state of affairs, prefer consistency, sometimes underestimate other non-state actors, and are very reluctant to accept loss than seek gain (Janice, 2007; Mcdermott, 2004). In the present day, the battlefield is no longer a matter of going to war using military power against the enemy but it is all about how states can manage their public domain vis-à-vis the international environment through the combination of hitherto non-essential instruments of control as portrayed in the media. Mor (2006) confirmed that this opens up the possibility of acquiring influence through effective management of public diplomacy, not as a damage control mechanism to protect a battered image but as fundamental to effective policy planning. Thus public diplomacy concerns and seeks to persuade the members of the public, as well as the foreign “public” that the values, policies and actions of the state deserve support. Until recently, state actors do not talk about religion in any shape or form on the basis that states except for some core Islamic states will rather maintain their secularity instead of meddling in religious activity. However, that’s beginning to change because of the reality on the ground in so many countries though it is going to take time and take people fluent in the language of

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religion and secularity as well as people who take their faith and the faith of others seriously, and people who are willing to allow for the possibility that religion is a real factor that can contribute to the well-being of society. Nevertheless, Joustra (2013) sees religion as essentially contested and understood to be so value-laden that no amount of argument or evidence can lead to one single, standard or correct use. It is also considered an essentially contested concept because it offers deep critiques of how individuals understand their values. Esposito (1992) though argued that religious faith at best is supposed to be a private matter and the degree of one’s intellectual capability and objectivity in academia is often equated with a secular liberalism and relativism that seemed antithetical to religion. Therefore, religion is not considered a significant variable for political analysis. Rather, the mixing of religion and public diplomacy is regarded as necessarily abnormal, irrational, dangerous and extremist. Hence, Joustra’s (2013) assumption that religion has not been, and in most of the world today is not, simply between our ears. It is in the hands, in the movement of bodies, its rituals and habits, its public, and even political expression. In Africa, religious leaders are immensely influential and often have millions of followers; hence, a religious community is a trusted network. In a deeply religious nation, they exert a huge sway over politicians, government officials, as well as large swathes of both the middle class and the mass public. Therefore, religion permeates all sectors of life and difficult to ignore. In Nigeria, for example, people will listen to their pastor or their imam about the need to live a healthy lifestyle before they listen and adhere to government directives. Therefore, when the leaders of the (religious) network validate something positive, it can turn the system around for the better. Taking the clue from the grand strategy construct, states must use all means possible to pursue peace. But contrary to the above submission, it is possible to argue that the efforts on the part of state actors to engage with religion are motivated by the belief that the inclusion of religion encourages a more peaceable global order. However, based on the crisis associated with religion in many parts of Africa, for example Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Kenya and Somalia, religion may be seen as a great destroyer, not stabilizer, of liberal peace, and that only through its careful expurgation from the public space can rational diplomacy and social solidarity be assured. Hence, the assertion that religion is an essentially contested concept. Thus, in a relatively settled political context, religion can provide the foundation for disagreement and consequently polarize such state’s political and public policy choices. There are three broad trends that have emerged to create favourable conditions for public diplomacy; these are the growing number of democracies across the globe, the outcome of the Cold War, which has promoted the U.S. inspired normative order, and the unimaginable revolution in the

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communication system, which has broken down erstwhile powerful states and market barriers, and thus globalizing and homogenizing data, perceptions, images and knowledge. For example, in the wake of the Arab Spring protests (2011), social media networks played a huge role in the rapid disintegration of regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Mor (2006) explains that these three developments conform to and enhance public diplomacy as a form of influence. The first trend can be factored into the increasing importance and weight in the foreign policies of many states through public opinion. The repercussion of the second trend is its emphasis on how foreign public opinion is influenced through the instrument of soft power laden with consistent persuasion in a democratic society while the third has brought about the lessening dependence of citizens on their governments and the local press for information on foreign events, and has vastly increased the potential targets for the direct communication of diplomatic messages. Of the three trends and across the international system concerning their influence on the foreign/domestic policies, the democratic trend stands as a medium of international discourse and justification. Thus, public diplomacy is aimed at developing and incorporating values and norms that speak to broadening the participation of every sector in the polity. Hence, the argument that the systemic exclusion of religion from public diplomacy in the formulation and implementation of public policy by states has weakened the coherent of public diplomacy, vis-à-vis, peace. ENGAGING RELIGION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA The beauty of public diplomacy is seen in the variety of actors. Meaning that actors in public diplomacy are different and are meant to complement one another. Undeniably, the contemporary Africa is a dynamic religious centre, a place where tradition and customs remain. Sub-Saharan Africa is a deeply pious region where a majority is conservative in its own beliefs yet tolerant of others, favours religious law yet is also content with democracy and what it can offer. Africa can be described by its religiosity, hence the commitment of the faithful to their leaders. Very important to the Christian and Muslim communities in Africa is the question of cooperation and obedience to their leaders because of the scope of their influence on members of the public. Diplomacy and its idea in Africa are distinct compared to that of the Western world. Most African states only gained its political independence from the early 1960s. The oldest being Liberia who gained its political independence in 1847. The youngest is South Sudan, which achieved its sovereign

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status in 2011. The style of diplomacy in the majority of African states before colonialism was a mixture of both culture and religion where the members of the public are fully involved. However, this has changed dramatically as African states after colonialism seems to have lost the culture of togetherness that ensures their unparalleled unity. As Spies (2018: 1) argues, public diplomacy in Africa is informed by its history of marginalization: a relationship, vis-à-vis, the rest of the world that infers continental vulnerability. African diplomacy, in the contemporary; isn’t born out of its negative experiences but instilled in Africans the shared traditional values, an unbroken diplomatic approach to life, respect for culturally constituted tradition and authority, their penchant for collective and thorough decisions making with principled prioritization of community’s interest rather than individuals’ interests. Prioritizing the community’s interest finds expression in some African concepts aiming at promoting selflessness and societal values. Such expressions include Harambee—Swahili word for pulling together. Ubuntu—Nguni word for being human (Spies, 2018). Another expression from southwest Nigeria is Agbajoowo—Yoruba word for communality. Communality is a practice that exists among Africans and it embraces the belief in continuous and constant need for interaction, a negotiation that breeds cooperation. It is a form of public diplomacy that transcends individuality. Public diplomacy characterizes the connection of policy and communication that engendered peaceful coexistence. Integrating religion as a tool for public diplomacy in contemporary Africa involves the following elements of public diplomacy: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, and community media through which African states can effectively respond to wake-up calls in a pressing area of public diplomacy. However, this must be built on trust. Thus, religion is a powerful force in public diplomacy, but its impact depends entirely on what it inspires people to do (Albright, 2006). The key to good public diplomacy is listening argued Rockower (2019). It is an attempt to understand and collect information from both the local and international environment from partners within and outside (the continent). Who are these partners? To begin with, public diplomacy needs a more nuanced understanding of the public beyond state actors. Zaharna (2012) postulates that in communication the target is the audience that listens to the actors communicating the message, hence the need to use the appropriate diplomatic approach designed around the audience’s needs, interests and goals, vis-à-vis, those of the promoter. This is considered a soft power strategy; which spurs change through attraction rather than coercion. Therefore, the consideration of the crossing point between public diplomacy and religion in Africa will expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships. Public diplomacy is thus informed by an understanding of the interface between religion and public diplomacy as the techniques through

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which an internationally recognized human right, political stability and international security, economic development and promotion of democratization in Africa can be achieved. Further to this is advocacy, Cull (2009: 18) sees advocacy in public diplomacy as state actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by undertaking an international communication activity while actively promoting a particular policy, idea or the actor’s general interests in the minds of a foreign public. This is done through media and social media engagement and direct engagement with civic and community leaders, interfaith partners and elected officials in the quest for peace and security. In West Africa, one unnoticeable expression among Nigerians is the view that if there is nothing to export to Europe, we have religion. Therefore, religion as a tool of public diplomacy in Africa is an answer to furthering a new soft power strategy in religion. This is because religion has a critical role to play in promoting the social conditions necessary for peace and security. It is about equipping citizens to engage states directly where bilateral efforts are not viable; equip civil society to combat sociopolitical and economic hostilities and promote a culture of political tolerance. Glassman (2008) asserts that religion is the crown jewel of public diplomacy that can also promote peaceful relations while also embracing all platforms relating to public diplomacy designed to resonate positively with other states within and outside the polity. To Rockower (2019), cultural diplomacy involves the use of cultural-cumreligious intangibles, such as art, music, food and dance to foster a tangible connection to help better understand each other. This includes projects such as the Multi-Faith Music Concert. In theory, if not entirely yet in practice, Africa has gotten the first wake-up call to shift from state-centric to more participatory and relational public-centric approaches in public diplomacy that will encourage neutral to positive relations between the state and the public. Zaharna (2012) believes that the public are often called stakeholders and assume organized public representatives such as civil societies or nongovernmental organizations which include religious bodies. The assumption here is that Africa shares similar goals and perspectives in maintaining peace just as religious organizations in Africa share similar goals and perspectives. Therefore, positive relations and shared perspectives between African states and religious bodies lie behind the disposition of states and religious organization to adapt their messages and approaches towards building peaceful relations that seek mutual engagement, dialogue and potential cooperation within and by extension at international level through which peace is maintained. In Africa, religion is seen as an embodiment of hope, peace and unity where the faithful see themselves as belonging to a community with powerful media outlets. Community media is a vital resource of communal public

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diplomacy because these are outlets where the community’s stories can be shared in ways that the general media cannot. Religious organizations in Africa appear to be a very good public diplomacy instrument. However, viewed from a strategic communication lens, and through the initiatives that may be offered by them to the public, the diversity of the political affinities and cultural identities of members of these organizations on the questions about whose norms and rules should govern how issues are addressed in the public arena are also diverse with various public-driven needs and goals using their media outlets and social networks to reach out to their members. What the above suggests is using religion to communicate with the public and its incorporation into public diplomacy is an element of diplomatic engagement that cannot be whisked away. Mutual understanding no doubt is a significant pillar of public diplomacy; for example, in Nigeria religion is often the core of national identity. Sevlian (2011) had argued that religion finds itself at the core of some of the greatest diplomatic puzzles in post9/11, and arguably pre-9/11, thus advocating that faith-based organizations and leaders can be enlisted to help better engage foreign communities. To Sevlian, this goes beyond states’ facilitating interreligious dialogue but religious leaders should be involved in peace-keeping and peace-building efforts. By implication, religious ideas and actors remain an indispensable tool in the pursuit of peace and justice, as well as the good that must be commonly constructed. It is pertinent to state that the religious organizations by incorporating new technology in their means of communication plans are determined to appeal to a larger and younger audience. To reach a broader base of followers, religious organizations, in Africa, have a YouTube channel where they easily deliver the ‘words of God’. This was demonstrated while responding to the Covid-19 pandemic in Africa, while reaching out to their audience, leading force in assisting the victims of the pandemic. Public diplomacy no doubt represents the whole gamut of connection of policy and communication that engendered peaceful coexistence anchored with total trust. To effectively integrate religion and public diplomacy in Africa, below are suggested approaches that need to be incorporated in its diplomatic engagements. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS Writing on the state of religion, Berger (1996: 3) posits that the world today is, as furiously religious as it ever was and in some places more so than ever.

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Far from exiting the world’s stage, religion has played a significant role in human affairs, just as modernization has continued to grow at the speed of lightning. The practice of public diplomacy, chiefly in information technology-driven and media-saturated time, is different from the communicative efforts between the fifth century B.C. warring Greek city-states or the persuasion strategies of Napoleonic France or Showa Japan (Vlahos, 2009). African states must be willing to collaborate with religious bodies who seem to have a grip on the means of communicating with the publics, by integrating them for mutual benefit. Zaharna (2012) believes that relations with the public are often concealed by the focus on getting the message out and promoting the state’s interests. The notion of the state is that the public is passive thus leaving the relational dimension unexplored. Conversely, if relations with the publics are positive, the message and image of the state would be received with ultimate enthusiasm. But if on the other way, there is a likelihood of being resisted by the public, hence the need for collaboration with the religious organization, integrating them into crisis management structures and planning processes from national to local community level with the belief that they understand the public better and thus galvanize nation branding campaigns that not only reflect state-centric public diplomacy but also engender cooperation. In public diplomacy, there is a tendency to counter misinformation, reconstruction of information. The constructionists in IR are concerned with the larger, more general, collective aspect of media impact, keen on demonstrating how micro-level processes of audience reception are of importance to macro-level societal processes (Livingstone, 2005), particularly those that are religiously motivated, that would risk the spread of conflicts and counter conflicts. Therefore, a new approach and enhanced resources are needed to establish the integration of religious bodies in Africa’s public diplomacy. This however requires significant reform in its foreign relations within the outside world that will convey strategic and diplomatic planning, focus and resource coordination to effectively counter misinformation. Essentially, the starting point for Africa’s public diplomacy is to recognize that its public diplomacy is somewhat weakened by a failure or lack of sensitivity to the importance of religious organizations in the formulation and implementation of its public diplomacy. There is a tendency for religious actors to implement government policy in a way that reflects an understanding of, and sensitivity to, religious practices and teaching concerning all religious and minority groups thus fostering peace across the continent and by extension to the outside world. The motivation for such is not to win popularity or to drive public diplomacy in Africa using religious organizations to rubber-stamp its policies for approval but public diplomacy is important for

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the reason that diplomatic attitudes and understanding can make or mar the success of public diplomacy initiatives. Peterson (2002: 78) had argued that in the past, foreign policy was often the sole prerogative of nation-states. Historically, it involves interaction between leaders and government ministers. However, people have had far more access to information and more soft power to influence global affairs directly or indirectly. Globalization, the speed and low cost of information transformation and processing, global news media, growing internet penetration, as well as the use of smart mobile phones are principal features of the twenty-first-century international environment. Just as access to information is growing at an exponential rate, there is an increase in populist movements occasioned by religious as well as sectarian beliefs and wider public participation in international affairs. Consequently, public diplomacy cannot thrive without a continuous and well-coordinated aptitude to appreciate, inform and influence the publics and private as well as government. By implication, effective public diplomacy must go beyond what the government can do. Therefore, a new public diplomacy paradigm should be put in place where the religious organizations will be empowered to be self-directed but constructively engage in helping government policy. In essence, the role of the religious organization as part of a comprehensive strategy to maintaining peace must be redefined and tied to African states foreign policy objectives. Within the religious cycle in Africa, there are some sensitive and useful teachings and practices that are appropriate and can enhance public diplomacy. For example, teachings on human rights can be accessed within the religious cycle. It is no longer a secret that Africa has a problem with the implementation of the principles of human rights; public diplomacy without the inclusion of policy that promotes human rights will not be taken seriously, hence public diplomacy is a two-way dialogue and not one-way. It is a known fact that followers of various religious sects – in Africa – adhere strictly to the teachings of their leaders, therefore, it is likely people might react to government policy negatively, but when religious leaders are involved and their opinions amplified, it becomes easier for state actors to know how best to convincingly communicate policies to both local and foreign nationals. The role of religious leaders vis-à-vis public diplomacy at least should be seen as a vital component of international security. Within the context of the sensitivity of their messages and drawing on their expertise and their reach, their messages can be amplified to strengthen Africa’s ability to communicate effectively with foreign publics. What this means is that religion can be seen as public-diplomacy assets to policymakers on public diplomacy.

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REFERENCES Adeboye, Enoch. 2020. “Pastor Enoch Adeboye Wants Govt to Include Men of God in Future COVID-19 Committees to Tackle the Virus Spiritually.” NewsWireNGR, April 19, 2020. https://newswirengr​.com​/2020​/04​/19​/pastor​-enoch​-adeboye​-wants​ -govt​-to​-include​-men​-of​-god​-in​-future​-covid​-19​-committees​-to​-tackle​-the​-virus​ -spiritually/ Albright, Madeleine. 2006. “Faith and Diplomacy.” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 4, no. 2 (April): 3–9. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/15570274​.2006​ .9523244. Baker, Nigel. 2016. “Religion and Diplomacy: A British View From the Vatican, Church.” Communication and Culture 1, no. 1 (October): 255–267. Barak, H. Obama. 2009, On a New Beginning, A Speech Delivered at the University of Cairo. June 4, 2009. http://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/the​_press​_office​/Remarks​-by​ -the​-President​-at​-Cairo​-University​-6​-04​-09/. Berger, L. Peter. 1996. “Secularism in Retreat.” The National Interest, no. 46 (June): 3–12. Colin, S. Gray. 2010. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cull, N. Nicholas. 2009. Public Diplomacy: Lessons From the Past. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press. Deloia, A. Mathew. 2011. “A New Tactic for Engagement With Iran: Faith-Based Diplomacy.” Master Dissertation, US Army Command and General Staff College. Djerejian, Edward.2007. Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. West Bethesda: Crossbow Press. Esposito, John. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford University Press. Frederick, H. Howard. 1993. Global Communication and International Relations. Belmont: Wadsworth. Gilboa, Eytan. 2008. “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March): 55–77. Glassman, James. 2008. “Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www​.america​.gov​/st​/texttransenglish​/2008​/July​/200​8070​ 2123​054x​jsnommis0​.3188745​.html. Hall, Ian. 2012. “India’s New Public Diplomacy Soft Power and the Limits of Government Action.” Asian Survey 52, no. 6 (November): 1089–1110. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1525​/as​.2012​.52​.6​.1089. Hall, Ian, and Frank Smith. 2013. “The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional Competition.” Asian Security 9, no. 1 (January): 1–18. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/14799855​.2013​.760926. Hourdequin, Marion, Peter Landres, Mark J. Hanson, and David R. Craig. 2012. “Ethical Implications of Democratic Theory for U.S. Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review, no. 35 (July): 37–44.

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Muehlenbeck, E. Philip. 2012. Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective. Vanderbilt: Vanderbilt University Press. Notter, James, and Louise Diamond. 1996. Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice. Washington, D.C.: The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. Nye, S. Joseph. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (March): 94–109. Olupona, K. Jacob. 2014. 15 Facts on African Religions. New York: Oxford University Press. Pehmoeller, L., and J. Smelser. 2013. Engaging Faith: Integrating Religion into U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East. IMES Capstone Paper Series. Peterson, G. Peter. 2002. “Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism.” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (September–October): 74–94. Rockower, Paul. 2019. “Jewish Communal Public Diplomacy.” Jewish News Online, March 4, 2019. http://www​.jewishaz​.com​/opinion​/jewish​-communal​-public​-diplomacy​/article​_ca1ada72​-3ec2​-11e9​-add9​-ffae4375aa74​.html. Seib, Philip. 2011. “Preface.” In Essays on Faith Diplomacy, edited by Naomi Leight, 7–13. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press. Seiple, Chris. 2013. “Let’s Talk About Religion.” OPENCANADA.ORG. https://www​ .opencanada​.org​/features​/religion​-diplomacy/. Sevlian, S. 2013. Faith-Based Engagement as a Tool for Public Diplomacy. USA: University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy. Silove, Nina. 2018. “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of “Grand Strategy”.” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (August): 27–57. Spies, K. Yolanda. 2018. “African Diplomacy.” In The Encyclopaedia of Diplomacy, edited by Gordon Marte, 11–14. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Stuart, Hall. 1997. Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. London: Sage. The United States Institute of Peace. 2011. “Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding.” http://glossary​.usip​.org​/resource​/tracks​ -diplomacy. Tuch, Hans. 1990. Communicating With the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas. New York: St. Martin’s. Vlahos, Michael. 2009. Public Diplomacy as Loss of World Authority, Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy. New York: Routledge. Wallace, C. James. 2013. “A Religious War? The Cold War and Religion.” Journal of Cold War 15, no. 3 (July): 162–180. Zaharna, R. S. 2012. “The 4th Quadrant of Public Diplomacy.” https://www​.e​-ir​.info​ /2012​/11​/06​/the​-4th​-quadrant​-of​-public​-diplomacy/.

Chapter 3

Post-Colonial Relations in Africa and the Emergence of Religion as an Instrument for Inter-State Diplomacy Victor H. Mlambo and Olusola Ogunnubi

Since the dawn of multiparty politics in Africa, scholars have questioned and debated the route Africa ought to take to ensure continental development and integration. Economic reforms, human rights and efforts towards democratization were the prime focus of Africa from the early 1990s, a period acknowledged as the second independence. The end of colonialism was seen as a promising era in the quest for Africa to integrate itself and promote a panAfricanist agenda. However, scholars and policymakers debated how Africa would manage to undertake this with institutions and governance structures severely damaged by colonialism. From the onset, significant emphasis was placed on Africa rediscovering its values, cultures and tradition. Second, economic integration was supposed to be an important element in inter-state diplomacy. Kaoma (2016: 63), however, argues that the arrival of colonialism in Africa brought with it a religious dimension that ought to be taken into consideration when one considers the element of inter-state diplomacy. One cannot, therefore, escape the growth and entrenchment of religion within Africa’s development. In other words, the socio-economic and, by extension, political scene in the continent is inextricably linked with religion. Even though sub-Saharan Africa has been described as one of the poorest regions in the world, religion continues to thrive and is regarded as a beacon of hope for many. Conversely, religion as an instrument of diplomacy has become entrenched within Africa’s political discourse, as evidenced by the establishment and proliferation of multinational Pentecostal churches throughout Africa, and their influence within African political systems cannot go unnoticed (Agbiji and Swart, 2015: 4–7). To gain a deeper understanding of religion as an instrument for inter-state diplomacy, this chapter first seeks to systematically 35

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address the existing empirical literature to provide a sound basis for a more evidence-based discussion of this highly debated and politicized issue. The chapter contends that the increasing role of religion within the context of inter-state diplomacy in Africa has not only changed the traditional ways of conducting diplomacy, but the foreign policy approach of nation-states has gone on to infuse religion as a soft power tool. The question thus arises as to whether religion has a place in inter-state diplomacy in Africa. With this in mind, the chapter seeks to answer the following questions: to what extent has religion become an important instrument of political dialogue within Africa’s political discourse? How has religion shaped diplomacy in Africa? The growth and consolidation of religion as a multifaceted phenomenon in Africa has come to greatly influence philosophy, culture and arts in the continent. This influence has resulted in religion becoming an interesting and growing area for research which has been underpinned by the recognition of its growing role and influence within inter-state diplomacy in Africa. The chapter debunks the notion that religion has minimal influence on inter-state diplomacy by arguing that over the last thirty years, through the establishment and growth of multinational Pentecostal churches, religion has become a major player within African politics and its consolidation ought to be taken into consideration when one looks at inter-state diplomacy in Africa. This chapter used a qualitative research approach to the review of the literature to answer the underlying arguments of the chapter. This approach allowed the collection of data from local, regional and international perspectives. This approach was deployed in order to contextualize the understanding of religion as an instrument for inter-state diplomacy and how it has evolved to become an integral part of the diplomatic and bilateral relations of countries in Africa. Therefore, this chapter delves into the debates, arguments and theoretical literature that inform the contemporary issue of religion and inter-state diplomacy. Taking into account the ongoing debates and reflection on the role of religion in African diplomacy and as a soft power tool, these narratives became integral to allowing the authors to reach a meaningful conclusion. As the emergence of religion within the context of inter-state diplomacy has historical connotations, it was important for the chapter to first examine these historical narratives and debates in order to understand how they have evolved to inform post-colonial relations in Africa. The collected data from these sources were analysed and interpreted thematically to answer the core arguments of the chapter. COLONIALISM, RELIGION AND AFRICAN SPIRITUALITY Scholars have argued that the quest to understand the current debates around the growth and consolidation of religion in Africa, its role in inter-state

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diplomacy and how it continues to be an effective soft power tool lies in two questions (Haynes, 1995: 91–92). First, what was the religious scene like in pre-colonial Africa and second, how did colonialism shape religion in colonial and post-colonial Africa? However, it should be noted that this chapter contends that it is imperative to distinguish between religion and African spirituality and understand how these have morphed to become important soft power tools within the context of inter-state diplomacy in Africa. Africa’s history has greatly informed the concept of African spirituality. That is, one cannot view African spirituality without taking into consideration the history of the continent as these are complementary. For Knoetze (2019: 4–6), even though African spirituality originated on African soil, one ought to take into cognizance that contact with others from other countries and continents also shaped it. The development and consolidation of African Christian spirituality today have been largely driven by independent or indigenous African churches. For Mangany and Buitendag (2013: 1–13), African spiritualties were and are still characterized by everything animate and inanimate, such as ancestors, spirits, emphasis on community, the importance of family, a disposition to openness and non-dualistic thinking. It is worth mentioning that while Christianity and Islam had been present in parts of Africa for several centuries before the Atlantic slave trade, African spirituality was more communal in nature and placed great emphasis on community and the welfare of peoples. However, we cannot isolate African spiritualities from religion because, to some extent, these concepts are intertwined. For example, Jacob Olupona, a professor of African spirituality at Harvard’s Divinity School asserted that African spirituality as a process is about understanding, accepting and recognizing that practices and beliefs inform every facet of human life, and hence religion in Africa cannot be separated from the mundane (Chioeazzi, 2015). For Olupona, the concept of modernity and its holistic application within the realms of religion has created confusion for many Africans. For example, the word “religion” itself proves to be very challenging as it assumes that religion can be observed as a standalone process separate from one’s society, environment or culture. While this observation of religion may be applicable in the Western world, in Africa, Olupona (2015) argues that it is impossible to separate religion from one’s public life as it has become a way of life for many. In a traditional African society, religion has a considerable influence (Agbiji and Swart, 2015: 1). African traditional religions produced no written works; hence for one to understand the traditional religion of Africa, one needs to delve into the continent’s history, customs and practices. Additionally, for the purposes of this chapter, it was important to understand the roles and powers of the priests, kings and other important role players who were adept in dealing with spiritual issues (Mokgobi, 2014: 1–4). The inability of Africans

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to produce written scriptures explaining their traditional religious beliefs led to the assumption that the people in Africa were not capable of ‘proper’ religious observance. However, this is not to imply that African spirituality as a concept represents a form of religious totalitarianism but rather to argue that African spirituality represents a holistic belief in indigenous methods related to human life (Olupona, 2015). While religion and politics were both prevalent in precolonial Africa, it was during the era of colonialism that scholars began to not only study religion per se and in relation to its political influence but also to examine how religion has become a source of conflict and violence in the post-colonial era (Abbink, 2020: 195). Unsurprisingly, Collins (2017: 19–21) notes that because colonialism informed the creation of nation-states in Africa and religion was at the centre of its diplomatic soft power, colonialism’s disregard for Africa’s multiethnicity, spiritual and religious beliefs was directly responsible for the waves of ethno-religious conflicts taking place in contemporary times. Arguably, fragmented unity built on colonial thinking and the holistic incorporation of the concept of ‘modernity’ by African states explains why colonial religious beliefs have replaced traditional African belief systems. Building on this, Knoetze (2019: 5) affirms that the problem with modernity is that it has often been the ‘misdeeds’ of the past because ‘it was the force behind colonialism and imperialism; it was oppressive and exploitive; it looked down upon other cultures; it dismantled the foundations of the indigenous cultures and belief systems; it had an unrealistic perception of progress and it was based on restrained greed’. This chapter posits that while African spirituality in the pre-colonial era did not operate in isolation, its teachings and ways of life were disrupted by colonialism, which sought to consolidate its own political, economic and social ideology. In 1884, the Berlin conference not only opened the door to the officializing of colonialism in Africa but also signalled the end of African values, cultures and the African way of life. The assumptions that the people of Africa were inherently backward drove the need to colonize them and entrench Eurocentric values as a means to ensure their development. According to Abdatista (2011), religion was used as a tool to appeal to the conscience of the black man. Religious beliefs in Africa did not arrive with the colonizers, but it was the colonizers who were able to use them as a soft power tool to demean pre-existing African traditions and beliefs. Of course, to ensure that their ideological perspectives were accepted, an element of force was also used. Religion played a considerable role in expediting the consolidation of a Eurocentric way of thinking (Okon, 2014: 194–195), and thus religious indoctrination became a key weapon in European colonization.

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Traditional values that bound Africa for decades were eroded. Colonizers viewed such values as pagan and heathen in nature. In essence, the colonialists considered Africans as inhumane, valueless and uncivilized. Consequently, their mission was to ‘civilize’ the African (Abdatista, 2011). Farge, in his book A History of Africa described how European intellectuals and missionaries pushed ahead with ideologically appealing credos to the black man through religion. According to him, in the mid and late nineteenth century, the Europeans were convinced that their scientific, religious (Christian) and industrial society was superior to what Africa had ever produced (Abdatista, 2011). The unfamiliarity with Africa’s diverse and multidimensional cultural practices coincided with Europe’s drive to entrench a European thought process and lifestyle, hence such practices and cultures were seen as un-European. Unfamiliar with the diverse cultures on the continent of Africa, European explorers viewed practices strange to them as lesser and savage. In his book, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Rodney (1972: 277) strikingly identified how Christian missionaries were at the centre of the colonizing agenda and ‘missionaries were agents of colonialism in the practical sense, whether or not they saw themselves in that light’. While the missionaries were seen as the saviours of Africans, they indirectly worked to ensure that the status quo remained the same and that the servant–master relationship was upheld between Africans and Europeans (Woodberry, 2004: 4). The problem with colonization was the way it viewed and treated African religious and spiritual beliefs as evil and did everything to ensure their eradication. Among the missionaries, it was common to believe that African traditional religious beliefs and practices were mediocre, and together with the traditional customs, had to be done away with before ushering in Christianity. While European powers (Britain and France) applied the same tactics on North African countries they had colonized (Algeria, by France, in 1830, Britain Aden, by Britain, nine years later, Tunisia in 1881, Egypt in 1882, the Sudan in 1889 and Libya and Morocco in 1912), these countries were strongly aligned to the Ottoman empire (which was Islamic) and fought against the entrenchment of Christianity at the expense of Islam (Armstrong, 2007). Manala (2013) contends that for many sub-Saharan countries, religion (Christianity) was not fully entrenched (rather African spirituality was at the forefront) hence it was not difficult for the missionaries and colonizers to consolidate their Christian values in many sub-Saharan countries. Even though colonization ended several decades ago, and African states have forged their own paths forward, the shackles of colonialism remain and have been reinforced through trade practices, foreign aid, external intervention in African affairs and through foreign direct investments. It will take decades for Africa to completely wean itself off colonialist thinking. Even worse has been the globalization of the world which has directly allowed

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former colonizers to exploit Africa through trade and investment schemes. Even though the physical presence of colonizers has ended, as the late Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah contended in his neo-colonist project, colonizers will find new tools to control and direct our future, thus Africa will struggle to completely free itself from the shackles of colonialism. RELIGION AS A SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Renewed effort by governments to exploit the power, influence and reach of religion in politics is not a new phenomenon. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the expansion of the British Empire saw a close alignment between the Christian missionaries and the British colonial functionaries (Mandaville and Hamid, 2018). Ogunnubi (2017) argues that the concept of soft power features greatly in the works of scholars such as Morgenthau, Knorr and Cline. However, before one delves into the narrative of what is soft power, it is important to attempt a definition of religion and its associated elements. Having described the elements of African spirituality in the previous section, the quest to define religion becomes key. In attempting to provide a holistic definition, it is important to consider whether that definition of religion would reflect its multifaceted nature and then, when religion is ultimately defined, exactly whose religion is being defined. For Caputo (2000), there are Eastern religions, modern religions, monotheistic, polytheistic, and even slightly atheistic religions, and a definition of religion ought to consider these variants. Eliade (1969) reveals that the difficulty in having an accepted definition of religion is because it has been observed from Eurocentric spaces and this has limited the recognition of other diverse systems that exist around the world. Many theories, definitions and concepts which have informed the concept of religion have a Western background attached to them; hence, the whole existence of the word religion is seen as ‘eurozentrischen’ (Beyers, 2010: 4–8). Moreover, with Christianity being the dominant religion of the West, Western understanding of Christianity has dominated the scholarly literature. While the quest to come up with a widely accepted definition had proved difficult, some have associated religion with a system that professes culturally lived experiences. For Myhre (2009: 3–14), religion is a human construct rooted in a longing to extend life beyond death. Religion is a gift from the deities or spirits for the wellbeing of humans (Myhre, 2009: 5–8). We, however, posit that there is no one-size-fits-all definition of the term religion, and thus it becomes important to take into consideration the many definitions that exist and factor in the diversity of religious beliefs globally.

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Diplomacy became integral to the understanding of the concept of soft power. According to McGlinchey (2017), diplomacy is a process of structured communication that takes place between two or more parties. Diplomacy goes back more than 2,500 years and was originally characterized by frequent contact via envoys travelling between neighbouring civilizations (McGlinchey, 2017). However, diplomacy back then did not feature embassies or consulates and was not governed by international law as it is in modern times. McGlinchey (2017) further observes that diplomacy is a well-governed and defined process where there is constant communication between actors (diplomats, who represent the state) who exist and operate in a system of international relations and participate in private and public discussions to pursue their objectives peacefully. However, this chapter contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), which ought to govern diplomatic engagement only references ‘countries’ as diplomatic actors, while failing to show that there are numerous other actors (for example, NGOs and transnational crime groups) in the international systems which are not affiliated to states but wield significant power and influence. Moreover, there are many tools used in diplomacy, embodying a combination of soft and hard power; these include economic support, political support and sociocultural cooperation. As modern diplomacy became systematized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wars of religion gave way to wars of national interest in an age of nationalism (Stempel, 2000). Religious diplomacy within the context of international politics in contemporary times has become synonymous with the use of soft power (Steiner, 2011). One example is the role and influence of the Vatican as a diplomatic organ of the Catholic Church. Joseph Nye, in his book Bound to Lead (1990), coined the term ‘soft power’ but acknowledged that successful states need both hard and soft power. If a country can make another country take a particular course of action without applying force, Nye considered this as soft power. For example, Ogunnubi and Shawa (2017) noted how Britain and the United States have used the English language and the quality of their higher education systems as a strong soft power tool in their foreign policy engagement. Nye described hard power as force and sanctions where another party is forced to do something against its will (Nye, 2017). The end of the Cold War and the adoption of democratic values by many countries gave rise to the infusion of soft power as a foreign policy strategy of nation-states. Building on Nye’s insights, Ogunnubi (2015) states that the assessment of a country’s national power capabilities should take into consideration both soft and hard power tools in what Nye termed ‘smart power’. Within the context of state relations, religion is one of the main factors that increasingly contribute to the shaping of international

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relations and, as such, Haynes (2016) recognizes the use of religion as a soft tool in diplomacy. The power of religion and its wide reach in the sphere of diplomacy is demonstrated by the global influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church. Kadri (2020) argues that the use of religion as a soft power tool contributes considerably to creating an environment where politics and religion can work together for the advancement of society and further consolidate relations between states. In a globalized world, this return of religion back to the public realm brings with it numerous challenges to the international security apparatus where culture overrides the geographical borders of states. These challenges, according to Ginty (2013), pose considerable threats not only to the safety of a state but, in a much broader context, to the economic development of the world. The growth of religious extremist organizations has greatly influenced how governments observe the power and influence of religion in international politics. Studies (Driskell et al., 2009; Gates and Steane, 2010) on religion and its influence on politics have evolved to specifically focus on non-state actors and their fusion of religion and politics to achieve their goals. Inasmuch as religion has become key in diplomatic relations, religion in present times has become a focal point for states and scholars alike, owing to the religious resurgence in international politics after a long absence (Fox, 2001). The number of studies about the growing influence of religion in international relations has increased significantly, focusing on various kinds of transnational religious actors on the regional and international scenes (Xu, 2012). The link between religion and politics has been driven by two factors, namely, the process of globalization and the revolution in communications. The transnationalism of religion takes place when religious ideas do not take heed of the laws, jurisdictions or boundaries of other states, whereas Haynes (2011) points out that nationalism, the opposite of religious transnationalism, is often linked with a state project (Haynes, 2011). Religious diplomacy is not unique to the developed Western states as a soft power tool – post-Cold War emerging powers have also centralized religion as their soft power diplomatic tool. Turkey, Indonesia and Nigeria for example, have incorporated aspects of religion into their broader global engagement activities. Turkey has, over the years, built mosques alongside the transportation infrastructure it funds in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Mandaville and Hamid, 2018). Indonesia promotes its distinctive idiom of ‘Archipelagic Islam’ (Islam Nusantara) as a global religious brand, while Nigeria, for its part, is dominated by numerous Pentecostal churches which have grown and spread beyond the country’s borders (Mandaville and Hamid, 2018). Nowadays, religion and politics have become inseparable from the sphere of international politics. Subscribing to this view, former U.S. secretary of

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state John Kerry echoed that, ‘the more we understand religion and the better able we are as a result to engage religious actors, the more effective our diplomacy will be in advancing the interests and values of our people’ (Morello, 2016). For Stempel (2000), three main factors have allowed for the consolidation of religion in international politics in the present time. First, the faith and religious beliefs of politicians, diplomats and statesmen play an important role in how they act and how they perceive issues in the international arena (for example, leaders of Muslim states opposing the concept of Islamic terrorism). Second, there are belief structures which underlie national/international views. These talk to the philosophies, intellectual currents, and beliefs that contribute to national/organizational views (for example, the association of African colonization with Western and European dominance). Finally, there is the organizational impact of faith and religious organizations. This can be observed in the rise, spread and impact of Pentecostalism. This consolidation of religion, therefore, has allowed for states to further their interests through religious diplomacy. Thus, in the quest for manipulation and protecting one’s interests, religion has become the ideal toolkit. Taking the above deliberation, the important questions to ask are: how has Africa in the post-colonial era managed religious diplomacy and how has this shaped inter-state relations? While this chapter attempts to answer these questions, the authors concede that religion is a contentious issue in Africa, fraught with varying opinions and arguments. For some, religion is why Africa’s socio-economic development is constrained and that religious practices in African modern times do not speak to African realities (Agbiji and Swart, 2015: 2–3). Other scholars have contended that religion is part of African life and cannot be blamed for Africa’s misfortunes, rather politicians and their inability to spur development are to be blamed (Mokgobi, 2014: 5–6; Agbiji and Swart, 2015: 3; Yagboyaju, 2017). Nevertheless, these opposing voices agree that religion has become an intricate part of African political life (Abbink, 2014: 94). While the growth of religion within the political sphere cannot be ignored, it is important to understand how this growth has manifested itself in a post-colonial Africa. There is a need to explore how religious diplomacy has shaped inter-state relations in Africa post-colonialism. DIPLOMACY, POLITICS AND RELIGION IN AFRICA: A POST-COLONIAL REFLECTION Africa is diverse and characterized by a plethora of religions and ethnic settings; this then makes the study of religion concerning politics very rewarding but complex. During the colonial era, politics and religion (African beliefs)

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were always intertwined (Haynes, 2005). Political power was underpinned by religious beliefs and political decisions always reflected religious thoughts. Community leaders were not only leaders politically, but they were also religious leaders with influence on their people’s health and welfare. It was colonialism and the modernization era which led to the secularization of politics and religion. Afterwards, the idea of politics was only observed in the workings of formal political institutions (e.g., legislatures, executives, presidents), as well as directing attention more generally on issues of authority, legitimacy, power and equity (Haynes, 2005). In a post-colonial Africa, religion and diplomacy have become even more accepted as key tools in the foreign policy of nation-states. From mega Pentecostal churches preaching the Christian gospel to the growing influence of Islamic teachings, there is a reinforcement of the importance and growth of religion in inter-state diplomacy in Africa. In Africa, the role and power of faith-based diplomacy have an increasingly competitive market where countries are using their religious background as a soft power tool (Sounni, 2020). The growth and reach of Morocco’s religious diplomacy have been a prime example of how the country uses religion to forge new relationships (See Roswell’s chapter in this book). The country’s state-supported brand of Islam remains its prime soft power asset and has, over the years, used this to influence countries in West Africa (Sounni, 2020). Apart from the church, faith-based diplomacy has also been vital in the process of peacekeeping. Faith-based diplomacy is important in peacekeeping as it is different from traditional methods of peacekeeping, owing to its holistic approach to the sociopolitical healing of a conflict that has taken place. In essence, we observe conflict resolution as not the only goal of faith-based diplomacy as there is also the need to restore the sociopolitical order that has suffered from war and injustice and the reconciliation of individuals and social groups. In Africa, leaders have done little to harness the peacekeeping capabilities associated with religion, rather religion has been used to inflame violent conflicts (Agbiji and Swart, 2015: 5). In a continent where religion constitutes an inextricable part of African social life, faith-based diplomacy has ample ability to foster collective development and ensure the consolidation of common goals through community development. Acknowledging the possibilities associated with faith-based diplomacy in Africa, there is a need for more critical thinking about its historical context and multifaceted nature (Leight, 2011). This critical thinking needs to reflect the role faith-based diplomacy can play not only in politics but also in helping address social ills. It needs to take into consideration the problems facing Africa and the role it can play in addressing such problems; hence, the need to ensure it understands the socio-economic upheavals facing Africa. We argue that until religion reflects African viewpoints and is tailor-made to contribute towards addressing African issues,

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understanding the effectiveness of religious inter-state diplomacy will remain difficult. However, one cannot ignore how African political and economic elites have often resorted to religion in their intense competition for the diminishing resources of wealth, political power and prestige. This often reduces the diplomatic role that religion can play in inter-state relations (Agbiji and Swart, 2015: 4). Undoubtedly, religion can play an important role in addressing past socio-economic injustices, consolidating cohesion and creating an environment characterized by peace and stability. Nonetheless, in Africa, religious intolerance, the rise of bogus preachers and the observation that religion has become highly commercialized and preys on the poor and vulnerable has given rise to religion being considered as exploitative. This negative observation often clouds the positive elements associated with religion and how faith can be used to strengthen inter-state diplomacy. This then leads us to question the capacity of religious organizations in the cause of effective communal management with state institutions in the quest to advance the needs of people. The alignments of religious organizations with political parties in Africa have raised questions regarding the secularization of religion and politics. Religion and politics have become synonymous with corruption and partisan politics. As religion becomes more consolidated in African life and, by extension, the political scene, African politics is bound to be shaped along religious and ethnic lines (Olukoshi, 2004: 24–25). However, there is a need to ensure that religion and politics work to ensure Africa’s development rather than allow elites and African politicians to use religion as a means of causing division in society. Moreover, the authors are of the view that politics shaped along religious and ethnic lines gives rise to an increased possibility of conflict and violence, as seen in the Central African Republic and South Sudan. The role of external parties in African affairs has also generated religious violence which in turn has defeated the true potential of faith-based diplomacy as a soft power tool for inter-state relations (Fox, 2001: 515). On the question of external intervention, we contend that religious conflicts attract more political intervention by foreign governments, as seen in the Central African Republic. Nganje and Ndawana (2020) however argue that foreign powers in Africa’s security paradigm have done little to change the peace and security dynamics on the continent because they are usually guided primarily by their geopolitical and economic interests in assuming a security role on the continent. While foreign intervention has helped reduce tensions and violence (in CAR and Mali, for example), it has not addressed the roots of the problem which give rise to ethno-religious conflicts, hence the presence of foreign powers does not guarantee peace and security. The authors are of the view that at the centre of the fusion of politics and religion should be the need to address Africa’s developmental issues

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and provide an avenue for Africa to pursue its developmental objectives. However, before such can be realized, there is a need to ensure that religion is not used as an instrument to divide society, because religion and diplomacy have not been all positive in Africa. While in pre-colonial Africa, religion and African beliefs systems were intertwined and driven by the need to improve the lives of the people and ensure peace and stability, in recent times Africa’s association with religion has always been seen within the confines of conflict and violence, thus detracting from the role it can play in consolidating interstate relations. Religion and Governance Issues in Africa As we have argued, the growth of faith-based diplomacy has not been without challenges, and sadly most of these challenges have ended in violence, conflict and political instability. Religious conflicts have become frequent in a continent where conflict and violence run along religious and ethnic lines. Basedau (2017) noted that as of mid-2017, eight out of ten armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa had a religious dimension. Such conflict was driven by either warring factions differentiated by religious identity, or they had incompatible ideas regarding the role of religion in the state. One common explanation points to a resurgence of religion in the face of failed or flawed modernization (Haynes, 2005). There was a misconception that modernization (education development, urban development, social mobility and industrialization) would combine to diminish significantly the social position of religion in Africa, but this has not been substantiated (Haynes, 2005). The authors argue that while the forceful modernization processes imposed on Africa reflected the desires of colonialism, post-colonial African leaders failed to consider the negative effects of this forced modernization which was not anchored in African values, traditions and beliefs, meaning that current developmental challenges, especially those relating to governance and conflict, can be traced back to this flawed period of modernization. Soon after, a series of political upheavals which were driven by the demand for political change and better economic and human rights took place (Joseph, 1997: 2–3). While many criticized the xenophobic writings of Samuel P. Huntington’s on the clash of civilization, his ideas and thoughts remain relevant and reflect what is happening in contemporary times (Shahi, 2017). Huntington argued that the civilization of the globe in the twentieth century will be confronted by two types of identity-based clashes: ‘fault line conflicts’ or ‘core state conflicts’ (Huntington, 2000: 22). According to him, identity-based clashes between religious groups, ethnic groups, tribes, clans and nations have taken place throughout human history.

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In Huntington’s interpretation, some conflicts will last longer than others because they include the fundamental issues of group identity and power. In Africa, the authors reflect that several examples can be studied from Huntington’s point of view. Prolonged conflicts in the DRC, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan over the last decade have become a menace to development. The increase in religiondriven conflict has cast doubt on its soft power ability within the context of inter-state relations. While elements such as state fragility, weak governance and external intervention have been factors blamed for the conflict in these countries, the religious element cannot be ignored. Moreover, politicians, in the quest to attain power, have also inflamed conflicts by aligning themselves with groups that represent their religious beliefs, hence the difficulty in finding a holistic and all-encompassing solution to the widespread conflict, not just in these countries but in Africa as a whole. Colonial governance policies and their obsession with getting rid of precolonial African governance systems and beliefs left a communal void that has never been filled. As a result, the absence of traditional leadership as a vehicle of social control anchored in political and religious systems concerned with the welfare of the people has led to the growth of ethno-religious conflict. Moeng (2019) argues that post-colonial leaders have, by and large, simply taken over from colonial powers and continued treating Africans as little people who have no opinion on matters that concern their lives and future, and thus, with this mentality, continental development will remain a pipe dream. Nigeria, Somalia and the Sahel have been observed as geographical hotspots for religious conflict (Basedau, 2017). Most, if not all conflict in these regions has already crossed borders and manifested itself in neighbouring countries. While insurgencies in Africa are often associated with Islam, in countries such as Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, there has been evidence of Christian rebel groups who have been operating since the turn of the millennium. There is a likelihood of conflict in countries with considerable mixed religious populations, and this has been observed in the Central African Republic, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire (Basedau, 2017). The complexity of these conflicts (and taking into account the external intervention in African affairs) makes it difficult to holistically pinpoint one single cause, although they do demonstrate a mixture of religious and secular roots. Parallel ethnic and religious identity boundaries increase the risks of interreligious confrontation (Basedau, 2017). Also, weak states both enable the activities of religious extremists and make their ideology a tempting alternative for the population. Muggah and Velshi (2019) note that religious leaders are often accused of not doing enough to promote peace and stability in times

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of crisis, but there are several ways in which faith-based diplomacy can intervene to restore peace. There are millions of people of faith who are actively involved in helping the poor and marginalized and fostering reconciliation in the aftermath of war through their churches, mosques, synagogues and temples or working through international humanitarian agencies and missions overseas. Moreover, faith-based diplomacy is multidimensional and faith-based groups have also frequently led the way in shaping international treaties and social movements to make the world safer. They have also been proactive about peace-making and community support. However, these support structures have often been hindered by the lack of political support and commitment. External support for religious extremism from countries in North Africa and the Middle East poses a special problem (Basedau, 2017). While this chapter contends that religion and politics in Africa have become greatly intertwined, the chapter has shown that religious and ethnic differences have also compounded Africa’s quest for peace and stability. The wholesale adoption of colonial policies by African states missed the point by not addressing the ethnic and religious dynamics that were a result of colonial policies associated with segregation and racism. This has been coupled with the growing threat of religious-based terrorism which has given rise to numerous ideologies anchored in the need for political change. This chapter supports the role and growth of religion in inter-state diplomacy as long as it can reflect Africa’s socio-economic perspectives. In the same vein, the authors cannot ignore the increasing rates of violence and conflict which have religious connotations attached to them and, because of the growing religious non-state actors coupled with weak governance systems and the fragmented modernization process, such actors will continue to seek political change in Africa through religious ideologies premised on force and destruction. CONCLUDING REMARKS This chapter aimed at reflecting on the role of religion in African inter-state relations and how religion in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras shaped political engagement and development. The chapter attempted to identify a direct link between religions and diplomacy and how African leaders have used religion as a tool in their foreign policy engagement. Applied as a soft power tool, religious organizations have become robust civil society agents advocating for civil liberties, stable governance and respect for the rule of law. It is evident from this study that religion cannot be separated from the African political sphere. In Africa, the chapter revealed that before

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colonialism, religion and politics were intertwined. Religion expressed as African beliefs informed political decisions, and political decisions reflected religious considerations. Modernization and colonization led to the secularization of religion, thus leading to the separation of African traditional values and beliefs from the political sphere. African elites in the post-colonial era inherited political, sociocultural, economic and governance institutions anchored in the colonial way of thinking. Rather than cementing itself as key for foreign policy engagement for Africa, African religion has been marred by incidents of violence and conflict which have defeated its sociocultural potential as a soft power tool in Africa’s political sphere. These conflicts have spilt over to other countries as non-state actors battle it out for ideological domination attached to religion and belief, often with severe consequences for governance. This chapter notes that while religion is inseparable from Africa’s political domain, its potential as an effective diplomatic tool has been overshadowed by the plethora of ethnoreligious conflicts that have engulfed the continent. In addition, the concept of religion itself has been driven by the need to maximize profit and influence. It has moved away from what religious beliefs were like in pre-colonial Africa, which were all about taking care of people and ensuring their welfare. This chapter argues that African elites who inherited a colonial-free Africa have failed to break free from the shackles of colonialism. Rather than incorporating a pan-Africanist approach to religious diplomacy, religion, its thoughts, and its underpinnings and role in society have continued to operate in a manner reminiscent of colonial missionaries – only this time, it is Africans who are attempting to appeal to the conscience of the black man. REFERENCES Abbink, Jon. 2014. “Religion and Politics in Africa: The Future of “The Secular”.” Africa Spectrum 49, no. 3: 83–106. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/000203971404900304. Abbink, Jon. 2020. “Religion and Violence in the Horn of Africa: Trajectories of Mimetic Rivalry and Escalation Between ‘Political Islam’ and the State.” Politics, Religion & Ideology 21, no. 2: 194–215. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/21567689​.2020​ .1754206. Abdatista. 2011. “The Philosophy of Colonialism: Civilization, Christianity, and .emory​ .edu​ /vioCommerce.” Accessed January 19, 2021. https://scholarblogs​ lenceinafrica​/sample​-page​/the​-philosophy​-of​-colonialism​-civilization​-christianity​ -and​-commerce/. Agbiji, Obaji M., and Ignatius Swart. 2015. “Religion and Social Transformation in Africa: A Critical and Appreciative Perspective.” Scriptura 114: 1–20. https://doi​ .org​/10​.7833​/114​-0​-1115. Armstrong, Karen. 2007. Islam: A Short History. New York: Modern Library.

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Chapter 4

Faith-Based Organizations as Soft Power for Social Development in Africa Michael Ihuoma Ogu

Development has remained an imperative for states across the globe and the role of religion in the development process has, until recently, been arguably neglected and understudied. Literature on development studies have arguably not sufficiently recognized the roles that faith and religion play in the lives of people in developing and underdeveloped countries. Wilson (1982) argued that, like other social sciences, development studies have been largely influenced by ‘secularization theory’ – arguing that as societies modernize, the social significance of religious actions, institutions and religious consciousness is lost (137). The merits of Wilson’s argument are manifest in ‘secular reductionism’ (Clarke, 2008: 385) the neglect of nonmaterial, especially religious, motivations in explaining individual or institutional behaviour. In the same vein, Chowdhury, Wahab and Islam (2019) argued that for several decades, there were only very few studies that examined the contributions of Faith-Based Non-Governmental Organizations (FBNGOs) in community empowerment (1074). Although some studies focused on such components as community participation, capacity-building, leadership development and resource mobilization, they concentrated mostly on Western and African countries. Regardless of the dearth in literature, faith-based organizations continued to contribute to the development process, particularly through specialized development organizations associated with the mainstream Christian Churches like the Catholic and Protestant churches. Casanova (1994) argued that organized religion, in the past, focused on the moral and spiritual regulation of individual conduct. However, since the late twentieth century, religion has developed a new concern for the conduct of public life, and religious leaders and organizations are increasingly willing to get involved in the 53

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public life, as well as emphasize the moral and spiritual implications of public policy (320). This chapter explores religious organizations, particularly faith-based organizations, as wielder of soft power in African politics, as well as their involvement in the social development process in Africa, highlighting some of the vistas and limits of their involvement, and making some suggestions for the improved intervention of faith-based organizations. The rest of the chapter is organized into six sections: the next section will attempt a clarification of some of the operational concepts in the chapter; the third section will trace the history of faith-based organizations in Africa, paying particular attention to the shift from secularization to more religious involvement if such a dichotomy exists; the fourth section would attempt to analyse faithbased organizations as soft-power holders within the African political space; in the fifth section, faith-based organizations will be explored as partners in the social development process and highlighting some of the challenges faced in the process; the sixth section would explore some of the approaches or steps to improving the intervention of faith-based organizations in the social development process; and the last section would contain some concluding remarks. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTS Development is a multifaceted concept, with a variety of meanings, depending on who is defining, and for what purpose. However, some of the famous definitions of development are those by Rogers (1976) who perceived development as a participatory process of social change intended to bring about social and material advancement for majority of the people through gaining control over their environment (122). Soola (2003) also defined development as the change in society that allows for a better realization of human values, guarantees greater societal control over its environment and political destiny, as well as empowers individuals to gain increased control over themselves (2). Among many other definitions of development, these two are particularly useful in this chapter because of their emphasis on social change and the role of the individual in bringing about such change. These perspectives lay a good foundation for defining social development more specifically. Social development is the process that seeks to provide equal social opportunities that prioritize individuals above other social or government institutions. It compasses the areas of community life, participation, nondiscrimination, social empowerment and trust. Social development focuses on issues such as access to healthcare services, poverty, literacy, youth and women empowerment, and skills training for rural dwellers because

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development is measured in terms of how marginalized groups are taken care of (Ogbe, 2017: 15). Faith-based organizations (FBOs) are generally referred to as religiousaffiliated organizations whose activities largely focus on human development. While there has not been a consensus in the literature as to a universal definition of FBOs owing to the various types of such organizations, Woldehanna et al. (2005) have submitted that FBOs are religious-based organizations, places of religious worship or congregations, specialized religious institutions and registered or unregistered non-profit institutions that have a religious character or mission (5). Ogbe (2017) have also observed that FBOs are religious-based groups connected with a faith community and are concerned with development (24). Clarke and Jennings (2008) observed that a faith-based organization is one that derives the inspiration and guidance for its activities from the doctrines and principles of a religious faith or a particular interpretation or school of thought within a religious faith (3). At a minimum, Scott (2003) argued that a FBO must be connected with an organized faith community, either in terms of a particular faith ideology or in terms of recruitment of staff, volunteers or leadership (2). Other identifying marks of a FBO are religiously oriented mission statements, the receipt of substantial support from a religious organization or the initiation by a religious institution. Clarke (2005) highlighted three different classifications of FBOs: first based on their functions and/or objectives; second, on the basis of their implicit or explicit connections to the faith; and finally, on the basis of organizational size and geographic area of service (79). We would, however, restrict ourselves to classifications on the basis of functions and/or objectives, namely; a. Faith-based representative organizations or apex bodies govern the faithful and represent them through engagement with the state. b. Faith-based charitable or development organizations which mobilize the faithful in support of development initiatives and fund and manage poverty alleviation programmes. They are mostly subsidiaries or associated with faith-based representative organizations. They are the most visible form of FBOs in developing countries. c. Faith-based sociopolitical organizations which interpret and deploy faith as a political construct, organizing and mobilizing social groups on the basis of faith identities but in pursuit of broader political objectives, or, alternatively, promote faith as a sociocultural construct, as a means of uniting disparate social groups on the basis of faith-based cultural identities. d. Faith-based missionary organizations which spread key faith messages beyond the faithful, by actively promoting the faith and seeking converts

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to it or by supporting and engaging with other faith communities on the basis of key faith principles. e. Faith-based radical, illegal, or terrorist organizations which promote radical or militant forms of faith identity engage in illegal practices on the basis of faith beliefs or engage in armed struggle or violent acts justified on the grounds of faith. The above typologies are similar to those highlighted by Odumosu et al. (2009), namely; interfaith organizations, apex bodies, development organizations, sociopolitical organizations and mission organizations (111). RISE OF FBOS IN AFRICA There is arguably no consensus on the historical trajectory of FBOs in Africa, generally, and African states, in particular. Baiyeri (2013) corroborated this view by asserting that the origins of FBOs in Nigeria remain ‘questionable’ among scholars (15). It would, however, be useful to explore some historical perspectives on some of the activities of religious organizations dating back to the colonial era in Africa, when faith organizations were significantly linked to the state. The exploration of African societies by the ‘West’ arguably bore some outcomes for African societies in the institution of schools, hospitals and rural infrastructure by various religious authorities of the colonial days. These mission schools and hospitals remain the earliest forms of faith-based activities on the continent. The various efforts of Christian missionaries, although perceived as strategies to convert the people to Christianity, were essentially targeted at advancing human development of the African people via educational, health and other social services. However, this significance appears to have faded away with the fall of the various colonial empires in Africa. Although, in the last decade at least, there has been a gradual movement towards engagement between faith organizations and governments, as FBOs have continued to seek and engage in dialogue with donor agencies locally and internationally. The growing synergy between FBOs and governments stem from efforts of former World Bank President James Wolfensohn and former Archbishop of Canterbury Dr George Carey and a series of conferences of donor representatives and faith leaders held in London in 1998, Washington, DC in 1999, and Canterbury (England) in 2002 (Heist and Cnaan, 2016: 6). Scholars have argued that the proceedings from these and other related conferences pointed to the synergy between faith and development as a new theme in policy and debates around development (Belshaw et al., 2001; Marshall

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and Keough, 2004; Marshall and Marsh, 2003; Palmer and Findlay, 2003). However, Marshall and Keough (2004) have argued that since then, connections between the worlds of faith and development have become ‘fragile and intermittent at best, critical and confrontational at worst’ (1). The United Nations Millennium Declaration in September 2000, and the eight broad Millennium Developments Goals (MDGs) spanning 2000–2015, lie at the heart of the synergy between faith and development (Clarke and Jennings, 2008: 2). Corroborating this view, Marshall and Keough (2004) argued that the millennium declaration in 2000 was perceived as a ‘covenant’, a solemn contract or agreement with quasi-religious or spiritual significance. It was seen as an inspirational document which generated a moral commitment among signatories and galvanizes the moral energy of the global community (4). However contested this perspective may appear, it is evident that more than half a decade since the expiration of the MDGs and into the Sustainable Development Goads (SDGs) individuals and groups within the ‘secular’ and the ‘sacred’ divides continue to combine efforts in pursuit of this global development agenda. Contemporary FBOs are also argued to have begun with the advent of missionaries to colonial Africa in the early twentieth century. It may prove a herculean task to arrive at a unanimous agreement on the origin and trajectory of FBOs in Africa, especially owing to the fact that African societies had varied colonial experiences, including religions experiences, and as such the involvement and intervention of faith-based or religious groups within African states manifested in a uniform way. Hence, while it is safe to argue that the historical trajectory of FBOs in Africa is traceable to the activities of religious groups and individuals during the colonial period in Africa, specific details about the progression of such organizations remain a major debate in the literature. The practice of helping and working with the vulnerable population and underdeveloped societies have always existed in the church, although not limited to the church, as other religious denominations have contributed in no small measure. In fact, even before the term ‘faith-based’ was coined, or the legislations in favour of FBOs in Europe and America, it can be argued that ‘faith-based’ development activities had already existed. However, over the years, Olutola (2019) argued that ‘the social provisioning role of faith organizations has spurred intensive academic discussions, and there is a growing body of literature emphasizing the positive role of faith and FBOs in enhancing social change’ (2). Beginning in the 1990s, FBOs have become prominent among activists, policy makers and donors, thereby increasing their recognition as key non-state actors in the development landscape across Africa, in particular, and around the world, in general (Tadros, 2010: 1).

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FBOS AS CATALYST OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT Haynes (2009) defined soft power as ‘the capability of an entity, usually but not necessarily a state, to influence what others do through attraction and persuasion’ (296). In the recent past, FBOs have arguably assumed a more significant role as influencers of foreign policy. Evidence from the literature suggests that there has been a significant influence of religion on global politics, especially as regards foreign policy (Shani, 2009; Banchoff, 2008; Haynes, 2007; Thomas, 2005). Regardless of the overwhelming significance of religion in international relations and global politics in the past two decades, some scholars are still sceptical about the role of religion in global affairs. Desch (2013), corroborating this view, argued that several scholars have been slow to recognize the importance of religion in world politics, particularly outside the European world (16). However, Shah et al. (2012) argue that ‘religion has become one of the most influential factors in world affairs in the last generation but remains one of the least examined factors in the professional study and practice of world affairs’ (4). The same controversy is also evident in the theoretical arguments for international relations; the emergence of the theory of International Political Theology (IPT) aiming to confront the revival of religion in international relations appears to ignore the subtle, yet present emphasis of realism, on the influence of individual religious beliefs on the interest of international relations actors and the decision-making process in international affairs. The controversy on the relevance and influence of religion in international relations arises from the debate on the secularization of global politics. Fox (2001) observed that secularization implies that religion is losing its importance in the world (55). Secularization is one of the hallmarks of modernity (Desch, 2013: 16). Stark (1999) identified a universal consensus that modernization is the engine that is dragging the gods into retirement (251). Two perspectives on religion as a soft power in international relations, as observed by Barnett (2011), are that, on the one hand, religion is an increasingly irrelevant artefact of the past, and, on the other hand, that it remains a potent source of international conflict (92). Interestingly, both perspectives remain relevant in debates around religion and power in international relations. Even more interesting is the convergence of the two perspectives that argue for instance, in the classic work Clash of Civilizations by Samuel Huntington (1993), that ongoing global economic modernization and social change are separating people from conventional local identities and weakening the nation-state as a source of identity, and religion appears to be filling this gap, in the form of ideologies and movements that are regarded as fundamentalist (26).

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While the controversy rages, Desch (2013) observed that ‘important elements of the secularization thesis are breaking down under intellectual inquisition’ (21). Howbeit, regardless of what side of the divide one aligns, it is evident that religion remains a formidable power in the realm of global politics and the soft power of religion and by extension FBOs governed religious ideologies and principles continue to influence, to varied degrees, the actions and inactions of other actors in international relations, particularly in Africa. Having established the soft power of religion and, particularly, FBOs in international relations, it is arguable that FBOs can also be very significant contributors to both national and global development, either as a way to propagate their religious ideologies or as a consequence of a sense of obligation resulting from their religious principles and doctrines. Dicklitch and Rice (2004) observed that Faith-based NGOs (FBNs) or simply FBOs are non-state actors guided by a central religion or faith that is at the core of their philosophy, pragmatism or even membership, although they are not simply missionaries (663). Putting it in proper perspective, Rakodi (2012) argued that ‘religion and development are not separate spheres of life – they are intertwined, and each influences the other’ (635). Development, particularly social development, has been described as not an end in itself rather a process that involves the input of several stakeholders: individuals, organizations and governments. Heist and Cnaan (2016) argued that social and economic development focuses on improving basic conditions and the quality of life of people living in developing countries, by, among others, activities of organizations that bring skills, resources, expertise and goods to a country where it is most needed (7). FBOs, as has been established in previous sections of this chapter, remain active partners in the process of development. Further activities in the development process include, but are not limited to, economic development, literacy, vocational education, higher education, human rights, political freedom, reduced poverty, secure housing, sustainable development, social infrastructure, health promotion and quality of life or subjective well-being (Lusk, 2010; Mohan, 2007; Estes, 1998). The role of FBOs in African development has arguably been a not so new phenomenon, as FBOs have contributed significantly to education, health and social service delivery over the last few decades. Olutola (2019) observed that in sub-Saharan Africa, an estimated 40 per cent of heathcare services are provided by FBOs, some examples of these organizations include Uganda Protestant Medical Bureau of Uganda; Al-Noury Specialist Hospital in Kano, Nigeria; the Christian Health Association of Kenya (6); Babcock University Teaching Hospital, among others, which serve rural communities and vulnerable individuals within their reach. Olarinmoye (2012) also observed that the Christian Health Association of Nigeria has significantly catered to

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individuals with tuberculosis, with its 140 hospitals and 187 clinics across the country (5). The Salvation Army in South Africa had reportedly been caring for AIDS orphans long before the first feature story on AIDS in Africa appears in USA Today in 1999 (Olutola, 2019: 7). The UNDP (2014) reported that FBOs were responsible for 50 per cent of healthcare provisioning in the Republic of Congo, 40 per cent in Kenya and Lesotho, and 55 per cent in Uganda (8). In the same vein, both Muslim and especially Christian organizations have continued to complement the many states in African in providing basic education, as well as primary and secondary healthcare services. For instance, up until 2004, 75 per cent of the primary schools in Sierra-Leone were owned and operated by FBOs (Nishimuko, 2008: 939). The Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), in its annual report for the year 2020, revealed that the organization had launched forty-seven projects to help 16 million people in Africa survive the refugee and food crisis occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic. The report stated that the forty-seven projects worth USD 8 million focused on water and sanitation for over 53,000 households and orphans, food and hygiene kits for more than 3,600 displaced persons in Mali, and medical supplies for professionals serving over 72, 000 families in Mozambique (ADRA, 2020: par. 11). Additionally, FBOs have also been significantly involved in conflict resolution across the conflict-torn continent of Africa. Ilo (2015) observed that religious groups such as Mennonites, Quakers and Catholic leaders have recorded remarkable outcomes in regard to conflict resolution in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America (99). Leaders of FBOs have arguably demonstrated their capacity to provide the assistance needed in helping fragile states survive conflict and post-conflict reconstructions. Howard (2015) identified some of the criteria that qualify an NGO to be described as a faith-based organization (1-3). These criteria also arguably define, to a large extent, the nature and magnitude of the interventions of FBOs in the development process. Howard also argued that many faith-based NGOs fall short of meeting all six criteria listed below, recognizing that organizations that follow these criteria are consistent with their mission and programmes rather than pursue funding opportunities at the expense of their mission. These criteria for identifying FBOs are: a. The notion of the sacredness of life: Faith-based NGOs value the life of individuals, and workers of faith-based NGOs understand people as created in the image of God with transcendent sacredness so that workers can engage with greater honour. Instead of thinking of rights in terms of minimum standards of asylum, food or education, they think of rights in terms of inclusion, abundance and community.

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b. Long-term and consistent presence in areas with great needs: Faith-based NGOs have a reputation of consistent presence in the areas of need, and such presence involves assets such as people, networks, leaders, infrastructure, buildings and donations that can be mobilized faster and more comprehensively. c. Faith-based NGOs apply and obey their conscience: Guided by their religious doctrine, faith-based NGOs advocate for the needy and serve as a voice of conscience. d. Operate from the standpoint of faith: All world religions emphasize the role of faith as an important tool for coping and resiliency and so should faith-based NGOs. e. Uphold the theology of mercy and forgiveness: Merciful people and organizations care for and are appreciated by their beneficiaries. f. Emphasize charity: Charity in this context is the willingness to give time, attention and resources in abundance. Evidences from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries reveal the proliferation of religious denominations, particularly protestant denominations across Africa, both propagating the doctrines of their religion, as well as contributing significantly to social and economic development within the region. The activities of these European missionaries resulted in the first sets of educational and healthcare services that benefited several colonial African communities, contributing to the human capital development in the region. Heist and Cnaan (2016) observed that many Catholic missionaries and organizations brought technology and knowledge to remote parts of the world for hundreds of years, and in many countries, the basic universities, hospitals and other major institutions started with these religious missions (3). Many FBOs today contribute to national and international social and economic development by engaging in activities and providing services in the following areas: infrastructural development; education; health care; humanitarian intervention, with particular reference to natural and conflict disaster; scientific experiments and research, among others. Although most FBOs are Christian, they are very diverse across several religions and denominations. Regardless of the antecedent of significant participation of FBOs in the process of development over the past decades, there is a significant dearth of literature or scholarly study on the contribution of religion to contemporary social and economic development studies and policy (Rakodi, 2012; Haar and Ellis, 2006; Berger, 2003). ver Beek (2000) argued that within the discourse on social and economic development, spirituality is taboo. He further very aptly observed that:

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Given the apparently integral link between spirituality and issues central to development, it would seem reasonable that spirituality would occupy a relatively prominent place in development theory and practice. However, the subject is conspicuously under-represented in development literature and in the policies and programmes of development organisations. (36)

In an effort to further confirm the assertion above, Heist and Cnaan reported that Kurt Alan ver Beek’s investigation of emphasis on religion and spirituality across leading development studies journals: Journal of Development Studies, World Development and the Journal of Developing Areas, between 1982 and 1998. The report revealed that in the Journal of Development Studies, for instance, there were forty-six hits articles for ‘gender’, thirtyeight for ‘population’, nineteen for ‘environment’, just one for ‘religion’, and none for ‘spirituality’ (Heist and Cnaan, 2016: 3). While it may be argued that there has been an improvement in these trends, it is also arguable that not enough effort has been made by scholars to significantly highlight the contribution of FBOs, particularly, and religion, in general, in the process of social and economic development, and in fact, this may have also accounted for the seeming scarcity of current literature on the subject matter in the recent times. ‘MENDING THE FENCE’ FOR FBOS IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA While it may be difficult and maybe even impossible to completely resolve the controversies involved in the debate around the role of religion in the process of social and economic development, it is important that some efforts are made to address some of the criticisms against faith-based organizational efforts within the development process. Some of the efforts that can be taken to ‘mend the fence’ for continued and more significant participation of faithbased organization in the process of development are summarized in the subsequent paragraphs. a. Nature of governance and leadership of religious institutions: The structure of leadership and governance within several FBOs are arguably ambiguous and devoid of adequate checks and balance mechanisms. For instance, Nigeria is home to some of the biggest protestant churches in Africa owned by individuals such as Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) and Living Faith World Outreach Ministry (A.K.A Winner’s Chapel), owned and operated by Enoch Adeboye and David Oyedepo, respectively. These organizations and their subsidiaries have continued to influence both domestic and foreign policy of Nigeria, with

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their leaders possessing significant economic resources and social status. While the private ownership and operation of these organizations does not immediately imply a bad or incompetent leadership, these organizations stand to benefit from a more robust leadership and governance structure that guarantees checks and balances, discourages abuse of power and promotes transparency and accountability, even among the members or faithfuls of such religious organizations. b. Issues of evangelization by faith-based NGOs: No doubt, FBOs are established and operated by a certain set of doctrinal provisions; however, these organizations have been accused of attempting to exploit their various activities to contribute to social development as a guise for indoctrinating beneficiaries into their beliefs and doctrines. Although a study by Heist and Cnaan (2016) revealed that most faith-based development organizations focus on service delivery rather than on proselytization (3), it can also be argued that FBOs engage in some form of proselytization in the process of delivering certain services. In fact, such efforts of proselytization have been appraised as more effective than detrimental to the recipients. For instance, Freeman (2015) argued that protestant institutions in Africa are helping people break away from traditional cultural norms, thereby liberating themselves to pursue wealth and personal progression (261). Regardless of the perceived merits of the interference of proselytization in the development activities of FBOs, such proselytization may benefit from regulations that ensure that the activities of these FBOs are not mere propaganda for the economic and religious gains of these FBOs. c. Government regulations: Several FBOs operating across the continent have been challenged by government policies and regulations, which have stifled the level of impact that these organizations would have achieved without these challenges. ver Wees and Jennings (2021) observed that FBOs in Cameroon have expressed concern that despite the Cameroon Health Sector Partnership Strategy (2007–2015), some legal barriers still hinder an effective partnership with the government. One of such barriers is the fact that FBOs have to pay the same tax as a private business, even though they assist that government in providing services to the Cameroonian population (par. 17). d. Partnerships and coalitions: Benedetti (2006) argued that FBOs that are less fundamentalist would be more willing to form partnerships and coalitions with others, while the more religiously fundamentalist organizations would less likely collaborate (857). While this may be largely the case for much of contemporary FBOs, it is imperative that this argument is put in context of particular FBOs. Some FBOs refuse to partner or form coalition not on the basis of fundamentalism but rather difference in

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mission and potential conflicts in procedure and service execution. Heist and Cnaan (2016) observed that coalition and partnership or collaboration are complex and very problematic issues in all types of national and international non-profits, not only for FBOs (13). e. Equal opportunities within FBOs: The problems arising from discrimination and nepotism in staffing and placement over merit and skill are issues that can grossly undermine the quality of goods and services provided by FBOs. In a bid to give preference to faithfuls and members of the same faith in recruitment within FBOs, such organizations may miss out on the competence and merit of other individuals who may not be accepted on the basis of their faith. Hence, FBOs should strive towards a balance in opportunities within the organizations based on merit and competence, as well as preference for individuals of same faith. f. Religion as catalyst for conflict: Religion has long been perceived as a catalyst of violent conflicts, terrorism, human rights abuses and other atrocities. Berman and Laitin (2008) argued that terrorism is often affiliated with religious groups (1). While the above arguments hold some merit, arguing that violent conflicts are solely the outcome of religious fanaticism and devotion is to undermine the complex nature of conflict, as well as the various political, economic, cultural and social dynamics of each conflict. Although religious differences are hardly ever the sole cause of violent conflicts, they have the potential to escalate conflict behaviour (643). FBOs within the continent must carefully guard against the use of religion to mobilize their members against the state or any other groups within the state, as that would be inimical to development. CONCLUDING REMARKS In this chapter, the variables of FBOs and social development in Africa have been explored. It was argued that FBOs, and generally religion, have continued to play a significant role as soft power, influencing the actions and inactions of international relations actors. Despite the controversy over secularization and the decline of religion in international relations, individuals and groups, and essentially the decision-making process in international relations is significantly premised on the values and ideologies of individual decision makers. FBOs have also continued to participate in the process of social and economic development, although not without some criticisms against the mission, leadership and procedure, as well as organizations and developmental strategies, just to mention a few. Contemporary literature in international relations should pay more attention to scholarship on the various dynamics to the roles of religion and particularly FBOs in the global power politics.

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Department, University of Birmingham, p. 111. http://www​ .rad​ .bham​ .ac​ .uk. Accessed October 10, 2016. Ogbe, Monday. 2017. “The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Community Development: A Study of Justice, Development and Peace/Caritas’ (JDPC) Interventions in Kano State.” M.A. Dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria. Olarinmoye, Omobolaji O. 2012. “Faith and Accountability in International Development: A Study of the Global Fund.” A Paper Presented at Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance, Princeton University 4th GLF Annual Colloquium, p. 5. Olutola, Omiyinka O. 2019. “Documenting Faith-Development Trajectory in Africa: Contributions and Contestations.” South Asian Journal of Social Studies and Economics 3, no. 1: 1–14. Palmer, M., and V. Findlay. 2003. Faith in Conservation: New Approaches to Religion and Conservation. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Rakodi, Carole. 2012. “A Framework for Analysing the Links Between Religion and Development.” Development in Practice 22, no. 5/6: 634–650. http://www​.jstor​ .org​/stable​/41723128. Rogers, Everett M. 1976. Communication and Development: Critical Perspectives. Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publishers, pp. 121–148. Scott, J. D. 2003. The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy: The Scope and Scale of Faith-Based Social Services. State University of New York, Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government/Pew Charitable Trusts, p. 2. Shah, Timothy Samuel, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft. 2012. Rethinking Religion and World Affairs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 319, 4. Shani, Giorgio. 2009. “Transnational Religious Actors and International Relations.” In Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, edited by Jeffrey Haynes. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 308–322. Soola, Ebenezer O. 2003. “Development Communication: The Past, the Present and the Future.” In Communicating for Development Purposes. Ebenezer Soola, Ibadan: Kraft Books. Stark, Rodney. 1999. “Secularization, R.I.P.” Sociology of Religion 60, no. 3: 251. Thomas, Scott M. 2005. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. UNDP. 2014. Guidelines on Engaging With Faith-Based Organisations and Religious Leaders. New York: UNDP, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support One. van Wees, Sibylle Herzig, and Michael Jennings. 2021. “The Challenges of Donor Engagement With Faith-Based Organizations in Cameroon’s Health Sector: A Qualitative Study.” Health Policy and Planning 36, no. 4: 464–472. doi:10.1093/ heapol/czab006 ver Beek, Kurt Alan. 2000. “Spirituality: A Development Taboo.” Development in Practice 10: 31–43. Wilson, Bryan. 1982. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–139.

Chapter 5

Forty Years and Still Counting Shia Exportation and the Character of the Nigeria–Iran Relations, 1979–2019 Charles E. Ekpo and Ekwutosi E. Offiong

The ingredient of religion in the advancement of national power cannot be overemphasized (Huntington 1996). Whether in the classical or contemporary world, religion and its attendant civilization have shaped and influenced relations among empires, kingdoms, dukedoms, chiefdoms and states. While religion defined the character of Jewish relations with their neighbours, it sparked and sustained centuries of crusades between the advancing Mohammedians and Christians in Europe (Nolan 2006). Religion also polarized the nations of Europe into Catholic and Protestant folds and ignited the conundrum which consumed Europe for over a century (Haynes 2009, 293). The modern-state system is dominantly secular. But religion is still a fundamental part of modern politics (Hanson 2006; Haynes 2009). The prevailing democratic order, for instance, has been argued to be a heritage of Christianity (Gruchy 1995) and the resistance of other religions – mostly the Islamic religion – to the democratic order and its contradictions is analysed by some scholars to be a clash of civilizations which is aimed at remaking the world order (Huntington 1996; Michael and Petito 2009). Not just has religion compartmentalized the world into circuits of friendly, enemies and ambivalent states, but it has greatly influenced the foreign policies of most states. The United States, for instance, factors religion as a tangential element of its soft power (Chaplin and Joustra 2010). Depending on the idiosyncrasies of its chief executive, the United States sometimes, in the words of Walter A. McDougall, betrays its national interest for its civil religion (McDougall 2016). Aside from the United States, the Iranian and Indian foreign policy formulation and implementation, of recent, are largely influenced by religion (Haynes 1991, 295). According to Maciej Potz, most Western states have this inherent ‘preferential 69

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attitude to religion’ in their dealings but this attitude ‘is sometimes so deeply embedded in the normative foundations of Western political systems that it often goes almost unnoticed’ (Potz 2020, 124). And the borders of India with Burma, Bangladesh (Jhala 2019), and Pakistan have failed to experience peace, largely due to the religious difference of these states. Put differently, religion is becoming a great channel of influence and relations in the international system, and most states are all out to secure the advantage that comes with its proclivities. This is more so as religion plays an integrative role (Potz 2020, 132). The prospect of coalescing the entire Middle East under its influence through Shiism, for instance, has been the cardinal objective of Iranian regimes since the 1979 revolution. Through Shiism, Iran has subverted the body polity of states across the globe. It has also been, largely, a surviving strategy in dealing with the isolation engineered by its Western ‘enemies’ (Ostovar 2017). Nigeria claims to be a secular state in outlook but is influenced by its two dominant religions such that it has been labelled as a ‘theocratic diarchy’ (Offiong and Ekpo 2020, 149–172). Religion triggers some form of friction and tension with tolls on the body polity of the Nigerian governance structure (Obadare 2006). And by so doing, makes the country vulnerable to subversive elements. Here, we attempt an explication into the Iranian moves to infiltrate the Nigerian polity through the Nigerian Shiites and the dynamics of the Nigerian state’s responses. SHIISM, IRAN AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC The land area presently known as Iran has been the same land area that the Persian Empire flourished in the fifth century BCE. with ruins and remnants still conspicuous today. But by the seventh century AD, the area was conquered by Islamic forces. It turned out that though Sunnis constitute a staggering 85 per cent of the entire global Muslim populations, Shiism prevailed as the dominant Islamic sect in Iran (January 2008, 9). The death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 AD culminated in a succession crisis that eventually gave birth to sects in Islam with the two dominant ones being the Sunni and Shiite sects. Upon the death of the Prophet, there was a tussle over who will succeed him as the leader of the Islamic faith, as he had no surviving son to fill that lacuna. Two groups emerged from the ensuing schism – the Sunni and Shi’at Ali (followers of Ali). While the Sunni posited that a leader should be selected from the acquaintance of the Prophet, the Shi’at Ali insisted that such privileged position should be held by the kinsmen of the Prophet only. The Shi’at Ali eventually rooted for the Prophet’s son-in-law, Ali ibn Ali Talib. Though Ali eventually became a caliph, he was

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murdered in five years’ period by the Sunnis. His son, Husayn, who sought to challenge Sunni’s rule lost his life in the process and is propitiated and emulated by Shiites as a martyr who gave his all for God (January 2008, 9–10). The enmity between these two sects remains till this day. The courage demonstrated by Husayn is imbibed by the Iranian Mullahs (Islamic scholars) who, according to Glenn Perry, have developed ‘the tradition of opposition’ by leading most of the protests and agitations that have resulted in some fundamental changes in the Iranian polity (Perry 1991, 118). This ‘opposition’ culture, he further noted, is a product of the years of inchoate relationship between Mullahs and the Shahs which he likened to the relationship ‘between emperors and popes in medieval Catholicism’ (Perry 1991, 115). Shiite clerics in Iran have a history of being subservient to the Safavids dynasty that brought them from Iraq and Lebanon and made Shia Islam a state religion (Capek 2015, 4). But this servile relation ended with the dismantling of the Safavids dynasty in the eighteenth century. Iranian religious leaders, consequently, have been phenomenal in leading several protests which resulted in a constitutional monarchy (Perry 1991, 118). But with the help of Britain and Russia to the Shah, there was a relapse to absolute monarchy in 1911, a situation which fomented the contradictions that heralded the revolution in 1979. The heated polity paved way for a military coup by Reza Khan, who eventually crowned himself as Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1925 (January 2008, 16). Reza made some upsetting reforms most of which denigrated Islam and promoted the ancient Persian heritage (January 2008, 17–18). His pro-West policies exposed Iran to Western manipulations. Reza’s support for Germany during World War II led to the invasion of Iran by Allied forces and his subsequent removal and replacement with his son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (January 2008, 19). These events offended the Shiite clerics for the basis of their relevance to society was shrinking and could vanish if left unchecked. The events further heightened the resentment which Iranians had for the British which companies, controlled and exploited Iranian oil to the benefit of the Shah. Donette Murray has analysed the character and dynamics of the U.S. and British involvements in the Iranian internal affairs with its highpoint being Eisenhower’s sanctioning of the coup that removed Mossadegh – the powerful prime minister who was committed to nationalizing foreign oil corporations in Iran – in 1953 (Murray 2010, 2). Mossadegh’s overthrow made Mohammad Reza a despotic U.S. puppet. Reza’s penchant for modernization pitched him against the Mullahs who became more suspicious of his regime. The Mullahs protested against these reforms with Ayatollah Khomeini being the most visible face of such protest. Fereydoun Hoveyda contends that the Iranian revolution was the product of a ‘long struggle between two men: Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and

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Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’ (Hoveyda 2003, 1). The latter, in written treatises and recordings, condemned the former’s policies and romance with the West (Lafraie 2009, 3). He also called on other Ulamas to revolt against the Shah whom he accused of dining with the devil, as well as betraying Islam (Hoveyda 2003, 15). Mosques became important hubs and networks for the coordination of protests nationwide (Alimagham 2020, 7). Khomeini, Najibullah Lafraie argues, employed various strategies including protests and the creation of parallel institutions to mount pressure on the Shah’s regime (Lafraie 2009, 72–75). Though he was banished in November 1964, he coordinated the protest from abroad. Upon the failure of the Shah to contain the Mullahs (January 2008, 38), he fled the country. In a referendum conducted on 30 March 1979, Iranians voted by over 90 per cent in favour of an Islamic republic (Hoveyda 2003, 30; January 2009, 48). The consequent constitution ceded so much power to the Mullahs, even to the extent of overruling elected officials. ‘At the head of the new power structure was the Council of Guardians. . . . At the top of the Council of Guardians was the supreme leader – the faqih. The faqih held ultimate power and could remove any person from the government. This position, everyone in Iran knew, was to be held by Ayatollah Khomeini’ (January 2009, 55). By technically submerging politics with religion, Iran became an Islamic republic and an adversary of the West. Survival, henceforth, defined Iranian foreign policy. Shiism and the Iranian Soft Power in the Middle East As pointed out earlier, Shiites constitute a substantial quota (15%) of the global 1.5 billion Muslim population. According to Mohammad Nafissi, states with 10 per cent or more Shiites include Azerbaijan (75%), Bahrain (70%), Iraq (60%), Yemen (40%), Lebanon (35%), Kuwait (35%), Pakistan (20%), Afghanistan (18%), UAE (15%), Oman (10%), Qatar (10%) and Saudi Arabia (10%) (Nafissi 2009, 111). In the Gulf, specifically, 70 per cent of the Muslims there are Shiites (Louer 2008, 6). Aside from Bahrain and Azerbaijan where Shiites populations appear to be preponderant, Iran seems to be the controvertible leader of the global Shiites’ population and has exploited the soft power incentives that come with it. The integrative power that comes with religion also endears most Shiite minorities across the globe to mother Iran for multidimensional support towards the general advancement of a common cause under the umbrella of same brotherhood. Iran, as demonstrated earlier, fought off Western interest and established the Islamic republic in a manner that antagonized Western nations and their allies, especially in the Middle East. There was thus, a high level of paranoia among Iranians that the United States will do anything possible to reverse the gains of the revolution (Murray 2010). This trepidation was further

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compounded by the Iraqi invasion in 1980 and the support it got from the West and its Middle Eastern neighbours (Ostovar 2017, 94). Having been tagged as an enemy of the West, the Islamic republic needed a foreign policy strategy that would give it some committed friends in the face of Western hostility. This strategy was to ally with other Arab nations such as Syria which faced similar threats (Goodarzi 2006), and the use of Shia soft power which has made the Iranian foreign policy to appear sectarian in character. By Shia soft power, we mean an indirect or direct influence which Iran wields over the citizens of other states who uphold or are willing to accept and propagate the Shia creed, and by so doing, owe Iran some allegiance as a model for/protector and benefactor of global Shia populations. This kind of power provides Iran with the needed networks to infiltrate and further grow its influence from the bottom in diverse strategies which we have analysed in this work. For instance, the cardinal focus of Iran’s foreign policy has been the exportation of the 1979 revolution which is coveted by non-state Shia Islamic actors such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Hourthis in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria (Ostovar 2017, 80). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was created and mandated to spread ‘the Islamic Revolution . . . to other countries’ (Selikta and Rezaei 2020, 7). Maryam Panah notes that the Iranian regime, just after the revolution, subverted some states such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, Philippines, and so on, to foment similar revolutions among ‘people who are like us’ (Panah 2007, 69). This, it thought, would establish parallel governments that could align with Iran. Iran does not just arm Shia insurgent groups but covertly organize and train such groups (Ostovar 2017, 99). Aside from an international radio which was established to spread propaganda, international conferences were organized to create ‘a network of organised Islamic opposition’ with support from the Iranian regime (Panah 2007, 70). The entire Gulf area, Laurence Louer has argued, is submerged in networks of global Shia Islamic movements ‘that are basically the offspring of non-local groups’ (Louer 2008, 2). The ensuing ‘Shia confederation’ has placed Iran in the position of advantage against its Middle East’s adversaries such as Israel which Iranian-backed Hezbollah had once successfully dislodged from southern Lebanon in 2000 (Cook 2008, 43). It has also played a role in sustaining the Iran–Syria alliance for decades (Maltzahn 2013, 7). The Shia soft power antics, too, has placed Iraq under the strong influence of Iran. According to Afshon, ‘Iraqi militias . . . became a way for Iran to influence Iraqi politics from below’ (Ostovar 2017, 99). It is therefore safe to go with the conclusions of Afshon that Iran has successfully harnessed the political unrest in the Middle East to its advantage by championing and using Shia networks to shake up the hitherto Sunni-dominated status quo. Middle East powers perceive of Iran as being

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expansive and transnational, and attempting to resurrect Persian Empire with Shiism as the unifying characteristics (Ostovar 2017, 87). Indeed, this utilization of soft power strategy by the Iranian regime has been empirically proven to be ‘a resounding success . . . in creating a Shiite Crescent . . . across the Middle East, the Gulf States, and Yemen’ (Selikta and Rezaei 2020, 235). The Iranian Quds Force and its second commander, Qassem Suleimani have been outstanding in Iran’s recent soft power exploits. But this exploit by the Iranian leadership has attracted suspicion and counterpunches by regional hegemons such as Turkey that has accused the Iranian government of ‘trying to dominate the region’ through Shia exportation (Ostovar 2017, 90). Saudi Arabia, on her part, has resorted to countersubversion and a systematic repression of its Shia populations to foreclose the chances of an Iranian-backed insurrection (Matthiesen 2015). It has also utilized the Dollar Diplomacy by spending billions of dollars, as aids, on Sunni regimes and militias (Hegghammer 2010). With support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Oman came together under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to counter the Iranian influence over the Gulf area. To shrink the Iranian influence in Iraq, too, the Saudi and Kuwait governments have supported the latter with about $20 billion and $40 billion, respectively (Saikal 2016, 168). The Saudi government has also prevailed on the Pakistani while the United States has supported Lebanon with over $800 million, ‘contain’ their Shiite populations (Terrill 2012, 32; Saikal 2016, 117). Iranian use of its Shia soft power has become hydra-headed and very difficult for its foes to contain. Africa has become a burgeoning destination for Iranian interest and influence in diverse ways. Iran is also profiting from the instability in Africa by supplying military support and arms to both state and non-state actors in conflict-prone areas (Conflict Armament Research 2012). Iranian diplomatic escapade in Africa is not only defined by objective dynamics but some subjective and soft variables such as religion. Fátima Chimarizeni argues that the basis of Iran’s closeness to the African countries of Sudan and Eritrea has been religion, just at it is a factor in the Iran–Syrian relations (Chimarizeni 2017, 44). Iran is also known to use the Hezbollah, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), and other proxies, to subvert and exert influence over some African states (Feierstein and Greathead 2017; Amusan and Oyewole 2016, 221). IRAN AND SHIISM IN NIGERIA The history of Islam in Nigeria could be traced to the eleventh century AD but the religion gained ground by the fifteenth century AD following its

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proliferation among the Hausa states and their ruling elite. Sects reflected in the teachings of all the itinerant Islamic scholars and traders but there is little evidence to point at regarding sectarianism or even radicalization until 1804 when Shehu Usman dan Fodio led a jihad that collapsed the northern Nigeria area to an Islamic theocracy. Since the Shehu was of Sunna’s creed (Sodiq 2017, 33), it became normal that Sunnis constitute the bulk and dominant majority of practising Muslims in Nigeria. Shiism was imported into Nigeria in early 1980s by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, a graduate of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and the founder of IMN. This coincided with the peak of the Iranian revolution which, by 1979, had successfully removed the Shah and installed a theocracy based on the Shia jurisprudence. But available sources, which will be referenced in the course of this work, suggest that the establishment of Shia Islam in Nigeria may not have solely been a coincidence but a calculated plan and attempt at extending the Iranian soft power influence into the Nigerian polity. Zakzaky, as a student, was a Sunni and a strong member of the Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria (MSS). During the 1979 ‘clash of civilizations’ (Offiong and Ekpo 2020, 157) in Nigeria, he was very vocal in campaigning for the inclusion of the Sharia law in the 1979 Constitution in Nigeria (Gray and Adeakin 2019, 10). But Zakzaky’s Islamic orientation changed. He became a renegade to some Islamic organizations from which he founded and led the IMN. Through the IMN, Zakzaky mobilized thousands of people which he steadily proselytized the Shia’s creed to. According to Simon Gray and Ibikunle Adeakin, the group has a strong ideological link to Iran (Gray and Adeakin 2019, 3). Ousmane Kane argued that Iran, in the aftermath of its revolution in 1979, utilized its popularity to its advantage by using its embassy in Nigeria to identify, train and sponsor radical Islamic activities and groups, such as the IMN, with a great degree of successes recorded (Kane 2003, 78). El-Zakzaky is recorded to have visited the shrine of Imam Husyan, the first Shia martyr and even prayed in the shrine of Imam Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law that was murdered by the Sunnis (Uche 2019, 3). Eventually, he became a Twelver Shiite. Though the IMN has denied receiving external funding, it has been argued that ‘Iran has been funding El-Zakzaky’s IMN with $10,000 monthly for social welfare programmes like soup kitchen and home shelters’ (Uche 2019, 4). This is roughly $120,000 annually and amounts to millions of dollars in decades. Karl Maier noted that Iran also sponsors the Zakaky’s ‘annual trip to Mecca in the hajj’ (Maier 2000, 168). The IMN has not only used these funds to transform its base in Zaria to ‘a Mecca for dispossessed people’ but has also contributed to the increase in the population of Shiites in Nigeria to about 4 million, which constitutes about 2–3 per cent of the entire Nigerian population (Uche 2019, 3). According to Jacob Zenn and others, Iranian support

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has increased Shia population in Nigeria from less than 1 per cent in 1979 to around 5–10 per cent in 2013 (Zenn et al. 2013, 43). A more recent estimate suggests that the group, in 2019, constituted about 17 per cent of Nigeria’s 100 million Muslim populations (Tangaza 2019). Shiites in Nigeria have over time displayed some audaciousness which suggests the involvement of a shadow party. From 1979, the group denounced Nigeria’s secularism, instructed its followers to resent opportunities in Nigeria, instigated several civil disobediences, attacked those it found wanting, and baited an Islamic revolution by circulating flyers with inscriptions as ‘Down with the Nigerian Constitution’ and ‘Islam Only’ (Kane 2003, 95). By 1981, El-Zakzaky was arrested for allegedly burning the Nigerian Constitution in Sokoto. By 1989, he started attacking secular prints media houses in Jos and Katsina (Kane 2003, 96). By this period, too, he could boast of supporters and splinter groups spread across Zaria, Zamfara and Kano (Alao 2013, 113). Iran, according to Hakeem Onapajo, even helps spread the ‘propaganda’ messages circulated by the IMN. The group, also, he further noted, has a standby defence force called the Hurrahs similar to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) which provides cover for the group during intermittent clashes with authorities. And in clashes against the Nigerian authorities, Iran wittingly speaks for the IMN. This was most conspicuous in the 2015 clash with the military which culminated in hundreds of casualties (Onapajo 2017, 3–10). The hidden hands in the Shiites’ temerity become more plausible as IMN is not the only group that was influenced by the successes of the events of 1979. Onapajo, for instance, has noted two Shia groups – Rasulul A’azam Foundation and Al-Thaqalayn Foundation – that are committed to peaceful expression of their rights to worship (Onapajo 2017, 5). A recent study by Glen Segell confirms that Iran from 2013 has escalated its support for the Shiites in Nigeria (Segell 2019). Iran, he noted, has, between 2007 and 2014, used the Al-Mustapha’s group of schools, to sponsor and radicalize about 45,000 Africans, including 5,000 Nigerians. The graduates are mandated to return the favour by exporting aggressively, the Shia jurisprudence, to their countries. Khamenei has this to say about the school and its imprints on the Nigeria’s stability: In March 2016, one of the university’s directors declared that some of the foreign fighters deployed by Iran and sent to Syria were Al-Mustafa’s students and clerics. Another senior Al-Mustafa official took great pride in the fact that wellknown radicals and terrorists Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon, Sheikh Nimr alNimr in Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Zakzaky in Nigeria are fruits of Al-Mustafa’s teachings. (Qtd. in Segell 2019, 196)

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This lends credence to the fact that Iran is satisfied with the level of presence and influence it has in Nigeria through the IMN, its splinters and its leader, El-Zakzaky. Iran has subsequently embossed its confidence that it attempted using its networks in Nigeria to move shipments of prohibited items to its non-state allies. According to Segell, a shipment of weapons directed to Hamas was intercepted by the Nigerian government in 2010; another targeting Hezbollah was allegedly seized in Kano in 2013; and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) discovered that Iran, through Hezbollah, used its networks in Africa to launder its drug money (Segell 2019, 194). Put it differently, Nicholas Zenn and others averred that between 1979 and 2013, the IMN has acted anti-Nigeria and Pro-Iran through the overt veneration of portraits of Iranian leaders Khomeini and Khamenei and Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and the burning of American and Israeli flags, as well as a number of terrorist plots: for example, three Nigerian Shias were arrested in January 2013 after training in Iran and Dubai to attack both US and Israeli government and civilian targets in Lagos. (Zenn et al. 2013, 47)

These are clear indicators that Iran, through Shiism, is making an inward movement into Nigeria, using the Shia soft power tactics. IMN’s engagements with the Nigerian armed forces and its lust for attacking liberal Muslim groups in Nigeria shows how volatile it could be and its intransigence and resistance in the face of authorities’ repression shows the capacity of the group (Abimbola 2010, 99) and how useful the group could be to whoever uses or manipulates it. PATTERNS OF NIGERIA’S RESPONSE TO THE IRANIAN SOFT POWER THREAT Generally, interference, whether overtly or covertly, in the affairs of an independent state is considered an issue of utmost importance since infiltration of any kind could culminate in multidimensional breach in security (Cohen 1973, 471–505). States often act in various possible capacities to contain or checkmate subversive agents and demonstrate, to their benefactors, that such breaches cannot be tolerated. While some states indulge in confrontational strategies such as counter-subversion, deployment of force, and so on, others prefer to strategically engage by containing and attacking where and when it would best ‘hurt’. Some may decide to adopt the avoidance and denial strategy, others equally could jointly solve the problem through diplomatic parleys,

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while some others could involve a third party, depending on the capacity of the parties and the nature of threats involved. In the case of the Iran and the Shiites in Nigeria, Nigeria’s reaction to the Shia threat has been multidimensional with the initial stage being that of denial and avoidance, followed by tactical engagements (confrontation), demonization, seldom attempt to jointly solve the problem, and the use of third-party to contain the threats. But none of these strategies have strictly followed the above-listed sequence. Some, such as the confrontational strategies, come intermittently in different forms with diverse actors utilized. Nigeria seems to have avoided the Shia threat at its initial phase. This is largely due to the fact that as in the early 1980s when the El-Zakzaky movement steadily mounted its staircases to radicalization, Shiites population in Nigeria was insignificant compared with its Sunni counterparts. What Nigeria did was to subtly encourage the proliferation of the Saudi Arabia’s Sunni Wahhabism – an activity which preceded the emergence of Shia movements in Nigeria (de Montclos 2017, 287). For instance, the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam (JNI) (Society for the Victory of Islam) received, between 1962–1965 and 1966, the sums of £100,000 and £2,000,000, respectively, from the Saudi government for the proselytization of Wahhabism in Nigeria (Kane 2003, 83). Nigeria only widened its arms to the Kingdom and other allies such as the United States who, in policy and practice, seek total containment of the Iranian soft power politics. This is similar to the strategy utilized by Sudan who, in 2014 at the behest of Saudi Arabia, ‘closed all Iranian cultural centres in Sudan and expelled the cultural attaché and other Iranian diplomat’ speculating that the government of Sudan ‘perceived that Iran was using its facilities and personnel in Sudan to promote Shiite Islam’ (Katzman 2016, 33). Furthermore, since the use of scholarship has been the most pervasive instrument of recruiting ‘Mullahs’ in Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom through USAID and DfID, respectively, are countering this by offering scholarships and funding secular educations in strategic cities such as Kano and other northern cities (Alao 2013, 143). As noted by a Shiite in Nigeria, the United States, as a strategic partner in Iranian containment, ‘scarcely’ condemns the human rights violation meted by the Nigerian government against its Shia populations which is often sanctioned by Saudi Arabia and its Western allies (Ctd. In Uche 2019, 5). The United States, El-Zakzaky alleged, had prevailed on the Indian government to block his admittance into the ‘Mendata’ hospital to foreclose his chances of getting treated during his publicized medical trip to India in August 2019 (Ayitogo 2019). This, as we have earlier noted, is similar to the Kingdom’s strategy in containing Shiism in the Pakistan. It also echoes Ousmane Kane’s submission that Saudi Arabia has been exporting its own Wahhabism to

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counter Iran’s (Kane 2003, 78). Nigeria, by befriending the former, uses the latter against a common enemy as its Shia containment strategy. Another pattern of Nigeria’s response to the Shia threat has been through direct confrontation and confrontation via proxies. There are documented series of Shiites’ clashes with security operatives, on the one hand and the Sunni-Shiites on the other. El-Zakzaky, for instance, has been arrested and detained for years by respective military and civilian regimes in Nigeria (Gray and Adeakin 2019, 12). Northern Nigerian Sunni establishments have been using proxies to harass Shiite populations, and this has created unbridled clashes between the Shiites and Sunnis, on the one hand, and the Shiites and government forces, on the other hand. Part of the strategy used here is the strategic incrimination and demonization of the Shiites who are seen by Sunni populations as ‘anarchists and irresponsible, with heterodox religious beliefs, involved in antigovernment activities’ (Kane 2003, 223). The press also, before the early 2000s, labelled them as ‘fanatics, fundamentalists, troublemakers’ (Maier 2000, 174). In the 1990s, being a Shiite in Kano was criminal enough to be stripped of government’s appointments (Kane 2003, 223). There is also a case in 2007 at Sokoto state, where Shiites believe they were framed for the murder of one Malam Umaru Dan Maishiyya which led to the lynching, arrest, jailing and bulldozing of their place of worship and family houses by local authorities (Campbell 2011, 55). In Sokoto, the Shiites unanimously argue that ‘the Sokoto Government has persistently shown hatred towards them’ (Alao 2013, 134). Nigeria’s government’s reactions towards the IMN became more confrontational from 1999. More force was used to quell IMN protests. The clash between the group and the entourage of Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Buratai, in Zaria on 2015 culminated in the killing of multiple of hundreds of Shiites members. A Judicial Panel of Inquiry set up by the Kaduna State government reported that 347 bodies of murdered Shiite members were handed over for mass burial by the military (Ogundipe 2016). The trend has not ceased as security agents have increasingly used lethal force against Shiites who defy all odds to protest against the continued detention of their leader, Mallam Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. The Nigerian government has reached out to the Iranian government to halt its support for the IMN (Odunsi 2019) but this has been the least of the reactionary strategies used by the Nigerian government. The Iranian government, on the other hand, does not hide its dismay for the ‘injustices’ the federal government have meted on its Shia populations and has overtly lobbied for Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, the Nigerian Shia leader, to be flown to Iran for medical check-up when the former was allegedly sick in custody. As of December 2019, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seyyed Abbas Mousavi, averred that the Islamic Republic is in ‘constant negotiation’

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and has prevailed on the Nigerian government to ‘expedite the resolution of the problem’ (Iran Front Page News 2019) but the results of such diplomatic strategy at solving the Shiite problem remains elusive. In what looked like its coup de grace, the federal government had declared the IMN a terrorist organization and, as such, proscribed it. Though the freedom of practising Shiism still remains, the umbrella for the coordination of the Iranian soft power has been badly hurt. Except another group is constituted, the IMN remains an illegal organization and El-Zakzaky will continue to attract the radars of Nigeria’s intelligence network. Nigeria, by so doing, has avoided direct confrontations with Iran while steadily and progressively containing the latter’s subversive threats. But the Iranian influence on Nigeria’s Shia populations is too cursive to celebrate victory, yet. Nigeria appreciates this fact and has continued to incarcerate the leader of the IMN group. Nigeria has also been very strategic in comments, decisions and policies it makes towards Iran. This is despite the fact that Nigeria is ‘angered’ by the Iranian subversive activities (BBC News 2010). For instance, during the controversial murder of General Qassem Soleimani, Commander of the Iranian Quds Forces, most countries, including those in Africa, condemned the attack. South Africa even labelled it as a ‘raw aggression’ and ‘act of international terrorism’. Nigeria, however, avoided making any comments but rather issued a red alert for caution against ‘some domestic interests [that] are planning to embark on a massive public disturbances and sabotage’ (Shaban 2020). This is a clear indication that Nigeria still perceives its Shiite population to be emotionally bonded with Iran, possessing the required capacity and capability to cause ‘massive disturbances’ and should not be provoked into causing problems.​ Data from the United Nations’ digital library shows that Nigeria has, also, for quite a suspicious number of times voted either absent (A) or no (N) in the United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) resolutions involving or discussing Iran, its nuclear programme, human rights violation and possible sanctions (see table 5.1). Between 1985 and 2020, Nigeria has voted about thirty-two times on Iranian-related resolutions. Of this number, Nigeria has avoided taking a stand by absenting itself twenty-six times. Where Nigeria took a stand with the remaining six votes, it voted ‘No’. Irrespective of the dents in the Iran–Nigeria relations in 2010, 2013 and 2015, Nigeria still technically supported the Iranian interest in the UNGA. This is rather symbolic and repercussive, especially as Nigeria is very conscious of the fact that its ‘No’ or ‘Absence’ in the voting process is not capable of derailing the passage of such resolutions. First, it demonstrates the nature and weight of diplomatic leverage that Iran possesses over Nigeria. Second, it conveys the idea that Nigeria do not seek to provoke Iran at the global stage so as not to battle the spill-over of reactions that could arise from its Shiites populations at home. The consistency

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Forty Years and Still Counting Table 5.1  Patterns of Nigeria’s Voting in UNGA’s Resolutions on Iran S/N

Year

Resolution

Agenda

Voting Status

Resolution Status

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1988 1987 1986 1985

A/RES/75/191 A/RES/74/167 A/RES/73/181 A/RES/72/189 A/RES/71/204 A/RES/70/173 A/RES/69/190 A/RES/68/184 A/RES/67/182 A/RES/66/175 A/RES/65/226 A/RES/64/176 A/RES/63/191 A/RES/62/168 A/RES/61/176 A/RES/60/171 A/RES/59/205 A/RES/58/195 A/RES/56/171 A/RES/55/114 A/RES/54/177 A/RES/53/158 A/RES/52/142 A/RES/51/107 A/RES/50/188 A/RES/49/202 A/RES/48/145 A/RES/47/146 A/RES/43/137 A/RES/42/136 A/RES/41/159 A/RES/40/141

HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS

A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A N A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A

Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted

Key: HRS = Human rights situation; A = Absent; N = No Source: Compiled by the authors with data from the United Nations Digital Library’s Voting Data, https:// digitallibrary​.un​.org​/collection​/Voting​%20Data?|n=en/

in the pattern of votes also demonstrates that Nigeria accepts the Iranian soft power prowess and seeks to contain than escalate situations. The fact, also, that the United States, being a friend of Nigeria and an enemy to Iran, often sponsors and votes ‘Yes’ to these resolutions suggests that, by voting ‘Absent’, Nigeria do not seek to display any overt support to any of these parties at the expense of its stability but could play along by welcoming advances from both while using one to checkmate the influence and subversion of the other.

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IMPLICATIONS ON NIGERIA–IRAN RELATIONS The character of Nigeria–Iran relations, generally, lacks the events or turning point that makes for a copious analysis or that aids a proper situation of the dynamics and intrigues as could be likened with Nigeria’s relation with African countries as South Africa, Ghana, Cameroon; European nations as the United Kingdom and France; American countries as the United States; and Asian countries as China. This may explain the dearth in literature and low attention granted this theme by scholars. A source, however, has asserted that Nigeria and Iran have been ‘enjoying cozy relationship for decades’ (Ekemenah 2019). President Muhammadu Buhari has recently described the relations between the two countries as being ‘mutually beneficial’ (News Agency of Nigeria 2020). The root of the relationship is traced to 1960 when Nigeria got her independence. This relationship was further whetted when Nigeria was admitted into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971 where it met Iran that has been a founding member (News Agency of Nigeria 2020). Nigeria and Iran further became culturally entangled, following Nigeria’s subscription to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986. The mutuality of Islamic culture in the face of the growing Christianity–Islamic religious bipolarity in then- Nigeria created an avenue for Nigeria to tolerate growing Iranian cultural spread in Nigeria which came in the form of exporting its brand of Islamism. The cultural services of the Iranian embassy, for instance, were emboldened enough to regularly supply ‘pro-Iranian magazines’ published in Iran and elsewhere (Kane 2003, 97). Irrespective of the security implication, Nigeria kept cool, even as Iran proved to be a friendly enemy and managed to prevent an open confrontation with Iran. But as it became more apparent that Iran was becoming subversive, the physiognomy of the relations between the two countries became what Fulan Nasrullah described to be ‘nominally cordial’ and underlined by Nigeria’s effort to counter Iranian subversive activities and attempts to hurt the U.S. and Israeli interests on the Nigerian soil (Nasrullah 2019). Nigeria, however, has handled as ‘family affairs’, successive subverting attempts by the Iranian government against its interest. For emphasis, an intelligence report recently declassified by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reveals that about six Iranian diplomats and military personnel infiltrated universities in northern Nigeria as students to advance Iranian Shia soft power (Anonymous 1984). The report also noted that Iran, through its embassy, funded many student groups, including the Kano University Students which it gave $100,000 in 1983 (Anonymous 1984, 6). University of Maiduguri, Christian students decried, was becoming ‘an extension of Iran’ (Anonymous 1984, 6). But Nigeria has treated the Iranian

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soft aggression with kid gloves. For instance, the manner in which the case of the presence of a high-ranking Iranian Quds Force’s agent, Ali Akbar Tabatabaie, without a diplomatic passport, was handled by the Nigerian government (Nasrullah 2019) demonstrates this. Though Tabatabaie was later surrendered by the Iranian government and was sentenced to five years’ in prison in Nigeria, his earlier escape to the embassy and later to Iran, through the aeroplane of the Iranian Foreign Minister, best demonstrates our position above (see Nasrullah 2019). In 2013, the Nigerian intelligence service also thwarted the attempt by three Iranian proxies to hurt Saudi Arabia and American interests. Again, this was handled without confrontations or escalated diplomatic actions. The peak of the diplomatic fracas between Iran and Nigeria has been the latter’s expulsion or request for the former to withdraw about two Iranian Ambassadors, in the past decade, for their subversive role against the Nigerian polity (Nasrullah 2019). The attempt also, by the Iranian government to move weapons to the Gambia through Nigeria, with El-Zakzaky as an agent, was also handled without any significant blow-up with Nigeria only prevailing on the government of the Gambia to cut ties with Iran in 2010 (Nasrullah 2019). It is surprising, however, that Senegal, as a result of the same incident had to recall its ambassador to Iran for ‘deeming’ Iranian response to the weapon saga as ‘not satisfactory’ (BBC News 2010b). After the provocative outbursts by the Iranian Ambassador, Saheed Kozechi, against the Nigerian government for its treatment of its Shittes’ population in 2016, Kozechi was recalled to avoid legal actions but he was still ‘able to get influential Nigerians to ensure he was still able to say his official farewell at the Presidential Villa’ (Track Persia 2016). As threatening as Iran’s sponsorship of the IMN could be, Nigeria has also managed to prevent an all-out diplomatic fracas by only negotiating with Iran to stop its sponsorship of the group. This is more complex to situate as Nigeria has, as its major allies, the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and also struggles to protect their strategic interest. But other than the recalling of its ambassadors and expulsion of some Iranian diplomats, Nigeria, it has been argued, has failed to be confrontational with Iran for it risks provoking Muslim populations that have successfully fallen under the ambience of the Iranian soft power politics (Anonymous 1984, 15). Nigeria–Iran relations, however, has increasingly shifted from the areas of governance and security to economy. The two countries are signing bilateral trade agreements with trade volume between the two countries estimated at some $50 million (The Nation 2015). Between March 2017 and March 2018, Iranian export to Nigeria increased by 55 per cent to the tune of $6 million (Ekemenah 2019). Presently, Iran covets greater trade and better relations with Nigeria. Just March 2020, Iranian envoy was well-received by

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the Buhari-led administration and his departure, ceremoniously announced (News Agency of Nigeria 2020). The reality, however, is that Iran has recorded a huge success in its soft power politics against Nigeria. As it stands, Nigeria does everything possible to avoid confrontations and escalation of diplomatic fracas with Iran. This is because Iran, through its network, influence and control of the Shiite populations in Nigeria, is capable of instigating a major offset that could compromise Nigeria’s security. Hence, the patterns of Nigeria’s relations with Iran constitute a part of its grand strategy to contain the Shiite’s threat which has lingered and escalated over the years. CONCLUSION This work has attempted to establish the sinew between the Iranian flexing of its Shia soft power muscle and the emergence and sustenance of a subversive Shia Islamist group in Nigeria. Such effort, as the case in the Middle East, has been very successful in the proliferation of Iranian influences among populations in Nigeria, especially those of the Shia’s creed. But Nigeria’s reactions to this Iranian soft power threat have been eclectic with no incidence of disrupted relations. Nigeria has proven capable in containing these threats but has, at the same time, admitted that it has lost a fraction of its population to the Iranian influence under the umbrella of Shiism. To this end, Nigeria has criminalized the conduits of Iran subversion – IMN – and has successfully pursued a policy that makes it to be at peace with Iran, as well as accommodating the interests of Iranian rivals that are its strategic partners. The latter, if not properly managed, poses another problem of presenting Nigeria as an arena for the clash of competing interests. But states must demonstrate their prowess in the internal arena, be it of hard or soft power dimensions. BIBLIOGRAPHY Abimbola, Adesoji. 2010. “The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria.” Africa Spectrum, 45, no. 2: 95–108. Alao, Abiodun. 2013. “Islamic Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Nigeria.” Conflict, Security & Development, 13, no. 2. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/14678802​ .2013​.796205. Alimagham, Pouya. 2020. Contesting the Iranian Revolution: The Green Uprisings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Amusan, Lere, and Oyewole, Samuel. 2016. “Iran’s National Interest and the GeoStrategic Imperative.” Geopolitica, 5, no. 2: 209–226.

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Anonymous. 1984. “Sub-Saharan Africa: Growing Iranian Activity.” A Research Paper, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, ALA 84-10119, December, 1984. Ayitogo, Nasir. 2019. “What El-Zakzaky Said About Situation at Indian Hospital (Full Transcript).” Premium Times, August 14, 2019. https://www​ .premiumtimesng​.com​/news​/top​-news​/346569​-what​-el​-zakzaky​-said​-about​-situation​-at​ -indian​-hospital​-full​-transcript​.html. BBC News. 2010a. “Nigeria to Question Iranian over Arms Seized in Lagos.” November 12, 2010. https://www​.bbc​.com​/news​/world​/africa​-11743454/. BBC News. 2010b. “Senegal Recalls Tehran Ambassador Over Arms Shipment.” December 15, 2010. https://www​.bbc​.com​/news​/world​-africa​-11998752/. Campbell, John. 2011. Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Capek, Michael. 2015. Understanding Iran Today. Hockessin, Delaware: Mitchell Lane Publishers. Chaplin, Jonathan, and Joustra, Robert, eds. 2010. God and Global Order: The Power of Religion in American Foreign Policy. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press. Chimarizeni, Fátima. 2017. “Iran-Africa Relations: Opportunities and Prospects for Iran.” Brazilian Journal of African Studies, 2, no. 3: 36–49. Cohen, Jerome. 1973. “China and Intervention: Theory and Practice.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 121, no. 3: 471–505. Conflict Armament Research. 2012. The Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence From a Nine-country Investigation. London, United Kingdom: Conflict Armament Research. Cook, Jonathan. 2008. Israel and the Clash of Civilisations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East. London: Pluto Press. De Gruchy, John. 1995. Christianity and Democracy: A Theology for a Just World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Montclos, Marc-Antoine. 2017. “Pilgrimage to Mecca and “Radical” Islam: New Trends From Sub-Saharan Africa.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 8, no. 3: 273–289. http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1080​/21520844​.2017​.1370574. Ekemenah, Alex. 2019. “Iran, Shiites and the Nigerian State.” Next Money, August 5, 2019. https://nextmoneyng​.com​/2019​/08​/05​/iran​-shiites​-and​-the​-nigerian​-state/. Feierstein, Gerald, and Greathead, Craig. 2017. “The Fight for Africa: The New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry.” Policy Focus, Middle East Institute, pp. 1–13. Goodarzi, Jubin. 2006. Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East. London: Tauris Academic Studies. Gray, Simon, and Adeakin, Ibikunle. 2019. “Nigeria’s Shi’a Islamic Movement and Evolving Islamist Threat Landscape: Old, New and Future Generators of Radicalization.” African Security. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/19392206​.2019​.1639281. Hanson, Eric. 2006. Religion and Politics in the International System Today. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haynes, Jeffrey. 2009. “Religion and Foreign Policy.” In Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, edited by Jeffrey Haynes, 293–307. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

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Hegghammer, Thomas. 2010. Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoveyda, Fereydoun. 2003. The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution. Westport: Praeger Publishers. Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Iran Front Page News. 2019. “Iran Says in Talks with Abuja to Resolve Shiekh Zakzaky Issue.” Iran Front Page News, December 8, 2019. https://ifpnews​.com​/ Iran​-says​-in​-talks​-with​-abuja​-to​-resolve​-sheikh​-zakzaky​-issue. January, Brendan. 2008. The Iranian Revolution. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books. Jhala, Angma. 2019. An Endangered History: Indigeneity, Religion, and Politics on the Borders of India, Burma, and Bangladesh. India: Oxford University Press. Kane, Ousmane. 2003. Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Katzman, Kenneth. 2016. “Iran’s Foreign Policy.” In Iranian Foreign Policy: Context, Regional Analyses and U.S. Interests, edited by L. Beck, 1–39. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. Lafraie, Najibullah. 2009. Revolutionary Ideology and Islamic Militancy: The Iranian Revolution and Interpretations of the Quran. London: Tauris Academic Studies. Louer, Laurence. 2008. Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press. Maier, Karl. 2000, This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis. United States of America: Westview Press. Maltzahn, Nadia. 2013. The Syriairan Axis: Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. Matthiesen, Toby. 2015. The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism. New York: Cambridge University Press. McDougall, Walter. 2016. Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy: How America’s Civil Religion Betrayed the National Interest. New Haven: Yale University Press. Michael, Michalis, and Petito, Fabio, eds. 2009. Civilizational Dialogue and World Order. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Murray, Donette. 2010. US Foreign Policy and Iran: American–Iranian Relations Since the Islamic Revolution. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Nafissi, Mohammad. “Shiism and Politics.” In Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, edited by Jeffrey Haynes, 111–127. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Nasrullah, Fulan. 2019. “Assessing the Impacts of a Potential US-Iran War on Nigeria.” Divergent Options, May 28, 2019. https://divergentoptions​.org​/2019​/05​ /28​/partnerarticle​-assessing​-the​-impacts​-of​-a​-potential​-iran​-war​-on​-nigeria/. News Agency of Nigeria. 2020. “Buhari Bids Farewell to Iranian Envoy, Lauds Nigeria-Iran Relations.” Guardian NG, March 6, 2020. https://m​.guardian​.ng​/news​ /Buhari​-bids​-farewell​-to​-iranian​-envoy​-lauds​-nigeria​-iran​-relations/. Nolan, Cathal. 2006. The Age of Wars of Religion, 1000–1650: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization, Vol. 1. A–K. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

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Obadare, Ebenezer. 2006. “Pentecostal Presidency? The Lagos-Ibadan ‘Theocratic Class’ & the Muslim ‘Other’.” Review of African Political Economy, 33, no. 110: 665–678. http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1080​/03056240601119083. Odunsi, Wale. 2019. “Iran Reportedly Withdraws Support for Nigerian Shi’ites, El-Zakzaky.” Daily Post, February 21, 2019. http://dailypost​.ng​/2019​/02​/21​/iran​ -reportedly​-withdraws​-support​-nigerian​-shiites​-elzakzaky/. Offiong, Ekwutosi, and Ekpo, Charles. 2020. “Nigeria: The Paradox of a Secular State.” Politics and Religion, XIV, no. 1: 149–172. Ogundipe, Samuel. 2016. “Exclusive: Judicial Panel Indicts Nigerian Army General, Others for Zaria Massacre of Shiites.” Premium Times, July 19, 2016. https://www​ .premiumtimesng​.com​/news​/headlines​/207155​-exclusive​-judicial​-panel​-indicts​ -nigerian​-army​-general​-others​-zaria​-massacre​-shiites​.html. Onapajo, Hakeem. 2017. “State Repression and Religious Conflict: The Perils of the State Clampdown on the Shi’a Minority in Nigeria.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13602004​.2017​.1294375. Ostovar, Afshon. 2017. “Sectarianism and Iranian Foreign Policy”. In Beyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East, edited by F. Wehrey, 87–111. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Panah, Maryam. 2007. The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. London: Pluto Press. Perry, Glenn. 1991. “The Islamic World: Egypt and Iran.” In Politics and Religion in the Modern World, edited by G. Moyser, 97–134. London: Routledge. Potz, Maciej. 2020. Political Science of Religion: Theorising the Political Role of Religion. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Saikal, Amin. 2016. “Iranian–Saudi Relations in a Changing Regional Environment.” In The Arab World and Iran: A Turbulent Region in Transition, edited by A. Saikal, 165–180. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Segell, Glen. “Neo-Colonialism in Africa and the Cases of Turkey and Iran.” Insight on Africa, 11, no. 2: 184–199. http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1177​/0975087819845197. Seliktar, Ofira, and Rezaei, Farhad. 2020. Iran, Revolution, and Proxy Wars. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Shaban, Abdur. “Africa amid Iran-U.S. Tensions: SA Outraged, Nigeria Alert, Horn of Africa Risk.” African News, January 6, 2020. https://www​.africanews​.com​/amp​/2020​ /01​/06​/africa​-amid​-iran​-us​-tensions​-sa​-outrage​-nigeria​-alert​-horn​-of​-africa​-risk/. Sodiq, Yushau. 2017. A History of the Application of Islamic Law in Nigeria. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Tangaza, Haruna. 2019. “Islamic Movement in Nigeria: The Iranian-Inspired Shia Group.” BBC News, August 5, 2019. https://www​.bbc​.com​/news​/world​-africa​ -49175639/. Terrill, Andrew. 2012. “The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security.” In Rivalry in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran, edited by M. Tyler and A. M. Boone, 1–52, New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc. The Nation. 2015. “Nigeria, Iran Bilateral Trade Volume Hits $50m.” May 25, 2015. https://thenationonlineng​.net​/nigeria​-iran​-bilateral​-trade​-volume​-hits​-50m/. Track Persia. 2016. “Iran Recalls Ambassador to Nigeria.” May 26, 2016. https:// www​.trackpersia​.com​/iran​-recalls​-ambassador​-to​-nigeria/.

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Uche, Chidiebube. 2019. “Shia Islam Clampdown in Nigeria: A Recipe for Insurgency?” African Security Review. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/10246029​.2019​ .1707698. Zenn, Jacob, Barkindo, Atta, and Heras, Nicholas. 2013. “The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria.” The RUSI Journal, 158, no. 4: 46–53. http://dx​.doi​.org​ /10​.1080​/03071847​.2013​.826506.

Part II

OTHER COUNTRIES WITHIN AFRICA

Chapter 6

How Many Divisions? Soft Power, Personal Diplomacy and the Holy See Hendrik W. Ohnesorge

THE INVISIBLE LEGIONS OF THE POPE On 2 May 1935, the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed. Devised primarily to bridle an increasingly assertive Nazi Germany, the treaty, which went into effect ten months later, stipulated a mutual assistance clause between the two signatory powers (cf. Scott 1962). While an important diplomatic document by itself, it was in particular the question that Joseph Stalin, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, addressed to his negotiating partner, French foreign minister (and future prime minister) Pierre Laval, which achieved ever-lasting fame. During negotiations, after the number of French divisions on France’s Western Front had been satisfactorily discussed, Laval asked Stalin (in words brought down to us by Winston Churchill), ‘Can’t you do something to encourage religion and the Catholics in Russia? It would help me so much with the Pope’. Stalin’s reply went down in diplomatic history, ‘Oho! The Pope! How many divisions has he got?’ Looking back on this exchange, and once more illustrating his astuteness in matters of diplomacy and statecraft, Churchill mused that Laval ‘might certainly have mentioned a number of legions not always visible on parade’ (Churchill 1949, 121). The incumbent pope to whom Laval and Stalin referred was Pius XI (reg. 1922–1939). His later successor Pope John Paul II (reg. 1978–2005) perhaps exemplified these ‘invisible legions’ most powerfully about half a century later when he, if not caused, at least contributed to the fall of the Iron Curtain (cf. Weigel 2011, 183–184; Brown 2009, 475). In fact, none other than Mikhail Gorbachev, Stalin’s successor as leader of the Soviet Union, is 91

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known to have remarked in 1992 that ‘everything that happened in Eastern Europe in these last few years would have been impossible without this pope’ (Appleby 2000, 12). The pope did not draw on bayonets or tanks or missiles, not even on lira or rubles or dollars, but on another form of power: attractive soft power. Recalling the pope’s celebrated visit to his native Poland in June 1979 as well as his subsequent diplomatic efforts in Eastern Europe and around the globe, John Lewis Gaddis accordingly noted, [T]he material forms of power upon which the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies had lavished so much attention for so long – the nuclear weapons and missiles, the conventional military forces, the intelligence establishments, the military-industrial complexes, the propaganda machines – began to lose their potency. Real power rested, during the final decade of the Cold War, with leaders like John Paul II, whose mastery of intangibles – of such qualities as courage, eloquence, imagination, determination, and faith – allowed them to expose disparities between what people believed and the systems under which the Cold War had obliged them to live. The gaps were most glaring in the Marxist-Leninist world: so much so that when fully revealed there was no way to close them other than to dismantle communism itself, and thereby end the Cold War. (Gaddis 2005, 195–196)

These ‘intangibles’ will be at the very core of this chapter. It shall be explored by which means the pope has the power to act on the diplomatic stage. While a subject increasingly addressed in literature, authors have recently pointed out a lack of studies on how to conceptualize papal diplomacy and its influence in international relations (cf. Troy 2018, 523; 2016). As shall be demonstrated, the notion of soft power provides a promising conceptual vehicle in this endeavour. In this context, the notion of personal diplomacy (i.e. foreign travels, speechmaking, symbolic acts and international networks) gains centre-stage. First, it will be introduced conceptually and subsequently applied empirically, especially with respect to the current incumbent on the Chair of Saint Peter, Pope Francis and his personal diplomacy towards Africa. SOFT POWER AND PERSONAL DIPLOMACY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION A century ago, Max Weber defined power as the ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which that probability rests’ (Weber 1947, 152). Emphasizing the relational understanding of power,

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Robert A. Dahl subsequently put forth the formula, ‘A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl 1957, 202–203). More recently, Joseph S. Nye noted that power entails ‘the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants’ (Nye 2004, 2). Despite these classic definitions, however, power does not only constitute a central factor in (global) politics, it also remains one of the most controversial concepts in international affairs today (cf. Barnett and Duvall 2005, 39, 66). It is in this vein that Joseph S. Nye argues, ‘Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it’ (Nye 2004, 1). Mindful of this predicament, Nye saw need to elaborate and enhance the traditional understanding of power in international relations, particularly as the world saw the end of the Cold War and a fundamental resetting of the international political landscape (cf. Nye 2008, ix). Distinguishing between different varieties of power, Nye states that ‘there are several ways to affect the behavior of others. You can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want’ (Nye 2004, 2). While between them the former two constitute the variety of hard power, the latter way, i.e., soft power, refers to ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments’ (Nye 2004, x). Whereas hard power rests on military strength and economic prowess, Nye presents a tripartite classification of an actor’s fundamental soft power resources: ‘its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policy (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)’ (Nye 2004, 11). While widely shared by researchers today, a fourth and hitherto widely neglected soft power resource can be identified: the attractive power of individuals (cf. Ohnesorge 2020, 112–134). Correspondingly, the concept of personal diplomacy provides an attempt to grasp the functioning of soft power as exerted by an individual actor on the world stage (cf. Ohnesorge 2020, 160–171). Drawing on Nicholas J. Cull’s definitions of the five core components of public diplomacy (cf. Cull 2008, 32–34), personal diplomacy can be defined ‘as an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by visiting foreign decision-makers as well as publics and engaging actively with them through means of joint appearances, speechmaking, or symbolic acts’ (Ohnesorge 2020, 162). As such, it is actively pursued, for example, by representatives of states or other international actors and is practised in order to bring about desired outcomes in a strategic manner by the means of soft power. Four key aspects of personal diplomacy, frequently working hand in hand in practice, can be identified. (1) foreign travels, (2) speechmaking, (3) symbolic acts, and (4) networks.

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(1) Foreign travels refer to the practice of leading decision-makers as well as their emissaries visiting their respective counterparts or publics. Even though this mode of diplomatic interaction has been practised for ages, and is in fact at the very core of diplomacy, technological advances, especially those facilitating and accelerating international travel, have increased both its practice and its importance today. (2) The delivery of (prepared) speeches or (spontaneous) remarks by leading decision-makers frequently goes hand in hand with travels abroad. Speeches can address a particular issue, articulate one’s own interests and visions, and set the (global) agenda by highlighting the urgency of particular topics. Especially with the development of information and communication technologies, speechmaking, thus defined, has likewise increased both in its scope and its importance. Speeches, remarks or news conferences hence frequently transcend the audiences on-site, reach a global audience and are accessible around the world in real-time as well as retrospectively. Especially in view of social media platforms like Twitter, this component of personal diplomacy takes full effect in a globalized and increasingly deterritorialized world (cf. Narbo 2016, 90). (3) Symbolic acts are another important aspect in the practice of personal diplomacy, including wreath-laying ceremonies, symbolic gestures or the attendance of historically, culturally or symbolically significant sights or rituals. With them, an actor expresses his affinity to a local community and may create images far exceeding the specific venue. (4) The maintenance of (elite) networks, both local and global, constitutes a further component of personal diplomacy and thus the practice of soft power in international affairs. Such networks include alumni of academic exchange programmes, epistemic communities or transnational organizations. Frequently, such networks draw on long-established contacts and operate on an extended time frame, hence being above the vicissitudes of everyday politics. With these conceptual preliminaries on soft power and personal diplomacy in mind, the following will empirically address the soft power wielded by the Holy See, focusing in particular on the current incumbent on the Chair of Peter, Pope Francis, and his personal diplomacy towards Africa. THE POWER OF THE POPES: SOURCES, TRADITIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS Since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the central point of reference in international law is the sovereign state, and its ‘legal capacity is expressed at the

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international level mainly by maintaining diplomatic relations, participation in international organizations and concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements’ (Walczak 2016, 513). In this setting, a combination of factors renders the pope an actor like no other in international affairs (cf. Matlary 2001, 81). The Triple Crown of the Pope The pope plays three roles on the international stage simultaneously: First, he serves as ‘the uncontested central leader’ (Byrnes 2017, 10) of the Catholic Church, comprising about 1.3 billion believers and constituting an immensely influential and virtually universal (the literal meaning of ‘catholic’) network. With respect to Africa, its influence is particularly impressive and in fact rapidly growing. According to a 2015 study, the number of Catholics has increased from 783,660,000 in 1980 to 1,228,621,000 in 2012 (a 57 per cent increase) around the world, and whereas number in Europe grew by 6 per cent only, Africa’s Catholic population has increased by 238 per cent in that time period (cf. Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate 2015, 1). For 2020, the Catholic Church Statistics, published annually by the Agenzia Fides, lists 243,248,000 Catholics for Africa, an increase by 9.2 million (out of 15.7 million globally) compared to the previous year. At the same time, the number of priests on the continent has increased by 1,391. In both categories, Africa ranks as the strongest growing continent by far. (cf. Agenzia Fides 2020). Second, the pope is the elected absolute monarch of the Stato della Città del Vaticano, the Vatican City State, commonly shortened to Vatican in everyday use. Established as a sovereign state by the 1929 Lateran Treaty, it encompasses a territory of 0.44km2, has a population of about 850, and draws its standing in international affairs not from its size but rather from cultural, social, or spiritual sources (cf. Walczak 2016, 513; Rieck and Niebuhr 2015, 43). Third, and of special importance in this chapter, the pope heads the Holy See: Frequently denoted ‘[t]he “real” actor in world politics’, it ‘is a separate legal entity that ‘has’ a state – the Vatican City State – but is none’ (Barbato and Joustra 2017, 2). The Holy See constitutes an undisputed subject of international law, and ‘in accordance with canon 361 of the Code of Canon Law, in the strict sense, is understood to be the person of the Roman Pontiff, or in the broader sense, the Pope together with the authorities to support him in carrying out his mission: the Secretariat of State and other institutions of the Roman Curia’ (Walczak 2016, 513–514). Today, the Holy See maintains full diplomatic relations with 183 states, including 51 states in Africa (excluding only the Comoros, Mauritania and Somalia), and enjoys observer status in a variety of international organizations, including the United Nations Organization (cf. Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations 2021).

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While different in terms of their subjectivity and power sources in international law, the three entities share ‘an internal bond’ (Walczak 2016, 513): the pope himself, who is at the same time head of the Catholic Church, head of state of the Vatican City State, and head of the Holy See (cf. Rieck and Niebuhr 2015, 44; Troy 2010, 496). The pope, arguably unmatched by any other individual in the world, therefore is in an eminent position to act as a personal diplomat on the international stage. Papal Diplomacy Then and Now Papal diplomacy looks back upon centuries, even millennia of successful practice. According to tradition, the first official papal delegate was sent to the outer Roman province of Illyria in the second half of the fourth century by Pope Damasus I (reg. 366–384) (cf. Walczak 2016, 491). Over the course of the following centuries, papal diplomacy was increasingly professionalized and gradually extended its influence around the world. In the twentieth century, the foundations of modern papal diplomacy were laid with the 1929 Lateran Treaty (cf. Walczak 2016, 496–497; Troy 2010, 492). Yet another milestone for papal diplomacy occurred in the 1960s, when the Second Ecumenical Council of the Vatican redefined the Holy See’s role in the world, emphasizing the need for (internal) reform as well as (global) dialogue (cf. Rieck and Niebuhr 2015, 47; Walczak 2016, 497; Troy 2010, 497). The incumbent at the opening of the Council in 1962, Pope John XXIII (reg. 1958–1963), il Papa buono, thus repeatedly expressed his view that for the church ‘the time had come to open the windows and let in some fresh air’ (Sullivan 2002, 17). At that time, proceeding from the Second Vatican Council and its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes), increasing attention was paid to the developing world (cf. Crespo and Gregory 2020, 121). Henceforth, the issues of environmentalism, social inequality, and conflict resolution gained centre-stage in the Holy See’s outlook on the world, and consequently in papal diplomacy. It was not least John’s successor, Pope Paul VI (reg. 1963–1978), who indeed ‘opened the windows’ to the world with the instruments of personal diplomacy, most prominently perhaps with his international travels and speeches, among them his trip to the Holy Land in 1964 as well as his muchnoticed address before the United Nations General Assembly in 1965 (cf. Lynch 2020, 359; Troy 2010, 497). With Paul VI, unprecedented attention was paid to the person of the pontiff himself, both within papal diplomacy, now increasingly understood by the Holy See as a strategic instrument, as well as in its perception around the world. Foreign travels and speechmaking, constituting two premier components of personal diplomacy, now came to the very forefront of papal diplomacy.

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Concerning the former, the very presence of the pope has long been recognized a crucial component of papal diplomacy, its foundations reaching back even to the gospels and Saint Peter himself (cf. Mt. 16, 18; Lk, 22, 32) (cf. Walczak 2010, 498; Lynch 2020, 359). The early papacy usually resorted to the appointment of legates and missions abroad. A pope travelling outside Italy or even far from the pomerium of Rome was, in fact, highly unusual, with only a few, albeit notable exceptions throughout the ages (cf. Lynch 2020, 359). After technological advancement increased the possibilities, speed and comforts in international travel, however, the papacy applied this instrument extensively, providing it with unprecedented purview (cf. Barbato 2016, 393). Connected with these developments were advances in information and communication technologies. Accordingly, papal travels not only continue to attract crowds around the world, but due to the tremendous media attention surrounding them ‘their impact is magnified and is able to generate interest well beyond the nations that popes visit’ (Lynch 2020, 361). Concerning speechmaking, this component of personal diplomacy again has a long tradition in papal diplomacy and statecraft. An early example includes the Council of Clermont in 1095, during which Pope Urban II (reg. 1088–1099) appealed to his audience to take up arms in order to reconquer the Holy Land, resulting in the First Crusade (1096–1099) (cf. Munro 1906, 231–242). In fact, ‘papal speeches addressed to the heads of states or ambassadors delivered during the official audiences at the Vatican, as well as the apostolic journeys abroad of His Holiness’ have been recognized as key ‘diplomatic-external documents of the Holy See’ (Walczak 2016, 496). Today, like foreign travels, their importance has dramatically increased. As Anthony A. Byrnes has noted, the pope’s ‘every utterance is intensely covered by the global media, and his voice is greatly magnified by the institutional mechanisms and sovereign standing of his global church’ (Byrnes 2017, 15). In a 2009 cable subsequently published by Wikileaks (Vatileaks), the U.S. Embassy in the Vatican in this very sense reported to President Barack Obama, ‘As the spiritual leader of 1.3 billion Catholics worldwide and enjoying respect as well from non-Catholics, the Pope wields an unparalleled moral megaphone’ (The Guardian 2010). No pope had used these instruments of personal diplomacy so skilfully and so strategically as the charismatic John Paul II (reg. 1978–2005), who travelled extensively during his pontificate (cf. Lynch 2020, 360; Matlary 2001, 87; Troy 2010, 498). His successor Benedict XVI (reg. 2005–2013) continued along these lines, also addressing novel trends in international relations including global terrorism, when speaking, for example, before the United Nations (cf. Lynch 2020, 360). In fact, not only the practice but also the scope of action of papal diplomacy has drastically increased after the end of the Cold War (cf. Rieck and Niebuhr 2015, 49). In the twenty-first century,

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more than ever before, the pope has truly become a global figure. According to one observer, he even holds claim to being ‘[o]ne of the best known human beings on earth’ (Byrnes 2017, 8). By means of personal diplomacy, the pope is wielding an influence in our globalized and interdependent world today not based on the size of the territory he rules or the material resources he commands but by means of his attractive soft power. Perhaps nobody on the Chair of Peter has understood this power better – and applied it more widely – than the current incumbent. Pope Francis: Soft Power on the World Stage When Pope Benedict XVI abdicated in February 2013, the conclave met to select a new pontiff under conditions unprecedented for half a millennium. To most observers, the election of the new pope, who took the name of Francis, came as a considerable surprise. At the time, the church was faced with a variety of challenges, including ‘the poor handling of the sex abuse scandals, internal power struggles revealed in what came to be known as Vatileaks, and financial improprieties by the Holy See’s banking operations’ (Crespo and Gregory 2020, 115). Francis, with his own biography and outlook, promised to enter into a new era, not least against the backdrop of these challenges. As Guy J. Golan, Phillip C. Arceneaux, and Megan Soule have recently noted, ‘The election of Pope Francis offered the embattled church with the opportunity to mend relationships with faithful in such regions as Latin America and Africa where it faces harsh competition and loss of membership to Protestantism’ (Golan, Arceneaux, and Soule 2019, 109). The Pope Goes Global No wonder, therefore, that Francis’s inauguration in March 2013 became a global spectacle, drawing 200,000 people to the Pontifical Holy Mess in St. Peter’s Square as well as 132 delegations from governments around the world (cf. Rieck and Niebuhr 2015, 62). Of course, the election and inauguration of a pope is always international news, but this time a combination of factors contributed to a special atmosphere: Francis, born Jorge Mario Bergoglio in Buenos Aires, became the first Latin American as well as the first Jesuit on the Chair of Saint Peter (cf. Rieck and Niebuhr 2015, 60). Due to his own background, he has been able to connect in new ways to audiences around the world which had in the past felt excluded from the attention of the Holy See, especially in Latin America and Africa (cf. Golan et al. 2019, 100). Additionally, the charismatic pope actively engaged in personal diplomacy from the start and, according to one observer, ‘has aggressively and persistently inserted himself – and by extension the Church he leads – into global policy debates on issues ranging from climate change, to migration,

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to the role of the family, to the definitions of economic justice and injustice’ (Byrnes 2017, 8). The influence of papal personal diplomacy has consequently increased considerably under Francis’s aegis. According to another cable sent from the U.S. Embassy, American diplomats even reported home that despite the disparity in size, governance, and history, we are both global powers, with global interests and influence. From many points of view, the [Holy See] is unique to the world in its ability to pursue its own agenda. The Vatican, with its diplomatic relations [. . . ] is second only to the United States. (Troy 2018, 522)

This new-found power does not solely spring from the institution that Francis has been heading since 2013. Rather, it flows to a considerable degree from his own persona, his background and international bearing. From the start, Francis has thus made a point to project a more humble image, very much in line with his own background and the papal name he chose, with a series of highly symbolic acts, ranging ‘[f]rom moving out of the papal apartments and embracing a humbler lifestyle, to washing the feet during Holy Week of social outcasts, to addressing Presidential Candidate Donald Trump on his treatment of migrants and refugees’ (Crespo and Gregory 2020, 122). Himself being, in view of the century-old traditions of the Holy See, an ‘outsider in the literal sense [and] exemplifying the end of the long history of Eurocentrism’ (Troy 2016), Francis has been in a powerful position to reshape Holy See strategic narratives and papal diplomacy indeed. According to Jodok Troy, while John Paul II had been ‘a globetrotter’, Francis consequently became ‘the first true “global pope”’ (Troy 2016; cf. Franco 2013, 71–77). After taking office, he ‘would soon embark on several high-profile international visits aimed at both engaging foreign publics and repositioning the Catholic Church’s image’ (Golan et al. 2019, 95). As Golan, Arceneaux and Soule continue: As the first non-European pope, Pope Francis had the potential to reorient and redefine perceptions of the Catholic Church away from its longstanding image as a historic colonial hegemon whose behaviour often fell short of living up to its rhetoric. This shift is particularly relevant to audiences in the formerly colonised regions of South America and Africa, where the Pope’s speeches were concentrated. (Golan et al. 2019, 96)

PERSONAL DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER: THE CASE OF AFRICA As argued above, matters of climate change, social inequality, as well as conflict resolution are among the chief issues of concern to the pontificate of

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Francis – and the pope soon chose his itinerary in order to lend weight to his ambitious agenda (cf. Lynch 2020, 358–359). While a detailed analysis of the pope’s travel diplomacy might be the topic for another treatise, a look at the countries visited so far, especially when compared to his predecessors, bears testimony to this assessment (see Table 6.1).​ Out of a total of thirty-two travels undertaken by Pope Francis outside Italy up to the end of 2019, four travels took the pope to Africa, where he visited eight countries in total (see Table 6.2). Accordingly, figures far exceed those of his predecessor, Pope Benedict XVI, during a comparable period of time. Rather, they approximate his pre-predecessors, Pope John Paul II, indicating a renewed attentiveness to the continent. After his first trip to Africa, homewardbound to the Vatican, Pope Francis thus reminded journalists aboard his plane: Exploitation! Africa is a martyr. She is a martyr to exploitation in history. Those who say that from Africa [sic] is the home of all calamities and all wars do not understand well, perhaps, the damage that humanity has done to certain forms of development. And it is for this reason that I love Africa, because Africa has been a victim of other powers. (Francis 2019)​

In fact, among his four journeys to Africa, Francis’s first visit to the continent was perhaps most widely anticipated. While Francis selected three countries (Kenya, Uganda and the Central African Republic), as one commentator Table 6.1  Journeys Outside Italy: Popes Paul VI through Francis Paul VI Pontificate Length (in days) Travels Outside Italy Countries or Territories Visited Travels to Africa African Countries Visited Travels/Year in Office Travels to Africa/ Total African Countries Visited/Total

John Paul II

Benedict XVI

Francis*

21 June 1963– 6 Aug. 1978 5,521 9 18

16 Oct. 1978– 2 Apr. 2005 9,658 104 126

19 Apr. 2005– 13 Mar. 2013– 28 Feb. 2013 31 Dec. 2019 2,870 2,484 24 32 23 48

1 1

16 35

2 3

4 8

0.6

3.93

3.05

4.7

1/9 = 0.11

16/104 = 0.15 2/24 = 0.08

4/32 = 0.13

1/18 = 0.06

35/126 = 0.28 3/23 = 0.13

8/48 = 0.17

Source: Based on data retrieved from The Holy See. n.d. ‘The Holy Father’. http://www​.vatican​.va​/holy​ _father​/index​.htm. * For Pope Francis, the period under review ends on 31 December 2019, since the global COVID-19 pandemic has foiled all of his international travel plans in 2020 and early 2021.

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observed, ‘it should be noted that the visit was for the whole continent but for practical reasons few lucky countries had to be selected’. In fact, as that commentator, Odomaro Mubangizi, went on, Francis’s visit was highly symbolic and far exceeded the immediate countries he visited: The Pope used Africa as a platform to air his views of global concern to whoever cared to listen, especially the global policy makers. The Pope was basically pleading the cause of Africa before the international community, but also assuring the ordinary African people that he is on their side. The Pope’s challenge goes both to the local and international leaders to take Africa seriously and address its pressing needs of marginalization, insecurity, sectarianism, and inequality amidst plenty. These issues cannot be addressed without a global compact of sorts. (Mubangizi 2015)

During this trip, the pope drew global attention to the three issues of climate change, social inequality and peace and reconciliation, which lie at the very heart of his pontificate. As has become evident in his statements, Francis does not regard these to be separate issues but rather interconnected ones that, taken together, have disastrous effects on the African continent in particular. Regarding the first, Pope Francis has become one of the world’s most forceful voices on climate change. In the much-noted Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’, strategically published in 24 May 2015, as the world anticipated the United Nations Climate Change Conference to be held in Paris later that year, Francis declared unequivocally, ‘If present trends continue, this century may well witness extraordinary climate change and an unprecedented destruction of ecosystems, with serious consequences for all of us’ (Francis 2015a, 20). Repeatedly, Francis has tied climate change to social inequality, especially with respect to the Global South (Lynch 2020, 364). In his 2015 encyclical he hence noted: Inequity affects not only individuals but entire countries; it compels us to consider an ethics of international relations. A true ‘ecological debt’ exists, particularly between the global north and south, connected to commercial imbalances Table 6.2  Journeys to Africa by Pope Francis No.

Destination(s)

11 18 28 31

Kenya, Uganda, the Central African Republic Egypt Morocco Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius

Dates 25 November–30 November 2015 28 April–29 April 2017 30 March–31 March 2019 4 September–10 September 2019

Source: Based on data retrieved from The Holy See. n.d. ‘The Holy Father’. http://www​.vatican​.va​/holy​ _father​/index​.htm.

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with effects on the environment, and the disproportionate use of natural resources by certain countries over long periods of time. (Francis 2015a, 36–37)

A clear indication of Francis’s soft power, the pope’s invocation did not go unnoticed, in Africa and around the world. For example, the Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND), a German nongovernmental organization dedicated to matters of sustainability and environmental protection, issued a press release in response, calling the papal encyclical a ‘wake-up call’ and demanding its recognition in the upcoming Paris climate negotiations (BUND 2015). In fact, African negotiators in particular successfully made the North–South divide, the issue of ecological debt, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) cornerstones in their Paris negotiations (cf. Huggins and Lewis 2018, 104–106; Karl 2018, 225–228). During his first trip to Africa, undertaken as climate negotiations in Paris commenced, Francis forcefully elaborated on these matters by means of personal diplomacy. In Nairobi’s Kangemi slum, for example, he stated, ‘The social and environmental debt owed to the poor of cities can be paid by respecting their sacred right to the “three Ls”: Land, Lodging, Labour. This is not a question of philanthropy; rather it is a moral duty incumbent upon all of us’ (Francis 2015b). According to observers, his words were not only well chosen but also drew global attention to the communities he visited (cf. Lynch 2020, 364). Besides the first two topics, the third major theme in Francis’s personal diplomacy, that is, peace and reconciliation, has been a constant throughout church history (cf. Walczak 2016, 522). In fact, it is at the very core of the Gospel itself (cf. Matlary 2001, 92). The pope in particular is in an exceptional position to serve as mediator or ‘honest broker’ between quarreling parties (cf. Troy 2010, 505; Rieck and Niebuhr 2015, 52). As Mariano Barbato and Robert Joustra have recently noted, ‘No purely material theory can make sense of the mystery of the human condition, its evils, or its joys, and no purely secular diplomacy is fit for the work of mediation, repentance, and reconciliation’ (Barbato and Joustra 2017, 2). While examples in this tradition reach back millennia (including the legendary meeting between Pope Leo the Great and Attila the Hun in 452 A.D. (cf. Norwich 2012, 22–23)), it was Pope John Paul II who ‘has chosen an active role in world politics in the areas of peace-making and human rights like no other pope before him’ (Matlary 2001, 87). With his call to peace and tolerance between the religions and in view of sectarian violence, in particular with respect to Africa, Pope Francis has followed in these footsteps. Again, his first trip to Africa proved highly indicative: His 2015 visits to Kenya and the Central African Republic thus

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highlighted the pope’s ‘plans to stride even more boldly into a hornet’s nest of religious hatred’, even as concerns regarding his security arose against the backdrop of tensions in both countries (cf. Fabricius 2015). During this trip, the pope extensively drew on the powers of personal diplomacy: In his visit to the Refugee Camp of Saint Sauveur in Bangui he declared, ‘We must work and pray and do everything possible for peace. But without love, without friendship, without tolerance, without forgiveness, peace is not possible’ (Francis 2015c). On meeting with the Muslim Community in Bangui the following day, Francis affirmed, Christians and Muslims are brothers and sisters. We must therefore consider ourselves and conduct ourselves as such. [. . .] Together, we must say no to hatred, no to revenge and no to violence, particularly that violence which is perpetrated in the name of a religion or of God himself. God is peace, God salam. (Francis 2015d)

Besides these prime examples of speechmaking, the pope also engaged in highly symbolic acts – and again with considerable success. One observer thus noted recently, ‘In the Central African Republic, Francis was able to have a positive impact on the Muslim-Christian tensions and made the powerful periphery gesture to open the Holy Door of the Cathedral of Brazzaville to mark the beginning of the Extraordinary Holy Year of Mercy’ (Barbato 2020, 13). During his more recent trip to Mozambique in 2019, Pope Francis emphatically reaffirmed this commitment to peace and reconciliation (cf. Horowitz 2019). Again, this particular papal journey was highly anticipated and the imminent visit by Pope Francis featured prominently during the signing of the 6 August Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation between Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) leader Ossufo Momade (cf. Vines 2019). The fact that the pope had planned to visit South Sudan in 2020, a design that came to naught amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, indicates his persistent engagement in peace and reconciliation efforts on the African continent (cf. Agenzia Fides 2019). All things considered, the fact that international papal travels for the period under observation average an unprecedented 4.7 journeys per year, with a particular focus on the Global South, illustrates the pope’s application of the traditional components of personal diplomacy, especially in his advocacy of the three issues particularly close to Francis’s heart. Ultimately, a further example of the extensive application of personal diplomacy, albeit in its twenty-first century, digital incarnation, shall briefly be addressed: Twitter. Pope Francis has an impressive 50 million followers on the social media platform across his nine accounts, tweeting in English

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(@Pontifex), Polish, German, French, Portuguese, Italian, Arabic, Spanish and Latin. Among world leaders currently in office, Francis comes in second in terms of his followers, surpassed only by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (63 million) (cf. Twiplomacy 2020). Again, this outreach demonstrates the truly universal approach taken by the current pope’s personal diplomacy (cf. Narbo 2016, 98). While Benedict XVI was the first pope to use Twitter in December 2012 (cf. Narbo 2016, 97), Francis has certainly expanded its use both qualitatively and quantitatively. Additionally, despite the occasional criticism that his Twitter activity is predominantly one-sided (cf. Giangravé 2019), a 2014 Pew Research Center study found ‘that on Twitter, where the conversation is often negative, 85 per cent of the opinions referring to Pope Francis have been either neutral or positive’ (Narbo 2016, 97). In the final analysis, with his unprecedented recourse to the instrument of personal diplomacy, skilfully combining its constituent components of foreign travels, speechmaking, and symbolic acts and directed towards Africa and the Global South to a special degree, Pope Francis has demonstrated that he profoundly understands the instruments of soft power in international relations today. CONCLUSIONS When Pope Francis was elected in March 2013, an expectant world looked towards the first non-European upon the Chair of Saint Peter and a restart in the Holy See’s relations to the world was in sight. Indeed, as Francis’s subsequent diplomatic efforts have demonstrated, the pontiff, in the term used by Pope John XXIII, ‘opened the windows’ to the world. During his travels, and in his personal diplomacy at large, Francis is usually greeted enthusiastically and has established an overwhelmingly positive image around the world. In fact, a 2016 WIN/Gallup poll found that Pope Francis had become the world’s most popular leader, far transcending Catholicism and being held in high esteem globally (cf. Cornwell 2016). Different developments contribute to the considerable degree of soft power emanating from papal diplomacy under Francis: First, while some of it flows from the peculiar institution of the papacy itself, it is the personal characteristics of the respective pontiff which lends particular weight to it (cf. Rieck and Niebuhr 2015, 60). In this regard, the charismatic pope from Argentina is in an eminent position to act as a personal diplomat. Second, developments in information and communication technologies in an ever-closer and interdependent world further add to the clout of the Holy See in international affairs today.

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Against this backdrop, Pope Francis has become involved in a wide array of contemporary issues by the means of personal diplomacy and soft power. In this context, a triad of interdependent issues forms the very core of Francis’s agenda: climate change, social inequality, as well as international peace building and reconciliation. With his comprehensive and strategic application of the instruments of personal diplomacy, Pope Francis has demonstrated a virtually unprecedented commitment to these issues, highlighting their importance through symbolic acts, travels and speeches around the world. In doing so, Francis has not only connected these issues but also put previously marginalized regions to the very top of his agenda, including Latin America and Africa. In particular, Francis has indicated a renewed interest in Africa, an observation that holds true for the 240 million Catholics but also for members of other denominations on the continent, whom the pope has routinely included in his personal diplomacy efforts. In doing so, Francis has been engaged in foreign travels, speechmaking, and a number of highly symbolic acts that have drawn global attention to some of the continent’s most pressing challenges. As indicated by the above analysis, these efforts have already come to fruition to a considerable degree, particularly with respect to the issues of peace and reconciliation as well as climate change. With his ability to both address the highest decision-makers and speak to some of the world’s most vulnerable and neglected communities, Francis has thus become the Pontifex Maximus in the truest sense of the term, a premier bridge builder and soft power has become his prime modus operandi in this endeavour. Future developments will show whether Francis will be able to build on his successes. Even today, however, it is certain that Pope Francis understands the powers of attraction in international relations better perhaps than any other pope before him (cf. Crespo and Gregory 2020, 129). When François Cacault, Napoleon Bonaparte’s envoy to Rome, asked how to deal with Pope Pius VII (reg. 1800–1823), the First Consul of France advised him to treat the pope as if he had 200,000 men (cf. Cronin 1973, 278). Today, the attractive forces of the pope stand unabated and his soft power and personal diplomacy may be more potent than ever before. In short, Napoleon’s verdict, not Stalin’s, has stood the test of time. REFERENCES Agenzia Fides. 2019. “Peace Agreement and Pope Francis’ Visit Giving Hope to the People of South Sudan.” Vatican News, December 6, 2019. https://www​.vaticannews​.va​/en​/africa​/news​/2019​-12​/peace​-agreement​-and​-pope​-francis​-visit​-giving​ -hope​-to​-the​-peopl​.html.

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Francis. 2015a. “Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father Francis on Care for Our Common Home.” Rome, Saint Peter’s, May 24, 2015. http://www​.vatican​ .va​/content​/dam​/francesco​/pdf​/encyclicals​/documents​/papa​-francesco​_20150524​ _enciclica​-laudato​-si​_en​.pdf. Francis. 2015b. “Visit to Kangemi Slum: Address of His Holiness Pope Francis.” Nairobi, Kenya, November 27, 2015. http://www​.vatican​.va​/content​/francesco​/en​ /speeches​/2015​/november​/documents​/papa​-francesco​_20151127​_kenya​-kangemi​ .html. Francis. 2015c. “Visit to the Refugee Camp of Saint Sauveur: Greeting of the Holy Father.” Bangui, Central African Republic, November 29, 2015. http://www​.vatican​.va​/content​/francesco​/en​/speeches​/2015​/november​/documents​/papa​-francesco​ _20151129​_repubblica​-centrafricana​-campo​-profughi​.html. Francis. 2015d. “Meeting With the Muslim Community: Address of His Holiness Pope Francis.” Central Mosque of Koudoukou, Bangui, Central African Republic, November 30, 2015. http://www​.vatican​.va​/content​/francesco​/en​/speeches​/2015​/ november​/documents​/papa​-francesco​_20151130​_repubblica​-centrafricana​-musulmani​.html. Francis. 2019. “Vatican Information Service Bulletin.” The Criterion Online Edition, Archdiocese of Indianapolis, December 1, 2019. https://www​.archindy​.org​/criterion​/vatican​/2015​/vis1201​.html. Franco, Massimo. 2013. “The First Global Pope.” Survival 55, no. 3: 71–77. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1080​/00396338​.2013​.802853. Gaddis, John Lewis. 2005. The Cold War. London: Penguin Books. Giangravé, Claire. 2019. “Seven Years in, Pope’s Twitter Account Garners Success, Criticism and Comic Mishaps.” Religion News Service, December 12, 2019. https://religionnews​.com​/2019​/12​/12​/seven​-years​-in​-popes​-twitter​-account​-garners​-success​-criticism​-and​-comic​-mishaps/. Golan, Guy J., Phillip C. Arceneaux, and Megan Soule. 2019. “The Catholic Church as a Public Diplomacy Actor: An Analysis of the Pope’s Strategic Narrative and International Engagement.” The Journal of International Communication 25, no. 1: 95–115. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13216597​.2018​.1517657. Horowitz, Jason. 2019. “Pope Francis, in Africa, Urges Mozambique to Put Past Tensions Aside.” The New York Times, September 5, 2019. Updated September 6, 2019. https://www​.nytimes​.com​/2019​/09​/05​/world​/africa​/pope​-africa​-photos​.html. Huggins, Anna, and Bridget Lewis. 2018. “The Paris Agreement: Development, the North-South Divide and Human Rights.” In Intellectual Property and Clean Energy: The Paris Agreement and Climate Justice, edited by Matthew Rimmer, 93–113. Singapore: Springer Nature. Karl, Timo. 2018. “‘Bottom-Up’-Ansatz statt ‘Top-down’-Kategorisierung: Die Integration umweltbedingter Personenbewegung in die Struktur des ParisAbkommens.” In Flucht, Transit, Asyl: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf ein Europäisches Versprechen, edited by Ursula Bitzegeio, Frank Decker, Sandra Fischer, and Thorsten Stolzenberg, 218–233. Bonn: Dietz. Lynch, Andrew P. 2020. “A Global Papacy: The International Travels of Pope Francis and Geopolitics.” In Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion,

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Troy, Jodok. 2018. “‘The Pope’s Own Hand Outstretched:’ Holy See Diplomacy as a Hybrid Mode of Diplomatic Agency.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 3: 521–539. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1177​ /1369148118772247. Twiplomacy. 2020. “The 50 Most Followed World Leader.” Data Collected on November 9, 2020. https://twiplomacy​.com​/ranking​/the​-50​-most​-followed​-world​ -leaders​-on​-twitter/. Vines, Alex. 2019. “Hope, Peace and Reconciliation: Pope Francis in Mozambique.” Chatham House, September 4, 2019. https://www​.chathamhouse​.org​/2019​/09​/hope​ -peace​-and​-reconciliation​-pope​-francis​-mozambique. Walczak, Roman. 2016. “Papal Diplomacy: Characteristics of the Key Issues in Canon Law and International Law.” The Jurist 76, no. 2: 489–529. Weber, Max. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Edited With an Introduction by Talcott Parsons. New York, NY: Free Press. Weigel, George. 2011. The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II – The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy. New York, NY: Image. All Online Resources Were Last Accessed on February 26, 2021.

Chapter 7

Religion and Soft Power in African Foreign Policy Morocco’s New Religious Diplomacy towards Nigeria Mathieu Rowsell

For many scholars, and especially for realist and neo-realist scholars, anarchy has become ‘a fundamental, defining, and analytical feature of IR’ (Kolsmas 2018, 507; Mearsheimer 2014; Lake 2007). While this ‘defining feature’ of international relations (IR) is still popular in the discipline, there is an increasing number of scholars who argue that the concept of anarchy does not accurately represent the international system and presents an inaccurate model of the interactions between states (Kolsmas 2018; Musgrave and Nexon 2018; Mattern and Zarakol 2016). Postcolonial and African scholars have especially criticized this ‘Eurocentric’ vision of global politics (Sindjoun 1999). For example, Barkawi (2016) and Grosser (2016) emphasize that the international system was long dominated by imperial entities that maintained strong relations of superiority over their peripheries (Grosser 2010, 8–9). If we rely on this critical perspective, the structure of the international system has historically been hierarchical rather than anarchic (e.g. an empire that imposes its will on its colonies/peripheries). While this hierarchical vision of the international system has been aptly applied to historical phenomena, a growing number of IR scholars have applied this concept to contemporary situations (Mattern and Zarakol 2016; Macdonald 2018; Nexon and Neumann 2018; Lake 2007). In recent years, the concept of hierarchy has been instrumental in opening the field of IR to different ways of thinking and conceptualizing relations between states (and between states and non-state actors) (Mattern and Zarakol 2016). Indeed, by applying the concept of hierarchy, these scholars try to respond to the ‘analytic insufficiencies of anarchy-centered theories’ and the ‘reductionist 111

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approach to studying world politics’ that characterizes the IR discipline (Mattern and Zarakol 2016, 624; Kolsmas 2018, 508). Some scholars agree that the concept of hierarchy can broaden our analysis of the international system and of international processes, because a hierarchical structure influences relation between states differently than other power structures (Mattern and Zarakol 2016, 624). By acknowledging the relevance of the theories of hierarchy in studying the relations between states, we can ‘incorporate new actors, systems, and processes in world politics (such as socialization, integration, deconstruction of the state, etc.)’ (Kolsmas 2018, 508; Mattern and Zarakol 2016, 629). Hierarchy also helps to bridge the eternal analytic divide in IR between the domestic and the international sphere (Mattern and Zarakol 2016, 630; Lake 2007, 50). As Musgrave and Nexon (2018, 594) proposes, ‘we need to attenuate—if not abandon—the assumption that relations among states are fundamentally distinctive from relations within them’. While there seems to be some consensus concerning the analytical productivity of the concept of hierarchy for the discipline, the definition of the term remains a hotly contested debate. For this chapter, I will use a broad definition of the term, where hierarchy is conceptualized as a structure of ‘vertical stratification’ that creates an asymmetry of power or position between actors (states and non-state agents) (Mattern and Zarakol 2016, 633; Musgrave and Nexon 2018, 594; Macdonald 2018, 134; Suzuki 2017; Sharman 2017, 141). These unequal power relations also build situations of super- and subordination between the actors in each level of the hierarchy (Musgrave and Nexon 2018, 594; Mattern and Zarakol 2016, 633). I argue that by putting the concept of hierarchy at the forefront of our analysis, challenges us to not only think vertically but also relationally. While many studies have been useful at unpacking the nature of hierarchy and the effect of hierarchy on actors’ behavioural changes, most of these studies remain Eurocentric and focused on ‘the Great powers’. Indeed, there is a clear lack of scholarship (except perhaps Sharman’s analysis on microstates) on hierarchical relations between ‘small’ or ‘weak’ states, and notably on African states (Sharman 2017). Furthermore, focusing on the hierarchical relations between states and non-state actors can be a useful framework through which to study the mobilization of soft power in foreign policy. The concept of soft power that was first introduced to political science by Nye (2004) can be a useful tool to understand more completely how hierarchy can be established and reproduced in the international sphere. More specifically, for the purpose of this chapter, I am interested in analysing the intersection of religion, soft power and hierarchy. According to Nye (2004), one of the core features of soft power, when compared to hard power, is that it is non-coercive. Instead, soft power works under the guise of attraction or influence. The resources that a state can leverage for the purpose of soft power include: ‘its culture (in places when it is attractive to others), its

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political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)’ (Nye 2004, 11). While there has been extensive research on the use of soft power by various states and non-state actors (ranging from sport diplomacy, to the influence of media and movies, to tourism), there is a clear lack of scholarship on the use of religion as a tool or instrument of soft power. Religious soft power, also referred to as faith-based diplomacy, is particularly powerful because it mobilizes different soft power resources (as identified by Nye). Indeed, religious traditions can be an element of a state’s culture, on the one hand, while also being universal in nature. Religion can be a great tool for foreign policy, by bringing not only moral authority and legitimacy but also by creating hierarchical relations between those states who possess the ‘correct’ interpretation of a particular faith, and those states who do not. For example, Roman Catholic countries in Latin America which uphold the dictates of the Holy See may treat those which do not as inferior. Therefore, this chapter seeks to contribute to the literature on the use of religion as an instrument of soft power by focusing on Morocco’s new religious influence in Africa. Indeed, during the past few years, the Kingdom of Morocco has spent a considerable amount of resources (material and symbolic) to rebrand itself as the leader in the ‘fight against radicalization’ and as an exporter of a ‘moderate vision of Islam’ on the African continent. Many African countries have accepted Morocco’s leadership on the matter and have even sent their imams to the Kingdom of Morocco to receive Islamic clerical training. Thus, the influence of Morocco’s religious diplomacy in Africa is not only discursive or ideational it also has material and corporal dimensions. I will analyse how Morocco has been able to construct and promote the idea that it has a superior religious status vis-à-vis other African states, in order to improve its political and diplomatic standing on the continent and in the international community. This faith-based diplomacy has been remarkably successful, since Morocco has been able to build new diplomatic relationships with African countries that have not traditionally been its allies, like Nigeria. To better understand how faith diplomacy is used by Morocco in different African states, this chapter draws on my fieldwork in Morocco, where I conducted interviews with Moroccan diplomatic and religious leaders, as well as with Nigerian students who were training to become imams. MOROCCO’S CONSTRUCTION OF A ‘MODERATE’ AND EXPORTABLE ISLAM Studies in international relations are rarely interested in the foreign policy of the Global South, preferring to look instead at relations between major world powers (Waltz 1979; Lascurettes 2020). Meanwhile, small states have a

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foreign policy worthy of theoretical study to understand the political dynamics between countries and non-state actors in the international sphere. They can also be part of the broader international system and create hierarchical arrangements. For example, facing the global rise of radical Islam, Moroccan leaders have chosen to develop a strategy of differentiating themselves from this form of Islam. This strategy is reflected in speeches depicting Moroccan Islam as a ‘moderate’ or ‘enlightened’, in order to ‘preserve the spiritual security of Morocco’ (Haddad 2016; Grosrichard 2016). This official discourse is manifested through the implementation of institutional mechanisms whose function is to regulate the religious field through the elaboration of a religious public diplomacy (Wainscott 2017). The attempts made by the palace (le Palais or makhzen) to control or regulate its religious field are far from recent. Indeed, Tozy (2009) states that since independence in 1956, elites have intimately tied Islam to the Moroccan nation itself. After independence, the monarchs have tried to assume exclusive control of the religious field. They partly succeeded, since the Moroccan constitution legitimizes the monarch’s status as Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-m’ouminine) (Tozy 1999; Maghraoui 2009; Régragui 2013). In this sense, the religious and foreign policy fields are traditionally seen as the ‘reserved’ areas (domaine réservé) of the king and continue to be controlled by the king in practice. The religious field has always been a tool used by the palace to legitimize the king’s domination in the political sphere. This explains why the religious field has always taken an outsized place in Moroccan politics (Musgrave and Nexon 2018, 593). The title of Commander of the Faithful, combined with the prophetic ancestry (sharif) of the king, can be conceptualized as symbolic capital, able to legitimize the domination of the king in the religious field in Morocco (and in some cases, even abroad). It would be fair to say that the makhzen occupies the highest positions in the religious field, and it is able to greatly influence and shape not only the agents who can enter and compete in the field, it can also exclude (to a certain degree) the players it finds undesirable. Indeed, King Hassan II instrumentalized the Moroccan religious sphere in the 1970s and 1980s, in order to legitimize his power by relying on traditional ulamas (religious clerics) and a Salafi-oriented conception of Islam, while marginalizing the Sufi brotherhoods who were historically major players in the religious, political, and military fields in the country (Tozy 2009, 66; El-Katiri 2013, 35; Bekkaoui and Larémont 2011, 32). The rise of the salafist ideology and movement in Morocco’s religious landscape is still felt today, but they have been greatly discredited since they have been associated with ‘fundamentalist’ and jihadi-takfiri groups in the country. However, with the ascension of King Mohammed VI to the throne in 1999, the religious field in Morocco changed greatly. There has been a significant reform or ‘restructuring’ of the Moroccan religious field by the palace since

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2004. The main characteristic of this reform is its highly secure character, but also the re-emergence of Sufi actors and doctrines in the political arena (Tozy 2009; Alaoui 2017; Bayloq and Hlaou 2016; Maghraoui 2009; El-Katiri 2013; Rubin 2014; Bekkaoui and Larémont 2011; Wainscott 2017). The thesis that seems to have gained consensus in the literature is that the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States as well as the attacks of 16 May 2003 in Casablanca ‘have transferred religion from the space of legitimacy to the space of security’ (Tozy 2009, 67). The type of capital used in the religious field has also changed greatly. The prestige that was earlier associated with the ‘purity’ of the Salafi ideology was abruptly discarded. The new way to acquire capital and gain a better position in the field is to clearly identify with the new ‘moderate’ Islam promoted by the palace. The possibility for the makhzen to impose labels (moderate Islam, wasat) in the religious field clearly illustrates the existence of a hierarchy (Suzuki 2017, 220). The social standing and the rankings of the agents in the field is determined by their acceptance of the royal narrative on what Moroccan Islam is or what it should be. The restructuring of the field is clearly linked to the process of bordering or marking identified by Mattern and Zarakol (2016): ‘They bring social beings into being, as particular identities, with particular interests, that have particular agencies, or particular capacities to make themselves present to others—capacities that mark them as superior or inferior’ (641). In this context, we see the reemergence of old actors (Sufis) in the Moroccan political arena that had been set aside or marginalized during the reign of Hassan II (Tozy 2009). Clerics with Salafist loyalties are being replaced by ‘neutral’ or even Sufi actors. Indeed, the Minister of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs Ahmed Toufik replaced the former Minister Abdelkebir Alaoui M’Daghri in 2002, who was ‘known for his more accommodating views towards Wahhabism’ (El-Katiri 2013; Hlaloua 2015; Bayloc and Hlaloua 2016). Sufism and Sufi actors now represent a core element of this ‘moderate’ Islam that Morocco tries to export abroad. This restructuring of the religious field was also influenced by national security concerns coming from abroad, namely, from Iran and Saudi Arabia. There has been a recent rise in popularity of Shiism and Wahhabism, seen as cultural infiltration by the Moroccan authorities. To counter this infiltration, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs was given the task to supervise (control) the training of Moroccan imams and the content of their sermons and fatwas (Maghraoui 2009; Baylocq and Hlaoua 2016; El-Katiri 2013). In other words, the religious clerks (ulamas) have now been institutionalized by the ministry. In this new religious system, preaching without official recognition from the ministry can be marginalized or arrested if the content of their preaching is not formalized. The material dimension of Islam

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is also under surveillance. Editions of the Qur’an from the Middle East are tightly controlled by the Ministry, and the king’s new edition of the Qur’an (Mohammed VI Qur’an, which contains typically Moroccan features) is now widely distributed all over the country and even abroad in West Africa (Cohen 2017). EXPORTING ISLAM ABROAD, THE RISE OF NON-STATE ACTORS This new institutionalization of the religious field by the Moroccan authorities in an effort to control the excesses related to radical Islam in its own territory has enabled Morocco to acquire a reputation as a defender of a ‘moderate’ version of Islam. This reputation allows the Kingdom to project its version of Islam outside of its borders, namely through Islamic cooperation and the training of foreign imams (Alaoui 2017; Wainscott 2017; Baylocq and Hlaoua 2016; Belhaj 2009). This faith diplomacy is built around two institutional instruments (or royal institutions) that aim to build and propagate the Moroccan government’s vision of a moderate Islam outside its borders (Lascoumes and Simard 2011). These instruments are the Mohammed VI Foundation of African Ulamas, which aims to ‘unify the efforts of the ulamas of Morocco and African countries to serve Islam’, as well as the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams and Preachers. This institute’s mission is not only to train imams in the Maliki rite (the Moroccan official Islamic practice) but also to prevent deviance towards extremism (Grosrichard 2016). These two institutions are also imbued by the king’s symbolic capital as Commander of the Faithful (Musgrave and Nexon 2018, 593). It is not by accident that both institutions were inaugurated by royal decree (dahir) and that they are named after King Mohammed VI. This new religious diplomacy now offers religious actors (imams, members of the Sufi brotherhoods, etc.) a chance to take on an important role in foreign policy. It is through these actors (and religious institutions) that the transfer of religious policies and ideas takes place. But also, it is the religious actors who receive this training that ultimately engage the religious diplomacy by applying their Moroccan Islamic training in their countries of origin. As a result, African imams who participate in this training in Morocco and who return to their countries to apply what they have learned have a vital role to play in the transmission of this religious diplomacy and of Moroccan soft power in general. For instance, out of 1,207 students who entered the institute between 2016 and 2017, 818 students are from West Africa (Mali, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Senegal), while the rest are from France and Morocco (Chaoui 2017). Most of them, according to my fieldwork at the institute, are

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members of West African Sufi orders who are historically and religiously linked to Morocco, like the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya. Neighbouring West African countries are sensitive to this discourse (of moderation in religion), especially as they do not have the experience of Morocco in religious governance nor do they possess religious institutions of such a large scale, capable of supervising effectively their religious fields (Baylocq and Hlaloua 2016, 121). Furthermore, by following the relationships and interactions between actors, we can see that the pursuit of power by the Moroccan actors is directed mostly at sub-Saharan Africa and is also brokered or mediated by local religious actors, or more specifically by Sufi brotherhoods. In this case, the concept of mutual orchestration elaborated by MacDonald (2018) becomes extremely useful. Morocco’s dominant position in the transnational religious field in West Africa is being mediated or brokered by subordinate local actors (Sufi brotherhoods) in exchange for material and ideational support (MacDonald 2018, 140). By sending their students and disciples to be trained and educated in Morocco, the different Sufi brotherhoods (and national authorities) explicitly accept and legitimate Morocco’s dominant position in the religious field. It is telling that in some cases, countries who do not necessarily possess strong diplomatic and historical links with Morocco, such as Nigeria, explicitly requested ‘Moroccan intervention in their domestic religious affairs’ (Wainscott 2017, 2; Oni 2016). As Wainscott (2017, 2) put it, this ‘warm reception’ of Moroccan involvement in the religious field of foreign countries is ‘puzzling’. It is not so puzzling if we consider that the subordinates who broker Morocco’s religious influence are able to benefit from tremendous ideational and material capital (MacDonald 2018, 131). In this sense, the logic of trade-offs seems appropriate for explaining the behaviour of subordinate actors in this hierarchical relationship between Morocco and West African states (Mattern and Zarakol 2016, 636). Subordinate actors would be motivated by symbolic and material incentives to support Morocco’s narrative. The relationship between the Tidjanniya brotherhood (present in Mali, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and especially powerful in Senegal) and Morocco seems to corroborate this argument. Indeed, the Tidjaniyya brotherhood, based in Fez (Morocco), but mostly active in West Africa, has played an active role strengthening the ‘fraternal’ and ‘religious’ links between Morocco and many West African countries (Sambe 2011; Triaud 2010; Clark 1999). The support of the West African members of the Tidjaniyya is not an accident. Tidjanis have always been closely linked to Morocco because the shrine of their founder, Ahmad al-Tijani, is located in Fez, Morocco. To advance in the ranks of the Tidjanniya, West African disciples normally go to Fez and receive ijaza (authorization to transmit Islamic knowledge) by Moroccan members of the brotherhood. By accepting Moroccan narratives and leadership in the religious field, they boost their

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own symbolic power in their respective countries against the claims of rival Sufi brotherhoods. The Tidjanis are also being rewarded in economic terms by Morocco for their acceptance of Morocco’s religious leadership. As an example, it is relevant to mention that Royal Air Maroc (RAM) has signed a partnership agreement with the Higher Council of Tijaniyya followers in Senegal, which aims to offer followers of this brotherhood ‘reduced airfare cost to visit Morocco’ (Le Matin 2014). Le Matin, a Moroccan daily, writes that this agreement ‘testifies to the depth of the spiritual relations uniting the two countries’ (Le Matin 2014). This is a striking example of the instrumentalization of religion for economic and diplomatic purposes. In a sense, I would argue that the religious field is able to produce capital that can be transferred to different fields, namely the diplomatic and economic fields. It is also telling to see that the Sufi and other religious actors explicitly claim that spiritual diplomacy can be used to advance Morocco’s diplomatic and economic interests in Africa. Indeed, the Global Meeting for Sufism, organized by the Boutshishiya tariqa the most powerful Sufi brotherhood in Morocco, claims that propagation of Sufism abroad by the Kingdom’s officials/diplomats can not only serve as a bulwark against jihadism and extremism in Africa but can also contribute to the economic, spiritual, political, and ‘civilizational’ growth of neighbouring African countries (Rencontre Mondiale du Soufisme 2017). Their argument is as follows: by adopting the Sufi principles spearheaded by Morocco, African countries could become more peaceful and stable, which would ultimately lead to greater economic growth (Rencontre Mondiale du Soufisme 2017). THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAM IN NIGERIA, FROM SUFISM TO BOKO HARAM The spread of Islam in Nigeria follows a similar pattern as in other parts of West Africa. Rather than being initially spread by the sword, it was originally spread by commerce (following the routes of the caravans from North Africa), and then eventually by way of the shaykh, or as discussed above, by the marabouts (Back 2008, 426). The marabouts in Nigeria were able to solidify the practice of Islam by not only providing the believers with an organizational way of practising and establishing various communities but also by being vocal against oppressive rulers (Back 2008, 426). The first tariqa (Sufi brotherhood) to take hold in Northern Nigeria was the Qadiriyya beginning in the sixteenth century, and this was followed by the Tidjaniyya in the eighteenth century (Black 2008, 426). The Qadiriyya would have profound impacts on the form of Islam practised in Nigeria, but also on the formation of an elite who was deeply influenced by Sufism. We see a process

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of institutionalization and militarization of the Sufi brotherhood in West Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with Umar Tall in Senegal and Uthman Dan Fodio in northern Nigeria (Back 2008, 426). Dan Fodio was instrumental in the creation of an Islamic caliphate, the Sokoto Caliphate, encompassing parts of northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Niger (Sulaiman 2020). Originally a religious scholar and teacher, Dan Fodio was a member of the tariqa Qadiriyya, and he pronounced a jihad against the local authorities in the city of Gobir, where he lived until 1802 (Sulaiman 2020, 6). His revolt against local authorities was aimed at reforming Islam in West Africa. To this end, most of his followers and supporters were also affiliated with his tariqa (Back 2008, 427). The Sokoto Caliphate eventually fell at the hands of the British in 1903. However, this does not mean that the Sufi elites of the Caliphate lost their role completely. According to Black (2008), the elites of Nigeria who belonged to the Qadiriyya were seen as useful allies to gain control of the territory in a peaceful manner. They were considered the ‘Native Administration’, and they were respected by the colonial powers (Back 2008, 427). Conversely, the other Sufi brotherhood present in Nigeria, the Tidjaniyya, was viewed with great suspicion by the colonial administration. While the Qadiriyya had a powerful reputation in northern Nigeria, due to its ancient roots in the country, but also because of Dan Fodio’s jihad, the Tidjaniyya had a more dynamic and international network of zawiyas (Islamic schools and places for collective worship). The Tidjaniyya was, and still is, deeply connected at various levels on the African continent, spanning from Nigeria to Senegal, Morocco and Algeria. This produced some fear among the British who felt that they could not totally control the Tidjaniyya in Nigeria to the same extent as they did with the ‘local’ Qadiriyya (Back 2008, 428). The British were not totally wrong, because the Tidjaniyya in Nigeria was deeply influenced by ‘outsiders’ from the 1930s to the 1950s, with the rise to fame of a Senegalese tidjani shaykh, Ibrahim Niasse (Back 2008, 428). Niasse spread a message of a pan-African, but also anti-colonial Islam, which was adopted quite quickly by the tidjani community in Nigeria. It is interesting to note that this pan-African image of the Niassene Tidjaniyya in Senegal is still alive today. During my fieldwork in 2019 in Medina Baye, the centre of the Niassene Tidjaniyya in Senegal, I noticed that there was an important number of Nigerian disciples and pilgrims. After Nigeria’s independence from British Rule in 1960, we see an increase in competition between the two Sufi brotherhoods. But, even more importantly, we see the emergence of a new conception of Islam in country, the introduction of Salafism and Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia. Similarly, to Morocco during the same period, Nigerian society started to be influenced by Salafi ideas that greatly marginalized the Sufi conception and practice

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of Islam, but which also criticized the presence of Christianity on Nigerian soil (Oriola and Akinola 2018). For example, the Saudi-educated Sheikh Abubakar Gumi was instrumental in the radicalization of some parts of the society in northern Nigeria and instigated religious wars against churches in Kano in the 1980s (Oriola and Akinola 2018, 599). The rise of Wahhabism in Nigeria, combined with a democratization of Nigerian society, eventually led to the implementation of sharia law in many states in the north of the country (Oriola and Akinola 2018). Finally, the religious field evolved in yet another direction in the 2000s with the establishment of the Salafist group Boko Haram, which declared a Caliphate in the state of Borno in northern Nigeria after capturing several territories (Oriola and Akinola 2018, 597). While the general trend within Salafism and Wahhabism in Nigeria in the 1980s was more reformist and non-violent in nature, Boko Haram is characterized by its violent extremism and close ties with other jihadi terrorist organizations abroad, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Boko Haram poses a radical security threat to the secular Nigerian government, but also to neighbouring countries. While President Mohammadu Buhari, in cooperation with neighbouring countries, has tried repeatedly to dismantle the movement, Boko Haram is still active and continues to operate without being contained. In terms of international relations and foreign policy, Ogunnubi et al. (2017) claims that ‘The leadership status earned and enjoyed by the country may, however, be diminishing given its inability to arrest the Boko Haram insurgency in its territory. This [. . . ] shows how protracted Boko Haram terror has impacted negatively on Nigeria’s status as a regional power in Africa and an important player in the global system’ (p. 457). This is particularly interesting because I would argue that the inability of the Nigerian government to contain Boko Haram has given Morocco an opportunity to use its soft power and intervene in Nigeria’s religious field by training some of its imams. SOFT POWER BETWEEN MOROCCO AND NIGERIA Frosty Relationships between the Giant of Africa and the Kingdom of Morocco The diplomatic relationship between Nigeria and Morocco has historically been considered to be frosty. This can be explained by the conflict between Morocco, the Polisario Front and Algeria concerning the independence of Western Sahara, which the Kingdom considers its ‘Southern Provinces’ (Wainscott 2015; Hamman 2020). The conflict in western Sahara has greatly influenced Moroccan foreign policy for decades. In Morocco, the defence

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of the territory of western Sahara is considered sacred, and political actors simply call it ‘the national cause’. It is the single most important geopolitical issue facing the country. Therefore, when the Polisario was admitted as a full-fledged member of the African Union (AU) in 1984, Morocco decided to withdraw from the organization, despite the fact that the Kingdom was one of its founding members. This not only isolated Morocco from the rest of Africa at the multilateral level, it also meant that bilaterally, the Kingdom chose to engage primarily with countries that supported its claim to western Sahara, such as French-speaking countries in West Africa (Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, etc.). To use the words of a Moroccan diplomat I interviewed in 2018: ‘Before, for Morocco, Africa was only Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, we don’t have many specialists of East Africa or English-speaking Africa’ (Interview with Diplomat 2, 5 January 2019, Rabat). This means that Nigeria, as a strong supporter of the independence of the Polisario, was not a diplomatic priority for Morocco. There were also the elements of language and colonial history, as Morocco had been traditionally engaged more with French Africa than with English Africa (Interview with Diplomat 2, 5 January 2019, Rabat). However, this situation started to change in 2015, when Buhari was elected president of Nigeria. His election coincided with a new orientation of Morocco’s foreign policy towards Africa as a whole. Between 2014 and 2018, King Mohammed VI carried out more than twenty official visits to a variety of African countries to establish bilateral accords (Abourabi 2021). Then, in 2017, Morocco was successfully readmitted to the AU. One of the primary aims of this African turn in Moroccan foreign policy was to establish itself as one of the big players on the African continent, and to achieve that, the Kingdom made it a priority to increase its cooperation with the ‘Giant of Africa’. Indeed, Mohammed VI visited Nigeria in 2016 to meet with President Buhari, and this was followed by a visit by Buhari to Morocco in 2018. According to a Nigerian diplomat in Rabat: Since the visit of the King in 2016, the relationship changed. It brought the two leader closer. The economic relationship was also able to come to play, by providing trade deals on phosphorus and fertilizers. The relationship was heightened and we can now call it a special relationship. Indeed, it’s the first time over 50 years that Nigerians came to Morocco. (Interview with Nigerian Diplomat, January 10 2019, Rabat)

While the ties between the two countries have been progressively strengthened over the last few years, Morocco’s influence in Nigeria is still meagre, especially on the economic front (Interview with Diplomat 2, 5 January 2019, Rabat). According to Diplomat 2, that is why the Kingdom is trying to influence Nigeria in different ways. One of these ways is by leveraging religion

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as a diplomatic tool to advance its national aspirations in its bilateral relations with Nigeria. Nigerian Students Training to be Imams in Morocco In 2018, during my fieldwork in Morocco, I conducted various interviews with African students at the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams Morchidines and Morchidates. For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus exclusively on the data from four interviews with students from Nigeria. In terms of religious affiliation, most African students at the institute belong to a Sufi brotherhood (tariqa). The majority of these students belong to the tariqa Tidjaniyya. This is advantageous for Morocco, since the seat of the Tidjaniyya is in Fez. Also, compared to other African Sufi brotherhoods, like the Muridiyya or the Boutshishiya, the Tidjaniiya possesses a pan-African orientation and networks spanning the continent. Therefore, most of the Nigerian students at the institute were also Tidjanis. But, compared to other countries like Senegal, where the students who attended the institute were sent directly by the leaders of the three majors Sufi brotherhoods (Tidjaniyya, Muridiyya, and Qadiriyya), the selection process in Nigeria was more fluid and did not necessarily involve affiliation to a specific tariqa. All the students told me that even though the Mufti of Nigeria, Dr. Ibrahim Saleh is himself a Sufi, this did not mean that you had to be a Sufi to apply to the institute and to be selected. A Nigerian student of the institute confided in me that there was a minority of Salafis among the Nigerian students, and that Saleh allowed them to attend the courses in Morocco in the hopes that this could change their minds and ultimately moderate their views, or perhaps even make them embrace Sufism: They don’t ask about the background because, there are some that are not Sufis now among the Nigerians, but the council of the Ulama said that maybe if they came here, they will change. . . . Even if they don’t become Sufi, they might learn about not using the side of extremism, even if you are not on my side it doesn’t mean disunity. This is the aim of sending even those that are not Sufis. It’s to fight against extremism because we are so far involved, especially in my province. (Interview with Husayn, 24 November 2018, Rabat).1

This view of Morocco, of being able to properly control its religious field, but also of possessing a more moderate conception of Islam, was shared by many Nigerian students at the institute. The problem of extremism in Nigeria and the influence of Boko Haram was a key element that came cross in all of

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the interviews. For these students, the real problem in Nigeria is the lack of unity in the country. Most of the students affirmed that Nigeria was plagued by disunity in terms of religious practices and that Morocco did not have that problem. This is important, because the inability of the Nigerian state and non-state actors to control and eradicate Boko Haram has made them lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the Nigerian students. This allows Morocco to take a more proactive role in the country by promoting its own concept of Islam, but also by projecting the idea of the King of Morocco as a legitimate source of Islamic authority. For example, when asked if the Nigerian students accepted the title of the King of Morocco as Amir al-Muminiin, they all said that it was a positive title and that they wished Nigeria had a similar policy, but also a similar figure and system. For example, Nada affirmed that: It’s a good thing that Morocco actually has this because one individual has control over the affairs of the state and it’s not only for Muslims but for everybody. From history we know that when this title was taken seriously, there was a lot of good that came out of it. So in Nigeria we have something like that, but its responsibility only lies with the Muslims and the Christians have their own, whatever religion has their own . . . And this, this brings about disunity. (Interview with Nada, 24 November 2018, Rabat)

This negative comparison between the ‘bad’ organization of the religious field in Nigeria and the ‘good’ organization of religious field in Morocco demonstrates the successful use of religious soft power in Moroccan foreign policy. Rabat is projecting the image of a country in total control of its religious field, thanks to the efforts of the king as Commander of the Faith. The prestige and charisma of the king is another element that adds to the legitimacy of Morocco in the religious field in Africa. We therefore see the establishment of a religious hierarchy where Morocco, by way of its superior understanding of Islam, can transmit its knowledge to other countries. It goes even further, as this ‘moderate’ version of Islam that Morocco professes can solve various problems that are plaguing African countries, notably religious extremism. The problem with this image and reputation is that Morocco is not immune from extremist and terrorist activities in the name of Islam. As we saw earlier, Morocco has been the victim of terrorist activities, including the Casablanca bombings in 2003. Another element that is important to note is the negative perception held by the Nigerian students concerning their own country’s production of Islamic knowledge, and to another degree, the practice of Sufism in West Africa compared with North Africa. To cite one of the students, Sufyan (son of a Sheikh from southern Nigeria):

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But you see how people do Sufism in other part of Africa is different from how they do it in Western part of Africa. Maybe in Western part of Africa they abuse Sufism. They can’t even read it clearly; some don’t even have the background of Islamic knowledge they can’t even be qualified to be a sheikh. Maybe they have money or influence and they made themselves a sheikh. So you see, people abuse Sufi. In other parts of Africa, it’s different, they have memorized Quran, they have written a lot of books. Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh is a Sufi and he has written a lot of books. If someone see someone like Ibrahim Saleh he will be impressed. He can speak frequently and fluently. While some Sufi sheikh can’t even read Quran and interpret hadith some of them they will even use voodoo to charm people. That is why people are scared of Sufism. And if you come to other part of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt you will be impressed, they have written lots of books, they have lots of books. This Sufism is different from other Sufis. (Interview with Sufyan, November 2018 Rabat).

This negative perception of Islamic knowledge in Nigeria, and sometimes of Sufism in the country, was shared by the other Nigerian students. This is illustrative of the colonial discourse I presented earlier. The Nigerian students a reproducing the narrative of a ‘white’ Islam (as a pure, correct form of the religion) as practised by the Arabs, and of ‘black’ (a tainted form of Islam, a form of syncretism influenced by pagan tradition) as practised by sub-Saharan Africans. Again, it not only establishes a hierarchy between the Arabs (and therefore Arab states) who are seen as the gatekeepers of a pure form of Islam, but it also completely marginalizes the fact that the countries south of the Sahara produced and continue to produce Islamic scholars of high quality. The reason for the internalization of this negative perception of their own practice of Islam by Nigerian students will need to be analysed in greater detail. But I would argue that the rise of Boko Haram, and also the Izala effect (a concept that refers to the sharp criticism of Sufi practice by Salafists in Muslim countries), have both produced a strong criticism of Sufi leaders and Sufism more broadly, which might still be influencing Nigerian students, even those who are affiliated with Sufi tariqas (Umar and Woodward 2020, 63). This has not only eroded the legitimacy of religious scholars in Nigeria but also the failure of the Nigerian government to stop Boko Haram also contributes to the opinion that the country needs the help of external forces to gain control of its religious field. In this case, the external force which has risen to the occasion is Morocco. CONCLUSION This chapter has illustrated how Morocco was able to use Islam as a tool of soft power in its diplomatic relations with many West African states, and

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most notably with Nigeria. I have argued that Morocco was not only able to ‘sell’ its concept of a ‘moderate’ Islam to persuade Nigerian non-state actors to pursue Islamic education in the Kingdom but also to change their views concerning how they and their fellow Africans should understand and practice Islam. By doing this, Morocco has not only been able to gain some allies in Nigeria but also to establish a hierarchical relationship with some of them. Morocco has become a leader in the fight against radicalization, a leader that other African states should try to accept and emulate (according to students at the Institute). Now that some of those Nigerians students have finished their studies at the institute, it would be relevant to conduct fieldwork in Nigeria to understand what type of work they are doing in the country, and what kind of positions they have obtained. Knowing that the diplomatic relationship between the Kingdom of Morocco and the ‘giant of Africa’ have been tense in the past (before the ascension of Buhari in 2015) because of the conflict in western Sahara, it would also be interesting to analyse if this faith diplomacy has a role to play in strengthening the two countries’ views on this subject. NOTE 1. Pseudonyms are being used to protect the identity of the Nigerian students who were interviewed.

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Chapter 8

Nye, Soft Power and Conflict Resolution Centring Trado-Religious Soft Power in Conflict Processes in Africa Surulola Eke

Trado-religious leaders, such as local chiefs, traditional leaders and other local elders, are highly revered individuals in African states. As the discussion below shows, people’s respect for these leaders derives from several factors. In some cases, individuals’ contributions to their local communities earn them chieftaincies, which are respected traditional titles. Some other trado-religious leaders gain respect because their position is either rooted in religion, which many Africans are invested in, or from local customs or both. The reverence for other trado-religious leaders may result from the central role of spirituality in the performance of their duties. In many communities in Africa, a trado-religious leader may owe their position to all these factors, making them highly revered members of society. Consequent upon the abovementioned factors, trado-religious leaders are effective mobilizers for both positive and negative causes in Africa. Several studies have explored how and why trado-religious leaders leverage their influence in local communities to stoke violent intergroup conflict (Juergensmeyer 2001; Makhubela 2010; Fluehr-Lobban 2011; Basedau and Koos 2015; Ibrahim 2018). However, an emerging new field on community leaders’ engagement indicates that such actors can also be significant agents of peace, especially when they desire such a role. In line with the latter interest, this chapter explores how trado-religious leaders’ soft power strategies have positively conditioned intergroup relations in a conflict-stricken Middle Belt Nigerian city, Jos. The discussion on the peacebuilding engagements of trado-religious leaders in Jos derives from a broader qualitative study 129

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undertaken in the summer of 2019 on the causes and spatial variation of ethnic conflict in the city.1 The chapter unfolds as follows. First, it examines Joseph Nye’s notion of soft power in order to contextualize the paper. Second, it details the different ways trado-religious leaders earn the respect of their communities. Third, it provides an overview of the literature on trado-religious leaders’ engagement in local communities. Fourth, it highlights the effectiveness of trado-religious leaders in maintaining social control for conflict avoidance even amid flailing conventional security interventions. CONCEPTUALIZING SOFT POWER Nye’s soft power concept, typically applied in the analysis of world politics, can help us appreciate the ability of trado-religious leaders to shape individual behaviour in the context of intergroup conflict. Therefore, this chapter begins with a conceptualization of soft power. Basically, the concept implies the ability to use attraction, rather than coercion, to influence the behaviour of others in order to produce desired outcomes (Nye 1990, 2004, 2008). Nye expanded on his initial conceptualization of soft power, describing it as the ability to shape behaviour ‘through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes’ (Nye 2011, 20). The usage of the concept has evolved over time. Beginning with Nye’s initial explication of a liberal democratic or ‘Americanized’ concept (Brannagan and Giulianott 2018, 1141), it has since been applied in analysing the behaviour of emerging states (Tella 2017) and later in examining the branding engagements of authoritarian regimes (Keating and Kaczmarska 2019). Although it is predominantly used to explain inter-state relations, soft power is also useful for understanding relationships between non-state actors at the domestic level because the factors that account for attraction at the international level also apply to domestic non-state actors relations. These factors, which the author describes as the three core elements of soft power, include resources, social construction and reception. In developing the concept, Nye posits that an actor with soft power is one that can shape the behaviour of others with its intangible non-economic and non-military resources, such as an attractive institution, culture, and values (Nye 2004). Consequently, trado-religious leaders can be viewed as having soft power given that they are perceived as possessing divine wisdom and their positions are rooted in cherished local cultures. Having said that, Joseph Nye has been criticized for focusing on intangible resources in his conceptualization of soft power even though the constructivist and relational dimensions of the concept

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are important for understanding how attraction is generated and why social capacities for influence may vary across actors (Mattern 2005, 585; Walker 2016, 61; Feklyunina 2016, 776). For example, with regard to the constructivist dimension of soft power, Feklyunina notes that ‘soft power is significantly more likely [. . . ] in a relationship between actors who broadly see themselves as part of the same socially constructed reality’ because this creates a perception of compatible interpretations of their identities, interests, and situations (Feklyunina 2016, 777). Like the resource dimension, the constructivist angle of the concept reinforces the idea of trado-religious soft power. Going by Feklyunina position, for example, trado-religious leaders, having derived their legitimacy and credibility from the local customs and religion on which their relationship with a community is founded, possess the capacity to influence the behaviour of their co-ethnics. Moreover, just as the soft power of state actors is sociolinguistically constructed (Mattern 2005, 585), so is the ‘attractiveness’ of trado-religious institutions forged in daily sermons and observances of sociocultural rituals within African states. Furthermore, the use of resources and media narratives to create attraction and attraction itself all indicate the relational aspect of Nye’s soft power concept (Walker 2016, 61; Feklyunina 2016, 776). In essence, the production of attraction is contingent upon the targeted audience positively interpreting the communications about the intangible assets of an actor (Feklyunina 2016, 776). Likewise, in the context of local communities, the soft power of tradoreligious leaders, as espoused in the next section, derives from their reverence by others, not simply their possession of certain intangible assets. Tradoreligious leaders possess the resource of being custodians of cultures and/or representatives of God, and local community members hear this in sermons and are socialized into this belief system from birth. Therefore, in the absence of any other condition that undermines their resultant sociocultural status, these actors will wield soft power within their communities. SOURCES OF TRADO-RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER REVERENCE The applicability of soft power to the relations between trado-religious leaders and local community members is more apparent when ‘attraction’, the central term in Nye’s conceptualization of soft power, is replaced with reverence/respect, the defining quality of trado-relitious leaders. This feature of trado-religious leadership makes it an influential institution across Africa. In fact, a 2008 Afrobarometer commissioned research on traditional leaders’ engagement in fifteen African countries2 shows that people are more likely

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to seek assistance from them than try to access their elected representatives (Logan 2008, 1). The same study reveals that citizens of these countries are least inclined to reach out to their elected officials for solutions to their problems (Logan 2008, 9). The significance of this positive disposition towards African traditional authority is better appreciated in the context of the contestations between traditional authority and elected officials in democratic African states. With the possible exception of Botswana, elected officials in Africa often pass legislation that undermines traditional authority in order to consolidate their political power. In other instances, new political administrations may initially downplay the relevance of traditional leaders, yet they end up depending on them to access the local populations (Logan 2008, 5). The influence of trado-religious leaders over the local population stems from myriad factors. In pre-colonial Africa, especially where hereditary monarchy had not been established, ordinary individuals became traditional rulers when their efforts advanced the wellbeing of the larger community. In Ghana, for example, people earned chieftaincies through successful leadership in ethnic wars of conquest, heroic performances in ethnic wars, or leading an ethnic group to virgin land (Adjei 2015, 86). These achievements not only facilitated their assumption of traditional stools but also bestowed upon such individuals a strongman status with which they maintained social control. In other countries, such as Ethiopia, the status of being elderly and having decades of lived experiences partly account for the reverence for trado-religious leaders (Alemie and Mandefro 2018, 10). Additionally, people’s embrace of religion in Africa bolsters the influence of trado-religious leaders. For example, studies on trado-religious leaders in Mali (Hinkel and Traore 2020, 411) and Somalia (Ibrahim 2018, 63) indicate that the ability of Islamic leaders to shape intergroup relations derives from their identity as clerics. In Mali, where the adherence to Islam traverses multiple ethnic groups and clans, these religious leaders, who are perceived as knowledgeable about divine prescriptions, are the most effective shapers of behaviour (Hinkel and Traore 2020, 411). While politicians are associated with ethnic groups, thereby lacking legitimacy beyond the in-group, the reverence of Islamic religious leaders in Mali transcends ethnic affiliations because all Muslims can view them as being honestly concerned about their wellbeing (Hinkel and Traore 2020, 402). This legitimacy gap is evident in the narratives of a participant in Hinkel and Traore’s study who noted that ‘when one [talks] to the Malian in the name of God, he understands. When you [do so] in the name of politics, they immediately see the commissioners . . . and the political parties that are not part of their culture’ (Hinkel and Traore 2020, 411). In other words, the religious leaders, unlike their political counterparts, are rooted in the culture of a wide swath of the population. This is also true for Somalia where trado-religious

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leaders are viewed as legitimate authority figures because their position is rooted in Islam, which is at the core of Somali life (Ibrahim 2018, 63). It is noteworthy that culture-informed reverence of trado-religious leaders is not limited to predominantly Muslim African countries. As Kariuki rightly points out, respect for elders is firmly rooted in African traditions, customs and mores (Kariuki 2015, 30). For example, Olusola and Aisha note that traditional authority in Nigeria is rooted in the highly revered customs of local communities (Olusola and Aisha 2013, 121). Therefore, people’s reverence for their customs engenders respect for such leaders whose authority derives from those traditions. Similarly, the pronouncements of traditional authority figures in Ghanaian communities are respected because these leaders are perceived as the custodians of local norms, which are themselves viewed as existing for the protection of each community’s collective wellbeing (Adjei 2015, 91). Furthermore, the perception that trado-religious leaders can access the spiritual realm for answers to mundane questions likely also legitimizes their positions on social and sundry issues. For example, Alemie and Mandefro note that indigenous elders in Ethiopia are better placed than law enforcement agents to resolve local conflicts because their recourse to the spiritual realm facilitates the discovery of concealed evidence which cannot be unearthed with mundane investigatory tools and strategies (Alemie and Mandefro 2018, 11). Similarly, pre-colonial Ghanaian Chiefs consulted the gods to determine the causes of deaths (Adjei 2015, 92). While practices like this may no longer exist in contemporary Ghana, Africa’s religious leaders, such as Pastors and Imams, are perceived as possessing heavenly insights that are inaccessible by other mortals. Based on the aforementioned sources of their soft power, such as the contributions to communal wellbeing, culture-based authority, and spiritual connections, trado-religious leaders are also viewed as trustworthy. For example, the distrust that ensued between de Klerk and Mandela over the post-apartheid transition violence was mitigated by the moral standing of the South African religious leaders who mediated the peace process (Sisk 2011, 2). Relatedly, eight in ten Malians view their traditional leaders as trustworthy, in stark contrast to how the country’s politicians are perceived (Logan 2008, 12). As noted earlier, because of their deficiency in public trust, these politicians rely on trado-religious leaders to communicate with their constituents. For example, Hinkel and Traore note that Malian trado-religious leaders mediate the relationship between the government and the people (Hinkel and Traore 2018, 403). While this middle-man role serves the messaging interest of the politicians, the trado-religious leaders ultimately benefit from their relationship with the elected officials as it enhances their reputation among their people. In weak African states where resources are scarce and inequitably distributed,

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membership of neopatrimonial networks is key to economic survival. Consequent upon their relevance to politicians, trado-religious leaders can access state resources and demand basic services on behalf of their people (Koter 2013, 192–193). The ability of trado-religious leaders to access public goods and services on behalf of their community feeds into the perception that they are invested in people’s wellbeing, which bolsters their leverage. THE EXERCISE OF TRADO-RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER Although trado-religious leaders in Africa enjoy similar sources of power, the exercise of their influence is hardly uniform. While some of these leaders have used their platform in ways that stoked or enflamed conflicts, others have channelled their moral authority towards promoting peace in their communities and countries. Therefore, this section highlights the activities of both categories of leaders. The Power to Inflame Different factors may shape the decision of trado-religious leaders to incite conflict. One thesis is that as contenders for power influence themselves, these leaders instigate violence when events or the actions of competitors threaten their standing within their communities or nations (Basedau and Koos 2015, 762). Also, trado-religious leaders may be inspired to mobilize their followers or ‘subjects’ to fight on behalf of the politicians with whom they have established a symbiotic relationship (Juergensmeyer 2001, 359). Whatever their motivation might be, there are several instances of violent conflicts that resulted from the actions or declarations of religious leaders. Some of the earliest examples are the series of medieval-era religious wars, commonly referred to as the Crusades, which were sanctioned by the top hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church (Basedau and Koos 2015, 760). Similarly, Muslim and Jewish religious leaders in Israel have not only supported the position of their religious community in the Israel–Palestine conflict but also the use of violence to attain it (Canetti et al. 2010, 576). Likewise, there are trado-religious leaders in Africa who are known to have incited or supported violence. Somali is a prime example of this. As noted above, Somali traditional leaders are largely revered because their role is perceived as a creation of Islam (Ibrahim 2018, 63). This reverence facilitates their ability to maintain social control within their clans. During the country’s civil war, traditional leaders exploited their legitimacy in their community and mobilized members of their clans to fight alongside their kinsmen irrespective of whether they were victims of aggression or the aggressors themselves

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(Makhubela 2010, 8). Similarly, Sudan’s civil war between 1983 and 2005 partly resulted from the activities of religious leaders who sought to attain and consolidate political power (Fluehr-Lobban 2011, 106). Prominent among those religious leaders was Hassan al-Turabi, the hard-line Islamist who facilitated Omar Al-Bashir’s ascendance to power and whose Muslim Brotherhood is known to have pursued an Islamization agenda (Fluehr-Lobban 2011, 116). Relatedly, when Muslim youths violently attacked Christians in northern Nigeria during the 2006 Danish cartoon controversy, the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) at the time, Archbishop Peter Akinola, chose to respond with inflammatory remarks. The former CAN president declared thus: ‘it is no longer a hidden fact that a long-standing agenda to make Nigeria an Islamic nation is being surreptitiously pursued [. . .] May we at this stage remind our Muslim brothers that they do not have the monopoly of violence in this nation [. . .] CAN may no longer be able to contain our restive youths should this ugly trend continue’ (Hackett 2011, 131). Some analysts suggest that the Archbishop’s comment motivated Christian youths in Nigeria to undertake reprisal attacks against their Muslim neighbours (Hackett 2011, 131). Although Archbishop Akinola may not have intended for his statement to inspire violence, it is unsurprising that it may have been interpreted as a ‘call to arms’ given his stature within the Christian community in Nigeria. While Muslim youths and their leaders may view the abovementioned comment as a threat, Christian youths are likely to interpret it as tacit support for violent reprisals. Choosing to Mend Fences To be successful at mediation, peacebuilders must be trustworthy and credible (Sande 2018, 32,38). As discussed above, trado-religious leaders in Africa possess both qualities because their authority is embedded in revered local cultures, and they are perceived as serving the collective wellbeing of their communities. While some of these leaders exert their influence in destructive ways, as shown in the preceding section, others use their moral standing to build bridges. A case in point is Somalia. Although the clan elders contributed to the violence during the civil war (Makhubela 2010, 8), the country’s tradoreligious leaders have a history of being peace agents. For example, it was their mediatory efforts that engendered the level of social cohesion that made Somalia rank among the most peaceful African countries before the 1980s (Menkhaus 2015, 412). They used their role as Sharia Court Judges to manage disputes that arose between contending power blocs (Makhubela 2010, 9). In more recent times, the moral stature of Somalia’s trado-religious leaders within their communities has been instrumental in persuading young pirates to pursue honourable employment (Besteman and Cassanelli 2003, 42).

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Also, in Mali, trado-religious leaders are credited with helping to restore broken relationships at critical junctures. While some Islamists fuelled conflicts between rival groups, it has taken the intervention of other religious leaders to establish channels of communication and ultimately transformation relationships (Hinkel and Traore 2020, 401). For example, the March 2012 coup was accompanied by the withdrawal of Malian military forces from the north, which left the region under the control of Islamists and Tuareg insurgents. Yet, Muslim leaders not only retained their access to the area but were also viewed by the militants as fair mediators between them and the government (Hinkel and Traore 2020, 412). In light of how they are perceived, religious leaders in Mali have mediated negotiations between the Malian government and militants as well as between rival rebel groups (Hinkel and Traore 2020). Additionally, they have intervened in intercommunal disputes to persuade the conflicting parties to resolve their problems through dialogue (Hinkel and Traore 2020, 3). The importance of trado-religious leaders in the maintenance of the social fabric of African states is evident in the pattern of dispute resolutions. In Botswana, for example, traditional institutions were estimated to have handled nearly 80 per cent of the country’s civil and criminal cases by the end of the twentieth century (Sharma 1997, 44). Similarly, studies on indigenous peacebuilding (Osei-hwedie and Rankopo 2012) show that cultural institutions are the preferred avenues for dispute resolution in Ghana. Relatedly, a study in Lagos, Nigeria, found that almost 90 per cent of the study population in Kosofe Local Government Area in the state were more inclined to accept the local chiefs’ settlement of the interethnic conflict in the community than the decisions of Western-styled courts (Okonji 2016, 31). Also, in Ethiopia, even local law enforcement officers recognize the effectiveness of traditional leaders in peacemaking to the extent of referring civil disputes to them for resolution (Alemie and Mandefro 2018, 10). It was this same acknowledgement of the effectiveness of trado-religious leaders in maintaining the peace that informed the British colonial system of Indirect Rule in West Africa and elsewhere (Osakede and Ijimakinwa 2015, 32). The trado-religious leaders in Dadin Kowa, Jos, fall under this latter category of individuals who use their influence to promote peace in their local communities. TRADO-RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND CONFLICT AVOIDANCE IN JOS, NIGERIA As the foregoing discussion details, trado-religious leaders can shape the trajectory of intergroup relations. Jos, Nigeria, presents a puzzling example

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of ‘peace amidst conflict’. Between 2001 and 2010, several Jos communities were enmeshed in an intense conflict between ethnoreligious groups, yet there was a notable exception, Dadin Kowa. Despite being surrounded by conflictaffected communities, Dadin Kowa remained a zone of peace throughout the four conflict episodes in Jos. The author’s recent qualitative study of the lived experiences of Jos residents indicates that conflict avoidance was possible in Dadin Kowa because trado-religious leaders actively pursued a peacekeeping agenda that largely hinged on their persuasive capacities. The effort of the community leaders was recognized by the Plateau State Police Commissioner, who asked the Divisional Police Officer for Dadin Kowa to transport the Mai Angwa (tribal chief) of the Hausa for a meeting at the Police Headquarters.3 As the discussion below indicates, the role of Dadin Kowa’s trado-religious leaders in ensuring social control was common knowledge in their community. However, the abovementioned recognition resulted from the experience of the police who personally witnessed the leaders’ efforts to douse the rising tensions in their community. One such instance was when agitated Muslim youths in Dadin Kowa were assembling at the entrance to the community to march to a neighbouring conflict-affected community to avenge the death of seven Dadin Kowa Muslim youths, who were reportedly killed in that community by Christian youths. One participant in the abovementioned study described the scenes as follows: Security operatives were preventing them from leaving and they were resisting the officers and were posturing as if they wanted to fight the security agents. When he [Hausa Mai Angwa] got there, he instructed them to go back, and said they will hear from him. Wallahi [I swear to Allah], none of them could have disobeyed him. Do you know how many people could have lost their lives because of this incident? So, thank God, they obeyed and went back.4

This intervention is significant in four ways. First, it demonstrates the willingness of a Dadin Kowa leader to insert himself in a difficult and potentially dangerous situation in order to de-escalate it. Second, it highlights the effectiveness of trado-religious leaders in peacekeeping within their communities. Third, and likely most importantly, it shows that these leaders can be effective agents of peace in the same situations where local enforcement may falter. In other words, soft power strategies may be more effective than hard power tactics in mitigating violence in local communities not only because trado-religious leaders are revered but also due to the perception of compatibility between their interests and the community members’, unlike law enforcement officers. This claim is based on substantial evidence which is documented in another publication (Eke 2020).

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Although the above incident involved a tribal chief intervening in a situation that law enforcement could not handle, Dadin Kowa’s traditional leaders have in other instances needed police involvement. For example, the leaders referred some cases of violent behaviour to the police for investigation and prosecution.5 In these situations, however, they were not passive observers, as one participant recounted: Once we hand someone over to the police, no one from the community will go and bail the person. They are left with the police to be prosecuted. We determine how long we want you to stay in prison. Sometimes, we would decide that we want someone to remain in detention for three days, one week or three months [. . . ] We would leave the person in police custody for as long as we decide before going to bail them.6

This narrative indicates that the trado-religious leaders are not only pragmatic enough to recognize the limits of their power but are also sufficiently selfaware to the point of using their moral stature to ensure that the deterrence motive of their referrals is achieved. By being able to influence when arrested community members are bailed, Dadin Kowa’s trado-religious leaders demonstrate to their ‘subjects’ that their invitation of the police to assist in resolving a matter does not necessarily undermine their authority vis-à-vis that case. The collaborative peacekeeping work of the leaders in Dadin Kowa transcends their cooperation with the police. Like the abovementioned association of religious leaders in Mali, the HCI, Dadin Kowa has a group of elders, known as the Elders Forum, who are responsible for settling interpersonal disputes and for the overall wellbeing of the community.7 The Forum, which many residents view as the foundation of peace in the community, comprises the Mai Angwa of both the Berom Christian and Hausa Muslim populations and their aides. At the beginning of the Jos conflict, the Forum members promised themselves that they would prevent its diffusion into Dadin Kowa.8 When the leaders formed a vigilante unit to further this objective, they ensured through a security monitoring committee that both the unit’s leadership and the patrol teams were bi-communal, comprising Berom Christian and Hausa Muslim youths.9 Although seemingly hard power measures, such as cooperation with the police and setting up a vigilante unit, were implemented in Dadin Kowa, it was the soft power of the trado-religious leaders that ensured the effectiveness of their interventions. As one participant noted, it was the ability of the leaders to shape, in his words, ‘the behaviour of their children’ that helped them ‘overcome the rising tensions’ and ultimately decided the fate of Dadin Kowa.10 Social control in Dadin Kowa was possible partly due to the collaboration between the trado-religious leaders of the respective ethnoreligious

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groups, as described above, and partly because these leaders are largely respected within the in-group, at least. This sense of respect is deducible from the stories of several participants in the author’s study. One of the protective steps we took was that Christian and Muslim families were directed to stop allowing visitors to their homes. The elders made this proclamation because if you receive strangers who have been victims of the conflict elsewhere, they could take out their revenge on innocent people here. So, each family prevented their relatives from coming here.

The participant does not directly comment on the reverence of trado-religious leaders in the community. However, if people adhered to the order on family visits, as the participant claimed, they likely did so because they respect the judgement of the trado-religious leaders. While the respect of Dadin Kowa’s trado-religious leaders was inferred from the comment on family visits above, another participant directly attributes the leaders’ influence in the community to people’s respect for them. The participant commented on the relationship between a tribal chief and the community’s youths: You see, these kids take Indian hemp and other drugs, but we can’t dissociate from them because of that. I will ask you to accompany the elder to the first gate around 7 pm, you’ll see them smoke their Indian hemp (marijuana) and other things. You’ll see how they would react as soon as they sight him. They start hiding their drugs because they don’t want him to see them. It is not as if he can hurt them or something, it is just that they respect him. If the police arrest them for using drugs, he’s the one who goes to bail them out and counsels them afterwards.

The youths referenced in the above quote indulge in vices which the community leaders disapprove. Yet, there is a trado-religious leader, who, although he frowns at their behaviour, bails them whenever they run afoul of the law. The result of the elder’s acts, according to this participant, is the respect of the youths, who because of their habits are the least amenable to control by others. In other words, like the pre-colonial Ghanaian traditional leaders, who became respected for their positive contributions to their ethnic groups (Adjei 2015, 86), the abovementioned cohort of Dadin Kowa youths revere their trado-religious leader because he solves their legal problems. The disadvantage of bailing these youths is evident in their continued use of marijuana in the elder’s absence. Yet, the youths’ desperate attempts to conceal the substance whenever he approaches them indicates that the elder commands the influence to curtail their violent impulses, just as elders

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successfully did during the abovementioned standoff between some Dadin Kowa youths and the police. Just as there was a cohort of youths who were potential threats to peace in Dadin Kowa, so were there youths who the trado-religious leaders viewed as potential agents of peace. Thus, the leaders assigned peacekeeping and conflict resolution roles to some youths as well as women leaders. Despite their delegation of responsibilities, the leaders never lost control to any of these groups ostensibly because their soft power is central to how they have always negotiated relationships, including with their wives and children. This view was expressed in the narratives of a Dadin Kowa Muslim participant: One of the ways is to maintain our control over our sons and be more powerful than our wives. You should be able to control anyone that you’re responsible for, so some tribal leaders feel that they’ll reduce their powers by creating subgroupings like the youth and women peace groups, which we have here [. . . ] If we hadn’t prevented revenge, it would have spread to other places. When this thing happened, everybody was asked to ensure that their children were indoors. We, however, selected some youths to stay outside and keep watch. The youths outside were not allowed to react to anything, so they always called us to let us know whatever they saw.

The participant’s narrative indicates that the trado-religious leaders are conscious of their power and use it to the full extent possible. The exercise of soft power at the scale described above may be viewed in some cultures as oppressive. In the case of Dadin Kowa, however, it is the reason why the leaders retained control of peacekeeping tasks despite delegating duties and were ultimately effective in ensuring that the community avoided the Jos conflicts. The argument that Dadin Kowa’s trado-religious leaders successfully ensured conflict avoidance in the community because of the people’s reverence of the leaders and the leader’s maximization of the resultant influence is reinforced by the outcome in communities where one of these factors was absent. In places where the trado-religious leaders are either not respected or refused to use their influence to shape behaviours, violent conflicts occurred. For example, one participant who commented on the relationship between the leaders of other communities and their people noted that social control in those places ‘because the youths are beyond the power of their elders. People should make their children their children, rather than their friends’.11 Commenting on the same category of leaders, another participant noted that ‘they are running around in search of peace even though the true source of peace is within them. Peace is like a t-shirt; you select the one you want and wear it’.12 The difference between the situation in Dadin Kowa and other Jos communities during the conflicts is encapsulated in one man’s narrative about his

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conflict time experience. ‘There was palpable fear everywhere’, he noted. He was a government employee, working at the State Secretariat at the time. He recalled seeing people run helter-skelter close to his workplace whenever there was conflict. Dadin Kowa was not exempted from the tension, as his story below indicates: Everybody will run out of their offices and when I reach Dadin Kowa, I’ll find out that a line had been drawn between the Muslims and Christians on the major road and this was done by the Muslim and Christian children. But as I said earlier on, thank God that the elders on both sides who were able to control the children. And that’s how we managed up to this time.

As the participant notes, like other Jos communities, Dadin Kowa was also at the brink of violence given that there was intergroup tension as well as youths who were willing to act on their fears.13 In his community, however, the trado-religious leaders were just as determined to ensure that the prevailing anxiety did not degenerate into violent conflict. While the conflict in other parts Jos was caused by factors beyond the lack of respect for elders and their concomitant inability to inspire positive behaviour, Dadin Kowa avoided the Jos conflicts because its trado-religious leaders deliberately chose to ‘mend fences’. CONCLUSION Trado-religious leaders are important figures in communities across Africa, and they play crucial roles for their people. In light of their social stature, they possess the resources necessary for shaping the behaviour of everyday people in their communities. However, these leaders differ in terms of how they exercise their influence. As shown above, some trado-religious leaders may use their social capital to mobilize members of their ethnic community to participate in conflict when they are in competition with other actors for relevance, to support their co-ethnics who are involved in political power struggles or to further their personal political ambitions. In contrast, other trado-religious leaders use their influence to promote positive behaviours within their communities. In addition to the past documented examples of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding engagements of trado-religious leaders in Africa, this chapter shows how a group of leaders in a Nigerian city, Jos, ensured conflict avoidance in their community even as conflict ravaged other communities. These findings have broader implications for our understanding of conflict processes in Africa and how conflict prevention and transformation

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endeavours are envisioned. For example, it broadens the conversation around peacebuilding effectiveness beyond a focus on malign actors who derail peace processes and centres the constructive and transformative interventions of the local benign agents that facilitate peacebuilding. Additionally, the chapter expands the application of Joseph Nye’s soft power concept as it shows that just as nations determine political-economic outcomes at the international level through soft power strategies, so can non-state actors, particularly trado-religious leaders, shape conflict processes in Africa through non-coercive means. Also, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that local communities possess the resources needed to facilitate conflict transformation, which reinforces the unending advocacy for the centring of local peacebuilding practices in conflict societies. Future research should explore why some trado-religious leaders are able to shape conflict outcomes through soft power strategies, while others are not. NOTES 1. This chapter contains interview data but the identity of interviewees is withheld. 2. These countries are Mozambique, Mali, Senegal, Namibia, Uganda, Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia. 3. Interviews with Dadin Kowa participants, May–June 2019. 4. Interviews with Christian and Muslim participants, May 2019. 5. Interviews with Christian and Muslim participants, May 2019. 6. Interview with a Dadin Kowa Muslim, May 2019. 7. Interviews with Dadin Kowa Christians and Muslims, May–June 2019. 8. Interview with a Dadin Kowa Muslim, May 2019. 9. Interview with a Dadin Kowa Christian, May 2019. 10. Interview with Dadin Kowa Muslim participant, June 2019. 11. Interview with Dadin Kowa Muslim participant, May 2019. 12. Interview with a Dadin Kowa Christian, June 2019. 13. This aspect of the study, threat perception in Dadin Kowa and the community leaders’ responses to it are examined in another paper. See Eke, Surulola (2021). External Malleability of Perceived Threat Outcomes in Ethnic Conflicts: Evidence from Jos, Nigeria.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Adjei, Joseph K. 2015. “The Role of the Chieftaincy Institution in Ensuring Peace in Ghana From Precolonial Times to the Present.” In Indigenous Conflict Management

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Strategies in West Africa: Beyond Right and Wrong, edited by Brandon D. Lundy, Jesse J. Benjamin, and Joseph K. Adjei, 85–101. New York: Lexington Books. Alemie, Ajanaw, and Mandefro Hone. 2018. “Roles of Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms for Maintaining Social Solidarity and Strengthening Communities in Alefa District, North West of Ethiopia.” Journal of Indigenous Social Development 7 (2): 1–21. Basedau, Matthias, and Koos Carlo. 2015. “When Do Religious Leaders Support Faith-Based Violence? Evidence From a Survey Poll in South Sudan.” Political Research Quarterly 68 (4): 760–772. Besteman, Catherine, and Lee V. Cassanelli. 2003. The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War. New Jersey: HAAN Publishing. Brannagan, Paul M., and Richard Giulianotti. 2018. “The Soft Power–Soft Disempowerment Nexus: The Case of Qatar.” International Affairs 94 (5): 1139–1157. Canetti, Daphna, Stevan E. Hobfoll, Ami Pedahzur, and Eran Zaidise. 2010. “Much Ado About Religion: Religiosity, Resource Loss, and Support for Political Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (5): 575–587. Eke, Surulola. 2021. “Fighting Violence: A Comparative Analysis of the Malleability of Perceived Threat Outcomes During the Jos Conflicts in Nigeria.” Unpublished Manuscript. Feklyunina, Valentina. 2016. “Soft Power and Identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian World(s)’.” European Journal of International Relations 22 (4): 773–796. Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn. 2011 “Religion, War, and Peacemaking in Sudan: Sharia, Identity Politics, and Human Rights.” In Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking, edited by Timothy D. Sisk, 105–122. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Hackett, Rosalind I. J. 2011 “Nigeria’s Religious Leaders in an Age of Radicalism and Neoliberalism.” In Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking, edited by Timothy D. Sisk, 123–144. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Hinkel, Tomas, and Traore Bakary F. 2020 “Mali’s Peace Networks: The Role of Islamic Religious Leaders in Conflict Resolution.” Conflict, Security & Development 20 (3): 401–418. Ibrahim, Hudda. 2018. “The Role of the Traditional Somali Model in Peacemaking.” The Journal of Social Encounters 2 (1): 60–68. Juergensmeyer, Mark 2001. “Terror in the Name of God.” Current History 100 (649): 357–361. Kariuki, Francis. 2015. “Conflict Resolution by Elders in Africa: Successes, Challenges and Opportunities.” Journal of Alternative Dispute Resolution 3 (2): 30–53. Keating, Vincent C., and Katarzyna Kaczmarska. 2019. “Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias and the ‘Hidden’ Attraction of Russia.” Journal of International Relations and Development 22: 1–27. https://doi​.org​/10​.1057​/s41268​ -017​-0100​-6. Koter, Dominika. 2013. “King Makers Local Leaders and Ethnic Politics in Africa.” World Politics 65 (2): 187–232.

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Logan, Carolyn. 2020. Traditional Leaders in Modern Africa: Can Democracy and the Chief Co-Exist? Cape Town: The Institute for Democracy in South Africa. https://afrobarometer​ . org​ / sites​ / default​ / files​ / publications ​ / Working ​ % 20paper ​ / AfropaperNo93​.pdf. Makhubela, L. M. 2010. “Conflict Resolution in Somalia: Learning From Failed Mediation Processes.” Master’s Dissertation, University of Pretoria. Mattern, Janice B. 2005. “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33 (3): 583–612. Menkhaus, Ken. 2015. “State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts.” Review of African Political Economy 30 (97): 405–422. Nye, Joseph. 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books. Nye, Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Nye, Joseph. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 94–109. Nye, Joseph. 2011. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs. Okonji, Patrick I. 2016. “Traditional Chieftainship in Peace Building and the Ethnic Conflict in Kosofe Local Government Area of Lagos State, Nigeria.” International Journal of Scientific Research and Innovative Technology 3 (6): 26–37. Olaniran, Olusola, and Arigu Aisha. 2013. “Traditional Rulers and Conflict Resolution: An Evaluation of Pre And Post Colonial Nigeria.” Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 3 (21): 120–127. Osakede, Kehinde O., and Samuel O. Ijimakinwa. 2015. “Traditional Institution and the Modern Day Administration of Nigeria: Issues and Prospects.” Journal of Research and Development 2 (9): 32–40. Osei-hwedie, Kwaku, and Morena J. Rankopo. 2012. “Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case of Ghana and Botswana.” IPSHU English Research Report Series 29: 33–51. Sande, Ken. 2018. Guiding People through Conflict: An Introduction to Christian Conciliation. Montana: Relational Wisdom 360. Sharma, Keshav C. 1997. “Mechanisms for Involving Traditional Leaders in the Promotion of Good Governance.” In Symposium on Traditional Leadership and Local Government, edited by Don I. Ray, Keshav C. Sharma, and Ibikunle I. May-Parker, 44–48. Accessed October 21, 2020. http://people​.ucalgary​.ca/​~taarn​ /clgfreport​.pdf. Sisk, Timothy D. 2011. “Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking.” In Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking, edited by Timothy D. Sisk, 1–8. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Tella, Oluwaseun. 2017. “South Africa in BRICS: The Regional Power’s Soft Power and Soft Balancing.” Politikon 44 (3): 387–403. Walker, Christopher. 2016. “The Authoritarian Threat: The Hijacking of “Soft Power.”” Journal of Democracy 27 (1): 49–63.

Part III

PERSPECTIVES FROM NIGERIA

Chapter 9

Determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Making a Case for Religion Oladotun E. Awosusi and Charles E. Ekpo

International relations is fundamentally anchored on bilateral or multilateral cooperation between and among actors (state and non-state) in the global system. In practice, however, it embraces, but it is not limited to, the overall behaviours of state actors in relation with other actors or the external environment. In the system, states’ behaviours are essentially piloted by foreign policies that are strategically designed to advance national interests and aspirations. According to Frankel (1975, 9), ‘foreign policy is a dynamic process of interaction between the changing domestic demands and the changing external circumstances’. Foreign policy is the strategy of defending a state’s national interest through diplomatic means (Osuntokun 1987). As an art, foreign policy of state mirrors its domestic context, interests and capabilities, and sensitivity to the dynamics of the internal and external indices are the crux of the art (see Frankel 1963; Yitan 2008; Morin and Paquin 2018). This is to say that the formulation and execution of a state’s foreign policy are dependent on the changing internal realities of the state and configuration of the international milieu per time. Adeniran (1983), however, averred that the formulation of a state’s foreign policy involves three elements: the first is the general principles and policy intention of a particular state actor towards another; the second is the goal or objective that a state seeks to achieve in its relation or dealings with other actors (state and non-state), and the third is the means of achieving that national aspirations and interests. These elements, in essence, are interconnected variables of a state’s foreign policy pinned on prevailing internal and external determinants. These determinants affect the direction and outlook of a state’s behaviour to external environment, influence the philosophical foundation or principles 147

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of the state foreign policy and project national interest and the instruments to be employed in advancing such interest. These determinants often include, but are not limited to, geographical location, historical experience, economic status, domestic sociopolitical interest, human capital, military capability, idiosyncrasies of the policy makers (leadership) and the structure of the international environment (Frankel 1963). These determinants are interconnected conditions which interact with one another to shape the behaviour of states beyond the borders. In the case of Nigeria, the concentric philosophical foundation and outlook of its foreign policy is a function of interaction between its domestic configuration, and to some extent, external context. The Nigerian state is not only geo-strategically positioned but also domestically dynamic and complex. These factors have attendant influences on Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation and execution. Religion, for instance, is a factor that determines domestic policy direction and informs public opinion in the country. Nigeria is a ‘religious-secular’ state in which religion influences almost every aspects of the socio-political landscape and decisions making. Religion remains a potent instrument of power by political elites. This resonates with the position of Afolabi (2015) that, the political leaders have, since independence, employed religious tool to wield political power while religious leaders employ same tool as means to access the former for personal benefits. Religion has a prime influence on the Nigerian domestic politics and development. While describing the nature and influence of religion on the postcolonial Nigerian state, Rahman, (1988, 357) notes that ‘When all our troubles – political, economic, social – come upon us in Nigeria, we decide to pray: we turn religious overnight and even our leaders in the country reflect this particular proclivity’. This was further stressed by Kukah (1993, 228), who posits that no one can desire to or occupy political office in Nigeria without disguising to be religious. The Nigeria domestic panorama is being laced with nuances of religion, and by implication has pitched Islam and Christianity against each other in the political quest for control of the Nigerian state (Bujra 2006; Offiong and Ekpo 2020). The corollary is that Nigeria’s foreign policies are often designed and implemented by policy makers whose orientations and world view have been largely influenced by prevailing domestic religious dynamics. For instance, Nigerian prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and commonwealth relations, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa once remarked thus ‘One primary essential to international friendship and cooperation is for each man to be true to his religious beliefs and to reaffirm the basic principles of his particular creed’ (Idang 1973, 70) Meanwhile, Balewa whose world view was gravely influenced by his religion – Islam – laid the foundation for the Afrocentric posture of Nigeria’s foreign policy which successive administrations have consistently favoured

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since independence (Awosusi 2020). For example, his conservative religious orientation explained why the prime minister was opposed to the pan-Africanists’ move for a ‘United African States’ in the early years of independence (Akinyemi 1974). To him, such pan-African ideal was too radical and overambitious. The succeeding military and civilian heads of states continued to play around religious beliefs in their foreign actions and diplomatic engagements in Africa and the world as a whole. This also featured vehemently in the public response of the former Nigeria military head of state, Ibrahim Babangida, to the public censure that greeted the Nigeria’s abrupt decision to become a full member of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in 1986. To the Islamic leader, the Nigerian state cannot ignore religion as weapon of its mobilization domestically and internationally. Hence, the prime need to become a full-fledged member of the Islamic organization, having observed it for many years. Though a plethora of extant literature exists on Nigerian foreign policy (see Claude 1964; Gambari 1989; Akinyemi 1974; Aluko 1977; Osuntokun 1987; Fawole 2002; Folarin 2010; Ogunnubi 2018, Awosusi 2020), various theoretical and empirical studies have largely overlooked the place of religion and how it interacts with other determinants to shape the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Rahman (1988), however, made an attempt to draw attention to religion in the operationalization of Nigeria’s foreign policy, but his work only advanced a brief survey of Islamic impacts on Nigeria foreign policy and the work, therefore, did little in situating religion as one of the determining variables of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In an attempt to fill this gap, this study accentuates religion as a subtle thrust of the Nigeria’s foreign policy. The authors argue that, like other variables, religion and faith-based elements are instructive and demands scholarly attention. RELIGION AND FOREIGN POLICY: A REVIEW Though not a new phenomenon in international relations discourse, religious and faith-based sentiments have been instrumental in birthing the modern Westphalian state system and its attendant international arrangement (see Philpott 2004, 981–982). The Westphalia international order anchored the new inter-state relations paradigm on the principles of equality and sovereignty of nation-states, and as well provided for religious forbearance and non-interference on religious basis in the internal behaviour of other nation-states. This shifted attention from religion as a framework of analysis of states’ behaviour in international relations discourse. Put differently, the global era between 1648 and the end of the bipolar international system (cold war) – 1989 – was a secular arrangement which gave little or no gap for

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religious analysis of international issues. Instead, nationalism was a domineering variable to explain states ideological behaviours with the external environment (Haynes 2011a). The declining relevance of religion in world affairs featured prominently in the positions of nineteenth century theoreticians and philosophers such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, Auguste Comte, Emil Durkheim among others who projected that religion would eventually go into ‘life exile’. The emerging global realities of the post-cold war era saw a ‘new-shift’ to religious explanation of the behaviours of state and non-state actors in international arena. That is, attempts were made to de-secularize and return religion to global discourse. This is what Pepito and Hatzopoulos (2003) referred to as the ‘return of the repressed’. To them, it is the re-emergence or return of what has been sent into exile for centuries. The first post-Cold War scholarly attempt to resuscitate religion in international relations discourse was the 1993 work of Samuel Huntington, entitled ‘Clash of Civilizations?’ In the work, he demonstrated how religion has become a core factor that impels and determines the actions and inactions of the people in the contemporary global society. Specifically, Huntington argued that religion, history, language and tradition were the first elements through which civilizations, the highest cultural grouping of people, differentiate from one another. More so, in his 1996 publication, Huntington buttressed his argument further thus: Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion, as the Athenians emphasized. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world’s great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and the Subcontinent. (Huntington 1996, 87)

To him, religion is a central explanatory framework of the modern international system. That is, religions serve as fulcrum for any civilization and any attempt to explain the modern world without recourse to religion might be an exercise in futility. Broadly, however, religion has over the years shaped states’ domestic and external behaviour (foreign policy) in varying dimensions and degrees. American foreign policy, for instance, has been subtly influenced by the nuances of religions.1 Similarly, both domestic and external behaviour of theocratic countries like Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan are grossly shaped by their religious views. In fact, the domestic behaviours of most state actors, which are fundamentally influenced by religious beliefs, come with international implications (see Carment and Patrick 1997; Ozturk 2021). In spite

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of this obvious significant place of religion, it enjoys little or no attention in contemporary international relations discourse. The place of religion in shaping the actions and inactions of state actors is the most significant but mildly explored phenomenon or indices in the contemporary international relations’ discourses. The re-emergence of religion as a key explanatory paradigm in international relations, however, witnessed contentious and unexplored argument over the role of religion in determining the foreign behaviour of nation-states in the international arena (see Huntington 1993; Haynes 2008; Hurd 2008). The question that remains contentious and unanswered is the extent, means and methods that religion actually influences foreign policy or behaviour of states in international system. Nonetheless, religion is an essential part of the domestic indices which shape the foreign policy direction of state actors in international arena. Religion shapes the world view, orientations and idiosyncrasies of people (foreign policy decision makers inclusive) across the globe. According to Schiavon (2016), religion is one of those determining factors which are significantly influencing the basic concept of global politics. She stated further that this influence occurs through religious actors who, depending on their ability to establish good relationships with key figures in world politics, may get close to decision makers. They can be also multinational actors, like nongovernmental actors that represent a certain religious tradition with significant foreign relations tentacles. Religion is multifarious and dynamic in itself, and it holds a significant place in societal lives. According to Ben-Porat (2013, 8), religion is one of the oldest means of societal identity, along other elements such as race, gender, class and ethnicity. As for Lincoln (2003), religion is a set of mutually held spiritual beliefs expressed in a discourse, perpetuated and interpreted by institutions, communities and associated practices. Wali (1989) avers that religion is a people’s way of life including both their tradition and social interaction. Also, Fox and Sandler (2004), note that religion is a source of world views and values, as well as a source of identity and legitimacy. Religion functions as a subtle force which exacts its influence on the people and society at large. It is a soft power tool which has the inherent ability to influence individuals to act towards a certain direction. This is what Haynes (2009) referred to as ‘religious power’, which points to the ability to influence policy makers to favour certain policies because it suits their religious inclination. According to Haynes (2008), an iota of access into the key foreign policy makers by the religious actors on the basis of their mutually shared religious views and beliefs may influence the foreign policy direction of the state through the employment of religious soft power. This resonates with the assertion of Bettiza (2020) that some state actors may have in their arsenal, certain substantial religious resources, among which is the use of religion in foreign

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policy via symbolic, cultural and network-based elements that may transcend the common notion of soft power. The Nigerian state, undoubtedly, possesses a viable pool of religious resources, which have been openly and clandestinely employed to advance its national objectives. While the soft power diplomacy of Nigerian religious actors such as Imams, Senior Pastors and Bishops, even traditional rulers who had at one time or the other influenced the domestic policies, and by extension, the Nigeria foreign policy outcomes, remains a topic for future studies, our analytic demonstration of the place of religion in the making of Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy in the subsequent sections of this chapter would further affirm this argument. Further still, several other studies (see Gill 1998; Gill and Keshavarzian 1999; Manza and Wright 2003; Fox and Sandler 2004; Warner and Walker 2011; Hayness 2011a, 2011b) have empirically and theoretically established the nexus between religion and politics (domestic and global) and strengthened the position that religion functions not only as an attribute of individuals and communities which cannot be overlooked but a subtle force influencing a state’s foreign policy. There is a consensus among various studies that a country’s religious custom, tradition, and beliefs can be employed as a soft power tool to influence the overall thrust of the foreign policy, as well as its international cooperation and stance (Nye 2004; Hayness 2009; Steinner 2011; Mandaville and Hamid 2018; Bettiza 2020; Ozturk 2021). Albeit, there lies a wide literature gap on the extent of religious impacts on the overall behaviour of state and how religion relates with other domestic factors to shape the foreign policy of states. Most of the few available literature focuses on domestic politics and religion with little or no attention on foreign relations. In Nigeria, as earlier noted, the foreign behaviour of the Nigerian state has, since independence, been gravely influenced by the tinges of the two preponderant religions – Islam and Christianity. Yet, religion has been overlooked as a key determinant of Nigeria’s foreign policy and how it interacts with other variables to shape the foreign policy orientations and outcomes of Abuja foreign policy. RELIGION AND THE MAKING OF NIGERIA’S DOMESTIC POLICIES Nigeria is a product of several historical forces that blew from different directions and shaped the country to its present character. While colonialism is often amplified in the discourses of state formation in Africa, it is not really colonialism, per se, that left the most palpable and enduring legacy in Nigeria but the civilizations which preceded and shaped it – the Western and Islamic

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culture. Since Christianity, it has been argued, is the most important aspect of the Western culture (Huntington 1996, 70), the exportation of Christianity to pre/colonial Nigeria is instructive in understanding the direction of influence between the church and the colonial state of Nigeria (see Ayandele 1966; Offiong and Ekpo 2020). Christian missions and missionaries, extant literature suggests, influenced the colonial government in various ways and are often found to be forbearers and accomplices to the destruction, desecration, sacking, and demonization of traditional culture during the early phase of colonial conquests (Afigbo 1965, 307–308, 2005a, 2005b). In other words, Christian missionaries fomented and provided the fundamental and ideological basis for the systematic replacement of traditional culture with Western culture. Aside from its direct influence on the colonial government, it was difficult, at the early phase of colonialism, to distinguish between colonial and missionaries’ objectives. Except for a number of instances where missionaries’ objectives threatened the interest and stability of the Nigerian extension of the British colonial empire (see, for instance, Offiong and Ekpo 2020, 155–157), activities of the missionaries and the colonial government aided and reinforced the interest of both entities. The passive secularism practised in Britain and its age-long romance with the church ensured that Christianity and its attendant Western culture dominated the structure of government, laws, designs of state institutions and significant aspects of the entire colonial political organization which was inherited at independence. Retrospectively, however, Islam had penetrated northern Nigeria as early as the eleventh century with the first Hausa convert recorded in 1370 (Falola and Heaton 2008, 30). Islam was proselytized by traders and Islamic scholars who targeted Hausa and Kanuri rulers. Islam, consequently, was elitist at inception and accommodated traditional religious rituals and practices. But like Christian missionaries, most Islamic scholars resented the syncretistic tendencies of the Hausa and Kanuri Islamic adherents and preached vehemently against it. Like colonial overlords in southern Nigeria, also, proselytization of the Islamic creed was a precursor to the corruption of traditional African culture with Islamic/Arabic culture. Through a forceful overthrow of African rulers in the northern Nigeria, an Islamic cleric, Shehu Usman dan Fodio established an Islamic theocracy in northern Nigeria in 1804, subduing the entire area under the Islamic culture (see Falola and Heaton 2008, 62–73). By 1903, therefore, when the British colonial forces attacked and occupied the northern Nigeria region, the Islamic culture had become so ingrained in the region with precepts that defined the social, political, cultural and economic life of the people. The southern part of the country, similarly, had embraced Christianity and other aspect of the Western culture. This created a sharp dichotomy and tension between the north and the south (see Ekpo 2017).

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Henceforth, British colonial policies became a covert attempt to manage the cultural differences and animosity between the Islamic north and Christian south (Ekpo and Magor 2021, 130). From the various constitutional reforms (Ekpo 2017) to the forbiddance of Christian missionaries from converting in the northern Nigeria (Ayandele 1966, 137), the colonial government sought to appease Islam and even enshrined the Indirect Rule system based on the theocratic organization in northern Nigeria (Offiong and Ekpo 2020, 156). From colonial period, therefore, there was a mutual trepidation of a possible dominance of the post-colonial Nigerian polity by either Islamic or Western civilizations. But the British managed to allay these apprehensions by pushing through a Western-styled Westminster system while relaxing the Islamic theocratic arrangement in northern Nigeria. This arrangement, however, survived few years after independence as Islamic groups and some northern Nigerian elite campaigned for the restoration of the Sharia jurisprudence. Their argument was that the Westminster system and the entire Western culture are an inheritance of Christianity and by implication, Nigeria cannot be classified as a secular state. Consequently, the constitution should be made to reflect the strength of the two religions since Nigeria, by default, flaunts Christianity through the Western culture (see Pereira and Ibrahim 2010, 925–927). The attempt by these religions to influence the policy and structure of the Nigerian state has culminated in the ‘Christianization’ and ‘Islamization’ of policy objectives in Nigeria. As argued by Nolte et al. (2009, 16) both Islamic and the Christian sacred texts determine the provisions of the constitution the country operates. That is to say that the constitution suffers not to contradict or antagonize the Bible and Quran. According to Offiong and Ekpo (2020, 165), such religious infiltration stretches out of the constitution and determine other things including ‘policies, laws, candidates in elections, state paraphernalia, emblems, employments, admissions, public rituals, subsidies, alliances, diplomatic conducts etc.’. This, they further argue, makes Nigeria’s acclaimed secularism ‘majorly cosmetic’ (p.166). The striking policies in Nigeria that fall within these confines of religious influence include that which establishes, runs and funds the Pilgrim Welfare Board. For each year, the country spends billions of Naira sponsoring its Christian and Muslim populations to their holy lands. The policy of pilgrim sponsorship, it should be noted, was a product of an intense lobby from, and influence of, the Society for the Victory of Islam (JNI) on General Yakubu Gowon’s military administration. Additional pressure from the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) also ensured that Christians, during the Shehu Shagari’s administrations, were also included and sponsored on pilgrimages (Pereira and Ibrahim 2010, 925; Offiong and Ekpo 2020, 157–158). The building and funding of the operations of central Mosques and Christian

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Chapels in federal and state capitals and government’s houses with public funds is a testimony to the inclination of policy makers and political leaders with religion (Umeanolue 2020, 145). The factor of religious influence on such policies measures from the fact that, though it is recognized by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, African Traditional Religious (ATR) ritual sites are often missing owning to the level of influence its adherents could exert to curl such policies in their favour. While prayers from Christian and Muslim adherents are often recited at the commencement and ending of public functions, various holy books of these religions are used as sacred objects of oath taking in courts and during swearing-ins into public offices. Commenting on this, Umeanolue noted thus: The main trust of the oath is the promise to act faithfully and in accordance with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In doing this, the help of God is solicited. Though religious leaders are not given specific roles to play when the oath is being administered, the mention of God’s name, coupled with the holding of scripture or any religious object, is enough to establish the invocation of the divine. (2020, 148)

Interestingly, also, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (see Sections 260 and 275) makes provisions for the Sharia jurisprudence which has been adopted and practised by some state in northern Nigeria. The Islamic police, the Hisbah, has been very active in the northern states of Kano and Kaduna, enforcing Islamic codes and morals. The Islamic court has also been active in over twelve states of the federation and is recognized and given credence by the constitution. The attempt to overlap what is enshrined by the Shari’a code with the common law often time culminates in policy ambivalence which manifests in various forms. The recent demolition of a hotel in Kaduna, by the Kaduna state government for an allegedly plotted sex party explains this ambivalence between what is legal and religious in the face of policymaking in northern Nigeria. Very importantly, also, the religious inclinations and idiosyncrasies of the chief executive go a long way to determining the nature of policies, even before elections. For instance, it has become conventional that presidents and governors be deputized by candidates from an antagonizing religion. Presidents emerging either from the Islamic or Christian religion tend to have a way of surrounding themselves with adherents of their religion. During the Chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s civilian administration, ‘Pentecostal rituals were liberally infused into state functions’ and Pentecostals ‘had a potent influence on political culture’ (Pereira and Ibrahim 2010, 926). President Goodluck Jonathan, on the other hand, fraternized with the CAN so much that it became a cause for concerns. President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration has

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also not disappointed in this angle, but cannot be assessed until the end of his administration. Nevertheless, the place of religion in the making of Nigeria’s domestic policies is often downplayed. Its place, also, in the framing and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy is also avoided by extant literature. In the subsequent heading, we demonstrate how religion has influenced Nigeria’s foreign policy and as well make a case for its inclusion as one of the determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy. RELIGION: A SUBTLE DETERMINANT OF NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY The concentric and idealist (moral) outlook of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence is arguably premised on the ideas of Nigeria’s Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, a conservative Muslim who believed in gradual and moral approach not only to domestic but also international affairs. The philosophical ideology of Nigeria’s foreign policy is a subtle religious ideal of ‘good neighborliness’, an idealistic approach to international politics and engagements. This moral-oriented foreign policy thrust has been uncompromisingly pursued by succeeding Nigerian leaders, at the expense of national interest (see Awosusi 2020). So far, Abuja’s foreign policy has, irrefutably, been influenced by its colonial antecedents, the civil war (1967–1970) experience, economic resources, military capability and geostrategic status and size, among others (see Aluko 1977; Fawole 2002; Ogunnubi 2018). These factors are interconnected and interacted with other domestic ingredients, specifically religion, to shape the foreign behaviour of the Nigerian state per time. As noted earlier, Nigeria is a secular state with very religious people, whose orientations have been gravely induced by the tinges of the two major religions: Islam and Christianity. Religion has served as a significant, but largely overlooked ingredient that shapes the direction of Nigeria foreign policy. Aside the fact that religion has been engaged as a soft power instrument to advance Nigeria’s national interest, it has been a salient impelling factor for certain actions and inactions of Nigeria in the international scene. For instance, Ahmadu Bello, the then premier of northern Nigeria publicly declared in 1964 at Medina thus: I promise to commit myself to the propagation of Islam. I was able to convert more than 60,000 non-Muslims to Islam. Within my region and surrounding, I have constructed several mosques and Islamic Centres. I hope to propagate religion of Islam to entire Nigerians and the rest of African. (see Wara 2016, 13)

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This public assertion drew the attention of the Arab world and some other Muslim states which gave the northern leader moral and financial support not only to propagate Islam but also to develop his region (Skuratowics 2004). Meanwhile, prior attempt by the state of Israel to salvage the socioeconomic situation of the northern Nigeria was flagrantly turned down by the northern leader due to suspicion of the intent of the former by the latter (see Akinyemi 1974; Gambari 1980). Similarly, the international overt and covert sympathy showed to the Arab world during the 1967 Arab–Israeli war was not unconnected to the religious attachment between the Arab world and the Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria. To put it into perspective, Nigeria’s First Republic (1960–1966) constitutionally allowed the three regions (north, west and east) to conduct their own foreign affairs somewhat independent of the federal government, and as such, the regions, for factors not limited to religion, assumed opposing foreign policy posture. On the Middle East conflict, for instance, the northern Nigeria tilted its foreign policy towards the Arab world, while the western and eastern regions were blatantly pro-Israel (see Gambari 1980). Consequently, the Nigerian state became internally divided on religious ground over the international issue. While the Muslimdominated northern region stretched its diplomatic arms towards the Arab world, the Christian-dominated eastern and western regions gave their unalloyed support to the Jewish state of Israel. Religion, in essence, was a major determinant of Nigeria’s foreign behaviour at that time. This foreign stance, however, featured evidently in the public assertion of Ahmadu Below, the premier of the northern region when he noted that ‘Jordan is my second home . . . what is Israel? To my mind, it does not exist, and it will never exist . . . I don’t know what it is’ (Nzewunwah 1984, 50). On the contrary, Chief Ladoke Akintola, the premier of the Western Nigeria also openly declared at Israel during one of his visits that ‘you can be assured of our friendship and support at any place and we promise never to withdraw this’ (Akinyemi 1974, 104). This position is similar to that of the Premier of eastern Nigeria, Michael Okpara who, in fact, publicly declared himself an ‘Israelite’ (Nzewunwah 1984, 49). Amidst the internal divides on the Arab–Israeli conflict, the federal government with the supreme stance on the nation’s foreign policy claimed neutrality, but it must be stressed that the earlier reluctance of the Nigerian State to establish embassy in Tel Aviv questioned such neutrality claim. This is in tandem with the position of Akinyemi (1974, 104), who argued that the failure of the federal government to establish embassy in Tel Aviv in line with the established Israeli embassy in Lagos was an attempt to align with the anti-Israel posture of the northern region. Also, Nigeria’s recent decision not to support the movement of the capital of Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018 betrays its supposed

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neutrality in the Arab–Israeli conflict and amplifies the nexus between the influence of religion and the religious idiosyncrasy of the head of government in the making and pursuant of the country’s foreign policy. More so, religion as a determining ingredient of Nigeria’s foreign behaviour further surfaced during the fratricidal civil war (1967–1970), a thirty months secession war which was interpreted and portrayed by some as a religious war between the Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria and Christian-dominated Biafra secessionist group in the eastern part of Nigeria (see Forsyth 1977). The two conflicting parties – Federal Government of Nigeria, under the leadership of Gen. Yakubu Gowon, and the Biafra Secessionist Group, under the leadership of Major General Odumegwu-Ojukwu – both subtly engaged the instruments of religion to get international sympathies and supports. The international support in terms of technical, military, and financial assistance offered to the Biafra secessionists by Israel could be analysed as a calculated and deliberate attempt by the latter to retaliate the earlier overt and covert sympathies shown by the Nigeria government to the Arab world in the course of the Arab–Israeli war as well as to ‘liberate’ the Christians in the eastern part of Nigeria. In reaction, however, the Nigerian government swiftly turned to its traditional Muslim allied states in the Middle East and North Africa, specifically Egypt for assistance to weaken the enemy forces. The support that Biafra got from Israel (a traditional ally of the United States) also informed the Nigerian government to quickly mend its broken fences with the Soviet Union (Russia) for military and financial support.2 The role played by Israel in the Nigeria civil war cum the age-long anti-Israeli stance of the Nigerian government under the successive Islamic leaders led to the eventual break of diplomatic ties with the former on 25th October 1973 (Nzewunwah 1984), and the Nigeria–Israeli relationship became sour for almost two decades. In effect, religion played a significant role in Nigeria’s domestic (civil war) and international policies (cold war and Arab–Israeli conflict). Similarly, the sudden draconian border policies which led to the episodic expulsion of over two million illegal African migrants from the country between 1983 and 1985 (see Aremu 2013; Awosusi and Fatoyinbo 2019) have an underlying religious influence. The period between late 1970s and early 1980s saw an unusual influx of illegal African migrants into the country. Among these illegal migrants were members of the fundamentalist Islamic group known as the Maitatsine under the leadership of Muhammad Marwa, a foreigner and Islamist from the neighbouring state of Cameroun, which troubled the northern part of Nigeria in the early 1980s (Skuratowics 2004). The Islamic organization was said to be dominated by foreigners, and the calculated national strategy to weaken their stronghold was to expel foreigners from the nation in spite of its traditional Africa-centred (Afrocentric) foreign policy. The massive expulsion was however greeted with regional

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criticism, as most African states became so wary about the acclaimed regional ‘big brother’ leadership stance of Nigeria in the continent (see Awosusi and Fatoyinbo 2019). As we have posited earlier, in the early years of independence, the Tafawa Balewa administration, for reasons which cannot be divorced from religion, prioritized Saudi Arabia and some other Islamic countries over Israel while establishing foreign missions, in spite of the geared efforts of the latter to establish foreign mission in Nigeria (see Rahman 1988). It is worth noting, however, that, this religion-motivated foreign policy behaviour is premised on the religious idiosyncrasies of the Balewa and the successive Nigerian leaders (both Christians and Muslims). Religion has consistently affected the perception and dispositions of Nigeria’s foreign policy decision makers since independence. For example, Nigeria’s decision to become one of the members of Organization for Economic Cooperation also known as D-8 comprising of Islamic states of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey, under the Islamic military head of state, General Sani Abacha, could have been a function of the strong religious (Islamic) affinities of the leaders of these countries. In similar case, Nigeria, stance against the United States-led gay rights under the former President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian, was not propelled by any factor other than religious and cultural colorations. Obasanjo openly slammed the same-sex union and advised fellow African states to follow suit by frowning at such proposal from the United States. In a swift move, thus, the Nigerian government proposed a bill to outlaw same-sex marriage in stiff opposition to such proposal from the United State in spite of the soft power diplomacy of the latter. Regardless of some sort of international condemnation and opposition to such bill, however, it was signed into law under Former President Goodluck Jonathan on 7 January 2014. The success behind the swift passage of such bill into law lies within the fact that neither the Islamic nor Christian creed sanctions such act. Nigeria’s border tolerance, especially on its northern border with Chad and Niger, which has created ambience of cross-border illegalities and criminalities in the country, is not unconnected to the post-independence ties between the Niger (an Islamic state) and the Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria. Given the religious and cultural homogeneity between the northern Nigerian people and the peoples of the neighbouring states of Niger and Chad, one could hardly tell the differences between and among them in the border communities. In the border communities between Nigeria and Niger, for instance, one can rarely differentiate between Nigerian and Nigerien given their religious (Islamic) and linguistic (Hausa/Fulani) affinity, and as a result, some of the residents maintain dual nationalities and perpetrate cross-border criminalities thereof (Ogunnubi and Awosusi forthcoming). The consequent effect of this is the recurrent trans-border national security threats posed by Boko

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Haram terrorists (an Islamic terrorist group) and Fulani herdsmen who use the porous northern border regions as hide-outs. This is to say that the Boko Haram terrorist group is a major religious act which gathered momentum as a result of the religious affinity and border tolerance in northern Nigeria, and today, impacting Nigeria’s foreign policy. An attempt to tackle increasing Boko Haram terrorism and other related vices around its borders, however, led to the resuscitation and expansion of the initial joint military alliance and cooperation to include Nigeria and the neighbouring states of Niger, Chad, Cameroun, and Benin known as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). As observed in the above analysis, Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust has been overtly and covertly driven by the tones of the two major religions (Christianity and Islam) over the years, and consequently makes religion a core determinant of Abuja’s foreign behaviour to neighbouring nation-states and the international society at large. Also, Nigeria has obviously employed religion as a soft power tool to advance its national interest. Albeit, religion is usually not fronted while making such foreign policy decision, but it remains a key subtle factor which interacts with other factors to influence such decision as it affects the outside world. As a result, like other ingredients and determinant, religion should be recognized, problematized and decorated as one of the compelling determinants of Abuja’s foreign policy. CONCLUSION We have attempted, in this work, to demonstrate the ingredient of religion in the making of Nigeria’s domestic policies and how such dynamics ultimately shape and influence the fundamentals of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The authors’ arguments are hinged on the premise that if Nigeria is being influenced so much by its two preponderant religions such that it has been described as a ‘theocratic diarchy’ (see Offiong and Ekpo 2020), then religion is a factor that must be given attention in the discourses of foreign policy ingredients of the Nigerian state. Though other factors are often emphasized by scholars, we have, however, demonstrated that religion, since independence, has played a significant role in defining and redefining the patterns and conducts of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The religious idiosyncrasies of the various Nigerian heads of government, past and present, have also shaped their disposition and attitude towards foreign policy debates and actions, and the roots of each of Nigeria’s oriental religions also blackmails the country into an automatic friendship with ‘pilgrim’ countries with such friendship maintained at enviable cost. Nigeria has also shown excessive weakness in controlling its international borders along neighbours with similar religious culture, especially, in its northern borders.

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In spite of the fact that Nigeria is a signatory to several international conventions and treaties on human rights, the country still defines rights from customary and religious precepts, and this explains why most international conventions are yet to be properly domesticated. The above trends notwithstanding, the role of religion in the discourses of Nigeria’s foreign policy is not given its deserved attention. There are little or no literature to associate with a theme as pertinent as this in Nigeria’s foreign policy and soft power analysis. We do not seek to stimulate a debate on whether or not the factor of religion should be included in the definition and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives. We rather, based on the factors above, advocate that aside from geography, demography, wealth and economy, military strength, human capital and leadership, religion should be integrated as one of the determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy for reasons already highlighted in this work. This is not just pragmatic, but would spark further interrogation that might generate theories towards a better understanding of the demarcation between what is spurred by the general religious outlook of the country, what is advanced by the eschatology of dominant policymakers and the dynamics between the former and the latter in shaping the character and nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives. NOTES 1. President Eisenhower, for instance, was gravely influenced by religious idiosyncrasies which became more obvious when he declared thus: ‘When God comes in, communism has to go’ in (see Inboden 2008, 259). 2. During the Cold War politics, Abuja foreign policy was pro-Western in spite of its acclaimed non-aligned stance in the bipolar world politics. But the reality of international politics, however, dawned on the nation during the civil war when its traditional friends (Western powers) gave support to the Biafra. This prompted Nigeria to quickly run to the arms of Russia for assistance.

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Afigbo, Adiele. 2005a. “The Calabar Mission and the Aro Expedition of 1901–1902.” In Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele Afigbo, edited by Toyin Falola, 350–359. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press Inc. Afigbo, Adiele. 2005b. “The Aro Expedition of 1901–1902: An Episode in the British Occupation of Iboland.” In Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele Afigbo, edited by Toyin Falola, 321–339. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press Inc. Afolabi, Oluwaseun, 2015. “The Role of Religion in Nigerian Politics and its Sustainability for Political Development.” Net Journal of Social Sciences, 3, no. 2: 42–49. Akinyemi, Bolaji. 1974. Foreign Policy and Federalism. Nigeria: Ibadan University Press. Aluko, Olajide. 1977. “Nigeria Foreign Policies”: The Foreign Policies of African States. London: Hodder and Stoughto. Aremu, Johnson. 2013. “Responses to the 1983 Expulsion of Aliens from Nigeria: A Critique.” African Research Review, 7, no 3: 340–352. Awosusi, Oladotun. 2020. “A Critical Review of Nigeria’s Regional Hegemonic Aspirations Through Afrocentric Engagements From 1999–2019: Call for a National Rethink.” Journal of Political Science, Public and International Affairs, 3, no. 1: 29–40. Awosusi, Oladotun, and Fatoyinbo, Olabode. 2019. “Xenophobic Prejudice in Africa: Cultural Diplomacy as a Panacea to the Deteriorating İnter-African Relations.” International Journal of Research Publications, 40, no. 1: 1–26. Ayandele, Emmanuel. 1966. The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842–1914: A Political and Social Analysis. London: Longman, Green and Co. Ltd. Bettiza, Gregorio. 2020. States, Religions and Power: Highlighting the Role of Sacred Capital in World Politics. Washington, DC: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. Bujra, Janet. 2006. “Leo Igwe: Interview With a Nigerian Humanist.” Review of African Political Economy, 33, no. 110: 740–743. Carment, David, and Patrick, James. 1997. “The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict: New Perspectives on Theory and Policy.” Global Society, 11, no. 2: 205–232. Claude, Philips, Jr. 1964. The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Ekpo, Charles. 2017. “Interest, Diffidence, Rigidity and the Challenge of Constitutional Change – The Nigeria’s Experience.” Legal Aid Oyo Journal of Legal Issues, 1, no. 1: 27–34. Ekpo, Charles, and Magor, Stephen. 2021. “Federalism, Federal Powers and the Politics of Restructuring in Nigeria.” Young African Leadership Journal of Development, 3, Article 18. Falola, Toyin, and Heaton, Matthew. 2008. A History of Nigeria. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fawole, Alade. 2002. Nigeria’s External Relations and Foreign Policy Under Military Rule (1966–1999). Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press Ltd. Folarin, Sheriff. 2010. “National Role Conceptions and Nigeria’s African Policy, 1985–2007.” PhD Thesis, Department of International Relations, Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria.

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Forsyth, Frederick. 1977. The Making of an African Legend: The Biafra Story. England: Penguin Books Ltd. Fox, Jonathan, and Sandler, Shmuel. 2004. Bringing Religion into International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Frankel, Joseph. 1963. The Making of Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press. Frankel, Joseph. 1975. British Foreign Policy, 1945–1973. London: Oxford University Press. Gambari, Ibrahim. 1980. Party Politics and Foreign Policy. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello Press Ltd. Gambari, Ibrahim. 1989. Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making: Nigeria After the Second Republic. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Gill, Anthony. 1998. Rendering Unto Caesar: Church and State in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gill, Anthony, and Keshavarzian, Arang. 1999. “State Building and Religious Resources: An Institutional Theory of Church-State Relations in Iran and Mexico.” Politics & Society, 27, no. 3: 431–465. Haynes, Jeffrey. 2008. “Religion and Foreign Policy Making in the USA, India and Iran.” Third World Quarterly, 29, no. 1: 143–165. Haynes, Jeffrey. 2009. “Religion and Foreign Policy.” In Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, edited by Jeffrey Haynes, 293–307. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Haynes, Jeffrey. 2011a. An Introduction to International Relations and Religion. United Kingdom: Pearson Education. Haynes, Jeffrey. 2011b. Religion, Politics and International Relations, 1st edition. London: Routledge. Huntington, Samuel. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3: 22–49. Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, 1st edition. New York: Simon & Schuster. Hurd, Elizabeth 2011. “Secularism and International Relations Theory.” In Religion and International Relations Theory, edited by Jack Snyder, 60–90. New York: Columbia University Press. Idang, Gordon. 1973. Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960–66. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Inboden, William. 2008. Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960. New York: Cambridge University Press.Kukah, Matthew. 1993. Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Lincoln, Bruce. 2003. Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After 9⁄11. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mandaville, Peter, and Shadi, Hamid. 2018. Islam as Statecraft: How Governments Use Religion in Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings New Geopolitics of the Middle East Report. Manza, Jeff, and Wright, Nathan. 2003. “Religion and Political Behavior.” In Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, edited by Michele Dillon, 297–314. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Morin, Jean, and Paquin, Jonathan, eds. 2018. Foreign Policy Analysis. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi​.org​/10​.1007​/978​-3​-319​-61003​-0. Nolte, Isa, Danjibo, Nathaniel, and Oladeji, Abubakar. 2009. Religion, Politics, and Governance in Nigeria. Religion and Development Working Paper, 39: 1–117. Nye, Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Nzewunwah, Okechukwu. 1984. “Nigeria and Israel: The Issue of Diplomatic Relations 1958–1983.” MA Thesis. Nnsukka, Nigeria: Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria. Offiong, Ekwutosi, and Ekpo, Charles. 2020. “Nigeria: The Paradox of Secular State.” Politics and Religion, 14, no. 1: 149–172. Ogunnubi, Olusola. 2018. “Unlocking the ‘Black Box’ of Nigeria’s Hegemonic Foreign Policy.” Journal of African Foreign Affairs, 5, no. 2: 43–65. Ogunnubi, Olusola, and Awosusi, Oladotun. Forthcoming. “Nigeria’s ‘Border Diplomacy’: Rhetoric or Substance for Regional Hegemonic Leadership?” Global Society. Osuntokun, Jide. 1987. “The Thrust of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in the Future.” Nigerian Forum, May–June, nos. 6&5: 1–5. Ozturk, Ahmet. 2021. “Islam and Foreign Policy: Turkey’s Ambivalent Religious Soft Power in the Authoritarian Turn.” Religions, 12, no. 38: 1–16. https://doi​.org​ /10​.3390​/rel120100. Pereira, Charmaine, and Ibrahim, Jibrin. 2010. “On the Bodies of Women: The Common Ground Between Islam and Christianity in Nigeria.” Third World Quarterly, 31, no. 6: 921–937. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/01436597​.2010​.502725. Petito, Fabio, and Hatzopoulos, Pavlos. 2003. “The Return From Exile: An Introduction.” In Religion and International Relations: The Return from Exile, edited by Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, 1–22. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Philpott, Daniel. 2004. “Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State.” Michigan, Journal of International Law, 25, no. 4: 981–998. Rahman, Olalekan.1988. “Islam and the Conduct of Foreign Relations in Nigeria.” Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal, 9, no. 2: 356–365. Saliu, Hassan, and Oshewolo, Segun. 2018. “Nigeria in African Affairs: Hegemonic and Altruistic Considerations.” The Round Table, 107, no. 3: 291–305. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1080​/00358533​.2018​.1476095. Schiavon, Elizabeth. 2016. “International Relations Religion’s Influence on Foreign Policy: The Case of U.S.-Israel Relationship.” MA Thesis, Foscari Veneza University. Skuratowics, Katarzyna. 2004. “Fundamentalist Religious Movements: A Case Study of the Maitatsine Movement in Nigeria.” MA Thesis, University of Louisville, Warsaw. Steinner, Sherrie. 2011. “Religious Soft Power as Accountability Mechanism for Power in World Politics: The Inter-Faith Leaders’ Summit(s).” Sage Open, 1–16. https://journals​.sagepub​.com​/doi​/10​.1177​/2158244011428085.

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Chapter 10

Nigeria’s Religious Soft Power Turning the Tide of a Declining Image Olusola Ogunnubi, Sheriff Folarin, and Confidence Ogbonna

Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, successive governments and leaders have pursued a ‘knight in a shining armour’ posture within the African continent (Talibu and Ahmed, 2016). One of its early nationalists, Jaja Nwachuku, noted that ‘our country (Nigeria) is the largest single unit in Africa . . . . We are not to abdicate the position in which God Almighty has placed us . . . the black continent is looking up to this state to liberate it from thralldom’ (cited in Shaw and Fasehun, 1980: 551). While there might be hyperbolic innuendo in Nwachuku’s statement, especially as regards Nigeria’s geographical size and its right to lead by divine mandate, it is evident that the country has pursued a leadership role in Africa through an Afrocentric foreign policy. Bach (2007) further notes that from the 1960s, messianic references to Nigeria’s leadership in Africa have been pivotal to its foreign policy and external relations. This explains its contribution to peacekeeping in Africa, its struggles against colonialism and white racist governments in countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe, among others, and the creation and funding of regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Ihonvbere, 1983; Oni and Taiwo, 2016). In this light, Nigeria is globally considered as a regional power within the African continent based on its robust foreign policy involvement in Africa and its quest to provide African solutions to African problems (Ogunnubi, 2016; Ezirim, 2011). However, there are also contrary views that despite the long years of its Afrocentric foreign policy, coupled with the vast material, human and financial costs involved, Nigeria has not benefitted much save for mere praise (Ihonvbere, 1983; Bach, 2007; Ogunnubi, 2014). In effect, Nigeria’s 167

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supposed leadership in Africa has not generated commensurate goodwill or diplomatic support from many African countries that have benefitted from its largess (Ogbonna and Ogunnubi, 2018). Indeed, Nigeria sometimes suffered embarrassment when her unsolicited assistance to fellow African states was rejected, such as in 2003 when she sent vessels to Ivory Coast to assist in the wake of the civil war (Folarin, 2014). Nigeria and its people’s image are frequently battered by harassment and extra-judicial killings in many African countries including South Africa, Ghana and Libya, among others (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). Citing the continental odium against Nigeria, Tella (2018) laments the deportation of 4,281 Nigerians from these countries as well as the killing of ninety-seven Nigerian fisher people in Bakassi by Cameroonian paramilitary troops, among other humiliating actions. The common stereotype that Nigeria is a nation of rogues, criminals, and perpetrators of advanced fee fraud is a huge dent in its image and has dire implications for the country’s global status. We argue that such perceptions can be reversed through the artful application of Pentecostal FBOs of Nigerian extraction as soft power agents to turn the tide in its declining image. The notion of soft power has received considerable attention in the literature on countries’ quest for regional powerhood, new regionalism and hegemony. Within the soft power discourse, the idea of ‘religious soft power’ has gained popularity, mainly due to studies conducted by scholars such as Jeffrey Haynes and Tamsin Bradley (2014). When Nye first conceived the concept of ‘soft power’ in the 1990s, not much mention was mentioned of religion as a soft power source;1 however, twenty-first-century realities have highlighted the positive effects of religion as an ideological strategy to win hearts and minds (Haynes, 2007). The term ‘religious soft power’ was coined to describe the deployment of the seductive power of religion as a soft power strategy in the public sphere and for the pursuit of foreign policy objectives (Mandaville, 2018). This involves transnational projection of religion through deliberate religious strategies and outreach sponsored by a government or other non-state actors, including parastatal organizations, humanitarian and relief groups, private charities, and migrant labourers (Beckley Center, 2018). Religious soft power is thus defined as ‘the use of religious ideas, norms, and values to spread and embed a particular understanding of the world’ (2014). While this is far from being a new concept, existing studies on the subject have mainly focused on the geopolitical implications of Islam in the Middle East, the global influence of the Roman Catholic Church, and the Protestant evangelical churches mainly based in the United States (Haynes, 2012; Jödicke, 2018).2 As part of the study of the soft power of nonstate actors, it is also important to explore the role of global mega-churches and the influence wielded by pastorpreneurs on behalf of their country of origin.

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While there has been extensive debate among scholars and practitioners in Nigeria on the proliferation of the country’s FBOs in Africa and further afield, a systematic and comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon within the context of international studies and foreign policy analysis has yet to emerge. The few studies on Nigeria’s soft power have not sufficiently engaged the effects of FBOs and their iconic leaders – referred to as pastorpreneurs in this chapter – on other global actors. Furthermore, within Nigeria’s growing soft power literature, FBOs have received little attention as one of the ways to bolster the country’s dwindling image. Such organizations, especially those of Pentecostal extraction are regarded as a potential soft power tool to bolster Nigeria’s wobbly status in Africa and are considered among others as magic wands to bolster its shaky image. Although the notion of Pentecostal FBOs as soft power resources in Nigeria is not novel, existing studies have only partly addressed this topic. A grounded understanding of these linkages that rests on a firm empirical and theoretical foundation is thus lacking. Fewer still are studies on Nigeria’s growing influence in the spread of Islam in Africa and her strategic location to strengthen the Islamic base in west and Central Africa and act as the focal point for the building of a Muslim caliphate south of the Sahara. However, this chapter focuses on Christian FBOs as a source of Nigeria’s religious soft power. The chapter proceeds from Luoma-aho’s (2012: xiii) International Relations thesis that ‘there is a God whose existence is relevant to the life of individuals, their communities, and the conditions they accommodate’, affirming that religion actively exists and operates in the everyday affairs of people and indeed states. Mylek and Nel (2010: 81) assert that, ‘religion has long been neglected in the social sciences, which have been profoundly influenced by “secularization theory”’, which submits that modernization results in religious institutions, actions and consciousness having decreasing social significance. Bemoaning the lack of interest in religion’s significance to international relations, Philpott (2009: 184) emphasized that, ‘it remains the case that religion’s place in political science scholarship is vastly under-proportioned to its place in headlines around the globe, and to scholarship in political economy, security studies, international institutions, and the like’ (see Luoma-aho, 2012). Haynes (2012: 13) explains further that, ‘religious soft power enables us to expand soft power beyond Nye’s original secular formulation . . . which focused mainly on the US government’. It is against this background that this chapter critically examines the nexus between Christian FBOs of Nigeria’s extraction and the extension of the country’s image in Africa and globally. More specifically, it interrogates the role of religion in understanding regionalism, hegemony and power politics in Africa while employing the heuristic value of soft power. We focus on

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Nigeria-based pastorpreneurs and Pentecostal FBOs as soft power resources to empirically assess their influence in (re)positioning Nigeria in Africa’s geopolitics. The analysis draws on extensive documentary evidence to establish the possible influence of FBOs as unofficial soft power sources to launder Nigeria’s global image. Examined in the context of religious nationalism, we explore the theological symbolism of faith in the increasing connectedness between religion and international relations. RELIGION, FOREIGN POLICY AND SOFT POWER: ANY LINKAGES? There is consensus among the various social sciences disciplines that there is a global resurgence of religion despite a prior narrative that its importance will not only decline but that the very phenomenon of religion will fizzle out due to modernity and/or globalization (Kubálková, 2009). The academic resurrection and subsequent intellectual interrogation of religion globally has moved swiftly from being academic folklore that borders on personal opinions to scholarly consensus in the social sciences (Fox, 2001; Kettel, 2012). Since 9/11, religion has featured prominently in everyday discourse to the extent that it now competes for the attention of journalists, politicians and think tanks, among others (Phillpott, 2002). This is anchored on the fact that it is one of the long-lasting and dominant forces that have and will continue to shape and influence many narratives around the world (Kratochvíl, 2009). The octopus-like reach of religion is visible in contemporary issues such as abortion, same-sex marriages, cloning, violence, terrorism and diplomacy, among others. Extensive intellectual energy has been applied to the systematic study of religion and the role of transnational religious actors in international relations (Haynes, 2007). This is evidenced by the plethora of disciplines, journals, and associations that now pay concerted academic attention to religion and its associated concepts (Kettel, 2016). Hence, it can be stated that the study of religion holds great promise not just for understanding the world around us, but in comprehending its trajectory and dynamics (Phillpott, 2009). Numerous scholarly assumptions, conclusions and prescriptions have been applied to the study of religion. As a concept, it suffers from a definitional crisis and conceptual anarchy. Reaching consensus on the meaning of religion even within the discipline of religion/religious studies has always been a challenge and is likely to remain so in the near future (Greil, 2009; Bergunder, 2014). Kubálková (2009) observes that the diverse intellectual attention paid to religion from different disciplinary standpoints, coupled with their distinct

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jargon, research agendas, and perspectives is akin to the proverbial ‘blind men and the elephant’ which has not enabled the systematic study of religion. Indeed, it is easier to say what religion is not than what it is. For instance, Dow (2007: 4) argues that: A definition of religion is difficult to make, because religion has many facets, many of which do not appear to be religious by themselves. For example, religion involves gathering in groups. It involves communal eating. It involves theoretical discourse about the nature of the universe, and so forth. Countless definitions have been proposed by theoreticians. The most interesting thing is that the average person can tell when others are engaging in religious behavior while many scholars and scientists have problems defining it. The concept of religion is like the concept of culture. It is easy to use in ordinary discourse, but difficult to define precisely.

To this effect, scholars have argued against defining religion since this can impose limitations on it (Dawes and Maclaurin, 2012). No stringing together of words can fully express the attributes of religion as a concept which can be accepted without contestation or controversy when intellectually scrutinized. For instance, religion is widely regarded, although not without contestation, as belief in the supernatural or a supernatural being. Although concise, this definition does not capture a rounded description of the current state or form of religion. Furthermore, some religions do not believe in a supernatural being (Fitzgerald, 2011). Geertz (1966: 90) conceived religion as: (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

Although this definition is one of the most popular and widely accepted, it has not gone unchallenged and has been characterized as not only Eurocentric, but Christian centred, and therefore biased (Asad, 1982). It is also critiqued for focusing on the person rather than the process, structure, and power relations of religion (Dow, 2007). Kishimoto (1961: 240) defined religion as: An aspect of culture centered upon activities which are taken by those who participate in them to elucidate the ultimate meaning of life and to be related to the ultimate solution of its problems.

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This definition is not without flaws as it restricts religion to a series of untested activities which may not be entirely accurate. Religions such as Islam are more than just activities; they are an all-encompassing belief system that affects the entire fabric of an individual or group of individuals and their relations with the state. Falk (2001: 30) sees religion as: All spiritual outlooks that interpret the meaning of life by reference to faith in and commitment to that which cannot be explained by empirical science or sensory observation and is usually associated with an acceptance of the reality of the divine, the sacred, the transcendent, the mysterious, the ultimate.

While this definition seeks to unveil the numinous nature of many religions practised around the world, it ignores the place of science in the study of religion, hence, making it a non-scientific venture. For Fitzgerald (2011), religion can be better understood as a universal but distinct kind of human practice and institution. He observed that religion is broadly seen as a natural aspect of human experience and action. Fitzgerald (2011) agreed that, while any definition of religion is a limitation of it, this cannot be a stand-alone concept and must be understood within the dynamics of politics and economics. While the intermeshing of religion with politics and economics holds true, his denial of the need to define religion is inherently flawed (Dawson, 2013). Norris and Inglehart (2011) posited that religion is a universal and multidimensional phenomenon that can be found across societies; this informed the classification of societies based on the predominant religion. They argued that religion could be classified as a societal institution which serves as a national identity as well as an individual practice which is rooted in the belief in a supernatural being or the need for spiritual enlightenment. The main argument against Norris and Inglehart’s (2011) treatment of religion is that while their objectives were global and ambitious, they mainly focus on Christianity and Islam, ignoring other less prominent religions across the world (Dawson, 2013). Haynes (2007) defined religion as a system of beliefs and practices relative to the sacred, which is typically (but not necessarily) a divine being (or beings) or a supernatural order. He noted that these beliefs and practices are usually considered ultimate and inviolate. The above discussion suggests that the debate on the conceptual remits of religion is far from over (Gallie, 1965). However, its role or function in any society or epoch cannot be contested; although it may differ in degree, content or magnitude, it serves some basic purpose in any period. This includes but is not restricted to the allocation and interpretation of values, promotion of a good life here or in the afterlife, and the reification and justification of a socio-economic and political system, among others (Shuriye, 2011).

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While debate continues on the definition of religion, as noted earlier, international relations scholars have interrogated its global resurgence by focusing on the nexus between religion and international relations. For example, Thomas (2005: 26) observed that: The global resurgence of religion is the growing saliency and persuasiveness of religion, i.e. the increasing importance of religious beliefs, practices, and discourses in personal and public life, and the growing role of religious or religiously-related individuals, non-state groups, political parties, and communities, and organizations in domestic politics, and this is occurring in ways that have significant implications for international politics.

The logic behind this movement is tied not only to the increasing influence of religious states and religious non-state actors in the international arena but their ability to shape the foreign policies and domestic politics of many countries (Kratochvíl, 2009). In this regard, Marshall-Fratani (1998) argues that, even prior to the existence of modern nation-states, all world religions have been transnational. By spreading their message of hope and salvation, these major world religions seek to dominate and influence the international scene. Haynes (2009) explicates that religious states and religious non-state actors are influential brokers in international relations because their actions have significant implications for the international order. For instance, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the Roman Catholic Church are religious states and religious non-state actors whose presence and activities shape the international order to a considerable extent. al-Qaeda’s 9/11 bombing of the World Trade Center was a significant international event, especially with regard to how states relate to terrorism and counter-terrorism (Phillpott, 2002). The Roman Catholic Church’s stance on homosexuality, abortion, and other sensitive issues exerts considerable influence on many countries’ domestic and foreign policies (Haynes, 2016). It is argued that the far-reaching influence of these FBOs can be a strategic weapon in the hands of states which seek to influence or change other states’ foreign policy (Ogunnubi, 2014, 2016; Tella, 2017). Within the context of soft power, especially its element of culture, it is argued that vibrant religious organizations can serve as a potent tool of diplomacy and foreign policy. According to Wilson (2014: 219): Faith-based organizations (FBOs) are gaining increasing attention in International Relations (IR) scholarship, reflecting their growing role in contemporary global politics in areas such as development, conflict resolution, forced migration, and social welfare.

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Faith-based organizations are organizations/agencies with or without nonprofit status that provide social services and are religiously motivated or affiliated (Goldsmith, Eimicke, and Pineda, 2006). Berger (2003: 1) defined FBOs as ‘formal organizations whose identity and mission are selfconsciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions and which operates on a nonprofit, independent, voluntary basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or international level’. Haynes (2016) noted that if FBOs have the ear of the government, they can influence a state’s foreign policy. Therefore, FBOs have soft power prospects which countries can tap to influence global politics. He noted that FBOs have the means and capability such as media and think tanks that can sway government policies and programmes to fit with their norms and values. In other words, states that are home to a religion that has global appeal can calibrate it to further their cause in international politics. Research on the role of FBOs across disciplines is not new, and scholars have examined the extent to which state-led religion and spirituality promote influence abroad (Haynes, 2007). Nigeria has often failed to live up to its potential as a promising regional leader in Africa and has not always taken advantage of its abundant resources for national development and continental growth. Notwithstanding debilitating domestic conditions, studies have established the country’s putative regional hegemonic influence within the context of its material and ideational power (see Ogunnubi et al., 2017). These studies argue that its regional hegemonic identity must be understood not only from the prism of material preponderance; its array of soft power resources should also be taken into account (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015, 2018). Nigeria has strong FBOs that are widely recognized for their evangelistic and philanthropic activities (Tella, 2017). Many fall under the umbrella of Pentecostalism, a brand of Christianity. Although, the existence and activities of these FBOs have attracted scholarly attention in the past two decades (Burgess, 2015), few studies have been conducted within the purview of religious soft power. Despite their abundant soft power resources within the context of international relations Pentecostal FBOs have yet to be the subject of extensive intellectual scrutiny (Tella, 2018, 2017; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2018). Pentecostalism is the fastest growing Christian sect in Nigeria, with millions of adherents (Burgess, 2015). This chapter acknowledges the blurred distinction between religion’s manifestation in all aspects of politics and society and its impact on world affairs (Kelly and Messina, 2002). We provide perhaps the first scholarly attempt to explore the connection between religion, foreign policy and soft power in the expression of Nigeria’s international affairs. This is because it is impossible to ‘disregard the impact of faith upon the lives of individuals and

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nations’ (Marshall, 2002: 6) and the literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy has often ignored religion as an analytical tool to understand the country’s role in international affairs. SETTING THE STAGE FOR NIGERIA’S RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER We submit that Nigeria’s unique religious identity represents soft power leverage to negotiate the conduct of its international relations, and can, in turn, serve to legitimize acceptance of its foreign policy strategies. The chapter focuses on pastorpreneurs and Christian-affiliated FBOs to argue that Nigeria’s religious institutional mould provides insight into the country’s global and regional identity and can therefore be used to subtly project its regional hegemony. Hence, the theological account of Nigeria’s statehood offers a pragmatic and nuanced explanation of the possible role of FBOs and pastorpreneurs in the country’s foreign policy discourse. Arguably, religion represents Nigeria’s greatest soft power export in the twenty-first century when globalization has facilitated increased interconnectivity and virtual borders. Nigeria’s religious identity is a subtle yet potent instrument to facilitate its foreign policy interests. From their humble beginnings in Nigeria, pastorpreneurs and Christian FBOs have permeated all continents through church planting and the use of digital satellite channels to broadcast their activities and programmes to a rapidly increasing global audience (Burgess, 2015). In what follows, we draw on available evidence to illustrate how Nigeria’s religious soft power is created and extended in the form of (1) spiritual tourism, (2) changing perceptions through institutions, (3) alternative conflict management mechanisms, (4) faith diplomacy (influence on domestic politics), and (5) cultural harvesting of norms. Spiritual Tourism Religious pilgrimages have contributed significantly to the development of global tourism. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, France, and the Vatican City can attest to the economic contribution of spiritual tourism3 to their gross domestic product (GDP).4 A remarkable aspect of Nigeria’s religious soft power which has been made attractive by pastorpreneurs and Christian FBOs is faith-based travel which provides a constant inflow of religious and medical tourists to mega-church evangelical crusades such as ‘Shiloh’ and the ‘Holy Ghost Congress’ hosted annually by Winners Chapel and the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), respectively. TB Joshua’s Synagogue is the most visited place in Nigeria, accounting for six

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of every ten visitors (Cision, 2019; World News, 2018). Buoyed by advancements in digital technology, thousands of adherents from all over the world travel to listen to popular Nigerian pastorpreneurs or watch them through sponsored television programmes and dedicated satellite channels. The emergence of elite Nigerian pastorpreneurs with an international outlook makes the country a unique destination for religious pilgrimage. Ogunnubi and Isike (2015) noted that prominent Nigerian pastors and televangelists are globally renowned for their miracles and supposed healing abilities. This attracts religious tourists from other African countries and abroad to receive spiritual counselling and seek alternative treatment for illnesses that have defied medical solutions, as well as financial prosperity from Pentecostal mega-churches. Revered and sometimes given the status of diplomatic statesmen, Nigerian pastorpreneurs are routinely visited by African heads of state, politicians, artists, traditional leaders, famous sports celebrities, and other prominent personalities (see table 10.1). Nigeria boasts some of the largest auditoriums in the world that have also become tourism destinations. With a seating capacity of 50,000, Bishop Oyedepo’s engineering marvel, Faith Tabernacle was the world’s largest church auditorium until it was overtaken by Pastor Paul Enenche’s Dunamis Port Harcourt-based International Gospel Centre popularly called Glory Dome which seats 100,000. These massive edifices offer alternative tourism prospects for Nigeria. To this end, pastorpreneurs and Christian FBOs should

Table 10.1  A Selection of Important Personalities Who Have Visited Nigerian Pastors S/N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Names Omar Bongo John Evans Atta-Mills Fredrick Chilumba Chang Kee Raph Beimer Dupuo Peter George Weah John Magufuli Julius Malema Joyce Banda King Goodwill Zwelithini King Moloto Solomon Professor Pasal Lissouba Jacob Westhurzen Prince Yormie Johnson,

Status and Country President, Gabon President, Ghana Zambia Singapore United States Supreme Court Judge Premier of Northern Cape Town (SA) Liberia Tanzania South Africa Malawi Zulu Kingdom, South Africa Limpopo Kingdom, South Africa President, Congo Brazzaville Rugby player, South Africa Former warlord and senator, Liberia

Source: Authors’ compilation from literature

Church/ Pastor Visited

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be considered as a new form of soft power to improve Nigeria’s battered image in Africa and beyond. Changing Perceptions through Institutions Despite being a secular state, religion occupies a prominent position in Nigeria’s socio-political landscape. Its pastorpreneurs and Christian FBOs are well-placed to play a major role in changing perceptions of Nigeria through their world-class institutions. The country’s higher education sector is home to many private universities, some of which are among the highest ranked in Africa. Nigeria’s Christian FBOs changed the face of higher education in Africa by establishing such universities. They include Winners Chapel’s Covenant University and Landmark University; Redeemer’s University owned by RCCG; Babcock University founded by Seventh-day Adventists; Bowen University belonging to the Baptist Church; and the Ajayi Crowther University set up by the Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion). The 2020 Times Higher Education World University Rankings ranked Covenant University, which was established in 2002, among the top five universities in Africa, after South Africa’s Universities of Cape Town, the Witwatersrand, and Stellenbosch and Egypt’s Aswan University. Covenant was also ranked as the best university in West Africa. Its mission statement, which recognizes the church’s role in restoring the dignity of the black person, aligns with the Afrocentric tone of Nigeria’s core foreign policy interests. On a continent which is in dire need of examples of good governance, effective leadership and functional institutions and infrastructure, the universities owned by Christian FBOs offer an attractive representation to showcase the brilliance of Nigeria. Similarly, the rhetoric on Nigeria’s giant status in Africa is reinforced in ministrations by Nigeria’s pastorpreneurs suggesting that the geographic positioning of the country on the African map literally takes the shape of a trigger in a gun when turned horizontally. It is explained that the continent’s destiny is intrinsically tied to that of Nigeria and Nigerians. It is therefore argued that the country’s spiritual awakening is the first step in Africa actualizing its aspirations of development. While there is no scientific evidence to support this claim, the rhetoric seems to support earlier claims by Nigeria’s founding fathers about the country and its people’s ‘manifest destiny’ to rescue the rest of Africa. Faith Diplomacy The multidimensional effects of religion in public life make faith an important component in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy and public diplomacy. Through the ministry of its renowned pastors and Christian FBOs, Nigeria

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is able to secure international acceptance of the country and its people. A unique demonstration of this point was the diplomatic immunity that Nigeria enjoyed in the aftermath of events that unfolded after the collapse of a building belonging to TB Joshua on 12 September 2014, which resulted in the untimely death of 116 church visitors including 85 South Africans. As a result of TB Joshua’s popularity in South Africa and among the top echelons of society, it was difficult for the government to openly condemn the death of its citizens. The South African government was also less critical of the questionable manner in which the Synagogue Church and the Nigerian government handled the repatriation of bodies to bereaved families. Given the chequered relations between Nigeria and South Africa since 1994, it was expected that this incident would result in another major diplomatic row.5 We contend that the manner in which the episode was handled without any diplomatic rancour between the two countries was the result of the attraction and reverence for TB Joshua by many South Africans which inadvertently saved the Nigerian government major international embarrassment (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). Through faith diplomacy, Nigeria’s mega-churches and their charismatic leaders can influence other countries within and outside the region to not just admire Nigeria but what Nigeria wants in terms of foreign policy. Put differently, Christian FBOs and their iconic spiritual leaders offer Nigeria the ability to shape the foreign policies of other African states to suit its national interests. This is because highly placed Africans who are in awe of Nigerian pastorpreneurs are likely to be inspired by their pastor’s country of origin. Nigeria’s pastorpreneurs can therefore serve as a means to improve the image of Nigeria and Nigerians by adopting a posture that portrays the country in a positive light. Alternative Conflict Management Mechanism The African continent is a hotbed of conflicts of a different nature and dimensions. Indeed, it offers some of the most fertile ground for interrogating conflict in the world (Osaghae, 1999). While there is little scholarly consensus on the definition, causes, and categorization of conflicts in Africa (Francis, 2006, 2011), there is agreement that the regularity and ferocity of these conflicts pose a grave danger to the continent’s growth and development (Zartman, 2001). This has precipitated the design of mechanisms and tools to manage conflict. Given the low success rate associated with mainstream or conventional methods of conflict management in Africa (Murray, 2001), attention has shifted to alternative conflict management mechanisms (Uwazie, 2011). Recently, FBOs have come to be considered as a veritable means of alternative conflict management not only within the territorial confines of a state but between and among states in the international arena (Bercovitch and

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Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). The literature offers many examples of the utilization of FBOs and religious actors to settle conflicts within and among states. Mubashir and Vimalarajah (2016), Ilo (2015), and Smock (2006), among others have argued that FBOs hold much promise for resolving conflicts. It is against this backdrop that Nigeria, a vital player in the resolution of conflicts in Africa since independence, can leverage the presence of her churches across Africa and her renowned church leaders to not only improve bilateral relations with these countries but to resolve conflicts in Africa. As shown in table 10.1, many African political personalities visit Nigerian megachurches for spiritual guidance. These churches also attract followers in other African countries and can therefore serve to mediate disputes between and among them. As noted earlier, the deaths of more than eighty South Africans in TB Joshua’s church in Nigeria in 2014 would have led to a diplomatic uproar but for many South African leaders’ reverence for his Synagogue, some of whom had visited him for spiritual guidance. This suggests that the Nigerian government has access to a significant pool of religious soft power in the form of its pastorpreneurs to improve its relations with other African countries and to act as an alternative mechanism to resolve conflicts between countries in the region. Cultural harvesting (advocacy, humanitarianism, entrepreneurial spirit, political participation, Nigeria’s role in Africa). Given the Afrocentric disposition of Nigeria’s foreign policy as regards providing African solution to African problems, scholars and stakeholders have recently drawn attention to the role of FBOs in providing humanitarian and welfare services around the world (Bach, 2007; Tadros, 2010). The large pool of Nigerian FBOs with branches across many African countries presents an ambassadorial opportunity for the Nigerian state to provide humanitarian succour to the African diaspora. Within Nigeria, Pentecostal FBOs provide welfare and humanitarian services to its citizens in the forms of scholarships, entrepreneurial training and seminars and workshops on political participation, among others. For instance, on 25 May 2019, it was reported that the Winners Chapel had donated more than 300,000 million naira to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camp in Benue State. On 4 April 2019, Winners Chapel donated 5 million naira worth of relief materials to the IDPs camp in Taraba State, while on 2 April 2019, Daystar Christian Center donated 10 million naira to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (Retrieved from www​.Premiumtimes​.org, 17 June 2019). Given these FBOs’ wide reach in many African countries, the Nigerian state could collaborate with them to offer welfare services to countries in dire need of assistance. This could be calibrated into Nigeria’s foreign policy approach in such a manner that it complements public diplomacy, similar to what occurs in advanced countries such as the United States, where Hollywood

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entertainers, religious leaders, and other social entrepreneurs are engaged by the state for image laundering or bilateral relations (Folarin, 2011). CONCLUSION This chapter argued that Nigerian pastorpreneurs’ (tele​vange​lists​-entr​epren​ eur-c​um-re​ligio​us philanthropists) international clout affords the country the ability and opportunity to wield significant influence beyond the national realm which can be considered as religious soft power. It analysed five major themes that capture the role and possible influence of these pastorpreneurs and FBOs. Although religious soft power is not explored in the literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy, and it has been underutilized in rebranding the country, we argue that, in pursuit of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives and national interests, non-state actors’ soft power matters, and that religious soft power offers a subtle diplomatic platform to turn the tide in Nigeria’s declining image. Nigeria’s religious soft power also offers a unique empirical and analytical example to illustrate an alternative discourse on the value of the Christian Pentecostal religion which may be different from contexts in the Middle East and the United States. NOTES 1. Although religion is excluded in Nye’s initial conception of soft power, some scholars have posited that religious soft power represents a major ideology undergirding the concept of soft power (Talbot, 2009). Nye would later acknowledge that ‘for centuries, organised religious movements have possessed soft power’ (2004: 94). 2. Religious soft power has been applied to a limit extent to study the influence of countries in the Middle East including Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran with respect to the propagation of Islam. The Beckley Forum (2018) claims that religious soft power is made popular ‘with the Saudi projection of “Wahhabism” around the world’ as well as Iran and Turkey’s use of religion as an instrument of statecraft. According to the Forum, ‘With religious identity politics, sectarianism, and proxy conflict on the rise in the Middle East and elsewhere, developing a better understanding of the geopolitics of religious soft power is a priority today’. 3. The term ‘religious tourism’ is used interchangeably with spiritual tourism, faith-based travel, pilgrimage, and faith-tourism to describe a unique type of tourism where ‘people travel either individually or in groups to visit different places for purposes such as missionary work or pilgrimage among other religious activities’ (Tourism Embassy, 2013:1). 4. TB Joshua’s two-day visit to Nazareth in June 2019 was projected to generate $1 million in revenue for Israel’s economy.

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5. Nigeria has suffered backlash from South Africa on less serious matters with recent examples including the repatriation saga in 2013 and the seizure of millions of dollars belonging to the Nigerian government meant for the purchase of ammunition to fight Boko Haram.

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Chapter 11

Islam and Nigerian Foreign Policy Processes, Procedures and Personalities Abubakar A. Usman, Elfatih A. Abdelsalam, and Hakeem Onapajo

The resurgence of religion in domestic and international politics has taken the scholarly world by surprise (Nair 2013) and motivated scholars to refer to it as ‘failure of secularization’ (Bacevich and Prodromou 2004; Haynes 2016). However, since the manifestation of this phenomenon, various scholars have written profoundly on the impact of religion on international politics (Bacevich and Prodromou 2004; Lacina and Lee 2013; Black 2004; Chernus 2009; Haynes 2008, 2016; Glazier 2013). In fact, as argued by Fox and Sandler (2004), the understanding of international relations is incomplete without using religion as a variable. The so-called ‘failure of secularization’ is perhaps unsurprising, particularly in relation to Islam, given the theological fact that Islam does not advocate the separation between religion and politics (Dawisha 2010). Muslims believe that Islam is a complete guidance to their spiritual, political and social life which makes them strive to influence their surroundings not just spiritually but politically and socially. Politically, they try to influence policies, both domestic and foreign, with their beliefs and world view by assessing, rationalizing and justifying policies (Dawisha 2010). Despite efforts to analyse the relationship between Islam and foreign policy, not much can be found in relation to Nigeria. Both Nolutshungu (1983) and Olayiwola (1988) have attempted a detailed analysis of Islam’s influence on Nigerian foreign policy. Also, a study by Adegboyega (AmbeUva, Adegboyega and Adegboyega 2007) did not focus on Islam only but on religion among various factors that influence Nigerian foreign policy. However, since so much has happened in the country’s politics from the time of their respective studies – such as military regimes frequent seizures of 185

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power, becoming a full-time member of the OIC, the return of democracy in the country, and the role Islam came to play in the domestic politics of various northern states – there is currently need for a revisit. The salient reason for studying Islam’s influence on Nigerian foreign policy is for the fact that Islam, according to various guesstimates, constitutes 50.4 per cent of Nigerian population and roughly 5 per cent of the world total Muslim numbers. These figures place Nigeria as the sixth country in the world with the highest number of Muslims (Miller 2009). With this number of followers, one expects, therefore, Islam to play at least some role in shaping Nigeria’s foreign policy. Hence, the objective here is to explore any form of influence that Islam makes on Nigerian foreign policy through the processes, procedures and personalities involved in policy decisions and ultimately the implementation of the policies. To do so, we raise a series of questions that the rest of the chapter tries to respond to. These questions are: Does Islam have a role in Nigeria’s foreign policy processes and procedures? Do Islamic institutions influence the implementation of Nigerian foreign policy? Are there reflections of Islam on Nigeria’s foreign policy? RELIGION AND FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE The end of the twentieth century witnessed the resurgence of religion in political spheres. The re-emergence has questioned modernization and secularization theories that suggest the gradual disappearance of religion in modern politics of the state (Deutsch 1953; Rostow and Rostow 1990; Almond 1960; Inkeles and Smith 1970). The resurgence in many non-Western countries signals the inadequacy of the models developed by Western scholars about the extinction of religion from the political spheres of such societies (Fox and Sandler 2004). To the contrary of the modernization and secularization theories, the influence of religion has become ever increasing in politics, generally, and foreign policy, in particular. This is more apparent in the Islamic world. In the case of foreign policy, religion’s influence is often portrayed as controversial, and thus has been less explored (Warner and Walker 2011). The chapter draws its theoretical explanations from the framework developed by Dawisha (2010) and Fox and Sandler (2004) theories on religion in international relations. Religion, according to Fox and Sandler (2004), has an influence of people’s world views which sequentially influence the way they think and behave. In addition, religion serves as a major aspect of identity, supplies political legitimacy and is linked with formal institutions that are likely to influence the political process. In spite of these roles played by religion in international relations, it has been overlooked almost entirely as a

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variable by the major theories of international relations. However, as argued by Fox and Sandler (2004), religion proves to have unsubstituted role in international relations and foreign policy. According to Dawisha, there are three interrelated processes of foreign policy – defined as ‘actions of a state toward the external environment and the conditions under which these actions are formulated’ (Starr and Dawisha 2015, p. 3) – which are: the influences of foreign policy, the making of foreign policy and the implementation of foreign policy. First, the influences of foreign policy, include, among others, culture and religion, which implies that in a country where Muslims are majority Islam is expected to make a significant influence on foreign policy. Second, the making of foreign policy includes processes, procedures and personalities involved in formulating foreign policy. Here also, in a country with a significant number of Muslims, Islam could play a role in shaping the perceptions and images of the political elites, generally, and the decision makers, in particular. Finally, the implementation of foreign policy means that the Islamic institutions, among others, play certain role in the implementation of foreign policy of a state where there is a significant number of Muslims. This, therefore, implies that in order to fully assess Islam’s influence in Nigeria’s foreign policy, it is imperative to discuss its presence in the domestic political processes. ISLAM IN NIGERIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS Islam has been one of the major factors that shaped Nigerian political history and still constitute a major component of the political culture in the northern part of the country (where the Hausa–Fulani and Kanuri ethnic groups are predominant). This is traceable to the nineteenth-century Islamic Caliphate, widely known as Sokoto Caliphate, established by a renowned Islamic reformer, Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. The Caliphate was short lived as it was ended exactly a century later in 1903 by the British colonial mandate (Campbell 2013). However, the British colonial authorities preserved some of the institutions of the Caliphate as they opted to impose indirect rule on the masses of the region without having to confront the masses themselves (Clark 1991, p. xxxv). This reason paved the way for Sokoto Caliphate and Borno Sultanate to maintain their structural and popular legitimacy even long after the conquest of their territories by the British colonial masters. Following Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the newly independent state adopted the British Westminster model of democracy. As noted by some scholars, there were strong manifestations of Islam in the first political party to have emerged from the northern part of Nigeria known as the Northern People’s Congress (NPC). The party adopted ‘one raised finger’ as the party

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logo to symbolize the Unity of God as believed in the Islamic monotheistic faith. Also, as part of its campaign rhetoric, it propagated that the ‘twofingered V-for-victory’ symbol held by its opponents in the south symbolized polytheism, which is considered as infidelity in Islam (Falola 1998, p. 2) As Dudley adds that NPC also made the party a representation of the consensus of the Muslim society – the Ijma’ – and its rejection by any member of the society would be tantamount to a sinful act (Onapajo 2012). In time, another Islam-oriented party in the form of Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) developed a different interpretation of Islam to ‘de-legitimate and de-mobilize’ people against the NPC which was accused of being dominated by the ruling class (Onapajo 2012). The NEPU engaged in mobilizing the grassroots elements of the society from the Madrasah, therefore, using Islam as the means to win people’s votes. Though both parties were very closely associated with the dominant Islamic brotherhoods known as Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya, most of NEPU’s leaders and a great number of their members belonged to Tijaniyya and held that the Qadiriyya brotherhood which majority of the Muslim elite and aristocrats belonged to was used in subjugating common people (Wakili 2009). Similar efforts to establish an Islamic oriented party was also made by the Muslims of the southwest of the country in Lagos which was named the United Muslim Party (UMP) (Kukah and Falola 1996). However, despite their symbolic Islamic nature both NPC and NEPU avoided being identified with a clear religious agenda. Two factors might be the reason for such decision. First, despite Muslims being the majority in the northern region, there were, and still are a significant number of Christians and animists particularly in the lower north often referred to as the Middle Belt. Second, Islam might not have been a unifying theme among the Muslims themselves with the Qadiriya and Tijaniya brotherhoods in the north and Ahmadiyya sect in the west dividing the Muslims themselves. After the First and the Second Republics, political parties with obvious religious and ethnic colouring seemed to be gradually fading away from the picture of Nigerian politics. Perhaps this was aided by the long military rule in the country that followed as the military were little concerned about religion and were very much secular in handling the country. The establishment of the first Muslim ecumenical organization, in the form of Jama’at Nasir Islam (JNI) in 1962, and the Jama’at Izala al-Bid’a wa Iqamat as Sunna (JIBWIS) in 1978, further agitated Islam’s influence in the domestic political milieu of Nigeria (Onapajo 2012). Part of the latter’s mission was to re-establish traditional Islam and do away with the Sufi Brotherhood practices especially in the northern part of Nigeria. All these new developments set the ground for the emergence of various forms of Muslim unions that strove to increase Islam’s role in the private, social and

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political life of their surroundings. Such unions were Muslim Students Society (MSS), the Brothers or Ikhwan, the Daawa group, and the Islamic Movement (Loimeier 2007). Also following the emergence of such organizations and unions, Muslims started to push for greater influence of their religion in the political and legal system of Nigeria. To unify the Muslims’ political interests, the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) was formed in 1973 with the Sultan of Sokoto designated as president, Shehu of Borno as vice president, reference to their spiritual power (Campbell 2013), and a leading Yoruba Muslim lawyer (Abdulateef Adegbite) as secretary general (Paden 2015), as a symbolic representation for the southwest Yoruba population who were neither allegiant to Sokoto nor to Borno. Another point of relevance in Islam’s domestic political influence is the reintroduction of Islamic judiciary system in various northern states. Following successful democratic transition in the country in 1999, twelve northern states changed the course of Islam’s domestic political influence by announcing their decisions to reintroduce Shari’a legal system within their states (Campbell 2013). This new development marked a new turn of religious influence in the Nigerian political system as masses of these twelve states clamoured to push their elected governors into implementing Shari’a in their respective states. As a result, Ulama (Islamic scholars) headed various institutions and took the centre of the decision-making processes in various states (Rufai 2011). This led Muslim masses to a renewed hope for their perceived interwoven relationship of Islam and politics and their expectation of Islam to provide social justice that has been lacking within the political milieu of Nigeria. Of particular relevance to note is the role of political elite in the reintroduction of Shari’a legal system within the said states. This is important because the pressure for the reintroduction of Shari’a law in most of the northern states came from the grassroots rather than the elite. With the exception of the former Zamfara state governor, Ahmed Sani, who was the first to reintroduce the system following his election in 1999, the agitation for Shari’a in the other eleven states that followed suit were clamoured by the masses. Governor Ahmed Sani’s case also was motivated by short-term political gain (Campbell 2013). Some of the elite governors appeared indifferent about it. This was evidently confessed by two of those states governors, Governor Ibrahim Shekarau of Kano and Governor Adamu Mu’azu of Bauchi, that the Shari’a reintroduction was the aspiration of the masses to which the elite had no option but to fulfil their masses’ sentiments (Wakili 2009). However, in their quest to mobilize masses’ votes and legitimatize their regime, the elites used Islam in reintroducing Shari’a which helped them achieve their political goal. Nolutshungu also noted the difference of political orientation between grassroots and elites during the First and the Second Republics where he

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described the ruling elites as leaning more towards nationalism and conservatism, something that caused tension with the more Islamically oriented grassroots’ factions. More pertinent here, indeed, is his claim that the northern ruling elites were not, in any significant way, different from their counterpart elites in other parts of the country in terms of ‘ideology, material orientation and external orientation’ (Nolutshungu 1983, p. 135). On the basis of the above, it could be established then that, one, the grassroots tend to be more passionate about religion, particularly its manifestation in politics, more than their secular-leaning elite. Two, the elites were less likely to embark on reintroducing Shari’a legal system except for the sake of political manipulation of the populace as to ensure the latter’s supports and votes. These two particular points, as to be later explained in relation to foreign policy, is among the many reasons why Islam has bigger influence on the domestic politics than it has on foreign policy of Nigeria. ISLAM AND NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY Despite arguably being one of the major religions in the country, Islam’s influence on Nigerian foreign policy has been largely ignored by the scholarly world. However, so much has been written on Nigerian foreign policy from various points of view. For instance, some of the works study Nigeria’s foreign policy focus on Africa (Sinclair 1983; Bobboyi 2010; Ibeanu 2010; Nweke 2018; Osaghae 2010; Ashaver 2014; Agbu et al. 2013), Nigeria’s various regimes’ foreign policy (Salami 2014; Akinyemi 1987; Fafowara 1998; Kolawole 2005; Folarin 2013; Oviasogie and Shodipo 2013), and influence of domestic factors on Nigerian foreign policy (Pürçek 2014; Mayall 1976; Ambe-Uva, Adegboyega and Adegboyega 2007; Ojione 2008; Ajaebili and Oyewole 2011; Akpomera and Omoyibo 2013; Nwankwo 2013). In addition to this, a number of researchers have made a general assessment on the country’s foreign policy (Julie 2010; Alao 2011; Ashaver 2014; Pham 2007; Ayam 1999), Nigeria’s role in peace-keeping missions, as well as bilateral and multilateral efforts (Mailafia 2010; Nwokedi 1985; Julie 2010). What is obviously missing in this plethora of literature is the influence of religion on Nigerian foreign policy, in general, and the role of Islam, in particular. This glaring absence is perhaps because of Nigeria’s constitutional labelling as a secular state. However, as shown above, Islam plays an important role in the domestic political arena and, as described by Nolutshungu, ‘it represents a social force’ (Nolutshungu 1983, p. 130). Islam, therefore, has an obvious influence on domestic politics. However, the same could not be said about foreign policy.

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Personalities, Processes and Procedures For more than half of its independent years, Nigeria was ruled by one military government or another. This made processes and procedures of foreign policy making in the country blurred while the policies were often made by the strongman in power not through the usual bureaucratic and democratic processes and procedures. In the years of civilian administrations, Nigerian foreign policy has shown inconsistency, depending mostly on the elites occupying the government. During the first six years of independence, the First Republic, Islam had very minimal influence which made Nolutshungu to argue that Islam had no influence in the first two decades of independence which he attributed to two major reasons. First, the role of Islam in Nigerian foreign policy for the first two decades since independence was far from obvious. It is surprising that even the early northern Muslim political elites did not pursue religious agenda in their foreign policy for the fear that due to the diverse nature of African countries, introducing Islam into the mix would have added more divisions among their people at a time when they were yearning for independence, national identity and unity. The second reason was the lack of unity among Muslims themselves (Nolutshungu 1983). Nolutshungu had a point for the first reason but the second is hardly the case for the fact that Nigerian Muslims are able to bridge their differences and unite in the pursuance of what they perceive as religious obligation as seen in the case of Shari’a debate, which was raised in the 1970s and 1980s, and somehow succeeded after the return of civilian rule in 1999. The likeliest explanation is the moderate and accommodating personality of some leading Muslim elite (notable among them Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the first and only Nigerian Prime Minister) and their willingness to recognize Nigeria as a diverse and multi-religious country which, therefore, dictate on them to relinquish their attempt to push for the country’s Islamic identity. The above assertion is supported by, first, the fact that the likes of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa were among the most moderate amid the ebullient Muslim radical elite, on the one hand (such as Malam Aminu Kano and Malam Ahmad Mahmud Saadu Zungur), and more religious and conservative figures such as Ahmadu Bello (Sardauna of Sokoto), on the other, who pushed for independence (Milligan 2008). Second, as evidences of what a fully autonomous north would do, it was well-recorded that prior to independence, northern Nigerian Muslim elites sent two of their own to Pakistan to look at Islamic education and judicial practices, and also sent others to Tripoli, Egypt and Hejaz for assessing, among other reasons, matters concerning pilgrimage. In addition, Ahmadu Bello (the Sardauna of Sokoto), who was known for his northern nationalism, once paid a visit to a number of Muslim countries for a call to conference in a plan to organize a political confederation of Islamic

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states and also strongly opposed economic agreement between Nigeria and Israel in 1961 and 1962. Sir Ahmadu Bello became the Vice President of World Muslim League in 1963 (Milligan 2008). Finally, there was already increasing discontent and accusations from the non-northern Muslim elites that the northern Muslim elite were pursuing Islamic agenda (Clark 1991). The First Republic lasted only for six years when some of the members of the Muslim northern elites along some few others from the southwest and southeast of the country were assassinated in a failed insurrection after which General Aguiyi Ironsi, a Christian Igbo from the southeast, emerged from the army to head the country. The mutiny made the impression of being instigated by ethnoreligious factors. Some sources had it that Aguiyi Ironsi in person shot Sir Tafawa Balewa after he, along with few others, were placed in a safe house by the mutineers (Clark 1991). Aguiyi Ironsi’s ‘coup within a coup’ (Clark 1991, p. 802) – as people came to call it – was ended six months later by yet another coup d’état led this time by a non-Muslim northern military leader, Major General Yakubu Gowon (Campbell 2013). Religion was one of the factors that led to the civil war that ensued following the 1966 military coup (Afolabi 2015; Kirk-Greene 1975; Chidiebere 2016; Garba and Garba 2005). In fact, Nigeria was accused of waging a jihad against the Christian southeast in an attempt to appeal to the sympathy of foreign missionaries (Stremlau 2015). Under the subsequent military regimes, there was little chance for much religious sentiment for the fact that the military elite had always claimed to have intervened to clean the mess of the civilian administrations hence wanted to appear more secular and nationalist than their civilian counterparts. And due to Western countries’ pressure for democratization, they often turned to African countries for legitimacy. The military coups were significant in a way as they halted any tendency of having Muslim pressure groups that might probably pressure the elite towards pushing for Muslims’ agenda in the country’s foreign policy. The NPN party that subsequently established a government in the Second Republic made no attempt in pursuing foreign policy on religious basis which would invite divisions and probably bloody conflict (Nolutshungu 1983). Despite having a Muslim head-of-state, during President Shehu Shagari’s reign, there was very little disagreement among Nigerian ruling elites on the country’s foreign policy orientation, which was secular. Therefore, the absence of Islam in Nigeria’s foreign policy under Tafawa Balewa’s administration, its presence in the foreign relation of the north under the premiership of Ahmadu Bello, and its absence yet again during Shehu Shagari’s administration did not tell us much about Islam in Nigerian foreign policy. One cannot fully discern the absence of Islam in Nigerian foreign policy without quite understanding the ethno-religious politics and competition for space, public influence and mutual fear of domination between the country’s Muslim and Christian populations. Every action and display of interest from

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one section, on virtually all sorts of issues, was viewed by the other with utter contempt and suspicion. An example of such attitude could be seen in what Milligan termed the ‘politics of pilgrimage’ (Milligan 2008, p. 36). As one of the five pillars of Islam, Muslims are obliged to perform Hajj to Mecca. However, since Nigeria’s constitution provides that citizens should be accorded the same right irrespective of their religious affiliation, Christian populations demanded that the Nigerian Federal Government also support their pilgrimage to Jerusalem in compensation for the Muslims’ benefit from the government support (Ilesanmi 2014). Thus, any attempt to push for religious considerations in the country’s foreign policy will more than likely engender religious upheaval and bloody conflict. Sometimes, even those foreign policies that are purely economic in nature such as Nigeria’s membership in OPEC are seen with religious coloration by the Christian population due to the overwhelming number of Muslim countries within the organization (Akinade 2002). There have been some major and central issues that occupy Islam’s international relations since the later decades of the twentieth century through the twenty-first century that have to be discussed below in detail. Palestinian-Israeli Conflict The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the oldest conflicts in the world. For religious reasons, Most Muslim countries vehemently show their support for the Palestinians. The division this issue has caused also manifest in Nigeria where the Christians mostly support Israel and their Muslim counterpart express sympathy and support for the Palestinians. In a poll conducted by the World Public Opinion in 2008, 23 per cent of Nigerians want Nigeria to take Palestinian side, whereas 15 per cent want the Israeli side and 55 per cent do not want Nigeria to take any side (World Public Opinion 2008). As noted earlier, one of the leading northern Muslim elites blankly rejected economic relationship with Israel between 1961 and 1962. However, his position softened later in 1984 following his meeting with Israeli Ambassador (Milligan 2008). The motive for the rejection in the first place appeared religious in nature for the fact that Sir Ahmadu Bello was the vice president of the Muslim World League in 1963. The Nigerian stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has not reflected consistency since independence. Sometimes it was more in support of the Palestinians and in other instances, it was more favourable towards the Israelis (Nolutshungu 1983). In 1973, Nigeria cut all diplomatic relations with the state of Israel albeit not for religious sentiment but rather to comply with the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) stance on Israel. To reiterate its position, in 1975 Nigeria voted in favour of the UN General Assembly Resolution 3376 to create the United Nations Committee on the Exercise

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of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (Mahler 2018). Between 1978 and 1983, Nigeria sent its troops to Lebanon, as part of the UN troops to replace Israeli troops following its invasion of Lebanon (Julie 2010). Exactly two decades since ending relations with Israel, Babangida’s regime overturned the decision to reinstate diplomatic ties between the two countries (Milligan 2008). Since April 1993, Israel has maintained an embassy in Abuja whereas Nigeria has maintained an embassy in Tel Aviv. In September 2009, Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, visited Nigeria and it is claimed that the then Nigerian foreign minister, Ojo Maduekwe, told him in a plain language that ‘Israel must give up Palestinian lands if peace must reign in the region’ (Milligan 2008, p. 37). Babangida’s decision, as mentioned above, may appear at first a random foreign policy decision if not for the 1986 decision of the same regime that made Nigeria a permanent member of the OIC. Once the previous decision is taken into consideration, it appeared then as a consolation effort by the regime to put off the rising uproar from the Christian communities following the OIC full member status as the Christian communities found it still unacceptable (Nolutshungu 1983). The reasons for this glaring inconsistency in Nigerian foreign policy orientation might originate from the following reasons. First, both Nigeria and the majority of the Muslim countries were colonized by one of the European countries. Upon gaining independence, they had to look to their colonizers for guidance into the modern politics and governance as well as their aids in economic and infrastructural constructions of their newly independent states. Second, most of the northern Muslim elites who were fostered by the British in the build-up to the Nigerian independence were moderate and conservative in attitude (Clark 1991). Most of these northern Muslim elite became the leaders in the newly independent Nigeria. Therefore, one would see why they looked to the West for inspiration in their foreign policy. Though Islam formed part of their religious identity, they felt much closer to Britain than to Saudi Arabia. Third, after the First Republic, mutual suspicion and competition between the adherents of the two religions became tense and increasingly apparent. Thus, the ambivalent foreign policy towards entities with some sort of religious bending is the likely outcome since the governments cannot afford to be seen sectional. The administration of Goodluck Jonathan took Nigerian-Israeli relationship to a new height when, in 2013, he became the first Nigerian president to visit Israel. During the visit, he performed pilgrimage and signed bilateral air service agreement with the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Bassey Udoand 2013). To mark this new diplomatic relationship, in 2014, Nigeria abstained from voting on the resolution on negotiated solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the United Nations (UN) Security Council (United Nations 2014). These later developments appeared to have changed Nigeria’s status on the Israeli-Palestine issue as was made clear by Nigeria’s

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Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN, Professor Joy Ogwu at the UN Security Council meeting prior to President Jonathan’s visit in January 2010. He said during a Security Council debate on the Middle East (United Nations 2011): It is disheartening to note that in the weeks following the resumption of the talks difficulties have arisen, resulting in a stalemate. Indeed many had hoped that Israel would heed the appeals for the extension of the 10-month freeze on housing construction in the West Bank Jewish settlements as a positive confidence-building measure. Instead the Israeli Government’s approval of 238 new homes in East Jerusalem announced last Friday will only enflame passions on the Palestinian side. The decision could be interpreted as a move to kill the direct talks and thereby complicate the peace process. Coming at a time when the Palestinian Authority has accepted the compromise of a two-month extension to the moratorium, the announcement would have profound impact on the United States-backed negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

It is also pertinent to note that when General Sani Abacha (1993–1998) fell out with the Western world, he formed a close relationship with a number of Muslim countries including Libya, Sudan, Palestine and Afghanistan. This new twist of events was demonstrated by the visit of Libyan Leader, Muammar Ghaddafi, to Nigeria at the invitation of Abacha, which portrayed him as Nigeria’s new ally (Fafowara 1998). However, the diplomatic relationship formed with those countries was hardly backed by religious sentiment as China became one of the major trading partners of Nigeria (Folarin 2013). Rather, the fall out of Nigeria with the West at that point in time made it more plausible to align with the West’s traditional enemies. In other words, Nigeria’s foreign policy was not predicated on ideological basis but rather on purely pragmatic and utilitarian basis. The OIC Membership A major manifestation of Islam in Nigeria’s foreign policy was its government’s decision of seeking an observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1973, a status that was granted. In 1986, the then military government of General Ibrahim Babangida covertly made the decision to admit Nigeria as a full-fledged member of the organization. Although pressured for long to assume full membership of the OIC, the IBB-led government chose to assume full membership of the organization to benefit from trade and zero per cent loans from the Gulf States and project Nigeria as the sub-Saharan state with the largest Muslim population. In addition, Fawole (2008) argued that the move represented an attempt to assuage Nigerian Muslims before the government would change its policy to recognizing Israel in 1989.

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As expected, this new development generated uproar from the Christians. They insisted that the move contradicted the secular nature of the country and thus suggested that the decision was an attempt to Islamize the country. Babangida’s admission of Nigeria into the organization on genuine Islamic sentiments is open to debate, but it is certain that the OIC membership promoted a discontent between Muslims and Christians that has continued through the next three decades (Fayomi, Chidozie and Yartey Ajayi 2015). In understanding the uproar that the OIC membership caused, there is need to review the political atmosphere around it. Within the same decade of the 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria witnessed the rise of religiously motivated political tensions and conflicts. Most notable among these political instigators were the Kano Anglican Fagge riot of 1982, the Kano Maitatsine crisis of 1980–1983, the Kaduna Kafanchan crisis of 1987, Kano Bonnke riots of 1991, Jalingo riots of 1992, and Kaduna Zangon-Kataf crisis of 1992 (Onapajo and Usman 2015). These crises were indications that all was not well in the fragile relationship between the adherents of the two dominant religions of the country and the lack of trust that existed between the two until then was fast breaking to pieces. It is in this context that the role the membership of OIC played in halting any future Islamic role in Nigerian foreign policy has to be understood. Despite that uproar, none of the subsequent Nigerian administrations withdrew its membership from the OIC. The membership has been given varying degrees of engagement by the subsequent administrations, depending on the foreign policy orientation of the administration and the elite occupying office. Given the atmosphere of tension and antagonism the OIC membership has engendered in the domestic politics, all the presidents who came afterwards, of whom three were Muslims, were cautious in pursuing any foreign policy that could lead to domestic religious tension. Thus, since Nigeria’s admission into the OIC, most of its multilateral relations with the Muslim majority countries took place under the OPEC platform rather than the OIC, policies that had little or nothing to do with Islam (Okeke 2018). Another point worth noting in discussing Islam’s influence on the Nigerian foreign policy is the fact that despite the lack of approval of Nigerian OIC membership from the Christian sphere, Nigeria maintained high commission offices in virtually all the major member countries of the OIC (Okeke 2018). This might point to the influence of Islam or rather the over growth of bureaucratic size in the country’s foreign affairs ministry. September 11 and the Afghan/Iraqi Invasions September 11 attack on World Trade Centre in New York, USA, in 2001, has altered the political environment and immensely affected the relationship between Muslim populations throughout the world and the Western world.

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In retaliation to the terrorist attack, the United States and its allies resorted to attacking two Muslim majority countries, Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq, which triggered mixed reactions among Muslim populations all over the world. To some extent, the unfortunate incident became a defining moment for the foreign policy of countries with majority Muslim population. In the aftermath of the September 11 attack, the then Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, was the first president from a major African state to travel to Washington to show his support to the then American President George W. Bush (Campbell 2013). Obasanjo’s action was not interpreted in a positive manner by the majority of Muslims who viewed Obasanjo and the uncritical support of his regime by the United States with disdain, suspicion and as part of a larger conspiracy to quash Muslims’ interests, particularly in the north. In fact, a poll conducted by Philiph Everts and Pierangelo Isernia in November and December of 2001 after the September 11 attack, showed that 40 per cent of Nigerians agreed, whereas 44 per cent disagreed with the U.S. military action in Afghanistan, with 16 per cent undecided. The data also shows that 64 per cent of Nigerians, as against 22 per cent, did not agree with Nigeria’s participating with the United States in military action against Afghanistan and 15 per cent were undecided. Overall, the data showed that Nigerians rather opposed military action against Afghanistan (Everts and Isernia 2002). Although the data did not specify the distribution of those views among the followers of the two religions, given the history of Nigerians and the way their opinions are polarized along Muslim–Christian lines, this data underlines that Islam might have influenced the role Nigeria played in limiting Nigeria’s support of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. The subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was also viewed with suspicion by Nigerian elites who regarded the United States as a hegemonic country just flexing its muscles by instigating the war (Campbell 2013). This perception made the then U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, Howard F. Jeter, to issue a note in March 2003, in an attempt to appeal to Nigeria and Nigerians, particularly Muslims, for their support and understanding of the essence of the war. This underlines the fact that the invasion of Iraq was not viewed favourably by the Nigerian elite and masses as the United States would have liked. One of the clear reasons for such perception was religion. Muslim elites and masses viewed the Iraqi invasion as yet another war against Islam and an attempt to destroy one of the Muslim countries. Some might have believed that the decision to invade Iraq was motivated by the country’s huge oil resources. Whatever the case, one could argue that Islam, though subtly, might have played some role in the output of the Nigerian foreign policy in relation to both Afghanistan and Iraqi invasions. What is yet unclear is the degree of the influence and the possible influence of other factors.

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CONCLUSION Religion has a way to reflect itself in both domestic and foreign policies of nations. Such reflection is often found in the processes and procedures followed in formulating the policy and the personalities involved. In the case of Nigeria, this chapter indicated that the Muslim elites who have occupied places where they could influence foreign policy are often moderates, conservatives or secular-leaning and nationalists. The tension and mutual distrust that exist between Muslims and Christians is another factor that can be directly linked to the lack of an Islamic influence on Nigerian foreign policy. The history of the country is full of mistrust between the followers of the two major religions over perceived domination of one another and unhealthy competition for influence and public spaces. This has prompted any administration to steer away from controversial policies that could engender disharmony particularly those with religious coloration. Third, the constitutional status of the country is secular therefore causing any policy with religious colouration to automatically lose constitutional and legal backing. Even military administrations steered away from any policy or action that appeared sectarian despite ruling by decree. The only exception was President Babangida’s OIC admission which he tried to balance by reinstating diplomatic relations with the state of Israel. Finally, the country’s federal system allows Muslims to impose Islam in their respective domestic or state political activities as seen in the case of Shari’a implementation in Muslim majority states. In addition, individuals often prefer to be identified with their religious, ethnic, state and regional affiliations rather than being identified as Nigerians. Majority of Muslims are therefore more inward looking by being more concerned with their state policies than the country’s foreign policy. This attitude affects Islamic institutions playing the role of pressure groups in foreign policy matters of interest to them. In the light of the above discussion, it is safe to assume that Nigerian foreign policy was not dictated by ideological considerations. Rather, it has been mostly influenced by purely utilitarian/pragmatic ones. The major explanation for this is to avoid sectarian friction and to ensure harmony between Muslims and Christians in the country. REFERENCES Afolabi, Oluwaseun Olawale. 2015. “The Role of Religion in Nigerian Politics and Its Sustainability for Political Development.” Net Journal of Social Sciences 3(2): 42–49. Agbu, Osita, Emeka Okereke, Sharkdam Wapmuk, and Bashiru Adeniyi. 2013. “The Foreign Policy Environment in Nigeria and Implications for Nigeria-South Africa Relations: Baseline Study.” SAFPI Policy Brief 54: 10–20.

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Chapter 12

Anglicanism and Soft Power in Nigeria Dimensions and Prospects Opeyemi Idowu Aluko

Religion is one of the potent weapons of interactions in human history. Religion is a force in interaction or a soft power in politics and international relations which became prominent after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. In the twenty-first century, religion has great social, economic and political influence (Fox, 2008; Gentile, 2021). It had been used in diverse ways in the course of administration, manipulation, advancement and communication by state actors, non-state actors and from one group to the other. Several international decisions had been preconditioned by the religious colorations and its soft power display by the actors involved. Several policies and diplomatic exchanges at the United Nation levels and other international politics and forums were preconditioned by the religious inclinations and religious soft power of the partners (Steiner, 2018; Platzer, 2021). Platzer (2021) further opined that friend and foe in the politics among nations and within nations are mostly conditioned by the religious orientations of the parties involved. The religious orientation of countries reflects in their choice of public policies and the trend of policies that emanated from international arena to be domesticated. International organizations such as United Nations, European Union and African Union among others are aware of the distinct force embedded in the religious inclination of member countries which can trigger the religious soft power display and politicking in policy making and voting actions on some specific global issues. These issues are often cushioned with religious biases, and they thus must be treated with religious mindset. These issues include policies about marriage (gay, lesbians, bisexual, transgender and homosexuals among others), women liberation (especially in Africa, Middle East and Far East), issues that deal with pilgrimage to ‘holy lands’, Western ideology on governance and peace-building across countries with religion-based 203

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public ideology, especially in the Arabian countries and international bargains amid countries that have to do with religious tenets or beliefs of states among others. Indeed, the place of religion as a soft power in the international system cannot be jettisoned. For over two decades, the international community has been contending to decipher the problem with the relationship between religion and diplomacy or religion and politics. Stempel (2000) opined that the U.S. foreign policy failed in Iran and other Middle Eastern countries because the policy or decision makers had systematically ignored the impact and influence of religion in Iranian politics. More importantly, in U.S. politics, the Protestant churches geared by the Anglican Church have played a major role in ensuring liberation and civilization of individuals. The Protestants’ rejection of autocratic regime hierarchies and focus on individual salvation became a turning point that drove the American democratic experiment, and even today fuels American idealism and universal human rights aspirations. Also, in other parts of Europe, religious soft power has given rise to modern developments. Given the predominance of religion soft power traditions in Europe, it is probably useful to consider the traditional Westphalia Balance of Power as a product of Christian philosophy of restraint a balance rather than merely secular alternative to religious struggle. In Germany, the role played by the Protestant Churches (Anglican Church and others) in the demise of the German Democratic Republic cannot be underestimated. The Federation of Evangelical Churches provided space for discussion of politics with the government and privately urged the regime to become more open, embrace democratic principles, and become progressive in operations (Bradley, 2009). This culminated in church support for a series of demonstrations across East Germany which led to the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the German Democratic Republic. Religious subtlety or misinterpretations had led to several conflicts, civil unrests and communal clashes to the extent of wars in other climes in Asia, Africa and Middle East among others. This was partly because the powers that are embedded in religious entities were seldom undermined. However, these religious entities may not wield hard power but possess the subtle power to mobilize the psychological might of the populace to act for or against the whims and caprices of the government. For instance, the communal religious unrest in Kano State Nigeria that resulted in killing and burning of Christian Churches was a reaction to the cartoon display of Prophet Mohamed – the Moslem religious leader elsewhere in Latin America (NBC NEWS, 2006; Knight, Mitchell, and Gao, 2009; Klausen, 2009; BBC, 2015). This shows how subtle religion is in mobilizing the people for either positive or negative mass actions. At the same time, several forms of development had been attained due to the combination of the several dimensions of religious acumen

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in the world such as the support and solidarity to fellow religious leaders across the globe on political, economic and social policies and decision. Several variants of religion exist, but this study examines the Christian Faith as epitomized in the Anglican Church administrations and her global religion soft power with a focus on Nigeria. Anglican Church is a foremost church in the world. It has its origin in England as the church for the state. From its onset, the Anglican Church has an all-embracing tradition. It is catholic and evangelical, liberal and conservative, charismatic/Pentecostal and traditional. George Carey a former Archbishop of Canterbury opined that the Anglican styles express a universal style that captures every aspect of the church universal without prejudice to the biblical tradition and standards (Asaju, 2019; Lambeth, 1998: 2). These vary from the simple display of power to mobilize citizens within a country to the elaborate prowess to influence government and politics of various countries across the globe. The style or methodological practice of the church ranges from evangelical to catholic, from charismatic to traditional or indeed a form of combination of these various traditions. The methodological practice of the Anglican Church made it possible for the church as a non-state actor to be dynamic in any political or socioeconomic climes and be able to contribute to economic growth, political development, educational enlightenment, health development and cultural change within the state. Due to these political, social, and economic contributions to the various countries development, Anglican Church in Nigeria has wielded several soft powers in the domestic and global politics. Therefore, how has the Anglican Church utilized her soft power to advance her impact on developments in Nigeria and how can it be improved? Data are collected using relevant books, journals, online reference sources, publications of the Anglican Church, and her data repositories which consist of interviews, videos, relevant journals, texts and daily outcome of the reflexibilities of the church with the state among other data sources. Data were analysed through systematic review and textual analysis of relevant literature. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION: RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER AND ANGLICANISM Religion is given to numerous connotations. Marty and Moore (2000) however noted five phenomena that help to describe what religion could be. Religion helps man to focus on the ultimate concern which is eternity in heaven, it builds community, appeals to myth and symbol, is enforced through rites and ceremonies, and demands certain behaviour from its adherents. Furthermore, Haynes (2011) opined that in order to understand

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religion properly, it should be seen as a tripartite entity which consists of the following: a body of ideas and outlooks, such as theology and ethical code, as a type of formal organization, such as an ecclesiastical church notable in the Church of England and Anglican Communion generally among other universal churches and as a social group, such as a faith-based organization. Therefore, it is clear, however, that religion affects the world in two basic ways (Steiner, 2011; Haynes, 1998, 2011): by what it ‘says’ relating to issues of doctrinal theology and what it ‘does’ relating to religion’s importance as a social phenomenon and mark of identity, which manifests in various modes of institutionalization. Soft power, on the other hand, is a relatively new concept. Nye (2004a, 2004b) opined that soft power is the capability of an entity, of both state and non-state actors such as religious organizations, to influence what others do through persuasion without an iota of force or threats. Soft power attracts or co-opts people; it does not coerce them. Soft power influences people by appealing to them not by forcing them to comply (Nye, 2011). Haynes (2011) further opined that soft power covers certain attributes which include culture, values, ideas, which is owned collectively, representing the different entities’ opinion by using different forms of influence without involving threat or use of armed force or economic coercion. Aluko and Ogunnubi (2018) also posited that soft power is neither the way of ‘sticks nor carrots’ but the way of simple influence in achieving common or specific objectives. It involves persuasion which is the ability to convince by argument and encouragement which utilizes the ability to attract using shared norms, values and beliefs of the group of people. It does not involve hard power threats both of military or diplomatic, as well as financial payments. Soft power is the power of attractive ideas to persuade individuals or groups to act in a certain way, in pursuit of identifiable goals. It is in contrast to the notion of ‘hard power’ which involves military or economic influence, involving overt leverage and coercion (Nye, 2021). Religious soft power in the same vein is not a new phenomenon. It is the use of religion to mobilize an institution or group of people to do what they would not have normally done. For example, Christian religious missions as expressed in the Great Commission for global mobilization as written in the Gospel according to Saint Matthew Chapter 28:19–20 says; Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen. (King James Version)

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This Great Commission for global mobilization (instituted by the Lord Jesus Christ to all believers is for soul winning and evangelism so that man will inherit eternal life instead of Hell Fire) have for centuries been a potent source of expressing international religious soft power with the aim of seeking to change people’s norms, values, and beliefs from one set of views to the Divine or Godly views regardless of the country in the world. These changes could be social, economic, or political ideologies to conform to the divine principles and doctrines so as to positively influence human race, enhance growth and propel development in all ramifications with the prospect of making heaven at last. Despite the fact that religion has little conventional power or ‘hard power’ attributes of and influence, such as financial, diplomatic or military resources, religious soft power has the ability to wield influence in politics and international relations using religious acumen. Haynes (1996, 2012) opined that religious soft power is conceptualized as the use of religious ideas, norms and values to spread and embed a particular understanding of the world. It often has both social and political impacts, influencing various outcomes, including democratization and democracy; conflict and conflict resolution; international development; and gender relations. Anglicanism on the other hand is a worldwide body of Christians that has its origin in England (English Land) and responding to God’s revelation through Jesus Christ. Anglicanism is the act of bringing together the authority of the Bible, the historic faith and the beauty of structured prayer. It is rooted in tradition, yet contemporary in practice. It is united in substance, yet diverse in expression. It is a global family living out faith in local communities. Although Christianity arrived in Britain in Roman times, Anglicanism traces its roots to St Augustine’s mission to England in 597 A.D. At that time, the church in England came under the authority of the Pope, but in 1534, Henry VIII split the church from Rome (Orombi, 2007; Asaju, 2019). In the period that followed, known as the English Reformation, which was associated with the Protestant Reformation in Europe, the Church of England was formally inaugurated as the nation’s established church and has been ever since. Anglicans began to worship outside Britain as early as 1578 but the worldwide network grew vigorously during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through mission organizations sending workers throughout the globe, particularly to British colonies. Soon bishops from the British Isles were leading dioceses in national churches and over time these became autonomous member churches united in one Anglican Communion (Asaju, 2019). The Global Anglican Future Conference (GAFCON) (2020) revealed that the doctrinal focus called Anglicanism is premised on the following:

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The Anglican Church rejoices in the gospel of God through which we have been saved by grace through faith in Jesus Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit. Because God first loved us, we love him and as believers bring forth fruits of love, ongoing repentance, lively hope and thanksgiving to God in all things. She believes the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be the Word of God written and to contain all things necessary for salvation. The Bible is to be translated, read, preached, taught and obeyed in its plain and canonical sense, respectful of the church’s historic and consensual reading. (GAFCON, 2020)

Furthermore, the Anglican Church upholds the four Ecumenical Councils and the three historic Creeds (Athanasian, Nicene, and Apostle Creed) as expressing the rule of faith of the one holy catholic and apostolic Church. She upholds the Thirty-nine Articles as containing the true doctrine of the church agreeing with God’s Word and as authoritative for Anglicans today. She proclaims and submits to the unique and universal Lordship of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, humanity’s only Saviour from sin, judgement and hell, who lived the life we could not live and died the death that we deserve. By his atoning death and glorious resurrection, he secured the redemption of all who come to him in repentance and faith. The church as well upholds the Anglican sacramental and liturgical heritage as an expression of the gospel, and upholds the 1662 Book of Common Prayer as a true and authoritative standard of worship and prayer, to be translated and locally adapted for each culture. Anglicanism recognizes that God has called and gifted bishops, priests, and deacons in historic succession to equip all the people of God for their ministry in the world. The church upholds the classic Anglican Ordinal as an authoritative standard of clerical orders. She as well acknowledges God’s creation of humankind as male and female and the unchangeable standard of Christian marriage between one man and one woman as the proper place for sexual intimacy and the basis of the family. The church repents of her failures to maintain this standard and calls for a renewed commitment to lifelong fidelity in marriage and abstinence for those who are not married. Anglicanism accepts the Great Commission of the risen Lord to make disciples of all nations, to seek those who do not know Christ and to baptize, teach and bring new believers to maturity. It also advocates for responsibilities of good stewards of God’s creation, to uphold and advocate justice in society, and to seek relief and empowerment of the poor and needy. In principle and interactions, the church seeks for Jesus’ second coming in glory as final event of history, committed to the unity of all those who know and love Christ and to building authentic ecumenical relationships. The church as well professes to recognize the God-given diversity among humans which enriches our global fellowship, acknowledge freedom in secondary matters

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and seek the mind of Christ on issues that cause division. Within the principles of diplomacy and game theory, the church rejects practices that are against human welfare, maximum development of human potentials, and the authority of governments or leaders who have denied the orthodox faith in word or deed. DIMENSIONS OF ANGLICAN CHURCH SOFT POWER UTILIZATION By usual social movement standards, the Anglican Church globally and the evangelical movements put various human rights issues on the global agenda and made a startling influence using soft power capabilities. Some of the highlights include: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000): The aim was to remove international crime syndicates that dispatch children and women from the developing world into prostitution and sweatshops (Haynes, 2007, 2009). The Sudan Peace Act (2002): The Anglican and Evangelicals promoted this law, as they were outraged by the Sudanese government’s attacks on southern Sudanese Christians and animists. The law and its accompanying sanctions were influential in helping create the road map for Sudan’s 2003 ceasefire and the peace treaty in 2004. The North Korea Human Rights Act (2004): The Anglican, Evangelicals and Korean Americans lobbied for this bill. The aim was not only to focus U.S. attempts to help North Korean defectors but also to focus attention on the country’s egregious human rights violations and nuclear weapons programme. The Anglican Church in Nigeria belongs to GAFCON. Under the aegis of GAFCON, the Anglican Church in Nigeria fought against the same-sex marriage bill: a bill to allow same-sex marriage in Nigeria which originated from America (Asaju, 2021). It was quenched by the protestant churches led by Anglican Church in Nigeria and in conjunction with the coalition of Christians in Nigeria (Asaju, 2021). The GAFCON movement is a global family of ‘authentic’ Anglicans standing together to retain and restore the Bible to the heart of the Anglican Communion (GAFCON, 2020). It began in 2008 when moral compromise, doctrinal error, and the collapse of biblical witness in parts of the Anglican Communion had reached such a level that the leaders of the majority of the world Anglicans felt it was necessary to take a united stand for truth. GAFCON second conference was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013, at which over 1,300 delegates from 38 nations including Nigeria and 27 Provinces of the Anglican Communion were present. The third GAFCON was held in Jerusalem, Israel, in 2018. GAFCON 2018 was one of the largest global Anglican gatherings and brought together 1,950 representatives from 50 countries, including 316 bishops, 669 other clergy and 965 laity. A further conference was held in

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2019 for those who for political reasons could not attend Jerusalem 2018. While GAFCON acknowledges the nature of Canterbury as an historic see, it does not accept that Anglican identity is determined necessarily through recognition by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Building on the above doctrinal foundation of Anglican identity, it thereby published the fourteen point focus Jerusalem Declaration as the basis of our fellowship (GAFCON, 2020). GAFCON has political motives to combat policies that are against the growth of true doctrine of salvation in any country where Anglican Church exist. Therefore, in Nigeria, the church has diplomatically exercised this motive in several ways and instances. Its economic bases is premised on helping the masses in any country where the church exists with such things that their economic life requires such as education provision, food, relief material, soft loan distribution and healthcare provision with or without the collaboration of the government for proper growth and development. The church also advocates legally for people with human rights cases against the government such as rape, theft, religious persecutions in workplace, religiously motivated murder, church destruction, kidnap and false acquisition against the church by the state among others. The church as well issues communiqués which show the stand of the church against public policies that are offensive to public peace, growth and national development. The Church of Nigeria Anglican Communion uses her ‘large population size’ and presence in all part of Nigeria as a soft power to diplomatically interact with the government and substantially influence the Nigerian government and its politics. The church has witnessed expansion and at present it has fourteen provinces as one of the largest in the world. It comprises over 167 Dioceses (new dioceses are created yearly), 175 Bishops, and more than 10,000 churches (Church of Nigeria, 2020). The population of Anglicans in Nigeria is about 29 million. It is important to note that many independent churches spring out of the Anglican Church in Nigeria which by proxy extend the networking prowess of the church in the religious, political, economic, and social landscape of Nigeria (Asaju, 2019). PROSPECTS OF ANGLICAN CHURCH SOFT POWER UTILIZATION IN NIGERIA Ever since the advent of the church in Nigeria, there had been a great awakening and development in the education, health, cultural, political, economy, leadership and moral development of Nigeria (Kwashi, 2013; Okoli and Okwuosa, 2020). The educational soft power displayed by the Anglican Church in Nigeria opens the door of Western education pioneer by the missionaries sponsored and financed by different groups from the Church

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of England. The level of finance committed to the educational sector transformed the educational landscape of the country. School buildings and curriculum pedagogy were formulated which formed the foundation for the present educational structure in Nigeria. Many students benefited from the Anglican Church overseas free education project to study in England. Such beneficiaries include Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther among others who returned to Nigeria as trained administrators and leaders in various sectors of the country. In contemporary times, the Anglican Church in Nigeria plays important role in the maintenance and improvement of the educational sector in the country. There is hardly any state in Nigeria (the entire 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory) where there are no Anglican Church educational structures such as basic school (primary and secondary schools) and the tertiary institutions such as the colleges of education, polytechnics and universities. At times, the basic schools are in conjunction with the government (Odili and Eluke, 2020). Other sectors where the prospect of the Anglican Church is evident include the health sector, cultural sector, political development, such as party formation and provision of candidates for political offices. The church indeed has expended millions of dollars on the development of Nigeria since independence. Nigeria’s development may be in jeopardy if the Anglican Church (the Church of England and Church of Nigeria) withdraws its support for any government in power (Wild-Wood et al., 2021; Duke and Okafor, 2020). At the same time, political, economic and or social policies may fail whenever Anglican Church decline consent in Nigeria. This is because the religious soft power of the church in conjunction with its Pentecostal and diplomatic political and socioeconomic prowess has a great deal of influence in the country. The soft powers of the Church of Nigeria, Anglican Communion had been expressed in several diplomatic acumens on Nigeria’s government and politics. The church had been able to persuade its members to join political parties so as to be able to influence governmental politics. This power of persuasion and pro-political support for her members led to the emergence of Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) and Goodluck Jonathan in 2011–2015, respectively, as Nigeria’s president. The current vice president of Nigeria (Professor Yemi Osibanjo 2015–2023 statutorily) is an AngloRedeemed Church pastor. The governors South West (2019–2023 statutory) except Osun State are all Anglicans and members of the national decisionmaking body in Nigeria. This gave the church some measures of influence to negotiate for good and favourable policies. Also, several members of the Church of Nigeria Anglican Communion mostly from the eastern and western part of Nigeria had emerged as state governors, senators, house of representative members, ambassadors among many other special assistants to the government on diverse matters. The political influence of General Gowon an

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Anglican and a former military head of state in Nigeria further strengthens the negotiating power of the church with the state with the view of fostering the church members as the principal state actor. The church has been able to use this membership strength as soft power capability at different times to precondition or checkmate government’s public policies in favour of humanitarian policies and national development. During general elections in Nigeria, several political aspirants seek for the Episcopal blessings and endorsement of the bishops and other clergies of the Anglican Church for a possible election victory. The visit for consultations and negotiation with the church shows the level of soft power wielded by the church in determining election victory. The Anglican Church also assigns special election monitoring groups or aligns with some international observers to monitor the trend of the electoral process before the election, during the elections; voting and counting of ballots and after the election peace negotiation among the candidates. The presence of the church in such context and observations represents ‘God’ which was referenced by all participants. Furthermore, in the educational sector, primary, secondary and tertiary institutions such as the colleges of education, polytechnics and universities are also established and funded by the church. The locations of such tertiary institutions are strategically positioned, and in all, the educational soft power prowess of the Anglican Church had assisted the government to provide standard and affordable education for the citizenry. It has also generated reliable means of employment for the citizens and trained people for the onward development of the country at large. In the health sector, the Anglican Church has displayed some of its soft power by providing several levels of health care for the citizenry. Cottage hospitals were built across villages which take care of primary health care for maternity care and to dispense drugs among other functions of primary health care. However, a few secondary healthcare facilities and equipment were jointly provided by the government and the church. In the social and cultural sector of the country, some cultural practices which were contrary to the fundamental human rights and international safety practices were constantly advocated against, such as human sacrifices, slavery, child labour, wife battering, and gender disparity among other obnoxious customary practices were preached against so as to attain an egalitarian and peaceful society. In several occasions, the Church of Nigeria Anglican Communion had dialogued with the government on various public policies in the country which were not pleasant for national growth and development. Such dialogue had led to press releases and diocesan or general synod communiqués giving the government ultimatum or advising the government to retract its steps for the sustainable development of all. The aftermaths of such communiqués were compromised by the government on their past decisions in favour of the

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church. Such issues include the imbroglio between State of Osun and the church on the use of ‘hijab’ (an Arabian head attire) by all female students on their school uniform and the forceful seizure of Christian public schools. These two imbroglios were diplomatically suppressed by the church exercising her soft power (Morning Star News 2013; Olawore, 2018). Similar imbroglio of forceful seizure of Christian public schools existed in 2017, 2019 and 2021, respectively, between the Anglican Communion and the government of Kwara State. In the same manner, the church dialogues with the state and such public policy to mingle the Christian school with non-Christian practices were shelved. Several landslide diplomatic ties had been made between the church and the state, especially in the economic and health sectors. During disasters such as flooding and fire outbreak, the church rendered help to the affected citizens by providing relief materials in solidarity with the state. These engagements with domestic politics further sealed the partnership and goodwill between the state and the church. Also during national epidemics such as Ebola, Lassa fever outbreak and the novel Covid-19 pandemic, the church assisted the state in public sensitization and provision of drugs, personnel and palliative to the citizens to combat the national scourge. The church also exerts her soft power against the public health and social bills that tend to legalize divorce, abortion, gay, lesbianism and the forceful compelling of the citizens to take Covid-19 vaccine in Nigeria. These bills and policies were withdrawn due to these pressures by the public that the church arouses. Moreover, the soft power display by the Anglican Church is also visible in the quest for human rights and social justice in the country. The church supported the ‘Bring Back Our Girls-BBOG’ social movement which was demanding from the federal government for the release of some schoolgirls who were kidnapped by the Boko Haram terrorist group in Chibok, a Christian Community in Bornu State Nigeria. This support propelled the intensity in seeking for the release of the kidnapped schoolgirls from the federal government. About 164 were released out of 276, while 112 were still in captivity (Obiezu, 2020). The church as well condemned the killings that are prominent in the Christian communities in southern Kaduna and the Fulani herdsmen-Farmers crises in Benue State in Nigeria. Also, in 2020, the church also well supported a group of Nigerian Youths who were protesting against the brutality of Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) unit of the police force. The church issued a communiqué to the effect asking the federal government to investigate the matter, vindicate the innocent and bring justice on the erring police officers. Also, the church in her charismatic prowess gains the respect and support of other churches and denominations in Nigeria. This is because the church operates with the principle and spirit of priesthood of all believers,

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Great Commission, and Pentecostalism that permits members to found new churches independent of the Anglican Church in the furtherance of the gospel and evangelism. This implies that those churches are offshoot of the mother church and therefore have the liberty to support the church in her national and international quest for good governance, maintenance of secularity nature of Nigerian polity, and maintenance of spiritual decorum among the Christian bodies such as Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN). CONCLUSION Indeed, the Church of Nigeria, Anglican Communion has over the time exerted her soft power in the annals of politics and governance in Nigeria. The church in recent times had engaged the government in high-level diplomacy and dialogue in order to forestall policies that are inimical to the social, political and economical standards of the church and society. The sphere of influence of the church transcends the spiritual guidance of the country to the provision of social guidance to maintain the secular nomenclature of the country and yet not the extreme secularity. The church also exerts her soft power in the political zones of the country in the electioneering period and in public policy analysis. The soft power of the church as a non-state actor is as well displayed in the supply of essential needs to the citizens such as healthcare needs, educational institutions, fulfilling special needs in critical moments, such as flood, internally displaced citizens due to terrorism, famine, welfare scheme for the unemployed among others. No doubt, there are yet grounds to be covered by the church in order to effectively exert her soft powers on the state for the attainment of rapid development and strict adherence to good governance in Nigeria. These areas include the following: the church should be more proactive in tackling political issues instead of being mere reactionary after the damage of the situation had taken effects on the state. A good example of this reactive tendency of the church was the kidnap of the 276 Chibok schoolgirls mostly Christians which was left completely in the hands of a social movement group instead of championing the pressuring of the government to ensure the release of the schoolgirls. This reactionary attitude had led to the lingering of the complete release of the entire kidnapped schoolgirls since 14th April 2014. There is a need for the church to exert her soft power more on the grassroot politics so as to train up new set of politicians that will take the development of the country and the church as first agenda instead of personal aggrandisement. Also the church can direct her soft power potential on sponsoring of bills meant to change some social and political landscape of the

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country. This will help the country to find her footings on the path of development and at the same time correct most of the societal ills. The Anglican Church’s soft power utilization can be improved as well when it imbibes the game theory sequential and simultaneous principle of interaction with zero or non-zero-sum game agenda. Therefore, the church can capitalize on any of the principles of game theory especially the non-zero-sum game principle in negotiating and dialoguing with the government or any other non-state actors in the country. REFERENCES Aluko, Opeyemi. “Gang and Urban Violence Prevalence on Democratic Sustenance”. ABAC Journal 38, no. 1 (2018): 133–143. Aluko, Opeyemi. “Urban Violence Dimension in Nigeria: Farmer and Herders Onslaught”. AGATHOS 8, no. 1 (2017): 187–197. Aluko, Opeyemi and Olusola Ogunnubi. “Nigeria’s Soft Power and Economic Diplomacy in Africa”. Journal of African Foreign Affairs (JoAFA) 5, no. 2 (2018): 189–206. Asaju, Dapo. Anglican Bishop Asaju Tackles Biden’s Gay Policy, Says, “God does not tolerate sin”. February 13, 2021. https://www​.churchtimesnigeria​.net​/bishop​ -asaju​-biden​-gay/ (accessed on 20/2/2021) Asaju, Dapo. Anglicanism in Nigeria Transcribed Audio Sermon Notes, 2019. BBC. The Issue of Depicting the Prophet Muhammad, 14 January 2015. https://www​ .bbc​.com​/news​/world​-europe​-30813742 (accessed on 20/2/2021) Bradley, T. “A Call for Clarification and Critical Analysis of the Work of Faith-based Development Organizations (FBDO)”. Progress in Development Studies, 9, no. 2 (2009): 101–114. Church of Nigeria. Provinces, Dioceses, Bishops and Churches, 2020. https://www​ .anglican​-nig​.org​/our​-provinces/ (accessed on 14/11/2020). Duke, Emmanuel, and Justus Okafor. “Poverty Alleviation Policies of Selected Churches in Anambra State, Nigeria”. GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis 3, no. 1 (2020): 40–52. GAFCON. The Jerusalem-Statement, 2020. https://www​.gafcon​.org​/about​/jerusalem​ -statement (accessed on 14/11/2020). Gentile, Emilio. Politics as Religion. Princeton University Press, 2021. Fox, Jonathan. A World Survey of Religion and the State. Cambridge University Press, 2008. Haynes, Jeffrey. “Causes and Consequences of Transnational Religious Soft Power”. London Metropolitan University Online Paper (accessed on 25/9/2020). Haynes, Jeffrey. Religion and Development: Conflict or Cooperation? Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Haynes, Jeffrey. Religion and Politics in Africa. London: Zed, 1996. Haynes, Jeffrey. Religion in Global Politics. London: Longman, 1998.

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Haynes, Jeffrey. Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012. Haynes, Jeffrey. “Transnational Religious Actors and International Order”. Perspectives 17, no. 2 (2009): 43–69. Henry Orombi. What is Anglicanism?, 2007. https://www​.gafcon​.org​/sites​/gafcon​.org​ /files​/resources​/files​/What​-is​-Anglicanism​.pdf (accessed on 14/11/2020). Klausen, Jytte. The Cartoons That Shook the World. Yale University Press, 2009. Knight, John G., Bradley S. Mitchell, and Hongzhi Gao. “Riding Out the Muhammad Cartoons Crisis: Contrasting Strategies and Outcomes”. Long Range Planning 42, no. 1 (2009): 6–22. Kolokoltsov, Vasily N., and Oleg A. Malafeyev. “Understanding Game Theory: Introduction to the Analysis of Many Agent Systems with Competition and Cooperation”. World Scientific, (2020): 1–28. Kwashi, Benjamin A. The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to the Anglican Communion: The Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion) 1 (2013): 165–83. Marty and Moore. Politics, Religion and the Common Good: Advancing a Distinctly American Conversation about Religion’s Role in Our Shared Life, San Francisco: Josey-Bass Publishers 2000. Morning Star News. Violence as Nigeria Merges Muslim Students into Missionary Schools, 2013. https://www​.christianitytoday​.com​/news​/2013​/december​/violence​-as​-nigeria​-merges​-muslim​-missionary​-schools​-osun​.html (accessed on 22/11/2020) NBCNEWS. 15 Killed in Nigerian Cartoon Protests, Feb. 16, 2006. https://www​ .nbcnews​.com​/id​/wbna11383819 (accessed on 20/2/2021). Nye, Joseph. “The Benefits of Soft Power”. Harvard Business School Working Knowledge, 2004a. http://hbswk​.hbs​.edu​/item​.jhtml​?id​=4290​&t​=globalization (accessed on 20/2/2021) Nye, Joseph. “The Future of Power”. Public Affairs, New York, 2011. Nye, Joseph. “Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept”. Journal of Political Power 14, no. 1 (2021): 1–13. Nye, Joseph. “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”. Public Affairs, New York, 2004b. Obiezu Timothy. Nigeria Marks 6th Year of Missing Chibok Girls Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, 2020. https://www​.voanews​.com​/africa​/nigeria​-marks​-6th​-year​-missing​ -chibok​-girls​-amid​-coronavirus​-pandemic (accessed on 23/11/2020). Odili, Jones Ugochukwu, and Patrick Eluke. “Return of Mission Schools and Stakeholders’ discipline in Rivers State, Nigeria”. Igwebuike: African Journal of Arts and Humanities 6, no 5 (2020): 77–92. Okoli, Anuli B., and Lawrence Okwuosa. “The role of Christianity in gender issues and development in Nigeria”. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 76, no. 4 (2020): 8. Olawore Akin. “Religious Garb Policy in Osun State: Mediating Ethno-Religious Conflict Mediation Case Study”. International Center for Ethno-Religious Mediation, 2018. https://www​.icermediation​.org​/religious​-garb​-policy​-in​-osun​ -state​-mediating​-ethno​-religious​-conflict/ (accessed on 22/11/2020).

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Platzer, Michael. “Faith-Based Organizations and the United Nations”. In Kury H., Redo S. (eds) Crime Prevention and Justice in 2030, pp. 663–674. Cham: Springer, 2021. Steiner, Sherrie. Moral Pressure for Responsible Globalization: Religious Diplomacy in the Age of the Anthropocene. Brill, 2018. Steiner, Sherrie. “Religious Soft Power as Accountability Mechanism for Power in World Politics: The InterFaith Leaders’ Summit(s)”. SAGE Open 1, no. 3 (2011): 1–16. http://sgo​.sagepub​.com​/content​/1​/3​/215​8244​0114​2808​5accessed on 25/9/2020 Stempel David. Faith and Diplomacy in the International System Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. New York, 2000. Wild-Wood, Emma, Liz Grant, Babatunde Adedibu, Alan Barnard, Aloys Ojore, and Yossa Way. “The Public Role of Churches in Early Responses to COVID-19 in Africa: Snapshots from Nigeria, Congo, Kenya and South Africa”. Studies in World Christianity 27, no. 1 (2021): 65–84.

Chapter 13

Pentecostal Mega-Churches and Religious Diplomacy in Nigeria Irene Pogoson and Maduabuchi Ogidi

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria’s foreign policy, like that of most other countries in the developing world, has witnessed successes and failures. Over the years, the centrepiece and main theatre of Nigeria’s foreign policy has been Africa. It was a laudable goal before the 1990s, but the exigencies of the post–Cold War international politics required a more dynamic diplomatic approach because Africa as the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy has waned and a broader perspective became necessary. Arguably, although, Nigeria still has a highly limited diplomatic resources for an effective global foreign policy; hence, there is need to pay more attention to current trends in international relations and diplomacy as regards the use of soft power strategies, which involves commanding international influence through the use of such elements as human rights records, democratic good governance and religion (Lord 2008). Since the early 1990s, there has been increased interest in the role of religion in societal development. However, there is no consensus on the relative importance of normative values such as religion in a nation’s foreign policy. Realists typically assert that policy should be free of such normative considerations, while idealists posit a set of widely shared or even universal principles as central to advancing global order (Robins 2018). Social constructivists note that values can and do play a role in foreign relations, but emphasize their subjective and malleable nature (Syder 2004). There is now increased understanding that given the changes in the social, economic and political arenas, religion can no longer be seen as a burden or distraction to development, but rather an important agent of social progress (Obaji and Swart 2018). Religion has over time come to occupy a very important place in human society, as both the social and psychological bases for choices that individuals and societies make. Generally, it has steadily grown to be of great 219

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importance in world politics. In the post–Cold War period beginning in the early 1990s, religion has further grown to occupy a more central position in international politics (and hence diplomacy). This has occurred with the increase in religious/ethnic/national conflicts on all continents, sometimes leading to the collapse of important governing structures (Hasan 2017). Furthermore, the growing influence of religion on international relations has been quite phenomenal. This is against the background of increased and growing presence and activities of religious organizations in the international arena, a development that has continued to shape the international order (Nye 2011). There is the emergence of what has been identified as “global religious identities” that may lead to increasing interreligious dialogues, involving greater religious engagements around issues, including international development, conflict resolution and social justice (Thomas 2005). In Western Europe, religion was limited to the private realm following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, ushering in an era of state-led secularization (Halahoff and Wright-Neville 2009). As societies modernize, they get increasingly secularized with the effect that religion is marginalized, privatized and excluded from the public space. There is now what can be called a de-privatization of religion in international relations with a reassertion of its socio-political relevance of religion. A major facilitating factor in this regard has been the wave of globalization which opened up the international space for increased nonstate transnational transactions. For transnational religious actors, globalization theoretically increases their ability to spread their messages and link up with like-minded groups across international borders (Haynes 2007). As a result, religious organizations that are capable of conducting transnational activities are valuable assets for state diplomacy. In diplomatic thinking, focusing on state interests made sense during the Cold War. The predilection, then, was to view religious identity and values as only marginally relevant to the conduct of diplomacy. However, the attacks of 9/11 by a non-state terrorist group that claimed to defend the interests of a major religious community led the U.S. government to reconsider how its diplomats engage on religious issues (Oren 2007). Effective diplomacy requires strategic deployment of all relevant resources at the disposal of the state in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. To this end, all the resources and potentials that give the state comparative advantage (including religion) are relevant; hence, the notion of religious diplomacy, which involves a state harnessing the potentials of its religious beliefs, institutions, personalities, and resources to make the most of its foreign relations (Robins 2018). This study explores the prospects of religious resources, specifically the newgeneration Pentecostal churches, as instruments of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The socioeconomic and political environment fostered by the Nigerian state over time created opportunities for the proliferation and growth of

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various religious organizations, especially among the Pentecostal subset of the Christian faith. The country is endowed with significant religious resources because it hosts vibrant Pentecostal mega-churches with indigenous founders and headquarters, and with global reach and influence that compare favourably with those in the developed parts of the world (Temitope 2018). Some of these churches have made great strides like building worldrecord-breaking worship centres, global spread in outreach, establishing universities with good global ranking, and attracting pilgrims and worshippers from different parts of the world. RELIGIOUS DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER POLITICS Religious diplomacy is the strategic deployment of religious resources in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. It is a theory of state–religion cooperation and collaboration on the world stage. It focuses on how religious leaders and diplomats can find common interests and ways of engagement towards shared goals. It can also be described as a state activity consisting of the use of religious factors in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives (Keiswetter and Chane 2013). It is the whole set of mechanisms for state cooperation with religious institutions in pursuit of pragmatically defined national interest. It is good to note that religious diplomacy is not peculiar or exclusive to theocratic states and that it is a theory that recognizes religious institutions, actors, ideas and symbols as important national assets which can be used to achieve political gains, both domestically and internationally (Stempel 2000). Through it, the state is able to make strategic use of international activities of religious organizations, ideas and symbols, appropriately interpreted to comply with the policies and programmes of the prevailing political regime. Although political decision makers usually have sentimental attachments to particular faiths, this does not necessarily have to be a problem to religious diplomacy since any relevant religious factors can be used in foreign policy, regardless of the faith of the decision maker. Religious diplomacy is based on cooperative and collaborative relationship between the state and religious institutions. Though the state as the stronger partner may try to leverage on religious institutions to its advantage, this relationship has to be collaborative, in which case it has to be profitable and beneficial to both sides and be based on mutual dependency. However, the dominant position of the state is reflected in the fact that when interests clash or diverge, it is the religious institutions that are expected to adapt to the demand of secular authorities, and not vice versa. Conducting effective religious diplomacy depends on the fact that state–religion relations require a minimum level of mutual trust.

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Furthermore, effective religious diplomacy is an important soft power resource of the state. In (international) politics, soft power is the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce. In other words, soft power involves shaping the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion (Nye 2004). A defining feature of soft power is that it is non-coercive and its elements of soft power include culture, political values, and religion. According to Nye (1990), when one country persuasively gets other countries to want what it wants, it might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants. For Nye, power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the desired outcomes, and there are several ways one can achieve this: coerce with threats; induce with payments; or attract and co-opt to achieve desired outcome. This soft power – getting others to achieve the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them. Soft power can be wielded not just by states but also by all actors in international politics, including non-governmental agencies. It is also considered the ‘second face of power’ that indirectly allows one to obtain the desired outcomes. A country’s soft power, according to Nye (1990), rests on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority). Therefore, a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example and aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. Fortunately, transnational religious organizations are bearers of soft powers in their own right. These organizations usually bear influences on state policies, thereby influencing international relations by shaping domestic politics. For example, Russia adapted a strategic mix of hard and soft powers, exploring the use of state–church relations in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. First, Russia embarked on achieving internal religious harmony through what it called inter-faith dialogue. By promoting an efficient inter-faith dialogue on the national level, the Russian authorities hoped to prevent interreligious tensions at home. This is to serve as a good starting point for building Russia’s international credibility for having a successful model for achieving harmonious religious coexistence, thereby enhancing its cultural appeal as an asset to her diplomatic soft power (Curanovic 2012). This is a good example of how the religious resources of a nation can be adapted and effectively utilized for diplomatic purposes. However, soft power is a more difficult instrument for governments to wield than hard power for two reasons: many of its critical

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resources are outside the control of governments and soft power tends to work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes takes years to produce the desired outcomes (Hasan 2017). THE RISE OF PENTECOSTAL MEGACHURCHES IN NIGERIA Pentecostal mega-churches, as used in this chapter, are transnational Christian religious organizations that have indigenous Nigerian founders and operational headquarters in Nigeria and have been able to establish their presence and influence globally with branches in different parts of the world. The rise of mega-churches in Nigeria can be attributed to two interrelated factors: the pattern of evangelistic communication of the Christian faith and the embarrassing failures of the state in meeting the expectations of its citizenry. Early Christian evangelism by missionaries in Nigeria took the form of frontal attack on the culture, beliefs, customs, the social structure and the very things that promote social cohesion. It demonized the African culture and social structures and portrayed such as constituting barriers to the progress of the society and its people (Davidson 1992). Most times after an individual had been converted to Christianity, he or she would still need to be ‘liberated’ and ‘delivered’ from the influences of the culture and tradition of his local community. Furthermore, missionary evangelism in Nigeria, as in other parts of Africa, had the effect of alienating individual converts from their community life. The individualism implicit in the Christian faith as presented by the missionaries had a disintegrating effect not only upon the African communities but also upon a sense of community needed to build a bonded society in Nigeria. Once an African embraced Christianity, it became difficult for him/ her to reintegrate into the socio-political structure of his community. Since the aim of the missionaries was not to Christianize a people en masse but the individual, evangelization created cleavages within African communities by ideologically and institutionally alienating individual converts from their communal life. This contributed to the atomization of communities hitherto characterized with communal solidarity and social cooperation (Davidson 1992). The gospel as preached by the early missionaries that brought Christianity to Africa was, perhaps in line with the colonial agenda, consciously communicated in a way that would weaken the hold of the traditional society over the indigenous population in order to make way for the colonial political and cultural domination of the people. The aftermath of this type of (Christian) evangelization fosters two dimensions of alienation among the adherents. On the one hand, it alienates the

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individual from his natural community, which preachers of the new faith demand he must reject and renounce. On the other hand, it alienates the individual from the state in which he is a citizen. The idea that Christians are pilgrims passing through earthly society reverberated in the messages of preachers. The belief is that the problems that exist in a society will always be there and all the individual could do about it is to become committed to the church in order to live above the problems. The church then poses as the repository of solutions to problems which the state has not been willing and able to handle. Thus, it is believed that the church operates heavenly economy while the rest of society wallows in abject poverty. This sells the ideas, inadvertently though, that the justifiable legitimate recipient of the allegiance and devotion of the individual is the church, and this has had serious implications for the commitment of citizens to the progress and development of the state (Nye 2004). Instead of engineering the needed changes in the state, citizens tend to practically exit the state, while at the same time committing seriously to the church. Instead of building the type of society they desire to live in, citizens now look for ready, quick and individualized solutions to problems that beset members of society generally, which require the collective will and actions of the citizenry. Thus, religion became an important instrument in the general struggle for personal survival, against the background of the failings of the state. This means that in the politics of literal exit of citizens from the state, while some recoil to their ethnic ensembles, others devote to their places of worship as an alternative or competing complement to life in the state, dovetailing with Marxian notion of religion as the opium of the masses (McKinnon 2000; Dobbs-Weinstein 2015). In Nigeria, this development has also been fuelled by the inability of the Nigerian state to foster common national identity and drive meaningful development to improve the lives of its citizens. It has led to the crystallization of religious affiliations into forms of religious nationalism that compete favourably with the state over the loyalty of citizens. As the state floundered over its basic responsibilities, the citizens took refuge in, among other social ensembles, their various places of worship not just out of faithful piety but as a vital strategy for survival. This created an opportunity for the proliferation and growth of various religious organizations, especially among the Pentecostal subset of the Christian faith. Pentecostalism began in Nigeria as a revival movement to the prominent mission churches in Africa during the early twentieth century. The evolution of Pentecostalism was reared by efforts of young Christian students in most universities in Southern Nigeria to break free from Western missionary control of mainstream churches such as Anglican, Methodist, Catholic, etc., that had become too cold, docile, and devoid of the resurrection power that the Apostles of old received in the upper room in Jerusalem on the day of

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Pentecost (Magbadelo 2004) This resulted in the popularity of many Africaninitiated churches which focused on prophecy and healing (Lindhardt 2014). Today, Nigeria has the largest Pentecostal followership in Africa with approximately three out of ten Nigerians identifying themselves as Pentecostal or Charismatic (Pew Research Centre 2006). These churches, especially large charismatic churches have become popular in Nigeria, competing for membership with mainstream churches. The expansion of the influence and extent of Pentecostalism was facilitated by the economic and political crises of the 1980s which produced believers from a pool of frustrated and marginalized people in the larger Nigerian society (Magbadelo 2004). The Pentecostal churches, through fresh insights, have been able to fill the gaps created by the early version of the gospel as propagated by the early missionaries that brought Christianity to Africa, in which the social transformative power of Christianity was not emphasized. The revelation of the gospel as preached by the Pentecostal churches has contributed to changing the narrative of the early Christian message by emphasizing the earthly role the Christian faith in social transformation as part of the report card of believers after their sojourn on the earth. Of a truth, Pentecostalism indeed seems ideally suited to a country like Nigeria, steeped in an entrepreneurial survival attitude that was born out of decades of failures of governments (Obaji and Swart 2018). It became a torchbearer for an attractive messianic message: Join the church, and you will prosper – not just spiritually, but financially, too. These churches claim to provide more than spiritual fulfilment to their members: they are also sources of community life in a country where there are often far more reliable safety nets than social services provided by government. Mega-churches often offer a great deal of prosperity teachings – how to prosper and make it in the world. People also often use church networks to access jobs and build social ties in new places. As a result of those factors, the churches grew stronger and stronger and came to assume the status of provider of solutions to diverse problems that beset citizens, whom the state by all practical standards appeared to have abandoned. This ushered in an era in which churches were much more than places of worship, but literal ‘nations’ and ‘kingdoms’. Churches are more or less assuming the status of nations as people shift their allegiance from the state and their ethnic group to their place of worship. In the midst of worsening socioeconomic conditions, escape from poverty and access to good living become an act of miracle that citizens seek for in their places of worship (Adogame 2010). As people get more frustrated and disenchanted with the performance of the state and the government, they took refuge in the church where they believed their needs are supernaturally supplied. And this explains why there is a high level of commitment among members to the

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churches. In a situation where the government does not care for the citizens, part of the responses of citizens to this situation is to go spiritual. In the midst of national insecurity, people seek spiritual security and protection. In the midst of economic hardship, people are becoming more and more religious, and religious organizations are proliferating across cities in the country, not necessarily out of the desire for genuine worship but importantly as a source of help out of many problems people face. Some of the mega-churches that have emerged in various parts of Nigeria include the following: 1. The Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) 2. Mountain of Fire and Miracle Ministry (MFM): This church was founded by Dr Daniel Olukoya and has an auditorium that can accommodate about 555,000 persons during a single service. 3. Living Faith Church World Wide, Also known as Winners’ Chapel, is among the biggest churches in Nigeria. The church has an auditorium with the capacity to seat up to 50,000 worshippers. 4. The Apostolic Church 5. Deeper Life Christian Ministry 6. The Commonwealth of Zion Assembly (COZA) 7. Believers Love World (also known as Christ Embassy) 8. Daystar Christian Center (DCC) 9. Salvation Ministries 10. House on the Rock 11. Latter Rain Assembly 12. Kingsway International Christian Centre 13. Synagogue Church of All Nations (SCOAN) Most of these churches accommodate large numbers of worshippers at a time and still run multiple services. For example, the Redeemed Christian Church of God, probably the most populated Pentecostal church in Nigeria, has the largest auditorium in their camp ground that can accommodate about 3 million worshippers. The Mountain of Fire and Miracle Ministry, founded by Dr Daniel Olukoya, has a prayer auditorium that can accommodate about 555,000 persons during at a time. Also, the Living Faith Church has a 50,000-capacity auditorium with a higher number of worshippers accommodated in the overflow and running four services on Sundays (Ikenwa 2019). These churches have various business outfits such as schools, bread factories, water bottling companies, printing press, and so on, and constitute a significant section of the economy, employing tens of thousands of people and commanding huge tourist attraction, as well as exporting Christianity to various parts of the world through missionary outreaches (Ohuocha 2014).​

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Another success story of these mega-churches is in the education sector. Since the establishment of the first private university in Nigeria in 1999, church-owned academic institutions have steadily become a force to reckon with in the Nigerian education industry. Students of faith-based universities in Nigeria have never had any reason to complain about poor infrastructure, students unrest and incessant strike actions unlike their counterparts in state-owned schools. Some of the universities run by these mega-churches are as follows: Covenant University, established in 2002 by Bishop David Oyedepo, the founder of the Living Faith Church Worldwide; Landmark University, also affiliated with the Living Faith Church Worldwide with special focus on improving the agricultural sector of Nigeria and Africa at large; Bowen University, established in 2002 by the Nigerian Baptist Convention; Redeemer’s University, established in 2005 by the General Overseer of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, Pastor Enoch Adeboye; and Mountain Top University, established in 2015 by Dr D.K. Olukoya, the founder and General Overseer of the Mountain of Fire and Miracle Ministry. Diplomatic Potentials of Mega-Churches in Nigeria Effective diplomacy requires strategic deployment of relevant resources at the disposal of the state in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. To this end, all the resources and potentials that give the state comparative advantage (including religion) are relevant and important. The notion of religious diplomacy involves a nation-state harnessing the potentials of its religious beliefs, institutions, personalities and resources in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Nigeria is endowed with significant religious resources by virtue of hosting vibrant Pentecostal mega-churches with indigenous founders and headquarters and with global reach and influence that compare favourably with those in the developed parts of the world. Some of these churches have made great strides like building world-record-breaking worship centres, global spread in outreach, establishing world-class universities with good global ranking, and attracting pilgrims and worshippers from different parts of the world (Majawa 2018). For example, from the news of good report from 2019 edition of Shiloh, the annual gathering of members of Living Faith Church, Worldwide, shot to over 21 million worshippers connected via Facebook and YouTube across 145 countries in 40 major languages, while over 7,000 foreign delegates registered from 54 nations from 6 continents. As a buffer to the dip in global image of the state, resulting largely from its dismal performance in critical national sectors, such as economy, governance, security, education, health and human rights, among others, the prospects presented by the exploits of these Pentecostal churches offer a window of opportunity in foreign policy operations of the Nigerian state.

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Table 13.1  Largest Church Auditoriums in the World Name of Auditorium Hand of God Cathedral Glory Sanctuary Dome Champions Royal Assembly Temple of the Glory of God

Church

Year of Completion

Capacity

Location

Salvation Ministries Dunamis International Gospel Centre Champions Royal Assembly Abuja God is Love Pentecostal Church Living Faith Church Worldwide Word of Life Bible Church

2020

120,000

2018

100,000

Port Harcourt, Nigeria Abuja, Nigeria

2015

80,000

Abuja, Nigeria

2004

60,000

Sao Paulo, Brazil

1999

50,000

Ota, Nigeria

2014

35,000

Warri, Nigeria

Deeper Christian Life Ministries General Convention of the Assemblies of God Calvary Temple Calvary Temple

2018

30,000

Lagos, Nigeria

1996

22,000

Cuiaba, Brazil

2013

18,000

Lakewood Church Liberty Worship Centre Holy Stadium

Lakewood Church Liberty Worship Centre

2005

16,000

2014

15,000

Hyderabad, India Houston, United States Kampala, Uganda

Gospel of the Kingdom Church Yoido Full Gospel Church

2005

12,000

Semarang, Indonesia

1973

12,000

Seoul, South Korea

Universal Church of the Kingdom of God Full Life Christian Centre House on the Rock The Apostolic Church Nigeria

1999

11,000

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

2015

10,000

Uyo, Nigeria

2013

10,000

Lagos, Nigeria

2011

10,000

Lagos, Nigeria

Faith Tabernacle International Gospel Centre Deeper Life Bible Church Great Temple

Yoido Full Gospel Church Word Cathedral of Faith Noah’s Ark Auditorium The Rock Cathedral National Temple

Source: Ikenwa 2019.

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Between 1841 and 1900, there were significant contributions of five missionary societies in the religious sphere of Nigeria. These were the Missionary Society of the Church of England, the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society from England, the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the Southern Baptist Convention of the United States, and the French Catholic Society for Africa (Diara 2013). Just like the early missionaries who introduced Christianity to Nigeria more than a century ago, Pentecostal mega-churches in Nigeria are doing the same thing in the reverse direction with a full-bodied Pentecostal version of the Christian faith, reevangelizing the home of the original missionary evangelists. Over the past century, no region on earth has witnessed so dramatic a transformation in its religious life as Africa. In 1910, just 9 per cent of the continent’s population was Christian; today, the population of Christians in Africa has continued to be on the increase (Adesoji 2017). Much of that growth can be attributed to European and American missionaries, who fanned out across the continent over the course of the twentieth century with a promise to bring light to the ‘dark continent’. But today, the narrative is beginning to move in the reverse direction with Africa and other regions of the so-called global south moving away from just receiving missionaries, to leading international evangelical efforts of their own. Today, nine of the top 20 missionary-sending countries in the world are in Asia, Africa and Latin America, according to the Center for the Study of Global Christianity, and few countries illustrate those changing dynamics better than Nigeria. According to the spokesman for the Winners’ Chapel, which is also known as the Living Faith Church Worldwide, ‘traditionally churches came from the Western world . . . with science, with modernization, the West has lost its debt to Christ . . . but now we are returning the kingdom back to them, (because) in Africa the faith is still strong’ (Ohuocha 2014). According to a Pastor from the United States who was sharing a testimony of his relationship with Bishop David Oyedepo, the founder of the Living Faith Church, at the 40th anniversary of the church, the operations of the church has had great impacts outside the shores of Nigeria. In his words, ‘there was a time when Africa needed America so much; now is the era when America needs to take advantage of the spiritual reawakening and revival going on in Africa’. The impact of the operations of the Pentecostal churches in Nigeria has contributed to the reawakening of Christian communities and organizations in different parts of the world. So, Christianity is a major Nigerian export to the rest of the world, including the developed countries and the Pentecostal mega-churches are the driving force behind this feat. Thus, if properly estimated, Nigeria’s Gross National Product (GNP) might be different from what it is, given the activities of these mega-churches on the world stage (Ikenwa 2019).

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Over the past three decades, Nigerian Pentecostal mega-churches have sprung up to global limelight. For example, the fastest growing church in Britain is the Nigeria’s Redeemed Christian Church of God, and four of the ten largest churches in Britain were founded by Nigerians. In Kiev, Ukraine, the largest Sunday service – with about 5,000 people attending – is conducted by Sunday Adelaja, a Nigerian and founder of the Pentecostal Embassy of God Church (Ikenwa 2019). The Winners’ Chapel claims membership on five continents, and the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) – Nigeria’s largest Pentecostal church – has adherents in more than 100 countries, with a target of building a church within a five-minute walk or drive of every person on earth. But the reach of Nigerian churches goes far wider, stretching into corners of the world where the presence of its government is far less obvious. The Nigerian state may need to partner with transnational religious organizations in the promotion of economic development, security, human rights and social justice at the domestic level. Such domestic cooperation has the potential of projecting the state positively in the international community, thereby enhancing the attraction and appeal of the state to foreign partners. CONCLUSION In practical diplomatic terms, faith-based diplomacy can be a useful tool of foreign policy in Nigeria. To be more impactful in international relations, the state may have to pursue a mix of both hard and soft power resources in the administration of its foreign policy. Over the past three decades, Nigerian Pentecostal mega-churches have sprung up to global limelight with real global influence and diplomatic potentials. The country can strengthen her soft power resource base through religious diplomacy, a strategy for deploying religious resources in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. As a matter of fact, religious leaders can help to validate a peace process before, during and after negotiations; through dialogue and public statements, they can make peace easier to achieve and sustain. Religion in the twenty-first century can be either a force for reconciliation and political stability or a wedge that deeply divides. It is now time for it to be used for reconciliation and diplomatic peacemaking. REFERENCES Abdo, Geneive. 2013. “The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a-Sunni Divide.” Analysis Paper no. 29, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution.

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Adesoji, Abimbola. 2017. “The New Pentecostal Movement in Nigeria and the Politics of Belonging”. Journal of Asian and African Studies 52, no. 8: 1159–1173. Adogame, Afe. 2010. “How God Became a Nigeria: Religious Impulse and the Unfolding of a Nation”. Journal of Contemporary Studies 28, no. 4: 479–498. Agbiji, Obaji and Ignatius Swart. 2018. “In the Wake of Overt Religiosity: A Critical and Appreciative Perspective on Religion as a Force for Social Transformation and Development in African Society”. In Wealth, Health and Hope in African Religion, edited by Stan Chu Ilo, pp. 265–293, Maryland: Lexington Book. Akanbi, Solomon and Jaco Beyers. 2017. “The Church as a Catalyst for Transformation in the Society”. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 73, no. 4: 1–8. Anderson, Allen Heaton. 2014. An Introduction to Pentecostalism: Global Charismatic Christianity. London: Cambridge University Press. Codevilla, Angelo. 2008. “Political Warfare: A Set of Means for Achieving Political Ends.” In Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda and Political Warfare, edited by Michael Waller, pp. 206–223. Washington, D.C.: Institute of World Politics Press. Curanovic, Alicja. 2012. The Religious Diplomacy of the Russian Federation. Russia/ NIS Centre. Davidson, Basil. 1992. The Blackman’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the NationState. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. Diara, Benjamin and Nche George Christian. 2013. “European and American Christian Missions and Nigeria’s National Development (1840-1960)”. Journal of Educational and Social Research 3, no. 10: 89. Dobbs-Weinstein, Idit. 2015. Spinoza’s Critique of Religion and its Heir. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gifford, Paul. 2016. Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa. London: Hurst Publishers. Halahoff, Ann and David Wright-Neville. 2009 “A Missing Peace? The Role of Religious Actors in Countering Terrorism”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32: 921–932. Hasan, Rumy. 2017. Religion and Development in the Global South. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Haynes, Jeffrey. 2009. “Transitional Religious Actors and International Order”. Perspectives 17, no. 2: 43–70. Ikenwa, Chizoba. 2019. List of Top 10 Biggest Churches in Nigeria Today. https:// nigerianinfopedia​.com​.ng​/list​-top​-10​-biggest​-churches​-in​-nigeria​-today/ Keiswetter, Allen and John Chane. 2013. Diplomacy and Religion: Seeking Common Interests and Engagement in a Dynamically Changing and Turbulent World. Doha: The Brookings Project on U.S. – Islamic World Relations Forum. Lindhardt, Martin. 2014. Pentecostalism in Africa: Presence and Impact of Pneumatic Christianity in Postcolonial Societies. Netherlands: BRILL. Lord, Carnes. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”. In Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda and Political Warfare, edited by Michael Waller, pp. 59–71. IWP Press.

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Majawa, Clement. 2018. “Pentecostal and Charismatic Renewal, A Religious Phenomenon for Transformation in Africa”. In Wealth, Health and Hope in African Christian Religion: The Search for Abundant Life, edited by Stan Chu Ilo, pp. 103–129. Maryland: Lexington Book. McKinnon, Andrew. 2006. “Opium as Dialectics of Religion: Metaphor, Expression and Protest”. In Marx, Critical Theory and Religion, edited by Warren S. Goldstein, pp. 11–29. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Nye, Joseph. 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. London: Basic Books. Nye, Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Nye, Joseph. 2011. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs. Ohuocha, Chijioke. 2014. Nigeria’s Mega Churches: A hidden Pillar of Africa’s Top Economy. https://www​.reuters​.com​/article​/us​-nigeria​-megachurches​-insight​-idU​ SKCN​0I10​4F20​141012 Oren, Michael. 2007. Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Osgood, Hugh. 2008. “Pentecostalism: Global Trends and Local Adjustments”. Journal of the European Pentecostal Theological Association 28, no. 1: 63–76. Robeck, Cecil M. and Amos Yong. 2014. The Cambridge Companion to Pentecostalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, UK. Robins, Roger. 2018. “Introduction to Current Trajectories in Global Pentecostalism: Culture, Social Engagement and Change”. Religion 9, no.11: 368. Snyder, Jack. 2004. “One World, Rival Theories”. Foreign Policy, November 1. Stempel, John. 2000. Fait and Diplomacy in the International System. Patterson School of Diplomacy and International commerce. Temitope, Ogunlusi Clement. 2018. “Prosperity Gospel Preaching and its Implication on National Developments”. International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies 5, no. 1: 313–330. Thomas, Scott. 2005. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 14

Music Diplomacy The Soft Power of Nigerian Gospel Melody Olusola Ogunnubi and Dare Leke Idowu

Music is a powerful tool with mass appeal that can lead to positive, therapeutic changes in the mood (Statler, 2012; Joij and Meurs, 2011; University of Groningen, 2011), emotions (Statler, 2012; Theorell and Horwitz, 2019) and behaviour (Cox, Nowak and Buettner, 2014) of audiences, regardless of race or nationality. Indeed, one’s perception of the world can be transformed by listening to happy or sad music (University of Groningen, 2011). Music also has thought-provoking political insinuations and foreign policy implications. For instance, Rosenberg (2012: 66) notes that as a fundamental strategy to win ‘the world’s hearts and minds during the Cold War’, in 1954, President Eisenhower used ‘money from his emergency fund’ to sponsor the ‘first Cold War musical ambassadors to foreign countries’ (Ansari, 2012: 1). Interestingly, the foreign policy actors of many countries have yet to come to terms with this reality. Music, power and foreign policy have endured in long decades of simple, complex and strategic relationships that predate the Cold War era. Recognized as a subtle but powerful and indispensable tool to fight the Cold War, major powers have weaponized music as a diplomatic tool of ‘resisting or undermining power relations of all kinds’ (Taruskin, 2016: 401). Likewise, music has been utilized to resist power and reinforce and weaken ‘existing power structures’ (Taruskin, 2016: 402). Unlike African states, major powers have deployed musical tours as a subtle soft power resource through which they have effected positive changes in the behaviour of transnational audiences and moderately pursued their national interests abroad (Idowu and Ogunnibi, 2021; Statler, 2012). For example, in a bid to advance its post–World War diplomatic, military, political and economic agendas, the United States engaged the subtle diplomatic tactic of deploying sponsored musical concerts, ensembles and international tours of the USSR (Statler, 2012), the Middle East, Europe, South America, and Asia 233

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(Voice of America, 2009; Dunkel and Nitzsche, 2019; Berkeley, 2018). The United States also used music as a medium to extend its cultural and political influence beyond its boundaries (Hixson, 1997; Rosenberg, 2012). Underscoring the significance of leveraging cultural exchange and performing arts as public diplomacy strategies to wage the Cold War by improving the way it is perceived globally by foreign publics, from as early as 1954, the U.S. State Department financed international cultural tours abroad (Cull, 2008; Davenport, 2009; Fosler-Lussier, 2012). These aimed to serve as a psychological tool to bolster America’s declining image (Fosler-Lussier, 2015; Davenport, 2009) and to change international perceptions of Americans as a racist, pompous, chauvinistic (Eschen, 2006) and having a tendency to rely on the use of force and power to achieve their goals. According to FoslerLussier (2010), the tours were also designed to contest Soviet propaganda about the United States by promoting the American culture and creating a positive impression of the United States and its foreign policy, as well as competing with the Soviet and Chinese artists who travelled for similar publicity purposes (Fosler-Lussier, 2012). Having highlighted how global powers have weaponized music and musical tours in their foreign policy execution, it is apposite to ask if this dimension of diplomacy is the exclusive preserve of the major powers. This question is important because other than the soft power prospect of America’s classical music, and Chinese and Soviet opera, nothing is said of the soft power of the music and celebrity diplomacy potential of African musicians. From studies such as Taruskins and Gibbs (2012) which theorized the association between music and diplomacy in successive ages to Ahrendt, Ferraguto, and Mahiet (2014) who adopted an historical and ethnographic approach to profile the nexus between music and diplomacy ‘from the pre-modern era to the present’, to more recent research that unravelled the diplomatic significance of ‘sound and voice on the international stage’ (Ramel and Prévost-Thomas, 2018: 1), there is no documentation of the soft power prospects of music produced by Africans and their iconic personalities. Ansari (2012); Campbell (2012); Gienow-Hecht (2012); Fosler-Lussier (2012); Statler (2012); Rosenberg (2012); Taruskin (2016), and other scholars that theorized the interconnectedness of music and diplomacy relied on an analysis of the musical diplomacy of the United States and USSR during and after the Cold War. Does this connote that, apart from being weaponized as a tool of resistance and to influence public opinion (Pareles, 2020; Salawu, 2020), music of African origin lacks soft power appeal? Using Nigeria as a microcosm of African states, we argue that they also possess significant cultural and musical soft power resources that have enjoyed global acceptance which national governments could deploy to revive their international image and advance the cultural dimensions of their national interests abroad.

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Unfortunately, beyond enjoying the lyrics and dancing to the rhythms of music produced by musicians of African descent, audiences, state actors, and international relations experts in African states have yet to consciously interrogate the foreign policy implications of this music. Although a number of studies have highlighted intercontinental adulation of iconic African personalities like Fela Kuti, King Sunny Ade, Tony Allen, Fela Sowande (Oikelome, 2017; Omojola, 2012; Waterman, 1990), and others who have become global phenomena, there is a dearth of studies on the soft power prospects of this music for international diplomacy. Until recently, scholarly analysis of the soft power potential of Nigeria’s iconic hip-hop musicians and the foreign policy implications of international acceptance of their hiphop music was almost non-existent.1 Consequent upon the dearth of studies on the soft power and diplomatic prospects of African musical exports, the authors interrogate and situate South Africa’s iconic Jerusalema song and the viral #JerusalemaDanceChallenge as major cultural export and soft power resource for ‘boosting South Africa’s external image and to extend its popularity globally in the aftermath of the 2019 Afrophobic attacks’ (Idowu and Ogunnubi, 2021: 462). This chapter aims to contribute to filling this gap in the literature on the intersectionality between music and international relations with respect to production by African artists. We draw on secondary sources to explore the linkage between music, soft power, and international relations, drawing inferences from the Nigerian gospel music industry. More specifically, we analyse the music diplomacy context of religious soft power embedded in the transnational attraction of Nigerian iconic gospel musicians and the music they produce. We also examine how Abuja could appropriate the unofficial dimension of music diplomacy to extend global admiration of the ‘Naija’ brand. SOFT POWER AND MUSICAL DIPLOMACY IN THE COLD WAR ERA Soft power is an international relations concept and an indispensable tool of foreign diplomacy in the twenty-first-century global system that is characterized by increased complexity, intractable inter-state conflicts and terrorism. The oxymoronic coinage, fame, and utility of soft power as it subsists today in the field and practice of international relations is credited to Joseph Nye who used the concept to address the skewed narrative on the dwindling power of the United States in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead (Nye, 1990). Nye also used the notion of soft power to underscore the shift from absolute reliance on states’ hard power resources as a tool to achieve their national interests.

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Since the widespread coinage and appropriation of this concept, Nye has continued to expand the frontiers of the conceptualization of soft power to accommodate not only the definition but the resource components of soft power that can be viable tools of allurement and co-optation in the complex global environment. Nye defined soft power as what occurs ‘when one country gets other countries to want what it wants’ (Nye, 1990a: 166). He further defined it as a state’s ability to achieve its desired ends or influence the preferences of others through the use of attraction as against the use of negative and positive reinforcers (stick and carrot) (Nye, 2009: 160), or ‘the ability to affect others by attraction and persuasion rather than just coercion and payment’ (Nye, 2017: 1). This connotes that soft power is a state’s cooptive ability to attract other states to promote its national interests without having to engage the use of threats, force and economic might. To achieve this end, states must deploy soft power resources that not only have the ability to attract and allure targeted states but are sufficiently viable to compel obedience without the use of physical, economic and military might. Nye identified ‘cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions’ (Nye, 1990a: 167), values, scientific breakthroughs, and policies (Nye, 1990b, 2009) as some of the major resources or components of a country’s soft power. Beyond the logic of attractiveness and allurement, states at which soft power resources are targeted must find them valuable, acceptable, legitimate and consistently operationalized (Nye, 2008, 2009). It is erroneous to assume that, while it has the ability to alter the emotions of its audience irrespective of race or nationality, music does not have political power and diplomatic clout. Music was used to persuade the public to support World War I and II efforts, and in contemporary times, it has become a tool to appeal to audiences’ appetite for sports (Beauchamp, 2017). Music, international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy have engaged in complementary and strategic relations for many centuries. Regrettably, academic scholarship on the impact of music on the discipline of international relations and vice-versa remains in an embryonic phase at the global level and is non-existent in Africa. Nonetheless, during the Cold War, music was an indispensable component of the global powers’ foreign policy (Schjønberg, 2019; Cull, 2008: 28). States’ diplomatic engagements detail a rich history of employing music not simply as an adornment (Prévost-Thomas and Ramel, 2018), but as a viable tool to advance their national interests abroad (Statler, 2012: 71; Hixson, 1998; Fosler-Lussier, 2012) and overcome cultural, geographical, political, and ideological divides (Hixson, 1998; Campbell, 2012) For instance, in a bid to counteract Soviet propaganda on racial discrimination, systemic black enslavement and human rights violations in the United States, staff of the U.S. State Department bankrolled cultural tours that featured many African Americans who performed classical music and jazz

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abroad (Fosler-Lussier, 2015; Davenport, 2009; Dunkel and Nitzsche, 2019). Through these tours, the United States achieved two strategic interests. This first was to underscore that the fact that African Americans could play classical music of European origin showed that they had access to education (Fosler-Lussier, 2015). More central was the projection of America as liberal enough to accommodate black jazz in its cultural landscape (Davenport, 2009). Beyond these, by exploiting the charm of jazz and its soft power appeal, the United States was able to frustrate Soviet global cultural propaganda (Davenport, 2009) and destabilize the USSR’s political agenda (Dunkel and Nitzsche, 2019). Although thwarted by the United States, China also attempted to exploit the cultural export of Chinese opera to diffuse Communist propaganda and ideology to South American states and advance the impression of good neighbourliness with its neighbours in Southeast Asia (Davenport, 2009; Zawisza, 2015). Soviet artists also toured with the aim of diffusing the values and ideology of communism on a global scale (Davenport, 2009: 30). Although music was relevant in the Cold War era as a tool for subtle diplomacy, its use in contemporary international relations is less appreciated despite the fact that regional powers with insignificant political clout globally are able to use their music and culture to secure attraction for their foreign policies and citizen-centred diplomacy. Nigeria’s globally acclaimed gospel music culture positions the country to use the leverage that music offers to advance its foreign policy practice. THE EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY STATE OF NIGERIAN GOSPEL MUSIC In contrast to Ajirire and Alabi (1992: 74), Makun (1997), and Ojo’s (1998: 210) work on the Euro-American origins of Nigeria’s gospel music, Adedeji (2004) cites Etim (1998: 3) and Okafor (2002: 6) to contend that it evolved independently. Contemporary Nigerian gospel musicians have appropriated the styles and instrumentation of foreign gospel musicians, including black Americans, Australians and Europeans. Using their advanced instrumentation skills, they have promoted New Creation lyrics, spiritual knowledge, charismatic stage performances and the divine power of their gospel melody to enhance Nigerian gospel music’s global status. Nigerian gospel music emerged in South Western Nigeria in the 1960s and spread to South-Eastern Nigeria in the 1970s and Northern Nigeria in the 1980s (Adedeji, 2004). Although there is no evidence to support his assertion, Adedeji (2004) argued that it was exported by the Christ Apostolic Church (CAC) women’s choir and Pannam Percy Paul. Available evidence indicates

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that Pannam Percy Paul’s first musical tour abroad was in the United States between 1985 and 1986 (My Testimonys Blog, 2014). However, in an interview with Punch Newspaper, Mrs D. A. Fasoyin the leader of the CAC women’s choir says that ‘there was a time we were even planning to travel outside the country but the plans did not materialize’ (Ige, 2020). By the 1990s, the image of Nigerian gospel music was boosted by iconic secular musicians, including Sonny Okosun and Chief Ebenezer ObeyFabiyi switching to gospel music following their ‘conversion and divine call’ (Adedeji, 2004: 66–67). It was during this time that albums produced by American gospel musicians began to flood the stores that sell Christian resources in Nigeria from where they flowed to family settings, campus fellowships and elite churches. Adedeji (2004) notes that American gospel music had a major impact on Nigerian gospel music. In 2000, award-winning American gospel musicians such as Kirk Franklin and Ron Kenoly visited Obafemi Awolowo University Campus for the Asaph National Christian Music Workshop (Adedeji, 2004) which facilitated the exchange of knowledge and the development of potential talent in the art of gospel music and instrumentation. The Face of Nigerian Gospel Music in the 2000s The increased interconnectedness of the world expedited by the widespread use of the internet-enabled gospel music by Americans, Australians and Europeans to became readily downloadable by the Nigerian Christian populace. The songs composed and produced by these gospel musicians were popular in Pentecostal churches in the country, where after they found their way into other denominations. This period also witnessed the rendition of foreign songs in Nigerian campus fellowships and churches. Songs produced by iconic foreign gospel musicians such as Kirk Franklin, Don Moen, Michael W. Smith, Kurt Carr, Bryon Cage, Martha Munizi, Cece Winans, Donnie McKlurkin, William Murphy, Fred Hammond, Hezekiah Walker, Smokie Norful, Kim Burrel, J. Moss, Casting Crowns, Tye Tribbets, Darlene Zcheke, Marvin Sapp, Yolanda Adams, Israel Houghton, Kim Walker Smith, Brian Johnson, Jenn Johnson, Chris Quilala, Micah Stampley, Travis Greene, Maranda Curtis, Tasha Cobbs, William McDowell, Todd Dulaney, James Eddie, J. J. Hairston, Kierra Sheard, Matt Redman and Jaye Thomas, among others were rendered as special numbers and incorporated as mainstream songs in campus fellowships across Nigerian tertiary institutions and churches. Gospel music produced by the Brooklyn Tabernacle Choir, Hilsong, Jesus Culture, Bethel Music, the Planet Shakers, Elevation Worship and other church-based bands abroad were also incorporated into the mainstream songs in Nigerian Christian cycles. This provided an opportunity

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for gospel musicians and instrumentalists from Nigerian campuses and Pentecostal churches to transcribe, rehearse, and appropriate the styles and instrumentation of Euro-American gospel artists that would shape the landscape of Nigerian gospel melody within a few years. Although a few gospel songs composed by Nigerian gospel musicians such as Pannam Percy Paul, Jadiel, Sammy Okposo and later Midnight Crew thrived at the national level, they could not compete with the Euro-American gospel music flowing into Nigerian campus fellowships and churches. Songs by evangelist Mama Bola Are, Funmi Aragbaye and Chief Ebenezer Obey were also popular, but mainly in the south-west because of language barrier associated with the use of Yoruba. Gospel music produced by CAC’s women’s choir was also enjoyed by Yoruba-speaking Nigerians. Evergreen gospel music produced by the Cherubim and Seraphim Church Ayo Ni O Choir also received widespread praise within south-west Nigeria but did not achieve national acclaim due to language barriers. This narrative began to change with the gradual renaissance of Nigerian gospel music which featured hit singles and albums produced by churchbased and independent Nigerian gospel musicians whose music was nationally acclaimed regardless of denominational, language and ethnic divides. This arguably changed the landscape of gospel music produced and sung across Nigerian churches. Church-based gospel musicians in this regard include Frank Edward, Eben, Sinach, Joe Praise, Ada Ehi, KI and Martin PK, all of Christ Embassy Church, and Nathaniel Bassey, Bukola Bekes and Kunle Ajayi, Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) Praise Team who have ministered in Australia, America, Europe and a number of African countries. Music produced by independent Nigerian gospel musicians, such as Pastor Chris Delvan, Dunsin Oyekan, Tim Godfrey, Chioma Jesus, Onos Ariyo, Victoria Orenze, Steve Crown, Samsong, Nosa, Prospa Ochimana, Mercy Chinwo and others has been instrumental in this ongoing renaissance, the effects of which are not only felt in Africa but across America, Australia, Europe, Latin America and Asia. Osinachi Joseph popularly known as Sinach has been the most successful Nigerian gospel musician. Sinach is a senior worship leader at Believers Love World International where Pastor Chris Oyakilome has consistently invested in the music ministers of Love World Music Ministry. It has produced a number of Nigeria’s leading gospel musicians, including Sinach, Frank Edwards, Eben, Sinach, Joe Praise, Ada Ehi, Chris Shalom and Buchi Atuonwu, among others (Williams, 2018). Oyakilome has a reputation for nurturing gospel music and providing musicians with financial support and a platform to rise to stardom (Vanguard Nigeria, 2019). He also launched the Love World International Music and Arts Awards (LIMA) in 2016 and hosted international gospel concerts to discover and motivate upcoming gospel talent.

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Harnessing digital information and communication technology, social media apps, iTunes and Spotify, music produced by Nigerian musicians has flowed to consumers across Africa, America, Australia, and Europe where foreign nationals have continued to express admiration and fondness not only for the music but also these musicians’ iconic personalities. Regional and global adulation for music produced by Sinach, Nathaniel Bassey, Dunsin Oyekan, Ada Ehi, Joe Praise, Steve Crown and other Nigerian gospel musicians is not without foreign policy implications. While the previous era saw an influx of Euro-American gospel music to Nigerian campus fellowships and churches, today, Nigerian gospel music is sung in churches and gospel concerts across the world, translated into foreign languages and acclaimed for its potent messages. For instance, Fowler (2020) notes that ‘the American church’s quarantine anthem made its way to the States from Nigeria, where songwriter and Pentecostal worship leader Osinachi Kalu Okoro Egbu, known as Sinach, first popularized “Way Maker”’. Speaking at the Experience 2018 Press Conference, Pastor Paul Adefarasin noted that ‘before now, American gospel songs were the norm in our services. Today, our indigenous songs are favourites in many American churches’ (Ekemezie, 2018). This captures the soft power potential of contemporary Nigerian gospel music. Concerts and Collaboration The renaissance of Nigerian gospel music has also resulted in collaboration between Nigerian and award-winning international gospel musicians. Popular Pentecostal churches such as the Commonwealth of Zion Assembly (COZA) featured concert performances by iconic American gospel musicians such as Kurt Carl in 2012, Kim Burrell and Tasha Cobbs in 2014, and Tye Tribett in 2015. The fearless concert organized by Tim Godfrey and held in the Nigerian federal capital, Lagos, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Abia, in 2020 featured performances by Marvin Sapp, Kirk Franklin, and Travis Greene (Channels Television, 2018), Israel Houghton, and collaboration between Tim Godfrey and Travis Greene in 2019 (TimGodfreyWorld, 2019). The American Gospel Musician J. J. Hairston’s 2019 tour with Tim Godfrey, Mercy Chinwo, and the Gratitude in Nigeria led to a remix of Mercy Chinwe’s ‘Excess Love’ and the production of ‘Onaga’ and ‘what have you not done’, all at the COZA, Abuja. With respect to song collaboration, in 2016, Dunsin Oyekan featured Kim Burrell in the production of the gospel hit ‘Na You’; Frank Edward featured Don Moen in many songs between 2017 and 2020; Tim Godfrey featured Travis Greene (American gospel singer) in the gospel hit ‘Nara’(TimGodfreyWorld, 2018) in 2018 with another collaboration in the pipeline; Tim Godfrey featured Israel Houghton in the production of ‘Toya Eze’ (TimGodfreyWorld, 2019) in 2019; J. J. Hairston featured Tim

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Godfrey in the production of ‘Onaga’ in 2019; and J. J. Hairston and Mercy Chinwo collaborated to remix the hit ‘Excess Love’ which was originally produced by Mercy Chinwo in 2018. In 2019, Eben featured Phil Thompson in ‘Agunechemba One’ (OfficialEben, 2019). These collaborations were remarkable, in that American gospel musicians mastered and sang songs embellished with the Igbo language. Nathaniel Bassey, the trumpet playing Nigerian gospel musician was featured by American-based Pastor William McDowell alongside Travis Greene in the live recording of ‘Nothing Like Your Presence Lord’ in the United States. The Experience Lagos Another feature of the current phase of gospel music in Nigeria is ‘The Experience’, which is arguably the largest live annual global gospel concert that hosts Nigerian-based and top-rated award-winning gospel music stars from across the world in Tafawa Balewa Square, Lagos. The Experience is an annual worship concert convened and hosted by Pastor Paul Adefarasin of House on the Rock Church Lagos. It was launched on 1 December 2006 (The Experience Lagos, 2019) with 70,000 worshipers which grew to over 250,000 in 2007, more than 700,000 in 2018 and about a million in 2019. Due to the lockdown and travel restrictions imposed to check the spread of the novel Covid-19 virus, the 2020 edition tagged the ‘global edition’ was held online and featured Nigerian and transnational worshippers and musicians (Glaziang, 2020). As Figure 14.1 shows, The Experience Lagos has featured iconic global musicians such as Donnie McCkurkin, Kirk Franklin, Yolanda Adams, Don Moen, Micah Stampley, Tye Tribbet Travis Greene, Cece Winans, Vicki Vohe, Todd Dulaney, and the Planetshakers (The Experience Lagos, 2019; GospelHotspot, 2016; Ekemezie, 2018) and Nigerian-bred stars such as Sinach, Eben, Nathaniel Bassey, Frank Edward, Tope Alabi, Chioma Jesus, Onos Ariyo, Mercy Chinwo, Midnight Crew, Steeve Crown, Sammie Okposo, Preye Odede, Glowreeyah Braimah, the Lagos Metropolitan Gospel Choir, and Ada (The Experience Lagos, 2019; Ekemezie, 2018).​ Apart from its socio-economic effects, The Experience Lagos has hospitality and religious tourism potential as it not only attracts iconic foreign musicians to Nigeria but also transnational worshippers who participate in the live worship experience. Pastor Paul Adefarasin noted in 2018 that The Experience Lagos has given Nigerian gospel musicians the opportunity to minister live alongside established and award-winning gospel musicians from abroad. This has contributed to human capital development and the economic worth of Nigerian-based gospel musicians who according to him, ‘have become highly sought-after internationally, with significant changes in their personal economic status’ (Ekemezie, 2018).

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Figure 14.1.  A Group Photograph of Nigerian and International Gospel Artists and the Host of The Experience Lagos, Pastor Paul Adefarasin. (Reprinted with permission from Martins, Perry. “The Experience 2019 Press Briefing,” gospotainment​.co​m. 19 December 2019. https://gospotainment​.com​/the​-experience​-2019​-press​-briefing/)

Adefarasin added that The Experience Lagos has opened up opportunities to network with several international gospel musicians, resulting in collaborations. These have boosted Nigerian gospel musicians’ reputations (Ekemezie, 2018) as well as national development and global admiration of the Nigerian gospel melody. Having explored the intersectionality between music, soft power, and diplomacy and presented an overview of the evolution and development of Nigerian gospel music vis-à-vis the networking, collaboration and human capacity development occasioned by the contact between Nigerian gospel musicians and their international counterparts, as well as the role of churchbased musicians, the next section analyses the soft power of ‘Way Maker’ produced by a Nigerian gospel artist and discusses how Abuja can exploit it to advance its global attraction. THE SOFT POWER OF THE ‘WAY MAKER’ ICON In his conceptualization of what constitutes a state’s soft power, Nye underscored that beyond the logic of attractiveness and allurement, the states that are the targets of soft power resources must find them valuable, acceptable, legitimate, and consistently operationalized (Nye, 2008; 2009). These criteria are used to appraise the musical soft power embedded in Sinach’s ‘Way Maker’. When Nigerian gospel musician Osinachi Kalu Okoro Egbu released

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her ground-breaking gospel single and globally acclaimed worship anthem titled ‘Way Maker’ in December 2015, little did she know that it would have over 158 million views within five years, transcend Nigerian audiences, and become a global phenomenon that is widely accepted by transnational audiences and international gospel musicians who have continued to reproduce it. From its emergence as a popular song in churches globally to the recording of numerous versions by award-winning and leading international gospel musicians, ‘Way Maker’ has had an unprecedented global impact that arguably has salient soft power implications for Nigeria and Africa at large (Gospel Music Association, 2020). The song received widespread transnational acceptance and was legitimized as the song of the Covid-19 season. Between 2019 and 2020, ‘Way Maker’ was covered by more than sixty international gospel musicians (Gospel Music Association, 2020), including Michael W. Smith (Asker, 2020; Whitmore, 2020), Leeland Christafari (The Hype Magazine, 2020), Paul McClure and Sean Feutch of Bethel Music, Britt Nicole, Steffany Gretzinger, John Wilds and the Jesus Image Choir, Caleb and Kesley, Passion Worship Band (New Release Today, 2020), The Elevation Worship (Thomas, 2020), Miranda Curtis, Revere ft. Darlene Zschech and William McDowell, and Linkowski and Davis Archuletta (American Idol Contestants) (Gospel Music Association, 2020). It has been translated into fifty languages (Fowler, 2020), including Spanish (Guy Muse, 2018) which had 158 million YouTube viewers within two years, Chinese (MITA Worship, 2021), Portuguese (Jeremy Riddle, 2020), South Korean (NAM D [예람워십 편곡자], 2020), and Italian (Michael W. Smith, 2020) (Smith, 2020; Fowler, 2020). Describing the debut ‘Way Maker’, New Release Today avers that: ‘Way Maker’ is a song that it seems like every church is playing, and every artist is recording! You can be pretty confident that you’ll hear this song at an upcoming worship concert because it’s such a powerful song with a powerful message. (New Release Today, 2020)

By virtue of transnational acceptance of the song, Sinach emerged as the first Nigerian gospel musician to reach over 100 million YouTube viewership on 7 March 2019 (Abulude, 2019) and was the first gospel artiste of Nigerian origin to be presented with ‘a gold plague from YouTube’ (Ochuko, 2020). During the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, it emerged as the quarantine anthem of the American Church and the ‘modern worship standard within the global church’ (Gospel Music Association, 2020) before it cascaded to other countries where transnational audiences sang ‘Way Maker’ from their balconies during the Covid-19 quarantine (Tady, 2020).

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‘Way Maker’ also ranked among the four songs on the chart of the Christian Copyright Licensing International (CCLI) US (Gospel Music Association, 2020) based on its frequency of use in churches (Fowler 2020). Described as a ‘powerful anthem’, it was nominated for the 51s+t Gospel Music Association Dove Awards in 2020 for ‘Song of the Year, Spanish Language Recorded Song of the Year (as recorded by Priscilla Bueno), and Worship Recorded Song of the Year (as recorded by Leeland)’ (Gospel Music Association, 2020; Dove Awards, 2020; This Day Newspaper, 2020). It won Song of the Year (GMA Dove Awards, 2020), marking the first time that a song written and produced by a Nigerian won this award. ‘Way Maker’ was also the first song composed by a Nigerian gospel musician to be ranked in the top 10 categories (This Day Newspaper, 2020). Interestingly, ‘two covers of “Way Maker” by Michael W. Smith (Michael W. Smith, 2019) and Leeland (Music meets heaven, 2019) were featured in the top 10 Hot Christian Songs chart’ (Asker, 2020), the first time that this had occurred (Asker, 2020). Radio stations which are pivotal in popularizing songs are vigorously promoting different versions of ‘Way Maker’ and even making calls to ask which version to play (Asker, 2020). ‘Way maker’, ‘I know who I am’, and other songs produced by Sinach have opened up major platforms to her across North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and the Caribbean (Sinach, 2021). Apart from her home country, she has ministered in ‘Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Atigua, Baubuda, Trinidad, Tobago, Greneda, Uganda, Barbados’ (Fowler, 2020) among others. Arguably, by virtue of her recurrent transnational tours, Sinach is the most travelled African gospel musician and the first to tour New Delhi, Pune, Maharashtra, India (Fowler, 2020; Henotage Media Concept, 2020). She entered into a ‘global song production partnership’ with Integrity Music in July 2019 and was the first African gospel musician to top the Billboard Christian Songwriters chart (Fowler, 2020). On 5 June 2020, the Billboard weekly chart ranked Sinach No. 1 Christian songwriter and producer, a position which she retained for twelve weeks in a row (Gospel Music Association, 2020). She was ranked 89th among the 100 most reputable persons on earth by Reputable Poll in 2019 (Reputationpoll, 2019) and 82nd in the 2020 most influential African women (Avance Media, 2020). Sinach has been honoured with invitations from Pastor Benny Hinn, a globally renowned healing televangelist and Pastor of the World Healing Center Church and has ministered alongside Hinn in different crusades across the world. Acknowledging Sinach in a crusade held in South Africa, Benny Hinn said: ‘Sinach, the anointing on your ministry is superb and very heavenly, you have a heavenly anointing’ (Glory Rain TV, 2016). Pastor Joel and Victoria Osteen invited her to minister at the Lakewood Church, USA, where

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she performed ‘Way Maker’, ‘I know who I am’, and other songs (Sinach, 2019). She has also ministered at the Elevation Church in the United States. Covid-19 and the Faith Diplomacy of the Nigerian song ‘Way Maker’ The ravaging effects of the Covid-19 global pandemic on people’s medical, mental, social, and physical health across the world have caused untold anguish and have tested people’s resilience to the limit. The pandemic has also exposed the frailties of medical science as countries continue to record an increase in the spread of the virus and casualties. In the face of these challenges, nationals of many countries are turning to gospel music not only to ease their trauma but to boost their hopes for an end to the pandemic, healing for those that are infected, and the discovery of a cure. ‘Way Maker’ has been very instrumental in bringing hope, succour, and comfort to those whose lives and families have been ravaged by the pandemic (CNN Africa, 2020). Sinach first sang ‘Way Maker’ at the Believers Love World Church in Nigeria where she worships. The song spread to the black community in the United States, followed by Brazil and thereafter gained widespread listenership in the white community in the United States and other parts of the world courtesy of digital information communication and technology (CNN Africa, 2020). The therapeutic effect of ‘Way Maker’ in bringing comfort to world during the pandemic is succinctly captured in the prologue of one of the covers of ‘Way Maker’ in Korea. The producer says: ‘We hope that this song brings hope, peace and encouragement during hard times of trouble and pain’ (NAM D [예람워십 편곡자], 2020). By virtue of its powerful message of hope, peace, and restoration, individuals, Christians and non-Christians alike, street occupants, hospital workers, community members, churches, and medical personnel seek comfort from the ravaging effects and devastating consequences of the unprecedented pandemic that has halted socio-cultural and economic activities and forced the most technologically advanced economies to a standstill for many months. Medical doctors and nurses were recorded listening to different covers of ‘Way Maker’, singing aloud and interceding on the rooftops of many hospital buildings (AG Ministry, 2020) including Cartersville Hospital and Western Missouri Medical Center (Big Boi, 2020) in the United States. People also gathered at parking lots (AG Ministry, 2020) including that of Northeast Georgia Medical Center–Braselton (Marciano & Company Real Estate, 2020), Northside Forsyth Hospital near Atlanta, and other major health facilities in the United States (Lets Eat Together ENEBLA, 2020). Community members play different covers of ‘Way Maker’ in their cars as they flash their

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headlights and sing along (Tady, 2020). They have played the song while praying for those infected with the virus and to honour and motivate health care workers working on the frontline in the fight against Covid-19 (Gospel Music Association, 2020). ‘Way Maker’ has helped many to find peace in the dark and gloomy time occasioned by the pandemic (Tady, 2020). Transnational admiration for and legitimation of ‘Way Maker’ in North America, Europe and Asia symbolizes a remarkable moment in global church history. It also has soft power implications for the dissemination of the cultural dimension of Nigeria’s national interests abroad. Under the guise of civilization, white colonists exported Euro-American Christianity to African countries. They coerced or sweet-talked Africans to adopt Christianity and the infrastructure and cultural traditions and practices of the West (Thiessen, 2020). The asymmetrical power relations between European and American evangelists and their Christian converts in Africa did not end with decolonization. As noted by Thiessen, ‘our way of relating to others has been informed by the idea that we have all of the answers, and it is our job to share them with the world’ (Thiessen, 2020). Such asymmetrical relations also subsist in the art of worship in North American churches. While ‘the top worship hits from Euro-American songwriters have been translated into countless languages and sung all over the world’ (Thiessen, 2020), American evangelical assemblies have not been receptive to gospel songs from other cultures. Riding on digital technology, social media platforms, and the internet, ‘Way Maker’, composed by a Nigerian woman, broke through the musical glass ceiling and emerged as the worship anthem in White American churches, and the Covid-19 worship anthem across the world. Johnathan Brown, the president of Integrity Music remarked: ‘For years, we have longed to see the songs of other nations meaningfully impact the global church . . . “Way Maker” has accomplished more than our wildest dreams. It is our great joy to celebrate this powerful artist’s accomplishment. Way to go, Sinach!’ (Gospel Music Association, 2020). ‘Way Maker’ as a Protest Song in the Fight against Police Brutality in the United States Aside from its acceptance as the global Covid-19 anthem, ‘Way Maker’ was appropriated by Americans protesting systemic racism, racialized police brutality and specifically the killing of George Floyd by Derek Chauvin, a former police officer of the Minneapolis Police Department. From Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Faithwire, 2020), to Indianapolis (Berglund, 2020; Fowler, 2020), Minneapolis, Minnesota and Fredericksburg, Virginia (Fowler, 2020; Uphaus, 2020), large groups of protesters who took to the streets sang ‘Way

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Maker’ as they marched and prayed (Gospel Music Association, 2020; Faithwire, 2020; Berglund, 2020; Uphaus, 2020). THE FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NIGERIA’S MUSICAL SOFT POWER Like the United States’ use of symphony orchestras to promote its Cold War national interests by registering its presence in countries abroad and reshaping the stereotypical mindsets held by foreign nationals (Ansari, 2012:1; Davenport, 2009; Fosler-Lussier, 2010, 2012, 2015; Dunkel and Nitzsche, 2019; (Gienow-Hecht, 2012; Ahrendt, Ferraguto, and Mahiet, 2014), the global appeal, admiration and legitimation of the Nigerian gospel music industry offers diplomatic levellers that Abuja can exploit to disseminate the cultural dimensions of its national interests and extend its global admiration. In this section, we consider how Abuja can employ global admiration for Nigerian gospel musicians and its iconic celebrity artists as potent diplomatic tools to extend such admiration. The musical soft power of ‘Way Maker’, the celebrity status of Sinach and other Nigerian gospel artists, and the increase in the number of award-winning international gospel artists at The Experience live concert in Lagos offer Abuja a viable opportunity to boost Nigeria’s global image. As the first gospel music produced by a Nigerian to be recognized by the Dove Awards nomination, Sinach has registered Nigeria’s nonstate presence and asserted the country’s global relevance with her message of healing, peace and succour during the Covid-19 pandemic without having to sponsor musical tours like the United States and USSR did during the Cold War era (Ansari, 2012: 1; Fosler-Lussier, 2010, 2012, 2015; Dunkel and Nitzsche, 2019; Davenport, 2009; Zawisza, 2015). Global adulation of ‘Way Maker’ puts Abuja in a rare and advantaged position to change stereotypes of Nigeria and Nigerians in the minds of international audiences. To this end, Abuja can modestly capitalize on the celebrity diplomacy potential of the global image of Sinach, a Nigerian producing gospel music with a strong message of hope, therapeutic appeal and a strong unifying effect during the Covid-19 pandemic in advancing its citizenship diplomacy objectives abroad. It can take advantage of her achievements and award-winning international artists’ ongoing participation in the annual The Experience live concert to promote a positive image of Nigeria at the global level and to make a case against the stereotypical framing of Nigerians as internet scammers (Ibrahim, 2017) by the Western media and the poor treatment meted out to Nigerians in many foreign countries. Unfortunately, Nigerian foreign policy experts, the Federal Government, the Ministry and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Nigerian Institute

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of Foreign Affairs have yet to recognize the phenomenal achievements of Nigerian gospel music and its iconic artists; neither have they grasped how they can appropriate them as a tool for public diplomacy. We thus argue that despite possessing numerous soft power resources that could be converted into tools to boost Nigeria’s global image and to achieve other salient dimensions of its foreign policy objectives, Abuja’s failure to recognize and utilize its soft power prospects validate the claim that ‘Nigeria is punching below its weight despite massive soft power capacity’ (Tella, 2019). The consequences are likely to be dire, not only for Nigeria as a state but also for its citizens that engage in legitimate ventures in the diaspora. NOTE 1. Authors that have covered this subject include Ogunnubi (2013; 2017); Ogunnubi and Isike (2015; 2017); Tella (2018; 2019) and Akinlolu and Ogunnubi (2020).

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Fosler-Lussier, Danielle. 2010. “Cultural Diplomacy as Cultural Globalization: The University of Michigan Jazz Band in Latin America”. Journal of the Society for American Music, 4(1): 59–93. Fosler-Lussier, Danielle. 2012. “Music Pushed, Music Pulled: Cultural Diplomacy, Globalization, and Imperialism”. Diplomatic History, 36(1): 53–64. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2011.01008.x Fosler-Lussier, Danielle. 2015. Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy. University of California Press. Accessed 11 August 2019 https://www​ .ucpress​ .edu​ /book​ /9780520284135​/music​-in​-americas​-cold​-war​-diplomacy Fowler, Megan. 2020. “How ‘Way Maker’ Topped the US Worship Charts from Nigeria. ChristianityToday​ .co​ m.” Accessed 13 September 2020. https://www​ .christianitytoday​.com​/ct​/2020​/june​-web​-only​/way​-maker​-worship​-song​-sinach​ -leeland​-michael​-w​-smith​.html [Accessed 13 Sep. 2020]. Frédéric, Ramel and Cécile, Prévost-Thomas. 2019. Introduction: Understanding Musical Diplomacies—Movements on the “Scenes.” In International Relations, Music and Diplomacy : Sounds and Voices on the International Stage, edited by Frédéric, Ramel and Cécile, Prévost-Thomas. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Gavan, Hillary. 2020. Worshippers Sing in Honor of Healthcare Workers. [online] Beloit Daily News. Available at: https://www​ .beloitdailynews​ .com​ /news​ /covid​ -19​/worshippers​-sing​-in​-honor​-of​-healthcare​-workers​/articleb5ae72dc​-a5bb​-5699​ -8dfb​-38908a271d70​.html Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. 2009. Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. 2012. “The World Is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America.” Diplomatic History, 36(1): 17–28. Glaziang. “World’s Largest Gospel Concert, The Experience Goes Virtual This December.” Glazia. Accessed 2 September 2020. https://glaziang​.com​/worlds​-largest​-gospel​-concert​-the​-experience​-goes​-virtual​-this​-december/. Glory Rain TV. 2016. “Benny Hinn to Sinach: “You Have a Heavenly Anointing”.” YouTube. April 21, 2016. https://youtu​.be​/WYUwwAuMyDk. GMA Dove Awards. 2020. “2020 Winners.” The 52nd Annual GMA Dove Awards | Honoring Outstanding Achievements and Excellence in Christian and Gospel Music. Accessed September 9, 2021. https://doveawards​.com​/awards​/2020​ -winners/. GospelHotspot 2016. “The Legacy Called “The Experience Lagos.” Accessed 13 September, 2020. https://gospelhotspot​.net​/theexperiencelg​-the​-legacy​-called​-the​ -experience​-lagos/ Gospel Music Association. 2020. “Sinach, Writer Of “Way Maker,” Named Top Songwriter For 12 Weeks in A Row.” Accessed 9 August 2020. https://www​ .gospelmusic​.org​/sinach​-writer​-of​-way​-maker​-named​-top​-songwriter​-for​-12weeks​ -in​-a​-row/ Gospel Music Association Dove Awards. 2020. “2020 Nominees | The 51st Annual GMA Dove Awards.” Accessed 2 September 2020. https://doveawards​.com​/2020​ -nominees/

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Gospel Music Association. 2020. “Sinach, Writer of “Way Maker,” Named Top Songwriter for 12 Weeks in a Row.” Accessed 25 March 2021. https://gospelmusic​.org​/sinach​-writer​-of​-way​-maker​-named​-top​-songwriter​-for​-12​-weeks​-in​-a​ -row/ Guy Muse. 2018. “Aquí Estás (con letra) Way Maker (Spanish w/lyrics).” YouTube. Accessed April 19, 2020. https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=3WTzg77JjG4. Henotace Media Concept. 2019. “[Gospel News] Sinach Becomes First Gospel Artiste to Tour India – HENOTACE.ORG.” Accessed 18 July 2021. https://henotace​.org​/gospel​-news​-sinach​-becomes​-first​-gospel​-artiste​-to​-tour​-india Hixson, Walter L. 1998. Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War. Palgrave Macmillan. Ibrahim, Suleman. “The View That ‘419’ Makes Nigeria a Global Cybercrime Player is Misplaced.” The Conversation. Last modified March 13, 2017. Accessed 9 September 2021. https://theconversation​.com​/the​-view​-that​-419​-makes​-nigeria​-a​ -global​-cybercrime​-player​-is​-misplaced​-73791. Idowu, Dare and Ogunnubi, Olusola. 2021. Music and Dance Diplomacy in the COVID-19 Era: Jerusalema and the Promotion of South Africa’s Soft Power. The Round Table, 110(4): 461–476. doi: 10.1080/00358533.2021.1956816 Ige, Tofarati. 2020. “Our Husbands were Our Backbone – Good Women Choir.” Accessed 22 March 2021. https://punchng​.com​/our​-husbands​-were​-our​-backbone​ -good​-women​-choir/ Integrity Music. 2020. “Sinach Named Top Christian Songwriter for Twelve Weeks in a Row.” Accessed 7 August 2020. https://www​.integritymusic​.com​/press​/2020​/6​ /5​/sinach​-named​-top​-christian​-songwriter​-for​-twelve​-weeks​-in​-a​-row Jeremy Riddle. 2020. “Way Maker (Official Live Video) [feat. Priscilla Alcantara] – Holy Ground | Jeremy Riddle.” YouTube. April 14, 2020. https://www​.youtube​ .com​/watch​?v​=miPSimQa1DY. John Hopkins University of Medicine Coronavirus Resource Center. 2020. “Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center”. Accessed 10 September 2020. https:// coronavirus​.jhu​.edu​/map​.html Jolij, Jacob and Meurs, Maaike. 2011. “Music Alters Visual Perception.” PLoS ONE, 6(4): e18861. https://journals​.plos​.org​/plosone​/article​?id​=10​.1371​/journal​.pone​ .0018861. Lets Eat Together ENEBLA. 2020. “Way Maker, Miracle Worker, Promise Keeper, Light in the Darkness….” YouTube. Accessed 10 September 2020. https//youtu​.be​ /Y54rCVmYq​n4. Makun, M. O. 1997. “Reverend Father T.M. Ilesanmi as a Gospel Musician’, an Ethnomusicological Essay Submitted for B.A. Degree to the Department of Music, Obafemi Awoowo University, Ile-Ife. Marciano & Company Real Estate. 2020. “Community Worship at Northeast Georgia Medical Center - Braselton.” YouTube. Accessed 13, September 2020 https://www​ .youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=Gu11C5Z6WmY​&t​=49s. Martins, Perry. 2019. “The Experience 2019 Press Briefing.” Accessed 13 September 2020. https://gospotainment​.com​/the​-experience​-2019​-press​-briefing/ Michael W. Smith. 2019. “Michael W. Smith - Waymaker Ft. Vanessa Campagna & Madelyn Berry.” YouTube. February 5, 2019. https://youtu​.be​/SE​_M9noEhNE.

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Michael W. Smith. 2020. “Michael W. Smith | Aprirai Una Via (con Vanessa Campagna) | Per Italia |Way Maker.” YouTube. March 27, 2020. https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=a92BK​-GnLwc. MITA Worship. 2021. “ Way Maker | 开路者 | Chinese 中文 | Virtual Choir.” YouTube. Accessed September 8, 2021. https://www​ .youtube​ .com​ /watch​ ?v​ =0Q1X7K1​-Uqs. Morris, A. 2020. “MUST SEE VIDEOS Doctors Praying Inside as Christians Surround Hospitals to Pray Outside Against Coronavirus.” Accessed 7 September 2020. https://www1​.cbn​.com​/cbnnews​/us​/2020​/march​/must​-see​-videos​-doctors​-praying​ -inside​-as​-christians​-surround​-hospitals​-to​-pray​-outside​-against​-coronavirus. Music Meets Heaven. 2019. “Leeland - Way Maker (Lyrics).” YouTube. September 18, 2019. https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=EXQGTInPpZU My Testimonys Blog. 2014. “Panam Percy Paul Testifies!” Welcome to MyTestimonys Blog! Rev 12:11. Last modified March 3, 2014. https://mytestimonys​.blogspot​.com​ /2014​/03​/panam​-percy​-paul​-testifies​.html. New Release Today. 2020. “The Many Versions of “Way Maker.” Accessed 14 August 2020. https://www​.newreleasetoday​.com​/article​.php​?article​_id​=2764 Nye, Joseph S. 1990a. “Soft Power”. Foreign Policy No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary pp. 153–171. Nye, Joseph S. 1990b. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books. Nye, Joseph S. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Nye, Joseph S. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1): 94–109. Nye, Joseph S. 2017. “Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept.” Palgrave Communications, 3: 17008. Ochuko, Rukevwe. 2020. “YouTube Awards Sinach Gold Plaque for Surpassing1 Million Subscribers.” Accessed 6 September 2020. https://guardian​.ng​/life​/youtube​ -awards​-sinach​-gold​-plaque​-for​-surpassing1​-million​-subscribers/ OfficialEben. 2020. “Eben - Agunechemba One Feat Phil Thompson.” YouTube. October 1, 2019. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=bhZKHBIPYPAhttps:/​/youtu​.be​/9​-wQ3FOYWyE. Ogunnubi, Olusola. 2013. “Hegemonic Order and Regional Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Study of Nigeria and South Africa (Doctoral dissertation).” University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg. Ogunnubi, Olusola and Ettang, Dorcas O. 2016. “Communicating South Africa’s soft power: Agents, Instruments and Recipients”. Communicatio, 42(3): 293–312. Ogunnubi, Olusola and Isike, Christopher. 2017. “Nigeria’s Soft Power Sources: Between Potential and Illusion?” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 31(1): 49–67. Oikelome, Albert. 2017. “Ensemble Organization of the Band of Fela anikulapo-kuti.” EJOTMAS: Ekpoma Journal of Theatre and Media Arts, 6(1–2). doi:10.4314/ejotmas.v6i1-2.7

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Ojo, Matthews. 1998. “Indigenous Gospel Music and Social Reconstruction in Modern Nigeria.” Missionalia: Southern African Journal of Mission Studies, 26(2): 210–231. Okafor, Richard C. 1997. “The Emergence of Neo-Traditional Forms in Contemporary Church Music in Eastern Nigeria.” In Music and Social Dynamics, edited by Omojola Bode. New York: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers. Omibiyi-Obidike, M.A. 1979. “Islam Influence on Yoruba Music. Bulletin of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan African Notes. Accessed 13 September 2020. https://www​.africabib​.org​/rec​.php​?RID​=190015713 Omojola, Bode. 2012. Yoruba Music in the Twentieth Century: Identity, Agency, and Performance Practice. University Rochester Press. Pareles, Jon. 2020. “The Legacy of Fela Kuti’s Music of Resistance: Hear 15 Essential Songs.” Accessed 22 March 2020. https://www​.nytimes​.com​/2020​/06​/10​ /arts​/music​/fela​-kuti​-afrobeat​-playlist​.html Ramel, Frédéric and Prévost-Thomas, Cécile. 2018. International Relations, Music and Diplomacy: Sounds and Voices on the International Stage. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Reputationpoll. 2019. “2019 list of 100 Most Reputable People on Earth.” Accessed 12 September 2020. https://www​.reputationpoll​.com​/2019​-list​-of​-100​-most​-reputable​-people​-on​-earth/ Rosenberg, Jonathan. 2012. “America on the World Stage: Music and TwentiethCentury U.S. Foreign Relations.” Diplomatic History, 36(1): 65–69. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2011.01009.x Salawu, Olajide Michael. 2019. “Abàmì Eda: Personhood and Socio-Political Commitment in Fela’s Music.” Muziki, 16(2): 4–21. doi:10.1080/18125980.2020 .1781547. Schjønberg, Inger-Marie. 2019. Soft Power to the People: Music and Diplomacy in International History. Accessed 14 August 2020. https://www​.duo​.uio​.no​/handle​ /10852​/69024 Sinach. 2020. “SINACH: Live in Lakewood Church | Way Maker.” YouTube. November 9, 2019. https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=hNyGjjqHLj8. Statista. 2020. “Coronavirus Deaths Worldwide by Country.” Accessed 12 September 2020. https://www​.statista​.com​/statistics​/1093256​/novel​-coronavirus​-2019ncov​ -deaths​-worldwide​-by​-country. Statler, Kathryn C. 2012. The Sound of Musical Diplomacy. Diplomatic History, 36(1): 71–75. Tady, Scott. 2020. “Blackhawk Grad’s Song Inspires Internationally.” Accessed 8 September 2020. https://www​.timesonline​.com​/entertainment​/20200401​/blackhawk​-gradrsquos​-song​-inspires​-internationally. Taruskin, Richard. 2012. The Oxford History of Western Music. New York: Oxford University Press. Taruskin, Richard. 2016. “Two Serendipities.” Journal of Musicology, 33(3): 401– 431. doi:10.1525/jm.2016.33.3.401 Tella, Oluwaseun. 2019. “Nigeria is Punching Below its Weight Despite Massive Soft Power Capacity.” Accessed 13 September 2020. https://theconversation​

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.com​/nigeria​-is​-punching​-below​-its​-weight​-despite​-massive​-soft​-power​-capacity​ -110804. The Experience Lagos. n.d. “The Experience Lagos – Live Praise Like You’ve Never Heard It Before.” Accessed 20 September 2020. https://theexperiencelagos​.com​ /2019/​#artiste. The Hype Magazine, 2020. “Christafari Releases Roots Reggae Version of The Hit Song ‘Way Maker’ Ft. Avion Blackman.” Accessed 13 August 2020. https://www​ .thehypemagazine​.com​/2019​/11​/christafari​-releases​-roots​-reggae​-version​-of​-the​ -hit​-song​-way​-maker​-ft​-avion​-blackman/ Theorell, Töres and Horwitz, Eva Bojner. 2019. “Emotional Effects of Live and Recorded Music in Various Audiences and Listening Situations.” Medicines, 6(1): 1–12. Thiessen, Anneli Loepp. 2020. “Even When I Can’t See it You’re Working: The Overlooked Authorship of Way Maker by Sinach. Sing! The Center for Congregational Song.” Accessed 7 August 2020. https://congregationalsong​.org​/ the​-overlooked​-authorship​-of​-way​-maker-/ This Day Live. 2020. “Sinach’s Way Maker Gets Multiple Dove Award Nominations.” Accessed 2 September 2020. at: https://www​.thisdaylive​.com​/index​.php​/2020​/08​ /14​/sinachs​-way​-maker​-gets​-multiple​-dove​-award​-nominations/ Thomas, Philips I. 2020. “How Singer Sinach Made Her Way to Global Stardom and Wealth.” Accessed 9 September 2020. https://reportafrique​ .com​ /entertainment​ / sinach​-songs​-biography​-us​-billboard/ TimGodfreyWorld. 2020. “Toya - Tim Godfrey Ft Israel Houghton.” YouTube. October 10, 2019. Accessed 5 April  2020. https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​ =V2jC7qgkKg0. TimGodfreyWorld. 2018. “Tim Godfrey ft Travis Greene - Nara (Official Video).” YouTube. September 13, 2018. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://www​.youtube​.com​ /watch​?v​=bhZKHBIPYPA. University of Groningen. 2011. “Music Changes Perception, Research Shows.” Accessed 14 August 2020. https://www​.sciencedaily​.com​/releases​/2011​/04​ /110427101606​.htm Uphaus, Adele. 2020. “Local Churches Hold Prayer Walk Through Downtown Fredericksburg in Response to Unrest.” Accessed 8 September 2020. https://fredericksburg​.com​/news​/local​-churches​-holdprayer​-walk​-through​-downtown​-fredericksburg​-in​-response​-to​-unrest​/article​_b67ce98a​-1406​-57a7​-a4fb​-cab8267799dc​ .html Vanguard Nigeria. 2019. “Pastor Chris Oyakhilome’s Ministry: Lima Awards Reflect A Stratospheric Rise to Glory.” Accessed 4 July 2020 https://www​.vanguardngr​ .com​/2019​/11​/pastor​-chris​-oyakhilomes​-ministry​-lima​-awards​-reflect​-a​-stratospheric​-rise​-to​-glory/ Voice of America. 2009. “Remembering Dizzy Gillespie’s Jazz Diplomacy.” Accessed 25 November 2020. https://www​.voanews​.com​/archive​/remembering​ -dizzy​-gillespies​-jazz​-diplomacy Von Eschen, Penny M. 2004. Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

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Waterman, Christopher Alan. 1990. Juju: A Social History and Ethnography of an African Popular Music. University of Chicago Press. Whitmore, Laura B. 2019. “Exclusive Premiere: Michael W. Smith Shares “Waymaker” and Announces New Album, Awaken: The Surrounded Experience.” Accessed 5 September 2020. https://parade​.com​/738213​/laurawhitmore​/exclusive​ -premiere​-michael​-w​-smith​-shares​-waymaker​-and​-announces​-new​-album​-awaken​ -the​-surrounded​-experience/ Williams, Ama. 2018. “LoveWorld Ministry Mega Stars.” Accessed 12 September 2020. https://goodgospelplaylist​.com​/loveworld​-ministry​-mega​-stars-/ Zawisza, Marie. 2015. “How Music is the Real Language of Political Diplomacy.” Accessed 10 September 2020. https://www​.theguardian​.com​/music​/2015​/oct​/31​/ music​-language​-human​-rights​-political​-diplomacy.

Chapter 15

Gospel Music Cosmopolitanism in Lagos, Nigeria, and the Soft Power Potential of Its Iconic Practitioners Joseph Kunnuji

Since1 the turn of the twenty-first century, there has been a rapid and massive shift in the way humans live, work, learn and relate to one another, mainly because of a digital revival in information technology. Described as the fourth industrial revolution, the current technological advancement continues to blur the boundaries between physical and digital spheres (Schwab 2016). One significant highlight of this age is the proliferation of social media platforms that have enabled individuals’ real-time influence on their followers. With these modalities, many celebrities have emerged in the entertainment and gospel music spheres through the deliberate and consistent use of social media platforms in promoting their brands. This use of influence and persuasion, summed up as soft power, has become more fashionable in today’s global politics (van Ham 2008, passim). And although it is uncertain exactly how this age will unfold, one thing is sure – governance in this emerging dispensation will be better pursued through soft power, including cultural diplomacy and leveraging on the influence of iconic individuals. This chapter focuses on the use of power in twenty-first-century Africa, with particular attention on the effective wielding of the power of attraction among internationally acclaimed Nigerian gospel musicians2 while highlighting the need for an updated soft power strategy in Nigerian governance. The chapter argues for the agency of social media and digital platforms in engendering the trans-local influence of celebrities, who are potentially resourceful to Nigeria through ‘celebrity diplomacy’ (Akinola and Ogunnubi 2020, 81–83). While contributing to discourses on the role of iconic individuals in foreign policy advocacy, and the function of religion in global politics, this chapter draws on the author’s auto-ethnographic observations and secondary sources, to argue for the agency of gospel music in creating an attraction 257

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for Nigeria. The chapter adapts Feld’s (2012) jazz cosmopolitanism in its construction of gospel cosmopolitanism to explain common trends within the Nigerian gospel music scene and lend a theoretical insight into the discourse.3 The chapter concludes that there is a pressing need for a reappraisal of Nigeria’s diplomatic strategies to encompass soft power, place branding and leveraging on the international clout of iconic individuals to advance the country’s foreign policy goals. This conclusion is predicated on van Ham’s (2008) thesis. Using examples like the association of cars with Germany and cameras with Japan, van Ham (2008, 129) argued that the images and reputation of brands and states tend to merge in the minds of global consumers. Hence, ‘to do their job right, politicians all over the world have to find a brand niche for their state, engage in competitive marketing, ensure customer satisfaction, and – most of all – create brand loyality’ (van Ham 2008, 129). Going by this reasoning, this chapter suggests that it would be helpful for Nigeria to advocate its image as a cultural/art hub in Africa (with emphasis on music and movies). This brand niche is likely to attract foreigners as the Nigerian music and movie industries have always done. As a point of departure into this chapter’s focus, the next section traces the roots of Nigerian gospel music to its historical antecedent in the nineteenth-century colonial introduction of Western music education. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE TO THE EMERGENCE OF GOSPEL MUSIC AND ITS ICONIC ACTORS IN NIGERIA An analysis of the historical antecedents to the current Nigerian gospel music scene may lend insights to its massive followership and trans-local influence. As Agawu (2016, 29) and many others have demonstrated, concert performances and their associated settings are Western constructs and vestiges of colonialism in Africa (see also Bakan 2007; Kaemmer 2008; Stone 2008; and Nanyonga-Tamusuza 2012 among others). This is not to be misread as the absence of musical activities in traditional African societies. Instead, the thesis here is that musical activities in pre-colonial Africa mostly existed as (secondary) aspects of various social and religious activities (see Kaemmer 2008 for mbira music’s role in catalysing spirit possession in Shona bira ceremonies, for instance). The striking absence of words that capture the Western conceptualization of music, in many (if not all) African languages, underscore this argument, which is detailed in Agawu 2016. Given the secondariness of musical activities in pre-colonial Africa, musicians’ social status ran the gamut from prestigious (consulted by nobilities) to beggarly (and total dependence on patrons). While Panzacchi (1994)

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demonstrates the prestigious status of griots (jali, plural jelilu) in traditional Mande societies, Achebe’s (1958) Things Fall Apart depicts a pre-colonial Igbo society in which a music profession alludes to laziness. The character Unoka (Okonkwo’s father) animates this perception of a music career: Unoka, for that was [Okonkwo’s] father’s name, had died ten years ago. In his day he was lazy and improvident  and was quite incapable of thinking about tomorrow[. . . ] He was tall but very thin and had a slight stoop. He wore a haggard and mournful look except when he was drinking or playing on his flute. He was very good on his flute, and his happiest moments were the two or three moons after the harvest when the village musicians brought down their instruments, hung above the fireplace. Unoka would play with them, his face beaming with blessedness and peace. Sometimes another village would ask Unoka’s band and theirdancing egwugwu to come and stay with them and teach them their tunes. They would go to such hosts for as long as three or four markets, making music and feasting. (My emphasis) Achebe 1959, 6–7

It is paradoxical that a character described as being ‘very good on his flute’, and whose musical proficiency earned him the privilege of inter-village tours and residencies, was also said to be ‘lazy and improvident’. To be clear, it takes several hours of daily practice, sustained over many years, to master a musical instrument; hence, it seems plausible that Unoka was perceived lazy based on the values of his (pre-colonial Igbo) society. Again, the perception of Unoka above typifies the stereotypical association of (full-time) music-making careers with laziness in some pre-colonial African societies. Thus, as I observed during my doctoral fieldwork in Badagry Lagos State, Nigeria, in 2017, other than their supportive role in rituals, work, babysitting and so forth, musical activities remain confined to end-of-the-day relaxations in many conservative African settings. As indicated in Achebe’s paragraph quoted above, musical entertainment was only reasonable after the harvest, which was symbolic of productivity. Besides, in these settings, communal participation in music-making was central, and musicking to promote camaraderie takes precedence over its artistry. Against this backdrop, when the colonial administration introduced Western education in the mid-nineteenth century, music education, which was predominantly liturgical and served the purposes of the missionaries, met with ambivalence among many Nigerians because of its social perception, on the one hand, and its religious affiliations, on the other hand (Emielu 2011; Adeogun 2018b). Consequently, Western art music4 was initially the preserve of the Christian elites of southern Nigeria. Following Nigeria’s independence, formal music education dwindled in public schools in the late 1970s perhaps because it lacked a national appeal.

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This implied restricted access to music education for the majority whose parents could not afford expensive musical instruments, like the piano, private teachers, or overseas educational travels (Adeogun 2018b). However, orthodox churches offered some opportunities and platforms to nurture the musical skills of children from both middle-class and working-class homes. Up to this point, the West modelled art music for Nigeria, and England remained its power centre. At the same time, orthodox churches played an educational role as formal music education declined in Nigerian public schools. In the mid-1980s, Nigeria embraced neoliberalism, introduced the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), and this, according to Adeoye (1991, 40), ‘unleashed unprecedented but avoidable hardship on the Nigerian masses without fundamentally addressing the basic problem of the economy’. The economic hardship coupled with political instability, following the annulment of the presumed free and fair 1993 elections engendered the traction of Pentecostal movements in Nigeria. As Tokunbo argued, although Pentecostalism did not begin in the 1990s, it gained currency at this time as it served as an ‘oasis’ amid ‘the social-economic trauma and political turmoil’ (Tokunbo 2019, 152; see also Adedeji 2012). It was at this time that many public theatres, night clubs and live-music venues closed down. Pentecostal churches proliferated, taking up these performance sites and becoming the major employers of musicians (see Adedeji 2005, 3). Some prominent secular musicians, including Sunny Okosun and Ebenezer Obey, also shifted to gospel music in this era marked by a musical cue-taking from American Pentecostal churches and gospel albums (ibid.). Inadvertently, Pentecostal Churches offered opportunities for a new type of mass informal music education which privileged aural methods over the Western music notation system. In contrast to the preceding era, the power centre of the music associated with Pentecostalism was the United States. Accordingly, unlike the Britishinspired formal music education, Pentecostal gospel music was more (socioeconomic) class cross-cutting, hence its wider acceptance. Consequently, gospel music emerged the mainstream Christian music in Nigeria since the 1990s, and popularity on the gospel music sphere would translate into millions of local fans. Churches did not only take over nightclub venues but also some of the musicians who played in them.5 For instance, Rev CL Franklin, Bishop TD Jakes, and many other American preachers whose sermons were interspersed with music would become models for the burgeoning African preachers of this era. As the Pentecostal movement’s teachings centred around giving hope to the oppressed, it absorbed otherwise stranded musicians owing to the economic hardship and decline in nightlife while also aiding the emergence of new ones. To reiterate, the Pentecostal movement in Nigeria did not emphasize the reading of musical notation, but the development of aural

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skills as many of those who populated this scene might not have been able to afford the expensive Western art music lessons, in which Western music literacy was central. Hence, Pentecostalism may be said to have opened the doorway to various influences from the United States, including jazz, soul and pop music while being more accessible to the masses. Over a protracted period, this movement saw the emergence of notable international gospel musicians who were nurtured as instrumentalists or vocalists in Nigerian Pentecostal churches. These include Mike Aremu, Sammy Okposo, Frank Edwards, Tim Godfrey and Nathaniel Bassey among others.6 On the other hand, many of the females who emerged through Pentecostalism were choristers and mostly lead vocalists in these Pentecostal churches, including Sinach and Mercy Chinwo. The point to be made here is that Pentecostalism was an agency to engendering mass followership for its musicians who would later emerge iconic owing mainly to this mass followership. In contrast, orthodox churches were more classy and elitist, making their associated musical scene largely exclusionary. As Adeogun noted, there was a gap between Western art music promulgated within orthodox churches and departments of music, on the one hand, and their surrounding communities, on the other hand, due to a ‘[r]estrictive conception of music education’ (Adeogun 2018a, 12). Perhaps because of the less emphasis on Western notation, the gospel music scene began to attract more practitioners and followers, and this would undermine the restricted access to music and the hegemony of European art music, which marked the Western system of education. It is quite telling that Pentecostalism discussed thus far, with its accompanying gospel music began in the United States of America, spread to Nigeria where it was indigenized and has now taken the gospel music world by a storm, particularly the U.S. gospel music scene. This is similar to the spread of jazz music which became indigenized in various parts of the world. In the next section, I adapt Steve Feld’s thoughts on jazz music’s cosmopolitanism, focusing on Accra as a jazz convergence site in Ghana. Conversely, my discussion of gospel cosmopolitanism here focuses on Lagos as a site of convergence for Nigerian gospel music, from where these gospel musicians relate to the rest of the world through internet connectivity and frequent travel. GOSPEL COSMOPOLITANISM: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE NIGERIAN GOSPEL MUSIC WITHIN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT The framework of gospel cosmopolitanism stems from Steven Feld’s (2012) concept of jazz cosmopolitanism, which describes a musical openness

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expressed through the localization of the American jazz genre in Accra Ghana. In his 2012 monograph, Feld used the biographical sketch of an instrument maker, Nii Noi Ottoo and the pioneering drummer of high life music, Guy Warren (later Ghanaba), to argue that the localization of jazz music in Accra highlights globally relevant innovativeness within a West African soundscape. Therefore jazz cosmopolitanism in Accra engenders conversations across continents and in particular the United States and Africa. Without using the term cosmopolitanism, Robin Kelly (2012) expressed a similar thought as he spotlit Abdullah Ibrahim and Guy Warren’s musical careers as exemplars of cosmopolitanism expressed through the use of African materials in expanding and contributing to the modern jazz idiom. In essence, cosmopolitanism in these contexts depicts the influence of a trans-continental musical world, which informs practitioners’ fundamental choices in innovatively localizing the styles, practices, aesthetics and other trends of this musical world. In the case of Nigerian gospel music, the American gospel scene was its initial power centre. Hence, the Nigerian gospel songs that have gained global traction are written in English (a widely spoken language globally) to reach audiences beyond the local music scene. A song like Nathaniel Bassey’s Onise Iyanu, which has a Yoruba title, is predominantly in English with the Yoruba phrase, onise iyanu, being its only non-English expression. We could make the same argument for Nathaniel Bassey’s Olowogbogboro and You are Mighty (Olorun Agbaye); Tim Godfrey’s Narekele Mo, and many other songs laced with, rather than written in, African languages. This practice typifies the Lagos gospel cosmopolitan soundscape, which blends African and Western instrumentation, aesthetics and musical idioms and employs a mix of languages. On some of these songs, non-Nigerians participate in singing Nigerian languages. Michael Stampley and Chandler Moore are heard singing Yoruba phrases in Nathaniel Bassey’s Onise Iyanu and Olorun Agbaye, respectively, while Travis Greene sings Igbo in Tim Godfrey’s Narekele Mo. Thus, gospel cosmopolitanism in Lagos typically employs Biblical messages, phrases in local languages with African musical elements, such as call and response, cyclical form, theme and variation, and Western harmonic structures and other American gospel aesthetics to create a nexus accessible both locally and beyond. If so, the songs listed above all animate and index gospel cosmopolitanism. Next, I examine how Mercy Chinwo’s Excess Love justifies this theoretical perspective. Excess Love is a short song that is usually extended through repetitions and variations (characteristics of African musics – see Turino 2001). Its calland-response chorus is often sung repeatedly in a cyclical form, typical of traditional African songs.

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Excess Love (Chorus) Call: Jesus you love me too much ooo Response: Too much o, too much o, excess love o

Through its localization of the American gospel genre, the song inhabits various spheres. An expression like ‘too much’ is indigenized with the use of the non-lexical syllable, ‘o’, which depicts emphasis in Nigerian pidgin English and some local languages. Hence, this song portrays gospel cosmopolitanism. Again, in the way that Excess Love portrays gospel cosmopolitanism, Narekele Mo, Imela, Onise Iyanu and many more Nigerian gospel songs highlight localizing American gospel styles and aesthetics in Nigeria. Hence, Mercy Chinwo’s cosmopolitan expertise would make her an appropriate fit for collaboration on Excess Love Remix with American gospel musician, JJ Hairston, perhaps because of the song’s accessibility within and beyond the local music scene. Accordingly, these Nigerian gospel songs are sung in combination with similarly short American gospel songs within the context of worship in Nigerian Pentecostal churches. Examples of short American songs that are often sung within the medley form alongside Nigerian gospel songs include Phil Thompson’s My Worship, with a similar four-line verse and a two-line chorus, repeated with variations as each rendition climaxes with additional instrumental and vocal intensity. It is quite telling that gospel cosmopolitanism embeds a soft power derived from its trans-local accessibility. Simply put, gospel cosmopolitanism engenders local and international accessibility, hence its wide acceptance and soft power. However, the embedded soft power of gospel music is not unique to this genre as a rise to global acclaim has often accompanied cosmopolitan sensibilities. Focusing on another part of Africa and a different musical genre, Turino (2000) examined the works of Thomas Mapfumo and identified his use of the Shona mbira as cosmopolitan. Mapfumo’s Chimurenga music rose to world acclaim in the 1990s, and this was engendered by his cosmopolitan use of indigenous African musical instruments and materials. Furthermore, examples of cosmopolitanism abound in the works of Angelique Kidjo, Salif Keita, Siti Binti Saad, Alli Farka Toure, Yousouf N’dour, Mori Kante, Fela Kuti, Miriam Makeba, Hugh Masekela, Tony Allen, Oumou Sangare, Manu Dibango and several African hip-hop musicians. As these musicians became popular locally, their works gained international traction. Similarly, several Nigerian gospel musicians have become globally renowned following their local success. From the discussion thus far, cosmopolitanism sums up the agencies to the emergence of the influence and attraction associated with the Nigerian gospel music scene. To this end, Nigerian gospel music currently possesses the potential to advance Nigeria’s cultural diplomacy in a multi-directional

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manner, which is globally accessible. At its inception, Nigerian gospel was shaped majorly by the American Pentecostal and gospel scenes. A few decades down the line, Nigerian gospel music has begun to shape American gospel inclinations, as I will later discuss using examples of Tye Tribbet, Michelle Williams and The Spirituals. Suffice it to say that examples abound of cosmopolitan Nigerian gospel songs, which have become globally renowned, thus bequeathing Nigerian gospel musicians with much trans-local influence and attraction. Yet, there remain numerous cultural resources that could be harnessed to advance Nigeria’s foreign policy goals. In keeping with Ogunnubi and Isike (2017), I suggest that the Nigerian government invests in developing culture and the education aimed at its perpetuity at all levels. Some of the traditional music idioms that Nigeria could promote and which could be used to further indigenize Nigerian gospel music are accessible in Sola Allison and Baba Ara’s music, among others. If presented with popular trans-local gospel aesthetics and songs sections are written in English thus making the music more accessible internationally, these traditional musical elements and styles could become significant identity markers, hence an additional unique selling point for Nigerian gospel music. As Clarke (2016, passim) suggests, this trend calls policymakers to more intentional advocacy and appropriation of cultural resources to nurture a positive appreciation of the country and boost its economy. To conclude this section, going by van Ham’s (2008, 128) argument that ‘a country’s brand is determined by its culture, political ideas, and policies’, Nigeria stands to benefit immensely from canonizing and constructing the country’s unique cultural offerings as diplomatic tools in a similar manner as the European Union, for instance, leverages on sports and music (van Ham 2008). The idea of country branding underscores Nye’s overarching thesis that the soft power resources of a state derive from its cultural attraction, among other sources (Nye 1990). Thus, the allure of today’s Nigerian gospel music bespeaks its influence on the country’s perception within and beyond Africa. As Aluko and Ogunnubi (2018, 200) posited, Nigeria’s population is a strength which could translate as a soft power resource. The next section highlights the massive followership, which Nigerian gospel musicians enjoy, as central in the global attraction of Nigerian gospel music, beginning with an operationalization of the concept of soft power. NIGERIAN GOSPEL MUSIC SOFT POWER The concept of soft power, popularized by Joseph Nye (1990), sums up the ability to influence another’s decision without monetary exchange or the use of force. The subtle and non-violent means through which nations

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exercise their soft power include, but are not limited to cultural attraction, the attraction of iconic personalities, and attractive national values and policies (Ogunnubi and Isike 2018, 58). In essence, out of the three ways of wielding power – stick, carrot, and persuasion (Aluko and Ogunnubi 2018, 191) – the third (persuasion) epitomizes soft power use. Accordingly, soft power enables governments to shape foreigners’, corporate bodies’, and other governments’ preferences through various means such as cultural exports and exchange programmes (Nye 2004, 2008; Clarke 2016, passim). The concept of soft power has been applied to the analysis of states and their foreign policies and diplomatic strategies in various scholarly works. The soft power discourse on Nigeria has also featured multiple dimensions. Tella (2018a) examined the concept within the ambit of insurgencies in Nigeria, arguing that Nigeria could have averted Islamic extremism, had the government exploited its soft power resources. Endong (2017) examined the soft power potential of the Nigerian film industry, Nollywood, which arguably creates more attraction for Nigeria than the traditional cultural diplomacy institutions of high commissions, consulates and embassies within and beyond Africa. Ogunnubi and Isike (2018, 54) also remarked that Nollywood champions the showcasing of the complex ‘varieties of the Nigerian cultural heritage and its people’, thereby promoting the Nigerian brand in Africa and further afield. Suffice it to say that motion pictures are pivotal in shaping perceptions. The use of documentaries and short films during the cold war, to advocate capitalism and consumerism to West Africans, animates this reasoning (see Tsika 2014). Ogunnubi and Isike (2018) identified Nigerian music as a soft power tool, with King Sunny Ade, Asa, Tuface, P-Square, Olamide, D’banj, Davido and other musicians being central in their discussion. They noted that Nigerian musicians have dominated the MTV Africa Music Awards since its inception in 2008, particularly the best artist category, which Nigerians have received in all editions. Nigerian musicians have been awarded for innovations such as pushing the creativity boundaries and ‘shaping the soundscape of contemporary Africa’, with which D’banj was credited (Ogunnubi and Isike 2018, 54). Hence, notable musicians from the Euro-American pop music scenes have since begun to seek collaborations with Nigerian musicians, with the recent being the collaboration between Beyoncé, Saint Jhn, Blue Ivy and WizKid on Brown Skin Girl. This trend, coupled with Burna Boy and WizKid winning awards at the 2021 Grammys, reinforces Ogunnubi and Isike’s (2018, 54) argument that Nigerian musicians are ‘unofficial ambassadors’ through whom the country may discover and pursue its ‘celebrity diplomacy’. In a similar vein, the Nigerian gospel music scene continues to produce unofficial ambassadors who have created a global appeal for Nigerian gospel music thereby attracting the collaborations of other iconic gospel

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musicians, particularly from the American gospel music scene. Strikingly, the Pentecostal movement, which enabled a broader reach of gospel music in Nigeria, also saw the spread of Nigerian churches beyond the country. The Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), for instance, with a vision ‘[t] o have a member of RCCG in every family of all nations’ (RCCG, n.d.), began to plant its parishes in various countries where its members relocate for work, business or study. By 2008, the RCCG had its physical presence in 110 countries, and this number has continued to increase (Jemirade 2017, 278). The globalization of Nigerian churches would not be unique to the RCCG as other denominations such as the Christ Embassy, Mountain of Fire and Miracles, Living Faith Church (Winners Chapel), and Deeper Life Bible Church, among others, have since planted parishes in various countries around the world. Perhaps an unintended consequence of the globalization of Nigerian churches is the international spread of Nigerian gospel music, which form the core of the music used in their parishes outside Nigeria. However, these churches may not overtly identify as Nigerian churches in a bid to be more culturally and racially cross-cutting, thereby attracting non-Nigerians and, in particular, the citizens of their host countries. In line with Jemirade’s (2017, 279) observation in Canada, these parishes of Nigerian churches outside Nigeria are mostly peopled by first-generation African migrants who often remain connected to their roots through religious activities, among other things. Given this, Nigerian gospel music is pivotal in the satellite parishes’ liturgy modelled after their source congregations in Nigeria. Notable among the gospel songs that have spread globally partly through the agency of the globalization of Nigerian churches are Sinach’s Way Maker, Mercy Chinwo’s Excess Love and Nathaniel Bassey’s Imela. While the globalization of Nigerian churches aided the trans-local spread of Nigerian gospel music, iconic musicians on this scene have also increased their global followership through both traditional and social media platforms. For example, the Multichoice DSTV Channel 331, One Gospel, is one conventional platform which has significantly facilitated a trans-local attraction for Nigerian gospel music within Africa, with its regular airing of Nigerian gospel songs. This coupled with social media agency, through which Nigerian celebrities benefit from the country’s population strength, has sustained and exponentially increased Nigerian gospel musicians’ mass followership. With the modus operandi of social media platforms, such as YouTube, Instagram, Twitter and Facebook, which suggest trending videos and posts to users, and Nigeria’s population distributed worldwide, a popular song in Nigeria stands a high chance of making its rounds globally. Hence, social media platforms have contributed to Nigerian gospel songs’ global traction, thus making musical collaborations with Nigerian gospel musicians fashionable, particularly among Euro-American gospel music icons. Prominent among

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recent American/Nigerian collaborations are Nathaniel Bassey and Michael Stampley on Onise Iyanu; William McDowell, Travis Greene and Nathaniel Bassey on Nothing Like Your Presence; Tim Godfrey and Travis Greene on Narekele Mo; and Mercy Chinwo and JJ Hairston on Excess Love Remix. Perhaps the most pivotal of the agencies to the global spread of Nigerian gospel music is the House on the Rock’s The Experience, an annual gospel festival, said to be the world’s largest gospel concert with over 700,000 attendees each year (Global News 20 February 2017). The concert which holds at the Tafawa Balewa Square Lagos every December, since 2006, has become a site of convergence for several acclaimed American gospel musicians and Nigeria’s most prominent gospel musicians. At this concert, these American gospel music icons experience Nigerian gospel music and participate in the scene’s fads and mannerisms. Don Moen, Donnie McClurkin, Tye Tribbet, Kirk Franklin, Smokie Norful, Travis Greene, Cece Winans, Nathaniel Bassey, Sinach, Frank Edwards, Tope Alabi, Chioma Jesus, Lara George, among several other iconic gospel musicians, are regular features at The Experience. To this end, Nigerian gospel music appears synonymous with ‘African praise’ on the American gospel music scene. For instance, Michelle Williams’ (ft. Kelly Rowland and Beyonce) performance at the 2015 Stellar Awards with an African theme, Say Yes, begins with the chorus of the famous Zimbabwean song Alpha and Omega but predominantly features and reimagines the popular Nigerian chorus When Jesus Says Yes (YouTube 2015). During the 2020 virtual edition of The Experience, Williams would later reveal that the aforementioned Nigerian song inspired this performance. In the same vein, Tye Tribbet’s ‘African praise’ features predominantly Nigerian songs; My God is Good O (Na Double Double), Jehovah (You are the Most High), Jehovah eee Jehovah aaa and Who has the final say? (Jehovah has the final say); interspersed with the famous call-and-response shout of praise in French – Louer Louer Louer – popular in Pentecostal circles across sub-Saharan Africa (YouTube 2019). The Spirituals, a U.K.-based choir, continued this trend at the beginning of 2021 with the release of their arrangement of Wade in the Water, laced with phrases like ‘we no go shy, no go shame’ and ‘e be our papa, God wey ‘e make the heavens’, among other pidgin English lines (YouTube 2021). Besides, a few Africans based outside Africa have also leveraged Nigerian gospel music’s popularity in carving musical niches for themselves. Sonnie Badu, a Ghanaian based in the United Kingdom, is one such example. And this goes to show the attraction for Nigerian gospel music engendered by the combined effects of Nigerian diaspora communities and the globalization of Nigerian churches, traditional and social media, The Experience, the collaborations between notable Nigerian gospel musicians and their American

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counterparts, and the adaptation of Nigerian gospel songs as emblematic of African praise. Moreover, Sinach’s Way Maker has been re-recorded severally, and Leeland and Michael W. Smith’s versions are probably the most widespread. To this end, it became the American church’s quarantine anthem during the 2020 global pandemic (see Fowler 2020). The wide acceptance of Nigerian songs is partly responsible for the mass social media following Nigerian gospel musicians enjoy. In turn, notable gospel musicians continue to shape their followers’ taste and preferences, a trend that perpetuates the global traction of Nigerian gospel music. As of December 2020, Nathaniel Bassey, for instance, had over 1 million followers on Twitter, over 2 million Instagram followers, and over 120,000 YouTube subscribers. The effect of Nigerian gospel musicians and other celebrities’ influence may be accessed through their role in mass actions such as the October 2020 #EndSARS protests in Nigeria. At this time, Nathaniel Bassey would call for prayer with a 24-hour notice, and hundreds of thousands of participants would join through his social media platforms, which alludes to the wielding of soft power. This is remarkable when juxtaposed with the Federal Government of Nigerian and the Lagos State Government’s social media activities, for instance. While the federal government of Nigeria had about 233,000 followers on Instagram, the Lagos state government had 186,000 followers as of December 2020. This observation suggests that iconic individuals and non-state actors seem to influence the masses more significantly than today’s governmental agencies. These iconic individuals, including notable Nigerian gospel musicians, possess the soft power to influence their followers’ lifestyle choices, fashion, entertainment preferences and life decisions and may well be viewed as unofficial ambassadors of the Naija brand. As van Ham (2008, 129) argued, ‘the art of politics pursued through oldstyle diplomacy has been shifting to encompass new art of brand building [. . .]’, which depends predominantly on the use of soft power. Expressly, van Ham purports that today’s governments are more effective inspiring, rather than controlling, their citizens, and branding has become a crucial state administration component (van Ham 2008).7 Similarly, Steiner (2011, 2), citing Mayntz 2002, remarked that ‘we have left the “statist” period where countries were the strongest arbiters of power and entered an era of globalisation characterised by “governance without government’. Given the current trend in which notable gospel musicians in Nigeria provide remote leadership, I, therefore, submit in line with Akinola & Ogunnubi (2020, 73) that Nigeria is currently witnessing an era of heightened use of soft power by iconic individuals through ‘less coercive, intangible, subtle and attractive’ exploitation of social media platforms. Given this, Nigeria is likely to be more effective in its administration by harnessing the soft power resident in iconic individuals to enhance its brand and promote its foreign policy goals.

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If culture is a significant source of soft power, as Nye 1990 opined, Nigeria has an abundance of it. Accordingly, the soft power potential of Nigeria runs the gamut from the arts and entertainment, population strength, a mass of professionals, iconic individuals, notable heritage sites, a unique array of indigenous fashion and cuisine, outstanding sports persona, the Nigerian pidgin English, a non-expansionist foreign policy, to religious plurality (see Duniya 2015; Tella 2018b; Aluko & Ogunnubi 2018; Akinola & Ogunnubi 2020). In the current global dispensation in which soft power politics is the preferred alternative to hard power politics, Nigeria could harness all these and more soft power resources to promote a positive perception of the country. However, as many scholars, including Aluko & Ogunnubi (2018), have concluded, Nigeria has not fared well in its soft power use. Since the country is yet to deliberately and consciously harness its soft power resources while formulating foreign policies and strategies that actively appropriate these resources in promoting its national interest, Nigeria’s image continues to be shaped by the perception of others and what the media portrays about it, which include the stereotype of corruption, and its citizens in other countries are widely known as peddlers in illicit drugs and email scam swindlers (Aluko & Ogunnubi 2018, 198).8 CONCLUSION This chapter revealed the centrality of the 1990s Pentecostal movement to the widespread American influence on the Nigerian gospel music scene. The chapter demonstrated that the Pentecostal movement made music playing and learning more widely accessible compared to the British educational style that promulgated Western art music. More recently, the mass following and participation in Nigerian gospel music both locally and internationally have been sustained through gospel cosmopolitanism, The Experience and the social media, which has since bestowed enormous soft power upon Nigerian gospel musicians. As the chapter argued, the Nigerian government has yet to fully come to terms with the current global political trend in which soft power is desired. Governments have begun to focus more on place branding and iconic individuals in promoting their foreign policies and national agenda.9 Given this, the chapter concludes that while Nigeria is yet to exploit its soft power potential in its diplomatic relations commensurately, the Nigerian gospel music scene is a possible tool with which the government could attract foreigners, corporate bodies and other governments. As the Nigerian gospel scene maintains its vibrancy as a cosmopolitan sphere with loops of exchange with other gospel music scenes within and beyond Africa, the Nigerian government merely needs to leverage on this existing platform,

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rather than reinvent the wheel, similar to the United States’ appropriation of existing cultural resources while instrumentalizing them. The ways in which the Nigerian government could instrumentalize its cultural resources include sponsorship, which enables the advocacy of economic and political goals and create an attraction for the country through the instrumentalization of existing channels. 10 As the chapter revealed, adopting a soft power strategy seems more compelling than optional considering the fast-paced global digital revival with its eclecticism, which means that there are copious borrowings and influences regardless of international boundaries, which have become less important with internet connectivity. Otherwise, the lopsided negative narrative of corruption, internet fraud, drug peddling about Nigeria and Nigerians may remain and continue to affect the image of Nigerians everywhere. NOTES 1. I acknowledge the support of the University Research Committee (URC) postdoctoral fellowship of the University of Cape Town, towards the preparation of this manuscript, and Titilayo Kunnuji, whose regular and insightful analysis of the Nigerian gospel music scene helped to deepen the discourse in this chapter further. 2. Nigerian gospel music in this chapter refers to the various musics stemming from the Nigerian Pentecostal sphere, which emerged subsequent to the American Pentecostalism traceable to the early twentieth-century Azusa street revival (see Creech 1996). 3. Jazz cosmopolitanism in Feld’s work captures the localisation of an internationally acclaimed musical genre – jazz. 4. Western art music here refers to European musical tradition, preserved in Western music notation and standardised forms including sonata, concerto and symphony. Western art music is epitomised in the works of Johann Sebastian Bach, George Frideric Handel, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Ludwig van Beethoven, Frederic Chopin, among many others. This tradition has become central to formal music education, not just in Europe but also in many previously-colonised countries in the global south. 5. America being the source of Nigerian Pentecostalism supplied the tools to maintain it, and this would include the architecture of the auditorium, the sound system, accoutrement of pastors, choirs and church members, as well as the music. 6. Many of these musicians were initially employed as instrumentalists and as sidemen in Nigerian Pentecostal churches before being established as notable gospel musicians. 7. Akinola and Ogunnubi (2020) argued that it is no longer enough for states to rely on their traditional sources of power – military, economy, population and natural resources. Instead states become more effective by increasing their capacity for attraction, and building and managing their brand.

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8. Why is the negative narrative about Nigeria dominant despite the number of Nigerian doctors in the United States, for example, the number of Nigerian lecturers in universities all over the world and the numerous Nigerian professionals in several other countries? Some literature have addressed this in part, highlighting the passivity of the Nigerian government as a reason for the image of the country. This chapter aligned with the literature in identifying gospel music is a cultural diplomacy tool. The positionality of a country and its global image are evinced in the popularity of its language and the number of its citizens who are gloabally renown. In the era of digital flows, soft power entails promoting a favourable image of a country to counter negative ones (George 2016). The dispensation of Nigerian culture through the liturgy of Nigerian churches draws people to Nigeria, and offers an opportunity for Nigeria to tell its story differently through the unofficial ambassadors of the gospel music scene, among other celebrities. 9. Perhaps the #BlackLivesMatter protests inspired the #EndSARS protests in Nigeria. If so, social media and citizen journalism are pivotal to this influence, and these have proven the waning of hard power in twenty-first-century politics. The Nigerian government’s use of brute force on 20 October 2020 escalated the #EndSARS protests and led to the destruction of several government-owned properties in Lagos – a signal to the weakness of hard power, and a justification of van Ham’s (2008) remark that ‘you cannot kill ideas with bullets’. On the other hand, Nigerian celebrities seem capable of undermining the government’s control over its citizens, considering the extent of their influence on their followers. 10. Countries such as the United States have often leveraged on existing artistic practices. For instance, Joel Meyerowitz’s photographic expertise came in handy post-9/11, when the U.S. government supported him to exhibit pictures of Ground Zero and toured the world to advocate American response to the attack (Clarke 2016).

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YouTube. 2015. “Say Yes – Michelle Williams ft. Kelly Rowland, Beyonce (2015 Stellar Awards).” https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=DBEl7nzOB​_M. YouTube. 2019. “@Tye Tribbett | African Medley LIVE Performance | TBN.” https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=bcJan​_XXM1Y. YouTube. 2021. “Wade in the Water: Live | The Spirituals (Official Music Video).” https:// www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=fxZ4H​-gq​_lc​&list​=RDGMEMMib4QpREwENw3​ _jAc0YgNwVMfxZ4H- gq_lc&start_radio=1.

Chapter 16

Religious Soft Power Influence on Nigeria’s Major Pentecostal Leaders Sources and Implications for Nigeria and Its Regional Power Status Dare Leke Idowu

Since the triumph of Pentecostalism over Islam in Nigeria’s post-1999 era (Obadare, 2018), Nigerian Pentecostal leaders have ascended to a more glorified pedestal of national and global influence. Pastor Enoch Adeboye, Bishop David Oyedepo, Pastor Chris Oyakilome, Pastor T. B. Joshua and others emerged as globally renowned Pentecostal leaders and celebrity clerics who wield enormous soft power influence. Through this attractive, co-optive and non-coercive power, major Pentecostal leaders in Nigeria have imperceptibly shaped national politics at home and abroad. Although studies like Ogunnubi and Isike (2017) have situated the soft power prospects of the globalization of Nigeria’s mega-churches, there is paucity of studies on the sources of the enormous soft power influence of Nigerian Pentecostal leaders and the implications of their religious soft influence for Nigeria and its regional power status. Therefore, taking cues from the political and socio-economic realities of Nigeria, this study analyses the sources of soft power influence of Nigeria’s major Pentecostal leaders. It also accounts for why non-state actors like the Nigerian Pentecostal leaders imperceptibly wield overbearing national and global influence. The study drew inferences majorly from the religious soft power influence of Pastor E. A. Adeboye, Bishop David Oyedepo and Pastor T. B. Joshua to underscore the implications of the religious soft power influence of Nigeria’s Pentecostal leadership for Nigeria and its regional power status. The study advances five theses. The first thesis contends that the reason for the enormous soft power influence and political relevance of Nigeria’s major Pentecostal leaders is rooted in state failure, governmental ineptitudes 275

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and integrity-deficit characteristic of Nigeria’s political leadership. The second thesis contends that the remarkable contributions of Nigerian Pentecostal leaders to development amidst state failure makes them more acceptable to the people compared with political leaders (Afrobarometer, 2020; Obadare, 2018; Adeboye, 2020). The third thesis argues that the soft power influence and the ascendency of Nigerian Pentecostal leaders as powerful non-state actors with strong influence in the Nigeria public space are consequent on the inclusiveness and overbearing demographical effects of their church membership. The fourth thesis posits that the soft power influence of major political leaders in Nigeria is engrained in the subtle contributions of Nigerian Pentecostal leaders in boasting Nigeria’s relatively untapped religious tourism sector through the influx of transnational religious tourists. The fifth thesis argues that the regional and global soft power influence of major Pentecostal leaders in Nigeria is engrained in the globalization of Nigerian-initiated churches, their spiritual healing power and proven power of electoral prophetism. RELIGION AS SOFT POWER Popularized by Prof Joseph Nye in 1990, soft power is the ability of a state to obtain preferred outcomes, influence decision and shape the preference of others through the use of attractive and non-coercive means as against the use of threat, sanction or payment (Nye, 1990, 2008). Building on this conceptualization of soft power by Nye (1990, 2008), this study defines religious soft power as a state’s use of religion, religious actors and religious exports as attractive resources of shaping the preference of other states and making them ‘want what it wants’ (Nye, 1990: 166). Studies on religious soft power have centred on how and why religious soft power states such as Brazil, Israel, the United States, Saudi Arabia, India, Iran and other Islamic states have interlaced their foreign policy with religion and deployed religious ideologies, resources, and outreaches as soft power tools of advancing their geostrategic interests abroad (Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, 2021a). During the Cold War era, the United States strategically deployed ‘religious outreach to solidify anti-communist alliances around the world’ (Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 2021b). Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Morocco and other states in the Middle East weaved Islam as a tool of statecraft and deployed the propagation of Islamic outreaches as soft power tool of advancing their geostrategic objectives abroad (Mandaville and Hamid, 2018). Specifically, Morocco employs the exportation of its ‘moderate’ version of Islam as soft power tool for advancing its

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regional expansionist agenda in Africa (Hmimnat, 2018). Taking cues from India, Iran, the United States and the Catholic Church, Haynes (2012) also detailed the soft power influence of religious transnational actors in global system. Regrettably, apart from Morocco’s export of moderate Islam as a tool of religious soft power, there is paucity of studies on the religious soft power of states in other sub-regions of Africa. Thus, this study fills this gap by examining the sources and exertion of the soft power influence of major Pentecostal leaders in Nigeria and interrogates the implications they hold for Nigeria and its regional power status in Africa. The soft power resources of major Pentecostal leaders in Nigeria identified in this study are the soothing effects of their powerful sermons, pulpit power of prophetic declarations, supernatural ability to decode, interpret and expound the real-life application of revelation knowledge, and effect tangible supernatural changes in the physical realms. All of these gain credence within the political and socio-economic milieu of the Nigerian state characterized by state failure, bad governance, endemic political corruption, healthcare deficits, insecurities and anguish of the Nigerian daily life. The quest for solace, comfort, and spiritual solution to inundating challenges from state failure invariably conditions a teeming population of distressed and disoriented Nigerians to continually influx Pentecostal churches in search of solace, miracles, signs and wonders. It is for this reason that Adeboye (2020) asserts that an increasing number of Nigerians are seeking comfort and solace in Pentecostal churches. To this end, leaders of Nigerian Pentecostal churches emerged as beacon of hope, consolation, comfort and refuge through their therapeutic sermons, worship sessions, prophetic declarations and appropriation of supernatural power in effecting tangible changes. Buttressing this, Godman Akinlabi, the Pastor of the Elevation Church, Lagos, Nigeria, Akinlabi avers that ‘the real undertone of the economy of the church is how do we distribute hope wholesale and retail? There is a quote from Martin Luther Jr. He said any religion that claims to be interested in the soul of man but is not concerned about the slum is a moribund religion’ (Mbele, 2018). Also important is their monthly and annual prophetic declarations and their ability to appropriate supernatural power in effecting socio-economic and medical changes in the physical realm. Beyond these, amidst state failure, major Pentecostal leaders provide Nigerians with alternative means of receiving basic necessities of life through a life of devotion to prayer and fasting. The potency of this alternative makes for the increasing acceptance and influence of major Pentecostal leaders in Nigeria. Thus, the ability of Nigerian Pentecostal leaders to appropriate supernatural power to effect tangible socio-economic changes, healing and protection from all forms of attacks make them very influential and acceptable amidst state failure and the dwindling influence of Nigerian political leaders.

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Apart from appropriating supernatural power to effect verifiable socioeconomic and medical changes, leaders of major Pentecostal churches in Nigeria are becoming more acceptable for actively addressing the ills of state failure (Ukah, 2005; Adogame, 2016). State failure, governmental ineptitude, integrity deficit and bad governance create vacuum in the socio-economic, health care and educational sectors that astute Pentecostal leadership are addressing with resources derived from non-state sources. Major Pentecostal leaders in Nigeria provide succour for economically disadvantaged members at home and abroad (His love Foundation, 2021a) by empowering unemployed youths, widows and widowers with social capital and ample skills for producing marketable goods (Akanbi and Beyers, 2017). In addition to the rehabilitation of 1,003 prostitutes and girls abandoned and of feeding 60,010,589 Nigerians, the RCCG established twenty-two daily feeding centres that have a record of 571,996 served meals. Overall, the RCCG has served a total of 216,447,763 as of September 2021 (His Love Foundation, 2021b). Furthermore, the Vocational Institutes (RVI) established by the RCCG has provided vocational skills for 731,827 unemployed Nigerians nationwide (His Love Foundation, 2020e). The RVI institute has graduated twenty-four students with sixteen having distinction from the National Business and Technical Examination Board (NABTEB). More importantly, under the medium of its New to Me Charity Shops, 191, 900 Nigerians have benefited from four charity shops outlets (His Love Foundation, 2020e). These all validate the assertion that that ‘perhaps no religious organization has surpassed Pentecostal churches in conducting empowerment programs for the benefit of their congregations’ (Onongha 2018: 376). However, while Onongha restricted the identity of benefactors to the congregations of Pentecostal churches in Nigeria, on the contrary, this study identified that the benefactors transcend the congregations of RCCG to include non-members, ordinary citizens, street prostitutes, inmates, drug addicts, the poor and destitute, orphans, widows, widowers, abandoned children, villagers, and non-Christians alike (His Love Foundation, 2020a). Beyond these, Pastor E. A. Adeboye and other leaders of major Pentecostal churches in Nigeria have contributed immensely to sustainable development through corporate social responsibilities and humanitarian gestures. One major contribution of leaders of Pentecostal churches to sustainable development in Nigeria is their tangible investment in augmenting infrastructural decays and deficiencies of sophisticated machines requisite for quality service delivery in the government-owned hospital. Leaders of Nigerian Pentecostal churches have used non-state resources to establish rehabilitation centres, build hospitals and mobile clinics, acquire and donate medical utilities and sophisticated medical equipment to boast quality service delivery in major tertiary healthcare hospitals such as the UCH, LASUTH, and others (Akanbi

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and Beyers, 2017). In 2020, the RCCG spent N50 Million to rehabilitate and upgrade the three-storey 100-bed primary healthcare centre located in Ajah, Eti-Osa Local Council Development Area (LCDA) of the state (Lagos State Public Procurement Agency, 2020). In addition, the RCCG built and commissioned the Enoch and Folu Adeboye Intensive Care Unit (ICU) at the Lagos State University Teaching Hospital (LASUTH) in 2017. Not long after it was commissioned, the RCCG Apapa family renovated the Enoch and Folu Adeboye ICU of the LASUTH, Ikeja, with resources acquired from non-state sources. Apart from renovating the Enoch and Folu Adeboye ICU of LASUTH, the Apapa family of the RCCG Church acquired and gave four state-of-the-art ICU CR 5,000 electric beds, Alpha-Active 4 Mattress, infusion pumps, syringe pumps, bedside lockers, and patient monitors to LASUTH (The Nation Newspaper, 2016). A total of 236 Nigerians benefited from the Enoch and Folu Adeboye ICU, LASUTH, Ikeja, as of September 2021 (His Love Foundation, 2021c). On 10 May 2019, the RCCG General Overseer, Pastor E. A. Adeboye commissioned the ultra-modern 3-bed Intensive Care Unit (ICU) equipment the church acquired and donated to the Enoch and Folu Adeboye, Intensive Care Unit, Plateau State Specialist Hospital, Jos (JNC International Limited, 2019; His Love Foundation, 2021c). Data available on the website of the JNC International Limited which supplied and installed the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) equipment indicated that the ICU was equipped with ‘Servo Air Ventilators, Enterprise CR 5000 4-section electric profiling ICU beds, Hospital mattresses, Portable patient monitors, Volumetric Infusion & Syringe Pumps Suctioning Machines, Bedside Lockers, Patient Conveyance Trolleys and Arterial Gas Analysers’ (JNC International Limited, 2019). A total of 102 Nigerians benefited from the Enoch and Folu Adeboye Intensive Care Unit, Enoch and Folu Adeboye, Intensive Care Unit, Plateau State Specialist Hospital, Jos as of September 2021 (His Love Foundation, 2021c). Premised on his quest to alleviate the anguish of Nigerians suffering from kidney diseases, in 2019, Pastor E. A. Adeboye donated a dialysis machine worth N10 million to the University College Hospital (UCH) Ibadan and pledged two additional dialysis machine which he delivered on 9 January 2020 (Agboluaje, 2019; University College Hospital Ibadan, 2020). The RCCG conducted cancer screening test for over 101,837 persons through its Healing Stripes Cancer screening Centre and Diagnostic Centre Surulere Lagos and its mobile screening centre (His Love Foundation, 2021c). Furthermore, in collaboration with medical institutions abroad, the RCCG conducted nine successful kidney transplants. The RCCG also established four dialysis centres in Ogun, Lagos and Ondo State. 28,989 dialysis sessions were conducted at a subsidized rate and a significant number conducted for free (His Love Foundation, 2021c). The mega-church also constructed

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renovated many maternity centres and day-care. Specifically, in Lekki, the RCCG constructed the Redeemer’s Maternity centre to provide free medical services to indigent pregnant women of Ito-Omu community. Overall, the RCCG has contributed significantly in providing free and quality health care for over 6,816,569 Nigerian nationwide. On the education font, leaders of major Pentecostal churches in Nigeria have used money derived from non-state sources to renovate and equip dilapidated classrooms and built more modern structures in state-owned primary and secondary schools (Adebumiti, 2019). In one of their contributions to Lagos State, the RCCG constructed and donated a building comprising of twelve classrooms to Ojodu Primary School in Ikeja Local Government Area of Lagos State (The Nation Newspaper, 2016). In another contribution, the RCCG donated 150 units of tables and chairs, replaced 20 faulty classroom doors, PVC ceilings, installed whiteboard, repaired faulty electrical and civil structural deficits in classrooms, and painted the buildings of Akitan Senior Grammar School, Surulere, Lagos. In 2020, the RCCG financed the construction of twelve classroom blocks with N130 million for a government-owned junior secondary school located in Ajah, Eti-Osa, LCDA of the state (Lagos State Public Procurement Agency, 2020). The RCCG also built eight schools that provide free education (free tuition, school uniforms, meals, and books) for the people of UmuObi Awkuzu in Anambra State, Makoko, Oko Abe, Ito-Omu, Okuta-Elerinla, Maryland, Eti-Osa East LCDA and Ajah Community of Lagos State. Beyond these, the RCCG has given 1,422,958 students scholarships and grants. Beyond their laudable contributions to primary and secondary schools across Nigeria, the RCCG donated N200 million for addressing infrastructural development needs of the University of Ibadan, University of Nsukka, and University of Lagos (His love Foundation, 2021d). Beyond the laudable contributions of the RCCG to the development of the health care and educational sector, rehabilitation and empowerment of poor Nigerians, Pastor E. A. Adeboye awarded and paid N188,440,342 for the construction of Ife-Ifewara road constructed between 2016 and 2019 in Osun State (Aborisade, 2021). Consequent upon these laudable contributions, Pastor Adeboye and other major Pentecostal leaders have acquired enormous soft power influence within the Nigerian public space. Corroborating this assertion, a study conducted by Afrobarometer affirm that religious leaders in Nigeria and Africa have over the years gained more public trust than political leaders who are seldom trusted and patronized by the electorates (Afrobarometer, 2020). Deducing from the aforementioned, the ability of Nigerian Pentecostal leaders to provide spiritual and tangible solutions to the socio-economic problems and deficits in the education, health care, road construction (Aborishade, 2021) and other sectors

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that political leaders failed to address is a major boast to their soft power influence. DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF MAJOR PENTECOSTAL CHURCH IN NIGERIA The demographics of major Pentecostal churches in Nigeria can be described in terms of size and compositions. The RCCG, Living Faith Church, Believers Love World, The Synagogue Church of Nations, Deeper life Bible Church and others have a relatively larger membership strength than orthodox churches in Nigeria. The membership of each of the RCCG and the Living Faith Church, Deeper Life Bible Church run into millions. The RCCG has an estimated 9,938,617 members, 51,580 parishes spread across 197 countries (The Official website of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, 2021), the Living Faith Church had over 6 million members spread across 147 countries (Babalola, 2014). In terms of the compositions of their members, Pentecostal churches in Nigeria accommodate all people regardless of their tribes, ethnic group, former religion and social status. In addition, the size, ethno-tribal feature and social standing of members also confer some level of influence on the General Overseer of the RCCG and Living Faith Church as pastors of the most powerful and populated churches. This is because by virtue of their church demographics, desperate political aspirants have attended major programmes at headquarters of RCCG and the Living Faith Church to receive the endorsement and spiritual blessing of the general overseer and covertly canvass for vote. Worthy of mention is Obasanjo’s attendance at the Holy Ghost Night of the RCCG prior to the 2003 general elections, Goodluck Jonathan’s attendance of the 15th Holy Ghost Congress of the RCCG in 2012, The Living Faith Chapel and the Lord’s Chosen Charismatic Revival Movement in 2015, respectively. Inadvertently, the presence of these power-seeking politicians at major Pentecostal churches in Nigeria adds to the reputation, endorsement, and soft power influence of Pentecostal leaders (Gaiya, 2015). GLOBALIZATION OF NIGERIA’S MEGA-CHURCHES AND ITS RELIGIOUS TOURISM POTENTIALS Hinged on the quest to evangelize the globe, major Pentecostal churches in Nigeria are fast appropriating the proceeds of digital information and communication technology, social media applications and the internet in delivering comfort, hope and faith to the global audiences. This has allowed major

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Pentecostal churches in Nigeria to reach a wide variety of global audiences and acquire larger transnational followers and members. Inadvertently, evangelism through digital technology and inter-continental physical presence is registering the iconic Pentecostalism brand and non-state presence of Nigeria in the global space. The presence of Nigerian churches abroad is another major way by which Nigeria’s Pentecostalism brand is registering the non-state presence of Nigeria in the east, west and south Africa where churches initiated, operated, or owned by Nigerians are the largest (Onongha, 2019: 371). Remarkably, this transcends Africa to include Europe ‘where the largest churches in the United Kingdom and in Eastern Europe are Nigerian-operated’ (Onongha, 2019: 371). Furthermore, four of the ten largest mega-churches in Britain are led by Nigerians and the ‘the largest single congregation in Western Europe is the London-based Kingsway International Christian Centre (KICC), founded by the Nigerian Pentecostal, Matthew Ashimolowo’ (University of Birmingham, 2020). Obviously, the transnational reach of Nigerian-initiated Pentecostal churches, the establishment and leadership of major European churches by Nigerians embodies the soft power influence of the Nigerian Pentecostalism brand. Apart from spurring global and transnational membership, the globalization of Nigeria’s faith-based mega-churches and their special programmes; the ‘Holy Ghost Congress’ of the RCCG and ‘Shilow’ of the Living Faith Chapel are a major boost to Nigeria’s ailing tourism industry. This is because of the attraction of a large number transnational religious tourist to Nigeria from Africa, Europe and North America. In an interview conducted by BBC’s Mbele Lerato, Tolu Abiola Lawal a travel agent underscores the untapped religious tourism potentials engrained in the global influence of Nigerianinitiated Pentecostal churches and their Christo-charismatic leadership. According to her: we have people coming into Nigeria to see T. B Joshua, and then we also have people coming into RCCG for our programmes. They have monthly Holy Ghost Service and there is another one called Special Holy Ghost Service, it’s in March. We have a huge influx of people for that . . . (Mbele, 2018)

Pastor T. B. Joshua of the synagogue church accounts for the highest number of religious tourists who visit Nigeria. At least six of ten religious tourists visit Nigeria because of Pastor T. B. Joshua. Religious tourist visits to Nigeria are not without economic implications (Adeola, 2015). Although there is a dearth of data on the actual contributions of religious tourism to Nigeria’s economy, as of 2011, religious tourist visits to Pastor T. B. Joshua amounted

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to $1,000 covering return flight, food, and accommodation (Mzaca, 2011). Apart from attracting the highest number of religious tourists to Nigeria, Pastor T. B. Joshua’s the synagogue church is renowned for hosting the presidents and political leaders of different countries at his Lagos Church. Interestingly, house owners in the neighbourhood of his SCOAN Church, Ikotun, Lagos, have converted their houses into hotels to exploit the creative economy of recurrent religious tourist visitations to the neighbourhood (BenNwankwo, 2013). Described as a ‘source of spiritual blessing to a number of countries’, notable political leaders and presidential aspirants, presidents and kings of African countries seeking prophetic blessing for electoral victory, God’s presence, spiritual protection and those seeking the prosperity of their kingdom have attended Sunday service at Pastor T. B. Joshua’s Synagogue Church of all Nations (Udodiong, 2017; Kangwa, 2016; Bebli, 2009). Notable African leaders who have visited Pastor T. B. Joshua’s church are President George Weah of Liberia, John Magufuli of Tanzania who visited as Tanizania’s minister of works in 2011, John Atta Mills of Ghana, Joyce Banda of Malawi, Omar Bongo of Gabon, Mr Pascal Lissouba of Congo, Andre Kolimba of the Central African Republic Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, and Morgan Tsvangirai the former Prime Minister of Zimbabwe (Bebli, 2009; Mzaca, 2011; Udodiong, 2017). Others are Winnie Madikizela-Mandela of South Africa, South Africa’s King Goodwill Zwelithini of the Zulu Nation, King Koshi Kgabo Moloto of the Limpopo Kingdom, and South Africa’s opposition leader Julius Malema (SCOAN International, 2009; Mzaca, 2011; Udodiong, 2017). Oppah Muchinguri of Zimbabwe’s Zanu-PF politburo and Cuthbert Dube of Zimbabwe’s Football Association also visited T. B. Joshua for spiritual healing (Mzaca, 2011). Although beset with a controversial image at home, Pastor T. B. Joshua is widely honoured abroad by the presidents and national leaders of many countries in Africa and Latin America. Apart from receiving invites to grace presidential inauguration ceremony (Ogunlami, 2015), thrilled by God’s presence during his visit to the Synagogue Church, Lagos, ‘President Bongo sent a presidential jet to bring Prophet T. B. Joshua to Gabon, to pray for his country’ (SCOAN Church, 2009). It is worthy of mention that Pastor T. B. Joshua is often received at the airport by the presidents and top national leaders of countries inviting him abroad. Another major soft power resource of Pastor T. B. Joshua is his power of electoral prophetism. He accurately prophesized the electoral victory of a number of African presidents including Salva Kiir Mayardit of South Sudan (The Nation, 2020) and President John Atta Mills of Ghana who publicly

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proclaimed Pastor T. B. Joshua as his mentor and spiritual father (SCOAN Church, 2009). Suffice to say that the transnational acceptance of Pastor T.B. Josuha is not limited to Africa alone (Mwita, 2015). In 2016, Mayor Elías Cuba Bautista, the Mayor of La Victoria, Peru, dignified T. B. Joshua with the ‘key to the city’ of Lima while General Juan Gonzales Sandoval, the president of Peru’s Armed Forces presented T. B. Joshua with a ‘Medal of Honour’ (Emmanuel TV, 2016). Evidently, the regional acceptance of Pastor T. B. Joshua for his power of electoral prophetism, supernatural healing, and spiritual blessings validates the assertion that major Pentecostal leaders in Nigeria wield soft power influence that transcends the borders of Nigeria. As the study will later show, this holds significant implications for Nigeria’s global image and the assertion of its regional soft power status. Apart from their soft power prospects, the spiritual tourism potentials of the globalization of Nigeria’s major Pentecostal churches, their Christocharismatic personality and religious creative exports offer a viable opportunity for boasting Nigeria’s ailing tourism industry. For instance, while the Nigerian tourism industry has demonstrated a remarkable level of vulnerability to economic crunch, transnational audiences seeking spiritual answers to their obstinate challenges, career upliftment, supernatural breakthrough continue to influx Nigeria. Even during the heat of Covid-19 pandemic, travel restrictions could not pose adverse effect on Nigeria’s religious creative economy. This is because by appropriating the proceeds of digital information and communication technology, many Nigerian-initiated Pentecostal churches continue to receive national and foreign remittance of tithes, offerings and special seeds amidst the Covid-19 pandemic. Christo-Charismatic Celebrity Personalities By virtue of their overwhelming supernatural abilities to effect changes in the physical realm, phenomenal contributions to sustainable development, power of prophetic declaration and the demographics of their church size, Pastor E. A. Adeboye, Bishop Oyedepo, and others have emerged as Christian celebrity pastors who are very attractive and beloved for their unique celebrity posture and style. For instance, Pastor E. A. Adeboye is fondly revered and adored for his simplicity of dressing and the use of tambourine, his ‘Daddy GO’ alias and Christian cliché ‘can somebody shout hallelujah’. Pastor Adeboye is also adored for being very generous, humble and renowned globally. Bishop Oyedepo, fondly called ‘Papa’ or ‘Bishop’ is renowned for his white suits and shoes, red tie and a unique tone of making emphasis. Pastor T. B. Joshua is celebrated widely celebrated across Africa, South America and Europe for his healing power and humanitarian aids (BBC News, 2014)

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SOFT POWER INFLUENCE OF NIGERIA’S MAJOR PENTECOSTAL LEADERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR NIGERIA AND ITS REGIONAL POWER STATUS At the national level, leaders of Nigerian Pentecostal churches have wielded their soft power influence to Christianize the Nigerian politics and challenge the perceived Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony in the Nigerian public space (Obadare, 2006, 2018) awaken members to become active participants in the Nigerian public life by voting and embarking on social movements. Pastor Adeboye of the RCCG initiated the ‘Let my people vote’ political awareness campaign to awaken members to register and vote for righteous leaders, obtain their permanent voters card and join any political party of their choice (African Courier Media, 2021; Udodiong, 2018). Sequel to governmental failure in curtailing Boko-Haram insurgency and Fulani herdsmen rascality, in 2020, Pastor E. O. Adeboye, the General Overseer of the RCCG, leaders of other Pentecostal churches mobilized their members for a nationwide ‘Prayer Walk’ to protest incessant kidnapping, abduction, and killing of many Christians and non-Christians in Northern Nigeria (Ibirogba et al, 2020; Channels Television). In Kaduna State, thousands of Pentecostal Christians took to the street under the platform of the CAN to protest against the spate of killings by Boko-Haram insurgents. Protest was also held in Benue, Ekiti, Kogi, Ondo and Osun state (Ibirogba et al., 2020). On the regional font, the globalization of Nigeria’s major Pentecostal churches, transnational adulation, and consultation of Nigeria’s prominent Pentecostal leaders by presidents and national leaders of African countries holds significant foreign policy implications for Nigeria and its regional power status. First, these religious leaders and their globalized churches have helped to distinctly register Nigeria’s non-state presence and influence beyond the shores of its borders. Second, the export of Nigeria’s iconic Pentecostalism brand has helped to distinctly register Nigeria in positive light in Africa, South America and Europe. By implication, the religious soft power of Nigeria’s major Pentecostal leaders offers a viable and cost-effective tool for projecting a moderate image of Nigeria and countering stereotypes undermining the global image, regional reputation and the assertion of Nigeria’s regional power status. The patronage of Nigeria’s major Pentecostal leaders by incumbent presidents, presidential candidates and national leaders of South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, Gabon, and others epitomizes Nigeria’s leadership role as a big brother saddle with the task of advancing the course of the continent. Additionally, the regional and global expansion of Nigeria’s iconic Pentecostal brands and its influence on the Pentecostal landscape of states in different subregions in Africa where churches initiated, operated, or

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owned by Nigerians are the largest (Onongha, 2019: 371), which affirms that Nigeria’s hegemonic influence in the continent is not restricted to its hard power credentials alone. The global export and adulation of Nigeria’s iconic Pentecostalism brand reverses the age-long narrative that depicts the Global North as producers and the Global South as consumers of things originating from the Global North. It is evident from the aforementioned that Nigeria’s Pentecostalism export is a viable soft power resource for extending the good image and global admiration of Nigeria globally. CONCLUSION The study investigates the sources of the soft power wielded by major Pentecostal leaders in Nigeria and situated the implications for Nigeria and its regional power status. The study argues that the soft power influence of major Pentecostal leaders in Nigeria is rooted in the ability of astute Pentecostal leadership to use resources derived from non-state sources to address the fallouts of state failure and bad governance, their remarkable contributions to development, the demographical effects of their church membership, globalization of Nigerian Pentecostal churches and their proven power of electoral prophetism and spiritual healing. The study underscores that Nigeria’s major Pentecostal leaders have wielded their soft power influence to mobilize members from the pew to the poll and embark on social movement to demand social change. The study concludes by asserting that the global expansion and transnational acceptance of Nigeria’s iconic Pentecostalism brand and patronage of Nigeria’s Pentecostal leaders by political and traditional leaders of African states validate that Nigeria’s Pentecostalism is a non-state avenue for projecting a positive global image of Nigeria and asserting its regional power status. REFERENCES Aborisade, Sunday. 2021. “ICYMI: Senate probes works ministry over RCCG’s N145m road project”. Accessed March 14, 2021. https://punchng​ .com​ /senate​ -probes​-works​-ministry​-over​-rccgs​-n145m​-road​-project/ Adebumiti, Adelowo. 2019. “Lagos government lauds RCCG over school renovation”. Accessed October 2, 2020. https://guardian​.ng​/sunday​-magazine​/lagos​-government​-lauds​-rccg​-over​-school​-renovation/ Adeboye, Olufunke. 2020. A starving man cannot shout halleluyah’ African Pentecostal Churches and the challenge of promoting sustainable development”. In African initiated Christianity and the decolonisation of development: Sustainable

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Index

Abimbola, Adesoji, 77 Abrams, Ansari, 233–34, 247 Accra, 261–62 activism, 18 Adams, Yolanda, 238, 241 Adeboye, Enoch, 16, 62, 227, 275–80, 284 Adedeji, Joseph, 237–38, 260 Adefarasin, Paul, 240–42 Adegbite, Abdulateef, 189 Adegboyega, Kasali, 185, 190 Aden, 39 Adeniran, Tunde, 147 Adeogun, Adebowale, 259–61 Adeola, Oredola, 282 Adeoye, Ayodele, 260 adept, 37 adequate, 62 Aderibigbe, Ibigbolade, 1–2, 11 Adesoji, Abimbola, 229 Adetiba, Toyin, 7, 15–16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30 Adogame, Afe, 225, 278 Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), 60 Africa, vii–viii, 1–9, 11, 13, 15–18, 22, 24–30, 35–54, 56–57, 59–64, 74, 77–78, 80, 82, 84, 89, 92, 94–95, 98– 102, 104–5, 113, 116–21, 123–25,

129, 131–36, 141–42, 149, 152, 158, 167–70, 174, 176–79, 190, 198–204, 219, 223–25, 227, 229, 235–36, 239–40, 243–46, 257–58, 262–67, 269, 271, 277, 280, 282–85 African, 1–9, 11, 15–17, 23–27, 29–30, 35–40, 43, 53–54, 56–57, 59–61, 74, 82, 100–103, 111–13, 115–19, 121–29, 131–33, 135–36, 149, 153, 155–56, 158–59, 167–68, 176–79, 191–93, 197, 203, 223, 233–37, 239, 244, 246, 255, 258–60, 262–63, 266–68, 271, 283, 285 Afrobarometer, 131, 276, 280 Afrocentric, 148, 158, 167, 177, 179 Afrophobic, 235 Agbiji, Obaji, 49, 219, 225 Akintola, Olabanji, 157 Akinyemi, Bolaji, 149, 157, 190 Alao, Abiodun, 76, 78–79, 190 Algeria, 39, 119–20 Alhaji, 148 Ali, Iman, 70, 75, 83 Allison, Sola, 264 Almighty, 167 Aluko, Opeyemi, 10, 149, 156, 203–4, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, 264–65, 269 Anglican, Anglicanism, 10, 177, 196, 203–15, 224

291

292

Index

apartheid, 133 Apostle/apostles/apostolate/apostolic, 95, 97, 208, 224, 226, 228, 237 Appleby, 2, 92 aristocrats, 188 army, 60, 79 Assembly, 80, 96, 193, 226, 228, 240 asymmetrical, 246 asymmetry, 112, 173–74, 178–79, 209, 219, 257 Awolowo, Obafemi, 15, 238 Baba, Ara, 264 Babalola, Popoola, 281 Babangida, Ibrahim, 149, 194–96, 198 Babcock, 59, 177 Bacevich, Andrew J., 185 Bach, Daniel, 167, 179, 270 Badagry, 259 Bahrain, 72, 74 bail, 138–39 Bangladesh, 70, 159 Bangui, 103 Baptist, 177, 227, 229 Barbados, 244 Barnett, Michael, 58, 93 Bekkaoui, Khalid, 114–15 Belhaj, Abdessamad, 116 belie​fs/be​lief/​belie​ves/b​eliev​ed/be​lieve​ rs, 4, 6, 16–17, 24–26, 29, 30, 37–40, 43–44, 46–47, 49, 56, 58, 63, 79, 131, 148–52, 171–73, 185, 204, 206–7, 220, 223, 224, 227 Bello, Ahmadu, 15, 75, 156, 191–93 Beyoncé, 265, 267 Beyond, 1, 3, 236–37, 277–78, 280 Bible/Biblical, 154, 205, 207–9, 228, 262 borders, 3, 42, 47, 70, 116, 148, 160, 170, 175, 220, 284–85 Borno, 120, 187, 189 Boston, 3 boundaries, 42, 47, 234, 257, 265, 270 Brannagan, Oaul, 130 Brazil, 228, 245, 276

Britain/British, 39–41, 71, 119, 136, 153–54, 187, 194, 207, 230, 269, 282 Brooklyn, 238 Buhari, 82, 84, 120–21, 125, 155 Cage, Bryon, 238 Cairo, 15 Caleb, 243 caliph, 70 caliphate, 119–20, 169 camaraderie, 259 Cameroon, 16, 63, 82, 119 Cameroonian, 63, 168 Campbell, John, 79, 187, 189, 192, 197, 234, 236 Canada, 266 Cape, 176–77, 270 Capek, 71 Capital/capitalism, 9, 61, 114–18, 141, 148, 157, 161, 211, 240–41, 265, 278 Carr, Kurt, 238 Casablanca, 115, 123, 189, 191, 197–98, 221, 247, 262 Cathedral, 103, 228 Catholic/Catholics/Catholicism, 4, 41– 42, 53, 60–61, 69, 71, 91, 95–97, 99, 104, 105, 113, 134, 168, 173, 208, 224, 229, 277 ceremonies, 84, 94, 205, 258, 283 Chad, 16, 159–60 Chair, 92, 94, 98, 104 Chapels, 155 Chaplin, Jonathan, 69 charity/charities/charitable, 55, 61, 168, 278 Charles, 8–9, 69–70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 147–48, 150, 152, 154, 156, 158, 160 Chauvin, Derek, 246 chief, 129, 136 Christ/Christianity, 6, 25, 37, 39–40, 44, 47, 53, 56, 59–62, 82, 103, 135, 137–39, 141–42, 153–55, 157–59, 169, 171, 174–81, 192–94, 196–97,

Index

204–8, 213–14, 226, 229, 237, 239, 266 Church/churches, 4, 9–11, 35–37, 42– 42, 44, 48, 53, 57, 62, 95–99, 102, 134, 153, 168, 173, 175–79, 204–15, 222, 224–30, 237–41, 243–46, 266, 268, 270, 276–77, 279, 281–84, 286 Churchill, Winston S., 91 climate, 101 colonial/colonial/colonists, 1, 7, 15, 35–38, 40, 41, 43–49, 56–57, 61, 99, 119, 121, 124, 132–33, 136, 139, 153–54, 156, 187, 223, 258–59 commission, 179, 196, 206–8, 214 Commonwealth of Zion Assembly (COZA), 226, 240 communism, 92, 161, 237 community, 8–9, 24, 26–29, 37, 44, 48, 53–55, 57, 60, 94, 101, 103, 113, 119, 129, 131–42, 167, 204–5, 213, 220, 223–25, 230, 245, 280 Comoros, 95 Congo, 47, 60, 176, 283 congregation, 282 conservation/conservatism, 10, 25, 149, 151, 190–91, 194, 198, 205, 259 continental, 26, 35, 47, 168, 174, 262, 282 court, 135, 155, 176 covenant, 57, 177, 227 COVID, 28, 60, 100, 103, 213, 241, 284 creed, 8, 73, 75, 84, 148, 153, 159, 208 deconstruction, 112 De Gruchy, John, 69 Delhi, 244 democracies, 21, 24, 25, 186–87, 207 denominations, 57, 61, 105, 213, 238, 266 Deutsch, 186 Diocese/diocesan, 207, 210–12 diplomacy, 2–10, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 35–37, 41–46, 48–49, 74, 91–97, 99, 101, 103–5, 111, 113–14, 116, 118, 152, 159, 170, 173, 175,

293

177–79, 204, 209, 214, 219, 221, 223, 225, 227, 229, 233, 235, 237, 239, 241, 243, 245, 247–55 Donnie, McClurkin, 238, 241, 267 DSTV, 266 dual/dualistic, 37, 159 earth/earthly, 1, 98, 224–25, 229–30, 244 Eben, 239, 241 Ebola, 213 economic, vii, 7, 16, 21–23, 27, 35, 38, 41–46, 48–49, 58–59, 61–64, 93, 99, 118, 121, 130, 134, 142, 148, 153, 156, 172, 175, 192–94, 203, 205–7, 210–11, 213, 219, 222, 225–26, 230, 233, 236, 241, 245, 260, 270, 275, 277–78, 280, 282, 284 education, 1, 8, 10, 18, 20, 41, 46, 59–61, 177, 191, 210–12, 227, 237, 258–61, 264, 270, 280 egalitarian, 212 Egbu, Osinachi, 240, 242 Egypt, 25, 39, 101, 124, 158–59, 177, 191 Ekpo, Charles, 8–9, 69–70, 72, 74–76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 147–48, 150, 152–54, 156, 158, 160 Ekwutosi, Offiong, 8, 69–70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84 embassy, 75, 82–83, 97, 99, 157, 180, 194, 226, 230, 239, 266 enslavement, 236 environment, 20, 22–23, 26–27, 30, 37, 42, 45, 54, 62, 93, 102, 147–48, 150, 187, 196, 220, 223, 236 epidemics, 213 episcopal, 4, 212 ethnic/ethnics, 43, 45–48, 130–32, 139, 141, 187–88, 198, 220, 224–25, 239, 281 ethnicity, 150–51 ethno​/ethn​ograp​hic/e​thnog​raphy​/ethn​ omusi​colog​y/eth​no-re​ligio​us, 17, 38, 45, 47, 49, 137–38, 192, 234, 255, 257, 281

294

Index

Euro/Euro American/Eurocentric, 38, 40, 111–12, 171, 237, 239–40, 246, 265–66 eurozentrischen, 40 Eze, 240 Ezirim, Gerald, 167 Fabricius, Peter, 103 Facebook, 227, 266 faith/faith based, 6–7, 19, 24, 27–28, 43– 46, 48, 57, 59–63, 70, 92, 113, 116, 123, 149, 170, 172–78, 180, 188, 205–9, 221–30, 245, 266, 281–82 Falola, Toyin, 4, 153, 188 fanaticism, 64 Farka, Alli, 263 Farnham, 11 Fátima, Chimarizeni, 74 fatwas, 115 Feierstein, Gerald, 74 Feklyunina, Valentina, 131 Fela, Kuti, 235, 263 Folarin, Sheriff, 1, 9, 149, 167–68, 180, 190, 195 followers/followership, viii, 1, 24, 28, 30, 70, 76, 103–4, 118–19, 134, 179, 186, 197–98, 225, 257–58, 261, 264, 266, 268, 271, 282 foreign, viii, 1–7, 9–11, 16, 19–21, 23, 25, 27–30, 36, 39, 41, 44–45, 48, 58, 62, 69, 71–73, 76, 79, 83, 91–94, 96–97, 99, 104, 112–14, 116–17, 119–21, 123, 147–53, 159, 161, 167–69, 173–75, 177–80, 185–87, 190–98, 204, 219–22, 227, 230, 234–38, 240–41, 247, 257–58, 264– 65, 268–69, 276, 284–85 Fowler, Megan, 240, 243–44, 246, 268 Fox, Jonathan, 2–3, 6, 42, 45, 58, 151– 52, 170, 185–87, 203 fundamentalism/fundamentalist, 6, 63, 94, 103–4, 114, 123, 138, 141, 148, 150–52, 154, 158, 161, 167, 169, 174, 188, 203, 206, 209, 212–13, 220, 236, 264–65, 270

Gabon, 176, 283, 285 Gao, Hongzhi, 204 gatekeepers, 124 Gaudium, 96 gay, 159, 203, 213 gender, 7, 62, 151, 207, 212 geopolitics, 170, 180 George, 56, 176, 197, 205, 246, 267, 270, 283 Germany/Germans, 71, 91, 102, 104, 204, 258 Ghaddafi, Muammar, 195 Ghana, 15, 82, 132–33, 136, 142, 168, 176, 244, 261–62, 283, 285 Giangravé, Claire, 104 Gienow, Jessica, 234, 247 Glazier, Rebecca, 185 globalization, 11, 30, 39, 42, 170, 175, 220, 266–68, 275–76, 281–82, 284–86 Godfrey, Tim, 239–41, 261–62, 267 Godly, 207 Godman, Akinlabi, 277 gods, 58, 133 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 91 Gospel, 10, 44, 102, 176, 206, 208, 214, 223, 225, 228, 233–35, 238–44, 246– 48, 257–61, 265–67, 269, 271 government/governance, 1, 5, 7, 16, 18– 20, 24, 29–30, 35, 46–49, 54, 62–63, 70, 74, 77–80, 82–83, 99, 116–17, 120, 124, 133, 136, 141, 153–55, 157–60, 168–69, 174, 177–78, 191– 95, 203–5, 209–15, 219–20, 225–27, 230, 247, 264–65, 268–71, 277–78, 280, 286 Gulf, 72–74, 195 Gumi, Abubakar, 120 Hackett, Rossalind, 135 Hadden, Jeffrey, 2 Hajj, 75, 193 Hakeem, Onapajo, 9, 76, 185 Hatzopoulos, Pavlos, 3, 150 Hausa, 75, 137–38, 153, 159, 187, 285

Index

Haynes, Jeffrey, vii, 2–5, 37, 42, 44, 46, 58, 69, 150–51, 168–70, 172–74, 185, 205–7, 209, 220, 277 health/healthcare, 10, 44, 54, 56, 59–61, 63, 205, 210–14, 227, 245–46, 277–80 Heaton, Matthew, 153 heaven, 205, 207, 244 hegemon/hegemonic/hegemony, 74, 99, 168–69, 174–75, 197, 261, 285–86 Hegghammer, Thomas, 74 height, 194, 243 Hendrik, Ohnesorge, 8, 91–92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104 Henry, Orombi, 207 heritage, 69, 71, 208, 265, 269 heterodox, 79 heuristic, 169 Hezbollah, 73–74, 77, 173 Hezekiah, 238 Hierarchies, 204 Hinkel, Tomas, 132–33, 136 Hinn, Benny, 244 Hisbah, 155 Hixson, Walter L., 234, 236 Hizbullah, 77 Hlaloua, 115, 117 Hlaoua, Aziz, 115–16 homogeneity/homogenizing, 25, 159 homosexuality/homosexuals, 173, 203 Houghton, Israel, 238, 240 Howard, Peter, 60, 197 humanist/humanitarian/humanitarian, 48, 61, 168, 179, 212, 278, 284 Huntington, Samuel, 2, 46–47, 58, 69, 150–51, 153 Ibadan, 161, 279–80 Ibikunle, Adeakin, 75 Ibrahim, Gambari, 75, 79, 119, 122, 124, 129, 132–34, 149, 154–55, 189, 195, 247, 262 Idang, Gordon, 148 ideal/idealism/idealistic, 9, 16, 21, 43, 149, 219

295

ideally, 225 ideational, 8, 113, 117, 174 ideological, 17, 38, 49, 75, 150, 153, 168, 195, 198, 236 Idowu, Dare, 10–11, 203–4, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, 233–36, 238, 240–42, 244, 246, 259, 262, 275–76, 278, 280, 282, 284, 286 Ihonvbere, Julius, 167 Ijimakinwa, Samuel, 136 Ijma, 188 Ilesanmi, Simeon, 193 indigenous, 15, 37–38, 133, 136, 142, 221, 223, 227, 240, 263, 269 indigent, 280 indirect, 8, 73, 136, 154, 187 indoctrinating/indoctrination, 38, 63 Indonesia, 42, 159, 228 Islam, 1, 8–10, 15, 37, 39, 42, 44, 47, 49, 53, 70–72, 74–76, 78, 113–16, 118–20, 122–25, 132–34, 148, 152– 54, 156–57, 160, 168–69, 172, 180, 185–98, 275–77 Israeli, 77, 82, 157–58, 193–95 iyanu, 262–63, 267 Izala, 124, 188 Jadiel, 239 jailing, 79 Jaja, 167 Jakes, 260 Jalingo, 196 Jama, 78, 188 Japan, 29, 258 Jenn, Johnson, 238 Jerusalem, 157, 193, 195, 209–10, 224 Jerusalema, 235 JerusalemaDanceChallenge, 235 jihad/jihadism, 75, 118–19, 192 Joshua, Temitope, 175, 178–80, 275, 282–84 Kaczmarska, 130 Kadri, Hichem, 42 Kaduna, 79, 155, 196, 213, 285

296

Index

Kafanchan, 196 Kalu, 240, 242 Kampala, 228 Kane, 75–76, 78–79, 82 Kangemi, 102 Kano, 59, 76–79, 82, 120, 155, 189, 191, 196, 204 Kante, Mori, 263 Kanu, Macaulauy, 22 Kanuri, 153, 187 Kaoma, Kapya, 35 Klerk, 133 Kogi, 285 Kolawole, Dipo, 190 Kuti, Fela, 235, 263 Kuwait, 72, 74 Kwame, Nkrumah, 15, 40 Kwara, 213 Kwashi, Benjamin A., 210 labour, 102, 212 lacuna, 70 Lagos, 77, 136, 157, 188, 228, 240–42, 247, 257, 259, 261–63, 265, 267–69, 271, 277, 279–80, 283, 286 Laitin, David, 64 laity, 209 Lambeth, 205 Lassa, 213 launder, 77, 170 Lee, Cassanelli, 185 lesbianism, 213 Lesotho, 60, 142 Liberalism/liberally/liberate, 21, 24, 155, 158, 167 Libyan, 195 Limpopo, 176, 283 Lin, Leo, 22 Lincoln, Bruce, 151 Lindhardt, Martin, 225 Linkowski, 243 liturgy, 266, 271 localization/localization, 262–63, 270 Love World, 239

MacDonald, Paul, 111–12, 117 Magbadelo, 225 Maghraoui, Driss, 114–15 Maharashtra, 244 Mahiet, 234, 247 Mahler, Gregory, 194 Mahmud, Ahmad, 191 Maiduguri, 82 Maier, Karl, 75, 79 Makhubela, Lucas, 129, 135 Malawi, 142, 176, 283 Malaysia, 159 Malema, Julius, 176, 283 Mali, 16, 45, 60, 116–17, 121, 132, 136, 138, 142 Mandefro, Hone, 132–33, 136 Mandela, Nelson, 15, 133, 283 Mapfumo, Thomas, 263 Maroc, 118 Marshall, Katherine, 56–57, 173, 175 Marxian, 224 Marxist, 92 Matthiesen, Toby, 74 Mcdermott, Rose, 23 McDonald, John, 18 McDougall, Walter, 69 McDowell, 238, 241, 243, 267 Mearsheimer, John, 111 Methodist, 224, 229 methodological, 4, 205 methodology, 2 methods, 17–18, 38, 44, 151, 178, 260 microcosm, 234 microstates, 112 milieu, 147, 188–89, 277 Milwaukee, 246 ministries, 10, 226, 228 miracle, 176, 225–27, 266 mission/missionaries, 39–40, 55–57, 59–61, 95, 116, 153–54, 159, 174, 177, 188, 192, 207, 210, 223–25, 229, 259 Missouri, 245

Index

Mlambo, Victor, 7, 35–36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48 mobility/mobilize/mobilization, 46, 53, 112, 149, 206–7 modernity/modernization, 2, 29, 37–38, 44, 46, 49, 58, 71, 169–70, 186, 229 Mohamed, El-Katiri, 204 Mohammad, Nafissi, 71–72 monarchy, 71, 132 moralist, 9 Morocco, 6, 8, 16, 39, 44, 101, 111, 113–25, 276–77 Moslem, 204 movement/movements, 9, 24, 30, 48, 56, 58, 73, 74, 77–78, 114, 120, 157, 173, 180, 189, 209, 213–14, 224, 260–61, 266, 269, 281, 285–86 moves/moving, 18, 70, 99, 229 Mozambican, 103 Mozambique, 60, 101, 103, 142 Muammar, Ghaddafi, 195 Mubangizi, Odomaro, 101 Mubashir, Mir, 179 Muhammadu, Buhari, 82, 155 Mullahs, 71–72, 78 Multichoice, 266 multinational, 19, 35–36, 151, 160 multiparty, 35 Muminiin, 123 Munizi, Martha, 238 Munro, Dana, 97 Murray, Donette, 71 Muslim, viii, 9–11, 25, 43, 60, 70, 72, 75–77, 83, 103, 124, 133–42, 154– 59, 169, 186, 188–89, 191–98, 285 Naira, 154, 179 Nairobi, 102, 209 narrative/narratives, 15, 36, 40, 99, 115, 117, 124, 131–32, 138, 140, 170, 225, 229, 235, 239, 270–71, 286 Nasir, 188 nationalism/nationalist/nations, 41–42, 150, 167, 170, 190–92, 224 Nel, 169

297

neutrality, 157–58 Nigeria, 1, 3–5, 7–11, 15–16, 24, 26, 28, 42, 47, 56, 59, 62, 69–70, 74–84, 111, 113, 116–25, 133, 135–36, 142–45, 147–49, 151–61, 167–71, 173–81, 185–205, 207, 209–15, 219– 21, 223–30, 234–35, 237–41, 243, 245–47, 257–61, 263–71, 275–86 nonstate, 9, 17, 168, 220, 247 Norris, Pippa, 172 Nye, Joseph, viii, 15, 17, 20, 41, 93, 112–13, 129–31, 133, 135, 137, 139, 141–42, 152, 168–69, 180, 206, 220, 222, 224, 235–36, 242, 264–65, 269, 276 Obadare, Ebenezer, 3, 11, 70, 275–76, 238–39, 260, 285 Obama, Barak, H., 5, 15, 97 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 155, 159, 197, 211, 281 Ogbonna, Confidence, 3, 9, 11, 167–68 Ogunnubi, Olusola, 1, 6–7, 9–11, 35, 40–41, 149, 156, 159, 167–68, 173– 74, 176, 178, 206, 233, 235, 257, 264–65, 268–70, 275 Ohnesorge, Hendrik, 8, 91–94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104 Onapajo, Hakeem, 9, 76, 185, 188, 196 Onongha, Kelvin, 278, 282, 286 Ostovar, Afshon, 70, 73–74 Oxford, 161, 271 Oyewole, Samuel, 6, 74, 84, 190 Pahlavi, 71 paid, 2, 9, 96, 102, 170, 191, 280 Pakistan, 70, 72, 78, 159, 191 Palestine, 134, 194–95 pandemic, 28, 60, 100, 103, 213, 243, 245–47, 268, 284 papal, 8, 92, 96–97, 99, 102–4 pastor/pastoral/pastorpreneurs, 5, 6, 9, 24, 96, 133, 152, 168–70, 175–80, 211, 229, 239–42, 270, 275, 277–85 peace building, 129, 136, 141–42

298

Index

peaceful, 8, 19, 22, 26–28, 76, 118–19, 135, 212 pedagogy, 211 Pentecostalism/pentecost, 3–6, 11, 43, 174, 214, 224–25, 260–61, 270, 275, 282, 285–86 performance, 129, 225, 227, 260, 267 pilgrim, 154, 160 Pilgrimage/pilgrims, 119, 154, 160, 175–76, 180, 191, 193–94, 203, 221, 224, 227 Pogoson, Irene, 10, 219–20, 222, 224, 226, 228, 230 Poland, 92 Polish, 104 politicization, 20, 161 politicking, 203 politics, vii–viii, 1–5, 7–11, 17, 35–36, 38, 40–45, 48, 54, 58–59, 64, 69, 72–73, 78, 83–84, 93–95, 102, 111–12, 114, 130, 132, 148, 151–52, 156, 161, 169, 172–75, 180, 185–90, 192–94, 196, 198–205, 207, 210–11, 213–15, 219–22, 224, 257, 268–69, 271, 275, 285 polytheism, 188 pomerium, 97 postcolonial, 111, 148 Potz, Maciej, 69–70 powerhood, 168 pragmatic, 138, 161, 175, 195, 198 Procurement, 279–80 Protestantism/protestant, 53, 59, 61–63, 98, 168, 204, 207, 209 protested, 71 Qadiriyya, 117–19, 122, 188 Qaeda, viii, 2, 173 Qassem, Suleimani, 74, 80 Qatar, 4, 72, 74, 276 qualitative, 17, 36, 129, 137 quantitative, 2, 17 Rabat, 121–24 radical/radicalisation, 11, 56, 75, 84, 114, 116, 120, 149, 191

Rahman, 148–49, 159 Ramel, Federic, 234, 236 Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), 5, 62, 175, 177, 226, 230, 239, 266, 278–82, 285 regional/regionalism, 5, 36, 42, 74, 120, 158–59, 167–68, 174–75, 198, 237, 275–77, 284–86 relational, 27, 29, 92, 130–31 religion/religionization/religiosity, 1–11, 15–30, 35–53, 58–59, 61–62, 64, 69–72, 74, 91, 103, 111–13, 115, 117–19, 121, 123–25, 129, 131–32, 147–52, 155–61, 168–75, 185–86, 219–27, 230, 257, 276–77, 281 rights/righteous, vii, 30, 35, 46, 59–60, 64, 76, 78, 80–81, 102, 159, 161, 194, 204, 209–10, 212–13, 219, 227, 230, 236, 255, 285 SA, 176 sacramental, 208 sacred, 57, 102, 121, 154–55, 172 Sadat, 19 Safavids, 71 saga, 83 Saharan/Sahara, 4, 25, 35, 39, 42, 46, 59, 117, 120–21, 124–25, 195, 267 Saheed, 83 Sahel, 47 Salafism, 119–20 sectarian, 30, 73, 102, 198 secularity, 16, 23–24, 214 secularization/secularism, 2, 11, 44–45, 49, 53–54, 58–59, 64, 169, 185–86, 220 sermons, 115, 131, 260, 277 service/services, 54–55, 59–61, 63–64, 82–83, 134, 174, 179, 225–26, 230, 240, 278, 280, 282–83 Shiism/Shiite, 70–72, 74–75, 77–80, 84, 115 soft power, 1, 3, 9, 11, 15, 17, 21, 25–27, 30, 36–38, 40–42, 44–45, 54, 55, 57–59, 61, 63, 69, 72–75, 77–78, 80–84, 92–95, 97–99, 101–3, 105,

Index

111–13, 115–17, 119–21, 123–25, 129–31, 133–35, 137–42, 151–52, 156, 159–61, 167–71, 173–75, 177, 179, 203, 205–7, 209–14, 219, 221– 23, 230–37, 240, 242–43, 246–47, 257–58, 263–65, 268–71, 275–77, 279–85 Sokoto, 76, 79, 119, 187, 189, 191 spiritual/spiritualities/spirituality, 17, 36–40, 53–54, 57, 61–62, 95, 97, 114, 118, 129, 133, 151, 172, 174– 80, 185, 189, 214, 225–26, 229, 237, 276–77, 280–81, 283–84, 286 systemic, 18, 23, 25, 236, 246 systems, 8, 18, 35, 38, 40–41, 46–48, 70, 92, 112 televangelist, 176, 244 Tella, Oluwaseun, 130, 168, 173–74, 265, 269 terrorism, 43, 48, 64, 80, 97, 160, 170, 173, 214, 235 theological/theology, 4, 58, 61, 170, 175, 185, 206 Tidjaniyya, 117–19, 122

299

tradoreligious, 131, 135 transnationalism, 42 Twiplomacy, 104 Ubuntu, 26 utilitarian, 195, 198 Vatican, 41, 95–97, 99–101, 105, 175 virus, 241, 245–46 Wahab, Haris, 53 Wahhabism, 78, 115, 119–20, 180 Wainscott, Anne Marie, 114–17, 120 Westminster/Westphalian, 94, 149, 154, 187, 204, 220 Whitmore, Laura, 243, 255 xenophobia/xenophobic, 46 Yagboyaju, Dhikru, 43 Yoruba, 26, 189, 239, 262 Zimbabwe, 142, 167, 283 Zwelithini, Goodwill, 176, 283

About the Contributors

El-Fatih Abdullahi Abdelsalam is professor in the Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), since 2008. He obtained B.Sc. and M.Sc. from Khartoum University and M.A. and PhD from Northwestern University, USA. He has taught political science in various institutes, universities and military academies. He has many publications: chapters in books, articles in refereed journals, and has edited, co-edited, authored and co-authored a number of books. His areas of specialization include contemporary Islamic political thought, foreign policy decisionmaking, conflict resolution, Middle Eastern politics and comparative politics. Toyin Cotties Adetiba is a senior lecturer at the Department of Political and International Studies, University of Zululand. He holds a PhD in social sciences (development studies) with a specialization in ‘Ethnic Politics’ from the University of Fort Hare, South Africa. His research interests include among others the broad field of political science, international relations, conflict resolution, military in politics, [public] diplomacy. Adetiba has published extensively in accredited peer-reviewed journals and book chapters and co-authored a book. He is a member of the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS), International Society for Development and Sustainability (ISDS), Society for the Study of International Relations and Strategic Studies (SSIRSS). ORCID: https://orcid​.org​/0000​-0002​-0414​-9289 Opeyemi Idowu Aluko (PhD) is a lecturer in the Political Science Department, Ajayi Crowther University Oyo State Nigeria. He is a proficient scholar in the field of political science: comparative politics with focus on urban violence studies, election violence studies among others. He has published over eighty papers in credible outlet in both national and international levels. 301

302

About the Contributors

Oladotun E. Awosusi teaches international relations and strategic studies at Legacy University, The Gambia. He holds MA (Hons) in history and strategic studies and BA (Hons) in history and international studies from University of Lagos and Ekiti State University, Nigeria, respectively. He has published several articles in reputable international journals. His research interest covers: African geopolitics, border diplomacy/studies, peace and strategic/ security studies. Surulola Eke is a Banting Fellow at Queen’s University, Canada. His research straddles international relations and comparative politics. Specifically, Dr Eke is interested in ethnic conflict analysis, natural resources conflicts, terrorism and peacebuilding. His academic papers on these themes have been published by Third World Quarterly, Journal of Global Security Studies, Peace Research, etc. His current research projects include the spatial variation of autochthonous conflicts and the spatial intensity variation of farmer–herder conflicts in West Africa. Charles E. Ekpo teaches peace and conflict resolution at the Arthur Jarvis University, Akpabuyo, Nigeria. He holds an M.A. degree in peace and conflict studies from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He is a member of the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN) and the Society for Peace Studies and Practice (SPSP). His researches revolve around African history; security, peace and conflict studies; and politicization. Sheriff Folarin (PhD International Relations) is professor of International Relations at Covenant University and visiting scholar of political science at Texas State University. He is, among others, a 2007 SUSI scholar and visiting fellow at the Walker Institute of International and Area Studies (WIIAS) University of South Carolina; 2013 Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Programme (host) scholar; a two-time visiting scholar at the Ithaca College in New York; and currently a visiting professor at the University of Rwanda; a member of faculty of the Ife Institute of Advanced Studies (IIAS) at Obafemi Awolowo University; and a UNODC Education for Justice (E4J) specialist. His foreign policy research focuses on Nigeria, sub-Saharan Africa, the United States, and Europe; and his current research areas, include health diplomacy/governance, religion as a soft power dynamic in Nigerian foreign policy, gender and development, and e-governance. Dare Leke Idowu is an assistant lecturer in the political science and international relations programmes of Bowen University, Iwo, Nigeria. He holds a B.Sc. Ed. and M.Sc. in political science from Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria. His research interests are cultural diplomacy, peace and conflict

About the Contributors

303

studies, religion and politics, democratization, gender and social movements in Africa. Joseph Kunnuji PhD, is senior lecturer in ethnomusicology and African musics at the Odeion School of Music (OSM), University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, Free State, South Africa. He holds a doctorate from the South African College of Music (SACM), University of Cape Town, South Africa. Following his bachelor’s degrees in Sociology and Music, Kunnuji found a meeting point of both fields in ethnomusicology. His research interests centre on marginal musical practices and the reimagining of African musical heritage. His career combines teaching, research, and performing, all underscored by a passion for broadly sharing his musical discoveries. He leads the Jo Kunnuji Experiment, an African-jazz ensemble, which incorporates jazz harmony in creating a contemporary Ogu style with a wide appeal locally and beyond. Victor H. Mlambo is a Lecturer at the University of Johannesburg, School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy. Victor’s research interests include Conflict and Migration Studies; Political Geography; Regionalism; Security Studies. Ekwutosi E. Offiong, PhD, is an associate professor in the Department of History and International Studies, University of Calabar, Nigeria. She is a fellow of the UNESCO fellowship programme at Maria Grzegorzewska University. She was acting dean of student affairs, Federal University Lafia, Nigeria, between 2015 and 2016. She is a member of Historical Society of Nigeria and has supervised several undergraduate and postgraduate theses and dissertations. Her current research is on church and social history. Confidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna is a lecturer with Evangel University Akaeze, Ebonyi State, and also a doctoral candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He specializes on comparative politics, with more research focus on power (soft power), hegemony, terrorism, Pentecostalism, democratic consolidation, among others. He has several book chapters and has published in Covenant University Journal of Politics & International Affair, Small Wars and Insurgency, African Security, Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation. Maduabuchi Ogidi has a PhD in political science from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He is a senior lecturer and head of the Department of Civic and Social Issues, School of General Studies, Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education, Owerri. His research interests include political theory and development, international politics and governance.

304

About the Contributors

Michael Ihuoma Ogu is a faculty and researcher with the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Babcock University in Nigeria. He is also a recipient of the William J. Fulbright Scholar-InResidence Fellowship Award. He has over a decade of university teaching experience in Nigeria and the United States , and his areas of core research interest are in international relations, governance and security studies. He has authored several peer-reviewed publications as both scholarly journal articles and book chapters. Olusola Ogunnubi is a research fellow at the Centre for Gender and African Studies based at the University of the Free State, South Africa and researcher at Carleton University, Ottawa. Previous, he held lectureship position at the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal between 2011 and 2014. His research interests include regional power studies, comparative foreign policy and African soft power. He has published in several journals including Politikon, South African Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Global Society, Journal of Developing Societies, International Journal of Culture, Politics and Society, Politiea, and Insight on Africa. While at Carleton, his research will focus on the theme of soft power and regional hegemony in Africa while also considering the analytical depth of the soft power variable. Hendrik W. Ohnesorge is managing director of the Center for Global Studies (CGS) and research fellow at the Chair in International Relations at the University of Bonn (Germany). He holds a bachelor’s degree in ‘Politics and Law’ from the University of Münster and a master’s degree in ‘German, European, and Global Politics’ from the University of Bonn. In 2011/12, he studied abroad at the University of Southampton (UK), and in 2017, he was visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, USA. In 2019, Dr Ohnesorge obtained his doctorate from the University of Bonn. His research interests include soft power, personal and public diplomacy, U.S. foreign policy and transatlantic relations, and the influence of individual decision-makers on international politics and history. His most recent books include Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations (2020) and Der Faktor Persönlichkeit in der internationalen Politik: Perspektiven aus Wissenschaft, Politik und Journalismus (coedited with Xuewu Gu; 2021). Hakeem Onapajo is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Nile University of Nigeria, Abuja, and the editor-in-chief of Nile Journal of Political Science. He holds a PhD in political

About the Contributors

305

science from the University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa. Dr Onapajo was a post-doctoral fellow at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Zululand, South Africa. He has also lectured at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Dr Onapajo researches in the areas of conflict and terrorism and elections and democratization in Africa. His publications particularly on the Boko Haram conflict are recognized as special contributions to research on the conflict and appear in reputable international journals and other publishing outlets. Irene Pogoson is, currently, a professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan. Before joining the University of Ibadan in 2000, Dr Pogoson worked, as a research fellow/administrative secretary with the Presidential Panel on Nigeria Since Independence History Project. Between 2005 and 2007, Prof Pogoson served as a policy analyst on governance with the Independent Policy Group, Abuja, a Policy Think–Tank, for President Olusegun Obasanjo. Prof. Pogoson is a member of a number of learned societies and organizations. She was on the Ibrahim Index Advisory Council of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) of the MO Ibrahim Foundation and a member of the Scientific Committee of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Her research interests are in international relations, with particular focus on foreign policy analysis, strategic studies, governance issues and gender studies. Mathieu Rowsell is currently a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Ottawa. His research interests include African foreign policy studies, religious diplomacy, political Islam and international political sociology. Currently, he is writing his thesis on Morocco’s religious diplomacy towards the African continent. He spent a year (2018–2019) in Morocco and Senegal to do his fieldwork where he conducted many interviews with key religious, political and diplomatic actors. Abubakar Usman is a researcher affiliated with the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), National University Malaysia (UKM). He obtained B.Sc. from Bayero University Kano (BUK), M.Sc. from the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), and PhD from the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS) National University Malaysia (UKM). He has published articles in various refereed journals and book chapters. His areas of specialization include globalization and development, violent extremism, foreign policy, Islam and politics, diplomacy, political discourse, social movement and developmental studies.